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**THE ASSOCIATION OF NORTHERN NATIVE PEOPLES:
A CASE STUDY OF A SOVIET INTEREST GROUP**

by

KAREN MICHELE CHOJNACKI, B.A.

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

Institute of Soviet and East European Studies

Carleton University

Ottawa, Canada

June 4, 1991

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Thesis Supervisor

Chairperson, Institute of Soviet and East European Studies

Carleton University

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ABSTRACT

This thesis analyzes the newly established Association of Northern Native Peoples (ANNP) in the Soviet Union and assesses its effectiveness in strengthening the culture, autonomy and way of life of the 26 northern indigenous peoples it represents. Criteria by which the group's potential for success will be examined are derived from various political interest group concepts. Changes in the Soviet political system since Gorbachev came to power in 1985 allow previously unworkable Western interest group concepts to be applied to the study of interest groups in the USSR.

The analytical framework considers group objectives, internal dynamics, external relations and financial resources to be key elements in the effectiveness of an interest group such as the ANNP. In order to validate the analytical framework as an appropriate application to the ANNP, it is first used to study a comparable northern native interest group that is known, to some extent, to have succeeded in its mandate by changing government policy. The group selected for this role, and that conforms to the stated requisites, is the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (ITC). After testing and refining the analytical framework with the ITC, it is then applied to the ANNP. It therefore becomes possible to assess the prospects for success of the Soviet group based on a framework first tested on the realized accomplishments of the ITC.

The thesis concludes first, that in the short-term the ANNP is not likely to meet with success, as it appears to have more qualities that undermine its effectiveness than support it in its bid for success. However, because the ANNP has existed for only one year, it is too early to tell what its long-term prospects are. Second, the analytical framework developed by using Western interest group concepts worked well as a method to examine the ANNP. Third, the broader application of the interest group approach used in this thesis can be useful to the study of Soviet politics.

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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

Designated the Association of Small Peoples of the North, an organization was created at the end of March 1990 that was unique as the first in the Soviet era to be inspired by, and representative of, 26 of the country's northern indigenous peoples.¹ Long extolled by Soviet authorities as socialist achievements, the results of previous policies towards indigenous peoples recently have been criticized severely, by natives and non-natives alike, for their original intent and adverse effects. The emergence of a national voice, made possible by the introduction of the Soviet policies of *glasnost* and *perestroika*, indicates an increasing determination among northern native peoples to resolve important issues and take control over their own affairs.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the Association of Northern Native Peoples² (ANNP) and determine its prospects for success in enhancing the culture, autonomy, living conditions and way of life of its 26 constituent groups. This organization was formed as information in the Soviet media emerged concerning problems facing northern native peoples and past Soviet policies towards them.

¹In this thesis, the terms "indigenous" and "native" are used synonymously. As applied in the Soviet case, it refers to 26 indigenous peoples who inhabited the northern regions of the Eurasian landmass prior to penetration of the area by ethnic Russians. Designated "Small Peoples of the North" in 1925, these 26 groups consist of Aleuts, Chukchi, Chuvans, Doigans, Ents, Eskimos, Evenks, Evens, Itel'mens, Kets, Khanti, Koryaks, Mansi, Nanais, Negidals, Nenets, Nganasans, Nivkhi, Orochi, Oroks, Saami, Sel'kups, Tofalars, Udegeys, Ul'chi, and Yukagirs. See A. I. Pika and B. B. Prokhorov, "Bol'shie problemy malykh narodov," [Big Problems of Small Peoples], *Kommunist*, no. 16 (November 1988): 76.

The Small Peoples of the North are now more often called "Peoples of the North," or "Numerically Small Peoples of the North." See, for example, L. Shinkarev, "Vernut' prava khozyayevam zemli," [Land Should Regain Its Genuine Owners], *Izvestiya*, 12 July 1990, 3, and A. Klimenko, "Dusha nye terpit direktiv . . . o problemakh malochislennykh narodov severa," [The Soul Does Not Take Orders . . . Concerning the Problems of the Numerically Small Peoples of the North], *Pravda*, 26 March 1990, 3.

²While originally called the Association of Small Peoples of the North, the author has chosen to reinterpret the organization's title to facilitate immediate understanding of the nature of the group. Consequently, in this thesis the group is designated the Association of Northern Native Peoples or the ANNP. (I am appreciative of my thesis supervisor, John Hannigan, for the use of this title.)

Since the 1917 Revolution, Soviet policies have aimed to alter the "backward"³ societies of indigenous peoples and create socialist ones, by educating the native peoples, activating them politically, and fundamentally reorganizing their economy. After the Bolsheviks came to power, they organized administrative units to represent various northern native peoples, and undertook to educate the indigenous peoples, create written forms of their languages and establish schools. The new regime founded centres consisting of administrative units, hospitals and cinemas which were to popularize Soviet rule and educate the native population in socialist political ideology. The state set up cooperatives and introduced collectivization, which eventually settled most of the traditionally nomadic reindeer herders, and gathered together hunters and fishers. The regime also launched a drive to industrialize the country, which marked the beginning of sustained, extensive natural resource development in the northern regions of the USSR, and resulted in an enormous influx of non-natives and a heavy toll on the environment.⁴

Since Gorbachev came to power in March 1985, reports have been published in the press exposing the means by which the existing system of economic planning and management has largely disregarded the way of life of the indigenous peoples.⁵ Recent discussion has revealed the lack of northern native control over local political councils (or *soviets*); forceful and effective pressures on northern indigenous peoples to

³This term has often been used by Soviet officials and scholars to denote the economic and social conditions of the indigenous peoples before the implementation of socialist policies. See, for example, V. N. Uvachan, *Put' Narodov Severa k Sotsializmu* [The Peoples of the North and Their Road to Socialism], (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), 10-11.

⁴For specific examples of the effects of Soviet policies on one of the 26 northern native peoples, the Evenks, see David G. Anderson, "Turning Hunters into Herders: A Critical Examination of Soviet Development Policy among the Evenki of Southeastern Siberia," *Arctic* 44, no. 1 (March 1991): 12-22.

⁵See for example, Valerii Sharov, "Mala li zemlya dlya mal'kh narodov?," [Is There Enough Land for the Small Peoples?], *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, no. 33, 1988, 10, and also Yuri Rytkheu, "Lozungy i amulety," [Slogans and Amulets], *Kommunist'skaya Pravda*, 19 May 1988, 2.

assimilate into the predominant Russian culture; degradation and loss of northern native languages and customs; erosion of traditional occupations among natives, particularly young people; increasing isolation of natives in unskilled, low-status and low-paying labour; high native infant mortality rates; rising alcoholism; shortages of hospitals, schools, electricity and housing in northern native settlements.⁶

These and other problems, further elaborated upon in Chapter IV, motivated northern native peoples to found the ANNP. The framework within which this group will be analyzed is derived from a model based on various political interest group concepts. While the rise of interest groups in the Soviet Union is not a new occurrence,⁷ the scope of activity and degree of independence currently enjoyed by them are. For the first time in Soviet history, individuals have been permitted to form associations whose agendas are not necessarily supported and approved by the authorities.⁸ Numerous organizations have emerged since 1985 and been highly critical of the Soviet bureaucracy, the Communist Party, and previous economic policies of the regime. The enormous changes that have taken place in the Soviet Union since Gorbachev's ascent to power have altered both the status quo and the activities of interest groups. Governmental structures have changed, and different viewpoints are encouraged and expressed. Hence, it is this author's view that interest groups prior to these major developments interacted with the decision-making apparatus in a separate and distinct way, based as they were on a relatively stable, consistent set of parameters.

⁶V. Pankov, S. Stepuniba, and I. Filimonov, "Rodom s Severa," [Northerners By Birth], *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, no. 74, 31 March 1989.

⁷One thorough study dealing with political interest groups in the USSR in the post-Stalin period is H. Gordon Skilling, and Franklyn Griffiths, eds., *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).

⁸See for example, "Moscow News Describes Informal Groupings," TASS in English, 2100 GMT, 14 February, 1990, cited in FBIS, *Daily Reports - Soviet Union*, FBIS-SOV-90-035, 21 February 1990, 66-67. The article estimates the existence of approximately two to three thousand informal groups and associations in the Soviet Union, comprising 2-2.5 million people.

As one scholar has concluded, prior to 1985 "studies of group influence on the policy process [was] the acknowledgement, tacit or explicit, that the party [CPSU] leadership set the ground rules for such participation."⁹

As concepts based on interest groups in the Soviet Union today are inadequate as models by which to analyze the ANNP, diverse approaches to the study of interest groups in the West are utilized to develop an analytical framework to study the ANNP. That there may be several pitfalls in using Western concepts to examine a Soviet interest group is resolved by examining several pluralist assumptions of Western interest group approaches and interest groups in the Soviet Union.

The framework first will be used to study a comparable northern native interest group that is known, to some extent, to have succeeded in its mandate by changing government policy. The task of analyzing the prospects for success of the ANNP, discovering how the interest group might pursue its objectives, and explaining why the ANNP is predicted to be successful or unsuccessful is facilitated when the ANNP is examined against a framework modified for a group that already has a measure of success. The group used for this purpose specifically must demonstrate similar grievances and characteristics as the Soviet group, and therefore must comprise indigenous people, preferably based in the north. Finally, the group must have a history that bears out its achievement in changing government policy. As there is no group within the USSR which can serve the function of a group comparable to the ANNP, it is necessary to turn elsewhere to meet these requirements.

The group selected for this role, and that conforms to the stated requisites, is the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (ITC). Created in 1971, this group represents all of the Inuit of Canada, and has proven its success in influencing the public policy-making process.

⁹Donald D. Barry and Carol Barner-Barry, *Contemporary Soviet Politics: An Introduction* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1987), 221.

The analytical framework will be tested and refined with reference to the ITC. By so doing, it becomes possible to assess the prospects for success of the ANNP based on an analytical framework first tested on the realized achievements of the ITC.

The thesis arrives at three major conclusions. First, although the ANNP has been effective in a number of areas, it has numerous, significant problems which may seriously hinder its success in the short-term. Because the ANNP has been in existence for only one year, however, it is still too early to be definitive about its long-term prospects. Second, the analytical framework developed by using Western interest group concepts worked well as a method to examine the ANNP. Third, the broader application of the interest group approach used in this thesis can be useful to the study of Soviet politics.

A note should be mentioned regarding the research methods used in this thesis. In Chapter II, the analytical framework was developed by drawing on both primary and secondary sources. Original theorists of interest group approaches were studied to determine concepts appropriate to study the ANNP. This led to an examination of interest group critiques which assisted in determining suitable interest group concepts. In Chapter III, predominantly secondary sources were used to analyze the ITC. This chapter aimed to test and refine the analytical framework and was not the major focus of this essay. The author also used primary sources for this chapter, particularly ITC's *Annual Reports*. In Chapter IV, mainly primary sources were used, namely Soviet newspapers such as *Izvestiya* and *Pravda*, translations of Soviet sources in the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service's *Daily Reports - Soviet Union*, and interviews with Soviet and Canadian government officials.

It is important to state several limitations to this study. First, the ANNP has an extremely short history. Second, some Soviet sources have simply not been available to the author, such as *Sel'skaya Zhizn'*. Other sources, such as *Severnye Prostory*, are

obtainable in the West, but only by subscription.¹⁰ The information therefore has been somewhat sparse. However, by carefully evaluating Russian sources that *have* been available, it is possible to maximize their usefulness and draw realistic conclusions.

¹⁰The magazine *Severnye Prostory* (*Northern Perspectives*) is the official mouthpiece of the ANNP. Though it may be purchased by subscription, the time required to receive the journal is prohibitive. Fortunately, a colleague who had recently been to the Soviet Union was able to provide me with several issues.

CHAPTER II: DEVELOPING THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

i. Theoretical Underpinnings

The aim of this chapter is to formulate an analytical framework that can be used to study the development and future prospects of the ANNP. But where does such an endeavour begin? The first step is to elaborate an approach which uses the "group" (the ANNP) as the focus of analysis. To accomplish this requires a brief discussion of the definition of a group, as used in political science.

A group can be defined as "a collection of individuals bound together by shared attitudes and interactions, real or potential, based on the needs created by the shared attitudes."¹¹ An interest is "the conscious desire to have public policy, or the authoritative allocation of values, move in a particular, general, or specific direction."¹² However, the two concepts may not always coincide. Individuals might express an interest, but may not want to do so by joining a group. Many nature enthusiasts, for example, although concerned about the deterioration of the environment, are not involved with Greenpeace or any other group active in protecting the environment. On the other hand, every member of a group may not hold an interest in a specific issue being championed by that group. Hence there is a need to unite the ideas of interest and group into a definition of interest group.

For the purpose of this essay, an interest group may now be defined as

any group that, on the basis of one or more shared attitudes, makes certain claims upon other groups in the society for the establishment,

¹¹Carol S. Greenwald, *Group Power: Lobbying and Public Policy* (New York: Praeger Publisher, 1977), 14.

¹²Joseph LaPalombara, *Interest Groups in Italian Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), 16.

maintenance, or enhancement of forms of behavior that are implied by the shared attitudes.¹³

While this definition indicates the interaction of individuals and goal-oriented activity, it does not specify the interaction between the group and the object of its activity, the nature of group objectives or the basis for the common interests. In other words, the context of interest group activity is lacking.

As the context relevant to this analysis is political, a political interest group is considered to be "any collection of two or more persons who in some manifest way demonstrate that they exist in part to influence public policy, or the authoritative allocation of values."¹⁴ While such a group manifests a desire to change public policy, it does not necessarily concern itself with interests that are solely political. The means by which a political interest group seeks to achieve its ends are distinct from the ends themselves. A political interest group may strive for any number of political, economic, social, religious, and cultural objectives, but the methods by which it seeks to realize these goals are always political.

Given the above definition of a political interest group, the next step is to examine analytical techniques that will assist in the analysis of a particular group, in this case the ANNP.

The literature on political interest groups was first developed in the West. Scholars first began to apply the concept of interest groups to the study of Soviet politics in the 1950's.¹⁵ Undertaking a case study of the ANNP using propositions and concepts from established studies such as these may at first seem the most appropriate

¹³David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion*, 2d ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971), 33.

¹⁴Joseph LaPalombara, *Politics Within Nations* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1974), 324. The terms *political interest group* and *interest group* will be used interchangeably in this essay.

¹⁵For a series of lucid studies done in the 1960's on a wide variety of interest groups, see Skilling and Griffiths, *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics*.

approach. At the present time, however, these studies cannot provide a workable analytical framework within which to examine the ANNP. There are several reasons for this.

First, the literature on Soviet interest groups is based on pre-Gorbachev political interest groups, and hence predominantly deals with those that are intimately connected with "established" bodies of individuals; by this is meant intellectual groups (e.g., writers), groups whose members were bureaucrats (e.g., industrial managers), and organizations such as the military. These bodies, by virtue of their close connection with Soviet decision makers, and especially the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU),¹⁶ were influential.

Second, the basic premise upon which such "established" interest groups were examined has changed very significantly in the last six years. For example, H. Gordon Skilling examined interest groups in a particular political context, based on post-Stalinist political characteristics such as stability and predictability.¹⁷ Since 1985, however, significant structural changes in the Soviet political system have changed these premises profoundly. The "leading and guiding force" of the CPSU in Soviet society has been eliminated from the USSR Constitution, thereby removing the one-party hegemony enjoyed by previous Soviet regimes. The Soviet leadership has recognized a plurality of political opinion and the existence of various political groups and associations. The results of elections are no longer assured, as multiple candidates

¹⁶LaPalombara states that of a number of "orienting questions" that should be posed in examining political interest groups, one is their degree of independence of government agencies and political parties. See LaPalombara, *Politics Within Nations*, 327.

¹⁷As two authors have stated, "a major difference between the way in which Stalin-era policy toward freedom of expression operated and the handling of such matters since the tyrant's death is that now, [1986] in contrast to the extremes of caprice and arbitrariness prevalent then, Soviet citizens as a rule recognize the boundaries separating what is permissible from what is likely to be punished." See Frederick C. Barghoorn and Thomas F. Remington, *Politics in the USSR*, 3d ed., Little, Brown Series in Comparative Politics, eds. Gabriel A. Almond and Lucian W. Pye (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1986), 251.

now compete for political offices, including that of the recently created position of USSR President, which will be decided by direct popular vote in the next election. The USSR legislature (the Supreme Soviet), which previously had been "highest body of state authority"¹⁸ only in theory,¹⁹ has become a genuine, permanent parliament under the new Constitution. The Supreme Soviet now is held responsible to the new Congress of Peoples' Deputies, the body of highest legislative authority in the Soviet Union today, whose deputies elect members to the Supreme Soviet.²⁰ The Supreme Soviet consists of two equivalent chambers, the Soviet of Nationalities and the Soviet of the Union, that meet twice a year for up to four months at a time, and therefore has the first permanent "politicians" in the Soviet Union.²¹ For the first time, Soviet politicians are openly debating issues, criticizing specific policies, and advancing different views on a wide range of concerns. Further changes have been made in the ruling apparatus including the top leadership of certain institutions, and the Soviet bureaucracy has been meaningfully reduced. The government has been decentralized, and power wielded by certain traditional centres of authority has shifted. Critical discussion of issues has become widespread in public discourse and publications, and previously suppressed information has been published.

¹⁸*The Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the USSR, 1977*, art. 6, quoted in David Lane, *Politics and Society in the USSR*, 2d ed. (Oxford: Martin Robertson & Co., 1978), 572.

¹⁹Prior to 1985, the Supreme Soviet met about twice a year for brief sessions (often for only several days) to adopt decisions that had already been made by the CPSU Politburo, the most powerful body in the country. For more on the differences between the theoretical and practical wielding of power in the Soviet Union prior to 1985, see Leonard Schapiro, *The Government and Politics of the Soviet Union*, 3d ed. (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1968), 57-79, 109-131.

²⁰The 542 members of these chambers are the USSR's first full-time politicians. Those elected to the Supreme Soviet are called Peoples' Deputies. See Centre for Canadian-Soviet Studies, *Background on The Changing Soviet Union: Implications for Canada and the World* (Ottawa: Centre for Canadian-Soviet Studies, 1990), 1.

²¹*Ibid.*

These altered political circumstances have resulted in a tremendous growth of independent associations and organizations in the Soviet Union over the past four years.²² Unofficial (called "informal") groups have begun to organize around environmental, political, social, cultural, economic and other issues.²³ This has been one of the significant changes engendered by the policies of *glasnost* and *perestroika*, providing a relative freedom of expression and autonomy previously unknown.

With these factors in mind, a study of the prospects for success of one of the newly created interest groups - the ANNP - is better served by an analytical framework based on literature of political interest groups as developed in pluralistic Western polities. Of the several approaches to the study of politics developed after World War II,²⁴ one took as its focus the examination of the behaviour of less formal political entities and behaviour, such as interest groups, mass movements, and less institutionalized political processes. This led to the behavioural approach to the study of politics - or behaviouralism.

Despite considerable criticism of this approach over the last several decades, two behavioural concepts are particularly useful for the development of the framework to analyze the ANNP.²⁵ The first is the importance attached to the general

²²For example, a large conference took place in Moscow, in August 1987, assembling over 300 representative of 47 associations and clubs to discuss social problems. See Radio Liberty 374/87 (18 September 1987) citing *Moscow News* and *Ogonek* (13 September 1987).

²³For a good discussion on the nature and structures of new groups in the Soviet Union see Radio Liberty 220/87 (June 11, 1987): 1-8. See also "Moscow News Describes Informal Groupings," 66-67.

²⁴For an examination of Marxist, polyarchical and economic theories of politics see Denis Monière and Jean H. Guay, *Introduction aux Théories Politiques* (Montréal: Québec/Amérique, 1987). Another approach is systems analysis, which deals with the political system as a whole and the interdependence of its constituent elements. For further discussion of systems analysis see David Easton, *The Political System* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953).

²⁵For critical commentary on the behavioural approach see Robert Dahl, "The Behavioral Approach in Political Science: Epitaph for a Monument to a Successful Protest," *American Political Science Review* 55 (December 1961): 763-772, David Easton, "The New Revolution in Political Science," *American*

environment within which behaviour is observed and analyzed.²⁶ Political systems both affect and are affected by "environmental" factors such as culture, demographic structure and the economy. Interest groups, therefore, must also be observed in relation to conditions existing at that time. For example, the ANNP is active in an extremely dynamic political system exhibiting a high degree of instability and unpredictability. These distinctive political conditions can weigh heavily upon a group in terms of its objectives, the manner in which it functions and the degree of success in attaining its goals.

Only in the last few years has the Soviet government permitted the formation of associations and organizations. However, because there have been so many recent changes in the public policy of the Soviet Union (e.g. in the economic, political and religious spheres), and because these reforms are still not deeply rooted, it is necessary to cast the study of the ANNP in this still volatile political environment. According to the behavioural approach, this dynamic political situation must be examined to determine its influence on interest groups. For example, in the most extreme case, the Soviet government could enact a law once again banning the formation of political interest groups and proscribing their activities.

The second concept of behaviouralism used in this essay is its focus on developing hypotheses that are testable and have a capacity for prediction.²⁷ This

Political Science Review 63 (1969): 1051-61, and Gabriel A. Almond and S. Genco, "Clouds, Clocks and the Study of Politics," *World Politics* 29 (1977): 489-522.

²⁶The behavioural approach holds that an understanding of a person's political behaviour can be enhanced by examining it in a larger context. This implies that political behaviour may be influenced to some extent by, for example, an individual's economic class or religion. The political behaviour of a group, for example, can thus be better understood in the light of an examination of environmental conditions. See Dennis Kavanagh, *Political Science and Political Behaviour* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 10-11.

²⁷A major tenet of the behavioural approach is its focus on developing testable hypotheses. That the statements developed must be able to withstand objective verification is crucial. In following this procedure, it becomes possible to make probability statements. See Barbara Leigh Smith et al., *Political Research Methods: Foundations and Techniques* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1976), 13.

thesis will test the analytical framework developed in this chapter by applying it first to the ITC, and then to the ANNP. In doing so the ANNP will be evaluated systematically and it should be possible to make some tentative predictions (or "probability statements") on the prospects for success of the group.

Having accepted two characteristics of the behavioural approach to assist the analysis of the ANNP, it remains to delineate a more pertinent approach. This is the group approach, which is based on the premise that the basic unit of political activity is the group.²⁸

Group scholars hold that the political system as a whole may be defined, at any given moment, according to the interaction of groups acting in conflict and cooperation. As Bill and Hardgrave have succinctly stated, the group approach involves the "basic issues of cooperation, conflict, continuity, and change. [It] raises from the beginning questions about the dynamics of decision-making and the distribution of rewards and priorities in society."²⁹ However, of greatest concern here is the study of the interest group itself, and not the verification or invalidation of the theory that political systems in general may be understood as the interaction of groups.

In studying interest groups as the basic unit of analysis in a political system, several perspectives exist on their role and importance, as well as their mode of "action and interaction."³⁰ The pluralist perspective holds that interest groups are central to

²⁸A seminal author of the group approach is Arthur F. Bentley, *The Process of Government* (San Antonio, TX: Principia Press of Trinity, 1949). First published in 1908, this book heavily influenced David B. Truman's *Governmental Process*. For an in-depth discussion on the origins, development and evolution of interest group theory, see G. David Garson, *Group Theories of Politics* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1978). For a critique of group theorists see L. Weinstein, "The Group Approach: Arthur F. Bentley," in *Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics*, ed. H. J. Storing (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1962), 151-224.

²⁹J. A. Bill and R. L. Hardgrave, Jr., in *Comparative Politics: The Quest for Theory* (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1973), 135.

³⁰Among these are pluralist, elitist and Marxist approaches to interest groups. See Alan R. Ball and Frances Millard, *Pressure Politics in Industrial Societies: A Comparative Introduction* (Hampshire, Great Britain: Macmillan Education, 1986), 1-2.

the decision-making process in a political system where power is widely, but thinly distributed. "That political power is fragmented and dispersed . . . is the major tenet of pluralism."³¹ Pluralist political systems allow and even promote individuals to create groups in order to advance their demands. In pluralist systems, based on freedom of speech, assembly and association, interest groups act as intermediaries to articulate needs of society to decision makers.³²

Historically, interest groups have arisen because of certain major changes in the government and politics of a society. They have originated under various conditions, among which are the development and maturation of the nation-state itself, when more and more people enter the realm of politics, and where "technology makes group-centered political behaviour possible."³³ The struggle to influence political decisions is undertaken in any polity. With the beginning of organized societies, political decisions were made by the influential few. However, as societies evolved, the growth of an educated public and the rise of the middle class led to new forms of political expression.

In twentieth century Western political theory, it is generally held that interest groups arise out of "mass political behaviour in industrial-urban societies."³⁴ Because of this orientation, interest group theory has tended to be somewhat biased in terms of its perspective. It has frequently assumed that the type of interest groups found in the West tend to exist only in pluralistic democratic polities. Therefore, the group approach used in the present analysis has been considered inappropriate to apply to the

³¹Ibid., 2.

³²R. A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 1-9.

³³LaPalombara, *Politics Within Nations*, 323.

³⁴Ibid., 324. It should be noted that interest groups are also found in less industrialized countries because, in any case, when increasing numbers of people enter the arena of politics, the need for various organizational forms increases.

study of the Soviet political system. In the past five years, however, political power has fragmented and dispersed enough to allow more meaningful study of group politics in the USSR. Hence, it is possible to analyze the ANNP, using a group-centered approach normally applied in a more democratic political system.

