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Psychology and Ideal Societies:
The Utopias of Hall, McDougall,
Münsterberg, and Watson

by

C

Jill Gladys Morawski

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Psychology
Carleton University
Ottawa, December 1979

The undersigned recommend to the Faculty
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Abstract

During the period 1915 to 1930, American experimental psychologists were concerned with making what was thought to be the "new" scientific psychology. Textbooks on the history of psychology typically describe this period as one where psychologists were occupied with the development of systematic theories, rigorous methods, and experimental innovations. The omissions created by this conventional historical perspective include psychologists' involvement in the amelioration of social problems, in the efforts of World War I, in the delineation of their professional roles and responsibilities in society, in the popularization of psychology, and in the attempts to reconstruct American society.

The present study explores a perceived lacuna in such conventional histories by attending to the intentions expressed by some psychologists to utilize psychological knowledge for societal improvement. This historical oversight is addressed through a study of utopias written by four notable psychologists of the period: G. Stanley Hall, William McDougall, John B. Watson, and Hugo Münsterberg.

Utopias constitute excellent vehicles for the study of such intentions of psychologists because they describe what knowledge is required for the design of a better society, and indicate what social ideals were prescribed by the psychologists. An examination of these utopias enables some assessment of how the four psychologists envisioned the application of

psychological knowledge, what standards they set for an ideal or improved society, and whether or not such aspirations also are contained in their scientific writings. From this perspective it is possible to compare these ideas with writings of other psychologists of the period and to determine whether the utopian visions were anomalous creations of four psychologists or were shared by others.

A detailed analysis of the four psychologists' utopias and scientific writings indicates that their utopian ideals also appear in their scientific writings. Despite the four psychologists' diversity in psychological theory, they shared a number of ideals. Hall, McDougall, Münsterberg, and Watson advocated unity, community, and harmony in society. These social conditions were to be met by establishing a sense of social obligation among individuals, a social order that recognized the family and maternal role of women, and a means of social control that enabled maintenance of these conditions. The four psychologists shared a belief in the efficacy and precedence of psychological knowledge in the establishment of a better society. Thus, their societal designs called for the implementation of psychological techniques and delegated the control of social and individual events to psychological experts. Appended to these suggestions were serious criticisms of then current society. Additional analysis indicates that these four were not alone in their thinking: other psychologists and social thinkers voiced similar social criticisms and drew plans

for a better society where social control would be implemented on a scientific basis and managed by scientific experts.

With an ascription to certain social ideals and a confidence in the potential of their science, the four psychologists were similar not only to many of their contemporaries, but also to other scientists who have contemplated utopian societies. The integration of science and social ideals in utopian formulations illuminates a general question, that of the possible functions of utopian thinking among scientists. Beyond a critique of current society, the utopian format enables a writer to demonstrate the utility of his theories and discipline. Utopian speculation also permits a writer to explore the fundamental relation between science and society. This study has shown how the utopian genre was especially appropriate to members of a promising science and of a society looking toward social reconstruction.

As an historical investigation of psychology, this study makes some advances toward the assessment of moral intentions -- and their foundation in human values -- as they appear in psychological theories. It illustrates how conventional histories of psychology are, in a way, utopic. As such, conventional histories have omitted treatment of important aspects of the discipline's past, among them the intentions shared by many psychologists to contribute to reconstructing American society and the influence of these intentions on psychological theories. This study has attempted to examine some of these

omissions by assessing and comparing four previously neglected works, and by placing them within the social and scientific context in which they were written.

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INTRODUCTION

Among the works of G. Stanley Hall, William McDougall, Hugo Münsterberg, and John B. Watson are found anomalies -- writings that seem to be alien to the output of scientific psychologists. These writings are fictions that speak of new worlds where man is happier, healthier, more unified, socially, and more effective than he was in early twentieth-century America. Writings of this sort are called "utopias", after Sir Thomas More's Utopia (1516), an account of an island in an uncharted territory where there are no wars, personal wealth, or religious bigotry and where learning is valued while gold is held in contempt.

The utopian writings of Hall, McDougall, Münsterberg, and Watson were published between 1915 and 1930, a period when experimental psychologists were occupied with designing what was thought to be the "new" scientific psychology. Why then, would four psychologists put aside scientific endeavors and dream of a better world? Indeed, a small number of psychologists in the early twentieth-century did indulge in fictional writings. But the question of why these four men chose the utopian genre is difficult to answer. There is no evidence in their publications or personal papers that they were requested to take on such a task or that they were influenced specifically by the writings of other "utopists", say, More or Francis Bacon.

It is highly unlikely that they wrote for profit because a psychologist of that period did not need to write fiction, much less utopian fiction, to supplement his income.

The only reasonable answer seems to rest with the general functions which the utopian genre serves, the opportunity to cast aside current social conditions and, without impediment, to design better ones. As we shall see, this quality of utopian thinking was exploited by a surprising number of creative writers when industrial, forward-looking Americans were contemplating reforms for the twentieth century. While the utopian spirit rose and fell among most creative writers, it was not abandoned entirely but was continued in non-fictional plans for reconstructing society. The spirit was evident in a major reform movement and in the plans and works of many professionals.

This study is an examination of the conditions under which Hall, McDougall, Münsterberg, and Watson each wrote a utopian fiction. The first chapter describes the professional and social atmosphere in which the works were produced. The second and third chapters present an historical perspective on utopias; they contain reviews of the uses of psychological notions in utopias and the functions which utopian speculation have served for scientists. In the next four chapters the utopian and professional writings of Hall, McDougall, Münsterberg, and

least one historian has attributed the conflict between individualist and communitarian orientations to a paradox in American thought which was common among turn of the century thinkers who "tried desperately to reconcile within themselves an ethic of communal responsibility with one of unrestrained individualism."⁴⁵ Another historian has suggested that this search for "collective individualism" may account for the apparent confusion and diversity in utopian conceptions of the individual. The commitment to a definite and controlled social structure seemed to reconcile the conflict and could encompass the questions of individual change.⁴⁶

During the nineteenth century, the age of "open-ended" utopias, France, England, and the United States produced works that couple descriptions of the ideal individual with increased interest in social change. Ideas of social and individual progress were mirrored in many utopias where the perfect man was evolving just as the perfect society might. Utopian writers of the late nineteenth century were less likely to stress the rational faculties of man and more likely to envision him as a sensing, learning animal.

The final age of Manuel's psychological history of utopias is one of "eupsychias" or the twentieth-century utopist's preoccupation with the psychological nature of man. Manuel did not specifically examine utopias of the

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Of greatest interest to this author is one particular factor which has been neglected in conventional histories: the intentions on the part of psychologists to apply psychological knowledge to improve human conditions. The predominance of histories of experimental psychology over those of applied psychology is one evidence of this neglect. Further evidence is seen in the dearth of research on the personal commitments and moral interests of psychologists.

The present study addresses this oversight through a study of utopian writings which employ psychological ideas. Utopias are excellent vehicles for the study of intentions to apply scientific knowledge because utopian speculations inevitably involve the "application" of knowledge to the design of a better or perfect world. Furthermore, in describing a better or perfect state, a utopist expresses notions about what conditions "should" prevail. In other words, a utopia is a statement of moral intention.

During the past three centuries utopian writing has increasingly relied on ideas from the sciences, including psychology. In fact, numerous scientists have written utopias which provide the historian with an opportunity to study the moral intentions behind proposed applications of that scientific knowledge. While several studies have exploited this opportunity in the cases of some other sciences, there has been no comprehensive study of the use of psychological knowledge in utopian writing or of the involvement

of psychologists in the design of utopias.

This study examines in detail four utopias written between 1900 and 1930 by American experimental psychologists: G. Stanley Hall, William McDougall, Hugo Münsterberg, and John B. Watson. It is expected that by examining their application of psychology to the design of a better society we may gain a more comprehensive view of these four psychologists and a clearer understanding of psychological science during that period than has been evident in conventional histories. Specifically, the questions raised in the present study are how four psychologists used the utopian genre to express certain aspirations for their science and for society and whether these aspirations were unique or were shared by other members of the social and professional milieu. The answer is sought in the moral intentions found in the utopian and other works of these psychologists as well as the writings of other psychologists and social theorists of the period. The question is also pursued at a different level, one associated with the general history of ideas, by exploring the possible functions of utopian writings. This exploration clarifies how other writers, especially other scientists, have used the utopian form to express ideas about science and society.

The present study entailed a three-staged investigation. First, the four utopias were reviewed and the other works of the four psychologists were assessed to determine whether

they contain intentions similar to or different from those expressed in the utopias. Second, the aims of the four psychologists were compared to ascertain resemblances and differences between them. These comparisons also served to uncover some possible functions of utopian speculation. Finally, these utopian ideas were examined in the context of then current social and psychological thought to determine whether or not they correspond with other intentions to use psychological knowledge.

The decision to pursue these questions was based on the perceived shortcomings of conventional histories as well as on the unique attributes of utopian writings. One implication of this choice was that the study would omit certain questions while expanding on some others. As a guide to the reader it must be made clear that several sets of interesting questions are not investigated here in detail. For example, it is not an objective of the present study to explore the psychological motivations of the four psychologists. Biographical and psychohistorical investigations can answer important questions about the origins of morals, theories, attitudes, and self-presentations. Indeed, all four psychologists have been subjects of such investigations. Nor does this study assess the influence which these individuals had on psychology or society. Their intellectual contributions are already cited in historical textbooks. Their influences on American society

comprise an extremely important subject but can be examined only when there is sound historical knowledge of the aims, images, and place of psychologists in the American social structure.

In preparation for this study it was necessary to become acquainted with utopian literature in general and especially with its relation to science. The preparation required a review of psychological notions in utopias since that of Thomas More. This review showed that psychological ideas have been adopted by utopists for several purposes: to describe the nature of the ideal man, to describe the construction and operation of a better society, and to emphasize the important role of science in maintaining the new order. It also was important to become familiar with utopias written by scientists, particularly psychologists, in order to uncover the various functions of utopian writing. This review revealed that scientists have used utopian thinking to criticize social conditions, to advocate social reform, to advertise a new theory or field, and to propose contributions of a science to society. These preparatory tasks yielded a general framework within which to assess the utopias of Hall, McDougall, Münsterberg, and Watson.

CHAPTER I

SOCIETY, REFORM AND AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGY, 1915-1930

It is evident that we, at this moment in history, do not want life to seem capable of being interpreted and understood, because that would be a reproach to us for our failure to undertake the task of reconstructing our social, political and economic theories, and in general, and in consonance with these, our ideals of a good life.¹

Written in 1926, these remarks reflect Floyd Dell's disappointment over the abandonment of the ideals that permeated American society before World War I. These ideals were disseminated most widely during the reform movement that began around the turn of the century. The movement was epitomized by such slogans as "community", "progress", "order", "organization", and "efficiency". It was to the "constructive" ideas and achievements of this reform movement that Americans looked back as they confronted the first decade after the war. And it was the ideals embodied in this movement which American intellectuals would either flatly discard or carefully modify.

Progressivism and Public Action

The American "progressive era", spanned the years from 1900 to 1917. The movement began under Theodore Roosevelt during a prosperous period when it became increasingly evident to many Americans that the industrial

development since the Civil War had not always been equitable and moral, or without adverse costs. Legal reforms were aimed at control of big business and trusts, conservation of natural resources, taxation revisions, and regulation of labor conditions. Reforms were not restricted to political and economic matters but heralded the welfare state in concerns for social and individual rights. Home, factory, school and community were foci for improvements in working conditions of women, consumer rights, laws for compulsory education, and standards of tenement dwellings, among others.²

Despite the tremendous surge in reform measures, the moves to alter American society were neither revolutionary nor anarchical but were attempts at orderly social change. What the reformers shared, and what one historian believes is the most "remarkable thing" about the movement, was allegiance to the labels of "constructive" and "progressive".³

Historians differ in their willingness to bracket and assess a social climate such as the progressive era.⁴ However, they usually agree about several distinguishing qualities of the period. First, it was marked by a belief in gradual social progress achieved by human effort. Whether explained in evolutionary, historicist, economic, or Calvinist terms, the idea of progress was one of social improvement and the elimination of misery and injustice.⁵

The second quality common to reform beliefs was a commitment to democratic ideals of equality, national unity, and citizen participation. Democracy still constituted the preferred forum for deciding what changes should occur, and the traditional notions of unity and community were valued similarly.⁶ Therefore, reform measures were not intended as attacks on existent American ideals, nor were they the products solely of legislators and social theorists. Historian Richard Hofstadter has aptly depicted the reform involvement of the "average" American. "First reality must in its fullness be exposed, and then it must be made the subject of moral exhortation; and then, when individual citizens in sufficient numbers had stiffened in their determination to effect reforms, something could be done."⁷ There was a revival in the idea of democracy as the will of the people which culminated in legislation on citizen rights to participate in law making. The underlying appeal of popular democracy is exemplified in the reformer William Allen White's comments on such legislation:

For this tightening grip of the people upon their state governments, as evidenced in some form in every American state, has been an intelligent, gradual, well-directed growth of popular power. Its direction has been wise;....Whose wisdom directed it? No man's name is connected with it. No party or propaganda has been behind the movement.... It is growth -- spiritual growth in the hearts of the American people. It is a big moral movement in democracy.⁸

Third, the reform ideals of progress and democratic order related to the recommended procedures for change. Progress represented not merely the idea of inevitable upward development but a planned and organized advancement toward the desired state. The efforts to eliminate political corruption, to legislate social reforms, and to strengthen public influence in government decision-making all called for more sophisticated organization and order. "Efficiency", "order" and "organization" were common terms in reform discussions.⁹

In consequence of this last quality of the progressive era, the need grew for experts and professionals to supervise the proposed changes.¹⁰ Lawyers, economists, sociologists, and political scientists had the necessary skills for legislation and administration of reforms.¹¹ Reconstructions at the municipal, regional, and state levels created the need for professional men and women to manage new bureaus and agencies. There was a concomitant belief that efficiency, organization, and control could benefit by techniques from the sciences.¹² Not surprisingly, the progressive era coincided with a period of expansion and specialization in many American professions, including the sciences.¹³

The rise of scientific management is one example of reform which integrated ideas about social harmony in democracy, progressive growth, efficiency and order, and the utilization of scientific techniques and experts.

Developed in the late nineteenth century by an American engineer, Frederick Taylor, scientific management was intended to increase production efficiency and improve industrial relations of workers. Taylor attempted to establish laws of management by using experimental methods in the industrial environment. He credited efficiency in this setting with the well-being of the individual worker as well as with the health of the economy. It is clear that the goals of scientific management would appeal to progressive reformers. For example, scientific management dovetailed with social reform because "it developed the notion of social control into a program of planning and placed the professional expert near the top."¹⁴

The United States entered World War I in April 1917, less than two years before its conclusion. From the onset, and certainly by the end of the war, the atmosphere of popular thought seemed to confirm D.H. Lawrence's comment that "all great words were cancelled out for that generation."¹⁵ American intellectuals and writers such as Walter Weyl, Henry James, Harold Stearns, Mabel Dodge, H.L. Mencken, and Ernest Hemingway ignored, abandoned, debunked, or ridiculed notions of reform, progress, or realizable ideals.¹⁶ The perceived decline in reform enthusiasm during the war years is typically interpreted as a marker for the end of the progressive era.¹⁷

: America in the Twenties

In the 1920s evidence of reform disillusionment may be found in intellectual thought, in politics, and in the pastimes of Americans. A commonly cited example of confusion and disillusionment is the alienation of artists who expressed serious doubts and cynicism about American society and who, in many cases, acted upon their grievances by leaving the country. But citing only this evidence obscures part of what Morton White has observed as the "double effect" which the war had on American thinkers.¹⁸ The tendency to overlook a renewed optimism, the other effect of the war, has resulted both from historical selectivity and from the very complexity of postwar writings. Many historians have focused on those writings and events -- alienated art, botched economics, the jazz age -- which showed little concern with reconstruction and, therefore, suggested that reformism was dead.¹⁹

The major difficulty in assessing postwar ideas arises from the fact that reform interests shifted in some important ways. First, numerous writers who expressed discontent with society and politics also constructed plans for a superior future. Such postwar reformulations were made by Franklin Giddings, Robert Park, Lincoln Steffens, and Thorstein Veblen.²⁰ Second, both the participants in reform activities and the proposed mechanisms for reform also underwent a shift. Many citizens retreated from

involvement in reform measures, and left campaigning to a decreasing number of politicians.²¹ The third and greatest shift in reform involvement came from the war itself when the promised specialists and techniques identified by prewar progressives were put to the test. The war was "an occasion when important progressive skills were put into service rather than pushed aside...."²² It produced the opportunity to utilize the skills of natural and social scientists to manufacture weapons, train soldiers, and maintain national morale. The war mandate contributed not only to growth of scientific research but to the conception, held alike by scientists and laymen, that specialists had a significant role in the future of American society.²³

The revised attitudes of many American intellectuals and the shifts in participants in reform measures suggest that reform ideals had undergone changes but had not disappeared. The war gave impetus to the notion that scientific techniques and expert leadership offered successful means for progressive and organized improvements.

The belief that the sciences would be successful guides to designing and implementing reforms is evident in the writings -- including the utopias -- of Hall, McDougall, Münsterberg, and Watson. The four psychologists were actively involved in experimental psychology during the progressive era and later published their utopias --

Münsterberg in 1916 and the others in the twenties. These psychologists advocated social change according to knowledge from their science. The four supported their demand for reform by citing specific social problems and by offering solutions derived from their expert knowledge. Agreement between their programs and those of other reform advocates can be assessed only after a closer review of American social trends as well as the statements of other reform-oriented thinkers.

Americans and "Normalcy"

The typical portrait of the twenties suggests that Americans "yearned for the release from the attacks of the reformers and the demands they made for altruism and self-sacrifice."²⁴ Evidence for this desired release is found not only in their detachment from reform actions but also in conservative politics and a pronounced interest in personal well-being.

In the 1920s, American politics moved toward what the newly elected President Harding called somewhat ungrammatically a return to "not heroism, but healing, not nostrums, but normalcy."²⁵ The return to "normalcy" allied government and big business and reduced government responsibility for the welfare of disadvantaged minorities and immigrants. Legislation bolstered tariff laws and immigration restrictions. Minorities no longer received the aid, or even the

tolerance, that they had in the prewar years. Instead, the decade was one of anti-immigrant campaigns, a "Red scare," and escalated activities of the Ku Klux Klan.²⁶

The decade was also an age of jazz, flappers, bathtub gin, and sexual revolution. Americans became more concerned with increasing their material prosperity, social mobility, and personal happiness. Even the so-called revolution in morals centered on personal liberation, in the forms of greater social independence for women and youth, increase in divorces, recognition of more permissive sexual mores, and exaltation of leisure. To F. Scott Fitzgerald, a notable participant, the decade was like a children's party that had been taken over by the adults.²⁷ The American "cult of the self" is apparent in popular literature on personal experiences (especially romance), physical culture, and psychology.²⁸

A pervasive interest in the self, in the personal component of life, is clearly illustrated in the popularity of psychological ideas. The subject became so fashionable in the twenties that one historian has called it "a national mania."²⁹ Publications on psycho-analysis, instincts, hormonal processes (gland psychology), personality, mental tests, and behaviorism were consumed with fervor by the lay public. Psychological notions were used to both embellish and to interpret literature, to explain the personalities of comrades, and even to analyse the "neuroticism"

of the social reformer.³⁰

Perhaps the most telling indicator of the public appeal of psychology is the satire produced by those typically cynical members of the society, the journalists. They requested behaviorist lullabies and sang "Yes, we have no mentalities."³¹ They devised intelligence tests for bank managers, marine engineers, and professors of comparative literature.³² They sneered "Give a psychologist a rat and a graph and you will get about the last word on the subject of the philosophy of education in the machine age."³³

In the twenties Americans were enraptured by the personal, and psychology was one forum for their interests. The cynical commentaries of numerous journalists indicate that some were not content with these pastimes. When Floyd Dell chastized American intellectuals in 1926 for abandoning serious ideals he exempted one group. "The scientific activities of mankind, unlike its imaginative activities, have not suffered from shell shock; and we do not find the students of the human mind rejoicing in the chaos of the 'unconscious' as an excuse for their failure to form a good working theory of it."³⁴ Dell proceeded to applaud the efforts of the scientific professionals who "undertake therapeutically the tasks of bringing harmony, order and happiness into inharmonious, disorderly and futile lives."³⁵ Contrary to Dell, these efforts were not

limited to "scientists." But the efforts he lauded were among those which contrasted with the popular portrait of the twenties.

Professionals and Reconstruction

Henry May reviewed the various historical perspectives of the twenties and found that the most optimistic interpretations were written in that decade itself.³⁶ At the time, complaints of social and political malaise were accompanied by descriptions of progress. Historians looked forward to programs for reconstruction which relied on expert leadership and new knowledge, often of the sciences.

The ideas of such historians are seen in the works of J.H. Robinson and Charles Beard. In 1921, Robinson contrasted the recent retreat of Americans into a "philosophy of safety and sanity" with the imminent changes toward betterment that are "already beginning to influence the aims and methods of all these sciences of man."³⁷ The sciences were those of human nature: biology, anthropology, and psychology. Robinson concluded that these sciences would produce an increase in intelligence and a

critical estimate of man's complicated nature, his fundamental impulses and resources, the needless and fatal repressions which these have suffered through the ignorance of the past, and the discovery of untried ways of enriching our existence and improving our relations with our fellow men.³⁸

Applying the methods of science to man "can form the only possible basis for a successful and real democracy."³⁹

Beard was equally optimistic about society but more concrete in specifying how the triumph was occurring. In a text that he published in 1927 with his wife, Mary, the past success of America was attributed to the application of scientific discoveries. In turn, future democracy depended on a quality of life made possible only by science.⁴⁰ Several years later, Beard edited a volume on the prospects of mankind. He denied any editorial intrusion into the tone of the contributions, yet in prefatory comments carefully ensured that the reader would notice the overall "more cheerful outlook upon the future of modern civilization."⁴¹

The hopeful spirit of these historians seems to have been shared by numerous social theorists writing in the twenties. For instance, Walter Lippmann and John Dewey both reacted to the war events with positive revisions to their theories of society. They revealed a certain loss of faith in the outcome of popular participation in social change, and placed greater responsibility for change on the shoulders of an intellectual elite. In Public Opinion, Lippmann withdrew his earlier reliance on public intelligence in favor of "intelligence" bureaus where knowledge would be applied to social affairs. The scientific expert would provide leadership by "interposing some form of expertness

between the private citizen and the vast environment in which he is entangled."⁴² In fact, the social scientist would establish his methods by "turning into opportunity the need among directing men of the Great Society for instruments of analysis by which an invisible and most stupendously difficult environment can be made intelligible."⁴³ Dewey likewise sought to enlist science and asserted that scientific ideas were the cause of social change. Applied to ethics and social actions, he argued, the scientific method would ultimately test the efficacy of social and moral conduct.⁴⁴ The future of society, particularly democracy, required the development of a science of man:

It sounds academic to say that substantial bettering of social relations waits upon the growth of a scientific social psychology. For the term suggests something specialized and remote. But the formation of habits of belief, desire and judgment is going on at every instant under the influence of the conditions set by men's contact, intercourse and associations with one another.⁴⁵

Other social theorists contributed to the discussion of the future advancement of society. Although modified by the war, the views of Franklin Giddings, Herbert Croly, Robert Park, and Lincoln Steffens contained notions of community betterment.⁴⁶ Bertrand Russell wrote that science, while frequently seen through its undesirable and mechanizing influences, could contribute to human liberation.⁴⁷ Although British, Russell's arguments are

consistent with those of his American counterparts. Written in 1922, Lewis Mumford's classic history of utopias was aimed essentially at demonstrating that "Our most important task at the present moment is to build castles in the air. We need not fear, as Thoreau reminds us, that the work will be lost. If our utopias spring out of the realities of the environment, it will be easy enough to place foundations under them."⁴⁸

Scientists shared such feelings of optimism about American society. In fact, it has been documented how optimism permeated what can be identified as an "American ideology of national science." Spokesmen for the scientific community such as Edwin Slosson and Robert Millikan helped shape an ideology that asserted the fundamental role of science in social progress, social unity, and in the safeguarding of democracy.⁴⁹ Just as the ideology required a scientific elite, so those technologists involved in scientific management and engineering insisted that the scientific expert was essential to industrial and democratic progress.⁵⁰

In summary, many historians, scientists, social theorists, and technologists did not abandon expectations for reform following the war. However, the postwar efforts differed from those of the progressive era in that they stressed the more conservative aspects of the reform impulse. The conservatism meant that "Major trends in social

science analysis and literature were continued into the twenties, but intellectuals generally showed less respect for the possibilities of government and the wisdom of the populace."⁵¹ Nevertheless, reform thought in the twenties retained many aspects of the earlier progressive era. There was still the conviction that American society would progress, although sometimes the changes were scheduled for a more distant future. Above all, there was a continuation and elaboration of the beliefs about the crucial contributions of science, convictions that science was the means for realizing a better society.

The continued endorsement of science generally, and social science particularly, was coupled with proposals for a scientific intelligence or expert to manage the necessary social changes. These proposals went even further than earlier ones in maintaining that the sciences would be developed and applied to control social phenomena, primarily by adjusting man to his changing environment.⁵² For instance, Russell wrote for American audiences and he cited the overdeveloped concern with the physical sciences and control of the environment. Like Robinson and Dewey, he suggested that a different orientation was desirable:

while we alter the environment to suit ourselves, we do not much alter ourselves to suit each other. The reason is, of course, that the sciences that deal with the formation of human character are far less developed than

those that deal with the inanimate world. This, however, is rapidly changing. It is highly probable that in a hundred years we shall have acquired the same control over the characters of children that we now have over physical forces.⁵³

Social control and adjustment obviously required knowledge about human perceptions and actions in any given situation, and the social scientist, as social engineer, seemed to be the "savior".⁵⁴

These ideas about the importance of science, the need for adjustment through social control, and the unique role of the social scientist became apparent to those working within social science professions. In his history of social work, Roy Lubove has shown how the growth of that profession was paralleled by a belief among the professionals that man, and not the social environment, need adjustment.⁵⁵ Management science adopted the plan of fitting the individual to the environment and a conviction that experts were necessary for this task.⁵⁶ Political science and sociology underwent a similar shift toward advocating expert leadership and the need for social control.⁵⁷

As we shall see, the writings of Hall, McDougall, Münsterberg, and Watson share some of the ideas about reform which have been described above. The utopias detail and criticize then-current social mores and describe how a social science, supervised by experts, could be used

to realize progress toward certain social goals.

Münsterberg's work, written on the eve of the war, shows a consistency with reform ideals that were to persist after the war. While the works of these four psychologists differ in their conception of the individual, they all proclaim the necessity for his dedication to the welfare of society.⁵⁸ In accentuating the primacy of psychological knowledge, the utopias resemble other calls for the development and use of psychology. Robinson, Dewey, Russell, and Bernal, among many others, shared F.C.S. Schiller's idea that "a pragmatically efficient Psychology might actually invert the miracle of Circe, and really transform the Yahoo into a man."⁵⁹ And, in disseminating these ideas in utopian fictions, the four psychologists were like some members of at least two other professions, engineering and political science.⁶⁰

In writing utopias, Hall, McDougall, Münsterberg, and Watson were unique in their field at that time. Many of their ideas were consistent with other social theorists. But it remains to be seen whether or not their intentions for mankind and their aspirations for psychology in society were shared by psychologists who did not write utopias. To do so it is necessary to examine more closely both the self-conceptions and the aspirations of American psychologists writing between 1915 and 1930.

Images of Psychology

The psychology of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is identified with the emergence of a "scientific" psychology. As such, its development is described as a progressive accumulation of scientific methodology, subject matter, and theory. One consequence of this view is that in histories of American psychology there is little or no information about applied psychology. Nor is there discussion about how psychology was guided by intentions to improve human conduct or social institutions.⁶¹

Recently, historians have challenged this conventional view. Reappraisals have shown that in addition to debates over systems, theories, and methods, psychologists working between 1915 and 1930 voiced other concerns.⁶² Among these, psychologists discussed the application of psychological knowledge and the attainment of desired social conditions through that application. Although the two issues are certainly related, each posed distinct questions. On the one hand, the general issue of application raised questions concerning the boundaries of the roles of psychology and the psychologist as well as the effects which applied psychology might have on the progress of experimental research. On the other hand, those individuals favoring the application of psychological knowledge faced additional questions about the desired goals and

means of such application.

American Psychology: 'Pure' or 'Applied'?

Since its founding in 1892, the American Psychological Association (APA) had functioned to secure the recognition, status, and reputation of psychology as an independent science. The development of laboratories and empirical methods attested to the scientific basis of the field. The activities of the association as well as the content of journals certainly emphasized such scientific status.⁶³ Surveys of psychology's progress until 1928 indicate a proliferation of experimental research. That is, the ascendancy and controversies of various schools, the refinement of experimental methods, and the introduction of neo-positivist thought guided research orientations between 1918 and 1928.⁶⁴

In the twenties, some psychologists increased efforts to promote and to protect experimental or scientific psychology. Perhaps the most adamant proponent of these interests was the Harvard psychologist, E.G. Boring. After the war, Boring, true to the standards of his mentor, E.B. Titchener, became seriously concerned about what he saw as the impoverishment of pure research. Boring saw pure research being threatened by the growth of applied psychology within educational institutions, the commercial uses of psychology, and the defection of research psychologists to

activities of an applied nature. He feared that the ideals of psychology as a pure research science were being contaminated by "America's commercial democracy." Boring conducted a campaign for experimental research on several fronts: influencing policy and leadership in the APA, ensuring the primary stature of research within his department, and preparing current and historical surveys of experimental research activities.⁶⁵

These ideals for an experimental science were not shared by all psychologists. Others were deeply concerned about the image of psychology but equally convinced that application served scientific as well as economic and professional interests. For instance, when Boring published his 1920 survey indicating that experimental research dominated American psychology, it was immediately refuted by Lewis M. Terman. In a reanalysis of Boring's data, Terman found that applied research engaged 51.5 per cent of APA members while pure research engaged 48.5 per cent.⁶⁶ Terman was not content with a statistical demonstration of the prevalence of applied research, but also defended its professional legitimacy.

Is this trend unfavorable to psychology as a science? The more conservative will probably so interpret it, but I do not believe that the history of science warrants this view. One has only to recall how such sciences as physiology, bacteriology, chemistry, physics, and biology have been stimulated by human needs to realize that a science stands to gain rather than lose, even as pure science, when it enters the lists in the service of mankind.⁶⁷

Terman's assertion, that practical applications of psychology would benefit the discipline, has received considerable support. Recently, historians of psychology have reviewed the development of applied psychology, not as Boring would have it, as a counter-movement to the experimental mainstream, but as fundamental in the growth of psychology as a whole. They have found that the participation of psychologists in the war effort and in the subsequent mental testing movement improved both the professional and occupational standing of psychology.⁶⁸ For instance, the public exposure that psychologists received during the war contributed to the promotion and expansion of its academic position, to the creation of job opportunities, and to a position of higher esteem within the American scientific community. These gains for the field of psychology led one historian to conclude that "if psychology had not in fact contributed significantly to the war, the war had contributed significantly to psychology."⁶⁹

There is no doubt that involvement in applied psychology served economic functions for American psychologists working in the twenties. The rapidly increasing number of trained psychologists entered a receptive market if they pursued applied interests. Educators were concerned with ways to evaluate student potential, especially the gifted, in order to improve educational programs and to increase organizational efficiency. Businessmen and industrialists were

concerned with postwar economic confusions, particularly with problems of labor. Such developments as the field of scientific management had already advertised the utility of social science. Furthermore, tests and measurement devices were quickly recognized as means for fitting an individual to a particular environment and thus for increasing happiness, efficiency, productivity, and control. In this sense it appears that "the industrial psychologist and the businessman shared the same goal and worked well together."⁷⁰

But applied psychologists of the twenties had other interests besides those of employment. They wanted to maintain professional standards, to produce research on applied subjects, to expose charlatans, and to promote a positive view of psychology. These concerns were revealed in numerous activities of the APA which were oriented toward research on and professional standards for applied psychology.⁷¹ Other forums for these concerns were created by the establishment of commercial companies such as the Psychological Corporation.⁷² The scientific and professional objectives of these attempts are elucidated in the AAAS presidential address of James McKeen Cattell in 1926: "The psychologists of this country....have taken the lead in forming a Psychological Corporation whose objects are to conserve for research part of the profits from the applications of our science and to conduct new research on an

economic basis. Scientific men should take the place that is theirs as masters of the modern world."⁷³

These initiatives for applying psychology in business, industry, and education did not fit Boring's ideals.

Clearly, they were antithetical to the conception of the psychologist held by E.B. Titchener, who wrote that "To invite him from his 'academic reserve,' or demand that he interest himself in 'practical ends' is simply to bid him cease from scientific activity."⁷⁴ Ironically, while many psychologists rejected these ideals, they did so for one of the reasons that Boring defended the primacy of experimental research, to guarantee the professional stature of psychology. Many saw the profession not merely as a scientific enterprise but as a science devoted to the needs of society and the challenge for social improvement. This broader professional self-image was accepted not only by the technologist, the applied psychologist, and the clinician but was also held by individuals who were considered to be, and counted themselves among, experimental psychologists.

Psychology: Contributions to a Better Society

In summarizing his analysis of sixty applied psychology books published between 1925 and 1938, Donald Napoli noted that "beyond the logical argument -- written between the lines of textbooks and popular manuals -- was a vision of

a better America, a well-adjusted society in which social utility merged with personal fulfillment to provide a satisfying life for all."⁷⁵ Napoli found that the writings of applied psychologists dealt with the control of individuals for their maximal adjustment to the environment. Although the roots of these intentions appear to be Darwinian, the applied psychologists were not tied to any specific school or theory and sampled freely from available concepts of behavior, instincts, habits, and feelings.⁷⁶

For these psychologists "a better America meant a well-adjusted society. What they dimly foresaw was a sophisticated meritocracy in which the most apt leaders would implement policies that maximized the adjustment of each citizen."⁷⁷ Napoli found that applied psychology texts integrated the goals of capitalism and industrialism, acknowledged the precedence of individual differences and maladjustments, challenged assumptions of egalitarian society where all citizens were eligible for leadership, and renounced radical or extreme politics. They described those personality characteristics that represent adjustment -- independence, self-reliance, social mindedness. They taught that each individual had an optimal place in society that should be accorded by ability, that social institutions would provide these places, and that maladjustment arose within the individual and was not caused by environmental situations. The authors related their appeal

for expert leadership to ideas of improvement, asking "the public not merely to have confidence in their knowledge and skills but in their ability to construct a better world as well."⁷⁸

Experimental psychologists had similar conceptions of the utility of psychology in social control and adjustment as well as in its ability to promote a better world. These conceptions initially appeared in the form of general statements about future developments. Since the 1890s, members of the APA also had promoted psychology as an important vehicle for human improvement. This message was explicit in the pre-1900 APA presidential addresses of George T. Ladd, John Dewey, and James McKeen Cattell.⁷⁹ Other experimentalists, like E.L. Thorndike and Karl Pearson, insisted that improvements demanded application of a particular scientific orientation, notably that of eugenics.⁸⁰ Some, such as Cattell and James Mark Baldwin, spoke more generally about democracy and world peace; in the case of Cattell science was essential to these goals.⁸¹ By World War I, some experimental psychologists began to take more specific stances concerning the immediate practical uses of psychology. Their arguments, sometimes resembling programs for action, incorporated ideas for social control and adjustment as well as prescriptions for the improvement of American society.

During the 1920s, these proposals were incorporated

in the writings of two experimentalists, Knight Dunlap and Floyd Allport. Dunlap had entered on an eclectic experimental career with projects ranging from research on reaction time and imagery to the editorship of the Journal of Comparative Psychology and writings on social psychology.⁸²

By the 1920s, Dunlap's commitment to experimental research had fused with a concern for the social benefits of scientific psychology.⁸³ These concerns led him to endorse social psychology because "Frankly, what we may call social psychology in the immediate future is but a propaedeutic to the real subject: a marshalling of facts and principles of scientific psychology into new formations, directed towards a specific purpose, namely: their application to social problems."⁸⁴ The "social problems" included sex life, family organization, religious organization, civics, race, and population. Dunlap held that these problems required experimental investigation and that "the principles and facts of social control must be worked out and systematized....and the methods of conserving, modifying, and abolishing these important controlling devices must be embodied not only in the rules of an art, but also in principles of science."⁸⁵

In the twenties and thirties, Allport's career included numerous research projects on social processes that resulted in what has been called the major impact of his work, the 1924 publication of Social Psychology.⁸⁶

Allport hoped that the textbook would serve not only college students but "all who are interested in the social adjustments of individuals and the broader problems of society."⁸⁷ In this book, he examined the nature of social adjustments from a behaviorist perspective and listed the potential contributions of psychology to an orderly and progressive society. He concluded that "Orderly social life necessitates a certain degree of subordination of individuals to one another and to the regulated institutions of society. Without such control unity and coordination would be impossible."⁸⁸ Social control, he argued, should enhance the "basic requirements for a truly democratic social order"⁸⁹ which assumed that "a nice balance of socialization and adjustment is therefore required within the individual....so modified by early social environment and by control through social institutions that it does not obstruct the release of the same responses in others."⁹⁰ These measures would correct what Allport saw as current conflicts in sex, family life, industry, and politics.

In addressing the practical uses of psychological knowledge, Dunlap and Allport proposed measures in accordance with desired objectives. That is, they suggested social control and adjustment as a means to promote those personality characteristics which were conducive to a "democratic" social order. The most noted spokesman for

the role that psychology might play in this democratic society was Cattell. His agreement with Dunlap and Allport is deserving of quotation.

It is futile to predict, but we are within our rights to hope, that the psychological sciences will in the end contribute in equal measure with the physical sciences to our knowledge and to its application to our welfare. For example, it is not unreasonable to guess that the average productivity of each individual could be doubled and his happiness correspondingly increased, if he were selected for the work that he can do best, trained in the right way to do it, and given the most favorable conditions.⁹¹

Attainment of a democratic social order, Dunlap and Allport claimed, required adjustment and control of the individual which, in turn, depended on the implementation of scientific knowledge. Furthermore, they held that although adjustment was necessary, it also might require alterations in the social environment, primarily in the controls maintained by social institutions. Here again Cattell gave an explicit account.

At present, however, and perhaps always, we can do more to alter the environment and to place individuals in situations where their reactions are what we want than we can to alter individuals. Fortunately all men are not born equal; it is both undesirable and impossible to make them equal, or indeed to alter fundamentally the constitution with which they are born. But we can give them equality of opportunity and more; for we can provide the best opportunity for each and improve the environment for all. Even though it may be difficult to alter people after they are born, it may ultimately be possible to select the kind of people that we want to be born.⁹²

Cattell's final sentence introduced an alternative to social control by suggesting eugenics as one possible way to secure well adjusted individuals.⁹³

Some form of guidance was required to implement these proposals for a democratic social order that would be maintained by adjustment and social control. Because psychology was an integral part of the implementation, many psychologists acknowledged the social responsibility of their science. For instance, Joseph Jastrow wrote that "it is the outstanding feature of our reconstructed psychology that it realized and accepted the obligation to apply....the conclusions arising from the study of the mental side of man."⁹⁴ Jastrow believed that the obligations of psychology necessarily included enhancement of the values of society.⁹⁵ His convictions about the discipline's responsibility to national well-being were shared by other psychologists.⁹⁶

The recognition that democratic social order, unity, and improvement could be realized by the use of psychological knowledge made the psychologist's feeling of responsibility a reasonable one. And to Jastrow it was a personal one which demanded that the psychologist "should join the small remnant of creative and progressive thinkers who can see even this bewildering world soundly and see it whole. Such is part of the psychologist's responsibility." While conceding that he was "not optimistic enough to

"indulge in Utopias", Jastrow did specify ways for psychologists to exercise their responsibility.⁹⁷ In addition to his laboratory work, he, like Allport, Cattell and others, dispensed expert guidance through popular writings. A prime example is found in his text entitled Piloting Your Life, The Psychologist as Helmsman.⁹⁸

Summary

Between 1915 and 1930 psychologists intensified their discussions of applying psychology to social life. Their interests were certainly not solely in employment and profit. Aside from questions of how tests could be used or how psychological skills should be marketed, they expressed concern for the well-being of American society. Like applied psychologists and clinicians, many experimental psychologists believed in the realization of social improvement through the adjustment of individuals to the environment and in the achievement of that adjustment by implementing social controls. Underlying these beliefs was the feeling that psychologists could and should contribute to these ends by extending their scientific expertise to education, industry, media, and the family.

Terman, Thorndike, Bingham, and Scott applied their expertise to educational and industrial situations. Yerkes and Cattell became publicists in government and the scientific community. Allport, Jastrow, and Dunlap spoke

from within the university and occasionally supplemented their academic involvements with popular writings. To this list must be added the names of Hall, McDougall, Münsterberg, and Watson. Their utopias include statements about psychology's ultimate contributions to a better world. They propose that techniques of social control would be implemented and supervised by psychological experts, and that individual conduct would be adjusted, for the welfare of society.

Just as clinicians and applied psychologists used various concepts and theories in talking about adjustment, so experimental psychologists could frame similar propositions despite the fact that they embraced different psychological systems. Ranging from idealism to eugenics to behaviorism, the utopias mirrored the plurality of psychological notions which could be drawn upon. Even the fact that two utopias, those of Hall and Münsterberg, included ideas about a spiritual community is not discordant. Other theorists writing in the twenties retained comparable conceptions while joining them with more concrete discussions of social order and democracy.⁹⁹

By the 1920's psychology had invaded many aspects of American life. It had gained academic, scientific and social respectability. Some have claimed that its social debut resulted in arrogance, that it was captivated by "the lure of the footlights and the glare of the headlights."¹⁰⁰

In fact, the rising economic, professional and social concerns of psychologists were not unlike those of other intellectuals and social thinkers of the post-progressive era. Nor was a faith in the promise of psychological knowledge unique to psychologists. Many saw in their own discipline hopes for social improvement. Indeed, many had their own utopias. When William James sketched a "utopia" in 1910, he expressed no doubt about changing man, for "It is but a question of time, of skillful propagandism, and of opinion-making men seizing historic opportunities."¹⁰¹ Not long afterward some psychologists gained the confidence to think that the time was nearly right, and that the knowledge was nearly ready for dissemination. They could set to work to design plans for social improvement. In some cases, these plans emerged as psychological utopias.

The utopias of Hall, McDougall, Münsterberg, and Watson vary in length and in the literary devices employed to describe the better world. However, the four utopias have much in common with other utopias which contain psychological notions and with other utopias written by scientists. These commonalities are reviewed in the next two chapters.

CHAPTER II

PSYCHOLOGICAL NOTIONS IN UTOPIAN WRITINGS

Although the term originated with the island of King Utopus, "utopia" has been used to describe a variety of extraordinary societies designed before and after More's speculation. Scholars have found it difficult to devise a universal definition of a utopia. The term has been used to describe fictions, social experiments, and statements of possible improvements.¹ Even when it is decided to include only written works in a definition, utopias still exhibit tremendous variation in form and content due to the influence of literary vogues, political events, and social trends. When the term is thus restricted, the historian interested in the study of utopias still must adopt a working definition that is sensitive to historical change.² For these purposes, a utopia can be defined simply as a verbal construction of a society where institutions, individuals, and human relationships are purportedly more perfect than those in the author's society.³

Every utopia contains psychological notions in so far as it presumes certain characteristics of the individual inhabitants. Whether a utopia is oriented toward spiritual transcendence or heavenly cities, toward voyages to some unplotted territory or Arcady, or toward transformation of existing society, it requires some psychological conception of man.⁴ Some theory of man is fundamental in the writer's decision to

promote a particular societal organization and moral system. Few scholars have made such theories of man a subject of systematic inquiry.⁵ The psychological nature of utopian man has not received the same critical attention that has been given to other facets of utopia such as technology,⁶ education,⁷ or political structure.⁸

The study of psychological notions in utopian thought can follow several courses. Utopias may be examined for the appearance of psychological knowledge in descriptions of the ideal man or citizen. One of the few studies of psychology and utopia has taken this approach by relating utopian visions of man to the "sensibilities" of the period in which the utopias were conceived.⁹ Second, utopias may be examined to determine if and how psychology is used as a technique for realizing the utopian world. Practically no attention has been given to this usage of psychology in utopias.¹⁰ Finally, utopias may be investigated for the functions that psychologists, and psychology as a corpus of knowledge, have in the ideal society. Such an investigation effectively would study the "ideal psychology": what would be known, who would know it, and what applications it would have in the ideal society.

These three approaches can be regarded generally as assessments of psychology in the description, construction, and maintenance of utopia.¹¹ The remainder of the chapter reviews these uses of psychology in utopian writing while attending to two important conditions: the evolving fashions in utopian

literature and the development of psychology as a modern science. The chapter is not intended as a comprehensive survey but rather as an overview of the major trends with representative examples.

Ideal Man in the Ideal World

In a history of ideas of human perfectibility, John Passmore raised a few questions regarding the study of the perfect or ideal man. Among them, he inquired about the distinction between the perfect man and the perfect citizen and about the possibility of perfecting man. The first question is apparently resolved in utopian speculations because most writers, including Plato and More, have seen the ideal individual and the ideal citizen as synonymous.¹² The second question is more closely related to the idea of techniques for implementing utopia and will be addressed later. For the present it is sufficient to acknowledge that the psychology of the utopian individual reflects some of these conceptions of perfectibility and that the use of psychology in constructing and maintaining utopias implies the feasibility of perfection.

The sole study of psychological notions in descriptions of utopia is that of Frank Manuel. His history is by no means exhaustive but, at least tentatively, it provides a suitable guide for the present review. Although Manuel did not examine closely the corresponding development

of psychological science, he found three ages since More's Utopia in which there were parallels between psychological thought in utopias and concurrently in society.¹³ The first age, characterized by utopias of "calm felicity", lasted from the appearance of Thomas More's Utopia in 1516 to the French Revolution. These utopias reflect the general assumptions that "man normally sought sensate happiness, that this state of pleasurable was easily definable, that the condition was derivative from the establishment of an appropriate institutional order."¹⁴ The utopian society provides material necessities; education and often religion ensures the continuation of utopian ideals. Society is structured to guarantee social harmony and eliminate social discord. The passions and drives of men are acknowledged but are portrayed as moderate, and any noticeable extremes are punished or removed.

