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**From Plant to Politics: The Canadian UAW
1936 - 1984**

by

Charlotte Alyce Bronwen Yates

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy.

Department of Political Science

**Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario
19 July 1988**

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submitted by

Charlotte Yates, B.A.Hons., M.A.

in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

W. H. ...

Chairman, Department of Political Science

as ...

Thesis Supervisor

Andrew ...

External Examiner

Carleton University

September, 1988

Abstract

This thesis studies the historically varied political strategies pursued by the Canadian branch of the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers in the union's attempts to shift the balance of power in its favour between 1936 and 1984. In so doing, the thesis examines and explains the Canadian UAW's changing relations to governments, corporations and political parties. Particular emphasis is placed on explaining the conditions under which this union pursued militant forms of political action.

The analytical framework used in this work is constructed around an understanding of unions as strategic actors which make choices under limits arising from the historical, political-economic and internal conditions in which the union operates. In turn, a union's strategic capacity - defined as its ability to pursue a particular course of action successfully - is understood as being determined by both external conditions, such as the state of the economy, and by the internal resources and dynamics of the union.

The most important external constraint on the Canadian UAW's strategic pursuits was the construction/ destruction of the Fordist mode of regulation, which was organized around a wage/productivity trade-off and encouraged the institutionalization of labour-management relations, union control of membership militancy and the practice of 'responsible' unionism. At the same, it is argued that the Canadian UAW shaped the nature of this compromise and the timing of its own acceptance of this arrangement. More specifically, the Canadian UAW's distinctive organizational structure and collective identity are argued to have delayed the union's acceptance of the practices of 'responsible' unionism and influenced the particular regulatory mechanisms put into place in the Canadian auto industry.

Overall, this study finds that, in contrast to current interpretations of union postwar political behaviour, Canadian Autoworkers continued to pursue militant, mobilization-based forms of political action until the early 1960's. It was only at this time that Canadian Autoworkers appeared to accept constraints on their militancy in exchange for improved wages and benefits and greater access to political decision-making. This period of detente between the UAW, governments and corporations was short-lived, however, owing both to emergent strains within the union between the rank and file and the leadership and the crisis of Fordism. Consequently, the UAW, in an attempt to protect its organizational integrity and position of strength in the workplace and society, returned to militant forms of political action, the effects of which were a shift in the balance of power in favour of the union and Canadian Autoworkers' split from their International union.

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Acronyms

AIB	Anti-Inflation Board
AIF	Annual Improvement Factor
AMC	American Motors Corporations
CCF	Cooperative Commonwealth Federation
CCL	Canadian Congress of Labour
CLC	Canadian Labour Congress
COLA	Cost of Living Allowance
GM	General Motors Corporation
IEB	International Executive Board of the UAW
LPP	Labour Progressive Party
NDP	New Democratic Party
OFL	Ontario Federation of Labour
PAC	Political Action Committee
PQ	Parti Quebecois
QFL	Quebec Federation of Labour
TAB	Transitional Assistance Benefits
TLC	Trades and Labour Congress
SUB	Supplementary Unemployment Benefits
UAW	International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers

Chapter One

Choice and Constraint in Trade-Union Political Strategy

Between 1936 and 1984, Canadian autoworkers were members of the International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW). Through the UAW, these workers entered into political struggles with governments and corporations, trying to shift the balance of power in the union's, and hence the workers', favour. The means through which Canadian Autoworkers' sought to exercise political power varied and included militant workplace action, lobbying and involvement in partisan politics. This thesis examines these political struggles and seeks to explain why, at particular historical moments, the union adopted one strategy over another and was more or less successful in its pursuit of political change.

This study is based on three key assumptions. Firstly, unions are not unitary actors. Rather, they are complex organizations made up of hundreds, if not thousands, of individual workers with their own interests and goals. Yet, in the process of confronting corporations and governments, unions often must present themselves as unified in order to be effective in their demands. This means that unions must construct a unity out of the diversity and conflicts within the membership. Therefore, the observed unity of unions masks the ongoing internal struggles to construct this unity - struggles which must be understood in order to explain

the particular unity of interest chosen by the union as its course of action.

This brings us to the second assumption. Unions as political actors make choices about their activities in the political and economic arenas. In other words, a union's pursuit of lobbying instead of workplace action to make political gains is partly a matter of choice. In turn, these choices affect the success of a union in exercising its political power.(1) This assumption implies, then, a rejection of analyses which see union power and behaviour as strictly determined by external conditions. Such analyses, which have become especially popular in explaining the recent divergence in strategy between American and Canadian autoworkers, reduce a study of union behaviour to a study of the political-economic environment.(2) Such reductionism cannot explain the variability of union responses to the most recent economic decline because it ignores the complexity of unions as political and economic actors whose own goals, values and ideas shape their entry into and understanding of politics.

This, however, is not to argue that unions exercise their choices free of constraints. The third assumption upon which this study rests is that choices made by any union are circumscribed by limits arising from political and economic conditions, past decisions and practices of the union and the particular characteristics of trade unions. Moreover, limits are placed on trade unions by their very existence as part of the matrix of a capitalist society. Trade unions are therefore constrained in

their actions and choices by capitalist social relations, in particular those between capital and labour, the structures of the bourgeois state and the ideological and cultural symbols and discourses which dominate the society in which these trade unions are situated. In the course of the following discussion, the reasons for starting from these assumptions will be made clear, as will their importance in providing a more complete analysis of the Canadian UAW.

Given these three assumptions, this study focuses on the formation and execution of union strategy. Such a focus provides an understanding of the choices made by the Canadian UAW and the factors which influenced its adopted course of action. Furthermore, these assumptions imply that the study is of necessity historical. The limits to trade-union strategy and action are neither immutable nor short-term. As the historical dynamics of society and the union alter, so do the limits and possibilities for political action. Finally, unions act under the weight of past choices and practices which may appear as long-established union traditions.

The Postwar Settlement

The most critical factor affecting UAW political behaviour between the late 1940's and the present was the development of the postwar settlement and its recent collapse. In the wake of the economic crisis of the Great Depression, the intensified class conflict during and immediately following World War II and the victories of left-wing class-based parties in most Western

industrialized countries, there came a massive reorganization of capitalism which ushered in a period of unprecedented prosperity and political stability.

The centrepiece of this reorganization lay in corporations' extension of mass production based on the assembly line. This change in the production process allowed for the development of economies of scale which resulted in the production of a greater volume of goods at lower prices. As Henry Ford understood, however, the development of a mass market was also necessary if these goods were to be sold and profit realized. In particular, workers had to be able to buy goods, such as automobiles, which had previously been the preserve of the wealthy.

The necessary increase and stabilization of demand occurred on two fronts. Firstly, through union struggles to improve wages and benefits, workers' capacity to consume was increased. The ability of organized labour to raise its own members' wages was not enough, however, to stabilize demand throughout the economy. The capacity for such national stabilization of demand rested in the state which, through the adoption of Keynesian demand management policies in the postwar years, buffered the economy from the ravages of boom and bust cycles by maintaining certain levels of demand. This was achieved through such measures as social welfare policy and the "socialization of finance" which permitted workers to amortize the cost of goods over a longer period of time than their regular pay check allowed.(3) These economic transformations marked the first component of the postwar settlement.

For such a reorganization of the production process and of the economy as a whole to be effective, however, there was also a need for political stability. In particular the open 'warfare' amongst labour, capital and the state, which had been especially marked in the 1930's, had to be muted. This necessity grew out of two conditions. Firstly, for the production process to be constantly 'revolutionized' and hence made more and more efficient, corporations needed to be able to make long-range economic plans. This required that conditions in industry be predictable. Secondly, spontaneous and repeated workplace disruptions of production contradicted the very premise of the profitability of assembly-line manufacture which relied upon continuous production. This required that some form of control over workers' actions be established.

In light of corporate failures to rid their workplaces of unions, the only alternative strategy to stabilize workplace relations was to recognize unions and draw them into some form of compromise. Out of this necessity grew the second component of the postwar settlement. Corporations and unions constructed a more stable and peaceful relationship. In exchange for controlling rank-and-file militancy and practising "responsible unionism", unions would receive improved wages and benefits. For their part, corporations agreed to recognize unions as enduring and legitimate actors in the workplace and to deliver decent wages and benefits in exchange for reduced disruption of production and the continued sole prerogative to organize the production process.

Although individual states played variable roles in mediating this arrangement, everywhere the state developed a more stabilized relationship with unions, which included giving organized labour some access to and influence on political decision-making.(4)

The above discussion lays out the general features of postwar settlements which were put into place in most advanced capitalist countries. To understand the specific effects of such settlements on trade unions, however, it is necessary to recognize that quite different national variants of the postwar settlement developed. These differences can largely be attributed to the specific role of the state, the degree of centralization of a national labour movement, the electoral viability of a social democratic party with ties to unions, and corporate and union practices and ideologies. Overall, two 'ideal' types of postwar settlement can be identified.(5)

The first variant can be denoted as the social democratic form of postwar settlement. In this variant the state played a central role in organizing the compromise between capital and labour. Led by a social democratic party with close ties to trade unions, the state not only embraced Keynesianism and pursued social welfare policies but also played a highly interventionist role in regulating the economy. In this model, the national labour movement tended to be highly centralized. Because of its effectiveness in mobilizing support for and influence over the ruling social democratic party, organized labour's leverage vis-a-vis capital was strengthened through support from the state. Moreover, because of the political power of the labour movement

and the need for stabilization in capital-labour relations, organized labour tended to be drawn into the centre of the political decision-making process via corporatist arrangements. The country which best fit this variant was Austria.(6)

The other variant may be described as pluralist. In the absence of a highly centralized, powerful national labour movement or a social democratic party, the state played a less direct role in orchestrating the compromise. More specifically, the state displayed less commitment to Keynesian regulation than found in those countries with social democratic governments.(7) Nonetheless, the state played a supportive role in stabilizing labour-capital relations through the introduction of collective bargaining legislation, the mediation of 'private' workplace disputes, and the use of broad fiscal policy measures to dampen the effect of boom and bust cycles in the economy.(8)

In the absence of a central role for the state, the locus of construction for the liberal-pluralist postwar compromise tended to become the sphere of private production. Collective agreements between individual unions and employers established the terms and limits of compromise. Specifically, unions and companies entered into 'private' arrangements to define the limits to workplace action and to guarantee levels of income (which also raised levels of aggregate demand) through such measures as pension plans, supplementary unemployment benefits and cost-of-living allowances. Although broad national trends in collective bargaining formulae which extended beyond the jurisdiction of individual unions might

have developed, there was no central orchestration of these developments due to the fragmentation of the collective bargaining process among a myriad of individual unions and employers.(9)

Under the liberal-pluralist variant, political concertation through corporatist intermediation between the state, labour and capital did not tend to develop. Rather, given the fragmentation of the national labour movement, interest group lobbying tended to become the modus operandi for union access to and influence upon political decision-making. In this situation, the proximity of unions to the centres of decision-making was widely divergent and largely dependent upon the power of the individual union and its willingness to engage in 'responsible' unionism.

Overall, the liberal-pluralist variant of the postwar settlement was potentially more fragmented than the social democratic variant. There was likely greater variation between unions in terms of the timing of the construction of the compromise and the specific conditions under which unions and employers agreed to a settlement. In so far as this was the case, it might also be argued that this variant was more fragile. The economic and political components of the postwar settlement were much more dependent upon the strategic capacity of individual unions which operated in different economic sectors.

Although the U.S. best represents the liberal-pluralist variant of the postwar settlement, it can be argued that the Canadian postwar settlement approximated this arrangement. Nevertheless, because of the persistence of a social democratic party in Canada, the postwar settlement in this country might more

aptly be considered liberal pluralist, with a social democratic tinge.(10) The social democratic hue of the Canadian postwar settlement has varied in intensity depending upon the specific nature of the relationship between trade unions and the party, the degree of union success in advancing its demands through nonpartisan strategies and the particular level of government under examination.

The relationship between the postwar settlement and trade unions is a complex one and has tremendous significance for understanding trade-union political strategy. On the one hand, the power of trade unions and their strategic choices have a determining impact on the particular shape of postwar settlement put into place in any one country. Once in place, however, the postwar settlement establishes certain conditions under which unions make strategic choices. Consequently, an examination of the emergence of the postwar settlement in Canada provides a basis for understanding some of the limits on the Canadian UAW's strategic pursuits.

Trade-Union Behaviour and the Postwar Settlement

In order to provide a theoretical framework for studying the rise and fall of the postwar settlement in Canada, the Canadian UAW's place within this arrangement and the constraints placed on union strategy by this compromise, the following discussion weaves together political interpretations of the postwar settlement, with particular attention to work by Leo Panitch and Adam Przeworski, with that of the Regulation Approach. There are several reasons

for this. Although political interpretations were dominant until the 1970's, they have a number of shortcomings when applied to a study of the UAW in Canada. These include, amongst others, their state-centred approach, implicit theoretical focus on union centrals rather than individual unions and functionalism which tends to displace union strategy from the explanatory framework. The Regulation Approach, by its greater attention to the production process and its rejection of functionalism, overcomes some of these problems. At the same time, political interpretations have provided some valuable insights into the impact of the postwar settlement on trade-union behaviour, a question which has received scant attention from the Regulation Approach. For these reasons, which will be elaborated in the following discussion, the two approaches have been intertwined.

i) A Critical Examination of Political Interpretations of the Postwar Settlement

Most analyses of the rise and fall of the postwar settlement have periodized this development into three distinct historical phases. The first period, which extended from the 1930's until the late 1940's, is characterized by intense class conflict and working-class mobilization. The second historical phase corresponds to the period of stability in labour-state-capital relations brought about by the postwar settlement. This period covers the years between the late 1940's and, circa, the mid 1970's. In the wake of this second historical period came the third period which marked the breaking apart of the postwar settlement. This new era is characterized by a decline in the

prosperity and stability which had been achieved in the postwar years, and a return to more open conflict between classes and the state as capital attempts to restructure itself in the face of changing national and international conditions.

The importance of this threefold periodization is that each period is defined according to characteristics of labour-state-capital relations. In particular, this periodization suggests that trade-union behaviour and strategy undergo some major transformations as a result of the postwar settlement which are characterized by a shift away from militancy in the first period towards a politics of compromise and leadership control of membership militancy. This threefold periodization therefore has tremendous analytical import for understanding the relationship between trade-union behaviour and strategy and the postwar settlement. For this reason, it is necessary to examine this periodization more carefully and its appropriateness for studying the Canadian UAW.

The first period, born out of the ravages of the Great Depression, was characterized by labour militancy and political victory by left-wing parties (mostly social democratic) which had strong support from the working class, and in particular from trade unions. During this period, both the workplace and the political arena became battle grounds amongst the state, capital and labour as the latter attempted to shift the balance of power in its favour. Organized labour adopted a radical discourse and practice in its struggles with corporations and governments to

gain recognition and a legitimate place for labour in the corridors of power.(11)

The success of labour's mobilization in this first period, combined with the need for a 'national' strategy to rejuvenate postwar economies and protect them from a repeat performance of the Great Depression, provided the catalyst for the reorganization of capitalist economies and the construction of a compromise among capital, labour and the state. With the exception of Sweden where similar events took place somewhat earlier, the construction of the postwar settlement has usually been dated somewhere in the late 1940's. In Canada, the existing literature has tended to date the postwar settlement from 1948 (when provincial and federal governments introduced the first labour codes which recognized trade unions and secured them a place in the postwar economy) to the mid-1970's when trade unions again came under attack.(12)

This second period, which was dominated by the politics of the postwar compromise, was characterized by the adoption of Keynesianism, greater government regulation of the economy, the articulation of compromises between organized labour and corporations and, in some cases, the emergence of corporatist structures of representation. Analyses of these postwar developments have identified a number of their effects on trade-union behaviour and political strategy. Jane Jenson and George Ross have argued that the new compromise between labour and capital "crystallized unions as strongly formal organizations."(13) The consequence of this was the displacement

of rank-and-file activism and spontaneous workplace action by leadership-based strategies based on negotiation with corporations and governments. Unions became caught in a web of legalistic rules and procedures epitomized in the growing complexity of collective agreements. Moreover, unions became disciplinary agents of their own memberships in order to ensure the fulfillment of their side of the compromise. Finally, the wage/productivity trade-off, combined with the victory of social democratic parties, had the effect of restricting union demands to those achievable within capitalism. Calls for more radical political and economic change, and in particular for socialism, were silenced.(14) Overall, the postwar settlement is understood as having placed limits on trade-union strategy such that militant forms of politics were removed from union agenda.

Contained within these analyses is the argument that trade unions demobilized the working class through their acceptance of and participation in the postwar settlement. This 'demobilization' thesis is of particular importance for understanding the impact of the compromise or its limits on trade-union political strategy. Consequently, it requires elaboration.

Panitch and Przeworski both argue that the working class was demobilized by union participation in the structures of compromise. Panitch focuses his analysis on the effects of corporatism on trade unions. In defining corporatism as "a political structure within advanced capitalism", Panitch argues that corporatism functioned to integrate "organized socio-economic

producer groups through a system of representation and cooperative mutual interaction at the leadership level and mobilization and social control at the mass level."(15) Corporatism therefore served a crucial function in reproducing the postwar settlement and capitalist social relations. According to Panitch, corporatism had the effect of demobilizing trade unions. The reasons for this were found in the impact of participation in corporatist structures on trade-union organization and behaviour.

Firstly, corporatism encouraged the centralization of decision-making within unions which came to rely increasingly on their leaders to articulate and organize their collective bargaining and political activities. Secondly, corporatist political structures reinforced a reformist ideology and practice within trade unions. Trade unions tied their interests to the survival and prosperity of the capitalist economy and therefore based their policy formulations on the recognition that healthy profits were a condition for further economic growth.

For Panitch, these developments contained within them a fundamental contradiction. The root of this contradiction lay in the conflict between the source of trade-union power and the operation of corporatist political structures. Trade-union power rested with the effectiveness of collective organization and mobilization of the rank and file. Once trade unions became part of corporatist political structures, which for Panitch are a form of state-enforced class collaboration, there existed a tendency for unions to become agencies of the state, which fundamentally divorced them from their basis of power which could only be

exercised when trade unions were autonomous working-class institutions.

This contradiction manifested itself in a crisis of representation. Once trade-union interests became articulated in terms of the continued prosperity of capitalism and given trade-union participation in corporatist decision-making, trade unions may have found themselves defending measures which favoured economic growth but countered the interests of their own memberships. According to Panitch, this tendency became particularly acute when wage restraint was placed on the political agenda. When trade unions endorsed and supported wage restraint measures they legitimated state economic policy. They did this, however, at the expense of the support of their own memberships which mobilized opposition inside the union. This created a crisis of representation inside the union and ultimately undermined corporatist structures themselves.(16)

Przeworski's argument is similar to that of Panitch's although his analysis focuses more generally on all bourgeois state structures and on the demobilization of the working class as a whole.(17) Przeworski argues that once universal suffrage was won by workers their struggles shifted from extra-parliamentary to parliamentary means. In so doing, workers were forced to conduct their struggles in "conformity with the structure of the bourgeois state".(18) This had two major demobilizing effects on working class action. Firstly, workers became represented inside the state by a series of organizations, such as trade unions and political

parties, which were often in competition with one another. Such competition between working-class institutions divided, and thus demobilized, the working class.

The second demobilizing effect of participation in the structures of the bourgeois state was rooted in the state's articulation of "relations of representation". According to Przeworski, capitalist democratic institutions are representative institutions in which the practice of politics relies upon the representation of a group's interests (in this case the working class) by its leaders. Because masses no longer directly defended their interests but instead relied upon their leadership to perform this action, such participation in the bourgeois state demobilized the working class.

Przeworski then extends his analysis to the effects of Keynesianism on working-class politics. Like Panitch, he argues that Keynesianism introduced reformism into working-class organizations. For Przeworski, this reinforced their commitment to participation in bourgeois state structures in the course of which workers were continually demobilized.

Overall, the postwar settlement was seen to bring real material gains to workers but at the expense of their own demobilization. Moreover, the organizations which represented workers, such as trade unions and political parties, played an active role in reinforcing this demobilization due to their embrace of reformist ideologies and political practices defined by the bourgeois state.(19)

The third historical phase, which extends from about the mid

1970's to the present, corresponds to the breakdown of the postwar settlement. By the mid-1970's capitalist economies registered high levels of inflation, declining productivity and, in some places, deindustrialization.(20) The recession became a full-scale economic crisis as double digit inflation was accompanied by unemployment levels unheard of since the 1930's.

The economic crisis undercut the very basis of the postwar settlement. As corporations experienced a declining rate of profit, they shifted production to low wage zones, attempted to reformulate workplace relations to allow for a flexible labour process and undertook a massive assault on trade unions.(21) Governments abandoned Keynesian solutions in favour of ones which would reduce the government deficit and restore profit levels. They used unemployment as a weapon to force unions to accept these changes and to cool off the economy. Concurrent with this, governments attempted to reduce social welfare payments and in so doing, increased the hardship on individual workers.(22) Moreover, many governments passed new labour legislation which curbed the right to 'free' collective bargaining and in some cases, such as the U.S. and Britain, threatened the very survival of unions.

Labour movements have responded differently to these recent assaults.(23) The demobilizing effects the postwar settlement had had on unions, seen in centralization, bureaucratization and reformism, however, are argued to have restricted the options available for unions in responding to the crisis. Socialism remained off the agenda as unions sought solutions to the

breakdown of the postwar compromise within the confines of capitalism. Without the political power to back up their proffered solutions to the crisis, however, unions found themselves excluded from decision-making and less able to shape national responses to the crisis.

ii) Rethinking the Postwar Settlement to 'fit' the Canadian case

The existing literature on the rise and fall of the postwar settlement, while almost exclusively focussed on analyses of Britain and Western European countries, can provide a starting point for the analysis of the postwar settlement in Canada. Caution is needed, however, in undertaking such a task. The arguments and concepts applied to analyses of Western Europe and Britain are not easily imported into Canada. The most obvious reason for this is the set of different historical circumstances under which the postwar settlement developed in Canada.

Firstly, although the CCF, followed by the NDP, has existed as a social democratic party in Canada since the 1930's, it has not received the electoral support from the labour movement that similar parties in Western Europe developed. Moreover, it did not play a crucial role in organizing the postwar compromise. Instead, it has remained out of power in almost all provinces where organized labour is strongest (except for a brief interlude in B.C.) and has experienced its greatest electoral victories in those provinces where organized labour is of lesser importance, namely Manitoba and Saskatchewan. Secondly, the Canadian labour movement is highly fragmented. Its central national labour federation, the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC), has limited power.

It is therefore individual unions in Canada which control the bulk of union resources and have played the crucial role in articulating the postwar settlement. This means that studies of central labour federations in Canada are of less value in understanding the postwar settlement than studies of individual unions.

Finally, for a series of reasons, including the decentralized and fragmented characteristics of the Canadian labour movement, corporatism has not developed in Canada.(24) Instead, interest group lobbying has characterized trade-union relations with the Canadian and provincial governments. This form of representation requires the elaboration of some different concepts. Because of the massive nature of this task, this study of the UAW only begins the process of examining lobbying as part of the postwar settlement.

Ironically, most of the existing studies of the Canadian postwar settlement, although few in number, have in fact concentrated their analysis on the CLC. Moreover, there has been more attention paid by political economists to the brief historical period when corporatism was on the political agenda and to explanations of why corporatism failed in Canada, than there has been to lobbying.(25)

Fortunately, some recent work prepared under the auspices of the Macdonald Royal Commission has undertaken to fill this gap. These works, however, remain a starting point for an analysis of existing structures of interest intermediation as they consist of broad overviews of the structures of trade-union and corporate

representation inside government.(26)

This is not to suggest that there have not been some very detailed studies of lobbying in Canada. Such studies, however, have been undertaken using an elite pluralist theoretical framework in which society and power are understood through the representational function of certain elites or through the differential accumulation of resources by various interest groups.(27) Lobbying by organized labour is understood as a 'natural' political activity and this group's lesser degree of influence in the lobbying process is attributed either to the lack of 'legitimacy' accorded unions by other elites or the labour movements' lack of resources. Elite pluralist analyses pay little attention to the relationship between union memberships and leaders. Instead, analysis is focussed on labour's role in the institutional sphere of politics, on the assumption that this information will shed light on the particular position adopted and the dilemmas faced by the labour elite. In this way, organized labour appears as a mere shadow of its functioning self. Without analysis of the manner in which workers constitute themselves as a powerful force in society, through organization, strikes, and partisan mobilization, the position of unions in the lobbying process lacks historical and material foundations.(28) Consequently, while some of the empirical findings of elite-pluralists on trade-union lobbying are useful, their theoretical starting point precludes them from contributing to an analysis of lobbying, working-class politics and the postwar settlement.

Beyond these difficulties in adapting existing discussions of

the postwar settlement to a study of Canada, there exist other inadequacies in the existing literature when applied to a study of the Canadian UAW. Firstly, the threefold periodization of the rise and fall of the postwar settlement does not fit the story of the Canadian UAW.(29) This periodization is especially problematic in identifying when the political practices of compromise dominated UAW political behaviour (i.e. when the UAW became entrenched in the politics of the postwar settlement). In contrast to prevailing analyses which argue that this compromise was effected in Canada by the late 1940's or the early 1950's, this study of Canadian UAW political strategy indicates that this union did not become fully enmeshed in the practices of the postwar settlement until the early 1960's. Very soon after that, the compromise came under strain owing to the beginning of the recession in the early 1970's. The lateness of Canadian Autoworkers' full incorporation into this political arrangement may be a consequence of the fragmented nature of the postwar compromise and its articulation with individual unions rather than a central labour federation. Therefore, it is conceivable that while the UAW's incorporation into the politics of compromise was retarded, other unions' incorporation occurred much earlier. Unfortunately, this hypothesis cannot be elaborated upon in this thesis, owing to its exclusive focus on the Canadian UAW and lack of comparison with other unions in Canada.

Even if revised to incorporate the argument that the postwar settlement was fragmented and unevenly developed in Canada, there

continue to exist problems with the threefold historical periodization. Analysts of the postwar settlement in capitalist societies have put forth this periodization because, as a whole, they treat the political compromise between labour, capital and the state as though it was quickly and uniformly put into place, with unions, corporations and governments readily agreeing to the terms of compromise.(30)

In contrast to this understanding of the development of the postwar settlement, it is proposed here that internal union struggles over the terms of the compromise will alter a union's perceived limits of political strategy and action, therefore varying the timing and the degree to which unions accept the postwar definition of "responsible" union practices over more militant forms of political action. Moreover, if unions are to be understood as not unitary actors but as organizations which must construct unity, the terms of compromise accepted by the leadership of unions will not necessarily take immediate hold of the entire union membership. Rather their introduction into the union might result in a series of political, economic and ideological struggles which may delay and in some cases deny the formulation of a compromise.(31)

This modified view of trade unions and the postwar settlement has a major advantage for understanding the postwar politics of the Canadian UAW. It can provide an interpretation of the postwar settlement as a compromise which was put into place sporadically and in piecemeal fashion. This should allow for a more nuanced understanding of the Canadian UAW's shifting strategies in the

postwar period and provide an explanation for the apparent contradictions in UAW strategy which until the early 1960's was an uneasy mixture of radical mobilization and leadership-dominated bureaucratic politics.

A second and related problem with theorizations on the postwar settlement concerns their understanding of the impact of the postwar settlement on working-class and trade-union politics. More specifically, I am referring here to Przeworski and Panitch's demobilization thesis. Lobbying by trade unions might have a tendency to demobilize unions in a similar fashion to that argued by Przeworski and Panitch in their respective analyses of democratic institutions and corporatist structures. Because Canadian unions have been brought into the political process as single-interest group lobbies, unions such as the UAW could find themselves competing not only with other interest groups but sometimes with other unions for access to government and its resources. One consequence of this, as Keith Banting argues, is that Canadian "consultative practices tend to be fragmented and informal".(32) The impact of this might be especially devastating for it may reinforce existing cleavages inside the Canadian labour movement and present a serious obstacle to the organization of working-class based politics in Canada.

Moreover, the actual process of lobbying is based on the representation of rank-and-file interests by their leaders. Based on Przeworski's analysis of 'representational' politics, lobbying is likely to encourage centralization of strategic planning and

action in the hands of the union leadership and create a tendency for the development of non-militant "bureaucratic" politics over militant, mobilization-based action. This tendency could well be reinforced by the government-imposed condition that in exchange for access to government, unions must demonstrate their legitimacy through the practice of "responsible" unionism. Such "responsible" behaviour has come to be defined to include an absence of radical ideological politics by unions and a willingness by unions to control rank-and-file militancy and direct action and to replace these with a politics of compromise.(33)

Panitch and Przeworski's analysis of demobilization suggests that this process is inevitable and complete. In turn, their analysis implies an understanding of unions as organizations shaped almost exclusively by external factors, rather than as strategic actors which make choices under certain constraints. To incorporate into this analysis the notion that unions are strategic actors, it is more useful to understand the demobilization of unions through their participation in practices such as lobbying and corporatist decision-making, as a tendency which may be counteracted by the internal dynamics of a union, the specifics of which are discussed in a later section of this chapter.

'Demobilization', then, is to be understood as neither inevitable nor complete. This point leads us to question the validity of arguments that suggest that unions became completely submerged in the economic, ideological and political relations of the postwar compromise. It is proposed here that such

institutionalization was never complete.

Charles Sabel argues this with effect in his critique of the 'end of ideology' thesis.(34) His argument centres on the importance of the internal dynamics of unions for understanding blockages to the complete institutionalization of unions into the postwar compromise. Sabel argues that the tendency towards complete acceptance of the postwar 'rules of the game' is constantly impeded by two factors: 1) the interest of corporate group leaders in aggrandizing their own power via-a-vis other corporate groups places limits on their willingness to freeze the rules of the game and 2) in attempting to establish their control over a group, leaders of corporate groups such as trade unions, put into place organizational structures which reintroduce politics and therefore open debate over the established 'rules of the game'.(35)

Overall, institutionalization is prevented by first, the need for leaders to redefine the rules of the game so to ensure their continued control over the group; second, the injection of ideological debate into unions which opens the possibility for political strategies and actions other than those defined as acceptable by the postwar settlement; and third, the threat of trade-union members to take action into their own hands should accepted practices result in severe losses to these members.(36) Sabel's analysis suggests that if one sees institutionalization as always 'partial', one is forced to pay more attention to the significance of internal union dynamics for understanding the role

unions play in constructing institutionalized relations and responding to any reshaping of the postwar settlement.

Such an analysis contributes to the explanation for UAW leaders' inability to impose the terms of the postwar settlement on Canadian Autoworkers prior to the early 1960's. Furthermore, recognition of the 'incompleteness' of trade-union incorporation into accepted postwar practices has implications for explaining why the Canadian UAW responded with militancy to changes in the terms of the postwar settlement which were imposed by governments and corporations in the 1970's and 1980's.

The final area in which there is need for modification of existing theorizations on the postwar settlement is the position of prominence awarded the state in these analyses. Much of the existing work is state-centred. This is no doubt a consequence of the crucial role played by the state in constructing postwar settlements in Western Europe. In Canada, and to an even greater extent in the U.S., the state played a lesser role in organizing the postwar compromise. Instead, the crucial components of compromise were put into place in the sphere of private production through collective bargaining arrangements negotiated between employers and unions directly.(37)

In Canada, the provincial and national governments played a supportive role through the implementation of a limited range of Keynesian demand management policies and the development of a highly state-interventionist labour code. In spite of the latter, which has been the subject of many analyses including a recent one by Panitch and Swartz, the state set itself up as a 'mediator' of

disputes and did not play a direct role in private-sector collective bargaining.(38) Moreover, although the Canadian labour movement has on various occasions in the postwar period attempted to gain greater state intervention in the economy and protection of unions' place in the workplace, provincial and federal governments have been hesitant to intervene and have only acted when under tremendous political pressure. Furthermore, when the federal government did attempt to increase its regulation of the economy with its 1975 Anti-Inflation programme, both the UAW and the auto corporations defied the federal government's guidelines in order to protect their private collective bargaining arrangements. In analyzing the Canadian postwar settlement, it is therefore necessary to pay greater attention to the sphere of private production than is accorded by much of the existing literature.

One further comment on the role of the state in constructing the postwar settlement is necessary. The whole concept of the postwar settlement has been developed to explain the relative stability and tenacity of postwar capitalism and the absence of working-class mobilization to destroy capitalist economies.(39) Western Marxism makes the argument that the state, because of its role in reproducing the conditions of a capitalist society, plays a key role in organizing this stability, which is understood as protecting the long-term interests of capital. Given this understanding of postwar society, it is not surprising that many analyses of the postwar settlement take the state as their

starting point. There are, however, inherent dangers to such an approach.

By starting analysis at the level of the state, which is assumed to serve the long-term interests of capital, and working outwards to a study of trade unions and other social actors, there is a danger that analysis of the postwar settlement will fall into a functionalist trap. Specifically, there is a danger of confusing cause with effect. Because the postwar settlement has functioned to make labour-capital relations more stable and to establish the basis for postwar prosperity, this result is often attributed to the roles ascribed to the state of protecting the long-term interests of capital and reproducing the conditions of existence for the capitalist economy. Thus, the effect of the postwar settlement is used to explain the causes of this arrangement.(40)

This type of formulation presents two serious problems which have particular bearing on my analysis of the Canadian UAW. Firstly, it precludes analysis or even an understanding of, in Alain Lipietz's words, 'failed experiments' in capitalism. Not all initiatives taken by the state to reproduce the conditions of capitalism succeed.(41) Yet these fall outside the scope of a functionalist analysis or, even worse, are reinterpreted to 'fit' the functionalist conception of the state. It is argued below (see Chapter 7) that tripartism and wage and price controls in Canada were failed attempts by the federal government to reformulate the conditions of the postwar settlement which had the unintended effect of straining union-government relations. This contrasts with the analysis put forward by David Wolfe, Donald Swartz and

Leo Panitch who argue that wage and price controls and tripartism were initiatives taken by the state to fundamentally undercut the position of trade unions.(42)

Secondly, a state-centred approach often tends to ascribe too much rationality and foresight to state policy. In turn, this can unintentionally displace the centrality of class conflict from analysis. Such is the case in Panitch and Swartz's study of recent changes to collective bargaining legislation in Canada. Despite the theoretical postulation by these authors of the importance of class struggle, capital and the state appear always to have the upper hand in the "battle of the eighties". They appear to act on the basis of a well-thought out and coordinated strategy articulated in response to the economic crisis. The resulting conception of class struggle is no more clearly summed up than in one of Panitch and Swartz's own metaphors of the state acting as referee in the wage and price controls battle where the referee "[held] the arms of one of the boxers while the other flailed away."(43) Given this characterization of the class struggle, it is surprising that labour has been able to score any victories! The problem with this analysis is that it ascribes too much foresight and rationality of action to both private business and government.

What is most notable about the decade of the eighties is the apparent uncertainty of both corporations and governments about the most effective strategy to be employed in response to the massive dislocations in the economy. This is no more clearly the

case then in the auto industry. A brief reading of the Globe and Mail business pages shows the fundamentally different strategies pursued by the Big Three automakers and the uncertainty of success of these strategies. An approach which allows for such uncertainty leaves space for observing the impact of the working class and trade unions on the resolution of the present crisis. Furthermore, it helps make sense of the often contradictory moves made by corporations in response to the crisis. Unless we are to understand these developments simply in a Machiavellian light as one more power struggle by corporations to beat down the working class, these contradictory actions can be better understood in light of the ongoing struggles between trade unions, governments and corporations, struggles in which neither party is sure of the rules of the fight nor its final resolution.(44)

iii) Contributions of the Regulation Approach

To overcome some of the problems with political analyses of the postwar settlement, without abandoning the concept or the insights provided by this literature, we turn to the Regulation Approach and its discussion of Fordism, and in particular to the work of Alain Lipietz. At the outset, it must be emphasized that work using the Regulation Approach is in many ways similar in content to the more state-centred analyses of the postwar settlement. Furthermore, depending upon the specific application of the regulation Approach, the literature does fall into some of the same traps identified above. Some of these problems include the assumption that the postwar settlement was quickly and uniformly put into place and an overemphasis on studies of capital

and the state rather than trade unions.(45)

Nonetheless, the Regulation Approach has at least two advantages for this study of the Canadian UAW. Firstly, this body of theory moves away from the functionalist analysis common in more state-centred approaches to the postwar settlement. It argues for a more contingent analysis of postwar developments which focuses on the centrality of human struggles. Secondly, the Regulation Approach begins its analysis at the level of capital accumulation, rather than at the level of the state. In so doing, it allows for greater attention to arrangements in the sphere of private production which, as argued earlier, constitute the core of the pluralist variant of the postwar settlement. To understand how the Regulation Approach differs from other analyses on these two key points, it is necessary to examine the main tenets of its argument.

The Regulation Approach starts from the assumption that the postwar settlement is but one historical example of a political-economic arrangement which secured labour-management cooperation under capitalism.(46) In this approach, the particular form and structures taken by a compromise are denoted as a "mode of regulation", defined as "The set of internalized rules and social procedures which incorporate social elements into individual behaviour..".(47) Such a mode of regulation is constrained by a particular "regime of accumulation", a term which "describes the fairly long-term stabilization of the allocation of social production between consumption and accumulation..".(48)

Transformation from one mode of regulation to another occurs once the existing mode of regulation begins to act as a fetter on necessary transformations in the regime of accumulation. The particular nature of any new mode of regulation is dependent, however, not on the laws of capital but on the course of human struggle.

In contrast to the state-centred analyses which see the postwar settlement as arising out of the long-term interests of capital which are protected and articulated by the state, Lipietz argues that "Regimes of accumulation and modes of regulation are chance discoveries made in the course of human struggles..."(49) Moreover, capitalism is full of failed experiments to construct such modes of regulation. Therefore, postwar political arrangements in capitalist countries, which can now be characterized by their regularities and apparent systematic incorporation of the working class into capitalism, are not seen as part of a design by the state or capital. Rather, they are seen as the product of particular historical struggles which put into place a system of behaviour and institutions which had as their result (not their intended function), the stabilization of relations in capitalist society. For, as Lipietz argues, "...results should not be confused with causes of existence: that a body of partial regularities which 'forms a system' is not the same thing as a system which 'unfolds' [sic]." (50)

Here lies the first major difference of the Regulation Approach from the more state-centred analyses of the postwar settlement. In moving away from a functionalist analysis, the

Regulation Approach provides an explanation for the emergence of postwar settlements which is contingent on the course of human struggles. By starting at the point of struggle, this approach provides a more adequate theoretical basis for understanding the impact of the Canadian UAW on the content and timing of the particular set of institutionalized labour-management relations which emerged in the Canadian auto industry.

Moreover, this body of theory recognizes the uncertain outcome of these struggles, many of which ended in failure by either corporations, governments or unions to reformulate relations in a desired fashion. Such was the case in the UAW's 1954 struggles for profit sharing and the Canadian federal government's attempt to gain consensus on its 1975 wage control policy. This conception of uncertainty is especially important in understanding the struggles between the UAW, corporations and governments, once the postwar settlement begins to breakdown. The Regulation Approach leaves open the resolution of the present crisis and makes it almost solely dependent upon socio-historic conditions and human struggles within a particular country.(51) Therefore, rather than presenting the UAW as a boxer with its hands tied back by the referee, the present situation is better characterized as a rugby scrum in which many members of the opposing teams push and shove to see who will get the ball at this particular point in the game. No winner is guaranteed and no set game plan is in operation. Moreover, to get the ball after one scrum does not guarantee that the same team will hold onto the

ball for the rest of the game.

Regulation theorists characterize the period corresponding to the postwar settlement, as one during which the Fordist regime was put into place. Fordism denotes two historically distinct but interrelated processes. Firstly, it encompasses a particular mode of capitalist accumulation which is based upon radical and constant change in the labour process so that workers' know-how is increasingly incorporated into machinery. It follows and is the ultimate extension of the scientific organization of work known as Taylorism.(52) More specifically, Fordism entails a labour process characterized by the semi-automatic assembly line where different parts of the labour process are integrated by a system of conveyor belts and where workers are fixed in positions determined by the system of machinery.(53) This labour process enables the pursuit of maximum efficiency by increasing the capitalization of industry which simultaneously allows a constant reduction in labour time wasted during production. For these reasons, Fordism is considered an intensive form of accumulation.(54)

Such changes in the organization of the labour process are accompanied by a rise in productive capacity and output. For capital accumulation to continue in this process, there is a need for a corresponding increase in society's consumptive capacity. Therefore, the second process denoted by the term Fordism consists of the continual adjustment of mass consumption to match the growing productive capacity.(55) More specifically, this means ensuring the existence of a mass market for the goods produced, something that ultimately can only be achieved by increasing and

stabilizing the relative wages of workers. What emerges, according to Michel Aglietta, is a "Fordist mode of consumption".(56)

These two process are not naturally linked and therefore do not develop simultaneously out of the logic of the market. Rather, the Regulation Approach holds that production is prone to crises because production and consumption do not naturally develop in tandem. The most dramatic example of this occurred during the Great Depression of the 1930's when productivity outstripped consumption. Furthermore, crises may be engendered by conflict between trade unions and corporations. The solution to these crises becomes a mode of regulation which has the effect of ensuring a balance between consumption and production and peace between labour and capital.

Overall, the mode of regulation which emerged in the post-1945 period consisted of two interrelated processes. On the one hand, the state intervened in the economy with a series of macro- and micro-economic policies aimed at demand management. More specifically, this refers to the introduction of Keynesian economic policies with its attendant development of the 'welfare state'.

The second component of the Fordist mode of regulation consisted of the institutionalization of wage labour-capital relations which had the effect of allowing simultaneous increases in production and consumption and preventing disruption of this cycle by trade-union conflict with corporations. This component of regulation centred on the institutionalization of collective

bargaining between unions and employers, with varying national degrees of state intervention. This institutionalization consisted of linking wages to productivity and inflation and engaging trade unions in an exchange of higher wages and benefits for decreased disruption of production.(57) According to Aglietta, this institutionalization of union-employer relations also entailed the articulation of politico-legal and social relations between workers and management and backed up by the local state, which were consistent with the new economic relations. These effectively tied workers' interests to the capitalist mode of production.(58)

Although a brief summary of the 'regulation' thesis, the above discussion points to the similarities and, more importantly, the differences between this and the more state-centred approach to the postwar settlement. In beginning analysis with forms of capital accumulation, the Regulation Approach pays greater attention to developments in the sphere of private production for the construction of a compromise. This has opened the door for detailed analyses of the institutionalization of collective bargaining between employers and workers in which the state plays a minimal role. Examples of work which have drawn on the Regulation Approach include The Second Industrial Divide by Michael Piore and Charles Sabel and Shifting Gears by Harry Katz. This line of inquiry is especially important for an analysis of the Canadian UAW and the postwar settlement, as it was in the private sphere that the most crucial components of the postwar settlement were put into place.

This is not to suggest that other analyses of the postwar

settlement have not paid close attention to emergent collective bargaining structures. For example, Walter Korpi, Andrew Martin and Andrei Markovits have all analyzed the institutionalization of collective bargaining in their respective case studies.(59) What distinguishes these studies from those by Katz, or Piore and Sabel, however, is the role played by the state and social democratic parties in laying the foundations for such collective bargaining arrangements. These state-centred analyses set up a problematic which is not easily transferred to studies of the U.S. and Canada where the state played a less direct role in organizing the compromise in the workplace. By starting at the point of production and then extending analysis to social actors and the state, the Regulation Approach provides the basis for an analysis which is not 'a priori' state-centred. Instead, the state is brought into analysis depending upon the particular conjuncture of human struggle.(60)

The second advantage of starting analysis at the point of accumulation is that it provides a more dynamic picture of economic developments in the postwar period in Canada. This ultimately leads to a more nuanced understanding of the compromise organized by the UAW, corporations and governments. What is most notable about the postwar economic boom in Canada is that this 'golden age of prosperity' was continually tarnished by cyclical recession. Although these recessions are noted in analyses by Wolfe and others, their significance for forcing changes to the particular arrangements of compromise between corporations and

unions is lost. This is largely a consequence of a lack of attention to institutionalization in the private sphere and to the mode of intensive accumulation which in the Regulation Approach necessitates constant change in the labour process.

By focussing attention on the need for ongoing transformation in the labour process to maintain profitability, the Regulation Approach opens the door to a more careful analysis of cyclical recessions and more importantly, to their significance in engendering further conflict between unions and employers as each tries to adjust the structures of regulation to deal adequately with resulting economic dislocations. Therefore, this approach identifies a source of constant instability in the Fordist regime and in so doing, provides a theoretical basis for understanding the incompleteness and instability of the postwar settlement.⁽⁶¹⁾ This is especially important for an analysis of the Canadian UAW and the auto industry which experienced recessions in 1951, 1954, and 1958-61, all of which had the effect of throwing the union and the corporations into conflict as each tried to reformulate the rules of collective bargaining.

Overall, by weaving together the Regulation Approach with the insights provided in work by Panitch, Przeworski and others, a part of the theoretical framework necessary for undertaking an analysis of the Canadian UAW is provided. This thesis, however, is neither a study of the Fordist regime nor of the postwar settlement, per se. Rather, it is a study of the Canadian UAW which through its political struggles shaped the content and timing of the postwar settlement, which once in place imposed

limits on UAW strategy and political action. Because of this focus and the stated assumptions that unions are not unitary actors and that their strategic choices are limited by characteristics of trade unions themselves, it is also necessary to pay theoretical attention to the internal dynamics of union political behaviour.

Towards a Theory of The Internal Dynamics of Trade-Union Power

At the root of any understanding of the role played by trade unions in shaping Fordist relations, and hence the development of the postwar settlement, lies the questions of the basis of trade-union power and the ability of any trade union to exercise its power through its strategic entry into politics. The power of workers is rooted in their position in the labour process. Although workers lost much of their control over the actual labour process owing to developments in scientific management and Fordist production techniques, workers have retained control over their labouring power. The necessity of this labour power for continued production and capital accumulation is therefore the basis of workers' power in a capitalist economy. Workers' willingness and ability to withdraw their labour becomes the final sanctioning act in any struggle for power. Trade unions, as representatives of workers, derive their power from these same relations of control.

The power of trade unions is therefore limited by the condition of the economy, especially the labour market, and hence by the power of capital. For example, when competition between workers for jobs is intense due to prevailing economic conditions, the strategic capacity of trade unions is restricted. However, the

economic determinants of trade-union power have often been overstated leading to an argument which precludes any variation in trade-union activity or strategy other than that arising from the nature of the economy. The economy is thus presented as the determinant of trade-union power, rather than as a factor that places limits on this power. This form of argument denies any importance to trade-union strategy. In order to insert the element of trade-union strategy into this discussion, it is necessary to redraw the relationship between the economy and the power of trade unions.

Once trade unions become firmly entrenched in society and in the workplace, they mediate the effect of an economic downturn on individual workers through the use of collectively-mobilized union resources. These resources, which are greater than those available to any individual worker, are used to protect union members and have the effect of modifying the impact of market conditions upon individual workers. Therefore, once unions become firmly established, there is no longer a direct correlation between trade-union power and the condition of the economy. Rather, within the limits imposed by the economy, the specific strategies pursued by a union in protecting its membership become a determinant of trade-union power in so far as different strategies more or less effectively mobilize the resources of trade unions. It is therefore crucial to provide a theoretical basis for understanding the internal dynamics of trade-union power and the determinants of trade-union strategy.

The most important resource of industrial unions is their organization of large numbers of workers. The degree to which this resource can be mobilized as a basis of power rests on the ability and willingness of these large numbers of workers to engage in united collective action, with the final sanctioning power being the strike or threat thereof. The mobilization of workers into collective action therefore constitutes the internal basis of trade-union power.

From this basic understanding, it can be argued that there are two contradictory dimensions of power. The first dimension is derived from the collective organization of workers, which ultimately comes down to the question of size. The second dimension rests on the union's ability to mobilize successfully any group of workers into collective action. While the first dimension of power relies on the ability of a union to organize more workers or at least to maintain existing memberships, the second dimension of power is more complex. According to Claus Offe and Helmut Wessenthal, a union must represent the diverse interests of its membership in such a way as to mobilize this diversity into a united strategy of collective action. There is obviously a potential contradiction between these two dimensions. A larger and more diverse union will probably be more difficult to mobilize behind a single project.(62)

Discussions of the relationships between the size of a trade union, its ability to represent its membership and the capacity of unions to engage in collective action are not new to social scientists. Rather, they have been the subject of periodic debate

about the role of trade unions in modern society.(63)

Claus Offe and Helmut Wiesenenthal provide perhaps the most valuable insights into these contradictory aspects of union power. For Offe and Wiesenenthal, the asymmetrical dependency of capital and labour in the labour process is the root of the power of each of these groups. Their relationship is asymmetrical because of the greater power accorded capital by its unity of interest in a modern firm and its control over the production process. Conversely, individual workers control only their own labour power and must compete with other workers to sell their labour power. This makes them less powerful than capital. For workers to shift the balance of power in their favour they must associate into unions. For unions to achieve their goals, they must be able to mobilize workers behind sanctions, the most importance of which is the strike.

Offe and Wiesenenthal categorize the underlying logic of trade-union collective action as "dialogical". This concept refers to the internal tensions experienced by trade unions when engaging in political action. More specifically, trade unions must both express and redefine the interests of their members in order to fulfill their dual objectives of representing the changing and varied interests of workers and engaging in a concerted programme of collective action. Hence, members of a union must act non-individualistically. Instead they must act on the basis of a collective identity which is forged by their association with one another in a union. The formation of this collective identify

constitutes part of the redefinition of members' individual interests into a unity of interest from which comes the basis for collective action.

Up to this point, Offe and Wiesenenthal's analysis captures the contradictory internal dynamics of unions. In coming to terms with which unions are most likely to overcome this contradiction, however, Offe and Wiesenenthal turn to a discussion of the relationship between union size and internal structures of representation. This ultimately weakens their argument.

Offe and Wiesenenthal's argument is twofold. Firstly, as unions increase in size, the interests which they must represent become increasingly diverse. This makes it more and more difficult for unions to articulate common interests and mobilize the membership into a common strategy for action. Secondly, Offe and Wiesenenthal argue that as size increases so does bureaucratization. This has the effect of separating the union leadership from the rank and file. This separation erects organizational barriers to mobilization of the union membership. Therefore, unions growing in size find themselves faced with an increasingly irresolvable paradox. While they have increased their numerical strength, they can no longer express and redefine the varied interests of so many members into a programme of collective action. Offe and Wiesenenthal therefore conclude that there is an optimal size for unions such that union strength will be related to union size by an inverse "U" curve.(64)

This argument concerning the relationship and impact of size and bureaucratization on trade unions is not new. Rather, Seymour

Martin Lipset in his studies of trade-union democracy reaches similar conclusions. Lipset argues that a secure leadership of a large union in which there are no competing political groupings has a monopoly of power while the membership has none. The explanation provided by Lipset for this concentration of power in the hands of the leadership rests on the necessity of bureaucratization of large unions and the subsequent realization of Michel's iron law of oligarchy. These developments prevent the existence of competing political groupings inside the union which, for Lipset, are a precondition for heightened rank-and-file participation and control. Lipset therefore concludes that small unions are likely to be democratic due to their lack of bureaucracy, while large unions get caught in the iron law of oligarchy.(65)

These analyses are based on a misconception of the very nature of trade-union power and organization, however. The root of this misunderstanding lies in the categorization of trade unions as classic bureaucracies, similar to other bureaucracies and organized along the principles of Weber's rational bureaucratic hierarchy. Trade unions, by the very nature of their existence as representatives of workers, can never fully conform to such a model for they do not have one centre of control as do traditional bureaucracies. Rather, trade unions in a capitalist society have two competing centres of control. On the one hand is the centre of control which lies in the leadership with its disproportionate command over union organizational resources. Because the root of

trade-union power rests in membership control over its labour power and the willingness of this membership to mobilize collectively and use the ultimate sanction of the strike, however, there exists a second centre of control. By virtue of each individual worker's control over his/her labouring power (something which cannot be appropriated by any union leadership), members of unions have the capacity to engage in unauthorized strikes, which have historically proven to be as successful in challenging union leaderships' courses of action as forcing corporations to meet workers' demands. This second centre of control therefore limits the capacity of leaders to impose strategies and settlements on members and ultimately engages them in the complex process of interest intermediation inherent to trade unions.(66)

Consequently, while at the most general level all unions are bureaucratic, the variety of internal organizations and the dynamics of internal interest representation and conflict resolution are lost in such an exclusive focus on 'bureaucracy in general'. Effectively, this means rejecting the Michelian 'iron law of oligarchy' and focusing instead upon the specific nature of the internal organization of trade unions. By looking inside the actual process and changing structures of union representation, the tensions between leadership centralization and rank-and-file control can be assessed. Such analysis can provide an understanding of the internal dialectics of union politics and the union's ability to construct a unity of interest which will allow the union to maximize the second dimension of power.

Beyond the issue of bureaucracy and size, however, Offe and Wiesenenthal's argument on the necessity of a trade-union collective identity, while not new to their analysis, is an important one for understanding the construction of union unity out of the diversity of membership interests.(67) It therefore requires elaboration.

Collective identity herein refers to the shared values and interests of a group which forge bonds of solidarity among members of the group such that these members are motivated by their identification with the interests and values of the collectivity to which they belong. In turn, the specific nature of the collective identity will shape the strategic options considered viable by the union. Such a collective identity is not a 'natural' condition but is constructed.(68) Furthermore, there is no inherent reason why one collective identity may dominate a union. Rather, especially in times of crisis, competing definitions of the collective identity may serve as a basis for internal struggle and subsequent changes to the perceived limits of trade-union strategy.

A union's collective identity hinges on both the 'objective' and ideological characteristics of any union. Objective factors include, among others, the diversity of jobs of the rank and file, the geographic concentration of the membership, and the social characteristics of the membership. The greater the variation of jobs, the more diverse the membership's interests are likely to be. Geographic concentration determines the degree to which unions can become dominant enough in any area to foster a community of

interests extending beyond the membership. Furthermore, such concentration counteracts tendencies of severe internal fragmentation along regional lines while it also weakens the competing demands of an anti-union community. Finally, as the heterogeneity of union membership along the dimensions of gender, race and age increases, so does the tendency for mobilization of specific sectoral interests. Therefore, as the objective characteristics of a union change, the propensity for increased internal conflict over different interests also increases. The result is either that the collective identity is changed to incorporate the new interests or the union becomes fragmented, thereby reducing its cohesion around the former identity. Such fragmentation creates an obstacle to the capacity of the union to mobilize the rank and file behind a concerted programme of collective action.

Objective conditions alone do not forge a collective identity, however. The ideology of the union membership is also a crucial influence on how these objective conditions are forged into a collective identity. The ideological mobilization of the membership partly relies upon the union educational forums and structures of internal interest representation which allow for the mobilization of interests, especially new ones, and their incorporation into the dominant union discourse. The ideological make-up of a union membership is also affected, however, by internal and external struggles between groups and different classes competing for power. Such struggles provide competing definitions of the role of the union and competing visions of the

union's strategic place in politics and society.(69) Such competition prevents the appearance of "the end of ideology" and the subsequent restriction of strategic options open to the union. To understand the limits to trade-union strategy, it is therefore necessary to examine ideological struggles and the dominant ideology within the union which will alter the perceived role of the trade union in society and its tendency to adopt either a bureaucratic or militant, mobilization-based course of political action.

Overall, internal organization, structures of representation and the collective identity exist and develop in a complex interplay which affects both the strategic choices perceived as open to a union and the union's capacity to pursue a desired course of action. Thus size and bureaucratization do not in themselves determine the success or failure of unions to respond to changing internal dynamics or to changes in the strategies of capital. Rather, the existence of organizational structures which provide avenues for rank-and-file debate and participation combined with the existence of a collective identity which prevents serious internal fragmentation and provides a 'unity of interest' are important determinants in the strategic capacity and direction of trade unions. Moreover, these factors will impact upon a trade union's incorporation into the postwar settlement and the extent to which the union is demobilized by such participation.

Combining this theoretical framework with that on Fordism and

the postwar settlement affords a more in-depth analysis of the role played by unions in shaping postwar compromises and an understanding of the variability of union incorporation into these arrangements. Finally, by emphasizing the variability of trade-union behaviour, this theoretical framework provides a basis for examining different strategic responses by trade unions to the breakdown of institutionalized relationships referred to as the Fordist mode of regulation.

Pointing the Way Forward

This thesis will analyze the reasons for shifts in UAW political strategy between 1936 and 1984, with the objective of understanding why Canadian Autoworkers' pursued one course of political action over another and the determinants of union success or failure in these political struggles. The internal dynamics of this union and the institutionalization of labour-state-capital relations are the key explanatory factors. The relationship between strategy, internal union dynamics and Fordist regulation is dialectical. Internal union struggles place limits on union strategy as do the pressures for stabilization of UAW relations with corporations and governments. At the same time, internal union struggles impact on the timing and nature of institutionalization, which once in place, alters the internal dynamics and hence the strategic capacity of the UAW. This theoretical framework provides a dynamic understanding of Canadian UAW political behaviour as it allows for the co-existence of conditions which generate both militancy and accomodation and

therefore for a conception of competing political strategies and visions of the UAW's role in its struggle for power.

This study concentrates its analysis on the role of the Canadian UAW in the auto industry, and in particular the union's relationship with the Big Three automakers, namely General Motors, Ford and Chrysler. One reason for this restricted focus is the impossibility, in a reasonable space and time, of analyzing all the different economic sectors in which the UAW is active. The second and more important reason for this, however, is the dominant position occupied by the auto industry in UAW political and economic activities. Part of the reason for this is that the majority of Canadian Autoworkers are employed by the large automakers. Also important, however, is the fact that the auto industry provided the logic for the UAW's incorporation into Fordist institutionalized relations of collective bargaining. The structures and practices adopted in the auto industry were copied to varying degrees in the other industries unionized by the UAW. Finally, the North American auto industry, of which the Canadian industry is a branch, is the example "par excellence" of the rationalization of production and relations with unions along Fordist lines. It therefore provides the most potent study of the interplay between the logic of Fordism and trade-union behaviour.

At the same time, it must be noted here that the Canadian auto industry was unique amongst Canadian industries. Very soon after its inception, the Canadian auto industry became dominated by the same corporations which controlled the American auto industry. The Canadian industry became even more integrated into

the American one after 1965 when the Autopact was signed and virtually eliminated auto trade barriers.(70) Furthermore, the North American auto industry was characterized by a high degree of concentration of ownership which meant that oligopolistic practices emerged in the production and distribution of vehicles.

These factors, combined with the fact that Canadian Autoworkers belonged to an American-based international union, had very particular effects on the nature of the Fordist mode of regulation which developed in this Canadian industry. Because of the highly integrated nature of the industry and the existence of an international union, the terms under which institutionalization of collective bargaining were established tended to originate in the U.S. and then be introduced to the Canadian industry and Canadian workers. This often added the additional dimension of nationalism to the union's internal struggles over the direction of collective bargaining. Secondly, the oligopolistic character of the industry often meant that the auto corporations could better afford the terms of a labour-management compromise as they could pass the increased wages and benefits onto consumers. Overall, the Fordist mode of regulation which emerged in the Canadian auto industry tended to be somewhat unique amongst Canadian industries because it was part of the North American logic of production and consumption and was not constrained by the same national factors that many other industries and unions confronted.

It is important to note here that throughout the thesis "politics" is broadly defined to include all UAW strategic

endeavours to shift the balance of power in its favour and in so doing to exact concessions from the government and corporations. This means that relevant union strategies range from workplace activities to political lobbying to partisan activity as long as these have as their aim a redress in the balance of forces in society in the union's favour. Politics, defined in this sense, excludes internal union politicking which is discussed in terms of its influence upon the mobilization capacity and strategic alternatives adopted by the UAW.

The following study is historical in content and chapters are arranged chronologically. Chapter 2 (1936-1945) makes the argument that due to concerted opposition to unions by corporations and governments and due to the victory of a Communist-dominated Left caucus in struggles for control of the UAW, Canadian Autoworkers pursued militant, mobilization-based strategies. More importantly, internal union struggles ultimately led to the establishment of a rank-and-file based organizational structure for the Canadian Region of the UAW and a collective identity based on a syndicalist understanding of the UAW's role in society and a firm commitment to rank-and-file control of the union. In turn, both these developments fostered the Canadian UAW's chosen course of militant political action. The overall significance of this period for the Canadian UAW was that it established the terms upon which Canadian Autoworkers entered the postwar society and were willing to negotiate any compromises with business and government.

In the three years immediately following the war (Chapter 3), Canadian Autoworkers continued to pursue militant, mobilization-

based strategies. In so doing, they entered into protracted conflict with their International Union, the Ontario and federal governments and the corporations which were intent upon negotiating a labour peace based on a politics of compromise. The key argument of this chapter is that due to the rank-and-file based organizational structure and the persistence of a militant, syndicalist collective identity amongst Canadian Autoworkers, the ability of the new International Union leader, Walter Reuther, to organize the terms of settlement was restricted. In particular he was unable to wrestle complete control of the Canadian Region from the left-wing caucus and therefore establish the preconditions for peaceful negotiation with corporations and governments.

Chapters 4 (1950-1957) and 5 (1958-61) argue that as the Reuther caucus struggled for and won increased organizational and ideological influence over the Canadian Region, institutionalized structures of collective bargaining, the core of the Fordist wage relation, developed in the Canadian Region. Furthermore, the Canadian UAW increasingly used lobbying to communicate its demands to governments, thereby signalling its acceptance of pluralist political practices and its role as a "responsible" union. None of these developments occurred, however, without internal struggle between a newly formulated nationalist left-wing caucus and the increasingly powerful Reuther caucus. It is argued in these chapters that by the end of this period the Reuther caucus secured control of the Region and Canadian Autoworkers became enmeshed in the postwar compromise, pursuing bureaucratic political strategies

over more militant, mobilization-based ones. Nonetheless, the Reuther caucus's control over the Canadian Region did not destroy this Region's organizational structure nor supplant the syndicalist collective identity with an ideology of business unionism.(71) Rather the collective identity was modified in such a way to reinforce syndicalist tendencies within the union.

According to the argument in Chapter 6, the years between 1961 and 1968 represented the heyday of the Fordist regime. Developments leading to and following the signing of the Autopact brought the Canadian UAW into closer partnership with the federal government, therefore signalling the stabilization of the political component of the postwar settlement. Moreover, regulations governing collective bargaining were rationalized on a continental basis. In this chapter, the argument is made that at the same time as the Fordist regime was stabilized it produced within it the basis for future instability. The Canadian UAW expanded its ranks through a massive organizing drive and thereby drew into the union an increasingly diverse membership with demands of its own. Moreover, the terms of postwar 'peace', in particular the membership's lack of control over production standards and strikes, became the object of struggle so that by the end of this period, the Canadian UAW was plagued by wildcats.

In Chapter 7 (1969-1978), it is argued that the Fordist regime reached its economic limits. This did not occasion, however, an abandonment of the postwar compromise but instead an attempt to reformulate it. The federal government unsuccessfully tried to draw the UAW into tripartite arrangements and voluntary

wage controls while the Ontario government succeeded in seizing this moment to reformulate its relations with the Canadian UAW along tripartite lines. At the same time, auto corporations and the union guarded the established structures of collective bargaining in anticipation of a return to prosperity. It is further argued that the Canadian UAW became caught in the contradictions of the Fordist regime. While trying to protect the perceived gains made through the postwar arrangement, the union leadership faced growing discontent amongst its own membership. To reconstruct internal unity, Canadian UAW leaders advocated a partial return to more militant, rank-and-file based strategies. In turn, it is argued that this move altered the strategic limits perceived by the union and in so doing prepared the Canadian UAW for a return to militant politics in the 1980's.

The final substantive chapter covers the period from 1979 to 1984 when the postwar settlement began to unravel. The Canadian UAW, along with governments and corporations, struggled to define the terms of any new relationship. The Canadian UAW, aided by an organizational structure which facilitated mobilization of the rank and file and the return to power of a leadership from the union's syndicalist tradition, returned to militant, mobilization-based strategies and embarked on an alliance-building strategy to bolster the union's articulated vision of Canadian society. Although it is argued that the long-term outcome of this role for the UAW is unclear, it is also argued that the UAW's success in its struggles has forced corporations and governments to

reincorporate the UAW into structures of consultation. The very success of the UAW's struggles, however, set it on a collision course with its own International Union and ultimately led to the creation of a new Canadian Autoworkers Union (CAW).

The concluding chapter has two objectives. Firstly, it draws together the theoretical and historical implications of this study for understanding union politics and the rise and fall of the postwar settlement. Secondly, it looks to the ongoing struggles engaged in by the new Canadian Autoworkers' Union and raises questions about the possible impact of recent changes to the union's structure and collective identity on Canadian Autoworkers' strategic capacity to continue their "forward march".

Endnotes

1. The best examples of work on trade unions which use an actor-centric model in which unions are understood to make strategic choices are George Ross, "What is Progressive About Unions?", Theory and Society 10 (1981): 609-643; Peter Lange et al, Unions, Change and Crisis: French and Italian Union Strategy and the Political Economy, 1945-1980 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), esp. Section 3: "Conclusions: French and Italian Union Development in Comparative Perspective".
2. For a particularly good example of work that sees union behaviour as solely determined by external political-economic conditions, see Thomas Kochan et al, The Transformation of American Industrial Relations (New York: Basic Books, 1986).
3. On the socialization of finance see Michel Aglietta, A Theory of Capitalist Regulation: The U.S. Experience (London: New Left Books, 1976), p.159.
4. For an especially good summary and analysis of the postwar settlement see George Ross and Jane Jenson, "Post-War Class Struggle and the Crisis of Left Politics" in The Socialist Register 1985/86, eds. Ralph Miliband et al (London: Merlin Press, 1986), pp.23-49.
5. Thanks is owed to Rianne Mahon for inspiring this argument on the national variations of postwar settlement. Also see Andrew Martin, "The Politics of Employment and Welfare: National Policies and International Interdependence" in The State and Economic Interests, vol.32 of the research studies prepared for the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), pp.157-241.
6. For selected readings on corporatism see Martin, *Ibid.*; Leo Panitch, "The Development of Corporatism in Liberal Democracies", Comparative Political Studies 10 (Apr., 1977): 61-90; Bernd Marin, "Austria - The Paradigm Case of Liberal Corporatism?" in The Political Economy of Corporatism, ed. Wyn Grant (Basingstoke: Macmillan Publishers Ltd., 1985), pp.89-125.
7. Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada. Vol.2. (Hull: Supply and Services, 1985): 554-555. Daniel Drache and Duncan Cameron, eds., The Other MacDonald Report (Toronto: James Lorimer & Co., 1985), p.15. Andrew Martin, "Politics of Employment and Welfare".
8. The United States is the prime example of the pluralist variant of postwar settlement. For discussion of the American

state's role in regulating the economy and labour-capital relations see Joel Krieger, Reagan, Thatcher and the Politics of Decline (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), chapters 5 & 6; Aglietta, Theory of Capitalist Regulation; Andrew Martin, "Politics of Employment and Welfare"; Christopher Tomlins, The State and the Unions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

9. On Canada see Stuart Jamieson, Times of Trouble: Labour Unrest and Industrial Conflict in Canada, 1900-1966, Task Force on Labour Relations (Ottawa: 1968), pp.369-370. On the U.S. see Harry Katz, Shifting Gears: Changing Labor Relations in the U.S. Auto Industry (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985); Michael Piore and Charles Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide (New York: Basic Books, 1984), pp.79-82.
10. Janine Brodie and Jane Jenson, Crisis, Challenge and Change (Agincourt: Methuen Publications, 1980), Chapters 8 & 9.
11. On Sweden see Walter Korpi, The Working Class in Welfare Capitalism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), Chapter 4; On Britain see Eric Hobsbawm et al, The Forward March of Labour Halted (London: New Left Books, 1981); On Canada see Brodie and Jenson, Crisis, Challenge and Change, Chapters 6 & 7.
12. Leo Panitch and Donald Swartz, From Consent to Coercion: The Assault on Trade Union Freedoms (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1985); Anthony Giles, "The State, The Crisis and Restructuring: Industrial Relations Policies in Canada, Britain, Sweden and France", paper presented to 6th Conference on Workers and their Communities. Ottawa, Ont. 1986.
13. Ross and Jenson, "Post-War Class Struggle", p.25.
14. Ibid., pp.23-49; Peter Gourevitch et al, Unions and Economic Crisis: Britain, West Germany and Sweden (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984); Leo Panitch, "Trade Unions and the Capitalist State", New Left Review 125 (1981): 21-43; Panitch and Swartz, From Consent to Coercion, pp.15-34.
15. Leo Panitch, "Trade Unions and the Capitalist State", p.24.
16. Ibid., pp.32-37; Leo Panitch, "Ideology and Integration: The Case of the British Labour Party" in Working Class Politics in Crisis, ed. idem. (London: Verso, 1986), pp.56-77.
17. Adam Przeworski, "Social Democracy as a Historical Phenomenon", New Left Review 122 (July-Aug., 1980): 27-58.
18. Ibid., p.28.
19. For variations of this argument see Ross and Jenson, "Post-War

- Class Struggle"; Brodie and Jenson, Crisis, Challenge and Change, esp. chapters 8 & 9; Hobbsbawm, Forward March of Labour Halted; For a critique of Panitch and Przeworski's 'reformism' argument, see Winton Higgins and Nixon Apple, "How Limited is Reformism?", Theory and Society 12 (1983): 603-630.
20. Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, The Deindustrialization of America (New York: Basic Books, 1982).
 21. Rianne Mahon, "From Fordism to ?: New Technology, Labour Markets and Unions", Economic and Industrial Democracy 8 (1987): 5-60; Alain Lipietz, "Towards Global Fordism", New Left Review 132 (Mar.- Apr., 1982): 33-47; Harry Katz, Shifting Gears; Piore and Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide (New York: Basic Books, 1984).
 22. Colin Leys, "Neo-Conservatism and the Organic Crisis in Britain", Studies in Political Economy no.4 (Autumn, 1980): 41-63. Mike Davis, "Reaganomics' Magical Mystery Tour", New Left Review no.149 (Jan.-Feb., 1985): 45-65; Krieger, Reagan and Thatcher; Goran Therborn argues against the "decline of welfarism" thesis, stating that:
 "...the available evidence strongly suggests that the rise of welfare state capitalism is an irreversible development providing a fundamental basis for all future working class struggles. ... the present attacks on the welfare state can only yield marginal encroachments and impairments, provided that - as seems fairly likely - the rules of liberal democracy are maintained."
 Goran Therborn, "The Prospects of Labour and the Transformation of Advanced Capitalism", New Left Review no.145 (May-June, 1984): 5-38.
 23. For an excellent comparative study of different national labour movements' responses to the most recent economic crisis see Gourevitch et al, Unions and Economic Crisis and Peter Lange et al, Unions, Change and Crisis.
 24. For a discussion of why Canada did not develop corporatism, see Leo Panitch, "Corporatism in Canada?", Studies in Political Economy 1 (Spring, 1979): 43-92.
 25. Heather McAllistair, "Labour's Direction in the Changing Political Economy: The Response by the Canadian Labour Congress to the Decline of Keynesianism, 1956-1978", paper presented to Canadian Political Science Association meetings. Guelph, Ont., 1984; Anthony Giles, "The Canadian Labour Congress and Tripartism", Relations Industrielles/ Industrial Relations 37 (1982): 93-125; Stephen McBride, "Public Policy as a Determinant of Interest Group Behaviour: The Canadian Labour Congress' Corporatist Initiative, 1976-1978", Canadian Journal of Political Science 16 (Sept., 1983): 501-518.

26. For examples of this work see Keith Banting, "The State and Economic Interests: An Introduction" in The State and Economic Interests, vol.32 of the research studies prepared for the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), pp.1-33; Pierre Fournier, "Consensus Building in Canada: Case Studies and Prospects" in ibid., pp.291-335; K.G.Waldie, "The Evolution of Labour-Government Consultation on Economic Policy" in Labour-Management Co-operation in Canada, vol.15 of the research studies prepared for the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985).

27. David Kwavnick, Organized Labour and Pressure Politics: The Canadian Labour Congress 1956-1968 (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1972); Paul Pross, ed., Pressure Group Behaviour in Canadian Politics (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1975); Paul Pross, "Space, Function and Interest: The Problem of Legitimacy in the Canadian State" in The Administrative State in Canada, ed. O.P. Dwivedi (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982), pp.107-129; Robert Presthus, Elite Accomodation in Canadian Politics (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1973).

28. For a critique of elite analysis in Canadian politics, see Leo Panitch, "Elites, Classes and Power in Canada" in Canadian Politics in the 1980's, 2d ed., edited by Michael Whittington and Glen Williams (Agincourt: Methuen Publications, 1984), pp.229-251.

29. Whether this periodization 'fits' the experience of other unions has yet to be historically examined. Recent work by Steve Jefferys on the American UAW at Chrysler, however, indicates that this threefold periodization does not fit his case study either. Steve Jefferys, Management and Managed: Fifty Years of Crisis at Chrysler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

30. For work which tends to portray the postwar settlement as quickly and uniformly put into place, see Panitch, "Trade Unions and the Capitalist State"; Panitch and Swartz, From Consent to Coercion; Gourevitch et al, Unions and Economic Crisis. A major and importance exception to this analysis is found in Lange et al, Unions, Change and Crisis. Because the chapters in this book deal with non-social democratic environments in which unions were not brought into the same type of compromise, they address some of the questions dealing with conflict over the terms of the postwar settlement. Due to this book's focus on union centrals, however, it concentrates analysis on union conflict with the state and capital but does not say much about possible tensions between union members and leaders over the terms of compromise.

31. Aglietta pays some attention to the importance of internal ideological struggles in unions for their acceptance of or resistance to the terms of compromise. See Aglietta, Theory of Capitalist Regulation, pp.190-198.
32. Banting, "State and Economic Interests", p.2.
33. A particularly insightful analysis of this thesis on "responsible unionism" is found in Tomlins, The State and the Unions, esp. Part III. On Canada, Kwavnick, although from an elite pluralist perspective, provides some interesting insights into this question. See Kwavnick, Organized Labour, Chapter 6.
34. Charles Sabel, "The Internal Politics of Trade Unions" in Organizing Interests in Western Europe, ed. Suzanne Berger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp.209-244.
35. Ibid., p.212; Also see Charles Sabel, Work and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
36. Sabel, "The Internal Politics of Trade Unions". In many ways, S.M. Lipset's argument on the importance of competing political factions within unions for allowing greater rank-and-file participation is similar to Sabel's analysis. See footnote #65.
37. Recent work on unions and collective bargaining in the U.S. has greatly contributed to this analysis. See Piore and Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide, chapter 4; Martin, "Politics of Employment and Welfare", p.183.
38. For a detailed account of early labour legislation which set the parameters to state action see H.A.Logan, State Intervention and Assistance in Collective Bargaining (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1956); For analysis of the role of the state see Laurel Sefton MacDowell, "The Formation of the Canadian Industrial Relations System During WWII", Labour/Le Travailleur 3 (1978): 175-196.
39. For an explanation and critique of this emphasis by Western Marxists on political stability see Perry Anderson, Considerations on Western Marxism (London: New Left Books, 1976).
40. Perhaps the most influential and illustrative example of functionalist analyses of the Canadian state can be found in Leo Panitch, ed., The Canadian State (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), especially articles by Panitch, Mahon and Finkel. For a critique of functionalism in Canadian political economy see Greg Albo and Jane Jenson, "A Contested Concept: The Relative Autonomy of the State in the New Canadian Political Economy", paper prepared for upcoming

publication, The New Canadian Political Economy, eds. Wallace Clement and Glen Williams.

41. Alain Lipietz, Mirages and Miracles: The Crisis of Global Fordism (London: Verso, 1987), p.15.
42. David Wolfe, "The Rise and Demise of the Keynesian Era in Canada: Economic Policy, 1930-1982" in Modern Canada 1930 - 1980's, eds. Michael Cross and Gregory Kealey, Vol.5: Readings in Canadian Social History (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd., 1984: reprint ed. 1985), pp.46-78; Panitch and Swartz, From Consent to Coercion, pp.30-34.
43. Panitch and Swartz, From Consent to Coercion, p.34.
44. David Gordon et al's theory of the "long swings and stages of capitalism" stresses the 'exploratory' and often conflictual character of periods of crisis. See David Gordon, et al, Segmented Work, Divided Workers (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1982), especially chapter 2.
45. Both Coriat and Boyer tend to see the postwar settlement as quickly and uniformly put into place. See Benjamin Coriat, "Labour and Capital in the Crisis: France, 1966-82" in The French Workers' Movement: Economic Crisis and Political Change, ed. Mark Kesselman (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), pp.39-47; Robert Boyer, "Wage Labour, Capital Accumulation and the Crisis, 1968-82" in *ibid.*, pp.17-38.
46. Lipietz, Mirages and Miracles, Chapter 1. This argument is also made in Marxist analyses of labour-capital relations. See Leo Panitch, "The Tripartite Experience" in The State and Economic Interests, vol.32 of the research studies prepared for the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), p.37; Donald Swartz, "New Forms of Worker Participation: A Critique of Quality of Working Life", Studies in Political Economy 5 (Spring, 1981): 55-78.
47. Lipietz, Mirages and Miracles, p.15.
48. *Ibid.*, p.14.
49. *Ibid.*, p.15.
50. *Ibid.*, p.18.
51. Alain Lipietz, "Les transformations dans la division internationale du travail: considerations methodologiques et esquisse de theorisation" in Le Canada et la Nouvelle Division Internationale du Travail/ Canada and the New International Division of Labour, eds. Duncan Cameron and Francoise Houle (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1985),

pp.27-55.

52. Lipietz, "Towards Global Fordism", p.34.
53. Aglietta, Theory of Capitalist Regulation, pp.118-119.
54. Ibid., Part I, Chapters 2 & 3.
55. Lipietz, "Towards Global Fordism", p.35.
56. Aglietta undertakes a more rigorous analysis of changes to wages and the consumption process than is presented here. He argues that not only do wages increase with the development of the Fordist regime, but they also change in form from piece-work, which can no longer function given the breakdown of the linkage between individual output and wages, to a "collective output bonus". Furthermore, he argues that a necessary accompaniment to these changes is a restructuring of the financial system so that workers can amortize the payment of goods over a longer period of time than that of the individual worker's pay period. Aglietta, Theory of Capitalist Regulation, pp.151-186.
57. Ibid., pp.186-208; Mahon, "From Fordism to ?"; Piore and Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide, esp. chapter 4; Katz, Shifting Gears; Lipietz, "Les transformations dans la division internationale du travail", p.46.
58. Aglietta, Theory of Capitalist Regulation, pp.189-193; Lipietz, Mirages and Miracles, p.19.
59. Korpi, Working Class in Welfare Capitalism; Andrew Martin, "Trade Unions in Sweden: Strategic Responses to Change and Crisis" in Unions and Economic Crisis, eds. Gourevitch et al, pp.190-359; Andrei Markovits and Christopher Allen, "Trade Unions and the Economic Crisis: The West German Case" in ibid., pp.91-188; Andrei Markovits, "The Vicissitudes of West German Social Democracy in the Crisis of the 1980's", Studies in Political Economy 19 (Spring, 1986): 83-112.
60. Lipietz, Mirages and Miracles, p.19.
61. See Aglietta's analysis of the 1950's, Theory of Capitalist Regulation, pp.190-198. It should be noted that the argument concerning the instabilities of the postwar settlement has not always been carried through by regulation theorists. See Coriat, "Labour and Capital in the Crisis" and Boyer, "Wage Labour, Capital Accumulation and the Crisis".
62. Claus Offe and Helmut Wiesensthal, "Two Logics of Collective Action" in Disorganized Capitalism by Claus Offe (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985), pp.170-220.

63. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971); Seymour Martin Lipset, see footnote #67; William Faunce, "Size of Locals and Union Democracy" in Readings in Industrial Sociology ed. idem. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1964), pp.402-412; Wilbert Moore, "On the Nature of Industrial Bureaucracy" in ibid., pp.136-145.
64. Offe and Wiesenenthal, "Two Logics of Collective Action", p.186.
65. For variations of Lipset's argument see S.M. Lipset, Martin Trow and James Coleman, Union Democracy (New York: The Free Press, 1956); S.M. Lipset and Martin Trow, "Reference Group Theory and Trade Union Wage Policy" in Common Frontiers of the Social Sciences, ed. Mirra Komarovsky (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1957), pp.391-411; S.M. Lipset, "Democracy in Private Government: A Case Study of the International Typographical Union" in Readings in Industrial Sociology, ed. Faunce, pp.383-401; S.M. Lipset, "The Political Process in Trade Unions: A Theoretical Statement" in Freedom and Control in Modern Society, eds. Morroe Berger et al (New York: Octagon Books Inc., 1954), pp.82-124. Mancur Olson reaches similar conclusions to Lipset regarding the relationship between size and the delivery of collective goods to members of unions. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action. For a critique of the argument that small size equates with greater internal democracy see Faunce, "Size of Locals and Union Democracy".
66. Richard Hyman, Industrial Relations: A Marxist Introduction (Basingstoke: The MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1975), pp.73-74; Colin Crouch and Alessandro Pizzorno, The Resurgence of Class Conflict in Western Europe Since 1968, 2 vols. (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1978).
67. A number of authors have investigated the idea of "collective identity" and its importance for the construction of group unity. For some examples see Offe and Wiesenenthal, "Two Logics of Collective Action", pp.183-184; Alessandro Pizzorno, "Political Exchange and Collective Identity in Industrial Conflict" in The Resurgence of Class Conflict, vol.2, pp.277-298; Alessandro Pizzorno, "Interests and Parties in Pluralism" in Organizing Interests in Western Europe, ed. Berger, pp.249-284; Sabel, "The Internal Politics of Trade Unions"; Adam Przeworski, "Proletariat into a Class: The Process of Class Formation from Karl Kautsky's The Class Struggle to Recent Controversies", Politics and Society 7 (1977): 343-401. The concept of "collective identity" is similar to Lipset's concepts of union culture and occupational community which he argues form a basis for rank-and-file participation. See Lipset et al, Union Democracy, esp. chapter 18.

68. Alessandro Pizzorno, "Interests and Parties"; Brodie and Jenson, Crisis, Challenge and Change, esp. chapter 1.
69. For an excellent discussion of this process see Sabel, "The Internal Politics of Trade Unions".
70. It should be noted that the three main industries (auto, agricultural implements and aerospace) which the UAW has organized have all developed some form of free trade arrangement with the U.S..
71. The main proponent of the argument that the UAW in Canada acted according to the principles of business unionism is Robert Laxer. Canada's Unions (Toronto: Lorimer & Co., 1976).

Chapter Two

Fighting Back: Building the UAW in Canada, 1936-45

The end of the depression signalled the beginning of protracted struggle between workers, capital and the state. The auto plants, the cornerstone of fordist industrialization in Canada, were the scene of much of this conflict and out of it grew one of the most powerful unions in Canada - the Canadian Region of the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW).(1) From 1936, when the first UAW locals were established, until the end of World War II, the Canadian UAW fought to consolidate its position in the workplace and to define its role in politics. Canadian autoworkers concentrated their energies on two demands - the legal recognition and protection of unions and the construction of tripartite decision-making structures in which organized labour could take up its "rightful position" as part of the triumvirate of power in a modern, capitalist society. In pursuit of these demands, the UAW steered a militant, mobilization-based course of political action. Canadian autoworkers engaged in strikes, mass-based lobbies and, ultimately, alliance-building to unite all progressive forces in Canada.

Especially after 1939, Canadian autoworkers were distinguished by their syndicalism, their radical discourse and their mobilization behind militant forms of collective action. The

reasons for this were twofold. UAW strategy was partly a strategy of necessity. Organized labour was excluded from established decision-making structures. When the UAW demanded participation and recognition, then, the only course of action left open to the union was workplace action and mobilization of popular support. Equally important, however, in understanding UAW militancy were the internal dynamics of the union in this period. In 1939, after three years of intense, internal conflict, a Communist-dominated, left-wing coalition secured control of the UAW. This meant that, throughout the war strategies were articulated by the most militant elements of the union. Furthermore, out of the internecine conflict developed a culture of democracy and an organizational structure which relied upon high levels of rank-and-file participation both of which tended to reinforce the union's commitment to membership-based strategies.

This chapter tells the story of the founding of the UAW prior to the construction of the Fordist mode of regulation. Yet, the story is crucial for understanding later developments in the UAW's relations with the government and the companies. The peculiar brand of syndicalism adopted by Canadian autoworkers in the first years of the UAW's existence and the organizational and cultural commitment to mobilization-based political strategies both shaped the union's entry into the postwar settlement and, ultimately, its response to the breakdown of this arrangement in the 1980's.

Struggling for Control: The Workplace and the Union, 1936-39

At the 1936 UAW Convention in South Bend, Indiana, autoworkers broke with AFL craft unionism, elected their first president, Homer Martin, and readied themselves for a massive organization of autoworkers into one industrial union. The sit-down strike quickly became the key instrument for organizing. Unlike the conventional tactics of picketing, the sit-down strike had the benefit of precluding the company option of hiring scabs to break a strike.

In December 1936 the American UAW's strength and resolve was put to the test. Kelsey-Wheel workers occupied their plant in Detroit on December 10 and by December 24 had forced a settlement with the company. This victory was shortly followed by the great Flint sit-down which lasted from December 30, 1936 to February 11, 1937. After violent confrontations between workers and management, a settlement was negotiated which gave the UAW bargaining rights in the twenty GM plants on strike.(2) The UAW had firmly established itself in the ranks of organized labour in the U.S..

Early organization in Canada was far less spectacular. In response to company initiatives to increase profits through speedups, elimination of piece rates, and employment of time studies, a handful of Kelsey-Wheel workers in Windsor, mostly Communists, chartered local 195 in December 1936. After a few days of attempted organization, five workers were fired for union activity. This provided the spark for a confrontation and on December 16, 140 Kelsey-Wheel workers followed the example of their brothers and sisters south of the border and occupied the

plant. The occupation was soon squashed as city police forced the workers to leave the plant. The striking autoworkers fought back and for almost two weeks battled with the police and the company. Finally, on December 26, both parties agreed to conciliation by a mediator from the Department of Labour in Ottawa. Within four days a settlement was reached and the strikers returned to work. The agreement was an informal one, unsigned by local 195 and known by unionists as a "bastard agreement". While wages were increased, the International UAW was not recognized.(3)

Shortly after the settlement at the Kelsey Wheel plant, the focus of UAW activity shifted to Oshawa. In early 1937 workers at the Oshawa GM plant faced their fifth consecutive wage cut, despite record company profits. After the announcement of a speed-up on February 15, the workers laid down their tools and appealed to the UAW for help. With the arrival of Hugh Thompson, UAW organizer from Detroit, the workers voted to join the UAW and go back to work. Within a month, 4,000 workers had joined the newly chartered local 222.(4)

When the first bargaining meeting between local 222 and GM took place on March 18, 1937, the key issue in dispute became clear. GM refused to negotiate with Hugh Thompson because of his affiliation with the International union. This made the central issue of dispute recognition of local 222 as an affiliate of the UAW International. After 13 days of negotiations, the UAW, aided by the Ontario Minister of Labour, David Croll, was poised for a breakthrough on this issue. The untimely return of Premier

Mitchell Hepburn from holidays, however, renewed GM's resolve to resist recognition of the UAW. Hepburn intended to protect his and other business interests from the demands of organized labour by invoking the power of the provincial government on the side of General Motors. Faced with such powerful opponents, the Oshawa autoworkers went on strike on April 8, 1937.(5)

The UAW's position was fragile. Premier Hepburn used the law as his weapon and, after conflicts with both Mayor Hall of Oshawa and Prime Minister Mackenzie King, created his own police force, popularly known as the "Hepburn Hussars", to crush the striking workers. Meanwhile, the UAW was floundering. The union was bankrupt and despite pledges of support for local 222's struggle, the cupboard was bare. Furthermore, Canadian organization was not central to the UAW's agenda and this softened its commitment to extending organizational support and activities north of the border.(6)

Finally, internal factionalism began to seriously divide and hence weaken the union precisely when it faced concerted opposition from both corporations and government. Following the 1937 sit-down strike in the US, Homer Martin, president of the UAW, became obsessed with ridding the union of Communists who he saw as his major source of opposition.(7) This crusade against the Communists led Martin to side with the companies in arranging quick settlements, as he feared that prolonged workplace struggles would strengthen the hand of his opponents.

These internal troubles were soon brought to bear on the Oshawa struggle and cracks began to appear in the union's

position. After private negotiations with Hepburn, Charlie Millard, local 222 negotiator and Martin ally, announced that a settlement was imminent. He urged that company trucks be allowed to cross the picket lines. Hugh Thompson, on the other hand, rejected this statement and argued that Millard had no authority to reach a settlement without the membership. Millard temporarily won out. Deeper splits within the union appeared, however, when Homer Martin met with GM officials in Detroit and agreed that the Oshawa strike could be settled without recognition of the UAW-CIO. Local 222 membership cried foul. Despite Martin's appearance in Oshawa to sell his position, on April 19 the workers rejected an agreement based on the programme spelled out by Martin and negotiated by Millard and J.L.Cohen, UAW legal counsel.

The local's position was further weakened, however, by the UAW president's refusal to mobilize other autoworkers in a sympathy strike in support of striking Oshawa workers. This decision, in combination with no financial support from the International, left the local 222 bargaining committee desperate for a settlement. On April 21 Millard arranged a meeting in Premier Hepburn's office. The Premier forced Millard and Cohen to sign a document denying any affiliation with the CIO and a statement that neither Martin nor Thompson would return to Oshawa or Toronto for negotiations. Within two days, on April 23, an agreement was reached between the local union and the company. It was ratified by a large majority of the membership. Like the local 195 strike, the Oshawa strike had been successful in gaining bread

and better issues such as wage increases, seniority provisions, and a shorter work week, but had failed to gain formal recognition of the UAW-CIO.(8)

Both the Kelsey Wheel and GM strikes revealed the tremendous obstacles faced by Canadian autoworkers in their drive to organize and gain recognition of their union. Corporations were intent upon rationalizing production and enlarging profits by increasing the exploitation of workers and combatting unionization of their plants. Where necessary, governments and the police intervened to ensure corporate victory.

To win in the face of such opposition, workers had to willingly down their tools and mobilize behind a concerted programme of collective action. It was through such militant action by Canadian autoworkers in Windsor and Oshawa that gains were made in these two strikes. However, it was also the unwillingness of the International union leadership to engage in militant action that nearly aborted the Oshawa strike and certainly prevented recognition of the UAW in Canada. These early workplace conflicts therefore revealed the necessity of widespread militant action by autoworkers if they were to win in their battles with corporations. At the same time, the events of these strikes signalled the dangers of internal factionalism and, in particular, the threat posed to successful unionization by the incumbent union leadership under the direction of Homer Martin. These realizations by Canadian Autoworkers pushed them towards the Communist-dominated, left-wing "Unity caucus" which offered the workers a more militant 'vision' of the union in society and

greater rank-and-file control over union activities.

Nonetheless, the Oshawa strike constituted a moral victory for Canadian Autoworkers and spurred on their unionization drive. Aided by the 1937 boom in Canadian auto production, the UAW scored a series of victories in Canada's auto industry. Workers in Windsor, St. Catharines and Brantford chartered locals of the UAW and in many cases secured their first contracts.(9) Nonetheless, Canadian Autoworkers still had not won recognition of the UAW. This goal continued to elude the unionists, largely owing to the onset of another economic recession and ongoing internal union struggles.

In 1938, the Canadian auto industry suffered a sudden downturn. Following the increased production of vehicles in 1937, the last two interwar years showed declines in Canadian auto production as demand for vehicles was met by imports. This change was at least partially the result of the lower tariffs instituted by the federal government in 1936. These new tariff rates made it more cost efficient for companies to produce vehicles in the US, where economies of scale lowered production costs, and then export them to Canada where the lowered tariff rates did not add sufficient extra cost onto the vehicles to warrant production in Canada.(10) In 1938 Hudson, Packard and Studebaker all ceased producing cars in Canada due to the effects of the lowered tariff.(11) Rising vehicle imports led to increased unemployment in the auto industry. Workers were therefore less secure and less willing to jeopardize their jobs with union activity. Workers who did engage

in strikes or other workplace activity to support their demands for union recognition, found their bargaining position weakened as companies replaced lost Canadian production with imports from the U.S.. The Canadian UAW therefore found its position amongst workers weakened.

The struggles of Canadian autoworkers were most seriously hampered, however, by the political turmoil which wracked the UAW from 1937 to 1939. As conflict escalated between the right-wing Progressive Caucus led by UAW President Martin and the left-wing Unity Caucus, the union's energies were drained away from the organization and representation of workers and towards control of the union. Since the August 1937 International UAW Convention, Martin and his allies had struggled to wrestle control of the whole union away from the membership, which they saw as Communist directed. Martin purged his opponents from their positions in the union. He sought control over wildcat strikes, which were considered a Communist-inspired tactic to win support of the membership, and entered the union into sweetheart deals with the corporations to allow for the firing of those leading wildcats.(12) To secure control of the Canadian Region, Martin appointed his supporter, Charlie Millard, as Director of the Region, rather than allowing an election by the Canadian membership.(13)

Charlie Millard spearheaded the factional struggles in the Canadian UAW. He was an ally of the Progressive Caucus at a time when most rank-and-file UAW members in Canada supported the Unity Caucus.(14) Like Martin, he was virulently anti-Communist and

determined to rid the union of that group's influence. Also like Martin, Millard's anti-Communism became a weapon in his own power struggles to retain his position of leadership in the union. Millard wielded the "Communist threat" like a sword with which to smite his enemies, regardless of their political affiliation.

Conflict between the two caucuses gathered momentum in the summer of 1938. At this time, Richard Frankenstein, vice-president and presidential assistant to Martin, defected from the Progressive Caucus to side with the Unity Caucus in a move to end factionalism within the union. The vice-president's defection gave the Unity Caucus a majority on the International Executive Board. In a last ditch attempt to secure his leadership position, Martin suspended five of the seven UAW executive officers on charges of association with the Communist Party.(15) Six of the 24 members of the International Executive Board (IEB) walked out of the meeting in protest and refused to attend future meetings. Millard was conspicuously absent from this protest, preferring instead to continue his support for Martin.(16)

This struggle inside the International Executive Board quickly found its way into the Canadian Region and brought the conflict there between the Progressive and Unity Caucuses to a head. The scene of conflict was a Canadian Autoworkers' conference held in Brantford on June 25 and 26, 1938. The first order of business was debate over Martin's suspension of the 5 executive officers. After lengthy and acrimonious debate, a resolution demanding that President Martin either show cause for the

suspension of these members or reinstate them, passed with 18 voting in favour and 15 against.(17)

The opposition was much more united in its dissatisfaction with Millard. Despite Millard's recommendation against a rank-and-file body to coordinate planning and organization of the UAW in Canada, the Conference set up a permanent Regional Committee. This body would be controlled by the rank and file and have the authority to formulate and carry out plans for organization of the region. The resolution creating this committee criticized the Regional Director for his absence from the Canadian region due to his involvement in International Union politics. It also blamed Millard for the slow growth of the UAW in Canada. Added to this was the demand that the Canadian region be given its own newspaper, by creating a Canadian edition of the UAW newspaper, The Auto Worker.(18) Although Millard attempted to mobilize his supporters in advance of the conference, the Unity caucus elected its candidates to all three executive positions on the newly created Canadian Regional Committee.(19)

This was an important political moment for the UAW in Canada. The Regional Committee provided rank-and-file activists, who were also Unity caucus supporters, with an organizational forum for mobilizing autoworkers behind their political programs. It also provided a mechanism which would allow them to control the organization of the union. It gave a strategic advantage to the Communists who, although not numerically dominant in the Unity caucus, were highly organized and could therefore be effective in giving direction to the union. It was not long after the creation

of the Regional Committee that the UAW pursued a course of militant workplace action and mobilized to oust the Progressive Caucus from the leadership of the Canadian region.

