1

PM-1 3 1/2" x 4" PHOTOGRAPHIC MICROCOPY TARGET
NBS 1010a ANSI/ISO #2 EQUIVALENT

National Library
of Canada

Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services Branch

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0N4

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Direction des acquisitions et
des services bibliographiques

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa (Ontario)
K1A 0N4

Notice to Users

Notice à l'utilisateur

NOTICE

The quality of this microform is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us an inferior photocopy.

Reproduction in full or in part of this microform is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30, and subsequent amendments.

AVIS

La qualité de cette microforme dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise au microfilmage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction.

S'il manque des pages, veuillez communiquer avec l'université qui a conféré le grade.

La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer, surtout si les pages originales ont été dactylographiées à l'aide d'un ruban usé ou si l'université nous a fait parvenir une photocopie de qualité inférieure.

La reproduction, même partielle, de cette microforme est soumise à la Loi canadienne sur le droit d'auteur, SRC 1970, c. C-30, et ses amendements subséquents.

**JAPANESE SECURITY POLICY:
CHANGE AND CONTINUITY**

by

James Dickson, B.A.

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

in International Affairs

The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs

Carleton University

Ottawa, Ontario

April, 1993

copyright

1993, James Dickson

National Library
of Canada

Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services Branch

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0N4

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Direction des acquisitions et
des services bibliographiques

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa (Ontario)
K1A 0N4

Notice de la Bibliothèque nationale

Our file - Notre référence

The author has granted an irrevocable non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of his/her thesis by any means and in any form or format, making this thesis available to interested persons.

L'auteur a accordé une licence irrévocable et non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de sa thèse de quelque manière et sous quelque forme que ce soit pour mettre des exemplaires de cette thèse à la disposition des personnes intéressées.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in his/her thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without his/her permission.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège sa thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

ISBN 0-315-B4046-7

Name James Dickson

Dissertation Abstracts International is arranged by broad, general subject categories. Please select the one subject which most nearly describes the content of your dissertation. Enter the corresponding four-digit code in the spaces provided.

Japanese Security Policy: Change & Continuity

SUBJECT TERM

0616

SUBJECT CODE

U·M·I

Subject Categories

THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

COMMUNICATIONS AND THE ARTS

Architecture 0729
Art History 0377
Cinema 0900
Dance 0378
Fine Arts 0357
Information Science 0723
Journalism 0391
Library Science 0399
Mass Communications 0708
Music 0413
Speech Communication 0459
Theater 0465

EDUCATION

General 0515
Administration 0514
Adult and Continuing 0516
Agricultural 0517
Art 0273
Bilingual and Multicultural 0282
Business 0688
Community College 0275
Curriculum and Instruction 0277
Early Childhood 0518
Elementary 0524
Finance 0277
Guidance and Counseling 0519
Health 0680
Higher 0745
History of 0520
Home Economics 0278
Industrial 0521
Language and Literature 0279
Mathematics 0280
Music 0522
Philosophy of 0998
Physical 0523

Psychology 0525
Reading 0535
Religious 0527
Sciences 0714
Secondary 0533
Social Sciences 0534
Sociology of 0340
Special 0529
Teacher Training 0530
Technology 0710
Tests and Measurements 0288
Vocational 0747

LANGUAGE, LITERATURE AND LINGUISTICS

Language 0679
General 0289
Ancient 0290
Linguistics 0291
Modern
Literature 0401
General 0294
Classical 0295
Comparative 0297
Medieval 0298
Modern 0316
African 0591
American 0305
Asian 0352
Canadian (English) 0355
Canadian (French) 0593
English 0311
Germanic 0312
Latin American 0315
Middle Eastern 0313
Romance 0314
Slavic and East European

PHILOSOPHY, RELIGION AND THEOLOGY

Philosophy 0422
Religion
General 0318
Biblical Studies 0321
Clergy 0319
History of 0320
Philosophy of 0322
Theology 0469

SOCIAL SCIENCES

American Studies 0323
Anthropology
Archaeology 0324
Cultural 0326
Physical 0327
Business Administration
General 0310
Accounting 0272
Banking 0770
Management 0454
Marketing 0338
Canadian Studies 0385
Economics
General 0501
Agricultural 0503
Commerce Business 0505
Finance 0508
History 0509
Labor 0510
Theory 0511
Folklore 0358
Geography 0366
Gerontology 0351
History
General 0578

Ancient 0579
Medieval 0581
Modern 0582
Black 0328
African 0331
Asia, Australia and Oceania 0332
Canadian 0334
European 0335
Latin American 0336
Middle Eastern 0333
United States 0337
History of Science 0585
Law 0398
Political Science
General 0615
International Law and Relations 0616
Public Administration 0617
Recreation 0814
Social Work 0452
Sociology
General 0626
Criminology and Penology 0627
Demography 0938
Ethnic and Racial Studies 0631
Individual and Family Studies 0628
Industrial and Labor Relations 0629
Public and Social Welfare 0630
Social Structure and Development 0700
Theory and Methods 0344
Transportation 0709
Urban and Regional Planning 0999
Women's Studies 0453

THE SCIENCES AND ENGINEERING

BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES

Agriculture 0473
General 0285
Agronomy
Animal Culture and Nutrition 0475
Animal Pathology 0476
Food Science and Technology 0359
Forestry and Wildlife 0478
Plant Culture 0479
Plant Pathology 0480
Plant Physiology 0817
Range Management 0777
Wood Technology 0746
Biology
General 0306
Anatomy 0287
Biostatistics 0308
Botany 0309
Cell 0379
Ecology 0329
Entomology 0353
Genetics 0369
Immunology 0703
Microbiology 0410
Molecular 0307
Neuroscience 0317
Oncology 0416
Physiology 0433
Radiation 0821
Veterinary Science 0778
Zoology 0472
Biophysics
General 0786
Medical 0760

EARTH SCIENCES

Biogeochemistry 0425
Geochemistry 0925

Geodesy 0370
Geology 0372
Geophysics 0373
Hydrology 0388
Mineralogy 0411
Paleobotany 0345
Paleoecology 0426
Paleontology 0418
Paleozoology 0985
Palynology 0427
Physical Geography 0368
Physical Oceanography 0415

HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES

Environmental Sciences 0768
Health Sciences
General 0566
Audiology 0300
Chemotherapy 0992
Dentistry 0567
Education 0350
Hospital Management 0769
Human Development 0758
Immunology 0982
Medicine and Surgery 0564
Mental Health 0347
Nursing 0569
Nutrition 0570
Obstetrics and Gynecology 0380
Occupational Health and Therapy 0354
Ophthalmology 0381
Pathology 0571
Pharmacology 0419
Pharmacy 0572
Physical Therapy 0382
Public Health 0573
Radiology 0574
Recreation 0575

Speech Pathology 0460
Toxicology 0383
Home Economics 0386

PHYSICAL SCIENCES

Pure Sciences
Chemistry
General 0485
Agricultural 0749
Analytical 0486
Biochemistry 0487
Inorganic 0488
Nuclear 0738
Organic 0490
Pharmaceutical 0491
Physical 0494
Polymer 0495
Radiation 0754
Mathematics 0405
Physics
General 0605
Acoustics 0986
Astronomy and Astrophysics 0606
Atmospheric Science 0608
Atomic 0748
Electronics and Electricity 0607
Elementary Particles and High Energy 0798
Fluid and Plasma 0759
Molecular 0609
Nuclear 0610
Optics 0752
Radiation 0756
Solid State 0611
Statistics 0463

Applied Sciences

Applied Mechanics 0346
Computer Science 0984

Engineering
General 0537
Aerospace 0538
Agricultural 0539
Automotive 0540
Biomedical 0541
Chemical 0542
Civil 0543
Electronics and Electrical 0544
Heat and Thermodynamics 0348
Hydraulic 0545
Industrial 0546
Marine 0547
Materials Science 0794
Mechanical 0548
Metallurgy 0743
Mining 0551
Nuclear 0552
Packaging 0549
Petroleum 0765
Sanitary and Municipal System Science 0790
Geotechnology 0428
Operations Research 0796
Plastics Technology 0795
Textile Technology 0994

PSYCHOLOGY

General 0621
Behavioral 0384
Clinical 0622
Developmental 0620
Experimental 0623
Industrial 0624
Personality 0625
Physiological 0989
Psychobiology 0349
Psychometrics 0632
Social 0451

The undersigned hereby recommend to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies and Research acceptance of this thesis,
submitted by JAMES DICKSON, in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

_____
Christopher J. Maule, Director
The Norman Paterson School
of International Affairs

_____
Professor J. Kovalio, Supervisor

ABSTRACT

In the Post-Pacific War era, Japanese security policy has not developed in a manner congruent with the Western concept of national security. The expansion of politico-strategic interests and military capabilities markedly lagged economic development, causing security policy to be termed *unique*. This study analyzes the relationships between the external and domestic determinants of security policy to explain its character and evolution. Cognizance is taken of the changing politico-strategic environment and Japan's economic development, which provided the stimuli for policy formulation. The domestic environment is explored to identify the imperatives and constraints that determined Japan's *unique* response. The most salient determinants were the societal values of pacifism and anti-militarism that established the boundaries within which government could formulate policy, and the political and decision-making processes that subtended incremental change. The gradual redefinition of societal values and the slowly emerging sense of nationalism and self-confidence, in the more contemporary era, has accommodated greater sensitivity to the security environment and movement toward the assumption of international political responsibilities commensurate with economic power. However, incrementalism has remained the norm in the movement toward effecting the ends-means relationships necessary to achieve a comprehensive national security policy.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I owe an incalculable debt to Professor Jacob Kovalio for his patient encouragement and advice throughout the research and writing of this thesis. As an outstanding teacher he provided me with the motivation and opportunity to acquire an understanding of a field of studies in which I had a long-standing interest but little knowledge. As a supervisor he provided the guidance and instilled the discipline necessary to pursue this inquiry. Any success I have had analyzing historical developments and contemporary issues in Japanese security policy is founded on Professor Kovalio's profound interdisciplinary knowledge of Japan and Asia-Pacific. Misinterpretations and other shortcomings remain entirely mine alone.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ABSTRACT	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	iv
LIST OF CHARTS AND TABLES	vi
ACRONYMS	vii
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER ONE: FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS	9
NATIONAL SECURITY	9
DETERMINANTS OF JAPANESE SECURITY POLICY	13
CONCLUSION	21
NOTES	23
CHAPTER TWO: THE DYNAMIC POLITICO-STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT	26
INTRODUCTION	26
POLITICO-STRATEGIC CHANGE IN THE 1970S	30
POLITICO-STRATEGIC CHANGE IN THE 1980S	35
POLITICO-STRATEGIC CHANGE IN THE 1990S	39
CONCLUSION	46
NOTES	49
CHAPTER THREE: SECURITY DIMENSIONS OF JAPAN'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT	54
BACKGROUND	54
THE MERCANTILIST-DEVELOPMENTAL STATE	56
THE REALITIES OF GROWING INDEPENDENCE	59
PRESSURES FOR SECURITY POLICY REALIGNMENT	65
CONCLUSION	71
NOTES	72
CHAPTER FOUR: DOMESTIC IMPERATIVES AND CONSTRAINTS	76
INTRODUCTION	76
THE NATURE OF THE STATE	77
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE	83
THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS	89
CONCLUSION	95
NOTES	98

CHAPTER FIVE: JAPAN'S EVOLVING SECURITY POLICY	103
INTRODUCTION	103
1951-1972	104
The Policy Environment	104
The Initial Development of Security Policy	105
1960 Revision of the Security Treaty	110
1972-1979	113
The Policy Environment	113
Policy Initiatives	116
1980-1989	120
The Policy Environment	120
Policy Initiatives: Comprehensive National Security	123
Strategic Horizons	125
Defence Capabilities	129
ODA Initiatives	130
Diplomatic Initiatives	133
THE 1990s	138
The Policy Environment	138
Defence Capabilities	139
ODA Initiatives	144
Diplomatic Initiatives	146
CONCLUSION	153
NOTES	159
 CHAPTER SIX: JAPAN'S SECURITY POLICY AND THE UNITED NATIONS	 161
INTRODUCTION	161
JAPAN'S INITIAL RESPONSE TO THE UNITED NATIONS	161
TRANSITION TO NON-MILITARY ACTIVISM	161
General Approach	171
Peacekeeping Operations	176
Arms Control and Disarmament	178
Politico-Strategic Alignment	180
TRANSITION TO COMPREHENSIVE ACTIVISM	180
General Approach	180
Impact of the Gulf Crisis	181
The Military Contribution	183
Membership on the Security Council	188
CONCLUSION	189
NOTES	192
 CONCLUSIONS	 198
 CHARTS AND TABLES	 209
 SOURCES CONSULTED	 218

LIST OF CHARTS

1.	SEA LANES OF COMMUNICATION	209
2.	STRAITS IN EAST ASIA	209

LIST OF TABLES

1.	DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES IN EAST ASIA	210
2.	CHANGES IN SOVIET FORCES IN THE FAR EAST	211
3.	DEFENCE AND ODA EXPENDITURES	212
4.	JAPAN'S INTERNATIONAL TRADE	213
5.	RESOURCE DEPENDENCIES	214
6.	DESTINATION OF JAPAN'S FDI	215
7.	JAPAN'S OUTWARD FDI	216
8.	GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF ODA	217

ACRONYMS

ASDF	(Japan) Air Self Defense Force
CNS	Comprehensive National Security
DSP	Democratic Socialist Party (of Japan)
EPA	Economic Planning Agency (Japan)
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GSDF	(Japan) Ground Self Defense Force
JCP	Japan Communist Party
JDA	Japan Defense Agency
JSDF	Japan Self Defense Force
JSP	Japan Socialist Party
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party (of Japan)
MITI	Ministry of International Trade and Industry (Japan)
MOF	Ministry of Finance (Japan)
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan)
MSDF	(Japan) Maritime Self Defense Force
MST	Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan (1960)
NDC	National Defense Council (Japan)
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PARC	(LDP) Policy Analysis Research Council
PKO Bill	(Japan) United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Bill
SLOC	Sea Lanes of Communication
SSBN	Ballistic Missile Carrying Nuclear Submarine

SDF	Self Defence Force
UNPCCB	(Japan) United Nations Peace Cooperation Corps Bill
SCAP	Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (Occupation of Japan)

INTRODUCTION

In the Post-Pacific War era, Japan's national security policy has been subjected to constant criticism by domestic and international actors. Domestic criticism was initially founded in opposition to the formation of the Japanese Self Defense Force (JSDF) and the US-Japan Security Treaty of 1951, which provided for Japan's defence against external aggression. This was sustained by the renewal of the US-Japan security regime, and the incremental growth of Japan's military capability and politico-strategic horizons. Similarly, regional actors, given their experience with an expansionist Japan following the Meiji Restoration, expressed the fear that Japan's politico-strategic capability and influence was developing to match its growing economic power. While the US-aligned states, principally ASEAN and the Republic of Korea (ROK), welcomed the US-Japan relationship as a moderating influence upon Japanese strategic thinking, others viewed Japan's security ties with the US and its growing strategic capability as being inimical to their regional and global objectives. Domestically and regionally, there was fear that Japan would meet its power potential in the realm of national security policy and effect a foreign policy based upon *realist* assumptions and the practice of *realpolitik*.

Criticism of Japan's national security policy by her sole formal ally, the United States, has also been persistent. Initially, such criticism was directed at the low level of effort respecting the defence of the Japanese Islands against a perceived Soviet threat. As the Cold War progressed and the United States pursued a policy of containment, Japan's rapid

economic recovery precipitated further US criticism in view of Tokyo's unwillingness to assume regional security responsibilities and burden-sharing. The United States' Western allies added to the US pressure for increased Japanese security efforts within East Asia to facilitate a more Euro-centric focus of US military assets. Moreover, with the advent of increasing interdependence and Japan's growing power in the global economy, both the US and the Western industrial states became critical of Japan's lack of contribution to the maintenance of world peace and security. Fundamentally, Japan's security policy did not conform to the Western concept of national security, leading to charges that Japan was simply *free-riding* and refusing to adopt a national security policy which adequately redressed the threats posed by the evolving international system

Japan's approach to national security after the Pacific War evolved in a manner quite unlike that adopted after emerging from the isolationism of the Tokugawa Period. After the Meiji Restoration, the threat posed to the Japanese State and society by the Western powers was addressed by modernizing in the European model and by practising international relations in the *realist* tradition of *Westphalian politik*. The Sino-Japanese War, which marked the end of the traditional constellation of power in East Asia that had been dominated by China, brought Japan into power politics for the first time and heralded a strategy of imperialism to further national economic power and security.¹ The subsequent Anglo-Japanese Treaty, the Russo-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese Entente, and participation in the First World War and its peace settlement were all manifestations of Japanese conformity to the prevailing mode of international relations, incorporating objective strategic assessment and rational activism to advance national interests.

Having been estranged from the informal Anglo-American Entente after the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1921, Japan continued to seek military and

economic security by means of an expansionary foreign policy, with the invasion of Manchuria in 1930, China in 1937, and Viet Nam in 1940. Rather than practice power politics founded in sound politico-strategic premises, the renewed excursions into Asia and ultimately the Pacific had their rationale in domestic political factors, supported by the ultra-nationalist myth that Japan was guided by a unique manifest destiny and had a special mission in the world.² Japan's decisive defeat by the Grand Coalition in 1945 underscored the inadequacy of such underpinnings for the conduct of power politics.

Following unconditional surrender at the end of the Pacific War and the subsequent occupation of the Japanese homeland, Japan resisted US pressure that it participate fully in the contemporary international security system. Although unreservedly aligned with the US-led Western powers in the ideological confrontation with the Communist world, Japan rejected the concept of alliance-based collective security with its reciprocal responsibilities and obligations, and adopted a national security posture unlike the prevailing Western model that emphasized military capability to counter external threats. The attempt was made to maintain only a minimum of self-defence capability, with security from external threats being vested primarily in the US. This was complemented by a strategy of isolationism respecting international politico-strategic affairs.

There has, however, been an evolution of Japan's post-war national security policy, with four distinct periods of development, resulting in incremental convergence of Japanese policy with that of the Western industrialized states. The first period extended from Japan's re-entry into the international system following the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, until 1972. During that period, the degree of emphasis upon domestic affairs was unusual as compared with other industrialized states. Japan focused on economic development and acted largely passively to external pressures and crises.³

The second period of 1973-1979 may be considered one of transition during which a metamorphosis in security policy began to be discernible, with Japan gradually adopting a more *realist* approach.⁴ While national security was still being viewed primarily in economic terms, greater cognizance was being taken of the global and regional security environments and their concomitant demands.⁵ Although this approach caused Japan to review its security capabilities, little was redressed in substantive terms, and security policy continued to drift without a coherent strategic *ends-means* relationship being articulated or effected.

The period 1980-1989 was characterized by the external environment having an increasing impact, producing a revised national security orientation and completing the transformation from economic security to comprehensive security in terms of declared policy. However, notwithstanding the tacit adoption of a Comprehensive National Security Policy in 1982, initiatives and capability enhancements to effect that policy remained incremental, and the most definitive initiatives taken in reaction to the politico-strategic environment ended in retreats. As described by Takashi Inoguchi, the implementation of comprehensive national security comprised of *two steps forward and one step back*.⁶

The post-1989 period has been marked with greater attention being given the politico-strategic environment, in terms of the global and regional threats to national security, and the necessary multi-dimensional security linkages and capabilities required in the more complex interdependent world. Moreover, there now exists a new assertiveness, sense of confidence, and a new sense of international obligation.⁷ The synthesis of these imperatives has irrevocably moved Japan's national security policy from having an uniquely domestic orientation to one more global in perspective. The manifestation of greater conformity to the Western conception of national security resides in the synergism of a defence budget which has grown in absolute terms to be the third greatest in the world, initiatives to contribute to

regional stability through military, diplomatic and economic means, and initiatives to broaden and intensify participation in the maintenance of global peace and security.

Notwithstanding a less isolationist approach to security in terms of both policy and its implementation, there still remains a significant disjuncture between Japan's economic power and the manner in which comprehensive national security is being pursued. Essentially, neither Japan's defence capability nor acceptance of international political responsibilities yet reflect the potential inherent in its absolute or relative international economic power.

As with the majority of states, Japan's national security policy has evolved in response to a complex calculus of external and domestic imperatives and constraints. This research is designed to analyze the relative import of the international system, its processes, and unit level factors with respect to the four major periods of Japan's Post-Pacific War national security policy development. In doing so, it will identify the central imperatives and constraints which have determined Japan's unique approach to security in the dynamic international environment and its response to evolving domestic conditions. The relative salience of these imperatives and constraints has been such that the character of Japan's security policy can be attributed primarily to domestic political and societal factors. Such an analysis will explain the elements of continuity and change in Japan's post-1951 security policy, and will identify that which can be expected to be operative in the future.

In Chapter One, the concept of national security and theory relevant to the determinants of a state's national security policy are reviewed. The focus of this chapter is not to critique current theory or to develop theory based upon a single-country study. Rather, existing theory is used, and integrated where necessary, to build the framework required for the comprehensive analysis of Japan's security policy over an extended period of time. The underlying rationale of this approach is to remain sensitive to the complexities of reality,

rather than being constrained to justify one particular paradigm or artificial simplification of explanatory theory.

Chapter Two takes cognizance of the premise that national security policy is primarily a state-specific response to the threats posed by the international environment to the socio-political entity that comprises the nation-state. In this context, the dynamic politico-strategic environment is explored in terms of its potential as a determinant, or stimulus, for the development and change of security policy. Global and regional imperatives are differentiated, while recognizing that at certain junctures the two are inextricably bound. The politico-strategic environment is further recognized in the context of containing pressures for change generated by allies and *friendly countries* which lie outside the realm of *threat*.

Chapter Three addresses the relationship between Japan's economic development and national security policy. Japan has found that economic and security issues cannot be viewed independently, and that the relative magnitude of economic success has generated multi-dimensional pressures on security policy orientation. First, there have been both positive and negative pressures regarding conformity to the traditional congruence between economic and political power. Second, the international character of the Japanese economy has precipitated increasing security concerns with respect to external markets and investment, and raw material dependencies.

The fourth chapter is concerned with domestic imperatives and constraints which are instrumental in determining the character of a state's response to externally generated stimuli. These determinants may be state-specific and may limit or enhance the national security responses made by decision-makers. Additionally, their relative salience with respect to each other, and with respect to external determinants, may also be state-specific. The chapter examines Japan's national security policy-making system and processes to identify those sets

of variables which were operative with respect to Japan in the Post-Pacific War era.

Japan's evolving national security policy is analyzed in Chapter Five to determine the extent to which each set of variables has influenced policy in each of the four periods previously identified. Both policy *per se* and the degree to which policy was effected are examined to better determine the *de facto* salience of the variables.

Japan's security policy with respect to the United Nations is examined in Chapter Six. The objective of this chapter is to determine whether the imperatives and constraints which shaped general security policy were similarly operative in response to a more specific policy issue.

NOTES

1. Hisahiko Okazaki, *A Grand Strategy for Japanese Defence* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1986): 44-45.

2. Ibid: 129-130.

3. Takashi Inoguchi, "Japan's Foreign Policy Background", in Herbert J. Ellison, ed., *Japan and the Pacific Quadrille* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987) 93.

4. Yukio Satoh, "The Evolution of Japanese Security Policy", in R. O'Neil, ed., *Security in East Asia*, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1984) 20.

5. Takashi Inoguchi, loc. cit.; and Yukio Satoh, op. cit.: 20.

6. Takashi Inoguchi, op. cit.: 94.

7. Chong Whi Kim, "Korea-Japan Relations and Japan's Security", in Dora Alves, ed., *Pacific Security Towards the Year 2000*, (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1987) 133-34.

CHAPTER ONE

FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

NATIONAL SECURITY

To address the national security policy of a specific state, the conceptual meaning of national security must be defined to provide a viable framework in which to progress the inquiry. A review of the literature reveals that national security tends to be an elusive concept by reason of the multiplicity of perspectives as to the referent objects of security. Moreover, there tends to exist uneven differentiation of the nation, state and government as security's referent subject. Lentner proposes a general conception of security as being "a core value of all countries", with the desire of all governments "to preserve themselves as independent entities and to retain control over their national life and decisions within their own territory".¹ This definition is in consonance with most early literature on national security, which proceeds on the assumptions that the sovereignty of the state was the paramount value to be addressed in the international arena, that national security policy was primarily oriented to counter externally generated military threats to sovereignty, and that all states were alike with respect to their *ends-means* approach to such threats. While this perspective is well-integrated with the *realist* view of international relations, it provides little flexibility in accommodating differing perceptions of national security which may exist within and between states, and differing approaches to the *ends-means* relationship beyond the military dimension.

Bobrow and Chan argue that any conception of national security must accommodate

alternative content in terms of the problems addressed and the means of dealing with them.

They base this approach on the assumption that national security rests in the perceptions of the policy-making elite who usually care about domestic outcomes as well as foreign policy objectives. Therefore, the analysis of security policy specific to a particular state must be addressed in terms of content (military, economic and socio-political), in security actors (both domestic and foreign) and in security processes (how actors and content interact).²

Buzan subscribes to the view that the dimensions of national security are state-specific, further observing that it is a Western concept, referring to the security of the whole socio-political entity. With the concept evolving in response to the particular nature of the Western states and their contemporary international environment, national security has focused on war prevention, and requires military and economic defences against a broad spectrum of military, political and economic threats. Given the multidimensional objects of security, Buzan argues that national security links military and foreign policy into a combined response to the external environment.³

These three conceptions of national security contain the common elements that it composes a core (or vital) interest, that it is concerned primarily with the relationship of the state to its external environment, and that it addresses the problems posed by the fundamentally anarchical character of the international system. These *realist* perspectives provide the rationale for considering the system dynamics relevant to security, and define a security policy domain that encompasses both political and economic dimensions.⁴ Moreover, by recognizing that national security extends beyond the security of the state and the regime to that of the whole sociopolitical entity, the policy-making domain is necessarily extended to the domestic environment for the enhancement of domestic prosperity and stability. The emphasis to be afforded a particular security objective will be dependent upon the perceptions of the

decision-making elite with respect to both international and domestic exigencies. The means by which a state will address its priorities will be contingent upon the spectrum of available capabilities, with additional reference to resource expenditures permitted by the sociopolitical entity.

The valid transfer of this Western concept of national security to other states is problematic, in that it evolved within a set of states having particular characteristics and capabilities as they coped with a specific set of domestic and international circumstances. Placing Japan's national security policy within this framework becomes dependent upon its similarities to the Western states across the fundamental elements of the Japanese sociopolitical reality and its international environment. Buzan's differentiation of 'strong power' and 'weak power' (referring to the resources and capabilities possessed) and 'strong state' and 'weak state' (referring to the degree of sociopolitical cohesion) provides a useful vehicle by which to accommodate the analysis of Japan's security policy within the Western model.

Strong states are those whose political life is based upon a synthesis of state and society, having a wide consensus on the form of the state which is expressed in stable governing institutions.⁵ With the strong state's inherent legitimacy and concomitant political stability, national security is primarily focused externally and is concerned about protecting its independence, political identity and way of life from external threats.⁶ This was the context in which Japan's 1980 *Report on Comprehensive National Security* was framed in response to a study on how Japan should help to forestall, prevent or limit war. A broad range of issues was addressed, including Japan's relations with the United States, her regional and global position, vulnerabilities with respect to energy and food, domestic and international economic weaknesses, and inadequacies respecting the Self-Defence Forces.⁷ The means by which

Japan's national security was to be enhanced reflected the Western approach of broadening the components of national security beyond the military dimension. These included strengthening the military and the US-Japan alliance, redressing economic vulnerabilities, accepting international responsibilities, and endeavouring to protect the 'free' world's political, economic and social systems.⁸

This may be differentiated from Japan's experience in the pre-1955 era, when political instability focused Japan's attention on internal security capability and domestic economic development. The initial problems of post-war economic reconstruction, the transition of political structures to those required by a new, imposed Constitution, and the political instability generated by the ideological challenge posed by a perceived Soviet-directed and supported Communist movement, served to give Japan's initial national security policy the distinct domestic orientation of what Buzan terms the 'weak state'.⁹ Whereas the period of threat to the fundamental nature of the Japanese nation-state from forces generated from within the polity was transitory and not endemic with respect to all sociopolitical structures, the fragility of the new democracy was of concern to the political elite.

The legacy of the domestically-oriented national security policy instituted to consolidate the democratic nation-state continued to be operative in the post-1955 period, with security from external threat being guaranteed by the United States. The consequent ambiguity of Japan's national security policy and the role that her increasing power should play in the international system remained until the 1980 *Report on Comprehensive National Security* was adopted as policy. Ambiguity was manifest in the lack of strategic thought and the lack of emphasis upon the military component of national security, as compared with that of the Western states. Continued ambiguity following 1980 was manifest in the operationalization of the 1980 recommendations, or lack thereof.

There exists little in the Western concept of national security to preclude significant differences between states in their approach to effecting the fundamental precepts of the concept. Indeed, whereas there exists a high degree of commonality in the ends to be achieved, it is expected that the means used will differ depending upon state capabilities and national attributes. It has been the extent to which Japan's *ends means* relationship fell outside the boundaries of expected security behaviour that caused its security policy to be termed 'unique'.

DETERMINANTS OF JAPANESE SECURITY POLICY

The analysis of the determinants of a state's security policy suffers from the absence of a widely accepted theory of security policy or a standardized analytic methodology to explain the policy choices of a specific state. Moreover, the explanatory power of the more parsimonious theories tends to be based upon well-understood behaviour that fits the general pattern or central tendency of most states, with little explanation of the exceptional and the abnormal.¹⁰ The search for parsimony has tended to differentiate theory into unit-level and system-level models, further limiting their explanatory power with respect to what is generally perceived as being the *unique* national security behaviour of Japan. Therefore, the need arises to address a range of theories, and integrate them when necessary, to build an analytic framework with which to identify the central causal factors which have shaped Japan's national security policy in the post-1951 era. As with the majority of states, Japanese security policy emerges from the interaction between the international environment and domestic influences, with policy choices changing in response to altered domestic and external conditions. Furthermore, differing approaches to security management and differing policy instruments may be employed even by states with limited military capability.¹¹ This suggests

that the relative salience of systemic and domestic factors, and the relative import of instrumentalities may well change across states operating in essentially the same environment and having similar national security objectives. Consequently, to offer a monocausal explanation of Japanese national security policy, without reference to the synthesis of systemic and domestic factors, would be less than complete.

This then limits the explanatory power of system or structural theories of international politics, which are weak in addressing how states define their interests and how their interests change. Waltz, in arguing the power of neo-realism, is careful to note that systemic theory predicts how states will act based upon assumptions about their interests and motives, but does not explain their particular policies.¹² He further observes that to explain differences in national response, not only must international constraints be considered, but so must the internal structures of states, which affect their policies and actions in response to the international environment.¹³

The relevance of both levels of analysis, systemic and unit, is expanded in Keohane's explanation of a theory of world politics, providing guidance with respect to the analysis of security policy. He notes that the assumption underlying structural realism, that states always seek power and calculate their interests accordingly, should be qualified, since under different systemic conditions states will define their self-interests differently. Furthermore, under similar systemic conditions, different states will define their self-interests differently.¹⁴ This leads to the conclusion that when considering how states define self-interest, the effects of the international structures and other international factors must be explored, as must domestic structure and factors.¹⁵

In transposing this guidance to the analysis of security policy, one can first support the relevance of considering both external and internal factors. Secondly, one can proceed on

the basis of considering external imperatives as being the primary stimuli for change, with domestic imperatives constituting the factors which shape the state-unique character of such change. This approach is implicitly supported by Keohane whose analysis process is to address the system and its pressures before moving to the domestic level of analysis.¹⁶ Moreover, such an approach is supported by the essential character of national security as being primarily behaviour designed to maintain the nation-state from threats posed by the international environment.¹⁷ It is emphasized that this but constitutes an initial structuring of analysis since states define national security in specific terms, thereby implicitly defining the range of stimuli for policy decisions.

Rosenau, in *Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy*, supports a dual level of analysis and provides guidance as to relevant variables to be examined to explain foreign policy. He asserts that foreign policy analysts explain the external behaviour of states in terms of what may be grouped into five sets of variables, which he describes as systemic, governmental, role, the individual and societal.¹⁸ Holsti supports this listing in his discussion of cognitive foreign policy decision-making. He argues that by the time systemic, societal, governmental and bureaucratic constraints upon individual decision-makers have been considered, much of the variance in foreign policy formulation has been accounted for.¹⁹ While Holsti tends to remain focused on the level of analysis problem, Rosenau more usefully recognizes the necessity of synthesizing systemic and domestic variables. However, he notes that such recognition does not constitute comprehension of how the two interact, nor does it indicate the conditions under which one predominates over the other.²⁰ Rosenau further cautions that the relative salience of variables is *issue-area dependent*.²¹

The question of issue area in the analysis of foreign policy lies in the concept that different types of issues evoke different sets of motives and embroil different sets of actors

within the overall foreign policy decision-making process.²² Rosenau remains elusive as to the definition of 'issue area' and notes that in many instances issue area boundaries will overlap. Furthermore, the typology of foreign policy issue areas differs markedly throughout the literature, reflecting a lack of consensus as to defining characteristics and as to whether the concept is best treated as an independent, dependent, or mediating variable.²³ However, the concept usefully suggests that national security policy can be delimited as an issue in terms of substantive content and output within Japan's overall foreign policy. As such, it has a specific decision-making process and a definable set of domestic actors. Additionally, in eliminating 'issue areas' as an independent variable by defining it as the dependent variable, the salience of the other explanatory variables can be better established.

It is recognized that the rationale underlying the differentiation of issues within foreign policy, with its consequences of differentiated nexus of motives-actors, could well be extended at a micro-level of analysis of issues within national security policy. However, the initial assumption is made for the purpose of constructing a framework of analysis that the micro-level issues, which compose national security policy, merit being clustered together into a definable entity by reason that Japan's sociopolitical focus perceives it as such.

Rosenau's description of systemic variables is general, giving only what he terms 'examples' of stimuli which could influence foreign policy decision-makers.²⁴ In addressing national security as a foreign policy issue area, the previous discussion on the nature of national security, the Waltz-Keohane perspective of the international system, and the increasing interdependence of states provide sufficient guidance to posit a more definitive list of externally generated variables specific to the issue. This list includes the character of the international system and its processes, and the politico-strategic environment that presents military, political and economic threats, alliances and political demands by external actors.²⁵

The domestic factors of government, the bureaucracy and the individual are best considered as intervening variables through which the stimuli for change are processed and transformed into policy output. Societal values may be operative within these decision-making entities as an additional set of intervening variables in terms of the organization and processes that they engender, and their influence in the cognitive process. Additionally, they may constitute a discrete independent variable in and of themselves in terms of their import within the sociopolitical entity.

Rosenau describes governmental variables as "those aspects of a government's structure that limit or enhance the foreign policy choices made by decision-makers."²⁶ Bureaucratic variables refer to "the behaviour of officials that is generated by the roles they occupy..."²⁷ To transpose these variables to a state-specific context and assess their relative salience, it is first necessary to identify the national security decision-making process that exists within Japan. Second, it is necessary to identify the relative influence of the organization of government, the bureaucracy, and the individual within that process.

The decision-making process can best be approached in terms of Allison's three models - rational policy-making, organizational process, and bureaucratic politics.²⁸ The 'rational actor' model can first be discounted in the context of domestic variables as this model depicts the nation-state as a unitary actor, interacting at the systemic level on a predictable basis and offering no insights into the domestic variables which may be at play. It does little to explain why different conceptions of national security prevail at different times, why they change, and, how and what strategies are chosen to effect policy. The latter two models can be used to characterize the apparent nature of security decision-making, however, some aspects of each may be present with respect to case-specific national security decisions.²⁹ The degree to which each decision is influenced by organizational and bureaucratic variables

can only be determined by a multi-model approach which will provide an indication of the relative salience of each.

Okimoto provides some guidance in taking this approach with respect to Japan when he addresses the three competing models of Japan's political economy, which he translates into the three dominant paradigms in comparative politics - elitism, liberal pluralism and (bureaucratic) statism. He establishes that when applying a single theory to Japan there tends to be a large number of cases where the fit between theory and empirical reality is far from perfect.³⁰ Okimoto concludes that given the nature of decision-making in Japan all three paradigms provide some insight leading him to assert that all paradigms must be considered and that any analytic framework must be based upon Japan's regime characteristics.³¹ In addition to supporting the concept of a multi-model approach, Okimoto's observations substantiate the necessity of identifying Japan's unique security policy decision-making process and its component parts. This approach implicitly demands that the analyst remains sensitive to the complexities of reality, as opposed to defending or being constrained by one artificial simplification.³²

In addressing the role of the individual decision-maker in national security policy formulation, one is again confronted with the level of analysis problem. Given the decision-maker's domestic and external environment, it is difficult to establish that policy output reflects his individual beliefs and values. However, Jervis is positive about the importance of the decision-makers in foreign policy issues, arguing that it is often impossible to explain crucial decisions and policies without reference to their beliefs about the world and their images of others.³³ While acknowledging the constraints imposed by the international environment, the nature of the state, the bureaucracy and the decision-making process, Jervis identifies that individual beliefs are operative to some degree regardless of changes within the

level being addressed.³⁴ Holsti is more specific when describing the role of the individual. In addressing cognitive approaches to foreign policy decision-making, he argues that their role, institutions and other constraints limit the influence of leaders, and that societal, governmental and bureaucratic constraints account for most of the variance in foreign policy output.³⁵ However, he does recognize that there is a growing body of empirical research that indicates the predominance of the leader and his beliefs in special circumstances.³⁶ This list, which includes non-routine and crisis situations, long-range planning, and structural uncertainty in general, provides guidance as to when one should inquire as to the role of the individual decision-maker.

Rosenau defines societal variables as the non-governmental aspects of a society which influences its external behaviour, including degree of national unity, major values and extent of industrialization.³⁷ This set of variables, which inherently incorporates a broad range of factors, must be more definitively stated with respect to national security to remain meaningful in the context of the present inquiry. The initial discussion on national security provides the required guidance to delimit the scope of variables and to form sub-sets of factors which may be addressed as entities for the purpose of the analysis at hand. From that discussion, sociopolitical cohesion (or national unity) becomes the prime variable, determining the domestic or external orientation of national security policy. With the assumption having been made that the fundamental *ends* of Japan's national security policy is in consonance with the Western model, to the extent determined by sociopolitical cohesion, then additional variables which can explain Japan's anomalous *means* must be sought. In the broadest terms, these can be classified into three sub-sets which encompass:- the material capabilities to effect policy choices, the societal values that influence which choices will be made, and the political processes by which societal values are translated into influence.

Material capabilities encompass the whole domestic economy, with its strengths and vulnerabilities relative to other actors in the international system. Additionally, cognizance must be taken of the economy's ability to provide the specific goods, whether military, non-military or monetary, which underlie the range of desirable policy options and the instrumentalities with which to effect them. Such options necessarily take cognizance of the broader context of national security that includes military security, economic security and the continued betterment of society's condition to enhance the state-society relationship. Moreover, given the contemporary reality that the world of increasing complex interdependence poses diverse threats, military power is a necessary but insufficient condition to ensure national security, and must be complemented by economic power and influence.³⁸

Societal values may be defined as the synthesis of the cultural and political values which form the lens through which national security threats are perceived and acceptable responses legitimized. Cultural values refer to the norms and practices which are typical and common within the population, forming a system of socially created and learned standards for perceiving and acting.³⁹ As such, they apply to the belief systems of individual decision-makers and to society at large. In the latter context, cultural values constitute an input into the decision-making process in that policy-makers may be constrained by the necessity of considering the appropriateness of their decisions with respect to the cultural values of the polity. While the term *culture* possesses the connotation of being historically-based and persistent across generations, new values may be introduced or the salience of traditional values changed in response to experiences which alter the mental programming of society. The trauma of Japan's defeat in the Pacific War may serve as an example of such experience. Furthermore, the range of cultural values is not only broad, but tends to be nation-state specific and a more meaningful variable for homogeneous nations such as Japan.⁴⁰ In that

society, cultural values are very much internalized, not only with respect to the citizenry, but also in its general political decision-making.

Political values refer to the polity's ideologically-based beliefs and to the conceptions of appropriate political behaviour. They define the sociopolitical consensus as to the character of the state, the dimensions of political accountability, and the decisional autonomy and policy latitude afforded the decision-making elite with respect to national security management.⁴¹ Whereas cultural values may well shape the national security policy, political values create and maintain the form and legitimacy of the decisional process.⁴² The distinction between these two sets of values tends to be blurred as they both contribute to the political culture of a state, shaping the prevailing ideology and political regime. In this respect, Japan's national security policy must be viewed within the framework of *Japanese* liberal-democracy, its institutions, and its processes as they relate to the formation of national security policy as a value-related response to the external environment.

CONCLUSION

With the exception of the 1951-1955 period, Japan's national security policy in the Post-Pacific War period can be addressed within the Western concept of national security. Relevant policy has been addressed from the perspective of the 'strong' state in which national security has been primarily focused externally, and has been concerned with protecting Japan's independence, political identity and way of life from externally-generated threats. However, notwithstanding general conformity to the Western concept of national security, Japan's *ends-means* relationships tend to fall outside the boundaries of expected security behaviour, causing Japan's national security policy to be termed *unique*.

The *unique* character of such policy limits the explanatory power of the more

parsimonious paradigms and theories when addressing Japan's security behaviour. Therefore, a more expansive framework of analysis must be used to seek a comprehensive understanding of this behaviour. The Waltz-Keohane guidance of considering external imperatives as being the primary stimuli for change, with domestic imperatives and constraints shaping the character of change, will constitute the initial approach to analysis. Within this construction, the international system and its processes, and the politico-strategic environment comprise the broad external stimuli for change. Integrating the Waltz-Keohane approach with Rosenau's *pre-theory* of foreign policy, the domestic imperatives and constraints shaping Japan's policy may be addressed in terms of governmental factors, including regime characteristics, institutions and decision-making processes; the bureaucracy; the role of the individual; societal values, including political and cultural values; and, the (economic) means to effect policy choices. These sets of factors, or variables constitute the framework for analysis, within which to identify the specific nature of the variables and their relative salience.

NOTES

1. Howard H. Lentner, *Foreign Policy Analysis* (Columbus: Merrill Publishing, 1974) 146-147.

2. Davis B. Bobrow and Steve Chan, "Simple Labels and Complex Realities: National Security for the Third World", in Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon, eds., *National Security in the Third World: The Management of Internal and External Threats* (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1988) 45-47.

3. Barry Buzan, "People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in the Third World", in Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon, *op. cit.*: 15-16.

4. Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations* (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1982) 121-22.

5. Barry Buzan, "People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in the Third World": 20.

6. Ibid: 22.

7. Robert W. Barnett, *Beyond War* (Elmsford: New York: Pergamon Press, 1984) xiii.

8. Ibid: 2-3.

9. Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*: 65-69.

10. Davis B. Bobrow and Steve Chan, "Understanding Anomalous Success: Japan, Taiwan and South Korea", in Charles F. Herman et al., eds., *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy* (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1987) 129.

11. Davis B. Bobrow and Steve Chan, "Simple Labels and Complex Realities: National Security for the Third World": 53.

12. Kenneth N. Waltz, "Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power", in Robert O. Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986) 121.

13. Ibid: 122.

14. Robert O. Keohane, in Robert O. Keohane et al., eds., *Neorealism and its Critics* New York: Columbia University Press, 1986) 194.

15. Ibid: 195.

16. Loc. cit.

17. Barry Buzan, "People States and Fear: The National Security Problem in the Third World": 15-16.

18. James N. Rosenau, *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy* (New York: The Free Press, 1971) 108.

19. Ole Holsti, "Foreign Policy Formulation", in Robert Axelrod, ed., *Structure of Decisions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976) 29.

20. James N. Rosenau, *op. cit.*: 98.

21. *Loc. cit.*

22. *Ibid*: 133

23. William C. Potter, "Issue Area and Foreign Policy Analysis", in *International Organization*, Vol.34, No.3 (1980): 418-424 provide a review of the literature on issue areas and posit the advantages and limitations of alternative conceptions.

24. James N. Rosenau *op. cit.*: 133-147.

25. Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*: 121-122; and Barry Buzan, "People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in the Third World": 154.

