1

National Library
of Canada

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Canadian Theses Service

Service des thèses canadiennes

Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0N4

NOTICE

The quality of this microform is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us an inferior photocopy.

Previously copyrighted materials (journal articles, published tests, etc.) are not filmed.

Reproduction in full or in part of this microform is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act, R S C. 1970, c. C-30.

AVIS

La qualité de cette microforme dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise au microfilmage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction.

S'il manque des pages, veuillez communiquer avec l'université qui a conféré le grade.

La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer, surtout si les pages originales ont été dactylographiées à l'aide d'un ruban usé ou si l'université nous a fait parvenir une photocopie de qualité inférieure.

Les documents qui font déjà l'objet d'un droit d'auteur (articles de revue, tests publiés, etc.) ne sont pas microfilmés.

La reproduction, même partielle, de cette microforme est soumise à la Loi canadienne sur le droit d'auteur, SRC 1970, c. C-30.

THE COLONIAL LEGACY IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM OF
A POST-COLONIAL STATE: THE CASE OF BANGLADESH,
1971-1985

BY

MD. ABDUL HAKIM

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN
POLITICAL SCIENCE

CARLETON UNIVERSITY
OTTAWA, CANADA

1987

(c) Md. Abdul Hakim

Permission has been granted to the National Library of Canada to microfilm this thesis, and to lend or sell copies of the film.

The author (copyright owner) has reserved other publication rights, and neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without his/her written permission.

L'autorisation a été accordée à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de microfilmer cette thèse et de prêter ou de vendre des exemplaires du film.

L'auteur (titulaire du droit d'auteur) se réserve les autres droits de publication; ni la thèse ni de longs extraits de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation écrite.

ISBN 0-315-39369-6

The undersigned hereby recommend to
The Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
acceptance of the thesis,

"THE COLONIAL LEGACY IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM OF A
POST-COLONIAL STATE: THE CASE OF BANGLADESH, 1971-1985"

submitted by

Md. Abdul Hakim, B.A., M.A.

in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

.....
Chairman, Department of
Political Science

.....
Thesis Supervisor

.....
External Examiner

Carleton University

August 14, 1987

ABSTRACT

Comparative public administration literature is replete with a plethora of conceptual frameworks to understand the nature of public bureaucracies. While some scholars argue that regime type is a very crucial determinant of the nature of public bureaucracies, some others assert that to understand the public bureaucracies of those countries that experienced prolonged bureaucratic administration what is more important than regime type is historical bureaucratic tradition. This dissertation seeks to enrich this on-going debate by examining the empirical validity of these frameworks by using Bangladesh as a case study.

The three areas on which this thesis has focused are administrative reform efforts, the specialist-generalist relationship, and the impact of the bureaucracy on rural development. By analyzing the administrative reform efforts in Bangladesh, both before and after independence in 1971, this study demonstrates that despite the eagerness of the ruling political elite and repeated recommendations by many reform commissions, far-reaching changes in the country's administration have not been introduced. The reform measures that have been adopted can at best be called "cosmetic".

Bangladesh has retained the British colonial tradition of generalism, as opposed to specialism, despite its well acknowledged dysfunctionality in an age of technological revolution. All attempts to award the specialists a reasonable share in the policy process have been thwarted by a powerful generalist cadre that views itself as the descendant of what Lloyd George once called the "steel frame" of British administration in India.

The colonial tradition of exercising bureaucratic control over the functioning of local government institutions has persisted very well in Bangladesh. A close examination even of the recently constituted and apparently autonomous Upazila Parishad reveals that bureaucratic control has not been really weakened over this body which is supposed to be the main agent of "decentralized development".

Our main conclusion is that the administrative system of countries like Bangladesh that suffered colonial rule for many decades is strongly shaped by the colonial bureaucratic tradition. Only an all-out effort can break that tradition.

TO MY PARENTS
WHO DIED LONG BEFORE I GRADUATED
FROM ELEMENTARY SCHOOL

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It is simply impossible to mention here the names of all those people who in different ways and capacities helped me to make this study possible. I apologize to those whose names do not appear here but helped me enormously. I have my deep regard for them. My deepest gratitude is to Professor D.C. Rowat, the supervisor of this thesis, who with great patience provided me with inspiring guidance, compassionate encouragement and perceptive criticism in every stage of this work. He was never too busy in giving prompt and constructive feedback on each chapter of this study. I gratefully acknowledge my indebtedness to him. I am also highly grateful to both Professors E.L. Tepper and V. Subramaniam for making time from their busy schedule to read this dissertation. Professor Tepper has been a source of constant encouragement and academic stimulation.

Dr. S.G. Ahmed of Dhaka University and Dr. A.S. Huque of Chittagong University helped me in collecting some documents vital to this thesis. It is my pleasant duty to express my thanks to them.

During my stay in Ottawa, my nephew Sarwar kept me constantly informed through hundreds of letters from Bangladesh about the well-being of our large family. I express my affection for him.

Finally, my wife Farhana had to spend many lonely evenings and weekends as I kept myself preoccupied with academic pursuits. With deep respect I acknowledge her sacrifice.

For any error and omission in this study I am alone responsible.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ABSTRACT	i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	iv
INTRODUCTION	1
Endnotes	15
Chapter I: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY	17
Statement of the Problem	18
Definition of Key Concepts	33
A Basis for Analysis	40
Significance of the Study	49
Methodological Explanation	51
Endnotes	54
Chapter II: EARLY ADMINISTRATIONS IN INDIA	59
Mughal Administration	60
East India Company Administration (1600-1857)	66
Administration Under the British Crown (1859-1947)	80
Endnotes	97
Chapter III: THE COLONIAL LEGACY IN PAKISTAN ADMINISTRATION (1947-71)	103
Bureaucracy in the Initial Years of Pakistan	104
The Structure of the Public Service	112
The CSP as Successor to ICS	120
Administrative Reforms in Pakistan	126
Bureaucracy and People's Participation in Rural Development	143
Endnotes	153
Chapter IV: IMPACT OF A MAJOR CHANGE OF REGIME ON THE BUREAUCRACY IN BANGLADESH, 1971-75	161
Awami League and Bengali Nationalism	162
Populist Character of Awami League Government	167
Intra-Bureaucratic Conflict	171
Awami League and Job Security of Officials	175

	Page
Lateral Entry of Professionals in Administration	177
Administrative Reform Efforts	181
The "Second Revolution"	196
Conclusion	199
Endnotes	201
 Chapter V: ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM EFFORTS IN POST-MUJIB BANGLADESH	 207
The Political Setting of Administrative Reform	208
The Need for Administrative Reform	213
Administrative Reform Efforts	219
Conclusion	239
Endnotes	241
 Chapter VI: SPECIALIST-GENERALIST RELATIONSHIP	 246
Attempts to Improve the Status of Professionals	249
Reasons for the Failure of Reform Efforts	254
Complaints of the Specialists	257
Responses of the Generalists	263
Conclusion	267
Endnotes	275
 Chapter VII: OFFICIAL CONTROL OVER LOCAL BODIES - AN IMPEDIMENT TO RURAL DEVELOPMENT	 278
The Colonial Experience	281
Bureaucratic Approach of Basic Democracies	283
Survival of Bureaucratic Approach under Mujib Government	288
Experiment with Gram Sarkar	294
Recent Programme of Decentralization	300
Problems and Prospects of Rural Development under the Recent Programme	310
Conclusion	319
Endnotes	322
 CONCLUSION	 327
Summary of the Findings	336
Applicability of Findings in Some South Asian Ex-British Colonies	338
Importance of Bureaucratic Inheritance Compared with Regime Type	349
Endnotes	352
 BIBLIOGRAPHY	 354

INTRODUCTION

Developing countries striving to achieve socio-economic development of their impoverished people need an efficient and committed administrative service. Most developing countries are not lucky enough in this regard. A crucial dilemma for many of these countries is that, on the one hand, their rapid socio-economic development means that government undertakes many activities and operations that might well be left to private enterprises in countries with mature economies, and on the other hand, the bureaucracies of these countries lack managerial skill and competence to carry out these elaborate development programmes.¹ Along with other factors, this contributes directly to the widespread hunger, malnutrition, disease, illiteracy, apathy and frustration.

Western governments, as well as scholars, motivated by their common concern for the deplorable conditions that exist in many developing countries, undertook programmes geared toward making the administrative machinery of these countries competent enough to shoulder the herculean task of socio-economic upliftment. The effort in "the placing of public administration advisers in more than fifty countries, the undertaking of several hundred projects in administrative improvement, and the training of several thousand officials in the United States"² is just an example of only the American concern over the issue. It was assumed by the technical assistance programme sponsored by the United Nations and some Western countries, especially the United States, that once

some management techniques which were developed and proved highly functional in the Western contexts could be diffused on a large scale to the developing countries, massive administrative improvement would automatically follow. The high euphoria of the foreign experts soon evaporated as the diffusion efforts did not produce the results calculated initially.³ It has been pointed out that the top-level administrators in countries with a long tradition of British and French colonial rule "are generally hostile to the scientific, mechanistic, egalitarian, and anti-intellectual bias of American public administration".⁴ The strong European administrative legacy in these countries led Joseph LaPalombara to write:

That the ability of these countries to resist American efforts to "modernize" public administration is formidable is clearly discernible in the reports of federal administrators and academicians - many of them experts in "O and M", personnel, classification systems, budgeting, and planning, etc. - who ventured abroad with great expectations, only to have their hopes shattered by the discovery that, even where institutional transfer is achieved, the consequences are often unanticipated. Thus, --- it is hazardous to conclude that the heavy investments of money and men pay the anticipated dividends.⁵

In the last few decades several Afro-Asian and Latin American countries have established institutes and schools of public administration, either by their own initiatives or with aid from external foundations and governments. Some of these countries are: Bangladesh, Brazil, India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, Philippines, Tanzania, and Thailand. The prime objective of these institutes and schools is to provide public

administration training and, to search out the major flaws in the existing administrative system and to suggest necessary changes in order to enhance the public policy formulation as well as implementation capability of the system.

While it would be unjust to argue that the above-mentioned efforts do not have any impact on the administration of developing countries, the real outcome of these efforts falls much short of expectations. In an era of social and political upheavals, the discipline and practice of public administration have not demonstrated sufficient imagination and adaptability.⁶ Therefore, in many Asian countries the trend today is to think of public administration either "as a discipline with no bearing on the process of national development" or "as an instrument for the maintenance of the existing system of law and order".⁷ This unhealthy state of the discipline and practice of public administration raises a plethora of fundamental and interrelated questions: why is the administration in many developing countries not marked by imagination and adaptability? Why is there a heavy emphasis on the maintenance of law-and-order rather than on innovative aspects of administration? Why is the administration in many developing countries not yet ready to play a significant role in national development? However, the question that is more fundamental than these is: what determines the role, ideology, structure and behaviour pattern of the bureaucracy? It is obvious that the nature of bureaucracy is not

determined by any single factor, i.e., political, social, cultural, economic, or external. The structure and function of bureaucracy are rather shaped by an intensive interplay of these diverse factors. However, it can be assumed that some factors have more decisive influence in shaping the structure and function of bureaucracy than others. It can also be assumed that the factor having the most influence in shaping the structure and function of the bureaucracy of a particular country or group of countries may not be so important for other countries that may have a completely different socio-economic, political, and cultural experience.

Contradictory statements⁴ have been made by scholars in their search for the theoretical condition that might be helpful to understand the role, status, ideology and behaviour of bureaucracy. The positions of some scholars on this issue will be briefly outlined here, and an extensive discussion will be presented in chapter one. In the classical Weberian bureaucratic model various ideal types of bureaucracy were linked directly to what Weber considered to be the crucial aspect of the political system, the form of legitimation acceptable to various types of society.⁸ The argument of Weber has been reinforced in the writings of many social scientists of recent decades. For example, Alfred Diamant has argued that the evidence from many developing countries has shown that the form of legitimacy system substantially shapes the organization and functioning of the administrative

system.⁹ And Ferrel Heady finds that regime type can be profitably used to distinguish among the bureaucracies of the developing countries.¹⁰ A similar argument, that a country's type of political regime strongly influences, if not determines, the nature of its bureaucracy, has also been put forward by scholars such as Milton J. Esman,¹¹ Merle Fainsod,¹² and others.

Some researchers do not advocate the above line of reasoning and speculate that "historical bureaucratic tradition" could be very useful to explain the nature and behaviour of the public service of those developing countries in which there is a firmly entrenched tradition of the civil service.¹³

Because of these contending lines of thought, a hypothesis this study attempts to investigate is: the type of political regime is more important than colonial bureaucratic inheritance in determining the nature of bureaucracy. Bangladesh (1971-85) is a good case to explore this hypothesis because it is a post-colonial country that has a long tradition of civil service. At the same time, the country has experienced a wide variation in its regime type ranging from a populist regime headed by a charismatic leader to a military regime. Thus the case of Bangladesh can be considered a good case for testing this hypothesis.

If regime type is more important than colonial bureaucratic inheritance in determining the nature of

bureaucracy, then one would expect a significant change in the nature of Bangladesh bureaucracy under various regimes, especially under the populist regime of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (1971-75). This regime is of primary importance to explore the above hypothesis for several reasons. First, in all the major movements against the "internal colonialism" of Pakistan the Bengali nationalist leaders and their lieutenants voiced their extreme hatred against the age-old structure, egocentric behaviour, and conservative ideology of the Pakistan bureaucracy and expressed their strong pledge to overhaul the administrative system so that it could effectively respond to people's aspirations. This feeling is reflected in the Awami League manifesto that states: "The existing administrative machinery was designed to discharge the functions of a colonial government. It needs to be radically re-structured in order to serve the needs of a dynamic, democratic society".¹⁴ Only a few months after the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent country Sheikh Mujib reiterated the earlier pledge of his party in his address to the nation over radio and television when he said:

We inherited a colonial administrative system unsuitable and inadequate for a free nation. There were elements in the administrative machinery which were slow in getting over the colonial attitude. Still now the old bureaucratic mentality persists in some quarters. We urge these elements to realise the meaning of an independent national government. We hope their backward-looking outlook will change. My government will recast the entire administrative machinery to suit the new state and new social order.¹⁵

Secondly, the Awami League achieved substantial success in developing party-oriented interest groups especially among students, workers, peasants, and youths with potentiality to provide inputs for shaping the public policies as well as mobilizing support to facilitate effective implementation of the policies. The Awami League as a political party seemed well prepared in terms of organization, skill and expertise to launch an attack on the colonial legacy in administration. Finally, the source of legitimation of the Awami League regime was much wider than the preceding regimes in Pakistan. The elections of 1970 in which the Awami League was awarded an overwhelming mandate to rule was the first general election in Pakistan since it emerged as an independent country in 1947 from the British colonial rule. None of the regimes in "united" Pakistan did have as strong a claim to legitimacy as the Awami League had in Bangladesh. It would, therefore, be interesting to examine the extent to which the nationalist leaders of the Awami League who took over as the ruling political elite of Bangladesh were successful in overhauling the colonial administrative system.

The thesis will show that the populist regime of Sheikh Mujib despite all its good intentions and potentiality to restructure the inherited administrative system, did not achieve much success in this regard. Although the regime initially took some harsh measures to curb the authoritarian, elitist, and "steel-frame" mentality of the elite cadre of the

bureaucracy, ultimately the regime realized that it needed the active cooperation of the higher-level bureaucracy to materialize its promise and dream of "Golden Bengal" and to keep the society under its close control. This led to the regime's increasing dependence on the bureaucracy. The higher bureaucracy thus thwarted the attempts of the ruling political elite to institute any major change in the administrative system of Bangladesh in almost the same fashion as it did before in the united Pakistan.

The thesis will also demonstrate that the successor regimes that have ruled Bangladesh since 1975 were not very successful either in breaking the colonial tradition in the administration of Bangladesh. These regimes, like their predecessors, also attempted to restructure the administrative system in order to make it viable and competent to meet the needs of an independent country. But the changes these regimes were able to institute could very well be termed "cosmetic".

For the purpose of testing our hypothesis fully, three issue areas will be examined in detail: (i) administrative reform efforts; (ii) the generalist-specialist relationship; and (iii) the relationship between the bureaucracy and people's participation in rural development.

An explanation of why these three issue areas are examined is warranted here. First, a new country drowned in mass poverty, massive unemployment, extensive illiteracy, and

unprecedented hunger, needs a well-conceived socio-economic programme to improve the fate of the millions of destitutes. The proper implementation of any socio-economic programme needs an administrative service committed enough to improve the social and material fortune of the masses and also willing to work with them. The elitist, paternalistic, authoritarian bureaucracy that the British built in India and kept almost intact in Pakistan was completely at odds with the spirit of such development programmes. This brings the question of reforming the bureaucracy to the fore. All major attempts to bring about any substantial change in the administrative system of Pakistan had been strongly and successfully resisted by the higher bureaucracy. This study will therefore examine the administrative reform efforts in Bangladesh to institute a sharp break with the inherited colonial administrative tradition, and their consequences.

