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**TOWARDS A CRITICAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE FOUNDATIONS
OF HEIDEGGER'S CONCEPT OF FREEDOM
IN *BEING AND TIME***

by

JOHN PIERLOT, B.A.

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Department of Philosophy

**Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario
August 27, 1991**

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submitted by John Francis Joseph Pierlot, B.A.

in partial fulfilment of the requirements for

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Thesis Supervisor

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16th September, 1991

ABSTRACT

This thesis argues that, for Heidegger, freedom means possibilities which are at once a condition of reality generally, and of human reality more specifically. It is also argued that Heidegger's concept of freedom is, though insightful, also highly problematic. The insights concern the way Heidegger manages to describe freedom as a function of an authentic manifestation of care such that freedom is integral to the reality of human being in a human world. The problems obtain from the fact that Heidegger's conception of freedom is grounded on a notion of human authenticity so exclusively relative to a very vague conception of Being, and so intimately tied to a permanent, individualizing kind of anxiety, that freedom no longer has any bearing on practical reality. Finally, it is shown how Heidegger might be modified, with insights borrowed from Martin Buber's position on authenticity and freedom, such that his insights are preserved without the burden of his rather serious oversights.

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*--But most of all to my dear wife Mary,
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General Introduction

The purpose of this thesis is to 1) extract and 2) critically evaluate, Heidegger's concept of freedom as it appears in his early work, *Being and Time*. Consonant with this project I argue that Heidegger is insightful insofar as he successfully manages to describe freedom in terms of possibilities which, though they apply specifically to the human, are nevertheless integral to the most encompassing meaning of the term reality. Despite the fact that Heidegger's concept of freedom is insightful in this regard, however, I also argue that it is seriously problematic, primarily because the discovery of freedom depends, for Heidegger, on the achievement of a kind of human authenticity that is so exclusively relative to a very vague conception of Being, and so intimately a function of a permanent, individualizing kind of anxiety, that freedom no longer has any bearing on the practical reality as we know it of human being in a human world.

I am interested in Heidegger's concept of freedom because it provides a good way to come to an understanding of what Heidegger has to say about the reality of human being in a human world. I choose *Being and Time* as my main reference to this topic because it contains the foundational material to which Heidegger himself continually refers when discussing the topic of freedom and the reality of human being in a human world in other, later works. In order to justify this point I do,

therefore, include consideration of some of the work Heidegger did on these issues subsequent to *Being and Time*. As a result of this justification, however, my most detailed analyses and criticisms remain most closely tied to the text of *Being and Time*.

During the course of researching and preparing this paper it became apparent to me that one of the most pressing difficulties facing anyone attempting to interpret Heidegger critically, is Heidegger himself. There are two primary reasons for this. First, Heidegger's researches are driven by a concern to articulate the meaning of human existence in terms of a concept called "Being" which is, on his own admission, so abstract and general it defies all attempts to understand it clearly. Heidegger claims that this problem has proven so serious that in the historical setting of the western philosophical tradition the issue as to what Being means has either been reduced to certain rather meaningless assumptions about what it means to be human in a human world, or it has been forgotten altogether and thus treated as irrelevant. Nevertheless, it is Heidegger's contention that the issue as to what Being means is so central that the reality of human being in a human world cannot be understood without a prior understanding of Being. Thus, his central driving concern is to articulate the meaning of Being. This does not mean, however, that Heidegger has been completely successful in defining Being. The result is that, although his philosophy contains some significant insights on the reality of human being in a human world, there is a strange vacuity in Heidegger's writings which makes it very difficult to conceptualize or explain what he is trying to say.

The second problem in interpreting Heidegger has to do with his language. In his attempts to describe Being, and to avoid linguistic terms laden with precon-

ceptions that tend to obfuscate the importance and relevance of the question about the meaning of Being, Heidegger is given to inventing his own terms or to using familiar terms in totally novel contexts. This once again makes it very difficult to understand or articulate what Heidegger is trying to say in clear language.

As an illustration of these difficulties I shall point out how they present a problem even in this general introduction. Notice that I am referring to reality with the term "human being in a human world", and to the human with the term "human". This is not really an appropriate description of either reality or the human for Heidegger. As I explain in chapters one and two below, these terms have too narrow a meaning to carry the full sense of what Heidegger means by reality and the human. For Heidegger, the human is not something separated from its world, nor is the world something separated from the human. Rather, they are simply two aspects of one reality which is supposed to include everything, including human and non-human entities, the consciousness of that which is conscious (which may or may not be the human, depending upon how consciousness is manifest) and even our awareness that existence goes hand in hand with non-existence or a "nothingness", which arrives from our sense that there might be more to this world than what the reaches of the five senses or the human mind tell us exists. For Heidegger, the terms human and world simply do not carry these very broad connotations. He therefore uses the term "Dasein" for what we would normally think of as human reality, and the term "Being-in-the-world" for what we normally think of as the world in which humans live and have their being. Furthermore, he says in several places in *Being and Time* that Dasein is Being-in-the-world, or that Being-in-the-world is Dasein.

The reason why this presents a problem here is because this is a general introduction, a statement of purpose about an exercise yet to be performed. We therefore do not have before us a clear understanding of Heidegger's terms for the human and for the world. Because of this I am faced with a rather awkward, immediate difficulty. I cannot use the Heideggerian expressions because they are not explained, and yet in not using them and substituting instead some normal everyday terms, I am being both inaccurate and unfaithful to Heidegger. This problem should give a clear indication as to just how serious is the problem of Heideggerian interpretation.

In recognition of these problems of interpretation I therefore begin this work with a chapter entitled "Heideggerian Interpretation", in which I explain these problems in greater detail, and indicate how I deal with them in my own project. For now, however, I will continue to use non-Heideggerian terminology in order to give as clear an understanding as possible as to what this project is all about. This is not a perfect solution to a rather perplexing immediate problem but it is the best way to give the reader who has not read Heidegger in detail a meaningful preview on this overall project.

Chapter Two, entitled "The Paradox of Unity", is then devoted to giving some important preliminary background which is necessary in order to understand Heidegger's concept of freedom clearly. This chapter is in fact an introductory survey of the first Division of *Being and Time*. The object in this introductory survey is to show first of all how and why Heidegger modifies his attempt to answer the question about the meaning of Being by turning it upon the question about the meaning of the Being of that entity which first asks the question. This entity is the human which, because

it is cognitively aware of and curious about the world in which it lives and has its being, is habitually concerned about the issue of its own Being. As a result of this change in focus, Heidegger's question about Being turns into an analysis of human being in a human world.

This analysis in turn indicates that a single phenomenon, which Heidegger calls "Care", lies at the heart of Heidegger's concept of freedom. Since care lies at the heart of Heidegger's concept of freedom we need to know the full meaning of care if we are to have a full understanding of what Heidegger means by freedom. The first Division of *Being and Time* is Heidegger's preliminary exposition on care. This exposition reveals that although care is unique to the human it also signifies a fundamental sameness between human and non-human entities. Hence the title of this chapter, the "Paradox of Unity". The paradox of unity obtains primarily because a single phenomenon is responsible for both unity and difference in the reality of human being in a human world. But the paradox of unity is itself maintained by another paradox, also rooted in care, which I call the paradox of freedom. The reason why the human is at once different from but also the same as non-human entities is because, as care, it is constituted at once by a kind of freedom which does not apply to the non-human and a kind of unfreedom which does pertain to the non-human. Thus care is also the locus of a paradox of freedom which maintains a paradox of unity in the reality of human being in a human world. The primary object of this chapter is to explain this aspect of Heidegger's concept of freedom.

In Chapter Three following, entitled "The Paradox of Freedom", I then show how Heidegger's concept of freedom rests on the view that freedom is more than just

a property of the human; it is a general condition of reality which applies to the human when it realizes a kind of authenticity from which follows an understanding of the self as an existence characterized by the existence of freedom in reality. In order to understand this view on the nature of freedom we need to know what Heidegger means by human authenticity. Therefore, a great deal of this chapter is devoted to analyzing Heidegger's position on what authenticity is and on how it applies to the human such that freedom can be conceived of as at once a condition of reality and yet something which applies specifically to the human. In addition, and because freedom in its application to Dasein always goes hand in hand with a fundamental unfreedom, I maintain an ongoing attempt to show how Heidegger's concept of freedom is paradoxical.

At the end of Chapters Two and Three, I give critical consideration to the issue as to whether or not Heidegger's concept of freedom as a function of human authenticity represents an accurate depiction of human life as we know it. My conclusions from these criticisms are that although there are insights in Heidegger's concept of freedom, there are also some rather serious oversights which suggest that Heidegger might not have been as successful as he thought in accurately describing the reality of human being in a human world. These criticisms are a preparation for Chapter Four, entitled "Buber's Critique on Heidegger", in which I bring Martin Buber in as an ally to substantiate my own suggestions that Heidegger's concept of human authenticity, upon which freedom is based, is seriously flawed. In this last chapter I push my critique on Heidegger to the point of using Buber's insights on freedom and human authenticity to suggest how Heidegger's thought might be

modified such that his insights can be preserved without the burden of some rather serious oversights.

Finally, it should be pointed out here that the topics of the paradox of unity and paradox of freedom are not explicit in Heidegger. Rather, they represent my own particular way of trying to come to grips with Heidegger's concept of freedom. Despite the fact that these are not explicit Heideggerian topics, however, I do think that the paradoxes of unity and freedom represent a good way to come to a critical understanding of some central issues in Heidegger. There are two reasons why I think this.

First, the paradoxes of unity and freedom are, though not something talked about specifically by Heidegger, nevertheless available in the text of *Being and Time*. Heidegger does describe an essential combination of unity and difference in a reality composed of humans and non-humans, and he does ascribe this combination of unity and difference to the common locus of care. He also describes a combination of freedom and unfreedom which is likewise founded on care, and which appears to maintain the paradox of unity in reality. The paradoxes of unity and freedom do, therefore, bring to light a central aspect of Heidegger's work in *Being and Time*.

Second, the paradoxes of unity and freedom represent a good way to come to an accurate critical understanding of Heidegger's work on freedom and human authenticity. As I argue in this paper, these paradoxes in their connection with their common locus in care, do carry some pretty significant insights on just how freedom is, though not a property of the human, nevertheless something which does really apply to the human. As such they represent that which I think is most worthy of

being preserved in Heidegger. It is this which causes me to want to push my criticisms of Heidegger to the point of suggesting ways in which he could be modified such that his insights are no longer overburdened by some seriously problematic assumptions about human authenticity.

CHAPTER ONE
Heideggerian Interpretation

INTRODUCTION

Before getting into the text of *Being and Time* directly, and so the main body of this paper, it is necessary to survey some problems connected with Heideggerian interpretation. The nature of Heidegger's work is such that any interpretation runs the risk of being a misinterpretation if certain problems are not worked out beforehand. Since a considerable portion of this overall exercise involves criticisms based on my interpretations of Heidegger, it is doubly important that the interpretations themselves be as accurate and as faithful as possible to Heidegger. The discussion immediately following is, therefore, more than just an anticipation of possible criticism on my own work. It is a response to necessary criticism should it not be engaged.

PART I: PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH HEIDEGGERIAN INTERPRETATION

i) The Problem of Language in Heidegger

There are several reasons why it needs to be pointed out that not only my own but any systematic attempt to interpret Heidegger is potentially laden with problems.

First, because many of Heidegger's terms are chosen to sidestep traditional categorical meanings his language presents an immediate problem. The project of *Being and Time* is partially destructive, partially constructive in nature. It is destructive in that the work contains an extensively modified philosophical vocabulary the purpose of which is to disperse the effects of linguistic terms that have become so laden with preconceptions it is all but impossible to make a clearly meaningful statement with them or ask a clearly meaningful question, let alone understand what it means to be human in a human world. It is constructive in that Heidegger's attempt to circumvent preconceptions related to language is directed towards attaining a new preconception-free understanding of human being in a human world, an understanding enlightened by the realization that although we have not realized it we have all along been asking and answering questions because of a preoccupation with one, all-encompassing but unanswered question--the question about the meaning of Being.

Because Heidegger wants to clear the air of all terminology laden with preconceptions, in order to get at the guiding basis of pure and original questions (such as the question about the meaning of Being), he is given to the use of neologisms or familiar terms used in unfamiliar contexts. This is a problem, though, for Heidegger's attempt to clarify things in new linguistic terms makes him difficult to understand. A clear interpretation of him therefore demands some translation. But the difficulty here is that there is a risk in translation of losing the intended sense of what Heidegger was trying to say; it is simply not easy to find an effective ground somewhere between the obscurity of Heideggerese terminology, which all too often

impedes understanding, and the desecrating effects of plain language which carry the risk of reducing Heidegger to saying things he never meant. My way of dealing with this problem is to translate Heidegger's terms into more familiar language, as best I can, and then stick for the most part thereafter to the original, or, where that is not possible to use terms which appear to carry Heidegger's meaning with as little loss as possible.

Many commentators in fact appear to be trying to follow the spirit of Heidegger's project in this way, some more adequately than others. To indicate how this can be done either problematically or adequately I present the following contrast between W. T. Jones' way of dealing with the Heideggerian term, *Dasein*, and Michael Gelven's treatment of the Heideggerian term, Being.¹

Jones routinely substitutes the term human for *Dasein*. But for Heidegger, the term *Dasein* has a larger connotation than does the term human; it is intended to connote the existence of an entity which, because it is sufficiently conscious to be able to ask about what it means to be, is *Dasein*.² A full understanding of this entity is not necessarily carried by the term human because it implicitly excludes the possibility that some entity other than the human might have this kind of consciousness. In addition, it is not always the case that the human is *Dasein*. Murray Miles,

¹ cf. Chap. 9, pp. 285-331, W. T. Jones; *A History of Western Philosophy: The Twentieth Century to Wittgenstein and Sartre*, U.S.A.: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975; and p. 18, Michael Gelven; *A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time*, U.S.A.: Harper & Row Publishers (Harper Torchbook), 1970.

² see pp. 27, 32, H.7, 12; Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, transl. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, U.S.A.: Harper & Row, 1962. In referring to this text I will, as above, always indicate the reference in Macquarrie and Robinson first, followed by Heidegger's original pagination as provided by the translators.

commenting on this issue, points out that, "Man is not, *qua homo sapiens*, Dasein. The species *homo sapiens* presumably roamed this planet long before the time at which it could first be meaningfully described as Dasein, as the entity which understands what it is in general to be an entity, what it is to be the type of entity which it itself is, or to be any of the various other kinds of entity. When this comes about, when the question as to entitateness in general is asked for the first time, man becomes Dasein".³ For these two reasons, Jones' substitution should be regarded with caution. Although it does seem self-evident that Dasein does for all intents and purposes mean the human, this is by no means completely certain in a rigorously philosophical sense. With respect to Heideggerian interpretation, therefore, the distinction between the human and Dasein has to be maintained clearly, otherwise our understanding of the human tends to become laden with just the kind of presuppositions Heidegger is trying to avoid.

Because an appropriate translation of Dasein would amount to a very cumbersome phrase, Jones seems to prefer the term human. I use the term human more sparingly than does Jones, preferring for the most part to stay with the term Dasein after translating it once clearly. In this instance this seems to be the best way to preserve Heidegger's meaning without distortion.

Michael Gelven translates Being (*Sein*) as "to be" or "to exist",⁴ which appears to capture the sense of the question about the meaning of Being without

³ p. 436; Murray Miles, "Heidegger and the Question of Humanism", *Man and World* 22: pp. 437-451, 1989. (emphases from text)

⁴ see p. 19; Gelven

retaining problematic presuppositions. In addition, this translation makes it possible to preserve Heidegger's distinction between *existence* and *existent*, which has to do with the difference between an entity which exists and existence itself. This is an extremely important distinction because of the way in which Heidegger pursues the question about Being via inquiry into the ways of Being (i.e., the existence) of Dasein (i.e., an existent).⁵ Because Gelven's translation is at once clear and faithful to Heidegger it is possible to substitute it freely with the Heideggerian term Being, which is what I do.

These two simple examples of translation are intended to illustrate how the problem of language in Heidegger may be dealt with. The actual term chosen is less important than are the issues of clarity and of whether or not the term to be used carries Heidegger's meaning without problematic extraneous inferences. The criteria to be followed, then, in dealing with Heidegger's terminology are as follows. A substitute term used must 1) be clear, and 2) carry the Heideggerian meaning. If either or both of these criteria are lacking, as is the term human when substituted too freely for the term Dasein, then the translation is to be regarded as suspect. In this way both the negative and positive aspects of Heidegger's project are adhered to.

ii) The Problem of Understanding Heidegger Schematically

This brings up a related problem in Heideggerian interpretation. In presenting a draft of this paper in seminar format it was pointed out that I was epistemologizing Heidegger, and this is problematic because the way in which I describe the human on

⁵ cf. p. 19; Gelven and p. 32, H.12; *Being and Time*

Heidegger's view has Heidegger supposedly making some rather dogmatic claims about human nature. My response to this criticism is as follows. I admit to schematizing Heidegger, to formalizing his analysis. However, this simply represents a way of dealing with a rather serious problem in Heidegger. When reading him it is rather easier to appropriate his insights intuitively than it is to explicate them concretely. I agree wholeheartedly with James Clark that a central problem in Heidegger is that his "fundamental ontology is concerned with a dimension of experience primarily non-verbal and noncommunicative".⁶

Ontology, for Heidegger, is the study of Being guided by what entities themselves, as phenomena, reveal as essential about themselves. But ontology is also phenomenology, for Heidegger, because insofar as the phenomena that are of particular interest are those which tell us something essential about the entity to which they apply, both sciences share the same "subject-matter". Thus, "[p]henomenology and ontology are not two distinct disciplines among others. [Rather they] characterize philosophy [i.e., the study of Being] itself with regard to its object and its way of treating that object".⁷ *Fundamental ontology*, for Heidegger, is uniquely concerned with the Being of Dasein because of all entities it is Dasein, by virtue of the fact that the question about Being is an issue for it, which reveals the most about what it means to be.⁸ *Fundamental ontology*, as the way into the question about Being, therefore

⁶ cf. James Clark's Introduction to his own book, *The Problem of Fundamental Ontology*, Vol. I, Canada: Graphic 48 Printing House Ltd. (Toronto), 1971. See also p. 21; Gelven.

⁷ pp. 61-2, H.37-8; *Being Time*

⁸ cf. pp. 32-3, H.11-13; *Being and Time*

has to do with what Dasein's experiences reveal about what it means for Dasein to be.

Heidegger's attempt to join ontology and phenomenology aligns with an attempt to establish a universal perspective for philosophical inquiry. Philosophy must be at once ontological, i.e., guided by the question about Being, *and* phenomenological, i.e., attentive to the realm of concrete entities. The problem with this is that the guiding question for philosophy is not only very non-concrete in nature, it is not even an understood question. What Clark is getting at here, then, is that because Heidegger's whole inquiry is guided by the question about what it means to be, a question which we do not even understand let alone have an answer for, it is centred on that aspect of phenomenological entities for which we appear to have little in the way of substantive knowledge. Heidegger himself says, in *Being and Time*, that though we ask about Being "[w]e do not *know* what 'Being' means".⁹ We appear to have just enough understanding but no more to ask the question. We therefore have very little idea of how to formulate the question, of how to approach what it asks, let alone begin to describe that towards which it leads.

The question about Being that guides fundamental ontology is, therefore, a question about we know not what. It is a question about something 'more' that applies to the consciousness of that which asks it, but that sense of something more is intuitively grasped only. This intuitive sense might be described in terms of a 'grass is greener on the other side' mentality, as it were, or that Daseins are things

⁹ p. 25, H.5; *Being and Time*

which thirst for knowledge, but this is small help in actually understanding what makes Daseins tick or what Daseins are for.

Traditionally, we have never succeeded in articulating what the question about Being demands without succumbing to ontologies based on the pernicious influence of assumed rather than observed categories, or essential aspects, of Being. Part of Heidegger's break with this tradition is connected with an attempt to maintain that any attempt to deal with the question about Being must be governed by attention to phenomenological entities and what those entities as phenomena reveal about themselves at an ontological level.

But linking phenomenology to ontology is small help here. Ontological understanding is still largely a matter of inarticulable intuitions; there still remains an inexorable tension between the realms of phenomenological and ontological being. Heidegger's way of dealing with this tension causes him to be intuitively insightful but extremely abstract when it comes to relating the world of real things and beings to the question about Being.

My way of dealing with this tension in this paper, and so of explaining Heidegger, revolves first around an attempt to appreciate his insights within the context of an attempt to understand a formal difference between that which clearly answers to the description of Dasein and that which does not answer to the description of Dasein. This is the project of Chapter Two following. Subsequent to this I then attempt to show how this understanding of a difference between Dasein and entities other than Dasein revolves around a kind of freedom that applies specifically to Dasein. I admit that the tension is not really banished by my procedure here. The

tension remains, however, not because there is something wrong with this way of approaching Heidegger, but because this particular method of approach enables one to see that Heidegger himself is not completely successful in showing how the human is unique because it understands itself in relation to Being. As a result, his concept of freedom is, though insightful, also seriously problematic. On the one hand Heidegger does manage to show us how freedom can be understood on the basis of a relationship between Dasein and Being, such that freedom emerges as a condition of reality which applies to Dasein. On the other hand, however, Heidegger is not completely successful in showing us how freedom in its application to Dasein is solely a function of Dasein's relationship to Being. The reason for this, as I shall show, is that Heidegger's concept of freedom appears closed to practical aspects of freedom which apply to Dasein more because of Dasein's relationship to other Dasein's in the real world, than because of Dasein's relationship to the ontological realm of Being. Because my approach does reveal both insights and problems concerning Heidegger's concept of freedom, it does successfully penetrate that strange vacuity in Heidegger's thought which seems to arrive because he was not completely successful in establishing a meaningful link between the phenomenal reality of human being in a human world and the ontological realm of Being. In short, I believe I have found a way to arrive, via a formalized, critical investigation of his concept of freedom, at a suitably sympathetic and yet critical understanding of Heidegger in general.

Some commentators deal with the problem of Heidegger's extreme abstraction by attempting to formalize Heidegger as if he were primarily a moralist. Such an

approach could but does not necessarily have to be considered problematic, for there are aspects of Heidegger that do lend themselves to ethical analysis. To illustrate how such an alternative approach may be engaged either appropriately or inappropriately I contrast, briefly, the following two commentators who do approach Heidegger via the issue of ethics.

Douglas Kellner¹⁰ attempts to extract an ethical analysis from Heidegger's "concept of authenticity in *Sein und Zeit*". In so doing, however, he establishes a connection between personal autonomy--"which presupposes an ability to conceive and choose between alternative possibilities and a capacity for creative choice"¹¹--and Heideggerian authenticity--"What is constituted in an authentic project is an authentic self".¹² As a result, Kellner concludes that Heidegger's concept of authenticity represents a ethical ideal where the goal is to become a authentic "self...characterized by resoluteness, autonomy, individuality, responsibility, loyalty and commitment", as opposed to the self of "inauthentic everydayness" which is characterized by "idle chatter, a constant search for diversion, and a spurious, non-committal surmising about things to do and changes to make".¹³

This is probably a poor way to understand Heidegger, for he expressly states in *Being and Time* that "our own Interpretation is purely ontological in its aims, and

¹⁰ "Authenticity and Heidegger's Challenge to Ethical Theory", Douglas Kellner, pp. 159-173 in *Thinking About Being: Aspects of Heidegger's Thought*, Robert W. Sheehan and J. N. Mohanty, eds., Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1984.

¹¹ p. 165; Kellner

¹² p. 165; Kellner

¹³ pp. 161-2; Kellner

is far removed from any moralizing critique of everyday Dasein".¹⁴ Everyday Dasein does intimate a non-autonomous self captivated by common opinions and projects, and Heidegger does align it with the concept of inauthenticity, the antonym of authenticity. However, both authenticity and inauthenticity are ontologically relevant phenomena. As such they are simply different ways in which the unique Being of Dasein manifests itself, and to which Heidegger deliberately avoids ascribing moral significance. Kellner's interest in concretizing Heidegger's challenge to traditional ethical theory represents, therefore, not a clarification but a misunderstanding of Heidegger.

One reason Kellner is led astray is because he misinterprets Heideggerian terms like "resolution" and "choice" as primarily evaluative rather than descriptive in nature.¹⁵ It is this which leads him to interpret authenticity as a moral requirement to embrace the freedom of personal autonomy.

William J. Richardson¹⁶ more correctly, I believe, notices the primarily descriptive connotation of authenticity. Authenticity, according to Richardson, does have to do with "achievement of the self", but only insofar as authenticity is "liberation in the sense of *aletheia*, the coming-to-pass of truth".¹⁷ This means no more than that Dasein, because it is the being for whom the question about Being is an

¹⁴ p. 211, H.167; *Being and Time*

¹⁵ This is true even though Kellner does notice that the evaluative understanding is "grounded in a descriptive ontology". (cf. p. 162; Kellner)

¹⁶ "Heidegger and the Quest of Freedom", William J. Richardson, pp. 161-82 in *A Companion to Martin Heidegger's "Being and Time"*, ed. by Joseph J. Kocklemans, U.S.A.: University Press of America, 1986.

¹⁷ p. 171; Richardson

issue, has the potential (if anything has that potential) for realizing or 'uncovering' itself as it is. This is not a theory of morality *per se* but an underpinning for understanding what it means for Dasein to be. Richardson correctly notes, therefore, that "at best...Heidegger himself is dealing here only with the ontological structures that will be operative in any moral life and these only insofar as they are part of the process of transcendence"¹⁸ (transcendence here meaning Dasein's potentiality for coming to know itself--or truth in general, where truth is *aletheia*).¹⁹

There are other ways of interpreting Heidegger in addition to viewing him as he stands in relation to ethics. Because a primary concern of his is language he can be viewed as a linguistic philosopher, whose dominant interest is to make "conceptual recommendations about language" adequate to the service of preconceptionless ontology.²⁰ Another way still is to view him as a cultural critic/historian. (Actually, everyone seems to view him in this latter light; the various issues of ethics, language, and general epistemology are invariably taken up within the context of Heidegger's critical historical project.)

¹⁸ p. 171; Richardson

¹⁹ Fred R. Dallmayr is another commentator whose approach to Heidegger on the question of ethics is appropriate. Dallmayr notes that "...instead of simply perpetrating (or abolishing) traditional value theories, Heidegger's work seeks to uncover the ontological conditions of possibility of valuing...." For Dallmayr the ultimate ontological condition here is the freedom that accompanies Dasein's authenticity. On this point I agree with Dallmayr, although I do not agree with him that Heideggerian authenticity is necessarily concomitant with "human solidarity". (p. 228; Fred R. Dallmayr, "Ontology and Freedom: Heidegger and Political Philosophy", *Political Theory*, Vol. 12, No. 2, May 1984, pp. 204-234) (see n. 132, pp. 145-147, Chapter Three of this paper for my discussion on this latter point. Also, ref. Fred R. Dallmayr, "Heidegger on Intersubjectivity", *Political Studies*, 3, 1980, pp. 221-246)

²⁰ This is the approach taken by Richard Schmitt in *Martin Heidegger on Being Human: An Introduction to Sein und Zeit*, U.S.A.: Random House Inc., 1969. See also p. 138, "Heidegger and the Destruction of Ontology", by Samuel Ijsseling, pp. 127-44, in Kocklemans.

I have chosen to schematize Heidegger as an epistemologist of sorts, as someone who because he is concerned with questions relating to our knowledge of the human and of reality does have a theory²¹ about how that reality is constituted. This should not be considered a problem necessarily. The above brief commentary on two writers who approach Heidegger on the issue of ethics is intended to show that any attempt to take him up on any one of the issues he addresses could be problematic but does not necessarily have to be so. These are just various ways of dealing with Heidegger's excessively abstract style of presentation, which does impair understanding. Caution only needs to be maintained such that Heidegger is not reduced to being just another moralist, linguist, epistemologist, or historian of ideas. Heidegger deliberately encompasses all of the above disciplines.²² If one does not forget this central point, when trying to interpret Heidegger on the basis of any one particular discipline, it is unlikely that one will overlook the fact that Heidegger's unique project is to understand the underlying foundations of all individual disciplines via the question about the meaning of Being.

iii) The Problem of Heidegger's 'Kantian-Type' Project

The last and possibly most contentious aspect of my interpretation of Heidegger concerns the way I implicitly highlight what I call the 'Kantian-type' nature of his project.

²¹ Read theory here as 'a particular view'. In keeping with Heidegger's phenomenological approach the word theory should not elicit consternation as long as it is understood that a theory is no more than a best guess made on the basis of what phenomena reveal about themselves.

²² see pp. 23-7; Gelven

In the upcoming examination on Heidegger's existential analytic of Dasein I present the phenomenological concept, "Being-in-the-world", as a composite of certain *a priori* conditions which, because they necessarily apply to the reality of that entity which asks about Being (Dasein), define what it means for Dasein (the human) to be in a (human) world. This is highly reminiscent of Kant's transcendental argument, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, which explained human knowledge in a similar vein. For Kant, the various fields of human knowledge--i.e., science and mathematics--were self-evident phenomena which presuppose certain *a priori* conditions or categories that explain how knowledge is possible.²³ It is on the basis of this similarity that Heidegger can be viewed as carrying on the Kantian project.

Nevertheless, my assimilation of Heidegger within a Kantian framework might justifiably be viewed with suspicion, and this for two reasons.

First, because Kant was driven by the quest for rational certainty, he never relinquished his faith in "the absolute autonomy of reason".²⁴ In this respect Kant's thought is laden with preconceptions about what it means to be human which Heidegger, with the question about Being, is trying to challenge. Second, the fact that an important part of Kant's project in the *Critique* concerns laying a new foundation for a theory of morality²⁵ indicates that Kant's concerns ultimately

²³ See pp. 112-15, B104-9; Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, transl. by Norman Kemp Smith, Hong Kong: MacMillan Education Ltd., 1989.

²⁴ p. 5; Michael Gelven. See also pp. 43-5, B3-6; *Critique*, where Kant's absolute faith in the criteria of universality and necessity causes him to argue for the existence of "certain modes of *a priori* knowledge" which "the common understanding is never without".

²⁵ Part of the "positive value" of the critical project is to show that although there are limits to human knowledge "there is an absolutely necessary *practical* employment of pure reason--the *moral*--in which it inevitably goes beyond the limits of sensibility". (pp. 26-7, Bxxv; *Critique*, emphases from

revolved more around the question as to what humans should do in a human world than around the question as to what it means to be human in a human world.

Despite these important differences between Heidegger and Kant, however, it is still appropriate to schematize Heidegger along Kantian lines, primarily because it is a helpful way to understand Heidegger. To be aware of the way in which his project is similar to but at the same time different from that of Kant is to be aware of just how much more universal is the critical inquiry of *Being and Time* as opposed to that of Kant.

Heidegger himself provides justification for this approach while at the same time pointing out that he views his work as a correction on Kant:

...the positive outcome of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* lies in what it has contributed towards the working out of what belongs to any Nature whatsoever, not in a 'theory' of knowledge. His transcendental logic is an *a priori* logic for the subject-matter of that area of Being called "Nature". But such an inquiry itself--ontology taken in the widest sense without favouring any particular ontological directions or tendencies--requires a further clue. Ontological inquiry is indeed more primordial, as over against the ontical inquiry of the positive sciences. But it remains itself naive and opaque if in its researches into the Being of entities it fails to discuss the meaning of Being in general. And the ontological task of a genealogy of the different possible ways of Being (which is not to be constructed deductively) is precisely of such a sort as to require that we first come to an understanding of 'what we really mean by this expression "Being"'. The question of Being aims therefore at ascertaining the *a priori* conditions not only for the possibility of the sciences which examine entities as entities of such and such a type, and, in so doing, already operate with an understanding of Being, but also

for the possibility of those ontologies themselves which are prior to the ontical sciences and which provide their foundations.²⁶

Two important points emerge from this quotation. First, for Heidegger, ontological inquiry is indeed a search for some *a priori* necessary conditions that do explain what it means to be. Second, it is therefore appropriate to associate Heidegger's method of inquiry with that of Kant. This is not to say of course that Heidegger did not have a problem with Kant. But for Heidegger the problem with Kant was not the desire to name the necessary conditions by which the self-evident occurs. This is, on Heidegger's own admission, nothing other than an entirely defensible phenomenological approach to understanding ontological conditions. Rather, the problem with Kant is that he failed to do phenomenological investigation properly (i.e., preconceptionlessly). Thus, with appropriate caution, it is possible to interpret Heidegger as doing a 'Kantian-type' project. That is, even though Heidegger's investigations are governed ultimately by the question about Being, they still do operate within the framework of a Kantian specification of "the *a priori* conditions...of ontologies themselves".²⁷

iv) The General Problem With Heideggerian Interpretation

This concludes the consideration of possible problems connected with my interpretation of Heidegger. In general it should be pointed out that one of the most

²⁶ p. 31, H.10-11; *Being and Time*

²⁷ p. 31, H.11, *Being and Time*. cf. also pp. 55-7; *The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger*, J. L. Mehta, U.S.A.: Harper Row Publishers (Harper Torchbook), 1971, and p. 132; "Heidegger and the Destruction of Ontology", by Samuel Ijsseling, pp. 127-144 in *A Companion to Martin Heidegger's Being and Time*, Joseph J. Kocklemans, ed.

pressing difficulties facing this kind of exercise, and which underlies all of the above potential problems, is that Heidegger is far easier to appreciate intuitively than to interpret clearly and concretely. His thought resists secondary explanations, primarily because it concerns universal attitudes that are extremely difficult to explicate without reverting to the expedient of simply repeating what he has written. The principle project of *Being and Time* is to establish a new presupposition-free foundation for metaphysics. Such a foundation can only be found, if it can be found at all, from an 'interrogation' of beings (individual entities) as to their respective manners of being (essence).²⁸

In his 1929 essay "What is Metaphysics" Heidegger emphasized two important themes from *Being and Time*, which have to do with where and how such a metaphysics must be grounded. The first theme concerns the phenomenological method upon which metaphysics must be based, and the second concerns Dasein's sense of 'nothingness' from which Heidegger believed metaphysical inquiry originally starts. In a 1943 postscript to this essay Heidegger went on to indicate his belief that "if our thinking should succeed in its efforts to go back into the ground of metaphysics, it might well help to bring about a *change in human nature*, accompanied by a transformation of metaphysics".²⁹ Taking nature here to mean attitude,

²⁸ cf. p. 93; ed.'s introduction to "What is Metaphysics" in *Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings*, ed. by David Farrell Krell, U.S.A.: Harper & Row Publishers, 1977.

²⁹ p. 267; "The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics", pp. 265-79 in *Existentialism From Dostoevsky to Sartre*, ed. by Walter Kaufmann, U.S.A.: Nal Penguin Inc. (Meridian ed.), 1975. (emphases my own) The text of the 1929 essay, "What is Metaphysics", is contained in this edition (transl. by Kaufmann) as well as in Krell (transl. by Krell) though the 1943 postscript appears only in Kaufmann. (Emphasis within the quotation is my own.)

it seems that Heidegger's project is intimately connected with the possibility of a universally presuppositionless attitude emerging out of his critical project.

This attitude, which applies to his work as a very broad underlying context, is far easier to adopt intuitively than to describe consistently and concretely because of the peculiar way in which language itself begins to fail when attempts to explain the incommunicable succumb to rational categorization. So many terms have become weighted with so many multifarious preconceptions that it is almost impossible to use language to describe consistently the kind of preconceptionless openness with which Heidegger tried to characterize his work. Therefore, it seems that almost any attempt at interpretation which is not straight repetition (which aids understanding but little) is bound to invoke some sort of closure on Heidegger's meaning.

This problem is amplified by the already mentioned problem that Heidegger's project deals with what appears to be non-verbal, intuitively appreciable only, subject matter. Not only is Heidegger difficult to understand because his language is difficult, he is also difficult to understand because his thought is centred around an ontological realm of Being which is by his own admission something that is only vaguely understood. Though I deal with that problem by attempting to schematize Heidegger and by attempting to focus on his conception of freedom, it should be kept in mind that the tension it entails is not entirely done away with. As I indicate, when I eventually look at Heidegger critically, this tension as it appears in Heidegger carries some potentially significant insights. At the same time, however, I will also show that precisely because Heidegger is so terribly abstract he is not only difficult

to understand, his insights are threatened by the burden of some rather serious oversights that have to do with the way in which his philosophy relates to practical reality.

CHAPTER TWO

The Paradox of Unity

INTRODUCTION

Having cleared the way for approaching Heidegger in some sort of systematic fashion, it is now possible to consider directly the project of Division One, *Being and Time*. As I have indicated in the general introduction, this chapter does not concentrate specifically on the question of freedom in *Being and Time*. Rather, it is a preliminary exposition on what Heidegger says about human being in a human world, engaged in for the purpose of laying down some foundations necessary to gaining a full understanding of Heidegger's concept of freedom as it applies to the human and to reality.

In order to situate the topic at hand and to get some understanding of the standpoint from which the analysis of *Being and Time* proceeds, I begin the main body of this chapter by highlighting some important themes from Heidegger's own Introduction to the overall text. These include 1) explanation of the relevance and nature of the guiding theme of *Being and Time*--the question about the meaning of Being; 2) preliminary consideration of some important terminology as it relates to the question about Being; and 3) an immediate problem --"a manifest circularity"¹

¹ p. 27, H.7; *Being and Time*

which threatens to end the project before it gets under way. The way in which Heidegger deals with this latter problem shows why the analysis of *Being and Time*, though originally intended to proceed on the basis of the question about Being, is subsequently pursued via consideration of the Being of Dasein.

Following this introductory synopsis, the chapter follows Heidegger's progress in Division One, *Being and Time*, to show how the question about Being ultimately revolves around the question of what it means to be human in a human world. Towards the end of this analysis the issue of freedom is introduced, for the purpose of showing how it is best understood via this preliminary exercise. In addition, some possible criticisms pertinent to material already covered are levelled against Heidegger. These are all brought to bear on one central problem in Heidegger which, because it revolves around the question of the adequacy of Heidegger's account on what it means to be human in a human world, ties in with the central issue of freedom as it applies to the human. The purpose of this critique is to announce this problem; a more detailed consideration of it, as well as a possible solution as to how it can be dealt with, is left to the conclusion of the more extended project of which this chapter represents but a beginning.

PART I: THE EXISTENTIAL ANALYTIC OF DASEIN

i) Heidegger's Introduction to *Being and Time*

The announced project of *Being and Time* is to ask and attempt to answer "the question about the meaning of Being."² Being, for Heidegger, means presence

² p. 19, H.2; *Being and Time*

or existence. Asking about the meaning of Being, therefore, is the same as asking about what it means *to be*, or what presence/existence means.³ The question about the meaning of Being is asked by an entity that is aware of existence, or, in Heidegger's terminology, by an entity for which Being is "an issue."⁴ By awareness what is meant here is the kind of apperceptive consciousness that enables that which has it to ask questions.

Heidegger's term for the cognizant inquirer that asks about Being is *Dasein* which, though in everyday usage means the human,⁵ carries the broad connotation of that-entity-which-exists-because-it-is-conscious-of-existing.⁶ Being an entity, the sole

³ As indicated in Chapter One, I follow Gelven in interpreting Being as 'to be'. Thus "[i]f the reader mentally substitutes 'to be' at every occurrence of the term 'Being' in the Macquarrie and Robinson translation, he will be much closer to the original meaning, although stylistic smoothness may be sacrificed". (p. 18; Gelven) The inclusion of the term 'existence' as an alternate translation is my own. The intention here is to connote an important distinction between existence *per se* (*Being*) and an existent (*being*), which carries an all important distinction between what it means for something to be and what something is. This distinction is crucial because what matters for Heidegger, as Gelven points out, is that "[w]e are asking, not what kind of thing a being is, but what it means to be at all". (p. 18; Gelven) It is important to keep in mind that, for Heidegger, the question as to what kind of thing a being is can only be approached through the question about what it means to be at all. (cf. p. 32, H.12; *Being and Time*)

⁴ see p. 32, H.12; *Being and Time*

⁵ cf. n. 1, p. 27, H.7; *Being and Time*

⁶ "Dasein is an entity which, in its very Being, comports itself understandingly towards that Being. In saying this, we are calling attention to the formal concept of existence. Dasein exists." (p. 78, H.53; *Being and Time*) Following Heidegger's custom I refer to Dasein in the third person neutral. This keeps to the spirit of Heidegger's attempt to maintain a presuppositionless objectivity (and also deals rather nicely with the gender-neutral issue). I hyphenate the above description of Dasein in order to indicate that the many words in that description are to be thought of as all going together to make up a single concept of what it means to be Dasein. This method of conceptualization is also reminiscent of Heidegger. Throughout this paper it will be noticed that many of the passages cited contain concepts expressed in several words tied together with hyphens. This can be confusing but it need not be if it is only remembered that the purpose here is to connote concepts which cannot be fully expressed in single words, and which would lose their force as concepts if the many words were not clearly tied together. Thus confusion can be avoided if one keeps in mind that whenever a hyphenated expression occurs a single concept is being expressed. As an aid to avoiding confusion I also provide explanations for these concepts, but in order to stay faithful to Heidegger, and for reasons of

entity in fact, which is aware of existence Dasein is the one which asks the question about the meaning of Being. Now the reason why Dasein asks this question is because Being always has been an issue for it; and Being continues to be an issue for it because it is the question about Being which ultimately motivates all inquiry. Despite the fact that Being is an issue for it, however, Dasein has forgotten its most important question.

In Part I of his Introduction, Heidegger discusses three historically pervasive reasons (or presuppositions, as he calls them) why the question about Being has "been forgotten,"⁷ but also why it nevertheless remains a most pressing philosophical question. "First, it has been maintained that 'Being' is the most universal concept."⁸ As such, it lends itself, like a kind of ubiquitous substratum, to the conception of all entities. As a result, the concept of Being has been treated as an underlying principle of universality under which heading fall concepts like "genus" and "class".⁹ Reduced in this way, the concept of Being has attained a false clarity. Though Heidegger agrees that Being signifies universality, he denies that it is analogous with terms of classification like genus or class. Being "transcends the universality of genus."¹⁰ Being is the universal of all universals; it cannot be restricted in definition to the level of a category, not even the broadest possible one. Because Being is so all

conciseness, I frequently chose to retain the Heideggerian manner of expression after such an explanation has been provided.

