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Constructions of Otherness:
A Selective Study of French Discourses

by

Dan Thu Nguyen, Honours B. A.

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
Department of Political Science

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Abstract

Introduction

The study of Western discourse as a global discourse; its nature and the implications of its universality. The creation and construction of Otherness in discourse; Orientalism and the forms of creation and power; Orientalist discourse about the Orient as a parallel structure of Western discourse about itself.

A brief introduction to the French thinkers and the texts selected for this paper; their significance in the context of the discourse of the Other.

Part I : Jean-Jacques Rousseau

Construction of the Physical Other in Discours sur les sciences et les arts; the Self opposed to Nature as Space and Time.

Construction of the Hypothetical Other in Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité parmi les hommes; the Self opposed to Nature as the original and the rustic.

Construction of the Impartial Other in Du Contrat social; the Self revealed by the Expert as an involved yet disinterested party.

Part II : Alexandre Kojève

Constructions of dualist discourses made explicit in Introduction à la lecture de Hegel; pre-Hegelian philosophical discourses as discourses of opposition and objectification.

Phenomenological discourse as description, exposition of past discourses; construction of the identical and eternal discourse as the final correction of past errors maintained in philosophical discourses.

The end of discourse and the end of man.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty

The perceiving Self in Phénoménologie de la perception; construction of the Pathological Other against the resurrected background of Kojévian discourse.

Part III : Michel Foucault

The discursive and institutional creation of Otherness as the explicit theme of Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique; the gesture of segregation and the discourse of alienation.

Discourse no longer constructive, but genealogical and archaeological; the involvement and disinterest of the Self engaged in discourse; the fusion of the Self and the Other without synthesis; the new breed of Self-Other, Subject-Object.

Appendix: The awkward confrontation between Reason and "reasonable madness", or self-conscious delusion; in Rousseau's Lettre à d'Alembert.

Conclusion

The movement from Rousseau to Foucault as a manifestation of discourse becoming self-conscious of itself; the impasse of an articulated discourse of the Other for Western man in becoming appropriated by the Other in the New World; the beginning of new modes ?

Introduction

This work represents the very first tentative expressions of a theory on discourse, specifically, Western philosophical discourse. The questions of how does Western man speak, either to himself in the formulation of meaning, or to others in the establishment of relationships, and what does he say, are not mere "escapist metaphors about conversation that flow from a fixation on language"¹, as some observers would lead us to believe. They address the immediate problem of making sense, making sense out of the day-to-day persistence of being and speaking, the justification of existence and speech, making sense out of the world, and making sense out of the delirious swarming of its inhabitants. A focus on Western discourse is the first step towards the construction of a framework of discursive modes and structures, which allows and is responsible for a certain global homogeneity in thought and discourse, much in evidence in the second half of this century.

What is this homogeneity of discourse and why should it be of any concern to anyone? One can dispose of the first question, for the moment anyway, by considering as an example the discourse of a very much non-Western country, Viet Nam, in the twentieth century. In 1926, Ho Chi Minh, then a mere rebel, set out to provide members of the Viet Nam Revolutionary Youth League with a basic introductory understanding of Marxist-Leninist doctrine; in a pamphlet written at that time, The Road to Revolution, the author readily confused

the qualities of the European revolutionary with those of a model Confucian; in a truly revolutionary manner, the modern Vietnamese is to be made to understand that "obedience to the Party does not preclude other traditional duties of moral conduct" based on the teachings of Confucius.² In spite of obvious incongruities, the least of which being the introduction of a discourse for which concrete conditions did not as yet exist, the Vietnamese leadership quickly discarded a seemingly impotent and anachronistic framework of ethical and moral codes and enthusiastically embraced Western concepts and ideas. In no less an important document as the 1945 Declaration of Independence of Viet Nam, it was stated that

The Declaration of the French Revolution made in 1791 on the Rights of Man and the Citizen also states: "All men are born free with equal rights, and must always remain free and have equal rights." Those are undeniable truths. 3

Eighteenth-century French revolutionary ideals have become twentieth-century Vietnamese truths. In an address to the French in Indochina, Ho Chi Minh himself stressed the importance of these Western principles; he graciously indicated that the Vietnamese people "respect [the French] as a great people who were the first to propagate the lofty ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity and have greatly contributed to culture, science, and civilization."⁴ There can be no doubt that Western discourse has found its way to

the other side of the world and has proved itself to be practically irresistible.

The Vietnamese experience shows that the romantic notion of East-meets-West cannot even begin to account for the total capitulation of the East, from the very beginning of the encounter, to the seductive discourse of the West; perhaps, rather than an encounter, which suggests a certain impartiality, if not equality, in the positions of the participants, we should speak of a "manifestation", one side manifesting, revealing, proving the reality and truth of the other side. If, therefore, the so-called revolution of 1945 in Vietnam was indeed fired by the glorious ideals of "liberté, égalité, et fraternité", then it could have only attained such a receptive mode in the light of a preparatory stage, in which the original Vietnamese discourse, of classical Confucianism, became an incomplete entity, a mere part of the whole of French discourse. The transformation of the Vietnamese polity within the categories of Western concepts is the manifestation of both the hegemony and the domination, thus the power, of Western discourse.

All this, however, remains too vague and abstract. We must separate the lines of inquiry into, at least, two, general orientations: 1) given the present universality of Western discourse, what is it that has allowed it or impelled it to reach that universality; in other words, what distinguishes Western discourse from the now obsolete non-Western discourses? 2) what are the implications of the existence of

a universal and global discourse, one which has its origins in a geographically specific history, for both the "old" speakers and the "new" ones? Ideally, these two sets of concerns must be approached simultaneously, for they constantly refer back one to the other; the characteristics of Western discourse are made more obvious when transposed to a foreign soil, where the concrete conditions of existence incessantly and violently clash with abstract principles of the good life. The inquiry into the very essence and particularity of this discourse is thus facilitated by its universality. The political implications of a global discourse on its various subjects are to a certain extent determined by the very nature of the discourse itself, which has been and is responsible for the expansion and supremacy of its modes and structures. Thus the inquiry into the problems of contemporary discourse must take into account the unique qualities of Western discourse.

This is an ambitious project indeed. We must, therefore, from the very beginning, delimit possible areas of study, perhaps somewhat arbitrarily, according to our interests and capabilities, which will permit a more intensive focus. In so doing, we will find that the project concerns more than one field of study in the discipline of political science; indeed, while the present paper can only hope to cover aspects of the discourse of specific French philosophers, modern and contemporary, further work

is needed in the fields of comparative politics, to investigate the mutations and permutations of a transplanted discourse, the problems of adaptation, and the possible solutions thereof; international relations and development studies, to unmask the incompetence of a differentiating, ethnically specific discourse which has found itself in the paradoxical position of having to serve not only its Western creators, but also the entire global community; finally, political theory, to increase our grasp on the understanding of human discourse in general, and Western discourse in particular, to point us towards the path of full self-consciousness, towards the knowledge of how we say what we say, and why we say it.

Given the overwhelming immensity of such an enterprise, it can only be accomplished in stages, which should not only complement one another, but also provide the necessary pauses for reassessment and readjustment. This first stage takes unto itself the task of addressing French modern and contemporary discourse, in the philosophical writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Alexandre Kojève, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Michel Foucault. The selection may appear at first to be quite an eclectic assortment, since all the above thinkers are quite prolific and their works cover a great deal of ground. However, by choosing specific writings and relating them to a fundamental understanding of how Western man speaks to himself about himself and about his world, we can distinguish the continuous thread, the basic quality which is

common, yet always evolving, to these different systems of discourse. The proposition put forth here is that, to understand the particularity of Western discourse, one must see it, or rather speak it, in the light of a differentiating discourse, that is to say, one that emphasizes differences and "otherness". It is this quality that must be explored, somewhat abstractly at first, before the concrete expressions, fixed in time and space, can be appreciated. Such is the task before us now.

*

Western philosophical discourse is a discourse of power, a discourse of appropriation: any attempt to render intelligible the chaos that is the Self's realization of its insignificance, its limited and finite status, vis à vis the non-Self (the world, the universe, other men) is done so in the articulate⁵ discourse of the Other. The discursive creation and dissolution of the Other provide the consciousness with knowledge of it-Self, by a reflective movement through the absolute knowledge of the Other. In other words, the Self, in situating itself with a created, finite, known Other, comes to grasp the truth of its existence by controlling and manipulating that of the Other; thus, such a discourse of truth, that is to say a discourse that purports to be true and to be about truth, reveals itself to be a discourse of power. In so far as the created Other corresponds to the relative needs of the Self, the Self increases its empirical status in the validation of its own truth, its own power: power thus is the force

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which enables the Self to control (by making intelligible and predictable) itself and the Other, be it Nature or other human beings. There exists, however, an underlying danger. The Self, in seeking a mediated meaning of its being through the being of the Other, risks the loss of an active-subjective participation in life, or, again, the Self may find itself bound to the never-ending process of Other-maintenance, thereby atrophying its own Self-living experiences.

To substantialise some of the above terms and concepts, albeit temporarily, only in so far as it will serve as a common framework and facilitate discussion, we will refer to Edward Said's work on Orientalism.⁶ While Professor Said's thesis is developed within the specific context of the Islamic Orient, we can still benefit much from his extensive and meticulous research into the Western man's, in this case the Orientalist's, creation of Otherness.

The concept of Orientalism revolves around two fundamental axes, which have a tendency to attract one another, that of creation and that of power. An act of creation, ex nihilo, contains within it a seemingly infinite number of possibilities, which could be manipulated (articulated and qualified) by the creator; hence, creation, as the objectification of potentials and possibilities by the creator, does not necessitate either the participation of the created (an absurdity in itself) or even its presence, concrete or abstract. Said speaks of this lack of presence of the Orient

even in speech: "I mean to say that in discussions of the Orient, the Orient is all absence, whereas one feels the Orientalist and what he says as presence; yet we must not forget that the Orientalist's presence is enabled by the Orient's effective absence."⁷ Moreover, the creative act changes the status of both creator and created: the creator acquires power, the created reality. The Orient only began to exist when the Orientalist began to speak of it:

. . . the sheer power of having described the Orient in modern Occidental terms lifts the Orient from the realms of silent obscurity where it has lain neglected (except for the inchoate murmurings of a vast but undefined sense of its own past) into the clarity of modern European science. 8

Western man, or the Orientalist we have before us, therefore engages in acts of creation through discourse; his creative discourse, however, follows a distinct pattern, and this particularity is the very same path which will enable us to move from the specificity of the Orientalist's discourse to Western philosophical discourse in general. The discourse of the Orientalist creates the Orient by articulating its distinctive features, qualifying and categorizing this new object which has sprung forth "from the realms of silent obscurity." It is by this very particularity that creation becomes appropriation, wherein the created product, as object, can only exist in terms of the creator, the speaker or subject, and thus necessarily belongs to him. In his intensive

study of Renan's works and European philological discourse,

Said notes:

Throughout his career Renan seemed to imagine the role of science as . . . 'telling (speaking or articulating) definitively to man the word [logos] of things.' Science gives speech to things; better yet, science brings out, causes to be pronounced, a potential speech within things. . . . In its first sense, creation, as Renan used the word, signified the articulation by which an object . . . could be seen as a creature of sorts. Second, creation also signified the setting . . . illuminated and brought forward from its reticence by the scientist. Finally, creation was the formulation of a system of classification by which it was possible to see the object in question comparatively with other like objects. 9

The tendency to articulate knowledge about the "outside" world in terms of objects which are amenable to classification, comparison, and enhancement (illumination), greatly reduces the unpredictability and menace of the unknown. As well, it serves to increase the strength of the position of the subject, by assuring him absolute control not only over his object of knowledge, but also over the means to acquire such knowledge. Here, the axis of creation merges with that of power.

According to Said, the power which resides in the Orientalist disciplines, and in the techniques of Orientalism as much as in the creators of Orientalism, consists of the "power to have resurrected, indeed created, the Orient, power that dwelt in the new; scientifically advanced techniques of philology and anthropological generalization."¹⁰ Indeed, the

Orientalist holds such a position of power, for he and his version of reality, or truth (revealed reality?¹¹), remain forever uncontested and supreme. Said thus concludes, "In short, having translated the Orient into modernity [i.e. into Western terms], the Orientalist could celebrate his method, and his position, as that of a secular creator, a man who made new worlds as God had once made the old."¹² Orientalism, therefore, as the discourse of the Orientalist, as a form of Western discourse, is a political phenomenon, in so far as it creates relationships based on power which must inevitably follow the initial discursive articulation of positions of power. The fact of Western domination in the East, Said argues, is made possible by the discourse of the West about the East, or the Orientalist's discourse about the Orient: "Orientalism, which is the system of European or Western knowledge about the Orient, thus becomes synonymous with European domination of the Orient"¹³

We may now propose to make the leap: what Said has shown to be the characteristics of Western discourse about the Orient can be brought to bear on Western discourse about the Occident, that is to say, the discourses of philology and anthropology may serve as paradigms for political and philosophical discourses. There is already a hint of such a possibility in Orientalism, in which Said suggests, in reference to Renan's discursive creations in his philological laboratory, that "even the culture he [Renan] calls organic and alive - Europe's - is also a creature being

created in the laboratory by philology."¹⁴ The same methods of differentiating, articulating, creating Otherness are evident in the West's discourse about itself, wherein the process of creating and maintaining a stable Otherness has become more and more explicit, as the pressures of a saturated, homogenized world render each new mode more and more vulnerable and ephemeral. We are now ready to turn to the selection of works from French philosophical literature which, it is hoped, will reveal some of the fundamental structures used by Western man in his discourse about himself and his world.

We must initiate the study in the discourse of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, for it is in the works of this philosopher, as well as in his personal life that the problem of the Other for Western discourse is given its first critical expression; indeed, with Rousseau, the experience of "alienation", that is the Self's realization of its constant abstraction of itself towards the position of Otherness, makes its first appearance, as Rousseau, the self-conscious philosopher, is rejected, made Other, by his own native city and his adopted one. In the self-consciousness of Rousseau the philosopher, the problem is therefore posited: the dichotomy of Self/Other, or Subject/Object, forms the crucial basis of his philosophical discourse, in so far as Rousseau strives to account for, if not eliminate, the experience of alienation by a reformulation of the primacy of the Self in new constructions of Otherness. While Rousseau may

be a self-conscious thinker, this is not necessarily to say that his discourse has become conscious of itself; a self-conscious attempt to resolve the problem of the dualist nature of Western discourse was to be affected by Alexandre Kojève, who, in his interpretation of Hegel, sought to describe the possibility and eventual realization of the synthesis of the Self and the Other. Here, discourse becomes self-conscious of itself, and in the works of Kojève's disciples, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Michel Foucault, the fact of discourse becoming self-conscious of itself, of its own constructions of Otherness, is the undeniable reality within which they must make the choice of either continuing the discourse of philosophy, or going beyond it towards new modes of expression. But let return to Rousseau, and set forth in detail the constructions of Otherness in the works selected, then move on in the same manner to those of Kojève, Merleau-Ponty, and Foucault.

In Rousseau, the discourse of the Other begins to reveal its Self-destructive propensity;¹⁵ the growing homogenization of the social realm, to the detriment of the once distinct public and private realms,¹⁶ has blurred the identity of the Self in its opposition to the Other (political actions as opposed to private labourings); the social Self flounders in inauthenticity and superficiality. In the desperate attempt to halt the critical movement of the Self's absorption into meaninglessness, Rousseau presents us with three implicit constructions of Otherness; in the Discourse on the Sciences and Arts, we have the Physical Other, while the Discourse on Inequality

gives us the construction of a Hypothetical Other; in The Social Contract, Rousseau anticipates our own technological mode, by creating an Impartial or Indifferent Other, human, but at the same time not quite human, faceless, and nameless.

The dualist nature of Western philosophy before Hegel is recognized by Alexandre Kojève, who, in his interpretation of the Hegelian system in his Introduction à la lecture de Hegel, sees the necessity and eventual dialectical suppression of such opposition in Western discourses, "which have been proven, by Hegel, to be erroneous discourses. Kojève's own discourse, therefore, can only be a phenomenological description of the structures of Being, and, in itself, is neither dialectic nor dualist. Hegelian science can be said to be dialectic only to the extent that its content, Western philosophy, is dialectical. Kojève's phenomenological discourse makes explicit the structures of the Other in philosophy, in such forms as those of Desire, Recognition, Fight, and Work, but claims that it is itself no longer subject to such divisions; Hegel's Book, The Phenomenology of Spirit, is the last Word spoken, and it is, therefore, eternally identical to itself.

Where does Kojève's Introduction belong in our own study, and what is its significance? On the one hand, Kojève categorically affirms the philosophical structures of the Other created by past generations, in which Rousseau and the philosophes no doubt hold an important position, and, as such, helps to clarify, if not substantiate, the

thesis of this paper. On the other hand, Kojève's revelation of the achievement of total self-consciousness by Western man, that is to say that Western man is finally fully aware of the ways in which he has given meaning to his own being and to that of the Other, leads us to an uncomfortable and awkward stasis; is there really nothing left to say? Are we all being embarrassingly redundant? I would hope not. Certainly Kojève's own discourse, the exposition of Hegel's Phenomenology as the latter is the exposition and description of human consciousness, participates still in the construction of otherness. The Other in this context is the partial knowledge of past philosophies, precisely the philosophies which have articulated so well the concept of otherness; these reveal themselves to be what they really are and have been in the light of absolute wisdom, which in turn is but the mediated synthesis in so far as it is the one final and ultimate correction of past errors.

The problem, of course, is that such a conclusion leaves one in speechlessness, in silence. Kojève cannot say anything or tell us anything anymore, since his fully self-conscious Self, as opposed to partially self-conscious Others, is no longer discursive. How do we then account for the continuing and continuous discourse after Kojève-Hegel? In order to complete the investigation of the Kojévian discourse, we must therefore include the attempt by one of his disciples to speak in the midst of silent wisdom. Maurice Merleau-Ponty

is immersed in Kojève's discourse on Hegel, the implications of which, however, he cannot as readily accept. He must therefore devise a way by which discourse may be reintroduced or reinitiated. In Phénoménologie de la perception, Merleau-Ponty carefully rearranges the Kojévian structures of consciousness against a shifting background of perception; the synthesis of absolute wisdom can never be achieved, for the Self remains forever "un individu inachevé," an unfinished individual, who is fixed, limited, and situated by his living body, and whose consciousness is first and foremost a perceptive consciousness, or a "conscience non-thétique."

The result thus is that nothing very clear or definite can be said about Merleau-Ponty's world of perception, except that it is characterized by obscurity and ambiguity. The discourse itself would lack substance, unless it were to be validated by a new construction of opposition, of otherness. This is precisely Merleau-Ponty's task: the perceiving Self is shown to be certain about the state of things and of the world, in spite of its partial view, because it can oppose its rooted presence in the world to the unanchored existence of the pathological case. The truth and commitment of the Self ("le Je engagé") is revealed by the lack of commitment of the Other, who, in this context, is created by psychological and psychiatric discourse. Merleau-Ponty's discourse thus concludes the second part of this paper and, at the same time, introduces the third and final part, the discourse of Michel Foucault in Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique.

In Foucault, the discourse of the Other is revealed explicitly, in so far as it becomes the very subject matter under discussion. Foucault proposes to trace the movement of division, of differentiation, back to its original geste, a comprehensive act of segregation, which acquired its own momentum and its own logic as the characteristics of otherness, unreason and madness, become more defined and more definitive. This critical and creative process occurred during what Foucault calls the "Classical Age," the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries in Europe. We have thus returned to the world of Rousseau and the Age of Reason. The cult of Nature is complemented by the articulation of Otherness in terms of the Unnatural, while the supremacy of Reason demands the return of the Other from the realm of unreason to that of truth.