26. James N. Rosenau *op. cit.*: 108.

27. *Loc. cit.*

28. Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision-Making: The Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971)

29. Davis B. Bobrow and Steve Chan, "Understanding Anomalous Success: Japan, Taiwan and South Korea": 123-124. The authors provide observations as to the utility of each of the models, noting that all three apply to most nations.

30. Daniel I. Okimoto, "Political Inclusivity: The Domestic Structure of Trade", in Takashi Inoguchi and Daniel I. Okimoto, eds., *The Political Economy of Japan*, Vol. 2 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988) 307-310.

31. *Ibid*: 310.

32. Davis B. Bobrow and Steve Chan, "Understanding Anomalous Success: Japan, Taiwan and South Korea": 119-120. The comment is made that the analyst does not want to have "to justify one particular model when we know that Japan has followed all three."

33. Robert Jervis, *Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976) 28.

34. Ibid: 15.
35. Ole Holsti, op. cit.: 26-29.
36. Ibid: 26-29.
37. James N. Rosenau, op. cit.: 108-109.
38. Edward E Azar and Chung-in Moon, eds., op. cit.: 11; and Davis B. Bobrow and Steve Chan, "Simple Labels and Complex Realities: National Security for the Third World": 44-53.
39. Martin W. Sampson, "Cultural Influences on Foreign Policy", in Charles F. Herman et al., eds., op. cit.: 385.
40. Ibid: 384-404. The author presents a study of Japan and France noting the importance of culture in foreign policy decision-making.
41. Barry Buzan, "People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in the Third World": and Davis B. Bobrow and Steve Chan, "Simple Labels and Complex Realities: National Security for the Third World": 20 and 64 respectively.
42. Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon, op. cit.: 80-85.

CHAPTER TWO

THE DYNAMIC POLITICO-STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

INTRODUCTION

The premise that national security policy is primarily a state-specific response to the international environment provides the rationale for taking cognizance of the politico-strategic environment. The *realist* perspective of the anarchical character of the international system posits a broad spectrum of externally generated military, political and economic threats, which require a national security response to protect the socio-political entity that comprises the Japanese state.¹ Moreover, the politico-strategic environment generates potential influences upon a state's security policy by virtue of the actions taken, or pressures applied, by allies and other external actors who lie outside of the realm of threat *per se*. By focusing on the politico-strategic environment which has evolved during the postwar period, potential stimuli for the development of national security policy can be identified. As Japan exists within a definable region having a unique security environment, East Asia, global and regional imperatives for change must be differentiated, while recognizing that at certain junctures the two are inextricably bound.

With the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty on 8 September, 1951, Japan returned to the international community as a sovereign state having to take cognizance of her geo-strategic position and the character of the international system. Two facets of the Peace Treaty are worthy of note. First, Japan was committed to give the UN assistance under terms of the UN Charter, and Japan's inherent right of individual or collective self-defence and the

right to enter into collective security arrangements were acknowledged.² Second, the Soviet Union was not signatory to the Treaty, remaining outside of its protocols while continuing to occupy Japan's Northern Territories. Nor was the PRC party to its protocols, with Japan concluding a peace treaty with the Chinese Nationalist government as a result of US pressure.³ Thus, the two major regional powers of the former Grand Coalition were not reconciled with Japan, effectively impeding the normalization of relations and exacerbating regional manifestations of the Cold War.

Cognizance must also be taken of the Security Treaty between the United States and Japan, also signed on 8 September 1951.⁴ Implicitly, the Security Treaty was the *quid pro quo* for the Peace Treaty and concomitant return of Japanese sovereignty.⁵ Its primary provisions were the U.S. obligation to deter direct aggression against Japan by all means, including U.S. military forces to be maintained in and around Japan, and the Japanese obligation to control domestic threats to security. Additionally, Japan itself was committed to increasingly assume responsibility for its own defence against direct and indirect aggression. This latter provision was complemented by the Peace Treaty's recognition of Japan's inherent right to self-defence, a right claimed under Article 51 of the UN Charter when admitted to that organization in 1956.⁶ However, the right (or obligation) to participate in multilateral collective defence as provided for in that same Article was not pursued, nor was it reflected in the Security Treaty. This left the Security Treaty asymmetrical, with the US obligated to respond to Japanese security contingencies, but demanding no Japanese response to a threatened US.

Given the East-West confrontation and deepening Cold War, Japan's geographic position was critical to US strategy, being at the intersection of the Soviet Union's Pacific frontier, Communist China's maritime approaches, and the leading edge of the US forward

deployment in Northeast Asia. While not articulated until Nakasone's comment of January 1983, Japan became the US strategists' 'unsinkable aircraft carrier' when the realities of the Cold War were manifest in the Korean Conflict. The intervention of the PRC, along with Soviet political and materiel support, served to heighten the ideological confrontation within the region. This was not lessened by the continued partition of the Korean Peninsula, with the two Koreas remaining a source of political and strategic instability.

Growth of U.S. commitment and power in the region throughout the 1950s and the 1960s accompanied the military expansion of the Communist states and their support of insurgencies throughout East Asia. Additionally, confrontation and intermittent hostilities between the two Chinas demanded the US response of maintaining military forces in the area together with a US-Republic of China Security Treaty. Similarly, a network of US bilateral treaties with other supporters in the region was established to maintain the viability and credibility of its containment policy.⁸ These developments served to increase the strategic value of Japan to the US, as the major regional actors were polarized into the East/West blocs. The PRC and the DPRK were dependent upon the Soviet Union for economic and military modernization, and, to a certain degree, for ideological support. Japan, on the other hand, was dependent on the US-Japan special economic relationship for its post-war recovery and on the US-Japan Security Treaty for its security from external threat.

The earliest manifestations of these politico-strategic conditions of the 1950s bipolar world underlay the basic assumptions of Prime Minister Yoshida's grand strategy for the re-emergence of Japan. These included continued US focus on the Northeast Pacific in general and upon Japan's continued security in particular, in concert with continuing US military and economic global predominance. Additionally, it was assumed that the foreign policies of regional actors potentially hostile to Japan would remain subdued by the Cold War's

tightening alliance systems. The efficacy of the Yoshida Doctrine, therefore, did not depend solely upon that which Japan could control, or had the initial desire to influence. Rather, it was dependent upon external actors and the dynamics of the politico-strategic environment.

Japan's political and economic commitment to the US-led Western bloc was reconfirmed with the signing of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security (MST) between the United States and Japan on 19 January, 1960.⁹ To be noted is that 'mutuality' was founded in the obligation of the US and Japan to act in the event of an attack upon either, but only where the attack takes place in the territories under Japanese administration. To enhance Japan's security, the US was granted the right to use facilities and bases in Japan for land, sea and air forces, but was not committed to maintaining forces in or around Japan as it had been by the 1951 Security Treaty.¹⁰ Regardless of mutuality, there was no provision for joint military action, and co-operative mechanisms were restricted to the agreement to consult on matters pertaining to the Far East, including the composition of US forces in Japan and intended operations outside of Japanese territory. Japan had essentially negotiated a security treaty which addressed her external threat with a US guarantee, and 'mutuality' was confined to the defence of Japanese territory and the rather nebulous matter of consultation.

Two other facets of the MST are worthy of note. First, the treaty was constructed with reference to the UN Charter as the basis of its legitimacy, committing the contracting Parties to endeavour to strengthen the UN's role of maintaining peace and security in concert with other 'peace-loving' countries, and, with the MST remaining in force until the UN could provide for international peace and security in the Japan area. Second, Article III demanded of each Party continuous and effective self-help to maintain and develop the capacity to resist armed attack, subject to constitutional provisions. Moreover, cooperation and capability was extended to the broader scope of national security, with Article II encouraging economic

collaboration and the promotion of democratic institutions.

The U.S.-Japan economic relationship and security treaties were founded in the tight bipolar character of the international system and Japan's perception of U.S. global and regional superiority.¹¹ In addition to these arrangements insulating Japan from external threats during the Cold War, an environment supportive of economic development was created. From a US perspective, the economic recovery of Japan and concomitant political stability provided the US with a strong regional ally. Furthermore, military base rights in Japan facilitated the forward deployment of US forces to redress contingencies not only in Northeast Asia, but in Asia-Pacific. Thus Japan became essential to US economic and military objectives in the ideological and political confrontation between the communist and Western blocs.¹²

POLITICO-STRATEGIC CHANGE IN THE 1970S

In the decade of the 1970s, the global strategic balance and the East Asian security environment changed significantly. Globally, the rigid bipolar structure, which had reached the height of the Cold War in both military and political dimensions, gradually eroded throughout the 1960s. A more diffuse power distribution became evident, in which the Western states increasingly took foreign policy initiatives independent of US leadership. While the Soviet bloc remained monolithic in Europe, it experienced a fracturing in East Asia with the Sino-Soviet split, which escalated to border clashes beginning in 1969.

Coincident with the decline of bipolarity was the increasing climate of detente between the US and the Soviet Union, with detente becoming the underlying premise of US global foreign policy. Furthermore, Soviet military activity in the Third World declined, strengthening the Western perception that detente was becoming well-established. Within the Western bloc, these politico-strategic changes resulted in weakening restraint on Soviet

initiatives and declining Western political efficacy. On the other hand, the Soviet Union was attributed approximate nuclear parity and its strengthening of conventional forces continued unabated, resulting in a perceived relative decline in US military strength.

The impact of these systemic changes, from a Japanese perspective, was the weakening of the Yoshida assumptions of continued US military superiority and globalist approach that would necessarily encompass Northeast Asia. The fear that the US would lose focus on the region was exacerbated by other extra-regional developments. The 1973 Arab oil embargo, the 1979 Iranian revolution and the subsequent Iran-Iraq war all served to re-orient US strategic doctrine, leaving Japan with the perception that the US was retreating into a Eurocentric strategy whose periphery did not extend beyond the Atlantic and the Middle East. Nixon's Guam Doctrine of 1969 did not serve to allay such fears, and was interpreted in Japan as presaging a US withdrawal from the Pacific.¹³

The Guam Doctrine was premised upon detente and the vision of a stable international order in which the policy of containment would be redundant, with diplomacy replacing confrontation and military intervention. Within this "New World Order", the former globalist approach by the US would be replaced by emphasis upon more narrowly defined US interests.¹⁴ While Washington asserted that the US would honour existing alliances and that it would use its nuclear capability to protect allies threatened by Soviet nuclear power, regional partners were expected to assume greater defence burden-sharing. Specifically, military and economic assistance would be furnished as required by treaty commitments, but the US would look to the threatened ally "to assume the primary responsibility for providing the manpower for its defence."¹⁵ The Guam Doctrine highlighted the linkage which existed between global and regional security, with regional security in East Asia being subject to the politico strategic changes within the global system.

The interdependence of global and regional issues and actions was also present in the 'Nixon shocks' of 1971. The first shock to Japan was the US secret diplomacy that led to US recognition of the PRC. The lack of prior consultation was viewed by Tokyo as a serious political and diplomatic breach of the MST. Strategically, it was a move away from the policy of containment and towards the strengthening of detente, and constituted an exploitation of the Sino-Soviet rift, further strengthening the move towards multilateralism and multipolarity in the region.¹⁶ Furthermore, the concurrent US abrogation of the US-Republic of China defence pact did little to support Japanese confidence in the inviolability of the MST. The concept of a changing US-Japan relationship was heightened by the second shock involving US unilateral economic initiatives that forced a re-evaluation of the yen and imposed quotas on Japanese textile exports.¹⁷ This assault upon the Yoshida assumptions of the early 1950s continued with the collapse of the US involvement in Vietnam, which was perceived as a lack of commitment to stem the expansion of communism in East Asia and indicative of declining US military and political power.

In 1977, the proposal by the Carter administration to withdraw all ground forces from the Korean Peninsula had an equally significant impact. This was again a unilateral U.S. strategic initiative respecting the 'Far East' that was taken without prior consultation with Japan. This decision, although ultimately modified to effect only a reduction of ground forces, caused Japan particular concern given Tokyo's assessment that a secure ROK was indispensable to Japan's security, that instability was inherent in partitioned Korea, and that US ground forces in Korea were a critical balancer in the region.¹⁸ Carter added further to the image of a declining US by endorsing the Guam Doctrine, and by rejecting the policies of containment and confrontation as being outdated. Detente, arms control and a reduced US defence budget were to be the basis of Carter's declared strategic policy.¹⁹ Regardless of the

Guam Doctrine's commitment to the US nuclear umbrella and contemporary treaty obligations, US regional policies placed into question its commitment and capability *vis-a-vis* East Asia. Japan was left having much less confidence in the US political will and military capability to commit the forces required for its defence.²⁰

Coincident with declining US credibility, Japan viewed with alarm, the steady Soviet military expansion in the region, the expansion of North Korea's military capability, and the increasing tensions caused by PRC policy towards Indochina.²¹ The major Soviet build-up was in response to the Soviet-Sino confrontation, resulting in approximately 25 percent of Soviet ground and air forces being deployed to the region by 1978. More threatening was the deployment of significant Soviet ground forces, along with the upgrading of ground, naval and air facilities, on the islands north of Hokkaido. Concurrently, the Soviet Pacific fleet was transformed from a primarily coastal force to an ocean-going navy with significant power projection capabilities. With one third of Soviet naval forces being assigned to this fleet by 1970, the naval balance in East Asia was significantly changed, posing an increased challenge to U.S. naval superiority and a heightened threat to the Japanese Islands.

The enhancement of Soviet regional power and influence was underscored by Vietnam becoming a Soviet client state and by the Soviet's subsequent use of Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay as forward operating bases. Strategically, this posed a threat to Indochina as a whole and, by extension, to the Malaysian Peninsula. More critical to Japan, the Soviets were well positioned to threaten the SLOCs in the South China Sea and the Straits of Malacca, through which passed the greater part of Japan's energy supplies from the Middle East and a significant part of her trade. (Chart 1)

By the end of the 1970s Japan perceived not only a change in the balance of military power, but also Soviet military and political activism as opposed to US withdrawal. The 1979

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan demonstrated the USSR's willingness to use force in pursuit of its interests and US impotence in countering such expansionism.²² Japan's immediate strategic frontiers were not immune to displays of the threat of force. The large-scale Soviet OKEAN naval exercise of 1975, frequent violations of Japanese airspace by Soviet combat aircraft and Soviet airborne and amphibious exercises in the Northern Territories made the threat most visible.²³ Japan's particular concern for its maritime frontiers was reflected in the 1978 Defence White Paper which stated that, "This increased Soviet naval power is becoming an unignorable factor in the security of the island regions off the coast of continental Asia."²⁴ The 1979 Defence White Paper finally stated that the Soviet build-up in the region "was having an impact on the US-Soviet military balance, and that the USSR was acquiring a noticeable military potential against the defense of Japan."²⁵

Notwithstanding the Soviet threat, there existed aspects of the politico-strategic environment which enhanced Japan's security. US-PRC rapprochement and Sino-Soviet confrontation presented Tokyo with the opportunity to strengthened Sino-Japanese relations. Quickly following the US lead, Japan normalized relations with the PRC in September 1972, and subsequently concluded a Treaty of Peace and Friendship in August 1978.²⁶ With an 'anti-hegemony' clause being agreed to in the Friendship Treaty, the Taiwan question tacitly resolved between Japan and the PRC, and with the Sino-Japanese economic links being developed in the 1970s, Japan progressively effected normalization of relations with a potentially hostile regional actor. However, rapprochement with the PRC resulted in heightened Soviet hostility, to what Moscow viewed as the formation of an anti-Soviet, US-PRC-Japan axis.²⁷

The Guam Doctrine, the US retreat from Vietnam and concomitant communist victories in Indochina, the abrogation of the US-Taiwan Security Treaty, and the later

proposal to remove ground troops from Korea also impacted upon Southeast Asia's views of their politico-strategic position. Like Japan, the non-communist states in this region questioned US commitment and ability to continue playing a dominant role in assuring the security of its regional allies. Furthermore, US rapprochement with the PRC was not unanimously viewed as a positive action, considering the continuing PRC influence in the area. Given the aforementioned Japanese regional security concerns and the Southeast Asian re-examination of their security environment, there existed a positive climate for heightened Japanese diplomatic effort in the region during the 1970s and for greater acceptance of such activism by the Southeast Asian states.²⁸

POLITICO-STRATEGIC CHANGE IN THE 1980S

The advent of the 1980s did little to alleviate Japan's concerns respecting the Soviet threat in East Asia. In addition to the continued Soviet militarization of the Northern Territories in terms of quantitative and qualitative improvements to forces and infrastructure, a more aggressive posture was taken towards the Japanese islands. Violations of Japanese airspace became routine, causing the JSDF to launch approximately 900 sorties annually to intercept Soviet probing; and, Soviet naval exercises involving carrier task forces, amphibious assault forces, submarine and strategic aircraft simulated invasion and the disruption of Japan's SLOCs.²⁹ Such exercises were supported by the continued growth and modernization of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, which became the largest of the four Soviet Fleets with approximately 90 major surface warships, 120 submarines, and strategic aircraft. Furthermore, the Pacific Fleet's operating area was expanded with 20 to 25 ships, four to six submarines, and units of the Soviet naval airforce being deployed from Cam Ranh Bay.³⁰ By 1985, Soviet military deployments in East Asia were described as presenting "an increasing

latent threat to Japan".³¹ In 1989, Japan's White Paper on Defense noted that regardless of the Gorbachev administration, "Soviet forces in the Far East not only cause a potential threat to Japan but also make the military situation in this area tense".³²

The stability of the region was further eroded by the ongoing war in Afghanistan. This caused the USSR to position approximately 110,000 troops and supporting airforces on the PRC's western flank, in addition to the build-up of ground and air forces on the Sino-Soviet frontier where 51 divisions deployed in 1981 as compared to 46 in 1979. Instability was further exacerbated by the Soviet Union's aid to North Korea's expansion and modernization of its military. Given Tokyo's assessment that stability on the Korean Peninsula was central to Japan's security, this latter Soviet initiative was considered a direct threat to the security of the Japanese archipelago. Also noted by Tokyo was the Soviet will to use force in pursuit of her interests as demonstrated by the Afghanistan invasion, and, to a lesser degree, by the 1984 joint Soviet-Vietnam combined forces exercise, which was conducted in response to Sino-Vietnamese cross-border clashes.³³

The overall disposition of Soviet military force in East Asia had become approximately equal to that facing NATO by the mid-1980s. (Table 1) This military build-up should be viewed in terms of a re-orientation of the Soviet Union's global strategy to acquire greater power and influence in the Asia-Pacific region. Soviet interest in the region also found expression in a 1986 Gorbachev speech in Vladivostok where he proclaimed that the Soviet Union was an "Asian and Pacific nation".³⁴ In the global context, the Soviet Union viewed Japan in terms of the U.S.-Japan security regime and as an unequivocal supporter of U.S. diplomatic, military, and economic policy. Moreover, Japan presented a physical barrier to Soviet expansion and a threat to its naval and strategic forces.

In this latter respect, Japan's geostrategic position is significant in that it dominates

the Sea of Japan and controls the Tsushima, Tsugaru and Soya straits that provided the Soviet Pacific Fleet, based in Vladivostok, with access to the Pacific Ocean. Hokkaido also presented a unique threat in that it is contiguous to the Sea of Okhotsk which is used by the Soviets as a *bastion* for its SSBNs. The safe and unrestricted operation of the Pacific Fleet's SSBNs remained essential to the strategic deterrent, making the integrity of the Sea of Okhotsk a vital Soviet interest. Japan's continued insistence that the Northern Territories be returned to Japanese sovereignty compounded this problem as resolution in favour of Japan would further extend Japanese territory into this vital area and would increase the surveillance capability of the Japan-U.S. alliance.

In response to the changing politico-strategic environment of Northeast Asia, the region was redefined as a focus of U.S. strategic, economic and political policy. In a policy statement of June 1982, the U.S. acknowledged that it would be required to make the largest defence contribution to regional security, but noted required burden-sharing by allies in response to the increasing Soviet threat. This was to be translated into U.S. pressure upon Japan to increase its defence budget and to assume an increased security role. Additionally, reliance was to be placed on the ROK's military posture and the continuation of the PRC as a "friendly, non-aligned country with parallel strategic interests".¹⁵ In February 1985, Secretary of State Schultz stated that the Pacific region had emerged as a leading force in global economic influence and that political and economic prospects in the region were most favourable. He further observed that the area had become one of the most heavily armed regions in the world and the Soviet Union's concentration of force was of considerable concern, given their willingness to use it for political ends.¹⁶ Consequently, the US formulated "The Five Pillars of our Defence Policy in East Asia and the Pacific".

1. The key importance of the U.S. security relationship with Japan.
2. The U.S. commitment to stability on the Korean peninsula.

3. U.S. efforts to build an enduring relationship with China.
4. U.S. support of ASEAN
5. The long-standing U.S. partnership with Australia and New Zealand."³⁷

With U.S. policy committed to continued rapprochement with Beijing, the possibility of a US-PRC confrontation lessened, either directly or through client states. Regardless that this policy was in support of US global efforts to distract the Soviet Union from the NATO front, it also contributed to a regional balancing of power and enhanced regional stability. From the PRC's perspective, the formation of an 'informal balance of power coalition' with the U.S. and Japan not only diminished the threat posed by the Soviets, but presented an alternative to the rapid modernization of her military that would necessarily compromise the other three modernizations being undertaken by Beijing.³⁸ From a Soviet perspective, the destabilizing effect of this 'coalition' was offset by the slower pace of PRC military modernization. Furthermore, early in the 1980s both the USSR and the PRC were making determined efforts to defuse their border confrontation.

This balance of power diplomacy, in what was essentially a regional multipolar system, presented Japan with a greatly moderated threat given the isolation of the Soviet Union. The Korean Peninsula still remained a source of concern by virtue of the nature of the DPRK and its leadership, its unrelenting military build-up, and the DPRK-ROK confrontation. However, neither the PRC nor the USSR appeared enthusiastic about supporting DPRK initiatives to re-unify the peninsula by force.³⁹ Notwithstanding a more benign environment on the Korean Peninsula, there remained sufficient tension to cause the Seoul-Tokyo relationship to be enhanced, strengthening the position of each and creating increasing opportunities for further rapprochement.

POLITICO-STRATEGIC CHANGE IN THE 1990s

The beginning of the 1990s was marked by a radical change to the global politico-strategic environment. The ideological and military confrontation of the Cold War ended and an essentially bipolar system was replaced by a new constellation of power, which was marked by a diffusion of economic power and by the relative predominance of US military capability. While the relationship between the major powers became more stable, and the possibility of confrontation and conflict was much reduced on a global scale, stability was not necessarily enhanced in regional security systems. Potential intra-regional conflicts, which had been suppressed by the structure of the bipolar system, were encompassed by a new environment that placed less restraints upon the pursuit of national interests by regional actors.

The principal dynamics of the structural transformation to date find their genesis in Gorbachev's domestic reforms and reorientation of the USSR's foreign and security policies. Externally this first led to heightened detente, with major concessions being made in INF, START, and CFE negotiations, by unilateral cuts to strategic and tactical capability in Eastern and Central Europe, and by a declared 'defensive military doctrine' for the Warsaw Pact in May 1987.⁴⁰ Ultimately the Soviet focus on domestic political and economic reform led to the collapse of communism and Soviet suzerainty in Eastern Europe, and then to the collapse of the Soviet Union as a communist-dominated political entity. The events in Eastern Europe, and subsequently in the Soviet Union itself, destroyed the Warsaw Pact as a military organization, and reduced the former Soviet Union's military capability and its ability to sustain war.⁴¹

If threat was to be assessed on the basis of both capability and *will*, then the threat of East-West confrontation in Europe was effectively reduced to the level of improbability. Note

should also be taken of the problems encountered in reorganizing the former Soviet military within the structure of the CIS, with claims and counterclaims being pursued by the constituent states with respect to 'ownership', command and control of tactical and strategic assets. Moreover, the incipient ethnic conflicts within the CIS focused the attention of the military on internal problems. These conditions further weakened both capability and will, particularly towards Europe which had been the major arena of East-West confrontation. Just as this area had been of primary concern in Soviet attempts to effect a more stable detente in the late 1980s, so it remained the primary focus of Russian rapprochement and diplomatic normalization.⁴² Additionally, the end of ideological confrontation and the need for Western economic support has enhanced the possibility of long-term stability between the Atlantic Alliance members and the Russian Federation, which may be considered as the USSR's successor in global, European, and Asia-Pacific politico-strategic affairs after 1990.

The progressive reorientation of Soviet/Russian foreign and security policy in Europe has also been reflected in its overall global posture, as evidenced by the 1989 withdrawal from Afghanistan, the termination or reduction of 'military advisors' and military aid to Cuba, Nicaragua and most of Africa, and the declared policy to withdraw all overseas deployment of troops by the year 2000.⁴³ This has been complemented by the growing cooperation of the US and Russia on global and regional security issues, and by the continuation of Russian unilateral troop reductions in both Europe and East Asia. In addition to supporting the diplomatic initiatives designed to reach accommodation with the United States as the leader of the Western Alliance, these unilateral and negotiated reductions must be viewed in the context of the Russian economy which makes difficult the support of active foreign intervention. Moreover, developments in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have discredited communism as a political and economic system, diminishing the salience of

ideological confrontation and destroying the ideological *raison d'etre* of former Soviet foreign relationships.

The politico-strategic transition in East Asia has not been analogous to that in Europe or that which is generally evident on a global scale. First, the region had developed into a more multipolar structure by the beginning of the 1980s, with the U.S.-Soviet competition being paralleled by Sino-Soviet competition in terms of direct confrontation and that involving third states. Secondly, the complexities of the political and security relationships within the region have not been governed by centralized security regimes similar to NATO and the Warsaw Pact, but by a multitude of formal and informal bilateral security arrangements. These factors have forestalled a systematic approach to the management of security issues as was facilitated by the more bipolar system which had existed globally and in Europe. Thus, detente in East Asia has not advanced to the same degree as that in Europe, nor has the magnitude of Russian capability and threat receded to the same extent. Moreover, within the region, the ideological component of instability still exists with the slow rate of political change in the PRC, Vietnam and Laos, the continuation of the Kim Il Sung regime in the DPRK, and the incipient communist insurgency in Cambodia.

The Russian politico-strategic posture has been somewhat paradoxical in the region since the ascendancy of Gorbachev and his successor. Sino-Russian rapprochement continued apace with significant reductions being made to Russian forces deployed on the PRC border, thereby reducing tensions on this frontier. This, in conjunction with the Afghanistan withdrawal and the abandonment of the operating base at Cam Ranh Bay portrays a more defensive posture, and supports the contention that at least the short-term threat has receded. However, the overall military capability deployed within the Asia-Pacific borders of Russia has not diminished significantly. While there has been some redeployment of ground forces,

the modernization of air forces and the Pacific Fleet has continued, and operational activities have not been significantly reduced.⁴⁴ Japan's strategic assessment of Soviet forces in the Far East is that they present a "severe military environment around Japan."⁴⁵

The problem of arms reduction in the region was addressed in the context of Gorbachev's 1986 Vladivostok speech in which he proposed a Pacific Conference similar to the Helsinki Conference. However, this was withdrawn given his recognition that the European experience with arms control could not be replicated in Asia-Pacific given the more fractured regional security arrangements.⁴⁶ Moreover, neither the United States nor Japan were receptive to these overtures, while non-communist Asia and the PRC continued to support an unreduced U.S. regional presence to counter Russian military capability and that of other potential regional powers.⁴⁷

While Russian diplomatic initiatives have increasingly taken on the character of extending rapprochement and accommodation towards East Asia states, they have also attempted to increase presence and influence in the region, thereby offsetting retrenchment in Europe with the expansion of political and economic interests in Asia.⁴⁸ Initiatives such as persuading Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia, normalizing relations with the ROK, and exerting pressure upon the DPRK to become more transparent respecting its nuclear capability have been complemented by attempts to become better integrated with the East Asian economy.⁴⁹ This may be contrasted with the forestalled resolution of the Russo-Japanese territorial dispute respecting the Northern Territories, and the linked issue of finally concluding a peace treaty with Japan. Little has been effected in advancing Japanese-Soviet detente, with mutual intransigence becoming entrenched after a more promising beginning in the late-1980s.⁵⁰

The development of positive Japan-Russia relations has been compromised by other

factors. First is continued strategic importance of the Sea of Okhotsk as an Russian SSBN bastion, regardless of the end of the Cold War. Given the character of the START talks, the value of SSBNs and the need for safeguarding them has become greater, and Russian possession of the Northern Territories enhances the integrity of the Sea of Okhotsk bastion.⁵¹ Second, given the retreat from Central Europe, the domestic political costs of returning or ceding territories in East Asia cannot be construed as being an acceptable option for Russia, regardless of the economic or international political *quid pro quo* that may accrue. Lastly, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty remains the cornerstone of the U.S. Asia-Pacific strategy and of Japan's security policy, with strategic advantage accruing to neither by reason of a much closer Japan-Russia relationship or in any compromise respecting the return of all the Northern Territories. The lack of essential politico-strategic change is also present concerning Russian relations with Vietnam and the DPRK. Regardless of various initiatives to resolve or defuse conflict within the respective sub-regions, the 1961 treaty with the DPRK and the 1987 treaty with Vietnam have not been abrogated, although they have been weakened.

These two sub-regions have remained the most volatile during the transition from the 1980s to the 1990s. The Korean Peninsula continues to be divided with a high concentration of military force complementing the stark ideological cleavage between North and South. Regardless of lessening political and materiel support from the PRC and Russia, the regime of Kim Il Sung remains stable and unreceptive to reunification on the basis of an open regime. Notwithstanding the foregoing, progress towards stability in the Peninsula has been made by the ROK's pursuit of *Nordpolitik*, within which Seoul's policy of expanding political and economic ties with Communist and former-Communist states has been extended to the DPRK.⁵² This, in combination with the collapse of the Cold War and Russian detente, has reduced the threat of military conflict. However, isolation of the DPRK, evidence of a

growing nuclear capability, serious economic problems, and continuation of the totalitarian, aggressive regime combine to present political and strategic uncertainty. For other regional actors, the longer-term outlook is one of continued uncertainty or the spectre of a militarily and economically powerful, unified Korea.

The PRC's focus in the 1990s has been the continuation of Deng's *four modernizations*, with emphasis being placed on economic development. The continuing rapprochement with the Russia, and the de-escalation of tensions inherent in Russian force reductions along the frontiers and Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, have enhanced the conditions necessary for such development. While these politico-strategic changes are conducive to economic development and continued preoccupation with domestic policy, the 1989 events at Tienanmen produced further incentive for the PRC leadership to remain introspective and forestall any continuation of exporting revolution or engaging in proxy conflicts.

In the short term, the PRC must be viewed as a benign actor in the region with respect to strategic initiatives. In viewing the longer term, cognizance must be taken of progress being made towards effecting Deng's fourth modernization - that of the military.⁵³ The January 1993 agreement with Russia to purchase former Soviet military equipment has given greater impetus to improving military capability, and provides the means by which the process of modernization can be enhanced. The agreement also signals that with economic development continuing apace, there is clear intent that increasing resources will be directed to improving military capability, propelling the PRC towards its potential as a future superpower. Japan has not been reticent in observing the destabilizing effect that this potential holds. In late 1992, the Chairman of the LDP PARC cautioned the Chinese government over its military build-up, especially with respect to planned expansion of naval offensive capability

and the rapid upgrading of technology by the PLA.⁵⁴

To advance economic development, the PRC requires stable relations with all its Asian neighbours and increased economic integration into both the Asia-Pacific and global economies.⁵⁵ Diplomacy towards these goals was exemplified in the August 1992 normalization of PRC-ROK relations, which should have the additional benefit of fostering the DPRK-ROK dialogue. In the longer-term, the ultimate resolution of the PRC's domestic political crisis will necessarily shape its foreign and security policy orientation; however, regardless of that orientation, the Asia-Pacific region will be presented with a more powerful and capable PRC.

In Southeast Asia, the volatility of Indochina has been reduced with the disengagement of Vietnam from Cambodia, the withdrawal of Soviet forces, and a more stable Sino-Vietnam relationship following the renewal of relations and the visit of the Vietnamese Prime Minister to Beijing. However, the issue of the internal structure of Cambodia remains far from being resolved, regardless of the active participation of the UN and the growing presence of peacekeeping forces in the country. A complete breakdown of the UN process and failure to resolve the issue has the potential to re-ignite both the internal and inter-state conflict in Indochina. Longer-term stability is also diminished by the continuing ideologically-based authoritarian cast to Vietnam, regardless of its movement towards more *laissez-faire* economic policies. As with North Korea and the PRC, the continued imposition of Communism has the potential to precipitate domestic political and social unrest, particularly as economic development continues apace throughout the remainder of the region and as the democratization of former Communist states becomes more developed.

The conclusion can be reached that while East Asia has experienced a reduction of tensions with the end of the Cold War, there does not exist the security architecture present in

Europe to maximize the possibilities of transition to a more benign form of inter-state relations. Both global actors and major regional actors remain in politico-strategic confrontation, albeit to a lesser degree than during the 1980s. Furthermore, the *de facto* multipolar structure, incorporating Russia, the PRC and the US that developed over the previous two decades, continues to exist with its inherent ambiguities concerning future alignments and the degree of foreign policy flexibility available to individual states. These conditions, along with long-standing confrontations, and territorial disputes, ideological cleavages, and incipient domestic instability in some states, maintain volatility in the region.⁵⁶ This presents Japan with a less stable immediate environment than that encountered at the height of the Cold War.

CONCLUSION

Japan has been subjected to an evolving international system which has evolved from a tight bipolar configuration in the 1950s and 1960s to an increasingly loose bipolar structure in the 1970s and the 1980s. Ultimately, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the concomitant end of the Cold War structure in the 1990s, the global system has remained in transition. Within East Asia, a regional multipolar system had effectively emerged by the 1970s, with that system being reinforced as the global trend moved towards a similar configuration in terms of the distribution of economic power. The constellation of global strategic power, however, changed from approximate parity between the two superpowers in the 1970s and 1980s, to US supremacy in the 1990s. The continuous transformation of global and regional power structures presented Japan with a changing set of assumptions on which to base security policy.

Throughout the period, the primary threat to Japan remained the Soviet Union, first in

the context of the Cold War and its potential to escalate to global conflict. As East-West detente variously waxed and waned prior to the 1990s, so did the threat of Japan being drawn into any potential global conflict. However, in the regional context, the Soviet threat was perceived to have steadily increased throughout the 1970s and the 1980s, with no manifestations of European detente being transferred to East Asia. The continuation of Russian antipathy towards Japan in the contemporary era has been exacerbated by mutual intransigence in settling outstanding territorial issues and unsuccessful negotiation of a formal treaty of peace. From the Japanese perspective, the negative impact on security engendered by these factors has been amplified by the qualitative improvements to Russian military capability in Asia-Pacific and by the renewed Russian focus on its Eastern frontiers.

Regional insecurity has also been fostered throughout the period by the chronic instability on the Korean Peninsula, an area which Tokyo considers vital to Japan's security. While the potential for conflict has progressively decreased with ongoing attempts to effect ROK-DPRK rapprochement, with contemporary support for stability being bolstered by the PRC and the USSR/Russia, the Koreas have remained a focus of Japanese concern. As with the PRC, the Koreas have not posed a direct threat to Japan but constitute a potential longer term problem as the regional balance of power evolves.

Japan's only formal ally, the United States, has remained the dominant external actor in Japan's security calculus throughout the post-war era. US dominance has been subsumed by its leadership role of the 'Western Alliance' in the global East-West confrontation, and by its strategic, economic and political interests in East Asia. However, the US-Japan relationship may be viewed as progressively changing with respect to constant US demands for Japan to contribute more to its own defence, then progressively demanding Japanese contributions to regional and global peace and security. By the mid-1970s, US Western allies joined in these

latter demands thereby becoming additional external actors in Japan's security policy formulation. In contrast, the Southeast Asian States, primarily ASEAN, became politico-strategic actors with respect to Japanese security policy by presenting a restraint upon the expansion of Japanese political and military influence in the region, regardless of US wishes and the US bilateral treaty system. Contemporary growing acceptance of Japan, albeit limited, is slowly offering Japan new security objectives in this region.

NOTES

1. Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*, (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1982) 121-122; and "People States and Fear: The National Security Problem in the Third World", in Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon, eds., *National Security Management of Internal and External Threats*, (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1988) 16.

2. See Denise Folliot, ed., *Documents on International Affairs 1951*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1954) 611-625 for the text of the Treaty of Peace with Japan. Article 5 specifically sets out Japan's security obligations to the UN and Japan's inherent right of individual or collective self-defence.

3. Tetsuya Kataoka and Ramon H. Myers, *Defending an Economic Superpower*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989) 17-19 recount US influence on Japan's treaty negotiations with the USSR which led to failure, and the pressure on Japan to conclude a treaty with the Chinese Nationalist government. Also see Michael M. Yoshitsu, *Japan and the San Francisco Peace Settlement* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983) 674-83 for the linkage between the US China policy and US support for passage of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.

4. See Denise Folliot, ed., *op.cit.*: 625-629 for the text of the 1951 Security Treaty between the US and Japan.

5. James H. Buck, "Japan's Self Defence Forces", in Edward A. Olsen and Stephen Jurika, eds., *The Armed Forces in Contemporary Asian Societies*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986) 72. See Michael M. Yoshitsu, *op. cit.*: 39-66 for the Dulles-Yoshida security negotiations of 1950-51, which shaped the asymmetric form of the Security Treaty and Japanese perceptions of being forced to accept it in return for a peace settlement.

6. J.E. Larsen (ed.) *New Foundations for Asian and Pacific Security*, (New Brunswick: National Strategy Information Centre, 1980) 90.

7. Ian H. Nish, "The United States in East Asia: Japan's Perspective", in Michael Liefer, ed., *The Balance of Power in East Asia*, (London: The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1986) 37.

8. S. Bilveer, "ASEAN and the New Security Framework in the Asia-Pacific Region", *Asian Defence Journal*, December (1991). The military alliance network is presented on p.19

9. R. Gott et al, eds., *Documents on International Affairs 1960*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1964). The text of the 1960 MST is reproduced at pp.456-459. Adverse PRC and Soviet Union reaction can be found at pp.455-456 and pp.459-462 respectively

10. Martin E. Weinstein, *Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, 1947-1968* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971) 87-90 and 95; and James Auer, "The Global Influence of Japan's Defense Efforts", in Jaros Radvanyi, ed., *The Pacific in the 1990s*, (New York: University of America

Press, 1990) 120-121 for analyses of the MST.

11. Reinhard Drifte, "Japan's Security Policy and Southeast Asia", in *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol.12, No.3 (1990):186-187.

12. Michael W. Donnelly, "Japanese-American Relations: the costs of brinkmanship", *International Journal* Vol.46, No.4 (1991): 634.

13. James E. Dornan, "The Changing Security Environment in Northeast Asia", in Richard B. Foster, et al, eds., *Strategy and Security in Northeast Asia*, (New York:Crane, Rusak and Co., 1979) 18.

14. Donald C. Hellmann, "Japanese Security and Postwar Japanese Foreign Policy", in Robert A. Scalapino, ed., *The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977) 343-344.

15. Taketsuga Tsurutani, *Japanese Policy and East Asian Security*, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981) 86.

16. Donald C. Hellmann, "Japan and the United States in the 1980s: The Domestication of Foreign Policy", in Herbert J. Ellison, ed., *Japan and the Pacific Quadrille* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987) 170. Also see Ian H. Nish, *op. cit.*: 32-33.

17. Donald C. Hellmann, *op. cit.*: 170.

18. Yasuhisa Nakada, "Japan's Security Perceptions and Military Needs", in Onkar Marwah and Jonathan D. Pollack, eds., *Military Power and Policy in Asian States: China, India, Japan* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980) 151-153.

19. Joyce E. Larson, ed., *New Foundations for Asian and Pacific Security*, (New Brunswick: National Strategy Information Centre, 1980) xviii-xix.

20. I.T.M. Gow, "Defence as a Political Issue", in J.W.M. Chapman, et al, eds., *Japan's Quest for Comprehensive Security*, (New York: St Martin's Press, 1982) 108.

21. Maseo Horie, "Northeast Asian Security: The Japanese Role", in J.E. Larsen ed., *op. cit.*: 98.

22. Seizaburo Sato, "Japan's Foreign Policy", in U. Alexis Johnson and George R. Packard eds., *The Common Security Interests of Japan, the United States and NATO*, (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing, 1981) 57.

23. James E. Dornan, *op. cit.*: 19. Also see *Defense of Japan 1976*, (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency) 17-18 for the JDA's perspective on Soviet naval manoeuvres in the maritime approaches to Japan, including the OKEAN 75 exercise.

24. *Defense of Japan 1978*, translated by Mainichi Daily News (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency) 33.

25. *Defense of Japan 1979*, translated by Mainichi Daily News (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency) 37.
26. Yasuhisa Nakada, *op. cit.*: 159.
27. Reinhard Drifte, "Japan's Strategic Environment in East Asia", in J.W. M. Chapman et al, *op. cit.*: 112.
28. Charles E. Morrison, "Japan's Politico-Strategic Role in Southeast Asia", in Dora Alves, ed., *Pacific Security Toward the Year 2000*, (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1988) 112-113.
29. R. Mark Bean, *Cooperative Security in Northeast Asia*, (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1990) 114-115.
30. Young W. Kihl and Lawrence E. Grinter, *Asia-Pacific Security*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1986) 5-6.
31. *Defense of Japan 1985*, translated by The Japan Times Ltd (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency) 23.
32. *Defense of Japan 1989*, translated by The Japan Times (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency) 39-40.
33. Michael Liefer, *op. cit.*: 146.
34. R. Mark Bean, *op. cit.*: 6.
35. See *Ibid.*: 4-5 and 21 for this account of the changing US posture in North East Asia.
36. Lawrence E. Grinter, "The United States: Coping with the Soviet Build-up and Alliance Dilemmas", in Young W. Kihl and Lawrence E. Grinter, *op. cit.*: 20-21.
37. *Ibid.*: 22.
38. Sheldon W. Simon, "Regional Threat Environments in Asia: Problems of Aggression", in Edward A. Olsen and Stephen Jurika, eds., *op. cit.*: 353.
39. *Ibid.*: 356.
40. See Michael Nacht, "From Competitive Allies to Potential Adversaries: The US-Japan Security Relationship" in Dora Alves, ed., *Change, Interdependence and Security in the Pacific Basin* (Washington: National Defense University Press 1991) 90; and Masashi Nishihara, "The Soviet Threat", in Eric Grove, ed., *Global Security* (Oxford: Brassey's (UK) Ltd., 1991) 52.
41. *Ibid.*: 52-53. By 1990, the U.S. assessed that the warning time to detect and prepare for Soviet attack had been increased from 14-60 days.

42. Hisashi Owada, "The Japanese Role in the Regional Security of East Asia", in Eric Grove, ed., op. cit.: 12-13.

43. Masashi Nishihara, op. cit.: 52-55.

44. Masashi Nishihara, op. cit.: 54-56. Also note Seizaboro Sato op. cit.: 79, and G. Robinson, "Defence Planners Uneasy", in *Asia - Pacific Defence Reporter*, Vol.18, No.2 (1991): 16 for a brief synopsis of the qualitative improvements to CIS forces in the region and concomitant Japanese concern.

45. *Defense of Japan 1991*, translated by The Japan Times Ltd (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency) 29-30.

46. Masashi Nishihara op. cit.: 56-57.

47. Donald Zagoria, "Regional Stability in East Asia", and Hisashi Odawa, op. cit., in Eric Grove, ed., op. cit.: 68 and 13 respectively.

48. Loc. cit.

49. Donald Zagoria, op. cit.: 69. Also see *Korea Newsreview*, Vol.21, No.48 (1992) 4-7 for a report of President Yeltsin's state visit to the ROK in November, 1992. The resultant joint statement focused on measures to de-escalate the DPRK-ROK confrontation and the signing of ROK-Russia economic accords.

50. See Gerald Segel, "North-East Asia: common security or à la carte?", in *International Affairs*, Vol.67, No.4 (1991) 758-759. The respective hardening of positions can be viewed in "Yeltsin Runs for Cover", *Ottawa Citizen*, 10 September, 1992: A10, and "LDP Demands Return of Northern Territories at Rally", *LDP Liberal Star*, Vol.21, No.244, September 1992. In addition to politico-strategic factors, the issue now engenders nationalism and assertiveness respecting national boundaries.

51. Seizaboro Sato, op. cit.: 79-80.

52. Thomas L. Wilborn, *How Northeast Asians View Their Security*, (Strategic Studies Institute: U.S. Army War College, 1991) 45.