As the membership wrestled for control of its union, the Canadian UAW faced serious challenges to its survival in the workplace. On August 3, 1938 the Walker Metal Products workers in Windsor went on strike when the company refused to negotiate a new contract. As time wore on, the workers' position was weakened; the company kept operations going with scabs. The workers became increasingly frustrated about the lack of leadership from their own union and the increasing hopelessness of their position with the company. Conflict became violent and reached a climax on August 31 when a bomb was planted in a scab's home. In response, Premier Hepburn sent Louis Fine, Chief Conciliation Officer, to Windsor to mediate a settlement between the two parties. On November 1 a settlement was reached but the union had been defeated.(20) Although the settlement stipulated that strikers would be given preference in re-hiring, by November, 1939 125 of the workers were still out of work and had been unable to find work for the entire year.(21)

This and other workplace conflicts increased the momentum to oust Millard and reorient the direction of the union.(22) While militants at the local level were responding to workers' demands for action and successfully mobilizing them in massive pickets, the union executive was providing little coordination and leadership to the strikes and focusing its energies on efforts to

defeat union leaders in Windsor. At a September Regional Conference, the leadership of Millard and the Martin administration became the key issue of debate.(23) Throughout the meeting, Millard travelled back and forth to Detroit attempting to shore up the leadership of Martin. Local delegates lambasted Millard and the union administration for giving poor leadership in the ongoing strikes. Furthermore, they accused them of lying to the strikers, who had been told that strike monies were forthcoming when the UAW had no such money available. There was also a call for local control over strikes in Canada and a move to establish an independent education department in liaison with the Workers' Educational Association to ensure greater rank-and-file participation in debates about the union's direction.(24)

As the tide moved quickly against the Regional Director, Millard accused the Unity Caucus of planning a hidden agenda for the meeting and of manipulating delegate elections to ensure strong representation of Communists at the Regional Conference.(25) These struggles continued for the rest of the year with Millard becoming increasingly autocratic in his leadership. Canadian Autoworkers accused him of sacrificing the organization of plants such as Duplate Glass in Oshawa to prevent greater control of the Region by the Unity Caucus.(26)

The results of this internal conflict were devastating. Not only did the UAW lose strikes in Windsor but membership seriously declined. Local 397 in Brantford handed back its union charter to the UAW in November, 1938 and by early 1939, local 502 in Windsor no longer existed. New attempts at organization, such as the one

in Peterborough to create local 570, stalled and once powerful locals such as 222 went into steady decline.

The Progressive Caucus, in its drive for control spurred on by its hatred for Communists, was threatening the heart of the union which relied upon committed Communists for the bulk of organization. Ironically, the actions of the Progressive Caucus succeeded in welding together disparate groups within the union which at the next UAW convention would seize power from the Martin administration. It was these struggles in combination with the eventual victory of the left-wing Unity caucus which deeply embedded in the membership a tenacious commitment to rank-and-file control over the union. Out of this commitment a union culture based on democracy was constructed.

These internal conflicts in Canada mirrored similar events in the U.S.. With Martin's expulsion of the 5 executive officers in 1938, the CIO under John L. Lewis joined the UAW rank and file in its struggle to democratize the union. Lewis forced Martin to restore the five executive board members, thereby swinging the balance of power on the UAW International executive in favour of the Unity Caucus. By January 1939, only three members of the executive supported Martin. In reaction, Martin suspended 15 of the 25 Executive Board Members and brought the conflict to a head. Then, in a final attempt to retain control over the union, Martin approached the AFL in March with the intention of taking the UAW out of the CIO. Rather than securing him victory, however, this initiative isolated Martin from all but a handful of

autoworkers. When Martin and a few other leaders affiliated a section of the UAW to the AFL, control of the UAW was surrendered to the Unity caucus.(27)

These struggles left the UAW in shambles and in need of regrouping. A special Convention of the International UAWA was therefore convened from March 27 to April 6, 1939 to undertake this task. The Canadian delegation included representatives from only three locals (locals 195, 199 and 222), a reflection of the weakened state of the union in Canada.(28) The election of the Canadian Regional Director was the most important convention event for Canadian autoworkers and constituted a turning point in the Canadian Region's future direction. Charlie Millard was originally the candidate chosen by the CIO to run for this position. The "Unity-caucus" dominated the Canadian delegation, however, and made it clear that they had their own candidate and would not brook opposition from the CIO nor stand quietly by if a Canadian director was imposed upon them once again. The "Unity" candidate, George Burt from local 222, ran and won against Charlie Millard. This election signalled the victory of the Unity Caucus in securing control of the Canadian Region. It also meant the fundamental redirection of the Canadian UAW's course of action.(29)

Understanding this new direction and the often contradictory role played by George Burt in his years as Canadian Director requires closer examination of the Unity Caucus in Canada. The Unity Caucus was based on alliances between three groups - Communists, left-wing CCFers, and militant trade unionists, who if

they had partisan alliances, saw these as secondary to the goal of building and consolidating the UAW as a powerful representative of workers. Although the Communists did not compose the majority of the caucus or of the rank and file, they did dominate the majority of local executives and, from 1939, the Canadian UAW leadership. They secured this position by virtue of their tight organization, commitment to the organization of autoworkers and the good relations they established with other UAW militants because of their key role in early organizing drives in the auto industry. This position of power gave Communists tremendous influence over the union's communications system, via local and regional newspapers, the educational structure and the collective bargaining councils. Nonetheless strong Communist influence over the Unity Caucus and the membership did not mean Communist Party control of the union. Rather, Communist autoworkers were ultimately dependent upon the support of their allies for their continued dominant influence over the UAW.

It was this complex interplay of forces inside the Unity Caucus which determined the election of George Burt and the Canadian Autoworkers' subsequent course of action. Communist autoworkers did not attempt to place a party member in the position of Canadian Director. Rather, along with their left-wing allies, they supported George Burt. Burt's election and early years as Director both reflected the diverse left-wing groups within the union and secured their leadership position long after Cold War purges had destroyed other similar union leaderships.

Burt was well aware that his position was dependent upon votes of Communists as well as other left-wing militants who sometimes came into conflict with the Communists. He therefore walked a fine political line, sometimes protecting Communists from attack while at other times, aiding their opponents.

Also noticeably absent from the Communist autoworkers' agenda was any real attempt to gain new membership for the party, or even link their union activities with those of the Communist Party. Instead, Communist influence was more subtle and ultimately longer lasting. Communists and their left-wing allies injected into the union a militant discourse and culture of workplace activism and solidarity. Consistent with this, they articulated a strategy of militant, mobilization politics. This fed the membership's commitment to democratic control of the union which for UAW members meant rank-and-file activism, not merely delegation to the union leadership. In turn, these ideological and cultural influences of the left provided the union with a basis around which to successfully mobilize workers to join and support the union and engage in militant action against corporations and governments.

To achieve this successful mobilization, the Unity Caucus made three moves to reorganize the union. At a closed meeting of the Canadian Regional Committee held a few days after the 1939 International Convention, a plan of action to rebuild the union was put into place. With local 222 having suffered one of the worst declines in membership, it was from this local that a call for the end to dual unionism and for the construction of a

democratic organization rang loudest. Tommy MacLean summarized the position of the local and the union as a whole when he stated:

The Convention has handed the Union back to the membership and it is our job to handle our own business, do our own bargaining and not be run by lawyers or any outside interference and that any purging that (is) necessary should be done by the membership.(30)

The overall organizational objectives spelled out at the meeting were those of unity, cooperation and coordination between locals and the union leadership. This entailed the consolidation of organizing drives with the explicit stipulation that, once organized, locals would retain their autonomy on workplace issues, free from interference by either the International or the administrative staff.

With these goals in place and a firm commitment to steer clear of factionalism, Canadian autoworkers were ready to move forward. A first step towards reaching the union's goals came with the International Executive Board's decision to grant a District Council charter to the Canadian region.(31) Canadian autoworkers had applied for a District Council charter to replace the Regional Committee since the latter had not been constitutionally recognized and consequently had been easily side-stepped by Charlie Millard.(32)

A District Council was a rank-and-file deliberative body to which delegates were elected on a per capita basis. In Canada, the Regional Director was henceforth required to make a report at each Council meeting to keep the membership informed about the activities of the union and the decisions of the International

Executive Board. The Regional Director and staff had a voice but no vote in the Council's proceedings. The Director's report was subject to debate, and recommendations from the membership to the administration followed. Each District Council had the right to formulate its own internal by-laws within the confines of overall International union policy. The function of the District Council was to formulate district policies on such issues as wages and politics, but with the stipulation that these bodies had no executive or administrative role in the union. District Council #26, the Canadian Council, met six times a year and had a source of financing independent of the administration and based on per capita membership payments targetted specifically for the Council.(33)

For Canadian autoworkers the District Council format was especially important. It symbolized a return to greater membership control. Canadian Autoworkers now had a constitutionally chartered forum for debate and decision-making which lay beyond the control of the union administration or executive. Moreover, Canada was not merely another region of the union but a separate country. Yet, hitherto, its only forum for rank-and-file input into union decision-making had been the International Convention, which was dominated by American delegates. There, the Canadian delegation was a small voice during convention deliberations. With the establishment of District Council 26, Canadian autoworkers had a forum through which to organize themselves into a united Canadian body. The Council therefore provided an avenue through which Canadian Autoworkers could articulate positions which accounted

for uniquely Canadian conditions. Finally, the District Council provided the Unity Caucus, and in particular the Communists, with the organizational means to mobilize the Canadian UAW membership behind a united programme for action.

The second move made by the Unity Caucus was to consolidate its ideological-cum-strategic position within the Canadian UAW. It did this by undermining the position of nationalists in the Canadian Region, who had supported the Unity Caucus but now posed a threat to its commitment to international unionism. Canadian UAW leaders removed nationalists from strategic positions within the union and exerted greater control over locals whose executives were nationalist.(34) This decision to rid the union of nationalist influence was no doubt linked to the strengthened position of Communists in the UAW and their strategic decision, made in 1936, to work within international unions. In turn, the success of this move ensured the organization of Canadian autoworkers as part of an International Union.(35)

The final step taken by the Unity Caucus to place the UAW on firm footing in Canada lay in the extension of UAW organization into new plants and the revival of existing locals whose membership had seriously declined due to internal factionalism. It must be remembered that at this time in Canada, no law required that union locals represent the majority of workers in a plant. The fact that the UAW had considerable numbers of locals established in Canada did not mean, then, that the union represented large numbers of workers in the plants where these

locals had been organized. Rather, many locals such as local 222 which began with a membership of 4,000 had been reduced to a handful of members. The internal union power struggles, repeated loss of strikes, the lack of protective labour legislation and the slump in the auto industry all contributed to a suspicion amongst workers that unions could not protect their interests and hence to the decline in membership. In the six months following the March 1939 UAW Convention, the Canadian region pressured the International UAW office to encourage the CIO to establish a Canadian Committee for Industrial Organization with financial support to aid in organization drives. This was finally done and the Canadian Committee for Industrial Organization, under the directorship of Silby Barrett of the United Mine Workers of Nova Scotia, was established. Unfortunately for the UAW, the CIO also appointed Charlie Millard to the Canadian CIO staff and he used this position to continue his crusade against Canadian UAW leaders.(36) The UAW then approached the Canadian government demanding labour legislation to protect the rights of workers. Finally, the Canadian UAW put forward a plan for the organization and coordination of collective bargaining to ensure a united front amongst Canadian UAW locals in demanding better wages and working conditions.(37)

By November, 1939, these actions had begun to pay off. Local 222 tripled its membership, as did local 199. Local 676, which received its charter in August, 1939 with only 85 members increased its membership to 250 by November. Local 195 increased its membership in all its plants.(38)

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This reorganization of the Canadian UAW was an important step towards building the UAW into a powerful political and social force in Canada. Canadian Autoworkers had consolidated an effective, organizational structure and renewed their commitment to workers' struggles. The Canadian UAW had also taken its first step towards expanding its membership base. Nonetheless, by 1939 the Canadian Region remained small and faced tremendous opposition. Companies remained staunchly anti-union and were aided by both the federal and provincial governments in their quest to prevent unions from widespread organizational success. It was only with the coming of World War II that conditions changed such that the balance of power shifted in favour of workers and their unions. It was in this next period from 1939-45 that the UAW would become an important political actor in Canada.

With War Comes Victory: The UAW from 1939-43

In November, 1939 Canada entered the Second World War. Thereafter, the federal government became deeply involved in regulating and controlling the wartime economy both through the ownership of industrial enterprises and the strict regulation of prices, imports, wages and labour mobility. Still absent from its agenda, however, was the introduction of a labour code which would give recognition to unions. Nonetheless, governments entreated workers to sacrifice their immediate interests in the defence of democracy and their country and to become partners in the war effort. The unions, however, saw little equality in the sacrifices being made. While their wages were controlled, profits were not.

While unions were called partners in the war effort, their representation inside the state was minimal and the government became increasingly dependent upon corporate advisors for the war effort. Finally, employers took the rhetoric of sacrifice as a cue to continue their assaults on workers, instituting speed-ups in the name of patriotism and ignoring unions' demands for collective bargaining.

However, the war also strengthened the hand of workers and ultimately unions. Labour became a scarce commodity. Such a shortage strengthened the bargaining position of workers and when government and corporations continued to resist their demands, workers joined unions to redress their grievances. Between 1939 and 1946, the number of organized workers in Canada rose from 359,000 to 832,000.(39) In this same period the UAW more than doubled its membership.

The UAW adopted a contradictory wartime strategy in pursuit of its demands. One of the union's primary goals was to gain workplace and legal recognition. Given continued government and corporate opposition to this demand, the UAW adopted a militant strike strategy to win recognition. Illegal strikes became common fare for Canadian autoworkers and were testament to their militancy and determination to force this issue onto the political agenda. At the same time, the Canadian UAW came out in support of the war effort, especially after 1941 when the Communists' anti-war position abruptly changed. The union therefore demanded the construction of tripartite decision-making structures in which

organized labour would have an equal voice to government and business in organizing the wartime economy. Confrontation and gestures of conciliation went hand-in-hand as Canadian autoworkers demanded their rightful position in society.

1) Wartime Political Strategy, 1939-43

Most wartime UAW struggles for union organization of a plant or for a collective agreement were victorious only after the threat or use of workplace action. The strike was the most effective means for Canadian autoworkers to exercise their power in the workplace and with government. In pursuit of this strategy, however, the Canadian UAW faced obstacles from both the federal government and its own International union.

With the imposition of the War Measures Act in 1939, the federal government took over responsibility for labour matters, formerly in provincial hands. As the federal government had no policy on collective bargaining or the recognition of unions, it extended the Industrial Disputes Investigation Act (IDIA) of 1907 to cover workers in 85% of industry in Canada.(40) The two key features of this Act were compulsory conciliation of labour disputes and a mandatory cooling off period, which stipulated that no work stoppages could occur in the course of an investigation of a dispute.(41) The legislation did not provide for the recognition of unions nor did it necessitate that companies engage in collective bargaining. The act was intended to prevent strikes, not provide legal rights for unions.(42)

Such government restrictions were not the only, nor at this point the most important ones, curtailing Canadian autoworkers'

actions. On December 7, 1939 the International Executive Board (IEB) brought down a new policy on wildcat strikes in the hope of building the 'responsible' image of the union. No strikes were to be authorized before all steps of the grievance procedure had been exhausted and then it was recommended that the local consult with the International before taking a strike vote. The IEB placed responsibility for enforcing the policy upon local committeemen and recommended that :

Where small groups threaten to shut down an entire plant by unauthorized action, it is the duty of the local union to support the temporary placing of other workers on the job to avoid a general shut down.(43)

This policy reflected the economic and political conditions present in the US where, under the Wagner Act passed in 1935, unions were legally recognized and employers were compelled to bargain collectively. Under these conditions, the union had accepted certain limitations and expectations imposed upon it by the law, in exchange for such recognition. This included the practices of responsible unionism out of which came this reformulation of union strike policy.(44)

The political and economic conditions facing Canadian autoworkers were completely different from those existent in the U.S.. Since Canada had already entered the war, there was greater moral pressure on the Canadian region of the UAW and other unions to sacrifice their own interests for the sake of maintaining much needed wartime production. Unlike the U.S., however, Canada did not have legislation which would protect unions in the face of such sacrifices. Instead, the Canadian state backed its moral

suasion with coercion, limiting the picketing, strikes and wage increases of workers. The UAW in Canada was thus faced with an incongruous situation. The union did not want to be made the villain of the war effort. At the same time, it faced an increasingly hostile government which refused to implement much-needed labour legislation and closely allied itself with the business community while ignoring demands by organized labour for some voice in decision-making in exchange for their sacrifices.(45) Confrontation with both corporations and the government through the use of strikes thus became the only means for the UAW to address its demands. The International's policy on wildcats was a hindrance.

In the name of unity, however, the Canadian leaders of the UAW initially accepted this union policy. Consequently, when on October 8, 1940, 78 autoworkers from local 222 wildcatted, in defiance of government regulations and union policy, to protest company violations of their collective agreement, the Canadian UAW decided not to support the strike. This was despite the union local's position of support for the wildcat. The reason given for the UAW's lack of support was consistent with International union policy - the grievance procedure had not been fully exhausted. Although the wildcatting autoworkers returned to work while union representatives negotiated with management to resolve the problems, autoworkers begrudged the International UAW's position on wildcats and the Canadian Region's willingness to support the policy.(46)

Due to the membership's antipathy towards the International union policy on wildcats, the Canadian UAW administration's support for this policy was short-lived. The membership resented the union's lack of support for their struggles and often proved too militant for the union to control. More importantly, in the course of autoworkers' struggles to organize new locals, the union quickly learned that government regulation was bolstering corporate initiatives to combat unions. The Canadian UAW therefore abandoned its early position of support for International strike policy and began an all out mobilization against corporations and government to force recognition of their union.

Evidence of this shift in strategy came in November, 1940, when workers at the Chrysler plant in Windsor were locked out of the plant following attempts to organize into a union local. They began picketing the plant to prevent other workers from entering and resuming production. On November 11, 24 picketers were charged under the Defence of Canada regulations for disobeying an order to disperse a picket line in front of a protected plant.(47) Under the Defence of Canada Regulations, certain plants were given a protected status due to their involvement in wartime production. This protected status made it illegal for workers to picket or disrupt production in any way. On November 13, Canadian UAW leaders, in defiance of International UAW policy, joined the membership in their struggle and another 46 persons, including George Burt, were arrested on the Chrysler picket. Within six days, forty-seven of the strikers, including George Burt, were convicted under the Defence of Canada regulations and the UAW

launched an appeal to the Supreme Court, where the convictions were upheld.(48) Although this first attempt at organizing Chrysler failed, autoworkers' experience on the Chrysler picket line reinforced their determination to win recognition through militant workplace action.

Over the next few months, the Canadian UAW was given further reason for abandoning any pretext of operating within the confines of the law and instead advancing a militant strategy of strikes. When the union did apply to the government for a Board to investigate a workplace dispute, it waited anywhere from 6 months to a year for a decision. When Canadian autoworkers threatened or actually engaged in illegal strike action, they sped up the process of establishing Boards. At the same time, the UAW experienced the lop-sidedness of justice. The union argued that the federal government overlooked breaches of the law by corporations while imposing heavy penalties on union members who refused to act according to the letter of the law.

A particularly dramatic illustration of the government's anti-union position was given during the UAW Coulter strike in Oshawa in early 1941. The strike was declared illegal as no Board had been established. The government threatened to arrest all UAW International representatives and to declare the union an illegal organization and seize its funds if it continued the strike. Furthermore, the government announced that anyone aiding the strikers even "by giving them a loaf of bread, would be committing a crime".(49) Any early lobbying efforts by the UAW to have the

government eliminate the causes of illegal strikes through the introduction of legislation were completely ignored.(50)

Despite its sometimes successful use of illegal strikes, the Canadian UAW leadership knew that these isolated, local struggles by a handful of workers could never overcome the opposition to unions mounted by the federal government and corporations. The Canadian UAW, therefore, issued a statement on Boards of Investigation under the IDIA to all its locals and used this as a means for mobilizing union members behind a more concerted course of action. All UAW locals were urged to establish legislative committees to organize resistance to existing legislation and to prepare a plan of action to push the Canadian Congress of Labour into mobilizing all industrial unions against government restrictions of trade unions. The statement also condoned workers' use of illegal strike action as part of this mobilization against the government.(51)

Whilst mobilizing for their offensive against government, Canadian autoworkers received a boost in morale and in membership strength. After a bitter struggle with the UAW in the U.S. in 1941, the Ford Motor Co., fearing revelations of brutality and other unfair labour practises in an upcoming National Labour Relations Board hearing, agreed to a settlement with the union which went far beyond any other settlement gained to date by the UAW. It included a union shop, dues check-off and improved wages and benefits.(52) Following in the wake of their brothers and sisters in the U.S., Ford workers in Windsor formed local 200 and demanded recognition of the UAW as the exclusive bargaining agent

for Ford of Canada employees. After some company resistance, a successful vote was held on November 13, 1941.

This vote paved the way for negotiations between the UAW and Ford. A settlement was reached on January 15, 1942 between Ford Motor Co. and the UAW-CIO. Without a strike, the company recognized the union as the exclusive bargaining agent of Ford employees and agreed to recognize shop stewards on the shop floor and pay them for time off the job to investigate and negotiate grievances. Ford workers had won something for which Canadian Autoworkers had been struggling over the past five years - recognition of the UAW in Canada.(53)

Ironically, just as Ford workers were struggling to victory, external circumstances modified the Canadian UAW's political orientation. Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in 1941 and Communist Parties throughout the world shifted their proclamations on the war from denouncing it as an imperialist war to supporting it as a people's war against fascism.(54) Communist members in the UAW had never openly denounced the war. Once the Communist Party called for support of the war effort, however, they mobilized Canadian autoworkers behind calls for greater economic efficiency and tripartite decision-making.

The Canadian UAW's first official statement of support for such action was made in a brief it presented to the federal government in March, 1942. In the brief the UAW criticized the government and business for their half-hearted commitment to the war and the lack of coordination of industrial production to

ensure maximum output with as little waste of labour and resources as possible. The major focus of UAW criticism lay in the procurement of tools for the production of vehicles which, it argued, was hampered by private control over industry. Companies had regulations about in-house sourcing and an inherently competitive structure of organization. The UAW advocated centralized planning of job allocation and tool production so that the cycle of production would be evened out between and within plants so to ensure a steady flow of supplies. "In proposing the pooling of the entire resources of the Automobile industry we recommend that a master plan be adopted, where the parts plants of the entire industry should be working to produce for centralized assembly plants." (55)

The means for achieving this centralization of production was the establishment of tripartite planning boards with equal representation from government, business and labour. Planning boards would oversee production in the entire industry and make decisions for the allocation of government contracts, resources, and labour. This "master plan" would also solve the problems of unemployment of autoworkers and improve their morale and commitment to the war effort.(56) The UAW presented its briefs to the government but received no response to the proposals.(57) Requests for a meeting with C.D. Howe were ignored.(58)

This union policy position, although largely the result of Communist direction, got widespread support amongst the membership. Despite autoworkers' willingness to strike wartime industries, Canadian autoworkers supported the war. What they did

not like was the way in which the wartime economy was run. The UAW's brief addressed this problem. Secondly, the union's demands for replacing private control of the economy with a body in which organized labour would participate on equal terms with business and government was consistent with Canadian autoworkers' understanding of their union's place in society. Tripartism was one more way of expressing labour's rightful position of power in modern society.

The federal government's continued unwillingness to act on UAW demands, however, put Communist and non-Communist autoworkers alike on guard against initiating further cooperative measures in support of the war effort. This guardedness, combined with the reality that Communists were dominant but not a majority in the Canadian UAW, prevented the Communists from supporting a no-strike pledge and led Canadian autoworkers to diverge from their American brothers and sisters over wartime strike policy.

The crucial union debate over strike policy occurred in 1942, following both Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 and the United States' entry into the war. In response to these two events, Communist members of the American UAW allied themselves with various other groups in the union to adopt a programme called "Victory through Equality of Sacrifice". As part of this programme, American autoworkers agreed to forego double pay on holidays and Sundays, recommended that arms plants be operated on a 24-hour, 7-day a week basis, and, most importantly, adopted a no-strike pledge. In exchange, the union expected an end

to profiteering, the establishment of tripartite industrial boards and measures to stop inflation. The UAW called upon the President and Congress to immediately consider this plan of action, concluding the document with the following:

Its adoption is necessary to insure maximum cooperation in winning the war... It will preserve basic American freedoms which drive for victory. It will establish Equality of Sacrifice.(59)

Immediately following this meeting, the Canadian Region of the UAW sponsored its own War Emergency Conference, both to discuss the International's policy and to determine a Canadian course of action. Canadian autoworkers feared unilateral adoption of the US-UAW war programme by the Canadian region. Having made repeated attempts at constructing a consultative relationship with the government and corporations and having been repeatedly ignored, Canadian autoworkers were unwilling to give up their most effective political weapon - the strike. Furthermore, they were unwilling to sacrifice any wage or benefits already won, seeing this as an invitation for management to take advantage of the situation and engage in further profiteering. Reports by Canadian delegates on the American War Conference put this fear to rest. All of them recommended against the adoption of a similar programme by the UAW in Canada. Tommy MacLean pointed to the wartime sacrifices already made by Canadian labour, which had not been met with similar sacrifices by business nor by cooperation from government. George Burt accused the American UAW leadership of imposing its programme on the membership and promised Canadian autoworkers that, although "The U.S. programme for victory came

from the top. In Canada, it must come from the bottom." (60) Communist and non-Communist Canadian autoworkers voted against a no-strike pledge and other sacrifices. (61)

Canadian Autoworkers spent the remainder of their War Emergency Conference planning a strategy to mobilize massive support for the union's demands for union recognition and tripartite planning of the war economy. The union abandoned the use of briefs to persuade the government to act as this strategy had proven futile. (62) Instead, Canadian Autoworkers determined to mobilize widespread support for their demands from other unions and the public.

On the issue of tripartite Industrial Production Councils, the UAW first had to inform and mobilize its own locals. International Representatives were assigned the task of going back to local executives, providing them with information on the production councils and using this to gain support amongst the membership. The UAW would also use local newspapers and a film made by the Canadian UAW on the war effort to spread the word amongst its members. To build support in other unions, Burt suggested that the UAW first approach its staunchest allies - the Canadian Seamen's Union, the United Electrical Workers', the Rubber Workers and the Woodworkers - who he argued "would go down the line with us". (63) Backed by these unions, the UAW could call a conference of industrial unions, thereby exerting pressure on the Canadian Congress of Labour for adoption of UAW proposals. By the end of the War Emergency conference, a meeting with the CCL had been scheduled with all indications that the labour federation

was willing to endorse the Canadian UAW's plan. Finally, the autoworkers insisted that the Trades and Labour Congress be urged to cooperate with the CCL so to present a united front for labour in its demands on the government.

To garner public support for the UAW's plan and fend off public attacks on the UAW's refusal to adopt a no-strike pledge, a similar plan for the dissemination of information was put in place. Press releases and newspaper ads were to be used to emphasize the sacrifices already made by the labour movement for the war effort. The Canadian Legion, the Red Cross, and "other patriotic organizations" were to be supplied with information on the UAW's plan and in some cases would have the UAW film shown to them. These actions would be supplemented by mass meetings for the public. To reach people in areas where the UAW was not established, delegates to the conference suggested that the Workers' Educational Association and The Canadian Tribune be used as vehicles for spreading information and mobilizing support. In addition, the UAW intended to sponsor radio programmes to discuss their programme for action.

Canadian UAW delegates to the Conference also recommended holding a mass lobby on Parliament Hill, to be planned by the new Publicity Director for the Canadian UAW, Harry Rowe. Rather than merely submitting another brief, the UAW adopted a form of lobbying which became known as "button-holing".(64) This procedure entailed pairing up each autoworker with one Member of Parliament who was 'button-holed' by the unionist and forced to listen to the

demands of the union. This form of lobbying relied upon rank-and-file participation and mobilization and would distinguish the lobbying efforts of the UAW from other unions until the end of the 1940's.

Finally, Canadian Autoworkers reaffirmed their commitment to organize new workers into the UAW and strike to force recognition. The objective of this massive mobilization was aptly summed up by George Burt when he reported:

We can liken ourselves to a modern army, who have made a tank attack and driven a wedge in the enemy lines. In order to safeguard our wedge, it will be necessary for us to bring up the rear.(65)

And bring up the rear they did. The Canadian UAW mobilized its own members behind union demands and pushed for the support of other unions and the public. Most successful, however, was the organizational drive. In the remaining months of 1942, UAW membership in Canada increased by 50%, the largest gain of any region of the union. Workers in De Havilland Aircraft and Chrysler corporations were amongst those organized in 1942, when 11 new contracts were signed covering 20,275 workers. In addition, the UAW won 12 of 13 votes held to see if workers wanted representation by the United Autoworkers Union.(66)

This mobilization strategy, coming out of the War Emergency Conference, constituted the first major attempt by the Canadian UAW to undertake such concerted action. The UAW in Canada had come of age and had finally proved itself a significant political actor. The reasons for this return us to a discussion of the complex interplay between broader political and economic factors

and the unique internal dynamics of the Canadian UAW. Because of the buoyant wartime labour market, the bargaining position of workers was strengthened. As these workers continued to face hostile employers and governments, however, they flocked to join unions such as the UAW in hope of redressing their grievances. Secondly, the years of UAW conflict with governments and corporations solidified Canadian Autoworkers' opposition to these groups. However, it also forced them to realize that victory could only be achieved by forging a "united front" with other unions and the public. Yet, these external factors still do not explain the particular course of action chosen by the UAW, nor its ability to put into action such a massive campaign. Answers to these questions lie inside the union.

The direction given the Canadian UAW by its wartime, Communist-dominated left-wing leadership prepared the groundwork for such a plan of action. Out of workers' discontent and daily experience struggles with employers and governments, this leadership constructed a militant discourse which made sense of workers' experience and mobilized support for the militant goals and strategies articulated by the union. In the absence of any mobilization behind a political party, however, this militancy resulted in the construction of a syndicalist conception of the union as the primary agent of change whereby workplace action was considered the most viable political strategy. Because of this particular conception of the union, the membership rejected the pursuit of a no-strike pledge but supported the Communist-inspired policy of tripartism. Finally, Canadian autoworkers' tenacious

protection of internal union democracy necessitated a strategy which relied upon the mobilized activism of the membership, rather than one which was executed from the top-down.

The pursuit of the UAW's strategy was also facilitated by the union's organizational structure which had been put into place over the past three years. After 1939, the District Council became the central forum for the articulation of UAW policy and an important means for maintaining communication channels between the local membership and the various levels of leadership. This organizational network was further enhanced by the concession of time-off for plant committeemen and stewards in the Ford plant, a structure which was gradually extended to other union locals. This network added another avenue through which workers could be mobilized. Finally, the UAW put into place an extensive communications system which had three components. In 1940, the union joined the Workers' Educational Association which worked with various unions acting as an umbrella organization for the educational and organizational activities of organized labour. Then, in March, 1942 the UAW created a new union position in public relations and assigned the full-time job to Harry Rowe, a member of the Unity caucus and long-time member of the UAW. Finally, following the Homer Martin debacle, Region 7 or the Canadian Region, with the financial aid of the International, established a Canadian edition of the UAW paper, The Auto Worker. This paper provided one more vehicle through which the UAW could keep its membership informed.(67)

The UAW was but one union which increased the pressure on government. Immediately following the 1942 defeat of the International Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers to gain recognition for workers in the gold mine at Kirkland Lake, the CCL and TLC united to present a brief to the federal government demanding the passage of collective bargaining legislation.(68) Unions also began rallying behind the CCF, a move which was considered crucial in CCFer Joe Noseworthy's 1942 victory over Arthur Meighen in a federal by-election.(69)

The mounting political pressure on both the Liberal and Conservative parties began to produce results. In an attempt to meet the growing tide of discontent in the labour movement, Premier Hepburn promised collective bargaining legislation in 1942 and the Ontario Conservative Party adopted a 22-point programme which included a commitment to collective bargaining legislation. George Drew, head of the Ontario Conservative Party, also proposed a conference of representatives from labour, management and government to determine a strategy to ensure maximum production for the war effort.(70)

The UAW responded immediately to these initiatives at its May District Council meeting, where the following resolution was passed:

Believing that all political parties are animated by a desire to project any measures which may contribute to the successful prosecution of the war, we call upon all unions in Ontario, irrespective of affiliation, to endorse Colonel George Drew's proposal for labour-management Government conferences for maximum production and we further urge Premier Hepburn to convene such a conference at the earliest date. In addition, we urge these locals to give consideration to the holding of a joint "Win the

War" conference.(71)

Then in June, C.D. Howe met with a UAW delegation in Windsor and announced his support for the war production committees proposed in both the UAW's war production brief and its War Emergency Conference. Howe followed this up with letters to companies with government contracts advising them to set up such committees.(72) Prime Minister Mackenzie King, worried by the growing opposition to his government's labour policy, proclaimed P.C. 10802 in December, 1942. This order "declared the right of employees of Crown Corporations to join unions and bargain collectively."(73)

As months went by, however, government support for tripartite industrial councils and collective bargaining legislation appeared as hollow promises. The initial enthusiasm of the labour movement soured as unions continued to be excluded from the decision-making process and to be faced with hostile employers armed with legislation aimed at preventing the disruption of production, not the recognition of workers' rights. The UAW and other unions once again expressed their growing discontent and opposition to the government through workplace action. Such union militancy culminated in the 1943 strike wave, in which one of every three trade-union members was out on strike.(74) The UAW was involved in a series of strikes, including two in Windsor where over 14,000 autoworkers 'hit the bricks'. The union also continued its organization drive. By the end of 1943, the Canadian Region of the UAW represented almost 45,000 workers.(75)

1943 proved to be a watershed in the politics of labour. The disruptions of production resulting from repeated strikes,

combined with the growing popularity of the CCF, finally forced the hands of the Ontario and federal governments. The first move was made by the Ontario government. It established a Select Committee on the Collective Bargaining Bill to hear briefs from various interested parties on proposed collective bargaining legislation. With this announcement, the UAW stepped up its lobbying efforts, once again relying upon the local leadership, this time to raise funds for advertising, circulate petitions and mount pressure on local MPP's.(76) Consistent with its commitment to rank-and-file control of the union, the UAW relied upon individual worker's testimonies to the Select Committee, rather than briefs and lawyers, to make clear the need for collective bargaining legislation.(77)

The proposed bill contained many proposals unacceptable to the UAW. In particular, the Autoworkers opposed the suggestion that the administration of the bill be left to a Labour Court. The union argued that administration by a judge removed the decision-making from politics and would force unions into a legal web of interpretations. Instead, the UAW pressed to have the administration of the bill undertaken by the provincial Department of Labour, which it claimed was subject to political pressure and could therefore be made accountable. As the day for passage of the legislation neared, however, manufacturers launched an "eleventh-hour" campaign to block it. When this opposition was combined with that from the union, the proposed legislation faced possible defeat. As a result, the UAW quickly changed its tactics

and urged all locals to mobilize support for the legislation. The union feared that the Legislative Assembly would interpret the concerted opposition from both unions and corporations as a lack of desire for the legislation, with the possible result of no legislation at all.(78)

The legislation was passed by the Ontario legislature in April, 1943. It was a compromise. The unions were victorious in having incorporated into the bill the principle of compulsory collective bargaining and the recognition of unions as exclusive bargaining agencies. They lost on the issue of administration, which was put under the jurisdiction of a Labour Court. A major setback for the unions was the inclusion of a requirement of majority rule in the certification process. This meant that unions had to prove that they represented 50% plus one of all workers in a plant before being granted certification as the official bargaining agent.(79) The UAW criticized this procedure as undemocratic for it gave management the credit for all the unorganized workers in a plant.(80) The bill, however, was generally considered a victory for the unions and within six months of the establishment of the Labour Court, 130 applications covering 80,000 people were received.(81)

In the same month of April, the federal government announced that the National War Labour Board would conduct public meetings on the causes of labour unrest.(82) The UAW's presentation to the Board laid the blame for wartime strikes and labour unrest at the feet of the government's labour policy. The union demanded provisions for union recognition, penalty for unfair labour

practices and compulsory collective bargaining.(83)

The UAW presentation also made demands far beyond those related to the collective bargaining procedure. The union demanded increased wages and cost of living allowances, equal pay for equal work, and the institution of a 44-hour week with time and half paid for extra hours worked. Finally, the UAW repeated its demands for labour-management committees and greater labour representation on government wartime boards. According to the brief, if workers were expected to make sacrifices in support of the war effort, they should be given a role in the policy-making functions of the government. The conclusion of the UAW's brief clearly reflected the union's understanding of its place in society:

We believe that the time is long overdue when the government should adopt a positive and effective labor policy which will facilitate harmonious relations and give workers that sense of participation in the war effort that will be productive of their best efforts.We look forward to the recommendations of such measures by the National War Labour Board as will permit the orderly growth of the labour movement and its greater participation as an equal partner in the titanic struggle in which we are engaged.(84)

In February 1944, after lengthy deliberations, the federal government proclaimed PC1003. Unions had won legal recognition and compulsory collective bargaining.(85)

ii) Partisan Conflict and the UAW

The UAW's militant strike strategy and its wartime briefs to government reflected an ongoing tension within the union over wartime union political strategy. The UAW defended its use of strikes and workplace action to pressure the government and business while also stating its principled objection to strikes as

deleterious for wartime production. In rejecting a no-strike pledge, Canadian Autoworkers set themselves on a course of conflict with both the government and business. This was done in response to the intense hostility of governments and corporations towards unions and in the absence of any legal protection of unions or unionists like that existing in the U.S.. Beneath this strategy of necessity lay another strategy which was based on the possibility of cooperation between the working class (represented by unions), government and business. This commitment to cooperation for the war effort provided the basis for the demands for tripartite industrial councils, labour representation on government boards and repeated UAW offers of cooperation with the government and business.

At the heart of these seemingly contradictory strategic positions lay the complex relations between Communists, CCFers, and militant trade unionists within the UAW. To understand fully these complexities it is necessary to distinguish between workers as party members and as trade unionists. Individual workers who were both members of a trade union and of either the CCF or CP, played a dual and often contradictory role within their trade union. At one level, they were workers struggling against the daily assaults by both the government and employers. At another level, they were party members with a responsibility for pursuing party policy within the union. This latter responsibility was all the more important during the war owing to the struggle between the CCF and the Communist Party for control of Canadian unions.

These dual roles often came into conflict over what union strategy was best. The strategy articulated by the party often conflicted with the most effective means for securing victory in the workplace. It is these tensions which explain the contradictory elements within the UAW strategy.

In support of the war, the CP advocated the construction of a popular front against fascism (which included the adoption of a no-strike pledge), de-emphasis on party politics, and construction of alliances with many classes. Between 1941 and 1943, this translated into calls for merging the CP's Labour Progressive Party with the CCF. At the same time, Communists in the UAW were loyal to a working class struggling against private corporations and governments for the rights to join and be represented by trade unions. Since there was no Canadian legislation guaranteeing workers' rights, many of the Communists within the UAW - contrary to party policy - did not support a no-strike pledge or the pursuit of a policy of collaboration with business which might undermine the union struggle for recognition and collective bargaining.(86) But, Communists did advocate the pursuit of cooperation through the establishment of tripartite boards and industrial councils which would coordinate an all-out war effort. Furthermore, the Communist Party's advocacy of the construction of alliances and de-emphasis of party politics aided Communist autoworkers in building alliances inside the UAW. When this party policy combined with the Communist autoworkers' strong support from union militants, it paved the path for Communists in the union to forge and maintain alliances with a series of factions

inside the union, without threat of losing these allies because of Communists' self-identification with their party. To reiterate a point made earlier, Communist autoworkers garnered support because of their militancy and organizational contributions to the union and often in spite of their party affiliation. Therefore, although certain elements of party policy posed a threat to the influence of Communists within the UAW, other policy elements secured them an even greater role within the union.(87)

CCF members of the UAW faced similar dilemmas but with much graver consequences to their party's success in the UAW. While the party did not advocate the type of popular front put forward by the Communist Party, the CCF advocated strong support for the war effort while at the same time desiring closer ties with organized labour. Therefore, while UAW supporters of the CCF supported the union's strike policy as a means to gain protective legislation, they too were cautious not to portray the union as undermining the war effort and thus they too urged labour representation in government decision-making.

The CCF's policy on organized labour, however, was more strictly partisan. The party wanted unionists to become members and financial supporters of the CCF. To achieve this goal, the party hierarchy advocated complete mobilization against the Communists.(88) For many CCF autoworkers, this strategy threatened to destroy the UAW. It would regenerate internecine conflict which in the 1930's had proven devastating for the union. Furthermore, Communists had proven themselves to be effective organizers and

militant, "non-partisan" unionists. For those CCF autoworkers whose major goal was protection and representation of the membership, these Communist union members were crucial allies in the construction of a militant and powerful union.(89) Out of this conflict between party and union goals, there developed a major split between left-wing and right-wing CCFers within the UAW. The playing out of this conflict fundamentally weakened the party's appeal to Canadian autoworkers and ultimately forced David Lewis, National Secretary of the CCF, to gain access to the Canadian UAW through the International Union and his friendship with Walter Reuther.(90)

Because of these complex internal dynamics, the Canadian UAW adopted a programme of independent political action.(91) It continued this course of action, with little debate, until 1943. In this year, the CCF received a boost in electoral support and its strategic position in many unions. Discontent amongst trade unionists over the lack of government action on collective bargaining legislation provided the perfect opportunity for staunch CCF trade unionists to mobilize their unions behind the CCF. Thirty-four CCF MPPs were elected in the August, 1943 Ontario provincial election, making the CCF the official opposition in Ontario. Nineteen of these MPP's were trade unionists, including Charlie Millard and two UAW members.(92) This CCF success was immediately followed by another; on August 9 the CCF won two of four federal by-elections in ridings which had previously been held by the Liberals.(93)

The CCF's unexpected success at the polls forced unions to

re-evaluate their relationship with the party. At the September, 1943 CCL Convention a resolution was passed declaring the CCF "the political arm of labour". The Trades and Labour Congress refused to endorse the CCF, preferring instead to maintain their non-partisan policy of supporting the friends of labour and punishing its enemies. Between these two polar positions lay unions such as the UAW for which the 1943 CCF victories sparked heated debate between the CCF and Communist union members over the partisan strategy to be adopted by the union. Further complications came with the CCF's rejection of the Communist Labour Progressive Party's application for affiliation with the CCF.(94)

The tone of UAW debate on this issue was set by George Burt in his report to Council immediately following the Ontario election. He lambasted the CCF for its paradoxical policy on the role of trade unions in the party. In the Oshawa riding, the CCF had parachuted in a candidate rather than selecting the candidate from one of the many trade-union activists. Secondly, having solicited the electoral and financial support of unions in the election, the CCF refused them input into party policy and candidate selection. The 1942 party guidelines for trade-union affiliation did not allow unions adequate representation inside the party and the result, for Burt, was inadequate input into party policy. Burt warned the CCF that his union would not allow "the tail (to) wag the dog".(95)

These issues came to a head when on November 28 and 29, 1943 a Special Canadian UAW-CIO Convention on Political Action was

convened in Windsor. The first order of business was a speech by provincial leader of the Ontario CCF, E.B.Joliffe. Joliffe was cautious in his appeal to the UAW, cognizant of the strength of the Communists in the union and of the CCF's need for greater support from this union, the largest industrial union in Canada. He appealed to Canadian Autoworkers for support of the CCF on the basis of the party's advocacy of union recognition, improved wages and the curtailment of business's power. Joliffe made it clear, however, that the CCF was not a labour party nor did it desire to be one. It was a party of the 'people' reflective of the pluralist nature of Canadian society and intent upon forging alliances among many groups. Joliffe's speech clearly reflected this as he emphasized the importance of the farmers and the "middle class" to the CCF's electoral and political strategy. Trade unions were to be incorporated into the party as one interest amongst many, and could not expect a dominant voice within the party.(96)

Debates following Joliffe's speech, over the remaining two days of the Convention, were symptomatic of the unique alliances within the UAW and the fundamentally different view of society from that articulated by the CCF held by most of the UAW delegates attending the conference. The first issue of debate concerned the CCF's recent rejection of the LPP's application for affiliation with the CCF.(97) The report of the UAW Political Action Committee plus Convention delegates argued that while both the CCF and the LPP advocated the formation of a broad set of alliances as a united front against business, the CCF's rejection of affiliation with the LPP was thwarting this goal and having the effect of

increasing the divisions within the labour movement.(98) For these autoworkers, the CCF may be advocating unity but it was not practising it.

The second criticism of the CCF focused on the party's regulation of trade-union affiliation. According to party guidelines adopted in 1942, union delegates from locals affiliated to the CCF had to become individual members of the party before having the right to participate in conventions and other party forums.(99) Canadian Autoworkers complained that this regulation curtailed the rights of affiliated locals in the party. While the whole local would pay per capita affiliation dues to the CCF, only those unionists willing to become a member of the party would have a voice. Furthermore, this regulation gave the CCF complete control over who was allowed to become a member of the party. The CCF's basis for representation of unions at party conventions also came under fire. The principle of one person, one vote combined with limitations on union delegations to party conventions meant that organized labour would have a limited say in the policies or strategies of the party. For many autoworkers, if the CCF wanted the support of organized labour, it had to show itself to be a real labour party in which trade unions came first. John Eldon, UAW International Representative, clearly reflected the mood of the convention when he asked "...when is the CCF going to recognize the fact that a labour party must be built by the unions and controlled by the unions?"(100)

The final set of criticisms lobbed at the CCF centred on the

party's vision of the nature of alliance building in constructing a political force which could oppose big business. Joliffe had repeatedly emphasized the importance of the farmers and the middle class in his speech, suggesting that they were equally important forces in the drive against big business. For most autoworkers, the farmers were important allies but were not at the cutting edge of struggles with both corporations and a government dominated by the interests of big business. The union's view of alliance building was quite different from the CCF's and was accurately summarized in the Report of the UAW Political Action Committee:

...it is our considered opinion that our union, instead of affiliating to one or another political party, should seek to become part [together with other unions] of a broad labour-farmer political federation....in which the trade unions will be the central force but to which will also be affiliated all other labour and farmer groups."(101)

Out of this debate on the CCF, three political options for the UAW emerged: 1) affiliation with the CCF, 2) forging unity between the LPP and the CCF to form a federated labour party, and 3) implementing a political education programme within the union which would prepare UAW members to become informed political activists. Although the first two political options roughly corresponded to the party lines of the CCF and the LPP respectively, those autoworkers who participated in the debate did not divide themselves according to party lines. Rather, many CCFer's and fellow-travellers of the Communists favoured the construction of a political action committee to pursue political education of the membership.(102) This strategy won out and the convention passed a resolution instructing all UAW locals to set-

up political action committees with the aim of educating the membership in the need for trade-union political action.(103)

This decision by the UAW Political Convention reaffirmed the UAW's commitment to a trade-union centred strategy of rank-and-file mobilizational politics. This decision to continue pursuing an independent course of action had important consequences for the UAW's subsequent relations with the Communists and the CCF, as well as with other unions. In turn, a discussion of these changed relations explains the UAW's decision in 1945 to support the Liberal-Labour Alliance.

Canadian Autoworkers' rejection of the CCF's bid for UAW affiliation was the first expression of open UAW-CCF conflict, which would characterize their relations for years to come. Bitter wartime struggles and the domination of the UAW by a left-wing leadership imbued Canadian Autoworkers with a radical, syndicalist view of society. This contrasted with the pluralist, interest-based view of society espoused by the CCF. Out of this difference came UAW criticism and rejection of the CCF's proposed place of organized labour in the party. Because the CCF refused to reorganize the party in response to these demands, these UAW criticisms resurfaced time and time again and caused repeated conflict in UAW-CCF, and later UAW-NDP, relations.

However, the UAW's rejection of the CCF also rested on the party's role in provoking internecine conflict within the UAW and allying itself with UAW enemies, particularly Charlie Millard. The fact that the CCF increased its politicking inside the UAW

throughout the 1950's, meant that the CCF sealed its own fate of troubled relations with the UAW.

Although the LPP also could not claim victory at the UAW Political Convention, the Canadian UAW's decided course of political action ended up strengthening the position of Communists within the union. Within a month of the UAW Political Convention, official Communist Party policy altered as a result of the Tehran Declaration. This constituted a commitment by the Allies to work together in peacetime and resulted in Communist advocacy of a united front.(104) Thereafter, Communists pursued a policy of constructing political alliances with all progressive forces in Canada to win the war. This strategy dovetailed with the sentiments and political direction of the bulk of Canadian UAW membership, reflected in debates at the Political Action Convention. The Communists in the union thus garnered greater support in the UAW at the expense of the CCF.

Finally, the UAW's decided course of independent political action, combined with Canadian Autoworkers' hatred and distrust of Charlie Millard, entered the union into conflict with the Canadian Congress of Labour (CCL). The CCL, heavily influenced by Millard, steered a course of partisan politics in support of the CCF. The UAW therefore quit the CCL Political Action Committee.(105) This signalled the beginning of a series of open conflicts between the UAW and CCL, conflict which was reinforced by the CCL's increased meddling in UAW affairs in a drive to rid the UAW of Communist influence. These actions drove the UAW further into the camp of Communist-dominated unions and increased Canadian Autoworker

distrust of the CCF.

Preparing for Peace, 1944-45

Following the introduction of federal collective bargaining legislation and in anticipation of the end of the war, Canadian Autoworkers prepared for peace in the workplace and in society as a whole. The collective bargaining legislation had immediate effects, seen in the marked drop in the number of strikes in 1944. The UAW continued to make inroads in its organization of autoworkers, also expanding its organizing drives to include workers in the agricultural implement and aircraft industries. As it attempted to use the new labour legislation to gain certification of new locals and to conduct orderly collective bargaining with the companies, however, the UAW found the legislation far from perfect. Mounting discontent over the legislation focused on the delays to certification of new unions, the lack of penalties for employers found guilty of unfair labour practices and the continued legal recognition of company unions.(106) As a result of these shortcomings in the legislation and the subsequent employer abuses of loopholes, frustrations with the lack of legal guarantees for unions continued to build amongst the Autoworkers. This resulted in a major strike in 1944 at the Ford plant in Windsor.

On April 20, 13,346 autoworkers went on strike to protest the suspension of four union stewards and the company's unilateral changes to the collective bargaining procedure.(107) To settle the dispute, the UAW agreed to take its case to the National Labour

Relations Board for settlement. After some delay the UAW received assurances of a settlement from the Board, backed by Department of Labour officials. The UAW therefore recommended that Ford workers return to work in anticipation of the agreed settlement. However, no such settlement was put into place and once again Ford workers went out on strike. This forced the National Labour Relations Board to intervene once again. This time an agreement was reached which allowed for the certification of the bargaining representatives and the beginning of negotiations for a new agreement. These negotiations would continue for a year without a settlement being reached, a delay which ultimately led to the 1945 Ford strike.(108)

This dispute at Ford brought to light many of the shortcomings of existing labour legislation. It also demonstrated the UAW's initial willingness to desist from continued confrontation and work towards a peaceful solution of continuing problems. Therefore, while negotiations continued at Ford, the UAW began lobbying to have the labour legislation changed. The first step towards this was the preparation of two detailed internal reports on the problems with PC1003, one prepared by the union administration in combination with a District Council committee and the other prepared by J.L.Cohen, legal counsel for the UAW.(109) Armed with this information, Burt on behalf of the UAW appealed to the Executive Board of the CCL to form a sub-committee to discuss changes to both P.C.1003 and P.C.9384, the Wage Control Order. Although the CCL appointed the sub-committee with Burt as

chair, none of its affiliated unions other than the UAW submitted materials to the committee. The resulting UAW recommendations included demands for legislation providing for the union shop and the automatic check-off of dues.(110) Although the CCL officially endorsed the UAW's recommendations, the only active support for the UAW's hoped-for changes to the labour code came from the Communist Party.(111)

This lobby eventually became part of a much broader one based on the UAW's Win the Peace Plan. With the victories of the Allies in Europe, peace seemed a certainty and the fear of a return to depression conditions intensified. The UAW convened a special District Council meeting on reconversion of the economy where the Win the Peace Plan, prepared by the Executive of the District Council with the help of the Workers' Educational Association, was adopted as union policy.(112) The preamble to the Plan clearly laid out the UAW's objectives:

The UAW-CIO, expects that victory will bring industrial democracy - steady jobs at union wages, the 40 hour week, annual vacations with pay, guaranteed minimum yearly income, all-inclusive health insurance for the worker and his family, full recognition of labour unions and genuine labour partnership in industry and government.(113)

The UAW's plan was to maintain wartime levels of production and hence employment while boosting purchasing power through decent wages, guaranteed annual income, equal pay for equal work, and fully paid vacations for workers. The UAW's slogan for peace became "A car for every family! A car and a tractor for every farmer!" To achieve these ends, cooperation between labour, management and the government was crucial. Therefore, once again,

the UAW proposed the formation of tripartite decision-making structures. These would take the form of a Reconstruction Joint Council and industrial councils in each region and all plants which would consist of equal representation from business, government and organized labour. To ensure labour's full cooperation it was also necessary to implement improved labour legislation.(114) Once again, the only outside support for the UAW's plans came from the Communists - this time from the Communist-dominated United Electrical Workers Union. The president of the U.E., C.S. Jackson denounced the CCL for concentrating its energies solely on internal union politicking rather than the larger political issues at hand. According to Jackson, the task of organized labour was to take up its rightful place as "bona fide partner" to business and the government in planning the postwar economy and it was up to the UAW and the UE to give the lead to the CCL in pursuing such a strategy.(115)

With the commitment to the Win the Peace Plan in place, the UAW's first task was to meet with C.D.Howe, federal Minister of Reconstruction, on the issue of establishing tripartite boards for reconversion. Ten UAW delegates representing auto, aircraft and agricultural implement plant workers were elected to undertake this job.(116) It was not until March, 1945 that such a meeting took place. On Wednesday, March 21 the UAW Conversion Committee met with various members of the House of Commons including C.D.Howe, Deputy Minister Carmichael and Paul Martin. The Committee presented the Win the Peace Plan. The submission emphasized the UAW's commitment to full employment, to be achieved

by maintaining high levels of demand in Canada and seeking greater export markets for goods produced in Canada. These policies, in turn, required the establishment of tripartite planning boards and an overall commitment to cooperation between business, labour and government.(117)

Howe supported the UAW's demands. He promised regular meetings with labour delegations on these questions and committed his Deputy Minister to make arrangements for the establishment of industrial councils. At another meeting the following day, the government committed itself to establishing an industrial regional committee and promised the UAW that it would notify the corporations about these committees.(118)

Whilst negotiations continued on the establishment of tripartite boards, the UAW continued its lobbies for improved labour legislation, including the union shop and automatic dues check-off. The UAW mobilized its locals to send delegates to Ottawa to pressure Prime Minister King.(119) To strengthen its voice, the UAW appealed to other unions to lobby with it on changes to the labour code. At the same time, it urged the CCL to take action on other sections of the Win the Peace Plan, including demands for a 40 hour week, two weeks paid vacation and hospitalization coverage for workers.(120)

The UAW's active mobilization of its own membership and attempts to get coordinated action from other unions and labour federations was premised on the UAW's understanding of its strategic strength during these last months of the war. This was

summed up by George Burt in one of his reports to the District Council when he stated:

It is absolutely essential that this job be done now because our strategic advantage rests on the fact that there is no unemployment problem.(121)

The UAW knew that with the end of the war, organized labour's position might be seriously eroded were depression conditions of high unemployment to return. The union also feared that despite the apparent accord between business and labour reflected in the increased numbers of certified unions and the decrease in workplace conflict, corporations would take advantage of any opportunity to attack and destroy the unions in their plants. Thus, UAW demands for cooperation between the union, GM, Ford, Chrysler and the government were premised on the existence of a position of strength for organized labour.

All signs pointed to success. With the introduction of the federal government's "White Paper on Employment and Income" in April, 1945 the government committed itself to maintaining full employment and stable incomes, something which the UAW also advocated. For the first time since the UAW's establishment in Canada, the government opened its doors to the union, discussing its programme for reconversion and apparently committing the government to some form of tripartite decision-making. This heightened cooperation between the federal government under a Liberal administration and the UAW, contrasted sharply to the experiences of the union with the Conservative Ontario government under the leadership of Colonel Drew. Drew and the Conservative Party, which had previously supported UAW demands for tripartism,

were now seen by the union as too closely aligned with the interests of business. As 1945 was an election year both provincially and federally, the UAW saw this as the perfect opportunity to mobilize its strength to ensure the election of governments favourable to the unions, thereby increasing the possibility of having their voice heard on issues of reconversion and the improvement of the labour code.

The UAW's electoral strategy diverged from many other CCL unions and reflected the influence exerted by Communists over union strategy. Under the umbrella of the CCL-PAC, many unions committed themselves to supporting the CCF, an action which had led to Burt's resignation from this committee. The UAW committed its Political Action Committees to a policy of constructing an alliance of all progressive groups in Canada to defeat the representatives of business and react in favour of those who would listen to organized labour. For the UAW this meant nominating and endorsing UAW candidates and seeking support for them amongst other organized groups.(122)

Almost immediately following this decision by the UAW, Mitch Hepburn approached the UAW and offered Liberal Party support for labour candidates in exchange for support for Liberal candidates in ridings where no labour candidate was nominated. To sweeten the offer, Hepburn promised the UAW that unions which entered such an alliance would be able to appoint the Minister for the Department of Labour should the Liberals win the provincial election. Furthermore, he promised to allow the unions to write their own

collective bargaining legislation, including a clause guaranteeing union security.(123) Although wary of Hepburn, the UAW saw this proposed alliance as a means to defeat the provincial Conservatives and achieve UAW goals of improved legislation and an alliance of progressive forces.

At a specially convened District Council meeting on the question of UAW political action, Burt urged the delegates to accept this compromise with the Liberals and committed the union to constructing an alliance amongst the Liberals, the CCF and the LPP. Out of this meeting came the UAW's decision to interview all three party leaders, with the aim of cementing "the progressive forces in Ontario... to unite the anti-Tory vote".(124) The CCF refused to endorse this policy. The Communist Party, with whose policy this decision conformed, wholeheartedly supported the UAW's proposed electoral strategy. Yet, autoworkers support for this strategy was not the result of the preponderance of Communists in the union but rather the complex groupings inside the union. For many autoworkers this electoral strategy promised immediate political gains. Moreover, to many of the militant non-partisan autoworkers this strategy conformed to their trade-union centred vision of political change, especially as this strategy promised the placement of independent labour candidates in the electoral field.(125)

Despite the apparent unity around this UAW policy, the election severely split the UAW internally. When the CCF refused to participate in the alliance with the Liberals and the LPP, the CCF nominated and supported its own candidates, often running

against UAW-sponsored candidates. In Windsor, many autoworkers who were members of the CCF actively supported CCF candidates, who ran against the UAW candidates (one of whom was George Burt), supported by both locals 200 and 195.(126) This intensified many Canadian Autoworkers' distrust of the CCF and opened wider the splits between the right-wing and left-wing elements within the union.

Perhaps the most surprising and foreboding event was the support that these CCFers received from the International office.(127) This support was a consequence of internecine conflict which had erupted in the American UAW and split the International executive. The main issue which led to open conflict amongst American autoworkers was their no-strike pledge. This policy was originally orchestrated by the leadership who were able to gain rank-and-file acceptance. By 1943, however, American autoworkers on the shop floor were really suffering from the effects of this pledge and wildcats began to increase. This disenchantment by the rank and file combined with the growing animosity between the Communist and other leaders, led to a serious split within the leadership.(128)

By 1945, the International executive was divided between two caucuses, the Reuther-centrist group and the Addes-Communist dominated group. Both struggled to control the union.(129) The Canadian Region remained solidly in the control of the Communist-dominated left. By giving support to the CCF, Walter Reuther, then UAW vice-president and friend of David Lewis, took the first step

to supplant left-wing control in Canada with that of his own caucus. Many of the Reuther's Canadian supporters were part of the right-wing group of CCFers in the Region. The party therefore served as an effective means for usurping control from the Canadian UAW executive.

The results of the 1945 provincial election were devastating for the CCF. The party dropped from 34 to 8 seats and the Conservatives won a resounding victory, returning them to power with a majority government. Nevertheless, the Canadian UAW argued that its policy had been vindicated. The actions of the CCF in opposing UAW candidates merely confirmed the fears of many UAW members that the CCF wanted the financial support of the unions but was unwilling to let them have their rightful place in the party. George Burt's electoral defeat was blamed on the CCF candidate who had opposed him. The election of Alex Parent, from local 195, despite CCF opposition in the riding, was held up as proof of labour's desire for its own candidates and not those of a party unwilling to consult labour.(130)

The UAW endorsed a similar electoral policy for the 1945 federal election, this time supporting Mackenzie King's Liberal Party. Although the Liberals won this election their narrow victory led the UAW to fear that the government's commitment to improved labour legislation would falter in the face of opposition.(131) These fears were temporarily allayed when the UAW entered into discussions with the new federal government over reconversion of the wartime economy.(132) The UAW received promises from the federal Deputy Minister of Labour McNamara that

the UAW would be given advance information on cutbacks in industry resulting from the transition to peacetime. They were also to be informed of any new job opportunities which would therefore allow the UAW to plan for the future of its members.(133) These rays of hope dimmed however, as government commitments to tripartite industrial councils were silenced and consultation between the UAW and the government produced few tangible results. Finally, neither the federal nor the Ontario government showed any sign that they intended to incorporate labour's demands for union security into new labour legislation.

The UAW's electoral strategy had failed. In attempting to unite the progressive forces in Canada against business, the UAW had instead succeeded in widening the splits within its own membership, namely those between the CCF and the Communists. It had gained nothing from its efforts of cooperation with government. This failure by the union to win a negotiated peace in the workplace and politics left it with little alternative but to return to militant workplace action to achieve its goals.

The most important of these workplace conflicts was the 1945 Windsor Ford strike. Since the spring of 1944, the UAW and Ford had been involved in negotiations. The key issues in dispute included UAW demands for the union shop, the automatic check-off of dues, two weeks vacation with pay, and layoff pay.(134) By the summer of 1945, no settlement had been reached. Ford workers were angry and demanded a contract. The breaking point came when Ford announced layoffs due to the gearing down of production with the

anticipation of peace. The UAW's worst fears had been confirmed. On August 31 Ford announced that 800 workers, including 250 veterans, would lose their jobs. Within the week, the company announced further layoffs which would total 1656 workers by September 14.(135) The UAW had had enough and on September 12, 17,000 Ford workers went out on strike.(136)

Although the key issues of the dispute were the union shop and the check-off of dues, the issue of Communist control of local 200 overlaid these bargaining demands and largely determined the progress of the conflict. As soon as the Ford workers went out, the company declared its opposition to the UAW's demands on the grounds that local 200 was an irresponsible local dominated by 'left-wing leadership'.(137) In raising the spectre of Communism, the company played into the splits within the Canadian labour movement, resulting in the relative isolation of the UAW in its struggle.

The UAW appealed to all other unions for support of its strike, arguing the importance of the strike issue for the entire Canadian labour movement. Such support was crucial, since the UAW did not have a strike fund and the workers were not eligible for any government benefits. The UAW's ally, the Communist-dominated United Electrical Workers, pledged immediate support to the Ford strike and was soon followed by the Ontario Federation of Labour. The Canadian Congress of Labour was not so forthcoming. The labour federation criticized the UAW over the timing of the strike and the issues involved. The crux of CCL opposition, however, was local 200's accused domination by Communists, an issue that was

raised in the CCL by none other than, Charlie Millard. The CCL therefore gave conditional support to the workers but no official support to the strike.(138) Although, the CCL's support was conditional, the UAW received support from various union locals across the country and most importantly from Arthur Reaume, Liberal Candidate in the 1945 federal election and Mayor of Windsor.(139)

As each day passed, the conflict escalated. Canadian autoworkers mobilized behind their Ford brothers and sisters. Local 195 in Windsor threatened a sympathy strike.(140) Soon after, on October 7, the UAW joint policy committee on the Ford strike called out the powerhouse workers to join their fellow workers on the picket line. The company did not waver however; instead it sought help from the police to protect company property. While waiting for police action, the UAW shored up its own resources at a special District Council meeting. Delegates to the meeting urged the International to give strike authorization to those local 195 plants where strike votes had already been taken, adding to this their demand for autonomy in the Canadian region so Canadian autoworkers could determine their own plan of action in the face of opposition from government and Ford. Finally, the District Council passed a resolution calling for the International to support the recommendation that all locals in Region 7 cease work for 24 hours in support of the Ford workers.(141)

The conflict reached a new peak when on November 2 the

Windsor Police Commission, without the support of Mayor Reaume, declared an emergency and attempted to cross the picket lines to re-open the powerhouse. The strikers resisted this attempt to break the strike and the Windsor police demanded reinforcements from the Ontario government. A total of 250 OPP and RCMP reinforcements were sent to Windsor. The UAW responded in kind and on November 4, 8,000 autoworkers from local 195 joined the Ford picket line. When word reached the UAW that the police were ready to move into the plant, the union organized a massive automobile barricade to protect the thousands of strikers walking the picket line. Autoworkers parked their cars on all roads leading to the plant, resulting in a massive traffic jam which effectively blocked police entry to the plant.(142)

Despite this show of strength by the union, Ford management in Canada refused to back down. Faced with a continuation of the strike, federal Minister of Labour, Humphrey Mitchell, met with Henry Ford to get him to intervene and settle the dispute.(143) At the same time Windsor autoworkers prepared for further conflict. Roy England and Alex Parent, presidents of local 200 and 195 respectively, called on the CCL to stage a one-day national strike, sending telegrams to locals across the country. The CCL and George Burt spoke out against this move while UAW locals such as local 199 organized strike votes in preparation for the general strike.(144)

This move was the perfect opportunity for Millard and others in the union movement to attack the Ford leadership as Communist inspired and to justify their own cautious support for the Ford

strike. The proposed one day stoppage was labelled as a "revolution" and as a "Labour Progressive Party plot to seize power in our country". Articles in Maclean's, The Toronto Telegram, the Globe and Mail, The Windsor Daily Star, and the CCE News joined in this chorus declaring the strike as ill-timed and ill-advised and condemning the leadership of the Autoworkers in Windsor.(145)

The timing of this attack on the Autoworkers could not have been more devastating. The strike had already dragged on for two months and no settlement was in sight. Fears of losing the strike began to build. On November 13, due to the intervention of Paul Martin, Minister of Health and Liberal ally of the UAW, the UAW leadership and Pat Conroy from the CCL met with government officials. After days of negotiations, a settlement was announced on November 27 which declared that a government arbitrator would sit in on all union-company negotiations and be responsible for settling all disputed issues.

At a meeting of the local 200 membership the union leadership was divided. Burt, Roy England and George Addes, from the International Union, favoured the settlement while Tommy MacLean and the negotiating committee opposed it. The membership defeated the proposal by 350 votes. In a last ditch attempt to get a settlement, Paul Martin approached the union leadership and promised them that a sympathetic arbitrator would be appointed. This settled the strike. On December 19, the membership approved the proposal by a two thirds majority. Martin lived up to his

promise. Justice Ivan Rand was appointed as arbitrator in the ensuing Ford negotiations and a settlement was finally reached on January 29, 1946.(146)

The Ford strike was a fitting end to the UAW's wartime struggles. The massive mobilization of autoworkers behind the Ford strikers was testament to the militancy of the UAW rank and file. This same militancy had been responsible for UAW wartime political strategy. The Ford strike also threw into relief the complex relations between Communists, non-Communist militants and right-wing groups within the union. As has been argued throughout this chapter, Communists only dominated the union to the extent that they maintained their alliances with other union militants. The final negotiations during the Ford strike were proof of this precarious balance of power. Fearing defeat in the strike, the leaders closest to the Communist Party urged a settlement with an unnamed government arbitrator. It was the militants in local 200, led by Tommy MacLean, who prevented this settlement and exacted promises of a sympathetic arbitrator.

The Ford strike lasted 99 days. It ultimately resulted in the winning of the Rand formula, a formula which provided for the automatic check-off of dues. The demand for a union shop was lost. The union had won the battle but not the war. But it could not have won completely without the full support of the rest of organized labour in Canada, support which had not been forthcoming. Growing fears amongst the public of the threat of Communism, fed by the newspapers and Canadian Congress of Labour alike, had effectively undermined the Ford strikers. The resulting

compromise between the company and the union, and the Rand formula were, however, a victory for the labour movement in Canada and made the Ford strike one of the most important ones in the history of unions in Canada.

Conclusion

At the end of World War II the UAW had 51,000 members and was the largest industrial union in Canada. This was the result of 9 years of intensive organization, with the largest increases in union membership coming during the war years. The sheer size of the UAW made the union a political force but it was its organization and political strategy based on mobilization politics which made it one of the most powerful unions in Canada. Once united in action, the Canadian Autoworkers had played a crucial role in forcing the introduction of new labour legislation in 1943-44, in increasing the wages and improving working conditions of its membership and in forcing the recognition of International unions in Canada. Its strike at the Ford Motor Company resulted in the principle of the automatic check-off of dues becoming a reality.

These successes of the UAW were also partially a result of the times. Low wartime unemployment rates strengthened the position of all labour in Canada as did the national need for the uninterrupted production of wartime materials. Unions, however, faced hostile employers and governments dominated by business and these opponents had to be challenged successfully before organized labour could make its mark on Canadian politics. The war years

were thus ones of protracted struggle between workers, corporations and governments which ended with some successes for unions.

There were other more important internal factors, however, which allowed the UAW to become one of the most powerful unions in Canada. The most telling of these was the ability of the UAW to mobilize its membership into united collective action. This was facilitated within the UAW by the organizational structure of the Canadian region of the union, the concentration of UAW membership in the southern reaches of Ontario, and the particular union culture and collective identity which had taken root in this period.

The formation of a District Council was the most important change to the Canadian UAW's organizational structure. This body provided a means of communication between the rank and file and leadership and increased membership influence over the union's direction. It became the means through which Canadian Autoworkers could organize union strategy and effectively mobilize behind a programme of collective action. This was no more clearly illustrated than during the 1945 Ford strike. Various workplace structures, such as plant chairmen with time off for union affairs, facilitated this communication and mobilization. Finally, the construction of a Canadian UAW educational and public relations system acted as another bridge between the membership and their leaders.

The ability of the Canadian UAW to use effectively the above-

mentioned structures for mobilization of Canadian autoworkers behind a common strategy was enhanced by certain objective characteristics of the union, such as its concentration in Southern Ontario. Such geographical concentration, combined with the similar characteristics of autoworkers as predominantly white males who worked in similar types of occupations, reduced the potential sectoral differences within the union. The similar membership characteristics and location made easier the union's task of articulating the varied interests of workers into a common programme. Effectively, because of these factors the UAW had an easier task defining a collective identity for its membership.

The collective identity of Canadian autoworkers, forged between 1936 and 1945, was characterized by a commitment to union democracy and a syndicalist understanding of the UAW's role in Canadian society. The experience of internal factionalism and the autocratic leadership of Homer Martin left in its wake a strong membership commitment to internal union democracy and rank-and-file participation. These traditions both blocked leadership attempts to usurp control of the union and facilitated the successful pursuit of mobilization strategies which relied upon the willingness of members to act collectively.

Finally, there emerged within the UAW a syndicalist tendency which contributed to its militancy and helps explain the UAW's persistent use of workplace action as a political weapon. As has already been argued, the Canadian UAW was roughly divided into three key groups - CCFers, Communists and militant trade unionists whose first commitment was towards building a strong union.

Although the Communists had the greatest influence on the UAW in this period, the effect of this influence was not to build massive support for the Communist Party itself. Most of the active members of the CP did not publicly proclaim their affiliation to the party and instead concentrated their energies on organizing new workers and affecting the direction of union policy. Based on this strategy and because of the important role played by these workers in union organization drives, the support that Communists built amongst autoworkers tended not to be support for the Communist Party itself. Rather it constituted support for militant trade unionism. This, in combination with workplace experiences, reinforced existing tendencies amongst many autoworkers to see their union as the key vehicle for implementing political change, rather than other vehicles such as parties. Ironically, the Communist Party was therefore instrumental in fostering a form of syndicalism within the Canadian UAW.

When the Communist Party lost favour due to its vacillating position on the war effort, this did not translate into a corresponding loss of support for many individual Communist autoworkers. However, it did reinforce the validity of the syndicalist position of many autoworkers. The failure of the CCF to present itself as a party of labour only reinforced this tendency as partisan politics were once again proven as an uncertain means for achieving labour's political ends. In fact, this syndicalist understanding of the UAW's role in society found resonance amongst many UAW supporters of the CCF, such as Tommy

MacLean. Tommy MacLean, like many autoworkers who had played a key role in the early days of the union, saw the conflict between the CCF and the CP as a serious threat to the unity of labour and the ability of trade unions to become a powerful political and social force in Canada. Therefore, for these autoworkers the union came first, above all party or outside influences. Overall, this syndicalist strain within the UAW allowed for the construction of unusual alliances between Communists, CCFers and non-partisan militants, alliances which would remain until well into the 1950's.

This syndicalist tradition combined with the UAW's continued commitment to mobilization politics is crucial for understanding the political trajectory of Canadian Autoworkers throughout the entire postwar period. These factors shaped their response to Cold War politics, their political strategies and their relations with other unions, the government and business. These early years of UAW struggle and history in Canada firmly established a tradition of militant mobilization politics which shaped the nature of the postwar Fordist regime and Canadian Autoworkers' entry into it.

Endnotes

1. Although the UAW did not adopt this full name until the 1940's, because the union modified its name a number of times, the union's present nomenclature is used here to avoid confusion.
2. Sidney Fine, Sit-down: The General Motors Strike of 1936-1937 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1969); John Bernard, Walter Reuther and the Rise of the Auto Workers (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1983), pp.41-49.
3. James Napier, Memories of Building the UAW (Toronto: Canadian Party of Labour, 1976), pp.8-20; John Manley, "Communists and Autoworkers: The Struggle for Industrial Unionism in the Canadian Automobile Industry, 1925-36", Labour/Le Travail 17 (Spring, 1986): 130-131.
4. Irving Abella, "Oshawa, 1937" in On Strike: Six Key Labour Struggles 1919-1949, ed. idem. (Toronto: James Lorimer & Co., 1975), pp.93-95.
5. Ibid., pp.100-102.
6. Ibid.; Irving Abella, Nationalism, Communism and Canadian Labour (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), chapter 1.
7. Roger Keeran, The Communist Party and the Autoworkers Union (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980), pp.188-189.
8. Abella, "Oshawa, 1937", pp.93-128; Abella, Nationalism, Communism, chapter 1.
9. Following the GM-Oshawa settlement, GM workers in Windsor became part of amalgamated local 195 and secured an agreement parallel to that of local 222. Workers at the McKinnon plant in St. Catherine's, who in December, 1936 had chartered local 199, went on to ratify a settlement in April, 1937. Then, in May, workers at L.A. Young Industries in Windsor signed an agreement as part of local 195. In this same month, fifty-three workers at the Adams plant in Brantford received a charter from the UAW-CIO chartering local 397. Finally, in July local 502, which included workers from Walker Metal and Sandwich Foundries in Windsor, was chartered. L195, Historical manuscript on local 195. No stated author, n.d.; Larry Johnston, "A Comparative History of the Relationship between U.A.W. and the C.C.F.-N.D.P. in the City of Brantford", paper prepared for Professor Leo Johnston, History department (University of Waterloo, March 1969), p.2.
10. V.W. Bladen, Report of Royal Commission on the Automotive Industry (Ottawa, 1961), pp.10-11.

11. James Dykes, Canada's Automotive Industry (Toronto: McGraw Hill Co., 1970), p.55; Tom Traves, "The Development of the Ontario Automobile Industry to 1939" in Progress Without Planning: The Economic History of Ontario, ed. by Ian Drummond (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), pp.208-223.
12. Keeran, Communist Party and Autoworkers Union, chapter VIII.
13. WRL, UAW, Proceedings of the Second Annual Convention of the International Union, United Automobile Workers of America (Milwaukee, 1937), pp.268-270, 289.
14. Abella, Nationalism, Communism, p.30.
15. Keeran, Communist Party and Autoworkers Union, pp.196-198.
16. Abella, Nationalism, Communism, p.31.
17. R7, Minutes to Meeting of Region #12 Conference, 25 & 26 June 1938. The Canadian Region was for a short while referred to as Region #12 of the International UAW. It was subsequently redesignated as Region #7.
18. Ibid..
19. Elected were George Thomson as President, William Emery as Secretary and Robert Lawrie as Treasurer. R7, Millard to Recording Secretaries of all Canadian UAWA locals, 12 July 1938; Minutes to Meeting of Regional Committee, 20 Aug. 1938.
20. L195, Historical manuscript on local 195. No stated author, n.d.; Napier, Memories of Building, pp.41-43.
21. GB, Regional Director's Report on Region 7 to George Addes, International Secretary-Treasurer, 30 Nov. 1939.
22. At the Chrysler plant in Windsor, another major conflict broke out when 78 Chrysler workers wildcatted. After a week on strike, they were joined by workers at Kelsey Wheel, Duplate Glass and L.A.Young Industries who staged a sympathetic walkout to help their Chrysler brothers. L195, Historical Manuscript on local 195. No stated author, n.d..
23. One example of Millard's autocratic leadership occurred during this meeting when Millard, unwilling to account for his actions to the Regional Committee, refused to have his report distributed to the membership and unsuccessfully attempted to prevent J.L. Cohen, the UAW's legal counsel, from giving an opposition report on the state of the union in Canada. R7, Minutes to Meeting of Regional Conference, 11 Sept. 1938.

24. Ibid..
25. Ibid..
26. R7, Letter from William Emery to unnamed person(s), 5 Dec. 1938; Regional Director's Report to Regional Conference, 26 Nov. 1938; Minutes to Meeting of Regional Conference, 26 Nov. 1938.
27. Keeran, Communist Party and Autoworkers Union, chapter VIII.
28. WRL, UAWA, Proceedings of Special Convention of the International Union, United Automobile Workers of America (27 Mar. - 6 Apr., 1939), pp.743-745.
29. Ibid., p.682; Interview with George Burt, 9 April 1985.
30. R7, Minutes to Meeting of Enlarged Regional Conference, 22 & 23 Apr. 1939, p.3.
31. R7, George Burt to William Emery, 27 Apr. 1939.
32. R7, Minutes to Meeting of Enlarged Regional Conference, 22 & 23 Apr. 1939, pp.2-4.
33. WRL, UAWA, Proceedings of the Second Annual Convention of the International Union, United Automobile Workers of America (Milwaukee, 1937), pp.235-239. District Councils were first constitutionally created in 1935. See Constitution of International Union, United Automobile Workers of America adopted at Detroit, Michigan Convention, (Aug., 1935). For details of the mandate given District Councils see, Proceedings of the Second Annual Convention of the International Union, (Milwaukee, 1937), pp.235-239.
34. GB, Regional Director's Report to the President of the UAW (Frankenstein), circa 1939-40.
35. On Communist Party policy in Canada see Ivan Avakumovic, The Communist Party in Canada (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1975), pp.131-134; Norman Penner, Canadian Communism: The Stalin Years and Beyond (Toronto: Methuen Publications, 1988), pp.140-146.
36. CRO, Recording Secretary (Fred Joyce), local 195, to Allan Haywood, 27 June 1940. One example of Millard's continued pursuit of militants in the Canadian UAW can be found in union trial proceedings of Tommy Maclean vs Charlie Millard. Millard questioned Maclean's allegiance to the union and accused him of being a "Labour Spy". Consequently, Maclean laid charges against Millard and undertook internal union trial proceedings to clear his name. CRO, Trial Committee Proceedings Re: Maclean vs Millard, 25 June 1940.

37. GB, Regional Director's Report on Region 7 to George Addes, International Secretary-Treasurer, 30 Nov. 1939.
38. Ibid..
39. Laurel Sefton MacDowell, "The Formation of the Canadian Industrial Relations System during WWII", Labour/ Le Travailleur 3 (1978):175-196.
40. Ibid..
41. Stuart Jamieson, Industrial Relations in Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1973), p.119.
42. Sefton MacDowell, "Formation of Canadian Industrial Relations System", p.179.
43. JE, United Automobile Worker, 13 Dec. 1939.
44. Christopher Tomlins, The State and the Unions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), Part II.
45. Sefton MacDowell, "Formation of Canadian Industrial Relations System", p.181.
46. Globe and Mail, 8, 10 Oct. 1940.
47. Globe and Mail, 11 Nov. 1940.
48. Globe and Mail, 13, 19 Nov. 1940, 7 Jan. 1941.
49. GB, "Statement on Boards of Investigation under the Industrial Disputes Act and Compulsory Arbitration" sent to all UAW locals by George Burt, Cyril Prince, Thomas Johnson, James Napier and Jack Taylor, 18 Apr. 1941, p.3.
50. For examples of lobbying see Toronto Telegram, 23 Feb. 1938, 20 Apr. 1940; Toronto Star 6 July 1940; R7, Minutes to Meeting of Regional Conference, 28 Jan. 1939, p.6; GB, Minutes to Meeting of District Council #26, 13 & 14 Jan. 1940, p.2; Regional Director's Report to District Council #26, 18 & 19 May 1940, pp.2 & 4.
51. GB, "Statement on Boards of Investigation under the Industrial Disputes Act and Compulsory Arbitration" sent to all UAW locals by George Burt, Cyril Prince, Thomas Johnson, James Napier and Jack Taylor, 18 Apr. 1941.
52. Bernard, Reuther and Rise of Auto Workers, pp.66-68.
53. Raymond Houlahan, "A History of Collective Bargaining in Local 200, United Automobile Workers of America" (M.A.

thesis, University of Windsor, 1963), pp.6-12.

54. Avakumovic, Communist Party, chapter 5.
55. GB, Report of War Production Committee in Minutes to Meeting of District Council #26, 14 & 15 Mar. 1942, non-paginated.
56. Ibid..
57. GB, Minutes to Canadian War Emergency Conference, 8 Apr. 1942, p.4.
58. Ibid., p.11.
59. WRL, Minutes of Proceedings of War Emergency Conference, UAW, Detroit, 7 & 8 Apr. 1942, pp.9-10.
60. GB, Minutes to Canadian War Emergency Conference, 8 & 9 Apr. 1942, p.6.
61. Ibid., passim.
62. Ibid., p.10.
63. Ibid., p.8.
64. Ibid., pp.7-12.
65. GB, Regional Director's Report to District Council #26, 27 & 28 June 1942, p.7.
66. GB, Regional Director's Report to District Council #26, 16 & 17 Jan. 1943, pp.1-3.
67. GB, Regional Director's Report to District Council #26, 18 & 19 May 1940, p.1.; Minutes to Meeting of District Council #26, 13 & 14 Jan. 1940, p.1.
68. Laurel Sefton Macdowell, Remember Kirkland Lake: The Gold Miner's Strike of 1941-42 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983), chapter 10.
69. Ivan Avakumovic, Socialism in Canada (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1978), p.97. Because of Communist strength in the Canadian UAW, the union's support for the CCF was minimal. Some locals and individual autoworkers got involved in the CCF. CCF, Art Shultz to Gillis or McInnis, 14 Jan. 1942; Proceedings of Trade Union Conference convened by Trade Union Committee - CCF Ontario Section, 25 July 1942, p.18.
70. Sefton MacDowell, "Formation of Canadian Industrial Relations System", p.190.

71. GB, Minutes to Meeting of District Council #26, 9 & 10 May 1942, p.11.
72. GB, Regional Director's Report to District Council #26, 27 & 28 June 1942, p.9.
73. Sefton MacDowell, Remember Kirkland Lake, p.240.
74. Sefton MacDowell, "Formation of Canadian Industrial Relations System", p.176.
75. Stuart Jamieson, Times of Trouble: Labour Unrest and Industrial Conflict in Canada, 1900-66, Task Force on Labour Relations (Ottawa, 1968), p.285; GB, Regional Director's Report to District Council #26, 5 & 6 June 1943.
76. CRO, George Burt to Secretary of UAW locals, Chairmen of Education Committees, Plant Chairmen and International Representatives, 16 Feb. 1943.
77. GB, Regional Director's Report to District Council #26, 9 & 10 Apr. 1943, p.9.
78. Ibid.; CRO, Telegram from George Burt to John Eldon, 6 Apr. 1943.
79. Sefton MacDowell, "Formation of Canadian Industrial Relations System", p.191.
80. GB, Regional Director's Report to District Council #26, 9 & 10 Apr. 1943, p.8.
81. Sefton MacDowell, "Formation of Canadian Industrial Relations System", p.192.
82. Ibid.. For detailed account of events leading up to the introduction of the federal labour code see Daniel Coates, "Organized Labour and Politics in Canada: The Development of a National Labour Code" (PhD thesis, Cornell University, 1973).
83. GB, Brief submitted to National War Labour Board by District Council #26, UAW, 27 May 1943, *passim*.
84. Ibid., p.26.
85. Sefton MacDowell, "Formation of Canadian Industrial Relations System".
86. Some evidence of this can be found through an examination of the debates at the Canadian War Emergency Conference. GB, Minutes to Canadian War Emergency Conference, 8 & 9 Apr. 1942, *passim*.

87. Penner argues that the Communist Party in Canada gained greater influence in trade unions once the party altered its anti-war position to one of support for the war. The reason Penner gives for this was Communists' moderate political position, epitomized by the no-strike pledge. My analysis of the UAW in Canada differs from this in so far as it does not appear to have been the moderate political position of the Communists that secured them greater support in the UAW, but their support for workplace militancy and relative silence on the no-strike pledge. As is suggested in this analysis, however, Penner also seems to argue that the CP's wartime policy secured greater support for Communists in trade unions, but not necessarily for the party itself. Penner, Canadian Communism, chapter 7.
88. David Lewis, The Good Fight (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1981), chapter 13; Avakumovic, Socialism in Canada, chapter 4.
89. Interview with Charlie McDonald, CAW Founding Convention, Toronto, Oct., 6 Sept. 1985.
90. CCF, David Lewis to Walter Reuther, 19 Jan. 1942. It should be noted that Lewis visited a number of International union offices in the U.S. in Jan. 1942, presumably to gain support for the CCF. See, CCF, David Lewis Correspondence Files 1940-42, Vol.99.
91. R7, Minutes to Meeting of Region 12 Conference, 25 & 26 June 1938, p.5.
92. Avakumovic, Socialism in Canada, p.92; GB, Speech by E.B. Joliffe to UAW Political Action Convention in Minutes to UAW-CIO District #7 Special "Political Action Convention", 28 & 29 Nov. 1943, p.15.
93. Gerald Caplan, Decline of Canadian Socialism: The CCF in Ontario (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1973), p.110.
94. The LPP is the Canadian Communist Party by another name. CCF, "LPP and Dominion Communist Labour Total War Committee; Telegrams and Letters, 1943-44", Vol.362.
95. GB, Regional Director's Report to District Council #26, 7 & 8 Aug. 1943, p.10.
96. GB, Speech by E.B. Joliffe in Minutes to UAW-CIO District #7 Special "Political Action Convention", 28 & 29 Nov. 1943, pp.14-17.
97. For discussion of LPP's application to affiliate with CCF see Avakumovic, Communist Party, pp.157-58.

98. GB, Report of Political Action Committee to Special Convention of Region 7, UAW-CIO, 28 Nov. 1943, pp.5-7; Minutes of UAW-CIO District #7 Special "Political Action Convention", 28 & 29 Nov. 1943, pp.29-49.
99. For discussion of these party regulations see CCF, Minutes to meeting of CCF National Executive, 19 & 20 Sept. 1942, pp.3-5.
100. GB, Minutes of UAW-CIO District #7 Special "Political Action Convention", 28 & 29 Nov. 1943, p.43; Report of Political Action Committee to Special Convention of Region 7, UAW-CIO, 28 Nov. 1943, pp.5-7.
101. GB, Report of Political Action Committee to Special Convention of Region 7, UAW-CIO, 28 Nov. 1943, p.5.
102. See debate on Resolution advocating the construction of local political action committees and Roll Call vote on this resolution in GB, Minutes to UAW-CIO District #7 Special "Political Action Convention", 28 & 29 Nov. 1943, pp.17-20, last 2 pages of minutes.
103. Ibid., p.20.
104. Caplan, Decline of Canadian Socialism, passim; Penner, Canadian Communism, pp.197-99.
105. For details of the developing conflict between the UAW and the CCL on political action see TRO, George Burt to Clifford Getty, 25 Nov. 1942; GB, Regional Director's Report to District Council #26, 17 & 18 June 1944, p.4, 25 & 26 Nov. 1944, p.7, 17 & 18 Feb. 1945, p.10; Minutes to Meeting of District Council #26, 25 & 26 Nov. 1944, pp.7-7a.
106. GB, J.L.Cohen, K.C. "P.C.1003 and an Effective Wartime Labour Policy" (circa 1944); George Burt, "Memorandum re P.C.1003 (circa 1944); "Memorandum on P.C.1003" prepared by Regional Office and the District Council Committee (circa 1944).
107. Jamieson, Times of Trouble, p.285; GB, "Memorandum on P.C.1003" prepared by Regional Office and District Council Committee (circa 1944), p.4.
108. Houlahan, "Collective Bargaining in Local 200", p.18; GB, "Memorandum on P.C.1003" prepared by Regional Office and District Council Committee (circa 1944), p.4.
109. Ibid.; GB, J.L.Cohen, K.C., "P.C.1003 and an Effective Wartime Labour Policy" (circa 1944).
110. Ibid.; GB, George Burt, "Memorandum re P.C.1003" (circa

1944).

111. GB, Regional Director's Report to District Council #26, 17 & 18 Feb. 1945, p.8. Joe Salasberg from the Communist Party spoke to the UAW District Council on the necessity for changes to the labour code and committed his support to the UAW in its endeavours. See GB, Minutes to Meeting of District Council #26, 17 & 18 Feb. 1945.
112. GB, Minutes to Meeting of District Council #26, 28 & 29 Oct. 1944, p.4.
113. GB, Canadian UAW-CIO "Win the Peace" Plan, Oct. 1944. This plan was submitted to and adopted by District Council #26 in October. See Ibid., pp.1-4.
114. GB. Canadian UAW-CIO "Win the Peace" Plan, Oct. 1944.
115. For record of C.S.Jackson's speech see GB, Minutes to Meeting of District Council #26, 28 & 29 Oct. 1944, pp.3-4.
116. Ibid., p.5.
117. GB, The Canadian UAW-CIO "Win the Peace" Plan presented to C.D.Howe, 21 Mar. 1945. See Minutes to Meeting of Reconversion Committee of UAW, 19-23 Mar. 1945, p.3.
118. Ibid., p.4.
119. Globe and Mail, 12 Mar. 1945.
120. GB, Regional Director's Report to District Council #26, 23 & 24 June 1945, pp.9-11.
121. GB, Regional Director's Report to District Council #26, 17 & 18 Feb. 1945, p.3.
122. Globe and Mail, 19 Feb. 1945.
123. TRO, George Burt to R.J.Thomas, 3 Apr. 1945.
124. GB, Minutes to Meeting of District Council #26, 1 Apr. 1945, p.4; Globe and Mail, 2 Apr. 1945.
125. It is important to note the distinction between the CP's policy of supporting the Liberal-Labour Coalition from the UAW's adoption of a similar policy due to the desire of many Canadian Autoworkers to elect labour candidates. Penner also recognizes this difference. Penner, Canadian Communism, p.204.
126. Ibid..

127. GB, Regional Director's Report to District Council #26, 23 & 24 June 1945, pp.11-14.
128. Keeran, Communist Party and Autoworkers Union, pp.241-249.
129. Ibid., p.251.
130. GB, Local 195 report in Minutes to Meeting of District Council #26, 23 & 24 June 1945.
131. GB, Regional Director's Report to District Council #26, 23 & 24 June 1945, pp.13-14.
132. Globe and Mail, 19 July 1945.
133. Globe and Mail, 20, 21 July 1945.
134. David Moulton, "Ford Windsor, 1945" in On Strike: Six Key Labour Struggles, 1919-1949, ed. Irving Abella (Toronto: James Lorimer & Co., 1975), p.134.
135. Ibid., p.134.
136. Jamieson, Times of Trouble, p.317.
137. Ibid., pp.317-318.
138. Moulton, "Ford Windsor, 1945", p.137, including footnote 37.
139. Ibid., p.137.
140. Ibid., p.138.
141. GB, Minutes to Special Meeting of District Council #26 on Ford Strike, 21 Oct. 1945.
142. Moulton, "Ford Windsor, 1945", p.141.
143. Ibid.. It should be noted that Moulton incorrectly refers to Humphrey Mitchell as the Premier whereas he was really the federal Minister of Labour.
144. GB, Local 199 Report on Ford Strike in Minutes to Meeting of District Council #26, 19 & 20 Jan. 1946.
145. Ibid., p.10.
146. Moulton, "Ford Windsor, 1945", pp.144-147.

Chapter Three

Responsible Versus Militant Unionism, 1946-49

The January 1946 arbitration decision covering the Ford-UAW dispute represented a major victory for the UAW and ultimately the entire Canadian labour movement. It also foreshadowed the foundations upon which the Canadian postwar system of Fordist regulation would be built. Justice Rand's decision acceded to the UAW its right to the automatic check-off of dues, amongst other union demands. This gain in union security was predicated, however, on the willingness of organized labour to control membership militancy. For Rand, the Ford strike had proven that postwar Canadian society could thrive only if management and organized labour reconciled their interests. His arbitration decision was the first step towards this goal.

Rand's decision, although farsighted, did not magically produce a settlement. Corporations and governments were hesitant to accord greater power or legitimacy to unions and union militants were resistant to compromise. Yet, business, government and unions realized that to ensure continued economic growth and prosperity some sort of 'peace' had to be achieved. These contradictory aims guaranteed that the first four years following World War II would be ones of intense struggle among corporations, unions and governments over whose terms would give most shape to the compromise.

Canadian Autoworkers were determined that any postwar 'peace' would be established on their terms. This determination hardened as corporate profits soared while workers bore the brunt of assembly line speedups, spiralling inflation and job insecurity.(1) Drawing on its "Win the Peace Plan", the Canadian UAW demanded sweeping social welfare measures, price controls and peacetime labour legislation which would restore workers' control over strikes. To back up its demands and in light of the Ford victory, the UAW once again pursued a militant strike policy. In spite of concerted corporate opposition, Canadian Autoworkers made initial gains through this strategy.

As the chill of Cold War politics settled over Canada and the economy wavered in its recovery, however, the balance of power shifted away from the UAW. Ridding unions of Communists and militants alike now became the first step towards constructing "responsible" unionism and ultimately the settlement upon which Fordist regulation depended. The Canadian UAW became a prime target for this blood-letting, owing to the strong Communist influence inside the union and, more importantly, Canadian Autoworkers' pursuit of a militant strike strategy.