Political scientists categorize groups in different ways. Some typologies, for example, focus on membership or size, others on ideology.³⁵ Any of these factors, individually or in combination, may be used to analyze the role groups play in the political process. One typology of groups constructed several decades ago by Gabriel A. Almond still commands a wide degree of acceptance. This classification categorizes groups into associational, institutional, nonassociational, and anomic divisions.³⁶

Of particular relevance to the study of the ANNP is the associational interest group. Almond suggests this as a specialized form of interest articulation³⁷ in the political process.³⁸ Associational interest groups have specific features that are expressly representative of the interests of a single group. They are structured to enable the development of group interests and goals, and are well-staffed and organized. These groups formulate strategies to communicate these demands to the political decision-making apparatus, including political parties and bureaucracies. This

³⁵One author, for example, has constructed a taxonomy pairing groups into "opposites:" Compulsory vs. Voluntary, Temporary vs. Permanent, Economic vs. Instrumental, etc. See Robert Presthus, *Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics* (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1973), 66-69.

³⁶Gabriel A. Almond, "Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," in *The Politics of the Developing Areas*, eds. Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), 33-38. For additional elaboration and discussion of institutional, nonassociational and anomic interest groups, see LaPalombara, *Politics Within Nations*, 328-332.

³⁷The political process may be said to be set in motion by interest articulation, or the making of political demands. See Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach*, 2d ed., Little, Brown Series in Comparative Politics, eds. Gabriel A. Almond, James S. Coleman and Lucian W. Pye (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1966), p. 169.

³⁸See Almond, "Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," 34.

latter feature is, in fact, the associational interest group's predominant role. To do this, they require substantial financial resources for support. These types of groups include trade unions, ethnic organizations and religious groups.³⁹

Associational interest groups do not, however, form an intrinsic part of established political processes, as is the case with government departments or ministries, called institutional interests in the Almond typology. Nor do they comprise entities "which articulate interests informally, and intermittently, through individuals, cliques, family and religious heads."⁴⁰ These are referred to as non-associational interests. Nor are they spontaneous demonstrations of people, known as anomic interest groups, as in an unprompted rally to protest violence against women.

The articulation of interests may also vary. According to Almond, demands or claims made by associational interest groups may be manifest (explicit demand) or latent (implied behaviour); specific (request for legislation) or diffuse (simple statement of discontent); general (demand expressed in terms of class or professional groups) or particular (demand set in terms of individual or family); instrumental (an agreement based on a realistic exchange) or affective (a basic statement of disappointment or other emotion).⁴¹ The type of demand or claim communicated to the political system depends on the nature of the particular group's mandate. But, in general, the more

manifest, specific, general, and instrumental the style of interest articulation, the easier it is to maintain the boundary between the polity and society and the better the circulation of needs, claims and demands from the society in aggregable form into the political system.⁴²

³⁹A number of problems have been noted with the Almond typology. For further discussion on these issues see Bill and Hardgrave, *Comparative Politics*, 121-129.

⁴⁰See Almond, "Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," p. 33.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, 34-35.

⁴²*Ibid.*, 36.

A high incidence of associational interest groups is typical of Western, pluralist, industrial societies. It is also an indication of strong support for defined limits between the political system and the society. It is the associational interest group which sustains and regulates the processing of demands from various sectors of society and the polity, and organizes and directs them through the political system.

In sum, this thesis examines the ANNP as a political interest group according to a number of concepts and propositions developed in Western political theories of behaviouralism and the group approach to interest articulation. Some pluralist assumptions held in Western interest group theory are accounted for by virtue of the changing political environment in the Soviet Union. The inquiry also utilizes the work done by Western political scientists on the associational interest group, now a viable political concept to study a Soviet organization representing ethnic minorities.

Having outlined the theoretical background to be employed in the development of an analytical framework, the next section will focus on the identification and elaboration of the specific criteria that are considered influential in determining the success of a political interest group. These criteria are the constituent parts of the framework used in the subsequent investigation of the ANNP, and its potential for success.

ii. Developing the Analytical Framework

The framework of analysis developed here is drawn from the work of two political theorists - David B. Truman in *The Governmental Process* and Joseph LaPalombara in *Politics Within Nations* - who have developed criteria that gauge the effectiveness of political interest groups.⁴³

⁴³For complete citations of these works, see footnotes 3 and 4 above, or the bibliography.

Truman holds that several factors determine the measure of success an interest group will have. The first of these is the degree of cohesion present in a group, a high degree of which will maximize the group's effectiveness. Cohesion can be influenced by several sub-factors, the first of which is the potential conflict or support that can arise from the overlapping of one group's membership with others. A second factor influencing group cohesion is the effectiveness of the leadership, whose main goal is to promote the cohesion of the group.

A second factor which bears upon the success of an interest group is public support. Truman holds that it is important to accomplish three steps, as a form of propaganda,⁴⁴ to accomplish this end: the first is issuing a group's message (through rallies, meetings, public appeals, etc.); the second is reinforcing certain beneficial public attitudes (for example, people's outrage at the treatment of a particular group); and the third is building a different perspective that will lead people to seek actively the attainment of group goals.

Another major factor is organizational expertise. This involves a range of issues, including the ability of the leadership in gaining access to decision-making centres in the political process, and the variety of techniques used to accomplish its ends. Truman postulated that the two elements which most affect access are the actual status of the group in the social structure, and the degree to which the interest group is effectively organized.⁴⁵

⁴⁴The term "propaganda" is one whose meaning is often viewed as derogatory, hence the need for clarification. For this purpose, the definition of the term is compared with that of "education." In this essay, this latter term is considered as "the transmission and reinforcement, by words and related means, of attitudes and skills that are accepted in the society under examination," while the former is regarded "as any attempt, by the manipulation of words and word substitutes, to control the attitudes and consequently the behaviour of a number of individuals concerning a controversial matter." For further discussion, see Truman, *Governmental Process*, 222-223.

⁴⁵"Cohesion . . . along with the related factor of size and those of organization, financing and techniques - is a crucial determinant of the effectiveness with which the group may assert its claims." Truman, *Governmental Process*, 159.

LaPalombara posits several components as part of an interest group's activities. These are lobbying, negotiating out of the public eye, employing propaganda campaigns directed at the public, promoting the election of sympathetic political candidates (and working to defeat opposing ones), developing special relationships with political parties, and seeking direct representation in decision-making bodies in the government. While LaPalombara believes that these activities influence a group's success, he holds that the greatest determinant of an interest group's effectiveness, and perhaps its most important resource, is the amount of money the group possesses, controls, or can mobilize.⁴⁶

It should be noted that the criteria for success developed from the works cited above are traditionally termed *independent variables*. In the classic experiment the independent variable is that which the researcher freely manipulates. While the independent variables used in this essay are not manipulated, they are examined separately in terms of their effects on an interest group's success, which is considered the *dependent variable*.⁴⁷ In this essay, the independent variables are termed criteria for success.

For this analysis, four criteria have been derived from studying works on the functioning, activities and success of interest groups. They are suggested as the key criteria which will influence the interest group's effectiveness. These independent variables, in no particular order of priority, consist of:

- a. Articulation of Group Objectives
- b. Internal Dynamics

⁴⁶LaPalombara, *Politics Within Nations*, 362.

⁴⁷In the typical experiment the researcher manipulates certain variables, termed *independent variables*, and the effects of this manipulation are observed in another variable, called the *dependent variable*. For further discussion of variables of research, see Smith et al., *Political Research Methods*, 44-45.

- i. Cohesion
 - ii. Leadership
 - iii. Communication
 - iv. Organizational Management
- c. External Environment
- i. Political Context
 - ii. Access
 - iii. Communication and External Actors
- d. Financial Resources

Although these have been identified as "independent" variables, it will be clear that each does not exist completely divorced from the other. Internal dynamics, for example, will be influenced by financial resources at the group's disposal. And leadership will affect internal cohesion and communication. However, for analytical purposes, they are distinct enough to allow for separate study.

a. Articulation of Group Objectives

The effectiveness in setting clearly defined and realistic objectives can influence the extent to which the group is successful. The ultimate goals of a group can be classified, at a general level, into systemic and issue-specific. Issue-specific goals involve a broad range of concerns including economic, environmental and religious matters. They are premised on an acceptance of the basic nature of the political system. Issue objectives comprise the vast majority of group interests.

But how can the objectives of a group first be arrived at? And how are they articulated to others in order to attract support? According to Truman, two interrelated forces cause the emergence of interest groups. The first is the increasing complexity of society, with its changing social and economic order, which engenders new concerns and interests and causes previous ones to lose significance. Unsatisfactory differences between anticipated change and reality motivate individuals to focus on specific issues. New patterns of interaction are required to resolve these emerging issues.

The second force contributing to the formation of interest groups, according to Truman, consists of the fluctuating economic, technological, and political conditions in society. He postulates that individuals in society who hold a common interest, organize themselves when a "disturbance" (some distinct event that changes the "equilibrium" in a certain part of society) unfavorably affects them. Hence, so the explanation runs, people will organize to correct the situation when they realize that their economic and political interests are being negatively affected.⁴⁸

While this proposal accounts for how interests arise and are organized, critics of Truman's explanation have suggested alternatives. Salisbury, for instance, argues that leadership is the principal reason for a group's success or failure.⁴⁹ He argues that interests are best united into a sense of common identity by an innovative leader who uses them to attract others to the issue. This organizer must compete in the interest group "marketplace" to draw support, and therefore will use selective incentives to try to attract potential members. These incentives may be of three types: the first is ideological, which offers no tangible rewards to members; the second is material, which proffers specific services to members; the third is social, which provides the social context of the struggle to achieve goals as the reward.⁵⁰

Arriving at specific objectives is the first step in the formation of an interest group. While most goals that arise are issue-specific, some are systemic. These deal with subjects that relate to *who* may participate in the political process, and *how* that participation is to transpire. Systemic goals involve profound opposition to the political system itself. When an interest group is pursuing systemic issues, it is likely to reflect

⁴⁸Truman, *Governmental Process*, 66-108.

⁴⁹Robert H. Salisbury, "An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups," *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 13 (February 1969): 1-32.

⁵⁰This typology is described in Peter B. Clark and James Q. Wilson, "Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organization," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 6 (September 1961): 129-166.

profound political instability, or trying to create it. It is postulated here that systemic goals are not likely to be achieved.⁵¹

b. Internal Dynamics

The second criterion of success involves the internal dynamics of a political interest group. These involve the unity of group membership, the effectiveness of the leadership, the degree of efficient internal communication and the manner in which the organization is managed and structured.

i. Cohesion

In order for a group to have maximum effectiveness in achieving its goals, it needs a relatively high degree of internal cohesion. As David Truman has stated:

The problem of cohesion is a crucial one for the political interest group. Other factors bear upon its capacity to assert its claims successfully upon other groups and institutions in the society, but the degree of unity in the group is probably most fundamental in determining the measure of success it will enjoy.⁵²

The internal cohesion of a group is stated "as the amount of internal membership agreement on the organization's goals."⁵³ In the absence of internal cohesion, conflict may arise within the interest group itself, and the group's ability to achieve its immediate objectives will weaken, as will its longer-term potential for success. If a group cannot display cohesion, it will not be seen as legitimate by the decision makers it is trying to influence.

⁵¹ LaPalombara, who analyses group politics in terms of conflict (as do many other group scholars), states that political conflict takes place over essentially two issues: the first deals with changing some of the basic components of the political system itself (known as systemic conflict), and the second deals with less fundamental issues (known as issue conflict). See LaPalombara, *Politics Within Nations*, 315-318.

⁵² Truman, *Governmental Process*, 167.

⁵³ Greenwald, *Group Power*, 41.

Among the various ways to measure a group's degree of cohesion, polling members' opinions is one of the most indicative. An opinion poll could be conducted to determine the extent to which the group's members continued to share the original mandate of the group.⁵⁴ Another measure is to assess the group's attitude towards its leadership.

Several factors impinge on a group's unity of membership. One factor is the phenomenon of overlapping membership. Truman postulated that when individuals belong to more than one group, there is a tendency for conflicts of interest to arise. This reduces the cohesion of a group and causes divisions in the membership. A second factor is the actual geographic distribution of the group. While modern technology may reduce its impact on cohesion, in general the more widely dispersed the group, the greater the difficulty in accomplishing consistent communication among group members, and hence the greater the likelihood of members being or feeling left out. A third factor can be the actual size of the group. The larger the group, the more likely it is to be heterogeneous, which could lead to disunity.⁵⁵ A fourth factor affecting the cohesion of a group involves its leadership. The political skill of the leadership can be important in reducing or halting the danger of disunity arising from other factors. This element of leadership is so important that it must be treated as a separate factor.

ii. Leadership

Groups are broken down into leaders, that is, those in the minority who actually make decisions for the group, and followers.⁵⁶ However, good leadership requires

⁵⁴Earl D. Huff, "A Study of a Successful Interest Group: The American Zionist Movement," *The Western Political Science Quarterly* 25 (March 1972): 114-115.

⁵⁵For case studies of several groups in which their internal dynamics have an impact upon cohesion, see Truman, *Governmental Process*, 167-187.

⁵⁶For a brief discussion on the processes of leadership development and selection, see Greenwald, *Group Power*, 47-48.

adaptability and responsiveness as well as decisiveness to ensure a positive relationship between the minority and majority.

The critical tasks for the "active minority" are twofold: to preserve and promote group unity,⁵⁷ and to function as spokesperson for the group in its dealings with external actors. In this case, as with the cohesion of a group, the size and heterogeneity of the group affect the leadership's role. For example, large, heterogeneous groups such as national unions require substantial leadership efforts and expertise to establish and maintain membership agreement. The leadership of such groups must make efficient use of the internal organization to assure that goals are met. Leaders of smaller organizations are likely to reach consensus more readily.

There are several ways the leadership may act to fulfill its two major tasks. To ensure the cohesion of a group, leaders will try to maintain a stable and consistent leadership. The leadership can also seek to enhance group unity by assuring two-way, steady communication between the leadership and membership. To act as effective spokespersons for the group, leaders must be able to put forward those beliefs and opinions which are representative of the membership. To do this, there has to be efficient communication, which is the third factor in the successful internal workings of an organization.

iii. Communication

Part of the effective functioning of any interest group is its capacity for internal communication. The term communication includes oral, visual and written forms and encompasses all instruments which lie at the group's disposal. For example, a group

⁵⁷"Preservation and strengthening of the group's cohesion become the prime objectives of the active minority, for without cohesion the group becomes ineffective, and without a measure of effectiveness either the leadership must change or the group must cease to exist." See Truman, *Governmental Process*, 188.

may utilize radio and television services, produce information bulletins, newsletters and magazines, and hold periodical meetings of the entire membership or regional chapters.

Communication is primarily a means to enhance the cohesion of a group and functions largely as a tool for the leadership. Leaders use it as a means to understand the members' aims and desires, and to keep the members aware of the activities of the leadership, especially if it involves such important developments as negotiations with the government.

A group's communication services also provide a forum for the members to express their desires and goals. A newsletter can be an effective channel for members' ideas on the direction of the group, the structure of its organizations or other group-oriented concerns.

iv. Organizational Management

The formal organization or structure of interest groups is important for a number of reasons. It indicates how decisions are made about their resources, and directly affects the effectiveness of groups in achieving the goals they have set on behalf of the members' interests. Hence, three interrelated factors need be discussed: the authority structure of an organization, the decision-making apparatus, and the manner in which the organization coordinates the strategy and objectives of the group.

First, the organizational structure chosen is representative of the attitudes and values held by the group (at least when it is first established). Interest groups that represent people whose cultures are based on consensus decision making, for instance, may structure their organization to reflect this fact. That structure is also influenced by the organization and political techniques of other groups in the political system.⁵⁸

⁵⁸According to Truman "all these factors - degree of cohesion, expectations of permanence, internal division of labor, and formalized values - intimately affect the survival and influence of the group. If they can be stated even partially through an examination of formal organization, that scrutiny is essential." See Truman, *Governmental Process*, 113.

Interest groups often formulate bylaws which outline their governing structures. They prescribe a procedure whereby a body representing the membership, such as a board of directors or annual assembly, has final authority over all major decisions. Also commonly delineated are the terms for membership and regulations for the election or appointment of formal positions in the group. While interest groups often appear democratic, it has been argued that they are almost always oligarchic on the inside.⁵⁹ Usually the membership remains relatively passive in its involvement with decision making, and only a small number of people dominate interest groups. The full-time staff, with their greater control over information and organizational resources, easily can attain pronounced influence within the organization. It is important to note, however, that the membership can be drawn into a more active role in making decisions. Some interest groups make a concerted effort to elicit the membership's views before setting policies.

Second, the centralized or decentralized structure of interest groups is indicated by its formal organization. It demonstrates, among other things, how groups respond to current policy demands. Interest groups can form a centralized structure in which principal responsibility for decision making is retained by the few, or a decentralized organization in which this responsibility is distributed widely.

Third, formal organization can demonstrate the tactics used by interest groups in seeking to achieve its objectives. For example, an organization seeking to distribute power, for a variety of reasons, may possess strong local branches, in which decisions can be made and local pressure brought to bear quickly. On the other hand, an organization expecting to make quick decisions on a constant basis may opt for a more centralized decision-making structure with weaker organizational branches.

⁵⁹Truman, *Governmental Process*, 139-155.

c. External Relations

The third major criterion of success involves the responses and interactions of a political interest group to factors external to it. These involve the political environment or context in which the group functions, the possibilities for access to decision-making centres and the ability to communicate to external bodies.

i. Political Environment

The first aspect of the political environment to be examined is one upon which the very existence of an interest group depends, that is, the freedom of individuals to assemble and form an organization. An unstable and unpredictable political situation lessens the degree of certainty that individuals will remain free to assemble and establish interest groups.

A second factor influencing interest group behaviour is the degree of independence from government agencies and political parties.⁶⁰ In a political environment that permits the formation of voluntary associations, established political "institutions" can be expected to demarcate the behaviour and activities of interest groups. For example, in a state where interest groups are permitted to exist, limitations on independent political activities in general may dampen, in the extreme case, the articulation of group interests to the point where they are wholly ineffectual. Hence, a political environment that permits the freedom of individuals to assemble and form an organization may also delimit the extent of group activities and behaviour, and hence influence the effectiveness of interest groups.

A third factor involves the dynamism of the political environment, which is especially apposite when studying interest groups in the Soviet Union at this time. In the last five years, the political structures of the USSR government, and the CPSU have

⁶⁰LaPalombara, *Politics Within Nations*, 327. For a critical view of interest group autonomy, see Gabriel A. Almond's introductory essay in Almond and Powell, *Comparative Politics*.

been substantially reformed. Until recently, the CPSU commanded a monopoly on political power, and its top officials held posts in the higher echelons of the government as well. However, the role of the CPSU has changed in the wake of various Soviet reforms, one of which renounced Article 6 of the USSR Constitution, repealing the Party's "leading and guiding" role "in Soviet society and" its function as "the nucleus of its political system."⁶¹ Where traditionally the function and activities of the Party's Political Bureau (the Politburo has historically been the most powerful body in the country) were directed to state affairs, now they are concerned more with the Party itself. In 1989, an elected legislative body (Congress of People's Deputies) was created which in turn elected from its members the Supreme Soviet, the first political entity in the USSR consisting of full-time politicians.⁶² Given this new political context, the behaviour of interest groups in the political process has changed. But because the situation remains so dynamic, the shifting political context will continue to influence directly the activities and effectiveness of interest groups.

ii. Access

A second factor under the general criterion of external relations involves crucial access to points in the decision-making process.⁶³ Political access may be sought not only to governmental bodies, either political or bureaucratic, but also to other points that the interest group deems relevant to its specific issue, such as the media or religious organizations.

Groups seek access to institutions of government in order to change policy. Several factors influence the degree of effective access achieved. The first is the

⁶¹ *The Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the USSR, 1977, 555.*

⁶² Centre for Canadian-Soviet Studies, *Background on The Changing Soviet Union*, 1.

⁶³ Truman has stated that "... power of any kind cannot be reached by a political interest group, or its leaders, without access to one or more key points of decision in the government. Access, therefore, becomes the facilitating intermediate objective of political interest groups." See Truman, *Governmental Process*, 265.

position of the group in the social structure. The group's status defines its legitimacy and affects the extent to which public officials view the interest group as truly representative of those whom it claims it represents. If it cannot establish its legitimacy, it will not be a participant in the policy-making process.

A second factor relates back to an earlier characteristic, and that is the extent to which the group is effectively organized. A group that is experienced in dealing with the government will have developed the requisite organizational support for this type of activity. If a group only occasionally interacts with the government it may never acquire the necessary routines and structures to be effective. This capability hinges on the leadership's organizational skills, and its capacity to adapt to changing circumstances. It also depends on the cohesion that an interest group can achieve in a particular situation, as well as the financial resources it can muster.

iii. Communication with External Actors

The third variable to consider in an interest group's external relations is its ability to communicate and manage relations with external actors. Just as internal communication is vital for group cohesion, external communication is essential for the support the group receives from the general public, various organizations, political parties and policy makers.

First, it is important that a group attempt to gain the support of the broader public. In order first to make the general population aware of a particular issue, a group must make information available to it.⁶⁴ Publicity, or undertaking propaganda, of a particular issue accomplishes a number of goals. First it alerts the public to an issue about which it may have been previously unaware. Second, it encourages people

⁶⁴Truman has argued that propaganda, used to educate and convince the public of a group's 'cause', can vastly influence the effectiveness of the group's achievement. Although since then this claim has been seriously reconsidered, it is nevertheless worthwhile to examine what the effects of publicity actually were. For further detail of this view see LaPalombara, *Politics Within Nations*, 355.

who have some knowledge of the issue to adopt an attitude supportive to the interest group's objectives. Third, the attitude it produces leads members of the public to act according to the interest group's goals. It should be noted that for any given issue, the portion of the public that an interest group can mobilize is limited. It is only in exceptional circumstances, if ever, that an entire adult population will be aware of a particular interest, and can be mobilized.

In the same way that the public may be a target for an interest group's propaganda, other interest groups may be as well. As with the general population, the more support that a given interest group can command from other, perhaps more powerful groups, the more likely it is to achieve access to the policy-making process.

Another goal of external communication is gaining access to political parties. This can be especially rewarding in instances where interest blocs form within a party.⁶⁵ This can quickly produce a willingness on the part of a political party to develop a platform supporting a particular group's goals, and can result in the voicing of a group's concerns directly to a legislative body. For example, if a political party adopts one or more of an interest group's concerns, and a member of the party is elected to the legislature, there is a greater likelihood that the group's concerns will be addressed.

The means that are used for the above purposes include public speeches, demonstrations, press releases, press conferences, information brochures, television and radio broadcasts. That these media, either singly or in any combination, are frequently utilized for propaganda effects does not guarantee success. They must be "represented by appropriate organizations that can use them at the key points of policy determination, [or else] the campaign as a whole may fail."⁶⁶

⁶⁵See for example B. E. Brown, "Alcohol and Politics in France," *American Political Science Review* 51 (December 1957): 976-94.

⁶⁶Truman, *Governmental Process*, 224.

To a large extent the interaction of interest groups with external actors is a function of the effectiveness of communication. How this relationship develops depends on the type of information being proffered, the frequency of strategically planted information, the length of time contacts are maintained, and the position and influence of the group's interlocutors in the decision-making process.

d. Financial Resources

A fourth and final criterion of success involves the financial resources of an interest group.⁶⁷ Of the many interest groups that exist in a given political system, it is only the few that are major actors in the political process. More often than not, these are well-funded groups. Most groups, however, carry little weight and are simply overpowered if their interests come into major conflict with those that "represent the concentrated wealth that multinational corporations and even single families represent."⁶⁸

Only the availability of financial resources allows groups to undertake activities, provide communications and plan strategies. Most groups, short of funding, regularly must decide on the allocation and distribution of resources to various projects. In one group, for example, money may be available to produce internal newsletters but not to produce the level of external publicity it desires. In another group, funding decisions may have to be made between hiring researchers or clerical staff, because there is insufficient means to do both. The lack of financial resources affects a group's everyday activities, and hence influences the effectiveness of its success in the long run. Whether it is considered to be the critical criterion for success, the financial

⁶⁷ LaPalombara has stated that "the factor that best determines a group's effectiveness is how much money it has, controls, or can mobilize." LaPalombara, *Politics Within Nations*, 362.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

resources of a group seriously can affect the outcome of a group's attempts to achieve its objectives.

iii. The Usefulness of the Case Study

The analytical framework developed in this chapter will be used to study the chances of success for the ANNP.⁶⁹ As this will be done as a case study, brief mention should be made of the usefulness of this approach. The use of this, or any other research strategy,⁷⁰ is initially determined by the type of research question proposed, the degree to which researchers can control events, and the extent of concentration on current, as opposed to historical events.⁷¹

The type of research question posed in the case study is *how* and *why* events in politics occur. These questions arise when it is important to discover more than simply the attitudes of voters or their representatives, and more than what type of legislation has been adopted and decision implemented. In this essay, the basic goal is to investigate the prospects for success of the ANNP and to discover *how* the interest group might pursue its objectives, and an explanation of *why* the ANNP is predicted to be either successful or unsuccessful.

The extent of control over events is a second factor to be examined in determining an appropriate research strategy. The case study approach is used when

⁶⁹For one thorough investigation of the case study strategy in political science, see J. W. Fesler, "The Case Method in Political Science," in *Essays on the Case Method in Public Administration*, ed. E. A. Bach (New York: International Institute of Administrative Sciences, 1962), 65-88. For another see Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, Applied Social Research Methods Series, vol. 5 (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1984).

⁷⁰Strategies in political science include "the rigorous controls of the experimental laboratory [experimental]" and the "relatively large numbers associated with the statistical mode of analysis [or statistical strategy]." For further discussion and comparison of these strategies, see LaPalombara, *Politics Within Nations*, 20-24.

⁷¹Yin, *Case Study Research*, 16.

investigating contemporary issues that cannot be manipulated. It relies upon a broad range of evidence for analysis, and includes the techniques of direct observation, methodical interviewing, examination of documents, and other elements.