53. See _____. *SIPRI Yearbook 1992* (Solna: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1992) 245-250 for an analysis of the significant increase in the PRC's defence budget in 1990 and 1991. While noting the extensive naval modernization program, it is observed that the military still has the lowest priority among the "four modernizations" and that military strength will be a product of economic development.

54. See Robert Thomsom, "Teeing off for prime minister", in *The Financial Post*, February 4, 1993: A8. _____. "A Colossus Stirs", in *ASIAWEEK*, Vol.19, No.4 (1993) 23-26, and Gary Klintworth, "Latest Soviet carrier for Beijing fleet?" in *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, Vol.19, No.2/3 (1992) 26-27 provide details of the modernization of the PLA's strategic capability.

55. Donald Zagoria, op. cit.: 62.

56. See S. Elizabeth Speed, *Maritime Disputes in East Asia: Implications for Regional Security* (Ottawa: ORAE Report No. R105, Department of National Defence, 1990) for a survey of maritime disputes contributing to regional instability.

CHAPTER THREE

SECURITY DIMENSIONS OF JAPAN'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

BACKGROUND

The Yoshida Doctrine of 1952 provided the grand strategy for Japan's post-war foreign policy. It posited Japan's economic growth as being the paramount national long-term objective, with national energies to be mobilized in support of economic development and with security from external threats to be afforded by the US-Japan Security Treaty. Both political and economic co-operation with the US were considered essential to maintain the desired separation of economics from the full scope of international politics. The achievement of this aim has caused Japan to become a major power in the international economic system, as manifest by a GNP second only to that of the US, and its position as the world's most important exporter of capital and donor of ODA.

Japan's relative economic position has given rise to external demands that Tokyo contribute more fully to international economic and political stability. Such a reaction from the international community and Japan's principal ally, the US, may have been predicted since economic change of this magnitude tends to upset the stability of bilateral relationships and challenge existing economic and political structures. Additionally, since Japan's contemporary economic capacity now confers the potential to develop considerable military power, there exist both positive and negative international expectations that the traditional congruence of these capabilities will be realized.

Japan's perspective of the international community has also changed with its growing

dependence on external markets for continued economic growth and sources of raw materials. Moreover, the magnitude of FDI and international financing has raised concerns for the political and economic well-being of individual states. These economic realities and the growing economic interdependence of contemporary international society have focused Japan's attention on the broader scope of international affairs, and have caused Japan to accept that economic and security issues cannot be viewed independently. The Yoshida Doctrine has, therefore, been subjected to forces generated by its success that have intruded into the sphere of national security policy.

Japan's postwar orientation to its external environment was, in part, influenced by the economic and political conditions encountered during the SCAP-controlled Allied Occupation from September 1945 to May 1952. In defeat, Japan had lost all of her overseas possessions and was on the verge of economic collapse. The destruction of industrial infrastructure and utilities reduced industrial production in 1946 to as low as 30.7 percent of 1934-35 levels, rising to only 83.6 percent in 1950.¹ With food production at less than 60 percent of pre-war levels, the disarray of the food distribution system, and the return of overseas Japanese to the home island, mass starvation was averted only by the distribution of food from US military stores and former Japanese war stocks in the winters of 1945-46 and 1946-47.² Economic recovery was not enhanced by the continuing embargo against Japan, nor by the SCAP prohibition of all private trade for the first two years of the Occupation, after which trade was conducted under strict SCAP-approved Japanese government controls.³ Furthermore, with SCAP's continued dismantling of Japan's economic war potential and the prospect of reparations, business was reluctant to undertake the demanding task of reconstruction.⁴

The labour situation did little but exacerbate the general economic malaise. The SCAP initiated labour laws of 1945 to 1947, designed to strengthen democratic foundations in Japan,

were first manifest in a trade union law that guaranteed the right to organize, engage in collective bargaining and strike.⁵ This immediately led to continuous rounds of wage-demands and strikes, fuelling ever-increasing inflation and undermining economic confidence. Moreover, the labour unions, which incorporated 56 percent of the work force in 1949, were politicized in reaction to economic and social conditions, and by socialist and communist penetration. Their demonstrated ability and willingness to generate economic and social chaos eventually precipitated SCAP-supported repression, especially with respect the communist-led elements.⁶

The costs of subsidizing Japan's economy, and the wide-spread social unrest which was threatening political stability and opening Japan to communist inroads, caused SCAP to focus on economic recovery in 1949. Primary among initiatives was MacArthur's call for an early conclusion of a peace treaty to end the blockade and permit Japan to trade, along with a minimum of reparations and economic restrictions.⁷ Japan was to be afforded an open US market within the US sponsored post-war economic system and was to be accommodated in a newly envisaged East Asian security system.

THE MERCANTILIST-DEVELOPMENTAL STATE

The approximately eleven-fold increase in GNP between 1954 and 1971 (Table 3) indicates the economic success of the Yoshida Doctrine. This can be ascribed in part to the initial stimulus provided Japan's economy by the Korean War, the economic structural accommodation afforded Japan by the US, and the liberalization of the international economy led by the US. However, the foundations of Japan's economic recovery lay in the occupation era, during which business familiarized itself with US technology and business methods, and made contact with those possessing the most advanced expertise in the world, the largest

credits, and the most extensive communications system available.⁸ This was complemented by stabilization payments from the Reconstruction Finance Bank, and subsequently by the extensive orders placed by the US for materiel procurements in support of the Korean War efforts.⁹ By the mid-1950s, the Japanese economy had been restored to pre Pacific War levels of production.

Continued economic growth was fostered by the US-sponsored bilateral economic relationship which allowed Japan to export freely into the US market while severely restricting access of US products into Japan. Moreover, no pressure was exerted by the US that Japan accept commercial or financial policies consistent with the growing liberalization of the international economic system, even after its entry into the GATT in 1955.¹⁰ The Bretton Woods monetary system also served to Japan's advantage in Japan-US trade relations by the growing over-evaluation of the dollar and concomitant Japanese price advantage. It was not until the Nixon 'shocks' of the early 1970s that the US began to address seriously the rising friction generated by the trade surpluses being accumulated by Japan.

International structural advantages were well-exploited by what Johnson terms the 'institutions of high speed growth', including a popular consensus favouring economic priorities, improved institutional arrangements, and an "organizational inheritance which stressed public-private cooperation, a convergence/cross-penetration of bureaucratic and business elites and conscious institutional manipulation."¹¹ The important point with respect to the 'improved institutional arrangements' discussed by Johnson is not so much the identification of the parts, but rather governmental support of economic initiatives by either bureaucracy or through public-private fora. Equally salient is Johnson's point that in military defeat, Japan pursued an economic victory, with the nation mobilized for economic development and led by an economic general staff in the form of MITI, which produced the

blueprint for the policies of economic high speed growth within Prime Minister Ikeda's 'income doubling plan'.¹²

If the 'general staff' analogy is to be advanced, it is more useful to consider it as being comprised of the LDP, the bureaucracy and big business. This triad gave substance to the Yoshida Doctrine and ensured that the national priority of economic development endured. Within this decision-making structure, the continuity of successive LDP governments and the consensual nature of Japanese politics provided the necessary long-term focus, while the bureaucracy with its *de facto* hierarchy facilitated the formation of the necessary initiatives, the mobilization of resources, and the compromises necessary to effect the aim.¹³ Big business, as an entity pursued its interests in a coordinated manner, seeking to exploit both domestic and international markets while supporting the Ikeda plan.¹⁴ A retrospective analysis of Japan's economic policy has given rise to Japan being described as a mercantilist-developmental state, whose objectives were:

- "(1) to construct a democratic society based on strong industries;
- (2) to succeed in the developmental game while abandoning participation in the prestige game [i.e. international politics]; and
- (3) to facilitate the working of the wealth game internally to encourage exports, and to create systems to distribute ...[wealth] as equally as possible to achieve the above."¹⁵

'Neo-mercantilism' was used as being descriptive of enriching the state through trade at the expense of trading partners, while spending a minimum on defence and investing new wealth in domestic industry.¹⁶ The 'developmental state' described a plan-oriented market economy in which industries were aided by private-public cooperation, subsidies, export promotion, import restriction and the aforementioned institutions of high-speed growth.¹⁷ Therefore, the Yoshida doctrine represents the neo-mercantilist international aspect, and Chalmers Johnson's developmental state represents the domestic and industrial aspects.¹⁸

These economic strategies produced a dramatically increasing GNP which became the

second largest in the non-communist world by 1968. Translated into global terms, Japan's share of world GNP reached 3.2 percent by 1960, 6.4 percent by 1970, 12.5 percent by 1980, and thirteen percent by 1990. International trade was crucial to the continued growth of Japan's economy and provided the foreign exchange reserves that support Japan's position as a major actor in global finance.¹⁹

THE REALITIES OF GROWING INTERDEPENDENCE

The economic interdependence increasingly evident in the contemporary international system is particularly salient with respect to Japan's security policy. Fundamental to the sustained growth of the Japanese economy is international trade, with dependencies and vulnerabilities being a function of trading patterns, flows, commodity types and transportation. Similarly, international finance flows create dependencies and vulnerabilities, in terms of the stability of states receiving FDI and, to a lesser extent, ODA where it engenders political interests. Such considerations become pertinent to security policy when they are perceived as compromising or supporting vital national interests, either directly or indirectly. Moreover, those extraneous to Japan's primary economic relationships, such as the Soviet Union, must be considered where they might seek to destabilize the system by military, political or economic means.²⁰ Finally, the web of interdependence is sufficiently wide and complex that initiatives taken by system members, such as embargoes, interventions, or political and economic pressures, may have intended or unintended consequences for other members.²¹

Two aspects of trade expansion must be considered. First is the importance of markets as outlets for Japanese industry, the growth of which provided for further expansion in terms of both fundamental rationale and earnings for capitalization. Second was the use of export

generated earnings to purchase the wide variety of raw materials and food commodities necessary to sustain both the export and domestic sectors of the economy. As Drifte observes, these latter requirements made Japan the world's largest importer of many raw materials, creating dependencies on Japan in the supplier states and generating competition with all other countries requiring the same resources.²² While the ratio of foreign trade to GNP is low as compared to other major economic actors (10.7 percent for exports and 6.5 percent for imports in 1986), two-way trade became essential for Japan's economic health.²³

The distribution of trade creates specific economic-security linkages. Of greatest significance is the US-Japan trading relationship, with the US being Japan's largest market and Japan being second only to Canada as a supplier to the US. The growing volume of this trade and its composition contributed to Japan's continued subscription to the US-Japan security regime and to the centrality of the US in Japan's overall foreign policy. This economic-security linkage exists to a lesser extent with respect to the EC, which comprises Japan's third largest export destination. (Table 4) While trade with Western partners has serious imbalances and resultant frictions, it continues to be integral to Japan's long-term export strategy given its production of sophisticated, high-value goods. Japan's current reliance on US military technology is also worthy of note, as is increasing Japanese competence and innovation in the same field which benefits the US.²⁴

Japan's economic relationships in Asia have been more complex than with Western partners. While the West led Japan in economic development, the majority of non-Communist Asia basically followed Japan in form and progress. This provided different market opportunities after initially offering only raw materials and primary products in return for finished goods.²⁵ Furthermore, the two major sub-regional groupings of ASEAN and Northeast Asia each presented a different relational basis as did the NICs which were

distributed across both subregions. However, various trends relevant to the economic-security linkage can be discerned within these diverse groupings.

Japan-ASEAN trade relations reflect a historic Japanese interest in the area as a source of raw resources, which continued with Japan's rapid economic development in the 1950s and 1960s. During that period Japan replaced the US and Europe as the region's prime supplier of manufactured goods.²⁶ However, the commodity mix changed with rising ASEAN manufactures and diminishing Japanese demand for primary products, in response to the restructuring of Japan's economy towards service and high-technology activities.²⁷ Two-way trade rose quickly, moving from \$35.2 billion in 1987 to \$51.7 billion in 1989, with the latter figure representing approximately 10 percent of Japanese exports and 12.2 per cent of imports. (Table 4)

Japan-NIC trade has been marked by increasing integration, resulting in a dramatic increase in the absolute value of two-way trade. Given the advancing industrial sophistication of the NICs and their comparative advantage, Japan is leaving an increasing amount of medium technology production to these states to facilitate restructuring into service industries and higher technology products.²⁸ The consequent horizontal and vertical integration stimulated the growth of exports to the NICs from \$19.2 billion in 1980 to \$37 billion in 1987.²⁹ This was matched by greater acceptance of NIC consumer products and the rising importation of semi-finished goods and component parts destined for Japanese final production.

The PRC presents a unique case in Japan's trade relationships with economic initiatives generally leading political initiatives on the Japanese side, and with Beijing using the economic relationship to attain political objectives. Nevertheless, Japan-PRC two-way trade increased from \$1.1 billion in 1971 to \$19.6 billion in 1989, with Japan capturing the

world's largest share of PRC trade.³⁰ Japan-PRC trade has not generated security concerns; rather, it has enhanced rapprochement and has positioned Japan to exploit more fully the developing PRC market.

Overall, trade with East Asia in 1989 represented 30 percent of total Japanese exports and 34.6 percent of total imports, making it Japan's second most important trading region in addition to being the most geographically intimate. (Table 4) Moreover, given the diversity of East Asian markets and their relative level of development, a greater degree of interdependence has developed than exists with the US or the EC.³¹ Finally, their relative vulnerability to penetration in the absence of any formal economic regime, makes them plausible alternatives to the US and EC markets should protectionism there become untenable. To a lesser extent, Japan provides a similar substitute for Asian states.

The degree of Japan's dependence on imported raw material is of particular importance, given absolute dependence on overseas sources for a wide variety of commodities and its significant share in the world trade of many of these resources. While attempts have been made to diversify sources, Japan remains dependent on a single state or region for over fifty percent of her needs. (Table 5) Oil exemplifies both the dependency and vulnerability in that almost all requirements must be obtained off-shore, with approximately 85 percent being supplied from the politically volatile Middle East. With both source and transportation vulnerable to disruption, and the commodity subject to radical cost variations, Japan remains most sensitive to this trade regardless of conservation efforts to reduce consumption.³² The restructuring of trade, the moving of 'dirty' and high resource-dependent production off-shore through FDI and conservation measures lessened resource dependency in absolute terms during the first half of the 1980s; however, dependency increased again in the latter half of the decade.³³ Moreover, the larger part of such restructuring has remained within ASEAN

and the NICs, thereby retaining a regional complexion to the problem.

Japan's industrial success and concomitant trade surpluses not only produced a creditor state by 1967, but the speed at which its financial position strengthened was unparalleled.³⁴ In the subsequent two decades Japan became entrenched as a global finance giant. The magnitude and growth of its overseas investment position was evidenced by the \$350 billion surge between 1986 and 1989, that gave Japan new stakes in the global economy and emphasized its dominance in the finance sector.³⁵ The concomitant intensification of interdependence resulted in the increased politicization of trade and investment ties.³⁶

One measure of interdependence is that of FDI with which Japan increasingly committed financial resources overseas. The overall scale of FDI remained relatively modest in comparison to total financial strength until the mid-1980s. Although Japanese capital outflows started to increase dramatically with Japan's gross external assets trebling to \$727 billion between 1982 and 1986, FDI comprised a very small percentage standing at only 8 percent in 1985.³⁷ Thereafter, FDI comprised an increasing percentage of capital outflows, moving to 23 percent in 1989 and 40 percent in 1990. By 1989, Japan became the world's largest supplier of FDI on an annual flow basis, with FDI increasing five-fold to 48 billion between 1985 and 1990.³⁸ The distribution of FDI by country/region and economic sector becomes important when analyzing the economic-security linkage. Of significance was the rising percentage of FDI being directed to the US and the EC in the 1980-1988 period. (Table 6)

This emphasis may be attributed to the targeting of financially safe and politically stable economies, and a reaction to growing trade tensions between Japan and each of these sub-systems. However, the absolute value of FDI to ASEAN, the NICs and China increased significantly from the 1985 position with Japan emerging as a major investor in East Asia. While the primary focus of this latter investment has been the more industrialized regional

states, FDI in the developing countries has picked up since the mid-1980s.³⁹

The sectors towards which FDI was directed indicates a decline with respect to manufacturing and primary products throughout the period 1951 to 1988 and an increasing trend towards finance, services and real estate.⁴⁰ Notwithstanding this new focus, FDI effected a new pattern of extensive overseas production, rising from two percent of total Japanese production in the early 1980s towards 10 percent by the end of the decade.⁴¹

The overall effect of overseas investment has been the accumulation of nearly \$400 billion in international assets since 1985 alone, with Japan having made the transition from a trading giant in the 1970s to a financial giant in the late-1980s. However, investment imbalances have exacerbated the problems associated with trading imbalances.⁴² Like export surpluses, Japan's finance position has increasingly politicized her economic relationship on a global scale in addition to the regional context. Moreover, the absolute scale of overseas investment made Japan a critical actor in the maintenance of the global economy and has raised Japan's profile and her vulnerability at both the international and unit level.

Japan's integration into the global economic system on an institutional basis was led by the US being instrumental in securing Japan's admission to the IMF (1952), the World Bank (1955), and the OECD (1964). However, Japan remained fundamentally reactive within these organizations, resisting pressure to accept an expanded role in international economic affairs. Notwithstanding this orientation, increasing pressures from a broad consensus of the major economic actors has been progressively imposed upon Japan to effect greater activism. Moreover, the politico-strategic linkages which exist within the global economy and are inherent in its institutions have created pressures of their own in the security dimension.

PRESSURES FOR SECURITY POLICY REALIGNMENT

From a national security perspective, positive gains were accrued by other states becoming economically dependent upon Japan, and, the greater the dependency, the greater was Japan's national security.⁴³ However, security liabilities were also generated by reason of economic success. Japanese national self-interest respecting global, regional and individual state stability underlay the requirement to enhance the general economic environment, and to 'protect' Japan's foreign investment, trade and resource supplies. Interdependence and integration presented a much broader stake in political stability than that envisaged when Japan's primary goal was domestic economic reconstruction and when the primary form of Japan's international economic relationship was exports.⁴⁴ Political stability as it relates to security policy has two dimensions - politico-strategic and the domestic stability of economic partners.

The politico-strategic factor concerns the interaction of states with reference to conflict or the absence thereof. In the global sense, the continued maintenance of the strategic balance, or US military supremacy, was essential to the security of Japan's overseas investments and trade, which primarily resided in the Western industrialized world and in other areas of US strategic interest. This created pressures that Japan's security policy to be increasingly complementary to that of the US to both bolster the West's strategic position and to accommodate and enhance economic ties. The West-Japan security axis also spilled over into the regional context by virtue of superpower competition existing in Asia-Pacific, regardless of detente in Europe. Similarly, tensions in other regions were salient in this respect, primarily Afghanistan in the context of East-West confrontation and the Middle East in terms of general system instability.

While it is difficult to differentiate global and regional security issues in what was

essentially a bipolar global strategic system, the degree of multipolarity in East Asia precipitated its own politico-strategic dynamics. The web of US bilateral security treaties, the 'special' US-Japan security and economic relationship, and Japan's growing economic integration and interdependence in East Asia established regionally focused economic-security linkages. The instability on the Korean Peninsula, the direct and proxy USSR-PRC confrontation, and fears of an expansionary Vietnam all served to make more vulnerable Japan's significant investment in East Asia. Perceptions of US withdrawal from the area in the 1970s heightened Japan's sense of vulnerability with respect to her own security and that of her economic partners, who themselves perceived the incipient creation of a power vacuum vulnerable to exploitation by Soviet and other Communist regimes.

The domestic stability of economic partners may be considered an exclusively regional problem. Vulnerabilities due to potential inter-state conflict were exacerbated by the fear of communist incursion at the political level, and the fear of domestic regime instability as a result of political and social evolution and revolution. Although Japan's investment in the region gradually diminished as a percentage of total trade and capital flows, considerable assets were built up as economic interdependence and integration proceeded. As noted by Morrison, the ASEAN states, by reason of their own perceptions of strategic and domestic vulnerabilities, sought to diversify their foreign relations and view Japan as a potential source of economic and political support.⁴⁵ The Fukuda Doctrine of 1977 may be interpreted as the early response to this requirement. Although still hesitant about a militarily strengthened Japan, ASEAN actively pressured Japan to bolster their security by non-military means. The same forces were generated in Northeast Asia to a lesser extent, with economic support being the most acceptable form of bolstering.

Overall, a 'virtuous circle' of economic ties-security-economic ties was established.

This fostered an ASEAN-Japan political relationship, in addition to Tokyo's bolstering of incumbent regimes by aiding their economic growth and by providing a successful model of development based upon non-communist economic strategies.⁴⁶ Increased diplomatic support for ASEAN on regional security issues has been evidenced in the aftermath of Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia and contemporary involvement in UN-sponsored attempts to effect a political settlement in Cambodia. Moreover, Japan's geo-strategic position and its ability to control the straits of the Japanese archipelago was viewed as a means to help insulate Southeast Asia from any conflict which erupted in the North Pacific, by controlling the egress of the Soviet Pacific Fleet from the Sea of Japan.⁴⁷

Southeast Asia, in turn, is geo-strategically vital to Japan's economic security as Malaysia and the Indonesian archipelago sit astride a series of narrow, easily controlled straits, which are essential to Japan's vital sea-borne trade (Chart 1). For example, of the some 150 ships transiting the Strait of Malacca each day, 44 percent of those over 30,000 tons are Japanese.⁴⁸ The Southeast Asian sea routes represent a savings of 3,000 nautical miles for shipping originating in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. The security of these straits is a function of the internal and external security of the riparian states; and, as trade and shipping increase so does the importance of stability in the sub-region.

The importation of oil provides example of dependence and vulnerability, with approximately 99.7 percent of requirements being imported and 83 percent of that total originating in the Middle East. Only tankers of less than 200,000 tons can use the Malaccan Straits which offer the shortest route, and very large crude carriers find their most suitable route through the Lombok Strait which adds some 1000 miles and three days to the journey (Chart 2)⁴⁹ In addition to the archipelago problem, tankers must first transit the waters of the Middle East and subsequently the Indian Ocean, thereby bringing these areas within the

security interests of Japan. The disruptions caused by the various Middle East crises, and most particularly the Iran-Iraq war and subsequent Gulf War, highlighted Japan's vulnerabilities with respect to the SLOCs in general.

Japan's increased volume of seaborne trade within Asia-Pacific, particularly that with Australia and the Americas for raw resources, and the United States for manufactures, extended the vulnerability of all the SLOCs serving the Japanese Islands. This was recognized by Prime Minister Suzuki in his controversial 1981 declaration that Japan would contribute to the defence of the SLOCs out to a distance of 1000 miles from Japan, a policy statement that was re-affirmed by Prime Minister Nakasone in the 1980s.

Japan's widespread economic interests and their vulnerabilities are well-recognized by her economic partners who have been applying increasing pressure for Japan to assume greater security burden-sharing on a global and regional basis. Essentially, Japan's economic success and low security profile have elicited charges of Japan 'free-riding' within a security structure financed by others. As economic development has progressed so has the application of pressure, first from the US and subsequently from her global and regional partners. Although US pressure had been initially applied as early as the formation of the JSDF, it was to be the 1970s and beyond that significant efforts were made to force Japan into large-scale re-militarization.

Significantly, it was during the rapid economic development of the 1970s that Japan's politically-imposed ceiling of one percent of GNP for defence spending was effected. US reaction was then focused to pressure Tokyo to increase this percentage, although budgetary emphasis was not accompanied by rationale on how additional funding should be allocated.³⁰ While the Reagan administration took a new tack by emphasizing a division of roles and missions *vis-a-vis* US and Japanese forces, budgetary pressures remained. Additionally, the

linkage between Japan's economic performance and her low profile in the 'common' global security effort was increasingly being tied to the US-Japan economic relationship with threats of economic retaliation being made if Japan would not play a more positive role in specific areas.⁵¹ While most US pressure was applied to cause Japan to play a more substantial role in her own defence, parallel pressure was applied within the framework of President Nixon's 'Guam Doctrine' to expand Japan's military capability in support of regional defence. This US initiative also included the suggestion that Japan be responsible for the SLOC's to the Indonesian Peninsula, and more recently beyond into the Indian Ocean - a suggestion resisted by both Japan and the East Asian states.

Although the 'one percent' defence spending ceiling was broken in 1987, military spending remained much less than expected by the US, causing continuous Executive and Congressional criticism that US-Japan Security Treaty obligations were not being met. It is to be noted that the US was not the only Western state to level criticism at Japan with respect to her lack of capability to assume regional security responsibilities. When the European states in the 1980s, perceived that US security capabilities were being overstretched globally, they attempted to have Japan relieve the US of some of its East Asian burdens so that the US might better respond to European and Middle East contingencies.

Not all US alliance partners demanded a similar response from Japan. Demands by Japan's regional economic partners for increased security spending commensurate with her economic position were oriented towards non-military means in view of Japan's history of militarism in the region. The desired means were first for Japan to become a political actor in maintaining the balance of power in the region, as expressed by the ASEAN leaders who increasingly visited Tokyo after the US withdrawal from Vietnam.⁵² Second, Japan was expected to provide both ODA and FDI to foster economic growth and domestic political

stability. This latter expectation was shared by the US and members of the OECD who were demanding in the 1970s that Japan give more official ODA in view of her economic power.⁵³ While aid and investment created their own economic tensions, more was generally desired, but on ASEAN terms. This pattern was equally applicable to the NICs and the PRC, although the former were principally targets for investment rather than ODA, while the PRC requested both.

The 1991 Gulf War was perhaps the final stimulus in welding the economic-security linkage, regardless of Japan's long-standing efforts to maintain the separation of international economics and politics. Japan initially came under intense pressure to support fully all the UN resolutions formed to resolve the crisis, then to provide in-theatre support for the UN-sponsored conflict. Cooperation with the international community with respect to the resolutions was generally satisfactory; however, when the decision to wage war was made, Japan's retrenchment into strategic isolationism was effected, with no in-theatre military or logistical support being provided the Coalition Forces. Moreover, financial support for the war effort was marred by an initial offer that was considered to be 'too little-too late' by the US Congress, and the final contribution of more than \$13 billion was made only after great pressure by the United States.⁵⁴ Notwithstanding providing the largest financial contribution from any state outside of the Gulf area, international criticism of Japan's contribution continued on the basis that Japan had the obligation to respond to international security crises with a military component, in addition to financing operations. Essentially, Japan was being pressured to conform more closely to the traditional linkage of economic and military power.

CONCLUSION

The growth of Japan's economy and relative strength has generated the politico-strategic ties, which run counter to the Yoshida doctrine of maintaining the separation of international politics and economic development. Moreover, international economic interdependence and integration forced Japan to become sensitive to regional and global security issues that had the potential to threaten the political stability necessary for the security of Japan's markets, sources of raw materials and manufactures, and overseas financial investment. Associated with these concerns was the additional problem of the security of seaborne transportation, vital to the movement of Japan's extensive trade.

The magnitude of economic success also generated demands by external actors, first the United States then the Western allies, that Japan assume a greater burden with respect to defending the Japanese archipelago. As economic development progressed, similar pressures were applied respecting regional and global security. Essentially, these external actors attempted to coerce Japan into effecting a more 'traditional' congruence between economic and military capability, and into adopting a national security policy having horizons beyond the immediate defence of Japan. By the 1990s, Japan's Western economic partners made it abundantly clear that Japan's contribution to global and regional peace and security must extend beyond the economic dimension and include military participation. On the other hand, the great majority of regional actors viewed with alarm the possibility that Japan's military capabilities might indeed match its economic strength. For these latter actors, Japan's growing economic power led to demands that Tokyo foster regional peace and stability by means of FDI, ODA, and by diplomatic support when appropriate.

NOTES

1. See Shigeru Yoshida, *The Yoshida Memoirs*, translated by Kenichi Yoshida (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962) 279-283 for Prime Minister Yoshida's account of the state of the Japanese economy in the immediate post-war years.

2. Loc cit., and Martin E. Weinstein, *Japan's Postwar Defence Policy, 1947-1968* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971) 13.

3. Chalmers Johnson, "MITI and Japanese International Economic Policy", in Robert A. Scalapino, ed. *The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977) 264.

4. Martin E. Weinstein, op. cit., 13.

5. Mikiso Hane, *Modern Japan*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986) 348.

6. Martin E. Weinstein, op. cit.: 35-36.

7. Ibid. 14.

8. J.W.M. Chapman, et al., eds., *Japan's Quest for Comprehensive Security* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1982) 145.

9. Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982) 199-200 and 227.

10. Gary R. Saxonhouse, "The World Economy and Japanese Foreign Economic Policy", in Robert A. Scalapino, op. cit. 284-285.

11. Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle*: 238-239.

12. Karel van Wolferen, *The Enigma of Japanese Power* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989) 352. Also see Ibid. 239-241 for a comprehensive description of the institutions of high speed growth.

13. Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle*. 49-50.

14. See Karel von Wolferen, op. cit. 353-357 for comment on the strength of the Keidanren as a coordinating and control agency, and its interaction with the government.

15. Shumpei Kuroon and Akihiko Tanaka, "From Prestige to Wealth and Knowledge", in Takashi Inoguchi and Daniel I. Okimoto eds., *The Political Economy of Japan, Vol. 2* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988) 79.

16. William R. Nestor, *Japan's Growing Power Over East Asia and the World Economy: Ends and Means* (London: MacMillan Press, 1990) 10.

17. Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle*: 10-34 passim
18. Loc. cit.
19. Reinhard Drifte, *Japan's Foreign Policy* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1990) 65-67.
20. J.W.M. Chapman, et al., eds., op. cit.: 148, and James William Morley ed., *Security Interdependence in the Asia Pacific Region*, (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1986) 14-15
21. J.W.M. Chapman, et al., eds., op. cit.: 148-149.
22. Reinhard Drifte, op. cit.: 63.
23. Ibid: 65-67.
24. See I.M. Destler and Michael Nacht, "Beyond Mutual Recrimination: Building a Solid US-Japan Relationship in the 1990s", in *International Security* Vol.15, No 3, 1990/91: 100-102 concerning technology transfer.
25. Charles E. Morrison, "Japan and the ASEAN Countries", in Takashi Inoguchi and Daniel I. Okimoto eds., op. cit.: 428.
26. Loc. cit.
27. Ibid: 429.
28. Reinhard Drifte, op. cit.: 94.
29. Loc. cit.
30. Ibid: 80 and 98. Japan-PRC trade in 1989 comprised 3.1 percent of Japan's exports and 5.3 percent of imports.
31. See Japan, *White Paper on International Trade, Japan 1992* (Tokyo: JETRO, 1992): 28-29 which develops a series of interdependence coefficients in terms of trade exchanges.
32. See Japan, *Economic Outlook Japan 1990* (Tokyo: Economic Planning Agency, 1990): 25 for trends in energy consumption and dependence on oil.
33. See Japan, *White Paper on International Trade Japan 1991* (Tokyo: JETRO, 1991): 23 for the trends in product and petroleum imports 1981-1990.
34. Richard Ellingworth, *Japanese Economic Policies and Security, Adelphi Paper No 90*, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1972): 27. Japan's financial growth was second only to that of West Germany by 1971 and continued to accelerate.

35. Kent E. Calder, "Japan in 1990. Limits to Change" in *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXI, No. 1 (1991) 21

36. Michael W. Donnelly, "Japanese-American Relations: The Costs of Brinkmanship" in *International Journal*, Vol. XLVI, No. 4 (1991): 626.

37. Reinhard Drifte, *op. cit.*: 66; and, Kent E. Calder, *op. cit.*: 21.

38. Mitsuru Taniuchi, *Foreign Direct Investment in the Asia Pacific Region* (Tokyo: Japan Centre for Economic Research, 1992) 2 and 16.

39. Mitsuru Taniuchi, *op. cit.*: 4.

40. *Loc. cit.*

41. Kent E. Calder, "Domestic Constraints and Japan's Foreign Economic Policy of the 1990s", in *International Journal*, Vol. XLVI, No. 4 (1991): 609.

42. Reinhard Drifte, *op. cit.*: 67.

43. William R. Nestor, *op. cit.*: 199.

44. Kent E. Calder, "Domestic Constraints and Japan's Foreign Economic Policy of the 1990s": 609.

45. Charles E. Morrison, *op. cit.*: 418-419.

46. Charles E. Morrison, "Japan's Politico-Security Roles in Southeast Asia", in Dora Alves, ed., *Pacific Security Toward the Year 2000* (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1988) 116.

47. *Ibid.*: 116-117

48. Sheldon Simon, *The Future of Asian-Pacific Security Collaboration* (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1988) 62.

49. Richard Ellingworth, *op. cit.*: 18-19.

50. Michael Nacht, "From Competitive Allies to Potential Adversaries: US-Japan Security Relationship", in Dora Alves, ed., *Change, Interdependence and Security in the Pacific Basin*, (Washington: National Defence University Press, 1991) 89. Care must be taken when comparing or observing upon defence budgets in terms of percent/GNP since expenditures may be variously defined on a national basis. See for example, *The Military Balance 1991-1992* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1991) 9 and *Defense of Japan 1992* (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 1992) 103-107 for the respective NATO and Japanese definitions of defence expenditures

51. Ian H. Nish, "The United States in East Asia: Japan's Perspective", in Michael Leifer, ed., *The Balance of Power in East Asia*, (London: The MacMillan Press, 1986) 35

52. Masashi Nishihara, op. cit., 75.

53. Ibid., 71

54. Kent E. Calder, "Japan in 1990: Limits to Change", op. cit., 31-32

CHAPTER FOUR

DOMESTIC IMPERATIVES AND CONSTRAINTS

INTRODUCTION

Throughout the period in question, there is significant evidence that Japan's response to its external environment has been influenced by domestic factors in a manner and to a degree that is unique in modern industrialized democracies.¹ To explain Japan's national security behaviour with respect to domestic factors, an understanding of the policy-making process is essential as it is within this process that salient domestic factors come to bear.

When attempting to characterize the nature of policy-making it is tempting to use one of the established paradigms of comparative politics and arrive at the conclusion that the elitist, pluralist or statist model is *most* descriptive. Such an approach with respect to Japan usually results in the unsatisfactory assertion that Japan is simply a system of bureaucratic rule as posited by Chalmers Johnson, or rule by a conservative coalition as advanced by T.J. Pempel.² The paradigm approach suffers from three major limitations. First, the use of such models proceeds from the assumption that the subject state's political system functions in the same manner as those from which the paradigm has been derived.³ The validity of this assumption is questionable with respect to Japan whose political system, in terms of institutional interrelationships and political culture, functions differently from the Western models of parliamentary democracy. Second, the use of narrow paradigms tends to forestall the identification of that which may be unique within a system. Last, the use of a single paradigm often results in the compulsion to describe the character of the decision-making

process in terms of only that paradigm, at the expense of being descriptive of its full character.

Okimoto observes that, in the case of Japan, the fit between any one of the paradigms and reality is far from perfect, and that one must break out from their constraints to understand the seeming inconsistencies in policy behaviour.⁴ Inoguchi, for example, achieves this in his analysis of Japan's foreign policy, concluding that 'bureaucratically-led, mass inclusionary pluralism' is most descriptive of the Japanese political system.⁵ Therefore, it is more productive to dispense with the single paradigm approach, and to explore more broadly the institutions, structures, actors and processes which are integral to the formation of security policy. Additionally, the *de jure* and *de facto* decision-making process will be differentiated where necessary to identify that which is unique within the Japanese system.

The analysis of the decision-making process will proceed by first addressing the nature of the state to identify the political culture, which defines the state-society relationship and the political system, and to define the constitutional underpinnings of security policy formulation. Second, the institutional structure will be explored to identify the imperatives and constraints within the decision-making process. Last, the reality of security policy formulation will be addressed to establish the role and salience of actors, their interrelationships, and the general orientation of the national security system.

THE NATURE OF THE STATE

The contemporary Japanese state is a liberal democracy whose genesis is found in political development during the decades following the Meiji Constitution of 1889 that was conferred upon the Japanese people by the political elite and legitimized by Imperial sanction. However, the fragility of both liberalism and democracy became apparent in the 1930s with

the ascendancy of extreme nationalism and militarism, resulting in government by militarist-dominated Cabinet fiat. Like the Meiji Constitution, the post-war Constitution of 1947 was a 'gift' to the Japanese nation from the ruling elite, in this latter case from the US-dominated SCAP.⁶ Thus the postwar version of Japanese democracy involves a balance between the highly democratic values and institutions reflected in the US-directed Constitution and Japanese values and political practices that have persisted throughout the postwar era.⁷

There remains debate as to the fragility and maturity of contemporary Japanese liberal democracy. However, the consistent striving of the dominant LDP to maintain legitimacy through the electoral system, increasing pluralism, and the continued viability of opposition parties are indicative of well-entrenched democratic principles in Japanese politics. Moreover, the Japanese people strongly support the system of parliamentary democracy, which is viewed as the antithesis of the prewar authoritarian militarism that resulted in the defeat of the nation and economic deprivation.⁸ Also remembered by members of the opposition parties in particular, was the severe suppression of both left-wing and liberal political beliefs under the prewar regime.⁹

Commitment to democracy is not particularly founded in deep ideological conviction, such as that which divided the Cold War protagonists. This is consistent with the observations that the Japanese nation has not been noted for strong ideological proclivities and that revolutionary ideologies have never had a *significant* popular appeal in Japan.¹⁰ For example, the ideological component of the left-wing opposition parties has greatly diminished over the decades following the Occupation. Where ideological distinctions were maintained, popular support was lost as voters sought to maximize their gain in the distribution of political and material goods within the existing system. In keeping with this characterization, it has been suggested that the growing popular support for the JDSP has been the result of the

diminishment of ideological distinction in the first instance, and, that support is given to the opposition parties to prevent the LDP from gaining sufficient parliamentary strength to amend the Constitution and alter the existing parliamentary system.¹¹

Also present, is a strong relationship between the state and society, with both oriented to the achievement of collective goals including national security. However, given the particularism within Japanese society and the concomitant difficulty in achieving consensus among competing interests, the state's role and basis of its legitimacy is the achievement of harmony by forging the necessary consensus on collective interests and national goals.¹² This has required not only a value system common to both state and society, but also a strong linkage between the government in power, the institutions of the state, and a broad range of the segments of society which represent definable interests. Legitimacy is maintained by first achieving broad consensus on national goals, then by performance in their achievement, with party and electoral systems institutions holding state and society together.¹³

The consensus-building imperative at the national level permeates the entire political culture and is integral to all levels of decision-making in the state, government and private institutions. However, the point must be made that consensual decision making pertains primarily to horizontal relationships among equals, and that vertical dissensus is encouraged thereby promoting debate while maintaining harmony and cohesion.¹⁴ The state, being at the peak of decision-making with respect to national goals and objectives not only acts to achieve consensus, but effects a close working relationship with all segments of society to maintain cooperation and compliance.¹⁵ This has resulted in state power permeating those segments of society relevant to particular issue areas and the government maintaining close political ties with the relevant private interests.

In terms of policy-making, the process of consensual decision making has encouraged

conformity in thought and behaviour, has fostered a lack of bold innovation, and has encouraged incrementalism and a slow decision-making process. Furthermore, if consensus and commitment are achieved, general unanimity can be expected to produce the single-minded pursuit of the declared societal goal at the expense of other legitimate interests for which sufficient consensus has not yet been achieved. Lack of action, on the other hand, may be attributed to efforts to maintain legitimacy by not overtly utilizing the intrinsic power of state institutions and by not imposing the 'tyranny of the majority' in the political arena.

The degree of pluralism attributed to Japanese democracy and alluded to in the consensual approach varies widely, depending on the analytic framework being used to address issue areas. Chalmers Johnson's analysis of Japan's political economy notes little pluralism outside of the bureaucratic elite or beyond the relationships among the bureaucracy, LDP, and the business community. Hellmann also contends that the elitist and statist elements of Japan's political tradition are still sufficiently strong to mute widespread pluralism in the formation of foreign policy.¹⁶ However, the electoral system and its grass-roots approach supports pluralism, with the primary concern of government being a consensus between state and society, and that of the ruling party being consensus with the electorate.¹⁷ The strength of this democratic component is perceived by the political elite as being such that an open break with public opinion on issues critical to the electorate would risk the downfall of the government.¹⁸

Policy flexibility is thus dependent upon the electorate's definition of the subject issue, and the government is constrained to act within the boundaries so defined. With respect to security policy, this first indicates that the government must acknowledge the relevant values held by society. Second, it must carefully evaluate the political salience of issues associated with each component of national security prior to formulating policy changes. Last, it must

continually gauge reaction to the implementation of declared policy. These constraints indicate that security policy can well represent more of a political compromise than a rational response to the external environment.¹⁹ While foreign policy in and of itself has elicited little public interest in postwar Japanese society, those aspects which impinge on the societal values of so called *pacifism* and *anti-militarism* have been classed by society as dramatic and far-reaching. Thus those issues falling under the rubric of national security, including defence, tend to be highly politicized.

The efficacy of opposition parties, informed opinion, the media and other actors external to the governing elite constitutes a second dimension of pluralism. Calder is persuasive in arguing that Japanese conservative policy-makers have not consistently dominated either the definition of issues or the formulation of policy.²⁰ The importance of crisis or critical issues is emphasized as the dominant situation in which pluralism is operative as the Government seeks political stability, with diverse interests external to the governing party and the bureaucracy being represented in the decision-making process.²¹ The identity and efficacy of extra-governmental actors with reference to national security will be explored when the decision-making process is addressed.

The political structure within Japan has been dominated by the LDP which has governed continuously since its foundation in 1955. Its formation from the two main postwar conservative parties, in reaction to a short-lived socialist coalition, has effectively given the LDP its enduring conservative character. Support for the LDP has been consistently underwritten by big business, industry and agrarian interests which were instrumental in its original founding, forming what Tsurutani and Pempel term the *Conservative Coalition*.²² Both commentators extend this coalition to encompass Japanese society in general, noting that it has traditionally been conservative and has been united with the postwar government in the

common desire to pursue "economic recovery, growth and prosperity with uncritical mass devotion and national unity".²³

Regardless of this expression of unity in national purpose, the LDP has retained its character as a coalition in that it remains composed of competing factions, preventing it from operating as an entity internally and from publicly presenting a single position on all issues. However, sufficient cohesion is maintained within the broad boundaries that comprise the policy options necessary to retain electoral support. In terms of national security, the extremes of support for a powerful military and full participation in global and regional with necessary constitutional amendment and supportive legislation have been represented in the LDP, but were subdued. Accepted policy has been commitment to the maintenance of the SDF at a moderate level of defensive capability, with close ties to the United States and other Western powers.²⁴ The expansion of military capabilities, or of politico-strategic horizons has been viewed as a major policy shift, precipitating dissensus within the party.

The opposition parties, since 1955, have never had the collective strength to defeat the LDP in the House of Representatives, and only recently have they won a temporary majority in the House of Counsellors. With ideologies ranging from the leftist politics of the JCP and the JSP, to the more centrist orientation of the DSP and the Komeito the opposition parties have most often lacked a common position on major issues. Consequently, they have tended to compete more intensely among themselves than to cooperate in challenging the LDP.²⁵ These divisions have been particularly intense with respect to national security issues concerning the status of the SDF and politico-strategic orientation. However, over the postwar era, all major opposition parties have moved to support the existence of the SDF in some form and to adopt more pragmatic national security positions.

It is to be noted that the public opinion mobilized by or supporting the opposition

parties on national security issues has not been translated into electoral successes. The 1960 political crisis surrounding the signing of the MST was immediately followed by a decisive LDP electoral victory. Similarly, the PKO Bill debates of 1991-92, which constituted a major policy shift, and generated wide-spread public dissension were followed by a LDP victory as it regained a majority in the Upper House of the Diet.

INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE

The Japanese system of democratic government presents no significant structural impediments to rational and expeditious security decision-making, with the exception of Article IX of the *Peace Constitution* which states:

"Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized ~²⁶

Three schools of thought have existed with respect to the national security implications of the *Peace Article*. The first, based upon a literal interpretation, asserted that any military capability including the SDF or any cooperation with foreign military forces was illegal. This was the view of the left-wing parties and an influential minority primarily composed of intellectuals and segments of the media, but not necessarily that of the majority of the Japanese people. This view persisted regardless of a 1959 ruling by the Supreme Court of Japan that Article IX:

"...does not in any way deny the inherent right of self defence which our country has as a sovereign state, and the pacifism of our country's Constitution definitely does not prescribe non-defence and non resistance. That our country can take measures for self-defence necessary for the maintenance of our country's peace and security and for ensuring its survival must be said to be natural, as the exercising of the functions inherent to a State ~"

The second school of thought, minimizing the reality of the Supreme Court judgement and the existence of the SDF, asserted that the Constitution precluded an expansion of security roles, such as participation in collective security arrangements, the overseas dispatch of the SDF, and participation in UN peacekeeping operations. This argument also noted the lack of constitutional framework for the SDF that ensured that security policy would be tied to the domestic political climate.²⁸ The third major argument was that Article IX had become a *dead letter* with the formation of the SDF, but that the Constitution served as a point of reference or justification for maintaining the *status quo*.²⁹

To place article IX in proper perspective with respect to the Japanese polity, it must be noted that its origins were not founded in a Japanese initiative, either as an act of contrition or in a dramatic conversion to pacifism, but rather in direction issued by SCAP. In response to an unacceptable draft of a revised constitution authored by the Matsumoto Committee, General MacArthur instructed the Japanese Government that he required three major principles to be incorporated in the new Japanese Constitution, one of which was,

"War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. Japan renounces it as an instrumentality for settling its disputes and even for preserving its own security. It relies upon the higher ideals which are now stirring in the world for its defense and protection. No Japanese Army, Navy or Air Force will ever be authorized and no rights of belligerency will ever be conferred upon any Japanese force."³⁰

The US interpretation of the *de facto* and *de jure* effect of Article IX was that the threat of belligerency as an instrument of diplomacy was discarded, the power and influence of the military establishment would be destroyed, and that it comprised a pledge of good faith to the world that Japan would adopt peaceful methods of dispute resolution.³¹

Yoshida Shigeru, first Foreign Minister then Prime Minister throughout the period leading to the adoption of the new Constitution, observed that "the revision of the Meiji Constitution was perhaps the most important single reform undertaken after the termination of

the Pacific War."¹² Yoshida acknowledged that it was most probably MacArthur who proposed the article concerned with the renunciation of war, and that the final draft of the Japanese version of the Constitution was necessarily based on the model provided by SCAP. Next to the definition of the Emperor as the symbol of the State, Yoshida reported that Article IX was the most discussed point, politically and publicly. Yoshida does not observe further on the domestic debate regarding Article IX other than to state his own conviction that it was necessary to dispel the Allied view that Japan was a militaristic nation, and that it need not be amended given national expenditure burdens and the contemporary (1962) international situation. He did, however, allude to the question of differentiating between wars of self defence and the fundamental right to defend one's country, with the latter right being implicitly retained by Japan.

Regardless of the rationale advanced with respect to the force and effect of Article IX, the Constitution significantly influenced Japanese attitudes and policies throughout the period, and forestalled other than incremental changes to security policy.¹³ The *prima facie* orientation of Article IX continued to support anti-militarism within the domestic political arena, and provided an anchor for the growth of pacifism as an acceptable societal value. Taketsugu Tsurutani has argued that historical and cultural traditions, geography and long periods of isolationism constitute the underlying causes of anti-militarism and pacifism, being the dominant societal values with respect to security policy, causing Japan to be both introspective and isolationist in the contemporary era.¹⁴ However, the weight of evidence is that contemporary expression of these values and continued support for the 1947 Constitution find their genesis in the experience of life under military rule in the 1930s and 1940s, and in the Pacific War and consequent defeat.¹⁵

Opposition to any significant expansion of Japan's military capability and role has

2

PM-1 3 1/2" x 4" PHOTOGRAPHIC MICROCOPY TARGET
NBS 1010a ANSI/ISO #2 EQUIVALENT

therefore, been directed at preventing a resurgence of militarism and avoiding international obligations that could lead to war.³⁶ One might also reflect upon Yoshida's comment that Japan could not afford the financial burden of a politico-strategic role in the world, and that expressions of pacifism support Japan's post-war choice to focus on economic recovery. Moreover, Article IX has been useful to the Government as the excuse to avoid dangerous and embarrassing international entanglements, and, as such, has become a symbol for resisting foreign pressures.³⁷

Institutionally, power is formally concentrated in the Prime-Minister who presides over all three branches of government, and who, with his Cabinet, is charged with the management of domestic and foreign affairs. In addition to having primacy in decision-making with respect to foreign policy decisions, the Prime-Minister is the Commander-in-Chief of the SDF and the pivotal official in all matters of defence.³⁸ The convergence of foreign policy affairs and defence in this office makes the Prime Minister the *de jure* locus of power for national security decision-making. However, the primacy of the Prime Minister and Cabinet remains effective only to the extent that he and his Cabinet retain a working majority in the Diet, and most importantly, in the House of Representatives. Control of the Diet is indispensable in that it is "the highest organ of State power ...and...the sole law-making organ of the State, approving treaties between Japan and foreign governments and passing legislation required to support international obligations."³⁹

Support is provided the government by a bureaucracy that is not a monolithic hierarchy as implied by the statist paradigm. Rather, the Japanese bureaucracy is a series of overlapping hierarchies, each having exclusive and shared areas of competence. Being so, it is an area of conflict and competing interests in which power is diffuse and the coordination of policy across ministries difficult.⁴⁰ Power which accrues to the bureaucracy results from its

essentially conservative character and national vision that parallels that of the ruling party, the political stability provided by the LDP that has made it possible for the bureaucracy to engage in long-term planning, and the personal associations and channels of consensus between LDP, bureaucratic and corporate elites.⁴¹ This power is further enhanced by the increasing complexities of national administration and the short, one-year tenure of Ministers that forestalls effective ministerial leadership.

This is not to imply that policy-making rests exclusively within an insulated bureaucracy. The Government retains its electoral support only as long as the bureaucracy is responsive to the political and material demands of society. Moreover, when issues and policies become highly politicized the bureaucracy defers to the political leadership. In the latter event, the ministerial role is that of coordination between the Party and the bureaucracy, and consensus seeking within the Cabinet. Fukui addresses the differentiation, in the MOFA example, between routine, non-controversial situations where discussions and consultations are generally contained within the bureaucracy's well-defined channels, and those of a more political or controversial nature where politicians and others extensively intervene in an often confused and arbitrary manner.⁴² In either situation, he emphasizes that decisions tend to evolve rather than be taken.

Bureaucratic support to security policy-makers includes, among others, the MOFA which has competence with respect to foreign relations, and the JDA which controls the instruments of defence policy and is organized to maintain civilian control of the military establishment.⁴³ Given the broad scope of national security, the MOF is an integral participant, with its control over the national budget and its influence respecting domestic and international economic policy. Similarly, MITI has an important voice given its competence regarding the continued well-being of the Japanese economy. Diffuse ministerial competence

becomes more onerous for the MOFA and JDA, as the lead bureaucracies for national security, in that influence within the bureaucracy is hierarchical with MOF and MITI being at the top and MOFA and JDA being at the bottom.⁴⁴ With the Japanese bureaucracy being an arena of conflict and competing interests, and with ministerial objectives and security orientations being divergent on critical issues, national security policy has tended to be fragmented and a compromise among the various ministries.⁴⁵

National security decision-making also has benefit of specialized fora to address relevant issues. The primary state forum of the National Defence Council is chaired by the Prime Minister with the Foreign Minister, Finance Minister, Director-General of the JDA, the Director-General of the Economic Planning Agency, and other Ministers and officials invited by the Prime Minister.⁴⁶ Additionally, the Diet Comprehensive Security Parliamentarians Consultative Council, having representatives from Komeito, the DSP, the now defunct New Liberal Club and the sponsoring LDP, provides a more pluralist, political forum for discussion of security issues by multi-party representation.⁴⁷ The establishment of the Consultative Council may be considered indicative of the growing importance of national security as a substantive political and national issue, the acceptance of this reality by an increasing number of the opposition parties, and implicit recognition by the governing LDP of the necessity to provide a mechanism with which to facilitate consensus across the political spectrum.

The LDP PARC, which is responsible to the Party Executive Council, is the party organ within which policy is formulated and all policy-relevant affairs are examined. With Cabinet Divisions organized to parallel the Diet's Standing Committees, and associated research committees being roughly parallel to the Cabinet divisions, a coherent organization has been formed to control policy. This has been enhanced by the special relationships

established with associated ministries within the bureaucracy, providing the primary avenue for advancing bureaucratic policy initiatives. Policy initiatives bubbling-up from external sources, are introduced into the PARC through the auspices of either the bureaucracy or LDP politicians.

This is then the forum in which LDP Diet members, LDP support groups, bureaucrats and various interest groups converge to negotiate policy concerns and seek consensus. As with inter-ministerial issues, if policy spans multiple areas of competence, the relevant horizontal linkages are effected to ensure that all legitimate interests are represented. Ultimately, policies approved within the PARC flow upwards to the Party's Executive Council for final approval prior to being brought to the Diet for legislative deliberation.⁴⁸ To better handle defence problems and facilitate consensus on security matters, the LDP organized, in 1980, special committees on defence whose decisions would be introduced into the appropriate forums within the PARC. These include the National Defence Divisions, the Security Affairs Research Council and the Foreign Affairs Research Council.⁴⁹

THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

The Japanese security decision-making process is essentially comprised of two tiers of which the first is primarily bureaucratic, dealing with routine, non-crisis issues.⁵⁰ However, security issues are consistently politicized thereby removing substantive policy making from the formal institutions of government and centring it in the intra-party decision-making processes of the LDP.⁵¹ This second tier provides the lens through which the *de facto* actors can be brought into perspective, and relationships identified.

Whereas the Prime Minister formally exercises control over Parliament, the bureaucracy and the Party, he is deflected from a concentrated focus on foreign and security

policy by the character of Japanese democracy and the nature of the LDP over which he presides. Because the LDP is a coalition of contending factions, the Prime Minister's tenure depends more on avoiding both inter-party and intra-party disputes than policy commitment and leadership.⁵² This presents particular problems with respect to foreign and security policy, which do not have a definable support base of electoral votes upon which to rationalize policy decisions and argue their efficacy on a political basis. The liability of factional politics is exacerbated by the political backgrounds of Prime Ministers, which have generally been devoid of security policy expertise. Thus the established norm is that the Prime Minister takes few initiatives with respect to security policy and focuses on consensus-building within the LDP.⁵³

This generalization is not to imply that the individual does not have the potential to shape security policy, as witnessed by more contemporary prime ministers attempting to gain some measure of global views, and by Prime Minister Nakasone's initiatives to formulate a more wide-ranging and dynamic security policy. However, while the individual may move towards the edge of public opinion and attempt to broaden it, the values and views within the party constitute a restraint of significance which no postwar leader has attempted to challenge overtly.⁵⁴ Therefore, regardless of predisposition to lead in foreign and security policy formulation, the Prime Minister has been constrained and there has existed little possibility of an individual style of decision-making.⁵⁵ Even in crisis situations where prime ministerial leadership is demanded, he finds little room to manoeuvre by reason of the aforementioned factional politics and electoral considerations.

It may be noted that Nakasone made in-roads in the enhancement of crisis management and coordination by reorganizing the Cabinet Secretariat in 1986, and establishing *ad hoc* commissions in an attempt to overcome Party and bureaucratic resistance

to Cabinet-generated foreign and security policy initiatives.⁵⁶ Additionally, he used his institutional position to force change in these policy areas, particularly with respect to expanding security horizons. These were contained within his grand design to reorient Japan's national purpose to a more internationalist orientation and to establish a new national consensus to replace the Yoshida Doctrine based upon the following tenets:

- "1. Japan would no longer be a follower nation.
2. Japan would be prepared for global leadership by being remade into an internationalist state.
3. A new liberal nationalism would be based on the concept of the country's national interests beyond traditional nationalism.
4. Japan would assume an active role in global strategic affairs."⁵⁷

However, Prime Minister Nakasone eventually paid a political price in pursuing these goals and initiatives were diminished in their execution. This was consistent with the experience of Prime Minister Kishi whose political demise after the signing of the 1960 MST was inevitable. Such costs to individual decision-making in situations of Party and societal dissensus have been well-recognized by successive prime ministers over the longer term, and have resulted in a general lack of policy leadership by that office.

The removal of much security policy decision-making from the formal institutions of government, as a result of the politicization of the issues, has reduced the salience of the bureaucracy. Furthermore, factionalism within the LDP and the polity has been transposed to bureaucratic agencies with respect to foreign policy in general and security policy in particular. The resultant inter-ministerial conflict has made it difficult to formulate long-term policies, which are prevalent in other issue areas such as economic development.⁵⁸ Moreover, the relative power of the MOF has been manifest in its opposition to large increases in the defence and ODA budgets as proposed by the JDA and the MOFA respectively - a position supported to varying degrees in the political parties and in the public's opposition to expansion of the JDA.⁵⁹ This has effectively conferred a significant role in security policy

formulation upon the MOF *within* the bureaucracy. Where bureaucratic dissensus cannot be resolved, consensus-building is brought back into political fora.

Holland's case study of the FY 1985 defence budget process highlights the political nature of these budgetary decisions, noting that the Ministers of Finance and Foreign Affairs, the Directors General of the JDA and the Administrative Management Agency, and the four top LDP faction leaders began negotiations after the JDA and the MOF failed to resolve their differences. With no consensus being achieved at that level, Prime Minister Nakasone was asked to decide the issue. While exercising leadership and achieving resolution, Nakasone observed the budget threshold necessary to gain public acceptance of the decision and to neutralize criticism from the media and opposition political parties.⁶⁰

Even where dissensus was not evident, bureaucratic recommendations accessed the decision-making process through the LDP PARC, within which there was a growing expertise in security policy. This has reflected the growing interest in foreign and security policy within the Party, and has been manifest in the formation of *seisaku zoku*, or *policy-tribes*, which not only establish close relationships with both the bureaucracy and special interest groups, but develop expertise in their field. As a group, the *seisaku zoku* have appeared to maximize what influence can be brought to bear on the upper echelons of the Party hierarchy, while diminishing the influence of bureaucrats by breaking their monopoly on information and expertise.⁶¹ The pluralism that the PARC accommodates is extensive but not all-inclusive, by reason of its character as a LDP organ. Those excluded by reason of political orientation must eventually be included in the legitimization of initiatives. This has been accomplished to a certain degree by virtue of debate in the appropriate Diet Committee, of policy initiatives which have survived the PARC process and have been approved by the Executive Council.

The internal structures of the Diet and its processes, have normally preclude serious

challenge to an LDP-sponsored policy. However, given the nature of Japanese politics, the LDP has been sensitive to the charge of imposing the *tyranny of the majority*; therefore, the attempt has been made to form some measure of consensus with opposition parties prior to public discussion. The modifications to policy initiatives which resulted from such consultations may be legitimately considered as part of the decision-making process and have contributed to pluralism. Moreover, this process has perhaps been more prevalent with respect to security policy than other issue areas, given its highly politicized character.

Decisions placed in the public fora of Diet committee meetings or plenary sessions have been the subject of carefully and meticulously planned debates.⁶² Where agreement was previously forged with at least some opposition parties, the conduct of negotiations ensured that the participants were accorded the appearance of not having compromised their principles or their commitment to their respective constituencies. If the issue demanded confrontation then the opposition kept faith with their support base by delaying and obstructive tactics which were ultimately countered by a LDP 'forced vote' as befits a parliamentary democracy.⁶³ This process, in addition to the aforementioned inter and intra-opposition factionalism has limited the efficacy of the opposition within the formal institutions of government. Nevertheless, they have constituted a constraint in security policy-making by having the potential to politicize security issues where there existed public sensitivity.

Acknowledging public sensitivity, the LDP and the Prime Minister's Office have not been remiss in continually taking the public's pulse by means of numerous opinion polls and surveys, as have the MOFA, the JDA and the media.⁶⁴ Thus collective opinion, can be construed as having exerted some influence upon the direction taken by security policy-makers.⁶⁵ The extent to which specific policy followed public opinion is difficult to define, and must be considered in the context of the more general observations made of the nature of

Japanese politics and the political system. Secondly, response to public opinion has not been absolute and has varied with the issue. For example, it would appear that foreign policy in the broader context is little modified by virtue of public opinion, with a disinterested and uninformed Japanese public acquiescing to that which the LDP formulates.⁶⁶ However, where foreign policy has converged with security policy the salience of public opinion has become significant.

In the absence of a clearly defined constitutional basis for national security policy, public acceptance of national security policy becomes the major criterion for the legitimization of that policy within Japan.⁶⁷ This has been reinforced by the character of the political system, the state and society, and by the nature of the LDP which harmonized policy to electoral prospects and the maintenance of political stability. These factors effectively imposed constraints upon all institutional points of the decision-making process and upon individual decision-makers. In that respect, public opinion may be considered the single most important domestic factor in the formulation of security policy, and a policy which ignores public opinion is unlikely to succeed and risks provoking a political storm and the government's downfall.⁶⁸ Significantly, public opinion on security issues has changed perceptibly throughout the 1970s and 1980s, and the linkage between its evolution and changing security policy has been convincingly established.⁶⁹

Public opinion may be considered a reflection of societal values relevant to a specific issue area, with the intensity of opinion being indicative of the depth to which the values have been internalized. In the case of national security, as previously argued, the dominant values are those of pacifism, anti-militarism, and commitment to Article IX of the 1947 Constitution. The genesis of these values and the reasons for their endurance throughout the postwar period become important in that they have been learned and retained to serve specific purposes of

society for which an informal societal consensus has formed, with concomitant policy boundaries imposed upon the state. Being so, the values are subject to modification and reinterpretation as the perceptions and goals of society evolve. This in itself has not changed the efficacy of public opinion on the decision-making process; rather, it has changed the boundaries within which security policy formulation was effected.

The public opinion polls in the post-war period as reported by Kataoka and Myers note growing support for the SDF, for incremental increases of its capability, and for expanded security horizons in terms of issues and geography.⁷⁰ These trends indicate that the societal values of pacifism, anti-militarism and interpretation of Peace Article IX have indeed been redefined by society at large. However, latent anti-militarism and pacifism still exist and cannot be ignored by policy-makers, resulting in the incremental evolution of security policy in terms of both ends and means. Regardless of incrementalism being the norm for policy change, there has existed no fundamental rationale which has limited the extent to which values are re-interpreted and security policy reoriented.

CONCLUSION

The character of Japanese liberal democracy is such that the primary concern of government is to maintain a consensus between the state and society, and that of the ruling party to maintain a consensus with the electorate. Flexibility with respect to policy issues such as national security, which is highly politicized, has, therefore, been constrained by the boundaries imposed by the electorate's definition of the relevant issues. In addressing national security, the societal values of anti-militarism and pacifism have not only characterized public opinion, but have permeated the government and the perspectives of the political and intellectual elites.

Rational national security policy-making, which might otherwise demand that these values be marginalized, have been further constrained by governmental, or organizational, factors including the Constitution, domestic politics, and the decision-making process. Article IX of the Constitution has supported anti-militarism and has provided the rationalization of public and state pacifism. Moreover, it too has subtended the politicization of security policy, thereby ensuring that policy change has been subjected to the arena of domestic politics.

Within domestic politics, intra-party factionalism has demanded consensus-seeking and compromise among competing positions and has limited the extent to which government leadership could be exercised in an expeditious and rational basis. Similarly, the necessary attempt to reach consensus within inter-party conflict has similarly limited the exercise of the 'tyranny of the majority' in an overt manner, thereby keeping security issues on the political agenda and ensuring a lengthy legislative process. On one hand, these conditions have been exacerbated by the sharp ideological cleavage between the ruling party and the major opposition party. On the other hand, the inability of the opposition parties to reach their own consensus has limited their effectiveness in forestalling policy change in the longer term.

While the organization of the state provides the requisite agencies to effect security policy formulation within its structure, policy-making has remained primarily within the party organization except where non-crisis, routine decisions are being made. This has diminished the salience of the bureaucracy, as has the growing foreign and security policy expertise within the ranks of politicians and the party organization. Moreover, the efficacy of the bureaucracy has been limited by overlapping ministerial responsibilities which have imposed the omni-present demand for lengthy consensus-building and compromises on major issues. From the perspective of the MOFA and JDA, bureaucratic long-term security planning is compromised not only by the bureaucracy's necessary sensitivity to public demands, but by

the hierarchy of ministries within which the MOF and MITI are predominant and the MOFA and JDA significantly subordinate.

Whereas the individual decision-maker in the form of the Prime Minister may be called upon to resolve bureaucratic deadlocks, he has typically done so within the aforementioned boundaries set by society and those imposed by the political culture and party politics. The latter constraint has tended to focus the Prime Minister more upon factional politics than security issues, making him the least salient of active domestic factors. This characterization of the individual in Japanese security policy-making could also be generalized respecting individuals at any level, given the diffuse nature of the policy process and the *nemawashi* system of staffing proposals and initiatives.

NOTES

1. The following references provide analyses of the unique impact of domestic factors on Japan's foreign and security policy: Richard Ellingworth, *Japanese Economic Policies and Security* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1972); Hisahiko Okazaki, "Japanese Security Policy", in *International Security*, Vol. 7, No. 2, (1988); Takashi Inoguchi, "The Ideas and Structures of Foreign Policy: Looking Ahead with Caution", in Takashi Inoguchi, and Daniel I. Okimoto, eds., *The Political Economy of Japan, Vol. 2* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988); and Mike M. Mochizuki, "Japanese Security Policy Beyond the Cold War: Domestic Politics and International Change", in M. Kahler, ed., *Beyond the Cold War in the Pacific, IGCC Studies in Conflict and Cooperation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991)

2. See Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982) 320; and T.J. Pempel, *Policy and Politics in Japan*, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1982) 307 for their respective interpretations of Japanese policy-making

3. Daniel I. Okimoto, "Political Inclusivity: The Domestic Structure of Trade" in Takashi Inoguchi and Daniel I. Okimoto, *op. cit.*: 307.

4. *Ibid*: 307-310. Okimoto's concern is the analysis of Japanese trade behaviour.

5. Takashi Inoguchi, *op. cit.*: 579.

6. United States, *The Political Reorientation of Japan* (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1949) 88-111. This report of the SCAP Government Section records the process of constitutional revision which ultimately led to the SCAP authorship of a draft constitution to be used by the Japanese government as a "guide". This draft essentially was the new Constitution Shigeru Yoshida, *The Yoshida Memoirs*, trans. Kenichi Yoshida (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1962) 132-142 acknowledges that the Japanese government made only minor changes which were approved by SCAP.

7. Donald C. Hellmann, "Japanese Politics and Foreign Policy" in Takashi Inoguchi and Daniel I. Okimoto, eds., *op. cit.*: 348.

8. Yukio Satoh, "The Evolution of Japanese Security Policy", in Robert O'Neil (ed.), *Security in East Asia*, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1984) 2

9. Wolf Mendl, "The Japanese Constitution and Japan's Security Policy", *Millennium*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1978): 41.

10. Taketsugu Tsurutani, *Political Change in Japan* (New York: David McKay Company, 1977) 39-49 and 179.

11. *Ibid*: 213.

12. Daniel I. Okimoto, *op. cit.*: 311-314.
13. T.J. Pempel, *op. cit.*: 33.
14. Taketsugu Tsurutani, *op. cit.*: 114.
15. Daniel I. Okimoto, *op. cit.*: 314.
16. Donald C. Hellmann, *op. cit.*: 352-353; and Chalmers Johnson, *op. cit.*: 51.
17. Hisahiko Okazaki, *op. cit.*: 189.
18. Wolf Mendl, *op. cit.*: 44.
19. S.K. Vogel, "The US-Japanese Relationship: Technological Rivalry and Military Alliance", in M. Kahler, ed., *Beyond the Cold War in the Pacific* (Berkeley: University of California, 1991) 20.
20. Kent E. Calder, *Crisis and Compensation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988) 471.
21. *Ibid*: 473-474.
22. Taketsugu Tsurutani, *op. cit.*: 38-41 and T.J. Pempel, *op. cit.*: 29.
23. Taketsugu Tsurutani, *op. cit.*: 42-43.
24. Stewart Menaul, "Japan's Defence Policy", *Conflict Studies*, No. 107 (1979): 5. Also see Harrison M. Holland, *Managing Defense: Japan's Dilemma* (New York: University of America Press, 1988) 46 which addresses LDP factional positions with respect to defence spending.
25. Taketsugu Tsurutani, *op. cit.*: 117.
26. All references to Japan's 1947 Constitution are taken from the official English translation contained in Hideo Tanaka, ed., *The Japanese Legal System* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1976) 3-15.
27. Stewart Menaul *op. cit.*: 7.
28. Yukio Satoh, *op. cit.*: 39-40.
29. Wolf Mendl, *op. cit.*: 44-47.
30. United States Government *op. cit.*: 102. The two other principles addressed the position of the Emperor and the superior position of the Constitution and will of the people, and the abolition of the Japanese peerage.
31. United States Government *op. cit.*: 114.

32. Shigeru Yoshida, op. cit.: 129 and 127-147 *passim*.
33. Wolf Mendl, op. cit.: 36; Hisahiko Okazaki, op. cit.: 192, and Atsushi Tokinoya, *The Japanese-US Alliance: A Japanese Perspective* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1986) 8.
34. Taketsugu Tsurutani, op. cit.: 110-113 *passim*.
35. Yukio Satoh, op. cit.: 20 and Chong W. Kim, "Korea-Japan Relations and Japan's Security", in Dora Alves ed., *Pacific Security Toward the Year 2000* (Washington: National Defense Press, 1987) 133.
36. Hisahiko Okazaki, op. cit.: 199.
37. Wolf Mendl, op. cit.: 46-47.
38. Donald C. Hellmann, op. cit.: 353; Harrison M. Holland, op. cit.: 1.
39. Hans H. Baerwald, "The Diet and Foreign Policy", in Robert A. Scalapino ed., *The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977) 39.
40. Harrison M. Holland, op. cit.: 36.
41. T.J. Pempel, op. cit.: 36; and, Taketsugu Tsurutani, *Political Change in Japan* (New York: David McKay Company, 1977) 88-93.
42. Haruhiro Fukui, "Policy-Making in the Japanese Foreign Ministry", in Robert A. Scalapino, ed., op. cit.: 22.
43. Harrison M. Holland, op. cit.: 4-6.
44. See Ibid: 42 respecting ministerial influence in the budget process, and Daniel I. Okimoto, op. cit.: 319 respecting the general ranking of ministries.
45. See Mike M. Mochizuki, op. cit.: 64-66 for a discussion on competing ministerial interests and orientations.
46. Appendix C of Harrison M. Holland op. cit.: 79-81 depicts the organization of the NDC.
47. Ibid: 10.
48. See Ibid: 9-10 for a more detailed description of the PARC organization.
49. Loc. cit.
50. Ibid: 36.

51. Donald C. Hellmann, "Japan and the United States in the 1980s: The Domestication of Foreign Policy", in Herbert J. Ellison, ed., *Japan and the Pacific Quadrille* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987) 178.

52. Taketsugu Tsurutani, *Japanese Policy and East Asian Security* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981) 3.

53. Michael Nacht, "United States-Japanese Relations", *Current History*, Vol. 87, No. 528 (1988): 151.

54. Robert A. Scalapino, "The Evolving Japanese Security Policy and the United States", in Dora Alves, ed., *Evolving Pacific Basin Strategies* (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1990) 98; and Akio Watanabe, "The End of Pax America?", in Dora Alves, ed., *Pacific Security Toward the Year 2000* (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1987) 77.

55. Donald C. Hellmann, "Japan and the United States in the 1980s: The Domestication of Foreign Policy"; and Chong W. Kim, *op. cit.*: 134.

56. Reinhard Drifte, *Japan's Foreign Policy* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1990) 17.

57. Kenneth B. Pyle, *The Japanese Question* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1992) 89.

58. Mike M. Mochizuki, *op. cit.*: 64-66; and Takashi Inoguchi, "Japan's Foreign Policy Background", in Herbert J. Ellison (ed.), *op. cit.*: 93.

59. See Larry A. Niksch, "Japanese Defense Policy: Suzuki's Shrinking Options", *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1982): 82-83 respecting JDA budget negotiations during Suzuki's tenure as Prime Minister.

60. Harrison M. Holland, *op. cit.*: 53-57.

61. *Ibid*: 9.

62. Hans H. Baerwald, *op. cit.*: 49.

63. *Ibid*: 49-50.

64. Tetsuya Kataoka and Ramon H. Myers, *Defending an Economic Superpower* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989) 41-54. It may be noted that the Prime Minister's Office has continually polled the public on security policy issues results of which may be found in the annual *Japan White Paper on Defense*.

65. Akio Watanabe, "Japanese Public Opinion and Foreign Policy", in Robert A. Scalapino, ed., *op. cit.*: 106. Also see Harrison M. Holland, *op. cit.*: 49-52 with respect to public support of one percent ceiling on defence spending and the budget process.

66. Donald C. Hellmann, "Japanese Politics and Foreign Policy": 354-355; and, Hans H Baerwald, op. cit.: 49-50.

67. Yukio Satoh, op. cit.: 20 and 50.

68. Wolf Mendel, op. cit.: 44.

69. See Tetsuya Kataoka and Ramon H. Myers, eds., op. cit.: 41-54 for a summary of polls and the media's reaction respecting significant security policy issues. Also refer to the following: Hisahiko Okazaki, op. cit.: 67; Michael Nacht, op. cit.: 152; and Mike M. Mochizuki, op. cit. 57-58.

70. Tetsuya Kataoka and Ramon H. Myers, op. cit.: 41-54.

CHAPTER FIVE

JAPAN'S EVOLVING SECURITY POLICY

INTRODUCTION

Japan's security policy has undergone a transformation during the postwar era, with four distinctive policy periods being identifiable. The first extended from Japan's re-entry into the international system in 1951 until 1972, during which Japan focused on economic development and attempted to separate economics from politics in the international arena. The second period, 1972 to 1979, was one of transition within which greater cognizance was taken of the global and regional politico-strategic environment; however, national security was still viewed primarily in economic terms without a coherent strategic policy being articulated or effected. The transformation from economic security to comprehensive security was completed from 1980 to 1989 in terms of declared policy. Notwithstanding this broadening of focus, the most definitive initiatives taken to redress the politico-strategic environment initially ended in retreats and the enhancement of means to effect policy remained incremental. It was not until the post-1989 period that policy and activism on a global scale began to be effected in terms of the end-means relationships necessary to achieve comprehensive national security.

1951-1972The Policy Environment

The first stage of security policy development extended from Japan's re-entry into the international system following the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty until approximately 1972. During these two decades Japan's emphasis on domestic affairs was unusual with internal factors having greater impact on the evolution of security policy than was the case in other industrialized states.¹ The ruling triad of government, the bureaucracy and big business focused on economic recovery through high-speed development, while acting passively to external pressures and crises.² Passivity to the external environment was accommodated by the US-Japan security regime and the associated special economic relationship, both of which were founded in the bipolar structure of the international system and accompanying Cold War, and in Japan's perception of US global and regional superiority. These systemic conditions, and Japan's geostrategic importance to the US global and regional strategy, permitted Tokyo to place reliance on the US for its protection against external threats.³

The focus on economic development and the retreat from international politics were supported by the Japanese polity, which subscribed to the societal values of pacifism and anti-militarism that had arisen from the experiences of the Pacific War and from rejection of the prewar military-dominated government whose leadership had brought first international censure, then defeat upon the Japanese nation. These values not only determined Japanese security perceptions respecting the role that Japan should play in the postwar world and within the US-Japan relationship, but became sufficiently entrenched to forestall large increases in the size and roles of the SDF.⁴ Appeal to these values and their *de jure* manifestation in Article IX of the Constitution provided the basis of politicizing national security issues within and between political parties. This further provided the rationale for government to resist

external pressures to expand Japan's security horizons and military capabilities in favour of allocating resources to economic development. The degree to which society at large subscribed to these values, as indicated in its aversion to extensive rearmament and international political relationships, was sufficient to cause the consensus-seeking government to remain restrained in its fulfilment of the minimum requirements to maintain the US-Japan relationship.

It is to be emphasized that the state and society did not reject rearmament absolutely nor did they reject completely the return of Japan to the international political arena. What was demanded was a muted approach that would assure a small military establishment under tight civilian control, and a foreign policy that would guarantee Japan's security without drawing the nation into peripheral foreign entanglements. Such a posture can best be considered as the compromise between the three security policy alternatives facing Japan in the aftermath of 1951. Revisionist conservatives advocated amendment of the Constitution and the Security Treaty to enhance Japan's rearmament and its diplomatic autonomy; the socialist and communist parties advocated unarmed neutrality and non-alignment in the Cold War, in strict conformity with the 'letter and spirit' of Article IX; and Prime Minister Yoshida's conservatives supported the *status quo* of the new US-Japan relationship with moderate, slow rearmament.⁵ The eventual unification of the conservatives into the LDP to forestall further socialist political gains, radicalized the security debate into a right-left ideological confrontation with Yoshida's national security prescription eventually emerging as LDP policy.

The Initial Development of Security Policy

A definitive national security policy was an integral part of Yoshida's grand strategy for the re-emergence of Japan after the Pacific War. The major tenets of the Yoshida Doctrine

were as follows:

- "1. Japan's economic growth should be the national goal. Political economic cooperation with the United States is necessary for this purpose.
2. Japan should remain lightly armed and avoid involvement in international strategic issues. A low posture in security will permit the nation to avoid internal political conflict over the question of self-defence. National energies should be mobilized towards economic development.
3. A minimum self-defence-force can be established, within constitutional restrictions, but long-term security is best guaranteed by signing a military treaty with the United States. Competition with the Soviet Union will keep the United States on Japan's side."⁶

Yoshida's pre-1951 position on the re-militarization of Japan reflected these tenets, repeatedly declaring in domestic fora the intention to abide by the principles of disarmament and renunciation of war, and asserting that Japan's security lay with the UN. This emphasis was accompanied by the rationale that the affirmation of pacifism was essential to dispel the suspicions of other powers and the fears of society concerning re-militarization, to gain universal confidence, and to hasten the conclusion of a peace treaty.⁷ Such pronouncements were supported by his resistance to US pressures that Japan re-arm, arguing with Dulles three days before the outbreak of the Korean War that the domestic constraints were three-fold:

- "1. Rearmament was too expensive for a defeated Japan;
2. Psychologically, the public did not support it; and
3. The scars of defeat were still unhealed."⁸

In addition to decrying the economic, social and political costs which would be incurred by remilitarization, Yoshida invoked the 'right to self-defence without arms' thesis that had been presented to the public in the context of Article IX. The pre-1951 position on self-defence was somewhat ambiguous, however, changing from attacking the legitimacy of the right to self-defence to arguing that the renunciation of war did not mean renunciation of that right.⁹ A more definitive interpretation of the right of self-defence was to be forthcoming

with the conclusion of the 1951 Peace and Security Treaties.¹⁰

This initial position was changed in response to continued US pressure and the politico-strategic realities of the Cold War, as occasioned by the outbreak of the Korean Conflict that hastened the conclusion of the 1951 Peace and Security Treaties. These realities were three-fold. First, the conflict on the Korean Peninsula presented an immediate danger to Japan and an escalation of the confrontation between Communism and the US-led Western states with whom Japan wished to identify. Second was US pressure that Japan rearm and that US forces remain in Japan to support the policy of containment.¹¹ Third was the implicit *quid pro quo* of the Peace Treaty and re-establishment of Japan's sovereignty in return for the Security Treaty desired by Tokyo.¹²

While Japan had little choice but to accept the US-proposed Peace and Security Treaties, benefit was derived in that the Security Treaty addressed the Japanese elite's fear of the domestic and external threats posed by the communist states, while its asymmetrical character permitted Japan to separate international politics and economics. Moreover, external recognition of the right of self-defence and the stated expectation that Japan should increasingly assume responsibility for its own defence provided international legitimacy for future qualitative and quantitative improvements to defence capabilities. It may be observed that admittance into the UN in 1956 legitimized the right of self-defence, a right that Japan formally claimed while repudiating the right (or obligation) to participate in collective security under Article 51 of the UN Charter in deference to Article IX of the Constitution.¹³

The Security Treaty must also be viewed as a compromise from the Japanese perspective and a source of incipient political conflicts given the Peace Constitution, the desire to regain complete sovereignty, and the wish for an unlimited US security guarantee. The Treaty was intended to be a provisional guarantee, with Japan increasingly assuming

responsibility for its own defence against direct and indirect attack, thereby precipitating the re-establishment of military forces and exposing Japan to pressures for greater security burden-sharing. Secondly, provision for the possible use of US forces to effect internal security, and the ceding of base rights to the US for unspecified purposes impinged upon Japan's sovereignty. Lastly, the US guarantee sought by Yoshida was not fully realized, but only implicitly so by virtue of base rights and the US "being willing to maintain armed forces in and about Japan".¹⁴ The former two issues and the overall Japan-US relationship became the focus of intense political and public debate. The debate did not incite or radicalize the general public, however, by reason of the socialist/intellectual opposition being unable to forge a coalition having sufficient political influence, and by Yoshida's public support of a 'go slow' defensive rearmament program and resistance to US calls for large scale militarization.¹⁵

The government, in fact, moved quickly to fulfil the minimum obligations required by the Security Treaty. The 75,000 member para-military National Police reserve, created by SCAP in July 1950, was transformed into the National Safety Agency in October 1952. By July 1954, the Japan Defense Agency and Ground, Maritime and Air Self Defence Forces had been legislated by the Diet, and a combined SDF Establishment of 220,000 was approved. The appellation of 'Self Defense Forces' permitted the Government to avoid 'army', 'navy' and 'airforce' which were explicitly unconstitutional, and to maintain the distinction between reality (*hon'ne*) and facade (*tatemaie*) while rearmament progressed.¹⁶

Acceptance of the Security Treaty and creation of the SDF were not effected without considerable constitutional debate, inter-party confrontation and intra-conservative conflict. The radicalization of politics between 1951 and 1955 resulted in an expansion of socialist gains on the platform of anti-US neutralism and pro-Constitutionalism.¹⁷ However, the Government avoided blatant, full scale rearmament, acknowledging public attitudes in the

early 1950s. In 1950, sixty-one percent of those polled were against Japan having a military, while support for the Security Treaty in 1951 stood at eighty percent, but decreased rapidly over the ensuing decade. Perhaps most revealing was the poll conducted in 1952 indicating that forty-eight percent acknowledged that Japan was rearming while forty percent were not sure.¹⁸ Taken together, polls and election results indicated that the government was ahead of public opinion respecting rearmament and that Yoshida's public 'go slow strategy' and maintenance of facade were both necessary and effective.

The military posture associated with the Yoshida Doctrine was formally announced in the *Basic Policies of National Defence* of May 1957, which stated that the objectives of national defence were to prevent directed and indirect aggression, and if invaded to repel such aggression. To achieve these objectives, the following principles were established:

- "1. To support the activities of the United Nations, and promote international cooperation, thereby contributing to the realization of world peace.
2. To stabilize the public welfare and enhance the people's love for country, thereby establishing the solid basis essential to Japan's security.
3. To develop progressively the effective defense capabilities necessary for self-defense, with due regard to the nation's resources and the prevailing domestic situation.
4. To deal with external aggression on the basis of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements, pending more effective functioning of the United Nations in future in deterring and repelling such aggression."¹⁹

These principles underlay the three SDF Build-Up Plans announced between 1957 and 1966 and the renegotiation of the Security Treaty into the 1960 US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security (1960 MST). The Build-Up Plans were designed to give the SDF an autonomous posture to enable Japan to resist any conventional aggression until US help could arrive.²⁰ In particular, maritime and air forces were to be improved to counter the growing Soviet naval presence in East Asia and Soviet intrusions into Japanese air space. While the total strength of the SDF rose from 178,000 to 236,000, it remained substantially lower than

the 325,000 - 350,000 standing army advocated by the US in 1954.²¹ Significantly, defence spending was to represent an ever-decreasing percentage of GNP and the national budget, although absolute expenditures increased six-fold. (Table 3) Overall, Japanese security policy remained defensive, and Japan remained the least-militarized state in Northeast Asia.

The defensive character of security policy, and the intent to portray a non-threatening posture to both domestic and external actors, was bolstered by further principles developed during the 1950s and 1960s. First, Japan rejected participation in collective security measures under Article 51 of the UN Charter that would involve using military force in support of security partners.²² Second, the Diet resolved in 1954 that the SDF would not be mobilized abroad.²³ Third, commencing with a Diet resolution to ban nuclear bomb tests in February, 1956, a series of government decisions were taken that resulted in the expression of the Three Nonnuclear Principles in December, 1967 - of not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing them, and not permitting their introduction into Japan.²⁴ In support of the US-Japan security regime and global peace and security, a fourth dimension of the non-threatening posture was advanced by the Three Principles of Arms Export declared in April, 1967. These provided that arms exports to the following countries would not be permitted:

- "1. Communist-bloc countries,
2. Countries to which the export of arms is prohibited under United Nations resolutions,
3. Countries which are actually involved or are likely to become involved in international conflicts."²⁵

1960 Revision of the Security Treaty

The crisis surrounding the revision of the Security Treaty should be viewed more a manifestation of domestic politics, than the result of widespread public activism against the government's commitment to a self-defence policy within a bilateral security system with the US. Nevertheless, the revision process provides insight into the relative salience of external

and domestic factors. Soviet space successes and concomitant shaken confidence in US power potential, the dilemma of permitting or not US nuclear equipped forces on Japanese soil, the Quemoy and Matsu crisis, and the use of Japan as a staging area for US military initiatives in the region all influenced Japanese demands for treaty revision.²⁶ However, of greater significance was the re-emergence of nationalism and confidence resulting from growing economic success and increasing international recognition. These factors, combined with the tensions inherent in the continuous presence of US bases and troops, created a demand for a more equal treaty that better recognized the sovereignty and independence of Japan.²⁷ The resultant revision addressed more these latter concerns as opposed to the politico-strategic environment that had changed little in terms of the fundamental ideological confrontation between East and West. More importantly, Japan remained within the framework of US military protection and gained a specific obligation of US protection against external threat.²⁸

Ratification of the treaty exacerbated domestic political problems. The communists and socialists publicly renounced any treaty with the United States as an alliance that would precipitate insecurity and possible war, while the anti-revisionist Yoshida faction within the LDP manoeuvred to retain the *status quo* of the 1951 Treaty. Prime Minister Kishi on the other hand was determined to force revision as an instrument to consolidate power in the LDP overriding the advice of the MOFA.²⁹ The intra-LDP cleavage was reduced to one of power politics for the leadership of the LDP and was resolved by Yoshida ultimately supporting Kishi on the understanding that Kishi would step aside when the new treaty was concluded. However, the prolonged uncertainty of the LDP position served to give a measure of public support to the socialist camp.³⁰

Once the LDP position solidified sufficiently to produce a 'Party position', confrontation focused on the LDP-socialist struggle, with treaty revision becoming the most

important issue in the Diet and with no political compromise possible.³¹ Having failed to maintain the 1956 broad national consensus on revision and having no means of forging a real or imaginary inter-Party consensus, Prime Minister Kishi was constrained to force revision through the Diet by imposing the 'tyranny of the majority' and violating the rules of Parliament.³² It was this parliamentary manoeuvring in 1960 that provided the focus for massive demonstrations, cutting across ideological lines and allowing the 'socialist coalition' to mobilize the public. Notwithstanding the size of demonstrations, Tokyo remained the locus of anti-government activism, and public outcry rapidly subsided once the MST was signed and Kishi resigned.³³

Public opinion respecting the critical elements of national security in the period surrounding 1960 provides further insight into the mood of the electorate. Support for a US-Japan security regime fell from its high of 80% in 1951 to a low of 15 percent in 1959, then gradually rose again throughout the 1960s. Notwithstanding this swing, support for complete abrogation of the bilateral security regime in 1959 was low. Meanwhile, the public's approval of the US itself remained high into the 1960s, with the majority being in favour of continued US-Japan cooperation, but having no common vision of the specific character of the security structure. Moreover, a clear majority was in favour of continuing the slow increase of SDF defensive capability.³⁴

One can conclude that while there was no national consensus on the specifics of the security regime and that Kishi had essentially lost the mandate for change, the centrality of the US-Japan relationship remained legitimate. Moreover, the growing public acceptance of the 1960 MST paralleled that of the growing acceptance of the SDF after the political confrontation had progressed to *fait accompli*. However, the process highlighted the political nature of the issue, and, like the formation of the SDF, provided a long-term polarization of

inter-party perspectives. With residual support for opposition to the US-Japan security regime and the SDF remaining within the polity, the government was constrained to continual consensus-building when addressing national security issues, resulting in a reactive security stance with little articulated strategy beyond the US-Japan relationship.

