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THE CANADIAN PUBLIC SPHERE:
CRITICISM, CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE
CHARACTERISTICS OF PUBLIC EXPRESSION, 1920-1950

by

CAROL RISEBROUGH, B.A. Honours

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

School of Journalism and Communication

Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario
September 1, 1995

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and Research acceptance of the thesis

The Canadian Public Sphere:
Criticism, Cultural Development, and the Characteristics
of Public Expression, 1920-1950

submitted by Carol Risebrough, B.A.
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the degree of Master of Arts

Thesis Supervisor

Chair, School of Journalism and Communication

Carleton University

September, 1995
Abstract

This thesis investigates an important stage in the history of the Canadian public sphere. Using Jurgen Habermas' model (1962) of the bourgeois public sphere to suggest which cultural and political criteria are necessary for the emergence of a normative public sphere, the characteristics of the Canadian public sphere are evaluated. Specifically extrapolating from Habermas' finding that the political public sphere emerged from the literary public sphere, this thesis explores the relationship between the level of cultural development in Canada and the quality of its own public sphere. After studying some of the deficiencies in Canadian political and cultural life in 1920, and the call for improvements in both by literary and political critics, it is argued that a nationalist public sphere emerged after 1920 in which two general objectives were prominent: 1) to foster an informed 'national public opinion' by increasing interest in public affairs, and 2) to foster Canadian (high) culture by elevating the level of the public's taste.
Acknowledgements

Writing this thesis would have been an unbearable project were it not for the support and enthusiasm that Michael Dorland threw behind it. His guidance was invaluable, and when I lost sight of my objective, his assurance that a study could be accomplished in this area of research was deeply appreciated. I would also like to thank the second reader, Brian McKillop of the History Department, for his insights and encouragement, and Mary Vipond of Concordia University for agreeing to act as the external examiner. In addition, I want to express my gratitude to all the professors connected to the Communications program at Carleton University. Their interesting and diverse approaches to the field of Communications studies were inspiring, and the courses that they collectively offered to graduated students were stimulating. Finally, as I am sure she is often forgotten, I want to thank Carole Craswell in the Mass Communications office for getting me through the 'official business' and paperwork of depositing a thesis in her knowledgeable and precise manner. Thanks to all.
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Introduction

The Concept of the Public Sphere

One of the most interesting properties of the public sphere is its ability to capture the thematic statements of past and existing societies. It acts as an historical record, a reflection of the logics that govern how a society speaks, thinks, acts, and organizes itself. Consequently, the public sphere is not simply a political institution, although its involvement in politics is not trivial. More broadly, it is an integral part of the cultural fabric and a product of the social and human conditions of communities, nations and eras. The modern public sphere developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It is remarkable that societies traditionally accustomed to political domination and inequality grasped their power to transform government through the instrument of public opinion. Drawing from Jurgen Habermas’ bourgeois model, the public sphere is the space between the state authority and the private sphere of autonomy in which citizens critically debate issues of social or political relevance. He states that by “public sphere’ we mean first of all a realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed . . . A portion of the public sphere comes into being in every conversation in which private individuals assemble to form a public body.”1 Habermas insists that a division between the spheres of public and private activity must be maintained to ensure the survival of an arena of ‘free’ discourse. But the possession of political consciousness is equally important. In a negative political environment in which freedom of expression
and thought is a crime against the state, it is not difficult to perceive the transgression of human and democratic rights. However, in a democracy, in which people are granted rights but do not always have the power to use them, it is more difficult to develop the critical understanding that is necessary to assess encroachments on privacy, rights and individual autonomy.

Habermas' sociological study demonstrates that an attitude of public confidence in the face of all types of authority (institutional power) is essential to the strength of the public sphere. Habermas' liberal model identifies a number of significant preconditions that retain their relevance outside the historical context of the early to mid-modern period. But the most pervasive feature of the changes that Habermas describes is the introduction of reason to the lives of individuals which allowed them to perceive their social, political, economic, and cultural environments in a new way. The realization that authority could and should be questioned, and that each person was capable of ideas and opinions, liberated people to understand their capacity to achieve rational freedom. The account of private and social autonomy takes Habermas into diverse areas of law, liberal social philosophy, ideology, cultural forms and practices, trade and capitalist economy, the structure of modern government, and class formation and distinction. From his careful interpretation, it is impossible to mistake the extent to which the public sphere is a culmination of other social processes, thought, and practices which inspire political awareness, and it is for this reason that it is so difficult to define a public sphere in a way that resists indiscriminate inclusion of all social activity. There must be a distinctive logic and a purpose to public involvement and expression that makes it specifically 'public'.
Public expression should contribute to the process of public opinion formation and revision (not just about ‘politics’) which is able to influence institutions of power (not only state power). Perhaps it is not helpful to think of the public sphere in such grand dichotomies as public and private, state and society, since as a public of civil society develops, it also begins to address questions to itself as well as to the state. These questions normally materialize in the form of social movements. The notion of a unified public that opposes the state is suitable to the idea that the public sphere is the space of ‘political’ criticism (i.e. discussion of daily actions and decisions of the government). But this notion does not leave any space for criticism that is directed at the politics of various social institutions or hegemonic practices, and which rarely enjoys consensual support by the combined public whose specific interests infrequently coincide.

The inclusion of all people in one public, under the umbrella of the public authority, creates the assumption of a unitary public which may, in fact, be fragmented into portions that seldom communicate due to the diversity of their immediate themes. Habermas asserts the purpose of having a mediating field of discussion is to provide members of the public with a space in which to communicate, to use their collective powers of reason to rationalize public authority, and to create consensus. However, Hohendahl insinuates that consensus is not the product, but the basis for discussion. Referring to the German crisis of literary criticism in the 1960s, he states that "[p]ast and present literature . . . had seemingly lost its meaning . . . there was no consensus that could serve as a basis for the general discussion." Similarly, Habermas asserts that the public sphere is constituted ‘in language’ and it exists only as long as public discussion
occurs. More specifically, it is constituted in language that belongs to two classes: criticism and rhetoric. As part of the ongoing cycle of legitimation, social and political criticism throws institutions and hegemonic practices into question by asking why they should be so. Criticism is evaluation grounded in reasoned discourse, and in principle, it allows the public to maintain some control over the way in which their social environments change. It is useful to understand rhetoric in Kenneth Burke’s expression of ‘symbolic action,’ which begins with the premise that human beings are divided from one another except when rhetoric momentarily unifies them. In its classical sense, rhetoric is the attempt to bridge divisions between people through rational persuasion. But persuasion which achieves consensus rarely occurs unless opposing perspectives can, first, find a common ground of understanding. It makes sense, then, that both a consensual basis and a critical stance are necessary for the continuance of a balanced and constructive public sphere. Habermas insists that the bourgeois public sphere was a space of ‘free discourse’ requiring freedom of thought and expression to achieve its touchstone function of rational critical discourse. Specifically, he argues, it is discussion that is directed toward the achievement of consensus. However, it seems likely that freedom of thought and expression would be better ensured if the public sphere were thought of less as a space of consensus, and more of a space of articulation and mutual communication--perhaps as a place to begin building understanding. In order to accommodate a broader conception of activity in the public sphere, it is necessary to displace the notion of a single public, predominantly concerned with the rationalization of state power and actions, for it leaves no place in the definition of the public sphere for the debate over ‘non-
political' subjects. Subjects apart from the scrutiny of government may be political in the sense that they are critical of forms of social power and authority outside of the official sphere.

Although Habermas' definition of the public sphere will serve as the standard of judgement in this study, the idea of a public sphere of consolidated interests and discourse is inadequate to the concept of the public sphere itself, (i.e. as an inclusive space of self-definition and articulation), and to the subject at hand, the prospect of defining and understanding the dynamics of a Canadian public sphere, which exhibits quite distinct social divisions and tensions. The temptation to simplify the Canadian public sphere by dividing it into categories such as 'literary' and 'political' should be resisted, because (as I hope to show) these issues are not independent. They are so completely fused in Canadian public discourse that Vincent Massey could make this claim: "Our military defenses must be made secure; but our cultural defenses equally demand national attention; the two cannot be separated."6

The Role of Culture in the Public Sphere

Understanding the complex social processes involved in the constitution of publics, and the criteria which are necessary for the establishment of independent public spheres is a necessary starting point for an investigator interested in possible examples of the public sphere. In the theory which dominates the next chapter, Habermas identifies two types of public spheres--one literary and one political--which require, respectively, the
distinct sensibilities of subjectivity, involved in the formation of taste, and political consciousness which developed with the concept of public opinion. The relationship between the literary and political public spheres suggests, again, that political awareness tends not to develop independently of other social and cultural activities. Habermas devotes a significant section of his analysis to the rise of commercial culture around which a body of consumers formed which took advantage of the available avenues to enter into a public of culturally literate individuals. In "Critical Theory, Public Sphere and Culture: Habermas and His Critics," Hohendahl explains that Habermas' work in Structural Transformation is a continuation of the theory of the culture industry formulated by Theodore Adorno and Max Horkheimer. Habermas' conception of the bourgeois public sphere and its transformation is premised on the idea that "culture legitimates itself as a medium of self-understanding and self-liberation" and not as a medium of mass entertainment whose political function is to render the mass public 'apolitical'. Hohendahl interprets Habermas' work specifically through the concept and theory of mass culture, and he suggests that, "[t]he intensive and sometimes decidedly polemical argument about the history, present state, and future of the public sphere has always been at the same time a discussion about the conditions and possibilities of culture in an advanced capitalist society." Deterioration of the public sphere occurred in conjunction with "the transition from cultural discourse to cultural consumption" in which the former capacity for creating a consciousness of the possibilities of self-determination and political emancipation (critical subjectivity) is virtually lost. Concurring with Habermas, Hohendahl asserts that the transformation of the modes of cultural production
has had an effect on the public sphere that is at least as important as the other forces which caused the gradual erasure of distinction between state and society. The possibility that there is a symbiotic relationship between the nature of a community's 'culture' and of its public sphere provides an approach to studying the Canadian public sphere, and it will serve as a leitmotif of this study.

But, first, how do other theorists understand the link between cultural and political phenomena? Geoff Eley also considers the effect of culture on the public sphere. Through the lens of a number of analyses of British social history, he studies Habermas' assertion that the political public sphere evolved from a literary basis. In various works, Eley recognizes the "intimate knowledge of the structure of public discourse in the chosen period--not just the press but also the public spectacle of music and the stage, the associational milieu of 'taverns, coffee houses and clubs,' and the literary world of 'printing, publishing and popular instruction'--what [John] Money calls 'the means of communication and the creation of opinion.'" Eley concludes that "[i]t becomes clear from this kind of analysis that the origins of an independent political life, i.e., a public sphere in Habermas's sense, must be sought in this wider domain of cultural activity." In a slightly different vein, Philippe Aries describes the phenomenon of public discourse, but he and his colleagues consider it from the perspective of changes in private life and culture. In the introduction to this work, Aries writes that public institutions arose from the development of "a new culture . . . a social life that revolved around conversation, correspondence and reading aloud . . . [or] debate." Notably, Aries proceeds to link practices of sociability, which accompanied cultural discourse and literacy, to political
discourse. "This attitude toward public affairs and public service corresponds chronologically at any rate, but perhaps in deeper ways as well, to the different forms of sociability that I have distinguished."\(^{13}\) The work of not only Habermas, but many other scholars, points to the relationship between cultural development and political culture.

**In Search of the Canadian Public Sphere**

The gradual shifts in the balance of public and private power in Britain and Europe which created the eighteenth-century public sphere were quite extraordinary. However, the public sphere has undergone tremendous transformations since its modern induction,\(^{14}\) and it is imprudent to assume the existence of ‘authentic’ public spheres in modern democracies. A Citizen’s Forum, commissioned by the Mulroney government in 1990, found that the Canadian public is aware of and dissatisfied with the nominal role it plays in Canadian political action and decision-making. Participants expressed "a desire to take control of the national agenda and put it back into the hands of the citizens" because they had "lost faith in the political system and its leadership."\(^{15}\) It would be careless to assume that the public’s contempt in 1990 was the product of a few instances of federal audacity. In fact, it is not clear that the Canadian public has ever had significant power to block unpopular decisions, or to address unfair privileges. Either the federal government has not shown an interest in listening to the concerns of Canadians, or, perhaps, the Canadian public has not demonstrated, consistently and in general terms, a strong political awareness of its rights, freedoms and duties concerning public debate
and a sense of its responsibility to maintain democratic institutions.

The aim of this thesis is to suggest an analytical interpretation which can account for some of the historical circumstances and characteristics of public debate and expression in Canada. At some point, has there been a strong public sphere in Canada? If so, when, and what were its institutional and discursive qualities? Can an argument be made about the relation of political culture to the level of cultural development in Canada? Measured against Habermas’ model, how does the Canadian experience compare? This final question provides a structure around which the immense activity of the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s, the time span which will be investigated, can be organized. In Habermas’ model of the bourgeois public sphere, fully discussed in the next chapter, culture played a central role in the formation of self-understanding and self-liberation. As Hohendahl helps to explain, cultural discourse (before the rise of commercial culture) was simultaneously a form of education and a means to exploring one’s subjectivity. Although it occurred within a ‘public’ of culturally literate individuals, ‘cultivation’ of one’s subjectivity was an exercise in critical understanding through debate that was directed toward a life-long process of individual enlightenment.

To consider the relation of cultural development to political culture is especially interesting when the country being studied is Canada, a place where culture, itself, became a public question and finally, a federal responsibility. Without suggesting that the issue of culture had been completely ignored in Canada during the nineteenth century, culture--specifically national culture--was one topic among many issues related to the common national causes that began to receive a considerable amount of public attention during the
period of revived Canadian nationalism following the First World War. Between the 1920 and 1950, a continuing concern for the perceived absence of "culture" in Canada—which, in the early twentieth-century sense, meant a condition of civilized social and intellectual sensibility, in other words, Canadian arts and scholarship—intersected with the need to elevate the quality and measure of discussion in public affairs. That the cultivation of ‘Canadian culture’ became a topic of public discourse suggests that culture could not have served as a practical foundation for the Canadian public sphere, in the way same way that several theorists argue that cultural practices and discourse underpinned the formation of the eighteenth-century public sphere. If cultural discourse was a form of education linked to the possession of a critical political consciousness, then it is not surprising that Canadians with a mind for public affairs judged that Canadian society was 1) wanting in culture, 2) in need of improved Canadian scholarship and adult education, and 3) generally lacking in political vibrancy both within government itself, and within the largely complacent public.

A number of questions arise from these findings. First, if these assessments are true, then what were the motivations which caused many individuals in the public to become active in public affairs, and how did political/public consciousnesses develop at all? The question that is more central to this study, secondly, is this: why was there the simultaneous understanding among the intelligentsia that Canadian culture and Canadian public life were so unsatisfactory? As the Canadian nation entered a new phase of existence, some Canadians reacted to the persistent ‘colonial’ character of politics and culture in their country. When applied to politics, this meant that the Canadian political
thinking had not changed radically since Canada was a colony, and was, therefore, outmoded and unprogressive and lacked the ideas it needed to cope with its modern challenges. When applied to culture, however, colonialism referred to the perception that Canadians were not producing their own culture, but continued to import it from the centres of cultural life. Political and cultural topics entered public discourse as the Canadian intellectuals voiced the need to modernize and elevate political thinking, and to enhance the quality of Canadian culture. As they publicly voiced this need for reform and development, they also expressed and interpreted the features of contemporary Canadian thinking, expression, and ideology which they found intellectually offensive, culturally banal, and politically counter-productive.

The objective to investigate characteristics of public expression in Canada could proceed in any one of the many directions in which Habermas’ multi-faceted research moves. But, one cannot merely apply Habermas’ method to a different set of historical circumstances and expect to find a variation on the same theme. Culturally and politically, Canada’s eighteenth century had virtually nothing in common with Europe’s eighteenth century, so the quest for the Canadian public sphere will not begin during that period. This study will begin in the 1920s, reaching back to the late nineteenth century (1880-1913) to understand certain trends of Canadian thought that were predominant and to which the apparently nascent forms of public consciousness were, in part, a response. Habermas’ approach to the public sphere was largely structural, since his aim, restated by Hohendahl, was to show how economic commercialization transformed culture and changed the public sphere. Different from the structural approach used to locate and trace
the changes in the public sphere, is the idea the public sphere can be 'found' in the matrix of social, cultural and political ideas, in intellectual history (which Habermas also uses in conjunction with structural analysis). Since the primary objective of this study is to define the characteristics of public expression, and not the structure of the public sphere itself, (although the observation of differentiated groups and their alignments with social and political classes does indicate a kind of structure) it makes sense to study trends in Canadian thinking and speech. The rhetorics that developed after the First World War were captured in the journal publications that accompanied the appearance of many clubs, voluntary associations, and social movements in Canada between 1920 and 1950. Moreover, the study of ideas, and the groups which formed around them, is a more rewarding approach than structural analysis if one begins with the premise that the strict dichotomies Habermas constructed in his research of the normative public sphere do not adequately represent the diversity and contention within the sphere of public debate. Publics are multiple, not unified. Civil society addresses questions to itself that are not strictly 'political'. Society opposes the state, but society is in a constant struggle with itself.

The groups which made dominant contributions to the Canadian public sphere can be identified by understanding how their language and actions reflected specific responses to the social and political confusion that western societies found themselves in after the war. In part, the differing assumptions and values of these groups' commitments to Canadian public life were consequences of the realization that, sometime during the First World War, Canada had become a modern nation, and the familiar precepts of the
nineteenth century had lost their relevance. In an article which looked at the poetic legacy of one of Canada’s preeminent nineteenth-century poets, Leo Kennedy wrote, "[u]ncertain of ourselves, distressed by our inability to clarify our relationship to these and comparative issues, we do not feel superior to circumstances at all . . . we are irritated beyond good manners by their [Victorian poets] acceptance of too-glib philosophy." Canadians reacted publicly, and variously, in the face of these circumstances of uncertainty and social discontent. The Canadian public sphere of this period can be interpreted as a double entity with an inside and an outside that coincided with Canada’s ambitions during this period to establish itself as a nation both in the international sphere and in the domestic sphere. The effort at the international level to prove that Canada was an equal nation in terms of scholarship, learning, culture, political savvy and power, required that Canadians become industrious at home creating and establishing scholarship, learning, political integrity and culture for the benefit of its national unity and prestige, at home and abroad. It was a new stage in nation-building, one of organizing domestic practices and culture which would underpin the cultivation of Canada’s self-image as a modern civilized nation.

There are two general groups whose responses to the growing pains that Canada was experiencing in the domestic and international spheres will be explored: nationalist voluntary associations and the discourses of Canadian literary and political critics. There was a general feeling during this period that social improvement and political and cultural development were necessary and both organizations and individuals were influenced by these needs. Public enthusiasts realized that, to attain the goals they understood to be in
Canada's best interest, it was necessary to organize and communicate in order to direct public opinion. There were conservative and 'radical' (or critical) reformers who participated in the public sphere that developed with the inception of a number of organizations and critical media. Conservative reformers tended to gather in the nationalist associations which took the issues of nationhood, identity and culture very seriously and exerted a significant influence on public opinion and public policy. But the divisions between the groups are somewhat artificial since some people belonged to organizations on both sides. For instance, F.R. Scott, a prominent Montreal law professor, was involved in the Association of Canadian Clubs. As a critic, his social and political commentaries frequently appeared in *The Canadian Forum*, and he was known for his satirical poetry as well as his critical essays. Likewise, Graham Spry was one of the initiators of the Canadian Radio League, and he held the position of national secretary for the flourishing Canadian Clubs. But he also ran as a candidate for the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation and was active with Frank Underhill and F.R. Scott in the League for Social Reconstruction. The contribution of literary and political criticism to the investigation into cultural development political culture will be discussed further, but this criticism should be distinguished from the 'criticism' that was expressed in the nationalist associations. To different extents, both categories of public action and discourse were nationalist. But while the traditional voluntary associations tended to reserve their criticism for things outside of Canadian borders (i.e. American popular culture, and British imperial policy), literary and political scholars took a more self-critical position on Canadian development and toward the nationalist solutions to the abstruse
questions that remained at the centre of Canadian nationhood.

There is a quite different third set of activists who were involved in social movements which resulted in the formation of a number of new political parties at both the provincial and federal levels (i.e. United Farmers of Alberta, United Farmers of Ontario, the National Progressive Party, League for Social Reconstruction, the Commonwealth Cooperative Federation) as well as movements for adult education and cooperative economic ventures (i.e. Canadian Association for Adult Education and the Antigonish Movement). These social movements had political implications because they aimed to restructure the social relationships that detained Canadians of lower classes in conditions of social inequality that they found unacceptable. This portion of the public interest drew its leaders from the small, but exceptional, group of politicians and academics who emphasized the need for new leadership with new ideas, concrete policies and relevant information. Despite their inability to capsize the two national parties, these organizations were prominent. Many of the key individuals in these organizations (i.e., J.S. Woodsworth, C.B. Sissons and Frank Underhill) frequently wrote for the *Canadian Forum*, and their perspectives, ideas and criticisms helped to create a more diversified and less typically conservative understanding of Canadian public discourse and action. As such, they deserve recognition in this study. It is notable that Mary Vipond makes a distinction between the members of traditional voluntary associations who were "middle-aged, well respected, and well established"\(^{17}\) who were "not so much social critics as aspiring social leaders and moulders of public opinion"\(^{18}\) and the "caustic criticism of the young ‘moderns’ such as F.R. Scott, A.J.M. Smith, Morley Callaghan, and Douglas
Bush’s who endeavoured to expose the superficiality of Canadian cultural nationalism. The ideas and protests of these progressive young moderns are indispensable to the study of Canadian public expression because, in their attempt to improve many aspects of Canadian cultural and political life, they naturally emphasized the deficiencies of public discourse and thinking. Their criticisms provide an important record and analysis of the established political and artistic culture they were trying to change.

The point of focusing on the nationalist elite public which congregated in traditional voluntary associations, as an object of study to understand the structure and culture of the Canadian public sphere, has three parts: 1) it illustrates the post-war rise in public spirit and politically oriented public action; 2) it demonstrates extensive use of voluntary associations which are characteristic of public action; and 3) it achieved a high level of dominance, affecting government policy and stirring awareness of the state of Canadian cultural life. The seemingly sudden interest of Canadians in public affairs, especially visible in the journals, is well expressed in the inaugural edition of the Canadian Forum: "The Canadian Forum had its origins in a desire to secure a freer and more informed discussion of public questions and, behind the strife of parties, to trace and value those developments of arts and letters which are distinctly Canadian." This passage is loaded with clues about the type of discourse that the leaders of the movement were trying to leave behind (i.e. misleading public discourse dominated by public figures and supported by a partisan press). As well, a moderate tone of national pride is evident, as is a somewhat elite concern for cultural development and appreciation. Similarly, the Dalhousie Review’s ‘Salutation’ in 1921 stated: "What we have in mind is the need of that
public, concerned about the things of the intellect and spirit, which desires to be addressed on problems of general import and in a style that can be generally understood.\textsuperscript{21} The stiff and somewhat abstract language suggests an academic institution willing, but uncomfortable with the task of addressing a general population which could not be trusted to understand or sympathize with the concerns of the academic community. It is intriguing that the universities demonstrated a marked appreciation for the Canadian public's desire to be addressed and involved in matters of public opinion, for, unfortunately, the university community often stands at the margins of public debate. How did this interest in creating informed discussion in the public develop? Who was asking for it? Had a new political consciousness developed in Canada during the First World War? Was a broad attention to informed public discussion unprecedented, or was it merely entering formats of mass media to a greater extent than it had previously in Canadian history? What kind of a public sphere did this seemingly ideal attitude toward public communication produce? Some Canadian universities (including Dalhousie, University of Alberta, etc.,) became active in the adult education movement by establishing extension departments. The creation of the \textit{Dalhousie Review} was connected to the idea that education was becoming increasingly important in the twentieth century, and that the university had a responsibility (as a public institution) to address some of the practical, as well as intellectual, needs of the citizenry. Notably, the \textit{Dalhousie Review} felt the need to distance itself from a style of discourse that would only impede the possibility of open discussion. The 'Salutation' continues, "we avow a nationalism that is not prejudice and a provincialism that is not narrowness."\textsuperscript{22} The excerpt suggests that
perhaps nationalism and provincialism had been the culprits that had depressed public
discussion in the past. This may be true, but they were certainly not the only
impediments which hindered full and open discussion.

The second point has more to do with deciding if the developments in 1920
represent a ‘public sphere’, or whether they represent structures of civil society that
should not be directly equated with the existence of a public sphere. To repeat a
distinction made earlier, the public sphere is connected to public opinion, whereas
organizations that are a part of civil society might create awareness about certain issues,
but are not directly involved with opinion formation about politics. Alexis de Tocqueville
claimed that there was a need in democratized publics for associational forms which
provided training grounds for the general improvement of political competence and
prudence. Looking at their purpose from another angle, Eley asserts that "voluntary
association was in principle the logical form of bourgeois emancipation and bourgeois
self-affirmation . . . [and was] the primary context of expression for bourgeois aspirations
to the general leadership of nineteenth-century society." Eley’s perspective suggests
that the structures were oriented more toward ‘civil society’ than the ‘public sphere’.

But, Brooke Claxton, one of the foremost leaders of the national organizations,
recognized that “there were four organizations which especially had a considerable
influence on the development of Canadian thinking and policy. These were the
Association of Canadian Clubs, the Canadian League, the Canadian Institute of
International Affairs, and the League of Nations Society in Canada.” The reference
to public policy alerts one to the connection between these organizations and the
emergence of organized public opinion which influenced policy-makers and legislators. However, the apparent influence of consolidated and autonomous public opinion on federal policy may be misleading because the ‘interlocking directorates’ of the nationalist voluntary organizations bricked a path all the way to Ottawa. Many of the leaders of this group either held government positions, or had close connections to influential people in the government, and the opinions of this group eventually became the ‘official’ position because of its connections to, and not its separation from, the public authority.

Mary Vipond "examined as structure a group of nationalist voluntary and cultural organizations which were formed or revitalized in the 1920s and which were led by or substantially composed of members of English-Canadian artistic and intellectual elite."27 While Vipond focused on the formalization of communication patterns between colleagues, professionals and academics through the establishment of a ‘nationalist network’, the principal organizations of this structure will be analyzed in this thesis from the perspective of their place in and influence on a Canadian public sphere. The existence of a distinct public of educated and artistic individuals in public affairs provides an entry point into an inquiry of what a public sphere in Canada might look like in terms of its institutional organization, and what type of discourse would emanate from it. What are the implications of elite dominance within the public sphere, and does its ability to influence government policy and thinking suggest that the Canadian public sphere was strong or weak?28

This brings us to the final reason why it is important to look at this group to understand the dynamics of Canadian public expression. The dominance of this public
is evident in their influence on public policy (i.e. they successfully lobbied for public broadcasting), but Faris asserts that "[o]ne of the basic weaknesses of the associations was the apparent lack of rapport with, or support from, rural Canada." Did elite organizations monopolize public opinion? Or, were their connections to the educational, corporate and political institutions responsible for their real success, in terms of public influence, at the expense of full public dialogue? To put the question slightly differently, how concerned were they with communicating with middle and lower class Canadians to understand their perspectives and viewpoints and to generate consensual public opinion? How did they view their position vis-a-vis the general electorate, and how was this expressed in their words? What type of public sphere was created by the ideologies which were endorsed by the conservative nationalist public? Most importantly, when cultural development became one of the topics of public debate instead of acting as a foundational understanding of self, community and practice (as it seemed to function in the bourgeois model), how did it affect the kind of public sphere that resulted? The whole movement toward the establishment Canadian culture, and the inclusion of the matter of cultural development in the public sphere, is, if not problematic, at least unexplained by Habermas’ model.

The establishment of Canadian culture as a civil matter had a reductive effect on the critical objective of public scrutiny which Habermas holds sacred to the public sphere. Criticism of the form of Canadian cultural development envisioned by elites was made difficult by the decidedly nationalistic and political tones which characterized the debate. Was it due to cultural under-development--cultural development, as discussed, is necessary
as an antecedent to dynamic cultural discourse—that the range of subjects, ideas, and criticism in Canadian public life was cramped? Did cultural underdevelopment contribute to the restrictive patterns in thought and speech which had resulted in a strangled public sphere and a largely inarticulate society?

Perhaps it was not the absence of an intelligent cultural discourse that was detrimental to the Canadian public sphere, but simply a result of the set of ideologies and values which were dominant; as Eley observes, "[t]he virtue of publicness could materialize other than by the intellectual transactions of a polite and literate bourgeois milieu."30 Certainly, the western farm movements, whose main plank was the need for reform of rail transport costs and grain tariffs, demonstrated that political and civil action did not require any specific cultural or social background. But the farmers and the labourers were not the leaders of these movements, and for many of the leaders, it was not a battle over material wealth that was being fought. Frank Underhill was "in search of Canadian liberalism" (to repeat the title of one of his more famous works) for most of his career. J.S. Woodsworth, one of the leaders of the CCF, urged progressive individuals in the universities and the general public to study "with an open mind the pressing social problems", to focus their energies on "matters of public policy", and to avoid assessments, philosophies, and knowledge that were "often of a rather imported character."31 The leaders of politically-oriented social movements understood the need for new social and political theories and cultural values which would guide and invigorate Canadian political culture and cultural development.
Canadian Literary Criticism and the Public Sphere

Since one of the forms of culture that Canadian nationalists were eager to establish was a 'Canadian literature', the assessments provided by literary critics of the dysfunctions in literary taste and cultural expression that were evident in Canadian writing, and of the difficulties of criticism in the Canadian context, are invaluable to understanding the problems of cultural development and criticism in Canada. The nationalistic talk about a 'Canadian culture' was countered in the literary sphere where scholars of literature worked to come to critical understandings of Canadian literary consciousness. The extent to which these scholars and writers were able to forge a 'public' literary discourse is difficult to measure. However, the Canadian literary discourse is important to this study because it was also involved in the process of defining the 'Canadian' mentalities, habits, and cultural norms that were articulated through Canadian literature. Literary critics could not escape the nationalist thinking that intellectual attention should be focused on Canadian matters, and therefore, Canadian literature became one of many a prominent subjects. But, Canadian literary critics were less enthused about creating a bulky 'Canadian literature' that other Canadians should read, than they were in searching for the nation that had remained largely unexamined by Canadian scholars in many disciplines.

Literary criticism provides a textual body in which the idea that there was a correlation between literary and political language can be explored. It seems that a perceptible stagnation in political rhetoric and action was matched by an ossification of poetic language in Canada which suggests that Northrop Frye was quite correct when he
once wrote of the "frostbite at the roots of the Canadian imagination." Did the language used by Canadian leaders exhibit an imaginative poverty that translated into political, and cultural deficiencies? Did Canadian public discourse in the period under investigation perpetuate or alleviate the symptoms of cultural and political stasis? Literary critics, while railing against the poor quality of Canadian literature and poetry, moved in and out of social and political criticism as well. For example, take Douglas Bush's observation that "[o]ur statesmen commonly assume that a reference to the vast physical resources of our fair dominion is a satisfactory substitute for an idea" while our poets think "it is enough to drop into the slot-machine a sunset or a heart-throb and the poem" is complete. The critical commentary on the condition of Canadian literature emphasizes some of the characteristics of Canadian thought and language which may assist me in drawing conclusions about the rhetorics of the more publicly and civicly active groups. Literary criticism should be included in a study of public expression because it was constantly transgressing the more narrow precepts of literary criticism and reaching into the broader field of social and cultural criticism. These seem more open subjects for general public discussion and they are vitally important to the ability of individuals to develop critical understandings of their social and political cultures.

Chapter Organization

The purpose of this chapter has been to raise and contextualize the questions that will be discussed throughout the thesis. First, a broad definition of the public sphere as part of the cultural fabric was introduced, one that presents a less rigid discussion of the
public sphere than the more structural argument permits. The theory chapter (Chapter One) focuses on Habermas' model of the bourgeois public sphere, and is contrasted with the classical model discussed in Hannah Arendt's work. The purpose of this chapter is to assess which of the conditions and requirements of the bourgeois public sphere are 'normative' and which were only historical. The objective of the second chapter is to elaborate on the connection that was observed, and publicly expressed, between the twin problems of cultural and political development and its consequences for public life. It explores the responses by Canadian intellectuals to the problematic characteristics of political and cultural life (pre-1920s) and their detrimental implications for the formation of a public sphere up to 1920. Many intellectuals, assessing Canadian public life around 1920, found that criticism was necessary to renew some of the cultural and political values that had become outdated and irrelevant. Given these assessments, the third chapter will proceed to focus on the reaction and activity of the nationalist elite public to the problems that had been acknowledged. This chapter investigates the components of nationalism as the public ideology of the intellectual elite, and looks at the construction of a public persona whose superior cultivation authorized members of the elite to address the broad Canadian public on matters of public opinion and cultural taste. There is also an attempt to assess the impact of the elite's conception of political and cultural development on the range, style and perception of acceptable Canadian public discourse and 'criticism'. Based on the conclusions drawn about the Canadian public sphere in the third chapter, the concluding chapter will assess these modifications in the light of Habermas' theory of the 'normative' public sphere, and in the light of criticisms of a number of scholars on the
public sphere who found that the element of nationalism was strangely absent from Habermas' investigation.

**Putting the Public Sphere in Perspective**

After so much talk about the content and characteristics of public expression, a word deserves to be said about the form of the Canadian public sphere. As Habermas' study demonstrates, the public sphere appears when a specific set of circumstances converged and when an oppositional relationship between the state and the public of an autonomous civil society existed. Although it is clear that the first is underpinned by the constitution of the national state, it is not clear how the lines between civil society and the state are drawn and redrawn. Habermas claims that a clear separation between public and private spheres was a catalyst for both civil society and the public sphere. To the contrary, from the task assigned to the political public sphere (to acquire control over the regulation of the private sphere and of civil society), Eley infers that "to deregulate society and confirm a protected space for the public, an entire regulative program was [formerly] required." This suggestion that civil society is not accurately described as part of an isolated 'private sphere' is reinforced by Habermas himself when he states that civil society was characterized by "a peculiar ambivalence of public regulation and private initiative."