⁷ p. 21, H.2; *Being and Time*

⁸ p. 22, H.3; *Being and Time*

⁹ p. 22, H.3; *Being and Time*

¹⁰ p. 22, H.3; *Being and Time*

pervasive it resists any attempt at reduction; it therefore is certainly not the clearest of all concepts and so needs to be reintroduced as a central topic for philosophical discussion.

The second presupposition is that Being, by reason of its "supreme universality,"¹¹ is undefinable. The problem here is that Being is one of those strange concepts that cannot be defined without using the word itself in the definition.¹² As a result the question about the meaning of Being has come to be regarded as meaningless. Heidegger fully understands the magnitude of this problem, but he does not concur with the conclusion that the question *is* therefore meaningless. Rather, he claims that the "the indefinability of Being...demands that we look the question in the face."¹³

The third presupposition is that the concept of Being is so self-evident it does not require to be addressed regarding its meaning. Being signifies existence or presence. Some understanding of Being is contained in all synthetic statements like "the sky is blue" or "I am merry,"¹⁴ and this understanding is taken to be sufficient in spite of the fact that Being remains essentially undefinable. For Heidegger, however, this partial understanding is, once again, simply proof that a true understanding is lacking rather than that the concept of Being is self-evident. Although "[w]e do

¹¹ p. 23, H.4; *Being and Time*

¹² cf. n. iv, p. 23, H.4; *Being and Time*

¹³ p. 23, H.4; *Being and Time*

¹⁴ p. 23, H.4; *Being and Time*

not *know* what 'Being' means" our failed attempts at understanding it do indicate that we do have a "vague average understanding of Being."¹⁵

In raising the question about the meaning of Being anew, therefore, Heidegger is making two centrally important points. First, although the question *is* important it *has not* been answered and, second, it should not have been forgotten because although attempts to answer it have failed those attempts point to Dasein's 'vague average understanding of Being' as "a positive phenomenon which needs to be clarified."¹⁶

Having established the relevance of the question about Being, Heidegger then goes on to deal with the structural implications of his question. A question is asked by an inquirer, and it asks about something. A question is then, in a sense, a dynamic medium between a subject and an object, a medium so powerfully dynamic in fact that it can involve the subject (i.e., the inquirer) with the object (i.e., the 'thing' asked about) to the point where the subject-object distinction begins to break down. This is the type of inquiry Heidegger is trying to invoke. To ask about Being is to ask universally or presuppositionlessly about "the Being of entities"; in this sense, then, entities are "interrogated" with complete openness as to their manner of Being.¹⁷

Here Heidegger finds himself having to deal with a rather serious problem. He wants to ask about what Being means in a universal sense but all attempts to get at the essential structure of Being in this sense seem to entail rationalizations that

¹⁵ p. 25, H.5; *Being and Time* (emphasis from text)

¹⁶ p. 25, H.6; *Being and Time*

¹⁷ cf. p. 26, H.6; *Being and Time*

inappropriately dismiss the question. This leads Heidegger to ask about Being in the sense of "in which entities is the meaning of Being to be discerned?"¹⁸ There are two problems connected with this, which Heidegger has to overcome if his analysis is even to get off the ground. First, the question has departed from its original universal standpoint in such a way that it is not clear how it can ever be approached universally at all. Heidegger has already taken pains to show that the notion of Being loses its universal character, or becomes linked to a meaningless kind of universality, when it is tied to the Being of specific entities.

Heidegger's solution to this first problem is based on the fact that there appears to be only one kind of Being which can be interrogated as to its manner of Being. This Being is Dasein, the cognizant inquirer. Because the question about the meaning of Being is asked by Dasein, which is that entity that is aware in some vague way of having Being (Dasein 'has' Being in the sense that Being is an issue for it), a sense of the universality of the question can be preserved as long as it is pursued via inquiry into the Being of Dasein. This is why Heidegger says, "to work out the question of Being adequately, we must make an entity--the inquirer--transparent in his own Being."¹⁹

Unfortunately, this solution brings up a further problem, a "manifest circularity" which threatens to dissolve the whole inquiry before it has even gotten under way. "If we must first define an entity *in its Being*, and if we want to formulate the question of Being only on this basis, what is this but going in a circle?"²⁰ The

¹⁸ p. 26, H.7; *Being and Time*

¹⁹ p. 27, H.7; *Being and Time*

²⁰ p. 27, H.7; *Being and Time*

possible problem here, which Heidegger himself points to, is that the inquiry into Being now seems to be based on doing nothing more than defining Being on the basis of nothing more than our own understanding of Being. However, Heidegger immediately goes on to point out that this problem need not be considered life-threatening to his project.

But factually there is no circle at all in formulating our question as we have described. One can determine the nature of entities in their Being without necessarily having the explicit concept of the meaning of Being at one's disposal. Otherwise there could have been no ontological knowledge heretofore. One would hardly deny that factually there has been such knowledge. Of course 'Being' has been presupposed in all ontology up till now, but not as a *concept* at one's disposal--not as the sort of thing we are seeking. This 'presupposing' of Being has rather the character of taking a look at it beforehand, so that in the light of it the entities presented to us get provisionally Articulated in their Being. This guiding activity of taking a look at Being arises from the average understanding of Being in which we always operate and *which in the end belongs to the essential constitution of Dasein itself*. Such 'presupposing' has nothing to do with laying down an axiom from which a sequence of propositions is deductively derived. It is quite impossible for there to be any 'circular argument' in formulating the question about the meaning of Being; for in answering this question, the issue is not one of grounding something by such a derivation; it is rather one of laying bare the grounds for it and exhibiting them. In the question of the meaning of Being there is no 'circular reasoning' but rather a remarkable 'relatedness backward or forward' which what we are asking about (Being) bears to the inquiry itself as a mode of Being of an entity.²¹

²¹ pp. 27-8, H.7-8; *Being and Time* (emphases from text)

Heidegger's solution to the problem of circularity is obtained, then, by pointing out that since the average understanding of Being which stimulates Dasein to ask about Being is a phenomenologically rather than propositionally evident fact, that understanding is more like a clue as to how our understanding of Being may be enhanced than like a conclusion fallaciously inserted as a premise in some argument. Rather than being wary of the hermeneutic circle his inquiry invokes, therefore, Heidegger embraces it, because rather than being shut down by it, his inquiry promises to expand it.²²

Happily, then, Heidegger's problems here are solved. And in realizing just how they are solved we are in a position to understand the method by which he will proceed in the existential analytic of Dasein. All attempts, even those which are problematic, to get at the essential structure of Being seem to be grounded in Being as it applies to Dasein. To be, or to exist, for Dasein means at least in part to be interested in what it means to be--"Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein's Being. Dasein is ontically [i.e., phenomenologically] distinctive in that it is ontological [i.e., the fact that it asks about Being is a phenomenological indicator about the nature of its own Being]."²³ Therefore, if Dasein is aware of Being, if Being is an issue for it, and if it can inquire into Being, then it is possible to enhance our preliminary understanding of Being by inquiring into Dasein's own unique ways of Being.

²² cf. also pp. 36-8; Gelven

²³ p. 32, H.12; *Being and Time*

This is, in fact, precisely where Heidegger begins his inquiry. This is also why, after raising the question about the meaning of Being, he immediately shifts focus in *Being and Time* becoming thereby the 'philosopher of the Dasein.'

As the philosopher of the Dasein Heidegger sets about inquiring into the ways in which Dasein exists. As a phenomenologist Heidegger is interested in seeing what he can come up with by looking at things as phenomena. As an ontologist, however, he views phenomena not merely as objects in a spatio-temporal world but as indicators about "what goes to make up Being, while Being is in every case the Being of some entity."²⁴

The dictionary definition of phenomenon is "a fact, occurrence, or circumstance observed or observable"; it is also "something that impresses the observer as extraordinary; a remarkable thing or person" or "an appearance or immediate object of awareness in experience."²⁵ For Heidegger, this definition applies but with the added qualification that "[b]ehind the phenomena of phenomenology there is essentially nothing else";²⁶ meaning that phenomena are, specifically, those facts, occurrences, circumstances, or appearances which appear to point to nothing else but the structure of Being. Phenomena in this sense therefore have an ontological status for Heidegger.²⁷ What Heidegger sees about Dasein, by way of phenomena, is that

²⁴ p. 61, H.37; *Being and Time*

²⁵ *The Random House College Dictionary*, unabridged and revised ed., U.S.A.: Random House Inc., 1980.

²⁶ p. 60, H.36; *Being and Time*

²⁷ It is important to note that for Heidegger the term ontology does not signify the study of essence per se, which in this sense means that ontology is basically traditional metaphysics. Ontology, for Heidegger, is the "science of the Being of entities". But phenomenology is also the science of the

it behaves in certain ways. Among these ways, which are observable, which impress the observer (i.e., Heidegger) as extraordinary or remarkable, and which are immediately apparent in experience (to the one who takes the time to look, as Heidegger would probably say) is the fact that Dasein is obviously concerned with what it means to be. Thus, one of the ways in which Dasein exists, one of the phenomena pertaining to it, is the fact that it is concerned about what it is to exist. But to exist is the same as to be, which is the same as Being. Insofar as the Being of Dasein is characterized by the fact that it is concerned about Being, Dasein's own Being is intimately linked to the realm of Being proper. Thus, in Dasein, there is already some phenomenological intimation of an ontological structure of Being.²⁸

Being of entities because a proper inquiry into the Being of an entity requires that one be attentive to the way in which the phenomenological characteristics of an entity tell us something about that entity at an ontological level. Ontology is, therefore, the same as phenomenology for Heidegger because both share the same "subject-matter", which has to do with the observable but also defining characteristics of any particular thing that exists. The link between phenomenology and ontology can be demonstrated through the use of a functional as opposed to structural argument about the nature of something. Phenomenologically my computer exists as a computer, not because it answers to some mental picture or definition I have of a computer, but because it actually performs the function of a computer. Similarly, Dasein exists as Dasein, not because it conforms to a definition of a rational animal, but because it is that unique entity whose existence is characterized by the fact that, among other things, Being does appear to be an issue for it. The function of a computer and the fact that Being is an issue for Dasein are existential facts; without them no computer and no Dasein. It should be noted here that Heidegger himself does not anywhere explicitly entertain the function/structure distinction as a way of describing entities. However, I suggest that he does appeal to such a distinction implicitly. In the upcoming analysis of the existential analytic, the various existentials--i.e., concern, solicitude, anxiety, and care--are ways of being or existing peculiar to Dasein. That is, Dasein is Dasein, and Dasein is revealed to be in essence, care, because it manifests certain specific types of behaviour as a Being-in-the-world. Another way of putting this is, Heidegger's understanding of what it means to be human in human world is gained from an analysis of the way in which the human *functions* in the world, rather than from an analysis of the way in which the human is presumed to be constructed as, for example, a rational animal. Therefore, I suggest that this demonstration of the difference between a functional as opposed to structural argument about the nature of something is not only a useful but also a faithfully accurate way of explicating how the link between phenomenology and ontology is achieved. (cf. pp. 58-61, H.34-9; *Being and Time*)

²⁸ Heidegger is here building upon the idea that because we ask a question we already have some information about where the answer to that question might lie. When I ask myself for example why my car will not start, I know that I will probably be more likely to find an answer to my question if I

In order to get at an understanding of Being, then, Heidegger starts out by trying to understand what constitutes the Being or existence of Dasein. He calls the constituents that make up the Being of Dasein "existentialia" or existentials.²⁹ Existentials are "characters of Being" or phenomenally apparent experiences which tell us something about Being because they tell us something about the Being or existence of Dasein. The existentials are supposed to be universal and necessary, or ontologically valid;³⁰ they are also supposed to be observable and so real, or phenomenologically apparent.

The following section, Part II, is essentially a listing, with explanations, of those existentials that constitute the Being of Dasein. With respect to those explanations the particular theme of interest is the topical concern of this chapter, the Paradox of Unity. The paradox of unity refers to the way in which the unique Being of Dasein indicates that Being, insofar as it applies to Dasein, is paradoxically constituted of both unity and difference. In this respect the paradox of unity serves as a preliminary clue to understanding Heidegger's paradoxical concept of freedom, which itself stands at the heart of the mystery of the question about Being. At the same time, however, the paradox of unity is not completely understandable unless

look for problems in the engine compartment than if I concentrate on that rust hole in the left rear door. Similarly, for Heidegger, if he wants to know something about Being in general he knows that he will have more luck inquiring into the ways of Being of that entity which knows enough at least to ask the question about Being, than if he tries to find out about Being by gazing long and hard at some less forthcoming phenomenon like a stone. Thus Heidegger's particular way of inquiring into the meaning of Being rests on the everyday understanding that the questions we ask point towards the answers we seek. (My thanks to Dr. Stanley Clarke, Dept. of Philosophy, Carleton University, whose comments on an early draft of this section of my paper are what brought this point to my attention.)

²⁹ see pp. 70-1, H.44-5; *Being and Time*, and pp. 48-50; Gelven

³⁰ cf. pp. 48-50; Gelven

one also understands fully Heidegger's concept of freedom. Because of this the chapter on the paradox of unity only represents a preliminary way into Heidegger's concept of freedom, a way which is necessary because it provides a foundational basis for a coherent discussion of freedom, but which will only become completely coherent itself when Heidegger's concept of freedom is eventually explained as well. One of the problems with Heideggerian interpretation, and this is true especially in regard to *Being and Time*, is that his work is so integrated it is very difficult to discuss any one topical concern either adequately or completely without a comprehensive knowledge of the whole context within which that topic appears. I have chosen to deal with this problem by writing this preliminary chapter to provide a foundation for discussing my main interest, Heidegger's concept of freedom. Unfortunately, this method is not totally without problems; no one chapter or section in this paper is totally coherent in and of itself. However, insofar as I think the problems connected with this approach are mitigated by treating the paper as an integrated unit, I think the reader should not have too much difficulty as long as one keeps in mind as a reference point the contextual background that is being developed throughout this paper.

PART II: THE PARADOX OF UNITY AS IT APPLIES TO THE EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENON OF DASEIN AS BEING-IN-THE-WORLD

i) Being-in-the-world

The existential, Being-in-the-world, is Heidegger's term for reality. It is important to realize that reality here does not just mean *a* reality; it is neither a

manifold of existence nor some specific thing that exists as a definitive object of analysis. Reality in this traditional sense answers to the notion of an object of experience.³¹ But for Heidegger reality, as a phenomenon with an ontological status, has a broader meaning. It does include objects of experience but also experience itself.³² Being-in-the-world is therefore reality in the sense of a "unitary phenomenon"³³ and an encompassing phenomenon, a composite of Dasein and that which is other than Dasein included. As such a composite it is, primarily, a "basic state"³⁴ of Dasein's Being, which includes such things as the consciousness of Dasein, the questions that consciousness leads to (such as the question about Being), and Dasein's sense that it somehow belongs to but is at the same time different from a world of entities which do not share its peculiar way of Being.

Being-in-the-world is Heidegger's most basic existential. It tells us something about Dasein's Being in the most general way because it signifies in the broadest possible way a "general awareness of the way in which the world presents itself to us."³⁵ Being-in-the-world is also regarded by Heidegger as a structural phenomenon which, though it represents a "primary datum that must be taken as a whole," may be looked upon as "having several constitutive items in its structure."³⁶

³¹ see p. 96, H.68, *Being and Time*

³² see pp. 254-5, H.211; *Being and Time*

³³ p. 78, H.53; *Being and Time*

³⁴ p. 78, H.53; *Being and Time*

³⁵ p. 52; Gelven

³⁶ p. 78, H.53; *Being and Time*

For the purposes of analysis Heidegger separates this basic unity into three constitutive components. The first is the component of "in-the-world"; the second is "that entity which...has Being-in-the-world" as its unique way of Being; and, third, there is "Being-in as such."³⁷ The ultimate results of this analysis are realization of 1) a distinction between entities other than Dasein and Dasein itself, and 2) an understanding that Being-in-the-world is an ontological structure that is paradoxically unified by that very item which makes Dasein and entities other Dasein distinct. This item, which Heidegger calls "Care", lies at the heart of the paradox of unity.

ii) In-the-World or the Worldhood of the World

This is component number one of Being-in-the-world. The term in-the-world is intended to connote the phenomenological-ontological structure or meaning of world. This is perhaps the most difficult existential to grasp because of the way Heidegger appears to talk about the world both subjectively, as some kind of intentional structure, and objectively, as a context of relations which Dasein is at once a part of and yet from which it is also distinct.

This difficulty is probably due to the fact that Heidegger is here dealing with the age-old problem of subject-object dualism. He is trying to break down the barrier between the knower and the known by showing that something is an object of knowledge because it is an object of experience.³⁸ With respect to the phenomenon

³⁷ pp. 78-9, H.53; *Being and Time*

³⁸ see section 13, pp. 86-90, H.59-62; *Being and Time*. It should be noted here that knowledge, for Heidegger, is not merely a question of some "relationship between subject and Object". (p. 87, H.60) Knowledge is not a function of *either* Dasein or its world; it is instead a function of Dasein *and* a world. This means that knowledge does not even entail a subject-object distinction because the world

of the world this means bringing to light all those ways in which the concept of world is experienced. Thus, for example, the world is an intentional structure insofar as it connotes something like "the 'world' of the mathematician." At the same time, however, it is also, objectively, a "totality of [all] entities...within the world," the "we-world,...or closest (domestic) environment" of Dasein, or the "*a priori* character of worldhood in general."³⁹

The analysis of worldhood is part of an analysis of that basic state of Dasein, Being-in-the-world. The analysis of in-the-world therefore revolves around what it means for Dasein to-be-in-a-world. With respect to that project Heidegger reduces the various meanings of the term world to three, two of which, though they refer to things other than Dasein, nevertheless tell us something essential about the Being of Dasein because they both determine and are determined by the existence of Dasein.

In the interests of clarity, then, I think it is appropriate to assume the licence of saying provisionally that there are two worlds under consideration which point to a third. The first is a world described by Heidegger as "environment", which is made up of "ready-to-hand" things (i.e., entities other than Dasein). The second is a world of "present-at-hand objects" (also entities other than Dasein), and the third is what Gelven calls "an existential of the self [Dasein] in which the modes of present-at-

Dasein experiences and so knows is both the world and Dasein taken together. As Being-in-the-world Dasein knows its world in the sense that it is "*fascinated by*" what is both its world and itself. (p. 88, H.61) Thus, "the perceiving of what is known is not a process of returning with one's booty to the 'cabinet' of consciousness after one has gone out and grasped it". (p. 89, H.62) Rather, "in knowing, Dasein achieves a new *status of Being* towards a world which has already been discovered in Dasein itself". (p. 90, H.62) (Emphases within quotes are from text.)

³⁹ p. 93, H.65; *Being and Time*

hand and ready-at-hand are but different (and incomplete) ways of seeing [i.e., knowing]" the world and itself.⁴⁰

The terms environment and ready-to-hand are intended to connote the world as an actual context of relations between real things. As an example of such a context, my computer is ready-to-hand as part of an environment specified by the relationships between computers, word processing programs, and papers produced for graduate seminars in philosophy. The term present-at-hand refers to objects within a different kind of world, the world of my understanding of what the terms world and object mean. These latter kinds of objects and the world to which they apply are relative to the actual environment of ready-to-hand things, but the world they denote is different in that it is a theoretically as opposed to practically apparent manifestation of the environmental world.⁴¹

Now both worlds are, for Heidegger, ultimately illustrative of the Being of Dasein. They occur because Dasein manifests *a priori* a "kind of concern which manipulates things and puts them to use."⁴² Concern (*Besorgen*) here is a technical term for Heidegger meaning in general a tendency to become involved with "activities which we perform or things which we procure."⁴³ This tendency to become involved has two different manifestations or modes, one practical the other theoretical. The practical manifestation of concern is revealed by Dasein's relationship to the

⁴⁰ p. 58; Gelven

⁴¹ cf. p. 99, H.69; *Being and Time*

⁴² p. 95, H.67; *Being and Time*

⁴³ see translator's note, n. 1, p. 83; *Being and Time*

environmental world of ready-to-hand objects, while the present-at-hand world reveals a theoretical mode of concern according to which Dasein is aware that the environmental world is a context of relations inclusive of Dasein which at once determines and is determined by Dasein.

The world of the ready-to-hand reveals a practical mode of concern because the context of relations it denotes includes relations that occur between Dasein and things precisely because Dasein is practically concerned or involved with environmentally ready-to-hand things. In this practical mode of concern Dasein is actually involved with physical objects and physical projects in the world of ready-to-hand things. Things (i.e., entities other than Dasein) within the realm of the ready-to-hand specified by this mode of concern have the character of "equipment". Equipment is a collective term for what Dasein encounters and uses in its daily concern for working and living.⁴⁴

Relations specified by this mode of concern arrive from Dasein but they also affect Dasein in that it has to obey what the larger realm of the ready-to-hand environment allows it to do with respect to the manufacture and use of equipment. A hammer is used to do the work of pounding nails, to build houses, which Dasein inhabits; a signal light on a car serves to preserve a semblance of order on a busy street; Nature is a bountiful host of "natural products" for Dasein to create and build things with, or a store of opportunities for Dasein to conquer.⁴⁵ (Mt. Everest to be conquered for glory could be considered as much a piece of equipment in this regard

⁴⁴ see p. 97, H.68 & n. 1; *Being and Time*

⁴⁵ Though not formulated in exactly these ways, these examples are conveniently provided by Heidegger in Chapter Three, Division One, *Being and Time*.

as is the forest to be used for lumber.) But Dasein cannot make a hammer out of leaves, or build houses with paper nails. It has to defer to what the bountiful host of Nature decrees is possible. Thus, while the mode of concern that causes Dasein to put things to use is illustrative of a certain inventive genius on the part of Dasein, an inventive genius which ready-to-hand things do not possess, this does not mean that Dasein is independent of its world. When they appear in the character of equipment, therefore, things within the world of the ready-to-hand point towards a practical mode of concern which reveals that Dasein is "worldly" but does not fully belong "within-the-world" as do non-Daseinly entities.⁴⁶

The second world, the world of present-at-hand entities other than Dasein, ties in with a theoretical mode of concern. Because Dasein manifests an ability for theoretical observation, it is aware in yet another way that the world is a context of objects unlike itself, but to which it is nevertheless irrevocably tied. It is the environmental world which occasions this mode of concern. The occasion of a hammer breaking or a signal light failing furnishes Dasein with an opportunity to become aware of the fact that its life determines and is determined by the context of relations that make up an environmental world (floods, earthquakes, or Mt. Everest killing someone who tries but fails to conquer it also provide such opportunities).

The world apprehended via the theoretical mode of concern is, for Heidegger, not necessarily less real than the world of ready-to-hand objects for the simple reason that cognitive apprehension is, *a priori*, as much a mode of concern that determines and is determined by the context of equipment and relations as is the practical one.

⁴⁶ p. 93, H.65; *Being and Time*

The world of the present-at-hand is the world that reveals to Dasein that although it is not of the world of equipment it is to some degree subject to it.

In-the-world is an existential, then, because the world is both a context of relations specified or determined by Dasein and a context of relations that determines Dasein. On the one hand it gets its character or structure from that way of Being peculiar to Dasein called concern, while at the same time it reciprocally affects the existence of Dasein.

The paradox of unity begins to emerge here with an understanding of what in-the-world as an existential indicates about the Being or existence of Dasein. On the one hand Dasein is quite unlike things other than itself, partially because things other than itself defer, as it were, to the designs of Dasein, but also, and primarily, because things other than Dasein are locked into the context of relations called world in a way in which Dasein is not. Only Dasein manifests concern. Therefore, only Dasein can affect what is environmentally ready-to-hand by turning things into equipment and using them as such. Concern is therefore the point of an essential difference in the reality of Being-in-the-world. At the same time, however, the world designated by Dasein reveals itself to be a context of relations of which Dasein is a part, by which it is to some degree determined, and to which it is, therefore, to some degree subject. In that concern maintains Dasein in relation to the environmental world, and in that what is ready-to-hand in that world does play a role in limiting Dasein's designs to what is physically possible, concern is, therefore, an essential point of unity in the reality of Being-in-the-world. The world Dasein knows and experiences is, therefore, a context of relations that includes Dasein but from which Dasein is

also distinct. The locus of the paradox of unity here is that unique way of Being called concern. Because Dasein is concern it is distinct from those entities which make up a world; but because Dasein is concern its basic state, Being-in-the-world, is a unified phenomenon.

iii) That Entity Which Has Being-in-the-world, or Being-with and Being-one's-Self

This is the second major component of Being-in-the-world. The two terms Being-with and Being-one's-self, which Heidegger equates with Dasein's Being-in-the-world, both refer to one common existential which Heidegger calls the "'Who' of Dasein." The 'who of Dasein' is Heidegger's term for self. Self here means, specifically, the abiding self or the constant subject of experience.⁴⁷ Like the previous existential, in-the-world, the who of Dasein or self gets its character from a way of Being or special kind of behaviour peculiar to Dasein. That way, in this instance, is called "solicitude". Like concern, solicitude (*Fürsorge*) is a technical term for Heidegger. Solicitude means "the kind of care which we find in 'prenatal care' or 'taking care of children', or even the kind of care which is administered by welfare agencies."⁴⁸ Solicitude therefore denotes a kind of care which is directed towards other Daseins, rather than towards environmentally ready-to-hand objects.

⁴⁷ "The question of the 'who' answers itself in terms of the 'I' itself, the 'subject', the 'Self'. The 'who' is what maintains itself as something identical throughout changes in its Experiences and ways of behaviour, and which relates itself to this changing multiplicity in so doing." (p. 150, H.114; *Being and Time*)

⁴⁸ see translators' note, n. 4, p. 157, H.121; *Being and Time*

In its daily concerned wanderings about its equipmental work-world Dasein meets other Daseins. The way in which it meets them is as usual rooted in real experience: "...when material is put to use, we encounter its producer or 'supplier' as one who 'serves' well or badly. When, for example, we walk along the edge of a field but 'outside it', the field shows itself as belonging to such-and-such a person, and decently kept up by him; the book we have used was bought at So-and-so's shop and given by such-and-such a person and so forth."⁴⁹ In this context experience tells Dasein that its Being and Being-in-the-world (its who) entails Being-with others.

The expression Being-with is, therefore, both a constitutive existential of Being-in-the-world and a "characteristic of one's own Dasein."⁵⁰ It denotes the realization that Dasein does not encounter only ready-to-hand objects or equipment in its everyday dealings in its world; it encounters other Daseins and from this encounter realizes that Being-in-the-world is, structurally, not just a context of relations between things other than Dasein, or between Dasein and things other than Dasein, but also a nexus of concerned⁵¹ entities like itself. Heidegger connotes this latter aspect of Being-in-the-world so revealed with the term "with-world",⁵² which means a world in which Daseins co-exist.

Along with meeting others and so the fact that it belongs to a with-world, Dasein also meets itself; that is, it is rendered capable of seeing that it is like others

⁴⁹ pp. 153-4, H.117-18; *Being and Time*

⁵⁰ p. 157, H.121; *Being and Time*

⁵¹ Read "concerned" here as having the technical meaning of concern ascribed by Heidegger.

⁵² p. 155, H.118; *Being and Time*

who are like itself, and who are not like ready-to-hand things or equipment.⁵³ Thus the existential Being-with occurs simultaneously with another existential, Being-one's-self--"Knowing oneself [i.e., Being-one's-self] is grounded in Being-with."⁵⁴ The two terms Being-with and Being-one's-self imply one common existential, the who of Dasein, or the abiding self. The simple point of all this is that the self is a being whose existence is unique in that it actively and cognitively co-exists with beings like itself in a way that is quite different from the way in which it co-exists with things unlike itself. This is the 'who' of Dasein, and another fundamental component of the structural phenomenon, Being-in-the-world.

As mentioned, the self is unique because it manifests a special way of existing called solicitude. Solicitude is of the same genre as concern, but it differs in one important way. First, it is similar in that it applies only to Dasein and because it engenders unity in the structure of Being-in-the-world, or between Dasein and a world. But it is dissimilar in that the objects of solicitude are not the same as the objects of concern. Concern applies only to things other than Dasein, while solicitude applies only to other Daseins.⁵⁵

⁵³ see p. 157, H.121; *Being and Time*

⁵⁴ p. 161, H.124; *Being and Time*

⁵⁵ "...those entities towards which Dasein as Being-with comports itself do not have the kind of Being which belongs to equipment ready-to-hand; they are themselves Dasein. These entities are not objects of concern, but rather of *solicitude*." (p. 157, H.121; *Being and Time*) It should be noted here that in English language usage the distinction between concern and solicitude is not as pronounced as in Heidegger. The English dictionary definitions of concern and solicitude are frequently interchangeable in that one can experience either concern or solicitude towards one's fellow human. (see *Random House College Dictionary*) It is extremely important to keep in mind the difference between the way these terms normally apply in English as opposed to the way they apply in Heidegger, because this difference is crucial to appreciating Heidegger's descriptions about the way in which Dasein relates differently to non-Daseinly entities as opposed to other Daseins. (see n. 1, 4, p. 83, H.57, as well as n.

The paradox of unity applies here too. Insofar as there are various ways of manifesting solicitude, Dasein can be with others and be itself in either an authentic or inauthentic way. Solicitude can be manifest as either forbearance or overbearance towards the other such that the other is either acknowledged as a unique Dasein or perfunctorily treated as an environmental object. In both cases the individual self, i.e., the one who is forbearing or overbearing towards the other, is also either authenticated or inauthenticated insofar as its unique nature, which is to be with others like itself, is either covered over (i.e., unacknowledged) or revealed (i.e., acknowledged).

Heidegger makes the point that when Daseins "devote themselves to the same affair in common [without] mistrust [they] become authentically bound together."⁵⁶ This is an authentic brand of solicitude because it "leaps forth and liberates" to free "the Other in his freedom for himself."⁵⁷ Authentic solicitude frees 'the other in his freedom for himself' in that it "makes possible the right kind of objectivity"⁵⁸ which allows the other to stand forth in its nature as another Dasein as opposed to some sort of environmental, non-Daseinly entity. Thus the solicitude that is authentic is the one which distinguishes Dasein as unique from things other than itself. The inauthentic brand of solicitude, on the other hand, defines the self in terms of what Heidegger calls the "they-self".

4, p. 157, H.121; *Being and Time*)

⁵⁶ p. 159, H. 122; *Being and Time*

⁵⁷ p. 159, H.122; *Being and Time*

⁵⁸ p. 159, H.122; *Being and Time*

The they-self is the self that gets covered over in its real nature because it is treated as an object of concern rather than as an object of solicitude. When this happens an inauthentic kind of unity obtains such that the world is a context of relations in which the distinction between Dasein and not-Dasein is clouded over. In this case unity is a function of Dasein being like objects in the environmental world, but it is a function also of Dasein being separated from its real self. However, when unity is a function of authentic solicitude, it simultaneously unites Dasein with its real character and distinguishes between Dasein and not-Dasein.

It is important to realize here that, for Heidegger, both manifestations of solicitude are *a priori* possibilities characteristic of Dasein and so of unity in the reality of Being-in-the-world.⁵⁹ The paradox of unity obtains, therefore, because no matter whether solicitude is authentic or inauthentic it still functions as an element of both unity and difference in the existential phenomenon of Being-in-the-world.

Another thing that is important to keep in mind here is the fact that for Heidegger the self is usually the they-self. This is because Dasein is "proximally and for the most part" absorbed with its world in such a way as to be unaware of its real being.⁶⁰ As I work at this computer trying to give a clear explication of Heidegger, I am not particularly taken up with the question about Being or what that question leads me to realize about my real nature. Rather, I am absorbed in the world of essays, graduate seminars, and theses in philosophy to the point where questions

⁵⁹ "The *"they"* is an *existential*; and as a *primordial phenomenon*, it belongs to Dasein's *positive constitution*." (p. 167, H.129; *Being and Time*. Emphases from text)

⁶⁰ see p. 167, H.129; *Being and Time*. (Note: The expression, "proximally and for the most part", is a constantly recurring expression which Heidegger uses to describe various aspects prevalent to the everyday world.)

pertaining to the way things really are, are not at all paramount on my mind.

Nevertheless, this capacity to be absorbed in such tasks is phenomenal evidence of a capacity to be concerned, which can lead to the realization that Dasein is capable of authentic solicitude. Thus, despite the fact that Dasein is not always preoccupied with authenticity directly, the fact that it *can* be so preoccupied is phenomenal evidence that it is somehow different from things other than Dasein, and that the unity of Being-in-the-world, constituted by concern and solicitude, is a paradoxical sort of unity.

iv) Being-in as Such

This is the third component of Being-in-the-world. Before getting into this component directly it is now necessary, in order to understand properly the notion of Being-in, to indicate clearly where Heidegger is heading with this analysis. His intention is to expose *the* fundamental way in which Dasein exists. This fundamental way he calls "*Care*". For Dasein, Being-in, or to-be-in-a-world, ultimately means to exist as care. Care is the foundation of both concern and solicitude. Care is, therefore, the locus of the unity of Being-in-the-world, and the locus of the distinction between Dasein and entities other than Dasein. Care is, therefore, the locus of the paradox of unity. I have avoided mentioning care up to now in order to show how Heidegger is leading up to it. In this respect I have imposed on Heidegger's progress somewhat; though he does mention care throughout his analysis I have, in order to make his phenomenological method of investigation stand out more clearly, avoided mentioning it for as long as possible.

Being-in is an existential that is similar to the existential of the self in that it pertains specifically to Dasein; it refers to the kinds of experiences that mark Dasein as an entity that exists in a context of relations called world in such a way that it is worldly but not within a world. As such Being-in signifies what it means for Dasein to exist-in a world. Now this sounds very much like Being-in is very little different from the existentials already studied. This is in fact true in the sense mentioned. However, insofar as we only understand Dasein to be different from and yet tied to things other than itself because it manifests concern and solicitude, we still do not know beyond an intuitional level of cognition exactly *why* Dasein manifests itself as concern and solicitude. We therefore do not have before us a full understanding of what it means for Dasein to-be-in-a-world. The final answer to this why is that Dasein is care. Before we can say this, however, we still have to show how Dasein simultaneously knows and experiences this to be the case. This is the reason why Being-in has to be considered a necessary component of Being-in-the-world. To-be-in-a-world is to have certain kinds of experiences that tell us we are in a world. The basic kinds of experiences that apply here are what Heidegger calls "state-of-mind", "understanding", and "language".⁶¹

State-of-mind is an *a priori* way of existing which applies uniquely to Dasein. It signifies Dasein's way of responding to the discovery that it is of such and such a nature within such and such a world. For Heidegger, the basic elemental state-of-mind is anxiety.⁶²

⁶¹ cf. p. 172, H.133; *Being and Time*

⁶² p. 227, H.182; *Being and Time*

Anxiety is the first experience by which the possibility arises of Dasein coming to know itself as it is, an entity which though it is worldly is not of a world in the same way as are things not-Dasein. Anxiety is a condition begotten of a certain unavoidable tension connected with Dasein's experience of existing or being-in a world. This tension has to do with the difference between Dasein and entities other than Dasein. Equipment exists in a world in a way quite different from the way in which Dasein exists in a world; it exists in terms of purposes which it itself does not define. But Dasein has no such pre-defined purpose (reading essence, in the sense of Being, thought of in terms of definite "spatiotemporal location" or 'place', would not be inappropriate here⁶³). Unlike equipment, then, Dasein is in part extra-worldly or 'homeless';⁶⁴ it simply exists, inexorably and enigmatically, with no particular explicit purpose. Anxiety is rooted partially in the fact that Dasein is a being that experiences it (i.e., a being to which state-of-mind applies) and partially in the fact that Dasein is cognitively aware that it is locked into a world which it is unlike.⁶⁵

Understanding is an *a priori* capacity by which Dasein originally comes to know itself as it is, as an entity which though tied to a world is yet always unlike its world. Understanding reveals to Dasein that it is unlike its world because it is

⁶³ cf. pp. 42-3; Schmitt

⁶⁴ cf. pp. 233, H.188-9; *Being and Time*

⁶⁵ Note: anxiety is not the same as fear; though fear can be rooted in anxiety fear does not necessarily pertain specifically and uniquely to Dasein. Fear is about something specific; animals can experience it, but only Dasein can experience anxiety upon which fear is grounded because only it experiences a sense of homelessness. (cf. pp. 179-82, H.140-2 & p. 230, H.185-6; *Being and Time*) It should be noted here that saying that Dasein experiences anxiety whereas animals only experience fear does not necessarily connote the idea that no animal can experience anxiety. The important point is that if any particular entity has a sufficiently high level of consciousness to experience anxiety, that entity is a Dasein.

somehow more than its world; being unlike equipment in a relatively fixed context of relations, it realizes that it can change its directions and involvements in that context in a way that equipment cannot. In this sense, understanding reveals to Dasein that "Dasein always has understood itself and always will understand itself in terms of possibilities."⁶⁶ For Heidegger, possibilities are synonymous with freedom because without such a thing as possibilities there could be no such thing as freedom. (Since a full explanation of this is reserved for the following chapter, I will not elaborate here. For now it is sufficient to simply realize that on Heidegger's view possibilities mean freedom.) Understanding therefore reveals to Dasein that it is somehow transcendent in relation to its world, that it is characterized by a kind of freedom which does not apply to things other than itself. At the same time, however, understanding is responsible for Dasein realizing that it does not transcend its world. In understanding "its ownmost potentiality-for-Being [i.e., itself as an existence characterized by possibilities] [Dasein] has been delivered over to the Fact of its thrownness into the 'there'."⁶⁷ In other words, through understanding Dasein not only realizes itself as something characterized by possibilities, as a potentiality-for-being, it also realizes that it is always, irrevocably, a worldly 'there' or presence that is limited by a world which it is enigmatically both of but not within. Understanding tells Dasein cognitively both that and why it is anxious, or, what anxiety and state-of-mind mean. It is a step on the way to realizing the "full enigmatical character of [its own] Being."⁶⁸

⁶⁶ p. 185, H.145; *Being and Time*

⁶⁷ p. 188, H.148; *Being and Time*

⁶⁸ p. 188, H.148; *Being and Time*

Language signifies the first condition of possibility for understanding. As such it is a necessary condition for understanding what anxiety means. Language signifies Dasein's ability to engage in "talking" and "hearing". For Heidegger, talking and hearing are linked in that talking presupposes an ability for hearing.⁶⁹ The link between language and understanding is then achieved by pointing out that "[o]nly he who understands can listen."⁷⁰ What Heidegger means here by listening is not "what is defined 'in the first instance' as "hearing" in psychology--the sensing of tones and perception of sounds."⁷¹ Rather, what he has in mind is a more primordial phenomenon, called "hearkening", upon which hearing is based, and by which Dasein realizes (i.e., understands) cognitively that "[m]an...is the entity which is such as to discover the world and Dasein itself."⁷² Thus language is the ultimate condition for the possibility of Dasein coming to recognize what anxiety and understanding tell it about itself, which is that Being-in-the-world is a phenomenon the paradoxical unity of which is constituted by concern, solicitude, and care.

Anxiety, understanding, and language are therefore important experiences which tell us something essential about what Being-in means for Dasein. Being-in signifies Dasein's anxious awareness that for it Being-in-the-world is a rather enigmatical kind of existence, an existence characterized by the realization that

⁶⁹ cf. p. 206, H.163; *Being and Time*

⁷⁰ p. 208, H.164; *Being and Time*

⁷¹ p. 207, H.163; *Being and Time*

⁷² pp. 208-9, H.165; *Being and Time*

although it is tied to a world, it is not of the world in the same way as are ready-to-hand environmental objects or equipment.

v) Care and Freedom

Care is the ultimate unifying existential of Being-in-the-world. Because Dasein is care and because Dasein is a Being-in-the-world the reality of "Being-in-the-world is essentially care" also.⁷³ Care is a technical term which encompasses the technical meanings of concern and solicitude. Dasein is care in the sense that concern and solicitude are rooted in care.⁷⁴ Gelven points out that care can be "subdivided into caring *about*...and caring *for*. Thus I *care about* automobiles, door handles, knives and forks. But I *care for* my brother, my friend, and other people."⁷⁵ Caring about refers, therefore, to things within the environmental context of world, and caring for others to the context of Dasein with other Daseins. Gelven also points out that these two transliterations of the term care align, respectively, with concern and solicitude, which in German share the common etymological root, care, and which Heidegger says "embraces the unity of these ways in which Being may be characterized" as a Being-in-the-world.⁷⁶

As care the unity of Being-in-the-world is "characterized" as "the Being of Dasein...ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the-world) as Being-alongside (entities

⁷³ p. 237, H.193; *Being and Time*

⁷⁴ see p. 237, H.193; *Being and Time*

⁷⁵ p. 122; Gelven (emphases from text)

⁷⁶ p. 237, H.193; *Being and Time* (see also p. 123; Gelven)

encountered within-the-world)."⁷⁷ This complicated phrase carries the point that because Dasein is care the unity of Being-in-the-world--Dasein's basic state--is a paradoxical kind of unity. As care Dasein is ahead-of-itself, not in the sense that it is somehow a spatially divided entity, but in the sense that it is characterized by possibilities that do not apply to all 'entities encountered within-the-world.' As care Dasein is therefore a Being-in-the-world only in the sense that it is 'alongside' entities encountered within the world. Again, the apparent spatial metaphor here does not mean that Dasein is in-a-world because it is somehow spatially beside non-Daseinly entities. Rather, the term alongside is meant to connote the idea that Dasein is not fully within-a-world in the same way as are non-Daseinly entities.