A closer scrutiny of the utopias of this period indicates that they differ on several points, especially in the emphasis on religion. The utopias of Campanella, Hartlib, Andreae, Bacon, Comenius, Leibniz, and Bruno share a tripartite formula for the ideal society. Science, religion, and a belief in the potential of man are accorded precedence in designing a society. For instance, Andreae's Christianopolis extends this triumvirate to both government and education; they were founded on religious principles yet stress the acquisition of a scientific attitude and the

potential for the improvement of every citizen. Education is intended for the worship of God, refinement of morals, and elevation of mental powers. In Campanella's City of the Sun the rulers are scientist-priests dedicated to the spiritual ideals of social unity.¹⁵ The examples of Andreae and Campanella illustrate how seventeenth-century utopias differ in their expectations for human improvement. Andreae emphasized the possible improvement of all citizens through education, while Campanella viewed innate differences in potential and accordingly advocated eugenics as a means of improvement.¹⁶

These utopias expound notions of community and social harmony but they also express beliefs in the ability of man to transform his earthly existence. To make these assertions the authors first had to criticize traditional authority as it was vested in established educational institutions and church doctrines.¹⁷ The assertions reflect emerging ideals of rationality and experimental methods, however much they imply some transcendental or religious bases.¹⁸

Two movements near the conclusion of the age of "calm felicity" impelled the maturation of such innovations in utopian thought. The first movement ensued from the political turmoil of seventeenth-century England and was manifested in numerous writings on the nature of man and society. Leviathan is one such work. Hobbes not only

sought resolution of political discord by demonstrating the necessity of state power but also recruited the new mechanistic philosophy to design a psychology that corresponded with his political arguments.¹⁹ James Harrington's Oceana offers an alternative for political stability with the dispersion of economic power and the establishment of what came to be commonly referred to as democratic principles.²⁰ These utopists departed further from religious traditions and shared with other students of moral science, notably Locke and Hartley, the belief that man could be brought to a good life through the development of a science of man.²¹

The second movement, the Enlightenment philosophy, was concentrated on the continent but had origins and repercussions in England. It was nourished by the English criticisms of political and social institutions and sensualist conceptions of man on the one hand, and the German conceptions of the universal and ideal on the other hand. Hence the Enlightenment promoted the notion of man's "natural rights" as well as his natural condition.²² The search for "noble savages" became a common fictional theme and was paralleled by discourse on the natural feelings of man. The utopias of this period typically describe primitive yet idyllic civilizations catering to these essential needs of man.²³

The second age of utopias spanned the nineteenth

century and corresponded with rapid advances in urbanization, industrialization, and a new awareness of inequities in the treatment of ~~women~~ men. This atmosphere of change fostered revised ideas about progress, the potential of man and society, and the supremacy of the sciences.²⁴ The utopian conceptions of the age utilized these new ideas; their underlying psychology endorsed not merely the significance but the priority of sensate experience, in epistemology as well as in moral values. As Manuel noted, this endorsement meant that "When the nineteenth century utopians appreciated man's passionate nature as at least equal, if not superior, to his reason, the old psychological scale of values was subverted. Where More insisted on content adequacy, Fourier dreamed of progressively greater pleasurable excitements."²⁵

Intellectuals extended ideas of progress to explain psychological phenomena: the natural abilities of man awaited impending perfectibility. However, this concern with the individual was often overshadowed by concern with social structure and development. Both considerations corresponded with the growth of two sciences: of man and of society.²⁶ While the commitments to ideas of progress and to a science of social life were to coalesce in the early twentieth century, particularly in American pragmatism, reform enthusiasm, and social Darwinism, they occupied a visible place in nineteenth-century thought and utopias.

Utopian speculation of this period has three inter-related foci that can be broadly identified with three geographical areas: France, England, and the United States. The French utopias primarily comprise scenarios of a positive science of society. Turgot, Condorcet, Comte and Saint-Simon all drew blueprints of social perfectibility with the belief that through science man could discover the laws of moral life necessary for individual and social perfection.²⁷ These beliefs in realizing man's potential through scientific knowledge perpetuated earlier utopian visions while their unqualified optimism and commitment to continual progress revealed new vistas for contemplating the nature of man. These utopias marked the beginning of "open-ended" utopism because the ideas of progress and malleability of man provided unlimited possibilities for the design of a "perfect" world.²⁸

The ideas of progress and science also were found in English utopias. The utilitarian speculations of Bentham and the Mills are programmatic attempts to devise practicable social systems. But the economic and political climate distinguished English utopian thought; the problems and politics of industrialization predominate in many utopias. While Fourier's utopia focuses on emotional life, the English counterpart, Owen's utopian design, stresses economics and a free socialism based on equitable division

of material wealth.²⁹ Later utopian thinkers lamented this English preoccupation because "utopias become vast reticulations of steel and redtape, until we feel that we are caught in the Nightmare of the Age of Machinery, and shall never escape...."³⁰

The literary fashions regarding English utopias resemble the impact of industrialization and politics in one respect: they tended to obscure systematic consideration of the psychological nature of man's well-being. The refinement and growth of the utopian genre as a form of imaginative fiction was spurred by several aforementioned nineteenth-century trends. Ideas of progress and evolution legitimized new conceptions of time, scientific and technological advances provided fodder for contemplating the fantastic, and the rise in social forecasting opened possibilities for a variety of social arrangements.³¹ Thus Bulwer-Lytton described a highly evolved race living underground, a short journey away from English society.³² Those eschewing the inevitabilities of industrialization, notably William Morris and W.H. Hudson, fabricated romantic and Arcadian worlds free from the unpleasant consequences of modern technology.³³ The increasing engagement of imaginative fiction as a vehicle for social criticism gave impetus to the creation of dystopias. It also introduced what was to become a popular mode of utopian thinking in the twentieth century, the anti-utopia, the undesirable and sometimes Hadean state.³⁴

The multiplication of utopias was not restricted to England and actually seems to have been more pervasive in the United States.³⁵ American society experienced one manifestation of the utopian spirit in the experimental community. It was here that the plans of Owen and Fourier were implemented as were those of native Americans. The availability of land and the transmission of European Enlightenment philosophy made America a natural location for the endeavor to realize utopian schemes.³⁶

While utopian experiments were conducted throughout the 1800s, utopian fiction reached its height in the final decade of the century. Over 160 utopias were published between the appearance of Edward Bellamy's Looking Backward (1888) and 1900.³⁷ Since the American utopia of this period seldom depicts a new nation or individual, historians have not interpreted this upheaval as a revolutionary move.³⁸ Rather, these utopias have been viewed as reactions to turbulence and transitions: economic instability, labor unrest, problems of industrialization, and skepticism concerning traditional values (especially those of religion and the family).³⁹ They represent prescriptions for reform in the synthesis of ideas from the social reform movement and the traditional use of American fiction to instruct and preach.⁴⁰ The unique American utopian solution to disillusionment with current affairs has been called a "pessimistic optimism". It expressed an attitude that "allows an author

to preserve what he likes about the present -- thus offering a sense of continuity -- while discarding what confuses or frightens him -- thus offering a hopeful introduction to a new world."⁴¹

What were the psychological assumptions of the individual in reform-oriented utopias? Because the majority of the works advocated some form of socialism, coupled with anything from capitalistic to communistic principles,⁴² and because they frequently championed ideals of "social harmony", "unity", "community", and "cooperation",⁴³ discussions of the individual were brief. Yet, taken together, these utopias did contain a variety of psychological conceptions of the individual.

Clues to the psychological conceptions are found in the explanations given as to how the individual attained characteristics required in utopia. A study of American utopias published between 1888 and 1900 discloses four proffered explanations for the transformation of man: sudden inward conversion, conversion inspired by a hero, domination by a preferred "race", and manipulation of the environment to determine desired human characteristics.⁴⁴ These conceptions represent attempts by the authors to deal with increasingly questioned religious doctrines and with the growing diversity of the American population.

In these utopias it was necessary to reconcile the needs and hopes of the individual with the community. At

least one historian has attributed the conflict between individualist and communitarian orientations to a paradox in American thought which was common among turn of the century thinkers who "tried desperately to reconcile within themselves an ethic of communal responsibility with one of unrestrained individualism."⁴⁵ Another historian has suggested that this search for "collective individualism" may account for the apparent confusion and diversity in utopian conceptions of the individual. The commitment to a definite and controlled social structure seemed to reconcile the conflict and could encompass the questions of individual change.⁴⁶

During the nineteenth century, the age of "open-ended" utopias, France, England, and the United States produced works that couple descriptions of the ideal individual with increased interest in social change. Ideas of social and individual progress were mirrored in many utopias where the perfect man was evolving just as the perfect society might. Utopian writers of the late nineteenth century were less likely to stress the rational faculties of man and more likely to envision him as a sensing, learning animal.

The final age of Manuel's psychological history of utopias is one of "eupsychias" or the twentieth-century utopist's preoccupation with the psychological nature of man. Manuel did not specifically examine utopias of the

first three decades (a common omission) but focused on works published between 1940 and 1965. Just as earlier utopias assimilated and exploited attitudes of the physical sciences, so twentieth century utopias more explicitly confronted and embraced the sciences of man. Manuel noted that the spirit, but not the solutions, of these utopias is conveyed in the words of the protagonist of Walden Two: "No one can seriously doubt that a well-managed community will get along successfully as an economic unit. A child could prove it. The real problems are psychological."⁴⁷

Incorporation of the life sciences into utopian speculation initially reflected a pessimism, particularly that extrapolated from Darwinian and Freudian thought, which was obviated in later uses of these same theories. There are no clearer examples of a "psychological view of hell on earth than those of Orwell and Zamitian."⁴⁸ Brighter prospects were discussed by writers who expanded Darwinism into theories of the evolution of consciousness (Teilhard de Chardin, Julian Huxley, and J.B.S. Haldane) and Freudianism into theories of sensate emancipation (Erich Fromm, Herbert Marcuse, Abraham Maslow, and Norman O. Brown).⁴⁹

Two other optimistic ideas have been borrowed from twentieth-century life sciences. The first is an interpretation of Darwinism that subscribes to eugenics, the application of genetics to breed the ideal individual.⁵⁰ The

second idea presents behaviorism as evidence that "Innate differences are unimportant; men can be moulded to any desired shape by employing the appropriate psychological procedures."⁵¹ However, the critic's opinion that the life sciences have infused utopia with a renewed optimism is not a unanimous one. Some individuals are exceedingly critical of the assumptions of psychology and others are impressed by signs of impending doom indicated by modern warfare techniques, political instability, the misuse of science, and the expendibility of material resources.⁵²

Twentieth-century utopias have shown substantial reliance on psychological notions to describe the utopian individual. In fact, ideas of becoming, developing, and creating in psychological theories can themselves be seen as utopian. This diminishing distance between utopian visions and socio-psychological theory illustrates what many have referred to as utopian feasibility. The following section traces one factor that has promoted the idea of feasibility in utopian writings: the application of scientific knowledge, that of psychology particularly, as a technique for establishing utopia.

A Perfecting Technique

The preceding review of psychological descriptions of utopian man unavoidably broached the question of technique, the ways in which psychology could contribute to the

realization of utopia. Overlap between psychological description and technique is inevitable whenever a model of ideal man implies a means for achieving that ideal. And in their methods of constructing utopias, as in their descriptions of the ideal, writers assimilated the attitudes of a new science -- psychology.

A number of scholars have expounded what can be called a "scientific imperative", the belief that utopia cannot carry on without science.⁵³ The belief implies that utopian designers must "first analyze the given conditions in society, and from the findings they construct, with all the knowledge available, a new society as near their ideal as possible."⁵⁴ This liberal interpretation of the scientific method began with the seventeenth-century utopists who, rejecting traditional knowledge, adopted a new epistemology. They held that knowledge was that which could be acquired by man. The correct method for acquisition of knowledge was seen in the use of sensate experience to observe, record, and analyze information.

This "empirical method" drew interest away from teleological questions and consequently, "There was less concern with the microcosm, man, as he reflected the great order, and more concentration on man as the means with the power to measure."⁵⁵ In the terms of René Dubos, the creators of utopias "fostered the view that nature must be studied not so much to be understood as to be mastered and exploited by

man." The attitude of mastery, sustained by belief in the right method, has been viewed as a foundation for utopian design.⁵⁶

However permanent this scientific foundation was, the applications of the new method changed. In the utopias of Bacon and More, perfection would follow from the advances of the physical sciences. While these two men differed in the details of scientific contributions, they shared a simple optimism about its inevitable progress and utility.⁵⁷ The British associationists and French perfectionists adapted these principles to the social and psychological sciences. Hence, the "new 'moral psychology' opened the way to the suggestion that men could be to an infinite degree improved by the use of appropriate social mechanisms -- in the first place, education."⁵⁸ Theories of the new psychology guided plans for achieving the ideal society. For instance, Turgot's psychological concept of the "genius" explains the improvement of society through procedures of special care and education of those exceptional individuals who would, in turn, contribute to the sciences.⁵⁹ The hopes for a science that would generate knowledge and ultimately, human goodness, was "the source of nineteenth-century Utopianism."⁶⁰

The emergence of psychology as an independent science during that century affected the use of psychology in two ways, through the development of formal and often elegant

theories of man and through the availability of these theories to any interested reader. Writers gained access to explanations of all facets of human existence with which they could enhance the credibility or demonstrate the feasibility of their ideal society.⁶¹ In other words, concepts and technical terminology from the burgeoning science of psychology offered writers a means for making their stories appear authentic and believable and gave enhanced reasonability to the realization of utopian ideas.

For example, psychology was often used to explain the means for transporting the narrator to the new society. Bellamy and others borrowed notions of hypnotism (mesmerism) to carry the narrator to utopia. These techniques involve either suspended animation for long periods of time or trance-like visions.⁶² Another device is employed in The Great Awakening where the soul of the narrator is transported to the future while he is undergoing brain surgery to cure insanity.⁶³ The device of the dream is used even in such anti-science utopias as Morris's News from Nowhere. Although the dream device was employed as early as the fantasy writing of Johann Kepler and does not require modern psychological knowledge for its efficacy, it was rendered more reasonable in light of psychological knowledge which offered systematic descriptions and explanations of the phenomenon.⁶⁴ In these cases, psychological ideas allow credible modifications of the traditional utopian

journey across unplotted territories and miraculous travels through time.

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the use of psychology for enhancing credibility was outranked, in frequency and in sophistication, by its use in explaining the development of the utopian individual. Psychological concepts, it was presumed, could explain the transition from the ordinary to the ideal individual.

Utopian citizens often have "clairvoyant" or "telepathic" powers.⁶⁵ They sometimes exhibit the "group mind" effect,⁶⁶

or have access to mind controlling drugs.⁶⁷ But by far

the most common characteristics of the ideal individuals

is superior intelligence. The explanation for such superiority usually is evolution: of the science of man, of man himself, or of both. While eugenics could account for the speed, direction, and maintenance of human improvement,⁶⁸ a

"natural" interpretation of evolution is occasionally

given.⁶⁹ Bulwer-Lytton explained the high state of evolution reached by his underground people with several psycho-

logical theories. He described the evolution of physical attributes (skull, wings, and thumb) and referred to Max

Müller's theory of language evolution to account for their ideal language.⁷⁰ More immediate improvements are claimed

to result from scientific developments in psychology.

Knowledge of the brain sciences could reveal means to stimulate higher consciousness either through techniques

of brain surgery, memory removal, or prenatal education.⁷¹ And in these ideal societies psychology could facilitate the citizen's comprehension of the world; for instance, theories of phrenology and self-consciousness in animals are practiced by Bulwer-Lytton's super-race.⁷²

There was no retreat from the reliance upon psychology for legitimizing accounts of fantastic societies. As the twentieth century began psychological theorizing proliferated. The readers' familiarity with these theories grew simultaneously as psychology became a standard course in college curricula, articles on psychology filled popular periodicals, and people began applying the new science to their everyday experiences.⁷³ These developments were paralleled in the growth of fantastic literature, utopian and distopian. Just as mid-nineteenth century writers discussed telepathy, mental evolution, association of thoughts, and phrenology, so twentieth-century writers propounded Gestalt, Freudian, and conditioning principles.⁷⁴ Psychology had come to play an important role in demonstrations of utopian feasibility.

The Perfect Place for Science

Once the utopian ideal is specified and its feasibility demonstrated with modern scientific techniques, what role is science given in the ideal society? Where do scientists stand in the social and political order of utopia? After

the seventeenth century these became established and essential questions for any designer of utopia. What changed, however, were the answers proposed. Utopian responses to the questions shifted as science came to occupy a leading place in society. In a seemingly contrary manner the permanent establishment of science in society went hand in hand with an increased instability of its position in utopias.

More's Utopia treats natural philosophy, that is, science, as a religiously sanctioned instrument for social welfare. Published one century later, Bacon's New Atlantis proposes a different place for science. While More vested the communal spirit with the duty of ensuring social progress, Bacon assumed the prior existence of social well-being and credited science with all further progress.⁷⁵ This contrast between the two utopias is underscored by Bacon's unique belief in the inevitable progress of science and in the perpetual new material benefits that it would bring. Differences also are seen in the place given science in society. In Utopia citizens engage in scientific activities for understanding and human welfare while in Bacon's Bensalem science is accorded an unequalled status. Bacon clearly stated that status: "Ye shall understand, my dear friends, that amongst the excellent acts of that King, one above all hath pre-eminence. It was the erection and institution of an order, or society, which we call

Salomon's House; the Noblest foundation, as we think; that ever was upon the earth, and the lantern of this kingdom."⁷⁶

The idea of science as "the lantern" and as a special social institution distinguished its role in Bacon's utopia from that of other seventeenth-century utopias. For instance, Campanella and Andreae viewed science as part of the general education of the future citizen. The distinction also extended to the power and rights of the scientist. While Hartlib, Campanella, and Andreae envisioned the scientist as sharing authority with religious and political leaders, Bacon gave the utopian scientist power over the king. His scientists held unprecedented rights: of isolation from the remainder of society, of secrecy and control of knowledge, and of responsibility for disseminating only what they deemed socially beneficial.⁷⁷

Bacon's plan for the ideal scientific college, Salomon's House, rested on three assumptions. The power of the college would be immune from coercion, the inventions made known would be beneficent, and the abuse of discoveries would be arrested by scientists.⁷⁸ Utopian thinkers of the Enlightenment were more sceptical. Although they still saw scientific progress as positive, they recognized the potential for its misuse. Their solutions to this apparent dilemma were varied and often tentative. Since Enlightenment philosophers placed emphasis on education as a perfecting agent, it is understandable that attempts to avert

corruption entailed protection of that institution. Protection typically was attained by separating education from church or state and establishing a guardianship by intellectuals, "the Enlighteners", to use Passmore's term. In turn, the Enlighteners would exhibit political neutrality by virtue of their distance from political life.⁷⁹ The solution was not always simple; Condorcet developed an elaborate scheme for preventing science from being usurped by an elite and guaranteeing its accessibility by the populace.⁸⁰ Several times during his life Saint-Simon devised plans for the role of the scientist in society. His early conception of the scientist as supreme ruler was modified and eventually replaced by the notion of a triumvirate of scientists, administrators, and moralists.⁸¹

In the nineteenth century scepticism about science and scientists occasionally shifted to distrust. Various anti-science utopias of the second half of the century illustrate such transitions. However, most utopian visions still accorded prestige and power to science, although it is difficult to assess the exact place of science in these societies since many writings omitted pertinent details.⁸²

What did become more common in utopias of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were the scientific innovations, the marvelous and technical gadgets essential to survival of the utopia and made possible only by science. Evidence of such achievements prompted one utopian scholar

to conclude that in utopia "Science is a servant, performing its duties like some kind of magic attendant...."⁸³

The amalgamation of science and society pervaded the technological utopias written between 1830 and 1940. In these works politics is frequently deemed unnecessary and many traditionally religious or political functions are transferred to the new technicians or engineers.⁸⁴

The ambivalent attitudes of early twentieth-century writings further blurred these ambiguous roles of science and scientists in utopia. Science was the source of evil; science was the salvation of humanity. Scientists were the madmen and corrupters; scientists were the heroes.⁸⁵

In H.G. Wells's A New Utopia science provides the primary means of realizing an ideal world, while less than a decade earlier he had created a horrifying tale about the deeds of an insane scientist.⁸⁶ Such ambivalence toward science and scientists was not unique to utopias but was a common theme in popular thought of the period. It reflects the respect and promises for science which had evolved in the last three hundred years as well as the fear of those very promises and potentials.⁸⁷ However, there is some indication that this ambivalence was less common among early twentieth-century scientists and professionals than among literary figures. Numerous technicians, engineers, and political scientists designed utopias in which their profession exerts positive influences and holds prestigious status.⁸⁸

It was during the early twentieth century that psychologists began to appear as characters in utopian literature. Their image in these writings is also one of ambivalence. In one super-state industrial psychologists guarantee perfect labor conditions while in another a psychologist from the College of Emotional Engineering, one Helmholtz Watson, rebels against the dystopic society.⁸⁹ Occasionally, psychological science is placed in the hands of others. In one dystopia the "Guardians" control and apply knowledge of hormones and behavior, sexual life, and thought processes. In another the "scientist-king" employs methods of conditioning, sensory deprivation, and "brainwashing".⁹⁰ In many utopias psychological knowledge is made available to educators, parents, or citizens themselves.⁹¹

Utopian writing often is viewed as either a rebellion against existing society (perhaps merely an entertaining critique) or a dream of unreasonable proportion. But there is another conception of utopias, one where they represent dreams of reason. From this perspective utopias "act as catalysts converting the crude materials of reality, the tools and products of experience and of science, into civilizations which take the shape developed first as an image in the mind of man. Utopias are like holy spirits which give the breath of life to matter."⁹² This conception implies the significance of utopian thinking for all endeavors, including that of science: "A vision of a human

future cannot do without the indispensable support of scientific expertise, but it encompasses more than the realm of science. The utopia without science is empty, but science without utopia is blind."⁹³

This review has suggested the use of scientific ideas, particularly those of psychology, in the fabrication of utopias. However, the significance of utopian thought within the sciences, for scientists, has not been examined. This examination is undertaken in the next chapter with the specific purpose of exploring the functions which utopian speculation has served for scientists.

CHAPTER III

UTOPIAN THINKING OF SCIENTISTS:
THE CASE OF PSYCHOLOGY, 1890-1915

Scholars of the mid-twentieth century have occasionally mentioned the relevance of utopian thought in the sciences. Some have found that utopias are beneficial for creative thinking, for the articulation of social change variables, for the analysis of social life, and for the "testing" of scientific ideas.¹ Although the utility of utopias in scientific discourse receives mention, it has been the subject of few systematic studies. This chapter reviews the dimensions of utopias which scientists have employed. As such, it draws upon the few existent studies of the utopias of scientists and examines utopian thinking of scientists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, paying special attention to the case of psychology between 1890 and 1915.

Functions and Formats of Utopian Speculation

Historical studies indicate that at least four functions, not necessarily mutually exclusive, have been served by utopian thinking among scientists. First, scientists have written utopian tracts for the simple purpose of criticizing social conditions and occasionally, of complementing such criticism with descriptions of alternatives. The utopias of

the naturalist W.H. Hudson and the evolutionist Samuel Butler serve this function.² Although the critical function of utopian thought does not require the author's expertise as a scientist, other uses do. The second function of utopian writing is to provide a vehicle for forecasting, especially the place of science in the future. Forecasting usually involves extrapolating scientific ideas beyond their current form. For instance, A.R. Wallace reviewed the scientific achievements of the 1800s and predicted how science would progress in the following century.³ J.B.S. Haldane and Bertrand Russell prepared similar descriptions of future science in the 1920s. However, they contemplated not merely the future of theoretical science but also its potential impact on the quality of human life.⁴

The general use of utopian speculation as a means for forecasting is related to two, more specialized, functions. Scientists have employed utopian thinking to demonstrate the crucial need for a scientific enterprise, be it a theory or a discipline. Warren Hagstrom has investigated the need for many emerging disciplines to justify the proposed changes in the structure of science which the addition of those disciplines would bring, as well as to demonstrate their potential utility for other sciences.⁵ Hagstrom found that emerging disciplines also face the tasks of regulating relations within the discipline, and of enhancing self-conceptions of the members. • To help fulfill these needs,

members of such disciplines as botany, statistics, and zoology once devised utopias with statements of what "ought" to be. These statements contain "disciplinary ideologies" which "are partly alleged facts about the contributions of the discipline and partly evaluations about what is or should be considered 'interesting' or 'intrinsically important'."⁶

Finally, scientists in emerging and established fields have undertaken utopian speculations to explore various resolutions to the problem of changing relations between the science and society. This function of utopian thinking, demonstrated in the case of medical science,⁷ is often seen to go beyond publicizing the potential utility of a science by including plans for the redesign of society with scientific techniques. For instance, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, numerous technicians and engineers wrote utopias that stipulated the way to the ideal society through the application of technology.⁸

The format of utopian thinking by scientists has varied considerably. Scientists have created what can be termed traditional or explicit utopias which have taken the form of fictional accounts. For instance, Haldane followed his forecasting with a collection of fictional essays on possible worlds.⁹ But, as demonstrated in such studies as those of Hagstrom, utopian speculation has also appeared in more implicit forms either in theoretical statements, treatises,

or methodological guidelines. In one history of modern sociology these implicit utopias have been labelled "utopian timetables" and have been found in the theoretical writings of Spencer, Durkheim, Small, and Ward.¹⁰ Likewise, the writings of Karl Pearson, particularly his The Grammar of Science, have been found to contain utopian speculation.¹¹

In addition to differences in functions and formats, the utopian thinking of scientists has varied in the extent to which scientific ideas are incorporated. The previous chapter illustrated the uses of scientific ideas in utopias: in descriptions of the ideal, in constructions of the utopia, and in the prescribed role of science in the ideal society. This background to the assorted functions, formats and uses of science in utopian speculation by scientists, facilitates an examination of the case of psychology between 1890 and 1915.

Psychology in the Utopian Thinking of Scientists

The beginnings of modern scientific psychology typically are set in the 1860s, although the time is subject to occasional debate.¹² The consequent psychology of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is identified with the emergence of a "scientific" enterprise. The last thirty years of the nineteenth century have been said to represent a time of foundings -- laboratories, textbooks, journals, associations, departments -- and the first years of the twentieth century as a time of expansion of these establishments.

as well as of membership.¹³ The growth of psychology was marked both by increasing definition of institutional structure and by the development of methods and theories. By the 1930s psychologists were looking back on the turn of the century as the time when "psychology, as a science had made a definite start in life."¹⁴

Within this atmosphere of rapid disciplinary development, combined with the spirit of the fin de siècle and the heightened interest in science generally, psychology was treated in a number of utopian visions. Already mentioned was the greater use of psychological notions in fantastic and utopian literature. But scientists themselves also inquired into the possibilities and probabilities of the development of psychology, as a discipline and as a form of psychological ideas. One place they did so was in their forecasts and visions of science and society. Wallace's utopian forecast for the science of the coming century included two predictions for psychology, the refinement and application of phrenology and the acceptance of psychical research.¹⁵ A similar study published in 1901 by Ernst Haeckel anticipated advances in monistic psychology.¹⁶ As mentioned, the implicit utopian writings of Karl Pearson, published between 1900 and 1915, discussed the necessity for an improved science to resolve the nature and nurture problem (ostensibly in favor of the nature position) and to explain the psychological aspects of society (in order to implement the required reforms).¹⁷

The ideal future of psychology was contemplated not only by members of academic or research communities but also by lay scientists. For example, the explicit utopian fiction written by a pharmacist, John Uri Lloyd, in 1895, contained several fantastic possibilities for psychology. Among these possibilities was the suggestion that the individual could not merely introspect about the content of his own mind, but could directly observe it.¹⁸ Perhaps the most systematic prescriptions for psychological knowledge were written by Albert Chavannes, a now little-known American writer. In essays and a short-lived periodical, Chavannes presented an implicit utopia for a "mental science" which would not only explain the nature of man but also would direct social planning. For instance, his theory of man which was designed in a 1902 publication, Mental Science, superimposed a voluntaristic and idealist philosophy on Darwinian notions of social and biological evolution.¹⁹ Chavannes also wrote two utopian fictions about a society founded on his psychological theories.²⁰ However, the use of utopian fiction by lay scientists, even lay psychologists, did not always result in projections of a scientifically sophisticated society. Samuel Butler and Grant Allen, both authors of psychological works, wrote fictions where neither psychology nor any other science played a part in the ideal society. Their writings functioned chiefly as criticisms of current society and as speculations on possible alternatives.²¹

If academic and lay scientists in general were ruminating on the future or ideal psychological science, one might expect psychologists themselves to be concerned with the possibilities for their discipline. And so it was: some of their concerns appeared in professional discussions. For instance, Pierre Janet stipulated a crucial role for his science, psychiatry in France, in a future where "all patients from the simply rheumatic to the general parietic, will have their psychology minutely investigated in all their details."²² American psychologists also devised disciplinary utopias in their professional writings. In 1894, George Trumbell Ladd spoke of the ways in which psychology would contribute to education, medicine, and treatment of the insane, for "In general, why should we not expect to see our science contributing to the improved conduct and character of men, in the school, in the court-room, the prison, and the asylum?"²³ The APA presidential addresses of James McKeen Cattell and John Dewey, presented in 1896 and 1900 respectively, charted similar routes for psychology.²⁴ As did scientists in general, these psychologists writing between 1890 and 1915 foresaw psychology playing specific and significant roles in the refined society of the future.

During this period a number of psychological scientists used means other than professional writings to describe an

improved psychology or society. Like several of the scientists named above, Havelock Ellis, Francis Galton, and Gabriel Tarde imagined a place for psychology in a superior society. And like some of the other scientists, Ellis, Galton, and Tarde turned to the format of utopian fiction. But the fictions of these three men were the first to be authored by individuals who devoted a large part, if not all, of their careers to the study of psychology. Furthermore, in these three utopias the particular brand of psychology of the authors was employed for purposes in addition to speculating on the future of psychology. The preceding historical review of utopian thought by scientists provides an exploratory framework for examining the utopias of Ellis, Galton, and Tarde to determine the functions of the writings and the uses of psychology.

Havelock Ellis: Toward a Humanistic Idealism

Henry Havelock Ellis was born in Britain on the eve of Darwin's major publication (1859), and his life paralleled and eventually became intimately involved with the "Age of Evolutionism."²⁵ Although he now receives only passing reference in histories of psychology, Ellis was an active figure in psychology at the turn of the century. Most of the assorted psychological issues on which he wrote -- sex, genius, eugenics, criminality, and sex differences -- were analyzed by him within a general evolutionary theory.

generated from the ideas of Darwin and Weismann.²⁶

For the most part, Ellis's work reflected the emerging scientific psychology: the use of theories and methods of empirical science rather than purely rational analysis and argument. His use of evolutionary theory was similar to that of the psychological schools of pragmatism and functionalism. However, Ellis was not entirely comfortable with the prevailing belief that empirical science provided the best knowledge of reality. While he strongly supported the idea of scientific method in most of his work, Ellis also expressed certain doubts about the adequacy of science as a tool for exploring human nature. The earliest expression of this scepticism appeared in his book, The Nineteenth Century, A Dialogue in Utopia.²⁷

Ellis's utopia takes place in a period far removed from the nineteenth century. The protagonist, a scholar of that obscure century, describes the ancient time to a naive youth. This setting permitted Ellis to characterize the ways in which the life of the future departed from its nineteenth-century roots. He contrasted the savage wars, the pretenses of Christianity, and the Victorian imperialism with the international government, peace, and spiritual fulfillment of the future. He based the possibility for this utopian civilization on the process of social evolution; the nineteenth century represented a primitive stage of development.

The Nineteenth Century did not provide a precise

description of this future utopia. The details of government, scientific and technological innovations, education and social organization were scant. In this sense his goal was not simply to depict an ideal world but also to comment critically on current social and intellectual conditions and offer an alternative, a model which reconciled both his particular scientific orientation and his philosophy of life.

Science was a major issue in Ellis's utopian dialogue and the scholar presented an elaborate analysis of nineteenth-century science and its problematic role in society. Accordingly, he found that three aspects of science contributed to the backward and deplorable social conditions of that century: the status of science, the misuse of science, and the methods of scientific investigation. Although it is the last aspect that was directly related to psychology, the other two require elucidation before introducing Ellis's alternatives.

Ellis portrayed the status of nineteenth-century science as that of a "cult": many worshiped it blindly, and "the rest were ignorant, hostile, or indifferent."²⁸ The scientific cult opposed the ideals of art and this antagonism fostered further arrogance within science. The attitude of superiority, a presumption that science furnished a guide for life, was related to the second feature of nineteenth-century science, its misuse. The scholar noted that science

was immensely affected by economic interests and "became, instead of the servant of life, the mere slave of commerce."²⁹

Its ties with commerce further elevated the position of science in society and culminated in its abuse. Research and development were aimed at the interests of politicians and tradesmen while humanitarian problems and metaphysical questions were largely ignored. Consequently, men who were drawn into the scientific enterprise were not those with a genuine aptitude for that work but those with "commercial and pugnacious instincts."³⁰

The primary problem, concluded the scholar, was that science began at the wrong end of the universe. Its methods had been developed first to study the stars and "six thousand years passed before it reached man."³¹ For this reason, only a few nineteenth century scientists realized the precedence of the science of man. This inappropriate inversion of priorities was responsible for the low standard of living with associated disease, filth, and poverty. Another victim of this inversion was the human sciences, including psychology. The result was ignorance and neglect of crucial psychological issues. Mental diseases were misunderstood and mistreated. Abnormal variations in aptitudes and personalities mystified everyone and primitive societies were destroyed by imperialist exploitations, despite an awareness that their survival was essential to the investigation of human origins. The study of relationships between men and women was neglected

and "They knew all about the laws of what they called gravitation, but they thought it impure to ascertain the laws by which human beings are attracted to one another and repelled."³²

In summary, nineteenth-century science was depicted as occupying an inappropriately powerful position in society. The quality of existence remained low and the growth of truly more important science, namely medicine and psychology, was thwarted..

Contrasted with these conditions was the nature of science in the future utopia. Science had come to mean "both a universally recognized instrument of research into the unknown and the organization of the whole material part of life."³³ Science was subjected to the attainment of the finest ends of living. Beyond that, men of the future civilization recognized the restrictions of science. Through the development of science, these people came to realize its limitations and claimed that "We are less eager to know, partly because we have learned the futility of our knowledge."³⁴ Scientific knowledge liberated humanity from dependence and belief, yet other forms of knowledge became equally important, if not more so. Science permitted transcendence of man's earlier preoccupations with material aspects of life precisely because it provided solutions to most material problems. Man was thus free to explore art -- the art of living, creating, thinking, and acting -- and to

encompass a new philosophy of life. The philosophy of this utopia is important because it is closely aligned with Ellis's later thinking. Before turning to this subject, the relation of the concept of science to Ellis's own scientific research merits some discussion.

Comparison of Ellis's conceptions of science and psychology with his use of science in the utopian dialogue can be pursued on three levels. First, the scientific basis upon which Ellis could make his utopia appear plausible, the means by which he constructed a utopia, was evolutionary notions. Situated in the distant future, his utopia had evolved through major social changes, and a portion of the book is devoted to tracing these changes. The distinction between the social evolution of civilization and the biological evolution of the human species is not clearly stated in the utopia. Ellis's use of evolutionary theory to substantiate his utopia is consistent with the role which that theory played in most of his psychological research. His studies of criminality, sex differences, and genius incorporated concepts of variation, laws of heredity, and ideas about natural and sexual selection.³⁵ In his psychology Ellis also confronted the recurrent problem of the relation between social and biological evolution. And like the approach taken in his utopia, his stand on the relation was not clearly defined. His solution to the problem ultimately was one that has been coined the "Darwinian solution":

social evolution could be perceived as a consequence of the biological evolution of intelligence and instincts.³⁶ And Ellis's unique refinement of the solution lay in his adamant conviction that social modifications would become permanent only if they were in complete agreement with biological evolution.

Second, the maintenance of Ellis's utopian civilization also depended on certain scientific ideas. Evolutionary notions could be adopted readily as the operating principle in the utopia. They could guide social planning and organization. But the utopia was not maintained with the same scientific concepts that were used to construct it. Instead, Ellis replaced the idea of positivist science with a view that resembled both humanism and metaphysical idealism.³⁷ In utopia the overwhelming tenet was of doing rather than knowing. Creative life required numerous "arts" which all constituted modalities of the unitary idea of the art of life. None took precedence and none yielded a superior understanding of reality. The idea of progress suggested by evolutionary theory was illusory. It was only in the past that people were "quite unaware that the 'progress' could be in either direction, and was merely due to that perpetual slight novelty, the continuous rhythmic vibrations in which life consists."³⁸

Although these ideas concerning life and science were not apparent in the methods of Ellis's psychological

research at the time the utopia was published, they would gradually come to guide much of his writing. Over twenty years later Ellis assembled these ideas in his major philosophical statement, The Dance of Life.³⁹ His ideas of harmony in the act of living, the cyclic nature of change, and the illusion of progress were subsequently supported by the ideas of two philosophers to whom Ellis referred: Bergson, with his concept of "becoming" through emergent evolution, and Vaihinger, with his notions about the "fictions" of science and material existence.⁴⁰

The final discussion of science occurs in the critical commentary on nineteenth-century science. As mentioned earlier, science of this period was described as an over-valued "cult" whose pursuits and applications were aberrant. At first glance this attitude toward nineteenth-century science might appear antagonistic to Ellis's own scientific ventures. Yet all of his research concerned psychological issues, precisely the subject that the utopian citizens found lacking in the ancient sciences. Despite its focus on human life, Ellis's own psychology might still fall subject to another of the utopian's criticisms. The psychology of Ellis and his peers was consistent with the stance of scientific positivism, the notion that reality could be known only through the scientific methods of observation and without reliance on metaphysics.⁴¹ His utopians had rejected this positivist conception of science, and therefore,

Ellis's commentary on nineteenth-century science includes self-criticism.

The Nineteenth Century enabled Ellis to evaluate the current state of society, specifically the role of science. It also exposed the nucleus of what were to become his foremost beliefs. These topics would be unlikely subject matter for the scientific journals in which he normally published. And the replies that Ellis received when he presented copies of the book to colleagues suggest a limited endorsement of his ideas. The comments of A.R. Wallace, a scientist who himself had rejected positivistic science;⁴² were the most sympathetic. Wallace wrote that he "agreed with almost all of it. It's a terrific condemnation of our false civilization, and I am glad to find that you think so nearly as I do."⁴³ William James mentioned the probability that most readers would not accept Ellis's "little book on our precious civilization."⁴⁴

Francis Galton: Final Plans for Eugenics

The versatility and ingenuity in the works of Francis Galton justify the title of "Victorian-Genius" that a biographer recently bestowed upon him.⁴⁵ Despite Galton's seemingly diverse accomplishments, most of his work focuses on one interest, the statistical study of evolutionary

notions. He was concerned with the inherited qualities of organisms and the means to measure them. In terms of the history of psychology, Galton was the "pioneer who brought about the union between psychological methods of measurement and the theory of evolution."⁴⁶ His excursions into such subjects as thumbprint analysis, composite photographs, anthropometrics, and reproduction in rabbits all bore relevance to the problem of inheritance and evolution.

Born in 1822, Francis Galton came from a distinguished British family. His interest in heredity and evolution began shortly after the first major publication on that subject by his cousin, Charles Darwin.⁴⁷ In 1865, Galton published his first paper on the inheritance of talent and character in animals, including humans.⁴⁸ This paper outlined the fundamental thoughts which were to guide Galton's research for the remaining forty-five years of his life.

In "Hereditary Talent and Character" Galton explained how domestication of animals affects the inheritance of certain characters. This analysis led to the assertion that human characters evolved similarly. Here Galton introduced the logic which typified his later research: "I justify my conclusions by the statistics I now proceed to adduce, which I believe are amply sufficient to command conviction."⁴⁹ He also contemplated two major evolutionary problems which would appear again in his later work. These were the inheritance of acquired characteristics and the

continuity of the germ plasm.⁵⁰ It was in this early paper that Galton noted the possibility of breeding men for superior traits and abilities, specifically intelligence. Galton stated that "If a twentieth of the cost and pains were spent in measures for the improvement of the human race that are spent in the improvement of the breed of horses and cattle, what a galaxy of genius we might not create."⁵¹ These suggestions prefaced a brief proposal for a utopia founded on eugenics

in which a system of competitive examinations for girls, as well as for youths, had been so developed as to embrace every important quality of mind and body, and where a considerable sum was yearly allotted to the endowment of such marriages as promised to yield children who would grow into eminent servants of the state.⁵²

Galton was broaching a subject that almost fifty years later was to comprise his last intellectual endeavor, the creation of a utopia.⁵³

Before considering Galton's utopia, it is worthwhile to trace his involvement in the eugenics movement. The word "eugenics" did not appear in "Hereditary Talent and Character" but is believed to have originated with Galton himself in Inquiry into the Human Faculty (1883).⁵⁴ Although eugenics was introduced in Human Faculty it was not until 1901 that Galton took concrete steps toward realizing his eugenics aims.⁵⁵ In the next few years he contacted numerous individuals for support for and advice on eugenics.⁵⁶

founded a research fellowship in National Eugenics at the University of London in 1904. Eugenics became officially defined as "the study of agencies under social control that may improve on the racial qualities of future generations, either physically or mentally."⁵⁷ But Galton gave a more explicit definition in the concluding paragraph of his autobiography of 1908.

Its first object is to check the birth-rate of the Unfit, instead of allowing them to come into being, though doomed in large numbers to perish prematurely. The second object is the improvement of the race by furthering the productivity of the Fit by early marriages and healthful rearing of their children. Natural selection rests upon excessive production and wholesale destruction; Eugenics on bringing no more individuals into the world than can be properly cared for, and those only of the best stock.⁵⁸

In his final years Galton invested time and finances in the eugenics cause. Just as his 1865 article had implied, he seriously considered examinations and grades of fitness, diplomas, and social support for those fit individuals to rear offspring.⁵⁹ Although he believed these programs should be administered by government, he went so far as to imagine eugenics should or could

suffice as the basis of a national religion, in the sense of that word as defined by J.S. Mill, for, though it be without any ultra-rational sanction, it would serve 'to direct the emotions and desires of a nation towards an ideal object, recognized as rightly paramount over all selfish objects of desire.'⁶⁰

It should be noted that Galton, an agnostic, perceived religion as an anthropological phenomenon. That is, religion was necessary to social stability and functioned as a deterrent to selfish predispositions.⁶¹

Exploring the possibility of eugenics comprised Galton's last professional activity. And in his final years he resumed another early project, the design of a utopia. On several occasions after the publication of the paper, "Hereditary Talent and Character," he noted the idea of a utopia built around one or another of his research findings.⁶² But it was only in his final ten years that Galton attempted to formulate this utopia in a novel entitled Kantsaywhere.⁶³

The novel never appeared in print although Galton tried to publish it shortly before his death.⁶⁴ Even before his death a niece had objected to the love-episodes, and during the settlement of his estate she destroyed most of Kantsaywhere.⁶⁵ The remainder of the work was forwarded to Karl Pearson and was included in his biography of Galton.⁶⁶ From these fragments it is possible to gain some idea of the utopia envisioned by Galton.

Kantsaywhere contains many of the literary devices traditionally found in utopian fiction. The story supposedly originates from journal entries of a young statistics professor, I. Donoghue.⁶⁷ The description of Donoghue's journey and discovery of Kantsaywhere have been destroyed,

but segments regarding his experiences in the country remain. Upon entering Kantsaywhere he met and became attracted to a young citizen, Miss Allfancy. Since she was about to be examined at the Eugenics College, Donoghue decided to take these examinations himself and determine what degree he could obtain. The existing portions of Kantsaywhere describe the Eugenics College, the methods of examination, and the system of granting eugenics diplomas or degrees. Only short excerpts on the culture and physical environment of Kantsaywhere remain.

The governing principles of Kantsaywhere are based on the genetic qualities of the citizens who "think much more of the race than of the individual."⁶⁸ The Trustees of the Eugenics College hold a supervisory position and administer all examinations for genetic fitness, examinations that are essential in determining an individual's right to marry and bear offspring. The numerous degree or certificates awarded by the college represented the level of genetic fitness. There was an elaborate system of points and stars awarded after examination, and an equally elaborate method of ascertaining who may marry whom on the basis of their cumulative points and final certification level. Those who failed the examinations were paid to leave Kantsaywhere, the insane and mentally defective were cared for in segregated areas, and those of undesirable genetic fitness were punished if they reproduced.

The examination was administered by the skilled staff of the Eugenics College and consisted of four sections: anthropomorphic, medical; ancestral, and aesthetic and literary. It was in describing these examinations that Galton most clearly drew upon his own research. The test of ancestral patterns resembled Galton's work on eminent families.⁶⁹ The anthropomorphic tests were similar to those constructed by Galton. Even the examination laboratory resembled his first laboratory.⁷⁰

The social organization of Kantsaywhere was a direct outcome of genetic engineering. Statistics were utilized to verify the country's maintenance of a steady population and to determine the civic worth of each citizen.⁷¹ Even friendships and social events were determined by the certification levels of the individuals involved.

Little information remains about the physical environment, the people, and their habits. Galton briefly described idyllic residential areas where "the houses near the town are practically villas, for the use of town dwellers, each with a small garden for flowers, vegetables and fruit."⁷² From the remaining segments of the story, it appears that Galton was more concerned with the physical stature and psychology of the utopians than with the physical environment. Both sexes had massive and healthy physiques, yet the women were truly "feminine". The people were not overly emotional but displayed a delicate balance of reserve and

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expressivity such that they "were gay without frivolity, friendly without gush, and intelligent without brilliancy."⁷³

The primary recreational interest was photography, specifically the composite portraits of families. Here is an additional correspondence between the utopia and Galton's scientific work, for he himself had compiled and studied composite portraits.⁷⁴

Only a single paragraph about the religion of Kantsaywhere exists. Galton preferred to call it a "superstition" because it had not "yet crystallized into a dogmatic creed."⁷⁵

This primitive creed mirrored the citizens' beliefs in the priority of racial concerns over those of individuals. The citizens looked upon life as "a huge organization in which every separate living thing plays an unconscious part, much as the separate cells do in a living person."⁷⁶ Galton saw the creed as a personification of conscience into numerous composite portraits, as a larger spirit composed of individual consciences. The ideas of race and spiritualism became confounded for he claimed that "There seems to be some confusion between the family, the racial, and the universal clouds of spirit-watchers. They are supposed to co-exist separately and yet may merge into one or many different wholes."⁷⁷ Except for the fact that the religion of Kantsaywhere was still in the process of formation, it was a spiritual counterpart to his scientific doctrine of racial life.

In summary, a single scientific concept was used in the creation and maintenance of Kantsaywhere. Eugenics explained the possibility of that unique country and the mental and physical well-being of its citizens. It formed the basis of government, education, and even religion. Eugenics beliefs even regulated cultural life since the selection of friends was determined by the individual's level of eugenic fitness and the chief pastime was the admiration of inheritance through composite photography and genealogical records.

Gabriel Tarde: The Individual in the Social Process

Gabriel Tarde differed from Galton and Ellis in that his formal education was not in the sciences, but in law, and that his study of psychological issues began late in his career. Although Tarde usually referred to his investigations as 'sociology', his work was intimately related to psychological problems and he was posthumously declared the "founder of social psychology" by several noted members of that discipline.⁷⁸ Yet Tarde, like Ellis, did not become an influential figure in the social sciences. Terry Clark has explained Tarde's obscurity by

the fact that he spent most of his life outside of Paris and the university system. Also, his reputation suffered because his work was out of harmony with the dominant intellectual temper of the time: Tarde was only mildly religious in an age of militant Catholic and anti-Catholic sentiment; he was not politically involved in an age of

engagement; he was neither a true positivist nor an antipositivist when most intellectuals were one or the other.⁷⁹

Furthermore, Tarde's theoretical work opposed that of Emile Durkheim,⁸⁰ and has probably suffered from the recent popularity of the latter's ideas.

Tarde was born in 1843 in Sarlat where his father was a judge. After completing legal studies in 1869, Tarde practiced law near his home town until 1894 when he was appointed director of the Bureau of Statistics in the Ministry of Justice. Three years later he was elected Professor of Modern Philosophy at the Collège de France.⁸¹

The evolution of Tarde's research is less known than his professional career in law. In keeping with his relative obscurity, Tarde's theoretical work has received little attention since his death in 1904; what is probably the most complete English account appears in a 1909 publication on psychological interpretations of society.⁸² His earlier writings were about criminality and incorporated data from his legal experiences.⁸³ In these works Tarde criticized the criminological theories of both Lombroso and Durkheim. Instead of explaining crime as biologically determined or as a "normal" social event, Tarde maintained that it was a social phenomenon with a basis in the individual.⁸⁴

It was in the course of his statistical investigations on crime and the resultant discovery of fluctuations in crime rates that Tarde first formulated theories of social action.

These theories were developed in three major publications and summarized in a fourth. Familiarity with these works is essential to understanding Tarde's utopia.