1972-1979

The Policy Environment

The second period of 1972-1980 can be considered one of transition, during which a metamorphosis in security policy began to be discernable as Japan gradually moved towards a more *realist* approach.³⁵ While policy was still being viewed primarily in terms of economic development, recognition was being taken of the strategic vulnerability of the Japanese economy whose continued health and expansion depended upon international trade. The oil crisis of 1973, the US retreat from Vietnam, and the later Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and activity in Vietnam all exacerbated vulnerability in terms of sources of raw materials and trade routes. Additionally, greater cognizance was taken of the external environment in terms of the stability of the US-Japan relationship given the Nixon 'shocks' of 1969, the apparent changing strategic balance in East Asia to one less favourable to the US, and the general atmosphere of global and regional détente in the East-West confrontation.³⁶

However, Japan continued to view the world through a bipolar lens, and security policy continued to drift without a grand strategy given conflicting external pressures. On one hand, détente undercut the rationale for military build-up as did the continuing assumptions of bipolarity, US overall superiority, and the questioning of the immediacy and likelihood of Soviet aggression outside of the context of global war. On the other hand, US pressure to transfer security responsibilities to regional allies, outlined in the Guam Doctrine and

reiterated by President Carter in the late 1970s, caused Japan to review security capabilities. The requirement to do so was made more acute by increasing Soviet capability and activity in the Northern Territories, and by a perceived ambiguity as to US commitment in East Asia as manifest by the retreat from Vietnam and President Carter's initial predisposition to withdraw ground forces from Korea.

Taken together, strategic and economic realities kept the continuation of the US-Japan security system as the single most important assumption for security decision-makers.³⁷ However, any predisposition to react to this reality and the general strategic environment was constrained by bureaucratic, political and financial factors, in addition to the requirement of not inciting the population by overtly upgrading military capabilities.

Government sensitivity to public attitudes respecting national security and the SDF was such that the Prime Minister's Office commenced conducting relevant polls in 1961, a practice that became triennial in 1972.³⁸ The results of these polls and those conducted for private institutions indicated public opinion increasingly supporting the existence of the SDF, with 73 percent in 1972 and 86 percent in 1978 stating that the SDF was necessary.³⁹ The nature of that support must be considered in that the majority were also supportive in maintaining the *status quo* respecting SDF capabilities and defensive posture, and that the majority did not support any constitutional amendment to clarify or further legitimize the position of the SDF. Public support for the 1960 MST also grew, although not to the same extent as did acceptance of the SDF. From the a low of 15 percent being in favour of the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1959, the 1960 MST was viewed positively by 41 percent of those polled in 1972 and by 61 percent in 1978.⁴⁰ Increasing support was enjoined by generally positive attitudes towards the US and by the assessment that the Soviet Union presented an escalating threat to Japan. Taken together, public attitudes during the period indicated that a

general consensus on security policy had been built, resting on a capable, defensive SDF and the MST. However, that consensus was founded in the *status quo* in terms of SDF roles and capabilities, and a gradualist approach to defence planning.

Coalescing public opinion on security policy was not reflected across the political spectrum. The JSP's long-standing support for the *Peace Constitution*, its opposition to the US-Japan security regime, and its commitment to unarmed neutrality continued throughout the 1970s. On the other hand, the DSP increasingly reflected public opinion *vis-a-vis* perceptions of Soviet expansionism and support for the 1960 MST and the SDF. By 1977, the DSP advocated building up the SDF for defence but relegating the MST to a supplementary security arrangement. Similarly, the Kōmeitō's security position moved closer to public opinion in order to be viewed as a viable alternative to the long-governing LDP. By 1978, its opposition to the existence of the SDF changed to acceptance of the right of self-defence and the means to effect it, albeit with a 'National Guard' and a neutralist orientation. Moreover, its 1973 call for the immediate abrogation of the MST changed to support for (temporary) continuation by 1981. The JCP, although unable to suppress its ideological loyalties, progressively erased its references of support for the PRC and Soviet Union and their policies. Nevertheless, it maintained its position on opposition to the MST and its advocacy for Japanese neutrality with the maintenance of the SDF.⁴¹

The diverse opposition positions kept the security issue politicized, ensuring the continuing constraint of close political scrutiny on government-sponsored security initiatives. However, the four major opposition parties lacked a common policy on the security issue, in addition to being collectively unable to defeat the LDP or its security initiatives in the Diet. Debates in the Diet and the press grew more intense as the decade progressed as a reaction to the search for a strategy that could be accommodated within the bounds of public consensus

while addressing the aforementioned strategic realities and US pressures. Notwithstanding the heightened profile that the security issue attained, neither security policy in general nor its individual components became as contentious as did the revision of the Security Treaty in 1960. Economic issues and the conduct of the LDP government highlighted the political agenda in the 1970s in response to the public mood and in conformity with pragmatic LDP politics.⁴² The major security initiatives of the decade, including the 1976 National Defence Program Outline(NDPO) and diplomatic activity, had the character of hesitant and cautious activism which mirrored public uncertainty as how best to address the external environment.

Policy Initiatives

The NDPO followed from a series of policy decisions precipitated by Japan's first White Paper on Defence (1970).⁴³ The Paper acknowledged the success of economic development at the expense of political and military pursuits, and the efficacy of foregoing an international role as a major military power. While acknowledging detente, the White Paper also took cognizance of international instability and tacitly recognized the declining US strategic posture in East Asia. The policy prescription advanced was the continuation of the US-Japan security regime, but with the US security guarantee being relegated to a supportive role. The Paper went on to propose that Japan assume an autonomous, independent defence posture orientated to the home islands, but with sufficient air and sea capability to deal with any conventional crisis until US help arrived. Such a defensive posture would constrain the SDF to acquire equipments that would not pose a threat to other countries.⁴⁴

The Fourth Defence Build-up Plan which accompanied the 1970 White Paper contained significant capability increases to support an autonomous posture and associated modernization of sea and air forces, requiring defence expenditures double that of the previous Build-up Plan. Its controversial nature and concomitant factional opposition within

the LDP, the massive increase in defence spending proposed, and a series of domestic incidents which compromised the SDF image, generated sufficient opposition within government, the bureaucracy and the public to cause the Plan to be downscaled in terms of both objectives and capabilities.⁴⁵ What remained was a program with an emphasis on defence capability orientated to detente and peacetime operations. However, sufficient equipment modernization remained to create the nucleus of a capable military force, which could support the goal of autonomy and move away from the Yoshida tenet of minimum military capability. The reduced plan was further compromised by financial constraints precipitated by the 1973 oil crisis combined with the still overly ambitious equipment program. Nevertheless, defence expenditures rose by a factor of 2.5 between 1970 and 1976, resulting in qualitative improvements being made. (Table 3).

The 1976 NDPO, which superseded the Defence Build-Up Plans, advanced the concept of a 'Standard Defence Force' to rationalize the development of the SDF, and was formalized as the fundamental document guiding the development, maintenance and operation of Japan's defence structure.⁴⁶ Consideration of the politico-strategic environment was highlighted in the assumptions of a continuing MST, global detente, Sino-Soviet confrontation and US-Sino rapprochement, and maintenance of the *status quo* on the Korean Peninsula.⁴⁷ In recognition of economic constraints on expansion of the SDF and failure of the Fourth Build-Up Plan, military capability was downscaled from that articulated in the 1970 Defence White Paper. This, in addition to the new politico-strategic assumptions, resulted in the SDF being assigned the primary objective of surveillance in peacetime and countering small scale aggression by itself or with the US. Two additional constraints were imposed on determining capabilities required to fulfil these roles. First was that the threat to security was to be defined in terms of both capability to execute hostile action and the intent to do so. Second was the

'interim' imposition of a one-percent of GNP ceiling on defence spending.⁴⁸

The 'One Percent' policy was not the product of strategic analysis, but rather a reflection of a public mood for tighter restrictions on the defence budget, and the MOF's implementation of fiscal austerity with public, bureaucratic and political support. It did, however, become institutionalized as a symbol of the *Peace Constitution* and a means to constrain defence spending and militarization. As such it became highly politicized in and of itself, and in relation to the attainment of capabilities outlined in the NDPO. Although there was no immediate effect with the absolute growth in defence spending remaining significant given the rapid growth of GNP between 1975 and 1980 (Table 3), adherence to the policy would eventually result in program delays and the inability to effect declared security initiatives in the 1980s.⁴⁹ The eventual breaking of this ceiling to attain NDPO objectives had to await a re-assessment of the international environment *vis-a-vis* Japan's national interests, to justify the political costs of overcoming public, political and bureaucratic resistance.

The benign strategic threat assessment in the NDPO did not diminish Japan's concern that the expanding Soviet presence in East Asia presented a synthesis of military power, political influence, and implicit threat of the use of force that were inimical to Japan.⁵⁰ Therefore, while the NDPO addressed the narrower military aspects of national security to the degree permitted by domestic constraints, increased public awareness of security issues was deemed necessary to counter the growing Soviet regional influences by engendering domestic support for national security goals and objectives. To this end, a Special Committee on Defence was established in both Houses of the Diet (May 1977) to discuss national security issues and ostensibly raise security policy formulation out of the confines of the LDP decision-making process.⁵¹

The broadening of the security debate and constrained enhancement of military

capability were accompanied by the increasing use of diplomacy to widen the scope of national security in terms of both horizons and instruments. This constituted a significant change from previous diplomatic activity, which had been focused almost exclusively on maintenance of the US-Japan relationship and support for the US posture in East Asia, and on international economic stability.⁵² Throughout the 1970s, Japan's attempts to forge a broader and more independent foreign policy were primarily directed toward ASEAN, with formal recognition of that organization by Japan being made explicit in 1972. Prompted by the perceived weakening of the US strategic position in East Asia after 1975, the growing Japanese economic position in the ASEAN states, and US pressure to strengthen its contribution to regional security, Japan embarked on a series of diplomatic initiatives to enhance regional stability.⁵³

Notwithstanding changes in the US-Soviet relative politico-strategic position in the region, Japan's search for a more prominent diplomatic role was premised on the US maintaining the regional strategic balance, ASEAN opposition to a Japanese military presence, the lack of present or planned military capability to contribute to regional defence, and domestic constraints on the overseas dispatch of military forces. Japan's efforts to secure a larger role in Southeast Asia was, therefore, constrained to effecting a special political and economic relationship with ASEAN that included the extension of diplomatic 'good offices' and the contribution to economic development through FDI and ODA. These principles coalesced into a defined policy that was articulated by Prime Minister Fukuda in 1977 after attending the second ASEAN summit conference.⁵⁴

The Fukuda 'doctrine' declared that Japan would cooperate with ASEAN in the political, economic, social and cultural spheres, would assist in strengthening and stabilizing the ASEAN states, and would be prepared to play an important (political) role in dispute

settlement between ASEAN and other Asian countries. While stating Japan's interest in interacting within Southeast Asia, Fukuda emphasized that it was not Japan's intent to become a major or regional military power.⁵⁵ Notwithstanding eschewing the establishment of a military presence, Japan's intent to forge strong political and economic ties had the complexion of a security initiative within the context of Japan's forthcoming *Comprehensive National Security Policy*. The vulnerability of the South East Asian SLOCs, trade, resource supplies, and investment was in effect being addressed by the attempt to establish a leadership role, and by political and economic means as opposed to military power.⁵⁶

Having made the decision to pursue a 'made in Japan' policy towards Southeast Asia, the tempo of political and economic initiatives quickly increased, accompanying Tokyo's assertions of its leadership role in the region and its 'representation' of ASEAN interests in extra-regional fora.⁵⁷ By the end of the 1970s Japan had become involved in the region's pressing politico-strategic issues, was ASEAN's most important contributor of FDI and ODA, and, had greatly increased the frequency of diplomatic and bureaucratic visits.⁵⁸

.

1980-1989

The Policy Environment

Whereas the previous decade has been described as one of transformation to a more externally orientated security policy, the change in perspective was essentially confined to regional security with little being effected regarding the allocation of resources to effect policy. The period 1980 to 1989 can be characterized as completing the transformation of security policy to one having a global perspective, addressing the issues of East-West confrontation and those of general peace and security in the world. This reorientation was accompanied by an intensification of the regional focus as Japan moved towards expanding

military, economic and diplomatic efforts to enhance self-defence and contribute to regional stability. As with previous periods, however, the reformulation of policy was not expeditious, and initiatives in reaction to the external environment were incremental.

Greater attention was given the expansion of Soviet capabilities and operations in East Asia, which were accompanied by greater pressure from the US respecting regional burden-sharing.⁵⁹ Moreover, cognizance was being taken of extra-regional instability, in areas such as the Middle East, that had precipitated new exhortations by external actors that Japan assume a greater role in supporting global peace and security. Reception to these latter pressures was accommodated by Japanese recognition of increasing economic vulnerability engendered by growing economic interdependence, and by failing detente in the first half of the 1980s. Also existing were counter-pressures in the form of opposition to Japan's development of military capabilities commensurate with its economic position by ASEAN, the ROK and the PRC, who considered that Tokyo's increased security efforts should be confined to economic and diplomatic assistance.⁶⁰

The nature of decision-making within the Japanese regime became more critical during this decade of an increasingly complex international security environment, within which both global and regional issues had to be addressed. With the decision-making process not being expeditious, changes in policy were slow to emerge notwithstanding rapid changes in the politico-strategic landscape and sharp crises which potentially threatened regional stability and economic security.⁶¹ Moreover, the continued governance of the LDP with its reluctance to encourage different approaches to the politico-strategic environment outside of the US-Japan security regime and its continued bipolar perspective, tended to forestall strategic thinking based on objective analysis.⁶² To these constraints was added a more complex public position towards national security, reflecting receding anti-militarism while

maintaining pacifist-isolationist sentiments.

The changing mood in Japan respecting security policy was founded in greater consciousness of the Soviet threat in East Asia such that the media was increasingly more critical of Soviet intentions and activities and more positive towards maintaining a Japanese self-defence capability.⁶³ Moreover, public opinion was increasingly expressing concern for Japan's security and the capability of the SDF to deter aggression. Public support for the SDF rose to 86 percent in 1982 as compared to 56 percent in 1956; and, by the mid-1980s, over two-thirds of the public supported a gradual build-up of the SDF for the maintenance of national security within the US-Japan security structure.⁶⁴ Significantly, the major opposition parties followed these trends to varying degrees, with the DSP becoming almost hawkish and supporting the MST and a major build-up, the Kōmeitō staying close to the LDP security position, and the JSP stating in 1984 that the SDF was necessary and 'legal' although still unconstitutional. Only the JCP maintained strong opposition to both the MST and the SDF.⁶⁵

Support for the SDF build-up did not attain the status of consensus nor was it unqualified. The media and the greater part of public opinion strongly supported the *status quo* of a self-defence posture with incremental modernization of the SDF within the one-percent GNP ceiling on defence spending and only to meet specific threats.⁶⁶ Moreover, although there existed general support for the MST, there was significant adverse reaction to the more aggressive US strategy that emerged in the 1980s and to US pressure for increased Japanese security efforts in East Asia. Similarly, there existed negative public reaction to the pressures for Japanese assumption of greater burden-sharing in global and extra-regional security operations. By the end of the 1980s Japan's security debate had shifted from that of the legitimacy of the SDF to that of the scope of its role, required capability, and the question of the overseas dispatch of SDF personnel. An integral component of this debate was the

financial resources to be allocated not only for the defence budget *per se*, but also to the other instruments of national security such as ODA, and the financing of international initiatives to enhance peace and stability.

The interaction of external and domestic factors caused Japan to move cautiously toward accommodating US global and regional strategies and towards establishing linkages with broader Western security interests. The continuing centrality of the US-Japan relationship was implicit in this reorientation to the global security environment; and, Japan's regional security policy remained based on a bipolar perspective with regionalist policies being pursued to maintain the relationship.⁶⁷

Notwithstanding the adoption of a Comprehensive National Security Policy in 1982, definitive policy initiatives in response to the external environment by Prime Ministers Ohira, Suzuki and Nakasone ended in partial retreats, forced by pacifist domestic constituency and undertones of isolationism, unilateralism and free-ridership.⁶⁸ Regardless of the change in the country's mood regarding national security, there remained a latent pacifist sentiment that constrained the Japanese leadership in its attempts to reorientate security policy.⁶⁹ These constraints moderated the movement towards alignment with the US, increased security horizons and increased capabilities, resulting in a slow transformation from economic security to comprehensive security, which could be otherwise characterized as 'two steps forward and one step back'.⁷⁰

Policy Initiatives: Comprehensive National Security

The necessity to increase strategic horizons and capabilities in a coordinated manner, and to depart from the Yoshida concept of separating economics and international politics, was recognized in the late 1970s, causing Prime Minister Ohira to establish three study groups. These addressed external economic relationships, the concept of a Pacific Basin

community, and Comprehensive National Security (CNS), with the membership in each overlapping to some extent and all being dominated by the MOF, MITI, and the 'ruling triad'.⁷¹ The task force on CNS had the mandate to study how Japan should help to forestall, prevent or limit war, not by military power alone, but through a chain of well-balanced national power including economic, political and diplomatic means.

The Report on Comprehensive National Security (July 1980) addressed the concept of national security in the same framework as that of Buzan, in terms of issues and the means by which national security should be addressed. With respect to defence capability, the Study Group concluded that the SDF did not possess the minimum capability necessary to fulfil either its unilateral or cooperative obligations under the MST. Consequently, it recommended more comprehensive Japan-US alliance relations and more concrete military cooperation, including the strengthening of Japan's defence effort and doubling the defence budget above the one-percent GNP ceiling. As significant was the recommendation that Japan accept international responsibilities commensurate with its economic stature and contribute to the protection of the free world's political, economic and social systems. The Soviet Union was identified as being the only state posing a military threat to Japan, and the requirement to avoid making the Soviet Union regard Japan as either weak or threatening was stated. Economic threats were assessed as being diverse in terms of the international economic system and the vulnerability of energy and food supplies. The analysis of economic security recognized growing interdependence, and identified the necessity for Japan to contribute to the stability of international political and economic systems and to the stability of individual states. Additionally, the Report endorsed the politically sensitive concept of establishing a Comprehensive National Security Council to promote an integrated security policy.⁷²

The CNS Report received conflicting reviews regarding the emphasis to be placed on

the military and non-military means of enhancing national security. The MOFA, JDA, and a minority representing the right found insufficient stress on the military component, and argued that the concept gave a mistaken impression that economic and political means could be substituted for military capabilities rather than complement them. On the other hand, the majority and the Left suspected that the concept was designed to underwrite a larger defence budget than might otherwise be possible. The economic ministries, led by the MOF, had a more balanced approach, having argued that national security spending should include, *inter alia*, overseas aid, resource diplomacy and defensive economic measures, and that appropriate shifts in funding between military, diplomatic and economic components could be effected as necessary.⁷³ Regardless of diverse perceptions of the Report and its implications, the concept provided a vehicle to forge a broader public, political and bureaucratic consensus on security policy, while the associated debate engendered a public mood that creating a capable military would not herald a return to militarism.⁷⁴

The adoption of comprehensive national security as Government policy was initiated by Prime Minister Suzuki in 1980 with his efforts to establish the Ministerial Council on Comprehensive Security as recommended by the CNS Report. However, this, as with the other major recommendations, was not achieved without political and bureaucratic compromise, with the issues of security and defence remaining politicized regardless of general consensus on the newly-defined national security orientation. Essentially, debate throughout the decade was generated by initiatives to increase the budget and role of the SDF, along with increased emphasis on foreign economic assistance and diplomacy. For global consumption, the concept of comprehensive national security as Japanese policy was announced in the 1981 editions of the Diplomatic Blue Book and Defence White Paper, precipitating concerns in East Asia about Japan's intentions *vis-a-vis* the development of the

military component.⁷⁵ On the other hand, it caused the US to be more optimistic regarding Japan's intentions about global and regional security burden-sharing.⁷⁶

Attempts to effect the recommendations of the CNS Report achieved mixed success. The ultimate character of the Ministerial Council on Comprehensive Security provides example of compromise. Its genesis lay in a perceived requirement, predating the CNS Report, that the mandate of the NDC be legally revised to form a National Security Council that could address international situations more comprehensively and not solely from a military perspective. Ministerial and bureaucratic delay forestalled the required legislation, and the issue remained unresolved until Prime Minister Suzuki addressed it in the wake of the CNS Report. Rather than widen the NDC mandate, or create an omnipotent National Security Council, the Ministerial Council on CNS was instituted as an *ad hoc* cabinet committee, additional to the NDC. Chapman argues that the reasons for this approach were three-fold, based on domestic and bureaucratic politics. First, a 'Council' did not require Diet approval as would changing the NDC, thus its formation had less probability of creating divisive political debate. Additionally, if it proved ineffective or a political liability, it could be easily dissolved. Second, there was considerable opposition from ministries who conceived that a powerful National Security Council would infringe on their prerogatives. Last, there existed concern that associating comprehensive security with the NDC would lead to domestic and external perceptions that all components of CNS had military overtones.⁷⁷ Thus effective institutional change to enhance security management was compromised.

Strategic Horizons

The first initiative to expand strategic horizons was undertaken by Prime Minister Suzuki during a visit to Washington in May 1981. The joint communique issued by Prime Minister Suzuki and President Reagan referred to an 'alliance' between the US and Japan, and

outlined the agreement for a more rational allocation of roles within the US-Japan security structure, with Japan making greater efforts to improve air and maritime defensive capabilities. When subsequently pressed by Japanese reporters to explain the specific intent of the joint communique, Suzuki responded that the terms 'alliance' and 'appropriate diversification of roles' had neither a military connotation nor a 'two-way' commitment. Although confirming that Japan intended to police the SLOCs to a distance of 1000 miles, he indicated that this too had no military meaning nor was it a commitment to the US. These retreats from pre-summit discussions and the substance of the communique were repeated to the Tokyo press and to the Diet, which remained sensitive to increased roles and capabilities for the SDF. Ultimately, contradictions between the communique and Suzuki's explanations in political fora were sufficient to cause the resignation of the Foreign Minister, who took responsibility for its drafting, to resolve the political debate.⁷⁸

Suzuki's tentative foray into an expanded strategic role for Japan had to await the leadership of Prime Minister Nakasone before clarification was made and substance added to security policy. At Nakasone's first news conference after his election to Prime Minister and President of the LDP, he gave free expression to an expanded military and politico-strategic role for Japan, stating that Japan's defence efforts had not been adequate, and that US and European arguments for defence spending commensurate with economic power were valid.⁷⁹ During a subsequent visit to Washington in January 1983, Nakasone advanced a more activist Japanese role within the US-Japan security regime, subscribing to Suzuki's stillborn initiative respecting an expanded role in maritime surveillance and defence, and to protection of the SLOCs up to 1000 miles from Japan's shores in cooperation with the US. Furthermore, in response to a hostile Soviet Union, he asserted that Japan should become "an unsinkable aircraft carrier against Soviet 'Backfire' bombers and should control the straits around the Sea

of Japan to prevent Soviet warships from coming between Vladivostok and the open Pacific."⁸⁰

At the Williamsburg summit in May 1983, the international perspective was further expanded by Nakasone's identification with the Western industrialized countries and the politico-strategic goals of NATO. For the first time, Japan embarked on substantive security discussions outside of the US-Japan security structure and engaged in debate on nuclear strategic issues.⁸¹ The essence of this new strategic thought was contained in the final joint communique to which Nakasone subscribed:

"...it is our duty to defend freedom and justice on which democracies are based. To this end, we shall maintain sufficient military strength to deter any attack, to counter any threat and ensure the peace."⁸²

Given the scope of Nakasone's position and the nuclear implications, domestic controversy was enjoined as to whether Japan was implicitly moving into the realm of 'collective security' both regionally and globally. However, criticism from the public, the media and the opposition remained relatively muted respecting this widening of strategic concepts. The major concerns remained the maintenance of a self-defence military posture and curtailing defence spending by means of the one-percent GNP ceiling.⁸³ Domestic constituencies did however, remain sensitive to the concerns of regional actors, especially ASEAN, who voiced grave concerns to Washington regarding reports of Japan's commitment to SLOC defence extending toward the Indonesian archipelago. To defuse criticism, Nakasone was explicit during his visit to ASEAN capitals, in May of 1983, that Japanese defence policy was solely committed to self-defence within the framework of the US-Japan 'alliance', and that policy-makers recognized ASEAN's legitimate sensitivities about Japan's past military actions in the region.⁸⁴

The recommendations in the CSN Report regarding more comprehensive Japan-US

alliance relations and more concrete military cooperation were progressively effected. Relevant measures included: increasing the frequency of combined US-Japanese exercises in and around the home islands, and in the maritime approaches to Japan; commencing Japanese participation in the multi-national RIMPAC exercises off Hawaii; formulating joint and combined communications, command and control plans; and, reorganizing the SDF to enhance both joint and combined operations. Additionally, there was the 1983 decision to permit the transfer of military technology to the US on the basis that international obligations should take precedence over the policy decision of 1976 which had precluded such transfers to any country.⁸⁵ More recent cooperative programs of note were the decision that Japanese companies could participate in SDI research and the troubled FSX joint project, both of which were also indicative of a growing interest in the potential of defence-related industries and general 'big-business' support for an expanded military posture.

Defence Capabilities

The degree to which Japan was able to effect comprehensive national security and Nakasone's vision was constrained by domestic economic and political factors, and also by the 'mood' of the country. Regardless of intense US pressure to end Japan's 'free-ride' in the security domain and to have Japan allocate a much greater proportion of GNP to defence and ODA, the relative budgets did not increase significantly as a percentage of GNP. While remaining below the one-percent GNP ceiling, the defence budgets for 1983 to 1986 did, however, continue to increase in real terms and were exempted from the fiscal restraint policies imposed on other ministries. (Table 3) ⁸⁶ This permitted the continuation of qualitative improvements planned in the 1983-1987 Build-Up Program, although not to the original forecast levels. The impetus toward reaching a satisfactory level of self-defence capability was subsequently reinforced by the 1985 approval of the 1986-1990 Defence

Program, and the associated estimates finally breached the institutionalized one-percent ceiling in 1987 with spending estimates at 1.004 percent of GNP.

The sudden abandonment of the one-percent policy had immediate political consequences with anti-Nakasone attacks by the opposition parties and the media; however, political costs were contained by government assurances that defence spending would remain 'in the area of one-percent' and by the issue being overshadowed by the 1987 tax controversy. Holland also notes that the public had been 'prepared' for this policy change by the government instituting the debate three years before effecting the change in the wake of a strong election victory.⁸⁷

The military capability enhancements achieved by a defence budget that had grown in absolute terms from the eighth largest in the world in 1982 to the sixth largest by 1989, did not change the self-defence character of the SDF.⁸⁸ Furthermore, the goals of the 1976 NDPO were not forecast to be met until the 1990s, and the capabilities envisaged in the CNS Report were not achieved regardless of the perceived increases in the Soviet threat and US exhortations. More positively, progress was made towards realizing Nakasone's concept of maritime defence to protect the Japanese archipelago, to deny the Soviet Pacific Fleet access to ocean waters, and to protect the SLOCs to 1000 nautical miles. However, achievement of these objectives remained dependent on support from the US Seventh Fleet.

ODA Initiatives

Given the CNS Report's recognition of the requirement to contribute to the stability of external political and economic systems critical to Japan's economic health, Japan's use of ODA is a useful indicant of the will and level of effort expended on these components of national security. Initial plans projected a 100 percent increase in ODA from 1981 to 1985 with the government targeting strategic countries such as the ROK, Pakistan, Thailand,

Turkey, Egypt and Kenya to enhance stability within the context of the East-West confrontation and domestic economic considerations.⁸⁹ Table 3 indicates a discernable increase in ODA as a percentage of GNP between 1978 and 1980; however, as with the defence budget, there was no significant increase, or variation, throughout the 1980s to indicate a focus on this component of comprehensive national security. Moreover, by 1988 Japan placed only twelfth out of eighteen OECD countries in terms of GNP devoted to ODA.⁹⁰ In absolute terms, however, the dollar value of ODA approximately met the goal of increasing 100 percent by 1985; and, by 1989 Japan was close to becoming the largest foreign aid donor within the OECD.⁹¹

Existing throughout the 1980s were US and OECD pressures for Japan to increase ODA significantly in terms of percent-GNP, and to target world development more generally. However, the pattern of ODA in the 1980s primarily fulfilled a security-related role having a Japan-centric focus, but in a somewhat uncoordinated manner. Bureaucratic politics remained in the fore with the powerful MOF successfully resisting MOFA attempts to specify ODA targets in terms of percent-GNP, thereby retaining the flexibility of responding to the state of the yen and the general health of the economy as demanded by public and political pressures.⁹² Institutional impediments and bureaucratic politics reduced the efficacy of ODA as a means to enhance security in the broader context. Essentially, there was no effective central coordinating authority, and four main ministries were involved in aid policy-making, each having competence with respect to discreet forms of aid. These were the MOFA, MITI, MOF and the Economic Planning Agency (EPA), which engaged in time consuming consensual policy-making that resulted in reactive rather than proactive policy.⁹³ The lack of legislation governing the coordination and principles of ODA exacerbated bureaucratic conflict on the one hand, and maintained the bureaucracies' control of the policy-making process on

the other. This effectively forestalled the Diet from being an active participant in ODA distribution, other than to observe upon aid distribution retrospectively and to legitimize decisions which have already been taken by the bureaucracy.⁴⁴

The geographic distribution of ODA did not meet the initial blueprint of targeting strategic countries in a global sense. (Table 8) Throughout the 1980s, the greater share of ODA remained in Asia, with only a change in emphasis from ASEAN to Northeast Asia as compared with the pre-1980 era. Given the relative health of ASEAN economies, continuing ODA to this region must be viewed as being directed to bolster political and economic stability, to enhance conditions for FDI, and to foster the security of Japan's resource supplies. The new emphasis on Northeast Asia may be viewed as engendering the same conditions with respect to the ROK, in addition to supporting the Japan-ROK rapprochement. ODA to the PRC, on the other hand, primarily supported rapprochement and economic positioning with respect to the PRC's market potential. Each and all of these objectives contribute to Japan's strategic and economic security.

Japan's use of ODA did not, therefore change significantly with the adoption of comprehensive national security in terms of objectives or focus. However, it must be remembered that the objectives of politico-strategic and economic security in the CNS Report called for a more global focus which was not achieved to a significant degree outside of the Asia-Pacific region. That Japan was fast approaching the position of the world's largest aid donor in absolute terms did carry with it significantly more effect where the aid was targeted. The goals of comprehensive national security were, therefore, better achieved from a Japanese perspective, but not necessarily from that of some recipients in ASEAN who feared a dominant Japanese position within their economies or who would have preferred an alternate structuring of ODA from that received.⁴⁵

Furthermore, the weight given to ODA as a means to enhanced security did not change significantly during the decade, remaining at approximately one-third of that afforded defence spending, with minor fluctuations in the ratio from year to year. (Table 3) This satisfied neither the East Asian states which preferred ODA expenditures to defence spending by Japan, nor the US and European States which were pressing for greater defence spending and even greater development assistance on a more global scope. If taken together as an aggregate representing the level of security burden-sharing, Japan still fell woefully short of the Western Industrialized states and its economic position when expressed as a percentage of GNP. However, in terms of absolute dollars Japan moved towards the front of the OECD states, without incurring significant public or political opposition, or precipitating political crisis.

Diplomatic Initiatives

The use of diplomatic initiatives to enhance national security was gradually expanded within and beyond East Asia during the 1980s in consonance with the recommendations of the CNS Report. Diplomacy in this context refers to those initiatives designed to develop a political role for Japan in the promotion of peace and security, and to consolidate Japan's position within the greater Western 'alliance'. This was supported in part by the general consensus to effect security by multi-dimensional means, and by regional and domestic aversion to either a significantly increased military capability or military regional presence. Moreover, political diplomacy was viewed as being complementary to economic diplomacy from a Japanese perspective, with respect to those areas targeted as being critical to Japan's national interest. There also existed nationalism and self-confidence, predicated on economic performance, that had given rise to increasing domestic support for a regional and global political role that was more commensurate with Japan's economic power. Lastly, increasing

multipolarity and interdependence produced a systemic environment that presented diplomatic opportunities and enhanced the probability of more receptive global and regional actors.

Notwithstanding domestic and external factors that engendered an increased political role in support of peace and security, residual isolationism and preoccupation with economic issues limited both the scope and intensity of diplomatic initiatives. Further constraints were imposed by the inability to effect a linkage between diplomatic and military initiatives given the limitations on the capabilities and the accepted roles of the SDF. Moreover, the lack of political and bureaucratic consensus on the appropriate focus of diplomacy undermined the development of a political leadership role at the international level.⁹⁶ This latter constraint reflected the cleavage between the MOFA, which had a strong orientation towards maintaining diplomatic congruence with the objectives of US foreign policy to maintain the Japan-US relationship, and that of the more powerful Finance Ministry which supported a more omni-directional outlook, both regionally and globally. This fundamental cleavage was further exacerbated by the domestic distributive focus of other ministries that reflected the primary orientation of Japanese politics and effectively reduced the resources available to support external initiatives.⁹⁷

Japan's political relationship with the West was developed during the 1980s to acknowledge the relevance of global politico-strategic issues and to support Japan's identification of its interests with those of the other industrialized democracies. Diplomatic support of the Western position on Afghanistan, Iran and INF negotiations, for example, was indicative of a new activism which fundamentally acknowledged US leadership in cooperation with Western Europe. On the other hand, Japan joined Western Europe in attempting to moderate US politico-strategic responses to crises, to maintain detente in Europe and to limit the escalation of regional conflict.⁹⁸ In addition to intensifying dialogue and diplomatic

activity with Western Europe during this period and associating itself with Western politico-strategic positions, Japan became increasingly involved in the fora which addressed security and disarmament issues.

While diplomacy *per se* intensified, political activism in terms of the commitment of resources remained more modest and reflected Japan's unique approach to the expansion of its political role in a material sense. The response to Afghanistan did include economic sanctions directed at the Soviet Union and a boycott of the Moscow Olympics in concert with the Western States. More direct involvement was limited to marginal assistance with the Afghan refugee problem and the assignment of civilian officials to the UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP). The response to the Iran-Iraq conflict similarly involved the participation of civilian officials in the UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG), but, unlike its Western 'allies', Japan did not participate in the protection of the oil tanker shipping that was vital to its energy supplies. Requests that Japan conduct minesweeping operations in the Red Sea in 1984 were not only turned down, but the Japanese Government acted with little debate on the issue in anticipation of public opposition. A more pressing requirement in 1987 was debated; however, adverse public opinion and a deep Cabinet division precluded the dispatch of minesweepers to the Gulf regardless of support by the Prime Minister and MOFA.⁹⁰ This lack of activism undermined the acquisition of diplomatic leverage where such was sought or attempted.

Although subordinate to Japan's economic diplomacy in East Asia, the attempt to develop a political role surpassed the efforts directed towards the Western democracies. This emphasis on regional diplomacy can be understood in the context of US and Western support of such efforts, the geographic immediacy of regional security issues and incipient instability regardless of European detente, Japan's economic investment in the region, and the more

multi-polar character of regional political relationships. Also to be acknowledged was the reluctance of other regional actors to accept an enhanced political role for Japan, although not to the degree associated with that of a Japanese military presence.

This latter factor was more pervasive in Northeast Asia, which, along with historic antagonism, caused Japan to focus on a diplomacy of rapprochement with the PRC and ROK, and to a lesser degree, with the DPRK. Attempts to foster, or to establish, diplomatic relations in this sub-region were hampered by Seoul's suspicions as to Japanese intentions respecting Tokyo-Pyongyang and Tokyo-Beijing negotiations, and by Beijing's fear that a greater political role would inevitably be matched by a stronger military presence.¹⁰⁰ Within Japan, negative stereotypes about Koreans and a longer-term fear of political and economic harassment by a united Korea tended to limit diplomacy to the political objective of rapprochement, to sustain normalized relations with first the ROK and secondly the DPRK. Rapprochement with the PRC was similarly engendered by the view that the PRC had the potential to precipitate regional instability and to become a threat to Japan itself.¹⁰¹

Compared with Northeast Asia, the scope and intensity of Japan's diplomacy in Southeast Asia were more extensive. After initially emphasizing bilateral relations, Japan focused on ASEAN, with Tokyo emphasizing close diplomatic ties and attempting to coordinate regional and global political activity. In addition to increasingly frequent prime ministerial visits and attending the annual ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference, several bilateral fora were instituted at ministerial, bureaucratic and non-governmental levels to effect regular consultation and coordination.¹⁰² Additionally, Japan attempted to effect a bridging role between ASEAN and other regional actors respecting disputes and regional conflicts, and purported to represent ASEAN positions at meetings of the G7 and OECD, reporting back to ASEAN on the content of the respective agendas.

Japan's approach to problems in Indochina after the end of the US-Vietnam war provides a useful perspective of diplomatic activity in Southeast Asia and of the attempt to forge a relevant and independent political role. Having failed in the late 1970s to establish sufficient diplomatic weight with Hanoi to cause it to lessen confrontation in Indochina and with the ASEAN states, Japan aligned with ASEAN and consistently supported the ASEAN position and the requirement for Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia.¹⁰³ Within the Japanese public there was relative ambivalence toward the support of ASEAN, which could be accomplished with little cost to other Japanese interests, notwithstanding some economic and political interests that preferred to forge closer ties with Indochina.¹⁰⁴

Subsequent support of the Sihanouk peace initiatives was accompanied by intense diplomatic activity to keep ASEAN informed, and by a 1984 proposal that Japan underwrite future peacekeeping in Cambodia and provide civilian officials to help monitor Cambodian elections as part of a political settlement. This latter commitment was repeated in 1988 at the Toronto G-7 summit.¹⁰⁵ While no offer of SDF involvement in peacekeeping was forthcoming or elicited by regional actors, Japan committed substantial resources to aid UN efforts in alleviating the refugee problem and repeatedly committed to provide economic aid to rebuild Cambodia after a settlement had been effected. As with extra-regional security issues, a willingness to dispatch civilian officials abroad and to engage in humanitarian relief was maintained, and the linkage between diplomacy and economic means to enhance peace and stability remained evident in expanding activism. Also evident was the continuing prohibition on the overseas deployment of the SDF, in reaction to both domestic and external opposition.

THE 1990s

The Policy Environment

National security policy in the post-1989 period has been marked with greater attention being given to the politico-strategic environment in terms of global and regional threats, and to the pressures applied by external actors that Japan increasingly assume a greater political role with respect to global peace and security. Moreover, ASEAN has been more positive towards an enhanced role for Japan in its sub-regional security affairs, signalling tentative acceptance of Japan as a full member of the international community with responsibilities that extend beyond the economic dimension. Japan also recognized the necessary multi-dimensional security linkages and capabilities required to effect comprehensive national security in the more complex, interdependent post-Cold War world. In response, Tokyo moved to implement better an integrated comprehensive national security policy, changing from a uniquely domestic orientation to greater conformity with the Western conception of such policy.

The manifestations of this reorientation were a defence budget that grew in absolute terms to be the third largest in the world, increased activism in contributing to global and regional stability through diplomatic and economic means, initiatives to participate in global and regional UN security operations, and a new receptiveness to the overseas deployment of the SDF. In addition to external imperatives and support for the assumption of a greater political role in the international system, there existed a new national assertiveness, sense of confidence, and a new sense of international obligation. These had their genesis in the 1980s as a result of Japan's strong economic position and institutions, and had reached sufficient maturity by the 1990s to influence security policy in a concrete way.¹⁶ Moreover, there quickly developed acceptance of the necessity to respond to international security crises with

more than economic means. The 'two steps forward and one step back' approach to enhancing national security throughout the 1980s had conditioned society to a certain extent regarding greater activism in the international system, with the political battles having already been fought over policy substance and leaving only implementation to be effected.

Notwithstanding completion of the transition from economic security to comprehensive national security respecting both policy and activism, there still remained a significant disjuncture between Japan's economic power, and the level of acceptance of international security responsibilities and implementation of expected policy responses. National security activity respecting both defence and international security retained an incremental character, reflecting continued domestic constraints on security policy decision-makers. Although more muted than in the 1980s, residual pacifism and anti-militarism continued to impede the allocation of resources to the SDF and constrained changes to its mandate respecting deployments abroad. Additionally, bureaucratic rivalries, conservatism and the contemporary economic climate made difficult increased funding of the defence budget and the legitimization of an expanded role for the SDF.¹⁰⁷

The same bureaucratic constraints continued to impede the formation of a coherent, long-term national security policy, with intra-bureaucratic conflict respecting the emphasis to be placed on the different components of comprehensive security policy and its objects. The resultant predisposition to react to peace and security issues, rather than to implement a definitive long-term strategy, was further exacerbated by the continued conduct of 'traditional' Japanese politics that precluded a strong leadership role in the conduct of security affairs.

Defence Capabilities

Japan's defence posture continued to be enhanced during the 1990s, regardless of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War virtually eliminating the possibility

of Japan being drawn into global conflict. These events gave new impetus to domestic demands for a reduction in defence spending and a halt to SDF modernization programs. However, the JDA and the MOFA continued to argue that Russia still posed a danger given the level of Russian forces being maintained and the unchanging challenge to Japan's sovereignty by the continued occupation and militarization of the Northern Territories. Moreover, regardless of Seoul's *Nordpolitik* to reduce military tensions on the Korean Peninsula, that area was still being viewed as containing the potential for short-term instability with Pyongyang maintaining its confrontational regime and building its offensive military capabilities.¹⁰⁸ Moreover, note was being taken of the PRC's modernization of the PLA.

The defence budgets of 1990 and 1991 would appear to support the JDA and MOFA strategic assessment. Additionally, the budgets were responsive to US and Western positions regarding greater Japanese security burden-sharing. Nevertheless, the new five-year Mid-term Defence Program, begun in 1991, reduced the scope and speed of SDF modernization, and defence spending for 1992 has been set at Y 4,551.8B, representing the second smallest increase since 1960. This reduction in growth was presented in the context of lessening tensions in the international situation and the slow growth of tax revenues.¹⁰⁹ Significantly, this level of defence spending remained the third greatest in the world, and the increase for defence was greater than the increase of the total budget. Also of note is that the rate of growth was much higher than that among the Western industrialized countries in general for the period.¹¹⁰

Regardless of a slow-down in the defence budget's rate of growth and a concomitant reduction in planned expenditures for major weapons procurement, significant military capabilities will be acquired within the 1991-96 Mid-Term Defense Plan. The planned acquisition of additional main battle equipment for the SDF will enhance the anti-invasion role

and dislodgement function of the ground forces. The addition of 42 F-15s for the ASDF and eight AEGIS destroyers for the MSDF will effectively extend the maritime defence perimeter. Although there is some shifting of resource allocations from the ship and aircraft modernization programs to the upgrading of support operations, this does not contribute a slowdown of capability enhancement in an absolute sense. Support operations were identified as a critical SDF weakness in the 1980 CNS Report, and programs to redress infra-structure and sustainability deficiencies must be considered as a force multiplier. Moreover, the enhancement of support operations also engender a more autonomous posture for the SDF in the longer term. More important and integral to this form of enhancement is the contributing growth of investment allocation (procurement, R&D and construction) and decline of operating costs as a percentage of the budget, which together denote a rising level of military capability.¹¹¹

In addition to having little effect on the defence budget, calls for a 'peace dividend' did not give rise to renewed questioning of SDF legitimacy, and public support for this component of national security has continued to be high.¹¹² Similarly, a majority of the public expressed support for the MST in 1990; and 61.7 percent of parliamentarians favoured the treaty being firmly maintained, and only 35.9 percent favoured review given the end of the Cold War.¹¹³ While there remains strong support for the present bilateral security regime, only 39.1 percent of the Diet members stressed that Japanese-US ties remain the pivot of Japan's diplomacy and 52 percent supported intensifying multi-lateral diplomacy (towards Europe and the PRC) concurrent with promoting US relations. This position on Japan-US ties is not congruent with government policy which posits the relationship as being "... the cornerstone of Japanese foreign policy".¹¹⁴

Continued enhancement of SDF capabilities was complemented by the first definitive

increase in SDF roles from that of defence in cooperation with the US. The August 1991 dispatch of SDF minesweepers to the Middle East in the aftermath of the Gulf War constituted the first foreign deployment of the SDF for other than training exercises. This reversal of the 1984 and 1987 decisions not to participate in Gulf minesweeping operations was a response to the intense criticism of Japan's solely economic participation in the Gulf Coalition. Japan was expected to play a leading role in the new international order, and Tokyo belatedly recognized that it must do so more concretely in the peace and security arena if it desired to develop greater political influence. The minesweeping request provided an acceptable *entrée* into high politics as participation was not only acceptable to extra-regional actors, but had the support of ASEAN.¹¹⁵ Moreover, domestic concerns were alleviated by the absence of a state of belligerency, the example of German participation, and the *de facto* approval of the United Nations, all of which provided political rationalization for what was in effect a new and broader interpretation of Article IX of the Constitution.