Although Histoire de la folie appears to present to us all the great forms of division within the framework of reason and unreason, it also includes structures of the Other which parallel Kojévian discourse (the notion of Work at Tuke's Retreat, or Pinel's society of two: the master and the servant) and Merleau-Ponty's objectification of the pathological (madness offered to the gaze of one and all). The crucial element of Histoire de la folie, however, is that it neither pretends to offer a new version of a discourse of the Other, nor does it aspire to bring about a synthesis of the Self and the Other; in short, Foucault's discourse is neither to give meaning, nor about meaning; it is a discourse on

discourse. Foucault purports to be a genealogist, who merely reconnects the various chronological episodes of a phenomenon, without having to judge on the relative merit of its movement through time or its eventual form; his method is also archaeological, in that these great episodes and structures are silent monuments, buried under the weight of illusory claims of truth and right by those who created them. And so, with Foucault, we end our discussion, as we find ourselves in the position of Rousseau's Indifferent Other, the Legislator, the Archaeologist, speaking, but not participating. Have we then for so long engaged in the project of the Other, which has become so overwhelming, that we no longer can tell apart what is Self and what is Other? Is our own age not characterized by this confusion, in which the so-called Third World clamours for Freedom and Rights, while the First World worships computers and social scientists?

These questions cannot be answered here, for our task is to address the discourses of the French writers briefly presented above; let us, therefore, return to "l'âge classique," and read Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

Notes

1. Ian Hacking, "The Archaeology of Foucault," in The New York Review, May 14, 1981.
2. William J. Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam, (Westview Press, Boulder, 1981), pp. 27-28.
3. Ho Chi Minh, On Revolution, Selected Writings, 1920-1966, ed. by Bernard Fall, (Praeger Publishers, New York, 1967), p. 143.
4. Ibid., p. 153.
5. The term "articulate" here is opposed to that of "suggestive;" for example, ancient Chinese discourse did not emphasize the "demarcation between the subject and the object", thereby bringing into focus the problematic distinction between the knower and the known. See Fung Yu-lan, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, ed. by Derk Bodde, (The Free Press, New York, 1966), p. 25.
6. Edward W. Said, Orientalism, (Pantheon Books, New York, 1978).
7. Ibid., p. 208.
8. Ibid., p. 86.
9. Ibid., p. 140.
10. Ibid., p. 121.
11. See Alexandre Kojève, Introduction à la lecture de Hegel, (Gallimard, Paris, 1979), p. 19, p. 145, p. 463, p. 485.
12. Said, op. cit., p. 121.
13. Ibid., p. 197.
14. Ibid., p. 146.
15. See above, p. 7.
16. See Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1958), pp. 22-78.

Part I : Jean-Jacques Rousseau

All the rest of my life and of my misfortunes followed inevitably as a result of that moment's madness.

J.-J. Rousseau, The Confessions.¹

Jean-Jacques Rousseau attributed his deliverance from the blinders of conventional norms and from the illusory security and comfort of consensual identity to a brief taste of madness, which he experienced prior to his composition of the first essay for the Dijon Academy. If we are to believe his Confessions, this burst of delirious agitation led him to articulate his deepest "enthusiasm for truth, liberty, and virtue"², in answering the question proposed by the Academy, "Si le rétablissement des sciences et des arts a contribué à épurer les mœurs." The Discours sur les sciences et les arts, therefore, contains not only Rousseau's attempt to pass judgment on the society of his time, but also the enunciation of a new epistemological model by which to form that judgment; here is the quest for truth, liberty, and virtue, for the understanding of the Self and of the world.³

Rousseau's primary concern in this essay is the state of morals⁴ in Europe, which is intrinsically tied to the extent of its cultural and intellectual sophistication. There is not much ground for controversy here, as Rousseau, at the very beginning of the discussion, categorically declares that "L'Europe était retombée dans la barbarie des premiers âges", only a few centuries ago, to be rejuvenated by a most unexpected series of events:

Il fallait une révolution pour ramener les hommes au sens commun; elle vint enfin du côté d'où on l'aurait le moins attendue. Ce fut le stupide Mulsuman, ce fut l'éternel fléau des lettres qui les fit renaître parmi nous. La chute du trône de Constantin porta dans l'Italie les débris de l'ancienne Grèce. La France s'enrichit à son tour de ces précieuses dépouilles. 5

The analogy, between what Rousseau perceives to be the actual causes of the rebirth of reason in Europe, and what is to enable depraved eighteenth century man to rise above the monuments of sciences and arts, erected only to blind him from his lumières, cannot be too greatly emphasized. Indeed, according to Rousseau, since an exogenous event, the fall of Constantinople, has had such important repercussions on the fate of European civilizations, then, Europe, at a time of great need, must look to different, that is external to itself, times and lands, to find true knowledge of and meaning for itself, thereby acquiring not only salvation but also greater wisdom. This search for a mirror through which Europe and Western man (the Self) must undergo the process of self-assessment and self-evaluation, occurs along the continua of space (other lands) and time (other historical periods), and thus is the search for the Natural or the Physical Other.⁶

The construction of Otherness in Rousseau remains implicit, that is to say that Rousseau's discourse is not conscious of itself; it opposes the Self to a creative understanding of Nature in terms of Space and Time. As such,

Nature, as the created Other, is at the same time authoritative and passive, in that it provides rigid measures for classification and comparison, and it can be easily manipulated through the careful selection of instances. The concept of Nature is thus in this sense a creation, or a construction of the Self, Rousseau, or any who follows the cult of Nature, articulated for the purpose of distancing oneself from one's Self, in order to pass that judgment on one's Self from the standpoint of Otherness. The movement of reflection, from the Self to the Other and then back again, must be kept absolutely distinct and defined in all of its various stages, for the balance between what is real, the Self, and what is created, the Other, must never be confused.

Rousseau, therefore, presents us with a living tableau, on which are displayed for scrutiny past cultures and peoples, far-away lands and civilizations; this is indeed Nature unfolding her most precious dimensions before us. There is no question that, in this matter, Rousseau's knowledge about the secrets of Nature can be anything but absolute; Rousseau must have absolute knowledge about the Other, so that he can then situate himself vis à vis his own Self and pass the final judgment. Such absolute knowledge is made possible by the fact of creation itself in which the creator or the speaker of the creative discourse "knows" the first and the last thing about the created

object. Thus, in writing on the virtues of the ancient Persians, Rousseau has already appropriated the entire history of these people, with the support of Xenophon's Cyropaedia:

Opposons à ces tableaux [of Chinese wickedness] celui des mœurs du petit nombre des peuples qui, préservés de cette contagion des vaines connaissances ont par leurs vertus fait leur propre bonheur et l'exemple des autres nations. Tels furent les premiers Perses, nation singulière chez laquelle on apprenait la vertu comme chez nous on apprend la science; qui subjuguèrent l'Asie avec tant de facilité, et qui seule a eu cette gloire que l'histoire de ses institutions ait passé pour un roman de philosophie. 7

The ancient Persians, in all their glory, have been ossified into the compartment of a virtuous time, fixed forever at a specific point on the continuum.

Western man and his civilization, however, need not be so anchored; to show that the present state of corruption of European morals is not necessarily its permanent state, Rousseau points to the regular tidal movement of the vulnerable "sort des mœurs et de la probité [assujetti] au progrès des sciences et des arts."⁸ Western man is therefore to travel "dans tous les temps et dans tous les lieux"⁹, to reflect his image off the various samples of Nature's Time and Space, and to come to some final understanding of himself with reference to these specimens of humanity.

The movement back to a time past allows Rousseau to distance himself from the overwhelming immediacy of his being, and to relinquish, momentarily, the position of a

subject for that of a predicate. He leads us to consider the rise and fall of Egypt, of Greece, Rome, and of Constantinople, ancient civilizations which have all been seduced by the sciences and the arts. Egypt, once "mère de la philosophie et des beaux-arts," has become mere object of numerous conquests; Greece, legendary for its heroism, now only knows the will of tyrants; Rome, "jadis le temple de la vertu," has found itself the plaything of barbarians; finally, Constantinople itself did not escape the forces of evil: "Tout ce que la débauche et la corruption ont de plus honteux; les trahisons, les assassinats et les poisons de plus noir; le concours de tous les crimes de plus atroce; voilà ce qui forme le tissu de l'histoire de Constantinople."¹⁰

The enumeration of these past civilizations like so many specimens under observation by the natural scientist denude them of any intrinsic reality, and yet they are made concrete again in the discourse itself. The speaker reanimates these specific periods of Time, these points which he himself has delimited and fixed forever in Nature's Time, in order to make himself the predicate of these temporal phantoms; they are the mirror that will always reflect back his own image for they are his own creation. Rousseau uses this construction of a temporal Other in conjunction with that of a spatial Other, the second dimension of Nature as Otherness.

Subjective distancing is thus also accomplished by a reflective movement through a spatial Other. Here,

Rousseau entreates Western man to turn his gaze towards other lands and other people, for, "pourquoi chercher dans des temps reculés des preuves d'une vérité dont nous avons sous nos yeux des témoignages subsistants" ?¹¹ The truth of which he speaks is the truth of the depraved condition of European morals and the corrupted spirit of Western man, which can only be made absolute by a categorical confirmation of the condition of other men and their morals. Thus he reveals to us the pitiful state of morals in China and the virtues of the happy savages in America:

Si les sciences épuraient les mœurs, si elles apprenaient aux hommes à verser leur sang pour la patrie, si elles animaient le courage, les peuples de la Chine devraient être sages, libres et invincibles. Mais s'il n'y a point de vice qui ne les domine, point de crime qui ne leur soit familier; si les lumières des ministres, ni la prétendue sagesse des lois, ni la multitude des habitants de ce vaste empire n'ont pu le garantir du joug du Tartare ignorant et grossier, de quoi lui ont servi tous ses savants ? Quel fruit a-t-il retiré des honneurs dont ils sont comblés ? Serait-ce d'être peuplé d'esclaves et de méchants ? 12

Je n'ose parler de ces nations heureuses qui ne connaissent pas même de nom les vices que nous avons tant de peine à réprimer, de ces sauvages de l'Amérique dont Montaigne ne balance point à préférer la simple et naturelle police, non seulement aux lois de Platon, mais même à tout ce que la philosophie pourra jamais imaginer de plus parfait pour le gouvernement des peuples. 13

These two instances of otherness represent the extreme points of a range of possible permutations of moral integrity; they are manifested along the continuum of Nature's Space, a dimension which, at the time of Rousseau's writing, still withheld many of the mysteries of the earth, while it can only now taunts us with the secrets of interplanetary space. Rousseau is not so much concerned with the disintegration of the Chinese Empire, nor with the challenge of the European intruders on the American Indians, than he is compelled by the vivid images they provoke. The particularities of these distant societies, are, therefore, not brought into the fold of the discourse as real, lived experiences of humanity, which, once they have been revealed to Western man, even in discourse, are to be integrated, absorbed as part of his own experience; they are to be kept at that very distance which have qualified them to be used for observation: earlier times and far-away lands, "c'est un beau rivage, paré des seules mains de la nature, vers lequel on tourne incessamment les yeux, et dont on se sent éloigner à regret."¹⁴

In his construction of the spatial Other, Rousseau is forced to reduce the existence of the selected samples into various essences, which could then be classified and qualified accordingly. This is the very same method of ossification, of objectification which is necessary for the reflective movement through the temporal Other. Hence, the

the stultified declarations on the state of morals in China and of the happy savages in America.

Having thus established a framework which clearly differentiates the hic et nunc of the state of European civilization from the selection of geographical and historical images, Rousseau is then able to embark, in the second part of his essay, on a confident discussion of the effect of the Sciences and arts themselves on the morals of Western man. At this point, the project of the Physical or Natural Other is completed, as the Self (Rousseau, Western man, Europe) reflects back and returns to itself with renewed assurance, ready for meaningful and purposeful action. Compared to his later works, the Discours sur les sciences et les arts displays a crude construction of the Other, for the Natural Other as Space, for example, holds a far too unstable position in the overall construction, as it can be frequently challenged by the actions of actual physical others. This construction remains valid only in the extent that there can still be an actual distancing possible between the Self and the images it creates. Furthermore, Nature as Otherness presents many difficulties; in terms of Time, it is too elusive to be taken as a firm and tenable opposition; in terms of Space, it is being eroded by the very discourse which created in the expanding movement of appropriation. It is therefore in the Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité parmi les

hommes, Rousseau's second essay to the Dijon Academy, that the project of the Other reaches a higher level of sophistication. It is that work to which we must turn now.

*

. . . I sought and found the vision of those primitive times, the history of which I proudly traced. I demolished the petty lies of mankind; I dared to strip naked, to follow the progress of time, and trace the things which have distorted it; and by comparing man as he has made himself with man as he is by nature I showed him in his pretended perfection the true source of his misery.

J.-J. Rousseau, The Confessions.¹⁵

The structure of Rousseau's second essay to the Dijon Academy very much resembles that of his prize essay, as it, too, is divided into two parts; the first part initiates the discourse by spurring the Self on towards an external and distant position, that of the Other, which effort enables it, the Self, to return to itself in the second part, to close and complete the circle of meaning. As we are specifically concerned with Rousseau's formulation of a discourse of Otherness, the emphasis will therefore be put on the first part of the essay over its second part.

In the Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité, Rousseau reluctantly abandons the discourse of the Physical Other; the Self is no longer opposed to

Nature as Space and Time, and Rousseau, "oubliant les temps et les lieux,"¹⁶ postulates the conditions of a Hypothetical Other. He writes, "Il ne faut pas prendre les recherches, dans lesquelles on peut entrer sur ce sujet, pour des vérités historiques, mais seulement pour des raisonnements hypothétiques et conditionnels; plus propres à éclaircir la nature des choses, qu'à en montrer la véritable origine".¹⁷ The construction of Otherness now occurs as a projection into the imagination, where one is asked to suspend temporarily all beliefs and to indulge in free association. The actual form of Otherness, however, is still Rousseau's cherished Nature, but the Self is now opposed to Nature as the Natural, that is as the original and the rustic. We have before us Man in the state of nature, the original man living in the wild, without the unnatural trappings of cities and salons.

After a careful consideration of the physical side of the original man in the state of nature and primitive men, who are found to be "forts et robustes",¹⁸ and "sa propre conservation faisant presque son unique besoin,"¹⁹ Rousseau proceeds to complete the description of his creation, by addressing his metaphysical and moral side. As a free agent, primitive man differs from other animals in that he is not always compelled by Nature to follow his instincts; this freedom therefore entails one other characteristic of man, and that is his ability to overcome his

own limitations, what Rousseau calls "la faculté de se perfectionner."²⁰ This faculty is rooted in human understanding which is stimulated by the passions:

. . . l'entendement humain doit beaucoup aux passions, qui, d'un commun aveu, lui doivent beaucoup aussi; c'est par leur activité que notre raison se perfectionne; nous ne cherchons à connaître que parce que nous désirons de jouir, et il n'est pas possible de concevoir pourquoi celui qui n'aurait ni désirs ni craintes se donnerait la peine de raisonner. Les passions, à leur tour, tirent leur origine de nos besoins, et leur progrès de nos connaissances; ²¹

The triangular configuration of man's perfectibility, representing the three elements of the passions, human understanding or Reason, and knowledge, which mutually support and reinforce each other, can be likened to the triangle of logos: speech-language-thought. Rousseau takes exception to the "designative" theory of language, posited by the Abbé de Condillac, and argues that, "les idées générales ne peuvent s'introduire dans l'esprit qu'à l'aide des mots, et l'entendement ne les saisit que par des propositions."²² Man thinks with and in words, and the articulation of a discourse enables him to formulate ideas: "Il faut donc énoncer des propositions, il faut donc parler pour avoir des idées générales; car sitôt que l'imagination s'arrête, l'esprit ne marche plus qu'à l'aide du discours."²³

Finally, man in the state of nature is neither good nor evil and so can be said to be strictly amoral; he

only tempers his relationships with other men with a natural pity, "vertu d'autant plus universelle et d'autant plus utile à l'homme qu'elle précède en lui l'usage de toute réflexion".²⁴ Moreover, the natural quality of pity, "modérant dans chaque individu l'activité de l'amour de soi-même," guarantees the preservation and continuation of the species.²⁵ Thus, without imagination,²⁶ without standards of morality, without regular and regulated interactions with his fellow beings, healthy and strong, savage man lives with Nature and follows her course. He is not opposed to Nature, he is the human manifestation of her being.

Rousseau's concept of Nature in this essay is no longer dependent on the stabilization of the two dimensions of Space and Time, for they have both been encapsulated in the being of primitive man; man in the state of nature is everywhere yet nowhere, he is yet has never been. His Space is Nature's space, which is all around him as well as within him, in so far as he is one of her creatures. His Time is Nature's Time, the immediacy of which forever dwells in absolute identity with itself; his is the eternal present. Nature, as embodied in man in the state of nature, is now significant by its essence as the Original and the Rustic.

This understanding of Nature has already been expressed by Rousseau in his first essay to the Academy, although it was yet to be organized into a veritable discourse, a construction of opposition. In it he had written, "c'est

sous l'habit rustique d'un laboureur, et non sous la dorure d'un courtisan, qu'on trouvera la force et la vigueur du corps. . . . Avant que l'art eut façonné nos manières, . . . nos mœurs étaient rustiques, mais naturelles."²⁷ In his second essay, Rousseau transforms these allusions to an original state of man's being, rooted in the coarse soil, into a cohesive construction of otherness, the hypothetical man in the state of nature, who is not only the first man, but also the natural man. The opposition between primitive man and eighteenth-century man is radical, since the existence of the former is purely conjectural; there can be no direct transition or overlapping between the state of nature and the establishment of society. In order to maintain this absolute separation, (Rousseau suggests that the development of perfectibility, social virtues, and other human virtues was caused by "[le] concours fortuit de plusieurs causes étrangères," and "[des] différents hasards,"²⁸ which cannot be accounted for in any rational way. These series of accidents he then attempts to describe in the second part of his essay.

In Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité, the Self inquires about its relative position vis à vis others in society, about what it has chosen to call inequality. It therefore begins to speak to itself about itself; the discourse begins. As it is an articulate discourse, it must posit distinctions and differentiations.

It hypothesizes about an Other which has never known equality or inequality and thereby creates primitive and natural man. This creature is then opposed to or put face to face with the questioning Self, and the unhappiness of the Self is revealed to be the very difference between it and its creation:

Tant que les hommes se contentèrent
de leurs cabanes rustiques, tant qu'ils
se bornèrent à coudre leurs habits de
peaux avec des épines ou des arêtes, à
se parer de plumes et de coquillages,
. . . en un mot tant qu'ils ne s'appli-
quèrent qu'à des ouvrages qu'un seul
pouvait faire, . . . ils vécurent libres,
sains, bons et heureux . . . ; mais dès
l'instant qu'un homme eut besoin du se-
cours d'un autre; dès qu'on s'aperçut
qu'il était utile à un seul d'avoir des
provisions pour deux, l'égalité dispa-
rut, la propriété s'introduisit, le
travail devint nécessaire 29

If man in the state of nature is the first man, then the eighteenth-century bourgeois is the epigone; if the former lives a rustic and solitary life, then the latter is an urban and social animal; one is natural, the other thoroughly unnatural.

The construction of the Hypothetical Other is a far more sophisticated construction than that of the Physical Other. The process of distancing is not as rigidly determined in that it manages to escape the two-dimensional structure of Space and Time. Moreover, it need not be a static entity, for the Hypothetical Other may enjoy a hypothetical life of its own. The advantage lies in the project's amenability to creative adjustment and modification, for it presents no

resistance to the being of the Self; since the Other is forever imprisoned in the realm of philosophical speculation, it will never be able to challenge the meanings imparted by the Self to it or to it-Self. Man in the state of nature is only to the extent of Rousseau's vision of him and of his relevance to Rousseau. This higher degree of sophistication of the discourse, however, is also responsible for its one weakness: that the Other is an open-ended hypothesis, that is to say that it is subject to alterations as well as radical reformulations, makes it illusive and abstract. A construction which is too easily modified, which does not provide the anchorage, a solid and stable point, for the necessary return of the Self to itself in the reflective movement, proves to be ambiguous and groundless. The abstract nature of this construction accounts for the diverging description of primitive man by Rousseau and Hobbes; in the Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes speaks of the very same savages in America, whose innate virtue Rousseau had praised time and time again,³⁰ but in a much different light: "For the savage people in many places of America, except the government of small Families, the concord whereof dependeth on natural lust, have no government at all; and live at this day in that brutish manner, as I said before."³¹ The reference, of course, is to the quality of life in Hobbes' version of the state of nature,

[a] time wherein men live without
other security, than what their own
strength, and their own invention

shall furnish them withall. In such condition, there is no place for Industry; . . . no Knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short. 32

Hobbes' construction of Otherness in the Leviathan is, as is Rousseau's in the second essay, in the realm of pure speculation; this accounts for the ease with which these two thinkers have manipulated the concept of a state of nature, and for the resulting divergence. However, such fluidity should not take anything away from the brilliance and great significance of the construct itself; that natural man, be he virtuous or evil, is chosen as the alter points to the beginning of a Self conscious of its own discourse, or again, a discourse in the process of being conscious of itself.