A case study is therefore a mode of inquiry that:

- investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when
- the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which
- multiple sources of evidence are used.⁷²

The case study in political science "involves exploring a hunch or theory or hypothesis about politics in a single situation . . . "⁷³ Even when the resources available for the case are relatively limited, the investigator can make observations and draw careful conclusions.⁷⁴

A number of advantages extend to the case study, the first of which is that it affords the opportunity to strengthen or weaken hypotheses. For example, if certain criteria are hypothesized as determinants in the effectiveness of an interest group, it is appropriate to single out at least one situation or case where the hypothesized relationships exist. If no case can be shown, the authenticity of the hypothesized relationships would be placed in serious doubt.

This advantage could lead to a miscalculation, however, if a generalization is made based simply on one case study. To avoid this mistake, Yin proposes that

case studies . . . are generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes. In this sense, the case study . . . does not

⁷²Ibid., 23.

⁷³LaPalombara, *Politics Within Nations*, 21.

⁷⁴Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method", *American Political Science Review* 65 (September 1971): 691.

represent a "sample," and the investigator's goal is to expand and generalize theories . . . and not to enumerate frequencies.⁷⁵

Another advantage of the case study is that it restrains those theorists who develop concepts and formulations that have little to do with realistic situations. A theorist may oversimplify a political phenomenon, for example, by explaining that economic crisis is caused solely because of social tensions. The case study is a strategy that corrects these tendencies, and allows for analysis of a political world that is full of variety and complexity.

iv. Applying the Analytical Framework

The framework developed in this chapter is a generic one designed for studying the reasons why interest groups are or are not successful. Its specific purpose here is to study a recently established native group in the Soviet Union. However, a number of problems can be anticipated before embarking on this endeavour. Looking at the ANNP itself, it has an extremely brief history and therefore a short time span for study. Also, the organization is a special type of interest group. It is relatively small (representing the USSR's 182,000 native peoples) and remote (based in the north, it is far from the centre of power). To complicate matters, it has been established in an especially volatile political situation.

As these are not the most conducive circumstances to apply a previously untested analytical framework, the decision has been made to test the criteria for success against an established and successful interest group which bears attributes similar to those of the ANNP. As no such group exists in the USSR, a Canadian example has been chosen. The Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (ITC) is a northern native group which has had objectives similar to those currently being articulated by the ANNP. Applying the analytical framework to a study of ITC will serve to validate the

⁷⁵ Yin, *Case Study Research*. 21.

legitimacy of the approach and the framework. At the same time, the test can reveal instances where the analytical framework should be refined or modified, and can show which success criteria were most important for ITC.

CHAPTER III: TESTING AND REFINING THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

i. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to test and refine the analytical framework developed in Chapter II to validate its usefulness as a method for evaluating the prospects for success of the ANNP. To this end, the framework will be applied to the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (ITC).⁷⁶

There are several reasons for choosing the ITC as the test case. Most importantly, the ITC possesses characteristics similar to the ANNP. The first commonality is that both the ANNP and the ITC represent northern indigenous peoples. Both groups speak for peoples who have traditionally relied upon the land for subsistence, and have developed deep concerns about the degradation of the environment, the deterioration of traditional economic pursuits and increasing lack of control over their way of life. Hence, the two organizations represent peoples who share similar grievances, notwithstanding the dramatically distinct political climates in which they live.

The second major reason for selecting the ITC is that it has achieved significant success in influencing government policy. It will be easier to measure the prospects for success of the ANNP after having applied the framework to an established, relatively successful organization.

As the analytical framework in Chapter II was drawn up for a political interest group, it is necessary first to examine whether the ITC meets the requirements necessary for consideration as such a group.

⁷⁶In Inuktitut, the language of the Inuit people, Inuit Tapirisat means "Inuit Brotherhood."

ii. The ITC as a Political Interest Group

The ITC was founded in 1971, and soon after announced its objectives through a charter, as follows:⁷⁷

- To help preserve the Inuit language and culture.
- To promote a sense of dignity and pride in the Inuit heritage.
- To provide a focal point for determining the needs and wishes of all Inuit.
- To represent Inuit on matters affecting their well-being.
- To improve communications to and between Inuit communities.
- To help Inuit achieve full participation in Canadian society.⁷⁸

The charter shows that the ITC was established to represent the values and wishes held by the Inuit of Canada, and to band together in an attempt to resolve existing problems. This is one of the key requirements of a political interest group, as defined in the previous chapter.

Another critical part of ITC's objectives is the recognition that the group exists to change public policy. Although the ITC charter does not specify an intention to do so, and in fact claims to be a "non-profit, non-sectarian, *non-political* organization,"⁷⁹ evidence based on the actual behaviour of the group attests otherwise. For example, one of its fundamental goals of promoting a legally assured Inuit homeland, is decidedly aimed at changing public policy. The ITC has long sought to establish Inuit self-government and realize the related goal of a land claims settlement. Only a few

⁷⁷The charter referred to here consists of stated ITC aims, initially approved by the Board of Directors, and usually published in the organization's *Annual Report*. In an interview with Mr. John Bennett, Co-Editor of the Inuit cultural magazine *Inuktitut*, he confirmed that these objectives were considered, in essence, the ITC's charter. (Note: *Inuktitut* - an Inuit cultural magazine - is published under the auspices of the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada.) Mr. John Bennett, interview by author, Ottawa, Ontario, 20 December 1990.

⁷⁸"Inuit Tapirisat of Canada's History," *Inuit Tapirisat of Canada: Annual Report, 1978-79*, 3. (Henceforth referred to as *ITC: Annual Report*). It should be observed that the wording of ITC's charter reads somewhat differently today than in the 1970s. However, the basic intent of its objectives have remained unchanged.

⁷⁹Italics mine. *ITC: Annual Report, 1978-79*, 3.

months after the ITC was formally constituted, leading organizers drew up a claims proposal for eventual submission to the federal government. Such goals and efforts qualify the ITC as a political interest group.

Before setting out to apply the analytical framework to the ITC, a brief overview of the historical background of the ITC will help to set the stage.

iii. Historical Background of the Inuit in Canada

This section discusses the relevant Canadian political environment prior to the formation of ITC. Outlining the events in the decades prior to the foundation of the ITC illuminates the motivations and context for Inuit grievances.

The Inuit in Canada number approximately 27,000 people, distributed across the Arctic regions of the country, above the tree line and as far north as Ellesmere Island. The majority of the Inuit population (17,400) reside in the Northwest Territories (N.W.T.), although there are sizeable communities in Northern Quebec and Labrador (6,500 and 2,000, respectively).⁸⁰ Traditionally, most Inuit are nomadic hunting and gathering people who have relied largely on the sea for survival.⁸¹ Consequently they have lived mainly in coastal communities.

Initial contact between Europeans and Inuit occurred about 400 years ago.⁸² But it was not until the nineteenth century when contact with American, and later

⁸⁰The source for these data is the 1986 Canadian Census, cited in Minister of Supply and Services, *Canada Year Book 1990: A Review of Economic, Social and Political Development in Canada* (Ottawa: Publications Division, Statistics Canada, 1989), 2-27 - 2-28. Small Inuit populations live in every Canadian province except Prince Edward Island, ranging from 10 in New Brunswick to 295 in Alberta.

⁸¹The important exception are the Nunamiut, or Caribou Inuit, who are inland dwellers. For more on the historical background of the Caribou Inuit, see Nicholas J. Gubser, *The Nunamiut Eskimos: Hunters of Caribou* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965).

⁸²Nelson H. H. Graburn and B. Stephen Strong, *Circumpolar Peoples: An Anthropological Perspective*, Goodyear Regional Anthropology Series, ed. Edward Norbeck (Pacific Palisades, CA: Goodyear Publishing Co., 1973), 191.

British whalers that the Inuit way of life was affected significantly. Commercial whaling began in earnest in the mid-nineteenth century in Hudson Bay.⁸³ Contact with American and British whalers introduced the Inuit to various trade goods. Whaling, however, had a relatively short history in Canada, as whales were much depleted by the end of the century. The Inuit "had come to depend on trade goods, and the withdrawal of the whalers would have left them with no source of supply if the fur trade had not begun at this time to expand into the north, filling the vacuum left by the whalers."⁸⁴

With the coming of the fur trade, Inuit began to exchange goods with traders on a regular basis. In exchange for furs, the traders would supply guns, bullets, tea and tobacco to the Inuit. However, from the time of the Great Depression until World War II the fur trade declined, and "in most places . . . [Inuit] livelihood was seriously threatened through diminished credit and irreversible dependence on imported goods."⁸⁵ The collapse of the fur trade caused previously flourishing trading posts in the North to be abandoned. The situation further deteriorated as exposure to diseases such as tuberculosis had begun to affect Inuit communities. In some areas, Inuit went hungry. Around this time the Canadian government began a concerted effort to improve conditions for the Inuit.⁸⁶

Prior to World War II the federal government had little interest in northern Canada. But when war broke out it quickly recognized the strategic importance of the western continental Arctic. In the 1950s, a radar system was built, as part of a North American defense system, and the number of American and Canadian military

⁸³Terence Armstrong, George Rogers and Graham Rowley, *The Circumpolar North: A Political and Economic Geography of the Arctic and Sub-Arctic* (London: Methuen & Co., 1978), 80.

⁸⁴*Ibid.*, 80-81

⁸⁵Graburn and Strong, *Circumpolar Peoples*, 193.

⁸⁶*Ibid.*, 194.

personnel stationed there increased accordingly. The Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line consisted of building almost 60 radar stations across the north, from Alaska to Baffin Island.⁸⁷

The DEW Line bases disrupted "the foundations of the Inuit social organization"⁸⁸ as they disturbed local game patterns, and drew many Inuit into the wage economy and away from traditional pursuits.⁸⁹ Some Inuit began to relocate to settle closer to these stations, and hence came into increasing contact with non-natives. The development and increase of air transportation led to further interaction, increasing awareness in southern Canada about the Inuit in the North.

All of these factors combined to motivate the federal government to encourage Inuit to relocate from small communities scattered across the North to fewer, more densely populated ones, in order to provide them with all of the social benefits due a Canadian citizen.⁹⁰ Delivering these benefits was facilitated, from the government perspective, through the establishment of centralized administrative centres, with corresponding health, educational and social services.⁹¹

⁸⁷While the vast majority of the DEW Line bases were located on Canadian territory, it was largely financed and run by the United States. See Kenneth Coates, *Canada's Colonies: A History of the Yukon and Northwest Territories* (Toronto: James Lorimer & Co., 1983), 211-212.

⁸⁸Kevin McMahon, *Arctic Twilight* (Toronto: James Lorimer & Co., 1988), 33.

⁸⁹*Ibid.*, 31-34. As stated by one author, "the DEW Line helped . . . [to lure] Inuit away from the land and into centres of population." See R. Quinn Duffy, *The Road To Nunavut: The Progress of the Eastern Arctic Inuit Since the Second World War* (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988), 33.

⁹⁰In 1939, the Supreme Court of Canada accorded the Inuit the same social assistance benefits that were the right of other native peoples (i.e. Indians) and Canadian citizens. For further discussion, see Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, *The Inuit* (Ottawa: Minister of Supply & Services Canada, 1986), 48.

⁹¹Frances Abele, "Canadian Contradictions: Forty Years of Northern Political Development," *Arctic* 40, no. 4 (December 1987): 310-320.

Increasing attention to the North also led to several changes in the way the N.W.T. was governed. These in turn were important for the political development of Inuit living in the N.W.T. Prior to 1951, the N.W.T. was governed by a group of federal public servants based in Ottawa. "This absentee and unrepresentative rule"⁹² continued until 1951, when the first session of the territorial council, which included several elected members, was held in the North. Gradually a higher proportion of members were elected to the N.W.T. council, and in 1967, following the recommendations of the federally-appointed Carrothers Commission⁹³ on the development of government in the N.W.T., the territorial government was moved from Ottawa to Yellowknife.⁹⁴ With this started the process of transferring responsibilities from Ottawa to the territorial government.

Along with the positive results these changes engendered, such as the elimination of cyclical famine among Inuit, and the provision of health services, was significant social turmoil. The new northern settlements, with their more concentrated population bases, destabilized the traditional Inuit system of authority, based on kinship ties, that had remained relatively intact for centuries. In some instances Inuit were removed from long-standing hunting and trapping areas; in others, they simply began to hunt and trap less, relying instead on social welfare payments. They experienced cultural dislocation and felt they had little control over the allocation of government

⁹²Michael S. Whittington, "Political and Constitutional Development in the Northwest Territories and Yukon: The Issues and the Interests," in Michael S. Whittington, ed., *The North*, vol. 72 of *Collected Research Studies/Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada and Canadian Government Publishing Centre, 1985), 62-63.

⁹³A. W. R. Carrothers, *Report of the Advisory Committee on the Development of Government in the Northwest Territories* (Ottawa: Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 1966).

⁹⁴The first fully elected territorial council was held in 1975, after which it came to be called the legislative assembly.

benefits. Indeed they did not, as the federal government implemented its new policies largely without native consultation.⁹⁵

With the discovery of oil at Prudhoe Bay, Alaska, in 1968, and the subsequent discussions within the Canadian federal government regarding potential massive natural resource exploration and construction in the North, a new period in the national mobilization of native peoples began. This gave rise to questions about potential economic, environmental and social consequences and motivated Inuit (and other native peoples in Canada) to begin to voice these concerns. Based on a society intimately connected with the land, the Inuit believed they should have input into the process of deciding how the land they lived on was to be used. Years of experience with southern-based policies that affected their lives directly, and the Canadian government White Paper of 1969 (which "expressly stated that Ottawa no longer intended to recognize native land rights"⁹⁶) catalyzed the Inuit and other native peoples to form organizations that would represent them and defend their rights.⁹⁷

iv. Development of the ITC

The idea of a national group representing all the Inuit of Canada resulted from a meeting at Coppermine (in the N.W.T.) in July 1970, where Inuit from various Arctic regions of the country convened to discuss issues of common concern. Representatives designated the new association Inuit Tapirisat of Canada and formed an organizing committee to assemble the following year and set the groundwork for the organization.

⁹⁵Duffy, *Road To Nunavut*, 33-46.

⁹⁶Gurston Dacks, *A Choice of Futures: Politics in the Canadian North* (Toronto: Methuen Publications, 1981), 60.

⁹⁷It should be noted that a northern native group related to the Inuit, called the Inuvialuit, founded a political organization in 1969. The Inuvialuit inhabit the Western Arctic and established the Committee for Original People's Entitlement (or COPE) largely in response to the effects of oil discoveries and natural resource exploration in the Beaufort Sea.

In February 1971, in Toronto, Ontario, the organizing committee consisting of seven Inuit from the N.W.T., Northern Quebec and Labrador gathered "to discuss an urgent need to form a united voice for the Inuit people of Canada." Inuit were seeking greater influence over decisions "concerning development in the North, education of their children and preservation of their culture."⁹⁸ These goals were incorporated into ITC's Charter and agreed to at the Founding Conference several months later.⁹⁹

The major concerns of the Inuit people included loss of control over their way of life, degradation of the environment, social problems such as widespread drug and alcohol abuse, and threats to cultural and linguistic preservation, including the absence of programs for educating Inuit children in traditional forms of activity. The ITC translated these issues into a number of concrete objectives, in the economic, environmental, political and social arenas.

Since its founding, ITC's primary aim has been to insure adequate means to support the traditional Inuit way of life. More than anything else, this means the control and ownership of land that would permit Inuit to pursue traditional activities such as hunting, fishing and trapping. Having control over land use and management would revive the Inuit culture and provide a basis for establishing a degree of self-government.

The emphasis which the ITC has put on land was apparent from the beginning. The ITC Board of Directors first conceived of a Land Claims Project almost as soon as it was established, in November 1971.¹⁰⁰ The ITC regarded an "Inuit Land Claims

⁹⁸"Inuit Tapirisat of Canada's History," *ITC: Annual Report*, 1973-74. (Henceforth referred to as *ITC: Annual Report*), 2.

⁹⁹This meeting took place in August, 1971, in Ottawa, and marks the official establishment of the organization.

¹⁰⁰"Report on Projects: Land Claims Project," *ITC: Annual Report*, 1973-74, 15. It is instructive here to discuss briefly a basic premise of native claims. The underlying principle of land claims is authority over, and legal title of land. As discussed previously, land traditionally has been, and largely remains critical to the fabric of the Inuit way of life. The term "way of life" includes social customs,

settlement in the Northwest Territories [as] the most important event in the lifetime of all Inuit."¹⁰¹

Within five years the ITC had formulated a proposal on behalf of the Inuit of Keewatin, Kitikmeot and Baffin. In exchange for land, hunting, the establishment of a new territory north of the tree line (Nunavut), money and other compensation, the proposal agreed to surrender Inuit rights.¹⁰² In this, the first of a series of proposals, the ITC focused mainly on the political objective of gaining control over land.

In February 1976, the comprehensive claim proposal was completed and submitted to the federal government. However, in response to criticisms from Inuit communities in the North who were dissatisfied with the ITC proposal and with the lack of adequate participation in its preparation,¹⁰³ the ITC withdrew its submission to the government in November 1976. After further consultations with Inuit communities in the North, the ITC issued a new proposal in July 1977. This time, the group went first to the general population to gauge public reaction. Only after this effort did the ITC submit the proposal to the federal government, in December 1977.¹⁰⁴

A recognized need to focus more attention on national concerns motivated the ITC leadership to place the land claim project under the guidance of an independent body called the Northwest Territories Inuit Land Claims Commission, in early 1977.

economic prospects and activities, and spiritual values derived from the relationship that native peoples have with the land. As such, the Inuit seek to obtain basic ownership of some lands, and realize self-government, among other interests, in their claims to the federal government.

¹⁰¹"Report on Projects: Land Claims Project," *ITC: Annual Report, 1973-74*, 3.

¹⁰²Inuit Tapirisat of Canada, *Agreement-in-Principle as to the Settlement of Inuit Land Claims in the Northwest Territories and the Yukon Territory between the Government of Canada and the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada*, 27 February 1976. In this thesis, the phrase "Agreement-in Principle" is denoted by the acronym AIP.

¹⁰³"Land claims Project," *ITC: Annual Report, 1976-77*, 7.

¹⁰⁴Inuit Tapirisat of Canada, *Proposed Agreement-in-Principle for the Establishment of Inuit Rights Between the Inuit and the Government of Canada*, July 1977.

Meanwhile, in the mid-1970's, one of ITC's regional affiliations, the Committee for Original Peoples' Entitlement (COPE), came under considerable pressure to permit development in the Beaufort Sea. The Inuvialuit decided to split away from the ITC in 1976 to settle their own land claim. Although this move caused a breach in ITC's unity, land claims negotiations between the ITC and the federal government continued for several years, until early 1979, but with little progress. Where Inuit insisted that political demands be met before continuing land claims negotiations, the federal government was determined that political affairs should remain separate. Negotiations reached an impasse over the proposal. Organizational and financial difficulties at the end of the 1970's, criticism from Northern Quebec and Labrador Inuit that ITC was failing to give enough attention to their regions,¹⁰⁵ and a growing realization that the land claim project was taking up proportionally too many resources and resulting in the neglect of some of the group's other objectives led the ITC to disband the N.W.T. Claims Commission and transfer responsibility for land claims to a Nunavut Claims Executive Committee (NCEC), which was accountable to ITC's board of directors. Under these new arrangements, ITC resumed negotiations with Ottawa in 1980, when both sides agreed to deal with the creation of Nunavut outside of the land claim process.

The NCEC operated until 1982 when, in a renewed effort to prioritize goals and establish a "more broadly-based coalition,"¹⁰⁶ the ITC constituted an entirely separate organization to deal with the land claim. The Tungavik Federation of Nunavut (TFN) subsequently was established in 1982, and continued to move forward with land claims

¹⁰⁵"ITC Charges Batteries, Eyes Political Activity," *Northern News Report* 5, no. 43 (February 1977), 2-3.

¹⁰⁶John Merritt et al., *Nunavut: Political Choices and Manifest Destiny* (Ottawa: Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, 1989), 75.

activities on behalf of the Inuit of Keewatin, Kitikmeot and Baffin. The TFN had a separate corporate status, was no longer accountable to the ITC board of directors, and was more independent than previous land claims groups the ITC had established. In the ensuing years, the TFN encountered numerous setbacks in its work towards a settlement. But its objective was finally realized when, in April 1990, it initialled an Agreement-in-Principle (AIP) with the federal government.¹⁰⁷ This agreement entitled approximately 18,000 Inuit to 136,000 square kilometers of land and \$580,000,000 compensation over a 14-year period.¹⁰⁸

A major reorganization at the end of the 1970s released the ITC from a major project and permitted it to devote more attention to some of its other objectives. One project, initiated in the early 1970s, was to improve communication "to and between the Inuit communities" in the North. The ITC wanted to transmit news of its activities, and provide Inuit with a means by which they could voice their needs and concerns. The leadership began plans to create and improve regular radio and television programmes, broadcast them to northern communities, and provide Inuit with written publications.

To this end, in 1975, the ITC first proposed the Inukshuk Project to produce television programmes in Inuktitut (the language spoken by Inuit), and to distribute them using the experimental Anik B satellite. Although programming was broadcasted for only six months, the project actually ran for almost three years, ending in May 1981, and was so successful that it led to the creation of the Inuit Broadcasting Corporation (IBC). While there have been many difficulties, including commercial

¹⁰⁷Tungavik Federation of Nunavut and Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, *Agreement-in-Principle Between the Inuit of the Nunavut Settlement Area and Her Majesty In Right of Canada* (Ottawa: Tungavik Federation of Nunavut and Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 1990).

¹⁰⁸Miro Cernetig, "Final Arctic Agreement Signed in Canada's Largest Land Claim," *Globe and Mail* (Toronto), 1 May 1990, sec. A, p. 11.

competition from American and Canadian television channels, and meager funding, the IBC has been in production since 1981.¹⁰⁹

In another instance, the ITC produced a short newsletter, called *Inuit Monthly*, that, among other things, aimed to publicize the goals of the group. Eventually, the newsletter was expanded to a magazine format, and renamed *Inuit Today*. The magazine provided a medium through which Inuit aspirations and feelings could be expressed, and through which ITC could articulate its objectives. Although the magazine ultimately was terminated, due to severe shortages in funding, it remained a viable form of communication for almost a decade.

This effort at improving communication was inextricably linked with ITC's goal to improve Inuit culture. In the 1970s, the ITC launched a number of organizations to deal with linguistic and cultural problems. The ITC recognized that many Inuit could not articulate in their own tongue, and desired to promote the use of Inuktitut as a way to assist the Inuit in strengthening their culture. In 1973, for example, the Inuit Language Commission (ILC) was created to research the linguistic needs of the Inuit. Among their task^s was to develop a standard system of writing in Inuktitut, and to gain input into school curricula in the North. In 1974, the ITC established the Inuit Cultural Institute (ICI) to act as a "supplementary and complementary educational source to assist Native Peoples to participate on an equal basis within the majority society through strengthening of their cultural self-identity."¹¹⁰ In the fall of 1976 the ICI created a National Inuit Council on Education (NICE) to study how to adapt education to become "a process which is meaningful, relevant and challenging for Inuit."¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹Gail G. Valaskakis, "Communication and Control in the Canadian North - The Potential of Interactive Satellites," *Etudes/Inuit/Studies* 6, no. 1 (1982): 19-28.

¹¹⁰"Inuit Cultural Institute," *ITC: Annual Report, 1974-1975*, 21.

¹¹¹"Council on Education Holds First Meeting in Eskimo Point," *ITC News* (April 1977), 6.

Eventually the ILC was incorporated into the ICI, which subsequently became an important force in changing the direction and content of Inuit education in the north. It consistently criticized the territorial government for lack of appropriate instruction for the Inuit, and for the entrenched "southern-modelled education system [which had] not prepared Inuit people to face modern society with confidence and efficient training."¹¹² The ICI was instrumental in changing the content of educational programs, and in building programs with a greater emphasis on Inuit culture, such as the development of courses on Arctic survival, hunting and trapping.

Another aim of ITC was the general improvement in the socio-economic conditions of Inuit. To deal with this issue ITC established the Inuit Development Corporation (IDC) in 1976, which the ITC envisioned as being funded through future royalties from natural resource development in the proposed area of Nunavut. This organization has been involved in a broad range of business activities, including improving employment opportunities for Inuit in industrial development projects in the North. Another organization aimed to enhance standards of living of Inuit is the Inuit Non-Profit Housing Corporation (INPHC). Created in 1975, its mandate was to enable Inuit to conduct their own housing projects. The ITC approached the problem of poor living conditions from another perspective also. In the 1980s it created opportunities to train Inuit for positions that currently non-Inuit held. The manpower and journalism training programs, the summer student program, as well as the more recent Inuit Management Development program are cases in point.

The ITC also had concerns regarding the legal status of Inuit under the Canadian Constitution. The issue of "indigenous rights" had broad repercussions as it was directly linked with rights of Inuit to ownership and control of land traditionally

¹¹²"Inuit Cultural Institute. Statement released at the NWT Council, Rankin Inlet, 26 October 1976," quoted in Duffy, *Road To Nunavut*, 11.

used by them. In 1979, the group established the Inuit Committee on National Issues (ICNI) to "secure constitutional recognition of Inuit and other aboriginal peoples' right to self-determination within Canada."¹¹³ This group, with the assistance of other native organizations in Canada, was active throughout the 1980s.

Throughout its history the ITC also has been closely associated with attempts to stay the development of resources in the North, of relevance to the preservation of the Inuit culture. For example, in 1979 the ITC, in cooperation with Baker Lake residents, applied for a permanent injunction to prevent the Northern Affairs Minister and other officials of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND) from authorizing mineral exploration or mining activity in the vicinity of Baker Lake.¹¹⁴ In another example, in 1981 the ITC and an international Inuit organization (the Inuit Circumpolar Conference) successfully challenged a plan to ship liquified natural gas through the Davis Strait on the grounds that it posed a serious hazard to the arctic environment. These are just two of the many environmental projects with which ITC has been involved to assist the Inuit in preserving their land base.