Second, Pakistan inherited a very strong British tradition that the policy-making functions could be best performed by the public servants whose "dominant professional value---has been that of classical generalism or guardianship similar conceptually to confucian and platonic canons".¹⁶ Because of such glorification of the generalist tradition the technical specialists were denied access to strategic policy-making and administrative positions within the bureaucracy. The specialists complained about their secondary role in the policy process, low rate of pay, less promotional

opportunity, and low status vis-a-vis the generalist. The subordination of the technically trained officials to the generalists fomented animosity between these two groups in the administration. This type of relationship between the generalist and specialist saps the resource development so badly needed by the new countries. Almost all major administrative reform commissions/committees in Pakistan proposed changes to the practice of generalist domination with a view to establishing a relationship of equality between these two groups and to facilitate proper resource development. But due to strong resistance by the generalist administrators such proposals could not be implemented fully. This study, therefore, examines the generalist-specialist relationship in Bangladesh administration in order to demonstrate that the extent to which the British and the Pakistani tradition still persisted.

Third, rural development is increasingly becoming the main focus of governmental development programmes in many developing countries, given the fact that an overwhelming percentage of the population of these countries lives in the rural areas. Rural development presupposes an administrative machinery that is task-oriented rather than status-oriented and willing to work among the people to encourage them to make the best possible utilization of the locally available resources for the development of their own locality. The British in India did not emphasize the "development" aspects

of administration for understandable reasons. The inherited British value of elitism coupled with Pakistan's bureaucratic approach to rural development was the main hindrance to the widespread people's involvement in rural development projects. This study, therefore, seeks to ~~examine~~ the approaches adopted in Bangladesh to encourage mass participation in rural development programmes and the extent to which official control over local government and rural development has been relaxed in Bangladesh.

The rest of this study is divided into seven major chapters and the conclusion. Chapter one includes the statement of the problem, a basis for analysis, the theoretical significance of the study, and an explanation of the methodology used. Chapter two provides a brief history of the administrative evolution in India under the Mughal and the British rule in order to identify the administrative structure, values, and norms that the British implanted in India. This will set the background of the administrative system that Pakistan inherited from the British when Pakistan emerged as an independent country. Chapter three analyses why and how the colonial administrative system that Pakistan inherited persisted so well despite repeated attempts by the successive Pakistani regimes to restructure it. Chapter four focuses on the role of the Awami League in generating the spirit of Bengali nationalism and the party's popularity among the Bengali masses. This will be done to

show the organizational strength and potentiality of the party to fulfill its earlier pledge of restructuring the colonial administrative system. The chapter will show that despite the party's repeated commitment, both before and after independence, the party ultimately retreated from its avowed position. An analysis of why the party failed to act according to its pledge will also be attempted in this chapter.

While chapter four will confine its focus specifically to the Mujib regime, the next major chapters of this study will deal with the regimes that ruled Bangladesh between 1975-85. Chapter five explores the administrative reform efforts of these regimes, the success and failure of these efforts, and the nature of the resistance that these efforts faced. Although in chapter five there will be occasional references about the generalist-specialist relationship as suggested by the administrative reform reports, chapter six will analyze in detail the generalist-specialist relationship in administration and the main obstacles to establishing a relationship of equality between these two groups. An attempt will be made to reveal the nature of animosity between these groups which substantially hinders effective coordination of administrative operations.

Chapter seven examines the measures adopted in Bangladesh to encourage people's participation in the rural development activities and the extent to which the approach to rural development is non-bureaucratic. The conclusion of the

thesis will include a brief summary of the major findings; the applicability of these findings to other countries of South Asia; and the importance of bureaucratic inheritance compared with regime type in determining the nature of bureaucracy.

Endnotes

1. J. Donald Kingsley, "Bureaucracy and Political Development, with Particular Reference to Nigeria", in Joseph LaPalombara, ed., Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 314.
2. David S. Brown, "Strategies and Tactics of Public Administration Technical Assistance: 1945-1963", in J.D. Montgomery and W.J. Siffin, eds., Approaches to Development (New York: McGraw Hill, 1966), p. 219.
3. Jose V. Abueva, "Administrative Doctrines Diffused in Developing States: The Filipino Response" (Paper presented for the International Conference on Theoretical Problems of Administrative Reform in Developing States, Lake Como, July 16-22, 1967).
4. Joseph LaPalombara, "An Overview of Bureaucracy and Political Development", in Joseph LaPalombara, ed., op. cit., p. 19.
5. Ibid.
6. Hahn-Been Lee, "The Concept, Structure and Strategy of Administrative Reform: An Introduction", in Hahn-Been Lee and Abelardo G. Samonte, eds., Administrative Reforms in Asia (Manila, Philippines: Eastern Regional Organization for Public Administration, 1970), p. 1.
7. Ibid.
8. Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, translated and edited by Hans Gerth and C.W. Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946).
9. Alfred Diamant, "Bureaucracy in Developmental Movement Regimes", in Fred W. Riggs, ed., Frontiers of Development Administration (Durham: Duke University Press, 1970), pp. 509-10.
10. Ferrel Heady, Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective (New York: Marcel Dekker, second ed., 1979), p. 267.
11. Milton J. Esman, "The Politics of Development Administration", in J.D. Montgomery and W.J. Siffin, eds., op. cit., pp. 59-112.
12. Merle Fainsod, "Bureaucracy and Modernization: The Russian and Soviet Case", in Joseph LaPalombara, ed., op. cit., pp. 233-67.

13. Metin Heper, Chong Lim Kim, and Seong-Tong Pai, "The Role of Bureaucracy and Regime Types: A Comparative Study of Turkish and South Korean Higher Civil Servants", Administration and Society 12, No. 2 (August 1980), pp. 137-57.
14. "Awami League Manifesto", in Bangladesh Document (Publication Division, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, n.d.), p. 70.
15. "Prime Minister Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's Address to the Nation on the Occasion of the First Anniversary of Independence", Bangladesh Document 1, (January '72-June '73), External Publicity Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, p. 10.
16. Ralph Braibanti, "The Civil Service of Pakistan: A Theoretical Analysis", South Atlantic Quarterly 58, (Spring 1959), p. 262.

Chapter 1
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY

The purpose of this chapter is mainly to set the theoretical perspective of this study. The chapter is divided into several sections focusing on the main problem the study is dealing with, the definition of the key concepts, a basis for analysis, the theoretical and practical significance of the study, and an explanation of the methodology used.

Statement of the Problem

As mentioned in the introduction, this study seeks to explore whether regime type has been more important than historical-bureaucratic inheritance in determining the nature of Bangladesh bureaucracy. It can be easily noticed that most of the theoretical works that have focused on the determinants of the bureaucracy's nature fall within the scope of comparative public administration literature. Therefore, in this section a brief review of the comparative public administration literature that has specifically addressed this issue will be attempted in order to highlight the problem this study deals with.

A very clear sign of parochialism in the public administration literature prior to the Second World War was the lack of emphasis on the comparative aspects of administration. Most public administration scholars "concentrated on the local scene, with only incidental references to other systems of administration".¹ Since the war comparative public administration as an academic

discipline has been gaining prominence and momentum. The heavy outpouring of books, journals, monographs, conferences, teaching courses, and institutes related to comparative public administration bears testimony to this fact. The discipline of public administration has ventured into this new arena for two prominent reasons. Firstly, some scholars realized that, in order to establish "a body of generalized principles" of public administration, cross-cultural analysis of administrative systems was unavoidable. In a path-breaking essay Robert A. Dahl wrote:

...the comparative aspects of public administration have largely been ignored; and as long as the study of public administration is not comparative, claims for "a science of public administration" sound rather hollow. Conceivably there might be a science of American public administration and a science of British public administration and a science of French public administration; but can there be a "science of public administration" in the sense of a body of generalized principles independent of their peculiar national setting? ²

Secondly, the emergence of comparative public administration as an academic field can be viewed as the direct consequence of increasing emphasis on comparative study in other social science disciplines. The glaring manifestation of this lies in the fact that comparative public administration has borrowed many of its concepts and constructs from other social science disciplines.

We now turn to a review of some of the major conceptual constructs that have been developed in the comparative public administration literature to study cross-national

administrative systems. Although the comparative public administration movement got its momentum in the past few decades, Max Weber (1864-1920), the famous German sociologist, can be considered the precursor of comparative public administration because of his typology of authority systems which eventually generated a tremendous amount of appreciation as well as adverse criticism.

Let us put Weber's typology of authority systems in its proper context. Weber defined power as "the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance..."³ But he was more interested in a special type of authority relationship than in power generally. Weber defined authority as "the probability that a command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons".⁴ In an authority relationship the ruler believes that he has the right to issue a command and the ruled feel that they have an obligation to honour the command issued by the ruler. This provided the foundation on which Weber erected the whole edifice of his typology of authority systems. He classified authority systems into legal rational authority, traditional authority, and charismatic authority. A brief account of Weber's three types of authority systems is given below.

Legal Rational Authority

In a legal rational authority system people believe that someone issuing a command is just acting in accordance with the legally set procedures. So the people feel that they owe an obedience to this legally established impersonal rule which is rational in character. The main characteristics of administration in a legal rational authority system are: a very high degree of functional specialization, a hierarchical authority structure with well-defined areas of authority and responsibility, impersonality of interpersonal relationships, recruitment and promotion of officials based on ability and technical competence, differentiation of official and private income of the incumbent, etc. How are these characteristics linked with one another? Weber's answer is: a system of control based on rational and impersonal rules trying to regulate the process and structure of administration with the aim of achieving maximum possible efficiency.

Traditional Authority

This type of authority system thrives on the basis of "sanctity" of order. The ruler believes that his inherited status empowers him to issue orders and the ruled feel an obligation to honour the orders in accordance with custom and memorial tradition which enjoy a predominant influence on the value system of individuals and groups of individuals. As the source of legitimacy in a traditional authority system is

significantly different from that for legal rational authority, Weber argues that the main characteristics of administration in a traditional authority system would also be quite different from those of a legal rational authority system. The major features of administration in a traditional authority system are: recruitment and promotion based on personal contact with and loyalty to the ruler rather than on ability and technical competence; no defined spheres of command and responsibility or rational ordering of office in a hierarchy, or regular appointments and promotions; personal control of the chief over the whole administration; dependence of staff on the whim of the chief for their term of office; etc. Although the chief enjoys the supreme and unchallengeable position in the traditional authority system, because of administrative decentralization the staff may emerge as the de facto power holders.

Charismatic Authority

Legitimation of authority in this type is derived from the 'charisma' (the "gift of grace") or the superhuman and extraordinary qualities of the ruler. The people pay their allegiance to the ruler and the commands issued by him because they can easily perceive his superhuman qualities which make him somebody very different from ordinary mortals. Thus, the basis of authority in this type of system is neither the prescribed rational and impersonal rules nor the highly

influential customs and traditions, but rather the gifted personal qualities like heroism, oratory power, supernatural quality and the like, with which the ruler is endowed. A charismatic authority system breaks down when the followers can observe a substantial decline in the charisma of their leader, who is abandoned by them as a result. The main characteristics of administration in a charismatic authority system are: there is no administrative staff in pure form, only followers and disciples; there are no legal rules; disciples are chosen on the basis of charismatic qualities; no appointments, promotions, hierarchy, specified spheres of competence, salary; unlike traditional authority, not bound by precedent; etc.

The three types of authority system elaborated by Weber are "ideal types"⁵ which cannot be found in their conceptual purity in any empirical reality. Weber made it very clear that empirical situations could be a blending of all these three types in widely varying combinations. He used the methodology of ideal type constructs as a conceptual tool for the heuristic purpose of understanding social phenomena better and for furthering social analysis. Nevertheless, Weber's methodology of ideal type construct and his analysis of administrative structures and their functioning under different forms of legitimation of power have been criticized by many scholars in the last few decades.⁶ What is most important here for our purpose is the fact that Weber directly

linked the nature of administration to the form of legitimation acceptable to various types of society.

Weber's analysis of administrative systems has also been criticized for its inadequacy to conceptualize administration in developing countries. The bureaucracies in the developing countries diverge so sharply either from the legal rational type or from the traditional type that any attempt to comprehend the bureaucracies of these countries with the help of such dichotomous constructs might mislead the researchers.⁷ Although Weber's analysis obviously needs some modification and expansion, no other model in the study of public administration can match it in detail, clarity, rigour, broadness, and simplicity.⁸ Talcott Parsons argues, "Probably Weber's analysis of authority even as it stands constitutes the most highly developed and broadly applicable conceptual scheme in any comparable field which is available, not only in the specifically sociological literature but in that of social science as a whole".⁹

The inadequacy of Weber's analysis to analyze administration in developing countries led Fred W. Riggs to develop the ecological approach to the study of public administration.¹⁰ However, the origin of an ecological approach to the study of public administration can be traced to the work of John M. Gaus, Leonard D. White and Marshall E. Dimock.¹¹ The approach was later elaborated further by John M. Gaus.¹² He wrote, "An ecological approach to

public administration builds...quite literally from the ground up; from the elements of a place -- soils, climate, location, for example -- to the people who live there -- their numbers and ages and knowledge, and the ways of physical and social technology by which from the place and in relationship with one another, they get their living".¹³ Robert Dahl¹⁴ and Roscoe Martin¹⁵ have also highly emphasized the need to study the ecology of public administration to understand administrative phenomena better.

It was, however, Fred Riggs who lifted the ecological approach from its rudimentary stage to its present enriched stage. He contends that a perfect comparative study of administration ought to be analytical, nomothetic, and ecological as opposed to normative, idiographic, and non-ecological.¹⁶ The basic premise of the ecological approach to the study of public administration is that bureaucracy is just one of the many sub-systems in a society and as a sub-system it is in constant interaction with other sub-systems, i.e., political, cultural, economic, etc. So to understand the structure and function of bureaucracy better, one must study it in the context of other societal sub-systems with which the bureaucracy is interacting continuously. Riggs drew the main inspiration of developing an ecological approach from the structural-functionalism of Talcott Parsons and P.X. Sutton. The typologies of "Agraria" and "Industria" that he developed to compare the administrative systems of developing

and developed countries¹⁷ have been criticized for being too general and too abstract.¹⁸ These shortcomings ultimately led Riggs to replace the typologies of *Agraria* and *Industria* with a more elaborate scheme of constructs dealing with the "fused", "prismatic", and "diffracted" societies.¹⁹

Riggs has constructed deductive models of societies on the basis of contrasting assumptions about the relationship between their social structures and the number of functions these structures usually perform. Thus, a structure can be "functionally specific" or it can be "functionally diffuse". Riggs names the societies with functionally specific structures as "diffracted" and functionally diffuse societies as "fused". A "prismatic" society occupies an intermediate position between these two polar ends of a continuum, implying that it is a semi-differentiated society in which traits of fused and diffracted societies exist side by side. The main features of a prismatic society as identified by Riggs are "heterogeneity", "formalism", and "overlapping".²⁰ He opines that these traits can be found in prismatic society as well as in the "prismatic-sala", by which he means the administration in a prismatic society. What is most relevant here to our purpose is that Riggs has viewed the administrative sub-system as a replica of the greater social system in which it operates. In essence, Riggs argues that the administrative system of a country, which is in constant

interaction with the political, economic, and socio-cultural system, is shaped by them.

Although Riggs has made a significant contribution to the comparative study of public administration through his theory of the prismatic society, the theory has spawned widespread criticisms.²¹ Ramesh K. Arora has criticized the prismatic theory for its pronounced "Western bias" and for the "negative character" attached to the prismatic society. He writes:

Riggs uses terms like "normlessness", "ritualism", "mimetic", "donative expenditure", "bazaar-canteen", "subsidized canteen", "myths", "double-talk", "interference complex", and "dependency syndrome" to characterize the functioning of a prismatic society. Unquestionably, such terms are value-laden...The model implies that the "negative" and "negative alone" is the "real" in a prismatic society.²²

Michael L. Monroe has criticized the prismatic theory of Riggs because it has not taken into consideration the prismatic traits so prominent in diffracted societies such as the United States.²³ Robert H. Jackson points out that the prismatic theory of Riggs is so preoccupied with his analysis of the structure of the environment of the administrative system that the administrative system itself has been relegated to the periphery of his analysis. Jackson argues that the Riggian prismatic theory is "relatively more successful as a conceptualization of developing social systems than as an analysis of the place of administration in such a system".²⁴

We can now make a brief comparative study of the analyses of Weber and Riggs, as far as cross-national administrative

patterns are concerned. Each of them has provided three deductively derived ideal types to explain administrative systems cross-nationally. But one significant difference in the approaches of these two scholars lies in the criteria they used to construct the ideal types. While Weber has used the criterion of legitimacy associated with the authority system, Riggs has used the criterion of structural differentiation. Weberian and Riggsian analyses also differ in the type of society each scholar has mainly focused on. While the main thrust of Weberian analyses is the nature of administration within a legal rational authority, the main objective of Riggsian analyses is to highlight the nature of administration in a prismatic society.²⁵

An important trend that has emerged in the last few decades in the literature of comparative public administration suggests the predominance of political elements in determining the role of bureaucracies cross-nationally. Thus, Merle Fainsod has provided a typology of bureaucracies on the basis of "the relationship of bureaucracies to the flow of political authority".²⁶ The five different forms of bureaucracies that he has distinguished using this criterion are: (1) representative bureaucracies, (2) party-state bureaucracies, (3) military dominated bureaucracies, (4) ruler-dominated bureaucracies, and (5) ruling bureaucracies. Inherent in Fainsod's analysis is the argument that the role of bureaucracies is determined by the surrounding political

structures with which the bureaucracies are in constant interaction. Further, the role of a bureaucracy changes with a change of surrounding political structures.