The discourse of the Other in a hypothetical construction of natural man begins to make more explicit the relationship between the Self and the Other, in that concrete man is different from abstract man in his relations with others; indeed, man is dependent upon his continuous relation with others for his escape from the state of nature:

Cette application réitérée des êtres divers à lui-même, et les uns aux autres, dut naturellement engendrer dans l'esprit de l'homme les perceptions de certains rapports. Ces relations . . . produisirent enfin chez lui quelque sorte de réflexion, ou plutôt une prudence machinale qui lui indiquait les précautions les plus nécessaires à sa sûreté. 33

The discourse here speaks of reflection through the use of others, thereby revealing the need for others. In making this need more and more explicit, the discourse also demands an increase in self-consciousness and control on the part of the Self, but, at the same time, it augments the autonomy and import of the Other. While Rousseau's Hypothetical Other is still pure creation, its manifestation as primitive or natural man in need of others to transcend its static Self, hints at the gradual shift in the status of the Self and the Other.

Finally, as was noted above,³⁴ Rousseau, in his Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité, only embarks on this new discourse with reluctance, for he still yearns for the definite and definitive discourse of the Physical Other; indeed, in his numerous notes, Rousseau appeals frequently to a comparison between European man and savage man from other lands for his arguments against the advantages of civilization.³⁵ The combined use of these two constructions of Otherness in the formulation of a meaningful reality leads the Self towards a position of tremendous power, if we understand power as the systematic control of the Self over its own existence and over that of actual others. We can only suggest, in passing, as evidence of this particular combination, the nineteenth-century rhetoric of imperialism and the contemporary theories of development in the so-called Third World.

I looked into the state of this book [Political Institutions], and found that it still required several more years' labour on it. I had not the courage to continue with it, and to postpone my resolution until it was finished. Accordingly I abandoned it, deciding to extract from it whatever could be extracted and then to burn the rest

J.-J. Rousseau, The Confessions. 36

While Du Contrat social undoubtedly represents Rousseau's greatest contribution to political philosophy, or at least, is perceived to be so, it poses many difficulties for the student of philosophical discourse. The hesitations and the discontinuity of the discourse are perhaps due to the unfinished nature of the greater work, of which Le Contrat social was to be a mere segment; or again, Rousseau's attempt at yet another construction of Otherness, what I have chosen to call the discourse of the Impartial or Indifferent Other,³ may have anticipated the actual conditions for and the circumstances of a truly technical world, and, thus, was beyond the grasp of an eighteenth-century man. Whatever may be the reasons for the lack of confidence in this discourse, a confidence and self-assurance which were much more clearly in evidence in Rousseau's two essays to the Academy of Dijon, one can nevertheless point to one instance where the discourse of the Impartial Other is most salient: this occurs in the discussion of the legislator or the lawmaker.

Although the general will can never err, that is to say, "la volonté générale est toujours droite, . . . le jugement qui la guide n'est pas toujours éclairé."³⁷ Hence the necessity for a legislator. However, the legislator cannot be a part of the body of people for whom he legislates; he is not a member of the sovereign, nor does he benefit from the constitution of the state:

Le législateur est à tous égards un homme extraordinaire dans l'Etat. S'il doit l'être par son génie, il ne l'est pas moins par son emploi. Ce n'est point magistrature, ce n'est point souveraineté. Cet emploi, qui constitue la république, n'entre point dans sa constitution. C'est une fonction particulière et supérieure qui n'a rien de commun avec l'empire humain; car si celui qui commande aux hommes ne doit pas commander aux lois, celui qui commande aux lois ne doit pas non plus commander aux hommes. 38

The legislator stands apart from the sovereign people, and it is this very distancing which allows him to judge the merit of particular laws for particular peoples. Moreover, the isolation and uniqueness of the legislator place him in a position above, if not beyond, men, from whence, as a supra-man, he possesses full knowledge of man and of man's nature; Rousseau speaks here of the god-man legislator:

. . . il faudrait une intelligence supérieure, qui vît toutes les passions des hommes et qui n'en éprouvât aucune, qui n'eût aucun rapport avec notre nature et qui la connût à fond, dont le bonheur fût indépendant de nous et qui pourtant voulût bien s'occuper du nôtre; enfin qui, dans le progrès des temps se ménageant une gloire éloignée, pût travailler dans un siècle et jouir dans

un autre. Il faudrait des dieux pour
donner des lois aux hommes. 39

The last sentence does not suggest that Rousseau attributes to God the task of legislating for men, but he does indicate that, in the past, divine authority has been instrumental in providing the force behind the execution of such a task.⁴⁰

Rousseau's discourse in Le Contrat social contains a new paradigm of differentiation; it is a radically new discourse in which both the Self and the Other have undergone a major transformation. Let us first reconstruct the figure of the Other. The legislator, as the figure of Otherness, is no longer an abstract or hypothetical being, but a real individual whose concreteness is rooted in his function and in his office; his being is immediately relevant to that of the Self, i.e. the people for whom he legislates. Moreover, he imparts meaning and purpose to the fact of continuous human association, which is the concrete manifestation of the general will of the sovereign people. Although he dictates the laws to a people, he does not participate in their execution, nor in their benefits. He is concerned about the welfare of the people, but has no personal interest in their care and well-being; he is therefore disinterested, but not non-interested. The legislator is an individual who is at the same time both human in his attention to others and supra-human in his possession of knowledge and wisdom.

This god-like figure of the Other is no longer opposed to the being of the Self in Rousseau's new discourse.

In fact, it "reveals" the Self to itself, and, for such a revelation to be successful, the nature of the Self had to be transformed into a neutral matter which can then be revealed for what it really is. In Le Contrat social, Western man and his society (the Self) are not a categorical fact with its distinct qualities anymore, which were to be mirrored against the qualities of the constructed Other; they now form an amorphous mass which, while it has tremendous potentials, lacks any real presence: such is the association of men bound together by the Social Contract. Rousseau's newly transformed Self is dispossessed of its subjective distinctiveness, its uniqueness; it has been rendered anonymous, in a collective body of equal and nameless individuals, which still holds the power, but has no identity:

A l'instant, au lieu de la personne particulière de chaque contractant, cet acte d'association produit un corps moral et collectif composé d'autant de membres que l'assemblée a de voix, lequel reçoit de ce même acte son unité, son moi commun, sa vie et sa volonté. Cette personne publique qui se forme ainsi par l'union de toutes les autres prenait autrefois le nom de Cité, et prend maintenant celui de République ou de corps politique, lequel est appelé par ses membres Etat quand il est passif, Souverain quand il est actif, Puissance en le comparant à ses semblables. 41

This political body is given its identity in the form of the legislation selected by the lawmaker; indeed, Rousseau stresses that the less remarkable a people seem to be, the better suited they will be for legislation: "Quel peuple est donc

propre à la législation? celui qui, se trouvant déjà lié par quelque union d'origine, d'intérêt ou de convention, n'a point encore porté le vrai joug des lois; celui qui n'a ni coutumes ni superstition bien enracinées"⁴²

The people, by their initial agreement to form an association of some kind, assume a position of receptiveness, ready to translate the sovereign power of the whole to the specific power of a government. The institution of government, a rather technical if not mechanical enterprise, cannot be undertaken before the establishment of laws. We have here the beginnings of a reciprocal relationship between the Self and the Other in a discourse which not only created a more autonomous Other, but also transformed the very essence of the Self, which, from an initial state of speechlessness ("ni coutumes ni superstitions"), is given a discourse (the laws) by the concerned Stranger. The relationship is reciprocal to the extent that the Self accepts the superiority of the Other in matters regarding its own welfare; it accepts the "expertise" of the Other, precisely because the latter is an involved, yet disinterested party. As for the Other, its very raison d'être is the "unfinished" nature of the Self, its lack of identity and presence. Reciprocity, however, does not entail in this particular construction identification; distancing is maintained by the exclusion of the Other from participation in the development of the Self's revealed identity. The Other's great expertise allows him to speak a new discourse to the

Self, but prevents him from engaging in the new discourse with the Self.

In Le Contrat social, the construction of the Impartial Other is not undertaken with as much confidence as in the two essays to the Academy; Rousseau is unsure of the relationship between the Self and the Other, the respective nature and roles of the two, and the outcome of such an interaction. Although he had attributed wisdom to the Legislator, thereby making him infallible, he is still troubled by the vulnerability of the Self to misguided direction; Rousseau is not very comfortable with his new objectification of the Self.

Mais si le législateur, se trompant dans son objet, prend un principe différent de celui qui naît de la nature des choses; que l'un tend à la servitude et l'autre à la liberté, l'un aux richesses, l'autre à la population, l'un à la paix, l'autre aux conquêtes, on verra les lois s'affaiblir insensiblement, la constitution s'altérer, et l'Etat ne cessera d'être agité jusqu'à ce qu'il soit détruit ou changé, et que l'invincible nature ait repris son empire. 43

Wisdom rests uneasily, as the possibility of failure of the Legislator jars with the recognized superiority of his very being. What Rousseau cannot reconcile in his discourse is the twofold shift which is gradually surfacing from the once-distinct blocks of the Self and the Other. First, while the Other is still a creation of the discourse, it is no longer an objectified entity used by the Self in the search for a meaningful evaluation and description of itself; rather, it

has acquired a subjective existence of its own, which only comes into contact with that of the Self for a specific and limited time and purpose. Moreover, it articulates the discourse of meaning for the Self, which is, initially, speechless. Secondly, the Self, once a discursive subject, which posited the totality of the being of the Other, is reduced to the status of an object; the characteristics of which the Other must take into account in his formulation of legislation. As such, the Self can be classified, categorized, according its various manifestations of the object of legislation (differences in climate, population, prosperity).

This construction of Otherness is an incredibly sophisticated one for eighteenth-century discourse; Rousseau cannot easily resolve the paradox of humanly concern and supra-human wisdom in the Legislator, the involvement and disinterest of the Expert, the dynamism and the silence of the Self. Rousseau can suggest that the legislator is coeval with to the founder of a polity, and that it would take an exceptional man living in exceptional circumstances to bring about a new body politic. For us, however, the concept of an Indifferent, yet Involved Other is not as difficult to grasp; in fact, it rings a familiar bell: we are surrounded by experts, whose knowledge in their field we have accepted to be near absolute. Indeed, we unquestioningly speak the discourse of those experts who direct

and organize the various sections of our existence; in matters of law, we seek the wisdom of lawyers; in matters of health, we follow the dictates of doctors, both of medicine and of psychiatry; in matters of technology, we timidly question the engineers and the computer scientists. These professionals are personally detached (disinterested) from the project of the seeking and inquiring Self, but, at the same time, they are also undeniably committed, by their very raison d'être, to this project. The legislators of the present day can only claim absolute knowledge in their respective fields because our discourse has enabled them to do so, by relegating our own Selves to a position of silent awaiting, of mute awe.

Notes

1. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Confessions, trans. by J. M. Cohen, (Penguin Books, Middlesex, 1967), p. 328.
2. Ibid.
3. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discours sur les sciences et les arts, Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité parmi les hommes, (Garnier-Flammarion, Paris, 1971).
The translation used is the one by Roger D. and Judith R. Masters: Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The First and Second Discourses, (St. Martin's Press, New York, 1964). All translations of the two essays are from the Masters text.
4. The term "morals" used here is a translation of Rousseau "les mœurs" which means manners or customs also.
5. Discours sur les sciences et les arts, p. 38.
Europe had sunk back to the barbarism of the first ages. . . . A revolution was needed to bring men back to common sense; it finally came from the least expected quarter. The stupid Moslem, the scourge of learning, brought about its rebirth among us. The fall of the throne of Constantinople brought into Italy the debris of ancient Greece. France in turn was enriched by these precious spoils.
The First Discourse, p. 35.
6. I use the terms natural and physical interchangeably here, for I take them to be derived from the Greek word phusis, nature.
7. Discours sur les sciences et les arts, pp. 42-43.
Contrast these pictures with that of the morals of those few people who, preserved from this contamination of vain knowledge, have by their own virtues created their own happiness and an example for other nations. Such were the first Persians, an extraordinary nation where one learned virtue as one learns science among us,

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which conquered Asia with such ease,
and which alone was honored by having the
history of its institutions taken for a
philosophic novel.

The First Discourse, p. 41.

8. Ibid., p. 41.

[The] fate of morals and integrity
. . . subject to the advancement of the
sciences and arts.

Ibid., p. 39.

9. Ibid.

. . . in all times and in all places.

Ibid., p. 40.

10. Ibid., pp. 41-42.

. . . mother of philosophy and the fine
arts . . . formerly the temple of virtue
. . . . All that is most shameful in
debauchery and corruption, most heinous
in betrayals, assassinations, and poi-
sons, most atrocious in the combination
of all crimes, forms the fabric of the
history of Constantinople.

Ibid., pp. 40-41.

11. Ibid., p. 42.

But why seek in remote times proofs of
a truth for which we have existing evi-
dence before our eyes.

Ibid., p. 41.

12. Ibid.

If the sciences purified morals. if they
taught men to shed their blood for their
country, if they aroused courage, the
peoples of China would be wise, free,
and invincible. But if there is no vice
that does not dominate them, no crime
with which they are not familiar; if
neither the enlightenment of govern-
ment officials, nor the supposed wisdom
of laws, nor the multitude of inhabi-
tants of that vast empire were able to
save it from the yoke of the ignorant
and coarse Tartar, what purpose did all

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its learned men serve ? What benefit has resulted the honors bestowed on them ? Could it consist in being populated by slaves and wicked men ?
Ibid.

13. Ibid., p. 43, note 1.
 I dare not speak of those happy nations which do not even know by name the vices we have so much trouble repressing, those savages in America whose simple and natural regulations Montaigne does not hesitate to prefer not only to the Laws of Plato, but even to everything philosophy could ever imagine as most perfect for the government of peoples.
Ibid., p. 42, note *.
14. Ibid., p. 51.
 It is a lovely shore, adorned by the hands of nature alone, toward which one incessantly turns one's eyes and from which one regretfully feels oneself moving away.
Ibid., p. 54.
15. The Confessions, p. 362.
16. Discours sur l'inégalité, p. 159.
 . . . forgetting times and places
The Second Discourse, p. 103.
17. Ibid., p. 158.
 The researches which can be undertaken concerning the subject must not be taken for historical truths, but only for hypothetical and conditional reasonings better suited to clarify the nature of things than to show their true origin.
Ibid., p. 103.
18. Ibid., p. 164.
 . . . strong and robust
Ibid., p. 106.
19. Ibid., p. 170.
 His self-preservation being almost his only care
Ibid., p. 112.

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20. Ibid., p. 171.
 . . . the faculty of self-perfection
Ibid., p. 114.
21. Ibid., p. 182.
 . . . human understanding owes much to the
 passions, which by common agreement also
 owe much to it. It is by their activity
 that our reason is perfected; we seek to
 know only because we desire to have plea-
 sure; and it is impossible to conceive
 why one who had neither desires nor fear
 would go to the trouble of reasoning. The
 passions in turn derive their origin from
 our needs, and their progress from our
 knowledge.
Ibid., p. 116.
22. Ibid., p. 191.
 . . . general ideas can come into the
 mind only with the aid of words, and the
 understanding grasps them only through
 propositions.
Ibid., p. 124.
23. Ibid., p. 192.
 It is therefore necessary to state propo-
 sitions, hence to speak, in order to have
 general ideas; for as soon as the imagi-
 nation stops, the mind goes no further
 without the help of discourse.
Ibid., p. 125.
24. Ibid., p. 197.
 . . . a vertue all the more universal and
 and useful to man because it precedes in
 him the use of all reflection;
Ibid., p. 130.
25. Ibid., p. 198.
 . . . moderating in each individual the
 activity of lone of oneself
Ibid., p. 133.
26. Ibid., p. 200.
Ibid., p. 135.
27. Discours sur les sciences et les arts, pp. 39-40.
 It is in the rustic clothes of a farmer
 and not beneath the gilt of a courtier

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that strength and vigor of the body will be found. . . . Before art had moulded our manners . . . , our customs were rustic but natural
The First Discourse, p. 37.

28. Discours sur l'inégalité, p. 204.

. . . the chance combination of several foreign causes

. . . the different accidents

The Second Discourse, p. 140.

29. Ibid., p. 213.

As long as men were content with their rustic huts, as long as they were limited to sewing their clothing of skins with thorns or fish bones, adorning themselves with feathers and shells, . . . in a word, as long as they applied themselves only to tasks that a single person could do . . . , they lived free, healthy, good, and happy But from the moment one man needed the help of another, as soon as they observed that it was useful for a single person to have provisions for two, equality disappeared, property was introduced, labor became necessary;

Ibid., p. 151.

30. Ibid., p. 165, p. 212.

Ibid., p. 190, p. 224.

31. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. by C. B. MacPherson, (Penguin Books, Middlesex, 1980), p. 187.

32. Ibid., p. 186.

33. Discours sur l'inégalité, p. 206.

This repeated utilization of various beings in relation to himself, and of some beings in relation to others, must naturally have engendered in man's mind perceptions of certain relations. Those relationships . . . finally produced in him some sort of reflection, or rather a mechanical prudence that indicated to him the precautions most necessary for safety.

The Second Discourse, pp. 143-144.

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34. See above, p. 9.
35. Discours sur l'inégalité, note 1, pp. 164-165; note 1, pp. 177-182.
The Second Discourse, note f, pp. 188-191; note j, pp. 203-213.
36. The Confessions, p. 478.
37. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Du Contrat social, (Garnier-Flammarion, Paris, 1966), p. 76.
 The general will is always right, but the judgment guiding it is not always well informed.
 Translation by Sir Ernest Barker, from Social Contract, Essays by Locke, Hume, and Rousseau, (Oxford University Press, London, 1980), p. 204. All translations are taken from this text.
38. Ibid., p. 78.
 The legislator must, in every way, be an extraordinary figure in the State. He is so by reason of his genius, and no less so by that of his office. He is neither magistrate nor sovereign. His function is to constitute the State, yet in its Constitution it has no part to play. It exists in isolation, and is superior to other functions, having nothing to do with the governance of men. For if it be true that he who commands men should not ordain laws, so, too, he who ordains laws should be no longer in a position to command men.
Ibid., p. 206.
39. Ibid., pp. 76-77.
 . . . there is needed a superior intelligence which can survey all the passions of mankind, though itself exposed to none; an intelligence having no contact with our nature, yet knowing it to the full; an intelligence the well-being of which is independent of our own, yet willing to be concerned with it; which, finally, viewing

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the long perspectives of time, and preparing for itself a day of glory as yet far distant, will labour in one century to reap its reward in another.
Ibid., pp. 204-205.

40. Ibid., p. 79.

Ibid., p. 208.

41. Ibid., p. 52.

As soon as the act of association becomes a reality, it substitutes for the person of each of the contracting parties a moral and collective body made up of as many members as the constituting assembly has votes, which body receives from this very act of constitution its unity, its dispersed self, and its will. The public person thus formed by the union of individuals was known in the old days as a City, but now as the Republic or Body Politic. This, when it fulfils a passive role, is known by its members as The State, when an active one, as The Sovereign Power, and, in contrast to other similar bodies, as a Power.

Ibid., pp. 181-182.

42. Ibid., p. 87.

What people, then, is the best raw material for laws? One which has a certain basic bond of common interest or agreed conventions, but has not yet borne the yoke of government: whose customs and superstitions are not deeply rooted. . . .
Ibid., p. 216.