Evident in this discussion is the inextricable connection between ITC's goals to improve Inuit language, culture and education, and preserve the environment. It is important to note, however, the close link of these objectives with that of establishing the territory of Nunavut. To the Inuit people the land claim is a way to protect their language, culture and way of life. They hope to establish a government and political institutions that better "reflect the traditions of the people of Nunavut."¹¹⁵ The Nunavut proposal stated that a government with powers similar to those of the present

¹¹³Inuit Committee on National Issues, *Completing Canada: Inuit Approaches to Self-Government* (Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, 1987), 5.

¹¹⁴"Baker Lake Inuit Defend Native Rights," *ITC News* (May, 1979), 6.

¹¹⁵Inuit Tapirisat of Canada, *Political Development in Nunavut* (Igloolik, n.p., 1979).

N.W.T., but with additional powers over land-use planning and control, would be established. The ITC recognized that the Inuit, comprising approximately 80% of the population in the proposed territory, would secure an Inuit majority in the territorial government, and would better represent them and their goals. With this as a background, the objectives of the ITC could be better realized.

Given this description of the development of the ITC, it seems reasonable to conclude that the ITC was interested in achieving the goals set out in its charter using a variety of strategies. These included creating educational institutions, increasing the quantity and quality of communication available to and for the Inuit communities in Canada, assisting in the preservation of traditional Inuit lands, and seeking to attain Inuit self-government through the achievement of a land claims settlement in Nunavut. This brief examination of ITC's objectives and activities sets the background for an analysis of the group, by applying to it the analytical framework.

v. Applying the Analytical Framework

a. Articulation of Group Objectives

Given the previous discussion on the objectives of the group and the means by which ITC strove to achieve them, it remains to analyze the group's articulation of its goals to determine how it used available resources to maximize its effectiveness in doing so.

The ITC defined its objectives in general terms, as enunciated in its Charter. That the group's goals were broadly-stated proved more advantageous than not because the ITC was able to develop more specific goals over time, as it gained experience in the Canadian political arena, and in discerning the specific concerns of the Inuit. For example, the group quickly became active in land claims, and subsequently in the areas of communication and education. However, one drawback of leaving objectives open-ended was that the group focused undue attention on certain goals. The most

significant example of this is the group's dedication to settling land claims which, for approximately the first seven years of ITC's activities, occupied the greatest attention of the group, and resulted in the neglect of other substantial goals, as demonstrated by the criticism of the ITC by regional affiliates in the latter part of the 1970's.¹¹⁶ The fact that the group eventually shifted its focus to other objectives is indicative of ITC's realization of this fact.

When ITC's objectives were elaborated, they generally proved realizable. For example, the leadership of ITC wanted to establish communication with the Inuit communities, which it proceeded to accomplish by travelling to the North, organizing radio and television programming, and producing written publications. Not all of ITC's goals were clearly defined and realistic, however. For instance, ITC had initially aspired to reach a land claims settlement within several years of submitting the proposal, and at one point the group announced its commitment to settle land claims in Nunavut within two years.¹¹⁷ It actually has taken over twenty years for these efforts to come to fruition, and these have not been firmly achieved, for the Agreement-in-Principle for the Nunavut land claim initialled by the TFN and the federal government in April 1990 is not legally binding.¹¹⁸

While the means to achieve ITC's goals have changed, the group's objectives themselves have remained quite consistent. This is demonstrated in the group's unchanging Charter over the past two decades, and in its practical activities in pursuit of its initial goals. For example, the group's original aim to improve the culture and language of the Inuit, as well as communication is still important. The Inukshuk Project developed by ITC led to the formation of the IBC, an organization that

¹¹⁶"ITC Charges Batteries," 2-3.

¹¹⁷"Tungavik Federation of Nunavut," *ITC: Annual Report*, 1982-83, 6.

¹¹⁸As stated in the *AIP*: "Nothing in the Agreement imposes a legal obligation on either party [TFN and the Government of Canada]." See *AIP*, 9.

continues at present to transmit Inuktitut programming to Inuit communities in the North.

The continuity of ITC's objectives indicates the group's success in identifying them initially. Aside from setting these goals successfully, the group also targeted appropriate strategies to achieve its objectives. Over the last twenty years, the strategies of the group have changed significantly. Initially, ITC worked on all of its objectives, even the difficult ones such as the land claims. But over time, the group has adopted new strategies to try to realize them. The decision to form a variety of organizations to better serve specific objectives was one such strategy. The creation of INPHC, IDC and TFN illustrate ITC's desire to delegate responsibility for certain goals. Specifically, the ICNI was founded in the late 1970s, and attempted to constitutionally entrench native rights. By so doing, ICNI was assisting the land claims process by striving to establish a basis for self-government.

Given that the articulation of ITC's objectives has been clarified, the remaining criteria for success subsequently will be outlined, beginning with the internal dynamics of the ITC.

b. Internal Dynamics

In this section the functions and activities of leaders and members of ITC will be examined, along with the manner in which they utilize available group resources. These factors bear on the group's internal operations, which influence the effectiveness of the group in realizing its objectives. These elements are together referred to as "internal dynamics," with four components of "internal cohesion," "leadership," "communications" and "organizational management."

i. Internal Cohesion

According to David Truman, the internal cohesion or unity of a group is one of the most important determinants of its effectiveness.¹¹⁹ In order to evaluate whether the ITC has had a high degree of internal cohesion, the following factors will have to be considered: structure, membership and representation.

i. Structure

The ITC is governed by an executive, comprising the president, vice-president and secretary/treasurer, which is answerable to the board of directors, consisting of presidents of regional affiliates of the group (ex-officio members of the board), members of several Inuit communities and heads of various ITC agencies.¹²⁰ These latter organizations include such groups as ICI, INPHC and IDC (now Nunasi Corporation).¹²¹ The regional affiliates comprise associations representing Inuit from specific regions in the east and central arctic (in the districts of Baffin, Keewatin and Kitikmeot), Northern Quebec and Labrador. They were created between January 1972 and June 1975 to deal with matters of concern to local Inuit communities.¹²²

¹¹⁹"The problem of cohesion is a crucial one for the political interest group . . . The degree of unity in the group is probably most fundamental in determining the measure of success it will enjoy." See Truman, *Governmental Process*, 167.

¹²⁰Although the composition of the executive and board of directors has varied over the years, the core of these bodies has remained virtually the same.

¹²¹In 1982 the IDC was renamed Nunasi, to better reflect "the geographical area of responsibility, Nunavut." See "Nunasi Corporation," *ITC Annual Report*, 1982-83, 13.

¹²²These regional affiliates are the Northern Quebec Inuit Association (NQIA became the Makivik Corporation in 1978), the Labrador Inuit Association (LIA), the Baffin Region Inuit Association (BRIA), the Keewatin Inuit Association (KIA), the Kitikmeot Inuit Association (KIA) and COPE. It should be noted that the Inuvialuit are of similar ethnic and cultural descent as Inuit, but are generally recognized as possessing a distinct culture and collective consciousness.

One of the aims in establishing these regional affiliates was to enhance "national unity."¹²³ Most of these organizations were initially inspired by, and remain closely linked to the ITC. For the most part, these regional groups, although being independent entities, are concerned with goals very similar to those stated in ITC's Charter, and in fact, have helped to communicate to the regions certain objectives of the ITC. For example, the Labrador Inuit Association (LIA) initially directed its attention and efforts towards contacting Inuit in the region and explaining the purpose and content of the Land Claims Project. The regional groups have also supported activities of the ITC, as in the instance where the LIA undertook a study to gather information on traditional Inuit land use and occupancy.¹²⁴

The group consequently has a relatively decentralized decision-making apparatus, a feature that is enhanced by the input of the membership at its general meetings, typically held annually. This brings up another subject for consideration, the membership of the group.

ii. Membership

When the ITC was established, it passed a number of by-laws that provided "for Inuit to be full voting members and non-Inuit to be associate (non-voting) members."¹²⁵ A group or individual seeking membership in the ITC was required to pay a small fee. Formal membership in both categories, however, rose slowly in the first few years of the group's operation.¹²⁶ The leadership therefore decided to change

¹²³Tagak Curley, "The Challenges Ahead - A Closing Message from the President," *ITC Annual Report*, 1974-75, 37.

¹²⁴This study was called the Labrador Inuit Land Use and Occupancy Report, and was completed in 1978. "Labrador Land Use and Occupancy Report," *ITC News* (April 1978), 3.

¹²⁵"Report on Projects: Membership," *ITC: Annual Report*, 1973-74, 10. Membership fees were between three and fifty dollars, depending on the nature of the member (e.g. business entity, non-profit organization, student, etc.).

¹²⁶Formal membership in the ITC increased from just 370 in 1974 to 756 in 1975. See "Report on Operations: Membership," *ITC: 1973-74*, 10-11.

the requirements for membership, whereby the entire Inuit population in Canada would be exempt from having to pay a membership fee. By so doing, the ITC would be able to include in its membership all of the Inuit in Canada.¹²⁷ The group could then assert that it was a national organization representing the interests of northern native people.

A plebiscite taken in 1982 provides a basis for determining the degree of cohesion of the membership. The leadership of the ITC had supported division of the N.W.T. since the group first was formed. The plebiscite showed that approximately 80 percent of the predominantly Inuit population in the proposed territory of Nunavut, and therefore the vast majority of ITC's membership, supported the idea as well.¹²⁸ This attests to the fact that the ITC was in accord with its membership.

However, divergent views among native groups in the N.W.T., for example COPE, were revealed in the plebiscite results. For example, the four communities in the proposed Inuvialuit region called Western Arctic Regional Municipality (WARM), whose populations are mainly Inuvialuit, voted only about fifty percent in favour of territorial division.¹²⁹ Also, the majority of the Dene in Denendeh, the western territory to be created through division, supported division. Abele and Dickerson postulate that "the Dene and Métis supported the Inuit strategy of holding a plebiscite in order to maintain Native solidarity, and perhaps because the advancement of self-determination in Nunavut would set a precedent enhancing the prospect of self-government in the western Arctic."¹³⁰

¹²⁷This policy change was further clarified in a discussion with Mr. John Bennett. Mr. John Bennett, interview.

¹²⁸For a detailed analysis of the plebiscite see Frances Abele and Mark O. Dickerson, "The 1982 Plebiscite on Division of the Northwest Territories: Regional Government and Federal Policy," *Canadian Public Policy - Analyse de Politique* 11 (1985): 1-2.

¹²⁹The Inuvialuit voted 50.3 percent in support of division. See Abele and Dickerson, "The 1982 Plebiscite on Division," 9.

¹³⁰*Ibid.*, 11.

Another factor which can affect the internal cohesion of a group is the extent of overlapping membership. If members of the ITC display allegiance to another group which comes into conflict with the ITC on a given issue, then internal cohesion of the group can be negatively affected.¹³¹ As there is overlapping membership within the ITC, this factor will be discussed briefly.

On the domestic level there are numerous groups that speak on behalf of Inuit regarding specific concerns. The Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC) is a group that represents the Inuit in Canada at the international level. Founded in 1977 to act on behalf of Inuit in Alaska, Canada, Greenland and the Soviet Union, the ICC's objectives are extremely similar to those of ITC's.¹³² Furthermore, contact between ICC and ITC is substantial, as the triennial ICC general assembly is attended by 18 Inuit delegates from Canada - three from each of the six Inuit regional organizations.

Because of the similarities in objectives between the ICC and the ITC, and their common recognition of problems confronting Inuit, the internal cohesion of the ITC is unlikely to be threatened by overlapping membership. Both groups represent a single native people, who share similar ancestries, customs, religions and way of life. The nature and objectives of these groups and the grievances and characteristics shared by their members indicate that overlapping membership has had, if anything, a reinforcing effect, and may have heightened Inuit commitment to ITC's objectives.

¹³¹"The internal political situation in a group is affected by the extent to which its membership overlaps that of other groups because of the varying effects that such overlapping has, and can have, upon cohesion." See Truman, *Governmental Process*, 159.

¹³²For example, the ICC has outlined objectives in its charter, including the following: "To strengthen unity among Inuit of the region; . . . to ensure the endurance and the growth of Inuit culture and societies for both present and future generations; . . . to promote wise management and use of non-renewable resources in the circumpolar region and incorporate such resources in the present and future development of Inuit economies, taking into account other Inuit interests. See Inuit Circumpolar Conference, *Report on Activities: Summer 1986-Summer 1988*, (1988), 1.

iii. Representation

A third characteristic significant for the unity of ITC's membership, is the representation of the group. The vast geographical base of ITC's members led the leadership to take steps to ensure that all of the Inuit would be represented by the group. For example, delegates to ITC's annual general meetings (AGMs) are selected from every one of the Inuit communities. Throughout the 1970s progress of negotiations between the ITC and the federal government regarding land claims was reported to the AGM, which had "the final say in the direction of Inuit proposals," a process which ensured that "negotiators [were] held accountable to the Inuit population."¹³³

The group was also motivated to establish the regional affiliates as they could better represent local Inuit concerns at the national level. Based on this two-tiered approach to representing the Inuit in Canada, the group tried to assure satisfactory representation of its constituents.

It should be noted, however, that the geographical distribution of the group's membership has presented serious obstacles for the group, and has sometimes impinged on the group's ability to unite the membership in support of its objectives. For example, the ITC was the target of considerable criticism by the Inuit community when it submitted its initial Nunavut proposal to the federal government in February 1976. The group was charged with having inadequately sought Inuit participation in the preparation of the proposal.

The question of representation also initially compelled the ITC to focus much of its resources on enhancing communications with Inuit communities. On numerous occasions as well, criticism has been directed at ITC for not being sufficiently active in

¹³³Katherine A. Graham and Anne B. McAllister, *The Inuit Land Claim, Constitutional Development, and Local Government Reform in the Northwest Territories: An Overview*, Eastern Arctic Study (Kingston: n.p., 1981), 9.

contacting Inuit communities to communicate the activities of the group, and to determine the interests and concerns of local Inuit. For example, in the group's 1988-89 *Annual Report*, ITC president Rhoda Innukshuk demonstrated serious concern over this factor and indicated her enduring commitment to the promotion of this goal. Communication between the leadership and the membership is therefore another important element of internal cohesion, sufficiently so that it will be discussed separately in a later section.

ii. Leadership

The second component of ITC's internal dynamics is leadership. There are four main functions of the leadership: to work effectively toward achieving the group's objectives, to encourage and maintain the internal cohesion of the membership, to ensure the smooth functioning of the organization, and to act as a spokesperson in relations with external actors. Two components of leadership influence its effectiveness in performing these functions: the selection process of the leadership, and the legitimacy and respect with which the leadership is regarded.

The leadership of ITC can, in general terms, be equated with the executive and the board of directors, described above. Initially, the president, vice-president and secretary-treasurer of ITC were elected by delegates to the annual general meetings. As the delegates were selected from every one of the 66 Inuit communities across the North, this process assured fairly broad-based representation. Beginning in 1979, however, election of the chief executive officers of ITC was open to all Inuit eighteen years and over, thus further ensuring satisfactory input into the process of leadership selection. Board members are elected in part by the AGM and in part by ballot from Inuit communities. Spokespersons for the group in various projects, such as the Land Claims Project in the 1970s, are held answerable to the board of directors.

The question of legitimacy is one about which the leadership of ITC has long been concerned. The leadership's mandate to undertake projects is derived from the

membership of the group as represented at the AGM. The presence of delegates selected by every Inuit community gives legitimacy to ITC's claim to represent the whole Inuit population. The legitimacy of ITC leadership is enhanced by its stability and continuity.

Throughout ITC's history the leadership of the group has remained quite steady. Many leadership positions, including the positions of president and vice-president, heads of projects and organizational affiliates, remained filled by a small number of Inuit. For example, John Amagoalik first became active in ITC during the 1970s, particularly as director of the Land Claims Projects, a position which he first accepted in November, 1975, and which he held for several years. Amagoalik has also been active as Co-Chairman of the ICNI. He was elected Vice-President of ITC in 1979, and President of the group in 1981. He retained the presidency until 1985, and was reelected to the position again in 1988, which he held until spring 1991.¹³⁴

Another example of leadership stability and continuity is evident in the case of Rosemary Kuptana, who won the most recent elections (May 1991) for president of the ITC. She has been involved with the ITC since the 1970's, and initially was a staff member of the organization. Among other offices Kuptana has held has been that of vice-president of the ICC.¹³⁵

A final example of leadership stability and continuity is evident in the case of Tagak Curley, founding president of the ITC. After his term in office, Curley remained active in the ITC as Director of the Land Claims Project and in other positions associated with the group. In late 1975 he took over as executive director of ICI. He also became the first president of the IDC, when the ITC passed a resolution

¹³⁴See "Inuit Committee on National Issues," *ITC: Annual Report, 1988-89*, 4-5 and "The President's Report," in *Ibid.*, 6.

¹³⁵See Circumpolar Conference, *Report on Activities*.

at its Annual General Meeting in 1979 to establish a board of directors for IDC distinct from the ITC.¹³⁶ Curley also has been a member of the Legislative Assembly representing Keewatin South. Perhaps the most significant feature of this active minority within the ITC was that it was thoroughly dispersed throughout the Inuit community in Canada. Many individuals in the leadership held respected positions within the community and were often leaders of the "Inuit" media, such as the IBC, as well as cultural and social organizations, such as the Inuit Cultural Institute. The continuity evident in these examples had a positive effect in that they reflected a consistent voice on behalf of the Inuit in Canada.

The stability of the leadership may have another effect, however; that of increasing the possibility of ITC's leadership becoming exclusive. The fact that a stable core of leaders in ITC has retained important controlling positions over long periods can result in internal conflict. It is possible for the leadership to become preoccupied with the activities involved in retaining their positions in the organization as opposed to the broader objectives and strategies of the group.

One aspect of the leadership of ITC yet to be considered, is how it uses the organization's communications resources to advance the effectiveness of the leadership in achieving group objectives. This leads to the discussion of a third component of ITC's internal dynamics, communications.

iii. Communication

One of the first goals of the ITC was to develop "communications with settlements throughout the Arctic."¹³⁷ The group recognized the need to establish links among Inuit throughout the North in order to both inform Inuit communities of its

¹³⁶See "Inuit Cultural Institute," *ITC: Annual Report*, 1988-89, 21-22, and "Inuit Development Corporation," *Ibid.*, 21-22.

¹³⁷"Inuit Tapirisat of Canada's History," *ITC: Annual Report*, 1973-74, 3.

activities and objectives, and provide a means through which Inuit can express their needs and concerns. The ITC attempted to do this through the use of newspapers, radio, telephone and television services, as well as by personal contact with Inuit by touring arctic communities. The group desired to

discuss local community concerns . . . [It recognized that] close contact with the communities was essential if the organization was to provide effective representation; and much of the first year was spent both assisting in the immediate problems of communities and in determining what programs should be given priority to meet the most urgent needs of the people.¹³⁸

When visiting northern communities, in its first years of operation, ITC held meetings with the local population and community councils to explain the role of the organization, to encourage Inuit membership in the group, to create local chapters in the various regions and to complete other communication-oriented tasks.

To a similar end, in December 1971 the ITC began publishing a newsletter called *Inuit Monthly*, noted above. Intended as a "forum of contributions from many Inuit people,"¹³⁹ the newsletter first acted to publicize the objectives and ambitions of the ITC. It quickly became ITC's national news magazine, effectively conveying information to Inuit communities on northern development (e.g. the Mackenzie Valley pipeline, etc.), progress on various ITC projects (e.g. land claims project, etc.), policies the ITC was dealing with concerning the territorial and federal governments, as well as other matters. Eventually the mandate of *Inuit Today* changed to one that included encouraging "dialogue between northerners and southerners . . . [to effect] an exchange of ideas over mutual concerns."¹⁴⁰ *Inuit Today* maintained this role until

¹³⁸"A Brief History of ITC 1971-1986," *ITC: Annual Report*, 1985-86, 17-18.

¹³⁹"Inuit Monthly," *ITC: Annual Report*, 1973-74, 8. Another publication, *Nunavut*, is produced on the subject of land claims. However, *Nunavut* is a publication of the TFN.

¹⁴⁰"Inuit Today," *ITC: Annual Report*, 1982-83, 11.

1983, when production was stopped because of reductions in grants and other contributions.

In maintaining *Inuit Today*, the ITC leadership was attempting to achieve several things. The ITC hoped the magazine would encourage Inuit to express their feelings and aspirations, and generate a renewed "sense of dignity and pride in the Inuit heritage." Many Inuit, in fact, did contribute to the magazine, writing articles about current events that affected the North, stories of Inuit experiences in the past, particularly about their traditional way of life before major contact with non-natives, and poetry. Participation of Inuit was promoted by publishing the magazine in Inuktitut as well as in English, thereby assisting in the preservation of the Inuit language and culture.

While the termination of *Inuit Today* was a significant setback, other communications projects continued and became successful in the long term. In attempting to provide Inuit communities with the opportunity to hear and speak their language and thereby preserve and develop their culture, the ITC established a research project intended to determine how to improve communication in the Arctic.¹⁴¹ This led to the purchase of community radio stations, which developed to transmit programming in Inuktitut produced by Inuit, and which came to be predominantly controlled by Inuit.

Another project focused on television programming to northern communities. In May, 1978, the federal Department of Communications accepted a proposal from the ITC to use the Anik B satellite to transmit Inuit programming to northern communities over a trial six month period in 1980/81. Begun in the fall of 1980, Inuit programming in Inuktitut was transmitted for 17 hours a week. Pronounced a successful learning experience at the conclusion of the project, the staff associated with this project were

¹⁴¹ "Communications," *ITC Annual Report, 1976-77*, 15.

transferred to the Inuit Broadcasting Corporation, which was granted a network licence by the CRTC a few months later.¹⁴² The Anik B project reinforced spoken Inuktitut in Cambridge Bay and began to teach Inuit in the other communities that had received Inukshuk broadcasts Central Arctic vocabulary.¹⁴³ The IBC continues to operate currently, broadcasting more than four hours a week to forty-three Inuit communities in the N.W.T., Northern Quebec and Labrador.¹⁴⁴

It is important to note that communication has always been a major concern of ITC, and a major challenge. While the group made important inroads in establishing communication with Inuit communities, the geographical expanse comprising the members of the group continued to remain an impediment to good communication. Members sometimes have felt somewhat disconnected with the activities of the national organization.

Begun in the 1970s these efforts at expanding communication links with northern Inuit communities remain important. They proved beneficial to the Inuit as they have encouraged the use of Inuktitut among Inuit, promoted Inuit communities to express their cultural concerns, and assisted ITC in terms of the confidence the Inuit subsequently felt towards the group in its abilities to accomplish specific objectives.

iv. Organizational Management

The final component to be examined under the general heading of internal dynamics is the organizational management capabilities of the ITC. Decisions of the

¹⁴²Inuit Tapirisat of Canada, *The Inukshuk Project* (n.p., n.d.), 3. "Our dream is an Inuit communications system stretching all across the North that will enhance the strength and dignity of our peoples."

¹⁴³Valaskakis, "Communication and Control in the Canadian North," 27.

¹⁴⁴Inuit Broadcasting Corporation, IBC official, interview by author, Ottawa, Ontario, 18 April 1991.

leadership regarding the organizational structure and management of the group, and objectives of ITC itself are examined.

During the first few years of its activities, the ITC leadership decided to form organizations that can be divided generally into two categories: those that would assist ITC in achieving its goals at a national level, and those that would do so on a regional basis. Organizations in the various regions inhabited by Inuit were better able to disseminate information to local communities, and act as a forum through which regional needs and concerns could be expressed. These groups worked on a wide variety of issues concerning the preservation of the Inuit language and culture. For example, the Labrador Inuit Association (LIA) undertook a Land Use and Occupancy study of the region and formulated a proposal for the settlement of land claims to the Federal Government in 1978. The LIA demanded rights to land, compensation, management powers over resources, and for regional government. Throughout the 1980s, the LIA endeavoured to see its comprehensive land claims in Labrador negotiated with the federal government, work that has realized some success as in early 1989, negotiations with Ottawa officially began. By so doing, this regional affiliate has assisted ITC towards accomplishing its objectives. Therefore, the decision to organize regional affiliations has demonstrated good organizational capabilities.

The decision by the leadership to organize ITC in this manner has also had some detrimental effects, however. A case in point is the Committee for Original People's Entitlement, COPE, which became an ITC regional affiliate in 1972. After ITC had submitted its original land claims proposal to the federal government, in 1976, COPE withdrew from ITC, and applied to the federal government for funding to prepare its own land claims. "Public name-calling on radio and in the native press widened the

breach between COPE and ITC."¹⁴⁵ Although ITC did not originally establish COPE, the decision to accept the group as a regional affiliate proved, in the short term, detrimental in its efforts to pursue its objectives. The resultant decline in the unity of the membership and pressure on the leadership marked the beginning of what was perhaps the most difficult period in the history of ITC.

The ITC leadership organized a second type of group, those that sought to achieve objectives of national concern, including the constitutional entrenchment of "aboriginal rights." Created at the annual general assembly of ITC in 1979, the Inuit Committee on National Issues (ICNI) represents all of the Inuit in Canada. Members of the group consist of a representative from each of the six regional associations, the president of ITC and the Inuit Women's Association, and two members elected at large by the annual general assembly of ITC. The ICNI aimed to secure the framework for native self-government under the Canadian Constitution. The decision by ITC to create the group assisted in the entrenchment of "existing aboriginal and treaty rights" when the Constitution was repatriated.¹⁴⁶

Hence the "division of labour" among affiliated organizations and more nationally oriented groups was a positive leadership decision. Organizing the Inuit umbrella group in this manner allowed each of the organizations to pursue fewer objectives with more resources. As illustrated above, ITC retains some control over the organizations it has formed as a member of boards of directors and various committees. In this way it has delegated responsibilities while retaining decision making on national issues.