It is beyond doubt that for civil society to exist, a certain amount of practical autonomy from state control is necessary. Autonomy is defined within the constitution of political communities. However, the amount of freedom granted in the constitution,
the extent to which public and private spheres are separated, and the degree of
deference or confidence can exist within a repressive state, just as the right to public
expression is not equivalent to the achievement of a sphere of democratic and informed
discussion. The national histories in which Habermas deciphers the formation of the
public sphere proceed from public defiance to revolutions and to the creation of new
constitutions which altered the relationship of state to society and to individuals, and
which attempted to permanently institutionalize the concept of the public sphere as a
feature of the political process. Canada is a country without a revolutionary tradition.
This fact does not simply mean that we declined the option to go to war for our
independence in favour of constitutional amendments. It means that there was never a
point in Canada's history when a new—-a revolutionary—language was created in which
to imagine an independent Canadian nation. The creation and re-creation of 'the'
Canadian myth, 'the' Canadian way, and 'the' Canadian identity, has been piecemeal and
sporadic in its continual and often contradictory quest for the principles that inform the
development of the Canadian nation. The basis of who we are remains uncertain and
shifts elusively before the minds that try to define it, and we seem to be too many things
at once, and finally, nothing very specific. That impression of Canadian society deserves
qualification, for we have, in this country, complex intellectual and social histories which
can be studied through the window of the public sphere.
Chapter One

Foundations of the Public Sphere:
The Value of Jurgen Habermas' Bourgeois Model

Public sphere models fall into a category of social theory in which theories of democracy and civil society intersect with theories of communication and social organization. Theories of the public sphere are part of a critique of the dominant modes of social and political communication, and of the bureaucratic organization of public authorities which minister to the civil body. Although theorists differ on the normative standards that should determine the public sphere, they agree that the twentieth-century public sphere exists in name, but not in function, because it now operates in such a way that severely limits autonomous private participation in public questions and redefines the function of the public sphere as a political space in which divisive groups negotiate and bargain with public authorities. If it ever was an arena of free communication which permitted a genuine plurality of opinions, or a space in which rational-criticism undermined arbitrary power, it is questionable now whether either is accomplished. Major critics of the public sphere, such as Jurgen Habermas and Hannah Arendt, assert that the legitimate public sphere is now an historical event, since what now passes for a public sphere is devoid of a proper publicity and public spirit. The theories to be outlined and discussed in this chapter share a number of common aspects: they are critical of the tendencies toward political scientization, bureaucratization, and centralization, and they accentuate the disappearance of the more clearly defined limits between the spheres of the public and the private that characterized epochs in which the public sphere is argued to
have existed.

The public sphere, and the complex social and political structures into which it is incorporated, came to the fore after a long period of dormancy, in the mid-seventeenth century. Although Arendt describes a public sphere which existed long before modernity, Habermas’ subject is the bourgeois public sphere which emerged in the pattern of transformations that redefined private and public life in Britain and Western Europe throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The theoretical centre of this thesis is Habermas’ exploration of the bourgeois public sphere in *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* ([1962] 1989). The aim of this chapter is to present a theoretical outline of the requisites for and structures of public spheres against which the characteristics of the Canadian public sphere will be assessed in following chapters. To that end, this chapter will study combinations of cultural and social conditions which underpin one type of a modern public sphere. I have chosen to juxta(pose Habermas’ theory with Arendt’s model of the Greek and Roman republican public sphere because they are, in such fundamental ways, antithetical, although they diagnosed similar problems in modern society and political discourse. In the light of an existing theory which opposes Habermas’, the normativity of Habermas’ model cannot be assumed but must be justified if it is to act as an appropriate model of comparison to the Canadian experience. Although Arendt’s theory will play a secondary role in this thesis, her focus accentuates a perspective which is a more critical approach to the contradictions and flaws of modernity than is Habermas’ model because she completely rejects the validity of modern liberalism. George Kateb comments that "[Arendt] gives life to the ancient world so that
our new life--life in the modern world--is seen for the immense anomaly that it is.\textsuperscript{1} Her critique of the assimilation of all spheres including the public sphere into the realm of 'the social' makes clear how essential is the true separation (in fact, the absolute isolation) of public and private spheres to the political freedom of individuals and to the protection and continuation of the public sphere as a human community. Having said that, the reason that Arendt's theory will act only as a counter-model is that her critics charge her ideal public sphere with modern incompatibility because it rejects the possibility of locating the public sphere alongside civil society in the social realm which acts as a mediator between the powers of the state and the rights of private individuals.\textsuperscript{2} Antithetically, Habermas conceives of 'the social' as a modern attitude in which people understood their private and political autonomy, an autonomy that was reflected, notably, in the organizations of civil society and the public sphere. For this reason, Cohen and Arato assert that Habermas' 'socially based' theory is compatible with modernity while Arendt's theory of the 'polis' is not. Her critics insist that Arendt fails to find a way to secure democratic freedom in the absence of civil society which has become a prominent projection of the private sphere into the social realm. Democratic protection from the arbitrary powers of the state is achieved through civil rights and the situating of the public sphere within the private realm--a protection that cannot be imagined if the public sphere is located within the state itself. An interpretation of Habermas' thought on the public sphere would be that it properly exists as an institution dedicated to consensual self-organization of a community of people who communicate together to decide what their relation to the public authority should be. However, it is not clear that Habermas is completely successful in his
arguments against the Hegelian and Marxist critiques of the bourgeois public sphere which led both modern thinkers to repudiate its ability to end social domination. Furthermore, Cohen and Arato point out that Habermas does not establish a place for the public sphere to exist, except in language. Because there are weaknesses in both Habermas’ and Arendt’s theorizations as models for the reconstitution of independent public spheres, in tandem they present a broader illustration of the difficulties inherent in the establishment and continuation of an effective and democratic public sphere than either can produce individually.

**Habermas’ Theory of the Public Sphere**

**Theoretical Context**

At the heart of democratic theory is the activity of "rationalizing public authority under the institutionalized influence of informed discussion and reasoned agreement"¹³ which came to be known as ‘public opinion’.⁴ The examination of the public sphere is another way of thinking through the modern dilemma pertaining to the proper (i.e. just, legitimate and non-coercive) way to organize the state and to manage social peace. The permanent achievement of a proper public sphere is the primary public interest, for it is the space in which the equitable balance of private freedom and a democratic social order is safeguarded. Linking his investigation into the public sphere with Habermas’ larger theoretical project, Calhoun asserts that the "importance of the public sphere lies in its potential as a mode of societal integration" since "[p]ublic discourse (and what Habermas later and more generally calls communicative action) is a possible mode of coordination
of human life, as are state power and market economics."\textsuperscript{5}

Habermas does not only trace the formation of the bourgeois public sphere, but also its degeneration. The public sphere degenerated, Habermas argues, when it expanded beyond the capacities for unmediated communication between private individuals who engaged socially in critical discourse pertaining to a myriad of cultural and political interests. Calhoun condenses the fundamental changes which Habermas traces in the degeneration: "the depoliticization of the public sphere and its impoverishment by removal of public discourse."\textsuperscript{6} One might add to these, as Nancy Fraser does\textsuperscript{7}, the fragmentation of the unitary public sphere into a more plausible, and, as Geoff Eley asserts\textsuperscript{8}, an historically more accurate conception of multiple publics representing various classes and social groups. Habermas addresses the disappointing results of the public sphere in democratic polities through the observations of Mill and de Tocqueville\textsuperscript{9} who noted with dismay the lack of a general interest in public affairs and the inability of rational-critical debate to resolve public disputes within democratized publics. The realization that the bourgeois ideal of a democratic public sphere exceeded its practical possibilities caused critics of public opinion to reorganize their practical thinking about the public sphere around the principle of compromisory political negotiation among competing interests. In the twentieth century, the democratized public sphere is occupied by the struggle between organized interest groups and a representative system of government, under the consumerized gaze of mass media corporations. The result is "a substitution of a more instrumental use of language and images for a genuine rational-critical discourse."\textsuperscript{10} Habermas states:
the public was largely relieved of this task [rational-critical discourse] by other institutions: on the one hand by associations in which collectively organized private interests directly attempted to take on the form of political agency; on the other hand by parties which, fused with the organs of public authority, established themselves, as it were, above the public whose instruments they once were.\textsuperscript{11}

However, those who contribute to Calhoun’s collection of critiques and discussions are less pessimistic about the current state of the public sphere for the simple reason that they value universal participation over the preservation of unified public opinion spawned of an ideal rationality. Universal participation, as distinct from an elitist and hegemonic conception that only some people participate while others are merely represented, changes the conception of the public sphere from consensual to conflictual space. In his introduction, Calhoun specifically attacks Habermas’ account of the degeneration of the public sphere. He charges that when Habermas assesses the twentieth-century public sphere he “does not include the sort of intellectual history, the attempt to take leading thinkers seriously and recover the truth from their ideologically distorted writings, that is characteristic of his approach to [previous centuries].”\textsuperscript{12} Despite the problems arising from an expanding institutionalized public sphere in liberal democratic polities, Habermas’ confidence in the normative power of the bourgeois model of the public sphere is clear:

In the first modern constitutions the catalogues of fundamental rights were a perfect image of the liberal model of the public sphere: they guaranteed the society as a sphere of private autonomy and the restriction of public authority to a few functions. Between these two spheres, the constitutions further insured the existence of a realm of private individuals assembled into a public body who as citizens transmit the needs of bourgeois society to the state, in order, ideally, to transform political into ‘rational’ authority within the medium of this public sphere.\textsuperscript{13}

This passage emphasizes the extent to which the possibility of a private sphere, necessary
for a public sphere in Habermas' view, depends "primarily on the way public authority is constituted both in doctrine and in fact, and in the first place on the authority claimed and exercised by the state." Over the course of its history, the modern social-welfare state has continually changed its relation to the electorate by constantly transgressing its "few functions" to gather an expanding number of 'public interests' under its control, to the extent that private autonomy is limited to a narrow band of fundamental rights which do not guarantee the ability to affect one's social condition. Habermas concludes that the political function of the public sphere was lost when the separation of the spheres of public and private was "dissolved" and, without clear distinctions between spheres, the public sphere expanded into realms from which it had been, earlier, excluded. When the purpose of the public sphere is no longer self-regulation of private life and of civil society, but becomes an arena in which groups vie for public assistance, change is more likely to be achieved by massive opinion blocs than through the unorganized process of public opinion formation on an individual basis. The reversal in the function of the public sphere from (individual) private criticism to (group) public relations occurs at the expense of the public discussion necessary to rationalize political action. Opinions now appear in the public sphere as faits accomplis, and the process of opinion formation is pushed out of the realm of full public discussion into the small group parameters in which they can be decided amongst members of an approximately consensual group. When the activity of opinion formation goes on prior to entering the public sphere of political negotiation, the public sphere can only contain the partial opinions of interested groups that have not engaged in a rational-critical dialogue. The recovery of critical reason in the age of
bureaucratic organizations and political interest groups, Calhoun suggests, means that we must "make 'publicity' a source of reasoned, progressive consensus formation rather than an occasion for the manipulation of public opinion."  

Habermas' theory of the degenerated public sphere cannot be well understood apart from his more general critique of instrumental rationality and technocratic models of decision-making and social organization that threaten to invade increasing dimensions of private, public and civil life. There is a complementary relationship between the two divisions of his theory: Habermas' project to construct a theory of communicative action and discourse ethics based on rationality is directed toward answering the question of how the public sphere might realize normative standards in the age of the social-welfare state. Habermas takes from the Classical doctrine of politics the distinction between theory and practice which serves as the basis for his critique of the reduction of practical questions to technical strategies of consideration. In the age of supposedly democratic polities, this reduction is fundamentally problematic because it relocates the discussion of publicly relevant questions outside of the public sphere.

This turn of events requires some explanation. In its classical connotation, 'practice' denotes virtuous political action which is cultivated through each citizen's understanding of his (as it were) public duty to secure an ethical social order. Practical questions are ones which concern how people want to live in their social environments, and in Habermas' view, which is premised on the idea that there cannot be a rational justification for oppression, practical questions involve forming rational social theories which have emancipatory aims. Thus, Habermas defends the use of reason during the
enlightenment to expose the oppressive social doctrine since it was an instance in which reason was used for the practical purpose of humane emancipatory action. However, since the beginning of the modern age, the formulation of rational practice directed toward diminishing domination has been steadily overridden by the use of reason to theorize the instrumental action best suited to the control of human and social realities. Classical 'theory' referred to the contemplation of things eternal, while modern theory deduces the predictive rules of social control and technical production. When it is applied to social and human phenomena in the social sciences, theory understands its objects as systems with discoverable laws of self-regulation which can be enacted through the establishment of proper conditions. Under the rubric of social science, politics loses its classical orientation toward moral and civil prudence and becomes political science involving "the technical problem of regulating social intercourse so as to ensure the order and well-being of the citizens of the state". Habermas asserts that

\[\text{emancipation by means of enlightenment is replaced by instruction in control over objective and objectified processes. Socially effective theory is no longer directed to the consciousness of human beings who live together and discuss matters with each other, but to the behaviour of human beings who manipulate.}\]

The surrender of traditional society organized through communicative action--an alternative to functionalism in which intersubjective understanding occurs through communication which is, itself, understood as a symbolic gesture based on consensual norms and mutual expectations for social behaviour--the surrender of this principle to technocratic rationality occurs as instrumental reason achieves ascendency over all other types of (delegitimized) reason.
The outstanding political repercussion of the renunciation of a society in which human beings decide and understand how to act together through communication, in favour of a society regulated through the application of objective systems theories, is that it becomes unnecessary for the public to discuss what has been technically decided without their input. Technocratic rationality makes the public sphere extraneous. In McCarthy's words, the application of technocratic rationality in the political sphere occasions the reduction of political power to rational administration--that is administration guided by theoretical insight into what is objectively necessary (for stability, adaptability, growth, and so forth)--deprives the public sphere of any function save that of legitimating the administrative personnel.¹⁹

But the public sphere is all the more crucial under these conditions because Habermas assigns to it "a critical and controlling function in relation to the transposition of technology into practice."²⁰ However, until a political self-consciousness is cultivated which can determine between practical and technical questions--cultivated in citizens who understand their position as political agents within an ideological structure of technical rationality--public opinion, which reflects the interests of a public of private individuals, will not resurface as the practical guide to social organization. It is against this theoretical understanding of the contemporary distortion of communication that Habermas submits the theory of the liberal public sphere and the possibilities for practical political action through consensual and rational communication.
The Arendtian Critique of the Modern Public Sphere

Different from Habermas' intention to build a theory of democracy based on rational discourse, Arendt is concerned to frame a new political philosophy for the modern world derived from the values of ancient political life (political equality, public discourse, and honour). By measuring contemporary political conditions against the model of the ancient republic, Arendt endeavours to defend the strict separation of public and private realms which she argues have been besieged by the social realm. She criticizes the ascendancy of social concerns (especially the collective interest in social reproduction through a national economy) to a position of priority in the public realm.\(^{21}\) Her theory is a critique of the two tendencies that she observed by looking at modern society from opposing perspectives--the intrusion of the public world into private life, and the expansion of private needs in the public realm--which destroyed the basis of the classical public sphere, and it is notable that Habermas attributes the loss of the public sphere to these same changes.

Arendt evaluates the loss of the idea of political action as communicative interaction among equal individuals in the common world of the polis--in short, the loss of the human community bound by language. Arendt claims that society has "changed almost beyond recognition the meaning of ['private' and 'political'] and their significance for the life of the individual and the citizen."\(^{22}\) The impetus for Arendt's philosophical project is to reconstruct the conception of politics as an end in itself, and not as an avenue for improving the material conditions of social life.\(^{23}\) Contrary to the contemporary conception of appropriate political action, ancient citizens assembled in the polis to
participate in "genuine republican constitution making [that] ought to have no other purpose than to institutionalize the public sphere itself" which secured the continuation of public discourse. The public sphere was set apart from all other aspects of human affairs and strictly reserved for two activities: action (praxis) and speech (lexis). Rhetoric, *the practice of persuasive argument, was* the appropriate activity of the public sphere, and it is important that within this term, the two activities of speech and action are inseparable precisely because action in the polis occurred in speech.

The characteristic of Greek political life that appealed to Arendt was its ability to sustain plurality of opinion by creating an ideal environment of powerless equality due to the exclusion of the realm of necessity from politics. Arendt insists that when the sphere of the social is allowed to consume the energy of the political sphere, "our capacity for action and speech [loses] much of its former quality since the rise of the social realm banish[es] these into the sphere of the intimate and the private." But one could argue that modern politics has only reacted to the modern society that arose between the public and private spheres and demanded political equality which only the state had the power to guarantee. Since Hobbes proposed the organization of modern government dedicated to social order, politics have become increasingly "socialized" as a growing number of formerly private matters enter the social question (first, in terms of commonwealth, and later, of social welfare) and become part of the public sphere. But what is the reason that the inclusion of economic and social interests degrades political action? Kateb asserts that "the effort of economic interests to promot[e] themselves by means of an electoral system falsifies the nature of politics by forcing on it essentially private or social concerns"
in lieu of genuine public interests which Arendt claims were upheld by the Greek attitude of public spirit. Arendt blames the limitation of freedom in the public sphere on the inclusion of "the life process" which debases political thought and action from that which is humanly excellent to that which is dictated by necessity, or to the achievement of private benefits at the expense of public interest and equality. Although Habermas also attributes the degenerated public sphere to the tendency of private interests to infiltrate it, it is important to note that Arendt does not recognize that there was a valid public sphere which emerged in the eighteenth century. She argues that because the bourgeois public sphere was not isolated from the social bases of reproduction, political opinion could not develop independently of private concerns.

So far, we have focused on the impact of one aspect of the social sphere—the collective interest in social reproduction through a private economy—on the public sphere. But there is an equally important consequence of the encapsulation of the public sphere within 'the social'; Arendt maintains that the existence of social hierarchies and power contaminates everything that goes on within the social sphere, including public opinion and political action, by imposing conformity which negates freedom of opinion. She argues that Greek public spirit—the desire to engage in a political life of judgement and rhetorical disclosure—degenerates into unified ‘public opinion’ in the eighteenth-century European salons.28 Interestingly, this is the historical period which, for Habermas, signified the full development of rational-critical public opinion formation as the normative condition of public discourse. Arendt’s perspective that public opinion was socially corrupted, and not rationally ethical, challenges Habermas’ attempt to deflect the
Marxist criticism of bourgeois ideology. Because he recognizes the value of the principle of publicity, he argues that the bourgeois public sphere employed an attitude which liberated it from social hierarchies and provided an open space of discussion through the mutual and conventional acceptance that participation must be on the basis of reason alone. However, in Arendt’s view, the consensual nature of enlightened public opinion was not afforded by the compulsion of rationality, but simply by the uncritical obedience to individual impulses for social acceptability. The centrepiece of Arendt’s reconstructive thesis is to separate the private sphere of necessity from the public realm of political discourse, and therefore, she cannot accept the privately-based bourgeois public sphere as a normative alternative. Although Arendt and Habermas have similar perspectives on the distortion of the modern public sphere, they have entirely different views of the normative standards for its reconstitution.

Criteria of the Bourgeois Public Sphere

One of the most roundly criticized features of Habermas’ study is the Kantian suggestion of the existence of objective general interests in society. McCarthy’s criticism of the bourgeois model of the public sphere stems from his disagreement that hegemonic standards of value exist which permit a common set of public interests. Hohendahl recapitulates McCarthy’s conclusion that "there is no single model of the public sphere, rather different societies have developed a variety of models with specific institutional and formal (procedural) features." Hohendahl observes that McCarthy reinforces, albeit inadvertently, the need for historical and particular accounts, such as Habermas’, of
practical public discourse and institutions which "have to be negotiated in accordance with the needs and values of the community." Likewise, Calhoun asserts "the historical specificity and grasp of concrete social-institutional foundations give Structural Transformation some advantages over Habermas’ later theory" of transhistorical communicative action. It is with these reminders of the value of appreciating the specific emergence of the bourgeois public sphere that we dive, purposefully, into the content of this particular study.

Habermas’ understanding of the formation of the public sphere required elaboration of many complex and interconnected transformations in areas ranging from the political and economic to the intellectual and social. However, one can extract from the subject matter of this extensive study five fundamental criteria which Habermas found to be necessary preconditions for the development of public opinion in the bourgeois public sphere: 1) the formation of a political consciousness within society; 2) the formation of a private economy in civil society; 3) a privately-owned free press; 4) civil rights; and 5) cultivation. To build a more accurately complex picture of its development, the initial roots of the bourgeois public sphere were put down as it developed within the locus of civil society, in liberal philosophy, and in bourgeois culture. The separation of the private sphere from the realm of public authority was the essential catalyst which initiated the revolutionary reorganization of power in the modern age into public and private sectors which permitted the formation of bourgeois culture and society. Habermas’ surety that the degeneration of the public sphere accompanied the fusion of the public and private spheres proceeds from the finding that these spheres were polarized
in bourgeois society. Many of Habermas' critics are unconvinced that the current public sphere, although it does exhibit an almost complete loss of rational-critical debate, serves as a manipulative token of its former self. John B. Thompson suggests that Habermas "betray[s] his debt to the work of Horkheimer and Adorno"32 whose theory of mass culture he draws on, which leads him to overstate the passivity of the mass-media audience. Thompson asserts that "if we wish to understand how public life in the modern world has been reshaped by the development of the media . . . we would be well advised to put aside the thesis of the refeudalization of the public sphere"33 and consider how "communication media . . . [have] created a new kind of publicness which cannot be accommodated within the traditional model"34 of representative publicity.

Public and Private Differentiation

The public sphere emerged simultaneously with the privatized economic development of the bourgeoisie in France and England (the two major countries under investigation) in the eighteenth century. During the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the spheres of public and private became polarized as the public authority became an administrative state, and the authority of manorial representatives of the king was forfeited to "the authority to police; the private people under it, as the addressees of public authority, formed the public."35 Once a separate and autonomous private sphere had developed which constituted a public body, and an administrative public authority had overtaken the regulation of the national economy through mercantalist policies, "the taxes and duties, and generally, official interventions into the privatized household finally came
to constitute the target of a developing critical sphere."36 The privatized economy created a new social class, the bourgeoisie, which held a dominant position in the public sphere.37 These private individuals possessed property which allowed them to participate in a privatized economy, and it was through their capacities as property-owning citizens that they began to criticize the actions of the state. The historical evidence of the transition from the unified public/private sphere of the medieval period, to the separate public and private spheres of the period of developing capitalism and administrative government, is one facet of Habermas’ argument for the development of the public sphere, for it permits him to assert that the existence of a private sphere separate from the state is one of the necessary preconditions for the bourgeois public sphere.

The Public Sphere in Civil Society

Thinking about the public sphere requires also that one think about how it fits into civil society. Habermas argues that the public sphere "was specifically a part of ‘civil society’ which at the same time established itself as the realm of commodity exchange and social labour governed by its own laws."38 Calhoun suggests that the concepts of public sphere and civil society are often confused and collapsed into one another. In opposition to this confusion, he offers a distinction:

the concept of public sphere is largely to go beyond general appeals to the nature of civil society in attempts to explain the social foundations of democracy and to introduce a discussion of the specific organization within civil society of social and cultural bases for the development of an effective rational-critical discourse aimed at the resolution of political disputes.39

He suggests that civil society is a conceptual term describing "the capacity of a political
community to organize itself\textsuperscript{40} in terms of economic markets, institutions, and a sphere of public interest, which all indicate the existence of a level of social democratization. Calhoun stresses that civil society and the public sphere cannot develop without the initial emergence of a self-conscious 'society', and a society that may interpret itself as a political community, a point that is thoroughly borne out in Habermas' investigation. Similarly, Keith Tester proposes that "the label of 'civil society' can be applied to all those social relationships which involve the voluntary association and participation of individuals acting in their private capacities\textsuperscript{41} which become logical subsequent to the differentiation of private interests from the authority of the state. As such, civil society is about the social relations that people form independently of public authorities. But Tester notes that Marx used the concept of civil society "to explore matters of why we live in the societies we do, and how we understand the delicate relationships between the demands of external sources of authority and our own private interests."\textsuperscript{42} The development of mercantalist policies by the state initiated a new relationship between the public authorities and the property-owning subjects, an essentially modern relationship which "assumed the peculiar ambivalence of public regulation and private initiative."\textsuperscript{43} In this web of relationships, the bourgeois public sphere occurred within the private sphere as a vocalized reflection of the interaction of private property and public authority in civil society. The idea that people were part of a society in which they could organize their actions autonomously of the state was important to the formation of the public sphere, as it was to the development of a realm of commodity exchange. That members of a society could think rationally for themselves both to organize their own relations, and
to develop their own independent and critical opinions, was the foundation on which the public sphere was built.

The Development of the Press in Civil Society

Before public opinion was accepted as a legitimate judgement of political actions, the public sphere was dominated by the public authority. Under this condition of domination from above, members of the bourgeoisie became critical of the state's interference in what they understood as their private affairs. They rejected the validity of domination from above based on the claim to rule, and they aspired to replace arbitrary and irrational authority with the principle of publicity which located power in critical reason. Before it could become concerned with criticism, the public sphere had to be removed from the sphere of public authority and relocated in the private sphere under the influence of private individuals. The shift in control of the press represents, quite dramatically, the bourgeoisie's recognition of their opposition to the state. Habermas contends that the public sphere shifted from the court to the town as the town gained significance, not only in economic terms, but also culturally and politically. A shift in control of the press almost certainly had to follow the shift in location of the public sphere in order that the press could continue to publicize information relevant to the new 'public' of private individuals. Private property and participation in commercial trade attributed a degree of autonomy to the bourgeois class that led it into "an awareness of itself as the [state's] opponent, that is, as the public of the now emerging public sphere of civil society." The press was the vehicle through which the bourgeois could "think
their own thoughts, directed at the authorities." Because this practice was not politically expedient in the early moments of the public sphere, critical reasoning was not explicitly directed at the authorities. Instead, criticism entered the press in the form of learned articles which were directed toward the enlightenment of upper-class subjects. As critical literary journalism advanced, and a political self-understanding developed within the bourgeois class, it began "casting itself loose [from the political sphere] as a forum in which the private people, come together to form a public, readied themselves to compel public authority to legitimate itself before public opinion." 

Two general categories of journals developed, each with its distinct function. The critical journals primarily contained art criticism (literary, visual, musical, dramatic) that was oriented toward the cultivation of taste within the new context of commercialized cultural production. Habermas comments that "it was through the critical absorption of philosophy, literature and art that the public attained enlightenment and realized itself as . . . the living process [of the critical journals]." The moral weeklies had a similar effect on the construction of public consciousness, but these journals contained a different kind of writing—periodical essays—which took public questions as their topic and thereby figuratively put the objectives of the public sphere into literary form. Political journals tended to be reflexive, an expression of the struggle to ascendancy of rational public opinion over domination. As such, these journals were political acts which provided resources through which the public could evaluate and know itself. In a practical sense, the press was used by the bourgeois public to take control of the public agenda and to subvert the principle of domination which legitimized social and political inequality.
But, the press was also a factor that was essential to the process of self-clarification that allowed the bourgeois to understand their revolutionary role in democratic public, political and social change.

Civil Rights and Liberal Social Philosophy

Prominent social philosophers of the early and mid-modern periods, among them Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel and Marx, all of whom receive attention in Habermas' study, initiated into society the ideas of freedom of agency that were so crucial to the social and political revolutions that took place in the modern era. Calhoun asserts that "a central topic for the transformational discourse was the question of absolute sovereignty versus the rule of general, abstract, depersonalized law."54 Habermas states that the public sphere’s political function was to gain control over the regulation of civil society by the means of rational-critical formation of a "public opinion as the only legitimate source of this law."55 Rational opinion was supposed to isolate the ‘true’ (i.e. unprejudiced and liberated) way for people to live. Calhoun suggests that the construction of the public sphere in ‘bourgeois society’ does not denote a public sphere based on class distinction, but on a type of society that was bourgeois,56 meaning that its hegemonic logic was built on the principles of the rational equality of human beings, and their rights to autonomy, self-regulation and a just organization of public and private life that constituted social and political freedom. According to this logic, bourgeois individuals constructed their interpretations of how to think about their activities in economic, cultural and political relations, but they could not understand the implications of the new social
philosophy without talking to others in the public sphere which was organized around Kant's 'principle of publicity': the public use of reason to effect enlightenment. It is this principle that Habermas insists is the normative essence of the bourgeois public sphere and which Calhoun states "was the valuable kernel in the flawed ideology of the bourgeois public sphere."57

The normativity of this principle has been attacked on the grounds of the impossibility of achieving a rational consensus in the environment of liberal pluralism. John B. Thompson asks "in view of the plurality of evaluative and interpretative standpoints characteristic of modern societies, [does] it [make] sense to try to build a political theory based on the possibility of rational consensus?"58 To defend Habermas' thesis, it is crucial to constantly bear in mind that the principle of publicity designates the public use of private reason for purposes of genuinely public interest. Fused within this principle are a commitment to rationality and a dedication to its use to realize government without domination, an ideal akin to Arendt's veneration of classical public spirit. The public's interest, first and foremost in Habermas' theory, is in ensuring for itself the democratic organization of all aspects of society. Habermas propounded the possibility of an integrated democratic society that "is based on communication rather than domination."59 However, Calhoun regrets that the specific institutional basis of the regenerated public sphere has so far eluded Habermas, causing him to shift his focus away from a specific model of the public sphere. He summarizes:

where Structural Transformation located the basis for the application of practical reason to politics in the historically specific institutions of the public sphere, the theory of communicative action locates them in transhistorical, evolving communicative capacities... The public sphere
remains an ideal, but it becomes a contingent product of the evolution of communicative action, rather than its basis.60

When we understand Habermas’ theory in its more complete sense, it is interesting to observe exactly how similar are Habermas’ and Arendt’s fundamental intentions for the reconstitution of a democratic public sphere. Their essentially emancipatory projects place them on common ground in their advocacy of a public sphere which would eliminate social and individual domination.

‘Cultivation’ and the Public Persona

Of particular interest to the question of the Canadian public sphere is the requirement of ‘cultivation’ to participate meaningfully in the type of public sphere that Habermas describes. By this, I mean to explore how the principle of publicity assumed the possession of bourgeois cultivation, and accordingly, how this cultivation structured the acceptability and authority of public speakers. Habermas does not devote a specific section to cultivation, per se, as a precondition of public discourse, but he advances the realm of private cultivation in the intimate setting of the bourgeois family as the original place of a rational-critical discourse that was, initially, literary. He states that the shift in the public sphere away from domination and toward criticism was accomplished by "converting the public sphere in the world of letters already equipped with institutions of the public and with forms of discussion."61 In the intimate setting of the bourgeois family, literary discussion was an established custom of reading, reflecting, interpreting, and sharing opinions with an audience of other readers who were expected to respond in a rational and critical manner. Habermas perceives this custom to be the training ground
for discussion of public matters. The ability to engage in critical debate required training in the use of reason, and the ability to use reason was the distinctive trait of cultivation during the eighteenth century. Somewhat differently, Arendt's model of the Greek public sphere speaks of cultivation in terms of the behaviour and actions of the citizens according to the principle of public spirit. To take the two divergent 'cultivations' into account as exigencies for public discourse, cultivation must be understood as a learned adaptation to the conventions of behaviour and action--speech acts in the case of public discourse--that warrant respect and consideration by one's public peers and inferiors.

Habermas contends throughout his investigation that the bourgeois public sphere did not emerge until the representation of authority in the status of persons or classes (such as royalty and nobility) was replaced by the authority of objective reason, used by private individuals, to decide all debates and to rationalize all authority. Habermas describes representative publicness as it was present in the nobleman who displayed authority by "embody[ing] it in his cultivated personality." The ability to embody authority made him a public person. In other words, there was a strong association between cultivation and public power which caused the incarnation of public authority (the sovereign's power) in cultivated persons to be respected. Although Habermas discusses the bourgeois ideal of disregard for status which permitted the authority of reasoned argument in the bourgeois public sphere, there are suggestions in his text that the connection between cultivation and public authority does not completely disappear. This is not an argument that Habermas makes specifically, but a conclusion he inevitably comes to when he writes that the bourgeois public "did not equate itself with the public,
but at most claimed to act as its mouthpiece, in its name, perhaps even as its educator—*the new form of bourgeois representation* (italics added).\(^\text{64}\)

Again, what I am investigating here, as part of a foundation upon which to assess the Canadian public sphere, is the extent to which bourgeois cultivation renewed the connection between social distinction and the authority to commit public actions, and to be respected as a public speaker and opinion leader. Throughout his sociological and historical study, Habermas discusses the aspects of bourgeois cultivation as part of the public sphere. The bourgeois stratum "was the real carrier of the public, which was from the outset a reading public"\(^\text{65}\) interested in all types of literatures, as well as other forms of culture. Habermas states that the public sphere was built on the "parity of all cultivated persons,"\(^\text{66}\) that it was occupied by "persons who—as readers, listeners, and spectators could avail themselves via the market of the objects that were subject to discussion,"\(^\text{67}\) and that public discourse was "the rational communication of a public consisting of cultivated human beings."\(^\text{68}\) Furthermore, he argues that the bourgeois intelligentsia were initiated into the art of critical debate through their sociable association with courtly-noble society. This association launched the gradual transferral of cultural life from the noble court to the bourgeois town. Habermas states that "the heirs of the humanistic-aristocratic society, in their encounter with the bourgeois intellectuals . . . built a bridge between the remains of a collapsing form of publicity (the courtly one) and the precursor of a new one: the bourgeois public sphere."\(^\text{69}\) There is a clear connection between educated cultivation and the forms of conversational sociability that made the bourgeois public sphere into an institution. Fraser suggests that "[a] discourse of publicity
touting accessibility, rationality and the suspension of status hierarchies is itself deployed as a strategy of distinction”70 which authorized the enlightened bourgeois opinion to stand as ‘public’ opinion.