43. Ibid., p. 90.

But should the legislator who is uncertain of his object flout the nature of the material in which he has to work, attempting to impose liberty in conditions which make for slavery, to favour the amassing of wealth when he should be giving his attention to problems of population, to plan conquest where a policy of peace is indicated -

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the authority of the laws will insensibly diminish, the structure of the community will change for the worse, and unrest will grow to a point at which the State will have to change between death or change and nature, which can never be defeated, will reassert her Empire.

Ibid. p. 219.

Part II : Alexandre Kojève

U

Events have taken place constantly since the time of Hegel and Napoleon but nothing has been said; nothing new can be said. Something was born in Greece and the last word has been spoken.

Alexandre Kojève.¹

It is difficult to discuss Kojève without experiencing that nagging suspicion that one is perhaps being redundant. Is there really nothing left to say? Kojève would have us think so, for he claims that his discourse does not bring to light anything new, it is a mere discourse about past discourses and the possibility of present discourse. Intoduction à la lecture de Hegel then is the description of the last true discourse, the Science of Hegel as embodied in the Book, The Phenomenology of Spirit; this is all very discouraging for the student of discourse. However, if we could just cast aside this final conclusion for the moment, and promise to investigate it later, we could then revel in the elaborate exposition of pre-hegelian construction of discursive Otherness, in what Kojève calls Western dualist philosophies. Indeed, it is the very dualist nature of Philosophy that enabled Hegelian Science. But let us return to Kojève's discourse about philosophical discourses; we must first understand what he says about them (what he knows about them), then, how he says it (how he knows what he knows), or his phenomenological method, and, finally, how he is able to say what he says the way he says it (how he came to know what

he knows). In other words, Kojève's Introduction à la lecture de Hegel will describe for us not only the language of philosophy, but also the language of this language and the reason for its final manifestation.

What is philosophy, and what is the language of philosophy? Kojève tells us that philosophy "is a discussion of anything at all, but is distinguished from all other discussion in the sense that it speaks not only of what it speaks, but also of the fact that it speaks about it, and that it is it that speaks about it."² This definition implies that, while the philosopher may still be a lover of wisdom, he must be a self-conscious one, self-conscious of his love, and self-conscious of his words of love: "La philosophie est la recherche de la Sagesse, et la Sagesse est la plénitude de la conscience de soi."³ If, therefore, Western philosophical discourse is truly characterized by constructions of Otherness, then, in order to be a self-conscious discourse, these constructions must be made explicit and accounted for. However, as philosophy is only love or desire of wisdom, it can never be totally self-conscious of itself; hence the implicitness of, for example, Rousseau's constructions of Otherness. Given this understanding of philosophy, Kojève claims that Hegel's Phenomenology is absolutely self-conscious of itself, for, to arrive at the "Science", "Hegel doit donc avant tout rendre compte de son propre discours philosophique."⁴ Hegel, then, speaking through Kojève, is very much aware of the

differentiating nature of Western discourse!

Human understanding, according to Kojève-Hegel,⁵ is essentially a discursive activity, in that man gradually reveals to himself the totality of reality by a succession of partial discourses. This is possible in the extent that the power or force of understanding is man's ability to "abstract" himself from the given, and to manipulate and reorganize in his thought the concept, or abstraction, of the real entity. It is through and by the concept that man returns to the entity and grasps, or again, creates, its meaning and significance:

D'une manière générale, lorsqu'on crée le concept d'une entité réelle, on la détache de son hic et nunc. . . . Or, détacher une entité de son hic et nunc, c'est la séparer de son support "matériel", déterminé d'une manière univoque par le reste de l'univers spatio-temporel donné, dont cette entité fait partie. C'est pourquoi l'entité peut être remaniée "ou simplifiée" comme on veut, après qu'elle est devenue un concept. 6

While the concept is the abstracted essence of the real entity, the concept itself is not ungrounded; it becomes the meaningful discourse, or it is the discourse made coherent: "Le concept n'est pas une "idée" ou un "sens", mais un mot-ayant-un-sens, ou un discours cohérent (Logos)."⁷ Thus, in order to attain Self-Consciousness, which is identified by Kojève-Hegel with Perfection and Satisfaction, there need be philosophers, whose discussions and words reveal to the consciousness each newly constituted reality: ". . . il faut

qu'à chaque tournant dialectique il y ait un Philosophe prêt à prendre conscience de la nouvelle réalité constituée."⁸

There is no doubt that this highest ideal, the identification of satisfaction-perfection with Self-Consciousness, hence its becoming in the discursive nature of Philosophy, is only valid for those who break the silence of the Unconscious (the philosophers), and who thereby accept Hegel's arbitrary definition of the totally self-conscious and satisfied wise man.⁹

What are some of the fundamental characteristics of Western philosophical discourse, or, in the context of Kojève-Hegel's description, how does Philosophy differ from Science? Kojève writes, "En partant de l'Esprit, c'est à dire d'une synthèse du réel et de L'idéal, Hegel renonce donc à déduire l'un de l'autre Il les pose, c'est à dire les présuppose, tous les deux."¹⁰ Moreover, "L'Esprit étant l'identité de l'Être et du Sujet, on peut 'déduire' de lui l'opposition antérieure des deux et le processus qui la supprime."¹¹ From the vantage point of the Spirit, which is Identity and Synthesis, one can surmise the becoming of Spirit which is manifested by Dualism, Opposition, Dialectical Suppression, and Error. These are the many faces of pre-Hegelian discourse, of Philosophy.

Philosophy is dualist, for Philosophy, as the becoming of the Spirit, is necessarily composed on the one hand of the Self (Selbst) and on the other of static-Being (Sein);

this dualism can also be understood in terms of the dichotomy of Time and Space, in which Time is identified with the Self or Man as Action=Negativity, and Space with static-Being. It is this very dualism which supports the Realism in the Philosophy described by Kojève-Hegel;¹² "Dans la mesure où la philosophie (occidentale) a été réaliste voire dualiste, elle a divisé la totalité de l'Être en Sujet et Objet, en Pensée et Réalité, etc."¹³ Ontological dualism, or Realism, provides intelligibility and meaning to the dialectic of the Subject and the Object in supposing the Object to be external to and independent of the Subject.¹⁴ It can only be from this basic structure that the relationship between the Self and the Other (or the Self and Being) develops into a dynamic confrontation.

Once the necessity for a distinct and independent Object has been clearly delineated, it remains to postulate the relationship between the two constituents of Philosophy; Kojève-Hegel argues that this relationship is one of opposition, in which the knowing subject is opposed to the object made known. To translate this into the terminology we have been using in this paper, this is tantamount to the Self as creator facing (face à face as in looking in the mirror) the Other which is his creation. The stage of consciousness at this point is one in which the Self projects itself outward, and is conscious of something other than and external to it-Self: this is the Self of Rousseau throwing its consciousness out to other times and other lands, hypothetical and god-like

beings; this consciousness (this discourse) is still a long way from reaching self-consciousness. But let us return to Kojève: what exactly does he say about the opposition of the Subject to the Object?

. . . Bewusstsein. - c'est la conscience-de-la-réalité-extérieure, du non-Moi opposé au Moi, de l'objet conçu opposé au sujet connaissant. Il s'agissait donc de l'attitude que prenait l'individu humain (le Particulier) vis à vis de l'Homme en tant que tel, pris en tant que Réalité-essentielle du Réel en général, cette Réalité-essentielle étant-pour cet Homme - quelque chose d'extérieur, d'autonome, d'opposé à lui. 15

Moreover, to stress this quality of opposition, Kojève-Hegel points out that Philosophy, that is, pre-Hegelian discourse, must necessarily be completed by Religion, for the absolute of essential-Reality is the divine, or God, and the religious man only understands himself as opposed to this essential-Reality, thus as Bewusstsein: 16

D'après Hegel, l'Homme se comprend en tant qu'individu isolé dans et par la Philosophie. Et toute la philosophie pré-hégélienne était en ce sens une philosophie du Bewusstsein, qui étudiait et révélait d'une part le sujet opposé à l'objet, l'individu humain opposé au Monde naturel, et d'autre part l'objet autonome extérieur au sujet. Quant à l'homme qui fait bloc avec le Monde, c'est-à-dire l'homme réel, collectif, historique, ou si l'on veut - l'Etat, il se révèle à lui-même dans et par la Religion. Et c'est pourquoi la Philosophie (pré-hégélienne) du Bewusstsein doit nécessairement être complétée par une

Religion. Inversement, toute Religion engendre son complément philosophique. Car dans la Religion le Wesen est interprété comme non-Homme, comme étant extérieur à l'Homme. L'homme religieux qui veut se comprendre lui-même doit donc se comprendre en tant qu'opposé ou Wesen, c'est-à-dire en tant que Bewusstsein: il doit par conséquent se comprendre dans et par une Philosophie (pré-hégélienne). 17

This long quotation contains within it all the crucial elements of Kojève-Hegel's understanding of Philosophy; let us address them one by one, against the specific background of Rousseau and the Age of Enlightenment.

In Philosophy, man is taken to be an isolated individual ("individu isolé"), who thinks and lives as if he were or could be all alone, conjuring up ideal societies out of thin air; this attitude, in which "chacun veut être reconnu, mais ne reconnaît pas les autres", Kojève-Hegel calls "L'Idéalisme existentiel": "L'Homme -de-la-Raison vit donc en société comme s'il était seul au monde, bien qu'il sache qu'il vive en société."¹⁸ This is the figure of Rousseau, living in self-imposed isolation, yet fiercely determined to be heard by his fellow men: "Me voici donc seul sur la terre, n'ayant plus de frère, de prochain, d'ami, de société que moi-même."¹⁹ This is the existence of the isolated Particular ("le Particulier isolé"), who must necessarily oppose to himself the greatness of the Universal ("l'universel"); here, we have the element of opposition.

The philosopher of the Enlightenment, or, in this

case Rousseau, finds himself in an impossible position in having become atheist; his opposition to the world is no longer in terms of a transcendence, his Religion no longer divine: "nous sommes au point où l'Esclave, qui a été successivement Stoicien, Sceptique, Religieux, est devenu athée: plus de transcendance, plus d'opposition au monde donné." In short, the enlightened man who as yet does not participate in society is "l'Esclave sans Maître, le Religieux sans Dieu".²⁰ However, in so far as all pre-Hegelian philosophies are "Philosophie du Bewusstsein", the philosophy of Rousseau must posit an object external to itself, the autonomy of which it must become slowly conscious; or again, to the collective man of the Enlightenment, to the collective Individual, must be opposed the autonomous whole of essential-Reality; the particularity of Rousseau must be opposed to the universality of Nature.

The cult of Nature is Rousseau's new Religion, for it reveals to him the Particularity of his being as opposed to the Universality of real-Being; Kojève writes,

La Philosophie du Bewusstsein, c'est-à-dire la Philosophie pré-Hégélienne, . . . ne s'occupe que du Particulier isolé. Or, en parlant du Particulier, elle doit nécessairement parler de l'Universel, auquel le Particulier est opposé. Seulement, cet Universel est non pas l'Etat, mais la Nature, c'est-à-dire quelque chose qui effectivement ne dépend pas de l'Homme et lui est extérieur. 21

The opposition between Nature as the Universal and Man as the Particular is further qualified: Nature, as external to Man, is thus essentially non-human; Man, however, is recognized only in his passive opposition to Nature. Kojève-Hegel argues that the dynamic link between these two protagonists was overlooked by Philosophy, and, therefore, the crucial transforming, negating, power of Work was neglected in the relationship. Such an error has drastic implications on the nature of Man himself: "Conçu ainsi, l'Homme devient un être absolument non-naturel, sans contact réel avec la Nature et sans pouvoir sur elle."²² This radical segregation, very much in evidence in Rousseau's categorical affirmations about the nature of the distance between concrete (read social) Man and Nature,²³ is not however particular to the philosophy of the Enlightenment; all pre-Hegelian philosophies are characterized by this opposition: "[toute la philosophie pré-hégélienne] opère avec l'opposition entre l'Homme isolé, réduit à la pensée pure, irréelle, et l'Univers réel empirique, réduit à l'Être pur et simple, complètement déspiritualisé, déshumanisé, privé de pensée."²⁴

If Philosophy is marked by a dualist structure, in which the totality of Being is differentiated into two opposing constituents, it is also a dialectical discourse, in so far as it is the ideal dialectical which reflects the real dialectical of Being.²⁵ In discussing the dialectical nature of Hegel's phenomenological method, Kojève insists that

Hegel's discourse is dialectical only to the extent that it is a description of something which is dialectical; hence, "[Hegel] se contente d'observer et de décrire la dialectique qui s'est effectuée au cours de l'histoire et n'a plus besoin d'en faire une lui-même."²⁶ In this sense, Hegelian discourse in itself is not at all dialectical; pre-Hegelian discourse, however, is very much dialectical, for each philosophical discourse, each philosophy, "révèle ou décrit correctement un tournant ou un point d'arrêt, thétique, anti-thétique ou synthétique, de la dialectique réelle, de la Bewegung de l'Etre existant."²⁷ The history of Philosophy, or the dialectical movement of the various philosophies, in which the truth of each philosophy is proven erroneous by the succeeding one, is still, nevertheless, an ideal history, which is abstracted from what Kojève-Hegel calls real History, the dialectical of which is not a discursive or verbal one (as in Philosophy), but one of struggle and work: "On discute non pas à coup d'arguments verbaux, mais à coup de massues et d'épées ou de canons d'une part, et de faucilles et de marteaux ou de machines de l'autre. Et si l'on veut parler d'une 'méthode dialectique' dont se sert l'Histoire, il faut préciser qu'il s'agit là de méthodes de guerre et de travail."²⁸ The dialectical suppression of each philosophy supposes one final characteristic of philosophical discourse, namely, the maintenance of human error in the discourses, which eventually cancel each other out.

Kojève-Hegel argues that what distinguishes Man from the animal, among other things, is his ability to maintain an error in the world, by transforming it into a discourse.²⁹ Thus, for example, Rousseau's misguided notions about the relative intelligence and virtue of the Muslims, in his discursive construction of the Physical Other, were held to be a truth, until they were proven to be erroneous by more recent discourses. Again, if we translate this into the context of constructions of Otherness, then, we can say that each construction, each creation of an Other is a partial truth or a partial error, which is at the same time absorbed and eliminated by the one which replaces it. According to Kojève-Hegel, erroneous discourses are dialectically transformed into true discourses by the transforming power of Struggle and Work,³⁰ to take the above example of Rousseau's discourse, one can transform the error of Rousseau's construction into a truth, by either conquering and physically subjugating Islamic nations (the real history of Western Imperialism as reflected in the ideal discourse of Orientalism), or achieving the highest standard of living and technological supremacy, thereby relegating the Muslim people to Third World status. All human errors are therefore potential truths, and all truths are nothing more than errors which have been revealed to be so and consequently corrected: "On peut même dire que toute vérité au sens propre du terme est une erreur corrigée. Car la vérité est plus qu'une réalité.

c'est une réalité révélée; c'est la réalité plus la révélation de la réalité par le discours."³¹ And Truth, or revealed Reality, is brought about in the natural world by Work and in the social or historical world by Struggle, by transforming the Real World, static-Being, so that it conforms to the once erroneous Discourse.³²

We have thus far expounded the Kojévian description of philosophical discourse, or pre-Hegelian discourse, or simply, Philosophy, which is characterised by its dualism, in which the two constituents of Subject and Object are in a relationship of opposition. Moreover, Philosophy is dialectical, in so far as it reflects the dialectical nature of real Being, the totality of which implies both Negativity and Identity.³³ Finally, dialectical suppression of philosophical discourses throughout the history of Philosophy ensures the correction of erroneous discourses, the error of which is revealed by subsequent discourses and corrected by the transforming power of Struggle and Work. Kojève's discourse has therefore made explicit the nature of Western discourse, or Philosophy, and has shown that it operates on the basis of various differentiating constructions (Subject and Object, Reality and Thought, etc.), which are dialectically propelled through History by Man's negating Action (Struggle and Work.) Given this elaborate description of Philosophy, we must now ask Kojève, who seems to have reached a most advanced stage of self-consciousness, how he is able to say all these things,

that is to say, to account for his own discourse. We must therefore turn toward the phenomenological method, and Kojève-Hegel's claim of the death of Man and of Discourse, and gauge the effects thereof on Western man's perpetual constructions of Otherness.

*

"La Phénoménologie est une description phénoménologique . . . ; son 'objet', c'est l'homme en tant que 'phénomène existentiel'; l'homme tel qu'il apparaît (erscheint) à lui-même dans son existence et par elle. Et la Phénoménologie elle-même est sa dernière 'apparition'."³⁴ Kojève speaks here of Hegel's The Phenomenology of Spirit, in which the Spirit comes to be self-conscious of itself, through Hegel, and describes its own metamorphosis, "c'est-à-dire l'histoire de ses progrès, 'apparitions' ou 'révélation' ('phénomènes')."³⁵ The phenomenological method, therefore, is a narrative, in so far as it is structured as a recital of the various manifestations and transformations of a particular object; it is a description of that object in its many permutations. In this context, the object is Man himself, Man as an "existential phenomenon." This is why Kojève-Hegel's Phenomenology is a philosophical anthropology: its purpose is to describe "l'essence' intégrale de l'homme", captured in all of the human "possibilities", of which one, for example, may be realised by a given historical period, or a culture.³⁶ Moreover, the

Phenomenology is an anthropology which is philosophical, for it takes all philosophical attitudes to be existential attitudes; each philosophy represents therefore a possibility, a "moment", a temporary attitude, of Philosophy. Each has its truth, its moment, but is insufficient to express the Truth of Philosophy.³⁷ Kojève recapitulates:

La Phänomenologie s'est révélée être une anthropologie philosophique. Plus exactement: une description systématique et complète, phénoménologique au sens moderne (husserlien) du terme, des attitudes existentielles de l'Homme, faite en vue de l'analyse ontologique de l'Etre en tant que tel, qui fait le thème de la Logik. En ce qui concerne en particulier la Religion, la Phänomenologie . . . contient la description phénoménologique de toutes les attitudes religieuses que l'Homme peut prendre en vivant comme un être historique dans le Monde spatio-temporel (et qui, d'ailleurs, ont déjà toutes été réalisées au cours de l'histoire, lorsque parut la Phänomenologie).³⁸

What is implied here is that Kojève is only writing a phenomenological description of the Book, in and by which Hegel wrote the phenomenological description of Spirit; since, by definition, such descriptions are systematic and complete, they no longer point beyond themselves, but continually return to their original point of departure: "le Cercle de la Science est un cycle qui se répète éternellement."³⁹ But this can only occur if the content of such a discourse contains within it all the "possibilities" of existential attitudes that could be manifested by Man, or, to put it another way, if all the possible discursive constructions of Otherness have been

exhausted. Kojève-Hegel claims therefore that the discourse of the Book is not dualist, not characterised by differentiation and opposition, not dialectical in itself, and certainly not erroneous; in short, it is not a philosophical discourse, but a "scientific" monologue.

It is obvious that Kojève-Hegel can make all these claims because such a monologue is only possible, in fact the last "possibility", when the dialogue, or discourse, between men has been silenced forever. When does Man stop opposing himself to an Other than himself? When he no longer desires, when he is perfectly satisfied. Perfection-satisfaction is the end of the dialectical movement of opposition, this movement being History=Time=Man, and is similar to the beginning of the movement in that it is Identity, but differs from it in that it is Identity revealed by the Concept, that is to say that the identity of Man and his world now exists for Man.⁴⁰ The journey from the initial fight for recognition, which produced the first Master and the first Slave, to the final terror of the Slave who liberates himself in a bloody revolution,⁴¹ is a circular voyage, for it takes Man back to the absolute Identity of his beginnings, but it is a unique voyage, never to be repeated, for Man's Identity, once existing in silence, and unknown to him, is now revealed by him to be for him. History has taken Man back to his non-human beginning.

Here we approach the question of the status of Man and of his discourse. Kojève-Hegel insists that, since

all the possibilities of Discourse have been exhausted in the process of History, and proven to be so by Hegel's Science, which accurately describes its entire dialectical becoming.

