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**DISSENT, ETHNONATIONALISM, AND
THE POLITICS OF COERCION IN THE USSR**

by

JOHN S. JAWORSKY, M.A.

**A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of**

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Political Science

Carleton University

Ottawa, Ontario

16 March 1990

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COERCION IN THE U.S.S.R."

submitted by
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in partial fulfilment of the requirements
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ABSTRACT

In multinational states dominant political elites use a variety of means to prevent or forestall the actual or potential mobilization of politicized ethnicity to challenge existing ethnonational patterns of authority. However, the use of coercion, or the threat of coercion, against those who challenge the ethnonational status quo, remains an important component of state policy, especially in centralized, authoritarian states.

This thesis examines and analyzes the linkage between nationality policy and policy towards dissent in the Soviet Union, with the aim of evaluating the role of state-sanctioned coercion in preventing or containing the activity of ethnonational activists. It addresses the following questions:

- i) What was the salience of ethnonational grievances as a motivating factor in dissent activity in the Soviet Union?
- ii) What was the pattern of state repression of dissidents and specifically, those individuals who were tried and sentenced to imprisonment for national rights activity?
- iii) Did this pattern of repression reflect dominant political elite concerns about the actual or potential threat posed by ethnonationalism to the stability and integrity of the Soviet Union?

The Soviet penal system provided a unique setting in which dissidents from a wide variety of backgrounds interacted over lengthy periods of time. Thus an examination of these individuals' interactions and political behaviour in this micro-

environment, with an emphasis on the period between 1965 and 1985, provides important information on the salience of ethnonationalism as an issue of concern to those who were imprisoned for their political activities, and on its influence on the nature and pattern of their interactions and activities while in detention.

Since a substantial number of the Soviet political prisoners detained during this period were arrested and sentenced as early as 1945, and since a discussion of any aspect of the "national question" in the Soviet Union requires a good grounding in its historical context, considerable attention is also devoted to the way in which Soviet nationality policy was reflected in the Soviet penal system between 1945 and 1965.

This dissertation demonstrates that, after World War II, those arrested and sentenced primarily for their national rights activities clearly comprised the largest single identifiable category of "politicals" detained in Soviet penal institutions. They were punished with particularly harsh sentences, and continued to be severely harassed and intimidated when released from imprisonment. Ethnonational background was the most important criterion leading to the formation of informal groups among political prisoners, and largely dictated the nature of their interpersonal relations and political cooperation.

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Coercion, Dissent and Ethnonationalism

Coercion -- the threat and use of violence -- is and always has been the ultima ratio regnum. This is not to say that government elites rule necessarily by force. Fostering internal political consensus and acceptance of a political system's claim to legitimacy are vitally important mechanisms of rule, for freely given consent is more reliable, and less costly, than consent given under duress.

However, all ruling political elites organize and deploy the means of coercion in the face of internal and external challenges, and usually establish and consolidate rule over the state's territory by the successful use of force: by revolution; by suppressing rebellions and secessions; and by forcibly subordinating and integrating neighbouring peoples, aboriginal groups, religious minorities, rebellious social groups, etc.¹

After they have consolidated their rule, dominant political elites make a strong effort to entrench and maintain those patterns of authority (political, class, and ethnonational) which, in their opinion, provide for the greatest degree of socio-

¹This line of argument is developed in Ted Robert Gurr, "The Political Origins of State Violence and Terror: A Theoretical Analysis," in M. Stohl and G.A. Lopez, eds., Government Violence and Repression: An Agenda for Research (New York: Greenwood, 1986), pp. 45-71.

political stability.² This involves containing or preventing activities which, in the eyes of these elites, pose an actual or potential threat to the stability of the state. In the case of a multinational state, in which the centrifugal forces of ethnonationalism pose a constant threat to the state's stability and integrity, this includes "managing," through a combination of strategies of co-optation, concessions and control, the challenge posed by the political mobilization of ethnicity.

The dominant political elites in multinational states can promote programs of political socialization designed to entrench and strengthen existing ethnonational patterns of authority, design sophisticated personnel policies to achieve the same end, introduce decentralized forms of federalism to satisfy restive ethnonational groups, etc. However, the use of coercion or the threat of coercion, against those who challenge the existing ethnonational patterns of authority, remains an important component of state policy, especially in centralized states with an authoritarian form of government.

Despite considerable variations in the level of state-sanctioned coercion in the Soviet Union between 1945 and 1985, during this period the Soviet Union readily fitted the definition of a centralized authoritarian state. Certainly, coercion was used on a massive scale during the Stalinist period in an attempt to "transform" society, and to eliminate real or imagined enemies of the new socio-political order. Coercion was applied more selectively after Stalin's death; however, until the late 1980s the key figures among Soviet dissidents were systematically harassed, and if

²On the concept of "patterns of authority" and the way in which political analysis can be equated with the study of authority patterns in various sectors of society see Harry Eckstein and Ted Robert Gurr, Patterns of Authority: A Structural Basis for Political Inquiry (New York: John Wiley, 1975), Part I.

they persisted in their activities they were almost invariably sentenced by Soviet courts to various terms and forms of penal detention or, in some cases, were expelled from the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union is also a classic example of a multinational polity, and there has been a great deal of speculation about the extent of the threat which ethnonationalism has posed to the stability and integrity of the USSR. If the threat was real, or was perceived to be real by the central leadership during the period under consideration, then one would expect activists in national rights movements to have become a significant target of state coercion.

However, there has been little consistent, systematic research on the pattern of measures taken by the coercive organs of the Soviet state to deal with the individuals who were most open and persistent in articulating political grievances through unofficial (non-state-recognized) channels.³ Research on this pattern of coercion is potentially quite illuminating, for as a prominent former Soviet dissident pointed out in an article written when he was imprisoned in 1974,

One should note that in the conditions of a closed society, whose self-appointed leaders try to impose on the world the concept of the "moral-political unity of the Soviet people", oppositionist activity within the USSR is carefully concealed from the Soviet and foreign publics. Thus it may be that the sole real indicator of the scope of an oppositionist movement in any given republic is the level of repression which it encounters.⁴

³There has been a general neglect, in the political science literature, of the study of the use of police forces and other forms of coercion as a central mechanism by which political elites protect their interests and maintain control over society. See the commentary on this issue, and a review of some relevant recent literature, in Otwin M. Jenin, "Police Performance and State Rule: Control and Autonomy in the Exercise of Coercion," Comparative Politics 18 (October 1985): 101-122.

⁴Viacheslav Chornovil, in Viacheslav Chornovil and Boris Penson, Daily Life in a Correction Colony in Soviet Mordovia, Soviet Institutions Series, Paper No. 3 (Jerusalem: The Soviet and East European Research Centre, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1975), p. 23. Unless indicated otherwise, I am responsible for all translations from non-English-language texts.

The purpose of this thesis is thus to examine and analyze the linkage between nationality policy and policy towards dissent in the Soviet Union, and evaluate the role of state-sanctioned coercion in maintaining the dominant ethnonational patterns of authority in Soviet society, 1945-1985, with an emphasis on the treatment of dissidents between 1965 and 1985. This study will address the following questions:

- i) What was the salience of ethnonational grievances as a motivating factor in dissent activity in the Soviet Union?
- ii) What was the pattern of state repression of dissidents and specifically, those individuals who were tried and sentenced to imprisonment for national rights activity?
- iii) Did this pattern of repression reflect dominant political elite concerns about the actual or potential threat posed by ethnonationalism to the stability and integrity of the Soviet Union?

The thesis will also address another significant issue. According to some analysts, important intrinsic constraints seriously hampered the political mobilization of ethnonationalism in the Soviet Union in the post-Stalin period. For example, it has been pointed out that there was no single overriding cleavage on which such mobilization might centre:

The issues that pit the interests of Russians against those of the non-Russian nationalities form only a small part of a much larger spectrum. Divergent historical and political experiences have shaped the attitudes of different non-Russian nationalities toward the Russians; for some, the Russians represent allies or protectors against traditional enemies. In other cases, regions and republics compete over the allocation of resources. And even within the same national republic, ethnic communities may be divided over key issues, such as the

importance and value of religious traditions or the desirability of further modernization, with its attendant Russification, for example. The dissident groups themselves are internally divided; Jewish and Ukrainian activists have more than once accused the civil rights movement of being insufficiently concerned with the national question, while Russian nationalists hold widely divergent views about the costs and benefits of empire. Thus, the existence of multiple cross-cutting cleavages that are not cumulative and mutually reinforcing constitutes a major asset for the regime in the management of ethnic relations.⁵

In addition, it has been pointed out that Soviet dissident activists were often ignorant of dissent activity in groups other than the one they belonged to. According to Ludmilla Alexeyeva, a prominent Soviet human rights activist and chronicler of the Soviet civil rights movement:

Both national and religious movements have had some success in working out an ideology, in consolidating their supporters, and in creating an organizational structure... Yet despite their commonality and the fact that the formation of a coalition would strengthen their chances for success, there are almost no connections among the dissenting movements... The nationalist and religious movements lack information about each other... Thus Lithuanians may be aware of their own national and religious problems, yet know nothing about the problems of Ukrainians, even though they resemble their own.⁶

However, the Soviet penal system provided a unique setting in which dissidents from a wide variety of backgrounds interacted over lengthy periods of time. Thus an examination of these individuals' interactions and political behaviour in this microenvironment, with an emphasis on the period between 1965 and 1985, will provide important information on the salience of ethnonationalism as an issue of

⁵Gail Warshofsky Lapidus, "Ethnonationalism and Political Stability: The Soviet Case," World Politics 36 (July 1984): 557.

⁶Ludmilla Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious, and Human Rights (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1985), pp. 8-9.

concern to those who were imprisoned for their political activities, and its influence on the nature and pattern of their interaction and activities while in detention.

The main focus of the thesis will be on the period between 1965 and 1985. However, since a substantial number of the Soviet political prisoners detained during this period were arrested and sentenced as early as 1945, and since a discussion of any aspect of the "national question" in the Soviet Union requires a good grounding in its historical context, considerable attention will also be devoted to the way in which Soviet nationality policy was reflected in the Soviet penal system between 1945 and 1965.

Review of Literature

After World War II, and until the end of the period under consideration in the thesis, official pronouncements by party and state leaders in the USSR about domestic ethnonational issues were primarily normative and exhortative in nature. In the "propaganda of success" tradition, the themes which were emphasized were the harmony of the Soviet peoples and, especially in the early 1960s, their gradual convergence towards a single internationalist unity, the "new historical community of people -- the Soviet people." Emphasis on the theme of the "merger" of nations varied over time, but official policy statements usually claimed that problems in the field of nationality relations in the Soviet Union had either been solved, or were in the process of being solved.⁷

⁷For a detailed analysis of the changing emphasis on the "merger" of peoples see Yaroslav Bilinsky, "The Concept of the Soviet People and its Implications for Soviet Nationality Policy," Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in the United States 14, no. 37-38 (1978-80): 87-133.

This approach began to change in the early 1980s when, after the accession of Andropov to power as the new General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, it was acknowledged that nationality issues required more detailed, realistic study so that new policy measures could be adopted to deal with growing problems in nationality relations.⁸ Thus by the late 1980s some Soviet scholars acknowledged that the tendentiously optimistic picture portrayed in official statements on this subject had encouraged a dangerous complacency which left policy-makers largely unprepared for the ethnonational disturbances following Gorbachev's accession to power as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1985.⁹

As for the scholarly Soviet literature on various aspects of ethnonational processes and relations in the Soviet Union, during the period under consideration its quality varied a great deal. Some of the work of Soviet scholars, especially in fields such as ethnography and social anthropology, was of high quality.¹⁰ However, empirical Soviet studies on ethnonational issues were strongly limited in number, scope, and approach. As Gitelman noted in discussing the Soviet scholarly literature of the 1970s and early 1980s:

⁸On developments in the early 1980s see Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "Minority Nationalism Today: An Overview," in The Last Empire: Nationality and the Soviet Future, ed. Robert Conquest (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), pp. 255-258.

⁹See, for example, the critique in Valerii Tishkov, "Narody i gosudarstvo," Kommunist No. 1 (January 1989): 49-51. It should be noted that until the late 1980s the official media's image of dissident national rights activists was highly negative and stereotypical, in line with the pattern discussed by Walter Parchomenko in Soviet Images of Dissidents and Nonconformists (New York: Praeger, 1986).

¹⁰See the favourable review of some of this literature in Ernest Gellner, State and Society in Soviet Thought (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), Chapter 6.

...it is likely that empirical [Soviet] research on nationality questions is deliberately limited, that the results of studies are carefully screened before publication, and that even certain methods cannot be used by the researchers.¹¹

Thus until the late 1980s Soviet scholars who were interested in the development of ethnonational groups and ethnonational relations in the Soviet Union avoided (at least in their open publications) politically sensitive aspects of the "national question" and were cautious in their interpretations and conclusions, carefully avoiding any discussion of political implications. Thus many significant ethnonational problems found little reflection in the officially published work of Soviet scholars, which portrayed nationality policy in a highly sanitized form.

In addition to this general avoidance, by Soviet scholarship on this topic, of politically sensitive issues, it was often methodologically flawed. Thus Rasma Karklins, who evaluated the content and usefulness of Soviet publications on the "national question" and national relations in the Soviet Union prior to the mid-1980s, argued that although they were often helpful in understanding the complexity of Soviet "multiethnic reality," they had to be supplemented with primary research conducted with recent Soviet emigrants living in the West.¹²

In fact, several studies based on survey research conducted with recent Soviet emigrants have recently been published, and some of these surveys included

¹¹Zvi Gitelman, "Are Nations Merging in the USSR?" Problems of Communism 32 (September-October 1983): 39.

¹²Rasma Karklins, Ethnic Relations in the USSR: Perspectives from Below (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1986), pp. 11-14.

questions about nationality issues in the USSR.¹³ However, this topic has not been a central focus of most of these studies; the most important recent exception is a monograph by Rasma Karklins which is based on a survey conducted with 200 Soviet Germans who came to West Germany in 1979.¹⁴

There are a number of important methodological problems with emigrant surveys of this kind. Most important, the samples which are surveyed are highly untypical of the Soviet population. As Karklins admits:

Methodologically the main problem is that no matter what care one takes in securing a good sample from the population pool available, emigration as such sets definite constraints in sample selection. In our case these are that compared to the overall population of the USSR, the Soviet Germans include few highly educated persons, their regional origin is lopsided (the emphasis is on residents of Kazakhstan and Central Asia), and they represent only one Soviet nationality.¹⁵

As for the Jewish emigrants who are usually featured in most other surveys of this kind, they are also unrepresentative of the Soviet population on a wide range of indicators,¹⁶ and their views of the "national question" in the Soviet Union are

¹³Gitelman, "Are Nations Merging," and Karklins, Ethnic Relations. A number of the reports from the Soviet Interview Project, the most systematic emigrant survey to date (the project was coordinated by James Millar at the University of Illinois, at Urbana-Champaign), are now available. See, in particular, Rasma Karklins, "Nationality Policy and Ethnic Relations in the USSR," in Politics, Work, and Daily Life in the USSR: A Survey of Former Soviet Citizens, ed. James R. Millar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 301-331.

¹⁴Karklins, Ethnic Relations, p. 14.

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 14-15.

¹⁶For basic data on the Jewish population of the USSR, see Mordechai Altshuler, Soviet Jewry Since the Second World War: Population and Social Structure (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987).

strongly influenced by the anti-Semitism which is found in certain sectors of Soviet society and which has, on occasion, been encouraged by the Soviet authorities.¹⁷

In addition, survey research with Soviet emigres adopted a perspective "from below"; that is, the focus was on the "common man" and on ethnonational interactions at work, in schools, and within circles of families and friends. Few of the survey respondents were prominent political activists, played a leading role within the two emigration movements (Jewish and German) which produced the majority of emigrants from the Soviet Union, or had been imprisoned at any point for their activities. Thus most of the data from these interviews are not directly relevant to the topic of this thesis.

As for field research by Western scholars, they were permitted to conduct such research in the Soviet Union on ethnonational issues only if they chose relatively innocuous research topics such as the lifestyle of the northern peoples of the USSR,¹⁸ although in the course of research on other, less sensitive topics, some Western scholars visiting the Soviet Union collected information which contributed significantly to our knowledge of the "ethnonational scene" in the Soviet Union.¹⁹

Other Western studies of the "national question" in the Soviet Union focussed on four areas: Soviet policies towards the nationalities; particular

¹⁷See, for example, Theodore H. Friedgut, Soviet Anti-Zionism and Anti-Semitism: Another Cycle, Research Paper No. 54 (Jerusalem: The Soviet and East European Research Centre, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1984).

¹⁸For example, Marjorie Mandelstam Balzer wrote several articles on the Siberian Khanty, based in part on summer field work in the USSR, and is writing a book on strategies of ethnic survival in Western Siberia. See Stephan M. Horak, ed., Guide to the Study of the Soviet Nationalities: Non-Russian Peoples of the USSR (Littleton, Colo.: Libraries Unlimited, Inc., 1982), p. 253.

¹⁹See, for example, Chapter 7 of Nancy Lubin's Labour and Nationality in Soviet Central Asia: An Uneasy Compromise (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984).

nationalities and/or republics; demographic trends and their implications for the nationalities and Soviet society; and the general implications of the national question for the future strength and stability of the country. The primary sources for these studies were programmatic pronouncements and official statements by the central and republican authorities, data on the national composition of central and republican party/state elites, and aggregate data, such as census results, party membership figures, occupational breakdowns, etc. which allowed the researcher to assess regional or ethnonational socioeconomic disparities, and analyse demographic and linguistic trends. As Gitelman points out, the limitation of most of these studies was that

in relying on aggregate, non-attitudinal data, individual attitudes and choices can only be inferred, at best. Also, because Western researchers have no access to the raw data that would permit independent analysis and full reporting, they must rely on Soviet findings and, to some degree, Soviet conclusions.²⁰

Some Western studies of the national question in the Soviet Union occasionally used material from samizdat documents, and mentioned prominent dissident spokesmen for some of the national movements in the Soviet Union; however, the rich corpus of samizdat materials on the "national question," and the available biographical data on activists in these movements, were not exploited in a careful, systematic fashion. The more specialized works dealing with individual nationalities and/or republics often relied more heavily on information from samizdat

²⁰Gitelman, "Are Nations Merging?" pp. 37-38.

documents,²¹ but with a few minor exceptions²² this material was used in a descriptive rather than analytical fashion.

Some of the latter publications overlapped with a large body of Western literature on dissent and dissidents in the Soviet Union. However, much of the general literature on Soviet dissent presented a somewhat distorted picture of this phenomenon. For example, as Rubenstein acknowledged in the preface to a monograph entitled Soviet Dissidents: Their Struggle for Human Rights,

This book does not attempt to describe all the significant groups of dissenters that coalesced during Brezhnev's rule. Soviet Dissidents focuses on events and personalities of the democratic movement in Moscow. Petitions and demonstrations there served as an example for numerous other groups -- Lithuanian Catholics, Ukrainian nationalists, Crimean Tatars, Georgians, Armenians, ordinary workers, Baptists, and Pentecostals--whose struggles are barely touched on in this book.²³

This emphasis on Moscow or Leningrad, and the activists in these two urban centres, was especially noticeable in popular media such as the New York Times.²⁴

²¹See, for example, Stanley V. Vardys, The Catholic Church, Dissent and Nationality in Soviet Lithuania (Boulder, Colo.: East European Quarterly, 1978); Borys Lewytzkyj, Politics and Society in Soviet Ukraine, 1953-1980 (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1984); and Peter J. Potichnyj, "The Struggle of the Crimean Tatars," in Nationalism and Human Rights: Processes of Modernization in the USSR, ed. Ihor Kamenetsky (Littleton, Colo.: Libraries Unlimited, 1977), pp. 228-243.

²²See, for example, Kenneth C. Farmer, Ukrainian Nationalism in the Post-Stalin Era: Myth, Symbols and Ideology in Soviet Nationalities Policy (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1980), esp. pp. 176-184; Bohdan Krawchenko and Jim A. Carter, "Dissidents in Ukraine Before 1972: A Summary Statistical Profile," Journal of Ukrainian Studies 8 (Winter 1983): 85-88; Jaroslaw M. Bilocerkowycz, Soviet Ukrainian Dissent: A Study of Political Alienation (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988).

²³Joshua Rubenstein, Soviet Dissidents: Their Struggle for Human Rights, 2nd ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1985), p. xiii.

²⁴Alexander Motyl, "The Soviet Union through the Eyes of the New York Times," Journal of Ukrainian Graduate Studies 4 (Fall 1979): 74-77.

There is no comprehensive, in-depth monographic treatment of ethnonational dissent in the Soviet Union, and even Dissent in the USSR (1975), a collection of essays which attempted to illustrate the great diversity of dissident beliefs and perspectives in the Soviet Union, lacked a chapter on any aspect of this topic.²⁵ There are several reasons for this neglect of ethnonational issues in most of the Western literature on Soviet dissent. One is the simple fact that Moscow and Leningrad were the main centres through which unofficial publications and information reached the West prior to 1985 (usually through reporters or diplomatic personnel), and information about developments outside of these large cities, and particularly in the non-Russian republics, tended to be scanty and less reliable. It also, however, reflected the fact that politicized ethnicity, and its capacity to provoke intrastate and interstate conflict was, for a variety of reasons, largely neglected by political scientists as a fruitful area of investigation.²⁶

Certain analysts and historians of Soviet dissent acknowledged the significance of ethnonational grievances as a motive for dissent in the Soviet Union, and pointed to the vigor with which activists in certain national movements were harassed and persecuted by the Soviet security apparatus.²⁷ Nonetheless ethnonational dissent, and relations among dissidents of various backgrounds in the Soviet Union, have not been the primary focus of any of these scholars'

²⁵Rudolf L. Tokes, ed. Dissent in the USSR: Politics, Ideology and People (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1975).

²⁶See Chapter 2 for more details.

²⁷See, for example, Peter Reddaway, "Dissent in the Soviet Union," Problems of Communism 32 (November-December 1983): 12; Frederick C. Barghoorn, Detente and the Democratic Movement in the USSR (New York: Free Press, 1976), p. 115; Liudmila Alekseeva, Istoriia inakomysliia v SSSR: Noveishii period (Benson, VT: Khronika Press, 1984), pp. 28, 37.

publications. In addition, some of the Soviet dissidents whose publications had a considerable influence on Western views of the Soviet Union had a curious "blind spot" concerning the "national question" in the Soviet Union.²⁸

In effect, there has been no consistent effort to study the linkage between nationality policy and policy towards dissent in the Soviet Union. Thus only a few specialized secondary works are directly relevant to the topic of this thesis. For example, several brief articles, and a chapter of a recent book on Russian nationalism in the Soviet Union, discuss the attitudes of Russian dissidents towards the political goals of non-Russian dissidents.²⁹ A few other articles deal with topics such as the pattern of protests among different national groups in the Soviet Union,³⁰ the Ukrainian national rights movement in the Soviet Union and the Jewish question,³¹ and the implications for Soviet nationality policy of the activities of the Helsinki Monitoring Groups in the Soviet Union.³²

²⁸The foremost example is the historian Roy Medvedev. See Alexander J. Motyl, "Roy Medvedev: Dissident or Conformist?" Survey 25 (Summer 1980): 74-85.

²⁹Yaroslav Bilinsky, "Russian Dissidents' Attitudes toward the Political Strivings of the non-Russian Nations," Nationalities Papers 11 (Fall 1983): 190-205; Chapter 6, "The Nationalities Problem," in John B. Dunlop, The Faces of Contemporary Russian Nationalism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983); Dimitry V. Pospelovsky, "The Jewish Question in Russian Samizdat," Soviet Jewish Affairs 8, no. 2 (1978): 3-23. See also Izrail Kleiner, Natsional'ni problemy ostannoi imperii: natsional'ne pytannia v SRSR ochymaadians'kykh dysydyntiv (Paris: PIUF, 1978).

³⁰David Kowalewski, "National Rights Protest in the Brezhnev Era: Some Determinants of Success," Ethnic and Racial Studies 4 (April 1981): 175-188.

³¹Israel Kleiner, "Present-Day Ukrainian National Movement in the USSR and the Jewish Question," Soviet Jewish Affairs 11 (November 1981): 3-14.

³²Yaroslav Bilinsky and Tonu Parming, "Helsinki Watch Committees in the Soviet Republics: Implications for Soviet Nationality Policy," Nationalities Papers 9 (Spring 1981): 1-26. This article represents the summarized findings of an unpublished report which was prepared for the National Council for Soviet and East European Research, Washington, 1980.

However, most of the aforementioned works only begin to deal with topics which are, in many ways, very complex. As Bilinsky points out,

The topic is so broad as to cry out for a comprehensive treatment in book-form: the political strivings of non-Russian nations take different forms, different are also the attitudes of various Russian dissidents... Above all, I beg all readers not to take brevity for dogmatism. If I had not summarized my findings concisely, I could have written a much longer article and should still not have brought out all the fine qualifications."

Because of the absence of significant research on ethnonational dissent in the USSR I will argue that the image, in the West, of Soviet dissent prior to 1985 was somewhat distorted, and that the existing secondary literature has not done justice to certain important aspects of dissent activity; namely, the ethnonational factor in dissent, its impact on relations among Soviet dissidents, and the role of state-sanctioned coercion in preventing the political mobilization of ethnonationalism in the USSR.

Primary Source Materials

Several different sources of primary materials have been used in this thesis:

- i) samizdat documents;
- ii) biographical data on dissidents;
- iii) memoirs;
- iv) personal interviews;
- v) miscellaneous.

"Bilinsky, "Russian Dissidents' Attitudes," p. 190.

Over 5,000 samizdat documents (unofficial publications)³⁴ of various kinds reached the West during the period under consideration. Given the variety of routes by which this material left the Soviet Union, and the possibility that some of these "pipelines" may have been used for purposes of disinformation, the work of the researcher is facilitated by the fact that a special unit (Arkhiv Samizdata) of Radio Liberty's Research Department in Munich, West Germany, collects all possible samizdat publications, and meticulously checks (to the degree that this is possible) their authenticity. Between the late 1960s and mid-1980s most of these documents were published, with annotations, in regular bulletins entitled Materialy Samizdata. Radio Liberty's Samizdat Staff has acquired considerable expertise in dealing with these materials, and its "track record" in publishing only genuine samizdat has been excellent. Although many of these documents are then republished elsewhere, Arkhiv Samizdata has been the most reliable source for the full range of samizdat materials.³⁵

In using these materials, however, one should be aware of several possible sources of bias.

- a) Only a certain proportion of samizdat documents from the "periphery" of the Soviet Union circulated widely within the country, and eventually reached the two

³⁴On the phenomenon of samizdat, and its use as a source of information about Soviet society and politics, see F.J.M. Feldbrugge, Samizdat and Political Dissent in the Soviet Union (Leyden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1975).

³⁵These comments are based on my systematic, long-term use of the materials made available through Arkhiv Samizdata. In addition, I spent several weeks in Munich, in October 1986, conducting research in the section of the Radio Liberty research facilities which is responsible for Arkhiv Samizdata, and was able to closely observe the work of its staff.

major urban centres of the RSFSR (Leningrad, and especially Moscow) which were the main conduits for the transfer of these materials to the West. Thus samizdat documents prepared in Moscow and Leningrad were much more likely to reach the West than those prepared outside these centres, especially if they originated in the non-Russian republics and were not written in Russian. The latter documents were almost certainly underrepresented in the stream of samizdat reaching the West. As Feldbrugge points out,

The best insight into the question of how much and what kinds of samizdat reached the West can be acquired by comparing the Arkhiy with lists of samizdat materials circulating in the Soviet Union as provided by known samizdat sources. The most important source in this respect is the section "samizdat news" in the Chronicle of Current Events. In its issues 12-27 (February 1970 - October 1972) this section mentioned 180 titles of samizdat documents currently circulating in the USSR. Of these, 85 have been included in the Arkhiy Samizdata and a few more have been reproduced in other Western sources. This would allow us to conclude that the total number of samizdat documents which were at that time circulating in the Soviet Union would at least be double the number of documents included in the Arkhiy (about 1500), i.e. 3000. The actual number of samizdat documents in the USSR is probably greater because... samizdat in non-Russian languages or circulating locally stands a much poorer chance of wide dissemination in the USSR and will therefore not pass the Soviet border as easily.*

b) Those individuals (activists in the democratic human rights movement in Moscow) who were most directly involved in passing samizdat documents to the West imposed a certain form of censorship when deciding whether or not to send certain materials abroad. Thus materials which may have reflected poorly on certain

*Feldbrugge, Samizdat, pp. 13-14.

dissident groups or movements or which, for one reason or another, were considered overly "sensitive" by the Moscow dissidents who controlled most of the transfer channels, were probably underrepresented in the samizdat literature reaching the West. The most frequent accusations of such censorship concerned samizdat documents dealing with controversial aspects of the national question in the Soviet Union, or with interpersonal conflicts among dissenters.³⁷

c) Radio Liberty's Samizdat Staff has exercised a certain selectivity in its treatment of samizdat materials - withholding from publication (on a temporary or permanent basis) items of a highly "sensitive" or "controversial" nature; e.g., samizdat which is strongly xenophobic or anti-Semitic in nature, or which might be considered slanderous.³⁸

As a result of the biases discussed above, the samizdat documents publicly available in the West do not provide a fully representative sample of the samizdat which circulated in the Soviet Union between 1965 and 1985. In particular, they do not accurately reflect the level of samizdat activity outside of Moscow and

³⁷The existence of this kind of censorship was confirmed by Oksana Meshko, a prominent Ukrainian human and national rights activist, in a personal interview in Toronto on 26 November 1988. For additional confirmation see the interview with Sergei Soldatov (a Russian dissident from Estonia who was allowed to leave for the West in 1981), conducted by Bohdan Nahaylo, in Suchasnist' No. 6 (June 1982), pp. 99-101. The reluctance to publicize conflicts among dissidents was underlined by the cautious fashion in which the editors of the Chronicle of Current Events (the major samizdat human rights journal) commented on a report dealing with the xenophobic behaviour of Ukrainian dissident V. Moroz in Mordovian Special-Regime Corrective-Labour Camp #1. See issue no. 47 of this journal (dated 30 November 1977), pp. 107-108.

³⁸This practice was confirmed in an interview with Peter Dornan of Radio Liberty's Samizdat Staff, in Munich, on 23 October 1986.

Leningrad, especially in the non-Russian republics, and they probably present an incomplete picture of ethnonational conflicts among the population at large, and within or among dissident groups in the Soviet Union. One can, however, partially control for this bias by conducting interviews with former dissidents who can throw light on topics which are not discussed, or only partially discussed, in samizdat.

Despite these biases samizdat documents are a very important source for the study of Soviet dissent, and yield a large volume of information which is directly relevant to the thesis topic. These documents include: reports on the arrests and trials of political prisoners (including, in some cases, transcripts of trials, texts of court sentences, etc.); information on conditions in penal institutions and the treatment of political prisoners by the penal authorities (including copies of some internal documents issued by these authorities); information on cooperative actions (e.g., preparation of petitions, hunger-strikes, etc.) carried out by political prisoners and, occasionally, information on conflicts among political prisoners; various programmatic documents, drawn up by individuals or groups (occasionally within penal institutions) dealing in full or in part with certain aspects of the national question in the Soviet Union; and biographical notes on individual political prisoners.

Of particular importance is the major samizdat human rights journal A Chronicle of Current Events (1968-1982). It summarized much of the information available in other samizdat documents, and provided a running account of the arrests and trials of dissidents as well as reports on their imprisonment.³⁹ Other samizdat

³⁹For more information about this periodical see Mark Hopkins, Russia's Underground Press: The Chronicle of Current Events (New York: Praeger, 1983).

periodicals, such as the Ukrainian Herald and the Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithuania, also carried reports on arrests and trials of dissidents, as well as accounts of their treatment in detention.

The coverage in these samizdat documents of the situation in Soviet penal institutions is quite regular, and often very detailed (see, for example, the section entitled "In the Prisons and Camps" found in most post-1974 issues of the Chronicle of Current Events). Thus a reliable and almost continuous chronicle of life in the several penal institutions (Vladimir prison, Chistopol prison, Mordovian camp 385/3-5, Perm camps 35, 36, and 37, etc.) where most of the prominent Soviet political prisoners were detained is available for a period covering several years.

ii) Biographical data on dissidents

Until the late 70s, there was no reliable Western source of current biographical information covering Soviet dissidents and political prisoners. Those interested in this topic had to laboriously compile such information on the basis of samizdat reports (especially in the Chronicle of Current Events and other samizdat journals), and reports in the bulletins, newspapers and journals of various human rights, religious and emigre organizations. Although these organizations occasionally published lists of Soviet political prisoners, these lists were rarely complete, and often contained outdated or unreliable information.

The situation changed at the end of 1978 when Dr. Cronid Lubarsky (a former Soviet dissident and political prisoner who completed his term of imprisonment early in 1977 and was allowed to emigrate from the Soviet Union

later the same year) began to publish USSR News Brief: Human Rights. This bulletin, which draws on a wide range of sources and contributors, is considered to be the most reliable source of information on the activity and treatment of Soviet dissenters.

Since 1978 Lubarsky has published an annual List of Political Prisoners in the USSR which is based largely on information from USSR News Brief: Human Rights. This annual list, like the USSR News Brief, is highly regarded as a reliable source by Western specialists on Soviet dissent. If the editor is not absolutely sure about a given piece of information, then this is clearly indicated, and the list is updated by means of a monthly supplement containing amendments and new entries.

For the period between 1956 and 1975 biographical data on Soviet dissidents, from a wide range of sources (first and foremost, samizdat documents) has been compiled in a reference work entitled Biographical Dictionary of Dissidents in the Soviet Union.⁴⁰ The result of a major collaborative effort by several scholars, it contains entries on 3,400 dissidents (including all those known to have been imprisoned between 1956 and 1975), and presents personal biographical data as well as information on their dissent activities. The compilers of the volume maintained high scholarly standards, and it is a significant research tool.⁴¹

Biographical data, often very detailed in nature, are also contained in samizdat documents as well as in memoirs and biographical sketches published in

⁴⁰S.P. de Boer, E.J. Driessen, and H.I. Verhaar, eds., Biographical Dictionary of Dissidents in the Soviet Union (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982).

⁴¹See the commentary on this source in Peter Reddaway, "Dissent in the Soviet Union," p. 4.

the West. The amount and quality of information concerning a given dissident or political prisoner varies a great deal. However, basic biographical data are available for most of the activists in, and especially the leading figures of, the whole range of dissent movements in the Soviet Union between 1965 and 1985.

Thus, since the mid-70s basic biographical information has been available concerning approximately 800-900 Soviet prisoners of conscience imprisoned at any one time prior to 1985. In particular, fairly reliable information is available on most of the political prisoners detained in penal institutions such as the Vladimir or Chistopol prisons, and the Perm or Mordovian corrective labour camps.⁴²

iii) Memoirs

Many former Soviet dissidents and political prisoners detained during the period under study have written about their experiences. The documentary and literary value of these works (which range in length from brief articles to multi-volume sagas) varies a great deal; however, they allow the researcher to gain deeper insights into the "microenvironments" to which these individuals were exposed. If the given author was imprisoned, his/her experiences while in detention are usually described in considerable detail, and these descriptions often contain valuable information about the background of fellow prisoners, as well as details about their views and activities. Most of the available memoirs were written after the given individual was released and allowed to leave the Soviet Union; of particular value

⁴²A data base has been created, using the sources noted above, which contains basic biographical information on all political prisoners known to have been imprisoned at some point between 1965 and 1985. For more information on this data base, see Appendix A.

are those works (often taking the form of a diary) which were written when the author was still an active dissident, or was detained in a penal institution.⁴³

In particular, there is a large volume of memoir literature, in a variety of languages, dealing with the Soviet penal system during the period from 1945 to 1956. It includes works by: German and Japanese prisoners of war captured by Soviet troops during World War II;⁴⁴ foreign communists who sought refuge in the Soviet Union in the interwar period and were arrested during the purges of the 1930s;⁴⁵ American and British citizens resident in the Soviet Union who were accused of espionage once the anti-fascist alliance began to break down after WW II;⁴⁶ and a wide range of Soviet citizens who were imprisoned for a variety of reasons prior to, during, and following WW II.⁴⁷

Memoirs are not, of course, always reliable. Some authors are prone to self-glorification, or may use their memoirs to present hagiographic portraits of friends and "settle accounts" with enemies. Some memoirists are not very observant about their surroundings, while others devote a great deal of attention to petty detail. And

⁴³See, for example, Mikhail Kheifets, Mesto i vremia (Paris: Tret'ia volna, 1978); and Edward Kuznetsov, Prison Diaries (New York: Stein and Day, 1975) and Mordovskii marafon (Ramat-Gan: Knigotovarishchestvo "Moskva--Ierusalim," 1979).

⁴⁴See, for example, Toyoko Yamasaki, The Barren Zone (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985).

⁴⁵See, for example, Karlo Stajner, Seven Thousand Days in Siberia (New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 1986).

⁴⁶See, for example, Alexander Dolgun, with Patrick Watson, Alexander Dolgun's Story: An American in the Gulag (New York: Knopf, 1975).

⁴⁷For a brief and unsatisfactory bibliography (it omits a considerable number of important titles) of this literature, see Libushe Zorin, Soviet Prisons and Concentration Camps: An Annotated Bibliography, 1917-1980 (Newtonville, Mass.: Oriental Research Partners, 1980).

if memoirs are written long after the events being described took place, then even the most conscientious author finds it difficult to accurately recreate the past.

However, sometimes such memoirs have been the subject of commentaries by other former prisoners and have been criticized for distorting facts, or praised for their attempts to remain objective.⁴⁸ In addition, sometimes an author's account can be confirmed by examining other works which discuss the same events or individuals. Most of the time, however, one is forced to rely on internal evidence to establish the veracity of the memoirs. That is, one evaluates the memoirs on the basis of whether the account is internally consistent, whether the author seems to be capable of distancing himself/herself from the events being described, whether the author frequently uses hyperbolic language, etc.

Despite some of the deficiencies noted above, the benefits of using such memoirs in a selective, judicious fashion far outweigh the drawbacks. This is certainly the case when it comes to research on the penal system during the Stalinist period, since control over all penitentiary institutions passed into the hands of the security organs in the 1930s, and penitentiary law came to be regulated exclusively by the internal instructions of these organs. Until the late 1980s such memoirs remained the most important source for the study of the Soviet penal system during the Stalinist period.⁴⁹

⁴⁸See, for example, R.I. Pimenov's critical review of A. Shifrin's Chetvertoe izmerenie in Pamiat': Istoricheskii sbornik, Vol. 1 (New York: Khronika Press, 1978), pp. 444-454, which points to a number of inaccuracies in the book. See also the comments (generally very positive) by Pimenov, Lubarsky and others on Anatolii Marchenko's memoirs, Moi pokazaniia, in Pamiat': Istoricheskii sbornik, Vol. 3 (Paris: YMCA-Press), pp. 466-489.

⁴⁹For an interesting (if controversial) use of memoir literature in an attempt to gauge the nature of the Soviet population's response to the "Great Terror" (a period of massive purges) in the Soviet Union between 1935 and 1939, see Robert W. Thurston, "Fear and Belief in the USSR's 'Great Terror': Response to Arrest, 1935-1939," Slavic Review 45 (Summer 1986): 213-234. See also

iv) Personal Interviews

Only a certain number of former Soviet political prisoners have written about their experiences, and of these individuals only a few had a strong interest in the "national question" and ethnonational relations in the Soviet penal system.³⁰ Therefore, a number of personal interviews were conducted with former Soviet political prisoners in Israel, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Canada.

There are several problems with such interviews. First of all, the sample of former Soviet political prisoners in the West is not representative of this group in the USSR. Most of the former are Jewish by nationality and were active in the Jewish emigration movement, although some were involved in the democratic human rights movement and, in a few cases, such as that of Anatolii Shcharansky, in both of these movements. Former political prisoners of Russian background are also strongly represented among those who have been allowed to leave the USSR, but only a few former political prisoners of Ukrainian or other ethnonational origins are in the West, and they are under-represented in the sample available for interviewing.

There is, in addition, the physical problem of locating and visiting these former political prisoners, although a certain number are concentrated in Israel,

Robert Conquest's reply, "What is Terror?" and Thurston's rejoinder, "On Desk-Bound Parochialism, Commonsense Perspectives, and Lousy Evidence," on, respectively, pp. 235-237 and pp. 238-244 of the same issue of Slavic Review. The need to rely on memoir sources may diminish if recent trends to provide researchers with improved access to relevant Soviet archival materials continues. See, for example, the statistical reports, on levels of repression in the 1930s and 1940s (based on archival sources), published in Argumenty i fakty, 3-9 February 1990 and 11-17 November 1989.

³⁰Among those who devote considerable attention to this theme are Mikhail Kheifets, in Mesto i vremia (Paris: Tret'ia volna, 1978) and Ukrains'ki syliuety (Munich: Suchasnist', 1984); and Joseph Scholmer, in Vorkuta (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1955), esp. Chapter 6.

Munich, and a few other centres. However, the most important problem is the "quality" of the interviews. Although a number of respondents (especially those in Israel) readily answered all my questions (from a prepared questionnaire) and authorised me to use the resulting interview data without any restrictions, others were reluctant to discuss certain issues or were evasive in their answers, and insisted that their comments on some topics remain "off the record." In addition, the interview situations were frequently not amenable to the administration of a standard oral questionnaire. It was difficult to keep the respondents "on topic," and they often became impatient or agitated if I insisted on adhering to a strict pattern of questions.

Since a standardized questionnaire could not be administered in a rigorous fashion, the data from interviews will be used in a qualified, judicious fashion, and primarily to supplement data from other sources.

v) Miscellaneous

Among the miscellaneous materials used in this thesis are published interviews with former dissidents and political prisoners,³¹ biographies and biographical sketches of dissidents and political prisoners,³² and the testimony of

³¹See, for example, William Cole, "Interviews with Andrei Amalrik, Vladimir Bukovsky, and Pyotr Yakir," Survey no. 77 (Autumn 1970): 128-145.

³²See, for example, Igor [Igor] Davydov, "Zinovii Antoniuk (Dolia liudyny--epizod iz zhyttia s'ohodnishn'oho GULagu)," Suchasnist', March-April 1981, pp. 195-207.

former dissidents and political prisoners before various governmental and non-governmental bodies.³³

Conceptual Framework

The research literature on ethnonationalism has gone in two primary directions. One direction has involved keeping pace with rapidly changing situations by providing largely descriptive accounts of ethnonational movements. The second direction involves a search for the "causal" conditions or factors that have given rise to these movements, and there has been a tendency to look for macrolevel explanations involving uneven economic development, internal colonialization, postindustrialism, etc.³⁴

One basic problem with most of these "causal" approaches is their high level of abstraction, for they attempt to explain contemporary phenomena in long-range, macrolevel terms. They specify certain environmental conditions which influence the development of ethnonational movements, but are usually unable to demonstrate their linkage to the contemporary political behaviour that is the supposed empirical manifestation of those conditions. In addition, a reliance on the concept of relative deprivation (which is implicit or explicit in the approaches noted above) turns ethnonational groups into instruments of economic interests, and leads to their being

³³See, for example, Marta Harasowska and Orest Olhovych, eds., The International Sakharov Hearings: Human Rights in the U.S.S.R. (Baltimore: Smoloskyp, 1977).

³⁴E.g., Tom Nairn, The Break-Up of Britain (London: NLB, 1977); Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); Peter Gourevitch, "The Emergence of 'Peripheral Nationalisms': Some Comparative Speculations on the Spatial Distribution of Political Leadership and Economic Growth," The Comparative Study of Society and History 21 (July 1979): 303-322.

treated as dependent variables rather than as autonomous forces in the political process. In the following chapter I will argue that such an instrumental approach is incapable of explaining many important aspects of ethnonationalism. This approach also downgrades the role of politics and policy which are, for the most part, also regarded as dependent variables.

This is not to argue that the political system is fully responsible for determining social conditions or that it alone brings about societal integration, but rather that political action strongly influences those conditions and the degree of integration attained in any society. Modern political institutions have become so involved in various sectors of society that their impacts cannot be disregarded. Thus it is odd that the political process has not been given a more prominent theoretical role in studies of ethnonationalism, for it is principally through political action that ethnonational movements have sought to change the governmental and socioeconomic conditions to which they object, and it is through policy responses that the decisionmaking institutions act.

In particular, contemporary political actions and policies have a cumulative impact, and create a contextual legacy within which future ethnonational activists must operate. The legacy also becomes a mechanism for transmitting a collective political memory, for it is through the political process that ethnonational movements and governments manifest their perceptions of past problems and future possibilities.

Thus it is important to consider the specific strategies which central political elites have adopted to deal with various manifestations of ethnonationalism,

including the activity of actual or potential leaders of ethnonational movements, in multinational states. A structural-functional approach is most appropriate for this purpose, and has already been used in several important studies of dissent in the Soviet Union by Barghoorn and Reddaway.⁵⁵ Reddaway's work is particularly relevant because, in some of his research, he has utilized empirical data on those individuals who have been arrested for dissident activity to demonstrate changes, over time, in state policies towards dissent.⁵⁶

For general theoretical insights into the phenomenon of politicized ethnicity, or ethnonationalism, I will rely on Joseph Rothschild's Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework, and a number of recent works by Anthony D. Smith and Walker Connor.⁵⁷ All of these scholars adopt a modified structural-functional approach which heavily stresses the importance of historical context, and reject narrow approaches to the study of ethnonationalism which define the phenomenon exclusively or preponderantly in economic terms.⁵⁸

⁵⁵See, for example, Peter Reddaway, "Policy towards Dissent since Khrushchev," in Authority, Power and Policy in the USSR, eds. T.H. Rigby et al. (London: Macmillan 1980), pp. 158-192; Frederick C. Barghoorn, "Regime-Dissenter Relations after Khrushchev: Some Observations," in Pluralism in the Soviet Union: Essays in Honour of H. Gordon Skilling, ed. Susan Gross Solomon (London: Macmillan, 1983), pp. 131-166; Barghoorn, Detente and the Democratic Movement in the USSR (New York: The Free Press, 1976); and other items listed in the bibliography of this thesis.

⁵⁶Peter Reddaway, "Soviet Policies on Dissent and Emigration: The Radical Change of Course Since 1979," Colloquium Paper No. 192, Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, Washington, D.C., 28 August 1984.

⁵⁷See, for example, Smith's Theories of Nationalism, 2nd ed. (London: Duckworth, 1983); Nationalism in the Twentieth Century (Oxford: Robertson, 1979); The Ethnic Revival (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); and Connor's The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

⁵⁸Thus, for example, Walker Connor does not deny the role of economic factors in national movements (especially as catalysts) but holds that ethnonationalism is remarkably independent from the economic variable. See his "Eco- or ethno-nationalism?" Ethnic and Racial Studies 7 (July 1984): 342-359.

Chapter 2 of the thesis addresses the question of the strategies, especially personnel strategies, used by dominant political elites in multinational states to maintain what they consider to be congenial ethnonational patterns of authority, with a focus on the Soviet experience. Chapter 3 examines the role of the Soviet legal-penitentiary system, as an instrument of coercion, in enforcing patterns of authority in Soviet society, and establishes the setting for the ensuing discussion of the "ethnational factor" in the legal-penitentiary system from 1945 to 1953 (Chapter 4), 1953 to 1965 (Chapter 5), and 1965 to 1985 (Chapter 6). Chapter 7 addresses the salience of the ethnonational identity of Soviet political prisoners, and the way in which it affected their behaviour and relationships in the Soviet penal system, and is followed by the study's conclusions (Chapter 8).

A Note on Terminology

There is still a great deal of disagreement concerning the most useful definition of terms such as "ethnic group" and "nationalism." "Ethnic group" is usually defined very broadly, as a distinct category of the population sharing common cultural features and social institutions as a group, and the features most frequently attributed to ethnic groups are common geographical origin or common ancestors, common culture or customs, religion, race or physical characteristics, and language.⁴⁹ However, the extent to which different sociologists stress subjective

⁴⁹Wsewolod W. Isajiw, "Definitions of Ethnicity," Ethnicity 1 (July 1974):116-117.

factors in ethnic group identification as opposed to objective factors varies considerably.⁶⁰

Terms such as "ethnic group," "ethnicity" (the character, quality, or condition of ethnic group membership) and "ethnic" have become somewhat debased by the broad variety of contexts in which they have been used, especially in North American popular sociology. This has often obscured vital distinctions between various forms of identity. Because of its focus on immigrant societies, and its tendency to identify ethnic groups with minorities, the North American sociological literature on ethnicity is dominated by an assimilationist paradigm (in the "melting pot" tradition) which typically treats ethnic groups as subordinate subgroups of a larger political society. In addition, many American definitions of the term ethnic group stress the objective as opposed to subjective factors in ethnic group identification, and imply that members need not be conscious of belonging to the ethnic group. Thus the uncritical application of concepts and theoretical frameworks from mainstream American ethnic group sociology to the Soviet Union may obscure the fact that almost all major peoples of the Soviet Union have a high degree of self-awareness as collectivities and are indigenous to the territory in which they reside, in most cases having lived there, in compact communities, for many centuries.

A nation is usually defined as an ethnic group with a high degree of self-awareness, and there is usually an implicit, if not explicit, reference to actual or potential political-territorial determination on the part of a given nation. However,

⁶⁰Ibid., pp. 121-122, and Pierre L. van den Berghe, "Ethnic Pluralism in Industrial Societies: A Special Case?" Ethnicity 3 (September 1976): 242-43.

the term nation has often also been employed as a substitute for the territorial juridical unit, the state, and thus nationalism is often used to mean identification with the state (state patriotism). In the thesis I will use the term nation and its derivatives only in the sense of the former definition. Thus I will be concerned only with those aspects of nationalism related to allegiance to a nation defined as a self-aware ethnic group, and will follow A.D. Smith's definition of nationalism:

...an ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of autonomy, cohesion and individuality for a social group deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential nation. In other words, nationalism is both an ideology and a movement... which aspires to "nationhood" for the chosen group; and "nationhood" in turn comprises three basic ideals, autonomy and self-government for the group, often but not always in a sovereign state, solidarity and fraternity of the group in a recognised territory or "home", and third, a distinctive, and preferably unique, culture and history peculiar to the group in question.⁶¹

The term "ethnonationalism" (ethnicity-based nationalism) is less ambiguous than traditional terms such as ethnicity and nationalism, and is steadily gaining popularity among many students of "ethnopolitics."⁶² Thus, although its use is rather awkward in certain contexts, it and its derivatives will be used throughout the thesis in conjunction with the term nation and its derivatives, as defined above.

The term political prisoners is defined as follows: those sentenced to imprisonment primarily for expressing their views on the question of socio-political,

⁶¹A.D. Smith, "Introduction: The Formation of Nationalist Movements," in Nationalist Movements, ed. Anthony D. Smith (London: Macmillan, 1976), pp. 1-2.

⁶²The neologism ethnonationalism was first popularized by Walker Connor. See his article, "The Politics of Ethnonationalism," in Journal of International Affairs 27, no. 1 (1973): 1-21. On the increasing acceptance of this term, see the articles by Ken Wolf ("Ethnic Nationalism: An Analysis and a Defense") and Fred W. Riggs ("What is Ethnic? What is National? Let's Turn the Tables") in Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism 13 (Spring 1986): 199-109, 111-123.

civil, or national rights (including the right to emigrate), or for their involvement in, or support of, organized activity in defence of these rights. Those sentenced primarily for their religious activity will not be discussed in the thesis. In most cases the Soviet political prisoners under consideration in this thesis fall into the category of "prisoners of conscience" as defined by Amnesty International; that is, they have not used or advocated violence. However, I will also include persons imprisoned for acts committed for political reasons, but involving violence. The great majority of the latter were residents of the Baltic countries (Latvia, Estonia, or Lithuania) or Western Ukraine (then Eastern Poland) who opposed the incorporation of these territories into the Soviet Union during World War II, and considered themselves prisoners of war imprisoned for carrying out military actions against an occupying power.

The definition of "dissent" to be used in the thesis is as follows: deliberate and purposive behaviour, manifested in the articulation of opinions critical of, or actions protesting against, established ideological, cultural and political norms and arrangements, and directed against the authorities who maintain the existing regime and enforce its rules and policies.⁶³

⁶³This is a slightly modified version of the definition used by Frederick C. Barghoorn in "The General Pattern of Soviet Dissent," in Dissent in the Soviet Union, ed. Peter J. Potichnyj (Hamilton: McMaster University, 1972), pp. 4-5.

Chapter 2

ETHNONATIONALISM AND THE SOVIET STATE

The Significance of "Ethnic Politics"

For many years, until the 1970s, the study of ethnicity was the domain of anthropologists and sociologists, and was dominated by the particular orientations of those disciplines. Although the great majority of contemporary states have an ethnically heterogeneous population, and communal conflicts based largely on ethnic grievances have been the major cause of bloodshed in these states,¹ political scientists paid little attention to the disruptive role of ethnonationalism, and its potential delegitimizing role in multinational states.

There were many reasons for this neglect, for many decades, of politicized ethnicity's ability to mobilize populations and provoke intra-state and inter-state conflict. One was the conventional academic wisdom, among most North American scholars after World War II, that "modernization and development would defuse and dissolve this allegedly primordial sentiment of ethnicity or, at a minimum, would relegate it to a species of folkloristic trivia."²

¹As Samuel P. Huntington noted in 1972, "communal conflict, in contrast, for instance, to social revolution, has emerged as the dominant form of social strife in both modernizing and modern societies. There have been few societies on any continent which have been free of this phenomenon. And the evidence all suggests that its frequency and intensity are clearly increasing. Modernization involves social mobilization; social mobilization generates communal identity and communal interaction; communal conflict and violence are the inevitable result." See his foreword to Eric A. Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies (Boston: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1972). On the dimensions of ethnic conflict in the 1970s and 1980s, see Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), Chapter 1.

²Joseph Rothschild, Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), p. 15.

This stereotypical view was largely due to the ahistoricist bias of the behavioralist-functionalist school of political science, which treated nations and their cultures not as autonomous forces, but as dependent variables. According to this school of thought, universal progress in modern conditions required integration, that is, the creation of ever more inclusive systems, which in turn implied "deparochialization" and "detrribalization." This social homogenization was not only inevitable in the long run, it was also to be a matter of deliberate policy.³ This point of view was reinforced by the popularity of the simplistic "contact hypothesis" (the long-held view, in social psychology, that contact among members of different groups would automatically improve relations among them); the use of the United States as a frame of reference because of the supposedly successful assimilationist history of this country of immigrants; and the Jacobinist view that the uniethnic state was normative and that the state, and its elites, had the ability to structure and virtually "create" society, in the process imposing cultural homogeneity.⁴

Another important reason for the long-term neglect of the study of politicized ethnicity was the frequent assumption, especially in Marxist or neo-Marxist thought, that economic considerations constituted the primary force which shapes the basic ideas and attitudes of humanity. Nationalism was not of central interest to Marx

³See Immanuel Wallerstein, "Ethnicity and National Integration," Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines 3 (October 1960): 129-139; and Karl Deutsch, "Communication Theory and Political Integration," in Karl Deutsch et al., eds., The Integration of Political Communities (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964), pp. 46-74. For an extreme version of this point of view see Orlando Patterson, Ethnic Chauvinism: The Reactionary Impulse (New York: Stein and Day, 1977).

⁴For the details of these and other explanations for the scholarly neglect of ethnonationalism see Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?" World Politics 24 (April 1972): 319-355; Rothschild, Ethnopolitics, pp. 20-25; Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Chapter 3; and S. Ryan, "Explaining Ethnic Conflict: The Neglected International Dimension," Review of International Studies 14 (July 1988): 162-164.

and Engels; rather, it was marginal and peripheral to their main concerns. In addition, Marxism and nationalism are philosophically incompatible because they posit different social cleavage structures: the one vertical and the other horizontal.⁵

For Marx, Engels and their more orthodox followers, the category of class was accorded absolute primacy in understanding the evolution of capitalist society. The nation was seen as transient and its development dependent on the level of economic and social progress it achieved. More precisely, the internal structure of a nation was seen to depend on the level of development of the productive forces and the social division of labour. Thus the modern nation-state was seen as a product of the rise of the bourgeoisie and was fated to disappear when this class was overthrown. The early Marxist legacy on this question was further encumbered by the rather arbitrary delineation, by Marx and Engels, of certain peoples as "historic" and "historyless." This reflected a form of Social Darwinism which saw the survival of the "fittest" peoples, with the losers being condemned to oblivion.⁶

Thus both the behavioralist-functionalist school, and Marxist or neo-Marxist analysis, viewed ethnicity and ethnonationalism primarily in instrumentalist terms which did not acknowledge any intrinsic value in minority cultures. The existence of ethnic groups and the articulation of ethnic consciousness were seen as stemming from the growing pains of modernization, and reflected differentials in distribution

⁵Walker Connor, The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 5-6.

⁶Connor, The National Question, Chapter 1. See also Ronaldo Munck, The Difficult Dialogue: Marxism and Nationalism (London: Zed Books, 1986), Chapter 1.

connected with uneven development.⁷ According to this view of ethnicity as "false consciousness," ethnic identity and group boundaries were defended, penetrated or ignored depending on situational exigencies.⁸

The instrumentalist approach to ethnicity and nationalism was largely motivated by a rejection of the primordialist or organicist approach, which treats ethnicity and nationhood as a cultural given, a "natural" state of being determined by one's descent. According to this latter approach the nation is an organism that has evolved over time, and because the ingredients of this organism -- language, myths, folkways -- and the circumstances of its development are unique, the spirit or ethos of each nation is unique as well. Although it retains considerable popular appeal, the primordialist approach is largely discredited in scholarly circles since twentieth-century phenomena such as the excesses of ultranationalism, the spread of fascism, and the policies of Hitler's Germany can be widely attributed to extreme forms of the organicist doctrine.⁹

⁷For a review and critique of the literature which tends to define and explain ethnonationalism in preponderantly economic terms, see Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Revival (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), Chapter 2.

⁸This view informs much of the recent theoretical literature on the state and state legitimacy, which continues to neglect or even ignore the extent to which politicized ethnicity remains one of the most important ideological legitimators and delegitimizers of states and governments. See, for example, works such as: Anthony de Jasay, The State (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985); John Keane, ed., Civil Society and the State: New European Perspectives (London: Verso, 1988); Nicos Poulantzas, ed. La Crise de l'Etat (Paris: PUF, 1976); John Hoffman, State, Power and Democracy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988); and Charles Bright and Susan Harding, eds., Statemaking and Social Movements (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1984). Andrew Vincent, in Theories of the State (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), acknowledges the importance of nationalism but then dismisses it as a "tool" of the state which is "simplistic and inchoate" and lacks "intellectual content" (p. 29). One exception to this neglect of nationalism in the recent literature on the state is Anthony Black's State, Community and Human Desire: A Group-Centred Account of Political Values (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988).

⁹Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism in the Twentieth Century (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1979), Chapter 3. For recent "semi-primordialist" studies of ethnicity see Harold Isaacs, The Idols of the Tribe (New York: Harper and Row, 1975); and A.L. Epstein, Ethos and Identity (London: Tavistock Publications, 1978). For a recent sociobiological variant of this approach see P. Van den Berghe,

However, the total rejection by most social scientists of the organicist approach to ethnicity, and the largely uncritical adoption of an instrumentalist approach, led to a serious underestimation of the emotional power of ethnicity and its mobilizing capacity, which largely stem from the fact that it draws on very powerful myths of origin which satisfy many individuals' need to "belong." In fact, the essence of ethnicity, and its emotional significance, stem from the fact that it is rooted in descent, real or putative, and thus can be seen as an extension of kinship. As Rothschild points out,

Psychologically, ethnicity has one advantage over other modes of personal identity and of social linkage, namely, its capacity to arouse and to engage the most intense, deep, and private emotional sentiments... once activated, ethnic identity, ethnic interest, and especially ethnic anxiety tend to neutralize and to subsume emotionally more abstract commitments to functional social groups. In other words, class interests, while indeed concrete in social and political systemic terms, are psychologically less palpable in the emotional life of people than ethnicity is.¹⁰

The importance of the nationalist myth of common descent,¹¹ rooted in history, is also underlined by the fact that although the nation as we know it is a modern construct, it is almost always based on a pre-modern ethnic community, and is

The Ethnic Phenomenon (New York: Elsevier, 1979).

¹⁰Rothschild, Ethnopolitics, pp. 60-61.

¹¹The political myth of nationalism is best summarized by Anthony D. Smith: "It holds... that mankind is naturally divided into distinct nations, each with its peculiar character, and that everyone must, again as a matter of nature, belong to a nation, which is the source of all power and every liberty. Nationalists further claim that nations have existed from time immemorial, but that, in the course of generations, the members of most nations forgot their identities and failed to recognise the ties that bound them; and it is only in recent times that nations have been reawakened, with the help of the nationalists and patriots, who have succeeded in reminding members of their national bonds, so paving the way for a truly national regeneration." "The Myth of the 'Modern Nation' and the Myths of Nations," Ethnic and Racial Studies 11 (January 1988): 1.

formed very much in its image.¹² This helps explain the problems faced by African countries which are trying to create a "state-nation." Their colonial boundaries were often purely arbitrary, and the resulting post-colonial states possessed no cultural or historical significance for the Africans incorporated in them.¹³

A purely instrumentalist approach which treats ethnic groups as instruments of special economic and political interests, with no independent status, is thus incapable of explaining the high level of altruistic commitment often demonstrated by many of the activists who act as promoters of the "nation." Ethnic nationalism implies a willingness to make sacrifices (even of one's life) for some larger public good, and it cannot readily be incorporated within an analysis which is clearly based on a utilitarian calculus. It is, in short, both primordial and instrumental in nature.¹⁴

¹²See, in particular, the detailed discussions in John A. Armstrong, Nations Before Nationalism (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1982), and Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986). In contemporary Europe, regional grievances have been successfully exploited only where they enjoy an ethnic base. See Milton J. Esman, "Perspectives on Ethnic Conflict in Industrialized Countries," in Milton J. Esman, ed., Ethnic Conflict in the Western World (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), p. 377.

¹³Anthony D. Smith, State and Nation in the Third World (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1983), Chapter 7.

¹⁴It is interesting to note, in another context, that social scientists in both the United States and the Soviet Union were unable to anticipate or even comprehend the triumph of Khomeini in Iran, since the intellectual traditions in both countries were incapable of regarding religious fundamentalism in the late twentieth century in any terms other than as a manifestation of "false consciousness." See Martha Brill Olcott, "The Iranian Revolution: A Crisis of Social-Science Theory," in Dennis L. Thompson and Dov Ronen, eds., Ethnicity, Politics, and Development (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1986), pp. 179-194. This same attitude permeates instrumentalist treatments of nationalist movements when it comes to understanding, or simply discounting, their "emotional content."

Ethnonational Movements and the Governmental Response

There are a large number of case studies of ethnonational movements in the twentieth century. These case studies usually stress the grievances of the ethnonational group striving for greater autonomy or independence within a multinational state, the social base of, and resources available to, the movement, the goals of the movement, and the means adopted to achieve these goals.¹⁵ The spectrum of potential goals ranges from the pluralistic ideal of full political integration combined with guaranteed cultural autonomy, to political-territorial autonomy along federal lines, to secession and full political independence.

As for the strategies, they can range from normative devices such as exploiting the sense of guilt, sympathy, etc. of the dominant ethnonational group and central governmental authorities; instrumental or utilitarian tactics such as proposing votes and other forms of support to the dominant political party in return for various favors and concessions; and coercive tactics such as the use of selective terror against prominent political figures from the dominant group, the organization of mass demonstrations and strikes, etc.¹⁶

However, little attention has been devoted to the circumstances which influence or determine the choice of goals and strategies of ethnonational movements. This is largely due to the great range of resources available to

¹⁵Much of this literature is noted in the annual annotated bibliographies prepared by the Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism, and re-issued by Garland Press. See, for example, Gale Stokes, Nationalism in the Balkans: An Annotated Bibliography (New York: Garland, 1984) and F. Gilbert Chan, Nationalism in East Asia: An Annotated Bibliography of Selected Works (New York: Garland, 1981). Several essays which adopt a more comparative approach to the study of nationalist movements can be found in Colin H. Williams, ed., National Separatism (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1982) and Anthony D. Smith, ed., Nationalist Movements (London: Macmillan, 1976).

¹⁶Rothschild, Ethnopolitics, pp. 167-170.

different ethnonational groups, the secrecy which usually surrounds the activities of ethnonational movements which are striving for radical changes in the territorial status quo (especially if they are active in authoritarian states), and attempts by the leaders of many ethnonational movements to mythologize the origins and history of these movements. It also reflects the lack of systematic data on a very significant topic -- the background, social composition and mobility profiles of both the leadership and the followers of ethnonational movements.¹⁷ Smith and others have emphasized the crucial roles played by certain sectors of the intelligentsia, especially the cultural intelligentsia, in the rise and development of ethnonational movements and ethnic "revivals"; however, little attention has been devoted to elite dynamics within specific ethnonational movements, and the role of their leadership figures.¹⁸

As for the central governmental authorities in any political system, they also have a variety of normative, instrumental, and coercive means at their disposal to counter the impact of the activity of disaffected ethnonational groups. The effectiveness of these means is underlined by the fact that although there have been a large number of political separatist movements based on ethnonationalism in the

¹⁷Robert J. Thompson and Joseph R. Rudolph, Jr., "The Ebb and Flow of Ethnoterritorial Politics in the Western World," in Ethnoterritorial Politics, Policy, and the Western World, eds. Joseph R. Rudolph, Jr., and Robert J. Thompson (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1989), p. 13. However, there are some exceptions. See, for example, William R. Beer, "The Social Class of Ethnic Activists in Contemporary France," in Esman, ed., Ethnic Conflict, pp. 143-158; and Jaroslaw Bilocerkowycz, Soviet Ukrainian Dissent: A Study of Political Alienation (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988).

¹⁸Smith calls the intelligentsia the "new priesthood" of the nation. Just as priests and scribes used to play the primary role in transmitting and disseminating the communal memory, in the early phase of ethnonational movements small groups of intellectuals play the primary role in redefining the community as a "nation" and unlocking its "secrets" through archeology, literature, history, etc. See his The Ethnic Origins of Nations, pp. 157-160. On the role of the intelligentsia in more recent ethnic revivals, and the alliances they form with other social groups in building the ethnic community, see Smith's The Ethnic Revival, Chapters 5 and 6.

post-WWII period, very few have been successful in achieving their aims.¹⁹ This is primarily due to the advantages available to the central political authorities in coping with actual or potential ethnonational unrest in a modern multinational state -- especially one with a centralized, authoritarian form of government. These advantages are numerous and impressive, and include:

- 1) the authority and means necessary to conduct a national census -- and thus to determine (and often manipulate) the categories which define the profile of the country's population;
- 2) the authority to define (e.g., in the state-controlled media) the issues involved in any intra-state ethnonational conflict, and to control or influence the way in which it is portrayed to the country's population and the outside world;
- 3) the authority to determine (through the state-controlled educational system, official youth organizations, the system of military or paramilitary training, etc.) the nature of the general and political socialization of the country's youth;
- 4) the authority to determine, through the formulation of cultural policy, the extent to which an ethnonational group is provided with access, or deprived of access, to the group's "cultural memory" in the form of literature in the native language, museums, other cultural facilities, etc;
- 5) control over taxation, the mobilization of capital, and other means of redistributing resources which can be used to reward (or punish) certain regions of the country and certain categories of the population;

¹⁹Anthony D. Smith, "Nationalism, Ethnic Separatism and the Intelligentsia," in National Separatism, ed. Colin H. Williams (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1982), p. 35.

- 6) the ability to attract, and co-opt, the country's skilled personnel into the state bureaucracy;
- 7) where there is a dominant core group facing a number of peripheral ethnonational groups, the capability to play one group against another (divide et impera);
- 8) a recognized status, in international law and international organizations, when engaging in negotiations with the leaders of an intra-state ethnonational movement (which usually lacks such status) and its actual or potential patrons;
- 9) control over the means of coercion, especially in the form of a security apparatus and the armed forces, which can be used to intimidate or repress actual or potential opponents.²⁰

It should be emphasized that, despite the importance of the principle of national self-determination as a source of legitimacy within the international political system in the twentieth century,²¹

there is an inbuilt bias in the international political system against secession that seems to be based on the 'epidemic' or 'chain reaction' hypothesis which claims that granting one national group the right to secede will open the floodgates to a whole series of claims. Since most states have ethnic and national minorities they are particularly sensitive about the dangers of creating a precedent in favour of secession. Since 1945 only Bangladesh (de jure) and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (de facto) have succeeded in severing

²⁰This list was compiled on the basis of discussions in a variety of sources. In particular, see Robert J. Thompson and Joseph R. Rudolph, Jr., "Ethnic Politics and Public Policy in Western Societies: A Framework for Comparative Analysis," in Ethnicity, Politics, and Development, eds. Dennis L. Thompson and Dov Ronen (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1986), pp. 25-64.

²¹Dov Ronen, The Quest for Self-Determination (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), Chapter 1.

links with existing states when this was opposed by the dominant groups within that state.²²

The concrete policies which central governmental authorities can implement to deal with the problems caused by a multinational population range along a very broad spectrum. The central governments' first choice is whether or not to permit an ethnonational minority to remain within the state, or on its historical territory within the state. If the decision is negative then genocide, expulsion or dispersal among other groups, or a combination of the two, are available means. If the central government accepts its population as a given, the next choice is whether to move toward assimilation of groups or to pursue a policy of group autonomy.

Some governments accommodate (usually reluctantly) minority ethnonational demands, especially in cases when minority protests are loud and persistent, and ethnonational leaders effectively mobilize large numbers of supporters to engage in political action. The central government may try to satisfy the aggrieved group(s) by making arrangements to accommodate its (their) cultural needs; there is usually a much greater reluctance to provide political concessions (e.g., concessions leading to a federation or confederation along ethnonational lines) to ethnonational minorities.²³

²²Ryan, "Explaining Ethnic Conflict," p. 173. See also David B. Knight, "The Dilemma of Nations in a Rigid State Structured World," in Pluralism and Political Geography: People, Territory and State (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), pp. 114-137; and David B. Knight and Maureen Davies, Self-Determination: An Interdisciplinary Annotated Bibliography (New York: Garland Press, 1987). For an interesting reflection on the way in which Western fears of the "Balkanization" of the Soviet Union have affected the way in which journalists have covered the growth of ethnonationalism in the Soviet Union, see Alfred E. Senn, "On Nationalism, Perspective, and a Few Other Things," Bulletin of the Association for the Advancement of Central Asian Research 2 (February 1989): 2-4.

²³See Joseph R. Rudolph and Robert J. Thompson, "Ethnoterritorial Movements and the Policy Process: Accommodating Nationalist Demands in the Developed World," Comparative Politics 17 (April 1985): 291-311; and Michael Keating, State and Regional Nationalism: Territorial Politics and the European State (Hemel, Hempstead: Harvester, 1988).

A considerable body of literature deals with the more drastic coercive options used by central governments, and especially the Nazi German government's genocidal policy towards Jews during World War II.²⁴ Likewise, considerable attention has been devoted to the consensual arrangements which have helped to maintain stable governments in certain liberal-democratic multinational states. For example, the literature on consociational democracy discusses how the cooperative attitudes and behaviour of the leaders of different segments of the population counteract the centrifugal tendencies inherent in plural societies, with a focus on political parties, legislatures, and electoral mechanisms.²⁵ However, there has been little scholarly interest in the wide range of specific strategies and policies (often quite sophisticated in nature), between the two extremes noted above, which central governmental authorities have used to deal with the grievances of ethnonational

²⁴See, for example, the new journal entitled Holocaust and Genocide Studies, and Leo Kuper, "Theories of Genocide," Ethnic and Racial Studies 4 (July 1981): 320-333. Relatively little attention has been devoted to the various waves of deportations, and policies of forced assimilation, which were widespread in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union during and soon after World War II. These included the brutal deportations of the Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans, and several other nationalities of the Soviet Union, as well as population transfers in Eastern Europe involving Ukrainians, Poles, Germans, and others. More recently, in the late 1980s Romania and Bulgaria engaged in harshly coercive policies aimed at the assimilation of their respective Hungarian and Turkish minorities.

²⁵Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); Kenneth D. McRae, ed., Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974); Kenneth D. McRae, Conflict and Compromise in Multilingual Societies: Belgium (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1986).

minorities.²⁶ In particular, there are few detailed case studies of the way in which central governments in multinational, multilingual states actually manage their ethnonational "problems" by means of ethnically differentiated personnel policies, even in states where minority rights are constitutionally entrenched. That is, details of the actual policy process in this area are usually lacking.

This is largely due to the sensitive nature of this subject. Thus, for example, even in liberal-democratic states such as Canada or Belgium, with relatively "open" political systems, little is known about the process whereby a certain percentage of senior civil service positions is allotted to personnel of a given ethnic background or with specific linguistic skills. However, because of the highly symbolic and sensitive nature of such appointments, in recent years the central agencies of government have definitely utilized a certain ethnic "calculus" in determining senior civil servant personnel allocation in these and other multinational states.²⁷ In such circumstances ethnicity is clearly an independent variable acting upon and conditioning political behaviour, even in circumstances which might seem to have little to do with ethnicity.

²⁶One exception is the fairly extensive literature on linguistic policy and language planning. See, for example, Goldie Shabad and Richard Gunther, "Language, Nationalism, and Political Conflict in Spain," Comparative Politics 14 (July 1982): 443-477; A. Mughan, "Accommodation or Defusion in the Management of Linguistic Conflict in Belgium?" Political Studies 31 (September 1983): 434-451; John Edwards, ed., Linguistic Minorities, Policies and Pluralism (London: Academic Press, 1984); and Nancy Schweda-Nicholson, ed., Languages in the International Perspective (Norwood, N.J.: Ablex Publishing Corp., 1986). Articles on this topic are frequently found in journals such as International Journal of the Sociology of Language, Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development, and Language Problems and Language Planning.

²⁷On this contentious issue see McRae, Conflict and Compromise, pp. 189-203; William W. Bostock, "The Commissioner of Official Languages: A Canadian Response to a Situation of Ethno-Linguistic Cleavage," Ethnic and Racial Studies 3 (October 1980): 415-426; and the annual reports of the Commissioner of Official Languages in Canada.

The Concept of an Ethnic Security Map

In a state with marked ethnonational cleavages, where the authority of the central government is rarely supported by strong horizontal bonds of trust and belonging among citizens of different ethnonational backgrounds, one of the priorities (and sometimes the top priority) of the central authorities is maintaining the security and integrity of the state in the face of internal as well as external threats. As noted in Chapter 1, in this situation central political elites (defined as the actors who control the civil bureaucracy, the police, the military, and the courts) are likely to conceive of state security as involving the maintenance of a congenial ethnonational pattern of authority. Thus one would expect the central governmental authorities' appreciation of the disruptive capabilities of actual or potential ethnonational movements to be reflected in the application of various stability-oriented policies, and one can hypothesize that the more the policy "mix" (of normative, instrumental, and coercive means) applied in a given situation tends toward coercion, the more the central authorities perceive the situation as threatening to their legitimacy and hold on power.

Cynthia Enloe has argued that such elites in plural societies usually have a very clear idea of the pattern of inter-ethnic relations which best suits the state's survival, and of which ethnonational groups are most reliable (in many cases, they are the groups with which the members of this elite themselves identify).²⁸ Enloe applies what she calls an "ethnic security map" to a study of personnel policies within multinational armed forces, police forces and other security agencies, and

²⁸Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in Divided Societies (Athens, Ga.: The University of Georgia Press, 1980), pp. 14-15.

concludes that, in the countries under study, central policy-makers did not leave the composition of the state's coercive institutions to chance. They conceptualized their publics in terms of ethnic identifications; and they used those conceptualizations to determine what manpower pools to draw on during different kinds of conflicts.²⁹ According to Enloe,

State elites have in their minds what might be called "ethnic security maps" which trace expectations that elites have regarding the political dependability of various ethnic groups. Such mental maps become the basis for state elites' structuring inter-ethnic relations in a fashion that best secures the current state structure... Each ethnic group affects -- and thus may jeopardize -- state security. Therefore it is important to state elites that they should create and maintain a pattern of ethnic relations that will maximize state security. To do this, each group will be treated according to its saliency for security and its estimated political reliability.³⁰

Enloe illustrates her case with reference to armed forces and police forces in a variety of different historical and contemporary settings (e.g., the British, Ottoman, and Austro-Hungarian empires, Indonesia, Malaysia, India, Iraq, Burma, Pakistan, Nigeria, etc.), and her conclusions are supported by a number of other scholars.³¹

²⁹Cynthia Enloe, Police, Military and Ethnicity: Foundations of State Power (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1980), Chapter 1.

³⁰Enloe, Ethnic Soldiers, p. 15.