The same type of reasoning has also been adopted by Ferrel Heady who seems to perceive the public bureaucracy as a sub-system of the political system in which it operates. This interpretation is supported by the following quotation from Heady:

The environment of bureaucracy may be visualized as a series of concentric circles, with bureaucracy at the centre. The smallest circle generally has the most decisive influence, and the larger circles represent a descending order of importance as far as bureaucracy is concerned. We may visualize the largest circle as representing all of society or the general social system. The next circle represents the economic system or the economic aspect of the social system. The inner circle is the political system; it encloses the administrative sub-system and bureaucracy as one of its elements.²⁷

What is most significant here for our purpose is Heady's assumption that the political system has the most decisive influence on the nature of bureaucracy. He uses this assumption in his classification scheme of political systems when he writes that "political system type would be the most crucial standard for distinguishing among the public bureaucracies of developing countries".²⁸ He provides a classification of the political systems on the basis of "the relationship between the basic political characteristics of the regime and the political role of the bureaucracy in the system".²⁹ He has sketched the following categories: (1) traditional-autocratic systems, (2) bureaucratic elite systems

- civil and military, (3) polyarchal competitive systems, (4) dominant-party semicompetitive systems, (5) dominant-party mobilization systems, and (6) communist totalitarian systems. Heady asserts that "the political role of the bureaucracy varies from country to country and is intimately related to variations in political system types among the developing countries".³⁰

Some scholars do not accept the argument that the nature of bureaucracy is determined by the regime type or the form of legitimation that exists in a society. Metin Heper, Chong Lim Kim, and Seong-Tong Pai have argued "that the historical bureaucratic tradition, rather than variation in regime types, may offer better explanations of the behaviours of the public service in some developing countries, especially where there exists a firmly established tradition of the civil service".³¹ In a comparative study of the political role of bureaucracy in Turkey and South Korea, which fall in Heady's category of polyarchal competitive system and bureaucratic elite system respectively, they assumed that the South Korean bureaucracy would be more involved in the governmental decision process than its Turkish counterpart. But contrary to their assumption and Heady's expectation the findings revealed that the Turkish bureaucracy was more involved in the decision process than its South Korean counterpart. So they speculate that the Turkish bureaucracy has inherited the tradition of unchallenged autonomy and predominance from the

Ottoman-Turkish bureaucratic rule which was further crystallized during the reform movement of Mustapa Kamal Ataturk.³²

The brief review above of some of the major conceptual frameworks that deal directly with cross-national administrative comparisons shows that scholars differ substantially in their views about the major determinant of the nature of administration. For Weber, it is the system of legitimation acceptable to a society; for Riggs, it is the degree of structural differentiation in a society in which the administration operates; for Fainsod and Heady, it is the type of political regime that exists in a society; and for Heper and his associates, it is the historical bureaucratic inheritance (in societies with a long tradition of civil service) that determines the nature of bureaucracy. This study, therefore, originates from a dominant controversy in comparative public administration around which much of the thinking and theorizing in the discipline have revolved for a long time.

In recent decades there has been an enormous growth in neo-Marxist theorizing about the nature of the state in post-colonial countries. In his influential work in the New Left Review, Hamza Alavi argues that in a large number of post-colonial societies "there has been an expansion in the power" of what he calls the "bureaucratic-military oligarchies and a "progressive attenuation" of the power of politicians and political parties.³³ The strength of the bureaucratic-military oligarchies stems, in Alavi's opinion, from the

"over-developed" nature of the "superstructure" of state apparatus vis-a-vis the "structure" i.e. the economic foundations of society. The over-developed state, Alavi argues, was created by the colonial power for the purpose of effectively subordinating the native social classes as a means to ensure smooth colonial exploitation. A legacy of this relatively highly developed colonial state apparatus is that:

At the moment of independence weak indigenous bourgeoisies find themselves enmeshed in bureaucratic controls by which those at the top of the hierarchy of the bureaucratic-military apparatus of the state are able to maintain and even extend their dominant power in society, being freed from direct metropolitan control.³⁴

Alavi is convinced that the state in post-colonial societies enjoys "relative autonomy" and it performs the "mediatory role" between the competing interests of the three propertied classes, namely the indigenous bourgeoisie, the metropolitan bourgeoisie and the landed class. He contends that the autonomy of the state apparatus is evident even in those ex-colonial countries in which some form of democratic process is in operation.

John Saul finds Alavi's analysis "most illuminating" to understand the state in post-colonial Tanzania. Nevertheless, Saul suggests "certain qualifications and extensions" of Alavi's argument. He points out that in East Africa the colonial state was over-developed "not so much in response to a need to 'subordinate the native social classes' as a need to subordinate pre-capitalist, generally non-feudal, social formations to the imperatives of colonial capitalism".³⁵

Saul observes that in East Africa the indigenous classes are much weaker than their counterparts in Alavi's South Asian study. The absence of a strong domestic class must affect the degree of autonomy of the state bureaucracy. He argues tentatively that it may make the bureaucracy subservient to the metropolitan bourgeoisie or may contribute enormously to the bureaucracy's degree of autonomy. Neo-Marxist analysis, thus, traces the centrality of the bureaucracy in the post-colonial state as a legacy of the colonial overdeveloped state apparatus. In this study we will show how and why the colonial administrative system is reproduced in the post-colonial country. But our approach will be different from the neo-Marxist approach.

Definition of Key Concepts

Before we delve into the analysis of concrete facts and information, it is necessary to provide a definition and clarification of the key concepts that will be used frequently in this study. The three that will be discussed in this section are: nature of bureaucracy, colonial bureaucratic inheritance, and regime.

Nature of Bureaucracy

In order to make the meaning of "nature of bureaucracy" clear we should first define the term "bureaucracy". No other term in social science has created so much ambiguity and confusion as bureaucracy has.³⁶ This is quite evident in

Martin Albrow's listing of the various meanings that have been attached to the term "bureaucracy". He has listed "seven modern concepts of bureaucracy" which are: (1) bureaucracy as rational organization; (2) bureaucracy as organizational inefficiency; (3) bureaucracy as rule by officials; (4) bureaucracy as public administration; (5) bureaucracy as administration by officials; (6) bureaucracy as the organization; and (7) bureaucracy as modern society.³⁷

This list shows that scholars have used the term to denote discrete and contradictory ideas about organization and administration. To some writers bureaucracy means a rational system of organization, and to some other writers it means administrative inefficiency. Some scholars view bureaucracy as a hero, but some other scholars cast it in the role of an unavoidable villain, and still others take a modest position by asserting that bureaucracy is not necessarily a hero or a villain, but rather a phenomenon commonly found in organizations that are large and complex.

A very dominant trend among scholars is to define bureaucracy either in terms of structural or behavioural characteristics of an organization. Thus, Weber who made a significant contribution to the modern thinking about bureaucracy, but never explicitly defined the term, identified the structural characteristics of bureaucracy as impersonality of relationship, hierarchical authority, well-specified area of duties, professional qualifications, full-time careers, separation of office from ownership, and centralized control.³⁸ Following

the lead by Weber many scholars have defined bureaucracy in terms of structural characteristics. Most prominent among them are Carl J. Friedrich, Ferrel Heady, Robert K. Merton, Talcott Parsons, and Stanley Udy Jr. Richard H. Hall has identified the most common structural characteristics of bureaucracy as they appeared in the writings of these scholars, including Weber. These are: (1) a clearly defined hierarchy of authority, (2) a clear-cut division of labour based on functional specialization, (3) a system of rules enumerating the rights and duties of the incumbents of office, (4) a system of procedures to deal with work situations, (5) impersonality of interpersonal relationship, and (6) a procedure of recruitment and promotion based on technical ability and competence.³⁹

Positive or negative meanings have been attached to bureaucracy when the term is defined in terms of its behavioural traits. Friedrich, for example, emphasizes the positive aspects of bureaucracy, such as precision and consistency, objectivity, and discretion, which enable the large scale organizations to achieve their objectives.⁴⁰

Peter M. Blau has defined bureaucracy as "organization that maximizes efficiency in administration".⁴¹ But some scholars stress the negative or dysfunctional features when they define bureaucracy in terms of its behavioural traits. The most notable exposition of the negative traits has been made by Merton. He argues that "the very elements which conduce toward efficiency in general produce inefficiency in

specific instances" and "also lead to an over-concern with strict adherence to regulations which induces timidity, conservatism, and technicism".⁴² Marshall E. Dimock has viewed the concept of bureaucracy as the antithesis of administrative vitality and managerial creativity.⁴³ Michel Crozier has used the concept of bureaucracy as "an organization that cannot correct its behaviour by learning from its errors".⁴⁴ The most frequent negative traits that are attached to bureaucracy are red tape, rigidity, too much impersonality, excessive secretiveness, "buck-passing", reluctance to delegate, empire building, over-devotion to precedent, lack of initiative, etc.

Another trend among some writers is to define bureaucracy as "office-holders". This can be illustrated by reference to such authors as Taylor Cole and Joseph LaPalombara. Bureaucracy has been defined by Cole as "a group of human beings or employees who are performing definite functions considered essential by a community".⁴⁵ LaPalombara finds that "it is reasonable to think of bureaucracy as encompassing all public servants".⁴⁶ He points out that the word bureaucracy may designate different types or levels of office-holders. Riggs elaborates this idea when he writes:

Actually, it is possible to discover in the writings of contemporary political scientists and historians a considerable range of variation between those who think of 'bureaucracy' as being limited to civil servants rather than embracing all office-holders; others limit the term to higher level officials, to career officers excluding political appointees, or to public officials by contrast with the officials of all kinds of organizations, including political parties. Such criteria are sometimes combined: for example one will often find bureaucracy limited to higher-appointed-civil-public-office-holders.⁴⁷

For this study none of the above meanings assigned to bureaucracy will be employed. The term will rather be used to designate the administrative apparatus the task of which is to carry out the civilian functions of the state. This definition of bureaucracy, however, is not totally different from all definitions of the term in the social science literature. Some contemporary political scientists have also used the term in the same sense. For example, Fritz Morstein Marx in The Administrative State (1957) has defined bureaucracy as "the type of organization used by modern government for the conduct of various specialized functions, embodied in the administrative system".⁴⁸ Similarly, John Dorsey in LaPalombara's volume of Bureaucracy and Political Development (1963) has defined bureaucracy "to refer to the 'public' or civil governmental administrative components of political systems".⁴⁹ The definitions by Morstein Marx and Dorsey come closest to the sense in which the term bureaucracy will be used in this study.

We are now in a position to define the term "nature of, bureaucracy". It refers to the structural arrangements of the civilian administrative apparatus of government and the attitudinal pattern of the officials who work in that administrative apparatus. The definition, therefore, has both structural and attitudinal components. The structural component encompasses the fashion in which the administrative apparatus is organized to discharge the functions assigned to it. The attitudinal component focuses on the value-orientation of the officials employed in the civilian administrative apparatus of government.

Colonial Bureaucratic Inheritance

Over a long period the colonial power introduces certain structural arrangements and practices in the administrative apparatus of the colony. These arrangements and practices seem to persist in many post-colonial countries. The most classic exposition of this fact is the following quotation from J. Donald Kingsley about administration in the post-colonial African countries:

Since the institutions of administration have been imported, since they are not African but European in origin, their ethos, structure, and functional character all reflect European more than African conditions. Indeed, the organization of offices, the demeanor of the civil servants, even the general appearance of a bureau, strikingly mirror the national characteristics of the bureaucracies of the former colonial powers. The fonctionnaire slouched at his desk in Lome or Contonou, cigarette pasted to his underlip, has his counterpart in every provincial town in France; and the demeanor of an administrative officer in Accra or Lagos untying the red tape from his files would be recognizable to anyone familiar with Whitehall or, more specifically, with the Colonial Office.⁵⁰

Such a result in the administration of post-colonial Asian countries can also be easily traced.

In this study colonial bureaucratic inheritance will refer to the structural arrangements and practices of the administrative apparatus that a post-colonial country has inherited from its colonial past. Thus, for the period between 1947 and 1971 when East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) was an integral part of Pakistan, colonial bureaucratic inheritance will be defined as the structural arrangements and practices of the administrative apparatus that Pakistan as a successor state has inherited from the British colonial rule. But for the period between 1971 and 1985, colonial

bureaucratic inheritance will refer to the structural arrangements and practices of the administrative apparatus that Pakistan inherited from the British, and Bangladesh in turn, has inherited from Pakistan.

Regime

To make the meaning of "regime" clear, it is necessary to make a distinction between a government and a regime, since quite often these words are used interchangeably. A government refers to a group of individuals headed by a leader who can claim the monopoly to govern and to exercise coercive powers over a given territory and its population. A regime, on the other hand, refers to "the set of structures, norms, and values which define the form of the state. It not only sets...the limits of legitimate governmental activity, but it also provides the institutional mechanisms and the 'rules of the game' of politics in a given country".⁵¹ This is exactly the sense in which the term "regime" will be used in this study. A change in leadership and personnel will not be construed as a change of regime unless it is accompanied by a change in the form of the state. In other words, there may be a change in the leadership and personnel (government) without any change in the form of the state (regime). Similarly, there may be a change in the form of the state without a simultaneous change in the leadership and personnel.

If we employ the above definition of a regime, the Mujib era in Bangladesh (December 1971 - August 1975) can be divided

into two regimes, because in January 1975 the constitution of Bangladesh was drastically amended which substantially altered the form of the state and the "rules of the game" of politics by converting a multiparty parliamentary system into a single party presidential system. But before the effects of these changes became sufficiently evident, a violent military coup brought an end to the Mujib era. Considering the short life of the amended form of the state, this study will treat the Mujib era as a single regime. This will be done mainly for the purpose of analytical convenience, but not at the risk of causing any damage to the central argument of the thesis.

A Basis for Analysis

In order to provide a basis for the analysis of our case study, we give the following generalized description of the colonial administrative pattern and how and why the post-colonial countries retain their colonial structural arrangements and practices despite attempts at administrative reform. This description applies more or less to most of the new states that have achieved independence since the Second World War. It attempts to encompass some of the major factors that contribute to the reproduction of the colonial administrative pattern in the newly independent countries. Thus it will provide a base upon which the analyses in the subsequent chapters of the thesis will be developed.

A basic feature of colonial administration is that the administrative machinery is geared predominantly toward the

fundamental needs of maintaining law-and-order and the timely collection of taxes. Although the administrators are under the overriding control of the metropolitan centre, they function in the field with minimum direction from a metropolitan centre and exercise more or less absolute authority over the local inhabitants. The efficiency of the administrators is measured primarily in terms of their success in maintaining law-and-order and adequate revenue collection. The administrators being aware of the fact that success in this could only mean more discretionary power for them in future, strive to keep the natives under severe control and make an all-out effort to ensure timely and adequate revenue collection.

The colonial administrators, empowered by the legitimization and direct mandate they have from the colonial power, perceive themselves as the minor lords in the field. They do not readily interact with natives for many understandable reasons - prominent among these are the cultural and intellectual differences, the apprehension that undue advantage might be taken by the natives of such interaction, and above all, the philosophy of colonial administration which does not attach much importance to such interaction. The administration becomes elitist, authoritarian, paternalistic, and egocentric. The natives accept the segregation between themselves and the alien administrators because they do not find any recourse for it.

In the initial decades of colonial rule the top policy

making and administrative positions in the colonial administration are the exclusive prerogatives of the nationals of the colonial power. The natives find themselves in the subordinate clerical and non-administrative positions. The pressure for induction of the natives into the elite cadre of the colonial services develops as a section of the natives is exposed to the Western value-system and liberal education. As a result, a slow process of recruiting the natives begins. But it does not bring about any change in the behaviour pattern of the elite service, since the basic philosophy of colonial administration remains unaltered. The native administrators attempt to imitate the values, behaviour pattern, life style and outlooks of their alien counterparts. They keep themselves as aloof from the general people as their alien counterparts do.