Discourse itself has reached its end:

Lorsque le Discours humain, en partant d'un point quelconque et en progressant nécessairement (conformément à la nécessité logique), retourne à son point de départ, on voit que la totalité du Discours est épuisée. Et l'épuisement du Discours est aussi l'épuisement de l'Histoire, c'est-à-dire de l'Homme et du Temps. 42

Man, too, is no more: in so far as Man is the objective result of his Action, or that Man's real being is his Action, and that Action ceases the moment when Man no longer opposes himself to an external objective entity, the end of the differentiating Discourse signifies the end of Man. Thus, the concrete manifestation of Hegelian Science and Wisdom in the world is not Man, but the Book, which remains eternally identical to itself.⁴³

Donc, encore une fois: réaliser le Savoir absolu sous la forme d'un Livre, c'est-à-dire faire coïncider le Concept intégral avec le Réel pris dans sa totalité, c'est-à-dire annuler la différence entre le Réel et le Temps et par cela même supprimer l'extériorité du Temps par rapport à l'Homme, - c'est supprimer le Temps lui-même; et c'est, par suite, supprimer l'Homme lui-même en tant qu'individu libre et temporel. 44

The Book, as the empirical existence of Science, is therefore the last manifestation of Discourse, for it is its true (correct) and absolute (total) revelation; its meaning is revealed to

itself by itself, in the movement from the beginning of the Book to the end, and then back again.

The categorical disappearance of Man and of Discourse in the synthetic identity of Subject and Object does not, however, signify the end of Man's tendency to create Otherness; indeed, as long as Man continues to wonder about the meaning of human experience, he will attempt to define the "I" in contradistinction to an "Other", although, in the process of becoming self-conscious of such a pattern, he may begin to lose the ability to maintain the qualitative distinctions of the Subject and the Object. Kojève-Hegel himself is not immune to this. The elaborate phenomenological description of past philosophical discourses is, in fact, the construction of a majestic structure, the intricacy of which is made intelligible by its final phenomenal apparition, the Science of Hegel. Viewed from this angle, the Self would be this non-discursive, non-human "Man", whose only activity consists of reading and rereading the Book, and who seeks to define himself vis à vis an Other, the discursive and human Philosopher. Since the Self, in this construction of Otherness, is perfectly conscious of the purpose and task of the Other (the dialectical suppression of the errors of which leads to the final Truth), it can no longer assume the absolute position of a Subject, which creates and manipulates the Object, nor can it accept the practical status of the Object, which is the result of a Subject's (Philosophy) active becoming.

The confusion is clarified by Kojève-Hegel, who declares that the new Self must necessarily be a synthesis of both Subject and Object; the Self differentiates between itself (the wise man) and the Other (the philosopher), but, at the same time, absorbs this differentiation into its new being: the Self is Subject and Object, Identity and Difference, "le même et l'autre".⁴⁵

The problem, here, is that it isn't all that clear that the Self is indeed this synthetic "Man"; wisdom and wise men are still quite hard to find, even with the mass reproduction of the Book. Perhaps, the Self is still this discursive, philosophical Man, who envisages the one final Discourse, cyclical and eternal, by which to measure the limits and errors of his partial discourses. From this angle, the "last" philosophical construction of Otherness is that of the identical and eternal Discourse, revealed to be the ultimate correction of all past errors which have been maintained in philosophical discourses. In creating this absolute Other in the True (thus, the end of) Discourse, the Self must as well be self-conscious, of itself and of its discourse, in the extent that the Science can only correct the errors of Philosophy, if Philosophy itself has come to be conscious of such errors. Again, this higher degree of self-consciousness poses the same problem as above: the confusion of the Subject and the Object. The Philosopher, as the Self, is the Subject, in so far as he constructs the identical and

eternal Discourse of the wise Man; nevertheless, he is Object, for his discourse, as a partial and erroneous utterance, is but one of the components which serve to produce the Total and True Discourse: the meaning of his experience can only be revealed by and through this Discourse.

Kojève-Hegel's solution to the continuing opposition of dualist discourse, in the synthetic identity of Subject and Object, thereby ending philosophical discourse and Man, is an awkward solution, because it opens up too many possibilities for further discourse, for more constructions of Otherness; indeed, one can posit the opposition between historical man and post-historical man, between pre-Hegelian discourse and post-Hegelian monologue, between teleological action and frivolous routine, ad infinitum. Moreover, it is not that certain that Man can actually exist in perfect identity with himself; Kojève himself had a few doubts as to how post-historical Man could refrain from abstracting from himself.

In his now-famous note on the nature of post-historical Man, in Introduction à la lecture de Hegel, Kojève muses on the possible manifestations of this non-human Man. The first edition has him looking at Man as a happy animal, surrounded by all the human things which make him happy:

l'Homme reste en vie en tant qu'animal
qui est en accord avec la Nature ou
l'Etre donné. Ce qui disparaît, c'est
l'Homme proprement dit, c'est-à-dire
l'Action négatrice du donné et l'Erreur,
ou en général le Sujet opposé à l'Objet.

. . . Ce qui veut dire pratiquement:
 - la disparition des guerres et des
 révolutions sanglantes. Et encore
 la disparition de la Philosophie;
 . . . Mais tout le reste peut se main-
 tenir indéfiniment; l'art, l'amour,
 le jeu, etc., etc.; bref, tout ce qui
 rend l'Homme heureux. 46

This vision, however, is recognised by Kojève in the second edition to be "ambigu, pour ne pas dire contradictoire."⁴⁷

Man, if once again a mere animal, cannot possibly retain the inherently human "happiness" of "l'art, l'amour, le jeu".

Without Desire, post-historical and non-discursive Man is only contented: "Si l'Homme re-devient un animal, ses arts, ses amours et ses jeux doivent eux-aussi re-devenir purement 'naturels'. . . . Il faudrait dire que les animaux post-

historiques de l'espèce Homo sapiens (qui vivront dans l'abondance et en pleine sécurité) seront contents en fonction de leur comportement artistique, érotique et ludique; vu que, par définition, ils s'en contenteront."⁴⁸

The self-satisfied American and the "American way of life" epitomize this re-animalization of Man for Kojève, while the rest of the world's population strive to approximate and reach this ideal.

Finally, this note ends with a complete turn-about, in which Kojève reaffirms Man's humanity; this is to say that Kojève relinquishes the idea of a perfectly contented animal, who is Man existing in total identity with himself and his world. Japanese Snobism creates opposition and distinctions, which are far more sophisticated than those engendered by Western historical Action (Struggle and Work); it is through

the new opposition found in snobism that Man is to remain human: "Pour rester humain, l'Homme doit rester un 'Sujet opposé à l'Objet', même si disparaissent 'l'Action négatrice du donné et l'Erreur'." ⁴⁹ The Self of the Japanese Snob is pure Form, or, at least, strives to be pure Form, in contradistinction to whatever Content it may be or have. Kojève writes,

. . . en dépit des inégalités économiques et sociales persistantes, tous les Japonais sans exception sont actuellement en état de vivre en fonction de valeurs totalement formalisées, c'est-à-dire complètement vidées de tout contenu "humain" au sens d'"historique". . . . [Une "japonisation" des Occidentaux veut dire que] l'Homme post-historique doit continuer à détacher les formes de leurs contenus, en le faisant non plus pour transformer activement ces derniers, mais afin de s'opposer soi-même comme une "forme" pure à lui-même et aux autres, pris en tant que n'importe quels "contenus". ⁵⁰

It would seem that Western discourse resists quite adamantly any attempt to synthesise it; even Kojève-Hegel's post-historical "descriptions" eventually return to the safe harbour of the "I" opposed to the "Other": the Self as pure snobist Form opposed to Content seems preferable to no Self at all. The end of Man and the end of Discourse are acceptable propositions, only if they refer to a particular definition of "Man", for example, as negating Action, and a particular definition of Discourse, for example, philosophical discourse. As such, they cannot prevent the emergence of new definitions, which would entail and allow new constructions of Otherness.

Kojève himself realised this in the tentative outline he made of the post-historical Japanised Man; in a sense, the relationship between the Self as Form and the Other as Content is not qualitatively very different from that between the Self as Negating Action and the Other as given Nature: in both instances, it is an effort on the part of the Self to assert it-Self over a non-Self, in a structure of opposition and confrontation.

It is tempting to posit Kojève-Hegel's "discourse" as a critical turning point for Western (or global) discourse in general; indeed, at this point, discourse has become, if anything at all, perfectly conscious of itself, self-conscious of its attempts to construct Otherness, of its partial successes and of its partial failures. It is therefore faced with a dilemma: either it proposes a final synthesis, eradicating all opposition, which may prove to be unacceptable in that it could eliminate Man qua man in the process, or it refuses the insight of self-consciousness and doggedly continues to build its own transparent edifices of Otherness. This, perhaps, is Kojève's legacy, and it is one which many of his disciples, of whom we have selected Maurice Merleau-Ponty, find difficult to accept or to reject: either way, the confusion of the Subject and Object in the newly-self-conscious Self leaves one in a most uncomfortable position, the position of not being absolutely sure of one's reality.

Notes 1

1. from Gilles Laponge, "Interview with Kojève", La Quinzaine Littéraire 53, (1 July 1968), Professor Darby's copy: p. 5.
2. Ibid., Professor Darby's copy: p. 7.
3. Alexandre Kojève, Introduction à la lecture de Hegel, (Editions Gallimard, Paris, 1979), p. 541.
 Philosophy is the search for Wisdom, and Wisdom is the plenitude of self-consciousness.
 (All translations are my own, unless otherwise noted.)
4. Ibid.
 Hegel must first then give an account of his own philosophical discourse.
5. In order to avoid repetitions, I will use the term "Kojève-Hegel" to denote "Kojève, in his interpretation of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit".
6. Kojève, Introduction, pp. 542-543.
 Generally, when one creates the concept of a real entity, one détaches it from its hic et nunc. . . . However, to detach an entity from its hic et nunc is to separate it from its "material" support, which is determined once and for all by the whole of the given spatio-temporal universe, of which this entity is a part. This is why the entity can be modified or "simplified" accordingly, after it has become a concept.
7. Ibid., p. 543.
 The concept is not an "idea" or a "meaning", but a word-with-a-meaning, or a coherent discourse (Logos).
8. Ibid., p. 279.
 . . . at each dialectical turning point there must be a Philosopher who is ready to become conscious of the newly constituted reality.
 Translation by James H. Nichols, Jr., from Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1980), p. 85.

Notes 2

9. Ibid., pp. 278-279.
10. Ibid., pp. 429-430.
 . . . by starting with Spirit - that is, a synthesis of the real and the ideal - Hegel foregoes deducing the one from the other He posits - that is, he presupposes - both of them.
 Nichols, p. 153.
11. Ibid., p. 430.
 Since Spirit is the identity of Being and the Subject, one can deduce from it the earlier opposition of the two and the process that overcomes that opposition.
Ibid., p. 154.
12. Ibid., note (1), p. 431, pp. 431-432.
13. Ibid., p. 431.
 To the extent that (Western) philosophy has been "realist" or, rather, "dualist," it has divided the totality of Being into Subject and Object, into Thought and Reality, and so on.
 Nichols, p. 154.
14. Ibid., p. 428.
15. Ibid., p. 198.
 . . . Bewusstsein, - it is the consciousness of external reality, of the non-Self opposed to the Self, of the conceived Object opposed to the knowing Subject. It was therefore a question of the attitude that the human individual (the Particular) held vis à vis Man as such, as the essential reality of the Real in general, this essential reality being for Man something external, autonomous, and opposed to him.
16. Ibid., p. 199.

Notes 3

17. Ibid., pp. 199-200.

According to Hegel, Man understands himself in terms of an isolated individual in and through Philosophy. And every pre-Hegelian philosophy was in this sense a philosophy of Bewusstsein, which scrutinized and revealed on the one hand the subject opposed to the object, the human individual opposed to the natural World, and on the other, the autonomous object external to the subject. As to the man who unites with the World, that is to say real, collective, historical man, or again - the State, he reveals himself to himself in and through Religion. And this is why the Philosophy (pre-Hegelian) of Bewusstsein must necessarily be completed by a Religion. Conversely, every Religion generates its philosophical complement. For in Religion, the Wesen is interpreted to be non-Man, to be external to Man. The religious man who wants to understand himself must therefore understand himself as opposed to the Wesen, that is to say as Bewusstsein; consequently, he must understand himself in and through a Philosophy (pre-Hegelian).

18. Ibid., p. 84.

this attitude, in which "everyone wants to be recognised, but does not recognise others", Kojève-Hegel calls "existential Idealism": "Thus the Man-of-Reason lives in society as if he were alone in the world, even though he knows that he lives in society."

19. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Les rêveries du promeneur solitaire, (Editions Gallimard et Librairie Générale Française, Paris, 1965), p. 29.

Here I am, then, alone on earth, having no other brother, neighbour, friend, society than myself.

Notes 4

20. Kojève, Introduction, pp. 84-85.
 we are at the point where the Slave who has successively been Stoic, Skeptic, Religious, now becomes atheist; no more transcendence, no more opposition to the given world. . . . the Slave without Master, the Religious without God.
21. Ibid., p. 232.
 The Philosophy of Bewusstsein, that is, pre-Hegelian Philosophy, . . . is only concerned with the isolated Particular. However, in speaking of the Particular, it must necessarily speak of the Universal, to which the Particular is opposed. But this Universal is not the State, it is Nature, or something that effectively does not depend on Man and to whom it is external.
22. Ibid.
 Conceived thus, Man becomes an absolutely non-natural being, without real contact with Nature and without power over her.
23. See Part I: Jean-Jacques Rousseau, above.
24. Kojève, Introduction, p. 232.
 [all pre-Hegelian philosophies] work on the basis of the opposition between isolated Man, reduced to pure, non-real thought, and the real, empirical Universe, reduced to pure and simple Being, as the despiritualised, dehumanised, thought-less complement.
25. Ibid., p. 460.
26. Ibid.
 [Hegel] is content to observe and describe the dialectic which was effected throughout history, and he no longer needs to make a dialectic himself.
 Nichols, p. 183.

Notes 5

27. Ibid., see also pp. 465-466.

Each philosophy correctly reveals or describes a turning point or a stopping place - thetical, antithetical, or synthetic - of the real dialectic, of the Bewegung of existing Being.
Nichols, p. 184.

28. Ibid., p. 461.

The "discussion" is carried out not with verbal arguments, but with clubs and swords or cannon on the one hand, and with sickles and hammers or machines on the other. If one wants to speak of a "dialectical method" used by History, one must make clear that one is talking about methods of war and work.
Nichols, p. 185.

29. Ibid., pp. 418-419, see also p. 463.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid., p. 463.

One can even say that every truth in the proper sense of the term is an error that has been corrected. For the truth is more than a reality; it is a revealed reality; it is the reality plus the revelation of the reality through discourse.
Ibid., pp. 187-188.

32. Ibid., pp. 464-465.

33. Ibid., p. 476.

34. Ibid., p. 38.

The Phenomenology is a phenomenological description . . . ; its "object" is man as "existential phenomenon"; man such as he appears to himself in and through his existence. And the Phenomenology itself is his last "apparition".

35. Ibid.

that is to say, the history of its progress, "apparitions" or "revelations" ("phenomena").

Notes 6

36. Ibid., p. 39.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid., p. 57.

The Phänomenologie has revealed itself to be a philosophical anthropology. More exactly: a complete and systematic, phenomenological, in the modern sense (Husserlean) of the word, description of the existential attitudes of Man, undertaken in the light of an ontological analysis of Being as such, which is the theme of the Logik. As to the particular question of Religion, la Phänomenologie . . . contains the phenomenological description of all the possible religious attitudes that Man could hold, in so far as he is a historical being living in a spatio-temporal World (and which, in fact, have already all been realised in the course of history when the Phänomenologie was written).

39. Ibid., p. 393.

the Circle of Science is a cycle which repeats itself eternally.

40. Ibid., pp. 391-392.

41. For a summary of the process of human history as presented by Kojève, see "Kojève's Solution", in Tom Darby, The Feast, (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1982), pp. 94-107.

42. Kojève, Introduction, p. 393; see also p. 436.

When human Discourse, starting from any point and progressing necessarily (according to logical necessity), returns to its point of departure, one sees that the totality of the Discourse is exhausted. And the exhaustion of Discourse is also the exhaustion of History, that is to say of Man and of Time.

43. Ibid., pp. 384-385.

Notes 7

44. Ibid., p. 385.

So, once again: to realise absolute Knowledge in the form of a Book, that is, to make the integral Concept coincide with the Real taken in its totality, that is, to nullify the difference between the Real and Time, thereby removing the exteriority of Time in relation to Man, — is to put an end to Time itself; and this, therefore, is to put an end to Man himself as a temporal and free individual.

45. Taken from the title of Vincent Descombes' book, Le même et l'autre, (Les Editions de Minuit, Paris, 1979).

46. Kojève, Introduction, note, p. 435.

Man remains alive as animal in harmony with Nature or given Being. What disappears is Man properly so-called — that is, Action negating the given, and Error, or in general, the Subject opposed to the Object. . . . Practically, this means: the disappearance of wars and bloody revolutions. And also the disappearance of Philosophy; . . . But all the rest can be preserved indefinitely; art, love, play, etc., etc.; in short, everything that makes Man happy. Nichols, note 6, pp. 158-159.

47. Ibid., note, p. 436.

. . . ambiguous, not to say contradictory. Nichols, note, p. 159.

48. Ibid.

If Man becomes an animal again, his arts, his loves, and his play must also become purely "natural" again. . . . One would have to say that post-historical animals of the species Homo sapiens (which will live amidst abundance and complete security) will be content as a result of their artistic, erotic and playful behavior, inasmuch as, by definition, they will be contented with it. Ibid.

Note 8

49. Ibid., p. 437.

To remain human, Man must remain a "Subject opposed to the Object", even if "Action negating the given and Error" disappears.

Nichols, note, p. 162.

50. Ibid.

. . . in spite of persistent economic and political inequalities, all Japanese without exception are currently in a position to live according to totally formalized values - that is, values completely empty of all "human" content in the "historical" sense. . . . [A "japanization" of the Westerners means that] post-historical Man must continue to detach "form" from "content", doing so no longer in order actively to transform the latter, but so that he may oppose himself as pure "form" to himself and to others taken as "content" of any sort. Ibid.

Part II (continued) :
Maurice Merleau-Ponty

After Alexandre Kojève, why Maurice Merleau-Ponty? The Master has spoken, what is left for the Disciple to say? In fact, Merleau-Ponty has quite a lot to say, for it was impossible for him to accept the end of Man and the end of Discourse, that is, the end of Action; the synthetic solution proposed by Kojève in the identity of Subject and Object could not be accepted by the French thinkers of the War years, for, in the light of Hegel's statement that "Les peuples heureux . . . n'ont pas d'histoire," they still found themselves encountering History, in the German Occupation, the Liberation, and the Algerian Crisis.¹ Merleau-Ponty, as a student of Kojève,² spoke the language of Hegelian philosophical anthropology, that is, he adopted the finality of Hegel's discourse:

Hegel est à l'origine de tout ce qui s'est fait de grand en philosophie depuis un siècle - par exemple du marxisme, de Nietzsche, de la phénoménologie et de l'existentialisme allemand, de la psychanalyse - . . . il n'y a pas, dans l'ordre de la culture, de tâche plus urgente que de relier à leur origine hégélienne les doctrines ingrates qui cherchent à l'oublier. 3

While Merleau-Ponty recognized this debt to Hegel, he could not, however, be satisfied with the categorical end of opposition, manifested concretely in the eternal and cyclical discourse; he believed that he was still experiencing History, and Kojève's synthetical solution failed to account for the on-going fact of historical action, which Merleau-Ponty himself

thought to have witnessed in the Second World War.