Yet, in contrast to the U.S. where the state led the assault against union radicals, Canadian governments left this to the unions themselves.(2) Conservative union leaders, the anti-Communism of International Unions and the ongoing power struggles within Canadian unions between the CCF and the Communists could be counted on to perform this job. The Liberal federal government did willingly cooperate, however, with American immigration

officials to bar the border-crossing of union militants 'suspected' of Communist sympathies.(3) The Canadian UAW became engulfed by this conflict and once again its energies turned inwards towards struggles for control of the union.

The union faced concerted attacks from its own International Union and right-wing CCF autoworkers. Once Walter Reuther was elected president of the International UAW a crusade began to rid the union of both Communists and militants. Reuther's election also shored up the fortunes of the CCF inside the union. Staunch party members became crucial allies in Reuther's anti-Communist campaign and, in turn, used this position to wage their own battles inside the Canadian UAW. At timely intervals, the Canadian Congress of Labour added its support to the purges.

Many Canadian Autoworkers fought against the anti-Communist tide, once again forging alliances amongst Communists, militants, nationalists and left-wing CCFers. In 1949, at the end of the first round of these struggles, the Canadian UAW Left caucus was weakened. In contrast to the American UAW, however, it continued to marshal considerable resources. In turn, the survival of the Left inside the Canadian Region guaranteed that the structures of Fordist regulation and compromise would not be constructed without further bitter struggle.

Running Against the Tide: Canadian Autoworkers' Militancy

The UAW entered 1946 on a high note, full of confidence following its victory in the 1945 Ford strike. Justice Rand brought down his arbitration decision on January 29, 1946.

Although Rand denied the UAW's demand for a union shop, claiming that it would deny the individual right of workers to work without association with a union, he ruled in favour of the automatic check-off of dues. As all employees benefitted from union negotiations, all of them were to pay union dues whether they were union members or not. Companies were responsible for the orderly conduct of this procedure and for any related expenses. Rand saw this as "the employer's contribution toward making the union through its greater independence more effective in its disciplinary pressure." (4) Rand also recommended in favour of union demands for improvements in the grievance procedure, increased rights for stewards and union officials with respect to layoffs and time spent on union business, special seniority provisions for returning veterans taking up employment at Ford, and a framework for setting up a group insurance scheme for employees. (5)

Rand's decision, although highly favourable to the union, was neither the result of any inherently pro-labour sympathies, nor the product of practical considerations in the Ford dispute alone. Rather, his decision was based on his understanding of the need for a reformulation of labour-management relations in Canada. Justice Rand made this position clear in his preamble to the arbitration decision, where he wrote:

The organization of labour must in a civilized manner be elaborated and strengthened for its essential function in an economy of private enterprise. For this there must be enlightened leadership at the top and democratic control at the bottom. Similarly, as to capital. The absolutist notion of property like national sovereignty must be modified and the social involvement of industry must be the

setting in which reconciliation with the interests of labour and public takes place.(6)

Without such reconciliation, "...economic war with all its ferocity and waste..." would prevail.(7) To achieve peace, however, it was necessary to support the development of 'responsible' unionism. One of the first steps towards this goal, was to support union leadership "which is opposed to communistic ends and methods...".(8) For Rand, granting the UAW union security through the automatic check-off of dues and making the corporation responsible for the collection of these dues was an important move towards achieving stability for the union and therefore undercutting the appeal of more radical groups of unionists. Similarly, improving the grievance procedure, establishing a group insurance scheme, and providing more rights to union officials would also foster greater responsibility on the part of the union.

This entrenchment of union rights was only part of Rand's design to reformulate labour relations, however. The other side of the bargain consisted of coercing the union into accepting its responsibilities. This was to be achieved by attaching conditions to the mandatory check-off such that:

1. no strike could be called by the union without a secret ballot, held under the supervision of an officer of the Department of Labour and in which a majority of all employees voted for a strike;
2. union officers, both international and local, were responsible for repudiating unauthorized strikes and declaring related picket lines illegal. The union was also responsible for notifying the company of its repudiation of unauthorized strikes;
3. any individual union members or the union itself which

violated these conditions could be penalized, including the possible temporary suspension of the automatic check-off.(9)

The collective agreement, signed on February 21, 1946 between the UAW and Ford Motor Co. of Canada, included a further clause on the union's responsibility in the workplace. Clause 55 stated that the union would not cause or permit its members to participate in a sit-down, stay-in or slowdown of production, nor would it cause or take part in a strike, stoppage or picket until the grievance procedure was exhausted and even then not unless such action was authorized by the International Union.(10)

In spite of these restrictions, the UAW declared the settlement a victory. However, the union was under no illusions about the nature of the agreement. The formula for automatic check-off of dues - henceforth called the Rand formula - did not guarantee improved union-management relations. These could only result from fair play by both the corporations and the union. Furthermore, the UAW opposed the penalties contained in the Rand formula on the grounds that they restricted union rights without similarly penalizing company violations of the collective agreement.(11)

It was therefore not surprising that when governments and corporations ignored or resisted union demands, the Canadian UAW resumed its strategy of militant workplace action. The union's agenda was still guided by the "Win the Peace Plan", which included demands for pensions, increased wages and replacement of the National War Labour Board with a Board which included representatives of labour.(12) These issues became part of UAW

demands for sweeping social welfare measures, which also included government price controls, government-financed low-cost housing, and a National Health Insurance Plan.(13) Furthermore, Canadian Autoworkers recommended that the government legislate a forty-hour week and increase benefits received under Workmen's Compensation to 100% of wages and Unemployment Insurance to 50% of wages.(14)

Tripartism, as a means for negotiating these demands, was abandoned by the UAW, largely due to corporate resistance to early government interest in this form of decision-making. This shift had two effects on UAW strategy. Firstly, since the government was unwilling to act on UAW demands without corporate approval, Canadian Autoworkers decided to shift their demands away from the political arena and back to the corporations themselves. Secondly, if negotiation was not to bring about improvements in workers' lives, then strikes would serve to force these issues onto the agenda.

On June 18, 1946, four months after the signing of the Ford agreement, Chrysler workers in Windsor and Chatham went on strike for better wages. The strike was long and bitter. The Canadian UAW, having consolidated its organization during the war, was better able, however, to coordinate union activities to achieve its goals. The union issued a directive to all locals, advising them that no settlements should be accepted which included wage demands lower than those put forward in the Chrysler dispute. This would prevent other UAW locals from undercutting the

position of Chrysler workers or challenging regional policy.(15) The militancy of autoworkers, combined with improved union coordination, paved the way to UAW victory. After 126 days on the picket line, the UAW won. Chrysler workers substantially improved their wages, winning twice the company's original offer, gained union security and for the first time won paid holidays.(16)

Soon after, at the December, 1946 District Council meeting, the UAW made it clear that it intended to use the strike to force its demands onto the political agenda. The District Council announced that unless the federal government implemented effective price controls, the UAW would stage a series of strikes throughout 1947 for better wages.(17)

Despite the successful use of strikes, the strike policy of the Canadian UAW became a source of internal conflict and growing concern. As Cold War politics heated up, union militancy became associated with Communism. Union militants, who still dominated the Canadian UAW and supported the strike strategy, faced growing opposition from moderates in the union who gained support from the International, now under the direction of Walter Reuther. George Burt got caught in the middle. Press reports claimed he favoured abandoning the right to strike.(18) Whether this was true or not, Burt still relied on the Left caucus for support.

Consequently, at the December 1946 District Council meeting, George Burt shored up his position in the Canadian Region by denying the press accusations. He blamed these rumours and various other moves to undermine the union's strike policy on internal union caucuses which were intent upon defeating the

Canadian Region's administration and redirecting union strategy. According to Burt, these "paid representatives of the International Union have been imported to Canada" to engage in professional factional politics.(19)

Nonetheless, George Burt expressed fears about the possible consequences of the UAW strike policy. He reported that while the wage policy had been successful, strikes had made the union unpopular. People had a tendency to blame unions for shortages of goods and increased prices, and this tendency was aggravated by the poor public relations campaign conducted around the union's wage policy. Burt therefore recommended that the UAW once again shift some of its energies towards the political arena in the hope of gaining government protection for free collective bargaining and other measures which dealt adequately with the causes of strikes. To achieve these ends, Burt proposed calling a tripartite conference on the wage-price production issue.(20)

Although Canadian Autoworkers' energies became increasingly absorbed by internal union conflicts subsequent to this District Council meeting, they did follow up on Burt's recommendation to step up demands for revamping existing labour legislation. This goal became ever more pressing as both the federal and Ontario governments began to formulate their labour codes. On June 17, 1947 the Federal government introduced its legislation on the new Labour Code into the House of Commons. This legislation transferred many of the provisions of P.C.1003 into the peacetime labour code. These included compulsory conciliation of disputes

with a cooling-off period during the investigation, tripartite conciliation boards, and a restriction on all strikes during the life of a collective agreement. The code also had much more restricted jurisdiction, consistent with the constitutional powers of the federal government during peacetime.(21)

Within days the District Council condemned this legislation as "both dangerous and inadequate". The UAW argued that the emerging "piecemeal handling of labour legislation by the provinces" would strike a "blow at full production, full employment and high incomes, and [would] accelerate a return to an economy of scarcity, such as prevailed in the hungry thirties." Canadian Autoworkers also decried the proposed legislation for its continued restriction of strikes. In its stead the UAW demanded that the Federal government accept responsibility for labour-management relations by implementing a National Labour Code which recognized the rights of organized labour.(22)

The federal government strongly resisted input into the new labour code from industrial unions. In the summer of 1948, the bill was referred to a Special Committee of the House of Commons which, as a result of a motion passed in the House, was prevented from hearing representations from unions under the jurisdiction of the Canadian Congress of Labour. Opposition to this form of closure was expressed by David Croll, Liberal member from Toronto-Spadina, and by CCF MPs, but to no avail.(23)

At the same time, the UAW criticized the provincial government for its adoption of legislation patterned on the

federal Labour Code and demanded that unions be allowed to help shape the legislation. In response, Charles Daley, the Ontario Minister of Labour, informed the UAW that the bill could be amended before it was enacted. Nevertheless, he failed to live up to this promise and ignored all representation by labour organizations.(24) This disregard for UAW concerns and the introduction of legislation deemed anti-union by Canadian Autoworkers led them to denounce the provincial Labour Code as "more detrimental to the organized workers of Ontario than the vicious Taft-Hartley Act of the United States."(25)

This exclusion of the Canadian UAW from the decision-making process and the introduction of legislation intended to curb union rights to workplace action furthered many autoworkers commitment to a strategy of mobilization against corporations and governments. At the same time, these actions illustrated continued government resistance to any compromise with labour and the absence of any postwar settlement in these first years following World War II. In contrast to prevailing analyses, the introduction of the Labour Code did not signal labour's acquiescence to restrictions on its right to strike nor did it signal the first step towards the postwar compromise.(26) Rather, it clearly illustrated governments', and ultimately corporations', intent to control labour militancy. Ironically, however, governments were not alone in this endeavour. Through red-baiting and anti-Communist purges, unions themselves attempted to rid their organizations of militancy and therefore establish the

preconditions for a lasting compromise. It was the nature and outcome of these Cold War struggles inside the Canadian UAW that would ultimately determine Canadian Autoworkers' response to and participation in postwar Fordism.

Cold War Politics and Canadian Autoworkers

The UAW had been dominated by the left-wing Unity caucus since the days of Homer Martin. As the war came to an end, however, this caucus began to crumble. The catalyst for this disintegration was the American UAW's no-strike pledge which increasingly isolated Communists, who wholeheartedly supported this policy, from their rank-and-file supporters and provided the basis for social democrats, such as the Reuthers, and others in the UAW to improve their strategic position vis-a-vis the Communists. The ensuing struggles led to a realignment of forces within the UAW. Many Progressive caucus supporters entered into alliances with the new Reuther caucus. This realignment resulted in Walter Reuther's election as president of the UAW in 1946 which, in turn, proved to be a turning point in the history of the UAW. Reuther took up the anti-Communist banner, intent upon ridding himself of internal opposition and laying the basis for more centralized control over the union and an ultimate detente with the corporations and governments of the day.(27)

The dynamic of this struggle inside the Canadian UAW has commonly been characterized as a conflict between the CCFers and the Communists.(28) Such a description of these struggles is misleading and simplistic, however, since cleavages within the

membership were not drawn strictly along party lines. Nor was the struggle about party allegiances. The struggle was over the strategic direction of the union. The lines of battle in the struggles were, correspondingly, between militants and non-militants who formed themselves into two coalitions which, for the purpose of the following discussion, will be referred to as the Left caucus and the Reuther caucus.

The Left caucus was similar to the Unity caucus - a loose coalition of Communists, left-wing CCFers, nationalists and other militant trade unionists often sympathetic to the goals of the Communist party. The Reuther caucus supporters, on the other hand, consisted of right-wing CCFers such as those who had supported Charlie Millard when he was director of the Canadian region of the UAW, members of the anti-Communist Association of Catholic Trade Unionists, Trotskyists, and simple right-wing trade unionists.

The Reuther caucus' strategy was to make peace with the corporations and government, based on an analysis that unions could only make real gains by 'stabilizing' relations. Such stable relations would reduce the losses incurred by the union in protracted strikes and bolster the union's legitimacy in the eyes of government and employers. In turn, this strength would pave the way to peaceful settlements and greater consultation in decision-making. The adoption of this strategy can at least partially be understood in the context of the historical legacy of the American unions, and the UAW in particular. The Wagner Act, the close consultative ties between organized labour and

American government during the war and the union's self-imposed no-strike policy during World War II had given many unionists a pluralist vision of their role in American society, one based on cooperation and consultation.(29) Hence, for many Autoworkers the most effective union strategy was a non-militant, non-confrontational one. The first step towards reaching this goal was to purge the union of Communists, who threatened the legitimacy of the union and who were intent upon mobilizing rank-and-file militancy.

These conditions did not exist in Canada, however. The protracted struggles between corporations, labour and government, the lack of labour legislation conducive to the organization of unions, and the Canadian Autoworkers' wartime strategy of relying on strikes to make political and economic gains, reinforced militancy amongst Canadian Autoworkers. Therefore, for the bulk of Canadian autoworkers, a radical strategy based on the rank and file was the only effective one for making gains for workers and having their voices heard in the corridors of power. For these autoworkers, Communists continued to be crucial allies as they proved themselves able organizers and militant unionists. Based on these differences, the story of Cold War politics inside the Canadian UAW was not merely a story of partisan or ideological conflict. Rather these politics were at the root of conflicts over the future direction of the union. This is the story.

At the UAW International Convention in Atlantic City on March 27, 1946, Walter Reuther ran on a slate with Emil Mazey,

John Livingston and Richard Gosser while incumbent president, R.J.Thomas, ran with the Communist-dominated slate led by George Addes. In the race for the presidency, Reuther won a small majority over Thomas with 4,444.839 votes for Reuther to 4,320.451 for Thomas. The remainder of the Reuther slate, however, was defeated and the Thomas-Addes team won the key executive positions.(30) In Canada, the Left remained dominant, resulting in the uncontested re-election of George Burt at the same 1946 convention.

Given Reuther's narrow victory and lack of control over the executive, his first task was to ensure the election of his supporters at the next convention. In Canada, he found a willing ally in the newly-elected president of local 195, Earl Watson. Watson's CCF slate of candidates had won control of this Windsor local from the Left just prior to the 1946 international convention.(31) Watson, an ardent anti-Communist, was ready to join with the Reuther caucus, beginning with the mobilization of support in elections for local 195 and 200 using propaganda directed against the Canadian administration.(32) Reuther's position was further strengthened in Canada by support he received for his anti-Communist position from the Canadian Congress of Labour (CCL). Just prior to the 1947 International UAW Convention, Burt was removed from his position on the CCL executive, amidst charges that he held allegiance to people outside the UAW-CIO. This fed into the building Cold War hysteria and could only strengthen Reuther's hand.(33)

At the next International Convention held in Atlantic City

on November 9-14, 1947, Reuther fought his election on an anti-Communist platform and won a resounding victory. He obtained 5,593 votes to his opponent's 303 (with 1,218 abstentions). Reuther supporters, Mazey, Livingston and Gosser, were elected to the positions of secretary treasurer and the two vice presidencies respectively, beating the incumbent and largely left-wing supported candidates George Addes, R.J.Thomas, and Richard Leonard. Furthermore, the Reuther forces captured all but four of the 22 seats on the Executive Board.(34)

One of these four was held by George Burt who was re-elected Director of the Canadian Region. Regional Directors of the UAW were elected by the regional membership, not by the convention as a whole. This ensured that the Left caucus, which still held sway in Canada, could influence the Director's election. The Left threw its support behind George Burt and gained him his victory. Reuther's candidate, Earl Watson, was marginally defeated; the election gave Burt 139.652 votes to Watson's 131.336.(35)

Burt immediately began to play the game for which he became well-known - that of political survival. Within weeks of the International Convention he announced that he would support Reuther's programme because of the overwhelming mandate given the new President at the convention.(36) He also complied with the Convention's decision to sign the anti-Communist affidavits required by the Taft-Hartley Act.(37)

Nevertheless, despite these acts of support for Reuther, Burt's major source of support at the Convention had come from

the Left caucus. Therefore, while he would try to smooth the troubled waters with Reuther to ensure his own survival, Burt's policies could not completely alienate the Left which still held substantial voting strength within the Canadian region. This balancing act was no more clearly revealed than over the issue of the Taft-Hartley Act. Following Burt's compliance with the act, the union executive of local 240 in Windsor drew up a statement similar to the Taft-Hartley affidavit, incorporating the provisions of the UAW constitution which barred Communists, Fascists or Nazis from holding union office. Burt acted immediately by convincing this local to hold-off on this action until it could be put to the Canadian District Council. There a compromise resolution was passed instructing local 240 to reconsider this action. A more radical motion censuring local 240 was defeated but so was a motion to table.(38) These events - Burt's election and the struggle over the Taft Hartley Act - clearly demonstrated the influence of the Left in Canada but also gave evidence of its precarious position. In none of these struggles had it achieved an easy victory.

Reuther was well aware of the strength of the Left in Canada and saw the Canadian region as a major source of opposition to his leadership. He therefore looked for ways in which to gain control of this region, along with many others. His first step in the U.S. section of the union was to fire any staff opposed to his leadership. The crucial positions over which to have control were the International Representatives who played a key coordinating role in collective bargaining and strikes and the

education and public relations directors. Within two weeks of his re-election, Reuther fired 77 staff members in the U.S., ridding himself of other opposition in the months that followed.(39)

In Canada staff cuts were announced in December, 1947. Supposedly because the International union had suffered financially in the months of October and November, the International Executive Board decided to cut down on staff expenses. Burt agreed to lay off four international representatives and initially relieved Charles Tanner and Fred Joyce of their duties. Reuther, however, had other plans. Under the guise of this austerity, he refused to reappoint five International Representatives, known to be Left caucus supporters, operating in the Canadian region. They were Brothers John Eldon, Harry Rowe (Public Relations for the Canadian region), Paul Siren, Fred Steeve, and Hans McIntyre. Joyce and Tanner were to resume their duties.(40) Reuther's unilateral action taken without consultation with the Canadian administration combined with the fact that he had fired representatives who were supported by Canadian Autoworkers resulted in a head-on conflict between the International Executive and the Canadian regional administration. This effectively meant a conflict between the Reuther and Left caucuses.

At a meeting of local union officials held on January 4, 1948 in Windsor, the conflict came to a head. Burt's appeal for support was a nationalist one. Arguing that the problems

encountered in Canada were unique and could only be dealt with by Canadians, he urged resistance to the International's interference in Canadian affairs. Various CCFers, Communists and nationalists rallied to his call with the major source of opposition coming, not unexpectedly, from Earl Watson and other local 195 officials. Watson made it clear that this was a 'left-right' conflict. He argued that staff in Canada should be "right-wing" in their political orientation to reflect the "right-wing sentiment in the Region".(41) Despite this argument, however, Reuther faced mounting pressure from Canadian locals which threatened to take action against the International if it did not desist from interference in Canadian staff appointments.(42) This opposition to Reuther's actions forced him to accept a compromise on the staff replacements. Siren, McIntyre and Eldon were reinstated with the agreement that Reuther supporters, George Specht and William MacDonald, would also be appointed to the Canadian staff.(43) This was a crucial victory for the Left caucus in Canada. In the years to come Siren played a key role in buttressing the Left caucus and in orchestrating resistance to Reuther's collective bargaining platforms.

These early struggles by Reuther for control of the Canadian Region shed light on the unique conditions in Canada and the importance of these for the continued presence of the Left in the Canadian UAW. Although Reuther faced some opposition to his firings in the U.S., he was able to isolate and attack this opposition with the use of anti-Communist rhetoric. In Canada, this tactic was not nearly so effective. The reasons for this

rested on Canada's status as a separate nation, the role played by Communists in Canadian UAW locals, the Canadian UAW culture of democracy and rank-and-file control, and the unique organizational structure of the Canadian Region.

In many instances the means by which the Reuther caucus attempted to gain control over the Canadian Region were seen as attempts by the International to impose American solutions onto Canadian conditions. This perception antagonized nationalists who feared that little or no control of the union would remain in Canada. These people then often found themselves in the same camp as the Communists. At the same time, many CCFers opposed Reuther's purges because they understood the important role that the Communists had played and continued to play in organizing and mobilizing locals. It was also likely that many CCFers were neither willing to engage in red-baiting, seeing themselves as socialists, nor willing to look with equanimity on a loss of national control over the union. For other autoworkers, Reuther's internal purges were reminiscent of the Homer Martin days and raised similar fears of the effect of internal factionalism on the survival and rank-and-file control of the union. Finally, the Canadian District Council provided an organizational vehicle for the Left to organize and protect itself from the attacks by the International administration. Left-wing autoworkers in Canada could not be as easily 'picked off' as their American brothers and sisters as long as they retained a presence in the District Council. Through this body they were able to organize a "united

front" to defend themselves. All these factors came into play in Reuther's early moves to gain control of the union and they would come into play time and time again in the future.

Although Reuther did not succeed in gaining complete control of the Canadian region through its International representatives, he did gain control over two strategic positions in Canada - the directorships of both the public relations and education departments.(44) Reuther quickly learned in the first year of his presidency the importance of controlling the means of communications within the union. In 1946 he appointed his brother, Victor Reuther, as head of the Education department and another supporter, Frank Winn, as director of public relations.(45) In Canada these departments remained in the hands of Reuther's opponents. Yet with the 1948 compromise over Canadian staff dismissals, Reuther was successful in firing Rowe as head of public relations and replacing him with a supporter, Jerry Hartford, who was a member of the anti-Communist Association of Catholic Trade Unionists in Windsor.(46) Hartford quickly took control over the Canadian Autoworker and became involved in the production of local union newsletters.

Taking control over the education process proved more of a struggle. Since the early 1940's, the Canadian region had belonged to the Workers' Education Association (WEA). Under the directorship of Donald Wren, this organization provided education programmes and materials to a variety of unions throughout Canada and the US. In September, 1947, various UAW locals in Canada met to discuss the WEA. This led to the

publication and distribution of a pamphlet which accused Wren of overspending on his expense account and having relations with the Communist Party. The WEA was also charged with being a front for the Communist Party.(47) This accusation had long been fed by the CCF, which mobilized opposition to union affiliation with the WEA.(48) The reaction within the UAW was swift. The District Council appointed an investigative committee which exonerated Wren of the charges and recommended that those UAW members responsible for the pamphlet be "dealt with".(49)

This was not the end of the matter, however. Yet another investigative committee was appointed, this time including Victor Reuther as newly appointed Education Director for the International and Burt.(50) Victor Reuther repeated the charges that the WEA was a front for Communism and refused to pay the Canadian region's affiliation fee to the organization. With the report of the second committee still pending, Walter Reuther appointed a new educational director, Bill MacDonald, from local 195.(51) Although the second Canadian committee report also recommended in favour of continued liaison between the UAW and the WEA, the struggle was already lost.(52) While the Canadian region remained affiliated to the WEA for a few more years, its impact declined as more and more in-house education programmes replaced those of the WEA.

Reuther's control over these two departments was tremendously important. Through control of the education and communications network, the Reuther caucus could fend off attacks

on its own policies while also mobilizing support for them amongst the membership. Furthermore, such control ensured that collective bargaining strategies adopted by the International executive would be presented to the membership in a positive light. This was all the more important as the majority of Canadian local leaders continued to support the Left caucus and were suspicious of any initiative taken by Reuther. Finally, both MacDonald and Hartford kept Reuther informed of the activities of the left caucus, in particular those suspected of being Communists or fellow travellers. Surveillance of the Canadian region was further facilitated by locals such as 199 in St. Catharines, which provided Reuther with information on Communists in the area. This laid the ground for further purges and provided Reuther with the information needed to assume greater control over the Canadian region.(53)

The UAW in Canada had not only to fend off attacks on its left-wing leadership from the International Union and its allies in Canada but also from the American and Canadian governments. With the building of Cold War tensions in the U.S., immigration authorities were on the look-out for Canadian Communists who attempted to cross the US-Canada border on their way to International union conventions. For instance, in July 1949, Roy England, Adam Jacobson and William Eaves (local 200), Steve Anco and Christopher Ellis (local 439), Reg Screen (local 28), Clifford Getty, Ted Dana and Aulay Miller (local 195) and others were denied entry to the U.S..(54) The District Council passed a resolution condemning this American practice and demanded that

the Prime Minister, the Department of Immigration and External Affairs, and the International Union do something to prevent this in the future.(55) Nevertheless, while some of the delegates were subsequently allowed into the U.S., the pleas of the Canadian region for ceasing this practice fell on deaf ears, both in government and the UAW itself.

The most significant impact this immigration policy had on the internal politics of the UAW lay in the manner in which it distorted Canadian representation at International union conventions. Many of the delegates who met with trouble at the US border were not Communists but merely members of the Left caucus which opposed the Reuther administration. These included Communists, some CCFers, such as Reg Screen, and nationalists alike. In many cases, those barred as delegates were replaced by Reuther supporters who then represented their locals at the Conventions. This substitution merely ensured the support of the Canadian delegation for Reuther's policies and thereby further strengthened Reuther's hand.(56) Ironically, this same practice served also to consolidate left-wing alliances as Communists and militants alike found themselves tarred with the same brush.

Given the apparent changing balance of power within the union, Burt began to move closer to the Reuther faction. With this he was re-appointed to the CCL executive and abandoned some of his erstwhile allies such as Roy England from local 200.(57) Thereafter, the Reuther caucus' influence on Canadian UAW political direction became increasingly evident. On December 11

and 12, 1948 the UAW District Council passed resolutions supporting the policies of the UAW-IEB and its top legislative bodies, including the withdrawal from the World Federation of Trade Unions and support for the Marshall Plan.(58)

The Communist left in the UAW was seriously weakened by these events. This, in combination with the declining membership of the Communist Party throughout Canada and the building of Cold War hysteria, made them increasingly reliant upon their CCF and nationalist allies. In this way, they were forced to accept defeat on motions condemning the Communist Party and the Soviet Union.(59)

At the same time, the Left caucus as a whole was on the defensive. Having lost much of its control over the administrative apparatus of the union, the District Council became even more crucial for the organization of the Left and the mobilization of its supporters. As the Left still held many of the executive positions within locals, it had an important voice in the District Council. Through this body it could have an impact on Regional policy beyond which its shrinking numbers might warrant.

The test of the Left caucus' strength came with the District Council debate over the CCL's expulsion of the United Electrical Workers and creation of a rival union, the International Union of Electrical Workers. Both Burt and Roy England, local 200, recommended against getting involved in this dispute. However, on a roll-call vote the Council passed a resolution which condemned the "IE as Communist-inspired and recommended giving moral and

financial support to the CIO chartered IUE-CIO. The results were 204,219 in favour and 195,149 against. This result was challenged by the Left caucus on the basis that recent per capita figures should be incorporated into the roll-call vote. At the next Council meeting in March, 1950 another vote was held based on the new membership figures and the Left was victorious with only 202,219 voting in favour of the original resolution and 205,149 voting against it. The UAW adopted a hands-off policy in the fight between the UE and the IUE.(60)

By the end of 1949, there was still no real victor in the struggle between the Reuther and Left caucuses in Canada. Each group continued to leave its mark on Canadian UAW struggles. On Reuther's part, he had succeeded in securing control over key parts of the union apparatus. Through this he took the first steps towards constructing a stabilized and highly regulated collective bargaining relationship with the companies. The first component of stabilizing the wage contract consisted of union negotiation of a cost-of-living clause which was won in Canada in 1948. The second component consisted of UAW acceptance of GM president's 1948 suggestion of productivity based wage increases, subsequently referred to as the Annual Improvement Factor (AIF).(61) This measure was passed on to Canadian contracts in 1950.

These clauses had a stabilizing effect on union-management relations and constituted the first steps in the construction of the Fordist mode of regulation. For workers, the clauses protected them against inflation, which in the immediate postwar years had

seriously eroded the buying power of workers. They also ensured that wages did not fluctuate wildly, even when the industry underwent a cyclical downturn. Taken together, these clauses stabilized and improved workers' buying power which was crucial for securing the Fordist regime. For companies, wages were now based on industry productivity and tended to be consistent with long range trends in the economy, rather than short-term ups and downs.(62) This gave corporations a greater ability to plan and project future developments without facing the uncertainty of dramatically increased labour costs.

The Reuther caucus also reaped the benefits of a booming economy. It could claim responsibility for the substantial wage increases won by Canadian Autoworkers in their struggles. It also benefitted from the extension of the Rand formula to other Canadian UAW contracts. By 1949, 40 UAW organized plants in Canada were covered by contracts containing this clause.(63) This benefitted the more conservative Reuther caucus by stabilizing union monies and activities but also by encouraging responsible unionism.

However, rank-and-file militancy and the Left's pursuit of a rank-and-file mobilization strategy also found their place in the Canadian UAW. Neither Reuther's language nor strategy of compromise, nor certain corporate initiatives to cooperate with the union could mask the continued control of the shopfloor by corporations. Companies instituted assembly line speedups in order to generate greater and greater profits. In 1948, a speedup resulted in local 195 members defying their president, Earl

Watson, and downing their tools in a wildcat.

While such rank-and-file militancy no doubt continued to exist in American plants, the difference in the Canadian case was that these displays of militancy were often aided by the Left caucus and used as a basis for mobilizing greater support for left-wing policy directions. A wildcat at the Oshawa GM plant in 1949 illustrated these points particularly well. Workers at the plant walked out to protest assembly line speedups and firings of three union stewards and one committee man. The District Council held a special meeting on the wildcat and proclaimed its support for the strike by donating \$1,000 to the local 222 strike fund.(64) The wildcat involved over 5,000 workers and lasted 21 days. The settlement was a compromise forced onto the workers by the International Union. The penalties for the four union activists were sharply reduced and in exchange the union agreed to repudiate wildcat strikes and allow management to set assembly line speeds.(65) The events of this strike demonstrated the International Union's commitment to responsible unionism and its acceptance of the wage-productivity trade-off which was so crucial for the institutionalization of labour-management relations under the Fordist regime. The Canadian UAW, however, was not so ready to accept such terms of settlement. A few days after the strike, George Burt reported to the District Council that the Oshawa wildcat indicated the need to revise existing labour legislation. He then assured the membership that the union would support strikes at any time if autoworkers faced speedups.(66)

The Left's support for this rank-and-file militancy not only kept this strategic option open to Canadian autoworkers but also built support for radical leaders, many of whom were Communists, who continued to be elected to local office and the District Council.(67) Reuther and his supporters had many struggles to come before they would secure dominance in the Canadian Region and henceforth steer Canadian Autoworkers onto a course of "responsible", non-militant unionism.

Gaining a Foothold: The CCF and the UAW

The Reuther caucus' struggle for dominance over the Canadian Region and its assumption of control over the International executive opened the way for the CCF to gain a foothold in the Canadian UAW. Reuther saw in the CCF a staunch ally in his struggle against the Communists and their supporters and his strategic pursuit of more moderate unionism. By financially and organizationally supporting this party, Reuther bolstered the position of his Canadian caucus supporters, many of whom were CCFers, and in so doing created another front of attack on left-wing militants in the union. In this way, the CCF became the 'fifth column' of the Reuther-UAW faction.

Reuther's drive for control of the Canadian Region dovetailed perfectly with the CCF's own agenda and needs. Following the 1945 electoral debacle, the CCF faced a financial and organizational crisis. In 1946, the party determined that in order to survive, it must solicit the ongoing support of labour unions. The CCF pursued a two-prong strategy to reach this goal. It revised the party

constitution to facilitate union affiliation and influence on the party, while at the same time committing itself to a policy of aiding the organization of workers, through which it hoped to encourage their affiliation.(68)

Secondly, the CCF stepped up its battle with the Communists for support of Canadian unions. Because the Communists continued to exercise tremendous influence over Canadian Autoworkers and because the UAW was the largest industrial union in Canada, it became a strategic battleground for the CCF in pursuit of this goal. However, the CCF remained dependent upon the International Union as its point of entry into the Canadian UAW, a point that was brought home to the CCF by its early failures to secure a base in the union via the District Council or UAW locals.

In 1946 the UAW District Council reaffirmed its Political Action Committee policy of independent political action.(69) This reaffirmation reflected the continued strength of Communists within the Canadian Region as well as continued discontent with the type of role that unions might play in the CCF. The decision effectively thwarted any CCF plans for establishing formal links with the Canadian Region. David Lewis, National Secretary of the CCF, therefore concentrated his energies on cementing his friendship with Walter Reuther. Upon Reuther's victory in 1946, Lewis sent his congratulations and wished him luck in securing his position as leader of the UAW.(70) Later that same year, Lewis asked Reuther to speak at the CCF National Convention scheduled for August, 1946.(71) Then following the 1947 Autoworkers' convention when the Reuther forces were defeated in the Canadian

region with the re-election of Burt, Lewis apologized to Reuther for the Canadian defeat:

I am only sorry that our people were unable to deliver a victory in the Canadian region. My impression is that it is merely a matter of time, now, and that continuing work will ensure a victory at the next convention. (72)

The CCF really learned its lesson on the balance of political forces in the Canadian UAW when the party made its first attempt to build support at the local level. In 1947, Oshawa local 222 endorsed the CCF as the "political arm" of labour. David Lewis took this as a sign that the CCF could advance its position in the UAW through the rank and file. The CCF Co-ordinating Committee, with the help of certain local 222 members, therefore, planned two meetings with Oshawa unions with the intent of strengthening the ties between organized labour and the party. The results of the meetings were a disaster for the CCF and confirmed continued autoworker support for the Left caucus. Communists and their supporters from Oshawa area locals turned out in full force at these meetings and succeeded in dominating their proceedings.(73) The only measure of success was the election of Art Shultz, Reuther supporter and UAW member of local 222, as secretary of a committee for coordinating relations between the CCF and the Oshawa unions.(74) Although the CCF had isolated pockets of support within the UAW, it was scattered and consisted of people with little or no power within the union.(75) The only way the CCF would gain influence amongst Canadian Autoworkers was via the International UAW executive.

Evidence of the International Union's determination to

support the CCF as part of its strategy for control of the Canadian Region was not long in coming. For the June 1948 Ontario provincial election, the International union allocated \$4,000 to the CCF and assigned Jerry Hartford, Canadian Public Relations Director, to help with CCF publications. In addition, five members of the UAW ran for election.(76) This support was given despite the Canadian Region's 1946 reaffirmation of its policy of independent political action. The International support for the CCF in combination with the momentous increase in CCF seats in the provincial legislature from 8 in 1945 to 21 in 1948 (including the election of one UAW member), provided the opening needed for the Reuther caucus to shift the Canadian Region's policy in favour of the CCF. At the District Council meeting following the election, Burt pointed to the International Executive's financial support of the CCF and the subsequent electoral victory by the party as proof of the UAW's potential power in partisan politics. He therefore agreed to continue the operations of a co-ordinating committee, composed of CCF members, local union executive officers, local Political Action Committees, and some members of Burt's staff.(77) This activity set the stage for the December District Council meeting where the Council passed a resolution endorsing the CCF as the political arm of labour and encouraging locals to establish Political Action Committees to engage in political action consistent with CCL, and now UAW, policy.(78)

Although this decision by the District Council constituted a major victory for the CCF, it did not reflect a groundswell of

rank-and-file support for the party. Rather, the Canadian UAW's decision to endorse the CCF was orchestrated by the leadership and was integrally linked to the power struggles within the UAW. This was no more clearly illustrated than in the 1949 federal election. The International Union increased its election contribution to the CCF to \$10,000.(79) Furthermore, four UAW members ran for election. However, rank-and-file support was largely missing.

In Windsor, where the large majority of Canadian Autoworkers were concentrated, Ford local 200 refused to support the CCF candidate for Essex West, Archie Cherniak. The local recommended instead that Windsor union locals continue to pursue an independent partisan strategy in cooperation with the LPP and the CCF, with the intent of electing local labour candidates.(80) The result was that Cherniak received support from Burt and the Regional Office but little from the local unions themselves.(81)

Furthermore, Burt's position on the CCF remained ambiguous. Although he had orchestrated the Canadian District Council's shift in favour of the party, his later behaviour indicated that this was likely one more move to retain the existing Canadian administration's control over the Canadian Region. While Burt's orchestration of the UAW shift behind the CCF shored up his own leadership position with the International and placated Reuther supporters in the region, Burt's arm's length relationship to the party guaranteed him continued support from the Left caucus and gave the Left political manoeuvrability.

Nonetheless, the UAW shift in partisan policy signalled a major defeat for the Communists. They had supported the UAW's

course of independent political action to prevent the CCF from gaining an organizational basis in the UAW. In so doing, they had left the door open for Communist Party mobilization and use of union resources. This door was shut with the 1948 resolution endorsing the CCF which gave this party access to UAW resources and legitimacy in its activities.

However, this new UAW policy did not mean that the struggles with the Communists were over. What it did mean was that the CCF was better prepared to help the Reuther caucus in its struggle. The party now had a firm foot in the UAW door and, through a study undertaken by Lorne Inglo, CCF Research Secretary, had identified those UAW members and locals who were sympathetic to the LPP.(82)

Thus ended the first three years in the life of the UAW's relationship with the CCF. The alliance of the UAW and the CCF was not borne out of a commitment to party politics or the anticipated election of a social democratic government more sympathetic to working people. Rather, it was an alliance of convenience. For the Reuther caucus it was a means of eliminating internal opposition and for the CCF it was a means of shoring up an otherwise troubled party. It was also an alliance, orchestrated by the leadership of the union and the party; the rank and file responded with apathy and in some cases defiance, as autoworkers were bent upon pursuing their own political agenda. These early years in the UAW's relationship to the party did provide impetus to the Reuther caucus' drive for control over the Canadian UAW. It would leave in its wake, however, a legacy of bitterness and apathy amongst the

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membership towards the CCF and later the NDP.

Conclusion

Justice Rand's 1946 arbitration decision in the UAW-Ford dispute appeared as a blueprint for the institutionalization of labour-management relations and ultimately the Fordist mode of regulation. Yet, by 1949, developments towards this end were few and the hopes of a lasting compromise between the Canadian UAW and corporations appeared uncertain. This was in spite of the International UAW's demonstrated interest in the stabilization of labour-management relations and success in negotiating strict rules for wage improvements (AIF and COLA) in exchange for its agreement to control membership militancy. To understand the obstacles to the development and entrenchment of the Fordist mode of regulation in the Canadian auto industry, it is necessary to review the Canadian UAW's relations with corporations and governments and its internal dynamics between 1946 and 1949.

For Canadian Autoworkers, the Ford strike and Justice Rand's decision represented a victory which reinforced their commitment to a militant strategy based on workplace action - a commitment which led to the Canadian UAW's 1946 strike strategy. The success of this strategy, seen in improvements to collective agreements, confirmed many autoworkers' belief that only through workplace action based on rank-and-file mobilization could the union secure benefits for its membership. Consequently, Canadian Autoworkers became even more determined to resist efforts to curb their control over strikes, whether by governments or their own

International, and to reject any compromises which would accede to management the unilateral right to organize production. This militancy obstructed the working out of a labour-management compromise.

The Canadian UAW, however, was not the only one resistant to detente. Governments of the day and corporations were just as determined to rein in the power of organized labour and establish the foundations of postwar society on their terms. Both the Ontario and federal governments ignored UAW demands for changes to the Labour Codes and reasserted the government's role in controlling union militancy. For their part, corporations fired union militants and instituted speedups. They were determined to maintain their managerial prerogatives without union interference. For the companies, the only basis upon which the Canadian UAW would gain legitimacy and access to decision-making was if its militant leadership was replaced.

Cold War hysteria combined with Walter Reuther's 1946 election as president of the UAW provided the starting point for just such a shift in Canadian UAW politics. Reuther's anti-Communism and successful purges of Communists opened the possibility of a compromise between the union, the government and corporations which had hitherto been prevented by the more radical politics associated with the UAW of earlier years. Reuther's moderate leadership and fundamental acceptance of the structure of capitalism, including the role of American capital in Canada, allowed him to take the first steps towards a more orderly collective bargaining relationship with companies, seen in the

1948 negotiation of AIF and COLA clauses.

Reuther's hegemony over the UAW and, ultimately, the entrenchment of Fordist relations were conditional, however, upon the destruction of left-wing opposition to his leadership. This was rapidly accomplished in the US by 1948, but not so in Canada. The fact that the Canadian Left was an alliance between left-wing CCFers, nationalists and Communists made Reuther's task more problematic. While Reuther's attacks on the Communists, in combination with the declining membership of the Canadian Communist party and attacks by other unions and the state, severely weakened the Communists inside the UAW, it did not destroy the Left caucus. The Left caucus' defeat of the right-wing inspired resolution to support raiding of the UE by the newly created IUE, the retention of various left-wing International Representatives and the unwillingness of locals to toe the line on the leadership-imposed partisan policy were but a few examples of this. The nationalists and CCFers continued to oppose Reuther's pursuit of control over the union and in so doing were obstacles to the early institutionalization of labour-management relations.

With Reuther's election and determined efforts to wrest control of the union from the Left, the Left caucus in Canada lost much of its control over the union apparatus, witnessed in the replacement of the Education and Public Relations Directors and the firing of many left-wing International staff. The Reuther caucus also gained an important ally in its struggles when it succeeded in manoeuvring the Canadian Region behind the CCF.

However, Reuther's purges and his resultant control over the union apparatus did not guarantee him control over rank-and-file elected local leadership nor the delegates to the District Council. Without this control, the Reuther caucus could not determine union strategy and steer the Canadian Region onto a more moderate course of action consistent with the working out of a compromise.

For the Left caucus, the District Council became the crucial forum through which left-wing supporters could be mobilized and Left caucus efforts coordinated. Without the District Council, the Left's power base would have remained solely in the locals, leaving its supporters isolated and without a means of coordination. This, in turn, would have made them easy prey for the administration. The only other rank-and-file deliberative forum was the International Convention to which the Left was largely prevented attendance due to immigration problems and where the Canadian delegates were vastly outnumbered by American delegates. Therefore, the District Council became the key organizational means for the mobilization of the Left in the late 1940's and ultimately throughout the 1950's.

Overall, the Left caucus' successful resistance to institutionalization and determined pursuit of militancy retarded the construction of postwar Fordist relations in the Canadian auto industry. At the same time, the victory of the Reuther caucus at the International level combined with its partial success in gaining organizational leverage over the Canadian UAW opened the way for the development of a compromise. When this was combined

with governments' labour legislation which continued to constrain union militancy, auto corporations desire for moderate leadership of the union and the politics of the Cold War, the groundwork for the construction of the Fordist mode of regulation was in place. Nonetheless, the specific shape of Fordist relations in the auto industry and the timing of the Canadian UAW's entry into a compromise were the product of further internal union struggle and debate over union strategy. This was the story of the 1950's.

ENDNOTES

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2. Reg Whitaker, "Fighting the Cold War on the Home Front: America, Britain, Australia and Canada", in Socialist Register 1984, eds. Ralph Miliband et al (London: Merlin Press, 1984), pp. 59-61.
3. Ibid., p. 56.
4. Canada, Department of Labour, Labour Gazette Vol. XLIV, No. 1, "Award on Issue of Union Security in Ford Dispute", Jan. 1946, p. 128.
5. Ibid., pp. 130-131.
6. Ibid., p. 125.
7. Ibid., p. 124.
8. Ibid., p. 126.
9. Ibid., p. 129.
10. R7, Memorandum of Agreement entered into on the 21st day of Feb. 1946 between Ford Motor Co. of Canada Ltd. and UAWA.
11. CRO, George Burt to Jerry Taylor, 5 Jan. 1949, pp. 5-6.
12. GB. Minutes to Special Meeting of District Council #26, 24 Feb. 1946.
13. GB, Minutes to Meetings of District Council #26, 5 & 6 Oct. 1946, 14 & 15 Dec. 1946, 20 & 21 Sept. 1947; Regional Director's Report to District Council #26, 13 & 14 Dec. 1947; CRO, Minutes to Meeting of Wage Committee of District Council #26, 23 Feb. 1946; Globe and Mail, 7 Oct. 1946; Telegram (Toronto), 5 Oct. 1946.
14. GB, Minutes to Meetings of District Council #26, 20 & 21 Sept. 1947, 26 & 27 Mar. 1949.
15. CRO, George Burt to All local unions and International Representatives, 18 June 1946.
16. R7, Minutes to Meeting of International Representatives, 2 & 3 Nov. 1946, p. 5.

17. Globe and Mail, 16 Dec. 1946.
18. One such report was found in Globe and Mail, 30 Nov. 1946.
19. GB, Regional Director's Report to District Council #26, 14 & 15 Dec. 1946, pp.18-20.
20. Ibid.
21. Stuart Jamieson, Industrial Relations in Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1973), chapter 5.
22. GB, Minutes to Meeting of District Council #26, 20 & 21 June 1947.
23. GB, Regional Director's Report to District Council #26, 19 & 20 June 1948, p.13.
24. GB, Minutes to Meeting of District Council #26, 11 & 12 Dec. 1948, p.10.
25. Ibid.
26. For example see Leo Panitch and Donald Swartz, From Consent to Coercion (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1985), pp.17-22.
27. For an analysis of the problems arising from the no-strike pledge see Roger Keeran, The Communist Party and the Auto Workers Unions (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980), chapter X, esp. pp.235-249. For a more comprehensive analysis of the breaking apart of the Unity caucus see Martin Halpern, "The Disintegration of the Left-Center Coalition in the UAW, 1945-1950", 2 vols. (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1982), chapters 5-7.
28. Irving Abella, Nationalism, Communism and Canadian Labour (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973).
29. This analysis is confirmed in Halpern, "Disintegration of Left-Centre Coalition", 1:79.
30. WPR, Election results 27 Mar. 1946. It should be noted that due to the UAW's particular system of voting, fractional votes were common. This resulted from the equal division of a local's per capita votes between the delegates present at the convention.
31. Globe and Mail, 3, 4 Mar. 1946; Telegram (Toronto), 2 Mar. 1946.
32. CRO, George Burt to William Sivell, copies to England, Watson, and Rooney, 7 Mar. 1947.

33. Windsor Daily Star, 11 Oct. 1947, pp.1 & 6.
34. Keeran, Communist Party and Autoworkers' Union, pp.280-284.
35. WRL, UAWA, Proceedings of the Eleventh Convention of the International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (Atlantic City, 1947), pp.535-536.
36. GB, Regional Director's Report to District Council #26, 13 & 14 Dec. 1947, p.1.
37. Burt agreed to sign the affidavit only after he tried to get unanimous support of the Canadian delegation to the International Convention to oppose this measure on the grounds that it might encourage Canadian governments to enact similar legislation. When the Canadian delegation split over the issue, Burt agreed to sign. Ibid., p.18.
38. GB, Regional Director's Report to District Council #26, 13 & 14 Dec. 1947, pp.17-18; Minutes to Meeting of District Council #26, 13 & 14 Dec. 1947, p.10.
39. Keeran, Communist Party and Autoworkers' Union, p.284.
40. GB, Minutes to meeting of presidents and other officials of local unions of Region 7, UAW-CIO, 4 Jan. 1948, pp.1-2.
41. Ibid.
42. RD, Ernest Wheatley, Pres. local 199, Telegram to W.P.Reuther, 12 Jan. 1948; Bargaining and Executive Boards, locals 199, 676, 275, Telegram to W.P.Reuther, 14 Jan. (n.d.); R7, A.D.Burke, Chairman Toronto Area Committee, Draft Letter to George Burt, 17 Dec. 1947. For an indication of the strength of the opposition to Reuther's firings the vote of District Council on the reinstatement of McIntyre showed 170.624 in favour and 107.922 against in Minutes to Meeting of District Council #26, 20 & 21 Mar. 1948.
43. GB, Regional Director's Report to District Council #26, 20 & 21 Mar. 1948, pp.17-18.
44. Halpern notes that "In the bargaining over appointments, Reuther concentrated on those positions that permitted the incumbent to exercise political and ideological influence on the membership." See Halpern, "Disintegration of Left-Centre Coalition", 2:272.
45. John Barnard, Walter Reuther and the Rise of the Auto Workers (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1983).

46. GB, Regional Director's Reports to District Council #26, 20 & 21 Mar. 1948, p.13, 19 & 20 June 1948, p.9; Interview with Bill Rutherford, Toronto, Ontario, 6 Sept. 1985.
47. GB, Minutes to Meeting of District Council #26, 20 & 21 Sept. 1947, p.5.
48. CCF, Brock King to David Lewis, 16 Sept., 20 Oct. 1942, 13, 14 Jan. 1943; David Lewis to Mr. B. King, 24 Sept. 1942; Eugene Forsey to David Lewis 27 Nov. 1946.
49. R7, Committee Report on Education Director's Expenses, District Council #26, Dec. 1947.
50. GB, Regional Director's Report to District Council #26, 13 & 14 Dec. 1947, p.11.
51. GB, Minutes to Meeting of District Council #26, 20 & 21 Mar. 1948, pp.4-5.
52. GB, Report of committee investigating WEA in Minutes to Meeting of District Council #26, 19 & 20 June 1948, pp.3-5.
53. The most notable example of someone over whom Hartford kept close watch was Paul Siren. In one letter to Walter Reuther's aide, Jack Conway, Hartford reported the following on Siren's candidacy for the Toronto District Labour Council:

"Every person running with Brother Siren on this slate was either a professed Commie or among the most openly-tagged pro-Communists in the labour movement in Canada... Siren, I suppose is not responsible for the heads the Toronto Telegram puts on its stories, but, nevertheless, by running with such a crowd, he lets them count him in as a "red candidate". Maybe this is none of my business, Jack, but this particular camel keeps piling a lot of straws on his back, don't you think?"

WPR, Jerry Hartford to Jack Conway, 21 Feb. 1949.

54. Many of these people had been stopped in 1948. GB, Regional Director's Reports to District Council #26, 18 & 19 Sept. 1948, pp.7-8, 17 & 18 Sept. 1949, p.13; CRO, George Burt to Irving Levy, 27 Dec. 1949; Paul Siren, Telegram to George Burt, 7 July 1949; Telegram (Toronto), 7 July 1949.
55. GB, Regional Director's Report to District Council #26, 18 & 19 Sept. 1948, p.14; Minutes to Meeting of District Council #26, 18 & 19 Sept. 1948, pp.7-8.
56. It was too much of a coincidence that any and all non-Reuther supporters were stopped at the border by Immigration officials. It appears that the latter were being helped in

their job by UAW and CCF members who identified left-caucus members as Communists. Interviews with Charlie MacDonald and Bill Rutherford, 6 Sept. 1985. Added evidence in support of this point was found in Burt's comments that Canadian delegates to the union convention were asked by Immigration officials whether they intended to support Reuther or not. CRO, George Burt to Irving Levy, 27 Dec. 1949.

57. WPR, Pat Conroy to Walter Reuther, 29 Oct. 1948; George Burt to Pat Conroy, 11 Nov. 1948; George Burt to Walter Reuther, 12 Nov. 1948.
58. GB, Minutes to Meeting of District Council #26, 11 & 12 Dec. 1948.
59. Motion condemning the Communist Party and the Soviet Union passed 55 to 7. GB, Minutes to Meeting of District Council #26, 10 & 11 Dec. 1949, pp.7-9.
60. GB, Minutes to Meetings of District Council #26, 17 & 18 Sept. 1949, 10 & 11 Dec. 1949, pp.4-5, 18 & 19 Mar. 1950, pp.2-3; Regional Director's Report to District Council #26, 17 & 18 Sept. 1949.
61. Harry Katz, Shifting Gears: Changing Labor Relations in the U.S. Automobile Industry (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985), p.16.
62. Ibid., pp.16-21.
63. CRO, George Burt to Jerry Taylor, 5 Jan. 1949.
64. GB, Minutes to Special Meeting of District Council #26, 12 Nov. 1949.
65. Globe and Mail, 21 Nov. 1949.
66. GB, Regional Director's Report to District Council #26, 10 & 11 Dec. 1949, p.15.
67. One particularly important election took place in 1949. In this year, Communist Party member, Gordie Lambert was first elected to local 199 executive in St. Catherine's. Lambert would play a crucial role in mobilizing the left caucus over next two decades. L199, List of Executive Officers, local 199, 1948.
68. CCF, National Constitution of the CCF, n.d.; Trade Union Panel, Summary of Recommendations made to National (CCF) Convention, n.d..
69. GB, Minutes to Meeting of District Council #26, 5 & 6 Oct. 1946, p.8.

70. CCF, David Lewis to Walter Reuther, 22 Apr. 1946.
71. Although Reuther declined, the invitation itself demonstrated the CCF's support for the Reuther caucus. CCF, David Lewis to Walter Reuther, 26 June 1946.
72. CCF, David Lewis to Walter Reuther, 10 Dec. 1947.
73. CCF, David Lewis to Frank McLellan, 11, 14 Jan. 1948; David Lewis to Art Shultz, 11 Feb. 1948.
74. CCF, Minutes to Trade Union-CCF Conference, 15 Feb. 1948.
75. CCF, Allen Schroeder to David Lewis, 28 Apr. 1946; Roll Call vote, 26 Oct. 1947; Oliver Hodges to David Lewis, 28 June 1947.
76. GB, Regional Director's Report to District Council #26, 19 & 20 June 1948, pp.16-17.
77. Ibid., p.16.
78. GB, Minutes to Meeting of District Council #26, 11 & 12 Dec. 1948, p.6.
79. CCF, Election Income, 28 July 1949, p.2; David Lewis, Night Message to Walter Reuther, 7 Apr. 1949.
80. R7, Ralph Allen, rec. sec. local 200 PAC, to all labour leaders Windsor area, 9 May 1949.
81. CCF, Archie Cherniak to Morden Lazarus, n.d..
82. Based on this study, the CCF ascertained that as of November 1948, UAW locals at Ford, McKinnon Industries and Massey Fergusson were dominated by Communists. He also produced a list of UAW officials represented on various LPP bodies. CCF, A.R. Williams to Lorne Ingle, 11 Nov. 1948; A. Andraas to Lorne Ingle, 30 Dec. 1948.

Chapter Four

Selling the Compromise to Canadian Autoworkers, 1950-57

By the end of 1949, the transition from war to peace time was complete. Political and economic conditions appeared ripe for working out a compromise between capital, labour and the state. However, contrary to popular interpretations this compromise was not magically nor uniformly put into place. Rather, for the UAW and the auto corporations the postwar settlement was constructed intermittently and was the product of struggles between workers, unions leaders and individual corporations.

The state in Canada played a minimal role in developing a compromise between capital and labour in these years. Canadian and Ontario governments were slow to take responsibility for providing the basic social security net demanded by workers. This issue had initially to be addressed through collective bargaining. Although the UAW and the federal government did develop a more consultative relationship based on lobbying in the years between 1950 and 1957, this brought few tangible results for the union. Furthermore, this sign of UAW willingness to practice "responsible" unionism was limited to the federal sphere of government. In its dealings with the Ontario government, the UAW proved willing to continue a course of confrontational action.

This lack of involvement by governments meant that the hammering out of a compromise between corporations and organized

labour took place in the sphere of private production. In the Canadian auto industry, the major steps towards constructing a compromise were taken in the 1950's when a system of Fordist regulation emerged. Such regulation took the form of a highly structured system of collective bargaining. Between 1950 and 1957 four major components of this regulatory system were secured. The structured wage and benefit formulas which had already been won in the U.S. were extended into the Canadian industry. The second component was the extension of the life of collective agreements beyond one year. This was followed in the mid 1950's by the negotiation of master agreements and then by the institution of a guaranteed annual wage, intended to buffer the effect of boom and bust cycles on workers' incomes. Although by 1957 these basic structures of Fordist regulation were uniformly in place in the Canadian auto industry and were largely accepted by workers and corporations alike, the process of establishing this structured system of collective bargaining was wrought with conflict.

The dynamics of this conflict were complex and multifaceted. Firstly, different corporate strategies engendered different forms of conflict. GM quickly accepted the UAW as a more or less permanent actor in the workplace and therefore sought to negotiate regulations which would curb union disruption of production and stabilize union-management relations. GM-UAW relations therefore established the parameters of Fordist regulation in the auto industry, which after much struggle would be emulated in other industry contracts. In contrast to GM, Ford continued anti-union practices intended either to circumvent or avoid the union

altogether. Only after protracted struggle with militant Ford workers was the corporation forced to accept regulatory mechanisms already implemented at GM.

Yet another dimension of conflict centred on struggles between the union leadership and the rank and file. The union leadership was intent upon creating a more stabilized collective bargaining relationship with the auto companies, seeing this as the means by which the UAW could make the most gains for its workers. The compromise reached most often constituted an arrangement between corporations and union leaders, who were then responsible for taking the settlement back to their union membership and ensuring that autoworkers abided by the conditions of the arrangements of "responsible" unionism. This process of 'selling' the postwar settlement often met with resistance from the rank and file. The resulting struggle between union leaders and their members meant that the settlement itself took years to be fully entrenched.

The organization of auto production itself proved a serious obstacle to the entrenchment of the new structures of collective bargaining. The auto industry converted to peacetime production with an extension of Fordism and Sloanism. Auto corporations fine tuned the assembly line, introducing time management specialists to rid the production process of inefficiencies and at other times speeding up the assembly line in an attempt to extract the maximum surplus from each individual worker. Contradictorily, Sloanist marketing principles consisted of increasing consumer demand and

hence profitability through the constant segmentation of the vehicle market. This meant the introduction of new car models each year, different accessories and colours and the introduction of life-style vehicles - cars for the teenager, second family cars, etc..(1) Consequently, the auto industry had long periods of downtime as factories were retooled for the new models. This resulted in annual periods of layoff and seasonal variations in workers' income. The combination of Fordism and Sloanism meant that workers in the auto industry experienced boom and bust cycles, working 60 hours one week and laid off the next. Such industrial boom and bust cycles were compounded by cyclical national recessions in 1951, 1954 and 1957 resulting from overproduction and production adjustments to the Korean war. The instability of employment combined with the harsh realities of assembly line life proved a serious obstacle to stabilizing relations between auto corporations and the UAW, as it often led to spontaneous wildcats and in some cases protracted legal strikes in attempts by the union to win its demands.

This rank-and-file militancy fed the ongoing conflict between the Left and Reuther caucuses in the Canadian UAW. The Left traditionally relied upon a militant workplace strategy both to mobilize support and make political gains. Such spontaneous workplace action appealed to the rank and file while simultaneously threatening the basis for the postwar settlement which necessitated union leadership control of rank-and-file militancy. Moves by the Reuther caucus to secure greater control of the membership to ensure acceptance of the new regulatory

system merely fanned this conflict and gave momentum to left-wing nationalists who increasingly gained ascendancy within the Left caucus. However, varying corporate practices also fragmented the Left, thereby opening the door to greater leadership control over union locals.

The concentration of union energies and conflicts on workplace arrangements and the growing possibility of establishing a settlement with the corporations also had its effect on UAW-CCF relations. Although the union executive continued to pump money into the party, the election of a sympathetic social democratic government waned in importance. Union leadership apathy towards the party, combined with continued membership distrust of the CCF, reduced the already half-hearted UAW commitment to a partisan strategy of political action.

A System of Fordist Regulation Takes Shape, 1950-57

1950 was a year of relative calm in the UAW before the storm of 1951. Negotiations in late 1949 had set the winning of social security coverage in the collective agreements as the agenda for 1950. Locals at Ford, Chrysler and General Motors entered into negotiations demanding \$100.00 per month company paid pensions, a reduced work week and better wages.(2)

In an attempt to shift the responsibility for workers' security onto government, Ford, in an unprecedented move, invited the UAW to join the company in lobbying for a contributory pension plan run by the federal government. George Burt heralded a major victory in labour-management relations when on March 1, 1950 both

parties met with Paul Martin, Federal Minister of Health, to discuss the matter.(3) No action was taken by the federal government towards such a pension scheme and the UAW continued its plan to bargain for this and other social security benefits.

Ford's desire for government sponsored benefits was equalled by its desire to prevent disruption of production. Thus, after a few weeks of negotiations, a settlement between Ford and the UAW was reached without a strike. In April, Ford local 200 voted to accept a one-year settlement including a \$55.00 per month company-paid pension plan, a disability plan, sick and accident benefits, and a substantial increase in hospitalization coverage.(4)

GM, on the other hand, went beyond negotiating details of wages and benefits and pushed for a more comprehensive restructuring of its relations with the UAW. GM agreed to union demands for a company paid pension plan, limited health care coverage, a gradual hourly reduction in the work week and the extension of AIF to Canadian contracts. In exchange, however, GM demanded a five-year contract. The union leadership readily accepted the longer-term contract and joined with GM officials in declaring the five-year contract a major step towards harmonizing labour-management relations. Despite some discontent within the membership, who saw the lengthy contract as a sell-out, the agreement was ratified without a strike.(5) Chrysler workers fared the worst in these negotiations, receiving wage increases but no pension plan.(6)

The divergence between GM and Ford negotiations and contracts

was particularly significant. Ford concentrated its energies on whittling down UAW demands while staying within the traditional scope of collective bargaining as negotiations over wages and benefits. GM tackled bargaining quite differently. While accepting UAW demands for improved benefits, it also negotiated long-term commitments from the UAW. Therefore, GM introduced a new element of regulation into union-management relations.

The appearance of growing harmony between the UAW and the corporations - witnessed in the lack of strikes during the 1950 negotiations and the GM - UAW five-year contract - evaporated, however, when in late 1950 economic troubles began to plague the Canadian economy. Inflation rose from 2.9% in 1950 to 10.6 % in 1951.(7) Workers' wages could not keep up with the cost of living. Government action to reduce inflation compounded the problem as Bank of Canada credit curbs and restraints on the money supply reduced consumer demand for motor vehicles.(8) In response, auto corporations laid off autoworkers while attempting to maintain production through speedups. Workers bore the brunt of the recession and became increasingly militant and distrustful of compromises with management.

The UAW responded to the dual pressure of workers' discontent and spiralling inflation with demands to re-open contracts to adjust wages for inflation. Ford seized this opportunity to follow GM's lead in negotiations. In exchange for union-demanded wage increases, Ford demanded a five-year contract effective immediately.(9) The union leadership favoured this arrangement but underestimated workers' militancy. Ford workers in Windsor

rejected this offer. Amidst accusations of Communist sabotage by Burt, Canadian Ford workers wildcatted on November 26 and won a ten cent wage increase in mid-contract without acceptance of a five-year agreement.(10)

This settlement threatened any future moves by the union leadership towards stabilizing union-management relations. Ford workers had proven that workplace action, not negotiations and compromise, achieved results. When within six months of reaching this interim agreement regular Ford negotiations began, the union leadership faced the prospect of conflict and unchecked rank-and-file militancy.

At the Ford negotiating table the UAW put forth demands for a reduced work week in the hope that this would prevent further layoffs and aid workers in weathering the 1951 recession.(11) Negotiations failed, however, and proceeded to the mandatory Conciliation Board hearings. Weeks went by before the Conciliation Board report was brought down. During this time, Ford instituted speedups and forced overtime, therefore making impossible the union's task of controlling its membership. Ford workers wildcatted repeatedly, staging a total of thirty-four work stoppages within a matter of weeks.(12) When twenty-six of these workers were fired, the entire 12,000 workers at the Ford plant walked off the job on December 3 in protest.(13)

The Canadian union leadership was divided in its support for the strike. While staunch Reuther supporters such as Jack Taylor, president of Ford local 200, denounced the wildcat as

unauthorized, other leaders, including George Burt, felt sympathy for the Ford workers' plight.(14) Although Burt publicly denounced the wildcat, in a letter sent to all union locals on December 10, he expressed his sympathy for the striking workers and blamed the International Constitution for his moves to terminate the strike.(15)

The International had no such sympathy, seeing this strike as a threat to its leadership and its goal of stabilizing collective bargaining relations. The International therefore moved to force a settlement of the strike and restore harmonious relations with the Ford corporation. Walter Reuther personally intervened and promised the company that the International UAW would put a stop to the wildcat. He ordered a vote by Ford membership on the issue. On December 14 local 200 voted to end the wildcat and leave the fate of the 26 men to the decision of an arbiter.(16)

For Reuther, strikes were not a political weapon to be used by workers at will, but were the last resort in ongoing negotiations and were to be carefully orchestrated by the union leadership. Consequently, Reuther's overriding concern in the 1951 Ford wildcat was to force Canadian autoworkers to abide by his policy of collective bargaining and strikes. In so doing, he hoped to lay the basis for the long sought stabilized relations with corporations. He and International Secretary Emil Mazey therefore joined Ford president Rhys Sale in blaming the wildcat on a handful of Communists.(17) The company then went on to press its luck by firing six more of the strikers, bringing the total dismissed to thirty-two. This group constituted 25% of the union's

elected representatives in the Ford plant.(18) The company then refused to continue negotiations with the UAW until the bargaining committee was rid of two of the men who had been fired. Burt, whose commitment to the International policy on the Ford strike was already uncertain, was angered by this. He publicly denounced these actions by Ford and announced his desire to refuse further negotiations on these company terms. Burt was held in check by Reuther, however, who declared that local 200 would continue to negotiate according to company terms.(19)

The resulting settlement, reached in February 1952, moved the union and Ford one step closer to a more structured collective bargaining formula. Ford accepted a COLA clause similar to that negotiated between the UAW and GM in 1948. In return, the union agreed to a three-year contract (20) The settlement failed to address workers' problems of speedups and forced overtime. The pattern of Fordist regulation was becoming clearer. In exchange for better wages and benefits, the union was willing to leave production decisions to the companies.

Reuther's heavy-handed method of securing control over the Canadian Region and selling this compromise with Ford provided the Left with a basis for mobilizing increased support. Despite the union leadership's rhetoric on wildcats, these were not mere manifestations of Communist agitation. They were rank-and-file protests against the arbitrariness of management and obstacles to better working conditions and wages. As such, they provided the left-wing local leaders with a base of membership support due to

the Left's willingness to support such workplace action. The resulting increased polarization of the Left and Reuther caucuses' strategic positions was made clear during a District Council debate over wildcats in January, 1952.

At this meeting, Burt argued that the prestige of the UAW had dropped as a result of the Ford wildcat. He recommended that a policy be adopted to stop the "undemocratic" practice of wildcats. Furthermore, Burt insisted that the Canadian Region revise its policy on strikes to conform with the Constitution of the International Union. Earl Watson supported this position, blaming irresponsible plant leadership for the work stoppages. The District Council passed a resolution which condemned the "irresponsible action" of some workers in fomenting wildcats which contravened the International UAW Constitution. The resolution also committed the union leadership to active prevention of wildcats.(21) The Left caucus held its own, however, succeeding in the passage of two other resolutions which blunted the edge of this show of support for Reuther and the International union. The Council went on record as supporting the Ford workers' demands for better conditions, contracts and reinstatement of the 32 discharged men. Secondly, it passed a resolution which resolved:

that this UAW-CIO District Council #26 request that the IEB of our union endorse and support strike action found necessary by our locals even though they be termed "illegal" under this anti-labour legislation.(22)

Subsequent wildcats at Chrysler and Freuhauf Tractor in March 1952 received Burt's unofficial support. This support revealed the tenuousness of the International's control over the Canadian

Region and the future difficulties which would be encountered by the union in selling its compromises with management.(23)

Obstacles to the development of Fordist regulation were not limited to those posed by workers. Within a month of signing the new contract with the UAW, the Ford Motor Co. of Canada announced its intention to move much of its assembly-line operations to Oakville, where the climate for capital was better.(24) This attempt by the company to avoid the union compounded the union's difficulties in achieving membership support for further compromises. It also demonstrated the continued unwillingness of Ford to accept the UAW as a permanent actor in the workplace. However, Ford's move also had the unintended effect of strategically dividing the Left caucus as different groups of workers attempted to fend off the quite different strategic assaults by Ford and GM.

Once again it was negotiations between GM and the UAW which produced the next major innovation in collective bargaining. Although the UAW had signed a five-year agreement with GM in 1950, pressures from the rising cost of living caused the union in 1953 to demand a renegotiation of the contract. GM offered the workers an additional five cents an hour and a master contract covering all GM plants which would hitherto have a common termination date for their contracts.(25)

A master contract was a double-edged sword. As it brought various plants in different cities into one contract, it allowed for common strike action by different locals. A master contract also allowed for the common establishment of wage rates, work

standards and benefit packages. This prevented a company from pitting one local against another. These effects increased the bargaining strength of the union. On the other hand, master contracts decreased the autonomy of union locals. Bargaining demands were established by consultation with all locals and this system could prevent one local from pursuing its own priorities independently of other locals in the contract. Furthermore, such a contract provided the basis for the union executive to play a larger role in the collective bargaining process due to the necessity for coordinating bargaining activities. These factors made the proposed master contract an attractive formula to both UAW leaders and GM. The UAW's ability to protect its membership would be enhanced as would the union leadership's control over the Canadian membership. For GM, what the company lost in local manoeuvrability, it gained in stabilizing collective bargaining as corporations saw the International union as a conservatising influence over more militant locals.(26)

For these same reasons, left-wing Autoworkers from GM in Canada opposed the acceptance of a master agreement. The core of this opposition was located in the UAW's largest GM local in Canada, local 222 in Oshawa. The five-year contract signed in 1950 had given Communist and nationalist militants in the local a basis for mobilizing support for their peculiarly named 'Democratic Right Wing Caucus', more commonly known as the Young Turks. GM's 1953 offer sparked open conflict between this and the Reuther caucus. Led by local 222 negotiators, Cliff Pilkey and Doug

Sutton, the Young Turks opposed GM's offer of a five cent an hour increase and the master contract.(27)

The Young Turks were not yet in a strong enough position to win in this struggle with the International, however. In July, 1953, all GM locals other than local 222 accepted GM's offer, thereby making the first major breakthrough for the Canadian UAW on the question of master contracts.(28) This weakened the Young Turks' position. Their attempts to mobilize support in the union around appeals to retaining national control over bargaining and to local autonomy gained them the support of local 222 membership, but hardened the antagonism of both the International UAW and the company.(29) The end result was that local 222 failed even to win the five cent an hour wage increase given to those Canadian GM workers who accepted the master contract.(30)

These negotiations were of crucial importance both to the structure of Fordist regulation in the auto industry and to Canadian Autoworkers' acceptance of it. Despite local 222's opposition to and exclusion from the master contract, the first step had been taken towards stabilizing collective bargaining through master bargaining and contracts. Nonetheless, Reuther's opposition to local 222, combined with his subsequent moves to usurp control from the local bargaining team, ensured that over the next two years momentum behind the nationalist appeals of the Young Turks would build.(31)

While this crisis at GM simmered, attention shifted back to Ford. Here the UAW also pushed for a master contract. However, the union leadership found the conflicts and alliances over this issue

quite different from those it had encountered at GM. Ford had no intention of accepting a master contract, especially as its move to Oakville was intended to avoid the UAW. Consistent with this desire, Ford dismissed between 1400 and 1500 workers at the Windsor plant due to the shift of Ford operations to Oakville.(32) Despite promises that the company would re-employ the Windsor workers in the new plant if they were willing to relocate, by September only 10% had been accepted at the Oakville operations.(33) This corporate action fed fears that Ford intended to keep union militants out of the Oakville plant. Ford's strategy led militants and non-militants alike to support UAW demands for a master contract. In contrast to their brothers and sisters in Oshawa, Canadian Ford workers saw a master contract as the only means for workers to resist corporate attempts to weaken their union through plant relocation and locally variant wage and benefit packages. The UAW's first step towards achieving its goal was to organize the new Ford plant in Oakville. In January, 1954 the union was successful and UAW local 707 was formed.(34)

Soon after this victory, Ford negotiations got underway. Almost immediately they bogged down over the UAW's demand for a master contract covering all Ford plants in Canada.(35) Meanwhile talks also began at Chrysler. If the UAW had hoped for a speedy resolution of both sets of talks, this hope was dashed as Canada entered into another recession and both corporations joined with others in Ontario to take a hard line against unions. Unions' positions were weakened as unemployment in Canada almost doubled

between 1953 and 1954.(36) Canadian autoworkers were particularly hard hit as the auto and aircraft industries geared down production as a result of the end of the Korean war. For example, on June 5, 1954 the Ford plant in Oakville shut down for 5 days and 6,650 workers in both Windsor and Oakville were laid off for periods longer than the shutdown.(37) By September, 16,000 workers in the auto industry alone had been laid off.(38)

When the UAW went into conciliation over the Ford and Chrysler disputes, the union and the companies were far apart in their proposals. At the Ford hearings, the UAW continued to demand a national agreement as well as a thirty cent per hour wage increase and improved benefits and seniority provisions. Similar demands, with the exception of the master agreement, were made at the Chrysler hearings. Both companies offered a four cent wage increase, no change to benefits and, at Ford, a readjusted seniority system under which the company would not be bound by regular seniority provisions for short-term layoffs.(39) The conciliation reports came down resoundingly on the side of the corporations. In all the reports, the conciliator recommended a zero increase in wages and benefits, excepting minor increases in hospitalization coverage, and status quo on seniority provisions. Furthermore, the Ford conciliation report blamed workers' wages for the increased prices of cars and the lack of competitiveness of the Canadian auto industry. Finally, the Board rejected the union's demand for a master contract.(40)

Ford was established as the UAW's strike target.(41) In an attempt to avert a strike, the UAW reduced its monetary demand to

that initially offered by the company and Reuther offered to negotiate the settlement himself.(42) Ford made it clear, however, that it wanted to bring the union to its knees; Wallace Clark, Vice President in charge of Ford industrial relations, announced, "when you settle it will be on the company's terms".(43) On October 10, 1954 the Ford strike began in Windsor, spreading to Oakville within the week.

The strike was a long and bitter one. Ford used its money and power to attack the union through the press and was aided in its endeavours by reporters themselves.(44) As the strike wore on, the company used the issue of the master contract to divide union locals amongst themselves. Rhys Sale, president of Ford Motor Co. of Canada, announced that Ford's resistance to a provincial agreement was not merely the result of cost and impracticality, but was an effort to preserve local union autonomy for: "...any agreement of a joint nature would not be a truly provincial agreement but one imposed by local 200 without regard to local conditions and problems."(45)

Canadian Autoworkers fought back. Militants and non-militants stood solidly together in support of the strike. However, the Canadian UAW's attempts to settle the strike were to no avail. Burt therefore invited International officers to take over Canadian negotiations. It was the Ontario government and the International Union which, in working behind the scenes, reached a settlement on January 27, 1955. The strike had lasted 109 days.(46)

The settlement was a complete victory for neither the company nor the union. The UAW won a master agreement covering hourly paid employees at Windsor, Etobicoke and Oakville but accepted a readjustment of the work week and seniority changes for short-term layoffs. The union also won a modified union shop, full medical coverage paid by the company and increased holidays. However, it agreed to changes in the job-posting practices and received the company's initial wage offer of 4 cents per hour. Workers voted heavily in favour of the settlement. Ford had weathered its 12th strike in 13 years.(47) Shortly thereafter, Chrysler workers gained a similar contract without a strike.

The Ford settlement constituted a breakthrough in establishing an industry-wide system of collective bargaining. In so doing, it put into place a major component of the emergent system of Fordist regulation. At the most immediate level, Canadian Ford workers had forced the Ford Motor Co. of Canada to accept a master contract and therefore the permanence of the UAW as the representative of autoworkers in Canada. The master contract restricted management's bargaining options as it undermined the company-perceived advantage of relocating production to avoid the union. Secondly, the master contract made it more difficult for the Ford Co. to pit one local against another as it had attempted during this strike. Finally, the master contract made the strike weapon more effective. All workers in one corporation could now go on strike simultaneously, thereby increasing the impact on production and the leverage of the union. Although the Ford Co. had been forced to accept the master

contract, it, like GM, would find itself the beneficiary of a more stable labour-management environment which meant fewer strikes.

Furthermore, the Ford settlement, combined with GM's earlier acceptance of a master contract and wage formulas, opened the way to a rationalization in the use of strikes and the establishment of pattern bargaining. The UAW could now coordinate bargaining such that only one corporation would go on strike at any one time. The union could then take the company-wide settlement negotiated at the targetted company and use this as the pattern for remaining negotiations with other corporations. This meant that wages and benefits set by the collective agreement of any one of the major corporations (the Big Three in the case of the auto industry) were copied by other companies in the same industry. The end-result of this would be standardized wages and benefits across an entire industry.(48) The first evidence of this had come in Chrysler's acceptance, without a strike, of a contract patterned on the 1954 Ford-UAW contract.(49) All of these developments contributed to the highly structured regulation of labour-management relations and reduced the areas of conflict between the two parties. One more component of a Fordist regulatory system had been put into place.

The 1954-55 Ford strike also had the unanticipated result of giving the International Union a stronger hand in Canadian union affairs. Burt's request for International help in collective bargaining set a precedent that would not be undone until 1979.

Furthermore, the thorny issue of master contracts had divided the Left caucus. The union administration had received support for this issue from UAW militants at Ford. This isolated militants at GM in Oshawa who ultimately gave up their opposition to the master contract. Nonetheless, if the UAW leadership anticipated that its victory on the question of master contracts meant a decline in opposition from Canadian militants, this leadership was soon proved wrong. The Left was still alive and well in Canada and ready to fight the next step towards regulated collective bargaining.

The 1954 economic recession with its attendant bitter struggles between the UAW and the auto corporations pointed the way to the UAW's next major demand, and ultimately the last major component of Fordist regulation in the auto industry. Cyclical downturns in the auto and agricultural implement industries, combined with the annual layoffs resulting from downtime while model changeover occurred, meant that workers' wages fluctuated wildly and made the future uncertain. The UAW laid the blame for these boom and bust cycles at the feet of the corporations themselves, in poorly planned production and substandard wages which the UAW argued reduced overall consumer demand. To deal with this problem, Walter Reuther formulated a plan for a guaranteed annual wage (GAW).⁽⁵⁰⁾ This was to be achieved through the negotiation of contracts which specified that companies be responsible for maintaining workers' annual wages during layoff by paying the difference between unemployment benefits and the usual wage. This would prevent wild fluctuations in workers' incomes. It

would also provide an incentive for the industry to iron out production cycles such that fluctuations between forced overtime and short work weeks were minimized and downtime due to model changeover or overproduction was rationalized.(51) With the return of prosperity in the industry in 1955 and the memory of 1954 hardships fresh in the minds of the workers, the International UAW made the winning of GAW the union's top bargaining priority.

In anticipation of corporate resistance to GAW, the International proposed a substantial dues increase to cover the cost of possible strikes over this issue. This dues increase, when combined with the International's interference and control over 1954 Canadian negotiations, sparked a resurgence of nationalism amongst Canadian autoworkers, who began demanding greater Regional autonomy from the International. In his report to the March District Council meeting, Burt attacked the nationalists as Communist allies. He urged Council delegates to continue their support for their International, including the proposed dues increase, on the basis that International unions were the only means to bargain with multinational corporations.(52)

Gordie Lambert, a well-known member of the Communist party from local 199 in St. Catherines, and Charlie Brooks, plant chairman for the Chrysler unit of local 195 in Windsor, defended the nationalist position. Both men spoke against the dues increase, arguing that Canadian strikers did not receive the same strike benefits as their American brothers and sisters. Cliff Pilkey, head of the Young Turks in Oshawa, then entered the fray,

arguing that such a dues increase would cause disunity amongst the membership.(53) The results of this District Council meeting were testament to the growing support for the nationalist left caucus.

The Council passed a resolution demanding that there be a Canadian Vice President on the UAW International Executive Board, with the understanding that this person would have full authority over staff members in Canada.(54) Then at the March 30th International Convention, half the Canadian delegation voted against the proposed dues increase from \$2.50 to \$7.50/month which was aimed at supporting the upcoming strikes for the Guaranteed Annual Wage.(55) With the overwhelming support of the US section of the union, however, the dues increase was approved. The 1955 negotiations were gearing up to be another head on fight between the Left and Reuther caucuses in Canada.

In preparation for this conflict, the International union moved to gain greater control over the Canadian region via George Burt. Burt had repeatedly demonstrated himself an uncertain ally of the International and was therefore blamed for some of the continued conflict within the Canadian Region. Following accusations by Canadian staff members, Tommy MacLean and John Eldon, that Burt was fomenting nationalism in Canada, the International Executive Board gave Burt an ultimatum. Either he cleaned up the politics in Region 7 or the International would guarantee that this was his last term as Canadian Director. The upcoming negotiations over GAW were the test of Burt's leadership.(56)

With Burt on notice and the UAW victorious on the issue of

GAW at Ford in the U.S., conditions were ready for the UAW to begin its struggle for GAW in Canada. GM was established as the union's Canadian target for winning this demand. After months of fruitless bargaining, the union prepared to strike.(57) Top union and GM negotiators from Detroit moved into the Canadian negotiations to attempt a last minute settlement.(58) This failed and at midnight on September 18, 17,000 GM workers went out on strike. The major stumbling blocks to a settlement were GM's demand for a three-year contract and the UAW's demand for GAW and wage parity between the Oshawa and GM workers in other locals. Since the abortive attempt in 1953 by local 222 to negotiate outside the master agreement, wages of Oshawa GM workers had fallen far behind those in other GM plants.(59)

The union anticipated conflict with local 222 and the presence of International negotiators at Canadian bargaining was the result. Local 222 wanted to ditch the demand for GAW in exchange for the settlement of local grievances, in particular production problems such as speedups. The International officers were determined to prevent this local from sabotaging the UAW's official agenda. Local 222 understood the obstacles it faced and attempted to strengthen its hand by ensuring the continued support of its allies on the Left. Local negotiators, Pilkey and Sutton, with International Representative Paul Siren, arranged a series of meetings with the Communist Party to discuss strike strategy.(60)

Local 222's mobilization of the Left against the International's collective bargaining strategy when combined with

public accusations that the Oshawa local was dominated by Communist "totalitarian power hungry union leaders", threatened both the success of the union's immediate negotiations as well as the long term goal of presenting the UAW as a legitimate and responsible union.(61) The International negotiators, therefore, isolated local 222 at the bargaining table. While apparently acceding to local 222's demand that the International negotiators leave the local to bargain on its own, in so doing the International negotiators effectively froze this local out of key negotiations between top corporate and union officials.(62) This ensured that GAW would remain a key demand and that local 222 could not trade it in exchange for settlement on local issues.

Negotiations and the strike dragged on.(63) Christmas came and went. Finally, the International, upon Burt's request, sent Leonard Woodcock, Vice President of the UAW, into the Canadian negotiations.(64) After another month of negotiations, a settlement was announced on February 14, 1956. The UAW won a union shop and extended the master agreement to include Oshawa. Furthermore, the agreement included GAW, better company-paid health coverage, and substantially improved wages.(65) In total the GM settlement was the largest to be won in Canada and was five cents more than the US settlement.(66) It had cost the workers 148 days on strike. All five plants voted overwhelmingly in favour of the contract.(67) Ford Canada followed the GM pattern when its turn for negotiations came about.(68)

Both the UAW leadership and the Left in local 222 proclaimed victory with the announcement of the GM settlement. The key goals

set by the International of a master agreement covering all Canadian GM workers and the Guaranteed Annual Wage had been won. In turn, the Young Turks from Oshawa saw the wage settlement, which was superior to that won in the US, as proof of their success both in defending their membership and in defying an Internationally set wage pattern. In reality, however, the Left had been defeated. Local 222 lost in its battle against GAW and failed to secure greater union control over production decisions.

The Guaranteed Annual Wage, subsequently known as Supplementary Unemployment Benefits (SUB), was the last of the set of regulatory mechanisms in UAW-corporate collective bargaining to be put into place. Wage formulas (COLA and AIF), longer-term master contracts, pattern bargaining and GAW rationalized the bargaining process and stabilized union relations with corporations. These structures, which remained in place until 1979, established accepted parameters around which orderly collective bargaining could take place. The UAW agreed to leave production decisions to management and to control membership militancy in exchange for improved and stabilized wages and benefits. This system of regulation also allowed companies to undertake longer range planning as labour and labour costs were now regulated on a long-range economic cycle. Finally, these new structures, in particular GAW, encouraged companies to further rationalize production as cyclical fluctuations in labour costs no longer acted as a disciplinary pressure on workers. The structures of Fordist regulation and consumption had finally been put into

place.

Although the structures were in place for the system of regulation, to be fully entrenched it was necessary that the Reuther caucus secure the support of and control over the membership. In Canada, this meant defeating the Left. The defeat of the Left caucus in the 1955-1956 round of negotiations augured well for the Reuther caucus. Elections in local 222 in May 1956 provided even more basis for hope amongst union leaders. Bill Rutherford, a known Communist member and activist in the Left caucus, was defeated in his bid for re-election for vice president of the local. However, Pilkey was re-elected.(69) Moreover, a new base for the Left emerged in 1956 with the successful split of the Chrysler unit from local 195. Chrysler workers had repeatedly attempted to remove themselves from the dominance of the right-wing caucus which controlled local 195. On August 22, 1956 the Ontario Labour Relations Board ruled in favour of the creation of an independent Chrysler local 444. Charlie Brooks, long-time plant chairman of the Chrysler unit, became president of the new local and lent his support to the Left caucus. Furthermore, Gordie Lambert, a member of the Communist Party and long-time militant in amalgamated local 199 in St.Catherines, held onto his elected union position despite repeated efforts by the Reuther caucus to oust him.

Another blow to the Reuther caucus' quest for control over the Canadian Region came with the onset of yet another recession in the auto and agricultural implement industries in 1956 which provided the basis for increased mobilization behind the Left

caucus. Unlike the previous two recessions, this one was caused by the flooding of the Canadian auto market with American and European imports, slackening demand due to the effects of government curbs on credit and overproduction as a result of automation. Imports of completed motor vehicles into Canada as a percent of total domestic supply jumped from 11.75% in 1955 to 20.03% in 1956.(70) Unemployment soared in both the auto and agricultural implement industries as companies cut production.(71) Workers remaining on the job were subjected to continued speedups. While the International union proposed solutions of a shorter work week and a reduction in prices of vehicles to stimulate demand, the Left caucus in Canada, led this time by local 444, demanded that workers be given the right to strike against unreasonable work practices.(72)

The appeal of the Left's solutions was reflected in the next District Council elections in 1957. The Left caucus put forward an entire slate of candidates. With support from some CCFers, nationalists and Communist party members, it won four of the nine Council positions, including the two top positions of President and Vice President which were filled by Pilkey and Reg Screen respectively. Gordie Lambert won a position on the resolutions committee.(73)

The Left steered the District Council onto a more radical course of action. At the September 1953 Council meeting, a resolution was passed which denounced the inhuman pace of production and demanded International support for the right to

strike over speedups. This resolution represented a challenge to management's right to control production and hence, the very basis of the postwar settlement when it stated:

We reject all so-called scientific systems and slide rule calculations for setting work standards as transparent masks for management to make arbitrary judgements. It is our firm belief that no outside party can determine a proper work pace. Only the worker on the job can possibly be in a position to make the decision of what constitutes a fair day's work.(74)

This resolution appealed to the immediate problems of workers on the shop floor, whereas the International union's bargaining philosophy and strike strategy was seen as ignoring these day-to-day realities. Thus, even by 1957 the postwar settlement had yet to truly be settled. This would not occur until the early 1960's and then it would last for less than a decade.

Searching for a Relationship with the State, 1950-57

The Ontario and federal governments played a minimal role in constructing the compromise between organized labour and management in the auto sector. UAW-government relations did not develop into a highly structured set of arrangements, but rather remained sporadic and became of lesser importance to the union than its relations with corporations. The UAW's strategy in dealing with government did change in this period, however. Strikes, which until 1949 had been a major part of UAW strategy to pressure governments, were abandoned as a means of gaining political leverage with governments. Lobbying replaced this more militant strategy in UAW dealings with the federal government. On the provincial scene, the UAW continued to be hostile to the

Conservative government but had minimal dealings with this government except on questions of the Labour Code.

Not having established a stable and ongoing relationship with the federal government, the UAW only mobilized its political resources into lobbies during times of economic crisis. Consequently, the issue which dominated UAW lobbies was unemployment. The UAW undertook its first major lobby on this issue in 1951. In this year inflation skyrocketed and the government's policy of restricting credit threatened automobile consumption and increased unemployment in the auto industry.

In April, 1951 the UAW sent 75 delegates to Ottawa to demand increased government unemployment insurance payments, price and rent controls, and abandonment of the government's policy of restricting credit.(75) This first lobby was followed on June 14 by another mass lobby led by Ford workers. The large UAW delegation met with Health and Welfare Minister Paul Martin and the parliamentary assistant to Finance Minister Abbott. Fourteen MPs and representatives from the trade department also attended the meeting. Again Canadian Autoworkers pressed for changes to the government credit policy which the union blamed for the reduction in car sales and the growing unemployment in the auto industry.(76) The government ignored the UAW's demands and was saved from future opposition by the union by the 1952 recovery in the auto industry.

By this time, UAW attention shifted to the agricultural implement industry where massive numbers of its membership were

laid off. Over the next two years, the UAW mounted a number of lobbies demanding the federal government's pursuit of a full employment policy.(77) The only response by the government was to call another meeting with the UAW, this time with more senior government officials, including C.D.Howe.(78) Within two weeks, the UAW followed up on this meeting with another delegation to Parliament. This time union leaders held private meetings with Labour Minister Gregg and Health Minister Martin.(79) Once again, the result was all talk and no action.

By this time, the national economy again went into decline with auto production being especially hard hit due to the end of the Korean war. In response to this recession, the UAW demanded a more comprehensive programme of action from the federal government. The union pressured the government to pursue a full employment policy by boosting housing construction, increasing the number of public works, devising a more equitable taxation system, implementing a national health insurance scheme, and increasing payments for the old age pension, family allowances and unemployment insurance.(80)

The UAW modified its lobbying strategy due to the failures of its earlier lobbies. Borrowing from a strategy employed earlier by certain locals, the union decided to increase its bargaining strength by eliciting the support of municipal politicians with whom it had more influence.(81) The union anticipated that concerted pressure from these local politicians, the UAW and other unions would force the government into action. In May 1954 at the provincial Mayors and Reeves Convention held in Windsor, Burt

appealed to the convention for its support in the UAW's campaign to the federal government for a full employment policy. He urged city councils to cooperate with their local labour councils and adopt the UAW's position on unemployment. The union gained support amongst the Association of Mayors and Reeves since prolonged unemployment had placed a burden on Municipal Welfare Departments. Workers who had exhausted their unemployment insurance benefits, turned to municipal governments for relief. Therefore, the Mayors passed a resolution blaming the Ontario and federal governments for this municipal plight and demanding a federal government commitment to full employment and the development of a new financial agreement with municipalities to provide them with greater monies for welfare.(82) Sometime after this, the federal government appointed Burt as the labour representative on the federal Unemployment Insurance Advisory Committee, but did nothing else to respond to the union's mounting demands.(83) Once again, industry recovery appeared to save the government from having to act.

For Canadian Autoworkers, however, the 1955 industry recovery was only a short reprieve from continued problems in the Canadian auto industry. By the summer of 1956, unemployment was once again on the rise and by 1957 reached crisis proportions. This recession differed from previous ones, however. The root of the problems no longer lay in cyclical overproduction by automakers but in climbing imports as a percentage of the Canadian domestic market and increased automation of the assembly line.

The UAW once again tried lobbying for increased unemployment insurance and a government commitment to full employment. Chrysler workers from Windsor mobilized city council support for a resolution demanding increased import duties and reduced excise tax on Canadian made cars.(84) The UAW District Council passed repeated resolutions calling for the reduction of imports and tripartite meetings on the question of imports and automation.(85)

After two years of lobbying for such a meeting, the government acceded to the UAW's demand. On November 25, 1957 a preliminary meeting on automation took place. It was chaired by the Assistant Deputy to the Minister of Labour, George Haythorne, and attended by industry representatives from General Motors, Canadian Industries Limited, and Canadian General Electric and labour representatives from the CLC, including Burt amongst others. Burt pronounced the meeting a failure, however, as the government and industry were interested in discussing new training necessary to ensure a workforce capable of handling the new technology, while the UAW's major concern was the effects of automation on worker displacement.(86) On the question of vehicle imports, the UAW did not even gain a meeting with government officials.

What was most notable about the UAW's lobbying strategy with the federal government in these years was its failure. In spite of repeated delegations to government, the Canadian UAW failed to move the government on any of its demands. The only notable change to UAW-federal government relations was the increased frequency of contact between union and government officials and the UAW's

occasional access to powerful government ministers, such as C.D.Howe.

This situation contrasted with the UAW's relations with the Ontario government. The UAW had fewer dealings with the Ontario government than it had in previous years. The only major provincial issue around which the UAW organized during the period from 1950 to 1957 was the Labour Code, in particular the conciliation procedure. Again in contrast to UAW-federal government relations, the union ignored lobbying on this issue in favour of more direct action.

The UAW's major complaint against the conciliation procedure was that it dragged out the negotiation process and placed severe limits on the union's control over the timing of strikes. This complaint had been made by the union when the provincial Labour Code was first introduced. It resurfaced following the 1951 Ford wildcat, which had been sparked by lengthy delays caused by conciliation proceedings. At this time, the UAW District Council had reiterated its demand for changes to the Ontario conciliation procedure, but to no avail.(87)

The year 1954 hardened the UAW's resolve to force such changes. In that year, at least six Conciliation Board reports were brought down on UAW disputes.(88) All of them recommended 0% wage increases (despite managements' initial offers of four cents an hour) and rejected most other union demands. These reports not only supported private business but led the way for corporations to withdraw many of their initial offers to the union. The UAW's

immediate response was to refuse to make a submission to the 1954 GM conciliation board.(89)

At the December 1954 District Council meeting, lengthy and heated debate took place over the conciliation procedure. Out of this debate the UAW issued a statement of policy on conciliation boards. It condemned the boards for hampering the negotiating process and accused judges acting as conciliators of being "the tool of Big Business". The statement reflected the growing discontent and militancy within the UAW as it read:

The UAW-CIO ,largest union in Canada, has become convinced that conciliation boards do little more than accentuate the class struggle, making the job of proper labour-management relations more difficult than it would be without them.... Conciliation boards may serve economic and political ends, but they will never do what they purport to do, that is, promote harmony and better relations between labour and management.(90)

It was then recommended that all UAW affiliated locals cease full participation in Conciliation Board hearings, except in a nominal fashion to satisfy the requirements of labour law. The statement concluded with the following:

The time has come to stop competing with management in prettily-bound briefs to conciliation boards. Conciliation boards should be regarded as nothing more than the economic and political hurdles which time and sad experience have shown them to be.(91)

In his report to the same Council meeting, Burt suggested that the UAW mobilize behind the CCF in the upcoming provincial election to increase pressure for change to the Labour Code.(92)

The union's resistance to the conciliation procedure continued throughout 1955. Burt claimed that strikes and the threat of strikes were the only means of getting negotiations

going.(93) When the UAW defied the conciliation procedure by refusing to submit a report to another GM conciliation board in 1955, the Board responded with a series of recommendations to ensure compliance with the law. If companies refused to make a full submission, the Board recommended that this be reported to the Minister of Labour and that unions either be allowed to strike immediately or the company be fined for unfair labour practices. On the other hand, if the union refused to make a full report, the union would be decertified. The Board justified these recommended penalties on the basis that "the public" had a right to full evidence submitted to an "impartial conciliation board" on a labour dispute.(94) The conciliation board's appeal on behalf of the "public" did not mask the inequalities of the Board's recommendations. While companies might be fined, unions would be decertified. This blatant protection of management rights only reinforced the UAW's commitment to challenge the conciliation procedure.