³¹On the use of multinational military forces in the Austro-Hungarian empire, see: Alan Sked, The Survival of the Hapsburg Empire: Radetzky, the Imperial Army, and the Class War (London: Longman, 1979); and Guenther Rothenberg, "The Habsburg Army and the Nationality Problem in the Nineteenth Century, 1815-1914," Austrian History Yearbook Volume III (1967), pp. 70-87. On more contemporary developments see Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Part 4 ("Military Politics and Ethnic Conflict"); the articles in DeWitt C. Ellinwood and Cynthia H. Enloe, Ethnicity and the Military in Asia (Buffalo: State University of New York, 1981); Anthony Kirk-Greene, "'Damnosa Hereditas': Ethnic Ranking and the Martial Races Imperative in Africa," Ethnic and Racial Studies 3 (October 1980): 393-414; and Claude E. Welch, Jr., "Ethnic Factors in African Armies," Ethnic and Racial Studies 9 (July 1986): 321-333.

If, as Enloe argues, central political elites are very sensitive to the security implications of the pattern of ethnic relations in a multinational society, then the concept of an "ethnic security map" can be usefully applied outside of the relatively narrow context of personnel management in military and police forces. Thus, for example, one would expect to see an "ethnic security map" influencing the selection of administrative personnel for a variety of sensitive "control points" in ethnic minority or ethnically mixed areas, especially in the case of large multinational states with a history of domestic ethnonational conflict.

One would also expect that concern over the security implications of ethnonationalism would be particularly marked in authoritarian states. Such states often have a maximalist view of the potential of "national integration" and "nation-building" (which are often code words for assimilation of ethnonational minorities into the dominant group), and do not possess well-developed mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of conflicts between communal groups.³² Thus the Soviet Union provides a convenient setting for a more detailed examination of the concept of an ethnic security map, in both the narrow and broad sense of the term.

The Contours of a Soviet Ethnic Security Map

Those scholars who have attempted an overview of the entire "ethnonational scene" in the USSR argue that Soviet nationality policy has differentiated among "target" groups, and that this differentiation partly depends on the central political

³²For a thorough discussion of the problems of, as well as the potential for, the resolution of ethnic conflicts in a variety of Asian and African states with authoritarian regimes, see Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Part Five, "Strategies of Conflict Resolution."

elite's perceptions of the political dependability of these groups or, to use Enloe's terms, on their conceptualization of an ethnic security map.³³ An assessment will be made below of the extent to which these elite perceptions have affected military policy, security policy, cadre policy, etc., with a focus on the period following World War II.

The discussion below largely follows the modified functional approach proposed by Armstrong in the mid-60s,³⁴ and adopts his assumptions that

the fundamental objectives of the ruling Soviet elite are to maintain control of the decision-making process in the present Soviet Union... It is further assumed that the elite believes (and is factually correct in its belief) that maximum centralized control and expansion of Soviet power require a unified national culture; that given the numerical and historical predominance of Russians, this culture must be Russian; but that, except in special cases, the elite is not primarily motivated by Russian ethnocentrism as such.³⁵

Given these assumptions, which I hold were valid during the period from 1945 to 1985, only certain forms and expressions of Russian nationalism were tolerated by the central political authorities in the Soviet Union. As Szporluk has pointed out, the "statist" current in Russian nationalist thought, which sees Russian history as an essentially political process, as the history of the Russian state (viewed as the most

³³See, for example, John A. Armstrong, "The Ethnic Scene in the Soviet Union: The View of the Dictatorship," in Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union, ed. Erich Goldhagen (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 5.

³⁴Armstrong criticizes mainstream functional theory for treating society as an equilibrium system which is essentially static, and he emphasizes the degree to which the direction of change in the Soviet system is due to conscious manipulation.

³⁵Armstrong, "The Ethnic Scene," p. 5. Armstrong restates his views on the "ethnic scene" in the USSR, with some modifications, in the article "Soviet Nationalities Policies," Soviet Jewish Affairs 15, no. 1 (1985): 57-64.

genuine expression of the Russian nation), did not pose a direct threat to the party in power. It was thus tolerated and even had some official support.³⁶ On the other hand, the "culturalist" position

conceives of Russian nationality as basically cultural or spiritual in nature. It attaches fundamental importance to the language, literature, ancestral homelands (soil) and religion, as markers of Russian identity, and it tends to judge politics -- the state -- in terms of conformity to these non-political dimensions of Russian nationhood....³⁷

Certain conceptions of Russian history inspired by the culturalist position posed a political challenge to the Soviet system, or even a denial of its legitimacy, and some of its proponents therefore encountered official sanctions. There is a strong tension between these two conceptions of history, and the relationship between the Russian people and the Soviet state is, in many respects, the central nationality issue in the USSR today, for the agenda of the non-Russians is largely determined by their perception of the position of the Russians in the Soviet political system.³⁸

i) Senior Party Cadres

The political-strategic significance of the ethnic pattern of senior party cadre recruitment in the non-Russian areas of the USSR became clear soon after the Bolshevik revolution. The training and promotion of local cadres in the 1920s (the policy of korenizatsiia, or indigenization) was not seen by the central party

³⁶Roman Szporluk, "History and Russian Nationalism," Survey 24 (Summer 1979): 1, 15-16.

³⁷Ibid., p. 1.

³⁸For a detailed examination of this question, see Roman Szporluk, "Dilemmas of Russian Nationalism," Problems of Communism 38 (July-August 1989): 15-35.

authorities as a good in itself, and did not reflect any great concern for the cultural differences among the nationalities. Rather, it represented an effort by the central authorities to increase the legitimacy of the communist regime in the non-Russian republics, where the large and overwhelmingly non-Russian peasant population was alienated from the urban centres dominated by a Russian or Russified population. It was felt that government measures would encounter less opposition if indigenous functionaries introduced new policies, and took into account local traditions and conditions. In addition, there was a practical problem -- the scarcity of qualified and reliable Russian cadres to administer the entire country.³⁹

Other strategic factors also played a role in the introduction of this policy. Stalin needed the support of the non-Russian party leadership in the non-Russian republics in his struggle with factional groupings in the party. In addition, greater consideration for the national sensibilities of the non-Russian population was supposed to help neutralize nationalist support for groups such as the Basmachi guerillas in Soviet Central Asia, and win sympathy for the Soviet Union among national groups (especially in irredenta) along the Soviet border and further afield.⁴⁰

³⁹See Stalin's statement, in 1920, that "all Soviet organs in the border regions... should as far as possible be recruited from the local people... only in this way can the Soviet power become comprehensible and dear to the labouring masses of the border regions." Cited in Robert Conquest, Soviet Nationalities Policy in Practice (London: The Bodley Head, 1967), pp. 50-51. On the policy of indigenization in general see Helene Carrere d'Encausse, Decline of an Empire: The Soviet Socialist Republics in Revolt (New York: Newsweek Books, 1979), pp. 24-27. On the situation in Ukraine in the early 20s and the policy of "Ukrainization" see Robert S. Sullivant, Soviet Politics and the Ukraine 1917-1957 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 96-105; Bohdan Krawchenko, Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Ukraine (London: Macmillan, 1985), pp. 48, 50, 100; and G.Y. Shevelov, "L'ukrainisation: une politique sovietique (1925-1932)," in Ukraine 1917-1932: Renaissance nationale, eds. Emile Kruba and Arcady Joukovsky (Paris: Inalco, 1986), pp. 39-66.

⁴⁰Sullivant, Soviet Politics, pp. 84-96, 105-106; Alexander G. Park, Bolshevism in Turkestan, 1917-1927 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957), Chapter 4.

However, when Stalin consolidated his position, indigenization became an increasingly formalistic policy, drained of any real content.⁴¹

Thus the indigenization policy, and other policies to satisfy the periphery's demands for cultural and economic autonomy, were initially introduced, as a strategic measure, when the centre lacked confidence in its control over the periphery. In addition, on at least one occasion, some indigenization measures were also promoted as a result of a power play within the top ranks of the Communist Party. After Stalin's death the head of the security apparatus, Lavrentii Beria, attempted to appeal to the resentment among the non-Russian peoples concerning Russian domination of the party and state apparatus. During an unstable period which lasted for several months, until Beria's fall, there was a vigorous debate among party leaders concerning the need to train and promote cadres of the local nationality in the non-Russian republics, and after Beria was ousted some steps were taken to modify the Russian domination of the nominally national apparatus.⁴²

The most detailed research on the way in which an ethnic "key" has influenced personnel policies in the Soviet Union covers the period after World War II, and especially after Stalin's death, when a formula was adopted whereby

⁴¹Sullivan, Soviet Politics, Chapter 4; Shevelov, "L'ukrainisation," pp. 62-65; and Yaroslav Bilinsky, "Mykola Skrypnyk and Petro Shelest: An Essay on the Persistence and Limits of Ukrainian National Communism," in Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices, ed. Jeremy R. Azrael (New York: Praeger, 1978), pp. 117-119.

⁴²Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr., "National Cadres as a Force in the Soviet System: The Evidence of Beria's Career, 1949-53," in Soviet Nationalities Policies and Practices, ed. Azrael, pp. 169-173. There was a rapid "nativization" of party and non-party personnel in Lithuania after Stalin's death which seems to have been linked to Beria's attempt to gain support among the national republican leaderships. See Romuald J. Misiunas and Rein Taagepera, The Baltic States: Years of Dependence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), pp. 127-128. For an analysis of the "Ukrainian connection" in Beria's plans see Yaroslav Bilinsky, The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine After World War II (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1964), pp. 237-241.

Russians (or other Slavs) were assigned to specific control positions in the non-Russian republics. This ensured central political control by Moscow, while the requirement of the nominal sovereignty of the non-Russian republics was satisfied by having local nationals occupy the most senior posts, and all positions of a representative nature.⁴³ This formula was expressed most dramatically at the republican level, in the pattern of recruitment of CPSU first and second secretaries in the non-Russian republics. According to a study which analyzed these patterns between March 1954 and March 1976:

1. The top party leadership in nationality areas is a carefully designed system in which Russian and native officials act as a check on each other. The Russian presence is built in for political reasons and is no longer a consequence of lack of non-Russian expertise. It does, however, seek to avoid drawing on Russian settler communities. The key to its power is control of cadres. The turnover of these officials is fairly rapid; they are doing a tour of duty.

2. The conventions of this system have been considerably regularized and strengthened since Stalin died. The dyarchy of native first secretary and Russian second secretary in charge of cadres is now the norm. This is not the same as a strengthening of Russian control, but represents rather the strengthening of institutional procedures, in an area where, before 1953, equivalent functions would have been performed by the security police....

4. Non-Russian party officials are employed overwhelmingly in their home areas. Russians move from place to place with considerable versatility. There is obscure, but none the less strong evidence for a profession of nationality affairs specialists based on the Central Committee Cadres Department.⁴⁴

⁴³Rakowska-Harmstone, Russia and Nationalism, pp. 96-99.

⁴⁴John H. Miller, "Cadres Policy in Nationality Areas: Recruitment of CPSU First and Second Secretaries in Non-Russian Republics of the USSR," Soviet Studies 29 (January 1977): 34-35. Miller has classified Ukrainians working outside Ukraine as "Russians," since he argues that the role of Ukrainians and Belorussians in the USSR is analogous to that of the Scots and Irish in the British Empire.

Miller acknowledges that there have been exceptions to these generalizations; however, a closer examination of these exceptions supports the general argument that security considerations played an important role in the recruitment of senior party cadres. Thus, for example, during the period under consideration teams of native first and second secretaries were consistently found only in those republics (Ukraine, Belorussia, and Armenia) where the population and local party leadership were perceived to be relatively reliable. In the case of Estonia, where both the first and second secretaries were of Estonian background, they had spent the interwar years in the USSR as communist emigres or the children of such emigres.⁴⁵

The above conclusions were confirmed by another study, on the ethnic composition of leading positions in the 14 non-Russian union republics over the 1955-1972 time period, which demonstrated that in spheres concerned with ideological, youth, labour, and health affairs, indigenous elites held most or all of the key posts, but in spheres relating to political security, industrial management, and cadre selection, Russians (or other Slavs) often outnumbered members of the indigenous nationality.⁴⁶

More specialized studies confirmed the existence of a "control formula" for these and other positions in the party and state bureaucracies of the non-Russian republics, although this formula was modified to suit local conditions. This has

⁴⁵Miller, "Cadres Policy," pp. 12-14. See also Carrere d'Encausse, Decline, pp. 141-155, and the discussion below for more details.

⁴⁶Grey Hodnett, Leadership in the Soviet National Republics: A Quantitative Study of Recruitment Policy (Oakville, Ont.: Mosaic Press, 1978), pp. 108-109.

been most clearly illustrated in the case of Soviet Central Asia. A detailed study of the political elite and power structure in post-WWII Tadzhikistan showed that

two men, instead of one, headed each power cluster within the Party and the government hierarchies -- a device that undoubtedly proved useful in checking the power ambitions of both. One was a local Communist, offering visible proof to the Tadzhiks that one of their own people could attain honor, power, and prestige within the Soviet system. The other was a Russian; alien to the country and to its people, history, needs, and aspirations, he served as the "eyes and ears" of the Central Committee of the CPSU.... the pattern of the distribution of the Russian cadres, and especially the customary supervision by the Russians of personnel placement at each administrative level, prevented the exercise of any meaningful local autonomy.⁴⁷

In the 1950s, according to Rywkin's case study of Uzbekistan:

1. Russian (or other Slavic) officials were assigned:
 - a) to key security positions within the KGB and to key military positions within the two existing military districts (Turkestan and Central Asian);
 - b) as Second Party Secretaries at both republic and region (oblast') levels and, most often, to district levels as well...
 - c) as heads of departments of Party Organizational Work (formerly Organization-Instruction Departments) and of the Special Section within Party committees;
 - d) to be in charge of other departments, political or not, and supervising various economic activities in industry or agriculture whenever closer control or better efficiency was required....
3. All important native office holders were given Russian (or other Slavic) seconds, vice-ministers or assistants, both within the Party and the Government apparatus. These Russian "seconds" often moved from one key position to another, always remaining behind the native

⁴⁷Rakowska-Harmstone, Russia and Nationalism, pp. 96-97. Rakowska-Harmstone has classified, for the purposes of the name analysis conducted in her study, all bearers of Slavic names as "Russian."

"firsts." They were sometimes shifted from one republic to another, something almost never available to local native officials....⁴⁸

In a follow-up study, which examined regional and district party staffing in Uzbekistan in the early 1980s, Rywkin concluded that the second secretaries remained the mainstay of the Russian presence in the regional party apparatus. All the Second Secretaries in the analyzed regions were Russians or other Slavs, and Western scholars generally agree that the Second Secretary in an oblast' in Central Asia has been a more important person than his counterpart in a Russian oblast'. The balance between Russian and Muslim control at the district level was, according to Rywkin, connected with the following factors:

1. districts with little non-Russian population and no major industrial or irrigation projects are most often left to native control;
2. on the contrary, districts rich in industry, irrigation or gas/oil extraction, tend to have Russian Party Secretaries, mostly Second ones;
3. districts characterized by specific ethnic staffing in the past seem at least from the 1970s on to continue in the same way into the 1980s. Shifts from one pattern of ethnic distribution to another are not very frequent: I was able to document only five such instances involving a shift to Muslim control and three reverse ones, for a total 1970-1983 gain of two positions for the Muslims.⁴⁹

The presence of these non-native officials in sensitive positions was not always successful in preventing a substantial accumulation of power by native personnel in

⁴⁸Michael Rywkin, "Power and Ethnicity: Party Staffing in Uzbekistan (1941/46, 1957/58)," Central Asian Survey 4, No. 1 (1985): 41-42.

⁴⁹Michael Rywkin, "Power and Ethnicity: Regional and District Party Staffing in Uzbekistan (1983/84)," Central Asian Survey 4, No. 1 (1985): 7.

the republics, as recent purges in Soviet Central Asia have illustrated.³⁰ Still, the intent of party cadre policy was clear.

More detailed studies of the Baltic republics show that a local variation of the ethnic security map largely dictated party personnel policy in this region after World War II. Thus, for example, a relatively small group of "Russian Latvians" (individuals of Latvian origin who were born and raised in the inter-war Soviet Union, or were born in Latvia and moved to the Soviet Union during or soon after WWI), who often had a minimal knowledge of the Latvian language, played a key role in the Sovietization of Latvia during and after WWII and, until recently, dominated senior party and state positions in the Latvian SSR.³¹ A similar pattern was found in the Estonian SSR while, in the absence of any substantial group of "Russian Lithuanians," non-native party and state cadres dominated the Lithuanian SSR until the death of Stalin.³²

The situation was more complex in the Ukrainian SSR. Here the pattern of the cooptation, patronage, and local recruitment of party personnel in recent years was characteristic of what Beissinger calls "neo-imperial" domination, "a system of external control exercised increasingly through local elites rather than through a

³⁰James Critchlow, "'Corruption', Nationalism, and the Native Elites in Soviet Central Asia," Journal of Communist Studies 4 (June 1988): 142-161; William Fierman, "Glasnost' in Practice: The Uzbek Experience," Central Asian Survey 8, no. 2 (1989): 30-31.

³¹Egil Levits, "National Elites and their Political Function within the Soviet System: the Latvian Elite," Journal of Baltic Studies 18 (Summer 1987): 182-185; and Adolfs Silde, "The Role of Russian-Latvians in the Sovietization of Latvia," Journal of Baltic Studies 18 (Summer 1987): 191-200.

³²Misiunas and Taagepera, The Baltic States, pp. 76-79, 126-128; and Jaan Pennar, "Soviet Nationality Policy and the Estonian Communist Elite," in A Case Study of a Soviet Republic: The Estonian SSR, eds. Tõnu Parming and E. Jarvesoo (Boulder: Westview, 1978), pp. 113-117.

visible external presence."³³ Specifically, the central party officials in Ukraine who replaced the "Ukrainian autonomist" party leader Shelest and his associates in 1972 relied heavily on the more Russified oblasts of Ukraine as a source of cadres for the remainder of the republic, and the career prospects of these cadres were significantly better than for officials from less Russified oblasts. Thus those members of the political elite who were well integrated into the dominant system of ethnic relations because of their careers and experience in highly Russified Ukrainian provinces acted as mediators for Russian political dominance, and as a linkage between the imperial metropole and its periphery through a subtle "ethnic division of labor."³⁴ Beissinger concludes that

What is striking about elite recruitment in the Ukraine over the previous two decades has been the extent to which processes of cooptation, patronage, and authority-building have been shaped not by secular socioeconomic trends or by the logic of succession, but rather by the regime's attitudes towards ethnonationalism and perceptions of the dangers it posed for Russian political domination.³⁵

That these senior cadre policies were a notable source of resentment in the non-Russian republics became evident during the first session of the new Congress of People's Deputies. A Georgian deputy attacked Moscow's practice of appointing republican Party second secretaries from outside the republic (he called them "satraps sent from Moscow") who did not represent the national interests of the

³³Mark Beissinger, "Ethnicity, the Personnel Weapon, and Neo-imperial Integration: Ukrainian and RSFSR Provincial Party Officials Compared," Studies in Comparative Communism 21 (Spring 1988): 75.

³⁴Ibid., p. 84.

³⁵Ibid.

republics where they serve and knew nothing of the national customs of these republics.⁵⁶ Likewise, a Moldavian deputy listed some of the individuals who had been sent from Moscow in the past to run Moldavia and requested that, in the future, this practice of "reinforcing leading cadres" be terminated.⁵⁷

Some of the local variations in the application of an ethnic security map to senior cadre appointments have been described above. However, the number of positions subject to an ethnic "control formula" is probably relatively small, and underlying this practice there has also been a broader policy emphasis on promoting the integration of the non-Russian nationalities into Soviet society by equalising ethnic socioeconomic levels and political participation rates.⁵⁸

In fact, "affirmative action" programs analogous to earlier digenization campaigns continue to provide for a more equitable representation of some previously underrepresented groups in higher education and in a variety of professional and managerial posts in the party and government bureaucracies. For example, preferential quotas for certain non-Russian groups, and especially Central Asian Muslims, were established at higher educational establishments in their native republics, and in the Central Asian republics there has also been a policy of

⁵⁶Izvestiia, 1 June 1969, p. 6.

⁵⁷Izvestiia, 2 June 1989, p. 7. During a plerum of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee on October 20, 1988, almost all speakers demanded the replacement of the Party second secretary -- a Russian -- by a native Lithuanian and a change of the second secretary's status as a "watchdog" over the republic. One speaker asked: "Why, for many decades, has the second secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee been sent from Moscow, and not elected by the Communists of the republican Party organization?" Sovetskaia Litva, 27 October 1988, quoted in Alexander Rahr, "Lithuanian Party Leadership Demands More Autonomy," Radio Liberty Research Bulletin 499/88, 8 November 1988.

⁵⁸Ellen Jones and Fred W. Grupp, "Modernisation and Ethnic Equalisation in the USSR," Soviet Studies 36 (April 1984): 159.

appointing and advancing indigenous cadres in various sectors of the party and government bureaucracies.⁵⁹

Most of these affirmative action measures were initially installed and promoted by the central authorities and, like all affirmative action measures, they discriminated against certain sectors of the population; in this case, the non-indigenous populations of the non-Russian republics. However, the trends varied greatly from republic to republic. According to one study analyzing the perceptions of emigres from the Soviet Union, the intensity of privilege for indigenous groups (in access to government or party positions, good jobs, and access to higher education) in the 1970s was

high in Central Asia, the Caucasus, Moldavia, Lithuania and Estonia (note the small N, which makes the last finding more questionable), middle-range in the Ukraine, and in Belorussia and Latvia the balance favors the Russians. In other words, though in most non-Russian republics the titular nationality is perceived as treated best, in Belorussia and Latvia Russians are seen as holding an equal or even superior positions.⁶⁰

⁵⁹This phenomenon has been most thoroughly examined by Nancy Lubin, who conducted extensive field research (including many interviews) in Uzbekistan in 1978-79. See her Labour and Nationality in Soviet Central Asia: An Uneasy Compromise (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), especially pp. 154-163 and 229-30. Certain "affirmative action" measures in the field of education are discussed in Rasma Karklins, "Ethnic Politics and Access to Higher Education: The Soviet Case," Comparative Politics 16 (April 1984): 277-294.

⁶⁰Rasma Karklins, "Nationality Policy and Ethnic Relations in the USSR," in Politics, Work, and Daily Life in the USSR: A Survey of Former Soviet Citizens, ed. James R. Millar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 307-308. The titular republican nationalities were perceived to have the easiest access to CPSU membership except for Belorussia, Latvia, and Ukraine (p. 309).

Another survey conducted with Soviet emigres indicates that this differentiation was based on whether the indigenous nations were gaining power in their republic, or losing it.⁶¹

In the case of those republics (especially in Central Asia) where indigenous elites have become increasingly self-confident, they often applied existing affirmative action measures, or introduced new, "informal" affirmative action measures, in such a way as to increase discrimination against non-indigenous populations even further. This was especially true of those areas of education or employment which were free of strict central control.

In the 1980s the central political authorities voiced increasing concern about the nature, extent and abuses of such local, "informal" affirmative action. Nonetheless, during the period under consideration this did not affect the "control formula" discussed earlier, and the domination of sensitive positions in the party and state bureaucracies of the non-Russian republics by Russians or other Slavs, when combined with increasingly self-confident indigenous elites in a number of republics, led to increasing tension among indigenous and non-indigenous groups.⁶²

The discussion above has shown that an ethnic security map was clearly applied to policies concerning certain senior personnel in party and government bureaucracies in the non-Russian republics of the Soviet Union, and has also

⁶¹Rasma Karklins, Ethnic Relations in the USSR: The Perspective From Below (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1986), p. 77.

⁶²For more details about central concern re local affirmative action measures, and the measures taken to counter this phenomenon, see Ann Sheehy, "Ligachev Stresses Benefits of Inter-regional Exchange of Personnel," Radio Liberty Research Bulletin 113/86, 10 March 1986; Ann Sheehy, "Slav Presence Increased in Uzbek Party Buro and Secretariat," Radio Liberty Research Bulletin 94/86, 24 February 1986; and Bess Brown, "The Twenty-Third Congress of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan," Radio Liberty Research Bulletin 74/86, 12 February 1986.

described some of the factors which determine the role it plays in specific circumstances.

ii) The Military

The historical record shows that in the case of non-Slavs in the Russian empire, only those considered loyal to the tsarist regime were drafted into military service, whereas groups considered to be unreliable (in particular, Central Asians and certain peoples of the Caucasus) were excluded from service in the regular army until, in the course of World War I, the tsarist regime had to quickly expand the military use of minorities to meet the manpower demands on its army. The strains inherent in operating a multinational military force became most obvious during World War I and especially in 1917, when the formation of national military units (for Ukrainians, Poles, Latvians, Estonians, Armenians, and others), with or without the sanction of the military authorities, proved to be one of the most important factors destabilizing the tsarist army.⁶³

Although national units were used in the Soviet Union during the interwar period, they were not popular with the Soviet leadership, which was unsure of its ability to fully control them, and all national units were abolished in March 1938, on the eve of World War II.⁶⁴ During this conflict, the German perception of the

⁶³Susan L. Curran and Dmitry Ponomareff, "Managing the Ethnic Factor in the Russian and Soviet Armed Forces: A Historical Overview," in Ethnic Minorities in the Red Army: Asset or Liability?, eds. Alexander R. Alexiev and S. Enders Wimbush (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), pp. 13-38. For a detailed examination of this topic, by a former Soviet historian who emigrated to Israel after working for many years in Soviet military archives, see Mikhail S. Frenkin, Russkaia armia i revoliutsiia 1917-1918 (Munich: Logos Verlag, 1978).

⁶⁴The first significant article to analyze developments during this period was Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone's "The Soviet Army as the Instrument of National Integration," in Soviet Military Power and Performance, eds. John Erickson and E.J. Feuchtwanger (London: Macmillan, 1979), pp. 131-134.

strategic importance of the "ethnic factor" in the Soviet Union, and particularly in the Soviet armed forces, played an important role in the political and military conduct of the war, and the policies adopted by the central Soviet authorities during World War II showed that they were uncertain about the willingness of many non-Russian nationalities in uniform to fight for the objectives of the Soviet state.⁶⁵

The only explicit attempt to apply the concept of an ethnic security map to the Soviet armed forces has focused on contemporary aspects of the problem of managing the multinational Soviet conscript army. It argues that the pattern of political socialization in the armed forces and the pattern of recruitment of conscripts into various branches of the armed forces, as well as the ethnic composition of various military units and the officer cadre, has reflected a clear concern over the reliability of troops of certain ethnonational backgrounds. Thus, for example, no soldier is stationed in his home area, and each military unit must be ethnically mixed.⁶⁶ Russians and other Slavs⁶⁷ dominate elite and special mission

See also: Rakowska-Harmstone, "USSR," pp. 18-24; Christopher D. Jones, "Historical Precedents: Ethnic Units and the Soviet Armed Forces," in Warsaw Pact: The Question of Cohesion, Phase II, Volume 1, by Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone et al. (Ottawa: ORAE, Department of National Defence, 1984), pp. 93-103; and Curran and Ponomareff, "Managing the Ethnic Factor," pp. 39-50.

⁶⁵Rakowska-Harmstone, "USSR," pp. 30-45; Curran and Ponomareff, "Managing the Ethnic Factor," pp. 51-64; and Alexander R. Alexiev, "Soviet Nationalities in German Wartime Strategy, 1941-1945," in Ethnic Minorities, eds. Alexiev and Wimbush, pp. 69-120.

⁶⁶Rakowska-Harmstone, "USSR," pp. 171-184. In response to hunger strikes, in June 1989, by young Georgian men demanding to be allowed to perform their military service in their home republic, there have been some minimal concessions by the local military command. Thus, for example, in the future young married men will be allowed to perform their military service in Georgia. See Elizabeth Fuller, "Georgians Win Concessions on Military Service," Report on the USSR 1 (7 July 1989): 20.

⁶⁷By "other Slavs" I mean primarily Ukrainians and Belorussians, most of whom appear to become "denationalized," and adopt Russian attitudes and outlooks, if they reach high party positions in the central party hierarchy. On these individuals see Yaroslav Bilinsky, "The Background of Contemporary Politics in the Baltic Republics and the Ukraine: Comparisons and Contrasts," in Problems of Mininations: Baltic Perspectives, eds. Arvids Ziedonis, Jr. et al. (San Jose, Calif.: AABS, 1973), p. 107; and Kenneth C. Farmer, "Consociational Dictatorship or Imperium? Non-Russian

combat services,⁶⁴ while Moslems and some other groups which are not well integrated into Soviet society are concentrated in low-prestige non-combat units.

According to data from studies based on name analysis:

While no hard information is ever given on the ethnic composition of the officer corps, Western estimates based on analyses of names agree that approximately 90 percent of the senior officers are of Slavic origin, and that Slavs also predominate in the junior ranks... The name analysis showed that almost all major non-Slavic groups were represented in the officer corps -- particularly among the junior ranks -- but overall they accounted for only 7.5 percent of the total as compared to their 25 percent weight in the Soviet population. Their share was higher in the Ground Forces (8.4 percent of the total) than in the Navy (5.3 percent) or the Air Services (5.8 percent). It was highest (although no percentage was given) among the rear services troops, inclusive of railroad and construction units.⁶⁵

There has, however, been some concern about the poor representation of Central Asians in the Soviet officer corps, especially as their relative contribution to the

Political Elites and Central Decision-Making in the USSR," Nationalities Papers 13 (Spring 1985): 47.

⁶⁴Ukrainians and Belorussians from the central and eastern regions of their native republics adapt well to military service, and those who choose a professional military career tend to become Russified quite quickly (if they were not already Russified). See Rakowska-Harmstone, "USSR," pp. 139-140. According to a Ukrainian who served in the Soviet armed forces in the early 1970s, the command staff at the military institute where he studied discriminated against students from Central Asia and the Caucasus, but not against Ukrainians. The Ukrainian students at the institute participated fully in student life (except for a student from Western Ukraine, who kept very much to himself), and rarely spoke Ukrainian among themselves. See the article signed O. Zh. in Ukrains'ke Slovo (Paris), 11 July 1982, p. 3. However, for the interesting case of a senior military officer of Ukrainian background who became fully integrated into the Soviet/Russian military milieu but then "rediscovered" his "roots," see Petro G. Grigorenko, Memoirs (New York: W.W. Norton, 1982).

⁶⁵Rakowska-Harmstone, "USSR," pp. 180-181, using data from Allen Hetmanek, Bruce Thompson and Richard Trout, Ethnic Composition of the Soviet Officer Corps (U), a Department of Defense Intelligence Document prepared under an interagency agreement for the Soviet/Warsaw Pact Division, Directorate for Intelligence Research, Defense Intelligence Agency, September 1979.

conscript pool available for military service grows.⁷⁰ Thus a few modest affirmative action measures have been adopted to increase the percentage of Central Asians in the Soviet officer corps.⁷¹

Some of the under-representation of Central Asians in the Soviet armed forces is probably due to the poor education, health, and technical skills of recruits from Central Asia.⁷² Nonetheless, it appears that many if not most senior positions in the Soviet military hierarchy have been reserved for Slavs because of their perceived reliability, and the treatment of non-Slavs in the military has been part of a broader strategy to ensure Slavic dominance of the armed forces. It is interesting to note in this regard that the number of Russians among the military representatives to the Central Committee of the CPSU steadily rose from at least 22 (out of 37) in 1966 to at least 32 (out of 40) in 1986.⁷³

iii) The Security Apparatus

Reliable information on the ethnic background of senior members of the Soviet security apparatus is limited. However, an increasing number of republican

⁷⁰See Edmund Brunner, Jr., "Soviet Demographic Trends and the Ethnic Composition of Draft-Age Males, 1980-1995," in Alexiev and Wimbush, eds., Ethnic Minorities in the Red Army, pp. 197-236.

⁷¹See Bess Brown, "Further Efforts to Enroll Uzbeks in the Soviet Officer Corps," Radio Liberty Research Bulletin 31/84, 18 January 1984, and "Measures to Integrate Central Asians into the Soviet Armed Forces Discussed in Uzbekistan," Radio Liberty Research Bulletin 93/83, 23 February 1983.

⁷²This factor is heavily stressed by Ellen Jones in Red Army and Society: A Sociology of the Soviet Military (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1985), Chapter 7.

⁷³Information from table prepared by Harriet Fast Scott, dated 20 March 1986, provided to Prof. Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone in a personal communication. I am grateful to Prof. Rakowska-Harmstone for making this table available to me.

KGB chairmen since 1954 have been members of the titular nationality, and this is probably due to the fact that, since Stalin's death, the republican KGB chairman has gradually become a much more visible, public figure, with considerable propaganda and public relations functions.⁷⁴ The main exception to this trend has been the case of the six Muslim republics. As of 1984:

In three of these -- Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan -- not a single Muslim has been promoted to head the KGB since 1955, and in the remaining three -- Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Kirghizia -- the record has been very spotty... It is also of interest that, in the six Soviet Muslim republics, all the KGB chairmen not of Muslim origin came to their posts from outside the republic in question, with the exception of Levon Nikolaevich Melkumov (born in 1924), the chairman of the KGB in Uzbekistan between 1978 and 1983.⁷⁵

Thus the central authorities may have felt that the republics bordering Muslim countries needed tighter control than other republics; in addition, the availability of qualified native cadres might also have been a problem in this region.⁷⁶ In any case, where a member of the titular nationality was KGB chairman, his first deputy was usually a non-native and appeared to play the role of a "watchdog" for the central authorities.⁷⁷

⁷⁴Amy W. Knight, The KGB: Police and Politics in the Soviet Union (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988), p. 168. On recent efforts to upgrade the image of the KGB, see Viktor Yasmann, "The KGB Under Glasnost: Creating a New Image," Radio Liberty Research Bulletin 198/88, 11 May 1988; and Amy W. Knight, "The KGB and Soviet Reform," Problems of Communism 37 (September-October 1988): 66-67.

⁷⁵Timur Kocaoglu, "The Chairmanships of the State Security Committees of the Soviet Muslim Republics," Radio Liberty Research Bulletin 34/84, 19 January 1984, p. 1.

⁷⁶Knight, The KGB, p. 168.

⁷⁷Ibid.

In general, the entire process of appointment to, and promotion within the security apparatus has been highly centralized and is largely outside of republican control. For example, before the first party secretary of Ukraine, Shelest, was dismissed from his office in 1972 and officially accused, among other offences, of "national egoism," the long-standing head of the KGB in Ukraine, a Shelest colleague (Nikitchenko) was replaced by a new official (Fedorchuk). He quickly organized a major crackdown on all forms of dissent in Ukraine, and especially national rights dissent, which contributed to the campaign to discredit Shelest.⁷⁸

Slavs have clearly dominated the security services, a crucial coercive instrument, in the non-Russian republics. According to Rakowska-Harmstone, this was true of all branches of the security apparatus in Tadzhikistan following World War II,⁷⁹ and Alexiev claimed in 1983 that the majority of senior KGB operatives in the Baltic republics, as well as most department and section chiefs, were Russians.⁸⁰ As for the internal security troops of the MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs), a study based on interviews with emigres maintains that these troops, which are trained to guard penal institutions and to suppress riots, civil disturbances, etc., were

⁷⁸See Yaroslav Bilinsky, "The Communist Party of Ukraine After 1966," in Ukraine in the Seventies, ed. Peter J. Potichnyj (Oakville: Mosaic Press, 1975), pp. 249-254; Jaroslaw Pelenski, "Shelest and His Period in Soviet Ukraine (1963-1972): A Revival of Controlled Ukrainian Autonomism," in Ukraine in the Seventies, pp. 283-298; and Yaroslav Bilinsky, "Politics, Purge, and Dissent in the Ukraine since the Fall of Shelest," in Nationalism and Human Rights: Processes of Modernization in the USSR, ed. I. Kamenetsky (Littleton, Colo.: Libraries Unlimited, 1977), pp. 168-179. According to the samizdat publication Ukrainian Herald, "The head of the Republic's KGB, Fedorchuk, fired off reports to Moscow, [charging] that the leadership of the CPU was not helping the KGB in carrying out its work effectively." See the translation of issue 7-8 of the Ukrainian Herald, published as Ethnocide of Ukrainians in the U.S.S.R. (Baltimore: Smoloskyp, 1976), p. 127.

⁷⁹Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia: The Case of Tadzhikistan (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), pp. 118-122.

⁸⁰Alexander R. Alexiev, Dissent and Nationalism in the Soviet Baltic (Santa Monica: RAND Corp., 1983), p. 11.

disproportionately manned with indigenous Central Asian personnel. Some of the emigres interviewed for this study claimed that this was the result of an intentional policy to exploit interethnic animosity.⁸¹ In addition, it appears that KGB border troop units, and ordinary troop units stationed in Eastern Europe, have been staffed almost exclusively by Slavs.⁸²

iv) Other Expressions of an Ethnic Security Map.

The central political elite's conceptualization of an ethnic security map appears to have affected a variety of other sensitive policy areas. Thus, for example, Slavs dominate the top of the hierarchy of the Procuracy, the highly centralized system of state attorneys responsible for overseeing and ensuring compliance of all state agencies with the law.

From 1978 to 1982, Slavs garnered 13 of the 14 leading appointments in the USSR Procuracy. Since the death of Brezhnev, Slavs have filled all eight of the vacancies at the all-union level. Thus, in the Procuracy, an institution dedicated to the maintenance of a single standard of justice throughout the country, responsible posts at the centre remain a Slavic preserve.⁸³

⁸¹Alexander R. Alexiev and S. Enders Wimbush, The Ethnic Factor in the Soviet Armed Forces, in Ethnic Minorities, eds. Alexiev and Wimbush, pp. 148-149.

⁸²Rakowska-Harmstone, "USSR," p. 171; and Alexiev and Wimbush, "The Ethnic Factor," pp. 139-140.

⁸³Eugene Huskey, "Generational Change in the Soviet Professional Elite: Procuracy Careers from Brezhnev to Gorbachev," in Elites and Political Power in the USSR, ed. David Lane (Aldershot: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1988), p. 152.

In addition, Slavs have been routinely appointed as deputy procurators in non-Slavic republics, and thus act as checks on their indigenous counterparts.⁶⁴

An examination of the inter-relationship between religion and nationality in the Soviet Union shows that official policies towards different religious groups have also been affected by perceptions of the way in which certain religions have aided or hampered the process of the supranational integration of the peoples of the USSR. In particular, some of the "national" churches,⁶⁵ especially those (the Lithuanian Roman Catholic Church and, above all, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church) which are associated with Lithuanian and Ukrainian nationalism, were subject to harsh persecution because of the mutually sustaining and reinforcing symbiosis of religion and national identities in these cases.⁶⁶ As Bociurkiw argued concerning the situation as of the mid-1980s:

Soviet religious policy and antireligious propaganda have long displayed acute awareness of the mutually supportive and protective roles performed by national and religious sentiments and have early identified this overlap of ethnic and religious loyalties as the main obstacle to Soviet political socialization in national republics and an opening for anti-Soviet diversions from emigre "bourgeois nationalists"

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 153.

⁶⁵"A national church claims as its faithful members of the given nationality, usually excluding -- unlike an imperial church -- other nationalities." See Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, "Institutional Religion and Nationality in the Soviet Union," in Soviet Nationalities in Strategic Perspective, ed. S. Enders Wimbush (London: Croom Helm, 1985), p. 186.

⁶⁶Bociurkiw, "Institutional Religion and Nationality," pp. 186-190. For more details on the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church during and after WWII see the articles by Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, e.g.: "The Suppression of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in Postwar Soviet Union and Poland," in Religion and Nationalism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, ed. Dennis J. Dunn (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987); "The Uniate Church in the Soviet Ukraine: A Case Study in Soviet Church Policy," Canadian Slavonic Papers 7 (1965): 83-113; and "The Catacomb Church: Ukrainian Greek Catholics in the USSR," Religion in Communist Lands 5 (Spring 1977): 26-34. On the Lithuanian Roman Catholic Church see V. Stanley Vardys, The Catholic Church, Dissent and Nationality in Soviet Lithuania (Boulder, Colo.: East European Quarterly 1978) and the journal Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithuania.

and Western propaganda agencies. This symbiotic relationship of religion and nationality has become a special target for Soviet "internationalist, patriotic indoctrination."⁸⁷

In contrast, the Russian Orthodox Church fulfilled the role of an "imperial" church by serving as an agency of supranational integration and socialization, and was thus given more privileges, and treated less harshly, than other Soviet denominations.⁸⁸

One can even argue that an ethnically differentiated strategy influenced central policies concerning the printed media in the USSR. Several analysts have pointed to a pattern of discrimination in the past in the print runs and distribution of, as well as in the rules of subscription to, certain non-Russian periodicals,⁸⁹ and in a detailed analysis of this pattern Szporluk has concluded that in the mid-1970s a policy was adopted of "promoting unrestricted growth of the Russian-language press and of gradually restricting the circulation of periodicals in languages other than Russian."⁹⁰ In particular, Szporluk argues that the central authorities who determine publishing policy focussed their attention on Ukrainians and Belorussians because they were most susceptible to assimilation, because they may have been susceptible to the "Polish virus,"⁹¹ and because the native-language press in these areas had the

⁸⁷Bociurkiw, "Institutional Religion and Nationality," p. 197.

⁸⁸Ibid., pp. 185-186, 197-198.

⁸⁹See, for example, Timur Kocaoglu, "The Print Runs of Republican Literary Journals: A Case of Discrimination?" Radio Liberty Research Bulletin 224/84, 5 June 1984; and Roman Solchanyk, "The Non-Russian Languages in the USSR -- Only for Poetry and Memoirs?" Radio Liberty Research Bulletin 376/84, 3 October 1984.

⁹⁰Roman Szporluk, "Recent Trends in Soviet Policy Towards Printed Media in the Non-Russian Languages," Radio Liberty Research Bulletin, Supplement 2/84, 7 November 1984, pp. 2-3..

⁹¹On this topic see Roman Solchanyk, "Poland and the Soviet West," in Soviet Nationalities in Strategic Perspective, ed. S. Enders Wimbush (London: Croom Helm, 1985), pp. 158-175.

potential to gain a wide readership even beyond the respective ethnonational communities.⁹² Finally, Szporluk argued that

the limitation of circulations of literary periodicals, which is especially in evidence with respect to the larger [non-Russian] nationalities, can be readily understood as an effort to prevent an alliance between the masses and the intellectual elites, even though those elites are not in any way "dissident." It is enough that they prefer to create in a language other than Russian. The authorities seem to be determined to limit contact between these two groups even though this means offending, perhaps alienating, the official cultural elites in Kiev, Tashkent, and Alma Ata. What evidently matters to Moscow is not that no independent view ever gets into print: rather, it wants to be sure that such a view, if it is aired at all, only receives exposure in a small-circulation medium.⁹³

One can easily suggest other policy areas which were affected by central political elite conceptualizations of an ethnic security map. Thus, for example, perceptions of a given ethnonational group's reliability affected the extent to which the group's intelligentsia were permitted to express pride in the group's historical past, and stress its distinctiveness, in official publications.⁹⁴ Policy towards certain ethnonational groups was also affected by strategic considerations of whether foreign reactions to treatment of the group might benefit or damage Soviet foreign policy interests.⁹⁵

⁹²*Ibid.*, pp. 22-25. The latter rationale also applies to the Uzbeks, whose native-language press was also subjected to harsh restrictions.

⁹³Szporluk, "Recent Trends," pp. 25-26.

⁹⁴For the most detailed examination of this topic see Lowell Tillet, The Great Friendship: Soviet Historians on the Non-Russian Nationalities (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1969).

⁹⁵See Rasma Karklins, "The Nationality Factor in Soviet Foreign Policy," in Soviet Foreign Policy in the 1980s, ed. Roger Kanet (New York: Praeger, 1982), pp. 58-76; and Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "Soviet Central Asia: A Model of Non-Capitalist Development for the Third World," in The USSR and the Muslim World: Issues in Domestic and Foreign Policy, ed. Yaacov Ro'i (London:

There is clear evidence that an ethnic security map strongly influenced the pattern of senior cadre appointments in the Soviet Union after World War II, and had a major influence on the direction of party/state policy in a number of strategically important policy spheres. Despite a nominal commitment to equal treatment of all members of all ethnic groups in the country, elite recruitment policies operated to maintain the dominance of Russians and other Slavic fellow travellers through a variety of tacit rules on career mobility for ethnic elites.

In the mid-1980s it appeared, at least on the surface, that a combination of normative and instrumental policy measures taken in accordance with this ethnic security map had succeeded in entrenching a stable pattern of ethnonational relations in the Soviet Union. Certainly, there was a general consensus among most Western Sovietologists that there was no serious challenge to the ethnonational status quo.⁹⁶ This perception was understandable given the history of authoritarian rule in the Soviet Union, and the resulting underdeveloped state of "civil society" in the pre-Gorbachev period. In addition, given the reluctance of Soviet social scientists in these circumstances to investigate politically sensitive aspects of ethnonational relations in the Soviet Union it was difficult, using official sources, to determine the nature and extent of ethnonational grievances among the Soviet population.

However one could, using a variety of unofficial sources, study the nature and extent of the coercive measures which were used to prevent and/or contain any attempts to challenge the dominant ethnonational pattern of authority in the Soviet

⁹⁶See, for example, Alexander J. Motyl, *Will the Non-Russians Rebel? State, Ethnicity, Stability in the USSR* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), Chapter 8; and Gail Warshofsky Lapidus, "Ethnonationalism and Political Stability: The Soviet Case," *World Politics* 36 (July 1984): 555-580.

Union. Widespread coercive measures were not needed in the immediate post-Stalin period, since the widespread and ruthless use of terror by Stalin and his associates effectively destroyed all organized forms of opposition to the "powers that be" in the Soviet Union, including independent ethnonational movements. Most Soviet citizens developed an ingrained awareness of the futility of protest which lasted for many years after the death of Stalin, and which resulted in a resigned acceptance of authority and an unwillingness to even consider opposition.⁹⁷

The dissidents of the 1960s and 1970s expressly set out to overcome this attitude, and their actions were supposed to prove that protest was possible. The central political elites, however, were equally determined to prevent the emergence of articulate and charismatic figures who were opposed to the political status quo, articulated grievances outside of officially-sanctioned channels, and were capable of gaining broad public support.

Details on the role of the Soviet legal-penitentiary system as an instrument of coercion will be provided in the following chapters, where it will be argued that after Stalin's death, and especially under the Brezhnev regime, a fairly sophisticated "calculus of repressive strategy"⁹⁸ was adopted which focussed heavily on actual or potential dissident leaders. In particular, the pattern of coercive measures taken to deal with the activities of different groups of political dissidents should reflect the central political elite's evaluation of the actual or potential threat which their

⁹⁷This is the main theme of Valentin Turchin's book entitled The Inertia of Fear (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981).

⁹⁸The term is used by Rasma Karklins in "The Dissent/Coercion Nexus in the USSR," Studies in Comparative Communism 20 (Autumn-Winter 1987): 338.

activity posed to the stability and integrity of the Soviet political system. By studying the pattern of coercion directed at various forms of dissident activity, and focussing on the cases when ethnonational grievances were an important motivating factor behind the dissident activity, it should be possible to create an ethnic security map for Soviet dissent.

Chapter 3

THE SOVIET LEGAL-PENITENTIARY SYSTEM: ITS ROLE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLITICAL COERCION

One of the most important conceptualizations of law is that of Max Weber. Starting with the idea of an order characterized by legitimacy, he suggests:

An order will be called law if it is externally guaranteed by the probability that coercion (physical or psychological), to bring about conformity or avenge violation, will be applied by a staff of people holding themselves specially ready for that purpose.¹

Weber may place too much emphasis on coercion, ignoring other considerations that may induce individuals to obey the law. For example, in a political system with a reasonable degree of political legitimacy, the authoritative nature of legal rules brings about a special kind of obligation which is not dependent on the use or threat of coercion or force, and many laws are obeyed because people feel it is their duty to obey.²

Still, coercion is implicit in most Western definitions of law, which hold that its principal function is to regulate and constrain the behaviour of individuals in their relationships with one another. Law is to be employed only when other formal and informal social control mechanisms fail to operate or are inadequate for

¹Max Weber, Law in Economy and Society (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 5.

²Phillip Selznick, Law, Society and Industrial Justice (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1969), pp. 4-8.

the job, and it can be distinguished from other forms of social control primarily in that it is a formal system embodying explicit rules of conduct, the planned use of sanctions to insure compliance with the rules, and a group of authorized officials designated to interpret the rules and apply sanctions to violators.³

However, the extent to which law has been deliberately used in a purposive fashion by political elites to maintain the existing patterns of authority in society varies a great deal across political systems, and in the Russian and Marxist-Leninist legal traditions the law plays a role quite distinct from that which it plays in most Western societies.

The Early Development of the Soviet Legal System⁴

The Russian imperial authorities did not accept the notion that the state itself was subordinate to fundamental principles of law, and tended to reject what was seen as a Western preoccupation with legalisms, declaring that concern with the details of legal procedure often sacrificed justice.⁵ Marxist-Leninist ideology also subordinated law to state interests. At the time of the October Revolution in Russia, the Marxist theory of law held that in any society, once economic relations

³See, for example, James Davis, "Law as a Type of Social Control," in Society and the Law: New Meanings for an Old Profession, eds. F. James Davis et al. (New York: The Free Press, 1962), pp. 39-52.

⁴My discussion will focus on the administration of criminal justice, rather than civil justice. In the Soviet Union civil justice has often been quite responsive to the needs of the ordinary citizen, and in civil cases where only individual interests are at stake, Soviet rule of law has usually been followed quite closely. On the dichotomy between civil and criminal justice in the USSR, see Louise Shelley, "The Structure and Function of Soviet Courts," in The Distinctiveness of Soviet Law (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), pp. 199-216.

⁵For a detailed discussion of the Russian attitude toward law see Richard Wortman, The Rise of Russian Legal Consciousness (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976).

reached a certain degree of complexity, a superstructure of laws and legal institutions would be erected to regulate economic activity. Because changes in the economy were seen to produce corresponding changes in the legal system, those who controlled the state's economy -- the ruling class -- also controlled the law. In capitalist society the ruling class, according to this scheme, was composed of a relatively small group of property owners who manipulated the law and legal institutions to promote their own narrow interests. But with the onset of a socialist revolution the property of the ruling class would be expropriated, and the levers of the economy would pass to the new proletarian state.⁶

According to this line of argument, after the revolution law and legal institutions would become the instruments of the proletariat, to do with as they saw fit, until such time as economic relations would become so routinized that law, the security apparatus, and even the state itself would no longer be necessary and would wither away. In Russia in 1917 the self-appointed vanguard of the working class, the Bolshevik party, was the body which was to "temporarily" wield the instruments of proletarian rule, and throughout the period under consideration in this thesis a number of elaborate arguments in Soviet political and legal theory identified the interests of the people with those of the state, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), and ultimately the leadership of the CPSU.⁷

⁶Christine Sypnowich, "The 'Withering Away' of Law," Studies in Soviet Thought 33 (May 1987): 305-306; and R.W. Makepeace, Marxist Ideology and Soviet Criminal Law (London: Croom Helm, 1980), pp. 14-28.

⁷Robert Sharlet, "The Communist Party and the Administration of Justice in the USSR," in Soviet Law After Stalin, Part III: Soviet Institutions and the Administration of Law, eds. D.D. Barry et al. (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1979), pp. 320-326.

An important implication of this approach was that the law was stripped of its ethical aura. By reducing law to an instrument of class rule, Marxist-Leninist analysis broke with an older tradition whereby ethical constraints, whether apparent or real, were placed on the legal system. According to this tradition the law was seen as a system of rules binding even upon the state and limiting political influence on the administration of justice, whereas in the Bolshevik view law was merely an extension of political power. The formula "revolutionary expediency equals revolutionary legality," and Lenin's definition of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" as unrestrained by law, expressed the belief of the new regime that laws were just as long as they served the interests of the revolution. Legal institutions, in turn, were regarded by the Bolsheviks as inherently political bodies that were at the disposal of a country's rulers.⁸

This instrumentalist approach to morality led to a distinctive interpretation of civil rights. From the Marxist-Leninist perspective, guarantees of civil rights existed only when a citizen participated in the building of socialism, and the exercise of rights and freedoms by the citizen were inseparable from the fulfillment of his duties. Since natural law was rejected by Soviet ideologists, there were no civil rights derived from sources other than positive law, and as positive law was created by the state, all civil rights were granted by the state.⁹ This stemmed from the fact,

⁸Makepeace, Marxist Ideology and Soviet Criminal Law, pp. 49-60.

⁹On the Soviet approach to civil rights as reflected in the 1977 Soviet Constitution see Yuri I. Luryi, "Three Years of the New USSR Constitution: The Soviet Approach to Human Rights," in Perspectives on Soviet Law for the 1980s, eds. F.J.M. Feldbrugge and William B. Simons (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), pp. 53-76; and Christopher Osakwe, "Soviet Human Rights Law Under the USSR Constitution of 1977: Theories, Realities and Trends," Tulane Law Review 56 (December 1981): 249-293.

noted above, that the idea of a Rechtsstaat -- a state under the rule of law -- was foreign to Lenin and many of his associates, and Soviet legal doctrine traditionally rejected it as a liberal, "bourgeois" concept.¹⁰

Western scholars have studied the development of the Soviet legal system, and the administration of justice in the Soviet Union, in considerable detail. There is general agreement that the civil war (1917-1921) was a period of often chaotic experimentation with the law. Increasingly radical approaches, leading almost to a form of legal nihilism, were advocated, and the introduction of the "Red Terror" saw primary responsibility for the investigation and trial of criminal cases shift from the ordinary courts and investigating units to extraordinary legal institutions, such as the Cheka and revolutionary tribunals.¹¹

A fundamental reappraisal of legal policy followed the introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP), a retreat from the policies of the civil war period which involved the reintroduction of certain capitalistic elements in the economy and a curtailment of mass repression. The legal system in place at the end of the

¹⁰See Gordon B. Smith, "Development and Evolution of 'Socialist Legality' in the Soviet Union," in Perspectives on Soviet Law for the 1980s, eds. F.J.M. Feldbrugge and William B. Simons (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), pp. 77-82; and Ivo Lapenna, "Lenin, Law and Legality," in Lenin: The Man, the Theorist, the Leader. A Reappraisal, eds. Leonard Schapiro and Peter Reddaway (New York: Praeger, 1967), pp. 235-264.

¹¹In 1920-22 one-third of the population in places of confinement were sentenced by ordinary courts; the others were convicted by revolutionary tribunals without resort to a court. See Ger P. van den Berg The Soviet System of Justice: Figures and Policy (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985), p. 17. On the operation of the regular Soviet courts during the civil war, see Samuel Kucherov, The Organs of Soviet Administration of Justice: Their History and Operation (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1970), Chapters 1-2. On the role of extraordinary courts during this period, see Kucherov, *op. cit.*, Chapter 3, and George Leggett, The Cheka: Lenin's Political Police (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), Chapter 9. It should be noted that a majority of the membership of all branches of the Russian legal community was opposed to the new Bolshevik government, and it initially tried to withhold its services from the new legal system. See Eugene Huskey, Russian Lawyers and the Soviet State: The Origins and Development of the Soviet Bar, 1917-1939 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 40-41.

civil war not only lacked support among the masses, it also was not equipped to provide the stability in legal relations essential to the expansion of private economic activity. What was needed was a legal order with sufficient traditional elements to guarantee its effectiveness and legitimacy in the conditions of NEP without endangering the foundations of state socialism. The introduction of such a legal order began in late 1921 and involved the partial rehabilitation of the legal theories, institutions, and personnel of the old regime.¹²

It was during this period that the RSFSR Criminal Code (1926) and Code of Criminal Procedure (1923) which, with some changes, were in effect until the post-Stalin period, were enacted. However, despite the relatively liberal atmosphere of the NEP period, the 1926 RSFSR Criminal Code made "social danger" (rather than violation of a specific provision of the Special Part of the Code) one of the keys to judicial sanctioning.¹³ Moreover, under the 1926 Code anyone who committed a "socially dangerous act" not specifically provided for in the Code could be subject to criminal responsibility under the doctrine of analogy.¹⁴ The 1926 RSFSR

¹²See Kucharov, The Organs of Soviet Administration of Justice, Chapter 4; and Huskey, Russian Lawyers and the Soviet State, Chapter 3.

¹³A socially dangerous act was defined as "any act or omission that is directed against the Soviet system or that violates the legal order," and in some cases punishment was based on the social danger of the person, rather than of the act he or she committed. See Soviet Criminal Law and Procedure: The RSFSR Codes, 2nd ed., introduction and analysis by Harold J. Berman (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), p. 20-22.

¹⁴Article 16 of the Criminal Code stated: "If any socially dangerous act is not directly provided for by the present Code, the basis and limits of responsibility for it shall be determined by application of those articles of the Code which provide for crimes most similar to it in nature." Soviet Criminal Law and Procedure, p. 22.

Criminal Code sharply delineated political and non-political crimes,¹⁵ and the first category was reflected primarily in Article 58, entitled "counterrevolutionary crimes." Punishments for such crimes were generally more severe than punishments for other offenses, and counterrevolutionary activities were defined in very broad terms.¹⁶

In 1928 the New Economic Policy began to give way to a drive for the rapid industrialization, collectivization, and proletarianization of Soviet society, and the fundamental reforms introduced during this "second revolution" had a profound impact on law and legal institutions. Initially, the legal system largely reverted to the nihilism of the civil war period, and political commands involving the implementation of punitive measures were often carried out among the population without the mediation of legal proceedings.¹⁷ Whereas under NEP law had acted as the protector of the existing order, it was now called on to facilitate a revolution

¹⁵According to Article 46, "The crimes dealt with in this code are classified as follows: a) Those directed against the foundations of the Soviet system... and therefore considered to be the most dangerous; b) All other crimes."

¹⁶"Under Article 58-1 an act was said to be counterrevolutionary if it was 'directed to the overthrow, subversion, or weakening of the power of the worker-peasant Soviets,' or if it was 'directed toward rendering aid to that part of the international bourgeoisie which does not recognize the equality of rights of the Communist system and seeks to overthrow it...' or, even if it was not specifically directed toward the above-mentioned goals, if it constituted a 'conscious attack against the basic achievements of the proletarian revolution.' Moreover, participation in any organization carrying on activity of the kind indicated in Article 58-1 was made a counterrevolutionary crime punishable by death, or under mitigating circumstances, by deprivation of freedom with strict isolation for five to ten years with confiscation of property." Soviet Criminal Law and Procedure, p. 23. Article 58-10, on counterrevolutionary propaganda and agitation, was very sweeping, and was applicable to statements advocating not only the subversion of Soviet power, but also the "weakening" of this power. For a translation of Article 58 of the RSFSR Criminal Code as of 1 October 1953, see Adolfs Silde, The Profits of Slavery (Stockholm, Latvian National Foundation in Scandinavia, 1958), pp. 291-294.

¹⁷On the atmosphere of "legal nihilism" during the "cultural revolution" see Robert Sharlet, "Pashukanis and the Withering Away of Law in the USSR," in Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1928-1931, ed. Sheila Fitzpatrick (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1978), pp. 181-186. See also, by the same author, "Stalinism and Soviet Legal Culture," in Stalinism: Essays in Historical Interpretation, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: W.W. Norton, 1977), pp. 155-179.

from above; that is, there was a return to a purely instrumental role for law. This meant the creation of a more flexible body of legal norms which would be responsive to rapidly changing political demands. Thus the various codes of law and procedure introduced during NEP were either revised or lost much of their authority; this was most evident in the field of criminal procedure.¹⁸

Modifications in the legal system involved a speedier handling of legal proceedings in criminal cases, and a simplification of the criminal process allowed judges to decide the majority of cases summarily, without the benefit of representatives for the prosecution or defence. Finally, the politicization of the legal system encouraged the application of the harshest possible penalties for social deviance, especially in the case of actions which could be interpreted as directed against the state.¹⁹

In the mid-thirties the role of law in the Soviet Union again began to change, from a facilitator of social change to a protector of the new status quo. Although it was once dismissed as a bourgeois institution, it was in the interests of the political leadership to adhere to at least the semblance of justice, and to reassert firm, centralized control over the legal system. This did not mean, however, a

¹⁸Huskey, Russian Lawyers and the Soviet State, pp. 168-179. For a recent Soviet article detailing the abuses of the law for political purposes during this period see A.P. Vershinin, "Deformatsiia sudebnoi zashchity grazhdanskikh prav i interesov v kontse 20-kh -- nachale 30-kh godov," Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo No. 8 (August 1989): 132-136.

¹⁹Throughout the early thirties there was a consistent revision upwards of minimum terms of deprivation of freedom, and in 1934 Article 58 of the RSFSR Criminal Code was modified to incorporate "betrayal of the Motherland" (izmena rodiny), generally translated as treason. "Treason was defined as including espionage committed by a Soviet citizen, the giving out of military or state secrets, going over to the enemy, and fleeing the country, and was made punishable by death, confiscation of property, or, if committed under mitigating circumstances, by deprivation of freedom for ten years with confiscation of property." Soviet Criminal Law and Procedure, pp. 29-30.

reduction in state repression or the introduction of new legislation. In fact, modifications in criminal law included a greater emphasis on the punitive aspect of criminal sanctions,²⁰ and new legal norms were often communicated to judges through the public pronouncements of prominent legal officials such as Vyshinsky, who dominated the highly-centralized Procuracy of the USSR during most of the thirties.²¹

In effect, Stalin and his associates tried to combine the intimidating force of repressive measures administered by the security apparatus with the legitimizing force of legal processes and symbolism. As Sharlet has pointed out, a theoretical stress on the independence of the judiciary and due process came about at a time of unprecedented terror and arbitrariness:

So strongly did the values of statism, coercion, and political expediency implant themselves in Soviet legal practice that they completely overshadowed established legal norms and institutions. In fact, the entire legal apparatus became eclipsed by the Special Section of the NKVD. The special tribunals consisted of three judges without people's assessors and were not governed by regular norms of judicial procedure. They were empowered to detain persons without notice or cause and to try cases in closed session without the presence of defense counsel. They also had the authority to imprison or exile "socially dangerous" persons for a term of up to five years and no appeal was possible.²²

²⁰The maximum duration of deprivation of freedom was extended from 10 to 25 years.

²¹During this period all legal agencies were completely subordinated to the Procurator General's office in Moscow, which was in turn subject to Stalin's will. See Sharlet, "Development of 'Socialist Legality'," pp. 82-83.

²²Sharlet, "Development of 'Socialist Legality'," pp. 81-82.

The heavy-handed political control of the legal process by the mid-thirties was exemplified by the fact that, when they participated in trial proceedings, advocates were expected to adhere to the position of the prosecutor, and restrict themselves to arguments mitigating their clients' guilt.²³

Legal Developments After 1953

Criminal law was overhauled and systematically recodified after Stalin's death, and this reflected the concern of his successors that the legal system as it existed in the early 1950s was a political liability. To the extent that it had been politically manipulated in order to inflict arbitrary punishment, it had ceased to be a true legal system; to the extent that the law had been bypassed altogether, with the security organs assuming certain judicial functions, it was relegated to a minor place in the Soviet political system and had lost credibility.²⁴ Thus a number of steps were taken after Stalin's death to eliminate some of the features of the legal system which had caused it to fall into disrepute, and these changes were eventually reflected in new criminal legislation.

For example, the Special Boards of the Ministry of Internal Affairs were abolished,²⁵ and the security organs were deprived of the power to conduct investigations of crimes under their own special rules, without supervision by the

²³Huskey, Russian Lawyers and the Soviet State, pp. 210-212.

²⁴Harold J. Berman, Justice in the U.S.S.R.: An Interpretation of Soviet Law, rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 53-65; and Kazimierz Grzybowski, "Soviet Reform of Criminal Law of 1958," Osteuropa-Recht 12 (1959-60): 110.

²⁵This took place, apparently, in September 1953. See Harold J. Berman, "Soviet Law Reform - Dateline Moscow 1957," Yale Law Journal 66 (1956-57): 1192.

Procuracy. The laws of 1934 and 1937 permitting persons charged with certain "counterrevolutionary" crimes to be tried secretly, in absentia, and without counsel, were repealed, and the doctrine that confessions have special evidentiary force in cases of such crimes was repudiated. Confessions were now treated as having no evidentiary force in themselves, and the matters contained in a confession had to be corroborated by other evidence.

Further, the law on so-called "counterrevolutionary crimes" was slightly narrowed, made a little less vague, and the term "counterrevolutionary" was eliminated, with the term "state" (i.e., anti-state) being substituted. Other changes included depriving military courts of all jurisdiction over civilians except for espionage; eliminating the doctrine of analogy; lightening the penalties for many crimes; etc.²⁶

The criminal codes which, with various amendments, were in force in the Soviet Union between 1965 and 1985, were based on the new Fundamental Principles of Criminal Legislation, the Statute on Crimes Against the State, and the Statute on Military Crimes, which were enacted in December 1958 and replaced the 1924 Fundamental Principles of Criminal Legislation and of Criminal Procedure, and the 1938 Law on Court Organization. In October 1960 the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR enacted a new Criminal Code, a new Code of Criminal Procedure, and a

²⁶On these and other changes see Soviet Criminal Law and Procedure, pp. 36-42; Berman, Justice in the U.S.S.R., pp. 66-77; and Peter H. Juviler, Revolutionary Law and Order: Politics and Social Change in the USSR (New York: The Free Press, 1976), Chapter 4.

new Law on Court Organization, to take effect January 1, 1961, and they replaced the 1926 RSFSR Criminal Code and the 1923 Code of Criminal Procedure.²⁷

Politics and Soviet Law after Stalin

As a result of these and other developments, by the early 1960s the Soviet Union had an elaborate body of law, of fairly high technical level, which in some respects was comparable to the legal systems of Western Europe.²⁸ In the prosecution of ordinary criminals, the due process rights of the defendant were generally respected, and procedural guarantees were not side-tracked as a matter of government policy.

However, Soviet law continued to be characterized by a very strong emphasis on the protection of the state and, in particular, the political and economic interests of state elites. Despite attempts by certain Soviet legal scholars, after Stalin's death, to elaborate a legal doctrine of civil rights more precisely and to strengthen the individual's legal position,²⁹ the supremacy of the CPSU's power remained fundamentally unchanged. Thus the CPSU continued to claim, and exert, hegemony and effective control over the legal process and its personnel. Although the

²⁷See Soviet Criminal Law and Procedure, pp. 14-16. An updated translation of the Soviet legal codes is found in William B. Simons, ed., The Soviet Codes of Law (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1980). The other 14 republics also adopted their own criminal codes, codes of criminal procedure, and laws on court organization. The RSFSR codes provided the model for the codes of the 14 other union republics, and in general the degree of their deviation from the provisions of the RSFSR codes was minimal.

²⁸See Part II, "Socialist Laws," of Rene David and John E.C. Brierley, Major Legal Systems in the World Today, 3rd ed. (London: Stevens and Sons, 1985).

²⁹On post-Stalin reforms in the legal process, and the work of Soviet legal scholars in this area, see Peter H. Solomon, Jr., Soviet Criminologists and Criminal Policy: Specialists in Policy-Making (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), especially Chapter 4.

growing complexity of Soviet society and the Soviet legal process imposed limits upon the extent of detailed Party supervision and control of justice, the CPSU definitely dominated the "commanding heights" of the legal process, and took a strong interest in all legal proceedings which involved parties challenging its policies or privileged position.³⁰

Thus criminal law continued to be used for the dual purpose of controlling behaviour normally considered to be criminal, and to buttress the Party's control of the state. The latter purpose led to the definition of any action that supposedly threatened that control as criminal, and the effect was to create a special category of crimes. In short, any expression or action which was perceived by the leadership of the CPSU to question or weaken its monopoly on power could be construed as a crime against the state.³¹

The most basic mechanism of Party control over the administration of justice was the nomenklatura system, whereby Party approval was required before a person could be appointed, or nominated in an election, to any influential position in the legal apparatus. The result was that all those involved in the legal process in the Soviet Union -- judges, procurators, advocates, or police officials -- had to pass through a system of political "filters" before they could take office or assume their responsibilities.³²

³⁰Sharlet, "The Communist Party and the Administration of Justice," pp. 380-383.

³¹Christopher Osakwe, "Due Process of Law and Civil Rights Cases in the Soviet Union," in Soviet Law After Stalin, Part I: The Citizen and the State in Contemporary Soviet Law, eds. D.D. Barry et al. (Leyden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1977), p. 205.

³²Sharlet, "The Communist Party and the Administration of Justice," pp. 326-328. For example, Party membership was an essential qualification for recruitment to the procuracy elite between 1978 and 1987, and the procuracy has been one of the most "party-saturated" occupational groups in the Soviet Union. See Eugene Huskey, "Generational Change in the Soviet Professional Elite: Procuracy

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The Party also played a central role in coordinating the work of all judicial bodies through the exercise of its "leading role" in these bodies. For example, Party officials regularly met with local law enforcement bodies to plan campaigns against crime, and the Party played the central role of overseeing the general coordination of the work of these agencies. In addition, the Party was heavily involved in the political education and supervision of legal cadres (through the primary party organizations in legal institutions), and the legal socialization of the public in general.³³

It was the "supervising," "coordinating" role of the Party which was stressed, and direct Party "interference" in the administration of justice was criticized as a violation of socialist legality.³⁴ Nonetheless, the distinction was often hard to maintain, especially when the Party was heavily involved in promoting one of the special anti-crime campaigns which were regularly launched in the Soviet Union. In addition, Party interference in the legal process was a regular feature in ordinary criminal proceedings involving prominent offenders and victims (especially if they were Party members), or if the crime had been particularly conspicuous.³⁵

Careers from Brezhnev to Gorbachev," in Elites and Political Power in the USSR, ed. David Lane (Aldershot, Hants: Edward Elgar, 1988), p. 152. On the close, cooperative relationship between the CPSU and the procuracy, see Hiroshi Oda, "The Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Procuracy," in Law and the Gorbachev Era, eds. Donald D. Barry et al. (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988): 127-153.

³³Gordon B. Smith, "Socialist Legality and Legal Policy in the Soviet Union," in Public Policy and Administration in the Soviet Union, ed. G.B. Smith (New York: Praeger, 1980), p. 120.

³⁴This distinction was maintained in all other aspects of Soviet public administration, and was equally blurred in practice.

³⁵Sharlet, "The Communist Party and the Administration of Justice," pp. 357-358, 361-163.

Thus, in spite of the post-Stalin reforms in criminal law, in terms of procedure Soviet law continued to retain a form of elasticity that permitted it to be expanded or contracted to suit the needs of the Party, and in the practice of Soviet law one found the parallel existence of legal regularity and legal irregularity in the way the law approached different cases. In other words, Soviet law expressly sanctioned the unequal treatment of certain privileged or disfavoured litigants by maintaining one general norm for regular litigants, and lapsing into a prerogative sphere whenever a privileged or disfavoured litigant was before the court.³⁶

For example, in the case of CPSU members, depending on the official status of the individual involved, the special treatment the defendant received within the criminal justice system either aggravated or mitigated his situation. On the one hand, Party officials who should have been prosecuted for misuse of government funds, embezzlement, etc., often escaped prosecution and were subjected only to reprimands administered within the Party structure.³⁷ On the other, senior Party officials continued to use the courts as a means of eliminating personal enemies and political rivals.³⁸

³⁶On the concept of prerogativism in Soviet law, see Osakwe, "Due Process of Law," pp. 205-213.

³⁷See Louise Shelley, "Party Members and the Courts -- Exploitation of Privilege," in Ruling Communist Parties and Their Status Under Law, eds. D.A. Loeber et al. (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1986).

³⁸Louise I. Shelley, "Soviet Courts as Vehicles for Political Maneuver," Soviet Union 13, no. 2 (1986): 163-186; and Yuri Luryi, "The Use of Criminal Law by the CPSU in the Struggle for Power and in the Inner Party Struggle: The Case of Frol Kozlov," in Ruling Communist Parties and their Status Under Law, op. cit., pp. 91-113. For one description of how the courts were abused in this fashion in the early 1980s see Pravda, 6 May 1987.

Soviet Law and Dissent

In liberal-democratic political systems the dialogue between a government and its critics takes place in a legislature, other political bodies or public gatherings, and the mass media, and the courts do not rule on questions as to what is "anti-state," "anti-social," or "politically wrong." In the Soviet Union, beginning in the 1960s, there was a gradual revival of debate on political and social themes in private circles and in samizdat documents; however, until the late 1980s the preparation, possession and circulation of samizdat, and other forms of unauthorized socio-political activity, were subject to harsh legal sanctions under Soviet criminal law.³⁹ In fact, the history of dissent in the post-Stalin period was consistently characterized by the employment of a variety of legal measures (including arrests and trials) to deter and punish dissident activists. Thus the legal system played a very important role in regime-dissenter relations both as an instrument of repression, and as a means of disguising the arbitrary nature of political suppression through references to the letter of the law.

Prerogativism in Soviet criminal procedure was clearly manifested in the handling of the "political" offender. In essence, this group included all those who committed any offense which the Committee on State Security (KGB), acting on general instructions from the CPSU leadership, deemed to be "political."⁴⁰ The

³⁹Dietrich A. Loeber, "Samizdat Under Soviet Law," in Contemporary Soviet Law: Essays in Honour of John N. Hazard, eds. Donald D. Barry et al. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), pp. 84-123.

⁴⁰Party control of the activities of the KGB is concentrated in the top levels of the party apparatus. In addition to the Politburo, which probably provides general policy directives, the Administrative Organs Department (now: State and Law Dept.) of the Central Committee Secretariat is believed to play an important role as a vehicle for party control. For details see Amy W. Knight, The KGB: Police and Politics in the Soviet Union (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988), pp. 125-143.

determination by the KGB to intervene in a given situation was made on a case-by-case basis, depending on the circumstances surrounding the commission of the alleged violation of criminal law. Thus the KGB could transform any case into a political case, with no established method for reviewing such a decision.⁴¹

One example of prerogativism exercised to the detriment of the defendant concerned what is perhaps the most fundamental due process protection available to the criminal defendant -- the right to counsel. All criminal cases (except those involving minors) precluded the involvement of a defense council at any point in the pre-trial phase of the proceedings, until the investigation into a case had been completed.⁴² The result was particularly harsh on political defendants, since they were subject to many other forms of discriminatory treatment within the criminal justice system. For example, their other statutorily granted rights were routinely violated during the phase of preliminary inquiry, at the trial hearing, in the sentencing process and during the appellate proceedings.⁴³

More specifically, the legal sanctions directed at those engaged in unofficial political activity were most clearly embodied in a special all-union statute enacted in

⁴¹On KGB policy towards dissent, see Amy W. Knight, "The Party, the KGB, and Soviet Policy-Making," The Washington Quarterly 11 (Spring 1988): 131-135.

⁴²For details see Yuri Luryi, "The Role of Defence Counsel in Political Trials in the USSR," Manitoba Law Journal 7, no. 4 (1977): 307-324. On the struggle to bring changes to this system, see Eugene Huskey, "The Politics of Soviet Criminal Process: Expanding the Right to Counsel in Pre-Trial Proceedings," American Journal of Comparative Law 34 (1986): 93-112; and Peter H. Solomon, Jr., "The Role of Defence Counsel in the USSR: The Politics of Judicial Reform Under Gorbachev," The Criminal Law Quarterly 31 (December 1988): 76-93. On the struggle waged by some Soviet advocates to properly serve their clients see Dina Kaminskaya, Final Judgment: My Life as a Soviet Defense Attorney (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), especially Chapter 1 and Part 2.

⁴³Osakwe, "Due Process of Law," pp. 209-215. For examples of some of the "errors" and "irregularities" which have occurred during preliminary investigations in ordinary criminal cases see Izvestia, 22 May 1987.

1958 together with the Principles of Criminal Legislation and of Criminal Procedure. The criminal codes of the union republics, enacted thereafter on the basis of these Principles, reproduced this statute verbatim in the first chapter of the special part of the Codes.

The chapter on political crimes was divided into two sub-chapters: especially dangerous crimes against the state (Articles 64-73, RSFSR Criminal Code) and other crimes against the state (Articles 74 to 88-2). The essential difference between the two was in the intentions of the offender. Especially dangerous crimes against the state were supposedly committed with the intention of undermining or weakening the Soviet political or social system. This formulation appeared in the definition of several such crimes -- Articles 68, 69, and 70 -- and was implied in the definitions of the other especially dangerous crimes against the state.⁴⁴

The provision of this section of the RSFSR Criminal Code which drew the greatest attention in the West was Article 70. It was defined as agitation or propaganda carried out with the purpose of undermining or weakening Soviet power or of committing specific especially dangerous crimes against the state; the spreading for the same purpose of slanderous fabrications which defame the Soviet political and social system; and furthermore the spreading, production or storage, for the same purpose, of literature with such content. A number of court cases and also the official commentaries to the Criminal Code made it abundantly clear that almost any statement which deviated from the prescribed orthodoxy on questions of a politically sensitive nature was considered anti-Soviet propaganda, and this made

⁴⁴See the translations in Simons, The Soviet Codes, pp. 91-98.