The paradox of unity occurs here because the locus of unity in the reality of Being-in-the-world, care, is a locus of both unity and difference in reality. Care signifies an essential difference between Dasein and not-Dasein, because care applies uniquely to Dasein. As a result of this difference Dasein has possibilities that non-Daseinly entities do not have. It is therefore not a within-the-world entity; rather, it is only alongside the world of entities other than itself. But, insofar as Dasein is 'alongside entities encountered within-the-world,' the reality of Being-in-the-world is not characterized by a complete distinction between Dasein and entities other than Dasein. In addition to the fact that it signifies a difference between Dasein and not-Dasein, care also signifies a certain similarity between Dasein and non-Daseinly entities. I have already indicated in a preliminary way what this similarity is. Dasein is similar to non-Daseinly entities in that even it cannot do anything it wants within

⁷⁷ pp. 236, 237, H.192, 193; *Being and Time*

the realm of environmental, ready-to-hand objects. Because of this Dasein is just as irrevocably tied to a world as are non-Daseinly entities.

Now admittedly it is still not apparent just how it is that care can be said to be the locus of unity and difference in reality. The reason why this is not yet fully apparent is that we still do not have before us a complete understanding of what Heidegger means by care. Care signifies a kind of freedom which belongs uniquely to Dasein. It is in this sense that care ultimately implies difference in reality. But care also signifies a kind of unfreedom which is not unique to Dasein. Unfreedom here means possibilities that do not apply only to Dasein. Because this is the same kind of unfreedom that applies to non-Daseinly entities, care therefore signifies a sameness between Dasein and not-Dasein, or unity in the structure of reality/Being-in-the-world. Care therefore implies the paradox of unity because it is the locus of a paradox of freedom in reality which maintains the paradox of unity. In order to understand fully the paradox of unity we therefore have to have a full understanding of care in its connection with Heidegger's paradoxical concept of freedom. It is in fact the project of the next chapter to fill in the picture in this regard. Before going with this project, however, it is possible to summarize what we have learned about care thus far in such a way that we can gain a useful preview on how the paradox of unity is at once rooted in care, and fully understandable only on the basis of a full understanding of a paradox of freedom which is also rooted in care.

I have pointed out above that concern, solicitude, state-of-mind, understanding, and language indicate that Dasein is care, and that as such it is an entity which has possibilities that entities other than Dasein do not have. Heidegger equates these

kinds of possibilities with freedom.⁷⁸ Freedom applies to Dasein, therefore, because insofar as Dasein's existence is characterized by possibilities which do not apply to non-Daseinly entities, Dasein is not marked by necessity in the same way as are non-Daseinly entities. Other things have possibilities also--an acorn can become an oak tree--but only Dasein has no apparent *specific* possibility. For this reason "[t]he 'essence' of Dasein lies in its existence."⁷⁹ But, as I have also mentioned above, because Dasein is care Dasein is also un-freedom. Dasein cannot escape certain limitations which its Being as care implies. It cannot escape the fact that it is irrevocably tied to a world which limits its existence. Thus, because Dasein is care it is, paradoxically, both freedom and un-freedom.

It is important to note here that freedom is not intended, primarily, to denote something which only applies to Dasein. It is true that the concept derives from an existential analytic of Dasein, but insofar as the existential analytic is being pursued in light of the question about Being, it emerges in that light as a condition of reality. That is, freedom as possibilities is, for Heidegger, not merely a property of Dasein. Possibilities occur in reality as well such that freedom is a condition of reality which applies uniquely to Dasein. Because this point is an important part of my discussions in the following chapter, I will not spend much time elaborating on it now. All I want to do here is indicate the extremely important points that, for Heidegger, 1) freedom is not just a property of Dasein, 2) that it applies to Dasein because Dasein is care, and 3) that in this application freedom always goes hand in hand with a

⁷⁸ p. 237, H.193; *Being and Time*

⁷⁹ p. 67, H.42; *Being and Time* (emphasis from text)

fundamental unfreedom. The purpose here is to give a preview on how it is precisely this paradoxical concept of freedom, rooted in care, which maintains a paradox of unity in reality, also rooted in care. Although freedom *appears* to apply only to Dasein it in fact marks reality as a complex structure characterized by care and freedom such that freedom always exists even though it is not always necessarily realized by Dasein. This point can only be understood fully if we understand the full meaning of care and Heidegger's concept of freedom. As I have indicated this is the project of the next chapter. For now all we need to know is that care indicates that the reality of Dasein, as a Being-in-the-world, is characterized by a paradox of freedom and unfreedom which maintains the paradox of unity and difference in reality. Difference in reality occurs because as care Dasein exists in the face of freedom as possibilities. In contrast to this, unity in reality occurs because as care Dasein's existence is also characterized by unfreedom. Thus the paradox of unity in reality is a function of a paradox of freedom in reality.

PART III: PROBLEMS PERTAINING TO HEIDEGGER'S ANALYSIS

This concludes the exercise of exposing the Paradox of Unity as a preliminary clue to understanding Heidegger's Concept of Freedom. Before closing, however, it would be in order to consider some problems connected with the existential analytic of Dasein as pursued thus far. The reason for this is as follows. Certain problems are already evident which can and should be mentioned here because they are directly related to criticisms I level against Heidegger, at the end of Chapter Three and in

Chapter Four, on the adequacy of his existential analytic and concept of freedom. All of these problems boil down to a latent emphasis on individualism or subjectivism which, because of the way it affects Heidegger's notion of freedom, not only can but has to be highlighted now.

i) Heidegger's Move From the Question About Being to Philosophical Anthropology

Despite the fact that he denies this to be the case Heidegger's attempt to come to grips with the question about Being leads him almost immediately, in *Being and Time*, into a kind of philosophical anthropology. He maintains this denial on the strength of the idea that because he is ultimately guided by the most universal of questions, the question about Being, his inquiry does not answer to the description of any one particular discipline which necessarily has to treat its particular object of inquiry as some sort of thing, a being in fact as opposed to Being itself.⁸⁰ Rather, because he is motivated by the question about Being, he is searching for the ontological foundations of *any* discipline.⁸¹

Nevertheless, the existential analytic of Dasein is to all intents and purposes a kind of philosophical anthropology because even though it is motivated by the question about Being it is based on an attempt to understand that question via the Being of Dasein. Though not intended to deal specifically with the question about

⁸⁰ see pp. 12-13 Chapter One above

⁸¹ see pp. 71-7, H.45-52; *Being and Time*

"what man is"⁸² it does, in explicating what it means for man (Dasein) to be, ultimately deal with precisely that question. I do not think this little inconsistency is necessarily problematic in and of itself. However, I do think it is symptomatic of a general inconsistency in Heidegger which gives rise to some rather serious tensions between the reality as we know it of human being in a human world, and Heidegger's own descriptions of this reality.

ii) The Problem With Heidegger's Analysis of Concern

One area where this problem is apparent is in the discussion of what in-the-world means. It is very difficult to escape the impression when reading Chapter Four of *Being and Time* that the world as it stands in relation to Dasein is largely an intentional structure, a work-world, the character of which is understood by Dasein, largely in terms of its own projects, as a manifold of utility.

In the interest of pointing out the paradox of unity my presentation was concentrated on exposing the relations that obtain between environmentally ready-to-hand objects and equipment, and between Dasein and that environment. But, while I believe this presentation does represent a faithful interpretation of what Heidegger was trying to say, it also tends to cover up a certain tension inherent in the fact that, on Heidegger's view, it appears that the relationship between Dasein and the environmental world is one in which the existence of Dasein is marked predominantly by a preoccupation for efficient exploitation of natural resources. Consider the following

⁸² p. 71, H.45; *Being and Time*

quotation in which Heidegger indicates how Dasein discovers and understands the environmental world:

In equipment that is used, 'Nature' is discovered along with it by that use--the 'Nature' we find in natural products. Here, however, 'Nature' is not to be understood as that which is just present-at-hand, nor as the *power of Nature*. The wood is a forest of timber, the mountain a quarry of rock; the river is water-power, the wind is wind 'in the sails'. As the 'environment' is discovered, the 'Nature' thus discovered is encountered too.⁸³

Heidegger goes on to note that it is only in the mode of the ready-to-hand that "'Nature'...can be discovered and defined...in its pure presence-at-hand." In view of the fact that ready-to-hand and present-at-hand apply to Dasein as concern it seems then that the world of things unlike Dasein is largely an intentional world, a world not only apprehended but also *defined* via a kind of concern that marks Dasein as an inveterate worker.

In addition to the fact that this smacks more of a preconception-laden, anthropocentric kind of subjectivity than of universal objectivity (a view which may not necessarily be a problem but which does, in view of Heidegger's attempt to avoid preconceptions, have to be argued for), it seems to represent a far from adequate understanding of the subjective aspect of human experience. The idea that the world is but a realm of ready-to-hand resources available for the manufacture and use of equipment carries with it the idea that Dasein's concern amounts to a concern for efficiency encompassing not only environmentally ready-to-hand resources but also Dasein itself. But, and as Clark points out:

⁸³ p. 100, H.70; *Being and Time*

...there are areas of subjective experience which do not fall under the structures of equipmentality as presented by the treatise. Consider, for example, the by no means unusual experience of...taking a walk. Not often will one discover a sensibility so systematic as to engage in such an activity in order to make himself a more effective instrument for work....It appears [then] that the course being set by the text cannot avoid yielding a concept of Dasein which shows excessive preoccupation--a compulsive worker.⁸⁴

The point here is that while Heidegger seems to lean heavily towards the view that Dasein is essentially an entity in which concern means a concern for the efficient manufacture and use of equipment, it is by no means clear that Dasein is *a priori* such a compulsive worker. Because this point is not clearly obvious, Heidegger should have a strong argument to convince us that this is indeed the case. But there is no such strong argument in the text of *Being and Time*. Heidegger is therefore building a description of Dasein on the basis of a largely unsubstantiated assumption. Thus, despite the purported claim that he is applying a level of generality or universality that avoids all the presupposition-laden subject matter of individual disciplines, Heidegger seems to be maintaining some rather dogmatic and problematic assumptions about what it means to be human in a human world that have no place in fundamental ontology. Heidegger claims to be trying to understand human existence on the basis of experiences which are supposed to be fundamental to the human. It appears that his analysis leans heavily on the idea that our propensity for exploitation is just such a fundamental experience but, in view of the fact that he does not seem to take into account other possibilities, or at least argue

⁸⁴ pp. 45, 46; Clark

decisively for the one he has chosen, it seems that his understanding of Dasein's relation to the environmental world rests on an unsubstantiated assumption about what is essential to human experience.

The nature of this assumption is such that a kind of subjectivity is implied where, ironically, the paradox of unity is mitigated but at the expense of freedom. Insofar as concern makes Dasein a slave of its worker nature, it gives rise to the idea that Dasein is so subjectively oriented to its world that anything outside its own sphere of involvements has no value other than as means to its own ends. In addition, Dasein now appears to stand pitted against the environmental world, where the essential relationship that begets awareness of itself as concern is one of Dasein's power against the power of nature.

This scenario lends itself to the view that in addition to being a slave to a worker-nature--a slave to the dictates of instinct in fact--Dasein is a slave to the possibilities that equipment affords. Thus freedom is a function solely of what is possible in the environment, and of possibilities which have to do with Dasein's concern to manipulate environmental resources. Gone are the kinds of possibilities which relate to such enjoyable exercises as refreshing mental and physical entertainment which, as Clark points out, do not necessarily have anything to do with a concern for efficient exploitation. Along with the disappearance of these possibilities there is also gone the idea of a freedom implied by the possibility that one is not the slave of some predetermined pattern of behaviour. The result of all this, therefore, is that the sole differences between Dasein and entities other than Dasein are that Dasein appears to have the capacity to exploit, and a capacity to be aware that it is a

slave of an instinctive propensity to be exploitive. In all other ways Dasein's concern indicates it to be very much like its world. It is, for example, very much like certain other non-Daseinly entities which function solely at the level of instinct. Unity here is a function of Dasein being, like certain other non-Daseinly entities, a creature harnessed to the environmental world because of involvements which are dictated largely by instinct. On this picture the only difference between Dasein and non-Daseinly entities would be that Dasein is aware that it is an entity which can and does use everything in its world for purely utilitarian reasons. Thus, the paradox of unity that emerges here emphasizes the subjectivity of Dasein in such a way that Dasein is far more of its world, far more predetermined, and far less free than is implied in Heidegger's statement that "the essence of Dasein lies in its existence."⁸⁵

Now it is true that Heidegger does say that concern ultimately has to do with "letting something be involved," which has the meaning of allowing or "freeing" ready-to-hand things to be what they themselves are, rather than with working or making "improvements upon," which means using ready-to-hand things strictly for our own purposes. Heidegger also indicates that letting something be involved is "the condition for the possibility of encountering anything ready-to-hand...[such that] what is then pertinent is the freeing of *everything* ready-to-hand as ready-to-hand."⁸⁶

However, insofar as letting something be involved only occurs when Dasein realizes the context of relations that makes up the ready-to-hand environment, and insofar as such realization only occurs in the first instance upon the occasion of things like

⁸⁵ p. 237, H.193; *Being and Time*

⁸⁶ p. 117, H.84-5; *Being and Time* (emphasis from text)

signal lights or hammers breaking, it still seems to be the case that Dasein's propensity to be involved with the environmental world springs originally from a utilitarian kind of concern. Thus, even though the ultimate meaning of concern, as 'freeing everything everything ready-to-hand as ready-to-hand,' connotes a less utilitarian kind of involvement, this meaning is not as phenomenologically evident (on the strength of Heidegger's own descriptions) as is the more utilitarian one. Heidegger's actual descriptions of Dasein's involvement with the environmental world does not clearly show, therefore, how it is that a less utilitarian mode of concern is the condition of possibility for exploitative concern.

Heidegger's analysis of concern is therefore problematic no matter how one looks at it. Dasein understands the environmental world as a context of relations because of its concern for working and manufacturing equipment from the realm of the ready-to-hand. This either leads to a very efficiency-oriented view of the subject, which has not been decisively argued for and which Clark suggests may not even be accurate, or it dissolves in light of the fact that Heidegger has not shown how it is that a less utilitarian mode of concern *necessarily* lies at the heart of Dasein's propensity towards exploitation of the environmental world. Neither one of these possibilities necessarily leads towards Heidegger's view on the ultimate meaning of concern. Since both of these options seem to rest on the idea that Dasein is most habitually an inveterate worker, I think we are forced to conclude that rather than being predominantly an existence which lives in the face of possibilities, and which realizes itself as such, Dasein is a creature which realizes itself as distinct from non-

Daseinly entities only because it realizes that it is a slave to a worker nature which causes it to want to exploit the environmental world.

On the results of what Heidegger actually says, as opposed to what he means to say, then, concern makes Dasein very much of its world and unfree because it is a creature of instinct. The only point of distinction between Dasein and not-Dasein is that only Dasein is uniquely cognizant of its predominant instinct, and cognizant of an ability for exploitation and manipulation which non-Daseinly entities do not have. The paradox of unity as manifest here in mitigated form implies a mitigated version of the paradox of freedom. If Dasein is a slave to a worker nature Dasein is far from free. The only freedom it has pertains to the possibilities afforded by environmentally ready-to-hand objects. Not only is all this far from what Heidegger was trying to say about the reality of Dasein's involvements in the environmental world, it does not even appear to be an accurate reflection of human experience. Heidegger's analysis of Dasein's involvements within the environmental world is therefore incoherent primarily because he appears to be labouring under the burden of an unsubstantiated assumption that in the everyday world Dasein is usually an inveterate worker.

iii) The Problem With Heidegger's Analysis of Solitude

This problem is further augmented by a problem connected with what Heidegger has to say about solitude. Recall that solitude refers to the way in which Daseins encounter other Daseins, and that it can be manifest as either an authentic (for-bearing) or inauthentic (overbearing) encounter with the other. I discussed solitude with respect to Heidegger's attempt to show that both the authentic and inauthentic

manifestations of solicitude apply to Dasein such that neither manifestation has ontological priority. Again, as with the discussion on concern, I made this point in order to highlight a paradox of unity that emerges out of what I think is insightful in Heidegger's analysis. The problem with this interpretation, though, is that it is not without tension, despite the fact that I believe it to represent Heidegger's intention to maintain a presuppositionless standpoint. This tension is similar to that which marks Heidegger's position on concern. As concern seems to revolve around a relationship between Dasein and not-Dasein such that Dasein is problematically subjectivized, solicitude revolves around a relationship between Dasein and other Daseins such that Being-with defers more to the subjective connotation of Being-one's-self than to Being-with others.

When Dasein walks along the edge of a carefully cultivated field, it is Heidegger's contention that Dasein meets another Dasein, the Dasein who tilled the field, "from out of the *world* in which concerned...Dasein essentially dwells."⁸⁷ It is on the basis of this that Heidegger seems to want to defend the view that "Dasein is essentially Being-with" in a neutral sense. The idea seems to be that as I realize the existence of other Daseins via a realization that there are others in the world capable of showing concern and of being involved in the environmental world as I am, I find a kinship with those others on the basis of that realization. However, Heidegger ends up saying that because "Being-with is in every case a characteristic of one's own Dasein...[o]nly so far as one's own Dasein has the essential structure of Being-with,

⁸⁷ p. 155, H.119; *Being and Time* (emphasis from text)

is it Dasein-with as encounterable for Others."⁸⁸ The problem with this is that, for Heidegger, Being-with seems to be, primarily, a function of Being-one's-self, rather than vice versa, because Dasein cannot understand others without first understanding itself.

The problem with this view is that the scenario of meeting another Dasein while walking by a field cultivated by the other does not in and of itself necessarily imply that there is any neutrality involved in the realization that there is another Dasein in the world. In fact it would seem that precisely the opposite is implied; Dasein has to have self-knowledge before knowledge of another is possible. This scenario entails encounter through the medium of some equipment that has been manufactured or used by some other. Such a medium would only indicate another if Dasein already knew, from its own experience, that it takes a Dasein to make and use equipment. The Dasein which walks along the edge of the field would at least have to know enough about itself to know that only another Dasein could have tilled the field. What is important about this is that in order for a Dasein to realize the existence of another out of the world in which concern dwells, it would first have to have a knowledge of the self, and the degree to which it can know the other is determined by the degree to which it knows itself. Thus, in order for Dasein as Being-with to occur, Dasein as Being-one's-self has to occur first.

This is a problem because Heidegger just seems to assume that self-knowledge precedes knowledge of the other. He does not provide any detailed argument, consonant with his phenomenological method of investigation, for holding the view

⁸⁸ see pp. 156, 157, H.120, 121; *Being and Time*

that Dasein is primarily a self before it is a social self. All he does show, and this quite successfully I think, is that Dasein is a social self that does have the possibility of relating to other Daseins in a way quite different from the way in which it can relate to things other than itself. But from this it is by no means clear that this social relationship arrives first from a discovery of the self.

When get into my detailed criticisms of Heidegger in Chapter Four following I intend to show that this assumption needs to be argued for, because there are other positions, held by other philosophers, according to which it is not true that knowledge of the other is based *a priori* on knowledge of the self. The reason for this is that because there are justifiable reasons for holding that humans experience the other at least simultaneously, if not before, they experience the self, it might be inaccurate to suggest that knowledge of the self as a individual precedes knowledge of the self as a social self. When I do take this issue up in detail, I shall do so within context of a consideration of the philosophical anthropology of Martin Buber, who criticized Heidegger on just this point, and who also held that the social relationship between humans is so basic that the self is *not* fully discovered until or unless the social relationship itself is discovered.⁸⁹ My intention at that time will be to show that Buber's view represents a possibility which Heidegger has ignored, and that because he has ignored it his analysis on what it means to be human in a human world is not so presuppositionlessly engaged as he might have thought. For now I simply want to indicate that this is a focal issue in my upcoming criticisms of

⁸⁹ The text I am referring to here, and to which I shall make more detailed reference later, is on pp. 163-81; Martin Buber, *Between Man and Man*, transl. by Ronald Gregor Smith, U.S.A.: Mac-Millan Publishing Co. (Collier Books), 1965.

Heidegger, and that in regard to those criticisms I do intend to substantiate them by offering an alternative to the view, intimated in Heidegger, that realization of the self as a social self only follows from realization of the self as an individual self. In addition, I make mention of this problem here in order that I might indicate what happens to the paradoxes of unity and freedom as a result of it.

The problematic assumption at hand here--i.e., that knowledge of the other is a function primarily of self-knowledge--seems to alter the paradox of unity in a rather disturbing way. If solicitude means primarily Being-one's-self before Being-with others, care, manifest as solicitude, signifies not just an essential disunity or difference between Dasein and non-Daseinly entities, which difference obtains when Dasein understands itself in its real nature (in authentic solicitude), but also an essential, anti-social sort of disunity between individual Daseins. Consequently, the sole unity that remains is the unity implied by the fact that Dasein is irrevocably tied to the environmental world. This alteration of the paradox of unity is disturbing because, insofar as it implies that Dasein is a decidedly anti-social creature, it reveals that Heidegger's thought tends towards a rather solipsistic view of the human in society which is 1) incoherent because it has not been clearly argued for, 2) certainly at odds with what Heidegger was trying to say about solicitude, and 3) as I shall try to show in Chapter Four, probably not an accurate depiction of human life in a human world.

With respect to the paradox of freedom, a problem emerges when one tries to consider what it means in relation to practical reality. I propose to deal with this problem in detail later, because in order to understand it fully we first have to know

more about Heidegger's concept of freedom, and know more about how freedom applies to Dasein as a result of Dasein's authenticity. However, because this problem is a most serious one and absolutely central to my criticisms of Heidegger, and because we already have enough material covered to understand where it originates and what some of its ramifications are, I shall give it some brief consideration right now. The only thing that should be kept in mind is that the following discussion is not intended to be a complete treatment on the subject at hand. Certain questions that might arise here should not be a cause for concern, therefore, because this issue will be dealt with later on in more detail.

If Dasein is most essentially a Being-one's-self, there is no longer any necessary basis upon which to describe the kind of necessary limitations on personal freedom that follow from human relationships in practical reality. Lacking any essential basis for human relations, there is, for example, no way to describe meaningfully, at the level of fundamental ontology, the kinds of rules and regulations that inevitably and necessarily must accompany the reality of humans living together in society. In fact, the way in which Heidegger disparagingly describes the reality of human society in terms of an everyday world, the dominant characteristic of which is that it is comprised of inauthenticity, one would have to think he would probably reject such mundane considerations. To some extent one could understand such a rejection, because Heidegger's project is to get beyond such specific considerations, which he would probably argue can only be engaged properly after first having gained an ontologically sound understanding of the Being of Dasein. However, this does not mean that there is not a problem here.

I believe the paradox of freedom faithfully and effectively carries Heidegger's idea that when Dasein realizes itself as care it realizes that it has some but not any and every possibilities. When Dasein realizes itself as care it therefore realizes that its freedom goes hand in hand with some fundamental limitations, or hand in hand with a fundamental unfreedom, which occur because Dasein cannot be at any given moment more than what the context of the world it is in and defines will allow. This appears to be consistent with the idea that in human society we frequently have to make rules which have the effect of negating certain individual freedoms or possibilities so that a maximum amount of freedom is retained. An example of such a rule is a law against stealing. If stealing were condoned individuals would have the possibility or freedom of taking anything they wanted from anyone else. The problem with this though is that no one would be able to own property with any kind of assurance that such ownership would be generally respected. They would always have to guard against the possibility that someone might want to take away what they own. A law against theft therefore has the simultaneous effect of restricting the freedom to steal while preserving the freedom to own. With respect to the paradox of freedom as it relates to Heidegger, however, this manifestation of a paradox of freedom in reality does not really apply because Heidegger's concept of freedom rests on a view of human authenticity which would be denied by anything like practical laws against theft. Thus, in his attempt to describe the reality of human being in a human world at the level of a fundamental ontology which goes beyond the level of ontic (i.e., practical) concerns, Heidegger ends up so far removed from practical reality that his understanding of human being in a human world is no longer relevant to practical

reality. This is a problem for two reasons. First, the analysis is incoherent precisely because it is so far removed from practical reality. Second, it fails on the strength of Heidegger's own injunction to not depart so far from the reality of real experience that all meaningful contact with phenomenal reality is lost.⁹⁰ As I will eventually show in detail, both of these reasons tie in with a latent subjectivity consonant with Heidegger's emphasis on the priority of Being-one's-self as opposed to Being-with others.

iv) The Problem With Heidegger's Analysis of State-of-Mind, or Anxiety

The problem of latent subjectivity continues to be a problem with respect to what Heidegger has to say about state-of-mind. It was pointed out that the basic elemental state-of-mind of Dasein, by which it comes to know itself as it is, as an entity which though tied to a world is yet unlike entities other than itself in that world, is anxiety.

The question that comes to mind here is, why anxiety? That is, why is the experience which represents Dasein's first *a priori* sense of the paradox of unity and freedom a negative experience? Part of the answer to this question is supplied by Heidegger himself. Anxiety is not so much a negative experience as a sense of "uncanniness," a sense of "not-being-at-home."⁹¹ In this sense anxiety signifies Dasein's discovery that its Being is not like the Being of equipment because it is somehow not at home in-the-world in the same way as is equipment. This, however,

⁹⁰ I provide more detailed references when I take this point up again later, in the following chapters. For now cf. for example p. 37, H.16; *Being and Time*.

⁹¹ p. 233, H.188; *Being and Time*

does not fully escape the connotation that anxiety is a negative experience because the sense of not being at home in a world is also a sense of nothingness, a nothingness which applies specifically to the Being of Dasein. In "What is Metaphysics", Heidegger seeks to clarify this sense still further by pointing out that in anxiety one "cannot be opposed to joy or even to the comfortable enjoyment of tranquilized bustle [because] [i]t stands--outside all such opposition--in secret alliance with the cheerfulness and gentleness of creative longing."⁹²

Despite all this, though, it is still difficult to escape the sense that anxiety still has primarily negative connotations. It seems to be a phenomenon which tells Dasein what it is by continually holding Dasein in front of that which it is not. Furthermore, it is an individuating experience; it separates Dasein thematically from the opposite of nothing, which is everything.⁹³

Three points should be noticed from this. First, because Dasein is thus individuated it stands alone before it learns anything about other Daseins or about the environmental context of entities other than Dasein. Second, account has not been taken of the possibility that Dasein can learn something fundamental about itself and about its world out of the "comfortable enjoyment of tranquilized bustle" that does frequently characterize its normal sphere of living. And, third, because anxiety is such an individuating, negative experience it connotes the same levels of disunity and freedom as does solicitude.

⁹² p. 108; "What is Metaphysics" in Krell

⁹³ see p. 235, H.191; *Being and Time*

v) The Ongoing Spirit of this Critique

At this point I should indicate that I do not take issue with Heidegger because he appears to destroy my topical concerns, the paradoxes of unity and freedom. The issue is bigger than that. These paradoxes concern what I think is enlightening in Heidegger's thought, and my criticisms concern problems which threaten his insights. (In the following chapters I give more detail on just what these insights are.) Therefore, my interest in retaining the paradoxes of unity and freedom as they emerge out of Heidegger is motivated by my intention to come to a critical understanding of Heidegger in such a way that in addition to exposing problems in his thought I also preserve his insights.

In keeping with the intention to preserve what is insightful in Heidegger, it should be pointed out, in Heidegger's favour, that he does not claim to have said the last word on what it means for Dasein to be in a world. At the end of *Being and Time* he says that, although his method of being guided by the universal question about Being should be adhered to, "our way of exhibiting the constitution of Dasein's Being remains only *one way* which we may take."⁹⁴ What is most important to Heidegger is his method of investigation which demands an openness to phenomena as they appear. With respect to the existential analytic as he engaged it he can, in view of his undeniable attempt to maintain a presuppositionless standpoint, claim to have been so open. Heidegger therefore appears to be open to correction on points of content, such as are connected with the problems mentioned above, or on exactly

⁹⁴ p. 487, H.436; *Being and Time* (emphases from text)

how one should approach an understanding as to what it means for Dasein to be in a world.

The foregoing critique is in fact deliberately situated around this intentional openness, or constructive relativism, in order to lay the foundation for another way of approaching the question about what it means to be human in a human world. This way flows out of Martin Buber's critique of Heidegger and concerns Buber's philosophical anthropology which, in Chapter Four, I shall suggest can be viewed not so much as a direct alternative but as a corrective supplement on Heidegger. Before I can do this, however, it is first necessary to develop further both Heidegger's concept of freedom as well as my own criticisms of Heidegger. This will prepare the way for using Buber to point out that the paradoxes of unity and freedom still apply in view of 1) the fact that, although there are other ways to view Dasein than as an inveterate worker, or as a self before it is a social self, it still remains that the unity of Dasein and not-Dasein is a function of a fundamental difference between Dasein and not-Dasein; and 2) the fact that, although Dasein's essential experience by which it comes to know itself and its world is not necessarily anxiety, Dasein still stands as the locus both of a paradoxical kind of unity and a paradoxical kind of freedom.

PART IV: TRANSITIONAL EVALUATION OF PROGRESS TO DATE

Before concluding this chapter it would be useful to give a summary evaluation of what has been established thus far in our examination of Division One, *Being and Time*. In this evaluation I first reiterate the basic reasons why I am in-

interested in Heidegger's concept of freedom, and then summarize what has been learned about this topic thus far. The purpose here is to show how our examination of the paradox of unity is a necessary step on the way to arriving at a critical understanding of Heidegger's paradoxical concept of freedom.

i) The Relevance of Heidegger's Concept of Freedom

The reason why I am interested in Heidegger's concept of freedom is because it provides a good way to come to a critical understanding of his project in *Being and Time*. It was mentioned in Chapter One of this paper that the question about Being brings a presuppositionless kind of openness or universal objectivity to philosophical inquiry. This openness ties in thematically with freedom as possibilities.

Because Heidegger places a demand for universal objectivity upon himself at the outset of his inquiry he has placed upon himself the demand to be open to whatever possibilities might arise from it. And because he has to be so open to possibilities one might say that he has placed himself within the parameters of his own concept of freedom. An understanding of the content of Heidegger's project leads to the realization that the locus of unity and difference in the phenomenon of Being-in-the-world is care, which is in turn the locus of the paradoxes of unity and freedom. A *critical* understanding of the content of Heidegger's project, as the preceding critique points out, reveals that Heidegger himself may not have succeeded entirely in adopting his own espoused universally objective standpoint, or concept of freedom. The fact that he appears to be labouring under the burden of some probl-

ematic, unsubstantiated assumptions about human subjectivity is an indication that there are problems connected with either Heidegger's concept of freedom or his failure to adopt it adequately. Thus, around the concept of freedom, Heidegger's whole project stands in doubt.

As mentioned, also in the foregoing critique, I suspect that the problem lies less with Heidegger's concept of freedom than it does with his own failure to shed some unnecessary preconceptions about the nature of human experience with respect to the environmental world, with respect to other humans, and with respect to human anxiety and the human understanding of what it means to be human in a human world. Therefore, the continuation of this exercise will be concerned first with developing Heidegger's concept of freedom more fully, and then with pointing out how it might still be salvaged with the aid of insights from Martin Buber's views on what it means to be human in a human world. In the meantime this chapter concludes with the following review of what has been accomplished thus far.

ii) General Review of Progress to Date

The reason why I have chosen to get at the concept of freedom in Heidegger via his extended analysis of the constitution of reality/Being-in-the-world is because it really isn't possible to grasp his concept of freedom without a thorough understanding of how he views the human and the world. To be human, for Heidegger, is to exist in a world in which one is, paradoxically, both free and un-free. This cannot be made apparent without first showing that Dasein is care. Care is the reason why Dasein expresses its existence as concern and solicitude. Care is also the reason why

Dasein experiences anxiety which, when understood and brought to language, indicates that Dasein is the locus of both unity and difference in the ontological phenomenon of reality (Being-in-the-world). Through care Dasein is both within and without its world, both absorbed and fascinated with its various everyday tasks with all their accompanying limitations, and yet beyond all its tasks with all their limitless significations. Through care Dasein is stamped at once with finite actuality and infinite potentiality. Dasein is finite in the sense that it is necessarily "fallen" or "thrown" into an everyday environment; it is infinite in the sense that it is marked by the immanent character of possibility.⁹⁵

Freedom is rooted in care. And because it is rooted in care it is as paradoxical as is care. Care is paradoxical because it is both *the* unifying and *the* distinguishing phenomenon of what it means to be human in a human world; it both unites and divides reality. Freedom is paradoxical because Dasein is both free and unfree. Dasein is free in that it is different from its world. Freedom, for Heidegger, is synonymous with possibilities. Thus Dasein is free in that it is marked by the immanent character of possibility. But Dasein is also finite. Thus freedom goes hand-in-hand with un-freedom.

It is not the purpose of this chapter to get into a detailed discussion/critique of freedom. The intention here has been to prepare the way for such a discussion and critique which, because of the way freedom is so tied to Heidegger's concept of what it is to be human in a human world, is now open. For now, freedom is directly connected with a kind of transcendence, and rooted in care, such that it is possible to

⁹⁵ see section 38, pp. 219-24, H.175-80; *Being and Time*

say that Dasein "understands itself in terms of [an] existence [which it can decide]."⁹⁶ In addition, however, freedom is a function of a kind of authenticity which is a necessary condition for it to occur. How this is so is the topic of the next chapter.

⁹⁶ cf. p. 33, H.12; *Being and Time*. Do not read this last to mean that freedom is rooted in will. This is not what Heidegger means. Dasein can decide its existence in the sense that existence is an issue for it because it is care, which implies possibilities. Will (and "wishing") "are rooted with ontological necessity in Dasein as care". (p. 238, H.194; *Being and Time*) There is no such thing as freedom rooted in will, for Heidegger, because on a scale of ontological priority care and freedom come first as the *a priori* ground(s) of will.

CHAPTER THREE

The Paradox of Freedom

INTRODUCTION

In the preceding chapter, I indicated that Heidegger's concept of freedom, founded on the notion of possibility, is at once something which applies to Dasein *and* a condition of reality. What I meant by this is that freedom is an integral part of the reality of Dasein as Being-in-the-world. As such freedom is something real which Dasein can have. The idea that freedom is a condition of reality is reminiscent of the Kantian postulate of freedom. The fact that, for Heidegger, freedom applies to Dasein, is a result of Heidegger's attempt to show that freedom is not simply a metaphysical postulate; rather it is something real which can be shown to apply to Dasein.¹ The result of this attempt gives rise to a concept of freedom which can be expressed as follows: There is freedom in reality which does apply to Dasein because there are possibilities in reality which apply to Dasein. The locus of this freedom is care.

In the preceding chapter I have also tried to show, from an exegesis of Division I of *Being and Time*, that reality is a structurally unified phenomenon which

¹ cf. p. 2; Michel Haar, "The Question of Human Freedom in the Later Heidegger", *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XXVIII, Supplement, 1989, pp. 1-15.

includes that which is Dasein and that which is not Dasein. The object was to show that the locus of this unity in reality is care. But care is also the distinguishing phenomenon between Dasein and entities other than Dasein. Hence care emerged as the locus of what I call the paradox of unity.

Despite the dominant problem of a latent subjectivity, indicated by my critique at the end of the foregoing chapter, the paradox of unity concerns what I consider to be enlightening in Heidegger's attempt to get at the question about what it means to be, via a preliminary analysis of what it means to-be-in-a-world. I believe Heidegger has successfully described, at the level of ontology which takes its guide from phenomenological evidence, the difference and the locus of difference between the existence of, say, a stone (an entity other than Dasein) and a human (Dasein). Dasein is different from a stone because it has possibilities, or a level of freedom, that stones do not have. But Heidegger has also successfully shown that this same locus of difference is a point of unity in a reality which is composed both of Dasein and entities other than Dasein. Dasein exists as alike a stone. That is, because care holds it to reality which includes limits upon what possibilities are available to it, it shares in the kind of unfreedom that characterizes such nonDaseinly entities as stones. As the locus of such unity Dasein's freedom therefore goes hand in hand with unfreedom.

Now the question might be asked here, just what is so insightful about all this? After all it does seem intuitively obvious that Daseins (i.e., humans) are different from non-Daseinly entities like stones because Daseins can do things that stones cannot. It also seems clear that Dasein is freer than stones, or that Dasein has

a higher level of freedom than do stones, precisely because Dasein has possibilities that stones do not have. Furthermore, it seems equally obvious that Dasein is bound to and conditioned (i.e., limited) by its existence in a world much of which it is unlike. In this respect Dasein is not total freedom, meaning it is not totally characterized by possibilities, or that not all possibilities are its own.

All this is true. But what is not so intuitively obvious is just how this combination of unity and difference occur and, correspondingly, how freedom rooted in care is something real. It is therefore not at all clear just how the paradox of unity is a function of a paradox of freedom, where freedom, founded on care, signifies the difference between Dasein and not-Dasein and where unfreedom, also founded on care, signifies a unity or a sameness between Dasein and not-Dasein.

Thus far our examination of Division I of *Being and Time* has revealed how the paradox of unity occurs. By carefully appealing to and analyzing certain basic experiences of Dasein, Heidegger shows that Dasein's ability or propensity to be concernfully involved with entities other than Dasein, to be solicitously involved with other Daseins, and to experience the attuning phenomenon of anxiety is rooted in care. Because Dasein manifests concern, solicitude, and anxiety, it can be said that Dasein is care. In addition, and because it is care, Dasein has possibilities which entities other than Dasein do not have. Dasein therefore has a level of freedom that distinguishes it from entities other than itself. But care, although it applies specifically to Dasein, is also a central phenomenon in the reality of Being-in-the-world. That is, care is not just some metaphysical-only description of the Being of Dasein. As evidenced by the paradox of unity in reality for which it is responsible, care is a

real central aspect of the Being of Dasein as Being-in-the-world. We already have, therefore, a clue as to how it can be said that freedom is a condition of reality which does actually apply to Dasein. It is a function of the existential phenomenon care, which shapes reality in such a way as to give rise to the paradox of unity.

In addition, we already have a clue as to how it can be said that the paradox of unity is ultimately defined by what I call the paradox of freedom. Difference in reality is defined by freedom in that a difference in freedom is what ultimately makes Dasein different from entities other than Dasein. Unity in reality is a function of a fundamental unfreedom that goes hand in hand with the freedom of Dasein. Reality places limits on Dasein such that its possibilities are limited. Dasein's freedom is therefore limited. Thus, insofar as it is characterized by a kind of unfreedom characterizing non-Daseinly entities, Dasein shares in, or is unified with, a reality that includes both Dasein and not-Dasein. All of this is a function of one phenomenon, called care, which both unifies reality and yet applies specifically to Dasein. Thus Heidegger has managed to show, on the basis of phenomenological evidence--i.e., experiences of Dasein---one underlying phenomenon at the heart of unity, difference, and freedom in reality.

Now admittedly the underlying phenomenon so exposed is rather vague. Care appears to be little more than a name. But insofar as this name successfully encompasses the phenomena of concern, solicitude, and anxiety, which do reveal that there are meaningful though limited possibilities in reality, it successfully stands for some one phenomenon that enhances our intuitive understanding of the difference between Dasein and entities other than Dasein, and of freedom. In this respect I think

Heidegger's work contains valuable insights; the hermeneutic circle *has* been expanded such that a common intuition about the difference between Dasein and entities other than Dasein, and about freedom, is given substance in a name, care, which stands for *the* ontological phenomenon lying at the heart of unity, difference, and freedom in reality.

Thus far, however, the present investigation has really only arrived in detail at an understanding that as care Dasein is the locus of both unity and difference in reality. Heidegger's concept of freedom as possibilities has been very sketchily delineated. We know in very general terms only that freedom as possibilities is a function of care. This does not signify a full understanding of Heidegger's concept of freedom and of care. For Heidegger, freedom is a possibility always available to, though not always necessarily realized by, Dasein. In this sense freedom may be thought of as a condition of reality. It is that possibility out of many possibilities in reality, some of which do and some of which do not apply to Dasein. But freedom is one possibility that is always available to Dasein when Dasein realizes an authentic mode of anxiety that is universally possible for all Daseins. In this sense freedom may be thought of as a condition of reality that does apply meaningfully (i.e., genuinely) to Dasein as Dasein.

In order to make all this clear, my first task will be that of showing how Heidegger expands the present preliminary understanding of care such that the paradox of unity and difference in reality emerges as a function, primarily, of a freedom in reality which ultimately applies to Dasein when Dasein realizes, in an authentic mode of anxiety, the full meaning of care. Freedom is, therefore, a function

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of a kind of authenticity whereby Dasein's existence is characterized by future related possibilities. This subject is the topic of section one, Part I following, entitled "Care as Being-Towards-Death, or Being-Towards-a-Future". After this it needs to be shown how Heidegger appeals to two basic experiences, conscience and guilt, in an attempt to prove that this authentic mode of anxiety and the freedom it implies is a universal and genuine possibility for all Daseins. I undertake this topic in section two, Part I following, entitled "Authenticity, The Call of Conscience, and Conscience as the Call of Care". Finally, it needs to be shown how freedom as possibilities is a function of the full meaning of care by virtue of a connection between care and time. This is the topic of section three, Part I following, entitled "The Full Meaning of Care in Its Connection With Temporality".

Throughout the forthcoming analyses I will also maintain an ongoing attempt to show how Heidegger's concept of freedom is paradoxical; it entails a fundamental unfreedom. This paradox has to do with the fact that, for Heidegger, freedom is a function of care. Heidegger tries to prove that Dasein has real freedom, by showing that freedom is a function of Dasein authentically manifesting care. But when Dasein is authentic it manifests a fundamental unfreedom as well.