With increasing politicization and exposure to Western education the pressure for an accelerated pace of induction of the natives in the cadre services is intensified. When the pressure becomes too strong to be ignored, the colonial power agrees to increase the native recruitment to the higher echelons of the administration. It satisfies the aspiration of an increasing number of native graduates with high potential to serve in administration to become members of the cadre services. With the passage of time such administrative concessions are considered inadequate by the nationalist political leaders who demand complete independence from the colonial rule. The nationalist leaders express their firm

commitment to totally overhaul the colonial pattern of administration once independence is achieved. They explain the socio-economic underdevelopment of their people in terms of the irrational system of colonial exploitation, and pledge to achieve socio-economic justice and prosperity soon after the colonial power is driven out of their country. Naturally enough, the nationalist leaders gain widespread support from the masses in their struggle for independence. The masses perceive the nationalist leaders as "saviours" and become militant even with the slightest provocation from their leaders. When the colonial power becomes sufficiently convinced that any attempt to prolong the colonial rule would be counterproductive, it decides to transfer power to the nationalist leaders who have successfully demonstrated their popularity among the masses.

The achievement of independence is followed by a "honeymoon period" when the whole nation is involved in rejoicing and jubilation at the attainment of "nationhood" through struggle. During the honeymoon period opposition to the new government is virtually nonexistent, and if it exists at all, it goes through a period of hibernation, considering the facts that the government is at the zenith of its popularity and any opposition might cause ruthless coercion. Opponents might even cooperate with the nationalist government in the hope of gaining access to prestigious government positions. But unfortunately the honeymoon is short-lived and soon the new government confronts the gigantic task of

state-building and nation-building. The different ethnic, religious, and regional forces that joined hands for the common cause of independence begin to slip apart into separate identities. To their dismay, the nationalist leaders discover that the society they have been leading is not at all homogeneous. It is rather a conglomeration of diverse and conflicting interests, loyalties and identities.⁵²

The promises that the leaders of the independence movement make put them in a very difficult situation after the achievement of independence. On the one hand, the level of expectation of the general populace is very high, but on the other, the possibility of fulfillment is very low. So an acute discrepancy appears between wants and expectations and the possibility of their satisfaction. The ruling elite find it almost impossible to live up to their previous promises with the meagre resources they have at their disposal. An obvious outcome of this inability is disillusionment and resentment among a considerable section of the population. Opposition to the government starts to grow and gradually gain in strength and momentum. A crucial dilemma for many post-colonial countries is that, because of the politicization people experience during the movement for independence, the rate of political participation is high, but the rate of institutionalization is low. The result is likely to be turbulence, instability, and resort to violence.⁵³ The ruling political elite become intolerant of opposition, and under the changed circumstances prefer to rely mainly on the

instruments of violence to keep the society they rule under effective control. The high degree of enthusiasm for socio-economic development with which the nationalist leaders start ruling the new country evaporates eventually and an effective political control over the polity becomes their main concern.

As the colonial administrators depart, their native subordinates are promoted from the less important managerial and clerical positions to more important administrative and policy-making posts. They think that it is their turn now to enjoy the prestige, status, and privileges that their alien counterparts once enjoyed during the colonial rule. The physical disappearance of the colonial administrators does not necessarily mean the disappearance of the colonial administrative structure, values, and norms.⁵⁴ The cadre officials who have the experience of working with their colonial counterparts in pre-independence years become the chief source of the "radiation" of bureaucratic dispositions that are essentially colonial in derivation.⁵⁵ The "old guard" set the tune and the style of administration in the new country which the post-independence elite cadre attempts to emulate meticulously. The diffusion of the colonial bureaucratic disposition thus becomes well entrenched in the administration of post-colonial countries.

Soon after achieving independence the ruling political elite confronts the difficult task of overhauling the colonial administrative system in accordance with their previous

denunciation and promise. The record of most of the post-colonial countries is not impressive in this regard. A sharp break with the colonial past remains a distant dream for most of these countries. The ability of the ruling elites to make such a break is constrained by a host of factors which deserve brief mentioning here. First, the ruling political elites of many of the post-colonial countries are not well-acquainted with the art of ruling a polity. They become heavily dependent on the bureaucratic elites for policy formulation as well as its effective implementation. The political elites find it to be counterproductive to antagonize an organized group on which they are so dependent. Secondly, the political environment of the country may not be favourable enough to bring about any disruption in the existing administrative system. Several major factors contributing to this unfavourable political environment are: (i) absolute solidarity of the population so common during the movement for independence fades away after independence, leaving a host of contradictions and cleavages; (ii) political opposition to the government gains in strength and militancy as the ruling political elite finds it extremely difficult to translate their vague promises into concrete actions; and (iii) conflicts over the constitutional issues of national importance lead to an extreme polarization of the society.

Having failed to achieve consensus through rhetoric, the ruling political elite resorts to gaining compliance through the use of coercion and terror. This substantially adds to

the importance of an undisrupted bureaucratic machinery which the ruling elite seek to use to prevent the further erosion of their political control over the society they rule. Thirdly, there is an imbalance in many new countries between the "political policy-making institutions and bureaucratic policy-implementing structures", which is the direct consequence of "premature or too rapid expansion of bureaucracy when the political system lags behind".⁵⁶ The political elite inherit the strong colonial administrative structures but have neither the experience nor the strong party organization to exercise effective political supervision and control over the administration. This may even lead to an appropriation of a considerable portion of political functions by the bureaucrats. Finally, like any other organized group in the society, bureaucrats are strongly opposed to any substantial change in the existing system, especially when the proposed change is likely to be detrimental to the privileges and prerogatives that they enjoy. To the political elite bureaucracy is a force to be reckoned with, given the facts that they are dependent on it for socio-economic development and also for strengthening their grip on the society.

Within a few years of achieving independence the political environment of many new countries becomes volatile and militant. The ruling elite finds it almost impossible to exercise any effective control over the society, let alone overhauling the inherited and dysfunctional colonial administrative system. A period of extreme political confusion and

uncertainty follows. Politics of agitation, military coups and countercoups, leftist insurgency, etc. are the most common manifestations of this period of national crisis. A bureaucracy which can demonstrate its competence in handling the internal security threats is highly preferred by those who have captured the state power. It poses a dilemma for the new countries. On the one hand, the need for socio-economic development calls for a thorough overhauling of the inherited colonial administrative system, but on the other hand, the need for effective control over the society dictates the keeping of the colonial pattern of administration intact.

In many new countries even the governments that are highly committed to refashion their bureaucracies find themselves too circumscribed by the exigency of the situation to seriously consider the issue of administrative reorganization. These governments set up administrative reform commissions with a mandate to make necessary recommendations to convert the inherited colonial administrative system into a dynamic one capable of meeting the rising aspirations of the people. But when the reform commissions come out with elaborate schemes and recommendations for a massive change in the existing administrative system, the ruling elite retreat from their avowed positions because of the apprehension, imagined or potential, that such changes would be detrimental to their self-interest of exercising effective control over the society. As a result, either the reform reports are shelved or only the minor recommendations are implemented by completely avoiding the major ones.

Significance of the Study

This study does not intend to resolve the longstanding controversy over the question: what determines the nature of bureaucracy? Nevertheless, it will make a significant contribution to the controversy by arguing that the colonial bureaucratic tradition has a strong formative impact on the nature of the bureaucracy in new states like Bangladesh that were under colonial bureaucratic rule for a long time.

Apart from its theoretical significance, the dissertation will be of practical importance too. The detailed analysis of the factors that contributed to the non-implementation of the major administrative reform proposals will help the policy makers to be acquainted with the main hindrances to bringing about needed changes in the administrative system of Bangladesh. Such acquaintance would be of immense value for the future administrative reform efforts. To the extent that these factors are at work in other countries, the findings could be of similar help elsewhere. Perhaps the main significance of this study will be the realization of the magnitude of the problem created by the colonial administrative legacy in the ex-colonial countries and an acknowledgement of the fact that anything short of an all-out effort is inadequate to eliminate it.

This study will also fill some gaps in the literature on the bureaucracy in Bangladesh. While many scholarly researches have been done on the bureaucracy in Pakistan (prior to 1971),

there is a great dearth of such research on the bureaucracy in Bangladesh. For some reason or other, there has been a sharp decline of interest of the foreign researchers in the administrative system of Bangladesh after the disintegration of Pakistan. However, some Bangladeshi researchers, despite the limited opportunity for social science research in the country, have attempted to document the administrative reform efforts by the successive regimes in Bangladesh. The most notable in this regard are Khan and Zafarullah,⁵⁷ and Maniruzzaman.⁵⁸ Their works are mainly descriptive and lack an in-depth analysis of why the major administrative reform proposals could not be implemented. They have failed to relate the failure of the reform proposals to the century-old tradition of bureaucratic predominance established by the British and reluctantly kept almost intact by the successive regimes in Pakistan.

The generalist-specialist relationship in Bangladesh administration has never been subjected to thorough academic research, although the reform commissions appointed by the government acknowledged the magnitude of the dysfunctions associated with the colonial tradition of the cult of the generalist. Researchers have made only occasional references to this issue when their main focus was on other issues of administration.

In the rural development literature it is now agreed that without the active involvement of rural people in the

different stages of rural development programmes, from planning to implementation, rural development remains a distant dream. The British and Pakistani approach to rural development was mainly bureaucratic in the sense that the cooperation of the people was sought only when the plan came to the implementation stage. Naturally enough, the response from the people was not at all encouraging. The ruling elites of Bangladesh, on many occasions, have ridiculed the centralized administration as an essentially colonial practice. Every regime has glorified the virtues of decentralization as a means to achieve socio-economic development in the rural areas. But the irony is that the planning, decision-making and management functions of the local bodies, which are apparently designed to be the agents of rural development, have not been fully decentralized. No research, insofar as I know, has yet been done to examine the extent to which the colonial bureaucratic approach to local government and rural development has been dismantled in Bangladesh. The present study will fill the above gaps in the literature on Bangladesh administration.

Methodological Explanation

The study is based on both primary and secondary source materials. The nature of the study needed intensive field research to collect the relevant materials. Therefore, as part of the preparation of this study field research was

undertaken during the period from May to August 1985. The author's familiarity with the issues under investigation, first as a student of public administration in Dacca University and later as a faculty member of Chittagong University, helped enormously to conduct the necessary field research even within a short span of time. During the field research government reports, documents, and other official records were collected and studied. The author's previous observation about the structure and functioning of the administrative system of Bangladesh under successive regimes became substantially clearer through the in-depth study of the government reports and documents. However, the most useful insight into the issues under investigation was acquired through open-ended interviews with government officials at different levels of the hierarchy and with different expertise, politicians, elected representatives of the local councils, and villagers.

Getting appointments for interviews with the officials was much more difficult than I had thought it would be.

Initially, whenever I approached the officials for interview, the most common responses were "I'm too busy to give an interview", "I've some important meetings coming up in the next few days", etc. The situation was really frustrating for me. A friend of mine, who was a senior-scale section officer in the Secretariat and thoroughly familiar with the values and attitudes of the officials, advised me how to get out of this

frustrating situation. He said, "It's obvious that they (officials) won't readily agree to give an interview unless you promise them anonymity, if they prefer. Until you offer them this choice, even if some of them agree to talk, you will get virtually nothing out of them, because they will be extremely tight-lipped".⁵⁹ The technique he taught me worked very well, but at the cost of anonymity. Anyway, the interviews have been extremely useful for the clarification of the basic issues and for the analysis of the facts and information assembled in this study.

Secondary source materials will be extensively used in this study. In fact, the first few chapters are wholly based on secondary materials and other analytical works written by Bangladeshi and foreign scholars. The last few chapters, preceding the conclusion, however, are based on both secondary sources and source materials collected during the field research. This combination of secondary and primary source materials, has enabled us to form a rational explanation of the administrative realities in Bangladesh.

Endnotes

1. Ferrel Heady, Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective (New York: Marcel Dekker, second ed. 1979), p. 4.
2. Robert A. Dahl, "The Science of Public Administration: Three Problems", Public Administration Review 7, No. 1(1947), p. 8.
3. Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, edited with an introduction by Talcott Parsons (New York: The Free Press, 1947), p. 152.
4. Ibid.
5. Max Weber's definition of an "ideal type" is as follows: "An ideal type is formed by one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct. In its conceptual purity this mental construct cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality. It is a utopia. Historical research faces the task of determining, in each individual case, the extent to which this ideal construct approximates to or diverges from reality". Max Weber, The Methodology of Social Sciences, translated and edited by Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1949), p. 90.
6. The major criticisms can be found in Robert K. Merton, "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality", Social Forces 18, (1940), pp. 560-68; Philip Selznick, "An Approach to a Theory of Bureaucracy", American Sociological Review 8, (1943), pp. 47-54; "Foundations of a Theory of Organization", American Sociological Review 13, (1948), pp. 25-35, and TVA and the Grassroots (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949); Alvin W. Gouldner, Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1954); Stanley Udy Jr., "Bureaucracy and Rationality in Weber's Organisation Theory: An Empirical Study", American Sociological Review 24, (1959), pp. 791-95; Peter M. Blau, The Dynamics of Bureaucracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955); Michael Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964); and Morroe Berger, Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).

7. Morroe Berger argues that Weber's ideal type is unable to explain the Egyptian bureaucracy as it does not take into account the environmental factors influencing the administration. Ibid.
8. Ramesh K. Arora, Comparative Public Administration: An Ecological Perspective (New Delhi: Associated Publishing House, 1972), p. 68.
9. Talcott Parsons, "Introduction", in The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, op. cit., p. 77.
10. Some of Fred W. Riggs' works that contributed most to the development of this approach are: "An Ecological Approach: The 'Sala' Model", in Ferrel Heady and Sybil Stokes, eds., Papers in Comparative Administration (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1957), pp. 23-116; The Ecology of Public Administration (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1961); Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1964); and Prismatic Society Revisited (Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1973).
11. John M. Gaus, Leonard D. White, Marshall E. Dimock, The Frontiers of Public Administration (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936).
12. John M. Gaus, Reflections on Public Administration (Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1947).
13. Ibid., pp. 8-9.
14. Op. cit., pp. 1-11.
15. Roscoe Martin, "Technical Assistance: The Problem of Implementation", Public Administration Review 12, (1952), p. 266.
16. Fred W. Riggs, "Trends in the Comparative Study of Public Administration", International Review of Administrative Sciences 27, (1962), pp. 9-15.
17. Fred W. Riggs, "Agraria and Industria - Toward a Typology of Public Administration", in William J. Siffin, ed., Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1957), pp. 23-116.
18. Robert V. Presthus, "Behaviour and Bureaucracy in Many Cultures", Public Administration Review 19, (1959), pp. 23-35.

19. Fred W. Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries, op. cit.
20. Ibid.
21. Some of the critical works are: Michael Monroe, "Prismatic Behaviour in the United States", Journal of Comparative Administration 2, No. 2 (August 1970), pp. 229-42; Robert H. Jackson, "An Analysis of the Comparative Public Administration Movement", Canadian Public Administration 9, No. 1 (March 1966), pp. 108-29; R.S. Milne, "Formalism Reconsidered", Philippine Journal of Public Administration 14, No. 1 (January 1970), pp. 21-30; Richard A. Chapman, "Prismatic Theory in Public Administration: A Review of the Theories of Fred W. Riggs", Public Administration (London) 44, (Winter 1966), pp. 415-33; Ramesh K. Arora, Comparative Public Administration: An Ecological Perspective, op. cit.
22. Ibid., p.121.
23. Michael L. Monroe, op. cit.
24. Robert H. Jackson, op. cit., p. 124.
25. Ramesh K. Arora, op. cit., pp. 127-29.
26. Merle Fainsod, "Bureaucracy and Modernization: The Russian and Soviet Case", in Joseph LaPalombara, ed., Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 234-35.
27. Ferrel Heady, Public Administration, op. cit., pp. 64-65.
28. Ibid., p. 267.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid., p. 275.
31. Metin Heper, Chong Lim Kim, Seong-Tong Pai, "The Role of Bureaucracy and Regime Types: A Comparative Study of Turkish and South Korean Higher Civil Servants", Administration and Society 12, No. 2 (August 1980), p. 153.
32. Ibid., p. 152.
33. Hamza Alavi, "The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh", New Left Review, No. 74, July-August 1972, p. 63.
34. Ibid., p. 61.
35. John Saul, "The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Tanzania", Socialist Register, 1974, p. 353.