Again in October, 1955 the UAW refused to submit a brief to a conciliation board, this time in the Massey Fergusson dispute.(95) In the face of UAW defiance of the law, the Ontario government merely rebuked the union for its actions.(96) When the UAW and Ford reached an agreement in 1956 to treat conciliation as a perfunctory obstacle to real bargaining, the matter was settled.(97) Henceforth, conciliation hearings became a formality, lasting, in some cases, a matter of minutes.(98)

The provincial government's lack of action in forcing the UAW

to abide by the law was attributable to a series of factors. Part of the reason lay in the power of the UAW whose membership was almost completely concentrated in Ontario. The UAW's threat to mobilize behind the CCF combined with evidence of growing militancy amongst Autoworkers seen in increasing numbers of wildcats over conciliation delays, posed an immediate threat to Ontario Conservatives presumably making them hesitant to act. Furthermore, the auto industry itself was the life-blood of Ontario's industrial complex. The fact that the UAW could severely disrupt production combined with the apparent acquiescence on the part of the corporations with regards to the conciliation process meant that government action was inappropriate.

Between 1950 and 1957, the UAW's strategy and relations with both the Ontario and federal governments diverged. Whereas at the federal level the UAW abandoned militant, mobilization politics in favour of lobbying and compromise, at the provincial level the union continued to engage in more direct action, using its workplace strength to make its voice heard. This federal-provincial difference persisted in spite of the better results achieved by the UAW through direct action in its dealings with the Ontario government. A number of factors help explain this difference in union strategy.

The single most important determinant of the UAW's shift away from militant workplace-based strategies towards lobbying was the effect on the use of strikes of the specific mode of Fordist regulation which emerged in the auto industry. The compromise between the UAW and the auto corporations which served as the

bedrock of Fordist regulation was based on a willingness of the union to control the militancy of its membership and therefore rationalize the use of strikes. Within the union, this necessitated not only a change in use of strikes, but also a reinterpretation of the use of strikes as part of union strategy. Strikes ceased to be seen as a political weapon wielded by workers in the face of government or corporate intransigence. Instead, they became the last resort in a conflict over the division of the economic pie. Throughout the 1950's, the International union administration fought to gain control over the Canadian region in order to ensure the compliance of Canadian Autoworkers with this new set of rules in collective bargaining.

This restriction of the use of strikes for economic ends limited the strategic options available to the Canadian UAW in its pursuit of political change. Lobbying was one of the few courses of action open for Canadian Autoworkers to influence government. Considering that other Canadian unions and the American branch of the UAW had already established fairly sophisticated lobbying practices, it was not surprising that the Canadian UAW followed suit.

A second and related factor which contributed to the Canadian UAW's willingness to pursue lobbying at the federal level despite its ineffectiveness in these years was the reduced importance of federal government action for the UAW's achievement of its goals. whereas in the 1940's the Canadian UAW had looked to the federal government to implement sweeping social welfare measures, in the

1950's many of the issues were successfully dealt with at the bargaining table. Even the importance of improved unemployment insurance benefits, which were the objective of repeated Canadian UAW lobbies in the 1950's, was blunted by the winning of GAW in 1955. Therefore, each step taken towards formulating a compromise with the corporations curbed the UAW's need for federal government intervention in the economy.

The final factor which contributed to the UAW's abandonment of militant action to achieve its goals lay in the union's relationship to the incumbent Liberal administration. Since the 1945 Liberal-Labour electoral alliance in which the UAW had participated, the Liberal Party had developed quite close ties with Canadian Autoworkers. Although in 1949 the union allied itself with the CCF, this earlier association with the Liberals continued to influence UAW politics. Personal ties between the union and certain government members, such as Paul Martin, secured this relationship and often provided the union with its access to government. In turn, this relationship fed union hopes that continued lobbying and dialogue with the Liberal government would produce results.

In contrast, there existed no such relationship between the Ontario Conservative government and the UAW. This factor, however, was less important in explaining the UAW's limited and yet confrontational relationship with the Ontario government. Most important was the provincial government's constitutional responsibility for labour law and the impediment posed by existing labour legislation in the UAW's pursuit of its goals. The

Conciliation Board procedure constituted a serious obstacle to the UAW's pursuit of a highly structured and industry-wide collective bargaining relationship with the auto corporations. In particular the 1954 Ford Conciliation Board recommended against the master contract. Although the UAW won the master contract through strike action, it determined to prevent further government interference with negotiations and the planning of strikes. The union therefore adopted a more militant strategy to oppose the provincial legislation.

Moreover, industrial relations affected the day-to-day lives of autoworkers, preventing the quick settlement of contracts and delaying workers' right to strike. Workers thus often took matters into their own hands by wildcatting. In turn, the UAW, with little hope of controlling this worker militancy despite its commitment to 'responsible unionism' in the workplace, intended to regain control by forcing a compromise with the government on the issue of Conciliation hearings.

In spite of these changes in the UAW's relationship with the federal government, union-government relations remained largely unstructured and sporadic. Governments refused to play a central role in securing the Fordist mode of regulation, preferring instead to rely on private industry and collective bargaining to iron out problems. This was most evident in the federal government's lack of response to repeated UAW calls for a government solution to unemployment. At the same time, the UAW accepted and, in many ways, facilitated this lack of government

intervention by concentrating its energies on making gains through collective bargaining and by failing to seriously mobilize behind a political party over which it might have more leverage. It is to this story that we now turn.

Partisan Politics Take a Back Seat: The CCF and the UAW

Between 1950 and 1957, the Canadian UAW gave increasing financial and organizational support to the CCF. This was the result of both pressure from the International union and the fulfillment of the 1949 District Council pledge of support for the CCF as the "political arm" of labour. This heightened support for the party masked the growing apathy towards the partisan option in politics, however. Rank-and-file autoworkers remained distrustful of the party and ignored calls to vote for the CCF. In turn, the Canadian union leadership, despite its rhetorical and financial support for the party, concentrated its political energies elsewhere.

The CCF, on the other hand, desperately needed UAW and other union support. In 1949, the CCF found itself financially strapped and organizationally bankrupt in many parts of the country. Its victories of the 1940's began to pale as the CCF dropped from 28 seats in the House of Commons in 1945 to 13 seats in the 1949 federal election. A solution to the CCF's problems lay in building stronger links with the trade unions, thereby providing itself with a solid financial basis upon which to rebuild the party.

To shore up its failing resources the CCF developed two strategies - rebuilding the party internally and developing

stronger links with the trade unions. In pursuit of these goals, the CCF launched a massive fund-raising and membership drive under the direction of Donald MacDonald. The party also attempted better communication with trade unions by establishing a CCL - CCF liaison committee (whose union representatives were Pat Conroy, Charlie Millard, George Burt, Samuel Baron and Murray Cotterill) and reconstituting its Trade Union Committee, which had atrophied over the three years of its existence between 1946 and 1949.(99)

Despite the CCF's desperate need for trade-union support, these initial moves proved to be false starts.(100) The first year of the CCF's financial and membership campaign was a failure. CCF memberships continued to drop from 1949-1950 to the grand total of 11,992 lost memberships. Furthermore, only \$13,543 was collected of an anticipated \$50,000.(101) The liaison committee never developed as a functioning body.(102) The CCF Trade Union Committee had limited funds and found itself relatively isolated from central party decision-making. No member of this committee sat on the Federal Executive and no regular reporting procedure to the party officials was established. No representative from the UAW was included on this committee.

In a move to further reduce tensions between the CCF and trade unions and increase trade-union financial support for the party, the CCL decided to decentralize Political Action Committees and place the major responsibility for their functioning upon provincial federations of labour. George Burt, as president of the Ontario Federation of Labour (OFL) was thus made a member of an OFL-CCF joint planning committee which was to coordinate

activities between unions and the party.(103)

This coincided with a push by the International UAW to systematize and improve the union's political action programmes. At the 1951 International Convention, a new constitutional provision was passed which directed all locals to set aside five cents from each monthly dues payment to establish a Citizenship and Legislative Fund.(104) This instilled new hope in the CCF for greater UAW support. Lorne Ingle, National Secretary of the CCF, approached Burt for a \$10,000 contribution to assist the National CCF organization campaign. He reminded Burt of the commitment to increased political action made at the last International UAW convention.(105) Although Burt ignored these early pleas for direct financial assistance, the District Council confirmed its support for the CCF and Burt appointed Art Shultz as the first full-time UAW Political Action Director.(106) Furthermore, local unions established local Political Action Committees in 1951 such that by the end of this year, 21 out of 38 locals had such committees.(107)

Other developments in the UAW also promised a more secure future for the CCF in the UAW. Windsor, as the centre of UAW activity, had been the target of CCF activities for some time. The strength of both the Communists and the Liberals in Windsor UAW locals, however, had prevented the CCF from making much headway in the area. It was thus with relief that the UAW received news from Archie Cherniak on May 11, 1951 that the winds of change in Windsor augered well for the CCF. Roy England, president of local

200 and long-time opponent of the CCF, had moved to the UAW staff and was replaced by Jack Taylor who Cherniak reported was "very friendly" to the CCF. Furthermore, Earl Watson, president of local 195, who at times had been resistant to any party involvement by the UAW, had spoken at a CCF sponsored meeting in Windsor.(108) These changes, in combination with Burt's apparent support of the CCF, were taken as a signal for better times in the future of the Windsor CCF.

The CCF overestimated the importance of these changes. Where CCF supporters in the UAW succeeded in coming to power locally, this did not indicate a massive turn around in membership support for the party. Rather, in many cases, it represented a strategic victory for the UAW administration and pro-administrative local caucuses in their battle to rid the union of Communists and more radical elements. These victories represented a change in leadership only and were often temporary as militant forces regrouped, only to win in their next struggle with the leadership.(109)

Furthermore, the CCF underestimated the strength of Liberal Party connections with Autoworkers, especially in Windsor. Liberal Party member Art Reaume, mayor of Windsor and supporter of the UAW in the 1945 Ford strike, continued to represent labour's interests in the city. For example, in 1950 he proposed local tax revisions intended to increase workers' opportunities for home ownership. He argued his case as follows:

It is not to be overlooked that Windsor is essentially a working man's city and although increases have been given in wage standards they have not, in my opinion, kept pace

with the increase in the cost of living. Nothing is quite so important for a community such as Windsor as to work towards the goal of trying to have as many home owners as possible.(110)

Considering that this appeal coincided with UAW struggles for increased wages in mid-contract to catch up with inflation, it reflected the willingness of non-CCF politicians to listen to and act upon the demands of labour. In turn, Paul Martin kept in touch with Windsor UAW affairs and offered help to the union whenever it should need it.(111)

Such was the constellation of political forces when the Ontario provincial election was called in the fall of 1951. The CCF was optimistic that increased union support would hold it in good stead for this election. Further encouragement came when the UAW increased its support for the CCF in preparation for the election. The union established various labour-CCF joint election committees throughout the province and eight members of the UAW ran for election on the CCF ticket, including Earl Watson.(112) Furthermore, three weeks before the election, Arthur Reaume and the UAW leadership had a major falling out when the Windsor mayor declared his Liberal candidacy for the upcoming election. Such optimism by the CCF was misplaced, however. The results of the election were devastating. The CCF dropped from the 21 seats it had won in the 1948 provincial election to two seats. In Windsor, Arthur Reaume, ex-mayor and staunch supporter of the UAW, was elected as Liberal member for the Essex West riding. No CCF members were elected in the Windsor area.(113)

The 1951 electoral defeat of the CCF spelled disaster both

for the party and the UAW's political action programme. The CCF faced financial chaos. MacDonald reported that the minimum immediate needs of the CCF totalled \$25,000-\$30,000. He expected the trade unions to meet this demand for:

In the overall trade union picture that is mere chicken feed. Even if we narrow our approach to the five or six big trade unions who are pretty solidly back of us it is still chicken feed - likely represents a small fraction of their budget.(114)

MacDonald assumed too much of the trade unions. The 1951 contest opened cracks in the embryonic relationship between the CCF and organized labour. Ingle warned MacDonald of trouble within the unions. The Steelworkers had lost their union organization drive in Trail and the poor results of the Ontario election meant that the Steelworkers International Office was reticent to pump more money into the CCF. This fact was confirmed by Charlie Millard.(115) Furthermore, the Packinghouse Workers were broke.

Nonetheless, MacDonald began his fundraising efforts, initially concentrating on three key industrial unions. MacDonald approached the UAW for \$12,000. He argued that although the CCF would like to gain contributions from various unions, it was forced to rely on its three major supporters, the UAW, the Steelworkers and the United Packinghouse Workers of America. He hoped that both Steel and the UAW would contribute \$12,000, and the UPWA, due its smaller membership, \$6,000.(116) Burt promised to take up this request with the International Union where he expected it to be met with sympathy, probably owing to Walter Reuther's early commitment to the CCF and longstanding friendship with many CCFers, including David Lewis.(117)

Weeks and then months went by, however, with no further communication between Burt and the CCF on this matter. Burt's silence fed CCF doubts of his commitment to the party and Ingle wrote to MacDonald to voice these suspicions:

Whatever happened to George's supposed \$72,000 Citizenship Fund, none of us know. But his contributions to the Jolliffe Leadership Fund, to the Eaton campaign, to the OFL's fund raising drive to fight the Guild case, seems to have dried up prospects for the immediate future. All of the above, however, plus Art Shultz' salary don't amount to \$72,000 so maybe there is still some hope in that direction, although nobody seems to be very optimistic about it.(118)

At least two factors contributed to the Canadian UAW's delayed and sometimes halfhearted financial and organizational support for the party. Firstly, Canadian contributions to the UAW Citizenship and Legislative Fund were completely controlled by the International and therefore reliant upon the IEB for dispensation. Furthermore, Canadian monies contributed to this fund were not exclusively spent on Canadian political affairs. Rather, they were also used to fund American lobbies and election campaigns. In fact, above and beyond the regular contributions made to the Citizenship and Legislative Fund, Canadian staff were often expected to contribute substantial monies to American elections.(119) This restricted UAW resources for contribution to the CCF. Secondly, Burt had his own problems to deal with. Wildcats in the Canadian region reflected growing discontent amongst the membership with his leadership. The party would have to wait until peace had been restored before getting further attention from the UAW.

Finally, the International agreed to the CCF's request and the Canadian UAW donated \$12,000 to the CCF National Organization Drive. This was the first of an annual \$12,000 UAW contribution which continued until the formation of the new party in 1961.(120)

This massive increase in UAW financial support for the CCF was coupled with increased participation by Canadian UAW leadership on CCF committees, such as the CCF Trade Union Committee of which Art Shultz became the chair in 1952.(121) Some locals also participated in CCF-Labour Organizing committees, although by 1957 only one local, local 112 at DeHavilland had actually affiliated to the party.(122) Overall, however, local UAW support for the CCF waned. By September, 1952, the number of local Political Action Committees dropped to eleven from the twenty-one that had been established only a year previously.(123)

Although the CCF increased its number of seats in the House of Commons with the 1953 federal election, this election was a disaster in the industrial heartland. Only one CCF member from Ontario was elected, Joe Noseworthy. This was despite the fact that the trade unions had provided more stable financing for the party and had fielded 33 out of the 65 CCF candidates who ran in Ontario. During this election the UAW added to its financial contribution to the CCF by paying the lost time of five UAW staff people whom the union assigned to work full-time on the election. Finally, the Public Relations Office helped UAW candidates and various ridings with their election material. Despite this increased activity, support for the CCF continued to slip downwards.(124)

Within weeks of the election, local 200 announced that it would not support the UAW executive decision to back the CCF. The local argued that partisan politics served to split the labour movement.(125) This starkly revealed the central problem with the CCF - UAW liaison. Money from the International UAW office and regional staff contributed to the party would not alone deliver votes for the CCF. The decision to support the CCF had been a leadership directive, rather than a movement from the rank and file. The lack of union political education and mobilization by the leadership combined with repeated CCF electoral defeats gave the rank and file little reason to support the party. Even the small victories of the 1955 Ontario provincial election where CCF candidate, Tommy Thomas from local 222, was re-elected, failed to convince the membership of the importance of a strategic alignment with the CCF.(126)

Conflict within the Canadian UAW over its decision to support the CCF reached a head at the September, 1955 District Council meeting. The UAW Political Action Committee introduced a report for discussion and a vote. Unexpectedly, two reports were presented to the delegates - a majority report and a minority report from Reg Screen, member of the PAC and the CCF, but longstanding member of the Left caucus. The majority report made a series of recommendations as follows:

1. continued support for the CCF as the "political arm of labour;
2. increased emphasis on a UAW political action programme;
3. regular use of the Auto Worker as vehicle for political education;
4. initiation of a political education programme in Reg. on 7

- by the Political Action Committee;
5. establishment of a central fund to be set up under the District Council-Political Action Committee to carry out the political education programme;
 6. local contribution of 2 cents per member a month from Citizenship Funds to central fund in #5;
 7. increased participation in municipal politics;
 8. construction of closer ties between the PAC, Region 7 Education Committee and locals.(127)

Screen's minority report objected to the first two provisions of the majority report but supported the remainder. Although the minority report was defeated when the first two recommendations were passed, the very act of bringing in such a report reflected the uneasiness of part of the UAW membership, in particular the Left, about the present relationship with the CCF. The majority report ran into further problems with its recommendations for a central political action fund. Both recommendations five and six were soundly defeated.(128) This resistance to loss of local control over political activities was but another element in the local struggles to retain their autonomy also witnessed in collective bargaining at the time. It also served as a warning to the union leadership that the rank and file intended to remain free to pursue its own course of political action. Further internal UAW splits over the CCF came to light with the CCF's adoption of the Winnipeg Declaration of Principles in 1956. The Left caucus denounced it as a shift to the right while the leadership declared it a shift in the "right" direction.(129)

These divisions amongst Canadian Autoworkers over the direction of the CCF and the UAW's role in the party were ignored by the union leadership. In the 1957 federal election, rather than pursue a long-term strategy of building local links between the

CCF and Canadian Autoworkers, the UAW continued even more vigorously its pursuit of a leadership-directed strategy. The UAW increased its aid to the CCF in 1957. It contributed \$18,000 to Political Action committees to assist the CCF in the federal election. Furthermore, all staff were to assist in the campaign under the direction of Shultz. All union service representatives were required to support the CCF party line and mobilize the locals which they serviced behind the party.(130) As the election neared, more people were assigned to help in the election. Finally, the International union, upon request from David Lewis, contributed an additional \$3,000 to the election campaign.(131) All these resources in combination with additional help from other unions did little to boost the support of the party. With the 1957 election of the Diefenbaker government and the consistent poor showing of the CCF over the last few years, a re-evaluation of party structure and policy was needed. This ultimately brought about the reformulation of the party in 1958, to become the NDP in 1961.

While the CCF survived as a result of financial contributions by unions such as the UAW, the UAW's commitment to the party was halfhearted. Despite pumping large amounts of money into the CCF, the UAW neither used this to gain leverage in the party so to redirect it towards the union's goals, nor followed these contributions with attempts at mobilizing rank-and-file support. Consequently, Canadian Autoworkers either resisted ties to the CCF or simply ignored the union's official policy of support

for the party.

This seemingly paradoxical role of the UAW in the CCF was the result of the internal politics and organization of the union and the union's concentration of its political energies in collective bargaining. Part of the problem lay in the continued strength of Communists and Liberal Party supporters in various locals and the alienation from partisan politics of other autoworkers who blamed internal factionalism and the resulting loss of union solidarity on struggles between the Communists and the CCF.

Unlike the Liberals and Communists who had built local credibility and community support amongst Canadian Autoworkers, the CCF had entered the UAW via the International union office and often appeared as an interloper. The Liberal Party, especially since the 1945 Liberal-Labour alliance in which the UAW had participated, had maintained strong community links with the UAW. Local Liberal representatives, such as Paul Martin, ensured UAW access to government and in many instances defended the interests of the auto industry and autoworkers. In addition, such politicians kept in close touch with union affairs, making sure to congratulate union members upon their election to office and to invite labour leaders to social functions.(132) Although these actions were less tangible than actual government action, they served to build community ties between the union and the Liberal Party.

The credibility of Communist Autoworkers was more indirect as it did not constitute support for the Communist Party but for militant unionists who were also Party members. Communist

Autoworkers had played a key role in the organization of many UAW locals that CCF members had not. In addition, they continued to be militant supporters of workers' rights on the shop floor, providing them with a strong base of support. Although, as a whole, this did not translate into party support, autoworkers supported these individuals, whether or not they were Communists, because they struggled alongside workers and protected their interests.(133) When the CCF in its alliance with the union leadership attempted to purge the union of such activists, this strategy often backfired. Autoworkers saw the CCF as an outside organization perpetuating unwanted internal union conflict. This inability by the CCF to build community support became a vicious circle as with each electoral defeat the party failed to gain the necessary foothold to construct such community ties.

Secondly, the UAW remained a relatively decentralized union in the 1950's with a mobilized membership committed to local autonomy. This had two effects on the UAW's relationship with the CCF. Firstly, it prevented the formulation of a centralized, concerted campaign behind the CCF, resulting instead in a locally propelled and determined party strategy. This, when combined with the lack of CCF community alliances with autoworkers, meant that there was no guarantee of local mobilization behind a CCF platform. Secondly, the CCF entered the UAW through the International. Considering that these years of the 1950's were characterized by ongoing struggles for local autonomy, the CCF was seen as playing on the same side as the International. It

therefore suffered the consequences of being embroiled in internal union conflict between nationalists and the International. Expressions of this discontent were found in local accusations against the International for trying to tell workers how to vote.(134)

Thirdly, Canadian Autoworkers' distrust of the CCF's commitment to labour, which first surfaced in the 1940's, lingered on. The CCF did not present itself as first and foremost a labour party; rather it saw itself as a party representing subordinate groups in society and those progressively-minded individuals who were disenchanted with the two major parties. While currying union support, the CCF was determined to incorporate unions into the party as one group amongst many. Moreover, while the party desperately needed the financial support of the unions, it feared that in coming too close to the industrial unions of the CCL, it would alienate other sectors of the labour movement represented by the TLC.(135) Thus, the CCF kept tight control over the party by retaining the requirement that unionists from an affiliated union also be individual members of the CCF and the right of the party to deny membership to any unionist it considered undesirable. Although the CCF established a Trade Union Committee to keep in touch with the demands and interests of organized labour, unlike the youth and women's committees, representatives from this committee were not made regular participants at CCF executive or council meetings. For many Canadian Autoworkers' whose historic goal had been the establishment of a labour party, these measures fed existing suspicions about the CCF's lack of real commitment to

the labour movement. This became all the more pronounced in the early years of the formation of the New Party.

The final reason for the peculiar relationship between the UAW and the CCF lay in the union's successful construction of a compromise with management at the bargaining table. Whereas in various other western industrialized societies social democratic parties played a crucial role in constructing a system of Fordist regulation, the CCF was excluded from this role.(136) Auto corporations and the UAW successfully completed this job themselves. The CCF's exclusion from a role as mediator in this process meant that the party could not mobilize support around the promise of ensuring a lasting compromise between organized labour and private business. This undercut the CCF's potential appeal to Canadian Autoworkers who increasingly saw in their own actions the key to winning concessions from their employers. In turn, this fed the well entrenched syndicalist orientation of Canadian Autoworkers. Nonetheless, the UAW continued to pump money into the party, apparently electing to keep alive the social democratic option should it be useful in the future.

By the end of 1957, the UAW had made clear its relationship to the CCF. While it would keep the party alive through financial and organizational support, the union showed no burning desire to elect a social democratic government. Until such time as governments and corporations showed themselves unwilling to compromise, the UAW would continue to pursue a trade-union centred course of action. Social democratic partisan politics therefore

remained in the wings of UAW strategy until the late 1960's when it would make its entrance onto the main stage of UAW political life.

Conclusion

By 1957, the structures of Fordist regulation had been put into place, first at GM and after protracted struggle at Ford. Organized by the UAW and the corporations themselves, the system took the form of a highly structured collective bargaining relationship. Wage formulas, longer-term contracts, master and pattern bargaining and a guaranteed annual wage constituted the core of this arrangement. These regulations reduced the scope of conflict between the union and the corporations and provided a long-term structure for bargaining. In exchange for managing worker militancy and accepting managerial control over production, the union won its members substantially improved wages and benefits and recognition as the legitimate representative of autoworkers' interests.

The oligopolistic structure of the industry eased the construction of this accord and its future success. With three corporations and a single union dominating the Canadian auto industry, market competition was greatly reduced. This facilitated the success of a compromise and its articulation as a rigidly defined system of collective bargaining rules.

Nonetheless, although the structures of regulation were in place, these structures were not yet fully entrenched within the union. The UAW leadership continued to face internal opposition to

the compromise from the Left caucus in Canada. It was this rank-and-file based opposition which posed the greatest threat to the survival and success of Fordist regulation. Although the new structures of collective bargaining increased International Union control over Canadian affairs, the accompanying centralization provided the basis for a successful mobilization of the Left caucus around a nationalist platform. In turn, the continued existence of the Canadian District Council provided the organizational means for the Left to articulate its alternate strategy and mobilize support. Once again, ridding the union of organized internal opposition to the International's agenda became high priority and was vigorously pursued in the last years of the 1950's.

The Canadian and Ontario governments played a minimal role in constructing the compromise in the auto industry. Although the Canadian UAW increasingly relied on non-militant tactics in its dealings with government, this reflected the emerging compromise between the union and the corporations rather than any fundamental rearrangement of union-government relations. It was not until the 1960's that a political compromise was structured.

Although the working out of the system of Fordist regulation was conducted in the sphere of private production, the Canadian UAW kept the social democratic option open through its continued support for the CCF. The union's halfhearted commitment to a strategy of partisan politics, however, prevented the translation of financial and organizational support into electoral fortune. Canadian Autoworkers remained committed to a trade-union centred

strategy of syndicalist politics.

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27. Interview with Bill Rutherford, CAW Founding Convention, Toronto, Ontario, 6 Sept. 1985; Interview with Cliff Pilkey, OFL Headquarters, Toronto, Ontario, 23 Oct. 1986.
28. Globe and Mail, 7 July 1953; GB, Regional Director's Report to District Council #26, 29 & 30 Aug. 1953.
29. Globe and Mail, 30 Oct. 1953.
30. R7, George Burt to Walter Reuther, 24 Feb. 1954.
31. WPR, Malcolm Smith and Doug Sutton to Walter Reuther, 21 Apr. 1954; Walter Reuther to Malcolm Smith and Doug Sutton, 14 May 1954; Doug Sutton to Walter Reuther, 7 July 1954; Walter Reuther, Straight Wire to Doug Sutton, 27 July 1954.
32. Globe and Mail, 7 July 1953.
33. Globe and Mail, 25 Sept. 1953.
34. Globe and Mail, 9 Jan. 1954.
35. R7, Regional Director's Report to District Council #26, 25 & 26 Feb. 1954, p.18.
36. Wolfe, "The Rise and Demise", pp.51 & 61.

37. Globe and Mail, 5 June 1954.
38. Globe and Mail, 21 Sept. 1954.
39. Globe and Mail, 22 July 1954.
40. Toronto Star, 21 July 1954; Windsor Star, 22 July 1954; on Etobicoke conciliation see Globe and Mail, 22 July 1954; on Local 240 conciliation see Globe and Mail, 9 Nov. 1954; on Chrysler conciliation see Globe and Mail, 3 Dec. 1954; on Massey Ferguson conciliation see Globe and Mail, 16, 24 July 1954.
41. Globe and Mail, 19 Sept. 1954; Toronto Star, 27 Sept. 1954.
42. L200, UAW Press Release, Oct. 1954.
43. Globe and Mail, 3 Oct. 1954.
44. Globe and Mail, 11 Oct. 1954; A particularly scathing attack on the strikers was made in a serial by Muriel Snider, Globe and Mail, 17, 18, 19, 20, Nov. 1954.
45. Globe and Mail, 1 Dec. 1954.
46. Globe and Mail, 30 Oct., 12 Dec. 1954, 28 Jan. 1955; Toronto Telegram, 21 Dec. 1954.
47. Globe and Mail, 28 Jan. 1955.
48. Harry Katz, Shifting Gears: Changing Labor Relations in the U.S. Automobile Industry (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1985), pp.29-30.
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50. TRO, Minutes to Meeting of District Council #26, 11 & 12 Dec. 1954, pp.20-26.
51. Globe and Mail, 9 June 1954.
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56. WPR, George Burt to Walter Reuther, 24 June 1955.

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59. Globe and Mail, 19 Sept. 1955.
60. Interviews with Bill Rutherford (1985) and Cliff Pilkey (1986).
61. CBC Oshawa news broadcast, quoted in Globe and Mail, 11, 30 Jan. 1956.
62. "Report on Labour" by Ron Haggart, Globe and Mail, 10 Oct. 1955.
63. Globe and Mail, 14 Nov. 1955.
64. Globe and Mail, 28, 29 Dec. 1955, 31 Jan. 1956.
65. TRO, Regional Director's Report to District Council #26, 17 & 18 Mar. 1956, pp.17; Globe and Mail, 14 Feb. 1956.
66. Globe and Mail, 15 Feb. 1956.
67. Globe and Mail, 16, 19 Feb. 1956.
68. Globe and Mail, 31 July 1956; Raymond Houlahan, "Collective Bargaining in Local 200", pp.27-28.
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70. SG, Imports and Taxes in the Canadian Automotive Industry (photocopy, no author cited), 1957, pp.iv & viii.
71. Globe and Mail, 18 May, 23 June, 5, 21 Dec. 1956.
72. Globe and Mail, 27 Dec. 1956, 25 Feb. 1957; TRO, Regional Director's Report to District Council #26, 21 & 22 Sept. 1957, p.14.
73. TRO, Roll call vote results in Minutes to Meeting of District Council #26, 22 & 23 June 1957, pp.A-E.
74. TRO, Resolution #5, Minutes to Meeting of District Council #26, 13 & 14 Sept. 1958.
75. TRO, Minutes to Special Meeting of District Council #26 for purpose of lobby in Ottawa, 11 & 12 Apr. 1951.
76. Globe and Mail, 14 June 1951.
77. Globe and Mail, n.d. Nov. 1952, 10, 18 Dec. 1953; TRO, Regional Director's Report to District Council #26, 29 & 30

Aug. 1953, p.21.

78. Globe and Mail, 10 Feb. 1954.
79. Globe and Mail, 25 Feb. 1954.
80. Globe and Mail, 25 Feb. 1954.
81. Toronto Star, 30 Jan. 1952.
82. TRO, Regional Director's Report to District Council #26, 19 & 20 June 1954, p.15.
83. Globe and Mail, 14 Oct. 1955.
84. RD, Letter from Windsor Board of Control, 6 June 1956.
85. TRO, Regional Director's Report to District Council #26, 16 & 17 June 1956, p.6, 14 & 15 Dec. 1957, p.1; Minutes to Meeting of District Council #26, 21 & 22 Sept. 1957, p.12; Brief on imports and tariffs submitted to meeting of District Council #26, 14 & 15 Dec. 1957.
86. Around 1957 District Council #26 became known as the Canadian Council. TRO, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 14 & 15 Dec. 1957, p.7.
87. Globe and Mail, 22 June 1952.
88. Toronto Star, 21 July 1954; Windsor Star, 22 July 1954; Globe and Mail, 16, 22, 24 July, 29 Oct., 9 Nov., 3 Dec. 1954.
89. TRO, Regional Director's Report to District Council #26, 10 & 11 Sept. 1954, p.25.
90. TRO, "Statement of Policy re Conciliation Boards" in Minutes to Meeting of District Council #26, 11 & 12 Dec. 1954, pp.13-15.
91. Ibid..
92. TRO, Regional Director's Report to District Council #26, 11 & 12 Dec. 1954, pp.1718.
93. Globe and Mail, 29 July 1955.
94. Globe and Mail, 7 Sept. 1955.
95. Globe and Mail, 4 Oct. 1955.
96. Globe and Mail, 19 Oct. 1955.
97. Globe and Mail, 16 May 1956.

98. Globe and Mail, 8, 13 Nov., 11 Dec. 1958.
99. CCF, Minutes to meeting of CCF National Executive, 25 Feb. 1950, p.5, 9 & 10 Dec. 1950, p.1; Lorne Ingle to M.J. Coldwell, 27 Oct. 1950.
100. The CCF's urgent need for trade-union support was no more clearly expressed than by Frank Scott who wrote to Lorne Ingle: "... you would be justified in giving it (the trade union committee) all the time and attention possible since only from that quarter can our immediate salvation come." CCF, Frank Scott to Lorne Ingle, 28 Oct. 1950.
101. CCF, "NED (National Expansion Drive) Report" by Donald MacDonald to National (CCF) Council Meeting, 17 & 18 Mar. 1951.
102. Gad Horowitz, Canadian Labour in Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), p.134.
103. Ibid., p.139; CCF, Minutes to meeting of Ontario CCF Provincial Executive, 15 May 1951.
104. GB, Regional Director's Report to District Council #26, 8 & 9 Sept. 1951, p.14.
105. CCF, Lorne Ingle to George Burt, 16 Apr. 1951.
106. GB, Regional Director's Report to District Council #26, 16 & 17 June 1951, p.20; Minutes to Meeting of District Council #26, 16 & 17 June 1951, p.9.
107. Four of these twenty-one PAC committees consisted either of the local executive or the chairman only. CRO, UAW-CIO Political Action Report to Staff Meeting, 4 Sept. 1952, p.3.
108. CCF, Archie Cherniak to Charlie McDonald, 11 May 1951; On Earl Watson's resistance to party involvement see Toronto Star, 3 Aug. 1950.
109. CRO, Ed Baldwin to Walter Reuther, 12 Apr. 1950; George Burt to Ed Baldwin, 26 Apr. 1950; M.McKay to George Burt, 23 Apr. 1952; William Baker to Standing Elections Committee and Executive Committee, Local 199, 9 Apr. 1954; George Burt to Norman Berger, 23 Apr. 1954; George Bennett to Walter Reuther, 27 Apr. 1954; Douglas Fraser to George Bennett, 14 May 1954.
110. L200, Mayor (Arthur) Reaume to Roy England, 20 Oct. 1950.
111. L200, Paul Martin to Jack Taylor, 21 May 1951.
112. GB, Regional Director's Report to District Council #26, 15 &

16 Dec. 1951, pp.16-17.

113. Globe and Mail, 23 Nov. 1951.
114. CCF, Donald MacDonald to David Lewis, 20 Dec. 1951.
115. CCF, Donald MacDonald to Charlie Millard, 19 Jan. 1952.
116. CCF, Donald MacDonald to George Burt, 21 Jan. 1952.
117. CCF, Donald MacDonald to Charlie Millard, 19 Jan. 1952.
118. CCF, Lorne Ingle to Donald MacDonald, 28 May 1952.
119. CRO, George Burt to All International Representatives, 3 Nov. 1952. This is the only letter of its sort found in UAW collections. This is not particularly surprising as at the end of the letter, Burt advises those that received this letter to destroy it or at least to keep the contents of the letter strictly confidential. Further evidence of the International's control over the Citizenship and Legislative fund will be seen in later debates when the Canadian Region begins demanding control over these monies.
120. CCF, Annual Accountant's Reports to CCF National Office, 1952-1962; Financial Statements of CCF National Office, 1952-1962.
121. CCF, Minutes to meeting of CCF National Council, 9 Aug. 1952, p.2.
122. CCF, Minutes to meeting of CCF Provincial Executive, 3 Apr. 1957, p.1; TRO, Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 21 & 22 Sept. 1957, p.10.
123. CRO, UAW-CIO Political Action Report to Staff Meeting, 4 Sept. 1952, p.3.
124. GB, Regional Director's Report to District Council #26, 29 & 30 Aug. 1953, pp.11-12.
125. Globe and Mail, 9 Sept. 1953.
126. TRO, Regional Director's Report to District Council #26, 25 & 26 June 1955, p.2.
127. TRO, Minutes to Meeting of District Council #26, 10 & 11 Sept. 1955, pp.6-7.
128. Ibid.
129. TRO, Minutes to Meeting of District Council #26, 22 & 23 Sept. 1956, p.8-10.

130. CSRO, Letters to George Burt from the following International UAW Representatives: Harry Ford, 1 Apr. 1957; Dennis McDermott, 3 Apr. 1957; Paul Siren, 15 Apr. 1957; Roy England, 23 Apr. 1957; Harry Rooney, 13 May 1957; Roy Brown, 14, 22 May 1957; Frank Burke, 13, 23 May 1957; J.L. Hiller, 16 May 1957; E.J. Parent, 21 May 1957.
131. CCF, George Burt to Lorne Ingle, 29 Apr. 1957; Emil Mazey to David Lewis, 29 Apr. 1957.
132. L200, Paul Martin to Jack Taylor, 21 May 1951; Mayor Arthur Reaume to Jack Taylor, 25 May 1951; Paul Martin to Jack Taylor, 22 June 1951; Milton Gregg to Jack Taylor, 28 June 1951; Mayor Arthur Reaume to Jack Taylor, 10 Sept. 1951; Invitation to Charlie MacDonald from Mayor Arthur Reaume, 13 Aug. 1953.
133. Interview with Charlie McDonald, CAW Founding Convention, Toronto, Ontario, 6 Sept. 1985.
134. One example of this came from local 676 which complained to George Burt that the local membership objected to attempts by the International union to force them to vote for the CCF. CRO, Dick Bland to George Burt, 3 July 1957.
135. Horowitz, Canadian Labour in Politics, Chapter 5.
136. Sweden is one of several examples where a social democratic government with very strong links to trade unions played a crucial role in formulating the postwar compromise. See Andrew Martin, "Trade Unions in Sweden: Strategic Responses to Change and Crisis," in Unions and Economic Crisis, eds. Peter Gourevitch et al, Volume 2: Harvard Center for European Studies Project on European Trade Union Responses to Economic Crisis (London: George Allen & Unwin (Publishers) Ltd., 1984), pp.191-359; For more specific discussion of the relationship between state intervention, social democracy and variants of Fordist regulation see Rianne Mahon, "From Fordism to ? : New Technology, Labour Markets and Unions," Economic and Industrial Democracy 8 (1987), pp.5-60; For theoretical discussion of the role played by social democratic parties in constructing a postwar compromise see Leo Panitch, Working Class Politics In Crisis (London: Verso, 1986), selected readings.

Chapter Five

Nationalist versus Fordist Solutions to the Auto Industry Crisis, 1958-61

From 1958 to 1961 Canada experienced the most serious recession since the end of the war. While inflation dropped in 1957 as a result of government fiscal policy, this coincided with a declining rate of investment which triggered a falling rate of growth in Canada. Unemployment jumped from 3.3% in 1957 to 7.1% in 1961.(1)

The effects of this recession reverberated throughout the auto industry. Consumers sought cheaper means of vehicle transportation and turned to small European imports such as the Volkswagen. Vehicle imports as a percentage of new car sales in Canada rose from 12.9% in 1957 to 28.1% in 1960.(2) Consequently, Canadian motor vehicle production plummeted.(3) This decreased production in combination with increased automation of the auto industry resulted in soaring unemployment amongst autoworkers.

The crisis which faced Canadian Autoworkers as a result of this economic downturn was compounded by corporate responses to the recession. To meet small car competition, North American automakers replaced domestic Canadian production with imports, either from the U.S. or those European plants where corporations such as GM produced their own small cars.(4) Many smaller industries shut down their Canadian operations or relocated their plants to avoid the union. Those workers remaining on the job

suffered from repeated assembly line speedups and forced overtime.

This crisis in the auto industry set the political agenda for the UAW. The union needed to address the immediate issue of unemployment while also searching for a solution to the structural problems faced by the industry. The complex roots of the problem meant that there existed no easy solution. The Canadian UAW was therefore once again pitched into internal turmoil as the Left and Reuther caucuses battled over union strategy. The key struggles were fought in the arenas of collective bargaining and federal government lobbying. The Left caucus, adopting a militant, nationalist discourse, proposed solutions centred on regaining Canadian control over the industry. In contrast, the Reuther caucus proposed improved cooperation with the automakers and greater integration of the American and Canadian auto industries.

The end result of these struggles was the thorough defeat of the Left inside the union and the entrenchment of Fordist regulation. Pattern bargaining was extended and Canadian autoworkers accepted contracts based on American settlements. The corporations and the federal government both agreed with UAW proposals for greater industry integration. This coalescence of interest, combined with the UAW's move to centralize political lobbying and therefore engage in accepted, bureaucratic forms of politics, moved the UAW and the federal government one step closer to a stable and more structured relationship.

Although these years corresponded to the creation of the New Democratic Party (NDP) with its closer ties to organized labour,

partisan politics remained secondary on the UAW's political agenda. While the UAW contributed large sums of money towards the organization of this new party and pushed locals to affiliate, partisan politics did not promise immediate solutions to pressing problems in the auto industry. In contrast, collective bargaining and lobbying held out the possibility of immediate political change. It was therefore in these areas that Canadian Autoworkers concentrated their political efforts.

Fordist Regulation Wins Out

The crises of the auto industry in 1951 and 1954 paled in comparison to the recession of 1958-61. Although the national economic recession was the immediate cause for the 1958 downturn, the severity of the recession's impact on the auto industry was rooted in structural problems of the Canadian auto industry and changing world conditions.

The Canadian auto industry was a high cost miniature replica of the American industry, controlled by American-based multinational corporations.(5) The industry was inefficient, producing various models of vehicles for a very small market. Consequently, prices of Canadian-made vehicles were higher than identical models sold in the U.S.. These high prices made the Canadian market especially susceptible to penetration by foreign imports.

Added to these structural problems of the Canadian industry was the overall decline of the North American auto industry's position in the world market. In the postwar years, the North

American industry was controlled by the Big Three automakers of General Motors (GM), Ford and Chrysler. This oligopolistic structure of the industry meant that individual corporations practised little price competition, instead relying on product differentiation, i.e. Sloanism, to increase their market shares. These practices further contributed to inflated prices of vehicles in Canada by preventing the attainment of economies of scale in the production of different models of vehicles. With the onset of recession in 1957, market conditions changed. Consumers demanded cheaper, more efficient vehicles. Trapped in their established practices, North American auto producers did not respond to this demand. Consumers therefore turned to European imports. The result was intense competition for the North American market and the loss by American automakers of their hegemonic position in the North American, and ultimately the world market for vehicles.(6)

The immediate effect of industry crisis on workers was soaring unemployment.(7) Between 1956 and 1959, the number of employed production workers in the Canadian motor vehicle industry declined by 6,229 or 22.5%. In the motor vehicle and parts industries combined, one out of every five jobs was lost in this same period.(8) The effects on UAW membership were devastating. Between 1957 and 1958 alone, UAW membership in Canada dropped by 10,000 to a total average monthly membership of 53,298.(9)

The UAW was aware of the complex roots of auto industry problems. It therefore needed to respond to the immediate problem of unemployment while also addressing the broader issues at hand. The UAW's collective bargaining strategy to deal with the crisis

was formulated at the international UAW economic conference held in Detroit on January 22, 1958. Two divergent strategies emerged which divided the union between left and right, workers and administration and Canadian Region versus the International. Led by Walter Reuther, the International executive proposed that the UAW adopt profit sharing as one of its key bargaining demands.(10) The details of the plan reflected the union's firm commitment to the wage/productivity tradeoff which served as the foundation of Fordist regulation and to solutions for the economic downturn based on stabilization of consumption rather than reordering production or militant mobilization of union members.

The key to the plan lay in a proposed three-way sharing of all profits above and beyond 10% of net capital before taxes. The latter would be distributed amongst the stockholders while any profit above the 10% mark would be distributed as follows: one half to the corporation for stockholders and executives, one fourth to be distributed to the workers and the remaining one fourth to the consumer.(11) The rationale for this proposal was presented by the UAW leadership as follows:

Unless a substantial portion of excessive profits is diverted into consumer purchasing power through higher wages and lower prices, the existing imbalance between productive power and purchasing power will continue, creating the danger that the already serious present recession will spiral into one of much more serious proportions.....

The supplementary economic demands for workers and the recommended price rebates for consumers ... reflect the right of workers and consumers to share in the greater productivity and the greater progress which certain industries and certain corporations within such industries enjoy in excess of the progress made in the economy as

a whole and which, to date, these companies have failed to share with consumers and workers.(12)

According to Reuther, the profit sharing scheme allowed for the deferral of part of workers' equity. Because the remaining balance of wages was to be paid out of profits, it would be non-inflationary.(13) This was therefore a sound means of responding to the economic crisis, which was characterized by both increasing inflation and declining consumption.(14) Finally, this proposal provided the opportunity for the UAW to build alliances with consumers and attack the monopolistic pricing practices engaged in by the corporations.

This profit sharing scheme threw into relief Reuther's understanding of the economic crisis and the extent to which this was influenced by the North American variant of Fordist regulation which rested on arrangements in the sphere of private production with little or no state intervention. Although unemployment was the number one problem facing UAW members, Reuther's solution did not tackle this issue directly. Instead it provided a means for boosting the economy through increased demand and productivity which, in turn, was expected to improve employment possibilities. The major responsibility for a solution to unemployment thus lay, according to the UAW, with private industry and improved productivity.(15)

Reuther publicly defended the profit sharing scheme as "perhaps the most pro free enterprise demand that we (the union) have ever made".(16) He argued that while management, due to its "greater contribution" to corporate profits, was entitled to a

healthy bonus. workers were also entitled to share in the profits according to their contribution to the corporation.(17) Finally, Reuther linked profit sharing to the construction of a more harmonious relationship between private business and workers:

I believe to begin with that free labor and free management have a great deal more in common than they have in conflict and I believe that freedom is an indivisible value but you can't have free labor without free management and we both need to learn to work and cooperate together to preserve our free society in a free world. Now we reject the whole concept of Marxism and the class struggle because that philosophy was based essentially upon the struggle to divide up economic scarcity. We believe that free men, free labour, free management working together within a free government in a free economic system have the glorious opportunity of cooperating in the creating and the sharing of economic abundance.(18)

Profit sharing was a means to enhance labour-management cooperation, and resolve auto industry problems.(19)

While Reuther mobilized the UAW membership to support his profit sharing scheme, the Left caucus, headed by local 222, put forth its own solution to the recession. In contrast to Reuther's plan, the Left caucus' proposal rested on increased worker control over the production process. It demanded that the union bargain for increased wages and a shorter work week, with the latter being aimed at resolving the problems of unemployment for the many and forced overtime for the remaining workers.(20) Not surprisingly, Reuther's proposal was endorsed by the conference.(21) When bargaining got underway in the fall of 1958, however, opposition to the proposal built.

During fall negotiations with the Big Three in Canada, Lyle Dotzert of local 200, supported by other Communists Rutherford,

Tucker and Babcock, accused Reuther of scrapping the demand for a shorter work week before the January economic conference and of calling the convention merely to ratify his own plans.(22) While Reuther had been advocating improved productivity and the harmony of interests between business and workers, Canadian workers were being subjected to speedups and forced overtime. This provoked the addition of another Canadian demand onto the bargaining agenda - the right to strike during the life of a collective agreement over the issue of speedups.(23)

The bargaining process dragged on. As UAW locals in Canada came closer to a strike, profit sharing was removed from the UAW's bargaining agenda and replaced with demands for wage parity between Canadian and American workers, improved pensions and better health care coverage. No mention was made of a shorter work week.(24) Reuther's about-face on the issue of profit sharing was at first glance surprising, given the union's massive publicity campaign in its favour. However, growing internal union opposition and the determined resistance by corporations to this demand made profit sharing a divisive and potentially dangerous issue for the leadership.

Still no settlement was forthcoming, and workers took matters into their own hands. Ford and GM workers wildcatted on November 14 in protest of the lengthy negotiations and the lack of a contract. UAW leaders publicly repudiated the strikers, arguing that such action interfered with master negotiations.(25) Nonetheless, illegal walkouts continued.(26)

Finally, on December 5 the GM contract was settled. It was a

replica of previously-settled American contracts and showed few gains on the major Canadian bargaining demands. No move was made towards either wage parity or 100% company-paid health benefits. Instead, the contract contained improvements to wages, pensions and the Guaranteed Annual Wage. It was also a three-year contract.(27) Contract negotiations continued at Chrysler and Ford.(28) Again the union was plagued with wildcats, this time at the Ford Oakville plant where the wildcats were endorsed by the local executive.(29) Finally, on January 11, Ford and the UAW signed a three-year agreement patterned on the GM contract.(30)

The last of the Big Three contracts to settle was Chrysler. Where GM and Ford had 'peaceably' settled their contracts, Chrysler talks broke down when the Canadian Chrysler local 444 refused to follow the established pattern. Led by Left caucus member, Charlie Brooks, Chrysler workers demanded a clause guarding against speedups, arguing that "Chrysler is trying to compete with automation by using human hands."(31) They also insisted on a two-year agreement.(32) After a week on strike, Chrysler and the union reached an agreement. It neither addressed the issue of speedups nor workers' demands for a shorter contract. Instead it was a replica of the other three-year agreements.(33) The pattern was not to be broken and the day following the Chrysler settlement, Massey-Harris-Fergusson and the UAW reached a similar agreement.(34)

These negotiations, characterized by their orderliness and their rigid adherence to the American contracts, reflected both

the increased control over the Canadian Region by the International Union and the firm commitment of both union and management to the newly established structures which regulated collective bargaining. While pattern bargaining, like master contracts, protected workers from corporate attempts to force wages and benefits down to a lowest common denominator, the particular content of these contracts had been dictated by the International and ignored any of the burning issues put forward by the Canadian membership of the union. The agreements reflected a lack of regard for the day-to-day concerns of workers on the shop floor who often faced an inhuman pace of work and only a lengthy grievance procedure through which to address the issue. Finally, they left untouched the growing concern over unemployment.

The three-year duration of these contracts spelled disaster for the Left. With the loss of their influence over most of the administrative apparatus and of key education and communication links with the workers, the Left had long been reliant upon their role in collective bargaining for the mobilization of support, often finding in strikes the support that they needed. These agreements undermined this strategy and gave the leadership the upper hand. Finally, the three-year contracts reflected and ideologically structured a growing moderateness within the union. Gains were to be won through the slow process of compromise with management and an orderly collective bargaining relationship. While there is no doubt that workers gained major benefits through these negotiations, the consequence was a depoliticization of workplace struggles and a reinforcement of the liberal pluralist

discourse offered by Reuther, who saw no fundamental conflict between workers and corporations but instead conceived of workers and corporations negotiating over the division of the economic pie offered as the fruit of capitalism. Ultimately, this round of collective bargaining served to entrench Fordist regulation and the accompanying union practices of compromise.

These were, however, the long-term effects of the 1958 negotiations. In the short-run the UAW administration found itself under fire from a growing nationalist opposition mobilized by the Left and fuelled by the growing fear of the effect of small car imports on the jobs of Canadian autoworkers. The conflict surfaced during the January, 1959 District Council meeting. Amidst accusations of a sell-out of Canadian workers by the International union and a growing separatist movement spearheaded by the Left caucus, Burt defended the contracts, adopting the language of the left and blaming the ills of International "capital" for the economic crisis:

I believe the only way we can defend ourselves against American capital is through International Unions such as ours. ...It seems to me that we are fighting against world capital, but particularly American capital, which is responsible for most of our economic ills, but an attempt is being made [by the Left caucus] to side track us into believing that international unionism is responsible for our failure to obtain things from American employers.(35)

Burt's position was bolstered by the presence and speech of Leonard Woodcock, member of the UAW executive board who argued that a common employer required a common bargaining approach.(36) Cliff Pilkey, local 222, supported by a large contingent of local representatives, labelled Burt a "Colonial Administrator" and

accused the union executive of forcing the contract down workers' throats by refusing to give strike authorization for any settlement beyond the American pattern. The opposition also criticized the International for dropping the Canadian demand for a shorter work week.(37)

This opposition to the International was a serious threat as it was widely supported by Canadian locals, in particular the powerful locals of the Big Three automakers. Supporters included Bill Rutherford and Cliff Pilkey, vice-president and president of local 222, Vic White, president of Ford local 200, Charles Brooks, president of Chrysler local 444, and Doug Sutton, former local 222 plant chairman and member of the GM bargaining committee.(38) The nationalists in the Canadian Region used the public and union press to build momentum.(39)

Such nationalist appeals found a sympathetic audience in the union as the general political climate in Canada turned on nationalist debates. Since the 1956 release of the Gordon Commission Report, public concern increased over the role played by American multinational corporations in the Canadian economy. In 1958, these nationalist sentiments had been mobilized by the Diefenbaker Conservatives to produce an electoral landslide. The use of a militant, nationalist discourse by the Canadian UAW Left caucus was therefore timely, and not surprisingly, mobilized the Left increased support amongst union members.(40)

Paradoxically, these same nationalist appeals by the Left, when combined with the nature of the Left caucus as a coalition of

Communists, CCFers and other union militants, provided the UAW leadership with a means of destroying the Left and hence the remaining organized opposition to the terms of the postwar compromise. The popular nationalism which developed in Canada in the late 1950's was tempered by the Cold War. Conservative nationalists were cautious in the articulation of their position, fearing that too open an attack on American business interests in Canada would undermine (or be seen to undermine) support for the U.S. as the bulwark against Communism.(41) The Left caucus in the Canadian UAW was especially open to this type of attack, given the participation in the caucus of many Communists and the Canadian Communist Party's earlier articulation of a nationalist party platform.(42)

Canadian UAW leaders seized on these factors to formulate a programme of divide and rule to squash the nationalist challenge to Reuther and the International. The first step towards this goal was an invitation to Walter Reuther to speak at the next District Council meeting. In preparation for the meeting, Burt advised Reuther to assuage the demands of the nationalists by allowing the Canadian Region control of its own Citizenship Funds and a free hand in bargaining submissions to the corporations.(43) Furthermore, Burt urged Reuther to voice support for Canadian Autoworkers' demand for a Canadian-made car.(44) Burt anticipated that acquiescence to these demands would draw nationalists back into the UAW fold and leave the Communists isolated in their opposition to the union leadership. Burt also mobilized Reuther supporters who were District Council delegates to speak out

against the nationalists at the upcoming meeting and to take over the Council executive.(45)

When the April District Council meeting took place, Burt attempted to further isolate the Left caucus by attacking the Big Three locals, where the Left was centred, for dominating UAW politics and ignoring the interests of those representatives from the parts' suppliers and other industries. He accused the Big Three locals, which represented a minority of delegates at the Council, of dominating the agenda with the question of nationalism, thereby subjecting the majority of delegates to a debate which had little to do with them.(46) Walter Reuther joined with Burt in his attack on the nationalists, arguing that Canadian workers could not have reached a better contract while negotiating with an International Corporation.(47) The end result of the meeting was a victory for the right-wing forces who took control of the District Council executive.

The Canadian UAW leadership then shifted its strategy to the local unions with the intent of ensuring the election of local executives supportive of the administration. The first local to come under fire was local 222. Prior to local 222 elections, Walter Reuther spoke at a membership meeting. He reiterated his charges against the nationalists and urged a show of support for his administration.(48) The support came in the May 1959 local 222 elections. Both Pilkey and Rutherford were defeated by Reuther supporters.(49) This was quickly followed by Pilkey's failed challenge to Burt at the UAW International Convention for the

position of Canadian Director.(50) In light of these victories, Burt directed Paul Siren, UAW staff member responsible for the Toronto area, to organize opposition and purge local unions of officers unfavourable to the union administration. Siren, a long-time Left caucus supporter, balked at this. He argued that these measures would destroy the democratic process in the union, and resigned his position in protest.(51) Before the resignation became effective, however, the Reuther administration received information which gave it the opportunity to rid the union of left-wingers altogether. Nels Wilson, one time member of the Left caucus from local 222, saw his own position in the union threatened by the purges. He therefore informed the UAW executive of the 1955 meetings between the UAW Left caucus and the Communist Party.(52) Upon receiving this information, Burt fired Siren on charges of his alleged association with the Communist Party.(53)

Siren was not the only casualty of Wilson's revelations, however. The International saw Wilson's accusations as the means for ridding all GM locals of radical elements. The International union executive therefore appointed an all-American committee composed of senior UAW officials to hear charges that a number of Canadian members holding high office in locals consorted with the Communist Party during the 1955-56 negotiations and strike.(54) Using McCarthy-like tactics, the committee held a trial at the Royal York Hotel in Toronto. Those on trial included Pilkey, Rutherford, Siren, Lambert and a handful of others.(55)

As the trial got underway, the District Council became the scene of another pitched battle between the Left and Reuther

caucuses. After four and one-half hours of debate the right-wing forces were victorious in their condemnation of Siren and the Communists, lending their full support to Communist purges in the name of 'democracy' in unions.(56) The union had little evidence to corroborate its charges, however, and was forced to exonerate the GM negotiating committee. Nonetheless, the trial committee ruled in favour of Siren's dismissal and the withdrawal of his union card.(57) Siren appealed his case to the Public Review Board which in October 1960 ruled that he had been disbarred by improper methods and restored his union card. This left him free to seek work in other unions.(58) Despite the clearing of Siren's name, the union leadership had succeeded in its goal of ridding the union staff of the key person responsible for aiding the Left opposition.

Through these measures, the Left caucus' organization was effectively destroyed. The Left's loss of control over the District Council combined with the loss of the local 222 executive and Paul Siren undermined its ability to organize opposition and mobilize membership support. Although Brooks and Lambert retained their union positions in locals 444 and 199 respectively, the organizational resources open to them were limited.

The Reuther caucus' success was most clearly revealed in the next round of collective bargaining. To ensure its control over Canadian negotiations, the executive sent Leonard Woodcock from the International UAW office to bargain the Canadian GM contracts. After a one day strike, the union won 100% company-paid health

coverage and improved pensions in exchange for another three-year agreement.(59) This settlement, based on the American ones, was quickly extended to Ford, Chrysler and Massey Ferguson workers.(60)

In the absence of an organized left opposition to these settlements, militant workers at the GM plant in Oshawa and the Ford plant in Oakville wildcatted in protest of the three-year agreements. These displays of militancy and defiance were without direction and mobilized support, however. They were therefore quickly crushed by the union leadership.(61) The International's control over the Canadian Region was secure. Reuther had won and the last obstacle to the entrenchment of Fordist regulation had been overcome.

Political Solutions to the Recession: The UAW and the Federal Government

Collective bargaining solutions to the economic recession were of limited value in tackling the more fundamental problems facing the auto industry, of which the most important was the importation of small cars for sale in the North American market. This problem was beyond control in the workplace and required government action. Thus, in addition to its collective bargaining strategy the UAW vigorously pursued a legislative programme, putting pressure on the federal government to intervene in the auto industry. Autoworkers expected the government to develop an industrial policy which would resolve the issues of imports, unemployment, trade and the protection of Canada's industrial base.

A series of solutions to the import question were advanced by the Canadian Autoworkers. The union was against increasing the tariff as a means to force production of small cars in Canada. Alternate proposals put forward by the union included government incentives to encourage corporations to establish small car production facilities in Canada, quotas or an embargo on small car imports, and the removal of the excise tax on low-priced cars built in Canada in order to make them competitive with imports and induce companies to produce such cars in Canada.(62) In an attempt to prevent the left-wing nationalists from mobilizing support around this issue, Reuther backed these demands inspite of their possible negative impact on the American auto industry.(63)

While a resolution of the import problem was crucial to the survival of the auto industry, the UAW saw the solution to this question as only a partial answer to the economic recession. As such, the union also put forward a comprehensive programme of government action, at the root of which lay greater government control over the economy. Burt's report to Council summed up the UAW position:

It seems to me that with automation, the means of production much improved and the competition that we are bound to get from socialist countries where the government controls the source of production, it is going to be more and more necessary for our government to consider taking over the resources of Canada and plan production for full employment. I think we have gone past the stage where we can depend on the hit and miss methods employed by private enterprise.(64)

The union called for a federal-provincial conference on

unemployment, an expanded public works programme and increased unemployment insurance payments. It also demanded that a moratorium on the debts of the unemployed be declared and legislation be passed instituting a shorter work week and a minimum wage of \$1.25 per hour. Finally, the union urged the government to pursue extended world trade to ensure access to expanding world markets.(65) Certain UAW locals in Toronto, in alliance with locals from the United Electrical Workers and the Rubber Workers, went further in their demands. They urged nationalization of the Avro plant, greater trade with all countries, especially China and East Europe, and the levy of taxes on all raw materials leaving Canada.(66)

The UAW began its political action programme with a province wide motorcade of unemployed which drove to Ottawa to protest unemployment. This show of strength by the Autoworkers was overshadowed, however, by the ongoing consultations between union leaders and the federal government.(67) Burt was one of five CLC delegates who participated in a National Winter Employment Conference called on July 14 and 15 by Labour Minister Michael Starr.(68) At about the same time, Burt was made a member of a government committee on technological change.(69) Taking advantage of what appeared to be the opening doors of government, Burt wired Prime Minister Diefenbaker, asking him to investigate whether the Big Three corporations were intending to build small cars in Canada.(70)

The combination of union input into government committees and pressure on the government for action resulted in a meeting

between a UAW delegation and various Cabinet Ministers, including the Prime Minister. The UAW presented a brief, emphasizing the importance of the auto industry to the Canadian economy and the imperative of government action as "... the problem is much bigger than the Union can handle. It requires Canadian Government action to protect the jobs of thousands of Canadian Auto Workers.".(71)

The UAW's lobbying efforts were strengthened when Chrysler announced the production of small cars in Canada and demanded tariff enforcement of Canadian content laws to protect the company from imports.(72) With momentum building, the UAW demanded that the federal government establish a Royal Commission on the auto industry.(73) To increase the pressure on the government, the union formed alliances with the mayors of various industrial cities and other community groups who joined in the cries for government action.(74)

The pinnacle of the UAW's efforts came in July when the District Council auto section presented a brief, backed by a 250-person delegation, to Cabinet and the Prime Minister where the latter announced the government's intention to establish a Royal Commission.(75) On August 2, 1960 under the terms of Order in Council P.C.1960-1047, Professor Vincent Wheeler Bladen of University of Toronto, was appointed Royal Commissioner to investigate the motor vehicle and parts industry in Canada.(76) Following this, the federal government increased the value added taxes on auto parts imported from the U.S..(77)

The UAW was victorious. The reasons for this success, however, did not lie in the power of the union alone. The auto industry was the lynchpin of Canada's industrial complex. A recession in this industry had a rippling effect throughout the economy forcing the government to pay heed. Secondly, the auto corporations had joined the UAW in pressing the government for action. In the immediate postwar period, the UAW and the corporations had consistently opposed each other in their solutions to problems in the auto industry. American auto corporations were hegemonic in the world market and fluctuations in production and profit were understood as corporate problems requiring possible changes in government fiscal policy, but not direct intervention in the industry itself. Thus, union calls for greater government protection of the auto industry fell on deaf ears. By 1957, the crises facing the industry were related to European imports and this went beyond the control of corporate decision-making, necessitating instead some form of government protection. The coalescence of union and corporate interests reflected the declining world dominance of the North American auto industry and the resulting need for a national policy to protect this industry from European competition. The drive for a national policy forged alliances between the union and the corporations, alliances which effectively forced the government to act.

These two years of political action leading up to the Royal Commission also had far-reaching effects on UAW political strategy and ultimately secured lobbying as the political form of

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the postwar settlement. Never before had the UAW had such access to government officials, including the Prime Minister, nor had it ever met with such success. Furthermore, government action had been brought about through the presentation of briefs and consultation between union leaders and government officials, rather than through more militant, direct action or threats of electoral mobilization. This situation was all the more surprising, given the fact that the Conservative party with whom the UAW had hostile relations, was in power. To the Canadian UAW leadership, this experience proved that lobbying with its implied practice of responsible unionism was an effective strategy. This leadership was therefore committed to the pursuit of lobbying and the abandonment of even a rhetoric of militancy and confrontation which had previously characterized UAW-government relations.

The Canadian UAW's attempt to put this strategy fully into action, however, was thwarted by heightened union conflict between the nationalist Left and Reuther caucuses. The preparation of the UAW's brief to the Royal Commission coincided with and fuelled these internal union battles. The fact that multinational corporations and imports were to blame for the recession in the auto industry set the conditions for yet another battle between these caucuses, this time over union recommendations to the Commission. The conflict came to a head at the September Council meeting where a Council committee report on the Royal Commission brief was submitted to the delegates, recommending greater integration between the American and

Canadian auto industries. Brooks, Lambert and Rutherford protested this recommendation, arguing for its replacement with the recommendation of an all-Canadian car. Given Lambert and Rutherford's well known connections with the Communist Party, Burt quickly turned this criticism into a Communist plot to dictate union policy from the outside. The Canadian Director then offered a compromise to the nationalists by suggesting the inclusion of a recommendation for the Royal Commission to study the feasibility of an all-Canadian Car. Several delegates jumped to Burt's assistance and the committee report was adopted, resulting in the resignation of Brooks and Lambert from the Council's brief committee.(78)

Both caucuses looked to mobilize support amongst the membership for their respective positions. A series of membership meetings to discuss the union policy became battles for support, as did local newspapers.(79) Previous battles with the union leadership had severely weakened the Left, most recently resulting in its loss of control over the District Council. This loss of a forum of communication and organization reinforced the Left's weakness by isolating it in local pockets of strength. The Left caucus therefore sought alternative means for mobilizing support and legitimizing its nationalist position on the future of the auto industry. Charlie Brooks, president of Chrysler local 444, organized a mass public rally on the Bladen Commission with Walter Gordon as the keynote speaker.(80) This local then prepared and submitted its own brief to the Bladen Commission. In St.Catherines, where Gordie Lambert was plant chairman of the

McKinnon Plant, the membership of local 199 turned down his proposal in favour of the one put forward by the District Council. This left him with one alternative - to gain support for his proposal from the GM Intra Corporation Council of which he was chair. Despite Burt's warning that such policy deliberation by this Council was unconstitutional, the GM Council supported Lambert and prepared its own brief for submission to the Bladen Commission. Finally, left-wing activists in Windsor Ford local 200 mobilized the support of the Windsor Unemployed Committee which also presented its own brief.(81)

All four briefs were submitted to the Commission on Wednesday, 26 October 1960.(82) The official UAW brief, couched in the 'neutral' language of economics, cited unemployment, the recession in auto production and sales, and the net effect of the auto industry on the Canadian economy as the reasons for a government policy on the auto industry. The UAW's key recommendation was that:

...the Commission examine the feasibility of an international agreement which would permit free trade in the products of any motor vehicle manufacturing company provided that the company produced in Canada or had produced for it in Canada a quantity of motor vehicles and parts, sufficient to assure maintenance of current levels of employment at current production volume and future increases in employment parallel with the growth of the company's Canadian market.(83)

This proposal was intended to increase the efficiency of the industry through the development of economies of scale in Canada while placing safeguards on Canadian jobs. A reduction of price would follow which would benefit consumers and help to win back the market lost to cheaper European vehicles. The union argued

that the private sector was ultimately responsible for evening out cyclical recessions and that the government's role should be limited to a conducive trade policy. Finally, the brief laid out plans for administration of the agreement by a tripartite board aimed at ensuring corporate fulfillment of all its responsibilities.(84)

The briefs submitted by the Left contrasted sharply with the official union brief. While the official brief courted the government and corporations through a 'neutral' economists' language, the GM Intra-Corporation brief lambasted private corporations for pricing cars uncompetitively with small cars in order to maintain profits at the expense of Canadian workers and for ignoring Canadian market demands for a cheaper and more efficient means of transportation.(85) Local 444's brief directly criticized the integration option which it argued would prevent industrialization in Canada. The local bolstered its arguments with nationalist appeals about American control of the Canadian economy. Both briefs proposed similar solutions to the industry's problems, including: 1) legislation to ensure minimum 75% Canadian content of cars sold in Canada with the ultimate aim of producing an all-Canadian car, 2) public scrutiny of corporate profits and 3) the establishment of a Crown Corporation either to produce vehicles or at least to issue consumer loans for vehicle purchasing.(86) The position of the Left was perhaps best summed up in the concluding comments in the GM Intra-Corporation Council brief:

In our judgement the Royal Commission must recommend mechanics whereby the Canadian economy will not be at the mercy of any private corporate decision outside of Canada's borders. Canada must be free to make its own decisions, to plan its economy and to provide employment. Anything less is not in our interests.(87)

In many ways this was the last hurrah for the organized left-wing opposition in the Canadian Region. Although other struggles between the Left and the leadership would surface in the future, these would be isolated to a few locals such as locals 199 and 444 where Lambert and Brooks maintained their membership support. These locals could be easily dominated or isolated by the International union, owing to their relatively small size and their lack of union-wide support.

The struggle over the Royal Commission and solutions to auto industry problems reflected the decline of the Left caucus. Although the Left had been largely unanimous in its proffered solutions, it had been forced to present three separate briefs for want of organizational means through which to mobilize a united front. The Left's nationalist discourse also placed it and, in particular the Communist Party, in a deepening crisis. A discourse of class and class struggle no longer appealed to workers experiencing the prosperity of the postwar boom. The Communist Party and other groups in the Left thus adopted a nationalist discourse in the hope of uniting workers and constructing alliances with other nationalist groupings to oppose American capital.

While this strategy initially mobilized support for the Left caucus, it also made this group vulnerable to red-baiting, which

the Burt administration adeptly used to villify the Left's proposals. Whereas red-baiting had proved singularly unsuccessful in the Canadian UAW during the late 1940's and early 1950's, times had changed by the late 1950's. Prosperity under capitalism, the 1956 invasion of Hungary and a personal attack on Walter Reuther by Khrushchev in 1959 all contributed to the growing appeal of anti-Communist rhetoric. Secondly, nationalism had inherently disorganizing tendencies. The Left caucus used nationalism to produce broad-based alliances in the name of a national policy. In so doing, this group undermined its own ability to maintain and organize a cohesive 'left' behind a long-term political project. Finally, nationalist appeals, in the absence of partisan organization, tended to reinforce the 'non-ideological' syndicalist tendencies within the UAW, which could as easily be mobilized by moderates in the union as the militants. In fact, this is exactly what happened in the conflict over solutions to the economic recession.

Burt's early appeals to the membership were couched in a militant discourse, calling for government control of private enterprise and the economy. He appealed to the union for unity in its approach to the Royal Commission, apparently offering the olive branch to his opponents with his proposed compromise on the all-Canadian car issue. While this undermined some of the Left caucus' support, more importantly it played on the union's syndicalist tradition and established practice of forming a united front in struggle. Only in unity could the union force its agenda onto the governments and the Left, no longer strong enough

to forge a compromise on its own terms, could now be vilified for breaking this tradition and undermining the union's position. Within weeks of the Royal Commission hearings, the District Council passed resolutions condemning both the minority reports to the Commission and the Communists within the union.(88)

Additional credence was given to the union's official lobbying efforts with the release of the Bladen Report in April 1961. Bladen recommended a series of measures intended to lower the price of Canadian-produced vehicles sold in Canada and a comprehensive policy of freer trade with Canadian content regulations aimed at facilitating the development of economies of scale and opening new markets for Canadian produced parts and vehicles.(89) While the report was a compromise between the demands of corporations, the UAW and other groups, the UAW's voice had been heard. The union leadership's strategy had been vindicated.

The UAW and the New Party

Whilst lobbying with the government to address the problems of the auto industry, the UAW, with other unions, faced a major reorientation of partisan politics. Since 1951, the Canadian UAW had contributed substantial amounts of money to the CCF, reinforcing this commitment with the repeated passage of Council resolutions voicing the union's support for the party. The 1957 election of a Diefenbaker minority government was followed within the year with another federal election. This produced a landslide victory for the Conservatives. CCF representation in Parliament

dropped from 25 to 8 seats.(90) The aftermath of this election was that union resources were severely depleted and morale at a new low.

In response, momentum built for the creation of a new party. In April 1958, a resolution calling for the creation of a new party was introduced and adopted at the CLC convention, setting off a three year move to build the New Democratic Party (NDP).(91) According to Horowitz, the move to create a new party was intended to strengthen the labour base of the party and broaden its appeal to the middle classes in the hope of constructing a winning electoral coalition. This also meant constructing a new image for the party, one not tarnished by the doctrinaire socialism of the CCF or CCL industrial labourism.(92) Nevertheless, the industrial unions, with their long tradition of party activism, were crucial to the construction of this new party.

Given the UAW's dominant role in the Canadian labour movement, both as a politically active union and as one of the largest industrial unions in Canada, George Burt, as Director of the Canadian Region of the UAW, was drawn into the centre of organizing the new Party. He was placed on three sub-committees of the National Committee for the New Party which included the Finance, Liberally-Minded and Founding Convention committees.(93) The Canadian Council also repeatedly passed resolutions supporting the creation of this new party.(94)

The major role undertaken by the union in these deliberations, however, still appeared to be financial. Throughout

the years spent organizing the NDP, the UAW continued to contribute its annual sum of \$12,000 to the CCF's organization fund.(95) In 1959, it contributed \$6,000 to the Ontario CCF with the International office providing additional monies equal to \$15,000 for the New Party Political Action Fund.(96) The New Party Finance Committee also undertook an intensive campaign amongst union locals to get them to contribute \$1 per member either through individual contributions or contributions on behalf of an entire local.(97) As Burt was head of this committee, UAW locals were presumably under more intense pressure to meet these contributions. By March, 1961, several locals, including white-collar ones, had subscribed their whole membership to the New Party Fund on the basis of \$1 per member.(98) By June, 1961 the Globe and Mail reported that the UAW had contributed \$50,000 to the New Party.(99)

When the Founding Convention of the New Democratic Party finally took place in 1961, the UAW had contributed 26% of the total contributions made to the New Party Fund. In exchange the UAW made up 10% of the delegates to the Ontario Founding Convention where Dennis McDermott, UAW staff member, was elected to the Executive of the Ontario NDP. Carrol Coburn, from the UAW's International Special Projects Department and a long-time activist within the ranks of the CCF, was the only other person associated with the UAW elected to the ONDP executive.(100)

New party guidelines for trade-union affiliation were passed at the Convention. Following this, intense pressure was exerted by the UAW office on locals to affiliate and a host of UAW locals

immediately responded. By the end of 1961, 19 locals had affiliated to the party, including locals 444 and 199, both of which had previously been organizationally dominated by Communists or fellow travellers and had opposed affiliation with the CCF.(101)

The Autoworkers' contribution to the founding of the New Party was immense, as was that of the Packinghouse Workers and the Steelworkers. Yet, the UAW's actual influence on the party was circumscribed by three factors:

- 1) the orientation of the party towards labour
- 2) the structure of union representation inside the party
- 3) the UAW's understanding of its role in politics and the resulting political strategies adopted to resolve the union's immediate problems.

Although trade unions played a major role in financing the organization of the NDP and despite the fact that the NDP desperately needed the trade unions to provide a sound financial and organizational base for the party, the NDP was not a party of labour. Rather, the party was a brokerage party, attempting to appeal to all progressive elements in society in the hope of building a winning electoral coalition.(102) This was clearly revealed in a resolution adopted by the National Council of the CCF, following its decision to reorganize the party into the NDP:

That the National Council urges provincial sections to establish a special committee to give leadership in the organizational and publicity work, seeking to broaden the base of interest in the new party:

That such Provincial committees should take the initiative now in inspiring and co-ordinating the development of farmers, businessmen, ethnic, women, youth and other liberally-minded groups at the local level;
That such provincial committees will be prepared to

cooperate fully with the efforts of the National Joint CLC/CCF Committee.(103)

The party leadership's view of society was a pluralist one, in which all interests were equal. Trade unions were one of these interests and their interests, like those of other groups, were to be brokered by the party to form policy and electoral compromises.

Given the fact that trade-union membership in Canada remained at a stable but low percentage of the population and that white-collar workers were the fastest growing section of the working population, existing industrial trade unions had to look for alliances in society which could provide them with a more powerful base from which to pursue their social and political goals. The New Party promised such alliances. However, the type of alliances constructed by the NDP placed unions in a position of competing with other interests within the party for priority on the agenda. The fact that many of these other 'interests' were antagonistic to unions made this task difficult, and at times impossible. Furthermore, many Canadian autoworkers remained committed to their view of labour as 'first amongst equals' because of its strategic and powerful position in the production process. Such a preeminent position for organized labour within the NDP contradicted the party's goals and anticipated path of success. Within the NDP, unions were expected to pay the bill, but they were not to call the tune.

The structure of union representation inside the party also ensured that organized labour did not dominate. Representation of affiliated locals to party conventions and other policy forums was

calculated on a per capita basis whereby unions had lower per capita representation than constituency organizations. Voting by union delegates was based on one delegate to one vote, thereby preventing block voting by any union.(104) Furthermore, union delegates had also to be acceptable as members of the party (although they did not have to actually be members of the party) in order to participate. The power to make this decision rested with the NDP executive which was under no obligation to provide reasons for its acceptance or rejection of a particular unionist into the ranks of the party.

For the unions this meant that their representation inside the party was more restricted than that of constituency associations and heavily controlled by the party bureaucracy. The resulting limited input by unions into party policy contrasted with the large financial contributions that unions made to the NDP. These same issues had prevented the UAW from supporting the CCF in 1943. In 1961, although internal union debate over these issues was absent, this did not mean that the membership agreed with this particular form of representation.

For example, local 112 of the UAW named Hugh Dowson as one of its delegates to the 1958 Ontario CCF Provincial Convention. The Party found that Dowson was not acceptable as a member as he was a Trotskyist. Without informing local 112 of the party's reason for rejecting Dowson's application, the CCF executive told the local to elect another delegate.(105) The local rejected the party's explanation as inadequate and stated that the union's original list of local delegates would stand.(106) When Dowson was refused

seating as a delegate at the Convention, local 112 appealed to the CCF for a meeting between the local union executive, the provincial CCF executive and the Political Action Committee. Rather than dealing with this matter, the Party's provincial executive decided that such a meeting would serve no purpose as its executive decision on Dowson had not been openly challenged on the floor of the Convention and the Convention was over.(107)

The control exercised by the party over the union locals reinforced the view amongst the UAW membership that the CCF/NDP was not a party of labour. It also fed the suspicion that the party was too willing to enter into internal union politics, despite its proclaimed neutrality in these affairs. This was yet another sore point left over from the 1940's struggles between the Communists and the CCF. Despite the image-building efforts of the CCF and CLC in creating the new party, for much of the UAW membership the NDP was a sheep in lamb's clothing. These conflicts between locals and the party did nothing to build support amongst union membership for the NDP. While locals did continue to affiliate, this in no way reflected a growing partisan movement within the UAW.(108)

Party regulations were not, however, the only reason for UAW underrepresentation within the NDP. The fact that the UAW, in contrast to the USWA or UPWA, did not have any representatives on the National Executive of the NDP was less likely the result of NDP opposition than the UAW's own half-hearted support for the party.(109) The large financial donations by the union and

affiliation to the NDP by several UAW locals could not mask the poor attendance of UAW staff, including Burt, at party-union meetings, nor the general apathy of the union membership towards the NDP. Once again, it appeared that the UAW intended to keep open the partisan option with little concern for the immediate electoral fortune of the NDP. Nonetheless, this lack of representation of Autoworkers contrasted with their heavy financial contributions to the NDP and fuelled discontent amongst the membership over the party's relationship to organized labour. This conflict festered throughout the 1960's, finally reaching a head in 1968 with McDermott's threat to lead the UAW out of the party.

The final reason for the limited influence of the UAW on the NDP and related to the one previously cited, was the union's syndicalist orientation and the effect this had on UAW strategy for political change. Autoworkers saw their union as a political organization capable of exercising political power independent of a political party. As was argued in Chapter Two, this was an unintended consequence of the role of the Communist Party in shaping ideological and political discourse and practice within the UAW. To recap this argument, the Communist-dominated left in the UAW forged a militant, trade-union centred discourse and culture amongst the autoworkers, consistently underplaying the role of the Party in shaping union affairs. This interpretation of society made sense of workers' daily lives and was therefore readily incorporated into their understanding of the workplace and the union. Long after the Communists lost their dominant role in

the union and, in the continued absence of a party which could give meaning to the day-to-day lives of workers, the syndicalist tradition flourished.

Such a trade-union centred understanding of politics undermined a partisan strategy while reinforcing a commitment to lobbying. The UAW success in lobbying between 1958 and 1961 confirmed many Autoworkers' view that the union itself was the most important political actor. The UAW certainly could not count on the NDP to provide the immediate political change that lobbies had succeeded in doing. In fact, many union members feared that too close an association with one political party might jeopardize the union's emergent relationship with government. While Autoworkers were willing to help in the building of the New Party, their historically constructed understanding of the role of the union in politics and the visible successes of other political strategies weakened their commitment to and mobilization behind the NDP.

Conclusion

The years of economic crisis between 1958 and 1961 were crucial ones in entrenching Fordist regulation and putting into place the last piece of the postwar compromise. The UAW's destruction of the organized left in the union allowed centralized control of the Canadian Region. With this control came the extension of regulations governing collective bargaining throughout the auto industry and into the agricultural implement sector. The highly regulated nature of collective bargaining

combined with the need for greater coordination of bargaining activities resulted in further centralization of control over the union in the hands of the International executive. In turn, this centralization ensured the abidance of both corporations and union locals to the established structure of regulation.

At the same time, the economic crisis provoked government rethinking of the nature and role of the auto industry in Canada. This government uncertainty coincided with more concerted attempts at lobbying by the UAW and provided greater opportunity for union access to and input into government decision-making. The UAW's perceived victory in lobbying reinforced its commitment to this strategy over more militant options and ensured the emergence of a liberal pluralist political component to the postwar compromise. However, this political compromise had yet to be fully effected and stabilized. This would be achieved in the remaining years of the 1960's when the federal government, upon the signing of the Autopact, became involved in regulating the auto industry .

Only in the arena of partisan politics did UAW strategy remain relatively unchanged. The flurry of activity and the UAW's huge financial contribution towards the formation of the NDP did not mask the continued secondary status of party politics. Ironically, the very syndicalism which had made the UAW so militant in the early years of its existence in Canada also made it open to the construction of a postwar settlement based on liberal pluralist commitments to competition between private interests inside the government. The need for a social democratic

party appeared to be waning in the UAW's quest for political power and change.

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33. Globe and Mail, 28 Jan. 1959.
34. Toronto Telegram, 29 Jan. 1959.
35. TRO, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 6 & 7 Dec. 1958, p.8. This Council meeting was postponed from December to 17 & 18 Jan. 1959 and as a result the date on the report does not coincide with the date the report was delivered to the Canadian Council.
36. TRO, Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 17 & 18 Jan. 1959, p.7.
37. Ibid., p.7-8.

38. The names of other supporters included Abe Taylor, Charles Tucker, Nels Wilson, Roy Babcock, Ed Bruce and Lyle Dotzert, Ibid.; Wilfrid List in Globe and Mail, 24 Jan. 1959.
39. L444, Chrysler 444 News, 11 Feb. 1959, pp.2-3; WPR, George Burt to Walter Reuther, 25 Mar. 1959 with attached report entitled "Notes on the Canadian Situation"; Globe and Mail, 9, 11, 12 Feb. 1959.
40. WPR, George Burt to Walter Reuther, 25 Mar. 1959 with attached report entitled "Notes on the Canadian Situation", pp.13-14; Philip Resnick, The Land of Cain (Vancouver: New Star Books, 1977); George Grant, Lament for a Nation (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1965).
41. Resnick, Ibid., Chapter 4.
42. Ivan Avakumovic, The Communist Party in Canada (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1975), Chapter 8.
43. WPR, Jack Gearing "Good Evening" in Oshawa Times, 14 Feb. 1959; George Burt to Walter Reuther, 25 Mar. 1959 with attached report entitled "Notes on the Canadian Situation", pp.10-11.
44. Ibid., p.14.
45. CSRO, Harry Benson to George Burt, 24 Mar. 1959.
46. TRO, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 4 & 5 Apr. 1959, pp.9-10.
47. TRO, Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 4 & 5 Apr. 1959, p.5; Globe and Mail, 6 Apr. 1959.
48. Globe and Mail, 6 Apr. 1959.
49. Toronto Telegram, 27 May 1959.
50. Globe and Mail, 16 Jan. 1960; Interview with Cliff Pilkey, OFL Headquarters, Toronto, Ontario, 23 Oct. 1986.
51. Globe and Mail, 28 Jan. 1960.
52. Interview with Bill Rutherford, CAW Founding Convention, Toronto, Ontario, 6 Sept. 1985; Interview with Cliff Pilkey.
53. Globe and Mail, 16 Jan. 1960.
54. Globe and Mail, 27 Jan. 1960.
55. Interviews with Bill Rutherford and Cliff Pilkey.

56. TRO, Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 2 & 3 Apr. 1960, pp.5-9, resolutions 11 & 12.
57. Globe and Mail, 6 May 1960.
58. Globe and Mail, 22 Oct. 1960.
59. Globe and Mail, 26 Nov, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14 Dec. 1961.
60. Globe and Mail, 6, 16 Jan., 3, 5 Feb. 1962.
61. Globe and Mail, 26 Nov., 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15 Dec. 1961, 6, 10, 11, 16, 27 Jan., 3, 5, Feb. 1962.
62. Globe and Mail, 3, 6 Mar. 1959; TRO, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 6 & 7 Dec. 1958, p.12; Resolution on small car imports passed by Canadian Council, Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 4 & 5 Apr. 1959, p.6; CB, Charlie Brooks to Prime Minister Diefenbaker, 4 Apr. 1960; On tariff question see TRO, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 20 & 21 June 1959, p.8; Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 19 & 20 Sept. 1959, p.7.
63. Globe and Mail, 6 Apr. 1959.
64. TRO, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 4 & 5 Apr. 1959, p.13.
65. Globe and Mail, 6 Mar. 1959.
66. Globe and Mail, 11 Mar. 1959.
67. Globe and Mail, 16 June 1958; CRO, George Burt to Michael Starr, 22 May 1958; George Burt to Honourable Ellen Fairclough, 30 May 1958; George Burt to Lester Pearson, 2 June 1958; George Burt to Hazen Argue, 2 June 1958; George Burt to All Staff Members, 2 June 1958; Allan Schroeder to George Burt, 5 June 1958; Lester Pearson to George Burt, 5 June 1958.
68. TRO, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 13 & 14 Sept. 1958, p.8.
69. TRO, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 6 & 7 Dec. 1958, p.13.
70. TRO, The wire was sent on 26 Feb. 1959 and reported in UAW Brief "'Small' Car Problem as it Affects Canadian Autoworkers" to Prime Minister and Members of Cabinet, Parliament Buildings, Ottawa, 20 Apr. 1959, p.3.
71. Ibid., p.6; Globe and Mail, 20 Apr. 1959.
72. Globe and Mail, 22 June 1959.

73. TRO, Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 4 & 5 & 6 Dec. 1959, p.2; Globe and Mail, 7 Dec. 1959.
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75. Globe and Mail, 6 July 1960; TRO, Regional Director's Report, 17 & 18 Sept. 1960, p.7.
76. Bladen, Royal Commission Automotive, p.vii.
77. Globe and Mail, 14 Dec. 1960.
78. TRO, Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 17 & 18 Sept. 1960, pp.15-19; Globe and Mail, 21 Sept. 1960; Burt's conviction that the left's split with the Council over recommendations to the Commission was a Communist plot was most clearly revealed in a letter he wrote in which he argued that Paul Siren had convinced the Communist Party to adopt this position out of vindictiveness over his discharge from the UAW. CRO, George Burt to Larry Gettlinger, 22 Sept. 1960.
79. WPR, George Burt to Walter Reuther, 4 Nov. 1960, p.2; Caucus for Progressive UAW Policy, "Jobs - Independent Policy - Unity", Local 444 News, Sept. 1960.
80. CB, Charlie Brooks to Walter Gordon, Q.C., 23 Sept. 1960.
81. WPR, George Burt to Walter Reuther, 2 Nov. 1960, p.2-3.
82. Bladen, Royal Commission Automotive, p.2.
83. SG, United Automobile Workers (UAW-CLC), Brief to the Royal Commission on Canada's Automotive Industry 1960, 24 Oct. 1960, pp.8-9.
84. Ibid., 18 pages.
85. SG, National Canadian General Motors Intra-Corporation Council, Brief to the Royal Commission on the Automotive Industry, n.d..
86. Ibid; CB, Submission of Local 444 UAW-AFL-CIO to the Royal Commission on the Automotive and Parts Industries, Oct. 1960.
87. SG, General Motors Intra-Corporation Automotive Brief, p.5.
88. TRO, Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 14 & 15 Jan. 1961, pp. 15-17; Globe and Mail, 16 Jan. 1961.
89. Bladen, Royal Commission Automotive, Chapter VI.

90. Gad Horowitz, Canadian Labour in Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), p.191.
91. Ibid., p.192.
92. Ibid., p.204. For a more complete discussion of the events leading up to the creation of the new party see Chapters 5 and 6.
93. CCF, Minutes to meeting of National Committee for the New Party, 8 & 9 July 1960, p.4.
94. TRO, Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 4 & 5 Apr. 1959, p.6, 4 & 5 & 6 Dec. 1959, p.4.
95. CCF, CCF National Office Balance Sheet as of 31 Dec. 1959, reported on 12 Jan. 1960; CCF National Office Balance Sheet as of 30 June 1960, reported on 19 July 1960.
96. CCF, Statement of Canadian Political Action Fund (Schedule A), 1 Apr. 1959 to 15 Dec. 1959.
97. TRO, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 17 & 18 Sept. 1960, p.12.
98. TRO, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 10 & 11 & 12 Mar. 1961, p.4.
99. Globe and Mail, 4 June 1961.
100. TRO, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 13 & 14 Jan. 1962, p.10.
101. On the original report submitted to the membership, the number of locals listed as affiliated equalled 15. However, on Burt's copy of this report, the names of four additional locals were pencilled in. Presumably, between the time of writing and delivering the report, these additional locals affiliated to the party. TRO, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 13 & 14 Jan. 1962, p.10.
102. The thesis of the NDP as brokerage party comes from Janine Brodie and Jane Jenson, Crisis, Challenge and Change: Party and Class in Canada (Toronto: Methuen Publications, 1980).
103. CCF, Minutes to meeting of National Council of CCF, 24 & 25 Jan. 1959, p.2.
104. Horowitz, Canadian Labour, Chapter 7.
105. CCF, Minutes to meeting of Provincial Executive, 25 Sept. 1958, p.4.

106. CCF, Minutes to meeting of Provincial Council, 10 Oct. 1958, p.1.
107. CCF, Minutes to meeting of Provincial Executive, 30 Oct. 1958, p.1.
108. By June, 1962 70% of the Canadian UAW membership was affiliated to the NDP. TRO, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 23 & 24 June 1962, p.6.
- 109 CCF, "Federal Office, Council and Executive, 1962, NDP" Vol.427; David Lewis to Allen Schroeder, 5 Feb. 1964.

Chapter Six

Fordism in Place: A 'Moment' of Peace, 1962-68

The year 1962 signalled the return of prosperity for the national economy and the auto industry. North American built compact cars successfully competed with small car imports for the North American market. Consequently, between 1961 and 1963, overseas imports as a percentage of new car sales in Canada dropped from 23.1% to 9.2%.⁽¹⁾ Nonetheless, the structural problems of the Canadian auto industry, identified during the 1958-61 recession, remained. The Canadian government rather than the automakers took the initiative in resolving these problems, leading in 1965 to the signature of a bilateral trade agreement with the U.S., commonly known as the Autopact.

The circumstances leading up to and following the implementation of the Autopact had repercussions on virtually every aspect of UAW politics in this period. As the government's search for an industrial policy in the auto sector signalled a more direct role for the federal government in regulating the auto industry, issues such as investment decisions, which had previously been the sole prerogative of management, now became the object of political attention. The UAW seized this opportunity to expand its scope of influence on the development of the auto industry. It unsuccessfully pushed for the establishment of tripartite decision-making centres in which the UAW would have a

role in monitoring corporate decisions. Nonetheless, its increased political pressure on the federal government combined with early corporate opposition to government policy, made the government more receptive to union demands. The Autopact therefore acted as a catalyst for the development of a closer relationship between the federal government and the UAW.

These developments had two effects on UAW political strategy. With the failure of the UAW's bid for tripartism, lobbying was firmly entrenched as the dominant mode of communication between the UAW and the federal government. This brought with it the dominance of a centralized, bureaucratic form of union politics. Secondly, because of the importance of the Autopact for Canadian Autoworkers' ongoing and future struggles, the UAW shifted its political energies almost exclusively towards the federal government and away from the provincial government.

Corporate recovery from the 1958-61 recession followed by industry adjustment to the Autopact had far-reaching effects on the structure of collective bargaining and the nature of the auto industry workforce. The bilateral trade agreement allowed auto corporations to rationalize further production by developing economies of scale on a continental basis. The UAW and the auto corporations responded to the new conditions by attempting to systematize the structures of Fordist regulation between the two countries. These efforts included a union drive for wage parity between Canadian and American workers, attempts at constructing international agreements and moves by corporations to standardize work rules and production standards. Nevertheless, this move

towards greater centralization and regulation of collective bargaining was met by repeated wildcats as autoworkers strove to reverse the trend towards greater loss of control over the production process.

The UAW not only attempted to bolster its strength through continental institutionalization of collective bargaining, but also engaged in a massive campaign to organize new groups of workers. These included white-collar workers, workers in Quebec and those working in new auto plants established in response to the Autopact. The Canadian UAW's tremendously successful organization drive numerically strengthened the union but simultaneously laid the basis for future internal conflicts and struggles.

Given the UAW's concentration of its political efforts on adjusting to the Autopact, it was not surprising that working with the NDP remained a secondary item on the union's political agenda. Only in 1968 did the UAW's relationship to the NDP begin to change. Although this was partly due to the 1968 election of Dennis McDermott as Canadian UAW Director, it was also a signal of the decline of postwar prosperity and subsequent new challenges to the labour movement. Paradoxically, while Fordist regulation and hence the postwar settlement reached full blossom in these years, at the same time the first seeds of their own demise were being sown.

Constructing an Industrial Policy: The Autopact and the UAW

Momentum for change in the auto industry was set in place with the establishment and 1961 report of the Royal Commission on the Auto Industry. Over the next four years, the federal government constructed an industrial policy for the auto industry intended to stimulate production in Canada. These government deliberations dominated the UAW's political agenda. Thus, while the union actively lobbied the provincial and federal governments on issues of improved pensions, the introduction of a National medicare system, and other social issues, these efforts were overshadowed by the burning issue of the auto industry itself.(2)

In turn, the federal government drew the Autoworkers more closely into the sphere of decision-making, increasing its contact with the union and demonstrating a willingness to act on various union demands. This marked change in the government's relationship with the UAW was a consequence of the 'national policy' politics engaged in by the government in constructing its industrial policy for the auto industry. As the automotive industry was the second largest manufacturing employer in Canada, the impact of inefficiency and recession in this industry rippled throughout the economy.(3) To protect Canada's industrial base and ensure continued economic prosperity in Canada, the government had to act to remedy the problems of declining Canadian auto production and increasing imports. The formulation of such a policy initially met resistance from the various multinational corporations and in attempting to build an effective coalition of support, the government looked to the UAW. As the union had been demanding

action from the government for some years, the advent of a government policy intended to increase Canadian auto production ensured the government of support from the Canadian UAW.