The intention here is to prepare the way for considering the implications Heidegger's concept of freedom holds for the possibility of understanding Being-in-the-world in terms of human agency in a communal world. In the previous chapter I indicated that Heidegger's position on authenticity is problematic because it rests an unsubstantiated priority of the subject. Despite this problem I do think, as indicated above, that Heidegger's paradoxical concept of freedom, and the paradox of unity it

maintains, are potentially insightful descriptions of what it means to be human in a human world. Because of the problem of a latent, unsubstantiated subjectivity, however, I also think the paradox of freedom that emerges from a full understanding of Heidegger's concept of freedom is not necessarily an accurate depiction of the way in which freedom actually is paradoxical in the reality of human being in a human world. The underlying reason for this is attributable, I believe, to the problematic way in which Heideggerian authenticity rests on a priority of the subject, and on the priority of Dasein's relationship to Being. In Part II of this chapter, therefore, the criticisms started at the end of the preceding chapter are carried forward to show that Heidegger's notion of authenticity, upon which freedom is grounded, does not necessarily give rise to an adequate understanding of human community primarily because of his failure to recognize the possibility that knowledge of the individual self does not *necessarily* precede knowledge of the social self. The primary consequence of this failure is that a meaningful notion of moral freedom in a human community might be inconsistent with Heidegger's concept of freedom. The following chapter then picks up on this problem within the context of Martin Buber's critique of Heidegger, to show that although Heidegger's work is flawed in this respect, his insights need not be abandoned even if made subject to such modifications as are implied by the kind of authenticity and moral freedom entailed in Buber's view of community.

PART I: THE FULL MEANING OF CARE AS A FUNCTION OF AUTHENTICITY

As mentioned in the Introduction above, in order to grasp Heidegger's concept of freedom it is necessary to go beyond our present preliminary understanding that as care Dasein has freedom because it has possibilities that non-Daseinly entities do not have. Because Dasein really only has freedom when it is authentic, we need to examine certain basic experiences appealed to by Heidegger to show that authenticity is, if not always actual, at least a meaningful (i.e., genuine) possibility for Dasein. In addition, we need to show how authenticity implies freedom on the basis of a connection between care and time. Before all this, however, we need to have before us a clear understanding as to just what is entailed in authenticity. This is the subject of section 1 following. After having established what authenticity means, I then go on to show, in sections 2 and 3 respectively, how authenticity and freedom are genuine possibilities, and how they are ultimately the function of a link established between care and time. In addition, throughout the following analyses I will also carry on the theme of showing that Heidegger's concept of freedom is paradoxical because it entails a fundamental unfreedom that is a function of freedom itself.

As in the previous chapter, my primary reference here will be *Being and Time*, though now I will be concentrating on themes from Division II. I continue to choose *Being and Time* as the primary reference because this work contains the foundational material to which Heidegger himself continually refers when discussing the topic of freedom in other works. The procedure to be employed here is not unlike

that employed in the previous chapter to explicate how the existential components of Being-in-the-world entail certain basic experiences--concern, solicitude, and anxiety--that have ontological import; they point towards care as the Being of Dasein. Now, certain new experiences are analyzed to reveal not only that but also how care always holds forth the possibility of authenticity and so freedom. These fundamental experiences, to be discussed in the following order, are: 1)"Being-towards-death", or Being-towards-a-future, and 2)authenticity, the "call of conscience" and "conscience as the call of care".² Following this the full meaning of care in its connection with time is described, in order to show that authenticity and freedom are, primarily, a function of Dasein being authentically resolute towards future related possibilities.

i) Care as Being-Towards-Death, or Being-towards-a-Future

For Heidegger, death is an event, the experience of which provides Dasein with an occasion for coming to know something irrefutable about its existence. Now it may seem odd to say Dasein experiences death. What does this mean? And what does it mean to say one can come to know something about oneself through death? After all how can one experience that which is to all intents and purposes the end of experience and existence as we know it? As Michael Gelven writes: "Death is something we cannot experience. There is an ancient Epicurean argument that attests to this: 'If death is there, you aren't; if you are there, death isn't.' The Epicureans used this argument to convince their followers not to fear death."³

² cf. pp. 276-8, H.233-5; *Being and Time*, and p. 141; Gelven

³ p. 145; Gelven

Heidegger too recognizes that on the face of it his contention is rather odd--
 "Surely this sort of thing is denied to any particular Dasein in relation to itself."⁴
 However, what Heidegger is trying to do here is achieve an "existential conception of death."⁵ He is less interested in describing what one actually experiences at the moment of death, than in describing the ontological import of death. Thus, when Heidegger says that "Dasein can gain an experience of death,"⁶ he means that death can be experienced as an existential phenomenon which indicates something important about the Being of Dasein. There are two ways in which death is experienced as an existential phenomenon.

First, a change occurs with death which is evident to Dasein because of its experience of Being-with others. "Dasein can thus gain an experience of death, all the more so because Dasein is essentially Being with Others....In the dying of the Other we can experience that remarkable phenomenon of Being which may be defined as the change-over of an entity from Dasein's kind of Being (or life) to no longer Dasein. The *end* of the entity *qua* Dasein is the *beginning* of the same entity *qua* something present-at-hand."⁷ Because of the fact that we do experience death, in

⁴ p. 281, H.237; *Being and Time*

⁵ p. 280-81, H.237; *Being and Time*

⁶ p. 281, H.237; *Being and Time*

⁷ p. 281, H.238; *Being and Time*. (emphases from text) Presumably, in this day and age, where the issue of organ donation is a practical reality, death may be viewed not just as the occasion of a change from Dasein to something theoretically present-at-hand but as the occasion of a change from Dasein to something practically ready-to-hand. Heidegger indicates that the "deceased" can and customarily does become an object only of the more abstract or theoretical mode of concern, primarily because "the deceased, in his kind of Being, is 'still more' than just an item of equipment, environmentally ready-to-hand, about which one can be concerned". (p. 282, H.238; *Being and Time*) Of course organ donation was not a reality when *Being and Time* was written but surely Heidegger must

the sense that we can realize its affects on the other who has died, death *is* experienced. It is an event which seems to signify above all a change from an entity which is alive, active, and capable of carrying out decisions and life projects to something inanimate which no longer displays the characteristics of something living. Thus death is experienced here as an event signifying a change from the Being of Dasein to the Being of something present-at-hand or ready-to-hand.⁸

The second thing evident about death is that it is inevitable.⁹ Though we do not know exactly what it means to experience death directly, we are capable of experiencing it as something impending. That is, we are perennially before the possibility of realizing certain ontological implications that accompany this one event that does, inevitably, happen to each and every of us.

Now when I say 'possibility of realizing' what death means, I mean that, according to Heidegger, Dasein tends in everyday experience to forget the ontological significance of the change that occurs at death. Dasein's normal tendency is to concentrate on the world of the living, and on its various projects in that world. In

have been aware of similar type practices, such as using human cadavers for medical research or teaching, which did occur in and prior to his day. Admittedly, the issue as to whether the deceased becomes like something present-at-hand or ready-to-hand is of secondary importance to the point that at death Dasein becomes no longer Dasein. However, it is interesting and relevant to speculate on the implications this line of thinking holds for the issue of using human remains for science. In this context the Heideggerian view of the change that occurs at death seems to align with the implication that science and technology entail fields of knowledge which, when these become commonplace, break down the distance between Dasein and objects other than Dasein such that the latter become objects of a quite unreflective, utilitarian kind of concern.

⁸ see n. 7 above

⁹ It should be pointed out here that Heidegger takes pains to point out that death is an "empirical" rather than "apodictic" or theoretical certainty. Thus, "[d]eath is probable in the highest degree for every man, yet it is not 'unconditionally' certain." It is on the basis of this that he makes the unequivocal statement, "Death is an undeniable 'fact of experience'." (see p. 301, H.257; *Being and Time*)

this respect Dasein tends to hide from or forget the full ontological implications of death. By retreating to the current everyday they-world environment of concern and solicitude, the phenomenon of anxiety is manifest collectively as a kind of cover-up on what death reveals to Dasein about itself. In the everyday world involving projects connected with plans and objects relative to the living it is never really myself who is dying; it is always the other. "'Death' is encountered as a well-known event occurring within-the-world. As such it remains in the inconspicuousness characteristic of what is encountered in an everyday fashion." Thus, in the everyday environment we console ourselves about death by saying something like, "'One of these days one will die too, in the end; but right now it has nothing to do with us'." The result is that "'Dying' is levelled off to an occurrence which reaches Dasein, to be sure, but belongs to nobody in particular."¹⁰ The point here is that because the full ontological implications of death are not necessarily realized Dasein only has the *possibility* of realizing them.

Nevertheless, Heidegger does hold that there are ontological implications connected with death which, though possible to realize only, are still actually realizable when an authentic mode of anxiety prevails. The term Being-towards-death signifies this authentic mode of anxiety. The issue as to just how Heidegger attempts to prove that Being-towards-death is a real possibility will be discussed in detail in section 2 following. For now the object is to indicate what the ontological implications of death are that attend this authentic mode of anxiety.

¹⁰ p. 297, H., 253; *Being and Time*

There are three ontological implications connected with Being-towards-death. First, although not something that can be experienced directly, death is, in the sense that it "*stands before us--[as] something impending*,"¹¹ an individuating experience. Grounded in the fact that "*No one can take the Other's dying away from him*"¹² is the implication that "By its very essence, death is in every case mine...." The ontological significance of death here is that it is an individuating experience. Dasein is brought before itself in a kind of self-awareness that tells it irrefutably about a future event whereby it shall one day endure a transformation "from Dasein to no-longer-Dasein as Being-no-longer-in-the-world."¹³

This implication gives rise to a second. Awareness of the fact that it will someday die--that is, someday become not-Dasein--brings Dasein face to face with the issue of its own Being.¹⁴ If Dasein recognizes the fact that "Death is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of [the Being of] Dasein,"¹⁵ it displays a mode of anxiety different from that everyday one which tends to cover over the ontological implications of death. Dasein now stands squarely before its own impending end in

¹¹ p. 294, H.250; *Being and Time* (emphases from text)

¹² This is not to say of course that one cannot sometimes prevent another from dying. What Heidegger is noting though, and what is pretty clear in any case, is that no one can escape the fact that one must one day die.

¹³ p. 284, H.240; *Being and Time* (emphases within quotes are from text)

¹⁴ "...death signifies a peculiar possibility-of-Being in which the very Being of one's own Dasein is an issue." (p. 284, H.240; *Being and Time*)

¹⁵ p. 294, H.250; *Being and Time*

such a way that it stands before itself, individuated, cognizant, and 'concerned'¹⁶ about its own Being.

The third and most important implication now follows. Dasein's present Being is modified by an experience of something in the future, death. It therefore becomes aware of itself ("disclosed to itself" in Heidegger's parlance) as being what Heidegger calls "ahead-of-itself".¹⁷ The term ahead-of-itself has already been mentioned previously (Chap. 2) in a lengthy (and confusing) phrase cited from Heidegger to articulate the full meaning of the structure of care. Death, experienced as something impending, therefore implies the structure of care.

In an earlier explanation of the words Heidegger uses to capture the sense of care in a single sentence, I explained the term ahead-of-itself very generally as meaning that Dasein has possibilities that non-Daseinly entities do not have. Now, however, it is possible to explain these words more concretely, in terms of Being-towards-death. The words ahead-of-itself are intended by Heidegger to connote the idea that as Being-towards-death Dasein is, although "thrown" or irrevocably locked into the finite spatio-temporal world, nevertheless more than that realm. This is what Heidegger means when he says that although "death...*is not to be outstripped*," "[i]f

¹⁶ I use single quotations here to indicate that the word 'concern' is being used in its normal meaning, as opposed Heidegger's technical meaning. This clarification is intended to avoid the connotation that in authenticity Dasein is concerned about itself in the same way as it is concerned about entities other than itself. Properly speaking the word that should be used here is 'care'. However, in order to preserve without ambiguity the Heideggerian technical meaning of care I prefer in this instance to appeal to the normal meaning of the word concern, and to supply this note to obviate possible confusion.

¹⁷ p. 294, H.250; *Being and Time*

Dasein stands before itself as this possibility [as Being-toward-death], it has been *fully* assigned to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being."¹⁸

The term potentiality-for-Being means existence characterized by actual possibilities.¹⁹ But potentiality-for-Being also means freedom--"In being-ahead-of-oneself as Being towards one's ownmost potentiality-for-Being, lies the existential-ontological condition for the possibility of *Being-free*."²⁰ To say that Dasein is 'assigned to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being' is the same as to say that Dasein understands its own existence "in terms of possibilities," and in terms of freedom.²¹ Thus, as a Being-towards-death Dasein exists in the face of a future event, death, which indicates that it is more than an in-the-world, non-Daseinly entity. Future events signify possibilities of which Dasein is aware, and of which non-Daseinly entities are not aware. They therefore signify a kind of freedom which belongs to Dasein. The idea that future events affect Dasein in the present such that its knowledge, attitudes, and actions in the present are modified leads, therefore, to an understanding that Dasein's existence is characterized by real freedom. The prime example

¹⁸ p. 294, H.250; *Being and Time*

¹⁹ As opposed to theoretical possibilities. Heidegger makes the point that possibilities as they apply to Dasein are "to be sharply distinguished from empty logical possibility and from the contingency of something present-at-hand [theoretical]". What he means is that Dasein cannot be thought of as something subject to the contingencies of logical constructs or theories of human nature because these kinds of constructs are not phenomenologically apparent. All that can be said about Dasein ontologically, and on the basis of phenomenological evidence, is that it "is in every case what it can be, and in the way in which is its possibility". This is not to say that Dasein can be anything at all, only that Dasein does have real possibilities which are not merely logical. (ref. p. 183, H.143-4; *Being and Time*)

²⁰ p. 237, H.193; *Being and Time* (emphases from text)

²¹ p. 185, H.145; *Being and Time*

of such a future event here is death, which Heidegger picks up on because it is so obviously impending (i.e., is so obviously a part of the present reality of Dasein) and can be experienced as such.

I think it is not too difficult to think of ways in which death does affect our attitudes and behaviour. If I am a practising Christian I would try to modify my life so that when I do die I will merit the eternal reward which I spent my life hoping for. This can be applied to any practitioner of any religious affiliation. Even if I am not a religious person I might want to live my life so that in my later years I will be able to view approaching death with the attitude that I am ready because I have made something of my life in the past. On a more negative note, some people may fear death and do all kinds of things to delay or deny it or the effects of old age which are its reminders.²² It does seem that Heidegger is correct to write of death as a future event which is certain, and which does affect human life in the present.

²² Leo Tolstoy's "The Death of Ivan Ilych" comes to mind here. In this story Tolstoy realistically describes the last days in the life of an imaginary, successful civil servant who has died at the premature age of 45, after having endured a lengthy, terminal illness. At first Ivan Ilych faces his impending death with fear, denial, and false hopes of some miraculous cure. Three days before his death Ivan Ilych is visited by a priest bringing the last sacraments. This visit brings home to Ivan Ilych the realization that for him and on this occasion there is no escape from death. At first the realization is terrible; he screams non-stop for three days, struggling "in that black sack into which he was being thrust by an invisible, resistless force". Finally, however, on the third day two hours before his death, Ivan Ilych feels his son's lips kissing his hand. Feeling sorry for all the trouble he has caused, he suddenly sees his life in a new perspective. This is not the way to deal with the inevitable he realizes. As denial gives way to full acceptance, Ivan Ilych stops screaming, experiences a release from the fear that has left him wretched for so long, and dies more joyful and at more peace than he has ever been in his life. Tolstoy's story realistically captures the various ways in which the impending event of death can and does affect life in the present. As such it is a nice literary illustration of Heidegger's point that death, experienced as Being-towards-death, is a part of life in the present. At first Ivan Ilych's life is characterized by denial of the fact that he will die. In this respect his attitude towards death is very much like the everyday attitude Heidegger writes about. But immediately before his death Ivan Ilych's life is characterized by his own individual acceptance of death. This corresponds to Heidegger's authentic Being-towards-death. As he is individuated, in this authentic attitude, Ivan Ilych simultaneously finds peace for himself and experiences an authentic mode of solicitude towards his fellow human beings. (see Leo Tolstoy, "The Death of Ivan Ilych", pp. 152-186, in *Story: Fictions Past and Present*, Boyd Litzinger and Joyce Carol Oates, eds., U.S.A.: D. C. Heath and Co., 1985.)

In addition, the implication that follows from this--that future events, and the future itself, do affect the present reality of Dasein or the human--seems equally correct. Sitting at this computer working on this paper on Heidegger is more than just an exercise of the present. It is conditioned, even motivated, by the desire to earn a degree in philosophy which I hope will better enable me to pursue other future oriented plans. In this respect, because I entertain and am affected in the present by future related possibilities, I am like Dasein ahead-of-itself. I do, therefore, manifest "[t]his item in the structure of care" which does appear to have "its primordial concretion in Being-towards-death."²³

Being-towards-death is, therefore, a possibility grounded in real experience which does apply to Dasein such that it is brought face to face with the issue of its own Being. In addition, Being-towards-death is a primary possibility that does indicate Dasein to be an entity that is affected by the future generally. Because it is care Dasein manifests concern and solicitude towards entities other than Dasein and other Daseins. In addition it manifests anxiety about the future. Since anxiety is an integral part of care, care is now manifest as Being-towards-death.

Now, it is important to realize here that Heidegger does not mean that death should be thought of in a negative sense. "Anxiety in the face of death must not be confused with fear in the face of one's demise." Rather, "[t]his anxiety...amounts to the disclosedness of the fact that Dasein exists as thrown Being *towards* its end."²⁴ Taking 'end' here to mean 'future', Being-towards-death may be conceived in its positive connotation as Being-towards-a-future. This is why the title of this section in

²³ p. 294, H.251; *Being and Time*

²⁴ p. 295, H.251; *Being and Time* (emphasis from text)

my paper reads 'Care as Being-Towards-Death, or Being-Towards-a-Future'. As Being-towards-a-future Dasein exists in the face of future related possibilities. Such an existence is a function of a potentiality-for-being which is manifest in authentically Being-towards-a-future, or of care. Being-towards-death is manifest positively as a kind of freedom where real choice is possible. For Heidegger, choice ("willing" or "wishing" in Heidegger's parlance) is "rooted with ontological necessity in Dasein as care."²⁵ Because care signifies possibilities, and possibilities freedom, Dasein exists in the face of a kind of freedom that makes choice meaningful. Thus, Being-towards-death has the primarily positive connotation that Dasein's existence is characterized by a real freedom (i.e., by real possibilities) which, as a necessary condition of choice, makes choice possible.²⁶

But Dasein is also unfree. It cannot escape the fact of death. Neither can it escape the fact of its being "thrown" into a reality where future possibilities are unpredictable. Not only is it limited in that its projects are limited by material ready-to-hand within-the-world--as was pointed out in the previous chapter--but it is limited in that it cannot control the future. I may have a heart attack tomorrow preventing me from finishing this paper, and rendering all my carefully laid plans requiring a philosophy degree ineffective. Being-towards-death only implies freedom insofar as it expands the meaning of care to imply future related possibilities which do apply to

²⁵ p. 238, H.194; *Being and Time*

²⁶ See also p. 360, H.312; *Being and Time*: Only "[i]f the Being of Dasein is essentially potentiality-for-Being, if it is Being-free for its ownmost possibilities, and if, in every case, it exists only in freedom for these possibilities or in lack of freedom for them, can ontological interpretation do anything else than base itself on *ontical possibilities*--ways of potentiality-for-Being--and project these possibilities upon *their ontological possibility*". (emphases from text)

Dasein. It also implies unfreedom insofar as it entails the necessary, and obvious, implication that the future cannot always be controlled.

Now it is important not to forget, as I already mentioned, that, for Heidegger, possibilities and so freedom are a condition of reality. Recalling that reality is Being-in-the-world, and that care as the Being of Dasein is central to that reality, what this means is that the kind of freedom care implies is at once a part of reality and yet something which is grounded specifically in Dasein. That is, it is a condition of a reality of which Dasein is a part. Thus freedom exists as something independent, as it were, of Dasein but as something which Dasein can nevertheless embrace or have if it actually displays the authentic mode of anxiety called Being-towards-death.

The analysis of Being-towards-death lends an important clue as to why Heidegger views freedom this way. If Dasein only has freedom when it is authentic, and if Dasein is not necessarily always authentic, freedom must be conceived of as independent of Dasein, as one possibility out of many which Dasein can have.

In saying that freedom, in *Being and Time*, is not something that applies only to Dasein, that it is a condition of a reality of which Dasein is but a part, I am taking issue with Michel Haar's contention that in *Being and Time* freedom is only applicable to Dasein and that only in later works does Heidegger talk of freedom as something independent of Dasein.²⁷ This interpretation is based on the thinking that because freedom in *Being and Time* is a function of authentic Dasein, it is relative solely to Dasein. Thus, it is that Haar writes:

In *Sein und Zeit*, liberty was nothing other than the free disposition of the "own most" possibility, namely the

²⁷ p. 27; Haar, "The Question of Human Freedom in the Later Heidegger"

anticipation of this ultimate possibility. Liberty resided in the movement of self-appropriation and hierarchical organization of possibles, beginning with the essential possible which is being-towards-death.... "Freedom towards death" is a conquest of authenticity, that is to say, a taking over by *Dasein* of its own possibilities at their source. "Freedom towards death" was thus the positing of an absolute autonomy even greater than the autonomy of the moral subject in Kant.²⁸

In contrast to this and for the later Heidegger, Haar writes, in reference to the essay, "On the Essence of Truth",²⁹ that "man is not the possibility of freedom; it is rather the freedom of Being that makes man possible."³⁰

In opposition to Haar, my contention is that both statements are true with respect to both *Being and Time* and "On the Essence of Truth". This is first evident upon consideration of Heidegger's tendency in *Being and Time* to distinguish possibilities in general from possibilities as they apply to *Dasein* via the terms "possibility" and "potentiality-for-Being".³¹ If one fails to notice this distinction, as does Haar apparently, one could be left with the impression that in *Being and Time* freedom conceived of as possibilities is solely a property of *Dasein*. My disagreement with Haar is based both upon this distinction, as well as on the argument offered above to the effect that insofar as authenticity is a possibility only, freedom has to be

²⁸ p. 2; Haar

²⁹ See "On the Essence of Truth", pp. 117-141, Krell. ("On the Essence of Truth" was "thought out and delivered in 1930 but not printed until 1943". (p. 208; Krell)

³⁰ p. 3; Haar.

³¹ See translators' note appended to references for the term "potentiality-for-being", p. 558, "Index of English Expressions", *Being and Time*. "...potentiality-for-Being is always used in connection with something of the character of *Dasein*, while the term 'possibility', which often seems interchangeable with it, is occasionally used in a somewhat wider sense."

conceived of in terms of possibilities that are at once independent of Dasein and yet applicable to Dasein. That is, when we are talking about possibilities in general we are talking about that which may or may not apply to Dasein, but when we are talking about potentiality-for-Being we are talking about Dasein as the ground of certain possibilities in reality.

In addition to the above, I offer the following considerations on the issue of freedom in the earlier and later Heidegger. In addition to the fact that he appears to miss an important distinction between possibility itself and Dasein's own potentiality-for-Being, Haar's interpretation fails to take proper account of the fact that "On the Essence of Truth" signifies not a break from but rather a continuation upon the work of *Being and Time*. In both *Being and Time* and "On the Essence of Truth" truth is defined as uncovering, disclosedness, or unconcealment.³² In both works truth is closely linked to freedom such that truth only occurs where there is freedom.³³ And, in both *Being and Time* and "On the Essence of Truth" freedom is at once a condition of reality and something which is grounded in authentic Dasein. I have already shown how this is the case in *Being and Time*; freedom as a condition of reality is possibilities in reality, while freedom as a characteristic of authentic Dasein is Dasein as a potentiality-for-Being, an existence which, when authentic, is free because it

³² "The most primordial phenomenon of truth is first shown by the existential-ontological foundations of uncovering." (p. 263, H.220; *Being and Time*) In "On the Essence of Truth" truth is defined as "*ta alethea*, the unconcealed". (p. 127; Krell)

³³ In *Being and Time* the possibility of unconcealment occurs in authentic Dasein. Authentic Dasein is characterized by resoluteness, which is at once the "most primordial" "truth of Dasein", and that "authentic disclosedness" whereby "Dasein frees itself for its world". (pp. 343-4, H.297-8; *Being and Time*) In "On the Essence of Truth", freedom "considered in regard to the essence of truth,...manifests itself as exposure to the disclosedness [i.e., unconcealment] of beings". (p. 128; Krell)

lives in face of [i.e., is open to] possibilities which apply to it. In "On the Essence of Truth" this is the case also. Freedom is a condition of reality in the sense that "man does not 'possess' freedom as a property." Rather, "freedom...possesses man--so originally that only *it* secures that distinctive relatedness to being as a whole."³⁴ As something relative to the existence of Dasein freedom means "openness of commitment," or "engagement in the disclosure of beings as such."³⁵

Now one might be tempted to conclude, from the statement 'freedom possesses man,' that Heidegger is here dissociating freedom from Dasein. This appears to be the temptation to which Haar has fallen prey. However, Heidegger does not say that freedom "possesses man" in order to signify a dissociation between freedom and Dasein. He only says this in order to indicate that "[f]reedom is [neither] mere absence of constraint with respect to what we can or cannot do. Nor is it...mere readiness for what is required and necessary (and so somehow a being)." Before all this, "freedom is engagement in the disclosure of beings as such, [where] [d]isclosedness itself is conserved in...the openness of the open region."³⁶ These passages are highly reminiscent of that one in *Being and Time* where Heidegger makes the point that, rather than being rooted in such wilful acts as "willing" or "wishing," freedom is first of all "rooted with ontological necessity in Dasein as care."³⁷ The point here is that freedom signifies a type of engagement, a type of questioning, so unreserved

³⁴ p. 129; Krell

³⁵ pp. 125, 128; Krell

³⁶ p. 128; Krell

³⁷ p. 238, H.194; *Being and Time*

that the idea of freedom as relative to any specific "readiness for what is required" becomes no longer relevant. It is in this sense that freedom becomes conceived of as "the openness of the open region itself."³⁸ In *Being and Time* this openness is the Being of Dasein as care. In "On the Essence of Truth" it is likewise synonymous with "ek-sistent, disclosive Dasein."³⁹ The conception of freedom in "On the Essence of Truth" is therefore in essence the same as in *Being and Time*.

The only substantial difference between *Being and Time* and "On the Essence of Truth" is that in the latter work freedom is more intimately linked to truth, such that it becomes the necessary condition or "essence of truth."⁴⁰ This does not, however, signify a dissociation of freedom from Dasein. It is rather a description of the full ramifications of freedom in its application to Dasein, ramifications which are only possible in and through an authentic Dasein which understands.⁴¹ Conceived of

³⁸ pp. 128-9; Krell

³⁹ p. 129; Krell. In a footnote on p. 128 Krell indicates that the term "ek-sistent" means "the ecstatic character of freedom, its standing outside itself". Krell's explanation is accurate but I find it a little muddy, so I will clarify it. Ek-sistent means freedom in the sense that it means an open region that exists as part and parcel of the spatio-temporal world. The spatial metaphor "standing outside" tends towards the idea that freedom is something which is totally separate from the spatio-temporal world. However, this is not the case for Heidegger, because Being is an inclusive concept. As such it includes the idea that existence is composed of both a definite spatio-temporal order and a realm of freedom or possibilities. The adjective ecstatic signifies the all-pervasive, enrapturing or encompassing character of freedom. Thus, "ek-sistent" as the "ecstatic character of freedom...standing outside of itself" means a kind of freedom which extends throughout reality as a pervasive, all encompassing condition of reality. The expression "ek-sistent, disclosive Dasein" therefore means that this kind of freedom applies to or is part of the reality of Dasein.

⁴⁰ p. 125; Krell

⁴¹ One term used by Heidegger to connote such authentic understanding, and the freedom that follows, is "letting-be". In *Being and Time*, letting-be is relative primarily to "the existential structure of concern". (p. 404, H.353) However, because concern "belongs to the essential constitution of care; and care, in turn, is grounded in temporality", letting-be has the character of "the temporal structure of awaiting" which points towards an authentic understanding of the future. (p. 404, H.353) Awaiting is the term Heidegger uses to connote an inauthentic understanding of the future. Dasein understands the

this way freedom signifies an absolute condition of possibility for being what it means to be; that is, freedom is a condition of possibility within which Dasein exists as the possibility of coming to understand what it means to exist with regard both to itself and to non-Daseinly entities. In *Being and Time* Heidegger was working out the conditions of possibility according to which it can be said that such freedom applies to Dasein. Later Heidegger goes on to clarify what freedom means as a necessary condition of truth.

The difference between Heidegger's earlier and later work on the subject of freedom is, therefore, not relative to the idea that it is only in later work that freedom becomes conceived of as something independent of Dasein whereas earlier

future inauthentically when it is too preoccupied with (i.e., concerned with, in the Heideggerian sense of the term concern) objects in the environmental world to be aware of itself as a potentiality-for-Being. Thus, the awaiting of "inauthentic *understanding* projects itself upon that with which one can concern oneself, or upon what is feasible, urgent, or indispensable in our everyday business". (p. 386, H.337) However, insofar as Dasein is thus capable of understanding "itself in terms of that with which it is concerned" in the environmental world, it manifests itself as a "potentiality-for-Being which cares". (p. 386, H.337) Thus, even though inauthentic "Dasein does not come towards itself primarily in its ownmost non-relational potentiality-for-Being,....it *awaits this* concernfully in terms of that which yields or denies the object of its concern". The point here is that even though awaiting signifies an inauthentic understanding of the future, the fact that Dasein is capable of such an inauthentic understanding is evidence that it does have the possibility of understanding itself authentically in "its ownmost potentiality-for-Being". (p. 386, H.336) It is in this sense that letting-be has the temporal structure of awaiting, which points towards an authentic understanding of the future. When such an authentic understanding obtains, awaiting gives way to a more authentic manifestation of letting-be, which Heidegger connotes with the term "anticipation". (p. 386, H.336) In *Being and Time*, anticipation points towards an unreserved readiness for understanding, a readiness to let things be what they are such that only then can an understanding of what they are follow. (cf. p. 387, H.338) In "On the Essence of Truth", "to let be--that is, to let things be as the beings which they are--means to engage oneself with the open region and its openness into which every being comes to stand, bringing that openness, as it were, along with itself". (p. 127; Krell) Admittedly, in *Being and Time*, letting-be is relative primarily to Dasein's understanding of itself as a potentiality-for-Being which means a kind of freedom in which Dasein exists unreservedly in the face of possibilities, whereas in "On the Essence of Truth" letting-be is closely linked to freedom as a necessary condition for truth. However, insofar as letting-be is still a function of 'engaging oneself with the open region', in "On the Essence of Truth", it is a function of an openness or freedom which applies to Dasein. Once again, therefore, the essay, "On the Essence of Truth" signifies, not a break from but a development upon *Being and Time*. (All emphases within quotes are from texts cited.)

on it was specifically a property of Dasein. Rather it is relative to the fact that as Fred R. Dallmayr points out, "From his earliest to his latest writings, Heidegger has tried to explore the presubjective or ontological grounding of freedom."⁴² In *Being and Time* the presubjective or ontological ground of freedom is a kind of openness which applies as a possibility to Dasein as care, such that Dasein's existence is revealed to be characterized most essentially by openness to possibilities. In "On the Essence of Truth" this ground is then explored more deeply in its relation to truth, and concluded to be, in the broadest possible sense, the necessary condition of truth as disclosedness. As Dallmayr points out, though, "Despite this slight shift of accent, the essay maintains a close linkage between truth and freedom" where freedom is "being free" [i.e., open] for the disclosure of Being."⁴³ This shift in accent amounts to no more than an indication that in addition to being something relative to an authentic Dasein freedom is, in general, a necessary condition of truth. Therefore, rather than being exclusively a property of an absolute autonomy of Dasein freedom has always been, for Heidegger, something more independent, an essential openness the possibility of which, if realized, actually possesses Dasein as a function of Dasein's own possible authenticity.

Of course, on the basis of Heidegger's view, if such a possibility for freedom is to be meaningful it has to be shown that authenticity is a meaningful, genuine possibility. Thus far this point has certainly not been clearly established. Granted it has been shown that a future seems to belong to Dasein's existence because Dasein

⁴² p. 228; Dallmayr, "Ontology of Freedom: Heidegger and Political Philosophy"

⁴³ p. 215; Dallmayr

lives in the face of possibilities over which it has some control. This is not definitive, however, because it has not yet been proven that authenticity is a genuine possibility universally available to all Daseins. Unless this can be shown to be the case it is not at all clear that freedom, conceived of as possibilities in reality, applies to Dasein. The purpose of the following section, therefore, is to show how Heidegger substantiates his position that authenticity is a genuine possibility.

ii) Authenticity, the Call of Conscience, and Conscience as the Call of Care

The analysis of Being-towards-death is the first step towards realizing just how Dasein is, though to a degree unfree, not locked into an entirely determinate landscape of existence. Specifically, Dasein is unfree because it cannot escape death; generally, it is unfree because it cannot escape the various curves life throws its way. This is true because Dasein has some but not total control over possibilities that affect it. However, the fact that meaningful possibilities do exist, is attestation of the fact that Dasein can, to a degree, always make of its life what it will.

The analysis of Being-towards-death is also a first step towards understanding how Heidegger's concept of freedom is understood on the basis of a link between care and time. Because Dasein is care, Dasein has possibilities. But possibilities are not just something that exist in the present. In that they apply to Dasein because of Dasein's ability to construe plans for the future, possibilities are something future related that exists in the present. Therefore, freedom is not just a function of existence understood as existence in the present. It is also a function of existence understood in terms of a future which applies to or *exists in* the present. The future

exists in the present in the sense that certain expected future events, such as death, can be understood by Dasein as affecting its own existence in present time. More on this later, in section 3 following.

I say that the analysis of Being-towards-Death is only a first step towards understanding Heidegger's concept of freedom because in and of itself this analysis still does not indicate definitively that freedom is anything more than a mere metaphysical postulate. To be sure it seems evident that possibilities exist, and that they apply to Dasein. But, and as I have indicated above, realization of the ontological significance of Being-towards-death depends upon an authentic mode of anxiety whereby Dasein understands itself as characterized by both freedom and unfreedom. The issue here, then, is to show that this authentic mode of anxiety is a genuine possibility.⁴⁴ If this can be done we will have good reason for claiming that freedom as possibilities is more than a metaphysical postulate, that it does really apply to Dasein.

Heidegger does think that authentic Being-towards-death is a meaningful possibility, primarily because of another basic experience, founded in care, which he calls the "call of conscience." Heidegger characterizes conscience as a call because of its connection with care.

It has already been pointed out, in the previous chapter, that as care Dasein is characterized by state-of-mind, understanding, and language. As state-of-mind, Dasein is anxious about or attuned to the fact that it is not in-a-world in the same

⁴⁴ Heidegger puts this problematic as follows: "...because Dasein is *lost* in the 'they', it must first *find* itself. In order to find *itself* at all, it must be 'shown' to itself in its possible authenticity. In terms of its *possibility*, Dasein is already a potentiality-for-Being-its-Self, but it needs to have this potentiality attested." (p. 313, H.268; *Being and Time*, emphases from text)

way as are entities other than itself because possibilities apply to it that do not apply to entities other than itself. Understanding and language represent Dasein's awareness of what anxiety means. Because it can understand, and because it has an ability for language, it is aware of the difference between itself and non-Daseinly entities, and that this difference has to do, primarily, with the fact it has possibilities that non-Daseinly entities do not have. In addition, it was pointed out that, for Heidegger, language is based primarily on an ability to listen, and that listening is a necessary condition of possibility for understanding. Listening and understanding go hand in hand, therefore, to signify full-fledged cognition of it means to experience anxiety. Within the context of the discussion on "The Paradox of Unity", anxiety and understanding were taken to mean that "Being-in-the-world is a phenomenon the paradoxical unity of which is constituted by concern, solicitude, and, ultimately, care."⁴⁵ Now anxiety and understanding are described in relation to the phenomenon of conscience such that, in addition to the paradox of unity, a paradox of freedom is clearly implied.

For Heidegger, the conscience is conceived of ontologically as the essence of language and understanding. The call of conscience therefore means an ability to hear and understand,⁴⁶ grounded in the Being of Dasein as care,⁴⁷ according to

⁴⁵ see p. 49; Chap. Two above

⁴⁶ "Conscience gives us 'something' to understand; it *discloses*....To the call of conscience there corresponds a possible hearing." (p. 314, H.269-70; *Being and Time*)

⁴⁷ "Conscience manifests itself as the call of care....the call of conscience--that is, conscience itself--has its ontological possibility in the fact that Dasein, in the very basis of its Being, is care". (pp. 322-3, H.277-8; *Being and Time*)

which Dasein is called "forth to its possibilities."⁴⁸ The call of conscience therefore expands the meaning of care such that in addition to being the structural locus of unity and difference in the existential phenomenon of Being-in-the-world or reality, it is the locus of a fundamental freedom in reality which applies to Dasein. Characterized as a call rooted in care, conscience signifies Dasein's understanding of what it means to be care and to experience anxiety.⁴⁹ To be anxious means that, in addition to being the locus of the paradox of unity in reality, Dasein is a locus of possibilities or freedom in reality.

Now it is important to realize that what Heidegger here means by conscience is not "some psychical faculty such as understanding, will, or feeling, or of explaining it as some sort of mixture of these."⁵⁰ Rather, conscience in and of itself is the ultimate condition of possibility for understanding--"*That which...gives to understand, is the conscience.*"⁵¹ In this sense conscience signifies at an ontological level an ability for knowledge. Heidegger describes the *call* of conscience as a "mode of discourse."⁵² Recalling that discourse, or language, is rooted in listening, what Heidegger means here is that the ultimate condition of possibility for understanding

⁴⁸ p. 318, H.273; *Being and Time*

⁴⁹ "To any state-of-mind or mood [i.e., to anxiety], understanding belongs equiprimordially. In this way Dasein 'knows' what it is itself capable of, inasmuch as it has either projected itself upon possibilities of its own or has been so absorbed in the 'they' that it has let such possibilities be presented to it by the way in which the 'they' has publicly interpreted things." (p. 315, H.270; *Being and Time*)

⁵⁰ p. 317, H.271; *Being and Time*

⁵¹ p. 316, H.271; *Being and Time* (emphases from text)

⁵² p. 316, H.271; *Being and Time*

and for knowledge is the ability to listen or to be open to what certain types of experiences tell Dasein about itself.

The question that comes to mind now is, just what particular experience is it that tells Dasein it is being called to embrace authentic Being-towards-death? The answer to this question is that particular, authentic manifestation of care called anxiety. In this mode of anxiety, which is "unfamiliar to the everyday they-self" Dasein experiences a sense of "uncanniness" or of being "not-at-home."⁵³ This sense of uncanniness or not-being-at-home amounts to the sense that there is something uniquely indeterminate about the nature of Dasein.⁵⁴ No matter how involved it may become in the everyday world Dasein is always nonetheless an existence characterized primarily by "potentiality-for-Being." The very fact that it can be totally involved in some particular everyday pursuit, to the point where "it has forgotten itself," is testament to the fact that it has possibilities; out of many possibilities it has chosen the particular involvement of the moment. Dasein's realization that it is thus characterized comes from the call of conscience. Rooted in the uncanniness of authentic anxiety, the call of conscience is basic to the existence of Dasein--"Uncanniness is the basic kind of Being-in-the-world, even though in an everyday way it has been covered up. Out of the depths of this kind of Being, Dasein itself, as cons-

⁵³ p. 321, H.276-7; *Being and Time*

⁵⁴ Richardson describes Dasein as transcendence in this regard. Thus Dasein is free because it is a transcendent Being-in-the-world. Richardson equates transcendence with freedom, which occurs when Dasein achieves a full, ontological understanding of the self. To say that Dasein is transcendent is the same as to say that Dasein is more than its world, because it lives in the face of possibilities. (see pp. 165-6, 169, 171; Richardson, "Heidegger and the Quest of Freedom")

cience, calls."⁵⁵ And, because anxiety is rooted in care "[t]he call of conscience--that is, conscience itself--has its ontological possibility in the fact that Dasein, in the very basis of its Being, is care."⁵⁶

Now this is all very well, but we still do not have a definitive answer to the question as to how one can say authentic Being-towards-a-future is a necessary or real possibility. Thus far, the analysis of the call of conscience has given us little more than something like, Dasein is aware of itself as care, and aware of all it means to be care because it is uncannily aware that its own existence is characterized by possibilities. These appear to be rather vague terms upon which to ground the claim that all Daseins can authentically exist towards a future. On the basis of these vague terms one might be able to claim that certain Daseins are sometimes thus aware of themselves. One might even be able to make the claim that on the basis of this awareness some Daseins understand a difference between themselves and non-Daseinly entities, and understand this difference in terms of a kind of freedom understood as possibilities.

In and of themselves these kinds of propositions do not seem to be too problematic. After all it does seem intuitively obvious that I am phenomenologically different from a cabbage, rock, or tree because I can do things that cabbages, rocks, and trees cannot. However, for Heidegger, the call of conscience means considerably more than this. He is trying to "trace back conscience *as a phenomenon of Dasein* to the ontological constitution of that entity" in order to make the "conscience intelli-

⁵⁵ p. 322, H.277; *Being and Time*

⁵⁶ pp. 322-3, H.278; *Being and Time*

gible as an attestation of Dasein's ownmost potentiality-for-Being--an attestation which lies in Dasein itself."⁵⁷ In other words, the call of conscience is supposed to reveal not simply that some Daseins are aware of having freedom some of the time but that *all* Daseins, even those lost to the thrall of everyday pursuits, have the possibility of freedom *all* of the time. In addition, the call of conscience is supposed to indicate *why* all Daseins have freedom. The call of conscience is supposed to reveal that Dasein has freedom because its existence is defined by something called care which makes all forms of concern, even those relative to the they-world, possible. It has to be shown on the basis of some particular experience that it is reasonable to suppose that freedom is, universally, a function of care manifest as authentic Being-towards-death. The call of conscience is not, in and of itself, such a definitive experience because, although characterized as a call, conscience still does give any indication who is being called to do what.