Laws of Imitation was published in 1890 and contains an argument for the existence of imitation as a fundamental ingredient of social processes.⁸⁵ Tarde observed that all phenomena, social and physical, not only exhibit variations but also show resemblances consisting of the repetition of events. While the biological form of repetition is heredity, and the physical form is vibration, Tarde believed that the social form is imitation. In society, imitation serves to transmit and reproduce social processes; Tarde extended this analogy to the point of defining society in terms of imitation and imitation in terms of "a kind of somnambulism."⁸⁶ As such, imitation occurs both consciously and unconsciously, in groups and in individuals.⁸⁷ Changes in the social process arise from invention or "any innovation or improvement, however slight, which is made in any previous innovation throughout the range of social phenomena."⁸⁸ Only the most successful inventions survive and eventually become imitations. The causes of this selection of the fittest inventions were laid out in laws that were introduced in Laws of Imitation and elaborated in La logique sociale and L'opposition universelle.⁸⁹

Tarde's laws of imitation explain how inventions result in imitations. These laws are called "logical" when a

particular imitation is adopted because it is in accord with the individual's aims or principles, and "non-logical" when an imitation has serendipitous bases such as circumstances of an individual's birth and status.⁹⁰ Tarde believed that an innovation may counter an existing imitation, and he termed the resultant conflict of the two processes opposition. These conflicting ideas struggle for ascendancy through "logical duels". The duels are terminated through either suppression of one idea, war and consequent victory of one idea, or reconciliation due to the appearance of an even newer invention.⁹¹ While Tarde claimed that many inventions arise from group processes, he also recognized the creation of inventions by individuals. He maintained that the individual inventor has special characteristics, such that "To innovate, to discover, to awake for an instant from his dream of home and country the individual must escape, for the time being, from his social surroundings. Such unusual audacity makes him ~~super-social~~ rather than social."⁹²

These concepts and laws are summarized in Social Laws, published in 1890. The volume contains Tarde's arguments for the science of social life and for the priority of the concepts of repetition, opposition, and adaptation in all of the sciences. It elucidates the idea that underlies his scientific principles, that of a harmonious synthesis in life where "everything undoubtedly starts with the infinitely

minute; and we may add that it probably returns thither, this is its alpha and omega."⁹³ The idea of harmonious synthesis involves a dialectic of the three primary processes of imitation, invention, and opposition. His social science culminates with the proposition "that we may believe that all three of these factors work together to effect the expansion of universal variation in its highest, widest, and profoundest individual and personal forms."⁹⁴

Tarde's final ideas have been credited to an interest in Hegel, and the relation of his concepts to those of the German is apparent in Social Laws.⁹⁵ However, Tarde did not claim to be successor to anyone's thought, although he did acknowledge the influence of Cournot, a philosopher who propounded a form of idealism.⁹⁶

Tarde's social psychological and legal studies were supplemented by literary ventures. Aside from the editorship of several journals, he wrote a number of plays and other works of fiction.⁹⁷ One of these works, Fragment d'histoire future, is a scientific view into the future, a utopia based on scientific laws and natural events. The story first appeared in a periodical in 1896. Nine years later it was re-published as a novel, in both French and English. The English translation was titled Underground Man.⁹⁸

In his preface to Underground Man, H.G. Wells admitted difficulty in ascertaining whether or when Tarde intended

satire or prophecy. Wells remarked that in describing how civilization overcomes possible extinction, Tarde had "mocked our conceit in our race's ability to do organized and amazing things."⁹⁹ Yet Wells hypothesized that Tarde's new conception of human intercourse was presented only "half-mockingly."¹⁰⁰

Underground Man commences after a devastating war at the end of the twentieth century. The first quarter of the story describes the evolution of culture following this war. There first occurred a major boom in scientific and technological knowledge, and microbiology eliminated disease, electrical technology decreased the need for human labor, and biological knowledge enabled the practice of eugenics. Science became the fundamental form of knowledge, and it seemed that all became known. Next there evolved an age of art, and the classics again became popular; even cuneiform was reintroduced. Finally, a "philosopher financier" appeared and built a civilization on utilitarian principles and on praise of mediocrity. The financier rejected Comte's sociology with its analogy of the polity as head of society. Instead, he favored Agrippa's notion of politics as the stomach, an indispensable, sensible and useful organ that is disagreeable to the eye and anything but aesthetic or brilliant in its qualities. The ultimate in mediocrity was displayed in the arts; for example, the financier had an aluminum statue of Louis Phillipe constructed and bordered by a garden of cauliflowers.¹⁰¹

At the height of this mediocre civilization (2489 A.D.), the world faced disaster: the sun went out. Its expiration was immediately felt in the freezing and eventual death of most life forms. The few survivors who had huddled at the equator were saved by the ingenuity of a soldier, Miltiades. In a lengthy soliloquy he convinced the surviving humans that other energies besides those of the sun were available but they lay far beneath the earth's surface. The remaining members of civilization had no alternative but to follow Miltiades' plans for an underground habitat.

The rest of Underground Man traces the formation and evolution of these subterranean peoples (Néo-troglodytes). Because the only animal foods available were those 'mined' from the ice graves on the surface and no vegetation survived without the sun's rays, the new civilization lived on the earth's mineral wealth. Physics and chemistry were immediately advanced and applied to synthesize minerals into foodstuffs and clothing. While many artifacts and books were carried from the surface and used to establish cavern museums, the art which flourished underground was architecture. The tunnels, caves and apartments were far more magnificent than any former terranian structure.

The principal feature of the underworld civilization was the elimination of most of organic nature. Once freed from nature, man could attend to his raison d'être, his social life. The organic elements "no longer" interpose

between men, and all sorts of vulgar wants no longer hinder the progress of human faculties."¹⁰² The absence of nature substantially advanced the purification of society and the realization of true humanity.

Underground Man contains obvious elements of jest and satire, particularly in the period prior to the solar extinction. Such jest is apparent in descriptions of cauliflower gardens and the mania for mastering cuneiform. After that, Tarde's motives seem more solemn and as Wells had noted, the jest and fantasy continue "but always with the gleam of definite intention coming and going within sight of the surface."¹⁰³ The seriousness of Tarde's intentions is evident in the precision with which he constructed the utopia and incorporated his social theories. While the science utilized to construct the underground utopia is simply physics and laws of the conservation of energy, the new world's maintenance and evolution are applications of his theoretical postulates of society and social processes.

The world of the Neo-troglodytes, the underground society, relies on two seminal concepts from Tarde's social psychology, invention and imitation. Inventions occur throughout the work but become most salient in discussions of the period following the sun's extinction. New activities appeared during the design of an underworld dwelling when a character exemplifying Tarde's concept of the inventive genius led in the new world's construction. Following the

inventions necessary for survival came imitation by the other survivors. Tarde employed the device of a solar extinction to illustrate how social invention followed from certain environmental changes. It provided a metaphor for his belief that "imitation is the necessary weakening of that which is imitated and that new inventions or entirely fresh sources for imitation are therefore necessary for the timely reanimation of expiring social energy."¹⁰⁴

In the period prior to the sun's failure, civilization experienced repetitious stages followed by novel shifts in social organization. Even the sun's demise was portrayed as a part of nature's cyclic changes. The innovations occurring after the catastrophe illustrated adaptation.

A third process in Tarde's conceptualization, opposition, was evident in periodic outbursts and a major war among the Neo-troglodytes. The oppositional process is perhaps most evident in the discovery of another underground society consisting of a group of Chinese whose social disorganization and overpopulation contrasted with the social stability of the utopians.

Tarde's application of his theories was not limited to the means by which he constructed the utopian society. He extended theoretical ideas to explain the new world's maintenance and used his views on science to describe the utopia's scientific milieu. The unique conditions underground permitted him to express his ultimate vision of human nature

and its potential. With the elimination of all other natural elements and, consequently, any necessity for economic exchange of products, society could become devoted to the social, "the exchange of reflections."¹⁰⁵ Utopian existence mirrors the essence of Tarde's conception of man. Although most of his writings concerned social processes, his theories were based on particular ideas of the individual. He perceived the individual's relations to others as explicable through "inter-cerebral" psychology. A relationship between individuals "means that we experience the sensation of a sentient thing, the volition of a conating thing; and the belief in a believing thing, -- the perception, in short, of a personality in which the perceiving personality is reflected, and which the latter cannot deny without denying itself."¹⁰⁶ In his utopia the true properties of the individual could be nourished and all social interactions could be transformed. If all economic, natural and social processes were satisfactorily dealt with, Tarde believed that the final state would "strengthen in each of us the distinctive traits of our individuality. Then the finest flower of our social life, the aesthetic life, would blossom forth, and as it became full-blown all men would come to have a share in it --."¹⁰⁷ These were Tarde's concluding remarks in his Laws of Imitation. He described the ultimate state of civilization, one that could emerge according to the social processes outlined in his theories. This

state was the culmination of the dialectic that Tarde had envisioned. "It is from the midst of exact repetitions, absolute contrasts, and perfect harmonies that the best examples of general diversity, picturesqueness, and disorder appear, namely, the individual characteristics of things."¹⁰⁸

Tarde offered his views on science in the course of describing the utopia's achievements. In the underground society, all sciences flourished, even those fields whose subject matter no longer existed including astronomy, microbiology, and comparative physiology. He admitted the usefulness of these sciences yet admired the happiness they brought as a pastime. He also noted that these natural sciences were not accorded "the exaggerated and fundamentally anti-social importance they formerly usurped during two centuries."¹⁰⁹ However, his apparently satirical commentary on past science was not extended to two disciplines, chemistry and psychology. In discussing these sciences, Tarde again touched upon a fundamental interest. Because both chemistry and psychology led to an atomistic theory of the self, these sciences exposed the existence of the self and consciousness in all matter. Further, the discoveries in psychology enriched doctrines on life and death, thus freeing the Neo-troglodytes to explore, "with a light heart", aesthetics and philosophical systems.¹¹⁰ In this exposition on utopian science, Tarde distinguished between inductive and deductive enterprises and reinforced his reductionist

beliefs that when investigating social processes, "The sociologist should yield to the psychologist."¹¹¹

In summary, in Underground Man, the possible consequences of Tarde's social system found actualization. When first introduced in Social Laws and Laws of Imitation, these consequences were proposed only as tentative hypotheses. In his utopia, Tarde capitalized on ideas which, in his other writings, were posed as theoretical conjectures.

Utopias for Psychology

Despite theoretical diversity, Ellis, Galton, and Tarde have much in common. They all stood at the edge of the new science with convictions that somehow they could make contributions. Ellis, Galton, and Tarde were personally involved in varying degrees in social reform, specifically reform based on scientific knowledge. And in the two decades bordering the turn of the century, these individuals wrote utopian fiction showing a general preoccupation with psychological ideas and an orientation toward their own psychological theories.

It could be argued that these works actually represent three explorations into creative literature, and that they should not be evaluated as serious efforts to advertise psychological notions or moral ideas about social improvement. The question of the intentions for their science or their theories would then become superfluous, and of little

relevance to the state of psychology. If they are seen merely as creative literature, a pastime of the authors, then it can be questioned whether or not these works contain the calls for social improvement found in other utopias.

Two conditions suggest that the authors wrote with serious intentions to clarify ideas expressed elsewhere in their works. First, these works represented ideas which were integral to the psychological research of the respective authors. Second, some of these ideas were unknown, ignored, or unpalatable to many in the scientific community. The first point was demonstrated in the preceding analysis of the utopias; the second deserves further comment.

These three psychologists built their utopias with ideas that were not accepted by the larger community of psychological scientists. Ellis's idealism was antithetical to the current atmosphere of positivism. Even James's complimentary letter to Ellis mentioned reservations about any general acceptance of the latter's ideas. Although Galton's utopia never reached the public, many of his prescriptions for eugenics did. During his lifetime these plans were frequently met with criticism from fellow scientists. Tarde's utopia contains skeptical accounts of the prevalent notions of positivism and includes psychological concepts that were contradictory to the ideas of other eminent theorists.

The fact that the ideas espoused in these utopias were

potential subjects for criticism is evidence that the authors had serious intentions. These works depict the unrealized dreams of three psychological scientists. They illustrate the tendency for some scientists to propose particular scientific ideas with the conviction that when applied, these ideas would hasten the realization of desired societal conditions. With the growing interest and involvement in the new science of psychology, it is understandable that scientists who expressed such a tendency would draw on that science.

Utopias and the History of Psychology

As we shall see, the foundation of psychology as a legitimate scientific discipline did not end its use in utopian speculations. Before turning to these later utopias, an important but as yet unasked question must be answered. What is the relevance of these psychological utopias for the history of psychology? Since the ideas being considered appeared in fictional form, and were disseminated in non-professional publications, did they in any way influence the activities of other psychologists? There is no evidence that they did. The utopias were neither cited nor discussed by other psychologists despite the fact that other works of the four authors received considerable attention.

Nevertheless, the psychological utopias already considered as well as those to be examined in later chapters,

offer several contributions to the history of psychology. For one thing, the utopias make explicit certain underlying dimensions of the authors' preference for one psychological approach over others. From the utopias it is learned that the preference for a psychological interpretation was substantially influenced by personal values in much the same way as were the ideals of a better society. These evaluative reasons for pursuing particular psychologies may not be explicit in an individual's scientific works. When they are present they frequently take the form of unquestioned assumptions, generalizations from research, or apparently tangential comments about whatever topic is being discussed.

The values in an individual's psychology can be examined through methods other than the study of his utopian speculations. For instance, value preferences can be sought in the personal records of a psychologist's life and compared with his scientific orientations. Alternatively, the logic of a psychologist's scientific propositions can be analyzed to determine underlying value assumptions. However, the preceding examination of the works of Ellis, Galton, and Tarde indicate that the study of utopias offers another means of identifying such values. From a study of The Nineteenth Century it was learned that Ellis desired a psychology that would acknowledge spiritual unity and harmony as well as the value of empirical understanding. The utopia also reveals Ellis's limited endorsement of current science

(despite his active participation in it), his desire to see the exaltation of human life, and his rejection of any society based on capitalism and imperialism. Galton was committed to the idea that the most important human quality was biological fitness, specifically intellectual ability, and he hoped that psychological knowledge would be engaged to optimize intelligence. By examining Kantsaywhere, it became evident that Galton feared the deterioration of the human stock and that he oriented many of his scientific efforts toward the eventual breeding for intelligence. It also was found that he acknowledged a need for religion and tried to reduce the apparent conflict between religious and scientific thought by proffering a scientific explanation of the need for religion. Tarde tried to demonstrate that it was possible to establish laws of social phenomena, and that man could use these laws to better society and to contemplate his intellectual potential. Underground Man illustrated not merely Tarde's aversion to materialism and mediocrity in politics, but also his promotion of the ideas of individual enlightenment and of the social value of exceptional individuals.

Examination of the utopias also exposes the interplay of psychology and society. In general, it illuminates the influence of social trends on psychological thought, the popularization of psychology, and the mutual anticipations of psychologists and laymen about the potential of a

psychological science. These facets of psychology's past are typically omitted from conventional histories. Yet the utopias of Ellis, Galton, and Tarde show that the writers were concerned, as scientists, with social problems and felt that their scientific expertise could aid amelioration of those problems. The utopias also indicate that the three writers believed in the efficacy of disseminating their science to the public in order to promote a better understanding of social life. Briefly stated, the writers at some point evaluated their psychologies according to criteria of what represented viable scientific knowledge and socially useful knowledge.

The preferences for a particular psychological system, social order, and association between psychological science and society comprise the moral intentions in the psychological utopias. Such intentions are not discussed in conventional histories and, in fact, are not always easy to identify. As psychology grew as an independent and objective science, the expected role of the psychologist shifted accordingly. In keeping with other natural and social scientists, psychologists apparently acknowledged the distinction between advocacy and objectivity, reform and analysis, values and facts.¹¹² This role shift was neither immediate nor ever completed, and conventional histories err in leaving the impression that it was.¹¹³ The assumed change in roles has tended to obscure moral commitments held by psychologists.

In utopian speculation, intentions are not hidden or omitted, for such speculation entails expression of preferred conditions and the conduct necessary to realize those conditions. Therefore, the utopias of psychologists provide information about these intentions and the way in which psychological knowledge is consistent with their attainment.

In summary, the cases of Ellis, Galton, and Tarde illustrate several ways in which psychological notions were incorporated in utopian formulations. Psychology was used not merely to enhance a story but also to explain ideal human conditions and the methods of realizing or maintaining these conditions. The works demonstrate several functions of utopian speculation for the scientist. The writers criticized social mores and offered preferred alternatives. They employed the utopia to give public exposure to their respective theories. They suggested the application of psychological knowledge to advance society.

Utopias by American Psychologists, 1915-1930

The next four chapters examine the cases of psychologists who wrote utopias between 1915 and 1930, a period when psychology had secured academic and public recognition. Only four psychologists wrote utopias during this period: G. Stanley Hall, William McDougall, Hugo Munsterberg, and John B. Watson. These four men occupied prominent positions in the discipline. Hall had founded the American Psychological Association, established a number of laboratories,

advanced research on human development, and trained a large number of productive psychologists. McDougall had emigrated from Britain when Harvard University called upon him to help direct their psychology program. He was reputed for his physiological research and for his innovative work on social psychology, primarily his theory of human social instincts. The German-born Hugo Münsterberg had also been called to Harvard's psychology department (about twenty years earlier) to replace William James. Beyond his teaching of experimental techniques, Münsterberg contributed significantly to the development of applied psychology. John B. Watson was the major promulgator of behaviorism in American psychology. Even after his resignation from academia, he directed attention to behaviorism through his suggestions to use psychological techniques for social control.

From a general comparison, it appears that these four psychologists differed from earlier psychological utopists, including Ellis, Galton, and Tarde, in the functions which their utopian writings would serve. Due to their prominent positions and the expanded forum for communicating psychological ideas, it is improbable that the four psychologists wrote utopias strictly to publicize their theories. Because the four psychologists' work and status were consistent with the scientific image that psychology had attained, it is unlikely that they wrote utopias merely as social reformers.

The scientists' utopias reviewed in this chapter suggest another possible function of utopian speculation, discussion of the relations between a science and society. By the late teens, psychology had become a recognized scientific discipline in America. But the relations of the field to other social institutions and of psychologists to the management of these institutions, was yet to be firmly established. Therefore, the place of psychological science in society was a reasonable subject for commentary, including the hypothetical discussions found in utopias. However, an exploration of these functions in the four utopias must be preceded by a clearer understanding of the utopian ideals.

In the next four chapters, the utopias of Hall, McDougall, Münsterberg, and Watson are assessed in terms of their ideals and their incorporation of psychological notions. Once identified, these ideals and uses of psychological notions are compared with the authors' other writings to determine if they are consistent. Finally, the authors' conceptions of science in the ideal society are related to their other writings on the role of science. In fulfilling these tasks, the discussion is structured so as to present with integrity the emphases of the authors.

CHAPTER IV

G.. STANLEY HALL AND THE IDEAL COMMUNITY

G. Stanley Hall has been generally applauded in histories of psychology for the role he played in the founding of American experimental psychology. He organized the first psychological journal, the first psychological association, the first Wundtian laboratory in America, and the American visit of Sigmund Freud.¹ Despite the enumeration of Hall's organizational and educational concerns, most historians have concurred with E.G. Boring that Hall was "not primarily an administrator" but pre-eminently a versatile psychologist.² They briefly mention Hall's genetic psychology and related evolutionary notions, his interest in psychoanalysis and religion, and his design of questionnaires.

These historians have not examined Hall's comprehensive view of evolution, his active concern with social problems, the philosophical assumptions of his theories, and his prescriptions for improving humanity. Several biographers have reported the life of Hall differently. They have examined the relations between the psychologist's theories of adolescence and his personal conflicts, his fascination with social philosophies of community over those of individualism, and the expression of Puritan attitudes in his psychology. Hall wrote not merely as a publicist for his

profession, his culture, and his psychology but also as a critical evaluator of them. Written late in his career, Hall's utopia incorporated many of these evaluations. In the utopia Hall drew upon his many psychological studies, the social upheavals of early twentieth century and, in his opinion, a perspective of synthesis which only old age can give.⁴

"The Fall of Atlantis" is Hall's description of a supreme civilization. The story is attributed to a labor arbitrator writing while in a week-long trance. Upon awakening, the arbitrator discovers that he has written a story about the lost Atlantis that was narrated by a cultural anthropologist who visited the city's remains in 2000 A.D. From the ruins beneath the ocean it was learned that Atlantis had at one time governed the civilized world and had developed a culture that far exceeded any contemporary vision of progress. Atlantis represented perfection in humanity in every detail. Its language was the most flexible expression of the human psyche, medicine had excelled to the point of becoming a philosophic science, the political structure integrated all known codes of justice, and education affected all facets and stages of life.

The underwater remains produced evidence that the fall of Atlantis was not cataclysmic but rather a gradual degeneration initiated by forces of individualism and by physical changes in the environment. Social practices

such as medicine declined as citizens broke communal health regulations for the sake of individual gain and physicians began to practice for personal profit. Law, religion, education, science, and the family faltered similarly. At the same time Atlantis began to sink into the sea. The physical decline was a natural and recurring phenomenon where land replaced sea and vice versa. Over time the island-continent became engulfed by water and its citizens either drowned or embarked on sea journeys in search of new land.

Although science is not a primary focus of the story, it was named as foremost among the achievements of Atlantis. Hall also employed scientific ideas in his construction of the Atlantis story. He explained development of the physical world in evolutionary terms and the society in cultural evolutionary terms. Social practices which resulted from cultural evolution served to maintain the utopian city-state. It is in describing these achievements and roles of science that Hall frequently included his psychological notions.

The myth has a long history of serious usages. From Plato onward writers have adopted the Atlantis theme for philosophical, moral, and scientific purposes.⁵ These conditions suggest that regardless of its status as mythology, the utopian facet of the Atlantis story deserves attention. The classic story of Atlantis might be considered rather

untenable as a utopian vision because of its romantic, historical, and tragic tones. But knowledge about the background of the Atlantis theme gives evidence against relegating this ideal society to the shelves of mythology. Late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries researchers sought the basis for the Atlantis legend with the scientific methods of geology, paleogeology, anthropology and biology. About the time that Hall wrote "The Fall of Atlantis" other scientists were undertaking excursions in search of the remains of the city.⁶

A format for analysis of Hall's Atlantis and of the psychological ideas in it is suggested by the structure of the tale. The utopia itself is described in five chapters on health, justice, education, religion, and women. Discussion of these utopian institutions is prefaced by description of the scientific views of Hall, and a consideration of their relation to Atlantis's genesis and demise.

Past, Present and Future

Stories of Atlantis usually feature bits of the past while advancing ideas about the future and assessing the present. "The Fall of Atlantis" follows precedent in describing a process of historical cyclicity that advances ideas about the future. The present is depicted in the hypothesis that the few surviving Atlanteans, the "half-human apes", may be the "link between the greatest era of

the world and our own...."⁷ Further references to the present appear in the described similarities between the social shortcomings of Atlantis and those of early twentieth century America. There seems to be little doubt that these similarities were intentional since Hall claimed that he wrote the story with "the profound conviction that certain degenerative changes -- industrial, social, hygienic, and religious -- are going on in our civilization and especially in our own land which may perhaps be realized by a larger historic perspective, which only imagination can supply."⁸

The multiple time dimensions, and the key to Hall's notions of history and science, are initially intimated in the story's origins. The labor-arbitrator author, depressed by social and political affairs of the post-war period, believes that his "larger racial unconscious self" had executed the history and "had sought to give expression to all the latent hopes and fears that the present situation has inspired for our civilization."⁹ Thus the story mirrors Hall's conviction that to understand the present, be it of society or individuals, it is necessary to understand the past. He further believed that this historically determined present is, in essence, a striving for the future. This historical metatheory frequently surfaces in Hall's writings and forms an essential part of his more pervasive theory of evolution.

Hall, who once mentioned an early ambition to become an historian, maintained a life-long interest in history. As a psychologist, he taught historical courses in psychology and philosophy, published a book on methods of teaching history, and belonged to several historical societies.¹⁰ He claimed an overriding purpose for historical scholarship, a purpose to which he devoted most of his research career: "...my interest in the past is connected with evolution, and where studies in these fields show no scintilla of this my interest for all."

If judged by his writings, an interest in evolution and its specific concern with history did dominate his research. This is no more apparent than in his conception of psychology. Hall's early statements on psychology describe an objective, experimental, and empirical science. In his early articles, he appreciated the prospects for Wundtian psychology, the elimination of distracting philosophical issues, and the relevance of physiological investigations, but he also warned against over-restricting the scope and subject matter of psychology.¹² By 1900 Hall was firmly committed to what he termed an "expansionist's policy for psychology" which advocated greater breadth in subject, method, and theory. Psychology should include study not only of the intellect but also of instincts and habits. It should be extended beyond the reductionist and classificatory methods of introspection to a system encompassing biology

and the arts. It should include the application of its results and exploitation of biological knowledge.¹³

For Hall, the new psychology held three promises. As "queen of the sciences" it would promote the unity of knowledge, it would bridge pure and practical research, and it would embrace a pluralism of systems, a harmonious synthesis that was necessary to understand the life of man.¹⁴ Hall gradually came to see realization of these promises in the use of evolutionary theory. By 1906 he defined psychology as

a description as accurate as can be of all those facts of psychic life, conscious and unconscious, animal and human, normal and morbid; embryonic and mature, which are demonstrable and certain to be accepted by every intelligent unbiased mind who fully knows them. They must also be so ordered, like to like, and organized that they can all be known with the least efforts, and so that each is nearest to that it is most akin. To this I would add that the best principle or organization of these facts, wherever it is justifiable, is evolutionary because the best explanation and definition of anything is a complete description of its developmental stages.¹⁵

He was convinced that a science of "anything" required knowledge of "its developmental stages in their temporal order."¹⁶

Hall became committed not simply to evolutionary thought but to a particular theory of evolution. Aspects of the theory are visible in early works but its first systematic treatment appeared in his 1904 publication, Adolescence.¹⁷

A description of the theory clarifies its relevance to a

historical perspective and to the stated promises for the new psychology.

In his theory of evolution, Hall held that man is evolving toward a permanent form. Evolution is primarily of consciousness. The individual mind is one form while the highest form is consciousness of the race or the "Man-soul". The theory states that all institutions and aspects of life reflect a particular and recognizable stage in evolution. As such, the theory contains three important assumptions. First, evolution is progressive and tends to move toward better conditions. For instance, even the individual mind is evolving toward realization of a "far larger and more adequate city of Man-soul", and the "super-man".¹⁸ Second, evolution of the race is repeated in the development of the individual; it involves recapitulation.¹⁹ At a psychological level, through each stage of growth the individual displays the psychological characteristics and impulses of a stage of racial development. Third, evolution occurs not only in the race and the individual but in all human aggregates: the family, political structures, and social institutions.²⁰

These assumptions relate to three positions that Hall took regarding evolution. While he believed that racial evolution is progressive, he held that the final form might not be a variation of our race but a manifestation of some other. Just as various species have become extinct; so

could humanity as we now know it.²¹ Hall accordingly fought for the preservation of "primitive" races because they might engender the future superman.²² He warned that "perhaps other racial stocks than ours will later advance the kingdom of man as far beyond our present standpoint as it now is above that of the lowest savage or even animals."²³

Related to this stance regarding primitive races is his assertion that man must somehow protect evolutionary patterns. Hall's belief that man is responsible for guarding the forces of evolution guided his prescriptions for educational and social reforms.²⁴ For instance, he claimed that the process of recapitulation in children must be understood, and that "We must develop each stage to its fullness in order to get all which comes out of it and which is the essential substructure of the next stages."²⁵

Finally, although Hall frequently argued that protection of evolutionary patterns should entail fitting the social institutions to the needs of individuals, he believed that, ultimately, it was survival of the race, and not the individual, that was of paramount importance. Concentration on the individual was referred to as "hyper-individuation" and a "cult of the self". Hall persistently argued for the elimination of "selfishness" and the subordination of the individual to the race, of "egoism" to "altruism".²⁶

This theory of evolution gave special meaning to contemplation of future and past. Because it was a human

responsibility to aid evolutionary progress and because the progress of the race was paramount yet vulnerable, Hall insisted that the future depended on the case of the child. His commitment to this issue occasionally approached the devotional. "The transmission of the sacred torch of life, the production, rearing and betterment of new generations in saecula saeculorum, is the supreme test of the value to the world not only of woman but of man, and indeed of every human institution, educational, cultural, religious, and of civilization itself."²⁷ According to Hall, civilization must serve the child.²⁸

Hall's theory of evolution has similar implications for the study of the past: If the child through whom evolution should be assisted represents the future, then it is imperative to understand the history that is repeated in each child. To know the development of mankind is necessary for guidance of the child because "We really know things only when we trace their development from the farthest beginning through all their stages to maximal maturity and decay."²⁹ Hall wrote that "Youth, when properly understood, will seem to be not only the revealer of the past but of the future, for it is dimly prophetic of that best part of history which is not yet written because it has not yet transpired...."³⁰

Hall's view of evolution was relevant not only to his psychological theorizing but also to his conception of the

discipline. The assumed interdependence of future and past guided his aspirations for the psychologist. Hall remarked that "the psychologist of the future, if his science is to have a future, must turn to the past, by which alone it can be judged, and if he would be prophetic and helpful must move more freely with the far larger command of data up and down the phyletic scale."³¹

With his theory Hall also demonstrated the potential of psychology to become eventually a practical, unified, and synthetic system. From 1885 Hall frequently related psychological research to its social benefits. He sometimes depicted the relation by positing a tendency for scientists to study problems which would yield practical or useful results.³² At other times he took the more extreme position that application was a necessary condition for the validation of psychological knowledge.³³

The application of research was fundamental to improving society and to aiding evolution. To Hall, it appeared that the psychologist or psychological pedagogue had been summoned to be the "engineer in the domain of nature."³⁴ He once called the psychologist "a sort of high priest of souls" who "is not content merely to fit for existing institutions as they are to-day but he would develop even higher powers, which gradually molt old and evolve new and better institutions or improve old ones."³⁵ He came to believe that "practical psychology" would play a major role in

readjusting social, cultural, and political institutions in preparation for an improved human nature, or a "higher democracy yet to come which will be a real city of Mansoul."³⁶

Just as the application of research served evolutionary progress, so did the idea of the unity of the sciences. Hall believed psychology had unique responsibilities to this unity. The importance of the "new unity" was illustrated with the case of child study programs where

The time is certainly coming when we shall realize that there is no true knowledge except the full description of all stages of development, and if man is the highest product of creation and his own self-knowledge the highest type of knowledge, we can already forecast a little what this knowledge is to mean and bring to the race. It means a new correlation and co-ordination of all the highest knowledge of the world, more economic and pedagogic in form and richer in contents. Indeed almost all my idealism focuses in this general direction and it is at this point where my homely theme this morning empties into the great ocean of future science.³⁷

Hall called for a psychology that united various philosophies and utilized methods and knowledge of other disciplines.³⁸ But, as indicated in the above quotation, he desired not merely plurality of viewpoints but their synthesis into a harmonious whole. While Hall occasionally equated synthesis with a "theocracy", he often presented it as a manifestation of evolution itself.³⁹ As queen of the sciences, psychology was accorded the greatest responsibility for such a synthesis and hence for successful evolution of mankind toward a better state or city of Mansoul.

The Ideals of Atlantis

Hall discussed the rise and fall of Atlantis with the aid of concepts from his theory of evolution. The story documents the evolutionary progress toward an ideal society that finally experienced triumphant unity and recognition of Mansoul. Atlantean citizens subordinated individual to social desires and celebrated a perception of being "uniquely one with all Nature, the consummate product of her creative evolution."⁴⁰ They understood the glory of evolution and the nuances of recapitulation and were devoted to the protection of that evolution.⁴¹

Health

The physical well-being of the citizens of Atlantis was sustained by their access to sacred-like facilities for recreation, a national health insurance plan, and highly developed medical research. The significance of physical health was evidenced in the field of medicine where doctors enforced regulations for breeding, sanitation, elimination of the unfit, and insanity. Medical research was dedicated to realizing human forms that even the Atlanteans, figures of strength, beauty, and longevity, would regard as supermen.⁴²

In other writings Hall clearly stated his concern for physical health. He held that physical vigor was imperative to general psychological health and that the corporeal

interpenetrated all psychological phenomena. To Hall, muscles were "the organs of the will" and their condition determined all human accomplishments.⁴³ Physical health and training contributed to mechanization of basic actions, thus allowing the mind to focus on "higher" work. His conviction about health extended to the notion that the "deep stratum of motor association is a plexus that determines not only conduct and character, but even beliefs." Thus "the purest thought, if true, is only action repressed to be ripened to more practical form. Not only do muscles come before mind, will before intelligence, and sound ideas rest on a motor basis, but all really useless knowledge tends to be eliminated as an error or superstition."⁴⁴

Hall further expressed his commitment to the idea of physical well-being in his practical suggestions for education, sex hygiene and eugenics. In fact, one of his major criticisms of education was its neglect of the physical growth of the child. Hall similarly criticized conditions in medical care and, in the case of nursing infants, warned of the psychological consequences of improper treatment.⁴⁵ He thought motor training, or physical education, was indispensable for forming efficient habits. His descriptions of ideal school systems listed physical activities as an integral part of the curriculae, especially in the early years of education when "the body needs most attention and the soul the least."⁴⁶ The necessity of physical training

also was implied by recapitulation theory because assuring the full expression of primitive characteristics in the child required involvement in such ancient activities as play and dancing.⁴⁷

In summary, Hall's professional statements on physical hygiene and its relation to psychological processes are consistent with the values they were given in Atlantis. The correspondence is evident in his discussions of such ideas as eugenics. But it is perhaps seen most clearly in a phrase that occasionally prefaced his psychological writings and that he called the chief motto of Atlantis: "Godlike" is the doctor who is also a philosopher."⁴⁸

Justice

According to Hall, justice in Atlantis was so perfect that it was adopted into such later utopian schemes as that of Plato. [Legal codes were the fruit of scientific and humanistic studies of religion, human nature, and ethics. Justice was based on two postulates, the social value of individual actions and a principle of pleasure and pain. One postulate was that deeds of an individual would be evaluated according to their value to the community. The other postulate equated happiness and virtue with justice, and pain and selfishness with wickedness. Laws granted happiness to the virtuous and just, and pain to the selfish and wicked. Punishments were scaled to fit the crime, so

that murder was punished by death and pride by "a curriculum of indignities and humiliations."⁴⁹

The high estimation of an individual's service to society was paralleled in other writings by Hall. His idea of society was of a community which superseded any existing social structure. "Community" was the social manifestation of Mansoul, the "soul of humanity" that "transcends not only all ethnic but all other distinctions within the human race and works in and through only those elements which are common to all mankind."⁵⁰ Although Hall acknowledged difficulty in describing the ideas of Mansoul, he saw it as the "prime function" of law and ethics in an ideal world.⁵¹

Learning

Atlanteans excelled all other races most in the domain of learning because they believed that learning alone permitted men to become "lords of creation and masters of their fate."⁵² Scientific studies had produced guidelines for primary education: the essential role of the mother in child care, the critical dimensions of the first four years of life, and the priority of physical and emotional education for the young and of disciplinary and sex-segregated activities for adolescents. The most supreme form of learning was research, and the researchers, given the titles of "pioneers" and "frontiersmen", had special status and responsibilities.⁵³

There are some parallels between the educational systems of Atlantis and several educational reforms advocated by Hall. While he favored the kindergarten system, Hall held that the home environment and the involvement of the mother were instrumental in optimal child care.⁵⁴ This belief was augmented by his acceptance of Freudian notions that emotional and instinctual energies deserve attention before intellectual abilities.⁵⁵ Hall frequently proposed systems that would focus on physical and emotional development in the early years of life and on intellectual discipline and vocational training in the later years. Even his proposals for course syllabi and segregated education were included in the utopian educational system.⁵⁶

Religion

Ideas of evolution permeated all aspects of religion in Atlantis. Acceptance of the evolutionary doctrine determined the citizen's awareness of being "uniquely one with all Nature, the consummate product of her creative evolution." Atlanteans held that "the soul no less than the body was evolved from primal animal instincts and there was no great chasm separating Mansoul from lower manifestations of the psyche or even demarcating vital from physical and mechanical energy."⁵⁷ All citizens rose through numerous stages of religious consciousness which ranged from the worship of vegetative life to anthromorphic forms. For instance, the

highest anthromorphic stage comprised the worship of deities who were superior men in size, strength and personality. These deities exhibited a selfless devotion to the "evolution of mankind."⁵⁸ The teachers of religion, the "heart-formers", practiced a theology that "was the higher psychology of the folksoul as it groped its way upward."⁵⁹ The heart-formers were responsible for the citizens' moral training, sex education, counselling, and religious tolerance. Religion in Atlantis represented both a theological pluralism and a unity in the universal recognition of Mansoul.

Religion in Atlantean society conforms to what Hall wrote elsewhere on the subject. He even described his personal religious background as a series of stages which culminated in a final realization that the objective of all faiths was representation of the Mansoul.⁶⁰ Throughout his career, Hall devoted time to the psychological study of religion.⁶¹ An article written in 1904 gives a fair summary of his research on the subject. The essay posits the thesis that all faiths share a belief in an altruistic soul and that they are evolving toward a universal religion supported by the discoveries of psychology.⁶² This universal religion accounted for the submission of the individual to the community, the synthesis of systems, and the eventual recognition of the Mansoul.

Women

Hall devoted a separate chapter to the crucial pattern of women in Atlantis. Strong and vigorous in form, Atlantean women were valued for their similarity to the ideal racial type and for their subtle but indisputable power. The former characteristic rested in women's superior intuitions and accomodates to unconscious forces. The latter was due to their role in infant care and their ability to fashion the male "by molding his very diathesis in the first years of life during which character is plastic."⁶³ These intuitive and emotional qualities yielded a semi-mystical wisdom and altruism. Because of these powers, women, especially the elders, were treated as confidantes and advisors by men in political affairs and were charged with maintenance of hospitals and special retreat "houses". In youth a woman employed her skills to make herself attractive, but in adulthood she would limit herself to selfless and often anonymous deeds.⁶⁴ With these two roles, a woman could fulfill both her familial and social obligations.

In his psychological studies of child-development, Hall stressed the importance of women as mothers and moral teachers. This conviction rested on a general theory of women as exemplars of exalted racial traits: nutritive, intuitive, and emotional. These traits fitted them for the serious responsibility of child care.⁶⁵ Hall even cited the flappers of the 1920s as exhibiting these revered traits

under a "superficial" guise of sophistication, masculinity, and independence.⁶⁶

Based on this theoretical orientation, Hall made several recommendations for protecting the unique attributes of women. He advocated that female education be reformed to emphasize preparation for maternity and domesticity. He described maternity as the primary goal of women and noted that "In an ideal society, with ideal men in it, woman's education should focus on motherhood and wifehood, and seek in every way to magnify these functions and to invest them with honor."⁶⁷ Although Hall acknowledged that 1904 did not mark an "ideal period", he maintained that advancement of civilization required further differentiation of the sexes. He prescribed protection of these distinctions in education, work, and the home.⁶⁸ These measures could help offset what Hall saw as the degenerative effects of the newer roles of women, effects such as the declining birth rate.⁶⁹

Science in the Ideal Society

Science and research were the apex of learning in Atlantis. The achievements were profound and included chemical synthesis of diamonds and gold, generation of life from crystals and emulsions, accumulation of data on Martians, development of new vegetation, and experiments on society and on breeding supermen. However, these and other

advances were not the reason for the elevated status of research.

Research in Atlantis was the ultimate expression of the belief in human improvement. And of the scientific endeavors, psychology represented the most valuable task. Emancipated from antiquated metaphysics, psychology "associated itself closely with religion and also with education, analyzed individuals to discern the best that was in every one and to guide him to it, and to realize that the soul of man is no less a product of evolution than is his body; and it also regarded all languages, myths, institutions, faiths, and even deities and everything transcendental as projection of Mansoul."⁷⁰ Researchers were exonerated from many social duties, supported for their work, and "regarded as the light and hope of the state."⁷¹ The most adventurous of the scientific research projects was breeding a better human stock. This research required a psychological perspective from which to study the will-to-live and "the promise and potency of a higher race of supermen which it was the business of civilization and learning to produce."⁷²

In his psychology as well as in his administrative and educational efforts, Hall lauded the values of research. Through this highest form of pursuing knowledge, man could improve upon and "benefit the whole race tomorrow."⁷³ He contended that we could not have too much research and proposed the expansion of universities and institutes.⁷⁴

Research was exalted as the "greatest achievement of man" and the researcher was declared a superman deserving of extensive freedom and support.⁷⁵

Hall's later writings emphasized not only the privileges of researchers but their leadership responsibilities:

Henceforth, as never before, progress is committed to the hands of the intellectuals and they must think harder, realizing to the full the responsibilities of their new leadership. Science in its largest sense is from this time forth to rule the world. ..In everything it is the expert who must say the final word.⁷⁶

If scientific researchers were to have such responsibilities then psychologists, who studied what Hall called the queen of sciences, certainly received a large share of the duties. Hall grew convinced of the special status of psychologists. They were responsible for the discovery and development of desirable human attributes and of methods for re-adjusting the environment to human needs.⁷⁷ Late in his life Hall announced the end of laissez faire social development and the necessity of researchers to "take the helm and be our pioneers in this new era."⁷⁸ Just as Atlantean researchers held a position of supreme importance, so the researcher in post-war America "who reveals and teaches us to command more of the world without and within is the chief benefactor of the race, the true prophet, priest, and king in our day."⁷⁹

Utopia's Fall: Pessimism and Optimism

The story of Atlantis ended with the simultaneous collapse of the physical and social environment. Nevertheless, it had an optimistic nemesis because there were survivors who could transmit some of the heritage of the civilization and strive for a future utopia. The fall had resulted partly from the rise of individualism and selfish desires, but these were psychological flaws that could be ameliorated in another civilization.

With such a denouement, "The Fall of Atlantis" contained an eschatology and a warning. In this sense the story reflected Hall's concerns for the future, and his approach to futuristic speculation. This approach entailed "a vivid sense of what the most immediate environment means and a strong impulse to modify it for the better; secondly, a large point of view that enables one to see the present in the larger perspective of both time and space -- that is, to realize its bearings on the welfare of mankind."⁸⁰

Therefore, Hall believed that conceptions of "ideal" conditions in the imaginative play of children and in the thoughts of adults were an efficient means for the ultimate actualization of these ideals. For instance, in summarizing a study of society building by children in sand boxes, Hall noted that there is "nothing so practical in education as the ideal...."⁸¹

Hall did not refrain from contemplating the future and

the ideal in writings other than his utopia. He was not silent on issues about the dangers of modern life. And after the onset of the First World War, his hopes were often infused with pessimistic opinions. These opinions concerned such topics as American youth, politics, science, and German society.⁸² For instance, he confessed to a "schizophrenia" caused by the contradiction between his earlier admiration for Germany and disdain for the war conduct of that nation. In his comments on Germany, he criticized an educational system that he had once admired.⁸³

Hall also commented on what he perceived as the degradation of American science. His comments resembled his portrayal of Atlantean science during the time of the society's collapse. The similarity is best exemplified in the case of psychology. In the midst of Atlantis's fall, psychology was employed "to fit men to be cogs in preexisting machinery" rather than to "develop ever higher powers in man himself which impel him to create ever newer and higher institutions as progress demands."⁸⁴ Eventually, the commercial preoccupations of scientists led to the demise of the scientific spirit and research centers.⁸⁵ In the last five years of his life, Hall expressed concerns about what he saw as similar patterns in American psychologists. He warned psychologists of the tendency to concentrate only on the means of making man fit existing social, educational, and industrial environments.⁸⁶ He cited the example of the

testing movement and drew an analogy between intelligence testing and the fads of phrenology and palmistry. He saw the testing movement as one of economic interests where psychologists served the demands of industry.⁸⁷

The case of psychology also illustrates the way in which Hall linked the degenerative and the creative in all aspects of life. After describing the dissociation and degenerative aspects of psychology, Hall traced out an optimistic eschatology. He anticipated a "superman" psychologist and a great synthetic movement that would "bring a new harmony to our ominously divided efforts and set us again on the trail we have so unfortunately lost."⁸⁸ Psychology would undergo a re-integration of knowledge foremost among its transformations would be the initiation of a comprehensive program for reorganizing social institutions.⁸⁹

Psychology was a microcosm of the universal process of regression and regeneration, of fall and recovery to some more perfect point. Fears of national decay, regression to hyperindividuation, and tragedies of political conflict were calmed by contemplating the future achievements of research. Hall attributed this optimism not simply to his personality, but to a belief in the advance of evolution.⁹⁰ When he outlined the idea of historical cyclicity, he described the cycle more like an upward spiral that may undergo temporary reversion but that ultimately leads to improvement. He wrote that his intentions for teaching evolutionary

theory lay in its messages of an eventual supreme end.⁹¹

Hall extended his faith in evolution to the advance of science, and for various reasons psychology in particular was vested with the hopes of social improvement.

CHAPTER V

WILLIAM MCDUGALL AND EUGENICS FOR SOCIAL IMPROVEMENT

William McDougall was British by birth but his career as a psychologist was spent equally in Britain and the United States. One historian has remarked that McDougall was rejected by American psychologists because he did not "mesh" with their culture. McDougall apparently did not concur because he repeatedly professed his admiration for and agreement with American ideals.¹

Historians of psychology have been critical of McDougall's work. He has been criticized for his teleology and indeterminism, inadequate methods, and interest in psychical research.² Nevertheless, they have considered his scientific works as both innovative and influential. McDougall has been credited with being one of the first to assert that behavior is the proper subject matter for psychology and with developing a purposive psychology in which human actions are held as goal directed. His leading role in the study of instincts has been acknowledged. In brief, McDougall has been credited with anticipating the behaviorist trend later promulgated by Watson, and his research in purposive psychology and instincts has earned him recognition as the progenitor of the hormic school of psychology.³

Few historians have done more than sketch McDougall's professional activities, probably because there are few

existing documents and personal papers.⁴ Examinations of his alliance with a nativist psychology and critical analyses of his purposive psychology have been restricted by lack of such archival resources; one is left to follow Montaigne's dictum that a man is his essays.⁵

Many of McDougall's published writings remain unexamined. Despite historical consideration of his instinct theory and his eugenics beliefs, only superficial attention has been given to his experiments and evolutionary theory. Commentaries on his studies in social psychology and the group mind effect have not mentioned his comprehensive theory relating individual and society. Nor has there been any investigation of his psychology of politics. Yet these writings occupy significant space in McDougall's bibliography, especially during his years in America, and offer substantial information about his psychology and his ideas about science.

One of his neglected publications, "The Island of Eugenia," is a proposal for a society founded on eugenics.⁶ Eugenia is described as the plan of an academic scientist who, after thirty years of study, shared his ideas with an old college friend who had since become an affluent philanthropist. The plan is presented in a dialogue between scientist and philanthropist, between the "Seer" and the "practical Man". Eugenia is devoted to the propagation of "superior strains". Recruitment is world-wide and citizenship

selection based on family history, intellectual abilities, and moral qualifications. Offspring of the Eugenians are educated, not necessarily to manage the ideal state, but rather to serve the world as foremost statesmen and thinkers.

The story resembles the typical utopian tale in the sense that Eugenia has an ideal geography and stable organization. Located in a well-defined territory, it has "a white man's climate and reasonably fertile soil."⁷ The land has beautiful and diversified natural features, with areas suitable for establishing great universities and professional schools. Except for the regulations concerning eligibility for membership, few aspects of the social organization of Eugenia are described in detail. But the utopia does outline a definite role for science and utilizes several psychological assumptions. The island was designed by a scientist "studying human nature and society" who was asked for his professional judgements.⁸ The scientist was committed to a belief not only in the science of man as the paramount subject of inquiry but also in a particular science of man that assumes the genetic superiority of the Nordic race.