Article 70 the most important legal tool in restricting freedom of expression in the USSR.⁴⁵

The sweeping character of the definitions of several especially dangerous crimes against the state was further enhanced by Article 72 (RSFSR Criminal Code), which provided that "organized activity, directed at the preparation or the commission of especially dangerous crimes against the state, at the creation of an organization to commit such crimes, and also participation in an anti-Soviet organization" entailed full criminal responsibility for such political crimes as were being contemplated.

In theory the applicability of Article 70 could have been restricted by the requirement of direct intent: the purpose of undermining or weakening Soviet power. Experience showed, however, that the courts were satisfied with some kind of "constructive malice": "the offender must have realized that his utterances could be or would be used by foreign enemies of the Soviet Union" and similar lines of reasoning.

Some apprehensions about the propagandistic counter-effect of Article 70 were reflected by the introduction of a new provision, shortly after the Sin'evsky-Daniel trial in 1966, to deal with the "systematic spreading, in oral form, of patently false fabrications which defame the Soviet political and social system and the production and spreading in a written, printed or other form of works of such

⁴⁵F.J.M. Feldbrugge, "Law and Political Dissent in the Soviet Union," in Contemporary Soviet Law: Essays in Honor of John N. Hazard, eds. Donald D. Barry et al. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), pp. 60-63.

content" (Article 190-1, RSFSR Criminal Code). In this case, anti-Soviet purpose was not required.⁴⁶

It is important to note that although the articles of the Criminal Code dealing with crimes against the state, and especially Articles 70 and 190-1 (RSFSR Criminal Code) were the standard provisions used in dealing with political dissent, a number of other articles of the Criminal Code were often encountered in the context of political trials. They included "hooliganism," defined in Article 206 (RSFSR Criminal Code) as "intentional actions which grossly violate public order and express an obvious disrespect towards society," "parasitism," defined by Article 209 as "engaging in vagrancy or in begging, and also leading any other parasitic way of life," Article 88 (currency speculation), etc. For example, there were a number of trials in which political dissidents were sentenced on the charge of hooliganism after cases were entirely fabricated on the basis of false testimony.⁴⁷

In itself, Soviet legal literature was of little help in explaining what was "anti-Soviet" and what defamed, weakened, or subverted the Soviet regime. And although Soviet legal doctrine stated that only actions detrimental to society were

⁴⁶Feldbrugge, "Law and Political Dissent," pp. 63-65.

⁴⁷On the general application of non-political articles of the criminal law to dissenters, with accompanying examples, see Amnesty International, Prisoners of Conscience in the USSR: Their Treatment and Conditions, 2nd ed. (London: AI Publications, 1980), pp. 56-60. On the use of charges of "hooliganism" against Soviet dissidents, see Ivo Lapenna, "The Contemporary Crisis of Legality in the Soviet Union: Substantive Criminal Law," Review of Socialist Law 1, no. 2 (1977): 79-82. On the general features of "anti-parasite" laws, see Maria Los, Communist Ideology, Law and Crime: A Comparative View of the USSR and Poland (London: Macmillan Press, 1988), pp. 78-104, and on the use of "anti-parasite" legislation against dissidents, see Andrei Tverdokhlebov, "Notes on Legislation in the Realm of Intensification of the Struggle against Individuals Evading Socially Useful Labor and Leading an Anti-social Parasitic Way of Life (Report to the Moscow Human Rights Committee)," Papers on Soviet Law, no. 1 (1977): 108-127, and Samuel Kuchеров's discussion (with a focus on the Brodsky case) in The Organs of Soviet Administration of Justice: Their History and Operation (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1970), pp. 198-247.

punishable, in fact the relevant statutes were so loosely drafted, and even more loosely interpreted, that opinions and even attitudes were actually punished. Soviet courts could deal with such questions only because they consistently followed the lead provided by the Party through a variety of channels -- pre-trial statements by officials and coverage in the government and Party press, the viewpoints expressed by the state prosecution, and privately transmitted Party instructions.

Thus Party interference was routinized and predictable in legal cases of a politically sensitive nature:

...the Party appropriates to itself exclusive jurisdiction in matters of political justice, predetermining and scripting for the legal cadres the basic questions of guilt, innocence, and sentencing. The Stalinist "jurisprudence of terror" has given way to a more insidious but less fatal jurisprudence of political expediency which is reflected in the growing body of "case law" that has been steadily accumulating during the post-Stalin years.⁴⁸

According to this "case law" the KGB played a very important role, on behalf of the Party, in monitoring the cases of political dissidents from the stage of pre-arrest surveillance to post-imprisonment administrative supervision. In fact, it appears that, in the mid-60s, the Party transferred responsibility for monitoring dissent from local Party organizations to the KGB.⁴⁹

The KGB was normally limited to investigating "especially dangerous crimes against the state" and certain major economic crimes (in other cases the investigating agency was the Procuracy or the MVD). However, the law defining

⁴⁸Sharlet, "The Communist Party and the Administration of Justice," p. 364.

⁴⁹Roy Medvedev, On Socialist Democracy (New York: W.W. Norton, 1975), pp. 160-161.

the jurisdiction of these investigating agencies was not clearly spelled out, and the KGB was also engaged in the preparation and supervision of cases against political prisoners charged under other articles of the Criminal Code (including those dealing with "hooliganism" and "parasitism").⁵⁰ All available evidence, however, indicates that in this and other areas of action the KGB was wholly subordinate to the Party, and the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU was responsible for all major decisions on policy toward dissent.⁵¹

Thus political trials were carefully orchestrated, and the Party and KGB manipulated the instruments of formal legality to achieve the desired effect.

In cases which go to trial under the "political" articles of the criminal code, KGB investigators prepare the indictment under the direction of Party authorities, who determine the sentence and verdict well in advance. The procurators and judges involved are then instructed accordingly... in planning a political trial, the Party leaves little to chance. Defense counsel and even the courtroom audience are subject to political screening... [and] ...counsel in politically sensitive cases must be cleared by the KGB.⁵²

⁵⁰Amy Knight, "Soviet Politics and the KGB-MVD Relationship," *Soviet Union* 11, Pt. 2 (1984): 174-175. See also Kaminskaya, *Final Judgment*, p. 176. Some recent accounts in the Soviet press have noted and criticized the "inappropriate" use of KGB operatives to monitor, harass and arrest dissidents, which resulted in the demoralization of some KGB personnel. See, for example, the article by a former KGB officer (now a pensioner), Ia. Karpovich, "Stydno molchat!" *Ogonek* No. 29, 15-22 July 1989, pp. 6-9.

⁵¹Peter Reddaway, "Soviet Policies on Dissent and Emigration: The Radical Change of Course Since 1979," Colloquium Paper No. 192, Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, Washington, D.C., 28 August 1984, pp. 29-30.

⁵²Sharlet, "The Communist Party and the Administration of Justice," p. 367.

As a result, throughout the period under consideration in this thesis the Soviet legal system played a crucial role in the central political elites' coercive strategy directed against political non-conformists.⁵³

Soviet Corrective Labour Law and Penal Institutions

Imprisonment in a Soviet prison or "corrective labour" camp⁵⁴ has been the most extreme form of legally-sanctioned coercion, short of execution or forcible detention in a psychiatric institution, experienced by Soviet citizens. The "camp experience" affected large numbers of people, especially when Stalin was entrenched in power, and the period of the greatest excesses within the penal system, from the early 1930s to the early 1950s, is still deeply entrenched in the memory of many Soviet citizens. There is a dearth of analytical literature concerning the development of Soviet penal institutions, and many details concerning the history of the Soviet penal system are still lacking; however, the basic outline is quite clear.

The People's Commissariat of Justice was formally put in charge of ordinary penitentiary institutions soon after the Bolshevik revolution, and it issued a Temporary Instruction on the administration of these institutions, as well as a more detailed Statute on General Places of Detention in, respectively, July 1918 and November 1920. As early as 1919, however, forced labour camps, and "special"

⁵³For a detailed account of two political trials in the Soviet Union during the Brezhnev period which support this contention see Kaminskaya, Final Judgment, pp. 161-205.

⁵⁴The institutional use of "corrective labour" was based on the principle that work is the best method of reforming offenders. Since the reformatory aims of penal policy were largely abandoned during the period under consideration in this thesis, I will generally use the term "labour camp" instead of "corrective labour camp." Prior to 1933 various other terms, including "forced labour camps" and "concentration camps" were used in the Soviet Union. See Robert Conquest, The Soviet Police System (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 77.

forced labour camps, were established for workers who were found guilty of having violated the provisions for labour discipline, and for political opponents of the Bolsheviks or "class enemies," respectively.

These forced labour camps, initially under the direction of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) or of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission, better known as the Cheka, functioned outside the ordinary penal system, for assignment to them was regulated by the NKVD or Cheka, rather than the ordinary courts, and they were not liable to supervision and control by the People's Commissariat of Justice.⁵⁵

A network of special camps supervised by the state security organs (the Cheka/GPU/OGPU) and remaining outside of the scope of the RSFSR Corrective Labour Code of 1924 (similar codes were adopted in the other republics after 1924) continued to function until the fusion of the NKVD and OGPU in 1934, when all places of detention were subordinated to the new penitentiary department of the federal NKVD, the GULag (Chief Administration of Corrective Labour Camps).⁵⁶ It

⁵⁵Mikhail Geller [Heller], Kontsentratsionnyi mir i sovetskaia literatura (London: Overseas Publications Interchange Ltd., 1974), pp. 49-59. The decree of the Central Executive Committee of 15 April 1919 on the establishment of forced-labour camps, and excerpts from the decree of the Central Executive Committee of 17 May 1919 which list the regulations concerning forced-labour camps, are translated in James Bunyan, The Origin of Forced Labor in the Soviet State, 1917-1921: Documents and Materials (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), pp. 72-75.

⁵⁶F.J.M. Feldbrugge, "The Soviet Penitentiary System and the Rules of Internal Order of Corrective Labor Institutions in Historical Perspective," Review of Socialist Law 12, no. 1 (1986): 7-10. According to Berman, apart from prisons, places of imprisonment were differentiated into correctional labour colonies, for those sentenced to terms of less than three years, and correctional labour camps, for those sentenced to three years or more. See Soviet Criminal Law and Procedure, p. 30. However, according to Artem'ev, corrective labour colonies were intended only for those sentenced for up to two years of detention. See Viacheslav P. Artem'ev, Rezhim i okhrana ispravitel'no-trudovykh lagerei MVD, Issledovaniia i materialy (Seria 1-ia, vyp. 26) (Munich: Institute for the Study of the USSR, 1956), p. 22. It appears that the corrective labour codes applied, at least in principle, to all places of detention. Feldbrugge, "The Soviet Penitentiary System," p. 11.

should be noted, however, that throughout most of the twenties the network of camps supervised by the state security organs, and the number of its inmates, were relatively small, and conditions in these institutions (with the exception of the Solovki camps) were not, initially, overly harsh. In the ordinary penal institutions, supervised by the republican NKVDs and the republican people's commissariats of justice, relatively lenient policies, stressing a policy of differentiation and rehabilitation in conformity with philosophies then popular in the United States and Western Europe, were pursued until 1928-1929.⁵⁷

There was a dramatic change of course in 1929, when repressive measures began to be increasingly used against opponents (real or imagined) of Stalin's drive to power and his goal of the rapid industrialization of the USSR. At the same time, a decision was made to use prisoners as a major component of the labour force, and penal institutions were expected to be self-supporting. This led to a significant increase in the number of individuals sentenced to imprisonment, to the rapid expansion of OGPU camps, many of which provided labour for the timber, mining, and construction industries, and a dramatic shift in the orientation of the

⁵⁷Peter H. Solomon, Jr., "Soviet Penal Policy, 1917-1934: A Reinterpretation," Slavic Review 39 (June 1980): 201-204. On the Solovki camps, see the initial chapters of Vol. 2 of Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn's The Gulag Archipelago 1918-1956: An Experiment in Literary Investigation (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), and David Dallin and Boris Nicolaevsky, Forced Labor in Soviet Russia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947), Chapter 8.

⁵⁸Barrington Moore has suggested that there was a strong linkage, during the thirties, between change and coercion: "...it must be emphasized that the choice was not between using terror and permitting the disintegration of Russian society. Rather it was between using terror as a major instrument to create and then consolidate a new social system, or else letting power go by default. By the late twenties the forces of recovery and reintegration were growing stronger in Russian society. Since these forces were growing from the ground up in a way that threatened Bolshevik power, terror had to be used to destroy them and impose a new order, a process most clearly seen in the collectivization of agriculture." Barrington Moore, Jr., Terror and Progress -- USSR (New York: Harper and Row, 1954), p. 11.

ordinary penal institutions, whereby the more progressive aims of penal policy were subordinated to economic goals.⁵⁹

Although a new RSFSR Corrective Labour Code was adopted in 1933 (the corrective labour codes of the other republics were not revised), it became obsolete soon afterwards:

...Owing to the reorganization of the entire prison and camp administration or, to put it more bluntly, to the full-scale introduction of comprehensive terror, control over all penitentiary institutions, including legislation concerning such institutions, passed into the hands of the security organs... Penitentiary law, as was subsequently admitted by Soviet sources, came to be regulated exclusively by internal instructions of the NKVD.⁶⁰

In fact, as mentioned earlier, the NKVD was given special powers to sentence "persons recognized as socially dangerous" to corrective labour camps (in 1933 the term "corrective labour" was substituted for "forced labour").⁶¹ Given the secrecy surrounding the security organs' regulation of penitentiary law between the mid-

⁵⁹Solomon, "Soviet Penal Policy," pp. 208-210. On the general role of forced labour in the Soviet industrialization effort, see S. Swianiewicz, Forced Labour and Economic Development: An Enquiry into the Experience of Soviet Industrialization (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), esp. Chapter 14. The most recent article in an ongoing debate on the nature, extent, and utility of the use of forced labour in the Soviet industrialization drive is Steven Rosefielde's "Incriminating Evidence: Excess Deaths and Forced Labour Under Stalin: A Final Reply to Critics," Soviet Studies 39 (April 1987): 292-313. For an interesting description of the early development of the Vorkuta coalfield, and of the role of convict labour as the primary labour force in this area, see P.I. Negretov, "How Vorkuta Began," Soviet Studies 29 (October 1977): 565-575. For more information on the Vorkuta area, and on Negretov, a former political prisoner who continued to live in the Vorkuta area after his release from imprisonment, see his memoirs, Vse dorogi vedut na Vorkutu (Benson, VT: Chalidze Publications, 1985). Lists of Soviet labour camps in existence during and after World War II are provided in Dallin and Nicolaevsky, Forced Labor, pp. 52-71, and Boris Iakovlev, Kontsentratsionnye lageria SSSR (Munich: Institute for the Study of the USSR, 1955), pp. 65-70.

⁶⁰F.J.M. Feldbrugge, "Soviet Corrective Labor Law," in Soviet Law After Stalin, Part I: The Citizen and the State in Contemporary Soviet Law, ed. D.D. Barry et al. (Leyden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1977), p. 34.

⁶¹Feldbrugge, "The Soviet Penitentiary System," p. 11.

thirties and Stalin's death, little is known about the details of formal changes in the structure of the penal system during this period. In 1943, however, a special type of harsh forced labour called katorga was introduced for those sentenced to long terms of imprisonment under Article 58 of the RSFSR Criminal Code or its equivalents in other republics.⁶²

The growth of the GULag, and in the number of prisoners under its jurisdiction, led to an enormous increase in the size and activities of the security apparatus. During the 1930s the NKVD became a huge industrial and construction concern which organized production under its own administration, and it supplied labourers to enterprises in the administration of other commissariats. The NKVD also acquired responsibility for heavily-armed border and internal guard units.⁶³

When the NKVD was renamed MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs) in 1946 the control of GULag passed automatically to the latter, and it continued under the MVD after 1949 when the MGB took over several MVD functions. For a brief period, after May 1953 and the fusion of the state security and internal affairs organs under Beria, the GULag was removed from its subordination to the police organs and placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice. However, it lacked the administrative capacity and experience necessary to administer the large

⁶²Feldbrugge, "The Soviet Penitentiary System," p. 11. Many katorga camps were renamed "special camps" in 1948. On katorga and the special camps see Solzhenitsyn's The Gulag Archipelago, Volume 3, Chapter 1. Solzhenitsyn's trilogy provided vivid evidence of the very harsh living and working conditions in the camps.

⁶³Swianiewicz, Forced Labour, pp. 14-15. See also the classic work by David Dallin and Boris Nicolaevsky, Forced Labour in Soviet Russia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947). However, the security apparatus itself was not immune to purges, and Stalin ably manipulated competing factions within the NKVD to prevent it from gaining too much autonomy. For details on the Yezhov period, see Robert Conquest, Inside Stalin's Secret Police: NKVD Politics 1936-1939 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1985).

complex of camps and colonies, and in April 1954 the MVD (which had just had a new internal security agency, the KGB, split off from it), resumed control of GULag.⁶⁴

Developments after Stalin's Death

In the post-Stalin period priority was given to reforming substantive criminal law. However, several sets of statutes on corrective labour camps and colonies were enacted, first (in 1954) to allow for a consolidation of the existing instructions and then, in 1958 and intervals throughout the 1960s, to conform with reforms in the work of the security organs and changes in criminal legislation. However, many of these statutes were never published.⁶⁵

Organizationally, these changes were reflected in the replacement in October 1956 of GULag by a Chief Administration of Corrective Labour Colonies (GUITK) of the MVD. In January 1960 the MVD of the USSR was dissolved and its duties transferred to the ministries of internal affairs of the union republics which, soon afterwards (1962) were renamed ministries for the protection of public order (MOOP). In 1966 a new federal MOOP was established and the corresponding RSFSR ministry was dissolved, with its duties being transferred to the USSR ministry. Finally, in 1968 the USSR MOOP was renamed the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the corresponding ministries in the union republics (except the RSFSR) followed suit. After 1968 the MVD, through its subordinate agency, the

⁶⁴Conquest, Soviet Police System, p. 79.

⁶⁵Feldbrugge, "Soviet Corrective Labour Law," pp. 35-41.

Chief Administration of Places of Detention (GUMZ), was responsible for all corrective labour establishments.⁶⁶

The full recodification of corrective labour legislation was not completed until the late 1960s, and the Principles of Corrective Labour Legislation were enacted by the USSR Supreme Soviet in July 1969, followed by the enactment of republican codes of corrective labour law, based on the federal principles, in 1970 and 1971. This formal recodification was not accompanied by any significant changes in the administration of the Soviet penal system, and simply confirmed the changes introduced earlier, after Stalin's death, in the form of statutes.⁶⁷ The differences among the republican codes are minimal, and for the sake of simplicity the code which will be cited henceforth is the Corrective Labour Code of the RSFSR (1970).

As a result of the changes following Stalin's death, the most severe forms of legally-sanctioned punishment which could be imposed on adult criminal offenders, short of execution or forcible detention in a psychiatric institution, included imprisonment, exile, banishment, corrective work without imprisonment and "obligatory induction to labour" of people sentenced conditionally to imprisonment. I will be concerned only with the forms of punishment which were applied most frequently to political dissidents -- imprisonment and exile.⁶⁸

⁶⁶Felbrugge, "The Soviet Penitentiary System," pp. 12-13.

⁶⁷Ibid., pp. 24-25.

⁶⁸Political dissidents were rarely sentenced to corrective work without imprisonment, or obligatory induction to labour. On the various forms of punishment listed above see Prisoners of Conscience, pp. 98-105. Extra-judicial sanctions included various forms of harassment by the security apparatus, and samizdat sources have speculated that, on some occasions, the Soviet security organs murdered certain individuals involved in dissident activity. See, for example, the information on the suspicious death of Father Bronius Laurinavicius in Chronicle of the Catholic Church in

A sentence to a term of internal exile (a maximum of five years), either by itself or, more frequently, following a term of imprisonment in a penal institution represented, at least in theory, a milder sanction than detention in a prison or labour camp. Intended to isolate prisoners from their usual environment, internal exile entailed strict confinement to a certain locality (usually a raion) in a remote and inhospitable area of the Soviet Union. Exiles, even those with severe health problems, were often compelled to engage in heavy physical labour, and were under psychological strain because of their isolation and estrangement from their surroundings. Exiles were kept under surveillance by the local branch of the MVD, were obliged to report to it at least once (and usually more frequently) a month, and the MVD often warned local residents not to associate with them.⁶⁹

The most significant form of punishment involved imprisonment in a penal institution. Article 24 of the Criminal Code (CC) of the RSFSR stipulates that a prisoner's term of imprisonment is served in a corrective-labour camp or prison.⁷⁰ Only a minority of known political prisoners served all or part of their sentence in prisons which, as especially high security institutions, were intended for those who

Lithuania No. 50 (8 December 1981), pp. 8-12; and on the "suicide" of composer Volodymyr Ivasiuk in A Chronicle of Current Events No. 53 (1 August 1979): 74-76. No definitive evidence clarifying the circumstances of these deaths has become available.

⁶⁹Prisoners of Conscience, pp. 101-103; Danylo Shumuk, Life Sentence: Memoirs of a Ukrainian Political Prisoner (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1984), pp. 369-370; interview with Danylo Shumuk, Mississauga, Ont., 10 October 1988. Ivan Shumuk, Danylo Shumuk's nephew, provided me with copies of several dozen letters written by his uncle when he was detained in internal exile in the Kazakh SSR between 1982 and 1987, and these letters provide interesting insights into the conditions of internal exile in the Soviet Union.

⁷⁰Ispravitel'no-trudovoi kodeks RSFSR (Moscow: Iuridicheskaya literatura, 1972), pp. 10, 24, 30, 31. Women prisoners were kept in separate, or separate sections of, corrective-labour camp. They were detained only under ordinary or strict regime, but were subject to the same basic regulations found in camps for male prisoners.

committed very grave crimes or were "especially dangerous recidivists." Political prisoners were most frequently detained in prison as punishment for disciplinary offences committed in a labour camp, and the regime in prisons was particularly harsh.⁷¹

In the labour camps the four regimes of labour camps between 1965 and 1985 were, in increasing order of severity, ordinary, reinforced, strict, and special, and each regime provided for a systematic reduction in a prisoner's rights to correspondence, visits, mail, and purchase of supplementary food supplies.⁷² According to Art. 24, RSFSR CC, those convicted of especially dangerous crimes against the state under Articles 64 to 73 of the RSFSR CC were automatically sentenced to detention in a labour camp under either strict or special regime, although part of the sentence could also be served in a prison.⁷³ I will focus primarily on those labour camps, henceforth to be called "political" camps, where the political prisoners sentenced under the above articles were detained.⁷⁴

⁷¹Prisoners of Conscience, pp. 164-165. For details on conditions in a prison where large numbers of political prisoners were detained see Vladimir Bukovskii, compiler, Vladimirskaiia Tiur'ma: sbornik statei i dokumentov (New York: Izdatel'stvo "Khronika," 1977). For a recent description of the poor conditions in Moscow's Butyrka prison, see Pravda, 30 August 1989.

⁷²Prisoners of Conscience, pp. 98-101.

⁷³Kommentarii k ugodovnomu kodeksu RSFSR (Moscow: Iuridicheskaiia literatura, 1971). pp. 63-64.

⁷⁴Although Article 6 of the Fundamentals of Corrective Labour Legislation provided that prisoners should, as a rule, serve their sentence in the republic of their residence prior to arrest, previous offenders (recidivists) and those convicted of "especially dangerous crimes against the state" could be (and almost always were) sent to serve their sentences in camps located in remote areas of the RSFSR. This created, among other problems, great difficulties for families wishing to make use of the minimal visiting rights which were permitted, and was a frequent source of prisoners' complaints.

Mechanisms of Control of Prisoners

The mechanisms of control over prisoners in Soviet penal institutions included a complex set of incentives and punishments which were consciously manipulated by the camp administration, social control through regimentation, and political and social re-education.⁷⁵ Punishments included a reduction in the provision of already limited and poor-quality foodstuffs to prisoners who were placed in punishment cells for infractions of camp regulations. In addition, the receipt of food parcels by individual prisoners, which was strictly regulated by the administration, could be further limited or denied. According to Karklins, "The official camp regulations on access to food show it to be the linchpin of a carefully calibrated system of rewards and punishments."⁷⁶

Likewise, the number and length of visits by family members, also strictly regulated by penal officials, could be reduced or forbidden on rather flimsy grounds. Other forms of punishment included extension of the term of imprisonment if new "crimes" were committed in camp, confinement in punishment cells or solitary confinement and, in those cases when political prisoners were detained together with ordinary criminals, allowing the criminals to physically abuse political prisoners.⁷⁷

⁷⁵For a recent study of these mechanisms see Rasma Karklins, "The Organisation of Power in Soviet Labour Camps," Soviet Studies 41 (April 1989): 276-297.

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 284.

⁷⁷These forms of punishment are described in a variety of memoirs and samizdat documents. In addition to the sources mentioned in Karklins, "The Organization of Power," see the details in Viacheslav Chornovil and Boris Penson, Daily Life in a Correction Colony in Soviet Mordovia, Soviet Institutions Series Paper No. 3 (Jerusalem: The Soviet and East European Research Centre, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1975); and the general commentary in Los, Communist Ideology, Law and Crime, pp. 110-120.

Punishments not mentioned by Karklins included restrictions on access to proper health care, assignment of prisoners to especially difficult or unpleasant forms of labour, and restrictions (often quite arbitrary) on the personal belongings which a prisoner was allowed to keep. The often arbitrary administration of such punishments was a relatively simple procedure, for although a complex set of rules regulated the internal order of Soviet corrective labour institutions, the camp administration had a great deal of flexibility in interpreting these rules and often ignored them. This was facilitated by the fact that these rules were not normally available to prisoners; in fact, the text of the "Rules of Internal Order of Corrective Labor Institutions" became available in the West only in 1986.⁷⁹ The reverse side of these punishments was the extension of various "privileges" to prisoners such as extra food packages, assignment to preferred jobs, etc.

Social control through regimentation was achieved by strict observance of procedures such as frequent roll calls, searches of prisoners' quarters, and regulations concerning uniformity of dress and personal appearance (e.g., haircuts). These methods, used in many different prison systems throughout the world, were aimed at enforcing discipline, instilling respect for authority among prisoners, and breaking their will.⁸⁰

A great emphasis was placed on "re-educating" prisoners by requiring their attendance at political lectures and encouraging participation in officially-approved cultural activities. The official aim of these activities was to elicit contrition and

⁷⁹Feldbrugge, "The Soviet Penitentiary System," p. 26.

⁸⁰Karklins, "The Organization of Power," pp. 285-286.

repentance concerning past misdeeds and "resocialize" prisoners, preparing them for a return to a normal life in the outside world. Those prisoners who refused to participate were punished, and those with strong political or religious convictions were particularly liable to boycott these official activities and therefore incur sanctions. Although one can dispute the effectiveness of such forced "re-education" (it was probably counterproductive in many, if not most, cases),⁸⁰ forced participation in these rituals did increase a prisoner's sense of powerlessness.⁸¹

Last but not least, strong efforts were made to co-opt certain inmates to participate in "prisoners' councils" or act in other official capacities in penal institutions, and to act as informers:

...the direct exercise of power by officials is supplemented by co-opted inmate "self-administration", self-policing, and mobilisation. By these means inmates are divided, made to control each other, and are pressured to change both their behaviour and attitudes. While co-optation exists in prisons the world over, it plays an unusual role in the Soviet labour camps; "self-organised activity" and "self-administration" are magic words in the vocabulary of the officials, yet at the same time true self-organisation by inmates is undermined.⁸²

The purpose of this system of incentives and punishments, regimentation, "re-education," and co-optation was to dehumanize prisoners, and turn them into "cogs"

⁸⁰For an interesting example of one political prisoner's revolt against these official activities, see Anatolii Marchenko, Moi pokazaniia (Paris: La Presse Libre, 1969), pp. 288-291.

⁸¹Karklins, "The Organisation of Power," pp. 287-288.

⁸²Karklins, "The Organisation of Power," p. 291. On the Council of the Collective, an inmate body which was supposed to act on behalf of prisoners, and the Internal Order Section, both of which acted as tools of the camp administration, see Anatolii Marchenko, My Testimony (New York: E.P. Dutton and Co., 1969), pp. 244-247.

to be manipulated at will by the penal authorities.⁴³ However, the emphasis on breaking the will of prisoners, and forcing them to make compromises with and concessions to the penal authorities, was especially strong in the case of political prisoners. Political prisoners were continuously subjected to a barrage of provocations and petty indignities designed to demoralize them,⁴⁴ and the ultimate aim of these tactics was to "persuade" political prisoners to "renounce" their views in writing, thereby discrediting the movements in which they had been involved.⁴⁵

The Coercive Role of Soviet Penal Institutions

Detention in a penal institution has been, as noted above, the most extreme legally-sanctioned means of punishing Soviet citizens for criminal acts, including participation in unapproved political activities, or deterring them from such activities. During the Stalinist period these means were used on a broad scale, in a brutal and often indiscriminate fashion, and affected large numbers of Soviet citizens.⁴⁶

⁴³For a graphic description of the dehumanizing impact of daily life in Soviet labour camps, see the essay "A Report from the Beria Reservation," in Valentyn Moroz, Boomerang: The Works of Valentyn Moroz (Baltimore: Smoloskyp, 1974), especially pp. 48-60.

⁴⁴The use of such methods was mentioned by all former Soviet political prisoners who were interviewed, and is described in numerous memoirs. A detailed depiction of these tactics is found in the memoirs of Irina Ratushinskaya, Grey is the Colour of Hope (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1988), especially Chapters 7-9.

⁴⁵Surveillance of political prisoners, through a network of informers, and maintenance of steady pressure on individual prisoners to "encourage" them to recant, was the duty of the resident KGB officers in a given camp. In the political camps the resident KGB officers may have had greater authority than the camp director. See Vladimir Bukovsky, To Build a Castle -- My Life as a Dissenter (New York: Viking Press, 1979), p. 332.

⁴⁶This topic is treated in more detail in the following chapter. However, it should be noted that there is still no consensus, in the Soviet Union or in the West, concerning the number of individuals repressed and imprisoned during the Stalinist period. Some indication of the scale of the figures involved comes from the estimate of one Soviet scholar, Shmelev, that 17 million Soviet citizens

The resulting destruction of organized political opposition, and the terrorization of a large part of the Soviet population, led to an atomization of society,⁸⁷ and a certain "inertia of fear."⁸⁸ Thus, even when state-sponsored terror declined as an instrument of control after Stalin's death, the inhibiting impact of the memory of Stalinist terror, when combined with the continued maintenance of a powerful security apparatus, still ensured the relative passivity of most individuals who might have otherwise engaged in unauthorized political activity. As Bahry and Silver have noted,

...a mature coercive regime does not need to engage in constant harassment of every person who strays from the orthodox line. It can tolerate unorthodox thoughts and a certain amount of unorthodox behavior, while resorting to coercion only when an unorthodox activity intensifies or challenges the authority of the regime.

More importantly, an efficient system of controls can rely on a perception of its coercive potential to inhibit deviation from prescribed political norms. As Jeremy Azrael has observed, in the post-Stalin era more of the activities of the secret police are "designed to have a 'prophylactic' instead of a 'punitive' effect." From this perspective, it is important that the state be perceived as having the capability and will to uncover and to act against dissident or unorthodox activity, whether or not it actually does so in every instance.⁸⁹

passed through Soviet labour camps between 1937 and 1953, while a Soviet writer, Iulian Semenov, claims that he saw a report, prepared for Stalin by his minister of state security, Ignat'ev, stating that approximately 12 million persons were detained in Soviet labour camps in 1953. See Thomas Sherlock and Vera Tolz, "Debates over Number of Stalin's Victims in the USSR and in the West," Report on the USSR 1 (8 September 1989): 10, 14.

⁸⁷On the deliberate undermining of social bonds among individuals as a result of mass terror, see Moore, Terror and Progress, pp. 158, 164.

⁸⁸Valentin Turchin, The Inertia of Fear and the Scientific Worldview (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981). According to Dallin and Breslauer, the arbitrary use of terror is most effective during the takeover and mobilization stages of the development of a communist system, for it helps to undermine the established social order. See Alexander Dallin and George W. Breslauer, Political Terror in Communist Systems (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970), p. 5-8.

⁸⁹Donna Bahry and Brian D. Silver, "Intimidation and the Symbolic: Uses of Terror in the USSR," American Political Science Review 81 (December 1987): 1066.

Thus, in the post-Stalin period a graduated series of milder, alternative measures was usually employed to inhibit dissident activity before there was resort to arrest, trial, and imprisonment in a penal institution.⁹⁰

Developing this argument, Karklins has argued, largely on the basis of a study of data from a major survey of former Soviet citizens now in the West, that a fairly sophisticated "calculus of repressive strategy" dictated Soviet policies on dissent following Stalin's death, after the use of mass terror as a method of societal control had ceased. The reasoning behind this calculus, which operated until the mid-1980s, is outlined below.⁹¹

1. Fear of repression was a major deterrent to autonomous political behaviour on the part of Soviet citizens, especially in view of lingering memories of Stalinist terror.
2. However, in the absence of a system of overt mass terror, when an individual actually experienced repression (either personally, or in the form of the arrest or harassment of a friend or relative) this usually led to increased political disaffection and dissent.⁹² Thus instilling fear was an effective means of prophylactic coercion, whereas actual repression could be counterproductive.

⁹⁰Peter Reddaway, "Policy Towards Dissent Since Khrushchev," in Authority, Power and Politics in the USSR, eds. T.H. Rigby et al. (London: Macmillan, 1980), pp. 160-161. Administrative harassment and threats to job security were a favourite tool used against nonconformists. See Rasma Karklins, "The Dissent/Coercion Nexus in the USSR," Studies in Comparative Communism 20 (Autumn/Winter 1987): 335-336.

⁹¹These points are based on Karklins, "The Dissent/Coercion Nexus," pp. 332-341, and are supported by the data in Bahry and Silver, "Intimidation," pp. 1072, 1089-1090.

⁹²This chain-reaction impact of repression of dissent activity was especially noticeable after the Siniavskii-Daniel trial of 1966. On the significance of this trial, and the protests which it spawned, see Ludmilla Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious, and Human Rights (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1985), pp. 274-282.

3. The need to apply judicial sanctions against dissidents not only reflected a failure in the graduated use of milder prophylactic measures by the KGB, it also led to considerable negative publicity and protests at home and abroad.
4. Therefore the more visible forms of repression of political dissent were avoided if at all possible. There was an alternation between permitting certain forms of autonomous behaviour in order to discourage recourse to more militant forms of protest, and cracking down on dissenters when their behaviour crossed a certain "acceptable" threshold of activity, which changed over time.

In accordance with this logic, the most effective policy of coercion involved maximizing fear and minimizing repression, and this was most easily achieved by making an example, on a selective basis, of those who were especially persistent in their dissent activity, or played a leading role in a dissent movement. According to Bahry and Silver,

aside from the question of cost-effectiveness, singling out leaders for reprisals is logical from the regime's standpoint. By not trying to punish every transgressor of official norms, the state minimizes the number of people permanently alienated by being penalized. But punishing leaders provides a demonstration effect that enhances general deterrence."

In the post-Stalin period the most persistent activists and actual or potential leadership figures in political dissent movements were, eventually, almost always

"Bahry and Silver, "Intimidation," p. 1089. The survey data used by Karklins indicate that those who played leading roles in dissent activity were, in fact, far more likely to be the victims of state-directed coercion than mere participants. Karklins, "The Dissent/Coercion Nexus," p. 334.

arrested, tried and sentenced to deprivation of freedom in a penal institution.³⁴

Thus the composition of these political prisoners should provide an important indicator of the scope of these movements, and central political elite perceptions of the actual or potential threat which they posed to state stability.

³⁴One exception to this rule was the exile to the city of Gorkii, without a trial or any official order other than an oral communication from an official of the procurator's office, of prominent human rights activist Andrei Sakharov. See the memoirs of Sakharov's wife, Elena Bonner, Alone Together (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986). Expulsion from the USSR, or revocation of citizenship from an individual travelling abroad, was another sanction applied on some occasions against dissident intellectuals or well-known writers and other cultural figures, such as Solzhenitsyn, Maksimov, Rostropovich, etc.

Chapter 4

THE SOVIET LEGAL-PENITENTIARY SYSTEM AND THE "ETHNONATIONAL FACTOR," 1945-1953

As noted in the previous chapter, in the post-Stalin period the detention of political non-conformists in a Soviet penal institution was part of a "calculus of repressive strategy" which aimed largely at deterring dissent, and the number of political dissidents detained in such institutions was relatively small. However, between the early 1930s and the mid-1950s these means were used in a much broader, cruder fashion to destroy all real or potential political opposition, terrorize a large part of the Soviet population, help atomize society, and provide the Soviet Union with a guaranteed supply of forced labour. In fact, the effectiveness of the selective "calculus of repressive strategy" after the mid-1950s was largely due to persistent memories of the much harsher repressive policies under Stalin.¹

The Soviet "camp experience" under Stalin had a tremendous impact on the citizens of the Soviet Union. Summed up by the term the "GULag," during the Stalinist period this experience affected almost every single individual in the USSR through the arrest and imprisonment of relatives, friends, and colleagues, and today

¹In the 1960s and 1970s several dissident activists who had been imprisoned during the Stalinist period were easily "broken" by threats of re-imprisonment. For example, such considerations played a major role in the decisions by Petr Iakir and Viktor Krasin, two prominent activists in the democratic human rights movement in Moscow, to fully cooperate with the KGB after they were arrested in 1972. Iakir had been imprisoned between 1937 and 1954, and Krasin between 1949 and 1954. In his later explanation of his behaviour Krasin underlined his deep visceral fear of re-imprisonment and the way in which the KGB played on this fear. See Viktor Krasin, Sud (New York: Chalidze Publications, 1983).

a significant section of the Soviet public has begun to demand a thorough examination and evaluation of all aspects of the Soviet penal system under Stalin.² It is also important to note that a substantial number of the political prisoners detained between 1965 and 1985 had been arrested and imprisoned much earlier, under Stalin.

In spite of the great interest in various aspects of Stalinist repression, in both the Soviet Union and the West, there is a notable lack of analytical literature on many aspects of the Soviet penal system under Stalin. Thus, for example, there has been a vigorous debate among Western scholars concerning the number of individuals, including political prisoners, imprisoned in the Soviet penal system at any one time between the early 1930s and 1953, or during this entire period.³

²This interest is reflected in the public enthusiasm surrounding the work of the most important unofficial forum in the Soviet Union for the study and evaluation of Stalinist repression, the "Memorial" society. For "Memorial's" statutes, see Ogonek No. 4, January 1989, p. 29. On 28 September 1987 the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU decided to set up a Politburo Commission "On the Supplementary Study of Materials Connected with the Repressions of the 1930s-1940s and early 1950s." On the creation and activities of this commission, see Izvestiia TsK KPSS No. 1 (January 1989), pp. 43, 107-113, and the regular reports in later issues of this monthly journal.

³See Steven Rosefielde, "The First 'Great Leap Forward' Reconsidered: Lesson of Solzhenitsyn's Gulag Archipelago," Slavic Review 39 (December 1980): 559-616; Steven Rosefielde, "An Assessment of the Sources and Uses of Gulag Forced Labour 1929-56," Soviet Studies 33 (January 1981): 51-87; S. G. Wheatcroft, "On Assessing the Size of Forced Concentration Camp Labour in the Soviet Union, 1929-56," Soviet Studies 33 (April 1981): 265-295; Robert Conquest, "Forced Labour Statistics: Some Comments," Soviet Studies 34 (July 1982): 434-439; S.G. Wheatcroft, "Towards a Thorough Analysis of Soviet Forced Labour Statistics," Soviet Studies 35 (April 1983): 223-237; Steven Rosefielde, "Excess Mortality in the Soviet Union: A Reconsideration of the Demographic Consequences of Forced Industrialization 1929-1949," Soviet Studies 35 (July 1983): 385-409; S.G. Wheatcroft, "A Note on Steven Rosefielde's Calculations of Excess Mortality in the USSR, 1929-1949," Soviet Studies 36 (April 1984): 277-281; Steven Rosefielde, "Incriminating Evidence: Excess Deaths and Forced Labour Under Stalin: A Final Reply to Critics," Soviet Studies 39 (April 1987): 292-313.

Likewise, there has been a great deal of controversy within the Soviet Union concerning these figures, and no clear consensus on this issue has yet emerged.⁴

This controversy will not be resolved⁴ until the archives of the Soviet security apparatus become more accessible to scholars, although this also raises the question of the extent to which the appropriate archival materials have been fully preserved.⁵ However, there is a general consensus, in both the Soviet Union and the West, that large numbers of citizens were detained in the Soviet penal system during the Stalinist period,⁶ and that the threat of such imprisonment played a major role in intimidating almost all citizens who might otherwise have engaged in unofficial political activities.

The absence of analytical research on this topic is partly due, as noted above, to a lack of reliable archival sources. However, even the sources which are readily available have not been fully utilized. In particular, there have been few attempts to analyse the large volume of descriptive material available in the form of the memoirs of former inmates of the GULag.

⁴For a survey of the literature on this topic, see Thomas Sherlock and Vera Tolz, "Debates over Number of Stalin's Victims in the USSR and in the West," Report on the USSR 1 (8 September 1989): 10-14.

⁵On the deplorable state of Soviet archives, see Vera Tolz, "Poor Storage of Books and Inaccessibility of Archives Discussed in Soviet Press," Radio Liberty Research Bulletin No. 108/88, 28 April 1988.

⁶Thus, for example, a history textbook for Soviet secondary schools published in 1989 quotes Roy Medvedev's estimate that 40 million people were repressed under Stalin, although this figure includes not only those who were imprisoned in penal institutions, but also individuals who were executed and exiled, or died during the famine which resulted from collectivization. See Sherlock and Tolz, "Debates Over Number of Stalin's Victims," pp. 10-12.

As noted in Chapter 1, the documentary (and literary) value of these memoirs varies a great deal, and they do not provide answers to questions about the overall number of those detained in the Soviet penal system. However, their judicious use provides important and useful insights into the composition of the inmate population, and therefore the primary "targets" of state coercion, during the Stalinist period. In addition, these memoirs throw a great deal of light on informal social structures in the camps, and the main sources of solidarity and conflict among their inmates.

The Changing Targets of Coercion

The memoir literature dealing with Soviet labour camps provides little useful information on the "national question" and its reflection in the composition and activities of labour camp inmates in the 1930s. However, the rapid increase in the number of Soviet citizens detained in labour camps in the 1930s was largely due to the high level of state coercion applied in order to enforce the "revolution from above" -- the rapidly implemented collectivization of agriculture and forced industrialization -- accompanied by the perceived need for a captive labour force which could be deployed at will in remote and inhospitable regions of the country. Thus, according to Swianiewicz, from the late 1920s until the mid-1930s the growth of forced labour was primarily connected with the absorption of the agricultural labour surplus created by forced collectivization, and peasants predominated among the inmates of corrective-labour camps.⁷ Juviler estimates that peasants repressed

⁷S. Swianiewicz, Forced Labour and Economic Development: An Enquiry into the Experience of Soviet Industrialization (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 22.

during collectivization constituted approximately 70 per cent of these inmates during the 1930s, while only approximately 15 per cent were "politicals" (including former "bourgeois" elements) and another 12 to 15 per cent were ordinary criminals.⁸ Thus one would expect that peasants from those areas (in particular, the Ukrainian SSR) which were most rapidly and brutally collectivized⁹ would be disproportionately represented among those detained in Soviet labour camps during the 1930s.

Although there are few details on the composition of the inmates of Soviet labour camps prior to 1939, it changed quite dramatically during, and especially after, World War II. Mortality in the camps was very high during the period from 1940 to 1948,¹⁰ and there was a large influx of new prisoners into the camp system during this period. This influx consisted of:

1) individuals imprisoned after the annexation by the Soviet Union of new territories in 1939-1940 (eastern Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Bukovina and Bessarabia);¹¹

⁸Peter H. Juviler, Revolutionary Law and Order: Politics and Social Change in the USSR (New York: The Free Press, 1976), pp. 56-57. See also Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: Stalin's Purge of the Thirties, revised ed. (London: Macmillan, 1973), p. 457.

⁹Two recent works which focus on the implementation of collectivization in the Ukrainian SSR are: Robert Conquest, Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); and Roman Serbyn and Bohdan Krawchenko, eds., Famine in Ukraine 1932-1933 (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1986).

¹⁰Ger P. van den Berg, The Soviet System of Justice: Figures and Policy (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985), p. 115.

¹¹It is estimated that between 1.25 and 1.5 million Polish citizens were deported to the Soviet Union during 1939-1941. According to Jan Gross, approximately 440,000 deportees ended up in labour camps and prisons, and another 180,000 were detained as prisoners of war. Although ethnic Poles constituted an absolute majority among the deportees, "no social category or ethnic group from the area was spared. Almost one-third of the forcibly deported population was Jewish (52 percent Poles, 30 percent Jews, and 18 percent Ukrainians and Belorussians). A similar fraction of the deported, almost one-third of the total, consisted of peasants and workers." Jan Tomasz Gross,

2) Soviet prisoners of war and civilian deportees returning (or, in many cases, forcibly repatriated) to the Soviet Union from Germany or elsewhere in Europe after World War II;¹²

3) "collaborators with the enemy" (Soviet citizens who remained on territory occupied by the Germans during World War II), and certain nationalities who were considered to be actual or potential collaborators;¹³

"Preface," in War Through Children's Eyes: The Soviet Occupation of Poland and the Deportations, 1939-1941, eds. Irena Grudzinska-Gross and Jan Tomasz Gross, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1981), p. xxiii. In the early phase of the Soviet-German war, many former Polish citizens were released from detention, and over 100,000 were allowed to leave the USSR. See *ibid.*, p. xxii. For additional details, see Jan T. Gross, Revolution from Abroad: The Soviet Conquest of Poland's Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). For a Soviet account which largely confirms Western data on this subject, see V.S. Parsadanova, "Deportatsiia naseleniia iz zapadnoi Ukrainy i zapadnoi Belorussii v 1939-1941 gg.," Novaia i noveishaia istoriia No. 2 (March-April 1989): 26-44.

It is estimated that approximately 85,000 Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians were deported from the Baltic states after their takeover in 1940-1941. See Romuald J. Misiunas and Rein Taagepera, The Baltic States: Years of Dependence, 1940-1980 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), Table 2, p. 274; and Dzintra Bungis, "The Deportation of Balts to the USSR: Still a Touchy Subject," Radio Free Europe Research, RAD Background Report/104 (Baltic Area), 8 June 1988.

¹²There are various estimates for the number of Soviet civilians and prisoners of war who were repatriated to the USSR. Elliott uses the figure of 5.2 million repatriates, all of whom were interrogated by Soviet security organs on suspicion of having been Nazi sympathizers or collaborators. Elliott estimates that Soviet screening commissions "dispatched 2.5 million (nearly one half) to prisons or forced labor camps; approximately 1.1 million (just over one-fifth) into military ranks; and perhaps 1.3 million (one-quarter) to their homes or into exile. Stalin apparently had the remainder, some 300,000 repatriates, executed for service in enemy ranks or simply for being captured alive by the Germans." Mark R. Elliott, Pawns of Yalta: Soviet Refugees and America's Role in Their Repatriation (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1982), p. 202. No nationality breakdown of these repatriates is available; however, since most Soviet civilian conscript-labourers (Ost-Arbeiter) in Germany had been recruited from Ukraine and adjacent territories, a major part of the repatriates would have been Ukrainian. See Yaroslav Bilinsky, "The Impact of World War II on the Nationality Question in the Soviet Union: An Essay," The Ukrainian Quarterly 42 (Fall-Winter 1986): 201.

¹³Misiunas and Taagepera (The Baltic States, p. 275) estimate that approximately 150,000 Balts were deported in 1944-1945 on this pretense alone, during and immediately following the reoccupation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania by Soviet forces, although it is not clear how many of those who were deported ended up in penal institutions. Eight entire nationalities (all accused of actual or potential collaboration with the Axis forces) were deported to Siberia or Central Asia during WW II. In all these cases the nationalities involved were judged as a collectivity. Robert Conquest has estimated the number of these deportees, excluding non-Volga Germans, as being well over one and a half million. See The Nation Killers: The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities (New York: Macmillan, 1970), p. 12. See also Aleksandr M. Nekrich, The Punished Peoples: The Deportation and Fate of Soviet Minorities at the End of the Second World War (New York: Norton, 1978). The

4) so-called "bandit elements" (anti-Soviet partisans who resisted the reimposition of Soviet rule in Western Ukraine and the Baltic states after World War II), and those accused of supporting them (often labelled "kulaks");¹⁴

5) individuals deported to the Soviet Union from its satellites in Eastern Europe after World War II;¹⁵

above-mentioned deportees were usually sent to and forcibly detained in areas of "special settlement"; however, those who resisted deportation or criticized the process were usually detained in penal institutions. See, for example, the account by a Kalmyk author, David Kugul'tinov, of how he was imprisoned after deportation: "Ot pravdy ia ne otrekalsia," Ogonek No. 35 (August 1988): 24-25.

¹⁴Resistance in these areas was quite stiff. On the activities and program of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA -- Ukrains'ka Povstans'ka Armiia), see the multi-volume series Litopys UPA, published in Toronto since 1976, and Peter J. Potichnyj and Yevhen Shendera, eds., Political Thought of the Ukrainian Underground 1943-1951 (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1986). On anti-Soviet partisan activity in the Baltic states, see Misiunas and Taagepera, The Baltic States, p. 81-103. Misiunas and Taagepera (p. 274) estimate that as many as 440,000 Balts (80,000 Estonians, 100,000 Latvians, and 260,000 Lithuanians) were deported between 1946 and 1953, although they stress that this is only an educated guess. The largest waves of deportations, between 1947 and 1949, coincided with the collectivization of agriculture. The ostensible targets of these deportations were "kulaks," especially those who were aiding "bandit elements"; in effect, however, the deportations affected those who were suspected of aiding anti-Soviet partisans, or those known to harbour strong anti-Soviet sentiments. Thus a "kulak" was basically anyone who was declared to be so by the authorities. See David R. Marples, "The Kulak in Post-War USSR: The West Ukrainian Example," Soviet Studies 36 (October 1984): 567. For a detailed analysis of Soviet documentation which throws considerable light on the deportations from Estonia, see Rein Taagepera, "Soviet Collectivization of Estonian Agriculture: The Deportation Phase," Soviet Studies 32 (July 1980): 379-397. One samizdat source states that approx. two million Ukrainians were deported from Western Ukraine during and after WW II, largely in retaliation against armed resistance by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. See Ethnocide of Ukrainians in the U.S.S.R: The Ukrainian Herald Issue 7-8 (Spring 1974) (Baltimore: Smolenskyp, 1976), p. 62. Bilinsky ("The Impact of World War II," p. 203) feels that this is an exaggeration; however, it is clear that these deportations were massive in nature, and sometimes included entire villages. See Yaroslav Bilinsky, The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine After World War II (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1964), p. 134. A Soviet Ukrainian writer (Petro Osadchuk) recently estimated that during the 1940s 10 percent of the Western Ukrainian population was deported from its ancestral territories in the Soviet Union (Literaturna Ukraina 22 February 1990). The deportees were usually sent to areas of special settlement in Siberia or Central Asia. A former MGB officer now living in Israel has estimated that between 1948 and 1953 approximately 30,000 deportees from Western Ukraine died in Chita oblast alone because of the harsh conditions of resettlement. See Leopold Avzeger, Chernyi kabinet: zapiski tainogo tsenzora MGB (Tel-Aviv: "Khoken," 1985). Those accused of partisan activity were sometimes executed, but more often they were sentenced to lengthy terms of imprisonment in hard labour camps.

¹⁵This category included, for example, certain members of the Polish Home Army (AK -- Armia Krajowa), formed as an underground force, subordinated to the Polish Government-in-Exile in London, during the German occupation. See, for example, the memoirs of Edward Buca, Vorkuta (London: Constable, 1976).

6) prisoners of war (POWs) from the main Axis powers (Germany, Japan, Italy) and their minor allies (e.g., Hungary, Romania), as well as nationals from other countries which contributed units fighting alongside Axis forces on the eastern front (e.g., the Spanish Blue Division).¹⁶

The large influx of individuals from these categories into the Soviet penal system during and after World War II reflected a significant change in the focus of the Soviet state's coercive capacity. In the late 1920s and early 1930s the main emphasis was on eliminating opposition to the state-directed radical socio-economic transformation of the Soviet Union -- the "revolution from above" -- and eliminating all political adversaries who could pose a threat to Stalin's domination of the CPSU.

Throughout the 1930s this general emphasis was supplemented by a policy of systematically destroying the political and cultural elites of the non-Russian peoples, treating national cultures as vehicles for a "Soviet" (Russian) culture, and gradually reinstating a favoured position for the Russian people as the "elder brother" of the non-Russians. However, any illusions that these policies had successfully attenuated the nationality problem in the Soviet Union were dispelled upon the outbreak of war

¹⁶Over three million Axis troops had fallen into Soviet hands by 8 May 1945, and although many were released soon after the end of the war, over 890,000 remained in the Soviet Union as of March 1947. See Martin K. Sorge, The Other Price of Hitler's War: German Military and Civilian Losses Resulting from World War II (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), pp. 76, 80. In 1950 it was estimated that approximately 1,500,000 former German, Italian, Austrian, Japanese and other combatants had not yet been accounted for by the Soviet Union. See Helmut M. Fehling, One Great Prison: The Story Behind Russia's Unreleased POW's (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1951), p. 172. Almost all those who were still alive after Stalin's death were released to their countries of origin. See William Craig, Enemy at the Gates: The Battle for Stalingrad (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1973), pp. 435-437. Although several detailed analytical studies of the treatment of POWs in the USSR were prepared in the Federal Republic of Germany in the 1960s, these and other studies (a total of twenty-two volumes) on the fate of German POWs during and after World War II were not made available (possibly for political reasons) to the general public until 1983 (Sorge, *op. cit.*, p. 81). See, for example, Diether Cartellieri, Die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen in der Sowjetunion. Die Lagergesellschaft, which was originally published by Verlag Ernst und Werner Gieseking (Munich) in 1967, but was not released until 1983.

between the USSR and Germany in 1941, which opened the way to suppressed centrifugal forces and demonstrated the instability of the multinational Soviet state.

These centrifugal forces were strongest in the territories which had been forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union between 1939 and 1941, and were then subjected to a rapid process of Sovietization.¹⁷ In particular the Balts, who possessed viable national states in the interwar period and the Western Ukrainians, who had developed a vigorous civil society in their countries of residence prior to WWII, strongly opposed the initial Sovietization process, and significant portions of these populations vigorously resisted the reimposition of Soviet control over their territories in the final phases of, and following, WWII. In its most dramatic form, this resistance took the form of partisan warfare against the Soviet military and administrative authorities.

The Soviet authorities responded as outlined above, with a massive show of force against those who actively opposed Soviet control of these territories, and their sympathizers. As I have argued above, the development of Soviet nationality policy in the postwar period cannot be fully understood without reference to this changing pattern of state coercion and the impact it had on its intended targets.

Categories of Prisoners in Postwar Labour Camps

During and after World War II the most serious offenders in the various categories listed above were either executed or ended up in Soviet labour camps. They were generally sentenced under Article 58 ("counter-revolutionary crimes") of

¹⁷This process is best described in Gross, Revolution from Abroad.

the RSFSR Criminal Code (they were usually called "politicals," "58's," or "kontrihs," the short form for "counterrevolutionaries"), and this is indirectly confirmed by one estimate, based on archival sources, that the percentage of all labour camp inmates imprisoned for "counterrevolutionary" activity under Article 58 rose substantially from 12.6% in 1936, to 28.7% in 1941, to 59.5% in 1946.¹⁸

From 1934 to 1953 all Soviet labour camps were part of a unified penal system subordinated to the Main Administration of Camps (GULag) of the NKVD. There was a considerable differentiation in the economic role of various camp complexes; in addition, in April 1943 katorga, or hard labour, was reintroduced in the form of hard labour camps, primarily for those sentenced under Article 58-1a -- treason against the homeland -- which included many of the individuals in the categories noted above. Later, in 1948, the hard labour camps were replaced by "special" camps, for several different categories of "counter-revolutionaries," which existed until Stalin's death.¹⁹

The distinctions between ordinary corrective-labour camps and hard labour or special camps were sometimes ignored by camp administrators who needed to "recruit" workers with certain specific qualifications.²⁰ In addition, although regular criminals were concentrated in ordinary labour camps, where they usually dominated

¹⁸See the article "'Arkhipelag GULAG': glazami pisatel'ia i statistika," in Argumenty i fakty No. 45, 11-17 November 1989, pp. 6-7.

¹⁹See the description of the katorga and special camps in Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago 1918-1956: An Experiment in Literary Investigation Vol. 3 (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), Chapter 1. For brief but informative summaries of the evolution of the various categories of camps, see the relevant sections of Zhak [Jacques] Rossi, Spravochnik po GULagu (London: Overseas Publications Interchange Ltd., 1987), a historical dictionary of Soviet penitentiary institutions and terms related to Soviet labour camps.

²⁰Solzhenitsyn, Gulag Archipelago, Vol. 3, pp. 33-34.

all other prisoners, some criminal elements were also found in almost all the hard labour and special camps, where they were strongly favoured by the camp administration, given many of the most privileged positions available to prisoners (e.g., work as cooks, stock clerks, work assigners, work brigade chiefs, etc.), and often acted as informers.²¹ These privileged workers ("trusties") were joined by certain individuals who had originally been imprisoned for their political activities but, for a variety of reasons (in some cases simply in order to ensure their survival) decided to collaborate with the camp administration.²²

Thus in the postwar period the ordinary labour camps, as well as the hard labour and special camps, contained a variety of prisoners from the categories listed above. Even POWs, who were usually detained in separate camps apart from other prisoners, were sometimes detained in the same camps as Soviet citizens, although they were usually housed in separate quarters.²³ In addition, after their initial detention many Axis prisoners of war were tried by Soviet courts for criminal acts committed during their military service, or during detention. Most of these crimes were qualified as acts against the Soviet state and fell under Article 58 of the

²¹According to one estimate, 8 percent of all prisoners in the Soviet labour camp system in 1947 acted, in one form or another, as informers on behalf of the camp administration. See the article, cited above, in *Argumenty i fakty* No. 45, 11-17 November 1989. This accords with an estimate that approximately 10 percent of German prisoners in Soviet POW camps actively collaborated with the camp administrations. See Cartellieri, *Die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen*, pp. 235-238.

²²For a description of various categories of trusties and their work, see Solzhenitsyn, *The Gulag Archipelago*, Vol. 2, Chapter 9. The trusties also included prisoners who did not compromise themselves by informing on fellow inmates, but occupied privileged positions in the prisoner hierarchy by virtue of their specialized work skills.

²³See V.I. Iukshinskii, *Sovetskie kontsentratsionnye lageri v 1945-1955 gg.*, *Issledovaniia i materialy*, Seria II (rotatornye izdaniia), No. 66 (Munich: Institute for the Study of the USSR, 1958), pp. 4-5. For additional details see the relevant sections of Diether Cartellieri, *Die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen*.

RSFSR Criminal Code; those POWs convicted under this article were transferred to labour camps, and were no longer considered to be POWs.²⁴

There is no evidence that, with the exception of most POWs, there was a policy to keep together prisoners from any one category listed above in particular labour camps.²⁵ In addition, according to several studies of the Stalin-era labour camps efforts were made to prevent any one national group from dominating a given barrack, brigade or camp section.²⁶ Given the need to deal, in the immediate postwar period, with a massive influx of new prisoners and the varying needs of the camps, it would have been difficult for the Gulag authorities in charge of the penal system to develop and implement a rigid, consistent policy of segregation. Thus

²⁴Viacheslav P. Artem'ev, Rezhim i okhrana ispravitel'no-trudovykh lagerei MVD, Issledovaniia i materialy (Seriia I-ia, vyp. 26) (Munich: Institute for the Study of the USSR, 1956), p. 10. This may partly explain the rationale behind the Tass statement of 5 May 1950 that no POWs remained in the Soviet Union, since by that point many or most former Axis troops remaining in the Soviet Union had probably been transferred to regular labour camps. On the presence of German and Japanese POWs among other prisoners in the Minlag and Ozerlag camp complexes, see Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago, Volume 3, p. 35.

²⁵It should be noted here that relatively few women were detained in Soviet penal institutions (Barton, L'Institution Concentrationnaire, p. 42). Those women who were imprisoned were usually kept in separate camps, or in separate sections of a male camp. Sometimes women prisoners had to work in the same conditions as male prisoners; usually, however, they were put to work on large state farms (often entirely staffed by women prisoners), in fish processing plants, etc. On the memoirs written by Polish women imprisoned during WWII, see Siewierski, Spotkanie narodow. Among the other memoirs written by former women prisoners which include information on the postwar period are: Aino Kuusinen, The Rings of Destiny: Inside Soviet Russia from Lenin to Brezhnev (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1974); Barbara Armonas, Leave Your Tears in Moscow (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1961); and Liubov' Bershadskaja, Rastoptannye zhizni (Paris: Piat' Kontinentov, 1975). See also "Sud'ba Natal'i Kostenko (zapis' L. Bogoraz)," in Pamiat': istoricheskii sbornik, vyp. 4 (Paris: YMCA-Press, 1981), pp. 402-412, and Robert Conquest, Kolyma: The Arctic Death Camps (London: Macmillan, 1978), Chapter 7.

²⁶See M. G. Santen[el], Sovetskie poslevoennnye kontslageri i ikh obitateli, Issledovaniia i materialy, Seriia II (rotatornye izdaniia), No. 77 (Munich: Institute for the Study of the USSR), p. 33; and Lukshinskii, Sovetskie kontsentratsionnye lageri, pp. 52-56.

²⁷For example, Lukshinskii feels that there were major differences (in terms of the composition of inmates, conditions of imprisonment, etc.) between the camps in the European parts of the USSR, and in the far north. See Lukshinskii, Sovetskie kontsentratsionnye lageri, pp. 4-5. In addition, the heads of certain camp complexes (especially those, such as Kolyma, which were quite isolated) wielded considerable power over their "fiefdoms," and they as well as their subordinates had a great

the available memoir literature indicates that in the immediate postwar period most Soviet labour camps contained prisoners from all or almost all categories listed above, as well as some ordinary criminals and those sentenced to long terms of imprisonment prior to WWII, although the proportions of these categories in various camps varied a great deal.

The memoirs dealing with the Stalinist labour camps deal with a variety of topics, and many of the authors focus heavily (in some cases almost exclusively) on their personal experiences and those of a few close friends. The authors who have a broader outlook, and are more observant about their surroundings, highlight two different components of the prisoner population which were well organized and had a major impact on life in the labour camps. These were the ordinary criminals, and certain ethnonational groups; however, the case of the criminals will not be discussed here in any detail.²⁸

deal to say about the distribution of prisoners among different camps in a given complex. See Conquest, *Kolyma*, pp. 67-73; and Barton, *L'Institution Concentrationnaire*, pp. 136-138.

²⁸As noted earlier, in many respects the criminals were a privileged group in the labour camps. The criminal "world" in the labour camps was very complex, and there were a number of subdivisions among the criminals, with each category developing a distinct set of rituals. The most basic differentiation was between the "legals" or "honest" criminals (often known as *blatnye*, from the word for thieves' jargon -- *blat*), a very organized group united by its members' subordination to a strict code of behaviour, and the *suky* ("bitches"), criminals who failed to adhere to the above-mentioned code of behaviour and ended up collaborating with the authorities (they were also quite well organized). Most criminals belonged to one or the other groups; however, some lived on their own. The best synthetic description of the criminal "underworld" in the camps is in Santter[er], *Sovetskie poslevoennye kontslageri*, pp. 51-97. See also the same author's memoirs, *Ihr Name ist Legion: zwölf Jahre unter Berufsverbrechen in der Sowjetunion* (Munich: J. Pfeiffer, 1962). However, almost all camp memoirs discuss, often at some length, the criminal elements in the camps.

Ethnonational Composition of Political Prisoners

The multinational composition of the political prisoners in Soviet labour camps, and the distinctive role of certain national groups in the camps, were first emphasized in memoirs describing life in the camps during World War II. Many of the Polish citizens who were imprisoned in the Soviet Union after the partition of Poland in 1939, and who were later allowed to leave the Soviet Union, have written about their experiences,²⁹ and their memoirs frequently refer to this feature of the camps. In fact, in many cases it made a significant impression on them.³⁰ However, few of the above-mentioned memoirs give details about the proportions of prisoners of a certain background in the labour camps; one exception is Krakowiecki's general estimate (for the Kolyma camps in 1942) that "the Ukrainian group was the largest, for every second prisoner in Kolyma was a Ukrainian, and the remainder consisted of a variety of other nationalities."³¹

As for the memoir literature dealing with the postwar situation in the labour camps, it often contains a wide variety of vague, general comments concerning the multinational composition of the prisoners. For example, one former prisoner noted that

the herd of prisoners at the camp, composed of so many different nationalities, offered the best possible opportunity of becoming

²⁹The best-known example of this genre is Gustav Herling, A World Apart (New York: Roy Publishers, 1951).

³⁰A recent commentary on this Polish memoir literature stresses the significance of Soviet labour camps as a "meeting-place" of various nationalities. See Henryk Siewierski, Spotkanie narodow (Paris: Instytut Literacki, 1984). Siewierski examines approximately 50 memoirs in his work (see the bibliography on pp. 139-140), and frequently cites excerpts from the memoirs which underline the variegated nature of the camp population. See, for example, pp. 25, 37, 61.

³¹Arnold Krakowiecki, Ksiazka o Kolymie (London: Veritas, 1950), p. 98, quoted in Siewierski, Spotkanie narodow, p. 73.

familiar with the oppression of minority races during the Stalin-Beria epoch. In Beria's gardens one met representatives of minorities from every possible nation...³²

These vague comments reflect the fact that few prisoners were in a position to make careful calculations of the number of prisoners in a given camp or camp complex, and to break these figures down by nationality would have been difficult even in the best of circumstances. Still, much of the memoir literature describing the postwar labour camps touches in some way on the composition of their inmates, and almost all the authors who mention their ethnonational background were particularly impressed by the large number of "Westerners" (zapadniki, a term used to describe Balts, and Ukrainians from Western Ukraine) whom they encountered in the political camps.³³

In fact, the evidence concerning the nationality breakdown of the political prisoners all points in one direction. According to Negretov, in the postwar katorga camps in Vorkuta

the majority consisted of Westerners -- Western Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians. Russians and Ukrainians from Greater Ukraine [otherwise known as Eastern Ukraine], who were the first to serve katorga sentences in 1943, later became a minority; however, they completely dominated the ranks of the pridurki

³²Unto Parvilahti, Beria's Gardens: Ten Years' Captivity in Russia and Siberia (London: Hutchinson, 1959), p. 122.

³³"Seeing the endless number of Balts in the camps, I couldn't help wondering where they came from?... Latvians and Lithuanians predominated, there were fewer Estonians. Many of the young fellows had been partisans, but the majority ended up in the camps in quite a random fashion... No less numerous were Ukrainians-Banderites from Western Ukraine..." A.E. Levitin-Krasnov, Ruk tvoikh zhar (1941-1956) (Tel-Aviv: Izd. Krug, 1979), p. 265.

[trusties] and this meant that the katorga camps were dominated by the Russian language and Russian customs and morals [nravy].³⁴

According to Scholmer, a German doctor who arrived in the Vorkuta camps in 1950 and spent three and one-half years there,

Of the thirty-five hundred prisoners in camp 9/10 in my time, about eighteen hundred were Ukrainians. The other large national groups were: about eight hundred Lithuanians, three hundred Latvians, three hundred Russians, two hundred Estonians [sic], and one hundred and ninety Germans (one hundred and twenty from Germany itself; seventy from the Soviet Union). But this by no means completes the list of all the different nationalities in the camp. There were thirty-six of these altogether.³⁵

One scholar, Silde, interviewed some 2,000 German and Austrian war prisoners and civilians who were released from the Soviet Union between October 1955 and the end of 1957, and he considers that their eye-witness testimony provides reasonably accurate information about the situation in Soviet camps in the late 40s and early 50s. According to a former prisoner interviewed by Silde, in one of the Vorkuta camps the breakdown of prisoners was as follows:³⁶

Ukrainians	40.0%
Balts (Latvians, Estonians and Lithuanians)	32.0%
White Russians (Byelorussians)	15.0%
Germans	4.0%
Poles	2.0%
Rumanians and Czechs	2.0%
Russians	2.0%
Yugoslavs	1.5%

*Negretov, Vse dorogi, p. 90. The estimates cited here include only political prisoners; that is, prisoners usually sentenced under Article 58 of the RSFSR Criminal Code or its equivalents in other republics.

*Joseph Scholmer, Vorkuta (New York: Henry Holt, 1955), p. 133. Elsewhere (p. 129) Scholmer states that seventy to eighty percent of the Ukrainian prisoners came from Western Ukraine.

*Adolfs Silde, The Profits of Slavery: Baltic Forced Laborers and Deportees Under Stalin and Khrushchev (Stockholm: Latvian National Foundation in Scandinavia, 1958), p. 26. Despite its rather dramatic title, this book contains a great deal of useful information.

Jews	1.0%
Various Asiatic peoples	0.5%

As for the women prisoners in Vorkuta, a woman who worked in brick-kiln No. 1 stated that "Of 1800 female prisoners in our camp, half were Ukrainians, about 150 were Germans, and the rest were Balts, mostly Latvians and Lithuanians. The break-down by nationalities was similar in brick-kiln No. 2 and in the so-called predshakhta (ante-shaft) camp."²⁷

In other camp complexes, similar percentages seem to have prevailed. In the Norilsk area,

As in Inta and Vorkuta, Balts are the second largest group next to the Ukrainians. B., an Austrian, has stated that in the Kaierkan punitive camp, 12 miles from Norilsk, which belongs to the 2nd camp cluster, the largest national groups were the Ukrainians and Balts. In addition, there were Chinese, Japanese, Caucasians, Poles and a small number of Rumanians.²⁸

And, according to the testimony of Japanese prisoners who had been detained in the Norilsk area, and were interviewed in Japan after their release in 1955,

The great majority of the prisoners were Ukrainians, many of whom had been involved in one or another of the continuing Ukrainian resistance movements against the Russians... They were numerous among the criminal prisoners as well as among the politicals, among the free labourers as well as among the guards. The other principal nationalities, according to the Japanese observers, were Georgians, Baltic peoples (Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians) -- the last president of Latvia was reported a prisoner in Norilsk -- Germans

²⁷Ibid., p. 33.

²⁸Ibid., pp. 90-91.

(both Volga and German Germans), Chinese, Poles, Crimean Tartars, Chechen-Ingush, and Jews."³⁹

As noted above, the authors of some memoirs dealing with the postwar labour camps were not interested in the national background of their fellow inmates, or chose not to discuss it in their memoirs. However, whenever the national question is raised in these memoirs, especially in reference to the katorga or "special" camps, the fact that Ukrainians (especially from Western Ukraine) and Balts were detained in large numbers, and often constituted a majority of the prisoners convicted under the "political" articles of the Criminal Code, is almost always noted.⁴⁰

Ethnonationalism and Group Solidarity in the Postwar Labour Camps

According to a number of observers, the presence of large numbers of these "Westerners" had a significant impact on life in the labour camps. One characteristic feature of these camps during the 1930s was their administrations' success in rapidly breaking down the social ties among most prisoners; in the process they were transformed into a relatively amorphous mass which could be

³⁹Herbert Passin and Fritz van Briessen, "The Strike at Norilsk," Encounter 6 (April 1956): 55. The general trend reflected in these data is confirmed by the testimony of former German prisoners detained in the Norilsk area. See, for example, the lengthy annex to Barton's L'Institution Concentrationnaire which is devoted to former German prisoners' accounts of the Norilsk strike in 1953.

⁴⁰Certain other groups, such as Georgians, Armenians, the Central Asian peoples, etc., are rarely mentioned in the memoirs dealing with the postwar camps. Those memoirs which do mention prisoners from these southern areas of the Soviet Union note that their survival rate in the camps was quite low. See, for example, Conquest, Kolyma, pp. 94-95; and Osvald Harjo, Moskva kjenner ingen tarer (Oslo: Tiden norsk forlag, 1956), pp. 95, 154. For help with the Norwegian source, and some German sources, I am indebted to Magda Opalski.

readily manipulated. This was achieved by allowing ordinary criminals to systematically harass and intimidate the "politicals," which often made their life unbearable.⁴¹ The only group of political prisoners which seemed to maintain a strong sense of solidarity in Soviet labour camps in the 1930s, and engaged in some form of political activity within certain camps, consisted of certain determined members of the Trotskyist opposition.⁴²

The same process of social atomization took place among camp inmates after WWII, but it occurred more slowly and was never fully successful, largely because after the war the number of ordinary criminals in the hard labour and special camps where many "politicals" were concentrated was relatively small. In addition, according to several witnesses who testified before the International Commission against Concentration Camp Practices (ICCCP),⁴³ there was a strong sense of solidarity among members of several national groups in the postwar camps, in particular Western Ukrainians and Balts, and this is confirmed in a large number of memoirs.⁴⁴

⁴¹This exploitation and abuse of political prisoners by ordinary criminals is described in almost all the memoirs surveyed. See, in particular, Elinor Lipper, Eleven Years in Soviet Prison Camps (London: The World Affairs Book Club, 1950), pp. 146-151. See also Jules Margoline, La condition inhumaine (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1949), chapter entitled "La deshumanisation," pp. 138-153.

⁴²See M.B., "Trotskyists at Vorkuta," in Samizdat: Voices of the Soviet Opposition, ed. George Saunders (New York: Monad Press, 1974); and Hryhorii Kostiuk, Okaïanni roky: Vid Luk'ianivs'koi tiurny do Voïkuts'koi trahedii (1935-1940 rr.) (Toronto: Diyaloh, 1978), pp. 73-80.

⁴³This body was, in some respects, a predecessor of the human rights organization Amnesty International. It consisted of survivors (of various political persuasions) of Nazi concentration camps who came together in 1950 to set up a commission to investigate political repression throughout the world. The commission published a number of valuable studies (on Spain, Greece, Tunisia, China, etc.), as well as a journal (in several languages) entitled Şatum before it folded in the late 1950s.

⁴⁴Barton, L'Institution Concentrationnaire, pp. 268-271. See also Kuusinen, The Rings of Destiny, p. 173; and Negretov, Vse dorogi, pp. 90-91. Some interesting examples of solidarity among postwar Ukrainian camp inmates are provided by a Yugoslav communist who was imprisoned in the Soviet Union from 1937 until 1950. See Julius Baranovski, Zatvorska i Sibirskaja Sjecanja (1926-

This solidarity was demonstrated in a number of ways. For example, almost all organized opposition to the camp administration and its abuse of the prisoners arose within individual national groups.⁴⁵ According to Scholmer,

The existence of the numerous underground organizations in the special camps of Vorkuta and the work they do is perhaps the most astonishing phenomenon of all... Each group is built up on a national basis. There is a perfectly good practical reason for this. Only people of the same nationality are really in a position to judge whether a man is personally and politically suitable to be taken on for underground work. On the whole it can be said that such groups are made up of the elite of each nation's representation in the camps. The groups are organized around a nucleus which is purposely kept as small as possible to minimize the NKVD's chances of making contact with it.⁴⁶

Although it was extremely difficult to set up and maintain any kind of unofficial communication network among prisoners in the labour camps, in some camps clandestine national committees succeeded in organizing as many as a quarter or a third of their compatriots without being exposed by the police.⁴⁷

One of the first priorities of the networks set up by these national committees was to eliminate the domination of the "politicals" by criminal elements, for even small groups of well-organized criminals often managed to terrorize much larger groups of political prisoners. All memoir sources agree that the domination

1957) (Zagreb: Stvarnost, 1981), pp. 184-188.

⁴⁵The main exception was the activity of certain former officers of the Red Army in the camps. However, their activity was limited, and did not encompass more than a few camps. See Barton, L'Institution Concentrationnaire, p. 305; Scholmer, Vorkuta, p. 19; Danylo Shumuk, Life Sentence: Memoirs of a Ukrainian Political Prisoner (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1984), pp. 205-206, 223-226.

⁴⁶Scholmer, Vorkuta, p. 189.