36. The most comprehensive analysis of the various meanings of bureaucracy can be found in Fred W. Riggs, "Introduction: Shifting Meanings of the Term 'Bureaucracy'", International Social Science Journal 31, No. 4 (1979), pp. 563-84.
37. Martin Albrow, Bureaucracy (London: Pall Mall Press, 1970), pp. 84-105.
38. Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, op. cit.
39. Richard H. Hall, "Intraorganizational Structural Variation: Application of the Bureaucratic Model", Administrative Science Quarterly 7, No. 3 (1962), pp. 295-308.
40. Carl J. Friedrich, Man and His Government (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1963), p. 471.
41. Peter M. Blau, Bureaucracy in Modern Society (New York: Random House, 1956), p. 60.
42. Robert K. Merton, "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality", op. cit. The article has been reproduced in R.K. Merton et al., eds., Reader in Bureaucracy (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1952), pp. 361-71; and also in R.K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (New York: The Free Press, 1968), pp. 249-60; the quotes are from Social Theory, pages 254 and 255 respectively.
43. Marshall E. Dimock, "Bureaucracy Self-Examined", Public Administration Review 4, (1944), p. 198.
44. Michel Crozier, op. cit., p. 187.
45. R. Taylor Cole, The Canadian Bureaucracy (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1949), p. 3.
46. Joseph LaPalombara, ed., op. cit., pp. 6-7.
47. Fred W. Riggs, "Introduction: Shifting Meanings of the Term 'Bureaucracy'", op. cit., pp. 567-8.
48. Fritz Morstein Marx, The Administrative State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 20.
49. John T. Dorsey Jr., "The Bureaucracy and Political Development in Viet Nam", in Joseph LaPalombara ed., op. cit., p. 322, fn. 8.
50. J. Donald Kingsley, "Bureaucracy and Political Development, with Particular Reference to Nigeria", in ibid., pp. 302-3.
51. Richard J. Van Loon and Michael S. Whittington, The Canadian Political System (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, third ed., 1981). p. 12.

52. W. Howard Wriggins, "Impediments to Unity in New Nations: The Case of Ceylon", in Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable, eds., Political Development and Social Change (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966), p. 563. The article was originally published in American Political Science Review 55, (June 1961), pp. 313-20.
53. Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay", World Politics 17, (April 1965), pp. 386-430. The article has been reproduced in Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 1-92.
54. Ralph Braibanti, "The Higher Bureaucracy of Pakistan", in Ralph Braibanti, ed., Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1966), p. 253. Braibanti analyzes the diffusion of British administrative norms in the Pakistan administration.
55. Ibid., p. 248.
56. Fred W. Riggs, "Bureaucrats and Political Development: A Paradoxical View", in Joseph LaPalombara, ed., op. cit., pp. 120-67.
57. Mohammad Mohabbat Khan and Habib Mohammad Zafarullah, "Administrative Reform and Bureaucratic Intransigence in Bangladesh", in Gerald E. Caiden and Heinrich Siedentopf, eds., Strategies for Administrative Reform (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1982); "Public Bureaucracy in Bangladesh", in Krishna K. Tummala, ed., Administrative Systems Abroad (Lanham, MD.: University Press of America, 1982); Mohammad Mohabbat Khan, "Reform for Decentralized Development: Bangladesh's Experiment with Major Administrative Reforms/Reorganization in the '80s", Politics, Administration and Change 9, Nos. 1-2 (January-December 1984), pp. 146-67.
58. Talukder Maniruzzaman, "Administrative Reforms and Politics Within the Bureaucracy in Bangladesh", Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 17, No. 1 (March 1979), pp. 47-59.
59. It is interesting to note that this friend also requested anonymity if I ever mention in my writing what he advised me. This is not surprising at all given the status-oriented and secrecy-oriented nature of Bangladesh administration.

Chapter II

EARLY ADMINISTRATIONS IN INDIA

A fruitful analysis of present human institutions cannot be made without reference to their historical past, because they are the product of historical growth. To comprehend the nature of administration in Bangladesh properly, it is necessary to trace the history of its evolution over a long period of time. This chapter, therefore, highlights the history of administrative evolution in India from the beginning of Mughal rule to the end of the British Raj.

Mughal Administration

The foundation of the Mughal empire in India was laid in 1526 by Babur, a Chaghatai Turk, who was a descendant of Timur on his father's side and was connected with Changiz Khan on his mother's side.¹ But it was during the reign of Akbar, the grandson of Babur, that Bengal became a part of the Mughal empire in July 1576 as a result of a successful military expedition by Akbar's able revenue official, Todar Mal. After nearly 240 years of independence, interrupted only by two brief conquests of Humayun, successor of Babur, and Sher Shah (Suri), Bengal had become a part of the vast Muslim empire of Northern India.²

The Mughals established an elaborate, well-defined and well-coordinated system of administration in India. However, the administrative institutions of the Mughal empire were mostly a continuation of the administration of the Sultanate with some alterations and improvements".³ Therefore, the

Mughal administrative system was nothing original. In fact, the origin of the Mughal administrative system in India can be traced to the system followed by the Abbasid Khalifas of Iran and the Fatimide Khalifas of Egypt. When the Muslims came to India their idea of administration went through a process of continuous change to adapt it to the peculiar customs and practices prevailing in India. Nevertheless, the central elements of the administration virtually remained unaltered.

It can thus be said that the Mughal administration in India was a combination of Indian and foreign elements. To use an often-quoted phrase by Jadunath Sarkar, Mughal administration was a "Perso-Arabic system in Indian setting".⁴ He observed that "the principles of their (Mughal) government, their church policy, their rules of taxation, their departmental arrangements, and the very titles of their officials were imported ready-made from outside India".⁵ The Mughals adapted their imported system to the Indian customs and practices so far as the adaptation did not contradict the basics of Muslim government and administration. While the mode of an Islamic state was not discarded at the top level of administration, the administration at the village level continued to be what it was in the preceding periods, with emphasis on substantial local autonomy.⁶

Absolute monarchy was the major premise of Mughal administration in India. The emperor had unlimited power in his own empire. His word was law and his authority was

unchallengeable. Like Louis the XIV of France, the emperor was the state. He was "the head of government, the commander of the State forces, the fountain of justice, and the chief legislator".⁷ All other officials of the state derived their power and authority, theoretically and practically, from him. The emperor was the real pivot of the entire government and administration. However, despite enormous concentration of legislative, executive, judicial, and spiritual powers in the person of the monarch, the Mughal emperors have been described by historians as "benevolent despots" who were guided by their policy of self-restraint and were concerned about the good of their subjects.⁸

A natural corollary of absolute monarchy was the highly centralized character of the Mughal administration. There was no delegation of real power down the hierarchy. The emperor empowered his closest officials to deal with important administrative matters, but he always kept a vigilant eye on their performance and punished those officials who committed any lapse in their performance. No important administrative decision could be taken without his full cognizance. Even matters of administrative details were brought to him for his approval, scrutiny, and judgment. Administrative matters which could be considered trivial by modern standards were regularly scrutinized by the emperor. This kept the emperor well acquainted with the state of affairs in his empire.

The Mughals highly emphasized "merit" as the guiding principle of recruitment of the state officials. The modern

device of testing a candidate's fitness for public service by competitive examination was not known to the Mughals.

Appointment to all top civil and military positions of the state was in the hands of the emperor who was solely guided by his personal judgment. The start was generally from the lower rank even for those who had a reputed family background. But the people with good potential and demonstrated ability could easily and rapidly climb to the top hierarchies of the state service. A career in the state service was highly attractive and prestigious. Ishwari Prasad writes: "The highest ambition of every aspiring youth, Hindu and Muslim, was to get an opportunity of serving the state, because it meant honour, prestige and high emoluments".⁹ The Mughal's policy of "career open to talent" attracted able aliens from many countries of Asia who in search of employment came to India and found a position in the Mughal administration. In fact, during the time of Akbar an overwhelming percentage of the officials were foreigners, rather than Indians.¹⁰

Specialization in a particular area of state service was not emphasized by the Mughals. Sometimes the officials were assigned duties that were diametrically opposed to the nature of the duties they previously performed. For example, Todar Mal, a top official in the revenue department, was sent by the emperor to lead a military expedition against the rebels in Bengal. Birbal, the court wit, was sent to command troops against Yusufzais, and Abul Fazl, a litterateur par excellence, was sent to command an invasion in the Deccan against Bahadur

Shah of Khandesh. Officials were freely and frequently transferred from one department to another without giving any serious consideration to their expertise. It seems that the emperor had an interesting idea of assuming that all state officials were competent enough to perform any state function, military or civil.

A very prominent feature of the Mughal administration in India was the mansabdari system. The word mansab literally means a place or rank, and a mansabdar was, therefore, a person who held a position in the state service. A mansabdar, depending on his rank in the state service, was expected to maintain a requisite number of troops for which he was paid either in cash or in kind. Interestingly enough, not all mansabdars were military personnel. The system included all high officials even though the main duty of many of them was not military in character and they were not required to maintain troops. The mansabdari system was a device which was the "army, the peerage, and the civil administration, all rolled into one".¹¹ Such an amalgamation of all high officials of the state into one unified cadre originated from the idea that all offices were interchangeable. Services were not clearly demarcated into administrative, financial, and judicial. No distinction was made even between the civil and military services. In fact, mansabdars were quite often transferred from completely civilian positions to military positions and vice versa. As a result, acquiring specialization in a particular type of state function was

difficult. The system thus created a class of generalist official nobility. It can be argued that the mansabdari system set the generalist tradition in the Indian subcontinent which was refined and reinforced during the British rule.

Mughal administration was highly centralized insofar as policies and decisions of great significance were concerned. But because of the underdeveloped technology of transportation and communication systems and the vastness of the empire, there was decentralization of executive functions to a ruling class of mansabdars stationed in the distant parts of the empire. Through the mansabdars the central government succeeded in keeping a firm grip over the subject people.¹²

The machinery of government did not come close to the villages where the vast majority of the Indian population lived. The state's only concern about the village was the timely collection of the revenues. Since time immemorial village communities were well organized and managed their own affairs independent of any interference by the state. The village communities maintained this autonomy throughout the medieval period. Neither the Mughals nor the Sultans preceding them found it profitable or practicable to intervene in the affairs of the village community. They therefore left the village undisturbed to manage its own affairs in its own ways.¹³ The institution of Panchayat, literally meaning a council of five persons, which was devised long before the Mughals came to India continued to be the dominant village institution. The Panchayat supervised the common activities

of the village, levied taxes, and possessed the judicial powers to settle minor disputes.

It should however be mentioned that the institution of Panchayat was not as developed in Bengal as in some other parts of India. Yet even in Bengal the elderly leaders of Gram Samaj (village society) provided social administration to the villages and raised nominal land taxes. The leaders of Gram Samaj settled all minor civil and criminal disputes either through persuasion, bargaining, compromise or through strong social sanctions against the offenders.

Although the Mughal administration in India was a continuation of the administrative institutions established by the Sultanate, the Mughals substantially improved the administrative system to meet their requirements. Some of the basic features of Mughal administration, i.e., centralization and the existence of a non-hereditary generalist class of powerful official nobility were taken over by the British in India with some necessary modifications to adapt them to the British imperialist desires.

East India Company Administration (1600-1857)

For the convenience of this study, the history of the evolution of the East India Company administration can be divided into two phases:

- i) The company as a trading concern (1600-1772); and
- ii) The company as an administrative concern (1772-1857).

Such a division would not be wholly arbitrary, because the basic nature of the East India Company in these two periods was dissimilar. Whereas the first period corresponds to the Company's existence as a mercantile organization par excellence, in the second period the Company emerged as a mighty political power in India.

The Company as a Trading Concern (1600-1772)

In December 1600 the British Crown granted a charter and authorized the East India Company to engage in private trading in the Eastern Waters.¹⁴ The Company was given certain power to enable it to carry on its trade and to manage its own affairs smoothly. In 1608 the Company's agents first came to India and were granted permission by the Mughal emperor Jahangir to carry out their mercantile function.¹⁵

The employees of the East India Company were divided into five grades of apprentices,¹⁶ writers, factors, junior merchants, and senior merchants.¹⁷ The servants of the Company usually started their career at the lowest rung of the ladder and at a relatively young age, usually between 15 and 18 years of age.¹⁸ The only qualifications that were emphasized for entry into the service were a knowledge of good commercial accounts and good penmanship.¹⁹ However, unrestricted patronage played a very dominant role in the recruitment process. Many of the Company's Board of Directors had a scandalous record of building enormous fortunes by selling the writership

positions in the Company for high prices.²⁰ On their appointment the young recruits were sent straightaway to India to assume their duty without undergoing any period of probation or training, either at home or in India.²¹ The main reason for this lack of training or probation was the purely commercial character of the Company at that time. The promotion of the Company's officials from one grade to another was guided "ordinarily by seniority, and exceptionally by merit".²²

Trade and commerce was the main preoccupation of the East India Company during this period. This was sufficiently evident in the designations of the Company's servants mentioned above. The predominantly commercial nature of the company has been properly reflected in the following quotation:

They (the Company's servants) bought, they sold...they kept accounts, they wrote letters, they regulated establishments and expenditures. Large ships from Europe brought woollen goods, cutlery, iron, copper and quick silver. The same ships carried away cotton piece-goods, fine muslins, silks, indigo, spices and Indian rarities. ...European commodities were despatched to remote factories. Native manufacturers were received in return.²³

To a limited extent the servants of the Company performed some legislative, administrative, judicial and municipal functions within the limits of their factories or trading settlements. It was only in the second half of 18th century that the Company actively considered the idea of political ascendancy and ultimately became the most formidable political power in India.

The conditions governing the service in the Company were thoroughly unfavourable. The salaries of the employees were ridiculously low. They were paid far less than what even in

those days could be called "fair wages".²⁴ Uncertainty and insecurity of tenure was high, because the Board of Directors hired and fired the Company's employees whimsically. Quite understandably, such adverse conditions of service had a very devastating effect on the morale of the employees. It has been said of the Company's servants in the first quarter of the 17th century:

Inspite of every precaution, jealousies and differences broke out occasionally amongst them, some were accused, and not unjustly, of "intemperate living, a word of great significance meaning not want of sobriety only", others of "pride and gorgeous apparel", some of being "lewd and debauched", and some of gambling, which seems not to have been an uncommon vice, several losing large sums not always belonging to themselves.²⁵

Rampant corruption became the general standard throughout the entire structure of the Company. Even the top executives, including the Board of Directors, were not always unimpeachable. Getting involved in private trade and accepting gifts and bribes from the client became institutionalized practices, although provisions for harsh disciplinary measures against the corrupt servants did exist.

In the first half of the 18th century the mighty Mughal empire began to disintegrate as it could resist neither the external military powers nor the internal ones. During this period the French and the British fought for their monopoly of the trade right in different parts of India.²⁶ The decisive victory of the British in the battles of Plassey in 1757 and Buxar in 1764 virtually made the East India Company the "King-maker" of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. The Company was

offered the Diwani or the right of financial administration in 1765 but the Company did not assume that role until 1772.

The Company as an Administrative Concern (1772-1857)

For different reasons this period was highly important in the administrative evolution of India. Firstly, this was the period during which the Company attempted to reorganize the administrative system that was totally disrupted by the disintegration of the Mughal empire. Secondly, during this period the East India Company was converted into a mainly political and administrative organization from a predominantly mercantile organization. Finally, during this period there began to emerge the system of administration by which India was governed during the colonial rule and which remains virtually unchanged in the subcontinent today. Some highly regarded Company's representatives like Hastings, Cornwallis and Wellesly made an enormous contribution in the evolution of the administrative system during this period.

The need for reforms under Warren Hastings, Governor of the Bengal Presidency (Bengal, Bihar and Orissa) from 1772 to 1785, arose from two main circumstances: (1) the disruption of the Mughal administration, and (2) the disinclination of the Company to take over the direct responsibility of administration through the agency of its own European servants.²⁷ Hastings adopted some measures to curtail the powers of the zamindars (landlords) who with the disintegration of the

Mughal empire had usurped such functions as justice and taxation which were supposed to belong to the state.

One of Hastings' measures was the reconstitution of the districts in 1772.²⁸ The Mughals split up their empire into a number of Subahs (provinces) each of which in turn consisted of a number of Sarkars (districts). An elaborate system of administration that the Mughals developed in the district had almost disintegrated when the East India Company took over the Diwani. In 1772 Hastings divided Bengal into twenty-three districts and posted one Collector of Revenue in each district. A native Diwan (collector) was appointed to assist the European Collector. The Collector was placed in charge of Diwani Adalat (civil court) and he was awarded the supervisory power over the Faujdari Adalat (criminal court) which was placed in charge of a local judge. The Collector thus emerged as the most powerful officer in the district. The post of Collector was, however, abolished in 1773, only a year after its creation. Hastings divided the Bengal Presidency into six zones and placed each zone under a provincial council responsible for the supervision and management of revenue administration. The tasks of administering civil justice and supervision of police force were transferred to the Aumil and Fauzder respectively, both originally were employees of the Nawab (local king). This experiment with the reorganization of district administration lasted only seven years. In 1781 Hastings again reorganized

the district administration. The six provincial councils of revenue were abolished and a Collector was appointed again in each district. The Collector was also made the supervisor of police force by abolishing the office of Fauzder.