"The Island of Eugenia" is subtitled "The Fantasy of a Foolish Philosopher." While McDougall admitted that the scheme was "conceived in all the ardour and ignorance of youth", he still claimed to believe that it was desirable and practicable.⁹ Twelve years after its first publication

in 1921, McDougall re-affirmed a belief in the fantasy and hoped for its realization.¹⁰ This evident faith in the Eugenia scheme or some similar modification of society was encompassed in McDougall's concept of science. He held that

the sole test or criterion of science, or true knowledge of Nature, is that it shall bring us such understanding of the course of natural events as will enable us effectively to intervene and modify the course of such events for our own purposes, direct the course of events teleologically, control them in some degree (however slight) in accordance with our desires and needs.¹¹

For McDougall, science was an enactment of certain characteristics of human nature, specifically those of purposiveness. Therefore, discussion of the relation of his ideal society to his psychology requires prefatory comments on his ideas about human nature and science.

Implications of a Purposive Psychology

As a university student McDougall became interested in human nature and simultaneously, came to believe that only science could mitigate the horrors of man's future. These interests led him to study philosophy and medicine and to specialize in the nervous system because it contained "the secrets of human nature." A reading of James's Principles of Psychology convinced him that his interests could be pursued within psychology so he followed that course. He thought psychology, most difficult and unsatisfactory but

deemed it "the science of most urgent importance in the present age, when, for lack of sufficient knowledge of human nature, our civilization threatens to fall into chaos and decay."¹²

This gradual introduction to psychology, subsequent studies in Germany, and experimental research on visual perception provided the footing upon which McDougall was to challenge certain accepted doctrines in psychology. His first book, a text on physiological psychology, introduced the unconventional theses that were to be held throughout his career. Here McDougall intimated that mechanistic explanations were barren because they were based on an inadequate interpretation of psychological events as parallel to physiological processes. He posited that psychological activities depend on conditions prior to existence. He stated that "we are compelled to postulate an existent, an immaterial being, in which the separate neural processes produce the elementary affections which we have called psychical elements...."¹³ In his second book, Introduction to Social Psychology, McDougall proposed that such an existent must influence psychological activities in a specific manner. That is, psychological actions are determined by certain purposes or goals.¹⁴ These two propositions, that psychological phenomena are more than the summation of physiological events and that they are guided by a purpose, comprised the propaedeutic of McDougall's psychology. The

remainder of his researches explored these positions in one of three ways: logical justification of the precepts underlying his psychology and refutation of alternative doctrines, elaboration of his position by explaining their relevance to psychological problems, and expansion of his position to corroborate a philosophy of science.

McDougall held definitive views on the function of scholarship, and particularly on that of psychological research. He believed the proper application of a scientific method demanded consideration of all possible explanations of an event and a flexible scepticism regarding these possibilities. He also believed that psychological knowledge could benefit both the intelligent reader and practitioner in other social sciences or social reform. Indeed, he not only held that such knowledge could affect social affairs but also that it necessarily did influence them. He cited the work of Freud as a significant but regrettable example of such influence.¹⁵ Therefore, McDougall addressed most of his writings not solely to the psychologist or student of psychology but equally to an audience interested in the social sciences. Although this approach did not deter him from undertaking detailed research, it was manifested in his lengthy and general introductions to the topic under discussion. These two ideas about the process and usefulness of research were derived from a fundamental conviction, that psychology was the "indispensible foundation" of social

science, vested with the responsibility for the survival of civilization.¹⁶

In justifying a purposive psychology, McDougall defended what he called a "teleological" position that he had initially referred to as "animism". This was "the belief that all natural objects which seem to exert any power or influence are moved or animated by 'spirits' or intelligent purposive beings."¹⁷ In arguing for the validity of a teleological position, McDougall revealed the deficiencies of a mechanistic view, claimed that science must be concerned with behavior, and noted that behavior could not be adequately described or explained by principles of either hedonism or antecedent events.¹⁸ McDougall continued these critical analyses of mechanistic psychology throughout his writings and extended them to whatever constituted the latest research, for example, the various behaviorist theories of the 1920s.¹⁹

McDougall's research program was consistent with his commitment to empirical methods and to a teleological position. For instance, he developed a social psychology where behaviors were interpreted as goal-oriented. He stated that when

any creature strives toward an end or goal, it is because it possesses as an ultimate feature of its constitution what we can only call a disposition or latent tendency to strive towards that end, a conative disposition which is actualized or brought into operation by the perception (or other

mode of cognition) of some object. Each organism is endowed, according to its species, with a certain number and variety of such conative dispositions as a part of its hereditary equipment for the battle of life; and in the course of its life these may undergo certain modifications and differentiations.²⁰

The outline for a social psychology stipulated that the primary foci for psychological research be the study of particular 'dispositions' and the underlying hereditary processes. Most of his subsequent psychological studies fell under one of these two subjects.

The study of dispositions described in Social Psychology essentially consisted of the categorization and description of human instincts. "Instinct" was defined not as an innate reflex action but as a disposition, or tendency, involving the perception of an object, a feeling about it, and an action or impulse to act toward or away from it.²¹ Although McDougall acknowledged intelligence in man, he held that "instincts are the prime movers of all human activity" and that most cognitive activities are closely linked with instincts. The study of instincts was fundamental to a science of human character.²²

McDougall prepared a taxonomy of primary and complex instincts. Primary instincts had correlates in specific emotion excitements (primary emotions): flight with the emotion fear, repulsion with disgust, curiosity with wonder, pugnacity with anger, self-abasement with subjection,

self-assertion with elation, and parenting with tenderness.²³ Complex instinctive states result from a compounding of primary emotions, usually through learning. These include such states as admiration, reverence, gratitude, envy, jealousy, resentment, and fascination.

McDougall intended his extensive study of instincts and emotions to rectify certain deficiencies in psychological theory. He maintained that the preoccupation of psychologists with consciousness, brain processes and intelligence was insufficient for understanding and controlling human conduct. Social scientists "whose primary interest it was to lay down general rules for the guidance of human activity in the great fields of legislation, of government, of private and public conduct" could not utilize such psychology. Any attempts to do so, as in the case of "the moral sense" or "rational will" have been unsuccessful.²⁴ McDougall hoped that his Social Psychology would demonstrate that processes such as consciousness and intelligence were instruments of basic mental forces underlying all activities. He believed that "given the native propensities and capabilities of the individual human mind, all the complex mental life of societies is shaped by them and in turn reacts upon the course of their development and operation in the individual."²⁵

McDougall continued to assert that a purposive psychology elucidating the human dispositions was fundamental to

understanding social life. He prepared some works to demonstrate the usefulness of purposive psychology for moral conduct and character.²⁶ In other works he argued that future research in psychology depended on acceptance of these general views.²⁷ On the one hand, McDougall fulfilled these promises by extensive analyses. For instance, The Group Mind is an attempt to show how even complex organization is explained by fundamental dispositions.²⁸ On the other hand, he often described how practical applications required more than a mechanistic psychology and how social decay would increase with its continued use.²⁹

He was not solely concerned with the description of psychological dispositions. McDougall insisted that activity was inherent in the organism and received impetus from a struggle for survival expressed as a will to live. Therefore, one of the greatest problems for psychology was to understand the underlying and innate basis of will as a mental process.³⁰ McDougall attempted to show that the evolution of mental processes was not mechanistic but teleological. Consequently, he rejected neo-Darwinism with its notions of natural selection and human conduct as reflex actions.³¹ In place of mechanistic neo-Darwinism, or Weismann's explanation for the agency of organic evolution, McDougall postulated that mind was distinct from material nature, indeed, that it evolved from mind itself. He equated the biological struggle for existence with a mental will-to-

live, and natural selection with intelligent and purposive activities. Purposive mental activity explained adaptation of the organism to new environment.³²

McDougall demanded a theory of evolution that would account for the function of mind and would encompass the influences of environmental constraints. Among the theories of evolution that rejected strict neo-Darwinism, only the Lamarckian hypothesis incorporated these premises.³³

McDougall recognized that Lamarckianism was in disrepute, especially since the dubious experimental verifications of Pavlov, but he tentatively accepted the hypothesis and even sought to validate it by conducting experiments with rats. He cut off their tails, and measured, generation after generation, in hopes that the tails would become shorter.³⁴

McDougall believed that the Lamarckian position coincided with the purposiveness, holism, and indeterminism in his psychology.³⁵ He saw another advantage of Lamarckianism, its practical utility. Beyond its theoretical implications, the Lamarckian thesis "must have practical bearings that are equally important, and must affect our attitude towards a number of political problems and social programmes. Of these, the most important is the problem of preserving and promoting the qualities of our human stocks."³⁶

The advantage of applicability was consistent with McDougall's commitment to the practical application of psychological knowledge. Applicability of Lamarckianism also implied a

reform program that seemed to contradict his initial reform interests. As early as 1906 McDougall had advocated eugenics, a measure supported by a theory of organic or material evolution.³⁷ McDougall held that knowledge of the mental differences between racial groups was imperative to "a science that will point the way to such a political and social organization as will offer some guarantee of stability and some prospect of the continued progress of human mind and human culture."³⁸ Yet Lamarckianism did not suggest reforms in breeding practices but programs of eugenics, or environmental improvements which protected preferred behaviors and habits so that they would be inherited by successive generations.

McDougall resolved the problem by advocating both types of reforms, eugenics and eugenics. He defended this stance by noting the compatibility and interdependence of the two measures. Inheritance of acquired characteristics was the slower process and could actually benefit from eugenics measures. Strictures about breeding not only yielded more rapid changes but also protected the precarious survival of acquired characteristics from the powerful influence of adverse biological selective forces.³⁹ With this argument McDougall continued and escalated his advocacy of eugenics measures.⁴⁰

Just as eugenics underlay the majority of his proposals for social improvement, so certain implications of

Lamarckianism directed his prescriptions for psychology and science. McDougall's development of psychological doctrines was paralleled by construction of a theory of knowledge. This epistemology accommodated various Lamarckian assumptions: that mind evolved in a purposive manner, that science was a product of the evolution of mind, and that the veracity of scientific knowledge was determined by its successful application. With these assumptions McDougall justified the precedence of psychological science, and the necessity to use that science for governing the affairs of men.

McDougall's psychology reflected these epistemological assumptions. He adopted the pragmatic principle as he had learned it from James, that is that

in interpreting natural phenomena we form hypotheses; when we find that an hypothesis will not work we must reject it, when we find that it works well, we call it a theory; and the larger the number of groups of natural phenomena for which it provides satisfactory interpretations, the stronger its claim to be regarded as the true theory. There is no other kind of scientific truth, no other meaning to be given to the words.⁴¹

According to McDougall, this principle illustrated the teleological nature of science because "the sole test or criterion of science, or true knowledge of Nature, is that it shall bring us such understanding of the course of natural events as will enable us effectively to intervene and modify...."⁴² The ultimate purpose of science is acquisition

of knowledge for bettering human conditions. McDougall was careful to insist that science was empirical, in that it proceeds by observation, hypothesis and experiment, and positive, in that it deals with reality as it exists, and not as it could or ought to exist.⁴³ Thus scientific knowledge, as pragmatic truth, could be distinguished from philosophical knowledge, as criticism and evaluation.⁴⁴

This epistemological position suggested two reasons for the priority of the science of psychology. First, if science results from purposive striving of mind, then scientists would benefit from knowledge of purposiveness provided by means of psychology. Even the separate field of philosophy could be refined by a knowledge of purposive psychology.⁴⁵ Second, psychology is unique in that it is relevant to all facets of human life and, in fact, the instrument by which scientific knowledge is applied to human affairs.⁴⁶

McDougall recognized that the "aim of psychology is to render our knowledge of human nature more exact and more systematic, in order that we may control ourselves more wisely and influence our fellow-men more effectively."⁴⁷ Practical application was essential for testing the validity of psychological ideas.⁴⁸ But what seemed even more important to McDougall was the need for applying psychology to amend social problems and hence, the need for better psychologists to "make themselves the saviors of our collapsing civilization."⁴⁹ Psychology was essential to mankind's continued

progress and to the realization of higher ideals.⁵⁰

Eugenia and Social Improvement

McDougall's Eugenia is not a utopia for Everyman. Rather it comprises a select group who aim to advance the life of Everyman. Improvement is effected in two ways. The selected breeders of Eugenia may re-enter society either to raise genetic fitness by inter-breeding or to apply their superior intelligence and skills to improve social and political conditions. Given their excellent genetic qualities and their training in an ideal environment, Eugenians contribute to human progress from within and without their utopian homeland. To McDougall this plan for Eugenia seemed "fantastic" yet "practicable" since it was constructed according to scientific ideas about genetics, evolution and psychology. These were ideas that, given financial means, he believed could be successfully applied.⁵¹

The genetic theory substantiating the Eugenia plan was straight-forward. Candidates for citizenship would be selected for superb phenotypic characteristics which represented sound genotypic traits. Although recruitment would screen the human race, utilizing criteria of intelligence, moral qualities, and family history, it would favor the preservation of the "disappearing" race of Nordics. In turn, recruited members would be endogamous, would inter-marry, and their offspring would re-apply for membership.

Eugenia offered a means for reversing a hypothesized tendency for the finest members of civilization to decrease in number and eventually to die off.⁵² McDougall felt certain of this tendency and he included evidence of it in his proposals for eugenics reform.⁵³ He was likewise convinced about the special attributes of the Nordic race, their perilous chance for survival in a world encouraging the proliferation of "lower races", and the need for elite leaders to protect culture and learning.⁵⁴

Eugenia not only would preserve a threatened race but also would furnish "world-service", primarily through "the improvement of human qualities."⁵⁵ Such aspirations for human progress, as well as fears about its potential degeneration, are consistent with McDougall's thesis that mankind can progress. He held that only "by a more strenuous use of our intellectual facilities, and by a growth of knowledge, especially a knowledge of the laws of human societies, will the stability and further evolution of nations be maintained."⁵⁶ Thus progress depended on science, and like science it was teleological because its direction was determined by desire for an ideal end.⁵⁷ Specifically, he proposed that progress could be stimulated by the contributions of exceptional people and by breeding finer stocks.⁵⁸

The plans for Eugenia also contained information about the utopian environment. Eugenia is an island with choice

climate, soil, and scenery. It has ideal working conditions, and excellent education and research facilities. Furthermore, environmental factors enhance family life which is important because monogamy, marriage, and the traditional role of the mother are highly esteemed and encouraged.⁵⁹ At a glance, insistence on superb environmental conditions seems superfluous to the functioning of a society founded on eugenic ideas. No explanation for this environmentalism was given in the plans. However, it is consistent with McDougall's interpretation of the progress of nations, purposive theories of social modification of character and instincts, espousal of Lamarckian theory, and his directives for study of related environmental influences.⁶⁰ These research interests assume the relevance of optimal environmental conditions in a utopia.

Science and Society

The construction and maintenance of Eugenia required the scientific knowledge found in McDougall's psychology: of genetics, progress, and environmental factors. This knowledge, indeed the very idea of planning a society, was conceivable only where scientific knowledge had attained a certain status. The protagonist of the story, a scientist of nature and society, formulated plans precisely because of a belief in the efficacy of science. Other social reform measures were merely "social plasters."⁶¹ Scientific

research in Eugenia focuses on the science of its initial founding, psychology, and in particular, its relations to eugenics. "The science of man will for the first time receive adequate recognition, that is to say, it will dominate the scene. To it all other sciences will be duly subordinated."⁶²

The conception of Eugenia, then, was based not only on certain scientific ideas of McDougall's but also on his particular philosophy of knowledge. The precedence of psychological knowledge in Eugenia was evident in the status ascribed to science, as well as in the credentials of its designer. Even the existence of Eugenia was explained by a purposive theory of knowledge, "for underlying all the activities of Eugenia will be the conviction that, if the human race is to have a future that we can contemplate, it can achieve such a future only by deliberately assuming the control of its own destiny."⁶³ The possibility of such control rested with science and the responsibility for securing it was placed in the hands of scientists, particularly psychologists.⁶⁴

Decay and Prevention

If the assumptions that led McDougall to acknowledge the responsibility of scientists lent reasonableness to the design of a utopia, then his observations of current social conditions confirmed the urgency of the task. Ominous comments on the trends of social and political affairs appear

throughout his psychological writings. These comments range from warnings of world wars, racial degeneration, and political turmoil to the decay of individual character.

Of this last topic, there is no clearer example than that contained in World Chaos in which McDougall maintained that, "Our present tendency is towards a world of gaudily attired neurotics and maniacs housed in barracks where they will pass the time between crises and disasters pleasantly enough, pressing innumerable buttons to set in automatic action the inane products of jazz and movie factories."⁶⁵

These criticisms were often accompanied by ideal models. For instance, claims that the family was in a state of decay were balanced by descriptions of a preferred family system and provisions for its maintenance.⁶⁶ The issues of stable family life and the traditional role of woman as mother and wife constitute prime examples of the ideals to which McDougall subscribed. He believed that these ideals represented innate and purposive desires and could be maintained by use of scientific, especially psychological, knowledge.

McDougall expressed similar ideals concerning the progress of nations and of the world. He presented an exhaustive treatment of these ideals in a book about America. The text outlined the ideals for the nation and procedures necessary for their actualization. Following a discussion of the physical and cultural pre-requisites for ideal nationhood (pre-requisites which he believed America had

achieved), he stipulated the philosophical ideals: harmony, unity, collective deliberation, prosperity, and progress. These ideals required psychological action for realization because they were "the result of intelligent purposive guidance and design...." and the foundation for future internationalism and national progress.⁶⁷ McDougall sketched the movement of American society toward these ideals and discussed the social problems which could obstruct that progress.

In his work on America, as in his text on personal ideals,⁶⁸ McDougall applied his purposive psychology to expedite realization of ideals. Such attempts seem at odds with his epistemological distinction between philosophical ideals and scientific facts. However, he avoided the contradiction by envisioning a special relation between philosophy and the social sciences. McDougall proposed that under appropriate conditions social scientists should follow the specifications of philosophers by investigating how the specified values could be implemented. Because the right conditions had not yet arrived and philosophical progress still required the assistance of scientific research, there had to be a different relation between the two fields. McDougall suggested that "It is, then, right and well nigh inevitable that the social scientist shall be also a philosopher, or, at least, interested in social philosophy and its problems."⁶⁹ It was the responsibility of the

social scientist to acknowledge philosophy in promoting the progress and ideals of mankind. And the necessity for accepting this responsibility was only too clearly evident in the precarious and degenerating conditions of society.

McDougall accepted this responsibility and he took up philosophical problems and proposed practical solutions.

By 1934, he felt that he had witnessed partial fruition of at least one suggestion: family allowances to the most fit would serve a eugenic function and avoid the philosophical and political problems associated with more drastic eugenic measures. This success served to raise his optimism about another social scientific recommendation, "The Island of Eugenia". A few years before he died, McDougall wrote that "I am encouraged almost to hope that at some remote date my Eugenic scheme may be realized by some enlightened multi-millionaire."⁷⁰

CHAPTER VI

HUGO MÜNSTERBERG AND AN IDEAL TOMORROW

Arthur Lovejoy once wrote to an acquaintance accusing him of a "highly regrettable attitude of aloofness and superciliousness."¹ The acquaintance was Hugo Münsterberg and the attitude referred to was Münsterberg's reaction to a reviewer's criticisms. Münsterberg became known for his pugnacious approach to both intellectual and political issues.² However, this trait did not deter a number of his contemporaries from respecting and praising his psychological work.³

Writers of textbook histories of psychology have tempered their praise. They have recognized Münsterberg as James's chosen successor as head of the Harvard psychological laboratories and as a multi-faceted psychologist. But the recognition has not been without some reservation for historians have indicated disappointment with Münsterberg's performance as the chief experimental psychologist at Harvard and with the fact that he overspread his research involvements across a variety of fields.⁴ Additionally, some attention has been given to his early research which is described as a psychological theory that stresses process over structure.⁵ Münsterberg's work after 1900 has been referred to as "applied" psychology; it seldom has received more than a brief comment.⁶

Recently, both Münsterberg's psychological theories and his explorations into applied areas have been the subjects of historical re-assessment. He has been cited for such innovations as promoting advertising psychology and conducting an early and insightful study of motion pictures, as well as opening other avenues in applied psychology.⁷ His contributions to American philosophy also have been examined,⁸ and the relation of these psychological and philosophical positions has been the focus of a recent intellectual biography.⁹

This last treatment of Münsterberg's thought has shown the apparent contradiction between Münsterberg's commitment to experimental psychology and to a philosophical idealism as well as the contradiction between his scientific attitude and his political involvements. According to the author of the study, Matthew Hale, the apparent inconsistencies were coordinated with a "consistent political ideology." This ideology illustrates that "it was Münsterberg not James whose vision proved more prophetic in twentieth-century America."¹⁰ While James wrote about freedom and spontaneity, his successor specified the necessity of order and rationality. Münsterberg prompted a view that melded the ideas of natural order with those of the potential of science for controlling social conditions. Likewise, he attempted to demonstrate the transcendental aspects of the will while acknowledging human limits, and the possibility of science for changing

society, while advocating value-freedom in the sciences.

One of Münsterberg's attempts to unite his political leanings with his scientific beliefs and metaphysical ideals appeared in a book-length utopian program published in 1916, the last year of his life. Tomorrow: Letters to a Friend in Germany is a fictional account of possible perfection; it contains his vision of a post-war internationalism. It appears as a series of letters sent by a German-American psychologist to a friend and historian in Germany who has requested the scientist's expertise in illuminating civilization's fate. The psychologist acknowledged the special circumstances that permitted him to outline the future. "You turn to me because one whose lifework is psychology may best foresee the days which wait for us, and one who lives in a neutral country may look with clearer eyes toward the tomorrow than those in belligerent lands."¹¹

The letters of the psychologist portrayed the utopian future, or tomorrow; as advancing from greater nationalism and internationalism to pacifism. These changes would require organized and efficient procedures to be implemented in line with a particular orientation, idealism. The philosophy of idealism requires an acceptance of certain eternal and absolute values. The development of civilization from nationalism to internationalism depends on the corresponding development of these absolute values. For instance, nationalism fosters beliefs in the eternal value

of unity of a nation.¹² In turn, acceptance of the idea of unity counters selfish individualism and fosters the recognition of other values. Tomorrow describes these stages which accompany the realization of idealism. The book concludes with an outline of post-war reconstruction involving establishment of peace and global organization: "If the people of a group, or finally of the globe, are bound by an organization, it demands in the same way that each subordinate its selfish desires to the progress of the whole, to the aims of western culture, to the ideals of mankind."¹³ This was the organization that would evolve from nationalism, internationalism, and pacifism and would contribute to ultimate ideals.

Tomorrow appears to contain a relatively uncomplicated utopian scheme until several other aspects of Münsterberg's work are taken into consideration. First, Münsterberg had chastised experimental psychologists for making judgments about desired social ends. According to him, the experimental psychologist "oversteps the boundaries of his realm" as soon as he evaluates any psychological processes.¹⁴ Despite this stance on the role limitations of the experimental psychologist, Münsterberg published Tomorrow, a volume replete with social values and evaluations. Furthermore, Münsterberg claimed that the problems of civilization required the application of scientific knowledge to practical life. While Tomorrow refers to some scientific innovations,

and while it supposedly incorporates the knowledge of the psychologist-author, its emphasis is on a subjective psychology that assumes that belief is the ultimate truth and ideals are the ultimate goals.

Consideration of the apparent contradiction between Tomorrow and other scientific works by Münsterberg requires some familiarity with his works. Such an understanding lends additional meaning to the utopia as well as clarification of the apparent inconsistencies.

A Pluralistic System of Science

Münsterberg received his psychological training in Germany. Although his scientific activities were extended in numerous directions during his career in America, he remained committed to the experimental psychology he adopted as a student. Münsterberg studied in the medical and psychological laboratories of the University of Leipzig where he earned both Ph.D. and M.D. degrees. At the University of Freiburg, Münsterberg was able to establish a laboratory of experimental psychology which is said to have competed with that of his former teacher, Wilhelm Wundt. Although trained as an introspectionist, devoted to the study of elements of consciousness, his research was not "Wundtian".¹⁵ Instead, it concerned a motor theory that omitted Wundt's notion of willing apperception. Münsterberg postulated that every sensation produced a motor response which, through a

feedback system, affected the organism's perception.

Münsterberg's successful laboratory and his psychological conceptions were appreciated in America, especially by William James who chose Münsterberg as his successor to head the Harvard psychological laboratory.¹⁶ But Münsterberg was not to live up to the image he had gained among American scholars, in part because once in the United States he became less involved in experimental work and more interested in epistemological, social, and political issues. The disappointment in his failure to meet expectations is illustrated in E.G. Boring's comment that there is "almost nothing of importance in experimental psychology connected with Münsterberg's name since the experiments in the Beiträge of the Freiburg days."¹⁷ It should be noted that Boring did attempt to explain, however superficially, Münsterberg's failure in America: "What happened was that Münsterberg was too original; his energetic mind went at once from experimental to still newer psychologies."¹⁸ These newer psychologies ranged from philosophical psychology and psychotherapy to various applied areas including industrial, juristic and social psychology. The remainder of Münsterberg's career was occupied with these interests.

Münsterberg's varied psychological interests are seen most clearly in terms of their relation to his theory of knowledge. In his experimental ventures, Münsterberg was a materialist and positivist. He believed that experimental

psychology concerned the analysis and measurement of physical events which were parallel processes to psychical events. Psychological phenomena were subject to the same laws as phenomena studied by the other natural sciences because Münsterberg claimed

That the whole world of mental facts is determined by laws, and that therefore in the mental world just as little as in the physical universe do wonders happen, is the necessary presupposition of psychology, which it does not discuss, but takes for granted. If the perceptions, associations, feelings, emotions, and dispositions are all given, the action must necessarily happen as it does.¹⁹

His positivism was equally apparent in his position that "Psychology starts with the presupposition that all objects which have existence in the universe are physical or psychical, objects in matter or objects in consciousness. Other objects are not perceivable by us, and therefore do not exist."²⁰

These positions imply certain boundaries of experimental psychology. Münsterberg viewed psychology as "a science which aims at description and explanation of inner life" through study of causal connections of its physical correlates.²¹ Causal connections of psychical phenomena such as the will cannot be made and, therefore, are not part of the experimental science. The experimental methods introduced in the mid-nineteenth century permitted the exact measurement of "physical elements of mental experiences".²² The

duties of the experimental psychologist were dictated accordingly, for "as long as he is to describe and explain, he cannot acknowledge that there is anything in the mind which does not allow such description and explanation. He must feel like the naturalist, who takes it for granted that everything in the universe is subordinated to natural laws."²³ Therefore, the role of the experimental psychologist contained restrictions; it excluded the consideration of understanding, purposes, and ideals of mental life. The psychologist should not evaluate mental life, the will, or metaphysical problems.²⁴

Münsterberg did not omit these aspects of reality from the domain of psychological thought. Rather, they were given over to a separate field of psychology. Experimental psychology, or "causal psychology", was distinguished from a field that Münsterberg referred to as "purposive psychology." In the latter field one studies the same inner experiences as in experimental psychology, but from the "different standpoint" of understanding the meaning or purposes of inner experiences. He typically defined purposive psychology by contrasting it with causal psychology:

The contents of consciousness with which causal psychology deals are objects, but the acts which have a meaning and which form the material of purposive psychology are acts of subjects. Hence if we contrast the mere material, we have in causal psychology mental objects which are found in consciousness, and in purposive psychology we have acts which are performed by a subject.²⁵

Münsterberg held that the methods of the two psychologies are similar and that "the search for necessary connections in our real life, in our life of purpose and meaning, begins with the same motives and ends with the same results as the causal scientist."²⁶ Both psychologies depend on the permanence of experience. For the causal scientist the permanency is of physical substance and energies, while for the purposive scientist it is of "sameness of will purposes" or the soul.²⁷ In turn, the soul is "part of the absolute mind", and closely related to "the over-individual obligations of truth, beauty and morality," just as the individual organism studied in causal psychology is part of the physical universe. It then follows that the soul can be studied in its individual and social aspects.²⁸

Purposive psychology was intended to begin where causal psychology terminated. It alone could study the values and absolute ideals of real life. Any attempt from the standpoint of experimental psychology to make such investigations was "psychologism", and Münsterberg once referred to such attempts as a "psychological imperialism" exhibiting an "expansionist policy".²⁹

The tenability of purposive psychology required two assumptions, that there exists some absolute knowledge and that philosophy, and not experiences in the physical world, determines our system of acquiring knowledge. Both assumptions were fundamental to a stance that Münsterberg called

philosophical idealism.

First, he claimed that the "general proposition, 'there is absolute truth', for me stands only as an expression of the minimal requirement for the truth-seeker. He who does not accept it, we idealists insist, negates himself, and we saw in that the very first fact which brushes aside all pragmatism and all relativism."³⁰ The absolute truth transcends that of individual wills because "We know other will acts in ourselves which we will with an over-individual meaning, those attitudes we take when we feel ourselves beyond the domain of our purely personal wishes. The will remains our own, but its significance transcends our individual attitudes; it has an over-individual value; we call it our duty."³¹ Understanding of these will acts can be acquired only from the normative sciences including logic, aesthetics, ethics, and metaphysics. Furthermore, "on the basis of these normative sciences the idealistic philosophy has to build up its metaphysical system, which may connect the disconnected will attitudes of our ethical, aesthetical, religious, and logical duties in one ideal dome of thoughts."³² Values of truth, beauty, harmony, progress, morality, and unity are subject to "the ultimate demand that all the values become one, that the world remain absolutely itself; and the satisfaction of this demand brings us the values of religion and philosophy."³³

The acceptance of absolute knowledge implies the second assumption, that the classification and methods of knowledge are

determined according to metaphysical and not physical grounds. Thus it becomes evident that even the theoretical causal sciences, including experimental psychology, are purposive and value-laden because they seek the ideal of constructing a system of the world and even more importantly, because they manifest certain eternal ideals.³⁴

Münsterberg spent considerable time constructing a taxonomy of knowledge,³⁵ yet he was thoroughly committed to a rapprochement where all knowledge ultimately would be subsumed in unity and culminate in a new "Weltanschauung, a unified view of the whole of reality." This hope pervaded his address at the 1904 St. Louis Congress of Arts and Sciences and prefaced many of his other scientific writings.³⁶

The search for knowledge through metaphysics and science offered a means for contemplating the external and over-individual value of truth. To Münsterberg, this belief by no means eliminated from life the more practical activities. Indeed, he maintained that "social life has the most immediate interest in uniting the personal joy with the over-personal value." The particular form of truth seeking was unimportant, and practical endeavors were valid so long as their contributions to personal happiness did not overshadow and were not misinterpreted as the real values themselves.³⁷

This evaluation of practical enterprises received a scientific counterpart in the applied sciences. As mentioned

earlier, Münsterberg acknowledged ultimate purposes in the causal sciences. For instance, the purpose of scientific psychology was not merely to develop metaphysical constructs but to establish that

The right of the scientific psychologist to link his results with the technical needs of social life is founded on even deeper reasons than that of the physicist. We need only to remember our earlier discussions on the principles of causal psychology. We saw that the inner life of those around us does not present itself as a system of causes and effects but only as a meaning to be interpreted. To study it as cause and effect involved a reconstruction, and every causal statement was thus an answer to an artificial question. But why should we raise such an unnatural question at all, if there is not need of applying the results of causal psychology to important practical interests?... The whole elaboration of causal psychology, and that is after all the form of psychology which is traditionally accepted as the science of the mind, has significance only if it is ultimately to serve our practical ends.³⁸

Münsterberg felt that the ultimate aims of scientific psychology were illustrated by contemporary social conditions. That is, the necessity of scientific guidance was evident everywhere in society. The need became more obvious when one observed the ineffectiveness of naive or every-day psychology.³⁹ But the need was also apparent in the demands for practical psychological knowledge made by other professionals including doctors, lawyers, teachers, and businessmen. Münsterberg believed that these demands showed "the duty of the practical psychologist systematically to examine how far other purposes of modern society can be advanced by

the new methods of experimental psychology."⁴⁰

Added to these metaphysical purposes and social demands was another reason for developing a practical or applied psychology. The reason related to Münsterberg's philosophy of scientific progress, specifically the belief that practical applications are necessary for advances in theoretical science. Münsterberg felt that "the knowledge of nature and the mastery of nature have always belonged together,"⁴¹ and that "the coupling of theory and practice represented a move toward a higher unity, "an ultimate view of pulsating reality."⁴²

Münsterberg carried through his commitment to practical psychology by writing, speaking, and supervising experimental research on applied problems. His interests led him to write volumes on practical psychology topics such as industrial efficiency, psychotherapy, education, social sanity, vocational guidance, and jurisprudence.⁴³ He published numerous studies on social problems such as prohibition and temperance, imaginary nervous diseases, scholarship, sex education, socialism, dancing, and feminism.⁴⁴ His writings and lectures were prepared for audiences ranging from experimental psychologists and other professionals to politicians and parents.

Münsterberg's endorsement of practical psychology was not unrestricted. On the contrary, one of his first American publications criticizes the new psychology for

assuming its relevance to problems of practical life and used the case of education to question these assumptions. He criticized psychologists and teachers alike for assuming that experimental research could be applied directly to educational experiences.⁴⁵ His animosity lessened over time but his warnings concerning the uses and abuses of practical psychology were continued.⁴⁶

The rationale with which Münsterberg could criticize the direct use of scientific psychology yet devote years to applied psychology research is important. His concept of applied science is fundamental not merely for understanding his own applications but also for gaining a better view of his epistemology. Münsterberg rejected the idea that applied science is simply the extension of theoretical findings to practical problems. The process of application requires awareness of certain aims or ends of practical life. Münsterberg maintained that when this was realized

We understand at once that it is utterly artificial to substitute the categories of the psychologist for those of immediate practical will-relations and to consider the child in the same class-room as a causal system of psycho-physical elements instead of a personality which is teleologically to be interpreted, and whose aims are not to be connected with causal effects but with over-individual attitudes. In this way the historical relation and the normative relation have to play at least as important a role in the pedagogical system as the psycho-physical relation, and we might quite as well call education applied history and applied ethics.⁴⁷

Therefore, applied sciences "should be" defined through their use of knowledge according to chosen ends. They would not be less valid because of such interdependence since "all this does not contradict the other fact that this choosing of ends together with making use of the knowledge for that end is itself a group of facts which can be studied and which therefore becomes an object of science."⁴⁸

The view that applied science is a combination of theory and values has implications for the functioning of the applied fields. For instance, pedagogy cannot rely solely on theoretical psychology or on the personal values of the teacher. It requires a third and independent agent, the educational theorist, to attempt the harmonious synthesis of theory and desired ends.⁴⁹ The area of "psychotechnics" would fill a comparable role in industry because "The task of psychotechnics is accordingly to determine by exact psychological experiments how this mental effect, the satisfaction of economic desires, can be secured in the quickest, in the easiest, in the safest, in the most enduring, and the most satisfactory way."⁵⁰ Münsterberg made similar proposals for applied work in medicine, jurisprudence and vocational guidance. He hoped that these fields would develop their own research facilities and laboratories.⁵¹

When Münsterberg demarcated distinct fields of applied science, he stipulated special roles for the applied scientist. Just as the experimental psychologist should refrain

from making evaluations, so the applied psychologist should understand the values, the desired social ends, in his research. These ends would be dictated by society because society is responsible for establishing institutes for applied research and provides the social ideals upon which applied scientists operate. Münsterberg believed that a society founded on individualism or utilitarianism could not give the proper guidance for achieving the right social ideals, the eternal values.⁵² The solution required social acceptance of idealism, and America was moving in that direction. Idealism was incipient in American life and ultimately would bring profound changes for "As soon as the nation feels that the meaning of life lies, not in the greatest pleasure for the greatest number of individuals, but in the realization of eternal ideals, then, as a matter of course, school and college and vocational life will be reshaped and reorganized."⁵³ Münsterberg appended descriptions of this emerging idealism to many of his writings. It was in Tomorrow that he precisely described the emergence of this new life and contemplated its repercussions.

Idealism and the Future

Tomorrow offers no dates for the appearance of the idealist world and the author claimed his psychology to be of no help in making such predictions.⁵⁴ Yet the protagonist was convinced of the eventual ascendance of idealism

and described how its emergence had already begun. The nationalism of European countries, particularly Germany, and the growing American nationalism comprised the first signs of a new philosophy and ultimately, of a new world order. It was only a matter of time before idealism and internationalism would be established.

In several letters the psychologist-author discussed the attributes of nationalism and demonstrated the rise of idealism. Nationalism meant a triumph of the state built on national love, defense, and belief in its ideals. The last ingredient is critical because it demands moral obligation; it is based upon the belief that "selfishness in individuals or nations seeks pleasure, advantage, enjoyment, happiness, but nationalistic ambition serves an idea, is loyalty and faithfulness in the fulfillment of a mission which is received from history."⁵⁵ Nationalism also affirms truth by uniting purposes of individual life experience. In other words, nationalism represents the sacrifice of individual wants for the absolute and over-individual ideals and fosters recognition that "truth is ultimately belief."⁵⁶

The psychologist-author elaborated on the superiority of German nationalism but acknowledged the rapid development of American nationalism. To him, an improved nationalism would depend on recognition of the philosophical contribution of German-Americans because Americans "must yield for today and tomorrow to the German idealism."⁵⁷ Germany already

had acquired efficiency, organization, and "Kultur", attributes which reflect the more fundamental belief in absolute values. The author noted how "The true German is guided neither by the realistic hope for his pleasures and advantages nor by the idealistic belief in the development of his own soul, but by his feelings of duty toward the common aims and ideals. His life is a contribution to fulfillments which lie beyond himself."⁵⁸

These over-individual and future-oriented obligations eventually would serve not a single nation, but the entire world. Here, the psychologist introduced the necessary sequel of internationalism and ultimately, pacifism. The new internationalism would require all nations to "repress" memories of earlier animosities, and organize programs of exchange, cooperation and common purposes. These programs would constitute the beginnings of "supernational organization."⁵⁹

Tomorrow recapitulates Münsterberg's philosophy both in espousing idealism and arguing for a particular epistemology. The predicted idealism implies a sense of a larger spiritual unity in the nation and the universe, and was defended in many of Münsterberg's writings.⁶⁰ Likewise, he often presented German thought as an exemplar of this idealism.⁶¹ The idealism proffered in Tomorrow depends on a recognition of absolute knowledge and of the moral obligations of individuals and groups. This requisite sense of

duty or obligation appears in Münsterberg's other comments on idealism.⁶²

More importantly, the idealism introduced in the book corresponds with Münsterberg's conception of ideal values and the means of striving for these values. Progress, morality, unity, and harmony are essential values in his philosophy and subjective psychology, and are no less evident in his utopian essay.⁶³ For instance, internationalism would be founded on notions of harmonious synthesis and the unity of mankind; the improved postwar world would manifest the valued ideal of progress. Before examining how the idea of progress fit with Münsterberg's perceptions of contemporary political and social conditions, it is necessary to understand how science and psychology would play a part in the future utopia.

Science in an Idealist World

Münsterberg wrote as a psychologist and made numerous references to the fact throughout the book. Yet he formulated an idealist scheme with an epistemology that placed the sciences in an auxiliary position to an overriding philosophy. This relation between science and philosophy offered no major problems to the consideration of psychology once it was understood that psychology functioned in the service of philosophical knowledge.

Tomorrow contained numerous questions about the efficacy

of scientific knowledge as well as arguments that the correctness of science depended on a certain philosophical understanding. For instance, the psychologist-author used nationalism, where "the state has proved itself stronger than the race," to exemplify the insufficiency of current psychological or scientific knowledge. He wrote that

To explain history from the angle of race is the last word of natural science and as such perfectly correct. But to explain the progress of social events is not the only way to understand it. We live in a world of purposes which must be interpreted and not explained. Their meaning and aim count and not their naturalistic origin. The pose of the scientific account is a sin against the true spirit of history.⁶⁴

The contemporary psycho-biological theories of war and aggression were criticized similarly.⁶⁵ The narrator rejected those speculations about the future which rely entirely on the idea of scientific achievement for "they ignore the fact that the real changes in the history of civilization have not come so much from inventions as from new principles of life."⁶⁶ Finally, the psychologist-author noted that the use of science is ancillary to absolute knowledge because "If I perform the same work because I believe in the absolute value of scientific truth, I am stirred by an idealistic motive."⁶⁷

If the position of science would be auxiliary in the new world, it certainly would remain important. Münsterberg appreciated the use of science in the service of ideals. Science would contribute to achieving American idealism

because as "Movements for vocational guidance and vocational education have spread over the land....The scientific expert is more and more often called into the service of public affairs."⁶⁸ Science also would have a place in the international bureaus and exchanges.⁶⁹ In Tomorrow science serves an ultimate purpose. As a psychologist, Münsterberg employed scientific knowledge to understand world affairs. Yet the use of science in designing the future world corresponds with Münsterberg's qualification that "there has come a kind of reaction against the mere collecting of facts and gathering of data. A longing for wide perspectives and for unified views of the world begins a new reign."⁷⁰ It seemed reasonable to Münsterberg that psychology, developed with recognition of idealism, would play an important role in the new reign.

Hopes for America

Tomorrow is the vision of a world united by a common philosophical goal. But it also has another objective in presenting Germany as a complement to contemporary America. To achieve this latter aim Münsterberg attempted to demonstrate two points. First, he portrayed German culture as honorable and worthy of emulation by explaining the noble roots of German nationalism and international policy. Second, he described the similarities between American and German culture and related them to the proposition that an

improved America depended on adoption of German ideals, especially those transmitted by German-Americans.

The attempt to clarify German cultural ideals and political activities occupied much of Münsterberg's time, even before the war. Several years after arriving in the United States he prepared a volume on America that listed the attributes of Germany and cited the growing similarity between the two countries.⁷¹ He continued his attempts by publishing articles on the values of German culture, education, and social life.⁷² His praise of Germany took on a more defensive tone after the onset of the war; he defended the innocence of Germany in initiating the war and condemned the treatment of German-Americans.⁷³ Münsterberg even sent messages to national leaders. One such letter to President Wilson called for analysis of wartime events "with the methods of scientific psychology." Münsterberg wrote "as a psychologist" maintaining that an incident that appeared to be an act of sabotage by a German could be explained with the concepts of "auto-suggestion" and "retro-active amnesia."⁷⁴

Münsterberg's sentiments were not merely pro-German. At one point he acknowledged a comment that he surveyed "the American world through German eyes with Harvard astigmatism."⁷⁵ Indeed, he saw the American world in a special way. Concurrent with his publications praising German culture, Münsterberg wrote about American virtues. He argued that

America was founded on idealism and was in many respects not unlike Germany. The similarities between these nations were increasing:

The American still puts the higher value on the personal, the German on the over-personal; the American on the intrinsic value of the creating will, the German on the intrinsic value of the absolute ideal. But every day sees the difference reduced, and brings the two nations nearer to a similar attitude of mind.⁷⁶

A "new wave" of idealism was appearing in America but it was not without impediments. Münsterberg warned that idealism was threatened by individualism, lack of self-control, neglect of the scientific expert, faulty educational and vocational guidance programs, and absence of organization.⁷⁷

Münsterberg asserted that much could be gained from the adoption of German ideals and believed that these ideals could be obtained from those Germans who had migrated to the United States. His hopes for such integration were paralleled by efforts for its realization, efforts such as setting up cultural and scholarly exchanges.⁷⁸

Münsterberg claimed that idealism and social harmony, attributes of social order, could be fostered by implementing techniques of social control. He suggested that social control could be expedited by several steps including the development of laboratories for research on social problems, the use of psychological experts, and the initiation of educational and vocational programs.⁷⁹ These steps would

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 hasten national organization and efficiency. Münsterberg also advocated the development of "self-control" in individuals. Paramount in such self-control would be a recognition of community obligations and dedication to meeting these duties through the most appropriate vocation. According to Münsterberg, vocational choices were clearly the means to personal and societal well-being.⁸⁰

Tomorrow contains comments on the importance of social efficiency, organization, and individual duty. But the primary concern is with international harmony and unity. Here again Münsterberg did not limit his hopes to critical essays such as Tomorrow. He attempted to convince influential people, including presidents and scholars, of a feasible world order. He wrote one such person about schemes for a "United States of the World."⁸¹ He sent a copy of Tomorrow to George Sarton, the historian of science. On December 8, 1916 Münsterberg wrote Sarton that "In short, I wanted to see a network of spiritual interests covering the globe, and I am more than ever convinced that the time after the war will be the gigantic opportunity for such works."⁸² Münsterberg died eight days later, leaving incomplete his plans for an idealist world and his attempts to improve America through a philosophy of unity, organization, efficiency, and social obligation.

CHAPTER VII

JOHN B. WATSON AND THE HOPES FOR BEHAVIORISM

A reviewer of one of Watson's texts on behaviorism commented that the ideas presented left one "for an instant blinded with a great hope."¹ Watson himself expressed great hope for his psychology and for its proposed applications to social conditions. This sentiment was to persist long after his career as a full-time academic psychologist ended.

Many historians have commented on Watson's zealous commitment to psychology.² The commonly held attitude toward his work is encapsulated in one historian's term "naive behaviorism."³ Watson has been called the proponent of what was to become for a time the foremost system of psychology.

There are three reasons for calling him behaviorism's proponent. First, he denied consciousness and introspection as valid concepts in psychology and, instead, argued for the study of behavior and for objective methods of observation. Second, he believed in the relatively strong influence on the individual personality of experience rather than of hereditary. Finally, Watson expressed beliefs in the practical uses of psychological knowledge.⁴

Some historians have undertaken more detailed studies of Watson than those in textbook histories. Several writers have interpreted Watson's zeal as either a reaction to or an altered continuation of his religious background.⁵ Others

have traced it to the particularly receptive social milieu of Americans in the 1920s who were caught in a psychology fetish.⁶ Still others have examined the apparent acceptance of Watson's plans, specifically his positivism and his calls for the practical application of psychology.⁷ Despite these intensive historical studies, one product of Watson's psychology and enthusiasm remains unanalyzed, a utopian vision constructed on behaviorist principles. Originally titled "The Behaviorist's Utopia", the nineteen page manuscript was published in 1929 as a shorter magazine article with the title "Should a Child Have More than One Mother?"⁸

Watson's utopia is thoroughly behavioristic. He envisioned a country with "units" of 260 husbands and wives (and a few extras who serve as "spare" husbands and wives). Each husband and wife pair, aided by a "scientifically trained assistant", cares for three children. They never know the identity of their biological children. Offspring rotate among these parent pairs, spending four weeks at each home, and at the age of twenty "his 260th mother and father pat him on the head and send him out to earn his living unaided."⁹ Because utopian society eschews religion, politics, philosophy, history, and tradition, the citizens seek only "behavioristic happiness," and do so "by experimentation."¹⁰ In a society replete with material conveniences, happiness, physical beauty, and health, the

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rearing of children is paramount. In this area, the behaviorist physician "takes charge" and assists the mother during the early years of the children's lives. Education aims at forming "emotional and dispositional habits."¹¹ At the age of sixteen children begin vocational and professional training. Segregated by sex, males learn vocations such as medicine, science, and manufacturing while females learn to manage homes, handle men, perfect sex techniques, and rear children. Because social rules are developed through experimenting, and misbehavior is corrected by retraining, the behaviorist's utopia has no need for political structure or "that abstract entity we call the State."¹²

The utopia certainly reflects Watson's enthusiasm for behaviorism. Of more importance, the hypothetical society incorporates the rudiments of his scientific thought. Watson employed both behavioristic psychology and his concept of social change to describe the utopia. His theories of human behavior account for its maintenance and his ideals of health and happiness measure its success. Finally, the utopia envisages what Watson believed to be a major function of psychology, "to establish laws or principles for the control of human action so that it can aid organized society in its endeavors to prevent failures in such adjustments."¹³ A discussion of the relations between the utopia and Watson's scientific and social ideals requires further knowledge of

his psychology, particularly its prescribed methods, subject matter, and purposes.