⁴⁷Witness no. 37, testimony before the ICCCP, in Barton, L'Institution Concentrationnaire, p. 311. For a detailed description of how one such network was set up see Shumuk, Life Sentence, pp. 191-206.

of criminal elements (which were favoured by the administration) in most camps was not broken until 1947-48, and that the main cause was the organized counteractions of the Western Ukrainians and Balts. In fact, in some camps the national committees which they established became so confident that they began to eliminate some of the trustees who were particularly detested.⁴⁷

The camp administrations used various tactics in an attempt to neutralize or eliminate these national committees. First of all, the security organs in individual camps carefully monitored all activities among the prisoners, largely by using informers.⁴⁸ However, it usually proved very difficult to infiltrate the national committees set up by the "Westerners."⁴⁹

Thus vigorous efforts were often made to split the prisoners along national lines. Santerre, describing one of the Minlag camps in the early 50s, states that

⁴⁷See the testimony of Austrian socialist Karl Fischer in Barton, L'Institution Concentrationnaire, p. 270 (see also pp. 312-314, and 319); and Santerre, Sovetskie poslevoennye kontslageri, p. 36. See also Shumuk, Life Sentence, pp. 202-205. For an interesting example from a somewhat later period, see Passin and Briessen, "The Strike at Norilsk," p. 62. According to Baranovski, in one camp in 1949 Western Ukrainians killed a number of informers and criminals in the service of the camp administration in broad daylight and in view of the other prisoners. On one occasion they killed an informer in the presence of the head of the camp unit. See Baranovski, Zatvorska i Sibirska Sjecanja, p. 220. As noted earlier, there was some segregation of criminals and "politicals" after the establishment of hard labour and special camps. However, since ordinary criminals were occasionally sentenced under "political" articles of the Criminal Code, a certain number were almost always available to act as informers. See Zoltan Toth, Prisoner of the Soviet Union (Old Woking, Surrey: Gresham Books, 1978), p. 128. In addition, ordinary criminals were occasionally intentionally detained in the hard labour and special camps to simply make life difficult for their inmates.

⁴⁸Barton, L'Institution Concentrationnaire, pp. 191-197.

⁴⁹According to John Noble, describing one of the Vorkuta camps before Stalin's death, "We had groups formed strictly along national lines, but they were not united. The Baltic peoples had the strongest organizations and the Russians the weakest. The MVD found it difficult to plant informers among the Balts, but they had a few Russian stukachy [informers]... who heavily infiltrated the Russian groups." I Was a Slave in Russia: An American Tells His Story (Broadview, Ill.: Cicero Bible Press, 1959), p. 138. Scholmer (Vorkuta, p. 200) states that the vast majority of informers among the prisoners in Vorkuta camp No. 6 were Russian.

In 1951-1952 the Ukrainian nationalists in the camps began to raise their heads. First of all, they gained the sympathy of the majority of the prisoners because they began to use radical methods to fight the abuses of criminal elements in the camps...

The Chekists were very perturbed by the activity of the Banderites [term used in the camps to describe Western Ukrainians], and in order to suppress it they began to use brutal methods which by that time were no longer effective. Subsequently, resorting to their beloved methods of blackmail and provocation, the Chekists succeeded in kindling enmity among the Lithuanians and Ukrainians, and then among the Russians and Ukrainians. As a result of these provocations, there were bloody confrontations among the hostile groups and this, in the final analysis, led to the downfall of their common resistance.³¹

Wherever possible, the security organs simply tried to exacerbate underlying tensions; that is, in many cases the antagonism was there to begin with, and was only encouraged by the security organs. According to Buca,

One result of our desperate situation was increased hatred and strife between the different nationalities, with each group trying to blame another for our plight. The basic conflict was between Russians and Ukrainians. The Russians regarded the Ukrainian nationalists and separatists as the real guilty men, and it was a kind of consolation to them to say that the Ukrainians were the real criminals who should be made to suffer for their sins. These Ukrainians, the Russians said, were the followers of Bandera, were enemies of the Soviet fatherland, aliens who didn't deserve to be fed; they should be worked until they dropped dead, and left to rot in the tundra... When the NKVD noticed this, they gladly encouraged it in order to keep the prisoners divided among themselves.³²

³¹Santerrel, Sovetskie poslevoennye kontslageri, p. 36. According to another former prisoner, the security organs' agents in the camps "divided the convicts, set them against each other, aggravating the differences between the various nationalities; they exploited with particular relish the Russian-Ukrainian differences of opinion." Toth, Prisoner of the Soviet Union, p. 69. See also Silde, The Profits of Slavery, p. 46.

³²Buca, Vorkuta, p. 80. According to Dolgun, in one of the Dzhezkazgan camps, "As far as we could tell, the kum [godfather -the local MGB commandant] was chiefly preoccupied with creating internal conflict in camp, setting the Ukrainians against the Russians (which was not hard) by spreading rumors and so on, on the divide-and-rule principle." See Alexander Dolgun with Patrick Watson, Alexander Dolgun's Story: An American in the Gulag (New York: Ballantine Books, 1975), p. 332 (see also p. 388). Of all the prisoners the "Westerners" seemed, in most camps, to be the most disliked by the guards and administration. However, the memoir literature occasionally mentions cases when guards or MVD officials favoured or at least sympathized with prisoners of

It should also be noted that there were major divisions within each major national group which could be exploited. Many memoirs mention that the prisoners of Russian background were particularly ridden by various factions;³³ however, internal divisions affected all the groups. Thus, although the Ukrainians (or at least the Western Ukrainians) generally had the reputation of being a strongly united group, in some camps internal divisions quickly came to the fore. According to Santerre

The Ukrainians, the largest group in the camp, had more potential, more than any other nationality, to oppose the authorities. Their main weakness, however, was the divisions in their midst. They were divided into Eastern and Western Ukrainians, and the latter in turn were divided into Banderites, on the one hand, and "Melnykites" on the other. As a result of all this, the Ukrainian intelligentsia simply kept their distance. Finally, and again as a result of Chekist provocations, elements of a criminal nature took over the leadership of the Ukrainian nationalists. By this time a number of their principled leaders had either been destroyed, or compromised in the eyes of the larger body of prisoners.³⁴

their own background. Toth mentions that in 1947, in a special camp at Kolyma, "The agent of the MVD was a lieutenant of Ukrainian origin, while that of the MGB was a Russian major. For some unknown reason they were at daggers drawn; they gave contradictory orders and each favoured his own people." Prisoner of the Soviet Union, p. 69. Baranovski mentions the interesting case of a Lt. Col. Didorenko, an NKVD operative in Alekseevka who tried to improve the living conditions of some of the Ukrainian camp inmates, and shared his disdain for the NKVD with Baranovski. See Zatvorska i Sibirska Sjecanja, pp. 189-191.

³³According to Buca (Vorkuta, pp. 80-81), "...the original solidarity among the Russians didn't last long. Soon they were split among themselves, which was only to be expected since they were people of so many different backgrounds: professional criminals, former Nazi collaborators, ideological opponents of the Soviet system, former soldiers sentenced simply because they had been captured by the Germans, and others who had broken down in p.o.w. camps and served their captors."

³⁴Santerr[e], Sovetskie poslevoennye kontslageri, p. 36. Buca (Vorkuta, p. 198) notes that it was unusual for a "Soviet" Ukrainian to have anything to do with a "Polish" Ukrainian. Internal divisions and the presence of criminal elements among the Western Ukrainians are also noted by Shumuk in Life Sentence, pp. 255-271. Buca (Vorkuta, p. 98) agrees with Shumuk that the political prisoners who joined the criminals, or emulated them, were much worse than the ordinary criminals.

In addition, groups which may have appeared strongly united to an outsider may, in fact, have been ridden by various cleavages. Bornet describes the discipline and solidarity of Japanese prisoners of war in glowing terms;⁵⁵ however, a Japanese account of the life of Japanese POWs in Siberian camps (based on the testimony of several survivors) emphasizes their rapid demoralization and a variety of frequent and bitter conflicts in their ranks.⁵⁶

Still, on a comparative basis, all available sources agree that the Western Ukrainians, Latvians, Lithuanians and Estonians maintained a much higher degree of solidarity than other national groups in the postwar Soviet labour camps. There were several reasons for this. First of all, core groups among the "Westerners" had gained considerable experience in organizing clandestine, underground nationalist activity during and immediately after WWII, and were able to put this experience to good use even in the difficult conditions of the labour camps.

Second, these prisoners usually knew very well why they had been imprisoned (their nationalist or pro-nationalist activities), and rarely had any illusions that good behaviour (short of full collaboration with the authorities) would help them in any substantial fashion. In contrast, many prisoners in the 1930s, and among the repatriates (both civilian and military) who returned (or were forcibly returned) to the Soviet Union after WW II, felt that their imprisonment was a "mistake" which would eventually be corrected. In the meantime, they had to

⁵⁵Francisque Bornet, Je reviens de Russie (Paris: Plon, 1947), pp. 151-153.

⁵⁶Toyoko Yamasaki, The Bitter Zone, translated by James T. Araki (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985), pp. 126-133, 148-149.

demonstrate that they were model Soviet citizens, and thus usually refrained from any form of unofficial political activity.

Third, many of the "Westerners" had been strongly affected by the integral nationalist current which began to dominate most of Eastern Europe in the 1930s.⁵⁷ This brand of nationalism had many negative features, including a strong emphasis on the need for charismatic leaders, the glorification of the nation and the "national spirit" (as symbolized by the slogan "nation above all"), and a tendency towards xenophobia which was sometimes expressed in the form of anti-Semitism.⁵⁸ But although these features of integral nationalism often led to distrust among various groups in the camps, and hindered their cooperation,⁵⁹ they also promoted the development of a certain "siege mentality" which led to strong group identification and in-group solidarity.

Another factor which played an important role among most of the Western Ukrainian and Lithuanian prisoners was their strong identification with a particular national church (the Uniate or Ukrainian Catholic and Roman Catholic churches, respectively) whose clergy often shared their imprisonment. The percentage of religious believers among the "Westerners," and especially Western Ukrainians and

⁵⁷For a discussion of integral nationalism, see Carlton J.H. Hayes, The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism (New York: Macmillan, 1948).

⁵⁸On anti-Semitism in the postwar camps, see Scholmer, Vorkuta, pp. 99, 105, 108-120. Ironically, many of the individuals in the camps who were genuinely guilty of war crimes acted as informers or were in charge of work brigades, and occupied privileged positions in the camps (Scholmer, p. 109). See also Santter[e], Sovetskie poslevoennye lageri, p. 38, and the following chapter.

⁵⁹See, for example, Siegfried Oelsner, Sibirische Odyssee. Mein Weg durch die Hoelle des KGB (Preussisch Oldendorf: Verlag K.W. Schuetz KG, 1981), p. 82. On Polish-Ukrainian antagonism in the camps, see Buca, Vorkuta, pp. 122, 190.

Lithuanians, was high, and was certainly higher than among most other groups of prisoners.⁶⁰ A number of memoirs emphasize the important role of religious life in the camps, both in preserving prisoner dignity and morale and, at least in the case of the two above-mentioned groups, preserving a sense of group identity.⁶¹

The solidarity of the "Westerners" and the significance of their activity in the postwar camps is underlined by their central role in the various strikes and uprisings which broke out in various camps, especially after the death of Stalin. Little information is available about many of the strikes, and even in the case of strikes which have been described by several different observers, the actual mechanics of the conduct of a given strike are rarely known. One exception is the memoirs of Danylo Shumuk, who headed the Ukrainian self-defence committee in charge of the strike, from 4 June to 4 August 1953, in Hard Labour Camp No. 3 of the Norilsk camp complex. He attributes the length and discipline of the strike (most of the other strikes in the Norilsk camps were quite brief, and often rather anarchic) to the

⁶⁰On the strength of the Ukrainian Catholic and Lithuanian Roman Catholic churches, their status and following prior to World War II, and their postwar fates, see Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, "The Uniate Church in the Soviet Ukraine: A Case Study in Soviet Church Policy," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 8 (1965): 89-113; and V. Stanley Vardys, *The Catholic Church, Dissent and Nationality in Soviet Lithuania* (Boulder, Colo.: East European Quarterly, 1978), pp. 31-36, 62-79.

⁶¹On religious life among Catholics in the camps, see, for example, Walter J. Ciszek, S.J., *With God in Russia* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), pp. 161-164, 173-174, 178-179, 211-212. According to Ciszek, many of the Ukrainians and Lithuanians who remained in exile after they were released from the camps attempted to maintain their distinctive religious practices (pp. 232-233, 252-257). Scholmer (*Vorkuta*, p. 148) considers that the religious life of the Lithuanians and Ukrainians in the camps was largely responsible for their mental stability, and the low rate of suicides among these groups. See also the memoirs of Polish priests imprisoned in postwar Soviet camps, e.g., Władysław Bukowski, *Wspomnienia z Kazachstanu* (Paris: Spotkania, 1979); and Ryszard Czesław Grabski, *Gdyby nie opatrność Boża* (Paris: Spotkania, 1985).

careful work which he and his close associates put into meticulously building up a Ukrainian self-defence committee.⁶²

Other memoirs describing the strikes which took place after Stalin's death,⁶³ as well as reports based on the testimony of prisoners of war who observed the strikes, all confirm that networks run by Ukrainians, or occasionally Balts, were usually in charge of the camps during the strikes.⁶⁴ Thus, for example, according to a report based on the testimony of Japanese POWs detained in Norilsk Special Camp No. 5,

As in most of the other political camps around there, the largest national group was the Ukrainians. But No. 5 had something more: several score Ukrainians who had been involved in some disturbance in the forced-labour camps of Karaganda in 1952 and had been transferred to Norilsk only lately. These seemed to form an important focus of the strike, providing it with leadership and boldness. One night shortly after their arrival, for example, four prisoners known to be spies for the administration were killed. The killers were never apprehended... [I]t impressed the prisoners with the determination and effectiveness of the Ukrainians, disposing them to follow their leadership.⁶⁵

⁶²This strike is described in considerable detail in Shumuk's Life Sentence, pp. 209-242. A fairly detailed account of a less successful strike in one of the other Norilsk camps largely confirms Shumuk's account. See Ievhen Hrytsiak, Korotkyi zapys spohadiv: istoriia Noryl's'koho povstannia (Baltimore: Smoloskyp, 1980).

⁶³Certain earlier, less well-known strikes, or attempted strikes, in postwar camps, were organized by former Soviet military officers, Russian monarchists, or members of the NTS. However, they were usually exposed by informers, or lasted for only a brief period of time. See Sautter[c], Sovetskie poslevoennye lageri, pp. 34-35.

⁶⁴It should be noted that such strikes were usually mounted only after an incident (such as the unjustified brutal punishment of a prisoner, or a guard shooting a prisoner after the latter accidentally entered the "forbidden zone" surrounding a camp) which broke the growing tension in the camp after Stalin's death. All memoirs emphasize the growing nervousness and uncertainty of the camp administrations, and the increasing self-confidence of the prisoners under their supervision, after Stalin's death.

⁶⁵Passin and Briessen, "The Strike at Norilsk," pp. 55-56.

Scholmer, in turn, states that in the Vorkuta camps, strike leaders were to a large extent identical with the leaders of existing resistance groups in the camps. In the camps where this was not the case, "strike leaders were at least chosen and approved by them [leaders of resistance groups]," and in the case of Vorkuta Camp 6 the underground strike committee was dominated by Ukrainians and Lithuanians.⁶⁶

The New Focus of Coercion

State-sanctioned coercion was widely used in the Soviet Union during and after WWII to help reimpose order in the country, which had been severely disrupted by this conflict. In particular, WWII had clearly demonstrated some of the liabilities of the multinational character of the Soviet state.⁶⁷

This chapter has underlined the significant changes in the major targets of state-sanctioned coercion in the Soviet Union during and following WWII, as reflected in the composition of the political prisoner population in Soviet labour camps. These changes were largely due to the central authorities' perceptions of new "national security" problems which had arisen as a result of the war, such as armed opposition to the integration of newly-acquired territories into the Soviet Union, and the alleged disloyalty of Soviet citizens who had been detained as

⁶⁶Scholmer, *Vorkuta*, pp. 234, 246. For accounts of several strikes which confirm the important leadership role of Ukrainians and Balts see Silde, *The Profits of Slavery*, pp. 211-258. Additional accounts of the strikes can be found in Barton, *L'Institution concentrationnaire*, pp. 319-350, 467-483.

⁶⁷Alexander R. Alexiev, "Soviet Nationalities in German Wartime Strategy, 1941-1945," in *Ethnic Minorities in the Red Army*, eds. Alexander R. Alexiev and S. Enders Wimbush (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), pp. 69-70.

POWs, had remained under German occupation, or had been repatriated after being deported to Germany as Ostarbeiter.

However, some of the new contingents of prisoners maintained a strong sense of group identity in the labour camps, and proved quite resistant to the process of dehumanisation and social atomization which had "broken" an earlier generation of prisoners in the 1930s. In particular, common ethnonational background provided the strongest basis for the informal organization of inmates in the postwar Stalinist labour camps. For the reasons listed earlier in this chapter, Ukrainian and Baltic nationalist partisans, and their sympathizers, formed cohesive core groups, especially in a number of "political" (hard labour and special) camps, which successfully challenged the dominance (supported by the camp administrations) of criminal elements in these camps and temporarily challenged, after Stalin's death, the authority of the camp administrations.

Chapter 5

THE SOVIET LEGAL-PENITENTIARY SYSTEM AND THE "ETHNONATIONAL FACTOR," 1953-1965

As I will demonstrate in the next chapter, the period from 1965 to 1985 represents a distinct, well-documented phase in the activity of political non-conformists in the Soviet Union and the methods used by the coercive organs of the state to deal with the leading figures among these individuals, who became known as "dissidents." However, the unsettled transition period following the post-Stalin strikes in the labour camps is of considerable importance since this is when a new strategy of state-sanctioned coercion directed against political offenders began to crystallize.

Although the primary targets of Stalinist terror were quite well defined, there was a certain unpredictable element to the pattern of repression during the Stalinist period which defied analysis, resulted in the arbitrary detention of a considerable

number of Soviet citizens,¹ and helped to obscure general trends in the coercive policies of the state authorities. This arbitrariness largely disappeared after Stalin's death, and certain continuities in state policy towards political offenders began to emerge at this time. This continuity is illustrated by the fact that a considerable number of the political prisoners detained between 1965 and 1985 had been imprisoned prior to 1965, and this subcategory of detainees will provide an important focus for this chapter.

Information on the situation of political prisoners in Soviet penitentiary institutions between 1956 and 1965 is limited. However, useful data can be gleaned from samizdat materials and camp memoirs covering this period, as well as the biographical data base described in Appendix A.

The Post-Stalin Amnesties

Stalin's death in 1953 led to a considerable amelioration of conditions in Soviet penal institutions, and to the eventual large-scale release of many of their inmates. As mentioned earlier, no firm consensus concerning the number of

¹Thus, for example, some prisoners during the Stalinist period were detained simply because fellow Soviet citizens had denounced them as "counter-revolutionaries" for personal advantage. In addition, many failures or accidents in the economic sphere were often labelled as "sabotage" which could be punished by imprisonment of the "saboteur(s)," and almost any contact with foreigners was considered grounds for arrest. Many examples of this arbitrariness during the 1930s are cited by Robert Conquest in The Great Terror: Stalin's Purge of the Thirties, rev. ed (London: Macmillan, 1973), Chapter 9. Beginning in September 1989 this monograph has been serialized in the Soviet monthly journal Neva (see the interview with Conquest on p. 126 of this issue). In some areas officials were actually given plans and "control figures" for arrests from Moscow, and were criticized for failing to fulfill quotas for arrests of "enemies of the people." See Roy Medvedev, Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism, revised and expanded edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), pp. 514-515. For other examples of arbitrariness in the pattern of state coercion during the Stalinist period, including the setting of quotas for arrests, see Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago 1918-1956: An Experiment in Literary Investigation Vol. 1 (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), paperback edition, pp. 47-92.

prisoners detained at any one time between the 1930s and early 1950s has yet emerged. However, even those scholars who have put forward relatively low estimates for the labour camp population in 1953 note that there was a dramatic decrease in the number of prisoners in the next few years.

Thus, for example, Berg's detailed study, based on Soviet sources (trade union data, criminal law statistics, and voting reports), estimates that the number of Soviet citizens (foreigners, including POWs, are not included) in the prison camp labour force in 1953 ranged between 3.0 and 3.5 million. According to his calculations this figure then dropped to approximately 1.6 million in 1956, and 1.0 million in 1959.² Although Berg's figure for those imprisoned in 1953 is quite conservative, the other figures he presents were partially confirmed in 1957 by P.I. Kudriavtsev, Assistant Procurator General of the USSR. In an interview with an American legal specialist he indicated that approximately 1 million prisoners were still detained in 1957. He and other Soviet scholars also noted that whereas almost half of those detained at the time of Stalin's death were political prisoners, in 1957 only approximately 1-2 per cent of all prisoners were in this category.³

This dramatic decrease in the number of prisoners, and especially political prisoners, was due to a number of amnesties declared after Stalin's death, and the official rationale for the first of these amnesties stressed its humanitarian purpose.

²Ger P. van den Berg, "Quantitative Aspects of the Stalinist System of Justice and Terror in the Soviet Union," in The Distinctiveness of Soviet Law, ed. F.J.M. Feldbrugge (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), p. 139. This article is partly based on a longer monograph by Berg, The Soviet System of Justice: Figures and Policy (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985).

³Harold J. Berman, "Soviet Law Reform -- Dateline Moscow 1957," Yale Law Journal 66, No. 8 (1957): 1194.

As a result of the strengthening of the Soviet social and state systems, the rise in the well-being and cultural level of the population, the growth of consciousness of the citizens, and their honest attitude towards the fulfilment of their social duty, legality and socialist law and order have been consolidated, while crime has been significantly reduced.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR considers that in these circumstances it is no longer necessary to detain further in places of confinement persons who have committed crimes which do not represent a great danger to the State, and who have, by a conscientious attitude towards their work, proved that they can return to an honest life of labour and become useful members of society.⁴

A humanitarian rationale was also strongly emphasized in another, later amnesty edict, on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution.⁵

However, a number of unstated considerations can be detected behind the official explanations for the amnesties.⁶ They included: the critical demographic situation in the Soviet Union after World War II (the effects of a large male labour deficit resulting from war casualties were felt well into the sixties),⁷ coupled with the inefficiency and low productivity of convict labour; the disruptions in the penitentiary system caused by the strikes discussed in Chapter 4; and insistent and growing demands by prisoners, as well as their relatives and friends, that they be

⁴Preamble to the provisions of the edict, "On the Amnesty," of 27 March 1953, in Mervyn Mathews, Soviet Government: A Selection of Official Documents on Internal Policies (New York: Taplinger Publishing Co., 1974), p. 256. For the original texts of the most important amnesty edicts see Sbornik zakonov SSSR i ukazov Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSR, 1938-1967 (Moscow: Izd. "Izvestiia Sovetov Deputatov Trudiashchikhsia SSSR," 1968), Vol. 2, pp. 627-635.

⁵Sbornik zakonov SSSR, Vol. 2, p. 633.

⁶On the formalistic and unsatisfying nature of most official Soviet explanations for a wide range of amnesties see Zigurds L. Zile, "Amnesty and Pardon in the Soviet Union," Soviet Union 3, Pt. 1 (1976): 44-45.

⁷Sheila Fitzpatrick, "Postwar Soviet Society: The 'Return to Normalcy'," in The Impact of World War II on the Soviet Union, ed. Susan J. Linz (Totowa: Rowman and Allanheld, 1985), p. 131.

released. In addition the amnesties, and the appearance of considerable numbers of former prisoners in mainstream Soviet society, played an important political role in promoting Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign and helping him to discredit some of his political rivals, helped placate Western governments and public opinion, and helped alleviate the oppressive and debilitating sense of fear and personal insecurity which had pervaded Soviet society during the Stalinist period.⁸

Several amnesties were declared between 1953 and 1957. The first major amnesty (decree of 27 March 1953) primarily affected ordinary criminals (those convicted for "counter-revolutionary activities" were excluded from consideration), and resulted in large numbers of these criminals being released or having their sentences reduced by half.⁹ A second amnesty (decree of 24 April 1954) allowed those sentenced for crimes committed when the defendants were under 18 years of age to be released if they had displayed "exemplary behaviour" and had completed no less than one-third of their sentence. It resulted in the release of many children

⁸Some of these factors are discussed in Paul Barton, L'Institution Concentrationnaire en Russie (1930-1957) (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1959), pp. 255-266. On the "politics" of the amnesties, and Beria's early attempt to exploit the 1953 amnesty for his own political purposes, see Roy A. Medvedev and Zhores A. Medvedev, Khrushchev: The Years in Power (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), pp. 9-10, 13-23.

⁹Sbornik zakonov, pp. 627-628. An early evaluation of this amnesty was provided by Vladimir Gsovski in Problems of Communism 2 (November-December 1953): 9-14. The declaration of this narrowly-defined amnesty contributed significantly to the dissatisfaction of the "politicals" in the camps and to the tense atmosphere which preceded the camp strikes. The release of large numbers of ordinary criminals also led to a dramatic increase in crime near the camps and eventually the entire Soviet Union. This is noted in a variety of memoirs such as, for example, Evgeniia Ginzburg's Krutoi marshrut: tiur'ma -- lager' -- ssylka, Vol. 2 (Milan: Arnoldo Mondadori Editore, 1979), p. 327; and Unto Parvilahti, Beria's Gardens: Ten Years' Captivity in Russia and Siberia (London: Hutchinson, 1959), pp. 246-251.

of "enemies of the people" who had been taken into custody during the 30s and 40s.¹⁰

On September 17, 1955 a much broader amnesty (permitting release or reduction in sentence) entitled "On Amnesty for Soviet Citizens Who Collaborated With the Occupiers During the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945" was announced. On September 20, 1956, the above amnesty was extended to include many former members of the armed forces convicted of surrendering to the enemy, and the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution on November 7, 1957 was the occasion for the release of some additional prisoners.¹¹

Establishing the exact criteria by which prisoners were released as a result of these amnesties is difficult since many clauses of the decrees listed above are ambiguous. In the case of the important amnesty decree of September 17, 1955, which was applied to a large number of political prisoners, even the title is ambiguous. Although it implied that the decree covered Soviet citizens who had collaborated with the Axis forces during WWII, the decree actually dealt with two different categories of prisoners serving their sentences in the Soviet Union.

The first category was defined as persons "convicted for service in the German army, police, and special German units" (Section 3). The second category was defined (Section 1) as those convicted "for aid to the enemy and other crimes

¹⁰ Zhak [Jacques] Rossi, Spravochnik po GULagu: Istoricheskii slovar' sovetskikh penitentsiarnykh institutsii i terminov, svyazannykh s prinuditel'nym trudom (London: Overseas Publications Interchange Ltd., 1987), p. 16. On the experiences of one youngster detained between 1937 and 1954, see Pyotr Yakir, A Childhood in Prison (New York: Coward, McCann, and Geoghegan, 1973).

¹¹ Sbornik zakonov, pp. 629-635.

specified by Articles 58.1, 58.3, 58.4, 58.6, 58.10, and 58.12 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR and corresponding sections of the codes of other Soviet republics."¹² In fact, this decree was the only one during this period to explicitly provide amnesty to prisoners sentenced, under Article 58, for general "counter-revolutionary" activities, and most of these prisoners were released under the provisions of this decree. Thus no matter what the nature of their political "offences," all "58s" who were affected by this decree were implicitly associated with those who had genuinely collaborated with the occupying forces during WWII.¹³ However, those who had served in Axis military or police units were treated quite leniently, for they were "to be released from places of confinement regardless of the term of confinement." In the case of the second category of prisoners, only those with a sentence of less than ten years were released, while those with longer sentences were supposed to have them halved.¹⁴

¹²My emphasis.

¹³It is important to note that in the case of both categories the amnesty was not to apply to "individuals involved in punitive actions who were sentenced for the murder and torture of Soviet citizens" (Section 14).

¹⁴There is also some ambiguity in the preamble to this decree, where it is stated that the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet deems it possible to grant amnesty to those who, "owing to lack of courage and unawareness of responsibility, were drawn into collaboration with the occupiers." It is not clear whether this is a mere declaratory statement or whether it is a prerequisite for the application of amnesty additional to the conditions outlined in the main body of the decree. The wording of the preamble could, conceivably, have excluded from the amnesty those who collaborated for other reasons -- e.g., conscious opposition to the Soviet regime. An additional ambiguity is found in the clause of the decree which applies to those Soviet citizens living abroad "who occupied, during the war, leading posts in the agencies of the police, gendarmerie, and propaganda created by the occupiers, including those drawn into anti-Soviet organizations in the postwar period." These individuals are relieved from responsibility under one condition: "if they have expiated their guilt by subsequent patriotic activities for the motherland or have surrendered [to Soviet authorities] with a full confession of their guilt" (Section 7, Paragraph 2). Such "expiation" could conceivably involve acting as an informant, or as an agent for the Soviet Union abroad.

Another source of ambiguity can be seen in the selection of those sections of Article 58 for which amnesty is provided in the decree of 17 September 1955. The reasons for singling out certain sections are not made clear; nor is the significance of omitting others. Some of this lack of clarity may have been the result of careless drafting by Soviet legal experts, for Article 58 is internally quite ambiguous (for example, some of the offences covered in Section 58-1a ("treason") overlap with other sections of the article). However, maintaining a certain ambiguity in the amnesty decree may have been intentional, for it provided the state authorities with some discretion to apply its provisions when and where they saw fit.

Still, a comparison of the sections included in, and omitted from, the decree shows a tendency for amnesty to be applied more readily to those sentenced for counterrevolutionary activities with a certain "foreign" component, rather than to those sentenced for "domestic" counterrevolutionary activity.¹⁵ This may have been due to the fact that although arbitrary arrests were made under all sections of Article 58, arbitrariness during the Stalinist period was especially common in cases where Soviet citizens were arrested for alleged espionage or maintaining foreign contacts of some kind. In addition, some citizens sentenced during the Stalinist

¹⁵For example, an amnesty was available to those sentenced under Article 58-3 ("Maintenance of relations for counterrevolutionary purposes with foreign states or with individual representatives of those states..."), Article 58-4 ("assistance, by any means whatsoever, to that section of the international bourgeoisie, which, not recognizing the equal rights of the communist system which is coming to replace the capitalist system, is endeavouring to overthrow it..."), and Article 58-6 (espionage). However, an amnesty was not available to those sentenced under Article 58-2 ("Armed insurrection... with counterrevolutionary aims, the seizure of power at the centre or in the provinces with the same aims and, in particular, with the aim of forcibly separating from the USSR or from a separate Union Republic any part of its territory..."), Article 58-7 (undermining the Soviet economy), Article 58-8 (commission of terrorist acts), Articles 58-9 and 58-14 (sabotage), and Article 58-11 ("Any type of organizational activity, directed towards the preparation or commission of crimes provided for in the present chapter, and also participation in an organization formed for the preparation or the commission of one of the crimes provided for in this chapter").

years under the "domestic" sections of Article 58 were probably seen as continuing to pose an actual or potential danger to state security even after Stalin's death, and thus the state authorities perceived a need to maintain considerable discretion in dealing with their cases.

In general, the way in which the amnesty decrees of this period were formulated indicated a considerable reluctance on the part of the central state authorities to announce an amnesty which would have unambiguously applied to all prisoners convicted on the basis of their political activities. A clear amnesty for political prisoners would have given them considerable credibility, and would have constrained the central state authorities' flexibility in continuing to "manage" those unofficial political forces which, in their opinion, could still pose a threat to the stability of the prevailing authority patterns of the Soviet state.

The Release of Prisoners

Despite the qualified and ambiguous nature of the post-Stalin amnesties, they resulted in the release of the great majority of political prisoners detained at the time. There are few detailed descriptions of the work of the commissions set up to examine the cases of those potentially eligible for amnesty. However, according to Roy Medvedev,

...about seventy special commissions were set up in the camps themselves to examine the cases of the prisoners. Soon over twenty more commissions set out from Moscow to look into the cases of those former prisoners who were living in exile or in "permanent settlement." Generally, each commission included an official from the Prosecutor-General's office, a representative of the Central Committee and a Party member who had already been rehabilitated; each was endowed with the powers of the Presidium [of the Supreme Soviet]

and could propose rehabilitation, pardon or a reduction in the length of a sentence in the name of the Supreme Court. The decisions taken by these commissions did not as a rule require confirmation but came into force immediately... The commissions worked quickly. Usually all that was necessary was a short interview with the prisoner himself and a brief review of his dossier.¹⁶

Several memoir sources describe these commissions in generally positive terms, stressing their efficiency and willingness to listen to the testimony of individual prisoners.¹⁷ However, amnesty could be, and was, denied to political prisoners in several circumstances other than those already noted above. In the case of the most significant amnesty, that of 17 September 1955, it did not apply to "individuals involved in punitive actions who were sentenced for the murder and torture of Soviet citizens" (Section 14). This clause was interpreted very broadly, to include responsibility for deaths which occurred during clashes between nationalist partisans and NKVD internal security units.¹⁸ In addition, nationalist partisans were often accused of and sentenced for the murder of civilians on the basis of flimsy circumstantial evidence.¹⁹ Amnesty could also be denied to a prisoner because of a record of "undesirable" behaviour on his/her part while in detention; in particular,

¹⁶Roy Medvedev, Khrushchev (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1983), p. 97.

¹⁷See, for example, Danylo Shumuk, Life Sentence: Memoirs of a Ukrainian Political Prisoner (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1984), pp. 281-285; and Liubov' Bershadskaya, Rastoptannye zhizni (Paris: Piat' Kontinentov, 1975), pp. 113-115.

¹⁸Interviews with Hryhorii Herchak, 11 November 1988, Toronto; Stefaniia Sichko, 17 October 1988, Toronto; and Danylo Shumuk, 10 October 1988, Mississauga.

¹⁹See, for example, the documents relating to the case of Bohdan Chuiko, AS 4361, 5196, 5197, 5198, 5199, and 5200.

participation in camp strikes or other disturbances, especially if the prisoner had received a second sentence for this activity and was therefore a "recidivist."²⁰

However, it appears that some of these circumstances were not clearly specified, and thus the individual commissions had considerable discretion in deciding on the application of the amnesty decrees. Although there are insufficient descriptions of the commissions' work to allow for firm generalizations, their decisions were affected by considerations such as the backgrounds of the members of the commission and the degree to which they were influenced by the camp administration's files on prisoners, as well as the prisoners' behaviour before the commission.

For example, in some cases the camp administration's subjective evaluation of a prisoner's behaviour in detention had a considerable influence on the commission's decision on whether or not to grant amnesty. Former prisoner Kestutis Jokubynas has stated that, in order to punish one of his fellow inmates who was seen as a troublemaker in the camps, the director of the camp where Jokubynas was detained intentionally falsified information in this inmate's personal file before it went to the commission, and this resulted in his continued detention.²¹ Another former labour camp inmate has claimed that in several cases of which he was aware, a prisoner's disrespectful attitude before the commission also spoiled his chances of receiving an amnesty.²²

²⁰See, for example, the case of Myroslav Symchych, described in AS 2789.

²¹Interview with Kestutis Jokubynas, 18 October 1986, Munich. Similar cases were cited by Stefaniia Sichko (interview, 17 October 1988).

²²Interview with Hryhorii Herchak, 11 November 1988, Toronto.

Given the large number of prisoners to be "processed," and the turmoil in the Soviet penitentiary system throughout the mid-1950s, it is not surprising that there were some inconsistencies in the decisions taken by the numerous commissions reviewing prisoners' cases, especially in view of the ambiguities, noted above, in the amnesty decrees. However, one way of assessing the impact of the amnesties, and of trends in the treatment of political non-conformists after the amnesties, is to examine the composition of the political prisoner population in the late 1950s and first half of the 1960s.²³

Political Prisoners after the Post-Stalin Amnesties

Few memoirs written by former prisoners cover the period from the late 1950s to 1965, and since the preparation and circulation of samizdat (and especially documents from the labour camps) did not become widespread until the late 1960s, the amount of information about the political prisoner population and camp life during this period is limited. However, as noted in Chapter 1, the amount and quality of such information increased dramatically in the late sixties. It has been used to prepare a data base which contains biographical information on all known political prisoners detained between 1965 and 1985, and this data base also includes

²³Approximately 2/3 of all labour camps were closed during the brief but significant liberalization of conditions in the labour camps after Stalin's death (Berman, "Soviet Law Reform," p. 1195). Most of these camps remained closed; however, the liberal regime in the labour camps ended, ironically, in 1958, when the new Fundamental Principles of Criminal Legislation and the Statute on Crimes Against the State were introduced. The regime in the camps gradually became more harsh throughout the early sixties, when "politicals" were concentrated in the Mordovian labour camps. For details see Paul Barton, "An End to Concentration Camps?" Problems of Communism 11 (March-April 1962): 38-46. The confused, ambiguous atmosphere which accompanied the closure of many camps is best depicted in Georgii Vladimov's Vernyi Ruslan, the satirical account of a camp guard dog deserted by his masters which was serialized in the literary monthly Znamia in 1989.

fairly complete information concerning their activities and treatment (including arrests and detentions) prior to 1965.

Thus one way of roughly estimating which categories of political prisoners were most heavily represented in Soviet penitentiary institutions during the late fifties or early sixties is to examine the composition of the set of political prisoners included in the above-mentioned data base who had been imprisoned at some point between 1957 and 1965. This set will only approximate the composition of the population of all political prisoners detained between 1957 and 1965, for it will over-represent the individuals sentenced to long terms of imprisonment, and exclude or under-represent those who were released soon after the amnesties or were sentenced to brief periods of detention in the late 1950s or early 1960s. However, in the absence of more reliable information, these data provide a useful partial indicator of those categories of political prisoners who became, or remained, the targets of state coercion after the mid-1950s. I will use the term "seniors" to describe this particular set.

The data base identifies 345 seniors, and the ethnonational background of a majority (257) of these seniors is specified or can be easily derived from the sources used in compiling the data base.²⁴ The ethnonational composition of this subset of seniors is presented in Table I.

²⁴For a description of this data base, see Appendix A. In some cases, even if an individual's ethnonational background is not specified in the materials used to compile the data base, it is implicit in these sources. Thus, for example, I assume that if an individual was sentenced for his/her participation in the Lithuanian nationalist partisan movement, or in the Ukrainian nationalist partisan movement, the individual was, respectively, a Lithuanian or Ukrainian. In the few rare cases where a non-national was involved in a given national movement such anomalies are almost always noted in the available sources.

Since the ethnonational background of a fairly large number (88) of seniors is not specified in the available data sources, a nationality was assigned to the 88

Table I

ETHNONATIONAL BACKGROUND OF SENIORS AS SPECIFIED
IN DATA SOURCES

<u>Nationality</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Ukrainian	133	38.6
Unknown	88	25.5
Lithuanian	62	18.0
Latvian	18	5.2
Russian	13	3.8
Estonian	6	1.7
Jewish	6	1.7
Crimean Tatar	4	1.2
Armenian	3	.9
Georgian	3	.9
Moldavian	3	.9
Other*	6	1.7

*Polish, Avar, Kalmyk, Belorussian, Kazakh, German.

N.B. Since the percentages are rounded off, they do not add up to exactly 100%

individuals in question on the basis of their names. Although there is a certain degree of unreliability in such assignments of nationality on the basis of name, this operation provides at least some indication of the possible distortions introduced by the presence of a fairly large "unknown" nationality category in the set of seniors.²⁵ The nationality breakdown of the seniors after this operation is completed is provided in Table II.

The only groups which are significantly affected by this re-allocation of those in the "unknown nationality" category are the Jewish group (its size doubles, and its relative standing is advanced), and the Russians, whose number increases quite dramatically and whose standing is also advanced. However, the most striking features of both Tables I and II are the distinct overrepresentation among the seniors (with respect to their percentage of the general population) of Ukrainians, Lithuanians, and Latvians, and the equally striking underrepresentation of Russians and Central Asians among the seniors.

²⁵The reliability of such identification on the basis of name varies considerably among different Soviet nationalities. Thus, for example, Estonian, Lithuanian, Latvian, Georgian, Armenian and some other names are usually highly distinctive, and few members of these national groups have assimilated into non-indigenous communities (Russian, Ukrainian, etc.) in their indigenous republics. However, the situation is more ambiguous in the case of Ukrainian names because of the heavy out-migration of Ukrainians into Siberia at the turn of the century (as well as various waves of deportations during the Soviet period), and the fairly high level of Russification of these Ukrainians as well as those living in Eastern Ukraine and neighbouring territories in the RSFSR.

Table II

**ETHNONATIONAL BACKGROUND OF SENIORS AS SPECIFIED
IN DATA SOURCES, AND INCLUDING NAME ANALYSIS**

<u>Nationality</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Ukrainian	164	47.5
Lithuanian	63	18.3
Russian	60	17.4
Latvian	18	5.2
Jewish	13	3.8
Estonian	6	1.7
Crimean Tatar	4	1.2
Moldavian	4	1.2
Armenian	3	.9
Georgian	3	.9
Other*	7	2.0

*Hungarian, Polish, Avar, Kalmyk, Belorussian, Kazakh, and German

N.B. Since the percentages are rounded off, they do not add up to exactly 100%

According to the data base, a majority (183) of the seniors were arrested and sentenced primarily for their participation in various national rights movements.²⁶ At least 120 seniors were involved in the Ukrainian national movement, 44 in the Lithuanian national movement, 10 in the Latvian national movement, 4 in the Crimean Tatar national movement, and 3 in the Estonian national movement, with 2 "others."²⁷ Of the 177 Ukrainians and Balts in this subset, at least 79 were members of nationalist partisan forces during and after WWII.

As for the other seniors (162), only in a minority of cases is a primary reason for their arrest and imprisonment clearly specified. Thus, for example, 25 seniors were imprisoned for being active in the "socialist opposition" (as "true" Marxists-Leninists, anarcho-communists, etc.), 22 were arrested for attempting to illegally leave the Soviet Union, and 6 were sentenced for protesting socio-economic conditions in the Soviet Union.

However, the information on the remaining 109 seniors simply indicates that they were arrested for "treason," for "political" reasons, or for activities such as conducting "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda," circulating samizdat, and making critical (oral) pronouncements directed at the political "powers that be." In these

²⁶Someone arrested and sentenced for his activity in, for example, the Lithuanian national movement could well have participated in general human rights activities, and/or been active in defence of the Lithuanian Roman Catholic Church. In other words, the categories I am using are not exclusive. In almost all cases, however, the sources used in compiling the data base indicate a primary reason for an individual's arrest and sentence, or this can be determined from the information available concerning a given individual's case.

N.B. In the case of an individual who was sentenced on several different occasions after World War II, I am interested here in the primary reason for the arrest which led to the individual's detention between a specific period: the mid-50s to 1965.

²⁷I use the term "at least" since, as noted below, some of the individuals in the "general political" category were probably activists in various national movements.

cases there is no indication of the specific motives for the individual's political activity, and the amorphous nature of this relatively large "general political" category is probably due to the fact that these individuals were active before the rise of the organized civil rights movement in the Soviet Union, and often acted as individuals or in small, isolated groups. Certainly, prior to the mid-sixties there was no organized network in the Soviet Union for gathering information about infringements of civil rights, and therefore information about people arrested for their political activity before this time is often sketchy.²⁸ If one looks, however, at indicators such as the pattern of sentencing, the primary reason for the arrest and sentencing of a certain number of those in the "general political" subset of seniors was probably their activity in the Baltic or Ukrainian national movements.

For example a Lithuanian, Vitas Sidaris, was sentenced to 25 years of imprisonment in 1957 (when such sentences were still being imposed) under Article 58 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR (counter-revolutionary crimes), and he was reported a political prisoner in a Mordovian camp in 1972 and in Perm camp 35 in 1974. Although the nature of the "counter-revolutionary" activity for which he was imprisoned is not known, the pattern of sentencing of most Lithuanian nationalist partisans was very similar, and Sidaris was probably sentenced for participating in the Lithuanian national movement. Thus if additional information concerning the individuals in the general political subset of seniors was to become available, it would probably mean an increase in the percentage of seniors sentenced for their activity in the national movements listed above.

²⁸Ludmilla Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious, and Human Rights (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1985), pp. 10-11.

Therefore, even if the seniors are not fully representative of all (especially short-term) political prisoners detained in Soviet penitentiary institutions between the late 1950s and 1965, the composition of this group suggests that by far the largest category of political prisoners detained during this period (and especially those who received long sentences) consisted of activists in various national movements, and most significantly the Ukrainian, Lithuanian, and Latvian national movements.

This conclusion is supported by all available memoir literature and interview data. Although Anatolii Marchenko, the author of the best-known (and according to most evaluations, very reliable)²⁹ memoirs describing Soviet labour camps in the early and mid-60s does not devote much attention to the "national question" he does mention, in a description of the Mordovian camps where most political prisoners were held in the early 1960s, that "here statistics in general have been turned on their head, including the proportion of men to women and the national composition of the adult population."³⁰ He further notes that "Political prisoners are brought to Mordovia from all corners of the Soviet Union and from all republics. There are particularly many Ukrainians and people from the Baltic republics -- Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia."³¹

In his memoirs Boris Vail' is also quite reticent about the "national question" in the labour camps; however, he notes the large number of Ukrainians among his

²⁹For highly positive evaluations of Marchenko's book by several well-known Soviet dissidents see "K desiatiletiu 'Moikh pokazanii' Anatolii Marchenko," *Pamiat': Istoricheskii sbornik*, vyp. 3 (Paris: YMCA-Press, 1980): 466-490.

³⁰Anatoly Marchenko, *My Testimony* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971), p. 51.

³¹*Ibid.*, p. 296. Marchenko (p. 179) also mentions the large number of women politicals from Ukraine and the Baltic states who were imprisoned for "nationalism."

fellow political prisoners in one of the Ozerlag camps in the late 50s, and the fact that Russians were in a distinct minority among these prisoners.³² More specifically Makhmud Kulmagambetov, who was imprisoned in the Mordovian camps between 1962 and 1969, estimates that Ukrainians (mostly former nationalist partisans or national rights activists) formed the largest group among his fellow political prisoners in the early 1960s, with Lithuanians coming second; however, taken together the Balts outnumbered the Ukrainians.³³ Another former political prisoner has stated that in 1961, in Camp No. 7 of the Mordovian camp complex where approximately 1,800 prisoners (the majority were "politicals") were detained, more than one-third were Ukrainians, mostly former nationalist partisans.³⁴ No evidence has come to my attention which would in any way contradict the pattern noted above: Ukrainian and Baltic national rights activists formed the largest group among the political prisoners detained in Soviet penitentiary institutions between the late 1950s and 1965.

The Role of the Partisans

The strong representation of Ukrainians and Balts among the seniors is partly due to the considerable numbers, in this group, of former Ukrainian and Baltic nationalist partisans whose role in the postwar camps was mentioned in Chapter 4

³²Boris Vail', Osobo opasnyi (London: Overseas Publications Interchange Ltd., 1980), p. 227.

³³Interview with M. Kulmagambetov, Munich, 23 October 1986.

³⁴See "The Autobiography of Levko Lukianenko," The Ukrainian Review 37 (Summer 1989): 10. Hryhorii Herchak (interview, 11 November 1988, Toronto) also states that the majority of "politicals" in the Mordovian camps in the early 1960s were Ukrainians and Balts, almost all of whom were former nationalist partisans or national rights activists.

of this thesis. In fact, some of these former partisans were still detained after 1965 and therefore merit special attention especially since, during the period under consideration, the Soviet media and scholarly publications consistently portrayed them as bandits and war criminals who collaborated with Axis occupying forces during World War II and continued to terrorize the local population after the war.³⁵

This is not the place to discuss the complicated history of the evolution of the nationalist partisan movements in Western Ukraine and the Baltic states during and after World War II. However, the crude and simplistic standard Soviet portrayal noted above is at variance with Western scholarship on these partisan movements, and is currently being re-evaluated in the Soviet Union itself.³⁶ For example, few of the postwar nationalist partisan leaders had been Axis collaborators, for the genuine collaborators of any note usually fled to Germany near the end of the war or occasionally switched to collaboration with the newly re-imposed Soviet regime. And although nationalist partisan activity led to the inevitable casualties among innocent civilians which accompany all forms of guerilla warfare, most of

³⁵For a partial bibliography of Soviet literature on the Ukrainian nationalist partisan movement during World War II see Peter J. Potichnyj, "Glasnost' and the UPA," paper delivered at a conference on "Glasnost', Perestroika and Ukraine" at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, 19 June 1989, pp. 44-48. For a recent example of the typically harsh Soviet press treatment of the Ukrainian nationalist movement see the cycle of articles in *Pravda Ukrainy*, 9-19 August 1989. For a discussion of Soviet literature on Baltic collaboration and resistance during the German occupation see Romuald J. Misiunas, "Soviet Historiography on the Baltic Republics in World War II," in Contemporary Soviet Propaganda and Disinformation: A Conference Report (Washington: U.S. Department of State, 1987), pp. 138-143.

³⁶In the late 1980s many writers, journalists, and historians in the Baltic republics began to "rehabilitate" the anti-Soviet nationalist partisan movements, and to portray them in generally positive terms. See, for example, the excerpts from the proceedings of an open party meeting organized by the Lithuanian Writers' Association and the Historical Institute of the Academy of Sciences, translated in *Elta Information Bulletin* No. 5 (May 1989): 5-8, and the analysis of other recent discussions on this issue in the following Baltic Area Situation Reports of Radio Free Europe Research: No. 5, 20 May 1988, pp. 29-32; and No. 5, 31 May 1989, pp. 17-21.

the indigenous civilian population in the areas of partisan warfare supported the nationalist partisans until official reprisals (including the deportation of the population of entire villages to Siberia or Soviet Central Asia) and the strain of supporting the increasingly beleaguered partisans took their toll.³⁷

The official Soviet image of these nationalist partisans is also at variance with the record of their behaviour in the labour camps. Thus, as noted in Chapter 4, many former nationalist partisans were at the centre of organized resistance to the camp administrations' brutal and arbitrary behaviour and their use of ordinary criminals against the "politicals" in the postwar camps prior to the amnesties. After the amnesties nationalist partisans were usually detained together with genuine war criminals and other individuals who had voluntarily aided the Axis occupying forces during WWII; however, the nationalist partisans strictly differentiated themselves from the latter groups, and this line of demarcation was clearly recognized by their fellow "politicals."

Thus, for example, it was the imprisoned war criminals and collaborators who cooperated most closely with the camp administration and were given privileged positions in the camps. Marchenko notes that in the early 1960s, in the Mordovian camp where he was imprisoned, the Council of the Prisoner Collective (an official body which was supposed to represent the interests of the prisoners) was

³⁷The best scholarly treatment of the evolution of Ukrainian nationalism during World War II is John A. Armstrong's Ukrainian Nationalism, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963). On the Ukrainian nationalist partisan movement after WWII and the issues noted above see Yaroslav Bilinsky, The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine After World War II (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1964), Chapter 4. On the Baltic nationalist partisan movements during and after WWII see Romuald J. Misiunas and Rein Taagepera, The Baltic States: Years of Dependence 1940-1980 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), pp. 81-103.

made up almost exclusively of former polizeis [politsai]. Earlier they collaborated with the fascists and now with the administration of our camps for political prisoners -- after all, it's all the same to them, as long as they can have a quiet life and get out as soon as possible. Even outside they manage to get on better than the rest: they are released with excellent character references, all the official organizations help them, they take a careful look around, adapt themselves -- and prosper. They might even make the grade as minor bosses somewhere.³⁸

Although he is writing about a later period, in his memoirs Natan Sharansky confirms Marchenko's observations. He writes that when he first arrived in Perm camp No. 35, where he was detained in 1980,

approximately half the zeks [camp slang for prisoners] consisted of politsai, or collaborators -- men accused of working with the enemy during World War II, either by serving in the German army or by assisting the Nazis in other ways... Every one of the politsai now zealously served and feared his new masters just as he had once served and feared the Germans. In return, the authorities generally trusted the collaborators... The collaborators held most of the easy jobs -- in the dining room, the hospital, the library, and the storeroom, and in production, although some were too old and sick to work.³⁹

He goes on to note that

Aside from the collaborators, there were other old men in the camp: Ukrainian nationalists, and Lithuanian and Estonian "forest brothers," who had fled to the woods with their weapons to defend their land from the Soviet occupiers. Many of these zeks were now weak and ill but, unlike the collaborators, they rarely assisted the KGB.⁴⁰

³⁸Marchenko, My Testimony, p. 231. In an interview (Munich, 23 October 1986), M. Kulmagambetov stated that in the early and mid 1960s the administration of the Mordovian camps clearly favoured the politsai, most of whom were poorly educated men with a great respect for authority.

³⁹Natan Sharansky, Fear No Evil (New York: Random House, 1988), p. 289.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 293. In a protest statement written in 1974 members of a new generation of younger political prisoners, of various backgrounds, demanded that they be detained separately from war criminals, but clearly stressed that they considered the former nationalist partisans to be political

Other facets of the behaviour of the former nationalist partisans in the camps, and their relationships with other groups of prisoners, will be discussed in Chapter 7 of this thesis. However, it should be noted that they were highly regarded by most of their fellow "politicals," of all nationalities and backgrounds; this is reflected in samizdat materials, in memoirs, and in the interviews conducted for this thesis. For example, in his memoirs (which deal with the early and mid seventies) Edward Kuznetsov, who is highly critical of many of his fellow prisoners and their intolerance and chauvinism, has this to say about the seven former Lithuanian partisans with whom he was detained in special-regime Camp No. 10 in the Mordovian ASSR:

They have all retained a deep friendship and give the impression of being an association of countrymen. They are exceptionally decent, sober-minded people and keep their distance from non-Lithuanians (particularly the Russians). They show no signs of anti-semitism (or no evident signs at least), they are all extremely courageous men, and none of them has any time for physical "discussions" [probably a reference to conflicts decided by physical force]. In the midst of all the criminals and wartime collaborators who set the tone here, they, the Lithuanians give the most gratifying impression. They have been promised release before the expiration of their terms provided they will condemn what they have done and sing the praises of their conquerors, but not one of them, except Bagdonas and Shlimas, has written a request for clemency; even so Bagdonas, in spite of all his collaboration with the Cheka, has been deceived, and Shlimas has had

prisoners in the full sense of the term. See Viacheslav Chornovil and Boris Penson, Daily Life in a Correction Colony in Soviet Mordovia, Paper No. 3, Soviet Institutions Series (Jerusalem: The Soviet and East European Research Centre, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1975), p. 9. The same source gives a number of examples of the cooperative relationship between the former war criminals and the penal administration (pp. 9-10).

his sentence reduced to 15 years, apparently because he is thought to be insane (he has hardly spoken one word in 15 years).⁴¹

Of the nationalist partisans in the camps between the late 1950s and 1965, almost all were arrested and sentenced before the major amnesties of the mid-1950s, and were either unaffected by the amnesties, or were released and then re-arrested and re-imprisoned. Few details are available concerning the exact nature of the original charges brought against these individuals (in most cases the available sources simply indicate that they were charged with treason). However, an interesting pattern is revealed by a comparison of two subsets of Ukrainian nationalist partisans included in the data base:

- a) those originally sentenced to 20 or 25 years of imprisonment and released during the post-Stalin amnesties, but later re-arrested and sentenced anew; and
- b) those who served 20-25-year terms continuously, without a break.

With no exceptions (except for 2 cases where the dates of arrest and/or trial were unavailable) those in group "a" (17 individuals) had been arrested and sentenced between 1944 and 1949, and with only a few exceptions all those in group "b" (34 individuals) had been arrested and sentenced between 1950 and 1957. There were two cases in group "b" where dates of arrest and/or trial were

⁴¹Edward Kuznetsov, Prison Diaries (New York: Stein and Day, 1980), pp. 203-204. For similar positive comments re these partisans see, for example, the necrologues written by fellow prisoners in memory of Stepan Mamchur, a former UPA member who was serving a 25-year sentence and died while imprisoned in 1977 (AS 3412, and Chronicle of Current Events 52 (1 March 1979): 65); the character portraits of several old former nationalist partisans in Mikhail Kheifets, Ukrains'ki syliuety (New York: Suchasnist', 1984), pp. 148-174; the character portrait of former Latvian partisan Teodor Assel'baums in AS 2697, p. 1; etc. For interesting notes on Mykola Konchakivs'kyi, a former OUN-UPA member who was imprisoned for 28 years and was greeted by the whole population of his village in Western Ukraine after he was released in 1978, see AS 3622 and 3623. Konchakivs'kyi died several weeks after he was released.

unavailable, and in seven cases the dates of arrest and/or trial predated 1950. However, in six of these seven cases the individuals involved had received additional sentences in the camps, prior to the amnesties, for organizing political actions such as strikes or for attempted escape, and were therefore considered "especially dangerous recidivists" to whom the amnesties did not apply.

Given the lack of detailed information on the backgrounds of many of these prisoners, any conclusions drawn from this pattern must be tentative. However, the above data suggest that most nationalist partisans sentenced during or soon after WWII were amnestied, while amnesty was denied, or less readily applied, to those arrested and sentenced close to the dates of the amnesties. Given the amount of time which had elapsed since the war, the latter could not be easily dismissed by the authorities as simply war-time collaborators. In addition, since one of the activities of the postwar nationalist underground consisted of punishing those citizens who actively cooperated with the new Soviet regime, some of these partisans had probably been charged with the murder of Soviet citizens and were therefore technically ineligible for amnesty. However, several individuals who were imprisoned at the time have argued that in the case of the nationalist partisans, amnesty commissions also considered whether or not a given individual had been detained long enough to have realized "the error" of his/her ways.⁴² Thus the exact

⁴²Interviews with Hryhorii Herchak, 11 November 1988, Toronto; Stefania Sichko, 17 October 1988, Toronto; Kestutis Jokubynas, 18 October 1986, Munich; Danylo Shumuk, 10 October 1988, Mississauga. This explanation is also suggested in a description of the case of Konstantyn Skrypchuk, an UPA member who was arrested in 1953 and sentenced to 25 years of imprisonment, which he served without a break. See Mykhailo [Mikhail] Kheifets, *Ukrains'ki syliuety* (New York: Suchasnist', 1984), p. 169. Shumuk argued that, for propaganda purposes, the security apparatus had a strong interest in portraying nationalist partisans captured in the late 1940s or early 1950 as especially dangerous criminals and, on some occasions, fabricated murder charges against them.

nature of the original charges brought against nationalist partisans appears to have been only one of the factors determining their fate.

A New Strategy of Coercion?

By the late 1940s organized opposition to the integration of the Baltic states and Western Ukraine into the Soviet Union had largely ceased.⁴³ Continuing concerns about the potential for further unrest in these territories were probably responsible for the continued detention, as noted above, of significant numbers of former nationalist partisans despite the amnesties of the mid-1950s. However, as I will show in the next chapter, these and other concerns were also reflected in the evolution of a new pattern of state-directed coercion which did not involve mass terror, but aimed at intimidating and, if intimidation was ineffective, imprisoning those perceived to be actual or potential dissidents (especially those considered capable of fulfilling leadership roles).

The pattern of repression inherent in this new coercive policy did not become clear until information about human rights violations in the Soviet Union began to widely circulate in the late 1960s. However, some elements of this policy can be discerned in the treatment of former nationalist partisans released during the post-Stalin amnesties, and the arrest of political non-conformists detained for the first time after the amnesties.

⁴³The persistence of this opposition, in spite of very unequal odds, was largely due to hopes, on the part of the partisans and their supporters, that conflict between the Soviet Union and the Western powers was inevitable in the wake of WWII. See Misiunas and Taagepera, The Baltic States, p. 82; and Bilinsky, The Second Soviet Republic, pp. 125-126.

In those cases where information is available concerning the activities of former partisans released during the amnesties, it appears that they made no efforts to renew clandestine political activity, tried to maintain a low public profile, and were preoccupied with rebuilding their personal and family lives.⁴⁴ However, even the simple presence of unrepentant former partisans in their native republics would have provided a constant, visible reminder to the local population of the forcible (and fairly recent) incorporation of Western Ukraine and the Baltic states into the Soviet Union.

Thus the former partisans were kept under tight surveillance after they were released. Particularly close attention was devoted to individuals who had played an organizational role in labour camp strikes and other camp disturbances;⁴⁵ however, the security apparatus and local party officials showed a great interest in anyone with a history of activity in a nationalist movement, and great concern about the possible "negative influence" which such individuals could have on their fellow countrymen.⁴⁶

⁴⁴Shumuk, for example, insists that he intentionally refrained from any political activity after his release from the camps in 1956; he even moved away from his native province in Western Ukraine in the hope that this would convince the security apparatus that he was now "harmless." See his Life Sentence, pp. 303, 305-308. In an interview (10 October 1988, Mississauga), Shumuk claimed that most his former colleagues released at this time also tried to maintain a very low public profile, as did S. Sichko and her husband (interview with S. Sichko, 17 October 1988, Toronto). See also the statement by Hrytsiak in AS 2838.

⁴⁵See AS 2838 re the harassment of Evhen Hrytsiak, and Shumuk, Life Sentence, p. 317. Both Hrytsiak and Shumuk played an active role in the Norilsk camp strikes of 1953.

⁴⁶K. Jokubynas (interview, 18 October 1986, Munich), argued that this is the main reason why Petras Paulaitis, a well-known Lithuanian dissident, was harassed so persistently when he returned to Kaunas after a review of his case in 1956 (he was originally sentenced to 25 years imprisonment). Paulaitis was told that he could resume his teaching career only if he condemned Lithuanian bourgeois nationalism, but he refused to do so and was subsequently sentenced to a new 25-year term, supposedly for "subversive work" with students of the Kaunas Polytechnic Institute. See also the biographical note re Paulaitis in the Chronicle of Current Events No. 27 (15 October 1972): 34.

As a result, there was a strong emphasis on "neutralizing" the influence of the former nationalist partisans. They were not allowed to settle in any of the larger urban centres in their homelands, and were placed under heavy pressure to "cooperate" with the security and local party apparati. Such cooperation usually involved publicly renouncing and denouncing their former activities, and acting as informants for the security apparatus concerning the activities of former friends and colleagues. Those who refused to cooperate in this fashion immediately fell under suspicion, and these suspicions were accentuated if the former prisoners showed any interest in events such as the Hungarian Uprising of 1956 or other manifestations of unrest in Eastern Europe, or maintained any form of contact with fellow former prisoners.⁴⁷

In practical terms, unrepentant former nationalist partisans were greatly restricted in their job opportunities, and often had to settle for work which was far below their level of qualifications. The situation of former partisans with families was especially difficult, for the most painful form of pressure on those who refused to cooperate with the authorities came in the form of threats that their children would be prevented from gaining a higher education, or occupying a desirable job.⁴⁸

⁴⁷Interview with Kestutis Jokubynas, 18 October 1986, Munich; Shumuk, Life Sentence, pp. 301-302, 313-316; Bohdan Nahaylo, "Four Decades of Resistance: An Interview with Danylo Shumuk," Radio Liberty Supplement 7/87, 25 August 1987, pp. 12-13. See AS 2431 for details of a provocation staged against Antanas Terleckas in connection with the events in Hungary in 1956. In an interview (21 July 1988, Mississauga), Shumuk stated that the security apparatus was greatly perturbed about his personal correspondence with other former prisoners, which it apparently feared represented the early phase of broader organizational activity.

⁴⁸Interview with Stefaniia Sichko, 17 October 1988, Toronto. Specifically, Sichko mentioned the case of a former UPA member, imprisoned after WWII and released during the post-Stalin amnesties, who befriended the Sichko family and regularly visited them after they returned to their home town of Dnelyna, in Western Ukraine, in 1957. Several years afterwards Sichko found out that this "friend" had been acting as a regular informant for the local KGB officer, who threatened that otherwise his two daughters would not be admitted to university. Sichko stressed that pressures of this kind led to the creation of a large network of informers in Western Ukraine, which tremendously demoralized the

Individuals in other categories of post-war prisoners encountered certain difficulties (e.g., in finding appropriate jobs and living quarters) after their release; however, they did not encounter the same policy of systematic, long-term harassment leading, in some cases, to re-arrest and re-imprisonment, which was the lot of many former nationalist partisans.⁴⁹

There are other indications that the former nationalist partisans were singled out for special attention during and after the post-Stalin amnesties. For example, few other seniors listed in my data base had been continuously detained throughout the period of amnesties, or had been released and then re-imprisoned soon after the amnesties. The main exceptions included individuals (23 cases) whose political offences are not specified in the available sources (some or most of them may have been former nationalist partisans) or individuals (9 cases) who originally tried to defect or escape from the Soviet Union (the reasons are not specified) and received

local population. In effect, it became very difficult to know whom you could trust.

⁴⁹On some of the general problems faced by prisoners released during the amnesties, see Solzhenitsyn, Gulag Archipelago, Vol. 3, Chapters 6 and 7. Details on the harassment and persecution of former nationalist partisans after their release from imprisonment are available in a number of cases; see, for example, the documents concerning the Sichko family in Osyp Zinkevych, comp. and ed., Ukrains'ka Hel'sinks'ka Hrupa: 1978-1982: Dokumenty i materialy (Baltimore: Smoloskyp, 1983), pp. 633-705; and AS 5196-5200 (on the case of Bohdan Chuiko). Some former Ukrainian nationalist partisans were so concerned about the oppressive atmosphere which they expected to encounter when they returned to their native territories, as well as pressures to renounce their views, that they preferred to settle down outside of Western Ukraine, or Ukraine in general. See, for example, the description of the case of Saranchuk in Kheifets, Ukrains'ki syliuety, p. 155. H. Herchak (interview, 11 November 1988, Toronto) stated that this was the main reason why he first settled in Uman', Eastern Ukraine, rather than Western Ukraine, after his release from detention, upon completion of a 25-year sentence, in 1977.

additional sentences for attempting to escape from labour camps during their first period of detention.³⁰

Partial exceptions include a small group of human rights activists (6 cases) who were imprisoned during the Stalinist period and re-imprisoned considerably later, during the Brezhnev period.³¹ It is also interesting to note that there is only one report of a former Vlasovite who was imprisoned after 1965 and was considered to be a political prisoner.³²

However, the large number of Ukrainian and Baltic "politicals" in the post-amnesty labour camps was not just the result of the continued detention of former nationalist partisans. Of the seniors in my data base, over half (54%) were arrested and tried for the first time after the amnesties of the mid-1950s. And although only 37% of the latter were clearly identified as national rights activists (almost all from Western Ukraine and the Baltic republics), this was the largest group among the "new" prisoners the nature of whose political activity was clearly specified in the available sources.

³⁰See, for example, the cases of Viktor Bondarenko and Bronis Purlis, mentioned in Chronicle of Current Events No. 46 (15 August 1977): 117, 125; and the case of Gennadii Krivtsov, described in S.P. de Boer et al., Biographical Dictionary of Dissidents in the Soviet Union, 1956-1975 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), pp. 290-291.

³¹For example, Vladimir Gershuni was arrested in 1949 and detained for several years for participating in an anti-Stalinist youth group. He was later declared insane and forcibly detained in a special psychiatric hospital from 1970 to 1974 after becoming actively involved in the democratic human rights movement. See the documents concerning his case in AS 4764 and 4765.

³²"Vlasovite" is the popular term for a member of the ROA (Russkaia Osvoboditel'naia Armiia). Ivan N. Pankratchenko, b. 1924, joined the ROA in 1943, became an officer in 1945, and was imprisoned between 1954 and 1974. He was arrested in 1987 and charged under Article 70-2 of the RSFSR Criminal Code for a speech calling for the overthrow of the Soviet regime. See Cronid Lubarsky, compiler, List of Political Prisoners in the USSR, 30 October 1987 (Munich: Das Land und die Welt, 1987), p. 115.

In contrast to the post-war nationalist partisans, many members of this new generation of national rights activists advocated legal, non-violent means of achieving their goals.⁵³ However, like the other unofficial political organizations of this period, they operated in a clandestine fashion, and in the labour camps they generally associated with the former nationalist partisans. In fact, the most widespread form of informal group affiliation among the "politicals" was the same as in the postwar camps -- ethnonational background.⁵⁴

The only other identifiable category of "politicals" who tended to associate with each other in the camps of this period consisted of "true" Marxists or Leninists (many of them students) who aimed at a renewal of socialism in the Soviet Union and had been detained for establishing clandestine political circles or study groups after Stalin's death and the turmoil in Eastern Europe in the mid-1950s. However, this latter category consisted of very disparate individuals who, according to several observers, spent much of their time engaged in abstract philosophical debates and

⁵³Extensive documentation concerning the trial in 1961 of one group, led by I. Lukianenko, which tried to create a political party advocating the secession of the Ukrainian SSR from the Soviet Union, is available in Ukrains'ki iurysty pid sudom KGB (Munich: Suchasnist', 1968). For a list of other trials which took place in Ukraine at this time see Michael Browne, ed., Ferment in the Ukraine (Crisis Press: Woodhaven, N.Y.: 1971), pp. 226-231.

⁵⁴Interviews with M. Kulmagambetov (Munich, 23 October 1986), K. Jokubynas (Munich, 18 October 1986), and Danylo Shumuk (Mississauga, 10 October 1988); Lukianenko, "Autobiography," p. 10.

frequently quarreled among themselves. There was little interaction between them and the national rights activists.⁵⁵

Despite Khrushchev's claim, in 1959, that "There are now no cases of people being tried for political crimes in the Soviet Union,"⁵⁶ political trials continued throughout the period between Stalin's death and Brezhnev's rise to power, although many of the grotesque abuses of legality characteristic of the Stalinist period were eliminated. There was a dramatic diminution in the number and scope of such trials; however, all forms of political activity outside of state control continued to be harshly suppressed, and the individuals who attempted to engage in such activity were almost always invariably arrested, tried, and sentenced to detention in a penal institution.

Continuity with the immediate postwar period was maintained in another important respect, for national rights activists continued to be heavily represented among the political prisoners detained in Soviet labour camps. Thus a majority of the "politicals" detained in Soviet labour camps between the late 1950s and 1965 were national rights activists, almost all of whom were Ukrainians and Balts, and of these Ukrainian and Baltic national rights activists a considerable number were former nationalist partisans who had been active during and/or after WWII.

⁵⁵Interviews with H. Herchak (Toronto, 11 November 1988), K. Jokubynas (Munich, 18 October 1986), and M. Kulmagambetov (Munich, 23 October 1986). For a good description of some of the groups in this category, see S.D. Rozhdestvenskii, "Materialy k istorii samodeiatel'nykh politicheskikh ob"edinenii v SSSR posle 1945 goda," *Pamiat': istoricheskii sbornik*, vyp. 5 (1982): 226-283. See also Vail', *Osobo opasnyi*, the memoirs of a participant in a socialist study group in the mid-1950s, and Revol't I. Pimenov, "Vospominaniia: Chast' I: Odin politicheskii protsess, 1956-1958," *Pamiat': istoricheskii sbornik*, vyp. 2 (1979): 160-262.

⁵⁶*Pravda*, 28 January 1959, translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* 11, no. 5 (11 March 1959): 14.

The extent to which these former partisans were singled out for special attention is best illustrated by the treatment of the political prisoners who were released during the amnesties of the mid-1950s, for the partisans were subjected to systematic and persistent harassment which frequently led to their re-arrest and re-imprisonment. The vigour and persistence with which these former partisans (a number of whom were still imprisoned in the 1970s) were harassed and persecuted (although by the early 60s many of them were seriously ill and often physically disabled)⁵⁷ reflects the concerns of both the local and central authorities, throughout the postwar period, that nationalism in Ukraine (especially Western Ukraine) and the Baltic republics was still a viable and potentially strong force capable of mobilizing large segments of the local population. In such a situation, the presence of even passive "figureheads" in a potentially unstable situation was perceived as a serious threat to at least the local stability of the state.

⁵⁷The most detailed description of the systematic harassment to which a former partisan was exposed is found in several documents relating to the case of Bohdan Chuiko, an UPA member who was imprisoned between 1948 and 1956, 1969 and 1977, and 1980 and 1986. The harassment included the publication of a number of newspaper articles accusing Chuiko of murder during World War II, although the original charges against him do not mention murder. Attempts which were later made to bring murder charges against Chuiko had to be dropped because of the clearly fabricated nature of the evidence. For details on Chuiko's case see AS 4361, 5196, 5197, 5198, 5199, and 5200.

Chapter 6

THE SOVIET LEGAL-PENITENTIARY SYSTEM AND THE "ETHNONATIONAL FACTOR," 1965-1985

The period from 1965 to 1985 provides a convenient focus for the remainder of this thesis. It coincides roughly with the periods in office of Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU from October 1964 until his death in November 1982, and his two immediate short-term successors in this office, Yuri Andropov (November 1982 - February 1984) and Konstantin Chernenko (February 1984 - March 1985). There was a distinctiveness to the style and content of party/state policy under Brezhnev which has been summed up by the now rather hackneyed phrase "period of stagnation," and it is generally agreed that ideological conservatism and neglect of growing societal problems in a variety of different spheres characterized his term in office. As for his immediate successors, even if, as some argue, Andropov had the desire and ambition to change the nature and direction of party/state policy, he was too ill, and in power too briefly, to effect any significant reforms, while Chernenko was a "caretaker" leader who did not have an opportunity (and, apparently, the imagination) to leave a significant stamp on policy.¹

¹On the transition period after Brezhnev's death, see Baruch A. Hazan, From Brezhnev to Gorbachev: Infighting in the Kremlin (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), and Dusko Doder, Shadows and Whispers: Power Politics Inside the Kremlin from Brezhnev to Gorbachev (New York: Random House, 1986).

This period also represents a distinct phase in the development of the Soviet legal system. The post-Stalin campaign to reform the legal system was partially reversed in the mid-sixties, and this was accompanied by a marked decline in emphasis on the de-Stalinization campaign promoted by Khrushchev, and the process of rehabilitating those repressed during the Stalinist years.² In fact, some of the new criminal legislation introduced during and shortly after Brezhnev's term of office represented an about-turn in the liberalizing trend (although it was often erratic) of the late 50s and early 60s.³

These conservative trends, however, provoked a novel reaction -- a determined effort by many Soviet citizens to organize themselves in various unofficial groups and publicly voice their concerns -- social, political, religious, economic, emigrational, etc.⁴ In particular, the years from 1968 to 1979 represented the high point of the activity of many of these groups. This was reflected in the establishment of a variety of samizdat journals such as A Chronicle of Current

²Albert P. van Goudoever, The Limits of Destalinization in the Soviet Union: Political Rehabilitations in the Soviet Union since Stalin (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), p. 12.

³A renewed liberalization in the area of criminal law and justice legislation was noticeable only in the second year of Gorbachev's term of office. See Louise Shelley, "Criminal Law Since Brezhnev," in Law and the Gorbachev Era: Essays in Honor of Dietrich Andre Loeber, eds. Donald D. Barry et al. (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988), p. 184.

⁴This emphasis on openly voicing grievances, demanding the observance of rights guaranteed in the Soviet Constitution, and attempting to gain a broad base of public support, was one of the most important facets of the democratic human rights movement in the Soviet Union from the mid-1960s on. The importance of this break with the conspiratorial methods adopted by unofficial groups after Stalin's death, and the "psychological reorientation" which this required, is best described by Vladimir Bukovsky in his memoirs, To Build a Castle -- My Life as a Dissenter (New York: The Viking Press, 1979), pp. 235-240, 277-279. See also Ludmilla Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious, and Human Rights (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1985), pp. 267-282.

Events (1968 - 1983),³ Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithuania (1972 - present), and The Ukrainian Herald (1970 - 1972, 1974, 1987 - present), and the rise of a variety of unofficial organizations such as the Initiative Group for the Defence of Human Rights in the USSR and the Helsinki Monitoring Groups.⁶ Last but not least, the special focus in this and the following chapter on the years between 1965 and 1985 can be justified by the fact that the documentation concerning state repression of political dissidents, as well as on the conditions of detention and activities of political prisoners in penitentiary institutions, is particularly rich for most of this period.

In Chapter 4 it was established that between 1945 and the mid-1950s a surprisingly high proportion of political prisoners in Soviet penitentiary institutions was composed of "zapadniki" -- Western Ukrainians and Balts -- and that, where they were imprisoned in significant numbers, these individuals were usually well organized and had a strong sense of solidarity. The disproportionately large number of Western Ukrainians and Balts imprisoned during this period can largely be explained by the vigour of the Soviet campaign to destroy the anti-Soviet partisan movements which were active for several years after World War II in the newly-annexed Western Ukraine and Baltic republics, and to eliminate their base of support in the local population. However, the pattern of state coercion described in

³For a detailed account of the history and contents of this, the most important human rights journal in the USSR, see Mark Hopkins, Russia's Underground Press: The Chronicle of Current Events (New York: Praeger, 1983). Although unofficial materials in typescript form were circulated long before 1965, the circulation of samizdat became a widespread phenomenon only in the middle and late sixties.

⁶There is no comprehensive, synthetic history of dissent in the Soviet Union. The best monograph on this subject is Alexeyeva's Soviet Dissent.

Chapter 5 indicates that following Stalin's death, and long after organized resistance to the imposition of Soviet control over Western Ukraine and the Baltic republics had been almost totally destroyed, the Soviet leadership and security apparatus were still greatly concerned about the continued viability of ethnonationalism in these areas. This chapter will attempt to determine the extent to which Soviet dissent between 1965 and 1985 was motivated by ethnonational grievances, and the extent to which the pattern of state-sanctioned coercion against dissidents between 1965 and 1985 continued to be influenced by central political elite concerns about the destabilizing impact of ethnonationalism.