Although it is probable that, by bourgeois representation, Habermas simply means the ability to represent rational public opinion, this concession is quite important, for it insinuates that modern public distinction continued to be founded on an exclusive form of cultivation, and it throws into question Habermas’ earlier conclusion that "[t]he public . . . was already the carrier of a different public sphere, one [unlike the former sphere of public authority] that no longer had anything in common with that of representation.”71

The ideology of equality obscures the fact that authority continued to be represented in cultivation. Fraser argues that the “practices and ‘ethos’ [of the bourgeoisie] were marks of distinction in Pierre Bourdieu’s sense, ways of defining an emergent elite, of setting it off from the older aristocratic elites it was intent on displacing on the one hand, and from the various popular and plebian strata it aspired to rule over on the other.”72 Therefore, the claim that, in the bourgeois public sphere, all public debates were settled on the basis of argument alone, and not social status, can be true only in an internal sense of the equality of its limited membership. For if one views the bourgeois public sphere from outside its boundary, as did those who lacked cultivation (as well as property), it appears that bourgeois cultivation was merely the replacement of noble cultivation since it had the same power to represent ‘public’ authority, but in its new sense—the opinion of the public body whose voice, Habermas implies in his assertion of a unitary public, had been entirely appropriated by the bourgeoisie. The connection between cultivation and
the authority to perform public speech would seem to be in the assumption of the cultivated persons’ abilities to form rational arguments free from uneducated narrow-mindedness. Habermas explains that following the institutionalization of democracy in America, Mill and Tocqueville observed that public opinion was reduced to the tyrannical will of the majority when its public source was expanded to include the uneducated and the politically untrained. Interpreting these thinkers, Calhoun suggests that the base problem of the democratized public sphere is the difficulty of protecting free, critical thought from public opinion itself. According to Habermas, the normative public sphere collapsed following its democratization, and it appears that one reason for this involved the lack of general cultivation necessary to maintain the dominance of the principle of publicity. Although the authority of educated cultivation may perform a practical function in public discourse, it is one that, nonetheless, gives some people the unconceded privilege to speak for others.

Conclusions - Considering Habermas' Model for the Canadian Context

We have had a brief discussion of the conditions which resulted in the bourgeois public sphere, and we have been made acquainted with the model of the classical public sphere and its main proponent who rejects the bourgeois political moment as an example of a proper public sphere. Arendt sees it, merely, as a variation of the public sphere’s continued abnormality. We have looked at how Habermas and Arendt view the distortion and recovery of communication in twentieth-century democracy, and we have ascertained
that Habermas' model of the public sphere is more plausible than Arendt's on account of his conception that the public sphere is intricately related to modern civil society. Because both Habermas' and Arendt's models existed in historical periods prior to the institutionalization of democracy, we have also become familiar with the conceptual and practical difficulties for an inclusive public sphere in democratic society.

In general, the preconditions necessary for the genesis of the bourgeois public sphere arise in the private sphere of intimacy and of civil society which are both part of the larger social realm. Contrarily, political cultivation and action in Arendt's theory is confined to the political life of the polis. Although Arendt's power-exclusive model magnifies the ideological imperfections of the bourgeois public sphere, the limitation of the Greek public sphere to political discussion appropriate to the polis is restrictive, and it appears to be a narrow conception of the magnitude of the public sphere in terms of its capability to contain more than strictly 'political' concerns in its discourse. Therefore, aside from the principle of publicity, which will be considered in a moment, the other of Habermas' preconditions of continuing significance is that the public sphere should be the public sphere of civil society dedicated to the consensual self-organization of a community of people who communicate together to decide what their relation to the public authority should be.

It has been amply demonstrated in the experience of modernity, that consensus within the public sphere of civil society is rare, if at all possible, which is why so many civil disputes are transferred to the official sphere where they are ultimately decided by the public authority. Habermas, himself, fully acknowledges that if rational-critical
discourse were revived, "the idea of publicity . . . is today realizable only as rationalization . . . of the exercise of societal and political power." In a more flexible reading of Habermas' model, in conjunction with his theory of communicative action, the principle of publicity is modified from its highly criticized bourgeois purpose of locating consensus which presupposes an homogeneity of social needs and values. Such an homogeneity is not representative of stratified societies. Hohendahl endeavours to cross this impasse by considering McCarthy's contention that rational-critical debate is fully possible without a definable set of common values and interests described originally in Kant's philosophy. Hohendahl arrives at the conclusion that "a weaker claim of rationality might ultimately be more fruitful for a highly pluralistic world where differences of race, class and gender [and others] cannot be overlooked." Hohendahl's remarks coincide with those of Fraser and Eley who argue for a differentiated public sphere designed for the participation of the inevitable groups of exclusion which, having no unity with the single dominant public, must either form their own public, or remain silent. The extent that these critiques of Habermas' bourgeois model will bear upon the Canadian public sphere remains to be seen in further chapters. But, it seems realistic to recognize the existence of several public discourses which may not necessarily be a part of a unitary public sphere.

Many of the criticisms of Habermas' theory are directed at the amalgamation of theoretical constructions and historical fact in Habermas' theory. The historical element is both a problem and an advantage in Habermas' investigation; historicity affords his model a concreteness that pure theory cannot, but it also makes the defects of the
bourgeois public sphere glaringly obvious and open to critique. The characteristic
imperfections of the bourgeois public sphere (i.e. class inequality, exclusivity, and its role
in stabilizing a new form of social domination) tend to diminish its normative value.
Although these particularistic shortcomings are unquestionable, Habermas' is a modern
model which exemplifies in actuality the preeminent purpose and activity of the public
sphere: rational-critical debate. Although critics complain that Habermas idealized the
historical verity of such debate, he seems justified in his assertion that critical reason is
germane to vigorous public discourse. Likewise, the historicity of this study means that
some of his findings may not be strictly applicable to the particular design and
understanding of a public sphere in a different culture and historical context. But, the
theoretical principles behind the specific circumstances of the bourgeois model continue
to be appropriate for the object of this study, and they will be central to determining the
possible existence, quality and form of the Canadian public sphere. For example, it is
undeniable that political consciousness is necessary for the formation of an active public
sphere. But the emergence of bourgeois political consciousness is one aspect that is
crucially affected by its historical context. The novelty, in the eighteenth century, of the
revolutionary ideas of privacy, subjectivity, expression, rights, and social, political and
economic autonomy had lost some of its fervour by the early twentieth century. This is
not true for all countries, but Canadian political life had become relatively stable by this
point (in comparison to its own political history and to the political turmoil occurring in
other parts of the world), although democracy was by no means realized. It remains to
be seen if political consciousness developed in public or in private in the Canadian
context, for, as Fraser especially suggests, political consciousness(es) need not originate uniformly in the private sphere, but may develop within public spaces.

One would think that if the public sphere could be formed within the context of absolute rule, before political rights to freedom of expression and opinion were recognized, that it would expand and realize its full potential for criticism and debate when it became an acceptable, and even mandatory, aspect of democratic government. However, following the institutionalization of democracy, Habermas finds that the bourgeois public sphere did not enjoy a full fruition, engaging an expanded portion of society in rational criticism of forms of domination; instead he traces its demise. Although Habermas identifies many inter-related causes for the degeneration of the public sphere, the first one to be identified was the lack of culture and cultivation in the larger public, referred to as the masses. The problem of political elitism and universal participation continues to rankle in the developing theoretical models of the public sphere, for, evidently, it was not solved in the bourgeois model. Regardless, Habermas' contribution to the understanding of what makes one type of public sphere possible is invaluable as a guide to beginning another historical investigation.
... it is my earnest ambition to rouse Canadian men and women from their present apathetic attitude in regard to the politics and administration of the country, and to kindle an intelligent interest in the great questions of the day.¹

C.W. Peterson (1919)

C.W. Peterson’s call to Canadian citizens to become engaged in the affairs of their nation was answered throughout the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s. The period covered in this study represents a progressive era in Canada, an uncertain time of change and development for a nation that was gaining full national status in the international sphere, was taking an interest in developing its own cultural and intellectual resources, and was awakening to the need for reform of the entire strategy of domestic government. The war victory and Canada’s entrance into the League of Nations ushered in a new phase of national consciousness, but the enthusiasm was darkened by an atmosphere of questioning and civil unrest. The 1920’s marked the beginning of a new political era in Canada founded on a demand for new goals in politics and a changed attitude toward social progress which placed more responsibility on the government to mitigate social problems and regulate a civil society in which consolidated wealth and power had grown out of all proportion with the wealth of the majority of Canadians. J.M.S. Careless expressed the change in political attitude in Canada this way: "before 1919, Canadian politics had been far less concerned with democratic progress or social advance than with the problems of
developing half a continent."² Pronounced social divisions and political discontent gave rise to populism in the western provinces which produced new federal and provincial parties. A more critical attitude toward the state and toward fundamental social values had developed within the intellectual community as well. The dismal experience of the Great War had caused Canadian intellectuals to question the meaning of their institutions and to look critically at the most central symbols and actors which represented their political culture. R.C. Brown and Ramsay Cook (1974) studied the era that ended with the conclusion of the First World War. The turning point into the new era, for these historians, was represented by the election campaign in 1921 between Conservative leader Arthur Meighen, and W.L. Mackenzie King, the Liberal Prime Minister to be. Recognizing the extent to which Canadian government had become an object of public scrutiny, King spoke out against the political style of the Conservative party that survived the Union government. King's words appear to have concurred with the public mood when he said that in "the mind of [Mr. Meighen], [the tariff] may be the issue; in the mind of the people, however, the issue is the Prime Minister himself and what he and his colleagues represent of autocracy and extravagance in the management of public affairs."³

Despite the opportunism of his accusation, and the fact that the tariff issue deserved every bit of clear public discussion, King had a point: many Canadians seemed dissatisfied with the condition of political culture at all levels (national, provincial, and in some cases, municipal) and they were restless. Politicians seemed unable between 1900 and 1921 to do more than barely surmount one crisis in unity and decision after another. Educated Canadians with an interest in the politics of their country sought something
more than stalemate and indecision from public life. In a paper published in the Canadian Historical Review in 1935, Frank Underhill discussed the development of political parties according to John A. Macdonald's institutionalization of leadership by government favour. Until the outbreak of the First World War, Canadian political culture had been dominated by the image of Macdonald, the "Prince of Darkness" as Goldwin Smith called him in his independent journal The Week, who held together a coalition of unlikely elements, "national, religious, sectional and personal, as motley as the component patches of any crazy quilt, actuated each of them, by paramount regard for its own interest." The conciliatory approach to 'government' remained unchanged while Laurier held the seat of power from 1896-1911. Underhill asserted that Laurier's era represented the golden age in the evolution of the Canadian two party system. Both parties were now completely national in the North American sense; that is, both appealed for support to all sections and classes of the nation and both preached the same policy—the continuous fostering of material prosperity through the incitement and patronage of government.5

Before the progressive era began in 1920, there was little concept within the official sphere of governing according to the general public interest except as this was interpreted as the success of commercial enterprise and 'national development'. By 1920, Canadians were turning their backs on the methods that had traditionally been used for Canadian nation-building because a growing number of people had come to understand them for what they were—"they old laissez faire attitude of non-interference with personal rights and private property was based on the self-interest of a privileged few." Not simply the view of a left-leaning minority, advocates of business and liberal economic principles recognized the social and political disequilibrium which resulted from the favouritism
shown towards industrial interests by successive Canadian governments. John Willison, who was involved with the Canadian Reconstruction Association which opposed government interference in the economic sphere, wrote to Prime Minister Borden in July 1917 stating, "[w]e are at the end of an era in Canada . . . The Canadian manufacturers, who have developed all the selfishness and arrogance of a privileged class, must have less power at Ottawa in the future." It was precisely the business class against which the cries of western farmers and industrial labourers rose in organized protest to voice their demands for some measure of equity. Macdonald's coveted plan for development of a vital Canadian economy through the triumvirate of national policies for immigration, settlement and a transcontinental railway would be attacked as well as the public cost of bailing out insolvent rail lines soared. Under the leadership of T.A. Crerar, the National Progressive Party, originating out of the Canadian Council of Agriculture in 1920, supported the 'New National Policy' an obvious reference to, and disqualification of Macdonald's passé scheme.

But King's words in the 1921 election referred more specifically to the actions of the Union government throughout the war years. Doug Owram's research (1986) described the important debate within the alarmed Canadian intellectual community (mainly among professors of philosophy) concerning the legitimate functions and powers of the democratic state and its relation to the individual. But the same concern for thoughtful and critical evaluation of the powers of the state was not evident in the general population which was, nonetheless, dissatisfied and disturbed by the conduct of the Union government, but which was not disposed to vote according to the highest reason. Donald
Creighton looked at the different manners in which Meighen and King addressed the electorate. He said of Meighen that "nobody believed more firmly than he that [people are] rational animal[s] whose conduct should be governed by reason" and he based his political career on the assumption that the confidence of the electorate would be achieved by logical argument. King however, "presented himself as the godlike avenger of the Canadian people's wrongs" committed by Meighen and his Unionist fellows in the heavy-handed parliament that sat under the War Measures Act. Creighton commented that "[King's] vague, grandiose charges diverted public attention from Meighen's practical issue", the tariff. It is perhaps unlikely that Meighen would (or deserved to) be returned to parliament given his conduct toward protesters in Winnipeg in 1919, to immigrants, and to Canadian citizens who were sent to war against their wills. But the style of rhetoric that appealed to the general Canadian public was King's "lather of moral indignation" rather than Meighen's logical and focused argument concerning a particular issue of enduring importance to the general interest of Canadians.

The election of 1921 was interesting because a third player had entered the two party system—the National Progressive Party under the leadership of T.A. Crerar. Carleton Stanley, writing about intellectual development in Canada in 1923, noted the unconventional methods of campaigning used by Crerar. Crerar's party had developed a rational policy that "contained more clear thinking than any political speech or platform we have ever had in this country." Not only the platform, but the inflammatory style of political rhetoric was abandoned to that which was more sensible: "the catchwords which our politicians have used since Confederation, as well as the platforms of Mr King
and Mr Meighen, were pitilessly scrutinised without either [political] rhetoric or invective.\textsuperscript{13} However, as history shows, King was elected and the National Progressive Party was shortlived. This brief example of the campaign rhetoric of 1921 symbolizes the opposing aspects of public discourse during this period. While there was a definite impulse to raise the level of public discussion and inject into it a greater degree of substance, the opposite manner of speech consisting of platitudes, unrealistic prophecies, morality plays, flag waving, and blind confidence preserved its place in Canadian public life. What explains the conjunction of two radically different rhetorical approaches to Canadian public discourse?

Political Culture and Public Opinion

The decade after the Great War marked an important step in the evolution of Canadian political culture and cultural development. Their performance in the war proved to Canadians that it was time for their country to take the final steps toward national status by gaining full constitutional control of all political powers, and by bringing into focus a culture which reflected its maturity as a nation. It was in this stirring of cultural awareness that Arthur Lismer, a leading member of the Group of Seven, remarked that "most creative people . . . have begun to have a guilty feeling that Canada was as yet unwritten, unpainted, unsung, . . . In 1920, there was a job to be done."\textsuperscript{14} Many publicly-spirited people, predominantly a small group of English-Canada's intellectual, political, educational and artistic elite described by Mary Vipond as constituting a nationalist network,\textsuperscript{15} became active in similar and overlapping organizations which
originated out of a perceived need among members for better national leadership and public understanding of Canadian issues, and for advancement in Canadian education and cultural life. Graham Spry expressed the new attitude that developed throughout the 1920s, and the enthusiasm Canadians demonstrated for learning about the public and intellectual affairs of their nation. His comments appeared in a ‘Canadian Clubs Supplement’ to a popular Canadian magazine late in 1926:

No student of opinion in the Dominion can have failed to notice the new character of certain sections of Canadian public life. There have been the appearance of critical journals, an increased interest in literature and its criticisms, a new examination of our educational standards, of our political life, and despite the exuberant excesses of some partisan subordinates in the last election, the last election was not without evidences of a more objective intelligent interest in public affairs by the mass of the people.¹⁶

In his comments, Spry suggested the burgeoning of a critical public sphere in which cultural and political affairs were being evaluated. The critical intent of cultural and political discussion had become more acute in response to the perceived deficiencies in cultural and intellectual life in Canada, and to the ‘exuberant’ but empty political rhetoric that continued to stultify public discussion and to exacerbate disappointment in Canada’s development, especially in economic terms. Vipond stated that "a new consciousness of Canada and of its world role led as well to a new awareness of the country’s weaknesses. The war had brought social disruptions and economic changes which exposed to view the many difficulties of the emerging nation."¹⁷ Although labour turbulence in mining and manufacturing sectors and political dissatisfaction in Canada’s western agricultural communities were central to the 1920s and 1930s in provincial politics, two issues that the intelligentsia adopted as the general themes of their movement were the inadequacies
of public/political life (including the condition and function of the civil service) and of the level of cultural development in Canada.

The publics which associated themselves with provincial and national affairs concentrated on different issues, and had different understandings of their contributions to public life. Provincial public discourse appears to have had much in common with a 'public sphere of civil society' because it considered and voiced opinions about the effect on people's private lives and business of tariff and rail policies, for example, and against the institutions that embodied the ideology of liberal economics which detained Canadians of lower classes in conditions of social inequality that they found unacceptable. Civil problems were linked to economic problems and to (what were judged to be) dysfunctional policies and ideologies. Gradually, the unresolved difficulties of farmers and labourers became political concerns that required political action, and the solutions that the leaders from these sectors advocated over the next thirty years (and especially throughout the depression) encouraged closer government regulation of civil society. But in the early 1920s, the presence of farm and labour unrest, business interests aligned against government decisions, and self-organization within specific industries and communities (i.e. the Wheat Pools, the formation of One Big Union, and the Antigonish movement in eastern Canada) suggests that a public consciousness, in which people understood their detachment (as part of an autonomous civil body) from the official sphere was alive within Canadian society. The fact that the public sphere was the site of struggle over industrial interests and the site of co-operation to build community resources illustrates that the 1920s public understood itself as part of a civil society which had its
own problems and its own possibilities for resolution.

However, much of the public discussion between 1920 and 1950 concerned questions pertaining to the Canadian nation itself. Apart from a consciousness that concerned matters of civil society, Canadian public consciousness during this period was also closely linked to the development and extension of national understanding about current public affairs as well as the history and culture of the young and intellectually unexplored nation. The public sphere that will be studied here, by looking at the organizations which constituted the nationalist network, and at the aspects of Canadian life which they intended to improve, was not a public of civil society, but is perhaps best described as a public of national affairs whose paramount goal was the formation of a national consciousness which championed national unity and public spirit.

Public consciousness concerning national matters was neither static nor homogeneous throughout this period, nor was it merely a product of post-war national pride. Although Canadian nationalism did grow as a result of the contribution of Canadian soldiers to the war effort, I argue that the public consciousness which motivated the creation and extension of voluntary organizations stemmed from two dominant and related recognitions. First, Canadians who had taken stock of persistent regional and sectional attitudes within the country, of the lamentable condition of the Canadian bureaucracy built on patronage, and who felt that the conventional style of political leadership in Canada was failing to cope with the social questions that strongly influenced a new political environment after the war (i.e. labour, social policies, distribution of wealth, social equality), these individuals realized that the stultified political culture in
Canada must change as a result of institutional reform and also through the very existence of organizations dedicated to the encouragement of thoughtful and informed public opinion. Second, there was a realization that Canada's material development had undermined its 'spiritual' development—the cultivation of a unifying national spirit—that was necessary to make Canada into a nation of people. One important manifestation of national spirit and identity was understood to be the establishment of a 'Canadian culture' and especially in the 1920s, a Canadian literature. Although the issues that were raised in the public sphere were various, many were directly or indirectly connected to the issues of cultural development and political culture. As Spry's remarks indicate, public attention in the 1920s was directed toward modifying public and cultural life so that it might become more meaningful and engaging for Canadian citizens. The Canadian elite understood that public discourse should express political and cultural difficulties and realities to Canadians, candidly and intelligently, and with a lesser degree of patriotic sentimentality. In the realm of public affairs, enthusiasts pressed for more objective and informed public understandings of practical issues, like the tariff, and Canada's role in western peace. It was assumed that an understanding of national issues could bind patriotic Canadians together in one unified national consciousness that would transcend parochial hostilities, and reduce the extent to which Canadians were mislead and confused by their politicians. In the cultural realm, it was time for Canadian poets and writers to provide the images and languages in which Canadians could begin to understand the intellectual, social and imaginative contours of their society which habitually had been subordinated to the depiction of the indifferent, unpeopled and uncultivated Canadian
It is the assertion of this thesis that the 1920s marked the emergence of a public sphere in which cultural and political questions concurred, and in which both aspects of Canadian life were understood to be in need of improvement and development. Desmond Pacey stated (and the writer could not agree more) that

[i]t is sometimes difficult to establish direct relations between political and economic developments and literary and cultural ones, but in these years [1920s] there is no doubt that the general air of change, excitement, and confidence did affect the development of Canadian literature . . . [there was] a determination to create a literature commensurate with Canada’s new status as an independent nation.18

The emergence of a Canadian public sphere, which encompassed both literary and political concerns, does not follow the pattern of development from the literary to the political public sphere that was central to Habermas’ model. How did the ‘absence’ of Canadian culture alter the character of the Canadian public sphere, and of political consciousness in Canada? If political development is an aspect of cultural development, then, was Canada’s cultural development, agreed to be quite limited, responsible for the political stagnation that Canadians felt in the 1920s and 1930s especially? Is this the reason that a public sphere emerged in which culture and politics were perceived to be equally problematic, and therefore had to be fostered simultaneously? It may not be possible to understand fully the ways in which something that did not exist in Canada (a vibrant intellectual and literary culture) influenced political development. However, by studying the comments of literary critics and public-spirited political reformers (both radical or conservative), it is possible to demonstrate that the problems of Canadian culture and politics were closely related. Both sprang from the social imagination which
bore, in Douglas Bush's caustic terms, an "inadequate and untutored critical instinct." His assessment of Canadian thought resembles that of Northrop Frye who asserted that Canadians tended to leave social norms unchallenged. Frye thought that a residual colonial imagination—the garrison mentality—existed in Canadian society, the most obvious feature of this mentality being the "instinct to seek a conventional or commonplace expression of an idea" which reduced the articulation of otherness and of social criticism. Bush found that speech and writing which was produced within this restricted imagination expressed cultural and political ideas in inadequate forms that bore common traits. This relationship is expressed in his admonishing remark concerning the quality of Canadian literary criticism:

[i]nflated rhetoric used to be left to the politicians . . . for use on the first of July; during the last years it has become the language of literature, and one learns on all sides that Canada is taking a permanent seat in the literary league of nations.21

Bush suggested that a similar form of misrepresentation, epitomized by Laurier’s optimistic but incorrect projection that the twentieth century belonged to Canada, was being used to describe Canadian literature which Bush and a few ‘unpatriotic’ others felt was generally undeserving of the praise it received. Moreover, Bush equated the false laudation of a "Canadian literature" with the naive, self-congratulatory, and misleading tone in which public figures described the international acceptance of Canada’s ‘national status’ and equality at the League of Nations.22 Bush judged that political and literary nationalism were of one form; both represented public dishonesty and irresponsibility which in no way assisted Canadians in understanding the problems and the realities that were integral to their social and political community. Those critics who said something
discriminating about Canadian literature were not only castigating literary foibles, but the folly of an entire culture which refused to engage in critical self-examination.

The Political and Cultural Deadlock

Political Culture

It did not require the keenest of Canadian minds to observe that there were problems of stagnation in the political and the cultural spheres. But some Canadian intellectuals realized that the particular political and cultural evolution in Canada retarded the development of a public sphere (even if they did not use that terminology), and that a vibrant public sphere would not develop until conditions of political and artistic culture had changed due to the elevation of the texts, criticisms and discourses in each. Canadian politics in the 1920s was beset by problems that the tradition of patronage and material nation-building, honed by Macdonald and Laurier, had consistently failed to resolve. In the opening to his discussion of "The Writer and his Public", Desmond Pacey highlighted the problems that Canadian leaders seemed to think they could ignore indefinitely. With the addition of third parties into the political dynamic (the National Progressive Party in 1921 and later the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation), Canadians were hopeful that new solutions might be found for the problems which had persisted without relief since Confederation: federalism, biculturalism and imperialism.\textsuperscript{23} An editorial from 1943, demonstrating the meaninglessness of political labels in Canadian politics, focused on the Conservative Party's tendency to resurrect itself without making any effort to change its character or party objectives. The editorialist asserted that the Tory government during
the Macdonald era "built up a nation . . . which was run by big business primarily in the interests of big business. Laurier's Liberal party took over this function in 1896\textsuperscript{24} and remained in power until 1911. The defeats and subsequent revivals of the Tory party under numerous variations of liberal-conservative jargon, led the author to this rhetorical question: "Would it be putting it too strongly if one suggested that this repetitious technique shows a certain lack of creative imagination?"\textsuperscript{25} Politicians, and indeed, the Canadian public, did not actively seek alternatives to the style of government established by Macdonald in the post-Confederation period, and until the early 1920s, public opinion had not been sufficiently mobilized to demand a better level of discussion and understanding of the problems that beset the country.

Particularly between Confederation and the conclusion of the First World War, political leadership was dominated by the need to avoid serious threats to the Canadian union which meant that empowered politicians avoided talking about the controversial problems which lay at the heart of the struggle for Canadian nationhood. A unified Canada was the goal, but a leader had not come forward to lead the country through the difficult questions of how to reconcile the federal and provincial governments and the majority of the Canadian public to consensual understandings of federalism, biculturalism, and changing imperial relations. The reason that these questions, for so long effectively buried, were nagging at the political consciousness was a result of the colonial political culture in which Confederation was framed. John Conway explained that the authors of Confederation assumed that a Canadian union would be part of the British Empire, and not an autonomous political and cultural unit. He argued that because Canadians had not
sought independence, they unconsciously failed to derive a set of political principles from their history. With the demise of the British Empire at the end of the First World War, "Canada [was] left with little more than an economic purpose [and a] cultural and political impasse [had] been reached."26 Once the option of independent nationhood became logical, even unavoidable, Canadian politics reached an impasse in which it could not retreat into imperialism because the western balance of power had shifted, and it could not go forward to national status without bringing the immutable questions of the Canadian nation to a head. Historian Edgar McInnis addressed the problem of political inertia by analyzing the congruence between the liberal and conservative political labels and the approaches to government made by so-called oppositional parties. After fifteen years of Laurier’s effort to do nothing to upset the strengthening national unity, Borden’s Conservative government came to power in 1911. McInnis observed that "[t]here could be no better illustration of the continuity of Canada’s political evolution than the fact that Borden adopted a policy that differed in very few essentials from that of Laurier."27 Although Borden rejected Laurier’s cautious isolationism, one political consistency, one might say ‘necessity’, remained unbroken throughout the Laurier-Borden governments: the need to preserve a fragile national unity through the insistence that Canada must achieve independent national status. The dissatisfaction with the political culture of ‘old politics’ spawned a new consciousness of the need for thoughtful public opinion on the problems which both marooned the political machinery and grounded political leadership in the powerless position of maintaining the illusion of national cohesion.

The open discussion and understanding of problems central to the Canadian nation
was also impeded by the entrenched patronage system. Gordon T. Stewart recognized that patronage "enabled the parties to mediate ethnic issues privately, rather than discuss them publicly and to come to terms with them."²⁸ Stewart drew from Kenneth McRae's (1974) discussion of consociational democracy to understand why biculturalism has been the most enduring question of Canadian politics. In his examination of other bilingual countries, McRae observed that linguistic communities often have separate sets of political elites which negotiate solutions to national problems. Even if there is little communication between the two communities, as has been the case between French and English Canada, there are elite means by which resolution can occur. In the Canadian case, McRae observed that French and English citizens were represented by the same national parties. Stewart argued that the two parties which represented both French and English communities were locked into power by a system of patronage that was equally systemic and accepted in both communities. Consequently, the practice of regulating French/English animosity through patronage gestures had the effect of removing bicultural discussion from the political agenda. Gordon concluded that "[patronage] helped to entrench a political culture which, because of its nature, pushed problems concerning the nature of Confederation to the background" and which produced a political environment of 'immobilization and stalemate'.²⁹ Acts of patronage replaced the tendency to think about or discuss openly how biculturalism and Canadian nationhood might be accommodated to one another. Public life languished under the need to pretend that the idea of Canadian nationhood, forged of two competing and ideologically estranged races, was non-problematic. Public life stalled until avenues were opened to discuss these
neglected questions about the Canadian nation which were bound to disrupt political complacency.

The traditional reliance on non-discursive methods of conciliation, compounded by the static indecision practised by politicians, was evident in the impoverished level of discussion in the Parliament. Grattan O'Leary, a journalist who sat in the press gallery in the 1920s, criticized the "inferiority in powers of debate" that he witnessed in the House of Commons. O'Leary, subjected daily to the monotony, left no party or leader unscathed. But, fortunately O'Leary went beyond ridicule and looked to the question of why political eloquence was in such scarce supply on the stage of Canadian democracy. He dismissed one unsatisfactory answer—that "Parliaments to-day concern themselves more with statutes and efficiency than with rhetoric and good speaking"—because he found something fundamentally wrong with a democracy that so unthinkingly submitted to the devaluation of oratory. He gave meaning and significance to this term: "Oratory is at once the expression and the chronicle of that creative stress which has shaped the course of political development in every parliamentary country." Oratory, or rhetoric in its classical sense, is the form in which political communities express the "large ideas" that provide the dynamic imaginative and ideological frameworks which construct social realities and knowledge. A political community without a strong and continuing tradition of oratory, O'Leary insinuated, was one in which a political imagination had received "no intensive cultivation" and therefore tended to remain within the degraded sphere of the concrete and the practical without realizing its obligation to articulate the development of political and democratic thought in accordance with the circumstances of the times.
The profound need for rhetoric to "[reconstruct] the fabric of civilization" in the aftermath of butchery and bloodshed in the heart of the civilized world, confirmed O'Leary's point that oratory simply could not go out of style. His criticism expressed the barren environment in which Canadian politics existed, deficient in understanding, principles, ideas and meaning.

If public opinion strengthened in the 1920s, the "lack of creative imagination" and of adept leadership in the political sphere was by no means rectified by the leader who dominated politics between 1921 and 1948, W.L. Mackenzie King. The general agreement among political critics who expressed their views during this time, as it is among historians, was that Canadian politics at the national level was lifeless and disappointing because Canadian leaders seemed content to respond as little as possible to the ideas and criticisms of progressive Canadian intellectuals and public enthusiasts. Frank Underhill, ever the critic of Canadian public life, also observed the rut into which Canadian politics had fallen. He asserted that "no healthy political life is possible in a community which had not emancipated itself from the meaningless bickering of two old political parties."  

The reciprocity issue provides an example of the political behaviour that offended his public instincts. In 1911, when a reciprocity agreement between Canada and the United States became possible, the Conservative opposition under Robert Borden denounced the deal on the unreasonable basis that Canada's sovereignty hung in the balance. He appealed to Canadians' moral and patriotic loyalty to the British empire, while in reality, it was the Canadian Manufacturers Association, the CPR and banking and insurance interests whose support Borden would need in the next election, that were more at stake.
This, one might say, is a fact of politics. However typical this type of political behaviour may be, the importance of this incident is that it represents a feature of Canadian public discourse in this era that had significant repercussions for political culture as a whole. McInnis commented that "there was relatively little discussion of these [reciprocity] proposals on their merits . . . A [Conservative] party that, in the face of Canada’s inescapable dependence on the United States, could trumpet the slogan ‘no truck or trade with the Yanks,’ was reckless in its dishonesty." \(^{35}\) The public irresponsibility of the Conservative Party is accentuated by McInnis’s comment that "under an emotional upsurge that had nothing to do with logic . . . an agreement that Canada had been seeking for the past seventy years" was defeated. \(^{36}\) Parties blocked each other’s decisions and vacillated erratically between imperialist and anti-imperialist positions depending on the political points to be scored, and as a result, any constructive amendments to significant Canadian problems were thwarted, often to the benefit of a privileged minority within Canadian society. As a taste of how the public felt toward their government, C.W. Peterson stated that Canadians lived with "the feeling of domination, of forces malignant, of a system inherently unfair, typified by machine politics, hidden agendas, and patronage by the bushel." \(^{37}\)

The dissatisfaction with the unco-operative disdain for public interest, and with the absurd and self-serving diatribes of political leaders, was expanded in a paper Underhill read to the Canadian Historical Association in 1946. His theme was that one of the essential problems of Canadian politics was the absence in its political parties of a philosophy of liberalism, or, in fact, of any political theory that would permit Canadian
politics to rise above "the sordid business of bargaining and manoeuvring amongst narrow selfish particularist interest groups." Underhill drew from Andre Siegfried's discussion of Canadian politics (1907). Siegfried portrayed politics in Canada as "the tilting ground for impassioned rivalries" in which the "parties are often to be found quite detached from the principles which gave them birth, and which have their own self-preservation as their chief care and aim." The lack of principle in the Canadian political tradition was something that bothered Underhill deeply. The image which appears to have ordered his disappointment with Canadian public life is represented in another essay he wrote for Canadian Forum in which he asked his readers to "[c]ontrast the way...in which Confederation was put across in 1867, in the midst of a vague general feeling that it was a good thing, with the vehememt discussion which took place among the Americans when they decided upon their federal constitution, and which produced some of the imperishable classics of political science." In contrast, politics in Canada was a "low game" and the "old man", Sir John A, was its preeminent captain. Before the 1920s, political dialogue which distorted issues and misled the citizenry was not challenged by a bloc of informed opinion derived within the discussions of private individuals and public representatives who congregated to form a public. One of the primary goals of the voluntary associations was to create and promote a bloc of informed opinion that generated discussion and thoroughly understood what the politicians were loath to tell the public. That Underhill endorsed this ambition is evident in his enthusiasm for work in these organizations, and in his prolonged struggle against the opinion that respectable professors declined from active engagement in public controversies.
Underhill’s political ideas were shared by the leader of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, J.S. Woodsworth. Woodsworth voiced a fundamental protest against political leadership by speaking out against the "unsatisfactory condition of public life in Canada." He declared that “the old objectives are gone, the old ideas are inadequate. the old parties do not command the enthusiasm and loyal support of even their own adherents.” Yet incredibly, the old parties maintained their dominance, regardless of the vacancy of their ‘ideas’ or ‘objectives’. The result, Woodsworth made clear, was a void of leadership on the Canadian political stage. He stated, "[w]e are awaiting a lead, but no leadership is evident." The Canadian Forum in the 1920s provides a record of the public discontent with the deadlock of conservative and impotent leadership that new federal parties had failed to displace. A desire for change had been voiced since the end of the war by the emerging Canadian left and by critical liberal thinkers across the political spectrum, yet Canadian political life remained static because an innovative style of political thinking and leadership failed to gain the majority confidence of the Canadian federal electorate. Amid the pressures of the depression and the spectre of inevitable conflict in Europe, Canadian politics seemed to have reached a breaking point by the election year of 1935. But once again, the conservative Canadian public opted for the traditional instead of the innovative, and for generalized denunciations in lieu of debate on definite issues. There is no more eloquent expression of the static delinquency of Canadian public life than that written by Graham Spry before the 1935 election:

An extraordinary and somewhat pathetic detestation for Mr Bennet is the primary political motive in Canada to-day, and the unusual, somewhat unintelligent, fervour, combined with a vague, real but still un-caralized desire for change form the main elements in a national election which, in the fifth year of the depression
in a pre-war epoch, has an importance immeasurably beyond that of almost any
election since Confederation.\textsuperscript{43}

Knowing public life as he did, Spry hit a note of dejection, saying that it was "perhaps
too much to hope that either the CCF or the Reconstruction Party may make the economic
issue [the merits of socialism versus capitalism] the centre of the fray."\textsuperscript{44} In the fifth
year of the depression in a pre-war epoch, the utter failure of the traditional
representatives of Canadian public life to address the obvious question is astounding. Not
simply a result of the untimely conjunction of inept leaders, Spry's words expressed the
failure of a political culture which denied the importance of ideas and rejected, as
blasphemy, the serious consideration of critical policy alternatives and social principles
in the sphere of public debate. As the manifestos presented by Woodsworth and H.H.
Stevens had not elicited responses from the two national parties, Spry feared the worst.
He said that the election would leave the "issues that are vital without an answer."\textsuperscript{45}
King, content to exploit the public's hatred for Bennett, was re-elected.