A Behaviorist's View of Psychology

While Watson is frequently cited for his criticisms of then-contemporary psychology, particularly introspection and concepts of consciousness, he actually spent little time on critiques.¹⁴ He even commented that a fundamental reason for abandoning introspectionist psychology was the "success" of his alternative psychology.¹⁵ During his first ten years of experimental researches, studies performed exclusively with non-humans, Watson became convinced of the success of studying behavior rather than mental concepts. One advantage of behavior as the subject matter of psychology was the possibility of studying it with the methods of experimental science. That is, behavior could be observed in an objective manner and the precision of observations could be increased by controlling conditions in the laboratory.¹⁶ These experimental methods permitted a consensus of observation and guaranteed what Watson termed the "essential contention of the behaviorist", that psychology was a science.¹⁷ Another major advantage of the study of behavior is its "practical value" in controlling and changing human activities. Early in his career, Watson anticipated this practical value by estimating the effects that behaviorism would eventually have on traditional educational practices.¹⁸

Therefore, accepting behavior as the subject matter of psychology not only permitted use of the methods of the natural sciences -- the methods of a domain to which Watson believed psychology belonged -- but also it offered an expedient means to the desired goal of controlling human activities.

Watson's first systematic statement on behaviorism and its unique advantages appeared in a twenty page Psychological Review article in 1913.¹⁹ Here he proclaimed the failure of psychology to become a natural science and argued that a behavioral perspective provided a means of attaining psychology's scientific status.²⁰ This article was followed by a series of investigations in two areas, the categorization of behaviors according to their origin and development, and the laws governing acquisition of behaviors. These investigations, along with writings on their implications for the practical control of social behaviors, comprise the major portion of Watson's publications.

The Origins of Behavior

Watson's descriptions of what could be studied using his behavioristic approach suggested a classification of behavior types and a re-classification of traditional subject matter. Watson began this reformulation by assessing the phenomena of "image" and "affection" because he believed that these demonstrated the problem of not being explicit behaviors.

He suggested that such phenomena were cases of "implicit behavior...which manifests itself chiefly in movements of the larynx, but which may go on in (to the eye) imperceptible form, in the fingers, hands, and body as a whole...."²¹

Watson admitted that current technical achievements permitted only study of explicit behaviors but announced his "very decided conviction, though, that not many years will pass before implicit behavior will likewise yield to experimental treatment."²²

Another step in this classification involved determining the origins or initial instances of explicit behavior. A taxonomy of simple and complex behaviors could have been devised from his early research in comparative psychology, but Watson was not content with such a program. In his aspirations for the field of psychology, he intimated another dimension because

when we are confronted with the practical and scientific needs of life we are ready to admit that after all what we seek to have psychology busy herself with is just this matter of environmental adjustment; what can man do apart from his training; what can he be trained to do, and what are the best methods for training; and finally, how, when the varied systems of instincts and habits have sufficiently developed, can we arrange the conditions for calling out appropriate action on demand?²³

Taken alone, the notions of simple and complex (or implicit or explicit) behaviors could not account for the dimensions of "environmental adjustment". In order to do so, Watson

had to distinguish between those behaviors which were acquired by the organism (habit responses) and those which existed in the organism at birth (instinctive responses).²⁴

After establishing a basic physiological understanding of human actions,²⁵ Watson attempted to distinguish these acquired and hereditary modes of response and to ascertain their origins. Hereditary responses were found to consist of two types, emotional and instinctive. The former was defined by changes in bodily mechanisms, principally visceral and glandular, and the latter by unlearned responses, principally of the striped muscles.²⁶ Watson employed a "genetic" method by studying these responses in the newborn child. In due course, he discovered three fundamental emotions -- love, rage, and fear -- and a number of instinctive reactions related to life-conserving and defensive activities.²⁷

Laws of Behavior Acquisition

Watson held that most behaviors, although composed of the same reflexes as hereditary responses, are habits:

"Any definite mode of acting, either explicit or implicit in character, not belonging to man's hereditary equipment, must be looked upon as a habit."²⁸ His 1915 APA presidential address cited the successful explanation of habit given in Becterev's notion of the conditioned motor reflex.²⁹ At the time, Watson had yet to attempt the conditioning of

humans according to this notion. His most noted demonstration of the conditioned motor reflex was his experiment with Albert B. which was reported five years later. In this experiment a stimulus (loud sound) that elicited an unlearned emotional response (fear) was paired with a neutral stimulus (white rat). After several trials of this pairing, Albert displayed fear responses when exposed only to the white rat.³⁰

Watson used the conditioned reflex notion to explain many other psychological phenomena. He maintained that behaviorism was consistent with Freudian thought because both systems acknowledged the influence of early learned habits and instinctive systems on the functioning of adult reactions. Therefore, symptoms of mental disease were explained as disturbances of adjustment between implicit and explicit habits.³¹ Similarly, he evaluated the notion of "wish" and proposed an experimentally derived ethics of behavior.³² Thought was explained as "unverbalized speech" and consciousness as a "kind of sub-vocal talk" with one-self.³³

These elaborations on behaviorism indicated that the study of human behavior involved the reduction of all complex behavior to simple actions.³⁴ Watson confidently wrote that his speculations would be confirmed when the appropriate experimental data were amassed.³⁵ He expressed two additional notions about behavior. He held that nearly all

behaviors were products of learning, and so that the study of inheritance was unnecessary,³⁶ and that this learning occurred during a critical period, the first two or three years of life, after which time habits were well-established.³⁷

Neither notion was confirmed by experimental methods.

Nevertheless, Watson used them to bolster a major principle of his psychology, the control of human behavior.

Social Control: Training, Untraining, Retraining

Before producing his "principles for the control of human action", and even before issuing his behaviorist decree of 1913, Watson made recommendations about the practical value of experimentation.³⁸ He subsequently described the goal of research to be the discovery of adjustments to stimuli and stated that "My final reason for this is to learn general and particular methods by which I may control behavior."³⁹ His "plan" for psychological research would yield knowledge for physicians, educators, jurors, and businessmen.

A precise account of the idea of "control" was given in a 1917 article, "An Attempted Formulation of the Scope of Behavior Psychology."⁴⁰

Watson stated that the control of behavior to "aid organized society in its endeavors to prevent failures" was just as much a function of psychology as the formulation of laws for predicting behavior.⁴¹ He claimed that society or, more specifically, leaders in society,

had been employing means of controlling social behavior since the beginning of society. However, such attempts at environmental adjustment relied on "roundabout, hit-and-miss methods" while behavior psychology would generate means for control by scientific methods.⁴² These methods would be more successful in establishing social control because scientific psychology was more efficient than methods of trial-and-error or common-sense psychology.

Watson's advocacy of scientific methods of social control had important, and as he seemed to recognize at a various times, troublesome limitations. When discussing social control Watson cautiously noted that psychology should refrain from making moral rules or creating social values because "psychology at present has little to do with the setting of social standards of action and nothing to do with moral standards."⁴³ He maintained that psychology should study how to control behaviors of the individual so that they will be made harmonious with social standards; it was the responsibility of others to establish and implement such standards.⁴⁴ On several occasions Watson acknowledged a significant problem associated with these limitations. That is, if society establishes social standards by the same hit-and-miss methods that it devises means of social control, then successful social standards will be developed only after an indeterminable time, if at all.⁴⁵

On several occasions, Watson proposed solutions to

this problem. First, although he asserted the inability of behaviorists to devise moral standards, he sometimes failed to uphold this assertion and talked about "behaviorist morals."⁴⁶ On one occasion he even proposed that the scientific knowledge of behaviorists should replace the legal system.⁴⁷ Second, when Watson did maintain his conviction that psychology should not pass value judgments, he looked for such judgments in a future "functional" or "experimental" ethics that would establish mores by scientific methods.⁴⁸ Related to this view were his suggestions that social scientists, particularly psychologists, could utilize experimental procedures to maximize social improvement. In order to do so, Watson added that psychologists must be given opportunity to conduct the necessary laboratory studies.⁴⁹ He similarly suggested that psychologists experiment upon and change large social systems.⁵⁰

The final solution offered to the problem of establishing moral standards, and to the behaviorist's role in such alterations, was the creation of a society according to experimental findings. This solution was essentially an extension of Watson's famous statement, "Give me a dozen healthy infants, well-formed, and my own specified world to bring them up in and I'll guarantee to take anyone at random and train him to become any type of specialist I

might select...."⁵¹ He wrote about the feasibility of his "own specified world" and the contributions for social betterment which it might yield. He even proposed a social experiment, a human laboratory. "Some day we ought to have great laboratories where squads can be kept at work. Their food, water, sex and shelter could then be kept under very definite control...."⁵² He more frequently mentioned the idea of an "infant farm" that would be "adequate in all respects for the study of the behavior problems in the young because I believe our technique has gone far enough even now to make it possible to bring up children so adjusted to life that they would never need to fall into the hands of the kindly analyst."⁵³ Watson once compared such an infant farm to marine biology institutions, noting that the former "would be one of the most profitable research investments that could be made at the present time."⁵⁴

These social experiments were never realized, and in his autobiography, Watson claimed "regret" at not having established "a group of infant farms" where various races could be reared under controlled conditions.⁵⁵ In addition to his proposals for human laboratories and infant farms, Watson wrote about another possible development, a utopia. This utopia describes how a better society could operate according to behaviorist principles, without the impediments of social traditions based on trial-and-error.

Behaviorism in the Ideal Society

Watson described Utopia as a dream of the behaviorist, a place where social life would be different. The special life would not revolve around political or religious doctrines but would be guided by the principles of "behavioristic happiness" and the methods of "experimentation."⁵⁶ These utopian principles and methods parallel many of those contained in his other scientific and popular writings.

The physical environment of Utopia is not paradisiacal. Watson imagined a country about the size of Texas with separate and large dwellings for each family unit. The conditions for work and leisure are similarly unremarkable because "Industry with us in our Utopia goes on much as it does here.... They have the same incentive here for doing a skillful job; increased pay; greater notice from the community for good work, and the like. Yet at the same time there is more time taken off for play and athletics than has been the case with any other nation. Wealth is laid up there as here."⁵⁷ These aspects of the utopian environment are much like the society in which Watson lived. But Utopia is unique in several respects: the figures of authority, the ideal conditions for child-rearing, and the personality attributes of the Utopian individual.

The social structure in Utopia contains some accepted traditions as well as some innovations. Watson stated that the country would be monogamous or "at any rate, I want to

see monogamy tried."⁵⁸ The monogamous family has three children with husband as wage-earner and wife as house-keeper. The social structure is unique in its absence of the "State," the judicial system, and the clergy.⁵⁹ Utopia does have important specialists called "behaviorist physicians" who are medical doctors trained in the methods of behaviorism. The well-paid behaviorist physicians act as both medical and psychological caretakers. "They guard the community on the psychological side just as they guard it on the medical side. There is a preventive psychology in Utopia just as there is a preventive medicine."⁶⁰ They are responsible for unconditioning behavior disorders, making decisions concerning euthanasia, and treating insanity. And in Watson's unpublished draft, the physicians are even charged with treating any individual who claimed to be "just an artist, just a poet, just a musician, or a composer, or actor...."⁶¹

These aspects of the social environment of Utopia are consistent with comments made by Watson in other writings. He frequently noted the breakdown of monogamous relationships and the social problems caused by family disintegration.⁶² He suggested replacing professionals of law and the legal system with behaviorists and a system of experimental ethics founded on behaviorism.⁶³ Furthermore, Watson wrote about the importance of physicians in general and about the assistance which they could receive from the

behavioral psychologist in particular.⁶⁴

Social innovations in Utopia are also evident in child-rearing practices and the promotion of certain personality characteristics. In Utopia, the identity of the infant is kept secret,⁶⁵ and she or he spends four weeks with each husband-wife pair until adulthood. From birth onward the child inhabits an environment designed for conditioning special attributes. Each child has a separate room and all houses have "a large common playroom well supplied with windows of quartz glass" as well as extensive yards with tall fences.⁶⁶ The aim of early training is to condition independence and absorption in activity. The former attribute is encouraged initially by concealing information about the child's biological parents. Independence also is maintained by such techniques as equipping homes "with a periscope so that the parents can glance now and then at the child without being seen. The child learns to do his stuff without having to have notice."⁶⁷ The paucity of toys in Utopia fosters independence and encourages manipulation of the environment. With these arrangements, the child also acquires the ability for absorption in activities.⁶⁸

Schools in Utopia continue the training of independence and absorption. They operate on the premise that "Learning is accomplished by doing, by the youngster finding himself in more and more difficult situations and extricating himself

by trial-and-error behavior."⁶⁹ In higher education children acquire the social ideals of Utopia through sex-segregated programs. The boys learn skills for successful wage-earning while the girls learn skills for successful home management. To ensure monogamy, the girls receive additional training to refrain from competition with men and to remain sexually attractive.

These child-rearing practices are aimed primarily at developing the utopian citizen, an individual with the desired attributes of absorption and independence. Such attributes are said to contribute to the functioning of society. For instance, Utopia's factories "hum there as here, and men work harder if anything because they are trained to be absorbingly active all during the waking hours."⁷⁰ With these special attributes, traits such as possessiveness, "invalidism", and "laziness" are practically non-existent.⁷¹ In fact, independence and absorption in activities facilitate achievement of the goals of Utopia, health and happiness. Health corresponds to the removal of behavioral disturbances such as invalidism and fear (although Watson also introduced techniques to guarantee a high degree of physical fitness).⁷² Happiness relates to activity because "Young Utopians are taught that death is the end of an individual's existence, and this is why happiness must be sought for in the things they are doing -- must be sought and found every day; and if they are not finding

it, then something is wrong with their training."⁷³

Essentially, happiness is the ability for absorption: "This complete absorption in activity is the keynote of the happiness of our children. It is our definition of behavioristic happiness."⁷⁴

There are numerous similarities between the child-rearing practices of Utopia and Watson's psychological research. His findings that the infant begins with a small repertory of responses and acquires more and complicated ones led him to emphasize the fundamental role of conditioning. He asserted that personality is the sum of conditioned emotional responses that are made from infancy onward.⁷⁵ For instance, Watson believed that the inability of an individual to be independent and assertive usually resulted from strong mother attachment in infancy. "Mother fixation" developed when the mother, originally an unconditioned stimulus to the unconditioned emotional response of love, becomes the stimulus for all emotional responses of love. Later "the gut reactions (emotions) have their center of reference in the mother -- manual, verbal and emotional tied together by this one, all exciting stimulus (she is really a complex situation at all times)."⁷⁶ These behavioral patterns produce an adult who cannot be independent, manipulate the world, become absorbed in activity, or be happy.⁷⁷ Just as Watson had designed a utopian environment that maximized independence in children so his other writings

advocate home conditions where the child has his or her own space and minimal parental attention.⁷⁸ The absence of "punishment" as a corrective device in Utopia similarly is promoted in his other writings.⁷⁹ In general, the utopian goals of health and happiness represent the objectives of scientific behaviorism which are determined by the absence of behavioral disorders (that prevent conquering the environment), and by independence and absorption in activities.⁸⁰

Science in Utopia

Watson held that the means for attaining behavioral objectives were of two types, altering the environment and retraining the individual.⁸¹ He proposed the application of both techniques in his utopia. But the proposals depended on an aspect of his behaviorism in addition to conditioning procedures. That is, they were designed with the assumption that behaviorism could and should be used to bring about social control and healthy individuals. As discussed earlier, Watson's statements about these functions of behavioral psychology were discordant with his occasional comments that scientists refrain from influencing social standards. His resolution of the discrepancy in his Utopia is most evident in the role accorded to science in that society.

In Utopia, the behavioral scientist does not or would not alter the social and moral standards precisely because those standards are identical with his. The morals of

Utopia are of "behavioristic happiness" and the duties of the "behaviorist physician" correspond to these morals. Elimination of the unfit, retraining of the behaviorally maladjusted, and practice of "preventive psychology" by conditioning comprise the scientific techniques for maintaining the desired social controls and personalities. Furthermore, with the elimination of religious, philosophical, political, and historical traditions, the formal rules are identical to accepted social standards. They are both behavioristic.

In other writings, Watson could not impose such consistency upon traditions, practices and ideals, and these works show the problems resulting from his inability to do so. Although at some times he claimed the behaviorist's disinterest in moral convictions, at other times in research reports, he described certain ideals of health and social control.⁸² More often Watson chose a less direct manner of discussing moral ideals. As noted earlier, rather than presenting behaviorist ideals with the presupposition that they were correct and that behaviorism had as its basis an improved ethics, Watson wrote about the inadequacies of current social standards and offered behaviorism as a means to develop better ones. Members of society were given this option; the behavioral scientists would act according to their decision.

Social Tragedies and Behaviorist Options

Of all the social maladies he noticed in society, Watson expressed greatest concern with those of male and female relationships, specifically marriage. Criticisms of the state of marriage prefaced the description of Utopia, and marital problems were attributed to the fact that only 20 per cent of wives were capable of "successful sex relationships" which "means that in 80 per cent of the homes today there is restlessness and unhappiness."⁸³ Watson believed that sexuality was one major problem in contemporary marriages, but that women were creating others. Not only were young single women teasing older married men, but married women were abandoning all efforts to remain attractive.⁸⁴ The condition of women was worsened by their failure in careers.⁸⁵ Furthermore, the marriage institution was threatened by the removal of biological and economic reinforcements. Concerning man, Watson wrote that "there is no biological reason now for his staying married. Women are not scarce, nor are they located at geographically different points. There are dozens of attractive women always right at hand. There is no longer any economic reason for a man's getting married. He doesn't want a wife to sew and scrub."⁸⁶ The plight of modern marriage contributed to problems within the family. Watson claimed that the home had failed as a social institution and "is not geared for twentieth-century service."⁸⁷ He and his second wife felt

that current domestic life relied on a "dangerous procedure" for raising children.⁸⁸

Criticism about family life centered around its effects on personality development of the child. Current family conditions were found to be responsible for creating individuals who were incapable of successful adult relationships, and he commented frequently on the resultant personality disturbances. According to him, excessive attention, poor training, and promotion of Oedipal complexes in children produced laziness, "invalidism", "nest habits", dependency, and unhappiness in adults.⁸⁹ The social crisis in the family was compounded by the increasing practice of unsound psychological treatments. That is, the use of mental tests, psychoanalysis, and other psychological "fakers" would yield no positive results because they were not scientific.⁹⁰

In proposing solutions to these problems, Watson emphasized the advantages of the experimental method. He described the similarities between everyday psychology and the newer experimental techniques. The latter were shown to yield greater precision and success because they permitted experimental control and prediction. Watson argued that prediction was impossible in everyday psychology with its trial-and-error methods based on incomplete knowledge of the stimulus and response.⁹¹ He stressed the simplicity of using experimental techniques.⁹² The efficacy and simplicity of the experimental method gave support to

Watson's contention that they could be employed by anyone in charge of the activities of an individual, including those of oneself.⁹³ He demonstrated not simply the experimental method but a behaviorist technique, and wrote that "You can see my goal -- every boy and girl by the age of fourteen to know his own organism and its reactions as in my example the boy knew his clock. I think this would lead the organism to be behavioristically self-correcting -- just as now the body unaided (unless too pronounced an infection sets in) heals its own wounds."⁹⁴ Watson argued that this technique of social experimentation would produce "trustworthy formulations" without bias because the behaviorist was "not against anything or for anything until it has been tried out and established like other scientific formulations."⁹⁵

The practice of these experimental methods was possible for everyone. They were the answer to the businessmen's cries for help in controlling behavior and the solution to the problems created by the "unscientific mother".⁹⁶ But Watson was not content with these measures and looked forward to the advent of a new type of specialist. On numerous occasions he described the possibility that either psychologists or physicians would become the new "analysts". They would be trained in behaviorism in order to condition, uncondition, and recondition patients as necessary.⁹⁷ Watson usually described these specialists, their education process, and the appropriate hospitals, as developments of the future.

He believed that, for the present, "analysis based upon behaviorist principles is here to stay and is a necessary profession in society -- to be placed upon a par with internal medicine and surgery."⁹⁸

Just as Watson imagined the "behaviorist physicians" in Utopia, so he contemplated the behaviorist as specialist in contemporary society. In Utopia, there were no problems reconciling social ethics and the practice of behaviorists. Outside Utopia, Watson recognized the need for a behaviorist psychology and its application to social problems, but he also noted the equally valid need for the psychologist to remain free from moral judgments. Yet he did state preferences for certain social standards. Possible clues for his doing so are found in his statements that contemporary individuals were incapable of social control and that social conditions were dreadful enough to "drive a behaviorist to dream of a Utopia where children grow up with reactions fit for present use and not for a Victorian era."⁹⁹

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CHAPTER VIII

SHARED ENDS, VARIED MEANS, AND GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

The four utopists devised distinct psychological systems. Their variations in scientific approaches closely correspond to those examined in Edna Heidbreder's Seven Psychologies. Hall was a contributor to the new functionalism, McDougall a dynamic psychologist, and Watson a behaviorist. Only Münsterberg, a participant in both structuralist and functionalist enterprises, cannot be fitted neatly into one of Heidbreder's categories.¹

Study of the four utopias has indicated the appropriateness of making such categorized distinctions since each work incorporates the psychological orientation of the author. But the examinations also gave evidence of areas of agreement. Despite differences in psychological theories, the authors shared a vision. They subscribed to ideals of improvement, suggested these ideals in their psychology as well as in their utopias, and held that these ideals could be realized, or at least approached, with the correct procedures. Each contrasted these visions with the sad reality of current society and the psychological problems that it endured.

The four utopias represent programs for improving society and individuals by applying psychological knowledge to attain social control. The feasibility of these programs

depended upon a recognition of ideals, and development of a psychology consistent with these ideals. It entailed a belief in the priority of scientific knowledge and in a technique for modifying peoples and situations. These utopias and the other writings of the psychologists contain certain moral intentions. Because the previous four chapters were devoted to delineating such intentions, it is possible to compare the intentions of the four psychologists as they were expressed in the ideal, in psychology and its technique, and in the role of science in an improved world. With this perspective, the works can be compared with other utopian writings of the period and with writings of other psychologists.

Individual and Social Ideals

Chapter two reviewed the uses of psychological notions to describe the utopian or ideal man: a seeker of sensate experience governed by some social order, a rational being capable of progressive evolution in intellect, biology, or sociability, or a creature capable of psychological emancipation. In utopian writing these psychological notions refer to ideal capabilities rather than to actual abilities. Therefore, utopias have often included measures for the improvement of man to ensure that the actual can approach the ideal. If one assumes that some of man's imperfect qualities are permanent, as did Hobbes, then the utopian

formulation frequently specifies control of the less than ideal traits.

Hall, McDougall, Münsterberg, and Watson all presented ideals of human advancement both in their utopias and in other writings. They proposed that these ideals could be obtained, usually by gradual progressive change. For Hall and Münsterberg, progress was stimulated initially by special forces -- by evolution and metaphysical development -- but it still required human intervention in the form of planning and control. For McDougall and Watson, the progress toward the ideal depended solely on human decision-making, that is, on a resolution to establish social control with techniques from existent scientific knowledge.

The psychologists specified both individual and social ideals. Although they differed in the emphases placed on various qualities, their ideals for the individual include five general attributes: superior intelligence and morals, dedicated service to society, self-control, physical excellence, and happiness. The quality of service to society was cited and detailed by all. Only Watson elaborated on what was implied by human happiness. The ideal of physical health and strength was listed by Watson, McDougall and Hall, and the latter two also called for superior intellectual and moral character. Self-control was explicitly stated only by Watson and Münsterberg although all four implied such control in describing the dedication of the

individual to societal above individual ends.

The ideal social conditions fall into four general categories: education facilities for developing the individual, a specific organization of the family, social harmony and unity, and efficiency. The four psychologists shared ideals about the primacy of educational and training facilities. These ideals parallel their conceptions of ideal individual attributes. For instance, McDougall's description of educational institutions emphasizes the development of intellectual and moral qualities, while Watson's stresses self-control and happiness through absorption in activities. Another social ideal which concerned all four writers was the organization of the family. Hall, McDougall and Münsterberg lauded the nuclear family and the traditional role of the mother, but Watson, while emphatically claiming the virtues of monogamy and traditional female roles, rejected the conception of a family unit where children spend their entire youth under the supervision of two adults.

The psychologists also voiced ideals of social harmony and unity. Survival and progress of society depended not merely on organization but on a sense of community and shared goals. The words unity, community, and harmony are common in their works but their descriptions of these concepts varied. Hall and Münsterberg perceived unity and harmony as resulting from a common recognition of either

the folksoul or absolute values. McDougall discussed unity as a symbiotic arrangement serving the common goals of world improvement. Watson saw harmony as the result of shared feelings of behavioristic happiness, and of the elimination of selfish desires. Only Münsterberg described the ideal of efficiency in detail. He claimed that it was a necessary trait for successful social unity.

The social and individual ideals of the psychologists were matched by criticisms of actual society. They all commented on the current psychological problems of individualism, selfishness, decaying morals, neuroticism, and lack of self-control. They similarly denounced the current status of the family as well as what was perceived as inadequate social mores. Hall focused his attack on education and the family, McDougall on the family, unsuccessful social reforms, and racial degeneration, Watson on marriage and sexual mores, and Münsterberg on moral weakness, poor education, and inadequate social reform.

With a common belief that there existed ideals of individual and social life which contrasted with current conditions but which could be realized, the four psychologists constructed their utopias. Despite their disappointments with society, these writers expressed confidence about the possibility of a better world. Beyond their preferences and criticisms, they perceived the means of betterment not through individual enlightenment but through

the correct techniques of social control. They also believed that the techniques were already available in established psychological science.

Techniques of Psychology and the Role of Science

The use of psychological knowledge to enhance the feasibility of utopian schemes was discussed in chapters two and three. As psychology gained sophistication and recognition, its concepts came to be used with increasing frequency, both as literary devices and as tools for constructing these hypothetical societies. For example, psychological ideas of the Enlightenment supported notions of transforming man through education, and the psychological concepts of "genius" permitted French utopists to explain the implementation of superior systems. As literary devices, such psychological ideas as hypnosis, drug states, and psychosurgery make utopian stories more entertaining if not more believable.

The four utopias discussed in the preceding chapters use models for implementing social change and control that are based on the science of psychology. Not surprisingly, the models of these explicit utopias are included within the psychological conceptions of the authors. Indeed, the fictional utopian models are consistent with non-fictional proposals for research or social reform made by the same authors. A summary of the psychological models in the

utopias will facilitate a comparison of the four techniques for implementing social control as well as of the roles of science.

Hall's scientific thinking was thoroughly entrenched in the theory of evolution. He developed a genetic psychology that stressed development, change, and progress. The life of children was paramount, for it held the key not merely to individual growth but to racial progress. His psychology was shaped by two other ideas: the notions of the "Mansoul" that represented spiritual community, and the role of humans in contributing to evolution, particularly through the acquisition and application of knowledge. Regarding the latter idea, Hall became convinced that psychology was the most important form of knowledge. The rise of Atlantis illustrated his evolutionary conceptions in the gradual progression through the application of knowledge to a highly evolved culture. The uncontested status of psychology and its applications, especially pedagogy, contributed to further advancement of social unity, harmony, altruism, and moral and physical health.

The psychology of McDougall also was influenced by evolutionary ideas. His interest in evolution was guided by a belief that human action was purposive, toward some improved end, and that this purposiveness had correlates in underlying hereditary processes. In other words, McDougall rejected a mechanistic conception of evolution in favor of

a teleological or goal-oriented one. Since he held that science, including psychology, was ultimately a purposive activity aimed at promoting human welfare, the application of psychological knowledge to practical life was imperative. Eugenia was a practical application since it demonstrated how implementing knowledge about human evolution would maximize intellectual and moral improvement. Instituting regulations for reproduction and education eliminated need for other control measures, such as a complex government structure.

An adequate evaluation of Münsterberg's psychology requires consideration of both its "causal" and "purposive" forms. While he accepted materialism and positivism in experimental (causal) psychology, he acknowledged meaningfulness and absolute truth in subjective (purposive) psychology. However, absolute truth in the form of values and ideals inevitably dictated the progress of causal psychology and its applications to real life because those endeavors themselves served certain purposes. This conception of psychology is apparent in Münsterberg's sketch of future society. Tomorrow elucidates Münsterberg's idealism which entails acceptance by mankind of absolute ideals and moral obligations. These ideals of progress, morality, unity and harmony correspond with ideals found in his other writings. But the future world also would have an important place for experimental psychology because scientific

expertise would serve vocational guidance and education, public affairs, and international organization. However, although psychological knowledge would expedite these improvements, Münsterberg relied on his purposive psychology with its historical approach to explain the gradual implementation of worldwide idealism and peace.

Watson's psychological system was based on a commitment to making psychology a natural science and the consequent necessity to adopt experimental methods. Behavior was seen as the one phenomenon that could be investigated with these methods of objective observation and control. To Watson, the strategy for a behavioral psychology included the categorization of behaviors and the establishment of laws governing their acquisition. But Watson identified yet another role for psychology in the control of human activities. His "behaviorist's utopia" described the use of psychology for social control. Society had no need for doctrines, politics, or justice measures, but would function according to behaviorism. As the guide for social control, the behaviorist physicians would apply behavior techniques to cultivate independence, happiness, and involvement in activities. They would introduce these techniques through institutions such as schools, hospitals, and the home.

The four utopias contain similar moral intentions. While these aims were not omitted from the scientific works of the authors, they received fullest expression in the utopias.

The attributes of the ideal individual were integrated into the functioning of a harmonious, unified, and efficient society. Psychology was engaged to provide techniques of social control that would fit the individual to society.

From the psychological beliefs of each writer were derived techniques for implementing social control and realizing desired social and individual ideals. With the exception of Münsterberg, the psychologists considered governmental structure only in so far as it was related to the means for dispensing psychological expertise. Control of social and individual events was left neither to the individual nor to disinterested politicians. It was the duty of those skilled in psychological science. While their common emphasis on psychological knowledge is not surprising, it is noteworthy that it corresponds to an equally special place that psychology occupied in the non-utopian writings of the individuals. Psychology was accorded "precedence" over all other sciences, with status as the "queen of the sciences", and priority in future scientific research ventures.

Ideals and Psychology in Other Utopias

The moral intentions and the conceptions of psychology shared by the four psychologists exhibit similarities to other utopias discussed in the second and third chapters of this study. The four psychologists described ideals of the

individual that were largely dictated by and in the service of a particular social order. With the interest of realizing a utopia, they proposed measures for the social control of individuals. In these ways the four utopias fit observations of literary historians that early twentieth-century American utopias were more or less committed to the idea of a secure and ordered society where the right social order would resolve problems by transforming individuals.

The psychologists utilized psychological theories to show the possible construction and operation of their utopias. For instance, Watson suggested use of behavioral techniques to maximize efficient labor, absence of crime, and the happiness of individuals. In general, these uses of psychology correspond to those of other utopias of the time: they reflect the reliance firmly established by the end of the nineteenth century of creative writers, on scientific ideas, both to render realistic their storytelling and to confront a permanent aspect of the modern world.

The four psychologists also accorded a special role to psychological science in their utopias. Many other utopias of the early twentieth century were less dedicated to the promise of science, and some even expressed fears that the triumph of science would bring chaos or destruction. Nevertheless, as noted in the second chapter, other writers -- especially scientists -- designed utopias that gave science

an elevated status and an important role in the ideal world. The four psychologists created similar roles for psychology in their utopias.

There is, however, a subtle discrepancy between the use of psychology in the four utopias and the historical development of those uses as described in the second chapter. In their reliance on psychology as a means to solve what were perceived as psychological problems, these utopias conform to Manuel's conception of "eupsychias". However, in their prescriptions for social order and control these four utopias more closely resemble utopias of the preceding three decades. The discrepancy is explicable once it is recognized that Manuel's survey excluded many utopias written between 1900 and 1930. In doing so, he neglected those works which drew upon the life sciences, but still accepted the conviction that transformations of society, rather than of the individual directly, would suffice. Utopias written during that period which used science for such ends incorporated political science, engineering, sociology, and in the case of the four utopias under examination, psychology.

The comparisons made in this chapter suggest that, despite varied psychological theories, the four experimental psychologists shared several moral intentions. It also is apparent that these intentions as well as the specific uses of psychology were not discordant with contemporary trends in utopian literature between 1900 and 1930. On a more

general level, these findings offer some clues to the functions of utopian speculation. Like Ellis, Galton and Tarde, the four psychologists freely criticized social conditions and presented psychology as a means for improvement. Unlike the earlier writers, the four psychologists were not obscure or neglected thinkers and their psychology was not in need of additional publicity.

The common intentions of the four psychologists point to other possible functions of utopian writing. In addition to social criticism, their utopias contained prescriptions for changing society and for the place of psychology in this change. These prescriptions correspond to several previously cited functions of utopian writing by scientists, to advocate social reform and to designate the relation between society and science.

Intentions Shared with Other Psychologists

The utopias of Hall, McDougall, Münsterberg, and Watson contain ideals of a preferred world. They reveal aspirations to apply psychological knowledge for attainment of these ideals. The four psychologists' other writings promote these ideals of society and the individual, either by describing better conditions, or by outlining programs for realizing these conditions.

Although Hall, McDougall, Münsterberg and Watson were alone in their exploitation of the utopian genre, they were not the only psychologists to express such intentions for

psychology and for American society. As shown in chapter one, other psychologists gave objectives for social improvement and discussed plans to use psychological knowledge to achieve those ends. Like the four utopists, many of these other psychologists wrote psychological articles for popular magazines, and they held academic positions as scientific psychologists. Some, like Watson, left academe and took employment which required application of their psychological skills.

The commonalities between the four utopias and the other psychologists discussed in this study are of three sorts. First, there was a general feeling that Americans of that generation were behaving in objectionable ways. For instance, Allport and Dunlap were concerned about problems in the family and with sex relationships. Other psychologists, applied and experimental, were dismayed by what they saw as deplorable intelligence levels, improper education, and lack of self-control. Second, there was a shared interest in improving society in certain ways. Just as Hall, McDougall, Münsterberg, and Watson described a better social order, an increased sense of community, and properly self-controlled individuals, so other psychologists discussed similar goals. They wrote about well-adjusted people and an efficient society, and about the advantages of a unified and democratic order. Third, there was a common belief that psychologists could and should assist

social advancement by developing and applying psychological knowledge. For instance, many psychologists believed that mental testing was an appetizing sample of psychology's future part in improving society when tests were used in education, vocational guidance, immigration procedures, and industry. Men like Cattell and Jastrow emphasized the social responsibility of psychologists to assist social advancement, and in their writings, they encouraged fellow psychologists to heed this responsibility.

In summary, when considered in terms of the work of other American psychologists, the utopias of Hall, McDougall, Münsterberg, and Watson appear as reasonable plans for their time. The utopias functioned as vehicles to express social criticism, descriptions of a better social order, and the roles that psychology could take in promoting that order. Other psychologists used less explicit formats to express similar ideas. Although it is evident that many psychologists communicated these ideas in professional writings, and in articles and books intended for lay audiences, it is still not known why four psychologists chose to write utopian fiction. As mentioned in the introduction to this study, biographical factors cannot account for the decision to use the traditional utopian genre. That is, the four utopists did not indicate why they turned specifically to utopian fiction over other means for presenting their ideas. Nor did they differ in either age or professional status from the other psychologists who shared similar ideas. It

is reasonable that, in a period when use of the utopian genre was still common, and when many people were planning the construction of a superior society, four psychologists would write utopias.

CONCLUSION

Utopias are not simply literary excursions into ideal realms; they represent contemporary values and everyday hopes. In utopias, authors make explicit their moral intentions. The utopias written by psychologists reveal how they viewed the social world in which they lived, how they dreamed of changing it, and how they would engage scientific expertise to do so. The utopias of Ellis, Galton, and Tarde illustrate their critical attitudes toward society and the value preferences which guided their psychological prescriptions for social improvement. The utopias of Hall, McDougall, Münsterberg, and Watson yield similar information. In addition, the latter four utopias show some previously undetected affinities among the psychologists' other work.

Before discussing these conclusions, the relation of the four works to utopian thought in general deserves comment. The utopias of Hall, McDougall, Münsterberg, and Watson have never been discussed in studies of utopian literature. Indeed, of all the psychologists' utopias considered in this work, only those of Tarde and Galton have been mentioned in such studies. Yet the utopias of Hall, McDougall, Münsterberg, and Watson illustrate some interesting dimensions of American utopian literature. They

demonstrate that the utopian spirit did not disappear after 1900 nor even after World War I. Most studies of American utopias focus on the period between 1885 and 1900, when the publication rate of utopias was amazingly high.

Few studies examine utopias written between 1900 and the twenties. As a consequence, there has been no thorough examination of the relations of utopian literature to such events as World War I and those of the postwar reconstruction period. The four psychologists' utopias show the influence of these events. Social upheaval associated with the war did not destroy visions of improvement but, if anything, sharpened them. Ideals of social reform, particularly the anticipation of scientific contributions to societal advancement, were clearly endorsed by Hall, McDougall, Münsterberg, and Watson.

The study of the four utopias also helps fill a gap in historical accounts. It provides a bridge between those earlier turn-of-the-century utopias that advocate a secure and ordered society and the post-1940 utopias that call for man's psychological emancipation. Hall, McDougall, Münsterberg, and Watson desired a united, harmonious, and ordered society, and yet they still prescribed certain modifications to the psychology of individuals. They used not the vague psychological notions employed by earlier utopists but concepts developed within their science such as were used by some of the later utopists. These findings

suggest a need to revise general histories of utopias and, in particular, that of Manuel, which neglects some periods of utopian writing.

The investigation has revealed that the four psychologists had serious concerns that were not of a strictly scientific nature but involved social criticisms, ideals for social improvement, and suggestions for the use of psychology in the improvement. These concerns were made apparent from analysis of the utopias. But further examination disclosed that the four psychologists displayed the same concerns in their theoretical and experimental writings. On comparing these findings about the four psychologists with the writings of other psychologists, it was learned that what initially seemed like four unconventional speculations actually had something in common with the concerns of numerous psychologists of the period. Although there is no published evidence that other psychologists wrote utopian fiction, many of them shared the four utopists' criticisms, ideals, and plans for applying their science.

These concerns I have called moral intentions. That is, they exemplify some psychologists' intentions to engage scientific knowledge for the improvement of human conditions. In describing a better or perfect state, the utopias express their authors' moral preferences for what "should" or "ought to" prevail. Other psychologists also

expressed hopes for well-adjusted individuals, a democratic order, a meritocracy where a man would be fitted to his job and rewarded for his contributions, and a society where experts could apply their skills to attain these conditions. Further investigation is needed to determine the extent to which these hopes were shared by the generation of American psychologists, as well as the means by which they attempted to implement them, if they did at all.

Perhaps the most notable aspect of these shared intentions (and one deserving additional study) is that they appear to have transcended the boundaries of the schools and systems which have been assumed to have divided psychologists of that generation. The four utopists, and the other psychologists discussed in this investigation, have been assigned by historians to one of a number of "schools" of psychological thought: dynamic, behaviorist, functional, structural, and associationist. As a consequence, many historical reviews accentuate differences among these psychologists at the cost of obscuring important similarities. Of course, these psychologists chose different systems within which to explore the nature of man, but conventional histories have not mentioned that they did so with some similar intentions to improve humanity in specific ways.

The similarities among the ideas of Hall, McDougall, Münsterberg, and Watson warrant general review. The most

apparent of these similarities is that the four psychologists presented a moral system both in their utopias and in other writings. In these works, community interests took precedence over those of individuals. Even suggestions of some form of capitalism were tempered by notions of community-shared wealth and services. Furthermore, the family was valued as was a division of duties by sex. The origins of these shared moral ideas pose an intriguing question, one worthy of closer examination. For instance, it seems peculiar that the four were adamant about survival of certain sex-role traditions although they were occasionally prepared to discuss more modern views of sexuality and of the intellect of women.

The four psychologists saw the advent of an improved morality in a particular society, one guided by scientific knowledge. While none of them rejected democracy, they stipulated a political order where popular democracy was eschewed in favor of an elitist system. In such an order, individual rights were maintained but the regulation of these rights was less the prerogative of the average citizen and more the duty of an elite expert class. Just as the four utopias are narrated by scientists of human nature, so an improved society would be guided by comparable experts.

These proposals for an improved morality and a particular social order were consistent with two fundamental

assumptions: that human nature could be made more perfect and that scientific knowledge offered a means of human improvement. Like many other psychologists, they were greatly influenced by evolutionary theory and the doctrine often derived from it that stipulates the upward progress of human nature. However, the four differed on the means for making such improvements. Some measures of selective breeding are advocated in the utopias of Hall, McDougall, and Watson. These eugenics measures imply the reproduction of the physically, mentally, and morally fit. The utopian genre gave the psychologists an excellent opportunity to suggest ways in which bettering environmental conditions would bring about human improvement. Here again their proposals have an evolutionary basis regardless of whether they used the notion of behavioral adjustment to the environment, as did Watson, or the idea of historical development of culture, as did Münsterberg.

In the psychological utopias, the possibility of human improvement depended on the acquisition and use of scientific knowledge. This view is consistent with the four psychologists' epistemologies, in which science, and especially psychological science, was accorded prominence, if not priority. In the case of Münsterberg, and to a lesser extent that of Hall, scientific psychology was not considered the apex of human knowledge and yet it was integral to the ultimate form of knowledge. Despite the individual

peculiarities in their theories of knowledge, the four psychologists believed that improvement would result from applying scientific knowledge to the conduct of human affairs. However, they were aware that biases could develop when the interests of application prevailed over the pursuit of knowledge and, accordingly, they proposed methods for eliminating such distortions.

Although it was not a major objective of this study, it is interesting to speculate on some implications of postulating human perfectibility and the relevance of psychological science to the perfecting process. Hall, McDougall, Münsterberg, and Watson were not cognizant of any undesirable political or social implications of their work. Nor did they acknowledge the relation of their ideals and values to concurrent societal conditions. Only men who had not yet glimpsed the possibility of racial extermination could write utopias containing eugenics proposals such as did three of these four. As to the fourth, Münsterberg, it is intriguing to note that, a generation before the Nazis, he saw German culture as the model for emulation in a utopia. Even the four psychologists' environmentalist proposals for social control, to be implemented by expert social scientists, would not be entirely palatable a generation or so later. This point was demonstrated by the reactions to one other utopia written by a psychologist, B.F. Skinner's Walden Two. In other words,

the intention of using science to attain a particular form of betterment was not subjected to the sort of critical assessment that it would receive twenty years later. The implications of misusing scientific knowledge to guide societal change, and of prescribing what ends are, in fact, better did not circumscribe these psychologists' formulation of a utopia.

Since the writing of the utopias, certain well-known events have heightened attention to the political and social implications of extrapolating from scientific knowledge to the functioning of the social world. But the passage of time has done more than to yield obvious and some tragic examples of presuming human improvement by reliance on science. It has made it easier for the contemporary student of science to identify the values associated with these assumptions. The psychological ideas as well as the ideal worlds of Hall, McDougall, Münsterberg, and Watson contain values that were not discordant with then-contemporary normative values of American society nor with those of other social scientists. Their prescriptions for a unified social order, commitment to community aims, preservation of the family, and function of the scientific expert in society were, for the most part, accepted American ideals. Even their suggestions for modifying democracy, from a system of relatively uncontrolled change, were shared by others. Therefore, the assumptions of human improvement guided by

scientific developments, at that time probably would not have been seen as seriously questionable because they were coupled with values that not only upheld the idea of human improvement but that were consistent with contemporary social beliefs.

Over the last four centuries, science has come to play a significant part in the fabrication of ideal worlds. And just as utopian speculation has relied on science, so scientists have embraced the utopian concept in formulating ideals of man, society, and science itself. Hall, McDougall, Münsterberg, and Watson found the utopian genre appropriate for contemplating the possibilities of their science. Their ideals were consistent with the growing hopes, if not the belief, in psychology as a science and as a means for perfecting man. In developing their psychology, these four expressed their intentions to construct an important science and contribute to human betterment.

With an ascription to contemporary social ideals and a confidence in the potential of their science, the four psychologists contemplated utopian societies in ways similar to other scientists. As we have seen, numerous scientists have formulated utopias, or "dreams of reason" to use René Dubos's term, that postulate how the products of science can be engaged to realize social ideals. The integration of science and social ideals in utopian formulations illuminates a general question posed at the onset of this study,

that of the possible functions of utopian thinking among scientists. Beyond a critique of current society, the utopian format enables a writer to demonstrate the utility of his theories and discipline. Utopian speculation also permits a writer to explore the fundamental relation between science and society, a relation of both theoretical and practical significance. This study did not purport to answer the specific and biographical question of why the four psychologists, and apparently no others, used the utopian genre. However, it has shown how the genre was appropriate to members of a promising science and of a society looking toward social reconstruction. Indeed, other psychologists of the same period described the possibility of employing psychological knowledge to realize an ideal social order.

As a historical investigation, this study has made some advances in the assessment of intentions -- and their foundations in human values -- as they appear in psychological theories as well as in other works by psychologists. Additional analyses are required to ascertain the origins of these values and the motivations which impelled psychologists such as Hall, McDougall, Münsterberg, and Watson to incorporate them in their fictions and their science. Also deserving further investigation are the ways in which psychologists have dealt with these value-laden intentions as their science placed increasing emphasis on attaining objectivity, analysis, and facts over advocacy, reform, and values.

In conclusion, a significant lesson of this research bears repeating. Conventional histories of psychology are, in a way, utopic. Concerned to further an ideal of a quantitative experimental science, they tell only of those events and men supporting that ideal. As such, conventional histories have omitted treatment of important aspects of the discipline's past, among them the intentions shared by many psychologists to contribute to reconstructing American society and to improving individuals. This study has attempted to examine some of these omissions by assessing and comparing four previously neglected works, and by placing them within the social and scientific context in which they were written.

Further correction of the biases of conventional histories of psychology requires the historian's attention not only to the experimental reports and theoretical essays which are typically surveyed, but also to other writings, both professional and popular, in which psychologists have addressed social concerns. It demands a broader perspective on the discipline, one that treats psychology as an experimental science that is also a social institution influenced by and, in turn, influencing the society in which it functions. Only when the personal and social dimensions which play a part in the development of psychological ideas are included in the histories of psychology, will the histories become meaningful to those engaged in creating new psychological models, and in designing new worlds.

NOTES TO CHAPTER I

1. Floyd Dell, Intellectual Vagabondage, An Apology for the Intelligentsia (New York: George H. Doran, 1926), p. 249.
2. Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform, From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York: Vintage, 1955); (ed.), The Progressive Movement, 1900-1915 (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963); Lewis L. Gould, ed., The Progressive Era (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1974); R. Jackson Wilson, ed., Reform, Crisis and Confusion, 1900-1929 (New York: Random House, 1970).
3. Hofstadter, Progressive Movement, p. 3.
4. See Hofstadter, Progressive Movement, pp. 3-4; Michael Kammen, People of Paradox: An Inquiry Concerning the Origins of American Civilization (New York: Knopf, 1972); George H. Mowry, "Social Democracy, 1900-1918," in The Comparative Approach to American History, ed., C. Vann Woodward (New York: Basic Books, 1968), pp. 281-282.
5. For instances, see Hofstadter, Progressive Movement, pp. 3-5; Henry May, The End of American Innocence, The First Years of Our Own Time (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1959), pp. 20-29; Jean B. Quandt, From the Small Town to the Great Community, The Social Thought of Progressive Intellectuals (New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 1970), pp. 23-35.
6. Quandt, Small Town to Great Community; David W. Noble, The Paradox of Progressive Thought (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958); Howard P. Segal, "Technological Utopianism and American Culture, 1830-1940" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1975); Stanley P. Caine, "The Origins of Progressivism," in Progressive Era, ed. Gould.
7. Hofstadter, Age of Reform, p. 202.
8. William Allen White, The Old Order Changeth (1910). Reprinted in Progressive Movement, ed. Hofstadter, p. 136.
9. See note 6. Also see Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order, 1877-1920 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967); Samuel Haber, Efficiency and Uplift: Scientific Management in the Progressive Era, 1890-1920 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964).
10. A concise summary of the notions of efficiency and expert leadership is given by Segal in "Technological Utopianism", ch. 4. See also Stow Pearsons, American Minds: A History of Ideas (New York: Henry Holt, 1958), pp. 430-442.