¹⁴⁵Duffy, *Road To Nunavut*, 239. It should be noted that COPE has since been re-accepted as a regional affiliate.

¹⁴⁶"Rights of Aboriginal Peoples of Canada," *Constitution Act*, 1982, cited in Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, *Aboriginal Self-Government and Constitutional Reform: Setbacks, Opportunities, and Arctic Experiences* (Ottawa: Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, 1988), 140.

c. External Relations

In this section the functions and activities of leaders and members of ITC in their dealings with circumstances and actors outside of the group will be studied. These components influence the group's effectiveness in realizing its objectives, and together are referred to as "external relations," with three components of "political environment," "access," and "communication with external actors."

i. Political Environment

Certain laws exist by which interest groups operate. In Canada, the most fundamental is "freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication . . . freedom of peaceful assembly; and . . . freedom of association."¹⁴⁷ While this legal framework outlines the guarantee of the existence and basic rights of interest groups, other laws govern some of the other behaviour of interest groups, such as lobbying. Other aspects of the legal environment are laws regarding tax-exempt status of interest groups. The ITC, and other interest groups in Canada, operates under these and other legal parameters.

One of the political characteristics of particular relevance to ITC has been the geographical distribution of its constituency. The fact that Inuit communities are located in the Northwest Territories, Northern Quebec, and Labrador, has involved ITC in attempts to influence national, provincial and territorial decisions on behalf of its constituency. For example, in dealing with the issue of Nunavut it has become necessary for ITC to involve both the territorial and federal governments.

In a discussion of the political context in which operates the ITC, it is critical to include a look at the situation in the Northwest Territories. The process of political devolution to the north has involved attempts to realize a division of the territories and

¹⁴⁷"Fundamental Freedoms," *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, 1981.

to achieve either provincial status or some other independent governmental structure than that currently existing in the N.W.T. This process is a complicated endeavour which must also integrate "a transfer of control over northern resources to the territorial governments with the accommodation of separate aboriginal demands for autonomy."¹⁴⁸ The consequences of the Nunavut settlement initialled in April 1990 will affect the nature of future development in the North. For example, the AIP includes decisions regarding control and management over land, measures which affect directly the direction of economic development.

A major component of ITC's political environment has been the federal government. Beginning in the early 1970s, the approach and degree of responsiveness of the federal government towards such issues as indigenous land claims and self-government have been critical to the ITC's advancement towards these goals. In 1973, for example, the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development announced a new government policy with respect to Indian and Inuit land claims, signalling a willingness to negotiate with native groups.¹⁴⁹ Another example is the announcement by the federal government of approval in principle for the creation of Nunavut in November, 1982. After the territorial plebiscite of 1982 Ottawa stated its support for ITC's proposal, but on the condition that land claims in the NWT be settled before the NWT was divided, and that the distribution of power and responsibility among regional and territorial governments be agreed on. Both of these cases show that federal approaches and decisions had impacts on the effectiveness of the ITC in pursuing its goals.

Another factor in the ITC's political environment is the international dimension. On the international level numerous organizations exist that have assisted ITC in

¹⁴⁸Ibid.

¹⁴⁹Graham and McAllister, *Inuit Land Claim*, 3.

dealing with its objectives. For example, the ICC, mentioned above, is active in the work of the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations, which "is charged to draft principles addressing indigenous human rights."¹⁵⁰

Finally, relations between ITC and other native groups in Canada are part of the general political setting with which the group must deal. For example, in attempts to establish the boundary between Nunavut and Denendeh, the ITC has negotiated with the Dene/Métis.

ii. Access

A second component to be dealt with concerning external relations is that of access to points of decision making. General access points at the federal level comprise the government bureaucracy, Members of Parliament and the federal Cabinet.

Given these points of access in the Canadian political system, it remains to examine which of these the ITC has targeted as relevant to its particular goals, and how the group attempted to influence those points of access. One example indicates that the group realized early on that access to the federal government was crucial to the effectiveness of the group. In the fall of 1971, the ITC opened an office in Edmonton, Alberta, from which it intended to operate. A short time later the group decided that a national headquarters in Ottawa would be more appropriate and provide "closer communication and better access to the Federal Government."¹⁵¹ The next three years were primarily organizational; that is, the ITC spent most of its effort in setting up its head office, establishing communications with northern Inuit communities, prioritizing objectives and building links with government agencies.

But relocating was only the beginning of ITC's growing awareness of the need to lobby the decision-making process. Since the late 1970s the ITC actively has sought

¹⁵⁰Dale Sambo, "The Arctic North: Report on Critical Issues in the Arctic," in *IWGIA Document No. 62: Critical Issues in Native North America*, no. 62 (December 1988/January 1989), 186.

¹⁵¹"Inuit Tapirisat of Canada's History," *ITC: Annual Report, 1973-74*, 3.

access to the N.W.T. Legislative Assembly. A new N.W.T. Council in the Legislative Assembly was elected in October 1979, comprising the first native majority in the territorial government. The ITC "convinced the 9th N.W.T. legislative council to support a plebiscite on [territorial] division . . ."¹⁵² Shortly thereafter, the Nunavut Constitutional Forum was established through which the ITC began to work on constitutional change.

At the federal level ITC also has been actively pursuing access to the policy-making process, and has realized some important successes. For example the first MP in the N.W.T. riding of Nunatsiak, Peter Ittinuar, was an Inuk who won the seat for the New Democratic Party in the general election of 1979.¹⁵³ He represented his constituency at the federal level and consistently dealt with the government in the interests of Inuit and the ITC. Under the auspices of the ICNI, Ittinuar, along with other noted leaders of Inuit groups including Charlie Watt and Mary Sillett, met with Prime Minister Trudeau in June, 1982, to discuss the agenda for the approaching First Ministers Conference. The meeting was successful as the

Prime Minister indicated his support for many of the agenda items ICNI proposed and made it clear that the agenda for the First Minister's Conference [would] deal both with specific issues relating to Inuit, Métis and Indian interests and those issues which [were] common to all aboriginal groups.¹⁵⁴

Ittinuar remained active in the pursuit of constitutional entrenchment of native rights in the 1980s, and continued to lobby the federal government.

Another area that could be designated an access point is at the international level. The ITC has been involved with Inuit Circumpolar Conference since the ICC

¹⁵²Merrett et al. *Nunavut*, 27.

¹⁵³Peter Ittinuar was the first Inuk in Canadian history to become a Member of Parliament.

¹⁵⁴"Inuit Committee on National Issues," *ITC: Annual Report*, 1982-83, 5.

was founded.¹⁵⁵ Support by this group has been beneficial in lobbying the government to deal with the concept of aboriginal rights, a major issue for ICC.

iii. Communication with External Actors

Being effective in communicating to individuals and organizations outside of the organization for the purpose of garnering broader public support is another important element of ITC's external relations. These efforts have been directed at that part of the public who may not be familiar with the situation of Inuit in Canada or aware of their aspirations.

From the beginning the ITC realized its importance in helping "make southern Canada more familiar with the Inuit, their aims and plans for the future."¹⁵⁶ As part of their communications efforts, the ITC produced radio programs of ITC activities, provided various materials for CBC Northern Service (radio and television) and sent news releases and public statements to southern newspapers. To promote the group's aims in more detail, ITC produced documentary films, the first of which was entitled *Nunavut*, which was specifically "designed to promote Inuit Land Claims in southern Canada."¹⁵⁷ A second, called *Nunatsiaq - The Good Land*, was completed in 1977 and was viewed by an estimated 300,000 Canadians on television. The film continued to be aired in subsequent years, bringing the total audience to an estimated 1.5 million people. In addition to television viewers, the film was seen also in many locations, including schools, clubs and universities in Canada, the United States, and Europe.

¹⁵⁵In 1986 a Canadian Inuk, Mary Simon, was elected President of the ICC, a position which she has retained to the present. Presidents are elected at the ICC's triennial General Assemblies, for a period of three years.

¹⁵⁶"Information and Public Relations," *ITC: Annual Report*, 1974-75, 10.

¹⁵⁷*Ibid.*, 11.

At various times throughout its history, ITC officers and staff members travelled across the country to gain southern support. For example, in March 1976, various members of the staff travelled across Canada making personal appearances and presentations during Native Land Settlement Week. In another instance, the director of Land Claims for the N.W.T., John Amagoalik, undertook a cross-country tour of Canadian Clubs in western Canada. In late 1977, Amagoalik travelled for two weeks to twelve cities from Victoria to Winnipeg. This effort resulted in substantial publicity for the ITC.¹⁵⁸

That the ITC sought the support of the public for its goals is clear, but it also attempted to "to create a climate of acceptance and understanding in southern Canada, so the *politicians* . . . [could] be persuaded to recognize the rights of the Inuit to run their own affairs."¹⁵⁹ One of the ways in which the ITC has tried to influence federal actors is by undertaking comprehensive research projects to support some of its aims. For example, in the early 1970s, the group hired a researcher to direct a project exploring traditional Inuit land use and occupancy in the Northwest Territories.¹⁶⁰ The Land Use and Occupancy Study provided the group with a large source of legal and environmental information that ITC presented to government spokespersons, such as past Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs, Warren Allmand,¹⁶¹ as the basis for the group's Nunavut land claim.

¹⁵⁸Mr. Amagoalik undertook this tour "as a major effort to gain southern support for the Inuit cause." "Information and Public Relations," *ITC, Annual Report*, 1977-78, 15.

¹⁵⁹Italics mine. "Information and Public Relations," *ITC: Annual Report*, 1974-75, 11.

¹⁶⁰Milton Freeman Research, *Inuit Land Use and Occupancy Project: Report* (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1976).

¹⁶¹"Land Use-Occupancy Study Presented to Indian-Northern Affairs Minister," *ITC News* (October 1976), 2-3.

iv. Financial Resources

A final criterion to be considered in this case is the monetary resources of the ITC. The financial means available to a group is always a necessary, but not sufficient, factor in determining a group's effectiveness.¹⁶²

In the late 1960's the federal government reviewed "its responsibilities for Indian matters," which led to the decision to fund native associations "to enable them to conduct research into Indian treaties and rights."¹⁶³ By late 1973, the Minister of DIAND issued a new policy regarding the claims of Indians and Inuit people, showing that it would be willing to negotiate with native organizations concerning land claims. Under these auspices, the ITC received its initial funding from the federal government. Finances for the group were divided into two broad categories: the core operating costs of the group, and projects undertaken by ITC. The former comprises the actual operating costs of ITC's office, including such things as staff salaries, while the latter consists of projects involving environmental, legal, communications and other issues.

In the 1974-75 fiscal year, ITC was receiving approximately half a million dollars for each of these two general areas.¹⁶⁴ Most of the funding in this latter category went to the land claims project, which received almost \$368,000, an indication of the effort put into this project by the ITC. By the end of the decade, money received for ITC's land claims had increased to more than the total budget for ITC projects, which had more than doubled to approximately \$1.2 million, while money received for core operations remained virtually unchanged.¹⁶⁵ By the late

¹⁶² LaPalombara, *Politics Within Nations*, 362.

¹⁶³ Graham and McAllister, *Inuit Land Claim*, 3.

¹⁶⁴ "Secretary Treasurer's Report," *ITC: Annual Report*, 1974-75, 3.

¹⁶⁵ "Secretary Treasurer's Report," *ITC: Annual Report*, 1979-80, 36.

1980s, ITC received approximately \$745,000 for its core operations, and over \$500,000 for its projects. As the jurisdiction for the land claims project had been transferred to the TFN, the ITC no longer provided funding for the project.

One of the things ITC has been critical of since the group began receiving funding from the federal government is that it has been inadequate to meet the needs of the group. For example, the costs to ensure good communication with a constituency extending across the Canadian North have been high. Costs have been incurred by the ITC in dealing with various unforeseen issues, such as the Baker Lake court case. This led the ITC to begin fund-raising efforts. For example, in 1983 the group created The Arctic Society. Its mandate is to promote greater public understanding of Inuit in Canada and to encourage funding of ITC's work. The Arctic Society has proven beneficial to the group in that it has been successful in securing funding for specific projects.¹⁶⁶ In addition to this, the ITC has been involved in corporate fundraising campaigns.¹⁶⁷ These fundraising attempts attest to ITC's continuing efforts to seek financial support other than from the federal government.

There have been occasions when the ITC has experienced serious financial difficulties and has had to make some hard decisions regarding the organization and future activities. For example, in 1977-78 ITC encountered considerable "financial strain," and was obliged to "cut down the size of the staff, and . . . [to] move its office to a new location where the rent . . . [was] considerably lower . . . [The] regional affiliated organizations . . . [were] having the same difficulties."¹⁶⁸ During this

¹⁶⁶See "Fundraising and the Formation of the Arctic Society," *ITC: Annual Report*, 1984-85, 11, and "Fundraising Report," *ITC: Annual Report*, 1985-86, 16.

¹⁶⁷For example, in 1986, the group contacted over one hundred corporations and foundations and was able to raise \$85,000. "Fundraising," *ITC: Annual Report*, 1986-87, 15.

¹⁶⁸"President's Report," *ITC: Annual Report*, 1977-78, 2.

period, the group was also unable to launch new projects, and some existing program activities, for example at the ICI, had to be suspended for several months. Federal financial support diminished further in 1979, and as noted previously, production of *Inuit Today* fell by half in the 1979/80 fiscal year.¹⁶⁹

The deteriorating financial situation was a major contributing factor in ITC's decision to establish the Tungavik Federation of Nunavut. This decision proved to be beneficial, as the financial situation of the group in terms of its other projects improved, and the financial conditions of the TFN were clarified, streamlined, and put to better use.

The importance of the financial resources the ITC owned, controlled, or could mobilize cannot be underestimated. Over its twenty-year history the group has been, by and large, successful at raising money. But the fact that the group relied overwhelmingly on governmental support has caused ITC some difficulties. For example, the situation at present is suffering from this fact. Government cutbacks at the end of the 1980s have resulted in a deficit situation for the group, and has put stress on the administration's abilities to cope with the requirements of the organization. However, even when financial times were difficult, ITC made decisions to reorganize, cut back on some programs and managed to survive and carry out its major objectives.

vi. Conclusion

The analytical framework developed in Chapter II has demonstrated that ITC has many qualities of a successful organization. But what are the attributes of ITC that specifically were instrumental in advancing the group's objectives?

¹⁶⁹"Inuit Today," *ITC: Annual Report*, 1980-81, 20-21.

First, the leadership of ITC has been crucial. Leaders of the organization were able to identify objectives successfully from the start. They organized the group in a decentralized manner and created regional associations to achieve better communication with the Inuit communities in the North, and to provide an opportunity for Inuit to have substantive input in the group. The leaders of the ITC were also able to reevaluate the group's objectives when the ITC was criticized for spending too much time and attention on regional concerns. The leadership's stability was also a factor to their benefit. It meant that long-term relationships could be established at different access points in the government, and increased the legitimacy with which the leadership was regarded.

Second, the degree of internal cohesion of the group, which has remained relatively high throughout its history, has been an important contributing factor to the group's effectiveness. The ITC ensured good representation of regional concerns in the national body, and a decentralized decision-making structure, features which tended to enhance the unity of purpose of the group.

Third, the group's communications strategy has been important in the achievement of its goals. Internally, the ITC made attempts to enhance the Inuit language and culture by producing *Inuit Today*, while externally the group launched campaigns to educate the public regarding issues of concern to the Inuit. Support from the general public increased the legitimacy and influence of ITC.

Finally, while the political environment in which the ITC has had to deal is complex, the group has been able to achieve access to crucial areas at both territorial and federal levels. Also, financial support has remained a difficult issue to resolve, but the group has been able to adjust its organization and priorities adequately to carry out its activities.

Aside from these positive attributes, some aspects of the ITC remained problematic throughout its history. First is the large geographical base of the group's constituents. The group did make inroads in establishing and maintaining communication with Inuit communities, but it has not been completely effective in involving the communities in decision making. Inuit in the different regions have for years criticized the group for being too distant from them. The leadership of the ITC has been often concerned with this issue, a recent expression of which was the statement by Rhoda Innuksuk, (president of the ITC at the end of the 1980's) that the organization needed restructuring in order to allow those "at the community level . . . greater opportunity . . . to voice their views and to become actively involved in the decision-making processes that affect their lives and future."¹⁷⁰ It is likely to remain a continuing concern for the ITC.

Of course, the materialization of success lies in relative change in government policy. The ITC did indeed receive some important commitments from the government. After it decided to establish a Land Claims negotiating body separate from the main group itself, this new group, the TFN, signed three agreements-in-principle with the federal government. The first dealt with "the use and administration of local municipal land, another to ensure that an equitable number of Inuit [would] be hired in regional government capacities, and a third dealing with the priorities and goals related to land use planning in Nunavut."¹⁷¹ Furthermore, the ITC was instrumental in entrenching "aboriginal rights" in the repatriation of the Constitution.

The most significant federal action, however, in support of the Inuit Land Claims was taken when it signed the Agreement-in-Principle with Inuit representatives in May, 1990. This agreement, though not legally binding the government to any

¹⁷⁰-The President's Report," *ITC: Annual Report*, 1987-88, 4.

¹⁷¹"Tungavik Federation of Nunavut," *ITC: Annual Report*, 1984-85, 6

action, is nevertheless an important accomplishment. To make the agreement binding, the agreement must be ratified, a process which the Inuit negotiators for the land claims have already begun.

CHAPTER IV: A CASE STUDY OF THE ASSOCIATION OF NORTHERN NATIVE PEOPLES

i. Introduction

The main purpose of this chapter is to use the analytical framework to assess the prospects of the ANNP. Before applying this framework, however, some background information is provided on the northern indigenous groups of the USSR. The point of this is to give some appreciation of the socio-economic and cultural development of these peoples in both historical and contemporary terms. This overview will identify some of the main reasons why these people have legitimate grievances against the state. From this discussion, it will become clear why an interest group was created to act on behalf of the northern native peoples.

ii. Historical Background of Native Peoples in the Soviet Union

The population of the 26 northern native peoples is almost 182,000 people¹⁷² and resides almost entirely in the northern regions of the Soviet Union. The "Soviet North" is an area defined according to climate, the level of economic development, the distance from more densely populated areas, and a low population density (less than five persons per km²). This puts the southern boundary of the area at approximately lat. 60° N in the northwestern region of the USSR, dropping down across Siberia and the Far East to approximately 50° N at the Pacific seaboard¹⁷³ (see Map 1). As the Soviet North is completely within the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic

¹⁷²*Osnovnye Pokazateli Razvitiya Ekonomiki i Kul'tury Malochislennykh Narodov Severa (1980-1989 gody)* [Basic Indexes of the Economic and Cultural Development of the Numerically Small Peoples of the North (1980-1989)]. (Moscow, USSR: State Statistics of the RSFSR, 1990), 5. (Henceforth this document will be referred to as *Osnovnye Pokazateli*.)

¹⁷³Armstrong, Rogers and Rowley, *Circumpolar North*, 21-22.

MAP 1. Administrative divisions in the Soviet North adapted from maps in *Circumpolar North* (Armstrong, Rogers and Rowley, 1978) and *Siberia Today and Tomorrow* (Coady, 1975). The boundary for this region corresponds to Slavin's definition of the Soviet North.

(RSFSR), the overwhelming majority of the northern indigenous peoples in the Soviet Union inhabit the RSFSR.¹⁷⁴

The topography of the Soviet North is divided into two immense areas known as the *tundra* and the *taiga*. The almost treeless tundra consists of permanently frozen (permafrost) subsoil. The climate of the tundra region is characterized by short, cool summers and long, cold winters with severe winds. The tundra has enough flora such as lichen, moss and occasional shrubs to support reindeer and musk-ox; and its abundant rivers teem with fish.¹⁷⁵ The tundra extends to the edge of the tree-line where the taiga starts.

The taiga comprises a massive coniferous forest that extends for thousands of kilometers across Siberia and the Far East. The forest lies mainly within the zone of sporadic permafrost, consists of scattered bog and marshes, and extends south to the edge of the Siberian steppe (plain). The climate of the taiga is noted for its harsh winters and short, warm summers. As in the tundra, the forest has many rivers that abound with fish, but unlike this region, the taiga has considerably more bountiful vegetation and wildlife.¹⁷⁶

The way of life of the northern indigenous peoples has been largely dictated by their immediate environment. The tundra, for example, is the native dwelling place of the reindeer, whose natural fodder is moss and lichen. Reindeer breeders in the tundra, such as the Dolgans and Entsyt, traditionally base their economy on the reindeer, and use them as a source of food, clothing and, when domesticated, transport. Tending

¹⁷⁴*Osnovnye Pokazateli*, 1990, p. 5. In 1989, more than 91 percent of each aboriginal group was located on the territory of the RSFSR, ranging from a low of 91.6 percent for the Chuvans to a high of 99.5 percent for the Chukchi.

¹⁷⁵Uvachan, *Put' Narodov Severa k Sotsializmu*, 10-11.

¹⁷⁶The Soviet North has three very large rivers (the Ob, Yenisei and Lena) and numerous smaller ones (Pechora, Khatanga, Anabar, Olenek, Indarka and Kolyma). See Michael Marsden, "Arctic Contrasts: Canada and Russia in the Far North," *International Journal* 14, no. 1 (Winter, 1958-59): 35.

reindeer required a constant search for pasture land, so traditionally reindeer breeders led a nomadic way of life. While some peoples depended solely on reindeer for their sustenance, others moved south with their herds to the taiga in the summer, where they hunted fur-bearing animals and fowl, and fished in the rivers to complement their principal activity.

In contrast, some native peoples pursued activities such as hunting or fishing as their main occupation, while practising reindeer-breeding as a supplemental activity. In areas encompassing both forest *and* tundra, native peoples such as the Evenks and Kets relied on hunting, from which they developed unique customs and traditions, while maintaining reindeer-breeding and fishing as subsidiary activities. Indigenous inhabitants of coastal areas in the northernmost regions of the Soviet North, such as the Nenets, hunted sea-mammals for their sustenance. Many of the natives who undertook these various traditional activities were nomadic.¹⁷⁷

Scattered across an expanse that is twice the area of arctic Canada,¹⁷⁸ these northern peoples, while pursuing traditional activities, were culturally distinct. Each native community occupied specific territory for hunting, fishing and grazing, which was defended from incursions by other native groups (or other clans within their own native group). Trading took place between some of the indigenous peoples, such as the Khanti and Mansi, and consequently their cultures intermingled. However, other native peoples, such as the Chukchi, were more hostile to external groups. The Chukchi, who inhabit the Chukotka peninsula on the Pacific seaboard, were said to be the "most warlike people of northern Siberia."¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁷Uvachan, *Put' Narodov Severa k Sotsializmu*, 29-30.

¹⁷⁸Marsden, "Arctic Contrasts," 33.

¹⁷⁹Terence Armstrong, *The Russians in the Arctic: Aspects of Soviet Exploration and Exploitation of the Far North, 1937-57* (London: Methuen and Co, 1958), 112. For another example of warring

Contact between northern indigenous peoples and ethnic Russians may have first occurred as early as the eleventh century.¹⁸⁰ Ethnic Russians initially began to settle in the North, west of the Ural Mountains, because of an abundance of fur-bearing animals in the area. Intensive harvesting of these animals depleted their numbers and led the Russians to search for new hunting grounds further east; and in the sixteenth century they entered Siberia. Under the patronage of the Tsars, they rapidly developed a dominant position over the northern indigenous peoples. While these early explorers and traders were initially vastly outnumbered, they were able to establish local superiority over the natives with relative ease, primarily because the native populations were widely scattered over vast areas, and were unfamiliar with firearms.¹⁸¹ Incoming Russians quickly organized strongholds (usually near rivers) that served both as administrative centres and military outposts. They instituted a system which used northern native rulers as agents in the collection of a fur tax (called *yasak*), which was "exactd as a symbol of submission to the Russian Government."¹⁸² But often the indigenous populations, wanting to distance themselves as much as possible from the incomers and their *yasak*, retreated to even more remote areas of the massive region.

behaviour among native peoples, specifically the Yukagirs, see Graburn and Strong, *Circumpolar Peoples*, 38-49.

¹⁸⁰At least one author believes that there is indirect evidence that Slavs first journeyed to the North before the tenth century. Terence Armstrong speculates that contact between Slavs and northern indigenous peoples must have occurred around this time, although no definitive signs have been discovered. For further discussion see Terence Armstrong, *Russian Settlement in the North* (Cambridge: Syndics of the Cambridge University Press, 1965), 9-10.

¹⁸¹It should be noted that in some areas native resistance to the foreigners was fierce and protracted. The Chukchi, for example, were openly resistant to incoming Russians until the mid seventeenth century. Even after Russians began to settle in the region, the Chukchi remained hostile.

¹⁸²Violet Conolly, *Beyond the Urals: Economic Developments in Soviet Asia* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 5.

By the seventeenth century fur had become the central government's principal source of foreign currency.¹⁸³ Although fur tribute was extracted, the fact was that there were "too few Russians in this vast expanse of territory to impose a heavy yoke on the widely scattered natives."¹⁸⁴ Where Russian settlements emerged, the indigenous population often retreated, maintaining their traditional forms of activity. When they did remain close to new settlements, however, contact resulted in numerous transformations.