Patterns of Dissent and the Ethnonational Factor -- Samizdat

As noted in Chapter 1, most of the Western literature on dissent in the Soviet Union between 1965 and 1985 is descriptive in nature, and focusses on activists in the general civil rights movement, and the Jewish emigration movement, in Moscow and Leningrad. Much less attention has been devoted to dissent in the "periphery," in the non-Russian republics. In particular, there have been only limited efforts to carefully systematize the data, imperfect as they may be, which could help determine the extent to which dissent activity in various parts of the Soviet Union was motivated by different kinds of grievances, and provoked differential responses from the organs of state coercion

One way of evaluating the salience of ethnonational grievances as a motivating factor in dissent is to analyse the themes found in samizdat literature. This can be done by studying the large body of documents available through

"Arkhib Samizdata," [Samizdat Archive], the fullest collection of samizdat documents in the West,⁷ and Feldbrugge has conducted such an analysis covering documents originating in the period between 1965 and 1974. Feldbrugge acknowledges that a strict and unambiguous classification of samizdat documents is difficult to achieve;⁸ however, the results of his analysis are instructive.

The largest category of documents (784 items) concerned individual complaints or special themes (documents devoted to specific Jewish, religious, or national themes were not included in this group), and the second largest category consisted of religious samizdat (487 items). However, the third largest category (203 items) consisted of national samizdat (defined as "documents attacking the official nationalities policy, complaining about specific acts of national discrimination and oppression or otherwise devoted to the nationality question in the USSR"), and these documents outnumbered documents of a general political nature (the fourth largest category, with 183 items). The next largest category consisted of Jewish samizdat (175 items).⁹

As noted in Chapter 1, one important factor which influenced these and other data on various aspects of dissent in the Soviet Union was the dominance, during the period under consideration, of Moscow as the most important centre for the collection and dissemination of all forms of "unofficial" information, including samizdat. Feldbrugge acknowledges that "samizdat in non-Russian languages or

⁷For more information on "Arkhib Samizdata" see Chapter 1.

⁸F.J.M. Feldbrugge, Samizdat and Political Dissent in the Soviet Union (Leyden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1975), p. 11.

⁹Ibid., p. 13.

circulating locally stands a much poorer chance of wide dissemination in the USSR and will therefore not pass the Soviet border as easily."¹⁰

Another important problem was access to the channels (Western reporters, embassies, tourists, etc.) by which samizdat usually reached the West. This is illustrated by the fact that between 1957 and 1967 Crimean Tatars sent thousands of collective and individual letters to the Central Committee of the CPSU and to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.¹¹ However, the earliest Crimean Tatar documents available in the West are dated 1967, and according to Alexeeva

they managed to find their way there from Jemilev's adherents only via the Moscow civil rights activists -- the Crimean Tatars had no possibility of establishing ties with the West themselves.¹²

Thus, even though the figures presented by Feldbrugge clearly demonstrate the high salience of ethnonational grievances as a factor motivating individuals to prepare and circulate samizdat documents between 1965 and 1974, the relative weight of the documents stressing these grievances in the entire corpus of samizdat materials was probably much greater. Another factor which contributed to this underrepresentation was the tendency of some Moscow dissidents to downplay the significance of the "national question," which was reflected in a reluctance to circulate, and transmit

¹⁰Ibid., p. 14.

¹¹See Tashkentskii protsess, sbornik dokumentov (Amsterdam: Fond imeni Gertsena, 1976), pp. 781-782.

¹²Ludmilla Alexeyeva, "Mustafa Jemilev, His Character and Convictions," in Tatars of the Crimea: Their Struggle for Survival, ed. Edward Allworth (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1988), p. 60.

abroad, documents considered to be "extremist" in stressing ethnonational grievances.¹³

Patterns of Dissent and the Ethnonational Factor -- Group Protests

In another effort to adopt a systematic approach to the study of various forms of unofficial activity in the USSR, Alexeeva has collected and analyzed all the data available in the mid-80s on mass unrest, demonstrations, strikes, and other group protests in the Soviet Union between 1953 and 1983, with a focus on the period since 1965.¹⁴ Alexeeva's analysis of these group actions shows that those which were motivated by ethnonational grievances drew the largest number of people, were the best organized and, in most cases, were peaceful in nature (only approximately 10% were accompanied by some form of violence). Her data also show that apart from some mass protests based on economic grievances (in particular, the Novocherkassk disturbances in June 1962), very few group protests of any kind took place in those areas of the RSFSR predominantly inhabited by Russians, or in the Central Asian republics. Such mass actions were much more common in the Baltic republics, Ukraine, and the Transcaucasus.¹⁵

¹³See the discussion in Chapter 1 for details.

¹⁴See Ludmilla Alexeeva, "USSR: Dissatisfaction in the Streets: Summary of the FoSoS Report," in Russia No. 12 (1986): 94-97, and "Public Unrest in the USSR," Radio Liberty Research Bulletin 296/85, 9 September 1985. These articles provide summaries of a report by Alexeeva, entitled Mass Rioting in the USSR, presented by the Foundation For Soviet Studies to the Office of Net Assessment of the Department of Defense, 1986. Sources for the study included samizdat materials, the Soviet and Western press, and emigre testimonies. The title of this report is misleading, since Alexeeva stresses that the majority of protests analyzed in her study were orderly and non-violent in nature.

¹⁵Alexeeva, "USSR: Dissatisfaction in the Streets," p. 96.

A less comprehensive study, by David Kowalewski, indicates that ethnonational grievances were behind almost two-thirds of the total number of protest demonstrations carried out by various groups in the Soviet Union between 1965 and 1978.¹⁶ Over fifty percent of the national rights demonstrations in Kowalewski's sample were conducted by Soviet Jews demanding the right of emigration, over twenty percent were conducted by Crimean Tatars, and approximately seven percent were conducted by Ukrainians, with Lithuanians, Meskhetians, and Germans following close behind. Kowalewski's data also show that approximately 80% of the protest events were peaceful in nature.¹⁷

However, Alexeyeva's more detailed survey includes data on approximately 2,000 cases, while Kowalewski's more restricted sample includes data on only 321 cases. Kowalewski's sample thus largely consists of the most highly-publicized protest demonstrations, which were often held in Moscow by Soviet Jews demanding emigration visas.¹⁸ Although activists in the Soviet Jewish and German emigration movements often received severe sentences as a result of their activities, these emigration movements should be differentiated from the other national rights movements, which aimed primarily at improving conditions for a given ethnonational group within the USSR. However, both Alexeyeva's and Kowalewski's data demonstrate that ethnonational grievances effectively mobilized

¹⁶David Kowalewski, "Protest for National Rights in the USSR: Characteristics and Consequences," Nationalities Papers 8 (Fall 1980): pp. 179-194.

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 181, 187-188.

¹⁸The impressive level of support for this emigration movement from Jewish communities outside the USSR, and from international human rights organizations, made it very difficult to totally suppress this movement and its protest actions. See David Kowalewski, "National Rights Protest the Brezhnev Era: Some Determinants of Success," Ethnic and Racial Studies 4 (April 1981): 185.

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significant segments of the adult population of several ethnonational groups to participate in protest actions.

Given the limited amount of reliable information on most of the events analyzed by Alexeeva and Kowalewski, their conclusions must be treated with some caution. However, the regional biases in samizdat coverage, as well as some Moscow dissidents' tendency, noted above, to censor national samizdat considered to be overly "sensitive" in nature, would logically result in an under-reporting of protest actions based on ethnonational grievances in the non-Russian periphery of the Soviet Union, and an over-reporting of protest actions in Moscow and Leningrad. Nonetheless, even the available data show that during the period under consideration ethnonational grievances were more powerful than any other source of dissatisfaction in Soviet society in motivating large numbers of individuals to engage in protest actions.

The extent to which such grievances can politically mobilize a given population is most clearly demonstrated in the case of the Crimean Tatars. Their drive for repatriation has been continuously active since 1957, when the nations deported during World War II at Stalin's orders for allegedly collaborating with the Axis forces were legally exculpated with the exception of the Crimean Tatars and Soviet Germans.¹⁹ The main tactics of the Crimean Tatars involved holding mass demonstrations, preparing mass petitions, and lobbying official bodies in Moscow; in

¹⁹On the background to the Crimean Tatar repatriation campaign see Ann Sheehy and Bohdan Nahaylo, The Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans and Meskhetians (London: Minority Rights Group, 1980); Aleksandr Nekrich, The Punished Peoples (New York: Norton, 1973); and Alan W. Fisher, The Crimean Tatars (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978). For the best collection of articles and documents on the Crimean Tatars see Allworth, ed., Tatars of the Crimea, especially Chapters 13-15.

fact, for several years beginning in 1964 the Crimean Tatar movement for repatriation was the only protest movement to maintain a permanent rotating lobby in Moscow. Even more notable, however, was the fact that

In 1968 the total number of signatures on the Tatars' appeals over the preceding eleven years reached 3 million. This meant that if, say, two-thirds out of roughly 300,000 Tatar adults signed petitions, they must have signed about fifteen each on average.²⁰

The significant mobilizing potential of ethnonational grievances has also been underlined by the mass demonstrations, demanding greater national rights, which have taken place in almost all of the non-Russian republics since 1987.²¹ According to a TASS report dated 17 June 1989, in the preceding year 60% of all demonstrations and other mass actions in the Soviet Union were linked to ethnonational grievances.²²

²⁰Peter Reddaway, "The Crimean Tatar Drive for Repatriation: Some Comparisons with Other Movements of Dissent in the USSR," in Allworth, ed., Tatars of the Crimea, p. 196.

²¹Tens of thousands of individuals participated in demonstrations in the Ukrainian, Belorussian, Moldavian, and Central Asian republics in 1988 and 1989, while hundreds of thousands of individuals participated in demonstrations in the Baltic and Transcaucasian republics. National rights grievances were the primary motivating factor behind the majority of these demonstrations, although they often coincided with ecological and economic grievances. Regular reports on these demonstrations have been carried in Radio Free Europe Research and Report on the USSR (the successor to the Radio Liberty Research Bulletin). See, for example, Bohdan Nahaylo, "10,000 Atend Unofficial Human-Rights Gathering in Lvov," Report on the USSR, 6 January 1989, pp. 16-17; Kathleen Mihalisko, "Popular Front Permitted to Hold Rally in Minsk," Report on the USSR, 10 March 1989, pp. 28-30; Vladimir Socor, "Recent Mass Rallies and Demonstrations in Soviet Moldavia," Report on the USSR, 19 May 1989; Dzintra Bungs' report on Latvia in "Eastern Europe in 1988," Radio Free Europe Research, RAD Background Report/251, 30 December 1988, pp. 31-34; Timur Kocaoglu, "Demonstrations by Uzbek Popular Front," Report on the USSR, 28 April 1989, pp. 13-15. It is estimated that as many as one million Armenians may have participated in one of the demonstration over the status of the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. See Elizabeth Fuller, "A Preliminary Chronology of Recent Events in Armenia and Azerbaijan," Radio Liberty Research Bulletin 101/88, 16 March 1988, p. 3.

²²Quoted in Victor Yasmann, "The International Security Situation in the USSR and the Defense Council," Report on the USSR 1 (1 September 1989), p. 8.

Patterns of Dissent and the Ethnonational Factor -- Arrests

In a preliminary attempt to analyze data on the pattern of state coercion directed at all forms of dissent activity, Reddaway has used a variety of sources to study the rates of arrest, between 1955 and 1984, of activists in the main dissent and emigration movements in the Soviet Union with the aim of enquiring into the reasons for, and extent of, changes over time in official policies on dissent and emigration. If one sets aside religious dissidents, Reddaway's data for the period between 1965 and 1984 show that the largest category of arrests involved Soviet dissidents detained for their socio-political activity (747 arrests), followed by dissidents detained for their national rights activity (589 arrests).²³

For Reddaway's purposes the data he has examined are very useful. However, quite correctly, he does not use them to speculate about the salience of different grievances leading to dissent activity. The arrest of a dissenter reflected only one gradation (albeit a major one) on the scale of state repression of dissident activity, and the unofficial Soviet sources which deal with this topic focus, quite logically, on more extreme forms of state repression; in particular, imprisonment or forcible detention in psychiatric hospitals.²⁴ Samizdat journals, and in particular A

²³Peter Reddaway, Soviet Policies on Dissent and Emigration: The Radical Change of Course Since 1979, Colloquium Paper No. 192, 28 August 1984, Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. I have derived these figures from the tables on pp. 42, 47, and 52 of this study.

²⁴Samizdat sources have speculated that, on a few occasions, an even more drastic sanction against dissidents may have been applied; namely, that the Soviet security organs murdered certain individuals who were involved in unofficial activities. See, for example, the information on the suspicious death of Father Bronius Laurinavicius in Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithuania No. 50 (8 December 1981), pp. 8-12; and on the "suicide" of composer Volodymyr Ivasiuk in A Chronicle of Current Events No. 53 (1 August 1979), pp. 74-76. No definitive evidence clarifying the circumstances of these deaths has become available.

Chronicle of Current Events, tried to provide information on all Soviet trials of political dissidents and, from the late sixties on, the great majority of these cases was in fact reported, at least in brief, in samizdat sources.²⁵ Because of the great practical constraints under which they were prepared, the same sources were much less comprehensive in covering lesser forms of coercion (arrests, harassment at work, etc.), and therefore the more selective data on arrests used by Reddaway are susceptible to the regional biases noted above.²⁶

Patterns of Dissent and the Ethnonational Factor -- Sentencing

Given the relatively high degree of reliability and comprehensiveness of the available information on the harshest sanction commonly used against dissidents -- a trial on criminal charges followed by imprisonment in penitentiary institutions or forcible detention in a psychiatric hospital -- there is a notable lack of analytical

²⁵There is no evidence that, during the period under consideration, a significant number of political prisoners was detained in locations unknown to Soviet or Western human rights observers. Details on many cases (e.g., individual political prisoners detained in camps for ordinary criminals, or forcibly detained in psychiatric hospitals) may have been meagre; however, during the period of the most intense samizdat coverage of dissent activity (1969-1983), some limited information on these individuals was usually available. In addition, the great majority of political prisoners who were detained in the early 1980s had been released by the end of the 1980s. Fairly comprehensive lists of those who were released have been published in the Vesti iz SSSR: prava cheloveka bulletin, and a detailed examination of these lists and the accompanying annual List of Political Prisoners in the USSR shows that almost all the cases of political prisoners had been noted earlier in samizdat sources. Thus the number of dissidents who were completely unknown to Soviet human rights observers was probably quite small.

²⁶On the practical difficulties of gathering information for, and physically preparing, each issue of the main Soviet human rights journal, A Chronicle of Current Events, see Hopkins, Russia's Underground Press, especially Chapter 9.

research focusing on the pattern of sentences imposed on those arrested for their dissident behaviour.²⁷

Some scholars have noted that dissent based on ethnonational grievances tended to provoke very harsh repressive measures by the Soviet government. Bialer notes, for example, that

An essential stabilizing force among the ethnic populations is the tight net of KGB supervision. The secret police are attuned to any manifestations of local nationalism. Dissidence in non-Russian areas has an even lower threshold of intervention than in Russia proper.²⁸

According to Peter Reddaway,

Since nationalism in the USSR's second largest republic is potentially a serious threat to Soviet rule, Ukrainian nationalists of all hues have been suppressed with special vigor... The Ukrainian Helsinki group, which was based in Kiev (though it also had members in western Ukraine), was crushed with special severity, many of its members receiving prison camp terms of 10 to 15 years.²⁹

The above statements are not supported by empirical data. However, according to Thorne's analysis of partial data on sentencing between 1978 and 1980, Ukrainian and Lithuanian national rights activists drew particularly harsh sentences.³⁰ In his more specialized study of dissent and repression in Lithuania (1969-1987),

²⁷The one major exception is a study by Thomas A. Oleszczuk, Political Justice in the USSR: Dissent and Repression in Lithuania, 1969-1987 (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1988), in which he examines, on the basis of a wide range of documentary sources, the legal measures taken against dissidents in Lithuania, and focuses on those who were actually sentenced for their activities.

²⁸Seweryn Bialer, The Soviet Paradox: External Expansion, Internal Decline (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986), pp. 32-33.

²⁹Peter Reddaway, "Dissent in the Soviet Union," Problems of Communism 32 (November-December 1983): 12.

³⁰Ludmilla Thorne, "Three Years of Repression in the Soviet Union: A Statistical Study," Freedom Appeals 9 (March-April 1981): 30.

Oleszczuk claims that there is a pattern of special judicial attention to "nationalists" and "hybrid dissidents."³¹ He argues that those who participated in nationalist dissent in Lithuania

average camp and prison sentences as much as three and a half years longer than those received by participants in either religious or human rights activity. This harshness confirms that the regime is most concerned about the power of nationalism in the Lithuanian Republic.³²

However, this conclusion is valid only if sentences assigned under several different articles of the Criminal Code are aggregated.³³ Thus the difference in sentences which Oleszczuk emphasizes is due to the fact that 12 "nationalist" dissidents, and 1 "hybrid" dissident, were the only individuals in his sample space to be sentenced under the Lithuanian equivalent of Article 64 of the RSFSR Criminal Code ("treason"), and received particularly harsh sentences (on average, a total of 13.2 years) under this article. Oleszczuk thus concludes that

The intensity of repression of nationalist dissidents derives from the prosecutorial decision on charges, not from the legal basis of "social danger." As may be seen in the table, nationalists in the contemporary period do not receive higher sentences than non-

³¹Oleszczuk distinguishes among dissidents on the basis of whether their activity was based on concerns about "pressures on ethnic identity, on the constraints on religious practice, and on the absence of many features of individual liberty and protection from arbitrary power" (p. 49). He also identifies a group of "hybrid" dissidents whose activity was based on two or more of these sources of discontent. Oleszczuk does not provide any precise definitions of these terms; however, he bases his typology on "information about the dissident's activities, from reports of his actions, the content of petitions signed by him and others, and the materials taken from him in searches by militia and secret police." However, nowhere in his study does he explain the process by which he arrived at the decision to assign individuals to one of these groups.

³²Oleszczuk, *Political Justice*, p. 130. To come up with a total sentence, Oleszczuk adds together the periods of detention in penitentiary institutions (prison and/or corrective labour camps) designated by the court and, where relevant, the period of internal exile assigned by the court.

³³See Table 7 in Oleszczuk, *Political Justice*, p. 131.

nationalists for any article... it is in the selection of charges that greater punishment is doled out to nationalists and hybrids.³⁴

However, Oleszczuk's conclusions may be affected by the fact that he uses data covering the entire period from 1969 to 1987 in reaching his conclusions, and does not control for the possibility that there may have been significant changes over time in all-union or republican policies concerning the sentencing of dissidents. In addition, since he had to use data on sentences imposed under disparate articles of the Criminal Code in order to ensure a fairly large sample space (98 cases), his generalizations (e.g., on the intensity of repression of nationalist dissidents) are often based on comparisons of very small subsets.³⁵ Oleszczuk himself admits that, as a result, meaningful comparisons of the data in these subsets cannot always be made.³⁶ One can, however, provide a more solid test of his conclusions by examining the data on sentencing of political dissidents throughout the USSR under a specific article of the RSFSR Criminal Code (and its equivalents in other republics), and over a more restricted time period. In particular, it should be possible to determine, in a more rigorous fashion, whether those political dissidents who engaged in national rights activity were, in fact, punished more severely, under a specific article, than those engaged in other forms of political activity.

³⁴Oleszczuk, Political Justice, p. 131.

³⁵For example, see Table 7, on p. 131.

³⁶Oleszczuk, Political Justice, p. 131.

Patterns of Sentencing under Article 70

One can control for some of the non-offence-related variables which could distort the available data on sentencing patterns by creating a subset of political prisoners³⁷ consisting of all political dissidents who were charged under Article 70³⁸ of the RSFSR Criminal Code and its equivalents in other republics, and whose cases were taken to court during the relatively brief period from 1972 to 1974.³⁹ This subset contains 137 cases; however, in 2 cases sentences are not known, and in 22 cases the political dissidents were declared "not responsible for their actions" by the court and were forcibly detained in psychiatric institutions. However, court

³⁷As explained in Chapter 1, the definition of political prisoner used in this dissertation excludes those individuals who were sentenced primarily because of their activities in defence of religious rights. This creates some problems in the case of Lithuanian Roman Catholic activists, or Ukrainian Catholic activists, who are often motivated by grievances based on national rights as well as religious rights; however, as I explain in Appendix A, most of the sources used in creating my data base usually indicate that one of the two grievances was a primary motivator for engaging in dissent activity.

³⁸Article 70 ("anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda") was chosen because, of the two articles of the Criminal Code which most explicitly circumscribed freedom of expression during the period under consideration (Art. 70 and Art. 190-1 of the RSFSR Crim. Code, and their equivalents in other republics), it was used against the most "serious" offenders and invoked the most severe sanctions. Thus the trials of dissidents charged under Art. 70 tended to attract considerable attention in Soviet and Western human rights circles, and information concerning these trials is generally more reliable than information on trials of dissidents charged under other articles of the Criminal Code. Article 70 also provides a convenient focus for analysis since there is a considerable range of variation in the sentences which can be imposed under this article. Punishment of first-time offenders under Art. 70 can consist of deprivation of freedom for a term of six months to seven years, with or without additional exile for a term of two to five years, or by exile for a term of two to five years. Under Art. 190-1 sentences do not exceed three years; thus the range of variation of sentences under this article is quite low, and less amenable to analysis. It is also important to note that the use or advocacy of violence almost never figured in the charges brought under Art. 70 (or Art. 190-1).

³⁹By choosing a relatively brief period, one can partially control for the possibility that there may have been significant changes over time in all-union or republican policies concerning the sentencing of dissidents. This particular time period was chosen because a considerable number of individuals charged under Article 70 of the RSFSR Criminal Code were tried in 1972-74 (in particular, in the wake of a large wave of arrests of dissidents in 1972).

sentences to definite terms of imprisonment are known in 113 cases, and the average period of detention was 6.5 years.⁴⁰

One would expect a number of other non-offence-related variables to affect the sentences imposed by Soviet courts under Art. 70. First of all, the provisions of the Criminal Code provide for increased sentences for "recidivists" (those who relapse into crime).⁴¹ The Soviet legal system is also supposed to consider the "social conditions" and "personality" of the defendant. That is, factors such as gender, family circumstances (e.g., number of dependents), age, and the defendant's attitude to the criminal act with which he/she has been charged are all to be taken into account.⁴² Thus before addressing the pattern of sentencing according to type of dissent, one should try to determine whether the non-offence-related variables noted above do in fact have a major impact on the lengths of sentences imposed by Soviet courts.

Recidivism. According to Oleszczuk's rather sparse data on the question of recidivism, the relationship of punishment to the dissident's prior record is unclear

⁴⁰The periods of detention in prisons and/or labour camps have been added to the term of exile (where relevant) to arrive at the total term to which an individual was sentenced.

⁴¹In the case of Art. 70, "The same actions committed by a person previously convicted of especially dangerous crimes against the state or committed in wartime shall be punished by deprivation of freedom for a term of three to ten years, with or without additional exile for a term of two to five years."

⁴²See, for example, V. Terebilov, The Soviet Court (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1973), pp. 27, 152; Articles 10, 38, 55, and 63 in Harold J. Berman and James W. Spindler, Soviet Criminal Law and Procedure: The RSFSR Codes, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), pp. 133-134, 138-139; and M. Cherif Bassioni and V.M. Savitski, The Criminal Justice System of the USSR (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1979), p. 168. The most important "mitigating circumstance" in political cases is the willingness of the defendant to express "sincere repentance" (Art. 38, point 10 of the RSFSR Criminal Code).

except in the case of Art. 70. Here his data show that the length of sentence clearly does increase with the number of previous arrests and trials, and Oleszczuk suggests that

trials under different articles may be driven by different dynamics in sentencing. The legal consensus on prior record seems to operate mainly in the case of this one type of more serious "political" trial... The trials under the less "political" articles seem to involve different pressures to overcome the logical predisposition to punish more persistent criminals.⁴³

The relevant figures derived from the data base show that in the case of political dissidents sentenced under Art. 70 between 1972 and 1974, recidivists received significantly harsher sentences than first-time offenders. The average sentence for non-recidivists was 6.0 years (N=96), and for recidivists was 9.7 years (N=17).

Gender. According to my data base, only six women political dissidents were sentenced under Art. 70 between 1972 and 1974. This indicates that female participation in activities leading to arrest and charges under Article 70 was probably considerably lower than male participation. It is also likely that women were not arrested as frequently as men for these activities, and/or that their cases were less frequently taken to trial, although the fragmentary data which are available do not permit definitive conclusions on this point. If one eliminates the single case when the court declared a woman dissident "not responsible,"⁴⁴ and the one case of

⁴³Oleszczuk, Political Justice, p. 121. If this is the case, then it supports the argument, advanced in Chapter 3, that the greater the official perception of the "social danger" of a given form of unofficial political activity, the more consistent the nature of the sanctions employed to control it.

⁴⁴Mariia Semenovna Musienko was arrested in 1971 with several other members of a Leningrad group advocating reform of society and a revival of Leninist policies. See S.P. de Boer et al., Biographical Dictionary of Dissidents in the Soviet Union, 1956-1975 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), p. 384.

"recidivism" (sentence -- 9 years) the average first-time sentence in the four remaining cases was 6.3 years, which is higher than the average non-recidivist sentence of 6.0 years. In all the cases where definite sentences were imposed, the defendants were Ukrainians sentenced primarily for their national rights activity.⁴⁵ Thus it is clear that once their cases were taken to court women political dissidents, at least those involved in Ukrainian national rights activity during the period under study, did not receive sentences which were shorter than the average sentence received by male political dissidents.

Age. Although Amnesty International claims that in political cases Soviet courts often disregard mitigating circumstances such as the age of the defendant,⁴⁶ Oleszczuk's data (which he himself admits are rather meagre) on differentiation of political sentences by age in Lithuania show a marked difference between the average sentence (all articles) for those under 21 years of age at the time of sentencing (0.6 years, N=6), and the overall average sentence of 4.4 years.⁴⁷

The relevant figures derived from my data base show that in the case of all political dissidents sentenced under Article 70 between 1972 and 1974, the average sentence received by those under 21 years of age at the time of sentencing (all were non-recidivists) was 5.8 years (N=7), only marginally lower than the average sentence received by all non-recidivists over 21 years of age (6.0 years, N=89).

⁴⁵The five women were Stefania Shabatura, Iryna Stasiv-Kalynets', Nina Strokata-Karavan'ska, Iryna Senyk, and Nadiia Svitlychna.

⁴⁶Amnesty International, Prisoners of Conscience in the USSR: Their Treatment and Conditions (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1980), p. 82.

⁴⁷Oleszczuk, Political Justice, p. 128.

This confirms Amnesty International's claim concerning the negligible weight given by Soviet courts to the mitigating factor of age, at least in the case of political dissidents charged under Art. 70.⁴⁸ It is interesting to note that one defendant, who was only 20 years old when he was sentenced in 1973, received the maximum sentence for a non-recidivist under Article 70 -- seven years of strict-regime camp followed by five years of exile.⁴⁹

Attitude of Defendant. An important element determining the sentence handed down by a court, but one for which it is difficult to control, is the attitude of the defendant during his/her trial. A Soviet court's sentence can be substantially moderated if the defendant confesses, shows remorse for his/her crime, volunteers information about fellow defendants, etc.⁵⁰ But although samizdat materials are helpful in determining who behaved honourably during a political trial, and did not give in to strong pressures to recant his/her views, samizdat documents are less explicit about the cases of defendants who cooperated with the authorities, informed on colleagues, etc. Even interviews are not always helpful in this regard, since former political prisoners who stated that it was "common knowledge" in the prisons

⁴⁸Since Oleszczuk does not provide a breakdown of sentences by age of defendant and article of Criminal Code, it is impossible to determine the significance of his figures on sentences by age alone. The most probable explanation for his dramatic figures is that the individuals in his sample space under 21 years of age were sentenced under "mild," "non-political" articles of the Criminal Code.

⁴⁹Zorian Popadiuk, a student in L'viv, Ukr.S.S.R., was arrested in 1973 for editing the Ukrainian samizdat journal Postup.

⁵⁰See the references in footnote 41 above.

and camps that some of their fellow prisoners had compromised themselves during their trials, were reluctant to provide names and details.⁵¹

In some cases, however, samizdat documents are quite explicit about the more blatant examples of such behaviour. Probably the best-known case is that of Piotr Iakir and Viktor Krasin, both of whom were well-known activists in the Moscow democratic human rights movement. Various forms of pressure were used to induce them to cooperate with the authorities and they finally agreed to do so, giving the court evidence about the activities of approximately two hundred individuals in the human rights movement.⁵²

Iakir and Krasin were sentenced to three years of imprisonment and three years of internal exile, relatively light sentences under Art. 70; however, after they appeared at a press conference at which they confirmed statements they made during their trial, these terms were reduced to the time already spent in prison, and the original term of internal exile.⁵³

As demonstrated above, sentences under Art. 70 are strongly influenced by prior sentences and by the defendants' attitude during their trials, while the gender and age of the defendant appear to play little or no role in determining the court's

⁵¹Interviews with Gillel Butman (5 December 1985, Jerusalem) and Gabriel Superfin (24 October 1986, Munich).

⁵²On the trial of Iakir and Krasin see Chronicle of Current Events No. 30 (21 December 1975): 82-86. See also Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent, pp. 312-317. Krasin's description of the trial and the events preceding it, and his explanation of his behaviour during the trial, are found in the autobiographical volume Sud (New York: Chalidze Publications, 1983).

⁵³Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent, p. 316. For another example see the case of Oleksa Prytyka, an Odessa physician who was sentenced to a relatively light term of 2.5 years of imprisonment under Art. 70 after "repenting" in such a sycophantic fashion that the judge felt obliged to admonish him. See A Chronicle of Current Events No. 28 (31 December 1972): 34; and The Ukrainian Herald No. 6 (March 1972): 147-148, 154-155.

final decision. One can control for the first two factors by eliminating, from the subset under consideration, all recidivists and well-known cases of defendants who cooperated with the authorities, and the subset can be made more uniform if the relatively few cases of women defendants, and defendants under the age of 21, are also omitted. One is then left with a reduced subset composed of male political prisoners, over 21 years of age, who were sentenced for the first time, between 1972 and 1974, under Art. 70 of the RSFSR Criminal Code or its equivalent in other republics.

One can break this subset down further into two groups, consisting of those who were arrested and sentenced primarily for their national rights activity, and those arrested and sentenced for other forms of political activity.³⁴ The national rights activists were sentenced to an average of 6.7 years of imprisonment and exile (N=50), and the other activists were sentenced to an average of 5.3 years of imprisonment and exile (N=32). Thus the sentences received by the national rights activists were significantly higher ($p=.01$) than the sentences received by the other activists.

In fact, the national rights activists typically received the harshest sentences under Art. 70. Of all the non-recidivist defendants in the original subset who were sentenced to 9 or more years of imprisonment and exile, 17 out of 19 (89%) were national rights activists, and the only non-recidivist defendants who received the

³⁴For an explanation of how individual cases were assigned to one of these two categories, see Ch. 1 and Appendix A. In most cases the latter group consists of civil rights activists, and individuals involved in unofficial political groups.

maximum sentence (12 years of imprisonment and exile) were national rights activists.⁵⁵

The procedure described above was repeated for the period 1979-1983. The results are as follows: non-recidivist defendants sentenced under Art. 70 of the RSFSR Criminal Code (or its equivalents) primarily for their national rights activity (N=32) received an average sentence of 8.7 years of imprisonment, while those sentenced primarily for other forms of political activity (N=63) received a significantly lower average sentence of 7.1 years of imprisonment.

It thus seems clear that political dissidents who engaged in national rights activity were, in fact, punished more severely than those engaged in other forms of political activity. In addition, this intensity of repression of national rights activists derived not just from the prosecutorial decision on charges, as argued by Oleszczuk,⁵⁶ but from the imposition of significantly higher sentences under at least one article (the most significant political article) of the Criminal Code.

However, several other logical questions can be raised concerning these data. First of all, it is possible that regional considerations affected the pattern of sentencing under Art. 70. Thus, for example, the severe sentences received by Ukrainian national rights activists during the period under consideration may have been due to local "initiatives," by the republican party, security, and judicial apparati, to clamp down on dissent in the Ukr.S.S.R.

⁵⁵Usatiuk (a Moldavian), and Popadiuk, Proniuk, Sverstiuk, and Svitlychnyi (all Ukrainians).

⁵⁶Political Justice, p. 131.

However, such a scenario is unlikely. Experts on Soviet dissent and the KGB agree that this institution, which was heavily involved in all important "political" cases and supervised their passage through the legal system, is highly centralized and, at least during the period under consideration, has rarely been subject to significant "local influences."⁵⁷ In addition, since "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" was the most severe charge commonly levelled against political dissidents during the period under consideration, it would be more difficult to exert local influences on the sentences imposed under Art. 70 than on sentences imposed under, for example, the "milder" Art. 190-1. On the basis of his study of Lithuanian dissent, Oleszczuk proposes that

Article 70 trials may be understood as trials so important to the regime that specific central directives would override the "normal" workings of the judicial system. In other words, on lesser charges the local procurators, judges, and police would have greater autonomy, and would tend to move in more differentiated directions... Of course, it would be oversimple to maintain that the central authorities (in either Moscow or Vilnius) were completely disinterested in the "less political" trials. However, in article 70 trials, the regime would want especially to demonstrate "legality" of the process and the seriousness of the defendants' crimes.⁵⁸

There is, in fact, some interesting evidence to support this argument. In his conversations with a fellow prisoner, the Armenian national rights activist Airikian claimed that in 1970, when he was first tried in a group case involving the illegal

⁵⁷Reddaway, "Soviet Policies on Dissent and Emigration," p. 29; Amy Knight, The KGB: Police and Politics in the Soviet Union (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988), Chapter 6; Amy Knight, "The Party, the KGB and Soviet Policymaking," paper delivered at the 19th Annual AAASS Convention, 5-8 November, 1987, pp. 12-15. However, Reddaway and Knight disagree on the extent of the KGB's subordination to the CPSU, with Reddaway stressing its subordination, and Knight its "relative autonomy."

⁵⁸Oleszczuk, Political Justice, pp. 121-122.

National Unification Party of Armenia, the Armenian Supreme Court imposed sentences on him and his fellow defendants which were considerably lower than those "required" by the KGB (in Airikian's case he was sentenced to four years of imprisonment instead of seven). Airikian attributed this leniency to the local Armenian judges' sympathy for the defendants; however, after the trial there were a number of major changes in the republican party apparatus, and the judge who sentenced Airikian was transferred to a job in the archives of the Ministry of Justice as punishment for his "intransigence."⁵⁹

During the period under consideration there were very few other incidents of the sentence demanded by the procurator not being imposed by the court. In one rare case, when an appeal court shortened a term of imprisonment imposed on a political dissident for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" from seven years to four years, the procurator protested this appeal decision and the court restored the original sentence.⁶⁰ Thus, in the rare cases when local judicial authorities were

⁵⁹Mikhail Kheifets, Voenno-plennyy sekretar': povest' o Parvire Airikiane (London: Overseas Publications Interchange Ltd., 1985), pp. 47-48. Airikian told Kheifets that after he was released following his first term of imprisonment, he met the judge who sentenced him in a bus in Erevan. This judge told him that a four-year sentence was the minimum sentence that he thought he could impose without the "higher instances" stepping in to overturn the verdict.

At his third trial, in 1974, Airikian appealed to the Armenian patriotism of his judges in his final statement before the court, and felt that this resulted in his sentence being reduced from the ten years of imprisonment and three years of exile demanded by the procurator to seven years of imprisonment and three years of exile. However, Kheifets claims that the KGB was so incensed by this "defeat" that it very carefully engineered an ordinary criminal case against Airikian in the camp where he was imprisoned. Although Airikian was accused of an offence that was usually considered an administrative infraction of camp regulations, and punished without reference to the courts, his case was put before the Perm oblast court (where the KGB could ensure a "favourable" verdict), and Airikian was sentenced to exactly three years of additional imprisonment. Because of the circumstances surrounding this case, Kheifets was convinced that it represented the KGB's revenge on Airikian for getting away with a shorter than expected sentence at his trial in Erevan. See Kheifets, Voenno-plennyy sekretar', pp. 92-96.

⁶⁰See the case of Anatolii Zdorovyi, as described in A Chronicle of Current Events No. 36 (31 May 1975): 182.

inclined to soften the sentence demanded by the procurator (and settled on well in advance in consultation with the KGB), measures were soon taken to "correct" the situation.

Patterns of Dissent and the Ethnonational Factor -- Composition of Political Prisoner Population

Last but not least, an important indicator of the salience of ethnonational dissent and official reaction to this dissent is the actual number of individuals sentenced for their national rights activity. In the following chapter I will present some data on the composition of the prisoner population in individual Soviet labour camps. However, the most reliable overall data on this subject have been compiled by Cronid Lubarsky, editor of USSR News Brief.⁶¹ According to his analysis, which classifies religious activists as political prisoners, during the decade from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s the two largest groups among political prisoners were those imprisoned for their religious beliefs and members of national movements.

In 1982, for example, approximately 30 per cent of all known political prisoners in the Soviet Union had been sentenced for their participation in national movements, while 25 per cent were religious activists. In the next place were participants in the democratic movement (18 per cent, including all those convicted for expressing general democratic demands in either written or spoken form),

⁶¹See the note on this publication in Chapter 1. In the mid-1980s Lubarsky estimated that he had reliable data on approximately 10-20 per cent of all political prisoners in the USSR. In retrospect, given the information available on political prisoners released in the late 1980s, it is clear that Lubarsky's data encompassed a considerably higher proportion of all political prisoners. See Cronid Lubarsky, "Changes in the Categories of Soviet Political Prisoners," in Fifth International Sakharov Hearing: Proceedings -- April 1985, ed. Allan Wynn (London: Andre Deutsch, 1986), p. 39.

followed by emigration activists.⁶² Among the members of national movements, the first place was occupied by Ukrainian national rights activists (approximately 13 percent of the total number of political prisoners), followed by Lithuanian (about 5 per cent) and then Estonian national rights activists.

In a more detailed study of these data, Lubarsky also calculates a "specific weight" for various dissent movements as of 1982 by relating the number of individuals from a given movement who were imprisoned to the potential target audience of the movement. According to his calculations the national movements (taken together) topped the list with a specific weight of 1.72, followed by the religious movements (taken together) -- 1.5, the democratic opposition -- 0.90, the emigration movement -- .72, and the socialist opposition -- .04.⁶³

An examination of all the major available indicators of dissent activity in the Soviet Union between 1965 and 1985, such as production of samizdat, group protests, rates of arrest, etc., has shown that the salience of ethnonational grievances as a motivating factor in dissent activity during this period was very high. Articulating and acting on these grievances provoked a strong reaction for, on average, those who were involved in national movements were treated more harshly by the Soviet judicial system than those involved in other forms of political activity.

If, as I have argued, the nature and vigour of the coercive measures taken to contain dissent activity reflect the central political elite's evaluation of the actual or potential threat which this activity poses to the political system, then these harsh

⁶²Lubarsky, "Changes in the Categories," p. 39.

⁶³Cronid Lubarsky, "On the Structure of Political Repression in the USSR," Russia Nos. 7-8 (1983): 141.

measures demonstrated this elite's grave concern about the destabilizing potential of ethnonationalism. In particular, the Baltic republics and Ukraine were a major focus of its attention.

One could still argue, however, that the harsh measures used to punish national rights activists were due to the fact that many if not most of them were, as official Soviet publications of the time usually claimed, anti-social "extremists" who were not articulating widespread grievances, but acting on behalf of small groups of poorly adjusted malcontents, or of foreign "bourgeois nationalists."

I have partly addressed this argument in previous chapters; however, it must be dealt with in a consistent fashion. This can best be accomplished by carefully studying the behaviour of the political prisoners detained from 1965 to 1985. The results of this examination will directly relate to the previous discussion concerning the salience of ethnonational issues among dissidents, for if large numbers of political prisoners were arrested and imprisoned largely or primarily because of their national rights activity, then one would expect that the nature and structure of their informal activities in the penal institutions where they were most highly concentrated would be strongly influenced by ethnonational considerations, and that the "national question" would be an important issue of debate and conflict among these inmates, as well as an object of manipulation by the camp administration.

An examination of the behaviour of the political prisoners in these camps should also provide insights into whether the political skills and sophistication of the imprisoned national rights activists were such as to justify the concerns of the central political authorities about the eventual impact of their unchecked activities.

Chapter 7

THE SOVIET PENAL SYSTEM AND POLITICAL PRISONERS, 1965-1985: THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NATIONAL IDENTITY

As noted in Chapter 1, a large body of samizdat documents and memoir literature deals with Soviet penal institutions between 1965 and 1985. Although the overall volume of memoir literature covering this period is much smaller than that available concerning Stalinist penal institutions, given the relatively small number of political prisoners detained between 1965 and 1985 these memoirs are a rich source of information on their experiences and activities in these institutions. In addition samizdat documents provide, for certain periods and penal institutions between 1965 and 1985, almost a running commentary on the activities and conditions of imprisonment of political prisoners, and the behaviour of penal officials.

In addition, parts of this chapter rely heavily on information derived from a series of interviews with former Soviet political prisoners. Seventeen of these interviews were conducted in accordance with a full standard questionnaire, and the other nine interviews were conducted in an ad hoc fashion. Even in the case of the interviews which were conducted in accordance with a standard questionnaire, the questions were "open-ended," and often required highly subjective responses; however, I was impressed by the careful, serious way in which all of the

interviewees approached the interviews, and their reluctance to make quick, facile generalizations.

The different forms of punishment imposed by the courts on convicted dissidents, the evolution, general features, and structures of the Soviet penal system and its role as an instrument of coercion, and the formal and informal mechanisms of control of inmates in the penal system, have been discussed in Chapter 3. As pointed out in Chapter 6, not all of the political prisoners detained between 1965 and 1985 were members of a dissident "elite." However, as argued in earlier chapters, those who played a leading role in various dissident movements, or were potentially capable of doing so, quickly drew the attention of the security apparatus and were sentenced by Soviet courts to lengthy terms of imprisonment or, in a few cases, expelled from the country. A large proportion of these individuals was concentrated in a relatively small number of penal institutions, and these institutions (in particular, the "political camps") will provide the focus for this chapter.

The Setting

According to a Soviet writer, now living in the United States, who performed his military service as an MVD guard at a labour camp for ordinary criminals and has described his experiences in semi-fictional form,

...a prison camp is like a country in miniature, and like Soviet society in particular. Within a camp, you have a dictatorship of the proletariat (which is to say, the camp administration), the people (prisoners), the police (guards). Within it, you can find the Party

apparatus, culture, industry in operation. It has everything that can properly be called a government.¹

It would be an exaggeration to call the camps a microcosm of Soviet society, since they were characterized by a highly strained atmosphere, and the negative features of Soviet society were found here in an exaggerated form. In fact, the Mordovian and Perm labour camps, where large numbers of political prisoners were detained, can be seen as rather volatile settings in which inmates of diverse national origins and political orientations lived in crowded quarters and were subject to constant physical and psychological stress.² Nonetheless, the available data on these camps between 1965 and 1985 provide a unique opportunity to study, in a relatively "closed" system, the behaviour and interactions, often over lengthy periods of time, of individuals who, before their detention, had played an important role (in many cases, a leading role) in a variety of dissident movements in the Soviet Union.

As noted in Chapter 3, although more than forty articles of the Criminal Code have been used to convict religious and political dissidents in the Soviet Union, during the period under consideration the most active and prominent political dissidents were usually sentenced under three of these articles: Article 64 ("betrayal

¹Sergei Dovlatov, The Zone: A Prison Camp Guard's Story (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), p. 40. See also the comment by a former camp inmate, Eduard Kuznetsov, who claimed that "nowhere as well as in a camp can you penetrate into the very core of a country's -- any country's -- political system." See his Prison Diaries (New York: Stcin and Day, 1975), p. 136.

²In contrast to the rather dispassionate characterization of the camps in the previous footnote, Edward Kuznetsov has also characterized the camps in a much more graphic and revealing passage. "What is a camp? ... it is mud, an unstable and never-ending quagmire where a serpent lies hissing under every second hummock... it is a desert, full of jackals, simooms and dangerous mirages... it is a city with its slums, rats on garbage cans, and stinking gateways where sinister shadows lurk... it is man in his full nakedness, and hanging over him is the perpetually cold and sullen sky of the eternal north. But occasionally an aperture opens, and a ray of piercing clarity suddenly shines on those who stand tall." The above passage is from Kuznetsov's foreword to Aleksei Murzhenko, Obraz schastlivogo cheloveka, ili pis'ma iz lageria osobogo rezhima (London: Overseas Publications Interchange Ltd., 1985), p. 11.

of the Motherland"); Article 70 ("anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda"); and Article 72 ("organized activity with the aim of committing especially dangerous crimes against the state, as well as participating in an anti-Soviet organization").

The dissidents sentenced under these articles were usually sent to special camps (henceforth called political camps), or occasionally prisons, located in the RSFSR, whereas the dissidents sentenced under other articles of the Criminal Code were sent to ordinary camps for criminals, usually located in the republic of the prisoner's residence prior to arrest or in the republic where the prisoner was tried. Usually only one or two "politicals" were located in a given criminal camp, and relatively little information is available about their experiences.³

Between 1965 and 1985 the highest concentration of known Soviet political prisoners was detained in a complex of strict and severe-regime labour camps in the Mordovian ASSR and Perm oblast, RSFSR, and in the Vladimir prison, RSFSR or the Chistopol prison, Tatar ASSR. In fact, during the period under consideration Mordovian camps ZhKh 385/1, /3, /10, /17 and /19, as well as Perm camps VS 389/35, /36 and /37 housed the great majority of the known political prisoners

³The major exception is Vadim Delone's autobiographical volume, Portrety v koliuchei rame (London: Overseas Publications Interchange Ltd., 1984). Between 1965 and 1985 the only major point of contact between most political prisoners and large numbers of ordinary criminals was during the so-called etapy ("transports"), when political prisoners were transferred from one location to another. Many prisoners have claimed that these etapy were intentionally prolonged in order to subject the "politicals" to the maximum amount of suffering at the hands of guards and the criminals with whom they were usually transported. See Amnesty International, Prisoners of Conscience in the USSR: Their Treatment and Conditions, 2nd ed. (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1980), pp. 106-110. For specific complaints concerning this practice, see the statement by seven political prisoners, from Perm camp No. 36 (November 1974), Arkhir Samizdata (henceforth AS) No. 2088, p. 2; and by nine political prisoners, from Mordovian camp No. 1-6 (December 1977), AS No. 3257; as well as Volodymyr Handziuk's letter, written in exile, of 4 February 1976, AS No. 3462, p. 2.

convicted under Articles 64, 70, and 72 of the RSFSR Criminal Code; that is, articles concerned with "especially dangerous crimes against the state."⁴

The conditions of detention in prisons⁵ did not allow for the development of widespread informal activities among prisoners, since regular communications between cells were difficult to maintain and were frequently disrupted by prison officials. Thus informal social structures were poorly developed among prison inmates, and they will serve only as a secondary focus of attention. The emphasis in this chapter will be on the informal activities of male "politicals," since relatively few women political prisoners were detained during the period under consideration, and it is therefore difficult to generalize about trends and tendencies in this particular subset of inmates.⁶

Mechanisms of Control, Inmate Protests, and the Role of Inmate Solidarity

The mechanisms of control over prisoners in Soviet penal institutions between 1965 and 1985 included a complex set of incentives and punishments which were consciously manipulated by the camp administration, social control through regimentation, and political and social re-education.⁷ Inmate reactions to the

⁴All of these camps were strict-regime camps, except for Mordovian camps 385/1 and /10, and part of Perm camp 389/36.

⁵See Chapter 3 for details. The best collection of documents on the activities of political prisoners in Vladimir prison was compiled by Vladimir Bukovskii, Vladimirskaiia tiur'ma: sbornik statei i dokumentov (New York: Izd-vo "Khronika," 1977).

⁶For a detailed account of life in the women's political zone of Mordovian camp ZhKh-385/3 between 1983 and 1986, see Irina Ratushinskaya, Grey is the Colour of Hope (Sevenoaks: Sceptre, 1989).

⁷See Chapter 3 for more details.

strictures imposed by these mechanisms, and to the harsh and often brutal treatment they encountered in the camps, included several different forms of protest. Protests could simply involve avoidance of duties by the individual prisoner but, especially among political prisoners, they often assumed a more organized form and included writing complaints, refusing to work, and engaging in hunger strikes. In the general camps, where there were few, if any, political prisoners, group protests usually took the form of spontaneous strikes or riots.⁸

The main mechanisms of control of prisoners in Soviet labour camps, as well as the basic forms of protest by prisoners, are not unique to the Soviet Union; they are found in many other penal systems, especially in authoritarian states.⁹ It is difficult, however, to find other examples of penal systems in which such large numbers of political prisoners of diverse backgrounds were detained together for such lengthy periods of time.¹⁰ In such a context the success of any group protest actions was heavily dependent on inmate solidarity; however, the question of the basis of group and inter-group solidarity among the political prisoners in Soviet labour camps has not been addressed in the existing literature. In earlier chapters I have demonstrated that ethnonational grievances were an important motivating factor

⁸Rasma Karklins, "The Organization of Power in Soviet Labour Camps," *Soviet Studies* 41 (April 1989): 288-29. For a detailed account of an uprising in a camp for ordinary criminals in 1970, see the article by Mikhail Zotov, written in 1979, *AS* No. 4231. See also *AS* 4497. On recent riots and hostage-takings in the camps where ordinary criminals are detained, see the articles by Dmitrii Radyshevskii in *Moscow News*, 2 July 1989; by Vladimir Prokopenko in *Izvestiia*, 15 June 1989; and by B. Pipia in *Pravda*, 8 June 1989.

⁹See, for example, Richard A. Cloward, "Social Control in the Prison," in Richard A. Cloward et al., *Theoretical Studies in Social Organisation of the Prison* (New York: Kraus Reprint Co., 1960).

¹⁰An analogous situation existed in some prisoner of war camps. See, for example, the article by Gerald H. Davis, "Prisoner of War Camps As Social Communities in Russia: Krasnoyarsk 1914-1921," *East European Quarterly* 21 (June 1987): 147-163.

in dissent activity leading to the arrest, trial, and imprisonment of many political dissidents in the Soviet Union. Thus, one would expect that one of the most important factors leading to the formation of informal groups among political prisoners was common ethnonational background.

One might also expect, given the "pressure-cooker" atmosphere in Soviet penal institutions, the complex "mix" of prisoners detained there, and the high salience of ethnonational concerns among many of the prisoners, that ethnic stereotypes and prejudices, and ideological disagreements re the national question in the Soviet Union, would be one of the most common sources of misunderstandings among the prisoners. However, an alternative possibility is that prolonged contact between the members of disparate groups of prisoners actually led, over time, to greater understanding and better relations among these groups.¹¹ Certainly, the level and extent of conflicts, the way in which they were expressed and resolved, and the success/failure of administration efforts to exploit ethnonational differences among the political prisoners, should provide a good indicator of the tolerance/intolerance of different categories of political prisoners, their political sophistication and capacity for compromise, etc.¹²

¹¹This is the argument behind the hotly-debated "contact hypothesis." For a detailed examination of the validity of this hypothesis, see Miles Hewstone and Rupert Brown, eds., Contact and Conflict in Intergroup Encounters (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986).

¹²The only article which has attempted to address some of these issues is David Kowalewski's "The Multinationalization of Soviet Dissent," Nationalities Papers 11 (Fall 1983): 206-230. Underlying the main argument of this article (that Soviet labour camps greatly facilitated multinational contacts and understanding among political prisoners) is Kowalewski's rather uncritical adoption of the "contact hypothesis."

Composition of Inmates in Political Camps

As noted in Chapter 6, the most careful and reliable attempts to study the composition of the total political prisoner population in the Soviet Union all point to the high percentage of political prisoners arrested and sentenced primarily because of their national rights activity. According to Lubarsky's calculations, this group consistently formed the largest identifiable category of political prisoners during the latter part of the period under consideration in this chapter.¹³

As for the inmates of the political camps mentioned above, it is important to distinguish between two categories: those who were "genuine" political prisoners (henceforth -- "politicals"); and those who could be considered political prisoners only by virtue of the articles of the criminal code under which they were sentenced.

The second category consisted, first of all, of former war criminals and other Soviet citizens who had collaborated with the Axis forces during World War II and were usually sentenced under the appropriate articles for treason.¹⁴ As noted in

¹³See Chapter 6 for more details.

¹⁴Article 58-1 of the RSFSR Criminal Code in force during and immediately after World War II, or Article 64 of the RSFSR Criminal Code in force after 1960 (or their republican equivalents). The term most commonly used by other prisoners when they referred to these former collaborators was politsai, while a common euphemism used to describe them was "te, kotorye sideli za voynu" (those imprisoned for their wartime activities). Most of the collaborators in the political camps had been arrested during or shortly after World War II and sentenced to serve 25-year terms of imprisonment. However, a number were released after Stalin's death and rearrested at some later date, while others were supposedly "discovered" and sentenced, often with a great deal of publicity, throughout the sixties and seventies. According to several former political prisoners, such arrests and trials were often intended to keep the memory of World War II fresh in the public's mind or were motivated by other political considerations, and several collaborators were always kept "on reserve." Iosif Mendelevich describes the case of one politsai who was sentenced to 25 years of imprisonment shortly after World War II, released in 1958, and then rearrested in 1965. Mendelevich speculates that the second arrest was motivated by a desire to discredit the Federal Republic of Germany during a low point in Soviet-FRG relations. See Operatsiia "Svad'ba" (Jerusalem: Tarbut, 1987), pp. 95-96. Iosif Meshener (interview, 15 December 1985, Beer Sheva), confirmed that in the mid-sixties there was a massive campaign, which in his opinion was politically motivated, to round up former collaborators. The campaign, under the slogan "nikto ne zabyt, nichego ne zabyto" ("no-one and nothing is forgotten"), was accompanied by massive press and media coverage. For additional confirmation of this point, see Vladimir Bukovsky, To Build a Castle: My Life as a Dissenter (New

Chapter 5, these prisoners were shunned by the "politicals," and did not participate in their protest actions. In fact, the great majority of these former collaborators faithfully served the camp administration,¹⁵ and usually held those jobs, open theoretically to all prisoners, which were least onerous and gave them access to, and control over, those goods (especially food) and services which were in greatest demand among the prisoners.¹⁶

In addition, the war criminals were the only inmates of the political camps who willingly participated in the official "cultural-educational" activities sponsored by the camp administration, and this led to various incongruous and even macabre situations.¹⁷ They were also the camp administration's main source of information

York: Viking Press, 1978), pp. 418-419.

¹⁵According to one former political prisoner, the more energetically the politsai had once served the Germans, the more servile their behaviour vis-a-vis the camp administration. See Mendelevich, Operatsiia, p. 188.

¹⁶In 1972, in Mordovian camp 17, the most comfortable jobs available to the prisoners were held by a former KGB colonel convicted for his crimes under Stalin, and a politsai who worked in the camp library. They got along very well with each other, since they both considered that "the Jews were the source of all evil in the world." Mendelevich, Operatsiia, p. 189.

¹⁷For example, according to Murzhenko, the "Sektisia Vnutrennego Poriadka" (the "internal order section" -- a "self-policing" unit consisting of those prisoners who were "on the path to rehabilitation") and the "Sovet Kollektiva Oriada" (the "council of the collective detachment" -- a prisoners' "self-administration" organ which supposedly looked after the interests of inmates), were dominated by former war criminals in all the camps where he was imprisoned. In a macabre scene, Murzhenko describes being called up before these bodies to be "judged" for his infractions of camp regulations. See Murzhenko's Obraz, pp. 112-114. In his memoirs, Iurii A. Vudka describes a camp concert where a choir made up of former politsai sings "The Party is our Helmsman." See his Moskovshchyna (London: Ukrains'ka Vydavnycha Spilka, 1978), p. 135. All the former prisoners who were interviewed confirmed that the official prisoners' organizations in the camps were dominated by war criminals or other inmates who had "gone over" to the administration.

on the plans and activities of the political prisoners, since many if not most of the politsai acted (often quite openly) as informers for the camp administration.¹⁸

Another, much smaller group of prisoners in the second category consisted of ordinary criminals who, during detention in a general-regime camp, deliberately engaged in a "political" act of some kind in order to be transferred to a political camp.¹⁹ In some cases these ordinary criminals also ended up serving the camp administration.²⁰

As for the "politicals," it is difficult, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 6, to clearly and unambiguously assign every single one of these prisoners to a specific category based on their political beliefs or the activity for which they were arrested and sentenced (in some cases, the problem is simply a lack of information). However, the unofficial literature (memoirs and samizdat) on the political camps usually uses a "shorthand" description to characterize a given political prisoner, and

¹⁸One former political prisoner commented that it was particularly difficult to plan protest actions such as hunger strikes in camps where large numbers of politsai were found. Interview with Boris Penson, 11 December 1985, Natania, Israel.

¹⁹One ordinary criminal, Leonyd Pedan, became "bored" with his surroundings in a general-regime camp and, at the urging of a fellow prisoner, helped him prepare and distribute leaflets (which he did not even carefully examine!) with certain political demands in order to be transferred to a political camp. However, instead of receiving the expected sentence of one or two years of imprisonment under Article 190 of the RSFSR Criminal Code, he was sentenced to four years of imprisonment in Perm camp No. 35 under Article 70-1 of the RSFSR Criminal Code. For details, see Iakiv Suslens'kyi [Iakov Suslenskii], "Politychna 'sprava' Leonyda Pedana," in Ostrivky pryiazni: Zbirnyk spohadiv i stattei pro ukrains'ko-zhydivs'ki stosunki, (Munich: Ukrain'ske Vydavnytstvo, 1983), pp. 104-108. For examples of similar cases, see Murzhenko, Obraz, p. 121; and Mendelevich, Operatsiia "Svad'ba", p. 288. For a detailed portrait of another ordinary criminal who ended up in a political camp, see Mikhail Kheifets, "Politicheskii bytovik Nikolai Serkov," Ekho 2, no. 1 (1979): 110-128.

²⁰See, for example, the memorandum to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, signed by nine political prisoners from Mordovian Camp No. 1-6 (December 1977), with details of the administration's use of "criminal elements" against political prisoners, AS No. 3251. However, Georgii Davydov cites many cases when the "criminals" aided the "politicals." See Davydov's analysis of the relations among prisoners of different backgrounds in Vladimir prison, from 1975 to 1977, in AS No. 3916, written when he was in internal exile in 1979.

the main categories used in these sources broadly coincide with the categories used by Lubarsky in his analysis of the political prisoner population as a whole, and by the former political prisoners who were interviewed.²¹

The most common designations for the "politicals" used in the unofficial literature and interviews were "nationalist," "dissident," and "Zionist." The term "nationalist" was used to describe a broad category of individuals, ranging from the Baltic and Western Ukrainian partisans imprisoned for their armed resistance to Soviet re-occupation of their homelands during and after World War II to the younger national rights activists who did not themselves use the term "nationalist" as a self-designation,²² but whose political activity was closely linked to, and largely motivated by, ethnonational grievances.²³ The memoir literature and all interviewees clearly distinguished between the older generation of partisans (often called stariki, or seniors) and the younger generation of national rights activists; however, the

²¹In fact, the general validity of the categories used by Lubarsky is confirmed by the fact that the interviewees rarely disagreed with his characterization of a given political prisoner.

²²The term "nationalist" is used in only a negative context in the Soviet press and Soviet scholarship. It did not have the same connotation in much of the unofficial literature which was surveyed, or in most of the interviews which were conducted with former political prisoners. However, most of the younger national rights activists in the political camps preferred to be called "national democrats." They saw themselves as having the same human rights orientation as the political activists in Moscow, but put a special emphasis on the "national question." In a statement explaining the difference between the human rights movements in Russia and Ukraine the members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Monitoring Group argued that "In Russia it is directed against illegal restrictions of the democratic rights of citizens, while in Ukraine it has the same goals but also has to deal with the national question." Translated from a photocopy of the original of "Memorandum No. 18 of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group," Kiev, December 1977. See also Mykhailo (Mikhail) Kheifets, *Ukrains'ki sylivety* (n.p.: Suchasnist', 1984), p. 107. This point was confirmed in interviews with Ukrainian national rights activists Petro Ruban, 25 November 1988, Toronto; and Stepan Sapeliak, 19 February 1989, Toronto.

²³The general use, in the political camps, of the term "nationalist" in a generic sense without any particular ideological overtones, was exemplified by Iosef Mendelevich's comment (interview, 17 December 1985, Jerusalem) that the number of "democrats" among the "nationalists" was greater than the number of "dissidents" in the camps where he was imprisoned.

common denominator between these groups was the fact that the primary reason why they were arrested and sentenced was their defence, by various means, of what they considered to be their national rights.

In the unofficial literature, and in interview responses, the term "dissident" was used to define a wide range of individuals, of various backgrounds, who were imprisoned either for their general human rights activity, or for establishing, or attempting to establish, general (non-nationalist) political organizations outside of the control of the CPSU.

Apart from these two broad categories,²⁴ there were several smaller categories of "politicals." One clearly identifiable group was the "Zionists" -- Jewish national rights activists whose main aim was to leave the Soviet Union for Israel.²⁵ This strong emphasis on emigration to an overseas homeland clearly distinguished this group from other "nationalists."

There were several small categories of "politicals" whose status in the political camps was more ambiguous. For example, each political camp usually contained several individuals who had been detained for their attempts to illegally cross the Soviet border. Their motives for doing so varied a great deal, and in many cases these individuals were not politically active in the camps.²⁶ The same

²⁴The interviewees had little difficulty assigning most political prisoners to one of these two categories.

²⁵The term "Zionists" is not an imposed label -- it was used as a form of self-identification. Although the great majority of Soviet Jews who leave the Soviet Union have not settled in Israel (North America is usually the favoured destination), most of the Soviet Jews who were imprisoned because of their emigration efforts left the Soviet Union for (and stayed in) Israel after they were freed.

²⁶An interesting sub-category consisted of those Soviet citizens who succeeded in escaping from the Soviet Union (or, in some cases, refused to return to the USSR from job assignments abroad), but later changed their minds (for family or other reasons), and went back to the Soviet Union after

was true of those arrested and sentenced for spying for foreign powers. Little is known of their backgrounds, and in most cases they played a passive role in all informal camp activities.²⁷ A small number of religious prisoners sentenced for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" was also detained in the political camps. Many of the religious prisoners kept to themselves, and information about them is usually scanty.²⁸

As for the proportions of prisoners in the categories listed above, no comprehensive lists of inmates detained at a particular time in any of the above-mentioned political camps were available to me. However, lists of prisoners in the Perm camps in 1974 known to the compilers of A Chronicle of Current Events are available, and they identify 96 prisoners detained in Perm camp No. 35, and 152 detained in Perm camp No. 36. The categories into which they can be broken down are shown in Table III.

receiving false assurances that they would not be punished. For an interesting description of several individuals in this category who were imprisoned after returning to the Soviet Union, see Makhmet Kulmagambetov, "Vozvrashchentsy," Kontinent No. 39 (1984): 295-321.

²⁷One interesting exception was N. Grigorian, who was imprisoned for trying to establish contacts with American intelligence in revenge for his father's false conviction on charges of theft. Grigorian signed a number of protest statements while imprisoned, and the camp KGB officer, in a conversation with Grigorian (then detained in Perm Camp No. 36), "expressed concern at the latter's evolution towards the dissidents." Grigorian had earlier been threatened with physical retribution for refusing to cooperate with the KGB. See A Chronicle of Current Events (henceforth, CCE) No. 52 (1 March 1979): pp. 42, 56, and 62-63.

²⁸E.g., according to CCE No. 33 (10 December 1974), four Jehovah's Witnesses were known to be detained in Perm camp No. 36, but none of them are known to have participated in any protest actions. Religious prisoners who were active in the political camps included Aleksandr Ogorodnikov and Vladimir Poresh. On Ogorodnikov, see Religion in Communist Lands 15 (Spring 1987): 69-78; on Poresh see A Chronicle of Current Events No. 57 (3 August 1980): 1-5.

Table III

	Perm camp No. 35	Perm camp No. 36
"nationalists"	51 (55%)	53 (35%)
"dissidents"	10 (11%)	17 (11%)
unknown	11 (12%)	18 (12%)
illegal exit	6 (6%)	13 (9%)
war criminals*	6 (6%)	35 (23%)
Zionists	6 (6%)	3 (2%)
ord. criminals*	1 (1%)	7 (5%)
spies	2 (2%)	1 (1%)
religious	0 (0%)	4 (3%)
terrorists	0 (0%)	1 (1%)

*The actual number of war criminals and ordinary criminals in these camps was probably considerably larger than the figures given here, since these individuals were of relatively little interest to the compilers of the Chronicle, and biographical information about them is very limited.

Source: CCE No. 33 (10 December 1974), pp. 143-166.

These and other data²⁹ show that the largest category of "politicals" in the political camps was made up of "nationalists." As noted in Chapter 1, many human

²⁹E.g., Butman (interview, 5 December 1985, Jerusalem), estimated that the overall composition of the prisoners in the political camps in which he was imprisoned was as follows: 40% politsai, 40% "nationalists," and 10% "dissidents" and others.

rights activists and Zionists were surprised by this fact when they were imprisoned for the first time, and it contributed a great deal to their camp "education."³⁰ According to all the interviewees, the largest group among the "nationalists" in the political camps always consisted of Ukrainians, usually followed by Lithuanians, Russians, and Jews.

Informal Structures in the Political Camps

When interviewees were asked to comment on the most important factor determining informal group affiliation for most of the prisoners in the political camps, the responses were unanimous in stressing that it was nationality. In fact, several interviewees used the term zemliachestvo (association of fellow countrymen), or obshchina ("commune") to refer to the informal groups which were almost inevitably formed by the larger nationalities (Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Jews, occasionally Estonians and Latvians, and Armenians) when more than a few individuals from a given group were detained in a particular political camp.³¹ Many prisoners clearly derived a great deal of satisfaction from belonging to such a zemliachestvo, which was an important source of moral-psychological support in a

³⁰According to Kronid Lubarsky, "I do not consider that the years which I spent in camps and prisons were in any way a waste of time. On the contrary -- now I can't even imagine not having lived through this experience... I learned a great deal in the camps and prisons, and I would briefly summarize what I learned as follows: it helped me to free myself from underestimating the strength of the national movements. The camps clearly demonstrate that in the Soviet Union people are imprisoned, first of all, for nationalism. This is the primary enemy of a totalitarian system which shuns all forms of pluralism. The national question is not simply one of the many problems facing the democratization of our country; it is, I daresay, the most urgent problem." Interview with Lubarsky in Pamiat': istoricheskii sbornik vyp. 3 (1980): 472-473.

³¹Ar'e Khnokh (interview, 14 December 1985, Tel Aviv), also used the term "kibbutz" to describe the community of Zionists in Perm camp No. 35 in the mid-70s. According to Mikhail Korenblit (interview, 11 December 1985, Jerusalem), "the camps quickly returned a person to his national roots."

brutal and dehumanizing environment.³² The interviewees stated that the above-mentioned zemliachestva usually included a majority of the "politicals" of a given nationality, and included people with a wide range of views. However, in the case of the Jewish zemliachestvo this was often the case only after assimilated (Russified) Jews who had been active in the democratic human rights movement, or in neo-Marxist opposition groups, rediscovered their "roots" in the camps and joined the Jewish zemliachestvo. This phenomenon will be discussed in greater detail below.

A Russian zemliachestvo was also found in many of the political camps, although it was usually quite small. This was partly due to the relatively small number of Russians imprisoned in these camps. Equally important, however, was the fact that many of the general human rights activists (often called "democrats" in camp jargon) of Russian background with a strong democratic orientation did not wish to associate with the Russian zemliachestvo since it tended to attract, and be dominated by, individuals of highly conservative political and religious views.³³

The interviewees' general comments concerning the significance of the zemliachestva as the main informal structures in the political camps were tempered by the following observations:

³²On the great symbolic significance of the events which zemliachestva sponsored to celebrate important national holidays, see, for example, Mendelevich, Operatsiia "Svad'ba", pp. 244-247. Prisoners were frequently punished for celebrating such events, or for refusing to give up certain national traditions. Thus Vasyl' Fedorenko (May 1976, Vladimir prison) was punished for refusing to shave off his traditional "Ukrainian" whiskers (AS No. 2585), while Mendelevich was regularly punished for wearing a "kipa" (skullcap). See Mendelevich, Operatsiia "Svad'ba", pp. 178, 194.

³³Interviews with Georgii Davydov, 15 October 1986, Munich, and Iurii Mashkov, 17 October 1986, Munich.

- 1). The common ethnic background of many of the former nationalist partisans (stariki) and former German collaborators did not lead to their fraternization, in spite of the fact that many of them had been jointly imprisoned, in some cases for 20-25 years, in similar conditions. According to Sharansky, "for a nationalist to behave like one of the politsai was very unusual."³⁴ Thus the zemliachestva excluded the collaborators.³⁵
- 2). Although the primary form of group affiliation was determined by nationality, this did not mean that every individual of a given nationality who was neither a politsai nor an ordinary criminal joined or was immediately accepted into the appropriate zemliachestvo. First of all, as noted above, not all political prisoners wished to become affiliated with "their" zemliachestvo; in addition, the zemliachestva were selective in accepting countrymen into their ranks.³⁶ Furthermore, in some political camps the number of individuals of a given nationality was so small that a zemliachestvo could not be formed.
- 3). A prisoner's nationality did not necessarily determine interpersonal relations in the political camps. Thus all interviewees stressed that individuals from a wide

³⁴Natan Sharansky, Fear No Evil (New York: Random House, 1988), p. 294.

³⁵This point was stressed by a number of interviewees, including Mikhail Kheifets. However, he also mentioned that not all of the politsai were cut of the same cloth. According to Kheifets, a small number of the politsai, including some who were quite young during World War II, had served the Germans in a passive rather than active fashion, and although they did not participate in the activities of the "politicals," they did not serve the camp administration as informers. For a relatively sympathetic portrayal of one such politsai, see Mikhail Kheifets, Mesto i vremia (evreiskie zametki) (Paris: Izd-vo "Tret'ia volna," 1978), pp. 77-79.

³⁶According to Iosif Mendelevich (interview, 17 December 1985, Jerusalem), the "dissidents" who wanted to join a given zemliachestvo immediately after arriving in a camp had to wait for a certain "trial period" before being accepted.

range of national backgrounds were among their closest friends in the camps.³⁷ Especially when several prisoners were detained in close quarters for an extended period of time, the most important factor determining their relations was each prisoner's personal character and ability to co-exist with others in cramped quarters and conditions of considerable stress.³⁸ All interviewees emphasized that when housed in claustrophobic and uncomfortable quarters, and subjected to various forms of harassment by the camp administration, even the most calm and mild-mannered individuals were often driven to the point of hysteria by the otherwise innocuous personal habits and character quirks of fellow inmates.³⁹

4). Most of the major protest actions in the political camps (preparation of joint statements and petitions addressed to Soviet and foreign figures and institutions, and hunger strikes or work stoppages) involved inmates of various nationalities. In fact, several former political prisoners noted that even when the initiators of a given protest were from one particular zemliachestvo, they often received more support

³⁷The interviewees spoke about the friendships established in the political camps with genuine emotion and, at the end of the interviews, often inquired whether I knew about the fates and whereabouts of their former fellow inmates.

³⁸Close contacts over extended periods of time were inevitable in the cells of the Vladimir and Chistopol prisons and in the special-regime camps, where prisoners were also held in cells. Even in the strict-regime political camps, where prisoners were housed in barracks, close daily contacts among prisoners could not be easily avoided.

³⁹According to Natan Sharansky [Anatolii Shcharanskii], "each move from one cell to another required a major psychological adjustment. A cell is a tiny society whose inhabitants work out a routine where they try to take into consideration each other's habits and weaknesses. They know what topics can be discussed and which ones are best avoided. And suddenly, when you don't expect it, they move you to a new cell. At the other place your cell mate liked to keep the radio blaring; here he can't stand it at all. There he was an outspoken nationalist; here he's a cosmopolitan. There you heard that X was a squealer while Y was a terrific fellow; here you're given equally compelling evidence that it's the reverse." See Sharansky, Fear No Evil, p. 323.

from the younger and more active members of other zemliachestva than from their older, more cautious and politically passive countrymen.⁴⁰

In spite of these caveats, all interviewees stressed that the zemliachestva played an important role in the life of the political camps. The significance and impact of the zemliachestva, and the extent to which they became an important focus for the activity of political prisoners, is underlined by the fact that they included not only those who had been active in national rights movements before their imprisonment, but also attracted many "dissidents" who had earlier demonstrated little interest in the political significance of their ethnonational backgrounds. In fact, one of the most striking phenomena in the political camps was the extent to which existing members of a zemliachestvo exerted a strong and lasting influence on other prisoners' sense of ethnonational identification.

Changes in National Identity

The literature on cross-cultural contacts, in the field of social psychology, indicates that, in certain situations, such contacts can have very significant results, and four broad categories of non-trivial outcomes of such contacts have been identified:

- i) intensified nationalism (often combined with intolerance or even xenophobia);
- ii) "passing," whereby individuals reject the culture into which they have been socialized and embrace a new culture;

⁴⁰In many cases, the old nationalist partisans strongly sympathized with their younger countrymen, but did not participate in protest actions because of their ill health (many of these individuals had been imprisoned for over twenty years), or fear that the administration would find an excuse to prolong their already lengthy term of imprisonment.

iii) marginality, whereby individuals aspire to membership in two racial or cultural groups that have mutually incompatible norms, values or entrance qualifications; and iv) mediation, whereby individuals select, combine and synthesize the appropriate features of different social systems, without losing their cultural cores or "myths."⁴¹

Samizdat and memoir literature on the political camps, supplemented by interviews, document a considerable number of cases of "passing," whereby highly assimilated (Russified) non-Russian prisoners rejected their adopted (Russian) culture and returned to their "roots," and cases of intensified nationalism. The phenomenon of "passing" was most common among the relatively large number of assimilated Jews who had participated in the general democratic human rights movement or had tried to establish underground political parties in the Soviet Union, and became Zionists in the political camps.⁴²

Although there was some variation in the degree to which these individuals had been aware of, and interested in, their Jewish background prior to imprisonment, those who were interviewed⁴³ all noted that the "camp experience" was decisive in determining their decision to become Zionists and emigrate to Israel. As one would expect, the anti-Semitism which even highly assimilated Jews encountered among some of their fellow prisoners played a certain role in promoting their growing Jewish awareness; however, the interviewees also emphasized two

⁴¹Stephen Bochner, "The Social Psychology of Cross-Cultural Relations," in Cultures in Contact: Studies in Cross-Cultural Interaction, ed. Stephen Bochner (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1982), p. 16. The latter two outcomes are particularly characteristic of immigrant societies.

⁴²The best-known cases include Oleg Frolov, Shimon Grilius, the Vudka brothers (Iurii and Valerii), Iakov Suslenskii, Iosef Meshener, Mikhail Kheifets, Boris (Baruch) Shilkrot, and Edward Kuznetsov.

⁴³Iurii Vudka, Suslenskii, Meshener, Kheifets, Shilkrot, and Kuznetsov.

other major influences: i) the example set by the Zionists whom they encountered when they first arrived in the camps; and ii) the example of solidarity shown by other zemliachestva.⁴⁴

That this growth of ethnonational self-awareness among many prisoners did not depend simply on the level of discrimination which they encountered in the political camps is illustrated by the cases of several Russified Ukrainians who were "Ukrainianized" in the camps.⁴⁵ In their cases the primary factors which influenced this process were not discrimination, but a growing sense of pride in the highly visible and unified stance of the Ukrainian zemliachestva in the camps, and the examples set by the many Ukrainians imprisoned for their national rights activity.

Last but not least, there were a number of cases in which Russians who were imprisoned for reasons unrelated to any form of national rights activity, and had not shown any politically significant interest in their Russian ancestry, developed a strong preoccupation with this background in the political camps.⁴⁶ In some cases this was due largely to their new surroundings and encounters with other prisoners. As Sharansky has noted,

"In the specific circumstances of the camps, even widely divergent political views often turned out to be less significant than common ethnonational background. Thus Boris Shilkrot, who came from a totally Russified family, became a Zionist under the influence of Iurii Vudka, who himself had been ambivalent about his Jewish background before his imprisonment. However, they differed quite radically in their political views -- in 1985 Shilkrot lived on a left-wing kibbutz in Israel and supported the "Peace Now" movement, while Vudka was a supporter of the right-wing Meir Kahane.

⁴⁴The main cases which came to my attention were: Vitalii Kalynychenko, Vitalii Lysenko, Leonid Pedan, I. Popadychenko, and Hryhorii Prykhod'ko.

⁴⁵This was especially true of the Russian neo-Marxist dissidents who were arrested in the late 50s and early 60s. On the ideological transformations which many of these neo-Marxists underwent in the camps, see S. D. Rozhdestvenskii, "Materialy k istorii samodeiatel'nykh politicheskikh ob'edinenii v SSSR posle 1945 goda," Pamiat': istoricheskii sbornik vyp. 5 (1982): 241-282.