Merleau-Ponty's contribution, therefore, to this advanced stage of discursive self-consciousness, is the mapping of a phenomenal field, "le champ phénoménal", an ambiguous and shifting realm, where "la réflexion n'a jamais sous son regard le monde entier et la pluralité des nomades déployés et objectifs et qu'elle ne dispose jamais que d'une vue partielle et d'une puissance limitée."⁴ Reflection, here, is as yet to be guided or motivated by Reason: it is a mere activity in the field of Perception, a non-thetical consciousness, a "lived" logic.⁵ Jean Hyppolite wrote of this newly-discovered land as a spontaneous and immediate form of Being, where "l'existence que nous sommes est immédiatement ouverte au monde et à autrui, avant de se réfléchir en significations intelligibles."⁶

It is from the ambiguous confines of this new territory that Merleau-Ponty seeks to answer Kojève's challenge; in his second work, Phénoménologie de la perception, is to be found an ambitious twofold undertaking: an attempt to escape the absolute synthesis of Hegelian Science, which has meant the end of History, thus the end of meaningful action, and the self-conscious formulation of the relationship between the Subject and the Object, or between the Self and the Other, in which the position of the Other is made explicit, if not primary. However, as we shall see below, in the process of breathing life back into Man, as the active agent of History, Merleau-Ponty's discourse loses gradually its self-consciousness: it

engages in an implicit construction of Otherness, a forceful and categorical differentiation, which posits the Self vis à vis the Pathological Other; we are already here anticipating the discourse of Michel Foucault.

But let us return to Merleau-Ponty and the Phénoménologie de la perception. This book very much rests on the foundations of his first work, Structure du comportement (1942), in which the structure of behaviour is shown to have its own intelligibility, "son sens immanent solidaire d'une forme, d'un ensemble où le tout domine les parties."⁷ Thus, the task is to understand these systems of behaviour in their own field of meaning, and not to attribute to them meaning from the external coexistence of elements.⁸ In this way, Merleau-Ponty introduces to the world the world of perception and living existence. "Il s'agit de décrire, et non pas d'expliquer ni d'analyser."⁹ Such is the nature of phenomenology. The Phénoménologie de la perception is a description of the components and processes by and through which ~~life~~ becomes conscious of its own existence. Merleau-Ponty presents us with the concrete entity of the living, limited, and situated body, as the vessel and dynamic of perception:

Le corps est le véhicule de l'être au monde, et avoir un corps c'est pour un vivant se joindre à un milieu défini, se confondre avec certains projets et s'y engager continuellement. . . . car s'il est vrai que j'ai conscience de mon corps à travers le monde, qu'il est, au centre du monde, le terme inaperçu vers lequel tous les objets tournent

leur face, il est vrai pour la même
raison que mon corps est le pivot
du monde: je sais que les objets
ont plusieurs faces parce que je
pourrais en faire le tour, et en ce
sens j'ai conscience, par le moyen
de mon corps: 10 *du monde*

As the living body must of necessity take up space, space which is therefore not available to an Other's body, it already suggests a certain negation as part of its mere being, even it is only to be understood as negation of the Other's possible positions in space. We have here the echo of Kojève's discourse. From the fact of the living body, inserted into the world, is derived the world of perception.

"Je m'engage avec mon corps parmi les choses, elles coexistent avec moi comme sujet incarné . . . C'est par mon corps que je comprends autrui, comme c' est par mon corps que je perçois des 'choses'." ¹¹ The ground of perception precedes the ground of intelligibility, in that it is offered to us by our being-in-the-world through the situated and finite existence of the body; the body both restricts our field of perception and allows it to be increased continuously, by its ability to move in the world. For this reason, experience of the world, and in particular, of the perceived world ("le monde perçu"), is a finite enterprise, for the perceived universe is always a partial universe, the perceived world an incomplete world. However, one must not take the contradiction between the reality of the world and its incompleteness as a problem, for it represents the very essence of existence:

La contradiction que nous trouvons entre la réalité du monde et son inachèvement, c'est la contradiction entre l'ubiquité de la conscience et son engagement dans un champ de présence. 12

Ainsi il n'y a pas à choisir entre l'inachèvement du monde et son existence, entre l'engagement et l'ubiquité de la conscience Cette ambiguïté n'est pas une imperfection de la conscience ou de l'existence, elle en est la définition. 13

For the Hegelian synthesis of the for-itself (Subject, Self) and the in-itself (Object, Other), Merleau-Ponty substitutes the permanence and immediacy of Existence, which could be understood as a synthesis only in the phenomenon of presence, a synthesis which must be continuously undertaken and which does not eliminate our own finitude.¹⁴ As such, an absolute synthesis is rendered impossible in the realm of perception, "par la nature même des perspectives à relier, puisque chacune d'elles renvoie indéfiniment par ses horizons à d'autres perspectives."¹⁵

Merleau-Ponty's own phenomenology, or existential phenomenology, as it was then called, is thus specifically concerned with the description of what is between the absolutes of the in-itself and the for-itself; it claims that it does not investigate the nature of the opposition between the Subject and the Object, or the Self and the Other, but, rather, the arena within which there are the possibilities for such opposition. Phénoménologie de la perception may be considered,

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— a philosophical anthropology, only to the extent that Man is man-living-in-the world, and his apparitions (the phenomena) consist of human existence, as witnessed by the lived experiences of the subject-object, the perceiving and perceived Man. This existential "inter-world" is as such an on-going project, a finite synthesis in the eternal present, "c'est à dire inachevée et précaire."¹⁶ History and historical action are once again possible, in so far as they have become behaviour, or comportement, inherent in human existence: the relation between a thing/person and its/his milieu is given meaning in the living experience of the situations, a meaning which is rooted in the limits of perception itself. Human existence has thus provided Merleau-Ponty with the means to circumvent Kojève's march toward the final synthesis:

Dans la version qu'en offre Merleau-Ponty, la phénoménologie serait en définitive le projet d'une description du fondement de l'histoire, à savoir l'existence humaine, telle qu'elle est vécue, c'est-à-dire jamais tout en blanc ou tout en noir, mais bigarrée, mélangée. C'est ce mixte qu'il faut décrire : un produit-producteur, un actif-passif, un institué-instituant, c'est-à-dire, sous toutes ces figures, un sujet-objet. ¹⁷

The emphasis on Man as man-in-the-world, as a living existence, makes explicit the philosophical problem of the Other, which has already been posited by Kojève-Hegel; while Merleau-Ponty agrees with Kojève that each consciousness strives for the death of the Other,¹⁸ he insists that this is the consciousness of the cogito, which can only emerge

from a prior consciousness, that of the percipio, in which the multitudes of consciousness merely coexist: "Pour que la lutte puisse commencer, pour que chaque conscience puisse soupçonner les présences étrangères qu'elle nie, il faut qu'elles aient un terrain commun et qu'elles se souviennent de leur coexistence paisible dans le monde de l'enfant."¹⁹ Face to face with an Other, the Consciousness — or the Self — must first undergo the process of acknowledgement (as distinguished from the fight for recognition), which is brought about by the mere coincidence of the living bodies confronting one another: "coexistence" is thus the paradoxical situation in which the distance between the bodies gives rise to a certain affinity, a strange sense of closeness, where there is mutual acceptance of the possibility of like-consciousness in like-body.²⁰

This a priori relationship between the Self and the Other, in which mutuality allows for authenticity, is a reciprocal "witnessing": the Other only becomes explicit or transparent (in that he is completely revealed) to the look ("le regard") or gaze of the witness, to the extent that the latter similarly exposes himself to the gaze of the former.²¹ For Merleau-Ponty, Being is first and foremost being-for-the-gaze, since the Subject is necessarily the subject of perception, and, therefore, can only have consciousness of the world by and through his "gaze", "ce regard qui n'a prise sur les choses que pour une certaine orientation des choses,

[laquelle] n'est pas un caractère contingent de l'objet, . . . [mais] le moyen par lequel [il] le reconnai[t] et [a] conscience de lui comme d'un objet,"²² Moreover, Merleau-Ponty further elaborates the Self-Other relationship to include third party witnesses ("tiers témoins"); the philosophical problem of the Other must then be understood as a particular instance of the philosophical problem of Others.²³ After all, "Le premier des objets culturels et celui par lequel ils existent tous, c'est le corps d'autrui comme porteur d'un comportement."²⁴ This is to say that man's world, or his milieu, is necessarily the social world or milieu, by the mere fact of his existence.

What are some of the implications of this elevation of the status of the Other to that of an accomplice or partner in the project of the Self? By this explicit acceptance of the Other, as witness and witnessed, Merleau-Ponty sacrifices the primacy of the Self's position or status in discourse to the increased autonomy of the status of the Other. The fact of the social (Others), an explicit given, allows the Self only relative freedom; this is to say that it is left with the dissatisfactory choice between affirmation of its relationship with the Other, or the social, and refusal of this relationship. This is an inconsequential choice, for it remains secondary to the fact of the Other. Merleau-Ponty would like to believe that, whatever the choice, both the Self and the Other would be enhanced in the process: "Autrui ou

moi, il faut choisir, dit-on. Mais on choisit l'un contre l'autre, et ainsi on affirme les deux."²⁵ To this, Bernard Halda responds, with more than mild regret:

Cela est vrai. Seulement autrui nous a précédé. Son existence nous pose plus de problèmes que nous ne lui en posons. . . . Nous sommes embarqués dans une aventure où notre personnage prend forme et conscience de lui-même par la confrontation avec autrui - un autrui en perpétuel devenir et dont les éléments sont infinis. 26

In a sense, in denying Kojève's synthesis of the Subject and the Object, Merleau-Ponty finds himself at the crossroads, unable to give his own discourse any direction: in order to account for his own utterances, which purport to be true, he must either fall back to the safe constructions of Otherness which characterised Rousseau's discourse, that is, a categorical separation between the speaking Self and the created Other, or suffer the consequences of a discourse which has ~~stripped~~ the Self of any creative power by subjugating it to the "gaze" of its own creation. Merleau-Ponty, in fact, succumbed to both fates.

The truth of the perceiving Self is presented in Phénoménologie de la perception in opposition to a Pathological Other, the distorted reflection of which reveals to the Self its innermost secrets. Merleau-Ponty's construction of Otherness is in this sense not much different from Rousseau's; it is implicit, in so far as it is not a self-conscious construction, and it is radical, in that it clearly differentiates

the spheres of the Self and of the Other. While Merleau-Ponty argues that "L'étude d'un cas pathologique nous a donc permis d'apercevoir un nouveau mode d'analyse - l'analyse existentielle - qui dépasse les alternatives classiques de l'empirisme et de l'intellectualisme, de l'explication et de la réflexion",²⁷ he does not stop to question the discourse which has allowed him to differentiate "pathological cases" from the rest; indeed, the model patient Schn., who is the Other par excellence, speaks only through the mouthpiece of doctors and other learned men, who have managed to fit his incoherence or incapacities into a framework of mental health, the creation of which Schn. himself totally ignored. In spite of the care Merleau-Ponty put into the phenomenology of the "inter-world" of perception, he failed to carry this concern into the inter-world between the subject-perceiving-the-pathological and the object-perceived-to-be-pathological. In speaking of the relationship between doctor and patient in the process of a treatment, he writes: "... le malade n'assumerait pas le sens de ses troubles qu'on vient de lui révéler sans le rapport personnel qu'il a noué avec le médecin, sans la confiance et l'amitié qu'il lui porte et le changement d'existence qui résulte de cette amitié."²⁸ Two things are made clear here: first, there is absolutely no doubt as to the status of each participant; that is, the patient (Other) must bear the truth of the doctor (Self) which is revealed to him by the latter. Secondly, there is no confusion between

the roles of the doctor and patient: the doctor gives meaning and the patient receives it. The separation must be radical in order for the construction to be valid; and, for Merleau-Ponty, this construction of the Pathological Other salvages his discourse from the ambiguity and obscurity, into which he had thrown both subject and Object.

Finally, it is this very simultaneous postulation of an incomplete Subject and an incomplete Object, what Vincent Descombes calls "l'idéalisme réformé par Merleau-Ponty", blurring the identity of Subject and Object in Non-Coincidence, Incompleteness, "dans le clair-obscur",²⁹ which pushes Merleau-Ponty's discourse to the brink of the Self's unwitting loss of prerogative. Descombes suggests that the philosophy of perception allows for a certain displacement of the "I" towards the "one", or again, "d'un passage du sujet personnel au sujet impersonnel et anonyme."³⁰ If this were to be the case, then, the Other, as well, would tend towards the "one"; all existences would in fact be impersonal and anonymous. Hence, we have the structure, in Phénoménologie de la perception, of the Self as the objective, conscientious, impersonal, and anonymous psychologist who is assured of his mental well-being, by reflecting on its absence in others; however, his very impersonality prevents us from identifying with him as the representative of the Self; indeed, his objectivity, or his self-objectification, leads us (our Selves) to regard him as object to our Self, our own creation

of ourselves. Merleau-Ponty's psychologist has been transformed from a confident, truth-giving Self to an Impersonal, Objective Other. In this sense, Merleau-Ponty's discourse is the content of Michel Foucault's discourse, the object of his genealogy and his archaeology, for the emphasis is now placed solely on the loss of position of the Self (it can no longer attain a "prise de position"), as the Impersonal or Disinterested Other begins to dictate the ways of seeing. Therefore, at the juncture of Merleau-Ponty and Foucault, the Self loses its will to power, i.e. to create, as it moves from the position of The "I", the subject who defines, to that of the "one", the subject-object, yet to be defined.

③

Notes 1

1. Cited in Jean Hyppolite, Sens et existence dans la philosophie de Maurice Merleau-Ponty, (Oxford University Press, London, 1963), p. 3.
Happy peoples . . . do not have history.
(All translations are my own.)
2. See note 1 of p. 22 of Vincent Descombes, Le Même et l'Autre, (Les Editions de Minuit, Paris, 1979), where the author lists some of the more renowned figures of the time who have attended Kojève's lectures on Hegel at the Ecole pratique des hautes études.
3. Merleau-Ponty, cited in Descombes, p. 23.
Hegel is the fountain-head of all the major philosophies of the last century — for example of Marxism, Nietzsche, German phenomenology and existentialism, of psychoanalysis —; . . . There is no task more urgent, in the cultural configuration, than to link to their Hegelian origin the ungrateful doctrines which seek to forget it.
4. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de la perception, (Editions Gallimard, Paris, 1983), p. 74.
. . . reflection never has under its gaze the entire world and the plurality of the nomads, displayed and objectified, and that it never has at its disposal but a partial view and a limited power.
5. Ibid., p. 61.
6. Hyppolite, p. 8.
. . . the existence that we are is immediately open to the world and to the Other, before reflecting itself into intelligible meanings.
7. Ibid. p. 5.
. . . its immanent meaning interdependent with a form, with a totality, the whole of which dominates the parts.
8. Ibid.
9. Merleau-Ponty, p. ii.
It is a matter of description, and not of explanation, nor of analysis.

Notes 2

10. Ibid., p. 97.

The body is the vehicle of being-in-the-world, and to have a body is, for the living organism, to join with a defined milieu, to merge with certain projects and to continuously commit itself to them. . . . for if it is true that I am conscious of my body through the world, that it is, in the centre of the world, the unnoticed term towards which all objects turn their faces, then it is true for the same reason that my body is the pivot of the world: I know that objects have many sides, because I can move around them, and, in this sense, I am conscious of the world through my body.

11. Ibid., p. 216.

I become involved in things with my body, they coexist with me as an incarnated subject . . . It is through my body that I understand another, as it is through my body that I perceive things.

12. Ibid., p. 382.

The contradiction which we find between the reality of the world and its incompleteness, is the contradiction between the ubiquity of consciousness and its commitment in a field of presence.

13. Ibid., p. 383.

Thus there is no choice between the incompleteness of the world and its existence, between the ubiquity and the commitment of consciousness This ambiguity is not an imperfection of consciousness or of existence, it is its definition.

14. Ibid., p. 519.15. Ibid., p. 381.

. . . by the very nature of the perspectives which are to be linked together, since each of them, by its horizons, call indefinitely to other perspectives.

Notes 3

16. Descombes, p. 72.
 . . . that is to say, incomplete and precarious.
17. Ibid., p. 73.
 In the version offered by Merleau-Ponty, phenomenology would ultimately be the project of a description of the foundation of history, namely human existence, such as it is lived, that is to say, never all in black or white, but multicoloured, varied. It is this mixed that must be described: a product-producer, an active-passive, an instituted-instituting, that is, under all these forms, a subject-object.
18. Merleau-Ponty, p. 408. See also François Heidsieck, L'Ontologie de Merleau-Ponty, (Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1971), p. 75.
19. Merleau-Ponty, p. 408.
 In order for the fight to begin, in order ~~for each~~ consciousness to suspect the alien presences that it denies, they must have a common ground and remember their peaceful coexistence in the world of the child.
20. Heidsieck, p. 77.
21. Ibid., p. 83.
22. Merleau-Ponty, p. 293.
 . . . this gaze which can only grasp things for a certain orientation of things, . . . [which orientation] is not a contingent characteristic of the object, . . . [but] the means by which [it] recognises and is conscious of it as an object.
23. Heidsieck, p. 84.
24. Merleau-Ponty, p. 401.
 The first of cultural objects and the one by which they all exist is the body of the Other as the carrier of a behaviour.
25. Ibid., p. 414.

Notes 4

The Other or the Self, one must choose, so they say. But one chooses one over the other, and thus one affirms both.

26. Bernard Halda, Merleau-Ponty ou la philosophie de l'ambiguïté, (Archives des Lettres Modernes, no. 72, 1966), p. 28.

This is true. Only, the Other has preceded us! His existence poses more problems for us than we for him. . . . We have embarked on an adventure where our character takes shape and acquires consciousness of itself through the confrontation with the Other - an Other in perpetual becoming, the components of which are infinite.

27. Merleau-Ponty, p. 158.

The study of a pathological instance has thus permitted us to glimpse a new method of analysis - existential analysis - which goes beyond the classical alternatives of empiricism and intellectualism, of explanation and reflection.

28. Ibid., p. 190.

. . . the patient would not accept the meaning of his disorders, which is just revealed to him, without the personal relationship which he has formed with the doctor, without the trust and friendship he feels for him and the change in existence which is the result of that friendship.

29. Descombes, p. 88.

. . . idealism reformed by Merleau-Ponty
. . . in the light-dark . . .

Part III : Michel Foucault

. . . it is not enough to say that the subject is constituted in a symbolic system. It is not just in the play of symbols that the subject is constituted. It is constituted in real, historically analyzable practices. There is a technology of the constitution of the self which cuts across symbolic systems while using them.

Michel Foucault.¹

Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique is Michel Foucault's compilation of "real, historically analyzable practices", which have contributed to the evolution of the meaning of madness; as such, it reads like an encyclopaedia, or a very thoroughly documented novel, in which no one is really quite sure who the heroes or the villains are. But Histoire de la folie is obviously much more than that; it is Foucault's chronicle of the creation and eventual transformation of the identity of madness within the vague boundaries of unreason, it is the unraveling of a discourse which, from its very first word, operates on the basis of differentiation; in short, it is a discourse on discourse. But how could this be possible? A discourse on discourse implies that discourse has become fully conscious of itself, since the content and the form, or the matter and the method, coincide in perfect identity. It would appear that we have returned to Kojève's identical and eternal discourse; this is, however, not the case. Foucault may speak of discourse, and yet stand apart from it, because his "method" is no longer discursive, but genealogical and archaeological. It is distinct from the "matter" of which

he speaks, and it is this distinction which allows us to escape from Kojève's final solution.

We have, therefore, before us a twofold task: first, we are to delve into the content of Foucault's discourse, which is an explicit discursive and institutional construction of Otherness, inherent in the seventeenth and eighteenth-century understanding of and practices towards madness; secondly, we must inquire into the form of Foucault's discourse, that is, the characteristics and possibilities of genealogy and archaeology. Perhaps, the outcome of Foucault's investigation into the discourse of the Age of Reason, and the concrete manifestation of his own discourse, would serve to clarify some of the obscurities and hesitations we have encountered in Rousseau's discourse, especially in the construction of the Impartial Other, and in Merleau-Ponty's discourse of the Pathological Other.