Heidegger of course realizes that there are still not sufficient grounds to claim that authenticity is a universally meaningful possibility. Thus far he only claims to have given a "general ontological characterization of the conscience." He thinks that he has "delimited plainly enough the character of the *hearing* which genuinely corresponds to the calling"--i.e., he thinks he has shown that the essence of conscience lies in the ability to be receptive to essential information about the nature of Dasein's existence--but it is not at all clear that this openness is a universal characteristic of all Daseins. Thus it is not at all clear that what the call of conscience signifies--i.e., Being-towards-death and Dasein's understanding of itself as a potential-

⁵⁷ p. 324, H.279; *Being and Time*

ity-for-Being--is a genuine possibility.⁵⁸ To investigate further, then, Heidegger proceeds to try and "grasp phenomenally what one hears in understanding the appeal" of conscience.⁵⁹ What he is, in effect, seeking here is the "*existential condition for the possibility*" according to which it is apparent that Dasein is, actually and in reality, a "potentiality-for-Being" (i.e., an existence characterized primarily by possibilities).⁶⁰

So, "[w]hat is it that is essentially implied when the appeal is understood authentically?"⁶¹ That is, how does the call of conscience imply that Dasein is in essence a potentiality-for-Being? To answer this question, Heidegger appeals to a basic experience that always accompanies "any experience of conscience: namely, that the call either addresses Dasein as 'Guilty!', or, as in the case when the conscience gives warning, refers to a possible 'Guilty!', or affirms, as a 'good' conscience, that one is 'conscious of no guilt'."⁶² In effect, what Heidegger is attempting to do here is expand the notion of conscience to include the understanding that any experience of conscience is always accompanied a sense that one is either guilty or not guilty. He then proceeds to analyze guilt as a phenomenon with a view to showing that what conscience gives us to understand is revealed when we understand what guilt means.

⁵⁸ p. 324, H.279; *Being and Time*

⁵⁹ p. 325, H.280; *Being and Time*

⁶⁰ p. 325, H. 280; *Being and Time* (emphases from text)

⁶¹ p. 325, H.280; *Being and Time*

⁶² p. 326, H.281; *Being and Time*

For Heidegger guilt, or "Being-guilty" as he calls it, is a phenomenon experienced in the everyday world. He identifies two ordinary, everyday meanings of Being-guilty. First, "[e]veryday common sense...takes 'Being-guilty' in the sense of 'owing', of 'having something due on account'." Second, "'Being-guilty' also has the signification of '*being responsible for*'--that is, being the cause or author of something, or even 'being the occasion' for something." Taken together, then, "[t]hese ordinary significations of 'Being-guilty' as 'having debts to someone' and 'having responsibility for something' can go together and define a kind of behaviour which we call '*making oneself responsible*'; that is, by having the responsibility for having a debt, one may break a law and make oneself punishable."⁶³ According to Heidegger, the single, most important aspect of these two ordinary senses of guilt taken together is that they entail obligations involving specific objects and specific persons. Thus, in an everyday context we experience guilt either in the sense that we owe an object or a favour to someone, or that we feel responsible whenever we break a law.⁶⁴

⁶³ p. 327, H.281-2; *Being and Time* (emphases from text)

⁶⁴ In a footnote to the texts cited above the translators indicate that the German term *Schuldigsein*, which they translate as Being-guilty, does ordinarily mean obligation in the sense of owing or being responsible for something specific, whereas in English this "does not represent a 'common-sense' usage of the English 'Being-guilty', which comes from an entirely different stem." The translators are here pointing out that in English there is a distinction between owing and guilty which does not exist in German. Thus in English I normally experience a sense of obligation because I owe my bank a monthly installment on a loan, but I do not normally experience guilt in relation to this debt unless I default on the loan. In German, however, there is no such clear distinction between guilt and obligation. Because of this difference the German expression *Schuldigsein*, translated by Macquarrie and Robinson as Being-guilty, must be regarded in the English translation as a technical term. This is important to keep in mind because otherwise the deeper ontological implications of Being-guilty, which Heidegger claims underlies all ordinary conceptions of guilt, could be missed. (see n. 1, p. 327, H.281; *Being and Time*)

Heidegger draws some important implications from these ordinary conceptions of guilt. First, because we can and do sometimes break laws we are presented with an opportunity to realize that we are responsible for our actions. As Gelven observes, "Suppose you do something morally wrong. If you reflect upon the fact that you committed such an action, you become *aware of yourself as someone capable of being held responsible. You are guilty.*"⁶⁵

A second implication follows. At the moment when one becomes aware of guilt one is faced with the opportunity to make a new decision. Gelven continues: "At this moment of awareness...there is a new decision to be made. You can...seek to deny your guilt to yourself...[by claiming] that there were external causes that determined your action...[or] [y]ou may even go so far as to deny that any action is free, that no one person is ever guilty at all. On the other hand, you can decide to admit your guilt, to recognize that you are responsible for the action and are deserving of the censure that goes with it."⁶⁶ The point here is that no matter whether or not external causes affect our decisions we must, unless we deny freedom altogether, admit that we are always in some way responsible for our actions.⁶⁷

A third important implication now follows. Awareness of responsibility for one's own actions is an occasion for realizing something important about oneself.

⁶⁵ p. 162; Gelven (emphases from text)

⁶⁶ pp. 162-3; Gelven

⁶⁷ Heidegger does not really take up the issue as to whether there is any freedom at all. He seems, rather, to assume that because possibilities exist there is always at least some freedom. However, because this whole exercise is in an attempt to extract and evaluate critically the meaning of Heidegger's conception of freedom, the question as to whether there is such a thing as freedom at all is in the process of being dealt with.

Avoiding or acknowledging guilt is tantamount to avoiding or acknowledging an authentic awareness of the self. As Gelven puts it, "[b]y avoiding guilt you become a non-self (inauthentic) self; whereas if you confront the guilt you are a self (authentic) self."⁶⁸

The analysis thus far yields two major points. First, taken together the above three implications indicate that even an ordinary everyday conception of guilt leads towards an understanding that guilt is somehow tied to the issue of authenticity versus inauthenticity. Second, by virtue of the fact that guilt is experienced in the everyday world, conscience must be experienced in some everyday sense also. As Gelven points out, "Unless it was genuinely possible for someone to be *guilty*, conscience would have no meaning."⁶⁹ Thus even in the everyday world guilt is an experience that implies authenticity, inauthenticity, and conscience to be meaningful terms.

Nevertheless, the above understanding of guilt still does not show how Being-guilty is an existential phenomenon which tells us something essential about (i.e., universally applicable to) the Being of Dasein. The analysis thus far is still tied to circumstances which are not universally necessary. In addition if the analysis were to stop here one would be left with the impression that Being-guilty is a function of specific acts of wrongdoing.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ p. 163; Gelven

⁶⁹ p. 168; Gelven

⁷⁰ cf. pp. 163, 168; Gelven

There is, however, another more important implication connected with guilt. "[I]n the idea of 'Guilty!' there lies the character of the 'not'.⁷¹ What Heidegger means here is that in addition to signifying specific responsibilities and obligations, guilt signifies responsibility itself. Specific responsibilities in the everyday world "have the character of '*coming to owe something to Others*'.⁷² The Dasein which experiences this kind of responsibility exists, therefore, as the ground (i.e., as "the basis") for "a lack of something in an Other."⁷³

Now, according to Heidegger, the condition of possibility for experiencing 'a lack of something in an Other' (i.e., for experiencing specific responsibilities) is that Dasein is a responsible being, a being in which responsibility is part of what it means for Dasein to exist. This is why he writes, "coming to owe something to others is possible without breaking the 'public law'," and "'*Being-guilty*'...is a *kind of Being which belongs to Dasein*."⁷⁴ As Being-guilty, as an existence that is always capable of responsibility, Dasein always exists in the face of something owing, a notness. "Hence we define the formally existential idea of the 'Guilty!' as "Being-the-basis for a Being which has been defined by a 'not'"--that is it say, as '*Being-the-basis of a nullity*'.⁷⁵ Being-the-basis, or to-be-the-basis of something means to

⁷¹ p. 329, H.283; *Being and Time* (emphasis from text)

⁷² p. 327, H.282; *Being and Time* (emphases from text)

⁷³ p. 326, H.282; *Being and Time*

⁷⁴ pp. 327-8, H.282; *Being and Time* (emphases from text)

⁷⁵ p. 329, H.283; *Being and Time* (emphases from text)

be the ground of something.⁷⁶ Gelven suggests that the German term, *Nichtigkeit*, translated by Macquarrie and Robinson as nullity, would be better understood if it were translated as "notness".⁷⁷ Being-the-basis of a nullity means, therefore, to be the ground of a notness.

Now what in the world does it mean to say Dasein is the ground of a notness? Heidegger's arguments are all very interesting but they are so terribly abstract it is not only very difficult to see what he means, it is difficult to accept his claim that an existence characterized by responsibility generally is prior to the experience of any specific responsibility. What is needed here is some example to help carry the point. Unfortunately, section 58, "Understanding the Appeal, and Guilt", is one of the most difficult sections in *Being and Time* because it does not offer much in the way of specific examples. A little interpretation is therefore needed here. To that end I turn to Gelven for help. We are asking what it means to say Dasein is the ground of a notness. According to Gelven, "[t]his means that, just as all of Dasein's possibilities are what can be, so too are they what can *not* be. The ability *to be* is also, in Dasein, an ability *to be not*....As a possibility, to be honest is countered with the ability to be dishonest (*not* honest). Ontologically speaking, since guilt focuses upon the unique self [as happens in the everyday world, when guilt is

⁷⁶ cf. p. 168; Gelven

⁷⁷ p. 168; Gelven. Actually the translators suggest the same thing in a footnote to this passage. (see n. 1, p. 329, H.283; *Being and Time*)

acknowledged or avoided] it does so in terms of the self's ability to exclude possibilities as well as to accept them."⁷⁸

I find Gelven's explanation here both helpful and plausible. On the strength of his suggestion Dasein does seem to exist in the face of possibilities. It is a potentiality-for-Being, or an existence characterized by possibilities, because it exists in the face of the ultimate possibility, the possibility of even not being something. But this is what Being-towards-death means as well! And this is what the phenomenon of conscience, pointed to by guilt, gives Dasein to understand! Thus it is that Heidegger says Being-guilty "signifies a calling-forth to that potentiality-for-Being which in each case I as Dasein am already. Dasein need not first load a 'guilt' upon itself through its failures or omissions; it must only *be* 'guilty' *authentically*--'guilty' in the way in which it is."⁷⁹

When it understands guilt Dasein understands the call of conscience and, consequently, what authentic Being-towards-death means. Dasein understands itself as a Being characterized by care, a potentiality-for-Being. However, this is not all an understanding of guilt yields.

Hearing the appeal correctly is...tantamount to having an understanding of oneself in one's ownmost potentiality-for-Being--that is, to projecting oneself upon one's *ownmost* authentic potentiality for becoming guilty. When Dasein understandingly lets itself be called forth to this possibility, this includes its *becoming free* for the call--its readiness for the potentiality of getting appealed to. In understanding the call, Dasein is *in thrall to its ownmost possibility of existence*. It has chosen itself. In

⁷⁸ p. 168; Gelven (emphases from text)

⁷⁹ p. 333, H.287; *Being and Time* (emphases from text)

so choosing, Dasein makes possible its ownmost Being-guilty, which remains closed off from the they-self....Understanding the call is a choosing; but it is not a choosing of conscience, which as such cannot be chosen [because it is basic to the Being of Dasein]. What is chosen is *having-a-conscience* as Being-free for one's ownmost Being-guilty. "*Understanding the appeal*" means "*wanting to have a conscience*".⁸⁰

The important point here is that Being-guilty signifies more than just an *understanding* of authenticity and freedom. It signifies a meaningful understanding of authenticity and freedom because it signifies *actual* authenticity and freedom. For Heidegger, true understanding is accompanied by the state understood.

This represents an insight which is demonstrable with a simple example. I may think I know what is entailed in the possibility of doing a Master's degree in philosophy. I may even think I am well qualified to do one. In this case I think I understand the possibility before me. However, I will never really understand what it means to do a Master's degree in philosophy, and whether or not I am capable of doing one, unless I actually engage myself in the pursuit of it. The reason for this is simple. I can never know exactly what such a pursuit involves, and can never know myself well enough to know how capable I will be, unless I actually am doing or have done it. In addition, I will never really understand my desire to acquire a Master's degree in philosophy unless I desire one badly enough to understand it by doing it. In the same way what the conscience means can never be fully understood, that is, what it is calling me to can never be fully understood, unless I want to have a conscience so badly that I am willing to embrace it. Such authentic understanding

⁸⁰ pp. 333-4, H.287-8; *Being and Time* (emphases from text)

is a function of as deep a level of involvement as possible with the object understood. This is why "the authentic understanding of the call has been characterized as "wanting to have a conscience."⁸¹

In the state of wanting to have a conscience Dasein is "disclosed" or "constituted by" "anxiety" and "resoluteness".⁸² In anxiety, Dasein exists understandingly and uncannily attuned to its own Being and towards what that Being as care means-- "The fact of the *anxiety of conscience*, gives us phenomenal understanding that in understanding the call Dasein is brought face to face with its own uncanniness." In addition, as anxious, Dasein exists *willingly* in the state understood-- "Wanting-to-have-a-conscience becomes a readiness for anxiety."⁸³

My example above can be used to demonstrate both the actual experience as well the readiness to experience that kind of understanding which accompanies actually existing in the state understood. If I am motivated to do a Master's degree in philosophy, despite the anxiety I feel about the pressures I know will probably accompany such an undertaking, I am clearly ready for that anxiety. Furthermore, when I embrace that anxiety by attempting such an undertaking I put myself in a position to learn something about myself which would otherwise not be possible.

In resoluteness, wanting to have conscience takes the form of "reticence". By reticence Heidegger means a kind of willing yet subdued anticipation that characterizes Dasein's readiness to embrace whatever the call of conscience reveals to it about

⁸¹ p. 342, H.295; *Being and Time*

⁸² p. 343, H.296; *Being and Time*

⁸³ p. 342, H.296; *Being and Time* (emphases from text)

itself. When Dasein is thus reticent it does not irresponsibly rush without reflection into any old course of action. Rather, it is willing to Be-guilty or responsible for its own existence in the most responsible way imaginable. It will be whatever its own Being reveals to it, which is that it is a potentiality-for-Being, an existence characterized by possibilities--"When our understanding of the appeal is Interpreted existentially as resoluteness, the conscience is revealed as that kind of Being--included in the very basis of Dasein--in which Dasein makes possible for itself its factual existence, thus attesting its ownmost potentiality-for-Being."⁸⁴ When it is resolute Dasein manifests the full meaning of care--"*Resoluteness,...is...that authenticity which, in care, is the object of care, and which is possible as care--the authenticity of care itself.*"⁸⁵ As such, resoluteness signifies Dasein as both unfree and free Being-in-the-world. Resoluteness "does not detach Dasein from its world, nor does it isolate it so that it becomes a free-floating 'I'." In this context Dasein is unfree because "[r]esoluteness brings the Self right into its current concerned Being-alongside what is ready-to-hand, and pushes it into solicitous Being with Others." But in this context Dasein is also free--"In the light of...one's self-chosen potentiality-for-Being, resolute Dasein frees itself for its world."⁸⁶ In its connection with care as the Being of Dasein, resoluteness therefore stands as the locus of a paradox of freedom in Dasein.

⁸⁴ p. 347, H.300; *Being and Time*

⁸⁵ p. 348, H.301; *Being and Time* (emphases from text)

⁸⁶ p. 344, H.298; *Being and Time*

Heidegger's analysis of resoluteness tells us in yet another way just how freedom, understood as the paradox of freedom, is a condition of reality that is at once relative to the Being of Dasein. Resoluteness is a central aspect of an authentic understanding of the reality of Dasein as a Being-in-the-world. It brings Dasein inexorably into contact with the limits of its world. But resoluteness also enables Dasein to entertain those possibilities which are realistic within-the-world. Resoluteness therefore signifies a paradox of freedom that ties in thematically with the reality of possibilities and limits within the reality of Dasein as a Being-in-the-world.

Before concluding this section it is necessary to say a few additional words on the way in which Heidegger understands that Being-guilty and, likewise, the conscience implied by Being-guilty, are something that apply universally to all Daseins despite the fact that authenticity is a possibility which does not often pervade the everyday world. Taken together the call of conscience and guilt signify the "*existential condition[s] for the possibility of...[an authentic] potentiality-for-Being*" which exists (i.e., is "factual" in Heidegger's parlance) in the everyday (i.e., "existentiell", as opposed to existential) world.⁸⁷ This is true, according to Heidegger, even when Dasein is lost, as it were, to the thrall of the everyday they-world. On the minimalist understanding that prevails here conscience and guilt are often (and usually) interpreted as critical faculties of the human according to which judgements about good and evil are made "relative to some definite deed."⁸⁸

⁸⁷ p. 325, H.280; *Being and Time* (emphases from text)

⁸⁸ see p. 336, H.290; *Being and Time*

Heidegger of course does not deny that such is the nature of experience in the everyday world. Indeed, he maintains that the ontological analysis of conscience and guilt must remain tied to everyday experience if they are to have any valid meaning at all--"such an analysis has no right to disregard the everyday understanding of conscience and to pass over the anthropological, psychological, and theological theories of conscience which have been based on it."⁸⁹ However, what he wants to point out is that such experiences themselves *always* point towards a deeper understanding of conscience and guilt. In the everyday world "[w]hen we experience a warning conscience, the voice is regarded in turn as merely oriented towards the deed which has been willed, from which it seeks to preserve us. But the warning, as a check on what we have willed, is possible only because the 'warning' call is aimed at Dasein's potentiality-for-Being--that is, at its understanding of itself in Being-guilty."⁹⁰

The way in which Heidegger maintains a link between everyday experiences of conscience and guilt, and the ontological conception of them, is an extremely important part of his analysis. Conscience and guilt are Heidegger's basis for claiming that authenticity is universally and genuinely possible. If he had not shown them to be experiences that are pervasive to the everyday world, in such a way that they suggest their own ontological significance, Heidegger would have no grounds for claiming conscience and guilt to be the foundation for a genuinely possible authenticity. This is the only way he could have established authenticity as something

⁸⁹ p. 336, H.290; *Being and Time*

⁹⁰ p. 338, H.292; *Being and Time* (see also p. 334, H.288)

meaningful. Because it is obvious that many people, maybe even most people, are not characterized by authenticity as described by Heidegger, it seems pretty clear that authenticity itself is not universally apparent. In order for authenticity to be meaningful at all, therefore, Heidegger has to show that it is at least a genuinely universal possibility. Such a possibility is maintained via the link between everyday experiences of conscience and guilt, and the ontological significance of these experiences. Heidegger's claims about authenticity are therefore substantiated not just in spite of but precisely because of the reality of inauthenticity.

iii) The Full Meaning of Care in its Connection With Temporality

There are two important points I want to make with respect to the connection between care and time. First, I want to show how care in its connection with time further establishes that authentic Being-towards-death, resoluteness, and freedom are universal characteristics of the existence of Dasein. This becomes evident upon consideration of the fact that, for Heidegger, there is a link between care and past time such that the past exists in the present in much the same way as does the future. The past existing in the present proves Dasein to be a creature that has always been characterized by possibilities which are, at any particular instance of the present, a function of a future that exists in the present. Second, I want to show how Heidegger prioritizes care in its connection with future time, such that freedom is a function of an authenticity in which existence is characterized by future related possibilities that exist in the present.

Prior to discussing these two points, it should first be pointed out that Heidegger's conception of time is not the ordinary one. In the ordinary scientific conception of time, time is understood as an infinite series of "nows", an infinite series of present moments, according to which the past is thought of in terms of "nows" which have been, the present in terms of a "now" that is current, and the future in terms of "nows" which are yet to be.⁹¹ On this conception, time appears as an infinite horizon upon which an infinitely unchanging substance endures changes in properties (accidents) while the underlying essence remains the same. This infinitely unchanging substance has the character of something "indissolubly present-at-hand" (i.e., an enduring *Eidos*) because it entails "an orientation *towards a free-floating "in-itself" o[n] a course of "nows" which is present-at-hand--an orientation in which the full phenomenon of the "now" has been covered up...[in] its character of having a location of the same kind as Dasein's, so that it has dwindled to an unrecognizable fragment.*"⁹² The idea here is that on the ordinary conception of time, understood as an infinite series of nows, the problem of change (i.e., the age-old problem of the one and the many) is explained as modifications occurring in particular moments to some essence that endures unchanged on the horizon of infinite moments. On this understanding, what is infinite is some enduring absolute, and what is finite is change itself. An example of such an enduring absolute, with respect to the dis-

⁹¹ see pp. 377, H.329; *Being and Time*. "What is characteristic of the 'time'[which is accessible to the ordinary understanding, consists, among other things, precisely in the fact that it is a pure sequence of "nows", without beginning and without end, in which the ecstatic character of primordial temporality has been levelled off."

⁹² p. 476, H.423, 424; *Being and Time*. The word "o[n]" thus bracketed signifies a correction on a probable misprint in the text. The word "of" appears in place of "on". I think my correction makes the intended meaning of this passage clearer. (emphases within citation are from text)

cussion at hand, would be the human essence conceived of as soul and, correspondingly, the soul conceived of as the essential ground of a 'thing which thinks.'

Heidegger's conception of time reverses this understanding such that what is absolute is change and what is relative is that upon which change takes place.⁹³

With respect to Dasein this means that Dasein is not an eternally enduring mind with a temporary body. Rather, it is a finite existence characterized by the infinite possibility of change. That is, it is present in the face of future possibilities and changes which, because they apply to Dasein as present, imply a future existing in the present. Because of this it can be said that Dasein has freedom, and that freedom

⁹³ cf. Heidegger's reference to Plato's *Timaeus*, where Plato talks about time as the "moving image of eternity". (see *Timaeus* 37d-38b, pp. 1151-1211 in *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*, ed. by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963, as well as p. 475, H.423 and n. x, p. 499; *Being and Time*.) In the passage alluded to above, Plato talks about Being in the spatio-temporal world as an order in which eternity is a function of the constancy of change. Even though Heidegger claims that Plato still thought of time in terms of "a sequence of 'nows' arising and passing away", he still appears to subscribe to Plato's depiction of time in the world as we know it. The reason Heidegger accuses Plato of failing to get beyond the ordinary conception of time, is that for Plato the manifestation of time in the world as we know it is but a derivative reflection of a more perfect, eternally unchanging order of Being, which rests on what Heidegger calls the ordinary conception of time. Heidegger takes issue with Plato, therefore, because Plato treated what Heidegger considers to be the more primordial conception of time as secondary. Nevertheless, Heidegger does maintain that Plato did fittingly "call time 'the image of eternity'." (p. 475, H.423) Insofar as the existential analytic reveals that authentic Dasein understands itself as a creature that is at once finite, and yet marked by future related possibilities, this image of eternity turns out to be, for Heidegger, an accurate description of the way in which "the innocuous infinite series of 'nows' which simply runs its course, imposes itself 'on' Dasein in a remarkably enigmatical way". (p. 477, H.425) Thus, even though Plato's conception of time prioritized the ordinary conception of time, he nevertheless did successfully describe time as it is manifest in the real world such that eternity is relative to the constancy of change, while that upon which change takes place is transitory. On this primordial conception of time, then, Dasein is finite, in the sense that it is "abandoned to the 'world' which is discovered with its factual 'there', and concernfully submitted to it", while at the same time being "futural in the ahead-of-itself". (pp. 465, H.412, 478, H.425) In other words, although Dasein cannot escape the limitations connected with the fact that it is a Being-in-the-world, it is also nonetheless an existence characterized by future related possibilities. It seems to be on this idea that Heidegger subscribes to Plato's depiction of time as the moving image of eternity. On this image, then, Dasein is a finite creature which exists in the face of possibilities. Insofar as possibilities signify the possibility of changing its involvements in the world, authentic Dasein is therefore a creature which understands itself as a relative rather than absolute existence, for which Being-in-the-world means a realm in which the only absolute is change.

is a function above all of a future that exists in the present. In what follows, I first indicate how Heidegger establishes a link between care and past time, in order to show how this link further supports the contention that authentic Being-towards-death and resoluteness are universal and so meaningful possibilities for Dasein. Then, I dwell for a bit longer on the relationship between care and future time in order to expose the full meaning of Heidegger's concept of freedom, as well as my contention that this concept of freedom is not only paradoxical but the reason, ultimately, why there occurs, on Heidegger's world view, a paradox of unity in reality.

To summarize the connection between care as the Being of Dasein and time generally, Heidegger repeats the lengthy sentence, "Dasein's totality of Being as care means: 'ahead-of-itself-already-being-in (a world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world).'"⁹⁴ To say that as care Dasein is ahead-of-itself means that Dasein exists in the face of future related possibilities. Existence means presence,⁹⁵ and "[t]he 'ahead-of-itself' is grounded in the future."⁹⁶ To say that Dasein exists in the face of future related possibilities, i.e., as ahead-of-itself, therefore means that Dasein's existence or presence includes a future that exists in the present.

When I cited Heidegger's sentence on the full meaning of care in the previous chapter I deliberately omitted the qualifier "already-being-in". The reason for this omission had to do with the fact that, at the time, I was only articulating the

⁹⁴ p. 375, H.327; *Being and Time*

⁹⁵ see p. 4-5, Chap. One; and p. 22, n. 3, Chap. Two above

⁹⁶ p. 375, H.327; *Being and Time*

meaning of care provisionally for the purpose of summarizing what had been learned to date about the Being of Dasein. Now, however, we are ready to go beyond what was there only provisionally established; we are ready for a full understanding of care in its connection with time. The qualifier "already-being-in" signifies a past which exists in the present in the same way as does a future. "In the 'Being-already-in...', the character of 'having been' is made known....'As long as' Dasein factually exists, it is never past, but it always is indeed as already having *been*, in the sense of the 'I *am*-as-having-been'. Only as long as Dasein is, *can* it *be* as having been."⁹⁷

In other words Dasein's presence or existence is characterized by the fact that it has a past which exists now, a past according to which it always has been such and such a kind of entity in such and such a kind of world.

The link between care and past time signifies that as care Dasein's existence is and always has been characterized by a present which includes a future. As such it signifies the universality of Dasein's Being as care. Heidegger's proof that a past exists in the present, that Dasein has always lived in the face of future related possibilities, rests upon the fact that throughout history Dasein has always manifest at least some of the central items in the structure of care. There exist in the present all kinds of historical artifacts that once "were encountered as ready-to-hand and used by a concerned Dasein who was-in-the-world."⁹⁸ These items were manufactured and used by Daseins in the past who conceived of them and their use in terms of future related possibilities. "Remains, monuments, and records that are still present-at-hand,

⁹⁷ pp. 375, 376, H. 327, 328; *Being and Time* (emphases from text)

⁹⁸ p. 432, H.380; *Being and Time*

are possible 'material' for the concrete disclosure of the Dasein which has-been-there....the Dasein which has-been-there is understood in its authentic possibility which has been...., the Dasein which has-been-there upon its ownmost possibility of existence."⁹⁹

Heidegger says such historical remains are only possible material for realizing the Dasein 'which has been there' because on the ordinary conception of time such artifacts are interpreted as items of a past which no longer exists. On the basis of such interpretations "only 'past' Dasein would be historical, not Dasein 'in the present'."¹⁰⁰ The result is that in such interpretations an important clue about Dasein is missed, which is pointed to by historical artifacts themselves--"they relate to man as the 'subject' of events."¹⁰¹ In addition, the ontological significance of this important clue is missed also. Consequently, the interpretation of Dasein as 'having-been-there' remains only a possible interpretation of the meaning of historical artifacts.

Nevertheless, according to Heidegger, if Dasein realizes that authentic mode of anxiety in which resoluteness occurs, it becomes aware of itself as always having been an existence characterized by possibilities. It "is assailed by itself as the entity which it still is and already was--that is to say, which it constantly *is* as having been," and so comes to know that "[a]s long as' Dasein factically exists, it is *never*

⁹⁹ p. 446, H.394; *Being and Time* (emphasis from text)

¹⁰⁰ p. 432, H.380; *Being and Time*

¹⁰¹ p. 431, H.379; *Being and Time*

past, but it always is indeed as already having *been*, in the sense of the 'I *am-as-having-been*'.¹⁰²

A rather serious problem emerges here. It seems that Heidegger's attempt to prove authenticity to be a universally meaningful possibility is based on an historical understanding of Dasein that is itself a function of authenticity! This problem is serious and demands discussion. However, because it ties in with another serious problem in Heidegger, the problem of Heidegger's latent subjectivity, I prefer to leave it to my critique in Part II of this chapter. The intention here is simply to notice this problem and to indicate that it will not be ignored.

With an authentic understanding of the past an authentic understanding of the present also occurs. "When resolute, Dasein has brought itself back from falling [i.e., it has brought itself back from lostness in the inauthenticness of the they-world], and has done so precisely in order to be more authentically 'there' [i.e., present] in the 'moment of vision' as regards the Situation which has been disclosed."¹⁰³ The terms 'moment of vision' and 'situation' signify the state of being that accompanies authentic understanding or resoluteness. Thus when Dasein is resolute, that is, when it understands its present existence and its past in terms of future related possibilities that have always existed as long as Dasein has existed, its present existence becomes modified by what it understands. What Dasein understands is that for it Being-in-the-world means 'Being-alongside entities encountered within-the-world.' And, because

¹⁰² p. 376, H.328; *Being and Time* (emphases from text)

¹⁰³ p. 376, H.328; *Being and Time* (emphasis from text)

"'Being-alongside...' becomes possible in making present,"¹⁰⁴ it also exists in conformity with the state understood. I have already shown why Dasein only exists as Being-alongside entities encountered in-the-world. As care Dasein exists not in-a-world--only entities other than Dasein are in-a-world--but alongside entities encountered within-the-world because its existence is characterized by possibilities that apply only to it.¹⁰⁵ On the basis of the link established between care and past time it now becomes apparent that, for Heidegger, one of the reasons this can be said is that Dasein's existence has always been so characterized.

We are now ready to describe fully Heidegger's concept of freedom as it occurs on the basis of a connection between care and future time. First, however, it would be useful to summarize what we have learned thus far. I have already pointed out that for Heidegger freedom means possibilities, and that freedom is a function of future related possibilities. In addition, I have been making the point, throughout the preceding analysis, that freedom is a genuine possibility because it is a function of an authentic mode of anxiety which is a genuine possibility for Dasein. Because authenticity is such a genuine possibility, freedom exists for Dasein--Dasein is free because it is a potentiality-for-Being. In the final analysis this authentic mode of anxiety, first made visible as Being-towards-death, is manifest as resoluteness. Resoluteness therefore signifies the full meaning of the Being of Dasein as care. To be care means to be an existence characterized by anxiety and living resolutely in the face of possibilities. To be care means to be a locus of freedom.

¹⁰⁴ p. 375, H.327; *Being and Time*

¹⁰⁵ see pp. 50-51; Chap. 2 above

There are only two points I wish to add to all this. The first is that, for Heidegger, "[t]he primary phenomenon of primordial and authentic temporality is the future."¹⁰⁶ Of the three ecstases of time, past, present, and future, the future has priority for Heidegger because it tells us precisely what it means for Dasein to exist. Thus the connection between care and future time is the most important with respect to understanding the Being of Dasein as an existence characterized by future related possibilities. My second point has to do with reiterating the full meaning of care in its connection with the priority of future time. Heidegger describes this authentic manifestation of care in its connection with time by the term "anticipatory resoluteness". Anticipatory resoluteness signifies that as care Dasein is an existence characterized by future related possibilities.

Anticipatory resoluteness, when taken formally and existentially,...is *Being towards* one's ownmost, distinctive potentiality-for-Being. This sort of thing is possible only in that Dasein *can, indeed*, come towards [i.e., understand, acknowledge] itself in its ownmost possibility, and that it can put up with this possibility as a possibility in thus letting itself come towards itself--in other words, that it exists....Anticipation makes Dasein *authentically* futural...¹⁰⁷

Anticipatory resoluteness also signifies that potentiality-for-Being is the ground, not of a fatalistic acceptance that in some ways Dasein is not free--the ultimate reminder of which is that it cannot escape death--nor of a Dasein totally different from and so removed from a world, but of possibilities and a kind of

¹⁰⁶ p. 378, H.329; *Being and Time*

¹⁰⁷ pp. 372, 373, H.325; *Being and Time* (emphases from text)

freedom which apply to Dasein, and which make understanding and action possible in the everyday world.

Anticipatory resoluteness is not a way of escape, fabricated for the 'overcoming' of death; it is rather that understanding which follows the call of conscience and which frees for death the possibility of acquiring *power* over Dasein's *existence* and of basically dispersing all fugitive Self-concealments. Nor does wanting-to-have-a-conscience, which has been made determinate as Being-towards-death, signify a kind of seclusion in which one flees the world; rather, it brings one without Illusions into the resoluteness of 'taking action'. Neither does anticipatory resoluteness stem from 'idealistic' exactions soaring above existence and its possibilities; it springs from a sober understanding of what are factually the basic possibilities for Dasein. Along with the sober anxiety which brings us face to face with our individualized potentiality-for-Being, there goes an unshakable joy in this possibility. In it Dasein becomes free from the entertaining 'incidentals' with which busy curiosity keeps providing itself--primarily from the events of the world.¹⁰⁸

This passage contains the heart and soul of Heidegger's concept of freedom. It tells us what Heidegger ultimately means by freedom. Freedom is first of all a type of understanding that 'frees Dasein for death' and gives it 'power over its existence.' Here freedom means the understanding, and living according to the understanding, that Dasein is an existence over which it has some power. Insofar as it is capable of realizing something essential about itself it can decide "to be itself or not itself."¹⁰⁹ Second, freedom also means the possibility of taking action--"it brings one without illusions into the resoluteness of taking action." Heidegger's concept of freedom,

¹⁰⁸ pp. 358-9, H.310; *Being and Time* (emphases from text)

¹⁰⁹ p. 33, H.12; *Being and Time*

conceived of as the ground of understanding and taking action, therefore means the first condition of possibility for any understanding or action whatsoever. In addition, as the ground of understanding, Heidegger's concept of freedom means the condition of possibility for truth. That is, it is, as indicated in "On the Essence of Truth", the "inner condition of the possibility of correctness" itself.¹¹⁰

But Heidegger's concept of freedom entails a fundamental unfreedom, also alluded to in this passage. Dasein cannot escape certain limitations, most significant of which is the possibility of its own death. 'Anticipatory resoluteness is not a way of escape, fabricated for the overcoming of death.' In anticipatory resoluteness Dasein is reminded that it is "transcendent", in the sense that it exists in the face of an infinity of possibilities. But anticipatory resoluteness also reminds Dasein that it is "finite", meaning that its existence is characterized by limitations--not all possibilities apply to it.¹¹¹

Richardson describes what I call the paradox of freedom in terms of a finite transcendence according to which a series of "nots" always accompany Dasein as resolute Being-towards-death. The first "not" occurs in the fact that Dasein "is not its own master--it does not create itself but finds itself as a matter of fact in the World." Second, Dasein "is not independent of other beings but is related to them and in this reference depends on them to be what it is." Third, "[a]nother kind of "not" that marks the finitude of *Dasein's* transcendence is the fact that Being itself, when considered in terms of beings, can only be experienced as not-a-being, [or] Non-

¹¹⁰ p. 125; Krell

¹¹¹ The terms "finite" and "transcendence" are borrowed from Richardson; "Heidegger and the Quest of Freedom".

being." Recalling my earlier discussion in the section on Being-towards-death, what this means is that authentic Dasein's experience of its own impending end brings it before the issue of its own Being and, consequently, before the issue of Being itself, in such a way that it realizes existence to be intimately connected with the limiting character of non-existence.

The fourth and most important "not" is connected with this issue. Authentic Dasein realizes that it "cannot be forever, it is destined to die." This "not" is the most important because insofar as "its sign is upon *Dasein* from the beginning" it marks Dasein to be "from the first moment of [existence a] Being-towards-death."¹¹²

This fourth "not" is also important because insofar as it signifies Being-towards-death it signifies the paradox of freedom that obtains when Dasein realizes authenticity. As a Being-towards-death Dasein exists in the face of future related possibilities, but as a Being-towards-death Dasein also bears the stamp of a fundamental finitude or unfreedom which it cannot overcome.

Through anticipatory resoluteness, therefore, Dasein understandingly accepts the full character of its existence. It understandingly accepts, in fact, that its freedom goes hand in hand with a fundamental unfreedom. It accepts its existence as characterized by the paradox of freedom.

The above passage cited from Heidegger also alludes to my point that the paradox of freedom maintains the paradox of unity. Only in accepting the kind of limitations as are implied in authentic Being-towards-death is Dasein free for those possibilities that do lie before it. It is in this sense that 'along with the sober anxiety

¹¹² pp. 166-7; Richardson

which brings us face to face with our individualized potentiality-for-Being, Dasein becomes free from the events of the world.' The paradox of freedom maintains the paradox of unity in that it signifies Dasein to be at once unique and yet tied to a world. That is, although it has power over its existence it can neither 'flee the world' nor 'soar above existence and its possibilities.' Rather, precisely because it realizes that it has some but not any possibilities Dasein emerges as a locus of a paradoxical kind of freedom that maintains it as at once unique from and yet nevertheless tied to a world.

PART II: A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF HEIDEGGER'S CONCEPT OF FREEDOM

In the following critique I will first of all highlight some reasons why I think Heidegger's concept of freedom contains some valuable insights. Following this, however, I will attempt to show where there are some rather serious problems which, because they spring from some unsubstantiated assumptions about human subjectivity, lead to a rather nihilistic view of what it means to be human in a human world. The purpose of this critique is to prepare the way for a consideration of Martin Buber's criticisms of Heidegger, and to prepare the way for showing that Heidegger's insights can be maintained even if his work is made subject to modifications borrowed from Buber. The deeper purpose behind this attempt to marry the insights of these two thinkers is to show that more valuable insights can be gained by treating philosophy as an ongoing cooperative search for understanding than by treating different thinkers independently. In this instance the insights to be gained have to do

with what I think is a rather important issue, the issue of what it means to be human in a human world.

i) Heidegger's Insights

Throughout the preceding analysis I have been maintaining that Heidegger's concept of freedom is such that freedom is at once a condition of reality and something which applies to Dasein. The reason for this is that this is the area in which I consider Heidegger's concept of freedom to be most insightful even though it is not without problems.

One of the themes Heidegger pursues with great tenacity in Division II of *Being and Time* concerns "the question of whether a potentiality-for-Being-a-whole is possible" in reality.¹¹³ Recalling from above that potentiality-for-Being means possibilities as they apply to Dasein, what Heidegger is in essence asking here is whether or not possibilities exist in reality such that Dasein is, in essence, an existence characterized by possibilities. In *Being and Time* the question about the meaning of Being is pursued via analysis of the Being of Dasein. Hence possibilities are apparently related primarily to the Being of Dasein. This suggests that freedom is not a condition of reality but a property of Dasein. I have already indicated, however, that for Heidegger there is more to freedom than this. Freedom is possibilities in general, and an openness or open region, in which occurs a disclosedness that implies a relation between the Being of Dasein and Being itself. Possibilities, or the

¹¹³ p. 280, H.237; *Being and Time*. Heidegger indicates that this is an "existentiell" question, meaning that it is a question about the actual state of affairs in the world as it is known. Thus he is asking here if potentiality-for-Being-a-whole is possible in experience.

open region of freedom, therefore possess Dasein before Dasein possesses freedom. I have also pointed out that what this means--and it does not matter whether one is talking about the earlier or the later Heidegger--is that freedom or the existence of possibilities themselves are the necessary condition upon which disclosure of the Being of Dasein occurs. Since disclosure of the Being of Dasein results in the realization that Dasein has or is a part of freedom, because it is an anticipatorily resolute Being-towards-death, this disclosure results in the realization that freedom is not a property. Rather it is a condition of reality which applies to Dasein.

This of course does not fully answer the question as to how freedom must be thought of as something that exists outside of Dasein. The discovery of a freedom which applies to Dasein does not seem to give sufficient ground for saying freedom is something that exists in and of itself as a condition of reality which Dasein only partakes of, as it were. And yet this is definitely where Heidegger is heading. In order to make this clear I will here reiterate and expand upon my earlier references to the essay "On the Essence of Truth". In that essay Heidegger describes the essence of truth, not in terms of traditional correspondence theories of truth, which are relative to the mind of the knower, but in terms of a freedom which is a necessary condition of truth. The reason, according to Heidegger, why truth is grounded in freedom is because before any "correspondence of the matter to knowledge" can occur "an inner condition of the possibility of correctness" must occur first.¹¹⁴ This inner condition of possibility of correctness is an "open region...into which every being comes to stand, bringing that openness, as it were, along with itself," and

¹¹⁴ pp. 120, 125; Krell

which "[w]estern thinking in its beginning conceived...as *ta alethea*, the unconcealed."¹¹⁵ Heidegger then goes on to equate unconcealedness with disclosedness which can only occur when "letting be" occurs.

In "On the Essence of Truth" letting be means "to engage oneself with beings"; in *Being and Time* it is similarly described as "involvement" with things ready-to-hand in the world.¹¹⁶ But, as previously pointed out, involvement in the world reveals some pretty important things about the Being of Dasein and the Being of entities other than Dasein (problems notwithstanding). Dasein is different from but nevertheless tied to things other than itself because in its worldly involvements it manifests concern, solicitude, and anxiety. Thus involvement entails disclosure; it is a kind of freedom the occasion of which gives rise to a coming to pass of truth. But freedom is also an open region which Heidegger unequivocally says, in "On the Essence of Truth", "[m]an does not 'possess'...as a property. At best, the converse holds: freedom...possesses man--so distinctively that only *it* secures for humanity that distinctive relatedness to being as a whole as such which first founds all history."¹¹⁷ Similarly, in *Being and Time* freedom is most generally conceived of as possibilities.

I think it is evident that even at the time of the writing of *Being and Time* Heidegger definitely did think of freedom as something more than just a property of

¹¹⁵ p. 127; Krell

¹¹⁶ see p. 127-8; "On the Essence of Truth" in Krell and pp. 115, 117, H.83-85; *Being and Time*, well as my earlier reference to "letting-be", n. 41, p. 99 above.