Generally speaking... the worst thing could happen to a person in labor camp would be to be Russian.... And, indeed, the anti-Russian feeling among the dissidents from the national republics and among the Zionists is very strong as a rule, for obvious reasons.⁴⁷

Given this hostility, a certain sense of defensiveness was understandable. In the case of Osipov, who started his political activity as a "dissident Leninist," detention in a political camp clearly played a crucial role in his evolution towards Russian nationalism. Here is Osipov's account of this process, as related by Kheifets:

The first months in the camp were a period of learning about the national question. Earlier I had given it no thought. But in the camp, I constantly encountered a tactless scratching at nationalist sore spots, with the nationals [i.e., non-Russians] constantly insulting the Russian nation. The Jews and the Ukrainians were especially zealous. they made fun of everything: our origin, our traditions, religion, culture, even our language.⁴⁸

Lacking full biographical information on all of the individuals noted above, and details of the circumstances in which they found themselves in the political camps, it would be unwise to generalize about the reasons for the changes in their attitudes concerning their ethnonational backgrounds, although some of the relevant factors have been outlined above. This discussion has, however, demonstrated the importance of the zemliachestva, which were the most significant unofficial organizations in the camps and acted as "families" in which a majority of the "politicals" found great comfort and an important source of support. The zemliachestva also served as an important base for coordinating unofficial activities among the "politicals," which will be discussed below.

⁴⁷"An Interview with Anatoly Shcharansky," Baltic Forum 3 (Fall 1986): 9.

⁴⁸Mikhail Kheifets, "Russkii patriot Vladimir Osipov," Kontinent No. 27 (1981): 197-198.

Cooperation and Conflict

(i) Cooperation

Although there were many cases of day-to-day cooperation among the "politicals" in dealing with the harsh realities of life in the camps, the most dramatic and significant cooperation took the form of joint statements, petitions and protests addressed to Soviet and foreign figures and institutions, and hunger strikes or work stoppages. Since the main purpose of the more dramatic and prolonged actions, such as hunger strikes, was to draw domestic and especially foreign attention to the situation in the camps and to the political issues of greatest concern to the political prisoners, thereby putting pressure on the Soviet authorities, fairly comprehensive accounts of these protest actions are available, particularly in A Chronicle of Current Events.⁴⁹

The cooperation among different groups of political prisoners was not superficial in nature. Effective protest actions had to be carefully organized in order to: a) insure that there was a core group of activists who would not be easily intimidated by the camp administration; b) prevent details of the protesters' plan of action from reaching the camp administration; and c) make sure that news of the strike reached the "dissident centre"⁵⁰ in Moscow, and eventually the West.

⁴⁹Kheifets has strongly underlined the "publicity" importance of the camp protests. While a prisoner, he criticized protest actions which were hastily prepared, and news of which had little or no chance of reaching the outside world. See Kheifets, Ukrains'ki syliuety, pp. 100, 102-103, and interview with Kheifets, 4 December 1985, Jerusalem.

⁵⁰Term used by Penson and Kheifets in my interviews with them on, respectively, 11 December 1985, Natania, and 4 December 1985, Jerusalem.

There were two major reasons for hunger strikes and work stoppages: a) to protest the especially brutal or inhumane treatment of a prisoner;⁵¹ and b) to bring attention to an issue of particular concern to the prisoners.⁵² An analysis of the accounts of such actions contained in the Chronicle of Current Events shows that there was a total of at least 181 hunger strikes and work stoppages in the political camps between 1965 and 1985 (or, to be more precise, between 1968 and 1982, the period when the Chronicle of Current Events was compiled).

Seventy-one of these cases were individual hunger strikes and work stoppages; the remainder (110) were collective actions. Although information is not always available on the number and names of prisoners who took part in a given protest, complete or partial information of this kind is available for 113 actions, which involved a total of 1238 participants. Seven hundred and fifty-five participants (61%) were "nationalists"; 349 (28%) were "dissidents"; 61 (5%) were Zionists; and 73 (6%) were members of the other categories of prisoners listed above, or could not be identified.

Thus the "nationalists" and Zionists participated fully in the protest actions in the political camps. In fact, several "nationalists" and Zionists were the leading figures in a number of the most important protest actions, and were always found in the "core group" which continued a given protest after less determined participants

⁵¹Examples include the collective hunger strikes called to protest Ginzburg's deprivation of visits from his family, and the beating administered to Stepan Sapeliak after his "infringement of the regulations concerning dress." See Istoriia odnoi golodovki: maiun' 1969 goda (Frankfurt/Main: Possev, 1971); and CCE No. 33 (10 December 1974), pp. 141-143.

⁵²For example, the numerous (unsuccessful) protests aimed at forcing the camp administration to formally grant the status of political prisoners to those imprisoned for their political activity. See CCE No. 35 (31 March 1975): 127; No. 37 (30 September 1975): 24; No. 38 (31 December 1975): 109; and No. 45 (25 May 1977): 255-259.

"dropped out."⁵³ Relatively few protest actions were restricted to members of a given zemliachestvo (if one omits, of course, individual protests),⁵⁴ and most of the zemliachestva cooperated quite readily with each other.⁵⁵

As for the open letters, statements, and petitions which were prepared by prisoners and then smuggled to the outside world,⁵⁶ a survey and analysis of the relevant documents reprinted in the Chronicle of Current Events provides a figure of at least 248 items prepared between 1968 and 1982, with 705 signatures appended to them.⁵⁷ Four hundred and fifty-two (64%) of the signatures belonged to "nationalists," 189 (27%) to "dissidents," 42 (6%) to Zionists, and 22 (4%) belonged

⁵³For example, according to Suslenskii (interview, 12 December 1985, Jerusalem), of the approximately 65 "politicals" who became involved in the campaign to demand the status of political prisoner, approximately 30 were Ukrainian "nationalists." The second largest group of participants consisted of "dissidents" (mostly Russians), and the third largest group consisted of Zionists. One Ukrainian political prisoner, Chornovil, played a leading role in this and a number of other protest actions. See Kheifets, Ukrains'ki syliuety, pp. 99, 102-103; and Viacheslav Chornovil and Boris Penson, Daily Life in a Correction Colony in Soviet Mordovia, Soviet Institutions Series, Paper No. 3, (Jerusalem: The Soviet and East European Research Centre, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1975).

⁵⁴For an example of one such exception, see the statement, accompanied by a one-day hunger strike, by Ukrainian male prisoners in the Mordovian camps demanding the release of several Ukrainian women prisoners, CCE No. 35 (31 March 1975): 132.

⁵⁵"An Interview with Anatoly Shcharansky," Baltic Forum 3 (Fall 1986): 4.

⁵⁶Many materials were smuggled out of the camps and prisons by guards or other camp personnel who agreed to do this for monetary gain or, occasionally, out of sympathy for the political prisoners. Other materials were smuggled out by prisoners who were being transferred from one penal institution to another, or (despite very meticulous body searches) by family members during their rare visits to imprisoned family members. On the importance of the various channels which were used by prisoners to inform the outside world of their activities, see Mikhail Kheifets, Voennoplennyyi sekretar': povest' o Paruire Airikiane (London: Overseas Publications Interchange Ltd., 1985), pp. 19-20, 105, and 113. According to Boris Penson (interview, 11 December 1985, Natania), the prisoners who were responsible for smuggling documents out of the camp usually did not participate in protest actions in order not to attract attention to themselves.

⁵⁷According to Suslensky (interview, 12 December 1985, Jerusalem), approximately 10% of the documents prepared by political prisoners in the camps actually reached the outside world. This estimate was based on his own experience, and that of other prisoners. To the best of my knowledge, the Chronicle of Current Events printed all the camp documents which reached its editors; however, some of the biases mentioned in earlier chapters may have played a certain role in "weeding out" certain items.

to individuals in other categories, or prisoners who could not be identified.⁵⁸ Of the collective documents, only a few were signed by members of one zemliachestvo, and these documents usually dealt with an issue of particular concern to the given group;⁵⁹ otherwise, there was considerable cooperation among the political prisoners of various nationalities in preparing and signing such statements. Thus, the "nationalists" and Zionists fully participated in an activity that was perceived by fellow prisoners to be indicative of a "democratic" orientation.⁶⁰

These figures could have been distorted if a given prisoner or small group of prisoners had participated in a very large number of hunger strikes, or signed a tremendous number of protest statements. However, there were physical limits on the number of times a prisoner could engage in a hunger strike, and although some prisoners did prepare a considerable number of repetitive protest statements, the Chronicle of Current Events did not document such repetitions. The Chronicle of Current Events focussed more on protest actions and statements of a political nature than those which dealt with a prisoner's personal grievances.⁶¹

⁵⁸For example, five documents were signed by Mykola Buduliak-Sharyhin, a Ukrainian who, at the age of 14, was deported from Ukraine to work in Germany and lived in Britain after World War II. He was arrested in 1968 during a business trip to the Soviet Union, and after refusing to cooperate with the KGB he was sentenced, under Article 64 of the RSFSR Criminal Code, for failing to return to the USSR after World War II. For a biography of Buduliak-Sharyhin, see CCE No. 51 (1 December 1978): 223-226.

⁵⁹See, for example, the document signed by three Ukrainian political prisoners in which they ask for the possibility to serve their sentences in Ukraine, in CCE No. 34 (31 December 1974): 34.

⁶⁰The fact that Valentyn Moroz, a prominent Ukrainian national rights activist, was reluctant to participate in collective protest actions, or sign collective protest statements, was clearly regarded by his fellow prisoners as a sign of his intolerance and non-democratic tendencies. Interviews with Danylo Shumuk, 10 October 1988, Mississauga; Edward Kuznetsov, 21 October 1986, Munich; and Vasyli' Romaniuk, 15 February 1989, Kitchener.

⁶¹Although one "political," Mikhail Makarenko, was notorious for writing and disseminating a very large number of protest statements, only a few have been documented in the Chronicle of Current Events. On Makarenko and his protest campaigns see Mendelevich, Operatsiia "Svad'ba", pp.

In addition, the harsh punishments usually imposed on those who engaged in such actions meant that few prisoners used them simply as a means of harassing the administration.⁶² In fact, the decision on whether or not to initiate or become involved in a protest action often gave rise to sharp debates within a given group of prisoners, and to considerable soul-searching on the part of individual prisoners.⁶³

Some categories of political prisoners, e.g., the great majority of the "seniors" (nationalist partisans) rarely or never participated in protest actions. Most of them had been imprisoned for lengthy periods of time, and were concerned that hunger strikes would endanger their already shaky health. Those who were approaching the date of their release from imprisonment were also reluctant to engage in any form of activity that would put their forthcoming release at risk. Last but not least, most of the older nationalists came from a tradition of highly conspiratorial activity and many remained faithful to a form of integral nationalism which stressed reliance on one's own national group rather than cooperation across national lines. This led to a distrust of "open" cooperative activity, and as a result of the above factors only a few of the "seniors" regularly participated in protest

265-269.

⁶²One exception was Mikhail Makarenko (see the previous footnote), who seemed to delight in flooding the administration with a never-ending stream of petitions and statements.

⁶³Interviews with Kheifets, 4 December 1985; and Mendelevich, 17 December 1985. See also Kheifets, Ukrains'ki syliuety, pp. 100-102.

actions.⁴⁴ As noted earlier, many of the prisoners who had been sentenced and imprisoned for "spying," or leaving (or attempting to leave) the Soviet Union illegally, also played a passive role in the political camps.

However, even the younger "nationalists" in the better-organized zemliachestva included individuals who varied a great deal in their political orientations and levels of political skills and tolerance. It would therefore be facile to see their widespread participation in protest actions as necessary evidence of a strongly democratic orientation, or of deeply-felt multinational "brotherhood."

In this context, the role of the leaders of the zemliachestva was crucial, for it was the job of these figures to channel the energy of their countrymen into cooperative activities directed against the "common enemy" and away from the various conflicts which inevitably arose among the political prisoners. As noted earlier, the "nationalists" and Zionists were energetic participants in various protest actions. However, their participation was largely regulated by the leaders of the various zemliachestva, who usually determined the dates and length of the more organized protests, and decided whether or not a particular zemliachestvo should

⁴⁴E.g., Danylo Shumuk and Balis Gaiauskas. It is interesting to note that, in spite of their long-term imprisonment, few of the "seniors" among the nationalists showed signs of mental instability. Semen Gluzman, a human rights activist and psychiatrist by training who was imprisoned from 1972 to 1979, wrote a detailed study on the psychological health and characteristic behaviour patterns of the long-term "politicals" with whom he was imprisoned, most of whom were nationalist partisans, and concluded that the great majority showed no signs of pathological behaviour. See AS No. 4005, written by Gluzman in 1978.

lend its support to a spontaneous action protesting the latest abuse of the camp administration.⁶⁵

In at least some cases, such decisions were taken by delegates from a zemliachestvo who overrode the objections of their fellow countrymen.⁶⁶ In particular, the Jewish zemliachestva were often split between two groups. One argued that since, as Zionists, their primary goal was to leave the Soviet Union for Israel, they should support only those actions which were aimed at protecting political prisoners abused by the camp administration, and should not participate in protests with purely political aims. The other group argued for widespread support of all serious actions, including those with political goals, organized by other groups of prisoners.⁶⁷ Thus an individual's or group's decision to participate in a given protest was, at least partially, a "strategic" decision which did not necessarily reflect the individual's or group's sentiments on a particular issue.

In addition, the cooperative actions noted above can partly be attributed to the unifying impact of the prisoners' perception of a "common enemy" -- the penal administration and, in more general terms, the political authorities who were behind

⁶⁵Thus, for example, Viacheslav Chornovil served as a leader of the Ukrainian zemliachestvo in the camps where he was detained, as did Paruir Airikian for the Armenian zemliachestvo. See the character portraits of these individuals in Kheifets, Ukrains'ki syliuety, pp. 85-126; and Kheifets, Voennoplennyi sekretar'.

⁶⁶Interview with Mendelevich, 17 December 1985, Jerusalem. He stated that the decision to participate in a hunger strike protesting the beating which a Ukrainian prisoner, Stepan Sapeliak, received at the hands of the administration was taken by two delegates from each of the zemliachestva in Perm camp No. 36. For details of this strike see CCE No. 33 (10 December 1974): 140-142.

⁶⁷Neither group totally prevailed, and the decision on whether or not to support a given protest action was often taken in an ad hoc fashion. On the general issue of the relationship between the Soviet Zionists and other political or human rights movements in the Soviet Union, see the polemical work by Vladimir Lazaris, Dissidenty i evrei: kto porval zheleznyi zanaves? (Tel-Aviv: Effect Publishing, 1981), especially Chapter 1.

their arrests and detention. This form of unity in the face of a common threat is well documented in the comparative literature on prisoner behaviour, and in the general literature on the social psychology of intergroup encounters.⁶⁸ It was expressed most visibly in the hunger strikes and work stoppages called in reaction to abuse and mistreatment of a fellow prisoner, and many inmates could be quickly and effectively mobilized to participate in such actions, which were seen as a form of "self-defence."

Still, the high degree of cooperation demonstrated by the participation of members of various zemliachestva in numerous protest actions, and their involvement in preparing and signing a variety of protest statements, underlines the political skills and sophistication of those who planned and implemented these activities. Such cooperation, and a readiness to enter into a dialogue on political issues of mutual concern, is not characteristic of eccentrics or extremists, and in this respect the younger "nationalists" in the political camps, and especially the leaders of their zemliachestva, showed considerable political maturity.

(ii) Conflicts

All interviewees were reluctant to comment on conflicts among the "politicals" in the labour camps. This seemed to be partly motivated by a desire to support the image of good relations and cooperation among political prisoners which was maintained by samizdat and, in particular, by the Chronicle of Current Events. In the one major case when the Chronicle turned its attention to such conflicts by

⁶⁸See Lee H. Bowker, Prisoner Subcultures (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1977), pp. 117-122; and Bochner, "The Social Psychology of Cross-Cultural Relations," pp. 19-22.

publishing an appeal by a group of "politicals" demanding a boycott of two fellow prisoners accused of "inciting national enmity," "hooliganism," and "egoism," this was done with great reluctance, and the Chronicle stated that although it "considered itself obliged to publish this statement," it did not "associate itself with the call for a boycott contained in it."⁶⁹ An attempt was also made to explain away this particular situation by suggesting that it was a consequence of the "cracking of the moral and physical strength of prisoners in the inhuman conditions of the special-regime camp" in which the prisoners in question were detained.⁷⁰ Other reasons why interviewees were reluctant to discuss conflicts among political prisoners included the continued detention of some of the individuals involved,⁷¹ and the fact that all such conflicts, as well as the publicity which accompanied them, played directly into the hands of the camp administration and the entire apparatus of state coercion.

Nonetheless, even those who were reluctant to comment on the details of conflicts among the "politicals" confirmed that they were quite frequent, and could not be attributed simply to the conditions of detention, or the machinations of the camp administration. When asked to comment on the primary causes of such conflicts, personality differences were invariably listed in first place; however, nationality differences were listed in second place by all but two respondents, while political differences were ranked in third place. Given the specific circumstances in

⁶⁹CCE No. 47 (30 November 1977): 108.

⁷⁰Ibid. This conflict will be discussed in greater detail below.

⁷¹Some interviewees argued that criticism was unethical in circumstances where the person to whom the criticism was directed could not freely respond.

the camps, the nationality conflicts which arose most frequently involved Ukrainian, Jewish, and Russian "politicals." Other groups were occasionally involved in conflicts, but they were usually short-lived and involved a limited number of individuals.⁷²

The Zionists in the political camps were particularly sensitive to any manifestations of anti-Semitism, and most of the former Zionist prisoners who were interviewed noted that intolerance and occasionally anti-Semitism could be found among a few of the members of every zemliachestvo. Nonetheless, they stressed that a majority of the younger, active "nationalists" from the Ukrainian, Baltic, and Armenian zemliachestva had a basic democratic orientation which was not marked by high levels of intolerance or xenophobia, including anti-Semitism. This did not exclude debates and disagreements on the "Jewish question," but they were usually conducted in a relatively civilized fashion.⁷³

However, most of the interviewees expressed strong reservations concerning those who identified themselves as Russian "nationalists." There was a clear

⁷²For example, several interviewees (Iosef Meshener, 15 December 1985, Beer Sheva; and Iakov Suslensky, 12 December 1985, Jerusalem) mentioned the case of Babur Shakirov, an Uzbek pan-Turkist who engaged in several heated disputes with Armenian political prisoners over differing interpretations of Armenian-Turkish relations in the past, and with Ukrainian "politicals" over the future of the Crimea. There was also occasional infighting among the Balts -- Suslensky mentioned a short-lived conflict between Lithuanian and Latvian political prisoners.

⁷³Interviews with Mikhail Korenblit, 11 December 1985, Jerusalem; Anatolii Altman, 9 December 1985, Haifa; and Ar'e Khnokh, 14 December 1985, Tel Aviv. Hillel Butman (interview, 5 December 1985, Jerusalem) and Iosef Meshener (interview, 15 December 1985, Beer Sheva) commented that they found it easier to discuss Ukrainian-Jewish relations with the Ukrainian "nationalists" in the camps than with Ukrainians whom they met after they left the Soviet Union. Butman also remarked that the more curious and intellectually-minded prisoners enjoyed a special, almost exhilarating freedom in the camps to discuss issues which could not be openly discussed in society at large. For an interesting comment on the internal "freedom" which the Yugoslav "dissident" Milovan Djilas enjoyed when he was imprisoned in Yugoslavia, see his book Of Prison and Ideas (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Jovanovich, 1986), pp. 1-3.

reluctance to generalize about this group, and the interviewees stressed that there was a wide spectrum of views and opinions on various issues among the Russian "nationalists," who included individuals of great honesty and personal integrity.⁷⁴ In addition, as noted earlier, the Russian "politicals" were a somewhat beleaguered minority in the political camps, and it was relatively easy for the non-Russian "nationalists" to vent some of their frustrations on this group.

Thus Georgii Davydov, a Russian human rights activist who was highly praised by a number of interviewees for his liberal attitudes on the "national question,"⁷⁵ ruefully commented that even the younger generation of Ukrainian "nationalists" assumed that every Russian "political," of even the most democratic persuasions, was a potential Russian chauvinist.⁷⁶ In turn, Edward Kuznetsov provided an interesting example concerning one of the Ukrainian stariki (Bezuhlyi), who intentionally provoked his cellmate Ogurtsov by regularly engaging him in discussions about Ukraine's right to secede from the USSR. The result was daily arguments, often ending in fisticuffs, which lasted over one month in the Mordovian camp where they were imprisoned.⁷⁷

Nonetheless, in spite of this extenuating factor, the consistency of the interviewees' criticism of the Russian "nationalists" was striking. It is perhaps best exemplified by Sharansky's comment, at a news conference shortly after he was

⁷⁴The persons who were most frequently mentioned in this context were Vladimir Osipov, Igor Ogurtsov, Vladimir Poresh, and Aleksandr Ogorodnikov.

⁷⁵E.g., Hryhorii Herchak (interview, 11 November 1988, Toronto), and Petro Ruban (interview, 25 November 1989, Toronto).

⁷⁶Interview with Georgii Davydov, 15 October 1986, Munich.

⁷⁷Interview with Edward Kuznetsov, 21 October 1986, Munich.

allowed to leave the Soviet Union, in response to a question about religious tolerance:

I learned to be tolerant in the camps. I was able to get along perfectly well with the democrats, atheists, Catholics, Orthodox believers, and Ukrainians in the camps; the only exception was the Russian chauvinists whom I met.⁷⁹

In addition, the interviewees who commented on the Russian "nationalists" stated that, with a few exceptions, they "stayed to themselves" and "did not actively participate in camp activities."⁸⁰

The most clearly identifiable group of Russian "nationalists" in the political camps consisted of the members of VSKhSON ("All-Russian Social-Christian Union for the Liberation of the People"). One Western scholar has portrayed this organization in a very positive light;⁸⁰ however, those who were imprisoned with its members tended to have a different perspective. Several interviewees claimed that the rank-and-file members of this organization were clearly anti-Semitic, and even Ogurtsov, the leader of this organization and a man who was generally highly regarded by his fellow prisoners for his personal qualities, was described by one interviewee as a "fanatic Russian Orthodox believer" who espoused the old

⁷⁹Le Monde, 11 September 1986. That Sharansky's comment was not motivated by Russophobia is clear from his warm comments concerning Vladimir Poresh, a Russian Orthodox activist who held strong anti-Semitic views when Sharansky first met him, but soon changed his opinions and became one of Sharansky's closest friends. See Sharansky's memoirs, Fear No Evil, p. 295. See also Sharansky's comments in his interview with David Shipler in the New York Times, 16 February 1986.

⁸⁰Interviews with Georgii Davydov, 15 October 1986, Munich; and Mikhail Kheifets, 4 December 1985, Jerusalem.

⁸¹See John B. Dunlop, The New Russian Revolutionaries (Belmont, Mass.: Nordland, 1976).

chauvinist slogan of "tsar, fatherland, and Orthodoxy."⁸¹ Another former political prisoner who met and became acquainted with several members of VSKhSON in a Mordovian political camp soon after their imprisonment was also strongly critical of their intolerance and xenophobia, and was surprised by the very positive portrait of VSKhSON which appears in the works of American scholar John Dunlop.⁸²

Many of the other Russian "nationalists" in the political camps were Russians who, as described earlier, had been active in a variety of general (often neo-Marxist) political organizations which did not emphasize "Russian" issues, and became preoccupied, often to an extreme, by their Russian background only after imprisonment. This phenomenon was so widespread in the period under consideration that it gave rise to the following comment by Lukianenko, a "veteran" Ukrainian prisoner:⁸³

...I was imprisoned, under my first sentence, from 1961 to 1976. Despite my positive attitude toward my Russian fellow prisoners, I came to observe the following phenomenon: before their arrest the activists from Moscow, Leningrad and other cities spoke out against a one-party system, and demanded a reform of the electoral system, the independence of trade unions, and other democratic changes. They

⁸¹Interview with Hillel Butman, 5 December 1985, Jerusalem. According to Kheifets (interview, 4 December 1985, Jerusalem), in the early seventies some VSKhSON members simply ignored all the Jews in the camps where they were imprisoned, and refused to have anything to do with them.

⁸²Interview with Makhmet Kulmagambetov, 23 October 1986, Munich. For a detailed critique of VSKhSON's program see Kulmagambetov's "Sotsial-Pravoslavie: tseli i metody," Forum No. 14 (1986): 62-80. According to Ronald Grigor Suny, Dunlop "downplays certain troublesome themes in Russian nationalist literature that smack of anti-Semitism," and his work is "so sympathetic to the nationalists that it crosses over to advocacy." See Suny's article, "Russian Nationalism in the Era of Glasnost' and Perestroika," in the special edition of the Radio Liberty Research Bulletin entitled Russian Nationalism Today (19 December 1988): 38. The best example of Dunlop's "advocacy scholarship" is his monograph The New Russian Nationalism, The Washington Papers/116 (New York: Praeger, 1985).

⁸³Lukianenko, a lawyer by training, tried to play the role of a "mediator" in several camp conflicts, including the conflict described in CCE No. 47 (30 November 1977): 107-109. See Lukianenko's open letter, "Panovi Shumukovi ta vs'omu smuhastomu koshevi," in Zupynit' kryvosuddia! Sprava Levka Luk'ianenka, ed. Stepan Sadovs'kyi (n.p.: Suchasnist', 1980), pp. 124-137.

were democrats. In the camps they encountered something which was completely new to them -- the national-liberation struggle. This novel phenomenon put them before two distinct alternatives: democracy -- and the disintegration of the empire... or the maintenance of the Union -- accompanied by dictatorship and lawlessness.

In real life such phenomena are inevitably more complicated, and there are a variety of intermediary stages which must be observed. But in theory... the alternatives are as I have presented them. And in the course of 15 years I observed how, under the influence of choosing between these alternatives, almost all the Russians who had once been democrats -- turned into defenders of the Union and enemies of democracy...⁸⁴

As Lukianenko indicates, the decisive "point of friction" in relations between the Russian political prisoners, including many (if not most) of the Russian "dissidents," and the non-Russian "nationalists" was the reluctance of the former to acknowledge, much less support, the right of self-determination for the major non-Russian peoples of the USSR. In those cases when Russian "politicals" supported this right, the support was often selective, with self-determination seen as a possibility for the Baltic republics or Armenia, but not for Ukraine.⁸⁵

Divide et impera

The two major sources of conflict noted above -- anti-Semitism and Russian vs. non-Russian antagonisms -- played a key role in the camp administration's policy of divide et impera. The most common tactics were quite simple. During his regular individual meetings with political prisoners, the resident KGB operative

⁸⁴Levko Luk'ianenko, "Ia rad, chto russkie proiavili initsiativu," from Referendum: zhurnal nezavisimyykh mnenii No. 12 (16-31 May 1988), AS No. 6262, , 35-36. Luk'ianenko singles out two exceptions to this rule: Georgii Davydov and Vladimir Bukovskii.

⁸⁵Interviews with Petro Ruban, 25 November 1988, Toronto; Solomon Dreisner, 16 December 1985, Jerusalem; Boris Penson, 11 December 1985, Natania; and Stepan Sapcliak, 19 February 1989, Toronto.

in the camp⁶⁶ would persistently raise the question of why, if the prisoner before him was a Jew, he had anything at all to do with the Ukrainians or Lithuanians, who were "pathological anti-Semites." If the prisoner was a Russian, the KGB officer would vigorously attack the Jews, the "rot at the heart of Russia," or Ukrainians and other non-Russian "nationalists," claiming that they hated Russians and planned to let loose an ethnocidal "bloodbath" in "our" Russia.⁶⁷

All interviewees, and practically all the memoir literature available to me, stressed that these attempts to manipulate the tensions inherent in the multinational setting of the political camps were extremely persistent. In fact, several interviewees felt that this was the most important function of the camp's resident KGB operative.⁶⁸ Since the arguments used to influence prisoners were most effective when enunciated by a fellow countryman, KGB operatives of the appropriate background regularly visited the camps to hold discussions with

⁶⁶Nicknamed the oper (short form for operupolnomochennyi) or kum (godfather).

⁶⁷Descriptions of conversations along these lines with the camp oper were repeated by every single interviewee. In a protest, written by Vladimir Bukovsky in Vladimir prison in 1975, he decries the anti-Semitic disinformation spread by KGB officers via their agents in the camp zones where he was imprisoned, and condemns the "regular efforts to set Russians against Ukrainians, Armenians, etc., everyone against the Russians, and Jews against Ukrainians..." See AS No. 2364. Sharansky describes a typical prisoner's conversation with the camp KGB officer in the following passage: "What? You don't want to squeal on your friends? But what does it mean to squeal? And on what friends? This Russian (or Jew, or Ukrainian, depending on the situation) who's serving time with you, don't you realize what kind of nationalist he is? Don't you know how much he hates you Ukrainians (or Russians, or Jews)? Why, he once told so-and-so..." See Sharansky, Fear No Evil, p. 236.

⁶⁸Interviews with Mendelevich, 17 December 1985, Jerusalem; and Anatolii Al'tman, 9 December 1985, Haifa.

individual prisoners.⁸⁹ Alternatively, prisoners were temporarily transferred to a nearby location where the appropriate "native-language services" were available.⁹⁰

Another tactic used by the camp administration was to intentionally bring together prisoners of varying backgrounds and inimical views, in the hope that serious differences of opinion would be transformed into open conflict. Commenting on his detention together with Viktoras Piatkus, a Lithuanian "nationalist," Sharansky notes that

I've heard it said that when astronauts are selected for a long space flight, they are given special tests to determine their psychological compatibility. In the Gulag, I often had the impression that the KGB conducted its own tests and selected cell mates on the basis of incompatibility. This is not merely a matter of sadism, for such an arrangement can also help the KGB break a man. It can intensify his desire to get out at any price, and can turn him into a squealer. It helps the KGB incite national and religious discord between zeks, which can be useful not only at the time but also in the future, when these men are eventually released.⁹¹

⁸⁹For details of the attempts at "re-education" of Ukrainian political prisoners conducted by KGB officers who used to regularly visit the political camps from Ukraine, see "Pro mynule i davno mynule," unpublished section of the memoirs of Danylo Shumuk, copy in my possession. To supplement the efforts of the KGB, the camps were regularly visited by "representatives of society" of a given nationality, who often gave lectures on topics such as "The Success of Soviet Nationality Policy." For descriptions of such delegations from the Ukrainian SSR, see the statement by Horbal', then (1974) in Perm camp No. 35, AS No. 2140, pp. 2-3, and Stepan Soroka's statement, written in the same camp in 1975, AS 2409.

⁹⁰In the case of the Mordovian camps, the investigation prison in Saransk, the capital of the Mordovian ASSR, served as this location.

⁹¹Natan Sharansky, Fear No Evil, p. 250. Contrary to the administration's expectations, and in spite of their disagreement on a variety of issues, they became close friends (p. 251). While in exile, in 1978, Ukrainian "nationalist" Viacheslav Chornovil wrote a letter to the wife of Vladimir Osipov, a Russian "nationalist," in which he claimed that the camp administration's motive in detaining him together with Osipov was "crystal clear" -- the hope was that they would turn into mortal enemies. However, by avoiding topics (e.g., Russian-Ukrainian relations) of a sensitive nature, they maintained very good relations. See Valentina Mashkova-Osipova, "Bolezn' i bolezni (V poriadke obsuzhdeniia)," Russkoe vrozozhdenie No. 4 (1978): 60-61. On the attempts to provoke a conflict between Chornovil and Osipov, see also Kheifets, Ukrains'ki syluety, pp. 91-92. Kheifets (p. 91) quotes Chornovil as saying that "we decided to put aside our differences until the final victory over Bolshevism."

On the whole, these efforts did not succeed in creating or inflaming ethnontional tensions, although the KGB opers were successful, using various forms of pressure, in "persuading" certain prisoners to "renounce" their previous political beliefs.⁹² Several interviewees stressed, however, that the Russian "politicals," especially those without strong democratic convictions, were particularly susceptible to the oper's chauvinist propaganda.⁹³

The camp administration's tactic of divide et impera was so blatant that, as mentioned earlier, it gave rise to a somewhat artificial unity among various groups of "politicals" in the face of a common enemy. Still, given the specific conditions in the camps, which seemed to provide ideal "breeding grounds" for inter-ethnic conflict, to effectively counteract the administration's strategy required considerable diplomatic and tactical skills on the part of the leading figures of the various zemliachestva.

For example, the political maturity of the leaders of the Ukrainian zemliachestvo was demonstrated by their reaction to the conflict situation, mentioned at the beginning of this section, which was provoked by the intolerant and xenophobic behaviour of one of its prominent members, Valentyn Moroz. In spite of Moroz's prominent role in the Ukrainian national rights movement of the sixties,

⁹²This was usually done in the form of an "open letter" in which the prisoner criticized his "anti-Soviet" activities in the past.

⁹³Interviews with Iosef Mendelevich, 17 December 1985, Jerusalem; Mikhail Korenblit, 11 December 1985, Jerusalem; Georgii Davydov, 15 October 1986, Munich; and Makhmet Kulmagambetov, 23 October 1986, Munich. According to Petro Ruban (interview, 25 November 1988, Toronto), all the members of the underground student group in Saratov called the Party of True Marxists, led by Oleg Senin, rapidly fell under the influence of the oper in Perm camp No. 36 and became notorious for their Russian chauvinist behaviour in the camp. According to Davydov, Sergei Ponomarev, a neo-Marxist dissident from Gorkii, underwent a similar evolution in the political camps.

this behaviour led to his expulsion from the Ukrainian zemliachestvo and he was spurned by almost all of his fellow countrymen, including those who had earlier supported him.⁹⁴

Discussions on the "National Question"

When asked to comment on the nature of discussions on the "national question" in the political camps, all interviewees stated that a majority of the political prisoners had a strong interest in this subject and were often preoccupied by it, since large numbers of them had been imprisoned primarily because of their national rights activity. Nonetheless, great restraint was usually shown by the "politicals" in discussing the "national question."

Discussions on this topic were usually conducted within the uninational confines of a given zemliachestvo, or between the members of zemliachestva who shared similar views on the "national question" (e.g., Balts and Ukrainians). According to one interviewee this topic was usually avoided in broader discussions among the "politicals" because of its "sensitive" nature.⁹⁵ Similarly, two other

⁹⁴Interviews with: Danylo Shumuk, 10 October 1988 and 13 November, 1988, Mississauga; Vasyl' Romaniuk, 15 February 1989, Kitchener; Edward Kuznetsov, 21 October 1986, Munich. According to Kheifets, "the great majority of the Ukrainians, headed by Shumuk, opposed Moroz (he was supported by Ivan Hel'), and all the other political prisoners in the zone took the side of the Ukrainian zemliachestvo." Even for those who had no personal knowledge of Moroz, the fact that he had been expelled from the Ukrainian zemliachestvo was enough to convince them that he must have behaved in a manner unbecoming a political prisoner. See Ukrains'ki syluety, p. 109. In the interview noted above, Kuznetsov acknowledged that Moroz is the anonymous vozhd' (whom he also calls a "little Hitler") in his memoirs entitled Mordovskii marafon (Ramat-Gan: "Moscow-Jerusalem," 1979), pp. 222-223. Murzenko also describes Moroz as an intolerant figure, with a strong "leadership" complex, in Obraz, pp. 185-189. A letter written by Danylo Shumuk which describes Moroz's relations with other prisoners was published in the journal Dvadtsat' dva no. 8 (July 1979): 167-174.

⁹⁵Interview with Petro Ruban, 25 November 1988, Toronto.

former prisoners mentioned efforts to set up informal lecture series in the political camps where they were imprisoned, but stressed that the "national question" was intentionally not raised in these lectures because of fears that the ensuing debates might sour relations among the prisoners.⁹⁶

Several interviewees mentioned occasional in-depth discussions on the "national question" among individual members of the Ukrainian-Jewish-Russian "triangle," but they all used the term "restraint" (sderzhannost') to describe the approach adopted in these discussions. Thus, some of the former Zionist prisoners who were interviewed noted that they frequently discussed, on an individual basis, various aspects of Jewish-Ukrainian relations in the recent past with their fellow Ukrainian inmates. However, discussions of Ukrainian-Jewish relations prior to the twentieth century were avoided because of the controversies this subject invariably raised.⁹⁷

When serious conflicts did arise, involving individuals both within and among the zemliachestva, certain "dissidents" often played an important mediating role. Thus, one of the reasons why Georgii Davydov, a Russian human rights activist, was so highly regarded by his fellow prisoners, was the fact that he was known for his impartiality in informally "adjudicating" such conflicts.⁹⁸

⁹⁶Interviews with Baruch Shilkrot, 2 December 1985, Jerusalem; and Ar'e Khnokh, 14 December 1989, Tel Aviv.

⁹⁷Interviews with Anatolii Al'tman, 8 December 1985, Haifa; Boris Penson, 11 December 1985, Natania; and Hillel Butman, 5 December 1985, Jerusalem. When Ukrainian "nationalist" Chornovil was detained together with the Russian "nationalist" Osipov, they lived in peace by avoiding "irritating problems of an ideological nature," for in conditions of imprisonment "all have to search only for that which unites us." See Mashkova-Osipova, "Bolezn' i bolezni," p. 61.

⁹⁸Interviews with Iakov Suslenskii, 12 December 1985, Jerusalem; and Boris Penson, 11 December 1985, Natania.

Conflict Resolution

Given the difficult living conditions and strained, politicized atmosphere in the political camps, it is not surprising that ethnonational tensions were always present in the political camps. These tensions were not "created" by the camp administration, but it did its best to exacerbate and exploit these underlying tensions in the tradition of divide et impera. In turn, the political prisoners developed their own means of countering these efforts and "managing" ethnonational conflict to ensure that it not become a convenient instrument in the hands of the camp administration.

The actual level of conflict appears to have been quite low, and several factors played an important role in preventing, or helping to resolve, ethnonational conflicts in these political camps between 1965 and 1985. First of all, one should emphasize the relative tolerance, willingness to engage in dialogue, and political sophistication of most members of the new generation of "nationalists" who began to arrive in the political camps in the sixties, and the leadership skills of several prominent figures in their midst."

The other important factor was the presence, in most of the political camps, of a core group of "dissidents" who placed a great deal of emphasis on the use of new, innovative measures to publicize the true reasons for their confinement, the conditions of confinement in the camps, and the behaviour of the camp administration. This led to the steady growth, in the late sixties and throughout the

"This point was particularly emphasized by Mikhail Kheifets (interview, 4 December 1985, Jerusalem) and Georgii Davydov (interview, 15 October 1986, Munich), who praised the leadership skills of several members of the Ukrainian zemliachestvo and Paruir Airikian, who was the most authoritative figure among the Armenians in the camps.

seventies, of various cooperative efforts, among political prisoners of various backgrounds, to prepare statements, engage in hunger strikes, etc., which would draw the attention of the outside world.

The fact that relatively small numbers of individuals were detained in the political camps between 1965 and 1985, and the availability of a significant volume of information about their activities, has permitted a relatively detailed case study of the "ethnonational factor" in these camps. This case study has confirmed the high salience of the "national question" as an issue of concern among those who were accused of, and sentenced for, unofficial political activities in the Soviet Union. In fact, the ethnonational background of the political prisoners played a paramount role in determining the nature of the informal structures they created in the camps, and inter-group relations in the camps.

The case study has also underlined the camp administration's great interest in the underlying ethnonational tensions among the political prisoners. The organs of state security readily exploited such tensions, and placed a great deal of emphasis on a policy of "divide and rule" which involved systematically setting one zemliachestvo against another.

However, these attempts to promote discord among the "politicals" were effectively countered by most of the zemliachestva, thus demonstrating the political skills of their leaders and the limited presence of extremist elements among their rank-and-file membership.¹⁰⁰

¹⁰⁰As noted above, the Russian zemliachestvo constituted a partial exception to this rule.

Chapter 8

CONCLUSIONS

To this day little is known about the central policy-making process, past and present, in the sensitive sphere of nationality relations in the Soviet Union. Information is quite limited, for example, concerning the individuals who have played a key role in formulating or influencing nationality policy, the institutional framework within which this policy has been shaped, and the way in which policy priorities have been established.

There are a number of indicators which, in the absence of data on policy formulation in this sphere, can provide valuable information on central political elite attitudes and concerns regarding the "national question" in the Soviet Union. Thus, for example, Western scholars have analyzed changes over time in official CPSU policy statements on this issue, have studied the ethnonational background of senior administrative personnel appointed to sensitive "control points" in party and state bureaucracies, and have examined the levels of provision of educational, publishing, and cultural facilities to various ethnonational groups.

However, in searching for informative indicators of central political elite attitudes and concerns regarding nationality issues in the Soviet Union, it is important to examine the whole spectrum of official measures taken to contain or prevent problems in this policy area. In particular, one important indicator which has been largely neglected by Western scholars is the nature and extent of the

sanctions imposed on those who articulated views on the "national question" outside of officially-approved channels.

This neglect was partly due to the enthusiastic rejection of the totalitarian "model" by the majority of the younger generation of Soviet specialists in the West in the 1960s and 1970s, for this led to a perception that state-sanctioned coercion had played only a minor role in furthering the stability of the Soviet political system, especially in the post-Stalinist period. However, although the use of brute force and violence against large segments of the Soviet population ceased in the mid-1950s, this by no means signified an end to the selective use of coercion, or the threat of such coercion, against those perceived as challenging the political status quo in the Soviet Union. If the threat of coercion is supported by the capability to exert it, and this threat is regarded seriously by its intended targets it is, in many respects, a much more effective (and more "tidy") mechanism of societal control than large-scale brutality.

It is therefore surprising that relatively few Western scholars have carefully studied the apparatus, mechanisms, and targets of state-sanctioned coercion in the Soviet Union, and its role in maintaining the stability of the Soviet political system.¹ During the period under consideration in this thesis the central political elites in the Soviet Union devoted considerable attention to perceived domestic threats to their dominance and the stability of the state, supported a strong domestic coercion

¹For some exceptions see Amy W. Knight, The KGB: Police and Politics in the Soviet Union (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988); Robert Conquest, Inside Stalin's Secret Police: NKVD Politics, 1936-39 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1985); Frederick C. Barghoorn, "The Security Police," in H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, eds., Interest Groups in Soviet Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 93-129; and Boris Levytsky, The Uses of Terror: The Soviet Secret Police, 1917-1970 (New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 1972).

capability in the form of a powerful security apparatus and compliant judiciary to deal with these perceived threats, and maintained tight central control over these coercive instruments. The Soviet Union's domestic coercive capability was used to enforce restrictions on political activity outside of officially-approved, Party-regulated channels, and impose sanctions on those who were found to be engaging in such activity.

Given this setting, and reliable information on the backgrounds and activities of a representative sample of the political targets of state-sanctioned coercion, one should then be able to determine the nature of the actual or potential domestic security threats of greatest concern to the central political elites. This thesis has shown that, in the Soviet Union, during the period under consideration the central political elites perceived the activity of national rights advocates to pose the greatest threat to the domestic security of the Soviet state.

This concern about the domestic security threat posed by ethnonationalism was clearly demonstrated during World War II, when entire nationalities suspected of actual or potential disloyalty to Soviet state interests were deported into the Soviet interior. Coercion was also used on a massive scale in the newly-acquired territories in the Soviet West (especially the Baltic states and Western Ukraine) to eliminate open resistance to Soviet rule among the indigenous populations, and this explains the large number of Balts and Ukrainians detained in Soviet labour camps after WW II, or deported from their ancestral territories into the Soviet interior.

The high level of state coercion directed at the indigenous populations of Western Ukraine and the Baltic states after WWII can be interpreted as a response

to their vigorous opposition to the incorporation of these territories into the Soviet Union. However, central political elite concerns about the destabilizing potential of ethnonationalism in these areas lasted long after the indigenous population's organized resistance to Soviet rule had, for all practical purposes, ceased. In fact, it was after the amnesties of the mid-fifties, when the great majority of political prisoners detained before 1953 were released, that these concerns were most clearly reflected in a new pattern of repression of political non-conformists.

In the mid-fifties a relatively sophisticated "calculus of repressive strategy" aimed at political non-conformists began to replace the broad and sometimes indiscriminate measures of coercion applied during the Stalinist period. This more selective strategy aimed, in general, at preventing the emergence and growth in popularity of leadership figures capable of mobilizing the broader public for any form of autonomous political action. In particular, there was a strong focus on detaining individuals who could potentially play a leadership role in national rights movements.

Thus, during the period from 1965 to 1985 (for which the most reliable information is available) those arrested and sentenced primarily for their national rights activities clearly comprised the largest single identifiable category of "politicals" detained in Soviet penal institutions. The new, younger generation of national rights activists had generally rejected the conspiratorial means adopted by their predecessors, attempted to openly generate broad public support for their activities and, with almost no exceptions, did not advocate violent means of attaining their ends. Nonetheless, they were punished with particularly harsh

sentences and continued to be severely harassed and intimidated when they were released from imprisonment.

The great sensitivity shown by the central political elite to the potential problems posed by the mobilization of politicized ethnicity in the Soviet Union was underlined by the fact that, in most cases, the national rights activists sentenced between 1965 and 1985 had not succeeded in establishing a large, well-organized base of public support for their activities.² Although their potential constituency was large, pervasive state controls over all forms of unofficial political activity were such that there were few opportunities for these activists to mobilize a mass public for collective action.

Thus the central political elites, fearing that at least some of these activists could eventually assume significant leadership roles in unofficial movements were, in most cases, reacting to the potential rather than actual, immediate threat which they posed. However, official concerns about the actual or potential leadership roles of the national rights activists who were arrested and imprisoned between 1965 and 1985 were not misplaced. As noted in Chapter 7, a number of individuals in this category played an important organizational role among the inmates of the "political" camps and were instrumental, in very difficult circumstances, in preserving peace among the prisoners in this turbulent setting. In addition, their leadership skills were clearly underlined by the significant role which many of these

²One exception, noted above in Chapter 6, was the disciplined large-scale activity of the Crimean Tatars. See Peter Reddaway, "The Crimean Tatar Drive for Repatriation: Some Comparisons with Other Movements of Dissent in the USSR," in Tatars of the Crimea: Their Struggle for Survival, ed. Edward Allworth (Durham: Duke University Press, 1988), pp. 194-201.

activists played in several national rights movements in the late 1980s, after their release from imprisonment.³

This, as well as the national rights activists' continued reliance on open, legal forms of political activity after their release, supports the argument in Chapter 7 that, on the whole, they were not marginal extremists with a distorted view of reality, as official Soviet statements of the time claimed. On the contrary, the great majority were concerned citizens who were dissatisfied with the existing pattern of ethnonational relations in the Soviet Union, and articulated grievances which were quite widespread in the communities which they represented.

Thus the central political elites of the Soviet Union were correct in perceiving that the movements which the national rights activists represented posed a potential threat to the pattern of ethnonational relations established during the Stalinist period, and maintained by the leaderships which followed. This is most clearly reflected in the dramatic nationality problems which became a priority focus for the Gorbachev leadership in the late 1980s, after some of the restrictions on the

³Thus, for example, Moldavian national rights activists and former political prisoners Mihai Morosanu (imprisoned 1966-69), Gheorghe Ghimpu (imprisoned 1967-73), and Alexandru Usatiuk (imprisoned 1967-1974) played a key role in organizing a series of rallies and meetings in Moldavia in the summer of 1988 devoted to national rights issues. See Grigore Singurel, "Moldavia on the Barricades of Perestroika," Report on the USSR 1 (24 February 1989): 37. Lagle Parek, an Estonian national rights activist (imprisoned 1983-1987) is a leading figure in the Estonian National Independence Party, and Heiki Ahonen (imprisoned 1983-86) played a major role in organizing the important demonstrations in Tallin on 23 August 1987 to commemorate the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. See "We Are Not Waiting for Gorbachev: An Interview with Tiit Madisson," Uncaptive Minds 1 (June-Aug. 1988): 45. Many (if not most) of the Ukrainian national rights activists who were imprisoned have recently played an active role in various political and civic organizations, or unofficial publishing efforts, in the Ukrainian S.S.R. There are countless examples: former political prisoner Ivan Hel' (imprisoned 1965-1968, and 1972-1987) is head of the Committee in Defence of the Ukrainian Catholic Church (see Emily Pyle, "Calls for Legalization of Ukrainian Catholic Church," Report on the USSR 1 (21 July 1989): 25); and Mykhailo Horyn' (imprisoned 1965-1971, 1981-1987) was elected to head the secretariat of "Rukh" (Popular Movement of Ukraine for Restructuring) in September 1989. A number of other former political prisoners (Lev Lukianenko, Viacheslav Chornovil, Ivan Hel', and Mykola Horbal') spoke at the founding Congress of "Rukh." See Ukrainian Weekly, 24 September 1989). Many more examples could be cited.

articulation of ethnonational grievances were lifted, and which caught many Western observers off guard.

The Concept of an "Ethnic Security Map"

The term "ethnic security map" was originally used in an analysis of the way in which central state regimes have used ethnicity to maintain political order through manpower manipulation in the armed forces of multinational states. I have broadened the scope of application of this term, and have used it to describe central political elite perceptions of the entire spectrum of domestic security problems posed by ethnonationalism in multinational states.

The term "ethnic security map" has been used in only a few, limited contexts, but the idea that central state regimes usually have clear expectations regarding the political dependability of various ethnonational groups in multinational states is implicit in much of the literature on the politics of nationalism and ethnicity, including studies dealing with the Soviet Union. However, little attention has been devoted to the actual strategies and methods which state regimes have used to prevent or hamper the rise and development of national rights movements. Thus, although the concept of an "ethnic security map" does not possess great analytical depth, it is effective in focusing attention on central political elite perceptions of the problems posed by ethnonationalism, and encourages the analyst to look for explicit measures taken by these elites to control this potentially destabilizing force.

In view of current nationality unrest in the USSR, the relationship between the central political elite's perception of domestic security threats and the pattern of state coercion directed against national rights activists in the past seems obvious, so obvious that it may appear unnecessary to emphasize this point. However, in the 1970s and early 1980s many Soviet experts in the West ignored the rich materials on political dissent in the USSR, downplaying the significance of Soviet political dissidents and their activities and arguing that they were marginal, isolated and often eccentric figures who did not represent any significant trends in Soviet society. These same experts often downplayed the significance of nationality, republican, and regional issues in the Soviet Union,⁴ and thus their views largely coincided with official Soviet portrayals of political dissidents and the "national question" in the USSR.

Group Identity and the Significance of the "Camp Experience"

Despite the deprivation and brutal treatment of prisoners in the Soviet penal system during the period under consideration, certain distinct forms of "community" life among its inmates were always discernible. Among political prisoners the strongest basis for group affiliation, throughout the entire postwar period, was ethnonational background.

Interaction among political prisoners across ethnonational lines was slower to develop (it was most widespread in the 1970s and early 1980s), and there were

⁴One good example is the prominent American Sovietologist Jerry F. Hough, whose work to date has almost totally ignored these issues. See, in particular, Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, How the Soviet Union is Governed (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979).

occasional cases of conflict among prisoners of different ethnonational backgrounds. However, despite the camp administrations' consistent and persistent policy of trying to exacerbate underlying tensions and provoke conflicts among the "politicals," the level of actual conflict was relatively low. In fact, for many political prisoners who were not national rights activists, the "camp experience" provided a valuable lesson on the nature and importance of the "national question" in the Soviet Union and, in a number of significant cases, the camp environment had a dramatic influence on an individual's sense of ethnonational identity.

The "camp experience" had other, more politically significant consequences which created problems for the security apparatus and the central political authorities of the Soviet Union. It was noted, in earlier chapters, that contacts among various groups of dissidents during most of the post-Stalinist period were poor or nonexistent, and this was true of national rights activists as well as those who were occupied with general human rights issues. However, many of the links established between individual political prisoners, or groups of political prisoners, during the period from 1965 to 1985, were maintained after they were released, especially in the more relaxed political atmosphere of the late 1980s.

Thus, for example, Estonian national rights activist and former political prisoner Tiit Madisson has attributed the good contacts between the Estonian opposition and the opposition in other Soviet republics to relationships which were initiated in the labour camps beginning in the 1960s.⁵ Attempts to maintain and

⁵"It was through the Gulag that we befriended Latvians and Lithuanians, and these friendships continue today... In addition we have close ties with Russians from Moscow and Leningrad, with whom we were imprisoned." Madisson, "We Are Not Waiting...", p. 45.

strengthen links between national rights activists who were former political prisoners were formalized when, in September 1987, Ukrainian and Armenian activists founded a joint committee in defence of political prisoners, and this was soon followed by a more ambitious effort, initiated and led by former political prisoners, to form a common front of the various non-Russian national movements.

Thus, in a hitherto unprecedented move, on June 11 and 12, 1988 leading national rights campaigners from Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia met in the Western Ukrainian city of L'viv to establish a Coordinating Committee of the Patriotic Movements of the Peoples of the USSR.⁶ Contacts among members of various national movements soon moved far beyond the limited circles of former political prisoners, and there has been a great deal of interaction, and exchange of experience, among a wide circle of national rights activists in several different republics.⁷ However, the initial contacts established in the labour camps played an important role in breaking down old stereotypes, and setting precedents for the future.

The "camp experience" has also promoted a great sensitivity, among the national rights activists who are former political prisoners, to all attempts by central or local authorities to provoke or exacerbate inter-ethnic hostilities in the "divide and conquer" tradition. Thus many of these former prisoners have spoken out on

⁶See Bohdan Nahaylo, "Representatives of Non-Russian National Movements Establish Coordinating Committee," Radio Liberty Research Bulletin 283/88, 22 June 1988; "Non-Russian National-Democratic Movements Hold Another Meeting," Radio Liberty Research Bulletin 465/88, 10 November 1988; and "Non-Russian National Democratic Movements Adopt Charter and Issue Appeal to Russian Intelligentsia," Report on the USSR 1 (13 January 1989): 18-22.

⁷See, for example, Bohdan Nahaylo, "Baltic Echoes in Ukraine," Report on the USSR 1 (13 January 1989): 18-22.

numerous occasions against all expressions of intolerance or xenophobia, and have stressed that all manifestations of national chauvinism will play into the hands of those who wish to deny greater autonomy to the non-Russian ethnonational groups. In fact, one former political prisoner has accused the Soviet security apparatus of engaging in various measures of provocation, analogous to those used in the Stalinist labour camps to set ordinary criminals against "politicals," in order to discredit the contemporary national rights movements.⁸ For example, the security apparatus in the Ukrainian S.S.R. has been accused of circulating bogus leaflets and petitions, of a chauvinist, inflammatory nature, and supposedly originating from Ukrainian "nationalist" circles, in order to turn public opinion against the Ukrainian national rights movement. Certainly, there have been numerous articles in conservative press organs which intentionally distort the aims of, and methods used by, this movement.⁹

This is not to deny that extremist elements can be found among the activists in national rights movements in the USSR; however, in most cases they are on the

⁸See Bohdan Horyn's speech, delivered on 3 August 1989, in Svoboda, 26 August 1989.

⁹This issue was raised in many speeches delivered at the founding congress of "Rukh," the Popular Movement of Ukraine for Restructuring. See, for example, the speeches by Oles' Honchar and Dmytro Pavlychko (Literaturna Ukraina, 14 September 1989) and Ivan Dziuba (Literaturna Ukraina, 5 October 1989). See also the appeal to Gorbachev, signed by 18 people's deputies to the Supreme Soviet, concerning the political situation in Ukraine, which states that: "Today it is convenient for the apparatus to set various groups of people against each other, and spread intentional disinformation about various informal groups. In particular, "Rukh" is described in the press (and not without success) as a Banderite nationalist organization, although neither the program of "Rukh" nor its formation (it consists of Ukrainians, Russians, Belorussians, Jews, and many other nationalities), nor its actions, nor its congress, which is working to promote multinational unity, give any grounds for such accusations." Ukrainian Press Agency Report, 11 September 1989. "Rukh's" appeals to the Russian population and all other non-Ukrainians in Ukraine, as well as its official statement condemning anti-Semitism, are found in Literaturna Ukraina, 5 October 1989.

periphery rather than in the mainstream of these movements.¹⁰ Thus the conflicts between ethnonational groups which led to several hundred deaths in 1988-89 occurred primarily in areas (Azerbaijan, Abkhazia, and Uzbekistan) which have had no tradition of organized national rights activity in the recent past, and where "popular front" movements were slow to develop.¹¹ Many of the clashes there appear to have been largely spontaneous and anomic in nature,¹² and in those areas where well-organized and relatively cohesive national rights movements exist, they

¹⁰Concerns about the possible growth of local Ukrainian chauvinist elements in Ukraine were expressed by the literary critic and former dissident Ivan Dziuba in his speech to the founding congress of "Rukh," Literaturna Ukraina, 5 October 1989. However, he noted that the more organized forms of anti-Semitism (e.g., the "Pamiat'" organization) had not found fertile soil in Ukraine.

¹¹On the clashes between Azerbaijanis and Armenians, which assumed their most violent form when Azerbaijanis attacked Armenians residing in Azerbaijani town of Sumgait, see Tamara Dragadze, "The Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict: Structure and Sentiment," Third World Quarterly 11 (January 1989): 55-71. On the situation in Uzbekistan, where Uzbek rioters attacked Meskhetians who had been deported to the Fergana Valley from Georgia during World War II, see Annette Bohr, "Violence Erupts in Uzbekistan," Report on the USSR 1 (16 June 1989): 23-26; and Ann Sheehy, "Social and Economic Background to Recent Events in Fergana Valley," Report on the USSR 1 (7 July 1989): 21-23. For background information see S. Enders Wimbush and Ronald Wixman, "The Meskhetian Turks: A New Voice in Soviet Central Asia," Canadian Slavonic Papers 17, No. 2/3 (1975): 63-78. On the clashes between Abkhazians and Georgians, see the chronology in Vera Tolz and Melanie Newton, "The USSR This Week," Report on the USSR 1 (28 July 1989): 31-32. For background information see Darrell Slider, "Crisis and Response in Soviet Nationality Policy: The Case of Abkhazia," Central Asian Survey 4, no. 4 (1985): 52-65; and Elizabeth Fuller, "Abkhaz-Georgian Relations Remain Strained," Report on the USSR 1 (10 March 1989): 25-27 and "New Abkhaz Campaign for Secession from Georgian SSR," Report on the USSR 1 (7 April 1989): 27-28.

¹²However, there has been some speculation, and even open accusations, that certain local officials were involved in provoking the disturbances, or did little to bring them to a quick end. Thus, for example, representatives of the Azerbaijani and Armenian democratic movements who spoke at the Ukrainian "Rukh" congress in September 1989 claimed that the conflicts in their republic were inspired by the "authorities" (they are not specified), who want to prevent a consolidation of forces in the Caucasus which are opposed to the party bureaucracy (Svoboda, 26 September 1989). According to one expert on this area, Prof. Swietochowski, "Tensions between Armenians and Azerbaijanis do have historical precedents, but the hostility between the Uzbeks and Meskhetians is entirely artificial. I sense something sinister, and I am suspicious." Rovchan Chafibekov and Erika Dailey, "Eminent Scholar Interprets Nagorno-Karabakh Dispute," Report on the USSR 1 (25 August 1989): 27. In Lithuania Prof. Bronius Genczelis, a deputy to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, has charged that much of the ethnic unrest in Lithuania is deliberately fomented by the security apparatus. See the excerpts from his article in Tiesis, 28 June 1989, translated in Elta Information Bulletin No. 10 (370) (September 1989): 7.

have condemned all forms of violence and have appealed for calm,¹³ although the more conservative Soviet media continue to paint these movements in very negative colours.

.....

Unless one carefully examines the strategy and pattern of state-directed coercion aimed at national rights activists in the Soviet Union, it is difficult to understand the relative quiescence of ethnonational movements in the postwar USSR, and the very rapid development of these movements in the late eighties. For most of the post-Stalin period the consistent and persistent policy of selectively intimidating and, if necessary, arresting, sentencing and imprisoning the most prominent national rights activists was remarkably successful in containing demands for changes in the pattern of ethnonational relations in the USSR. Such intimidation was particularly effective because of the lingering memory of the much broader and more brutal forms of repression applied in some areas of the Soviet Union (in particular, the newly-acquired territories of the Baltic republics and Western Ukraine) as recently as the late 1940s, and the resulting atomized, demoralized state of Soviet society. In turn, once the "individualized" (but still highly intimidating) forms of coercion applied to national rights activists in the post-Stalin period were attenuated in the late 1980s, this contributed to a dramatic increase in the extent of ethnonational protest in the Soviet Union.

¹³See, for example, Yaqub Turan and Timur Kocaoglu, "Appeal to the People of Fergana," Report on the USSR 1 (16 June 1989): 26-27; and the speeches of Ukrainian "Rukh" activists in Literaturna Ukraina, 14 and 21 September, 1989.

Thus, by devoting more attention to the pattern of state-directed coercion against political non-conformists in the pre-Gorbachev period, Western observers would have been much better prepared for the high profile of the "national question" in Soviet domestic politics in the late 1980s.

Appendix A

DATA BASE: POLITICAL PRISONERS 1965-85

Introduction

For the purposes of this thesis a data base was constructed which contains basic biographic information on all political prisoners, mentioned in the sources noted below, known to have been detained in a Soviet penal or psychiatric institution, for 6 months or longer, beginning or ending during the period between January 1, 1965 and December 31, 1985.

I have defined the term political prisoners as follows: those sentenced to imprisonment primarily for expressing their views on the question of socio-political, civil, or national rights (including the right to emigrate), or for their involvement in, or support of, organized activity in defence of these rights. Those sentenced primarily for their religious activity are not included.¹

In most cases the political prisoners under consideration fall into the category of "prisoners of conscience" as defined by Amnesty International; that is, they have not used or advocated violence. However, I will also include persons imprisoned for acts committed for political reasons, but involving violence. The great majority of the latter were residents of the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) or Western Ukraine (then Eastern Poland) in the interwar period who opposed the

¹In some cases there was a strong link between an individual's religious activism and activism in defence of national rights. In the Soviet Union this was particularly true of Lithuanian Roman Catholic activists and Ukrainian Catholic activists, whose dissent activity was often motivated by a combination of religious and ethnonational grievances. Likewise, many national rights activists were also involved in general human rights activities. However, the sources used for the data base usually indicate a primary motivating factor for dissent activity even if another motivating factor, or several other motivating factors, played a significant role.

incorporation of these territories into the Soviet Union during World War II, and considered themselves prisoners of war detained for carrying out military actions against an occupying power.

Sources

The three main sources which were used in a consistent fashion to supply information for this data base were:

- i) The Vesti iz SSSR (USSR News Brief) bulletin edited by Cronid Lubarsky and published in Munich, as well as the annual publication List of Political Prisoners in the USSR published by the USSR News Brief and the monthly supplement to the latter publication. The Vesti iz SSSR bulletin began publication on 15 November 1978, and all relevant information was extracted from all issues up to and including the first issue for 1989.
- ii) S.P. de Boer, E.J. Driessen and H.L. Verhaar, compilers and editors, Biographical Dictionary of Dissidents in the Soviet Union, 1956-1975 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982).
- iii) A Chronicle of Current Events, the irregular samizdat journal (64 issues) which appeared between 1968 and 1983 and was the main organ of the democratic human rights movement centred in Moscow.

All three sources listed above have achieved a solid reputation among both researchers and human rights organizations.² In addition, these sources attempt to cover the entire Soviet Union and have no specific biases apart from the general ones which affect all samizdat sources and publications based on samizdat (see Chapter 1 for details). Therefore only the names of political prisoners who are mentioned in these three sources have been included in my data base. Other sources have also been used, but only to provide additional biographical information about individuals mentioned in the three sources noted above.

Biographical Information

The following information was coded: 1) name; 2) nationality; 3) date of birth; 4) place of birth; 5) gender; 6) profession; 7) marital status; 8) level of education; 9) place of residence before arrest; 10) date of arrest; 11) date of trial, place of trial, and court jurisdiction; 12) article(s) under which sentenced (RSFSR Criminal Code); 13) sentence; 14) place(s) of detention; 15) date of release; 16) primary reason for arrest and trial.

Data Base Program

The PFS:File database manager program was used to organize the data on political prisoners. This program allows for the convenient retrieval and cross referencing of information from the categories listed above. A separate file was

²See, for example, Mark Hopkins, Russia's Underground Press: The Chronicle of Current Events (New York: Praeger, 1983); and the commentary on the Biographical Dictionary by Peter Reddaway in his article "Dissent in the Soviet Union," Problems of Communism 32 (November-December 1983): 4.

created each time a given individual was sentenced. If an individual included in the data base had served a term of imprisonment prior to 1965, this was also noted on a separate file.

The list below provides, in summary form, selected information on Soviet political prisoners from the data base. Additional information (including date and place of birth, gender, marital status, profession, place of residence prior to arrest, places of detention, etc.) has not been included in this summary, but is available upon request. Each entry has been constructed as follows:

Last name, initial of first name, (nationality), date of trial, (article(s) of RSFSR Criminal Code under which sentenced), term of detention,³ primary reason for arrest and trial.

Abbreviations: R (Russian); Uk (Ukrainian); M (Moldavian); CT (Crimean Tatar); J (Jewish); Li (Lithuanian); La (Latvian); E (Estonian); Az (Azerbaijani); G (Georgian); Ger (German); H (Hungarian); A (Armenian); Uz (Uzbek); Kaz (Kazakh); P (Polish); Bel (Belorussian).

The primary reasons for arrest and trial are defined as follows: exit -- attempt to leave the country without official permission (includes defection); nat -- activity in defence of national rights; emig -- activity in defence of the right to emigrate;

³If, instead of being sentenced to a definite term of imprisonment, an individual was forcibly detained in a psychiatric institution, this is noted by the use of the term "insane."

socio-econ -- activity in defence of socio-economic rights (includes unofficial trade union activity, organization of strikes, etc.); pol -- general political activity.

The last category (pol) includes activity in defence of general human rights, circulation of samizdat expressing general political (rather than nationalist, religious, or socio-economic) concerns, participation in general protest demonstrations, making critical (oral) pronouncements of a general nature, and socialist opposition.

In some cases very little information is available concerning a given political prisoner, apart from the fact that he/she was detained in a given location at a given time. Such cases have been omitted from this data base.

Political Prisoners, 1965-1985

Aban'kin, V., (R), 1967, (64), 12, exit

Abduldzhemilev, D., (CT), 1966, (190-3, 191), 2, nat-CT

Abduldzhemilev, F., (CT), 1967, (190-3, 191, 206), 3, nat-CT

Abduigaziev, E., (CT), 1968, (190-3, 190-1), 1.5, nat-CT

Abdulkhakova, E., (CT), 1967, (190-3, 191), nat-CT

Abdullaev, E., (CT), 1966, (112Uz, 113Uz), 2, nat-CT

Abduraimov, N., (CT), 1970, (190-1), 2, nat-CT

Abdurakhmanov, S., (?), 1983, (190-1), 2, pol

Abduramanov, Abdugafar, (CT), 1966, (112Uz, 113Uz), 2, nat-CT

Abduramanov, Amet, (CT), 1978, (?) 4, nat-CT; (also, 1967, (?) 2, nat-CT)

Abduramanov, Mansur, (CT), 1966, (190-3, 191), 2, nat-CT

Abduramanov, Shevket, (CT), 1961, (70-1, 64Uz), 5, nat-CT

Abdurashitov, D., (CT), 1974, (198), 1.5, nat-CT

- Abel, E., (Ger), 1974, (190-1), 3, emig
- Abibullaev, I., (CT), 1968, (190-1, 190-3) 2, nat-CT
- Abkhairov, S., (CT), 1968, (?), 2, nat-CT
- Ablaev, R., (CT), 1986, (190-1), 3, nat-CT
- Abliazizov, A., (CT), 1967, (?), 1, nat-CT
- Abramkin, V., (?), 1983, (190-1), 3, pol; (also 1980, (190-1) 3, pol)
- Abramov, M., (J), 1983, (206) ?, emig
- Abrutiene, E., (Li), 1983, (190-1, 70), 6, nat-Li
- Abrutis, V., (Li), 1980, (190-1), 2.5, pol
- Abuladze, G., (G), 1984, (148), 3, nat-G
- Adamovich, V., (?), 1976, (190-1), 3, pol
- Adviljons, A., (?), 1981, (209), 1.5, emig
- Afanas'ev, V., (?), 1968, (64), 12, pol
- Agabaian, O., (A), 1980, (70, 72), 3, nat-A
- Agaeu, N., (Az), 1976, (?), insane, pol
- Agafonov, (?), 1970, (?), insane, pol
- Ahonen, H., (E), 1983, (70), 7, nat-E
- Aidov, V., (?), 1967, (70), 5, pol
- Airapetov, D., (?), 1975, (70), 7, pol
- Airapetov, Pavel, (?), 1982, (70, 72), ?, pol
- Aizenberg, E., (J), 1985, (190-1), 2.5, emig
- Akadenko, F., (?), 1982, (70), 12, pol
- Akhmetov, E., (CT), 1968, (190-1, 190-3), 3, nat-CT

Akhmetov, N., (?), 1982, (190-1), insane, pol; (also, 1969, (70), 10, pol, and 1972, (206-2), 10, pol)

Akhmedev, P., (?), 1981, (70), 12, pol

Akhundov, M., (?), 1969, (?), 4, pol

Akimov, D., (CT), 1972, (190-1), 3, nat-CT

Akk, V., (La), 1969, (70, 72), 1.5, nat-La

Akramavichius, P., (Li), 1952, (old 58), 25, nat-Li

Akselrod, D., (J), 1983, (190-1), 1.5, pol

Akst, V., (?), 1983, (190-1), 2, ?

Alaian, A., (E), 1982, (83), insane, exit

Alamanov, R., (CT), 1966, (190-3, 191), 2, nat-CT

Albrekht, V., (Pol), 1985, (206-2), 3, pol; (also, 1983, (190-1), 3, pol)

Al'chikov, A., (CT), 1967, (190-3, 191), 2, nat-CT

Aleksandrov, G., (?), 1983, (190-1) insane, pol

Aleksandrovich, R., (J), 1971, (70-1), 1, emig

Alekseenko, S., (?), 1970, (83), insane, exit

Alekseev, M., (?), 1986, (70-2), 10, pol

Aliev, N., (?), 1980, (68, 70), 13, pol

Alieva, G., (CT), 1974, (198-1), 1, nat-CT

Alifanov, O., (?), 1985, (?), ?, exit

Alimov, R., (CT), 1968, (?), 2.5, nat-CT

Aliverdiiev, A., (?), 1970, (?), 15, pol

Alle, K., (E), 1981, (206-2), 3, nat-E

Al'tman, A., (J), 1970, (64, 72, 93-1), 10, emig

- Altunian, G., (A), 1981, (70), 12, poi; (also 1969, (191-1), 3, pol)
- Alu, A., (E), 1982, (206-2), 2, nat-E
- Amalrik, A., (R), 1973, (190-1), 3, pol; (also, 1965, (209), 2.5, pol, and 1970, (190-1), 3, pol)
- Ametova, S., (CT), 1969, (190-1), 1, nat-CT
- Amirdzhanian, K., (A), 1964, (70), 5, pol
- Anderson, K., (E), 1967, (64), 15, nat-E
- Andreev, M., (?), 1984, (191-1, 206-2), 5, pol
- Andreika, A., (Li), 1983, (206), 9, nat-Li; (also, 1982, (70), 4, nat-Li)
- Andriukov, P., (?), 1983, (70, 190-1), (?), pol
- Andriushin, E., (?), 1982, (70), 5, pol
- Andrushko, V., (Uk), 1982, (70), 15, nat-Uk; (also, 1960, (?), 5, pol)
- Anhalt, A., (Ger), 1981, (80), 2, emig
- Anikeiev, R., (?), 1980, (64), 12, exit
- Anishchenko, V., (?), 1981, (64), 10, exit
- Anisimov, A., (?), 1970, (?), insane, pol
- Anisimov, Victor, (?), 1977, (70), 10, poi
- Anokhin, P., (Uk), 1979, (?), ?, pol
- Anokhin, V., (?), 1963, (?), ?, pol
- Antipov, I., (?), 1971, (64), insane, exit
- Antonian, A., (A), 1969, (70-1, 72), 5, nat-A
- Antoniuk, Z., (Uk), 1982, (209), 1, nat-Uk; (also, 1972, (70), 10, nat-Uk)
- Antoniv, O., (Uk), 1982, (?), ?, nat-Uk
- Antonov, M., (R), 1968, (70), insane, nat-R

- Antsupov, E., (R), 1981, (70), 12, pol
- Apikian, A., (A), 1981, (70, 72), 2, nat-A
- Apostol, M., (Uk), 1961, (?), >5, nat-Uk
- Arakas, I., (E), 1977?, (77?), 12, nat-E
- Arakelian, G., (A), 1974, (70, 72, 69A), 2.5, nat-A
- Arenberg, A., (?), 1979, (64, 72, 89, 213-2, 218), 8, exit
- Arenberg, V., (?), 1979, (64, 72, 89, 210, 213-2, 218, 229), 12, exit
- Arkhangel'skii, V., (?), 1975, (206), 2.5, pol
- Arr, I., (E), 1982, (83), 2, exit
- Arshakian, A., (A), 1981, (70, 72), 11, nat-A; (also 1974, (70, 72), 10, nat-A)
- Artsimovich, M., (R), 1982, (190-1), insane, pol
- Arushanian, L., (A), 1969, (70), 1.5, nat-A
- Aruso, (E), 1982, (83), 2.5, exit
- Arutunian, E., (A), 1982, (190-1), 3, nat-A; (also 1980, (190-1), 2.5, nat-A)
- Arutunian, Genrikh, (A), 1985, (190-1, 154-3, 228), 7.5, ?
- Arutunian, Grachik, (A), 1985, (190-1, 154-3, 228), 5, ?
- Arutunian, M., (A), 1981, (70, 72), 12, nat-A
- Arutunian, S., (A), 1969, (70), 3, nat-A
- Arutunian, Vagan, (A), 1985 (190-1, 154-3, 228), 6
- Arutunian, Vartan, (A), 1981 (70, 72), 8, nat-A
- Asano , D., (CT), 1969 (198), ?, nat-CT
- Asanov, P., (CT), 1967 (190-3, 191), 2.5, nat-CT
- Asanov, U., (CT), 1972 (198), 1, nat-CT; (also 1967 (190-3, 191), 1, nat-CT)
- Asanov Z., (CT), 1968, (?), 1, ?