The contact between Russians and natives introduced guns, bullets, tea, alcohol and other goods to the native peoples. While official policies towards the indigenous peoples included the collection of *yasak*, in general the state did not want its representatives to interfere with native customs and affairs. Officials were encouraged to treat native peoples with respect, and even learn native practices. These policies were not, however, followed by local administrators, who used their position over the indigenous peoples to their own advantage. For example, local officials sometimes forcibly baptized natives and enslaved or made serfs out of them. In fact, "by the beginning of the eighteenth century it was possible to own lawfully native serfs or slaves."¹⁸⁵

Intensive hunting of fur-bearing animals, a decline in the European market for furs, and opening trade links with China at the turn of the eighteenth century caused additional hardships for the natives.¹⁸⁶ It diverted trade away from fur and towards other commodities, making the payment of *yasak* increasingly difficult. Consequently,

¹⁸³Armstrong, *Russian Settlement in the North*, 60. Armstrong also states that in 1605 approximately 11 percent of the state's total revenue was drawn from fur.

¹⁸⁴Armstrong, *Russians in the Arctic*, 114.

¹⁸⁵Philip Lineton, "Soviet Nationality Policy in North Western Siberia: An Historical Perspective," *Development and Change* 9 (1978): 90.

¹⁸⁶Russia and China signed the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689. It established the frontier and "regulated relations" between the two countries. See Armstrong, *Russian Settlement in the North*, 62.

natives found it much more difficult to purchase trade goods (including vodka) upon which they had grown dependent. And as the Russian population in the area grew, the position of native peoples steadily declined.

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the situation of the northern indigenous peoples worsened. The central government turned its attention from the fur trade in the north to the development of agriculture in the south. The government maintained the fur tax, despite the drastic depletion of fur-bearing animals in the region.¹⁸⁷ Incoming Russian merchants gained increasing control over local trade with the natives, regulating price and availability of goods. Exposure to alcohol, disease (such as tuberculosis) and hunger further worsened their situation.¹⁸⁸

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the northern indigenous peoples were in a weakened state. While those who had retreated to isolated areas of the north were not unduly affected by contact with the Russians over the centuries, those that remained near Russian settlements were materially dependent on Russian trade goods, which they could little afford. Disease had brought about a decline in the native population and alcoholism was on the increase.

Such were the circumstances of the indigenous peoples of the Soviet North prior to the establishment of the Soviet regime. While there were significant influences on the natives prior to the establishment of the Soviet regime, large segments of these populations remained isolated from these disturbances by retreating to the many remote areas of the region. The Bolshevik Revolution and the establishment of the Soviet government marked the beginning of a major shift in the policy of the central

¹⁸⁷It should be noted that a Commission set up in 1763 permitted natives to pay tribute to the state, subject to certain conditions, in money and not fur. See *Ibid.*, 64-65.

¹⁸⁸For an account of tsarist relations with native peoples, see Armstrong, *Russian Settlement in the North*, Parts I and II.

government towards the natives, and began a fundamental reorganization of their way of life.

The new Soviet regime was quick to establish its policy towards different nationalities. Lenin drew up guidelines for a nationality policy that posited that there could be no free peoples which oppresses other peoples.¹⁸⁹ The "Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia," announced the equality of all peoples and the right of national minorities to "free development."¹⁹⁰ The new state proclaimed the end of exploitation of minorities, the equality of their languages and cultures and promised social and economic development.

In ideological terms, Lenin developed a policy based on concepts developed by Marx and Engels which stated that the progression directly from the pre-capitalist stage of development (a patriarchal or feudal social order) towards socialism was possible when the intermediate stage of capitalism was bypassed. Known as the non-capitalist road of development, Lenin's programme constituted the foundation of the nationalities policy towards peoples who were "backward," or not industrialized. In this theory, the northern indigenous peoples were considered not even to have evolved to the feudal stage of social development.

The Bolshevik regime viewed the indigenous people in the Soviet North as being among the most economically, politically, and culturally backward in the Soviet Union. They had no industry or working class which could become "the driving force" of a new socialist society. Native occupations, many of them nomadic, were difficult to modernize, a necessary goal for the construction of socialism. Hence, new means in

¹⁸⁹Kerstin Eidlitz Kuoljok, *The Revolution in the North: Soviet Ethnography and Nationality Policy*, Uppsala Research Report in Cultural Anthropology, 1, trans. T. J. M. Gray and N. Tomkinson (Uppsala, Sweden, n.p., 1985), 32.

¹⁹⁰Vladimir Ul'yanov (Lenin) and Iosif Dzhugashvili Stalin, *Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia*, November 1917 cited in Armstrong, *Russian Settlement in the North*, 192. As the first Commissar of Nationalities, Stalin was responsible for the implementation of this decree.

the non-capitalist road of development were necessary. As a first step in this development, the northern native peoples were combined into a special group in 1925, called "the small peoples of the North," and began to be treated as a unit.¹⁹¹

The industrialization of the Soviet North was to serve as the key foundation block for the development of northern natives. This would change the native economies to socialist forms by modernizing the means of production (replacing old instruments and tools for new ones and training natives to use them) and changing the native social structure, based on the clan, into socialist forms.

After the end of the civil war and the defeat of the last open resistance in the Soviet North, a committee was created by the Bolshevik government specifically to deal with the native peoples. A Committee of the North,¹⁹² was established in 1924 to "promote the economic development, cultural growth and political re-education of the . . . [northern indigenous peoples] and to supply the area with consumer and producer goods. . . ." ¹⁹³ As an executive body, the Committee of the North came to influence much of the material conditions of life for the natives and maintained the major responsibility for administration, education, medical and cultural services until 1935, when it was disbanded. Initially the Committee of the North established settlements from which social services, such as schools, hospitals and cinemas could be provided to the native peoples. The Committee also established state stores and cooperatives where goods were sold to natives, and where the state purchased furs and

¹⁹¹In 1925 the Central Executive Committee of the USSR and the Council of People's Commissars issued a decree that united the 26 northern indigenous peoples into a special group designated Small Peoples of the North. See Pika and Prokhorov, "Bol'shie problemy mal'kikh narodov," 76.

¹⁹²This committee was officially entitled the "Committee of Assistance to the Peoples of the Northern Borderlands," but became known simply as the Committee of the North. See M. A. Sergeyev, "The Building of Socialism among the Peoples of Northern Siberia and the Soviet Far East," in M. G. Levin and L. P. Potapov (eds.), *The Peoples of Siberia*, (Detroit: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 487-510.

¹⁹³Constantine Krypton, *The Northern Sea Route and the Economy of the Soviet North* (London: Methuen & Co, 1956), 2.

fish from natives at high prices. Such centres, known as *kult bazi* (literally, "cultural bases"), were intended to educate the local population in socialist practices.¹⁹⁴

The goal of educating the natives was particularly important to the new regime. During the 1920s and 1930s, Soviet scholars began to develop script for native languages. Initially based on a modified Roman alphabet, a change in Soviet policy in the mid-1930s required that the Cyrillic alphabet be used. This step was justified as "facilitating the learning of Russian as a second language by people whose native language was not Russian."¹⁹⁵ Books were soon provided for instruction of natives in their own languages and in Russian, natives began to receive training to become teachers, and schools were built.

As many native peoples were nomadic, boarding schools were preferred by the Soviet authorities. This meant that parents were separated from their children for long periods, which differed greatly from the traditional teaching methods used by native parents, and which aroused parents' resentment and suspicion.¹⁹⁶

The Committee of the North also had the task of establishing organizations to carry out political education in the North. To this end it set up the Red Tents which sought out the nomads. They provided the same kind of functions as the *kult bazi*. The Red Tents were instruments of Soviet propaganda, disseminating information among the northern indigenous peoples and assisting local Soviet organizations in the implementation of economic and political measures in the North.

¹⁹⁴Lineton, "Soviet Nationality Policy," 93-94.

¹⁹⁵Barbara A. Anderson and Brian D. Silver, "Equality, Efficiency, and Politics in Soviet Bilingual Education Policy, 1934-1980," *The American Political Science Review* 78, no. 4 (December 1984): 1021.

¹⁹⁶Violet Conolly, *Siberia Today and Tomorrow: A Study of Economic Resources, Problems and Achievements* (London: Collins, 1975), 186.

Another measure taken by the new regime to reorganize native life was the creation of native political institutions in the 1920's and 1930's. To this end new administrative units were established. The first National *Okrug* (or national district) was created for the Nenets people in 1929. Many of the smaller groups making up the northern indigenous peoples were assigned not only National *Okrugs*, but also National *Rayons* and National Local Soviets. More "advanced" native groups (who were not classified as Small Peoples of the North) were assigned autonomous republics (ASSR).¹⁹⁷ The purpose of these administrative units was to bring "Soviet power into closer contact with the native population and [allow] the state to assess more accurately their economic and cultural needs."¹⁹⁸ The local soviets were responsible for informing the people about measures adopted by the Soviet regime and the CPSU, for conveying news of events in the Soviet Union in general, and for familiarizing the local population with Soviet law. They also disseminated information for education and public health and directed cultural work. In addition to this, national *okrugs* were to "prepare mass cadres for Soviet, party and cooperative organizations."¹⁹⁹ Because the divisions were territorial, not all the members of a particular people were necessarily included in one administrative area. These units were granted a degree of local autonomy, and were allowed to elect their own representatives to local government organs. They were permitted to send delegates to the Soviet of Nationalities, part of the supreme legislative body of the Soviet Union.

¹⁹⁷One of the largest native groups in the north, the Yakuty, saw their region obtain the status of Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (or ASSR) in 1922.

¹⁹⁸S. S. Savoskul, "Social and Cultural Dynamics of the Peoples of the Soviet North," *Polar Record* 19, no. 119 (May 1978): 132. Translated by Terence Armstrong.

¹⁹⁹Savoskul, "Social and Cultural Dynamics," 133.

Soviet efforts at assimilating native peoples have had noticeable impacts. A comparison of the statistics in Table 1 shows a dramatic decline in the number of indigenous people who consider the language of their group to be their native tongue. These statistics also show the powerful influence of Russian, the use of which has become pervasive among the native peoples. Even in the case of one of the larger northern native groups such as the Nanais (with a population of 11 877 - see Table 2), the percentage who consider Russian to be their native language (55.3) is greater than those who regard the language of their group to be their native tongue (44.1). Among one of the smaller native groups like the Orochi (883), the situation is even more pronounced. Only 17.8% of the Orochi consider the language of their group to be their native tongue, while 81.0% consider Russian their first language.

The most profound alterations in the lives of the northern native peoples were introduced by reorganizing native economies, begun in the late 1920s. The Soviet regime considered traditional native economic activities "as a manifestation of human weakness and helplessness in the struggle for existence."²⁰⁰ It desired to collectivize traditional native activities and settle nomads in order to "rationalize" the economy and expose indigenous people to socialist practices.

The first attempts at collectivization in the Soviet North began in 1929. While in theory collectivization was voluntary, in practice it frequently was imposed forcibly. Native people were hastily gathered together in areas often distant from their traditional hunting, fishing and pasture lands. Collective farms (*kolkhozes*) united members of different clans and tribes into single communities. They encouraged hostility towards the "wealthier" natives (for instance, reindeer-breeders with large herds), who were more reluctant to undergo collectivization than poorer ones. The regime also promoted the development of other non-traditional industries on *kolkhozes* such as dairy farming.

²⁰⁰Eidlitz Kuoljok, *Revolution in the North*, 107.

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Table 1. Language Statistics of the Northern Native Peoples.

Northern Peoples	Percentage who consider the language of the group to be their native language.			Percentage of those in 1989 who consider the Russian language to be their native language.
	1959	1970	1989	1989
Aleuts	55.9	-	25.3	72.2
Chukchi	93.9	82.6	70.4	28.3
Chuvans	-	46.2	18.5	71.2
Dolgans	93.9	89.8	84.1	15.2
Entsy	-	-	46.5	37.9
Eskimos	84.0	-	51.6	45.9
Evenks	55.9	71.4	29.5	29.1
Evens	81.4	56.0	43.8	27.4
'tel'mens	36.0	35.7	18.8	80.2
Kets	77.1	74.9	48.8	49.4
Khanti	77.0	68.9	60.8	38.5
Koryaks	90.5	81.1	52.4	46.8
Mansi	59.2	52.4	36.7	62.6
Nanais	86.3	69.1	44.1	55.3
Negidals	-	61.8	26.6	69.5
Nenets	84.7	83.4	77.7	17.6
Nganasans	93.4	75.4	83.4	15.3
Nivkhi	76.3	49.5	23.3	76.2
Orochi	68.4	48.6	17.8	81.0
Oroks	28	15.6	44.7	54.2
Saami	-	-	42.0	56.8
Sel'kups	50.6	51.1	47.7	50.6
Tofalars	-	-	42.8	55.5
Udegeys	73.7	54.5	24.3	68.1
Ul'chi	84.9	60.8	30.8	66.5
Yukagirs	52.5	46.8	32.0	45.9

Source: *Osnovnye Pokazateli Razvitiya Ekonomiki i Kul'tury Malochislennykh Narodov (1980-1989)* [Principle Indices of the Economic and Cultural Development of the Numerically Small Peoples of the North], (Moscow, 1990), 13. See also *Soviet Census 1970*, cited in Conolly, *Siberia Today and Tomorrow*, 192.

Table 2. The Northern Native Peoples and their populations in the RSFSR, in 1989.

Northern Peoples	1989
Aleuts	644
Chukchi	15 106
Chuvans	1 384
Dolgans	6 571
Entsy	198
Eskimos	1 703
Evenks	29 975
Evens	17 055
Itel'mens	2 428
Kets	1 084
Khanti	22 283
Koryaks	8 942
Mansi	8 266
Nanais	11 877
Negidals	587
Nenets	34 190
Nganasans	1 262
Nivkhi	4 631
Orochi	883
Oroks	179
Saami	1 835
Sel'kups	3 564
Tofalars	722
Udegeys	1 902
Ul'chi	3 173
Yukagirs	1 112

Source: *Osnovnye Pokazateli*, 5.

The *kolkhozes* cut across the traditional native social organization, the clan structure, and contributed to its disintegration.

Efforts to settle nomadic peoples accompanied the drive to collectivize native economies. The regime considered nomadism as a barrier to the work of economic and social development. In practical terms, the state wanted better access to the nomads, who were the most difficult to reach and influence among the native peoples. Of all the native peoples, the nomads (usually reindeer-breeders) were the most difficult to settle. Settlement was not only antithetical to good management of reindeer, which required constant movement in search of new pasture lands, but it required adaptation by the natives to a very different way of life. In contrast, peoples engaged in hunting and fishing were much easier to collectivize.²⁰¹ The fact that they were often settled already, and that collectivization frequently meant a simple delineation and designation of traditional hunting or fishing grounds, facilitated this process.

The overzealous implementation of collectivization resulted in considerable upheaval among the native population, and initially it was opposed strongly. In protest, natives slaughtered many of their reindeer, a consequence which led the Soviet regime to proceed at a slower pace.²⁰² According to one source, 12 per cent of the northern native peoples in the Soviet North were collectivized by 1931, 37 per cent in 1934, 75 per cent in 1939-40 and 97 per cent in 1943. Collectivization continued until it was largely completed, in the 1950s.²⁰³

In the first two decades after World War II, the Soviet regime implemented a policy whereby *kolkhozes* were combined into larger units (*sovkhozes* or state farms)

²⁰¹Savoskul, "Social and Cultural Dynamics," 134-136.

²⁰²The number of domesticated reindeer in the country fell by 30 per cent between 1929 and 1933. See Basil Dmytryshyn, *USSR: A Concise History*, 4th ed. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1984), 171.

²⁰³Eidlitz Kuoljok, *Revolution in the North*, 107.

and reorganized into state enterprises. The advantages to the regime were said "to consist in the possibilities of concentrating the technical and economic resources and [in better] utilizing the labour."²⁰⁴ Between 1953 and 1966, the number of *kolkhozes* in the Soviet North fell from 2,044 to 550, while the number of *sovkhozes* grew from 50 to 200.²⁰⁵

Throughout the period of collectivization and "consolidation," the Soviet regime gained greater access to the native peoples. Settling nomads and collectivizing native traditional economies permitted the Soviet authorities to expose the native populations to what they considered desirable activities and objectives. It allowed the state to educate them in socialist political ideology, penetrate and break down native social structures, and introduce new techniques and methods of engaging in economic activities.

The decision to rapidly industrialize the Soviet Union, adopted as the First Five Year Plan in 1929, was one aspect of the regime's efforts to organize the country's economy which introduced further changes to the way of life of the northern native peoples. There was relatively little industrial expansion in the northern regions of the Soviet Union, or in the rest of the country, before 1930. But exploration and exploitation of non-renewable resources soon opened up numerous deposits of minerals (e.g., diamond, nickel and gold), and, most importantly, hydrocarbons (e.g., coal, oil and gas) in the Soviet North.²⁰⁶ The abundance of natural resources led to massive industrial development in the North, necessitating the establishment of transport in the northern regions, and previously remote areas were drawn into a country-wide transportation network.

²⁰⁴Ibid., 117.

²⁰⁵Ibid.

²⁰⁶Armstrong, Rogers and Rowley, *Circumpolar North*, 26-36.

Large-scale construction of industries in the north began in earnest in the 1930s, increased slowly during the decade, and saw its greatest growth after World War II, with energy output increasing enormously in the 1950's through the 1970's. This refers particularly to the development of oil and gas. Massive exploration and development has taken place; huge oil and gas pipelines have been built.

Among the many effects of such activities several are of particular note. First, the development of industry started to attract some of the native population as early as the 1930s. By the end of that decade, native peoples had begun to work in the timber, food and mining industries. Natives began to move from rural regions to urban areas, although natives today still reside overwhelmingly in rural areas (see Table 3 and 4).

Second, the labour requirements of the Soviet industrialization programme led to substantial demographic changes in the North. The development of natural resources in the areas inhabited by natives resulted in a large influx of migrant Russian and other non-native workers. According to the calculations of one author, the number of Russians in the Soviet North rose from approximately 100,000 in 1926 to between 4.5 and 4.75 million in 1959, while the number of northern indigenous people increased from about 92,670 in 1926 to 127,000 in 1959.²⁰⁷ As noted above however, the most significant development of northern natural resources took place between the mid-1950's and the mid-1970's. Correspondingly, the greatest increase in the population of non-natives took place during this period, growing from about 6.7 million in 1970²⁰⁸ to around ten million people today.²⁰⁹ The northern native population grew from

²⁰⁷See Conolly, *Siberia Today and Tomorrow*, 191, and Terence Armstrong, "The Population of the North of the USSR," *Polar Record* 11, no. 71 (May 1962): 178.

²⁰⁸Armstrong, Rogers and Rowley, *Circumpolar North*, 282.

²⁰⁹Centre for Canadian-Soviet Studies, *Background on The Changing Soviet Union*, 16.

Table 3. Northern Native Peoples residing in rural areas in the Soviet North, in 1989.

Northern Peoples	Population	Per cent
Aleuts	408	63.4
Chukchi	12 995	86.0
Chuvans	639	46.2
Dolgans	5 283	80.4
Entsy	117	59.1
Eskimos	1 315	77.2
Evenks	23 909	79.8
Evens	12 769	74.9
Itel'mens	1 485	61.2
Kets	891	82.2
Khanti	15 646	70.2
Koryaks	6 371	71.2
Mansi	4 490	54.3
Nanais	7 210	60.7
Negidals	363	61.8
Nenets	28 340	82.9
Nganasans	915	72.5
Nivkhi	2 284	49.3
Orochi	468	53.0
Oroks	28	15.6
Saami	1 117	60.9
Sel'kups	2 664	74.7
Tofalars	625	86.6
Udegeys	1 186	62.4
Ul'chi	2 287	72.1
Yukagirs	698	62.8

Source: *Osnovnye Pokazateli*, 8.

Table 4. Northern Native Peoples residing in urban areas in the Soviet North, in 1989.

Northern Peoples	Population	Per cent
Aleuts	236	36.6
Chukchi	2 111	14.0
Chuvans	745	53.8
Dolgans	1 288	19.6
Entsy	81	40.9
Eskimos	388	22.8
Evenks	6 066	20.2
Evens	4 286	25.1
Itel'mens	943	38.8
Kets	193	17.8
Khanti	6 637	29.8
Koryaks	2 571	28.8
Mansi	3 776	45.7
Nanais	4 667	39.3
Negidals	224	38.2
Nenets	5 850	17.1
Nganasans	347	27.5
Nivkhi	2 347	50.7
Orochi	415	47.0
Oroks	151	84.4
Saami	718	39.1
Sel'kups	900	25.3
Tofalars	97	13.4
Udegeys	716	37.6
Ul'chi	886	27.9
Yukagirs	414	37.2

Source: *Osnovnye Pokazateli*, 9.

156,000 native people in the Soviet North in 1979 to approximately 182,000 in 1989.²¹⁰

These demographic changes have affected the lives of the northern peoples considerably. In general, immigration of non-natives into the Soviet North has made most of the native groups minorities in their own national autonomous regions and districts. The indigenous peoples total only from three to twenty-three per cent of the population in autonomous areas. In theory, these districts and areas are the native people's representative institutions, but in practice they "are completely dominated by ethnic Russians and other immigrants with the latter making up 80 or 90 per cent of the inhabitants."²¹¹

Third, the environment has been abused extensively. The land in many cases has been polluted, pasture lands have been degraded, and reindeer herds can no longer forage where they once did. Pipelines now block natives from using vast tracks of land, and oil spills (from bursting pipelines) have wreaked havoc with some areas as well. Industrial enterprises have polluted the waters of the northern regions in the U.S.S.R.. Above-ground nuclear testing in the north has permanently restricted access to some areas of the region.

Overall, what has been the impact of Soviet policies of the past several decades towards the northern indigenous peoples? Judging from the criticism that has emerged recently, the effects, while being of benefit in some respects, generally have been negative. Among the severest critics of Soviet policy have been the indigenous peoples themselves,²¹² who have "exploited *glasnost* to air their demands and to fill in the

²¹⁰*Osnovnye Pokazateli*, 1.

²¹¹Jens Dahl, "Indigenous Peoples of the Soviet North," *IWGIA: Yearbook, 1989*, eds. Teresa Aparicio and Jens Dahl (Copenhagen, n.p., 1990): 217.

²¹²See for example Rytkheu, "Lozungi i amulety," 2, Eremer Aipin, "Ne neft'yu edinoi," [Not by Oil Alone] *Moskovskie Novosti*, no. 2, 1989, and I. Levshin, "Surovaya realnost' surovoi zemli," [The Harsh Reality of a Harsh Land], *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, 2 September 1988, 3-4.

'blank spots' in their histories."²¹³ The intelligentsia and other communities have also come to the defense of the northern native peoples in recent years.²¹⁴ Together they have pointed out the numerous failures of the often lauded improvement and modernization of the traditional economies of the northern indigenous peoples.

First, education policies towards the northern native peoples have been condemned for encouraging assimilation with the predominant Russian culture. Criticism has been levelled against the utilization of Russian as the language of instruction, the discouragement of native tongues, and the separation of children from their parents in order to educate them in boarding schools. The policies have also been blamed for creating generational gaps between younger natives, who are much less cognizant of traditional activities, and the older generation.

Second, the policy of settling nomadic peoples has disrupted and in some cases destroyed their traditional economy, and, in effect, their culture.²¹⁵ The intensive and extensive industrial development of the Soviet north, particularly regarding the exploration and development of oil and gas, has caused enormous degradation of pasture lands and hunting grounds, and resulted in a deterioration of the traditional activities that are maintained. Nuclear testing in the Arctic has been decried as being responsible for a particularly high rate of mortality on Chukotka.²¹⁶

Third, the poor standards of living of the northern native communities have been deplored. Nomads and settled northern peoples are much poorer off than newcomers to the North. Long promised administrative centres have not been built,

²¹³Kathleen Mihalisko, "Discontent in Taiga and Tundra," *Radio Liberty Research* 296/88, (July 7, 1988): 1.

²¹⁴See for example Pika and Prokhorov, "Bol'shie Problemy Malykh Narodov," 78.

²¹⁵Ibid.

²¹⁶Vladimir Lupandin and Ye. A. Gayer, "I Ask for the Floor," *Moscow News*, no. 34 (August 1989), 5, in *CDSP* 41, no. 45 (September 1989): 20

and those that exist do not provide adequate housing, medical services and cultural facilities.²¹⁷ The mortality rate is two to three times higher for northern natives than the average for residents of the RSFSR. The life expectancy is low, at 56 years for women and 45 years for men. The suicide rate is higher than the USSR average as well.

Fourth, native people have accused the Soviet regime of taking control of the local political bodies in the north. While it is true that a number of the northern indigenous peoples were assigned administrative units, local power that they may once have held is no longer in their hands, as they are vastly outnumbered by non-native inhabitants of the region. "Even for budget allocations, the autonomous regions . . . receive constant petty supervision from territorial or provincial agencies and experience powerful pressure from various union and republic ministries and departments."²¹⁸

Clearly, northern indigenous peoples have no shortage of grievances. With the initiation of Gorbachev's policies of *glasnost* and *perestroika*, native peoples have expressed their deep concerns and are now attempting to resolve some of these pressing issues. By forming an organization to represent their interests, the 26 northern native peoples have "exploited *glasnost* to fill in the 'blank spots' in their histories."²¹⁹

In 1988 a prominent native writer and intellectual, Vladimir Sangi, at a meeting of the Secretariat of the Board of the Russian Republic Writers' Union, of which he was an elected member, proposed that an association of nationalities of the North be

²¹⁷See for example, Lyubov' Nenyang, "'Pyatna' v geografii," [Stains in geography] *Pravda*, 19 May 1988, 6.

²¹⁸M. I. Mongo, "The Congress of USSR People's Deputies: Tenth Meeting," *Izvestiya*, 8 June 1989, 4, cited in *CDSP* 41, no. 29 (August 1989): 19.

²¹⁹Mihalisko, "Discontent in Taiga and Tundra," 1.

created to represent the "aspirations of the 26 nationalities of the Soviet North and [to] protect their interests."²²⁰ During the same year numerous articles appeared discussing the situation of the northern native peoples. In August 1989, a brief note in the Soviet newspaper *Pravda* announced the creation of an "Association of Small Peoples of the North," and the "election" of the first president of the association, Vladimir Sangi.