The Canadian government made its first move to increase automotive production in Canada in October, 1962 with the implementation of a pilot tariff incentive programme. The government announced that it would begin to enforce and collect a 25% duty, which had been allowed to lapse, on imports of automatic transmissions. Manufacturers' could recoup this duty, and that collected on imports of up to 10,000 engine blocks which were also levied at a 25% rate of duty, by increasing the export of parts made in Canada. This action met with little resistance by the corporations and paved the way for the next step in the government plan.(4)

Exactly a year after its pilot project, the Canadian government put into effect a full version of its tariff incentive plan. The government imposed duties on all new parts imported from the U.S. into Canada. Companies could earn remission of these duties such that, for each dollar worth of Canadian content in vehicle and parts exports (in excess of a base rate determined between November 1961 and October 1962), automakers could import duty-free an equivalent dollar value of new vehicle and original parts.(5) George Burt was in Ottawa at a meeting with Industry Minister Drury and Labour Minister MacEachen when the programme was announced.(6) Content regulations had been advocated by the UAW in its submission to the Bladen Commission and the union came

out immediately in support of this tariff incentive plan. Amongst auto corporations, however, the government programme sparked tremendous opposition. Therefore, when Drury went to explain it to the Auto Parts Manufacturers' Association, the UAW staged a massive demonstration in support of the government outside the meeting.(7)

The UAW lauded this development, citing the dramatic 82% increase in exports of cars, trucks and motor vehicle parts from Canada between 1962 and 1963 as proof of the programme's effectiveness.(8) However, such unilateral Canadian government action threatened to become a critical issue in Canadian-American relations, raising the possibility that the US might introduce a retaliatory tariff. Before the issue came to a head, President Johnson and Prime Minister Pearson, in a series of hasty and secret meetings held between April 1964 and January 1965, developed the Automotive Agreement.(9) Before the Pact was signed, the Canadian government consulted both union and corporate officials about the plan. Although the UAW had some reservations about freer trade between Canada and the US, the union's major concern was the possible loss of jobs resulting from industry adjustment. Burt demanded that the government receive guarantees of job security before going ahead with the agreement, a demand which Industry Minister Drury insisted should be dealt with through collective bargaining.(10) On January 16, 1965 the Automotive Agreement was signed.(11)

The Automotive Agreement (henceforth called the Autopact) consisted of two parts. The first was a bilateral agreement

between the U.S. and Canadian governments which laid out specific conditions under which freer trade between these countries could be established in the automotive sector.(12) The second part of the agreement consisted of "letters of undertaking" from the vehicle manufacturers to the Canadian government. In these letters, the corporations agreed to a specified formula for increasing the value added in Canada. These commitments ensured continued investment and specified levels of Canadian content in vehicles to be sold in Canada, and hence indirectly protected Canadian jobs.(13) The Autopact effectively introduced a modified version of Bladen's suggested extended-content plan.

The bilateral trade agreement had an immediate impact on the organization of vehicle and parts production in Canada. Firstly, it allowed corporations to reduce the number of different models produced in Canada and thereby allowed specialization and rationalization of production such that continental economies of scale could be reached. Secondly, corporations could decide to increase assembly in Canada while reducing their parts production, relying instead on the import of parts from the U.S.. This would also increase efficiency in production. Finally, corporations could increase the specialization of parts production to avoid duplication and subsequent higher production costs.(14)

Each corporation responded differently to the Autopact. American Motors Corporation expanded its assembly in Canada and with the introduction of its new car, the Hornet, supplied the entire western market in the U.S. from its Brampton plant.

Chrysler also chose to increase its assembly in Canada, rationalizing this process by concentrating production on a few models while phasing out others. Prior to 1968, Ford met its commitment by increasing the production of trucks in Canada but changed its strategy after 1968 to that of regional specialization of the production of a new compact car. Finally, GM relied on the increased export of Canadian-made parts, thereby reducing the number of car models produced in Canada to half that of the pre-Agreement level.(15) By September 1966, GM had terminated the production of certain models of Buicks and Oldsmobile cars, GMC trucks and all Corvair models at its plants in Oshawa, St.Catherines and Windsor.(16)

In the first three years of the agreement, all signs pointed to its great success in rejuvenating the Canadian auto industry. In 1968, 60% of all vehicles produced in Canada were exported, compared to 7% in 1964.(17) In this same year, Canada's share of total vehicle production approached twice its 1960 level.(18)

While the industry itself boomed, the Autopact's effect on employment was more complex. Labour productivity rose, as did new employment possibilities.(19) Between 1964 and 1967, employment in the Canadian auto industry increased by 20.9%.(20) As the UAW had feared, however, industry adjustment to the Autopact resulted in extensive job dislocation. In 1966 alone, the UAW's newly established Council committee responsible for monitoring the effect of the Autopact announced that a total of 4,385 workers had been laid off due to company adjustment to the Autopact.(21)

Immediately following an announced layoff by Ford in April,

1965 the federal government joined with the union in voicing concern over layoffs. Labour Minister MacEachen urged the establishment of a tripartite committee to examine job dislocations due to the Autopact.(22) Burt followed this up with his own appeal for such a committee, but to no avail.(23) The UAW's old ally, Paul Martin, now External Affairs Minister, publicly denounced the Ford layoffs and promised that the government would investigate the matter and provide help for those workers affected.(24) Finally, on April 30 Burt and a delegation from the Canadian Council met with Drury, MacEachen and Martin to discuss an adjustment assistance programme and press for a tripartite committee responsible for providing a coordinated approach to the job dislocation problem.(25)

In response to this growing pressure, the government announced on June 28 the creation of a special fund for workers dislocated as a result of the Autopact. It was known as the Transitional Assistance Benefit (TAB) plan. This plan was intended to top-up the unemployment insurance earnings of workers affected by the reorganization of the auto industry. The government proposed that companies join it by contributing certain monies to this fund. The companies objected, arguing that they already contributed to the Supplementary Unemployment Benefit plan (previously the Guaranteed Annual Wage).(26) Modifications were therefore made to the government's proposal. If companies did not contribute to the TAB fund and their workers were covered by SUB, workers laid off as a result of adjustment to the Autopact would

have to draw on their supplementary unemployment benefits. If this fund either did not exist or was exhausted in the course of the readjustment, workers would then qualify for assistance from the state-operated plan. Only if the individual employer was willing to pay the government an amount equal to the supplemental unemployment benefits that would be paid to a worker, could workers opt to receive TAB over SUB.(27)

The TAB plan fell far short of the UAW's proposed assistance benefit programme. The key complaint lay in the necessary depletion of SUB funds before workers became eligible for TAB payments. Employer contributions to SUB had been negotiated in lieu of part of a wage increase, not to sustain workers laid off as a result of a government policy which was proving highly lucrative for the corporations. Canadian Autoworkers saw this use of SUB as gouging out part of their wages. In reaction to these problems and the continued layoffs in the auto industry, Burt recommended that the UAW withdraw its support for the Autopact.(28) This had little or no effect on the UAW's relationship with the government, nor did it produce any response by government officials. Over the next year, the UAW continued to meet with and press government officials to improve the conditions of the TAB programme, asking also for job retraining and special early retirement provisions for workers thrown out of work by the Autopact.(29)

The union was in a difficult position. It had supported integration of the North American auto industry in its brief to the Bladen Commission. Integration had been achieved with the

Autopact, but at the cost of jobs and rising discontent amongst autoworkers. Secondly, the union had been pressing for closer consultation with the government throughout the 1950's and the Autopact had seen this happen. Since early government moves to correct auto industry problems the UAW had developed a regular, ongoing communications network with the federal government. Outright opposition to the Autopact might once again shut the doors of government to the union. Furthermore, lobbying by the union appeared to have had some effect, for although the assistance programme put into place by the government fell short of UAW recommendations, its very implementation suggested that the government was listening to the union.

The UAW was trapped. Its demands had been met within the accepted confines of compromise upon which lobbying was premised. Should the union engage in outright confrontation with the government, it might well lose its toehold of influence. The UAW began walking a fine line, tokenly withdrawing its support for the Autopact to quell growing internal discontent while continuing to consult with both companies and the government.

The second year of the Autopact proved to be no better for autoworkers, as layoffs continued and no government action was forthcoming. On August 16, 1966 GM announced a layoff in Oshawa of 2600 workers.(30) A delegation of local 222 accompanied by Burt met with federal Ministers of Labour and Industry and Manpower on August 25 to discuss the layoffs. In its brief, local 222 condemned TAB as a failure and recommended that the government

introduce a more comprehensive programme to help laid off workers. The Minister of Labour promised to look into the matter and the Minister of Industry and Manpower, Drury, expressed his support for the union local's proposal that companies be required to give advance notice of and reasons for layoffs. Drury promised the UAW delegation that its proposal would be seriously considered.(31)

In the hope of gaining provincial government support for union demands of the federal government, local 222 staged a demonstration at the Ontario Department of Labour which was followed by a meeting with two Cabinet Ministers. Local 222 again presented its brief demanding a job retraining programme for workers thrown out of work as a result of the reorganization of the auto industry. The Ontario government responded with an investigation into provincial training and education programmes. It concluded that there were plenty of jobs in the Oshawa area for laid off workers.(32)

Given the federal government's apparent support for union demands, Burt and the Council Autopact Committee recommended that the UAW support the Autopact "in principle" while it pursued a new lobbying strategy aimed at achieving incremental rather than wholesale changes to existing policies such as TAB.(33) The new strategy consisted of a concerted lobbying campaign of all interested parties, including management. The first stage of the campaign involved union locals which were encouraged to meet with government officials on their own specific problems. This was intended to increase the number of UAW presentations to government and increase the impact of union demands by focussing on the

personal hardship suffered by individual autoworkers. The second stage of the campaign consisted of planning a series of meetings between the union, local Members of Parliament and management to discuss the 1967 production year and employment prospects. "On the agenda for discussion with top management were the means by which the company and union could cooperate to minimize the impact of any reduction in the work force..."(34)

Left-wing members of the Council such as Gordie Lambert and Bill Rutherford, both active members of the Communist Party, mobilized opposition to this position. They argued that the UAW should completely withdraw support for the Autopact due to its deleterious effect on workers. Burt and Jack Taylor argued that the union should adopt a 'wait and see' attitude in anticipation of government changes to certain regulations.(35) Given the weakness of the internal opposition, the union administration won out. The Council passed a resolution withholding the union's "full support" for the Autopact until the federal government introduced an improved assistance programme.(36)

The union launched its new lobbying strategy which reached a climax on November 1 when a UAW delegation, headed by Burt, met once again with the Ministers of Labour and Manpower and Industry to demand further government action on assistance to laid off workers. This was the fifth such meeting in the past 12 months. At the end of the meeting, Labour Minister Nicholson announced changes to the TAB programme intended to meet the criticisms of the union.(37)

The UAW was again caught in a dilemma. The government had responded to the union's demands but the proposed changes left untouched the UAW's demand that TAB should not be dependent upon worker coverage by the Supplementary Unemployment Benefit fund. Nor did the government's changes to TAB increase the percentage of take-home pay provided by the programme. Burt wrote to the Labour Minister to make clear the UAW's disappointment and ultimate opposition to the changes which did not go far enough in meeting UAW concerns.(38) Reflecting the union's disenchantment with the government's half measures, the Canadian Council passed a resolution stating that the UAW would "withhold its complete support of the Auto Trade Pact until the full rights of workers are preserved and guaranteed and until labour has an authoritative voice in any future plans that have a direct bearing on the welfare and well-being of Canadian auto workers."(39)

Within a week of the Council meeting GM announced a 6-day layoff of 10,400 auto workers in Oshawa.(40) GM workers petitioned the Industry Minister in protest while UAW and CLC representatives met with government officials to continue discussions on the Autopact.(41) Burt demanded that the government participate in a tripartite committee to discuss the Autopact. Once again the government agreed to such a committee if Burt could convince companies to participate.(42) The plan faltered when corporations refused.(43)

The UAW's task of successfully pressing the government to act in the union's interests was made increasingly difficult as the Autopact bore the fruit of economic success in its first three

years. Labour productivity in Canada increased. Manufacturers exceeded their commitments laid out in the letters of undertaking and two-way trade between the U.S. and Canada increased. As the government had predicted, this prosperity produced related gains in other industries located in Canada.(44)

While the government continued to respond to some of the UAW's demands, its need for support from the union was less than it had been when corporations opposed the trade agreement. This led in the summer of 1968 to the UAW's exclusion from the review consultations on the Auto Pact's performance. This was in spite of earlier promises by the Prime Minister and Labour Minister Jean Marchand that the union would be consulted.(45)

The UAW's decision in September 1968 to protest officially its exclusion from the talks was contradicted by a union brief submitted to government in February 1969. The brief praised the government for its speedy reaction to a recently announced Ford layoff and "...the Minister of Labour's deep concern for individuals laid off due to technological change".(46) The paradoxical position of the UAW in its dealings with the federal government was perhaps best summed up by the union itself when it wrote in its submission to government:

....just because we get some of what we want, does not mean that we can abrogate our responsibility to our members to demand whatever else is in their best interests.(47)

The pursuit by the government of an industrial policy in the automobile industry altered the UAW's relationship with the federal government. The union met with government officials more

frequently and on a regular basis. The union's point of access inside the government also changed as the UAW shifted its lobbying activities beyond the Department of Labour and into a more central sphere of government - that of the Departments of Industry and External Affairs. In the case of the Minister of Industry, this shift was largely the result of the logic of government organization; this department was responsible for much of the day-to-day organization of the Autopact. Considering the government's early interest in gaining the UAW's support for the trade agreement, it was imperative that the UAW be drawn into the deliberations with this department.

The UAW's contact with the Department of External Affairs was a more complex articulation of the mediation of union interests inside government. At one level it was also functionally determined. The Department of External Affairs monitored the impact of the bilateral trade agreement. The desire by the government for UAW support for the Autopact necessitated some liaison between this department and the union. This, however, was not the only determinant. Paul Martin, who represented the Windsor riding of Essex East, was the Minister of External Affairs. His long-standing relationship with the Autoworkers made him the prime candidate for ironing out compromises with the union while his dependence on autoworkers for votes made him a more accessible and responsive Minister to UAW demands.

Canadian Autoworkers' 'privileged' access to such powerful Departments appeared to be waning by 1968, leaving them to rely

upon the Minister of Labour for input into government decision-making. This alteration of the UAW's access to the government can be explained by two factors. Whereas the government had desperately needed UAW support in the early days of the auto policies, the subsequent success of the Autopact and the corresponding support given the policy by auto corporations, blunted the need for union support. Secondly, by 1968, the Autopact was firmly entrenched, requiring less 'politicking' to ensure its success and requiring instead, orderly administration of the policy. This in turn resulted in the shift of UAW points of access inside the government to a bureaucratic and functional basis. Hence, the UAW again was forced to rely on the Department of Labour as a channel of access and communication.

Lobbying by the UAW in this period was characterized by contact between the leadership of the union and Ministers of the government. The lack of mobilization politics by the union was the consequence of two factors - the actual structure of the political practice of lobbying itself and the control exercised by the union executive over the rank and file and strategic planning.

Lobbying is structured, both ideologically and by means of practice, around the representation of interests by leaders representing a certain membership.(48) It is based on the process of dialogue between various competing interests and the state, with the assumption that the state, acting as umpire in the negotiations, will construct a consensus based on a compromise with interested parties. Groups allowed entry into such deliberations are expected to behave responsibly and accept the

"win and lose" process of constructing such a compromise, without resorting to confrontational methods of input. In desiring access to and input into government decision-making, the UAW had to prove itself a legitimate part of the political process. Having failed on numerous occasions to gain acceptance of tripartite structures of decision-making, the UAW had to accept the practice of lobbying with its inherent restrictions. This included abandoning mobilization politics, in particular workplace action, in favour of ongoing consultation between the representatives of competing interests.

The replacement in this period of mobilization politics with bureaucratic politics by the UAW can, however, only be fully explained by the degree of control exercised by the leadership of the union over the membership. In previous years, union locals and groups supportive of the Left caucus, had engaged in mobilization politics side by side the lobbying efforts of the union executive. The Reuther caucus' effective disorganization of the Left and consequent increased control over union local activities ensured that such confrontational political activities would not undermine the union's lobbying activities, but might be carefully orchestrated if necessary by the union itself.

Nonetheless, the demobilizing tendencies of lobbying and the domination of the bureaucracy over membership-propelled strategies was never so complete in the Canadian Region as it was in the American section of the union. Because the Canadian UAW was a region of an International union, it lacked an extensive

bureaucracy and instead relied upon a skeletal staff whose major role was to service locals in collective bargaining. The Canadian UAW did not have its own research staff and unlike the U.S., where the International paid an executive officer for almost full-time lobbying work in Washington, no such monies were allocated to the Canadian Region. In the absence of a professional staff and other resources and because the constitutional mandate of the District Council gave this body the responsibility for pursuing political goals, the rank and file played a greater role in articulating political strategy and, in particular, in the lobbying process.

For example, the District Council Autopact Committee, not professional research staff or lobbyists, were responsible for putting together briefs and planning strategy which had to be approved by rank-and-file delegates to Council. Furthermore, although the Canadian UAW received research support from the International research staff, for information on locally variant conditions the union relied on union locals. This had two unanticipated benefits for the Canadian UAW. Firstly, it served an educational purpose. A larger number of Canadian Autoworkers were kept well informed of industry-wide conditions. Moreover, continued local leadership involvement in strategic planning reproduced a unity of purpose within the union. This unity prevented serious backlashes against the union leadership while also contributing to the effectiveness of Canadian UAW political strategy by assuring membership support. These effects ensured continued rank-and-file activism and prevented the thorough demobilization of the membership from a reliance on bureaucratic

politics.

Overall, the UAW met with some very real gains from its lobbying efforts. The UAW had demanded government intervention in the auto industry and this had been achieved. The introduction and subsequent alteration of the Transitional Assistance Benefit programme were the direct response by government to UAW demands. Similarly, the very act of ongoing regular contact between the union and the government marked a major victory for the UAW which had long demanded access and input into the decision-making process.

These successes, however, placed the UAW leadership in a paradoxical position with its membership. As representatives of the interests of the union membership, the UAW leadership was expected to protect and defend its members. In the face of the serious dislocations suffered by autoworkers as a result of reorganization of the auto industry, the union withheld "full support" for the Autopact and pressed the government for action. However, in order to maintain its position of access to government and because of the union's acceptance of lobbying with its inherent emphasis on consensus and compromise, the union leadership did not dare engage in more than vocal opposition to the government. Regular meetings between government and union officials therefore continued alongside the UAW's voiced opposition to the government. These union practices placed the government in a stronger position vis-a-vis the UAW. Even when it ignored union demands, the government could count on the UAW's

desire to continue regularized consultation to maintain 'peace' in union-government relations.

The centrality of the auto industry to the Canadian economy and the federal government's pursuit of an industrial policy in this sector provided the UAW with greater scope of influence on the federal government. It also provided the basis for the stabilization of union-government relations. The absence of organized opposition inside the union enhanced this stability, making easier the union leadership's task of organizing consent behind a course of action and acting as representative of the membership's concerns. Union leaders anticipated that these developments signalled a lasting peace. The beginning of recession in 1968, however, revealed that this was but a fleeting moment of detente which might easily degenerate into a state of open conflict.

The UAW in the Workplace, 1962-1967

1) Extending Fordist Regulation of Collective Bargaining

The renewed buoyancy of the auto industry which began in 1962 eased the functioning of the highly structured collective bargaining relationship between the UAW and the auto corporations. Corporations had more to give workers over the bargaining table and oppositional groups had little basis upon which to organize resistance. This period therefore began on a note of stability in the workplace, providing the basis for extension and fine-tuning of existing regulations which governed labour-management relations.

The union extended pattern bargaining to the aircraft and agricultural implement industries through the signing of three-year agreements which established parity of conditions between these industries and the auto industry.(49) Other gains made by the autoworkers in the early 1960's included early retirement schemes and improved pensions and health care coverage. These were all the result of ongoing negotiations, punctuated by short, well coordinated and centrally-controlled strikes at corporations targetted by the union executive as the pattern setter.(50)

The internal process for establishing priorities for collective bargaining became similarly centralized. Walter Reuther set the bargaining agenda in his speech to UAW conventions with little or no membership resistance. In cases where there was opposition, the union leadership moved quickly to quell the discontent. Such was the case in the Ford Oakville plant in 1965. Autoworkers at the plant refused to accept the settlement reached through master negotiations and stayed out on strike. George Burt responded quickly, threatening these workers with discipline if they did not remove their pickets. The only course of resistance left to these workers lay in individual action. Immediately following this forced return to work the Ford plant was plagued with absenteeism.(51)

Only in the 1967 negotiations were major innovations in collective bargaining practices made and these were in response to the Autopact. The UAW placed wage parity between Canadian and American workers on the agenda. This demand, although widely supported by Canadian workers in previous years, was placed on the

1967 bargaining agenda as a result of the International union's concern over the possible impact of the Autopact on American jobs. The UAW anticipated that American jobs in the auto industry might be lost to Canadians due to their lower rates of pay.(52) In response to the union's demand, the Big Three automakers agreed to an early opening of Canadian contracts in a move to establish common expiry dates for all UAW contracts on the continent.(53) The intent of this move was that U.S. agreements would be settled first, followed by the application of these agreements, including wage parity, to Canadian workers.

Wage parity was publicly opposed by Canadian government officials and most of the business community, who argued that it was inflationary, would result in contracts which reflected conditions in the American rather than the Canadian economy and would lead to similar expectations amongst workers in other industries.(54) Despite this opposition, the UAW and the automakers proceeded.

The first move was made in American Chrysler negotiations, when on November 8, 1967 the company agreed in principle to wage parity for Canadian workers. In Canadian negotiations Chrysler demanded that wage parity be exchanged for changes to the Canadian rest period system such that workers would no longer be allowed to take the same rest period which resulted in a shut down of production; the company wanted the American system of staggered rest periods.(55) After a nine-day strike by Canadian Chrysler workers, the company gave up this demand and signed an agreement

with wage parity which would come into effect in 1970, contingent on the continuation of the Autopact.(56) GM also wanted changes to work practices in exchange for wage parity. After a lengthy strike, however, the corporation gave up this demand and agreed to wage parity.(57) Ford and American Motors quickly followed suit.(58)

This series of negotiations won the International union an additional victory. The Chrysler agreement contained provisions for the entry of Canadian Chrysler workers into the U.S. production and maintenance master agreement, to be effected in the next round of negotiations in 1970.(59) For years the International union had sought such an international agreement and this was the first of its kind in the Big Three. It also coincided with the first international bargaining session in the aircraft industry.(60)

This set of negotiations was especially significant as it extended and further centralized existing structures of collective bargaining. Wages for Canadian and American autoworkers were not only structured according to similar wage formulas such as COLA and AIB but now converged on parity. Pattern bargaining had also been extended on a continental basis. Although UAW past practices had consisted of applying American settlements to Canadian workers, this practice was now systematized by the common expiry dates of Canadian and American contracts. In the case of Chrysler, this practice was further entrenched by the provision for an international agreement covering both Canadian and American workers. Collective bargaining was also characterized by high

degrees of International union control. International officers from Detroit did much of the collective bargaining for Canadian workers, a tradition which continued under Dennis McDermott once he became Canadian Director in 1968.

The one failure in this move by corporations and the UAW to systematize the structures of Fordist regulation on a continental basis was in the area of production standards. Canadian autoworkers were unwilling to accept the American system of staggered rest periods. This rejection and the maintenance of existing rest periods in Canada was significant for two reasons. Firstly, each rest period was an expression of labour's importance, causing as it did the shutdown of production. Such a daily exercise of control reinforced workers' understanding of their crucial role in production. Secondly, the Canadian system of rest periods whereby all workers went on breaks at the same time, facilitated communication amongst workers and between workers and union representatives. This system prevented the disorganization of workers into small groups and instead reinforced the collective identity of workers based on shared experience. This strengthened the union by readying workers for collective action but also potentially threatened it by giving workers the basis for workplace opposition, should the union fail to deal with membership concerns.

Despite these major advances in stabilizing UAW-corporate relations, Fordist regulation was nonetheless fragile. This fragility was reflected in rank-and-file resistance to further

centralization and regulation of collective bargaining, and in particular to their complete loss of control over production standards. The UAW's willingness to engage in 'responsible unionism' contradicted the day-to-day worker experience of companies' anti-union practices. Simultaneously with the development of the UAW's stabilized relations with management came revisions to the Ontario Labour Relations Act which made it easier for companies to actively discourage workers from joining a union.(61) A wave of strike breaking moves by companies throughout Ontario prompted 6,500 autoworkers of local 199 to call for a general strike in Ontario.(62) Similar calls for militant action were made by militants in the UAW in protest to the increasing use of injunctions against pickets.(63) These were cries in the wilderness, however, and the UAW resorted instead to lobbying, resulting in the establishment in 1967 of a Royal Commission on Injunctions, headed by Justice Rand.(64)

A more serious challenge to the union and its accord with management was the wave of wildcats over speedups and other workplace grievances which plagued the union in the 1960's. In defiance of their union, Ford workers at the Oakville plant repeatedly downed their tools between 1962 and 1966 in protest of speedups and unresolved grievances. In each case, these workers confronted their own union as the agency responsible for getting the workers back to work.(65) When these same workers wildcatted in 1968 to protest the union's decision to extend a strike deadline, UAW officers recessed negotiations, informing the workers that the International called the shots and the membership

would resume work if it wanted negotiations to continue.(66) The union was similarly plagued with wildcats in the AMC plant in Brampton, GM, Chrysler and Dominion Forge plants in Oshawa and Windsor, and in the Douglas Aircraft and Massey Ferguson plants.(67)

Perhaps the most ironic yet bitter of these wildcats occurred in the AMC plant in 1966. Workers in the plant walked off the job in protest of a host of pending grievances including the company practice of hiring outside workers for new jobs. The UAW told the workers to go back to work as they were breaking the collective agreement and the law. When these attempts by the union failed, an injunction against picketing was granted to the company and the workers were forced back to work by the government.(68) Where the union failed, the government intervened to ensure labour peace, using the very instrument which the UAW had been opposing.

These wildcats were first and foremost an expression of resistance to the absolute control of management over the production process. In most of the cases cited above, the issue which had sparked the walk out was the pace of work set by the assembly line. The wildcats reflected the continued fundamental conflict between labour and management in the workplace. In turn, these work stoppages, while not initially aimed against the union, placed workers in direct conflict with it. This was largely a consequence of the particular structured relations into which unions were drawn in the postwar society and the corresponding contradictions inherent in the union's role as representative and

regulator of its own membership.

The UAW, in the hope of ensuring the representation of its interests in both the political arena and the workplace, had constructed a consultative relationship with the government and corporations which would only be reproduced on the condition of the union's practice of responsible unionism. Responsible unionism entailed a replacement of open confrontation with dialogue and a role for the union in disciplining its own rank and file for spontaneous and 'illegal' workplace action. Beneath the acceptance of this role for the union lay the acceptance of management's right to control the production process. Wildcats threatened this relationship and the union leadership's control over its own organization.

At the same time, wildcats were a transitory form of resistance. They were the response of an isolated group of workers and lacked the organization to be truly effective in forcing change within the union or the workplace. The absence of an organized opposition within the Canadian Region of the UAW to mobilize around these rank-and-file sentiments meant that this resistance remained fragmented. This fragmentation combined with the success of collective bargaining in delivering wages and benefits to workers ensured the union leadership control over the union. However, once the economy faltered in the 1970's, similar acts of resistance to the union's leadership would force a fundamental re-evaluation of union strategy.

ii) "Organize or Die" (69)

While collective bargaining continued 'as usual', the UAW mounted a massive organizing campaign to increase its membership and therefore its strength. The first group targetted for unionization under the UAW banner consisted of white-collar workers, especially those engaged in office or technical work in industries already unionized by the UAW. Pressures to unionize these workers came from three sources. Firstly, existing office locals in the UAW pressed for expansion of their ranks. These workers, often affiliated to industrial locals, found their interests and demands overshadowed by those of industrial workers and threatened to leave the union if their interests were not taken seriously.

This led in 1961 to the creation of a separate division within the union known as the Technical, Office and Professional Department (TOP) with its own newsletter. Office workers were also given the right to self determination in the type of local affiliation desired by these workers. These changes reflected the success of white-collar workers' mobilization inside the UAW but also gave them the organizational basis for more effective mobilization in the future. These changes also established a communications network which appealed to the specific interests of white-collar workers, thereby enhancing the appeal of the UAW to unorganized workers.(70)

Although the structures representing white-collar workers were now in place, pressure from this group alone did not move the UAW to commit organizational resources to this sector. Rather, two

other factors intervened to push the UAW into action. Firstly, UAW membership had declined during the 1958-61 recession and never recovered. Moreover, in 1962 and 1963 many UAW-unionized plants were relocated within Canada in an attempt by companies to avoid the union.(71) The UAW needed to enhance its membership base to safeguard the strength of the union. Secondly, given the vast increase in white-collar workers employed in the auto industry due to automation's replacement of blue-collar workers, this group became the most attractive one for expanding UAW ranks.(72)

In Canada, the tradition of organizing white-collar workers had been established in the early 1940's when Ford office workers were organized into local 240. It was only in the early 1960's, however, when the International union committed resources to this sector, that the organization of white-collar workers by the Canadian UAW took off.

In 1963 Chrysler office workers voted in favour of the UAW as their bargaining representative. Their first contract was approved in December of the same year.(73) This was followed in the spring of 1964 with the certification of office workers in the St.Catharine's plant and the Ford office workers in Bramalea in May, 1965.(74) The UAW renewed its commitment to the organization of white-collar workers at the 1966 International convention. This paid off in Canada when in 1967 workers from a series of Northern Electric plants voted in favour of UAW representation.(75) Over the next years, the Canadian UAW expanded its drive for white-collar membership by organizing credit unions and other office

locations, largely concentrating, however, on those regions where the UAW already had a strong foothold.

Simultaneously, the Autoworkers committed resources to the organization of Quebec workers. The International office paid the salary and expenses of the President of the Quebec Federation of Labour, Louis Laberge, and sent its own staff members to help in the organizing drive. Effective September 1965 the UAW-International office committed \$5,000 per month for one year to the CLC to help in its organizing efforts in Quebec. In total the UAW committed \$138,000 for the year to this drive.(76) In addition to these commitments, the UAW organized the new St.Therease GM assembly plant.(77) By the spring of 1966, the plant was certified and bargaining was underway. Key demands were the inclusion of the plant in the GM master agreement and equalized pay rates between the St.Therease and Oshawa workers.(78) After a lengthy strike, the workers won some improvements but failed to win entry into the master contract or wage parity. These losses opened the union up to discontent amongst its Quebec membership which reached a head in the 1970's.

The final, though by no means the least important, push in the UAW's organizing drive came as a result of the expansion in the numbers of workers employed in the Canadian auto industry following the Autopact. The UAW committed massive resources to organizing these new, young autoworkers to ensure the union's monopolistic position within the auto industry.

These organizing efforts paid off handsomely for the UAW. At a time when most industrial union memberships were static, the UAW

in Canada increased its membership from 62,340 in 1961 to 102,300 in 1966.(79) The expanded ranks of the Canadian UAW increased the union's basis of power. To exercise this power, however, the union had to have the capacity to mobilize this new membership alongside the old behind a strategy of common action.

Initially, the UAW's commitment to social unionism rather than business unionism appeared to hold the key to success in forging solidarity and a unity of purpose amongst both Canadian and American autoworkers. The UAW in both Canada and the U.S. argued in favour of the rights of all to a decent standard of living, pressed for adequate lowcost housing, and improved health care (in the case of Canada this took the form of provincial medicare) and pensions. The union bargained for protection and rehabilitation of its members who suffered from alcoholism and for nursing home coverage for members requiring mental health care as a result of the stress and alienation arising from work on the assembly line.(80) Finally, the UAW distinguished itself from other unions with its support for progressive issues such as the struggle by California grape pickers to establish a Farmworkers' union and peace in Viet Nam. This latter position ultimately led to the UAW's withdrawal from the AFL-CIO in 1968.(81)

While many of these developments affected the American autoworkers more than their Canadian brothers and sisters, they had important implications for the construction of international solidarity within the UAW, and in particular amongst Canadian autoworkers. Until the 1960's Canadian Autoworkers had been deeply

divided between left and right caucuses. With the victory of the Reuther caucus over the left-wing elements within the union, there was no guarantee that this would necessarily build a strong union. The pursuit of new members, the continued appearance of democratic reforms within the union and the UAW's leadership on social issues built internal union solidarity and pride amongst workers in the union's position as leader for progressive change. The UAW under Reuther had replaced the old militant political unionism with a social unionism, providing the basis for the reconstruction of a culture of class conflict into a culture of union solidarity.

Nonetheless, the infusion of new members into the Canadian UAW laid the basis for increased internal conflict in the 1970's. UAW membership was no longer as homogeneous as it been in previous years. White-collar workers, a younger generation of autoworkers, a greater number of women and a francophone membership altered the objective characteristics of the Canadian Region. These groups had their own sectional interests which the union would have to accomodate to maintain internal harmony.

The difficulties in doing this were already apparent in Quebec. Following the 1966 failure by the union to secure wage parity and incorporation into the master contract for workers at the Ste. Therese GM plant, the UAW leadership balked at requests for a French language edition of the UAW newspaper, Solidarity.⁽⁸²⁾ The lack of attention to Quebec workers' demands fostered discontent and threatened internal unity. The test of the Canadian UAW leaders ability to preserve internal union solidarity would come in the 1970's.

The NDP and the Autoworkers, 1962-67

With UAW attentions focussed upon adjustment and struggle over the Autopact, mobilization behind the NDP remained of secondary importance to the UAW's immediate political agenda. As in the past, the union contributed sizeable resources to the NDP and encouraged locals to affiliate to the party. Between 1962 and 1967, however, minimal debate took place within the union about the role of the UAW inside the NDP. Moreover, many autoworkers continued to harbour feelings of mistrust towards the NDP for its insistence on regarding organized labour as merely one more interest to take into account.

The 1962 and 1963 federal elections were clear indications of this paradoxical role for the UAW in partisan politics. In 1962 the newly formed NDP won eleven more seats than had the CCF in 1958. However, only three of these were in Ontario and none of the latter were in UAW strongholds such as Windsor and Oshawa.(83) Yet by June 1962, 70% of all UAW members in Canada had affiliated to the NDP through their union locals.(84) According to the report of the Ontario Federation of Labour's Political Education Committee, the UAW led all other unions in Ontario in its affiliation rate.(85) However, leadership pressure from locals to move closer to the NDP produced affiliation, not voters. A public opinion poll conducted after this election discovered that a greater percentage of union households had voted Liberal than NDP in the 1962 election.(86)

When an election came again in 1963, the UAW placed six

additional people onto its International Staff in order that they could work fulltime for the election of the NDP. This personnel was in addition to those members of the permanent staff already assigned to work on the election.(87) The central UAW office as well as affiliated locals contributed monies, but to no avail. The Liberal Party won a minority government and the NDP slipped from the 19 seats it had won in 1962 to 17.(88) The NDP blamed part of this poor electoral showing on the unions' lack of adequate financial support for the party and their inability to deliver union votes.(89) Nonetheless, it was the party which took the initiative in improving relations with the trade unions.

The NDP wrote to George Burt and other union leaders who were also members of the CLC Executive Committee and reported on a meeting of federal NDP officers and their discussion of the NDP-Trade Union liaison. The letter informed Burt that the NDP felt that at all future Ottawa meetings of Officers or the Executive of the party, time should be set aside for discussion of issues of particular concern to the NDP and organized labour. Therefore, members of the CLC Executive Committee and the heads of other unions located in Ottawa were invited to attend these party meetings starting in May 1963.(90) These overtures were carried over into the 1963 August federal NDP Convention where three UAW representatives were placed on convention committees.(91) Further organizational connections between the UAW and the NDP were established with the appointment of Allan Schroeder, Education Director for the UAW, to the Federal NDP Council and the Finance

Committee.(92)

These attempts by the NDP to draw the UAW and other unions closer to the party continued throughout the next years. For example, in 1966 the Ontario NDP changed its constitution to allow unions with more than 2,000 members affiliated to the ONDP to name one delegate to the party's provincial council.(93) While these measures increased the formal union representation on various party committees, they tapped the same human resources as did the union, those people who held leadership positions within the union. This did not tackle the more fundamental problem of the lack of membership support for the party, but rather reproduced the top-down approach of the NDP to the unions.(94) Furthermore, the party's strategy became snagged on a more elemental problem - that of the duties and commitments of these active union officers to their union. Repeatedly, George Burt and other UAW officers involved in the party missed meetings due to their ongoing commitments within the union itself. This ultimately led to the resignation of Allan Schroeder from his party positions and to ongoing complaints within the party about the absence of union leaders.(95)

Finally, the NDP refused to relinquish any of its control over union local representation at party functions. This set the party in conflict with UAW locals and heightened autoworkers' distrust of the NDP commitment to labour. One such conflict erupted in 1963 between local 444 and the NDP. Nelson Dearing, Financial Secretary of local 444 and long-time supporter of the Left caucus, applied for membership in the NDP and was rejected.

The local executive immediately took up his case with the NDP, first asking party officials to reconsider their actions.(96) After eight months, the local still did not have a reason for the rejection of Dearing's application, nor had the decision been reversed. Arthur Taylor, recording secretary of local 444, wrote once again to the party, this time lambasting them for their undemocratic practices. He also made it clear that local 444 might disaffiliate from the NDP and publicly air this issue with other UAW locals.(97) Within a month, the NDP executive agreed to accept Dearing's application for NDP membership. The executive also made it clear, however, that the party would not tolerate pressure from the unions and would continue to exercise its exclusive right to refuse or accept a membership application without explanation.(98)

Given these problems, the UAW restricted its active support for the party to election times. The 1965 federal election saw the UAW contribute in excess of \$36,000 to the campaign and assign eight UAW members to full-time political work for the 7 weeks of the campaign.(99) The results of the election saw the NDP increase its federal representation from 17 to 21 seats, with three of the four newly won ridings located in Ontario.(100) This led to speculation that the labour movement was responsible for the improved fortunes of the party.(101)

This speculation was fed by the results of the 1967 Ontario election. NDP representation in the Ontario legislature jumped from 7 to 20 seats. Three one-time UAW members were elected to the legislature as were five other trade unionists. Fred Burr, teacher

and former UAW member won the Sandwich Riverside riding in Windsor from old UAW Liberal friend, Arthur Reaume. Hugh Peacock, research economist for the UAW beat Conservative Ivan Thrasher in the Windsor West riding and Cliff Pilkey, local 222 activist in Oshawa, won this seat from Conservative Albert Walker.(102) Other ridings such as Brantford elected a union-supported NDP candidate for the first time in its history.(103) The regional UAW office had again contributed both staff and money in addition to massive local union contributions.(104) Whether these improved election results were really attributable to heightened trade-union activism or not, this interpretation of the election was popularized in newspaper articles by such labour reporters as Wilfrid List, who argued that the key to the Ontario NDP's 1967 success was its ability to capture the labour vote.

This election was the first of a series of events which would change UAW-NDP relations. The NDP appeared to have received most active union support in ridings where either trade unionists ran as candidates or the union was highly integrated into the planning and organization of the election campaign.(105) This was consistent with the historical role envisioned by many Canadian autoworkers for unions as "first amongst equals" within a pro-labour party and encouraged these trade unionists to push for a reorientation of the NDP in favour of organized labour. These factors were not, however, enough to initiate a complete shift in UAW partisan strategy, especially as the reasons for the UAW's lack of attention to partisan politics were not alone rooted in internal party affairs.

Throughout the years between 1962 and 1968, the NDP's continued exclusion from a role in constructing the postwar settlement combined with the UAW's establishment of a stabilized lobbying relationship with the federal government confirmed the party's secondary importance in UAW political actions. The UAW sought immediate political and economic change and this was being achieved through collective bargaining and lobbying.

Not long after the 1967 Ontario election, however, the economy began to falter. With this came a reorientation in government and business responses to unions which challenged the UAW's strategic reliance on collective bargaining and lobbying. The combination of these events with the election of a new Canadian UAW Director more sympathetic to the NDP set the stage for a radical redirection in UAW partisan strategy and ultimately UAW-NDP relations.

1968: A Year of Transition for the UAW

The year 1968 was a year of major transition for the UAW. Internally, the most dramatic change came with the retirement of George Burt who had been Canadian Regional Director since 1939. The ensuing struggle for the position of Canadian Director threatened to split the Canadian Region as militants from the syndicalist tradition supported Herb Kelly and the administration, including Walter Reuther, supported Dennis McDermott. Kelly's poor health forced him out of the leadership race and on May 7, 1968, Dennis McDermott was elected to the position of Canadian Director of the UAW. McDermott, under pressure from the Kelly supporters

and in the face of internal union divisions, hired as his administrative assistant Herb Kelly and later Robert White, both of whom came from the syndicalist faction in the union. This helped mend potential ruptures inside the union.(106)

McDermott represented different elements in the union than had George Burt. Coming out of Massey Fergusson, McDermott was perceived as being less susceptible to domination by the large auto locals. Furthermore, he was a staunch social democrat and a right-winger in the union. McDermott was also a protege of Walter Reuther and represented the new tide of social unionism which now engulfed the UAW.(107) In his first address to the UAW Canadian Council McDermott clearly laid out the role he envisioned for the UAW in society when he stated:

It seems to me that our philosophy can be summed up very simply. If any member of our union is in difficulty, it is our business. If any member of our community is in distress, it is our business. If any person or group of persons in our society is deprived, underprivileged or exploited, it is our business. Any form of human misery, no matter what its form, its origin, or its geographic location, is our concern and if it is humanly possible we should strive to do something about it.(108)

McDermott took over the leadership of the UAW at a time when organized labour was confident of having won the major battles for recognition and social security and secured the future for unions in society. Yet at this very moment, the dark clouds of recession and anti-unionism were once again building on the horizon. Within weeks of McDermott's election as head of the Canadian Autoworkers, the Rand Commission Report on Injunctions was released. Rand recommended that in exchange for banning 'ex parte' injunctions,

unions must be considered legal entities capable of suing and being sued. In addition, the report recommended that mass and sympathetic picketing and boycotts be banned. Finally, Rand proposed new guidelines for strikers wishing to retain their jobs at a striking location. They would be allowed to keep hold of their jobs only if they did not find more than 24 hours of alternative work per week.(109)

Rand's report represented a major attack on the newly established rights of organized labour. McDermott labelled the report as fascistic. He argued that if the recommendations contained in the report were implemented, they would seriously encroach upon the process of free collective bargaining.(110) McDermott ended his report to Council on the Rand Commission with a warning to the government:

In my view any attempt on the part of any government to impose the terms and conditions of this report on workers in a free society, would almost certainly be cause for a general strike.(111)

While threatening militant action in defiance of the government, McDermott took on the mantle of the UAW's representative in consultations with the federal government. These meetings took a new turn in September, 1968 when McDermott and five other labour leaders were invited to dine with Prime Minister Trudeau at 24 Sussex Drive to discuss the growing problem of inflation and its relationship to prices, profits and wages.(112) The government had to respond to this issue and was drawing labour into discussions in the hope of achieving a consensus on the government's course of action. The UAW's entrenched consultative

relationship with the government provided the perfect means by which to attempt the construction of such a consensus. Where this relationship had hitherto been characterized by demands from the union and responses from the government, the process was now inverted. This use by the government of its channels of communication with the union to construct a consensus on government policy added a new dimension to the relationship - one which the UAW leadership was uneasy to accept but fearful to reject should this result in its banishment once again to the fringes of power. As a result, McDermott accepted the invitation, following this with a call to the UAW to respond immediately with its own solutions to the problems of inflation.(113) The next few years were spent struggling with this dilemma and out of this would come another reformulation of the UAW's relationship with the government.

Finally, the June 25, 1968 federal election swept Trudeau to power in a climate of Trudeaumania. While the NDP gained a seat in this election, its promises to gain the "middle class" vote fell flat. Nonetheless, having contributed vast sums of money and time to this election on behalf of the NDP, the UAW saw the NDP's relative success in the face of the Liberal sweep as a sign of organized labour's importance to the party. The fact that Ed Broadbent, with the active support of local 222 and other unions, won the Oshawa riding away from Conservative Michael Starr lent credence to this.(114)

The NDP's continued de-emphasis on labour's importance to the party combined with McDermott's greater support for a partisan

political strategy, however, forced a major confrontation between the UAW and the NDP. McDermott praised the NDP for holding onto its seats in Parliament but then went on to criticize party leaders and warn them of their abuse of organized labour's contribution to the party:

The one obvious object lesson learned is that the so-called middle class vote is very fickle and is easily lost as was the case this time. The so-called middle class leadership of the NDP who thus far have been content to accept labour's contribution and little else, might be well advised to increase their dialogue with labour. We produced our vote - they didn't. (115)

This direct challenge to the party forced to a head the issue of the relationship between the NDP and unions. In October the NDP received a report from Harold Thayer on the trade union-NDP liaison. He reported on growing discontent amongst trade unions over their lack of participation in party policy making and their conflict with the "intellectual wing" of the party. He recommended that 1) all budgets for the party be prepared and adopted only after consultation with the trade-union movement; 2) decisions on research, public relations and hiring organizers should be made only with input from unions; 3) a liaison body be established to consider policy matters plus the establishment of other institutionalized forms of union representation; 4) certain industrial ridings should be earmarked for trade-union candidates; and 5) the number of trade-union delegates on National and Provincial Councils should be specified and union caucuses be left to elect their own delegates.

While acquiescing to labour's demands, Thayer's concluding

comments laid much of the blame for labour's underrepresentation in the party at the feet of the unions themselves. He criticized unionists for not attending party meetings or taking party commitments as seriously as union ones.(116) This prompted the NDP to appoint a committee to investigate union complaints.(117) This was the first step in the fundamental reformulation of the relationship between the NDP and trade unions which would be crucial in the next years of UAW strategic planning.

Thus 1968 was a paradoxical year for the UAW. It represented the culmination of its efforts to establish an orderly collective bargaining relationship with the corporations and a stabilized relationship with the government. At the same time, it represented a new beginning point for the union, faced as it was by the challenges of economic recession, growing anti-unionism and a more sympathetic NDP. The stage was set for the UAW to enter the seventies.

Conclusion

The years between 1962 and 1968 represented the heyday of the Fordist regime. With the signing of the Autopact, the federal government became more involved in the economy of the auto industry. This opened new possibilities for political solutions to industry problems. Canadian autoworkers seized this opportunity to increase the union's pressure on the federal government and demand greater integration in the decision-making process. The federal government responded to union demands and drew the UAW closer to the centre of decision-making. Lobbying became the dominant

political form of this relationship and brought with it a tendency inside the union towards centralized, bureaucratic politics. The postwar settlement had finally crystallized, holding promise of a lasting peace. Nonetheless, the domination of bureaucratic forms of politics inside the Canadian UAW was never complete. The lack of staff and money and the continued reliance on the Canadian Council for planning and executing political lobbies prevented the complete political demobilization of Canadian autoworkers.

Collective bargaining also became more highly regulated and centralized during this period. The UAW and the auto corporations responded to industrial adjustment resulting from the Autopact with attempts to systematize Fordist regulation throughout Canada and the U.S.. This process was never fully completed as Canadian Autoworkers successfully resisted the imposition of American work rules onto Canadian plants. This erected yet another barrier to the demobilization of Canadian autoworkers.

At the same time, the Canadian UAW responded to new opportunities resulting from both the Autopact and a prosperous economy by organizing massive numbers of new workers into UAW locals. This strengthened the Canadian UAW by enlarging the number of workers it represented. The addition of new members, however, also changed the character of UAW membership. No longer was the Canadian UAW the preserve of older, white male English-speaking blue-collar workers. Included now in the ranks of Canadian autoworkers were increased numbers of young workers, women, Quebecois and white-collar workers. These groups with their own sectional interests added a new internal dynamic to the union and

posed yet another obstacle to demobilization and hence a lasting peace which relied as much on internal union consensus as it did on the willingness of corporations and governments to recognize the UAW as a legitimate political and social actor.

Although the structures of Fordist regulation and the postwar compromise crystallized in this period, the entire regime was essentially fragile. It was constructed on the basis of a consensus to which governments, corporations and the union had to be committed. For the union this entailed the additional responsibility of ensuring that its membership willingly abided by the accepted practices of "responsible" unionism.

Such a consensus was illusory, however. It was contradicted by the day-to-day realities which confronted workers in the workplace. On the shopfloor, the fundamental conflict of interest between management and workers was a stark reality and made more immediate by management's use of assembly-line speedups throughout the 1960's in its goal to increase productivity and profitability. Moreover, grievance procedures which constituted part of the existing mode of regulation were increasingly seen by workers as fetters on their attempts to deal effectively with workplace injustices. Hence, simultaneous with the extension of Fordist regulations came an increase in spontaneous worker resistance, seen in wildcats and absenteeism.

The glue to the Fordist regime, however, was economic prosperity. As long as corporations were willing to meet union demands with substantial wage and benefit improvements, any

possibility for effective organized opposition to the union leadership's course of political action was undercut. Once recession began to plague the Canadian economy, however, the postwar settlement threatened to come unstuck. It was to this and the new internal union challenges that the UAW would have to respond in the 1970's.

Endnotes

1. Carl Beigie, The Canada-U.S. Automotive Agreement: An Evaluation (Washington: Canadian - American Committee, 1970), p.13.
2. For information on these lobbies see Globe and Mail, 15 Jan. 1964; WPR, George Burt to Emil Mazey, 23 Feb. 1965; Submission of Canadian Region UAW to Ontario Minister of Health, the Honourable Mathew [sic] Dymond, Dec. 1966; TRO, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 16 & 17 Mar. 1968; PC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 22 & 23 June 1968.
3. V.W. Bladen, Report of Royal Commission on the Automotive Industry (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1961), pp.29-30.
4. Beigie, Automotive Agreement, p.38.
5. Ibid..
6. Globe and Mail, 29 Oct. 1963.
7. Globe and Mail, 31 Oct. 1963.
8. TRO, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 7 & 8 Dec. 1963, pp.7-8.
9. Beigie, Automotive Agreement, pp.38-39.
10. Globe and Mail, 8 Jan. 1965.
11. Beigie, Automotive Agreement, pp.38-39.
12. Ibid., pp.46-47. For full text of this agreement see Beigie's Appendix A.
13. Ibid., p.47. For content of these "letters of undertaking" see Beigie's Appendix B.
14. Ibid., p.49.
15. Ibid., p.61-65.
16. CB, Report of Canadian UAW Council Committee on the US - Canadian Automotive Products Agreement, 24 & 25 Sept. 1966, p.3.
17. Beigie, Automotive Agreement, p.74.
18. Ibid., p.78.
19. Ibid., Chapter 7.

20. WPR, Brief on the Canada - US Auto Pact, 10 Dec. 1969, p.7.
21. CB, Report of Canadian UAW Council Committee on the US - Canadian Automotive Products Agreement, 24 & 25 Sept. 1966, p.2.
22. Globe and Mail, 19 Mar. 1965.
23. Globe and Mail, 27 Mar. 1965.
24. Globe and Mail, 24 Apr. 1965.
25. Globe and Mail, 30 Apr. 1965; TRO, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 26 & 27 June 1965, p.7.
26. Globe and Mail, 30 June 1965.
27. R7, Report of UAW Canadian Council Committee on Automotive Products Agreement presented to Canadian Council 14 & 15 Jan. 1967.
28. Globe and Mail, 6 July 1966; TRO, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 25 & 26 Sept. 1965, pp.7-18a.
29. Globe and Mail, 16, 26 Aug. 1966; TRO, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 2 & 3 Apr. 1966, p.12.
30. Globe and Mail, 16 Aug. 1966.
31. CB, Report of Canadian UAW Council Committee on the US - Canadian Automotive Products Agreement, 24 & 25 Sept. 1966, p.3.
32. Ibid., p.4.
33. TRO, Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 24 & 25 Sept. 1966, pp.8-9.
34. CB, Report of Canadian UAW Council Committee on the US - Canadian Automotive Products Agreement, 24 & 25 Sept. 1966, p.1.
35. TRO, Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 24 & 25 Sept. 1966, pp.8-9.
36. Unfortunately no copy of the resolution was found. Therefore see R7, Report of UAW Canadian Council Committee on Automotive Parts Agreement presented to Canadian Council, 14 & 15 Jan. 1967, p.4.
37. Ibid., p.1; Globe and Mail, 2 Nov. 1966.

38. R7, George Burt to Mr. Nicholson, 20 Dec. 1966 copied in Report of UAW Canadian Council Committee on Automotive Parts Agreement presented to Canadian Council, 14 & 14 Jan. 1967, pp.5-6.
39. Ibid., p.6; Globe and Mail, 16 Jan. 1967.
40. Globe and Mail, 27 Jan. 1967.
41. Globe and Mail, 8, 9 Feb. 1967.
42. R7, John Nicholson to George Burt, 21 Mar. 1967.
43. TRO, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 24 & 25 June 1967, p.7.
44. Beigie, Automotive Agreement, Chapter 7; CB, Brief on the Canada - United States Automotive Products Agreement submitted to federal government 20 Feb. 1969, p.1.
45. Ibid. (Brief), p.1; PC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 14 & 15 Sept. 1968, p.26.
46. CB, Brief on the Canada - United States Automotive Products Agreement submitted to federal government 20 Feb. 1969, pp. 7 & 10.
47. Ibid., p.7.
48. Adam Przeworski argues that the structure of the bourgeois state constitutes relations within the working class as relations of representation. His argument, although made with specific reference to the institution of parliament, has important implications for this argument on lobbying and is therefore worth quoting. Przeworski states that:
 "Masses do not act directly in defence of their interests; they delegate this defence... Leaders become representatives. Masses represented by leaders: this is the mode of organization of the working class within capitalist institutions. In this manner participation demobilizes the masses." Adam Przeworski, "Social Democracy as a Historical Phenomenon", New Left Review 122 (July - Aug. 1980): 29.
 It should be noted that while my analysis of lobbying is similar to Przeworski's on parliamentary institutions, it diverges from his conclusions. Przeworski concludes that participation in structures of the capitalist state necessarily demobilizes the working class. It is argued here and throughout the thesis that although such participation tends towards demobilization, other factors such as the union's collective identity and specific internal organizational structure may counteract this tendency, therefore leaving open the possibility for union mobilization of the membership.

49. Globe and Mail, 27 July 1962, 18 Feb. 1965.
50. Globe and Mail, 4, 18, 19, 21 Dec. 1964, 28 Jan., 17 Feb., 8 Mar. 1965, 7 Oct. 1966.
51. Globe and Mail, 25, 30 Jan. 1965.
52. Globe and Mail, 6 Mar. 1967; David Blake, "Multinational Corporation, International Union and International Collective Bargaining: A Case Study of the Political, Social and Economic Implications of the 1967 UAW - Chrysler Agreement", paper prepared for delivery at the Symposium on International Collective Bargaining sponsored by the International Institute for Labour Studies. Geneva, Switzerland, Spring 1969, p.26.
53. Globe and Mail, 12 July 1967.
54. Blake, "International Collective Bargaining", pp.15-24.
55. Ibid., p.13.
56. Ibid.; Globe and Mail, 9 Nov. 1967, 2 Feb. 1968.
57. Globe and Mail, 14 Dec. 1967, 28 Mar. 1968; TRO, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 16 & 17 Mar. 1968, pp.8-12.
58. Globe and Mail, 22 Apr., 24 June 1968.
59. Blake, "International Collective Bargaining", p.14.
60. Globe and Mail, 10, 22 July 1968.
61. TRO, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 23 & 24 June 1962, pp.1-2, 30 & 31 Mar. 1963, pp.3-4.
62. Globe and Mail, Nov. 1964, 2 Dec. 1965.
63. TRO, Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 24 & 25 Sept. 1966, pp.3-4.
64. Ibid.; TRO, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 24 & 25 June 1967, p.16; Globe and Mail, 4 Jan. 1967.
65. Globe and Mail, 10, 11, 25, 29 Oct. 1963, 14, 18, 22 Jan. 1965, 4, 6, Oct. 1966.
66. Globe and Mail, 4, 5, 7, 8 Apr. 1968.
67. On AMC wildcats see Globe and Mail, 19, 21 Oct. 1963, 8 May 1964, 21, 23, 24, 27 Sept. 1966; On GM and Chrysler wildcats

see Globe and Mail 2 Dec. 1964; On Dominion Forge wildcat see Globe and Mail, 20 Sept. 1965; On Douglas Aircraft wildcat see Globe and Mail, 14 Oct. 1966; On Massey Fergusson wildcat see Globe and Mail, 22 Oct. 1966.

68. Globe and Mail, 21, 23, 24, 27 Sept. 1966.
69. Quoted from CRO, Draft report on UAW organizing drive, n.d., p.1.
70. Carl Dean Snyder, White Collar Workers and the UAW (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973), Chapter 6.
71. TRO, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 23 & 24 June 1962, pp.3-4 & 8, 22 & 23 Sept. 1962, pp.3-4, 30 & 31 Mar. 1963, p.5; Globe and Mail, 6 June, 17 Oct. 1962.
72. Snyder, White Collar Workers, Chapter 1.
73. Globe and Mail, Dec. 1963.
74. Globe and Mail, 13 Apr. 1964.
75. Globe and Mail, 17 May 1966; Snyder, White Collar Workers, p.101.
76. WPR, Walter Reuther to Donald MacDonald (CLC), 31 Aug. 1965.
77. TRO, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 25 & 26 Sept. 1965, p.2.
78. TRO, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 2 & 3 Apr. 1966, pp.6-8.
79. CRO, Draft report on UAW organizing drive, n.d., p.1.
80. R7, Report of the Resolutions Committee to the Canadian UAW Economic Conference, Windsor, Ontario, 23 Apr. 1967.
81. PC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 22 & 23 June 1968; Victor Reuther, The Brothers Reuther and the Story of the UAW (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976), Chapter 25.
82. CRO, Memo from Jerry Hartford to George Burt, 30 July 1965; Memo from Jerry Hartford to George Burt, Maurice Vassart, Roland Morin, Louis Laberge and Joe Walsh, 27 Apr 1967; Jerry Hartford to Roland Morin, 26 Oct. 1967.
83. John Campbell, Canadian Political Facts, 1845-1975 (Agincourt: Methuen Publications, 1977), pp.89 & 92.
84. TRO, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 23 & 24 June 1962, p.6.

85. TRO, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 22 & 23 Sept. 1962, p.12.
86. Janine Brodie and Jane Jenson, Crisis, Challenge and Change (Agincourt: Methuen Publications, 1980), p.248.
87. TRO, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 30 & 31 Mar. 1963, pp.10-11.
88. Campbell, Political Facts, p.89.
89. CSRO, Morden Lazarus, "Labour's Role in Party Structure", report submitted to closed conference of CLC, 16 Oct. 1968, p.1.
90. CCF, Terence Grier to George Burt, 6 May 1963.
91. TRO, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 14 & 15 Sept. 1963, p.9.
92. CCF, Terence Grier to Allan Schroeder, 24 Oct. 1963.
93. CSRO, Lazarus, "Labour's Role in Party Structure", p.3.
94. Brodie and Jenson, Crisis, Challenge and Change, Chapter 8.
95. CCF, Allan Schroeder to Terence Grier, 22 May 1964; Terence Grier to Allan Schroeder, 15 Oct. 1964.
96. CCF, Arthur Taylor to Terence Grier, 11 Jan. 1963.
97. CCF, Arthur Taylor to Terence Grier, 13 Sept. 1963.
98. CCF, Jim Bury to Art Taylor, 11 Oct. 1963.
99. TRO, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 15 & 16 Jan. 1966, p.13.
100. Campbell, Political Facts, pp.89 & 92.
101. CSRO, Lazarus, "Labour's Role in Party Structure", p.1.
102. Globe and Mail, 18 Oct. 1967; TRO, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 16 & 17 Mar. 1968, pp.21-22.
103. Larry Johnston, "A Comparative History of the Relationship between JAW and the CCF-NDP in the City of Brantford", history term paper submitted to Professor Leo Johnson, University of Waterloo, March 1969, pp.18-19.
104. Ibid.; TRO, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 16 & 17 Mar. 1968, pp.21-22.

105. Larry Johnston, "UAW and CCF-NDP in Brantford", pp.17-19.
106. Globe and Mail, 8 May 1968; Robert White, Hard Bargains: My Life on the Line (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1987), pp.78-85.
107. For an insightful description of McDermott's position inside the Canadian Region see White, Hard Bargains, pp.78-90.
108. PC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 22 & 23 June 1968, p.2. This was McDermott's first address to the Canadian Council as Canadian Director.
109. Ivan Rand, Report of the Royal Commission Inquiry into Labour Disputes (Province of Ontario: Queen's Printer, Aug. 1968).
110. PC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 14 & 15 Sept. 1968, p.2.
111. Ibid., p.33.
112. Ibid., pp.3-4.
113. UAW solutions included the establishment of a government agency to monitor price increases with the power to inquire into costs, profits and all other factors affecting corporate proposals for such increases. To aid in this corporate evaluation, the UAW recommended that all companies with businesses in Canada be forced to publish comprehensive financial statements on their Canadian operations. Finally, the Council urged the government to develop statistical data on the Canadian economy, including unit labour costs, unit profits and labour productivity assessments in order that a realistic evaluation of the reasons for inflation could be made. Ibid., p.35.
114. Ibid., p.18.
115. Ibid..
116. CCF, Harold Thayer, "Trade Union - NDP Liason", 4 Oct. 1968.
117. CCF, Memo from Clifford Scotton to Members of Federal Council, Federal Caucus, Officers of CLC and Political Education Committee Director of the CLC, 25 Oct. 1968.

Chapter Seven

The Times They are a Changin', 1969-78

The 1960's had been years of relative prosperity in the Canadian auto industry and marked the heyday of Fordist regulation. Beneath this relative calm, however, were signs of instability and change in the Canadian UAW. Collective bargaining in the 1960's had been marred by an escalating number of wildcats. Moreover, the Canadian UAW's successful organization drive in the 1960's expanded the ranks of the union and posed possible problems as the Canadian union had to respond to the demands of an increasingly diverse membership. The significance of these internal rumblings was overshadowed, however, by the massive improvements in labour-management-government relations. Overall, then, the UAW looked to the 1970's for a continuation of the stabilized relations with corporations and governments and the attendant gains made for its membership under this new-found peace.

Instead, the UAW found that the ground upon which this settlement with corporations and government rested had shifted. The upward spiral of costs, noted in 1968, did not abate but continued into the 1970's. When inflation levelled out, unemployment began to rise. The 1970's became a decade of recession as Fordism reached its limits. This did not occasion a sudden abandonment of Fordist institutions and relations of

compromise, however. Instead it introduced a period of uncertainty as governments, corporations and unions sought solutions within the limits of the postwar settlement.

Overall, the core of Fordist regulation - institutionalized collective bargaining - remained intact in this period. In fact, the UAW made some major collective bargaining gains in the 1970's, including increased control over production standards. Furthermore, in Quebec where institutionalized relations were largely undeveloped and corporations appeared intent upon preventing the emergence of such an arrangement, the UAW engaged in some protracted struggles and partially succeeded in extending the terms of Fordist regulation into that province. Only in some of the smaller firms and in the agricultural implement industry did the UAW face major corporate challenges to established patterns of collective bargaining.

The 1970's recession did occasion some restructuring of relations between the UAW and governments. The federal government responded to the recession with a mixture of Keynesian and monetarist policy. This government's most significant initiative came with its attempted construction of tripartite structures of decision-making and the 1975 introduction of wage and price controls. The initial support amongst various labour leaders for tripartism and even in some cases, an incomes policy, evaporated as union memberships mobilized opposition to these proposals. This membership resistance, combined with the federal government's unwillingness to negotiate the terms of restraint, moved the UAW towards more militant, mobilization-based strategies.

Consequently, these policy initiatives succeeded not in restructuring the postwar settlement with labour as the government had intended, but in straining existing union-government relations. However, this did not pose a major threat to the existing mode of regulation which was dominated by institutionalized collective bargaining. In fact, the protection of existing regulatory structures in collective bargaining by both the major auto corporations and the UAW provided the union with a means of successfully circumventing government attempts to curb wages.

In contrast to the federal experience, the Ontario government used the 1970's recession as an opportunity to further secure the politico-legal foundations of the Fordist regime. The Ontario government seized the labour movement's interest in tripartism to construct informal tripartite forums of communication between government, business and union leaders.

The UAW's political agenda during the 1970's was dominated by the recession and government policy initiatives to deal with inflation. It was the increased conflict inside the Canadian UAW, however, which determined the particular, and often contradictory, course of action pursued by the union. Similar to the late 1950's, Canadian Autoworkers were divided between the leadership's proposed strategy of working within the confines of Fordist regulation and a re-emergent Left caucus' call for militant, nationalist strategies based on mass collective action by the membership. To prevent internal disintegration of the Canadian UAW

with. its implicit threat to the union's position of power, the Canadian union leadership moved to reconstruct internal consensus by entering the terrain of mobilization politics. Furthermore, Dennis McDermott moved to gain greater structural autonomy from the International union.

The renaissance of Canadian nationalism also paved the way for a reformulation of the UAW's relationship with the NDP. With the birth of the Waffle, a nationalist caucus inside the NDP which articulated a programme for an independent socialist Canada, including demands for national unions, the NDP got caught between demands from this caucus and international unions. The international unions won out. The resulting increased leverage of the UAW inside the NDP combined with its strained relations with the federal government over wage and price controls made partisan politics a more viable political strategy. Thus, the 1970's marked a high point in UAW-NDP relations as the UAW increased its support for the party, not hesitating to wield its new-found power against any party policies antithetical to union interests.

Finally, in the 1970's the UAW found itself confronted with the unique demands of its newly organized Quebec workers, demands which centred on the question of Quebec nationalism. To maintain its organizational presence in this province, the UAW had to respond to this challenge and gradually pieced together a strategy which was notably more militant than that of many other unions and the NDP. This was a delicate task as the International Union had little understanding of the Quebec question and the vast majority of Canadian autoworkers were anglophone. The Canadian leadership

was successful, however, in ably demonstrating support for Quebec workers' demands while minimizing the alienation of other autoworkers.

UAW politics in the 1970's are difficult to decipher. The union's political and workplace strategies began to merge one with the other. Where lobbies were unsuccessful, the union increasingly supplemented this strategy with a return to mobilization politics. Each step intended to maintain the union's position of power and legitimacy in society was accompanied by internal union struggle which necessitated careful consideration of the political means adopted by the union leadership. Overall, the 1970's were turbulent years for the UAW. The resulting story is one of a union struggling to retain its legitimacy and influence in a changing society while also reconstructing internal solidarity - a prerequisite for the successful pursuit of collective action.

Recessionary Politics, 1969-75

i) Working within the Limits of Fordist Regulation: Costs and Benefits for the UAW

The UAW entered 1969 optimistic about the continuation of its regularized lobbying relationship with governments and the attendant role it anticipated playing in government decision-making in the 1970's. Signs of inflation in 1968 and the UAW's fears about the effect of rising costs on the national economy and its own membership did nothing to dampen this confidence. In fact, events early in 1969 fostered the UAW's commitment to lobbying as an effective strategy. A meeting between the UAW and government

officials held in November, 1968 on the question of workers' benefits under the Transitional Assistance Benefit programme resulted in a victory for the union.(1) In early 1969, the Department of Labour announced changes to the assistance programme which incorporated demands made by the UAW over the past three years. These included a reduction in eligibility time, an increase in benefits and the possibility for individual autoworkers to draw either SUB or TAB benefits when laid off due to readjustment under the Autopact.(2)

Secondly, UAW pressure on the government to include the union in talks on the Autopact appeared a success. Dennis McDermott and the UAW Auto Tariff Committee met with government officials including Minister of Labour, Bryce Mackasay, and Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce, Jean Luc Pepin, for three hours on February 20, 1969. McDermott heralded this meeting as a victory stating that "... it is my distinct impression that we have started a meaningful dialogue with senior members of the Trudeau Government."(3)

McDermott also saw hope in the government's proposed solution to the problem of inflation. He praised the creation of the Prices and Incomes Commission (PIC) with its mandate to determine the causes and effect of inflation and possible means for achieving price stability. McDermott therefore willingly entered, along with other unions, into discussions with the Commission.(4) These meetings generated further hope that the government was serious in its intent to curb inflation and to include organized labour in its deliberations.

By the fall of 1969, however, the UAW once again appeared on the outside of government deliberations. Rumblings from various American government officials indicated that the American government wanted changes to the Autopact, including possible revisions or the elimination of the safeguards which guaranteed investment and production in Canada. Subsequent official talks on the Autopact excluded the UAW. However, the federal government was intent upon maintaining its consultative relationship with the UAW and when pressured by the union, responded with an invitation for the UAW to meet with Canadian government officials prior to upcoming joint consultations with the U.S. on the Autopact.(5)

For the UAW leadership, the resulting December meeting with Pepin laid to rest fears that the union was being pushed out of the decision-making process. At this meeting, the UAW delegation presented its brief to Pepin and then departed from a structured debate about this document and began discussion about the Canadian government's position on the Autopact.(6) McDermott proclaimed the meeting a step forward in the UAW's relations with government, citing Pepin's support for the UAW's position on the letters of undertaking as an example of the progress made in this meeting. More importantly, the informal nature of the meeting signalled to McDermott that the UAW might now move beyond the brief as a means of communicating to government and into the realm of private and informal discussion.(7) Once again the politics of consultation proved successful and held future promise of closer ties between the UAW and the federal government.

Such was not the case on government economic policy, however. Unions began to fear that the Prices and Incomes Commission was not seeking consensus on policy options for dealing with inflation but rather was willing to unilaterally impose a solution. More importantly, the federal government's announcement of expenditure cutbacks for the 1970-71 fiscal year, combined with Prime Minister Trudeau's announcement of a reduction of government employees, indicated to the unions that inflation was to be tackled at the expense of employment.(8) The UAW thus reversed its position of support for government initiatives, joining with other unions in a withdrawal from participation in further discussions with the PIC.(9) McDermott demanded that the government shift its attention away from wage restraint to unemployment.(10)

Following this breakdown in union-government talks, the Prices and Incomes Commission announced a proposed 6% ceiling on wages, which the UAW rejected.(11) Canadian Autoworkers were determined to bargain without government interference. This resolve hardened when in June 1970 Trudeau bypassed the union and carried the idea of voluntary wage restraint directly to workers at the UAW Ford plant in Talbotville.(12)

Big Three negotiations were to begin in the summer of 1970. Despite an isolated call by the Windsor and District Labour Council and local 444 for more militant action (including a possible general strike) to protest government economic policy, the UAW pursued a strategy based on orderly collective bargaining to bypass the recommended 6% government wage restriction.(13) This set of negotiations was especially important in demonstrating the

effectiveness of the union's strategy to resist government policy as the UAW and the major auto companies were scheduled to negotiate wage parity between American and Canadian workers. Government officials had voiced resistance to this practice due to its possible inflationary impact.(14) A victory in these negotiations would thus mean a successful challenge by the UAW to government policy.

Bargaining in both the US and Canada began on July 15, 1970, marking a first in the simultaneous expiration of Big Three contracts. Key demands were wage parity, parity in COLA clauses, improved pensions, more vacations and voluntary overtime.(15) Added to the Canadian agenda were demands for improved supplementary unemployment benefits, more control over speedups and, from the Ste. Therese GM workers, the establishment of French as the working language in the plant.(16) For the first time in years GM was chosen as the strike target.(17) On September 15, 1970, 350,000 GM workers in the U.S. and Canada went out on strike.(18) After almost two months, a settlement was reached in the U.S.. Autoworkers gained a major wage increase, improved pensions, two extra paid holidays and a COLA adjustment.(19)

The sticking point to the settlement was the adjustment of the American terms to Canada. Canadians were demanding the right (which their American brothers and sisters already had) to strike over production standards. Furthermore, more money was needed for the SUB plan in Canada as it was bankrupt, owing to the drain on its finances due to the Canadian government TAB plan which had

until 1969 forced laid-off workers to draw on their SUB benefits before becoming eligible for TAB.(20) Fears grew within the Canadian Region over the possibility that American workers would return to work before a Canadian settlement and that the lack of monies in the strike fund would force Canadian workers back to work.(21)

When a settlement had not been reached by December 1, Leonard Woodcock, president of the UAW, and George Morris Junior, from GM labour relations in Detroit, entered Canadian negotiations.(22) On December 16 a settlement was reached. Canadian workers gained wage parity but not COLA parity.(23) They gained the benefits of the American contract but lost on their demands for the right to strike over production standards and voluntary overtime. Finally, the UAW withdrew its demand to make French the working language in the Ste. Therese plant on two conditions: 1) that the contract include a letter authorizing the permanent umpire responsible for grievance and arbitration hearings to hire a bilingual assistant who would hear discipline and local agreement arbitration issues at the Ste. Therese plant in French and 2) that Quebec Labour Minister Jean Cournoyer would act on his promise to deal with this issue through legislative means.(24)

Negotiations with Ford and Chrysler proceeded after the end of the GM strike. By the end of January, these workers had won contracts patterned on the GM settlement.(25) The final step towards parity was made at the AMC plant in Brampton. In April, 1972 AMC workers ratified a three-year agreement which gave them parity with the Big Three.(26) The UAW's established relationship

with the major auto corporations had held them in good stead, resulting in agreements which exceeded the 6% guideline recommended by the PIC.(27)

The combination of the PIC's lack of enforcement powers and the institutionalized collective bargaining relations with the Big Three had strengthened the UAW's position with the government. Similar conditions did not hold for the non-auto companies which were hard hit by the deepening recession. In the midst of the Big Three negotiations, the UAW was confronted with concessionary demands from many of these companies. In January 1971, Acme Screw and Gear threatened to close its plant if the UAW did not accept a three year extension of the existing collective agreement.(28) A four-day strike by the workers was to no avail and the UAW negotiated an 18 month wage-freeze to prevent closure of the plant.(29) In February, consistent with its resistance to wage parity in 1968, Massey Fergusson appealed to workers for moderation in their demands due to the company's poor financial position.(30) Within days, Massey Fergusson announced a layoff of 2450 workers and terminated the collective agreement to force the UAW's hand.(31) The result was the signing of an inferior agreement.(32)

The UAW's collective bargaining strategy failed to protect workers in the non-auto plants and led to concessionary agreements. The union's lobbying efforts to get government action to protect its membership from plant closures met with a similar fate. Protests outside the Ontario Conservative leadership

convention and meetings with Ontario and federal government ministers all appeared fruitless. Governments refused to introduce legislation regulating plant closures and severance pay for affected workers.(33) Growing unemployment, the UAW's acceptance of concessions and the failure of lobbying to produce protective legislation for workers fed discontent within the union and opened up a space within the UAW for the mobilization of a new left caucus advocating alternative forms of political action.

ii) Divisions in the Ranks: The Emergence of a New Left Caucus

Many of the members of the 1950's Left caucus reappeared as the proponents of a more militant mobilization strategy. The base of support for this course of action had shifted, however. The infusion of new members into the Canadian UAW in the 1960's had brought with it a host of younger workers, unfamiliar with established UAW traditions and untainted by the historical legacy of internal politics.(34) At the same time, their experience of the monotony and alienation of the assembly line made them open to appeals for the more radical course of action proposed by militants in the union.

For the next few years, a new Left caucus and the UAW leadership battled over what constituted the most effective political strategy for the UAW to protect its membership. The Left advocated a return to mobilization politics aimed at engaging the membership in collective action. Its strategy included the use of collective bargaining and strikes to resist management solutions to the recession, seen in speedups, overtime and threatened plant closure, the use of mass demonstrations to force popular pressure

on governments seemingly unwilling to protect workers, and a mobilization within the NDP to set the party onto a path of socialist construction.(35)

A major step in pursuing this strategy lay in gaining greater autonomy for Canadian autoworkers within the International union structure. For the Left, the present structure, manifested in pattern and international bargaining, joint Canadian-American policy and bargaining agenda forums, IEB control over strike authorization and a centralized communication and education system, was a fetter on Canadian attempts to set a national political agenda in the face of a deepening economic recession. The alienation from the International union was perhaps heightened by Dennis McDermott's practice of leaving much of the collective bargaining to union negotiators from the International UAW.(36) Ideological nationalism, while a means used by the Left to mobilize support for its programme, was not an end in itself. In fact, the majority of the Left did not support calls for outright independence of Canadian Autoworkers from the International structure. Rather its demands for greater autonomy within the International union were part of its militant political strategy, rather than hollow calls of nationalism.

The Canadian UAW leadership struggled to resist this strategic redirection, determined as it was to preserve its newly won consultative relationship with the government and orderly collective bargaining relations with corporations. In its view, temporary compromises with government and management were worth

exchanging for anticipated long-term gains to be made through continued access to government decision-making and good relations with corporations.

The Canadian UAW leadership could not afford, however, to ignore growing membership discontent which was predicated on an apparent failure by the union to protect its members. Thus, while the Left struggled to redirect the UAW, the leadership struggled to reconstruct internal consensus. This task was complicated by the growing disillusionment with the International union, found both inside and outside the UAW. For Canadian UAW leaders such as McDermott and his staff (including Bob White, McDermott's administrative assistant), International unions remained the most effective means for bargaining with multinational corporations. However, consistent with the Canadian leadership's goal of maintaining hegemony over its membership and in the face of growing nationalist pressure within the entire Canadian labour movement, a restructuring of relations with the International became imperative. Thus, for Canadian Autoworkers the early 1970's were ones of struggle and reconstruction.

Signs of a new Left caucus within the UAW had appeared during the 1970 Big Three negotiations over the issue of voluntary overtime.(37) Since 1969, in response to the recession, corporations, aided by changes to the Ontario Employment Standards Act, had begun scheduling extended periods of compulsory overtime for workers.(38) For example, in 1969, the Ford-Oakville truck operation scheduled a work week of 56 hours, consisting of ten hour days from Monday to Thursday and eight hour days on Friday

and Saturday.(39) Compulsory overtime was aimed at extracting more from each individual worker rather than increasing the number of workers and absorbing the additional costs of benefits for new workers. The initial response to this by some autoworkers was to wildcat, something which McDermott, in an unprecedented move, supported.(40) Pressure by the Autoworkers on the Ontario government produced no results, leaving the overtime issue to be dealt with at the bargaining table.(41)

In an attempt to ensure that overtime and other Canadian issues were dealt with in 1970 negotiations, a group of Council delegates, including old Left caucus members such as Gordie Lambert, Charlie Brooks and Bill Rutherford, and several new people such as Pat Clancy and Steve Nimigon, proposed that Canadian delegates meet prior to the International Convention to put together a Canadian programme for the 1970 negotiations. The expressed purpose of this meeting was to prevent American workers from determining the union's agenda. After heated debate between this new Left caucus and the pro-International leadership of McDermott and White, the proposal was defeated.(42)

Nonetheless, voluntary overtime did make it onto the bargaining table, only to be quickly removed with the acceptance of a settlement patterned on the American agreement.(43) Militants in the union took this as proof of American control over negotiations and accused the Canadian union leadership of selling out Canadian workers to the U.S..(44) Such discontent was fed by Woodcock's role in Canadian negotiations and by the

International's levy of a new dues assessment intended to help pay the union debt incurred as a result of the GM strike.(45) Given the major bread and butter gains made by Canadian auto workers in the 1970 negotiations, these issues and the strategic alternatives offered by the Left did not find fertile ground amongst the membership, which acknowledged its support of negotiations with ratification of the contracts.

While the Big Three negotiations failed to provide the Left caucus with an opportunity for mobilization, the UAW's acceptance of concessions and its ineffectiveness in gaining government action on plant closures proved more fertile ground. At the June, 1971 Council meeting the Left sponsored a caucus meeting to discuss the position taken by the Regional administration in response to deteriorating working conditions, concessions and plant closures. A steering committee was elected at the meeting and given the task of formulating a programme of action for the upcoming Canadian Council meeting in September.(46)

In the interim, yet another crisis enveloped the UAW. Despite earlier assurances by federal government ministers concerning the inviolability of the Autopact safeguards, meetings between the American and Canadian governments, held in August, 1971, resulted in further debate over the removal of these safeguards. Once again McDermott petitioned federal Cabinet Ministers on the need to retain the safeguards as protection of Canadian jobs. To strengthen the UAW's position he solicited support from the CLC, NDP, and the International Executive Board. Once again the Federal Ministers assured McDermott of their support for the UAW's

position.(47) These government promises appeared hollow and the future of the Autopact uncertain, however, as meetings on the trade agreement continued, most often without the UAW.

The stage was set for a major battle between the Left caucus and the union leadership at the September 1971 Council meeting. In preparation, the Left's steering committee circulated its report a week prior to the Council meeting. It condemned the Canadian union for failing to deal with plant closures, wage freezes, and speedups and accused the leadership of lending support to companies' attempts to move back to the 10-hour day. Key to the proposed solutions contained in this programme for action was the Left's demand that International agreements cease and that Canadian Autoworkers be given autonomy within the International union structure. This included a Canadian constitution, the right to determine national policy and bargaining goals and a separate Canadian newspaper. The document went on to outline specific means for addressing the day-to-day economic problems confronting workers on the shop floor. It ended with a call for a socialist political agenda as a means for achieving long-term protection of workers' rights.(48)

Debate at the September Council meeting was sparked by GM's announcement of layoffs of over 2000 workers at its Oshawa and Ste. Therese plants.(49) The solutions to these layoffs offered by the UAW GM Council were repetitions of the past. They included removing the government excise tax on cars, a ban on overtime, early retirement, price reductions on GM cars and the production

of a small car by GM.(50) Lobbying was the strategy intended to communicate these demands to government. At the Council meeting the Left moved that union members be allowed to decide upon strategy for themselves at a one-day strategy conference. The Left's agenda was made clear by Lyle Dotzert of local 200 who criticized the union leadership for opting to lobby rather than mobilize the "working class into demonstrations" against the government and corporations. McDermott denied that demonstrations would achieve results, arguing that they would be detrimental to the union's cause. Instead, what was needed was intensive research, the delivery of a brief on unemployment and the recession, publicity and ultimately the application of pressure on the government. For McDermott and his supporters, lobbying, not confrontational demonstrations, got results. The Left's motion was defeated and McDermott was given a mandate to continue lobbying.(51)

Despite majority support for McDermott's position, the discontent reflected in the re-emergence of an organized Left caucus could not be left to fester. It could only spell disaster in the future as Canadian Autoworkers lost faith in the UAW's ability to protect their interests. The test of the UAW leadership lay in its ability to reconstruct a consensus within the union. Aided by improved economic times and the federal government's shift of attention to the question of unemployment, and despite the UAW's poor financial position, the Canadian regional leadership began fighting against concessions.(52)

In September Dominion Forge workers went on strike over

company demands for a one-year wage and benefits freeze, a COLA freeze and a reduction of plant time spent on handling worker grievances.(53) In contrast to earlier short-lived attempts to resist such concessions, this local, with the support of the union leadership, stayed on strike for 134 days to gain a better contract.(54) Similar militancy was supported by the UAW leadership in the 1972 DeHavilland strike where the company forced a strike which lasted eight months.(55) In both cases, the union made significant gains. Where on previous occasions the UAW had been willing to compromise with management and accept concessions at the cost of membership dissatisfaction, these protracted struggles against concessions regained the union support from its membership and effectively undermined some of the Left's support.(56)

The UAW leadership would not, however, bend on its position of negotiating with the government on the Autopact. McDermott continued to mount pressure on the government with repeated telegrams to federal government Ministers, including the Prime Minister.(57) On at least one occasion, these efforts resulted in a long-awaited meeting between McDermott, the UAW Auto Tariff Committee and Industry, Trade and Commerce Minister Pepin.(58)

Such fruits of lobbying did not allay the fears of the Left caucus concerning the future of the Autopact. The Left continued to press the UAW leadership for more militant political action. Bev McCloskey, on behalf of local 222, repeated the Left's request for an emergency one-day strategy meeting concerning UAW action to

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protect the safeguards. Also reiterated was the Left caucus' demand to use mass demonstrations as a means of increasing popular pressure on the government.(59) McDermott made his position clear in his response to local 222. Citing the October 20th meeting with Pepin as proof of success of the UAW's lobbying efforts, McDermott concluded his argument in favour of lobbying as follows:

It seems to me that we are doing everything possible to avoid serious erosion of the auto pact and nothing more can be achieved by calling conferences or promoting demonstrations. This is an extremely delicate matter that is being handled through diplomatic channels and I would not want to attempt anything which would inhibit the action of our government representatives who have indicated that they support our position in this regard.(60)

Local 222 was but one local pressing McDermott for action on the Autopact. As opposition built amongst Autoworkers, the UAW leadership entered the fray of local union politics in an attempt to rid itself of its most vocal opponents.(61)

Events continued to work against the regional leadership, however. A special UAW International convention held on November 13, 1971 led to further criticism of the International for its apparent disregard for Canadian concern over the Autopact safeguards and of McDermott for not representing Canadian interests. Once again sections of the Canadian membership demanded that the Canadian Region meet separately to establish its own policies for presentation to future International Conventions.(62)

McDermott soon realized that lobbying by the union's leadership, even when it produced meetings and government assurances of support, was not enough to quell growing internal union opposition. What was needed was a strategy which actively

engaged the membership while not threatening the UAW's ongoing dialogue with the government. In other words, the UAW leadership had to enter the strategic terrain of mobilization politics now monopolized by the Left. On December 3, 1971 the Auto Tariff Committee, in conjunction with McDermott, put together a letter-writing campaign which encouraged Canadian Autoworkers to protest the possible dismantling of the Autopact by sending letters to their local MP.(63) Momentum behind this new UAW campaign gathered as a group of Oshawa citizens, led by Mayor McNeely and Ed Broadbent, NDP-MP, decided to join with local labour organizations in their own "write in" campaign to Prime Minister Trudeau.(64)

The Left also sought new allies and rallying points around which to mobilize more support. The latter were found in the Douglas Aircraft Strike. On August 15, 1971 President Nixon had announced a 90-day wage freeze intended to curb spiralling inflation in the U.S.. American Autoworkers, like other unionists, were affected by this.(65) Within three weeks certain American-based companies with plants in Canada, in particular McDonnell Douglas Aircraft, attempted to impose a similar wage freeze on its Canadian workers.(66) After a month of negotiations, the company continued to demand a wage freeze, resulting in a strike on October 13 by 4,000 workers.(67)

After another three weeks of negotiations and walking the picket line, Ernest Moran, administrative assistant to UAW president Woodcock, and Vice President Kenneth Bannon, director of the UAW aerospace department, entered the Douglas negotiations.(68) Within a week, the company made the workers an

offer. Although it was favoured by the American union officers and accepted by the Douglas office workers, Canadian production workers of local 1967 rejected it, demanding an even better settlement.(69) The International Executive Board, supported by McDermott, was determined to terminate the strike and have the offer accepted. Hence, the IEB ordered local 1967 to submit the company offer to the membership within 24 hours. To ensure that the offer was presented to the membership in a favourable light, Jerry Hartford, Canadian Public Relations Officer, distributed a written summary of the offer and international representatives shared in the report to the membership.(70)

Such International interference fanned nationalist fires within the local which, in turn, were used by the left-wing plant leadership at Douglas to produce a two-to-one vote against the settlement.(71) The Canadian UAW leadership attempted to minimize this defeat by blaming the steward body for undue influence at the voting stations. The International's actions, however, seemed to confirm the Left's analysis of the IEB as a conservative force in collective bargaining and reinforced its commitment to achieve greater autonomy for the Canadian Region. The strike thus became the pivotal point for mobilization by the Left, leading to endorsement of local 1967's behaviour by local 222, DeHavilland workers and others.(72)

Meanwhile the company ceased negotiations.(73) This placed the union in a precarious position for it could no longer negotiate nor could it end the strike, short of imposing a

settlement on the Douglas workers. It was the company that provided the union with a way out. Although negotiations had ceased in Canada, the UAW continued to negotiate aerospace contracts in the U.S.. On December 2 an agreement patterned on the 1970 GM agreement was accepted by American Douglas Aircraft workers.(74) The McDonnell Douglas plants in the U.S. could not fully resume production, however, without the wings produced in Canada. The company therefore threatened to close the Canadian plant if the strike in Canada was not settled.(75) This threat of a loss of Canadian jobs altered the mood of many Canadian workers. A meeting of local 1967 membership was called on December 11, 1971 for the purpose of voting on the question of whether or not to return to work. A large number of the workers blocked an attempt to have a secret ballot on this question, opting instead for a show of hands which defeated the motion.

This provided the International with a 'legitimate' avenue for terminating the strike. In the name of protecting internal union democracy, the International Executive Board ordered local 1967's executive and negotiating committee to attend a meeting in Detroit and show cause why the International should not terminate the strike, given the local's denial of workers' right to a secret ballot.(76) There was no question of the outcome. Immediately following the Detroit meeting, International officers ordered local 1967 production workers back to work, enforcing this with the withdrawal of strike pay. McDermott defended the lack of a secret membership ballot on the question of strike termination by again blaming a "lunatic fringe" of the left for undue influence

and control over the membership and by insisting that continuation of the strike was not in local interests.(77) The Douglas strike became a rallying point for the Left, epitomizing as it did the problems with pattern bargaining, international control over strike authorization, and the UAW's strategic response to company threats of plant closure. The stage was being set for a stormy January Council meeting.

In the meantime the Left caucus found allies for its fight over the Autopact in the Waffle.(78) In the first week of January, 1972, the Waffle in conjunction with the Windsor and District Labour Council sponsored a symposium on the Autopact.(79) The conference was attended by several hundred trade unionists including UAW members, Ed Baillargeon, local 200, Burt Rovers, president local 1520, Pat Clancy, president local 707, Jim Connell, president local 199, Abe Tylor, president local 222, Charlie Brooks, president local 444, and Al Campbell former president local 27.(80) Guest speakers included Ed Broadbent, NDP-MP for Oshawa, and Ted Bounsall, NDP-MPP for a Windsor riding. Echoing the UAW Left caucus' position, the conference attacked the UAW's strategy of lobbying and letter writing intended to preserve the Autopact safeguards and proposed in their stead, a mass demonstration and one-day work stoppage.(81)

While the Left had gained new allies and increased public attention for its struggle over strategy with the UAW leadership, its alliance with the Waffle unwittingly provided the Canadian executive with an effective means for undermining the left-wing

opposition inside the union. The January Council meeting became the scene for this and the struggle over the Douglas Aircraft strike.

McDermott's report to Council set the stage for the fight. His first target was the Left caucus Autopact strategy which he attacked in two ways. Firstly, McDermott accused the Left of defying the democratic voice of the majority of Autoworkers whose representatives at the September Council meeting had voted against holding a one-day conference to discuss UAW political strategy on the Autopact. Ignoring this decision, the Left had then sought new allies in the Waffle with whom it staged such a conference in Windsor on January 9.(82)

The second line of attack used by McDermott consisted of parallelling the Waffle's interference in internal union affairs with the role once played by the Communist party. This argument was poignant as the September Council had issued a warning to the Communist Party to stay out of UAW business in response to the Communist Party's creation of an Auto Bureau and the latter's advocacy of a more militant plan of political action for autoworkers.(83) McDermott urged the Council to deliver a similar warning to the Waffle, which the Director argued was intent upon gaining a foothold in unions and constituted a threat to Autoworkers' control over their own union.(84) Once again, McDermott set up the union leadership as the defenders of internal union democracy and vilified the Left caucus for its courtship of an organization intent upon usurping control from the membership.

This was a particularly effective attack on the Left.

Canadian Autoworkers' historic struggles to maintain the District Council, combined with the construction of a culture of union democracy and solidarity, had produced both strong loyalty to the Council as the democratic vehicle for membership participation and a commitment to a united front once the internal decision-making process had established the union's policy. The Left caucus' actions defied this tradition and raised the spectre of 'outside' control of a union whose membership had a long history of defending the integrity of membership control.

The debate that followed McDermott's report centred on the strategic alternatives offered by the Left caucus and the leadership. Rutherford, Lambert and Clancy, as the most vocal opponents of McDermott, continued to emphasize the importance of mobilization of autoworkers to ensure that their voice was heard in the Autopact debates. They applauded the Waffle conference for its publicity of the Autoworkers' plight. McDermott returned to his arguments that effective policy inputs rested on good representation to those government officials in charge of Autopact negotiations. In other words, effectiveness was dependent upon acting within the limits of the politics of compromise. Leadership supporters at the Council meeting added to the arguments against the Waffle by blaming it for the NDP's loss of the most recent Ontario election. The result was the defeat of the Left. The Council passed a motion censuring the activities of the Waffle for its attempts to meddle in UAW affairs and establish policy for the union. It then reaffirmed the union's commitment to lobbying and

the letter-writing campaign.(85)

The Left caucus fared no better in its struggle to support the Douglas workers' cause. Debate following McDermott's report on the Douglas strike was quickly censured with the passage of a motion disallowing further debate on this aspect of the Director's report.(86) This cleared the way for Emil Mazey, guest speaker from Solidarity House in Detroit, to put forth the International's position on the Douglas strike. According to Mazey, strike authorization had been given the Douglas workers on condition of their achievement of the GM pattern settlement. When this was reached there was no reason to continue the strike. Echoing McDermott, Mazey blamed the continuation of the strike on "despotic" local leaders who denied the membership the right to make their own decisions.(87) Once again the International was presented as the defender of workers' rights and union democracy. After further heated debate, two Left-inspired resolutions which criticized the International and put forward demands for greater autonomy were defeated.(88)

While the Canadian UAW leadership had won this most recent battle with the Left caucus, thereby reaffirming support for the International and the union's existing political strategy, this had been due as much, if not more, to the pro-International caucus' control over the Canadian Council as it was the result of overwhelming support for the Canadian leadership's programme for action. The Left caucus still had a strong local base of power. The Canadian Council decisions were thus only one step towards reconstructing a consensus amongst Canadian autoworkers, a task

which the union leadership would continue to pursue over the next eighteen months.

iii) Reconstructing a Unity of Interest

Such a reconstruction of consensus relied upon the ability of Canadian UAW leaders to respond effectively to some of the Left caucus demands, but in a manner which incorporated these changes into the dominant discourse and established structure of union practices. This process of reproducing existing union structures and strategic practices established new limits to political action, however, thereby opening the way for a possible transformation in the strategic alternatives open to the union. This process of reconstruction and transformation continued throughout the 1970's, laying the groundwork for the more fundamental redirection in the UAW's political strategies in the 1980's.

McDermott's attempts to reconstruct internal union consensus were evident in two areas. At the immediate level of political action, lobbying and collective bargaining reflected changes which incorporated some of the practices advocated by the Left caucus. Secondly, the structural relations between the Canadian Region and the International union were radically altered in 1973 in direct response to many of the demands made by the Left.

The Autopact remained one of the key issues concerning Canadian Autoworkers. By the spring of 1972, concern over the effect of the American DISC (Domestic International Sales Corporations) policy on auto investment in Canada had been added

to the UAW's political agenda. The DISC programme was introduced by President Nixon as part of his August, 1971 economic programme and was intended to encourage multinational corporations to increase investment in the U.S., rather than continue the shift of investment to other countries. DISC was a tax incentive programme. Corporations which established DISC plants in the U.S. could indefinitely defer payment of taxes on goods exported to other countries, including Canada. While the Autopact safeguards guaranteed certain levels of investment in Canada, should they be removed as had been suggested by certain Canadian and American government officials, Canadian Autoworkers would suffer under the DISC legislation.