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11. For a discussion of their participation in progressive reforms see Hofstadter, Age of Reform, pp. 148-164.
12. For discussions of the idea of science as the correct procedure for implementing progressive measures see Wiebe, Search for Order, pp. 144-149; Richard Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955), pp. 123-142. It seems that Americans of the progressive era did not see a contradiction between professional guidance and administration and popular or direct democracy. In a history of citizen participation in government, Nelson M. Rosenbaum implied that the real impact of bureaucratic expansion (hence a decrease in popular control) was not actually felt until after World War II. "Origins of Citizen Involvement in Federal Programs," in Anticipatory Democracy, People in the Politics of the Future, ed. Clement Bezold (New York: Random House, 1978), pp. 139-155. Historian Thomas K. McCraw similarly maintained that the idea of expert leadership was not held as contradictory to ideas of direct democracy because experts would act "in the public interest". "The Progressive Legacy," in Progressive Era, ed. Gould, pp. 183-186. Some historians have argued that the one implication of participation of professionals in reform policy was felt by the professionals themselves: a perceived tension between reform advocacy and scientific objectivity. See Mary O. Furner, Advocacy and Objectivity: A Crisis in the Professionalization of American Social Science (Lexington: University Press, 1975); Gene M. Lyons, The Uneasy Partnership, Social Science and the Federal Government in the Twentieth Century (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1969), pp. 1-26.
13. See Segal, "Technological Utopianism", ch. 4; Robert M. Veatch, Value Freedom in Science and Technology (Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1976), pp. 15-39; Furner, Advocacy and Objectivity.
14. Haber, Efficiency and Uplift, pp. xi-xii.
15. D.H. Lawrence quoted in Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August (New York: Macmillan, 1962), p. 489.
16. William E. Leuchtenburg, The Perils of Prosperity, 1914-1932 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), chs. 7 and 8; Henry May, ed., The Discontent of the Intellectuals: A Problem of the Twenties (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963); David W. Noble, The Paradox of Progressive Thought (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958), p. 248.

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17. See Hofstadter, Progressive Movement, pp. 1-15.
18. Morton White, Social Thought in America: The Revolt Against Formalism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), p. 181. For discussions of the discontent and exodus of some intellectuals and artists see note 16 above.
19. A number of historians have pointed to the distorted accounts of the twenties. Christopher Lasch has maintained that the image of that decade as one of "disillusionment" has resulted from a preoccupation with the writings of "tired radicals" such as Allen, Fitzgerald, and Hemingway. He has also discussed how, for many American liberal intellectuals, disillusionment became more than a reaction, it became a social philosophy in itself. See The New Radicalism in America, 1889-1963 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), pp. 251-255. Others have interpreted disillusionment as originating not strictly in the particular cultural events of the post-war years but in the Puritan heritage. See May, Discontent of Intellectuals; Kammen, People of Paradox.
20. See Charles Forcey, The Crossroads of Liberalism: Croly, Weyl, Lippmann, and the Progressive Era, 1900-1925 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961); Quandt, Small Town to Great Community; Lasch, New Radicalism; White, Social Thought in America, ch. 12.
21. For discussion of progressive politicians in the twenties see Leuchtenburg, Perils of Prosperity, ch. 7; Hofstadter, Age of Reform, ch. 7.
22. Haber, Efficiency and Uplift, p. 117. Hofstadter has noted how progressive enthusiasms about unity, nationalism and public involvement contributed to the war effort. Age of Reform, p. 275.
23. For information on the war involvements of scientists, growth of the sciences during the war, and ideas about the place of science after the war see Robert M. Yerkes, ed., The New World of Science: Its Development During the War (New York: The Century Co., 1920); Ronald C. Tobey, The American Ideology of National Science, 1919-1930 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971); A. Hunter Dupree, Science and the Federal Government (Cambridge: Belnap Press, 1957); James R. Mock and Cedric Larson, Words that Won the War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939); Lyons, Uneasy Partnership, pp. 1-49.

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24. Leuchtenburg, Perils of Prosperity, p. 84.
25. Warren Harding quoted in Leuchtenburg, Perils of Prosperity, p. 89.
26. See Hofstadter, Age of Reform, pp. 285-301; Paul L. Murphy, "Sources and Nature of Intolerance in the 1920s," in Reform, Crisis, and Confusion, ed. Wilson; Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr., Ideologies and Utopias, The Impact of the New Deal on American Thought (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1969), pp. 15-21; Leuchtenburg, Perils of Prosperity.
27. F. Scott Fitzgerald, "Echoes of the Jazz Age," Scribner's Magazine 90(1931), pp. 459-465. Reprinted in Loren Bartiz, ed., The Culture of the Twenties (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970), p. 416.
28. See John Burnham, "The New Psychology: From Narcissism to Social Control," in Change and Continuity in Twentieth Century America: The Nineteen Twenties, eds. J. Braeman, R.H. Bremmer, and D. Brody (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1968); Frederick L. Allen, Only Yesterday (New York: Harper, 1921); Floyd Dell, Love in the Machine Age (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1930); Paula Fass, The Damned and the Beautiful, American Youth in the 1920's (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977); Baritz, Culture of the Twenties.
29. Leuchtenburg, Perils of Prosperity, p. 164.
30. Grace Adams skillfully summarized the popular interest in various psychologies and reflects the later disappointment in them. See "The Rise and Fall of Psychology," Atlantic Monthly 153(1934) pp. 82-82; Psychology, Science or Superstition (New York: Covici-Friede, 1931). The rise in psychology related articles as the twentieth century progressed was found in a study using the Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature. See Hornell Hart, "Changing Social Attitudes and Interests," in Recent Social Trends, Report of the President's Research Committee on Social Trends (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1933). Also see Lucille Birnbaum, "Behaviorism in the 1920s," American Quarterly 7(1955) pp. 15-30; Burnham, "New Psychology."
31. See Birnbaum, "Behaviorism in the Twenties;" "Behaviorism: John Broadus Watson and American Social Thought, 1913-1933." (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1964).

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32. Stephen Leacock, "A Manual for the New Mentality," Harper's 148(1924) pp. 472-480.
33. Stuart Chase, "Education," in Whither Mankind? A Panorama of Modern Civilization, ed. Charles Beard (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1928), p. 374.
34. Dell, Intellectual Vagabondage, pp. 247-248.
35. Ibid., p. 248.
36. Henry May, "Shifting Perspectives on the 1920s," Mississippi Valley Historical Review 43(1956), pp. 405-427.
37. James H. Robinson, The Mind in the Making (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1921), p. 207.
38. Ibid., p. 226
39. Ibid., p. 207. For a detailed discussion of this work see White, Social Thought in America, ch. 8.
40. Charles and Mary Beard, The Rise of American Civilization (New York: Macmillan, 1927).
41. Beard, Whither Mankind?, p. v.
42. Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Macmillan, 1922), p. 368.
43. Ibid., pp. 373-374.
44. See White, Social Thought in America; Tobey, Ideology in National Science; Sidney Kaplan, "Social Engineers as Saviors: Effects of World War I on Some American Liberals," Journal of the History of Ideas 17(1956) pp. 347-369.
45. John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (New York: Henry Holt, 1922), p. 323. He argued for a similar function for philosophy in "Philosophy," in Whither Mankind?, ed. Beard.
46. See note 19.
47. Bertrand Russell, "Science," in Whither Mankind?, ed. Beard. Also see Icarus, or the Future of Science (New York: Philosophical Library, 1924).

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48. Lewis Mumford, The Story of Utopias (New York: Boni and Liveright, 1922), p. 307.
49. Tobey, Ideology of National Science.
50. See Haber, Efficiency and Uplift; Segal, "Technological Utopianism."
51. R. Laurence Moore, "Directions of Thought in Progressive America," in Progressive Era, ed. Gould, p. 52.
52. Historians have differed on the extent to which they believe ideas of social control by expert leaders existed in prewar reform programs. For instance, Otis L. Graham, Jr. wrote that "A basic progressive belief was in the possibility of a conscious re-ordering and subsequent control of society and its direction, a re-ordering accomplished by a public awakened by ideas, a control guided by trained intelligence and backed by right values." An Encore for Reform, The Old Progressive and the New Deal (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 11. In a study of selected reformers working primarily before 1917, Daniel Levine reported that they all subscribed to a belief that human beings should control social life. However, Levine found that the individuals differed on their estimation of human capacity which led several of them to propose the rule of experts or elites. Varieties of Reform Thought (Madison: The State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1964), pp. 109-117. The pre- and post-war commitments of Taylorites, those involved in scientific management, to the idea of control by a scientifically trained elite are reviewed in Samuel Haber, "The War Machine," in Reform, Crisis, and Confusion, ed. Wilson. For a popular statement on expert leadership in democracy see Mary P. Follett, The New State (New York: Longmans Green, 1918). For other accounts of postwar ideas about expert leadership and scientists see Tobey, Ideology of National Science, pp. 177, 198; Kaplan, "Social Engineers as Saviors"; Burnham, "New Psychology."
53. Russell, "Science," pp. 71-72.
54. Kaplan, "Social Engineers as Saviors."
55. Roy Lubove, The Professional Altruist: The Emergence of Social Work as a Career, 1880-1930 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965).

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56. Loren Baritz, The Servants of Power, A History of the Use of Social Science in American Industry (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1960); Haber, Efficiency and Uplift, and "The War Machine."
57. In a 1929 review of sociology's progress, Jessie Bernard cited numerous surveys that indicated that sociology was becoming increasingly involved with issues of social reconstruction. "The History and Prospects of Sociology in the United States," in Trends in American Sociology, eds. G.A. Lundberg, R. Bain, and N. Anderson (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1929), pp. 1-71. F.H. Giddings was one sociologist who developed concepts of social control and leadership of an elite after the war. His ideas about control were influenced by behaviorist psychology, particularly the work of Watson. See Birnbaum, "Behaviorism: Watson," pp. 96-102. Stow Persons has described how notions of control and scientific expertise affected the study of public opinion: "Prior to the war....attention focused upon the role of public opinion in the social process. The issues debated were matters of value -- the uses and abuses of public opinion. On the question of opinion formation, the interest of students centered upon the relationship to desirable social goals. After the war, however, there was a sense in which interest in public opinion as traditionally conceived ceased to exist. Students were now concerned primarily with the way in which the opinions of individuals were formed, with the techniques for recording these opinions, and with the making of statistical computations of them. The great philosophic questions that had preoccupied the previous generation now seemed to be settled; the sovereignty of public opinion was taken for granted, and it remained only to learn how to manipulate it. The central questions were now: What do individuals think about specified subjects, and how did they come to think that way? How can they be made to think the way we want them to think?" American Minds, p. 374.
58. Other writers varied on the degree to which they believed the individual was rational, responsible, or capable of self-control. See note 51.
59. Tantalus, or the Future of Man (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1924), p. 64. A large number of writers, scientists among them, contemplated the fruition of psychological knowledge as a significant benefit for society in the future. Expectations for psychology's

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productivity included progress in eugenics, psychical research, robots, physical connection of brains, hormonal control, humanism, learning, and socialization. See, for instance, Stewart E. Bruce, The World in 1931 (New York: Searl and Company, 1921); E.N. Bennett, Apollonius, or the Future of Psychical Research (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1927); J.B.S. Haldane, Possible Worlds, and Other Essays (London: Chatto & Windus, 1928); Daedalus; Charlotte Haldane, Man's World (New York: Doran, 1927); H.S. Hatfield, Automaton, or the Future of the Mechanical Man (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1928); C.E.M. Joad, "The Future of Man," Harper's 157(1928); p. 492-500; J.D. Bernal, The World, The Flesh and the Devil: An Inquiry into the Future of Three Enemies of the Rational Soul (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1928); Russell, "Science"; Anon., "The Future of America, A Biological Forecast," Harper's 156(1928), p. 529-539; F. Aveling, Directing Mental Imagery (New York: Doran, 1927). It must be noted that these writings have their pessimistic counterparts, primarily the writings of journalists. A series of utopian sketches solicited by the editors of the Nation tended to reflect such scepticism. See C.E. Ayres, Science: The False Messiah (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1929); Stuart Chase, "Very Private Utopia," Nation, 16 May 1928, pp. 559-562; Edna Ferber, "A Few Things Altered or Abolished," Nation, 30 May 1928, p. 609. Even among these writers, several envisioned a better future with the conquering of individualism and fostering of a social or cooperative spirit. See Upton Sinclair, "My Private Utopia," Nation, 11 June 1928, pp. 39-40; Frederic C. Howe, "A Political Utopia," Nation, 22 August 1928, pp. 178-179.

60. Segal, "Technological Utopianism"; Rhodes, Utopia in American Political Theory.

61. Examples of these biases can be found in most textbook histories. Therefore, the titles cited below are not exceptional cases but rather represent a small sample. E.G. Boring, A History of Experimental Psychology 2nd ed. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1950); Gardner Murphy, Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology, revised ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1949); Michael Wertheimer, A Brief History of Psychology (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970); and Duane Schultz, A History of Modern Psychology, 2nd ed. (New York:

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Academic Press, 1975). Occasionally other events -- social influences, practical applications -- are cited in reference to this period. However, these citations are usually brief and generally restricted to epilogues.

62. Criticism of this conventional view has not been limited to the science of psychology but has occurred in historical re-appraisals of many of the social and natural sciences. See Joseph Agassi, "Towards an Historiography of Science," History and Theory 2(1963); M. Teich and R.M. Young, eds., Changing Perspectives in the History of Science (London: Heinemann, 1973); Stephen Toulmin, "From Form to Function: The History and Philosophy of Science in the 1950's and Now," Daedalus 106(1977), pp. 143-162. A cogent argument for reappraisal in the history of psychology is contained in David Leary, "The Intentions and Heritage of Descartes and Locke: Toward a Recognition of the Moral Basis of Modern Psychology," paper presented at the annual meetings of Cheiron, Wellesley, June 1978.
63. Samuel W. Fernberger, "The American Psychological Association, A Historical Summary, 1892-1930," Psychological Bulletin 29(1952), pp. 1-89; Thomas M. Camfield, "The Professionalization of American Psychology, 1870-1917," Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 9(1973), pp. 66-75; "Psychologists at War: The History of American Psychology and the First World War," (Ph.D. diss., University of Texas at Austin, 1969), pp. 2-63.
64. Samuel W. Fernberger, "Statistical Analysis of the Members and Associates of the American Psychological Association, Inc. in 1928," Psychological Review, 35 (1928), pp. 447-465; "The Scientific Interests and Scientific Publications of the Members of the American Psychological Association," Psychological Bulletin 45 (1938), pp. 261-281; J.S. Bruner and G.W. Allport, "Fifty Years of Change in American Psychology," Psychological Bulletin 37(1940), pp. 757-776; G.W. Allport, "The Psychologist's Frame of Reference," Psychological Bulletin 37(1940), pp. 1-28. However, both Allport's and Fernberger's 1938 articles indicate that there were great interests in applied areas. Allport maintained that his data indicating a decline in "social betterment" and "applied psychology" interests was due in part to the sample of journals he used. Another survey showed a decline in experimental psychology and an increase in applied after 1912. See James McKeen Cattell,

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"Psychology in America," Science 70(1929), pp. 335-437. Reprinted in James McKeen Cattell, Man of Science, vol. 2, ed. A.T. Poffenberger (Lancaster: The Science Press, 1947), p. 457.

65. John O'Donnell, "The Crisis of Experimentalism in the 1920s: E.G. Boring and His Uses of History," American Psychologist 34(1979), pp. 289-295.

66. E.G. Boring, "Statistics of the American Psychological Association in 1920," Psychological Bulletin 17(1920) pp. 271-278; Lewis Terman, "The Status of Applied Psychology in the United States," Journal of Applied Psychology 5(1921), pp. 1-4. O'Donnell presented detailed accounts of this and other attempts by Boring to enhance the standing of experimentalists. "Crisis of Experimentalism."

67. Terman, "Status of Applied Psychology," p. 4..

68. Thomas M. Camfield, "Psychologists at War: The History of American Psychology and the First World War," (Ph.D. diss., University of Texas at Austin, 1969); Baritz, Servants of Power; Donald S. Napoli, "Architects of Adjustment: The Practice and Professionalization of American Psychology 1920-1945," (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Davis, 1975); Franz Samelson, "World War I Intelligence Testing and the Development of Psychology," Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 13(1977), pp. 274-282; Nicholas Pastore, "The Army Intelligence Tests and Walter Lippmann," Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 12(1978), pp. 316-327; Michael Sokal, "James McKeen Cattell and American Psychology in the 1920's", unpublished manuscript, Worcester Polytechnic Institute, 1978.

69. Camfield, "Psychologists at War," p. 257.

70. Sokal, "Cattell and American Psychology," p. 22. Also see note 66.

71. These activities included the election of applied psychologists to the presidency, establishment of a special clinical section in 1919 and committees to deal with questions of certification, and reports of applied research in annual meetings. See Camfield, "Psychologists at War," pp. 285-286. The increased interest in research in applied problems is evidenced in the shifting

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patterns of the topics at the annual symposia of the APA. These are listed below (the symposia were discontinued in 1924). From Samuel Fernberger, "The American Psychological Association: A Historical Survey, 1892-1930," Psychological Bulletin 29(1932), p. 66.

Symposia

- 1898. Relations of Will to Belief -- Ladd, Hibben, Caldwell, and Armstrong.
- 1899. How Should Psychology Be Taught? -- Fullerton, Jastrow, Aikins, and Judd.
- 1905. The Affiliation of Psychology with Philosophy and with the Natural Sciences -- Münsterberg, Hall, Thilly, J.R. Angell, Taylor, and Ostwald.
- 1907. Relations of Ethics to Philosophy and Psychology -- Judd, Lindley, and Stratton.
- 1910. Philosophical and Psychological Usages of the Terms Mind, Consciousness, and Soul -- J.R. Angell, Bode, Tawney, and Lindley.
- 1911. Instinct and Intelligence -- Marshall, Herrick, Yerkes, and Judd.
- 1911. Psychology and Medical Education -- Franz, A. Meyer, Southard, and Watson.
- 1913. The Standpoint of Psychology -- Creighton, F.M. Urban, Dewey, and Münsterberg.
- 1915. The Relations of Psychology to Science, Philosophy and Pedagogy in the Academic Curriculum -- Dodge, M.F. Meyer, Gardiner, Ogden, Judd, Haggerty, B.T. Baldwin, and Ruckmick.
- 1916. Twenty-fifth Anniversary Program -- Hall, Cattell, Jastrow, and Dewey.
- 1917. Classification of the Personnel in the Army.
- 1918. The Future of Pure and Applied Psychology -- Yerkes, Hall, and Thorndike.
- 1921. Psychology in Its Social Relations -- Cabot, Franz, and C.M. Campbell.
- 1922. The Application of Psychology.
- 1923. Contributions of Freudianism to Psychology -- L.L. Thurstone, Leuba, Lashley, and Jastrow.
- 1924. The Psychological Basis of Conservatism and Radicalism -- Catlin, Moore, and F.H. Allport.

- 72. See Camfield, "Psychologists at War," pp. 268-288; Napoli, "Architects of Adjustment," pp. 9-116; Sokal, "Cattell and American Psychology," pp. 16-31.

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73. James McKeen Cattell, "Some Psychological Experiments," Science 63(1926), pp. 1-8, 29-35. Reprinted in Cattell Man of Science, vol. 2, ed. Poffenberger, p. 394.
74. E. B. Titchener, "Psychology: Science or Technology?" Popular Science Monthly 84(1914), p. 45. By 1930, even Boring exhibited a certain degree of leniency toward applied psychology. See Edwin G. Boring, "Psychology for Eclectics," in Psychologies of 1930, ed. Carl Murchison (Worcester: Clark University Press, 1930), pp. 115-127.
75. Napoli, "Architects of Adjustment," p. 54.
76. Ibid., p. 59. Napoli's observation of Darwinian origins has been discussed by other historians. For instance, see Hamilton Cravens and John C. Burnham, "Psychology and Evolutionary Naturalism in American Thought, 1890-1940," American Quarterly 23(1971), pp. 635-657; George W. Stocking, Jr., "Lamarckianism in American Social Science," Journal of the History of Ideas 23 (1962), pp. 239-256. R. Whipple, "Darwin's Influence on American Psychology," unpublished manuscript, University of Pennsylvania, 1972. This influence still has created controversy among psychologists; see Donald T. Campbell, "On the Conflicts Between Biological and Social Evolution and Between Psychology and Moral Tradition," American Psychologist 30(1975), pp. 1103-1126. Hofstadter, Social Darwinism.
77. Napoli, "Architects of Adjustment," p. 71. Also see pp. 67-74.
78. Ibid., p. 73.
79. George T. Ladd, "The Problems of Psychology," Psychological Review 1(1894), pp. 1-21; John Dewey, "Psychology and Social Practice," Psychological Review 7(1900), pp. 105-124; James McKeen Cattell, "Psychology and the Other Sciences," Psychological Review 3(1896), pp. 134-148.
80. Edward L. Thorndike, "Eugenics: With Special Reference to Intellect and Character," Popular Science Monthly 83(1913), pp. 125-138; Karl Pearson, The Scope and Importance to the State of the Science of National Eugenics, (London: Dulau and Co., 1911); Nature and Nurture: The Problem of the Future (London: Dulau and Co., 1910); Social Problems: Their Treatment, Past, Present and Future (London: Cambridge University Press,

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1912). Thorndike was convinced also of the social benefits of testing; see "Educational Diagnosis," Science, 1913, 37, 142. For detailed historical treatment of Thorndike's work see Geraldine Joncich, The Sane Positivist: A Biography of Edward Lee Thorndike (Middleton, Wesleyan University Press, 1968). On Pearson, see Bernard Semmel, Imperialism and Social Reform (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); E.S. Pearson, Karl Pearson: An Appreciation of Some Aspects of His Life and Work (Cambridge: University Press, 1938). To Thorndike, it was a responsibility of science to direct man's control of his own future: "Ethics and religion must teach man to want the welfare of the future as well as the relief of the cripple before his eyes; and science must teach man to control his own future nature as well as the animals, plants, and physical forces amongst which he will have to live." "Eugenics," p. 138.

81. James Mark Baldwin, "The Procedure of Peace and the Role of the United States," The New York Herald (Paris ed.), 20, 21 and 23 October 1917. Reprinted in Between Two Wars (1862-1921) (Boston: Stratford, 1926), vol. 2, pp. 11-122. James McKeen Cattell, "Science, Education and Democracy," Science 39(1914), pp. 154-164; "Science and National Welfare," Popular Science Monthly 87(1915), pp. 309-310; "A Program of Radical Democracy," Popular Science Monthly 80(1912), pp. 606-615; E.L. Thorndike, "The Emotional Price of Peace," August 1911, No. 45 (New York: American Association for International Conciliation).
82. Knight Dunlap, "Knight Dunlap," in A History of Psychology in Autobiography, vol. 2, ed. Carl Murchison (Worcester: Clark University Press, 1932), pp. 35-61.
83. Knight Dunlap, "Social Need for Scientific Psychology," Scientific Monthly 11(1920), pp. 502-517; "The Applications of Psychology to Social Problems," in Psychologies of 1925, ed. C. Murchison (Worcester: Clark University Press, 1928), pp. 353-379.
84. Dunlap, "Applications of Psychology," p. 355.
85. Ibid., p. 354.
86. Daniel Katz, "Floyd H. Allport (1890-1978)," American Psychologist 34(1979), p. 352.

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87. Floyd H. Allport, Social Psychology (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1924), p. vii.
88. Ibid., p. 391. "Albert Weiss also saw a "biosocial" behaviorism as necessary since it "leads to more effective methods in the control of individual and social behavior," See "The Biosocial Standpoint in Psychology," in Psychologies of 1930, ed. Murchison, p. 306.
89. Allport, Social Psychology, p. 415. For similar positions on the superiority of democracy and social control see Emory S. Bogardus, Fundamentals of Social Psychology (New York: The Century Co., 1924); Ernst S. Groves, Personality and Social Adjustment (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1931).
90. Allport, Social Psychology, p. 427.
91. James McKeen Cattell, "The Contribution of Science to the Welfare of the Nation; Science, The Declaration, Democracy," Scientific Monthly 24(1927), p. 205. Bracketed information added. Elsewhere Cattell noted: "Psychology, not less than other sciences, perhaps more than any one of them, is concerned with problems of human welfare. The nation, the family, schools, churches, courts, prisons, armies, navies -- these are all institutions which aim by emotional and rule of thumb methods to alter individuals and to control their behavior. When we have knowledge and understanding concerning institutions and individuals and learn how to apply knowledge and understanding for their betterment, it will be the product of a science of psychology," "Psychology in America," p. 471. Also see Lewis M. Terman, "The Psychological Determinist, or Democracy and the I.Q.," Journal of Educational Research 6(1922) pp. 57-62. It must be remembered that these views are not restricted to psychologists. They were shared by politicians such as Herbert Hoover, natural scientists, and social scientists involved in the founding of institutes such as the Social Science Research Council. See Lyons, Uneasy Partnership, pp. 17-49; Tobey, Ideology of National Science, pp. 167-185.
92. James McKeen Cattell, "Practical Psychology," Science 53(1921), p. 35. Cattell did not seem to doubt that control was possible, but felt that its successes would rest with placing the individual in the right environment. This was the "business" of psychology: "But we can place them in situations where they will behave as nearly as their constitutions permit in the way that we

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92: cont'd.

want. By changing the surroundings we control behavior most effectively. This is what our industrial civilization has done, but it has advanced without special reference to the kind of mental life and behavior that will follow. What we need is a science that will coordinate all efforts to control conduct with the effects of all changes in the environment. This is the primary business of psychology; it requires the cooperation of all the sciences and of all the professions." "The Usefulness of Psychology," Science 72(1930), p. 287. Cattell was noting that while social control has been primarily informal, it is the responsibility of psychology and psychologists to develop scientific control which can both replace uncoordinated informal methods and correspond with the aims of society. Others were to agree. Charles Hubbard Judd, The Psychology of Social Institutions (New York: Macmillan, 1926). See Lewis M. Terman, "Objective of Social Control and Motivation in a Planned Society," Chairman's report of a Discussion Group: Social Science Research Conference of Pacific Coast, San Francisco, June 13-15, 1934, Proceedings of the 4th Annual Conference, pp. 48-51; "The Control of Propaganda as a Psychological Problem," Scientific Monthly 14(1922), pp. 234-252. Here again, the notions of "social control" were not voiced only by psychologists. The need for such control was the conclusion of the president's committee on social trends organized in 1929. See Recent Social Trends; Lyons, Uneasy Partnership, pp. 47-49.

93. Psychologists like Cattell, Thorndike, Hall, Pearson, Ellis and McDougall wrote on eugenics in the twenties. Other eugenicists found support for their programs in the findings of mental testing. However, it was in the 1920s that the eugenics movement, as defined by Galton, faced some overwhelming counter-evidence: refutation of instinct theory and rise of environmentalism, development of Mendelian genetics, and the events of the Great Depression. Eugenics programs did not disappear after 1930 yet were revised. See Hamilton Cravens, The Triumph of Evolution, American Scientists and the Heredity-Environment Controversy 1900-1941 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1978); G.R. Searle, Eugenics and Politics in Britain, 1900-1914 (Leyden: Noordhoff International Publishing, 1976); Donald K. Pickens, Eugenics and the Progressives (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1968); John Higham, Strangers in the Land, Patterns of American Nativism 1860-1925 (New York: Atheneum, 1977), pp. 273-277.

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94. Joseph Jastrow, "The Reconstruction of Psychology," Psychological Review 34(1927), p. 170. Also see "Joseph Jastrow," in History of Psychology in Autobiography, vol. 1, ed. C. Murchison, pp. 135-162.
95. Jastrow, "Reconstruction of Psychology," p. 193.
96. Yerkes, New World of Science, pp. xiii-xiv. In an autobiographical sketch, Yerkes wrote that he had a lifelong plan to establish "an institute of comparative psychobiology in which the resources of the various natural sciences should be used effectively for the solution of varied problems of life." "Robert Mearns Yerkes," in History of Psychology in Autobiography, vol. 2, ed. Murchison, p. 390; F.L. Wells, "Values in Social Psychology," in The Unconscious: A Symposium, ed. Ethel Drummer (New York: Knopf, 1928); C.A. Ellwood, "Social Education in the United States," in Higher Education Faces the Future, ed. Paul A. Schlipp (New York: Horace Liveright, 1930), p. 270. For a similar attitude see, Charles H. Judd, "Charles H. Judd," in History of Psychology in Autobiography, vol. 3, ed. Murchison, pp. 231-135. Adolf Meyer, "Mental and Moral Health in a Constructive School Program," in Suggestions of Modern Science Concerning Education, eds., Jennings, Watson, Meyer, and Thomas, p. 156.
97. Joseph Jastrow, "Lo, The Psychologist," in Feelings and Emotions: The Wittenberg Symposium, ed. Martin L. Reymert (Worcester: Clark University Press, 1928), p. 436.
98. Joseph Jastrow, Piloting Your Life, The Psychologist as Helmsman (Garden City: Garden City Publishing Company, 1930).
99. For others see Quandt, Small Town to Great Community; Wilson, Quest of Community.
100. Jastrow, "Lo, The Psychologist," p. 134. The argument that psychologists became arrogant in the 1920's is analyzed historically by Sokal, "Cattell and American Psychology."
101. William James, "The Moral Equivalent to War," reprinted in Pragmatism and Other Essays (New York: Washington Square Press, 1963), p. 299.

NOTES TO CHAPTER II

1. The quest for a universal definition of utopia can lead one down many roads. Among the complications encountered is a pun stemming from the English pronunciation: utopia derives from the Greek word meaning "no place" but in English is pronounced the same as eutopia meaning "good place". This semantic ambiguity has arisen in most attempts to define utopia. Writers tend to view utopia or utopian literature as describing the ideal, good, or improved society, and as transcending the existing social reality. For some this ambiguity in definition is seen as an inherent paradox in utopian thought because utopia refers to the ideal yet also designates the unreasonable. For discussion on the definition and composition of utopias see Darko Suvin, "Defining the Literary Genre of Utopia: Some Historical Semantics, Some Genealogy, A Proposal and a Plea," Studies in the Literary Imagination, 6(1973), pp. 121-145; Roger L. Emerson, "Utopia," Dictionary of the History of Ideas, vol. 4, pp. 458-465; George Kateb, "Utopias and Utopianism," The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 16, pp. 267-271; W. Warren Wagar, "Utopian Studies and Utopian Thought, Definitions and Horizons," Extrapolation 19(1977), pp. 4-12; Lyman Tower Sargent, "Utopia: The Problem of Definition," Extrapolation 16(1975), pp. 137-148; "Opportunities for Research on Utopian Literature to 1900," Extrapolation 19(1977) pp. 16-26; M.I. Finley, "Utopianism Ancient and Modern," in The Critical Spirit: Essays in Honor of Herbert Marcuse (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967).
2. A good example of such historical sensitivity is evident in Kenneth Roemer's procedure for selecting utopias for a study of late nineteenth century utopian thought. Because Roemer observed that utopian authors of that period who used fictional formats frequently claimed that their use of fiction was a mere trapping, he decided to include nonfictional utopias in his study of that period. The Obsolete Necessity: American Utopian Writings, 1888-1900 (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1976), p. 8.
3. This definition is similar to that of Darko Suvin. "Defining the Genre." It also resembles the definition given by a social scientist, David Riesman, who defines utopia as "a belief, not in existing reality, but in a potential reality; it must not violate what we know of nature, including human nature, though it may extrapolate our present technology and must transcend our present social organization." Individualism Reconsidered (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1954), p. 72.

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A historical approach to utopian studies has encouraged methodological innovations and demonstrated the relevance of utopias to general historical inquiries. See Sargent, "Opportunities for Research"; Wagar, "Utopian Studies"; F. Polak, The Images of the Future, trans. Elise Boulding (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1973); Kenneth M. Roemer, "Utopian and Methodology: Uses of Fiction in American Studies," Rocky Mountain Social Science Journal 12(1975), pp. 21-28; "Sex Roles, Utopia and Change: The Family in Late Nineteenth Century Utopian Literatures," American Studies 13 (1975), pp. 33-49.

4. Utopian scholars often distinguish between the various structures of utopias by assessing their positions on two dimensions: time and space. Utopias exist either in the present or some removed period (past or future) and are located either here or some location (earthly or nonearthly). At least one writer has noted historical changes in the positions on which utopias stand on these dimensions. Rhodes argues that utopias have evolved through three stages: "upward" utopias or those in a future time, another space (such as heavenly cities), "outward" utopias or those set in the present but in another location (such as utopias in the Pacific islands), and "inward" utopias set in the here and now (such as plans for the transformation of existing society). Rhodes associates the transitions from one stage to another to the decline in religious thought, the exploration of the new world, and industrialization and modern politics respectively. Harold V. Rhodes, Utopia in American Political Theory (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1967).
5. The absence of systematic or intensive inquiry into the image or psychology of man inherent in utopian writing is ironical in light of the observation that most contemporary criticisms of utopian thought focus on the treatment and conceptualization of the individual. Examples of such criticisms permeate a collection of essays on utopia by contemporary scholars. See George Kateb, ed. Utopia (New York: Atherton, 1971).
6. Howard Paul Segal, "Technological Utopianism and American Culture, 1830-1940," (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1975); René Dubos, The Dreams of Reason: Science and Utopias (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961); Lewis Mumford, "Utopia, The City and the Machine," Daedalus 94(1965), pp. 271-292.

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7. Howard Ozman, Utopias and Education (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1967); Betty H. Hearn, "An Interpretative Study of the Relationship between Political and Educational Theory in Four Literary Utopias," (Ph.D. diss., University of Mississippi, 1972); Gildo Masso, Education in Utopias, No. 257 of Teachers College Columbia University, Contributions to Education, New York, 1927.
8. Rhodes, Utopia in Political Theory; Allyn B. Forbes, "The Literary Quest for Utopia, 1880-1900," Social Forces 6(1927), pp. 179-189; Judith Shklar, "The Political Theory of Utopia: From Melancholy to Nostalgia," Daedalus 94(1965), pp. 367-381; Crane Brinton, "Utopia and Democracy," Daedalus 94(1965), pp. 348-366; Adam Ulam, "Socialism and Utopia," Daedalus 94(1965), pp. 382-400. For mention of other works of utopia and technology, education and politics as well as of those on religion, sex, science, city planning, geography, and art, see Sargent, "Opportunities for Research," pp. 19-26.
9. Frank E. Manuel, "Toward a Psychological History of Utopias," Daedalus 94(1965), pp. 293-322.
10. Numerous writers mentioned the use of psychological concepts, such as those of Freud or Skinner, but gave no indication as to the source or magnitude of influence. For instance, see Chad Walsh, From Utopia to Nightmare (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1962). Manuel did refer to the works of Marcuse, Brown, and Fromm, primarily in connection with their own utopian ideas. "Toward a Psychological History," pp. 314-319.
11. This threefold taxonomy omits one combination of utopian and psychological thought, the use of psychological theory to analyze the utopia or author. One example of this approach can be found in Robert Plank's application of Rorschach techniques to understand the geographical shapes of the islands of utopia. "The Geography of Utopia: Psychological Factors Shaping the 'Ideal' Location," Extrapolations 6(1965), pp. 39-49.
12. John Passmore, The Perfectibility of Man (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970). For discussion of the identity of the ideal man with the ideal citizen see Passmore, chapter 10; Nell Eurich, Science in Utopia, A Mighty Design (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 54-62. For discussion of Thomas More's treatment of the individual and the citizen see essays in William Nelson, ed. Twentieth Century Interpretations of Utopia (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968).

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13. Manuel was sensitive to problems of periodization and intended the device "to be illustrative rather than definitive." "Toward a Psychological History," p. 295. Most studies of utopias commence with More's treatise; a few include Plato's Republic. Since the present study, like that of Manuel's, concerns the influence of the emergence of a science in its modern form, it is sufficient to adopt the common starting point. For histories of earlier utopias see John Ferguson, Utopias of the Classical World (London: Thames and Hudson, 1975); Marie Louise Berneri, Journey Through Utopia (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1950).
14. Manuel, "Toward a Psychological History," p. 300.
15. Berneri, Journey Through Utopia, p. 119; Manuel, "Toward a Psychological History," and "Pansophia, A Seventeenth-century dream of science," in Freedom from History (New York: New York University, 1971), pp. 89-113; Thomas Campanella, "The City of the Sun," in Ideal Commonwealths, ed. Henry Morley, (New York: P.F. Collier & Sons, n.d.). Since this English translation of Campanella's utopia is bowdlerized, it is preferable to consult the commonly cited French translation; La Cité du Soleil, traduction par Arnaud Tripet. (Genève: Librairie Droz, 1972).
16. Manuel, "Pansophia," pp. 107-108.
17. Manuel contrasted More's Utopia with the later utopists' belief in man's ability to transform the world: "By contrast, the seventeenth century figures, imbued with a completely different spirit, were virtually all men of action who believed passionately that their plans, however fantastic they may be to us, could and would be crowned with success here and now, or at least within a foreseeable future.... Utopia, having left the realm of fiction, became a manifesto." "Pansophia," p. 92. Likewise, Eurich called these seventeenth century men "publicists" and "reformers" for "With remarkable energy and optimism, the new utopists worked hard for the adoption of their plans. The basis of their enthusiasm, the source of their great energy, was the new learning. With scientific knowledge man was to build the road to progress and the better world," Science in Utopia, p. 145. For further discussion about departure from traditional authority in these utopias see Eurich, pp. 147-200; Passmore, Perfectibility of Man, p. 169. For the traditional ideas in More's Utopia and their later

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demise, see Hugh Trevor-Roper, "The Intellectual World of Sir Thomas More," The American Scholar 48(1978-79), pp. 19-32.

18. Manuel, "Pansophia," p. 106.

19. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. E. Rhys (New York: Dutton, 1931/1651); Berneri, Journey Through Utopia, pp. 143-44; Hugh Kearney, Science and Change, 1500-1700 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971), pp. 184-186. As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, not every student of utopias will agree to the inclusion of such authors as Hobbes or Locke in a review of utopias since some see these works strictly as political statements and, therefore, not utopian. For example, see Kateb, "Utopias and Utopianism," p. 268.

20. James Harrington, Oceana in Ideal Commonwealths. See Berneri, Journey Through Utopia, pp. 144-145.

21. See Alan G.R. Smith, Science and Society in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (London: Thames and Hudson, 1972), p. 179; Kearney, Science and Change, pp. 219-222; Passmore, Perfectibility of Man, pp. 159-170; John T. Merz, A History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century, vol. 4 (New York: Dover, 1904-1912), pp. 428-29. To a certain extent, Berkeley's visions of founding a university in the new world belongs to this spirit of utopism. For a fictional history of utopian schemes of seventeenth and eighteenth century intellectuals, see Jorge Louis Borges, "Tlon, Uqbar Orbis Tertius," in Labyrinths, Selected Stories and Other Writings, eds. Donald A. Yates and Jones E. Irby (Baltimore: Penguin, 1970).

22. For a comprehensive account of Enlightenment thought in Britain and Europe see Wilhelm Windelband, A History of Philosophy, trans. James Tufts, vol. 2 (York: The Macmillan Company, 1901), pp. 437-528. The influence of French Enlightenment on the utopias of Godwin and Fourier, see Passmore, Perfectibility of Man, pp. 178-182.

23. Frank E. Manuel and Fritzie P.-Manuel, eds., French Utopias (New York: The Free Press, 1966), pp. 1-16; Berneri, Journey Through Utopia, pp. 174-206; Manuel, "Psychological History," pp. 302-303.

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24. While the underlying assumptions of the new science, from Bacon onward, supported the notions of intellectual and social progress, the idea of progress can also be seen in theological doctrines. See Ernest L. Tuveson, Millennium and Utopia: A Study in the Background of the Idea of Progress (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964). For the connection between religion and science, and the notions of scientific progress see Robert K. Merton, Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth Century England (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1970); Edgar Zilsel, "The Genesis of the concept of Scientific Progress," Journal of the History of Ideas 6(1945), pp. 325-349. For interpretations of the influence of these religions and scientific ideas of progress on American psychology see Paul G. Creelan, "Puritanism and the Rise of American Psychology," (Ph.D. diss., The University of Chicago, 1978).
25. Manuel, "Toward Psychological History," p. 308.
26. Among the historical treatments of the emergence of sociology and psychology are George H. Mead, Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century, ed. Merritt H. Moore (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936); Merz, History of European Thought, vol. 4; Maurice Mandelbaum, History, Man, and Reason, A Study in Nineteenth Century Thought (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1971).
27. Frank E. Manuel, "Taming the Future: The French Idea of Perfectibility," in Shapes of Philosophical History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965), pp. 92-114; "Henry Saint-Simon on the Role of the Scientist," in Freedom From History, pp. 205-218; The Prophets of Paris (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965); Manuel and Manuel, French Utopias.
28. Manuel, "Toward a Psychological History," p. 303. Manuel noted how the dynamism of nineteenth century utopian thought, combined with the use of "scientific" theories, promoted the presentation of utopias as a "system". It was with such a systems model that Saint-Simon discussed "administration" and "planning" of the ideal society with the aid of science and technology. pp. 303-309.
29. For a comparison of the utopias of Owen and Fourier, see Berneri, Journey Through Utopia, pp. 210-216.

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30. Lewis Mumford quoted in Berneri, Journey Through Utopia, p. 217. For similar attitudes toward the growth of technology in utopian literature see Frye, "Variety of Literary Utopias," p. 327; Polak, Images of the Future, pp. 137-142.
31. Richard Gerber, Utopian Fantasy, A Study in Utopian Fiction Since the End of the Nineteenth Century (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1955). The rise of science fiction also has been identified with these trends and, at this point in time, the distinction between utopias and science fiction can become blurred. Isaac Asimov differentiates the two genres by defining "science fiction" as "that branch of literature which is concerned with the impact of scientific advance upon human beings" and the genre of "social fiction," to which utopias belong, as "that branch of literature which moralizes about a current society through dealing with a fictitious society." "Social Science Fiction," in Science Fiction: The Future, ed. Dick Allen (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971), pp. 263-264. However, others have not admitted to such obvious demarcations between the genres. Sam Moscovitz defined "science fiction" as "a branch of fantasy identifiable by the fact that it eases the 'willing suspension of disbelief' on the part of its readers by utilizing an atmosphere of scientific credibility for its imaginative speculations in physical science, space, time, social science, and philosophy." He noted that "Many of the so-called utopias, while basically intended to present 'unpopular' political, sociological, or philosophical views, are technically works of science fiction." Explorers of the Infinite: Shapes of Science Fiction (Cleveland: World Publishers, 1963), pp. 11-12. Like its appearance in utopias, the use of psychology in science fiction has escaped attention by science fiction scholars. Other fields of inquiry have received scrutiny; for instance, see Leonard Isaacs, Darwin to Double Helix, The Biological Theme in Science Fiction (London: Butterworth, 1977); J.W. Milstead, M.H. Greenberg, J.D. Olander, & P. Warrick, eds., Sociology Through Science Fiction (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1974). Other general histories of science fiction include Robert M. Philmus, Into the Unknown: The Evolution of Science Fiction from Francis Godwin to H.G. Wells (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970); Brian W. Aldiss, Billion Year Spree, The History of Science Fiction (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1973).

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32. E. Bulwer-Lytton, The Coming Race (London: Routledge, 1871).
33. William Morris, News From Nowhere (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1890); W.H. Hudson, A Crystal Age, 2nd ed. (London: T. Fischer Unwin, 1906).
34. Walsh, Utopia to Nightmare; Gerber, Utopian Fantasy. Scholars have differed in the explanations of the proliferation of dystopias in the twentieth century. While Emerson located the transition after 1930, Roemer identified it with the rise of totalitarianism (Stalinism and Nazism) and Parrington with the disillusionment following the Great War. See Roemer, Obsolete Necessity, pp. 7-8; Vernon L. Parrington, Jr. American Dreams, A Study of American Utopias (New York: Russell & Russell, 1964), pp. 192-194.
35. Despite the recent surge in utopian studies, there has yet to appear a general or comprehensive bibliography of utopias or utopian literature. Existing bibliographies vary according to the editor's definition of utopia, his geographical parameters, and periodization. For some good sources, see the bibliographies appended to the following works: Roemer, Obsolete Necessity; Parrington, American Dreams; Gerber, Utopian Fantasy. Roemer's listing also contains an annotated bibliography of secondary sources. Bibliographies of fantastic literature also contain utopias. See Everett Bleiler, The Checklist of Fantastic Literature, published in English, 2nd ed. (Naperville, Ill: Fax Collections, 1972/1949); I.F. Clarke, The Tale of the Future: An Annotated Bibliography (London: The Library Association, 1972).
36. Whether European or native in derivation, Americans entertained several utopian predispositions, among which were feelings that America was a potential utopia, newer conceptions of progress, and admiration of individual enterprise and practical application of ideas. Maren Lockwood, "The Experimental Utopia in America," Daedalus 94(1965), pp. 401-418; Segal, "Technological Utopianism." Some historians claim a unique American origin of these ideas. Segal has argued cogently that while the influences did not surface in all utopian writings, they appeared in a more diffuse and what appeared to be an "intuitive" manner in American thought. pp. 14-18.

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37. Roemer, Obsolete Necessity, p. 9. See note 33. Edward Bellamy, Looking Backward, 2000-1887 (Boston: Ticknor, 1888):
38. J.F. Normano, "Social Utopias in American Literature," International Review for Social History 3(1938), pp. 289-290; Roemer, Obsolete Necessity, pp. 5-6.
39. Parrington, American Dreams, pp. 176-177; Roemer, Obsolete Necessity, pp. 4-7, 171-173; Segal, "Technological Utopianism," ch. 4; Alexander J. Stuppel, Jr., "Utopian Humanism in American Fiction, 1888-1900," (Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1971); Francine C. Cary, "Shaping the Future in the Gilded Age: A Study of Utopian Thought, 1888-1900," (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1975); Charles J. Rooney, Jr., "Utopian Literature as a Reflection of Social Forces in America, 1865-1917," (Ph.D. diss., The George Washington University, 1968). Although infrequently noted, there was another literary reaction to these events, prophecy of catastrophe. See Frederic C. Jaher, Doubters and Dissenters (London: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964).
40. Several historians have discussed the similarities between these utopias and conventional religious sermons or pulpitering and the American tradition of using fiction for didactic purposes. See Virgil L. Lokke, "The American Utopian Anti-Novel," in Frontiers of American Culture, Ray B. Browne, et.al. (Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Studies, 1968), pp. 123-153; Forbes, "Literary Quest for Utopia," pp. 179-189; Roemer, Obsolete Necessity, pp. 88-89. Thus, the utopias represent a continuation of moral writing: "The publishers of the late nineteenth century gave their readers a good deal of 'moral pap' as Louisa May Alcott described her own work," Parrington, American Dreams, p. 181.
41. Roemer, Obsolete Necessity, p. 6.
42. Parrington surveyed 47 utopias published between 1883 and 1900 and found that 27 proposed a "modified capitalistic state," 5 a "totalitarian state," and 4 a "communistic state" (although he stated that 3 of these were satiric). American Dreams, pp. 177-178. Labels must be used cautiously, especially when discussing political philosophy, since certain terms were undesirable to the authors and their audiences. For instance, Roemer noted that "Very rarely did they use

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'socialism!; instead they preferred more American-sounding names such as Nationalism or co-operative individualism.' Obsolete Necessity, p. 77.