Another contribution of Hastings was the division of the Company's Covenanted Civil Service into two branches: one to carry on the commercial functions and the other to perform the general administration.²⁹ To enhance the efficiency of the Company's servants and to raise their morale, Hastings initiated proposals for some kind of training for them. But he could not proceed much with his reform proposals as he was under constant tutelage of the Board of Directors at home and hence could not establish the radical changes that were necessary.³⁰

When Cornwallis assumed office in 1786 the morale of the Company officials was at its lowest ebb. He decided to do something about it in order to raise their morale. He figured out that the only effective way of preventing abuses and maintaining high morale was to ensure a decent pay for the officials. He persuaded the Board of Directors regarding the efficacy of his plan and provided the collectors with liberal emoluments. At the same time, he prohibited the Company's servants from indulging in private trade, accepting bribes and gifts, and other malpractices. Cornwallis' strategy paid off. He achieved considerable success in lifting the Company's servants from the depth of degradation.

Another innovation of Cornwallis was his organisation of

the civil service structure into four branches: (i) public or general, (ii) revenue, (iii) judicial, ~~and~~ (iv) commercial.³¹ Cornwallis also made provision for the reservation of all top positions below the rank of Councillors of the Company for members of a special cadre known as Covenanted Civil Service. In fact, this super-elite cadre of Covenanted Civil Service was the forerunner of the elite generalist cadre of Indian Civil Service (ICS) that was subsequently developed by the British in India. The origin of the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) and the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP), the successors of ICS in India and Pakistan respectively, can be traced to this Covenanted Civil Service.

Cornwallis, like his predecessor, resorted to the reorganization of district administration. In 1787 the Collector was empowered with judicial and magisterial powers with full control over the police force. Because of this concentration of revenue, judicial and magisterial powers "the Collector had become by 1790 the bottle-neck through which all lines of control must pass".³² This system of district administration was, however, intended only to be an interim system. Being tremendously influenced by the Whig philosophy of John Locke, in 1793 Cornwallis introduced sweeping administrative reforms the essence of which was "separation of powers". The Collector was stripped of his judicial and magisterial powers. A new post of District Judge was created to preside over the administration of justice. The

magisterial power to supervise the police was transferred to the District Judge. Thus the Collector was reduced to a mere collector of revenue.

Another major reform introduced by Cornwallis was in the area of land revenue administration. Traditionally the Zamindars, a class of hereditary revenue collectors, did not have legal right to land. But Cornwallis, in his bid to create a class of landlords in the English sense and to make the task of revenue collection easier, introduced the permanent settlement in 1793. The settlement awarded the legal title to land to the Zamindars and placed the actual cultivators at their mercy. The revenue payable to the government by the Zamindars was fixed forever. But there was no limit to the revenue the Zamindars could raise from the cultivators. Cornwallis definitely achieved through the permanent settlement what he wanted to, but the social cost of the settlement was shockingly high. The landed aristocracy created by the settlement subjected the Bengal villages to its merciless oppression. The Zamindars became the virtual dictators in rural Bengal.

Marquess Wellesley, Governor-General of India from 1796 to 1806, attempted to discard commercial elements from public administration. He highly emphasized systematic training and education for the Company's civil servants. He could realize that ruling a vast empire on a permanent basis "shall require a succession of able magistrates, wise and honest judges, and

skillful statesmen properly qualified to conduct the ordinary movements of the great machine of Government".³³

Emphasizing the need for highly qualified personnel to rule the empire, he wrote: "In the Civil Service we must seek not the instruments by which Kingdoms are overthrown, revolutions are accomplished, or wars conducted, but an inexhaustible supply of useful knowledge, cultivated talents, and well ordered and disciplined morales".³⁴

Considering the urgency of training and education for the civil servants, Wellesley founded the College of Fort William in Calcutta under Regulation IX of 1800 without waiting for the necessary approval of the Court of Directors.³⁵

For the first time in the Company's history some kind of arrangement was made to formally train the new recruits on their arrival in India. Wellesley could very well see that the qualifications of the new recruits did not correspond to the administrative functions they were to perform.

Furthermore, the recruits being completely unfamiliar with the language, customs, laws, and history of the land they were supposed to administer, were apt to demonstrate inefficiency in their performance. To counteract these serious flaws, Regulation IX of 1800 provided that every new recruit must undergo a training for three years in the College of Fort William before he was assigned to any administrative duty. The period of probation was to be devoted to the completion of the prescribed course of studies of the college. It was

provided to offer a mixed course of instruction of an ambitious character consisting of both Oriental and Western studies, including extensive training in the native language. The students were to write two examinations each year and at the end of the third year successful candidates were to be awarded degrees and certificates of proficiency.³⁶

The Directors of the Company turned their face against the College mainly for two reasons. The Directors resented the arbitrary founding of the College without their formal sanction and the other reason was the huge expenses involved with the operation of the College.³⁷ So, after a period of five years the establishment of the College was drastically curtailed. It was reduced to a mere school to teach Indian languages to the young recruits to the Covenanted Service assigned to Bengal. The College was finally abolished in 1854.³⁸ Although Fort William College was short-lived, it can be credited with making the first attempt at an institutional arrangement to train the young recruits of the Company. Wellesley's plan was to impart his College an All-India character and to secure uniformity in the standard of training and education by requiring all the civil servants of the Company in India to receive their training at Fort William.³⁹ The intellectual exercises in the College gave the students "an insight into the social institutions of the people over whose destiny they were to preside".⁴⁰ The greatest of Wellesley's achievements, however, was that

although the Fort William College was disfavoured, the principle of Wellesley's plan did not perish. In 1806 the Board of Directors themselves founded a similar institution at Hertford. It was later transferred to Haileybury in 1809 "to provide a supply of persons duly qualified to discharge the various and important duties required from the Civil Servants of the Company".⁴¹

The East India Company's training college at Haileybury was modelled after the Fort William College at Calcutta. The objective was to train the recruits in Oriental and Western studies. All new servants of the Company were required to spend two years in the College and pass an examination to be qualified for their appointments in India. "There was a great deal of Haileybury that was borrowed from Fort William".⁴² The College had an impressive list of Faculty that included Reverend H. Samuel Henley, Reverend Edward Lewton, T.R. Malthus, William Dealtry, Berwick Bridge, Jonathan Grant, and John B. Gilchrist.⁴³

One great contribution of the Haileybury College was that it injected a "spirit of camaraderie" in its students.⁴⁴ "The friendship and associations formed at the College constituted one of the several bonds of comradeship among all the civil servants during their administrative careers, and helped to maintain an elevated standard of thought and feeling in the service as a corps d'elite".⁴⁵ The comradeship in Haileybury had its bad side too. Upon arrival in India the

recruits used to associate exclusively with their fellow collegians at Haileybury. It prevented them from enriching their knowledge of India and the Indians. The Haileybury College survived for fifty years and was abolished in December 1857 after the introduction of open competitive examination as the mode of entry into the Covenanted Civil Service. The College sank with its master when, after the Sepoy (soldiers) Mutiny of 1857, the government of India was transferred from the East India Company to the Crown.

Nomination as the mode of entry into the Covenanted Civil Service of the Company was one of the main reasons why the civil service could not demonstrate the high standard of performance and integrity one would have expected from it. Therefore, after 1830 criticism against the Company's policy of recruitment started to mount. Strong demand in favour of replacing the patronage system by open competitive examination began to emerge. Thomas Babington Macaulay in his famous speech in the British House of Commons in 1833 stated:

It is said, I know, that examination in Latin, in Greek, and in Mathematics are no tests of what men will prove to be in life. I am perfectly aware that they are not infallible tests; but they are tests I confidently maintain. Look at any walk of life - this House, at the other House - at the Bar - at the Bench - at the Church - and see whether it be not true, that those who attain high distinction in the world are generally men who were distinguished in their academic career.⁴⁶

But the Company was in favour of maintaining the status quo and strongly opposed the idea of introducing competitive examination. The Company's rationalization of its stand was

that India needed men of vigorous character and personality rather than scholars, as administrators, and that such men could be recruited only by nomination.⁴⁷ The protagonists of the open competitive principle won the debate. The Charter Act of 1853 made the Covenanted Civil Service open to competitive examination and heralded a new era in the evolution of the civil service in India. To give effect to the Act of 1853 a committee was appointed under the chairmanship of Macaulay to draft the examination rules.⁴⁸ The committee prepared an elaborate plan for the future recruitment of the Company's civil servants.⁴⁹ Surprisingly enough, the Indian vernaculars were totally excluded from the list of subjects in which the candidates were to be examined as "of no value except for the purpose of communication with natives of India".⁵⁰ The first competitive examination was held in July 1855. It is interesting that the Northcote-Trevelyan Committee Report that was submitted to the British Parliament in 1855 recommending the open competitive examination for recruitment to the British Civil Service was partially inspired by the adoption of this mode of entry into the Covenanted Civil Service in India in 1853.

In summary, then, during the second phase of the Company's administration in India (1772-1857), the Company evolved from a mercantile entity to a genuinely modern bureaucracy capable of materializing Britain's imperial desires in a country as vast and populous as India.

Administration Under the British Crown (1858-1947)

After the Sepoy Mutiny in 1857, the British Crown felt the necessity of taking over the direct responsibility of governing and brought an end to the East India Company administration in India. A new era in Indian administration thus began. By the time the government of India was transferred to the Crown, the East India Company had already established a modern administrative system replacing the medieval Mansabdari system of the Mughals. But the total exclusion of the Indians from the Covenanted Civil Service of the Company was one of the main grievances of the local people.

Indianization of the Higher Civil Service

The British introduced Western education in India in the 1830s. The objective was, as Macaulay wrote in his famous Minute of 1853: "to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect".⁵¹ With the spread of Western education, Indians who took advantage of it started to demand Indian representation in the superior posts. The strict enforcement of monopoly in the Covenanted Service for the colonial nationals virtually deprived the Indians of any hope of rising to the higher levels of administration. The Act of 1833 mentioned in an unequivocal term that "No native

of the said territories (of British India) shall by reasons only of his religion, place of birth, descent, colour, or any of them, be disabled from holding any place, office, or employment of the Company".⁵² However, the Act of 1833 did not at all help the Indian representation in the superior positions of the civil service because entry into the service was still dependent upon the chance of obtaining nomination by one of the directors. So the demand for Indian representation in the service continued.

To satisfy the Western-educated Indians, Queen Victoria's Proclamation in 1858 included this passage: "It is our further will that, so far as may be, our subjects of whatever race or creed, be freely and impartially admitted to offices in our service, the duties of which they may be qualified, by their education, ability, and integrity, duly to discharge".⁵³ The Queen's proclamation and the introduction of open competitive examination as the basis of recruitment to the higher civil service raised Indian expectation.

The manner in which the proclamation was implemented disillusioned the early Indian nationalists and provided them with one of their main grievances. There were some obvious reasons why the Queen's proclamation and open competitive examination could not provide the Indians with any opportunity to enter the higher civil service. The competitive examination was held in London and the maximum age limit was 21 years. The factors that prevented the Indians from

competing for the higher civil service on equal terms with the British were: heavy expenses involved with appearing at the examination, fear among the upper caste Hindus of the loss of caste involved in crossing Black Water, unwillingness of the Indian parents to send their sons to an alien culture and climate when they were still very young, low standard of Western education in India, and so forth.⁵⁴

As the size of the Westernized class in India was constantly expanding, the demand for Indianization of the service was gradually becoming irresistible. To accommodate the Indian aspiration for representation in the superior civil service, the British government, over a long period of time, made some concessions that helped the gradual Indianization of the Covenanted Civil Service. To please the Westernized Indians the Aitchison Commission (1886-87) under the chairmanship of Sir C.V. Aitchison raised the age limit for entrance to the Covenanted Civil Service by fixing it between 19 and 23 years of age. The Commission changed the name of Covenanted Civil Service to Civil Service of India which was later popularly known as the Indian Civil Service. The Islington Commission (1917) under the chairmanship of Lord Islington recommended that 75% of the positions in the ICS should be recruited in England by open competition. The remaining 25% were to be filled from among the Indians partly by direct recruitment and partly by promotion from the lower services.⁵⁵

The concessions offered by the Islington Commission fell short of Indian expectations because agitation for self-rule in India had been gaining momentum in the first quarter of this century. The Montagu-Chelmsford Report of 1918 increased the Indian quota in the ICS by considering the changed political conditions in India. The Report suggested that 33% of the superior posts should be recruited in India, and that this percentage should be increased by 1.5% annually.⁵⁶

The most decisive step toward Indianization was taken in 1922 by introducing the system of simultaneous examination to be held in England and India for the recruitment of the ICS.⁵⁷ The Lee Commission (1924) under the chairmanship of Lord Lee of Fareham recommended that 20% of the vacancies in the ICS should be filled by promotion from the Provincial Civil Service and the remaining 80% should be filled in equal number by the Europeans and the Indians on the basis of competitive examination.⁵⁸

Because of the above concessions and the changed political atmosphere in the country, the proportion of Indian members in the ICS steadily increased. The first Indian member of the ICS was recruited in 1864. The number of Indians appointed to the service rose to 12 by 1886.⁵⁹ None of these 12 members was a Muslim. The first Muslim member joined the service in 1888.⁶⁰ The number of Indian members of the ICS was 60 (5%) in 1909 and 78 (6%) in 1919.⁶¹ However, the proportion of Indian members increased sharply after the First World War

because of the introduction of "dyarchy" in the Indian provinces and of simultaneous examination for the ICS, so that at independence in 1947, 48% of the total strength of 1,157 were Indians.⁶²

We can now pinpoint some of the major features of British administration in India. This will provide an alternative to describing in minute detail the evolution of administration in India under the British Crown.

Excessive Centralization

British administration in India was highly centralized right from the beginning of the East India Company's takeover of the Diwani. Nevertheless, under the Company's administration the officials stationed in the field enjoyed a great degree of independence mainly because of the vastness of the country and the underdeveloped nature of the transportation and communication systems in India. Therefore, although the administration was theoretically and legally centralized in its orientation, the officials in the distant parts of the country worked at their own accord in practice, without waiting for the detailed instructions and clarifications to come from the centre, which could be highly time-consuming. Centralization of administration became effective after the Mutiny because of the advent of the railway and the telegraph. The developments in the technology of communication gave an added impetus to the colonial zeal of

bringing the whole country under the same administrative mould, regardless of local differences in custom, language, and economic conditions.⁶³

Centralization was most evident in the financial sphere. By keeping finance firmly in its grip the central government attempted to exercise constant control on the provincial governments. Without the prior sanction of the central government it was almost impossible for a provincial government to incur an expenditure. An inevitable consequence of this "was a stream of trivial references as embarrassing to the recipient who had to deal with them, as it was annoying to the provincial governments who had to send them".⁶⁴

Absolute dependence of the provincial government on the central government for funds was not unexpected altogether since the government and its administration was unitary in character.

In appreciation of India's splendid cooperation with the British in the First World War and increasing nationalist demands, the British government decided to make some political concessions to the Indians. The Montagu-Chelmsford Report of 1918 declared:

The policy of His Majesty's Government, with which the Government of India is in complete accord, is that of the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire.⁶⁵

To give effect to the idea of "the progressive realisation of

responsible government" the Government of India Act of 1919 introduced a dual form of government known as "dyarchy". Provincial subjects were divided into the "Reserved" and the "Transferred" subjects. The reserved subjects, including finance, land revenue, justice, and police were to be administered by the Governor in Council, and the transferred subjects, including local self-government, education, health, and public works were to be administered by the Ministers responsible to the legislature. Each part of government was, thereby, made "accountable to distinct sets of people - the British electors in one case and the provincial voters in the other".⁶⁶

Although by looking at the above reorganization it might appear that in respect of the transferred subjects the provincial governments became almost entirely independent, the independent operation of the transferred subjects, in fact, was tremendously constrained by several factors. Excessive emergency powers given to the Governor General and the Governor reduced dyarchy to a mere sham. Moreover, the provincial governments did not have any control over officers who held the top administrative positions in the various transferred departments since these officers belonged to the All-India services such as the ICS. This caused a great deal of resentment among the Indian politicians who viewed the system of dyarchy as a thoroughly inadequate mechanism to fulfil the Indian aspiration for responsible government.

Contrary to popular expectation, the system of British administration in India remained, as before, decisively centralized. The Government of India Act of 1935 theoretically awarded autonomy to the Indian provinces by clearly separating the federal and provincial spheres of administration. However, by providing the Governor General with enormous emergency power to intervene in provincial matters and by denying the provincial governments any effective control on the members of All-India services who occupied crucial administrative positions in the provinces, the essentially centralized character of the British administration in India was retained.