The Canadian UAW, with the support of the International, mounted opposition to DISC, linking this with the union's demands for retention of the Autopact safeguards. The union lobbied the federal government and used the media to publicize the deleterious effects of DISC and changes to the Autopact.(89) There were notable changes in the UAW's lobbying strategy, consistent with the leadership's earlier attempts to move onto the terrain of mobilization politics. The UAW held a series of community meetings aimed at forging alliances with mayors. No longer did the union's lobbying strategy rely solely on the activities of the central leadership but also upon active participation by local union presidents. This mobilization resulted in a meeting between union representatives, their newly-found mayoral allies and Premier Davis, who agreed to support the UAW's position and proposed that he might make direct representation to Ottawa on the question of

DISC in particular.(90)

The UAW also found Ed Broadbent an ally. His earlier participation and organization of the Oshawa community lobbying group on the Autopact was the beginning of this relationship. When in February 1973, government ministers announced that Autopact safeguards were transitional, Broadbent attacked the government's position in a lengthy speech in the House of Commons, acting as a voice for the Autoworkers.(91) The combined pressure mounted by the UAW and the NDP ultimately led the government to retract its statement. The apparent success of the union's strategy constituted a victory for lobbying and for the Canadian UAW leadership's bid for greater support amongst autoworkers.

More important to reducing internal conflict was the 1973 round of collective bargaining. Once again the Canadian region braced itself for a struggle over the issue of voluntary overtime.(92) For the first time since his election as Canadian Director, Dennis McDermott took control of the entire bargaining process.(93) Chrysler was made the strike target by the UAW. To ensure solidarity in Canadian ranks and test the nationalist waters, a secret ballot referendum was held in all Chrysler locals to determine whether Canadian autoworkers wished to remain under the terms of an international agreement. The vote showed strong support for the international, paving the way for negotiations.(94) After a brief strike at Chrysler, an agreement was reached which included a "30 and out" pension clause, allowing workers of 55 years of age and over, with thirty years of service,

to retire with full pension, a new health and safety programme, a voluntary overtime clause for time worked over 48 hours and language which gave Chrysler workers the right to strike over production standards during the life of a collective agreement.(95) Ford negotiations were more difficult as the Canadians waited for a settlement in the U.S. before striking over voluntary overtime. After a brief strike, however, a settlement parallel to the Chrysler one, but without the 'right to strike' clause, was reached.(96) A settlement at GM was reached without a strike but also without a voluntary overtime clause.(97)

Despite the uneven gains made in these negotiations, McDermott heralded them as a victory for Canadian autoworkers and as proof of the Canadian UAW's ability to negotiate and strike over its own issues, in this case with the full support of the International.(98) The International, like the Canadian union administration, realized the dangers to the union of imposing settlements on the Canadian region which did not address the particular issues raised by Canadian Autoworkers, dangers which had been made clear by the success of the Left in mobilizing opposition in union locals and the Canadian Council.

Most important for the future, however, was the fact that these negotiations represented a shift in the foundations of Fordist regulation. With UAW victories on the question of overtime and at Chrysler over speedups, the union had succeeded in forcing corporations to recognize union input on questions of production standards. This victory therefore challenged management's exclusive control over the organization of production and shifted

the terms upon which labour-management peace was organized.

Whilst these negotiations were underway, a more radical transformation in the Canadian Region's relationship to the International was being effected. The Left caucus in the UAW continued to demand sweeping changes to the International union structure. Added momentum for this struggle came from national unions such as the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE) which led a move at the 1970 CLC convention for the establishment of guidelines to ensure a degree of autonomy for Canadian members in International unions.(99) McDermott's initial reaction to these nationalist demands was to condemn unions such as the Canadian Brotherhood of Railway, Transport and General Workers (CBRT) and CUPE for meddling in other union's affairs and defend international unions on their historical track record of good trade unionism.(100)

As the months passed, however, McDermott began to change his tune. Within his own union, momentum was building behind many of the Left caucus' nationalist recommendations. This threatened the union leadership's control over its membership. Secondly, American economic policy, such as the Hartke-Burke Bill which initiated the DISC programme, was being increasingly recognized as a threat to the Canadian economy. Although the UAW, unlike many other international unions, had come out against this legislation, the potential impact of this bill on the auto industry was fuelling nationalist fires amongst Canadian Autoworkers, thereby aggravating internal tensions.(101) Finally, many international

unions had suffered from local breakaways due to union leaderships' unwillingness to respond to demands for greater autonomy for Canadian locals.(102) The loss of the Steelworkers' local in Kitimat to the Canadian Council of Unions brought the point home to the UAW leadership and pushed McDermott into action.(103)

To respond to the nationalist question and return internal unity to the Canadian region of the UAW was a delicate matter. Although the Left caucus increasingly posed a threat to the Canadian UAW leadership, McDermott could not afford to lose the support of the powerful pro-International elements within the union. He therefore trod carefully in his accommodation of changes to the region's relationship to the International union. McDermott's report to the January, 1973 Council meeting demonstrated this balancing act. It began with a recitation of the political and economic conditions which were feeding nationalism and might constitute a real threat to the survival of the UAW in Canada.(104) Immediately following this, however, McDermott condemned the CCU, linking it to anti-unionism and to a nationalist left:

The Canadian Council of Unions is a loosely put together negative organization compromising the yahoos on the right and the yahoos on the left and their mortal enemy is the strong aggressive, effective international union ...I am convinced they are part of an overall conspiracy financed by the establishment power blocks in our society in an attempt to put good unions to death.(105)

Having laid to rest fears amongst the pro-International caucus, McDermott then went on to argue that nationalism was a well-founded reaction to American imperialism and Nixon's economic

policies. It required some response by International unions to ensure that Canadian regions were not treated as mere branch plants of International headquarters. The Director then laid out recommended changes to the International union structure which in McDermott's words would allow "true international unionism". These included 1) separate affiliation of the Canadian region to world bodies, 2) a Canadian research staff for dealing with economic policy, educational matters, arbitration and international affairs, and 3) a national newsletter.(106) A compromise had been effected and McDermott was given a mandate to pursue these matters.

By April, 1973 McDermott announced that the IEB had accepted his proposals. There would now be an all-Canadian newspaper, a professional economist to handle Canadian issues, and separate Canadian affiliation to world bodies such as the International Metalworkers' Federation. Finally, a new financial arrangement had been worked out to allow Canadian dues to be spent in Canada.(107) Based on his own internal success, McDermott became a prime force behind new CLC guidelines presented at the 1974 CLC convention for Canadian autonomy in international unions.(108) A new consensus within the UAW had been constructed and with this, a new relationship with the International.

If there were any remaining doubts amongst the leadership and its supporters about this turn of events and the necessity of this restructuring, they were laid to rest with the events of the United Aircraft Strike in Quebec. This strike began on January 7,

1974 and was one of the longest and most violent strikes in the Canadian Autoworkers' history. As it unfolded, it confirmed the Autoworkers' understanding of the uniqueness of Canadian economic and political conditions, in particular those in Quebec, and the importance of a more autonomous union responsible for planning its own strategy.

The strike which began with a lockout by the company, was but the culmination of many months of labour-management conflict marked by sit-ins and slowdowns by the workers and threats and firings of labour militants by the company.(109) Some of the key issues in the strike were the right to the automatic check-off of dues (the Rand formula), cost of living allowance, a voluntary overtime clause and the reinstatement of 21 workers suspended due to their involvement in previous workplace agitation.(110)

The strike soon escalated into a violent confrontation between the viciously anti-union company and a group of determined unionists intent upon winning basic union rights. The company refused to negotiate face to face with the union until its demand for the Rand formula was forfeited. The UAW, whose struggles in 1945 had won Canadian labour this right to the automatic check-off of dues, refused to back down.(111) The company spied on picketers with closed circuit television mounted at the plant gates, issued vicious anti-French and anti-union press releases, and paid hundreds of dollars to the municipality for extra police protection.(112)

In turn, the strike became a cause celebre for the UAW, the CLC and the Quebec Federation of Labour. The UAW poured in

thousands of dollars from the strike fund and membership donations and rallied the membership for support.(113) The strike, which had been marred by violence from its very first day, took a more serious turn as it entered into its eighth month, when six bombs were detonated to disrupt the plant's power supply.(114) It was at this point that the strike began to take on a significance far beyond that of a workplace struggle. It became a focus for nationalist sentiment and a political scandal. Most importantly, it became the scene of struggle between the International union and Canadian Autoworkers.

The United Aircraft strike consumed a large amount of strike monies and, with no settlement in sight, the UAW could expect it to continue to drain its funds. Because of the importance of this strike for winning basic union rights in Canada and presumably in consideration of the build-up of anti-International sentiment in Canada over the Douglas Aircraft Strike, International union Officers, including McDermott, voted to contribute extra monies to the United Aircraft strikers. The one opponent to this move was Emil Mazey, the secretary-treasurer of the UAW. He wanted the strike terminated.(115) After the IEB decision was made to continue support for the strike, Mazey took matters into his own hands. On August 10 he circulated a letter to each individual striker, all Canadian UAW locals, the IEB and the Officers of the union which accused local 510 and the Canadian regional leadership of fraud in the delivery of strike benefits. He undertook this action at the very moment when McDermott was outside the country

on a visit to the Soviet Union.(116)

Although McDermott's own leadership had been impugned by Mazey's attack, this was only a small part of the crisis which the Secretary Treasurer's actions threatened to create. The fragile consensus which McDermott had succeeded in building seemed about to collapse as locals contributing monies to local 510 began to suspect that support for the strike was misplaced. This split was made all the more serious by the fact that it threatened to divide francophone and anglophone workers within the union. Moreover, such interference by an International officer of the union might foster the remobilization of nationalist opposition to the International union.

At the next Council meeting in September, McDermott lambasted Mazey for his actions, accusing him of using his staff to spy on local 510 and Canadian International Representatives.(117) McDermott recommended that a motion be passed demanding that the IEB reprimand Mazey and prevent him from engaging in this type of action in the future.(118) The motion passed unanimously.(119) Mazey's calculated move to end the strike merely confirmed Canadian Autoworkers' commitment to greater regional control over their own affairs.

Mazey's actions signalled to the company, however, that the union might be willing to terminate the strike of its own accord. The United Aircraft Company thus hardened its resolve to wait out the strike rather than negotiate in good faith. United Aircraft's optimism appeared to be confirmed when in the fall of 1974, 1200 workers returned to their jobs.(120) All these events could do

nothing but weaken the morale of the workers who remained on the picket line. At this very moment, however, the strike erupted as a political scandal both federally and provincially. The federal government was accused by Ed Broadbent in the House of Commons of continuing to give grants to United Aircraft despite its relocation of most production to the United States.(121) Although the federal government refused to act, the publicity received by this political controversy helped keep the United Aircraft strike alive.

A more serious political scandal was brewing in Quebec. The Liberal provincial government was already discredited in the eyes of the Quebec labour movement and as the United Aircraft strike became more violent and showed no signs of settlement, labour unrest again threatened to undermine this government's position. The Parti Quebecois made its own political gains from the strike by agitating for changes to the labour code to include the Rand formula. With pressure mounting, the Liberal government decided to intervene in the United Aircraft strike in search of a settlement. Initial attempts at conciliation failed when the company refused to guarantee jobs to all but a quarter of the strikers and insisted that the remaining jobs be left in the hands of scabs.(122) In face of these failures to find a solution, a group of strikers took matters into their own hands. They occupied the plant, took hostages and demanded a settlement to the strike. In support of this action, the QFL staged a mass demonstration outside the plant. Police moved in and, using tear gas and clubs, beat the

workers inside the plant despite their attempts to surrender peacefully.(123)

After one more failed attempt at conciliation and as the strike entered its twentieth month, Premier Bourassa came up with a settlement which both the company and the UAW agreed to recommend.(124) On August 26 the membership of local 510 voted to accept the agreement. At the same time these workers voted in favour of a special levy of one hour's pay per month for the 34 jailed strikers who had led the "commando" raid in May.(125)

The UAW lost its demand for the Rand formula but made some gains. The Quebec government promised legislation which would guarantee francophone workers the right to speak French on the job. Less tangible but no less important was the renewed spirit of militancy and heightened emotional bonds of union solidarity which the strike left in its wake. The commandos were declared heroes by the Canadian Council and their actions declared courageous. The Canadian UAW had stood by the United Aircraft strikers in the midst of opposition from the International and a virulently anti-union company. The union had proved itself a militant defender of workers' rights and in so doing, had reproduced internal union solidarity.

The Canadian UAW had weathered the storms of the early seventies and emerged more united than ever. Moreover, the course of mobilization politics adopted by the union leadership had established new limits to the strategic capabilities of Canadian Autoworkers which would prove crucial in the struggles to come. Pressure from the Left caucus and the organizational structure of

the Canadian Region, including the Canadian Council and new structural autonomy from the International, had greatly contributed to this strategic redirection. In turn, Canadian Autoworkers' commitment to their union and willingness to engage in united collective action had ensured success of these endeavours.

Two final questions remain unanswered, however. Why did the Canadian UAW leadership negotiate a compromise with militants in the union when in the 1950's, similar factional demands had been met with purges and absolute opposition? Secondly, why was McDermott, a known right-winger in the union, capable of effecting a new consensus within the union?

Part of the answer to these questions lies in the absence of Walter Reuther as President of the UAW. In 1970, Reuther and his wife were killed in an airplane crash. With the long-standing UAW president's death, the internal dynamics of the union changed. Reuther was almost a mythical figure before he died, epitomizing to Autoworkers the union's progressive and socially responsible image and role in society. Autoworkers revered him and any opposition to his leadership was tantamount to treason. Behind this image also lay a leader who was ruthless when opposed and adroit in his leadership capabilities. When Reuther died, space opened for the remobilization of internal union opposition and for greater independence of action by Regional Directors such as McDermott.

The rest of the answer to these questions lies in McDermott's

leadership. Although McDermott was a known right-winger within the union and an ardent supporter of the International, he had been elected as Director, on the condition of rebuilding consensus within the union.(126) When he initially failed in this task the prospects of defeat in future elections for Canadian Director increased. McDermott was therefore pushed to fulfill his mandate.

Moreover, over the years McDermott supported various progressive causes both within and outside the union, therefore building respect, if not outright support, amongst many members who were politically more left-wing than McDermott. For instance, in 1969, James Bridgewood was expelled from his official duties in UAW local 707 due to his alleged support for the Communist Party. This action, initiated by certain Canadian UAW members, was heavily supported by Reuther and the IEB. Despite this International support, McDermott backed a Canadian Council resolution which would allow Communists to run for union office, arguing that: "The way to beat the Commies is at the ballot box."(127) At the next International Convention in 1970, McDermott and the Canadian Council supported the unsuccessful move made by local 707 to have the Canadian Region exempt from the clause in the International constitution which barred Communists from holding union office.(128)

Furthermore, McDermott was a progressive on international affairs, mobilizing against American involvement in the Viet Nam War, actively supporting the union drive by California farmworkers, pushing the Canadian UAW's affiliation to the Canadian Civil Liberties Association and condemning American

involvement in the overthrow of the Allende government.(129)
Finally, McDermott respected the specifically Canadian UAW democratic traditions, including the existence of a left opposition. In 1975 he was quoted as saying:

We have a communications system here that they (the American UAW) don't have in the U.S.. Every three months I have to report on my stewardship to a council comprised of all the local unions, which is good. But we also have a built-in Marxist-oriented opposition that forces me to be reasonably slim and alert.(130)

These factors ensured McDermott residual support from the left, making it easier for him to effect a compromise.

The Cycle of Recession Deepens, 1974-78

At the moment internal harmony was restored, Canadian autoworkers were confronted with yet another downturn in the economy. In 1974 inflation reached 10.9%, the first time for double digit inflation since 1951. The rate of unemployment in the auto industry rapidly escalated owing to the impact of the oil crisis on consumer demand for large North American built cars.(131) As the recession deepened, unemployment in the auto industry reached crisis proportions. By February 11, 1975 one sixth of Canadian autoworkers were indefinitely laid off as were 18% of UAW members working in non-auto plants.(132)

In response to this recession and in a move to gain cooperation from trade unions, both the federal and Ontario governments attempted to restructure their relations with organized labour along tripartite lines. Although the UAW, along with various other unions, showed interest in such tripartite

arrangements, the federal government's initiatives failed; they were tied to a wage control policy to which union leaders could not gain the consent of their memberships. The result was a return by the UAW to more militant, mobilization-based strategies in its dealings with the federal government. Moreover, the UAW used its institutionalized relationship with auto corporations to shield its members from the impact of the wage control order. In contrast, the Ontario government's moves to draw labour into tripartite consultations were more successful. This produced some very real gains for the UAW and transformed the political component of the postwar settlement.

(i) The UAW, the federal government and collective bargaining)

The UAW initially counted on the increased frequency of meetings with the federal government over the Autopact and its ongoing consultation with certain key Cabinet ministers, such as the Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce, to allow the union to monitor closely the Autopact and to provide it with avenues for gaining political action on broader trade issues seen as crucial for the revitalization of the Canadian economy.(133) To supplement the union's lobbying strategy, the Auto Tariff Committee recommended various workplace arrangements to overcome the immediate problems associated with layoffs.(134)

In the meantime, federal policy-makers were once again consumed with finding a means to curb inflation. As in 1969, wages and pricing were targetted as the root of spiralling inflation. In an attempt to gain the cooperation of both organized labour and business in a programme of voluntary restraint, Finance Minister

Turner engaged in a series of meetings with representatives of these groups on the issue of wage and price controls.(135) McDermott, as a member of the Executive Committee of the CLC, participated in these meetings, which culminated in early 1975 with a luncheon with Prime Minister Trudeau. Trudeau offered the CLC a social contract similar to that forged in Britain between Labour Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, and the Trades Union Congress. While the CLC was not completely averse to this arrangement, it had reservations which McDermott stated would only be laid to rest if other representatives of the business community, such as the banks, real estate firms and professionals, joined in such a voluntary restraint programme.(136)

To increase the pressure on the government and ensure that the UAW voice was heard in any further negotiations, Canadian Autoworkers planned a mass lobby of Cabinet.(137) On February 17, 1975, three hundred Autoworkers sat with McDermott during his presentation of a UAW brief. The brief reiterated many demands made earlier by the union's Auto Tariff Committee, including the reduction of vehicle prices, government regulation of corporate investment and diversification of Canada's trading partners. Added to these demands was a demand for nationalization of the major oil corporations, rent controls and a general price rollback to dampen the cost-push of rising inflation.(138) The UAW summarized its position as follows:

Our program was born out of the recognition that many of the things that affect us cannot be dealt with at the level of collective bargaining and require political action...our government can do something to respond

to the present crisis and any such action will necessarily mean a challenge to the power of the corporations in our society.(139)

The UAW ended the meeting with an ultimatum. Either the government acted in the next four to six weeks or it would face a mass demonstration of Autoworkers on Parliament hill.(140)

On the questions dealing more directly with the auto industry, the UAW got results. Alistair Gillespie, on behalf of the government, expressed support for some of the UAW recommendations on trade. He announced that he had taken action on the UAW's proposal for an annual report on the auto industry. Furthermore, he assured the UAW that the government was keeping close watch on the auto corporations' investment commitments to Canada. Gillespie declined to take steps towards reducing vehicle prices, however, claiming this was beyond government control.(141)

This last statement presaged the government's position on its restraint policy. After additional meetings between the Ministers of Finance, Labour and Manpower and Immigration and the CLC Executive Committee, union representatives were forced to conclude that the government was unwilling to accommodate the views of organized labour.(142) The CLC then planned a meeting for May 7 to coordinate a new strategy for labour, only to be pre-empted in its deliberations by Finance Minister John Turner's public proposal for voluntary wage and price controls. McDermott quickly condemned Turner's plan for its lack of substantive means to control prices and its silence on inflationary items such as rents, gas prices and professional fees.(143) Along with the rest of the CLC executive, McDermott refused to consider Turner's proposal unless

steps were taken to effectively control all prices and prevent corporations from reaping the benefits of restraint.(144) Additionally, McDermott recommended that the real solution to the economic crisis lay in increasing labour's buying power, not reducing it.(145)

The government was not to be deterred in its pursuit of controls. In his June budget speech, John Turner clearly placed the bulk of the blame for inflation on wages and salaries, stating:

The fact is that we have been building serious cost increases into our economy which threaten to erode the competitive position of our industries both at home and abroad. The major cause of this increase in costs has been the accelerating rise of wages and salaries, which account for some 70 percent of our total national income.(146)

On October 14, 1975 the government introduced compulsory wage controls, adding to this price controls so to make the policy more palatable.(147) Guidelines for wage and salary increases were laid down and employees and employers were expected to bargain within these limits. If they did not voluntarily stay within the guidelines, the Anti-Inflation Act provided for administration of the programme by three agencies whose job it was to ensure compliance. The Anti-Inflation Board (AIB) was responsible for monitoring compliance. Should settlements exceed the recommended limits, it became the responsibility of the Administrator to investigate the conditions under which an 'excessive' settlement was bargained and to enforce the guidelines where necessary by requiring employees to pay back monies in excess of the wage control order. The final step in the administrative procedure

consisted of an appeals process whereby the decision of the Administrator could be taken to the Anti-Inflation Appeal Tribunal and then to the Federal Court of Appeal.(148)

Within 24 hours, the UAW announced its intention to defy the government's wage control policy, making it the first union to do so.(149) Over several months, the UAW engaged in a three-prong strategy to respond to controls. The first was a collective bargaining strategy which was pieced together over the first 6 months of the AIB's existence. The UAW intended to "bargain as usual" under the terms of existing regulations which structured collective bargaining relations with corporations. In so doing, it intended to gain contracts without initial consideration of AIB guidelines. The UAW then proposed to use the lengthy bureaucratic procedure involved in administering controls to allow workers to retain the excess monies until such time as it became virtually impossible to recoup these monies, either due to political considerations or threatened deterioration in union-management relations. The strategy's success relied on corporate commitment to the existing structures of collective bargaining.

The second and third elements of the union's strategy were closely intertwined and dealt more directly with the articulation of the union's relationship with the government. The first of these strategies relied upon the mobilization of the UAW membership into demonstrations to oppose government policy, the culmination of which was the October 14, 1976 "Day of Protest". The second consisted of an attempt to reformulate organized

labour's relationship with the government along corporatist lines. These last two strategies were spearheaded and coordinated by the CLC, and although the UAW participated, its commitment to both strategies varied according to internal union debates and struggles.

The UAW leadership instructed all its locals to insist on negotiating contracts without consideration of AIB guidelines and to strike if necessary. Furthermore, no local was to sign a contract containing language stipulating that the settlement was subject to AIB approval. Instead, locals were to demand full implementation of the agreed settlement and place responsibility for overturning the agreement on the AIB itself. Once again workers were encouraged to strike to back up this demand. Finally, even if an agreement was rolled back by the AIB, the UAW refused to accept this decision until all levels of appeal had been exhausted, a process which could take up to two years.(150)

The rationale behind this strategy was twofold. The Canadian labour movement saw the structure of the government's control programme as an attempt to have corporations and unions act as an "arm of the state" by voluntarily agreeing to negotiate within the limits established by government.(151) By pursuing a strategy which forced the AIB to intervene to gain union acceptance of wage restraint, the UAW hoped to shift the responsibility for restraint back onto government and thereby deflect any membership discontent away from the union. Secondly, the UAW strategy was aimed at gaining company support for the union's demands to retain excess monies. The key to this lay in immediate implementation of the

full negotiated settlement. If the AIB later ruled against the UAW contract and demanded repayment, companies would be responsible for collecting money which was already in workers' pockets. According to the UAW, it was one thing to keep certain monies from workers; it was another - as the corporations knew - to take back what workers had already spent.(152) The UAW therefore backed up its demands for full implementation with strikes. The strike weapon was particularly important at the beginning of the wage control programme since it demonstrated the UAW's willingness to act on its threat. Thereafter, strikes over full implementation became less and less frequent as companies were unwilling to suffer such disruption of production.

One of the earliest cases in which this strategy was used was in a dispute with DeHavilland Aircraft in 1975. On August 23, prior to the imposition of wage controls, DeHavilland workers went on strike.(153) As the strike continued and the government introduced wage and price controls, DeHavilland reduced its offer from an original 20% increase to 12% and demanded that it be subject to AIB approval. The UAW rejected the settlement and continued the strike.(154) By December 8, the UAW had won the first step in the battle, receiving the full 20% from the company.(155) As was required by law, the contract was submitted to the AIB which stated that 15% was the maximum amount acceptable. The UAW responded that it would treat the AIB ruling as a suggestion and should a rollback be ordered, the union would go back on strike as there would no longer exist a valid

collective agreement.(156) In this case, the UAW won. Although it faced more severe tests of its strength in the future, this initial victory reinforced the union's commitment to its strategy and its ability to fight back.(157)

The second strategy of mass protests was the source of much greater internal union conflict. Public-sector unions were at the forefront of the Canadian labour movement in demanding radical action in response to the government's restraint programme. At the 1975 CUPE convention repeated calls were made for a general strike.(158) The CLC got behind these calls for militant action and became the prime mover behind this labour strategy of collective action. Within the UAW, such calls to worker action found support amongst left-wing autoworkers and created uneasiness amongst the leadership. At the January 1976 Council meeting, McDermott came out against a general strike. He doubted that the rank and file would support such measures and warned that the only purpose of a general strike was to bring down the government. If the unions did not have the power to do this, they should not get involved in such action at all.(159) McDermott's position was tempered by Joe Morris, president of the CLC, who was a guest speaker at the council meeting. Morris gave a rousing speech to the autoworkers, warning them that such militant action may be necessary to prevent the cooptation of trade unions into becoming an "instrument of the state", as had the corporations.(160)

The CLC had already planned a mass demonstration on Parliament Hill for March 22, 1976, a course of action which McDermott supported whole-heartedly. It is unclear why McDermott

supported the mass demonstration while rejecting a general strike. However there are some indications of his reasoning. The success of a general strike relied upon the ability of workers to shut down production which also meant that workers would have to forfeit a day's pay and face possible disciplinary action for engaging in an illegal work stoppage. McDermott, and the local leadership, doubted that the rank and file would be willing to make such sacrifices to resist the government's wage control programme. Based on these calculations, a mass demonstration might succeed where a general strike would not, as workers were not being asked to stay off work in order to participate. Another reason may be found in McDermott's overriding concern for maintaining the union's legitimacy in the eyes of the government and keeping open the channels of consultation, which despite wage controls, appeared at other levels to be improving.(161) A general strike might threaten the UAW's input into government policy and seemed a sure way of losing entrance to the corridors of power.

The UAW was enthusiastic in its participation in the March mass demonstration, however. It gave its own touch to the demonstration by arranging for a train to pick up autoworkers in the various communities en route to Ottawa, thereby parodying the 1930's "On to Ottawa Trek".(162) Rank-and-file autoworkers responded with far greater enthusiasm for the demonstration than the UAW leadership had anticipated. The train cars were filled to overflowing. When these proved inadequate, autoworkers piled into their cars to make the journey.(163) Between 3500 and 4000

autoworkers poured onto Parliament Hill to voice their opposition to wage controls.(164) Many plants, including the Oakville Ford and Ste. Therese and Windsor GM plants, were forced to shut down operations due to absenteeism of autoworkers destined for the demonstration.(165)

This proved to be a turning point for McDermott's position on the general strike. The success of the March 22 'Train Day of Protest' proved that the UAW leadership had underestimated the militancy of autoworkers and their willingness to sacrifice in mounting opposition to Liberal government policies. Furthermore, a meeting between union leaders and government officials during the demonstration failed to produce any compromises demanded by the unions. Any reservations felt by McDermott about the effectiveness of and the need for a general strike were overcome. The demonstration had given autoworkers a new sense of purpose and power. If harnessed into a general strike, this might strengthen organized labour's bargaining position with the government, rather than weaken it.(166)

At the Canadian UAW Collective Bargaining conference, held three weeks after the demonstration, McDermott reversed his position on the general strike. He argued that it might be an effective strategy after all. Following this, he mounted pressure on the CLC to submit a programme of action to the next CLC convention, including a mandate to organize and conduct a general work stoppage.(167)

Autoworkers were ready for a show of militancy at the upcoming CLC convention. The turn of events at the convention

proved unsettling and contradictory, however. The CLC Executive introduced a policy document entitled "Labour's Manifesto for Canada" which called for the establishment of tripartite structures in which organized labour would be a full partner. Furthermore, it recommended labour's participation "in national economic and social planning structures which would include the formulation of an incomes policy." (168) With this, it recommended strengthening the CLC in order that it could operate more effectively within these structures. (169)

This document generated heated debate at the convention. Rank-and-file delegates opposed the CLC's Manifesto on the basis of its lack of proposed tactics to fight wage controls and its collaborationist nature. Fearing defeat of the document, Morris intervened to alter the language by replacing "social corporatism" with "social democracy" and the "Labour Manifesto" was endorsed, although without unanimous support. Militants at the CLC convention were further assuaged by the Executive's introduction and the convention's adoption of a Programme for Action which gave the CLC "a mandate to organize and conduct a general work stoppage, or stoppages, if and when necessary." (170)

At the June UAW Canadian Council meeting, it became clear that the UAW Left caucus and the leadership were playing two different games with the same deck of cards. The decision to engage in a general strike was endorsed unanimously by the Council. The objectives sought by the leadership and the Left caucus through this action, however, differed. For the Left it was

a means of using labour power as a political weapon to force the government to back down from its wage control initiatives. This led many of the more militant council delegates to recommend in favour of a longer work stoppage than the proposed one-day strike. These delegates feared that such a brief display of power would be ineffective in achieving the desired results. McDermott, on the other hand, insisted that a one-day general strike was "not a paper tiger" but a true demonstration of labour's power.(171)

At the same time, McDermott supported the CLC social and economic manifesto with its proposal for labour's participation in tripartite structures. He argued that tripartism was a means of establishing an "acceptable partnership" which would "guarantee an on-going relationship [with government] no matter what the party in power." (172) For McDermott, tripartism and the general strike appeared integrally linked. The CLC leadership, especially Joe Morris, appeared intent upon using the period of wage controls to secure a more permanent and structured relationship with the state. Hence, the pursuit of tripartism. However, as labour had been weakened and isolated in these early years of the 1970's, the government may not see the necessity of pursuing a partnership with the Canadian Labour Congress. If successful, a show of strength such as the one-day work stoppage might back up the CLC's demands for greater participation in political decision-making.(173) Initially, McDermott supported this CLC strategy but carefully downplayed his commitment to tripartism, given the opposition it evoked.(174)

Behind the scenes, however, top labour and government

officials met to discuss the CLC's Manifesto. The CLC agreed to enter into tripartite structures if the government dropped the wage control programme. After a series of meetings it became clear that the government was unwilling either to drop wage controls or to implement the CLC's proposed tripartite decision-making structures.(175) In reporting on these events, McDermott moved away from his earlier position of support for tripartism and accused Prime Minister Trudeau of attempting to use these meetings and the CLC's Manifesto to steer organized labour away from the NDP.(176)

When these negotiations with government failed, plans began for the work stoppage.(177) For the UAW, the first step in this mobilization was to inform workers why such a day of protest was necessary. The union held membership meetings with all locals, distributing UAW-made leaflets which explained the need for such a work stoppage. Where weak spots were identified, further meetings were held to press the importance of full participation in the work stoppage. Secondly, the UAW approached management to ask for its support in the union's action. Companies were asked to close their plants or guarantee that no disciplinary action be taken against participating workers.(178) The logic behind the work stoppage and the approaches to management was best explained by Larry Sheffe, UAW International Staff representative, in his reports to the Canadian Director. To the membership, Sheffe argued that the general strike was the only means for the UAW to air its opposition to the government wage control programme as "Labour's

only weapon to protest against unjust and morally illegal laws is to withhold their labour." (179) This action was seen purely as a political protest, however, and, as Sheffe argued to the management of Douglas Aircraft, De Havilland and Spar, the general strike was not a strike against companies. (180) The union did not want such a political protest to ruin the stabilized relations which had been established between the UAW and managements.

The UAW's mobilization campaign continued up until October 13, the day before the scheduled general strike. On October 14, over one million Canadian workers went out on strike. The UAW succeeded in closing a large majority of its plants as thousands of autoworkers rallied to the call of protest. (181) The Day of Protest had no perceivable effect on government policy. For the UAW, however, it was a success. The mobilization of large numbers of autoworkers behind the general strike strengthened the commitment and belief in the union's capacity to fight controls successfully.

The UAW's growing success rate in gaining contracts in excess of AIB guidelines and in keeping this money was testament to this renewed militancy and determination. The first settlements caught by the controls programme showed uneven results, with the majority of them falling within AIB guidelines. By the end of the first year of controls, however, UAW gains were substantially better than those of most other unions in Canada, demonstrating the effectiveness of using bureaucratic delays to stall rollbacks and of harnessing company support for retaining settlements above the guidelines. In the second year of the programme the difference

between the UAW and other Canadian unions became greater. Most of the labour movement accomodated its demands to the guidelines which the UAW continued to defy.(182)

In 1976, the Big Three negotiations produced settlements which vastly improved workers' fringe benefits, including additional paid time-off.(183) Most importantly, the negotiations produced a solidarity pact between American and Canadian Autoworkers which stipulated that no agreement would be signed on either side of the border if wage parity was not maintained or if companies refused to implement fully settlements which went beyond AIB guidelines.(184)

The Big Three settlements strengthened the position of workers in the parts, agricultural implement and aerospace industries which all received settlements patterned on ones in the auto industry. In the case of Massey Fergusson this meant that workers received twice the amount allowed under government guidelines.(185) Finally, where the UAW did anticipate rollbacks, it worked out behind-the-scenes arrangements with the companies. In a few cases, companies took away workers' rest periods in lieu of money already paid to workers but then did not enforce this change to work rules. More often, the company placed the rollback into a new pension plan which was exempt from controls. In other cases, companies agreed to delay the pay-back until the end of the controls period, after which the company gave workers a wage-bonus reopener equal to the amount specified for rollback.(186)

Finally, in 1977 the UAW won its first gains in paid

education leave. This programme consisted of a company commitment in the collective agreement to pay for a certain number of days of education leave for each worker. This was the first programme of its kind in North America and constituted a major victory for the UAW, which throughout the 1970's had placed greater emphasis on education in order to build the bonds of solidarity and ideological commitment to the union movement. As Gord Wilson argued, paid education leave would help the union "develop some class consciousness about what our role is in society as workers." (187) Within a year, 45 Canadian UAW contracts contained provisions for paid education leave. (188)

The UAW's strategy was unique amongst all other Canadian unions and it worked, both in preventing wage restraint and in maintaining membership support for the union. (189) There were three major reasons for this success. The first lay in the relative prosperity of the Canadian auto industry. Immediately following the 1973 jump in oil prices, consumer demand shifted away from the large North American vehicles towards cheaper, more fuel efficient foreign cars. (190) The Canadian auto industry suffered less, however, than its American counterpart. By the 1970's, the Canadian auto industry was more profitable owing to higher prices charged for vehicles, coupled with stronger Canadian demand and dramatic productivity increases which led Canadian productivity to equal if not surpass that achieved in the U.S.. Moreover, Canadian plants were producing vehicles for which demand was sustained throughout the 1970's. The Canadian auto industry therefore experienced relatively "good times" between 1975 and

1978. Auto and parts corporations were willing to pay workers for industrial peace, rather than face escalating strikes and long interruptions of production.(191)

The second and related reason lay in corporate antipathy to the wage and price controls and companies' overriding concern for protecting the foundations upon which labour peace had been established - i.e. the Fordist mode of regulation. The 1970's economic downturn was understood as a cyclical recession from which the economy was expected to rebound. Given this anticipated return to prosperity and Canadian Autoworkers' militant opposition to wage controls, the costs of supporting this policy, including a possible end to labour-management peace, seemed to outweigh the short-term advantages of lower labour costs. Corporations therefore willingly worked out means for circumventing wage controls, the end result of which was to preserve institutionalized collective bargaining and hence the Fordist mode of regulation.(192)

The internal structure of the Canadian UAW and its memberships' militancy were also crucial in determining the success of the union's strategy. In particular, centralized control over collective bargaining and education within the union were crucial for the success of the anti-controls strategy. In contrast to many other unions, the UAW national office was involved in all local negotiations. This allowed it to monitor local responses to the controls and prevent them from undermining the UAW's national strategy.(193) At the same time, the greater

national control won by Canadian autoworkers in the early 1970's reduced the power of the International to prevent an all-Canadian strategy from emerging.

The importance of this greater autonomy was illustrated when in 1977, Mussels workers in Montreal went on strike to protest the company's rollback of their settlement according to AIB guidelines. Canadian Autoworkers faced injunctions and, most importantly, the International's refusal to pay strike benefits as the Mussels strike was considered illegal. Although McDermott accepted the IEB decision, he set up an Emergency Fund and made appeals for contributions from other autoworkers. Although isolated calls for Canadian control over the strike fund surfaced during Council debates, the Canadian UAW leadership's position of standing firm behind the Mussels workers guaranteed that this did not blow up into another internal union crisis.(194) Rather it confirmed the consensus which McDermott had succeeded in building and the union's determination to fight controls at any cost. Finally, the willingness of Canadian autoworkers to back up their demands with strikes forced corporations to realize the costs of enforcing wage controls.

While McDermott's commitment to mobilization strategies grew stronger, his commitment to tripartite arrangements with the federal government faltered. A series of meetings between government, business and organized labour where demands for removal of controls surfaced failed to change the government's position. This prompted McDermott to condemn publicly tripartism and recommend further mobilization against the federal

government.(195) Subsequent attempts by Trudeau to woo labour into tripartite consultations were dismissed by McDermott as a strategy for getting labour to "rubber stamp" the restraint policies of government.(196)

Part of the reason for McDermott's about face on the question of tripartism was probably rooted in his desire to become president of the CLC and his resulting uneasiness about committing himself to a strategy which rank-and-file unionists continued to oppose.(197) The federal government had also proved itself uncompromising over the terms of any tripartite arrangement, however. The UAW's militant opposition to wage controls made acceptance of any such arrangement impossible unless controls were rescinded.

Overall, the federal government failed in its attempts to tackle Canada's economic problems through a restructuring of relations with organized labour. Instead mandatory wage controls dominated the political agenda of the UAW and other unions and strained UAW relations with the incumbent Liberal federal government. This did not, however, signal the complete breakdown of the postwar settlement. Although the recession indicated that the Fordist regime of accumulation had reached its limits, the core of Fordist regulation - institutionalized collective bargaining - remained intact.

ii) Reconstructing Relations with the Provincial Government: Hints of Tripartism

Whereas the federal government and the Canadian labour movement failed to restructure relations along tripartite lines, the Ontario government succeeded. This government seized on labour's interest in tripartism to construct a close relationship with unions operating in Ontario. Consequently, the UAW's relationship with the Ontario government, which had hitherto been sporadic and of lesser importance to the union, became at once more highly structured and more crucial in the union's quest for political change.

The Ontario government's corporatist initiatives in the 1970's were integral to this government's perceived solution to the economic decline of the decade. In contrast to the federal government's concentration on the problem of inflation, the Ontario government focused its energies on the question of productivity. Unprecedented numbers of strikes in the early 1970's combined with increased union attention to issues of production standards threatened the productivity of Ontario industry and the labour-management peace upon which this depended.

The Ontario government's solution to this problem lay in reformulating the postwar compromise on two dimensions. The first was to restructure labour-management-government relations along tripartite lines. The second lay in addressing some of workers' shop floor concerns with the objective of formulating a new human relations strategy for motivating workers.(198) Specifically, this meant addressing health and safety and broad "quality of working

life" issues. The Ontario government's linkage of solutions to productivity with this two-dimensional reformulation of the postwar settlement was clearly summarized by Ontario Premier Davis as follows:

...productivity is a key factor in relation to objectives we all share, including improved standards of living, security of employment and quality of working life. It is my belief that joint action by labour, business and government in this area could reap many benefits.(199)

The first steps by the provincial government towards improving labour-government relations were taken prior to the introduction of wage and price controls and heightened debate over tripartism. In response to growing labour criticism of the Ontario Labour Relations Board, the Conservative provincial government appointed Tim Armstrong to this board and not long after made him deputy minister of labour. Tim Armstrong was a liberal social democrat who had acted as the UAW's legal counsel for years. His appointment met with strong approval from the UAW.(200) Armstrong would play a crucial role in orchestrating compromises between the provincial government and the UAW and therefore in constructing the basis for closer relations between this union and the government. Not long after this, and coincident with the UAW's commitment to tackling issues of health and safety and production standards, the Ontario government appointed the Ham Commission to investigate health and safety measures in the province.(201)

It was only after the federal government's introduction of wage and price controls and internal union debates over tripartism, however, that the Ontario government pushed for corporatist restructuring of labour-management-government

relations. Although the Ontario government opted into the federal government's anti-inflation programme, the provincial government was shielded from responsibility for wage controls and hence growing conflict with the labour movement due to the introduction of this legislation under the Peace, Order and Good Government Clause of the BNA Act and the federal government's exclusive role in enforcing the controls programme.(202) These factors combined with the labour movement's expressed interest in tripartite decision-making made it an appropriate time for the Ontario government to establish a series of forums for labour, management and government consultation on issues related to productivity.

The first of these was established late in 1975. Under the auspices of the Ministry of Health, a bipartite advisory committee on health and safety, consisting of business and labour, was established to which the UAW appointed one of the five labour representatives.(203) More important than this development, however, was Premier Davis's call for a meeting between key labour, business and provincial government representatives "to discuss the subject of productivity improvement", including in its purview the issue of quality of working life. McDermott attended as the UAW's representative.(204)

This informal dinner meeting served as the basis for the establishment of a more permanent top-level tripartite body. Early in 1977 the Ontario government established a Centre for Quality of Working Life with a mandate to coordinate QWL programmes in plants and disseminate information. More significant than the actual

programmes was the creation of a tripartite Committee on the Quality of Working Life, later renamed the Labour-Management Committee. This body, consisting of top business, union and government representatives (including the Canadian Director of the UAW), met regularly over dinner to discuss broad economic issues of concern to the Ontario economy.(205) Although no formal decision-making was undertaken by this committee, it served as an important forum of communication and for the Ontario government was used to sound out reactions to politically controversial issues.(206)

Further evidence of the Ontario government's commitment to improved labour-government relations came with the passage of Bill 139 in January 1977. Bill 139 was an interim piece of legislation on Health and Safety, introduced to deal with such matters until deliberation was complete on an omnibus bill which would draw all health and safety legislation together. For the unions, some of the most important provisions of this bill included the right of individual workers to refuse work considered dangerous, the empowerment of the Ministry of Labour to order the establishment of joint health and safety committees in a workplace, the appointment of workers' representatives to investigate accidents, and the provision for fines of employers who contravened certain sections of the act.(207) Although the UAW had been pressing for the right to strike over production issues, the provision for individual workers to refuse unsafe work was considered a step in the right direction. The UAW therefore supported the bill.(208) These two steps taken by the Ontario government provided

structures of communication between management and labour beyond those institutionalized with collective bargaining and improved UAW-government relations.

The success of the Ontario government initiatives in drawing the UAW into closer consultation with both government and management was dependent, however, upon continued evidence of 'good faith' by employers and the government. The Fleck strike which began in March 1978 threatened to undo the progress made by the Ontario government. In March 1978 a group of seventy-five women who worked at Fleck Manufacturing went on strike to gain their first contract as a local of the UAW. The key issue of the dispute was the union's demand for the automatic check-off of dues. From the day that the decision to go on strike was taken, the police played an unprecedented role in the strike. They initially attempted to intimidate the strikers and later used violence on the picket lines. On some days, as many as 520 policemen faced the pickets. The fact that Deputy Minister of Labour, J.D.Fleck was half-owner of the corporation and that Liberal MPP, Jack Riddell, acted on behalf of Fleck management to talk to picketers made the strike a political scandal and raised questions about the misuse of political power in gaining police support.(209)

The UAW fought this strike on two fronts. It mobilized Canadian Autoworkers behind the strike and bussed in support picketers from surrounding UAW locals. In one instance, the Canadian UAW leadership called out workers from the nearby Ford

Talbottville plant (who were both physically big and militant workers) to walk the picket lines and 'discourage' police violence.(210) In addition, the union solicited funds from other locals while also providing the workers with sizeable strike benefits. In these endeavours, the UAW was aided by the support received from other unions, various women's groups and the NDP whose members also came out to the picket line to demonstrate their support for the Fleck women.(211)

The UAW, now under the directorship of Robert White, also used the newly created tripartite forums of communication established by the Ontario government and the government's desire for closer consultation with the UAW to force the issue of the Fleck strike and the Rand formula onto the political agenda. White introduced the issue of the strike to the Labour-Management Committee where he made it clear that if the Ontario government wanted cooperation from the UAW, it would have to act to settle the strike and consider legislation on the Rand formula.(212) White kept up this pressure, adding to it the threat of more widespread job action if a settlement was not forthcoming.(213) Finally, in August, 1978 the strike was settled. The Fleck workers won the automatic check-off of dues.

The UAW reaped more benefits from this strike than merely a contract settled in favour of one of its locals. In mobilizing such support for this group of workers, the UAW proved itself able and willing to protect the interests of women in the UAW. Moreover, following the strike, White followed up on his pressure for legislation on the Rand formula with a letter to Premier Davis

in which he warned the Premier that he could not expect continued UAW cooperation on economic policy, QWL or manpower training committees if the provincial government was unwilling to protect unions through legislation on the Rand formula.(214) Soon after, the provincial government took the first step towards such legislation.

During the Fleck strike, deliberations had continued on Bill 70, the omnibus bill intended to replace Bill 139. Management was opposed to Bill 139 and organized to prevent inclusion of many of its provisions in the new bill. Initially, it appeared that business was going to win out as the proposed Bill 70 would exclude two-thirds of workers in Ontario, would water down the rights of workers to refuse unsafe work and made establishment of health and safety committees discretionary, rather than mandatory.(215) Whether coincidental or not, following the Fleck strike and White's threatened withdrawal from cooperation with the Ontario government, Bill 70 was changed to include many of organized labour's demands and was passed in December, 1978.(216) The UAW claimed this a victory for the labour movement.

The declining productivity of the Ontario economy and increased labour-management conflict were testament to the exhaustion of the Fordist mode of accumulation. Yet, like the federal government, the Ontario government did not respond to these economic difficulties by abandoning the postwar structures and relations of labour-management compromise. Instead the Ontario government sought to reformulate Fordist relations and

institutions through tripartite initiatives. In contrast to the federal experience, however, the Ontario government succeeded in its endeavours by drawing union leaders and heads of business into an informal network of tripartite consultation.

This reformulation of the postwar settlement gave the UAW increased leverage with and access to senior Ontario government officials. The UAW used the Ontario government's desire for an improved labour-management-government environment to win victories on a series of issues. In exchange, however, it had agreed to cooperate on issues dealing with quality of working life and productivity. The possible effects of this cooperation on the UAW's strategic capacity were demobilization and entrenchment of bureaucratic politics. As will be seen in the next chapter, however, these developments were stopped short as the auto industry entered into serious crisis in 1980 and the UAW remobilized to protect itself in the face of attacks on existing structures of Fordist regulation. Ironically, this economic crisis would provide the basis for the UAW to have much greater leverage with the Ontario government and to use the existing structures of consultation to its own benefit.

The Turning Point: UAW and the NDP

1) Unions or the Waffle: The UAW and the NDP, 1969-73

During the 1970's, the UAW's relationship with the NDP went through a dramatic reappraisal, with the UAW securing a more prominent position within the party. The Autoworkers' move towards forging stronger links with the NDP had been initiated by

McDermott, an ardent social democrat who in 1968 demanded better communication between trade unions and the party and increased labour representation in party policy and decision-making structures. The momentum for this continued throughout the 1970's, marking a shift in the UAW's political strategy towards greater emphasis on partisan politics.

The catalyst for the strengthening of ties between the UAW and the NDP, however, was the struggle between international unions and the Waffle over party strategy and direction. It was ironic that at the same 1969 federal NDP convention where the Waffle first surfaced and began mobilizing behind a platform to reduce labour's control over the party, organized labour was complaining of its lack of influence in the party and pushing for greater representation therein. The results of this convention were testament to these apparently contradictory forces. Many Waffle resolutions were passed, as was a motion to expand the federal Council to include twelve representatives of large affiliated unions.(217)

Although Dennis McDermott was the keynote speaker for the NDP establishment against the Waffle Manifesto at the 1969 federal NDP convention, the lines of battle between the Waffle and the UAW had not yet been drawn. In his Council report on the NDP convention, McDermott praised the Waffle manifesto for having rejuvenated a convention which, according to McDermott, would otherwise have been dull. Furthermore, consistent with his experience of a left-wing opposition within the UAW and its accepted role in maintaining dialogue within the union, McDermott praised the

Waffle and found:

Neil Watkins to be a decent and very concerned individual ... The Watkin's group, if it can rid itself of some of the negative anti's, may well emerge as the intelligent left of the NDP.(218)

In the meantime, the UAW turned its attentions to the impending Ontario NDP leadership fight. Once incumbent Donald MacDonald stepped down from the leadership race, McDermott found the basis for mobilizing the UAW behind a single candidate, Stephen Lewis.(219) The Canadian Director employed union resources to ensure a united UAW voice at the Ontario convention, a strategy which radically departed from earlier traditions of leaving union locals to make their own decisions, independent of influence from the central union office.(220) This strategy of concerted action had a decisive impact on the leadership race.

The Ontario convention took place in October, 1970. The UAW turned out in full force, sponsoring 265 out of a total 830 union delegates. Organized labour represented approximately 45% of all voting convention delegates, up from 20% in 1968.(221) McDermott openly declared his position in the leadership race which was now between Stephen Lewis and Walter Pitman. Steelworkers' leaders William Mahoney and Larry Sefton, however, stayed neutral. In fear of losing the election, Lewis approached McDermott for help. The Canadian UAW Director agreed and organized autoworkers to 'borrow' the credentials of various steelworkers to ensure a victory for Lewis.(222) Lewis won with an overwhelming majority, proving to McDermott and other autoworkers the importance of a united front by the UAW and the ability of the union to have far

reaching influence within the NDP.(223)

This was not the end to the struggles at the convention, however. The Waffle, while deciding not to run a leadership candidate against Lewis and Pitman, had succeeded in winning 4 of the 15 members-at-large on the NDP executive. Furthermore, it was victorious in having a series of Waffle-inspired policies passed by the delegates. The momentum behind the Waffle struck fear into the hearts of the party establishment over the impending debate on the Waffle Manifesto. A standing vote held on the Saturday of the convention had left the outcome of the Waffle Manifesto uncertain. A ballot vote was therefore scheduled for Sunday. Various delegates and at least one MPP approached McDermott to help prevent the Waffle from winning this vote. He agreed and instructed the UAW staff to mobilize UAW delegates to vote against the manifesto. On Sunday, the manifesto was narrowly defeated, leading Robert Hackett to conclude that it was the UAW's block voting that had ensured its defeat.(224)

For the UAW this convention proved that the union could have tremendous influence in the party and opened the possibility for a new strategy of united action in NDP affairs. It also indebted Lewis to the UAW. By relying upon McDermott to mobilize UAW and other union support behind his leadership candidacy, Lewis had placed himself squarely in the camp of the international unions. This coincided with the building of animosity between the UAW and the Waffle and the growing nationalist opposition within the UAW itself. The Waffle's manifesto had clearly attacked international

unions for their conservatism and joined in the nationalist chorus which internally wracked the UAW. Hence, McDermott changed his tune about the Waffle and became virulently opposed to this group.(225)

Before the conflict between the UAW and the Waffle reached a head in 1972, however, there were a series of other skirmishes between these two groups. The federal NDP convention, held in April 1971, followed on the heels of the Ontario one and was also a leadership race. The UAW once again turned out in full force. Although autoworkers were divided on the leadership issue, their union played a crucial role in mobilizing opposition to the Waffle.(226) For the first time, the CLC took measures to ensure that labour's influence was felt by establishing a steering committee of 25 labour leaders responsible for coordinating labour's policy approach at the convention. The defeats of the Waffle's policy proposals were proof of the effectiveness of this strategy.(227)

With this success as evidence of labour's potential within the party and driven by its renewed commitment to the NDP, the UAW immediately began preparations for the upcoming Ontario election. Consistent with the "Action Program" adopted in 1970 by an ad hoc CLC committee organized to improve labour's showing within the NDP, the UAW held political organizing seminars for its regional staff and local unions in preparation for the provincial election.(228) Once the election was called, McDermott assigned 15 full-time UAW staff and twenty local union people in priority ridings to work on the election, arguing that the time was ripe

for the election of an NDP government. These staff contributions were in addition to the monies donated by the International union and UAW locals to the NDP election coffers.(229)

The results of the election were disappointing. The NDP suffered a net loss of one seat.(230) The UAW had contributed a total of \$99,972 to this campaign and joined with the NDP establishment in blaming the Waffle for the NDP's failure.(231) The Waffle was not to be halted, however. It turned its energies towards work in trade unions, publishing a pamphlet entitled a "Socialist Program for Canadian Trade Unionists" which attacked union leaders as conservative and a buffer for private capital.(232) In this light, the Waffle organized the January 1972 Autopact conference held in Windsor. This was the last straw for McDermott and the Autoworkers who, as previously discussed, reacted swiftly and harshly in condemning the Waffle for its attempted interference in internal union affairs.

Stephen Lewis was no less swift in his attempt to prevent any loss of support from the autoworkers who had delivered him votes at the Ontario NDP convention and money in the last election. Accepting an invitation to speak at the January Canadian UAW council meeting, Lewis praised the UAW for its help in the election and announced the establishment of a new party position for a trade-union liaison person who would be responsible for ongoing dialogue with the unions to ensure their voice was heard within the party.(233) Then, in March, Lewis set the wheels in motion for ridding the NDP of the Waffle by establishing a three

person committee to investigate the status of the Waffle. The committee's report, supported by the trade unions, recommended the dissolution of the Waffle and the establishment of closer ties to the trade unions.(234) Despite subsequent attempts by Lewis and others to maintain a middle ground in this fight, the party had been severely divided. The party leadership was forced to decide whether to give way to the Waffle and lose trade-union support or go along with the unions. On June 24, 1972 at the Ontario NDP provincial Council meeting in Orillia, the final show down occurred. The Waffle was disbanded.(235) The unions had won.

This victory for the unions confirmed the UAW's commitment to the party and its continued influence within the NDP. The fears which as late as 1968 had led the UAW to threaten withdrawal from the party were temporarily laid to rest. Autoworkers went on to make heavy financial contributions to the B.C. provincial election and the 1972 federal election.(236) In response to Stephen Lewis's appeal to the UAW to increase its involvement in the NDP between elections, McDermott began speaking at NDP conferences and constituency meetings while also urging autoworkers to send large numbers of delegates to the 1973 federal convention, despite its not being a leadership convention.(237) Then in 1974, the UAW sent money and organizers to the Nova Scotia election and contributed in excess of \$150,000 to the 1974 NDP federal election campaign.(238)

The UAW was now in a position of power within the party and was willing to contribute more than ever before, including making overtures to party members disenchanted by the unions. All these

activities, however, were undertaken with the understanding that the UAW and other unions were now 'first amongst equals' in the party. This sentiment was no more clearly revealed than by McDermott when he described his increased involvement in the NDP as follows:

... it was a conscious effort to try to restore some improvement in our relations with the rest of the Party but at the same time demonstrating that we do not intend to become second class citizens within that Party.(239)

The internal party conflict with the Waffle had laid the conditions for the UAW's success in gaining greater influence inside the party. The coincidental timing of the emergence of the Waffle with the push by autoworkers for greater representation inside the party became a strategic advantage for the UAW and other unions. NDP leaders found themselves forced to make a choice between maintaining trade-union support or adopting a more radical nationalist position to allay the Waffle opposition. The unions' financial contributions to the NDP and the ever-hoped for votes to be found in the ranks of labour, necessitated that the party leadership side with the unions. If the unions did not have a great degree of influence over the party prior to this period, they certainly did now. In the remaining years of the 1970's the UAW flexed its new muscles.

11) The NDP and Wage Controls

Following in the wake of the labour movement's victory over the Waffle and the strengthening of its ties with the NDP, the UAW increased its energies in the arena of partisan politics. It contributed monies to the 1975 Saskatchewan election, despite the

virtual absence of the UAW from the Saskatchewan labour scene.(240) Autoworkers turned out in full force to the 1975 federal NDP convention, throwing their support behind long-time ally Ed Broadbent, whose election as head of the party reinforced the UAW's support for the NDP.(241) Furthermore, at this same convention Cliff Pilkey was elected to the Federal Council along with other trade unionists. This confirmed the party's commitment to better labour representation in top decision-making bodies.(242)

When the Ontario provincial election was called in 1975, the UAW contributed more money to the NDP's election campaign than any other individual union. It paid for 24 local union activists to work fulltime for the election and ran two UAW candidates.(243) The results of the election, which placed the ONDP as the official opposition in Ontario, were taken as proof of the success of the UAW's partisan strategy and of the importance of trade-union support for the successful future of the New Democrats. Ed Broadbent's personal appearance at the next Council meeting to thank autoworkers for their support was icing on the cake.(244)

At the very moment that optimism was building amongst the autoworkers about the future of the NDP and steps were being taken to improve further the communication between trade unions and the party, the issue of wage controls and the CLC's Manifesto threatened to drive another wedge between the party and the unions. Following the announcement of the federal government's wage control programme, the CLC mounted pressure on the NDP

governments of Manitoba and Saskatchewan to condemn the programme. No such announcement was made, however, and the CLC unsuccessfully attempted to get meetings with the provincial premiers over this issue. To date these negotiations had gone on behind closed doors. With this rebuff, however, McDermott publicly denounced the NDP governments and threatened to withdraw his union's support from the NDP.(245)

Tensions between the CLC and NDP also surfaced over the CLC's Manifesto, with its proposals for the establishment of tripartism. At the 1976 CLC convention where the document was originally debated, NDPers opposed the proposal. Following this, a meeting was held between the NDP Federal Executive and the CLC Executive Committee to discuss the Manifesto and labour's response to wage controls. Even from the Manitoba representatives where wage controls had been implemented, the CLC met opposition to its proposal as the NDP argued that only under social democratic rule should labour enter into such tripartite arrangements.(246) Tommy Douglas made the position of the NDP eminently clear when he argued:

the minute you take one of those positions you get coopted and you get seduced, so you're better to stay in the role of confrontation and don't ever get yourself involved with the establishment. That's what happened to you on the Economic Council, that's what happened to you on the Canadian Labour Relations Council, and, by God, I'm proud of you, you don't go there and get seduced.(247)

McDermott responded to this speech with charges of hypocrisy, asking Douglas if he had not sat on parliamentary committees and if he had been coopted. McDermott then returned to his theme from the early 1970's. He warned the NDP that organized labour would

not continue in a role as second class citizens, adding to this the additional warning that the NDP had better to listen to the trade unions carefully if the party did not want to lose their support. In other words, the NDP must support the CLC's position on wage controls and tripartism.(248)

To ensure that the NDP listened, McDermott publicly announced in an interview with Wilfrid List, Globe and Mail labour reporter, that organized labour would now seek to gain better representation at the Executive level of the NDP. This would be achieved by appointing more powerful labour representatives, such as the President of the CLC, to trade-union positions within the party. These representatives had the power to commit or withdraw union support for the party and hence would be more effective in making labour's voice heard within the NDP.(249)

This power play by McDermott and other labour officials worked. On February 14, 1977 the CLC executive had a private meeting with Manitoba and Saskatchewan premiers, Schreyer and Blakeney, about their position on wage controls and got an agreement that both provinces would pull out of the programme. By April, Saskatchewan had honoured this agreement.(250) Secondly, the CLC Political Education Committee, headed by McDermott, and the NDP Executive came to an agreement to increase the dialogue between labour and the party by ensuring that the CLC executive attend all NDP executive meetings and vice versa. Finally, an agreement was reached to change the basis of labour representation on the party executive such that leaders of the most powerful

unions in Canada would occupy similarly powerful positions within the party.(251)

When the NDP lost its position as the official opposition in Ontario in the spring of 1977, McDermott once again blamed the lack of trade-union input for the loss. He accused the "eggheads" of the party of dominating the election strategy and softening Stephen Lewis's appeal to the electorate.(252) UAW Left caucus members such as Bill Rutherford, while supporting McDermott's position, provided a different analysis. They argued that the NDP had tried "... to win the middle class vote instead of concentrating on the workers where the vote is..".(253) McDermott received widespread support when he called on autoworkers to attend the upcoming Ontario NDP Convention so as to wrestle control of the party away from the academics.(254) While the UAW did not succeed in this endeavour at the Ontario NDP convention due to internal union divisions over the leadership race, it met with victory at the federal convention where the majority of policies adopted by the party coincided with those held by the UAW.(255)

Consistent with its determination to become a power block within the party, the UAW directed its political education programmes towards building greater membership support for the NDP. Following up on the June Council recommendation for improved political education with an emphasis on the NDP, the Citizenship and Legislative Committee began publishing a newsletter which was distributed to all UAW locals.(256) This push for improved political education of autoworkers received a major boost when the UAW won paid education leave (PEL) in collective bargaining. PEL

was an incentive for autoworkers to enlist in educational seminars as they no longer had to forfeit wages in exchange.

The conflicts between the party and organized labour in the 1970's ultimately drew the UAW closer to the NDP. The union saw itself as able to influence policies and direct the party. Added reasons for mobilizing behind the NDP were provided to autoworkers by their experience with the cynical manipulation of the electorate by the Liberal party over wage controls. This made autoworkers more determined than ever to have a labour party which would listen to the demands of unions. The responsiveness of the NDP to labour's demands made this appear a real possibility. Once McDermott became President of the CLC in 1978, he carried this commitment to the CLC and attempted to steer the central federation of labour even closer to the New Democrats. McDermott's position, and that of many autoworkers, was perhaps best summed up in the Director's speech to the UAW Council upon his return from a visit to Australia, when he stated:

Bob Hawke, President of the ACTU (Australian central labour federation) ... is also president of the Australian Labour Party, an arrangement we might well consider duplicating here. (257)

The possibility of changing the NDP into a labour party raised the potential for a fundamental transformation of the conditions of the postwar settlement. These hopes, which would have necessitated a re-evaluation by all unions of their role in the party, were based on the false expectation that the UAW would have time to build upon this alternate strategy. The 1980's dashed these hopes when the UAW needed immediate political change and

once again was forced to rely on its own resources, rather than the long-term prospects of the NDP.

The Quebec Question and the UAW

It was not only English Canadian nationalism which confronted the UAW with new internal political challenges. In the 1970's, Canadian Autoworkers found themselves face to face with the issue of Quebec nationalism. While the Quiet Revolution of the 1960's had produced UAW resolutions in support of reforms in Quebec, this transformation in Quebec society had little direct impact on autoworkers. By the early 1970's, however, the UAW had organized a sizeable number of plants in Quebec. It had therefore committed itself to the representation of Quebec workers' interests.

Some of the reasons for the UAW's greater organizational presence in Quebec lay in the establishment of new auto plants following the Autopact. GM located a plant in Ste. Therese in 1965 and within months the UAW won certification. This was an important plant for the UAW to organize as the union had hitherto maintained a virtual monopoly in representing Canadian autoworkers and feared that competition, either from other unions or from a non-union plant, might undermine the leverage gained by the UAW through such a bargaining monopoly.

The second reason for the UAW's organizing drives in Quebec lay in the most rudimentary principle of industrial unionism. Industrial unions rely upon the organization of large numbers of workers to exercise political and economic power. Quebec was fertile ground for additions to the UAW membership. In the early

1970's the UAW committed increased resources to the organization of Quebec plants and was rewarded with major successes. Between the summer of 1971 and 1972, the UAW organized 15 new plants with a total membership of 1207. The majority of the plants were in one of the three key industries traditionally organized by the UAW.(258)

The 1970's was, however, an explosive decade in the history of Quebec nationalism and worker militancy. Although the public sector unions constituted the centre of this militancy, witnessed in the 1972 Common Front bargaining and strikes, Quebec members of the UAW were also part of this wave of renewed militancy and nationalism. This was at least partly in response to corporate attempts to exploit francophones as a cheap source of labour and company practices of importing English-speaking management and insisting that English be the language spoken on the shop floor.(259)

The UAW, in an attempt to maintain its organizational presence in Quebec, had to respond to these problems. This was made complex by the UAW's status as an International Union with a Canadian membership which was largely anglophone. Should the UAW ignore the demands of its francophone membership it would likely find itself the object of nationalist opposition and possibly lose its membership to a Quebec union. At the same time, given the highly structured nature of collective bargaining found in master contracts and North American pattern settlements, the Canadian UAW leadership could not forestall a settlement which covered

thousands of workers throughout Canada in order to respond to the francophone membership. The latter problem was compounded by International control over strikes and negotiations. The International Executive Board had little understanding of the importance of the issues of French language and culture and therefore posed a possible obstacle to the reconciliation of francophone interests within the union.

Thus, the Canadian UAW had to maintain a delicate balance between responding to the francophone membership's demands and acting within the limits prescribed by the existing structure of institutionalized collective bargaining. The early 1970's were marked by a cautious incremental pattern of change and compromise on the issues of language and Quebec nationalism. As momentum grew amongst Quebec workers for a separatist political option, however, the UAW's position became more radical, ultimately leading to its declaration of support for the PQ and self determination for Quebec.

In 1969 McDermott took the first step towards assuring Quebec workers the right to internal union representation in French. The Director, along with the President of the Ste. Therese GM local, successfully pressured the International into providing union communications in both French and English and simultaneous translation at meetings where French delegates were present.(260) The provision of union services in French was rapidly expanded. By 1972 the Canadian Region Newsletter, strike fund reports, and communications from the regional and International union administration were all translated. Additionally, the UAW

gradually translated all union educational programmes into French so that the union could begin separate educational seminars in Quebec.(261)

Internal union representation of francophone workers' demands was only part of the problem which confronted the UAW in its Quebec locals. The GM Ste. Therese plant was a classic example of the unique problems facing the UAW in this province. Because GM refused to incorporate this plant into the existing GM master contract, workers' wages at Ste. Therese were set at a level far below the wages of Ontario workers doing similar work. Working conditions were also poor and workers were subjected to constant speedups. Finally, GM hired unilingual English foremen brought in from outside the Ste Therese area to work in the plant. This prevented francophone workers from dealing with day-to-day problems in their own language, forcing them instead either to communicate in English or go unheeded.(262)

These company practices threatened the UAW in two ways. Firstly, the exclusion of Quebec plants from the master contract and the resulting lower wages and poorer working conditions, undermined the leverage and power gained by the UAW through institutionalized collective bargaining. Quebec was becoming a cheap wage labour zone for the auto industry which companies could potentially use as a basis for undermining the bargaining position of the UAW in Ontario. Secondly, the wage and working condition disparities between French and English autoworkers combined with company practices of imposing the English language on the

Quebecois threatened the UAW's internal unity. Quebec workers blamed the union's poor representation for the lower wages as well as the lack of progress on language issues.

The International UAW immediately took up the issue of extending existing collective bargaining structures into Quebec. By 1970, these efforts paid off. After a lengthy strike, Ste. Therese workers received wage parity and were included in the GM master contract.(263)

The language issue persisted, however, at the Ste. Therese and other plants. While the International union had been willing to use its resources to gain wage parity and inclusion in the master contract, it understood less the importance of the language issue, falling as it did outside the gambit of traditional collective bargaining demands and Fordist regulation.(264) The Canadian Region understood the importance of this issue for continued legitimacy of the UAW in Quebec. It therefore continued to fight for language rights, adding this issue to the list of Canadian demands in the 1970 GM negotiations. Given the International's lack of commitment to securing language rights within the contract, however, it favoured acceptance of a settlement without French language provisions. McDermott was faced with a dilemma. He could hold up signing an agreement over the language issue and therefore put himself in open conflict with the International or he could sacrifice the Ste. Therese workers' demands with the possible consequence of losing this membership. The Canadian UAW was saved from making either decision. Firstly, Labour Minister Jean Curnoy promised legislation to settle this

dispute. Secondly, the UAW and General Motors worked out a compromise which gave Ste. Therese workers the right to arbitration and grievance hearings in French.(265) This was a partial solution and only temporarily deflected further criticism of the UAW by Quebec workers.

In the meantime, the UAW faced a more serious test of its position on Quebec with the imposition of the War Measures Act in October 1970. Like the CLC and the NDP, the UAW initially came out against the imposition of the War Measures Act on the basis of its restriction of civil liberties.(266) After heated debate over a resolution submitted to the Canadian Council which recommended the revocation of the War Measures Act and its replacement with new measures to be included under the Criminal Code, this resolution was referred back to make it more militant. The resulting new resolution made clear the UAW's opposition to the FLQ and its tactics but went further in its condemnation of the War Measures Act and its support for francophones victimized by this government action.(267)

The amended resolution stated that the widespread Canadian support for the War Measures Act "may be little more than a manifestation of mass prejudice against French Canada wherein the natural revulsion against the FLQ was transposed to the general populace of Quebec..."(268) Although the resolution reiterated the UAW's concern for civil liberties, it abandoned the earlier recommendation for changes to the Criminal Code and instead demanded the revocation of the War Measures Act and its

replacement with new legislation intended to deal specifically with the FLQ.(269) The UAW's position on the FLQ and the War Measures Act went further than that of the NDP or the CLC in attempting to come to grips with Quebecois analysis of these events. This was a crucial move for the UAW to make if it was to maintain its legitimacy amongst Quebec workers.

To date, the UAW had been engaged in a juggling act, balancing off the demands of francophone workers, the International and its largely anglophone Canadian membership. The union had yet to formulate a clear position on Quebec nationalism, opting instead for an incremental strategy of reaction to each new problem as it surfaced. A series of events transpired between 1970 and 1976 to alter this course of action and led the UAW into support for the PQ and Quebec self-determination.

Probably the most important factor which pushed McDermott to adopt a more radical position on Quebec was the continued discontent amongst Ste. Therese workers, the largest single UAW membership in Quebec. Bob Dean reported to McDermott that despite UAW support for Ste. Therese workers in their struggles to gain wage parity with Ontario workers and entrance into the master agreement, local 1163 remained in the hands of "a small number of highly vocal but viciously anti-International, anti-McDermott and anti-democratic people...". Other seemingly well established locals were similarly disenchanted with the union.(270)

The structural changes in the Canadian region's relationship with the International which had come about in the early 1970's had the effect of increasing the Canadian administration's

independence in dealing with issues of national concern which, in turn, opened up the space for the region to deal more directly with the Quebec issue. Following on the heels of these formal changes in International-Canadian relations came the United Aircraft strike. Emil Mazey's role in undermining the position of these striking workers both reinforced the Canadian autoworkers' commitment to greater independence within the International union structure and brought home the especial importance of this for preventing further alienation of Quebec autoworkers from the UAW. This strike, revolving as it had around the issue of union security and the Rand formula, also revealed to the UAW the serious inadequacies of Quebec labour legislation. Collective bargaining and a prolonged strike had done nothing to change the company or the government's position on these issues and the UAW had been forced to settle the strike without winning basic union security for its members.

For many Quebec workers, the only solution to this and many other problems facing francophone workers lay in partisan politics. When the Parti Quebecois was elected in 1976, with the vocal support of many Quebec autoworkers, including International Representative Bob Dean, conditions necessitated that the UAW articulate a position on the whole question of Quebec nationalism and the Parti Quebecois.(271)

The Canadian Council was once again the forum through which such a policy was hammered out. In his report to the January, 1977 Council meeting, McDermott voiced his support for the Parti

Quebecois's victory as an expression of the rights of the Quebecois to determine their own future. He then went on to praise the PQ as a "progressive" party and, in particular, commended Levesque for his withdrawal from the federal government's wage and price controls programme.(272)

It was not, however, until the April Council meeting that the real debate over Quebec occurred. In between the January and April Council meetings, McDermott and his staff discussed at length the dangers of openly debating the Quebec question. The majority of the staff favoured the adoption of a policy on Quebec without full Council debate. They feared that open discussion would seriously divide the union between anglophone and francophone workers and between those who saw Quebec's problems as regional concerns versus those who saw Quebec as a separate nation. McDermott, however, feared that lack of open discussion would allow internal union divisions to fester. He therefore decided to put forth a resolution on Quebec for full debate at the next Council meeting.(273)

The resolution which the leadership introduced to Council supported Quebec's right to determine its own future in confederation. The resolution was worded carefully in an attempt to appeal to all factions within the union. It avoided any mention of separatism while couching the union's support for the Quebecois in the well-worn phrases of support for democracy and equality and a commitment to solidarity amongst French and English workers.(274) The resolution sparked heated debate as Council delegates found themselves deeply divided over the question. Many

voiced their opposition to the resolution on the basis of Quebec's threat to confederation and its demand for a better deal than that given the other provinces. Others cautiously supported it, making clear their opposition to separatism but support for equal rights for francophones. The Left was also divided on the issue. Pat Clancy, local 707, supported the resolution for its recognition of the UAW's commitment "to our French brothers". Gordie Lambert, an old guard Communist from local 199, opposed it for its lack of recognition of Quebec as a separate nation and recommended that the resolution be referred back for inclusion of this principle. James Bridgewood, local 707 delegate, supported Lambert, seeing the move towards Quebec self-determination as the first step towards worker self-determination and a concerted battle with capital.(275)

In an unexpected move, McDermott took up the suggestion of the "two nations" principle and urged an amendment to the resolution to include the following phrase, "Canada was founded on the basis of full equality between its two founding nations". He went on to speak on this amendment and, using a radical language apparently borrowed from the Left, argued that the Quebecois had "suffered under the yoke of a modern colonialism, (and) have not been free to determine their own linguistic and cultural and economic future, as they were promised under Confederation."(276) McDermott summarized that it was for these reasons that the PQ had been elected.(277)

McDermott's strategy of introducing the "two nations"

principle can only be elicited from an analysis of Council debate. The UAW leadership needed the passage of this resolution to secure some legitimacy amongst its Quebec membership, many of whom had supported the P.Q. and its separatist option. The union leaders could not, however, rely on their old right-wing allies to vote in favour of this resolution. At the same time, Quebec representation at the District Council was too small to pass the resolution. McDermott's unprecedented support for the Communist position therefore appears to have been based on a calculation of the leadership's need for support from the Left. Council debate, however, indicated that the Left was also divided on what position to take on the Quebec question with some supporting the original resolution and others objecting to its lack of recognition of Quebec as a nation. Without the full support of the Left and other progressives in the union, the resolution was headed for defeat. By including the "two nations" principle it was unlikely that the resolution would lose the support of such Left caucus delegates as Clancy and Rutherford. This amendment, however, would ensure the support of delegates such as Lambert and Bridgewood. This strategy worked, for after further debate following McDermott's intervention, the amended resolution was passed.(278)

This was a crucial step for the Canadian UAW. By enshrining the principle of Quebec self-determination in official union policy, the resolution signalled the UAW's recognition of the "special status" of Quebec workers within Confederation and, more importantly, within the union itself.

Overall, the Canadian UAW was successful both in protecting its bargaining position through the extension of Fordist regulations into Quebec plants and in beginning the reconstruction of internal unity. The latter, however, had necessitated a redefinition of the union's collective identity. Quebecois autoworkers could not be drawn into the union on the basis of the old discourse and union culture. Rather, the culture and discourse had to be modified to allow for recognition of the separate status of Quebec autoworkers from their brothers and sisters in the rest of the union. Both the Council structure and the region's greater autonomy from the International union provided the organizational means for taking these steps. Moreover, the continued existence of a Left caucus provided the necessary support for this move. The recognition of Quebec workers' special status did not deeply divide the union but instead was the first step towards forging a new internal solidarity which would be cemented in the 1980's.

Conclusion

Although the high levels of inflation and declining productivity of the 1970's were indications that Fordism had reached its economic limits, this recession did not occasion a complete abandonment of Fordist regulation. Rather governments, corporations and the UAW interpreted the downturn as simply cyclical and sought solutions to the economic decline within the established parameters of the postwar settlement. Therefore, although structures of Fordist regulation were modified in this decade due to political struggles over the nature of solutions to

the recession. The basic forms and compromises remained intact, and were even extended at times.

Both the federal and Ontario governments sought solutions to the economic downturn by drawing organized labour and corporations into tripartite forums of decision-making and regulation. The federal government's initiative failed, owing to rank-and-file rejection of wage controls and trade-union leaders' failed attempt to respond simultaneously to increased membership militancy and force greater concessions from the federal government through mobilization of union members into mass demonstrations. For the UAW, its membership's successful mobilization against wage controls both strained relations with the incumbent Liberal federal government and opened new strategic alternatives for the union. These new alternatives included greater emphasis on mobilization strategies and partisan politics, in particular greater support for the NDP.

In contrast to the federal experience, the Ontario government's tripartite initiatives were more successful. Articulated around the issue of improved productivity and quality of working life, tripartite forms of consultation attracted the UAW leadership. Although these forums were not structured to provide the union with direct input into day-to-day political decision-making, the UAW used the Ontario government's desire for cooperation with organized labour to gain greater access to government officials and successfully exercise more leverage with the government for action on specific issues, such as health and

safety legislation and the Rand formula. Consequently, the economic recession resulted in more stabilized relations between the Ontario government and the UAW, which would become increasingly important in the UAW's struggles and alliance-building efforts in the 1980's.

In the sphere of collective bargaining which constituted the core of Fordist regulation in the auto industry, the Fordist compromise remained alive and well. Both the auto corporations and the UAW were intent upon preserving institutionalized collective bargaining in anticipation of the continued benefits to be reaped from this arrangement. Hence, some improvements were made to this arrangement with the establishment of wage parity between American and Canadian autoworkers and the extension of existing structures of regulation into Quebec. Additionally, the Canadian UAW, in response to growing membership militancy, won greater control over production standards, including voluntary overtime and, at Chrysler, the stated right to strike over speedups.

Significantly, it was the concerted defence of regulated collective bargaining by both the union and the corporations which provided the UAW with its successful strategy of defiance of wage controls. The willingness of Canadian autoworkers to strike in defence of negotiated settlements, combined with the relative prosperity of the auto industry in the late 1970's, provided the basis for wage increases far beyond the Anti-Inflation Board guidelines and the behind-the-scenes arrangements between the UAW and corporations which served to 'hide' certain wage increases from AIB inspection.

Finally, the UAW, disillusioned with the Liberal federal government and led by the ardent social democrat Dennis McDermott, used its financial and organizational contributions to the NDP to gain greater leverage and improved representation inside the party. The catalyst for success in these endeavours was provided by the emergence of the Waffle. In proposing a strategic redirection of the party behind a radical nationalist solution to Canada's economic problems, the Waffle ran a collision course with international unions. In response, the UAW made it clear that the party had to make a choice between continued international union support or the Waffle. The unions won out and this victory provided the UAW with more influence inside the party which it used to ensure NDP compliance with trade-union views on issues such as tripartism and wage controls. Thus, the 1970's marked a high point in UAW-NDP relations.

While the recession did not precipitate a breakdown in Fordist institutions, it did generate the conditions for redirection of UAW political strategy away from bureaucratic politics to mobilization politics based on higher levels of rank-and-file activism. Examples included locally-propelled lobbying efforts and mass demonstrations to protest federal government policy. The explanation for the UAW's embrace of such strategies and for its success lay in the changing internal dynamics of the union and the resulting strategic conflict over union responses to the recession.

The 1960's organizing drives by the UAW swelled its ranks and

brought into the union younger workers, a large contingent of Quebec workers and more women. The strains of incorporating these new workers into the dominant union discourse and practices were aggravated by the economic recession and continued corporate practices of forced overtime and speedups to which the UAW had failed to respond in the late 1960's. Although the Canadian union leadership attempted to respond to these demands in a piecemeal fashion within the confines of existing structures and practices, the deteriorating economy thwarted these efforts and instead provided the basis for the emergence of a new Left caucus.

This Left caucus mobilized the discontent in the union behind an alternative pan-Canadian strategy which was more radical and necessitated greater regional autonomy from the International union structure. In bringing together the various disparate groups in the UAW in opposition to the leadership's strategy, the Left caucus made more effective the challenge by autoworkers who were discontented with the leadership. UAW leaders were forced to respond to the opposition. They therefore successfully advanced the cause for greater structural autonomy within the International, entered the terrain of mobilization politics and usurped some of the more radical discourse of the Left. In doing so, the Canadian UAW reconstructed internal consensus and therefore became more effective in its struggles. Furthermore, these changes made the union strategically prepared for the challenge of Quebec nationalism.

The outcome of these struggles and internal realignments was a rearticulation and redefinition of the union's collective

identity. This rearticulation occurred on two dimensions. Firstly, Canadian autoworkers were reunited behind their union as a leader in progressive change and a defender of trade-union democracy and working-class struggles. At the same time, in response to the Quebec challenge, the UAW extended this collective identity to include the defence of Quebec workers' rights through commitments to two languages and two nations.

The internal transformation of the Canadian UAW made its struggles in the 1970's more effective but also set the conditions for its strategic entry into the crisis of the 1980's, when the UAW would be faced with fundamental challenges to its position in the workplace and politics. The winds of change had already begun to blow at the end of 1978. In this year, Dennis McDermott stepped down from the leadership of the UAW to take up the position of president of the CLC. Robert White was elected to take his place as Canadian Director of the UAW. White came from a different faction of the union than had McDermott. He came out of the UAW tradition of militant syndicalism and a hands-on approach. He had been the disciple of Tommy MacLean, Assistant Director of the UAW for much of the immediate postwar period and a man who had consistently put the union before any factional fights, partisan politics or allegiance to a particular leader.(279) White brought this tradition back into the UAW leadership.

Coincident with White's ascension to the leadership of the UAW came the first indications of troubles to come. Demands for concessions and escalating numbers of plant closures pointed to

more fundamental problems in the economy.(280) Then in July 1978, Doug Fraser, newly elected president of the UAW, resigned from the Labour-Management Group in the U.S., accusing management of beginning "to wage a class war" against unions.(281) And class war it was that confronted Canadian autoworkers in the 1980's.

Endnotes

1. Included at this meeting with the government was Herb Gray, MP Windsor West, Mark MacGuigen, MP Windsor-Walkerville, Eugene Whelan, MP Essex, and George Haythorne, Deputy Minister of Labour. TRO, Memo from Frank Guinlan, 27 Nov. 1968.
2. PAC, Press release from Department of Labour, 8 Jan. 1969; Report on the Canada-US Auto Trade Agreement, Joint Conference UAW-GM, US and Canada, 9 Apr. 1969.
3. PAC, UAW Brief on Canada-US Autopact, 20 Feb. 1969; Globe and Mail, 21 Feb. 1969; Dennis McDermott to all union local presidents, 5 Mar. 1969; PC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 26 & 27 Apr. 1969, pp.1-2.
4. PC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 18 & 19 Jan. 1969, pp.12-13; George Haythorne, "Prices and Incomes Policy: The Canadian Experience, 1969-1972", International Labour Review 108 (July-Dec. 1973): 491.
5. PAC, D.McDermott to J.L.Pepin, 19 Nov. 1969; J.L.Pepin to D. McDermott, 19 Nov. 1969. Both reprinted in Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 17, 18 & 19 Jan. 1970, p.9.
6. Globe and Mail, 11 Dec. 1969.
7. PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 17, 18 & 19 Jan. 1970, p.10.
8. Haythorne, "Prices and Incomes", p.492.
9. Ibid., p.493; PC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 13 & 14 Sept. 1969, pp.9-10.
10. PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 17, 18 & 19 Jan. 1970, pp.1-3.
11. For information on the Prices and Incomes Commission's guidelines see Haythorne, "Prices and Incomes", p.495; PAC, Regional Director's oral report to Canadian Council in Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 5, 6 & 7 June 1970.
12. PAC, Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 5, 6 & 7 June 1970, pp.53-55; Globe and Mail, 20, 22 June 1970.
13. Globe and Mail, 9 June 1970.
14. Toronto Star, 18 Feb. 1970; David Blake, "Multinational Corporation, International Union and International Collective

Bargaining: A Case Study of the Political, Social and Economic Implications of the 1967 UAW - Chrysler Agreement", paper prepared for delivery at the Symposium on International Collective Bargaining sponsored by the International Institute for Labour Studies. Geneva, Switzerland, Spring 1969, pp.15-21.

15. Globe and Mail, 15 July 1970.
16. Globe and Mail, 29 Sept. 1970.
17. There was much debate within the UAW over the reasons for the choice of GM as the strike target. Many Canadian Autoworkers felt that GM was chosen due to the need of Leonard Woodcock, newly elected president of the UAW following Walter Reuther's death and one-time executive member in charge of the union's GM department, to prove himself a capable leader. McDermott argued that GM had been targetted due to the impending sale of the Vega which GM thought would be a big seller in the small car market. PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 31 Oct. & 1 Nov. 1970, pp.7-12.
18. Globe and Mail, 15 Sept. 1970.
19. Globe and Mail, 13 Nov. 1970.
20. Globe and Mail, 14 Nov. 1970.
21. Globe and Mail, 26 Nov. 1970.
22. Globe and Mail, 1 Dec. 1970.
23. Globe and Mail, 17, 18 Dec. 1970.
24. PAC, "Major Settlement Terms, UAW-GM Canada Negotiations, 1970", p.20.
25. Ford workers went on a brief six day strike while Chrysler workers settled without a strike. Globe and Mail, 20, 26, 29 Jan. 1971; PAC, Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 30 & 31 Jan. 1971, pp.2-9.
26. Globe and Mail, 19 Apr. 1971.
27. Department of Labour, Canada, Collective Bargaining Review no.12 (Canada: Department of Labour, 1970), pp.96-99; *idem.*, no.1 (Canada: Department of Labour, 1971), pp.95-98; *idem.*, no.2 (Canada: Department of Labour, 1971), pp.32-35; *idem.*, no.5 (Canada: Department of Labour, 1971), pp.36-39.
28. Globe and Mail, 19 Jan. 1971.
29. Globe and Mail, 21, 25, 26 Jan. 1971.

30. For discussion of Massey Fergusson's initial reaction to wage parity see Blake, "International Collective Bargaining", p.22; Globe and Mail, 20 Feb. 1971.
31. Globe and Mail, 24 Feb. 1971.
32. Globe and Mail, 4 Mar. 1971.
33. Globe and Mail, 12 Feb. 1971; PAC, Report of UAW Plant Movement Committee submitted to Canadian Council in Minutes of Meeting of Canadian Council, 12 & 13 June 1971, insert after p.20.
34. The UAW held special seminars and educational sessions for the new, younger members of the union in order to draw them into the historical traditions of the UAW. PC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 26 & 27 Apr. 1969, pp.21-22.
35. PAC, "A Programme for Struggle and Progress for Canadian UAW Workers" prepared by Steering Committee, 15 Sept. 1971.
36. Interview with Robert White, Canadian UAW Regional Headquarters, Toronto, Ontario, 31 Dec. 1985.
37. PAC, Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 17, 18 & 19 Jan. 1970, pp.4-6.
38. PC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 26 & 27 Apr. 1969, pp.12-13; Globe and Mail, 8 May, 16, 17 June 1969.
39. PAC, Memo from Jack Taylor to D.McDermott, 9 May 1969.
40. Globe and Mail, 8 May, 16 June 1969; PAC, Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 14 & 15 June 1969, pp.9-11.
41. PAC, "Report of Activities Relating to Overtime Problems at the Big Three", 25 July 1969.
42. PAC, Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 17, 18 & 19 Jan. 1970, pp.4-6.
43. PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 31 Oct. & 1 Nov. 1970, pp.7-12.
44. Globe and Mail, 18 Dec. 1970.
45. By December 1970 the UAW strike fund was \$79.5 million in debt. Globe and Mail, 12 Dec. 1970; PAC, Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 30 & 31 Jan. 1971, pp.2-9.
46. This steering committee consisted of Gordie Lambert, Vice

Pres. local 199, Al Campbell, Pres. local 27, Reg Screen, Pres. local 28, Bill Rutherford, Vice Pres. local 222, Pat Clancy, Pres. local 707 and Lyle Dotzert, Committeeman local 200. PAC, Steering Committee to Delegates, 15 Sept. 1971.

47. PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 25 & 26 Sept. 1971, pp.5-6.
48. PAC, "A Program for Struggle and Progress for Canadian UAW Workers" prepared by Steering Committee, 15 Sept. 1971.
49. PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 25 & 26 Sept. 1971, p.13.
50. Globe and Mail, 24 Sept. 1971.
51. PAC, Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 25 & 26 Sept. 1971, pp.6-7.
52. By summer of 1971 the UAW remained seriously in debt. It owed \$3 million to the United Rubber Workers, approximately \$20 million to the Teamsters and \$8 million to Canadian banks. Moreover, to get money for the 1970 GM strike, the UAW had sold its building and properties to the Teamsters for \$25 million and needed to start buying these back. Globe and Mail, 23 July 1971.
53. Globe and Mail, 20 Sept. 1971.
54. Globe and Mail, 31 Jan. 1972.
55. Globe and Mail, 17 Dec. 1971, 20 Jan., 19 Aug., 16, 18 Sept. 1972; Toronto Star, 7 Jan. 1972.
56. Another example can be found in the 1972 Acme Screw and Gear negotiations. Globe and Mail, 24 Aug., 15 Sept., 14, 15 Dec. 1972.
57. PAC, Telegrams from D.McDermott to J.L.Pepin, 30 Sept., 6 Oct. 1971, 12 Jan. 1972; Telegram from D.McDermott to M. Sharpe, 1 Dec. 1971; Telegram from D.McDermott to P.M.Trudeau, 1 Dec. 1971.
58. PAC, Telex from J.L. Pepin's Executive Assistant to D. McDermott, 7:04 p.m. 6 Oct. 1971. This telex was to confirm a telephone call arranging a meeting for 20 Oct. at 2:00 p.m..
59. PAC, Bev McCloskey to D. McDermott, 19 Oct. 1971.
60. PAC, D.McDermott to Abe Taylor, 1 Nov. 1971.
61. PAC, D. McDermott to Jim Connell, 20 Oct. 1971; J. Connell to

- D.McDermott, 27 Oct. 1971; Gordon Lambert to Allen Schroeder, 19 Apr. 1972.
62. PAC, J.Connell and K.R. Brisbois to Pres. Leonard Woodcock, 19 Nov. 1971.
 63. PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 15 & 16 Jan. 1972, p.1.
 64. PAC, Letter from Abe Taylor and Tom Simms, 13 Dec. 1971.
 65. PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 25 & 26 Sept. 1971, p.5.
 66. Ibid., p.10; Globe and Mail, 10 Sept. 1971.
 67. Globe and Mail, 13 Sept., 5, 14 Oct. 1971.
 68. Globe and Mail, 6 Nov. 1971.
 69. Globe and Mail, 15 Nov. 1971.
 70. Globe and Mail, 16 Nov. 1971.
 71. Globe and Mail, 19 Nov. 1971.
 72. Globe and Mail, 19, 20 Nov. 1971.
 73. Globe and Mail, 20 Nov. 1971.
 74. Globe and Mail, 2 Dec. 1971.
 75. Robert Laxer, Canada's Unions (Toronto: James Lorimer & Co., 1976), p.93.
 76. Globe and Mail, 11 Dec. 1971.
 77. Globe and Mail, 13 Dec. 1971.
 78. Robert Hackett argues that the Waffle's strategy was to link up with existing pockets of radicalism in Ontario trade unions rather than building new caucuses. He goes on to argue that the Waffle Labour Caucus had an active core of between 20 and 30 members with peripheral sympathizers amongst autoworkers in Oakville, Windsor, Oshawa and St. Catharines. This argument concurs with this analysis that the UAW left caucus sought allies amongst other groups such as the Waffle. Robert Hackett, "Pie in the Sky: A History of the Ontario Waffle", Canadian Dimension, Special Waffle Edition, Oct-Nov. 1980, p.54.
 79. John Bullen, "The Ontario Waffle and the Struggle for an Independent Socialist Canada: Conflict within the NDP",

Canadian Historical Review LXIV (1983): 207; Globe and Mail, 10 Jan. 1972.

80. PAC, Flyer announcing "Emergency Conference Canada - USA auto pact", sponsored by Ontario Waffle Group, 9 Jan. 1972; Hackett, "Pie in the Sky", p.54.
81. Hackett, Ibid..
82. PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 17 & 18 Jan. 1972, p.2.
83. The Canadian Tribune, 21 July 1971, p.8; PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 25 & 26 Sept. 1971, p.16.
84. PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 17 & 18 Jan. 1972, pp.2-4.
85. PAC, Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 17 & 18 Jan. 1972, pp.3-6; Globe and Mail, 17 Jan. 1972.
86. PAC, Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 17 & 18 Jan. 1972, pp.6-7.
87. Ibid., pp.7-9.
88. Ibid., pp.11-15.
89. PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 10 & 11 June 1972, pp.16-18; "Nixon's Economic Program", News from UAW, 17 Aug. 1971.
90. PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 10 & 11 June 1972, p.19, 14 & 15 Oct. 1972, p.1.
91. PAC, Ed Broadbent, copy of Speech prepared for delivery in House of Commons, 13 Mar. 1973.
92. Globe and Mail, 7 Feb., 22 Mar. 1973.
93. Interview with Robert White.
94. Globe and Mail, 17 Sept. 1973; PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 9 & 10 June 1973, p.8.
95. The clause which provided Chrysler workers with the right to strike over production standards was dependent upon changes to Ontario labour legislation which were never effected. Globe and Mail, 18, 21, 29 Sept. 1973; PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 26 & 27 Jan. 1974, pp.5-6.

96. Globe and Mail, 24 Nov., 5, 8 Dec. 1973.
97. Globe and Mail, 10, 17 Dec. 1973; PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 26 & 27 Jan. 1974, pp.5-9.
98. PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 26 & 27 Jan. 1974, pp.5-9.
99. PAC, Donald MacDonald to Principle Officers of International Unions affiliated with CLC, 2 Apr. 1971.
100. PAC, Regional Director's oral report to Canadian Council in Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 5, 6 & 7 June 1970, pp.17-20.
101. Terence White, "Canadian Labour and International Unions in the Seventies" in Prophecy and Protest, eds. Samuel D. Clark et al (Toronto: Gage Educational Publishing Ltd., 1975), pp.292-293.
102. Ibid., pp.298-303; R.B.Morris, "The Reverter Clause and Break-aways in Canada" in Capitalism and the National Question, ed. Gary Teeple (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), p.90.
103. PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 13 & 14 Jan. 1973, p.13.
104. Ibid., pp.9-10.
105. Ibid., p.13.
106. Ibid., pp.14-15.
107. Globe and Mail, 16 Apr. 1973; PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 9 & 10 June 1973, pp.5-6, 26 & 27 Jan. 1974, p.20.
108. PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 21 & 22 Sept. 1974, p.3.
109. PAC, Brian Johnson, "Dubious Battle: Montreal United Aircraft Strike as a Throwback to Class Warfare", copy of article which appeared in Maclean's Feb. 1975, p.3; Globe and Mail, 8 Jan. 1974. For a more in-depth analysis of certain aspects of the United Aircraft strike see Michael Pratt, La Grève de la United Aircraft (Sillery, Quebec: Les Presses de l'Université du Québec, 1980).
110. PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 20 & 21 Apr. 1974, pp.9-11.
111. Ibid.; Globe and Mail, 31 July 1974.