- Ashikian, A., (A), 1970, (70-1, 72), 2, nat-A
- Asselbaums, T., (La), 1952, (old 58), 25, nat-La
- Assmuss, K., (Ger), 1983, (190-1), 2, pol
- Astra, G., (La), 1983, (70), 12, nat-La; (also, 1961, (64, 70, 228), 15, nat-La)
- Asylbaiev, M., (Kaz), 1987, (79), 10, nat-Kaz
- Avagian, S., (A), 1987, (?), insane, nat-A; (also, 1982, (190-1), 3, nat-A)
- Avakov, A., (?), 1975, (70), ?, pol; (also, 1970, (70), 5, pol)
- Avdeev, A., (?), 1983, (83), 3, exit
- Avdeev, I., (R), 1959, (?), 6, pol
- Averichkin, B., (R), 1967, (64, 70), 8, nat-R
- Avetian, E., (?), 1983, (70), insane, pol
- Avetisian, L., (?), 1982, (94), 1, pol
- Avgustov, R., (?), 1971, (?), insane, pol
- Avilions, A., (?), (198, 209, 224), ?, emig
- Avramenko, V., (?), 1972, (?), insane, pol
- Axt, V., (Ger), 1983, (190-1), 2, pol
- Azamov, S., (?), 1982, (?), ?, pol
- Azernikov, B., (J), 1971, (70, 72), 3.5, emig
- Babaian, A., (A), 1969, (70-1, 72), 6, nat-A
- Babaian, V., (A), 1964, (70), 5, nat-A
- Babelev, F., (?), 1971, (190-1), ?, pol
- Babishchev, E., (?), 1974, (70, 72), ?, pol
- Babitskii, K., (J), 1968, (190-1, 190-3), 3, pol

- Babych, S., (Uk), 1976, (218-1), 15, pol; (also, 1960, (?), 3, pol; and 1964, (70), 10, pol; and 1968, (?), 6, pol)
- Badalian, L., (A), 1974, (70, 72), 2.5, nat-A
- Badolis, Z., (La), 1985, (70), 3, pol
- Badz'o, I., (Uk), 1979, (70), 12, nat-Uk
- Baev, G. (CT), 1969, (190-1), 2, nat-CT
- Bagdavadze, M., (G), 1983, (?), 3, pol
- Bagdonas, I., (Li), 1945, (?), insane, nat-Li
- Bagdonas, P., (Li), 1957, (old 58), 25, ?
- Bagretsov, I., (?), 1957, (?), 10, pol
- Baikovs, V., (La), 1962, (62 La), 4, ?
- Bairamov, R., (CT), 1969, (190-1), 3, nat-CT
- Bakanavichius, A., (Li), 1969, (68), 15, nat-Li
- Bakhmin, V., (?), 1983, (190-1), 1, pol; (also, 1980, (190-1), 3, pol)
- Bakhtiarov, O., (Uk), 1970, (190-1), 3, pol
- Bakich, M., (?), 1980, (?), insane, pol
- Bakunin, I., (?), 1979, (83), insane, exit
- Balakhonov, V., (R), 1985, (190-1), 3, pol; (also, 1974, (64), 12, exit)
- Balakirev, V., (R), 1973, (70), 4, pol
- Balashov, V., (?), 1962, (70), 10, pol
- Balodis, K., (La), ?, (?), ?, nat-La
- Balodis, Z., (?), 1985, (70), 3, pol
- Balter, A., (?), 1984, (?), ?, emig
- Baltrushis, A., (Li), 1970, (?), 4, nat-Li

- Baranauskas, S., (Li), 1964, (?), 10, nat-Li
- Baranov, Iurii, (R), 1968, (70-1, 72), 3, nat-R
- Baranov, Nikolai, ?, (70-2, insane, pol; (also, 1963, (70-1), 5, pol, and 1968, (70), insane, pol)
- Baranov, V., (Uk), 1980, (70), 12, nat-Uk
- Barbarchuk, N., (?), 1961, (?), >4, pol
- Bariev, A., (CT), 1969, (190-1), 1.5, nat-CT
- Barinov, V., (?), 1984, (83), 22.4, exit
- Barkans, I., (La), 1983, (70), 4, pol
- Barladianu, V., (Uk), 1977, (190-1), 3, pol; (also, 1980, (190-1), 3, nat-Uk)
- Barsegov, R., (A), 1970, (70-1, 72), .5, nat-A
- Basarab, D., (Uk), 1954, (old 58-1a), 25, nat-Uk
- Basargib, Viktor, (?), 1980, (70), 12, pol
- Bashkirov, P., (?), 1980, (122), ?, pol; (also, 1976, (190-1), 1.5, pol)
- Bastis, V., (Li), 1963, (?), 25, nat-Li
- Batovrin, S., (?), 1982, (?), insane, pol
- Batshev, V., (?), 1966, (209), 5, pol
- Batulin, (?), 1986, (70?), ?, pol
- Baturov, I., (?), ?, (70 or 64), insane, pol
- Batyrshyn, V., (?), 1986, (206), insane, pol
- Bruzhis, R., (Li), 1972, (190-2, 98?), 3, nat-Li
- Bazdyrev, V., (?), 1983, (70), insane, pol
- Bedarkov, A., (?), 1981, (70), 8, pol
- Bedrylo, S., (Uk), 1970, (70), 4, nat-Uk

- Begun, I., (J), 1982, (70), 12, emig; (also, 1977, (43), 3, emig
- Bekdualieva, R., (?), 1970, (?), 3, pol
- Bekirov, L., (CT), 1979, (191-2), 4, nat-CT
- Belauskene, I., (Li), 1983, (70), 7, nat-Li
- Beletskii, V., (?), 1981, (70), insane, pol
- Beliak, S., (?), 1983, (70?), 10, pol
- Belik, I., (?), 1962, (?), ?, soc-econ
- Beloborodov, L., (R), 1971, (70), insane, pol; (also, 1969, (83), 2, exit)
- Belogorodskaiia, I., (?), 1973, (?), ?, pol; (also, 1969, (190-1), 1, pol)
- Belokopytov, V., (?), 1985, (64, 70), 7, exit
- Belomesov, V., (?), 1971, (70, 72), 4, pol
- Belous, V., (?), 1972-3, (190-1), ?, pol
- Belov, I., (R), 1968, (70-2), 5, pol; (also, 1963, (70-1), 5, pol)
- Belov, N., (?), 1976, (64, 102), 12, exit
- Belov, S., (?), 1982, (190-1), insane, emig
- Benderskii, G., 1969, (83), ?, exit
- Benner, I., (Ger), 1983, (96), ?, emig
- Benzo, V. (?), 1979, (?), insane, pol
- Berdiugin, V., (?), 1982, (190-1, 154-2), 8, pol
- Berdnikov, M., (?), 1983, (?), insane, pol
- Berdnychuk, A., (Uk), 1970, (64, 70), 12, exit
- Berdnyk, O., (Uk), 1979, (70), 6, nat-Uk; (also, 1949, (?), 6, nat-Uk)
- Berdzenishvili, D., (G), 1983, (70), 9, nat-G
- Berdzenishvili, L., (G), 1983, (70), 9, nat-G

- Berenshtein, I., (J), 1984, (191-1-2), 4, emig
- Berezin, (?), 1959, (?), 15, deser
- Berg, A., (E), 1983, (83, 312-2), 2, exit
- Berger, A., (J), 1969, (70, 72), 6, pol
- Bergman, P., (Ger), 1974, (190-1, 190-3, 210), 3, nat-E
- Berman, G., (J), 1972, (198-1), 3, emig
- Bernshtam, M., (?), 1973, (?), insane, pol
- Berozashvili, M., (G), 1960, (?), 5, soc-econ; (also 1950, (old 58), 10, pol)
- Bersenev, V., (?), 1970, (70, 72), 3, pol
- Beryslavs'kyi, M. (Uk), 1969, (70), 2.5, nat-Uk; (also, (Stalin era), ?, nat-Uk)
- Berzin'sh, G., (La), 1969, (70, 72), 3, pol, nat-La
- Bessonov, Iurii, (?), ?, 12, deser
- Betker, P., (E), 1985, (206-2), nat-E
- Bezdrovnykh, V., (?), 1983, (190-1), ?, pol
- Biarankis, K., (Li), 1969, 15, nat-Li
- Bichuchaite, K., (Li), 1972, (?), 1, nat-Li
- Biletsky, (?), 1980, (174), 8, emig
- Bilialov, S., (CT), 1984, (190-1), ?, nat-CT
- Bilialov, S., (CT), 1970, (190-1), 1, pol
- Birzhis, P., (Li), 1959, (old 58), 25, nat-Li
- Bishevaia, E., (?), 1981, (190-1), 1.5, pol
- Blatnoi, D., (J), 19981, (173), 8, emig
- Blimovich, V., (?), 1982, (70), 8, pol, emig
- Bobrov, V., (R), 1970, (70, 72), 4, pol

- Bobrov, Vladimir, (?), before 1974, (?), ?, pol
- Bochevarov, G., (R), 1968, (70-1, 72), 2.5, nat-R
- Bodnia, M., (J), 1970, (64a, 72, 83-15, 93-1-15), 4, emig
- Bogach, N., (?), 1969, (?), 3, pol
- Bogachev, A., (?), 1959, (?), 7, soc-econ
- Bogdanov, V., (?), 1968, (64), 10, pol
- Bogdzevich, I., (?), 1985, (70?), ?, pol
- Bogdzevich, V., (?), 1985, (70?), insane, pol
- Bogoraz, L., (J), 19968, (190-1, 190-3), 4, pol
- Bogoslovskii, A., (?), 1984, (190-1), 3, pol
- Boguslavskii, (?), 1968, (70), 3, pol
- Boguslavskii, V., (J), 1971, (70, 72), 3, emig
- Boichuk, I., (Uk), 1970, (64, 66, 70), 20, nat-Uk
- Bokshtein, I., (?), 1962, (70, 72), 5, pol
- Bolonkin, A., (R), 1982, (70), 6, pol; (also, 1972, (70-1), 6, pol, and 1978, (93-2, 147-2, 156-1), 3, pol)
- Bombin, M., (?), 1986, (190-1), ?; pol
- Bondar, I., (Uk), 1981, (?), ?, nat-Uk
- Bondar', N., (Uk), 1971, (70-1), 7, pol
- Bondarenko, O., (?), 19969, insane, pol
- Bondarenko, V., (?), 1943, (?), ?, pol
- Bondarev, I., (?), 1974, (?), insane, exit
- Bonner, E., (R), 1984, (190-1), 5, pol
- Borisov, I., (?), 1970, (206-2), 3, pc!

- Borisov, V., (?), 1969, (190-1), insane, pol; (also, 1965, (70, 72, 218), insane, pol)
- Borisov, Vladimir Il'ich, (?), 1969, (190-1), insane, pol
- Borisov, Vladimir Sergeevich, (?), 1969, (190-1), insane, pol
- Borodin, L. (R), 1982, (70), 15, pol; (also, 1968, (70-1, 72), 6, nat-R)
- Borodin, N., (?), 1980, (206-2), insane, pol
- Borovik, P., (?), 1983, (?), insane, pol
- Borovikov, V., (?), 1982, (?), insane, pol
- Borovnyts'kyi, I. (Uk), 1961, (70-1, 190-1), 10, nat-Uk
- Borovskii, A., (?), 1970, (83), insane, exit
- Boss, D., (Ger), 1950, (old 58-10), insane, pol
- Bragunets, E., (?), before 1975, (?), insane, emig
- Brailovsky, V., (J), 1981, (190-1) 5, emig
- Braun, N., (R), 1969, (70), 9, pol
- Breslavskii, N. (?), 1956, (83-15), insane, exit; (also, 1945, (old 58-1a), 10, emig)
- Brikulis, I., (Li), ?, (?), 10, nat-Li
- Brind, I., (J), 1972, (190-1), 2.5, emig
- Brodskii, I., (J), 1964, (?), 5, pol
- Brodskii, V., (?), 1985, (206-2), 3, pol
- Brovko, I., (?), 1975, (?), insane, pol
- Bruzhas, I., (Li), 1966, (?), 10, nat-Li
- Bubela, A., (Uk), 1981, (?), executed, nat-Uk
- Bublyk, V., (Uk), 1959, (?), insane, nat-Uk
- Rudagian, I., (A), 1971, (70, 72), 3.5, pol
- Buz'iliak-Sharygin, M., 1970, (64), 10, pol

- Buiakov, (?), 1986, (70), insane, pol
- Bukovskii, V., (R), 1972, (70), 12, pol; (also, 1963, (?), insane, pol, and 1965, (?), insane, pol, and 1967, (190-3), 3, pol)
- Bulakh, E., (?), 1981, (190-1), 1, pol
- Bulev, A., (?), 1979, (?), insane, pol
- Bumeisters, I., (La), 1981, (64, 88), 15, nat-La
- Burbulis, A. (Li), 1964, (?), 15, nat-Li
- Burkov, E., (?), 1982, (66), 7, pol
- Burmistrovich, I., (J), 1969, (190-1), 3, pol
- Burnickis, H., (La), 1981, (?), insane, nat-La
- Burov, A. (?), 1961, (?), 3 exit; (also, 1944, (?), 5, exit, and ?, 20, exit)
- Bushin, V., (?), 1981, (190-1), insane, pol
- Bushinskas, K., (Li), before 1974, (?), ?, pol
- Bushniak, N., (?), 1981, (190-1), ?, pol
- Butchenko, I., (?), 1983, (198-2) 1, pol; (also, 1975, (64), 8, pol)
- Butenko, I., (?), ?, (64), ?, pol
- Buterus, G., (Ger), 1979, (64), insane, exit
- Butko, A., (?), 1974, (190-1), insane, pol
- Butman, G., (J), 1971, (64a(17), 70, 72, 189-1), 10, emig
- Butnyts'kyi, I., (Uk), 1981, (?), executed, nat-Uk.
- Butov, P., (?), 1982, (70), 7, pol
- Buzas, P., (Li), 1980, (70), 1.5, pol
- Buzin, I., (R), 1968, (70-1, 72), 3, nat-R
- Buzinnikov, E., (?), 1978, (190-1), 3, pol; (also, 1955, (?), 1, soc-econ; and 1956, (?), 3, exit)

- Bychkov, G., (R), 1972, (190-1), insane, pol
- Bykov, B., (?), 1967, (?), 6, pol
- Bykov, V., (R), 1968, (70), insane, nat-R
- Chahaida, B., (Uk), ?, (66), insane, nat-Uk
- Chalyi, (?), 1980, (70?), ?, pol
- Chamovskikh, V., (?), 1971, (70), 7, soc-econ
- Chanturia, G., (?), 1983, (?), 3, pol
- Chanturishvili, T., (G), 1969, (70, 72, 91), 6, nat-G
- Charukhov, R., (CT), 1973, (206), 3.5, pol
- Chaus, A., (?), 1980, (70), ?, pol
- Chekali., A., (R), 1986, (188-3), 3, pol; (also, 1971, (70), 4, pol)
- Chekanavichius, A., (Li), 1980, (195, 196), insane, nat-Li; (also, 1973, (?), insane, nat-Li)
- Chekhovskoi, A., (? 1970, (70), 6, pol
- Chekialis, Rimas, (Li), 1973, (?), 3, nat-Li
- Chelebiev, D., (CT), 1984, (196), 1, pol; (also, 1967, (190-3, 191), 3, nat-CT)
- Chemertan, S., (M), 1964, (70, 72), 5, pol
- Chepula, A., (?), ?, (?), insane, soc-econ
- Cherdyntsev, I., (R), after 1964, (206), 4, pol; (also, 1964, (70, 72) 6, pol)
- Cherep, A. (?), 1978, (?), insane, emig
- Cherepanov, V., (?), 1981, (218, 64), 12, exit
- Cherkaiev, A., (?), 1984, (70), ?, pol
- Cherkasov, A., (?), 1986, (?), insane, pol
- Cherkavs'kyi, V., (Uk), 1968, (64), 15, nat-Uk

- Chernetskii, V., (?), 1982, (70, 72), ?, pol
- Cherniavska, I., (?), 1981, (190-1), 3, pol
- Chernobytsky, B., (J), 1981, (191-1), 1, emig
- Chernoglaz, D., (J), 1971, (70-1, 72), 5, emig
- Chernogorov, A., (?), 1975, (70), insane, pol
- Chernykh, B., (?), 1983, (190-1, 70), 5, pol
- Cherniak, A., (?), 1984, (93-2, 196), 4, emig.
- Chernykh, V., (?), 1982, (?), ?, pol
- Chernyshov, A., (?), 1982, (190-1, 162-2, 218), 3.5, pol
- Chernyshov, V., (R), 1970, (70), insane, nat-R
- Cherpakov, G., (?), 1971, (?), insane, exit
- Chesnokov, V., (?), 1967, (64), 10, exit
- Chevierev, V., (?), 1984, (190-1), 2, pol
- Chikatueva, V., (R), 1965, (70-1, 72), 3, pol
- Chikhladze, T., (G), 1984, (?), 15, exit
- Chinnov, A., (R), 1969, (64), insane, exit
- Chistkov, V., (?), 1969, (83), insane, exit
- Chitanava, V., (C), 1980, (70), 7, nat-G
- Chiukshlis, K., (Li), 1963, (?), 15, nat-Li
- Chkheidze, T., (?), 1983, (?), 3, pol
- Chobanov, M., (CT), 1972, (198), 1, nat-CT; (also, 1968, (191-1), 3, nat-CT)
- Chokmar, A., (CT), 1967, (?), 1, nat-CT
- Chornomaz, B., (Uk), 1972, (70), 4, nat-Uk

Chornovil, V., (Uk), 1980, (117), 5, nat-Uk; (also, 1966, (190-1), ?, nat-Uk, and 1972, (70-1), 9, nat-Uk)

Chorny, (Uk), before 1974, (70), 6, nat-Uk

Chorny, P., (Uk), 1979, (70), 6, pol

Chornyshov, V., (Uk), 1962, (?), 4, nat-Uk

Chubatyi, M., (Uk), 1966, (70), 4, nat-Uk

Chuchman, P., 1969, (64), 15, nat-Uk; (also, 1947, (old 58), ?, nat-Uk)

Chuchman, S., (Uk), 1969, (64), ?, nat-Uk; (also, 1947, (old 58), ?, nat-Uk)

Chuiko, B., (Uk), 1980, (93), 6, nat-Uk; (also 1947, (?), ?, nat-Uk, and 1961, (64), 20, nat-Uk)

Chukaev, A., (?), 1985, (70), 10, pol

Chuklin, A., (?), 1986, (83), insane, exit

Chukshis, K., (?), 1963, (64), 15, pol

Chu-nai-bo, (Chinese), 1981, (92-2, 156-2), 6, pol

Chuprii, R., (Uk), 1973, (70, 72), 4, nat-Uk

Chraev, S., (?), 1976, (190-1), insane, ?

Churganov, A., (?), ?, (70, 130), ?, pol

Dagdzh, T., (CT), 1967, (74), 3, nat-CT

Dagdzhiev, A., (CT), 1966, (190-3, 191), 2, nat-CT

Dambrauskas, A., (Li), 1962, (?), ?, pol

Dambrauskas, L., (Li), 1984, (70), 5.5, pol

Daniel, I., (J), 1966, (70-1), 5, pol

Daniliuk, I., (?), 1974, (190-1), 3, pol

Danilov, N., (?), 1968, (70), insane, pol

Danne, E., (La), 1969, (64, 70), 7, pol

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- Dapshiene, Z., (Li), 1978, (?), 4, pol
- Dasiv, K., (Uk), 1973, (70), 10, nat-Uk
- Dauic̃tas, I., (Li), 1976, (70), 7, pol
- Davarashvili, B., (G), 1972, (?), insane, nat-G
- Davidenko, G., (?), 1971, (70, 72), 4, pol
- Davidov-Ryzhov, V., (?), 1979, (190-1), insane, pol
- Davletov, K., (?), 1971, (70), insane, pol
- Davlid-Zade, V., (?), 1976, (92-3), 10, emig
- Davydov, G., (R), 1973, (70-1), 7, pol
- Davydov, V., (?), 1979, (190-1), insane, pol
- Delone, V. (R), 1968 (190-1, 190-3), 3, pol
- Delydivka, V (Uk), 1983 (70), 11, pol
- Demchuk, A. (Uk), 1970, (64), 15, nat-Uk
- Demchuk, H. (Uk), 1958, (old 58), 25, nat-Uk
- Demchyshyn, A. (Uk), 1969, (64), 15, nat-Uk
- Demianchuk, T. (Uk), 1972, (64), 15, nat-Uk
- Demianov, I. (?), 1975, (?), insane, pol
- Demianov, N. (?), 1971, (64, 70, 218-1), insane, pol
- Demin, V. (?), 1985, (70), 5, pol
- Demydiv, D. (Uk), 1973, (70, 72, 223-19-Russ), 5, nat-Uk
- Denisenko, G., (?), 1971, (70), 7, pol
- Denisov, A., (?), 1978, (190-1), insane, pol
- Denisov, E., (?), 1985, (?), insane, pol
- Denisov, S., (?), 1985, (?), insane, pol

- Deonisiadi, G., (?), 1967, (?), 5, pol
- Diad'kin, I., (?), 1980, (190-1), 3, pol
- Diak, M., (Uk), 1967, (64, 72, 218), 17, nat-Uk
- Diak, V., (Uk), 1971, (93-3), 10, pol; (also, 1971, (70), 5, nat-Uk)
- Didenko, K., (?), 1967, (64), 15, pol
- Didenko, V., (?), 1984, (64), 10, deser
- Din, O., (CT), 1972, (?), 1, nat-CT; (also, 1969, (?), 1.5, nat-CT)
- Dinmukhamedov, R., (?), 1969, (?), 13, pol
- Diter, H., (Ger), 1985, (117), 7, emig
- Diukarev, M., (?), 1982, (64), 12, exit
- Dmitrienko, V., (?), before 1979, (?), insane, pol
- Dobrosmyslov, I., (?), 1974, (190-1), insane, pol
- Dobrovolskii, A., (R), 1968, (70), 2, pol; (also, 1964, (?), insane, pol)
- Dolgii, P., (?), 1974, (190-1), insane, pol
- Dolinin, V., (?), 1983, (70), 5, pol
- Dolishnyi, I., (Uk), 1966, (?), ?, nat-Uk
- Dolishnyi, V., (Uk), 1985, (209), 3, nat-Uk; (also, 1972, (70), 10, nat-Uk)
- Donskii, G., (?), 1984, (70, 154), 5, pol
- Dor'ch, (?), 1962, (?), 4, pol
- Doronina, L., (La), 1983, (70), 8, pol; (also, 1970, (190-1), 2, pol)
- Dovganich, Z., (?), 1969, (?), 10, pol
- Dragosh, N., (R), 1964, (70, 72), 7, pol
- Dragunas, R., (?), 1969, (64 Li), 4, pol
- Dreer, A., (?), 1984, (70), ?, pol

- Dreizner, S., (J), 1971, (70-1, 72, 189-1), 3, emig
- Dremluga, V., (R), 1970, (190-1), 3, pol; (also, 1968, (190-1), 3, pol)
- Drop, (Uk), 1962, (?), 15, nat-Uk
- Dubauskas, I., (Li), 1953, (old 58), 25, nat-Li
- Dubrovin, V., before 1972, (70), insane, pol
- Dudenas, M., (?), 1962, (64), 15, pol
- Dudin, A., (?), 1968, (64), 15, exit
- Dufanets', M., (Uk), 1981, (?), executed, nat-Uk
- Dumanis, A., (?), 1979, (174), 2.5, emig
- Duzhyns'kyi, R., (Uk), 1965, (70), 4, pol
- Dvoretiskii, F., (?), 1977, (?), insane, pol
- Dykii, (Uk), 1965, (70), 8, nat-Uk
- Dymshits, M., (J), 1970, (64a, 70, 72, 93-1, 218-1), 15, emig
- Dzabiradze, V., (G), 1983, (70), 9, pol
- Dzhemilev, E., (CT), 1965, (206), 1, nat-CT
- Dzhemilev, M., (CT), 1986, (188-3), 3, nat-CT; (also, 1966, (80-1), 1.5, nat-CT, and 1970, (190-1), 3, nat-CT, and 1974, (198-1), 1, nat-CT, and 1979, (24, 42 Uz), 4, nat-CT, and 1984, (190-1), 3, nat-CT)
- Dzhemilev, R., (CT), 1979, (190-1), 3, nat-CT; (also, 1967, (190-3, 191) 1, nat-CT, and 1973, (190-1, 190-3), 3, nat-CT)
- Dzhepperov, N., (CT), 1966, (190-3, 191), 2, nat-CT
- Dzhiaugis, A., (Li), 1965, (64), 15, pol
- Dzhit'lov, V., (?), 1972, (70), insane, pol
- Dzhvarsheishvili, T., (G), 1975, (?), 4, pol
- Dziuba, Iurii, (Uk), 1974, (70), 5, nat-Uk

- Dziuba, Ivan, (Uk), (70), 5, nat-Uk
- Edelshtein, I., (?), 1984, (224-3), 3, emig
- Efimov, A., (?), 1970, (70), insane, pol
- Efimov, L., (?), 1970, (70), insane, pol
- Efremov, N., (?), 1985, (190-1), ?, pol
- Egiazarian, S., (A), 1981, (70, 72), 4, nat-A
- Egides, P., (J), 1970, (190-1), insane, pol; (also, 1947, (?), 6, pol)
- Egorov, A., (?), 1973, (70, 72), 4, pol
- Eikhvald, V., (?), 1971, (190-1), insane, pol
- Einman, K., (E), 1981, ((206-2), 1, nat-E
- Ekimian, G., (A), 1969, (70-1, 72), 6, nat-A
- Ekimov, A., (?), 1971, (70), insane, pol
- Elbert, L., (?), 1983, (198-1), 1, emig
- Elchin, V., (J), 1982, (70), 5, pol
- Elin, M., (?), 1965, (64), 10, deser
- Emelkina, N., (?), (190-1), 5, pol
- Epshtein, S., (?), 1985, (188-3), 2, pol; (also, 1983, (190-1), 2, pol)
- Eremenko, A., (?), 1981, (190-1), 2.5, pol
- Ernakov, G., (R), 1982, (70-2), 10, pol; (also, 1974, (70), 4, pol)
- Ermolaev, S., (?), 1979, (206-2), 4, pol
- Ermolenko, V., (Uk), 1985, (?), ?, nat-Uk
- Eshmantas, G., (Li), 1980, (70), 11, nat-Li
- Evdokimov, B., (?), 1972, (70), insane, pol
- Evdokimov, R., (R), 1983, (70), 8, pol

- Evfratova, T., (?), 1982, (?), ?, pol
- Evgrafov, M., (Uk), 1975, (70), 10
- Evsiukov, Serafim D., (?), 1986, (?), insane, pol
- Evsiukov, Serafim S., (?), 1986, (80), 3, emig; (also, 1980, (80), 2.5, emig)
- Fadeev, N., (?), 1979, (?), insane, exit
- Fadeeva, A., (?), 1986, (?), insane, pol
- Fadin, A., (?), 1982, (70), ?, pol
- Faikin, N., (J), 1985, (190-1), 3, emig
- Fainberg, V., (J), 1968, (190-1, 190-3), insane, pol
- Falkov, B., (?), 1984, (?), ?, emig
- Farbyshevs'kyi, I., (Uk), 1967, (?), 15, nat-Uk
- Fast, G., (Ger), 1974, (190-1, 190-3), 2, emig
- Fedorenko, V., (Uk), 1975, (64, 70), 20, exit; (also, 1959, (?), 7, ?, and 1967, (?), 5, ?)
- Fedorenko, V., (Uk), 1982, (?), 5, pol
- Fedorov, I., (?), 1969, (70), 11, pol
- Fedorov, Iurii P., (R), 1962, (70-1, 72), 5, pol; (also, 1970, (64a, 72, 93-1), 15, exit)
- Fedorov, L., (?), 1971, (68, 70), insane, pol
- Fedoseev, N., (?), 1969, (70), 12, soc-econ
- Fedotov, M., (?), 1985, (64), 4, pol
- Feldman, A., (J), 1973, (206-2), 3.5, emig
- Feldman, A., (?), 1979, (206-2), 4, emig
- Feldman, G., (?), 1983, (70), 6, pol
- Fertikh, I., (Ger), 1974, (190-1), 3, emig

- Fetisov, A., (?), 1968, (70), insane, pol
- Filatov, V., (?), 1973, (76-1, 174, 177), 6, pol
- Fin, R., (?), 1971, (96-1, 190-1), insane, pol
- Finkelshtern, A., (?), 1982, (64), 8, emig
- Fokeev, M., (R), 1970, (70, 72), 3, pol
- Forpostov, G., (Pol), 1968, (?), insane, exit
- Fradkova, N., (?), 1984, (209), 2, emig
- Freimanis, G., (La), 1983, (70-2), 6, nat-La
- Frenkel, V., (J), 1985, (190-1), 1.5, pol
- Frolov, O., (R), 1970, (70, 72), 5, pol
- Gabai, I., (J), 1970, (190-1), 3, pol
- Gaenko, V., (R), 1965, (70-1, 72), 4, pol
- Gafarov, R., (CT), 1967, (190-1, 190-3), 1, nat-CT
- Gaiauskas, B., (Li), 1978, (70-2) 15, nat-Li; (also, 1948, (?), 25, nat-Li)
- Galanskov, I., (R), 1968, (70, 72, 88), 7, pol
- Galdikas, B., (Li), 1948, (old 58), 25, nat-Li; (also, 1956, (?), 3, nat-Li)
- Galkin, L., (?), 1983, (190-1), 3, pol
- Gal'perin, A. (J), 1971, (70-1, 72, 89-2), 2.5, emig
- Gamsakhurdia, Z. (G), 1978, (70), 5, nat-G
- Ganelin, V. (J), 1982, (173), >4, emig
- Ganiushkin, A. (?), 1971, (?), insane, pol
- Garoza, B. (P), 1972?, (64), 15, pol
- Gavrilov, (?), 1982, (190-1), 2, pol
- Gavrilov, G. (R), 1970, (70, 72), 6, pol

- Giedra, R. (Li), 1962, (64), 10, exit
- Geidane, B. (La), 1969, (70), 1.5, nat-La
- Geltser, I. (?), 1982, (190-1), 3, pol
- Gendler, I. (J), 1968, (70-1, 158-1), 3, pol
- Genik (?), ? (old 58), 25, pol?
- Gershkanu, N. (M), ? (?), insane, nat-M
- Gershuni, V. (?), 1982, (190-1), insane, pol; (also, 1969 (190-1), insane, pol, and 1949 (?), 10, pol)
- Gette, I. (G), 1984, (190-1), 4.5, emig
- Gilev, N. (?), 1971, (64), 10, exit
- Gimbutas, I. (Li), 1948 (old 58), 30, nat-Li
- Gimpu, G. (M), 1972, (70), 6, nat-M
- Ginzburg, A. (J), 1968, (70-1), 5, pol; (also, 1978, (70-2), 8, pol)
- Giunashian, S., (A), 1982, (190-1), 3, nat-A; (also, 1969, (70-1, 72) 4, nat-A)
- Gunter, V., (Ger), 1984, (190-1), 1, pol
- Gladko, ^c, (?), 1962, (64), 13, exit
- Glezer, I., (J), 1972, (70), 6, emig
- Glukhov, A., (?), 1978, (?), insane, emig
- Glukhov, I., (?), 1985, (70), insane, pol
- Gluzman, S., (J), 1972, (70), 10, pol
- Gogbaidze, (G), 1984, (70), 4, nat-G
- Gogia, Z., (G), 1980, (70), 9, nat-G
- Gogiashvili, G., (G), 1985, (70), insane, pol.
- Goldfeld, A., (J), 1971, (70-1, 72, 89-2), 4, emig

- Goldovich, A., (?), 1985, (64, 70, 75, 88), 20, exit
- Golts, I., (?), 1972, (191-1), 3, pol
- Golub, A., (?), 1962, (64), 12, exit
- Gomelskii, V., (?), 1966, (190-1), 2.5, pol
- Goncharov, V., (?), 1979, (190-1), 3, pol
- Gonin, V., (?), before 1979, (?), insane, exit
- Gorbachev, S., (?), 1980, (190-1), 2, pol
- Gorbanevskiaia, N., (R), 1970, (190-1, 191), insane, pol
- Gordienko, A., (?), 1982, (209), ?, pol
- Goriachev, P., (?), 1969, (64), ?, exit
- Gorokhovskii, L., (?), 1969, (?), 4, pol
- Goux, R., (?), 1982, (?), insane, emig
- Grabans, I., (La), 1968, (64), nat-La
- Grachev, (?), 1973, (190-1), insane, ?
- Grantins, L., (La), 1987, (198-1), .5, pol
- Graur, V., (?), 1972, (70), 4, pol
- Grazhis, I., (Li), 1975, (70), 3, nat-Li
- Grebenshchikov, V., (?), 1967, (70), 7, pol
- Grezin, B., (?), 1983, (70, 206-2, 228), 4, pol
- Grigas, S., (Li), 1967, (64), 15, nat-Li
- Grigas, V., (Ger), 1971, (209), insane, pol
- Grigor'ev, V., (Uk), 1970, (70), 6, exit
- Grigoriants, S., (A/R), 1983, (70), 10, pol; (also, 1975, (154-2, 190-1), 5, pol)
- Grilius, S., (J), 1970, (70, 72), 8, pol

- Grimm, I., (?), 1964, (70), 6, pol; (also, 1980, (190-1), 3, pol)
- Grinev, V., (?), 1984, (190-1), 1.5, pol; (also, 1982, (190-1), 3, pol)
- Grinkiavichius, K., (Li), 1972, (98, 190-3,), 3, nat-Li
- Gritsius, I., (?), 1954, (old 58), 25, pol
- Griunval'd, N., (?), 1947-48,(?), 25, pol
- Grivnina, I., (?), 1981, (190-1), 5, pol
- Groberman, I., (J), 1979, (206-2), 4, emig
- Grodetskii, I., (?), 1972, (64), 4, exit
- Gromov, L., (?), 1985, (98-3), insane, soc-econ
- Grudzis, S., (Li), before 1974, (64), 15, pol
- Gubanov, E., (R), 1972, (?), 1, pol
- Gubanov, L., (?), 1965, (?), insane, pol
- Gudava, E., (G), 1986, (206-2), 4, emig
- Gudava, T., (G), 1986, (70), 10, emig
- Gudilin, V., (?), 1968, (?), insane, pol
- Grudzis, K., (Li), ?, (64), 15, nat-Li
- Guenter, V., (Ger), 1984, (190-1), 1, emig
- Guliev, B., (CT), 1967, (190-3, 191, 206), 3, nat-CT
- Gumer, K., (CT), 1982, (206-2), 3, pol
- Guseinova, L., (CT), 1968, (190-1), 1, nat-CT
- Gutkina, G., (?), 1978, (78), 10, pol
- Gutorov, (?), 1984, (?), 6, pol
- Gviniashvili, T., (G), 1983, (70), 4, nat-G
- Haiduk, R., (Uk), 1974, (70), 7, nat-Uk

- Haiovyyi, H., (Uk), 1961, (?), 6, nat-Uk
- Hallman, H., (E), 1981, (206-2), 1, pol
- Hamula, M., (Uk), 1974, (70), 7, nat-Uk
- Handziuk, V., (Uk), 1981, (206-2, 218-2), 3, nat-Uk; (also 1964, (70), 15, nat-Uk)
- Hasiuk, Ia., (Uk), 1960, (?), 12, nat-Uk
- Havryliuk, V., (Uk), 1968, (64), 15, nat-Uk
- Hel, I., (Uk), 1966, (70-1, 72), 3, nat-Uk; (also, 1972, (70), 15, nat-Uk)
- Henta, I., (Uk), 1966, (?), 5, nat-Uk
- Herchak, H., (Uk), 1952, (old 58), 25, nat-Uk
- Hermaniuk, B., (Uk), 1959, (old 58-1a, old 58-11), 10, nat-Uk
- Hevrych, Ia., (Uk), 1966, (70-1), 3, nat-Uk
- Hint, I., (E), 1983, (93-1, 170, 174, 175), 15, pol
- Hlyva, V., (Uk), 1952, (old 58-1), 25, nat-Uk
- Hnat, V., (Uk), 1961, (?), 15, nat-Uk
- Hohus', B., (Uk), 1962, (?), 15, nat-Uk
- Horbal, M., (Uk), 1984, (190-1, 70), 11, nat-Uk; (also, 1971, (70-1), 7, nat-Uk, and 1980, (117, 191-2), 5, nat-Uk)
- Horovyyi, V., (Uk), 1976, (?), 6, nat-Uk
- Horbovyi, V., (Uk), 1949, (old 58-2, old 58-11), 25, nat-Uk
- Horyn', B., (Uk), 1966, (70), 3, nat-Uk
- Horyn', M., (Uk), 1982, (70-2), 15, nat-Uk; (also, 1966, (70, 72), 6, nat-Uk)
- Hreshchuk, I., (Uk), 1971, (?), insane, pol; (also, 1975, (190-1), insane, pol)
- Hromiak, I., (Uk), 1953, (?), 25, nat-Uk
- Hryhorenko, P., (Uk), 1964, insane, pol; (also, 1970, (70, 190-1), insane, pol)

- Hryn', M., (Uk), 1966, (70), 3, nat-Uk
- Hryn'. R., (Uk), 1870, (70). 3, pol
- Hryn'kiv, D., (Uk), 1973, (70, 72), 10, nat-Uk
- Hrytsyna, B., (Uk), 1961, (?), executed, Nat-Uk
- Hubka, I., (Uk), 1967, (70-1, 72), 11, nat-Uk
- Hudyma, P., (Uk), 1974, (64), 15, nat-Uk
- Hurnyi, R., (Uk), 1961, (?), 15, nat-Uk
- Husiak, D., (Uk), 1950, (?), 25, nat-Uk
- Hutsalo, Iu., (Uk), before 1977, (?), 25, nat-Uk
- Hutsul, M., (uk), 1974, (70), 9, nat-Uk
- Huzei, S., (Uk), 1974, (64), 10, nat-Uk
- Iagman, L., (J), 1971, (70, 72, 189-1), 5, emig
- Iakas, S., (Li), 1972, (190-1), 2, nat-Li
- Iakhimovich, I., (Pol), 1969, (190-1), insane, pol
- Iakir, A., (?), 1984, (80), 2, emig
- Iakir, P., (J), 1973, (70-1), 1.5, pol; (also, imprisoned 1937-54)
- íakob, I., (E), 1974, (64), 15, nat-E
- Iakovlev, M., (?), 1981, (181), ?, pol
- Iakubauskas, K., (Li), 1965, (64), 15, nat-Li
- Iakubchionsis, G., (Li), 1986, (?), ?, nat-Li
- Iakubenko, N., (?), 1971, (70), insane, soc-econ
- Iakimov, (?), 1981, (?), insane, pol
- Iaminov, (?), 1978, (?), insane, pol
- Ianenko, V., (?), 1983, (70), 12, pol

- Ianin, V., (?), 1983, (188), 5, exit; (also, 1982, (174), 8, exit)
- Iankauskas, A., (Li), 1971, (?), insane, pol
- Iankevych, S., (Uk), before 1977, (?), 25, nat-Uk
- Iankov, G., (?), 1983, (?), 3, pol; (also, 1979, (70), insane, pol)
- Iankov, V., (?), 1983, (70), 7, pol
- Ianovitskas, I., (Li), 1962, (?), 13, nat-Li
- Ianulis, A., (Li), 1980, (70), 3.5, pol
- Iarve, V., (E), 1981, (190-1), 2, nat-E
- Iasakov, R., (?), before 1978, (?), insane, exit
- Iashkunas, H., (Li), 1977, (64, 70-2), 15, nat-Li
- Iasnyts'kyi, S., (Uk), 1953, (?), 25, nat-Uk
- Iastrauskas, A., (Li), 1962, (64), 12, exit
- Iatsenyi, K., (Uk), 1975, '64), 10, nat-Uk
- Iatsenko, V., (Uk), 1968, (190-1, 1, nat-Uk; (also, 1973, (?), insane, nat-Uk)
- Iatsys, I., (Li), 1971, (64), 12, nat-Li
- Iatsyshyn, M., (Uk), 1972, (70), 6, pol
- Iauchkois, I., (Li), 1967, (64), 12, pol
- Iauga, A., (Li), 1967, (64), 15, nat-Li
- Iauneika, A., (Li), 1960, (?), 15, nat-Li
- Iazydzhiev, I., (CT), 1969, (191-2, 190-1), 2, nat-CT
- Ibragimov, L., (CT), 1971, (?), 2, nat-CT
- Ibraimov, Z., (CT), 1967, (190-3, 191), 3, nat-CT
- Igoshin, P., (?), 1970, (130-2, 180-2, 190-1), 4, soc-econ
- Igrunov, V., (?), 1975, (?), insane, pol

- Ihnatenko, M., (Uk), 1981, (70), 11, pol
- Il'akov, V., (?), 1961, (70-1), 7, pol
- Il'in, A., (?), 1969, (66, 68, 72, 102), insane, pol
- Imnadze, A., (G), 1978, (70), 7, pol
- Ingerhold, A., (E), 1982, '83), ?, exit
- Iofe, O., (?), 1970, (70), insane, pol
- Iofe, V., (R), 1965, (70-1, 72), 3, pol
- Iokubynas, K., (Li), 1957, (?), 10, nat-Li, exit; (also, 1948, (?), 10, nat-Li)
- Ionutis, D., (Li), 1985, (162-2), 2, pol
- Iovchyk, M., (Uk), 1961, (?), 15, nat-Uk
- Irbitis, A., (La), 1972, (64), 15, nat-La
- Ird, I., (E), 1972, (64), 15, nat-E
- Isaev, G., (?), 1983, (70), ?, pol
- Islaiamov, K., (?), 1974, (70), 6, pol
- Iufimets, S., (?), 1983, (?), insane, pol
- Iunusov, G., (CT), 1979, (191-1), 2, pol
- Iurchyk, M., (Uk), 1959, (old 58-1a, old 58-11), 7, nat-Uk
- Iuravichius, M., (Li), 1981, (190-1), 3, pol
- Iurkevich, I., (?), 1969, (70), 4, pol
- Iuskevych, A., (Uk), 1975, (70), 5, pol
- Iusupov, M., (CT), 1968, (191-1) i, pol
- Iutsis, I., (Li), 1971, (64), 12, nat-Li
- Ivanitsky, A., (?), 1975, (70), insane, pol
- Ivan'kov, M., (?), 1956, (old 58), insane, pol

- Ivanov, Anatolii, (?), before 1977, (70), insane, pol
- Ivanov, Anatolii I., (?), 1970, (70), 5, pol
- Ivanov, Anatolii M., (?), 1982, (70), 6, pol; (also, 1962, (?), 7, pol)
- Ivanov, Iu., (?), 1955, (old 58-10, 58-11) 10, pol; (also, 1974, (?), insane, pol)
- Ivanov, M., (?), 1983, (64, 213-2) 12, exit
- Ivanov, N., (R), 1968, (70-1, 72), 6, nat-R
- Ivashchenko, D., (Uk), 1966, (70), 2, nat-Uk
- Iverieli, K., (G), 1984, (77, 83, 213-2), 15, exit
- Iverieli, P., (G), 1984, (?), 15, exit
- Ivlev, A., (R), 1968, (70-1, 72), 2, nat-R
- Ivoilov, V., (R), 1968, (70-1, 72), 6, nat-R
- Izatov, A., (Meskh), 1971, (?), ?, nat-Meskh
- Izmailov, F., (CT), 1968, (198), .5, nat-CT
- Izmailov, R., (CT), 1968, (?), 3, nat-CT
- Izvekov, I., (?), 1979, (68), 8, pol
- Kabanova, O., (?), 1985, (?), insane, pol,
- Kachinskas, A., (li), 1972, (98, 190-3, 206), 3, nat-Li
- Kachur, M., (Uk), 1967, (70-1, 72), 5, nat-Uk
- Kadashev, (?), 1980, (206-2), 2.5, emig
- Kadyev, R., (CT), 1979, (206), 3, nat-CT; (also, 1969, (190-1), 3, nat-CT
- Kadyrov, N., (CT), 1967, (190-3, 191), 2.5, nat-CT
- Kadyrov, S., (CT), 1985, (190-1), 3, nat-CT
- Kadzhionys, I., (Li), 1953, (?), 25
- Kagarlitskii, B., (J), 1982, (70, 72), ?, pol

- Kakabadze, N., (G), 1983, (?), 3, pol
- Kaktis, (Li), before 1960, (old 58), 25, pol
- Kalade, V., (Li), 1972, (98, 190-1,), 3, nat-Li
- Kalep, V., (E), 1981, (70), 4, nat-E
- Kalinin, I., (?), 1973, (?), insane, Pol
- Kalinin, V., (?), 1957, (old 58), 25, pol
- Kalishyn, A., (?), 1979, (68), insane, pol
- Kaliuzhnyi, V., (Uk), 1976, (83), insane, exit
- Kallas, T., (E), 1970, (72), insane, pol
- Kalnyn'sh, V., (La), 1963, (64, 68, 72), 10, nat-La
- Kalosh, H., (Uk), 1970, (?), insane, pol
- Kalugin, A., (?), 1982, (190-1, 206), insane, pol
- Kalva, P., (La), 1963, (?), 10, nat-La
- Kalynets', I., (Uk), 1972, (70), 9, nat-Uk
- Kalynychenko, V., (Uk), 1980, (70-2), 15, nat-Uk; (also, 1967, (64), 10, exit)
- Kamenskii, N., (?), 1970, (70, insane, pol
- Kaminskas, K., (Li), 1962, (?), 15, nat-Li
- Kaminskii, L., (J), 1971, (70-1, 72, 189-1), 5, emig
- Kampov, P., (Uk), 1981, ((93-3), 13, nat-Uk' (also, 1970, (70), 9, nat-Uk)
- Kanar, S., (CT), 1974, (?), 5, nat-CT
- Kandelaki, T., (G), 1985, (190-1), 3, pol
- Kandinov, I., (?), 1977, (174), 5, emig
- Kandyba, I., (Uk), 1981, (70-2), 15, nat-Uk; (also, 1961, (64-1, 72), 15, nat-Uk)
- Kanevskii, B., (?), 1983, (190-1), 5, pol

- Kaparov, M., (?), 1983, (70, 72), 8, pol
- Kapishin, A., 1979, (68), insane, pol
- Kapitonenko, (Uk), 1962, (?), 8, nat-Uk
- Kapitsynsh, I., (La), before 1969, 15, nat-La
- Kapoian, V., (?), before 1976, (64), 10, esp
- Kapranov, M., (R), 1970, (70, 72), 7, pol
- Karaev, E., (CT), 1966, 190-3, 191), 2, nat-CT
- Karaev, I., (CT), 1966, (112, 113 Uz), 1, nat-CT
- Karaliunas, V., 1975, (70), insane, pol
- Karalius, I., (Li), 1957, (old 58), 25, nat-Li
- Karapetian, A., (A), 1974, (190-1), 2, nat-A
- Karapetian, K., (A), 1974, (?), 2.5, nat-A
- Karavans'kyi, S., (Uk), 1970, (70), 8, pol; (also, 1945, (old 58), 25, nat-Uk)
- Kareisha, I., (?), 1980, (209), 1, pol
- Karibzhan-Uly, K., (Kaz), 1977, (?), insane, nat-Kaz
- Karimov, A., (CT), 1968, (190-1), 2, nat-CT
- Karmanov, A., (?), 1966, (70), insane, pol
- Karpavichius, P., (Li), 1964, (64), 15, nat-Li
- Karpenko, V., (Uk), 1969, (70), 1.5, nat-Uk
- Karpenok, M., (?), 1975, (64, 70), 7, pol
- Kartukha, V., (?), 1983, (206-2), 2, pol
- Karu, A., (E), 1982, (206-2) 2.5, nat-E
- Kashin, V., (?), 1974, (190-1), insane, pol
- Kashkov, Iu., (?), 1965, (?), insane, pol; (also, 1962, (70), insane, pol)

- Kasianov, S., (?), 1981, (68, 224), 7, pol
- Kasimov, I., (CT), 1968, (190-1), 1, nat-CT
- Kaspryshyn, A., (Uk), 1961, ((?), 5, nat-Uk
- Kaufman, I., (?), 1972, (?), ?, pol
- Kavoliunas, V., (Li), 1953, (?), 25, nat-Li
- Kazachkov, M., (?), 1981, (206-2), 3.5, pol; (also, 1976, (64, 88, 78, 154), 15, emig)
- Kazakevichius, A., (Li), 1953, (?), 25, nat-Li
- Kaznovs'kyi, V., (Uk), 1956, (?), 25, nat-Uk
- Kernychnyi, D., (Uk), before 1977, (?), 25, nat-Uk
- Keisin, Iu., (?) 1974, (?), insane, exit
- Keivan, B., (?), 1970, (?), 1, pol
- Kekilova, A., (Turk), 1971, (?), insane, pol
- Kendel, V., (?), 1982, (190-1), 1.5, pol
- Kerimov, Islam, (Meskh), 1972, (198), 1, nat-Meskh
- Ketenchiiev, R., (?), 1982, (64), 10, emig
- Khachatryan, A.K., (A), 1969, (70), 5, nat-A
- Khachatryan, A.Z., 1970, (70, 72), 5, nat-A
- Khachatryan, R., (A), 1974, (70, 72), 2.5, nat-A
- Khaibulin, (?), 1957, (old 58-10, old 58-11), 10, pol
- Khaimobvich, I., (J), 1967, (70), 7, pol
- Khairepdinova, K., (CT), 1965, (206), .5, nat-CT
- Khairov, I., (CT), 1968, (190-1), 1.5, nat-CT
- Khakhaev, S., (R), 1965, (70-1, 72), 10, pol

- Khakhulin, I., (?), 1981, (70), 3.5, pol
- Khalibaev, S., (CT), 1967, (?), 2, nat-CT; (also, 1969, (190-1), 1, nat-CT)
- Khalikov, E., (CT), 1973,(190-1), 2.5, nat-CT
- Khalikov, R., (?), 1982, (70, 72), ?, pol
- Khalilova, M., (CT), 1969, (190-1), 1, nat-CT
- Khalman, H., (E), 1981, (206-2), 1, nat-E
- Khanas, (Uk), 1962, (?), 12, nat-Uk
- Khantsis, I., (J), 1970, (206-2), 2.5, emig; (also, 1972, (190-1), 2, emig)
- Khanzhenkov, S., (Bel), 1963, (?), 10, pol
- Kharitonov, V., (R), 1973, (70), insane, pol
- Kharlanov, V. (?), 1970, (66), 5, polr
- Khasanov, A. (?), 1984, (?), insane, pol
- Khaustov, V. (?), 1974, (70), 6, pol
(also 1967, (190-3, 206-2), 3, pol)
- Khavkin, I., (R), 1982, (70), ?, pol
- Kheifets, M., (J), 1974, (70), 6, pol
- Khermlin, R., (E), 1980, (206), 1.5, nat-E
- Khlopotin, G., (J), 1984, (?), ?, emig
- Khmara, S., (Uk), 1980, (70), 12, nat-Uk
- Khnokh, A., (J), 1970, (64a-15, 70, 72, 93-1), 10, emig
- Khobta, P. (?), 1973, (70), 9, pol
- Khodorovich, S. (R), 1986, (188-3), 3, pol; (also, 1983, (190-1), 3, pol)
- Khodzhaeva, U. (CT), 1967, (190-3, 192Uz, 204Uz), 3, nat-CT
- Kholmiansky, A. (J), 1985, (200, 218), 1.5, emig

- Khomiak, I. (Uk), 1956, (old 58), insane, nat-Uk
- Khomiakevych, O., (Uk), 1961, (?), 12, nat-Uk
- Khomizuri, G., (A), 1983, (70), 9, pol
- Khotyns'kyi, Iukhym, (Uk), 1985, (?), executed, nat-Uk
- Khramov, N., (?), 1984, (80), ?, pol
- Khramtsov, Iu., (?), 1980, (198-2), 6, emig; (also, 1953, (?), 25, exit)
- Khromenkov, V., (?), 1986, (206-2), 4.5, pol
- Khrystynych, B., (Uk), 1960, (?), long term, nat-Uk
- Khudenko, I., (?), 1973, (93-1,), 6, soc-econ
- Kiago, R., (E), 1984, (83), 1.5, pol
- Kifiak, S., (?), 1971, (70), 5, pol
- Kiirend, M., (E), 1975, (70), 5, nat-E
- Kiarza, T., (Li), 1966, (?), 10, nat-Li
- Kiirend, O., (E), 1983, (83, 213-2), 7, nat-E
- Kim, B., (?), 1972, (?), long term, pol
- Kim, I., (?), 1979, (96, 162), ?, pol
- Kindeev, L., (?), 1972, (64), insane, exit
- Kindrat, V., (Uk), 1961, (?), 13, nat-Uk
- Kinsfader, R., (Ger), 1984,(198-1), 2.5, emig
- Kipysh, I., (Uk), 1961, (70-1, 190-1), 10, nat-Uk
- Kirdeikis, V., (Li), 1962, (64), 15, nat-Li
- Kirichenko, S., (?), 1983, (64), 7, exit
- Kirotosk, A., (E), 1974, (64), 14, nat-E
- Kiselev, A., (?), 1971, (70, 72), 3, pol

- Kiselik, V., (?), 1953, (old 58), 25, ?
- Kivilo, Harald, (E), 1957, (old 58), 25, nat-E
- Kizhner, K. (J), 1971, (70-1, 72), 2, emig
- Klaudene, V. (Li), 1967, (?), 10, ?
- Klebanov, V. (?), 1978, (190-1), insane, socio-econ
- Klimanova, L. (R), 1965, (70-1 and 72), 4, pol
- Klimauskas, P. (Li), 1960, (?) 15, ?
- Klimenko, F., (?), 1969, (70), 5, pol
- Klimova, M., (?), 1983, (70), 4, pol
- Klink, Valentin, (Ger), 1974, (190-1), 2, emig
- Klink, Viktor, (Ger), 1974, (190-1), 2, emig
- Kloster, I., (Ger), 1979, (?), 3, emig
- Klymchak, B. (Uk), 1978, (64, 70), 20, exit
- Klymchak, P., (Uk), 1961, (?), 15, nat-Uk
- Knavinsh, (?), 1961, (old 58), 25, pol
- Kobakhadze, G. (G), 1984, (77, 83, 213-2), 15, exit
- Kobryn', V., (Uk), 1985, (190-1), 3, pol
- Kobrynychuk, V., (Uk), 1957, (?), 10, pol
- Kobylets'kyi, Ia., (Uk), 1960, 5, nat-Uk
- Kochubei, A., (?), 1972, (83), insane, exit
- Kochubievsky, B., (J), 1969, (190-1), 3, emig
- Kochubievsky, F., (J), 1982, (190-1), 2.5, pol
- Kodene, V., (Li), 1968, (?), 10, nat-Li
- Kogan, A., (?), 1970, (70), 7, pol

- Koialis, H., (Li), 1962, (64), 10, exit
- Koifman, E., (?), 1985, (224), 2.5, emig
- Kolbe, V., (?), 1979, (80), 3, emig
- Kolesov, I.N., before 1972, (83), insane, pol
- Kolevatov, L., (?), 1983, (190-1), 3, pol
- Kolomin, V., (?), 1970, (190-2), 6, pol
- Kolomyiets', V., (Uk), 1976, (70), insane, pol
- Kolopach, R., (Uk), 1973, (70, 190-2), 3, nat-Uk
- Kolpakbaiev, A., (?), 1981, (64), 12, exit
- Kolyshenko, V., (Uk), 1972, (?), insane, exit
- Komarov, E., (R), 1971, (70), insane, pol
- Komarov, V., (?), 1967, (?), 10, pol
- Komarovskii, V., (?), 1967, (?), insane, pol
- Konchakivs'kyi, M., (Uk), 1950, (?), 28, nat-Uk
- Kondrashov, I., (?), 1982, (70), ?, pol
- Kondriukov, V., (Uk), 1969, (70), 3, nat-Uk
- Konevych, I., 1958, (old 58-1a, old 58-11), 7, nat-Uk
- Kononov, G., (?), 1980, (70), 4, pol
- Konosov, M., (?), 1968, (70-1, 72), 4, pol
- Konovalov, I., (?), 1981, (?), insane, pol
- Konovalykhin, V., (?), 1984, (?), 2.5, emig; (also, 1978, (190-1), 4, emig)
- Konstantinov, S., (R), 1968, (70-1, 72, 218-1), 1, nat-R
- Konstantinovskii, V., (?), 1972, (64), 15, esp
- Kontuganskaia, T., (CT), 1967, (190-3, 191), 3, nat-CT

- Konukhov, M., (?), 1966, (64), ?, pol
- Kopeiko, N., (?), 1973, (190-1), insane, pol
- Kopokhov, L., (?), 1983, (162-2), 2, pol
- Kopotun, M., (?), 1970, (70), 6, pol
- Koppel, K., (E), 1981, (206-2, 212-1), 2.5, nat-E
- Koptsiukh, (?), before 1974, (?), 12, exit
- Kopysov, I., (?), 1982, (190-1), 2, pol
- Korablev, N., (R), 1962, (?), 5, pol; (also, 1959, (?), 3, pol)
- Korboia, K., (E), 1972, (64), 15, nat-E
- Korchnoi, I., (?), 1979, (80), 2.5, emig
- Korekhov, S., 1984, (191, 198-2), 3, pol; (also, 1977, (?), 6, pol, and 1974, (?), 2, pol)
- Korenblit, L., (J), 1971, (70-1, 72), 3, emig
- Korenblit, M., (J), 1971, (64a, 70-1, 72, 189-1), 7, emig
- Korfidov, V., (?), 1979, (83), insane, exit
- Koriagin, A., (R), 1985, (191) 2, pol; (also, 1981, (70, 218), 12, pol)
- Kornev, V., (?), 1983, (196), ?, pol
- Koroban, A., (Uk), 1970, (70, 218-1), 9, nat-Uk
- Korol, V., (Uk), 1955, (old 58), insane, pol
- Korolchuk, S., (?), 1971, (70), 4, pol
- Korovin, F., (?), 1974, (?), 4, pol
- Korsak, A., (Li), 1967, (64), 15, nat-Li
- Koshelyk, R., (Uk), 1964, (?), 6, nat-Uk
- Kostava, M., (G), 1985, (188-3), ?, pol; (also, 1978, (70), 5, pol)

- Kosyrev, A., (R), 1970, (70, 72), 2, pol
- Kotkas, T., (E), 1985, (83), 3, exit
- Kots', M., (Uk), 1967, (70), 12, nat-Uk
- Koval, I., (Uk), 1961, (?), executed, nat-Uk
- Kovalchuk, D., (?), 1962, (?), 10, pol
- Kovalenko, M., (Uk), 1972, (70-1), 8, pol
- Kovalev, A., (?), 1982, (190-1), insane, emig
- Kovalev, I., (?), 1982, (70), 10, pol
- Kovalev, S., (R), 1975, (70), 10, pol
- Kovalevskii, A., (?), 1982, (190-1), 1.5, pol
- Kovetskii, (?), 1972, (?), 12, exit
- Kovhar, B., (?), 1972, (?), insane, pol
- Kozhevnikov, Iu., (?), 1983, (70), insane, pol
- Kozhin, V., (?), 1984, (206-2), insane, pol
- Kozlov, A., (?), 1971, (190-1), insane, pol
- Kozlov, Andrei, (?), 1971, (70), insane, pol
- Kozlov, V., (?), 1973, (64), insane, pol
- Kozlovskii, E., (?), 1981, (190-1), ?, pol
- Kozovoi, V., (R), 1958, (old 58), 8, nat-R
- Krainyk, M., (Uk), 1980, (70, 72), 10, nat-Uk
- Krakhmalnikova, Z., (?), 1983, (70), 6, pol
- Krasin, V., (?), 1969, (?), 5, pol; (also, 1973, (70-1), 4, pol, and 1949 (?), ?, pol)
- Krasivskyi, Z., (Uk), 1980, (64), 6, nat-Uk; (also, 1967, (64, 70, 72), 17, nat-Uk)
- Krasniak, V., (?), 1957, (70), insane, pol

- Krasnopevtsev, L., (?), 1958, (old 58-11), 10, pol
- Krasnov, D., (R), 1969, (70, 72), 2, pol
- Kravchenko, L., (?), 1971, (?), insane, pol
- Kravchenko, V., (Uk), 1981, (190-1, 206-2, 218-2), 4, pol
- Kravets', A., (Uk), 1973, (70, 72), 5, pol
- Kravtsiv, I., (Uk), 1972, (?), 5, pol
- Kravtsov, L., (J), 1971, (?), insane, emig
- Kreck, S., (?), 1975, (70), insane, pol
- Kreker, V., (Ger), 1984, (?), ?, emig
- Krieger, H., (Ger), 1984, (198), 1, emig
- Kritsky, E., (?), 1983, (190-1), 3, pol; (also, 1980, (206-2), 3, pol)
- Krivda, Iu., (?), 1984, (162, 153), 2, pol
- Krivinskas, I., (Li), 1963, (64), 15, pol
- Krugliak, (?), 1966, (?), 12, exit
- Kruklyn, V., (La), 1960, (?), 10, nat-La
- Kruusmiagi, K., (E), 1983, (206), 5, nat-E
- Krylova, L. (?), 1979, (64, 72, 213-2), 3, exit
- Krylskii, I., (J), 1972, (?), insane, emig
- Krysanov, Iu., (?), 1981, (64), 8, pol
- Kryshtal, P., (Uk), 1972, (64), 15, nat-Uk
- Kubertdinov, I., (CT), 1983, (?), ?, nat-CT
- Kubiliunas, S., (Li), 1959, (?), 15, pol
- Kubyshkin, (?), 1975, (70), insane, pol
- Kucherianu, N., (M), 1964, (70, 72), 6, pol

- Kudirka, S., (Li), 1971, (64), 10, exit
- Kudiukin, P., (?), 1982, (70, 72), ?, pol
- Kuke, I., (Li), 1966, (?), 15, nat-Li
- Kukharuk, O., (Uk), 1972, (64), 20, nat-Uk
- Kukk, I., (E), 1981, (190-1), 2, pol
- Kukk, V., (E), 1973, (64), 10, nat-E
- Kukobaka, M., (Bel), 1984, (70), 12, pol; (also, 1970, (190-1), insane, pol, and 1978, (190-1)3, pol, and 1982, (190-1), 3, pol)
- Kukui, V., (J), 1971, (190-1), 3, emig
- Kulak, O., (Uk), 1956, (?), 25, nat-Uk
- Kulchyns'kyi, M., (Uk), 1970, (190-1, 70), 2.5, nat-Uk
- Kuleshov, E., (?), 1978, (190-1), 2, pol
- Kulikov, D., (R), 1970, (70, 72), 5, pol
- Kulikovs'kyi, V., (Uk), 1962, (?), 15, nat-Uk
- Kulmagambetov, M., (Kaz), 1962, (?), 7, pol
- Kulyk, P., (Uk), 1956, (?), 10, pol
- Kulynyn, V., (Uk), 1967, (64, 70), 6, nat-Uk
- Kume, A., (E), 1981, (?), insane, exit
- Kunnis, R., (E), 1982, (206-2), 2, nat-E
- Kupin, V., (?), 1961, (?), 10, desr
- Kurbatov, V., (?), 1980, (70), insane, pol
- Kurbetdinov, I., (CT), 1983, (?), ?, nat-CT
- Kurchyk, M., (Uk), 1954, (?), 25, nat-Uk
- Kurtinowski, F., (Pol), 1953, (?), 25, pol

- Kurtseitov, D., (CT), 1973, (?), 4.5, nat-CT
- Kurtumerov, E., (CT), 1973, (190-1), 2, nat-CT
- Kurylo, V., (Uk), 1980, (70-2), 15, nat-Uk
- Kurzhiuskas, I., (Li), before 1974, (?), ?, nat-Li
- Kushev, E., (R), 1967, (190-3), ?, pol
- Kusidis, A., (?), 1977, (70), insane, emig
- Kutsenko, H., (Uk), 1985, (70), 4, pol
- Kutsyl', D., (Uk), 1968, (190-2, 70-2), insane, pol
- Kuum, P., (E), 1982, (190-1), 1, nat-E
- Kuvakin, V., (?), 1981, (70), 6, pol
- Kuzenkov, A., (?), 1968, (190-1), 2.5, pol
- Kuzin, E., (?), 1973, (70, 72), 6, pol
- Kuzmin, I., (?), 1973, (190-1), insane, pol
- Kuznetsov, A., (?), 1983, (190-1, 228), 2, pol
- Kuznetsov, E., (J), 1970, (64a, 70-2, 93-1), 15, emig; (also, 1962, (70-1, 72), 7, pol)
- Kuznetsov, G., (?), 1966, (70), insane, pol
- Kuznetsov, V., (?), 1975, (64), 17, exit
- Kuznetsov, V., (R), 1969, (70-1), insane, pol; (also, 1966, (?), insane, pol)
- Kuznetsova, E., (Uk), 1966, (?), 4, nat-Uk
- Kuzyk, H., (Uk), 1961, (?), 15, nat-Uk
- Kvachevskii, L., (J), 1968, (70-1) 4, pol
- Kvets'ko, D., (Uk), 1967, (64, 70), 20, nat-Uk
- Kychak, I., (?), 1958, (?), 10, pol
- Kyian, B., (?), 1958,)?(, 10, pol

- Kyiv, E., (?), 1970, (68, 70), ?, pol
- Kyiv, V., (E), 1985, (83), 3, exit
- Kyrb, I., (E), 1985, (64, 70), 8, esp
- Kyrboia, K., (E), 1972, (64), 15, nat-E
- Kyrylo, M., (Uk), 1961, (?), 12, nat-Uk
- Laadi, P., (E), 1983, (206-2), 3.5, nat-E
- Labrinskas, A., (Li), 1972, (?), 3, pol
- Ladyzhenskii, L., (J), 1974, (70), 6, pol
- Lafera, E., (Ger), 1982, (154, 218), 2, emig
- Lakalov, A. (?), 1972, (190-1), ?, pol
- Lalaiaants, E. (A), 1969, (70), 3, pol
- Landa, M. (J), 1980, (190-1), 5, pol; (also, 1977, (?), 2, pol)
- Lapienis, V. (Li), 1985 (70), 7, pol; (also, 1978, (70), 5, pol)
- Lapinskas, I. (Li), 1966, (?), 10, ?
- Lapp, R. (E), 1970, (70, 72, 218?), 5, nat-E
- Lapman, I. (E), 1980, (83?), insane, exit
- Larin, Ivan K. (?), 1974, (83), insane, exit; (also, 1971, (?), insane, pol)
- Larin, Ivan M. (?), 1971, (70), insane, pol
- Lashkarashvili, Z. (G), 1984, (70), 7, nat-G
- Lashkova, V. (R), 1968, (70), 1, pol
- Laur, R. (E), 1985, (206-2), 5, nat-E
- Lauraitis, S., (Li), 1970, (64), 12, nat-Li
- Lauri, A., (E), 1981, (206-2), 1, nat-E
- Lauri, K., (E), 1981, (206-2), 1.5, nat-E

- Laurinskas, L., (Li), 1975, (?), 1, nat-Li; (also, 1950, (?), 15, nat-Li)
- Lauska, Ianis, (La), 1984, (70), 5, nat-La
- Lautsius, I., (Li), 1971, (190-1), 2, nat-Li
- Lavrent'eva, N., (?), 1971, (70, 72), ?, pol
- Lavut, A., (?), 1983, (190-1), 5, pol; (also, 1980, (190-1), 3, pol)
- Lazarev, Iu., (?), 1970, (70), 6, pol
- Lazareva, N., (?), 1982, (70), 6, pol; (also, 1980, (190-1, 196), 1, pol)
- Lazaruk, P., (Uk), 1980, (?), 3, nat-Uk
- Lazda, P., (La), 1979, (70), insane), nat-La
- Lazhinskas, V., (Li), 1972, (?), insane, nat-Li
- Lebed', M., (?), 1979, (88-1), 2.5, pol
- Leiderman, (?), 1975, (64), 10, exit
- Leikus, I., (Li), 1971, (64), 15, nat-Li
- Lein, E., (J), 1981, (191-1), ?, emig
- Leivand, I., (E), 1971, (64), insane, exit
- Lemberg, G., (?), 1974, (?), 3, pol
- Leoniuk, V., (Uk), 1960, (?), 12, nat-Uk
- Leshchauskas, I., (Li), 1950, (?), 25, nat-Li
- Leshchuk, V., (Uk), 1958, (old 58), 25, nat-Uk
- Lesiv, Ia., (Uk), 1981, (224-4), 5, nat-Uk; (also, 1967, (64, 70, 72), 11, nat-Uk, and 1979, (224-3), 2, nat-Uk)
- Lesnov, B., (?), 1981, (70), insane, exit
- Leviash, V., (?), 1984, (226-2), insane, pol
- Levin, A., (?), 1970, (190-1), 3, pol

- Levin, Ia., (J), (190-1), 3, emig
- Levinzon, S., (J), 1975, (?), 6, emig
- Levit, S., (J), 1971, (70, 72), 2, emig
- Levitin-Krasnov, A., 1971, (142-1, 190-1), 3, pol
- Levshin, Iu., (?), 1968, (64), 12, pol
- Levyts'kyi, (?), 1960, (?), 10, pol
- Levyts'kyi, M., (Uk), 1957, (old 58), 25, nat-Uk
- Liakh, V., (?), 1973, (70), 4, pol
- Liapin, A., (?), 1978, (206), insane, pol
- Libovych, O., (Uk), 1961, (64-1, 72), 10, nat-Uk
- Lichutin, P., (?), 1966, (?), 12, exit
- Liepin, E., (?), 1969, (183-2), 1, pol
- Lietavitas, I., (La), 1962, (70), 3, pol
- Lipinskaia, V., (?), 1977, (190-1), insane, pol
- Lismanis, D., (La), 1981, (64), 10, nat-La
- Lisovyi, V., (Uk), 1980, (209), 1, nat-Uk; (also, 1973, (70), 10, nat-Uk)
- Listvina, L., (?), 1979, (64, 72, 213-2), 3, exit
- Litvak, B., (?), 1980, (174-1, 174-2), 8, emig
- Litvinenko, A., (?), before 1974, (70), 5, pol
- Litvinov, B., (?), 1980, (70), 12, pol
- Litvinov, I., (?), 1980, (?), insane, emig
- Litvinov, P., (R), 1968, (190-1, 190-3), 5, pol
- Liubarskii, K., (K), (70-1), 5, pol
- Liubarskii, L., (J), 1973, (75-1, 190-1), 4, emig

- Lizhbovskii, E., (La), 1961, (70), 4, pol
- Liziunas, B., (Li), 1979, (64), 15, nat-Li
- Lokhvyts'ka, L., (?), 1985, (190-1), 3, pol; (also, 1981, (190-1), 3, pol)
- Lokshin, O., (?), 1981, (203-1, 190-1, 190-3), 3, emig
- Lolashvili, A., (G), 1981, (64), 12, pol
- Lomakin, P., (?), 1973, (70), 2.5, pol
- Lubman, L., (?), 1978, (64), 13, pol
- Lukanin, V., (?), 1969, (70), insane, pol
- Lukianenko, L., (Uk), 1978, (&0), 15, nat-Uk; (also, 1961, (64), 15, nat-Uk)
- Lukianov, A., (?), 1976, (83), insane, exit
- Lukianov, E., (Kalmyk), 1983, (64), executed, pol
- Lukianovich, Maris, (?), 1980, (70), 5, pol
- Lukoshevichius, P., (Li), 1981, (?), insane, pol
- Lukov, (?), 1959, (?), 7, pol
- Lupynis, A., (Uk), 1971, (70), insane, nat-Uk; (also, 1956, (old 58-10), 6, nat-Uk, and 1957, (old 58-11, old 58-14), 10, nat-Uk)
- Lushch, K., (Uk), 1969, (64), 15, nat-Uk
- Lutsker, M., (J), 1972, (?), 2.5, emig
- Luts'kiv, V., (Uk), 1976, (70), insane, nat-Uk; (also, 1961, (64), 10, nat-Uk)
- Lutzyk, M., (Uk), 1973, (209), 2, pol; (also, 1944, (?), 20, nat-Uk, and 1957, (?), 15, nat-Uk)
- Luvyshchuk, E., (J), 1982, (190-1), 3, pol
- L'vov, S., (?), 1970, (190-1) insane, pol
- Lychak, P., (Uk), 1969, (64), 8, exit
- Lysak, P., (?), 1957, (old 58), insane, pol

- Lysenko, V., (?), 1974, (64, 70), 7, pol
- Lysov, V., (?), 1979, (?), insane, pol
- Lytvyn, Iu., (Uk), 1982, (70), 15, nat-Uk; (also, 1955, (?), 10, nat-Uk, and 1975, (190-1), 3, nat-Uk, and 1979, (191-1) 3, nat-Uk)
- Madisson, T., (E), 1981, (70), 6, pol
- Maftser, B., (J), 1971, (70, 72), 1, emig
- Magdeev, R., (?), 1980, (64), 12, exit
- Magi, (E), 1981, (190-2), 1.5, nat-E
- Magidovich, A., 1980, (190-1), 2.5, pol
- Maiauskas, V., (Li), 1972, (?), insane, nat-Li
- Maier, G., (Ger), 1981, (80), 3, emig
- Maier, V., (Ger), 1982, (209-2), 2, emig
- Makarenko, M., (J), 1970, (70, 88, 162, 173) 8, pol
- Makhmudov, K., (?), 1976, (?), insane, pol
- Ma-Khun, (Chinese), 1973, (?), 15, esp
- Maksimov, A., (?), 1982, (209-2), 2, emig
- Maksimov, V., (?), 1972, (70-2), insane, pol
- Maksimova, G., (?), 1985, (190-1), 5, emig; (also, 1982, (190-1), 3, emig)
- Makvebashvili, (G), 1961, (?), 15, pol
- Malchevskii, S., (R), 1969, (70, 72), 9, pol
- Malinin, (?), 1982, (70), 2, pol
- Malinovskii, N., (?), 1981, (70), 3, pol
- Malkin, A., (J), 1975, (80-1), 3, emig
- Maltsev, V., (?), 1950, (old 58), insane, pol

- Maltseva, N., (?), 1980, (190-1), 2, pol
- Malyshev, K., (?), 1974, (190-1), insane, pol
- Malyshev, L., (?), 1981, (70, 228), 8, pol
- Mamai, A., 1984, (64), 4, esp
- Mamchur, S., (Uk), before 1975, (?), 25, nat-Uk
- Mamus, M., (Uk), 1983, (?), ?, nat-Uk; (also, 1948, (?), 25, nat-Uk)
- Manilovich, B., (?), 1983, (190-1, 70), 6, pol
- Manucharian, A., (A), 1981, (70, 72), 6, nat-A
- Maramzin, V., (?), 1975, (70-1), 5, pol
- Marchenko, A., (R), 1981, (70), 15, pol; (also, 1961, (64), 6, exit, and 1961, (?), 3, exit, and 1968, (198), 1, and 1975, (198-2) 4, pol)
- Marchenko, O., (?), 1970, (64), 14, pol
- Marchenko, V., (Uk), 1984, (70), 15, nat-Uk; (also, 1973, (70), 8, nat-Uk)
- Maresin, V., (?), 1974, (?), insane, pol
- Marikov, V., (?), before 1970, (64), insane, pol
- Marichenko, I., (?), 1980, (?), insane, pol
- Markants, L., (La), 1970, (70, 72), 1.5, nat-La
- Markarian, A., (?), 1973, (70), 4, pol
- Markman, V., (J), 1972, (70), 3, emig
- Markosian, R., (A), 1974, (65-1, 67, 213, 70), 7, nat-A; (also, 1980, (190-1, 186), 3, nat-A)
- Markov, D., (?), 1983, (190-1), 3, pol
- Markus, S., (?), 1984, (190-1), 3, pol
- Marmus, M., (Uk), 1973, (70), 8, nat-Uk
- Marmus, V., (Uk), 1973, (70), 11, nat-Uk

- Marsal, A., (?), 1981, (190-1) 2.5, emig
- Martimonov, E., (R), 1970, (70, 72), 3, pol
- Martirosian, L. (A), 1974, (69A, 190?), 2.5, nat-A
- Martirosian, N., (A), 1974, (69A, 190?), 3.5, nat-A
- Martirosian, S., (A), 1974, (69A, 190?), 3, nat-A
- Martirosov, V., (?), 1980, (213-2), 8, exit
- Martynenko, O., (Uk), 1966, (70), 3, pol
- Martynov, M., (CT), 1970, (190-1), 2, nat-CT
- Martynovych, M., (Uk), 1978, (70), 123, nat-Uk
- Mashkov, Iu., (?), 1959, (?), 7, pol; (also, 1967, (64-15), 10, exit)
- Mashkova, V., (?), 1967, (64-15), 6, exit; (also, 1959, (70, 72), 7, pol)
- Maszkowcow, W., (Pol), 1983, (?), insane, exit
- Mashtalir, M., (Uk), 1961, (?), 10, nat-Uk
- Masiutko, M., (Uk), 1966, (70), 6, nat-Uk
- Mataitis, V., (Li), 1945, (?), 25, nat-Li
- Mat'ko, A., (?), 1975, (70), insane, pol
- Matrosov, (?), before 1970, (?). insane, pol
- Matsiauskas, I., (Li), 1972, ((98, 190-3,), 3, nat-Li
- Matskevichius, A., (Li), 1974, (70), 2, pol
- Mattik, K., (E), 1975, (70), 6, pol
- Matusevichius, I., (Li), 1953, (?), 25, nat-Li
- Matusevych, M., (Uk), 1978, (70, 206-2), 12, nat-Uk
- Matusevych, O., (Uk), 1983, (70), 3, nat-Uk; (also, 1980, (190-1), 3, nat-Uk)
- Matveev, A., (?), 1981, (64), 10, exit

- Matviiuk, K., (Uk), 1972, (70), 4, nat-Uk
- Mazelskis, (Li), 1965, (64), 15, nat-Li
- Mazur, D., (Uk), 1980, (70), 11, nat-Uk
- Mazurak, V., (Uk), 1982, (70-2), 15, nat-Uk
- Mednikov, V., (?), 1967, (?), 3, pol
- Medvedev, I., (?), 1976, (?), insane, pol
- Meilakh, M., (?), 1984, (70), 12, pol
- Meilanov, V., (?), 1980, (70), 9, pol
- Melder, M., (E), 1984, (83), 1.5, nat-E
- Melen', M., (Uk), 1967, (70-1, 72), 6, nat-Uk
- Meleshko, V., (?), 1972, (190-1), insane, soc-econ
- Melikian, S., (A), 1971, (70, 72), ?, nat-A
- Melikian, V., (A), 1971, (70, 72), 4, nat-A
- Melkoian, S., (A), 1981, (70, 72), 2, nat-A
- Melngailis, G., (La), 1983, (?), insane, pol
- Melnik, Iu., (?), 1981, (70), ?, pol; (also, 1972, (70, 196) 3, pol)
- Melnikov, A., (?), 1981, (64), 6, exit
- Melnychuk, M., (Uk), 1961, (?), 12, nat-Uk
- Melnychuk, T., (Uk), 1979, (206-2) 4, nat-Uk; (also, 1972, (70), 3, nat-Uk)
- Melykh, M., (Uk), 1961, (?), 15, nat-Uk
- Memetov, E., (CT), 1968, (190-1), 1.5, nat-CT
- Memetov, S., (CT), 1968, (190-1), .5, nat-CT; (also, 1979, (209, 187, 198), 5, nat-CT)
- Mendelevich, I., (J), 1970, (64a, 72, 93-1), 12, emig