¹¹⁷ p. 129; Krell

Dasein. At the end of "On the Essence of Truth" he points out that the decisive question (in *Being and Time*, 1927) of the meaning...of the openness, [and] of the truth of Being and not merely of beings, remains intentionally undeveloped." Indeed he admits that "[o]ur thinking [still] remains on the path of metaphysics." He believes he has successfully shown that there is more to truth than simple correspondence, that truth is in essence founded on freedom, but he is still not satisfied that he has shown "a way of thinking which, instead of furnishing representations and concepts, experiences and tries itself as a transformation of its relatedness to Being."¹¹⁸

Two things are importance to notice from these closing remarks in "On the Essence of Truth". First, although *Being and Time* itself never really does get beyond the existential analytic of Dasein such that what is discovered about the Being of Dasein is not clearly ascribed to Being proper, the direction Heidegger was thinking in is clear from this later essay. In other words, it is appropriate to surmise, from hints given in *Being and Time* about the relationship between the Being of Dasein and Being proper, that Heidegger was thinking about freedom holistically which though evident in Dasein is more than a property of Dasein. It is a characteristic of Being, or existence, itself.

Second, it is important to realize that Heidegger himself was not satisfied with his own efforts to expose what existence in general means. Consequently, he was never completely successful in articulating completely just what it means to say that freedom is something more akin to Being proper than it is to the Being of

¹¹⁸ pp. 140, 141; Krell

Dasein. Nevertheless, and as Murray Miles points out, Heidegger was convinced that "[w]hat distinguishes man from all other entities...is that man possesses an implicit comprehension of Being as such, of the non-entitative as distinct from particular species, from classes of entities belonging to the same species, and from the generic sense of what it is to be an entity as such, irrespective of kind."¹¹⁹ In *Being and Time* this conviction launched investigation into the question about Being via the existential analytic of Dasein. In later works, such as "On the Essence of Truth", Heidegger's attempt to move beyond the specific Being of Dasein resulted in a conception of truth grounded in a kind of freedom which, though very general in the sense of being more than a property of Dasein, is still something that applies to Dasein. This "turning", Miles points out, "in no way represents an abandonment of his earlier thinking, but...a turning of attention from one to the other of the terms in the distinctive relation between the entity which understands Being, man, and the non-entitative dimension or Being as such." Thus, "[t]he centrality of the relationship itself [between existence itself and the existence of Dasein] is the constant in Heidegger's thinking, early and late."¹²⁰ What is important about all this is that Heidegger never stopped struggling with the question about Being. All his inquiries were motivated by it, and he never satisfied even himself that he had found the answers he was looking for. He never fully satisfied even himself that freedom is an aspect of all reality, rather than just being a property of Dasein.

¹¹⁹ p. 434; Miles, "Heidegger and the Question of Humanism"

¹²⁰ p. 435; Miles

Because of this Heidegger himself is of limited help in trying to understand fully how freedom is more than just a human property. Nevertheless, because of what he does offer, it would be inappropriate to conclude that freedom is only a human property. To do this would entail having to say that possibilities apply only to the human. I think such a claim has to be considered problematic, even if one could make the case that only humans are *aware* of possibilities. All sorts of events take place that are not of obvious human origin. One clear example that comes to mind here is genetics which seems to follow an order of possibility totally outside the realm of human manipulation. Now it is true that humans do exercise control in this area, sometimes with marked success on some forms of life. However, this control, based on the human invention of probability theory, is token at best. Probability theory says that if I throw a two-sided coin into the air once, there is a fifty percent chance of it landing heads. However, it is entirely conceivable that if I throw the coin into the air one hundred times it will land one hundred times tails. This seems improbable, but it could happen. There is simply no indication that certain mathematical calculations based on probability theory will ever make some and only some specific events out of many possible ones necessary. Possibilities exist which lie beyond the realm of human involvement or control. Heidegger is right in this regard. The fact that he was not able to show just *how* he was right does not change the fact that he was. At the same time he was right to notice that humans do have possibilities that they can control. I do not have to sit at my computer working on this paper on Heidegger. That is my choice, which I have chosen and continue to choose, out of a number of options open to me. Thus, Heidegger was right in saying that

possibilities actually apply to the human in reality. Since possibility is freedom, for Heidegger, he is therefore right in thinking of freedom as something at once independent of and yet specific to the human. Dasein is therefore free, and freedom is a condition of the reality of Being-in-the-world. We may not fully understand how this is so, but it does seem to be actually so.

ii) Problems Pertaining to Heidegger's Conception of Freedom in its Relation to Authentic Dasein

Despite the fact that I think Heidegger was on to something important when he attempted to describe freedom as both a condition of reality and as something applicable to Dasein, I do think that his notion of authenticity, upon which freedom is grounded, is seriously problematic. The experiences upon which authenticity is founded appear to be so individuating that, despite Heidegger's claims to the contrary, human being in a human world becomes little more than a realm of isolated human islands existing in communion with themselves as opposed to existing in community with one's fellow humans. This whole picture becomes a little scary upon consideration of the fact that, for Heidegger, freedom is grounded on this kind of authenticity such that any practical consideration of human society as we know it seems to entail an implicit negation of authenticity. Serious as this problem is, it is made even worse by the fact that Heidegger does not really have any real proof that his conception of authenticity is an accurate reflection of what it really means to be human in a human world.

I have already pointed out, in Chapter One, that Dasein is problematically subjectivized because 1) the first necessary condition of Dasein Being-with others is

the realization of what it means to be oneself, and 2) the occasion of such realization is the very negative, highly individualizing experience of anxiety. These problems continue to be evident in the second Division of *Being and Time*. The experiences appealed to for the purpose of proving authenticity to be a meaningful possibility--i.e., Being-towards-death, resoluteness, and anxiety--continue to re-enforce the negative, individualizing connotations of authentic anxiety. This is first evident upon consideration of the fact that for Heidegger Being-towards-death is before all else an individuating experience.¹²¹ It is again evident in the analysis of the call of conscience and guilt. I have indicated that the call of conscience amounts to a sense of "uncanniness" whereby Dasein understands itself as a potentiality-for-Being. This understanding occurs synonymously with an "alienation" from the they-world, such that when Dasein understands uncanniness, it "has been individualized down to itself in its uncanniness and has been thrown into the 'nothing'."¹²² Guilt is likewise an extremely individuating experience. In that it signifies a complete understanding of Dasein's "ownmost authentic potentiality-for-Being" it signifies a Dasein which "has chosen itself [and]...become closed off from the they-self."¹²³ Finally, in resoluteness, authentic Being-towards-death "*brings [Dasein] face to face with the possibility of being itself, primarily unsupported by concerned solicitude, but of being itself, rather, in an impassioned freedom towards death--a freedom which has been released from the illusions of the 'they', and which is factual, certain of itself, and*

¹²¹ p. 284, H.240; *Being and Time*. "By its very essence, death is in every case mine, in so far as it 'is' at all."

¹²² pp. 321-2, H.277; *Being and Time*

¹²³ pp. 333-4, H.287; *Being and Time* (emphasis from text)

anxious."¹²⁴ The individuating aspects of authenticity are then re-enforced in the connection established between resolute care and the priority of future time. In the "full structural content" of anticipatory resoluteness Dasein is "*Being towards one's ownmost, distinctive potentiality-for-Being*."¹²⁵

All of these individuating experiences are enhanced by the accompanying experience of anxiety. "All understanding is accompanied by a state-of-mind" [and] "*...the state-of-mind which can hold open the utter and constant threat to itself arising from Dasein's ownmost individualized Being, is anxiety*. In this state-of-mind, Dasein finds itself *face to face* with the 'nothing' of the possible impossibility of its existence."¹²⁶ Anxiety concretizes the realization that "[a]nticipation utterly individualizes Dasein, and allows it, in this individualization of itself, to become certain of the totality of its potentiality-for-Being. For this reason, anxiety as a basic state-of-mind belongs to such a self-understanding of Dasein on the basis of Dasein itself. Being-towards-death is essentially anxiety."¹²⁷

There are two reasons why I have a problem with all this. The first has to do with the fact that Heidegger's concept of freedom stumbles because of the heavy priority he places on the ontological reality of individualized, authentic Dasein, as opposed to the more practical reality of everyday Dasein in the they-world environment. This can be made apparent upon consideration of a paradox of freedom, which

¹²⁴ p. 311, H.266; *Being and Time* (emphases and bold print from text)

¹²⁵ p. 372, H.325; *Being and Time* (emphases from text)

¹²⁶ p. 310, H.265-6; *Being and Time* (emphases from text)

¹²⁷ p. 310, H.266; *Being and Time*

appears to be real, and yet which does not appear to have anything to do with Heidegger's concept of freedom. This paradox has to do with the fact that in human society we find it necessary to make rules in order to preserve law and order. We find it prudent to use our freedom, as it were, to curtail our freedom in order to enhance freedom. Thus we have a law disallowing murder. Insofar as most people presumably believe that it would not be advisable to allow murder as a common practice, one might say that we voluntarily write and subscribe to such a law.¹²⁸ That is, we use our freedom to curtail our freedom to take the life of another. In so doing, we realize the benefit of a greater freedom which follows from the realization that we do not have to live in the fear that someone may legally take the life of another.

I say that this paradox of freedom is not evident in Heidegger because it refers to a practical reality Heidegger is trying to get beyond. That is, he is questioning all those ways in which Dasein has previously been studied from a more practical standpoint; he is deliberately trying to go beyond any "philosophical psychology, anthropology, ethics, and 'political science', poetry, biography, or history," in order to get an a priori understanding of "the basic structures of Dasein [and] of Being itself."¹²⁹ Heidegger's reason for remaining beyond the realm of the practical has to do with the fact that, for him, no adequate practical understanding of

¹²⁸ I am thinking here of the notion of the "preamble" which contains the reason for a law. The notion of the preamble is ancient, going back at least as far back as Plato's *Laws*, and is still current I believe in law today.

¹²⁹ p. 37, H.16; *Being and Time*

what it means to be human in a human world is possible unless it is tied to a more ontological level of understanding.

The two realms, the practical and the ontological, are apparently not exclusive on Heidegger's view, although he does somewhat dubiously maintain in one place that "they do not necessarily go together either."¹³⁰ Despite the latter claim, however, Heidegger more consistently maintains in *Being and Time* that fundamental ontology must operate on the view that there is an intrinsic relationship between ontological and practical reality. "[T]he Interpretation which is more primordial existentially, [i.e., ontologically] also discloses *possibilities* for a more primordial existentiell [i.e., ontic, or practical everyday] understanding, as long as our ontological conceptualization does not let itself get cut off from our ontical experience."¹³¹ This is the reason why he is always contrasting and yet linking everyday understandings of such things as conscience and guilt with the ontological implications of those everyday understandings.

My problem, with respect to the paradox of freedom, is that in this one area at least Heidegger seems to have failed to maintain a link between an ontologically relevant paradox, which has to do with an ontological locus of unity and difference in reality, and a practical manifestation of this paradox, as is evident in the fact that rules in society paradoxically curtail freedom in order to enhance it. Of course the paradox of freedom is not something specifically talked about by Heidegger; it is my topical concern only. Nevertheless, and as I have tried to argue, an ontologically

¹³⁰ p. 37, H.16; *Being and Time*

¹³¹ p. 341, H.295; *Being and Time* (emphasis from text)

relevant paradox of freedom does emerge out of Heidegger. In view of this I do think it is appropriate to suppose that it in addition to being ontologically relevant--to the issue of unity and difference between Dasein and not-Dasein--it should relate to practical reality in the same way as do other ontological issues in Heidegger.

I should point out here that not all commentators agree with me that Heidegger's existential analytic of Dasein yields a predominantly individualistic picture of Dasein.¹³² All of these positions are based on remarks Heidegger makes to the effect that although authenticity is a function of Dasein coming to realize itself as it is, it is also that by which Dasein simultaneously realizes the Being of other Daseins as well, and that in so realizing it is brought into authentic Being-with others. Here is a sampling of these remarks: "*Authentic Being-one's-Self* does not rest upon an exceptional condition of the subject, a condition that has been detached from the 'they'; it is rather an *existentiell* modification of the 'they'--of the 'they' as an *essential existentielle*."¹³³ "When Dasein is resolute, it can become the 'conscience' of Others. Only by authentically Being-their-Selves in resoluteness can people authentically be with one another...."¹³⁴ "Resoluteness brings the Self right into its

¹³² Among these commentators I include Jay A. Ciaffa, "Towards an Understanding of Heidegger's Conception of the Inter-Relationship Between Authentic and Inauthentic Existence" (*Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, Vol. 18, No. 1, January 1987, pp. 49-59); Fred R. Dallmayr, "Ontology of Freedom: Heidegger and Political Philosophy" and "Heidegger on Intersubjectivity" (*Human Studies*, 3, 1980, pp. 221-246); Georg Römpf, "Truth and Interpersonality: An Inquiry into the Argumentative Structure of Heidegger's *Being and Time*" (*International Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. XXIX, No. 4, Issue No. 16, December 1989, pp. 429-447); and Glen A. Mazis, "Co-Being [*Mitsein*] and Meaningful Interpersonal Relationship in *Being and Time*" (Discussion, *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, Vol. 16, No. 3, October 1985, pp. 294-300).

¹³³ p. 168, H.130; *Being and Time* (emphases from text)

¹³⁴ p. 344, H.298; *Being and Time*

current concerned Being-alongside what is ready-to-hand, and pushes it into solicitous Being with Others."¹³⁵ "[D]eath individualizes--but only in such a manner that, as the possibility which is not to be outstripped, it makes Dasein, as Being-with, have some understanding of the potentiality-for-Being of Others."¹³⁶

I do not doubt that Heidegger thought that his notion of authenticity entailed a fundamental relationship between Daseins. This is basically what all the above mentioned commentators argue in support of the claim that authenticity as per Heidegger entails such a fundamental relationship. I have three problems with Heidegger on this issue. First, I think these remarks are outweighed by the pervasiveness of Heidegger's insistence that authenticity entails before all else individuation. This implies that authenticity is possible without Being-with, that the social aspect of Dasein is considerably less essential than is the aspect of Being-one's-self. As a result, Heidegger's notion of authenticity is primarily relative to Dasein individuated from other Daseins.

Secondly, I am not convinced that Heidegger's version of authenticity is even accurate because I am not convinced that he has actually managed to show that authenticity is a function of a kind of self-knowledge that precedes knowledge of the social self, and from which alone knowledge of the social self follows. In short, I am not convinced that Dasein understands itself, either individually or socially, on the basis of the individuating experiences of Being-towards-death, resoluteness, and anxiety, because I think there is some doubt that these experiences are themselves as

¹³⁵ p. 344, H.298; *Being and Time*

¹³⁶ p. 309, H. 264; *Being and Time*

fundamental to Dasein as Heidegger thinks they are. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, I think Heidegger has forgotten one possibility, the possibility that Dasein can just as surely learn something fundamental about itself from the social context of what Heidegger calls the they-world, as it can when it stands alone before itself in anxiety. This is evident upon consideration of the fact that the paradox of freedom that emerges out of Heidegger does not include the paradox of freedom entailed in the fact that humans in society sometimes use their freedom to curtail their freedom, in order to enhance their freedom.

This issue, as well as the issue about knowledge of the self as a social self are central to my upcoming discussion on Martin Buber's critique of Heidegger. I propose to show that Buber's vision of a human community, built upon the idea that authenticity is a function of Dasein understanding itself only when it understands itself socially, is a possibility which Heidegger has, somewhat inexcusably I think, failed to consider.

This brings me to the third reason why I think the Heideggerian conception of authenticity is seriously problematic. Actually, I have already mentioned this reason earlier on in my discussion on the connection between care and past time, and have promised to discuss it.¹³⁷ It has to do with the fact that Heidegger's notion of authenticity stumbles because it rests, in the final analysis, upon a rather dubious kind of proof. It is true that Heidegger thinks he has proven authenticity to be a universal possibility for all Daseins. He has after all gone to considerable trouble to appeal to basic experiences of Dasein--that is, to Dasein's experiences of death, of

¹³⁷ see p. 127 above

conscience, and of guilt--to substantiate his conclusions. Heidegger has not however dealt with one possible objection that could be levelled at his analysis. He claims, as Jones points out, that "his "fundamental existentialia" are absolutely universal: no human being lacks them; nothing that is not a human being has them."¹³⁸

The problem here is that while Heidegger claims to be describing the ontological structure of Dasein, he can still be asked for evidence to support these claims. If this question were asked a rather serious problem would emerge. Heidegger would not have a convincing answer to give in reply because the ontological structure of authentic Dasein has to be experienced in order to be proven. In order to accept Heidegger's conclusions one would actually have to be in the state of authentic anxiety. We would have to be what Jones calls "adepts at moody understanding." If we were not such adepts, however, we might be tempted, justifiably I think, to conclude that "Heidegger's account of the ontological structure of Dasein as revealed in the fundamental existentialia is simply a vivid account of how the world looks to Heidegger, an alienated and anxious man."¹³⁹ Heidegger's probable reply to this, according to Jones, would be something like you have "looked [neither] long enough [nor] correctly." "I have looked, he would say, and I have seen; if you have not looked and not seen, that is simply evidence of some deficiency in you, not in me." However, and as Jones also points out, this reply is not likely to prove satisfying. Although "unassailable" "from Heidegger's point of view," it is "from outside his

¹³⁸ p. 319; Jones. Keeping in mind what I said in Chapter One about Jones' tendency to use too freely the term "human" for "Dasein", one should mentally substitute Dasein for every occurrence of the term human when reading this passage.

¹³⁹ p. 320; Jones

point of view no reply at all."¹⁴⁰ It would seem, therefore, that Heidegger's emphasis on individualism is so total it bespeaks a total failure of his whole philosophical inquiry into the existential analytic of Dasein. All that is needed to destroy the existential analytic of Dasein is one person convincingly claiming some other foundation than anxiety as the foundation of human authenticity. In the following chapter I offer just such a witness, Martin Buber.

¹⁴⁰ p. 320; Jones

CHAPTER FOUR

Buber's Critique of Heidegger

INTRODUCTION

Before getting into Martin Buber's criticisms of Heidegger directly, it is necessary to highlight some of the main points intrinsic to his views on human community. This is necessary because in order to understand Buber's criticisms of Heidegger properly, we need to understand something about the thought upon which those criticisms are based. In addition, we need a foundation upon which Heidegger and Buber can be compared. Such a comparison is necessary because there are some significant similarities between these two thinkers which could incline one to think that there is, in essence, not much difference between Heidegger's and Buber's views on community. This is in fact not true. The similarities are surface only. At a deeper level, that is at the level of the foundations upon which the views of these two thinkers respectively rest, these similarities give way to substantial differences. This can only be made apparent if we understand not only Heidegger's but also Buber's essential philosophical foundations. Part I following therefore consists of two sections. The first, entitled "The Foundations of Buber's Views on Community" lays out the main points of Buber's philosophical thinking on human community. Section two, entitled "Critical Comparison Between Heidegger and Buber", is then devoted to

pointing out that although similarities exist between Heidegger and Buber, their respective views rest on quite different foundations, which in turn derive from quite different points of departure.

Part II then takes up Buber's critique on Heidegger. Section one, entitled "Buber's Criticisms of Heidegger", concerns the critique itself. In sections two and three, entitled respectively "The Essential Grounds for Buber's Notion of Community", and "The Relationship Between Authenticity and Freedom in Buber and Heidegger", I then attempt to show how Buber's criticisms are valid in light of the fact that his views on human community give rise to a kind of authenticity that is more convincingly in keeping with the reality of human being in a human world than is Heidegger's notion of authenticity. Throughout these analyses I maintain as central my own topical consideration of freedom. The intention is to prepare the way for showing that, because Buber's conception of human authenticity maintains a closer link between freedom and reality, Buber's notion of authenticity represents a more positive and so better ideal than does Heidegger's.

In Part III, I then show how I think Heidegger can be modified with insights borrowed from Buber, such that Heidegger's insights are preserved and enhanced without the burden of his rather serious oversights.

PART I: MARTIN BUBER ON COMMUNITY

i) The Foundations of Buber's Views on Community

For Martin Buber, authenticity is before all else a function of reality understood from the standpoint of human relationships. All relationships, for Buber, unfold

with respect to the human person. Of all possible human relationships, he identifies three distinct kinds. "Man's threefold living relation is, first, his relation to the world and to things, second, his relation to men--both to individuals and to the many--third, his relation to the mystery of being."¹ These three kinds of relationships in turn identify three different ways in which the human life of relationship is possible. The first is "life with nature," the second, "life with men," and the third, "life with spiritual beings," or God.²

The most important of these is the second, 'life with men.' All other relationships defer to this one, because in this alone the human in relation is met with direct response, come alive in the duality of dialogue. This is evident, for Buber, because in that they possess a mutual power of language, humans realize before all other relationships an intrinsic bond between the self and a personal other.³

This bond is the bond that begets true human freedom. Freedom is the result of the human relationship because in it every individual human interest or appeal is met with an unconditioned, positive response from some caring other. For Buber, freedom is a function of a kind of personal responsibility within which one maintains oneself ready and willing to live the life of unconditioned dialogue.

¹ p. 177; Martin Buber, *Between Man and Man*, transl. by Ronald Gregor Smith, New York: Macmillan Publishing Co. (Collier Books ed.), 1965.

² p. 150-151; Martin Buber, *I and Thou*, transl. by Walter Kaufmann, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970. (see also p. 177; *Between Man and Man*)

³ p. 151; *I and Thou*. "Of these three spheres [of relation] one is distinguished: life with men. Here language is perfected as a sequence and becomes speech and reply. Only here does the word, formed in language, encounter its reply....The moments of relation are joined here, and only here, through the element of language in which they are immersed."

Let us realize the true meaning of being free...it means that a quite personal responsibility takes the place of one shared with many generations. Life lived in freedom is personal responsibility or it is a pathetic farce....In our life and experience we are addressed; by thought and speech and action, by producing and by influencing we are able to answer. For the most part we do not listen to the address, or we break into it with chatter. But if the word comes to us and the answer proceeds from us then human life exists...in the world. The kindling of the response in that "spark" of the soul, the blazing up of the response, which occurs time and again, to the unexpectedly approaching speech, we term responsibility.⁴

The desire or longing for human relationship is, according to Buber, innate to human character. That is, the "You" of the other is innately a part of the "I" of myself. "In the beginning is the relation--as the category of being, as the readiness, as a form that reaches out to be filled, as a model of the soul; the *a priori* of relation; the *innate You*."⁵ Because of this the life of dialogue is a function not just of responsibility but of a mutual, interhuman dependency. "I require a You to become; becoming I, I say You."⁶ If I find a You, I find identity and also freedom. Identity and freedom are found only in a true I-You relationship because only this kind of relationship involves unreserved encounter between two or more equally caring (i.e., responsible), dependent subjects. If I find a caring, dependent You, I find myself as I am, a caring, dependent subject. I also find freedom in the knowledge

⁴ p. 92; *Between Man and Man*

⁵ p. 78; *I and Thou* (emphases from text); see also p. 69

⁶ p. 62; *I and Thou*

that my dependency will be met, not with reserve or possible rancour, but with a reciprocal expression of dependency and responsibility on the part of the other.

The I-You or "life with men" relation is the most authentic for Buber. This does not mean, however, that it always prevails. The dependency that defines it is not always recognized, and the responsibility that upholds it is not always shouldered. This can happen in either one of two ways. Either the "life with nature" relation, or the "life with spiritual beings" relation may dominate.

First, when the "life with nature" or I-It relation prevails as dominant, the world becomes "a giant swamp phantom and overpowers man."⁷ Such a world is dominated by "[t]he unlimited sway of causality...which is of fundamental importance for the scientific ordering of nature."⁸ It is also a manifold of utility in which when one "says You, he means: You, my ability to use!,"⁹ a world of "ends and means" made "oppressive" by the "capricious man" who because he "does not believe and encounter....has no destiny but is merely determined by things and drives, feels autocratic, and is capricious."¹⁰ Second, when the relation of "life with spiritual beings" dominates "the world of the senses" becomes a world of "appearance" only.¹¹ It is a world in which "again and again man shuns actualization" because "he would rather attend to God than to the world," a world in which the original

⁷ p. 102; *I and Thou*

⁸ p. 100; *I and Thou*

⁹ p. 109; *I and Thou*

¹⁰ p. 100, 109; *I and Thou*

¹¹ p. 125; *I and Thou*

meaning of a "faith" that "fills the temporal gaps between the acts of relation" becomes "a substitute for these acts."¹² Life dominated by the relation to spiritual reality therefore gives rise to a world in which "[t]he trust-in-spite-of-all of the fighter who knows the remoteness and nearness of God is transformed ever more completely into the profiteer's assurance that nothing can happen to him because there is One who would not permit anything to happen to him."¹³

There are two common factors in both of these inauthentic types of relation. First, they are both, in essence, I-It relations which differ most fundamentally from the authentic I-You relation in that an I never encounters the other as a personal You. Rather, I encounter the other as an it, an object. This is true, on Buber's view, just as much with respect to the realm of spiritual being as it is with respect to the realm of nature. "Whoever knows the world as something to be utilized knows God the same way,"¹⁴ because someone who "would rather attend to God than to the world....is no longer confronted by a You; he can do nothing but place a divine It in the realm of things, believe that he knows God as an It, and talk about him."¹⁵

The second basic characteristic of inauthentic relations is that "[t]he I of the basic word I-It appears as an ego and becomes conscious of itself as a subject (of

¹² pp. 162, 164; *I and Thou*

¹³ p. 162; *I and Thou*

¹⁴ p. 156; *I and Thou*

¹⁵ p. 164; *I and Thou* (see also p. 162; "He thirsts for something spread out in space, for the representation in which the community of the faithful is united with its God. Thus God becomes a cult object.")

experience and use)."¹⁶ The result is that a world comes to dominate that is precisely the opposite of the I-You community. "Egos appear by setting themselves apart from other egos," whereas "[p]ersons appear by entering into relation to other persons."¹⁷ If the ego dominates, therefore, a world emerges in which persons no longer exist as persons. Rather, everything, including persons, are treated as objects relative to some utilitarian end that has nothing to do with what it really means to be human. Such a world is an egotistical world in which persons do not exist as persons; there are only isolate subjects living in relation to objects of "experience and use."

When the authentic I-You relationship obtains, however, the human's relation to nature, (i.e., to the external, spatio-temporal world), and to the being(s) of the spiritual appetite all fall into place around a full understanding of what it means to be human. The "universe (i.e., world of nature) becomes a home" for a community of persons, and one's "relation to a human being" becomes understood as "the proper metaphor for the relation to God."¹⁸ That is, God stands as an image within the realm of Being for the innate I-You relation. In such a world true freedom obtains, because "[f]ree is the man that wills without caprice. He believes in the actual, which is to say: he believes in the real association of the real duality, I and You."¹⁹

¹⁶ pp. 111-112; *I and Thou*

¹⁷ p. 112; *I and Thou*

¹⁸ pp. 150, 151; *I and Thou*

¹⁹ p. 108; *I and Thou*

This is, in essence, the heart of Buber's thought on community. Before closing this section, however, there are two points that need to be briefly considered. First, although Buber himself does not substantiate his position in this way, I think it would be useful to engage in a little thought experiment to demonstrate what his emphasis on the priority of human relations over any form of I-It relation might involve in the everyday world. It seems to me that if the kind of relation he envisions should obtain, a whole lot of current practical problems would cease to exist. If I existed in positive relationship with my fellow human beings, in the way Buber describes, I do not think I would pollute rivers or indiscriminately chop down trees without thinking seriously about the consequences of such actions. I would, instead, use the world's resources with care and respect, not just for themselves, but for the sake of all other people and future generations. My constant guiding consideration in such matters would have far less to do with such utilitarian concerns as profit-making and exploitation for my own benefit than it would to do with how my actions affect others. Similarly, if I existed in positive relationship with my fellow human beings, I would be far less likely, I think, to knock another person on the head with a baseball bat in order to steal their money. The kind of world Buber's views on human relations implies would be a world characterized by a high level of practical moral freedom. Should such a world exist, responsibility would define a kind of freedom whereby we need never fear the foibles of the "capricious man."

My second point has to do with the human relationship to the realm of spiritual being. On Buber's view the realm of human relations has priority over the realm of spiritual being such that an authentic human relation to being only occurs in

and through the I-You relation. On the basis of this priority my belief in God or in a spiritual realm of being is not valid if God and the spiritual realm exist solely for the purpose of shoring up by beliefs in relation to those of someone else. Rather, my belief in God or spiritual reality is valid only if I understand God to be somehow the infinite I and the infinite You of every positive human relationship.

Of course all these points still need substantiation. It is pretty clear, I think, that the idyllic world I describe above does not in fact exist. The actual case seems to be that it is the I-It world which dominates in reality as we know it. It is therefore not at all clear that the I-You relation is innate. Nor is it clear that a relationship to being exists on the basis of such an I-You relation. However, this is not the place to try Buber's position. That will come later when I consider whether or not Buber's criticisms of Heidegger are adequately founded. For now my purpose has been to indicate what Buber's claims are, as well as some important accompanying implications, in order that we might have a basis upon which to compare Buber with Heidegger, and upon which we can understand where Buber is coming from in his criticisms of Heidegger.

ii) Critical Comparison Between Heidegger and Buber

As I have indicated, there are some significant similarities between Heidegger and Buber which could tempt one to conclude that their respective views on what it means to be human in a human world rest on similar philosophical foundations. As I also mentioned, however, these similarities are surface only. Heidegger's and Buber's respective philosophical foundations are substantially different.

There are three major areas of similarity between Heidegger and Buber. The first has to do with the fact that both thinkers describe an everyday world which, though it signifies a predominantly inauthentic mode of being human, nevertheless tends to prevail because it is a highly seductive realm. For Buber the inauthentic everyday world is the It-world, for Heidegger it is the they-world. Buber describes the It-world as a "world in which one has to live and live comfortably," a world "that offers us all sorts of stimulations and excitements, activities and knowledge."²⁰ Heidegger describes the they-world as a realm in which occurs "the comfortable enjoyment of tranquillized bustle."²¹ For both Buber and Heidegger the everyday world is therefore a seductive world. As such it is a world in which people become so absorbed they tend to regard each other, not authentically as ends worthy of understanding in and for themselves, but inauthentically as means to some other ends. Thus it is that Heidegger says, when "Dasein understands itself proximally and for the most part in terms of its world...the Dasein-with of Others is often encountered in terms of what is ready-to-hand within-the-world."²² Similarly, for Buber, the "capricious man does not believe and encounter....he only knows the feverish world out there and his feverish desire to use it."²³

The second major similarity between Heidegger and Buber is that both thinkers hold similar views on the origin and significance of anxiety. With respect to

²⁰ p. 84; *I and Thou*

²¹ p. 108; "What is Metaphysics", in Krell

²² p. 156, H.120; *Being and Time*

²³ p. 109, *I and Thou*

its origins, Heidegger says "[t]hat which anxiety is anxious about is Being-in-the-world itself," while Buber calls anxiety "the stirring of the creature between the realms of plantlike security and spiritual risk."²⁴ With respect to its significance Heidegger says that "[a]nxiety throws Dasein back upon that which it is anxious about--its authentic potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world"²⁵ For Buber, anxiety amounts to a sense of loneliness or alienation which always attends absorption with the It-world, and motivates the person so absorbed to seek a more authentic relation. "At times when man is overcome by the horror of the alienation between I and world,...the world fills him with anxiety...[and] it occurs to him that something might be done."²⁶ Thus, for both Heidegger and Buber, anxiety originates in the situation of a creature with the capacity for something more than purely utilitarian worldly involvements, and it signifies the possibility for overcoming such inauthentic involvements.

The third major similarity between Heidegger and Buber concerns the way in which they both describe freedom as a function of a resolve to live according to one's own innate authenticity. Thus it is that Heidegger writes, "in authentic resoluteness...Dasein *hands itself down* to itself, free for death, in a possibility which it has inherited and yet chosen,"²⁷ while Buber writes, "the free man does not have an end

²⁴ p. 144; *I and Thou*

²⁵ p. 232, H.187; *Being and Time*

²⁶ pp. 120, 121; *I and Thou*

²⁷ p. 435, H.384; *Being and Time* (emphases from text)

here and then fetch the means from there; he has only one thing: always only his resolve to proceed toward his destiny....He believes; he encounters."²⁸

The similarities end here though. For Heidegger, authentic Dasein maintains itself in anxiety. Because "anxiety can mount authentically only in a Dasein which is resolute,"²⁹ anxiety itself is the sign of authenticity; it is something to be embraced as the abiding hallmark of authenticity. In addition, anxiety signifies a kind of authenticity in which Dasein understands itself primarily in a relationship with the self, in a relationship that is with its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. In contrast to this, Buber's position is that anxiety is something to be overcome because it points to a kind of authenticity in which the human understands itself primarily, not in relation to itself, but in relation to other persons. In general, anxiety means loneliness for Buber. Specifically, it means two kinds of loneliness. First, "lonesomeness means detaching oneself from experiencing and using things"; second, "lonesomeness means the absence of relation."³⁰ In the first kind one has met the first necessary condition for becoming authentic; one has become detached from the world and is ready for a relationship. In the second, one has moved even further towards the possibility of a relation; one experiences a lack of any relation, and so is ready for the only relation that can overcome anxiety, the I-You relation.

Now one might be tempted to conclude from this that anxiety is, for Buber, not much different from Heideggerian anxiety. After all, both kinds of lonesomeness

²⁸ pp. 109-110; *I and Thou*

²⁹ p. 395, H.344; *Being and Time*

³⁰ p. 152; *I and Thou*

taken together seem to signify that leaving behind one's excessive attachments to the It-world is a necessary condition for authenticity. For both Buber and Heidegger authenticity entails precisely this kind of detachment. In addition, Buber's description of anxiety as lonesomeness seems congenial to the view that in authenticity one is in the position of having no relation at all with another. Does this not therefore imply a view similar to Heidegger's? Does it not seem evident, on Buber's view as well as on Heidegger's, that if lonesomeness means an absence of relation, anxiety has to be considered at once a perennial condition of authenticity, and the necessary condition of a kind of authenticity in which one stands in relation not with another but with the self?

With respect to Buber, however, all this is only partially true. It is true that for Buber authenticity is a function of a certain detachment from the everyday world. It is also true that on his view anxiety does have to be thought of as something that *usually* accompanies one's attempts to become authentic. However, it is not true that on Buber's view authenticity entails an absence of relation, which is the meaning of the second form of loneliness. I will explain all this shortly, but first I must indicate that this is the crucial point that has to be understood if one is to understand the fundamental difference between Heideggerian and Buberian anxiety. For Heidegger, anxiety always maintains itself in an authenticity of "self-being,"³¹ whereas for Buber it only leads to an authenticity of relationship which, when achieved, signifies the overcoming of anxiety. In respect of this difference anxiety is, for Buber, antithetical to actual authenticity.

³¹ As Buber puts it.

This gets a little complicated to explain. However, because an explanation is crucial to understanding a central difference between Heidegger and Buber, I will endeavour to provide one. The first clue to understanding what is going on here is that, for Buber, anxiety is but one of two "portals" to the authenticity of the I-You relation. Furthermore, it is not even the "main portal" which is the achievement of relation itself.³² The full text to which I am referring reads as follows:

Of these three spheres [i.e., the three different possible relations] one is distinguished: life with men. Here language is perfected as a sequence and becomes speech and reply. Only here does the word, formed in language, encounter its reply. Only here does the basic word go back and forth in the same shape; that of the address and that of the reply are alive in the same tongue; I and You do not only stand in a relationship but also in firm honesty. The moments of relation are joined here, and only here, through the element of language in which they are immersed. Here that which confronts us has developed the full actuality of the You. Here alone beholding and being beheld, recognizing and being recognized, loving and being loved exist as an actuality that cannot be lost. This is the main portal into whose inclusive opening the two side portals lead.

--But isn't solitude, too, a portal? Does it not happen sometimes in the stillest lonesomeness that we unexpectedly behold?³³

The reason I say this is complicated is because there seem to be several "portals" for Buber. I think this can be sorted out as follows, however. The "main portal" consists of two aspects, "the two side portals." These two aspects, intrinsic to the I-You relation, are "speech and reply," "beholding and beheld," "recognizing and being recognized," and "loving and being loved." In that the "main portal" is

³² p. 151; *I and Thou*

³³ p. 151; *I and Thou*

comprised of these one might say that the "main portal" is singular but comprised of reciprocity. What this means, with respect to the discussion on anxiety, is that anxiety is not even a first priority for Buber. It plays second fiddle to the reciprocity of true relation, which he seems to feel could occur without any experience of anxiety whatsoever.

This leaves the second portal, the anxiety of lonesomeness or "solitude". Solitude, for Buber, is a necessary condition for the restoration of an authentic I-You relation, when the I-You relation fails. As such it stands as an indication that even when the main portal is closed, so to speak, it is still possible to reclaim authenticity. As I mentioned there are two forms of solitude or lonesomeness for Buber. The first entails detachment from the world of strictly utilitarian concerns. The second entails an absence of relation. The first kind is the first necessary condition for restoration of the I-You relation. True dialogue can never occur unless total absorption in the everyday world is modified by a certain detachment. When such detachment occurs either one of two things can occur. A true I-You relation can obtain, or one can be met with no relation at all. In this second possibility solitude goes hand in hand with communication, in the sense that when one truly understands oneself in one's detachment from the everyday world one is willing to be unreservedly open to the other. Willingness to communicate is, on Buber's view, a willingness for authenticity. As such it is a prerequisite for authenticity. But the kind of authenticity implied is different from that of Heidegger because it is a function, not of communication and understanding of the self as a self, but of communication and understanding of the self as a social self. Thus for Buber authenticity obtains only when one is open to the

Being of the other, whereas for Heidegger it can obtain when one is open to the Being of oneself.

Now Buber does admit that this willingness to communicate could become met with an enduring solitude, because others could "forsake us after we had spoken the true You to them."³⁴ However, this does not necessarily mean Heideggerian anxiety, "[f]or where unreserve has ruled, even wordlessly, between men, the word of dialogue happened sacramentally."³⁵ Insofar as one is willing to embrace the I-You relation, Buber seems to feel that some sort of spiritual reward will follow such that one is not necessarily the victim of permanent anxiety. His notion of anxiety is therefore not nearly so negative as is Heidegger's.

To concretize what such a reward might be, I suggest the following interpretation. If it is true that the I-You relation is innate, and if one is willing to embrace it in order to become authentic, then it could be said to follow that one is better off embracing it. Insofar as one *could* be met with a like willingness on the part of another, it has become at least possible to realize the mitigation of anxiety. Inasmuch as a possibility is better than no possibility at all, then, one could say that one would be better off.

This is the essence of Buber's view on anxiety. In contrast to Heidegger, anxiety for Buber is not a perennial condition of authenticity. Instead it is a motivation to become authentic, which exists only to the extent that authenticity remains unachieved. Insofar as the achievement of authenticity is a communal affair,

³⁴ p. 152; *I and Thou*

³⁵ p. 4; *Between Man and Man*

grounded in the priority of the I-You relation, it would seem that in reality anxiety would remain very much a part of an individual person's life. However, this has nothing to do with authenticity *per se*. Rather it has to do with authenticity unachieved. For Buber, then, authenticity remains in essence antithetical to permanent anxiety. As such it is only intended to be understood as something which occurs when the I-You relation does not dominate, and as something to be overcome by entering into such an authentic relation.

The third major difference between Buber and Heidegger lies in the fact that on Heidegger's view authenticity entails first and foremost an individualized relationship with Being, while on Buber's view authenticity means first and foremost a communal relationship between persons. I have already pointed out why this is so on Heidegger's view despite the fact that he claims Being-with others to be as much a part of authenticity as is Being-one's-Self. In view of the fact that authenticity is, for Heidegger, a function of self-knowledge before any other kind of knowledge, one is left to the unavoidable conclusion that authenticity is possible for a Self which stands alone without others. The primary reason for this is that, on Heidegger's view, Dasein understands itself primarily in relation to Being. This is why Heidegger says "Dasein is an entity for which, in its Being, Being is an issue," and why he says "[t]he phrase 'is an issue' has been made plain in the state-of-Being of understanding--of understanding as self-projective Being towards its ownmost potentiality-for-Being."³⁶ The relationship to Being obtains because of the way in which the question about Being leads into the Being of Dasein. One thing that seems evident about

³⁶ p. 236, H.192; *Being and Time*

Being or existence, is that it entails possibilities. And what seems evident about Dasein, on the basis of the existential analytic, is that Dasein is an existence characterized by possibilities. Thus, when Dasein is authentic it understands itself, in relation to the Being or existence of possibilities in general, as an ownmost, individualized potentiality-for-Being.

For Buber, however, the human does not understand itself primarily in relation to Being. Rather, it understands itself in relation to other humans, and only from this does an understanding of Being follow. Because of this, authenticity is not possible unless a real relation obtains between a self and an other.

PART II: A VALID CRITICISM OF HEIDEGGER

Having gained an understanding of the basics of Buber's thought, and of some major similarities and differences between Heidegger and Buber, we are now ready to consider directly, Buber's own criticisms of Heidegger. I treat this topic in three sections below. First, I outline the basics of Buber's criticisms. Then I test the efficacy of those criticisms by exploring the foundations of Buber's philosophy upon which his criticisms are based. Finally, after having substantiated the fact that I think Buber's criticisms are justly founded, I reintroduce the topic of freedom in its connection with authenticity, in order to highlight yet another very important difference between Buber and Heidegger. The purpose here is to re-enforce the validity of Buber's critique with my own thinking that Buber's philosophy is more

congenial than is Heidegger's to a practical manifestation of authenticity and freedom in human society as we know it.

i) Buber's Criticisms of Heidegger

Buber believes that, despite the fact that Heidegger's existential analytic signifies an attempt to understand the human on the basis of non-anthropological foundations, "we must nevertheless test the genuineness and correctness of its anthropological content, since in philosophical fashion it draws upon concrete human life, which is the subject of philosophical anthropology."³⁷ In this respect Buber's criticisms of Heidegger are motivated by a concern similar to my own. Heidegger's thought must stand the test of philosophy understood in relation to life itself, if it is to be considered at all valid.