While the departure of the SDF force to the Gulf was a low-key event to minimize political debate, the return after successful and politically uneventful operations was raised to a national event. Prime Minister Kaifu described the deployment as "a brilliant achievement spearheading Japan's international contributions in the dawning era", and was joined by a broad spectrum of the LDP leadership for the return ceremonies.¹¹⁶ Significantly, the initial debate on sending minesweepers to the Gulf had touched off public demonstrations, although public support for the deployment had risen to 56 percent by the time of departure.¹¹⁷ On completion of the deployment more than two-thirds approved the government's decision, paving the way for future overseas initiatives involving the SDF. The question to be debated was no longer the constitutional status of overseas deployment, but rather the nature of such operations.

The dispatch of SDF forces to UN peacekeeping operations in Cambodia can be viewed as a logical extension of the Gulf mine-sweeping operations, with the same incremental approach being taken to overcome domestic resistance. A United Nations Peace Cooperation Corps Bill (UNPCCB) was first introduced to enable the SDF to participate in the Gulf War. However, the government was forced to withdraw the UNPCCB, having been unable to forge an LDP consensus and having incited a strong negative reaction from both public opinion and opposition parties.¹¹⁸ Again reacting to criticism of Japan's role in the Gulf War, Prime Minister Miyazawa indicated that he firmly intended to have the Bill approved during the next Diet session "as the core of human contribution to world peace."¹¹⁹ It is significant that the United Nations Peace Cooperation (PKO) Bill was introduced along with a Bill to permit the SDF to participate in UN-sponsored humanitarianism relief activities overseas, thereby reinforcing the imagery of UN sponsorship and the 'peaceful' purposes of such deployments.

The political process at play in the ultimate passage of these Bills and the international context in which they were pursued will be addressed in detail in Chapter Six, as will the ultimate character of the legislation. Suffice to note at this juncture that the ten month delay in getting the Bills through the Lower House, and the subsequent six month delay in the Upper House, were founded in bitter political opposition supported by a majority of public opinion opposed to the dispatch of troops to foreign *territory*. Argument opposing the Bills was advanced on the predictable constitutional basis along with resurrection of the anti-militarist position. On the other hand, argument supporting the Bills emphasized Japan's constitutional focus on the UN charter, the 'non-military' character of authorized operations, and the necessity of actively supporting the UN to establish Japan's place in the 'New World Order'. Less than three months after the Bills became legislation, Cabinet approved a UN request for

SDF participation in the Cambodian peacekeeping mission, and members of the SDF were dispatched in September, 1992.

ODA Initiatives

The use of ODA as a security-enhancing mechanism in the 1990s has essentially followed the pattern set during the previous decade, with some diversification being taken in response to international pressures to provide more for the development of disadvantaged economies. However, this trend has been complemented by even greater increased economic aid to Asia where ODA is better placed to enhance Japanese economic security and to bolster diplomatic relations. By 1991, the ODA budget reached approximately \$US 14B making Japan the world's largest aid donor. Significantly, the 1992 budget plan, approved after the Gulf War, included a 7.8 percent increase in ODA, representing approximately a three-fold greater increase than that of the general budget.¹²⁰ The rationale put forth for this ODA growth in a climate of fiscal constraint and economic slow-down was that it represented a response to international expectations that Japan fulfil its political and economic role in the world community.¹²¹ More importantly, as an index of burdensharing in the international system, the 1992 ODA growth sends a clear signal to Japan's critics that it is attempting to move towards assuming responsibilities commensurate with its economic position.

These responsibilities are being seen not only in the light of humanitarian considerations and recognition of interdependence, but are increasingly viewed in the context of contributing to world peace and security. Whereas the ODA-security linkage was definitively established with respect to ASEAN and Northeast Asia in the previous two decades it is now being extended on a global scale. With the collapse of the East Bloc and the Soviet Union, greater attention is being given the Central and Eastern European states as potential recipients of ODA with Japan assuming a role in the establishment of the European

Bank for Reconstruction and Development.¹²² Additionally, the ODA-peace and security linkage has been manifest in the new guidelines for ODA, announced by Prime Minister Kaifu in the Diet in April 1991. These attempts to support arms control and disarmament by considering the following respecting potential recipient countries:

- "1. trend in military expenditure;
2. trend in development, production, etc. of weapons of mass destruction such as atomic weapons and missiles;
3. trend in the export and import of weapons, and
4. efforts for promoting democratization and introduction of a market-oriented economy and the situation on securing basic human rights and freedom."¹²³

One other aspect of contemporary ODA warrants attention - that of an overt linkage of ODA and political objectives. While the link existed with respect to ASEAN, the PRC and the ROK in the 1980s, it was somewhat more subtle than that evident in the Japan-Russia negotiations on the peace treaty and Northern Territories issues. In this respect, ODA has emerged as a primary instrument of national security.

Whereas Japan carefully balanced the rate of increase in ODA and defence spending during the 1980s, there would appear to be a new trend developing with the 1992 budget indicating greater growth of ODA as compared to the defence budget.(Table 3) While it is yet too early to draw definitive conclusions, it would appear that ODA is becoming an increasingly important means to effect comprehensive national security and to meet international expectations concerning Japan's political role. This means is not only a more acceptable manifestation of international activism to the domestic constituency, but is also more palatable to regional actors who remain concerned about Japan's military potential. It can also be noted that since ODA is parcelled out among the various ministries to administer programs within their area of competence, the budgetary process would more easily reach consensus on increased ODA rather than increased defence spending where the government is

attempting to enhance its position within the international community.¹²⁴ Moreover, increased ODA would be unlikely to elicit an unfavourable public response given the public's passive but positive support to increased aid levels.¹²⁵ It may be summarized that it is the government's intention to pursue further the use of ODA as a politico-strategic instrument given plans "to obtain the understanding and support of our people for our ODA policies" and the declaration that the "expansion of ODA represents an important pillar of our diplomatic effort to make a positive contribution to the international community through non-military means".¹²⁶

Diplomatic Initiatives

Japan's diplomacy in support of national security, in the 1990s, has retained much of the character established in the preceding decade, in that both scope and activity progressively increased, on an incremental basis. Regardless of subscription to the 'New World Order' and recognition that such an order could be established and maintained only when the major actors work together, Japan's activism remained subdued in the global sense.¹²⁷ While policy statements emphasized the need to play a positive role in world politics, to bolster cooperative ties with the US for world peace and security, and to strengthen relations with Europe, diplomatic initiatives were few and Japanese leadership was absent.¹²⁸ This may be ascribed to a continued lack of focus and national consensus as to what direction and with what intensity, Japan should pursue its place in the evolving international system. Even within the aforementioned policy statements, Japan's searching can be discerned. While noting that, *inter alia*, security policy would be pursued in cooperation with the other industrialized democracies, it is specified both that Japan-US relations would constitute the basis of Japan's diplomacy and that Japan would pursue an avowed UN-centred diplomacy.

The Gulf Crisis may be considered a major catalyst of the search for an increased

political role in the post-Cold War era, while bureaucratic and societal factors contributed to the ambiguity as to Japan's future diplomacy. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, Japan was among the first states to denounce the violation of international peace and security, and to impose a trade embargo against Iraq. This was quickly followed by a two billion dollar assistance package to Egypt, Turkey and Jordan, and by a contribution of a similar sum to support the emerging coalition forces. It must be noted, however, that prior to extending economic aid, the Japanese Defense Agency received a letter from the US Secretary of Defense stating "...at this time evidence is needed to show that the US-Japan relationship continues to be firm..."[and that without such evidence]"...the two nations no longer have a relationship."¹²⁹ The implicit 'threat' in this communication, and subsequent pressure on Japan by the US and Coalition members presented Japan with a dual challenge - whether it should participate actively in the Coalition and what financial support should be forthcoming.

Retrenchment into Article IX of the Constitution by the opposition parties and the public, and a split in the LDP, not only forestalled participation by the SDF, but also severely limited attempts to contribute by means of civilian logistics and medical support even outside of the theatre of operations.¹³⁰ On the other hand, polls indicated general support for a significant financial contribution, regardless of a special tax increase and domestic spending cuts required.¹³¹ The ultimate contribution of some \$US 13 billion was not forthcoming without strong opposition by the MOF which had to be overcome by external pressures, and financial contributions were accompanied by conditions that restricted their use to non-warfighting purposes.¹³² These limitations on Japan's participation in the Gulf Crisis resulted in no significant diplomacy being effected, other than support of the series of UN resolutions being directed against Iraq.

The Gulf War caused close inspection of Japan's role in the international security

system by both external and domestic actors. In the case of the former, Japan was found wanting and was again subjected to harsh criticism in terms of the timeliness of concrete support and the nature of that support. Moreover, Tokyo's response to the Gulf Crisis compromised its declared 'UN-centred' diplomacy and its drive to gain a permanent seat on the Security Council. Within Japan, the debate focused on the efficacy of attempting to pursue an enhanced political role in global peace and security without demonstrating the commitment to providing military assistance where and when necessary. Additionally, there was a polarization of views manifest in a marked division of public opinion as to Japan's future international role.¹³³ Until a new national consensus is forged, the government is unlikely to act in other than an incremental manner given the nature of Japan's political system. As noted by Owada, Japan's global role will not be determined by the political elites, but will be defined by Japanese society.¹³⁴

Japan's diplomacy directed towards regional security issues was more focused and active than that respecting global peace and security. Diplomatic activism within East Asia reflected the 1992 Diplomatic Action Policy which asserted that "peace and development in the Asia-Pacific region constitute the basis of Japan's own stability and prosperity"¹³⁵ In Southeast Asia such activism was directed towards the resolution of the Cambodia question and the furtherance of a recognized political, if not leadership, role. In Northeast Asia, the focus was to enhance the normalization of bilateral relations, with some tentative movement towards playing a political role across the sub-region.

Involvement in the Cambodian conflict progressed beyond the willingness to participate in the peace process and reconstruction financing expressed in the late-1980s. The 1990 Tokyo conference on Cambodia was a Japanese initiative that complemented a Japanese-proposed peace plan and frequent meetings with the various Cambodian factions. This was

followed by another peace proposal prior to the mid-1991 Jakarta Meeting, and by strong support for the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia, first by financial means and ultimately by the dispatch of SDF and civilian peacekeepers.¹³⁶ This escalating activity enhanced Japanese efforts to retain influence in the peace settlement process and supported its overall diplomacy in the region.¹³⁷ The objective of an expanded political role in Southeast Asia was consistent with the threat posed by incipient instability in the region to growing Japanese investment and economic interdependence, in addition to strategic considerations. The former considerations ensured MITI and MOF support of deeper Japanese political involvement that was again pronounced by Prime Minister Kaifu during his 1991 tour of the ASEAN states.¹³⁸ However, pursuit of a political role on an incremental basis may be expected to continue given ASEAN's acceptance of such a role only with respect to certain issues, and only while Japan remains firmly within the US alliance system.¹³⁹

The movement towards the establishment of a new security framework by ASEAN has posed both opportunity and dilemma for Japanese politico-strategic activity in Southeast Asia. The decision of ASEAN Heads of Government at the fourth Summit Meeting in Singapore, on 27-28 January 1992, to include security in the ASEAN PMC agenda complemented ASEAN's agreement to engage in a collective dialogue on security issues and to expand security cooperation.¹⁴⁰ Both initiatives may be viewed as reactions to potential regional instability and the changing balance of power in East Asia after the end of the Cold War. The inclusion of Japan as a Dialogue Partner in the PMC and a growing consensus within ASEAN that an increasingly influential political and security role for Japan in the region is inevitable given its economic power have led ASEAN countries to contemplate the efficacy and the desirability of Japanese participation in regional collective security.¹⁴¹ Where lingering distrust of Japan remains, the concept of integrating Japan into some form of regional security association,

preferably with the US involved, holds much more appeal than Japan developing as an independent military power.

Tokyo's response to playing a security role in Southeast Asia beyond the economic and diplomatic dimensions has been somewhat ambiguous. The expanded security agenda of the PMC was welcomed as a forum for political dialogue "...for mutual reassurance among the friendly countries..." and for "...Japan to deepen mutual trust with those countries."¹⁴² This theme was reiterated in Prime Minister Miyazawa's policy speech to the 123rd session of the National Diet in January 1992, in which he emphasized that Japan would play an active role economically and politically in the PMC with no mention of military cooperation.¹⁴³ On the other hand, the passage of the PKO Bill and subsequent dispatch of SDF units to Cambodia in support of the UNTAC displayed a willingness to contribute militarily to regional security, albeit in a muted form under the auspices of the UN. At this juncture in the Japan-ASEAN relationship, there has been no resolution of the intra-ASEAN debate as to the bounds of an acceptable Japanese security role, nor has Japan expressed interest in entering into either collective or bilateral formal military agreements with the ASEAN states. The extent to which Japan will further participate in the military dimension of regional security will be dependent on the development of 'mutual trust' and the societal-imposed boundaries evident in the PKO Bill debate.

Notwithstanding the definitive advances made respecting the Japanese position in Southeast Asia, if the number of international VIP exchanges can be construed as a valid indicant, then Japan's major diplomatic effort within Asia-Pacific was directed towards Northeast Asia.¹⁴⁴ Japan's diplomacy towards the two Koreas was primarily focused on enhancing peace and stability in the peninsula through attempts to advance the normalization of Japan's bilateral relations and tentative efforts to mediate between North and South. The

level of diplomatic activity with the DPRK rose significantly in 1990 and 1991 given Pyongyang's urging for a quick conclusion to the full normalization of relations. Both formal and informal channels of communication were established; however, the use of multiple channels, particularly those opened by the LDP representative Kanemaru as part of a joint LDP-JSP delegation to Pyongyang, precipitated intra-party and LDP-bureaucratic conflict, effectively slowing the normalization process.¹⁴⁵

The further constraints imposed by Seoul's concerns respecting the DPRK-Japan dialogue and US concerns regarding the DPRK's nuclear capability forced Tokyo to proceed cautiously and to retain control of the speed and conditions of normalization.¹⁴⁶ Both these domestic and external constraints upon Japan's diplomacy with the DPRK, and Japan's own concerns regarding the direction of the DPRK's nuclear development limited success in establishing full diplomatic ties with Pyongyang, regardless of the increased pace of diplomatic activity.¹⁴⁷ Attempts to encourage dialogue between North and South Korea should be viewed as being complementary to Tokyo-Pyongyang diplomacy of ending the isolation of the DPRK, with associated diplomacy being extended to Moscow and Beijing. Dialogue with these two capitals has, however, given the impression of Japanese interest in the continuation of a divided but peaceful Korea, regardless of publicly supporting ROK proposals for the reunification of the peninsula.¹⁴⁸

Diplomacy with respect to the ROK reflected the same theme of strengthening friendly and cooperative relations, but also with a view to building confidence in Japan's long-term political interests in the region.¹⁴⁹ With the dispatch of SDF minesweepers to the Gulf, the PKO Bill and the continued advance of SDF capabilities, diplomatic activism was required to moderate ROK suspicions of Japan's security intentions. Unlike the Western position, the ROK retained its fundamental opposition to any Japanese movement towards the assumption

of a political or military role commensurate with its economic strength. Additionally, it was necessary for Japan to pursue an active diplomacy of political support for the ROK to counter the unfavourable ROK perceptions of the Japan-DPRK normalization process. In sum, there has been little evidence of Japanese intentions to attempt the formation of a bilateral security regime or any other form of military cooperation with the ROK. Rather, diplomatic energy has been directed towards simply reaching an accommodation that will serve to defuse the long-standing animosity between the two states in both the short and long term.

Security diplomacy respecting the PRC has taken a similar direction as that towards the two Koreas, with the normalization of relations and the reduction of PRC isolation being the objectives with which to enhance a long-term accommodation with a potential regional rival.¹⁵⁰ Also noted by Mochizuki, was Japan's sensitivity to PRC perceptions of a resurgence in Japanese nationalism and militarism. Tokyo's moderate reaction to Tiananmen, and its initiative during the 1991 G-7 meeting to lift the economic ban on the PRC, were indicative of a more independent diplomacy towards that state and of the drive for improved relations. The subsequent visit of the Japanese Emperor to the PRC in October, 1992 best illustrates the importance Japan attaches to normalization and its support of Beijing's economic (and political) reforms. Although subject to intense domestic debate as to the political wisdom of such a visit, Japan's requirement to maintain a stable relationship with the PRC demanded this level of diplomacy.

Japan's incremental movement towards an independent security agenda in Northeast Asia and its increased diplomatic activity has been most clear with respect to the Soviet Union and its successor Russia. Regardless of the end of the Cold War and the promising beginning of a new era in Russo-Japanese relations that were heralded by the Gorbachev visit to Tokyo in 1990, little has been achieved in progressing towards the conclusion of a peace treaty and

the normalization of relations. The unprecedented level of bilateral diplomacy has effectively remained focused on the question of the Northern Territories, irrespective of the 1990 LDP pledge to strive towards genuine rapprochement with the former Soviet Union and the significant achievements of the Kaifu-Gorbachev summit.¹⁵¹ Progress beyond a tentative Russian proposal that the return of the two most southerly islands be the accepted *quid pro quo* for Japanese economic assistance, made before Gorbachev's planned visit to Tokyo in 1991, was withdrawn as mutual intransigence on the issue came to the fore. On the Japanese side, the return of all four islands has become a matter of national honour which the government cannot ignore. This has been complemented by the hard line taken by the MOFA and the JDA that the issue must be resolved prior to the conclusion of a peace treaty or extensive economic ties being established, a position strongly supported by the generally anti-Russian Japanese public.¹⁵² On the Russian side, retaining the islands has become a domestic political issue of such proportions that it caused Yeltsin to cancel his September 1992 state visit to Tokyo, reflecting Russian intransigence in ceding further territory.¹⁵³

CONCLUSION

The imperatives and constraints which have influenced Japan's security policy can be differentiated into the primary groupings of external and domestic variables. Relevant variables generated in the external environment have included, in order of relative salience: the United States, the Soviet threat, the international system, and, regional and extra-regional actors.

Throughout the Post-War era, the United States remained the most salient external influence on Japan's security policy. First, the US global and regional politico-strategic postures shaped Japan's general security environment, providing various levels of capability

and commitment with respect to the global and regional balance of power. Second, the US-Japan security regime remained fundamental to Japan's security policy, sufficiently insulating Japan from the international political environment to allow Tokyo to conduct primarily low politics in pursuit of Japan's other vital interests, such as economic development. Changes to Japanese security policy reflected the perceived waxing and waning of the US capability and commitment respecting both the general US position and that directly related to the US-Japan 'alliance'. Third, Tokyo had no option but to take cognizance of US insistence that Japan increasingly assume burden-sharing respecting its own defence, and more recently, respecting regional and global peace and security, since the continuance of the US-Japan security regime was perceived to be contingent upon the acknowledgement of these pressures. Together, these imperatives exerted greater influence on security policy formulation than did the threat posed by the Soviet Union and Russia.

While Japan remained preoccupied by the latent threat inherent in growing Soviet activism and build-up in the region, Japanese assessments considered both capabilities and intentions. The resultant analysis consistently posited that there was no immediate threat to Japan, but that potential Soviet political and strategic influence had to be increasingly addressed within security policy. Policy output, however, remained sensitive to the relativities of the Soviet and US politico-strategic positions, both globally and regionally. After the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the East Bloc, Japan's security calculus remained essentially the same, addressing the US-Russian balance in East Asia.

The evolution of the international system, away from the tight bipolarity of the Cold War, provided Japan with a more flexible environment in which to pursue its security interests. However, until the end of the 1980s, Japan viewed both the global and regional security environment primarily through a bipolar lens; and, in the wake of the Cold War, the

bipolar perspective remained in place when regarding the potential Russian threat which continued to be perceived in East Asia. Essentially, the US-Japan security regime remained paramount in Japanese policy calculations. The transition to increasing multi-polarity was acknowledged only with respect to secondary issues, notwithstanding the policy latitude that a transitory system presented and Japan's subdued, incremental initiatives to take advantage of that systemic condition.

The influence of systemic conditions may also be viewed in the context of the changing distribution of economic power. Japan's growing economic power brought with it demands that Japan not only accept responsibilities associated with maintaining the economic system, but that it increasingly assume responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security upon which the economic system was dependent. Moreover, Japan's economic power was subject to the dynamics of an increasingly interdependent world, and therefore on the continued security and stability of economic partners. Systemic conditions, in this respect, forced Japan to expand the scope and application of its security policy.

Regional and extra-regional actors also influenced security policy, but to a lesser degree than the other external variables cited. On one hand, the US Western allies added to the pressure that Japan contribute more to defence, and to regional and global security. However, such exhortations were essentially supplemental to those of the US. On the other hand, the rising intensity of these demands, prior to the 1990s, were off-set by counter-pressures of regional actors who wished to limit the expansion of Japan's strategic capabilities and influence. Where these pressures changed in the 1990s, they remained in the context of a limited and conditional acceptance of an expansionary Japanese security policy anchored within the framework of the US alliance system and UN initiatives. Overall, pressures that Japan expand politically have been subsumed within the US position: counter-pressures to

restrict Japan politically have been seized by Tokyo to rationalize its policy of incremental change, where convenient or where necessary, to accommodate domestic imperatives and constraints.

While external variables have provided the stimulus for change respecting Japan's security policy, they have been less salient than the collectivity of domestic variables with respect to policy output and the implementation of such policy. Relevant domestic variables have included, in order of relative salience: societal values of pacifism and anti-militarism; institutional factors including the Constitution; the political process and the decision-making process; the bureaucracy; and, the individual.

The societal values of pacifism and anti-militarism, learned by Japan's citizenry as a result of the experience of the Pacific War and consolidated by the success of the Yoshida Doctrine, became internalized within the polity and set the boundaries within which government could formulate policy. In practical terms, these values were translated into a posture of political isolationism respecting the international community and a rejection of a domestic military capability beyond the minimum required for self-defence. This minimum, however, was conditioned by the evolving politico-strategic environment, but nevertheless constrained Japan's response to the 'threat' and externally-generated pressures to address that threat. Article IX of the Constitution institutionalized these values, and served as the reference point for society's demands for a minimalist security policy. Moreover, the *Peace Constitution* provided rationalization for Japan to resist external pressures for change, and supported the long-standing contention that the SDF could not be deployed beyond the immediate environs of Japan.

The constant politicization of security issues, especially those respecting the roles and capabilities of the SDF, effectively subjected policy-making to the dynamics of Japan's

political process and removed decision-making from the formal institutions of government. Thus national security policy remained subject to the government's concern of maintaining consensus with society and within the political system, and policy initiatives represented a political compromise rather than a rational response to the external environment. These processes were reflected in incremental, reactive policy changes, and in the difficulty Japan experienced in formulating pro-active, long-term policies beyond the initial Yoshida Doctrine. Moreover, policy implementation remained tentative and incremental to reduce political conflict and to prevent inciting the public.

The salience of the bureaucracy in security decision-making was progressively reduced as policy became increasingly politicized as it moved beyond the economic dimension. With the adoption of Comprehensive National Security, the particularized and hierarchical character of the bureaucracy not only made coherent policy difficult to formulate, but the complexity of relationships across expanding interests exacerbated the inherent slowness of the bureaucratic decision-making process. These problems associated with expanding security horizons and issues were not unique to the bureaucracy, being also reflected in political decision-making.

While the individual decision-maker, the Prime Minister, played an infrequent role in resolving political and bureaucratic impasse, he would appear to have taken few initiatives in security decision-making with the exception of the Nakasone prime ministership. Regardless of any predisposition to lead, the individual remained constrained by the political process and by the opinion of the political constituency. Where the Prime Minister moved too far ahead of public opinion, retreats were common and a political price paid.

The influence exerted by external and domestic factors have not remained constant over time. The relative salience of the US-Japan relationship and the Soviet/Russian threat have gradually increased, as have the entire set of external variables relative to domestic

variables. This may be attributed to the lessening of pacifism and anti-militarism, and the emerging sense of nationalism and self-confidence within Japanese society. These slowly changing societal values have incrementally accommodated greater sensitivity to the external security environment, resulting in expanding security horizons and acceptable means of achieving security goals. Nevertheless, domestic factors have retained their dominant position and are unlikely to be subordinated in the foreseeable future. The incrementalism evident in policy formulation and implementation, and the concomitant lack of traditional congruence between economic and strategic power, can be expected to continue until these dominant domestic factors further evolve in character.

NOTES

1. Takashi Inoguchi, "Japan's Foreign Policy Background", in Herbert J. Ellison, ed., *Japan and the Pacific Quadrille* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987) 93; and Richard Ellingworth, *Japanese Economic Policies and Security* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1972) 1.
2. Takashi Inoguchi, loc. cit.; Richard Ellingworth, op. cit. 30.
3. Reinhard Drifte, "Japan's Security Policy and Southeast Asia", in *Contemporary Southeast Asia* Vol.12, No.3 (1990) 186-187.
4. Yukio Satoh, "The Evolution of Japanese Security Policy", in Robert O'Neil, ed., *Security in East Asia* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1984) 19; and Richard Ellingworth, op. cit.: 1.
5. Tetsuya Kataoka and Ramon H. Myers, *Defending an Economic Superpower* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989) 13-14; and John W. Dower, *Empire and Aftermath* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979) 397-400.
6. Michael W. Donnelly, "Japanese-American Relations: the costs of brinkmanship", in *International Journal*, Vol 46, No 4 (1991) 633.
7. John W. Dower, op. cit.: 381.
8. Makato Momoi, "Basic Trends in Japanese Security Policies", in Robert A. Scalapino, ed., *The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977) 343.
9. See John W. Dower, op. cit.: 378-383 for the dynamics of the changing position on the right of self-defence.
10. For the texts of the 1951 Peace and Security Treaties see Denise Folliot, ed., *Documents on International Affairs 1951* (London: Oxford University Press, 1954) 611-626.
11. Makato Momoi, op. cit.: 343-344.
12. Loc. cit.
13. Jusuf Wanandi, "The Internal and External Dimensions of Southeast Asian Society", in Joyce E. Larson, ed., *New Foundations for Asian and Pacific Security* (New Brunswick: National Strategy Information Centre, 1980) 70.
14. Martin E. Weinstein, *Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, 1947-1968* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971) 44.
15. John W. Dower, op. cit.: 387-388 and 433-449.

16. Tetsuya Kataoka and Ramon H. Myers, *op. cit.*: 15.
17. *Ibid.*: 15-16.
18. John W. Dower, *op. cit.*: 384-385.
19. *Defense of Japan 1976* (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency) 31.
20. James H. Buck, "Japan's Self-Defense Forces", in Edward A. Olsen and Stephen Jurika, eds., *The Armed Forces in Contemporary Asian Societies* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986) 75
21. John W. Dower, *op. cit.*: 462.
22. See Shigeru Yoshida, translated by Kenichi Yoshida, *The Yoshida Memoirs* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962) 194-195.
23. See Ito Kenichi, "The Japanese State of Mind: Deliberations on the Gulf Crisis", in *The Journal of Japanese Studies*, Vol.17, No.2, (1991) 278.
24. See *Defense of Japan 1981*, translated by The Japan Times Ltd (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency) 158-159 for the development of the Three Non-nuclear Principles. Regardless of the LDP position that the Constitution did not proscribe nuclear weapons if they were "defensive", successive governments have viewed this policy as immutable.
25. See *Defense of Japan 1988*, translated by The Japan Times Ltd (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency) 180-181 for the subsequent evolution of these principles and the eventual Japan-US agreements of the 1980s that permitted the transfer of military technologies to the US.
26. George R. Packard, *Protest in Tokyo* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966) 58 64.
27. *Ibid.*: 33-41 and 67.
28. For the text of the 1960 MST, see Denise Folliot, ed., *Documents on International Affairs 1960* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964) 456-459
29. George R. Packard, *op. cit.*: 70.
30. See *Ibid.*: 64-81 for a detailed treatment of Conservative factional politics
31. *Ibid.*: 153 and 187.
32. *Ibid.*: 248-251 summarizes legal and customary parliamentary procedures which were violated.
33. *Ibid.*: 303.
34. *Ibid.*: 147-152 and 246-248; and Tetsuya Kataoka and Ramon H. Myers, *op. cit.* 45-46 provide the results of newspaper and government polls cited

35. Yukio Satoh, *op. cit.*: 20 and Takashi Inoguchi, "The Ideas and Structures of Foreign Policy: Looking Ahead with Caution" in Takashi Inoguchi and Daniel T. Okimoto eds., *The Political Economy of Japan. Vol 2* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988) 38.

36. Yukio Satoh, *op. cit.*: 122; and Akio Watanabe, "The End of Pax America?", in Dora Alves, ed., *Pacific Security Toward the Year 2000* (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1988) 67.

37. Akio Watanabe, *op. cit.*: 72.

38. J.W.M. Chapman et al., *Japan's Quest for Comprehensive Security* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983) 10-11.

39. See *Defense of Japan 1979*, translated by Mainichi Daily News (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency) 200-206 for relevant data from JDA and PMO surveys. The preservation of national security emerged as the primary reason for supporting the SDF for the first time in 1978.

40. *Defense of Japan 1976*, (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency) 57; *Defense of Japan 1978*, translated by Mainichi Daily News (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency) 207; and J.W.M. Chapman et al., *op. cit.*: 11.

41. See Ronald J. Hrebennar, *The Japanese Party System* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986) 91-94, 121-125, 174-175, 200-201, and J.W.M. Chapman et al., *op. cit.*: 13-18 for an expanded account of respective party positions on national security.

42. Ronald J. Hrebennar, *op. cit.*: 236-237 tabulates the major political issues and LDP policy responses for the period 1958-1983.

43. *Defense of Japan 1970* (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency).

44. See Makato Momoi, *op. cit.*: 345-347 for comment on the first White Paper.

45. Harrison M. Holland, *Managing Defense: Japan's Dilemma* (New York: University Press of America 1988) 21-22; and I.T.M. Gow, "Defence as a Political Issue", in J.W.M. Chapman, et al., eds., *op. cit.*: 62-64 provide details of the controversy precipitated by the Fourth Build-Up Plan and subsequent down-scaling of objectives.

46. See *Defense of Japan 1976* (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency) 37-42 for the rationale underlying the Standard Defense Force. *Defense of Japan 1977* (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency) 45-82 presents the NDPO.

47. I.T.M. Gow, *op. cit.*: 66.

48. Akio Watanabe, *op. cit.*: 70.

49. Harrison M. Holland, *op. cit.*: 49-50 provides an expansion of the 'one-percent' *raison d'être* and its impact upon military capability.

50. Yasuhisa Nakada, "Japan's Security Perceptions and Military Needs", in Onkar Marwah and Jonathan D. Pollack, eds., *Military Power and Policy in Asian States: China, India and Japan* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980) 164.

51. *Ibid.*: 164-165.

52. Peace and security diplomacy during the 1950s and 1960s essentially mirrored that of the US, examples of which were Japan's position with respect to the PRC, Taiwan, Korea, and the failure of Japanese-Soviet Peace Treaty negotiations.

53. Charles E. Morrison, "Japan and the ASEAN Countries", in Takashi Inoguchi and Daniel I. Okimoto, eds., *op. cit.*: 421.

54. Japan, *Diplomatic Bluebook for 1977*, translated by Foreign Press Centre (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 30.

55. Charles E. Morrison, *op. cit.*: 422; and Japan, *Diplomatic Bluebook for 1977*, translated by Foreign Press Centre (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 30.

56. Charles E. Morrison, "Japan's Politico-Security Roles in Southeast Asia", in Dora Alves, ed., *op. cit.*: 113.

57. See Shiro Saito, *Japan at the Summit* (London: Routledge, 1990) 143-148 respecting political issues of Vietnam and Kampuchea.

58. F. Quei Quo, "Japan's Role in Asia: A United States Surrogate", in *International Journal* Vol 38, No 2 (1983): 257.

59. Takashi Inoguchi, *op. cit.*: 97.

60. Reinhard Drifte, *op. cit.*: 193.

61. Hisahiko Okazaki, "Japan's Defense Capabilities", in Dora Alves, ed., *op. cit.* (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1987) 55; and Hisahiko Okazaki, "Japanese Security Policy" in *International Security*, Fall (1982): 197.

62. Reinhard Drifte, *op. cit.*: 188-189; and Hisahiko Okazaki, *A Grand Strategy for Japanese Defense* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1986), *passim*, present a valuable study on Japan's strategy and highlight the sterility of Japanese strategic thinking.

63. See Tetsuya Kataoka and Ramon H. Myers, *op. cit.* 46-50 for relevant excerpts from the influential daily newspapers.

64. See *Ibid.*: 50-51 for the polling data used.

65. See J.W.M. Chapman et al., *op. cit.*: 13-18, and Ronald J. Hrebenar, *op. cit.* 98, 140, 175 and 202 for the evolution of party positions on the defence issue. Note that while the JCP opposed unarmed neutrality, it wished to disband the SDF *per se*.

66. S.K. Vogel, "The US-Japanese Relationship: Technological Rivalry and Military Alliance": 13, and Mike M. Mochizuki, "Japanese Security Policy Beyond the Cold War: Domestic Politics and International Change": 58 in M. Kahler, ed., *Beyond the Cold War in the Pacific* (Berkeley: University of California, 1991).

67. See Reinhard Drifte, *op. cit.*: 191 respecting regional policies; and S.K. Vogel, *op. cit.*: 13 and Mike M. Mochizuki, *op. cit.*: 63 who argue that the US-Japan relationship remained the most important external variable.

68. Takashi Inoguchi, "The Ideas and Structures of Foreign Policy: Looking Ahead with Caution": 41 and Hisahiko Okazaki, "Japan's Defense Capabilities": 55-56.

69. Hisahiko Okazaki, "Japan's Defense Capabilities": 55-56; Mike M. Mochizuki, *op. cit.*: 67 and Reinhard Drifte, *op. cit.*: 195-196.

70. Takashi Inoguchi, "Japan's Foreign Policy Background", *op. cit.*: 94.

71. See J.W.M. Chapman et al., *op. cit.*: 149-150 for comment on the composition of the three study groups commissioned by Prime Minister Ohira and the mandate of the CNS Group.

72. See Robert W. Barnett, *Beyond War* (Elmsford (New York): Pergamon Press, 1984) 1-6 for the official summary of the Study Group's 70 page report.

73. J.W.M. Chapman et al., *op. cit.*: 321.

74. *Ibid.*: 231 and 235.

75. *Diplomatic Bluebook 1981 Edition*, translated by Foreign Press Centre (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 30-31; and *Defense of Japan 1981*, translated by The Japan Times Ltd (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency) 115-116.

76. Robert W. Barnett, *op. cit.*: 15-20 provides an overview of responses to the CNS Report.

77. J.W.M. Chapman et al., *op. cit.*: 73-76.

78. See Martin E. Weinstein, "Japan's Defense Policy and the May 1981 Summit", *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, Vol.1, No. 1 (1990): 25-29 for a commentary on the retreat from the summit communique; and R. Mark Bean, *Cooperative Security in Northeast Asia* (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1990) 117-118 for a US interpretation of Japan's commitment to protect the SLOCs to 1000 miles and defend Japan's maritime approaches to a distance of several hundred miles. Larry A. Niksch, "Japanese Defense Policy: Suzuki's Shrinking Options", in *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, Vol.1, No.2 (1982): 83-86 provides a useful commentary on the US position as to the roles and missions that the US thought Japan should be prepared to assume.

79. See R. Mark Bean, *op. cit.*: 114-115 for excerpts from the text of Nakasone's press conference.

80. M. Leighton and L.R. Rosenberger, "The Soviet Union: Meshing Strategic and Revolutionary Objectives in Asia", in Young W. Kihl and Lawrence E. Grinter, eds., *Asia Pacific Security* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1986) 59-60. Also see Kenneth E. Pyle, *The Japanese Question* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1992) 101 which observes that the Japanese words used refer to a "big aircraft carrier".

81. Kenneth Hunt, "Japan's Foreign and Security Policies", in Michael Leifer, ed., *The Balance of Power in East Asia* (London: The Macmillan Press, 1986) 125, and James Auer, "The Global Influence of Japan's Defence Efforts", in Janos Radvanyi, ed., *The Pacific in the 1990s* (New York: University of America Press, 1990) 124-126 report Nakasone's support of NATO's IFN negotiation position, and discussions on the Pershing II deployment to Europe.

82. James Auer, *op. cit.*: 125.

83. Tetsuya Kataoka and Ramon H. Myers, *op. cit.*: 41-54 provide a selection of relevant abstracts from the press.

84. Atshusi Tokinoya, *The Japan-US Alliance: A Japanese Perspective* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1986) 23-24; and, Charles E. Morrison, "Japan's Politico-Security Roles in Southeast Asia": 117-118 address ASEAN reaction to Japan's security policy and Nakasone's 1983 visit to the region.

85. James Auer, *op. cit.*: 124. The operative premises for the 1976 decision were founded in the interpretations of Article IX of the Constitution.

86. Ian H. Nish, "The United States in East Asia: Japan's Perspective", in Michael Liefer, ed., *The Balance of Power in East Asia* (London: The MacMillan Press, 1986) 38.

87. Harrison M. Holland, *op. cit.*: 50-52.

88. See *Defense of Japan 1985*, translated by The Japan Times (Tokyo: Defense Agency) 153, and *Defense of Japan 1989*, translated by The Japan Times (Tokyo: Defense Agency) 320 for a comparison of defense expenditures.

89. J.W.M. Chapman et al., *op. cit.*: 95-96.

90. Alan Rix, "Japan's Foreign Aid Policy: A Capacity for Leadership?", in *Pacific Affairs*, Vol 62, No 4, (1990): 464. Also see Bela A. Balassa and Marcus Noland, *Japan in the World Economy* (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1988) 167 for Japan's comparative performance.

91. Alan Rix, *op. cit.*: 461.

92. Bela A. Balassa and Marcus Noland, *op. cit.*: 68 and, Alan Rix, *op. cit.*: 460-475 *passim* note the bureaucratic politics involved in the formulation of Japan's foreign aid.

93. Robert M. Orr, "Japanese Foreign Aid in a New Global Era", in *SAIS Review*, Vol 11, No.2 (1991): 141.

94. *Ibid.*: 142.

95. Alan Rix, *op. cit.*: 461-475 passim, and Charles E. Morrison, "Japan and the ASEAN Countries": 438-441 address the problems of types of ODA offered by Japan and distribution methods used.

96. Richard Stubbs, "Reluctant Leader, expectant followers: Japan and Southeast Asia" in *International Journal*, Vol 45, No 4 (1991): 663-667.

97. Kent E. Calder, *Crisis and Compensation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988) 134 and 159-161.

98. See Atshusi Tokinoya, *op. cit.*: 38-40.

99. Takashi Inoguchi, "Japan's foreign policy in a time of global uncertainty", in *International Journal* Vol.46, No.4 (1991): 581-582.

100. See Thomas L. Wilborn, *How Northeast Asians View Their Security* (Strategic Studies Institute: US Army War College, 1991) 15-17, 50-52, and 64.

101. *Ibid.*: 36-38.

102. Mathiah Alagappa, "The Major Powers and Southeast Asia", in *International Journal*, Vol.44, No.3 (1989): 573.

103. *Ibid.*: 56:-570 and Reinhard Drifte, *op. cit.*: 194.

104. Charles E. Morrison "Japan and the ASEAN Countries": 423.

105. Richard Stubbs, *op. cit.*: 665.

106. See Chong Whi Kim, "Korea-Japan Relations and Japan's Security", in Dora Alves, ed., *op. cit.*: 133-135 regarding the 1980s, and, Chalmers Johnson, *Japan in Search of a 'Normal' Role* (San Diego: Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, University of California, 1992) 26-27 refers to conceit and chauvinism as being apparent in Japanese views of East Asia.

107. See Chalmers Johnson, *Japan in Search of a 'Normal' Role*: 25 regarding the economic ministries' protection of their leadership position.

108. See *Defense of Japan 1990*, translated by The Japan Times Ltd. (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency) 35-50 and 60; and *Defense of Japan 1991*, translated by The Japan Times Ltd. (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency) 28-37 and 45-47 for Japan's strategic assessment of the USSR/Russia and the Korean Peninsula.

109. Yukio Satoh, "Asia-Pacific Process for Stability and Security," in *Japan's Post-Gulf International Initiatives* (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1991) 34; and the LDP *Liberal Star*, Vol 2, No. 238 (1992): 3 which reports on the fiscal 1992 budget.

110. _____. *SIPRI Yearbook 1992* (Solna: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1992) 241.

111. See *SIPRI Yearbook 1992*: 241-242 where a time series chart is presented showing the allocations within the defence budget from 1982 to 1990. During the period the investment component rose from approximately one-quarter to one-third of aggregate military expenditure. This trend continues in the 1990s.

112. *Defense of Japan 1991*, translated by The Japan Times Ltd. (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency) 270 presents a PMO survey of February 1991 which indicates 62.4 percent of those surveyed support maintaining national security with the SDF and the MST.

113. The survey of upper and lower members of the Diet in December 1990 is reported in the LDP Liberal Star, Vol 21, No 233 (1992): 10-11.

114. Itaru Umezu and Haruhisa Takenchi, eds., *White Papers of Japan 1990-91* (Tokyo: The Japan Institute of International Affairs, 1992): 215. The policy speech by Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa to the 123rd Session of the National Diet is presented 213-220, in which the relationship with the US is stated to be the pivot of both Japan's foreign and security policies.

115. Richard Stubbs, *op. cit.*: 662.

116. LDP Liberal Star, Vol.20, No.237 (1991): 11.

117. See Courtney Purrington, "Tokyo's Policy Responses During the Gulf War and the Impact of the "Iraq Shock" on Japan" in *Pacific Affairs*, Vol.65, No.2 (1992): 171; Takashi Inoguchi, "Japan's foreign policy in a time of global uncertainty": 600; and, Koji Watanabe, "Challenges and Opportunities for the Japanese Diplomacy", in *Japan's Post Gulf International Initiatives* (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1991) 33 for survey results.

118. See Kitaoka Shin'ichi, "Chronicling Japan's Crisis Diplomacy", in *Japan Echo*, Vol.14, No.1 (1992):36-42 for an account of decision-making and politics which led to the withdrawal of the UNPCCB.

119. LDP Liberal Star, Vol.20, No.236 (1991): 1.

120. LDP Liberal Star, Vol.21, No.238 (1992): 3.

121. *Loc. cit.*

122. See *Diplomatic Bluebook 1990* and *Diplomatic Bluebook 1991*, translated by The Japan Times Ltd. (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 80 and 84, and 131 and 139 respectively.

123. *Diplomatic Bluebook 1991*, translated by Foreign Press Centre (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 131.

124. See Jeremy Paltiel, "Japan's Innovative East Asian Policies: Keeping all the Flying Geese in Formation", (Unpublished paper, 1992, presented to the Japan Studies Association of Canada, at Carleton University, Ottawa, October, 1992). Robert M. Orr, Jr., "Japanese Foreign Aid in

a New Global Era", in *SAIS Review*, Vol.11, No.2, 1991: 139, also notes that in 1989 aid-related personnel were spread throughout 16 ministries.

125. Katsuhiko Mori, "Changing Patterns in Geographic Distribution of Japan's Bilateral Official Development Assistance" (Unpublished paper, 1992, presented to the Japan Studies Association of Canada, at Carleton University, October, 1992.)

126. See Foreign Minister Nakayama's speech to the 118th Special Session of the National Diet, 2 March, 1990 in, Yoshiji Nogami and Tatsuaki Iwata, eds., *White Papers of Japan 1988-1989* (Tokyo: The Japan Institute of International Affairs, 1990) 203.

127. See Hisashi Owada, "The Japanese Role in the Regional Security of East Asia", in Eric Grove, ed., *Global Security* (Oxford: Brassey's (UK) Ltd., 1991) 7 for comment on "Pax Consortis".

128. "Japanese Diplomacy in a Changing World", *LDP Liberal Star*, Vol 21, No 239 (1992): 3 presents the government's action policy for 1992.