Foucault begins his observations on the birth of madness by demonstrating that the construction of an Other is accomplished by a comprehensive "gesture", which entails not only an appropriate discourse, but also a corresponding practice and attitude; thus, the initial point of differentiation is a general "geste de ségrégation", which begins to trace the very faint outline of the Other. At this stage, the purpose of the gesture is as yet undefined, and the figures which emerge as a result of this gesture are caricatures of all that is unfamiliar, alien, other:

Le geste . . . n'isolait pas des étrangers méconnus, et trop longtemps esquivés sous l'habitude; il en créait, altérant des visages familiers au paysage social, pour en faire des figures bizarres que nul ne reconnaissait plus. Il suscitait l'Etranger là même où on ne l'avait pas pressenti; il rompait la trame, dénouait des familiarités; par lui, il ya quelque chose de l'homme qui a été mis hors de sa portée, et reculé indéfiniment à notre horizon. D'un mot, on peut dire que ce geste a été créateur d'aliénation. 2

In a sense, this initial gesture conjures up figures of Otherness in the very midst of Familiarity, or Sameness ("l'autre" evoked in "le même"); therefore, the Other, in this case, is not an entity which contains within it possibilities of Otherness — as did Rousseau's Physical Other, for example —, but it is the gesture itself which belongs to the structure of Otherness. Foucault maintains the importance of this creative act right through the many permutations of the face of madness, even until the early nineteenth-century, when the practices towards madness were channelled into two distinct processes, that of "liberation" and that of "protection": to Foucault, these were merely different offsprings of the same gesture. He writes, "Ces deux ensembles ne s'opposent pas; ils font plus même que se compléter; ils ne sont qu'une seule et même chose — l'unité cohérente d'un geste par lequel la folie est offerte à la connaissance dans une structure qui est, d'entrée de jeu, aliénante."³

Once the gesture has been made by a particular,

society, it must be made concrete by a series of divisions, by and through which the identities of both segregator and segregated become more clearly defined. For Foucault, the great division which underlies all other divisions in Western culture is that between Reason and un-Reason,⁴ wherein Reason took it upon itself to "know" and "understand" un-Reason. Madness, as a specific form of un-Reason, has become the very special interest of Reason, in so far as it was created to be Reason's own private mirror and most precious possession.

Madness is, in a sense, absence of Reason, and, as such, is only possible in the context of Reason; or again, one cannot have madness without Reason. Foucault explains this seemingly paradoxical statement by suggesting that, "la nature de la folie est d'être secrète raison - de n'exister du moins que par elle et pour elle, de n'avoir au monde de présence que ménagée à l'avance par la raison, et déjà aliénée en elle."⁵ The discourse which created madness from Reason is that which constructs "le même et l'autre", "sameness" in the figure of madness that Reason recognizes to be its own reflection, and "otherness" in the distance maintained by Reason between this reflection and itself. The entire experience of madness in the classical age was therefore one of obscurity and confusion, wherein the absence that is madness became more and more profound.⁶ Reason can only grasp and maintain madness both within reach and at a safe distance by turning to the concrete embodiment of madness, the madman, who is much more open to

definition than is madness itself: "Caractère immédiatement concret, évident et précis du fou; profil confus, lointain, presque imperceptible de la folie."⁷ By isolating, observing, and dissecting the character of the madman, Reason can thus return to the experience of madness in general, and deduce its fundamental nature:

Le XVIII^e siècle perçoit le fou,
mais déduit la folie. Et dans le fou
ce qu'il perçoit ce n'est pas la folie,
mais l'inextricable présence de la
raison et de la non-raison. Et ce à
partir de quoi il reconstruit la folie
ce n'est pas la multiple expérience
des fous, c'est le domaine logique et
naturel de la maladie, un champ de
rationalité. 8

The madman is conspicuous by his "alterity": he does not manifest his own Self, for his being immediately implies the background of those who are not mad; he is first and foremost an outline of incongruity against the backdrop of men of Reason: he is other. Moreover, he is other in what Foucault calls "un double système d'altérité"; the speaking Self perceives the madman as other than the others around it, or again, the Self isolates the madman as the Other from the Otherness of his world:

Le fou, c'est l'autre par rapport aux
autres: l'autre - au sens de l'exception
- parmi les autres - au sens de l'uni-
versel. . . le fou est évident, mais
son profil se détache sur l'espace exté-
rieur; et le rapport qui le définit,
l'offre tout entier par le jeu des com-
paraisons objectives au regard du sujet
raisonnable. . . il est maintenant
repoussé à l'autre extrémité du monde,

mis à l'écart et maintenu hors d'état
d'inquiéter, par une double sécurité,
puisque'il représente la différence de
l'Autre dans l'extériorité des autres. 9

In articulating the position of the madman, Reason, as the discursive Self, reaffirms the crucial elements of a construction of Otherness, which have already been made familiar to us through Kojève; first, the element of opposition is clearly enunciated, in that "la folie existe par rapport à la raison, ou du moins par rapport aux 'autres' ". Opposition also exists between the categories of the Particular, in the exceptional being of the madman, and the Universal, or the universality of other men of Reason. Secondly, the figure of the Other is necessarily objectified, in that the Self appropriates the being of the Other in terms of an Object; as Kojève's Slave is not human in the eyes of his Master, so Foucault's madman is a case study for the nosologist. Finally, as the Other is the object of the Self's discourse, it only exists in silence, offering its mute being to the "gaze" of the Self. We shall therefore address each of these aspects separately, though necessarily in the light of Foucault's discourse about discourse, that is, one which is disengaged from the tendencies of discursive speech, and, yet, which is the very possibility of a discourse which has become conscious of itself.

The question of opposition in the discourse of Reason on madness presents us with both the now familiar and accepted dualism of the Self and the non-Self, or Other, and the more disquieting displacement of the actual locus of Otherness, by

which, while there still remains an opposition between the Self and the Other, the Self and the Other actually exchange places. There is no doubt that discourse that makes sense, that is, discourse that can be understood by most people, must be a discourse that is consensual: this is the discourse of Reason which purports to make sense not only of itself, but also of something that is quite other than itself, non-Reason. The two participants to the confrontation are therefore clearly delineated as to their respective perspectives: Reason is the Self, for it is the Subject that speaks, madness is the Other, for it is the other-than-the-Subject, of which the Subject speaks. This is the dualist structure in its most simplistic form; however, as Foucault observes, the experience of madness in the classical age was subsumed by two distinct understandings of this experience, which contradicted each other in the matter of the nature of the participants of the opposition.

Foucault unravels the two juxtaposed experiences of madness that the classical age has passed down to the positivist medicine of the nineteenth century (which has, in fact, superimposed them), and, in so doing, manages to destroy the definition and definitiveness of both the Self and the Other; the Self is as much self as other to itself, and the Other is now both other, and Self understood by an other. In other, clearer, words,

[la médecine de l'esprit], dans sa
forme "positive", n'est au fond que
la superposition des deux expériences

que le classicisme a juxtaposées sans jamais les joindre définitivement: une expérience sociale, normative et dichotomique de la folie qui pivote tout entière autour de l'impératif de l'internement, . . . et une expérience juridique, qualitative, finement différenciée, sensible aux questions de limites et de degrés, et qui cherche dans tous les domaines de l'activité du sujet, les visages polymorphes que peut prendre l'aliénation. 10

The first experience of madness, or form of alienation, thus takes the individual madman to be a categorical Other to the "sameness" of men in society: "le fou est reconnu, par sa société, comme étranger à sa propre patrie; . . . on le désigne comme l'Autre, l'Etranger, l'Exclu."¹¹ Or again, it is specifically concerned with "l'individu devenu Autre, étranger à la ressemblance fraternelle des hommes entre eux."¹²

The Self is the rational man in society, the Other is the madman living in, yet outside, of society. The second view of madness sees the madman as the limited individual, limited on the one hand by his own madness, and on the other by his banishment from society; he is therefore considered to be incapacitated (mentally ill), and as such, must be put under the care and protection, that is, the power of an Other: "le sujet est dépossédé de sa liberté par un double mouvement: celui, naturel, de sa folie, et celui, juridique, de l'interdiction, qui le fait tomber sous le pouvoir d'un Autre: autrui en général, qui est représenté en l'occurrence par le curateur."¹³

We have, here, in this second experience of madness, a "new" Self: the subject is "l'être tombé dans la puissance de

l'Autre, et enchaîné à sa liberté",¹⁴ who is powerless before an Other it did not create. The fusion of the Self and Other is already beginning to emerge. But let us return to the discourse of Reason and its characteristics.

The second element of the construction of Otherness in madness is the objectification of the figure of madness, the madman. Even before the positivism of the nineteenth century, madmen were already objects, though not as yet objects to be cared for and protected, but objects to be shown, as in an animal fair. While segregated and interned, they nevertheless had to be shown, had to be acknowledged as the spectacular beasts that they were: "Jusqu'au début du XIXe siècle, . . . les fous restent des monstres - c'est-à-dire des êtres ou des choses qui valent d'être montrés."¹⁵ The affinity between madness and bestial nature was not, however, a constant quality in the definition of the former: only the element of objectification remained throughout the many changes undergone by the figure of madness. In speaking of le Neveu de Rameau, Foucault writes:

Comme le bouffon du Moyen Age, il vit au milieu des formes de la raison, un peu en marge sans doute puisqu'il n'est point comme les autres, mais intégré pourtant puisqu'il est là comme une chose, à la disposition des gens raisonnables, propriété qu'on se montre et qu'on se transmet. On le possède comme un objet. 16

Le Neveu is treated as an object imbued with madness; and so, he actually becomes and is a madman: "Il est fou parce qu'on le

lui a dit et qu'on l'a traité comme tel."¹⁷ The Self creates Otherness in the person of the madman, and, by the same process appropriates him, as one does a thing which one has made. The nature of the appropriating process is further qualified by Foucault; indeed, unlike, for example, Rousseau's Physical Other, which actually existed in reality, but the essence of which was totally manufactured, or his Hypothetical Other, which had an existence only in discourse, the creature of madness exists in a most awkward relationship with its creator. Since the madman was isolated from the very midst of men of Reason, his presence is and must be maintained distinctively separate at all times; moreover, his tangible proximity renders Reason's dependence on him ever more acute, as his very being serves to define Reason's every move:

Car si [le fou] est pour la raison objet d'appropriation, c'est qu'il est pour elle objet de besoin. Besoin qui touche au contenu même et au sens de son existence; sans le fou, la raison serait privée de sa réalité, elle serait monotonie vide, ennui d'elle-même, désert animal qui lui rendrait présente sa propre contradiction La raison ne peut pas dresser constat de folie, sans se compromettre elle-même dans les relations de l'avoir. La déraison n'est pas hors de la raison, mais justement en elle, investie, possédée par elle, et chosifiée; c'est, pour la raison, ce qu'il y a de plus intérieur et aussi de plus transparent, de plus offert." 18

The self-conscious discourse has, once again, revealed a shift within the structure of the construction of Otherness; while the relationship between a subject and an object is still being

affirmed, the Subject's dependence on the Object gradually becomes more overt, thereby undermining the foundation of a rigid and powerful identification. The fusion of Selfness and Otherness slowly emerges, as the mutual dependence of their natures becomes more explicit.

The segregation and objectification of madness give rise to one final characteristic in Reason's discourse. This is the realm of silence, which surrounds the existence of the madman. As Descombes puts it, "Le psychiatre parle du fou, mais le fou, lui, ne parle pas."¹⁹ The silence of madness, however, is not an empty silence; beneath the delirious ramblings of a madman, which do not constitute a discourse, lies a deeper truth, which is the secret truth of both Reason and madness, expressed in a discourse which is "à la fois langage silencieux que l'esprit se tient à lui-même dans la vérité qui lui est propre, et articulation visible dans les mouvements du corps."²⁰ The madman is a mute object submitted to the gaze of Reason, but Reason itself is no longer the only one to impart truth; in fact, Reason begins to seek out the deeply hidden discourse of truth of madness, thereby acknowledging the potential "liberation" of the madman from his delirium. It is this pregnant silence of madness which unites all of the other elements and qualities of Reason's discourse into a cohesive whole, the manifestation of which is evident in the positivism of psychiatric medicine in the nineteenth century.

The madman of the early nineteenth century is still an object to be shown and displayed, as were the "monsters", his counterparts in the preceding centuries; although he is object, his purpose is no longer to frighten or awe, but to give Man an objective grasp on his own being: this is to say that, by inquiring into the distorted being of the madman, in order to reach that hidden truth of both Reason and un-Reason, rational man can acquire knowledge about himself in a most "objective" manner. The "langage silencieux" of the madman must be carefully scrutinized, for his must be a totally transparent existence, a limpid pool the surface of which faithfully mirrors the face of Reason.²¹ We have here the figure of Merleau-Ponty, patiently asking the pathological Schenck the truth of human perception, demanding that the aberrations of humanity step forth and reveal to him his truth.

Reason's postulation of a deep truth within the delirious expressions of madness has serious implications for the nature of Otherness; the Other is now expected to break out of his silence and to be made self-conscious of his madness. Foucault illustrates this change in the reform policies of Tuke in England and Pinel in France; the Retreat, Tuke's answer to rehabilitation, is an environment which forces the inmates to exercise "self-restraint", in so far as they are made conscious of their limitations — or freedom: "Tuke a créé un asile où il a substitué à la terreur libre de la folie, l'angoisse close de la responsabilité."²² Responsibility

implying a certain degree of self-consciousness is achieved at the Retreat by means of the policies of Work and Surveillance. Although in these activities, madness still remains the silent object of Reason's scrutiny, it has nevertheless a new status in which it is made to recognize itself for what it is; this status anticipates the eventual outpouring of the patient of psychoanalysis, the practice of which "a doublé le regard absolu du surveillant de la parole indéfiniment monologuée du surveillé - conservant ainsi la vieille structure asilaire du regard non-réciproque, mais en l'équilibrant, dans une réciprocité non-symétrique, par la structure nouvelle du langage sans réponse."²³ Non-symmetrical reciprocity is the very fusion (and not "con-fusion" or synthesis) of the Subject or Self with the Object or Other, in which the Other has achieved its own logic and autonomy, so as to become a "Self" in its own right.

In the work of Pinel in France, the same attempt to make the madman a self-conscious Subject is evident, although by much different methods. The three major methods are, 1) a self-conscious recognition of the silence of madness, 2) madness's introspection and self-scrutiny, and 3) madness's self-judgment. In the process of emphasizing the silence which surrounds the madman, Pinel forces madness to come to grips with the "error" of its being, to endeavour self-consciously to reject the unorganized speech of delirium for the disciplined speech of Reason: "Et c'est à partir de là seulement

qu'un langage commun redeviendra possible, dans la mesure où il sera celui de la culpabilité reconnue."²⁴ The madman is made to account for himself in speech, because of the very silence which has characterised Otherness: "L'absence de langage, comme structure fondamentale de la vie asilaire, a pour corrélatif la mise au jour de l'aveu."²⁵ The discourse of the patient in psychoanalysis is this same confession, encouraged by the analyst, though requiring no response. The second method of transforming the madman into a self-conscious Subject is to offer him to the gaze of madness itself; this is to say that Pinel brings madness face to face with itself, and in the process, allows it to reveal to itself its own warped ways: "Elle se verra elle-même, elle sera vue par elle-même - à la fois pur objet de spectacle et sujet absolu."²⁶ The original Self (the man of Reason) has distanced himself from the entire experience of the Other (madness) to the extent that he is no longer involved in the opposition of Subject and Object; the Other must now, in its newly-found autonomy, act as both Subject and Object, Self and Other: "C'est donc dans le spectacle d'elle-même, comme déraison humiliée, que la folie pourra trouver son salut, lorsque, captivée dans la subjectivité absolue de son délire, elle en surprendra l'image dérisoire et objective dans le fou identique."²⁷ This role of subject-object is further enforced by Pinel's third method, which consists of the perpetual self-judgment of madness; its new nature of subject-object

allows it to act as both accuser and accused, for it must be made conscious of the entire process of requital for the crimes committed against Reason: "de la faute à la punition, le lien doit être évident, comme une culpabilité reconnue par par tous."^{27*}

At the end of the story as told by Foucault, the figure of the madman is no longer a categorical, bestial, Other in the Western construction of Otherness; Foucault's minute investigation into discourse has bared all the hidden potentials of both participants in the once clearly defined opposition of Self and Other. On the one hand, the Object or Other has been made to be self-conscious of itself, or again, to be a Subject experiencing its objectification; moreover, it is now a speaking entity, endowed with a discourse which is based on an inner truth and logic. It is a Subject-Object, a Self-Other. The opposition, which is essential to discourse (dialogue), now resides within the new creature. On the other hand, the Self, that is, the man of Reason who is speaking about the madman, no longer participates actively in the construction of Otherness, in so far as it merely "listens" or "looks": it is, in a sense, "beyond" the opposition of Self and Other, in that it is concerned and interested in the project of the Self-Other (madness, in this case), but is not personally motivated. It is willing to act as Other to the Subject-Other's subjective assessment of itself; in fact, this original Self has become a mute Other (the analyst who listens), but an Other who has

a certain wisdom, or at least a definite expertise - as did Pinel and Tuke - which accounts for the "indifference" and disinterest. Here we find the concrete manifestation of the impartiality of Rousseau's Legislator, the all-knowing law-maker who does not enjoy the fruits of his labour, nor does he participate in the reciprocal search for truth. Here we see the eagerness and objectivity of Merleau-Ponty's psychologist. Finally, it is here that we must return to Foucault and the discourse which has revealed all this, the discourse which has claimed to uncover the fusion of the Self/Other dichotomy.

*

Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique is an archaeological and genealogical work. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow define archaeology à la Foucault as "an ahistorical discipline with an ahistorical technical language which is able to survey and order history precisely because it is not in history."²⁸ The archaeologist must therefore dig down through the many layers of history, to unearth artifacts, to reconstruct them into a coherent whole by their own logic, but he cannot participate in their living significance, in terms of historical meaning (existence or context) or eternal worth (essence). He is not to link together the various manifestations of a phenomenon on the surface of their theoretical justifications, but, rather, he must restrict himself

to one experience and retrace its evolution from its roots to its visible form above earth. The classical experience of madness is thus an elaborate edifice which has been gradually erected, the work on which must be carefully reassembled and displayed:

Ce travail, et les forces qui l'animent, nous essaieront de ne pas le décrire comme l'évolution de concepts théoriques, à la surface d'une connaissance mais en tranchant dans l'épaisseur historique d'une expérience, nous tenterons de ressaisir le mouvement par lequel est devenu finalement possible une connaissance de la folie. 29

In order to achieve the status of an archaeologist, one must be unaffected by the flow of Time, by history; to be an archaeologist, "c'est se placer légèrement en retrait par rapport à la chronique de l'évolution."³⁰ But how is that possible? That is, if we do not subscribe to Kojève's synthetic end of History.

Foucault's archaeology is ahistorical, because he intends to bracket "both the truth and the meaning of serious statements . . . to avoid the illusions of the serious speakers."³¹ The key to ahistorical speech is disinterest on the part of the speaker (Foucault); this does not mean that there is not involvement; as a matter of fact, there must be some degree of "agitation" or "concern", but the outcome of such concerned involvement is quite irrelevant to the position of the speaker. In a sense, the archaeologist is "disinterested", as he has no personal interest in his object of research, but

is not "non-interested", as he has specifically chosen that field to research. This, however, is the very reason for Dreyfus and Rabinow's criticism of archaeology, in what they see as the "methodological failure of archaeology":

Archaeology as the disinterested study of mute monuments can never enter the debates which rage around the monuments it studies. In fact, from the archaeological perspective the monuments were mute all along. 32

[Moreover] . . . like the human scientist the archaeologist seems paradoxically, albeit profoundly, to be trying to both affirm and deny his finitude. How can the archaeologist appear in history as the pure ahistorical thinker who disinterestedly catalogues the death of man and God? 33

Finally, Dreyfus and Rabinow inflict the ultimate historical strait-jacket on Foucault's archaeology by demanding that it be "accounted for and relativized."³⁴ However, to do such a thing is to ignore the coincidence of Foucault's discursive mode with the actual nature of the new breed of Subject-Object that is contemporary Man.