- Menders, F., (La), 1969, (70), 15, nat-La
- Mendrun', B., (Uk), 1974, (?), ?, pol
- Menkush, Ia., (Uk), 1966, (70), 2.5, nat-Uk
- Menshikov, V., (R), 1958, (old 58), 10, pol
- Merkurev, A., (?), 1971, (70), 5, pol
- Merkushev, V., (?), 1968, (64), 10, exit
- Mesh, Ia., (J), 1984, (182, 191-1), ?, emig
- Meshener, I., (J), 1970, (70), 6, pol
- Meshkanis, A., (Li), 1975, (64), 15, nat-Li
- Meshko, O., (Uk), 1981, (70), 5.5, nat-Uk; (also, 1947, (old 58), 10, nat-Uk)
- Miasnikov, A., (?), 1981, (190-1, 3, pol
- Mikalauskas, A., (Li), 1962, (64), 12, exit
- Mikhailov, A., (E), 1983, (206-2), 3.5, nat-E
- Mikhailov, G., (?), 1985, (185), ?, pol
- Mikhailov, I., (?), 1971, (70), insane, pol
- Mikhailov, O., (?), 1979, (64, 70, 88), 16, exit
- Mikhailov, V., (?), 1979, (206), 3, pol
- Mikheev, D., (R), 1971, (64, 70, 83, 196), 8, pol, exit
- Miklashevich, A., (R), 1967, (70-1, 72), 3, nat-R
- Milavskii, L., (?), 1981, (190-1), 3, pol
- Miliukhin, V., (?), 1979, (70), insane, pol
- Miliutin, O., (?), 1980, (70), ?, pol
- Milkovskii, M., (?), 1981, (206), ?, pol
- Miller, A., (E), 1985, (206-2), 5, nat-E

- Miller, H., (Ge-), 1981, (209), 1, emig
- Milner, A., (?), 1979, (206) 6, emig
- Mirauskas, A., (?), 1973, (?), 3, pol
- Mirkin, B., (?), 1981, (70), 3.5, pol
- Mirkushov, V., (?), 1968, (64), 10, exit
- Mironov, I., (?), 1970, (130-2, 180-2, 190-1), 5, pol, soc-econ
- Mishchenko, V., (?), 1983, (190-1), 1, pol
- Mishkins, B., (li), 1962, (?), 15, nat-Li
- Mishiunas, L., (Li), 1968, (64), 12, nat-Li
- Misudovin, A., (?), 1969, (183-2), 1.5, pol
- Mitashiunas, I., (Li), 1964, (?), 10, pol
- Mitiashin, B., (?), 1985, (70), 8, pol; (also, 1969, (190-1, 206-2), 3, pol)
- Mitrikas, V., (?), 1955, (?), 25, pol
- Mitskute, G., (Li), 1971, (?), 3, exit
- Mkrtchian, I., (A), 1981, (188, 212-1, 89-3), 4, nat-A; (also, 1981, (70, 72), 12, nat-A)
- Mogilever, V., (J), 1971, (70-1, 189-1), 4, emig
- Mogilevsky, A., (?), 1975, (206-3), 5, pol; (also, 1972, (206-2), 5, pol)
- Mogilnikov, I., 1985, (64), 10, deser
- Moiseev, V., (?), 1966, (190-1), insane, soc-econ
- Molaev, A., (CT), 1968, (190-1, 190-3), 1.5, nat-CT
- Molostov, (?), 1958, (?), 7, pol
- Monakhov, A., befoore 1977, (70), insane, pol
- Monakov, M., (?), 1980, (70, 72), 5, pol

- Monastyrskiy, B., (Uk), 1973, (?), 3, pol
- Monblanov, V., (?), 1982, (206-2) insane, pol; (also, 1978, (206) 4, pol)
- Morkunas, S., (Li), 1965, (?), 15, nat-Li
- Moroz, V., (Uk), 1970, (70), 14, nat-Uk; (also, 1966, (70-1), 4, nat-Uk)
- Morozov, M., (?), 1981, (70), 8, pol; (also, 1979, (70), 5, pol)
- Moshkov, S., (R), 1965, (70-1, 72) 4, pol
- Moskalenko, H., (Uk), 1967, (?), 3, nat-Uk
- Moskvin, O., (?), 1977, (70), insane, pol
- Motriuk, M., (Uk), 1973, (70, 72, 144), 4, nat-Uk
- Mukha, (?), 1959, (?), 7, pol
- Mukhamediarov, R., (?), 1973, (70), insane, pol
- Mukhamedshin, G., (?), 1975, (70, 88), 7, pol
- Mueller, G., (Ger), 1981, (209), ?, emig
- Multinsh, V., (La), 1984, (190-1), insane, pol
- Mumychak, I., (Uk), 1985, (?), ?, nat-Uk
- Murakhas, N., (CT), 1983, (190-1), 2.5, nat-CT
- Muratov, R., (CT), 1969, (190-1), 1, nat-CT
- Murauskas, A., (Li), 1973, (?), 3, nat-Li
- Murauskas, S., (Li), 1985, (162-2), 3, pol
- Murzhenko, O., (Uk), 1985, (198-2), 2, pol; (also, 1962, (70-1, 72), 6, pol, and, 1970, (64a, 72, 93-1), 14, exit)
- Musatov, S., (?), 1973, (64), insane, exit
- Musienko, M., (?), 1972, (70), insane, pol
- Musikevichius, K., (Li), 1983, (64), 10, pol

- Mustafaev, E., (CT), 1967, (190-3, 191), 1.5, nat-CT
- Mustafaeva, S., (CT), 1970, (?), 3, nat-CT
- Mustafaev, Eivaz, (CT), 1973, (206-2), 3, pol
- Muzhikiavichius, K., (Li), 1983, (64), 6, pol
- Mykhailenko, A., (Uk), 1980, insane, nat-Uk
- Mykytka, Ia., (Uk), 1973, (70), 8, nat-Uk
- Myn'ko, O., (Uk), 1961, (?), 10, nat-Uk
- Myrias, O., (Uk), 1962, (?), 5, pol
- Naboka, S., (Uk), 1981, (70, 190-1), 3, nat-Uk
- Nabokin, (?), 1982, (?), insane, pol
- Nadtoka, B., (Uk), 1962, (?), 3, nat-Uk
- Nagorny, V., (R), 1968, (70-1, 72), 3, nat-R
- Nagritskaite, L., (Li), 1981, (190-1), 1.5, nat-Li
- Nahrobnyi, I., (Uk), 1962, (?), 12, nat-Uk
- Naidis, D., (?), 1968, (?), ?, pol
- Nakashidze, A., (?), 1960, (64), 10, exit
- Nakhodkin, (?), 1983, (118, Uk), 5, emig
- Namtsiavichius, M., (Li), 1964, (64), 10, nat-Li
- Naritsa, P., (?), 1976, (?), 2.5, pol
- Nashpits, M., (J), 1972, (198-1, 190-3), .5, emig; (also, 1975, (190-3), 5, emig)
- Nastusenko, L., (Uk), 1969, (?), insane, nat-Uk
- Naudzhiunas, B., (Li), 1972, (?), insane, pol
- Naumov, E., (?), 1974, (153), 2, pol
- Navasardian, A., (A), 1981, (70, 72), 11, nat-A; (also, 1974, (70, 72), 9, nat-A)

- Nazarenko, O., (Uk), 1969, (70), 5, nat-Uk
- Nazarian, R., (A), 1978, (70), 7, nat-A
- Nazarov, (?), 1982, (70, 72) ?, pol
- Nazarov, A., (?), 1972, (70, 72, 190-3), 3, pol
- Nazarov, V., (?), 1981, (?), ?, pol
- Nechyporenko, H., (Uk), 1981, (70), 12, nat-Uk
- Nedelin, E., (?), 1983, (70), insane, pol
- Nedobora, V., (Uk), 1970, (190-1), 3, pol
- Nefediev, Ia., (?), 1982, (64), 4, exit
- Nekipelov, V., (R), 1980, (70), 12, pol; (also, 1974, (190-1), 2, pol)
- Nepommniashchii, M., (J), 1985, (190-1), 3, pol
- Nezdiiminoga, V., (CT), 1971, (70), 7, pol
- Nezhenets, A., (?), 1969, (190-1), 3, pol
- Niazov, M., (Meskh), 1971, (206-2), 3.5, nat-Meskh
- Niitso, V., (E), 1981, (70), 4, pol
- Nikitenkov, V., (?), 1979, (68, 77), insane, pol; (also, 1972, (70), insane, emig)
- Nikitin, A., (?), 1981, (218), insane, pol
- Niklus, M., (E), 1981, (70-2, 190-1), 15, nat-E; (also, 1959, (old 58-4), 17, nat-E)
- Nikolaenko, N., (?), 1969, (70), 5, pol
- Nikolaev, E., (?), 1970, (?), insane, pol
- Nikolaev, V., (?), 1968, (?), insane, exit
- Nikuradze, N., (?), 1979, (64), 118, pol
- Nisanova, L., (J), 1975, (?), 1.5, emig
- Novikov, A., (?), 1970, (70), 12, pol

- Novikov, V., (R), 1974, (0-1), 2, pol
- Novodvorskaia, V., 1970, (70), insane, pol
- Novoseltsev, V., (?), 1983, (70), 10, pol
- Norbutas, (Li), 1957, (old 58), 25, nat-Li
- Novozhitskyi, A., (?), 1961, (?), 10, exit
- Nozhak, O., (R), 1955, (70), insane, pol
- Nudel, I., (J), 1978, (43), 4, emig
- Nurkadze, N., (?), 1979, (64), 11, pol
- Nurmasaar, E., (E), 1963, (?), insane, Nat-E
- Obukhov, G., (?), 1981, (70), 4, pol
- Ocheretianskii, M., (?), 1983, (198), 1, emig
- Odabashev, E., (Meskh), 1970, (162 Az), 2, nat-Meskh
- Odobesku, Ia., (M), 1967, (70), 7, nat-M
- Ofkints, U., (La), 1963, (70, 72), 10, nat-La
- Ogaian, R., (A), 1985, (109), 5, nat-A; (also, 1982, (190-1, 154), 3, nat-A)
- Oganesian, V., (A), 1969, (?), insane, pol
- Ogorodnikov, A., (?), 1980, (70), 6, pol
- Ogurtsov, I., (R), 1967, (64, 72) 20, nat-R
- Okhapkin, O., (?), 1984, (?), insane, pol
- Okulova, Iu., (?), 1977, (?), 2, exit
- Orenburger, L., (Ger), 1974, (191-1, 190-3, 210), 2, nat-Ger
- Oleinikov, Iu., 1983, (?), insane, exit
- Oliinyk, A., (Uk), 1947, (?), 25, nat-Uk; (also, 1965, (?), executed, nat-Uk)
- Oliinyk, V., (Uk), 1969, (64, 66, 72), 20, nat-Uk

- Omerov, M., (CT), 1962, (70, 72), 4, nat-CT
- Onuchkin-Timofeev, A., (?), 1983, (70), 10, pol
- Oras, U., (E), 1984, (206-2), 4, nat-E
- Orekhov, V., (?), 1979, (?), 12, pol
- Oreshkin, P., (?), 1974, (?), insane, pol
- Orlov, Iu., (R), 1978, (70), 12, pol
- Orula, T., (E), 1982, (206-2) 3, pol
- Osadchyi, Mykhailo H., (Uk), 1972, (70), 10, nat-Uk; (also, 1966, (?), 2, nat-Uk)
- Osadchyi, Mykhailo I., (Uk), 1973, (64), 15, nat-Uk
- Osadchuk, I., (?), 1973, (?), insane, exit
- Oshchepkov, V., (?), 1971, (?), insane, exit
- Osipov, V., ?, (64), 10, exit
- Osipov, Vladimir Nikol., (R), 1974, (70-2), 8; (also, 1962, (70, 72), 7, pol)
- Osipova, T., (?), 1985, (188-3), 2, pol; (also, 1981, (70), 10, pol)
- Osmanov, D., (CT), 1974, (198), 1.5, nat-CT
- Osmanov, Iu., (CT), 1983, (190-1), 3, nat-CT; (also, 1968, (190, 64Uz), 2.5, nat-CT)
- Osmanov, S., (CT), 1968, (64Uz, 190), 1, nat-CT
- Oss, M., (La), 1982, (206), ?, nat-La
- Ostrenko, V., (Uk), 1983, (70), ?, nat-Uk
- Ostroglad, V., (?), 1981, (?), 15, pol
- Ostroushko, N., 1976, (79), 15, pol
- Ostrovskiy, M., (Uk), 1968, (?), 15, nat-Uk
- Ostrovskiy, V., (Uk), 1958, (?), ?, nat-Uk
- Ovchinnikov, I., (?), 1967, (?), 3, pol; (also, 1958, (64), 7, exit)

- Ovchinnikov, N., (?), 1979, (70), ?, pol
- Ovsienko, V., (Uk), 1981, (70), 15, nat-Uk; (also, 1980, (188-1), 3, nat-Uk, and 1973, (70), 4, nat-Uk)
- Ozernyi, M., (Uk), 1975, (?), 5, nat-Uk; (also, 1966, (70, 72), 3, nat-Uk)
- Ozhigov, B., (?), 1973, (70), insane, pol
- Padar, V., (E), 1984, (206-2), 4, nat-E
- Pailodze, V., (G), 1983, (174-2), 11, pol; (also, 1978, (206-1), 2, pol)
- Pakutskas, I., (Li), 1982, (64), 12, exit
- Palatnik, R., (J), 1971, (190-1)2, pol, emig
- Palchak, M., (Uk), 1961, (64), 15, nat-Uk
- Palchak, S., (Uk), 1961, (?), 10, nat-Uk
- Paliichuk, D., (Uk), 1952, (?), 25, nat-Uk
- Panachev, I., (?), 1983, (191-1, 206-2), ?, pol
- Panarev, A., (?), 1983, (80), 1, emig
- Panifidin, M., (?), 1966, (64, 89, 146), 10, exit
- Pankov, N., (?), 1984, (?), insane, emig
- Pankova, N., (?), 1984, (?), insane, emig
- Panov, A., (?), 1982, (190-1), 3, pol
- Panteleev, V., (?), 1982, (190-1), 2, pol
- Papaian, (A), 1982, (70), 6, pol
- Paradzhanov, S., (A), 1982, (174), 5, pol; (also, 1974, (?), 6, pol)
- Paramonov, G., (R), 1970, (70, 72), insane, pol
- Parasionkov, F., (?), (190-1), insane, soc-econ
- Parek, L., (E), 1983, (70), 9, nat-E

- Paritskii, A., (J), 1981, (190-1), 3, emig
- Parubets, M., (?), 1983, (154), 5, emig
- Pashel, R., (CT), 1972, (?), 2, nat-CT
- Pashilis, A., (Li), 1970, (70, 72), 4, nat-Li
- Pashkauskene, A., (Li), 1974, (?), insane, pol
- Pashnin, E., (?), 1970, (70), 9, pol
- Pastukh, O., (Uk), 1967, (166 Uk), 5, nat-Uk; (also, 1971, (190-1), 0.5, nat-Uk)
- Patel, A., (CT), 1966, (190-3, 191), 2, nat-CT
- Patkau, W., (Ger), 1983, (206-2), 2, emig
- Paulaitis, P., 1958, (old 58), 25, nat-Li
- Paulauskas, I., (Li), 1964, (?), 15, nat-Li
- Paulavichius, L., (Li), 1976, (190-2), 1.5, pol
- Paulus, E., (E), 1970, (70, 72, 218), 2.5, nat-E
- Pautsitis, I., (La), 1982, (190-2, 206), 1.5, nat-La
- Pavlenkov, V., (R), 1970, (70, 72), &, pol
- Pavliuk, V., (?), 1982, (?), insane, emig
- Pavlov, (?), 1967, (83), insane, pol
- Pavlov, A., (?), 1967, (64), insane, exit
- Pavlov, B., (?), 1973, (?), insane, pol
- Pavlov, N., (?), 1981, (70), 5, pol
- Pavlovskii, G., (?), 1982, (190-1), 5, pol
- Pecheliunas, P., (Li), 1980, (70), 8, pol
- Pecherskii, G., (J), 1961, (?), 7, emig
- Pechiulaitis, P., (Li), 1975, (?), 1, pol; (also, 1953, (old 58), 25, nat-Li)

- Pechulionis, P., (Li), 1980, (70), 8, nat-Li
- Pedan, L., (?), 1973, (70), 3, pol
- Peliu, I., (E), 1983, (206-2), 4, nat-E
- Penson, B., (J), 1970, (64a, 93-1, 70), 10, emig
- Petrykh, I., (?), 1974, (190-1), 3, pol
- Pervushyn, V., (?), 1983, (?), insane, pol
- Pesti, A., (E), 1983, (70), 7, pol
- Pestov, V., (R), 1970, (70, 72), 4, pol
- Pestov, Victor, (R), 1970, (79, 72), 5, pol
- Petkus, V., (Li), 1978, (70-2, 72, 121), 15, nat-Li; (also, 1958, (old 58-10), 8, nat-Li)
- Petkau, V., (Ger), 1983, (206-2), 2, emig
- Petrashko, V., (?), 1969, (68, 70, 72), 6, pol
- Petrashov, I., 1980, (70), insane, pol
- Petrenko, A., (?), 1969, (190-1), 1, pol
- Petrov, E., (?), 1973, (70-2), 10, pol
- Petrov, G., (?), 1985, (76-1, 88, 190-1), 8, pol
- Petrov, Iu., (?), 1979, (?), insane, exit
- Petrov, N., (?), 1974, (64), 13, exit
- Petrov, V., (R), 1973, (70-1), 5, pol
- Petrov-Agatov, A., (?), 1969, (70-1)7, pol
- Petviashvili, T., (G), 1984, (?), 14, exit
- Piatronis, P., (Li), 1974, (70-1, 72), nat-Li
- Piatruskas, B., (Li), 1968, (?), ?, nat-Li

Pidhorodets'kyi, V., (Uk), 1984, (198), ?, nat-Uk; (also, 1951, (?), 25, nat-Uk, and 1982, (198), 1.5, pol)

Pikhelgas, I., (E), 1981, (?), insane, exit

Pilnikov, V., (?), 1980, (206-2), 5, emig

Pimenov, R., (?), 1970, (190-1), 5, pol; (also, 1957, (old 58-10, old 58-11), 10, pol)

Pimenov, R., (?), 1984, (?), insane, pol

Pindis, (Li), before 1960, (old 58), 25, pol

Pinkusovich, A., (?), 1985, (154-2), 5, emig

Pinson, N., (J), 1969, (?), 3, exit

Pintan, (La), 1960, (?), insane, exit

Pirn, P., (?), 1980, (?), ?, esp

Pirogov, S., (?), 1958, (old 58-11), 8, pol; (also, 1973, (190-1), 2, pol)

Plakhotniuk, M., (Uk), 1982, (121, 210), 4, nat-Uk; (also, 1972, (?), insane, nat-Uk)

Platonov, V., (R), 1968, (70-1, 72), 7, nat-R

Plushch, L., (Uk), 1972, (70), insane, nat-Uk

Ploshchak, M., (Uk), 1959, (old 58-10), 10, nat-Uk

Plumpa, P., (Li), 1958, (?), 7, nat-Li; (also, 1974, (70, 72), 8, nat-Li)

Podrabinek, A., (?), 1981, (190-1), 3, pol; (also, 1978, (190-1), 5, pol)

Podrabinek, K., (?), 1980, (190-1), 3, pol

Pohorilyi, V., (?), 1984, (70, 72, 218), 6, pol

Pohyba, M., (?), 1979, (206-2), 5, pol

Pokora, S., (Uk), 1961, (?), 12, nat-Uk

Pokrasenko, Iu., (Uk), 1962, (?), 6, pol

Pokrovskyi, I., (Uk), 1949, (old 58), 25, nat-Uk

- Polezhaev, A., (?), 1969, (64), insane, exit
- Poliakov, M., (?), 1984, (70, 89), 8, pol
- Polis-Abolis, V., (La), 1981, (70), ?, pol
- Polishchuk, A., (?), 1982, (?), ?, pol
- Polishchuk, E., (Uk), before 1980, (64), ? nat-Uk
- Polonskii, M., (J), 1985, (?), ?, pol
- Poluektov, V., (?), 1984, (70), 4, pol
- Polynek, V., (?), before 1977, (?), ?, pol
- Pomazov, V., (?), 1971, (190-1), 1.5, pol
- Ponomarev, A., (R), 1971, (190-1), insane, pol
- Ponomarev, S., (R), 1970, (70, 72), 5, pol
- Ponomarev, V., (?), 1970, (190-1), 3, pol
- Popadiuk, Z., (Uk), 1983, (70), 15, nat-Uk; (also, 1973, (70), 12, nat-Uk)
- Popov, (?), 1968, (70), insane, pol
- Popov, Iu., (?), 1983, (?), insane, pol
- Popov, V., (?), 1973, (64), insane, exit
- Popov, Vladimir, (?), 1972, (70), 3, pol
- Popov, Vladimir Vas., (?), 1970, insane, pol
- Popovich, O., (Uk), 1975, (70-2), 13, nat-Uk
- Poreh, V., (?), 1984, (188-3), 3, pol; (also, 1980, (70), 8, pol)
- Poschius, P., (Li), 1961, (?), 15, nat-Li
- Postalaki, V., (M), 1964, (70, 72), 6, pol
- Potapchuk, M., (Uk), 1974, (64), 20, nat-Uk
- Potapov, (?), 1957, (old 58-10, old 58-11), 10, pol

- Potapov, A., (?), 1963, (70), 4, pol
- Potapov, N., (?), 1966, (64), 12, pol
- Potashov, V., (?), 1970, (70), 4, pol
- Potemkin, V., (?), 1969, (68, 70, 72), 7, pol
- Potsiluiko, L., (Uk), 1969, (64, 72), 15, nat-Uk
- Potylitsyn, S., (?), 1968, (83), insane, pol
- Povilonis, V., (Li), 1974, (70), 2, nat-Li
- Povkh, Iu., (J), 1972, (192 Uk), 3.5, enrig
- Pozdeev, V., (?), 1971, (64), 10, exit
- Praks, T., (E), 1953, (old 58), 25, nat-E
- Prantskunaite, Ona, (Li), 1977, (190-1), 2, pol
- Prapuolenaitis, I., (Li), 1972, (98, 190-3), 3, nat-Li
- Priskaru, N., (Romanian), 1963, (?), insane, soc-econ
- Prokhorenkov, A., (R), 1970, (70), 5, pol
- Prokopovych, H., (Uk), 1967, (70-1), 11, nat-Uk
- Pronin, V., (?), 1966, (?), 10, exit
- Proniuk, E., (Uk), 1973, (70), 12, nat-Uk
- Protsiv, M., (Uk), 1962, (?) <15, nat-Uk
- Protsiv, Mykola, (Uk), 1962, (?), executed, nat-Uk
- Protovorov, I., (?), 1981, (70), 3.5, pol
- Pryimachenko, (?), 1963, (?), 4, pol
- Prykhod'ko, H., (Uk), 1981, (70-2), 15, nat-Uk; (also, 1973, (70), 7, nat-Uk)
- Pryshliak, E., (Uk), 1952, (old 58), 25, nat-Uk
- Prytyka, O., (?), 1972, (70), 2.5, pol

- Pundyk, P., (?), 1962, (?), 5, pol
- Puntusov, A., (?), 1975, (70), insanr, pol
- Radzhiukas, (Li), 1984, (?), ?, pol
- Pupart, A., (E), 1970, (64), 15, nat-E
- Purkis, B., (?), 1953, 25, pol
- Purtov, I., (?), 1972, (70), insane, pol
- Purtov, S., (?), 1972, (70), insane, pol
- Pushkar, V., 1981, (64), 10, pol
- Putse, (?), before 1974, (70), 5, pol
- Putse, A., (?), 1973, (64), 15, pol
- Raab, B., (?), 1985, (206-2), 2.5, pol
- Raagma, Iu., (E), 1980, (206-2), 1, nat-E
- Rabinovich, D., (J), 1971, (89), 1, emig
- Rabinovich, V., before 1974, (83), insane, exit
- Radygin, A., (R), 1963, (64, 70), 10, exit
- Radzinskii, O., (?), 1983, (70), 6, pol
- Raef, Iu., (?), before 1970, (?), ?, exit
- Rafals'kyi, V., (Uk), 1968, (70), insane, pol; (also, 1954, (?), insane, pol)
- Raigorodetskii, M., (?), 1974, (190-1), 2, pol
- Raizer, V., (Ger), 1982, (190-1), 2, pol
- Rakets'kyi, V., (Uk), 1972, (70), 5, pol
- Ramazan, (CT), 1969, (190-1), 1, nat-CT
- Ramazanov, R., (CT), 1973, (190-1), 2.5, nat-CT
- Randis, Z., (Li), 1976, (64), 10, nat-Li

- Rasinov, I., (CT), 1968, (190-1), 1, nat-CT
- Rasskazov, M., (?), 1985, (64, 206), 10, descr
- Ratushinskaia, I., (R), 1983, (70), 12, pol
- Rausch, I., (Ger), 1984, (249-a), ?, emig; (also, 1981, (80, 190-1), 2, emig)
- Ravensky, A., (?), 1984, (83), 2, exit
- Ravinsh, M., (L), 1985, (70), insane, nat-La; (also, 1974, (64), 7, nat-La)
- Razgladnik, A., (?), 1983, (70), 12, pol
- Razluts'kyi, V., (Uk), 1981, (190-1), 3, pol
- Razumovskii, Iu., (?), 1970, (130-2, 180-2, 190-1), 2, soc-econ
- Razveev, B., (?), 1984, (190-1, 227), 3, pol
- Rebryk, B., (Uk), 1975, (70), 7, nat-Uk; (also, 1967, (70-1), 3, nat-Uk)
- Redko, N., (?), 1969, (70), 7, pol
- Reinhold, A., (?), 1954, (64), 25, ?
- Reiser, V., (Ger), 1982, (190-1), 2, emig
- Rekashius, (Li), 1955, (?), 25, ?
- Rendel, L., (?), 1958, (old 58-11), 10, pol
- Rep'ev, A., (?), 1965, (?), 10, exit
- Repin, V., (R), 1983, (70), 5, pol
- Repnikov, V., 1953, (?), insane, pol; (also, 1959, (?), 10, emig)
- Reshetnik, A., 1972, (190-1), 2, pol
- Rezert, Kh., (J), 1971, (?), 5, emig
- Reznikov, Iu., (?), before 1980, (64), insane, pol
- Reznykiv, O., (Uk), 1972, (70), 5.5, pol
- Riabokov, V., (?), 1985, (?), insane, pol

- Richter, Ch., (Ger), 1983, (206), ?, emig
- Riga, S., (?), 1984, (190-1, 227), insane, pol
- Riinieks, D., (La), 1963, (64, 72), 15, pol
- Riinieks, I., (La), 1963, (70), 7, nat-La
- Rimkus, I., (Li), before 1977, (664), 15, nat-Li
- Rips, I., (J), 1969, (70), insane, pol
- Rivkin, M., (?), 1983, (70, 72), 12, pol
- Rode, G., (La), 1963, (64, 70, 72), 15, nat-La, pol
- Rodionov, V., (R), 1970, (70, 162), 3, pol
- Rodzin, N., (?), 1982, (70), ?, pol
- Rogachev, M., (?), 1967, (64), 4, exit
- Rogaleva, E., (?), 1969, (68, 70, 72), 5, pol
- Roginskii, A., (?), 1981, (196-2), 4, pol
- Roitburd, L., (J), 1975, (191-2), 2, emig
- Rokits'kyi, V., (Uk), 1972, (?), 5, pol
- Romaniuk, (Uk), 1962, (?), ?, nat-Uk
- Romaniuk, V., (Uk), 1972, (70-2), 10, nat-Uk
- Romanov, A., (R), 1970, (70, 72), 6, pol; (also, 1981, (190-1), ?, pol)
- Rombe, S., (J), 1981, (?), ?, emig
- Ronkin, V., (J), 1965, (70-1, 72), 10, pol
- Roomae, (E), 1981, (190-2), 1.5, nat-E
- Rose, E., (?) 1982, (190-1), 1, pol
- Rosenberg, I., (J), 1985, (190-1), 2, pol
- Rosenfeld, R., (?) '976, (117), 12, pol

- Rozenberg, Z., (La), 1962, (64, 70, 72), 6, nat-La
- Rozenblat, I., (E), 1981, (206-2), 1.5, nat-E
- Roshal, (J), 1961, (?), 9, emig
- Roshianu, I., (Romanian), 1969, (?), insane, pol
- Rozhdestvov, V., (?), 1977, (190-1), insane, pol
- Rozhkalns, I., (La), 1983, (70), 8, pol
- Rozluts'kyi, B., (Uk), before 1974, (?), 4, pol
- Rozumnyi, P., (Uk), 1980, (?), 3, nat-Uk
- Ruban, M., (Uk), 1968, (?), 5, nat-Uk
- Ruban, P., (Uk), 1985, (70), 14, nat-Uk; (also, 1976, (89-3, 153, 190-1), 9, nat-Uk, and 1968, (70, 218), 5, nat-Uk)
- Ruban, V., (Uk), 1972, (70), insane, nat-Uk
- Rudaitis, I., (Li), 1974, ((70), 3, nat-Li
- Rudenko, M., (Uk), 1977, (70), 12, nat-Uk
- Rudenko, Raisa, (Uk), 1981, (70), 10, nat-Uk
- Rugis, I., (Li), 1973, (?), ?, nat-Li
- Rukosuev, A., (?), 1983, (64), 8, exit
- Rulev-Kagan, L., (?), 1983, (88,89-3), 154-3), 8, emig
- Rumiantsev, A., (?), 1971, (190-1), 2.5, pol
- Rumiantsev, V., (?), 1959, (64), 15, pol
- Rumyga, I., (Uk), 1981, (?), executed, nat-Uk
- Russu, (M), 1969, (?), 12, nat-M
- Rusyn, I., (?), 1966, (70), 1, pol
- Ruze, A., (La), before 1980, (64), ?, nat-La

- Rybachuk, F., (Uk), 1981, (?), executed, nat-Uk
- Rybak, G., (?), 1982, (209), insane, emig
- Rybak, V., (?), 1982, (64), insane, exit
- Rybak, V., (?), (64), insane, exit
- Rybakov, A., (?), 1972, (70), insane, pol
- Rybakov, Iu., (?), 1976, (89-2, 96-2, 98-2, 189, 206-2), 6, pol
- Rynkovenko, V., (Uk), 1962, (?), 6, nat-Uk
- Ryzhnik, M., (J), 1969, (80), 1, pol
- Ryzhkov, N., (?), 1985, (64), 15, deser
- Ryzhov, (?), 1979, (70), ?, pol
- Saakian, K., (A), 1974, (69A, 235A), 3.5, nat-A
- Saarits, M., (E), 1983, (?), 1.5, nat-E
- Saarte, V., (E), 1970, (?), 4.5, nat-E
- Sabanov, E., (CT), 1969, (198), 2, nat-CT
- Sabanova, Z., (CT), 1970, (198), 2, nat-CT
- Saburova, P., (?), 1970, (190-1), 3, pol
- Sachuk, I., (Uk), 1963, (?), 5, nat-Uk
- Sade, S., (E), 1982, (190-1), 1, nat-E
- Sado, M., (Assyrian), 1967, (64, 72), 13, nat-R
- Sadunaite, N., (Li), 1975, (70), 6, nat-Li
- Sadunas, I., (Li), 1983, (130Li), 1, nat-Li; (also 1982, (?), insane, nat-Li)
- Safarian, K., (A), 1962, (70), 4, nat-A
- Safronov, A., (R), 1970, (64), 12, exit
- Sagatov, I., (?), 1976, (?), 12, pol

- Saharadze, P., (G), 1983, (70), 3, pol
- Sakalauskas, A., (Li), 1974, (70), 5, exit
- Sakhat, M., (CT), 1966, (190-3, 191), 2, nat-CT
- Saledinov, K., (CT), 1968, (190-1, 190-3), 2, nat-CT
- Salman, M., (J), 1981, (209), ?, emig
- Salum, V., (E), 1980, (?), insane, nat-E
- Samkharadze, N., (G), 1980, (70), insane, pol
- Samoilov, E., (?), 1975, (70), insane, pol
- Sanagina, V., (?), 1957, (old 58-10), 10, pol
- Sannikova, E., (R), 1984, (70), 5, pol
- Sapeliak, S., (Uk), 1974, (70), 8, nat-Uk
- Saranchuk, P., (Uk), 1980, (?), 5.5, nat-Uk; also 1953, (old 54), 25, nat-Uk)
- Sarkanas, S., (Li), 1966, (?), 10, ?
- Sarkisian, E., (A), 1974, (70, 72), 4, socio-econ
- Sartakov, P., (R), 1984, (190-1), 6, pol; (also 1972, (70), 12, pol)
- Sartaniia, R., (?), 1971, (64), insane, exit
- Sarychev, S., (?), 1969, (206-2), 2.5, pol
- Sasnauskas, I., (Li), 1980, (70), 6.5, nat-Li
- Savchenko, P., (?), 1979, (190-1), 1.5, pol
- Savchenko, V., (Uk), 1962, (?), 6, nat-Uk; (also 1970, (190-1), 2, nat-Uk)
- Savchyn, A., (?), 1975, (?), >2, pol
- Savinkin, O., (?), 1973, (70 and 72), 7, pol
- Savurenko, I., (?), 1979, (?), insane, pol
- Schaab, J., (Ger), 1980, (92), 3, emig

- Schwartzkopf, W., (Ger), 1982, (?), 1, emig
- Seferov, E., (CT), 1961, (70, 64Uz), 7, nat-CT
- Seferov, R., (CT), 1968, (190-1, 190-3), 2.5, nat-CT
- Seidametov, R., (CT), 1965, (206), 1, nat-CT
- Seitablaev, S., (CT), 1968, (190-1), 1, nat-CT
- Seitmuratova, A., (CT), 1967, (74), 3, nat-CT; (also 1971, (?), 3, nat-CT)
- Selli, S., (E), 1982, (206-2), 2, nat-E
- Semanov, S., 1982, (?), ?, pol
- Semeniuk, K., (Uk), 1985, (70), 12, pol; (also, 1958, (?), 3, pol)
- Semeniuk, R., (Uk), 1965, (?), 3, nat-Uk; (also, 1950, (old 58), 25, nat-Uk)
- Semenov, A., (?), 1981, (64), 10, exit
- Semiletov, V., (R), 1971, (70, 72), 5, pol
- Seminenko, M., (R), 1958, (old 58-11), 8, pol
- Semionov, A., (?), 1981, (64), 10, exit
- Senderov, V., (R), 1983, (70), 12, pol
- Senin, A., (R), 1983, (190-1 or 196), insane, nat-R
- Senin, O., (R), 1970, (70, 72), 9, pol
- Sen'kiv, V., (Uk), 1974, (70), 7, nat-Uk
- Sentsov, N., (?), 1966, (64), 12, exit
- Senyk, I., (Uk), 1973, (70), 9, nat-Uk; (also, 1946, (old 58), 10, nat-Uk)
- Sepp, A., (E), 1981, (206-2, 212-1), 4, pol
- Serbenchuk, R., (?), 1963, (?), 9, pol
- Serebrov, F., (R), 1981, (70), 9, pol; (also 1977, (?), 1, pol)
- Sereda, M., (?), 1984, (175, 170, 208-2, 196-2, 218-1), 7, pol

- Seredniak, L., (Uk), 1972, (190-1), 1, pol
- Sergeev, L., (R), 1972, (190-1), 2.5, pol; (also 1969, (88), 6, socio-econ)
- Sergeev, M., (?), 1969, (70?), insane, pol
- Sergeev, S., (?), 1972, (70), ?, pol
- Serhienko, O., (Uk), 1972, (70), 10, nat-Uk
- Seveliev, D., (?), 1978, (?), insane, pol
- Sevriugov, V., (?), 1982, (70), ?, pol
- Sevruk, V., (?), 1972, (70), insane, pol
- Shaab, I., (Ger), 1980, (92), 3, emig
- Shabatura, S., (Uk), 1972, (70), 8, nat-Uk
- Shabanov, E., (CT), 1979, (206), 2, nat-CT
- Shaburov, N., (?), 1982, (?), insane, emig; (also, 1970, (70, 72), 5, pol)
- Shaefer, E., (?), 1984, (112), 2.5, pol
- Shafer, N., (J), 1971, (190-1), 1.5, emig
- Shakalis, V., (Li), 1980, (?), ?, exit
- Shakhverdian, B., (A), 1973, (70, 72), 7, nat-A
- Shakirov, B., (Uzbek), 1968, (64, 70?), 12, nat-Uz
- Shakishvili, L., (G), 1983, (?), 3, pol
- Shaltoian, A., (M), 1972, (72), 10, nat-A
- Shal'vis, V., (Li), 1972, (?), 4, ?
- Shamanuri, (G), 1982, (206), ?, pol
- Shamratov, S., (CT), 1967, (74), 3, nat-CT
- Shapiro, D., (J), 1985, (190-1), 3, pol
- Shaporenko, D., (Uk), 1974, (70), insane, pol

- Shashenkov, E., (?), 1968, (70), insane, pol
- Shatalov, (?), <1977, (190-1), insane, pol
- Shatalov, N., (?), 1978, (190-1), 1.5, emig
- Shatravka, A., (Uk), 1984, (190-1), 2, pol; (also 1983, (190-1), 3, pol); (also 1980, (?), insane, exit); (also 1974, (?), insane, exit)
- Shatravka, M., (Uk), 1983, (190-1, 196-3), 3, pol; (also 1974, (?), insane, exit)
- Shcharanskii, A., (J), 1978, (64, 70), 13, pol
- Shchegolev, V., (?), 1982, (190-1), ?, emig
- Shcherbakov, A., (?) 1984, (64), 15, exit
- Shchetkina, V., (CT), 1974, (198), 1, nat-CT
- Shchipkova, T., (?), 1980, (206-2), 3, pol
- Shefer, L., (J), 1982, (70), 5, pol
- Sheludko, G., (?), 1977, (64), 15, insane, exit
- Shepshelovich, M., (J), 1971, (70-1), 2, emig
- Sher, (?), 1969, (65, 70), 2, pol
- Sherkshnis, I., (Li), 1968, (64), 15, nat-Li
- Shershen, (Uk), 1962, (?), 6, pol
- Shevchenko, (?), 1982, (?), insane, pol
- Shevchenko, I., (Uk), 1959, (?), 15, nat-Uk
- Shevchenko, O., (Uk), 1980, (190-1), 8, nat-Uk
- Shevchenko, V., (Uk), 1980, (70), 11, nat-Uk
- Shevchuk, A., (Uk), 1966, (70), 5, nat-Uk
- Shevchuk, A., (Uk), 1981, (190-1), 3, pol
- Shibalkin, V., (?), <1975, (64), >3, exit

- Shibanov, N., (?), 1969, (70), 7, pol; (also 25 and 8 yr. sentences (pol) -- no other information)
- Shikhanovich, I., (J), 1984, (70), 10, pol; (also 1973, (70), insane, pol)
- Shilinskas, I., (Li), 1970, (70, 72), 5, nat-Li
- Shilkov, A., (?), 1982, (70), 6, pol
- Shilkrot, B., (J), 1970, (70), 3, pol
- Shimko, A., (?), 1980, (?), insane, pol
- Shimonis, I., (Li), 1984, (?), >2, ?
- Shirvinskii, Z., (Li), 1976, (190-1), 2, pol
- Shkol'nik, I., (J), 1973, (64, 70), 10, emig
- Shleshnev, V., (?), 1971, (64), insane, exit
- Shmelev, V., (?), 1983, (70), 10, pol
- Shmul', V., (?), 1960, (?), 7, ?
- Shnarr, F., (Ger), 1974, (190-1), 2, emig
- Shnirman, S., (Ger), 1983, (80), 3, emig
- Shovkovyi, I., (Uk), 1973, (70, 72, 144, 218), 5, nat-Uk
- Shpilberg, A., (J), 1971, (70, 72), 3, emig
- Shreier, L., (?), 1985, (190-1), 3, pol
- Shtein, L., (?), 1971, (64), insane, exit
- Shteinberg, V., (?), 1984, (?), ?, ?
- Shtern, M., (J), 1974, (147-2Uk, 168-2Uk), 8, pol
- Shtilbans, V., (J), 1971, (70-1, 72), 1, pol
- Shukhevych-Berezyns'kyi, I., (Uk), 1972, (70-2), 15, nat-Uk; (also 1958, (?), 10, nat-Uk); (also 1949, (?), 10, nat-Uk)
- Shuliak, A., (Uk), 1953, (?), 25, ?

- Shults, V., (Ger), 1974, (190-1, 190-3, 210), 2, emig
- Shumuk, D., (Uk), 1972, (70-2), 15, nat-Uk; (also 1958, (old 58-10), 10, nat-Uk); (also 1945, (old 58), 20, nat-Uk)
- Shur, G., (J), 1971, (70-1, 72), 2, emig
- Shushenkov, V., (?), 1972, (?), insane, pol
- Shushunin, V., (?), <1975, (70), >3, pol
- Shust, (Uk), 1962, (?), >3, nat-Uk
- Shutkin, A., (R), 1975, (190-1), 1.5, pol
- Shuvalov, O., (R), 1968, (70-1, 72), 1, nat-R
- Shynkaruk, T. (Uk), 1971 (old 58?), 12, ?
- Sichko, P., (Uk), 1982, (190-1), 3, nat-Uk; (also 1979, (190-1), 3, nat-Uk); (also 1947, (old 58), 25, nat-Uk)
- Sichko, Vasyi', (Uk), 1982, (224), 3, nat-Uk; (also 1979, (190-1), 3, nat-Uk)
- Sichko, Volodymyr, (Uk), 1981, (80), 3, nat-Uk
- Sidaris, V., (Li), 1957, (old 58), 25, ?
- Sidenko, F., (Uk), 1965, (70), 5, pol
- Sidorov, V. (?), 1984, (70), insane, pol
- Sil'nitskii, A., (J), 1974, (80), 2, emig
- Silivonchik, G.V., (?), 1969, (64a, 70 1, 72, 102e, 102f, 218), 18, exit
- Simkin, A., (?), 1978, (190-1), insane, pol
- Simokaitis, V., (Li), 1971, (64), 15, exit
- Simutis, L., (Li), 1955, (old 58), 25, nat-Li
- Sinder, V., (Ger), 1982, (198-1), 3, emig
- Siniavskii, A., (R), 1966, (70-1), 12, pol
- Sinkevich, O., (?), 1956, (?), 7, pol

- Sin'kov, N., (?), 1973, (70), 5, pol
- Sirenchis, I., (H), 1961, (70), 7, pol
- Siryi, V., (Uk), 1969, (83, 98), insane, exit
- Skachinsky, A., (?), 1976, (64?), 8, exit
- Skliarova, L., (?), 1970, (64), 15, exit
- Skobov, A., (?), 1983, (70), insane, pol
- Skochok, P., (Uk), 1979, (190-1), insane, pol
- Skripkin, M., (?), 1982, (70), 4, pol
- Skrypchuk, K., (Uk), 1953, (old 58), 28, nat-Uk
- Skudra, Z., (La), 1978, (64), 12, pol
- Skuieniks, K., (La), 1963, (84La), 7, nat-La
- Skuodis, V., (Li), 1980, (70), 12, nat-Li
- Skvirskii, V., (?), 1984, (190-1), 3, pol; (also 1983, (190-1), 3, pol); (also 1979, (93), 5, pol)
- Skyba, I., (Uk), 1970, (?), ?, ?
- Slepak, V., (J), 1978, (206-2, 43), 5, emig
- Slinin, A., (J), 1974, (80), 3, emig
- Slishevskii, I., (?), 1971, (70), insane, pol
- Slobodian, Mykhailo, (Uk), 1975, (64), 14, nat-Uk
- Slobod'ian, Mykola, (Uk), 1974, (70, 72), 5, nat-Uk
- Slobodniuk, V., (?), 1973, (70), 5, pol
- Sluchka, A., (Li), 1965, (64), 15, nat-Li
- Sluchka, S., (Li), 1965, (?), 13, nat-Li
- Smiltans, K., (La), ?, (?), 15, nat-La

- Smirnov, (?), <1975, (?), >2, pol
- Smirnov, A., (?), 1983, (70), 10, pol
- Smirnov, O., (?), 1968, (70), insane, pol
- Smirnov, V.A., (?), 1984, (64), 10, exit
- Smolkin, V., (J), 1965, (70-1, 72), 3, pol
- Soglovoi, M., (?), 1979, (206), 3, pol
- Sokirko, V., (?), 1980, (190-1), 3, pol
- Sokolov, A., (?), <1978, (70), insane, pol
- Sokolov, B., (?), 1970?, (70), 4, pol
- Sokolov, V., (?), 1972, (206-2), 5 (later insane), pol; (also, 1958, (?), 10, pol
- Sokolova, N., (?), 1985, (83), 1.5, exit
- Sokul's'kyi, I., (Uk), 1985, (206-2), 3, nat-Uk; (also 1981, (70), 15, nat-Uk); (also 1970, (70), 4.5, nat-Uk)
- Soldatov, S., (R), 1975, (70), 6, pol
- Solodkyi, I., (Uk), 1956, (old 58), 25, nat-Uk; (also, 1948 (?), 25, nat-Uk)
- Solomeitnikov, B., (?), <1978, (?), insane, pol
- Soloviev, O., (R), 1969, (190-1), insane, socio-econ
- Soome, H., (E), 1984, (83), 1.5, exit
- Sopoev, (?), <1979, (70), insane, pol
- Soroka, M., (Uk), 1953, (old 58), 25, nat-Uk
- Soroka, S., (Uk), 1958, (?), 25, nat-Uk; (also, 1952 (?), 25, nat-Uk)
- Soroka, V., (Uk), 1961, (?), 15, nat-Uk
- Sorokin, E., (?), 1974, (64), 12, exit
- Sorokin, N., (?), 1978, (190-1), insane, pol

- Sorokin, V., (?), 1980, (181-1), 1, pol
- Spashchenko, V., (?), <1974, (?), insane, pol
- Spinenko, V., (?), 1978, (?), insane, pol; (also 1971, (70, 72), insane, pol)
- Stanelite, I., (Li), 1980, (190-3, 209), 3, pol
- Starchik, P., (?), 1972, (70), insane, pol
- Starosol's'kyi, L., (Uk), 1980, (89-2), 6, nat-Uk; (also, 1973, (70, 190-2), 2, nat-Uk)
- Stasevich, A., (?), 1979, (206-2), 3, pol
- Stashaitis, V., (Li), 1965, (64), 15, nat-Li
- Stasiv-Kalynets', I., (Uk), 1972, (70), 9, nat-Uk
- Statkiavichius, A., (Li), 1980, (190-1, 190-3, 70), insane, pol; (also, 1970, (70), insane, pol); (also, 1951, (?), 6, ?)
- Steba, I., (Uk), 1967, (70), insane, pol
- Stepanchuk, A., (?), 1980, (?), insane, emig
- Stepaniuk, O., (Uk), 1957, (?), 25, nat-Uk
- Stepanov, A., (?), 1970, (70), insane, pol
- Stepanov, I., (?), 1969, (70), 15, pol; (also, detained earlier for approx. 30 years)
- Stolar, I., (Uk), 1973, (245, 259), insane, ?
- Stonkus, P., (Li), 1967, (64), 15, nat-Li
- Strashkov, N., (?), 1969, (66), 15, pol
- Streikus, I., (Li), 1962, (?), 15, nat-Li
- Stril'tsiv, V., (Uk), 1982, (70), 6, nat-Uk; (also 1979, (190-1, 198), 2, nat-Uk); (also 1944, (?), 10, nat-Uk)
- Strokata, N., (Uk), 1972, (70), 4, nat-Uk
- Strotsen', P., (Uk), 1958, (?), 25, ?
- Strus, P., (?), 1960, (?), 10, ?

- Strutyns'kyi, I., (Uk), 1959, (old 58), 10, nat-Uk
- Studenkov, A., (R), 1968, (70-1, 94, 158-1, 196-2), 1, pol
- Stus, V., (Uk), 1980, (70), 15, nat-Uk; (also, 1972, (70), 8, nat-Uk)
- Subbotin, V., (?), 1982, (206-2), 5, pol
- Suchkin, (?), 1978, (83), insane, pol
- Sudakov, S., (?), 1974, (?), insane, pol
- Sudarov, A., (R), 1968, (70-1, 72), 2, nat-R
- Suk, I., (Uk), 1970, (70), ?, pol
- Suleimanova, S., (CT), 1967, (190, 191), ?, nat-CT
- Sulimov, V., (J), 1980, (80), insane, emig
- Superfin, G., (J), 1974, (70-1), 7, pol
- Surva, I., (E), 1981, (206-2), 2.5, nat-E
- Suslenskii, I., (J), 1970, (70), 7, pol
- Sverdlov, V., (?), 1978, (64), 8, pol; (also, 1981, (174-2, 174-1), 6, pol)
- Sverstiuk, I., (Uk), 1973, (70), 7, nat-Uk
- Svistelin, G., (?), 1979, (96, 162), ?, pol
- Svitlychna, N., (Uk), 1973, (70), 4, nat-Uk
- Svitlychnyi, I., (Uk), 1973, (70), 12, nat-Uk
- Symchych, M., (Uk), 1983, (190-1), 2.5, nat-Uk; (1970, (?), 12, nat-Uk); (also, 1949, (old 58), 25, nat-Uk)
- Symonchuk, M., (?), 1969, (206-2), 4, nat-Uk
- Sysoiev, V., (?), 1983, (228), 2, pol
- Systar, V., (E), 1980, (206), 1.5, nat-E
- Sytinskii, V., (?), 1984, (190-1, 70?), insane, pol

- Tabelev, L., (?), 1982, (70), insane, pol
- Talantov, B., (?), 1969, (190-1), 2, pol
- Tamm, S., (E), 1970, (70, 72, 218), 3, nat-E
- Tarasenko, V., (?), 1982, (64), ?, exit
- Tarasov, A., (?), 1964, (64), 8, pol
- Tarnavskiy, N., (Uk), 1964, (70, 72), 7, pol
- Tarnopolskii, I., (J), 1983, (190-1), 3, emig
- Tarto, E., (E), 1984, (70-2), 15, nat-E; (also, 1962, (70), 5.5, nat-E); (also, 1956, (?), 4, nat-E)
- Tauberts, A., (La), 1985, (70), 6 or 7, nat-La
- Teeslau, A., (E), 1981, (206-2, 212-1), 1.5, nat-E
- Telik, (?), <1982, (70), ?, pol
- Telkenis, A., (Li), 1970, (70), 3, pol
- Telnikov, V., (J), 1957, (old 58) 10, pol
- Temirbaiev, N., (?), 1984, (crim. art.), 2, pol
- Temonen, A., (E), 1981, (206-2, 144), 1.5, nat-E
- Terebenin, K., (?), 1971, (64), 15, pol
- Terliatskas, A., (Li), 1980, (70), 8, nat-Li; (also, 1973, (?), 1, nat-Li); (also, 1957, (old 58), 4, nat-Li)
- Ternovskii, L., (?), 1980, (190-1), 3, pol
- Tershivskaia, M., (Uk), 1965, (70), 6, pol
- Teshaev, K., (?), 1970, (71Tad, 190, 206-2), ?, pol
- Teslenko, M., (?), 1970, (70), 6, pol
- Tibilov, P., (Ossetian), <1968, (64), ?, exit
- Tiitso, O., (E), 1980, (206), 1.5, nat-Li

- Tilgals, I., (La), 1978, (70, 72), 5, nat-La
- Tilgals, M., (La), 1978, (70, 72), 3, nat-La
- Till, A., (Ger), 1982, (190-1), 2.5, pol
- Timofeev, L., (?), 1985, (70), 11, pol
- Timofeev, V., (?), 1962, (64), 12, exit
- Timokhin, S., (?), 1984, (83), 2, exit
- Timokhin, V.S., (?), 1975, (70), insane, nat-R
- Timokhin, V.K., (?), 1975, (70), insane, pol
- Timonin, I., (?), 1971, (?), insane, pol
- Tissen, (Ger), 1974, (190), 3, pol
- Titov, V., (?), 1982, (70?), insane, pol; (also 1981, (70), insane, pol)
- Tiurichev, V., (?), 1981, (70), insane, pol
- Tkach, S., (Uk), 1968, (?), 2.5, nat-Uk
- Tkachev, V., (?), 1961, (64), 10, ?
- Tkachuk, I., (Uk), 1959, (old 58), 10, nat-Uk
- Tkachuk, V., (Uk), 1966, (64), 20, nat-Uk
- Tkalich-Petrov, A., (?), 1982, (?), ?, pol
- Tohv, T., (E), 1984, (206-2), 3.5, nat-E
- Tolstousov, G., (?), 1970, (?), ?, pol
- Tolstykh, N., (?), 1985, (70), >2, pol
- Tomachinskii, V., (?), 1983, (209, 190-1), 7, emig
- Tomonis, M., (Li), 1974, (?), insane, nat-Li
- Tovkach, I., (Uk), 1972, (64), 12, nat-Uk
- Tovmasian, A., (A), 1973, (70, 72), 3.5, nat-A

- Tovstenko, V., (?), 1971, (70, 72), insane, pol
- Tovstoniuk, (?), ?, (190-1), 3, ?
- Trakhtenberg, (?), 1982, (70), ?, pol
- Trakhtenberg, E., (J), 1971, (190), 3, emig
- Trakhtenberg, L., (J), 1971, (70-1, 72, 202Mol), 2, emig
- Trepov, L., (?), 1967, (64), 12, exit
- Treinberg, H., (E), 1983, (206-2), 5, nat-E
- Trifonov, V., (?), 1968, (190-1), insane, pol
- Trish, V., (Uk), 1974, (190-1), insane, ?
- Trotsiuk-Kozliuk, P., (Uk), 1972, (?), insane, nat-Uk; (also, ?, (old 58), 25, nat-Uk)
- Trufanov, F., (?), 1972, (70), 15, pol
- Trusova, T., (?), 1983, (?), 4.5, pol
- Tsalitis, I., (La), 1983, (70), 6, nat-La; (also, late 1940s, (old 58), ?, nat-La); (also sentenced under Art. 70 in 1950s?)
- Tsarev, I., (?), 1976, (190-1), ?, pol
- Tselykh, A., (?), 1972, (70), insane, pol
- Tsepko, (?), <1975, (?), >2, ?
- Tsereteli, I., (G), 1983, (70), 4, nat-G
- Tsidzikas, P., (Li), 1973, (70), insane, nat-Li
- Tsintsadze, Z., (G), 1983, (?), 3, pol
- Tsitlenok, B., (J), 1975, (190-3), 5, emig
- Tsukerman, V., (J), 1981, (190-1, 190-3), 3, pol
- Tsurkov, A., (?), 1984, (191), 4, pol; (also, 1979, (70), 7, pol)
- Tsurkova, I., (J), 1983, (190-1), 3, pol

- Tsytsyk, R., (?), 1973, (?), 3, ?
- Tuchas, R., (Li), 1953, (old 58), 25, ?
- Tumelkans, (?), 1972, (?), 15, pol
- Turchenko, A., (Uk), 1982, (190-1), 2, pol
- Tursunov, V., (?), 1976, (190-1), insane, pol
- Turyk, A., (Uk), 1957, (old 58), 25, nat-Uk
- Tvaladze, E., (G), 1985, (70), 8, pol; (also, 1963, (64), 5, exit
- Tverdokhlebov, A., (R), 1974, (190-1), 5, pol
- Tyhlivets', O., (Uk), 1961, (?), 12, nat-Uk
- Tykhyi, (Uk), 1960, (?), 10, nat-Uk
- Tykhyi, (Uk), 1960, (?), 10, nat-Uk
- Tykhyi, O., (Uk), 1977, (70-2), 15, nat-Uk; (also 1957, (old 58), 7, nat-Uk)
- Tymkiv, I., (Uk), 1959, (old 58), 10, nat-Uk
- Tystsevich, S., (?), 1967, (70), insane, pol
- Tyzhykov, L., (CT), 1967, (?), 1, nat-CT
- Ubozhko, L., (?), 1970, (190-1), 3, pol
- Uchitel', A., (R), 1969, (70), 4, pol
- Ugnachev, A., (?), 1957, (old 58), insane, pol
- Ukhanov, N., (?), 1984, (190-1), 2, pol
- Ul'ianchenko, L., (?), 1970, (70), insane, pol
- Umerov, L., (CT), 1968, (190), 1, nat-CT
- Umerov, R., (CT), 1969, (190), 1, nat-CT
- Umerov, S., (CT), 1962, (70, 72), 3, nat-CT
- Urb, T., (E), 1982, (83), ?, exit

- Urnezhius, Z., (Li), 1967, (64), 15, nat-Li
- Usatiuk, A., (M), 1972, (?), 12, nat-M
- Useinova, S., (CT), 1966, (190, 191), 3, nat-CT
- Ushakov, G.M., (R), 1975, (70, 72), 5, pol
- Ushakov, V.G., (?), 1982, (191-2), 3, pol
- Ustinovich, S., (R), 1968, (70-1, 72), 3.5, nat-R
- Uteiev, T., (?), 1981, (64), 14, exit
- Utemov, M., (?), 1981, (?), insane, pol
- Utenkov, V., (?), 1972, (68), 10, pol
- Uvarov, A., (?), 1976, (?), insane, emig
- Uzlov, V., (R), 1970, (70, 72), 3.5, pol
- Vaartnou, V., (E), 1982, (83), ?, exit
- Vagin, E., (R), 1967, (64, 72), 8, nat-R
- Vaichiunas, V., (Li), 1981, (190-1), 2.5, nat-Li
- Vail', B., (J), 1970, (190-1), 5, pol; (also, 1957, (old 58), 3, pol) (also, 1958, (old 58), 6, pol) (also, 1959, (?), 7, pol)
- Vaitmaa, R., (E), 1985, (191-1), 3, nat-E
- Valkiv, M., (Uk), 1977, (190-1), insane, nat-Uk; (tried earlier -- no details available)
- Vaivada, A., (Li), 1968, (64), 15, nat-Li
- Valdman, I., (E), <1974, (64), 12, exit
- Valk, I., (E), 1985, (?), ?, nat-E
- Valk, T., (E), 1985, (?), ?, nat-E
- Valov, I., (?), 1981, (?), insane, pol; (also, imprisoned earlier -- no details available)
- Varat , A., (E), 1975, (70), 3, nat-E

- Vare, (E), 1981, (190-2), 1.5, nat-E
- Varenkov, P., (?), <1966, (64), ?, exit
- Vares, K., (E), <1959, (old 58), 25, nat-E
- Vasil'ev, A., (?), 1984, (206-2), 4, pol
- Vasil'ev, I.A., (?), 1975, (70), 4, pol
- Vasil'ev, I.V., (?), 1969, (64, 72, 102, 218), 114, exit
- Vasil'ev, N., (?), 1970, (130-2, 180-2, 190-1), 2, socio-econ
- Vasil'ev, V., (?), 1969, (190-1, 70), insane, pol
- Vasylyk, V., (Uk), 1968, (70), 6, nat-Uk
- Vasilian, O., (A), 1969, (70-1, 72), 6, nat-A
- Vedeneev, R., (?), 1971, (70), 3, pol
- Veduta, B., (?), 1967, (64), 15, exit
- Veepalu, E., (E), 1985, (83), ?, exit
- Vekshin, V., (?), 1970, (70), 3, pol
- Velikanova, T., (R), 1980, (70), 9, pol
- Veliullaev, A., (CT), 1967, (?), 3, nat-CT
- Vendysh, M., (J), 1967, (64), 15, exit
- Verba, (?), before 1982, (70), insane, pol
- Veres, S., (Uk), 1970, (70), 2, nat-Uk
- Veretenev, V., (R), 1968, (70-1, 72) 2.5, nat-R
- Verkholiak, D., (Uk), 1956, (old 58), 25, nat-Uk
- Verkhovskii, A., (?), 1982, (190-1), 1.5, pol
- Verner, V., (?), 1974, (190-1), 3, pol
- Vernik, I., (?), 1972, (?), 4, pol

- Vetokhin, Iu., (?), 1972, (70), insane, exit
- Veveris, I., (La), 1983, (70), 3, nat-La
- Viarav, I., (E), 1984, (190-1), insane, nat-E
- Vilchiavskas, B., (Li), 1973, (?), 2.5, nat-Li
- Vilbakh, Vilo, (E), 1980, (206), 2, nat-E
- Vilutis, I., (Li), 1971, (64), 15, nat-Li
- Vinarov, Ia., (J), 1975, (80), 3, pol
- Vinkelis, Iu., (La), 1982, (190-1), 2, pol
- Vinogradov, V., (?), 1983, (?), insane, pol
- Vinokurov, B., (?), 1975, (?), insane, pol
- Vins, N., (?), 1985, (190-3, 191-1-2), 5, pol
- Virbitskas, M., (Li), 1967, (?), 10, nat-Li
- Virun, S., (Uk), 1961, (64, 72), 11, nat-Uk
- Vishkers, E., (?), 1972, (64), 15, pol
- Viūnysh, O., (La), 1982, (190-2, 206), 2, nat-La
- Vitkayskaite, O., (Li), 1980, (190-1), 1.5, nat-Li
- Vladimirova, T., (?), 1982, (70), 6.5, pol
- Vodyshchak, O., (Uk), 1969, (64), 15, nat-Uk
- Volkov, (?), 1970, (206-2), 1, pol
- Volkov, E., (?), 1967, (190-1), insane, pol
- Volkov, N., (?), 1983, (?), insane, pol
- Volkov, O., (?), 1976, (89-2, 96-2, 98-2, 206-2), 7, pol
- Volkov, V., (?), ?, (70), ?, pol
- Volokhonskii, L., (?), 1982, (70), 5, pol; (also, 1979, (190-1), 2, pol

- Voloshin, A., (J), 1971, (70, 72, 89-2), 2, emig
- Volkovskii, L., (J), 1985, (190-1), 3, emig
- Volzhskaia, V., (?), 1971, (190-1), 1.5, pol
- Vorob'ev, O., (R), 1971, (70), 6, pol
- Vorobiov, C. (Uk), 1962, (?), 4, nat-Uk
- Vorona, A., (?), 1983, (70), insane, pol
- Voronov, N., (?), before 1978, (190-1), insane, pol
- Vorozhko, V., (Uk), 1974, (64), 20, nat-Uk
- Vudka, Iu., (J), 1970, (70, 72), 7, pol
- Vudka, V., (J), 1970, (70, 72), 3, pol
- Vylegzhagin, V., 1974, (70), 4, pol
- Vynnychuk, P., (Uk), 1973, (70, 72), 6, nat-Uk
- Vysotskii, A., (?), 1982, (190-1, 89), 3, pol
- Vysu, A., (E), 1970, (70, 72, 218), 3.5, nat-E
- Zabak, O., (R), 1968, (70-1, 72), 1, nat-R
- Zabrauskas, A., (Li), 1977, (190-2), ?, nat-Li
- Zadkov, G., (?), 1968, (70), insane, pol
- Zagirmiak, A., (?), 1977, (64), 10, exit
- Zaitsev, V., (?), 1962, (64), 10, exit
- Zaitsev, V., (?), 1979, (186-1, 190-1), insane, pol
- Zakharchenko, V., (Uk), 1973, (70), 5, pol
- Zakharov, V., before 1974, (?), 12, exit
- Zakshauskas, P., (Li), before 1974, (?), 15, nat-Li
- Zakshevsky, K., (Li), 1977, (?), ?, nat-Li

- Zalepa, Iu., (?), 1980, (70,72), 8, pol
- Zalivaiko, B., (?), 1969, (64), 13, pol
- Zalmanson, I., (J), 1970, (64a, 72, 93-1) 8, emig
- Zalmarson, S., (J), 1970, (64a, 72, 93-1), 10, emig
- Zal'manson, V., (J), 1971, (64a, 70, 93-1, 247), 10, emig
- Zalyvakha, O., (Uk), 1966, (70), 5, nat-Uk
- Zamaratskii, G., (?), 1958, (?), 8, exit
- Zamoshkina, E., (?), 1973, (?), 15, emig
- Zarinsh, A., (La), 1981, (70, 88), 3, nat-La
- Zasinov, (?), 1976, (64), 12, exit
- Zaslavskii, S., (J), 1970, (70, 72), 3, pol
- Zatikian, S., (A), 1969, (70), 4, nat-A; (also, 1979, (68), death, executed, nat-A)
- Zatvars'kyi, V., (Uk), 1960, (?), 5, nat-Uk
- Zavertkin, V., (?), 1969, (?), 15, pol
- Zavurov, a., (CT), 1976, (?), 3, nat-CT
- Zdorovyi, A., (Uk), (70), 7, pol
- Zekeriaev, I., (CT), 1968, (190-1, 190-3), 1, nat-CT
- Zelenkevichius, I., (Li), 1968, (64), 15, nat-Li
- Zelichenok, R., (J), 1985, (190-1), 3, emig
- Zelikson, B., (J), 1965, (70-1), 3, pol
- Zelinger, (Ger), 1974, (?), 3, pol
- Zelmash, H., (Uk), 1961, (?), 15, nat-Uk
- Zelmash, O., (Uk), 1961, (?), 12, nat-Uk
- Zemelis, Iu.,(?), 1960, (66), 15, pol

- Zemtsov, A., (?), 1969, (206-2), 1, pol
- Zerkaltsev, (?), 1981, (?), insane, pol
- Zerkaltsev, A. (?), 1982, (70), 6, pol
- Zhamgarian, E., (?), 1981, (190-1), 3, pol
- Zheimavichius, (Li), ?, (old 58), 25, nat-Li
- Zheleznov, A., (?), 1972, (142, 227), insane, pol
- Zhgenti, V., (G), 1980, (70), 9, nat-G
- Zhikharev, M., (?), 1985, (190-1), insane, pol; (also, 1974, (190-1), insane, pol)
- Zhiltsov, V., (R), 1970, (70, 72), 4, pol
- Zhilinskas, A., (Li), 1969, (?), 6, nat-Li
- Zhipre, A., (Li), 1958, (old 581a, 58-8, 58-11), 25, nat-Li
- Zhmuila, V., (Li), 1972, ((98, 190-3,), 3, nat-Li
- Zhuchkov, K., (?), before 1974, (70), 3, pol
- Zhuk, V., (R), before 1973, (190-1), insane, pol
- Zhukauskas, S., (Li), 1974, (70), 6, nat-Li
- Zhukovs'kyi, V., (Uk), ?, (old 58), 25, nat-Uk
- Zhurakivs'kyi, M., (Uk), 1952, (?), 25, nat-Uk
- Zhviniis, B., (Li), 1965, (64), 15, nat-Li
- Zibaki, A., (La), 1962, (64, 70, 72), 12, nat-La
- Zinchenko, A., (Uk), 1981, (70), 11, nat-Uk
- Zinchuk, K., (Uk), ?, (64), 20, nat-Uk
- Zinoviev, V., (?), 1981, (190-1), insane, emig
- Zinovieva, V., (?), 1970, (190-1), 1, pol
- Zirk, Ia., (?), 1982, (206-2)2, pol

Zisels, Io., (J), 1985, (190-10, 3, pol; (also, 1979, (190-1), 3, pol)

Zograbian, R., (A), 1974, (70-1, 72), 10, nat-A

Zorkaltsev, A., (?), 1981, (70), 6, pol

Zorkaltsev, V., (?), 1981, (70), insane, pol

Zubko, S., (?), 1981, (218, 224-3), 4, emig

Zunshein, Z., (J), 1984, (190-1), 3, emig

Zvarychevs'ka, M., (Uk), 1966, (70), 1, nat-Uk

Zverev, M., (?), 1975, (70), insane, pol

Zverev, Iu., (?), 1985, (206-2), 2.5, pol

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Interviews were conducted with the following individuals:

Al'tman, Anatolii (9 December 1985, Haifa, Israel)

A. Al'tman, a blue-collar worker, was born in Chernivtsi, Ukr. SSR, in 1941. After applying in vain for emigration to Israel, he was arrested in 1970, together with E. Kuznetsov and others, in the Leningrad "hijacking" case. Al'tman was sentenced to ten years in a strict-regime camp. He was released in 1979, one year before the end of his term, and allowed to leave the Soviet Union for Israel the same year.

Butman, Hillel [Gillel'] (5 December 1985, Jerusalem, Israel)

H. Butman, an engineer, was born in Leningrad, RSFSR, in 1932. After applying in vain for emigration to Israel, he was arrested in 1970, together with E. Kuznetsov and others, in the Leningrad "hijacking" case. Butman was sentenced to ten years in a strict-regime camp. He was released in 1979, one year before the end of his term, and allowed to leave the Soviet Union for Israel the same year.

Davydov, Georgii (15 October 1986, Munich, Federal Republic of Germany)

G. Davydov (Russian), a geological engineer, was born in 1940. He was arrested in 1972 for circulating samizdat materials and human rights activity, and was sentenced to five years in a strict-regime camp and two years of internal exile. He was allowed to leave the Soviet Union in 1980, after serving his sentence in full.

Dreizner, Solomon (16 December 1985, Jerusalem, Israel)

S. Dreizner, an architect, was born in 1932. An emigration activist who had applied in vain for emigration to Israel, he was arrested in 1970 in connection with the Leningrad "hijacking" case. Dreizner was sentenced to three years in a strict-regime camp. He was released in 1973 and allowed to leave the Soviet Union for Israel later in the same year.

Herchak, Hryhorii (11 November 1988, Toronto, Canada)

H. Herchak was born in 1931. A participant in the Ukrainian nationalist underground (UPA) after World War II, he was arrested in 1952 and sentenced to 25 years of imprisonment. He served his term in full, and was released in 1977, but was

persistently harassed after his release. He was allowed to leave the Soviet Union for Canada in August 1988.

Jokubynas, Kestutis (18 October 1986, Munich, Federal Republic of Germany)

K. Jokubynas, a librarian, was born in 1930. In 1947 he joined the Lithuanian nationalist resistance movement, and in 1948 he was sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment. He was released in 1954, and in 1957 he was arrested for his contacts with other former prisoners, and attempting to board a foreign ship, and sentenced to ten years of imprisonment. He was allowed to leave the Soviet Union in 1977.

Kheifets, Mikhail (4 December 1985, Jerusalem, Israel)

M. Kheifets, a writer, was born in 1934. He was arrested in 1974 for preparing and circulating samizdat materials, and sentenced to four years of imprisonment in a strict-regime camp and two years of internal exile. He was allowed to leave the Soviet Union for Israel in 1980.

Khnokh, Ar'e [Iurii] (14 December 1985, Tel Aviv, Israel)

A. Khnokh, an electrician, was born in 1940 in the Moldavian SSR. After applying in vain for emigration to Israel, he was arrested in 1970, together with and other emigration activists, in the Leningrad "hijacking" case. Khnokh was sentenced to ten years in a strict-regime camp. He was released in 1979, one year before the end of his term, and allowed to leave the Soviet Union for Israel the same year.

Korenblit, Mikhail (11 December 1985, Jerusalem, Israel)

M. Korenblit, a dentist, was born in 1935. After applying in vain for emigration to Israel, he was arrested in 1970, together with and other emigration activists, in connection with the Leningrad "hijacking" case. Korenblit was sentenced to seven years in a strict-regime camp. He was released in 1977, after serving her term in full, and allowed to leave the Soviet Union for Israel.

Kuznetsov, Edward (21 October 1985, Munich, Federal Republic of Germany)

E. Kuznetsov was born in 1939. He was first arrested in 1961 and charged with circulating samizdat and planning to found an anti-Soviet organization. He was sentenced to seven years in a hard-regime camp and released in 1968. After applying in vain to emigrate to Israel, he was arrested in 1970, together with other emigration activists, in connection with the Leningrad "hijacking" case. He was initially sentenced to death, but this was commuted to 15 years in a special-regime camp. He was

released before the end of his sentence, for he was involved in a "spy swap" which allowed him to leave the Soviet Union in 1979.

Kulmagambetov, Makhmet (23 October 1986, Munich, Federal Republic of Germany)

M. Kulmagambetov (Kazakh), a teacher, resigned from his job in 1958 because of his disagreement with the teaching programme. In 1962 he was arrested for "anti-Soviet activity" and sentenced to seven years of imprisonment and three years of exile. He was allowed to leave the Soviet Union in 1976.

Mashkov, Iurii (17 October 1986, Munich, Federal Republic of Germany)

I. Mashkov (Russian), born in 1937, was arrested in 1958 and charged with membership in an oppositional student group and propagating anarcho-communism. He was sentenced to seven years in a strict-regime camp, and served this term in full. In 1966 he was charged with attempting to illegally cross the border, and was sentenced to ten years in a strict-regime camp. He served his term in full, and was allowed to leave the Soviet Union in 1978.

Mendelevich, Iosif (17 December 1985, Jerusalem, Israel)

I. Mendelevich, an emigration activist, was born in 1947. After applying in vain for emigration to Israel, he was arrested in 1970, together with and other emigration activists, in connection with the Leningrad "hijacking" case. Mendelevich was sentenced to twelve years in a strict-regime camp. He was released in 1981, and allowed to leave the Soviet Union for Israel the same year.

Meshener, Iosif (15 December 1985, Beer Sheva, Israel)

I. Meshener (Jewish), a teacher, was born in 1936. He was arrested in 1970 for protesting the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and writing and circulating samizdat materials, and was sentenced to six years in a strict-regime camp. He was released in 1976, and was allowed to leave the Soviet Union for Israel the same year.

Meshko, Oksana (26 November 1988, Toronto, Canada)

O. Meshko, a teacher, was born in 1905. She was imprisoned between 1947 and 1955 for her contacts with the Ukrainian nationalist underground, and became a founding member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Monitoring Group in 1976. She was arrested in 1980 for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" and sentenced to .5 years of imprisonment in a strict-regime camp and 5 years of internal exile.

Penson, Boris (11 December 1985, Natania, Israel)

B. Penson, an artist, was born in 1946. After applying in vain for emigration to Israel, he was arrested in 1970, together with and other emigration activists, in connection with the Leningrad "hijacking" case. Penson was sentenced to ten years in a strict-regime camp. He was released in 1979, one year before the end of his sentence, and allowed to leave the Soviet Union for Israel the same year.

Romaniuk, Vasyl' (15 February 1989, Toronto, Canada)

V. Romaniuk (Ukrainian), a priest, was sentenced in 1944 to ten years of imprisonment for "nationalist-religious activity." In 1972 he was sentenced to two years in prison, five years in special-regime camps, and three years in exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." He was released in 1982, and allowed to leave the Soviet Union in 1987.

Ruban, Petro (25 November 1988, Toronto, Canada)

P. Ruban, born in 1940, was arrested in 1968 and sentenced to five years of imprisonment in a strict-regime camp for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" in connection with Ukrainian national rights activity. He was re-sentenced in 1976 to six years of imprisonment and 3 years of exile, and to an additional nine years of imprisonment and five years of exile in 1985. However, he was released from imprisonment in 1988, and allowed to leave the Soviet Union for the United States in the same year.

Sapeliak, Stefan (19 February 1988, Toronto, Canada)

S. Sapeliak, born in 1952, was arrested in 1973 for Ukrainian national rights activity, and sentenced to five years of imprisonment in strict-regime camps and three years of exile. He served his term in full, and was released in 1981. Sapeliak visited Canada in the winter of 1989.

Shilkrot, Barukh [Boris] (2 December 1985, Jerusalem, Israel)

B. Shilkrot, born in 1946, was sentenced to three years of imprisonment in a strict-regime camp in 1970 for protesting the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and circulating samizdat materials. He was allowed to leave the Soviet Union for Israel in 1974.

Shumuk, Danylo (9 October 1988, Mississauga, Canada)

D. Shumuk was imprisoned in Poland, 1933-1939, as a member of the Communist Party of Western Ukraine, 1945-56 in the Soviet Union for his connections with the Ukrainian nationalist underground (UPA), and 1957-67 for refusing to collaborate with the Soviet security apparatus. He was sentenced in 1972 to ten years of imprisonment and five years of exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" (writing his memoirs), and was allowed to leave the Soviet Union for Canada in 1987, after serving his sentence in full.

Sichko, Stefaniia (17 October 1988, Toronto, Canada)

S. Sichko, born in 1925, was sentenced to ten years of imprisonment in labour camps in 1946 for her connections with the Ukrainian nationalist underground (UPA). She was released in 1955, but she and other members of her family were persistently harassed after they returned to their home in Western Ukraine. Sichko visited Toronto in the fall of 1988.

Suslenskii, Iakov (12 December 1985, Jerusalem, Israel)

I. Suslenskii (Jewish), born in 1928, was sentenced in 1970 to seven years of imprisonment in strict-regime camps for protesting the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and circulating samizdat materials. He was released in 1977, and allowed to leave the Soviet Union for Israel in 1978.

Vudka, Iurii [Ar'e] (13 December 1985, Tel Aviv, Israel)

I. Vudka (Jewish), born in 1947, was sentenced in 1970 to seven years of imprisonment in strict-regime camps for unofficial political activity (helping to found a neo-Marxist organization). He was released in 1976, and allowed to leave the Soviet Union for Israel in 1977.

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