129. Reported in Chalmers Johnson, *Japan in Search of a 'Normal' Role*: 10.

130. See Takashi Inoguchi, "Japan's foreign policy in a time of global uncertainty", *op. cit.*: 584-585 regarding the positions of political factions and segments of society.

131. Koji Watanabe, *op. cit.*: 23.

126. Michael Brenner, "The alliance: a Gulf post-mortem" in *International Affairs*, Vol.67, No.4 (1991): 671.

133. Hisashi Owada, *op. cit.*: 5.

134. *Ibid.*: 12 and 14.

135. *LDP Liberal Star*, Vol.21, No.239, (1992): 5

136. Richard Stubbs, *op. cit.*: 666.

137. The significance of the passage of the PKO Bill cannot be overstated given domestic political and public opposition. The rapid deployment of SDF personnel to Cambodia three months after the legislation was passed suggests the great importance the Government has attached to full participation in the Cambodian peace process.

138. Richard Stubbs, *op. cit.*: 666-667. Kaifu noted both ASEAN expectations for this role and Japan's willingness to pursue it.

139. *Ibid.*: 662-663. Stubbs reports these views as expressed by the Prime Minister of Singapore.

140. See Michael Richardson, "ASEAN Opts for Closer Security Ties" in *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, Vol.18, No.10/11, 1992: 32, and S. Bilveer "ASEAN and the new security framework in the Asia-Pacific region" in *Asian Defence*, December 1991: 16-19, for the development of ASEAN from economic to security cooperation. The Dialogue Partners in the PMC are the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the EC, Japan and the ROK.

141. See Michael Richardson, "Japan moving toward regional security role" in *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter* Vol.17, No.11, 1991:18-19 where it is argued that there is emerging consensus in Southeast Asia that Japan no longer presents a latent military threat and that Tokyo's regional intentions are peaceful and constructive.

142. Itaru Umezu and Haruhisa Takenchi, eds., *White Papers of Japan 1990-1991* (Tokyo: Japan Institute of International Affairs, 1992): 27. The Foreign Policy White Paper of 1991 (MOFA) further notes that the building of mutual trust between Japan and the Asia-Pacific countries will be dependent on their belief that Japan will not become a military power.

143. *Ibid.*: 215-216.

144. See the tabulation of VIP visits in the Diplomatic Bluebooks for 1990 and 1991.

145. Brian Bridges, "Japan's Relations with North Korea: Towards Normalization", in *Korean Journal of Defence Analysis*, Vol.3, No.2 (1991):197-202.

146. See Brian Bridges, *Ibid.*: 200-201 concerning the "five principles" the ROK has asked Japan to accept in its negotiations with the DPRK.

147. See Koji Kakizawa, "Japan's Position on Suspected Nuclear Weapons Development by North Korea", in *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, Vol.4, No.1, (1992): 61-63 regarding the impact of the nuclear question on normalization talks.

148. Gerald Segal, "North-East Asia: a common security or à la carte?", in *International Affairs*, Vol.67, No.4 (1991): 762-763.

149. See Yulio Satoh, "Asia-Pacific Process for Stability and Security", : 44-45., and Thomas L. Wilborn, *op. cit.*: 50-52 respecting ROK and general regional unease as to Japan's political future in East Asia.

150. See Mike M. Mochizuki, *op. cit.*: 125, respecting future Sino-Japanese rivalry.

151. See Takashi Inoguchi, "Japan's foreign policy in a time of global uncertainty" : 585-587 for 1990 bilateral diplomacy.

152. *Ibid.*: 586-587 explores the bureaucratic concerns regarding resolution of the problem.

153. "Yeltsin Runs for Cover", *Ottawa Citizen* (Ottawa), 10 September, 1992: A10.

CHAPTER SIX

JAPAN'S SECURITY POLICY AND THE UNITED NATIONS

INTRODUCTION

An analysis of Japan's interaction with the UN provides a means of determining if the imperatives and constraints which shaped general security policy were similarly operative in response to a more specific policy issue. Moreover, the UN constitutes a relevant focus given Japan's declarations in the 1950s that the UN would be viewed as the principal actor in securing a peaceful international environment and in guaranteeing Japan's security from external threats.

The Preamble to Japan's 1947 Constitution reflects this orientation in general terms, expressing Japan's determination to pursue peaceful cooperation with all nations, to reject action that would cause Japan to be visited by war, and to preserve security by trusting in the peace-loving peoples of the world. Also expressed is the desire to occupy an honourable place in international society and to strive for the preservation of peace. Adding substance to this pacifist constitutional orientation is the renunciation of the threat or use of force as an instrument for settling international disputes (Article IX).¹ More specific was Japan's declared intention to apply for membership in the UN, and to conform to the principles and obligations of the UN Charter in accordance with the 1951 *San Francisco Treaty of Peace with Japan*.² Commitment to the UN was similarly expressed in the 1951 US-Japan Security

Treaty, which was to remain in effect until the UN could provide for Japan's security.¹

Japan's reliance on the UN as an instrument of security policy and its support of the UN's peace and security functions changed over the course of the post-war period, in response to the rapid erosion of the UN's efficacy in fulfilling its mandate to maintain international peace and security and concomitant inability to guarantee Japan's security. Thus, Japan's pursuit of national security interests in the UN was effectively confined to an agenda limited by the constraints that the international politico-strategic situation imposed on the Organization. Significantly, the revitalization of the UN and the Security Council after the end of the Cold War was paralleled by a resurgence of Japanese interest in using the UN to enhance its security policy and advance its political influence in the international arena.

In addition to external factors, Japan's interaction with the UN was influenced by domestic factors. On one hand, the fundamental premise that the UN constituted a key focus for Japan's foreign and security policy enjoyed the consistent support of the polity. In response, Japan sought to strengthen the UN's peace and security functions and to enhance Japan's position within the relevant decision-making organs. On the other hand, Japan's activism in support of these functions remained limited to rhetoric and economic assistance for approximately three decades. The issue of human support for UN security initiatives remained beyond the politically feasible until the mid-1980s, after which there was first limited civilian participation in UN peacekeeping operations. It was not until 1992 that military support could be provided without precipitating a domestic political crisis, thereby permitting Japan to pursue more effectively political influence within the world body.

JAPAN'S INITIAL RESPONSE TO THE UNITED NATIONS

The domestic debate as to whether Japan should, or could aspire to UN membership was first broached in the Diet, on 28 June 1946, in the context of Article IX of the proposed Constitution. The government's position, supported by the majority of the people, was that the security of Japan would be dependent on the United Nations, but that Japan would be precluded from accepting any obligations respecting the provision of military forces. While in general agreement with the necessity of requesting quick admission to the UN, the opposition parties remained concerned that membership would demand rearmament for self-defence and the possession of military forces for secondment to the UN, as provided for in the Charter.⁴ These concerns resulted in the argument that unarmed pacifism should be complemented by a policy of permanent neutrality that was considered by its advocates as being incompatible with UN membership. Public opinion became evenly divided between those advocating permanent neutrality and those supporting UN membership; however, media opinion moved toward support for the UN.⁵ The outbreak of the Korean War effectively ended the neutrality debate, with decisive UN involvement providing a basis for renewed optimism that the organization could guarantee Japan's security. Moreover, broad public and political support for the UN action was translated into renewed domestic support for Japan's future membership in the Organization.⁶

Japan's commitment to seek membership in the UN, as expressed in the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, was pursued during the 13th Session of the Diet (May 1952) in response to the situation on the Korean Peninsula and the UN's involvement. With substantive opposition being forthcoming only from the Communist Party, and with strong support being expressed in the media and public opinion, Diet approval was easily attained.⁷ However, the Diet discussion was detailed, with the Foreign Minister and Chief of the MOFA Treaty

Bureau addressing the Foreign Affairs Committees of the Upper and Lower Houses. The focus of discussion remained primarily on the UN peace and security functions, reflecting concern for the level of rearmament that might be demanded for collective security and "UN assistance" obligations, and the future status of the 1951 Japan-US Security Treaty.

The government's position was that the possession of military forces was not a criterium for membership and that the question of Japan's rearmament was a separate issue.⁸ Prime Minister Yoshida was explicit that cooperation with the UN would be constrained to that permitted by the Constitution, treaty commitments and domestic laws, and that the UN could not ask Japan to send military forces abroad.⁹ This policy stance did not preclude a degree of active cooperation in UN peace and security initiatives, as evidenced by Japan's 1951 commitment of continued cooperation with UN forces in Japan for the prosecution of the Korean War, even before Japan obtained a UN seat.¹⁰ It did, however, define the scope of cooperation which endured for 40 years. Similarly enduring was the centrality of the US-Japan security regime in the absence of UN capability to fulfil the terms of the Charter.

Within one month of the Peace Treaty having attained Diet approval, Japan formally submitted application for UN membership on 23 June, 1952. The four-year hiatus between application and admission to the UN on 18 December, 1956 reflected Soviet opposition and its use of the veto in the Security Council, precipitating both embarrassment and a sense of injustice in Japan.¹¹ Notwithstanding the problems encountered in gaining UN membership, public support for membership in the Organization remained high, and an idealistic perception of the UN as a guarantor of peace and security persisted in the minds of the Japanese people.¹²

These sentiments were expressed in the UN by Japan's Foreign Minister in reply to the speeches of welcome on 18 December, 1956. Additionally, Japan's constitutional

commitment to support a peaceable international society and to base its security on "the peace-loving peoples of the world" was reiterated, and the pursuit of disarmament emphasized. Finally, Japan's perceptions of its common destiny with the Asian states and its responsibilities as a bridge between Asia and the West were announced.¹³ The thrust of this maiden speech to the UN General Assembly was converted into what would constitute the three basic principles of Japan's declaratory foreign policy:

- "1. it would be UN-centred;
2. it would cooperate with the free democratic nations; and
3. it would identify closely with the Asian countries."¹⁴

The profession of a UN-centred diplomacy and emphasis on the importance of cooperation with the UN respecting peace and security was not free of limitations since, in 1954, the Diet had resolved that the SDF would not be mobilized abroad.¹⁵

The reaffirmation of Prime Minister Yoshida's position of the 1952 Diet debate on Japan's obligations respecting UN membership was manifest in more concrete terms within two years of UN membership. In 1958, the UN Secretary-General requested that the SDF participate in UNOGIL (Lebanon, 1958) general observation duties. A quick and unequivocal negative response was given, without the issue being placed on either the bureaucratic or political agenda to forestall precipitating a domestic crisis.¹⁶ The government's prudence respecting the substance and process of its response to this first request for human resources to support a UN security initiative was soon validated. In 1961 the Head of Japan's UN Mission suggested that Japan should be willing to participate in UN peacekeeping, precipitating a storm of protest in the Diet which forced a retraction of the remarks and reflected the strong opposition in the polity to even this most benign form of military cooperation.¹⁷

The inability of the Security Council to act because of the veto and the East-West

confrontation effectively denied Japan any UN guarantee of security, and Japan's stance regarding military cooperation with the UN further diminished the *de facto* centrality of the UN within security policy. UN diplomacy respecting peace and security during the first fifteen years of membership was, therefore, essentially confined to the subsidiary issues of decolonization, the promotion of cooperation with Western and Asian countries, and the promotion of world disarmament through specific measures. The latter focus was accorded a high priority by Tokyo, with membership being gained in the UN Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in July 1969 when its membership was expanded from 18 to 26.¹⁸ Reference to a "UN-centred" diplomacy as such was no longer reflected in public documents by the 1960s, reflecting a lack of confidence in the Organization and Japan's weak support for security-related multilateralism.¹⁹

TRANSITION TO NON-MILITARY ACTIVISM

General Approach

The apparent consolidation of detente in the East-West relationship, growing Japanese perceptions of a relative US decline, the advent of a less tight bipolar system, and the emergence of an economically powerful Japan coincided with a renewed Japanese interest in the UN by the 1970s. While not moving towards a UN-centred security policy *per se*, the expression of the UN as being the principal instrument with which Japan hoped to preserve peace and security was restated in 1970. This rhetoric was accompanied by the reaffirmation of Japan's intention to cooperate positively with the UN, and by declaratory support for the strengthening of the UN's peace and security functions. Specifically, the enhancement of the Security Council, peacekeeping operations, and arms control and disarmament processes were emphasized. Significantly, the composition of a proposed expansion of the Security Council

was addressed, with a thinly-veiled rationalization for Japan's permanent membership on the Council being advanced.²⁰

The foregoing perspective of the Japan-UN relationship, produced by the Director-General of the MOFA's United Nations Bureau, was not issued as declaratory government policy. However, it did reflect the primary security-related UN functions upon which Japan expended considerable energy throughout the 1970s and the 1980s. In this sense, Japan attempted to secure a more stable and peaceful global and regional environment through the UN, by which means Japan's strategic and economic security would be enhanced. Moreover, the UN was increasingly viewed as the multilateral forum in which Japan could best seek political influence and gain international stature, and could pursue security-related objectives through other than the military means that remained proscribed by domestic constraints.

Activism to gain a permanent seat on the Security Council was advanced within the context of a Japanese initiative at the 1968 General Assembly for a review of the UN Charter, with the result that the issue was placed on the agenda for the 1969 General Assembly. The Foreign Minister's remarks at both sessions were interpreted as expressing this aspiration, in response to strong domestic feeling that the status of permanent membership should be afforded Japan, given its economic power and financial contribution to the UN. With the exception of the US, no support for this position was forthcoming from the Security Council.²¹ Japan again pursued the issue as a member of the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on Strengthening the Role of the Organization that was established in 1975. However, little was accomplished given competing aspirations of other states to gain permanent membership and the reluctance of this forum to recommend expanded membership. Alternately, Japan adopted a strategy of frequently seeking election as a non-permanent member, serving an unprecedented six terms by 1988.²² The importance that

Japan placed on being represented in the Security Council as a means of contributing to world peace and security was reflected in Tokyo's positive assessment of its own performance during these terms.²³

Peacekeeping Operations

While increasingly giving positive recognition to UN peacekeeping operations throughout the 1970s, it was not until 1979 that Japan began to make specific proposals for bolstering the UN peacekeeping function in the Special Committee on the Charter and in the General Assembly.²⁴ Additionally, the government commissioned a private panel in 1982 to address the issue, in response to a request from the Secretary-General of the UN. The resultant 1983 Report was debated in the Diet, and significantly, that part recommending incremental implementation of Japanese participation in such operations was deleted prior to the report being forwarded to the UN.²⁵ In addition to Diet opposition to Japan's provision of material and human resources to peacekeeping operations, there still did not exist a national consensus on how Japan should approach this issue. While opinion polls were indicating a rise in support for greater Japanese cooperation with the UN, only 44 percent surveyed in 1982 supported cooperation in peacekeeping. Participation in peacekeeping operations, especially with respect to the SDF, remained a political issue, with the government remaining sensitive to the national mood.

Notwithstanding the government's reluctance to commit Japan unconditionally, or even to any specific level of participation in peacekeeping operations, the Foreign Minister did announce to the 37th General Assembly (1982) that Japan was ready to cooperate more actively in the strengthening of this UN function.²⁶ Activism in this field followed the incremental approach prescribed in the 1983 Report. By 1988, Prime Minister Takeshita acknowledged Japan's awareness " . . . of its position as a member of the international

order...", and its obligations to "...actively play a larger role and accept larger responsibilities from the global perspective", including making "...the utmost effort to further strengthen and expand our non-military contribution to United Nations and other peacekeeping activities."²⁷

The Prime Minister's policy speech of the following year proclaimed that in response to heightening international expectations towards UN peacekeeping, Japan would not only promote financial cooperation, but would "...enhance the provision of personnel in appropriate fields..."²⁸

The growing practice of making financial contributions to UN peacekeeping operations was finally complemented by the provision of human resources commencing in 1988, with civilian personnel being assigned to four of the six UN peacekeeping operations formed in 1988 and 1989. Although the numbers of personnel were limited, Japan was represented in the UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group, the UN Transition Assistance Group in Namibia, and the Observation Mission of the UN for the verification of Elections in Nicaragua.

No attempt was made to move ahead of political and public opinion respecting the dispatch of SDF personnel on UN peacekeeping missions. The reluctance of the government to broach this societal-imposed prohibition can be viewed with reference to the two requests during the 1980s that Japan contribute to Western-led naval operations in the Middle East. The 1984 suggestion that Japan join Western powers in clearing the Red Sea shipping lanes of mines was unequivocally rejected by Tokyo. In this case, the request was acted upon with little debate, and little was reported in the press, as the government did not want to stir up predicted unfavourable public opinion.²⁹ A more pressing requirement to conduct minesweeping operations in the Gulf emerged in 1987, during the Iran-Iraq conflict, when Japanese ships were sustaining damage and Western powers were joining the US in sending

naval vessels to the region to protect merchant shipping. Responding to increasing US pressure and international opinion that Japan should contribute to the Western bloc's security interests in the Gulf, Prime Minister Nakasone established a MOFA working group to address the issue.

The two options initially considered were SDF minesweepers, desired by the US and supported by the Prime Minister, and Maritime Safety Agency (Coast Guard) patrol boats. Nakasone reports that both options were rejected, the former by reason of perceived constitutional and domestic law constraints and adverse public opinion, and the latter because of capability and logistical problems.⁴⁰ The action ultimately taken was financial support for Oman and Jordan, a \$10 million contribution to defray UN peacekeeping expenses, and the financing of a navigation system to enhance the minesweeping efforts by others. Further insight into the decision is provided by the Chairman of the SDF Joint Staff Council who observed that SDF minesweepers "...did not go for purely political reasons - concern that China, the two Koreas and other Asian nations would charge Tokyo with remilitarization" ⁴¹

Arms Control and Disarmament

Beyond membership in the Committee on Disarmament and the annual sponsorship of a resolution calling for the early conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, significant activism respecting arms control and disarmament commenced with the Diet ratifying the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on 24 May, 1976. This served to reinforce Japan's position of promoting nuclear disarmament, while keeping open the avenue for the uninhibited use of nuclear energy and for equal treatment with other Western States over safeguards.⁴² Unlike the issue of peacekeeping operations, initiatives in the UN respecting arms control and disarmament enjoyed the support of a national consensus, thereby permitting Japan to pursue the issue as economic and technical strength presented new opportunities

That consensus, founded in the atomic experiences at the conclusion of the Pacific War, and complemented by wide subscription to the 'Peace Constitution', was expressed in the nation-wide support and enthusiasm of the 1978 and 1982 special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.³³ Japan's acceptance of the position of one of the vice-chairmen from Asia in the Preparatory Committee for the Second Special Session of the General Assembly was indicative of the government's belief that progress towards balanced disarmament was essential for Japan's long-term security, and that the domestic constituency demanded a positive Japanese contribution towards that end.³⁴ Similarly, the unanimous adoption of identical resolutions on the promotion of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, by both Houses of the Diet prior to the Second Special Session of the General Assembly, indicated political consensus on this issue area. In addition to reflecting these elements of domestic significance in his statement to the 1982 Special Session, Prime Minister Suzuki appealed for the "three principles of peace" through disarmament, and submitted four working papers related to Japan's atomic experience and proposals for strengthening the role of the UN in the promotion of disarmament.³⁵

Significantly, one of Suzuki's three principles of peace and one of the working papers addressed 'strengthening and expansion of the UN peacekeeping functions for the promotion of disarmament'. As reviewed above, Japan progressively worked towards this objective, diplomatically and with a widening range of means. The promotion of disarmament during the remainder of the 1980s followed declared policy of making step-by-step contributions commensurate with its diplomatic, technical and economic abilities.³⁶ Concrete initiatives towards this objective within the UN included contributing to the conclusion of a nuclear test ban, a ban on chemical weapons, conventional weapons reductions, and verification. Additionally, at the Third Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament

(1988), Prime Minister Takeshita announced plans to convene an international conference in Japan to address the relevant issues.¹⁷ Also noteworthy was Japan's claim of being a mediator within the Western group, and between the Western group and the Eastern and non-aligned groups, thereby contributing to the achievement of consensus. However, there is no evidence as to the efficacy of this self-appointed role within this issue area.

Politico-Strategic Alignment

The latter claim was indicative of a fourth dimension of Japan's use of the UN to enhance its security. That was, to attempt to consolidate better its position as a member of the US-led Western states, while posturing as a leading Asian nation. These potentially conflicting positions were reflected in the voting patterns of Japan in the UN, with a widening gap emerging between Japan and the US in the 1970s and 1980s as compared with the 1960s. Not only was this indicative of fundamental differences in perspective, but also of Tokyo's sensitivity to domestic criticism of indiscriminating adherence to US policy which caused Japan to abstain rather than vote in favour of resolutions of particular import to the US.¹⁸ Notwithstanding the dichotomy between this pattern and Japan's continued reliance on the US-Japan security regime, there did remain a high level of congruence between Japan and the Western bloc as a whole. Moreover, on the more fundamental security issues of both a global and regional character, such as Cambodia, Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war, the Korean Peninsula, and the East-West confrontation in general, Japan's UN policies remained essentially congruent with those of the US.

TRANSITION TO COMPREHENSIVE ACTIVISM

General Approach

The advent of the 1990s brought with it what may be viewed as the beginning of

Japan's comprehensive activism within the framework of the UN. The term *comprehensive* is used to indicate the addition of the military component to Japan's use of diplomatic, economic, and non-military personnel resources with which to pursue its security interests. The end of the Cold War, the search for a *New World Order*, and cooperative USSR and US attitudes towards the UN provided an environment in which the Organization was becoming a more relevant forum for global and regional security issues. Paralleling increasing UN relevance was a discernable shift in Japan's declaratory policy *vis-a-vis* the Organization. Having moved away from a stated "UN-centred" policy in the 1960s to one of "cooperation and support" in the 1970s and 1980s, reference was again made to the UN being a major pillar of Japan's diplomacy in 1990.³⁹ Finally, in the Prime Minister's policy speech to the 123rd session of the Diet (1992), Japan again claimed to be pursuing a UN-centred diplomacy.⁴⁰ In addition to a changing international environment and the increasing efficacy of the UN in addressing peace and security issues, Japan perceived its position and role in the international system as having changed. This new perspective was articulated most clearly in the 1991 White Paper on Foreign Policy, which announced that Japan's foreign policy was at a turning point given Japan's position to influence virtually all issues related to the construction of a new international order, and international expectations and demands that Japan mobilize its capabilities to that end.⁴¹

Impact of the Gulf Crisis

In response to the impact of the Gulf Crisis, Tokyo recognized that human resource participation and cooperation would be necessary in foreign policy execution, one objective of which was the declared intention to help enhance the peace and security of the world.⁴² The Gulf Crisis of 1990-91 may also be considered as having precipitated the imperatives which finally caused Japan to participate militarily in UN-sponsored peace and security operations. A

brief analysis of the decision-making processes which led to the subsequent unprecedented dispatch of SDF personnel overseas provides insight into the salience of contemporary imperatives and constraints operative in Japanese security decision making

Japan's initial response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 20 August, 1990, was to convene a series of Cabinet meetings during which the MOFA position of solidarity with the US prevailed over the MITI position of waiting for the Western European response.⁴³ The resultant policy of imposing economic sanctions on Iraq prior to the applicable UN Security Council resolution constituted a quick, decisive response which was not to be repeated during the crisis. Policy-making from this point was to be reactive, characterized by indecision and fragmented policy initiatives from individual ministries. There is no evidence the institutionalized fora of security decision-making were used to manage the crisis until January 1991. Subjected to pressure by the US to play a prominent role, the Kaifu Cabinet responded with a series of increasing financial commitments to the peace making efforts of the US led multilateral force, and to aid Egypt, Jordan and Turkey.⁴⁴ Within the government, the MOI attempted to limit the absolute contributions to be extended, while the MOFA was receptive to increasing US demands.

The MOFA also took the lead in drafting a United Nations Peace Cooperation Bill (UNPCB), the thrust of which was to make non-military contributions to the Coalition Forces in the Gulf.⁴⁵ While supported by the Prime Minister and some factions within the Cabinet, the MOFA draft was opposed by other members of the Cabinet, by LDP leaders, the JDA (which had not been consulted), and even by some MOFA officials who supported US demands for a SDF response.⁴⁶ The Prime Minister's attempt to forestall the use of the SDF was finally overcome, and the final draft of the UNPCB contained provision for SDF participation in UN-sponsored peace and security missions. However, restrictive provisions on

3

OF/DE

3

PM-1 3 1/2" x 4" PHOTOGRAPHIC MICROCOPY TARGET
NBS 1010a ANSI/ISO #2 EQUIVALENT

the permissible duties of SDF personnel excluded their participation in 'front-line' peace-making operations.⁴⁷

Continued intra-Party conflict made it difficult for the Prime Minister and respective Cabinet Ministers to address the intended interpretation of the Bill in ensuing Diet debates. Furthermore, debates concentrated on the constitutional issue of dispatching the SDF overseas, thereby polarizing the political parties and public opinion. Given the loss of support from the Democratic Socialist Party and the Kōmeitō Party that was necessary to carry the Bill in the Upper House of the Diet, and by the opposition of two-thirds of the public which had been mobilized by opponents of the Bill, the Government was forced to withdraw the proposed legislation on 9 October, 1991.⁴⁸ Both the DSP and the Kōmeitō agreed to co-sponsor a new bill that excluded the SDF, during the next Diet session.⁴⁹

When Desert Storm began in January, 1991, the government finally convened the Security Council, which was complemented by an *ad hoc* Cabinet Gulf Crisis Headquarters and a MOFA Special Internal Crisis Centre.⁵⁰ Initial policy options were quickly formulated in part because they came from the MOF in the form of financial contributions and from the JDA respecting SDF operations. While the MOF initiative gained required inter-party support and the means were easily legislated, the JDA-inspired initiative to employ SDF transport planes suffered the same fate as did the UNPCB.⁵¹ The proposed use of SDF aircraft to rescue war refugees, even on humanitarian grounds, incited sufficient opposition in public opinion and from political parties that the Prime Minister manoeuvred to avoid their use.⁵² The Gulf hostilities ended with Japanese activism being confined to financial contributions to the Coalition and those Gulf States suffering economic loss from the crisis.

The Military Contribution

Adverse international reaction to Japan's constrained response caused the Prime

Minister to seek again a means to commit the SDF to "global" peace and security tasks after the cessation of hostilities.⁵³ Responding to a request from Saudi Arabia and the US, Japan announced on 24 April, 1992 that the SDF would participate in minesweeping operations in the Gulf; and, a squadron of four minesweepers and two support ships sailed on 26 April, 1992.⁵⁴ The objectives of this unusually rapid deployment were three-fold: to be perceived as an active participant in the Coalition, albeit after hostilities had ended; to reduce the potential for international rejection and isolation; and to repair Japan-US ties which had been damaged by Japan's position throughout the crisis.⁵⁵ The low political profile afforded the departure can be contrasted with the Prime Minister's and LDP 'welcome home' after the successful completion of the mission.⁵⁶

The timing of the decision to deploy to the Gulf became the important factor in what was, in effect, a radical change in policy. First, hostilities had ceased in the region and the SDF was not being dispatched to an area of conflict. Second, the Government had perceived a change in public opinion that would support such a deployment. Third, the April local elections were over, thus any potentially damaging public opinion could not be translated into electoral defeat.⁵⁷ Complementing these factors was the government's reliance on Art.99 of the SDF Law which permitted the SDF to conduct minesweeping "at sea", without any geographical constraints being expressed. Although considerable political debate ensued in the wake of the decision, the high rate of public approval on completion of the operation legitimized the government's action, and paved the way for future debates centring on *how* the SDF could contribute overseas, rather than *if* it could be dispatched overseas.

The success of the minesweeping operation helped form a new national consensus that Japan should contribute to peacekeeping operations, although a significant minority of the population still opposed SDF participation on the basis that it could constitute the first step of

a return to militarism.⁵⁸ This changing national consensus was accompanied by pressures from factions within the LDP that the government reintroduce legislation to permit the overseas dispatch of the SDF on UN peacekeeping operations. The objectives of these faction leaders were to consolidate Japan's position in the "New World Order" and strengthen the Japanese position in the UN, with the United Nations Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) Bill being viewed as a necessary means to achieve the aim.⁵⁹ Party consensus on the issue was finally forged by reason of the new Prime Minister requiring the support of these faction leaders for his selection and maintenance in office.⁶⁰

Unlike the UNPCB, which the MOFA drafted in virtual isolation and without input from the JDA, the PKO Bill was constructed within a more rigorous regime. A Special Office was established within the Cabinet Office to draft the legislation, with the following being represented:

1. The MOFA, being very supportive of the initiative and considering it to be an integral part of the concept of Comprehensive National Security;
2. the JDA, being very supportive and closely aligned with the MOFA;
3. the Maritime Safety Agency, with interests related to possible future peacekeeping participation;
4. the Ministry of Health and Welfare, with interests in peacekeeping support roles such as medical teams;
5. the MOF, with its concerns about future financial obligations;
- and
6. Cabinet Office officials with domestic political concerns.

In addition to the technical aspects of participation, careful consideration was afforded expected opposition from within the public, the media and the Diet regarding SDF participation in terms of scope and level of tasking. Cognizance was also taken of anticipated negative reaction from the PRC and the two Koreas. The policy process also included the PARC, although no initiatives *per se* were forthcoming from the Party's policy analysis

organization. Furthermore, while the PKO Bill was being constructed to provide a legal basis for participation in general UN peacekeeping operations, it was specifically crafted for Cambodia and introduced into the Diet for that purpose.⁶¹

To enhance passage of the Bill in the Diet, the attempt was again made to forge political support with the DSP and Kōmeitō, with only that of Kōmeitō being initially forthcoming. Bitter debate in the Lower House fuelled uncompromising opposition by the Social Democratic Party, the Japan Communist Party and the Democratic Socialist Party, resulting in the LDP imposing the "tyranny of the majority" to effect passage on December 3, 1991.⁶² However, increased public ambivalence towards the PKO Bill became evident, occasioned by the legislative process employed and the temporary outburst of anti-militarism on the eve of the 50th anniversary of the Pearl Harbour attack. Additionally, complex and subtle conflict within the LDP and between the LDP and key opposition parties remained, with the result that passage of the Bill through the Upper House was by no means assured.⁶³ A further six months of negotiations with Kōmeitō and the DSP ensued before a compromise was reached and a revised Bill was passed by the Upper House.

The PKO Bill will enable Japan to participate in the following UN peacekeeping operations, of which items (a) to (f) are considered *core operations*:

- "a. monitoring ceasefire agreements
- b. stationing in the buffer zone and providing surveillance
- c. checking incoming/outgoing arms and munitions
- d. collecting and disposing of arms which are abandoned
- e. helping with the setting-up of cease-fire lines
- f. assisting with the exchange of POWs
- g. monitoring elections
- h. assisting and monitoring local police
- i. providing aid in civil administration areas
- j. provision of medical care
- k. searching for and rescuing refugees
- l. providing refugees with food, clothes and medical care, etc.
- m. setting-up of shelters for refugees
- n. repairing and construction of basic life-supporting facilities

- o. assisting with removal of contamination and other damage
- p. provision of transport and communication facilities, storage of materials, construction of all sorts and provision of machines and equipment"⁶⁴

Significantly, the major amendments to the original Bill required to effect the political compromise incorporated the following:

1. Separate enabling legislation will be required for participation in *core operations*;
2. When *core operations* are legislated, mandatory Diet approval shall be required for each dispatch of SDF personnel;
3. Continued participation in a specific, approved *core operation* must be approved by the Diet every two years; and,
4. The implementation of the PKO Bill will be reviewed in three years.

Three additional provisions within the PKO Bill should be noted - a ceasefire must exist; the belligerent parties must agree to Japan's participation; and, the use of arms is limited to the minimum required for *individual* self-protection.⁶⁵ Together, the cited provisions and amendments clearly limit Japanese participation to support functions within the traditional concept of UN peacekeeping. The commitment to front-line peacekeeping has been reserved for future consideration, and contributions to peace-making operations clearly proscribed.

On 20 September, 1992, the vanguard of a 1700-person SDF peacekeeping mission landed in Cambodia, in response to a UN request that Japan dispatch SDF personnel, civilian police officers and election monitors to support the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).⁶⁶ This first deployment of the SDF to operations to foreign soil significantly expanded Japan's security horizons and participation in global politics, and has signalled the beginning of what has been previously termed as 'comprehensive activism' by Japan within the framework of the UN's peace and security function. However, Japan's reaction to externally-generated imperatives and to its own international political aspirations has been moderated by domestic constraints and the sensitivity of regional actors respecting the scope and level of participation. The SDF mission within UNTAC is indeed restricted to

'non-core' PKO activities, reflecting the still fragile national consensus on PKO participation. If the 1991 minesweeping operation can serve as a model, the successful completion of this current deployment will be necessary before a new national consensus is formed which permits SDF participation in *core* PKO activities.

Membership on the Security Council

Japan's response to the changing international order and its acceptance of more global peace and security responsibilities have been paralleled by a renewed focus on becoming a permanent member of the Security Council. Evidence of mounting Japanese pressure in the direction is found in the MOFA's 1991 assertion that it has become very important to be seated in the Security Council given the Council's renewed responsibilities in maintaining international peace and security. The MOFA further observed that as Japan's international position rises, expectations for Japan's appropriate UN role are growing.⁶⁷ Clarity of purpose was made evident on January 5, 1992 when Prime Minister Miyazawa stated, in interview with NHK, that Japan would actively pursue permanent membership on the Security Council.⁶⁸ In a subsequent address to the Security Council on 31 January 1992, the Prime Minister was more circumspect, noting that it was now important to consider thoroughly ways to adjust the functions and composition of the Security Council to make it more reflective of the new era. He further noted that Japan was prepared to take an active part in this process, and observed that it was important that those who extend considerable financial support be involved in "...its establishment from the earliest stage."⁶⁹

A similar approach to advancing Japan's candidature for a permanent seat was repeated by Foreign Minister Watanabe who expressed in Tokyo, prior to departing for the UN General Assembly, that the Security Council must be revamped so that Japan can receive a permanent spot.⁷⁰ In his address to the General Assembly, the Foreign Minister stressed,

inter alia, Japan's financial support of the UN and the new domestic arrangements that enable its participation in peacekeeping . Additionally, he urged the Organization to address the functions and composition of the Security Council.⁷¹ This was followed by overt advocacy for a permanent seat by the Japanese permanent representative to the UN, at an official dinner, and by Prime Minister Miyazawa at his press conference for the New Year.⁷² The increasing frequency of direct statements claiming a permanent seat on the Security Council, and efforts to garner international support on a bilateral basis, are indicative not only of a new Japanese focus on the UN, but also of a new assertiveness and confidence that it is time for Japan to take its full and appropriate position in the international system.

CONCLUSION

The imperatives which shaped the character of Japan's national policy have been similarly influential in determining Japan's interaction with the UN respecting that Organization's peace and security function. While causal relationships have necessarily changed with the inclusion of the UN as a subject of security policy, the relative salience of the external and domestic factors explored in Chapter Five remained essentially consistent within corresponding policy periods.

In one respect, the US, the Soviet Union/Russia, and the international system may be viewed as a collectivity that determined the degree to which the UN was able to fulfil its peace and security function. As the UN's efficiency varied in response to the dynamics of the US-Soviet/Russia relationship, so did Japan's reliance on the UN as a guarantor of its security and its use of the UN as a forum for peace and security issues. Moreover, the level of Japan's activism within the UN security framework responded to the policy flexibility afforded by changes in the international system as precipitated by the aforementioned relationship and the

Japanese-US relationship. This became most apparent in the post-1989 period. From another perspective, the continuing centrality of the Japan-US relationship to Japanese foreign and security policy defined Japan's UN position on significant peace and security issues.⁷³

Additionally, Japan's sensitivity to that relationship and to the positions of the US-led Western bloc eventually complemented the systemic factors which were providing incentive for increased Japanese activism in the UN. As with the development of strategic horizons and SDF capabilities expanded, sensitivity to regional actors produced counterforces to Japan's movement towards greater participation in UN security initiatives where military options were concerned.

While external factors effectively set the broader boundaries of Japan's UN-centred activism, domestic factors focused the scope of Japanese participation and limited the means employed. The societal factors of pacifism and anti-militarism, and associated subscription to the *Peace Constitution*, remained most salient, with the government carefully considering their strength when crafting its UN policy. In a positive sense, these factors have consistently legitimized Japan's declaratory support of the UN as an instrument of security policy, and, have underwritten its attempts to strengthen the Security Council and peacekeeping operations and its participation in the arms control and disarmament processes. However, to the detriment of Tokyo's interest in expanding its influence in the Organization, they have limited the extent to which Japan could participate in the peacekeeping and peacemaking functions vital to the UN's relevance respecting global peace and security. The slow recession of these values, coupled with the gradual emergence of a new national confidence and assertiveness, were necessary for the building of a new consensus that permitted limited participation in UN military initiatives.

Regardless of wide societal support of the UN and its intended peace and security

function, Japan's participation in military-related activities has been subjected to the same level of politicization as encountered in the foundation of general security policy. As evidenced by four decades of debate on the provision of human resources to UN security-related activities, policy-making has reflected the government's concern with maintaining the state-societal consensus and its electoral position. Given the political crises that consideration of such options engendered, incremental and reactive policies remained the norm and were formulated primarily within the political system. However, it cannot be ignored that Japan has progressed to a "comprehensive" UN policy, encompassing diplomatic, economic and military contributions. This new posture, along with renewed attempts to gain a permanent seat on the Security Council, signal Japan's investment in the UN as an instrument of security policy and as a forum in which to wield increased political influence.

NOTES

1. All references to Japan's Constitution are taken from the official English translation contained in Hideo Tanaka, ed., *The Japanese Legal System* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1976) 3-15.

2. All references to the *Treaty of Peace with Japan*, San Francisco, 8 September 1951 are taken from the text of the Treaty provided in Denise Folliot, ed., *Documents in International Affairs* (London: Oxford University Press, 1954) 611-625. See the Preamble and Article 5 respecting commitment to the UN five years prior to Japan's membership in the organization.

3. All references to the *Security Treaty between the USA and Japan*, San Francisco, 1951, are taken from the text in *Ibid*: 625-626. See Article IV respecting the expectation that Japan's security would rest within the security framework of the UN.

4. See _____. *Japan and the United Nations*, Report of a Study Group of the Japanese Association of International Law (New York: Manhattan Publishing Company, 1958) 12-19. Also see 19-35 for views expressed in the press between 1945 and 1948 that reflected fundamental support for the UN, but recognized its difficulty in dealing with political issues.

5. *Ibid*: 40-53. The result of a 1949 Asahi poll indicated that 39 percent favoured permanent neutrality, 36 percent advocated joining the UN, 7 percent supported a regional collective security regime, and 8 percent favoured a bilateral security regime.

6. See *Ibid*: 59-67 for comment on the positive attitudes of the media, political parties and the non-communist labour unions respecting the UN's response to the Korean conflict.

7. See *Ibid*: 92-94 for comment on the Communist Party's criticism of the UN, and on media and public support.

8. See *Ibid*: 82-90 for a summary of the major questions and the government's responses.

9. Shigeru Yoshida, translated by Kenchi Yoshida, *The Yoshida Memoirs* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1962) 194-195.

10. *Ibid*: 268.

11. See *Ibid*: 94-95 and 223-226 for an account of the Soviet position *vis-a-vis* Japan and the UN from 1952-1956.

12. Sadako Ogata, "Japan's Changing Role in the United Nations" in *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol 37, No 1 (1983) 34.

13. See _____. *Japan and the United Nations*: 226-228 for security-related abstracts of the text of the Foreign Minister's speech to the 11th Session of the UN General Assembly.

14. Sadako Ogata, *op. cit.*:34 reports this policy statement by the Foreign Minister at the 26th session of the Diet, 4 February 1957.

15. Yamauchi Toshihiro, "Gunning for Japan's Peace Constitution", in *Japan Quarterly*, Vol.39, No.2 (1992) 160-161 reports this communication to the UN by the Chief of the Treaties Bureau (MOFA), prior to Japan's membership in the UN.

16. See Shizuo Saito, "The Evolution of Japan's United Nations Policy in *Japan Review of International Affairs*, Vol.1, No.2 (1987) 194 where the constraints of the Constitution, the Self Defense Forces Law and public opposition to military activities of any kind are cited as the reasons given by Japan for its refusal of the UN request. It is also reported that the UN considered requesting Japan's participation in UNEF II (1973) but did not in recognition of Japan's special (domestic) circumstances.

17. *Ibid*: 195.

18. See Masahiro Nishibori, *Japan Views the United Nations*, (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1970): 6-8 and Sadako Ogata, *op. cit.*: 38.

19. See Shizuo Saito, *op. cit.*: 188-189 and Sadako Ogata, *op. cit.*: 34-35.

20. See Masahiro Nishibori, *op. cit.*: 3-4 and 8-9 respecting Japan and the Security Council, and 1-9 *passim* for Japan's 1970 position on the UN.

21. See Shizuo Saitō, *op. cit.*: 196-197 and Sadako Ogata, *op. cit.*: 30-31.

22. Japan was elected as a non-permanent member of the Security Council for the following terms: 1958/59, 1966/67, 1971/72, 1975/76, 1981/82, and 1987/88. It may be noted that paralleling Japan's activism in pursuing a Security Council seat, efforts were made by Japan to have greater representation throughout the organs of the UN in keeping with Japan's position as a major financial contributor. See the 1985 and 1986 editions of the *Diplomatic Bluebook*, translated by Foreign Press Centre (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 72 and 108 respectively for Japan's position on this issue.

23. See the 1982 and 1988 editions of the *Diplomatic Bluebook*, translated by Foreign Press Centre (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 80 and 93 respectively; and, Masatada Higaki *et al.*, eds., *White Papers of Japan 1981-82* (Tokyo: Japan Institute of International Affairs, 1983) 29.

24. See Masatada Higaki *et al.*, eds., *White Papers of Japan 1980-81* (Tokyo: Japan Institute of International Affairs, 1982) 35.

25. See Shizuo Saito, *op. cit.*: 195-196. The report suggested a list of seven areas in which Japan could progressively participate if national consensus could be obtained. A "step-by-step" implementation policy was emphasized, and SDF participation viewed as a possibility in the longer term.

26. *Loc. cit.*

27. Prime Minister's policy speech to the 112th session of the Diet, 25 January, 1988, translated in Hideo Tsukakosi, *et al.*, eds. *White Papers of Japan 1986-87* (Tokyo: Japan Institute of International Affairs, 1988) 188.

28. Prime Minister's policy speech to the 114th session of the Diet, 10 February 1989, translated in Yukiya Amano, *et al.*, eds. *White Papers of Japan 1987-88* (Tokyo: Japan Institute of International Affairs, 1989) 203. Japan's consideration of sending civilian personnel on peacekeeping missions had previously been communicated in Prime Minister Takeshita's address to the UN General Assembly on 1 June, 1988.

29. Takashi Inoguchi, "Japan's foreign policy in a time of global uncertainty", in *International Journal*, Vol.46, No.4 (1991) 9-10.

30. Nakasone Yasuhiro, "Reinterpreting the Constitution to deal with emergencies", in *Japan Echo*, Vol.17, No.4 (1990) 9-10. Also see Soichiro Tahara, "Gulf Crisis Sparks Constitutional Debate in Japan", in *Bungeishunga*, October 1990. (Translation by The Asia Foundation's Translation Service Centre) for a report of the deep Cabinet cleavage on the issue of military participation.

31. Goro Takeda, "Send Troops to the Middle East", in *Sekai Nippo*, September 19, 1990 (Translated by the Asia Foundation's Translation Service Centre).

32. See the *Diplomatic Bluebook for 1976*, translated by Foreign Press Centre (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 75, and Reinhard Drifte, *Japan's Foreign Policy* (New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1990) 60.

33. See Sadako Ogata, *op. cit.*: 39.

34. *Diplomatic Bluebook 1982 Edition*, translated by Foreign Press Centre (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 82 for comment on "balanced disarmament".

35. See *Diplomatic Bluebook 1983 Edition*, translated by Foreign Press Centre (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 94 and Sadako Ogata *op. cit.* for details of Prime Minister Suzuki's address to the General Assembly, 9 June 1982.

36. See *Diplomatic Bluebook 1984 Edition*, translated by Foreign Press Centre (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 94 and Foreign Policy Speech to the 108th Session of the Diet, 2 January 1987 in Masatada Higaki, *et al.*, eds., *White Papers of Japan 1985-86* (Tokyo: Japan Institute of International Affairs, 1987) 223.

37. See *Diplomatic Bluebook 1988 and 1989*, translated by Foreign Press Centre (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 73-75 and 56 respectively for Japan's reporting on deliberations on disarmament in the UN.