In the Nenets National Okrug, in the Northwest Soviet Union, in December, 1989, a three-day congress consisting of more than 250 representatives was held to elect delegates to the All-Union Congress of native peoples of the Soviet North.²²¹ During this gathering, a programme was discussed that was to form the basis for the group's stated aims and strategies. The issues of greatest concern to native peoples were national culture, the environment, autonomy and regional cost accounting.²²²

The Statutes adopted at the organization's founding conference in March, 1991 provided for the Association of Northern Native Peoples to defend "the interests of the small peoples and [helped] them to implement their political, social, economic and cultural rights, preserve their cultural character and maintain their traditional way of life as well as be in control of the preservation of [their] natural resources . . . "²²³ This demonstrates that the ANNP was created to represent the values and desires held by the northern native peoples, and to unite in an effort to resolve existing problems. This is one of the central preconditions of a political interest group, as defined in Chapter II.

²²⁰A. Shishov, *Sovetskaya Kultura*, 11 February 1989, 3, in "More Autonomy for North's Native Peoples?" *CDSP* 49, no. 14 (May 1989): 8-9.

²²¹See also "Northern Ethnic Groups Form Association," Moscow TASS in English 1131, 12 December 1989, cited in FBIS, *Soviet Union - Daily Report*, FBIS-SOV-89-237, 12 December, 1989, 71-72.

²²²These goals were identified through a public opinion poll. See *Ibid.*

²²³"Statutes of the Association of the Small Peoples of the Soviet North," *IWGIA Document No. 67: Indigenous Peoples of the Soviet North*, no. 67 (July 1990): 47. Henceforth this document will be referred to as "Statutes."

A second key part of the ANNP's objectives is the recognition that the organization exists to change public policy. The group's Programme, which defines the activities and functions of the ANNP, does just this. It states that one of the group's basic goals is preparing amendments to USSR and RSFSR legislation regarding the "protection of the interests and rights of the small peoples of the North,"²²⁴ which is directly aimed at altering public policy.

Such objectives qualify the ANNP as a political interest group. The task now is to analyze the ANNP in the same way as the ITC was examined in the previous chapter to determine whether the ANNP is being structured and managed in a potentially effective way. In other words, what are the prospects that this Association will be able to fulfill its objectives and improve the situation of indigenous peoples living in the Soviet North?

iii. Applying the Analytical Framework

a. Articulation of Group Objectives

The founding congress of the Association of Northern Native Peoples was held on March 30 and 31, 1990, in Moscow.²²⁵ Its principle aim was to "defend the interests of the small peoples of the Soviet North."²²⁶ The manner in which it

²²⁴"Programme of the Association of the Small Peoples of the North of the Soviet Union," *IWGIA Document No. 67: Indigenous Peoples of the Soviet North*, no. 67 (July 1990): 54. Henceforth this document will be referred to as "Programme." It should be noted that both the Statutes and the Programme were adopted by the founding Congress of the ANNP as *preliminary* documents. They were to be revised and adopted at another assembly, but this has as yet not taken place.

²²⁵"Small Peoples of North Congress Ends," Moscow Television Service in Russian, 1700 , 31 March 1990 [Vremya], cited in FBIS, *Soviet Union - Daily Reports*, FBIS-SOV-90-066, 5 April 1990, 111.

²²⁶"Programme," 53.

articulated this broad goal was through its Statutes, which delineated its objectives, and a Programme, which outlined its strategies for the achievement of its goals.

The ANNP Statutes describe the purpose and objectives of the group. In very clear, though general terms the Statutes state the group's aims of enhancing the political, social, economic and cultural conditions of the northern indigenous peoples. This includes measures to participate in national and international organizations, to hold conferences regarding native issues, to formulate guidelines regarding the membership and leadership of the ANNP, including election procedures for group leaders, and to determine the group's financial basis and legal status.

Through the Statutes, the group has effectively articulated its objectives. One of the group's strong points is that its goals cover many areas of concern for the indigenous peoples of the Soviet North. While it can be argued that the ANNP is somewhat optimistic in declaring its aim to be seeking actively to improve the social, economic and cultural conditions of the northern native peoples, this author regards the Statutes as an indication of the degree of seriousness with which the group is taking its mandate. The group is delineating a wide range of goals to show its recognition of the widespread problems among northern native peoples, and that it intends to be earnest in seeking to achieve them all.

Although the ANNP's goals may be clearly articulated, some may be unrealistic. For example, the objective of enhancing "the small peoples of the North," meaning *all 26 groups*, is perhaps questionable. As seen in Table 2, the population of some of the northern indigenous group is extremely small, the least of which is the Orok people, who currently number 179. It is perhaps idealistic to expect to preserve and promote the way of life of a native group of this size. It is uncertain that the Orok population is sufficient even to reproduce itself. Also, as it stands today, more of the Orok people consider Russian (54.2%) rather than the language of their group (44.7%) to be their native tongue, indicating a high degree of assimilation into the Russian

culture (see Table 1). It is difficult enough to try and establish institutions such as schools that will enhance the culture and language of large native groups, without the more prohibitive factors associated with smaller groups.

The strategies for accomplishing these goals were formulated and adopted by the founding Congress and constitute the Association's Programme. They include the following: representing the interests of the Peoples of the North in the institutions of state power, in the economy and in public institutions and organizations; getting the Supreme Soviet to ratify the 1989 International Labour Congress (ILO) "Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries;" enhancing the constitutional status of northern native peoples constituting a minority in a given territory; and undertaking "expert studies" regarding economic objectives of industrial enterprises desiring to exploit natural resources in territories where native populations reside.

The detail of the Programme shows that the ANNP had very clear and specific ideas about how to achieve its stated objectives. In contrast, the ITC's strategies only became clear through the group's activities, which were revealed as the group developed over time. The ANNP's Programme deals with issues directly related to improving the goals of the group. One of the strategies, for example, states that referendums among the northern indigenous peoples will be held when a section of land is allocated for purposes other than native "economic activities." This is one step closer to native control over the environment in which they live, as it would restrict activities not in the interests of the indigenous populations. This strategy, and the Programme in general, correspond closely with the ANNP's stated goal of enhancing the economic, cultural, social and political conditions of the native peoples.

b. Internal Dynamics

In this section the structure, functions and activities of the ANNP are examined. These factors will influence the ultimate degree of effectiveness in realizing the group's objectives. Consisting of elements that lie within the group, they are collectively entitled "internal dynamics," and include the four components of "internal cohesion," "leadership," "communication" and "organizational management."

i. Internal Cohesion

In order to evaluate whether the ANNP has attained, or is likely to achieve a high degree of internal cohesion, the following factors will be considered: structure, membership, and representation.

a. Structure

The ANNP is governed by a Council, comprising 56 members including the president, Vladimir Sangi. Approximately two individuals from each of the 26 northern indigenous peoples are represented on this body. The Council has a five-member working group, or Secretariat, consisting of Sangi and four aids, who operate a permanent office in Moscow.²²⁷ The ANNP Council itself is accountable to the Congress, which, in theory, acts as the "supreme executive body" of the group. The Congress is convened only once every three years (at a minimum).

The ANNP consists of numerous regional associations, provided for in one of the provisions of its Statutes which states that "in autonomous republics and *okrugs*, *krais* and territories, rayons and settlements, national and territorial associations" will be established.²²⁸ The ANNP comprises sixteen "territorial" associations which

²²⁷ Mr. Gennady N. Oskolkov, Department Chief, Council of Ministers of the RSFSR, interview by author, Ottawa, Ontario, 9 May 1991. Mr. Oskolkov applied the term "Secretariat" to this working group.

²²⁸ "Statutes," 49.

correspond to the sixteen main administrative units in the RSFSR.²²⁹ Each of these has a president and an operating staff of three to five people each. Spread across these sixteen territories are 26 "national" associations, representing each of the northern indigenous peoples. The number of national associations represented in each administrative division varies according to the local native population. For example, a single administrative division with three resident native groups will have three national associations plus the territorial one.²³⁰

Although the ANNP's Statutes provide for the formation of these two types of regional associations, the manner in which they interact with the ANNP remains uncertain. Given the size of the Council, however, it is possible that the regional associations are represented in this executive body.

The fact that the ANNP provided for and established regional indigenous associations attests to the importance the group attaches to regional links, which is critical for a group comprising such diverse peoples and representing individuals scattered over such a vast area. In the case of the ITC, the role of regional affiliates proved vital to the degree of internal cohesion of the group. They are the link for the constant flow of communication between the national organization and the local Inuit population. Regional associations are likely to enhance the internal cohesion of the ANNP.

Prior to the formation of the ANNP, other associations based on regional indigenous concerns had been founded. For example, the founding congress of the Association of the Northern Peoples of the Khanti and Mansi took place in August,

²²⁹These administrative units referred to here are the Buryatskaya, Komi and Yakutskaya ASSRs, the Archangel'skaya, Amurskaya, Irkutskaya, Kamchatkaskaya, Murmanskaya, Magadanskaya, Sakhalinskaya, Tyumenskaya, Chitinskaya and Tomskskaya oblasts, and the Krasnoyarskiy, Primorskiy and Khabarovskiy Krays.

²³⁰Mr. Gennady Oskolkov, interview. On Chukotka in the Soviet North, for example, both the Chukchi and the Eskimo (national) associations are present.

1989. The congress adopted a Charter and programme designed to preserve "nature in the areas of habitation and [to develop] . . . [the] unique national cultures" of the Khanti and Mansi.²³¹ Broadly speaking, this regional organization is concerned with goals very similar to those stated in the ANNP's Statutes.

b. Membership

Most of what is known regarding the membership of the ANNP is derived from analyzing the composition of the delegates to the founding congress of the group. In the opinion of one observer at the congress (a member of the IWGIA), delegates were predominantly members of the intelligentsia. Few were reindeer herders, fishers and hunters. Furthermore, "half of the delegates were members of the Communist Party."²³² That CPSU members comprised approximately fifty percent of the delegates shows a strong connection with the Soviet party apparatus, and with the pre-reform establishment in general.

The overlapping membership in the ANNP and the CPSU is significant. It may lead to conflict between CPSU members and non-Party members who not only mistrust the Soviet regime, and especially the CPSU, but consider it responsible for many of their current problems. If the ANNP is seen to be too closely connected to the CPSU, it could engender feelings of alienation among the broader membership, and the view that the ANNP is an illegitimate mouthpiece to represent them.

The Statutes of the ANNP are indefinite with regard to membership. They stipulate that the membership of the ANNP could include anyone "belonging to one of the Peoples of the North," and also representatives of "other nations if their activities [had] to do with the interests of the peoples of the North and the areas inhabited by

²³¹"Siberian Ethnic Groups Form Association," TASS in English, 1305, 12 August, 1989, cited in FBIS, *Soviet Union - Daily Reports*, FBIS-SOV-89-157, 16 August 1989, 60-61.

²³²Jens Dahl, "Introduction," *IWGIA Document No. 67: Indigenous Peoples of the Soviet North*, no. 67 (July 1990): 14.

them, and if they recognize the Statutes and the Programme of the Association and take active part in its activities."²³³ This raises several questions. Are all northern indigenous peoples automatically considered members, in the same way as the Inuit of Canada are in the ITC? (The fact that an affirmative answer to this question was of considerable value to the ITC suggests that the same could be true of the ANNP.) What is the procedure for becoming a member? Do the members have to pay a fee to join the group? If they do, is it a significant amount? If they do not have to pay a fee, what prevents the ANNP from automatically including in the membership every person in the 26 northern native peoples? Finally, why are the 26 northern indigenous peoples represented by the ANNP, to the exclusion of other peoples who also have inhabited the northern regions of the Eurasian landmass since before contact with ethnic Russians?²³⁴ According to one source, defining who is eligible to join the ANNP has been a topic of ongoing discussions within the group.²³⁵

If such issues cannot be resolved, internal cohesion will suffer. For example, if all native peoples were automatically included in the membership, the unity of purpose felt by the members may be enhanced. Thus far, the author has found no mention of changes the leadership may have made to the membership provisions in the Statutes, nor has been able to discover any figures on the membership of the group.

²³³"Statutes," 49.

²³⁴Dahl, "Introduction," 14. It should be noted, that representatives from such peoples were present at the conference, as were ethnic Russians who had settled in the Soviet North hundreds of years ago.

²³⁵According to a Soviet Nivkhi, the ANNP was concerned about this issue and that executive members of the group had been discussing it for some time. This information is derived from an interview with Mr. Walter Slipchenko, a senior official in the Government of the Northwest Territories who has had much experience dealing with Soviet natives through working to promote exchanges between Canada and the Soviet Union. Mr. Walter Slipchenko, interview by author, Ottawa, Ontario, 2 May 1991.

c. Representation

A third characteristic significant for the unity of ITC's membership, is the representation of the group. It has been difficult to determine how the various northern indigenous groups were represented at the Congress. According to one account, the delegates to the founding conference were "represented according to their numbers."²³⁶ This statement, while unclear, suggests that the delegates were selected in some proportion to the population of the native group they represented. If native peoples were proportionally represented, some groups are likely to have been far less represented than others. As seen in Table 2 the smallest indigenous population is 179 (Oroks), and therefore would have had far fewer delegates attending the conference than the others, the largest population of which is 34,190 (Nenets). This situation encourages friction between the northern indigenous peoples, as one is liable to feel underrepresented relative to another. The procedure for choosing delegates to the Congress has also remained unclear.

The group's plans to insure that the interests of all 26 groups are heard have been much clarified, however. As mentioned previously, each native group has about two representatives who sit on the 56-member Council of the ANNP, a feature which assures approximately equal representation of each indigenous people at the highest levels of authority within the group. This representation is paralleled at the regional levels as well, where each of the 26 native groups are represented in their own "national" associations.

One of the questions that remains, however, is whether these national associations will be able to convey regional concerns adequately to the central body of the ANNP. The experience of the ITC showed the importance in being able to communicate with the main organization to accomplish this end. However, as

²³⁶Ibid., 12.

mentioned above, there has been little information regarding how the views of the regions will be incorporated into the national body.

The fact that both national and territorial associations have been established to represent the regions may prove problematic. It is possible that the existence of these two types of associations will cause some confusion, for, at the very least, the jurisdiction of the two associations will overlap.

Another aspect of representation is the character of the membership. A significant number of delegates to the founding congress of the ANNP were intellectuals, men and members of the Communist Party. Clearly, this is not representative of the greater indigenous population of the Soviet North. More than half of the population of the northern native people are women, and the vast majority are neither members of the intelligentsia nor the CPSU. It is not known whether the Council of the ANNP consists of individuals similarly unrepresentative of the northern native peoples. If this is the case, the unity of the group may be adversely affected, as the membership may believe that their interests are not being taken into account.

ii. Leadership

According to the provisions of the ANNP Statutes, the leadership of the ANNP resides in its Council. The Council is empowered with executive authority over the everyday activities of the group. The Council is responsible for relations with external political and public associations, and international organizations.²³⁷ The president of the Council is also the president of the ANNP and the head of the ANNP Secretariat. The Council president is headquartered in Moscow. The president has the power to execute financial decisions, conclude and negotiate agreements, and engage and discharge staff. Because the Congress is to be "convocated at least once every three

²³⁷"Statutes," 50.

years," the president and the Council can have uncontested terms in office of up to three years.²³⁸ There are no provisions in ANNP's Statutes that stipulate limits to the number of times members of the Council and the president can be elected. The Council also has two vice-presidents (currently Bolshakov and Samar), although nothing is known about their responsibilities.²³⁹

Leadership will be a major determinant of how the ANNP's internal dynamics develop. There are four principal functions of the leadership: to work effectively towards achieving the group's objectives, to encourage and maintain the internal cohesion of the membership, to assure the smooth functioning of the organization, and to act as a spokesperson in relations with external actors.

To carry out these functions the leadership must have the support of the Association's members. In this respect, the selection process of the leadership is important. The Statutes state that both the Council and the president are to be elected by open voting and by a simple majority of the Congress of the ANNP. However, the first president of the organization, Vladimir Sangi, was "elected" seemingly through another process. As early as August 1989, notice of Sangi's "election" as president of the ANNP was published in the Soviet newspaper, *Pravda*. Clearly, Sangi was not elected through the election process outlined in the ANNP Statutes. This immediately raises some questions. What was the election process for Sangi in 1989? Who authorized it? How were the voting delegates selected?

Unfortunately, there is not enough information available to answer these questions. However, Sangi's presidency, and possibly the make-up of the Council, appear to be points of contention. One source has stated that the news of Sangi's

²³⁸*Ibid.*, 49.

²³⁹Mr. Gennady Oskolkov, interview.

presidency was not well received by some of the conference delegates.²⁴⁰ There are apparently concerns that Sangi is too culturally assimilated into the predominant Russian culture, largely due to the fact that he has been living in Leningrad for many years. He was also a member of the board of the RSFSR Writers' Union, an established Soviet institution and a decidedly non-native milieu.

Finally, one source has asserted that the leadership of the ANNP is somewhat misdirected in its objectives. A senior Russian bureaucrat has stated that the leadership is neglecting to focus on the important issues of preserving native culture and education, and the northern environment, and instead is aspiring for more political power. He believes that the leadership is too ambitious, and concerning itself too much with setting up organizations parallel to the government instead of establishing the ANNP as a lobby group.²⁴¹ This situation could lead the membership of the group to view the leadership as illegitimate, and cause disunity among the ANNP's membership.

There is some uncertainty, therefore, about the degree of respect the leadership commands. It appears that the leadership consists mainly of members of the native intelligentsia who are at the same time members of relatively established organizations. Although Sangi is a widely respected writer known throughout the native communities, and even among the broader Soviet public, much of his writing talked uncritically about the successes of socialism during Soviet rule. On the other hand, in the era of *glasnost*, it was Sangi, along with a group of other writers representing the peoples of the North, who wrote a letter to Gorbachev in 1988, stating their concern over the situation of northern native peoples.

Another northern native person who had a major role in the formation of the ANNP is Chuner Taksami, a Doctor of history. He was the chairperson of the

²⁴⁰Mr. Walter Slipchenko, interview.

²⁴¹Mr. Gennady Oskolkov, interview.

organizing committee that met in 1989, and he also opened the founding Congress of the group with a lengthy presentation regarding the cultural, economic and social conditions of the northern indigenous peoples.²⁴² It is worthwhile to note that his opening speech was very long, somewhat repetitive, and included numerous reminders of how Soviet policies towards the native peoples had been beneficial.

The fact that Sangi and Taksami, and other leading members of the ANNP, are part of the intelligentsia and affiliated with established organizations in the USSR may have both positive and negative consequences. On the one hand, it may be regarded suspiciously by some northern native peoples, who have reason to mistrust people who have been and perhaps still are part of Soviet institutions. As noted above, enmity towards such organizations as the CPSU is high in the Soviet Union, and the standing, respect and legitimacy of ANNP's leadership is unlikely to be elevated if the leaders are part of such entities. On the other hand, because the leadership of the ANNP enjoys a position of considerable influence outside of the native community, it can undoubtedly function as a spokesperson with government officials. The leadership may therefore be in a better position to influence public policy towards northern indigenous peoples. In these ways, the character of the leadership is important and will likely influence the degree of effectiveness in achieving the group's goals.

The leadership must also be able to communicate with its membership. Because of the importance of communications in the internal dynamics of a group, and its integral role in the effectiveness of the leadership, it is dealt with separately, in the following section.

²⁴²Churer Taksami, "Opening Speech at the Congress of the Small Indigenous Peoples of the Soviet North," *IWGIA Document No. 67: Indigenous Peoples of the Soviet North*, no. 67 (July 1990): 23-43.

iii. Communications

One of the differences between the ITC and the ANNP is the importance attached to communications. The ITC Charter explicitly aimed to enhance communications. In working rigorously to organize various contacts with the Inuit communities in its first few years of operations, the ITC directly assisted in the improvement and preservation of Inuktitut and the Inuit culture.

Developing communications has a lesser priority in the ANNP. As mentioned in a previous section, prolonged contact and involvement of Soviet officials with these peoples resulted in the creation of a communications network in the North that, in comparison to the Inuit in the Canadian North before the 1970s, was well-developed. These include not only radio and television links, but written communication as well. The early Soviet policy of devising scripts for native languages, and publishing newspapers and textbooks in the native languages, helped to keep those languages alive. However, over the years, and particularly because of the policy of sending children to boarding schools, use of native languages has been in decline.

Thus, when the ANNP was created, it announced that particular "attention should be paid to development in deeds, not in words, of national cultures, literature, mother tongues, customs, traditions and feasts."²⁴³ The group declared its aim of enhancing the cultural living standards of the northern natives. To help realize this goal, the ANNP adopted its own "publishing organ", a magazine entitled *Severnye Prostory* (*Northern Perspectives*).²⁴⁴

Several things should be noted about this publication, however. First, *Severnye Prostory* was first published before the ANNP was even founded, in 1985. According

²⁴³"Declaration of the Congress of the Small Peoples of the North," *IWGIA Document No. 67: Indigenous Peoples of the Soviet North*, no. 67 (July 1990): 46.

²⁴⁴The magazine first was published in 1985, and is issued six times each year. "Small Peoples of North Congress Ends," 111.

to one source the magazine was initially produced by the Soviet government.²⁴⁵ The ANNP, evidently, had no input into the format or contents of the magazine during its first few years of operation.

Before 1990 the magazine published stories by natives and non-natives who dealt with problems faced by indigenous people (based on a small sample of three issues). For instance, in a June 1989 issue an article was published about the environmental costs of hydroelectric projects in the North.²⁴⁶ The individual being interviewed was a candidate of geographical science who expressed deep concern over the impact on the Evenk people of a massive local hydroelectric project. Articles have been written on cultural issues as well. This includes poetry and short stories concerning the northern native way of life, fairy tales and even patterns to make traditional native clothing.²⁴⁷ The fact that the magazine was publishing articles concerning issues directly related to northern native cultures before the ANNP adopted it as its mouthpiece means that the group cannot be accredited with the contents and direction of the magazine before 1990. Despite this, *Severnye Prostory* remains helpful in furthering some of the general aims of the ANNP.

The second aspect of note about this publication is that it is published in Russian only. This makes the magazine widely accessible to northern indigenous peoples as many of them consider Russian as their native language or have fluency in Russian as a second language. But it does not make any inroads into the preservation of native tongues. The problems associated with publishing the magazine in northern native languages is problematic. In order to do so the ANNP would have to decide in which

²⁴⁵Mr. Gennady Oskolkov, interview.

²⁴⁶F. Ya. Shipunova, "Tsena kilovatta," [The Cost of Kilowatts], *Severnye Prostory*, no. 3 (May-June 1989): 4-5.

²⁴⁷See *Severnye Prostory*, no. 6 (November-December, 1988).

of the 26 native languages the magazine should be produced, a daunting task. Publishing the magazine in three or four native languages would probably do more to alienate the other 22 or 23 than to help the three or four. The very fact that the ANNP is attempting to enhance the 26 native languages through the use of a common publication is unavoidably improbable. It would perhaps be better to encourage the national and territorial associations to initiate local publications in the language of the local native inhabitants.

It is also important to note that the editorial council of the magazine is composed of a number of important native literary figures and members of the intelligentsia, including Chuner Taksami, Yurii Rytkeu, V. Boiko, and Vladimir Etylen. Their presence on the editorial council of *Severnye Prostory* may mean the continuing articulation and promotion of native group's interests through the magazine. However, along with this potentially positive influence, is the prospect that the magazine may be too academically oriented, and may ineffectively communicate to indigenous peoples at all levels of society.²⁴⁸

In contrast to the ANNP, regional indigenous associations have begun to develop their own communications programmes in attempts to promote native languages and cultures. In fact, some of these projects were initiated prior to the formation of the ANNP. In January 1990 the first Nivkh language paper was published in Sakhalin. The purpose of this project was to "preserve and increase the language and traditions of the Nivkh."²⁴⁹ Other projects, including the use of television for broadcasts in native tongues, also have been launched with similar objectives.²⁵⁰ It is

²⁴⁸ This is supported by a senior RSFSR government official who stated that the magazine was really a "government" publication. Mr. Gennady Oskolkov, interview.

²⁴⁹ "First Nivkh Language Paper Published in Sakhalin," Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, 0204, 2 January 1990, cited in FBIS, *Soviet Union - Daily Reports*, FBIS-SOV-90-002, 3 January 1990, 87.

interesting to note the differences in the actual projects between the national and regional levels of the association. The regions appear to be undertaking activities that are of more direct benefit to the local indigenous populations than the central organization.

iv. Organizational Management

The final component to be examined under the general heading of internal dynamics is the organizational management capabilities of the ANNP. This section examines the group's organization and decision-making structure to determine whether it can act effectively on behalf of the members' interests.

The 26 northern indigenous groups included in the ANNP have concerns that will clearly differ. One centralized, umbrella organization may find it difficult to deal with all interests of its 26 native groups, especially when they concern local issues. It is therefore particularly important to have regional associations, which can better focus on local issues and deal with them at the regional level. In recognition of this, the ANNP created 26 regional groups representing each of the indigenous people it represents, called national associations. However, the group's Statutes also provided for the creation of "territorial associations."²⁵¹ Accordingly, the ANNP organized 16 territorial associations based on corresponding administrative units in the Soviet North.

While the formation of territorial and national associations allow for regional views to be expressed, it may incur several risks as well. The first is the possibility that the ANNP will be redundant at local levels of activity as the jurisdiction of these two types of associations necessarily overlap. In each of the sixteen territorial associations there is *at least* one national association, which may lead to duplication of

²⁵⁰"New 'Far East' TV Program Broadcast," Moscow Domestic Service, 0900 , 6 February 1990, cited in FBIS, *Soviet Union - Daily Reports*, FBIS-SOV-90-029, 12 February 1990, 111.