Rule by Bureaucracy

Under the colonial rule the bureaucracy itself was the ruling element in India. The administrators on the scene enjoyed extensive authority and discretion over the local inhabitants. Although the broad framework of government and administration was designed in London, the bureaucracy ruled the country in a fashion deemed appropriate to keep the entire Indian society firmly in its grip. To a large extent, bureaucracy's power was unrestrained. Owing to the underdeveloped nature of communication between India and England, the higher bureaucracy exercised enormous discretion in dealing with the peculiar Indian problems. In the absence of representative political institutions and in view of the

2

limited power of such institutions when they were created in the first quarter of the 20th century, the higher bureaucracy cast itself in the role of Plato's Guardians unrestrained by political control. The policy-making process in India was absolutely dominated by the career bureaucrats who made it possible for the British to rule a vast country with remarkably few British officials. The government in England was highly pleased with the performance of the higher bureaucracy as it proved its utmost effectiveness in providing the British government with what it expected from the bureaucracy, i.e., extraction of resources and transfer of such resources from India to England.

The members of All-India services like the ICS and IPS (Indian Police Service) were alarmed by the emergence of representative political institutions and by the adoption of dyarchy in the Indian provinces. They regretted that an inevitable consequence of these developments would be a sharp reduction of their official authority and would make them subservient to the elected politicians. It was difficult for the higher bureaucracy, long accustomed to near paramountcy under the imperial rule, to welcome the emergence of representative political institutions and make itself accountable to the elected Indian politicians. Therefore, within a few years after the introduction of dyarchy about a tenth of the whole number of ICS and IPS officers "took advantage of the rules which permitted premature retirement on

proportionate pension, and those who stayed lost, for a while, a part of their former zeal and their former driving power".⁶⁷ It was soon realized that their alarm was totally unwarranted because the Secretary of State still remained the main arbiter and custodian of their fortunes. The elected politicians in the provinces had no effective control on the members of All-India services. Even after the adoption of dyarchy the higher bureaucracy ruled India in almost the same fashion as it did before. "The members of the I.C.S. were responsible, and considered themselves responsible, to themselves".⁶⁸ Jawaharlal Nehru referred to the ICS officers in his autobiography "as a group that had practically absolute power, subject only in theory to a control by the British Parliament".⁶⁹ India under the colonial rule was a perfect example of Merle Fainsod's category of "ruling bureaucracy".⁷⁰

The Dominance of Super-Elite Generalist Administrators

The Indian Civil Service was the pivotal service around which the entire administrative edifice in India was organized. It has been described as the "steel frame" of British administration in India.⁷¹ The Indian Civil Service was at the top of the administrative structure and was centrally recruited, organized and controlled. The major features of this apex service were entry through competitive examination based on intellectual capability; elaborate and

rigorous post-entry training; permanency of tenure; reservation of top policy-making and administrative positions at the central, provincial, and district levels for members of this elite cadre; attractive emoluments and other benefits; and a system of promotion and frequent transfers based predominantly on seniority and partly on merit.⁷² The British needed such a generalist civil service in India chiefly for the purposes of maintaining law-and-order and collecting taxes.⁷³ The Indian Civil Service was a highly generalist cadre in the sense that its members were recruited on the basis of an excellent general education and intelligence rather than on the basis of their specialized and technical knowledge. It was an elite cadre in the sense that top posts in the bureaucracy as a whole were reserved for members of this service alone. The ICS officers staffed the key positions close to the Governor General and Governors as well as the highest positions in the central and provincial secretariats and the topmost administrative positions in the divisions, districts and subdivisions.

The Indian Civil Service was instrumental in enabling the British to fulfil their colonial aspirations in India. This apex service demonstrated its effectiveness in keeping India under close control even when the nationalist movement was at its zenith. It was astonishing that 760 British members of the ruling Indian Civil Service could as late as 1939, in the face of the massive force of the Indian nationalist movement

led by Gandhi, hold down 378 million Indians".⁷⁴ About the conservatism of the ICS members, Nehru wrote in his autobiography:

...because they had largely autocratic powers, they resented all criticisms, considered it one of the major sins, became more and more intolerant and pedagogic, and developed many of the failings of irresponsible rulers. They were self-satisfied and self-sufficient, narrow and fixed minds, static in a changing world, and wholly unsuited to a progressive environment.⁷⁵

Indian nationalist leaders expressed their strong antipathy toward the I.C.S. Nehru wrote:

Of one thing I am quite sure, that no new order can be built up in India so long as the spirit of the I.C.S. pervades our administration and our public services. That spirit of authoritarianism is the ally of imperialism, and it cannot co-exist with freedom....Therefore it seems to me essential that the I.C.S. and similar services must disappear completely, as such, before we can start real work on a new order.⁷⁶

Because of the British policy of reservation of the top policy-making and administrative positions for the ICS members there was very limited scope for members of the other services for advancement in the service. The members of the specialized services had been made clearly subordinate, theoretically and actually, to the ICS. The dominance of the super-elite generalists was so complete in Indian administration that it would not be an exaggeration to say that the administrative history of British India was really the history of the ICS.

Destruction of Self-Governing Rural Institutions

The British policy of excessive centralization caused heavy damage to the self-governing village institution of the Panchayat. Megasthenes, who visited India three centuries before the birth of Christ, described the village communities as small "republics". Within a set limit each village was "autonomous and self-sufficient, governed by its own elected officers, satisfying its own needs, providing for its own education, police, tribunal, all its economic necessities and functions; managing itself its own life as an independent and self-governing unit".⁷⁷ It must however be mentioned here that the village government in India had never been democratic in the Western sense. The Panchayat collected some local taxes to carry out its multifarious functions. Although it is true that the Panchayat was dominated by the village influentials and consequently the poor peasants and members of the lower castes had virtually no say in the affairs of the village, the Panchayat became an integral part of village social life in India. The institution survived very well right up to the end of the Mughal rule. But such a self-governing village institution was completely incompatible with the elaborate despotism of the East India Company and the British Crown.

We have mentioned earlier that the village institution in Bengal was weaker than in some other parts of India. The informal institution of Gram Samaj that existed in Bengal

could not withstand the onslaught of land reform introduced by Cornwallis in 1793. The landed aristocracy created by the permanent settlement monopolized almost every aspect of village administration and thereby destroyed the traditional social fabric of the Bengal villages.

The Bengal Village Chowkidari Act of 1870 divided the rural areas into unions, each consisting of a number of villages, and empowered the District Magistrate to appoint the members of the union Panchayat and thus brought this institution under official tutelage. Under this Act the main function of the Panchayat was to ensure security in the rural area by employing village policemen who were paid from the funds collected from the villagers as taxes. The Panchayat could not undertake any development work. The Act of 1870 thus turned an ancient self-governing institution into a subservient organization and stripped it of its traditional development functions. The Bengal District Administration Committee, 1913-14 reported:

In Bengal the Permanent Settlement and the predominating local influence of the landlords, as well as other contributing causes, such as the spread of education, improved facilities of communication, and the ever-increasing tendency to centralization of control, have combined to destroy all traces of any village systems which may have existed in pre-British days.⁷⁸

A system of centralization took the place of the former system of local self-government and local arbitration.

It should be mentioned here that while the British destroyed the ancient village self-governing institutions;

they introduced some new local government institutions like the District Board, Union Board, and Municipal body. However, these local government institutions worked under constant official tutelage.⁷⁹

Aloofness of Officials from the People

Throughout its rule in India the British government emphasized that the officials of the Crown, especially the district officers, must maintain a close personal touch with the Indian people. But this was never achieved for a number of reasons. Prominent among these were the mutual ignorance and social exclusiveness which divided the alien race of the rulers and the native race of the ruled. At the turn of the 20th century a new dimension was added to the problem of achieving a better understanding between the administration and the people. The nationalist movement in India helped the Indians to internalize a feeling of resentment against the British rulers. The objective of the two races being diametrically opposed, one making all possible efforts to perpetuate the British rule in India and the other agitating for self-rule, all possibilities of a better relationship between the two races were doomed for ever.

During the British rule in India the District emerged as a vital administrative unit of government. The district officers were entrusted with the responsibility of working as the main link between the government and the governed. For

reasons mentioned above, the district officers kept themselves aloof from the ordinary villagers and therefore failed miserably to accomplish that task. The people maintained a very negative view about the government. "All that the people know of the Government is that it takes away their money....It gives them no roads, no irrigation, no medical aid - nothing; and its officials are the only thieves in the district".⁸⁰

Although this view about the government may be a bit exaggerated, it can logically be argued that the district officers and the commoners of the village lived in two different worlds segregated by their racial differences, cultural traditions, level of intellectual development, mutual ignorance, and above all by the goals the two groups were striving to achieve since the beginning of this century. To the people the officials of the Crown projected the image of authoritarianism, elitism, and paternalism.

Law-and-Order Orientation

The maintenance of law-and-order is the topmost priority of any civil bureaucracy in a viable state. This is all the more so in a country which is under colonial rule, precisely because without internal order colonial rulers cannot materialize their ultimate goal, the extraction of resources. An elite ICS officer was placed in charge of law-and-order in each district of British India. The officer was especially instructed to attach the highest priority to the maintenance

of law-and-order in his district. The efficiency of the officer was measured in terms of his degree of success in performing that paramount task. An inevitable consequence of too much emphasis on the maintenance of internal order was the negligence of development as an aspect of administration. The district officer spent most of his time dealing with the problem of law-and-order and had too little time to devote to development activities. Moreover, the British were not very keen for the socio-economic development of the people of India. Their main concern was the extraction of resources and to maintain internal peace in order to facilitate such extraction.

This chapter has provided a brief sketch of the administrative evolution in India from the beginning of the Mughal rule to the end of the British Raj. The next chapters of the thesis will attempt to demonstrate that the administrative system introduced by the British in India persisted very well during the years of united Pakistan and also in Bangladesh after it achieved independence from Pakistani rule.

Endnotes

1. R.C. Majumdar, H.C. Raychaudhuri, and Kalikinkar Datta, An Advanced History of India (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1963), p. 425.
2. H.H. Dodwell, ed., The Cambridge Shorter History of India (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934), p. 358.
3. Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi, The Administration of the Mughul Empire (Patna, India: Janaki Prakashan, 1979), p. 1. For details of the administrative system of the Sultanate of Delhi, see Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi, The Administration of the Sultanate of Delhi (Lahore: Ashraf, 1944); and U.N. Day, Administrative System of Dehli Sultanat (1206-1413 A.D.) (Allahabad, India: Kitab Mahal Publishers, 1959).
4. Sir Jadunath Sarkar, Mughal Administration (Calcutta: 1935), p. 6.
5. Ibid., p. 6.
6. B.N. Puri, History of Indian Administration, vol. 11, Medieval Period (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1975), p. 184.
7. R.C. Majumdar, et al., op. cit., p. 554.
8. However, emperor Aurangzeb was an exception. His adoption of utmost theocracy in state policy led to the imposition of Jiziyah on the Hindus, the demolition of their temples, and the suppression of some festive Hindu religious institutions like the Holi. This caused such grave resentment among the Hindus that the foundation of the Mughal empire began crumbling even before Aurangzeb's death.
9. Ishwari Prasad, The Mughal Empire (Allahabad: Crugh Publications, 1974), p. 319.
10. It has been estimated by W.H. Moreland that about 70% of the officials were foreigners and only 30% of the officials were Indians proper. See W.H. Moreland, India at the Death of Akbar (London: 1920), p. 70.
11. R.C. Majumdar, et al., op. cit., p. 556.
12. For an analysis of the Mansabdari system and how it worked, see I.H. Qureshi, The Administration of the Mughul Empire, op. cit., pp. 88-113.
13. B.N. Puri, op. cit., p. 210.

14. Bernard S. Cohn, "Recruitment and Training of British Civil Servants in India, 1600-1860", in Ralph Braibanti, ed., Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1966), p. 87; Akshoy Kumar Ghosal, Civil Service in India Under the East India Company (Calcutta: Calcutta University Press, 1944), p. 13.
15. William Foster, "The East India Company", in H.H. Dodwell, ed., The Cambridge History of India, vol. v, British India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1929), pp. 76-116.
16. This grade ceased to exist after 1694. See Muzaffar Ahmed Chaudhuri, The Civil Service in Pakistan (Dacca: National Institute of Public Administration, 1969), second edition, p. 2, fn. 1.
17. Ibid., p. 2.
18. B.B. Misra, The Central Administration of the East India Company (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1959), p. 383.
19. Sir Edward Blunt, The I.C.S.: The Indian Civil Service (London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1937), p. 14.
20. James Holtzman, The Nabobs in England: A Study of the Returned Anglo-Indians, 1760-85 (New York: n.p. 1926), p. 22.
21. B.B. Misra, op. cit., p. 383.
22. Akshoy Kumar Ghosal, op. cit., p. 21.
23. J.T. Wheeler, Early Records of British India, quoted in ibid., p. 73.
24. For the pay structure of the Company's servants, see Sir Edward Blunt, op. cit., p. 15; Bernard S. Cohn, op. cit., p. 91.
25. W.N. Sainsbury, Calendar of State Papers: East Indies, quoted in Akshoy Kumar Ghosal, op. cit., p. 55.
26. For details of the complex rivalries between the French and the British, see Henry Dodwell, Dupleix and Clive: The Beginning of Empire (London: Archon Books, 1968).
27. B.B. Misra, "Efforts for Administrative Reforms Before Independence", Indian Journal of Public Administration 9, No. 3 (July-September 1963), p. 312.

28. Ibid., p. 313.
29. Mohammad Mohabbat Khan, Bureaucratic Self-Preservation: Failure of Major Administrative Reform Efforts in the Civil Service of Pakistan (Dacca: University of Dacca, 1980), p. 74; M.A. Chaudhuri, op. cit., p. 4.
30. Bernard S. Cohn, op. cit., p. 96.
31. M.A. Chaudhuri, op. cit., p. 4; A.K. Ghosal, op. cit., p. 226.
32. L.M. Penson, "The Bengal Administrative System, 1786-1818", in H.H. Dodwell, ed., The Cambridge History of India, vol. 7, op. cit., p. 452.
33. Montgomery Martin, ed., Despatches, Minutes and Correspondence of the Marquess of Wellesly, K.G., During his Administration in India (London: W.H. Allen, 1937), vol. 11, p. 346.
34. Ibid., p. 340.
35. For the full text of Regulation IX of 1800, see A.K. Ghosal, op. cit., Appendix J, pp. 487-93.
36. B.B. Misra, The Central Administration of the East India Company, op. cit., p. 388.
37. A.K. Ghosal, op. cit., p. 262.
38. M.A. Chaudhuri, op. cit., p. 7.
39. B.B. Misra, The Central Administration of the East India Company, op. cit., pp. 390-91.
40. Ali Ahmed, Role of Higher Civil Servants in Pakistan (Dacca: National Institute of Public Administration, 1968), p. 22.
41. Sir Percival Griffiths, The British Impact on India (London: Macdonald, 1952), p. 192.
42. Philip Woodruff, The Men Who Ruled India, Vol. 1, The Founders (London: Jonathan Cape, 1953), p. 280.
43. For details of the background and academic excellence of the faculty, see Bernard S. Cohn, op. cit., pp. 117-21.
44. H. Morse Stephens, "An Account of the East India College at Haileybury, 1805-1857", in Abbott Lawrence Lowell, ed., Colonial Civil Service (New York: Macmillan & Company, 1900), pp. 233-345.

45. Sir Richard Temple, Men and Events of My Time in India (London: 1882), p. 19; quoted in Bernard S. Cohn, op. cit., p. 135.
46. A.B. Keith, Speeches and Documents on Indian Policy (London: 1922), vol. 1, p. 252; quoted in M.A. Chaudhuri, op. cit., p. 10.
47. M.A. Chaudhuri, ibid., p. 9.
48. For a list of the other members of the committee, see Hugh Tinker, "Structure of the British Imperial Heritage", in Ralph Braibanti, ed., op. cit., p. 30, fn. 10.
49. For a list of the subjects in which the candidates were to be examined and the marks assigned to each subject, see B.B. Misra, The Administrative History of India, 1834-1947 (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 182.
50. Hugh Tinker, "Structure of the British Imperial Heritage", op. cit., p. 30.
51. Thomas Babington Macaulay, Prose and Poetry (Cambridge, Mass.: 1952), p. 729.
52. Quoted in Hugh Tinker, "Structure of the British Imperial Heritage", op. cit., p. 29.
53. For the full text of the Queen's Proclamation in 1858, see Ramsay Muir, The Making of British India, 1765-1858 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1915), pp. 381-84; the quote is from p. 383.
54. M.A. Chaudhuri, op. cit., p. 17.
55. R.C. Majumdar, et al., op. cit., p. 932.
56. Ali Ahmed, op. cit., p. 77.
57. L.S.S. O'Malley, The Indian Civil Service, 1601-1930 (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1965), p. 252.
58. M.A. Chaudhuri, op. cit., p. 35.
59. Hugh Tinker, "Structure of the British Imperial Heritage", op. cit., p. 54, fn. 44.
60. By about 1870 the Muslims had lost their earlier ascendancy in the public services mainly because of their reluctance to accept Western education on religious grounds. For a detailed analysis of this, see Sir William Wilson Hunter, The Indian Musalmans (London: 1871), chapter iv, pp. 143-213.