38. See Shizuo Saito *op. cit.*: 189-192 for an analysis of Japan's UN voting pattern and a qualitative presentation of voting behaviour.

39. *Diplomatic Bluebook 1990*, translated by Foreign Press Centre (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 109.

40. See Itaru Umezu and Haruhisa Takeuchi, eds., *White Papers of Japan 1990-91* (Tokyo: The Japan Institute of International Affairs, 1992) 213-220 for the text of this policy speech.

41. See *Ibid.*: 24-31 for objectives and priorities of Japan's foreign policy.

42. *Ibid.*: 29.

43. Courtney Purrington and A.K., "Tokyo's Policy Responses During the Gulf Crisis", in *Asian Survey*, Vol.31, No.4 (1991) 307-308. "A.K." is reported to be a Japanese defence expert.

44. _____. "The Gulf Crisis and Japan", in *Japan Echo*, Vol.17, No.4 (1990) 6. See also Courtney Purrington and A.K., *op. cit.*: 308 for the five US demands on Japan in August 1990, the relevant being:

1. dispatch personnel and equipment to the region, including minesweepers and transport planes;
2. provide monetary support to the coalition;
3. provide aid to neighbouring countries in the region.

45. Takashi Inoguchi, "Japan's Response to the Gulf Crisis: An Analytic Overview", *The Journal of Japanese Studies*, Vol.17, No.2 (1991) 258.

46. See Takashi Inoguchi, *loc. cit.*; Courtney Purrington and A.K., *op. cit.*: 212-213; and Kitaoka Shin'ichi, "Chronicling Japan's Crisis Diplomacy", in *Japan Echo*, Vol.19, No.1 (1992) 37-39 for accounts of the bureaucratic and intra-Party conflict concerning the content of the Bill.

47. See Ito Kenichi, "The Japanese State of Mind: Deliberations on the Gulf Crisis", in *Journal of Japanese Studies*, Vol.17, No.2 (1991) 276-277 for the restrictive articles of the proposed Bill.

48. See Kitaoka Shin'ichi, *op. cit.*: 39 for survey responses of LDP members respecting the UNPCB; and Takashi Inoguchi, *op. cit.*: 259 for comment on public opinion. Ito Kenichi, *op. cit.*: 278-289 presents a detailed account of the mobilization of public opinion.

49. Courtney Purrington and A.K., *op. cit.*: 313-314.

50. *Ibid.*: 311 and Courtney Purrington, "Tokyo's Policy Responses During the Gulf War and the Impact of the Iraqi Shock on Japan", in *Pacific Affairs*, Vol.65, No.2 (1992) 163.

51. See Courtney Purrington, *op. cit.*: 163-165 and Takashi Inoguchi, *op. cit.*: 259 for the inter-party bargaining to gain Kōmeitō and DSP support for financial contributions to the Gulf Coalition Forces.

52. The Security Council of Japan approved the dispatch of SDF aircraft to the Gulf region to airlift war refugees, and the enabling ordinance was promulgated and put into force on 29 January 1992. However, it was constructed such that requests for SDF airlift were not forthcoming. The ordinance was rescinded on 19 April, 1992.

53. See "Gulf War Retrospective", in *Japan Echo*, Vol.19, No.1, 1992:34 which notes that regardless of Japan's \$13B contribution to the Gulf effort, Kuwait did not mention Japan with public thanks to the countries that had assisted its liberation.

54. See Ushiba Akihiko, "The Minesweeping Mission", in *Japan Echo*, Vol.19, No.1 (1992) 43-50 for an account of the operation.

55. See Kitaoka Shin'ichi, *op. cit.*: 41; Courtney Purrington, *op. cit.*: 171; and, Eugene Brown, "Contending Paradigms of Japan's International Role: Elite Views of the Persian Gulf Crisis", in *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, Vol.10, No.1 (1991) 3.

56. "Minesweepers Return", in *LDP Liberal Star*, Vol.20, No.237 (1991) 11.

57. See Kitaoka Shin'ichi, *op. cit.*: 41 and Courtney Purrington, *op. cit.*: 171-173 for an expanded analysis of the deployment feasibility from the perspective of decision-makers.

58. Sato Seizaburo, "Gulf War Retrospective", in *Japan Echo*, Vol 19, No.1 (1992) 34-35. Also see Kent E. Calder, "Japan in 1991: Uncertain Quest for a Global Role", in *Asian Survey*, Vol.32, No.1 (1992) 35 for survey results of popular opinion indicating 50 percent supporting SDF participation in UN peacekeeping and 23 percent supporting a military role in future conflict if under UN command.

59. See "Japan's Role in the International Community", in *Japan Echo*, Vol.19, No.2 (1992) 56. The draft report of the LDP Special Study Group on Japan's Role in the International Community is presented in pp.49-58.

60. Courtney Purrington, *op. cit.*:174; and, Kent E. Calder, *op. cit.*:30-40.

61. This information on the policy process was obtained when the author was interviewing M. M., an official of Japan's Ministry of Justice who was on secondment to the MOFA while participating in the drafting of the PKO Bill.

62. See *LDP Liberal Star* Vol.20, No.237 (1991) 1; and Courtney Purrington *op. cit.*: 173-175 for a detailed account of inter-party politics and the legislative process.

63. Kent E. Calder, *op. cit.*:40.

64. See Embassy of Japan, "Explanatory Note of the Government of Japan's Position on the Newly-Enacted Laws on Peacekeeping Operations and Disaster Relief", BUL-10, 17 June (1992).

65. *Loc. cit.*

66. *LDP Liberal Star* Vol.21, No.244 (1992) 3.

67. *Diplomatic Bluebook 1991 Edition* (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 87 for Japan and the Security Council.

68. NHK Japanese language broadcast, 5 January 1992, translated by Prof J. Kovalio (Carleton University).

69. Japan, "Statement by H.E. Mr Kiichi Miyazawa, Prime Minister of Japan, at the United Nations Security Council Meeting at the Level of Heads of State and Government" (United Nations: Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations, 31 January 1992)

70. NHK Japanese language broadcast, 15 September 1992, translated by Prof J. Kovalio (Carleton University).

71. Japan, "Statement by H.E. Mr. Micho Watanabe, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, at the 47th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations" (United Nations: Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations, 22 September, 1992).

72. NHK Japanese language broadcast, 24 November 1992 and 30 December 1992, respectively report the statements of Japan's permanent representative to the UN and the Prime Minister. Translated by Prof J. Kovalio (Carleton University).

73. See Itaru Umezu and Haruhisa Takeuchi, eds., *White Papers of Japan 1990-91* (Tokyo: The Japan Institute of International Affairs, 1992) 213-236 for the texts of the Prime Minister's and Foreign Minister's speeches to the 123rd session of the Diet, 24 January 1992, which refer to the Japan-US relationship. It is to be noted that the Prime Minister also referred to Japan's "UN-centred diplomacy" in this same speech.

CONCLUSION

Japan's security policy has undergone a transformation such that it more closely conforms to the Western concept of national security, with the state now actively addressing a broader spectrum of military, political and economic threats posed by the international environment. Moreover, the instruments of security policy now encompass economic, diplomatic and military means. Notwithstanding the reorientation of security policy from that of the Yoshida Doctrine, which focused on economic security, avoided involvement in international strategic issues and advocated a minimum self-defence capability, the transformation is not yet complete. There still exists a significant disparity respecting the expected congruence between economic power and the assumption of politico-strategic responsibilities. This disparity continues to elicit expression of the uniqueness of Japanese security policy and charges of Japanese free-riding with respect to global peace and security.

Conclusions as to the future direction of Japanese security policy may be drawn from the elements of continuity and change which have been salient in the evolution of policy to date. Additionally, any such conclusions must be built upon an objective view of contemporary policy and the *de facto* pursuit of that policy. The first point of note in this latter regard is the absolute and relative magnitude of Japan's defence budget, which has risen to be the third largest in the world. Second is the continued SDF modernization and the new infrastructure programs, which are progressively endowing Japan with significant military capabilities. Military capabilities have, however, remained defensive in character, non-nuclear

and without strategic potential. Furthermore, there are no substantive proofs that any of these three characteristics are in transition. It must further be acknowledged that increases in defence budgets and military capabilities have largely been in response to pressures from the US and the US-led Western states that Japan assume greater burden-sharing with respect to self-defence and regional security. Complementing these pressures was the acknowledgement of an increasing Soviet/Russian potential threat, continuing instability on the Korean Peninsula, and the more recent modernization programs of the PLA.

The third point to be noted is that Japanese strategic horizons have expanded to address regional and global peace and security issues, with regional activism being predominant. Increasing Japanese interest in East Asian security affairs has been precipitated by a more complex group of imperatives, including general pressure by the US and its allies that Japan assume greater regional burden-sharing, a rising Soviet/Russian presence in the region, continued instability on the Korean Peninsula, the constantly increasing integration of the Japanese economy with regional actors, and an emerging desire by Japan to enhance its regional political influence. These factors have precipitated a growing range of Japanese policy initiatives which have transcended a primarily reactive policy towards the region, with a more proactive orientation emerging.

On the other hand, activism on a global scale has lagged regional policy in both scope and level of effort, and has remained largely reactive. In the global dimension, tentative initiatives have primarily been in response to specific pressures and demands from the external environment. One notable exception to this pattern is Japan's renewed efforts to gain influence in the security fora of the UN; however, this in itself has precipitated reactive policy with Japan's realization that such influence cannot be accrued without the commitment of human resources to the UN's peace and security operations.

The fourth dimension of policy is that 'comprehensive national security' is being pursued, with military, diplomatic and economic instruments being increasingly integrated to address Japan's security concerns. The evolution of emphasis placed on the military as opposed to non-military instruments of comprehensive national security is difficult to quantify in absolute terms; however, using percent-GNP as the relative measure of military emphasis, this component has remained relatively static. On the other hand, the scope of SDF activities has expanded within the US-Japan security regime, and more recently with the unprecedented deployment of the SDF abroad in support of the Gulf Coalition minesweeping operations and UN peacekeeping operations. As described, the economic and diplomatic components of comprehensive national security have markedly increased in the last decade, both regionally and globally. However, as Japan experienced during and after the Gulf Crisis, the US-led Western bloc considers that Japan's contribution of non-military means alone is insufficient to afford Tokyo a position of influence with respect to global peace and security issues.

The last dimension of Japanese security policy of note is the tentative movement towards expanding the range of security regimes and fora within which Japan has pursued its security interests. As recently as 18 January 1993, Tokyo declared that the Japan-US relationship and security regime constitute the cornerstones of Japan's foreign and security policies. This declaratory policy reflects what has been essentially consistent throughout the four periods of the development of Japanese security policy. Augmenting the bilateral relationship during the last decade, however, has been Japanese participation in discussions on security-related issues in a widening variety of fora such as the G-7, OECD and the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences. This latter forum, along with increased activism in the UN regarding peace and security initiatives, has not only accommodated Japan's broadening politico-strategic horizons and efforts to increase political influence, but has permitted Tokyo

to pursue its own specific interests more effectively.

Three additional observations need be made regarding Japan's expanded use of security-related fora and regimes. First, Japan's position in the UN on fundamental peace and security issues has not varied markedly from that of the US or the US-led Western States throughout the Post-War era. Second, activism associated with the UN and UN-related initiatives has conferred a certain international legitimacy by reason of the nature of the Organization, making such activism more acceptable to regional and global actors. Last, Japan's participation in the ASEAN forum in general, and its interest and activism in ASEAN security affairs remain acceptable by virtue of the continued US-Japan relationship.

The evolution of Japanese security policy to date has been marked by incrementalism, regardless of the force or origin of the imperatives for change. This incrementalism has been manifest in policy formulation which attempted to avoid politically hard choices and to avoid challenging the national consensus on societal and political values. Therefore, initial policy choices in response to new conditions, that could not be ignored, tended to avoid means or instruments to which the polity had not been previously exposed by either their use or long-term debate upon their possible use. As described, the societal values of pacifism and anti-militarism, which persisted throughout the post-war period, have constituted the major constraint upon configuring a national security policy that more closely conforms to the Western concept. While these values have receded in the more contemporary period, they, nevertheless, remain sufficiently internalized that initiatives which present too great an assault upon their fundamental premises risk precipitating a breach of the state-societal consensus. It has been the potential of such a breach that has kept security issues highly politicized, especially those concerning the capabilities and roles of the SDF. Moreover, these values have been translated into a perspective which eschews international involvements having the

potential to embroil Japan in conflict or a state of belligerency. The existence of the *Peace Constitution* has, and continues to serve as an anchor for these values, precluding any concerted movement to amend this fundamental law and restricting the extent to which its provisions may be interpreted to accommodate new security policy initiatives.

While the Japanese government has not been reticent in appealing to these 'special' domestic conditions when convenient, to avoid unwanted international politico-strategic commitments or increases in the defence effort, the evidence is substantial that the mood of the country is closely monitored in formulating security policy. The absence of a clearly defined constitutional basis for security policy and the SDF continues, thus public acceptance remains the basic criterion for the legitimization of policy; policy which ignores society's values and its mood still risks provoking the type of political storm which the government remains intent on avoiding.

Incrementalism is further entrenched by a political system that has essentially remained unchanged since the 1950s. With inter-party and intra-party interaction remaining focused on electoral politics, the salience of the public mood is enhanced respecting core issues, particularly those associated with security policy. Moreover, the character of the public face of policy-making remains consensual in the legislative process; and, more importantly, consensual policy-making remains integral to intra-party factional support for the leadership of the ruling party. This political environment will continue to ensure that comprehensive changes in policy will only be effected over the longer-term through a sequence of incremental policies. Until political reform is effected to restructure the electoral system and the ruling party's factional politics, two further consequences may be expected to continue. First, security policy formulation other than that dealing with routine matters, will remain focused in the LDP decision-making process rather than in the bureaucracy or other

institutional decision-making fora. Resultant policy will then continue to reflect political compromise, rather than the realities of the situation or a long-term, coherent strategy. Second, and following from the first, decision-making in response to crises or radical change in the external environment will continue to reflect not only the manifestations of incrementalism, but will also be inappropriately slow in emerging.

For Japan, the contemporary transitional condition of the international system presents the potential of a more benign politico-strategic environment; however, this is not without condition from the Japanese perspective. Russia's regional politico-strategic potential and mutual intransigence regarding settlement of the Northern Territories issue remain constants. Additionally, tensions on the Korean Peninsula have not moderated significantly, and the PRC presents a future economic and military challenge in the region. These conditions would portend a continuing increase in Japan's military capabilities and related expenditures, and attempts to increase political influence in the region. Moreover, the continuance of the US-Japan security regime will necessarily remain the cornerstone of Japan's security policy if Russian and future PRC capabilities are to be balanced sufficiently without Japan embarking upon a massive nuclear and conventional rearmament program. In addition to the continuing existence of political and societal constraints precluding such an effort, the time required to close the capability gap sufficiently to have strategic meaning would mitigate against choosing such an option voluntarily.

Sustaining the US-Japan security regime will also remain necessary if Japan is to complete its normalization of relations with the majority of East Asian states who continue to watch Japan's growing power with varying unease as to how that power may be further developed and used. The US-Japan relationship, both general and security-related, is perceived by regional actors as providing a mantle of moderation and international

respectability for Japan. Japan's sensitivity to such perceptions have been in evidence, and their continued observance correctly acknowledged by Tokyo as a prerequisite for the avoidance of isolation and for any future regional leadership role. Moreover, given contemporary economic interdependence in the region, and the necessity of its continued development for Japan's future economic security, Tokyo's positive political and economic regional cooperation will be pursued.

The maintenance of the US-Japan relationship will subtend continued US pressure for Japan to effect increased defence and regional security burden-sharing, and Japanese acquiescence will continue to present regional actors with a more palatable option than would an 'isolated' Japan. On Japan's part, acquiescence, to the degree acceptable to its domestic constituency, will remain a necessary mechanism with which to relive other pressures within the relationship. These imperatives, in combination with continued perceptions of potential regional threats, ensure that Japan's military capabilities will progressively expand while the US-Japan security regime remains in place. However, irrespective of such expansion of military power, the maintenance of a defensive posture will be pursued in acknowledgement of the character of the US-Japan security regime that provides US strategic capabilities for the security of Japan, and to alleviate regional and domestic fears of incipient expansionary militarism.

The transitional condition of the international system also presents uncertainty with respect to the future global and regional power relationships and alignments, and to the complexion of national interests that will be pursued by external actors. Recognition of the contemporary status of these factors presents Japan with some confidence in continued US interest in East Asia and its commitment to Japan's security; however, the existence of some uncertainty as to the longer-term configuration of the politico-strategic regional structure will

provide incentive for enhanced Japanese activism in regional security-related fora. With the aforementioned caution being expressed by regional actors and the domestic constraints on Japanese military expansion, increased use of non-military instruments of security policy will necessarily provide the primary means with which Japan will attempt to enhance its position within such fora or any emerging security regime.

Regardless of Japan's regional aspirations, the prevailing regional attitudes mitigate against the expectation that Japan will be willingly afforded a dominant role. Moreover, sensitivity to regional actors and domestic constraints preclude an overt drive for a leadership position and other than incremental commitment to regional involvement, with the result that a support role in the formation or maintenance of a regional security regime remains Tokyo's most likely course of action. Additionally, from the Japanese perspective and that of the majority of East Asian actors, such a regime would necessarily be complimentary to the matrix of US-led security arrangements in East Asia.

One further expectation of Tokyo's security-related regional interaction becomes evident from the historical perspective and from the evolution of relationships within East Asia. Japan's primarily ASEAN focus of its diplomatic and economic initiatives has provided a more substantive base upon which to build future cooperative security policy than has its efforts in Northeast Asia. While politico-strategic imperatives have caused Japan to take initiatives in both directions, the growing acceptance of Tokyo's overtures and activism has not been equal in each sub-region. With overt and strong fundamental estrangement continuing to exist in Northeast Asia, acceptance of Japan in this sub-region will lag substantially that being developed with the Southeast actors. This will cause Japan to maintain the contemporary relative focus of Japan's security policy respecting cooperative efforts towards ASEAN while reversing the direction in terms of possible security concerns.

On the global stage, Japan can no longer afford to maintain a low posture respecting peace and security beyond its immediate region. In one dimension, the effects of interdependence are being recognized where the deleterious impact of general system and extra-regional political stability threaten Japan's economic security. This, in itself, constitutes an increasingly salient imperative for Japan to contribute more to global security burden-sharing. Additionally, progressively increasing economic interdependence makes Tokyo more vulnerable to the demands of its major trading partners that Japan accepts the full range of responsibilities, both military and non-military, associated with such burden-sharing. Compounding the problems posed by interdependence is the transitional state of the international system that has given rise to the potential of increased politico-strategic instability in many of the regions vital to Japanese economic security, or the security of its economic partners. Moreover, it has thrust into the forefront of shaping a new international order that group of US-led states with which Japan wishes to identify. Both conditions exacerbate the pressures that Japan respond positively to the challenge.

Japan has also begun to experience the synergism created between the external pressures to contribute to global peace and security, and the emerging national confidence and assertiveness that support and demand enhanced global influence beyond the economic dimension. To date, this has resulted in strong declaratory policy respecting Japan's commitment to participate more fully in international political affairs, which has been manifest in more selective means and constrained application of the necessary means. However, as the synergism is further strengthened by increased externally-generated demands and the confidence gained by Tokyo's experience in the application of means novel to Japan, more comprehensive global participation will be progressively undertaken.

The further expansion of means, particularly those associated with the roles and

capabilities of the SDF, but also diplomatic means encompassing concrete commitments to external actors, will remain subject to the forging of a new national consensus. This will become progressively more difficult, requiring increasingly radical interpretations of the Constitution and assaults upon the fundamental premises of that document. Without constitutional amendment, which is unlikely to be deemed desirable by the greater part of the polity, the extent to which Japan could participate in politico-strategic solutions to regional or extra-regional disorder will remain limited in the shorter term.

These continuing domestic conditions give substance to the expectation that Tokyo will attempt to effect its declared 'UN-centred' diplomacy and confine the use of military means to within the auspices of the UN. In addition to 'legitimizing' the contribution of human resources to the global security function as being demanded by external actors, the Organization engenders the necessary domestic support about which a new consensus may be reasonably built. Notwithstanding the utility and acceptability of the UN as an instrument of security policy, there will remain limits upon the scope of Japan's participation. Progress from the already approved participation in limited peacekeeping functions to participation in 'core' peacekeeping has already been provided for, and will be effected after the initial successes in the more limited role. However, consideration of an active peace-making role, even under the auspices of the UN, would constitute an excursion into the issue areas which would cause the type of political storm that the government constantly seeks to avoid.

To summarize, as Japanese security policy continues to evolve in the 1990s, movement will continue to be incremental across the full scope of defence, regional and global security policy. Furthermore, the balance between military and non-military components will continue to favour the latter. However, given the current roles and capabilities of the SDF and the availability of economic and technical resources, such

incremental movement will be translated into a military presence well able to support a more politically influential role for Japan, regionally and globally. Such development, in concert with the incremental growth of the diplomatic and economic components of national security, will effectively position Japan for a future leadership role in regional and global security. The character and acceptability of that role will remain dependent, however, on the development of a government able to exercise leadership, and on the perceptions of other actors as to the desirability of Japan exercising such a role. These same factors will be relevant in Japan's quest for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, but with Japan's economic status and commitment to comprehensive UN-centred activism being the more salient issues, and being ultimately dependent upon the UN's will to expand the number of permanent seats.

CHART 1: SEA LANES OF COMMUNICATION
Defending an Economic Seapower (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989)

CHART 2: STRAITS IN EAST ASIA
The Future of Asia-Pacific Collaboration (Lexington: D.C. Heath, 1988)

TABLE 1: DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES IN EAST ASIA (1985)
 Defense of Japan (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 1985)

TABLE 2: CHANGES IN SOVIET FORCES IN THE FAR EAST
Defense of Japan (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 1990)

FISCAL YEAR	GNP	DEFENCE EXPENDITURES			ODA		
	¥ BILLION	¥ BILLION	% GNP	% GROWTH	¥ BILLION	% GNP	% GROWTH
1955	7559	134.9	1.78	-3.3			
1960	12743	176.9	1.23	0.6			
1965	28160	301.4	1.07	9.6			
1970	72440	569.5	0.79	17.7			
1975	158500	1327.3	0.84	21.4			
1976	168190	1512.4	0.90	13.9			
1977	192850	1690.6	0.88	11.8			
1978	210600	1901.0	0.90	12.4	466.3	0.23	21.9
1979	232000	2094.5	0.90	10.2	578.0	0.26	24.0
1980	247800	2230.2	0.90	6.5	749.0	0.31	29.6
1981	264300	2400.0	0.99	7.6	699.0	0.27	-6.6
1982	277200	2586.1	0.93	7.8	753.0	0.28	7.2
1983	281700	2754.2	0.98	6.5	893.0	0.32	18.6
1984	296000	2934.6	0.99	6.5	1026.0	0.34	14.8
1985	314600	3137.1	0.99	6.9	906.0	0.29	-11.7
1986	336700	3343.5	0.99	6.6	950.0	0.29	4.8
1987	350400	3517.4	1.00	5.2	1078.0	0.31	13.5
1988	365200	3700.3	1.01	5.2	1171.0	0.32	8.6
1989	389700	3919.8	1.01	5.9	1369.8	0.32	6.8
1990	439420	4159.3	0.99	6.1	1449.4	0.31	5.8
1991	(461694)	4386.0	0.95	5.5	1529.5	0.33	5.5
1992	(472229)	4551.8	0.96	3.8	(1648.8)	(0.35)	7.8

TABLE 3: DEFENCE AND ODA EXPENDITURES

Sources: Japan's Official Development Assistance (Tokyo: MOFA, 1989)

Defense of Japan (Tokyo: JDA, Annual Editions)

Diplomatic Bluebook (Tokyo: MOFA, Annual Editions)

**The changing geographical composition of Japan's trade,
selected years (percentage)**

	Exports				Imports			
	1973	1980	1985	1986	1973	1980	1985	1986
United States	25.9	24.4	37.6	38.9	24.2	17.5	20.3	22.2
European Common Market	13.2	13.2	11.4	14.0	8.3	5.5	6.6	10.1
Other Western Europe	4.6	3.5	3.0	3.9	2.3	1.6	2.0	2.7
Canada, Australia, New Zealand	6.7	5.0	6.2	5.7	15.5	9.0	10.1	10.3
East Asian NICs	14.8	14.8	12.8	14.3	6.8	5.3	7.7	10.5
East Asian LDCs	6.1	7.0	4.2	3.6	9.0	14.1	13.1	11.5
China	2.8	3.9	7.1	4.7	2.5	3.1	5.1	4.7
South Asia	2.1	2.2	2.1	2.1	3.6	3.7	3.2	2.9
Middle East and North Africa	4.7	11.4	7.1	4.8	12.8	32.1	23.6	15.6
Latin America and Caribbean	6.7	6.3	4.1	3.9	4.6	3.9	4.7	4.9
Sub-Saharan Africa and other	9.7	4.9	2.1	1.9	6.6	2.6	2.1	2.6
Socialist Countries	2.8	3.3	2.3	2.2	3.9	1.8	1.5	1.9
World	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Trend of Japanese Trade with ASEAN Nations

(1) Value of exports and imports by item

(100 million US\$)

TABLE 4: JAPAN'S INTERNATIONAL TRADE

Japan in the World Economy (Washington Institute for International Economics, 1988)
White Paper on International Trade (Tokyo: JETRO, 1992)

TABLE 5: RESOURCE DEPENDENCIES
 Beyond War (Elmsford: Pergamon Press, 1984)
 White Paper on International Trade (Tokyo: JETRO, 1991)

TABLE 6: DESTINATIONS OF JAPAN'S FDI
 Foreign Direct Investment in the Asia Pacific Region (Tokyo, JCER, 1992)

TABLE 7: JAPAN'S OUTWARD FDI
 Foreign Direct Investment in the Asia Pacific Region (Tokyo: JCER, 1992)

Geographical Distribution of Bilateral ODA					
(Net Disbursements, \$ million)					
	1975	1980	1986	1987	1988
Asia	638 (75.0)	1,383 (70.5)	2,494 (64.8)	3,416 (65.1)	4,034 (62.8)
Northeast Asia	76 (8.9)	82 (4.3)	490 (12.7)	577 (11.0)	725 (11.3)
Southeast Asia	426 (50.1)	861 (44.0)	1,169 (30.4)	1,866 (35.6)	2,197 (34.2)
ASEAN	380 (44.7)	703 (35.9)	914 (23.8)	1,680 (32.0)	1,920 (29.9)
Southwest Asia	133 (15.4)	435 (22.2)	831 (21.6)	970 (18.3)	1,109 (17.3)
Unspecified	3 (0.3)	5 (0.3)	4 (0.1)	3 (0.1)	4 (0.1)
Middle East	90 (10.6)	204 (10.4)	340 (8.8)	526 (10.0)	583 (9.1)
Africa	59 (6.9)	223 (11.4)	418 (10.9)	516 (9.8)	884 (13.8)
Central and South America	47 (5.4)	118 (6.0)	317 (8.2)	418 (8.0)	399 (6.2)
Oceania	5 (0.6)	12 (0.6)	55 (1.4)	68 (1.3)	93 (1.4)
Europe	0 (0.0)	-1.5 (—)	2 (0.1)	2 (0.0)	4 (0.1)
Unallocable	11 (1.3)	1 (0.2)	221 (5.7)	302 (5.8)	425 (6.6)
Total Bilateral ODA	850 (100.0)	1,961 (100.0)	3,846 (100.0)	5,248 (100.0)	6,422 (100.0)
Note: The figures in the parentheses indicate the shares (%) of bilateral ODA distributed to each region. Regions are classified according to the standard by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.					
Geographical Distribution of Bilateral ODA by Types (1988)					
(Net Disbursement, \$ million)					
	Grant Assistance	Technical Cooperation	Development Lending and Capital	ODA Total	Increase (%)
Asia	681.92 (46.1)	601.74 (42.2)	2,748.69 (78.2)	4,034.35 (62.8)	18.1
Northeast Asia	52.35 (3.5)	177.40 (12.5)	494.90 (14.1)	724.64 (11.3)	25.6
Southeast Asia	340.69 (17.6)	342.58 (24.0)	1,593.32 (45.3)	2,196.59 (34.2)	17.7
Southwest Asia	370.88 (25.0)	78.13 (5.5)	660.47 (18.8)	1,109.47 (17.3)	14.4
Unspecified	— (—)	3.64 (0.3)	— (—)	3.64 (0.1)	39.5
Middle East	127.10 (8.6)	72.55 (5.1)	382.87 (10.9)	582.52 (9.1)	10.7
Africa	525.96 (35.3)	110.41 (7.8)	247.55 (7.0)	883.93 (13.8)	71.4
Central and South America	96.30 (6.5)	185.62 (13.0)	117.17 (3.3)	399.29 (6.2)	-4.5
Oceania	46.06 (3.1)	28.98 (2.0)	18.03 (0.5)	93.07 (1.4)	36.8
Europe	— (—)	4.28 (0.3)	-0.32 (—)	3.96 (0.1)	81.7
Unallocable	3.85 (0.3)	420.90 (29.5)	— (—)	424.75 (6.6)	40.7
Total	1,483.19 (100.0)	1,424.49 (100.0)	3,514.19 (100.0)	6,421.87 (100.0)	22.4
Note: Figures in the parentheses indicate the shares (%).					

TABLE 8: GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF ODA
Japan's ODA 1989 (Tokyo: MOFA, 1990)

SOURCES CONSULTED

- Alagappa, Mathiah. "The Major Powers and Southeast Asia". *International Journal* Vol.44, No.3 (1989).
- Allison, Graham T. *Essence of Decision-Making: The Cuban Missile Crisis*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1971.
- Alves, Dora, ed. *Change, Interdependence and Security in the Pacific Basin*. Washington: National Defense University Press, 1991.
- _____. *Evolving Pacific Basin Strategies*. Washington: National Defense University Press, 1990.
- _____. *Pacific Security Toward the Year 2000*. Washington: National Defense University Press, 1988.
- Amano, Yukiya, et al. *White Papers of Japan*. Tokyo: Japan Institute of International Affairs, 1989.
- Articles From the Japanese Press*. Tokyo: Asia Foundation Translation Service Centre, 1990-92 articles.
- Axelrod, R., ed. *Structure of Decisions*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.
- Azabu, Akira. "Echoes from the Gulf in Japanese Politics". *Japan Echo* Vol.18, No.2 (1991).
- Azar, Edward E. and Moon, Chung-in. *National Security in the Third World: The Management of Internal and External Threats*. Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1988.
- Balassa, Bela A. and Noland, Marcus. *Japan in the World*. Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1988.
- Barnett, Robert. *Beyond War*. Elmsford (New York): Pergamon Press, 1984.
- Bean, R. Mark. *Cooperative Security in Northeast Asia*. Washington: National Defense University Press, 1990.
- Brenner, Michael. "The alliance: a Gulf post-mortem". *International Affairs* Vol.67, No.4 (1991).
- Bridges, Brian. "Japan's Relations with North Korea: Towards Normalization". *Korean Journal of Defence Analysis* Vol.3, No.(1991).
- Brown, Eugene. "Contending Paradigms of Japan's International Role: Elite Views of the Persian Gulf Crisis". *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies* Vol.10, No.1 (1991).

- Brownlie, Ian, ed. *Basic Documents in International Law*, Second Edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.
- Buzan, Barry. *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*. Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1982.
- Calder, Kent E. *Crisis and Compensation*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988.
- _____. "Domestic Constraints and Japan's Foreign Economic Policy of the 1990s". *International Journal* Vol.XLVI, No.4 (1991).
- _____. "Japan in 1990: Limits to Change". *Asian Survey* Vol.XXX, No.1 (1991).
- _____. "Japan in 1991: Uncertain Quest for a Global Role". *Asian Survey* Vol.32, No.1 (1992).
- Chapman, J.W.M. et al, eds. *Japan's Quest for Comprehensive Security*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982.
- A Colossus Stirs. *Asiaweek* Vol. 19, No.4 (1993).
- Curtis, G.L. *The Japanese Way of Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988.
- Destler, I.M. "Beyond Mutual Recrimination: Building a Solid US-Japan Relationship in the 1990s." *International Security* Vol.15, No.3 (1990/91).
- Donnelly, Michael W. "Japanese-American Relations: the costs of brinkmanship". *International Journal* Vol.46, No.4 (1991).
- Dower, John W. *Empire and Aftermath*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979.
- Drifte, Reinhard. *Japan's Foreign Policy*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1990.
- _____. "Japan's Security Policy and Southeast Asia". *Contemporary Southeast Asia* Vol.12, No.3 (1990).
- Ellingworth, Richard. *Japanese Economic Policies and Security*. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1972.
- Ellison, Herbert J., ed. *Japan and the Pacific Quadrille*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1987.
- Folliot, Denise, ed. *Documents on International Affairs 1951*. London: Oxford University Press, 1954.
- _____. *Documents on International Affairs 1954*. London: Oxford University Press, 1957.
- Foster, Richard B. et al, eds. *Strategy and Security in Northeast Asia*. New York: Crane,

- Russak and Co., 1979.
- Gott, Richard et al, eds. *Documents on International Affairs 1960*. London: Oxford University Press, 1964.
- Grove, Eric, ed. *Global Security: North American, European and Japanese Interdependence in the 1990s*. Oxford: Brassey's (UK) Ltd., 1991.
- "Gulf War in Retrospective." *Japan Echo* Vol.19, No.1 (1992).
- Hane, Mikiso. *Modern Japan*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1986.
- Herman, Charles F. et al, eds. *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy*. Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1987.
- Higaki, Masatada, et al, eds. *White Papers of Japan 1980-81*. Tokyo: Japan Institute of International Affairs, 1982.
- _____. *White Papers of Japan 1981-82*. Tokyo: Japan Institute of International Affairs, 1983.
- _____. *White Papers of Japan 1985-86*. Tokyo: Japan Institute of International Affairs, 1987.
- Holland, Harrison M. *Managing Defense: Japan's Dilemma*. New York: University Press of America, 1988.
- Hrebennar, Ronald J. *The Japanese Party System*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1986.
- Inoguchi, Takashi and Okimoto, Daniel I., eds. *The Political Economy of Japan, Vol 2*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988.
- Inoguchi, Takashi. "Japan's foreign policy in a time of global uncertainty". *International Journal*, Vol.46, No.4 (1991).
- _____. "Japan's Response to the Gulf Crisis: An Analytic Overview". *The Journal of Japanese Studies*, Vol.17, No.2 (1991).
- Ito, Kenichi, "The Japanese State of Mind: Deliberations on the Gulf Crisis". *Journal of Japanese Studies* Vol.19, No.2 (1991).
- Japan. *Defense of Japan*. Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 1976-1991 eds.
- _____. *Diplomatic Bluebook*. Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1976-1991 eds.
- _____. *Economic Survey of Japan*. Tokyo: Economic Planning Agency, 1951-1991 eds.
- _____. *Explanatory Note on the Government of Japan's Position on the Newly-Enacted Laws on Peacekeeping Operations and Disaster Relief*. Embassy of Japan (Canada), Bul-10, 17

June 1992.

____. *Japan's ODA*. Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1987 and 1989 eds.

____. *Japan's Post Gulf International Initiatives*. Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1991.

____. *Japan Views the United Nations*. Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1970.

____. *White Paper on International Trade Japan*. Tokyo: Japan External Trade Organization, 1980-1992 eds.

Japan and the United Nations. Report of a study group set up by the Japanese Association of International Law. New York: Manhattan Publishing Company, 1958.

"Japan's Role in the International Community". *Japan Echo*, Vol.19, No.2 (1992).

Jervis, Robert. *Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.

Johnson, Chalmers. *Japan in Search of a "Normal" Role*. Policy Paper No.3. San Diego: Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation. Berkeley: University of California, 1992.

____. *MITI and the Japanese Miracle*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982.

Johnson, U.A. and Packard, G.R. *The Common Security Interests of Japan, the United States and NATO*. Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing, 1981.

Kahler, M., ed. *Beyond the Cold War in the Pacific*. IGCC Studies in Conflict and Cooperation. Berkeley: University of California, 1991.

Kakizawa, Koji. "Japan's Position on Suspected Nuclear Development North Korea." *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, Vol.4, No.1, (1992).

Kataoka, Tetsuya and Myers, Ramon H. *Defending an Economic Superpower*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1989.

Keohane, Robert O., ed. *Neorealism and its Critics*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986.

Kihl, Young W. and Grinter, Lawrence E., eds. *Asian-Pacific Security*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1986.

Kitaoka, Shin'ichi. "Chronicling Japan's Crisis Diplomacy". *Japan Echo*, Vol.19, No.1 (1992).

Klintworth, Gary. "Latest Soviet carrier for Beijing fleet?". *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*,

Vol.19, No.2/3 (1992).

Liberal Star. Tokyo: Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, Monthly Newsletter.

Larson, Joyce E. *New Foundations for Asian and Pacific Security*. New Brunswick: National Strategy Information Centre, 1980.

Leifer, Michael, ed. *The Balance of Power in East Asia*. London: The Macmillan Press, 1986.

Lentner, Howard H. *Foreign Policy Analysis*. Columbus: Merrill Publishing, 1974.

Marwah, Onkar and Pollack, Jonathan D., eds. *Military Power and Policy in the Asian States: China, India and Japan*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1980.

Menaul, Stewart. *Japan's Defence Policy*. Conflict Studies, No.107, May 1979.

Mendl, Wolf. "The Japanese Constitution and Japan's Security Policy". *Millennium*, Vol.7, No.1 (1978).

The Military Balance. London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1970-91 eds.

Mochizuki, Michael M. "Japan After the War". *SAIS Review*, Vol.10, No.2 (1990).

Morley, James William, ed. *Security Independence in the Asia-Pacific Region*. Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1986.

Nacht, Michael. "United States-Japan Relations". *Current History*, Vol.87, No.528 (1987).

Nakasone, Yasuhiro. "Reinterpreting the Constitution to deal with emergencies". *Japan Echo*, Vol.17, No.4 (1990).

Nestor, William R. *Japan's Growing Power Over East Asia and the World's Economy*. London: Macmillan Press, 1990.

NHK English Language News Broadcasts, 1991-1993.

NHK Japanese Language News Broadcasts, Trans. Prof. J. Kovalio. Ottawa: Carleton University. 1992-1993.

Niksch, Larry A. "Japanese Defence Policy: Suzuki's Shrinking Options". *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, Vol.1, No.2 (1982).

Nishiboro, Masahiro. *Japan Views the United Nations*. Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1970.

Ogata, Sadako. "Japan's Changing Role in the United Nations". *Journal of International*

Affairs, Vol.37, No.1, 1983.

Okazaki, Hisahiko. *A Grand Strategy for Japanese Defense*. Lanham: University Press of America, 1986.

____. "Japanese Security Policy". *International Security*, Vol.7, No.2 (1982).

Olsen, Edward A. and Jurika, Stephen. *The Armed Forces in Contemporary Asian Societies*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1986.

O'Neil, Robert, ed. *Security in East Asia*. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1984.

Orr, Robert M. "Japanese Foreign Aid in a New Global Era". *SAIS Review*, Vol.11, No.2 (1991).

Packard, George R., *Protest in Tokyo*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966.

Paltiel, Jeremy. "Japan's Innovative East Asian Policies: Keeping all the Flying Geese in Formation". Unpublished paper: presented to the Japan Studies Association of Canada, at Carleton University, Ottawa, October, 1992.

Pempel, T.J. *Policy and Politics in Japan*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1982.

Potter, William C. "Issue Areas and Foreign Policy Analysis". *International Organization*, Vol.34, No.3 (1980).

Purrington, Courtney, and A.K. "Tokyo's Policy Responses During the Gulf Crisis" *Asian Survey*, Vol.31, No.4 (1991).

Purrington, Courtney. "Tokyo's Policy Responses During the Gulf Crisis War and the Impact of the 'Iraqi Shock' on Japan". *Pacific Affairs*, Vol.65, No.2 (1992)

Pyle, Kenneth B. *The Japanese Question*. Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1992

Quo, Quei F. "Japan's Role in Asia: A United States Surrogate". *International Journal* Vol.38, No.2 (1983).

Radvanyi, Janos, ed. *The Pacific in the 1990s*. New York: University of America Press, 1990.

Richardson, Michael. "ASEAN opts for closer security ties" *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, Vol.18, No.10/11 (1992).

Rix, Alan. "Japan's Foreign Aid Policy: A Capacity for Leadership?" *Pacific Affairs*, Vol 62, No.4 (1989/90).

- Rosenau, James N. *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy*. New York: The Free Press, 1971.
- Saito, Shiro. *Japan at the Summit*. London: Routledge, 1990.
- Saito, Shizuo. "The Evolution of Japan's United Nations Policy". *Japan Review of International Affairs*, Vol.1, No.2 (1987).
- Satoh, Yukio. *The Evolution of Japanese Security Policy*. London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982.
- Sato, Seizaburo. "Gulf War Perspective". *Japan Echo*, Vol.19, No.1, 1992.
- Scalapino, Robert A. et al, eds. *Internal and External Security Issues in Asia*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986.
- Scalapino, Robert A. *Major Power Relations in Northeast Asia*. New York: University Press of America, 1987.
- Scalapino, Robert A. ed. *The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977.
- Scalapino, Robert A. and Masumi, J. *Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962.
- Segal, Gerald. "North-East Asia: a common security or à la carte? *International Affairs*, Vol.67, No.4 (1991).
- Schott, Jeffrey J. "Trading Blocs and the World Trading System". *The World Economy*, Vol 14, No.1 (1990).
- Simon, Sheldon. *The Future of Asian-Pacific Collaboration*. Lexington: D.C. Heath and Co., 1988.
- Singh, Bilveer. "ASEAN and the New Security Framework in the Asia-Pacific Region". *Asian Defence Journal*, December (1991).
- SIPRI Yearbook 1992*. Solna: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1992.
- Speed, Elizabeth. "Maritime Disputes in East Asia: Implications for Regional Security". *ORAE Report*, No.R105, Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1990.
- Stubbs, Richard. "Reluctant Leader, expectant followers: Japan and Southeast Asia". *International Journal*, Vol.45, No.4 (1991).
- Tahara, Seichiro. "Gulf Crisis Sparks Constitutional Debate in Japan". Trans. Asia Foundation's Translation Service Centre. *Bungeishunga*, October, 1990.

- Takeda Goro. "Send Troops to the Middle East". Trans. by the Asia Foundation's Translation Service Centre. *Sekai Nippo*, September 9, 1990.
- Tanaka, Hideo. *The Japanese Legal System* Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1976.
- Taniuchi, Mitsuru. *Foreign Direct Investment in the Asia Pacific Region*. Tokyo: Japan Centre for Economic Research, 1992.
- "The Gulf Crisis and Japan". *Japan Echo*, Vol.17, No.4 (1990).
- Tokinoya, Atsushi. *The Japan-US Alliance: A Japanese Perspective*. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1986.
- Trout, B. Thomas and Harf, James E., eds. *National Security Affairs*. London: Transaction Books, 1982.
- Tsukakoshi, Hideo, et al. *White Papers of Japan 1986-87*. Tokyo: Japan Institute of International Affairs, 1988.
- Tsurutani, Taketsugu. *Policy and East Asian Security*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981.
- _____. *Political Change in Japan* New York: David MacKay Company, 1977.
- Umeza, Itari and Takeuchi, Harihisa. *White Papers of Japan 1990-91* Tokyo: Japan Institute of International Affairs, 1992.
- United States Government. *Political Reorientation of Japan*. Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1949.
- Ushiba, Akihiko. "The Minesweeping Mission". *Japan Echo*, Vol.19, No.1 (1992).
- Weinstein, Martin E. "Japan's Defense Policy and the May 1981 Summit". *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, Vol.1, No.1 (1982).
- _____. *Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, 1947-1968*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1971.
- Wilborn, Thomas L. *How Northeast Asians View Their Security*. Strategic Studies Institute: US Army War College, 1991.
- von Wolferen, Karel. *The Enigma of Japanese Power*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989.
- Yamauchi, Toshihiro. "Gunning for Japan's Peace Constitution". *Japan Quarterly*, Vol.39, No.2 (1992).
- Yoshida, Shigeru. *The Yoshida Memoirs*. Trans. Kenichi Yoshida. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1962.

Yoshitsu, Michael M. *Japan and the San Francisco Peace Treaty Settlement*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1983.

END

1 3-1 2-9 3

FIN