Despite the Canadian public's consistent decision to support traditional national
parties, public disaffection with the existing methods and styles of government and politics
in Canada was rife. Critics complained that principles, leadership, and debate were not
to be found on the political stage. But they were on the political horizon. The fact that
these criticisms are available to students of the Canadian public sphere illustrates the
existence of critical expression and debate. Despite the vital public sphere that was going
on behind the scenes of daily politics, a disgruntled but conservative 'public opinion' of
the general electorate was relatively uninfluenced by the existence of a critical stream in
public opinion. Canada's political culture had not been revolutionized by the mid-1930s,
but although progressive reformers like Underhill and Spry were frustrated by the lack of response from the general Canadian public, the existence of a more progressive political culture was becoming evident. In 1920, no one was studying Canadian problems and realities with much enthusiasm. By the time the election of 1935 had come, thousands of people in a string of national organizations met regularly to learn about and discuss public issues, and two new parties, one of which was to have a significant influence for many years, had entered federal politics with policies which were the result of critical and objective studies of Canadian issues. Those who became active in the protracted drive to mobilize, organize and cultivate responsible public opinion by pointing out the problems and deficiencies of Canadian public life were part of a movement for progressivism in Canada. Reformers emphasized various particular issues, but the general ambition was to revitalize public life and to raise the realistic expectations of Canadians for ethical and principled leadership and for a more responsible regard by the government for ‘public’ interests through the vehicle of informed and thoughtful public opinion.

If Canadians were discontent with the political status quo even before the First World War, why was the shift in political culture so gradual? The late arrival and meagre number of critical journals of Canadian opinion suggest that criticism, as an intellectual tradition and a public exercise, was uncommon in Canada. W.L. Grant stated that "[f]ew gifts of greater value could be given to our Canadian life by a publicly-spirited millionaire than that of a literary and political weekly" that embodied a critical attitude toward nineteenth-century precepts that had been shaken irrevocably by the war. Looking back on this era, Desmond Pacey asserted that university quarterlies had an incredible influence
on Canadian cultural development: "lacking the weekly journals of opinion which have played such a part in English intellectual life, Canada relied upon the quarterlies to provide informed discussion of public affairs, reasoned reviews of current books and general essays on literature, arts and social movements."47 In 1938, F.P. Grove made an explicit connection between political and literary criticism, although his complaint at the time was that social and political criticism was absent from ‘critical’ reviews of literature because Canadian fiction was virtually void of the same. He believed "it to be axiomatic that the general level of mental aliveness within a nation can best be measured by the spirit of intellectual adventure displayed in the critical activities of weeklies and monthlies."48 Grove judged that a greater magnitude of various kinds of criticism (social, literary, political, cultural) was needed to stimulate mental activity in the Canadian public in the attempt to achieve public enlightenment across divisions of geography and social class. The implications of Canadians’ lack of concern with intellectual ideas, Grove asserted, was that they did not possess a healthy public spirit. He was appalled that "Canadians are, at bottom, not interested in their own country . . . This lack of mental aliveness is fundamental. Canada is a non-conductor for any sort of intellectual current."49 Standards, principles, thought, critical opinion, and interest in Canada were needed to rescue its politics from its present lethargy. The same were needed to fill an empty public sphere with a new vitality.

Cultural Development
Although he often found himself amid detractors of his ideas, Frank Underhill was perhaps at his most conventional when he expressed dissatisfaction with the tendency for Canadian leaders to forfeit the principles and practice of Canadian politics "to the sphere of commercial and industrial progress, to the development of the material resources of the country." The problem of Canada's overtly material development began to offend Canadians in the 1920s who wished to see Canada develop culturally, instead of in a consuming passion for material wealth. By 1920, the existence of Canadian culture was still in question, and it would remain so throughout the period which this thesis investigates. Canada's literature was 'colonial', its scholarship on Canadian topics of interest was insufficient and conservative, and its educated population was so small and dispersed that a civilized culture, which required extensive collectivity, seemed unlikely. The focus of literary and cultural discussions after 1920 was in building and cultivating a national consciousness through a Canadian literature which embodied a national identity, and on which could be built a body of Canadian criticism.

Within the university quarterlies and critical journals, regular commentary was written on the status of cultural development in Canada and the level and type of education that was common to most of its citizens. In general, the disturbed protests about the state of Canada's literary and cultural development belie the intellectual community's assumption that a cultivated and literate citizenry would also possess a strong public spirit. The need for political and public moral standards was often the central point in articles which discussed political and cultural paucity. Those who made this connection between cultivation and public spirit reacted strongly against the colonial
character of their nation which was still absorbed in the mundane task of material development. When F.P. Grove complained that "true civilizations have . . . grown out of a spiritual soil, not a material one," he suggested, like many of his Canadian contemporaries, that the concept of Canadian nationhood was meaningless unless it incorporated a set of cultural values. In 1925, A.R. MacDougall asserted that 'ethical theory' and "the emphasis on mental (which of course included moral) and cultural riches, rather than on material [riches]" must remain important to Canadians in their new phase of cultural, intellectual and spiritual nation-building. A material culture, as opposed to an ethical or moral one, MacDougall suggested, was a culture in which an apolitical citizenry had developed without a public spirit; a community in which ethical considerations were important would be a community that took "an intelligent interest in the machinery of government", that participated in the "solution of [social] problems" and understood the significance of Woodrow's Wilson's declaration that "our civilization cannot survive materially unless it be revived spiritually." Although MacDougall's discussion is written in the universal language of 'human civilization', the same pattern was at work at the national level. The 'cultivation' of Canada through the development of its literature and criticism was expected to transform the dominant material ideology, which lacked features of identity, character and public consciousness, into a national spirit in which the citizen's concern for culture, literature, public affairs was implicit.

In a similar vein, Carleton Stanley (who later became president of Dalhousie University) wrote a critical article for a British journal in 1923 on the "Spiritual Conditions in Canada." Stanley argued that important social institutions (university,
press and church) had been absorbed into the sphere of material wealth whereby they forfeited their abilities to act as defenders and educators of civil rights, intellect and culture. He complained that Canada’s intellectual community was contained in institutions that lacked independence, and was largely silenced due to the existence of very few “critical weeklies and reviews of standing” in which to express their opinions and thereby encourage a critical understanding of Canadian institutions, ideologies, and social structure. The result of the material ideology that had pervaded Canada’s social institutions, Stanley proposed, was that the ‘education’--not academic but social and political--of the large majority of Canadians was suffering. He linked the educational deficiency in the climate of materialism to the paltry level of political ‘thought’ and discourse which appealed more often to emotion than to reason--a practice, he noted, that T.A. Crerar and the Progressive Party made a conscious effort to reverse in the 1921 election. Significantly, Stanley concluded his discussion by addressing cultural deficiency, signified by Canada’s lack of art and literature, which he attributed directly to the "appalling materialism of our ambitions, our judgments, our pleasures, our whole activity." The point made in Stanley’s article was that a lack of character and cultural development in Canadian communities would persist so long as the respect for material wealth distorted respect for the "things of the intellect and the spirit" as the ‘Salutation’ for the Dalhousie Review put it. The Dalhousie Review was an enterprise in public education—that is, it provided an informative service of education to the public body with the intention of increasing public enlightenment--designed to allow social problems to "be clearly understood and effectively discussed" from an historical, as well as a
contemporary, perspective. According to the intellectual community which expressed their collective belief that a society of cultivated individuals would also be a society which would respond intelligently to public affairs, the lack of cultural development, obvious in the virtual absence of critical journals, was one of the primary factors contributing to the long dormancy of the Canadian public sphere. But the interpretation of cultural development in terms of a national culture was a problematic aspect of Canadian cultural development itself. And although the dissatisfaction with Canada's level of cultural development did generate discussion about the need for criticism and about the effects of a material culture on Canadian society, the resulting discourse of national culture restricted the range of acceptable debate within the emerging Canadian public sphere. The effect of nationalism on the public sphere will be assessed fully in the following chapter, but it should be noted at this point because it runs counter to the idea that a critical public sphere and political consciousness were emerging fully developed from the colonial stage.

What the discussion of materialism veils, however, is the more fundamental problem that Stanley did not explicitly mention: colonialism. Residual colonialism was a problem stemming from the historical fact that the nation of Canada was the product of a long process of negotiation for political independence. Harold Innis associated Canada's intellectual and cultural development with the condition of colonialism that has remained a central fact of our political and social history. In his essay, "The Church in Canada"\textsuperscript{56}, Innis asserted that one of the significant facts of Canada's retarded cultural development lay in its colonial roots in New France under the administrative bureaucracy of Louis XIV. He stated that "Great Britain failed in the first Empire [the Thirteen
Colonies] because Englishmen are alike, but succeeded in the second Empire [British North America] to a greater extent than is generally realized because French bureaucracy had become solidly entrenched in New France."^{57} The bureaucratic control over the Canadian provinces afforded by the continuity of administration, had produced a political culture that was institutionally different from that of the Thirteen Colonies. He stated that "the absence of a revolutionary tradition in Canada assumes relative stability and continuous repression with the result, as Professor J.B. Brebner [1945] has shown, that we have been largely concerned with the training of our best students for export to countries with a revolutionary tradition."^{58} An indication of the possible difference between Canada and a country which had a revolutionary tradition (the United States being the obvious choice) is supplied in the finding of literary critic F.W. Watt who explored the patterns of social protest in Canadian writing. His study led him to a conclusion with which Innis could easily have agreed: "[Canadians'] desire for unanimity produced a national temper or ethos which offered no adequate outlet (except emigration) for those who had criticisms, reservations or competing ideals."^{59} He asserted that the exigencies of material nation-building "remained so dominant (politically organized and communicated to the public) that . . . the issues [of the great European social revolutions] were rarely seriously brought into the arena of public debate and were never sharply drawn, despite the efforts of a militant minority."^{60} Colonial cultural development, which deeply affected the political culture, created an environment in which articulate and autonomous thought was repressed, and inarticulate communication, especially the conduits associated with the public authority (i.e. the transcontinental railway) were
celebrated. Innis’ understanding of patterns of Canadian communication reflects Northrop Frye’s observation that "[i]t is in the inarticulate part of communication, railways and bridges and canals and highways . . . that Canada has shown its real strength." Frye’s comment points to a constant feature in the history of Canadian communication; there has been more success in installing the hardware of physical communication systems than there has been in generating the Canadian content to be transported and broadcast on these systems. The comments of Innis, Watt, and Frye suggest a problem that appears to be related to colonialism and to the level of cultural development in Canada and which reveals itself in the idea that there has been a lack of expression in Canada--that, in the period under study and before, Canadian society was largely inarticulate.

At the end of the war, eager Canadian nationalists were painfully aware of the continuing colonialism of Canada. Those who found the nation’s cultural and political discourses destitute, unrealistic and full of Canadian idealization blamed it on materialism and insufficient education, and they were determined to see these impediments to intellectual currents removed. A.B. McKillop’s (1987) examination of discourses that are recorded in Canadian journals of opinion in the 1920s revealed a high concern for the redefinition of social values, and for the possibilities for social progress and civilization in a ‘value-free’ scientific era. The scientific orientation of society seemed to oppose the value-laden concepts of culture, morality and humanity. Canada’s intellectual community, in tandem with others in Britain and Europe, debated the worth of a civilization which might develop without these values. The problem was considered more acute in Canada, a country without a literary tradition which expressed and determined is changing cultural
values, and in which American mass culture had a growing influence among Canadian audiences. American mass culture and entertainment which seemed to be diverting the attention of the majority of Canadians away from the development of art, literature and scholarship in Canada, was interpreted as a threat to the moral values and critical standards which were imparted to those exposed to 'high' culture. Against the threat of science and of mass culture, the Canadian intellectual community turned to the conservative doctrine of liberal humanism as a means of salvaging civilization, and more immediately, as a foundation on which to build notions of 'Canadian culture.'

Paul Litt, who studied the articulation of 'Canadian culture' through the values of liberal humanism espoused by the members of the Massey Commission, stated that members of the cultural lobby "generally agreed that the values that underpinned liberal democracy could be found in traditional high culture, [and therefore] cultural questions took on enormous contemporary relevance." 62 This attitude was derived from the tradition of Arnoldian criticism in which the value of culture was understood to be in its ability to give order to society by establishing the predominant values which should underpin social thinking, and to act as a defence against the development of a value-free society based on science and technology. Arnold's thoughts on culture somewhat reflect Habermas' conception of culture as a means to self-understanding and self-liberation. Litt stated that for Arnold, "culture was a force of freedom because it stimulated the intellectual development and self-awareness that were the true marks of individuality." 63 Litt asserted that liberal humanists, who maintained a strong faith in high culture as a form of intellectual training and enlightenment, felt that "the only safeguard of a
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democracy is an attitude of intelligent critical evaluation on the part of citizens."\textsuperscript{64} Exposure to high culture was understood as a form of education which permits the spiritual, moral and intellectual development of individuals in democratic societies. It was quickly becoming apparent to members of Canada's intellectual community that the new medium, radio, was not being used for educational purposes, but for entertainment purposes which, they assumed, would result in a weakening of the Canadian's critical abilities. This discourse is most evident in the projections of the Canadian Radio League who advocated public ownership in radio so that it could "serve instead [of a means of disseminating mass culture] as an instrument of education and entertainment, and as a means of cultivating thoughtful public opinion."\textsuperscript{65} Mass entertainment, as a form of culture, was interpreted by the intellectual community to be taking the place of higher forms of culture such as religion and liberal education which emphasized the formation of 'character'. McKillop cited an article written in 1918 by W.P.M. Kennedy for The Rebel (a University of Toronto publication which became Canadian Forum). Kennedy asserted that the purpose of liberal education was for "the building up of character... in order to make students 'leaders of public opinion, courageous guides to the new Canada'."\textsuperscript{66} Kennedy's statement demonstrates the extent to which liberal education and individual cultivation were understood to be the foundations of political vibrancy and leadership. Educational culture was defended as a means to reproducing, within the Canadian public, a cultivated pool of leadership which possessed political consciousness and which was able to fulfil the critical function of protecting democratic institutions.

The defense of high culture which 'cultivated' individuals as social leaders
indicates that the maintainers and creators of twentieth-century Canadian society were expected to be able to engage in criticism—the discussion of the standards of value on which people agree to shape their sociopolitical communities. What is so important about criticism that every functional society must have its share? Although Matthew Arnold did not interpret criticism as a 'public' discourse, criticism and cultural discourse, as he understood them, are germane to the public sphere. In his terms, criticism was the process through which people distinguished the intelligent and meaningful from the witless, the sublime from the mediocre in thought, writing and art. Consequently, criticism is an activity that can only occur within the discourses of people in society. It is not the standards themselves (for they change continually), but the ongoing search that is important, because that search is the record of cultural discourse which Habermas stated was necessary to the formation of a critical subjectivity and taste, and when applied to the political stratum, to the formation of political consciousness and public opinion. Spry’s enumeration of the developments in Canadian intellectual life (evident in the critical journals of opinion, in an enlarging reading public, and in the effort to increase the clarity and intelligence of political discussion) signifies the growth of a movement that created a public sphere with critical aspects. Moreover, the developments that Spry distinguished indicate the formation of a public sphere which demanded the identical requisites (cultural discourse, subjectivity, political consciousness) as the theoretical model proposed by Habermas. The discourse of Canadian culture grew in reaction to the country's own material emphasis as a colony, and in reaction to the need to find new sources of civil values on which political and human communities could be established. The ideology of
liberal humanism was completely compatible with Canadians' efforts to complete the transition from (materialistic) colony to (spiritual and well-governed) nation in which a national identity and consciousness (both in the political and cultural senses) could emerge simultaneously.

But in order that this thesis does not fall into the same trap which it criticizes, the writer's own enthusiasm to 'discover' the Canadian public sphere must be countered. Among the spokespersons for Canadian literature, for instance, there were explicit nationalists, guilty of enthusiastic 'boosterism', and implicit nationalists, concerned—in the interest of fostering a significant and worthwhile culture—to bring standards of criticism to the evaluation of Canadian culture. Whether critical or uncritical, the fact is that it would be almost impossible to find a Canadian public speaker between 1920 and 1950 who was not a nationalist and an ardent patriot. Despite the disillusionment of Canadians with the first and second world wars, and with the failure of Canadian politics and economy, the passion for the Canadian nation that was exhibited by the intellectual community did not fade throughout this period. The next generation of critics, writing in the 1960s and 1970s, better understood how debilitating Canadian nationalism was to the public sphere which emerged after the 1920s. Eli Mandel's conspicuous criticism of Frank Underhill's empty words ("A nation is a body of men who have done great things in the past and who hope to do great things in the future") in The Image of Confederation (1964) is explained by the fact that Underhill, in all his tirades against Canadian political traditions and inadequacies, was a fervid nationalist. Mandel brooded over Underhill's optimism saying "How pathetic it is that, confronting the gravest crisis that the nation has
endured, one of its most eloquent liberals can propose as a resolution to the deepest rift of all not the constitutionalism of the rationalists, but only the vaguest hope, based on an illusion looking toward a mystery." The acceptance of Canadian nationalism as the consensual basis on which public speakers and writers constructed their discourses meant that nationalism, like idealism before it, caused a certain amount of emptiness and vacancy to persist in Canadian public discourse. In the following chapter, one of the major questions that will be asked is whether or not Canadian nationalism, as it was understood by Canadian intellectuals, could afford an unrestricted space of free and critical discourse; Mandel suggested that it did not.

This cursory look at some aspects of, and comments on, Canadian cultural development illustrates that associations were recognized between the cultural development of the country and the possession of a more critical public spirit. The intellectual community applied their minds to the conclusion of Canada's colonial dark ages as an act of intelligent and rational patriotism. Canada's intellectual community responded to the passage of nineteenth-century thought and relations and to Canada's fledgling independence. by fostering a rational and objective understanding of the ideals, policies, and rhetorics to which Canadians could reasonably be expected to pledge their unified support. But despite the wish to be objective, the intellectual community's loyalty to Canada, to the idea that it need not be so colonial, nor so parochial, was the fundamental tenet of their public spirit.

The Problem of Canadian Criticism
The increasing level of cultural discourse which Graham Spry perceived,⁶⁸ that perhaps had given rise to an "authentic" public sphere, must be weighed against the complaint that Canadian intellectual life and culture were not sufficiently developed. In 1893, Canadian historian John Bourinot wrote Our Intellectual Strengths and Weaknesses in which he endeavoured to demonstrate a latent capacity, but reluctance, of Canadians to develop their cultural and intellectual resources. Despite his assertion that "the spirit of materialism and practical habits ... [continues to] cramp literary effort,"⁶⁹ his faith was strong that Canadians would do the "rough work" necessary before "its Augustan age [would] come."⁷⁰ In 1921, W.L. Grant set for himself the task of bringing Bourinot's survey of Canadian cultural development up to date in an article for Queen's Quarterly. Grant suggested that a marked improvement had occurred since Bourinot's investigation in Canadian art, and in the existence of public galleries, better architecture, and the improvement of academic enterprises (although historical writing was "not always free from provincialism").⁷¹ Although Grant did mention the worthy achievements of a few Canadian writers and poets, he found that Canada still waited for its great author and its great poet. Literature, and especially literary criticism, remained virtually void in Canadian cultural life.

Criticism is one of the processes through which change (both cultural and political) occurs. It is also the institution in which the public sphere comes alive. Without criticism, changes in taste and opinions are arrested and public spheres remain dormant. If cultural and political developments in Canada are related, then perhaps Douglas Bush's suggestion that Canadians had an "uncritical instinct" is a clue as to why both were
impaired. Bush suggested that the semi-colonial state in which the nation existed was perpetuated while Canadians rejected the need to understand themselves and their country in a self-critical manner. A.J.M. Smith complained in his essay, "Wanted--Canadian Criticism", that one of the foremost impediments of Canadian literary development was the conservative cultural limitations that bound the subject matter of Canadian writers to that which was well within the limits of the public's puritan morality. He said that the idea that "praise or blame is to be conferred [on any subject whatsoever] after a consideration, not of its moral, but of its aesthetic harmony is a proposition that will take years to knock into the heads of our people." Canadians, as far as Bush and Smith were concerned, were recluses of Victorian taste whose moral indignation was provoked by any subject tainted by realism, and whose first reaction was to denounce all writing which employed realism on the basis that it was improper or untrue, and thereby to deny the possibility of close analysis and open consideration of works which studied Canadian sociology and psychology. For example, a short story by Jean Burton, published in *Canadian Forum* (October 1927), which made faint allusions to sexuality, and to disturbing trends of psychological despair in Canadian society, elicited indignant replies and threats of subscription cancellation. To demonstrate the distaste for social realities in the Canadian reading public, it is sufficient to repeat the objection of one offended reader who asked if a story about squalor and suicide was "of any value, ethical, literary or otherwise?" Realism, a modernist literary style, was resisted by the Canadian public, but leading Canadian poets, notably those associated with the McGill Group (A.J.M. Smith, F.R. Scott, Leo Kennedy, A.M. Klein), which produced the shortlived
McGill Fortnightly Review (1925-27) and Canadian Mercury (1928-29), and also F.P. Grove. E.J. Pratt, Dorothy Livesay, and Raymond Knister, pursued the acceptance of realism, not only because they found it more engaging than the endless scenic gushes. As Desmond Pacey explained, realism was a part of the strategy of literary nationalism which was directed toward the creation of "a Canadian literature worthy of comparison with the new literature emanating from abroad." Pacey clearly expressed the extent to which Canadian literature was politicized during this period. But, at the same time, realism in literature had a potential role to play in the development of important and worthwhile cultural, political, social and public discourse in Canada which was needed to modify some of the stale and outdated nineteenth-century attitudes toward society which many members of the Canadian public harboured. As E.K. Brown noted, one of the important aspects of a meaningful literature was an accuracy of tone. He found that "throughout our literature there has been a disposition to force the note, to make life appear nobler, or gayer or more intense than Canadian life really is," a convention that Stephen Leacock played with in his ironic satire of small town Ontario. Brown asserted that "it would help us toward cultural maturity if we had a set of novels . . . that described the life of Canadian towns and cities as it really is."76

The years after the First World War marked the conscious movement of Canadian thought into the intellectual sphere of modernity which was at odds with the remnants of nineteenth-century idealism and sensibility that had clung to Canadian cultural perspectives throughout the first two decades of the twentieth century. Smith emphatically set the standard against which Canadian artists would be measured in the
modern Canada: "Modernity and tradition alike demand that the contemporary artist who survives adolescence shall be an intellectual. Sensibility is no longer enough, intelligence is required. Even in Canada." It was not that Canadians were stupid, but that they resisted the fact that their culture would not be meaningful, interesting, and most importantly it could not sustain cultural discourse, unless Canadian artists could say something significant about the life and times of human society from a Canadian perspective. Similarly, Bush condemned the culturally destructive reliance on the majesty of the Canadian landscape to fill the space of intelligent evaluation. Writers seemed to think that "mountain or rivulet make cultivation superfluous; indeed they seem to fear that some fundamental brain-work would take the bloom off our spontaneous emotions." Within this stunted intellectual climate, critical cultural discourse (from which a political consciousness and normative public sphere are theoretically derived) could not flourish, and the reluctance to think seriously about cultural and social conditions in Canada contributed significantly to the exaggerated praise for the arts in Canada, to the emptiness of political discourse, and to the limited growth of a critical public sphere. Although Spyr noticed an advancement in the level of critical discussion in Canadian cultural and political discourses, a problematic pattern in cultural discourse is suggested by a number of commentators on Canada’s cultural development.

An observation made by literary critic E.K. Brown asserted that the formation of creative ideas was inappropriate within the ‘set of values’ that structured colonial cultural attitudes. Brown asserted that the "uneasiness in the presence of the contemplative or esthetic is to be ascribed to the frontier feeling that these are luxuries which should not
be sought at a time when there is a tacit contract that everyone should be doing his[her] share in the common effort to build the material structure of a nation. The 'tacit contract' was more than a pragmatic view that Canadians would have to build their house before they could live in it. That understanding was not tacit, for it was, in fact, explicitly expressed in official public discourse. The language that Brown used suggests that not only were Canadians encouraged to contribute to nation-building projects. The aspect of the public agreement that was tacit--silent and unspoken--was the expectation that the Canadian public would continue to allow political decision-making to go on with very little of their own input, and which demonstrated little concern for their welfare and their capacities as citizens of a democratic polity.

The attitude that Canadians should remain silent about the injustices and inequities which were plainly obvious to them in Canadian society began to change in the first two decades of the twentieth century. In the atmosphere of post-war nationalism, the view that all activities should be utilitarian was openly unacceptable to the small portion of Canadians who were university educated. Although many had completed graduate studies at universities in Britain and the United States, once these individuals returned to Canada they constituted an urban middle class of cultural consumers who understood the spiritual and intellectual essentials of nationhood, and who desired to dispense with Canada's unrefined colonial character and reach towards the realization of a distinct national character expressed through cultural and intellectual achievement. But progress was frustratingly slow, and the fundamental problems in the cultural and political spheres that began to be openly discussed in the 1920s remained problematic in the 1960s, as
Desmond Pacey pointed out in the closing comments to his essay on Canadian writing which initiates the second volume of *The Literary History of Canada*. The perpetual and unchanging crisis of Canadian culture and politics suggests either that the more critical attitude which developed between 1920 and 1950 toward Canadian public affairs (including culture) did not go far enough in its criticism and therefore in its ability to change public thinking, or that despite the vigour of the criticism which had been aroused in the articulate 'elite' intellectual community, their classist alienation from the largely inarticulate 'mass' public caused most attempts to forge a connection between these two categories of society to fail. And it appears that the two types of criticism, political and cultural, were not equally effective during this period.

Criticism, when applied to politics and to culture, produced two different results. Political criticism formed public opinion, while cultural criticism concerned the taste for and significance of artistic or literary works. It seems that public opinion was more easily encouraged and understood than Canadian cultural criticism, and therefore, the change in political culture is more easily discernible within this period than is progress toward a body of Canadian criticism. It was less difficult to focus criticism on entrenched political conventions which impeded change, than it was to assess the consequences of a non-existent literature. For instance, in his study of the implications of the patronage system on political culture, Gordon Stewart observed that "there emerges a remarkable similarity in how the system worked under Macdonald and Laurier and a remarkable stability in a system that had the same structure in 1912 as it did in the 1880s." But through series of commissions culminating in 1911-12 that scrutinized the public service, the public
began to understand the debilitating effect patronage had on the public service. During the war years progressive reformers, such as W.L. Grant, lobbied for changes that would require the public servants to be selected on the basis of merit and qualification, and in the 1920s, the civil service became a question that was diligently debated in some of the voluntary associations which formed the institutional framework of the new public sphere.

The problem of developing Canadian literary criticism continued long past the point at which an established and even dominant 'Canadian' public opinion had developed. E.K. Brown expressed clearly how the 'colonial mentality' rendered Canadian criticism problematic because a colony "applies to what it has standards that are imported, and therefore artificial and distorting. It sets the great good place not in its present, nor in its past, nor in its future, but somewhere outside its own borders, beyond its own possibilities" (italics added). Unlike the criticism of debilitated political institutions, cultural standards that originated in the materialistic colony--the hinterland--remained unacceptable because it was expected that the induction of cultural values could only occur in the cultural centre--the metropolis. F.B. Housser expressed this problem in 1926 in the 'Introduction' to his book on Canadian art in which he portrayed the Group of Seven in Whitmanesque terms as the forthright assertion of an independent Canadian spirit through the artistic representation of the rough landscape which Canadian artists had previously disguised in a mistier and more romantic style reminiscent of the old world. It is notable that Housser consciously borrowed the rhetoric of the American transcendental poet to validate the art movement in Canada which has not since, I do not think, been described as transcendental. The following comment suggests why it was
necessary to do this. Housser stated that

[as long as Canada regarded itself artistically as the mere outpost of Europe; as long as its painters elected for voluntary mediocrity by the mental admission that Canadians possess no potentialities with which to create a culture as good or better than Europe's; so long was our modern twentieth-century-born spirit of independence voiceless.]

The use of the transcendental lexicon demonstrates the lengths to which the Canadian critic had to go to defend himself against the accusation that he was speaking from a partisan and provincial perspective. But the reliance on a language that didn't describe the philosophy or meaning of this movement in Canadian art did nothing to improve Housser's case. Within the metropolis-hinterland relationship in which Canada existed with Europe and Britain, it was assumed that 'colonials' were without the tools necessary for the cultivation of urbane taste and were therefore incapable of objective and discriminating criticism necessary to raise colonial culture to respectable standards for art and literature. Canadian literary critics were placed in the awkward position. Their job was to foster the future maturity (even greatness) of Canadian literature. But they had to do so with the materials at hand, by evaluating an admittedly immature literature by imported standards that consistently ranked Canadian literature, and those who defended it, low on the scale of respectable and intelligent taste. Canadian criticism rested uncertainly in a position of having to defend an immature literature and at the same time having to criticize its unworthiness in comparison to the great literatures of other nations. If critics attempted to evaluate literature on a set of indigenous cultural standards, the literature would be rejected as none other than colonial. The hinterland-metropolis configuration of cultural haves and have nots was inescapable, and it left no comfortable
space in which Canadian literary critics could allow a national literature to take shape. This uncertainty was compounded by the fact that, within the tradition of German romantic nationalism, a national literature symbolized and legitimated the achievement of nationhood.

The problem of simultaneously needing a literature, and of understanding that Canadian literature was still unformed, explains the predominant form of expression that developed within literary criticism. Commentary on Canadian criticism invariably identifies the recurring pattern of rifted thought that characterized the process and plight of literary criticism. John Bourinot's thesis in Our Intellectual Strengths and Weaknesses (1893) was that the existence of native literature in Canada, humble as it was, proved that cultural and intellectual growth in Canada had occurred. The idea that this needed to be demonstrated, and the fact that these developments were so desperately required as an indication of nationhood, is an explanation of why Bourinot is so uncritical of the actual works. In fact, he insinuated that the fact that these works existed was almost enough to satisfy the nineteenth-century Canadian 'critic'.

Bourinot assessed the level of cultivation and public performance of politicians and the press by studying how well each used language to fulfil their public functions. He portrayed Canadian leaders as cultivated and publicly-minded men of good character whose skills of speech and debate represented the possession of intellect and taste. The value that Bourinot placed in the capacity for individual cultivation, rational argument, education, and rhetorical prowess is evident in the fact that he associated the best political leaders with these characteristics. He compared the distinction of public figures against
the immoral, narrow-minded, and partisan character of the press which, he asserted, demonstrated "an absence of that responsibility to public opinion." Curiously, when Bourinot turned his attention to Canadian literature, he said that in the "truly Canadian spirit" people should show "a love for Canada, its scenery, its history and traditions." He implied that the uncritical celebration of Canadian writing and poetry was a patriotic duty and expectation, that was later reflected in the embarrassing flourishes of the Canadian Bookman and the Canadian Authors' Association which pressed the public to buy Canadian novels of questionable quality. In literary pursuits, Bourinot seemed to give Canadians a license to be as partisan, unobjective, unreasoned, and unlearned as they wished to be. In contrast to the standards Bourinot expected of public figures, the absence of standards in literature (another form of public expression) suggested that the act of writing in Canada in the late nineteenth-century was considered to be an apolitical, as well as an unintellectual, exercise whose sanctioned function and subject matter concerned the loyal veneration of Canadian nature and institutions. It appears that by the end of the nineteenth century, the public's tacit contract for national development was being extended to its obligation to support the cultural development of the nation. Bourinot's fawning praise of Canadian literature and poetry, and his indication to the public of its proper response to Canadian writing, suggests that public spirit was expected to remain unconditionally apolitical now that the house was built, but the walls were still bare.

By 1921, when W.L. Grant wrote "The Present Intellectual Status of Canada", other critics (not the 'boosters' of the Canadian Authors' Association which Bush and
Smith frankly criticized) were more stridently dissatisfied with the condition of Canadian literature. Modern critics' attempts to foster Canadian criticism accentuates the contradiction between Bourinot's critical task and his uncritical rendering of it, and the more exacting standards applied by modern critics demonstrates how harmful Bourinot's charitable form of 'criticism' for literary excellence. Irresponsible criticism was beneficial neither to the cultivation of literary taste in the reading public, nor to the aim of fostering a literature of high calibre, just as irresponsible and unrealistic political rhetoric was detrimental to the formation of an informed public opinion which is essential to the success of every democratic government. The rifted pattern of thought (evident in Bourinot's enthusiasm for Canada's prospective Augustan age) had changed into the characteristic modern ambivalence, tinged with colonial insecurity, which has become synonymous with Canadian culture and criticism. Grant stated that "we still tend with an uneasy arrogance which veils a real humility to hail each new imitation as "the Canadian Keats" or "the Canadian Kipling" or we indulge in a pitch of extravagant laudation in which all standards disappear." When Desmond Pacey looked at the process of political and cultural evolution from 1920 to 1960, he stated that Canadians were "still prone either to under-rate Canadian books because they were not reviewed in the fashionable English or American periodicals or to over-rate them because they were our own, still alternated between truculent cultural self-assertion and whining cultural self-pity" (italics added). Pacey's comment illustrates the tension between the co-existing concepts of colony and nation that was created by a confusion arising from where Canadians thought their cultural attitudes (and therefore values) rested. In a submission
to the Massey Commission in 1950, B.K. Sandwell demonstrated the longevity of the
'colonial mentality' when he wrote that "[o]ne serious consequence of the unripe state of
national culture is a deficiency in the ability of Canadians to formulate judgements
concerning the achievements . . . of their fellow-citizens. The whole evaluation process
among Canadians tends to await the result of an evaluation process taking place
somewhere else." Lacking the security of its cultural worth, Canada had not yet
become a site of culture, nor of evaluation, perhaps because it feared that under too stern
an application of criticism, Canadians would find Canadian culture, measurable by
European standards, still did not exist.