112. Johnson, "Dubious Battle", pp.2-4.
113. PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 20 & 21 Apr. 1974, pp.9-11; Memo from Emil Mazey to presidents and financial secretaries of all local unions in Canada, 28 May 1974.
114. Johnson, "Dubious Battle", pp.1 & 5; Globe and Mail, 23 Aug. 1974.
115. PAC, Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 21 & 22 Sept. 1974, pp.7-12.
116. Ibid.; PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 21 & 22 Sept. 1974, pp.24-25.
117. PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 21 & 22 Sept. 1974, pp.24-25.
118. PAC, Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 21 & 22 Sept. 1974, p.6.
119. Ibid., p.16.
120. Johnson, "Dubious Battle", p.5.
121. House of Commons Debates, 15 Oct. 1974, pp.408-411.
122. Johnson, "Dubious Battle", pp.5-6; Globe and Mail, 13, 32 Nov. 1974, 15 Feb. 1975; PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 7 & 8 June 1975, pp.22-23.
123. Globe and Mail, 13, 14, 17 May 1975; The Gazette, 2 Apr. 1976; PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 7 & 8 June 1975, p.23.
124. Globe and Mail, 21, 28, 31 May, 24 July, 19, 20 Aug. 1975; PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 7 & 8 June 1975, pp.23-28; Memo from Emil Mazey to Officers of UAW, 3 June 1975; Confidential Memo from Bob White to D.McDermott, 18 Aug. 1975; "Recommendations of the Prime Minister (Bourassa) to the Parties Involved in the Strike at Pratt & Whitney (previously known as United Aircraft)", 18 Aug. 1975.
125. Globe and Mail, 27 Aug. 1975; Confidential Memo from Bob White to D.McDermott, 27 Aug. 1975.
126. Interview with Pat Clancy, Canadian UAW Regional Headquarters, Toronto, Ontario, 1 Feb. 1984.
127. On Bridgewood case see WPR, Walter Reuther to James Bridgewood with attached IEB decision, 19 Feb. 1969; Globe

and Mail, 11, 16 June, 29 Aug. 1969; On McDermott's support for resolution see PAC, Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 14 & 15 June 1969, pp.8-9.

128. Globe and Mail, 23 Apr. 1970.
129. Globe and Mail, 15 Jan., 11 June 1973; PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 17, 18 & 19 Jan. 1970, pp.5-6, 9 & 10 June 1973, pp.14-19, 26 & 27 Jan. 1974, pp.20-21, 7 & 8 June 1975, pp.15-19.
130. The Windsor Star, 9 July 1975, p.41.
131. In December, 1973 GM announced the permanent layoff of 50,000 workers in the U.S.. In Canada, plants in Oshawa, St. Catharines and Windsor were shut down for additional time prior to Christmas due to the slackening demand. By January 4, GM had announced further layoffs in St. Catharines and 100 workers had been laid off at the Windsor trim plant. PAC, D.W.Tyce to D.McDermott, 4 Jan. 1974.
132. SG, Memo from Sam Gindin to All Staff, Canadian Region, 11 Feb. 1975; Memo from Sam Gindin to All Canadian Staff, UAW, 9 Apr. 1975; Sam Gindin, "Report on Canada's Auto Trade to UAW Council", 14 & 15 June 1975, p.1.
133. PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 20 & 21 Apr. 1974, pp.1-2; "Report on UAW Tariff Committee Meeting with Gillespie", 7 Jan. 1975; "UAW Policy Statement on Economy", Brief prepared by UAW Auto Tariff Committee for presentation to UAW Council, 26 & 27 Jan. 1975; SG, Sam Gindin, "Report on Canada's Auto Trade to UAW Council", 14 & 15 June 1975, pp.3, 4 & 9.
134. PAC, "UAW Policy Statement on Economy", Brief prepared by UAW Auto Tariff Committee for presentation to UAW Council, 26 & 27 Jan. 1975, p.23.
135. A.Maslove and G.Swinmer, Wage Controls in Canada, 1975-78 (Ottawa: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1980), p.5.
136. PAC, Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 25 & 26 Jan. 1975, p.3; Regional Director's oral report to Canadian Council in Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 14 & 15 June 1975, p.7.
137. PAC, D.McDermott to P.M.Trudeau, 31 Jan. 1975; D.McDermott to John Munro, 31 Jan. 1975; D.McDermott to John Turner, 31 Jan. 1975; D.McDermott to R.Andras, 31 Jan. 1975; D.McDermott to D.Jamieson, 31 Jan. 1975; D.McDermott to A.Maceachern, 31 Jan. 1975; D.McDermott to R.Basford, 31 Jan. 1975; D.McDermott to A.Gillespie, 31 Jan. 1975; D.McDermott to E.Whehan, 31 Jan. 1975; D.McDermott to A.Ouellet, 31 Jan.

- 1975; D.McDermott to Danson, 31 Jan. 1975; D.McDermott to C.Drury, 31 Jan. 1975; D.McDermott to J.Marchand, 31 Jan. 1975.
138. PAC, "UAW Policy Statement on Economy", Brief prepared by UAW Council for presentation to Federal Cabinet, 17 Feb. 1975.
 139. Ibid., p.22.
 140. Montreal Star, 18 Feb. 1975.
 141. PAC, Alistair Gillespie to D.McDermott, 25 Apr. 1975.
 142. PAC, "Executive Council Statement" prepared for meeting of Ranking Officers of CLC Affiliates, 7 May 1975; Regional Director's oral report to Canadian Council in Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 14 & 15 June 1975, pp.7-9.
 143. PAC, Regional Director's oral report to Canadian Council in Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 14 & 15 June 1975, pp.7-9.
 144. PAC, Regional Director's oral report to Canadian Council in Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 7 & 8 June 1975, pp.10-11.
 145. Ibid., pp.29, 31-32; For discussion of CLC's rejection of wage and price controls see Maslove and Swinner, Wage Controls, pp.5-6.
 146. John Turner, "Budget Speech", 23 June 1975 quoted in Maslove and Swinner, Wage Controls, p.15, footnote 18.
 147. Ibid., p.11.
 148. Ibid., Chapter 3.
 149. Globe and Mail, 15 Oct. 1975.
 150. SG, Report prepared for UAW by Sam Gindin, "The UAW and Wage Controls", 15 Jan. 1979, pp.8-9; Maslove and Swinner, Wage Controls, Chapter 8; PAC, Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 10 & 11 Jan. 1976, p.21.
 151. PAC, Speech by Joe Morris to Canadian Council in Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 10 & 11 Jan. 1976, p.40.
 152. SG, Report prepared for UAW by Sam Gindin, "The UAW and Wage Controls", 15 Jan. 1979, p.8.
 153. Globe and Mail, 23 Aug. 1975.
 154. Globe and Mail, 29 Nov., 1 Dec. 1975.

155. Globe and Mail, 8 Dec. 1975.
156. Globe and Mail, 20 Dec. 1975.
157. PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 10 & 11 Jan. 1976, pp.7-8.
158. Janine Brodie and Jane Jenson, Crisis, Challenge and Change (Agincourt: Methuen Publications, 1980), pp.275-276.
159. PAC, Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 10 & 11 Jan. 1976, p.19.
160. PAC, Speech by Joe Morris to Canadian Council in Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 10 & 11 Jan. 1976, pp.39-40.
161. PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 10 & 11 Jan. 1976, p.10, 26 & 27 June 1976, p.24.
162. PAC, Contract entered into by UAW and CN, 9 Mar. 1976.
163. Local 444 in Windsor which had originally expected and paid for the journey of 400 workers found itself obliged to pay for an additional 300 workers who unexpectedly turned up to board the train. PAC, Frank Fairchild to Nelson Dearing, 27 July 1976.
164. PAC, Frank Fairchild to All local union Presidents and Recording Secretaries in Canadian Region UAW, 15 June 1976.
165. Globe and Mail, 23 Mar. 1976.
166. Interview with Sam Gindin.
167. PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 26 & 27 June 1976, pp.17-18.
168. Heather McAllistair, "Labour's Direction in the Changing Political Economy: The Response by the Canadian Labour Congress to the Decline of Keynesianism, 1956-1978", paper presented to Canadian Political Science Association meetings. Guelph, Ontario, 1984, p.28.
169. Ibid..
170. Ibid., pp.28-29.
171. PAC, Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 26 & 27 June 1976, pp.4-8.
172. PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 26 & 27 June 1976, p.20.

173. Interview with Sam Gindin.
174. PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 26 & 27 June 1976, pp.17-18.
175. McAllistair, "Labour's Direction", pp.30-31.
176. PAC, Regional Director's oral report to Canadian Council in Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 11 & 12 Sept. 1976, pp.15-16.
177. McAllistair, "Labour's Direction", p.31.
178. PAC, Progress Report from Buzz Hargrove to D.McDermott, 16 Sept., 5 Oct. 1976; Memo from Pat Smith to D.McDermott, 27 Sept. 1976; Memo from Larry Sheffe to D.McDermott, 12 Oct. 1976.
179. PAC, Memo from Larry Sheffe to D.McDermott, 31 Aug. 1976, p.2.
180. PAC, Memo from Larry Sheffe to D.McDermott, 12 Oct. 1976, p.2.
181. PAC, Regional Director's oral report to Canadian Council in Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 15 & 16 Jan. 1977, p.8; Memo from Buzz Hargrove to D.McDermott, 18 Oct. 1976; Memo from Pat Smith to D.McDermott, 19 Oct. 1976; Memo from J.C.Maloney to D.McDermott, 15 Oct. 1976; Memo from Gordon Parker to D.McDermott, 19 Oct. 1976; Memo from G.Roy Scott to D.McDermott, 20 Oct. 1976; Memo from Ed Bruce to D.McDermott, 20 Oct. 1976; Memo from Larry Sheffe to D.McDermott, 21 Oct. 1976.
182. SG, Report prepared for UAW by Sam Gindin, "The UAW and Wage Controls", 15 Jan. 1979, pp.9-17.
183. Globe and Mail, 15 Nov. 1976.
184. PAC, Regional Director's oral report to Canadian Council in Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 15 & 16 Jan. 1977, p.22.
185. SG, Report prepared for UAW by Sam Gindin, "The UAW and Wage Controls, 15 Jan. 1979, p.18.
186. Ibid., p.16; For a complete breakdown of the handling of each individual UAW contract under the AIB guidelines see Tables attached to this report.
187. PAC, Regional Director's oral report to Canadian Council in Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 16 & 17 Apr. 1977,

- p.14; Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 16 & 17 Apr. 1977, pp.25-27; Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 1 & 2 Oct. 1977, p.44; Globe and Mail, 22 Mar. 1977.
188. PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 28 & 29 Jan. 1978, p.4.
 189. SG, Report prepared for UAW by Sam Gindin, "The UAW and Wage Controls", 15 Jan. 1979, p.9.
 190. SG, Memos from Sam Gindin to All Canadian Staff of Canadian Region, 11 Feb., 9 Apr. 1975; Sam Gindin, "Report on Canada's Auto Trade to UAW Council", 14 & 15 June 1975, p.1.
 191. Simon Reisman, The Canadian Automotive Industry: Performance and Proposals for Progress, Inquiry into the Automotive Industry (Ottawa, 1978), pp.155-160.
 192. Information on individual corporate responses to wage controls is uneven and limited. However, in a series of internal UAW memos by the union staff responsible for mobilizing autoworkers behind the Day of Protest indicate that many companies were either antipathetic to wage controls or, in some cases, opposed. See PAC, Memo from Pat Smith to D.McDermott, 27 Sept. 1976, especially on Local 80; Memo from Larry Sheffe to D.McDermott, 12 Oct. 1976, p.2; Memo from Buzz Hargrove to D.McDermott, 16 Sept. 1976, especially on Twin Cee, Lustrro Steel Products and Chryaler Parts and Truck; Memo from Buzz Hargrove to D.McDermott, 5 Oct. 1976, p.1, especially on Lustrro Steel. On the subject of the anticipated prosperity of the Canadian auto industry see Reisman, Performance and Proposals.
 193. For a comparison of a decentralized union's response (Canadian Union of Public Employees) to wage controls with a centralized union's response (UAW-Canada) to wage controls, see Maslove and Swinner, Wage Controls, Chapters 8 & 9.
 194. PAC, Regional Director's oral report to Canadian Council in Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 16 & 17 Apr. 1977, pp.14-15; Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 16 & 17 Apr. 1977, pp.33-34; Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 11 & 12 June 1977, pp.13-14.
 195. PAC, Regional Director's oral report to Canadian Council in Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 16 & 17 Apr. 1977, p.8.
 196. PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 1 & 2 Oct. 1977, pp.1-3.
 197. Continued rank-and-file resistance to tripartism was evident in proposals by various provincial labour federation

conventions for the CLC to remove tripartism from its agenda. McAllistair, "Labour's Direction", p.32.

198. Donald Swartz, "New Forms of Worker Participation: A Critique of QWL", Studies in Political Economy no.5 (Spring, 1981): 57.
199. PAC, William G. Davis to McDermott, 5 Feb. 1976.
200. PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 20 & 21 Apr. 1974, p.8.
201. In 1973, the UAW collective bargaining conference called for the right to strike over health and safety issues and production standards. Globe and Mail, 16 Apr. 1973; In a study of Ontario Health and Safety legislation, Vivienne Walters argues that early moves by the provincial government to act on these issues were not made in response to organized labour as the labour movement had not placed high priority on this issue. While this may well be the case, it was at least coincidental that action by the provincial government coincided with UAW moves to deal with such issues. Vivienne Walters, "Occupational Health and Safety Legislation in Ontario: an analysis of its origins and content", Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 20 (Nov., 1983): 416.
202. For discussion of constitutional aspect of the AIB see Maslove and Swimmer, Wage Controls, "Appendix: The Constitutionality Issue", pp.42-43.
203. PAC, Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 10 & 11 Jan. 1976, p.27.
204. PAC, William G. Davis to McDermott, 5 Feb. 1976 with attached list of participants.
205. Interview with Robert White; Pierre Fournier, "Consensus Building in Canada: Case Studies and Prospects" in The State and Economic Interests, Vol. 32 of the research studies prepared for the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986): 303-304; For an in-depth study of Quality of Working Life projects in two Canadian plants see Don Wells, Soft Sell (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 1986).
206. Interview with Robert White.
207. Walters, "Health and Safety Legislation", p.415.
208. PAC, Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 16 & 17 Apr. 1977, pp.38-40.

209. On Jack Riddell's involvement see Globe and Mail, 20, 28 July 1978.
210. Robert White, Hard Bargains: My Life on the Line (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1987), p.137.
211. Julie White, Women and Unions prepared for the Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women (Ottawa, 1980), pp.95-103.
212. Interview with Robert White.
213. PC, Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 10 & 11 June 1978, pp.9-10.
214. PC, Robert White to Premier Davis, 17 Aug. 1978, copied in Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 16 & 17 Sept. 1978, pp.5-6.
215. PC, Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 28 & 29 Jan. 1978, p.38.
216. Walters, "Health and Safety Legislation", pp.415-416.
217. Bullen, "Waffle and Independent Socialist Canada", p.197; Hackett, "Pie in the Sky", p.26.
218. PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 17, 18 & 19 Jan. 1970, p.6.
219. PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 31 Oct. & 1 Nov. 1970, p.5.
220. Interview with Robert White.
221. Globe and Mail, 5 Oct. 1970; Hackett, "Pie in the Sky", p.33.
222. PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 31 Oct. & 1 Nov. 1970, pp.4-5.
223. Hackett, "Pie in the Sky", p.33.
224. Ibid..
225. Ibid., pp.32-34; Bullen, "Waffle and Independent Socialist Canada", pp.198-200.
226. PAC, UAW Canadian Region Newsletter 1 (23 Apr. 1971): 2; Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 31 Oct. & 1 Nov. 1970, pp.5-6; D.McDermott to all UAW local union presidents, recording secretaries, Political Action Committee Chairmen and Canadian Regional Staff, 11 Mar. 1971.

227. Hackett, "Pie in the Sky", pp.40-44.
228. CCF, "Action Programme - 1970" adopted by Affiliated Organization Committee - NDP of Ontario, 10 Apr. 1970 copied in Minutes to Special Conference, Affiliated Organization Committee, Toronto, 10 Apr. 1970; PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 12 & 13 June 1971, pp.9-10, 25 & 26 Sept. 1971, p.2.
229. PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 25 & 26 Sept. 1971, pp.19-21.
230. Hackett, "Pie in the Sky", p.53.
231. PAC, Memo from Frank Quinlan to McDermott, 5 Jan. 1972; Bullen, "Waffle and Independent Socialist Canada", pp.205-206.
232. Bullen, Ibid., p.206; Hackett, "Pie in the Sky", p.53.
233. PAC, Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 17 & 18 Jan. 1972, p.10.
234. Bullen, "Waffle and Independent Socialist Canada", pp.207-208.
235. Ibid., pp.210-212; Hackett, "Pie in the Sky", pp.55-60.
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238. PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 20 & 21 Apr. 1974, p.8; National and Area Staff Reports to Canadian Council, 20 & 21 Apr. 1974, p.3; Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 21 & 22 Sept. 1974, p.9.
239. PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 9 & 10 June 1973, p.2.
240. PAC, Regional Director's oral report to Canadian Council in Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 7 & 8 June 1975, pp.33-34.
241. Ibid., pp.33-34, 42; PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 6 & 7 Sept. 1975, p.2.
242. PAC, "Report of Community Action Program and Citizenship Committee" in National and Area Staff Reports to Canadian Council, 6 & 7 Sept. 1975, p.2.

243. PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 6 & 7 Sept. 1975, p.3; Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 6 & 7 Sept. 1975; Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 10 & 11 Jan. 1976, p.12.
244. PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 10 & 11 Jan. 1976, p.12; "Citizenship and Legislative Committee Report" in National and Area Staff Reports to Canadian Council, 10 & 11 Jan. 1976, pp.3-4; Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 10 & 11 Jan. 1976, p.12.
245. PAC, Regional Director's oral report to Canadian Council in Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 15 & 16 Jan. 1977, pp.12-13.
246. Ibid., p.11.
247. Tommy Douglas as quoted by McDermott in Ibid..
248. Ibid., pp.11-12; Globe and Mail, 6 Jan. 1977.
249. PAC, Regional Director's oral report to Canadian Council in Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 16 & 17 Jan. 1977, pp.16, 18-19.
250. PAC, Regional Director's oral report to Canadian Council in Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 16 & 17 Apr. 1977, p.9.
251. Ibid., pp.9, 16, 37.
252. PAC, Regional Director's oral report to Canadian Council in Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 11 & 12 June 1977, p.11.
253. PAC, Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 11 & 12 June 1977, p.14.
254. Ibid., p.11.
255. PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 28 & 29 Jan. 1978, pp.21-22; "Citizenship and Legislative Committee Report" in National and Area Staff Reports, 1 & 2 Oct. 1977, pp.4-5.
256. PAC, Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 11 & 12 June 1977, pp.19-22; "Citizenship and Legislative Committee Report" in National and Area Staff Reports, 1 & 2 Oct. 1977, p.3.
257. PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 28 & 29 Jan. 1978, p.7.

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258. PAC, "The State of the Union in Quebec, August 1971 to July 1972" submitted by Bob Dean to McDermott, 23 Aug. 1972.
259. Henry Milner, The Decolonization of Quebec (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd., 1973); Pierre Fournier, The Quebec Establishment (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1976), Chapters 8 & 9; Kenneth McRoberts and Dale Posgate, Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd., 1980), Chapters 7 & 8.
260. PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 26 & 27 Apr. 1969, pp.14-16.
261. PAC, "The State of the Union in Quebec, August 1971 to July 1972" submitted by Bob Dean to McDermott, 23 Aug. 1972, p.2.
262. Walter Johnson, The Trade Unions and the State (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1978), pp.83-98.
263. Ibid., pp.84-86.
264. For some discussion on the International UAW's position on the French language issue see Ibid., pp.84-88.
265. Globe and Mail, 29 Sept., 30 Nov. 1970; PAC, "Major Settlement Terms UAW - GM Canada Negotiations, 1970", p.20; Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 31 Oct. & 1 Nov. 1970, pp.7-12.
266. PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 31 Oct. & 1 Nov. 1970, pp.14-17; Telegram from Ed Baillargeon to D.McDermott, 21 Oct. 1970; Philip Resnick, The Land of Cain (Vancouver: New Star Books, 1977), p.196.
267. PAC, Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 31 Oct. & 1 Nov. 1970, pp.13-15, 19.
268. Ibid., Resolution #4, p.2.
269. Ibid..
270. PAC, "The State of the Union in Quebec, August 1971 to July 1972" submitted by Bob Dean to McDermott, 23 Aug. 1972, p.5.
271. Although McDermott had voiced his own support for the Parti Quebecois in January 1974, this did not constitute official union policy nor did it constitute recognition of the nature of Quebec nationalism. Rather, McDermott's support for the PQ lay in his understanding of it as the only alternative to the NDP for organized labour in Quebec. PAC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 26 & 27 Jan. 1974, p.25; See also Director's oral report to Canadian Council in Minutes to

Meeting of Canadian Council, 15 & 16 Jan. 1977, p.21; Globe and Mail, 31 Jan. 1977.

272. PAC, Regional Director's oral report to Canadian Council in Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 15 & 16 Jan. 1977, p.21; Globe and Mail, 31 Jan. 1977.
273. Interview with Sam Gindin.
274. PAC, Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 16 & 17 Apr. 1977, Resolution #6 "Two Founding Nations", pp.102-103.
275. Ibid., pp.55-73.
276. Ibid., p.63.
277. Ibid., pp.62-65.
278. Ibid., p.73.
279. For some insight into White's approach to the union see White, Hard Bargains; Interview with Robert White.
280. Globe and Mail, 19 Aug., 19 Sept. 1978; PC, Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 10 & 11 June 1978, pp.33-34; Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 16 & 17 Sept. 1978, p.6-9.
281. PC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 16 & 17 Sept. 1978, pp.17-20.

Chapter Eight

New Directions for Canadian Autoworkers: 1979-84

This chapter tells the story of the crisis of the Fordist regime in the auto industry. Corporations, governments and the UAW attempted to respond to new conditions which threatened to undermine the basis of the political stability and economic prosperity which had marked the postwar years. The UAW's goal was to preserve its position of influence in the workplace and society as a whole despite the new situation. This chapter also tells the story of the last years of the Canadian Region of the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America. Both these stories hinge on the Canadian Autoworkers' strategic response to the growing economic crisis in the 1980's which threatened to destroy much of what the union had built over four decades.

Between 1979 and 1983, the Canadian economy went into serious economic decline along with the rest of the world economies. The Fordist regime had reached its limits. The 1970's "latent crisis of Fordism", characterized by declining American productivity and a profit squeeze, became full blown in the 1980's as the increased competitiveness of Japan and Germany in the world economy threatened American economic hegemony. Higher North American wage costs were targetted as the root of this declining competitiveness.(1)

These high wage costs were, in turn, intrinsically linked to the particular mode of Fordist regulation put into place in the postwar years. The Fordist wage relationship appeared as a fetter on continued capital accumulation. The result was intensified conflict between corporations, unions and governments.

The North American auto industry was at the centre of this crisis. Between 1979 and 1983, Japanese vehicle imports into Canada rose dramatically. High interest rates and lowered relative incomes due to the recession made lower-priced vehicles more attractive to the consumer. Existing production and marketing strategies of the North American automakers contributed to the competitive edge of imports. In comparison to the Japanese, North American auto corporations were inefficient. They paid high labour costs, had invested less in new technology and designs, and continued to advance Sloanist marketing techniques which reinforced the inefficiencies of auto production and encouraged reliance on the once-profitable large, luxury cars.(2)

This economic crisis worked its way through the auto industry unevenly, first hitting the smallest of the Big Three automakers, Chrysler, and the independent parts' suppliers.(3) Ford and General Motors were the last to feel its full impact. Corporations were uncertain about how to respond effectively to the downturn. Consequently, individual corporate strategies differed in timing as well as in nature, differences which largely reflected each company's structure, economic viability and perceived strategic capacity. Such uncertainty also led corporations sometimes to pursue contradictory strategies.(4)

Whether companies were hit earlier or later by the crisis and whether they decided to invest in new technology or new marketing strategies, corporate responses particularly hurt workers. Plants were closed and extended layoffs initiated. Correspondingly, the number of unemployed autoworkers increased. Corporations also undertook a major assault on existing Fordist structures of collective bargaining and labour relations, upon which the UAW had come to rely for some of its organizational strength. Automakers demanded wage concessions, changes to workers' pay regime, the dismantling of master and pattern bargaining, and changes to seniority and job posting practices in order to introduce a more flexible labour process.(5) The UAW, along with all other unions in the Canadian economy, came under attack as corporations attempted to meet the challenge of depression and heightened competition.

Government responses to the economic downturn were similarly variable. Federally, after a brief interlude of Conservative rule, the Liberal party returned to power on a nationalist platform which held promise that this government would use its leverage to ensure continued auto production and employment in Canada. As the economy ground to a halt, however, the federal government, like the corporations, targetted workers' wages and unions as well as the welfare state, as responsible for the economic crisis. Consequently, the federal government's nationalist direction was eclipsed by a move towards fiscal conservatism. The result was high interest rates, increased unemployment, cutbacks in social

programmes and the restriction of union rights. Finally, the federal government abandoned its earlier protection of the auto industry and instead adopted a wait-and-see attitude about the effects of industry restructuring and escalating Japanese imports.

Only with the Ontario government did the UAW continue to experience some influence. Although this government readily curbed the rights of public-sector unions, the importance of the auto industry for the provincial economy and the government's 1970's strategy of increased consultation with unions, led it to support many UAW calls for change to the industry. These years of crisis, therefore, saw the UAW in closer consultation with the Conservative Ontario government than it had been in previous decades.

UAW strategies reflected both the changing nature of corporate and government responses to the economic decline and recent experiences with wage and price controls. During 1979 and the early months of 1980, UAW strategies reflected an uneasy optimism about the economy. Collective bargaining continued to be peaceful and the union continued to lobby government. Only in the sphere of partisan politics did UAW strategy alter as Canadian Autoworkers, along with other CLC unions, mounted a massive campaign in support of the NDP.

By mid-1980, however, when the economy plunged into recession and mounting numbers of autoworkers were laid off, the UAW's 'politics as usual' came to an abrupt halt. Unemployment and economic depression meant declining memberships, greater job competition between workers and heightened job insecurity.

Compounding these sources of union weakness were growing internal union divisions over the strategic response to corporate and government attacks on unions. Concessions and corporate attempts to introduce a more 'flexible' labour process found the UAW divided between those willing to accept such changes in the hope of saving their jobs and more militant workers who insisted on fighting back. Furthermore, the UAW found itself the object of membership ire as workers blamed the union and not corporations for the losses they were incurring. While these divisions muted other potential sectional interest divisions, they threatened to split the union.

This internal weakening of the UAW and the concerted attack on unions by both government and corporations led the UAW to search for a strategy which would effectively protect its members and defend the organizational integrity and strength of the union. The Canadian UAW ultimately returned to militant, mobilization-based politics. Canadian Autoworkers staged sit-downs to protest plant closures and engaged in mobilization of its members against concessions. On the political front, the UAW lobbied and participated in massive demonstrations. These activities were distinguished from similar actions in the 1970's by the UAW's greater willingness to use workplace action to secure political victories and by the union's construction of alliances with a broad cross-section of the Canadian public.

Canadian Autoworkers' were successful in their struggles. By 1984 a new period of detente between corporations, governments and

the UAW appeared to be in the making. Canadian Autoworkers, however, paid a heavy price for these successes. They were forced to leave their International Union and begin building their own national union. Thus, this period marked the end of the history of the Canadian UAW.

Years of Uncertainty, 1979-80

In hindsight, analysts see 1979 as the beginning of the economic crisis which would dominate the early 1980's. This analysis is based, however, on 20-20 hindsight. What characterized the years of 1979 and 1980 was uncertainty about the condition of the economy and the auto industry's place within it. In the early months of 1979, economic indicators gave hope that the Canadian economy was pulling out of the economic stagnation which had plagued the country since the early 1970's. Although inflation and unemployment continued to register high levels, they had stabilized between 1978 and 1979.(6) In the North American auto industry there were signs of returned prosperity. In 1979, Japanese imports to Canada fell to their lowest level since 1974. Automakers continued to make much needed moves to increase their competitiveness through the introduction of new technology and the downsizing of vehicles.(7) Although the latter corporate practices threatened autoworkers with at least temporary layoffs, the long-term prospects of the industry appeared to be good.(8)

Optimism about the auto industry was marred, however, by the poor performance of the Chrysler Corporation. In 1978 Chrysler closed its truck plant in Windsor and phased out small engine

production in Canada.(9) In the third quarter of this same year, Chrysler announced that it had suffered the worst losses in its history.(10)

Furthermore, beneath the veneer of apparent recovery lay indications of much deeper problems. Since 1974 a trend of disinvestment from the Canadian auto industry developed which continued into the late 1970's. In turn, where once there had been a trade surplus for Canada in automotive products, there was now a deficit. Finally, automakers and parts' suppliers reduced their commitment under the Canadian content regulations of the Autopact from a high of up to 95% Canadian Value added for Sales in Canada in 1971 to a low of approximately 60% in 1979.(11) These problems came home to roost with a vengeance in 1980. Even then, however, autoworkers and automakers alike were unclear whether the industry was suffering yet another cyclical recession or more serious structural problems.(12)

The strategies employed by the UAW in 1979 and 1980 and the union's subsequent gains and losses were reflections of this uneasy optimism of the future. The key issues concerning Canadian Autoworkers were problems in the auto industry, provincial legislation on the Rand formula, and wage increases commensurate with the escalating cost of living. Solutions to these issues lay in federal and provincial government action and the willingness of corporations to allow union members to share in the anticipated benefits of technological innovation and industry restructuring.

Relations between the federal Liberal government and the UAW had deteriorated over the past few years. This was the legacy of

the 1975 imposition of wage controls and the UAW's mobilization against this policy. Canadian Autoworkers who since 1945 had had close relations with the Liberals, discovered that this party was an uncertain ally. This suspicion was borne out in the lack of federal government response to UAW appeals for aid to unemployed autoworkers. Almost a year of lobbying by the union on the issues of reintroducing Transitional Assistance Benefits and making changes to the Autopact in 1978 had met with little or no response.(13) This failure of lobbying combined with the strained relations between the UAW and the Liberal Party and the union's need for immediate action on the problems of auto unemployment led the UAW to concentrate its political energies on mobilization behind the NDP for the 1979 federal election.

When Robert White became Canadian Director of the UAW in 1978, he also became a CLC vice-president and Chair of the CLC's National Political Education Committee, positions which Dennis McDermott had held before him. From this vantage point, White played a crucial role in organizing the CLC's 1979 federal election campaign. The centrepiece of the CLC's election strategy was the parallel campaign. Inspired by the successful mobilization of workers for the October 14, 1976 Day of Protest, the CLC intended a similar mobilization of workers behind the NDP.(14)

The theme of the CLC's campaign was household economics i.e. how increasing prices, wage controls, high interest rates and erosion of medicare hit workers in their pocketbooks. These problems, it was argued, could only be dealt with if workers

elected an NDP government. To get this message across to the membership, unions set up phone banks and organized personal visits from volunteers.(15) To ensure centralized coordination of this campaign, the CLC asked for and received staff from its affiliates.(16)

The UAW, which already had a policy of committing its staff to election work, concentrated its energies on gaining the commitment of local union leaders to the parallel campaign. The union therefore scheduled a series of area leadership meetings in Ontario and Quebec and distributed fact sheets and other literature as well as organizing phone banks. Local activists and retirees staffed the phones while the union contributed funds.(17) The overall results of the concerted labour campaign were disappointing. The NDP lost two seats in Ontario and only marginally increased its popular vote.(18)

Nonetheless, White publicly declared the parallel campaign a success, pointing to the increased NDP popular vote in UAW strongholds. He attributed the Tory's lack of majority to organized labour's mobilization.(19) Nonetheless, Council debate and internal union analysis identified at least three problems with the CLC's campaign. One problem lay in the local leadership's fear of openly supporting the NDP lest this result in their defeat in the next union election.(20) Another problem identified by the union lay in the message given to workers. The union had told workers how to vote, not why they should vote for the NDP. Such a top-down message built resistance amongst some workers and failed to dispel fears of socialism felt by others. Finally, the UAW

recognized that even if workers' consciousness were raised by the campaign, the NDP often failed to distinguish itself from the other parties.(21) The UAW, however, saw its part in the campaign as a success.

In the end, the lessons learned from the parallel campaign provided a basis for future strategic emphasis on syndicalist politics and building a broad political movement. The UAW's analysis of the campaign was premised on the following observation made by Sam Gindin, Canadian UAW Research Director:

Unions that have been militant in defending their members and democratic in terms of the accessibility of the top leadership and involvement of the local leadership and rank-and-file, had the best base for mobilizing the members electorally.(22)

Gindin went on to argue that institutions such as the Canadian Council and militant strategies such as the Autoworkers' fight against wage controls had legitimated the union's participation in politics and provided the avenues for such political participation.(23) From these observations, Gindin concluded that to overcome the identified problems of electorally mobilizing workers, the UAW must continue its militant path of action, encourage new, more militant leadership to develop and broach the subject of socialism and the NDP as a socialist party so to clearly identify the NDP as the party of labour. These were long-term solutions whose starting point lay in union education programmes.(24)

This analysis explicitly identified the importance of the Canadian Region's unique organizational structure and militant,

union-centred collective identity to union victories. To preserve the UAW's role as a powerful and dynamic political force in society, these qualities had to be safeguarded and built upon. In future struggles once the economy went into serious decline, this understanding would prove crucial for the union's choice of strategic response to corporations, governments and union members. The analysis also had immediate implications for the NDP. As the NDP was relegated to the position of a long-term solution to workers' problems, the UAW would have to return to militant syndicalist action for immediate defence of its membership.

On the provincial government front and in collective bargaining, the UAW fared better in its demands. In contrast to the deterioration of UAW-federal government relations, relations between the provincial Conservative government and the UAW continued to improve. Meetings between White and government officials on the question of legislating the Rand formula, which had begun in late 1978, continued into 1979 as did meetings of the Labour-Management Committee.(25) These consultations improved the union's access to and influence on government decision-making, thereby reinforcing the union's commitment to cooperation with the provincial government.

The 1979 round of collective bargaining with Ford and GM reflected the relatively good times anticipated by corporations and the union alike and the stabilizing effect this had on labour-management relations. After very short strikes, the UAW reached three-year agreements with both Ford and General Motors. In both cases the union made some major gains. Wage increases were

substantial. The UAW won improved pensions, paid education leave and a larger number of paid personal holidays. The conciliatory tenor of the 1979 negotiations was perhaps best reflected in GM's willingness to recognize the UAW as the bargaining agent for any new plants established in Canada.(26)

The troublespot for Canadian Autoworkers, and ultimately the first signs of the pending crisis in the auto industry, came in deliberations over Chrysler. Corporate financial problems were reflected in a growing number of layoffs. In early August, 1979 Chrysler laid off 980 workers and announced 2,150 more for the next few weeks.(27) At the same time, Chrysler approached the American government for financial aid to ward off impending bankruptcy.(28) To deal with the question of layoffs and in anticipation of Chrysler demands for financial aid from the Canadian government, the UAW met with provincial and federal Ministers of Industry to present the union's position. The UAW demanded that if Chrysler asked for financial assistance, the union should have input into the negotiations, which must include guarantees for Canadian jobs. Secondly, the UAW reiterated its demand for the reintroduction of TAB as a short-term measure for helping the growing number of unemployed autoworkers.(29)

At about the same time as these deliberations and as Chrysler waited for the American government response to its demand for financial aid, the UAW and Chrysler entered into negotiations.(30) Once at the bargaining table, Chrysler demanded concessions from its workers. The company argued that concessions were an important

means of reducing costs and increasing the competitiveness of the company. Without concessions, many jobs would be lost. Canadian Director, Robert White, and Canadian Chrysler workers initially rejected these concessions.(31) On October 16, 1979, however, UAW President Doug Fraser announced that the UAW would grant concessions to the corporation.(32) White went along with this decision, arguing that the concessions were merely temporary measures intended to shore up the corporation and would be regained by the end of the three year contract.(33) After a brief Canadian strike, Canadian and American workers ratified an agreement which gave the automaker \$203 million in wage and benefit concessions over the next three years.(34) In exchange, UAW president Fraser was appointed to the Chrysler Board of Directors, a joint board of union and corporate officials was established to determine the investment of the pension fund, and workers entered a new stock-ownership plan.(35)

Contrary to expectations, within weeks of these negotiations, Chrysler workers faced another set of concessions. These, however, were demanded under much different conditions than the first. The United States Congress approved financial aid to the Chrysler corporation on condition that the company gain further concessions from its workers and additional loans from countries other than the U.S., in particular Canada.(36) While American members of the UAW International Executive Board accepted these concessions as the only way to save the corporation (and hence jobs), White refused to go along with the deal. While not yet rejecting concessions in principle, White did reject the notion that

Canadian wages and benefits could be determined by a foreign government. At least part of his decision was predicated on the possible development of a nationalist backlash within the Canadian region should Canadian autoworkers be forced to accept conditions established by the American government.

While the Canadian Director's decision maintained internal Regional harmony, it strained the Canadian Region's relationship with the leadership of the International Union. American union leaders accused the Canadians of refusing to share in the sacrifices needed to save jobs. To demonstrate their displeasure, the International Chrysler Bargaining Committee announced that the Canadian No Concessions stand effectively put an end to the Chrysler International Agreement which had been in effect since 1970.(37)

To strengthen their No Concessions position, Canadian Autoworkers continued to lobby the federal government on the issue of the Chrysler loan so to ensure that concessions were not a condition attached to the Canadian loan. The possibility for success in this lobby was enhanced when the Conservative federal government was defeated in January, 1980. An election was a prime time for the UAW to increase its political leverage with the federal government. As in 1979, the union supported the CLC's parallel campaign. Perhaps the key difference in the UAW's campaign was its use of "job canvassing". The intent of this strategy was clearly articulated by Gord Wilson, staff member of the Canadian Region, when he argued to Council that "We are merely

translating that geographical constituency known as the riding, into a constituency known as the workplace." (38) The Canadian UAW poured huge resources into the campaign. (39) It set up 18 phone banks through which 45,000 Autoworkers were contacted and 20,000 NDP supporters identified. (40) The results of the election were seen as a victory. The NDP gained 5 seats (losing however in Ontario) and increased its popular vote. (41)

Gains by the NDP were not the most important sign of hope coming out of the election for Canadian Autoworkers. The Liberal Party's 1980 campaign centred on issues of greater state intervention and Canadianization of the economy. (42) This nationalist position augered well for the UAW as the union's demands on the Chrysler loan and auto industry adjustment necessitated federal government protection of national industrial interests. When the Liberal Party was elected, the union's hopes of sympathetic government hearings were fuelled by the appointments of Marc McGuigan as Secretary of State for External Affairs and Herb Gray as Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce. Both these men were considered nationalists and came from Windsor ridings where the UAW held substantial influence.

Herb Gray's appointment turned out to be the more important one for the UAW, as he was made responsible for Chrysler loan negotiations. Herb Gray's May 1980 announcement that any loans for the Chrysler corporation must guarantee Canadian jobs augered well for the UAW. (43) Within days, the UAW's influence on these negotiations was made abundantly clear. While attending the CLC convention in Winnipeg between May 5 and 9, Bob White was

requested by Gray to return to Ottawa to attend scheduled meetings between Ontario and federal government officials and the Chrysler Corporation. Due to White's responsibilities at the Convention he declined the invitation. Not to be deterred, Gray arranged for all government and corporate negotiators to fly to Winnipeg where meetings could be held with UAW participation. Consistent with UAW demands, both Ontario and federal government representatives demanded job guarantees in exchange for the loan. When the deal was finally worked out with Chrysler, it fulfilled many of the union's objectives. Chrysler received a total of \$250 million dollars on several conditions, the most important of which included:

1. an agreement by Chrysler not to close any existing facilities without approval of the Minister of Industry;
2. corporate commitments to invest approximately \$1 billion in Canada between 1980 and 1985 to expand a van plant to produce a new small van, to produce one of Chrysler's small front-wheel drive cars in its Windsor assembly plant, and to update the Etobicoke Castings Plant;
3. job guarantees.(44)

These negotiations were seen as a victory for the UAW on two fronts. First, the UAW's close participation in the actual negotiations was a unique experience for the union. In contrast to union fears that its participation was mere window-dressing, UAW participation resulted in serious consideration and inclusion of many union demands, in particular job and investment guarantees, in the final deal. Furthermore, the UAW's influence on decision-making fostered hope that the Canadian and Ontario governments would tackle the problems of the auto industry in cooperation with the union.

Secondly, the governments' insistence on job and investment guarantees rather than the American pattern of concessions strengthened the Canadian Region's hand in refusing the concessions forced by Congress. It did this in two ways. First, Canadian governments did not restrict the UAW's strategic manoeuvrability as had the American government's loan conditions. Second, Chrysler's agreement to job and investment guarantees increased the union's strategic capacity by eliminating some of the uncertainty about future corporate commitments to Canadian production. This latter point was particularly important as one of the strategies adopted by multinational auto corporations in response to heightened international competition had been to shift production to Third World countries.(45) Chrysler's capacity to engage in these activities was restricted and correspondingly the union's hand was strengthened.

The optimism over the Chrysler loan negotiations was tempered by the harsh realities of the deepening economic crisis and the auto industry's serious decline, however. Unemployment became the most pressing problem for autoworkers. By January 1980, 25% of UAW membership in the parts industry was on indefinite layoff as were over 7,000 production workers.(46) Added to this were layoffs in the agricultural implement and aircraft industries.(47)

The economic downturn in both Canada and the US resulted in an overall decline in consumer demand for vehicles. Shifting patterns of consumer demand towards small, gas-efficient vehicles which North American producers were only gradually producing

resulted in increased sales of imported vehicles. Between 1979 and 1980, Japanese imports rose from 8.2% to 15.4% of the Canadian market.(48) Corporate responses to increased international competition included extensive retooling and technological innovation which resulted in some plants being closed for up to three years.(49) In the case of the parts industry, heightened competition combined with greater in-house sourcing of parts by the large automakers often forced permanent plant closure.

In response to the rapid economic decline, the UAW stepped up its lobbying efforts. Its demands focussed on three issues: 1) Japanese imports, 2) the need for financial aid from the federal government to unemployed autoworkers, and 3) protection for workers thrown out of work as a result of plant closures. The union's solutions to the import question were tied to policy recommendations on the other two issues. The UAW recommended that Japanese and German automakers be brought under the Autopact. Because of Canadian content regulations, this would force these automakers to locate production facilities and hence provide jobs in Canada while also allowing the same models to remain available to the consumer.(50)

On the issue of financial aid for the unemployed, the UAW stepped up its lobbying efforts on the federal government for the reintroduction of Transitional Assistance Benefits. The union also proposed the extension of regular unemployment benefits regardless of the number of weeks worked.(51) To add force to their argument, Canadian Autoworkers asked for and received Premier Davis's support in the union's appeals to the federal government.(52) This

lobbying resulted in a two-hour meeting between White and Industry Minister Herb Gray, who later announced his support, in principle, for the UAW's requests.(53) Following this was a meeting between UAW representatives and Employment Minister Lloyd Axworthy. At this meeting Axworthy announced that the federal government would now allow the unemployed in Windsor to requalify for UIC after working ten weeks, as opposed to the customary twenty weeks.(54) Although this was a step in the right direction, partial extension of UIC benefits was not enough. For many autoworkers in Windsor, the prospect of gaining another ten weeks work in order to requalify for UIC was dim. Furthermore, although Windsor was hardest hit by unemployment in the auto industry, there were large numbers of workers outside this city who also needed financial aid. The UAW therefore continued to pressure the government for further extension of unemployment benefits and the reintroduction of TAB.

Canadian Autoworkers collected signatures of support for union demands and introduced a petition to Axworthy at another meeting on May 21. At this meeting, the Minister of Employment proposed the establishment of a working group to study the economic problems and prospects of the auto industry. The UAW agreed to participate.(55) Meetings of the Working Group were held on May 26, June 17, and July 11 and 14, during the course of which the UAW became convinced that any resulting recommendations would fall far short of its demands.(56) These fears were confirmed. Although the Working Group found that 23,000 autoworkers were on

indefinite layoff and that future prospects of employment were uncertain due to the effects of auto industry restructuring, the Group stated that autoworkers presently had enough available income from UIC. In order to deal effectively with long-range problems, the Working Group argued that a "multi-faceted approach" had to be used in order to arrive at an "integrated response".(57) To Autoworkers this meant more research and little immediate action, something which those on the unemployment roll could hardly afford.

While the UAW waited for government action on the question of financial aid to the unemployed, it could ill afford to wait for solutions to the problems of plant closures. Although UAW proposals for financial aid to the unemployed would help some of these workers, there were additional problems confronting those thrown out of work by plant closures and requiring additional attention. First, these workers, many of whom were middle-aged, were being permanently laid off from the auto industry and, given the condition of the economy, faced few prospects for re-employment. Second, severance packages offered were minimal, partly as a consequence of the depressed economy and partly as a result of corporate strategies to take advantage of the weakened position of Canadian unions. The difficulty for the UAW in responding to this problem was that once a plant closed, there was little or no redress for abandoned workers.

Although the UAW required immediate action on the issue of plant closures, it initially relied upon lobbying of the Conservative government to introduce legislation to protect

workers from plant closures. This issue put to the test the provincial government's stated desire for more meaningful dialogue with organized labour. It clearly pitted workers against corporations and required that the provincial government take sides. The summer of 1980 proved to be an important test of the provincial government's relationship with unions, as demands for action on plant closures coincided with escalating pressure for legislation on the Rand formula. Since 1979 the UAW had been involved in a bitter strike at Blue Cross which refused to agree to the inclusion of the Rand formula in the collective agreement.(58) At the same time, the United Steelworkers were involved in their own protracted struggle with Radio Shack, again over the rights of workers to the automatic check-off of dues. These strikes, following as they did the violent strike at Fleck in 1978, underlined the importance for unions of legislation on the Rand formula. If the provincial government did not act on this and the issue of plant closures, White made it clear that the government could forget about future cooperation from the UAW.

The Ontario government came through on its promise to the UAW for action on the Rand formula when it introduced Bill 89, which made compulsory the automatic check-off of dues.(59) This victory encouraged the UAW and led it to continue its lobbying on the issue of plant closures. The union demanded legislation which would require companies to give 6 months notice of shutdowns and that there be public accounting of the company's decision. To enforce the legislation, the UAW proposed that the government

seize company assets without compensation if the company refused to abide by the regulations.(60) A series of lobbies by the union produced sympathetic words but no direct government action.(61)

As the weeks wore on, no government action was forthcoming and the number of plants closing their doors escalated. By June, 1980 eleven plants had either already permanently closed or were scheduled for closure over the next few weeks.(62) In response, autoworkers became increasingly militant and hostile to multinational corporations. The union therefore found itself in an increasingly intractable position. To carry on lobbying in the hope of government action meant continued job loss for autoworkers and growing internal dissatisfaction with the union. To adopt a more militant course of action might restore faith in the union amongst the membership but at the possible cost of the good relations between the Ontario government and the union. Ultimately, the costs of internal weakening of the union were too high and the benefits of good relations with the provincial Conservatives too uncertain.

At the International UAW Convention in 1980 Bob White threatened that if governments did not take immediate action to protect workers, he would lead union members onto the street in protest.(63) It was only at the next District Council meeting that these threats began to take shape. At this meeting, union members heard woeful tales of the suffering of fellow workers and their families as plants closed down.(64) Although isolated calls for cooperation with companies were heard, the overall mood of the meeting was angry and militant.(65) John Moynahan, president of

the Canadian Council, perhaps best summed up the meeting's mood when he commented on the closure of the Bendix plant in Windsor where it had recently been discovered that workers had been exposed to asbestos:

I would say that it is a sorry day indeed when an international corporation like Bendix can scar the lungs and bodies of their employees and then scar their hearts and souls with the trauma of plant closure and loss of employment and possibly pension security. It is unfortunate in this day and age to have our government speak of an industrial strategy while at the same time a group of American Corporate Bastards are disrupting our community and its workforce with a foreign decision without concern for its employees or their community.(66)

Seeing the need for some form of action which would gain both public recognition of the problem of plant closures and force governments and corporations to take workers' demands seriously, White proposed that the union stage sit-downs in the plants. White argued that workers take over their plants and stay there. When the police moved in, workers from nearby factories should close their plants and join the sit-down strikers. Such action, he argued, would be more effective than pickets since sit-downs would prevent companies from removing equipment and quietly escaping back to the U.S..(67) After lengthy debate, the District Council committed itself to a full-scale mobilization strategy, including plant sit-downs, with the expressed intent of forcing government legislation and corporate responsibility to workers. Autoworkers rushed to offer their plants as the first target for a sit-down.(68)

On August 6, 1980, the UAW faced pending closure of both the

Houdaille and Bendix plants and made a last ditch attempt to pressure the Ontario government into action.(69) Autoworkers' mood was forcefully summed up in the union's brief to the Ontario government which stated:

In a society which prides itself on its democratic institutions, this unilateral power of capital to respond only to its stockholders is a blatant contradiction.(70)

At the same time, negotiations were underway with Houdaille over the settlement conditions for workers affected by the closure. The poor terms offered by the company and the Ontario government's inactivity pushed the UAW into action.

On August 8, 200 autoworkers occupied the Houdaille plant in Oshawa.(71) Houdaille, an American multinational corporation which had paid huge severance settlements to its executives, was the perfect target for this strategy which was as much aimed at increasing public awareness of plant closures as it was at securing immediate gains for UAW members. It was also fitting that such a show of militancy should take place in the same city where the UAW staged its first protracted and successful strike in 1937, against both GM and the provincial government.

While workers occupied the plant, White persuaded the International Union to pay them strike pay, arguing that the union would suffer if it left workers to fight this battle on their own. This move bolstered the morale of both workers and staff, as did White's threat of having thousands of GM workers from the Oshawa plant join the protest if the company refused to take the Houdaille workers seriously.(72) Also inspiring was the presence

at the plant of NDP MPs Ed Broadbent and Mike Breaugh and the massive demonstration staged by the local women's auxiliary. Finally, on August 21, after repeated company threats of legal action, a settlement was reached. Severance pay was increased almost six times the amount originally offered by the company and pension benefits were improved and extended to include workers of 55 years of age.(73) By the autumn of 1980, workers at Beach Appliance in Ottawa and the Bendix plant in Windsor had also staged sit-downs and met with similar successes.(74) Soon after, the Ontario government established a Select Committee on Plant Closures and passed severance pay legislation to protect workers faced with plant closures.

These events constituted a victory for the Canadian UAW. Plant sit-downs cemented the rank-and-file's solidarity with one another and their union. It was a victory for labour at a time when other unions were in retreat and internal disarray. Most important, however, was what these actions meant for the postwar politics of compromise and the UAW's strategic responses to concerted assaults on the union by corporations and governments. Confronted with corporate breaches of the postwar compromise, Canadian Autoworkers had engaged in militant collective action, therefore breaking with the postwar practices of orderly collective bargaining and responsible political action. In turn, the effectiveness of this strategy in forcing governments and corporations to respond positively to union demands changed the perceived boundaries of action by the UAW. The sit-downs proved the militancy of Canadian Autoworkers and the ability of the union

to mobilize its membership into a programme of united collective action to protect the UAW from becoming the victim of the economic crisis.

At the same time, there were limitations to this victory. While the UAW had proven its militancy and strength and improved severance packages, individual autoworkers still lost their jobs as plants continued to close down. Beyond the hardship this produced for individual workers, plant closures also weakened the union by reducing UAW membership. Finally, and most importantly, plant sit-downs were a rearguard action which left untackled the long-term structural problems which plagued the auto industry. The UAW had to use its strength to effect a strategy which would ensure long-term benefits to its membership and a place for the union in any restructuring of the auto industry.

Meeting the Challenge of Economic Crisis: The UAW Fights Back,
1981-83

Although 1980 marked a serious downturn in the economy, it was only in 1981 that the full impact of the economic crisis was felt and its implications began to be understood. In Canada, unemployment rose to double digit figures in 1981 and inflation remained high. Interest rates skyrocketed and Canada's balance of payments declined. Finally, corporate profits continued to decline at an ever increasing rate.(75)

The auto industry was in particularly bad shape. In 1981 and 1982, imports rose to 23% and 25% respectively.(76) North American producers found themselves uncompetitive with the Japanese, owing

to the latter's lower labour costs, more efficient and technologically advanced organization of production and perceived higher quality of product. It was at this point that autoworkers and automakers alike began to realize that this was not another cyclical downturn like previous ones, but a more fundamental structural crisis for the industry. Effectively, it was a crisis in the Fordist regime of intensive accumulation and regulation.

The appreciation of the crisis as a structural one, fundamentally shifted the ground upon which UAW strategic initiatives were founded. At the most abstract level, it meant a breaking apart of the institutional arrangements put into place in the postwar period to ensure the viability of Fordism as a growth strategy. In particular, corporations and governments targetted high labour costs and rigid collective bargaining structures as a root cause of the lack of competitiveness of the Canadian economy and the auto industry in particular. Whereas in earlier postwar decades unions and high workers' wages had constituted the bedrock of Fordist expansion, unions now became the prime target for restructuring the economy. Workers' wages had to be limited as did the power of unions. This translated into attacks on unions in the workplace and a breakdown in consultation between organized labour and government.

This is not to suggest, however, that corporations and governments had a fully articulated strategy to respond to the economic crisis. Rather, corporate, government and union strategies were pieced together with each new analysis of the state of the economy and in reaction to each other's strategic

initiatives. Finally, government and corporate strategies often came into conflict as government initiatives to restore the profitability of the national or provincial economy contradicted corporate actions to restore profitability to the auto industry.

Because automakers were unsure of which direction to take in responding to industry problems, autoworkers faced uncertainty. This made it more difficult for the UAW to plot a course of action. This uncertainty was particularly acute for Canadian autoworkers as it was extremely unclear where Canada fit into the multinational corporations' agenda. Early economic indicators suggested that Canada was losing out, resulting in predictions of the collapse of the Canadian auto industry and the parts industry in particular.(77) Trends of disinvestment from Canada by vehicle manufacturers continued in the early 1980's. Canadian subsidiaries therefore had less capital to invest in improvements to increase their efficiency and international competitiveness. Corporations continued to reduce commitments under Canadian content regulations, resulting in declining production of parts in Canada. Although the Canadian dollar had dropped in value relative to the American, Canadian subsidiaries were unable to take advantage of this owing to the resulting higher costs of parts imported from the U.S. and intracorporate transfer pricing practices.(78) Finally, most North American investment in small car production was destined for the U.S., leaving Canada with the production of the large and possibly obsolete cars and specialty vehicles.

These trends appeared confirmed when GM, the largest auto

corporation operating in Canada, altered its strategy in mid-1981. Between 1979 and early 1981, GM pursued a strategy of greater vertical integration and massive North American investment to improve economies of scale. When confronted with a cash flow squeeze, continued decline in sales and the move by Japanese automakers to compete in the large car market, however, GM adopted a more defensive strategy of joint ventures with Japanese manufacturers and greater off-shore sourcing of parts.(79)

The only certain element of corporate strategy lay in the intent to scapegoat workers and unions as the root of the economic crisis. This was made abundantly clear in the last months of 1980 when the UAW, along with many other unions, faced a mounting flood of concessionary demands from employers. These demands were the first step towards dismantling the existing regime of collective bargaining. They therefore constituted a fundamental attack on the very foundations upon which unions had constructed support for themselves amongst their members and leverage with corporations. The weakened condition of unions - a result of declining memberships and increased job insecurity - made resistance to corporate attacks more problematic.

Compounding workers' weakened position was the federal Liberal government's abandonment of its 1980 nationalist platform and adoption of a policy of fiscal conservatism. Escalating interest rates reduced the demand for cars and other consumer goods. Production therefore slowed down and more workers were thrown out of work. Restrained government spending on social welfare measures harshened the effects of unemployment.

In the context of this overall uncertainty, the UAW pieced together a militant, mobilization-based strategy. The UAW ultimately moved away from defensive manoeuvring and into a struggle over how the "national interest" would be defined. The success of UAW struggles ultimately led in late 1982 to the union's reassertion of its position of power with both governments and corporations.

The complexity of events between 1981 and 1983 which led to this UAW victory necessitates a breakdown of the following discussion into four separate sub-sections. The first deals with the Canadian Autoworkers' struggle against concessions. This is followed by a discussion of the UAW's attempts to influence the federal government's auto-industry policy. The third section deals specifically with the UAW's participation on the 1983 federal Automotive Task Force. The last section consists of a discussion of the UAW's role in the NDP between 1981 and 1983.

1) The Fight Against Concessions and the Restructuring of the UAW's Role in the Workplace

In late 1980, the UAW was confronted with increasing concessionary demands from corporations. Companies threatened that without concessions by the union, plants would be closed and Canadian jobs would be lost. Given the escalating numbers of plant closures, this threat rang true for many Canadian autoworkers. The Canadian UAW therefore initially accepted concessions. In November, 1980 the UAW signed a contract with Massey Fergusson which reduced pensions and delayed COLA and annual wage increases.(80) In December, Chrysler once again demanded

concessions.(81) This time White agreed to accept them on the grounds that, unlike the earlier episode, these demands were not the result of a Congressional decision, but were based on the very real possibility of bankruptcy and loss of jobs at Chrysler.(82)

The dangers to the union of accepting these and other concessionary deals became quickly apparent, however. The local bargaining team for Chrysler local 444 divided over the question of concessions and therefore made no recommendation on the concessions contract to the Chrysler membership.(83) The majority of local 444 membership voted against concessions with the vote recorded showing 2,312 against and 2,301 in favour. Overall the Canadian Chrysler membership voted marginally in favour of concessions with 2,921 in favour and 2,664 against. Similarly close votes were recorded in the U.S..(84) These votes demonstrated the potentially divisive nature of concessions.

This point was brought home by two separate events. Firstly, union staff noted that companies were beginning to shift jobs from one plant to another within Canada, depending on workers' willingness to accept concessions. This was potentially explosive for the union. Workers would begin to see the union as responsible for such job competition and would begin to compete with their own union brothers and sisters as companies pitted autoworkers against autoworkers.

The second event which indicated the dangers for the union of accepting concessions occurred when White sent his administrative assistant to convince wildcatting workers in a small local to

return to work until negotiations were completed. These workers had previously been frightened by company threats of closure and had accepted concessions. This time, however, they felt the pinch of these give-aways and blamed the union for forcing concessions down their throats. The most striking feature of this confrontation was that these were not traditionally militant workers.(85) In the wake of this, the Canadian UAW rejected concessionary demands from a corporation taking over the bankrupt White Farm Equipment Co. in Brantford even though similar demands had been accepted in the U.S..(86)

The leadership of the Canadian UAW was in a precarious position. Militancy in the union was spreading and workers were demanding that concessions be rejected. On the other hand, many autoworkers and their families were frightened of the prospect of unemployment and if company solutions to this were concessions, these workers were willing to accept them. The union became the object of membership ire with growing disunity the result. In turn, this limited the union's capacity to mobilize the membership behind a common strategy of collective action. The Canadian UAW therefore sought a strategy to ensure the united support and collective activism of its membership.

At the next District Council meeting, Canadian Autoworkers articulated a strategy to deal with the mounting demands for concessions. White took the lead and recommended to Council that Canadian Autoworkers resist employers who were attempting to take advantage of the unique circumstances at Chrysler by demanding concessions. He urged Council delegates to pursue a No Concessions

policy.(87) White's recommendation was greeted with enthusiasm, particularly amongst Chrysler workers who had already given away substantial wages and benefits to keep the corporation afloat. However, support for a No Concessions policy also engendered open criticism of the International UAW which was blamed for pushing Canadian workers to accept concessions because of political pressure in the U.S.. The feelings of Chrysler workers were aptly summed up by Ken Gerrard, vice president of local 444:

It is sad to say the International are [sic] speaking for their own and not for us as Canadians and if that is the way it has to be, then we have no alternative but to speak out as Canadian Nationalists and say to Iacocca, the Capitalist Rat, to hell with your super deal and we as Canadians have got to stand up for Canadian jobs.."(88)

After much debate, the Canadian Council voted to reject further concessions. This decision gave White a mandate to pursue a No Concessions policy. It also gave him legitimacy as the representative of the Canadian membership should future fights with the International erupt.

The UAW's No Concessions policy was effectively a strategy to bargain "as usual" rather than reopening contracts. The Canadian strategy entailed protecting master agreements and pattern bargaining and entering into collective bargaining with an agenda of demands and the threat of a strike. If after negotiations the union had to accept less than it normally would, it would still be in a stronger position than if it had entered negotiations already prepared for concessions. Finally, the No Concessions route included rejecting company offers to trade wages for changes to

job classifications and other alterations in the organization of the labour process. This position did not emanate from an ideological rejection of cooperative labour-management relations but rather from the presentation of these demands as concessions.

The decision to pursue a course of opposition to concessions rather than accepting them was based on the potential dangers concessions held for the strength of the union. The most obvious threat lay in the internal conflict engendered by concessions. Canadian Autoworkers were already divided on the issue and it was the union rather than the company that was being blamed for them. Concessions, however, also posed a much greater, long-term threat. They constituted an attack on the very structures of collective bargaining. Concessions meant differential wage and benefit packages between plants and ad hoc negotiations with each individual company. These practices would destroy master and pattern bargaining which had historically reduced conflict between locals and workers in different corporations. Furthermore, because concessions were largely practised on an ad hoc basis they left workers open to corporate practices of pitting one worker against another, thereby forcing wages and benefits down to a lowest common denominator.

Finally, concessions were often presented in a form of increased cooperation with the company. Corporations increasingly suggested profit sharing, Quality of Working Life projects and lump-sum rewards for workers in replacement of annual wage increases and COLA adjustments. According to the corporations, these alterations would allow workers to share not only in the bad

times, but in the good times. Such projects as Quality of Working Life programmes were proposed as a means of reducing the monotony of the assembly line and allowing workers more control over their daily activities. More importantly, these measures were presented as the only viable means of improving productivity and the quality of vehicles which were necessary prerequisites for improving the international competitiveness of North American vehicle producers.(89) Without such changes to the labour process and workers' payment regime, corporations threatened that they might be forced to close down.

These types of concessions were even more threatening to the union. Such 'cooperative' measures would increasingly tie workers' interests to the corporation, therefore providing them with incentives to allow speedups and other productivity-enhancing changes. Because workers' had no control over profit levels or the recording techniques of such profits, there was no guarantee that workers' would gain any benefits from such productivity gains. Furthermore, by tying workers' interests more closely to the corporation the union's role as representative would be undermined and union membership would be fractured along corporate lines.(90)

Although Canadian Autoworkers' No Concessions strategy was formulated in recognition of these problems, its success was not guaranteed. Should corporate threats of plant closure without concessions become a reality, the Canadian UAW would still face membership discontent and job loss for its membership. Nonetheless, the Canadian UAW leadership was convinced that

concessions would not in themselves save a corporation, nor resolve the economic crisis. They would certainly weaken the union, however. A No Concessions strategy therefore appeared as the only viable response by the union.

The union's No concessions strategy was soon put to the test. In the last months of 1981, two different cases of concessionary demands clearly illustrated the various potential dangers for the union. Long Manufacturing, a parts producer located in Oakville, demanded the reopening of the UAW contract. The company wanted vacation time reduced, employee responsibility for insurance, significantly reduced COLA and no future wage increases. If workers did not accept these company demands, Long Manufacturing threatened to close the plant. If workers accepted them, however, the plant would continue to function and the company proposed that 50 jobs be moved to Oakville from its Michigan plant, which was also unionized by the UAW. In defiance of the Canadian union leadership, the local bargaining committee pursued negotiations with the corporation.

The threats that these concessions posed to the Canadian UAW were threefold. Firstly, based on past experience, the union leadership expected that acceptance of these concessions would result in future internal divisions as workers who accepted the concessions would later blame the union for their losses. Secondly, the potential relocation of jobs from the U.S. to Canada in exchange for concessions posed a threat of pitting Canadian workers against American workers who all belonged to the same union. Finally, negotiations by the local committee posed a threat to the

Region's No Concessions policy and the possibility of a united strategy. Given these dangers, White stepped into local negotiations and a recommendation to reject the concessionary demands was presented to the membership. The union's policy appeared vindicated when a substantial majority of the Long Manufacturing workers accepted this recommendation.

American Motors Corporation also jumped on the concessions bandwagon. AMC demanded that workers' forfeit substantial wages and benefits to finance the company's future product line. In exchange, if profits reached 4% of sales in 1985 (a virtual impossibility for AMC given its past history) workers would be paid back the lost monies with 10% interest. Unlike the Long Manufacturing local, local 1285 at the AMC plant agreed with the No Concessions policy and recommended that concessions be rejected by the membership. Although many of the voting members were probationary, the membership voted 1100 to 1 in favour of the no-concessions route. Shortly thereafter, the second shift of workers at AMC was laid off. AMC management, however, advised the union that the layoff was not the result of the UAW's No Concessions stand, but of declining car sales. (91)

These two experiences confirmed the union's analysis of concessions. Concessions would neither prevent layoffs, nor guarantee corporate profitability. They did hold the potential to divide the union, however. While the votes at both plants demonstrated rank-and-file militancy and the willingness of autoworkers to fight concessions, conflict between local union

leaders at Long Manufacturing and the UAW executive over the No Concessions policy indicated that certain sections of the union were anxious to accept concessions. These events underlined the importance of central control over collective bargaining and an active mobilization of the membership behind the union's No Concessions policy.

To strengthen the union's position, the UAW sought allies in its No Concessions policy and solicited support from the Ontario Federation of Labour and the CLC. Both these labour federations endorsed the UAW's position and the latter called for all Canadian affiliates to follow suit.(92) Even the International Union appeared bent on a No Concessions policy. At two meetings of the International Executive Board held in July and September, 1981, the executive declared it would not reopen collective agreements for early negotiations.(93)

Within days of GM's announced intention to demand concessions from the UAW, however, the IEB reversed its decision.(94) Backed by the January 1981 Canadian Council decision to reject future concessions, White cast the lone dissenting vote against the decision to give GM concessions. Members of the UAW Executive Board attacked White for committing Canadian Autoworkers to a policy position without prior approval of the IEB. Such practices had been unheard of since the Reuther years of centralized control. White responded that the Executive could throw him out of the administrative caucus but he would not move on the Council's No Concessions position. White calculated that the Canadian border, combined with Canadian membership voting control over the

position of Canadian Director, would hamper any attempts by International officers to replace the Canadian Director. White's mandate from the Canadian membership was secured when, within hours of the IEB meeting, both the Ford and GM Canadian Bargaining Councils voted against the reopening of their contracts.(95)

At the next Canadian Council meeting White reminded delegates of the stakes involved for the union if it was to allow concessions:

I predict we will before this [concessions] is over, see large numbers of our members attacking each other and fighting each other for jobs. We will have large numbers of our members attacking not the corporations or the governments, but the leadership of our union, and will eventually see them turn against our union as an institution.(96)

The basis for White's fears came from events inside the American UAW. Just prior to the Canadian Council meeting, UAW President Fraser attempted to sell the concessions decision to American GM workers. Forty-six percent of both the American GM union leadership and the membership voted against the president's proposal to reopen GM contracts.(97) Nevertheless the slightly favourable majority was taken as a mandate to reopen the contracts and the re-negotiated agreements contained \$3 billion in concessions, including a profit-sharing plan in lieu of wages. The vote on the contract bore out White's predictions on the dangers of dividing the membership; only 52% of the GM workers in the U.S. voted for the contract.(98)

White blamed this discordance between the rank and file and

the American UAW leadership upon the lack of contact between American Regional Directors and their membership. According to White, the existence of the Canadian Council was responsible for preventing similar internal divisions from erupting amongst Canadian Autoworkers.(99)

For the Canadian UAW to speak with one voice against concessions, the membership had to be mobilized. Once again the Canadian Council became the organizational basis for the execution of the union's strategy. The Council formulated a plan for organizing against concessions and local delegates returned to their membership to put the plan into action. All staff were directed to coordinate and focus on the No Concessions strategy. The UAW used its newspaper, special literature and speaking tours to articulate the union's position to the membership. Shop stewards were involved in the process to ensure daily reinforcement of the union's position.(100) Although perhaps coincidental, the creation of a separate Quebec Council identical to the Canadian Council and of improved representational structures for women in the union, including the provision of daycare at Council meetings, could not but help mobilize unity in the ranks of the union.(101)

Perhaps the most delicate task involved in this mobilization was the attempt by the Canadian UAW leadership to present the Region's No Concessions position as a resistance to the corporations and separate this from growing animosity towards the International Union. Evidence of Canadian Autoworkers' distrust of the International was becoming increasingly apparent during

Council debates. The decision by Canadian Chrysler workers to withdraw from the international agreement was seen by many as further confirmation of the reorientation of the union away from the International union.(102)

White resisted this interpretation of the Canadian UAW's strategic divergence from the International Union. He argued that unique Canadian economic conditions necessitated a different UAW strategy. The linchpin of this argument was that Canadian labour was cheaper due to the devalued Canadian dollar, a government run health insurance scheme, and other social services.

White also pointed to the historically high profits generated by North American automakers and the excessively high salaries paid to corporate executives to divert membership anger away from the International union and against the corporations. Finally, White argued that the solution to the industry's problems lay in government protection, not in workers' concessions.(103) This approach to the mobilization of Canadian Autoworkers was critical. It deflected criticism away from the UAW itself, of which Canadian autoworkers were a part, and therefore prevented membership energies from being drained through internal struggles and instead mobilized them against corporations and governments.

The difficulty of mobilizing the membership behind a united strategy was revealed in spring negotiations at the Rockwell and Eaton parts plants in Tilbury and Wallaceburg respectively. Both companies proposed the replacement of COLA with a profit-sharing scheme. Despite UAW staff opposition, the local bargaining

committee at Rockwell recommended in favour of the proposals and was supported by the membership.

At the Eaton plant the situation was more complex and revealed internal divisions within the union and the political dangers therein. Once again the UAW staff opposed the agreement while the local bargaining committee favoured it. The membership, however, voted to resist concessions and go on strike. Not to be outdone, the local committee undertook a phone campaign of the membership and held a second meeting from which UAW staff was barred. This time the membership voted in favour of concessions, following which the local president contacted International UAW President Fraser to complain of Robert White and his staff's interference in local matters.(104) Not only had these locals broken solidarity with union policy but the aftermath of internal politicking revealed the deep divisions within the union over the No Concessions policy. To be successful, the Canadian UAW had to henceforth show a united front. Otherwise the existing leadership would be threatened as would the ability of workers to resist repeated demands for concessions.

The upcoming Big Three negotiations were the major test of the No Concessions policy and the drive to protect existing regulations governing collective bargaining. At the May, 1982 Canadian UAW Bargaining Conference the goals for upcoming negotiations were clearly laid out and the No Concessions position confirmed.(105) Before bargaining began yet another obstacle was put in the way of Canadian Autoworkers. In June, 1982 the federal government introduced its "6 & 5" legislation and was soon

followed by the Ontario government. These acts withdrew public-sector workers' right to strike and restricted bargaining over wage settlements.(106) When Bob White, as a member of the CLC Executive, met with the federal government to pressure it into reversing its monetarist policy direction and resuming Keynesian solutions to the crisis, government officials completely ignored these suggestions. Instead they issued a warning to private-sector unions. Prime Minister Trudeau announced the establishment of a committee, headed by Ian Sinclair of Canadian Pacific, which would have the responsibility of ensuring that private-sector employers stayed within the limits of the government's restraint programme. Trudeau then turned to White and warned him that the government would discuss the restraint package with the heads of the auto corporations to ensure that the UAW did not negotiate substantially better contracts in the upcoming negotiations.

The Prime Minister followed up on this threat in August, 1982. The Prime Minister's Office called a meeting with Bob White, representatives of the auto industry and government officials to discuss Japanese imports, prospects for the auto industry and the government's "6 & 5" programme. At the meeting, Trudeau issued an ultimatum. Either the auto industry followed the government restraint programme in its upcoming collective bargaining or the government would refuse further discussions on the question of Japanese imports and delay further negotiations with Japanese automakers.(107)

The UAW was no longer fighting individual corporate demands

for concessions but was now faced with a government which had clearly allied itself with the auto industry. The stakes of the UAW's No Concessions position had grown. As both business and government made clear their intention to have unions pay the price of economic recovery, the only strategic avenue open to the autoworkers was to use their power in the workplace to resist being made the scapegoats of the economic crisis.

In a symbolic move to garner greater support for the UAW's position, White raised the question of concessions in his speech to the central committee of the International Metalworkers' Federation. He implored all unions to oppose multinational demands for concessions.(108) A more tangible move to bolster the union's position was made at the June Canadian Council meeting. Council delegates voted in favour of a special levy of fifty cents per month per member to build a No Concessions strike fund.(109) Canadian Autoworkers were preparing themselves for a bitter and potentially protracted struggle.

Talks began between the UAW and the Big Three in July, 1982. Both Chrysler and GM demanded concessions.(110) Negotiations with GM were the first ones to get seriously underway. General Motors opened negotiations with a threat. Either Canadian Autoworkers accepted concessions like their counterparts in the U.S., or car production would be moved out of Canada. This threat was made all the more real as it came days after GM laid off 1540 Ontario autoworkers.(11) Nonetheless, Canadian GM workers stuck to their No Concessions position and by mid-September a settlement was reached. Although the UAW gave up paid personal holidays, it

maintained a modified Annual Improvement Factor and COLA and gained a commitment by GM to pay lump sums of up to \$17,500 to long-service employees laid off due to plant closure. Perhaps most important was GM's agreement not to revise work rules which would have given the company greater flexibility in assigning workers. The total package won by the union equalled a 9% increase for workers in the first year of the contract. The UAW bargaining committee unanimously accepted the offer and membership votes in favour of the agreement were high.(112) This was a victory for the UAW. Canadian Autoworkers had resisted the major concessions demanded by GM and government pressure to stay within the "6 & 5" government guidelines.

In so doing the UAW had preserved the basic structure of institutionalized collective bargaining. The settlement also restored members' faith in their union as the defender of their interests. More importantly, however, the GM negotiations confirmed the union's analysis of concessions. Concessions and the threat of plant closure were not intended to salvage dying corporations but rather were an attempt by corporations to seize the moment to weaken unions and restructure workplace relations. Finally, this victory encouraged UAW militants and found them new allies, therefore paving the way for future successes.

Perhaps more important in the union's No Concessions fight, however, was the outcome of Chrysler negotiations. These were delayed until the GM settlement, after which the UAW and Chrysler Corporation began bargaining in earnest. Chrysler continued to

demand further concessions while Canadian Autoworkers demanded that they begin to recoup the losses incurred over the past two years. When the corporation refused to budge, Canadian Autoworkers went on strike while their American brothers and sisters waited on the sidelines.

Bargaining remained at a standstill. When the first week of December passed and it looked as though the strike would drag on well into the New Year, the Canadian bargaining committee presented its bottom line to the corporation. The union demanded a \$1.15 per hour increase effective immediately and COLA, to be followed by further wage and COLA increases in the second year of the agreement. At first Iacocca flatly refused the proposal. In a last marathon bid for an agreement, however, Chrysler backed down and agreed to the \$1.15 wage increase and other benefits in exchange for a one-year agreement. Within hours the settlement was enthusiastically endorsed by the Canadian membership. The Canadian settlement also led the way for a 75 cent wage increase for American UAW members.(113)

This agreement thrust the Canadian UAW into the limelight. The union received vast media coverage and became a symbol of militancy in labour circles in both the U.S. and Canada. Canadian Autoworkers had taken on a corporation and had won in the face of enormous odds. Telegrams from unions across Canada poured into the UAW office, claiming that the UAW had given them the courage to continue their battles against big business.(114)

Both the media attention and the widespread support for Canadian Autoworkers' actions enhanced the position of the UAW.

This alone, however, could not have catapulted the union into the position of power that it achieved after these negotiations. Rather, it was the union's ability to seize a strategic moment when Chrysler was just beginning to regain its economic viability and then successfully mobilize its membership behind a united strategy that won the union this victory. In turn, the Chrysler settlement cemented the sometimes fragile unity amongst Canadian Autoworkers. The struggle itself built strong ties between workers from other plants who saw in the Chrysler strike, the crucial test of the union's future. Finally, Canadian Chrysler workers, who only two years previously had been severely divided on the question of concessions, emerged united and more militant in their support of their union.

This round of collective bargaining with the large automakers was a milestone in the Canadian Autoworkers' No Concessions strategy and their attempt to regain a position of strength both politically and economically. The concessions battle was far from over, however. The economic crisis had taken its greatest toll on the smaller non-auto and parts plants. Autoworkers in these factories had yet to enter negotiations which were scheduled for 1983. These workers would need all possible union support to resist concessions. If these negotiations produced concessions, the door would once again be opened for a possible flood of concessionary demands. Moreover, concessions in these sectors held the potential of dividing the union between workers employed by the large automakers and those in the smaller plants.(115) The

Canadian UAW still faced an uphill battle in its struggles to resist concessions and maintain internal harmony, and hence union strength.

Furthermore, The UAW's No Concessions victories still did not address the more serious underlying threat to unions posed by concessionary demands. Concessions were the thin edge of the wedge designed to restructure the place of unions in the workplace and the Fordist regime as a whole. If most other unions accepted the restructuring of their position in the workplace, the UAW would eventually be forced to follow suit. Although the UAW's pressure to have other unions and labour federations follow a No Concessions strategy had produced some solidarity amongst unions, this was not enough. What was required to fight effectively the imposition of a new, and reduced, role for unions in society was a more structurally unified labour movement.

It was in this context then, that Bob White began pursuing the idea of a Canadian Metalworkers' Federation. Given the severely weakened position of industrial unions, the only route for Canadian union survival and growth, according to White, was the creation of "organic unity" within the Canadian labour movement.(116) The creation of a Canadian Metalworkers' Federation was seen as the first step towards this goal. Such a federation would create a closer working relationship between Canadian sections of International industrial unions. Unions, such as the Steelworkers, Machinists, Moulders and Rubberworkers would join the federation and share information, jointly organize new workers, coordinate collective bargaining and synchronize

political, research and legislative activities. According to White, this organization was not intended as a move against International unions. Rather, it was intended to strengthen the position of unions as a whole in Canada by allowing greater coordination of union activities and more effective mobilization of labour's resources.(117) Ironically, the unanticipated fruits of the UAW's own success in its workplace and legislative struggles would prevent this restructuring of the Canadian labour movement.

ii) Demanding a Canadian Industrial Strategy

The UAW saw many of the problems associated with the decline in the North American auto industry as beyond the scope of workplace action. Canadian government action was seen as imperative. Specifically, Japanese imports were targetted as the number one problem. The UAW saw these imports as having a multiplicity of effects on the North American auto industry. At the most obvious level, they increased competition and reduced the North American producers' market shares. This meant more downtime in Canadian plants and in some cases forced plant closure. For Canadian Autoworkers this meant longer and more frequent periods of layoff and possibly permanent unemployment.

In addition, the UAW argued that increases in off-shore production of parts by North American automakers were a result of the heightened competition from imports. Because Japanese producers were not required to produce in Canada as were North American auto producers covered by the Autopact, Japanese

automakers had an unfair cost advantage. In response to this heightened competition, North American automakers were reducing their commitment under the Canadian content regulations and shifting production to cheap wage labour zones. The immediate effect of this was increased unemployment. In the long term, these corporate practices threatened the future existence of the Canadian auto industry.

The Canadian UAW rejected the argument that cutting labour costs in North America would rejuvenate this industry. Rather the union argued that the solution to these problems lay in a national policy designed to protect the auto industry and Canadian interests. White summed this up in a statement made to the Canadian Council:

If the government does not have the guts to make the rules in Canada's best interests, then we will lose jobs to imports, as well as outsourcing by the North American manufacturers. The Japanese auto manufacturers will not source significant production in this country unless forced to do so, and North American manufacturers will join them and ship parts and fully assembled automobiles into Canada, unless the rules say otherwise. Contrary to what some would have us believe, there is little if anything we can do about that in collective bargaining. (118)

The immediate task at hand for the UAW was therefore to increase its pressure on the federal government.

Since 1980, Canadian Autoworkers had experienced a decline in their influence over the federal government. Evidence of this was seen in the lack of government action on the issues of reintroduction of TAB, unemployment and the decline of the Canadian auto industry. Furthermore, government discourse had shifted from its earlier nationalist rhetoric towards a discourse

of restraint.(119) Because of these changes and because auto industry problems were seen by the UAW as beyond the scope of its own workplace action, Canadian Autoworkers adopted an alliance-building strategy to increase the effectiveness of its lobbies.

This strategy had at least two tangible advantages over a traditional single-interest-group lobby. Firstly, it reduced the government's ability to dismiss the UAW's demands as those of a special interest. In so doing, it limited the government's strategic ability to divide-and-rule the various groups clamouring for action. Secondly, it enhanced the legitimacy of the UAW's demands by providing it with a broader base of support.

Canadian Autoworkers initially found allies amongst the Canadian subsidiaries of the North American parts and auto producers. On April 4, 1981 representatives from the domestic auto industry joined with the UAW to meet members of Cabinet, including Herb Gray. They demanded that the federal government take immediate action to restrict car imports and pursue the long-term goal of ensuring increased Canadian content in foreign and particularly Japanese cars.(120)

Political pressure for Canadian government action was increased when in May the U.S. reached a three-year agreement with the Japanese to restrict voluntarily exports to the U.S.. The Canadian government thereafter undertook its own negotiations with the Japanese and under the direction of Herb Gray, Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce, reached an agreement on June 5, 1981. The Japanese agreed to reduce their exports to Canada by 6% of the 1980 level.(121) The UAW, the auto industry and NDP-MP's

decried this arrangement as it still allowed the Japanese 18% of the Canadian market and did nothing towards the longer term goal of Japanese investment in Canada.(122)

In reality the agreement was even more useless than the above groups anticipated. The agreement came into effect after a surge of Japanese imports into Canada in the early part of 1981. Consequently, Japanese imports actually increased in 1981.(123)

Compounding the problems of the Canadian auto industry were the soaring interest rates which dampened demand for North American-made vehicles. The UAW quickly added this problem to its agenda for immediate political action. Canadian Autoworkers supported the Ontario Federation of Labour's post-card campaign which was intended to register massive displeasure with high interest rates. The UAW pressed for further action on this problem and consistent with its newly adopted strategy of alliance building, pressed the CLC Executive to form a broad coalition to fight interest rates. The recommendation was adopted and preparations by the CLC began for a massive demonstration.(124)

In the meantime, layoffs of UAW members attributed to the jump in interest rates resulted in a meeting between a large UAW delegation and federal government officials.(125) The meeting was to no avail. The culmination of organized labour's protest to interest rates came on November 21, 1981 when the CLC-planned massive interest rate demonstration took place. An estimated 100,000 people, including consumers, home-owners, small business and workers, marched in protest on Parliament Hill.(126) As in

previous demonstrations, the UAW had the single largest union delegation in attendance.(127)

Although the Canadian labour movement had been successful in forging a popular-based coalition for the demonstration and massive numbers of people had turned up to protest, the demonstration was not a success. It neither affected government policy, nor did it build a long-term coalition between unions and the community. On the issue of interest rates unions might find temporary allies, but the public remained hostile to unions, a hostility which made labour's defence of its position in society more difficult.

At the same time as mobilizing its membership for the interest rate rally, the UAW continued to lobby for action on the question of imports. With the release of figures on the continued increase in Japanese imports and in anticipation of the renegotiation of the import agreement, White sent a detailed letter to Herb Gray pressing him for further action. The UAW's position consisted of two points: 1) Japanese automobiles should be limited to 10% of the Canadian market and 2) any increase beyond 10% should be based on a formula which necessitated a commitment to Canadian content.(128)

To bolster the union's position, the UAW once again sought allies in its struggle. The union approached and received the support of the Motor Vehicle Manufacturer's and the Automotive Parts Manufacturer's Associations. In a response to White's request that these Associations follow up on the UAW's lobby of Herb Gray, both groups contacted the federal government and

pressed for measures similar to those advocated by the union. Following a meeting between the UAW Auto Tariff Committee and Herb Gray on December 21, 1981, the UAW solicited the support of the CLC and its affiliates in the UAW lobby against imports. Arguing that a decline in the auto industry reverberated throughout the national economy, the Autoworkers quickly gained this support. The CLC Executive Council endorsed the UAW's position as did various affiliates which sent their own letters to the Prime Minister demanding action on the import question.(129)

The UAW then took up its proposal on imports with provincial parties and legislatures. UAW representatives first lobbied Ontario Liberal and NDP caucuses to gain support for their proposal for new auto trade rules.(130) Having gained these groups' support, the UAW then turned to Premiers Davis and Levesque to garner official provincial government support. After lobbying by UAW representatives of various provincial members, White met with both Premiers. The Ontario government came out in favour of Canadian content regulations for off-shore manufacturers and the Quebec legislature passed a motion officially endorsing the UAW's position on imports.(131)

The UAW's successful alliance building and aggressive lobbying brought results. Canadian Autoworkers participated in a series of meetings on imports with the Motor Vehicle Parts Manufacturer's Association, the Automotive Parts Manufacturer's Association, and government officials. At the first meeting all three groups made separate presentations to the federal

government. This action led Edward Lumley, Minister of Trade who had taken over Herb Gray's responsibility for auto trade negotiations, to claim that the three groups could not agree on a course of government action. Fearing that this was an attempt by the government to avoid action, White sought to construct a consensus with the parts and auto producers. After lengthy meetings, the three groups finally came to an agreement. Although the UAW was forced to soften its position, the agreement contained the crucial demands for import restrictions and a long-term programme for locating Japanese production facilities in Canada.(132)

This success resulted in a three-day meeting between UAW representatives and various government and opposition caucuses.(133) Shortly after this meeting, Lumley left for Japan to renegotiate an auto trade agreement. His three basic demands were: 1) a reduction in Japanese imports, 2) an increase in Canadian value added through the purchase of Canadian auto parts and 3) prospective investment in Canada by Japanese vehicle manufacturers. In contrast to Gray, Lumley took a harder line towards the Japanese and threatened retaliatory action should the Japanese ignore Canadian demands.(134) Despite these threats, Lumley returned to Canada without an agreement. At midnight, upon the Minister's immediate return to Canada, he called White at his home to announce the bad news. Although Lumley dismissed White's suggestion of unilateral government action, he did agree to slow down Customs inspection of Japanese imports as a means of pressuring the Japanese to negotiate an agreement.(135)

Japanese imports were slowed to a trickle as Customs inspectors increased the number of imported cars examined at the border. The effect of these measures was a dramatic reduction in the availability and hence the sale of Japanese vehicles. In July, sales of Japanese cars dropped to 16.3% and trucks to 19.2%.⁽¹³⁶⁾ By the middle of August the federal government announced that a new deal with the Japanese had been reached. Imports would be severely restricted.⁽¹³⁷⁾

The UAW's alliance building strategy appeared to pay off. It resecured the union influence over government policy and forced the government into action on the question of Japanese imports. An explanation for this success, which contrasted with the failure of the interest rate rally, lay in the allies brought 'on side' by the UAW, the enduring nature of these alliances and the lack of coherent policy stance taken by the federal government on the issue of Japanese imports. Federal government actions on the issue of Japanese imports were short-term and incremental. This government appeared uncertain how to deal with the import problem and preferred to adopt a wait-and-see attitude. The importance of the auto industry to the national economy, however, made it imperative that solutions be found to the crisis in this industrial sector. This uncertainty made the government more open to pressure and proposed union solutions.

The UAW seized this opportunity but realized its own limitations in forcing government action. The union therefore sought broad-based alliances, including the automakers themselves

and the two provincial governments most affected by auto industry adjustment and recession. These were powerful allies and in willingly compromising its own agenda, the UAW organized a unity of interest between these groups. Moreover, these alliances were nurtured by the union to ensure that they did not immediately dissolve, as had those on the issue of interest rates.

The UAW's alliance-building strategy also has a broader significance for understanding this union's response to the breakdown of the Fordist regime. When the postwar settlement was secured, unions gained access to and influence upon governments in exchange for practising "responsible unionism". Under this arrangement, the state enhanced and protected union legitimacy. When this compromise broke down, unions were threatened with a loss of their legitimacy in society and became the scapegoats of the economic crisis. This could be seen in government and corporate actions and discourse and in the increasing public hostility towards unions. Canadian Autoworkers' alliance-building strategy was a response to their loss of influence and legitimacy, which had the effect of constructing a new legitimacy for the union outside the sphere of the state and inside society. Given the prevailing uncertainty of both government and corporate responses to the crisis, these actions by the UAW constituted a shift away from defensive manoeuvring and entered the UAW into a debate over how the "national" interest would be defined. Eventually, this would lead the UAW to become one of the central figures in the national debate over free trade with the United States.

iii) The 1983 Task Force on the Canadian Auto Industry: A Move towards the Reincorporation of Canadian Autoworkers into "Responsible" Unionism

Perhaps the most important indication that UAW mobilization had paid off came in 1983 when Edward Lumley asked Bob White to co-chair with Pat Lavelle, President of the Automotive Parts Manufacturers' Association, a task force on the Canadian auto industry. Other members of the task force included the presidents of the Big Three in Canada and Sam Gindin, UAW Research Director.(138)

In mobilizing broad-based political support for its policy demands, the Canadian UAW had mounted effective pressure on the government. Moreover, this mobilization combined with Canadian Autoworkers' willing and successful use of militant workplace action to secure both immediate demands for its membership and greater public attentions to workers' plight, constituted a political threat to the government. The federal government's attempts to push unions outside the policy decision-making process were being effectively countered by Canadian Autoworkers. Consequently, the government wanted to bring the Canadian UAW 'on side' and reincorporate it into the sphere of "responsible" unionism. The task force was the first step towards this end.

White's appointment as co-chair of the task force marked the first time that a union leader had been given such a powerful position on a government-appointed body. It did not, however, guarantee union victory on all government fronts. In fact, soon after White's assumption of his duties as co-chair of the Task

Force, the UAW and Canadian automakers suffered a major setback. Negotiations with the Japanese over continued import restrictions began anew, this time under the direction of Gerald Regan, Minister of State for International Trade. In contrast to UAW experience with Lumley, Regan ignored UAW input into the negotiations and agreed to a deal which allowed for substantial increases in Japanese vehicle imports. (139)

Both the lack of communication between Regan and the union and the resulting trade agreement brought home the uncertainty of the UAW's position of influence with the government. It also emphasized the importance for the union of using the Task Force as a means of pushing the government into action. This meant hammering out a compromise with the automakers, without which the report could be easily dismissed by government and the prospective fruits of union influence evaporate. For the next few weeks the Task Force became the focus of the UAW leadership's activity until on May 19, 1983 the Task Force Report was submitted to Edward Lumley.

The report constituted an exhaustive study of the Canadian auto industry, including in its purview consumer concerns, competitiveness, labour-management relations and Transitional Assistance Benefits. In these sections of the report the UAW won some unanticipated victories. On competitiveness, all presidents of the automotive and parts manufacturers agreed to the report's findings that:

"Productivity, quality of production, labour costs and absenteeism in Canadian plants compare favourably with conditions in plants in the United States, Europe,

Australia, and any Third World country where vehicles are produced.(140)

This had potential repercussions for collective bargaining, since it prevented corporations from using arguments based on Canadian labour's lower productivity to force concessions. Additionally, the report recognized the need for reinstitution of TAB for workers dislocated as a result of industry restructuring. This had been a union demand since 1978 when the first effects of restructuring began to take their toll on Canadian autoworkers.

The most important, although most publicly controversial section of the report, consisted of the Task Force's proposed new trading relations for Canada. The Task Force recommended that the basic formula of trade outlined in the Autopact be applied to off-shore producers. It proposed that a gradual increase in Canadian content be required of vehicle producers importing into Canada and established the goal of 60% Canadian content to be achieved by 1987. Added to this, the Task Force report recommended that any manufacturer which sold 28,000 vehicles in Canada must establish an assembly facility and continue to meet a specified assembly-to-sales ratio. The enforcement mechanism for such an agreement would be quotas. Failure to meet Canadian content regulations would result in a restriction of sales to less than 3,000 vehicles per year. The rationale behind this proposal was the creation of jobs in the auto and related industries and the anticipated spin-offs for the Canadian economy.(141)

While these sections of the report favoured the UAW, other sections committed the union to support for certain corporate

restructuring strategies. In particular, by recommending the report, White endorsed changes in workplace arrangements which would result in the development of a more flexible labour process. Specific measures cited by the Task Force included broader job definitions, more flexible staffing arrangements and the use of group problem-solving techniques to improve productivity.(142) Although White had rejected many of these measures when presented as concessions, his support for the Task Force Report indicated his willingness to accept modifications to work practices if the union was involved in planning and executing these measures. For their part, corporations had gained by securing the UAW leaders' commitment to changed labour-management relations. The report was unanimously recommended by all members of the Task Force.

The UAW's membership's support for changes to work practices, with their possible threat to individual, and in particular skilled, workers' jobs, was never 'tested' by White. Whether due to the relative unimportance attached by White to these sections or due to the possible divisive nature of these recommendations, the Canadian Director focussed on other aspects of the Task Force in his report to Council. White declared the Task Force Report a victory for the UAW because of its recommendations in favour of TAB and an auto trade policy, both of which the UAW had been demanding.(143)

Given recent UAW experiences with government, particularly the recent Japanese trade negotiations, however, the UAW leadership recognized the inherent dangers of such a report. Firstly, although many UAW demands were given legitimacy by the

report, so too was government action given legitimacy because of the union's participation on the Task Force. Furthermore, the government now had an easy scapegoat should action on trade prove politically dangerous. Secondly, because the report was considered favourable to union demands, it had the potential of placating Canadian Autoworkers before any real government action took place. Given the federal government's recent practice of ignoring union demands, the UAW could ill afford to lose the momentum that had achieved White the position of co-chair of the Task Force in the first place.

The Canadian Director therefore advocated continued mobilization of pressure on the government. The proposed action campaign imitated many similar lobbies of the recent past. The first step in the UAW's campaign consisted of an informational campaign to ensure that Autoworkers knew the details of the report. The first step towards this goal was taken at the District Council meeting where White explained in detail the nature of the Task Force Report and urged all delegates to return to their locals to spread the information. The Canadian Council Auto Tariff Committee and a number of local leaders from the auto sector were given more detailed information. Following this, staff were sent into locals to undertake in-depth discussions of the report with in-plant leadership.(144)

To mount political pressure in support of the Task Force and get the membership involved, the UAW developed a card voicing support for the report. The union urged locals to get the

membership, members of the community , including auto dealers, and local managers to sign the cards, which would be presented to the Prime Minister at a meeting in the fall. Consistent with earlier UAW efforts to build broad coalitions, White recommended that locals set up tables in local shopping centres in order to garner widespread support for the trade recommendations. To increase the political pressure, the programme of action included directives for locals to garner the official support of Municipal Councils and local Members of Parliament. To aid in this mobilization, the UAW office prepared leaflets, video tapes and fact sheets on the auto industry and its importance for the entire Canadian economy.

In the meantime, the UAW leadership secured the support of Ed Broadbent and the NDP Federal Caucus. It then pressed for the official endorsement of the union's position by both the Quebec and Ontario governments. Finally, the union leaders prepared to get the endorsement of the upcoming federal NDP convention and the various provincial NDP leaders, including Manitoba premier Howard Pawley.(145)

Beyond the efforts by Canadian Autoworkers, the campaign to gain political support for the Task Force was aided by two other factors. Firstly, both the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers' Association and Automotive Parts Manufacturers' Association waged their own campaign to garner support for government action. Secondly, as in previous lobbies, the importance of the industry itself for the entire Canadian industrial complex lent credence to union and corporate demands for protection from Japanese imports. During the depths of economic crisis, entire communities had been

brought to their knees owing to their dependence upon the auto industry. Furthermore, workers in other economic sectors dependent upon the auto industry felt the pinch of a deteriorating Canadian auto industry. It was hardly a surprise when the UAW's campaign gained widespread support.