As I have already pointed out, Heidegger himself agrees with the basic point that there has to be a real relationship between an ontological and an everyday understanding of existence. His philosophy is driven by the concern to show a connection between phenomenologically relevant facts (i.e., experiences of Dasein primarily) and ontological reality. However, he disagrees that life is to be understood primarily on the basis of philosophical anthropology. The reason behind this claim is that, according to Heidegger, philosophical anthropology has historically always treated the human theoretically, as some sort of present-at-hand being with a pre-determined nature. Heidegger identifies two major sources for such thinking. The first is the Greek heritage of western philosophy, which gave rise to the view that the

³⁷ p. 164; *Between Man and Man*

human is in essence an "*animale rationale*." The second is the heritage of "Christian theology" which, "taking along with it the ancient definition, arrives at an interpretation of that entity which we call 'man'," according to which the human is, in essence, an *animale rationale* because it has been created as such by God.³⁸ Both of these historical roots coalesce into an "anthropology of modern times, where the *res cogitans*, consciousness, and the interconnectedness of Experience serve as the point of departure for methodological study."³⁹ The problem with such study, for Heidegger, is that the human is always studied in a theoretical vacuum without the guiding light of the question about Being, which brings into play the motivation to make ontological suggestions only on the basis of phenomenologically significant, fundamental experiences. Heidegger's rejection of philosophical anthropology is based, therefore, on the idea that Dasein can only be understood in its relationship to Being. Anything else inevitably leads to theoretical only claims about the nature of Dasein which "are either left ontologically undetermined, or get tacitly assumed as something 'self-evidently' 'given' whose 'Being' is not to be questioned."⁴⁰ In other words, anything else inevitably gives rise to an understanding of the human essence that is false because the realm of existence that defines the human is either falsely understood or not understood at all.

Buber's philosophy, on the other hand, is driven by the concern to engage in philosophical anthropology. He does, however, clearly accept Heidegger's point that

³⁸ p. 74, H.48; *Being and Time*

³⁹ p. 75, H.49; *Being and Time*

⁴⁰ p. 75, H.49; *Being and Time*

one cannot understand human existence solely on the basis of theoretical constructs. In respect of this Buber has therefore modified philosophical anthropology, as it is described by Heidegger, such that the absolute Heidegger says has always been assumed can only be understood on the basis of a connection between it and real human life. It is on the basis of this modification that he seriously questions whether an "extraction of "existence" from real human life is anthropologically justified," because "real man in his relation to his being, is comprehensible only in connexion with the nature of the being to which he stands in relation." Buber's main contention with Heidegger is just this point. For Buber, to be fully human (i.e., authentic) one has to exist in conformity with one's innate tendency to relationship. For Heidegger, to be authentic is to be Dasein standing resolute in the light of Being. To exemplify this major contention Buber takes exception to Heidegger on three separate issues, the issue of guilt and the call of conscience, the issue of anxiety and solitude, and the issue of solicitude and Being-with others.

With respect to guilt and the call of conscience, Buber first of all agrees with Heidegger that in the everyday world guilt means specific obligations or "indebtedness." He also agrees that "all understanding of indebtedness must go back to a primal guilt."⁴¹ However, when it comes to understanding what guilt really signifies Buber accuses Heidegger of reducing existence to a solipsistic board game with predetermined rules, to which we are indebted, which we must play according to, and to which we are recalled by a sense of primal guilt should we stray from or forget the rules of the game. This cannot be the full meaning of life, for Buber, because it

⁴¹ p. 166; *Between Man and Man*

entails a kind of reserve that precludes the possibility of any meaningful human relations. Such a life would be a life of horror, a life in which the human is condemned to live perpetually haunted by the spectre of a primordial indebtedness calling it to the dubious destiny of fulfilment in self-isolation. This is the implication Buber claims attends the Heideggerian conception of guilt and the call of conscience.

In contrast to this Buber maintains that in guilt "[i]t is not my existence which calls to me but the being which is not I." When the call of conscience is thus properly understood one becomes "aware of the whole life without reduction, the life in which the individual...is essentially related to something other than himself." Such a life does not entail reservedly "playing the enigmatic game on a board by myself." Rather, it means finding oneself unreservedly "placed in the presence of a being with whom I have agreed on no rules for the game and with whom no rules can be agreed upon."⁴²

Buber's second criticism centres on the Heideggerian understanding of anxiety and authenticity. According to Buber, the Heideggerian experience of anxiety comes as the climactic conclusion to an historical sense of solitude the roots of which were spoken first by Nietzsche in the words, "God is dead!." Nietzsche's proclamation is a value proclamation signifying the end of an historically pervasive sense of an existing universal principle of law, order, purpose, and destiny to which the human had hitherto always been able to refer for an understanding of its existence, and from which, consequently, it had always sought and found comfort. The question remain-

⁴² p. 166; *Between Man and Man*

ing in the wake of Nietzsche's proclamation is, 'what now'? The answer to this question is, 'now, the greatness of humanity.'⁴³ This answer leaves a problem, however. To what does humanity turn in order to rediscover its essence, its purpose, its destiny? Lacking a "supernal artisan"⁴⁴ to turn towards, these questions signify, along with an attempt to rediscover meaning in life from some new foundations, an anxiety and a solitude before the issue of existence which Buber claims culminates in the absolute solitude of Heideggerian anxiety. In these questions, "[M]an...finds himself alone with a universe which has become alien and uncanny, he can no longer stand up to the universal forms of present being; he can no longer truly meet them."⁴⁵ The result is that "[a]pparently nothing more remains now to the solitary man but to seek an intimate communication with himself. This is the basic situation from which Heidegger's philosophy arises."⁴⁶ Rather than dealing with the situation, however, Heidegger embraces it by embracing solitude and anxiety as the hallmarks of authenticity. He therefore comes to treat "the anthropological question...about the essence of man and about his relation to the being of what is" as a question "about human existence in its relation to its *own* being."⁴⁷ As such he instantiates solitude as something to be sought in and for itself.

⁴³ see Friedrich Nietzsche, "The Gay Science", pp. 125-126 in *Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre*, ed. by Kaufmann. The interpretation given here on Nietzsche is my own, formulated some years ago in an undergraduate course in existentialism.

⁴⁴ Sartre's words, from "Existentialism and Humanism" (1946), p. 27; Jean-Paul Sartre, *Existentialism and Humanism*, transl. by Philip Mairet, Great Britain; Methuen London, 1989.

⁴⁵ p. 167; *Between Man and Man*

⁴⁶ p. 167; *Between Man and Man*

⁴⁷ p. 167; *Between Man and Man* (emphasis from text)

On Buber's view, however, this represents an incorrect treatment of some very important questions. Heidegger fails to see that authentic "[h]uman life touches on absoluteness in virtue of its dialogical character." He fails to see, therefore, that there is a form of authenticity, rooted in human character itself, which signifies the cessation of solitude. The opposite of solitude, for Buber, is "wholeness". Wholeness simultaneously signifies the authenticity of a true dialogic relationship, and the cessation of solitude. Only the dialogic relationship signifies a cessation of solitude because "[m]an can become whole not in virtue of a relation to himself but only in virtue of a relation to another self."⁴⁸ The dialogic relationship signifies wholeness, the opposite of solitude and anxiety. The dialogic relationship also signifies authenticity. Authenticity therefore goes hand in hand with the possibility of a cessation of anxiety/solitude. In contrast, Heidegger's emphasis on "the man of 'self-being'" entails the possibility neither of authenticity nor of the overcoming of anxiety. Rather, because "he absolutizes the temporally conditioned situation of the radically solitary man," he "isolates from the wholeness of life the realm in which man is related to himself" and derives "the essence of human existence from the experience of a nightmare."⁴⁹ In contrast to this Buber's dialogic relation "breaches the barriers of a lofty solitude, subdues its strict law, and throws a bridge from self-being to self-being across the abyss of dread in the universe."⁵⁰

⁴⁸ p. 168; *Between Man and Man*

⁴⁹ p. 168; *Between Man and Man*

⁵⁰ p. 175; *Between Man and Man*

Buber's third main criticism of Heidegger concerns the Heideggerian notion of solicitude. Buber introduces this criticism by first bringing up the fact that everything said thus far appears to be contradicted by Heidegger's statements to the effect that solicitude entails a fundamental relationship between a self and an other. He therefore observes, as did I when I criticised Heidegger on this point in the previous chapter, that Heidegger not only probably did consider such a relationship essential, but that he also thought he had successfully described it, despite his heavy emphasis on authenticity as a function of self-being. Nevertheless, Buber is of the opinion that Heidegger's notion of solicitude is not sufficiently robust to support the notion of the dialogic, I-You relation he has in mind.⁵¹

The reason why Buber thinks solicitude is not a sufficiently robust existential to support true interpersonal relations, is that solicitude is, for Heidegger, something derivative of the human essence (ie., it is a subordinate phenomenon of the major phenomenon, care), while the dialogic relation is, for Buber, that which is most intrinsic to the human essence.

In *mere* solicitude man remains essentially with himself, even if he is moved with extreme pity; in action and help he inclines towards the other, but the barriers of his own being are not thereby breached; he makes his assistance, not his self, accessible to the other...he is "concerned with the other", but he is not anxious for the

⁵¹ It should be noted that, although this a very similar to my own criticism of Heidegger on the issue of Being-with, Buber's criticisms are considerably more substantial than are my own. The reason for this is that Buber has an alternate position to defend, whereas I was only trying to suggest a problem in respect of the fact that Heidegger's emphasis on Being-one's-self precluded a possibility he should have taken into account. I pointed out that Heidegger failed to consider the possibility that authenticity might not be a function solely of knowledge about the self. Buber's criticisms should be regarded as a supplement to my own, therefore. He is my witness for claiming that Heidegger missed out on a possibility because his whole philosophy is built on precisely that possibility which Heidegger ignored.

other to be concerned with him. In an essential relation, on the other hand, the barriers of individual being are in fact breached and a new phenomenon appears which can appear only in this way: one life open to another--...so that one experiences the mystery of the other being in the mystery of one's own. The two participate in one another's lives in very fact, not psychically, but ontically.⁵²

The first point to be noticed from this passage is that Buber speaks of solicitude as *mere* solicitude. The reason for this is that solicitude is not as intrinsic as is care. I think Buber has a good point here. In the existential analytic, solicitude is an existential, one phenomenon out of several, which Heidegger analyzes because it points, most significantly, to care as the Being of Dasein. It is care which Heidegger is trying to bring into view. But the full meaning of care is that Dasein is before all else a resolute, ownmost potentiality-for-Being. As care, therefore, Dasein's existence is to be understood, most essentially, as an existence characterized by possibilities. Nothing about this description of Dasein makes it necessary to conclude that Dasein cannot be authentic if it does not exist in relation to some other. Now it is true that Heidegger talks about authentic Dasein in such a way as to indicate that in authenticity Dasein cannot "pass beyond 'a life of solicitude with others'."⁵³ However, and as Buber points out, "this mature resolute existence with the world [still] knows nothing of an *essential* relation." The goal for Dasein remains the achievement of "self-being."⁵⁴ The fact that this does not entirely preclude the possibility of a

⁵² p. 170; *Between Man and Man* (emphasis from text)

⁵³ p. 171; *Between Man and Man* (Buber citing Heidegger)

⁵⁴ p. 171; *Between Man and Man* (emphasis from text)

relation is irrelevant to Buber, because what matters is which comes first, relation or self-being. For Buber the priority is the relation, for Heidegger it is self-being.

The second point to be noticed from the above passage is that Buber considers his relation to be relative to the ontic realm. The basis for this lies in the view that when a true I-You relation obtains "the universe becomes a home" for the human.⁵⁵ In authenticity, the human therefore becomes a self for a world which includes others. Authenticity therefore signifies real relationships in a real community of real people. In contrast to this Buber points out that on Heidegger's view there is no home and no world for Dasein to dwell in. Though "pointed towards being with the world and towards an understanding and solicitous life with others....Heidegger's man [ultimately] stands before himself and nothing else." In such an existence the universe is not a home. Rather, it is a realm of uncanniness in which Dasein "stands in his anxiety and dread before nothing."⁵⁶ This is the result of Heideggerian authenticity. If the Heideggerian Dasein is authentic it is condemned to be perpetually homeless, perpetually without the world it must shun. The result is that "Heidegger's self is *a closed system*."⁵⁷ The openness of Heideggerian authenticity dissolves in an individualism so complete "the self to which [one is supposed to] become opened to is by nature closedness and reserve." The further result of this is that the Heidegger's emphasis on a relation to Being itself dissolves because "Man can attain to existence

⁵⁵ p. 150; *I and Thou*

⁵⁶ p. 172; *Between Man and Man*

⁵⁷ p. 171; *Between Man and Man* (emphases from text)

only if his whole relation to his situation becomes existence, that is, if every kind of living relation becomes essential."⁵⁴

This just about completes my consideration of Buber's criticisms of Heidegger. Before concluding this section, however, I should summarize and make a few observations on the main points of the critique. First, with respect to Buber's reinterpretation of guilt and the call of conscience, it should be noted that the central point of contention with Heidegger does not rest on a difference of opinion as to the meaning of guilt. Buber agrees that guilt is a primordial sense of indebtedness which does signify the possibility of understanding what the call of conscience means. In this respect Buber agrees with Heidegger that there is something innate to the human which can be realized such the human is before the possibility of becoming authentic. Buber disagrees with Heidegger, however, on what the call of conscience means. For Heidegger, it means an understanding of oneself in one's ownmost authentic potentiality-for-Being. For Buber it means an understanding of oneself as destined to be fulfilled only when an authentic I-You relation obtains. This bears out my earlier observation that a central difference between Heidegger and Buber lies in the fact that for Buber the human is to be understood innately as a social being which only understands itself fully when a real relationship with an other occurs, whereas for Heidegger the human is above all an innate, individualized potentiality-for-Being.

Second, on the issue of anxiety and authenticity, Buber emphatically disagrees with Heidegger on the idea that anxiety is a perpetual condition of authenticity. For Buber, anxiety does not signify authenticity. Rather it signifies a possibility and a

⁵⁴ p. 180; *Between Man and Man*

willingness to become authentic, which could theoretically pass if authenticity is achieved. This bears out my discussion to the effect that authenticity is not primarily a function of anxiety, and that even should one's attempts to achieve it in a relation fail, because of rejection on the part of another, one is still better off trying as opposed to not trying to become authentic.

Third, with respect to Buber's point that Heidegger's notion of solicitude is not strong enough to support an authentic communal relationship, I want to emphasize, via reiteration, Buber's point that not only is it not strong enough, what it implies by way of relationships is implicitly denied because of Heidegger's insistence on the priority of self-being. In my opinion this is probably the most important aspect of Buber's criticism because in it there is highlighted the conclusion I drew in Chapter Three above, that Heidegger's whole philosophical system fails because of his strong emphasis on individualism. This issue is also important because it ties in with anxiety. Buber introduces this problem by emphasizing a contrast between intrinsic self-being and intrinsic relations with others. His conclusion is that one cannot be authentic unless one is open to the possibility of a relation with others. I think Buber has a good point. His notion of authenticity entails a relationship to real world that is lacking in Heidegger. In addition, his position suggests that one does not have to live in a perennial state of anxiety, or even experience anxiety at all, in order to be authentic. As long as one is open to another, the possibility always exists of finding relief from anxiety.

Unfortunately, however, the issue is not as clear as all this. Buber's criticisms of Heideggerian authenticity include statements to the effect that Heidegger's whole

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system is marked more by closure than openness. In essence I agree with Buber on this point. The problem with this though is that if this is all one concludes about Heidegger's philosophy one has put oneself in the position of having to ignore certain insights that Heidegger has. I have already pointed out, in Chapter Three above, what these insights are. Heidegger has successfully described how it is that freedom as possibilities is at once a condition of reality and something which applies to Dasein. He has therefore described an open as opposed to a closed view of reality. His philosophy is therefore not quite so closed as Buber seems to claim. The notion of a relationship is still a possibility insofar as there are any possibilities at all. Buber has a problem with the fact that, for Heidegger, this is not the primary possibility. His articulation of this problem indicates a possibility Heidegger has not thought of. But this does not seem sufficiently strong evidence to completely discount a philosophical system which contains insights. Granted Buber does recognize some insight in Heidegger; he agrees with Heidegger on the primal essence of guilt. However, he does not appear to recognize what I consider to be Heidegger's best insight, the idea that authenticity is, at least in part, a function of a resolve to embrace a fundamental openness to possibilities in reality. He is not, therefore, as open to Heidegger as another as he should be. As a result, a certain tension exists between Buberian authenticity and Heideggerian authenticity, a tension evident in Buber's somewhat extreme claim that Heidegger's system fails completely. He is right to point out that Heidegger's philosophy fails in that his notion of authenticity seems to exclude a meaningful relationship to the real world, but he goes too far in claiming that this signifies a

complete failure of the Heideggerian notion of authenticity. This tension needs to be discussed to see if there is any way of reconciling it.

On the order of business I have established for this chapter, however, this is not the place for such a discussion. First, I want to further instantiate Buber's insights by considering the experiential grounds upon which they are based, and by bringing to light a paradox of freedom in reality that Heidegger's philosophy seems to miss. After this I will be ready to consider these two philosophers on a level with one another, that is at the level of their respective notions of human authenticity, and to suggest a way to reconcile the tension between them.

ii) The Essential Grounds for Buber's Notion of Community

All of Buber's criticisms of Heidegger, as well as my own critical comparison between Buber and Heidegger, have been premised on the position that the I-You relation is innate to the human person. Personal authenticity is a function of this innate relation. So too is authentic freedom. And anxiety, though a portal to authenticity and freedom, is something to be overcome in the actual achievement of authenticity and freedom. In addition, a proper understanding of the human relation to the realm of Being and to the material world depends upon the priority of the I-You relation that is innate in each and every one of us. Thus far, all this has been posited on the strength of the claim that the I-You relation is innate to the human. In short, the whole foundational basis of Buber's critique on Heidegger rests on the strength on this claim.

This claim has not been tested though. And tested it must be, for a critic could always come along and destroy everything that has thus far been said simply by asking, what are your grounds for claiming the I-You relation to be innate? In this section, therefore, I propose to forestall this critic by giving this most important question an answer.

In answer to the critic I shall demonstrate three things. First, I shall point to those experiences Buber himself points to in order to demonstrate the validity of claiming the I-You relation to be innate. Second, I shall subject these experiences to scrutiny to see if they are as sufficient grounds as Buber thinks they might be for claiming that the I-You is innate in all of us. Third, I shall introduce consideration of another aspect of human experience which Buber points to but does not elaborate upon, but which could, in view of a wider consideration provided by an epistemological ally of Buber, be used in his favour. Finally, after having discussed these three points separately, I shall summarize, within the context of a comparison between Heidegger's and Buber's respective concepts of freedom, my reasons for thinking that Buber's understanding of authenticity is superior to that of Heidegger.

There are two kinds of experiences pointed to by Buber which suggest the I-You relation to be innate. The first is anxiety and the second is friendship or love. These experiences point to the I-You relation as innate in the sense that they signify, respectively, an intrinsic yearning and a capacity to be in relation with some caring other. Of these two kinds of experiences, however, only the second, friendship and love, is directly relevant to the issue of proving that the I-You relation is innate. With the exception of the following explanation as to why anxiety is not as import-

ant as are friendship and love, I will therefore be concentrating mainly on friendship and love in my attempt to substantiate Buber's claims about the essentiality of human relationships.

As indicated, anxiety amounts to a sense of aloneness, for Buber, a sense of aloneness which arises first of all from a sense that one cannot properly be fulfilled in any kind of I-It relationship. As has also been indicated, the I-It relationship is constitutive both of an inauthentic relationship with the world, and of an inauthentic relationship with divine being. Both forms of inauthenticity entail egoism and predominantly utilitarian concerns such that the other is always viewed as some form of object. A sense of lonesomeness occurs along with absorption with the It-world because despite the fact that the It-world is a world in which one "can live comfortably," it is a world upon which intrudes a sense of "primal guilt." As a result of this intrusion we find ourselves dissatisfied when we preoccupy ourselves predominantly with the It-world. This leads to Buber's first sense of lonesomeness; we become somewhat detached from the It-world environment. Along with this there occurs a second kind of lonesomeness, a sense of an "absence of relation."⁵⁹ Taken together these two senses of being alone signify a readiness to become involved in unreserved encounter with another person. But insofar as it only signifies a readiness for encounter, anxiety does not tell us directly that we do have an innate capacity for being in a responsible I-You relationship. It only tells us that we have a longing to be in such a relationship. As such anxiety is an important but not the main experience validating the claim that the I-You is innate in all of us. I think it goes without

⁵⁹ p. 152; *I and Thou*

saying that if a primary capacity for relation exists, we will be lonely and anxious if we cannot achieve it. The experiences of friendship and love are therefore our primary concern here, because they do bespeak just such a capacity.

Friendship and love are the most important experiences for two reasons. First, they signify actual fulfilment of the I-You relation.⁶⁰ As such they indicate not just a capacity but the possibility of fulfilling the capacity for mutually unreserved co-existence. Buber variously describes friendship and love in this regard as "beholding and beheld, recognizing and being recognized, loving and being loved."⁶¹ The common element in these descriptions is that friendship and love entail reciprocity. Buber also indicates that "the moments of relation are joined here."⁶² Thus friendship and love signify the actual achievement of reciprocity. In this reciprocity a true I-You relation obtains because both parties to the relation have to be at once responsibly open to and yet dependent upon one another. When this occurs both parties are actively open to one another. Second, since the actual relation signified by friendship and love "is stronger [i.e., more primordial] than solitude," friendship and love are more primordial reminders of what is innate in us, than is anxiety or solitude.

This is the basis of Buber's appeal to experience. The idea that the I-You relation is innate is substantiated, ultimately, on the basis of an appeal to friendship and love. Our critic could still object to this, however, on the grounds that none of this really proves that friendship and love point towards a capacity for relation that is

⁶⁰ cf. p. 113; *I and Thou*

⁶¹ p. 151; *I and Thou*

⁶² p. 151; *I and Thou*

innate. At most one might conclude that it suggests such a capacity exists, but this is a far cry from Buber's contention about essential innateness. We therefore have to address this question.

I think there is a way to answer our critic. Actually, there are two replies, one given by William A. Shearson,⁶³ and one which I give myself. I will consider Shearson first.

On the issue of the innateness of love and friendship, Shearson indicates that there are a number of ways in which the critic could challenge the contention that we do have a capacity for relations with others. One could first of all try to deny outright that this capacity exists. I do not think such a contention deserves much consideration. There are all sorts of examples in real life proving that this is not a valid consideration. I do not need to go very far to find one either. I love my wife and child dearly, and always try to put our relationship before all other priorities. The other parties in the relationship do the same. This example shows that there are some people who do have a capacity for love and friendship. The contention that no such capacity exists is therefore ruled out.⁶⁴

⁶³ William A. Shearson; *The Notion of Encounter: An Inquiry into the Nature and Structure of the Human Situation and Existential Knowledge in Existentialist Metaphysics*, Canada: published by Carleton University for the Canadian Association for Publishing in Philosophy, 1980. (My references to Shearson are all taken from Chapter Three of this volume entitled, "'The Notion of Encounter in Martin Buber'.")

⁶⁴ Shearson does not give this objection even as much consideration as do I. He simply admits, without further argument that if "the primordial and basic human condition were one of being shut off from the other", the possibility of a capacity for love and friendship "would be inconceivable". Of course Shearson does not have to say more than this, because he has already shown how, on Buber's view, the capacity for relationship does exist. (see p. 305; Shearson) I might add here that not even Heidegger would accept the idea that 'the primordial and basic human condition is one of being shut off from the other'. Solitude is still a part of the make-up of Dasein.

On Shearson's view this leaves the critic with two remaining options. Either the one would have to say that "love and friendship are primitive states, which the more developed and civilized I-It attitude should eliminate" or "love and friendship do not really exist at all as mutual relations between people, but only as subjective states, externally related."⁶⁵ Shearson then indicates that Buber would probably reply by pointing out that these objections are founded, ultimately, on the position already dismissed, which is that "being shut off from the Other is man's essential condition." The reasons behind such a reply are that 1) the first option entails an exaltation of the It-world so extreme the world is, in essence, reduced to the complete depersonalizing atmosphere of the "concentration camp," and 2) the second option is in essence premised upon option number one. The reply Shearson suggests Buber would make is therefore based on the idea that if it is contended that love and friendship are not essential, one is in essence espousing the view that they do not really exist. Since this claim has already been shown to be false our critic's two remaining options are refuted.

I like Shearson's observations as far as they go, because I think he does point out quite effectively that any objection to the idea of a capacity for relationship has to be considered, in essence, a denial of any capacity for relationship. These observations are powerful because, in that any objection seems to entail some sort of acknowledgement of the I-It over the I-You, they fall before the criticism that an I-It attitude is at heart a solipsism. This is in fact the heart and soul of Buber's critique of Heidegger. Because Heidegger prioritizes Dasein's ownmost potentiality-for-Being,

⁶⁵ p. 305; Shearson (underlining from text)

in such a way the relationship becomes secondary, Heidegger is in fact a proponent of the I-It attitude. This is why Buber associates Heidegger with an historical climax of solitude. Because Heidegger brings the movement towards solitude into focus around a description of Dasein as authentic when it understands its ownmost potentiality-for-Being primarily in terms of self-being, he entrenches solitude into the very nature of the human. Solitude therefore becomes solipsism. As a result the very nature of human experience which does include a capacity for relationship is denied. To circumvent this rather dubious possibility Buber turns to the consideration that human relations are not only extant, they are essential. On the basis of the answers given above to our critic it seems that Buber is vindicated. He is right because the possibility that he might not be right is an impossibility.

Now when I say I that like Shearson as far as he goes, I mean to indicate that I think there is yet one more way to substantiate Buber's claims about the essentiality of human relations. In both *Between Man and Man* and *I and Thou* Buber compares the essential relation to the relationship that exists between mother and child.⁶⁶ In *Between Man and Man* this comparison goes as follows: "...a relation can share in essential life only when it derives its significance from the effect of a relation which is essential in itself--such as that between mother and child."⁶⁷ In *I and Thou* this comparison is invoked on a more cosmic scale: "Every developing

⁶⁶ pp. 76-77; *I and Thou*, and p. 169; *Between Man and Man*

⁶⁷ p. 169; *Between Man and Man*

human child rests, like all developing beings, in the womb of the great mother--the undifferentiated, not yet formed primal world."⁶⁸

These comparisons remind me of a chapter entitled "Mother and Child" written by the late Scottish philosopher John MacMurray in his book, *Persons in Relation*.⁶⁹ Like Buber, Macmurray was a philosophical anthropologist who believed that the essence of what it means to be human could only be discovered in and through human relationships. And, like Buber, Macmurray similarly believed that an essential human relation is founded on personal responsibility, human interdependence, and love and friendship.

In the chapter "Mother and Child" Macmurray argues his point of view by appealing to the nature of the relationship that exists between a mother and a child. Macmurray notes that this relationship is defined by a combination of responsibility and dependence so basic that life itself depends on it. The newborn child is totally helpless. Our first experience in life is therefore one of dependency. A child cries when it needs something. When these cries are met with response from the caregiver, all is well with the world for the child. Sometimes, however, and this probably happens more often as the child gets older, the response is slow in coming. On such occasions the child experiences anxiety. As it grows older into adulthood this anxiety can give rise to differing attitudes towards the world and towards one's fellow human beings. Macmurray describes these different possibility attitudes in detail

⁶⁸ p. 76; *I and Thou*

⁶⁹ Chapter Two in *Persons in Relation*, John Macmurray, London, Great Britain: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1961.

elsewhere, both in this book and in others.⁷⁰ Following I will describe them briefly in order to show that there are enough similarities between Macmurray and Buber such that it is appropriate to substantiate Buber on the basis of what can be learned from Macmurray about the relationship between mother and child.

Macmurray identifies three possible attitudes one can have towards one's world and other humans. These attitudes align with Buber's threefold relations. First, one can seek to overcome anxiety by retreating to some abstruse vision of a transcendent good. This is very similar to Buber's "life with spiritual beings" relation. Second, one can seek to overcome anxiety by turning one's attention to the world and trying to carve one's own personal niche in it by treating everything, including other people, as objects of a very utilitarian kind of concern. This is very much like Buber's "life with nature" relation. Third, and this is the most authentic possibility, one can try to understand anxiety and realize thereby that one can only be fulfilled if one understands oneself as a social being related to others. This is very much like Buber's authentic "life with men" relation.

Macmurray and Buber are also similar in that they both link the inauthentic attitudes with the anxiety of self-isolation. For Macmurray, one can attempt to deal with anxiety by seeking an exclusive relationship with the divine, which gives rise to a passive, reflective frame of mind, or one can attempt to deal with anxiety by

⁷⁰ The full content of Macmurray's thought is contained in two volumes, the one already referred to and an accompanying one entitled *The Self as Agent* (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1953). These volumes are a disciplined, detailed, and comprehensive working out of Macmurray's philosophy, and were first presented by Macmurray as the Gifford lectures of 1953-54. Macmurray's thought is also laid out in an earlier, somewhat more informal volume, *Freedom in the Modern World* (London, Great Britain: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1974), which is a collection and printing of BBC talks given by Macmurray in the winter of 1930, and the spring and summer of 1932.

treating the world as a manifold of utility, which gives rise to an aggressive, pragmatic attitude towards the world and one's fellow humans. Both attitudes entail self-isolation. The only difference is that in the one self-isolation is a function of communion with a self that is understood solely in terms of spiritual reality, while in the other self-isolation entails the more violent egoism of aggressive manipulation for personal gain. This is highly reminiscent of Buber when he points out that a life dominated exclusively either by attention to spiritual reality, or by attention to worldly affairs, is a life dominated by an egotistical It-world attitude.

What is important about this comparison is that there is a great deal of similarity between Macmurray and Buber. Both were philosophical anthropologists whose primary field of reference was the realm of human relations.⁷¹ And both tried to substantiate their positions on the basis of experience. One experience common to both thinkers is the relationship of a mother to a child. Macmurray gives a more detailed analysis of what this experience means, however. In respect of the similarities between these two thinkers, including the fact that they both raise this example I think it is appropriate, therefore, to use Macmurray's analysis to strengthen Buber's position.

What is most important about the mother-child relation is that it is first of all a real relation. In addition, it is a relation in which life itself (for the child that is) could be at issue if the relation is not authentic. A child is totally helpless, totally dependent. The mother must therefore be a responsible, caring other if the child is to

⁷¹ There are many other similarities in addition to the ones I have pointed out, including the fact that Macmurray has a critique of Heidegger very similar to Buber's. What I have indicated already, however, is sufficient to justify my use of Macmurray to help substantiate Buber's position.

live and prosper. A third important aspect of this relation is that as the child grows older it cannot help but experience anxiety if the caregiver is not available. The implication from this is that, because the child will always experience anxiety if the caregiver is not responsible, anxiety is the hallmark of inauthenticity. A fourth important point is that anxiety is mitigated by an authentic relationship, and a fifth is that the child's experience is such that it can come to know this as a fact of life. That is, it can come to know, as it grows older, that people are dependent upon one another and that they require a caring response to this dependency if anxiety is to be overcome. The mother and child relationship is therefore an experience from which we can learn something important about the essentiality and dynamics of human relationships. This experience tells us that our first relation is not a relation with the self or with spiritual reality. Rather it is a human relation. This experience is therefore an important clue for understanding human authenticity in terms of human relationships rather than in terms of individual self-being. In addition, it is an important clue about how authenticity is constituted because insofar as it tells us that the individuating experience of anxiety can be overcome, it tells us that if we want to overcome anxiety we had better embrace a kind of authenticity according to which we are ready and willing to be open to the needs of others.⁷²

All this is relevant to the discussion on love and friendship in that it goes to substantiate Buber's position that love and friendship bespeak an essential capacity for human relations. On Macmurray's analysis our earliest experience coincides with

⁷² Macmurray discusses all of this in the volumes already mentioned, though the most detail directly relevant to the discussion at hand is contained in the volume *Persons in Relation*.

a reciprocity of responsibility and dependency. For Buber reciprocity is the hallmark of friendship and love. The reciprocity of responsibility and dependency are therefore essential aspects of an authentic I-You relation. In Macmurray we find that this reciprocity is so essential to the nature of human experience that should it not obtain when we are first born we probably would never get to the point of being able to argue whether or not human relations are essential. Macmurray's analysis reveals that we develop in life in such a way that we have a choice as to whether or not we will maintain authentic relations with others as our caregivers once maintained such a relation with ourselves. We have a choice in fact as to whether or not we will live according to our capacity for love and friendship. This implies that we do not necessarily always live according to this capacity. However, this does not deny that such a capacity exists. It seems evident that we would evidently not be alive now, or at least we would now all be seriously miserable, anxious human beings, did it not exist. Of course Macmurray would have to answer the same critic as does Buber, who might try to suggest that a capacity for human relations exists but is not essential. Because he is so similar to Buber, however, Macmurray could answer the critique in the same way as could Buber. Because the It-world attitude is essentially self-isolating, it gives rise to the attitude that relations with others are not essential to the human. But because this position entails an implicit denial of any capacity for human relations, which denial is untenable with real experience, Macmurray could point out to the critic that a capacity for human relations is indeed innate and essential to the human. Macmurray's analysis of the relation of mother and child

simply strengthens this contention because it effectively shows that life itself sometimes depends on the existence of an essential capacity for human relations.

This concludes my consideration of the essential grounds for Buber's notion of community. In view of the fact that Buber's position rests on the idea that love and friendship bespeak an essential capacity for relation I think it can be concluded that not only is his own philosophical position substantiated, his criticisms of Heidegger are vindicated. The critic we have brought forth to test Buber is beaten on all fronts. Any challenge to the notion of an essential capacity for relation, seems to be based ultimately on an attempt to prioritize an It-world attitude. Such an attempt ultimately either stems from or leads towards a total rejection of any capacity for interhuman relations. Since it is not true that there is no such thing as a capacity for interhuman relations, Buber's critic is defeated. When we add to these considerations Macmurray's analysis that life itself sometimes depends on authentic human relations our critic lies not just defeated but buried. We can now go on, armed with the knowledge that Buber is a credible witness against Heidegger, to consider some additional implications connected with the differences lying between these two thinkers.

iii) The Relationship Between Authenticity and Freedom in Buber and Heidegger

In consideration of the fact that the basis of authenticity is so different for Buber and Heidegger, I should point out some fundamental differences that exist between these two thinkers on the issue of the relationship between authenticity and freedom. My purpose here is to argue that Buber's understanding of authenticity is

better than Heidegger's because it is decidedly more realistic. I have already indicated that for both Heidegger and Buber authenticity is, in general philosophical terms, a necessary condition for freedom. What I want to do here, however, is show that at a practical level of consideration, Buber's notion of authenticity aligns with a more realistic conception and possibility of freedom than does Heidegger's.

For Heidegger, authenticity implies both individuation and freedom. The same is true for Buber. However, the kind of freedom implied is quite different. So too is the relationship between freedom and practical reality. I will consider this relationship first with respect to Heidegger. Because authenticity is, for Heidegger, such an individualistic state of being, the freedom it implies must be considered at a practical level equally individualistic. If one were to try and posit an ethics or a social philosophy in the spirit of Heideggerian authenticity, I think the results could be a little scary. One would have to espouse a kind of humanism described by Heidegger, in his 1947 essay "Letter on Humanism", as "a humanism that thinks the humanity of man from nearness to Being."⁷³ But Dasein's "nearness to Being" defines Dasein to be in essence an existence characterized by possibilities. Possibilities signify freedom, and Dasein is authentic only when it understands itself in terms of freedom. But, as I pointed out in the previous chapter, authentic understanding is a function of living in the state understood. Thus, in order to be authentic, Dasein has to be free. It has to live as if it were in Sartre's words "condemned" to its ownmost, innate propensity towards freedom. This is the essence of Heideggerian humanism. An ethics or a social philosophy that espouses such a humanism would have to entail no

⁷³ p. 222; Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism", pp. 193-242 in Krell

specific ethical or social rules whatsoever, because not only is there no justification for any such rules, there is an implied denial that any such rules might be valid. Unfortunately, much as one might like to have a society defined by no rules whatsoever, it is in reality neither practical nor prudent to try to actually have such a society.⁷⁴

Now what I have said above may sound a little extreme, and I doubt that Heidegger, were he alive to defend himself, would ever agree that this is what he was thinking of. Consider, however, the following passages from the "Letter on Humanism". In response to the question, "If the thinking that ponders the truth of Being defines the essence of *humanitas* as...belongingness to Being,...can we obtain from such knowledge directives that can be readily applied to our active lives?," Heidegger replies that his "thinking is neither theoretical nor practical. It comes to pass before this distinction. Such thinking is, insofar as it is, recollection of Being and nothing else."⁷⁵ This is no answer to what I think is a rather good question. In order to understand ourselves in terms of a "truth of Being [which] defines the essence of *humanitas* as belongingness to Being" we need to know what Being means. Unfortunately, Heidegger never really succeeds in telling us what Being means. All he has to say on the subject are words to the effect that Being is an "openness," a "free space in which freedom conserves its essence," and "the no-

⁷⁴ This is in fact why Sartre, in his 1946 treatise *Existentialism and Humanism*, modified the Heideggerian notion of authenticity by making the freedom it implied subject to a Kantian-type categorical imperative. (see pp. 29-30, 45; *Existentialism and Humanism*, in Mairet)

⁷⁵ p. 236; "Letter on Humanism"

thing."⁷⁶ Beyond this about all he has to add is that "[t]he one thing thinking would like to attain and for the first time tries to articulate in *Being and Time* is something simple. As such, Being remains mysterious, the simple nearness of an unobtrusive governance."⁷⁷ Granted we do know from the previous chapter that Being means possibilities and so freedom. But even this is of little use in helping us understand definitively what it means to be human in a human world. Taken together, all the above definitions of Being from *Being and Time* and "Letter on Humanism" tell us is that Dasein's authenticity is a function of a relationship with Being where Being either means nothing specific, or it means freedom. On the basis of this relationship authentic Dasein is to be thought of before all else as "the shepherd of Being."⁷⁸ As the shepherd of Being, Dasein is the shepherd of vagueness or of freedom.

To be fair to Heidegger I should briefly interrupt this criticism in order to indicate that this criticism should not be read as a total condemnation of Heidegger. As I said in the previous chapter and in section one above I do believe that there are some insights here. At the level of ontological understanding Heidegger has, I believe, successfully suggested a way to conceive of a reality of possibilities to which Dasein is related.

At the same time as one keeps this in mind, however, it is important to realize that, at the level of such practical considerations as ethics and social philoso-

⁷⁶ pp. 214, 223, 228, 238; "Letter on Humanism"

⁷⁷ p. 212; "Letter on Humanism"

⁷⁸ p. 210; "Letter on Humanism" (For anyone who might be wandering if this really is the direction in which Heidegger was thinking at the time of the writing of *Being and Time*, I point to the sentence immediately following this quotation: "It is in this direction alone that *Being and Time* is thinking when ecstatic existence is experienced as "care". (cf. section 44 C, pp. 226 ff.).")

phy, Heidegger's insistence on the priority of Dasein's relation to Being leads to some rather serious oversights. The relationship to Being as the foundation of authenticity is simply too vague to have any meaningful bearing on practical reality. On the basis of this relationship there are only two options available upon which Dasein's essence can be understood. One is Being in the vagueness of Being, the other is Being as freedom. It does not matter which option one chooses to understand Dasein by when trying to use an understanding of Dasein as the foundational guide for establishing practically meaningful rules. Any rules would entail a denial of authenticity. In the case of option one, Being in the vagueness of Being, Dasein would become regulated on the basis of specific considerations, that are inauthentic in comparison with the more authentic considerations according to which Dasein must be understood in its relation to the generality of Being itself. In the case of option two, Being as total freedom, Dasein would become regulated on the basis of inauthentic impositions on its essential ownmost freedom. Dasein's essential authenticity, that is Dasein's essential relation to Being, therefore precludes the possibility of any meaningful practical considerations, such as are entailed in the specification of moral or social rules.

Now admittedly Heidegger does indicate, in "Letter on Humanism" that "the terms 'authenticity' and 'inauthenticity,' which are used in a provisional fashion [in *Being and Time*], do not imply a moral-existential or an 'anthropological' distinction but rather a relation which, because it has been hitherto concealed from philosophy, has yet to be thought for the first time, an 'ecstatic' relation of the essence of man to

the truth of Being."⁷⁹ This is small help though because insofar as authenticity still entails a relationship to Being before all else, it would be contradictory to Heidegger's whole philosophy to try and posit any sort of ethical or social rules that might restrict Dasein's proper relationship to Being/freedom/possibilities/potentiality-for-Being. The simple fact of the matter is that any attempt to respect practical reality seems to entail trampling on the Heideggerian notion of authenticity. Heideggerian authenticity is so exclusive to such practical considerations that it amounts, at a practical level, to a denial of any justifiable restrictions on freedom.