Margery Fee pointed directly to the dilemma of Canadian critics in her discussion
of the institutionalization of Canadian literature in the university, which was as much a
political act involved in the demarcation of national boundary as it was a cultural act.
She drew on the dissertation of Australian scholar Alan Lawson who studied the
"Recognition of National Literatures." In his dissertation, he clearly expressed the plight
of 'colonial' critics:

The predicament of those judges assessing the writing of the age of imminent
maturity was to be sharply discriminating enough to justify their role as critics
while concealing their eagerness to actually discover the Great Australian/Canadian
novel and thereby extend their legitimate activities into teaching and research."

The Canadian critic was a dogged figure, required to ensure his respectability as a critic
by deferring to a hierarchy of standards developed to evaluate more matures literatures,
and forced, then, to rank Canadian literature below that of Britain and America. A
distinctive feature of the commentary of literary critics is that their thought seemed to
move on two axes, the hierarchy of literature and to the passage of time. Canadian
literature ranked low in the hierarchy and seemed powerless to catch up in time and to the standards of the developed literatures which drew from a rich past and made constant advancements in contemporary literature.

The question of the existence of Canadian literature has important implications for this study. As the existence of a reading public (which is probably more fundamental to the formation of a public sphere than the possession of a national literature) was doubtful in Canada, one of the foundations of the liberal public sphere was absent. Although the very limited reading public in Canada commended literatures written by non-Canadians, the absence of a well-developed Canadian literature (fiction) was troubling because of the perception that Canadians could not begin to understand who they were until they saw themselves represented in literature, and were able to discuss those representations. In 1912, literary critic Edgar Pelham lamented that "[n]o one . . . has yet synthesized for us the meaning of our Canadian life, nor revealed to us ourselves. Mere scattered hints and faint suggestions we find, but no convincing picture." Still more problematic for a literature which might contribute to a healthy public sphere, was the genre of fiction that had taken hold in Canadian literary culture. Carole Gerson’s study of nineteenth-century Canadian fiction writing, discussed Canadians’ literary taste for romantic fiction in which the author removes characters and circumstances from the arena of common experience by heightening their distinguishing characteristics so that heroes are more perfect, villains more evil, and events more coincidental, tragic or blissful than real life.

The colony-nation looked to the future, or to the romantic hero, to justify the deficiencies of the present, but it would not look at itself realistically or critically because such behaviour would be considered unpatriotic, pessimistic, even un-Christian. Gerson noted
that a "lack of optimism" was one of the "most reprehensible violations of the [Walter] Scott standard that Canadian authors could commit."91 Canadian cultural tastemakers judged that a wholesome Canadian literature should be built on Christian idealism, on the presentation of optimism, courage, noble social behaviour, individual and social virtue, and decorum (emphasizing restraint, self-control, and conformity and denying the importance of individual freedom to engage in autonomous thought and action). These features were uncriticizable because of their connection with the Christian faith, and because it was considered dishonourable to denigrate "Canada", the nation which would one day be great, on the basis of its present colonial inadequacies. The solution was not to mention these inadequacies; the implication was that "the resulting [literary] discourse of gentility masked the society it represented."92 Gerson studied the literary comments of Lorne Pierce, chief editor of Ryerson Press from 1922-1960 and writer of An Outline of Canadian Literature (1927). She found that despite his recognition that Canadian writing was impaired by ""diffuse style, shadowy characters and ephemeral thinking' as well as the tendency to 'offer a moral epigram as a substitute' for penetrating characterization, [Pierce] went on to commend precisely those features of Canadian writing that resisted realistic social and psychological analysis."93

The importance of Gerson's study of nineteenth-century literary culture to the possibilities of a Canadian public sphere lies in the use of language that she described. Decades into the twentieth century, literary language, in fiction and criticism, was used as a means to avoid the need to observe, examine and understand the reality of the social space called Canada.94 From Gerson's work, one infers that the crisis of thought and
development in the political and cultural spheres that Canadian nationalists fervidly attempted to rectify after 1920, was, in part, the consequence of nineteenth-century Canadian literary culture which institutionalized a form of public speech that consciously, and with general approval, evaded meditation on and valid understanding of the character of Canadian society and individuals within it. This was so consistent that it seems impossible that it was an unconscious error. In fact, it appears to have been deliberate, as Gaile MacGregor's study of literary language and cultural development makes clear. She argued that writers 'conventionalized' the Canadian experience, expressing it in borrowed romantic language and forms which were unsuited to its depiction, as part of a strategy of avoidance. She determined that "it seems obvious that the wilful confounding of fact and fantasy, when the latter is imposed upon rather than emerging from the former, can, especially in a colonial setting, be culturally debilitating, even dangerous."

The fact that by 1920, Canadian literary criticism was still a mystery, and a good portion of critical public discourse was expended in proclaiming the need for critical public discourse, suggests that the public use of language to avoid, to confound, to deny, and to silence the expression of those "who might say something distasteful about domestic affairs" as Harold Innis once said, had become a conventional cultural norm.

**Canadian Criticism and Public Opinion**

The problems of time and of place are important to Canadian political and cultural criticism. The Canadian colony was situated in the uncivilized new world and its
geographical location virtually excluded the possibility of its cultural existence. Canada had become a 'young' nation in which it was expected that cultural development, like the length of its political history, was truncated. The imaginative split between the long cultural history of the old world and the short period of Canada's existence in the new world shifted Canada's present out of the contemporary range of possibility for cultural worth. The consequence of Canada's inability to admit and analyze its present appears to have caused a consistent tendency to avoid and deny the present realities and conditions in Canada and to focus on either a romanticized past, or on Canada's approaching Augustan age. In economic terms Canadian leaders focused on the nation's destiny to become a great industrial, economic, and political power despite recurrent bouts of depression, the defense of outdated and flawed development and tariff policies, and the entrenchment of an inert political culture.

Because cultural development includes the development of many aspects of society (intellectual, political, literary, artistic), it is plausible that there is a strong relationship between the advancement by the cultural elite of a literary taste for romance, and the advancement by the political elite (politicians) of a political ideal in which the public was conceived as a body of apolitical receptors for political rhetoric whose criticism would be interpreted as unpatriotic and disloyal. The act of criticism was subordinated in both spheres to the detriment of the public's conception of their critical and political role in a public sphere, and to the detriment of the Canadian public's understanding of what they might be in cultural and political terms: in short, of their collective but diverse identity. An address by Wilfrid Laurier in 1887 which implored French-Canadians to forget the
past "to be Canadian" demonstrates this pattern of Canadian thought and speech in its political form. Laurier's speech provides a strong example of a wilful avoidance of reality in favour of the political (official) visions which were expounded as the correct direction of respectable public opinion. Although he admitted "the truth is that . . . everywhere the prevailing feeling will be found to be one of unrest and uneasiness. Of Discontent and Irritation." he implored the Quebecois to "remember this [that they must admit that Canada, and not Quebec was their home] in order to remind you that your duty is simply and, above all, to be Canadians." Laurier's aim in this speech, as in his political career, was to avoid and elude the real problems that Confederation posed for the provinces, and especially for French-Canadians. He did not present an argument which questioned and proved to the Quebecois the validity to the Union for their province. Instead he asked French-Canadians to negate the importance of their historical place and cultural memory as French-Canadians because, he declared, they owed allegiance to the nation which had been brought into existence by the sound Act of Confederation. He broached the sensitive question as to whether members of the French race came to be British subjects through a constitutional agreement or an act of conquest by saying "I shall not stop to discuss" the "controversial" question; Laurier accepted the historical fact of conquest, but not the cultural consequence of resentment. As the leader of a national party, his public statement that "there is no difficulty in the matter for me" was an outright denial of the history of a people whose political motto remains 'je me souviens.' And his assertion that the Quebecois had won their civil and political liberties with the defeat of the French regime, shows that Laurier was willing to use the loftiest terms of
democratic rhetoric to avoid the effort to explore through discussion and reason the French-Canadian identity in the nation of Canada. In response to the disturbing reality that Laurier well understood, he used the language of liberty and national greatness to appease, to confound, and to create a false public knowledge based on the wilful resistance of the need to open these issues to discussion. It seems impossible that the French-Canadian people did not realize that what was being spoken was false public knowledge. For the moment, we will presume that they did know. Why could they not speak out against it? Assessments of Canadian social and political history of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries suggest that rhetoric which relied on patriotism and expressed the state’s perspective was so difficult to criticize because it was considered unpatriotic for the citizens of a young country, with its whole future ahead of it, to be critical of the public figures who fostered and encouraged the visions of a great national future. Canadian political rhetoric was built on patriotism and on the assumption that the Canadian public was loyal to the project of the Union, and therefore must be uncritical of it.

An example of the antithesis of Laurier’s speech appeared in The Week, a unique journal of opinion that existed in Canada before the turn of the century. Judge James W. Longley asked the question that Laurier avoided: "is confederation a success?" The article was a criticism of Confederation, and Longley knew this was a dangerous undertaking. Unless he could be absolutely sure, and convincing, in his argument of the inadequacy of the BNA Act, then he should better have said nothing: "the public man who ventures to challenge inquiry ought to be able to make a pretty clear case against [Confederation]
because, if the Union is a good thing and has been a success, it is almost a crime to make a question about it at all." But because the success or failure of Confederation was of such importance to Canadians, and because the discontent with the Union was so obvious, he said that "no one ought to have the least hesitancy in discussing [it] thoroughly and candidly." Longley's preface indicates how cautious were even those people—who were convinced by reason of the inadequacies of certain policies and who had the high social standing to make legitimate public statements—of publicly admitting and assessing realities, be they political or cultural. In Canadian political culture it was disrespectful to find fault with the ideas and policies of public leaders. Longley said that "[if Macdonald] is right, he should be loyally sustained by every good man in Canada." In his analysis of Upper Canadian political culture and intellectual history, F.S. Wise investigated the dominant ideology of the political culture in which Longley judiciously asserted his insight on Confederation. Wise explained that "conservative politicians long continued to identify their policies with the good of Canada and the empire and to equate opposition to those policies with disloyalty." Wise's comment is significant because it clearly indicates that the public's use of reason was neither invited nor condoned in the political culture which was characterized by a deep respect for the institutions of law and government. To perpetuate the uncritical loyalty for conservative policies required that the facts and realities about how such policies actually affected Canadians, be dismissed and ignored behind a rhetoric of national greatness. Longley's courage seems to have come from his belief that in a democracy it was the public duty of intelligent citizens to be engaged in the good government of the nation, and good government was not what he
understood to be the product of Confederation. In 1885, the J.W. Longley's of Canada were rare indeed, but his attitude toward public spirit was a premonition of the progressivism which swept the elite class in the 1920s.

Some of Longley's essay bears repeating because it demonstrates the clear differences between the ways in which politicians and private individuals approached the questions of Canadian nationhood. His writing also reveals the narrow range of possible debate and criticism of national institutions and policies because unconditional patriotism--characterized by a unprotesting reverence for the idea of the Canadian nation and of the policies designed to complete its development--was the only form of public spirit which Canadians knew, and which it was politically acceptable to possess. Longley stated that

It must be admitted at the outset that . . . the idea of Union is sound . . . [Confederation] is intrinsically a good policy, and one that ought to be satisfied and applauded by every patriotic man in the country.\textsuperscript{103}

However, like Laurier, Longley could see that

as a matter of fact, everyone is not content with the condition of affairs since Confederation . . . What the objections are cannot be gathered very definitely by reading the speeches of public men, nor by perusing the leaders of the public press. But people are crying out against the conduct of matters generally, and the National Policy of Sir John Macdonald is not sustained by the people cordially. This must be admitted . . . [The provinces] continue to pay the penalty of folly which, from pure sentiment, perpetuates a system which never had any sound basis and which never can be anything but a conspicuous failure sooner or later manifest to the dullest.\textsuperscript{104}

Longley noted, as public figures did, that Canada appeared to possess all the requisite qualities to make a great nation. But he understood that "autonomy, cohesion, [and] community of interest" did not exist in the Canadian nation and that "this is what all the enthusiastic orators who dwell upon the great resources, and picture the brilliant future
of our country, unfortunately leave out of the account.\textsuperscript{105} The gap between the 'idea' of Confederation and the 'fact' of its inadequacy, indeed improbability, which Longley highlighted is exactly the gap which Laurier intended to repudiate. Laurier preached servility to British institutions in the attempt to reconcile Quebec to Canada through emotion and sentiment, and not by reason.

Margery Fee put her finger on perhaps 'the' form in Canadian public rhetoric--cultural and political--that the public sphere of the 1920s, built on voluntary organizations dedicated to rational and objective discussion of current Canadian realities, endeavoured to correct. She said that "a writer would begin a piece with a negative picture of past colonial mediocrity and end with a positive picture of future national literary glory."\textsuperscript{106} The same seems to be true of political rhetoric which consistently referred to Canada's great natural resources and possibilities, which stood in contrast to its constant economic insecurity, political indolence, and cultural poverty. The colonial present in Canada had to be ignored because that present was inconsistent with Canada's cultural and political possibilities as a nation. To criticize optimistic literary and political rhetoric was tantamount to disloyalty and showed a lack of patriotic allegiance, which in nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century Canada, was the most important feature of public spirit. Loyalty meant a commitment to the idea that Canada's destiny was to be a great country in the new world. The result, in political and cultural discourse, is that there are clear juxtapositions between the reality and the language, between the romantic tales of habitants and the sordid reality of life on the treeless prairie, between public speech and popular thought, between an optimistic 'official rhetoric' and a incensed, but silent, public
feeling. Public discourse, in the political style of Laurier, created what Tony Wilden has called "the Imaginary Canadian" who is wrongly convinced that democracy and civil liberties are guaranteed by our lauded institutions, and what political scientist Gad Horowitz called ‘Red Tories’ which Robert Kroetsch explained are "people who at once believe and radically disbelieve what they believe in."\(^{107}\) Kroetsch said that in Canadian writing, "a gap opens between work and object . . . The gap between signifier and signified has become the subject itself, a question mark [the question of our identity] over what it is we mean by the act of writing."\(^{108}\)

The study of cultural and political discourse leads us precisely to the place where all Canadian criticism seems to run-- back to one of the original Canadian novels in which Suzanna Moodie’s literary representation of her home and life in the backwoods of Canada, riven by a romanticized love for the majesty of the Canadian landscape and a deep fear and hatred of the uncivilized ways of life it forced upon its captives--which brought Margaret Atwood to the conclusion that Canadian expression exhibits schizophrenia, a disease resulting from the confrontation of the human mind with the ominous and indifferent Canadian wilderness. I find the term rather too consciously hypochondriac, if you will, to be accepted as the ultimate assessment of Canadian public expression because it seems to be the end product of the ‘cultural self-pity’ that Pacey reproached, and it brings Canadian criticism to another impasse. We are sick. We have an incurable disease--‘incurable’ as in "the seemingly incurable tendency for Canadian to get stuck at the level of language, confounding rhetoric with reality, is an intellectual handicap we can ill afford."\(^{109}\) But the handicaps of Canadian discourse may well have
been only 'seemingly' incurable. The main impediment to political discourse, and as Gerson asserted to cultural expression, seems to have been the tendency to idealize Canada. She found an adequate assessment of Canadian public discourse in the words of Gerda Lerner who said that "Idealization is very frequently a defensive ideology and an expression of tension within society."110 The tension between the concepts of colony and nation, between ordered human society and incomprehensible nature, between present and future, and between the imitated and the original presented happy circumstances for the normalization of public expression built on idealization. It seems to be the most predominant feature of public expression, if not of the Canadian literary imagination which Atwood studied. The problems which beset the formation of Canadian literary criticism (Canada's cultureless 'place' in the hinterland) appear to have beset the tradition of critical public discourse in Canada as well (the uncritical stage in the 'time' of Canada's development). The rhetorical patterns of literature and public speech both exhibit a gaping cleft between language and reality which places critics of that gap in a kind of 'in between' wasteland in which they are left to dither between self-assertion and self-pity, but with little substantial thought, or even information, to understand, analyze and interpret—all of which were detrimental to the formation of critical and informed public opinion.

Conclusion

We have looked at the deficiencies of political culture and cultural development and we have noted that public speakers recognized that criticism was necessary in both
spheres to improve the level of political discussion and cultural achievement. In both cases, the lack of political and literary criticism permitted distortions in taste and public opinion which restricted political and cultural development. It seems clear that cultural underdevelopment (evident in the political and ‘cultural’ voids in Canada by 1920) was one of the primary factors contributing to the long repression of a sphere of critical public. The concern for leadership and the cultivation of leaders of public opinion, which is an important aspect of the public consciousness that will be discussed in the next chapter, was associated with liberal education, with exposure to high culture and forms of independent, critical media which might accomplish a greater degree of public enlightenment. We have looked at the problematic development of criticism in colonial cultures, and have studied similarities in problematic literary and political forms of expression. All seem to be the fault of cultural immaturity which encompassed the whole process of perception, expression and practice. The exploration of Canadian political culture suggests that cultural development must be one of the primary factors in the long dormancy of the public sphere. The colonial development of an apolitical public spirit is a fact of our political history, stemming from the methods and doctrines of national and cultural development, which had a significant influence on Canadian political consciousness and on the formation of a critical public sphere in the 1920. In fact, a critical political consciousness is not strongly evident until after the period which this thesis explores had ended, and a new era began in the 1960s and 1970s. But, the initial foundations of that political consciousness were laid in the 1920s, and it began with the realization that criticism was integral to any worthwhile community in Western
civilization. But, the critical assessments of the political vacancy of Canada's constitution, a correlative of the intellectual and creative dependency which accompanied the political willingness to remain in the British Empire, suggests that if Canadians had cared to effect their independence by imagining new political symbols and deriving political theory from their experience, the course of their cultural development would have been changed fundamentally.

Having said that, were Canada's intellectual, cultural and political conditions by 1920, which could not support the existence of a healthy public sphere, the product of cultural underdevelopment or of political conventionality and apathy? In fact, it seems that they cannot be considered exclusively of one another. In "Politics, Culture, and the Writing of Constitutions" John Conway asserted that the "problems of Canadian culture and Canadian politics are intimately related"111 because both proceed problematically from the reluctance to build cultural autonomy. Without seeking cultural and symbolic independence (in fact, consciously seeking cultural dependency) Canadians developed a set of cultural thought processes in which we unconsciously failed to abstract political ideas and self-determining cultural symbols from the Canadian experience due to our reliance on both derivative political and cultural models. He summarized much of what this chapter has intended to say in his comment, "[i]n literature, as in politics, we rely on borrowed symbols and are hobbled by them."112 The debilitating repercussions of the reliance on the British intellectual and political traditions and symbols are fundamental to understanding the problem of public discourse and criticism.

The most obvious event that those who want to understand Canadian political
development study is the Confederation period and Canadian constitution. Conway asserted that Canada’s original constitution was built on "assumptions of immaturity and colonialism" because it was the product of a restrictive cultural environment in which "French and English thought, by decreeing submission to foreign authority, positively inhibited cultural creativity." Conway asserted that one of the main reasons for the creative debt in the Canadian constitution was the narrow boundaries of intellectual training of its authors, and he attributed the imaginative paucity of the Canadian constitution to the perhaps stereotypical notion that English Canadians, in the British tradition "distrust abstract ideas." Without ignoring the depth of philosophical and political thought in the British tradition, Conway argued that among the British commercial middle classes "political theorizing was an uncommon intellectual exercise . . . and this [class] was the parentage of the Canadian constitution." He proposed that

[the Canadian constitution] is devoid of any political theory, old or new, because it accepted as its foundation and as the source of its legitimacy, the British constitution . . . Implicitly, the act said that all fundamental questions about [humankind] as a political animal and about society as a political organism had been answered . . . Perhaps Canadian intellectual history has been so barren in the realm of political theory partly because our culture, as evidenced by the BNA Act, implies that there is no need for any.

Conway went on to suggest that "perhaps the public sphere has been barren for the same reason." Conway implied that the utilitarian method of development which was not balanced with intellectual and cultural development underscored the fact that Canada, as a nation, was an absurd misconception. Within the framework of the Canadian constitution, there was no reason for a nation to come into existence; there was only a
reason for a colony to perpetuate itself. After Confederation, Canada remained a repository of natural resources to be developed. The 'tacit contract' for material development, as a political project, seemed to satisfy Canadians just enough during the Macdonald and Laurier eras to keep political and cultural criticism from surfacing. But the new international economic and political community that was emerging throughout the First World War shifted the international balance of power. The British Empire was clearly in demise, and imperial nationalism that had been the creed of Canadian leaders from Macdonald onwards (a "desire that 'less of dependence' shall mean 'more of alliance' in the future of the British commonwealth"

119) transformed itself into Canadian nationalism that was strongly convinced of the need for full independent status, and for all attributes of civilized societies which included, of course, 'Culture'. The next chapter will consider the institutional and discursive qualities of the new public sphere, and will study the principles of a new public spirit which developed in reaction to the stagnant political culture and absence of Canadian cultivation which has been described. The gross need for public dialogue, both critical and informative, to transcend the political and cultural impasse could no longer be disguised from the Canadian public which organized the machinery of public opinion in accordance with this need.
Chapter Three

The Nationalist Public Sphere: Creating Public Opinion and Educating Cultural Taste

The conclusion of the First World War marked the most concerted attempt in Canada's history to reverse the effects and characteristics of colonialism by encouraging Canadian autonomy, both politically and culturally. The preceding chapter focused on Canadian intellectuals' analyses of the twin problems of public and cultural life in their country. In brief review, it has been shown that the need for cultural and political criticism was recognized simultaneously, and that intellectuals understood both categories of criticism to be the necessary remedies to the perceived deficiencies in Canadian public and cultural life. It also seems evident at this point that, as a consequence of a lack of critical literary and political discourse, there were distortions in Canadian literary taste and public opinion that signified the weakness of critical subjectivity and political consciousness which, Habermas' theory suggests, had to be strengthened before critical public dialogue was possible. But, as we will see in this chapter, the need for criticism was quickly subsumed in the nationalist drive to encourage a singular Canadian public opinion that was critical mainly of the disinterest with which many Canadians regarded public affairs, and of the indifference toward public interest and opinion that had characterized Canadian government since Confederation. The attitude which structured the type of public opinion that the elite public endorsed was clearly expressed by B.K. Sandwell when he stated that the "most urgent need of Canada today is the upbuilding of
a public opinion which will affirm the right of the Canadian people to express their will, as a unit, upon any conceivable subject which may become of national importance.\textsuperscript{1} Sandwell went on to say that once a national will was obtained, "I trust we are all sufficiently loyal Canadians to abide by that will whatever it may turn out to demand."\textsuperscript{2} The fact that the 'right' to express public opinion needed to be affirmed suggests that, until the end of the First World War, the formation of opinion within the public had been discouraged, and that the emerging nationalist public elite would emphasize homogeneity, unity and national consensus about the subjects which became of national importance. His second comment indicates that criticism of Canadian public opinion built on nationalist values would be equated with disloyalty. Instead of becoming more critical, nationalists continued to avoid critical self-examination by placing principal emphasis on 1) informing themselves and others in the attempt to clarify understanding of specific public issues, and 2) increasing the level of the entire public's interest in public affairs and Canadian culture through publicity. Although the more abstract catalyst of this stage in the Canadian public sphere was the perceived need to effect political and cultural development through criticism, discussion and understanding, the practical political agenda of Canadian nationalists who took up the challenge was to generate national perspectives about what an independent Canada should represent. If Canada was to transcend the political impasse that it had reached during its uncertain transition from a material colony to an autonomous nation with a unique national spirit, Canadians needed to come to a consensus about what they stood for, and consequently, the formation of a national will had to occur. Information and public consciousness were integral in meeting this
This chapter will study the ideological characteristics that Canadian public opinion and the conception of 'Canadian culture' shared, and it will trace the evidence of a continuing resistance to engage in self-criticism. This stage in the argument is concerned with demonstrating that the evolving purpose of the Canadian public sphere was to act as a space for the cultivation of Canadian cultural taste and Canadian public opinion through adult education and organizations dedicated to public discourse. The need for cultivation was based on the premise that there were two types of people in the Canadian public: the cultivated individuals who possessed public spirit, and the uneducated majority who did not. The assumption on the part of the elite leaders of the Canadian public sphere was that apathy and disinterest among the mass of Canadians in the formation of national unity and consciousness was a product of their lack of intellectual and civic training which disabled them from fulfilling their proper duty as Canadian citizens. The need to 'cultivate' Canadians in terms of their abilities to make the 'right' judgments about cultural consumption and public thinking (and 'rightness' in Canadian public opinion was assumed to be on the side of the political and cultural nationalists) was based on the opinion that the majority of Canadians did not share the intellectual elite's understanding of the citizen's duty to encourage unity of opinion, consciousness and national will. Nor were they as convinced as the elites that Canadians should express their cultural consciousness by supporting and consuming a developing Canadian culture which, Paul Litt has asserted plausibly enough "was valued [in the tradition of Arnoldian criticism] for its political effects more than for its intrinsic value," that is, it was valued for the
role culture played in forging the good society. Although the attempt to cultivate public consciousness and a taste for Canadian culture was intended to rectify some of the problems that the intellectual community had begun expressing after the war, the need to have Canadians think about their country in a national sense was so strong during this period that 'cultivation' became synonymous with public interest in national affairs.

The dominance of the elite public during this phase of the Canadian public sphere (1920-1950) is evident in the fact that their cultural expectations were eventually granted in the normalized ideal of Canadian 'high' culture. But, a more central finding in this research is that, as a consequence of the language the intellectual elite used to describe what respectable citizenship and public spirit meant in the post-war Canadian context, and in their understanding of themselves as knowledgeable and appropriate leaders of public opinion and taste, they set standards for public expression that could only be met by the type of cultivated citizen whose cultural values and sense of public duty matched their own. At the expense of critical discourse based on individual thought, English-Canadian public opinion developed in a manner that advocated a single, conservative nationalist opinion that equated principled and responsible public thinking with the duty to promote national cohesion and co-operation. As a result of the temper that Canadian public opinion developed, Canadian liberal thinkers found themselves on the fringes of a public sphere in which it was considered disloyal, unprincipled and unrespectable to state one's opposition to that unified opinion.

The trait of 'cultivation' among public speakers and opinion leaders in the nationalist public sphere was an important element of the identity or persona of 'the good
Canadian’. In the interest of developing national unity, the ‘good Canadian’ was constructed as a citizen with a well-developed sense of his/her loyalty, and duty to the state to support public and cultural issues with his/her attention and intelligence. What emerges in this chapter is a picture of the ideological assumptions and values that developed in Canada following the First World War during which time the elite resolved to elevate the quality and measure of cultural and public life in this country. Nationalism was the Canadian public ideology of the intellectual class. It was primarily directed toward the achievement of an autonomous Canadian nation in which people thought of themselves, not as Nova Scotians, Albertans, Ontarians and Quebecois, but ultimately as Canadians. Nationalism is usually described as an irrational pride in national characteristics and possessions. In order to take seriously the public sphere that emerged from this ideology, it is necessary to look at the components that were fused within Canadian nationalism so that it becomes clear how nationalism was both a reaction to colonialism, as well as to aspects of the twentieth-century world which apparently threatened the kind of society that Canadians wanted to conserve, but needed, at the same time, to establish.

A Public Ideology of Nationalism

At the centre of the English-Canadian public sphere was the perceived need for nationhood. Although a constitutional nation (a nation on paper) existed, the development of a co-operative national spirit among Canadians and the cultural trappings of nationality were conceived as proof that Canada was evolving as a nation. ‘Nationhood’ represented
to many members of the intellectual elite progress and improvement in the political life of Canada (i.e. the emergence of a more constructive style of leadership), in the cultural output in which Canadians could take interest and pride, and, more generally, in the quality of life provided in Canadian society. The quest for nationhood was conceived as a method of overcoming parochial mentalities that lacked a sense of national vision and co-operation. A national public sphere developed because it was assumed that an understanding of national issues could bind patriotic Canadians together in one unified national consciousness that would transcend parochial hostilities and replace them with a definable Canadian consciousness on which national public opinion could be based. The nationalist public sphere was based on the assumption that "the absence of adequate facts . . . was what really stood between Canadians and the ability to make the right choices." It was the attitude of the intellectual class that myths, prejudices, regional attitudes, and the misleading diatribes of self-serving politicians caused the Canadian electorate to consistently make uninformed political choices. The 'right' choices were co-operative decisions that were in the best interests of the nation as a whole. Canadian nationalists felt that the colonial attitudes would gel into national consciousness if intellectuals made an effort to fill the cultural and political 'absences', and then to disseminate the ideas they had fashioned about Canada to the unenlightened. Consequently, cultivated individuals\textsuperscript{3} of the elite public saw themselves both as initiators of their own public consciousnesses and, increasingly, as educators of public consciousness among those who did not share their goals and thinking.

Although nationalist organizations asserted that one of their main objectives would
be the "education of public opinion"⁶, it is more probable that the Canadian elite only succeeded in acting as the spokespersons for Canadians on matters of national interest. In 1925, leading members of the Canadian League produced a memorandum that summarized some threats to Canadian nationhood. The document insisted that the consolidated voice of an elite set of nationalists could have a beneficial influence on the progress of Canadian nationhood. It stated that "if their members are animated by the proper spirit, [the groups] might wield an influence out of all proportion to their mere members."⁷ Furthermore, members asserted that "it is a commonplace that the actions of governments are always influenced, not by the many, but by the few, and in this case the few will have the double advantage . . . of being able to state that their view is held from coast to coast by thoughtful men."⁸ As public opinion became increasingly organized after 1920, the English-Canadian conservative nationalist viewpoint became the only acceptable public attitude because the members of the nationalist public sphere closely associated unified and consensual public opinion with the achievement of a national consciousness. The implication of this association was that the range of public debate was limited to the least controversial of the issues connected to national development. The quest for nationhood debilitated the public sphere even as it provided a motivation to build one.

But there were other less political reasons that the nationalist public sphere adopted such a strong view toward conformity of thinking and the necessity of national unity ("unity" meaning a co-operative agreement about how Canadians understood their nationality, and how the country should be governed). One reason had to do with the
influence of the First World War on Canadian socio-political thought. It is a commonplace that the barbarous experience of the war destroyed the nineteenth-century liberal faith in individualism, science and competition as principles supporting the march toward a perfected human society. Although faith in those principles was certainly shaken, it is incorrect to presume that the philosophy (particularly idealism) and values that had been central to Canadian thinking in the nineteenth century were abandoned. In fact, the shift was more toward conservative reform than radical change, and although it sounds contradictory, it is important to stress that the rejuvenation of idealism (a conservative philosophy) was coupled with the obvious need for social improvement, as well as political change. In his study of The Government Generation (1986), Douglas Owram confirmed that "idealism . . . was still present in the lexicon of Canadian social reform" because the approach to reform was communitarian and the goal was to promote collectivist social values (with which political unity was easily compatible). The nineteenth-century precept that, for Canadians, was most challenged by the war was the principle of liberal individualism. This is not surprising given that Canadian philosophy and social thought had never endorsed it. In philosophical terms, the cause of the war was related to the adoption by a unprincipled state of an extreme form of liberal individualism which had abandoned its sense of social morality and responsibility in the quest for the supremacy of the most powerful. The effect of the war on Canadian social and political thinking was to reaffirm what Canadians had always known: that the "subordination of all personal motives and conduct to the laws of the community" was essential to the continuation of a peaceful, orderly and worthwhile society. To place the
social whole above individual self-interest was morally right, and it was an aspect of conscientious and informed citizenship.

The attempt to maintain peace amid the apparent breakdown of the social order required that people try to make sense of the confused world they found themselves in after the war. A.B. McKillop described one of Canada’s most significant journals of taste and opinion, *Canadian Forum*, as an embodiment of the search "for a means of achieving and maintaining social and cultural stability and direction in a world which seemed to be increasingly without adequate sources of authority." The need to preserve human civilization from the technological, and secularizing threats that the twentieth-century world seemed to impose was, however, accompanied by a knowledge that, if Canada was to be respected as a fully developed nation, Canadian society and political culture required reform. Above all else, what was needed to accomplish the task that lay before Canadians was strong, responsible and effective political leadership, and astute leadership was not likely to occur without the aid of a vocal public with clear ideas of what it wanted. While many intellectuals were critical of the vapid level of political discussion and the appalling marks of Canadian political culture, they were critical because these inadequacies left the Canadian public and civil body without leadership, and consequently, without hope for social, cultural and political improvement.

The movement to better Canadian society was broadly called ‘progressivism’, a "loose middle-class reformist ideology" which, Owram explained, advocated "the adoption of a particular approach to government" that utilized the expertise of intellectuals to examine the role of the state and to redefine its public responsibilities. Owram found
that the sacrifices demanded of the citizenry during the First World War, and the justifications that were accepted for the abuses of their civil liberties, contributed to the strengthening of democratic thought towards the duty of the government to conduct itself efficiently and in the best interests of all citizens. Following the war, when veterans were returning, economic inflation was high, unions were growing, and riots erupting, the public began to appeal to the government to intervene and regulate several aspects of Canadian society. In the atmosphere of public scrutiny, sharpened by the experience of the War Measures Act, government and politics were to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the public only by recognizing the importance of public opinion. After the war, Canadians began to have increasing expectations of their politicians. The existence of a body of informed public opinion forced politicians to speak and respond to criticism in an equally intelligent, and concise manner lest they be scoffed at by Canada’s public elite, a group to which most influential bureaucrats and politicians belonged. As traditional sources of authority were challenged, and as Canada stood at the crossroads of colonialism and nationhood, the public felt the need for leadership in Canada that did more than play one region off against another, but which was competent, purposeful and constructive and which acted as a facilitator and promoter of national unity. In fact, this comment by Brooke Claxton’s biographer indicates that nationalists conceived of the state as a vehicle through which national unity could be achieved: "[Claxton] believed in strong central government because, as a Canadian patriot, he thought it a prerequisite to Canadian unity and independence as well as to social progress." The achievement of nationhood, made possible by a centralized state legitimimized by public opinion, was considered by
nationalists to be a form of Canadian social, as well as political, improvement.