43. Parrington, American Dreams; Segal, "Technological Utopianism," chap. 4; Roemer, Obsolete Necessity, ch. 9; Stuppel, "Utopian Humanism." Normano found that "American utopias are significant of the forward drive of the people, not of the isolated individual, toward improved social conditions. The history of this literature is virtually a 'novel without a hero,' to utilize Thackeray's expression." "Social Utopias," p. 291. Roemer noted that when a "hero" appears, he "was perceived as a temporary means of solving a specific crisis," p. 64.
44. Roemer, Obsolete Necessity, ch. 4.
45. Parrington, American Dreams, p. 152.
46. Michael Kammen, People of Paradox: An Inquiry Concerning the Origins of American Civilization (New York: Knopf, 1972), p. 116: Polak presents a different interpretation of solution to the individual versus society problem: he describes the adoption of idealism which permitted some authors to embrace the idea of spiritual evolution toward perfection, an evolution which incorporates stages of nationalism. Polak, Images of the Future, pp. 160-161. See also Roemer, Obsolete Necessity, pp. 82-83.
47. Skinner quoted in Manuel, "Toward a Psychological History," p. 310. Skinner's claim is shared by many. However, all do not share his judgement about what psychology is needed. Note the argument of a student of Marcuse: "Social and political engineering have been given over to practical imagination. Utopia, must therefore take the next transcending step. After elimination of the burden of wants and struggle and war there would still remain the burdens of fear and guilt, of domination." Finley, "Utopianism Ancient and Modern," p. 28. One study that does include the period 1900 to 1930 is an anthology. See Glenn Negley and J. Max Patrick, The Question for Utopia (New York: Henry Schuman, 1952).
48. In his account of dystopias, Walsh remarked "about one past element of modern thought which on the whole has doused utopia with cold water: This is psychology." Utopia to Nightmare, p. 124. Walsh was talking about Freudianism although he mentions behaviorism as a similar example. See also Manuel, "Toward a Psychological History," pp. 310-311.

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49. Manuel, "Toward a Psychological History," pp. 312-318. Also see Finley, "Utopianism Ancient and Modern"; W.H.G. Armytage, Yesterday's Tomorrows, A Historical Survey of Future Societies (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968), pp. 214-218.
50. The work of the geneticist H.J. Muller is given as an example. Passmore, Perfectibility of Man, pp. 186-189; Manuel, "Toward a Psychological History," p. 313. The continued interest in this variation of utopian feasibility is evidenced in John Maynard Smith, "Eugenics and Utopia," Daedalus 94(1965), pp. 487-505; Paul Bloomfield, "The Eugenics of the Utopians: The Utopia of the Eugenists," The Eugenics Review 40(1949), pp. 191-198.
51. Passmore, Perfectibility of Man, p. 170.
52. For a critique of the psychology of modern utopias see George Kateb, "Utopia and the Good Life," Daedalus 94(1965), pp. 454-473; Joseph W. Krutch, The Measure of Man (London: Alvin Redman, 1956). For utopists' reactions to modern warfare and politics see Gerber, Utopian Fantasy, pp. 72-77; Parrington, American Dreams, pp. 219-229; Walsh, Utopia to Nightmare.
53. This is one half of the provocative comment that "Science cannot carry on without Utopia, nor Utopias without science." Francis and Barbara Golfing, "Towards more Vivid Utopias," in Utopia, ed. Kateb, p. 33. The reasons for the necessity of science in utopian thinking are numerous: it is an irreversible part of modern man's existence, it underlies one method of thinking about most aspects of reality, and it offers irreplaceable means for the design of the unknown.
54. Gerber, Utopian Fantasy, p. 46.
55. Eurich, Science in Utopia, p. 201. Also see pp. 200-230.
56. Dubos, Dreams of Reason, p. 57.
57. See Robert P. Adams, "The Social Responsibilities of Science in Utopia, New Atlantis and After," Journal of the History of Ideas 10(1949), pp. 374-398; Edgar Zilsel, "The Genesis of the Concept of Scientific Progress," Journal of the History of Ideas 7(1945), pp. 325-349.

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58. Passmore, Perfectibility of Man, pp. 169-170.
59. Manuel, Prophets of Paris, pp. 26-28.
60. Passmore, Perfectibility of Man, p. 206.
61. The influence of science upon society's images of the world and of everyday experiences is a neglected aspect of the history of science. See Charles E. Rosenberg, No Other Gods: On Science and American Social Thought (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1961); "Scientific Theories and Social Thought," in Sociology of Science, ed. Barry Barnes (Baltimore: Penguin, 1972); G.S. Rousseau, "Literature and Science: The State of the Field," Isis 69(1978), pp. 583-591.
62. Bellamy, Looking Backward; Skelton Kuppard, A Fortune from the Sky, cited in Garber, Utopian Fantasy, p. 143. Armytage notes that ideas of "psychic travel" were influenced by the work of the members of the Society for Psychical Research. Yesterday's Tomorrows, pp. 66-67.
63. Albert Adams Merrill, The Great Awakening (1899). Cited in Virgil L. Lokke, "American Utopian Anti-Novel."
64. Morris, News from Nowhere; John Lear, Kepler's Dream, with Full Texts and Notes of Somnium, Sive Astronomia Lunaris, trans. P.F. Kirkwood (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965).
65. Bulwer-Lytton, Coming Race; William A. Taylor, Intermere (Columbus, Ohio: Twentieth Century Publishing Company, 1901-1902); cited in Solberg, Sourcebook of Utopias, p. 236.
66. For instance, see Alcanon O. Grigsby, Nequa (1900). Cited in Lokke, "American Utopian Anti-Novel," p. 139. Also Owen Gregory, Meccania, The Super State (London: Methuen, 1918), esp. p. 250.
67. Bulwer-Lytton, Coming Race; John Uri Lloyd, Etidorpha, or The End of the Earth. The Strange History of a Mysterious Being (Cincinnati: John Uri Lloyd, 1895). "Psychoscope" found in Paolo Mantegazza's L'Anno (New York: Dial Press, 1932), pp. 171-172.

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68. H.G. Wells, A Modern Utopia (New York: Thomas Nelson, 1904); Milan C. Edson, Solaris Farm (1900), cited in Lokke, "American Utopian Anti-Novel"; Bulwer-Lytton, Coming Race. Selective breeding was common to the dystopia. For instances see William N. Harben, The Land of the Changing Sun (New York: Merriam, 1894), cited in Roemer, Obsolete Necessity, p. 197; Grant Allen, "The Child of Phalanstery," cited in Sam Moscovitz, ed., Science Fiction by Gaslight (Cleveland: WORLL Press, 1968), p. 54; E. Zamiatin, We, trans. G. Zilboorg (New York: 1959).
69. See Hudson, Crystal Age; Winwood Reade, Martyrdom of Man (1872), cited in Gerber, Utopian Fantasy, p. 11.
70. Bulwer-Lytton, Coming Race.
71. Bulwer-Lytton, Coming Race; Lloyd, Etidorpha; H.G. Wells, The Island of Dr. Moreau; D. Mark Lemon, "The Memory of Forgetfulness," in Moscovitz, Science Fiction by Gaslight, pp. 361-364; Edson, Solaris Farm.
72. Bulwer-Lytton, Coming Race, pp. 94-104.
73. John C. Burnham, "The New Psychology: From Narcissism to Social Control," in Change and Continuity in Twentieth-Century America: The 1920's eds. John Braeman, Robert H. Bremner, and David Brody (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1968), pp. 351-398; William E. Leuchtenburg, The Perils of Prosperity, 1914-1932 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 162-167. Leuchtenburg believes that after the war "psychology became a national mania," p. 164; Stephen Leacock, "A Manual of the New Mentality," Harper's, 1924, 248, pp. 472-473; Donald S. Napoli, "The Architects of Adjustment: The Practice and Professionalization of American Psychology, 1920-1945," (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Davis, 1975), pp. 78-125; Hornell Hart, "Changing Social Attitudes and Interests," in Recent Social Trends in the United States, Report of the President's Research Committee on Social Trends, Vol. 1 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1933), pp. 382-442.
74. Isaac Asimov, Trends (1938); Theodore Sturgeon, More Than Human; Philip J. Farmer, The Mother; and H.F. Heard, Doppelgangers. All cited in Moscovitz, Explorers of the Infinite, pp. 339-346.

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75. Judah Bierman, "Science and Society in the New Atlantis and other Renaissance Utopias," Publication of the Modern Language Association of America, 78(1963), p. 494.
76. Francis Bacon, New Atlantis, in Famous Utopias of the Renaissance, ed. Frederic R. White (New York: Hendricks House, 1955), pp. 227-228.
77. Bierman, "Science in Renaissance Utopias," p. 499; Eurich, Science in Utopia, pp. 261-266; Berneri, Journey Through Utopia, pp. 126-129; Adams, "Social Responsibilities of Science"; Moody E. Prior, "Bacon's Man of Science," Journal of the History of Ideas, 1954, 15, pp. 348-370.
78. Adams, "Social Responsibilities of Science," p. 391.
79. Passmore, Perfectibility of Man, pp. 190-193.
80. Manuel, Prophets of Paris, pp. 75-92.
81. Manuel, "Saint-Simon on the Role of the Scientist," pp. 214-217.
82. Gerber, Utopian Fantasy, pp. 50-51.
83. Ibid., p. 51.
84. Segal, "Technological Utopianism," pp. 44-47.
85. For these contrasting images of science and the scientists see Gerber, Utopian Fantasy; Roemer, Obsolete Necessity; Armytage, Yesterday's Tomorrow; Robert M. Philmus, Into the Unknown: The Evolution of Science Fiction from Francis Godwin to H.G. Wells (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970).
86. Wells, Modern Utopia, Island of Dr. Moreau.
87. Oscar Handlin, "Ambivalence in the Popular Response to Science," in Sociology of Science, pp. 269-291. While Handlin described the popular conceptions of scientists, Stephen Toulmin elucidated the possible ambivalence among scientists themselves. Toulmin suggested that scientists have operated with two images, one of the dedicated, purely intellectual seeker of truth as seen in Newton and the other of the practical, socially-oriented scientist in the form of Bacon's man of science. The latter is the role sold to the populace

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while the former constitutes the scientist's self-image. "The Twin Moralities of Science," in Science and Society: Past, Present, and Future, ed. Nicholas H. Steneck (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1975), pp. 111-124.

88. For instance, Rhodes, Utopia in Political Theory; Segal, "Technological Utopianism".

89. Gregory, Meccania; Huxley, Brave New World.

90. Zamiatin, We; Harben, Land of Changing Sun. The latter work is discussed in Roemer, Obsolete Necessity, pp. 114-117.

91. For educational and psychological knowledge held by teachers and citizens in utopia see Roemer, Obsolete Necessity, pp. 120-124.

92. Dubos, Dreams of Reason, p. 50.

93. Martin G. Plattel, Utopian and Critical Thinking (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1972), p. 97.

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1. Examples include Herbert C. Kelman, "From Dystopia to Utopia: An Analysis of Huxley's Island," in A Time to Speak: On Human Values and Social Research (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1968), pp. 115-150; Wilbert E. Moore, "The Utility of Utopias," American Sociological Review 31(1966), pp. 765-772; Paul Goodman, Utopian Essays and Practical Purposes (New York: Vintage, 1951); Suzanne Keller, "The Planning of Communities: Anticipations and Hindsight," in The Idea of Social Structure: Papers in Honor of Robert K. Merton, ed. L.A. Coser (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1975); Herbert L. Leff, "Utopia and Change," in Experiment, Environment and Human Potentials (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978); Margaret Mead, "Towards More Vivid Utopias," in Utopia, ed. George Kateb (New York: Atherton, 1971); Francis and Barbara Golfing, in Utopia, ed. Kateb. Also see Chap. II, notes 92 and 93.
2. Samuel Butler, Erewhon or Over the Range, new ed. (London: Cape, 1924/1872). Butler's name did not appear on the work until the fifth edition in 1873. W.H. Hudson, A Crystal Age, 2nd ed. (London: T. Fischer Unwin, 1906). Butler and Hudson both were dilettante scientists.
3. Alfred Russell Wallace, The Wonderful Century: Its Successes and Failures (London: Sonnienschein, 1898).
4. J.B.S. Haldane, Daedalus, or Science and the Future (London: 1923); Bertrand Russell, Icarus, or The Future of Science (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959/1924).
5. Warren O. Hagstrom, The Scientific Community (New York: Basic Books, 1965), pp. 212-215.
6. Ibid., p. 212.
7. René Dubos, The Dreams of Reason: Science and Utopias (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), pp. 63-98. Dubos outlined a number of medical utopias and concluded that they illustrate reactions of medical philosophy to the changing social and scientific environment, and that "The more effective it becomes through scientific knowledge, the more it must concern itself with the long range consequences of its practices for future generations." p. 98.
8. Howard P. Segal, "Technological Utopianism and American Culture, 1830-1940," (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1975).

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9. J.B.S. Haldane, Possible Worlds, and Other Essays (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1928).
10. Herman Schwendinger and Julia R. Schwendinger, The Sociologists of the Chair: A Radical Analysis of the Formative Years of North American Sociology (1883-1922) (New York: Basic Books, 1974). See especially pp. 447-449.
11. Hagstrom, Scientific Community, pp. 212-215.
12. The choice of the 1860s is more than a retrospective decision and was shared by some practitioners of that period. William James suggested in 1867 "that perhaps the time has come for psychology to begin to be a science" and Wilhem Wundt stated in 1873 that his research "is an attempt to mark out a new domain of science." Quoted in Conrad Miller, "Some Origins of Psychology as a Science," Annual Review of Psychology 30(1979), pp. 10-11.
13. Thomas M. Camfield, "The Professionalization of American Psychology, 1870-1917," Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 1973, 9, pp. 66-75; Samuel W. Fernberger, "The American Psychological Association, A Historical Summary, 1892-1930," Psychological Bulletin, 1932, 29, pp. 1-89; H. Misiak and V. Sexton, History of Psychology (New York: Grune & Stratton, 1966).
14. Edna Heidbreder, Seven Psychologies (New York: The Century Co., 1933), p. 112.
15. Wallace, Wonderful Century, pp. 193, 212. As early as 1874, Thomas Henry Huxley mentioned a place for "Psychology" in the ideal university. "Universities, Actual and Ideal," in Science and Culture, and Other Essays (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1882), p. 47.
16. Ernest Haeckel, Riddle of the Universe at the Close of the Nineteenth Century, 2nd ed., trans. by J. McCabe (London: Watts & Co., 1901).
17. Karl Pearson, Social Problems: Their Treatment, Past, Present, and Future (London: Cambridge University Press, 1912); Nature and Nurture: The Problem of the Future (London: Dulau and Co., 1910).

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18. Lloyd's most frequent use of psychology concerned mind-expanding drugs. However, he also posed some epistemological questions about science which were directly relevant to psychology. For instance, Lloyd commented that "Man cannot count his fingers unless some outside object touches them, or they press successively against each other, or he perceives them by sight. The brain of man, the seat of knowledge, in which mind centers, is not perceptible through the senses. Does it not seem irrational, however, to believe that mind itself is not aware, or could not be made cognizant, of the nature of its material surroundings?" Lloyd then proceeded to demonstrate the unbelievable by describing a means to observe the brain. He also suggested that "An instrument capable of searching and illuminating the retina could be easily affixed to the eye of a criminal, after which, if the mind of the person operated upon were stimulated by the suggestion of an occurrence either remote or recent, the mind faculty would excite the brain, produce the record, and spread the circumstances as a picture before the observer. The brain would tell its own story, and the investigator could read the truth as recorded in the brain of the other man. A criminal subjected to such an examination could not tell an untruth, or equivocate; his very brain would present itself to the observer." In his fantasy, Lloyd attempted to criticize the orthodoxy of contemporary science as well as illustrate its potential. Etidorpha, or the End of the Earth, The Strange History of a Mysterious Being (Cincinnati: John Uri Lloyd, 1895), pp. 196, 201, 202.
19. Albert Chavannes, Mental Science, As a Guide to Health, Happiness and Business Success (Knoxville, 1902). No biographical information on Chavannes has been located to date. Several of his psychological works have been located. See Magnetation, and its Relation to Health and Character (Knoxville, 1898); Vital Force (Knoxville, T. Haws, 1888); Heredity, Cross-breeding, and Pre-natal Influences (New York: Murray Hill, 1886). Chavannes also wrote about the conditions of women and problems of capitalism. Lizzie Melton, A Self-Reliant Girl (Knoxville, 1900); The Concentration of Wealth, a Study as to its Causes, Results and Remedies (New York: True Nationalist Publishing Company, 1893).
20. The Future Commonwealth, or What Samuel Balcom Saw in Socioland (New York: True National Publishing Co., 1892); In Brighter Climes, or Life in Socioland (Knoxville: Chavannes and Co., 1895).

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21. Although Charles Grant Blairfindie Allen (1848-1899) held an academic position as Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy for three years, his free-lance writing occupied most of his career and comprised his primary source of income. His utopia, The British Barbarians, is a reversal of a traditional literary device; instead of relating the experience of an ordinary individual visiting utopia he recounted the visit of a utopian citizen to nineteenth century Britain. The utopian had come from a future and more highly evolved society where nineteenth century problems of morality, class, property, and aggression were non-existent. The work is a utopian romance but Allen preferred to call it a "Hill-top Novel" because "of late we have been flooded with stories of evil tendencies: a Hill-top Novel is one which raises a protest in favor of purity." The British Barbarians (London: John Lane, 1895), p. vii. Allen's ideas of social evolution in this and other works are Spencerian. He frequently lauded the work of Herbert Spencer; wrote verses about Spencer's philosophical system, and corresponded with him. Allen even discussed a "Gospel according to Herbert Spencer" in which commitment to a future and perfect society is obvious: "in your capacity as parent, will you produce and bring up better units for the composition of the Society in future; so, in your capacity as citizen, will you help to mould the State...." Quoted in Edward Clodd, Grant Allen, A Memoir (London: Grant Richards, 1900), pp. 15-16. Allen's psychological research was mainly on sensation: See Physiological Aesthetics (London: Henry S. King and Co., 1877); The Colour-Sense: Its Origin and Development, An Essay in Comparative Psychology (London: Trubner and Co., 1879). He also wrote popular articles on the psychology of 'genius', love, and handedness. Many of these are contained in Science in Arcady (London: George Routledge and Sons, Limited, 1892), and Falling in Love, With Other Essays on More Exact Branches of Science (London: Smith, Elder, & Co., 1891). Throughout his life Samuel Butler (1835-1902) demonstrated ambivalence toward science and scientists; his attitudes fluctuated between emulation and condemnation. For discussion of the bases and repercussions of these attitudes see Frank Miller Turner, Between Science and Religion: The Reaction to Scientific Naturalism in Late Victorian England (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), pp. 164-200. His utopian satire illustrated this ambivalence. Its inverted title, Erewhon (nowhere),

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- set the atmosphere for the inversion of time in the utopian society. Some 500 years before the novel's protagonist appears, the Erewhonians realized that, according to Darwin's theory of evolution, machines would surpass man in the phylogenetic hierarchy just as animals had supplanted vegetable life in the distant past. With this realization, the Erewhonians consciously interfered with, and reversed evolution by abolishing all machines. And Butler's satire of modern science was accompanied by a comparable treatment of religion, the then-predominant antagonist of science. Such a double-edged message is an excellent example of his ambivalence. For further discussion see Armytage, Yesterday's Tomorrows, pp. 51-55. Butler's interests in psychology were residuals of his attempts to construct an epistemology. The resultant writings include a study of hereditary transmission of habits and a work on unconscious memory. See Life and Habit (London: Jonathan Cape, 1923/1877); Unconscious Memory (London: Jonathan Cape, 1924/1880).
22. Pierre Janet quoted in Henri Ellenberger, The Discovery of the Unconscious, The History and Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry (New York: Basic Books, 1970), p. 231.
23. George T. Ladd, "The Problems of Psychology," Psychological Review, 1894, 1, p. 21.
24. James McKeen Cattell, "Psychology and the Other Sciences," Psychological Review, 1896, 3, pp. 134-148; John Dewey, "Psychology and Social Practice," Psychological Review, 7(1900), pp. 105-124.
25. This term appears in a recent work on late nineteenth century literary criticism. "Evolutionism" refers to the application of evolutionary notions to realms of thought unconnected with biology. Ellis is seen to exemplify this use of evolutionary theory in his literary criticism. Tom Gibbons, Rooms in the Darwin Hotel (Nedlands: University of Western Australia Press, 1973).
26. J.G. Morawski, "The Concept of Evolution in the Psychological Works of Havelock Ellis," (M.A. Thesis, Carleton University, 1976).

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27. Havelock Ellis, The Nineteenth Century: A Dialogue in Utopia (London: Grant Richards, 1900).
28. Ibid., pp. 39-40.
29. Ibid., pp. 42-43.
30. Ibid., p. 43.
31. Ibid., p. 47.
32. Ibid., p. 119.
33. Ibid., p. 40.
34. Ibid., p. 44.
35. Lawski, "Evolution in the Psychological Works of Ellis."
36. While the term "Darwinian solution" is my own, Mandelbaum has described that method as one solution to the problem of how society evolves. Darwin believed man had developed a moral sense from his social instincts and his high level of intelligence; in turn, this moral sense allowed man to select social customs which would benefit society and, if they did not, society would not survive. Hence, in Darwin's own writings one could find an explanation for the progress of man and society. Cf. Mandelbaum, History, Man & Reason, ch. 11.
37. Metaphysical idealism holds that within "natural human experience one can find the clue to an understanding of the ultimate nature of reality, and this clue is revealed through those traits which distinguish man as a spiritual being." Mandelbaum, History, Man & Reason, p. 6.
38. Ellis, Nineteenth Century, p. 161.
39. Havelock Ellis; The Dance of Life (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1923).
40. Ibid.
41. Mandelbaum; History, Man & Reason, pp. 10-20.
42. For an account of some who rejected scientific naturalism or positivism, including Wallace, see Turner, Between Science and Religion.

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43. Letter from A.R. Wallace dated October 18, 1900.
Ellis Collection, Yale University Library.
44. Letter from William James dated December 4, 1900.
Ellis Collection.
45. D.W. Forrest, Francis Galton: The Life and Work of a Victorian Genius (New York: Taplinger Publishing Co., 1974).
46. Robert I. Watson, The Great Psychologists, 3rd ed. (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Company, 1971), p. 311.
47. Galton acknowledged the great influence of his cousin: "The publication in 1859 of the Origin of Species by Charles Darwin made a marked epoch in my own development, as it did in that of human thought generally." Memories of My Life, 3rd ed., Francis Galton (London: Methuen & Co., 1909/1908), p. 287. He even attributed his pursuit of eugenics ideas to the work: "I was encouraged by the new views to pursue many inquiries which had long interested me, and which clustered around the central topics of Heredity and the possible movement of the Human Race." P. 288. In his biography of Galton, Karl Pearson noted evidence of Galton's early interest in evolution. The Life, Letters and Labours of Francis Galton (Cambridge: University Press, 1914-1930), vol. 2, pp. 70-77.
48. Francis Galton, "Hereditary Talent and Character," Macmillan's Magazine, 12 (1865), pp. 157-166; 318-327.
49. Ibid., p. 157.
50. For comments on Galton's involvement in these issues see Pearson, Life of Galton, 2, pp. 81-82.
51. Galton, "Hereditary Talent and Character," p. 165.
52. Ibid., p. 166.
53. The fact that this article is a synopsis of Galton's later research interests has not gone unnoticed. Karl Pearson perceived it as laudable foresight as seen in his comment: "and then -- in 1864 -- We suddenly find the whole doctrine of eugenics as the salvation of mankind developed half-a-century too early." Life of Galton, 2, p. 77. Galton himself twice acknowledged the import of that article. He wrote that it "contains

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the germs of many of my subsequent memoirs" including four books. He later added that his views on eugenics first appeared in the article: Memories, pp. 289, 244, 310. One historian of science has examined this work in the context of then-current scientific knowledge and concluded that Galton could not have arrived at the ideas contained in it either through logical inferences or current conceptions. She then traced the political and personal, rather than scientific, origins of Galton's theorizing. "Nature and Nurture: The Interplay of Biology and Politics in the Work of Francis Galton," In William Coleman and Camille Limoges eds., Studies in History of Biology, vol. 1 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), pp. 133-209.

54. Pearson, Life of Galton, 3a, p. 221.

55. In that year Galton gave the Huxley Lectures in which he set out his proposals for a science of eugenics. For a description of and reaction to these lectures see Pearson, Life of Galton, 3a, pp. 226-240.

56. For a description of his appeals and contacts see Pearson, Life of Galton, 3a, pp. 221-225. One person from whom Galton solicited advice and collaboration was Havelock Ellis. "Evolution in the Psychological Works of Ellis," Morawski.

57. Galton, Memories, p. 321.

58. Ibid., p. 323.

59. The seriousness of these aims is evidenced in his substantial financial investments. He presents such plans to a meeting of the "Sociological Society" in 1904. Francis Galton, "Eugenics, its Definition, Scope and Aims," Sociological Papers 1 (1905) pp. 45-50. The paper also appeared in Nature 70 (1904) pp. 92-93. See Pearson, Life of Galton, 3a, pp. 261-266.

60. Francis Galton, "The Part of Religion in Human Evolution," National Review, 23 (1894) pp. 755-765. Quoted from Pearson, Life of Galton, 3a, pp. 92-93. Similar views are stated in Francis Galton, "Eugenics, I. Restrictions in Marriage; II. "Studies in National Eugenics," Sociological Papers, 2 (1906) pp. 1-53.

Notes to Chapter III cont'd.

61. Cf. Pearson, Life of Galton, 3a, pp. 88-89.
 62. Galton referred to a utopia based on his anthropomorphic studies in an interview for the Times. - Victorian Genius, Forrest, p. 247. He also discussed utopian conditions in a lecture to a group of demographers. Life of Galton, Pearson, 3a, pp. 220; 411.
 63. Kantsaywhere was not Galton's only attempt to write a utopian novel. Incomplete drafts of an earlier utopia, Donoghue of Dunno Weir (1911) are contained in the Galton Papers. It was the story of a Donoghue family who set up a utopian experiment. The idea originated with the father whose "mind dwelt on the possibility of founding what might be called a School of Heredity. When Darwin's Origin of Species burst on the world, his ideas greatly widened and began to take practical shape. He had his two elder sons well educated in the natural history side of science and they both obtained considerable university success." (p. 6). Except for the role of the sons (Galton had no children), there is startling resemblance between the ideas of Donoghue and Galton. In this utopia Galton outlined Donoghue's plans to create the appropriate housing for his community which "should be devoted to a thorough study and useful application of the processes of heredity...." (p. 5). Like Kantsaywhere, the utopia would have the relevant colleges (in this case he mentioned a "College of Statistics" and "Darwin Institute"), would be devoted to breeding fine stocks, and would be set in a pleasant area with all the necessary facilities. Appended to this draft was a newspaper clipping about and his comments on a utopian experiment called Bournville, a planned community to be occupied by artisans. Donoghue of Dunno Weir, Galton Papers, University College London.
- While Galton explained the title's meaning -- "Dunno Weir" is a corruption of Donoghue's Weir -- he gave no comparable explanation for the title Kantsaywhere. The title is open to several interpretations although Pearson claimed that when Galton was proceeding slowly on the novel he wished it would go to "won't say where." Life of Galton, 3a, p. 411. Pearson may be responsible for the title Kantsaywhere because the remaining pages of the draft contain a longer title: The Eugenics College of Kantsaywhere. Galton Papers.

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64. Methuen, which had published numerous works by Galton, rejected the novel... Life of Galton, Pearson, 3a, p. 411. However, it is somewhat perplexing that he could not find a publisher since as late as 1909 George Allen & Sons solicited Galton for material. They asked specifically for a book on the "philosophy of racial progress and improvement," on eugenics. George Allen & Sons to Francis Galton, April 22, 1909. Galton Papers.
65. His niece, Millicent Lethbridge, defended her actions in a previous letter along with the remaining parts of Kantsaywhere which she sent to Edward Wheler-Galton: "When I began the work of execution, my heart ----- me so much that I thought that I would begin by merely 'Boulderizing' it and then see. So I destroyed all the story, all poor Miss Augusta, the (Nunson) anecdotes plus in fact every thing not to the point -- but there were a good many places that I felt myself incapable of judging. So I am returning you the mutilated copy, hoping... that Prof - Karl Pearson might see it... Mutilated as it is, poor Kantsaywhere can never be published + is as safe from that as if it were destroyed altogether, but I think what remains might interest Prof - Pearson + possibly though I doubt it, be useful. Besides if something survived I would not feel quite so much like a Murderous!" Millicent Galton Lethbridge to Edward Wheler-Galton, March 27, (1911?). Galton Papers. The lengthy quote is given not merely because of its charming tone but because it is the only evidence, however obtuse, regarding why Kantsaywhere was destroyed. Also see Pearson, Life of Galton, 3a, pp. 408; 410-411.
66. Substantial excerpts from the surviving pages were reproduced in Life of Galton. Pearson also supplemented the text with information given to him by an unnamed person who had read the entire manuscript before its destruction. The remaining pages of Kantsaywhere are in the Galton Papers.
67. "I don't know who," Life of Galton, Pearson, (3a, p. 411.
68. Galton quoted in Life of Galton, Pearson, 3a, p. 414.
69. Pearson, Life of Galton, 3a, p. 415.
70. Ibid., p. 416. Pearson observed that the description of Kantsaywhere's laboratory matched that of Galton's First South Kensington Laboratory.

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71. Ibid., pp. 421-422. • Pearson discussed this use of statistics and its relation to Galton's earlier publications on percentiles and means.
72. Galton quoted in Life of Galton, Pearson, 3a, p. 424.
73. Galton quoted in Life of Galton, Pearson, 3a, p. 422.
74. Forrest, Victorian Genius, pp. 138-142, 286.
75. Galton quoted in Life of Galton, Pearson, 3a, p. 423.
76. Galton quoted in Life of Galton, Pearson, 3a, p. 423.
77. Galton quoted in Life of Galton, Pearson, 3a, p. 423.
78. Floyd H. Allport, Social Psychology (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1924); Emory Bogardus, A History of Social Thought (Los Angeles: University of Southern California Press, 1922); Fay B. Karpf, American Social Psychology: Its Origins, Development, and European Background (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1932). Some sociologists criticized Tarde for his "psychologism" or psychological reductionism. See Terry N. Clark, "Gabriel Tarde," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 15, p. 510.
79. Clark, "Gabriel Tarde," p. 509.
80. John T. Merz, A History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century (Edinburgh: W. Blackwood & Sons, 1907-1914), vol. 4, pp. 558-561; H. Peyre, "Durkheim: The Man, His Time, and His Intellectual Background," in Kurt M. Wolff, ed. Emile Durkheim, 1858-1917 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1960), p. 25.
81. F. Giddings in the preface to Gabriel Tarde, Laws of Imitation, trans. by E. C. Parsons (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1903).
82. Michael M. Davis, Psychological Interpretations of Society, Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, Columbia University, vol. 33 (New York: Longmans Green & Company, 1909).
83. Bogardus, History of Social Thought, pp. 372-73.
84. Clark, "Gabriel Tarde," p. 512.

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85. Gabriel Tarde, Les lois d'imitation (Paris, 1890).
Laws of Imitation was translated in 1903; see note 81.
86. Tarde, Laws of Imitation, p. 87.
87. "By imitation I mean every impression of an inter-psychical photography, so to speak, willed or not willed, passive or active." Laws of Imitation, Tarde, p. xiv. For a discussion of Tarde's concepts see Ellenberger, Discovery of the Unconscious, pp. 514; 518.
88. Tarde, Laws of Imitation, p. 2.
89. See Karpf, American Social Psychology, p. 98. Gabriel Tarde, La logique sociale (Paris: F. Alcan, 1895); L'opposition universelle (Paris: F. Alcan, 1897).
90. Tarde, Laws of Imitation, p. 141.
91. Ibid., pp. 169-170.
92. Ibid., pp. 87-88.
93. Gabriel Tarde, Social Laws, trans. by H.G. Warren (New York: Macmillan Company, 1899), p. 205.
94. Ibid., p. 213.
95. Georges Guy-Grand, "Gabriel Tarde," Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 14, p. 3.
96. Tarde, Laws of Imitation, introduction.
97. For the most complete bibliography see Davis, Psychological Interpretations, p. 254.
98. Gabriel Tarde, "Fragment d'histoire future," Revue Internationale de Sociologie 4, 1896 p. 603; Gabriel Tarde, Underground Man, trans. by Cloudesley Brereton (Westport, Conn.: Hyperion Press, 1905).
99. H.G. Wells in the preface to Underground Man, p. 14.
100. Wells in Ibid., p. 15.
101. Ibid., p. 48.

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102. Ibid., p. 141.
103. Wells in Ibid., p. 17.
104. Tarde, Laws of Imitation, p. 210.
105. Tarde, Underground Man, p. 117.
106. Tarde, Social Laws, pp. 30-31.
107. Tarde, Laws of Imitation, p. 398.
108. Tarde, Social Laws, p. 200.
109. Tarde, Underground Man, p. 167.
110. Ibid., p. 172.
111. Tarde, Laws of Imitation, p. 74.
112. See Mary O. Furner, Advocacy and Objectivity: A Crisis in the Professionalization of American Social Science (Lexington: University Press, 1975); Gene M. Lyons, The Uneasy Partnership, Social Science and the Federal Government in the Twentieth Century (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1969); Robert M. Veatch, Value Freedom in Science and Technology (Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1976); Roy Lubove, The Professional Altruist: The Emergence of Social Work as a Career, 1880-1930 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965); Ronald C. Tobey, The American Ideology of National Science, 1919-1930 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971).
113. For some perspectives on this type of omission in conventional histories see David Leary, "The Intentions and Heritage of Descartes and Locke: Toward a Recognition of the Moral Basis of Modern Psychology," paper presented at the annual meeting of Cheiron, Wellesley, June 1978; Allan R. Buss, "In Defense of a Critical-Presentist Historiography: The Fact-Theory Relationship and Marx's Epistemology," Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 13(1977), pp. 252-260.

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

1. R.I. Watson, The Great Psychologists, 3rd ed. (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1971), p. 87; W.B. Pillsbury, The History of Psychology (New York: W.W. Norton, 1929), pp. 246-247; J.C. Flugel and D.J. West, A Hundred Years of Psychology, 1833-1933 (London: Duckworth, 1964), p. 174.
2. E.G. Boring, A History of Experimental Psychology, 2nd ed. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1950), p. 521.
3. Dorothy Ross, G. Stanley Hall: The Psychologist as Prophet (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1972); R. Jackson Wilson, In Quest of Community: Social Philosophy in the United States, 1860-1920 (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1968); Paul G. Creelan, "Puritanism and the Rise of American Psychology," (Ph.D. diss., The University of Chicago, 1978).
4. G. Stanley Hall, "Old Age," Atlantic Monthly 127(1921), pp. 23-31. Hall felt not only the philosophical advantages of old age but the social ones as well. He wrote to his son about one of his last papers: "There is a wonderful liberty in being old and not anxious about a career, and being able to say what you want to in any way and on any topic." G. Stanley Hall to Robert G. Hall, December 24, 1923. Hall Papers, Clark University Archives.
5. L. Sprague De Camp, Lost Continents: The Atlantis Theme In History, Science, and Literature (New York: The Gnome Press, 1954). De Camp found that the "Theme has been tied to communism, socialism, anti-socialism, Spiritualism, thosophy, racism, pacifism, romanticism, diffusionism, Rousellian primitivism, and Horbigerism." p. 274.
6. Ibid., p. 232.
7. G.S. Hall, "The Fall of Atlantis," In Recreations of a Psychologist (New York: D. Appleton, 1920), p. 127.
8. Ibid., p. v.
9. Ibid., p. 5.
10. G. Stanley Hall, Life and Confessions of a Psychologist (New York: D. Appleton, 1923), pp. 123, 405, 588; Methods of Teaching History (Boston: D.C. Heath and Co., 1883); Founders of Modern Psychology (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1912).

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11. Hall, Life and Confessions, p. 588.
12. G. Stanley Hall, "The Philosophy of the Future," Nation 27(1878); pp. 283-284; "The New Psychology," Andover Review 3(1885) pp. 120-135, 239-248; "The Relations of Physiology to Psychology," Christian Register 69(1890), pp. 698-699.
13. G. Stanley Hall, "College Philosophy," Forum 29 (1900), pp. 409-422; "Note on Psychology," Philosophical Review 15(1906), p. 173.
14. G. Stanley Hall, "The Line of Educational Advance," The Outlook 62(1899), pp. 768-770; "The New Psychology," Harper's Magazine 103(1901), pp. 727-732; "The Present Status, Field and Problems of Psychology," Worcester Evening Gazette, September 29, 1904; "Child Study in the University and College," Journal of Education 62(1905), pp. 136-7; also in Proceedings of the National Educational Association (1905), pp. 710-714; "The Affiliation of Psychology with Philosophy and with the Natural Sciences," Science 23(1906), pp. 297-301; "The University Idea," Pedagogical Seminary 15(1908), pp. 92-116.
15. Hall, "Affiliation of Psychology," p. 298.
16. G. Stanley Hall, "A Glance at the Phyletic Background of Genetic Psychology," American Journal of Psychology 19(1908), p. 151.
17. G. Stanley Hall, Adolescence, 2 vols. (New York: D. Appleton, 1904).
18. G. Stanley Hall, "Philosophy," Decennial Celebration: Clark University (Worcester: Clark University Press, 1899), p. 184; "Rest and Fatigue," Ainslee's Magazine 9(1902), pp. 503-508. Confirmation of the assumptions is nowhere as clearly stated as in the following: "Nothing so reinforces optimism as evolution. It is the best, or at any rate, not the worst that survive. Development is upward, creative, and not-decreative. From Cosmic gas onward there is progress, advancement, and improvement." Adolescence, vol. 2, p. 546. See also vol. 1, p. viii.
19. Although suggestions of recapitulation, primarily in comparisons of aspects of the child and those of primitives, appeared in Hall's writings throughout the 1890s but its first explication appeared in Adolescence.

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20. To contribute to evolutionary progress, Hall believed that institutions such as education require "reformation" not revaluation. See "Some Dangers in our Educational System and How to Meet Them," New England Magazine 41(1907), pp. 667-675. See also "The Budding Girl and the Boy in his Teens," Southern California Teachers Association, Redlands Review Press, 1909, p. 54.
21. Hall, Adolescence, vol. 2, p. 62.
22. For instance see G. Stanley Hall, "Mission Pedagogy," Journal of Race Development 1(1910), pp. 127-146; "The Point of View Toward Primitive Races," Journal of Race Development 1(1910), pp. 5-11; "Social Phases of Psychology," American Journal of Sociology 18(1913), pp. 618-621; "The Undeveloped Races in Contact with Civilization," Bulletin of the Washington University Association, 4(1906), pp. 145-150.
23. Hall, Adolescence, vol. 1, p. viii; "Phyletic Background".
24. Hall originally placed this responsibility not merely with each individual but with those overseeing some aspect of individuals' growth. Early discussions mentioned the responsibilities of those in charge of education, the family, and health care. On educators see "Recent Advances"; "Some Dangers in our Educational System and How to Meet Them," pp. 667-675; "The High School as People's College," Pedagogical Seminary 9 (1902), pp. 63-73; "University Idea". On librarians see "Childrens' Reading as a Factor in Education," Collected Papers of G. Stanley Hall, vol. 18, Clark University Archives. On the family see "New Ideals of Motherhood Suggested by Child Study," Report of the National Congress of Mothers, Washington, D.C., 1905, pp. 14-27. Later, Hall shifted this responsibility toward intellectual leaders, primarily scientists. This shift will be discussed later but an early indication of it appears in "The Negro Question," Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Association 19(1905), pp. 95-107.
25. G. Stanley Hall, "Heirs of the Ages," Proceedings of the New Jersey Association for the Study of Children and Youth (Bloomfield, N.J.: The Brotherhood Press, 1899), pp. 6-7; "The Needs and Methods of Educating Young People in the Hygiene of Sex," Pedagogical Seminary 15(1908), pp. 82-91; "Recent Advances in

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25. cont'd.

- Child Study," Pedagogical Seminary 15(1908), pp. 353-357.
26. Hall, Life and Confessions, p. 64; "Rest and Fatigue"; "Heirs of Ages"; "A New Universal Religion at Hand," Metropolitan 14(1901), pp. 778-780; "The War and Some of its Relations to Education," School and Society 4 (1916), pp. 115-120.
27. G. Stanley Hall, "Recent Progress in Child Study," Child Welfare Magazine 8(1914), p. 212.
28. G. Stanley Hall, "The National Child Welfare Conference: Its Work and its Relations to Child Study," Pedagogical Seminary 17(1910), pp. 497-504; "New Universal Religion"; "High School as College".
29. Hall, Adolescence, vol. 2, p. 62.
30. Ibid., p. 448.
31. Ibid., p. 62. Hall called the aversion to study the past and tendency to merely speculate on the future the "genetophobia" of psychology, pp. 40-41.
32. "But I think now, scientific values being equal or even approximately so, the problem that promises most useful results would always be preferred, even for pedagogic reasons...." "University Idea," Hall, p. 102.
33. Hall, Adolescence, vol. 1, p. ix.
34. G. Stanley Hall; "The View-point of the Psychologist as to Courses of Study which Will Meet the Future Demands of a Democracy," Pedagogical Seminary 26(1919), p. 99.
35. Hall, Life and Confessions, p. 436.
36. G. Stanley Hall, "Psychology and Industry," Pedagogical Seminary 27(1920), p. 293. See also Life and Confessions, pp. 437-438. While the frequency of these exhortations increased during the post-war years, they did not represent entirely new thoughts. Note a 1899 discussion on philosophy and psychology: "The conception that mind, as we know it in consciousness, has

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been developed out of something very different that, like organic forms, tends to vary and change indefinitely is a new conception and is sure eventually to reconstruct out of new and old elements a far larger and more adequate city of Man-soul with reformed administrative, educational, religious, and other functions." "Philosophy," p. 184.

37. G. Stanley Hall, "Child Study in the University and College," Journal of Education (Boston) 62(1905), pp. 136-137.

38. Hall, "Child Study"; "Affiliations of Psychology with Philosophy"; "New Psychology"; "Present Status, Field and Problems of Psychology."

39. G. Stanley Hall, "New Psychology," p. 247; Life and Confessions, p. 541; "Psychology and Industry," p. 293; "Viewpoint of the Psychologist," p. 98.

40. Hall, "Fall of Atlantis," p. 72. They knew that "the soul no less than the body was evolved from primal animal instincts and there was no great chasm separating Mansoul from lower manifestations of the psyche or even demarcating vital from physical and mechanical energy." p. 74.

41. Ibid., pp. 58-59, 72, 74.

42. Ibid., pp. 17-22.

43. Hall, Adolescence, vol. 1, p. 131.

44. Ibid., pp. 234-235. For other discussions on the importance of the physical see Hall, "New Psychology," pp. 128, 249; Life and Confessions, pp. 418, 451; "Affiliations of Psychology with Philosophy," p. 298; Adolescence, vol. 1, chapter III; "Mental Science," Science 20(1904), pp. 481-490.

45. G. Stanley Hall, "What is to Become of Your Baby?" Cosmopolitan 47(1910), pp. 661-668; "Recent Progress in Child Study".

46. G. Stanley Hall, "The Ideal School Based on Child Study," Forum 32(1901), pp. 32-3.

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47. Hall encouraged play and dancing both as a means of acting out urges and as a motoric means for experiencing activities of modern man. Thus, dancing permitted rehearsal of racial activities and practice of social intercourse. "Play and Dancing for Adolescents," Independent 62(1907), pp. 355-358; Educational Problems, vol. 1 (New York: D. Appleton, 1911), chapter 2; "The Story of a Sand Pile," Scribner's 3(1888), pp. 690-696. Reprinted in G. Stanley and some of his pupils, Aspects of Child Care (Boston: Ginn, 1907); "Some Social Aspects of Education," Pedagogical Seminary 9(1902), pp. 81-91; "High School as College"; Adolescence, vol. 1, chapter III.
48. Hall, "Fall of Atlantis," p. 17.
49. Hall, "Fall of Atlantis," p. 31. Also see pp. 28-35.
50. Hall, Life and Confessions, p. 442. The notion of man-soul surfaces in many of his writings, regardless of the topic. See, for instance, "Rest and Fatigue"; "New Ideals of Motherhood"; "New Universal Religion"; "Some Aspects of the War," Address at Williston Seminary, Easthampton, Massachusetts, June 16, 1917; "Teaching the War," School and Society 1(1915), pp. 8-13; "Psychology and Industry"; "Education in Sex Hygiene," Eugenics Review 1(1910), pp. 242-253; "The Message of the Zeitgeist," Scientific Monthly 13(1921), pp. 105-116; "Viewpoint of the Psychologist".
51. Hall, "Fall of Atlantis," p. 34.
52. Ibid., p. 45.
53. Ibid., pp. 45-60.
54. G. Stanley Hall, "Influence of the Home upon the School," paper read at the Massachusetts Branch of the National Congress of Mothers and Parent-Teacher Associations. Excerpted in The Evening Post (Worcester), October 17, 1914; "Social Aspects of Education"; "New Ideals of Motherhood"; "Recent Progress in Child Study"; "Sex and Education Hygiene".
55. Hall, "Recent Progress in Child Study". Other articles stressed education of the instinctual and emotional. See "The Feelings and Their Education," Friends' Intelligencer 70(1913), pp. 771-772, 787-791; "Education of the Heart," Redlands Review Press 18(1909), pp. 31-38; "Child Training," The Woman's World 31(1915), pp. 31-32.

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56. Hall, "Ideal School"; "High School as College"; "Some Social Aspects of Education"; "A Central Pedagogical Library and Museum for Massachusetts," Pedagogical Seminary 12(1905), pp. 464-470; "Educational Reforms," Pedagogical Seminary 1(1891), pp. 1-12; "A Children's Institute," Harper's 120(1910), pp. 620-624; "High School as College"; Adolescence, vol. 2, Chapters 16 and 17; "Co-education in the High School," Proceedings of the National Education Association, 1903, pp. 446-460; "The Question of Co-education," The Munsey (1906); "Co-education," American Academy of Medicine Bulletin 7(1906), pp. 633-656.
57. Hall, "Fall of Atlantis," pp. 72, 74.
58. Ibid., p. 77.
59. Ibid., p. 80.
60. Hall, Life and Confessions, p. 424.
61. As early as 1883 Hall argued that theology could benefit from use of psychological findings. Later he contributed articles on the psychology of religion, devoted two chapters of Adolescence to the topic, and made a psychoanalytic study of the life of Jesus. "Theology and Education," The Nation, July 26, 1883; "The Genetic View of Berkeley's Religious Motivation," Journal of Religious Psychology 5(1912), pp. 137-162; Jesus the Christ in the Light of Psychology, 2 vols. (New York: Doubleday, Page, 1917).
62. Hall, "New Universal Religion."
63. Hall, "Fall of Atlantis," p. 100.
64. Ibid., pp. 99-109.
65. "New Ideals of Motherhood"; "Recent Progress in Child Study"; "Feelings and Their Education"; "Marriage and Fecundity of College Men and Women," Pedagogical Seminary 10(1903), pp. 275-314.
66. G. Stanley Hall, "Flapper Americana Novissima," Atlantic Monthly 129(1922), pp. 771-780.
67. Hall, Adolescence, vol. 2, pp. 610-611.