²⁵¹"Statutes," 49.

tasks. The second is the danger that the hierarchical arrangement of the national and territorial associations will be detrimental to the group. That the national associations are subordinate to the territorial may lead to too much bureaucracy in the organization.²⁵² It is questionable whether the decision to organize the group in this hierarchical manner will be a positive influence on the functioning of the group.

One indication that regional associations are active is seen from the initiatives they have taken to establish contacts with Canadian institutions. In the past few months, the Government of the Northwest Territories has received requests from two regional affiliates of the ANNP to explore possibilities for cooperation. These proposals were forwarded independently, not through the national offices of the ANNP.²⁵³

While regional associations have been formed, the ANNP has, on paper, a highly centralized decision-making structure. Much of the real authority of the ANNP resides in the hands of the Council. Although the Congress acts as the "supreme executive body" of the group, it is convened only once every three years (at a minimum). In the interim, the real decision-making body of the ANNP is the Council. The ANNP has made no provisions for including representatives from regional associations on this Council. In other words, it has encouraged the creation of regional groups, but seems not to have encouraged their input into the key decision-making body of the national organization. Thus, the organization is not structured to incorporate, on a consistent basis, the views of the regions. This is in sharp contrast to the structure of the ITC, which also recognized the importance of regional affiliates. In the ITC, each regional association president had a seat on the board of directors, and

²⁵²There is no parallel in the ITC, for this group's regional associations corresponded to administrative divisions as well, but all of them comprised Inuit people and none other.

²⁵³Mr. Walter Shipchenko, interview.

had regular input into, and were very much connected with, the decision-making apparatus of the group.

The decision of the ANNP to establish regional associations does not appear to fit well with the stated objectives of the ANNP. Given that the group aims to improve the living conditions of the northern indigenous peoples, and protect and promote their way of life, the management decision to organize the group seems problematic in several key areas, including the lack of regularized input into group decision making and the risk of over-bureaucratization. In contrast, the ITC's regional affiliates helped to ensure consistent two-way communication between the leadership and the membership, enhanced internal cohesion and worked towards formulating and achieving group objectives. From the management perspective, the ANNP does not appear to have this capability.

d. External Relations

Moving now from the internal to external dimension of the ANNP's activities, it is important to examine the political environment in which the ANNP operates, and the interaction of the group with actors outside of the group. The three different components of the ANNP's external relations are the "political environment", "access," and "communication with external actors."

i. Political Environment

Until recently, the only legitimate forum in the USSR for the articulation of interests was through established organizations, such as Writers' Unions. Even these groups were obliged to recognize limitations of their views. The Party leadership retained, in practice, "ultimate veto power over any policy proposal."²⁵⁴ The situation has changed since 1985, however, with pronounced liberalization of the political

²⁵⁴Barry and Barner-Barry, *Contemporary Soviet Politics*, 221.

conditions of the country, allowing for the formation of associations with divergent viewpoints which do not first have to be endorsed by the CPSU.

In November 1990, a new law on public associations was published in the Soviet Union that claimed the freedom to association as a basic right. It states that: "A public association is a voluntary formation that comes into being as a result of the free exercise of the will of citizens who have joined together on the basis of common interests."²⁵⁵ This recent law outlines guidelines by which public associations may operate, including a description of the activities of public associations related to the exercise of influence over legislative bodies.²⁵⁶ The new law demarcates the activities of associations, the requirements for their formation (including establishing statutes and registering them with the USSR Ministry of Justice), grounds for liability, and other provisions. At its founding Congress the ANNP seemed to have been aware of the draft regulations of this law, as its Statutes and Programme closely correspond to the requirements stipulated in the new law.²⁵⁷

The fact that the interests of the ANNP extend to several levels of government increases the complexity of the political context within which the group functions. For example, in its Programme, the ANNP stated that it wanted to work at both federal and

²⁵⁵"Law of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: On Public Associations," *Izvestiya*, 1-2, cited in "The Law on Public Associations," *CDSP* 42, no. 43 (November 1990), 18.

²⁵⁶The Law includes the following rights regarding this activity:

- to participate in the formation of bodies of state power and administration;
- to exercise legislative initiative;
- to participate in the working out of decisions by bodies of state power and administration;
- to represent and defend the legitimate interests of their members (participants) in state and public bodies; (See *Ibid.*)

These activities describe those commonly associated with lobbying. The term "to lobby" is defined as the "means to seek to exercise influence over policy. . . . [which commonly results in] presence at national, state, and local centers where legislative and executive bodies are located." See LaPalombara, *Politics Within Nations*, 352.

²⁵⁷While the Law on Public Associations was formally issued in November 1990, it had been debated and highly publicized before the ANNP was founded.

republican (RSFSR) levels to improve the "constitutional status of territories with a compact population of Northerners."²⁵⁸ This particular task may be difficult, as it involves the establishment of boundaries in areas that are inhabited not only by northern native peoples but also non-natives. It also challenges the government's interest in maintaining control over the development of natural resources in the North,²⁵⁹ a concern that has predominated for decades.

The ANNP must also operate at the local decision-making level. For example, the group intends to hold referendums among the northern native peoples regarding their readiness to allow the use of local lands for purposes of natural resource exploitation. The strategy of transferring greater responsibility and control to the native peoples will be a complicated process, however. Historically, the northern indigenous peoples have had no decision-making powers in the local *soviets*. The administrative districts in which native peoples reside have had for many years an overwhelming majority of non-native inhabitants. Consequently, the soviets comprise a proportionally much larger number of non-native than native people. This factor has enormously contributed to a lack of native influence at the regional level.

ii. Access

The ANNP has numerous points of access to the decision-making process in the Soviet Union. First, and probably the most important, is the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the permanent legislative body of the country. It consists of two equivalent chambers, the Soviet of Nationalities and the Soviet of the Union, that meet twice a year for up to four months at a time. The Supreme Soviet is held responsible to the

²⁵⁸"Statutes," 54.

²⁵⁹One senior Soviet official views further development of natural resources and the export of raw materials from the Soviet North as part of the "way to solve the problems" of the area. I. Lavrovsky, "Should We Sell Our Oil Abroad," *Izvestiya*, 20 November 1989, 2, quoted in "Foreign Affairs: World Economy," *CDSP* 41, no. 47 (December 1989): 22.

new Congress of Peoples' Deputies, the body of highest legislative authority in the Soviet Union today, whose deputies elect members to the Supreme Soviet.²⁶⁰

For the first time, Soviet "politicians" in the Supreme Soviet are openly debating issues, criticizing specific policies, and advancing different views on a wide range of issues. A number of northern indigenous people have been elected to sit on the Supreme Soviet, including Eremei Aipin, Evdokiya Gayer, Mikhail Mongo, Semen Pal'chin, and Vladimir Etylen.²⁶¹ Among this group some, such as Evdokiya Gayer (a Nanai), have a history of activity on behalf of the northern indigenous peoples. She is outspoken in her views and she has supported enthusiastically issues such as increased local autonomy for native peoples in the Congress of Peoples' Deputies.²⁶² Another member of this group is Mikhail Mongo, who has been similarly vocal in his articulation of northern native concerns, and has also made statements in support of native culture, increased power at the regional level, and the development of native languages.²⁶³ Having members of the indigenous populations represent native concerns in the Congress means that the ANNP has direct representation in a legislative body. That the natives sit on committees and help draft legislation is, clearly, highly conducive to increasing the effectiveness of the group in terms of achieving some of its objectives.

²⁶⁰The 542 members of these chambers are the USSR's first full-time politicians. Those elected to the Supreme Soviet are called Peoples' Deputies. See Centre for Canadian-Soviet Studies, *Background on The Changing Soviet Union*, 1.

²⁶¹Extracts from a Special Supplement to the Newspaper "Soviet Russia" (*Sovetskaya Rossiya*) Dedicated to a Conference on Ethnic Minorities in the Northern USSR (March-April, 1990), 1990, 137-146.

²⁶²"The Congress of USSR Peoples' Deputies: Twelfth Meeting," *Izvestiya*, 10 June 1989, 3-11, in "The Congress of USSR Peoples' Deputies," *CDSP*, 41, no. 31 (August 1989): 19-20. See speeches of Gayer and Mongo, given at a session of the Congress of Peoples' Deputies in 1989 in Ye. A. Gayer, M. Mongo and V. Larionov, "Da budet' uslyshan golos deputata!" [Yes, the Voices of the Deputies will be Heard!], *Severnye Prostory*, no. 4 (July/August, 1989): 2-5.

²⁶³"The Congress of USSR Peoples' Deputies: Tenth Meeting," *Izvestiya*, 8 June 1989, 7-8, in "The Congress of USSR Peoples' Deputies," *CDSP* 41, no. 29 (August 1989): 19-20.

Other points of access include the heads of ministries and state committees who are appointed by the Supreme Soviet. The president of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev, is also a powerful access point. Interaction between the president and the ANNP actually began at the group's founding congress, as Gorbachev himself was in attendance. This level of interaction indicates that the group had the sanction of the country's highest authorities. In the printed press, on the second (and last) day of the Congress, a brief note from Gorbachev to the ANNP was published, indicating the president's support of the general aims of the group.²⁶⁴ This endorsement can be used by the ANNP to its advantage. The group can use the fact that it has been endorsed by the president to secure access to decision makers.

The ANNP has also sought to influence local governments across the Soviet North. The call for greater native control over local resource development will be one of the more contentious issues at the level of local government. Although local governments do not have ultimate responsibility for resource development in their regions, they are acquiring some authority which can affect that development. Enforcement of environmental standards is one avenue that has been used effectively by local governments.

In this respect, it is significant that numerous native representatives at the founding Congress are also involved in local governments. For example, Mikhail Mongo is a member of a territorial soviet executive committee in the Evenki National-Territorial Election District.²⁶⁵ The Communist Party can also be influenced at the local level. Members of regional committees of the CPSU have demonstrated interest

²⁶⁴M. S. Gorbachev, "S'ezdu narodov Severa," [The Congress of Peoples of the North], *Pravda*, 30 March 1990, 1.

²⁶⁵"The Congress of USSR Peoples' Deputies: Tenth Meeting," 19.

in the problems of the northern indigenous peoples.²⁶⁶ Opportunities therefore exist at local levels of government and the CPSU to further the group's influence on the local decision-making process.

A final point of access is at the international level, which can be used to assist the ANNP in pressuring the Soviet government on certain issues. In the ANNP's strategic programme, the readiness of the group to deal with international organizations on issues such as the enhancement of indigenous cultures, rights, and way of life was clearly stated. Since that time, the ANNP has demonstrated considerable activity in this sphere, and has developed contacts with the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC),²⁶⁷ the Saami of the Nordic countries and the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA).

Representatives of the ANNP are also attending international conferences and meetings.²⁶⁸ One of these, called *Northern Forum*, was hosted by the Government of Alaska in September 1990. This meeting brought together officials from different northern regions of the world, including several areas of the Soviet North, Canada, Alaska, Scandinavian countries, China and Japan, and marked the official founding of the *Northern Forum*. A statement of intent was signed at this conference that recognized the similarities shared by northern regions of the world with respect to the environment, "economic well-being and the appropriate role of regional governments in decision making which affects the North." The goals of the *Forum* are to enhance decision making at regional, national and international levels regarding northern concerns, and to provide "opportunities to exchange ideas, solve common problems,

²⁶⁶See for example a report of a meeting of such individuals with the Editor of *Sovetskaya Rossiya* in Pankov, Stepuniba, and Filimov, "Rodom s severa."

²⁶⁷The President of the ICC, Mary Simon, was one of the observers at the Congress.

²⁶⁸Mr. Walter Slipchenko, interview.

and plan cooperative initiatives."²⁶⁹ The relevance of this to the ANNP is that it gives the group access to an international organization that is involved with issues of concern to the native peoples of the Soviet North. Involvement in such entities is part of the ANNP's strategy towards achieving its objectives.

The International Labour Organization (ILO) has become one of the focal points for the ANNP's international contacts. In accordance with its Programme, the ANNP wants the USSR Supreme Soviet to ratify the "Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples and Independent Countries," adopted in 1989 by the ILO.²⁷⁰ The president of the ANNP, Vladimir Sangi, is particularly committed to this goal. However, this is going to be a difficult task. In an interview in July, 1990, Vladimir Sangi suggested that the ANNP was having a difficult time in convincing Soviet bureaucrats to ratify the newly revised and adopted Convention 169 (170) of the ILO.²⁷¹ On the other hand, a Department Chief of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, Mr. Gennady Oskolkov, asserted that the government of the RSFSR is prepared in principle to ratify the Convention almost immediately. However, he stated that because the Convention deals with land ownership issues, the ratification process is complicated insofar as the "land question" in the Soviet Union is yet to be resolved.²⁷²

The ANNP is also preparing to send representatives to an upcoming conference in Copenhagen, the purpose of which is to call for the creation of an international organization representing indigenous peoples of Arctic countries. This gathering is to

²⁶⁹Governor's Summit, "Statement of Intent," September 1990. One of the signatories of this agreement was Vladimir Etylen, a native writer from Chukotka.

²⁷⁰"Programme," 56.

²⁷¹Shinkarev, "Vernut' prava khozyaevam zemli," 3.

²⁷²Mr. Gennady Oskolkov, interview. It should be noted, however, that recently a law on property ownership was adopted in the Soviet Union. The "Law on Property in the USSR" came into effect 1 July 1990. "Law of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Property in the USSR," *Izvestiya*, 10 March 1990, 2, cited in *CDSP* 42, no. 12 (April 1990): 21-25.

be held in June 1991, and is expected to include 15 Inuit leaders from Alaska, Canada, and Greenland, and 15 of the executive members of the ANNP.

iii. Communication with External Actors

Soviet media has played a significant role in generating public support for the ANNP. As mentioned above, news concerning the conditions of northern indigenous peoples began to be published extensively in the Soviet Union in 1988 and 1989. A variety of local and regional newspapers as well as the central press began to write openly about the extent of the problems. During this time reports were issued by numerous scholars, journalists and government workers, native and non-native alike.²⁷³ Additional public support for the ANNP was generated as "the ecological state of many areas of the North became known."²⁷⁴

Since its founding, the ANNP has attempted to maintain communication with the press.²⁷⁵ Unlike the ITC, the ANNP has not yet initiated a public campaign concerning the situation facing northern native peoples. It can be argued, however, that the printed media itself has undertaken this task. It should be noted, though, that native peoples, such as Eremai Aipin who were at the founding congress of the ANNP, previously have published articles concerning native issues and problems. Much news about the objectives of the ANNP was produced in the months following its founding Congress as well.²⁷⁶ While it is unclear how closely the ANNP works with the Soviet

²⁷³For one example, see A. Shishov, "The Large Problems of Small Peoples: At a Turning Point," *Sovetskaya Kultura*, February 11, 1989, 3, cited in *CDSP* 41, no. 14 (May 1989): 8-9.

²⁷⁴Dahl, "Indigenous Peoples of the Soviet North," 219.

²⁷⁵Evgenn Nefedov, "Poka yeshchyo yest' chistyie istoki." [At Present there are Still Clean Sources], *Pravda*, 1 October 1990, 3.

²⁷⁶Shinkarev, "Vernut' prava khozyaevam zemli," 3.

press, judging by coverage of northern issues leading up to the congress, one would expect that it is quite close.

However, it is interesting to note that since the late fall of 1990 there has been a noticeable decline in the number of articles in the press about the ANNP and northern native peoples. While this may indicate that the group has not been successful in communicating effectively with the press, it is more likely a consequence of the increasing preoccupation among the media with the current, critical conditions in the Soviet Union, and perhaps also to the public's overriding concern with their own conditions. Attention has been focused more on issues of "national" concern, such as inflation, rising unemployment and strikes, and political questions such as declarations of independence by several republics.

d. Financial Resources

In its Statutes the ANNP specified its sources of income as "voluntary contributions" by domestic and international organizations, including state institutions and private enterprises, and by citizens of the Soviet Union and foreign countries. The group also aspired to collect revenue from industrial enterprises and other associations that "produce consumer goods and souvenirs using the symbol and the emblem of the Association."²⁷⁷ The ANNP and any affiliated firm or association were "exempt from paying taxes, state customs duties and other kinds of contributions to the state budget of the USSR."²⁷⁸ To monitor its financial and economic activities, the ANNP established a Control Commission.

²⁷⁷"Programme," 51.

²⁷⁸"Statutes," 50.

The ANNP reportedly has received funding from both the RSFSR and All-Union levels of government.²⁷⁹ The Secretariat in Moscow apparently received its entire operating budget from the RSFSR government. The ANNP also is said to possess a bank account, to which contributions may be made by RSFSR ministries. It is not known, however, whether any such donations have been made.²⁸⁰ The fact that the group has secured some funding from the RSFSR government indicates a degree of commitment to the group, particularly because of current budgetary constraints. The ANNP's dependence on the government for financial resources may prove in the long run to be detrimental to the effectiveness of the group. The fact that the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada also largely relied on the government for its funding made the group subject to changing government priorities and objectives. When the government reduced its funding to the ITC, the group was affected directly. For example, the group's major publication, *Inuit Today*, was ultimately cancelled for lack of money. The project dealing with constitutional reform also saw its funding cancelled after the Meech Lake Accord was signed by the provincial and federal governments.

The monetary arrangements within the ANNP provide two-way funding between the central organization and the regional associations. In other words, the Council provides the regions with funding, and, when possible, the regions transfer some funding to the Council. As noted in the group's Statutes, there are provisions for the establishment of various enterprises and other profit-making projects. When the regional associations earn money through these projects, they are to send a portion of it to the group's Council. This provides another useful avenue for raising money for the group.

²⁷⁹Mr. Walter Slipchenko, interview.

²⁸⁰Mr. Gennady Oskolkov, interview.

Little more can be said about the financial situation of the ANNP. Exact monetary figures are unknown.²⁸¹ The Association obviously has enough funding to send representatives to international conferences, but there has been a scarcity of information on the activities of the ANNP within the USSR since shortly after its founding Congress of March 1990. The ability of the ANNP to secure financial resources and spend them wisely will be a critical factor in its future effectiveness. This aspect of the ANNP will have to be watched closely, especially given the current financial crisis in the USSR.

iv. Conclusion

Does the ANNP have qualities of a successful political interest group? Since its inception the ANNP has established itself, set out its objectives, planned its strategies and undertaken numerous activities. The group has managed to accomplish much during the one year of its existence.

First, the ANNP started out with a set of clearly articulated goals, and strategies to achieve them. The group's Statutes outlined its broader goals encompassing a wide range of contemporary concerns held by northern indigenous peoples. While a few of the objectives were not practical (such as the goal of preserving and promoting the culture of all 26 of the native groups), most of them were realistic and, in general, indicated a commitment to address seriously widespread problems among northern native peoples. The ANNP also drew up strategies (in its Programme) which closely correspond to its objectives, a further indication of the group's sound beginnings.

Second, the leadership of the ANNP is in a position to benefit the group. The group's leaders are affiliated with established Soviet institutions such as the CPSU and

²⁸¹Ibid. Mr. Oskolkov was unwilling to divulge exact sums of money related to the budget of the ANNP.

the RSFSR Writers' Union, and are members of the intelligentsia. These characteristics mean that the leadership has access to important decision-making bodies in the Soviet Union which provide the leaders with opportunities to articulate their objectives (which several leading native figures have done). The leadership indeed has appeared most active in this particular area. In fact, ANNP's president has already signed an international agreement regarding concerns shared by northern regions of the world. That the group's leaders have access to local, national and international bodies appears, in fact, to be the group's strongest quality as an interest group.

Third, the group has established territorial and national native associations. The decision to establish these regional affiliates is critical for a group comprising such a diversity of peoples. The regional and national associations assures representation of local indigenous peoples, while the territorial associations represent native peoples in the administrative divisions. This may promote the feeling among the regional native populations that progress is being made, and may consequently enhance support for the group.

Fourth, the group has been fairly successful in dealing with the Soviet media, as evidenced by the coverage it received around the time of its founding Congress. Native people themselves have been active in writing about and publicizing their problems and concerns.

Finally, the ANNP has secured funding from the USSR and RSFSR governments, indicating a certain commitment to the group on the part of the state. However, as shown in the case of the ITC, governments may change their views on the need for funding a certain group. So it is important for the ANNP not to be entirely dependent on state financial support. In fact, the ANNP has attempted to raise fund outside of the government. Unfortunately, nothing is known about the success of these efforts.

Along with these positive developments, the ANNP faces significant problems. First, internal cohesion in the ANNP is problematic. While the ANNP's apparently decentralized decision-making arrangement (with a central body and both territorial and national associations) is conducive to garnering support for the group at the local level, it is not certain that local views are incorporated in the decision-making process of the group. This, in fact, may be unlikely as the leadership is an (old-style) elite and seems to be running the group. The overlapping membership of the group may also provoke internal disunity. The proportion of CPSU members in the group, if it is reflected in the number of delegates to the founding Congress, may be opposed strongly by the general native population which is deeply suspicious of established Soviet institutions, particularly the Communist Party. In addition, the composition of the leadership, and perhaps even the membership, may not adequately represent the native population. The delegates to the founding Congress were primarily intellectuals, men and CPSU members.

Second, the leadership's affiliation with established Soviet institutions and the intelligentsia may be viewed negatively by the northern native population, as it may appear reflective of the native elite, and not of the broad indigenous population. Therefore, conflict is likely to occur, and in fact has already, between members and leaders. The leadership requires the support of the group's members in order to fulfill its mandate effectively, and so this conflict is likely to diminish the effectiveness of the group in realizing its goals.

The third factor deals with communications. Not much is known about the communications developed in the group, aside from the adoption by the ANNP of *Severnye Prostory* as its official mouthpiece. This magazine, however, is not likely to advance the group's goals, as it is produced only in Russian, and is run by an editorial board consisting of members of the intelligentsia who run the risk again of being seen by the native population as isolated from their concerns. If the group encourages

regional levels of the organization to pursue this aim, communications projects are more likely to have positive effects. Indeed, some local groups have taken steps on their own towards achieving the ANNP's goal of promoting native languages.²⁸²

Finally, the organizational management capabilities of the group are questionable. While the decision to create national associations was vital for the group and conducive to adequate representation of the native population, the decision to create territorial associations may prove to be an unnecessary layer of bureaucracy that hinders rather than helps in fulfilling the objectives of the ANNP.

The analysis of the ANNP shows that it possesses both positive and negative qualities. In the short-term the ANNP is not likely to meet with success, as it appears to have more qualities that undermine its effectiveness than support it in its bid for success. But the ANNP has not existed long enough to state what its long-term prospects are. To become an effective political interest group, however, it likely will have to change.

²⁸²"First Nivkh Language Paper Published," 87.

CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION

The purpose of this thesis was to analyze the newly established Association of Northern Native Peoples and to assess its effectiveness in enhancing the culture, autonomy, living conditions and way of life of its 26 constituent groups. Three conclusions have been drawn from this paper.

First, the analysis revealed the effectiveness of the ANNP. As determined in Chapter IV, the ANNP has a number of both negative and positive attributes. Among the former are the internal dynamics of the group, which do not appear conducive to the ANNP's success. Reasons for this include the fact that the ANNP leadership is connected with established state institutions, composed of CPSU members and intellectuals and is therefore unrepresentative of the general native population. It is not known whether local views are incorporated in the decision making process of the group or not. The official mouthpiece of the group, *Severnnye Prostory* appears not to be significantly assisting the ANNP towards its objectives. In fact, the regional associations appear to be taking the lead in communications projects that are of more direct benefit to the local indigenous populations. All of these factors indicate a rather oligarchical structure "on the inside"¹ of the group. Conflict has already occurred between the ANNP's members and leaders.

The analysis has also shown that the group has a number of points in its favour. The group started out with clearly articulated, realistic objectives, and corresponding strategies to realize them. Furthermore, the leadership characteristics noted above may actually benefit the group by obtaining access to important decision making bodies in the Soviet Union. The ANNP has been active at the both national and international levels. Access to decision making points may be the group's most

¹Truman, *Governmental Process*, 139-155.

advantageous feature. Finally, the group has secured some funding from the state, and, by trying to raise money outside of the government, is taking one step towards being less vulnerable to fluctuations in government policy regarding financial support.

So, the ANNP has both positive and negative attributes, which appear to diminish the group's effectiveness in the short-term. Because the group has only been in existence for one year, it is premature to state definitively its long-term prospects for success. However, there may be ways in which the ANNP may become more effective as a political interest group. For example, attempts may be made to overcome the breach between the leadership and the membership by involving the regions more in the decision making process at the centre. This might enhance the internal cohesion of the group. Perhaps another way to augment the effectiveness of the ANNP is to encourage the national and territorial associations to become more active at the local level in attempts to resolve regional problems. It has already been noted that the regions seem to be having a degree of success more than the central body of the ANNP. Possessing greater power within the group may make the regions even more able to resolve issues of concern to northern native peoples.

The second conclusion of this paper is that the analytical framework worked well as a way to examine critically the ANNP. As seen in Chapter IV, the framework allowed the systematic analysis of the group, and was a useful analytical tool as it determined both the strong and the weak points of the group. As research for the chapter progressed, and as information was gathered, the framework facilitated examination of new factors by having clearly defined criteria and allowing new information to be incorporated into the overall framework with relative ease.

The third conclusion concerns the application of the interest group approach to the study of Soviet politics. The analytical framework of Chapter II was

developed for an associational interest group in the Soviet Union, based on a number of Western interest group concepts. While previously these concepts were inappropriate to apply to the study of Soviet political interest groups, recent changes in the political system in the Soviet Union are sufficiently significant to warrant this type of application. In the case of the ANNP, these interest group concepts were applied successfully. At present, the associational interest group is a viable political concept to study certain Soviet organizations.

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