Regardless of their political stripe, those who were publicly and politically minded in this era were reformers, and the creation of the modern state is a testament to their agreement that a decent society must be regulated by the state. Public thinking moved gradually to the left of the economic spectrum, if not the liberal democratic spectrum, and the enlarging bureaucracy of the Canadian state was pulled in this direction as well. Members of the nationalist network were believers in federal power and ability. Donald Creighton suggested that "it was national feeling that first impelled [liberal Conservative R.B. Bennett, like Borden and Meighen] along the path towards state regulation and control." Creighton observed that in the 1930s "among informed people there was a growing belief that the depression, like the war, was a national crisis that demanded and justified federal action." An issue of contention during the depression was the transfer of tax revenues from the federal to the provincial governments that would allow the provinces to meet their rising public welfare bills. Creighton observed that the distraught public reaction to the depression was that it exposed the "failure of Canadian federalism" and that it forced even the most staunch economic liberals to accept the inadequacy of free enterprise to meet the needs of society. Creighton observed that the movement in the 1920s to understand the purposes and functions of the Canadian state, was followed by the demand in the 1930s that the state take a more active role in the regulation of the economy. The two stages of public discourse were part of one movement toward government regulation of civil society in the best interest of the social whole. The nationalist public saw the best hope for Canada in a strong federal state
that could lead, organize and unify Canadian society against the civil and economic disorder that threatened the federalist ideal of Confederation. "Progressive" thought, then, was based on the conservative idea that it was in the best interest of the public to preserve the founding constitutional principles of the Canadian federal state.

The Homogenization of Public Opinion

One important aspect of nationalism, obvious in the explosion of organizations and media for public discussion and enlightenment, was the renewed attention to the importance of democracy and of the public's participation in its maintenance and practice. Although the term 'public sphere' was not generally used in the statements of intent of newly formed or rejuvenated organizations, the concept of public opinion was receiving intellectual attention in Canada. Public opinion, as a principle on which government should operate, began to be taken much more seriously by large numbers of Canadians than it had in any previous period in Canadian history. A rallying call to the public issued from the Canadian Nation in which an editorialist wrote that "[i]n a democracy, power rests with those who form public opinion."18 Graham Spry captured this feeling in an editorial in which he wrote that "these organizations [the Canadian Clubs] have a real function in creating a public opinion . . . their influence is such that government cannot afford to ignore them."19

But the realization that public opinion must be the basis of government was accompanied by the realization that public opinion, itself, "has been the subject of little or no adequate examination,"20 and was, consequently, very little understood or discussed
by average Canadians. In 1922, Walter Lippman published *Public Opinion*, and in 1925, *The Phantom Public*. Both books were in the American critical tradition which asserted that the idea of representative and responsible government based on public opinion was an idealization of political realities. But, the importance of such books for Canadian thought was not that they made Canadians suspicious of the advantages of public opinion. Quite the opposite, the importance was that they tended to reinforce the notion that public opinion was an important principle that had, in Canadian political culture, traditionally been given less than its due respect.

R.M. MacIver wrote a critical review of *The Phantom Public* which highlighted the dissimilarity in the attitudes toward public opinion held by American and Canadian intellectuals. If MacIver is an adequate representative, Canadian intellectuals retained (or perhaps had recently acquired) a faith in public opinion, but only because they understood public opinion to be a very different entity than it was to American critical intellectuals. Illustrating an elitist and communitarian approach to public opinion, MacIver asserted that the disillusion with mass democracy in the American republic issued from a collective realization that a "'close' hand in government elections is frustrated in political decisions."21 In other words, the expectation that 'government by the people' could occur in anything more than the most remote fashion, was fallacious. MacIver's assertion that "the main movement of democracy . . . [has not been] to defend its right or competence to govern, but only to elect representatives who shall govern on its behalf" expressed his conservative faith in the political institution whose maxim was 'peace, order and good government'. MacIver stated that "in spite of our author's disclaimers, . . .
public opinion does determine the general attitude of government" and to his credit, MacIver did not ignore the problematic question of how the opinion of the public was to be determined:

[...]

one can realistically discuss the problem of democracy without an appreciation of those special groupings which are all the time at work shaping, evoking, and focusing opinion. They provide a means to creating order within the vast heterogeneity of modern society. (italics added).

It would be impossible not to make the connection between these anonymous 'special groupings' and the associations which composed the nationalist network. MacIver's explanation of how public opinion formed suggests that one of the functions of associations such as the Canadian League and the Canadian Clubs was to order and homogenize public opinion, to distil a dominance within public opinion that could, effectively, represent to the Parliament the opinion of Canadian elites (the cultivated individuals who were capable of 'informed' public opinion). The backgrounds in liberal education which many of the elite shared influenced their thinking that contact with instructive culture would promote the development of an intelligent and responsible citizenry which was necessary to make mass democracy work. When assessing this seemingly liberal statement, one must bear in mind the elite's interpretation of 'intelligent and responsible citizenry' and also their conception--reflected in R.M. MacIver's elitist assessment of public opinion--of how it was 'supposed to work'. Owram's study of the government generation makes clear the elite's conception of their relationship with the mass public: "[o]nly with intelligent leadership disinterestedly bringing issues before the public in an understandable manner would the masses be able to deal with the complex issues of the modern age . . . The purpose of the intellectual elite thus became all the
more important in the age of the common man. It had to bring sound information to the public.\textsuperscript{23} Although the idea of using rational discussion to achieve consensual public opinion coincides with the Habermasian function of the public sphere, the distinctly elitist conception of public opinion within the intellectual community was at odds with the more populist, or radical programme of social activists. The public sphere in Canada was not a consensual and uniform space, but Canadian nationalists were quite successful in making it appear that it was.

It is not a coincidence that the creation of 'Canadian public opinion', endorsed from coast to coast, became so urgent in the aftermath of the war for democracy. The existence of fascism, militarism, and communism reinforced in citizens of democratic countries the urgent need to fulfil their collective function as the conscientious guardians of democracy by forming public opinion and ensuring that their governments respected it. However, in Canada, the issue of public opinion and popular government posed a unique problem. The purpose of public opinion is to criticize the unjust actions of the state and to sanction its legitimate actions and functions. But the idea that politically ethical government could operate according to public opinion was based on the assumption that there was unity within public opinion, and that public opinion regarding national issues was an expression of the national will and consciousness. Canadian unity, national will and national consciousness were things that the intellectual elite judged to be absent from Canadian political culture, and they could not, therefore, offer a basis on which Canadian public opinion could be built. They had to be established within the Canadian public sphere as a consequence of public discourse concerning the nation itself.
The general purpose of the Canadian Clubs demonstrates this point. The organization was designed to "foster and encourage a national public opinion and spirit, to stimulate intelligent citizenship, to awaken an interest in public affairs and to cultivate an attachment to the institutions and soil of Canada." Canadian nationalism (obsessed as it was with the attainment of political and cultural unity which was thought to signify mature nationhood) could not remain separate from the rejuvenation of democratic spirit in Canada. Democratic spiritedness was compatible with the intentions of nationalists because what was required for a stable democracy was also required for a stable and unified nation. By improving the way in which democracy worked in Canada (i.e. by formulating national opinions on which the government could act) it was hoped that national cohesion and unity would result. The pursuit of Canadian democracy and the pursuit of Canadian unity and consciousness fit hand in glove in the public sphere that developed after the First World War.

But the implication of this association between a unified public opinion and Canadian nationalism was that the range of public discourse was restricted to such an extent that this public sphere was robbed of much of its critical, or one might say 'political', function. If one considers the problem of political dissent and disunity of opinion that existed in Canada following the First World War (including the growth of French-Canadian nationalism, and of populism in western agricultural communities) one realizes that the prime political objective of the nationalist public sphere was to create a unified public opinion strong enough to counter those who did not support the idea of Canada, vaguely conceived as it was, as a centralized federal state with a diversified yet
national identity and culture. A unified public opinion was needed less because it was theoretically correct to govern according to the will of the public than because political leadership in Canada could not progress beyond negotiating between regional demands (in other words, national leadership was not possible) until that will and opinion which sanctioned it to lead effectively were generated. To be of practical assistance to Canadian leadership, public opinion could not be split, but had to be uniform, and therein lies one of the problems that the nationalist public sphere presented for liberal thinkers. The creation and education of a national public opinion was contrary to the purpose of the liberal public sphere which is to permit a space for the rational consideration of all ideas, and the expression of individual thought, "however unpopular or erroneous".

A speech made by then past Prime Minister, Sir Robert Borden in 1923 illustrates the constriction of public discourse during the post war period that resulted from a need to reestablish the social and political stability of the past. The war represented a crisis of social morality. It destabilized the nineteenth-century belief that civilization would be achieved by rational human progress. Borden expressed the attitude of Canadian statesmen toward the type of public spirit that was necessary in a post-war age whose people had witnessed the destructive and inhumane use of scientific knowledge, and was haunted by it. One reaction to the growth of control over the means of destruction and the apparent abandonment of moral responsibility and respect for human life, was the need for firm and consolidated government within the international political community and a new faith in the homogeneity of 'sound' public opinion which championed social morality and responsibility, and whose power to police radical thought and action derived
from the fact that 'sound' opinion made logical sense to the majority of people. Although Borden spoke of 'world' opinion, the principles that he endorsed in this speech largely concur with those that underpinned the model of Canadian public opinion which was fostered in the nationalist voluntary associations. He stated that an international forum of discussion provided means to

establish the habit of constant consultation and co-operation, thus to remove distrust, misunderstanding, and suspicion, and finally to create and maintain a world opinion that will ostracize and punish any nation resorting to war rather than to judicial determination; this must be the supreme purpose.25

At the national level, the same emphasis on mutual information, unity, cohesion and a moral responsibility for individuals to adopt a co-operative public spirit was based on the assumption that social order could be restored through the achievement of proper government.

The question of government enjoyed a rejuvenation in the post-war period. In his essay "Science, Authority and the American Empire,"26 McKillop explored the Canadian responses to the prevalent "moral rootlessness" felt throughout the western world, and to modern critical thought which questioned the possibility of human rationality and morality as the bases of human civilization. In Canada, the reaction to this intellectual and social uncertainty seems to have been that it elevated a consciousness of the need for cohesion, and it produced a naive (but not innocent) faith in the idea that there was a social and moral 'rightness' to which all members of society could agree. To illustrate his point, McKillop noted that one of the first Canadian magazines in the modern critical style was University of Toronto publication, The Rebel. Despite its title, the magazine was predominantly concerned with rebuilding social stability through the re-articulation of
cultural values. As McKillop describes it, the magazine’s philosophy concurred with a characteristically Arnoldian response to the social and intellectual chaos that followed the end of the war: confidence was retained in "the ability of [people] to find valid criteria by which to determine what was the best that had been thought and said in the world." In other words, criticism and thought had not become as meaningless as the modern existentialists proposed. The premise that there were still valid cultural criteria spilled into the belief that there must still be valid public and political criteria on which to build a sound public opinion. This belief was the root of Canadian public consciousness during this period: the belief that everyone could come to the same conclusion if they were supplied with the right criteria, and possessed the proper public attitude to correctly evaluate that criteria. The problem that was most evident to Canadian nationalists—the need to achieve nationhood—was put forward in public discourse as an ideological certainty.

An essay by Senator J.S. McLennan, which appeared in the Dalhousie Review, left no ambiguity about the social responsibility of all Canadian citizens to conform to a public opinion which, because it had become dominant, demonstrated its unquestionable validity. McLennan stated that "what was once the opinion of a few people, if it has the essence of rightness in it, spreads and becomes public opinion, which backs up and reinforces one line of action, reprobates and withdraws support from those who advocate another." It was not so much rationality that was associated with ‘rightness’ in this period, but the application of conscientious public morality to determine what was collectively ethical and therefore, ‘right’. McLennan continued that the right public
opinion would be conceded by conscientious individuals who were neither "grossly ignorant" of public issues, nor "anti-social" and thus unwilling to contribute to social harmony. It is not a great leap to understand how powerful was Canadian nationalism—not only as a political need but as a social value—under these intellectual circumstances.

Nationalism and the determination to maintain peace were the two major forces that shaped Canadian public ideology during this period. The effort to maintain peace reinforced nationalism because it gave Canadians another reason to unite and co-operate. It is pertinent that Graham Spry mentioned the two aims together in a comment he made while writing about the principles of the Canadian Clubs: "the all-embracing principle [is] that this people is a nation, and must unite and have a widespread sense of unity ... and that this nation has, within the free alliance of British nations, an opportunity and a duty, a part to play in maintaining a peaceful and orderly world society." But, as mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, not everyone in Canada was as converted to the nationalist cause. One intention that evolved within the Canadian public sphere was to raise national and public consciousness in Canadians who fell into the broad category of the less educated, or uneducated, masses. The 'education' of those outside the elite class involved the cultivation of a public spirit that matched that of the Canadian elite. Although the elite were perfectly capable of influencing Parliament without the support of the majority of Canadians, they were concerned that the Canadian nation function as a democratic polity. The support of Canadians legitimated the elite to be the spokespersons for the entire Canadian electorate. In fact, it appears that the Canadian elite acted in much the same way that Habermas described the bourgeoisie as acting. He said
that "[w]herever the public established itself institutionally as a stable group of discussants, it did not equate itself with the public but at most claimed to act as its mouthpiece, in its name, perhaps even as its educator." The nationalist elite took it upon themselves to represent national public opinion, but unlike the eighteenth-century bourgeoisie, the twentieth-century elite were more concerned that their representation was legitimate, and therefore, they were more ambitious educators of proper public consciousness. The following Canadian Club speeches provide examples of the manner in which public speakers aimed to cultivate national consciousness and public spirit.

**Addressing the Canadian Citizen**

In an address to the Canadian Clubs which was reprinted in its journal *Canadian Nation*, Sir Robert Borden spoke on "Canada’s Debt to the French Regime" in an effort to encourage the scholarly investigation into the period of Canadian history when the territory was under French colonization. Borden emphatically asserted that "[w]e of the English-speaking provinces should surely take a very deep interest in the colonization begun by Champlain" because, he argued, if our origins had been as British colonies, Canadians too might have revolted with the Thirteen Colonies against Britain and formed one colossal North American nation founded on a constitution which embodied American liberalism. Although his request reflected the practical need for Canadians to write their history in order to better understand their country, Borden's speech was an appeal to English-Canadians to accept and respect French culture, and so to improve relations across the great Canadian divide and increase the possibility of national unity and identity.
What seems evident in the type of address that issued from the nationalist associations was its distinctly ‘public’ quality—that is, these addresses were written for the type of citizens whose public interests were compatible with the needs of the state. The public that was addressed on the history of French colonization, on constitutional relations, on a Canadian art movement, and the future functions of a civil service, for example, was a public envisioned not only as a set of people who periodically cast ballots. They were conceived as a community of publicly-minded individuals who were interested in such questions on an ongoing basis as part of their function as citizens to contribute, with their intelligence, to the development of values which would underpin the idea of Canadian nationhood. In other words, although the concepts of national identity and unity remained nebulous, it was clear to the dominant Canadian public that their duty was to support the development of national cultural and political values (just as they had once been required to support material nation-building policies in the nineteenth century).

Similarly, the emphasis on the patriotic citizen’s duty to support federalism is prominent in an address made by Ernest Lapointe to a branch of the Canadian Clubs in 1928. Lapointe’s address focused frankly on the promotion of national unity. After declaring that Canada had "grown into full nationhood and [had] taken [its] place among the nations of the world", the purpose of Lapointe’s address was to indicate to Canadians how they should understand their identity as citizens of this nation. A figure of the state himself, he urged Canadians that the principle of federalism was one of ‘self-expression’, and he went on to suggest that self-expression and the expression of nationality must be synonymous in the Canadian citizen:
in our case, situated as we are, this principle [the right to self-expression] must be qualified so as to signify self-expression within the federation . . . [Consequently] our aim must be, in all spheres of national life, federal self-expression; that is, liberty with unity . . . [and] the responsibility [for making national life the preeminent form of self-expression] is upon the citizenship of Canada . . . Thus shall we create a new national type, the Canadian type, combining and harmonizing the qualities and the energies of the great races from which we spring. 33

Although his obvious point was that Canada needed to achieve some semblance of racial unity, his use of the principle of federalist organization to describe the self-expression of identity insinuated that the state was to be the highest social and political value for Canadians. Literally, the principle of federalism involves agreeing to be governed by a central authority, to surrender one's own autonomy and right to political agency to the state which was sanctioned to be the guardian of communitarian standards of social good; otherwise, what democratic justification would there be for the surrender of those rights? To believe that self-expression should express the principle of federalism was to agree that the federal state was the organizer and regulator of an orderly and peaceful society, and that it was in the individual's best interest to contribute to the state's good society by thinking co-operatively and in terms of national interest. Lapointe concluded his speech with the thought that "the real public wealth is to be found in the popular conscience, in the public spirit engendered by virile traditions and the training of minds, of hearts of souls" 34 to think nationally.

Lapointe's effort to place the moral onus on Canadians to make national expression a form of self-expression, underscores the point of this type of address to those who were willing to listen; Canadians must be trained to think in terms of the official view of Canada as a united federal state. Despite the title given to this speech ("Unity
and Diversity''), the overriding message from the federal camp that it was a duty of Canadian citizens to be devoted, committed, or converted to national purposes and causes. meant that criticism of those causes and purposes would be interpreted as disloyal, unpatriotic, and unnecessarily negative. In 1931, a statement made by Prime Minister Bennett prompted H. Sanders to write an article on "Freedom and Justice" for the Canadian Forum. Bennett had said that "[i]t is not just or right that now, or at any other time, we should permit, by work or deed, such action as may tend to unsettle confidence in the institutions and customs under which we live." criticism of those things (usually external influences, i.e. American mass media and culture) which threatened nationhood was applauded in the nationalist public sphere. But criticism of the principles around which the Canadian nation was steadily taking form was clearly not condoned by public representatives. Sanders responded, saying that "surely no intelligent person would deliberately say that because we have freedom it is not just that we should be permitted to question it." In theory, Canadian public figures and opinion leaders would not deny that Canadians possessed the right to freedom of expression. But the predominant public attitude that "[w]e need patriots rather than theorizing pussyfooters" severely restricted the amount of criticism that was vocalized (as well as the extent to which it was taken seriously) about the questionable curtailment of civil liberties by the public authority. The lack of criticism impeded the movement toward a more liberal political culture.

The comments of Borden, Lapointe and Bennett suggest that the state's view of national interest (i.e. stability, cohesion, and the co-operation of Canadian citizens to achieve these) became a principle of public behaviour which structured an acceptable
range of individual thought in accordance with that principle. The implication of "thinking nationally" for Canadian public consciousness and expression was that public interest and the interest of the state were collapsed into a consensus which left the public sphere without the necessary polarity to afford a political dialectic. As a result of the dominance of the nationalist attitude toward correct public consciousness, Canadian political culture retained its unquestionably conservative, and illiberal tone during the nationalist public movement. John Porter came to roughly the same conclusion in his study of class and the Canadian political system. He stated that the "maintenance of national unity has overridden any other goals there might have been, and has prevented the polarizing, within the political system, of conservative and progressive forces." 38

But, why did the development of national values become their public duty, and secondly, on what premise did they begin to articulate those values? To answer the first question, if we recall the discussion of Canadian material development in the previous chapter it was clear that public consciousness was predicated on the need for the Canadian political community to surmount its own colonialism, and consequently, the purpose of public discussion was to redress the ambiguity of Canadian nationhood and its problematic counterpart, national identity. 19 The increased level of public discussion can be generally understood as a response to the widespread complaint among Canadian intellectuals that Canada had reached the 1920s with a material and economic purpose, but had so far refrained from formulating and articulating its political reason to exist. Without defining its political ideology as an autonomous political and cultural unit, the prospect of national unity, identity, and cultural expression was dim.
Given the comments of some bold Canadian critics shortly after the war, the Canadian public sphere appeared to have been headed in an extremely strong direction in terms of transcending its political impasse and of attaining more significant levels of cultural and political definition. But the political ideology that emerged after the First World War was no: one of political liberalism, but of political nationalism. Therefore, the key to public thinking in Canada during this period was not to become an individual and liberal thinker, but to start thinking nationally. Because the establishment of a new nation—the Canadian state—had not been realized by the political document created in 1867 (which only made the future existence of the Canadian nation possible) Canadian public consciousness developed with an awareness that it was the public activity and mentality of the citizen that would be required to accomplish this feat, as Borden’s address insinuated.

But, to answer the second question, this phase of the Canadian public sphere was premised on the supposition that the creation of national unity would restore order to the disunified and sectional Canadian political community by returning the public, ideologically, to the founding federalist principle of the Canadian nation. In short, the Canadian public sphere was based on nationalism that privileged, above all else, the federalist principle of government. While in the nineteenth century, the control over material nation-building was the chief concern of the federal government, in the twentieth century Canadian intellectuals were required to modernize this principle and adapt it to Canada’s twentieth-century needs for cultural and political development. In this manner, the unity and identity that had not emerged throughout the period of materialism might
be achieved. In addition, the post-war displacement of the nineteenth-century principles of individualism reinforced the nationalist/federalist faith that, through co-operative decision-making which incorporated the voice of the public and the view of the state, the state was positioned to be the most advantageous organizer of Canadian social progress. The federal government’s responsibility to govern in a manner that was endorsed by Canadians in every region meant that there needed to be a similarity of will among Canadians. For the government to uphold its responsibility, it was the citizen’s duty to promote and embrace their similarity with other Canadians—their nationality. The point to be taken is that the nationalism was not only a form of reactive politics against colonialism, but was a way of thinking that was compatible with federalism and the conservation of a ‘Canadian’ society. Together, nationalism and federalism reflected the ‘proper’ attitude that citizens were expected to hold in the Canadian federal state.

**Adult Education and the Public Sphere**

It is not surprising that political figures like Borden, Bennett and Lapointe would have an interest in encouraging public support for the programmes and policies of the federal government. However, those private individuals who volunteered their energy as adult educators, whose main interest was in seeing that Canadians were better equipped and trained to carry out their civic duties, generally advocated the cultivation of a public of loyal and informed supporters of the conservative nationalist outlook. In his biography of Dr Henry Marshall Tory, E.A. Corbett stated that it "was Dr Tory’s belief that the educator, as a trained citizen, has a duty to the state." An indication of the way in
which that duty was understood, and the direction in which leading adult educators moulded Canadian citizens, is provided in Tory's own assertion that "in no country in the world is an intellectual understanding of the meaning of loyalty more necessary than in Canada . . . I am confident that the necessary unity of feeling and sentiment is slowly being brought about" (italics added). In a master’s thesis on "Political Education and Democratic Citizenship," Charles Cochrane’s and William Wallace’s book *This Canada of Ours: An Introduction to Canadian Civics* (1931) was used to describe the “good Canadian”. This citizen had a strong public spirit which caused in him/her a keen interest in public affairs—an interest that was taken to be a measure of each individual’s patriotism. In a political sense, the primary aim of adult education was to instill a sense of public responsibility as well as pride in Canadian institutions by teaching people about Canadian political values (i.e. federalism, nationhood, collectivism, co-operation, unity). Similarly, the leaders of voluntary associations asserted that "the education of public opinion is, of course, the real function of such voluntary, non-partisan organizations as the Canadian Clubs." The social goals of adult education also had political overtones and these organizations often worked together to achieve their goals. Although in their working philosophy, leading figures in adult education stressed that the "creation and development of the attitude of free enquiry is the task of education," the emphasis on the primacy of "social goals [which should] take precedence over individual and sectional purposes" reflected an aspect of the ideology of Canadian nationalism which judged the co-operative effort of Canadians to think in national terms to be a principle of good Canadian citizenship, and a characteristic of appropriate public behaviour and expression.
Corbett described the need for co-operation between the public and the government in order to achieve "effective planning and administration." He proceeded to assert that this "sort of co-operation between citizens and government requires an active and integrated system of communications equipped to provide factual information on which sound opinion can be based. This seems to be perhaps the most important task of adult education in the future of Canada." Adult education was directed toward the cultivation of a national opinion derived by bringing together the views of the state and of the public in a co-operative space—the public sphere—in which the social values which the state was to reflect, the philosophy of adult education, and the public's civic attitudes concurred.

**Public Consciousness and the Nationalist Network**

The reaction of the Canadian intelligentsia to a depressed political culture was documented in the preceding chapter, but the questions of how the Canadian associations intended to develop national sentiment through public opinion and how the political culture was influenced by these groups await discussion. Throughout the examination of public associations, one question should remain central: do the philosophies and activities of these organizations represent a public sphere that coincides with the normative requirements suggested by Habermas' model? To what extent was the purpose of the Canadian public sphere to create a space for the public's use of rational criticism to rationalize public authority?

As Habermas' model indicates, one of the fundamental requirements for a vital
public sphere is the growth of public consciousness—the awareness within the public of their rights, responsibilities and isolation from the state. Members of the elite public were the main instigators of discussion about national affairs, and their aim in forming leagues and associations was to pool their knowledge and information, to become mutually enlightened on Canadian problems, and then to form a sound opinion about these problems and issues. Because this study focuses on the traditional voluntary associations (Canadian League, the Canadian Clubs, the Canadian Institute of International Affairs and the League of Nations Society in Canada) the following excerpt, which involves many of the prominent members of this movement, seems a valid reflection of the way in which Canadian public consciousness began to develop. In David Bercuson’s biography of Brooke Claxton, the formation of public consciousness within ‘Claxton’s group’ (a predominantly male group that J.L. Granatstein (1982) and Douglas Owram (1986) also studied) is clear. Based on letters and archive files of Claxton and other group members, Bercuson asserted that in the 1920s, Claxton’s close friends developed a sensibility for Canadian issues through their sociable discussions which invariably turned to politics. Bercuson explained that

the men and women met to socialize and to discuss serious issues, especially those pertaining to Canada; members were determined to learn, and to teach each other as much as they could about their country, its prospects and its problems. . . . The group awakened the public consciousness of several of its members . . . [and their discussions] awakened interest in Canada.

It would be difficult to overstate the importance of this shift in attitude concerning the serious manner in which Canadians (in their intellectual islands across the country) were beginning to take public issues and dialogue. It is not true that organized discussion of
Canadian affairs was unprecedented. The Canadian Round Table was at its height in 1916 with three hundred members and a press bureau which provided to small newspapers "a stream of articles giving what we consider the right direction" of opinion. However, the Round Table's imperial nationalist purpose was to "develop imperial feeling in Canada and, in cooperation with similar groups in England, to work for stronger links between the Dominions and the mother country." The opposing venture in the 1920s to generate discussion among Canadians for purposes of national independence and political direction meant that Canadians were attempting, apparently for the first time in a sustained and organized manner, to generate 'national' perspectives and ideas. The shift that was manifested in 'Claxton's group' was part of a long development in the attitude against ambivalent and hesitant political leadership and against the continued domination of Canadian officials by their elder statesmen in Britain. They were critical of the quality of participation by the collective Canadian public in the functioning of Canadian democracy, and of the lack of public understanding and concern for the problems that hindered the full development of the Canadian nation. They were not critical of the federalist foundation of the Canadian state, nor did they explore in a critical manner the problem of reconciling the need for federal unity with the ethical imperative to advocate liberal democracy and freedom of opinion.

The success of the nationalist organizations in creating national consciousness is difficult to assess with any certainty. However the political influence they had is more easily discernable. Bercuson summarized that from "the late 1920s to the 1950s this group produced some of Canada's major bureaucrats, politicians, and opinion moulders
and helped shape public policy." In The Ottawa Men (1982), J.L. Granatstein recounted the story of nineteen civil servants who brought the modern state in Canada into being between 1935 and 1957. Most of these men were members or executive members of at least one voluntary association in the 1920s or 1930s and most showed strong dedication to the nationalist movement and especially to the CIIA to which "virtually all in the group belonged." In addition to increasing public knowledge about national issues, the ancillary purpose of the more exclusive voluntary associations was to inject ideas into the political sphere. The intellectual elite asserted "the importance of extra-parliamentary input into policy formation by those with superior knowledge and ability." Owram noted that "[John] Dafoe, [Vincent] Massey and [King's private secretary, Norman] Rogers were writing speeches for King, and all three were urging him to accept the idea that party policy should be directly influenced by semiformalized groups of non-politicians coming together to discuss issues."

The claim that the traditional voluntary associations were interested in creating a network of dominant public opinion that issued from a strongly nationalist perspective is not an exaggeration. In Canadian Nation a quasi-advertisement, disguised as an article, asserted the need for organizations like the Canadian Clubs by repeating comments made in the Canadian press about their existence. Macleans' Magazine reported that the Canadian Clubs movement represented "thirty-two thousand intelligent persons, men and women, French and English, easterner and westerner, in one thought [which] constitutes the greatest intellectual force in Canada, next to the universities" (italics added). Vipond's examination of the nationalist network implied that its deliberate purpose was
to homogenize and consolidate informed opinion in Canada, and to ensure that the opinions of the elite community would embody the Canadian standard of public opinion. She asserted that the consummate intention of the nationalist network was "to 'mould public opinion' in the direction of a national consciousness . . . to formulate social goals, to give direction to the national will, and thus to give cohesion to Canadian society."56

Ron Faris argued that the traditional voluntary associations endeavoured to preserve British hegemony in Canadian society and proposed adult education as a means to improving the political vibrancy of the broader Canadian public, and the nation. But their motives for doing so were spurious, he argued, in comparison to the social movements which also used education for social and political purposes. His charge was that

almost every voluntary association had consciously adopted elitist criteria for the selection of members and had also devised means for influencing public policy. At least one association of each type attempted relatively sophisticated interest group tactics—specifically the imperialist Round Table Movement, the nationalist Canadian League, and the internationalist CIIA . . . the traditional voluntary associations used 'education' as a surreptitious means of expressing their political values.

In other words, traditional voluntary associations neglected to infuse Canadians with a consciousness of their civil liberties and their more fundamentally democratic purpose to freely develop opinion (indeed, they appear to have discouraged this activity) because these issues were not circumstantially suitable to the priority of nationalist organizations: the ascendency of conservative nationalism and the consummation of the Canadian nation. To prove that nationalist organizations were inherently elitist in their conception of public opinion and participation, Faris looked at the set of criteria that was established for CIIA
membership in 1932. The criteria suggested that potential members should be those who were "in a position to influence public opinion and most important those who shape public policy" such as those influential people in banking, industry and journalism who were "behind the scenes in politics." Additionally, members who were "experts in international affairs" were to be drawn from business, the public service, and universities. Faris asserted that not only the CIIA but all of the elite organizations failed to represent the Canadian social structure because they drew their support, virtually exclusively from the corporate, political and education elites of Canada. His broad thesis in *The Passionate Educators* was that "in the 1920s, while agrarian political movements of a regional character were developing . . . members of the political-corporate-educational elite were engaged in establishing voluntary associations which served as a national communication network for the elite which interpreted 'national unity' in terms of their hegemony." Paul Litt made the same point about Canadian culture when he said that the Canadian cultural elite "defined the Canadian identity in terms of its own liberal humanist values."

The best tangible example of nationalist elite hegemony is found in the interpretations of public broadcasting. The struggle over broadcast programming that Faris traced in the contentious relationships of these 'passionate educators' illustrates the incongruous public values that influenced conservative and 'radical' reformers. In terms of broadcast content, the fundamental question was whether public broadcasting should further the aims of the state by promoting national cohesion and identity or should be used to promote the principles and practices of liberal democracy which included
pluralism in opinion and the construction of citizens as social and political agents. As the CBC developed, it became clear that within this institution national unity was deemed more important than a critical and open evaluation of some of Canada's more controversial issues. Graham Spry, Alan Plaunt, Charles Bowman, and Brooke Claxton spearheaded a lobby group, the Canadian Radio League, in the early 1930s to ensure that radio in Canada would remain 'Canadian' in character unlike the American-controlled cinemas in Canada. The Radio League maintained that "[broadcasting] should serve as an instrument of education and entertainment, as a means of cultivating thought and public opinion." Spry called public broadcasting "a majestic instrument of national unity and national culture" whose potential to forge Canadian unity and consciousness would be lost under private ownership. The education value of radio broadcasting was not lost on the Canadian Association for Adult Education either. The CAAE provides an interesting example of the conflicting public and social ideologies that developed after 1920 since it was an organization in which both members of the nationalist network (traditional voluntary associations) and the social movements belonged. Under the directorship of E.A. Corbett, the association was involved in countless public educational ventures which used radio series to reach a broad Canadian audience (i.e. Farm Forum, Citizens' All and Citizens' Forum). But, the foremost obstacle for Corbett was the constant problem of funding liberal-minded programs. In 1939, the CIIA considered funding a radio series with the CAAE but finally decided that it "would be a radical departure from tradition . . . to promote or share in public debate of controversial questions" which might jeopardize national unity. Faris' examination emphasized the
extent to which the CBC became a 'state broadcaster' at the expense of being a broadcaster based on the needs of the public body in a liberal democratic polity. The stipulation in the CBC's mandate (finally abandoned in the 1991 revision of the Broadcast Act) that it should enhance national unity and consciousness makes it clear that the more radical (meaning liberal-minded) of the reformers in the CAAE lost the fight for the type of educational broadcasting that might have influenced the development of a more critical public that was crucially aware of its oppositional position vis-a-vis the state. The manner in which Canadian nationalists interpreted public broadcasting underscores one of the major conclusions of this thesis. The need for nationhood forged a conservative public consciousness in Canadian nationalists in which the idea that the state and public are oppositional entities was sacrificed to the idea that each citizen's public consciousness should be an emulation of the official perspective.

**Cultivating Public Taste**

The cultural nationalism which culminated in the Massey Commission in 1950 had been developing throughout the same period in which Canadian public opinion was being honed under the leadership of the intellectual elite. The connection between the two developments was noted by Paul Litt in his investigation of the premises and concepts which informed Canadian cultural nationalism and the commission itself. He stated that "the roots of post-World War II cultural nationalism can be traced back to World War I . . . [to] a variety of national voluntary associations that rose into prominence in the 1920s." It was during this period that Canadian culture (i.e. national culture) was
conceived both as a expression of national identity and consciousness which would signify the maturity of the nation, and simultaneously as a means to training an audience to appreciate the kind of culture that members of the Canadian elite thought would be most advantageous for national development. Because political sovereignty and national culture were correlated so exactly in Canadian cultural discourse, radical criticism of cultural efforts and attitudes was the rare exception in this period.