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68. Hall, Adolescence, vol. 2, pp. 617-647; "Flapper Novissima"; "Co-education in the High School," p. 446; "Co-education"; "Points of Difference Between Men and Women, Inherent and Acquired," Proceedings of the International Conference of Women Physicians 4(1919) pp. 90-99.
69. Hall believed that women in education contributed to the "feminization" of schools and that unmarried female teachers underbid their married male counterparts thus producing an economic inequality. "Question of Co-education;" "Some Dangers of our Educational System". He also thought that the higher education of women was exhausting and could "spoil a good mother to make a good grammarian." "New Ideals of Motherhood," p. 19. He also wrote to his son advising him not to marry a professional woman for these and other reasons. G. Stanley Hall to Robert G. Hall, May 2, 1913, G. Stanley Hall Papers.
70. Hall, "Fall of Atlantis," p. 58.
71. Ibid., p. 56.
72. Ibid., pp. 58, 80.
73. G. Stanley Hall, "The Story of Clark University," Worcester Magazine, 17(1914), p. 17. Also see "Contemporary University Problems," Pedagogical Seminary 21 (1914), pp. 242-255.
74. G. Stanley Hall, "How Can Universities be so Organized as to Stimulate More Work for the Advancement of Science?" Proceedings of the 18th Annual Conference of American Universities, 1916, pp. 25-38; "University Research," Pedagogical Seminary 24(1917), pp. 97-113.
75. Hall, "University Idea," p. 104. Also see "Message of Zeitgeist"; "Story of Clark"; "How Can a University"; "Contemporary University Problems".
76. Hall, "Message of Zeitgeist," pp. 112-223.
77. G. Stanley Hall, "Practical Relations between Psychology and the War," Journal of Applied Psychology 1(1917) pp. 9-16; "Practical Applications of Psychology as Developed by the War," Pedagogical Seminary 26(1919); pp. 76-89; "Editorial Forward," Journal of Applied Psychology 1(1917), pp. 5-7; "Point of View of the Psychologist"; Life and Confessions, pp. 437-438.

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78. Hall, Life and Confessions, p. 542.
79. Ibid., p. 546.
80. G. Stanley Hall, "The Age of Efficiency," Youth's Companion 84(1910), p. 639.
81. Hall, "Story of the Sand Box," p. 156.
82. G. Stanley Hall, "Nietzsche and the Doctrine of Force," Massachusetts Historical Society, 1914-15, pp. 176-184; "Message of Zeitgeist"; "Gospel of Magnanimity"; "Education of the Heart"; "Influence of the Home on School"; "Story of Clark"; "Some Aspects of the War".
83. G. Stanley Hall, "Psychological Notes on the War," Journal of Race Development 6(1915), pp. 357-369; Nixola Greeley Smith, "Have you got a Schizophrenia? A University President Has One and It's the Only Good Thing of the War," New York Evening World, July 10, 1916; anon., "G. Stanley Hall Calls Kaiser Unconquerable," The Boston Herald, August 27, 1914.
84. Hall, "Hall of Atlantis", p. 66.
85. Ibid., pp.
86. Hall, Life and Confessions, pp. 9-15. See also "Point of View of the Psychologist"; "Psychology and Industry".
87. Hall, Life and Confessions, pp. 447-451.
88. Ibid., pp. 15-16.
89. Ibid., pp. 437, 477. Also see "Point of View of the Psychologist"; "Psychology and Industry".
90. Hall, Life and Confessions, pp. 584-584; "The Chief End of Man," Current Literature 48(1910), pp. 528-531; "Salvaging Civilization," Century Magazine 104(1922), pp. 830-840; "The Gospel of Magnanimity," Pedagogical Seminary 30(1923), pp. 252-263; "Age of Efficiency"; "Message of Zeitgeist"; "Social Phases of Psychology"; "Mission Pedagogy"; "Psychological Notes on the War".
91. Hall, Life and Confessions, pp. 366-367.

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NOTES TO CHAPTER V

1. E.G. Boring, History of Experimental Psychology, 2nd ed. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1950), p. 465; William McDougall, "Autobiography," in A History of Psychology in Autobiography, vol. 1, ed. Carl Murchison (Worcester: Clark University Press, 1930), pp. 191-223. McDougall's appreciation for American culture is probably best represented in The American Nation: Its Problems and Psychology (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1926). American Nation was also published as The Indestructible Union: Rudiments of a Political Science for the American Citizen (Boston: Little, Brown, 1924).
2. Boring, History of Experimental Psychology, pp. 465, 717-718; Gardner Murphy, Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology, revised ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1949), pp. 442-443; R.S. Peters, ed. Brett's History of Psychology (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1962), p. 763.
3. Michael Wertheimer, A Brief History of Psychology (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1970), pp. 68, 75, 111; R.I. Watson, Great Psychologists, 3rd ed. (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1971); Peters, Brett's History, p. 763.
4. No evidence of any remaining manuscripts and personal papers has been found through correspondence with Harvard, Duke, and the Archives of the History of Psychology, Akron.
5. For example, see Eileen McIlwaine, "Knowledge in Human Instinct in the Psychology of William McDougall," (Ph.D. diss., University of Ottawa, 1968); N. Pastore, The Nature-Nurture Controversy (New York: King's Crown Press, 1949).
6. William McDougall, "The Island of Eugenia," Scribner's Magazine 70(1921), pp. 483-491. The article was reprinted in National Welfare and National Decay (London: Methuen, 1921) and Religion and the Sciences of Life (London: Methuen, 1934). References made in the present discussion will be from the article as presented in National Welfare and National Decay.
7. "Island of Eugenia," p. 18.
8. Ibid., p. 3.
9. McDougall, National Welfare, pp. 1-2.

Notes to Chapter V cont'd.

10. McDougall, Religion and Sciences, p. xi..
11. William McDougall, The Frontiers of Psychology (London: Nisbet, 1934); p. 15.
12. McDougall, "Autobiography," p. 221..
13. William McDougall, Physiological Psychology (London: J.M. Dent, 1905), p. 168. McDougall rarely referred to the "existent" as the "soul" after this time.
14. William McDougall, An Introduction to Social Psychology (London: Methuen, 1908). Even in his final book, McDougall admonished the "pontifical" attitude of scientists and their control over the public's knowledge of scientific ideas. See The Riddle of Life: A Survey of Theories (London: Methuen, 1938), esp. pp. ix-xi.
15. See Social Psychology, pp. 1-2; "Autobiography." McDougall's comments on the social influences of Freud's psychology are contained in "Some Social Effects of the Freudian Teachings," Appendix V in Psycho-analysis and Social Psychology (London: Methuen, 1936).
16. William McDougall, "The Apollonian and the Dionysian Theories of Man," reprinted in Religion and the Sciences, p. 50. McDougall argued that psychology was the key to solving numerous theoretical and epistemological problems including causality in science. For instance, see "Mechanism, Purpose, and the New Freedom," Philosophy 9(1934), pp. 5-18, reprinted in Religion and Sciences, p. 15.
17. William McDougall, Body and Mind: A History and Defense of Animism (New York: Macmillan, 1911), p. viii.
18. McDougall, Body and Mind; Psychology, The Study of Behavior (London: Williams and Norgate, 1912).
19. William McDougall, "Men or Robots? I", "Men or Robots? II", in Psychologies of 1925, ed. Carl Murchison (Worcester: Clark University Press, 1928), pp. 273-292, 293-308; "Purposive or Mechanical Psychology?" Psychological Review, 30(1923). pp. 273-288.
20. McDougall, Social Psychology, p. 168.

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21. McDougall distinguished his conception of instinct from those of other psychologists and adopted a threefold definition: "We may, then, define an instinct as an inherited or innate psycho-physical disposition which determines its possessor to perceive, and pay attention to, objects of a certain class, to experience an emotional excitement of a particular quality upon perceiving such an object, and to act in regard to it in a particular manner, or, at least, to experience an impulse to such action. Social Psychology, p. 30.
22. See his discussions on the priority of instincts and their relation to intelligence: "Instinct and Intelligence," British Journal of Psychology 3(1910), pp. 250-266; Psychology, Study of Behavior, esp. pp. 68-79; Social Psychology, pp. 20-46.
23. While McDougall labeled these the seven primary instincts he also mentioned others which play a less significant part: reproduction, gregariousness, acquisition and construction. See Social Psychology, pp. 47-92.
24. McDougall, Social Psychology, p. 4.
25. Ibid., p. 18.
26. See, for instance, William McDougall, Character and the Conduct of Life (London: Methuen, 1927); Modern Materialism and Emergent Evolution (New York: Van Nostrand, 1929); "Psychology, Disarmament and Peace," The North American Review 219(1924), pp. 577-591. Although it was to have a greater impact on the scientific community, McDougall claimed that his Social Psychology was intended for the public. "Autobiography," p. 208.
27. See William McDougall, "The Present Chaos in Psychology and the Way Out," Journal of Philosophical Studies 5(1930), pp. 353-363; "Prolegomena to Psychology," Psychological Review 29(1922), pp. 1-43; "Instinct and Intelligence"; "Apollonian and Dionysian".
28. William McDougall, The Group Mind: A Sketch of the Principles of Collective Psychology, With Some Attempt to Apply them to the Interpretation of National Life and Character (New York: Putnam, 1920). A less detailed case is presented in American Nation.

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29. William McDougall, "Our Neglect of Psychology," The Edinburgh Review 245(1927), pp 299-312; World Chaos: The Responsibility of Science (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1931); Outline of Psychology (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923); "Present Chaos"; "Prolegomena".
30. McDougall, Outline of Psychology, pp. 450-451; "Autobiography", p. 222.
31. William McDougall, "Mental Evolution," in Evolution in the Light Of Modern Knowledge: A Collective Work (London: Blackie and Son, 1925).
32. McDougall, Body and Mind, p. 257.
33. McDougall found numerous advantages of the Lamarckian hypothesis. It not only explained how mind directed its own evolution and did so teleologically, but it accounted for the appearance and success of mutations (mutations as an element of evolution became a popular concept after 1900), adaptability to environmental changes and, perhaps of most importance -- although not an essential point in explaining evolution -- was its moral value: "What belief could stimulate so powerfully to individual effort at self-improvement -- moral, intellectual, aesthetic, and body -- as the belief that every improvement we achieve in our own personalities will be in some measure, however slight, transmitted to our children and our children's children and by them perpetuated so long as the human race shall endure." "Was Darwin Wrong?" The Forum 79(1928), pp. 244-253. Reprinted in Religion and Sciences, pp. 184-185. On McDougall's criticisms of emergent evolution theories see Mental Evolution; Modern Materialism, pp. 237-264.
34. McDougall cautiously noted the inadequate evidence for the Lamarckian Hypothesis, warned against its hasty application, and held that it was "a question for experimental decision." "Was Darwin Wrong?", p. 179. He even suggested alternatives, particularly a Weismannian hypothesis "that the germ-plasm itself, or the reproductive cells, have enough of mental activity to produce the variations upon which all selective processes must be supposed to operate and without which they can produce no evolution." "Mental Evolution," p. 354. But as his own experiments (with inheritance of learning in rats) progressed, McDougall grew more confident of the validity of a Lamarckian theory. See

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34 cont'd.

for instance, "Preface," Religion and Sciences, p. ix; Psycho-analysis and Social Psychology, pp. 110-111. In addition to his positive experimental evidence, he found support in historical and sociological examples, leading him to a firm conclusion: "I submit that we have now such positive experimental evidence in support of the Lamarckian theory as justifies us in applying it to the interpretation of the problems of history and sociology." Frontiers of Psychology, p. 210. His Lamarckian experiments are reported in the following: "An Experiment for Testing of the Hypothesis of Lamarck," British Journal of Psychology 17(1926), pp. 267-304; "Second Report on a Lamarckian Experiment," British Journal of Psychology 20(1929), pp. 201-218; "Third Report of Lamarckian Experiments," British Journal of Psychology 24(1933), pp. 213-235; "Fourth Report on a Lamarckian Experiment," British Journal of Psychology 28(1938), pp. 321-345, 365-395.

35. See for example, a treatise aimed primarily at citing the advantages of his psychology: "The Hormic Psychology," in Psychologies of 1930, ed. Carl Murchison (Worcester: Clark University Press, 1930). Also see Modern Materialism, pp. 151-156.
36. McDougall, "Was Darwin Wrong?" in Religion and Sciences, p. 182.
37. William McDougall, "A Practicable Eugenic Suggestion," Sociological Papers 3(1907), pp. 55-80.
38. McDougall, Psychology, Study of Behavior, p. 170. See also Outline of Psychology, pp. 450-451; "Autobiography," pp. 222-223. His popular writings contained warnings against racial degeneration caused by higher breeding rates among the lower races. See especially, American Nation; National Welfare, World Chaos.
39. McDougall, "Was Darwin Wrong?" pp. 183-184.
40. William McDougall, "Family Allowances as a Eugenic Measure," Character and Personality 2(1933), pp. 99-116; "Whither America?" reprinted in Religion and Sciences (originally part of BBS presentation); National Welfare; World Chaos.

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41. McDougall, "Mechanism, Purpose and New Freedom," p. 15. On various occasions McDougall attributed this principle and his knowledge of it to William James whose works he read and whom he met early in his career. "Autobiography"; Frontiers of Psychology; Outline of Psychology, p. ix.
42. McDougall, Frontiers of Psychology, p. 15. He reiterates the connection between pragmatism and teleology in science in his final book, Riddle of Life, pp. 240-242.
43. McDougall, Outline of Psychology, p. 38. He stated these principles as early as his first text, Physiological Psychology, and reiterated them in his first general textbook on psychology, Psychology, Study of Behavior.
44. McDougall, Modern Materialism; Frontiers of Psychology.
45. McDougall, Frontiers of Psychology. While this work contains the most detailed account of the benefits of purposive psychology for scientists, it is also discussed in Social Psychology, pp. 1-19; "Philosophy and the Social Sciences," in Human Affairs, eds. R.B. Cattell, J. Cohen, and R.M.W. Travers (London: Macmillan, 1937), pp. 319-346.
46. McDougall, Social Psychology, pp. 1-6.
47. McDougall, Outline of Psychology, p. 1.
48. McDougall, Outline of Psychology, pp. 9-10. See also "Apollonian and Dionysian". McDougall frequently used the example of Münsterberg who he believed turned from mechanism to applied endeavors while still retaining a psychology of values.
49. McDougall, Psycho-analysis and Social Psychology, p. viii. Also see World Chaos, "Our Neglect of Psychology"; "Some Social Effects of Freudian Teachings". In his last book, The Riddle of Life, McDougall rephrases his psychological concepts and attempts explanation of "collective consciousness". Even in these revisions he views his theory as "ethically and religiously" advantageous "because it gives us a glimpse of an intelligible possibility of the continuance of the

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49. cont'd.

activity of each one of us beyond death of the body, and hence of the continuing influence of whatever of positive value in our personalities may have accrued from our individual efforts." p. 273.

50. McDougall held that the highest state of mental evolution pertained to these goals: "that is, striving regulated in the choice of goals and means by the desire to realize an ideal of character and conduct, a desire which itself springs from an instinctive disposition whose impulse is turned to higher uses by the subtle influences of organized society embodying a moreal tradition." Outline of Psychology, p. 449. He also held that hormic psychology was suited to this stage of evolution: "The hormic psychology alone offers an intelligible and consistent account of human valuations and at the same time offers to philosophy a scientific foundation in which freedom of the rational will of man, the power of creating real novelties, actual and ideal, and the power of self-development towards the ideal both of the individual and of the race, can find their proper place consistently with its fundamental postulates. It is thus the only foundation for a philosophy of meliorism." "Hormic Psychology," p. 29. Also see Psychology, Study of Behavior, p. 170; Frontiers of Psychology, Conduct of Life, pp. viii-ix; "Psychology, Disarmament and Peace".
51. McDougall, Religion and Sciences, Introduction.
52. McDougall, "Island of Eugenia," pp. 8-9.
53. McDougall; "Practicable Eugenic"; "Family Allowances"; National Welfare.
54. McDougall, National Welfare; World Chaos; American Nation; "Whither America?"; "The Functions of Endowed Universities of America," in Higher Education Faces the Future, ed. Paul Arthur Schlipp (New York: Horace Liveright, 1930).
55. McDougall, "Island of Eugenia," pp. 6-7.
56. McDougall, Group Mind, p. 301.
57. For a description of McDougall's belief in ideals as the highest stage of evolution of mind, see note 49. Such ideals were thought to guide international and national progress. See American Nation; Group Mind.

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58. See Group Mind, especially final two chapters.
59. McDougall, "Island of Eugenia," pp. 14, 16-17, 19.
60. For instance, McDougall credited the flourishing of certain civilizations in part to their agreeable climate. Group Mind; American Nation. In his Social Psychology he stated that a significant psychological advance surrounds "the increasing recognition of the extent to which the adult human mind is the product of the moulding influence exerted by the social environment...."
61. McDougall, "Island of Eugenia," pp. 5-6.
62. Ibid., pp. 24-25.
63. Ibid., p. 25.
64. McDougall, World Chaos, p. 69.
65. Of the last topic, there is no more explicit example than is contained in World Chaos. See also Janus: The Conquest of War, A Psychological Inquiry (New York: E.R. Dutton, 1927).
66. McDougall, "Practicable Eugenia"; World Chaos; Character and Conduct; "Autobiography".
67. McDougall, American Nation, p. 39. Also see pp. 227-228.
68. McDougall, Character and Conduct.
69. McDougall, "Philosophy and Social Sciences," p. 342.
70. McDougall, Religion and Sciences, pp. x-xi.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VI

1. Arthur Lovejoy to Hugo Münsterberg, 1909 (no other date), p. 6. Hugo Münsterberg Papers, Boston Public Library.
2. The reactions to Münsterberg's personality and research at various points of his career are discussed in Matthew Hale, Jr. "Psychology and Social Order: An Intellectual Biography of Hugo Münsterberg," (Ph.D. diss., University of Maryland, 1977).
3. Throughout Münsterberg's papers there can be found letters from American psychologists in appreciation of his work. For instance, Mary Calkins wrote him that "I have long considered your conception of psychology as distinctly epochmaking in the development of the science..." Mary Calkins to Hugo Münsterberg, January 11, 1901, Münsterberg Papers. A letter from Cattell was similar in attitude. See James McKeen Cattell to Münsterberg, March 18, 1914.
4. R.I. Watson, The Great Psychologists, 3rd ed. (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1971), pp. 359, 361, 394; E.G. Boring, A History of Experimental Psychology, 2nd ed. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1950), pp. 427-429.
5. R.S. Peters, ed., Brett's History of Psychology (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1962), pp. 657-660; W.B. Pillsbury, The History of Psychology (New York: W.W. Norton, 1929), pp. 248-251.
6. J.C. Flugel and D.J. West, A Hundred Years of Psychology, 1833-1933 (London: Duckworth, 1964), p. 179; Watson, Great Psychologists, p. 361.
7. David P. Kuna, "The Psychology of Advertising, 1896-1916," (Ph.D. diss., University of New Hampshire, 1976). Merle J. Moscovitz, "Hugo Münsterberg: A Study in the History of Applied Psychology," American Psychologist 32(1977), pp. 824-842; Richard Griffith, "Forward," The Film, A Psychological Study, by Hugo Münsterberg (New York: Dover, 1970).
8. Bruce Kuklick, The Rise of American Philosophy (New Haven: Yale University Press; 1977), esp. pp. 196-214.
9. Hale, "Psychology and Social Order."
10. Ibid., p. 10.

Notes to Chapter VI cont'd.

11. Hugo Münsterberg, Tomorrow, Letters to a Friend in Germany (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1916), p. 2.
12. Ibid., pp. 6, 26.
13. Ibid., pp. 267-268.
14. Hugo Münsterberg, Psychology, General and Applied (New York: D. Appleton, 1914), pp. 9-10.
15. Hale, "Psychology and Social Order," pp. 45-48.
16. Ibid., pp. 83-89.
17. Boring, History of Experimental Psychology, p. 428.
18. Ibid.
19. Hugo Münsterberg, "Psychology and Life" in Psychology and Life (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1899), p. 8. This article is reprinted from "Psychology and the Real Life," Atlantic Monthly 81(1898), pp. 602-43. References will refer to the later publication.
20. Ibid., p. 13.
21. Hugo Münsterberg, "The Subconscious," in Subconscious Phenomena ed. by Hugo Münsterberg, Theodore Ribot, Pierre Janet, Joseph Jastrow, Bernard Hart and Morton Prince (Boston: Richard G. Badger, 1910), p. 26.
22. Münsterberg, Psychology, General and Applied, p. 56.
23. Ibid., p. 14.
24. Münsterberg often dictated the limitations of experimental psychology and the concordant restrictions of its practitioners. See, for instance, "Psychology and Life," p. 18; Psychology, General and Applied, pp. 9-10; "Subconscious," pp. 30-31; "Psychology and History," in Psychology and Life, reprinted from Psychological Review 6(1899), pp. 1-31.
25. Münsterberg, Psychology, General and Applied, p. 297.
26. Ibid., p. 303.
27. Ibid., pp. 303-306.

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28. Ibid., pp. 308-309.
29. Münsterberg, "Psychology and History," pp. 179-180.
Also see "Psychology and Mysticism," in Psychology and Life, reprinted from Atlantic Monthly 83(1899), pp. 67-85.
30. Hugo Münsterberg, "The Opponents of Eternal Values," Psychological Bulletin 6(1909), p. 337.
31. Münsterberg, "Psychology and Life," p. 27.
32. Ibid., p. 28.
33. Hugo Münsterberg, Science and Idealism (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1906), p. 40.
34. Münsterberg stated the values as follows: "The objects of the scientific judgments are without value, but the scientific judgments themselves are affirmation of value. Thus the simple fact of a scientific statement proves that reality is more than a system of natural objects. The question whether there exist real values is therefore in no way denied so long as we have only found that there are no values in the system of physical and psychical objects. Those systems have resulted from the reconstructing thought of the scientist who thinks the world without value for the purpose of thinking it in causal connection; but this work itself moves in a reality which logically precedes the reconstructing system, and in which the thinking itself demonstrates the relation to values as it aims towards the value of truth." The Eternal Values (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1911), p. 23.
35. See Hugo Münsterberg, "The Scientific Plan of the Congress," in Congress of Arts and Science, Universal Exposition, St. Louis, 1904, vol. 1, ed. by Howard J. Rogers (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1905-1907); "The Position of Psychology in the System of Knowledge," Psychological Monographs 4(1903), pp. 641-654; Vocation and Learning (St. Louis: The Peoples University, 1912); "Psychology and History."
36. Münsterberg, "Scientific Plan," p. 95.
37. Münsterberg, Science and Idealism, pp. 46-47. Münsterberg recognized personal joy but only as it was viewed as one aspect of an impersonal, over-individual value

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37 cont'd.

of happiness. Therefore, he was highly critical of utilitarian models of both personal pleasure and social benefits. See Hugo Münsterberg, "Happiness is More than Pleasure," The Independent, July 4, 1907, pp. 19-20; Vocation and Learning.

38. Münsterberg, Psychology, General and Applied, pp. 345-346.

39. See Hugo Münsterberg, "Naïve Psychology," Atlantic Monthly 112(1913), pp. 802-812; "The Fear of Nerves," in American Problems, From the Standpoint of a Psychologist (New York: Yard, 1910), pp. 1-24.

40. Hugo Münsterberg, Psychology and Industrial Efficiency (New York: Houghton, Miffling and Company, 1913), p. 15.

41. Ibid., p. 6.

42. Münsterberg, Psychology, General and Applied, p. 17. The notion that combining theory and practice contributed to a synthetic unity was present in other writings; see, for instance, "Psychology and Education," Educational Review 16(1898), pp. 105-132.

43. The major works addressing these topics include Psychotherapy (New York: Moffat, Yard and Co., 1909); Psychology and Social Sanity (New York: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1914); On the Witness Stand: Essays on Psychology and Crime (New York: McClure Company, 1908); Psychology and the Teacher (New York: D. Appleton, 1909); Psychology and Industrial Efficiency.

44. A number of essays on these issues were reprinted in two volumes: American Problems and Psychology and Social Sanity. Others include "The College and the Household Sciences," Good Housekeeping 56(1913), pp. 40-38; "Finding a Life's Work," McClure's Magazine 34(1910), pp. 398-403; "The German Woman," Atlantic Monthly (1912), pp. 457-467; "Nothing but the Truth," McClure's Magazine 29(1907), pp. 532-536; "The Prevention of Crime," McClure's Magazine 30(1908), pp. 750-756; "Psychology and the Navy," North American Review 197(1930), pp. 159-180.

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45. Hugo Münsterberg, "The Danger from Experimental Psychology," Atlantic Monthly 81(1898), pp. 159-167. In addition to a lecture presented in 1895, this article provoked considerable criticism, enough to warrant a reply from Münsterberg: "The Teacher and the Laboratory: A Reply," Atlantic Monthly 81(1898), pp. 824-829.
46. For instance, see Psychology, General and Applied, pp. 346-348.
47. Münsterberg, Scientific Plan, p. 121.
48. Münsterberg, Vocation and Learning, p. 123.
49. Münsterberg, "Psychology and Education."
50. Münsterberg, Psychology and Industrial Efficiency, p. 244.
51. Münsterberg, Psychotherapy; On the Witness Stand; "Nothing but the Truth"; Vocation and Learning. In 1913 Münsterberg wrote President Wilson that "the establishment of a governmental bureau is needed".... "Just as experimental stations for the improvement of industrial conditions, for the testing and distribution of the individuals and for the scientific advising of legislative bodies and manufacturers' associations could secure for the national workshop a gigantic step forward." Münsterberg claimed that such stations would comprise "one of the most promising means to solve the problems which face our whole time and your progressive administration." Münsterberg to Wilson, March 26, 1913, Münsterberg Papers. In return Wilson advised Münsterberg to negotiate with the Secretary of Labor concerning establishment of such plans. Münsterberg to Wilson, April 5, 1913. Münsterberg's hopes for the effects of a bureau is explicitly stated in Psychology and Industrial Efficiency: "The ideal solution for the United States would be a government bureau for applied psychology, with special reference to the psychology of commerce and industry, similar to the model agricultural stations all over the land under the Department of Agriculture." p. 306. Other suggestions for similar experimental laboratories were made in "Choice of a Career," in American Problems, p. 42; "Efficiency of the Farm," in Psychology and Social Sanity, pp. 220-222.

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52. Münsterberg, "The Choice of a Vocation," in American Problems, p. 43. Through advocacy of social agencies and the use of experts Münsterberg gave society certain responsibilities. These suggestions resulted from his belief that "In the complexity of modern life, with its gigantic technical achievements, the whole can never come to its own without a powerful organization. This belief in the efficiency of organization in the interest of modern Germany. It has transformed the commercial life, it has molded the social movements, and it has finally begun to change the attitude of the individuals toward society." "The Germany of To-day," North American Review 195(1912), p. 200; Psychotherapy, pp. 8, 62, 395. Münsterberg presented numerous criticisms of individualist and utilitarian philosophies which value individual or group pleasure based on material conditions rather than a higher pleasure in striving for absolute ideals. See Vocation and Learning; "Happiness is More".
53. Münsterberg, "Standing of Scholarship," p. 65. Münsterberg often repeated that "The positivistic period of natural science has ebbed for ten or fifteen years; an idealistic one is rising." "Emerson Hall," Harvard Psychological Studies 2(1906), p. 21. His statements were sometimes accompanied by a historical summary of idealism's ascendancy and general forecasts of its future. Also see The Americans; "College and the Household"; "Germany of Today".
54. Münsterberg, Tomorrow, p. 6.
55. Ibid., p. 35.
56. Ibid., p. 38.
57. Ibid., p. 108.
58. Ibid., p. 118.
59. Ibid., pp. 224-242.
60. See note 52.
61. See, for instance, American Traits From the Point of View of a German (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1901); "Germans at School," Popular Science Monthly 79(1911), pp. 602-611.

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62. Münsterberg stressed the obligation to the group over individual desires. This position was consistent with his criticisms of utilitarian thought as well as his beliefs in absolute knowledge and the ideals of social unity. This obligation even held for the psychologist: "The economic experimental psychology offers no more inspiring idea that this adjustment of work and psyche by which mental dissatisfaction in the work, mental depression and discouragement, may be replaced in our social community by overflowing joy and perfect inner harmony." Psychology and Industrial Efficiency, p. 308. (For the place of obligation in ascertaining mental health see note 80).
63. For extended discussions of values see Eternal Values; Vocation and Learning; Idealism and Science.
64. Münsterberg, Tomorrow, pp. 25-26.
65. Ibid., p. 177.
66. Ibid., p. 111.
67. Ibid., p. 117.
68. Ibid., pp. 153-154.
69. Ibid., pp. 228-232.
70. Münsterberg, "The Germany of To-day," North American Review 195(1912), p. 189.
71. Münsterberg, American Traits.
72. Hugo Münsterberg, "Emperor William, The Man," Everybody's Magazine, 31(1914), pp. 513-515; "German Woman"; "Germany To-day"; "Germans at School."
73. Hugo Münsterberg, "The Impeachment of German-Americans," New York Times, September 19, 1915; "International Understanding," Cosmopolitan Student 5(1914), pp. 135-37; The War and America (New York: D. Appleton, 1914); The Peace and America (New York: D. Appleton, 1915); Hugo Münsterberg to William Peterson, President of McGill University, November 3, 1914, Münsterberg Pamphlets, Harvard University, reprinted from McGill Daily.
74. Münsterberg to President Wilson, March 27, 1916, Münsterberg Papers.

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75. Münsterberg, American Traits, pp. vi-vii.
76. Münsterberg, The Americans; Germany To-day.
77. Münsterberg cites intemperance, the rapid growth of divorce, the aspirations for luxury and ostentation, nervous diseases, sexual degeneration, and immorality and the breakdown of the family as social ramifications of individualism and lack of self-control. See The Americans; "Fear of Nerves"; American Problems. Poor educational facilities disregard for the expert and lack of social organizations posed further threats to America's growth. See "Choice of a Vocation"; "Standing of Scholarship"; "The Intemperance of Woman," in American Problems; "The Mind of the Jurymen with a Sidelight on Women as Jurors," Century Illustrated Monthly Magazine 86(1913), pp. 711-716; "The Third Degree," McClure's Magazine 29(1907), pp. 614-622; "The Intellectual Underworld," International 7(1913), pp. 349-352; "Prevention of Crime."
78. These measures are discussed in "Psychology and Social Order," Hale, pp. 185-220.
79. Münsterberg, Vocation and Learning, pp. 260-1.
80. In discussing the psychology of the healthy individual Münsterberg wrote that "Freedom of our real life means that we must know ourselves in the midst of our life work as guided by aims and obligations and that in this purposive existence of ourselves we do not feel ourselves as determined by causes." In other words, "The only real test of health is the serviceableness to the needs of life." Psychotherapy, pp. 51, 76. According to Münsterberg, such obligations and service require control of the will. He described the imaginary nervous diseases sweeping over the country and recommended that "we need more training in self-discipline, in continuous effort, in voluntary attention, and in thoroughness; ...The improvement must come from within. The fault is in ourselves, in our prejudices, in our training, in our habits, and in our fanciful fear of nervousness." "Fear of Nerves," p. 21. For example, Münsterberg's insistence of self-control was the basis for his rejection of prohibition: "Prohibition removes every temptation. Hence it has no educative influence whatever. To learn to be moderate involves the development of will power which is beneficial in every walk of life. Only cowards who have no trust in their own will prefer to be removed from every temptation." "Prohibition and Temperance," in American Problems, p. 99.

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81. Hugh Richardson to Münsterberg, July 10, 1915, Harvard University Archives.
82. Münsterberg to George Sarton, December 8, 1916, Münsterberg Papers.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VII

1. Quoted in Robert S. Woodworth, Contemporary Schools of Psychology rev. ed. (New York: The Ronald Press, 1948), p. 93.
2. W.B. Pillsbury, The History of Psychology (New York: W.W. Norton, 1929), p. 292; R.I. Watson, Great Psychologists, 3rd ed. (New York: J.P. Lippincott, 1971), p. 431; E.G. Boring, History of Experimental Psychology, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1950), p. 644.
3. Boring, History of Experimental Psychology, p. 622.
4. Pillsbury, History of Psychology, pp. 292-297; Watson, Great Psychologists, pp. 417-443; Gardner Murphy, Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology rev. ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1949), p. 261.
5. Paul G. Creelan has suggested that Watson's behavioral science is permeated with religious symbolism, such as his association of the behavior scientists with the Covenant of God. Creelan has attempted to trace this interpenetration of religious ideals to Watson's personal background. "Puritanism and the Rise of American Psychology," (Ph.D. dissertation., University of Chicago, 1978), pp. 152-194). David Bakan, however, has described Watson's psychology as an attempt to divest behavior of any religious explanations. "Behaviorism and American Urbanization," Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 2(1966), pp. 5-28.
6. See Lucille Birnbaum, "Behaviorism in the 1920's," American Quarterly, pp. 15-33; "Behaviorism: John Broadus Watson and American Social Thought, 1913-1933," (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkely, 1964). John C. Burnham, "The New Psychology: From Narcissism to Social Control," in Change and Continuity in Twentieth-Century America: The 1920's, eds. John Braeman, Robert H. Bremner, and David Brody (Columbus: Ohio State University, 1968), pp. 351-398.
7. See Brian D. MacKenzie, Behaviourism and the Limits of Scientific Method (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1977); Franz Samelson, "Reactions to Watson's Behaviorism, Part 2: Some Puzzles and Some Answers," paper presented at the annual meetings of Cheiron, Akron, 1979; John Chynoweth Burnham has described how American society of the 1920's was particularly receptive to the notion of scientific control. "Psychiatry, Psychology and the Progressive Movement," American Quarterly, 12(1960), pp. 457-465. This trend has been discussed in Chapter 1.

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8. John B. Watson, "Should a Child Have More than One Mother?" Liberty, July 29, 1929, pp. 31-35. Watson entered the article in his bibliography in The Psychological Register (1932), as "Utopia." The draft of the article, with editorial corrections, has the title "A Behaviorist's Utopia." Cedric A. Larson presented me with this draft manuscript.
9. Watson, "Should a Child," p. 33.
10. Ibid., p. 32.
11. Ibid., p. 33.
12. Ibid., p. 35.
13. John B. Watson, "An Attempted Formulation of the Scope of Behavior Psychology," Psychological Review 24(1917), p. 329.
14. Probably his most extensive critique is contained in his 1913 article. See "Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It," Psychological Review 20(1913), pp. 158-177.
15. John B. Watson, "The Place of the Conditioned-Reflex in Psychology," Psychological Review 23(1916), p. 90.
16. According to Watson the "essential contention of the behaviorist" was as follows: "the world of the physicist, the biologist, and the psychologist is the same, a world consisting of objects -- their interests center around different objects, to be sure, but the method of observation of these objects is not essentially different in the three branches of science." "Image and Affection in Behavior," Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 10(1913), p. 427.
17. These points are suggested in numerous writings before his 1913 decree. Among these writings, a 1910 article in Harper's magazine summarizes the points. "The New Science of Animal Behavior," Harper's 120(1910), pp. 346-353.
18. Watson, "New Science," p. 353.
19. Watson, "Psychology as the Behaviorist Views it."

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20. Ibid. In this paper he also amended his argument about studying animal behavior. In earlier articles he took what can be called a "continuity" position stating that studying behavior of infra-humans will provide knowledge of human behavior since the differences between species' behavior are of degree and not of kind. However, in 1913 he described the investigation of animal behavior as valuable "in and for themselves, without reference to the behavior of man." P. 177.
21. Watson, "Image and Affection," p. 428.
22. Ibid., p. 428.
23. Watson, "Attempted Formulation of the Scope," p. 336.
24. See John B. Watson, Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist 3rd ed., rev. (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1929/1919), esp. pp. 14-15; "Attempted Formulation of the Scope," p. 342.
25. Watson, Psychology from the Standpoint.
26. Ibid., pp. 225, 263.
27. Ibid. See also, John B. Watson, "Practical and Theoretical Problems in Instinct and Habits," in H.S. Jennings, John B. Watson, Adolf Meyer, and William I. Thomas, Suggestions of Modern Science Concerning Education (New York: Macmillan, 1920).
28. Ibid., p. 301.
29. Watson, "Place of Conditioned-Reflex."
30. John B. Watson and R. Rayner, "Conditional Emotional Reactions," Journal of Experimental Psychology 3(1920), pp. 1-14; John B. Watson and R.R. Watson, "Studies in Infant Psychology," Scientific Monthly 13(1921), pp. 493-515.
31. John B. Watson, "Behavior and the Concept of Mental Disease," Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 13(1916), pp. 589-596. See also John B. Watson and J.J.B. Morgan, "Emotional Reactions and Psychological Experimentation," American Journal of Psychology 28(1917), pp. 163-175.

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32. John B. Watson, "Does Holt Follow Freud?" Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 14 (1917), pp. 85-93.
33. John B. Watson, "Is Thinking Merely the Action of Language Mechanisms?" British Journal of Psychology, 11(1920), pp. 87-104; "The Place of Kinaesthetic, Visceral and Laryngeal Organization in Thinking," Psychological Review 34(1927), pp. 339-348; "The Unconscious of the Behaviorist," in The Unconscious: A Symposium ed. E.S. Drummer (New York: Knopf, 1928).
34. For instance, see John B. Watson, "What the Nursery Has to Say About Instincts," in Psychologies of 1925, ed. Carl Murchison (Worcester: Clark University Press, 1928).
35. John B. Watson, "Instinctive Activity in Animals," Harper's 124(1912), p. 396; "Recent Experiments on How We Lose and Change our Emotional Equipment," in Psychologies of 1925, ed. Murchison, p. 81; The Ways of Behaviorism (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1928), pp. 10-16, 75.
36. John B. Watson, Behaviorism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1924), pp. 39, 99; Ways of Behaviorism, pp. 25-26; Psychology from the Standpoint, p. 224; "What the Nursery," pp. 9-10.
37. In an article on their Albert experiment, Watson and Watson reported that "We believe that by the end of the second year the pattern of the future individual is already laid down." "Studies in Infant Psychology," p. 494. Also see Watson, Ways of Behaviorism, p. 101; Psychological Care of Infant and Child (New York: W.W. Norton, 1928), pp. 8, 45; "What About Your Child?" Gosmopolitan 85(1928), pp. 77, 108, 110, 112.
38. See Watson, "New Science of Animal Behavior"; "Instinctive Activity in Animals."
39. Watson, "Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It," p. 168.
40. Watson, "Attempted Formulation of the Scope."
41. Ibid., p. 329.
42. Ibid., p. 330.

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43. Ibid., p. 329.
44. This refrain from taking on the responsibilities of implementation was mentioned by Watson on several occasions. For instance, he wrote that "It is not the behaviorist's business to say what is good for society. Society must make up its mind what it wants its members to be and do; then it's up to the behaviorist to find the methods and technique that will bring up the child in the way it should grow." Ways of Behaviorism, pp. 60-1. This position was also stated in "Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It"; "Attempted Formulation of the Scope"; Behaviorism; "Practical and Theoretical Problems," p. 54-55.
45. At times his attitude toward this problem was extremely pessimistic. On the current methods of social change he wrote the following: "In trying to arrange these situations, society often works as blindly and as haphazardly as does the infra-human animal. Indeed if one were to characterize social experimentation in general during the past 2000 years one would have to call it precipitous, infantile, unplanned, and say that when planned it is always in the interest of some nation, political group, sect or individual, rather than under the guidance of social scientists -- assuming their existence." Behaviorism, p. 44. See also Behaviorism, p. 182; Ways of Behaviorism, p. 63. These critical conditions were sometimes viewed as corrigible if behaviorism was employed. He wrote that "The behaviorist believes that only systematic, long-sustained, genetic studies upon the human species begun in infancy and continued until past adolescence, will ever give us this experimental control over human conduct so badly needed both for general social control and growth and for individual happiness." Psychology from the Standpoint, p. 8.
46. At the conclusion of Psychological Care of the Infant and Child Watson stated that "There is no ideal system of civilization." pp. 184-185. This was consistent with his other statements on the necessity for psychologists to refrain from issues of morals, values or ideals (see note 44). However, at other times he advocated behaviorist goals and "morals." See, for instance, "The Weakness of Women," Nation 125(1927), pp. 9-10.
47. Watson, "Recent Experiments," p. 74.

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48. Watson, "Does Holt Follow Freud?"; Behaviorism, pp. 47, 303-4; "Recent Experiments," pp. 70-71.
49. His statement to this effect includes clarification of his multiple uses of the term "control": "The behaviorist believes that only systematic, long-sustained, genetic studies upon the human species begun in infancy and continued past adolescence, will ever give us this experimental control over human conduct so badly needed both for general social control and growth and for individual happiness." Psychology from the Standpoint, p. 8.
50. Watson, Behaviorism, p. 44; Psychology from the Standpoint, pp. 5-8.
51. Watson, "What the Nursery," p. 10.
52. Watson, Behaviorism, p. 214. He also introduced the idea of a "great reconditioning laboratory" for adults in Ways of Behaviorism, p. 138. See also "It's Your Own Fault," Collier's pp. 29, 34.
53. Watson, "Unconscious of the Behaviorist," pp. 104-105; In one article, Watson described just how such an experimental nursery would operate. Here he made it clear that such an experiment was not an end in itself: "With the enormous data and with the improved methods which we should get from this experimental nursery, we would be in a position to shape the establishment of infant laboratories in every important educational institution in the country and certainly in the public school systems of our large cities. See "Practical and Theoretical Problems," pp. 77-81.
54. Watson and Watson, "Studies in Infant Psychology," p. 515.
55. John B. Watson, "John Broadus Watson," in A History of Psychology in Autobiography vol. 3, ed. Carl Murchison (Worcester: Clark University, 1936), p. 281.
56. Watson, "Should a Child," p. 32.
57. Ibid., p. 32.
58. Ibid., p. 32.
59. Ibid., pp. 35, 33, 34.

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60. Ibid., p. 34.
61. Watson, "A Behaviorist's Utopia," p. 10. An editorial comment attached to this page may have been heeded because this reference to artists was absent from the published article. Thus, the editorial comment deserves repeating: "Aren't the poets, artists and writers prime forces in re-conditioning people, doing on a large scale what your consultory psychologist does on a small scale? Men like Wells and Shaw have re-conditioned a large part of the world in its attitude to many subjects. They are mass-psychologists."
62. Watson, Behaviorism, pp. 41-43; Ways of Behaviorism, pp. 86-87, 157-159; "Weakness of Women"; "Men Won't Marry Fifty Years from Now," Cosmopolitan 86 (1929), pp. 71, 104, 106.
63. See Watson, Behaviorism, pp. 182, 303-304; "Recent Experiments," p. 74.
64. Watson often commented on the importance of the medical practitioner, suggested that someday the behaviorist might be on equal footing, and once used "Johns Hopkins Hospital" as an example of a wishful Freudian slip which he could possibly make. For the example of the wishful slip see John B. Watson, "The Psychology of Wish Fulfillment," Scientific Monthly 3(1916), p. 482. For other discussions about physicians see Behaviorism, pp. 297, 301; Attempted Formulation of the Scope, pp. 550-551; Ways of Behaviorism, p. 108.
65. Birth information was recorded in hospitals "so that parenthood can be established if later research problems demand it." Watson, "Should a Child," p. 33.
66. Watson, "Should a Child," p. 32.
67. Ibid., p. 34.
68. Ibid., pp. 34-35.
69. Ibid., p. 35. In the unpublished draft contained a fairly extreme statement about involvement in activity which was omitted from the published form: "They were absorbed in their activity. They literally were what they were doing. Automobiles passed in the street, people went to and fro -- nothing was seen or heard by them." "A Behaviorist's Utopia," p. 16.

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70. Watson, "Should a Child," p. 32.
71. Ibid., p. 33. Watson defined "invalidism" here as "a device by which a lazy, whining, complaining child or adult can control the behavior of others with profit to himself."
72. These techniques included originating the utopia with good stocks of healthy individuals and practicing euthanasia when an unfit infant was born or insanity developed.
73. Watson, "Should a Child," p. 33.
74. Ibid., p. 35.
75. Watson and Watson, "Studies in Infant Psychology"; Watson and Rayner, "Conditioned Emotional Reactions"; Watson, "Behavior and Mental Disease."
76. Watson, "Unconscious of the Behaviorist," p. 100.
77. For descriptions of the child and adult troubled by mother fixation see Watson, Psychological Care, pp. 69-81; Behaviorism, pp. 294-295.
78. Watson, "Recent Experiments," pp. 69-70; Psychological Care, pp. 84, 108, 122; Watson and Watson, "Studies in Infant Psychology," p. 514.
79. Watson, "Recent Experiments," p. 71; Behaviorism, pp. 183-186; Ways of Behaviorism, p. 1.
80. For instance, in the conclusion to Behaviorism, Watson suggested the goals of behaviorism: "Behaviorism ought to be a science that prepares men and women for understanding the principles of their own behavior. It ought to make men and women eager to rearrange their own lives, and especially eager to prepare themselves to bring up their own children in a healthy way. I wish I could picture for you what a rich and wonderful individual we should make of every health child if only we could let it shape itself properly and then provide for it a universe in which it could exercise that organization -- a universe unshackled by legendary folklore of happenings thousands of years ago: unhampered by disgraceful political history; free of foolish customs and conventions which have no significance in themselves, yet which hem the individual in like taut steel bands." p. 303. See also, Watson, Psychological

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80 cont'd.

Care, pp. 9-10, 150; "Weakness of Women," pp. 9-10; Psychology as the Standpoint, pp. 8, 111.

81. Watson, Psychology as the Standpoint, p. 259.

82. For instance, see Watson, "Weakness of Women," pp. 9-10; Behaviorism, pp. 303-304; Ways of Behaviorism, pp. 112-113.

83. Watson, "Should a Child," p. 32.

84. Watson contrasted the married women's concern for personal grooming with that of married men: "Their wives look ten years older than they do, ten times tired, ten times more lifeless, ten times fatter. Watch the theatre exits some night -- see the handsome well-set-up men, then look at their wives -- fat, waddling, fatuous. Go down into the working centers. The men are browned, sinewy, hard, lean; the women fat and wabbly," "Men Won't Marry," p. 71.

85. Watson, "Weakness of Women," p. 10.

86. Watson, "Men Won't Marry," p. 104.

87. Watson, "Should a Child," p. 31.

88. Watson and Watson, "Studies in Infant Psychology," p. 514.

89. For instance see Watson, Psychological Care; Behaviorism, pp. 292-295; Psychology from the Standpoint, pp. 260-262, 445-450.

90. Watson, Ways of Behaviorism, pp. 128-131; "It's Your Own Fault"; Psychology From the Standpoint, pp. 436-442.

91. Watson, Behaviorism, pp. 41-44; Psychology from the Standpoint; "Attempted Formulation of the Scope."

92. Watson, Psychology from the Standpoint, pp. 16-17, 258-259; Behaviorism, pp. 44-47.

93. Watson, "Recent Experiments," pp. 62-66.

94. Watson, "Unconscious of the Behaviorist," p. 113.

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95. Watson, Behaviorism, p. 47.
96. Watson and Morgan, "Emotional Reactions," p. 173.
For comments on behaviorist training for the home
and mother see Watson, "Unconscious of the Behavior-
ist," pp. 99-100; Psychological Care, pp. 12, 106;
"What about Your Child," p. 108.
97. Watson, Behaviorism, pp. 297, 302; Ways of Behaviorism,
"Unconscious of the Behaviorist," pp. 104-106. He
also prescribed specialists in the school system:
"Students of psychology" who were trained in experi-
mental psychology and psychopathology. See "Practi-
cal and Theoretical Problems," pp. 75-76.
98. Watson, Behaviorism, p. 297.
99. Watson, "Should a Child," p. 31.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VIII

1. Edna Heidbreder, Seven Psychologies (New York: The Century Co., 1933). - Textbooks on the history of psychology frequently use the notions of "systems" and "schools" to describe psychology in the teens and the twenties. See, for instance, Robert S. Woodworth, Contemporary Schools of Psychology, rev. ed. (New York: The Ronald Press, 1948); Duane Schultz, A History of Modern Psychology, 2nd ed. (New York: Academic Press, 1975); David L. Krantz, ed., Schools of Psychology: A Symposium (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969).

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