By October, thirty Municipal Councils had endorsed the UAW's position, as had various unions in the CLC. The Steelworkers and Rubberworkers distributed UAW material to their members and urged them to sign cards in support of government action on the auto industry. The UAW locals had worked hard in mobilizing support within their respective communities. For example, local 199 in St. Catharines, with a membership of 8,000, succeeded in getting 18,012 cards signed to support the Task Force.(146) Finally, the Ontario and Quebec governments came out in support of the UAW's position, as did the NDP convention. Perhaps the most surprising turn around was witnessed at GM Canada. Because GM in the U.S. opposed content regulation, Don Hackworth, president of GM Canada, had promised not to lobby government on trade policy. Given the Manufacturers Associations' and the union's campaigns, however, the president changed his mind and began actively supporting the Task Force.(147)

In the meantime, the UAW held a series of meetings with the federal government to discuss the Task Force Report. Lumley finally responded to the mounting pressure. Although he remained unwilling to move on the larger issue of trade, he implemented a series of minor Task Force recommendations. These included the

creation of an Automotive Council to advise government on auto policy, an annual reporting system on the industry and some encouragement of the parts industry which was the hardest hit by the combined economic crisis and restructuring of the auto industry.(148) These moves by Lumley encouraged the UAW which continued to pressure the government by mounting a radio and newspaper ad campaign and getting provincial MLA's to sign content cards in support of the Task Force recommendations.(149) A meeting between the UAW and Prime Minister Trudeau fed union hopes that the federal government would take further action on the Task Force proposals. Trudeau's resignation and the resulting national election dashed these hopes.(150) No government was going to act on such provocative measures as those advocated by the Task Force when it faced an impending election.

White's appointment as co-chair of the Task Force and the resulting report on the auto industry brought few immediate tangible results for the Canadian UAW. Yet, these same developments pointed to the future shape of any new mode of regulation and the UAW's place in this new arrangement. White's appointment was the fruit of the union's successful mobilization against plant closures, concessions and, ultimately, the union's exclusion from decision-making. By 'flexing its muscles', the UAW had forced the federal government and corporations to shift from a strategy of union bashing to that of constructing a new form of consultation with the union. In garnering UAW support for such consultation, corporations gained union support for future restructuring and governments enhanced the legitimacy of their

policy efforts. While Canadian Autoworkers had not forced a fundamental realignment of political forces, they had prevented, at least temporarily, their union's exclusion from future restructuring of labour-management relations and the auto industry.

The NDP as a Long Range Strategy

In the 1980's, the UAW's orientation towards the NDP underwent a subtle but important change. There were two major elements to this change. Firstly, in the context of the UAW's overall political struggles in the 1980's, the importance of the NDP was eclipsed by Canadian Autoworkers' pursuit of other political strategies. The election of an NDP government, either provincially or federally, was unlikely in the immediate future, something which was confirmed by the results of the 1979 and 1980 parallel campaigns. Yet, Canadian Autoworkers needed immediate political action in order to protect their jobs and their union's position in the workplace and society. Therefore, although the UAW supported the NDP with the long-term goal of finally electing a social democratic government, other strategies such as collective bargaining, workplace action and lobbying became more important to the UAW's political agenda.

Secondly, the UAW altered the focus of its contribution to the NDP. Although the UAW leadership continued to press locals to affiliate and wield influence inside the party through its elected party positions, the UAW focused more and more of its energies on raising the political consciousness of Canadian Autoworkers. By

doing this, the UAW intended to mobilize politically its membership behind the union's ongoing battles of which the NDP formed only a small component.

This latter change was partly a consequence of lessons learned from the 1979 and 1980 parallel campaigns. As Sam Gindin had reported immediately following the 1979 election, the UAW's immediate goals must be to continue its militancy and raise the political consciousness of its membership. According to Gindin, this would have the long-term effect of building a base of support for the NDP. In the short-term, this strategy would strengthen the UAW in its struggles with corporations and governments of the day. This reorientation towards the NDP fit well with the UAW's shift towards a syndicalist course of action in the early 1980's. Effectively, the UAW's first task was to pursue a trade-union centred course of action and mobilize its membership behind the union as the central organization capable of protecting the members' immediate interests.

The first indication of change in the UAW's relationship to the NDP came during the 1981 Ontario election. Following its federal counterpart, the Ontario Federation of Labour spearheaded a parallel campaign. The UAW reaffirmed its commitment to the NDP as the political arm of labour and the union's Citizenship and Legislative Committee began a campaign for new party memberships in the Toronto area. The UAW's commitment of staff and resources to the party, however, was reduced. Union resources were constricted owing to declining membership and the recession and these had to be carefully allocated to strategies most likely to

bring immediate political results.(151) Nonetheless, autoworkers staffed phone banks and canvassed the membership.

The results of the Ontario election were devastating. The NDP lost 200,00 votes and 12 seats. In his report to Council, White gave three reasons for the party's setback. The first reason he cited for lack of UAW enthusiasm was the success of the UAW's plant occupations in the summer and fall of 1980. White argued that workers' discontent was mollified by the Ontario government's appointment of a Select Committee of the Legislature to investigate the issue of plant closures. Secondly, White blamed Michael Cassidy's leadership of the provincial NDP. He argued that Cassidy was not perceived as capable of leading the province, partly due to his poor showing in the media. Finally, White argued that the parallel campaign had not worked properly.(152)

White was only one of many who blamed Cassidy's leadership for the poor showing in the Ontario election. Michael Cassidy therefore resigned as ONDP leader. In the ensuing leadership race, White was determined that the UAW should speak with one voice at the convention and therefore ensure the election of a sympathetic leader. The Canadian UAW Director voiced his personal support for Bob Rae who he argued had a strong media presence which could be an important element in shaping the electoral chances of the NDP.(153) After much heated debate over a recommendation by White, the Canadian Council voted in favour of UAW support for the Rae campaign.(154) Various other unions also supported Bob Rae. Consequently, after intensive internal politicking and amidst

charges of block voting by unions, Bob Rae was elected as provincial leader of the ONDP.(155)

Although White's role in Rae's campaign was reminiscent of McDermott's role in the 1970 Stephen Lewis campaign, there were some significant differences. White had minimal personal contact with Rae. Although White concentrated his and the UAW staff's energies on mobilizing Canadian Autoworkers behind the leadership campaign, he had little input into the overall planning of the campaign or in politicking at the actual convention. Moreover, following this spurt of party activism the UAW turned its attention to collective bargaining and the No Concessions fight. The UAW contributed few resources to the party in between elections. Time permitting, the Canadian Director attended NDP executive meetings in his capacity as vice-president of the party.(156)

Whilst the UAW fought against concessions, the NDP's position began to change. The first open evidence of this shift came in Ed Broadbent's 1982 speech to the Canadian Club in Hamilton. Broadbent argued for a reduction in the deficit and encouragement of investment through such measures as corporate tax breaks.(157) These proposals were intended to shift the party away from its traditional emphasis on Keynesian solutions to the economic crisis towards a "more fiscally responsible" position on economic affairs.(158) To organized labour, these proposals represented a dangerous shift to the right. Specifically, workers associated deficit-cutting with a reduction of social services and other social programmes which benefitted working people.(159)

In spite of the negative implications of this speech for organized labour and Bob White's personal dislike for Broadbent's comments, the UAW was silent on this issue. The union was in the midst of Big Three collective bargaining and had little time for party politics. This lack of action contrasted sharply with UAW behaviour in the 1970's when McDermott had repeatedly placed pressure on the NDP to ensure compliance of party policy with union policy. Fittingly, it was McDermott, now head of the CLC, who immediately registered his displeasure over Broadbent's speech and pressured the party to reverse its position.(160)

Consistent with its changed partisan strategy, the UAW concentrated its attentions on politicizing Canadian Autoworkers. Although in early 1983 the UAW conducted its own mail campaign and job canvasses to help the ONDP in its bid for more members, the bulk of UAW energies were spent on political education.(161) Through the UAW's Paid Education Leave programme, the union worked to raise membership consciousness on issues such as medicare and interest rates. White aptly summed up the UAW's goals when he argued that the first step towards political victory lay in building a broader political movement within the union. This would immediately bolster the UAW's ongoing political battles and might in the future translate into electoral support for the NDP.(162)

These education activities were part of the UAW's involvement in the Ontario Health Coalition which included other trade unions, teachers, native peoples, consumers, senior citizens and some church organizations. The objective behind the UAW's support for

this coalition was to raise the public's consciousness on the political dangers of doctors opting-out of medicare and to strengthen lobbies to save medicare.(163) The UAW's goal was not to talk about the NDP, but to talk about politics.

The UAW's pursuit of mobilization strategies committed it to a more militant course of action than the NDP. This was no more clearly revealed than in debate over the NDP's new "Statement of Principles" which was to replace the 1956 Winnipeg Declaration of Principles. After months of deliberation, a statement was presented to the July 1983 federal NDP convention for ratification. Although Bob White, in his capacity as vice-president of the NDP and chairman of the CLC's Political Education Committee, actively supported the statement, White declared the "Statement of Principles" a great disappointment. It lacked a radical vision of change which the UAW saw as essential for the NDP to distinguish itself from other parties and to deal with the current economic and political crisis.(164) The entire lack of internal UAW debate over this statement and other NDP issues, however, indicated that the UAW's discontent with the party's direction was not important enough to warrant time and money. Canadian Autoworkers were pursuing their own course of political action. Increasingly, they appeared to be leaving the NDP behind.

What was most remarkable about the UAW's involvement in the NDP in these years was the lack of internal union debate over the party and the relative unimportance of the NDP to the union's immediate political agenda. Although the UAW sought the NDP as an ally in many of its struggles, the party was only one of many UAW

allies. Moreover, the UAW spent a greater portion of its political energies mobilizing and cementing the support of other allies than it spent on the NDP.

The UAW's immediate goal was to build a broad political movement of opposition to current corporate and government solutions to the economic downturn. While this political mobilization might reap benefits for the NDP, its primary objective was to force immediate political change from incumbent governments. The fact that Bob White came from the syndicalist fraction of the union and that Canadian Autoworkers had an historical legacy of trade-union centred political action made this strategic shift both viable and successful. The Canadian UAW therefore established itself as an alternative centre of political leadership, a position which it would foster in the years to come and which would allow the union a place in national debates historically occupied by political parties.

1984: The Bittersweet Fruits of Victory

By 1984, there were signs of economic recovery. Unemployment was down as was inflation. Interest rates had dropped from their all time high in 1982 and consumer spending was increasing. The condition of the Canadian auto industry also improved. Demand for vehicles made in Canada increased and certain new investments seemed imminent owing to the lower Canadian dollar and its corresponding effect on labour costs in Canada.(165) At the same time, owing to continued restructuring by North American automakers, workers still faced layoffs and possible permanent

dislocation due to technological innovation or the shifting of production to Third World Countries. The Canadian independent parts industry was in the worst shape as vertical integration of the larger corporations such as GM and new production techniques took their toll on the parts market.

This economic recovery did not automatically translate into more harmonious labour-management relations or an improved political environment for trade unions. Overall, industrial unions continued to be weakened by declining memberships as economic recovery often meant replacement of workers with machines.(166) North American auto and parts producers continued to face intense international competition and targetted labour costs as the key to increased competitiveness. The dominant corporate strategy for reducing these labour costs was to dismantle the structures of Fordist regulation. Automakers continued to demand concessions and experimented with a more flexible labour process. These experiments necessitated that the structure of collective bargaining be radically altered, and with this the role of trade unions.(167) Similarly, governments continued to take advantage of the weakened condition of trade unions by introducing anti-labour legislation. While such legislative attacks by the Ontario government were largely aimed at public sector unions, these moves created an environment which tended to legitimate corporate demands for concessions from private sector unions.

The UAW was in perhaps the most powerful position of any union in Canada. The auto industry was recovering and, despite

continued threats by employers, the union's strategic capacity was consequently enhanced. At a time of recovery, corporations could ill afford to lose production time or profits from lengthy labour disputes. Secondly, the fruits of the UAW's successful mobilization of its membership did not end with the Auto Task Force. Canadian Autoworkers had to be reckoned with and both the Ontario and federal governments intended to secure the UAW's reincorporation into the sphere of legitimate politics. Finally, Bob White's use of the media began to pay off. The Canadian Director became the darling of the media, a fact that bolstered the UAW's legitimacy as a "responsible" union.

On the government front, the UAW continued to reap the benefits of its previous victories. White was asked and agreed to become the first chairman of the federal government's newly established Automotive Council which was to advise the government on automotive policy.(168) When American Motors Corporation announced its intention to invest \$764 million to build and equip a new assembly plant in Brampton and the federal and Ontario governments began negotiating to invest government monies, the UAW was brought into the discussions. White repeatedly met with AMC officials, Premier Davis and Federal Industry Minister Lumley. He was kept apprised of decisions and given opportunities for input. AMC agreed to recognize the UAW at its new facility and to take its existing workforce into the new development. Overall, White saw AMC's investment decision as falling in line with Task Force recommendations and heralded the Task Force as the means by which the UAW had influenced public policy in this area.(169)

Finally, White agreed to serve as co-chairman of the Ontario Task Force on Technology.(170) The circumstances under which White participated on this Task Force were illustrative of the UAW's new found position of power and the importance of this for forcing a closer articulation of UAW-government relations. The fact that White rather than the head of the Ontario Federation of Labour was made co-chair of this Ontario Task Force was the first indication of the UAW's leverage and subsequent leadership position. More important, however, was the pressure placed on White by Deputy Minister of Labour, Tim Armstrong, to participate on the Task Force. White was initially opposed to serving on the Task Force and only agreed after Armstrong exerted extreme pressure on him.(171)

White's rationale for his decision to participate was based on his understanding of the enhanced legitimacy that would be gained for the UAW by "serving the public interest". Furthermore he anticipated that the Task Force would provide organized labour with a forum for influencing corporate and government responses to new technology.(172) This latter point was especially important. Recent studies of the effect of new technology on the auto industry predicted that by 1985, 20% of auto final assembly labour would be replaced by automation. By 1988, 50% of labour involved in small component assembly would be replaced.(173)

At the same time that the UAW was enjoying increased access to government and influence on decision-making, the national political climate was undergoing a drastic change which threatened

the position of all unions. The NDP's popular support continued to drop. The election of Brian Mulroney as head of the Progressive Conservative Party followed by John Turner's election as head of the Liberals indicated a growing popular shift to the political right. Political debate concentrated on the deficit. Solutions to this problem centred on cutting social services and 'freeing' the economy from the rigidities of government regulation and intervention. These solutions posed direct threats to workers as jobs would be lost and unemployment and other social benefits would be restricted. The winds of political change blew harshly for trade unions.

Therefore, although the UAW was presently enjoying greater political influence, the future remained uncertain. The UAW and the labour movement as a whole had to re-evaluate their partisan strategy and pursue a more realistic course of support for the NDP in light of the failure of previous parallel campaigns. The CLC therefore changed its strategy for the 1984 federal election. It replaced the full-scale mobilization attempted under the original parallel campaign with the strategic targetting of resources and constituencies where organized labour might have an effect on the outcome of the election. This meant concentrating resources in ridings which either already had an NDP-MP or where the NDP held big potential.(174)

When the federal election was finally called, it could not have come at a worse time for the UAW. Many workers were on vacation and Big Three collective bargaining was getting underway. Nonetheless, the UAW contributed monies, from both the

International and local union coffers, and assigned a number of local activists to work in key campaigns. This election took on a greater significance for the UAW than many previous ones. Firstly, two of the ridings targetted for intensive labour support were in Windsor where the UAW played a key role. Secondly, eleven UAW members were running for election, the highest number in the union's history of partisan activity. In these particular ridings, Autoworkers' enthusiasm was heightened and Bob White played a more direct role in the election campaigns.(175)

The results of the election confirmed the worst fears of the UAW. The Conservative Party won a landslide victory. In spite of Prime Minister Mulroney's talk of governing through consensus rather than confrontation, all signs pointed to a major political realignment where trade unions would be left in the cold. Mulroney's appointment of a Saskatchewan farmer to the post of Labour Minister was the first indication of future problems. Secondly, the government's immediate agenda included deregulation, the privatization of Crown Corporations, spending cuts and changes to unemployment insurance. All these items threatened workers' jobs, the future of national industrial development and the social support system upon which workers had come to rely. Finally, weeks passed by and neither the CLC nor its affiliates had an audience with the new government.(176)

The UAW had little time to ponder the effects of this political realignment given the progress of collective bargaining. Despite the economic recovery in 1984, the UAW faced further

concessionary demands from corporations. The union continued to pursue its No Concessions strategy. Because of the uneven nature of the auto industry's recovery, autoworkers in parts plants suffered the brunt of these struggles. The No Concessions strike by local 397 at the Hussman's Store Equipment plant in Brantford illustrated the still difficult times facing Canadian Autoworkers. The strike began on December 16, 1983 over company demands for more than 28 concessions, including zero wage and benefit increases, major changes to seniority provisions, the elimination of voluntary overtime and the termination of paid lunch breaks.(177) After eight and one-half months on the picket line, the workers gained a contract which defeated almost all the company demands and won wage and benefit increases.(178) Once again the UAW's No Concessions strategy had been vindicated.

GM collective bargaining ended up having the most momentous consequences for Canadian Autoworkers, however. To understand the full import of these negotiations, it is necessary to examine the different economic and political circumstances facing American and Canadian Autoworkers. By 1984, the Canadian auto industry had begun to recover, owing largely to lower labour costs. In contrast, the American auto industry was still in very bad shape. In addition to these basic economic factors, the political environment differed between the two countries. Although Canadian national politics were moving steadily to the right, the political environment continued to be more favourable to unions than in the U.S. where President Reagan had consistently taken a hardline against unions. Furthermore, the American component of the UAW was

gearing up for an all-out mobilization behind the Democratic Party and wished to prevent, if possible, a major strike which would provide grist to Reagan's anti-union mill.(179)

The final important difference in this round of negotiations lay in the internal dynamics of the UAW. Although over the past three years the IEB had not approved of the Canadian's No Concessions collective bargaining strategy, the resulting tensions between Canadian and American union leaders and workers were eased by the solid friendship and respect between UAW International President Doug Fraser and Canadian Director Bob White. Relations worsened between the International Union and the Canadian Region when Doug Fraser stepped down from his position as International President and was replaced by Owen Bieber. White did not support Bieber's bid for the presidency. No friendship existed to prevent a widening of the internal strategic divisions between Canadian and American Autoworkers.(180)

When collective bargaining began at GM, it became immediately apparent that the corporation wanted further restructuring of collective bargaining. For Canadian UAW negotiators, the most troublesome company demand was the replacement of wage increases with lump sum payments. Serious bargaining first got underway in the U.S. and in early September, Owen Bieber selected GM as the target strike company. After a number of short, local strikes an American agreement was reached. It contained lump sum payments and a continuation of the profit-sharing scheme.(181)

Canadian Autoworkers opposed both and prepared to strike for

a "made in Canada" agreement. The Canadian UAW position with the corporation was even more difficult than it had been in 1982 as an American pattern had already been established. Therefore, on October 5, 1984 GM tabled its economic proposal which, although based on the American settlement, was worse in the number of concessions it demanded. Although bargaining continued, GM refused to budge on its concessionary demands. Canadian Autoworkers prepared to strike.

Owen Bieber, however, was intent upon forcing Canadians into line with American negotiations. He therefore threatened non-authorization of strike pay if the UAW in Canada tried to break the pattern set by American GM negotiations. By this time, White faced a militant and mobilized membership whose representatives at the bargaining table were unwilling to start accepting concessions. White called Bieber's bluff and won, leading Canadian GM workers on a six-day strike which gave them hourly increases rather than lump sum payments and profit-sharing, maintained their COLA clauses and improved pensions. Negotiations also led to some major new innovations such as the establishment of a Prepaid Legal Services Plan, paid for by GM.(182) The new Canadian GM contract was ratified by an overwhelming 87% of production workers and 83% of skilled workers. This compared with a ratification of the American contract by only 58% of the GM workers.(183)

These negotiations proved to be the turning point for relations between the International and Canadian UAW. At the December 1984 Canadian Council meeting White received a mandate to seek greater autonomy for the Canadian region within the

international union structure, including demands for Canadian control over collective bargaining and strike authorization and complete control over staff appointments in Canada. The Council also agreed that if no such reformulation of the International relationship was forthcoming, steps would have to be taken to establish an autonomous Canadian Autoworkers union.(184) White took these demands to a special IEB meeting scheduled for December 10, 1984. Although American Executive Board members differed in their reaction to Canadian demands, the overall consensus amongst this group was that such a restructuring of the International relationship was impossible. A vote to reject the Canadian Council's adopted position was rejected 24 to 1, with White the sole member who voted in its favour.(185)

Immediately following this vote, White made a motion to Council to establish a committee to begin restructuring the union into an American and a Canadian UAW. After heated debate, the motion was passed.(186) When on December 15, White called a special Council meeting to discuss these events and gain a commitment by Canadian Autoworkers to restructure into an independent Canadian union, he received the enthusiastic endorsement of the majority of delegates.(187) Henceforth, Canadian Autoworkers started down the road to independence. The story of the Canadian UAW had come to an end. A new history was in the making - the history of the Canadian Autoworkers Union.

Conclusion

The Canadian Region of the UAW emerged victorious out of the economic crisis of the eighties. The union preserved its organizational integrity, secured membership solidarity and proved its strength in conflicts with employers and governments alike. Seen in this light, the victory was a modest one even though the battles to achieve it were momentous. Poised against corporations intent upon restructuring the auto industry and hence the place of the union as representative of workers, the Canadian UAW fought back with sitdowns and a mobilization of its members against concessions. Similarly, as governments arrayed themselves more clearly on the side of corporations and increasingly denied unions access to and influence upon decision-making, Canadian Autoworkers sought broad-based alliances in their lobbies, intent upon having their voices heard and their legitimacy reinstated.

The union's successful pursuit of militant mobilization strategies in both the workplace and in the political arena forced the union's re-entry into the corridors of power. Canadian Autoworkers won better contracts than many other unions and protected the core of their highly structured collective bargaining formula. In so doing, the union prevented internal conflict and increased market competition among its own members. Furthermore, the UAW secured itself an even more influential position in government decision-making than it had achieved in earlier years. Examples of this influence included the UAW's involvement in the Chrysler loan negotiations, government decisions to invest in the AMC's new venture and the varied Task

Forces on which Bob White served. The corollary to the UAW's adoption of a militant, syndicalist political strategy was a gradual shift away from the increasingly partisan direction taken by the union under McDermott. Although the UAW remained active within the NDP, its immediate goals were the maintenance of a strong and militant union which could act in its own capacity as a powerful political actor. The UAW needed immediate political action and this was something the NDP could not deliver.

Possibly the most important element of the UAW's victory consisted of its preservation of the union's organizational integrity and legitimacy as representative of its members. At a time when all trade unions in Canada were under attack and when many were in disarray both strategically and internally, UAW leaders secured the support of Canadian Autoworkers and forged a new unity in the ranks. This victory was essential for all other UAW successes. Only through the mobilization of the rank and file behind a united course of action could the UAW have resisted the disabling impact of internal fragmentation and the perilous shift in the balance of power in favour of corporations.

To understand the Canadian UAW's success in the face of individual workers' fears of unemployment and a declining standard of living, one must look inside the union. While the condition of the auto industry from mid-1983 onwards helped the UAW in its recent struggles, its initial victories were scored when the death knell was being sounded for the Canadian auto industry. In these early struggles, the Canadian UAW, like its counterpart in the

U.S. and like many other Canadian unions, was threatened by shrinking memberships and heightened job insecurity. Therefore, one must examine the internal dynamics of the UAW to explain its successful militancy.

The three most important factors in explaining the UAW's strategic assault in the 1980's were: 1) the specific organizational structure of the Canadian Region of the UAW, 2) the syndicalist collective identity forged earlier within the union and 3) the strategic direction of the union in the late 1970's. On the question of the organizational structure, the District Council and the union's extensive educational system were once again the crucial structures through which the rank and file were mobilized and the leadership kept in touch with membership concerns. Furthermore, through Council debates and Director's reports, workers were kept politically informed and were provided with alternative analyses of the crisis to those offered by the popular media and government and corporate spokespersons.

Canadian Autoworkers' strong sense of identity with their union was another essential ingredient in the UAW's success. For autoworkers, their union represented a progressive, social force built on the foundations of worker militance and internal democracy. As has been argued in previous chapters this syndicalist collective identity was the legacy of a particular mixture of the continued existence of a Left caucus within the UAW, the ensuing struggles between this group and the administration and Walter Reuther's brand of social unionism. The importance of this collective identity for the struggles of the

eighties lay in the militancy it bred within the membership, the internal unity it fostered and the commitment it produced to the protection of the UAW under seige. Moreover, this syndicalist tradition opened the possibility for a trade-union centred course of action based on workplace struggles.

Finally, the UAW's earlier struggles in the late 1970's, especially those against wage controls, were crucial in preparing the groundwork for the 1980's. The UAW had made substantial in these earlier battles and the taste of recent victory reinforced workers' belief in their ability to defend themselves from attacks from governments and corporations alike. Secondly, the anti-wage controls campaign had greased the wheels of the union's organization therefore facilitating its entry into the battle of the eighties. Finally, UAW mobilization against wage controls had expanded the perceived limits to action of leaders and rank and file alike. Militant workplace action had resecured a place in union strategy.

Noticeably absent from this discussion of factors contributing to the UAW's successes is mention of its Canadian Director, Robert White. Popular interpretations of the UAW's victories have rested almost exclusively on the popularity and perceived toughness of this Canadian union leader. The role ascribed to White in such analyses misrepresents the basis of this or any other union's power. The power of any union leader does not rest on the individual qualities of the leader. Rather, the power of a union rests in the willingness and ability of its

membership to take united collective action. A union leader, such as Robert White, derives power from his representation of this membership. If Canadian Autoworkers had been unwilling or unable to mobilize behind a strategy of militant collective action, White would not be in a position of power. Conversely, if White had been leader of a different union, he alone could not have forced the successful collective mobilization of its membership.

Having said this, White did shape the direction of the UAW. He came out of the syndicalist tradition of the union, once best represented by his mentor Tommy MacLean. White therefore saw the union as an independent actor capable of mobilizing power in its own right. He was able and willing to seize the opportunities presented and mobilize union resources to steer the union onto a militant course of action. Finally, White's use of the media and subsequent media image aided the union in its search for allies and for legitimacy in society.

Overall, Canadian UAW successes, seen in the protection of master bargaining, AIF and COLA, appeared as protective measures against the dissolution of the Fordist mode of regulation. From the union's vantage point, this was partially true. The UAW had come to rely on these structures for its organizational strength and membership support. In desiring to preserve its own strength, the union fought to protect existing structures and relations. Nonetheless, one union could not check the breakdown of the Fordist mode of regulation which had become a fetter on capital accumulation under the conditions of heightened competition and declining productivity. Yet, because neither corporations nor

governments had a ready-made solution to these problems, the Canadian UAW was able to protect certain existing collective bargaining arrangements. Rather than preventing the dissolution of the Fordist mode of regulation, however, the UAW's strategic success placed it in a position of strength from which it could negotiate and shape the terms of any new compromise. By 1984, Canadian Autoworkers had succeeded in forcing corporations and governments to rethink their strategy based on union-bashing and to redraw a consultative relationship with the UAW. The new consultative relations, combined with corporate initiatives towards a more flexible labour process, were early indications of the possible shape of the new mode of regulation. Any new forms of labour-management peace, however, would also be dependent on the Canadian UAW which was itself undergoing a major transformation.

The irony of the UAW's success is that while it forged a new unity amongst Canadian Autoworkers and hence preserved the organizational strength of the Canadian Region, it laid the basis for the destruction of the International Union. The separation of Canadian Autoworkers from their International Union was not the result of a magical groundswell of nationalism amongst Canadian Autoworkers or their leaders. Rather it was the unanticipated outcome of the strategic divergence of Canadian Autoworkers from their American brothers and sisters. This strategic divergence grew out of assaults by corporations and governments on the UAW and the Canadian UAW's particular understanding of how workers and a union could best survive this onslaught. In turn, the different

strategies pursued by Canadian and American autoworkers, combined with their new status as separate unions, raised the possibility that the emergent mode of regulation in the Canadian auto industry would be "made in Canada".

Thus the story of the Canadian Region of the UAW came to an end. Canadian Autoworkers now had new challenges to confront and a new history to make. Once again the course of UAW action in constructing its future would rest in the dynamics of change in the auto industry and inside the union itself.

Endnotes

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2. Alan Altshuler et al, The Future of the Automobile (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984).
3. The agricultural implement and aerospace industries in which the UAW represented workers were also very hard hit early in the economic crisis. As this thesis focuses on the auto industry, the specifics of these industries are not dealt with.
4. This argument concerning the uncertainty and often contradictory nature of auto corporations' responses to the economic crisis contrasts with Marc Van Ameringen's analysis of the Canadian auto industry. Van Ameringen presents corporate actions as though they form part of a coherent and well thought out strategy. Although the argument presented here cannot be fully elaborated upon, there are enough illustrations of corporate uncertainty presented in this chapter to suggest a rethinking of Van Ameringen's argument. See Marc Van Ameringen, "The Restructuring of the Canadian Automobile Industry" in Canada and The New International Division of Labour, eds. Duncan Cameron and Francoise Houle (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1985), pp.267-287.
5. Altshuler et al, The Future of the Automobile; Michael Piore and Charles Sable, The Second Industrial Divide (NY: Basic Books, 1984); Harry Katz, Shifting Gears: Changing Labor Relations in the U.S. Automobile Industry (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985), Chapters 4 & 6.
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20. PC, Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 9 & 10 June 1979, pp.7-8.
21. SG, "Election 1979: Some Observations on Labour's Role", Inter-office communication from Sam Gindin to Bob (White) and Jim (Gill), 28 May 1979, pp.12-13.
22. Ibid., p.11.
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24. Ibid., pp.11-13.
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104. PC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 19 & 20 June 1982.
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107. PC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 27 & 28 Nov. 1982; Globe and Mail, 6 Aug. 1982.
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110. Globe and Mail, 14 July, 17, 28 Aug. 1982.
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114. PC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 5 & 6 Mar. 1983, pp.30-31.
115. Evidence of a potential split between workers from the independent parts' sector and those from the big auto plants surfaced when White proposed, in Oct. 1983, to do away with

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the No Concessions strike fund. This proposal came in the midst of negotiations in smaller plants and resulted in tremendous opposition from workers in these plants. Consequently, White backed off from this recommendation and the No Concessions fund remained in place. PC, Minutes to Meeting of Canadian Council, 22 & 23 Oct. 1983.

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141. Ibid., especially chapters 7 & 8.
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144. Ibid., pp.17-18.
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146. PC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 22 & 23 Oct. 1983, p.6.
147. Ibid., pp.21-22.
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149. PC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 11 & 12 Feb. 1984, p.7, 23 & 24 June 1984, p.7.

150. PC, Regional Director's Report to Canadian Council, 23 & 24 June 1984, p.6.
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Chapter Nine

Conclusion

The Canadian UAW experienced certain significant strategic turns in the course of its history, as previous chapters have shown. After 1939 when a Communist-dominated Left caucus seized control of the union, the most militant section of the Canadian Region directed union strategy. This leadership, in the face of growing union strength during the war and determined government and corporate resistance to unions, mobilized autoworkers behind a militant strategy of collective action. The strike became the major weapon for achieving both political and economic goals. By the end of World War II, Canadian Autoworkers along with their brothers and sisters in other unions, had won legal recognition and secured some collective bargaining gains from their employers. By engaging in massive organizing drives throughout the war, the UAW was established in 1945 as the largest and possibly most powerful industrial union in Canada.

These wartime victories were, however, only a small step towards the UAW's desired goals of union involvement in government decision-making, greater union security and substantial wage and benefit improvements for autoworkers. Having staged a massive strike at Ford in 1945, which resulted in the Rand arbitration decision in favour of the automatic check-off of dues, the UAW determined to continue its use of the strike to make political and

economic gains during peacetime. Pressures both inside and outside the union developed, however, pushing Canadian Autoworkers to pursue a more moderate course of action. The 1946 election of Walter Reuther as president of the International UAW, with his subsequent purging of Communists from the ranks of the union, strengthened the position of moderates in the UAW. The heating up of the Cold War added legitimacy to this grouping, as did corporate and government attempts to force the development of "responsible" unionism. Consequently, although the Canadian UAW continued its militant, mobilization politics in the immediate postwar years, this strategy came under increasing attack from the International as well as corporations. It was further undermined by the International UAW's negotiation with GM of wage increases linked to productivity and a cost of living allowance, both of which fostered the institutionalization of labour-management relations and countered the strategy of militancy.

These early signs of conflict over the strategic direction of the Canadian UAW became more pronounced during the 1950's. The Reuther caucus secured greater control over the union apparatus and more membership support in Canada. Collective bargaining became institutionalized and increasingly centralized in the hands of the leadership. Longer contracts, pattern and master bargaining, and a rigid wage and benefit structure (including the guaranteed annual wage) facilitated these developments. Coincident with this shift towards 'responsible' union behaviour with corporations came the Canadian UAW's increasing reliance upon lobbying as a form of communication with governments. The Left

caucus continued, however, to mobilize support at the local level for its more militant, and nationalist, political strategy. The successes of the Left caucus, although declining over the decade of the 1950's, prevented the thorough demobilization of Canadian Autoworkers and a complete redirection of union strategy.

The years of economic downturn in the auto industry between 1958 and 1961 proved to be a turning point in the UAW's political trajectory. During these years, the Left caucus was resoundingly defeated. The Reuther caucus dominated the union apparatus and hence had the power to determine the strategic direction of the union. Regulations governing collective bargaining were extended and the practice of "responsible" unionism legitimized. Through its participation and apparent influence on the Royal Commission on the Auto Industry, the Canadian UAW's commitment to single interest group lobbying was confirmed. Although the NDP was formed during these years with the expressed intent of structuring a closer link with trade unions, UAW successes in securing political gains through alternate strategies muted the urgency for electing a social democratic government. Consequently, although the UAW contributed huge sums of money to the founding of the NDP, its commitment to partisan politics was secondary.

Canadian UAW politics between 1962 and 1968 were dominated by the politics of compromise and negotiation. With the Autopact, the UAW and auto corporations sought to systematize between the U.S. and Canada those structures which regulated collective bargaining. As a result of the politics surrounding the bilateral trade

agreement, the UAW had more regular contact with the federal government and gained access to more powerful Cabinet Ministers. Once again, the success of these political strategies undermined the UAW's interest in party politics. Although increasing numbers of UAW locals affiliated to the NDP and the union remained a major source of party funds, this political strategy remained secondary to the UAW.

The 1970's economic recession forced a shift in UAW political strategy. Economic decline undermined the relative peace secured by the UAW in its dealings with governments and corporations and its own membership. As workers increasingly bore the brunt of recession through spiralling inflation, plant closures, speedups and overtime, membership discontent with the union, which seemed incapable of protecting its membership, increased. The fact that in the 1960's the Canadian UAW had rapidly expanded its ranks amongst young workers, women and francophones added to the growing unease inside the union. A new Left caucus mobilized disenchanted autoworkers to mount a challenge to the union leadership and, ultimately, to its adopted course of political action. This internal fragmentation of the UAW combined with the federal government's imposition of wage controls, pushed the Canadian UAW to pursue a more militant strategy of strikes and mass demonstrations. Furthermore, for the first time in its history the Canadian UAW began to use its financial leverage inside the NDP to steer the party onto a course more acceptable to the union.

Canadian UAW leaders, however, feared the possible loss of union influence with governments and corporations if responsible

union politics were completely abandoned. Consequently, the Canadian UAW combined its pursuit of militant, mobilization-based strategies with continued lobbying, negotiations with corporations and the pursuit of tripartism with the Ontario government. Overall, the 1970's saw the Canadian Autoworkers follow a contradictory course of political action, combining militant confrontational politics with attempts to maintain and improve established relations with governments and corporations.

When the economic crisis hit in full force in the 1980's, however, Canadian Autoworkers opted to pursue an all-out campaign of rank-and-file mobilization. Having failed in lobbying and attempts to secure greater NDP influence in government in the late 1970's, the union returned to strategies based on workplace action. Through plant sitdowns, militant strikes, mass demonstrations and alliance-building, it used its resources effectively. The result was improved settlements for laid-off workers, government legislation on plant closures and ultimately, the inclusion of the UAW in government decision-making on auto investments and policy initiatives. Overall, the Canadian UAW had used its militancy to force a reformulation of institutionalized relations with corporations and governments. Such a militant political strategy, however, contradicted the International UAW's pursuit of cooperation with governments and corporations. The strains resulting from this strategic divergence ultimately led to the split of the Canadian UAW from its International union. The political history of the Canadian UAW had come to an end; that of

the CAW began.

In chapter one it was argued that unions should be seen as strategic actors. A union's adopted course of action is informed by choices constrained by limits arising from the particular historical, political-economic and internal conditions in which the union operates. In turn, a union's strategic capacity - defined as its ability to pursue a particular course of action successfully - is determined by both external conditions such as the state of the economy and by the internal resources of the union, namely its strength in numbers and its ability to mobilize its membership behind a strategy of united collective action. This latter goal is made more complex by the contradictory logic of union power. As unions increase their strength through organizing more workers, they also increase the diversity of membership interest. Such interest diversity threatens the ability of a union to construct internal unity and ultimately to mobilize the membership behind a common course of collective action. It was further argued that the ability of a particular union to overcome this contradiction rests on a union's specific organizational structure and collective identity. The remainder of this chapter draws on the analysis of the Canadian UAW's postwar strategic choices, presented in the intervening chapters, to reiterate this argument by locating the Canadian UAW's strategic turns in 1) the peculiarities of Canadian Fordism - and thus also the crisis of Fordism - and 2) the union's distinctive organizational structure and collective identity.

The Fordist Regime and Canadian Autoworkers

1) The Private Nature of the Fordist Wage Relation

The broad political-economic conditions and social relations which grew out of the Great Depression and World War II were structured as a particular regime of capital accumulation, namely the Fordist regime. To summarize briefly, Fordism refers to a particular mode of accumulation based on mass production and mass consumption. To achieve the latter and therefore realize the profit from mass production, a means of regulating labour-capital relations to ensure adequate workers' buying power and stability in labour-management relations so that production could be made ever more efficient developed. Although specific modes of regulation differ from one country to another, a point to which we will return, certain common elements to the postwar modes of regulation developed in all capitalist countries. These included 1) adoption of a Keynesian policy framework which gave the state an unprecedented role in regulating the economy and organizing the compromise between capital and labour and 2) the institutionalization of relations between companies and unions based on a wage/productivity trade-off. Political struggles, in particular those between capital, labour and the state, determined the specific national variant of the regulatory mechanisms of the Fordist regime. Consequently, trade unions as representatives of workers were crucial participants in the construction of this postwar arrangement. Once in place, the Fordist regime imposed its own limits on union strategy and behaviour.

Based on the political history of the Canadian UAW, three issues of special importance regarding the Fordist regime in Canada (and more specifically the Fordist mode of regulation) and the UAW stand out in need of explanation. Firstly, how can we understand the Canadian UAW's role in shaping the specific regulatory mechanisms which led to the institutionalization of labour-state-capital relations in the auto sector? Secondly, and related to the first, how do we understand the UAW's late incorporation into the postwar settlement and hence its late acceptance of the practices of 'responsible' unionism? Thirdly, and finally, how did the Fordist regime, once securely in place, impose limits on Canadian Autoworkers' political behaviour?

Before beginning to answer these questions, and hence move towards an explanation for changing UAW political strategy and capacity, it is first necessary to examine the nature of the Fordist regime in Canada. It is always risky to make generalizations based on a case study of one union. This risk is herein reduced, however, by the pivotal position of the auto industry in the development of postwar economies based on mass production and consumption. The centrality of the auto industry to the Canadian postwar economy, and hence the Fordist regime, is matched by the important role played by the UAW in securing initial gains, such as the automatic check-off of dues, which served as a model for other unions in Canada and subsequently became linchpins in the regulation of labour-management relations.(1) Consequently, while the following discussion is

based on the case study of the Canadian UAW, it contains certain general arguments which at the risk of overstatement, raise questions about current interpretations of the postwar settlement and organized labour's place within it.

In contrast to state-centred understandings of the postwar settlement in Canada, this study suggests that the wage relation which constituted a crucial part of the mode of regulation was put into place in the sphere of private production through negotiations and struggles between individual corporations and unions. Governments provided a basic structure within which labour-management conflicts were organized but played a minimal role in either institutionalizing labour-management peace or regulating markets. They preferred instead to rely upon the private sphere for management of the economy and the construction of labour-management stability.(2) The Fordist mode of regulation in Canada, therefore more closely approximated the American one than the more state-centred Western European versions.

As a whole, studies of the Canadian postwar settlement have posited a much greater role for the state in regulating labour-management conflict. Their arguments are based on the highly state-interventionist labour legislation first introduced by the federal government in 1943 and then made more permanent through provincial legislation in 1948. The basic argument offered is as follows. The Canadian government introduced labour legislation which restricted greatly organized labour's capacity to use the strike. Whether due to the inherent weakness of the highly fragmented Canadian labour movement or due to the reformist labour

leaders of unions in the immediate postwar years, labour quickly acquiesced to these state-imposed restrictions. The effect of this legislation was to demobilize Canadian unions and therefore establish the terms for labour-management peace in the postwar years. Overall, then, the Canadian state through its introduction of this labour legislation is supposed to have played a central role in imposing the terms of the postwar compromise.(3)

The political history of the Canadian Autoworkers contradicts this analysis. Labour-management peace in the auto industry was not magically achieved via labour legislation. Following the introduction of PC1003 in 1943 and up until the end of the war, the number of strikes involving the UAW did decline rapidly. This was not merely the result of the union's acquiescence to the terms of the new federal labour legislation, however. Rather, the UAW was highly critical of the restrictions placed on its ability to strike and understood the threat posed to unions by this legislation. At the same time, however, the UAW was intent upon contributing to the war effort. Consequently, it was willing to accept temporarily the terms imposed on its activities by PC1003.

Following the war, however, the UAW resumed its course of militant action. Even after the introduction of peacetime labour legislation, the Canadian UAW, like other unions in Canada, engaged in several protracted strikes.(4) Moreover, throughout the 1950's the union experienced wildcats by workers opposed to the emerging terms of compromise. In many cases these wildcats were unofficially supported by union leaders who identified the

International UAW Constitution, and not existing labour law, as the primary reason for their public repudiation of these strikes. Thus, while the labour legislation provided a weapon for both companies and moderates in the union to squash rank-and-file discontent, it did not provide the basis for labour-management peace. Rather, the institutionalization of labour-management relations in the auto industry was only really secured through private negotiations. Longer contracts and master and pattern bargaining provided the crucial structural basis for the reduction of labour-management conflict. As these structures took a long time to develop and were the subject of intense union-membership conflict, the construction of the postwar settlement was delayed.(5)

Increases in domestic demand, and hence the level of mass consumption in Canada, were similarly very dependent upon arrangements in the private sphere. Work by several political economists points to Canadian governments' lack of commitment to Keynesian policy initiatives and to government regulation of demand and the economy as a whole.(6) Governments introduced social welfare benefits intended only to ensure a minimum level of demand; unions supplemented these benefits and ultimately made workers' wages adequate through privately-negotiated collective agreements. Furthermore, most government schemes were introduced incrementally and quite late in the postwar game. The example of the developments of Canadian government pensions and health care provisions serve to illustrate this point.

The political history of the Canadian UAW supports this

argument. It was through collective bargaining that Canadian autoworkers achieved healthy wages and adequate social welfare benefits. Strict wage rules, including COLA and AIF clauses, private pension and health care plans and the use of a supplemental unemployment insurance scheme and seniority to provide the union with some influence over adjustments to labour-market demand constituted the basis for stable and adequate levels of demand, while also contributing to the regulation of labour-management conflict.

Moreover, this study suggests that governments actively resisted intervention in the labour market if private arrangements could be designed to regulate fluctuations in the economy. The example of the Canadian UAW's battle for government aid to workers suffering due to industry adjustments to the Autopact illustrates this argument. In the U.S., a system to aid workers dislocated by the Autopact was introduced immediately with the signing of the bilateral trade agreement. In contrast, the Canadian government resisted this move and initially insisted that this matter be dealt with in collective bargaining. After intensive lobbying by the UAW, the Canadian government did introduce a Transitional Assistance Benefit (TAB) programme. This programme, however, only covered workers whose collective agreements did not contain Supplementary Unemployment Benefit clauses or those whose private benefits through SUB had been exhausted. Thus, even upon introducing a programme, the federal government demonstrated its preference for privately-negotiated arrangements.

In summary, based on the history of the Canadian UAW, it seems more appropriate to understand the Fordist wage relations and the institutionalization of labour-management relations in Canada as having been primarily constituted in the sphere of private production. Both the stabilization and increase of domestic demand and the negotiation of labour-management peace were largely the product of conflicts between corporations and unions and were codified in collective agreements. While the state imposed limits on workplace conflicts and intervened in the economy to provide minimum levels of demand, it was the strategic capacities of corporations and trade unions which actively shaped the content and form of major aspects of the Fordist mode of regulation. Moreover, the Canadian state demonstrated a willingness, if not a preference, for privately organized structures which would regulate the economy and structure the labour market.

This retheorization of the postwar settlement provides an important starting point for explaining UAW political strategy and action. By rejecting an analysis which sees the postwar settlement as either imposed or centrally orchestrated by the state, this alternate theorization of the private nature of the Fordist wage relations accords a greater role to individual unions and corporations, such as the UAW and the automakers, in influencing the timing and shape of the particular regulatory mechanisms and socio-political arrangements put into place. This role is further enhanced by the lack of powerful, centralized trade-union or employer organizations. This requires elaboration.

The postwar settlement in Canada, the terms under which the Canadian UAW accepted institutionalized labour-management relations and the practices of 'responsible' unionism were not fully in place until around 1960. Moreover, the regulatory mechanisms of the Fordist regime were not imposed by the state. Rather they were put into place in a piecemeal fashion and only after protracted conflicts both between the UAW and corporations and within the union itself.

A cursory review of UAW political history illustrates this point. The first steps toward institutionalization of labour-management relations were taken in the late 1940's with the introduction of peacetime labour legislation and the UAW-GM negotiations of COLA and AIF clauses. Throughout the 1950's, however, resistance to further institutionalization came from two areas. First, the Left caucus in General Motors fought bitterly against longer contracts and master bargaining and effectively delayed the membership's acceptance of these arrangements. Conversely, in negotiations with Ford, it was the corporation which mounted opposition to master contracts in the hope that it could resume earlier practices of circumventing the union. Furthermore, even though the Left caucus failed on a number of counts to prevent the structures of regulation from being erected, it continued to mobilize enough membership support for alternative goals and strategies to prevent the full acceptance of the terms of the settlement and the practices of 'responsible' unionism. Without full membership support, the UAW could not live up to its

side of the postwar bargain to manage autoworkers' militancy. This inability on the part of the union leadership was no more clearly illustrated than in the number of wildcats which plagued the union throughout the 1950's.

The argument concerning the private nature of the Fordist wage relation and regulation also helps explain the Canadian UAW's growing focus on collective bargaining strategies over other forms of political action. Canadian Autoworkers' wartime experience of government rejection of tripartism and postwar failures to have governments respond adequately to their demands combined with their successes through workplace action to reinforce the union's commitment to workplace struggles. Hence, rather than resulting from the conservatism of the union or its adoption of a philosophy of business unionism, the UAW's choice to focus on collective bargaining can be understood as a strategy of necessity in the face of few alternative paths to effective political action.

So far we have focussed on explaining UAW influence on the nature and timing of certain key components of the Fordist mode of regulation. What, however, was the impact of this regime on UAW politics? The Fordist wage relation was founded on institutionalized labour-management relations and an acceptance by unions of 'responsible' union practices. Once in place, the UAW pursued leadership-dominated bureaucratic forms of politics such as lobbying and centralized collective bargaining. The UAW eschewed more militant forms of politics as these would constitute a breach of the postwar bargain and possibly threaten gains made through this compromise. In this way, the politics of compromise

ushered in with the Fordist regime tended to demobilize union militancy.

This demobilization was partial, however, and, in the case of the Canadian UAW, short-lived. One of the reasons for this incompleteness lay in the internal dynamics of the Canadian UAW to which we will return later. There were, however, two other reasons for the partialness and short duration of the domination of bureaucratic politics on UAW strategy.

Firstly, the late acceptance by Canadian Autoworkers of the terms of compromise meant that their historical experience of militancy was still alive in the union when the Fordist regime began to unravel. In particular, militants from the 1950's continued to function in the union into the 1970's and were there to remobilize discontent inside the Canadian UAW. Secondly, and more importantly, the private nature of the Fordist wage relations combined with the regionally specialized and hence fragmented Canadian economy meant that the terms of institutionalization and the wage/productivity trade-off tended to be sector-specific. This requires elaboration. Many of the regulatory mechanisms put into place by the UAW and the auto corporations filtered through into other unions' collective agreements. Examples of this included the Rand formula, cost-of-living clauses and, most recently, the indexing of pensions. Nonetheless, each sector of the economy had its own form of regulation which was highly dependent upon the nature of the economic sector in question and the strength and strategy of the corresponding union.(7) This introduced a certain

fragility into the Fordist mode of regulation which mitigated against complete demobilization. In particular, labour-management peace was dependent upon individual corporations and unions, not on overarching labour and employer organizations. Consequently, the ties that bound unions to the postwar compromise were more tenuous and there existed no overarching organization to discipline the Canadian UAW, or other unions, for breaking with established practices.

Finally, while the Fordist mode of regulation had the effect of demobilizing and hence threatening one aspect of the UAW's strategic capacity, the regulatory structures of collective bargaining also had the effect of enhancing the union's strategic capacity. This point can best be illustrated by examining one example - master and pattern bargaining. While these bargaining structures had the effect of centralizing decision-making and reducing local influence over the terms of a collective agreement, these structures simultaneously increased the union's bargaining power. They reduced the scope of corporate action by discouraging production relocation to avoid the union and prevented corporations from pitting one group of workers against another to reduce wages and benefits to the lowest common denominator. Moreover, they allowed the UAW to take more effective strike action on a corporate-wide basis and to extend gains made in strong sectors of the auto industry to weaker ones. These unanticipated benefits of institutionalized collective bargaining led to an ironic turn of events in UAW politics. Whereas in the 1950's, union militants in the Canadian Region had fought against

institutionalization due to its threat to rank-and-file control of the union and membership militancy, union militants in the 1980's mobilized to protect the existing structures of regulation from government and corporate attacks in order to preserve the organizational strength of the UAW.

ii) Single Interest Group Lobbying: The Political Form of Postwar Representation

Although the core of the postwar compromise between labour and capital was constituted in the private sphere, this is not to suggest that restructuring of labour-state relations did not also occur. Rather, it is simply to suggest that such political arrangements were less central than arrangements constituted in the sphere of private production.

Corporatist arrangements, which characterized certain Western European countries, developed as a consequence of massive state intervention in postwar economies and a strong and centrally organized labour movement with links to a social democratic party in power.(8) None of these conditions held in Canada. Consequently, corporatist arrangements did not appear in this country.(9) Instead, unions represented their demands to the state via interest group lobbying.

Interest group lobbying developed as a particular historical form of interest representation for trade unions in the postwar period and had an impact on UAW strategic choices. Consequently, it is necessary to pay more attention to the development of the UAW's lobbying relationship with governments in order to

understand fully the specificity of the Canadian Fordist regime.

Although the UAW practised some type of lobbying from the moment of the union's consolidation in the early 1940's, this political strategy was overshadowed first by militant strike action during the 1940's and then by collective bargaining in the 1950's. Governments, unresponsive to many union demands and supportive of the regulation of the economy in the private sphere, were not crucial to the UAW's strategic deliberations up until the end of the 1950's. Consequently, the UAW's relationship with both the Canadian and Ontario governments was sporadic and largely unstructured.

The 1960's marked the most important period of development in UAW-federal government relations. Due to the apparent structural problems of the Canadian auto industry and the inability of the union to effect needed changes in the industry through collective bargaining, the UAW turned increasingly to the federal government for help. Lobbying therefore became a more important strategy in the union's struggle for political and economic change. The UAW's apparent influence on the 1961 Royal Commission on the Auto Industry reinforced the perceived efficacy of lobbying.

Nonetheless, the UAW's desire for a restructuring of its relationship with the government was not enough to bring about this result. Rather it was only as the federal government began moving towards regulation of the auto industry and ultimately the Autopact that the UAW was given greater access to and influence over government decision-making. In exchange for the political support offered by the UAW for the Autopact, the government built

a more stable and structured relationship with the UAW. UAW access to senior Cabinet Ministers, regular meetings between government and union officials and the willingness of the federal government to act on certain union demands were all testament to this restructuring. In turn, the articulation of a closer relationship between the UAW and the federal government further reinforced the union's commitment to lobbying.

This restructuring of UAW-government relations and the UAW's increased reliance on a lobbying strategy was restricted, however, to the federal level of government. UAW relations with the Ontario government did not undergo a major restructuring until the late 1970's and then under very different conditions than those present in the 1960's. Consequently, UAW relations with the Ontario government remained relatively unimportant throughout the 1960's.

This historical analysis has helped explain the UAW's shift towards lobbying in the 1960's and the particular conditions under which UAW-federal government relations were restructured. In general, lobbying, like collective bargaining, relied upon 'responsible' union practices and had the effect of reinforcing the shift in UAW strategy away from mobilization-based strategies to leadership-dominated ones. Single-interest group lobbying, however, had its own structural and ideological characteristics which contributed to this demobilization. It is to this discussion that we now turn.

Lobbying is a form of political interest intermediation based on the relations between leaders representing various groups and

is organized on the basis of bureaucratic hierarchy. It is also a politics organized around the political discourse of pluralism. Lobbying is structured around compromise and competition between various groups defined according to their 'interests' which compete for a share of resources which are defined as limited.

One of the effects of trade-union participation in lobbying is to divide the working class along the dimension of the varying and often competing interests of different types of workers represented by different unions. Participation in single-interest group lobbying therefore erects structural barriers to the definition of class-based interests by workers. Unions are encouraged through participation in lobbying to see themselves in competition with other unions which represent different interests but compete for the same 'limited' resources.

The encouragement of such a pluralist understanding of the world through participation in lobbying could be seen in the UAW's increasing reliance on its own resources for mounting a lobby. Throughout the 1940's, the UAW relied upon the Workers' Educational Association for trade-union based information and cooperated with a number of unions, especially the U.E. and Rubber Workers, in its representations to government. These practices waned in the 1950's as the UAW increasingly accepted the ideological and structural parameters of single-interest group lobbying and relied almost exclusively on its own resources. A similar transformation took place in the scope of UAW presentations to governments. UAW lobbies changed in content from

broad nationally-based economic analyses, such as that put forward in the UAW's Win the Peace Plan, to limited analyses of specific aspects of the auto industry.

The organization of the political practice of lobbying on the basis of interest had, however, yet another effect on UAW strategy. While lobbying encouraged the dissolution of class content and cross-union alliances, it established the basis for UAW-corporate cooperation in lobbying. Because the 'interests' of the union and the corporation were similarly based on the health of the auto industry, when necessary or expedient, these two groups could construct a compromise as a basis for a joint lobby of government. The first example of this came in the 1950's when the UAW demanded adequate worker pensions and, in the face of having to pay this pension themselves, Ford agreed to lobby with the union to push for government-funded pensions.

Finally, lobbying can be argued to have a demobilizing effect on union strategy similar to the effect of corporatism. This demobilization can be seen in the UAW's replacement in the 1960's of militant, mobilization-based forms of strategy with a bureaucratic politics based on leaders as representatives of the union. To maintain access to and influence upon government decision-making, the union had to present itself as both a legitimate actor and one capable of practising 'responsible' unionism.(10) Militant mobilization-based politics were therefore precluded from union strategy if the UAW wanted access to and influence over government decision-making. Consequently, heightened reliance on lobbying in the 1960's reinforced the demobilizing

effect of insitutionalized collective bargaining. At the same time, single-interest group lobbying reinforced the fragmented and fragile nature of the Fordist regime in the auto industry.

iii) Who Needs Social Democratic Parties?

As a whole, support for either the CCF or its successor, the NDP, was of secondary importance to UAW struggles for political change. This contrasts with the Western European experience where social democratic parties developed strong ties to organized labour and with the support of this constituency won control of various governments in the postwar years. What explains the UAW's strategic choice not to focus its political energies on electing a social democratic government?

In the UAW's early years, lack of support for the CCF can be partly explained by opposition from Communists who exerted tremendous influence on the union's strategic direction. Added to this was a growing mistrust of the CCF amongst Canadian Autoworkers. Part of this mistrust stemmed from the party's strong association with the International Union. For other Canadian autoworkers the source of mistrust came from the CCF's competition with the Communist Party for UAW support. This competition had led to bitter internal union conflicts which threatened to divide, and hence weaken, the union which they had worked so hard to build.

These factors combined to prevent any strong CCF constituency from growing and organizing support within the UAW in the 1940's. The lack of national electoral support from workers therefore prevented the CCF from securing electoral victory after the war

whilst other social democratic parties across Europe were being swept into power. From this moment onwards, the die was cast. In various Western European countries, social democratic parties were elected as guarantors of working-class gains, both economically and politically, through adoption of Keynesian policies and in particular, the pursuit of full employment. Once in power, these parties put into place the postwar settlement and reaped the electoral benefits of postwar prosperity and stability.

For the CCF, the situation was reversed. Unable to garner enough electoral support to win control of either the Ontario or federal governments, the CCF was not in a position to present itself as the guarantor of postwar prosperity or as the 'saviour' of the working class. Instead, the Liberal Party usurped this position, declaring its support for full employment and trade-union rights. Even though this party proved less committed to government intervention in the economy, whether in the pursuit of full employment or in delivering social welfare benefits, a postwar settlement was taking shape without the aid of the CCF.

The UAW found alternative strategies such as lobbying and workplace action effective in securing a decent standard of living for autoworkers and enough political change to blunt the need for a social democratic government supportive of organized labour. No one could argue with success. With each step taken by the Canadian UAW towards securing a stronger and more advantageous position for autoworkers, the need for a social democratic party waned. Furthermore, the risk of supporting the CCF increased as many autoworkers saw partisan politics as a potential threat to

existing arrangements which so far had paid off.

Ironically, because of workers' ambivalence towards the CCF and the CCF's original constituency which included farmers and other social groupings, the party hesitated to put all its eggs into labour's basket and failed to pursue a more aggressive pro-labour policy. For many Canadian autoworkers, this merely confirmed their earlier mistrust of the CCF and thus a vicious circle of suspicion was created. When in 1958, the CCF and CLC began proceedings to create a new party with much stronger links to labour, these contradictions persisted. Although the UAW heavily contributed to the formation of the NDP, the final decisions on such issues as trade-union affiliation to the party and the NDP's continued interference in local UAW decisions, reinforced many Canadian autoworkers suspicions about the NDP's lack of real commitment to organized labour. The circle of suspicion remained unbroken. Only in the 1970's did conditions both inside and outside the Canadian UAW change sufficiently to lead to a reorientation of the union towards the NDP. These changes would, however, prove to be too little too late.

Finally, the private nature of the postwar settlement had the effect of creating structural obstacles to union mobilization behind the CCF/NDP. It has already been argued that the development of sector-specific regulatory mechanisms for collective bargaining and single-interest group lobbying had the effect of fragmenting the national labour movement along the lines of industry and individual unions. This fragmentation reinforced

interest-divisions within the labour movement. When combined with the diversity of groups, and hence interests, targetted by the CCF/NDP for support, this fragmentation of the labour movement made almost impossible the task of mobilizing workers, or even just autoworkers, behind a party which was trying to 'broker' the interests of so many different groups.(11)

It must be noted, however, that the CCF/NDP did give a "social democratic" tinge to the postwar settlement. As this party garnered enough electoral support to remain a viable third party, its demands for greater government regulation of the economy and improved social welfare provisions were not completely lost on the other parties, in particular the federal Liberal Party. Especially during elections and at those times when the CCF/NDP was either opposition party or the supporter of a minority government, this party provided an impetus for pursuit of social welfare policies. In so doing, the CCF/NDP bolstered the legitimacy of union demands for government regulation of the economy.

The Internal Dynamics of the UAW

An examination of the various structures of Fordist regulation provides us with only a partial explanation for postwar UAW political behaviour and strategic choices. The UAW's willingness and capacity to mobilize its membership remain unexplained. It is in the internal dynamics of the union that the rest of the explanation for UAW political behaviour lies. The organizational structure of a union and its collective identity are crucial in understanding a union's capacity to construct unity

out of membership diversity and hence to mobilize this membership behind a strategy of collective action. The organizational structure influences the degree of rank-and-file participation in union strategy and conversely the extent to which union leaders dominate or control union decision-making. Moreover, the specific organizational characteristics of the union structure the opportunities for membership interest representation, therefore influencing the extent to which the union is capable of constructing unity rather than allowing the growth of competing sectoral interests.

Organizational structure alone, however, cannot fully explain a union's capacity for forging membership support for a particular course of action. Rather the union's collective identity may facilitate the construction of unity by providing the basis for members to overcome the diversity of their individual interests and to act in the interests of the collective. At the same time, the collective identity shapes the perceived strategic options of the union. In the case of the Canadian UAW both the organizational structure and the collective identity have positively contributed to the union's mobilizational capacity and to keeping open the strategic possibility for militant action by the membership.

The most important organizational structure of the Canadian UAW which contributed to its mobilizational capacity was the District Council, later renamed the Canadian Council. Established in 1939, this council consisted of rank-and-file delegates directly elected by the membership who met on a regular basis as defined in the Council's by-laws. The Council was both financially

and structurally independent of the International Union administration and executive and limited even the Canadian Regional administration to a voice but no vote in proceedings.

Although restricted from decision-making in policy areas deemed the responsibility of the International Union (which came to include dues increases, general collective bargaining goals and strikes), the Canadian Council took over major responsibility for policy-making on other issues and strategic planning for the Region. Moreover, it became an important forum for debate on all union issues, including those under the IEB jurisdiction. In this capacity, the Canadian Council became the central arena for rank-and-file input into and criticism of union policy, accountability of the incumbent leadership and testing the waters of membership support for leadership initiatives. It became the organizational means for mobilizing the membership behind strategic plans and, at the same time, allowed for ongoing rank-and-file participation in union affairs.

The Canadian Council maintained a far greater significance than similar bodies in the American section of the union, the majority of which were dismantled by 1943. Due to the fact that the Canadian Region was simultaneously a separate region and country within the International, the Canadian Council came to play a more central role in union affairs. All the political issues and strategic planning, which were handled in the U.S. by a professional staff, became the responsibility of the Canadian Council. Consequently, Council delegates were more intimately

involved in researching and plotting the union's chosen course of political action. This not only resulted in greater membership education and activism but also made political strategy subject to ongoing debate.

This organizational network was supplemented by the system of in-plant representation. Out of its 1945 Ford strike, the Canadian UAW won the right of paid time-off for union plant chairmen executing their union duties. This was extended throughout the union, thereby establishing further communication links between locals and a ready means for ensuring the flow of information between the rank and file and the union administration.

The extensive educational network within the UAW augmented the mobilization effect of this organizational structure. Union education had a long history in the UAW in Canada, formally beginning with the Canadian Region's affiliation with the Workers' Educational Association in 1940. The union's educational thrust was never limited to training shop stewards and administering collective agreements, but included sessions on party politics, economic issues and government policy. Furthermore, the UAW began holding sessions for families of active trade unionists in order to teach them the principles of trade unionism and seminars for retirees on how to prepare for retirement. This education system provided the union with a well-informed membership. Ongoing communication about the major issues facing the union provided it with a strong basis upon which to mobilize membership support for political activities. Finally, by involving families and union retirees, the union made itself a central focus of unionists'

lives and combatted the growth of anti-union demands within the family and community.

Overall, the organizational structure and educational process provided the union with a means for mobilizing the membership. This distinguished it from many other unions where centralized bureaucratic control and 'expertise' replaced union initiatives based on mobilization of the rank and file. Bureaucratic demobilization was further hampered by the Canadian UAW's status as part of an International Union. Whereas the offices of the International Union became highly bureaucratized, the centralized nature of the UAW and the lack of resources given to union regions meant that the Canadian Region experienced a relatively low level of bureaucratization and instead was forced to rely upon local leadership and the membership for strategic deliberation and planning. These organizational characteristics alone, however, did not fully explain the Canadian UAW's mobilization capacity or its strategic orientation towards union-centred forms of political action. Canadian Autoworkers' collective identity was also crucial for understanding their political behaviour.

The relatively homogenous make-up of the Canadian UAW membership facilitated the growth of a well-developed union collective identity. Up until the 1960's, the majority of Canadian Autoworkers were white English-speaking males who worked in similar types of assembly-line jobs, geographically concentrated in southern Ontario. Characteristics such as these facilitated the construction of a common understanding of and commitment to the

union and its role in society. There existed no objective basis such as race, gender or language for the exclusion of certain members of the union from the dominant cultural symbols and discourse of the union.(12) In turn, this reduced the potential for the emergence of competing claims on the union.

This argument is inadequately addressed in this thesis. It requires more careful attention to the way in which the "universe of political discourse" was constructed out of symbols of maleness, the anglo-saxon culture and the 'male' environment of the assembly line. (13) Nonetheless, in the most general sense it can be argued that the homogeneity of Canadian autoworkers prevented the fragmentation of the union along sectoral, although not ideological, lines and provided a basis for a strong identity with the union.

The ideological and strategic struggles inside the union gave the UAW collective identity its early syndicalist orientation. This syndicalist tendency was evident in the membership's understanding of the union as the primary agent of political struggle and change. Workplace action, in particular the strike, was seen as the most viable weapon for forcing political and economic change.

A number of factors contributed to the development and entrenchment of this syndicalist tendency amongst Canadian autoworkers. The first was the peculiar nature of the Unity caucus which secured control over the Canadian region in 1939. Although Communists dominated this caucus, they depended upon trade-union

militants and left-wing social democrats for continued control of the union. Consequently, rather than building support for the Communist Party or strictly following party policy, Communist autoworkers pursued and supported a strategy of militant workplace action to which other members of the caucus were also committed.

A strategy which centred upon trade-union action rather than support for a political party resonated among the membership which had grown mistrustful of party politics. Moreover, syndicalist forms of political action were consistent with Canadian Autoworkers' commitment to rank-and-file participation in and control of the union. In turn, a syndicalist orientation fed this union culture of democracy. Finally, the success of workplace-based political strategies in meeting membership demands reinforced the commitment to this strategic orientation.

This syndicalist tendency and the union's organizational structure help explain Canadian Autoworkers' resistance to the institutionalization of collective bargaining and hence delay in the acceptance of regulatory structures and the practices of 'responsible' unionism. Institutionalized labour-management relations meant that collective bargaining would shift from local to leadership control. Furthermore, institutionalization was based on a compromise whereby the union agreed to control membership militancy in exchange for healthy wage and benefit increases. This meant greater leadership control over the use of the strike weapon. These proposed changes countered the union membership's commitment to rank-and-file control of their union, raising the spectre of a return to the days of Homer Martin, and to

syndicalist forms of struggle to protect membership interests. Consequently, the UAW's syndicalism retarded the entrenchment of Fordist regulatory mechanisms as autoworkers fought to prevent their loss of control over strikes and, ultimately, their union.

Without the District Council as vehicle for organizing opposition, however, it is less likely that the membership could have mounted an effective challenge to more highly regulated collective bargaining. Through this Council, the Left caucus mobilized enough support for alternative strategies and resistance to the course of action pursued by union leaders to delay institutionalization. By the early 1960's, however, the union leadership won out by discrediting the Left caucus as Communist and securing substantial wage and benefit increases for workers through collective bargaining. Nonetheless, the transformation of the union's ideological orientation which accompanied the Reuther caucus victory and institutionalization left open the possibility for remobilization. The UAW never became captured by the philosophy of business unionism. Rather the UAW's ideological orientation shifted from a political conception of unionism to a form of social unionism. Although workplace struggles lost their 'political' nature and union practices became highly regulated, the UAW actively supported and engaged in struggles for 'social' justice. This social unionism prevented the ideological demobilization of the membership and constructed a culture and discourse of social activism amongst autoworkers. Moreover, commitment to social activism combined with Reuther's construction

of union pride amongst autoworkers served, in a modified fashion, to reinforce Canadian Autoworkers' commitment to their union as the central actor in political struggles.

Thus, the syndicalist orientation of the union was modified but not destroyed. Moreover, its more militant tendency remained amongst certain pockets of the membership who, once Fordism came under strain, regained ascendancy in the union and once again mobilized support behind a more militant course of action. Overall, these internal dynamics of the Canadian UAW facilitated the mobilization and unity of the rank and file which were important preconditions for the union's strategic capacity to pursue successfully collective action and in particular more militant practices.

Fordism in Crisis

By the 1970's, the Fordist regime had reached its limits and began to break down. To understand the UAW's political response to this, it is necessary to discern the exhaustion of the Fordist mode of accumulation in the 1970's from the dismantling of the Fordist mode of regulation which did not really occur until the 1980's.

It is important to note that the argument made throughout this thesis concerning the breakdown of the Fordist regime runs counter to the interpretation of the politics of the 1970's and 1980's put forth by other analysts, in particular David Wolfe, Leo Panitch and Donald Swartz.(14) These political economists identify the wage control period in the mid-1970's as the point when the

postwar settlement ended and the federal government abandoned Keynesianism in favour of monetarist solutions to economic problems. In these analyses, the 1980's is understood as a continuation and intensification of attacks on the postwar settlement and trade unions. This type of analysis is problematic for understanding the Canadian UAW's strategic pursuits which fundamentally differed between the 1970's and 1980's. It also masks the fundamental difference between government and corporate practices in these years.

While a full discussion of the problems with this type of analysis is impossible at this point, a few comments seemed appropriate. David Wolfe, whose work has served as the foundation for this post-Keynesian argument, identifies the Bank of Canada's 1975 policy of monetary restraint as the first step in the federal government's "abandonment of Keynesianism in favour of more conservative alternatives."⁽¹⁵⁾ The second step by the government in this direction consisted of the Anti-Inflation Programme, introduced on October 14, 1975. The "centrepiece" of this programme, according to Wolfe, was the government's wage and price control order. This "end of the Keynesian era" in Canada signalled the abandonment of the postwar settlement and was followed, according to Panitch and Swartz, by continued and intensified assaults on trade unions and the replacement of consent, which characterized the postwar compromise, with coercion.⁽¹⁶⁾

There are a number of problems with this analysis which have direct bearing on how we understand the breakdown of the Fordist regime and the impact of this on trade unions. It must be

reiterated that the argument that the Fordist mode of accumulation had reached its limits in the 1970's, is not in dispute here. Rather, what is being disputed is the implicit argument found in Wolfe et al, that once the mode of accumulation is exhausted, the political, social and institutional arrangements which regulated and held together the postwar economic order are immediately abandoned.

There are two main problems with these analyses. The first consists of Wolfe's interpretation of the Bank of Canada's move towards restriction of the money supply. The second is Wolfe, Panitch and Swartz's analysis of the 1975 wage and price controls. Wolfe argues that the Bank of Canada's policy of restricting the money supply in 1975 was an indication of the "end of the Keynesian era".(17) Yet, when the Bank of Canada adopted similar policies of monetary restraint in the early 1950's, Wolfe argues that these initiatives demonstrated the "constraints on the ability of Canadian governments to implement Keynesian demand management policies."(18) While both the 1950's and 1970's Bank of Canada decisions constituted monetarist policy initiatives, the earlier decision is said to reflect the constraints on Keynesian demand management while the latter reflects the "end of Keynesian era". What differentiates the significance of these two Bank of Canada decisions? In Wolfe's analysis, the point of differentiation appears to lie in the federal government's 1975 introduction of the Anti Inflation Programme (especially wage and price controls) which is presented as confirmation of the

monetarist shift by the federal government. This characterization of wage and price controls is problematic, however, as it contradicts Keynesian analyses which argue that incomes policies are part of the modern Keynesian arsenal for reacting to inflation.(19) In Wolfe, Panitch and Swartz's analysis, the basis for categorizing wage and price controls as part of the monetarist shift appears to lie in their unilateral introduction by the federal government and their imposition on trade unions. The fact that the government was unable to secure labour's consent to an incomes policy, however, is surely an inadequate basis for arguing that this policy was conservative in nature. Moreover, this type of post-facto analysis ignores early government-union cooperation on the question of a 'social contract', including an incomes policy, and the internal union conflicts which led organized labour to officially oppose wage controls, even though according to Maslove and Swimmer, many union leaders actually supported the idea of wage restraint.(20)

Nonetheless, even if we accept that wage and price controls were a move to dismantle the postwar settlement, this assigns too great a role to the state in the organization of this compromise and assumes much greater corporate support for such government interference in the labour market. If, as is argued here, the postwar settlement was secured in the sphere of private production, no state policy without the full support of corporations could have dismantled this arrangement. On the basis of the political history of the Canadian UAW, we know that auto corporations were quite willing to work with unions to circumvent

the wage control order and protect the structures of collective bargaining. Only in the late 1970's and early 1980's did corporations undertake a massive restructuring of industry and Fordist wage relations themselves.

It seems more appropriate to understand the decade of the seventies as one of uncertainty when neither governments, corporations nor unions were decided on how best to respond to the economic downturn. This, while the Bank of Canada pursued a monetarist policy, the federal government attempted to salvage, or at least prop up, the postwar settlement and the existing wage relation through greater state regulation i.e. wage and price controls and tripartism, a strategy which was attempted in the 1970's by a series of governments in other capitalist countries.(21) This initiative by the federal government failed, however, due, at least partially, to established postwar practices which relied on arrangements in the private sphere. This line of argument leads to quite a different conclusion concerning the breakup of the postwar settlement, or the crisis of Fordism. Instead of seeing the 1970's as a period when both the Fordist mode of accumulation and regulation were dismantled, this decade becomes characterized by a disjuncture between accumulation and regulation. While the Fordist regime of intensive accumulation may have reached its limits in the 1970's, governments, corporations and unions reacted to this with an attempted reformulation of existing regulations and institutions intended to bolster profit levels, restore labour-management peace and set the economy back

'on track'.

Finally, the argument put forth by Wolfe et al makes difficult any explanation of the complexity and differentiated nature of union strategies in the 1970's and 1980's. In the case of the Canadian UAW, which has received such praise for its militancy in the 1980's, one of the few explanations for varying union strategies becomes the change in union leadership from McDermott, who is miscast as the revisionist or complete reactionary, to Bob White. The latter's 'nationalism' or 'radicalism' therefore becomes the crucial explanatory factor in recent UAW behaviour.(22) Yet, explanations which rest on leadership fail to explain the contradictory strategies pursued by the UAW in the 1970's and place too great an importance on leadership in the battles of the eighties. Let us now return to our own explanation for UAW political strategy and the breakdown of the Fordist regime.

Declining productivity and profitability combined with rising inflation in the 1970's indicated that the postwar regime of accumulation had reached its economic limits. Nonetheless, this did not occasion a sudden abandonment by governments, the auto corporations or the UAW of the Fordist wage relation. Rather, seeing the economic downturn as cyclical, all three of these actors attempted to preserve and in some cases reformulate existing socio-political arrangements in anticipation that this strategy would shore up the failing economy. Governments began seeking tripartite arrangements. Federal tripartite initiatives failed, being tied to a wage control programme which rank-and-file

unionists rejected. Rather than providing a basis for a reformulation of union-government relations, the federal Liberal's mid-1970's economic policy strained these relations and encouraged the remobilization of the UAW. In contrast, the Ontario government was successful in drawing the UAW into tripartite consultation. Consequently, rather than resulting in destruction of postwar institutionalized relations, the recession provided the basis for the construction of more stabilized relations between the Ontario government and the Canadian UAW.

Similarly, the structures of collective bargaining which constituted the core of both institutionalized relations between labour-management and the Fordist wage relation were protected and enhanced in this period. The Canadian auto industry remained relatively prosperous throughout the 1970's, which meant that auto companies continued to prefer peaceful labour-management relations. Consequently, when Autoworkers mobilized against wage controls and were determined to strike in defence of their right to bargain collectively for wages, the auto corporations willingly cooperated with the union to circumvent the wage control order. In general, the private and sector-specific nature of the Fordist regime in Canada contributed to the strategic capacity of corporations and the UAW to resist any unilateral government moves to restructure existing socio-political arrangements.

These broad political-economic conditions partially explain the preservation of the Fordist mode of regulation in the 1970's but they provide no explanation for the UAW choice of strategy or

the apparent contradiction between the UAW's return to more militant mobilization politics while it simultaneously acted to protect existing institutionalized relations. To explain this strategic shift in the face of UAW leadership determination to preserve existing socio-political arrangements, one must look to the changing internal dynamics of the union and the resulting strategic conflict over union responses to the recession.

The Canadian UAW came under terrific internal strain in the 1970's, which threatened to divide and hence seriously weaken the union. New members brought into the union as a result of the 1960's organizing drive were less easily incorporated into the dominant union culture and practices due to the economic recession and the lack of success of existing union strategies in responding to problems of forced overtime, speedups, concessionary demands and plant closures. This membership discontent was fertile ground for left-wing militants in the union, many of whom remained from the earlier Left caucus. These militants formed a new Left caucus and successfully mobilized existing membership discontent behind more radical strategic alternatives. Effectively, this group saw the wage/productivity trade-off and institutionalized relations, both of which were protected by the International Union, as fetters on union strategy and its ability to protect the membership adequately from the day-to-day misery of the assembly line.

This challenge to the union leadership and existing strategic pursuits forced union leaders to respond in the hope of reconstructing internal consensus. They therefore secured greater

regional autonomy from the International, pursued more militant mobilization-based strategies alongside their practices of 'responsible' unionism, and usurped some of the more militant discourse of the Left caucus.

This strategic redirection and the resulting union struggles not only reasserted the UAW's position of strength vis-a-vis corporations and governments but also reincorporated dissident union members into the union. In particular, the basis for the union's collective identity was both reaffirmed and redefined. The pursuit and success of more militant strategies reunited Canadian Autoworkers behind their union as the defender of rank-and-file interests. It also reaffirmed the union's commitment to internal democracy and rank-and-file control. Secondly, the Canadian UAW had responded to the specific demands of the francophones in the union and in so doing modified the union's collective identity to include commitments to two languages and the two founding nations.

The changing internal dynamics of the Canadian UAW combined with the union leadership's pursuit of a reconstructed internal unity provide the explanation for this union's adoption of a more militant programme of political action. Moreover, this examination of the internal dynamics of the Canadian UAW helps explain the contradictory nature of union strategy during the 1970's. Briefly, although union leaders saw the union's future strength and influence lying in continued acceptance of the politics of compromise, this could only be achieved if the union continued to act in a unified way and if union leaders were understood as the

legitimate representative of autoworkers' interests. Given the mounting challenges to incumbent union leaders and to the union's strategic direction, the preconditions for continued union influence were undermined. Thus, in trying to preserve both its legitimacy and its position of strength from which to continue its established relations with governments and corporations, the Canadian UAW had to break with the politics of 'responsible' unionism and pursue a more militant course of action.

At the moment when internal UAW harmony was restored, the Fordist mode of regulation came under serious attack. Auto corporations and governments identified union wage structures and trade unions' institutionalized position in the economy and society as a root cause of the economic crisis of the 1980's and as fetters on attempts at economic recovery. The result was the introduction of legislation intended to restrict the scope of union activities and corporate attacks on the structures of collective bargaining. These constituted a fundamental attack on the UAW's position of power which had been enhanced by the regulatory structures and its capacity to deliver adequate wages and benefits to its membership.

The Canadian UAW's response to these attacks was a mobilization of Canadian autoworkers. Part of this remobilization entailed a shift in union electoral strategy whereby the UAW mobilized behind the NDP in the 1979 parallel campaign. When this strategy failed to produce any meaningful political change and in the face of escalating attacks on unions, the UAW reverted to syndicalist forms of militant political action. This move could be

seen in the use of sitdowns and other workplace-based strategies. New in the UAW's political arsenal, however, was its pursuit of broad-based alliances. Throughout the 1980's, the Canadian UAW sought alliances with corporations, provincial governments and other labour unions to form a united front of resistance and put forth alternate strategies for the revitalization of the economy. The goal of the union was to prevent the destruction of the organizational integrity of the union through dismantling of existing structures and relations and to regain union strength in order that unions could have an impact on the shape of any new regime in the making. Success in this objective was crucial for corporate and government solutions to the economic crisis threatened to displace, if not completely destroy, unions. Consequently, the Canadian UAW fought to resist concessions, including those aimed at introducing a more flexible labour process, in order to protect itself and place the UAW in a position of strength from which it could negotiate, and therefore shape, any future changes to work relations or the wage structure.

Canadian Autoworkers were relatively successful in their struggles. This could be seen in the Canadian UAW's protection of the basic structures of collective bargaining and the union's access to the centres of political and economic decision-making in the 1980's. To explain the UAW's relative success and its choice of strategy we must once again turn to the broad political-economic conditions and the internal dynamics of the union.

One of the most important factors in explaining UAW capacity

for influencing developments in the 1980's was the uncertainty of corporate and government responses to the crisis. This uncertainty, combined with the sectoral nature of collective bargaining structures, opened the strategic space for UAW influence. Furthermore, once the UAW decided on its own strategy of opposition to unilateral corporate restructuring and insistence on union participation, the very success of this strategy limited the strategic options available to corporations and governments alike. In particular, the UAW's successful resistance to strategies which relied upon 'union-bashing' forced governments and corporations to adopt a new 'tack' based on re-establishing and restructuring the basis for union-corporate cooperation.

Secondly, in the post-1982 period, the Canadian UAW's strategic capacity was enhanced by the improved economic performance of the Canadian auto industry. The lower value of the Canadian dollar relative to the American dollar was perceived as making Canada a more profitable area for auto investment. Although the Canadian dollar took its first dive below the American dollar between 1978 and 1979, due to the perceived cyclical nature of this drop in value and multinational corporate practices of preventing the use of this lowered dollar for improving Canadian productivity and profitability, the lower value did not register in corporate planning. When, however, the Canadian dollar continued to drop and appeared to be permanently valued at a lower rate than the American dollar, auto corporations planned increased investment in Canada to take advantage of lower costs. Consequently, competitive Canadian labour costs strengthened the

UAW's hand in resisting concessions in the post-1982 period and in maintaining existing structures of collective bargaining.

While these factors enhanced the union's strategic capacity, it was the internal dynamics of the union which determined the union's particular course of action and success. Firstly, the fact that the UAW had entered the terrain of mobilization politics in the 1970's expanded the perceived limits of union strategy: action beyond those given by the 'responsible' unionism and politics of compromise ushered in with the Fordist regime. The membership had been successfully mobilized before and this type of strategy had worked. It therefore appeared a viable strategy in the 1980's.

There were two major differences, however, between the mobilization politics of the 1970's and those strategies pursued in the 1980's. Firstly, the UAW returned to using workplace action such as sitdowns and strikes for specifically political purposes. Secondly, in the 1980's the Canadian UAW attempted to construct a new legitimacy and position of political strength for itself through building alliances with a wide range of groups in society. These particular strategic choices can be partially explained by the UAW's understanding of the impact of the crisis on the union.

As in the 1970's, the Canadian UAW found its membership increasingly divided over the appropriate strategy for the union to pursue. Unlike the 1970's, however, where membership division was based on the sectoral interests of new groups in the union, the divisions in the 1980's were more clearly based on ideological

differences between militant and non-militant sections of the union. On the one hand, the union confronted members who insisted on pursuing a strategy of cooperation with corporations, including acceptance of concessions, in the hope that this would ensure continued jobs. On the other hand were workers who insisted that concessions were the thin edge of the corporate wedge, intended to destroy the very bargaining capacity and hence the power of the UAW. Not only was the union incapable of reconciling these conflicting membership demands, but whether it agreed to concessions or not it found itself the object of membership discontent. Members blamed the UAW, and not the corporations, for failing to protect autoworkers. The union needed to adopt a strategy which would return internal unity to the union.

Furthermore, concessions posed a more serious threat to the union than any of the constraints placed on unions in the 1970's. Concessions were not merely intended to lower the wage bill for corporations but were also being demanded in areas of seniority, wage rules and master and pattern bargaining. In other words, acceptance of these concessions meant agreeing to the dismantling of the entire structure of collective bargaining. These structures had organizationally strengthened the UAW's position by preventing membership competition, corporate whip-sawing of wages, and allowing the union a near monopolistic bargaining position in the auto sector. By accepting the dismantling of these structures the UAW would open itself further to membership discontent and competition and to corporate strategies intended to divide and rule and force wages to their lowest common denominator. The only

means for the UAW to protect its organizational integrity and strength in the workplace was to resist plant closures and concessions. This goal could not be pursued through cooperation with corporations. In the wake of failures of lobbying and mobilization behind the NDP, Canadian Autoworkers looked to alternative strategies.

Finally, the UAW understood that alone it could not win this fight to protect the union's position in the economy and society. The UAW therefore coupled its new militancy with a strategy of alliance-building intended to shore up the UAW's position of strength and to ensure UAW influence over the direction of economic restructuring.

While this analysis of the union's interpretation of the crisis explains the limitations on the union and its pursuit of a strategy of alliance-building, it does not explain the UAW's decision to pursue workplace-based strategies. This can be explained by the revival of the syndicalist tradition amongst Canadian Autoworkers in the 1980's. The union's experience in the 1970's demonstrated the possible effectiveness of workplace action in securing political change. When Robert White was elected Director of the Canadian Region he brought the syndicalist tradition back into the leadership. This was reinforced by the appointment of several militants as union staff. The combination of a mobilized membership with this leadership made workplace action appear as a viable strategy.

Nonetheless, the choice by the Canadian UAW to pursue

mobilization-based strategies in 1980's did not guarantee their success. The organizational structure of the union contributed to the union's mobilization capacity. As in previous years, the Canadian Council served as a forum of communication between the rank and file and the leadership and as the means for mobilizing locals behind the union's strategy. The union's educational and informational network, whose access to the membership had been improved through the winning of Paid Education Leave in 1979, also facilitated the mobilization by ensuring a well informed membership. Finally, the highly centralized nature of collective bargaining gave the national office of the Canadian UAW the ability to monitor local developments and intervene in order to ensure that locals pursued the union's adopted plan of action.

The UAW's successful mobilization of its membership and of broad-based support for its demands prevented the complete destruction of those regulations which governed collective bargaining and had been put into place in the postwar years. The union had also stalled its exclusion from political decision-making. As the UAW proved itself a powerful union in the workplace and society, the federal and Ontario governments and the auto corporations attempted to draw the UAW back into consultation and ultimately the politics of responsible unionism. The Canadian UAW, which never intended any 'revolutionary' change through its remobilization, has accepted this reformulation of labour-state-capital relations in the hope that from its new-found position of strength, the union can shape any new regime to come.

Beyond Independence: Prospects of the CAW in the 1980's

Canadian Autoworkers' successful pursuit of a militant mobilization-based strategy in the 1980's ultimately forced these workers to leave their International and form a new national union. Ironically, the products of this success may be the undoing of the union in the future. With independence, the Canadian Autoworkers' Union (CAW) was numerically weakened. In response to this, the CAW has attempted to increase its membership through mergers and aggressive organizational drives. While successes in these endeavours with such unions as the Canadian Air Line Employees' Association have increased the numerical strength of the union, they have also increased the diversity of membership and sectoral interests which are potentially divisive to the union.

Secondly, organizational drives such as the one involving the east-coast fishermen have opened up the CAW to charges of raiding. No matter the facts of the case, which point to the fishermen's desire for a change from the autocratic practices of their earlier union, the United Food and Commercial Workers International Union (UFCW), these charges and the attendant growing hostility between the CAW and various international unions which have sided with the UFCW, weaken the position of Canadian Autoworkers and their capacity to construct broad-based alliances within the labour movement. This has already thwarted White's envisioned Canadian Metalworkers Federation which International Unions now view suspiciously as one more attempt by White to gain more power.

The CAW has also altered its organizational structure which could potentially threaten its capacity to mobilize its membership and maintain internal unity. Firstly, the building of an independent union which has responsibility for all union functions including those once performed by the International has made imperative the expansion of the union's bureaucracy. With this has come a growing hierarchy of organization and greater separation of the rank and file from the leadership. The tensions that this creates are amply reflected in the microcosm of the UAW office which has been transformed into a highly bureaucratic organization with growing support staff discontent.

The nature of the Canadian Council has also been changed. The executive of the union and the Council are now structurally intertwined, leaving open the possibility for greater leadership control over the functions and decisions of the Council. This, in turn, may reduce the scope of the Council as a basis for organization of opposition. Although White's personal participation in leafletting plant gates in a recent organizational drive at Michelin Tire tempers such pessimism, the degree to which this can and will continue remains to be seen as the union grows larger.

These changes to CAW organization and membership strength come at a time when Canadian Autoworkers face continued challenges from corporations intent upon restructuring the workplace and heightening their competitive position in the world automobile market. Old assembly-line plants, like the GM plant in Oshawa,

have been completely transformed by a massive infusion of robots. Auto corporations continue to demand a reduction in job classifications, changes to seniority provisions and dismantling of master bargaining so to develop more flexible and 'cooperative' labour relations. The auto corporations, while still uncertain of the shape of any long-term economic recovery, seem to have determined their strategy for restructuring the auto industry and hence, re-establishing their own profitability.

It takes two to tango, however, and with Canadian Autoworkers' renewed position of strength, the corporations are not in a position to call the tune themselves. The CAW has developed its own strategy to respond to industrial restructuring with the goal of ensuring a place for the union in any new economic order. While the CAW supports the introduction of new technology with its promise of improved productivity and is willing to negotiate certain changes to work rules and methods, it expects to have input into these decisions and to share in the benefits of improved productivity and profitability. At the same time, the CAW has continued its struggles to maintain various collective bargaining structures, including seniority, the system of pattern bargaining and negotiated wages and benefits which remain independent of a company's economic performance. These goals, which contradict corporate definitions of "flexibility", are seen as crucial by CAW leaders in preserving the union's leverage in the workplace and its organizational integrity and strength. Moreover, the CAW leadership is under no illusions that the new era of 'cooperative' and flexible labour relations

represent a panacea for workers or a fundamental change in corporate priorities. As Bob White has recently commented:

...it is naive to believe, under our economic system, that the adversarial nature of labour relations can disappear... As long as the corporations have the power, and face the pressure to make profits their dominant priority, and as long as workers have other priorities - like better incomes and improved worklives - adversarial relations will remain. As long as fear and insecurity are the flip side of the attempt to achieve greater cooperation, any apparent success in winning such co-operation [sic] will only be temporary.
(23)

To succeed in these struggles and therefore shape any new regime of labour-management relations, however, the CAW needs to ensure its continued mobilizational capacity, which for reasons cited above may be threatened.

At the same time, recent collective bargaining gains by the CAW, positive media coverage and the rallying of rank and file from other unions in support of CAW initiatives augers well for Canadian Autoworkers' ability to force their own demands onto corporate and national agenda. Consequently, it is impossible to predict the CAW's success or failure in shaping the new, emergent mode of regulation. It is possible to state with certainty, however, that any successes by the CAW in shaping the new regime will be, in contrast to the Fordist experience, "made in Canada".

Endnotes

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2. David Wolfe, "Economic Growth and Foreign Investment: A Perspective on Canadian Economic Policy", Journal of Canadian Studies 13 (Spring, 1978): 3-20; Wallace Clement, Continental Corporate Power: Economic Elite Linkages Between Canada and the U.S. (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1977), esp. chapter One.
3. Leo Panitch and Donald Swartz, From Consent to Coercion: The Assault on Trade Union Freedoms (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1985), pp.15-34; Bullen and Roberts, "A Heritage of Hope", p.119.
4. Stuart Jamieson, Times of Trouble: Labour Unrest and Industrial Conflict in Canada, 1900-66, Task Force on Labour Relations (Ottawa: 1968), chapter VII.
5. According to Jamieson, the incidence of wildcats across Canada increased in the 1950's. Ibid., p.357.
6. David Wolfe, "The Rise and Demise of the Keynesian Era in Canada: Economic Policy, 1930-1982" in Modern Canada 1930-1980's, eds. Michael Cross and Gregory Kealey, Vol.3: Readings in Canadian Social History (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd., 1984: reprint ed. 1985), pp.46-78; Wolfe, "Economic Growth and Foreign Investment"; Leo Panitch, "The Role and Nature of the Canadian State" in The Canadian State: Political Economy and Political Power, ed. idem. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), pp.3-27; Nixon Apple, "The Rise and Fall of Full Employment Capitalism", Studies in Political Economy no.4 (Autumn, 1980).
7. Jamieson and Downie provide some evidence of the differential collective bargaining mechanisms put into place by various unions in a number of industries. See Jamieson, Times of Trouble, passim; Bryan Downie, "The Influence of International Unions in Collective Bargaining in Canada", paper presented at 16th Annual Industrial Relations Center Conference. McGill University, Montreal, Sept. 1965.
8. Leo Panitch, "The Development of Corporatism in Liberal Democracies", Comparative Political Studies 10 (April, 1977), pp.61-90; Leo Panitch, "Trade Unions and the Capitalist State", New Left Review 125 (1981): 21-43; Gerhard

Lehbruch and Philippe Schmitter eds., Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Making (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1982).

9. Leo Panitch, "Corporatism in Canada?", Studies in Political Economy no.1 (Spring, 1979): 43-92.
10. David Kwavnick, Organized Labour and Pressure Politics: The Canadian Labour Congress, 1956-1968 (Montreal: McGill Queen's University Press, 1972).
11. Janine Brodie and Jane Jenson, Crisis, Challenge and Change (Agincourt: Methuen Publications, 1980).
12. In contrast to the Canadian experience, the American UAW was deeply divided on the basis of race. A series of factors contributed to this internal division, not the least of which were company practices of hiring blacks as scab and low-wage labour, union hesitance to respond to blacks' demands, and the racism of many white autoworkers. For one account of the development of racial divisions within the UAW see August Meier and Elliott Rudwick, Black Detroit and the Rise of the UAW (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979).
13. The concept of the "universe of political discourse" comes from Jane Jenson, "Gender and Reproduction, or Babies and the State", Studies in Political Economy no.20 (Summer, 1986): 9-46.
14. Wolfe, "The Rise and Demise"; Panitch and Swartz, From Consent to Coercion; Leo Panitch, "Class and Power in Canada", paper presented to conference on "Canadian Social Structure" sponsored by Association for Canadian Studies in German Speaking Countries. Grainau, German Federal Republic, Feb. 1984.
15. Wolfe, "The Rise and Demise", p.71.
16. Ibid., pp.46-78; Panitch and Swartz, From Consent to Coercion.
17. Wolfe, "The Rise and Demise", p.71.
18. Ibid., p.61.
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20. Allan Maslove and Gene Swinner, Wage Controls in Canada, 1975-78 (Montreal: The Institute for Research on Public

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22. On 'reformist' labour leaders see Panitch and Swartz, From Consent to Coercion, *passim*. Although David Wolfe has not, to my knowledge, written anything on nationalism and the UAW, in a discussion between he and myself at University of Toronto, it became apparent that he placed great explanatory value on UAW nationalism, in particular with regards to Canadian Autoworkers' split with their International union.
23. Robert White, "The Old and the New: Workplace Organization and Labour Relations in the Auto Industry" in Industrial Change and Labour Adjustment in Sweden and Canada, ed. Gregg Olsen (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1988), p.226.

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