A particular example of the debilitating effect that nationalism could have on cultural taste and discourse, is found in the meteoric rise to public favour of the Group of Seven artists. The Group of Seven emerged just at the point when cultural and political nationalists were searching for something which could represent the waxing Canadian cultural spirit. John Thompson and Allen Seager (1985) assessed some of the widely held perceptions of this Canadian legacy, one being that the Group of Seven was persecuted by unprogressive Canadian art critics. They asserted, "such condemnation was rare...; the Group members magnified any criticism for its publicity value and cultivated an image as rebellious young men defending Canadian culture from unpatriotic philistines imbued with foreign values."66 Thompson and Seager supported this claim on the basis that comments like those made by detractor Hector Charlesworth (that the "Paint Slingers" had a "rigid formula of ugliness") were quoted in advertisements for exhibitions of the artists' works.67 The writers emphasized the restrictive effect of the narrow nationalist enthusiasm for the Group's art which caused other serious trends in Canadian art in this period to be neglected: "[t]he ultimate irony of the Group of Seven's nationalist crusade was that their hegemony of public taste obscured the work of other
talented artists... [and that] their revolution against the art establishment had turned into an establishment of its own" which was not particularly open to criticism. Other analysts of the Canadian art movement contend that the "Group of Seven’s nationalism—not its modernism—created its public... That is not to say that this art was praised unduly... but that it was praised for the wrong thing."

The connection between the twin problems of political and cultural development is clear in the elite’s assumption that exposure to instructive high culture would benefit both situations. Improving the public’s taste would not only make it open to Canadian ‘high’ culture, it would 1) facilitate the development of critical faculties necessary for political participation, and 2) instill a set of cultural values (stressing the moral duty to seek self and social improvement) which favoured the maintenance of a conservative social order: a ‘Canadian society’ that resembled its British parent more closely than its American neighbour. The second assumption is as important as the first in terms of its bearing on public consciousness because, in this era of ‘progressivism’ there was a "general conviction that the state, moved by enlightened public opinion and guided by expert judgment, should be the prime target of social progress."

Although it is possible to exaggerate this equation, I suggest that it was the duty of the citizen to support the extension of the state’s administrative power over Canadian society, including its intrusion into the cultural sphere (and anyone who did not agree with the interventionist convictions of Canadian ‘liberals’ was not sufficiently ‘Canadian’, i.e. patriotic, and had probably read too many American magazines and paid too much attention to American news and politics). One of the approaches, then, to preserving a ‘Canadian society’ was to
introduce citizens, by exposing them to a specific type of culture, to a set of values which was supposed to mould the character of the ‘good Canadian’: cultivated and informed patriot. It is of prime importance to recognize the extent to which national culture was desired for its political effects.

Because culture was desired, ultimately, for its political effects, ‘cultivation’ became a necessary characteristic of the legitimate public persona, i.e. of those who were equipped to represent the opinion of the public, and indeed, to express the personal opinions that would become ‘public’. Because members of the intellectual/cultural elite thought of themselves as having superior cultural as well as political capabilities, their approach to improving the political competence and cultural taste of the collective Canadian public was to substitute their own cultural resources, through education, for what they found lacking in the cultural development of ‘the masses’, whose backwoods and prairie dust character still symbolized Canada, to the chagrin of the intellectual elite. It was a source of embarrassment to know that, as a citizen of Canada, one was still labelled as a ‘colonial’ despite one’s own self-perception, not to mention one’s Rhodes Scholarship.\(^1\) The point being made is that there was some degree of self-interest in the cultural nation-building project.

There were many avenues through which cultural institutions endeavoured to take ‘culture’ to Canadians. The National Gallery orchestrated lecture and exhibit tours, the National Film Board sent films on circuits in rural communities, the National Council of Education organized "lectures by leading British singers, actors and authorities in literature, drama and fine arts",\(^2\) and the ‘Free Concert Movement’ developed in Ottawa,
Montreal and Toronto in the 1920s to "educate the listening public." Maria Tippet claims that "one of the most common forms of cultural education in the period [was] music and drama festivals." including the Dominion Drama Festival which came to life in 1932. A comment made by government film commissioner, Ross McLean, before the Massey Commission in 1949 is a strong statement of the rationale behind these educational ventures. Speaking about the rural NFB film circuits, McLean said, "we feel a certain responsibility towards all farming communities . . . which do not normally have the same channels of communication with, shall we say, the interpreters of the national purpose, that urban audiences have." Between the turn of the century and 1950 there had been a progression from the idea that high culture would "[bring] Canadian culture into line with that of the mother country . . . [and bind] the Dominion itself together by giving it "an identity of tastes and aspirations" to "the equation of high culture with national identity" and most importantly, a vision of national identity constructed by the nation's intellectual and political elite, as reflected in McLean's statement.

It was due to the specific conception of Canadian culture, based on liberal humanism, that cultural education was deemed necessary. Liberal humanism stresses the need for self-improvement. Culture is one of the forms of education that provides an opportunity to improve the mind and the moral character. Cultural nationalists were determined to develop a 'Canadian culture' which could facilitate spiritual, moral, civic, and intellectual refinement and would provide, at the same time, a basis for a distinct national culture and identity in North America. It is not, then, difficult to understand why one of the targets of cultural nationalists was the mass media, especially American films,
magazines and radio programs for which Canadians provided an eager market. In addition to the perception that Canadians neglected the development of their own art and literature while consuming a foreign 'culture', members of the cultural elite consistently protested that American mass culture failed "to improve the individual's intellectual and critical faculties" and "left the ignorant citizenry vulnerable to manipulation and exploitation." The cultural elite might have been aware of the paternalism inherent in their conception of the ignorance in which Canadians outside the elite circle lived. In fact, one acquaintance of Vincent Massey said of him that

what [he] failed to appreciate was that the philistinism against which he felt Canadians had to be protected was not, as he seemed to feel and certainly implied, wholly an invasion of the less desirable aspects of American culture over our borders, but to an important extent was a native element in Canadian life and very much a part of our own Canadian make-up.

This part of the Canadian make-up counted for nothing in Canadian politics, opinion and culture because (and this the cultural elite did not openly recognize) the class of political and cultural reformers that emerged in the 1920s were successful in making cultivation an attribute of and a prerequisite for the acceptable public persona. Thus, one's ability to participate in public debate in Canada was, from an educational point of view, dependent on class.

More than any other institution, the flagship of Canadian culture since the 1930s has been the CBC. The Canadian Radio League successfully lobbied for the introduction of public broadcasting that had been recommended in the 1929 report of the Aird Commission. In a manner that was to become typical of Canadian thinking about mass media, they argued that its educational value could and should, in the interest of
developing an intelligent and informed public, be exploited. But the CBC’s emphasis on educational broadcasting does not explain the predominant problem it encountered as a purveyor of ‘Canadian culture’ and national consciousness: its limited audience. By the time the Massey Commission was holding hearings across Canada, there was the general feeling that the CBC and other national cultural institutions were subjecting unwilling Canadians to cultural elitism.

In a broad sense, differences in cultural taste revealed the existence of distinct classes in Canadian society. The mass/elite split was especially evident in the attitude that cultural nationalists developed about the ignorant audience they addressed. In a critical article published in the Canadian Forum, R.B. Tolbridge criticized the CBC’s unimaginative failure to make ideas and ‘education’ interesting to the ‘average Canadian’. He cited one CBC chairman’s remark that "[w]e have in mind having broadcasts of an educational nature which do not appeal to the masses of the population. They have to be invited or incited to hear these programs for their own benefit." Similarly, CBC general manager Dr. Augustin Frigon proclaimed that "it is not [the CBC’s] business to appeal to a mass audience for sixteen hours a day. It has cultural and educational responsibilities . . . and consequently many of its programs will appeal only to limited audiences." The simultaneous disdain and enthusiasm with which cultural nationalists—as educators—approached the Canadian mass audience was most likely a product of their frustration, understanding, as they did, both the ‘need’ for Canadian (high) culture and the persistent ‘problem’ connected with its development: the fact that the public refused to develop a taste for it.
In a study of national film culture, Charles Acland analyzed the goals and strategies of an organization that developed in the early 1930s, the National Film Society. Of his three major assertions about film culture, one is of particular interest to the discussion of public taste. Acland contends that the 1930s marked "the formation of the question of national culture as one of national education." The educational strategy was based on the assumption that the 'problem' of Canadian culture (i.e. the reason that it was not taking a firm hold in a Canadian audience) was a consequence of deficiencies in the quality of public taste. This idea is reiterated in a section of the Massey Commission subtitled "The Problems of Painters and Galleries." The report stated that "the Canadian painter faces very serious problems" because, although art was a necessary aspect of a developing Canadian culture, Canadian artists could not live by their talents because a cultivated audience (and market) for their work did not exist in Canada. Consequently, the commission took the position that "numerous and representative exhibitions of painting [were recommended] to educate the public taste." Returning to the category of film, Acland's argument about the implications of this attitude toward public taste concurs with this thesis' assertion that members of the nationalist associations proclaimed themselves to be the proper public representatives on the basis of their superior intellectual cultivation. Acland argued that "[t]heir class specificity meant that voluntary organizations were structurally restricted to those who had the cultural capital to participate, . . . and who shared in a particular taste formation that would encourage them to attend, say, a lecture about Eisenstein's October rather than a Hollywood film." In the same way that it approached Canadian public opinion, the cultural/
intellectual elite "acted as though it represented the interests of society in general [while it distanced itself] from the popular audiences about whom they claimed to know so much." Cultural education became the process through which the gulf that separated the Canadian elite class from the masses could be bridged; the masses would have to rise to elite standards or be shunned.

But in the twentieth century, the masses could no longer be shunned. In mass society, they were the more significant, if mediocre, aspect of social organization. Writing on American culture, again for the Canadian Forum, James H. Wellard asserted that "the need for culture is strongly felt by those enthusiasts whose social sense urges them to wrestle with the masses rather than to shut them out . . . Hence the somewhat vague Adult Education movement . . . and the whole gamut indicating culture-consciousness and cultural deficiency at the same time." Although he was talking directly about American culture, he could not have more adequately described the forces that inspired the movement to elevate cultural taste in Canada. With an uncanny relevance to the experience of Canadian cultural development, Wellard, writing in 1934, continued:

the rapid substitution of education and culture for the seasoned folk-lore and tradition of the older nations [is infeasible]" . . . "the implication in this strenuous cultural development . . . is that America has not created or does not appreciate [its] own culture, and is heavily dependent on European art, literature, music and the rest for a substitute\textsuperscript{47} (italics added).

In Canada, the intention was to substitute one level of public taste and cultivation (one derived from British models) for another ‘inferior’ and ‘less developed’ one. But it seems that the general result was similar in that ‘Canadian culture’ had the aura of being
imposed, artificial and driver, by something other than individual creativity and an ability to express the human condition from a Canadian perspective. It existed for some reason other than for its own sake or for the sake of expressing a particularly important idea or sentiment; in the minds of nationalists, it existed primarily as an icon of national maturity. Consequently, the ‘problem’ and the ‘question’ of Canadian culture have persisted relatively unchanged despite decades of attention in the public, and the official, sphere.

Vipond asked the crucial question that must be asked of the intellectual elite of this period. Despite the wide-spread movement for adult education, were Canadian intellectuals successful in "disseminating nationalist ideas from the elite to the mass . . . [in fact] did they really try?" Vipond suggested that the "concrete task of education and proselytization" required that intellectuals "gather information and convey it to the public" through lectures, radio series, instructive films, artistic representations, etc. Her assertion that elite organizations only "claimed to wish to mould public opinion." (italics added) and taste, led her to the conclusion that, not only was a small Canadian minority touched by these organizations, but that members of the elite were complacent about this fact; in other words, they were content to act "as [the Canadian public’s] mouthpiece, in its name, perhaps even as its educator" to quote, again, Habermas’ phrase which expresses so succinctly the attitude of the elite public toward the broad Canadian public. There is no doubt that the ‘passionate educators’ described by Faris wanted to improve their country by cultivating Canadians who had had few opportunities for education. But the acknowledgement that ordinary Canadians did not co-operate in large numbers did not
stimulate the elite to question or modify their own conceptions of public opinion and taste, or their conceptions of the Canadian nation. Public representatives could not be critical of nationalism itself (which incorporated a conservative defense of traditional society, federalism, and elite democracy), nor could they be self-critical of their position as representatives of the Canadian public and of the national purpose. I have found no references to suggest that they thought their hegemony was something that needed to be justified or defended. This comment by Faris, however, questions whether the elite public was operating with public interests at all, or whether they merely made the decision that their personal convictions provided suitable public interests: the CAAE "served as a meeting ground for elite leaders of traditional voluntary associations bent on public expression of their personal views."90 Similarly, Acland concluded that the National Film Society also provided a space in which "the interests of a particular class faction became those of the nation."91 If you happened not to agree with the leaders of opinion and taste, your opinion was worthless as an individual whose lack of patriotism and public spirit betrayed a dearth of cultivation.

Critical Differences

The reason for discussing nationalism, cultivation, cultural substitution, the construction of a public persona, is really to get back to the problem of criticism in Canada that was explored in the preceding chapter. The 1920s did mark a new era in Canadian political culture, and that change occurred because some people realized that critical discussion was necessary to stimulate cultural development and political
competence and independence. Although the main thrust of argument throughout this and
the preceding chapter has been that the critical (or liberal) tradition in Canada through to
1950 was quite weak, it would be an over-simplification to suggest that criticism, or even
'reradical thinking', never occurred because the educated class had erected a solid wall of
'enlightened' nationalism. If this were true, how could the emergence of such critical
journals of opinion as the Canadian Forum and Dalhousie Review be explained?

The differences in the types of criticism that are taken seriously in this study are
very subtle and some distinctions must be made. In a limited way, critical discourse (if
we take it to mean the public use of private reason) and nationalism were complementary.
Although the public consciousness which emerged in the process of this transformation
was nationalist in character, and therefore sanctioned one way of thinking over others, the
nationalist public movement did accomplish a change in political culture because it
advocated and practised factual and rational discussion with the intention of helping
Canadians to make the 'right' choices about their government, their society and their
culture. It seems probable that the use of a network of informative associations to define
national public opinion was successful because the movement developed partly in reaction
to the judgement that Canadian misgovernment had occurred in the past because the
electorate did not have sufficient information to make intelligent decisions.

Like the voluntary associations, the new journals provided needed forums for the
clarification and discussion of political and cultural issues. There was the outright
criticism of the Canadian Authors' Association, what I would call explicit nationalism,
against those who read foreign books. But neither the Canadian Forum, nor the
nationalist associations explored here were *explicitly* nationalist; they were rationally nationalistic in that their aim was to inject useful and accurate information about Canadian issues into public discussion. The volume of informative discussion that they produced, and the coherence of their movement gave like-minded Canadians something to think about. Perhaps the nationalist associations were so successful in becoming the spokespersons for Canadian national issues because, in part, it was difficult to disagree with the seeming logic of their intentions and actions. Although members of the nationalist elite were critical of the things which held Canada back from attaining its potential greatness, it seems more correct to say that they engaged, not in *criticism*, but in a project of mutual and public *information* through which they suggested the right way to think about Canadian problems and the direction of the country's development. Within the voluntary associations, the emphasis was on sound information which confronted some of the holes in Canadian public knowledge and the misconceptions that Canadians held about policies, politics, and the institution of Canadian government. However, their assumption that social, political and cultural improvement would be fulfilled with the achievement of nationhood, was not open to debate.

The *Canadian Forum* differed in that it was a journal of information *and* criticism (here referring to the practice of evaluating the assumptions and convictions on which cultural or political values rest.) In the preface to a collection of *Forum* articles, J.L. Granatstein suggested that the journal was "avowedly nationalist" but "deliberately progressive." The journal's progressive character was produced by its unwillingness to be satisfied with perpetuating conventional wisdom. The *Canadian Forum* was a
national magazine and its public was intended to be a broadly-based national audience. However another intriguing comment by Granatstein questions who this journal was really directed to, or at. He stated that "the public may be mired in smugness, but the Forum was not." Did Granatstein mean the general public which might have been considered smug in its rigid parochialism, puritanism and the type of small-town self-importance that Stephen Leacock satirized? Or, did Granatstein mean the ‘Canadian country club’ public of elites whose respectability was a major obstacle to public controversy?

There are two things which suggest that it was the latter of the publics which the Canadian Forum intentionally addressed. First, despite the initial hopes of its editors, the journal’s audience was relatively small and select. Vipond affirmed that the Forum was "the single most important journal of the Canadian intelligentsia."94 Second, the Forum addressed many of the same issues that were sacred to the Canadian League, the CIIA, and the Canadian Clubs (i.e. international and constitutional relations, the tariff, foreign economic investment, cultural and literary development, Canadian political leadership) but it often took a different tack on those issues. For instance, Escott Reid challenged the conventional wisdom and the nationalist associations when he asserted that "[i]t is gratifying to our sense of national self-satisfaction to say that the election [of Canada to the League of Nations] marks an international recognition of the status of the Dominions and Great Britain as co-equal nations in the Commonwealth, but it is perhaps untrue."95 It appears that the Forum was in confrontation with the elite public, and was attacking some of the most central tenets of Canadian nationalism. But, why, if the Canadian Forum was ‘avowedly nationalist’? How was the elite public smug where the Canadian
Forum was not?

In terms of its relation to public debate, the self-satisfied 'smugness' of the elite class as a whole reveals another characteristic of the public persona: respectability. Respectability worked in two ways to suppress and control public debate. First, because they belonged to a class of 'cultivated' and respectable individuals, their smugness issued from the feeling that they understood more, and knew better than other Canadians. Consequently, members of the intellectual elite denied, in their attitudes and behaviour, that other people could have important ideas or opinions which deserved to be heard and respected. So, the respectability of the elite class acted as a barrier to the critical or unorthodox ideas and the varying perspectives on Canadian issues that originated outside the public elite. Second, respectability limited the amount of criticism that could developed internally as well. To be blunt, it was not considered respectable within the conservative elite public to engage in controversy, and especially to initiate it by saying something critical. The reason that the CIIA failed to "promote or share in public debate of controversial questions"96 is suggested in Vipond's finding that members of the intellectual elite were not "social critics", and were "well respected, and well established."97 T.W. MacDermot complained that the vitality of Canadian intellectual life was stifled because "the freedom to venture new theories, to re-question old ones, is suspect if it is exercised in any but the most intensely respectable form."98 To express something in 'respectable form' meant to respect the principles that were important to the more conservative members of the nationalist public: nationhood, patriotism, cultivation, capitalism, Christian morality. This left little room to examine the assumptions and
convictions of social, cultural or political ideologies. Frank Underhill, who faced dismissal from the University of Toronto for his engagement in public controversy, experienced the pressure to conform to respectable public conduct. In an essay entitled "On Politics and Professors," Underhill asserted that one of the dangers "which confronts the intellectual integrity of the academic man is the danger of respectability." He noted that public activity by professors was perfectly acceptable if it included working on Royal Commissions (i.e. doing the work of the state). However, when professors took "the radical side" they sacrificed their respectability in the eyes of the elite class. In defense of Professor Underhill, Carleton McNaught reinforced the importance of freedom of expression. He said that "ordinary Canadians are . . . entitled to hear the reasoned views of Canadian scholars in the fields of history, economics and political economy . . . To the extent that they deny us this right, our universities are doing a real disservice to democracy," and, one would add, to the health of the public sphere.

Underhill's name was among the sixty-eight professors who published a letter in Toronto newspapers in 1931 to sound their disagreement with the totalitarian tactics used by the Toronto Police Commission to restrict the freedoms of speech and assembly in the effort to "stamp out Communism" in Toronto. The barrage of public feedback to the letter demonstrated the contempt with which some members of the Canadian public held a civil liberty as basic as freedom of expression. Even more remarkable, an anonymous editorialist wrote in the Canadian Forum that only one of the four Toronto dailies which ran the letter supported the side of free speech. The indignant tone of the public backlash accentuated the inflexible respect for the authorities of church, state, and law
exhibited by Toronto's social leaders.\textsuperscript{102} A letter from the presidents of the Board of Trade expressed the "regrettable condition" that the issue of free speech had marred "the outstanding reputation of the University of Toronto." Sir William Mulock, Chancellor of the university, warned that "eternal vigilance is the price of liberty--not license, but liberty within the law." 'Radicalism', if it is radical to assert that freedom of speech should prevail in a democratic society, was neither acceptable, nor respectable, nor appreciated in the public sphere in which liberal thinkers seemed unwelcome and disgraced. The implication of this cultural convention regarding 'respectable' public behaviour was that most critical, castigating, progressive, radical, or otherwise intelligent ideas were withheld from the sphere of public debate.

**Conclusion**

The period spanning 1920 to 1950 has been labelled a 'progressive' era in Canada, and a great deal of social and political change and modernization in thinking took place. The modern Canadian state took form around the ideas of a generation of 'liberals' (Brooke Claxton being a prime example) who were interventionist and who supported the extension of the Canadian administrative bureaucracy. Political labels (conservative, liberal, socialist) became confused in this period as seemingly contradictory conservative and 'progressive' elements found compatibility in the predominantly conservative public sphere. Reflecting on Gad Horowitz's essay on "Conservatism, Liberalism, and Socialism in Canada,"\textsuperscript{103} McKillop and Romney explained that "[b]y linking Canadian socialism and progressive statism to a primal Canadian conservatism, Horowitz enabled left-wing
nationalists to seat themselves comfortably in the Canadian conservative tradition." What this means is that, despite the talk about social and democratic reform, cultural development, public consciousness and the progress toward nationhood, the conservative Canadian political culture was not pressured to change because up to 1950, the imperative in Canadian politics was stubbornly fixed: the 'need' for Canadian nationhood and unity.

Therefore, and to the frustration of radical or liberal thinkers, the period following the First World War was highly conservative in Canada. There was an almost reactionary determination to preserve elements of a traditional society in which human values were placed above commercial and scientific values, and in which a democratic form of government--the rightful government of humane and peaceful nations--was to be maintained at all costs. As Canadians retreated from a laissez-faire perspective based on individualism and competition as a means to social progress, they accentuated the need for social cohesion and co-operation, international peace and national thinking. These attitudes spilled over into the conception of national unity and 'right' public opinion. For the good of the social whole, Canadians were being encouraged to change their parochial and sectional ways of thinking, and to judge how their own actions might affect the goal of democratic social stability. As Robert Falconer suggested, "change comes by persuasion, not by force" and it was through education that "we must recover the idea of the higher unity" of humankind that began with the individual who could "see things whole." The ability to have a non-parochial understanding of the larger needs of community was what, for Falconer, distinguished the 'cultivated individual' who was capable of forming intelligent public opinion. While liberal education and the formation
of a thinking citizenry were encouraged as a means to building a unified peaceful society. The cautious post-war ideological climate and the quest for enlightened nationalism provided little space for criticism of the restraints placed on the freedom and expression of individual thought. Support for democracy was the only respectable public and political attitude, and those who ventured to claim that communism or socialism provided models of decent government and social organization were severely censured. Liberal democracy was endorsed insofar as it was construed as a just form of government for a nation of people who could agree to the logic and necessity of political unity and cooperation. In the search to regain social stability, political and social leaders preached a sermon of cohesion and solidarity needed to reconstruct the social order after the Great War. Nationalism provided the ordering point to which the Canadian public could be marshalled. Very few Canadians took seriously the idea that their own pro-nationalism might be in contradiction with their anti-fascist attitudes, and that, although Canadian nationalism was not generally supported by official violence, fascism and nationalism had similar practical effects on the reduction of individual expression and the level of critical thought among citizens.

As a public ideology, Canadian nationalism presented a new obstacle to criticism. The homogeneity of nationalist public opinion made political criticism and the expression of radical ideas not only an unpopular, but an unrespectable activity. Similarly, the determination within the intellectual class to foster Canadian culture frustrated the attempt among objective critics to encourage artistic expression that was genuinely worthy of notice beyond the reasoning of cultural nationalists. Some bold critics understood that the
problem of literary development, for instance, could not be entirely attributed to foreign influences, and that Canadians must take responsibility for their cultural immaturity. These critics charged that cultural and intellectual mediocrity was, albeit unintentionally, endorsed by organizations such as the Canadian Authors' Association which abandoned any attempt to bring critical standards to Canadian literature. The arguments used by cultural nationalists to justify their cause (that aggressive American exportation of cultural products 'flooded' the Canadian market and reduced the prominence of Canadian artists) were under attack by literary critics who were disturbed that Canadian culture of such a poor quality should be defended so vigorously.

However, the initial calls by F.P. Grove. W.L. Grant. Douglas Bush and A.J.M. Smith, for instance, to achieve cultural and political development through criticism seem to have failed. In the early 1940s, literary critic E.K. Brown's assertion that Canada's "great good place" was beyond its own borders and its own possibilities reflected the opinion that in the literary world Canada had yet to become a 'place' with its own critical standards to meet. Canadian writers and books remained on the literary periphery and Canada's Augustan age lay in its future. But the political situation in Canada changed more rapidly. The general mood among intellectuals was that, as a nation, Canada's time had come. The signing of the Westminster Statute in 1931 marked the achievement of full constitutional independence from the British Parliament. Members of the nationalist organizations supported constitutional autonomy because it indicated the achievement of independent nationhood in a political sense, in the same way that the Group of Seven, and the development of a Canadian literature represented national independence on the cultural
level. But unlike the ambivalence that dogged Canadian literary critics, Canadian nationalists seemed certain that Canada was living in its "present" (not in a picturesque past or glorified future) because it had finally reached the goal to which it aspired when Confederation was signed. It had become its own place, a nation, and an actor in the international sphere. Now that Canada was "real" in a national sense, it was time to finally face its own realities.

But Claxton's biographer asserted that members of nationalist associations were "basically unconcerned with social or economic change." Similarly, an historian of the Canadian Clubs noted that during the depression years "[s]peakers seemed to be ignoring pressing local problems in favour of national and international issues." The Canadian Forum, on the contrary, was "criticized for being too negative; this was, in the opinion of some readers, a destructive activity. Underhill responded saying that

[c]riticism of this kind . . . simply aims at giving a realistic understanding of the political, economic and social forces which underlay the day-to-day happenings recorded in newspaper headlines . . . This so-called destructive criticism is especially needed in Canada just because there has been so little of it." Canadians still had difficulty facing their own "unpleasant facts" as Underhill called them.

Putting Underhill's observation together with what we have learned about Canadian nationalism, the idea of Canada that the public elite espoused, and the manner in which they perceived and addressed the Canadian citizen, it seems that the nationalist associations were more concerned with imposing their own 'reality' of Canada than in taking a self-critical position when evaluating Canadian weaknesses. Their idea of Canada was fictitious because it was a place in which all people shared the conviction that Canadian unity and a common identity existed which created a distinct nationality.
Despite the assurance of leaders of the nationalist associations, one cannot but feel the elusiveness of the other Canadian public in this discussion that has centred on the question of nationhood. The ‘other’ public was the one which was addressed but did not speak for itself, and whose response to the elite has been largely surmised in the mythology of this era. For it is not clear that this public was speaking through the CCF, or the Social Credit party, or the One Big Union, or even the Winnipeg strike in 1919 or through the audience ratings for the CBC. This problem has implications for the way in which we understand the history and the mythology of Canada. An observation by Desmond Pacey captures the elusiveness of the question of nationhood and identity:

[s]uch has been the preoccupation with the question of Canada itself and with a search for a national identity in a nation where it does not exist in as palpable and obvious way as in Europe and the United States, that one is sometimes left with the odd sensation that Canada is nothing but a figment of the historical imagination, a concept nurtured in the minds of a small minority of Canadian leaders in each generation, aided and abetted by a few historians.\textsuperscript{110}

The conscientious observer has to admit that she has not discovered the Canadian public, or the Canadian public sphere at all. Both have remained obscure, unknown and unfound.

Perhaps this conclusion is influenced by the fact that this study admittedly focused on non-critical activity, its assumptions and its purposes. Perhaps if an exhaustive study had been attempted on the criticism of a few literary critics, or the progressive or radical thinking of a few political activists, a different story of political and cultural development would have been told. As it stands, this study comes to the conclusion that cultural development amounted to cultural substitution, and political development amounted to an elitist set of nationalist responses to various Canadian problems that became public information and structured the public persona. Regardless of whether or not the attitudes
of the 'real' Canadian public have been explored in this thesis, it seems clear that cultural criticism and political consciousness seemed to have remained relatively undeveloped throughout this period.

From a theoretical perspective, one reason that the political public sphere remained inadequate (by normative standards) might be that the program of cultural development via substitution also failed. To concede that this statement explains the Canadian experience however, is to agree with Habermas that political consciousness is the product of a critical subjectivity developed through one's contact with educative cultural forms, and that the existence of an authentic public sphere presupposes a high level of cultural development. Without suggesting that Habermas was wrong in thinking that political consciousness was instilled in this way in the bourgeois public sphere, it is crucial to consider that the bourgeois public sphere, and the cultural foundation that gave it birth, were the products of a particular ideology and society. Craig Calhoun suggested that the construction of the public sphere in 'bourgeois society' does not denote a public sphere based on class distinction, but on a type of society that was *bourgeois*, meaning that its hegemonic logic was built on the principles of the rational equality of human beings, and their rights to autonomy, self-regulation and a just organization of public and private life that constituted social and political freedom. Although the entire society was not bourgeois, this class was the most powerful component of the social structure in the eighteenth century, just as the Canadian intellectual elite was matchless in Canada in the period we have explored. In the eighteenth century and in the twentieth, the public sphere is the product of the dominant ideologies that exist in a society at any one time. This is
not to retreat from the original assertion that there were similar problems in Canadian cultural and political development which affected both public opinion and cultural taste. It is an acknowledgement that cultural and political underdevelopment in Canada were the result of a specific set of ideologies, cultural values, attitudes, and social practices that intersected and minimized the importance of culture, criticism and civil liberties.

Canadian nationalism was an ideology in which a strong national will and culture were highly valued. But compared to eighteenth-century bourgeois ideology, it was not one that was conducive to individual thought, political agency, and the formation of subjectivity and taste except within a small minority that quickly filled the ranks of public and political leadership. The bourgeois ideology championed privacy, autonomy, equality, subjectivity, rational law and civil rights. These principles allowed eighteenth-century individuals to think about their relationship to the state. The claim to rationality placed the emphasis on the thinking individual to authorize the actions of the state in public discourse. In the spectrum of Canadian public discourse ranging from international and constitutional relations, to economic planning, public services, and proper citizenship, the emphasis was on the state because it was the state, and not the individual, which had the power to be an agent of progress and change and a representative of the Canadian people’s desire for autonomy. While lip-service was paid to the improvement of individuals’ minds and character through contact with culture, the primary reasons for fostering Canadian culture and cultural taste were to confirm that there was a Canadian nationality which deserved to live under a sovereign state, and secondly to create an effective citizenry which would make the right political choices. The imperative in those
political choices was the belief that progressive statism would ensure the development of a superior society that retained its founding federalist principles. Although citizens were encouraged to think about Canadian issues, they were encouraged to think nationally, not individually. The Canadian individual was in the shadow of the state, even when the state was barely more than a shell of its future self. Furthermore, it is difficult to find an emancipatory interest (that is, an interest in deconstructing the dominant structures of society) in the public rhetoric that developed in the nationalist public sphere of the elite intelligentsia, for it was chiefly concerned with forming and being that dominant structure of society which was called ‘national consciousness.’ Although the objective of all voluntary associations was to cultivate a national spirit by forging, through communication, an understanding of what Canadians were expected to be unified to, the ideology of nationalism, as a principle that ordered the thinking of the movement, made radical criticism inadmissible. Critical debate was truncated because the nationalistic appeal, while it certainly offered a solid consensual base on which to build discussion, set restrictive parameters on the nature and course of discussion and on the capacities for the Canadian public sphere to permit self-determination and political freedom.
Conclusion

The Canadian Public Sphere and Habermas' Criteria

That the Canadian public sphere differs in significant ways from the bourgeois public sphere is not surprising given that they have existed in different historical and cultural contexts in which the public viewed its relationship to the state much differently. As Habermas described it, the bourgeois public was concerned to transform arbitrary political domination into rational government by institutionalizing rational law and public opinion. The Canadian elite public did not see its democratic government as an adversary. Instead, it viewed the state as a potential facilitator of a ‘Canadian’ society influenced by intelligent public opinion and thoughtful government intervention in economics, public welfare, and culture. But they also judged that Canadian government (both the bureaucracy and the political leadership) had the potential to work more efficiently, effectively and constructively than it had in the past. The Canadian intellectual elite realized it must take its share of responsibility for the unsatisfactory state of Canadian public life. Only by demanding better government, and supplying it with ideas, could they hope for change and improvement. Through a network of associations, they aimed to create a solid public opinion that was predicated vaguely, and defensively, on the idea of the Canadian nation and the identity of the people who lived in it. Public opinion provided the intellectual elite with a medium through which they could respond to political incompetence and at the same time address the ambiguity of social values and the concepts of Canadian culture and identity.
The intellectual elite positioned themselves as leaders in public thinking. They addressed both the government and the broad Canadian public which they thought was inadequately interested and involved in the public affairs of the nation. They found that the government needed a modernized and clearer understanding of Canadian political principles, values and the direction in which it was taking the country in the twentieth century. As a new consciousness developed after the First World War, public enthusiasts judged that the task of governing Canada was still imagined by political leaders and public officials to be the task of inciting conflicting interests to move in one general direction through continuous political brokering. This approach to government indicated that the country was not moving and thinking as a unit. One implication of this approach was that strongly articulated national leadership was absent, and unlikely to emerge, under such circumstances.

But some of the central prerequisites necessary to meet the Habermasian standards of 'normativity' -- an ideal that several critics observe remains "historically unattained" -- are not evident in the Canadian public sphere. Chiefly due to the findings that the Canadian public sphere was weak in debate that was both rational and critical, and that the elite public was ideologically aligned with and physically connected to the state, the conclusion by Habermasian standards would be that we have explored a degenerate public sphere in which the separation of state and public had collapsed, and in which individual political consciousness was extraneous.