Archaeology as "the disinterested study" and Foucault as "the disinterested thinker" epitomize the new being of the Self having become Other, an impartial Other with the expertise to enunciate serious statements. Foucault does not claim to judge Man, or his discourse, but is merely "listening" to Man speak to himself about himself, through the monuments he has created - his constructions of Otherness. We, discursive men, are the object of his archaeology; we are the

Object that is made to speak of itself, in a subjective discourse of truths and errors, of guilt and retribution. We are the Self-Other, Subject-Object, reclined on the couch of the psychoanalyst, breathing and coughing under the stethoscope of the understanding doctor, and forever willing to plead our case to whomever would be willing to lend an ear. Seen in this light, Foucault's archaeologist need not account for his discipline, nor does he have to "relativize" it, for he does not participate in the search for the Self-Other's elusive truth, except perhaps as a concerned by-stander, or a deliberate witness.

"The debates which rage around the monuments [archaeology] studies" are the continuous whines of the Self-Other, which, once liberated from the silence of Otherness, cannot stop talking about itself or its monuments. The archaeologist is "the pure ahistorical thinker", precisely because the outcome of these debates no longer affects him, in the extent that he does not favour one outcome over another; he does not judge on the successes or failures of those he chooses to study, as a good criminal lawyer can argue the case for or against a murderer, without having to judge the good or evil within the particular man.

Having said all this, we must still ask ourselves (since we, as Subject-Object, continuously do so) how we got to be the way we are. Foucault can also provide the clues to this puzzle, for he is as well a genealogist. According to him, "Three domains of genealogy are possible", and "all three

were present, albeit in a somewhat confused fashion" in Histoire de la folie; ³⁵

First, a historical ontology of ourselves in relation to truth through which we constitute ourselves as subjects of knowledge; second, a historical ontology of ourselves in relation to a field of power through which we constitute ourselves as subjects acting on others; third, a historical ontology in relation to ethics through which we constitute ourselves as moral agents. ³⁶

These three domains correspond loosely to the three areas we have investigated in Histoire de la folie: first, the initial opposition between the Self as a knowing Subject and the Other as Object of knowledge; secondly, the appropriation of the Other by the Self in the objectification of the former; and thirdly, the ensuing evolution of both the roles of the Subject and of the Object in the close proximity of a mutually dependent relationship.

_____ In order to better illustrate Foucault's genealogy, let us follow him as he traces the source of the changes in the ethical system, which is composed of four distinct aspects: "substance éthique", "mode d'assujettissement", "pratique de soi", and "téléologie". It is this last aspect which proves to be most revealing for the understanding of our present predicament. What Foucault terms "téléologie" is the aspect of ethics which concerns itself with such questions as, "What is the kind of being to which we aspire when we behave in a moral way? For instance, do we want to become pure, or immoral, or free, or masters of ourselves, and so on."³⁷ Foucault distinguishes

the classical, read ancient Greek, telos from the modern-day one in terms of the nature of self-mastery:

In the classical perspective, to be master of oneself meant, first, taking into account only oneself and not the other, because to be master of oneself meant that you were able to rule others. So the mastery of oneself was directly related to a nonsymmetrical relation to others. You should be a master of yourself in a sense of activity, nonsymmetry, and nonreciprocity.

Later on, . . . mastery of oneself is something which is not primarily related to power over others: not only do you have to be master of yourself in order to rule others, . . . but you have to be master of yourself because you are a rational being. And in this mastery of yourself you are related to other people, who are also masters of themselves. And this new kind of relation to the other is much more reciprocal than before. 38

This latter form of self-mastery is explicitly described in Histoire de la folie: the relationship between the figure of madness and the enlightened man of the eighteenth century evolved from a non-symmetrical, non-reciprocal mode, in which Reason segregated and interned silent madness as un-Reason, to a non-symmetrical, but reciprocal mode, in which Reason recognized the hidden truth of madness (the potential for self-mastery), and therefore expected madness to account for itself, that is, to manifest mastery over itself. In a sense, in the new ethics, everyone is to be both subject, as master of oneself and a rational being, and object, in the reciprocal relation with others. This is what Foucault calls the "technology of the constitution of the self",³⁹ in which this

Subject-Object that is the modern individual strives for self-mastery in a process of selective elimination, at the end of which the best technique for the revelation of its truth is obtained. These are the techniques of truth: est (Erhart Seminar Training), encounter groups, psychoanalysis, biorhythm, Primal Scream, et al. That the individual is subject to these techniques, and objectified by the various methods, suggests that there is someone for whom and to whom he expresses his most inner truths. Since "the key to the technology of the self is the belief that one can, with the help of experts, tell the truth about oneself",⁴⁰ the role of the experts, the archaeologist and psychiatrist, has become indispensable. We have come once again to the detached, disinterested, but attentive, "master of truth."

We no longer have Discourse, not so much because, as Kojève had claimed, the Subject and the Object are dialectically synthesized in the identical and eternal discourse of Science, but because the Subject and the Object have fused into a monotonous monologue, forever querying, wondering about a truth for which the "experts" no longer care. Foucault, the expert, has chosen to be the archaeologist, merely reconstructing the lost city of Man and not having to defend it, and the genealogist, tracing the family tree, but free from the family squabble about the inheritance.

Notes 1

1. from an interview with Paul Rabinow and Hubert L. Dreyfus, "How We Behave", in Vanity Fair, November 1983, p. 69.

2. Michel Foucault, Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique, (Editions Gallimard, Paris, 1982), p. 94.

The gesture . . . did not isolate unrecognized strangers, and those who have been for too long evaded by habit; it created them, altering faces familiar to the social landscape so as to make bizarre figures that no one could recognize any longer. It evoked the Stranger even where one had not expected him; it tore the web, loosened familiarities; through it, something of man has been put out of his reach and indefinitely drawn back from our horizon. In a word, one can say that this gesture was the creator of alienation. (All translations are mine, unless otherwise noted.)

3. Ibid., p. 479.

These two sets do not oppose each other; they more than complete each other; they are but one and the same thing - the coherent unity of a gesture by which madness is offered to knowledge in a structure which is, from the start, alienating.

4. Vincent Descombes, Le Même et l'Autre, (Les Editions de Minuit, Paris, 1979), p. 132.

5. Foucault, Histoire de la folie, p. 195.

the nature of madness is to be secret reason - at least to only exist because of and for it, to only have in the world a presence that is previously arranged by reason, and already alienated in its form.

6. Ibid., p. 198.

7. Ibid.

The immediately concrete, obvious, and precise character of the madman; the confused, distant, and almost imperceptible profile of madness.

8. Ibid., p. 203.

The XVIIIth century perceives the madman, but deduces madness. And what it perceives in the figure of the madman is not madness, but the inextricable presence of reason and unreason. And that from which it reconstructs madness is not the multiple experience of madmen, but the natural and logical domain of illness, a field of rationality.

9. Ibid., p. 199.

The madman is the other in relation to others: the other - in the sense of the exception - amongst others - in the sense of the universal. . . . the madman is obvious, but his profile stands out against the external space; and the relation which defines him offers all of him to the gaze of the reasonable subject, by the play of objective comparisons. . . . he is now pushed back to the other end of the world, put aside and maintained in a neutral state by a double security, since he represents the difference of the Other in the exteriority of others.

10. Ibid., p. 147.

[The medicine of the psyche], in its positivist form, is in fact only the superimposition of the two experiences which classicism has juxtaposed without ever joined definitely: a social experience of madness, normative and dichotomic, which revolves entirely around the imperative of internment, . . . and a juridical experience, qualitative, finely differentiated, sensitive to questions of limits and degrees, which searches, in all the fields of activity of the subject, the polymorphous faces that alienation may have.

11. Ibid., p. 148.

the madman is recognized by his society to be stranger in his own homeland; . . . he is called the Other, the Stranger, the Outcast.

12. Ibid., p. 149.

the individual become Other, stranger to the fraternal similarity of men to men.

Notes 3

13. Ibid., p. 148.

the subject is dispossessed of his freedom by a double movement: the natural one of his madness and the juridical one of his banishment, which makes him fall under the power of an Other: other in general, represented in this case by the guardian.

14. Ibid., p. 149.

the being fallen under the might of an Other and chained to his freedom.

15. Ibid., p. 162.

Until the early nineteenth century, . . . madmen remained monsters - that is, people or things worth showing.

16. Ibid., p. 365.

As the fool of the Middle Ages, he lives in the midst of the forms of reason, no doubt slightly on the margin since he is not like the others, but nevertheless integrated since he is there as a thing, at the disposition of reasonable people, a property to be shown and transmitted. He is owned like an object.

17. Ibid., p. 363.

He is mad because he was told so and because he is treated as such.

18. Ibid., p. 365.

For if [the madman] is the object of appropriation by reason, it is also an object of need for it. Need which touches on the very content and meaning of its existence; without the madman, reason would be deprived of its reality, it would be empty monotony, bored of itself, desert animal which would make present its own contradiction Reason cannot report on madness without compromising itself in its relationships of ownership. Unreason is not outside of reason, but in fact in it, invested, possessed by it, and made into a thing; it is, for reason, what is most internal, and also most transparent, most displayed.

Notes 4

19. Descombes, p. 132.
The psychiatrist speaks of the madman,
but the madman, himself, does not speak.
20. Foucault, Histoire de la folie, pp. 255-6.
at the same time the silent language which
spirit holds to itself in its own truth,
and the visible articulation of the move-
ments of the body.
21. Ibid., p. 481.
22. Ibid., p. 504; see also p. 507.
Tuke has created an asylum in which he has
replaced the free terror of madness with
the enclosed anguish of responsibility.
23. Ibid., p. 508.
. . . has doubled the absolute gaze of the
warder with the infinitely monologued speech
of the ward - thereby preserving the asylum's
old structure of the non-reciprocal gaze, but
balancing it, in a non-symmetrical recipro-
city, with the new structure of language
without response.
24. Ibid., p. 517.
And it is only from there that a common
language would become possible again, to the
extent that it will be that of a recognized
guilt.
25. Ibid.
The absence of language, as the fundamental
structure of life in the asylum, correlates
with the confession brought to light.
26. Ibid.
It will see itself, it will be seen by itself
- both as show object and absolute subject.
27. Ibid., p. 5
It is therefore in the spectacle of itself,
as humiliated unreason, that madness will be able to
find salvation, when, captured in the absolute
subjectivity of its delirium, the pathetic and
objective image of which it will catch in the
identical madman.

Notes 5

- 27*. Ibid., p. 521.
from the fault to the punishment, the link must be obvious, as a guilt recognized by all.
28. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1983), p. 97.
29. Foucault, Histoire de la folie, p. 225; see also p. 139.
This work, and the forces which animate it, we will not try to describe it as the evolution of theoretical concepts, on the surface of a knowledge, but by cutting down through the historical thickness of an experience, we will attempt to grasp once again the movement by which finally became possible a knowledge of madness.
30. Ibid., p. 364.
it is to put oneself slightly back away from the chronicle of evolution.
31. Dreyfus and Rabinow, Michel Foucault, p. 95.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid., p. 96.
34. Ibid., p. 99.
35. Foucault, "How We Behave", p. 65.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid., p. 66.
38. Ibid., p. 67.
39. See note 1.
40. Dreyfus and Rabinow, Michel Foucault, p. 175.

Part III : Appendix

It might appear to be slightly out of place here to speak of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's Lettre à d'Alembert, in an appendix to Foucault's archaeology, but Rousseau's polemic on the theatre may provide us with a good illustration of the eighteenth century's concern for the reflection of Reason on the illusive surface of un-Reason. For Rousseau, the theatre is first and foremost a form of ~~amusement~~ or entertainment, which is to be shown, and thus to be seen; hence, its usual designation of a "spectacle".¹ He also understands it to be a self-conscious attempt by reasonable men and women to represent certain facets of the human condition, that is, it purports to be a reflection of society, but one which is artificially created. For example, it is in this second sense that he deplores the plays of Molière, to which he asks, "Est-ce là l'image fidèle de la société?", with obvious despair.²

We may at this point approximate the relationship between the reasonable man and the "monster" behind the bars of the asylum, with that between the reasonable man and the comedian on stage; in both instances, it is a matter of looking at a somewhat distorted mirror of oneself, a mirror which has been immobilized and segregated, in order to enhance the differences between the viewer and the viewed. Moreover, as the madman acquired his own inner truth and logic from the depth of the un-Reason which is his milieu, so does the theatre, in spite of its exaggerations and illusions, acquire

from its own staged reality, a realm of obscurity between Reason and un-Reason, a certain truth and logic. The crucial difference, however, and the basis for Rousseau's vehement objection, is that the theatre, as opposed to the asylum, is composed of reasonable men, that is, in Foucault's words, people who have already achieved a significant degree of self-mastery; while these people of the theatre may share with the inmates of the asylum the fault of having distorted the real presence and existence of Reason, by their false representation and excessive behaviour, they are not exonerated from their guilt by the inherent bestial nature of madness. For Rousseau, their behaviour is all the more unacceptable because of their reasonable nature.

The theatre is a threatening milieu for Rousseau, because therein all is a mediated reality, non-natural: time, space, men, and things, are all captured and displayed again according to the logic of the theatre. For one who has postulated the ideal mirror for Man to be Nature, the mirror of an arbitrary, artificial, and exaggerated world is appalling. Foucault writes,

Dans la seconde moitié du XVIII^e siècle,
 . . . on situe [la folie] . . . dans ces
 distances que l'homme prend à l'égard
 de lui-même, de son monde, de tout ce qui
 s'offre à lui dans l'immédiateté de la
 nature; la folie devient possible dans ce
milieu où s'altèrent les rapports de
 l'homme avec le sensible, avec le temps,
 avec autrui; elle est possible par tout
 ce qui, dans la vie et le devenir de
 l'homme, est rupture avec l'immédiat. 3

The affinity between the nature of madness and that of "make-believe" was too great to be ignored by Rousseau; indeed, acting removed one from the immediacy of one's being and allowed for an indefinite number of possibilities to surface. That such an experience could be consciously sought out by reasonable men was incomprehensible to Rousseau; and we may forgive him for this, for his discourse is yet to become conscious of its own needs (Foucault the archaeologist has yet to make his entrance on stage), and thereby recognize Reason's need for madness, the reasonable man's need for the theatre, even the theatre of the absurd.

Notes

1. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Lettre à d'Alembert, (Garnier-Flammarion, Paris, 1967), p. 65.
2. Ibid., p. 127.
3. Michel Foucault, Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique, (Editions Gallimard, Paris, 1982), p. 391.

In the second half on the XVIIIth century,
... [madness] was situated ... in
those distances in which man stood apart
from himself, from his world, from all that
is offered to him in the immediacy of nature;
madness becomes possible in that milieu
where the realtions of man with the sensible,
with time, with another, are altered; madness
is possible in all that is, in the life and
in the becoming of man, rupture with the
immediacy.

Conclusion

We have begun with Rousseau apologizing for his fit of madness, and ended with Foucault's description of the many reasons for such an apology; we have asked Kojève for a resolution of the Self-Other dichotomy and have received the end of discourse and the end of man; as for Merleau-Ponty, we hadn't dare to ask too much from him, for we would only be sent away to see a psychologist. All these discourses appear to be as varied and unique as one could expect from a selection which cuts across three centuries; however, the choice of these particular thinkers was not random, for they all represent specific points in the evolution of discourse. That they were all French writers further brought them closer to being along the same continuum, and, at the very least, guaranteed a similar cultural background. Rousseau's discourse provided us with the first-hand experience of the content of Foucault's discourse, while Kojève's signified the impasse of a discourse which has left the relative security of its unconsciousness for the troubled waters of self-consciousness. Merleau-Ponty's discourse is the attempt to "save" Kojève, which failed because it revealed itself to be hopelessly outdated; Foucault, however, proves to be somewhat more successful in starting a discourse of his own, if only because it coincides with our present structure of being.

The aspect which has been emphasized in the study of these discourses is that of the construction of Otherness, or the differentiating nature of Western man's discourse.

Working from the premise that Western man's Self is taken essentially to be a discursive Self, which must speak about itself in order to arrive at an understanding of itself and its world, the construction of Otherness entails a process of differentiation between what is Self and what is non-Self. The non-Self is referred to as the Other; since it is only the Self that speaks, the Other need not actually exist: it is created, formulated, articulated by the Self. It can be created in speech, as was Rousseau's Other, or it can be imposed on a being, as Kojève's Slave and Foucault's eighteenth century madman. The purpose and *raison d'être* of an Other are to provide the Self with something it can speak about and to, with a structure of opposition and confrontation which enhances each participant's unique qualities.

The very nature of a construction of Otherness entails as well a relationship between the Self and the Other characterized by the status of one as Subject, and the other as Object. The existence of the created Other is objectified, or "chosifiée", in the speech of the Self, the speaking, or "gazing" Subject. The Object is thus appropriated by the Subject, as a thing rightly owned by its creator. Rousseau can therefore have a patronizing admiration for the savages of America, whose glory and virtue would not have been appreciated but for their articulation and revelation within Rousseau's essays. Kojève's Slave is not considered human by his Master, for the latter has won the right to own him as a result of

his victory in the fight for recognition. However, with Kojève, we have the beginning of a shift in the subject-object dyad: the Master, formerly a mere Self in search of recognition, was willing to die in the process of making an Other recognize his own humanity - or Self, or again, he is the Self who seeks meaning through an Other; in winning the fight, his Self/Subject is recognized, but by a Slave, an Other/Object; this is to say that, in Kojève, the Self realizes that its own essential definition rests and depends on an Other that is a mere Object, a mere thing. It is tied to a relationship in which its autonomy and Subjectivity have been degraded by its dependence on a non-human Other. The Slave, however, has become indispensable, and as such, acquires a great autonomy, and subjectifies himself by the means of Work and Revolution.

By the time we arrive at Foucault's discourse, the clear demarcation between Subject and Object has been completely muddled; the madman, initially segregated by Reason, and an object of spectacle, is now asked by Reason to account for itself, in a subjective discourse, to which Reason will be an attentive, but passive listener. The search for meaning is no longer undertaken by the Self, but by a Self-Other, Subject-Object, that engages in a continuous monologue about truth and error, right and wrong, to which another mutant form of Self-Other, Subject-Object, the expert, listens with the utmost disinterest. We have fusion of the Self and the Other, but no synthesis; we have a monologue, but no eternal and identical discourse.

We may now ask, what is it that has turned discourse into monologue? There are two possible answers to this, and both would necessarily demand a more in-depth study than what can be expressed here. First, discourse has become absolutely conscious of itself, and this new state of being was brought about by the second condition, which is that discourse has been homogenized over the entire surface of the earth. We must therefore proceed with the second condition first.

The extinction of other "discourses", such as the Eastern mode, and to a lesser degree the Islamic mode, in the Western discourse's movement of expansion (since, by its very nature, must constantly seek out otherness), has assured the domination of the particular discursive mode, which was once geographically contained. The saturation of the world by this discourse meant that, everywhere that Western man turned his gaze, he encountered his own "Self" speaking his own specific truth. This is evident in such absurdities as India's claim to be the largest "democracy" and China's claim to communism, not to mention again Ho Chi Minh's cry of "Liberté, Fraternité, et Égalité". Indeed, for the first time, Western man hears himself speak, loud and clear, in a discourse which he himself has created; this situation is tantamount to the hypothetical one in which Rousseau voyages to the Americas, only to find the "happy savages" contentedly established in salons and attending the theatre on a regular basis.

It follows that Western man (or any Man, at this stage of homogeneity) cannot help but become self-conscious of his discourse: his discourse is now become self-conscious of itself. Man must take into account the structures he has erected and the differentiations he has created, and, in this sense, is the object of his own reflection, of his subjective monologue. There is no Other to be object of his discourse, since all have become speaking subjects, engaging in their own monologue about themselves. As Professor Darby would say, "all experience is equal; it is raw material to be shaped and controlled by our willing wills." All selves are equal, though some are more equal than others, only to the extent that their techniques of the Self are more successful, that is, their monologues on themselves are more "interesting" or more "efficient", thereby making them "unequal" in the equality of homogenized discourse.

Finally, what we are experiencing here is not so much an impasse, or the end of human discourse altogether, but, perhaps, the beginning of a new cycle, replacing the old one of the Self/Other, Subject/Object; if indeed, Man is God, then he must be indefinitely creative: we have before us modes of expression which are still a long way from reaching self-consciousness. What are Basic, Fortran, Cobol? We may never have to argue, debate, or defend again, if we are given access to the LOGON code, and are thereby allowed to program our own language. Why should we engage in dialogue, when we can interface ?

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