Martin Buber's notion of authenticity, on the other hand, seems to be open to the practically oriented realms of ethical and social philosophy. Consider the following quotation from *Between Man and Man*:

But is there on this level something corresponding to the essential *Thou* in the relation to the multitude of men, or is Heidegger here finally right? What corresponds to the essential *Thou* on the level of self-being, in relation to a host of men, I call the essential *We*....Here we have to do with a category essential for our consideration, which it is important to clarify. It cannot straightaway be grasped from out of current sociological categories. It is true that a *We* can arise in every kind of group, but it cannot be understood from the life of any one of the groups. By *We* I mean a community of several independent persons, who have reached a self and self-responsibility, the community resting on the basis of this self and self-responsibility, and being made possible by them. The special character of the *We* is shown in the essential relation existing, or arising temporarily, between its members; that is, in the holding sway within the *We* of an ontic directedness

⁷⁹ p. 212; "Letter on Humanism"

which is the decisive presupposition of the *I-Thou* potentially.⁸⁰

Buber goes on to point out that although "no particular kind of group-formation *as such* can be adduced as an example of the essential *We*...in many of them the variety which is favourable to the arising of the *We* can be seen clearly enough."⁸¹ He then goes on to describe several examples of such "group-formations." These examples include "revolutionary" and "religious" groups, "the genuine disciples and fellow-workers of a movement," and "such a structure [as] can arise in...a terrorist régime, when adherents of an opinion which is opposed by the régime...perceive that they are brothers and meet not as members of a party but in genuine community."⁸² What is important about all this is that although Buber maintains that any particular "group-formation" has to entail a will to community amongst its members if authenticity is to obtain, it is still possible to conceive of a real community within the realm of "ontic directedness" (i.e., the real world). Buber definitely means us to think that the I-You relation can be a reality in the real world. In addition, though he refuses to specify any particular set of rules that might make such a relation possible, I think it is clear that he is open to any particular arrangement as long as the possibility of essential relations remains the uppermost concern.

Because of this I think it is safe to assume that Buber's notion of authenticity is open to necessary, practical restrictions on freedom. I suggest that this obtains

⁸⁰ pp. 175-176; *Between Man and Man* (emphases from text)

⁸¹ p. 176; *Between Man and Man* (emphases from text)

⁸² pp. 176-177; *Between Man and Man*

primarily because of his emphasis on the relation of "life with men" over the relation to Being (i.e., "life with spiritual beings"). Because of this priority Buber's understanding of a human essence is far less vague than is Heidegger's. The human is related to other humans. This is practical. Authenticity is based on this relation. Authenticity is therefore practical. A practically meaningful authenticity is the basis for a practical understanding of freedom. The human relationship to freedom therefore has a bearing in practical reality. In order for freedom to exist people must be concerned primarily not with Being but with each other. In respect of the fact that human authenticity and freedom are so relative to practical reality, I think it is entirely appropriate to assume that Buber is open to necessary rules and regulations despite the fact that his vision of authenticity is decidedly idealistic. Buber ultimately envisages a community in which specific rules and regulations are no longer necessary.⁸³ Nevertheless, I think there is, implicit in his idealism, an acceptance of reality for what it is, an acceptance which signifies openness to the necessity of specific ethical and social rules.

The major difference between Heidegger and Buber, on the subject of authenticity and freedom, therefore has to do with the fact that although there is, for both thinkers, a certain similarity between their respective views on authenticity and freedom, this similarity dissolves in view of what their respective views hold for practical reality. When one attempts to consider Heidegger at a practical level one is left with the impression that real practical considerations are antithetical to both authenticity and human freedom. On Buber's views, however, there is no such

⁸³ cf. pp. 156-157; *I and Thou*

contradiction. The underlying reason for this difference is that for Buber the primary relation which defines authenticity is the relation of "life with men," whereas for Heidegger authenticity is a function of a relationship between Dasein and Being itself. Buber's thought aligns with reality as we know it because it is built upon an understanding of authenticity that does not deny that reality. Heidegger's thought on the other hand rests on a conception of Being which is, no matter how you take it, extremely problematic with respect to practical reality. Being either means nothing specific or it means an essential freedom that cannot justifiably be trammelled upon, even in respect of practical considerations. The result is that Heidegger's thought is so removed from practical reality it becomes contradictory to try and entertain, on the basis of necessary ethical and social rules, a relationship between authentic Dasein and actual reality. Buber's thought, on the other hand, seems to entail no such contradiction. Based on the reality of human relationships, it remains tied to the reality of human relationships. Heidegger's thinking wafts too exclusively in the realm of intellectual fantasizing. Buber's thinking denies such fantasizing because it is based on the contention that there is no meaningful intellectual reality unless it can be understood on the basis of practical human relations. These are Buber's words to that effect:

The intellect should [indeed] serve the true great reality, whose function it is to embody the truth of God; it must serve. [But] [n]o matter how brilliant it may be, the human intellect which wishes to keep to a plane above the events of the day is not really alive. I can become fruitful, beget life and live, only when it enters into the events of the day without denying, but rather proving, its superior origin. Be true to the spirit, my friends, but be true to it on the plane of reality. Our first question must be: what is the truth? what has God commanded

us to do? But our next must be: how can we accomplish it from where we are?⁸⁴

This is of course the same in spirit to Heidegger's claim that "the Interpretation which is more primordial existentially, also discloses *possibilities* for a more primordial existentiell understanding, as long as our ontological conceptualization does not let itself get cut off from our ontical experience."⁸⁵ However, as the above arguments are meant to indicate, Heidegger fails while Buber succeeds in remaining true to the spirit of adequate interpretation. The most basic underlying reason for this is that Heidegger and Buber follow different roads of inquiry. Heidegger follows the path of Being as most essential. In so doing he gets so far removed from practical reality the meaning of his whole inquiry stands in doubt. Buber follows the path of human relations as most essential. In so doing he manages to steer a middle course between philosophical idealism and appropriate philosophical attention to practical reality. One must not be tempted to assume, on the basis of certain similarities, that these two thinkers share essentially similar views. Rather one must be aware of two different roads taken which lead to significantly divergent views on the essential nature of human anxiety, human authenticity, and on the scope and limits of human freedom in reality.

⁸⁴ p. 143; Martin Buber, *The Writings of Martin Buber*, ed. by Wili Harberg, U.S.A.: The World Publishing Co., 1965.

⁸⁵ p. 341, H.295; *Being and Time*

PART III: HEIDEGGER MODIFIED

I will now attempt to demonstrate how I think Heidegger can be modified on the basis of insights borrowed from Buber. There are two points I want to establish on this order of business. The first has to do with exposing the nature of Heidegger's and Buber's insights on freedom within context of a renewed discussion on the paradox of freedom. What I want to do here is show that there are two paradoxes of freedom in reality which apply separately to Heidegger's and Buber's respective conceptions of authenticity and freedom. Second, I want to show how Heidegger's understanding of the relationship between authenticity and freedom can be improved simply by attaching to it Buber's own insights. The result of this is that care becomes modified such that, in addition to retaining insights already there, it now includes the second understanding of the paradox of freedom.

i) The Paradox of Freedom Revisited

As is evident from my considerations in Chapter Three, I think there are two conceptions of the Paradox of Freedom. The first, which has primarily to do with Heidegger, I will now call for want of a better name the ontological paradox of freedom. I have already indicated what this paradox is in Heidegger. Because Dasein is care it finds itself when it is authentic to be characterized by an essential relatedness to possibilities or freedom. But because it is care Dasein also finds itself characterized by an essential relatedness to unfreedom; it cannot escape certain limitations connected with the fact that it is a Being-in-a-world. In Heidegger this

paradox emerges primarily out of a relation between Dasein and Being which defines Dasein to be authentic when it understands and accepts itself as an individualized potentiality-for-Being.

As I have indicated, this description of Dasein entails, at the level of an ontological understanding of Dasein's relationship to reality, a rather insightful description of the way in which possibilities in reality are related to Dasein such that it can be said, without the aid of a metaphysical postulate, that Dasein has freedom.⁸⁶ However, I have also indicated that at the level of practical considerations, this description entails a rather problematic rift between authenticity and practical reality.⁸⁷ I will now comment on this problem in order to show just exactly how problematic is the emphasis on a relationship to Being. What is enlightening about the ontological paradox of freedom dissolves in face of the realization that what this leads to is a paradox of freedom so strong the supposed attainment of freedom leads to no freedom at all.

The ideal is for Dasein to become authentic. When Dasein is authentic it is supposed to be free, that is it is supposed to be before all else the shepherd of the openness of the open region. But when it is thus authentic, it is characterized by perpetual anxiety. How can this be called freedom? How can one be considered free when all authenticity offers is a perpetual state of anxiousness about what one should be, what one should do, or what one is? All one has by way of freedom is the knowledge that there is nothing specifically necessary. This is the ultimate meaning

⁸⁶ See my discussions in the Introduction and section 1, Part II of Chapter Three above.

⁸⁷ See my discussions above in this chapter, as well as in the closing pages of Chapter Three above.

of Heideggerian openness/freedom for authentic Dasein. All that Heidegger is able to add to this is the realization that this freedom goes hand in hand with an anxiety begetting kind of unfreedom, the ultimate reminder of which is that Dasein is a Being-towards-death.

Admittedly, Heidegger tries to indicate that Being-towards-death is not supposed to have a primarily negative connotation. Rather, it is supposed to be a reminder to Dasein that it has meaningful possibilities. Unfortunately, this insight dissolves on the kind of answer that must be given to the following question. In view of the fact that the authenticity of Being-towards-death is most synonymous with individuation, what *specific* possibilities might there be that one can say actually apply to Dasein? The answer is only one, anxiety. As an authentic Being-towards-death Dasein must stand alone before itself in anxiety about future related possibilities. One cannot even bring in the consideration of Dasein's Being-with others as a help here, because this is only a derivative aspect of authenticity. As such it is unessential in relation to the authenticity of anxiety founded in self-being. In authenticity it appears that Dasein is before all else a creature that must live as if it were condemned to being with itself, alone, isolated, and without recourse to any essential interhuman element. How can this be construed as a meaningful kind of freedom? The picture this gives rise to reminds me of Prometheus helplessly chained to a cliff for 30,000 years, while vultures come daily to tear out his insides. Or the image of Sisyphus condemned for all eternity to the futile exercise of rolling a stone up a hill only to have it forever fall back down again. I suppose one could say these mythical characters are free in that they still have the possibility of denying their

situation, the possibility of asserting their own moral independence of what are otherwise rather trying circumstances. At a practical level of consideration, however, Prometheus and Sisyphus are not at all free. They have no control over their respective fates and they have no control over the anxiety which attends those fates. This appears to be the situation of authentic Dasein. As the shepherd only of Being Dasein is the shepherd only of a perpetual anxiety about a theoretical state of life in which, as Miles points out "his restoration to his own essence as Dasein, is a desideratum, not for man's sake, but for the sake of Being itself."⁸⁸ Heidegger's insights about freedom as something which possesses Dasein thus dissolve in the realization that freedom possesses Dasein so completely that it really has no freedom at all. Dasein existing for the sake of Being is Dasein without any freedom at all! The Paradox of Freedom which was so enlightening has now dissolved into a Paradox of Freedom where the supposed attainment of freedom has become a total absence of freedom.⁸⁹

Now we do have a rather serious problem on our hands. The ontological paradox of freedom in Heidegger, though insightful on one front, becomes so strong, on the basis of the Heideggerian understanding of authenticity, that the attainment of freedom goes hand in hand with a rather dismal kind of slavery to anxiety. On the one hand it bespeaks a meaningful relationship between Dasein and freedom in

⁸⁸ p. 447; Miles, "Heidegger and the Question of Humanism"

⁸⁹ In addition to Miles, see also pp. 14-15; Haar: "If freedom is located integrally on the side of Being, which 'gives free rein to the relation between man and itself,' necessity is more heavily accentuated on the side of man and on the side of thought. The remembering of the beginning results from a 'distress-filled necessity.' This necessity too must, however, be the reflection in thought of a necessity and even of a distress of Being."

reality, such that we can understand freedom to mean an open region which makes choice meaningful. On the other hand, however, the paradox of freedom as it emerges out of Heidegger does not appear to align with any practically meaningful, positive understanding of freedom. In authenticity Dasein appears to have meaningful choices. However, in authenticity the welfare of Dasein when it realizes freedom appears to be a rather irrelevant issue. Its freedom appears to be a freedom for anxiety and nothing more. Surely there must be a less nihilating way to preserve Heidegger's insight that freedom is a condition of reality which applies to Dasein!

Now when I say that this ontological paradox of freedom is relative specifically to Heidegger, I mean two things. First, I mean that the second paradox of freedom, which I will redefine shortly, does not really apply to Heidegger because of the fact that authentic Dasein is primarily a Dasein which is at once individualized and related before all else to Being. As a result the second paradox of freedom, which has primarily to do with practical reality and with a decidedly more positive understanding of human freedom, does not apply in the case of Heidegger's understanding of care and authenticity. Second, I mean that although the ontological paradox of freedom does actually seem to apply to Buber (as I will show when I get around to suggesting a way to modify Heidegger), it applies to Buber in such a way that it does not dissolve into such a nihilating picture of what it means to be human in a human world. In respect of these considerations, I therefore think that the insights connected with this paradox of freedom belong to both Buber and Heidegger, while the oversights belong primarily to Heidegger.

The second paradox of freedom, which I call the practical paradox of freedom, has to do with the idea that in real life freedom is frequently maintained only at the expense of certain restrictions placed on individual autonomy. The reason for this is that in respect of practical reality a greater freedom for most individuals usually prevails only when we institute and live according to certain specific, autonomy restricting rules. Buber says "[f]ree is the man that wills without caprice."⁹⁰ The freedom intimated here is of a kind with the moral freedom that obtains when what I want to do aligns with what I should do. It is a kind of freedom in which the distinction between "ought" and "is" no longer exists, a kind of freedom in which freedom itself ceases to become an issue. It is, in a word, freedom from the constraints of fear and anxiety, which is precisely what Buber's understanding of human authenticity is supposed to entail. In order to realize this kind of freedom I have to live as a dependent, responsible person in relation with other dependent, responsible persons. I have to deny absolute personal autonomy in favour of a sense of identity which comes from the realization that living in relation with others is essential to my being. If I do this I realize a release from the anxiety that follows from a sense that I have to go it alone. But this is, in essence, the reason for rules in society. We find that it is better for all concerned if we institute and follow certain rules, than it is if we refuse the possibility of rules. We do not have to fear that the interests of others will be allowed to destroy our own. In short, we can be free from anxiety.

The fact that Buber thinks we will no longer need such rules if we attain the authenticity of I-You does not deny these practical considerations. Rather, I think his

⁹⁰ p. 108; *Between Man and Man*

notion of authenticity aligns with them, because if we truly want to be authentically related to others, it seems to me that we will accept rules for as long as they are necessary. It is true that on Buber's understanding of human authenticity, true freedom from anxiety does not obtain unless authenticity is actually achieved. In this respect, simply wanting the freedom that attends authenticity does not necessarily mean the achievement of freedom from anxiety. It is also true that Buber's notion of authenticity suggests that we can move beyond this. In this respect his notion of authenticity represents an ideal. However, insofar as wanting freedom from anxiety is the first necessary condition for achieving it, and insofar as Buberian authenticity entails a necessary denial of absolute personal autonomy, I think Buber's idealistic notion of authenticity and freedom does not deny reality as it is. Rather, it just represents the best of what might be achievable in society. Another way of putting this is, the value which we seek, and which we still think of in terms of oughts, is substantiated in the fact that we know what we need. We know, if we want to be free from fear and anxiety, that we need order in society, we have to get along together, and that in general we cannot live . . . if we were alone. Buber's idealism is simply a representation of the best of what can be achieved in respect of these facts. As such, therefore, it represents a practically relevant value. Because a practical paradox of freedom does align with his thought, therefore, it seems to me that Buber's idealism does have a bearing on practical reality, such that our understanding of why we should make rules is at once enhanced and guided by a very meaningful, not to mention positive, conception of freedom as freedom from anxiety.

ii) A Modification of Heidegger

The notion that freedom means freedom from anxiety is the central point of difference between Heidegger's and Buber's conceptions of freedom. There is, however, another aspect to their respective conceptions of freedom that is quite similar. As I have indicated, for Heidegger, freedom means existence characterized by meaningful possibilities in reality. Consider the following quotation from Buber: "...I and You confront each other freely in a reciprocity that is not involved in or tainted by any causality; here man finds guaranteed the freedom of his being and of being. Only those who know relation and who know of the presence of the You have the capacity for decision. Whoever makes a decision is free because he has stepped before the countenance."⁹¹

It is this passage which first made me think that Heidegger and Buber could be joined in thought such that Heidegger's understanding of authenticity and freedom, and of care as the foundation of authenticity and freedom, could be modified for the better.

On Buber's view, when authenticity obtains one is not only free from anxiety, one attains a "capacity for decision" not at all unlike Heidegger's idea that living in the face of possibilities is what ultimately makes decision possible. The only central difference, therefore, between Heideggerian and Buberian authenticity is that for Heidegger the necessary condition for authenticity is acceptance of one's ownmost existence as characterized by possibilities, while for Buber existence characterized by possibilities only really becomes meaningful when one first accepts that one needs to

⁹¹ p. 100; *I and Thou*

stand in good relations with other persons. The main reason for this difference is that for Heidegger the person is supposed to be able to understand its existence completely when it understands itself as a self, while for Buber such understanding only occurs in virtue of a prior understanding that one is in essence a social being.

"Whoever stands in relation, participates in an actuality; that is, in a being that is neither merely a part of him nor merely outside of him....The I is actual through its participation in actuality."⁹² Thus, it is only through prioritization of the "life with men" relation that any meaningful "life with spiritual being" relation obtains.

I think Buber is on to something eminently worthwhile here. His point is that when one lacks a proper relation with another one lacks an understanding of possibilities as they apply to oneself. I think it is not difficult to demonstrate the worth of this claim. If I am a self-isolated individual I am only really concerned with my own interests. Furthermore, I usually know what those interests are, or at least I know a significant majority of them. In such a scenario spontaneity is lacking. I am in thrall to the causality of my own interests and desires. When I am open to the needs of others, however, a far greater degree of spontaneity obtains. I do not know what will be expected of me. All I really know is that I am ready to answer to the best of my ability to those needs when they occur. I am therefore much more spontaneously oriented, much more open to possibilities, than I would be did I lack any real concern for others. In short, I am an existence that really is characterized by as many possibilities as can apply to me.

⁹² p. 113; *I and Thou*

One can go even further to demonstrate this insight of Buber's. If I realize my existence as characterized by possibilities out of a relation with others, I realize the freedom that comes from knowing that I can answer to the various spontaneously originaive needs of an other. In addition, however, I also know a certain unfreedom that comes from this realization. I know that if my freedom to answer to spontaneous needs is to prevail I must actually attempt to answer to those needs. Thus my new-found freedom goes hand in hand with a certain unfreedom. Not only is it likely that I will not always be able on my own to realize the needs of another, I know that if I am willing to try I must always be ready to curtail my freedom to follow my own interests first. It seems that if I accept the idea that interhuman relations are essential to my being I will be met with some rather fundamental unfreedoms. However, this need not be so negative as are the implications of the Heideggerian paradox of freedom. In accepting these unfreedoms on the basis of an understanding that human relations are essential, I gain the freedom of knowing that I might be able to expect similar consideration from others. This comes from knowing that I need others just as they need me, and it leads to a kind of freedom where I am at once free of the anxiety that accompanies self-isolation, and free (i.e., capable) to make decisions on behalf of the spontaneous needs of others that I might not otherwise make. On the latter consideration I therefore find myself in my capacity to make decisions far more decisively than would be possible if I lived in a world in which everyone thought of themselves only in relation to themselves and to the total freedom of the open region of Being. Buber's thought therefore implies a paradox of freedom that applies to both an ontological and a practical understanding of freedom in reality. This is why I

claim that the insights relative to the ontological paradox of freedom apply to both Buber and Heidegger, whereas the oversights belong primarily to Heidegger.

So, what modifications can we make to Heidegger in respect of these considerations? I think the answer is really rather simple. As I mentioned Heidegger failed somewhat inexcusably to consider the possibility that the self might be in essence a social self, before it is an individual self. That is, Heidegger is at fault for not at least considering the possibility that the individual can gain a better understanding of itself if it understands itself in relation with other humans, than it could by understanding itself in relation to itself or to existence in general. In respect of this failure, and in respect of all the preceding discussions which do, I think, definitely validate the possibility that Heidegger ignored to be meaningful, I think it is not too difficult to decide where and how Heidegger should be modified. Just change, without further ado, the meaning of care such that Heideggerian authenticity is now built on the primacy of human relations.

Care is the locus of Heidegger's whole thought on authenticity. Care is what indicates Dasein to be a potentiality-for-Being and a Being-towards-death (or towards-a-future). Care is also the foundation for concern, solicitude and anxiety. If we change the meaning of care to mean before all else that the human is, innately, an I-You kind of creature, we will of course have to modify the meanings of concern, solicitude and anxiety. However, I do not think this poses too great a problem.

First, with respect to concern, I think if care were modified, such that it means *a priori* the essentiality of human relations, it would imply a kind of concern

considerably less utilitarian in nature. Concern would become a derivative, not of self-being, but of social being, such that when Dasein is authentic its involvement with environmental, ready-to-hand objects would be conditioned by attention more to the needs of others, than to its own needs. This would have the effect of allowing us to understand ourselves, not in terms of an exploitative kind of Being-in-the-world, but in terms of a kind of Being-in-the-world upon which the world would be a home for a community of persons. A further result of this modification would be that Heidegger's idea that concern ultimately means "letting-be" would be far less overshadowed by the idea that concern means manipulating and using for purely individualistic, personal reasons.

The meaning of solicitude could be modified to mean that way in which care, redefined as the locus of essential human relations, is manifest in the world as we know it. As a result, solicitude would actually mean "caring for my brother, my friend, and other people"⁹³ in the real world. A further result of this modification would be that solicitude would then be relative to that way in which we have to make rules in order to live peaceably together in society. As such it would be relative to the practical paradox of freedom, which is missing in Heidegger anyway.

As for anxiety, just substitute the Buberian meaning of anxiety as loneliness, with all the implications that go along with it. (Actually, if solicitude is redefined such that it is a practical manifestation of care reinterpreted in terms of human relationships, the Buberian meaning of anxiety would simply occur as a substitute to that of Heidegger.) Anxiety would then amount to either a detachment from the It-

⁹³ p. 122; Gelven

world of concern, which is the first necessary condition for the possibility of an authentic I-You relation, or an absence of relations which signifies a resolved willingness to actually be in an I-You relation. If anxiety were thus reinterpreted, it would also become something to be overcome with the achievement of authenticity. This would solve the problem of Heidegger's rather nihilating picture of authenticity.

The primary advantage of these modifications is that we would now have what I think is a rather good understanding of freedom at both an ontological and a practical level. At a practical level, the reinterpretation of care enables us to maintain a closer link between an ontologically relevant understanding of what it means to be human in a human world, and our knowledge of reality as it is. If care means that Dasein is before all else a social creature which understands Being on that basis, and if solicitude means care manifest in the real world as the essentiality of human relationships fulfilled, the practical paradox of freedom can be understood far more closely in its relation to the ontological paradox of freedom. Because we are care we are defined by interhuman relations. In this respect, then, our very being is defined by the necessity of restricting personal autonomy. Authenticity would be a function of such a necessary restriction. In society as we know this would amount to the reality of necessary ethical and social rules. In the framework of an ontological understanding of human being in a human world, this would relate to the idea that although we live in the face of possibilities, not all possibilities can be meaningfully regarded as our own.

The ultimate result of this link reestablished between ontology and reality would be that the connection between freedom and authenticity would not have to have the negative connotations such as are implied in Heidegger. Anxiety need not

be construed as so integral with authenticity. Rather, it would simply be understood as a part of human experience which can be overcome, and which, when overcome, gives way to true authenticity and a very positive manifestation of freedom in reality.

PART IV: CONCLUDING COMMENTARY

This just about completes my critical consideration of Heidegger's concept of freedom. Before closing, however, I want to indicate that it is appropriate to modify Heidegger primarily because of his own admissions that he may not have gotten it all right, and because of his intentional openness to correction. In addressing this topic I am addressing two questions which could be directed at me, for which I could be faulted for not having answered. The first question that might be directed at me could be, why do you choose to modify Heidegger? In view of the fact that you obviously think Buber has the superior understanding both of authenticity and of freedom, why not just dismiss Heidegger, and point out that if one wants to understand human authenticity and freedom properly, just read Buber? The second question that might then follow could be, how can you justify your modification of Heidegger? You may not agree with him, but what gives you the right to play fast and loose with his thought, by suggesting possible changes which he evidently was quite satisfied to ignore?

In answer to the first question, there are two reasons why I choose to modify Heidegger rather than dismiss him. First, in order to suggest a dismissal of Heidegger I would have had to consider far more of Buber than I did in this paper, where I only used him to aid in my criticism of Heidegger. My concern here is to arrive at a

critical understanding of Heidegger. I have pushed that project to the point of suggesting modifications, but it does not validly include leaving Heidegger behind. If such a project were worthwhile, and I am not saying here that it would necessarily be worthwhile, it would have to be far more extensive than what is presented here.

Second, I do not think that if one understands Heidegger properly it is possible to dismiss him honestly. I have tried to indicate that I believe he has some very worthwhile insights, most significant of which is the revelation of care as the Being of Dasein. Granted, I think the way in which he understands care is problematic, but in that it does successfully stand for the locus of unity, difference, and freedom in reality, I think it does represent a rare articulation of some rather basic intuitions on these matters. Care is central to the Heideggerian corpus. It may not appear as specifically mentioned in works subsequent to *Being and Time* but, insofar as it is absolutely central to *Being and Time*⁹⁴ and insofar as *Being and Time* is foundational to much of the works following, the analysis of care as the Being of Dasein and as the locus of authenticity and freedom in Dasein is an integral part of Heidegger's thought. To dismiss Heidegger is to dismiss care and all the attendant implications that accompany this his most important existential phenomenon. I have no wish to do this, nor do I have any pretensions to writing a completely separate philosophy. Rather, I am most interested in understanding the problems and insights that accompany this phenomenon. In addition, I am interested in understanding philosophy as a discipline which thrives best on performing this sort of exercise via

⁹⁴ For a good article on this point see Richard J. Klonoski, "Being and Time Said All at Once: An Analysis of Section 42", pp. 61-68 in *Tulane Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. 32, March 1984. Also see pp. 119-123; Gelven.

consideration of problems and insights, and similarities and differences, that exist within both the range of individual thinkers and the range of comparisons between different thinkers. I have pushed this attempt to understand to the point of suggesting modifications on the meaning of care, but this does not mean that I am in a position to dismiss Heidegger altogether.

With respect to the second question regarding my right to modify Heidegger, my reply is that Heidegger himself gives me not only the right but the responsibility of suggesting changes. This is true even though this right is subject to two important restrictions, which have to be obeyed unless they are argued to be without foundation. Because I have not and do not intend to argue against them (primarily because they tie in with what I consider to be insightful in Heidegger), I therefore place my answer to the question about my right to modify Heidegger within the context of those restrictions. The idea here is to show that Heidegger can be modified precisely because of these restrictions.

The first restriction has to do with the fact that, for Heidegger, philosophy has to proceed towards ontological understanding on the basis of phenomenological evidence, and the second concerns Heidegger's claim that the point from which philosophy "arises" and "returns" is "the hermeneutic of Dasein."⁹⁵ These are the only two points which Heidegger claims to have drawn conclusively from *Being and Time*, but because he does draw them conclusively they stand as restrictions on how he can be modified.

⁹⁵ p. 487, H.436; *Being and Time*

These restrictions amount to claims about method. Philosophy can only proceed adequately if it follows the method of ontologically relevant statements on the basis of phenomenologically apparent facts. This does not mean something like logical positivism for Heidegger.⁹⁶ Rather it means that one must maintain a presuppositionless kind of openness in any philosophical inquiry such that nothing that might be revealed in the inquiry is obfuscated by propositions that have no basis in reality. This is true, for Heidegger, just as much with respect to isolating which phenomena are the most relevant as it is with respect to making ontological statements about phenomena.

The import of this methodological concern is that Heidegger thinks he has identified how philosophy must proceed. Philosophy must proceed, in its inquiries into the ontological structure of existence, upon the assumption that ontological structures are meaningful only when they are clearly revealed in phenomenologically relevant facts. In addition, the inquiry into the ontological structure of reality has to proceed via inquiry into the whole of reality, which means human being in a human world. Thus it is that Heidegger sets out inquiring about Being by trying to understand the Being of Dasein as a Being-in-the-world. As a result of this inquiry he comes up with some pretty significant things to say about the reality of Dasein in a world. This does not mean, however, that Heidegger claims to have said the last word on what it means to be Dasein in a world. Rather, he claims that:

...our way of exhibiting the constitution of Dasein's
Being remains only *one* way in which we may take

⁹⁶ "One can never carry on researches into the source and the possibility of the 'idea' of Being in general simply by means of the 'abstractions' of formal logic--that is, without any secure horizon for question and answer". (p. 487, H.437; *Being and Time*)

it....The distinction between the Being of existing Dasein and the Being of entities, such as Reality, which do not have the character of Dasein, may appear very illuminating; but it is still only the *point of departure* for the ontological problematic; it is nothing with which philosophy may tranquillize itself....One must seek a way of casting light on the fundamental question of ontology, and this is the way one must go. Whether this is the *only* way or even the right one at all, can be decided only *after one has gone along it*. The conflict as to the Interpretation of Being cannot be allayed, *because it has not yet been enkindled*. And in the end this is not the kind of conflict one can 'bluster into'; it is of the kind which cannot get enkindled unless preparations are made for it. Towards this alone the foregoing investigation is *on the way*.⁹⁷

There is one very important point to notice from this. Heidegger emphatically does not claim to have said the last word on the Being of Dasein. Rather, he only claims to have given a "point of departure for the ontological problematic," which is to say a point of departure for inquiry into the meaning of Being. This point of departure is the study of the Being of Dasein, which is that Being for which Being is an issue. It is clear that Heidegger is convinced that if any understanding of Being is to be had at all it can only be had in and through a proper understanding of the existence of Dasein. Aside from this, however, I think it is clear that Heidegger is open to suggestions other than his own on what it means to be Dasein. He is therefore open to correction on just what it means to be Dasein in a world. On the basis of this it seems clear that Heidegger himself was trying to espouse in his work just the kind of presuppositionless openness which is supposed to be so characteristic of authentic Dasein.

⁹⁷ pp. 487-488, H.436-437; *Being and Time* (emphases from text)

I take this intentional openness as an invitation to suggest modifications on the meaning of care. Because it seems clear that Heidegger's understanding of care leads to a decidedly unrealistic break between reality as we know it and authentic Dasein, I think Heidegger stands in need of correction. And, because Heidegger himself is intentionally open to correction, I think he has to accept correction. My work here therefore amounts to an attempt to convince Heidegger that his understanding of care is at once insightful and problematic. The insights have to do with the way in which care lies at the heart of a paradox of unity and a paradox of freedom in reality. The problems have to do with a kind of authenticity that is so negative it denies any meaningful notion of freedom. That is, Heidegger's notion of authenticity is so exclusively relative to a very vague conception of Being that authentic Dasein is left separated from reality by a paradox of freedom so extreme that freedom itself appears to be rather meaningless. I therefore bring in Buber, not only to aid in my criticisms of Heidegger, but to help me see a way in which Heidegger can be modified such that his insights are preserved without the burden of his rather serious oversights. The result is that Heidegger's paradoxical concept of freedom is modified around a more realistic and eminently more positive understanding of human being in a human world.

General Conclusion

On Heidegger's understanding of the reality of Dasein as a Being-in-the-world, Dasein and Being-in-the-world are constituted by something called care such that reality entails a paradox of unity which is maintained by a paradox of freedom. The paradox of unity has to do with the fact that on Heidegger's view care signifies at once a fundamental difference and a fundamental sameness between Dasein and non-Daseinly entities in the reality of Being-in-the-world. This paradox is maintained by a paradox of freedom in that difference in reality is a function of a difference in freedom between Dasein and entities other than Dasein, while sameness is a function of a fundamental unfreedom that applies to Dasein such that Dasein is alike or unified to the reality of things other than Dasein. The common locus of these paradoxes is care. Because care is at once unique to the Being of Dasein, and yet constitutive of the reality of Dasein as a Being-in-the-world, the paradoxes of unity and freedom it signifies are at once conditions of reality and yet something which apply uniquely to Dasein.

Freedom, for Heidegger, is synonymous with the existence of possibilities. The paradox of unity applies to Dasein in that Dasein is capable of being aware that it is not like entities other than itself. This awareness occurs when Dasein is authentic. When Dasein is authentic it realizes that the difference between it and entities

other than Dasein has to do with the fact that it has possibilities that entities other than it do not have. At the same time, however, when Dasein is authentic it realizes that it is not characterized by total freedom; that is, it realizes that only some possibilities apply to it. This is evident when Dasein authentically realizes that it is a Being-towards-death. As a Being-towards-death, Dasein is constantly reminded of the fact that its existence is characterized at once by future related possibilities, and so by freedom, and by a series of "nots" which indicate that it does not have total freedom. Thus, although Dasein has the possibility of changing its involvements in the world in a way in which non-Daseinly entities cannot, it also cannot escape the fact that it cannot control the future, or manipulate ready-to-hand things in the environmental world in just any old way; it has to obey what the reality of Being-in-the-world allows as possible.

The most significant "not", however, lies in the fact that Dasein cannot escape the fact that it must one day die. This "not" is the most significant for two reasons. First, it indicates to Dasein that its own existence is marked by the immanent possibility of non-existence. Second, it serves as a perennial reminder to Dasein that insofar as its very existence as a whole is characterized by the possibility of non-existence, its existence is at any one moment also marked by the fact that possibilities always go hand in hand with non-possibilities. Thus, insofar as Dasein has the possibility of being say a fighter pilot, it also exists before the possibility that it may not actually be able to become a fighter pilot because becoming a fighter pilot depends upon a requisite series of skills which it may or may not be able to learn. As a result, the most important "not" connected with authentic Being-towards-death

signifies the existence of possibilities in reality which may or may not apply to Dasein.

Authentic Being-towards-death therefore signifies a paradox of freedom in the reality of Dasein as a Being-in-the-world, a paradox of freedom which maintains the paradox of unity in reality. And, because authentic Being-towards-death is a function of an authentic manifestation of the full meaning of care, care emerges as the locus of the paradoxes of unity and freedom in reality. As such, care is a fundamental existential phenomenon which signifies, for Heidegger, a kind of freedom which is at once a condition of reality and yet something which actually does apply to Dasein. Freedom is a condition of reality because care signifies possibilities in general; and it is something which applies to Dasein because in authenticity Dasein is a potentiality-for-Being, which is to say an existence characterized by those possibilities out of an apparently infinite range of possibilities that actually apply to it.

In addition to showing what Heidegger's concept of freedom means, I have also argued in this paper that Heidegger's concept of freedom entails some rather significant insights which are, unfortunately, overburdened by some rather serious oversights. The insights concern the way in which Heidegger describes freedom as a condition of reality which also applies to Dasein. The result is that freedom can be thought of as an ultimate condition of possibility for choice which is more than just a property of Dasein, or a mere metaphysical postulate. It is something real which can be shown to be real by appealing to experiences of Dasein. This appeal to experience reveals that freedom has to be thought of as something more than just a property of Dasein. There are two reasons for this. First, since authenticity itself is only a

possibility (though a real, genuine possibility) it stands as an indicator that there are such things as possibilities that can but do not necessarily always apply to Dasein. Second, in addition to the fact that there are possibilities that Dasein does have, there appear to be possibilities in reality which Dasein cannot control. Heidegger's concept of freedom, founded on an authentic manifestation of care, therefore engenders an insightful description of the way in which freedom can be understood to be at once a condition of reality and yet something which applies to Dasein.

It is because of this insight that Heidegger's concept of freedom is paradoxical. If freedom as possibilities is a condition of reality which applies to Dasein such that it is always more than Dasein, freedom as it applies to Dasein always goes hand in hand with unfreedom. The reason for this is that as soon as Dasein encounters a possibility it encounters the fact that it cannot have all possibilities. It therefore encounters unfreedom whenever it encounters freedom.

This insight into the paradoxical nature of freedom in its application to Dasein also gives rise to an insightful description as to why there is a paradox of unity in reality. When Dasein simultaneously encounters freedom and unfreedom it realizes that it is itself the locus of both difference and unity in reality. Difference here is a function of freedom; Dasein is different from entities other than itself because it has possibilities that entities other than itself do not have. Unity is a function of Dasein's unfreedom; because not all possibilities apply to it Dasein is characterized by the same kind of limitations that mark non-Daseinly entities. Thus, the insights connected with the paradox of freedom give rise to the insight that

Dasein stands at the heart of a paradox of unity in reality precisely because it stands at the heart of a paradox of freedom in reality.

Despite these significant insights, however, some serious problems emerge when one tries to understand Heidegger's paradoxical concept of freedom in relation to the practical reality of human being in a human world. Heidegger's concept of freedom is founded upon a notion of human authenticity according to which Dasein is authentic, and so characterized by both freedom and unfreedom, only when it stands alone before itself as an individuated and anxious Being-towards-death. This notion of human authenticity is problematic because it seems to be built on some assumptions about the essential nature of human experience which are antithetical to the actual nature of human experience. Heidegger's notion of authenticity entails the idea that the human is authentic when it realizes itself to be an existence which can only know itself properly if it understands itself in relation to Being. But, beyond telling us that Being means an open region in which freedom conserves its essence, Heidegger never really succeeds in telling us what Being means. On the basis of what he does give us, however, authentic Dasein is supposed to understand itself as a creature which exists in an individualized, anxiety ridden relationship with absolute freedom.

In addition to this general problem, Heidegger's notion of authenticity is flawed for two specific reasons. First of all it rests upon the assumption that the human can be authentically aware of itself as it is when it stands alone before itself in self-knowledge. This assumption, which rests upon the idea that the human is a self before it is a social self, is problematic because not only has Heidegger failed to

argue for this position on the basis of real experience, his position is antithetical to another view, which can be shown to have a bearing in real experience. This latter view is that the human is not a self before it is a social self, and it rests on the idea that a proper understanding of the self cannot be had without first having a prior understanding of the self as a social creature. Secondly, Heidegger's notion of authenticity entails a paradoxical conception of freedom that appears to have no relation to a practical paradox of freedom that occurs in human society when we use rules to curtail our freedom in order to enhance our freedom. Thus the paradox of freedom that aligns with Heidegger's notion of human authenticity has no relationship to a practical manifestation of this paradox in real life.

These problems all originate in Heidegger's insistence on the priority of Being-one's-self over Being-with others, because it is this insistence which is responsible for Heidegger's failure to maintain a link between the ontological depiction of Dasein as a Being-in-the-world, and the reality as we know it of human being in a human world. To aid in this criticism I bring in the philosophical anthropologist, Martin Buber, who took issue with Heidegger on this very point. Since Buber's whole philosophy is built upon the idea that human authenticity is a function of human relations, his thought represents the very possibility which I claim Heidegger should have considered. Buber's contention is that the human does not understand itself properly as an individual unless it first understands itself as a social being. For this reason the human cannot be authentically aware of what it means to be human unless it is aware that it is in essence a social being. Furthermore, the

human cannot understand itself in its relationship to the realm of Being unless it first understands itself in the reality of human relations.

Because Buber's position on human authenticity is built upon the practical reality of human relations, it does entail a conception of freedom which does relate to practical reality. Buber's notion of authenticity represents an ideal. As such it entails the idea of a human community in which no specific rules are necessary. In such a scenario the human achieves a relationship with Being such that it lives in the face of possibilities which make choice meaningful. The only restrictions that would exist would be voluntary ones that follow from the necessity of obeying what reality decrees is possible. Thus, on Buber's notion of authenticity there occurs an ontologically relevant paradox of freedom similar to that which appears in Heidegger. There is a major difference, however. For Heidegger, the limitations that accompany the realization of freedom are relative primarily to what the environmental world of ready-to-hand things allows as possible. Heidegger himself would probably deny that this is the case, but in view of the fact that his notion of authenticity is so far removed from practical reality, I think these are about the only kinds of limitations that do apply in his paradox of freedom. For Buber, however, these limitations would also include the kind that are necessary if people are going to live peaceably together in society. Thus, Buber's notion of authenticity does include a relationship to the realm of Being. It therefore intimates an ontological paradox of freedom similar to that of Heidegger. But Buber's notion of authenticity entails a more realistic conception of the ontological paradox of freedom because it includes limitations having to

do with the reality of human relations, which Heidegger's notion of authenticity seems to exclude.

Now all this of course does only represent an ideal, which depends upon the actual achievement of authenticity. Buber envisages a community of persons which no longer needs the guiding force of specific ethical or social rules, because in such a community what people should do would align with what they want to do. In such a community there would no longer be any need to enforce compliance to specific rules; it would function, rather, on the basis of a voluntary respect between its each and every member. However, this does not mean that Buber is not open to the necessity of specific rules and regulations. Buber's position on authenticity appears to entail the idea that one must be willing to subscribe to specific rules as long as authenticity remains unachieved. Heidegger, however, does not appear to be so open to practical reality. His notion of authenticity is so exclusively a function of the human relation to Being that it becomes antithetical to authenticity to consider the practical necessity of specific rules and regulations. Thus Buber's notion of authenticity, and the paradox of freedom it entails is much more closely related to the reality as we know it of human being in a human world than is Heidegger's.

In conclusion, all of these problems in Heidegger seem to have one common origin. Heidegger's concept of freedom fails because it is founded on a notion of human authenticity which inappropriately prioritizes the individual self-being of Dasein over social being. Heidegger stubbornly maintains this assumption without solidly arguing for it. He can therefore be faulted for ignoring the possibility that human relations with others are more important than either individual self-being, or

the human relationship with Being. As a result of this fault there is a real tension between insights and oversights in his concept of freedom. Although Heidegger has managed to describe just how it is that freedom may be considered at once a condition of reality and yet something which applies uniquely to Dasein, he has also managed to remain so far removed from the realm of practical reality that his insights lie buried in the ethereal reaches of a rather meaningless understanding of Being. In order to deal with this tension I therefore push my criticisms of Heidegger to the point of suggesting how his thought can be modified with insights borrowed from Buber. As a result of this modification Heidegger's central existential phenomenon, care, can now be understood to be the locus of a paradoxical concept of freedom that does accurately reflect the practical reality of human being in a human world.

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