The incredible extra-parliamentary public activity of a sizable group of Canadian intellectuals should not be discounted altogether on the grounds that the Canadian public
sphere did not share Habermas' central criteria. Unless we are willing to disregard the intense public spirit that was evident in this portion of the public, and abandon the possibility that a public sphere did exist during this period, we have to take the nationalist public sphere seriously. The discourse produced by public enthusiasts was important not only because it influenced public policy, but because it articulated and emphasized the dominant values which structured public opinion in this generation. Distinct from the bourgeois ideology that emphasized the freedom of the individual in a sphere of private autonomy, Canadian nationalism was a way of thinking that emphasized the development of those things which palpably represented nationhood: mainly political unity, national identity and culture. To argue that the elite public's logic was nationally biased, and therefore arbitrarily sanctioned one way of thinking over others, is not to argue that public debate between 1920 and 1950 was worthless or invalid. It is simply to recognize that the concept of evolving nationhood (represented through the state) received much greater attention in public debate than did, say, the principle of individual rights and private autonomy.

In addition to the articulation of their values, the public discourse of Canadian nationalists also manifested the elite public's understanding of the proper relationship of the Canadian citizen to the state. After studying Habermas' theory and the criticisms of it, it was concluded that a constructive public sphere should exist within civil society where it could act as an independent space for consensual self-determination of a community of people. The movement to establish political and cultural independence in this period suggests that the nationalist public was striving for self-definition in their
discussions. They pursued the ideal of a politically unified and culturally homogenous nation that could be governed as a consensual unit. Although the idea of "nationhood" was defined for Canadian thinkers within the concept of German romantic nationalism, the definitional aspect existed in the discussions of the principles and values which could generate a Canadian consciousness through which an informed citizenry could be unified. As one researcher described the people who were behind this wave of public initiative, "they saw themselves as intellectuals and artists, performing the critical function of crystallizing community identity by dispensing meaningful symbols, and articulating common goals." But, the fundamental problem with the definitions that the nationalist public produced (besides the fact that they were vague and focused more on the "need" for Canadian consciousness than on expressing exactly what it might be) was that it simply was not meaningful to many Canadians, especially those who did not live in central Canada. But, the fact that the Canadian public sphere was involved in self-definition does not necessarily mean that this public sphere was independent of the state. Where was the Canadian public sphere situated?

Although it has been argued that the nationalist public was influential because of its connections to, and not its separation from, the public authority, it would be irresponsible to assert that the formation of institutions devoted to intelligent "national" public opinion was initiated by the state. Certainly the potential benefit of nationalist associations was not lost on political figures who tended to use the podiums of the Canadian Clubs as outlets for their political (as distinct from "public") perspectives (and no one seemed to notice the contradiction). However, the conclusion that the state was
behind the nationalist public sphere should be dispelled, because the 'needs' of the state that underpinned public thinking during this period were the needs as interpreted through the complex ideology of Canadian nationalism that was generally common to the public elite. In other words, the ideas about what it was that Canada needed in this period of uncertainty originated in a public of private individuals who recognized the incredible potential of the federal state to act as the architect of a superior North American society. Douglas Owram observed that at the beginning of this period (especially during the First World War), the intellectual community was quite far removed from and had little influence in the official sphere. In 1917 "the intellectual reform groups had simply not gained enough acceptance in government circles to make their opinion really count." It was not until intellectuals organized themselves into a network of discussants in response to discontent and the disintegration of Canadian unity in the post-war period that their opinion became something the government began to take seriously.

The post-war nationalist public sphere was a product of the first war for democracy which signalled to Canadians their emergence as a distinct nation, but a nation which, intellectuals admitted, had many political and cultural weaknesses. Although the public spirit which initiated the nationalist network stressed the evolutionary achievement of nationhood as a solution to many of Canada's developmental difficulties, it should be emphasized that public spirit developed in individuals who were displeased with the way that Canada was being governed, and with the neglect that was being shown by Canadians for their own artistic and literary cultures. The intellectual elite imagined the best relationship between the public and the government to be a co-operative symbiosis in
which constructive public discussion was needed to maintain a participatory democracy, and in which the articulation of the public’s informed expectations would increase the government’s ability to govern well. One interpretation of the Canadian public sphere might be that the interconnected private individuals and public figures realized that political and personal benefits could be obtained if they collaborated in one powerful group which created and acted on the informed opinion of the ‘public’ that an enlarged, centralized state could serve in the national interest. It seems more correct to say, however, that the nationalist public valued the federal state because it was the only institution that had the power to control and regulate aspects of Canadian society, and could claim that right to do so on a national scale on the basis that federal control was exercised in the national interest. One of the important things to appreciate about the public/state relationship is that members of the elite public saw themselves (not the government) as the source of right thinking about how that power should be applied, and to which Canadian problems. As such, their thinking was an expression of their own elite ‘public consciousness’--the consideration of the effective use of state power in the national interest--but it does not demonstrate a highly developed ‘political consciousness’ which would be more concerned with the defense of civil liberties and individual freedom in political and social relations.

The conservative nationalist public which consolidated itself in a network of voluntary associations was an important and influential aspect of this stage in the history of the Canadian public sphere. However, as noted in the last chapter, there was a difference between the type of criticism that emanated from ‘enlightened nationalists’ and
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the insights of a small number of critics who emphasized the assumptions of 'progressive' thinkers about Canadian political and cultural development, and who stressed the impropriety of favouring national thinking and political imperatives over civil liberties and individual thought. Although these critics waged a war of words against the constriction that a too-consensual opinion placed on public debate, it is clear that public consciousness far outweighed political consciousness in Canadian public discourse.

This conclusion leads us back to the question with which this study began. Habermas' theory of the normative public sphere stressed the relationship between a critical subjectivity, developed within an audience-oriented sphere of cultural and literary discourse, and the possession of a political consciousness necessary for rational-critical debate. If, in that model, the existence of the political public sphere of the bourgeoisie presupposed a high level of cultural development, what kind of public sphere was possible in a community whose level of cultural development was judged by its own members to be insufficient? In the public sphere that was found in Canada, public spirit was fervid but largely apolitical. To elaborate on an earlier comment, it was common for public figures to be invited as speakers and participants in the organizations that were dedicated to creating informed public opinion. This was standard practice in the Canadian public sphere because the state and the nationalist associations shared a vision of Canada and an understanding of the roles of the state and the public in that vision. Public discourse was characterized by the expression of too much consensus and too few conflicting ideas and points of view.

But not everyone in the vocal Canadian public exhibited an apolitical
consciousness. Many of those who succeeded in seeing and articulating a different reality than the one expressed in nationalist discourse were the product of a particular cultural experience that was, once again, beyond Canadian borders. Many of the 'liberal thinkers', referred to throughout this study, as well as the leaders of the nationalist associations, were graduates of Oxford. Owram described the type of experience that was common to many Rhodes scholars:

it was not so much the education they received, but the exposure to a particular culture and way of thought that counted. Graham Spry, for example,\(^5\) steeped himself without reservation in the new community, participating in the famous debating clubs . . . and investigating the heady political discussions that circulated through this university of the English elite.\(^6\)

This historical evaluation reinforces the theoretical point that a symbiotic relationship exists between a level of a community's cultural development and the quality of its public sphere. When it is suggested that a lack of Canadian cultural development produced a public sphere which was intellectually and culturally restrictive, and politically unsatisfactory, that does not mean that the inability to define and understand 'Canadian culture' (i.e. a possible tradition of literature, a style of artistic expression, etc..) barred Canadians from engaging in open public discourse. It means that in Canadian political, artistic, and literary cultures, the public had not learned the value of free, controversial discussion instigated by a liberal exposure to challenging and experimental ideas, and to various interpretations of the realities in which Canadians lived. As only a select few members of the Canadian public had the opportunity to experience "a particular culture and way of thought" that could not be experienced in Canada, they were incapable of transforming the political and intellectual cultures to which they returned after graduation.
Some retained the spirit of Oxford, while others seemed to think that the atmosphere of Oxford could be reproduced in the tide of Canadian nationalism that swept the intellectual elite.

It was not that the spirit of Oxford could not have been reproduced in Canada; it was not. According to the research presented in this thesis, the explanation for why the same type of cultural experience did not emerge in Canada rests in two factors: the manner in which the intellectual elite approached cultural development and the reasons for which they did so. The relationship between cultural development and the public sphere really comes down to the community’s ability to debate, which includes its ability to derive debatable ideas. ‘Culture’, as something that we attend to subjectively, is bound up in the complex of imaginative and rational literatures, artistic images and creative ideas which are interpretations and reflections of the social, political and cultural phenomena in which we live. What various cultural forms hold in common is their ability to spark debate about what these expressions and images mean to each of us individually, and ultimately about the worth and validity of such expressions and ideas. Debate allows people to test their subjective interpretations of, say a film or a policy paper, against the interpretations of others, and in doing so, people are brought to better understand their values, their social positions, their political status, their hegemony, ethnicity, gender, etc.—they come to understand the impact of those variables on the way that they perceive. From among the radically different perceptions, criticism exists as a continually dynamic process through which social, political and cultural values are defined and redefined.

The approach to, and the justification for, Canadian cultural development, under
the leadership of the intellectual elite, limited the process which has just been described. The most striking quality of the rhetoric of Canadian culture throughout this century is its immovability. The debate has never moved far from the original need to control the citizenry's cultural consumption so that people might think, read, see, hear and judge like 'Canadians'. The dialogue has never been liberated from the original (and unprovable) idea that Canadians' preference for mass produced American culture (what Americans call entertainment) would cause the Americanization of the Canadian people. If Canadian nationality was, in fact, eroded in the flood of American culture over Canadian borders (to use the language of Canadian cultural nationalists), then there would be no justification to maintain separate political institutions.

The perceptions of the political need for a specifically 'Canadian culture' which expressed the nationality of the Canadian people shaped the intellectual elite's strategies of cultural development. The manner in which nationalists attempted to reach this objective was through 'cultural education', as they termed it, which really amounted to the attempt by the intellectual elite to substitute their cultural tastes in place of the 'low' cultural tastes of the masses. The leaders of the Canadian public sphere connected a specific form of cultivation with the possession of Canadian public spirit and with the ability to act in the role of the legitimate public personae. In other words, they found in themselves the definition and identity of 'the Canadian' To this identity they hoped to proselytize the rest of the population through the medium of Canadian culture. The broad Canadian public was approached as a trainable audience of cultural consumers that would be socialized through their contact with this culture, and which could supply a necessary
market (economic basis) for Canadian cultural production. This paternalistic approach was more suited to the construction of cultural consumers than cultural debaters and discussants because, as uncultivated individuals, Canadians outside the intellectual elite were presumed to lack the cultural capital that would allow them to form the right judgements. The activities of judgement, criticism, interpretation and opinion formation went on before they were addressed. The implication of the strategy of cultural substitution was that the practical cultural role of the majority of Canadians became merely one of acceptance and acquiescence.

The implication of the politicization of Canadian culture was the obvious tendency to limit cultural expression to subjects and styles which promoted a self-consciously Canadian image, and which excluded a whole range of expression from the admissible limits of Canadian cultural production and criticism. The less obvious implication of politicization was that it devalued cultural expression because it was no longer addressing an audience of subjective individuals. Politicized culture did not promote critical subjectivity; it did not encourage subjectivity at all; that is, the understanding of oneself as a subject who was capable of unique and intelligent responses to cultural stimuli. Instead, it surreptitiously constructed an understanding of oneself as the object of predetermined interpretations in which the object could not participate. That the reasons to pursue cultural development were political implies that national consciousness was more important than the character of individuals despite liberal humanists' claim that high culture provided opportunities for individuals to improve themselves mentally and morally.
It is easy to look back to another era in Canadian life and to smirk at its unsophisticated nationalism and leap to the conclusion that the problems of Canadian identity and culture were exacerbated by the nationalist bias of a generation of public leaders which tried to popularize, through public persuasion, a vision of Canada that coincided with their conservative values and Ontario-centric perspectives. But, Canadian culture and the idea of the Canadian nation were, I submit, much more sophisticated things in the minds of these leaders than they turned out to be in the radio broadcasts on the CBC or in the NFB films that travelled through rural circuits. The nationalist public sphere was an important moment in the history of the Canadian public sphere. It was the product of a generation in which the final transition from colony to nation was in progress, and in which the elite intelligentsia constituted an exclusive and definable group whose ascendancy in public opinion seems to have been virtually unchallenged, although the Canadian public was not unified, but one stratified along class lines, as Faris’ work indicates. The nationalist public sphere resembled the bourgeois public sphere in that, in both instances, an elite public emerged which became the self-proclaimed spokespersons of opinion for the entire public. There is nothing abnormal about this feature of the Canadian public sphere. Habermas’ own ambivalence about the validity of public opinion (expressed in his discussion of Mill, Tocqueville, Hegel and Marx) has led one critic to the practical resolution that public opinion is never fully representative or inclusive because "[it] comes to refer more positively to the views held by those who join in rational-critical debate on an issue." But, the most significant point of difference between the Canadian and the bourgeois experiences was the level of
cultural and intellectual development and practices (or what Habermas calls conversational sociability) that left the Canadian public sphere without a strong tradition of rational-critical debate, and perhaps in deeper ways influenced the thinking of a populace which harboured such small respect for political consciousness and evaluative criticism.
Endnotes

Notes to 'Introduction'


2. The preconditions are extensively discussed in the second chapter. They include the division of public and private spheres, public participation of private individuals, existence of political consciousness, the formation of civil society in which to locate the public sphere, and a confident attitude toward individuals’ capacities for self-judgement and understanding.


4. In the opening pages of The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, (Cambridge, 1989) Habermas refers to the Greek polis to help his readers understand the very abstract concept of the public sphere. After stating that public life occurred in the locale of the market place (the agora), Habermas asserts that "of course this did not mean that it occurred necessarily only in this specific locale. The public sphere was constituted in discussion (lexis)". Habermas insists that it was the activity of public speech performed by citizens which created, and kept alive the public sphere (p. 3).


8. Ibid., p. 242.

9. Ibid., p. 244.


13. Ibid., p. 9.

14. The second chapter outlines the transformations of the public sphere which Habermas details. While the first half of his study examines the changes and conditions leading to the development of the
bourgeois public sphere and the normative qualities of this temporary phenomenon. The second half deals with Habermas’ view of the decline of the public sphere due to the replacement of rational-critical debate with less participatory and critical forms of publicity. Even though Habermas’ degeneration theory is thought by some critics to be overstated in its pessimism of mass media, no one argues that the public sphere operates in the same way now as it did prior to the twentieth century.


18. Ibid., p. 262.

19. Ibid., p. 269.


22. Ibid.

23. See comments by Craig Calhoun in chapter one, p. 44.

24. See Habermas’ discussion of Mill’s and Tocqueville’s ambivalence toward the democratized public sphere in *Structural Transformation*, p. 129ff.


31. The introduction to Hohendahl’s work *The Institution of Criticism* (1982) discusses the divorce, by the mid-nineteenth century, of literary criticism from the press (and, consequently, the public sphere) following 1) the institutionalization of German literary studies in the academy and 2) the commercialization of the press resulting in the rise of feuilleton criticism which was more preoccupied with the taste of audiences than with critical scholarship and discourse. In “Literary Criticism and the Public Sphere,” Hohendahl attacks the veracity of the autonomous commercial critic, and states that literary critics “are unanimous in their belief in the autonomy of literature, the objectivity of criticism, and the social
independence of the critic. Literary life is considered a closed realm of communication, where in discussions among authors, critics, and readers only literary arguments are admissible. Extraliterary factors are essentially ignored; in cases where they are empirically verifiable, they are labelled mere evidence of decline. As a result, author and literary public appear only in their specific, abstract roles" (p. 45). However, in a specific look at the discourse of Canadian literary criticism ("Privacy, Publicity, and the Discourse of Canadian Criticism, Essays in Canadian Writing, 51-52 (Winter-Spring 1994) Robert Lecker suggests that the discourse of Canadian literary has been privatized (made for a specific audience in the university) since the mid-1950s although Canadian literature "appeared to have become much more public" (p. 42) following the inception of publicly funded cultural agencies. He asserts specifically, that "whereas the preindustrial discourse of Canadian criticism [before 1957] imagined a broad public readership, postindustrial critical discourse constructed a much more limited audience" (p. 47) and that "the sense of exchange and debate that characterized the preindustrial publicity was replaced by pedagogy that privileged oratorical over conversational modes of address" (p. 46). The level of subscription to Canadian literary magazines, and the lack of impact that this discourse had on general public opinion suggests that, even if Canadian literary critics wanted to make the discussion public, it did not become a discourse in which the general public engaged with literary critics.


Notes to Chapter One


4. Habermas outlines the complex evolution of ‘public opinion’ in the fourth chapter of Structural Transformation. He maintains that the bourgeois public understood the function of the public sphere to be in the formation of opinion through the compulsion of reason. Habermas discusses the progression of the conception of public opinion from the opinion of private individuals who had no authority to judge the political body, through the ‘general opinion’ of a morally conscious society, and finally to the politically conscious ‘public opinion’ which “compell[ed] lawmakers to legitimize themselves” (p. 96) before the public which was a product of the modern administrative state. In its final form, public opinion referred to “the critical reflections of a public that was competent to form its own judgements” (p. 90). In this way, the public sphere, the space in which rational opinion was generated by private individuals, was accepted as a legitimate aspect of the political system.


7. Nancy Fraser, "Rethinking the Public Sphere: a Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy," in Habermas and the Public Sphere, Craig Calhoun (ed.), p. 109-142. Fraser insists, with others in this volume, that, as an ideal and as an historical actuality, Habermas' conception of the bourgeois public sphere is too narrow and rigid to indicate the dynamic nature of the public sphere which resists degeneration despite the problems with its democratized form. Her criticism echoes Calhoun's observation that the "revitalization of a critical political public during the 1960s and its refusal to quite go away since then" lends credence to this view [that Habermas assessment of public sphere's degeneration is overstated]" (p. 33). Similar to Thomas McCarthy's assertion that "Habermas' model is too inflexible for the concerns of a modern pluralist society" (p. 104), Fraser resists the idea that the Kantian principle of a universal set of interests is an acceptable basis for the construction of political needs, for it presupposes the unitary nature of the public sphere, and masks the aspect which she contends (along with Joan Landes, Mary Ryan and Geoff Eley) made the existence and practice of rational-critical debate possible: its exclusivity. She refers directly to Eley's assertion that the voluntary associations of civil society provided "the training ground, and eventually the power base of a stratum of bourgeois men who were coming to see themselves as a 'universal class' and preparing to assert their fitness to govern" (p. 114). Relatedly, Fraser denies that political identities may be fully formed in the private sphere, and she disagrees that "discourse in the public sphere should be restricted to discussion about the common good, and that the appearance of private interests and issues in always undesirable" (p. 118). As an example of identity formation in the public realm, Fraser takes the political actions of women whose first task was to force the issue of their social and political oppression into the arena of contestation where it continues to be "publicly argued out" (p. 124). Overall, Fraser questions whether, in comparison to a normative standard of a unitary and homogenous public sphere, a fragmented public sphere of multiple publics does not, in fact, signal a more democratically minded and organized society characterized by "a widening of discursive contestation, and [she adds] that is a good thing in stratified societies" (p. 124).

8. Geoff Eley, "Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures: Placing Habermas in the Nineteenth Century" in Ibid., p. 289-339. In this chapter, Eley stresses "the variable origins of Offentlichkeit." (304). Drawing on the extensive work of Christopher Hill, Eley criticizes that Habermas idealizes the bourgeois character of the public sphere and overlooks the existence of competing publics throughout the entire history of the public sphere. He asserts that a political awareness arose in other social classes whose social movements are not mentioned in Habermas' study. Eley questions whether these other publics are mere "variants", as Habermas refers to them in his 'Author's Preface', of the bourgeois public sphere or whether their emergence, internal organization and operation differed from the bourgeois model. He also suggests that the forms of political address did not adhere to a general bourgeois ideal of rational discussion, as Habermas' work implies, but had stridently nationalist tones as "backward" European countries followed France's lead in articulating liberty. Eley states: "[a]rmed with a new political consciousness, they then set about constituting a national public sphere in all the ways [that the English and French bourgeois did (i.e. reading and literary societies, an independent and critical press) ... but with the crucial differences: it was stimulated from the outside rather than being the spontaneous outgrowth of indigenous social development, ... and it was consciously expansive rather than narrowly restrictive, oriented toward proselytizing among the people rather than closing ranks against them" (p. 305-306). Eley concludes that, historically, the existence of a diverse public sphere composed of competing publics must be recognized. Theoretically, he submits that "the public sphere makes more sense as the structured setting where cultural and ideological contest or negotiation among a variety of publics takes place, rather than as the spontaneous and class-specific achievement of the bourgeoisie in some sufficient sense" (p. 306).

9. Habermas, Structural Transformation, p. 129-140.


Arendt condemns 'the social' in four specific ways: 1) it destroys the basis for a public sphere as a human community, in which power is equalized, by introducing the realm of necessity (social reproduction) into the public sphere; 2) it causes the public sphere to become the site of a struggle over private interests instead of a universal public interest in maintaining an institution of democratic communication; 3) the location of the public sphere within the social sphere causes would-be political agents to act within the limits of socially acceptable behaviour, thereby replacing individual and autonomous political actions with social conformity; and 4) by making itself the object of politics, the social sphere reduces politics to the administration of social welfare through an unaccountable bureaucracy. Arendt's criticism of bureaucracy stems from her disagreement with the political transformation it represents. In modern democracies, less emphasis is placed on the public's participation in their government than on the expectation that the application of political power to oppressive social conditions will accomplish social welfare.


23. Arendt is concerned to accentuate the difference between modern and ancient politics. Political action, in the contemporary political sphere, is directed toward society; its purpose is to alleviate oppressive social conditions in the name of social equality. Action intended to alleviate such problems had no place in the polis, for these were not political issues.


25. The ancient public sphere was reserved for property owners who were free to enter the political world of equality, having mastered their material needs in the private sphere of the household (oikos) over which they ruled absolutely. Without a civil society in which public and private interests could interact, the powers of the private sphere were excluded from politics, and a power-free space resulted in which all were ruler and ruled in turn, and where each asserted his plurality within a sphere of equality.

26. Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 49. Arendt regards the normalization of social behaviour
conducive to social reproduction as an impediment to political action. Arendt advises that "statistical uniformity is by no means a harmless scientific ideal; it is the no longer secret political ideal of a society...which, entirely submerged in the routine of everyday living, is at peace with the scientific outlook inherent in its very existence" (p. 43). This passage reveals the characteristics of conformity and control which cause individuality and action to be relegated to the private sphere, being no longer acceptable in public life dedicated to social existence. It is not only that the management of social reproduction enters the political realm, but that the attitudes of modern society as an object of social science infiltrate the public sphere itself, resulting in the "socialization" of politics in accordance with the characteristics Arendt analyzes in modern mass society: mass conformity and behaviourism. The strength of these social attitudes, Arendt argues, have impacted on the notion of ancient plurality which derived from the private cultivation of uniqueness, difference and individuality, and which was displayed in the public world where these private traits were recognized as specifically human. Fuss captures Arendt's central thought that "a life without action and speech...falls short of being a human life because it fails to disclose what is uniquely and unrepeatable individual about this life" (Hannah Arendt: The Recovery of the Public World, p. 161). In the absence of a human community in which to act originally, spontaneously, and outside of conformity, people are left with a society in which to behave according to measures of conformity which stabilize the sphere of the social.

27. Kateb, Hannah Arendt, p. 117.


30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. John B. Thompson, "Theory of the Public Sphere," Theory, Culture and Society 10(3) (1993) p. 183. Thompson summarizes the critiques made by Geoff Eley and Nancy Fraser of the idealization of the bourgeois public sphere, the exclusion of women from public life, and Habermas' omission of competing discourses and public which existed during the bourgeois period. These critiques are included in other sections of this chapter.

33. Ibid., p. 184.

34. Ibid., p. 187.

35. Habermas, Structural Transformation, p. 18. Habermas argues that the drastic changes that occurred throughout the eighteenth century in these England and France were fundamentally due to the changing constitution of the public authority which began to administer to public needs that had formerly been controlled by individual landowners of the aristocratic class. In agreement with Habermas' premise, Roger Charier asserts that "the limits of the private sphere depend primarily on the way public authority is constituted both in doctrine and in fact, and in the first place on the authority claimed and exercised by the state" (Charier, 1989). Charier asserts that during this period of transition, the state developed from a relatively weak state into a authoritative and depersonalized administration whose counterpart was the bourgeois private sphere which contained the propertied class still excluded from public office. The resulting modern bureaucratic state gradually assumed responsibility for law, taxation, defence, and the regulation of the (now national, but privatized) economy, functions which had been responsibilities of the manorial or estate lords during the Medieval and pre-capitalist periods. When the state assumed those
responsibilities, the private sphere was rid of its public functions, and public and private realms became separate.

36  Ibid., p. 24.
37  Ibid., p. 23.
38  Ibid., p. 3.
39  Calhoun, "Civil Society and the Public Sphere," p. 269.
40  Ibid., p. 275.
42  Ibid., p. 4.
43  Habermas, Structural Transformation, p. 24.
44  Ibid., p. 23.
45  Ibid., p. 28.
46  Ibid., p. 30.
47  Ibid., p. 23.
48  Ibid., p. 25.
49  Ibid.
50  Ibid.
51  Ibid., p. 42.
52  Ibid., p. 43.
53  Ibid., p. 184.
54  Calhoun, Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 14.
55  Habermas, Structural Transformation, p. 54.
56  Calhoun, Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 7.
57  Ibid., p. 2.
58  Thompson, "Theory of the Public Sphere," pp. 184-185.
59  Calhoun, Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 29.
60  Ibid., p. 32.

62. Habermas takes an interesting excerpt from Goethe's novel, *Wilhelm Meister*, to demonstrate the shift from medieval representative publicness to modern publicity. In Goethe's narrative, Wilhelm's intention to become influential within the nobility by taking on the cultural conventions of this class fails because he did not realize that the nature of 'publicness' had changed from that which was represented in noble cultivation to "the bourgeois idea of the freely self-actualizing personality that already showed the imprint of the neohumanism of the German classical period" (p. 13). Therefore, authority that was once represented by the head of state gave way to authority that resided in a rationally generated public opinion. Consequently, he argues that one aspect of the public sphere’s degeneration is the regression to a type of publicity which relies on popular notoriety at the expense of critical discourse.

63. Ibid., p. 13. Habermas does not list a citation for the quotation he attaches from Goethe's novel.

64. Ibid., p. 37.

65. Ibid., p. 23.

66. Ibid., p. 54.

67. Ibid., p. 37.

68. Ibid., p. 35.

69. Ibid., p. 30.

70. Calhoun, *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, p. 115.


Notes to Chapter Two


5. Ibid., p. 40.

7. Ibid., p. 98.


9. Ibid., p. 172.

10. Ibid., p. 168.

11. Ibid., p. 172.


13. Ibid.


22. See Escott M Reid's article "Canada on the Council," *Canadian Forum* (Jan 1928) in *Forum* p. 55-56. Escott argued that Canada played a relatively minor role and we probably admitted with the British expectation that it would increase the representation on the council of the British viewpoint.


25. Ibid., p. 212.


31. Ibid., p.163.

32. Ibid., p.164.

33. Ibid., p. 164.


36. Ibid., p. 403.


42. Ibid.


44. Ibid., p. 137.

45. Ibid., p. 139.

46. W. L. Grant, "The Present Intellectual Status in Canada," *Queen's Quarterly* 29 (1) (July 1921) p. 92.


1938) p. 458.

49. Ibid., p. 460.


53. Ibid., p. 353.


55. Ibid., p. 384.


57. Ibid., p. 384.

58. Ibid., p. 384.


60. Ibid., p. 475.


63. Ibid., p. 100.

64. Ibid., p. 90.


66. A.B. McKillop, “Science, Authority and the American Empire,” Contours of Canadian Thought, (Toronto, 1987) p. 120.


68. To repeat Spry’s words again he stated:
   No student of opinion in the Dominion can have failed to notice the new character of certain sections of Canadian public life. There have been the appearance of critical journals, an increased interest in literature and its criticisms, a new examination of our educational standards, of our political life, and despite the exuberant excesses of some partisan subordinates in the last election, the last election was not with out evidences of a more objective intelligent interest in public affairs by the mass of the people (Faris, The Passionate Educators, p. 7.

70. Ibid., p. 48.


84. Ibid.


This tendency is also borne out in Robert L. McDougall's essay "The Dodo and the Cruising Auk: Class in Canadian Literature," in which he discusses the "abnormal absence of feeling for class and of concern for what class structure can do in a developing society to make or mar the life of the individual" (218). Although his specific topic is class, McDougall's primary concern is with the freedom of the individual and the critical depiction of the individual "in relation to the structure of his/her society which is so clearly to be seen in the literatures of English and the United States" (Literary History of Canada, Vol. 2. p. 227).


Wilfrid Laurier, "To be Canadians" an address given on August 2, 1887 at Somerset, Quebec. This speech appears in Debates About Canada's Future 1868-1896 Virginia Robeson (gen. ed.). (Toronto, 1977) p. 4-5.

Ibid., p. 4.

Ibid.


Ibid., p. 7.


Longley, "Is Confederation a Success?", p. 6.

Ibid., p. 7-8.

Ibid., p. 8.

Fee, "Canadian Literature and English Studies," p. 27.


Ibid., p. 88.


112. Ibid., p. 16.

113. Ibid., p. 3.

114. Ibid., p. 7.

115. Ibid., p. 13. In support of this claim, Conway refers to Professor Glazebrook’s finding that the Canadian constitution lacked “fine phrases . . . about the rights of [humankind] for the act was strongly in the British tradition and it was not British to generalize.” *A History of Canadian Political Thought* (Toronto, 1966). Conway suggest that skeptics refer to David Corbett’s discussion of the scorn for abstraction in "The Social Sciences in Canada," *Queen's Quarterly*, 66 (1959-60) p. 56.


117. Ibid., p. 8-9.

118. Ibid., p. 9.


**Notes to Chapter Three**


2. Ibid.


5. Ron Faris studied the educational backgrounds of the leaders of the traditional voluntary organizations and found that the majority had been Rhodes scholars, and came from families with strong roots in higher education.


Ibid


Ibid., p. 91.

Ibid., p. 112.

Ibid., p. 177.


Ibid., p. 214.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 208


Ibid.


Ibid., p. 211.


Ibid., p. 115.


Ibid., p. 6.
33. Ernest Lapointe, "Unity and Diversity," *Canadian Nation* 1(1) (Feb 1928) p. 10
34. Ibid., p. 11.
36. Ibid., p. 51.
39. In addition to the developing understanding that cultural and political development had suffered as a consequence of a residual colonial attitude which was contrary to the idea of Canadian nationhood, the nationalist movement developed in opposition to the rise of provincial rights according to a series of Privy Council decisions, to the explicit emergence of Quebec nationalism during the First World War, and to dissatisfaction in agricultural and labour sectors which had initiated some political action on their parts. Throughout the depression, the nationalist outlook developed a reactionary stance against the suggestion that the liberal economic system might be replaced by socialism.
41. Ibid.
45. Ibid., p. 32.
47. The members of Claxton's group were future public enthusiasts and policy-makers Jack Farthing, G.R. McCall, Terry MacDermot, Raleigh Parkin, F.R. Scott, Eugene Forsey, Arthur Terroux, V.C. Wansborough and Arnold Heeney.

Ibid. p 170.

Ibid., p 185.


Ibid.

Ibid., p. 11.

Ibid., p. 19.


Ibid., p. 51.

Ibid., p. 19.


Ibid.

Ibid., p. 165.


Litt, *The Muses, the Masses and the Massey Commission*, p. 20.

In the first chapter of his book, Faris begins to construct the class dichotomy that dominates his study by showing what a surprising number of the leaders of traditional voluntary associations had been Rhodes scholars.


Ibid., p. 53.

Ibid., p. 57.

78. Ibid., p. 89.
81. Ibid.
85. Ibid., p. 8.
87. Ibid., p. 477.
92. On the cover of the November 19, 1921 edition of *Canadian Bookman* is an advertisement for Canadian Authors Week. It was arranged in a series of subheadings reading "Motto: More Readers for Canadian Authors" to "Methods: Every known means of suggestion, from sermons to cartoons and from dinners to dynamite" and so on down to "Argument: More Readers for Canadian literature means more and better literature. That means a better understanding of Canada, at home and abroad." Approximately in the centre of the advertisement was the reminder that "(THIS INCLUDES YOU!)."
96. Ibid. p. 51.


102. The Globe responded by asking "[w]hy is the cause of a group of revolutionary agitators to be preferred to the welfare of a loyal, Christian nation? This is the only point involved in the so-called free-speech issue. When somebody is spreading disease germs, should . . . college professors protest against those in authority using their best efforts to check the malignant inoculations?" The Globe proceeded to urge for explicit action against the professors: "[the University of Toronto] is a State institution . . . Its Board of Governors cannot ignore a course of action by a portion of its staff who, in the name of 'free speech' came to the rescue of a section of the population who would pull down our form of government, . . . and set up defiance of Christianity and wholesome family life." These excerpts from the Globe were included in "The Intellectual Capital of Canada", an editorial that ran in the Canadian Forum in March 1931 and was included in Granatstein's compilation of Forum articles (pp. 77-80).

103. This essay is found in the Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 32 (1966).


111. Calhoun, Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 7.

Notes to the Conclusion


3. One interesting facet of the Canadian public sphere that could not be included in this study is the relationship between the nationalist public and the modern Canadian welfare state. Leading members of the nationalist public were increasingly pulled into the growing bureaucracy. Queen's political scientist Adam Shortt had infiltrated the Canadian bureaucracy for a time before the war, but it was his student, O.D. Skelton, who was instrumental in assembling the young minds which formed one of the most politically influential groups of men in Canadian history: the 'Ottawa men' described in Granatstein's book as the 'civil service mandarins', most of whom were intensely active in the nationalist voluntary associations. The difficulty in this relationship was that some individuals tended not to understand the distinction between their formerly private capacity as citizens in the public sphere and their later capacity as public representatives who held a share of the public power.


5. Owram found that Lester Pearson, Norman Robertson, Vincent Massey, Frank Underhill, F.R. Scott, Arnold Heeney, Alex Skelton, J.W. Pickersgill, Jim Macdonnell, Norman Rogers, W.L. Grant and Eugene Forsey were members of this auspicious list.


7. Margaret Prang has written a book on the philosophy and life of one of the prominent figures of the nationalist movement: Newton Rowell. In her book entitled Newton Rowell: Ontario Nationalist (Toronto, 1975) she wrote of his vision of Canada: "[I]ke many Ontarians, Rowell possessed an 'Ontario nationalist' dream of western Canada in which the public schools and the Protestant churches would Canadianize and Christianize the European immigrants to create beyond the Great lakes a 'new Ontario'" (p. 69).

8. Craig Calhoun (ed.), 'Introduction' to Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 17.
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