61. Philip Woodruff, The Men Who Ruled India, Vol. II, The Guardians (London: Jonathan Cape, 1954), p. 363.
62. Ralph Braibanti, "Public Bureaucracy and Judiciary in Pakistan", in Joseph LaPalombara, ed., Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 365.
63. Sir Edward Blunt, op. cit., pp. 75-6.
64. Ibid., p. 76.
65. Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms, 1918 (Montagu-Chelmsford Report), p. 1.
66. Gurmukh Nihal Singh, Landmarks in Indian Constitution and National Development, vol. 1, 1600-1919 (Delhi: 1952), third edition, p. 294.
67. Sir Edward Blunt, op. cit., pp. 82-3.
68. David C. Potter, "Bureaucratic Change in India", in Ralph Braibanti, ed., op. cit., p. 143.
69. Jawaharlal Nehru, An Autobiography (Bombay: Allied Publishers Ltd., 1962), p. 442.
70. Merle Faingod, "Bureaucracy and Modernization; The Russian and Soviet Case", in Joseph LaPalombara, ed., op. cit., pp. 234-37.
71. It was British Prime Minister Lloyd George who first used the term "steel frame" in a speech before the House of Commons in August 1922.
72. David C. Potter, op. cit., p. 142.
73. B.S. Khanna, "Bureaucracy and Development in India", in Edward W. Weidner, ed., Development Administration in Asia (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1970), p. 221.
74. D.A. Lowi, "Lion Rampant", Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies 2 (1963-64), p. 235.
75. Jawaharlal Nehru, op. cit., p. 442.
76. Ibid., p. 445.
77. This view of Sri Aurobindo has been quoted in Ahmed Shafiqul Huque, The Problem of Local Government Reform in Rural Bangladesh: The Failure of Swanirvar Gram Sarker (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Dept. of Political Science, University of British Columbia, 1984), p. 33.

78. Report of the Bengal District Administration Committee, 1913-1914 (Calcutta: Bengal Secretariat Press, 1915). The Report has been reprinted by the National Institute of Public Administration, Dacca, 1966, p. 91.
79. For a detailed discussion of the structure and functioning of the local government institutions during the British rule, see Hugh Tinker, The Foundations of Local Self-Government in India, Pakistan and Burma (London: The Athlone Press, 1954).
80. Quoted in Reginald Reynolds, White Sahibs in India (London: The Socialist Book Centre, 1946), third revised edition, p. 184.

Chapter III
THE COLONIAL LEGACY IN PAKISTAN ADMINISTRATION,
1947-1971

* In August 1947 Great Britain relinquished its sovereignty over India in the face of an irresistible nationalist movement directed against British rule. Before they quit India, the British divided India into two sovereign entities to give recognition to the Muslim demand for a separate homeland consisting of the Muslim majority areas of India. The new state of Pakistan thus came into being.¹ The purpose of the present chapter is to demonstrate that Pakistan's administrative system remained substantially what it had been under the British rule. Or, in other words, the administration in Pakistan is a continuation of the Imperial traditions established in the Indian subcontinent by the British. The need for administrative reform and readjustments was continuously emphasized throughout Pakistan's existence as a united country (1947-71). Reform and reorganization was often promised but seldom carried out. The net result of the failure of the administrative reform efforts was that the government functions were carried out through an administrative system that was implanted by the colonial rulers to materialize their imperialist purposes but at odds with the need for socio-economic development of the impoverished people of an independent country.

Bureaucracy in the Initial Years of Pakistan

When independence came in 1947, the administration of Pakistan was in bad shape, mainly because of the shortage of

skilled administrative personnel, office buildings and equipment and because of the gigantic rehabilitation operation that had to be undertaken by the government for the millions of refugees who migrated to Pakistan from India.² The central government of Pakistan, which did not exist before independence, had to start from scratch. "Government had to be improvised by men sitting on packing-cases, writing notes to each other in pencil".³ The two major provinces of Pakistan, East Bengal and West Punjab, did not inherit a secretariat in working order. However, the most important factor disturbing the smooth operation of the administration was a terrible shortage of experienced management personnel. Until the Aligarh movement of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan in the late 19th century, the Indian Muslims were reluctant to accept Western education. Consequently, the higher civil services in India were dominated by the British and the Hindus. Immediately before independence, the total number of members in the Indian Civil Service (ICS) and Indian Political Service (IPS) was 1,157. Of these, only 101 or 9% were Muslims.⁴ Of the 101 Muslim ICS and IPS officers in 1947, 95 opted for service in Pakistan. They were joined by 50 British ICS and IPS officers, 1 Indian Christian ICS and 11 war service candidates. The total number of ICS and IPS officials who joined the service in Pakistan thus stood at 157.

**Cadre Origins of ICS - IPS Administrative Talent in
Pakistan at Partition, 1947**

Cadre	Number	Percentage
Muslim ICS	83	53.0
Indian Christian ICS	1	0.6
British ICS	36	23.0
Muslim IPS	12	7.6
British IPS	14	8.8
War Service Candidates	11	7.0
Total	157	100.0

Source: Ralph Braibanti, "Public Bureaucracy and Judiciary in Pakistan", in Joseph LaPalombara, ed., Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 367.

The quality of experience of the Muslim officers who joined the service in Pakistan was equally disappointing. Only 8 of them held positions in the secretariat of the government of India and only 3 of them held the rank of Joint Secretary. None of these Muslim officers held the positions of Additional Secretary and Secretary.⁵

The political history of Pakistan's initial years is a history of extreme instability. Within the framework of a parliamentary democracy, between August 1947 and October 1958, there were as many as 7 cabinets, the average life of a cabinet being 19 months.⁶ This happened precisely because

of the lack of respect of the politicians for democratic values, institutions, and practices. National interest was secondary to the personal interest of the politicians. Instability in the political arena provided the higher bureaucracy with the leverage to assert themselves in the affairs of the state. Keith Callard commented:

In Pakistan, political parties have waxed, waned and suffered eclipse. Political leaders have argued and reduced each other to impotence. Men of religion have laid claim to complete authority and have achieved almost none. In the meanwhile the state has been run largely by the civil service, backed by the army, which has carried on much as it did before independence.⁷

The disorganization which existed among the politicians and representative institutions reduced the credibility of the parliamentary system. As the most organized civilian institution, bureaucracy became the chief forum in which national issues were contested.

The Pakistan Administrative Service (PAS), a new equivalent of the ICS and IPS, was created in 1947. It was renamed in 1950 as the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP). An official pamphlet announced in glowing terms:

The Civil Service of Pakistan is the successor in Pakistan of the Indian Civil Service, which was the most distinguished Civil Service in the world. Although the largest of the superior services, it is a body of a few hundred only. But it consists of men who, under ministerial and legislative direction, exercise many of the most important functions of government and on whom, subject to such direction, lies the prime responsibility for securing the tranquility, well-being and good government of their country.⁸

It will be demonstrated later in this chapter that as the

direct descendant of the old ICS established by the British, the CSP instead of being "under ministerial and legislative direction", emerged as the most powerful "ruling clique" in the Pakistani society and often exercised control over the ministers and the elected representatives of the people.⁹

The CSP was different from its predecessor in one important respect. A member of the old ICS was assigned to the cadre of one province. He either served that province or the central government at one particular time. But a member of the CSP was not affiliated with any province and in the interest of strengthening national solidarity transfers between the provinces took place on a regular basis, although the provincial government had very little control over the central cadre officials.

In the initial years the ruling political elites of Pakistan deliberately maintained the law-and-order orientation of the civil bureaucracy, partly in the interest of the survival of the new state and partly to ensure their own power and position. The vice-regal tradition of bureaucratic predominance continued in the new state under political patronage. As Sayeed observed:

Both Jinnah and Liaquat [first Governor-General and Prime Minister of Pakistan respectively] relied very heavily on the civil servants. --- The only model of government that Pakistani leaders had known was that of the British vice-regal system in India under which the bureaucrats had exercised their power --- without any interference from politicians.¹⁰

The colonial bureaucracy did not have the tradition of

operating under political control and direction. After independence the descendants of the ICS found it difficult to discharge the government functions under the guidance of the elected politicians. Fortunately for them, the bureaucrats-turned-politicians sided with the civil servants in preserving their autonomy from political interference. Thus, Iskandar Mirza, a top level bureaucrat who became the Minister of Interior, said:

You cannot have the old British system of administration (and) at the same time allow politicians to meddle with the civil service. In the British system the District Magistrate was the King-pin of administration. His authority was unquestioned. We have to restore that.¹¹

The higher bureaucracy kept ruling the country in almost the same fashion as it did before independence. The members of the CSP "continued to believe that they represented the people, a myth that was firmly cherished in the old ICS by all members of the administrative elite".¹² Taking advantage of the disorganization which existed among the politicians, the "steel frame" of the CSP played the decisive role in the policy formulation and implementation processes. It was revealed during the PRODA (Public and Representative Offices Disqualification Act, 1949) proceedings against Hamidul Huq Chowdhury that under instruction from the central government the Chief Secretary (a civil servant) of East Pakistan stopped the export of steel drums to India which had been ordered by Chowdhury, the Minister of Finance and Commerce.¹³ On many occasions East Pakistani politicians complained that the Chief

Secretary of the province used to send fortnightly reports to the central government about the activities of the provincial ministers.¹⁴ The helplessness of provincial governments in dealing with the centrally controlled officials had been evidenced in the following complaint by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the then General Secretary of the Awami League:

Officers, who were under the direct control of the Central Government but were working in the Province refused to carry out or obey the orders of the Ministers of the Provincial Cabinet or the Provincial Legislature, because they believed that the Provincial Government had no power to take any action against them if they violated the orders of the Ministers or the Ministry.¹⁵

The centrally controlled officials took full advantage of their sacred untouchability by the provincial government and exercised enormous discretion in discharging their duties. This reduced the autonomy of the provinces enshrined in the 1956 constitution to a mere sham.

Since the inception of the new state of Pakistan the members of higher bureaucracy were gradually gaining prominence in the political arena. Three of the four provincial Governors under Jinnah were the British members of the ICS. Two of these three Governors presided over the cabinet meetings in their respective provinces. One of them was able to reallocate cabinet portfolios without the formal approval of the Chief Minister of the province. All three of the ICS Governors sent fortnightly reports to Jinnah giving detailed accounts of everything in their provinces, ranging from squabbles in the provincial cabinet to details of

refugee rehabilitation and the food problem.¹⁶ Ziring observed: "Although the British in theory transferred power to the Muslim League and the politicians, real power remained with the higher bureaucracy that governed India in the halcyon days of colonial domination".¹⁷

By October 1954 the higher bureaucracy had virtually captured the state. In the so-called "cabinet of talents" of Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad all the key portfolios went to members of the higher bureaucracy. Ghulam Mohammad himself was a member of the Indian Audit and Accounts Service. The members of his cabinet such as Iskandar Mirza, Chaudhury Mohammad Ali, and Ayub Khan were members of the bureaucracy - civil or military. With these personalities in the top positions of state power, it seemed "that a sort of Viceroy's Executive Council had reappeared in which real power was in the hands of administrators".¹⁸ It was no surprise that they did not take any measure to curb the power, privileges, status, and discretion of the services to which they once belonged. To the contrary, with their blessings the services continued to rule the country in the old vice-regal tradition. Ironically, from 1951 until the independence of Bangladesh in 1971 the Governor-General or President of Pakistan had been an ex-civil servant or military person. Therefore, "his entire approach to government was conditioned by many years of service as an employee of the government during the days of British rule".¹⁹

British administrators in India regarded native politicians and politics "as nuisances who had to be tolerated if the facade of self-government were to be maintained".²⁰ The attitude of Pakistani administrators was not different in this regard. It has been observed:

In the political field it (the higher bureaucracy)... prevented the march of democracy and promoted the continuation of British imperial rule: only the pigment of rulers (was)...brown instead of white.²¹

The Structure of Public Service

It has been commented by Braibanti that "the structural organization of the public services of Pakistan is one of the most complicated of any bureaucratic system in existence".²² Structurally, it was not much different from the system that was in effect before independence. Indeed, the rigidity of the public service structure, "has enabled it to defy the winds of reform more than any single institution in Pakistan".²³ Following the British tradition, the public services in Pakistan were structurally extremely fractionalized. The services were classified vertically and horizontally. The vertical classification of the services was based on the type of work they performed. There were three categories of services:

- i) generalist-administrative services such as the CSP;
- ii) functional services like the Audit and Accounts Service, Income Tax Service, Foreign Service, Postal Service, etc.; and

iii) specialist services such as engineering, health, and education.²⁴

The horizontal classification of the services was based on the degree of importance of work and the nature of responsibilities involved. Horizontally the services were divided into class I, class II, class III, and class IV services.²⁵ These four classes of services were again arranged into gazetted and non-gazetted cadres. The members of class I and class II services were known as gazetted officers and their names appeared in the official gazett. They were placed in positions of higher responsibility and were entrusted with greater powers. The members of class III service mainly performed clerical and routine functions under the guidance and supervision of class I and class II officers. The class IV employees performed the menial and messengerial works. The first two classes were the privileged ones in terms of pay structure, rules regarding leave, pension, medical aid and other conditions of service. Some kind of service classification is unavoidable in any administrative system. But the caste-like classification of the services in Pakistan, with too rigid barriers between them, created too much class consciousness, jealousy, and superiority and inferiority complexes detrimental to the team spirit necessary for the performance of public functions.

The services could again be divided into all-Pakistan services, the central superior services, and the provincial

services. Only two services, the CSP and the Police Service of Pakistan, were treated as the all-Pakistan services. These services were centrally organized and administered. They enjoyed the highest status, power, privileges, and esteem. The all-Pakistan services were the heritage from the British colonial rule.²⁶ Although these services were centrally recruited and controlled, their members worked both for the central and the provincial governments, a peculiar feature not to be found in any federal country except India.²⁷ The idea of having elite cadres of all-Pakistan services can be traced back to the Aitchison Report in the last quarter of the 19th century.²⁸ This report established "the basic structure and conceptual premises of the services which exist even now in Pakistan".²⁹ The Aitchison report suggested the creation of the all-India services such as the ICS as a strategy to accommodate the growing indigenous demands for Indianization of the public services. The report aimed at ensuring the predominantly British membership of this elite cadre by requiring the candidates to be recruited only in London. The members of other central and provincial services could, however, be recruited in India. Therefore, the creation of the ICS as an all-India service was guided by the intention of fulfilling partially the demands for Indianization of the services without surrendering the locus of power to the Indians. Ironically enough, after independence such an elite cadre of services continued to

operate in Pakistan, but with a different rationale. The official justification behind having the CSP as an all-Pakistan service was

---to create a well-knit Civil Service for the whole of Pakistan, constituted and operated on a centralized basis, thereby increasing association between the various provinces and developing homogeneity in administration. The members of this service, who shall be liable to be posted to any of the Provinces of the Dominion, will be administratively more useful to the central as well as the Provincial Governments than if they belonged to Provincial cadres, because of the knowledge and experience they will acquire by serving in the Provinces of West Pakistan as well as in East Pakistan, and uniform standards of administration will also be achieved.³⁰

In the culturally segmented society of Pakistan, it was argued, the all-Pakistan services would work as a unifying force and would help counterbalance the extent of parochialism and provincialism.³¹ Sir Geoffrey Burgess, a British member of the ICS and Director of the Civil Service Academy at Lahore, commented on the role of the Academy in injecting a national feeling in the young recruits:

I often wonder which one is more true: that the idea of an all-Pakistan service as the C.S.P. helps to unite Pakistan, or that the idea of Pakistan helps to unite the service. On the whole, I think the people who leave the Academy are better Pakistanis than those who join, without at the same time losing their character as Punjabis or Bengalis, or whatever it is.³²

The civil war in 1971 that resulted in the secession of the Eastern wing from the rest of Pakistan adequately proved that the idea of an all-Pakistan service could not be as effective as it was intended to achieve national integration. Many other measures that could generate a better understanding

between the two wings of Pakistan were not attempted.³³ The representations of East Pakistan in the top central secretariat positions was extremely low.

Uneven Representation of the Provinces in the
Central Secretariat in 1966

Posts	Number	West Pakistan	East Pakistan
Secretaries	19	19	0
Joint Secretaries	41	38	3
Deputy Secretaries	133	123	10
Under-Secretaries	548	510	38
Total	741	690	51

Source: Muzaffar Ahmed Chaudhuri, The Civil Service of Pakistan (Dacca: National Institute of Public Administration, 1969), p. 56.

Although East Pakistan's representation in the federal administration slightly increased after 1956, such strategic positions as the secretaryships of Economic Affairs, Defense, Home, Finance, Establishment, Commerce and Industries were deliberately denied to the East Pakistanis who, as ever before, found themselves in the less important federal administrative positions. It can thus be argued that even the bureaucratic means of achieving national integration was not tried sincerely.

The Central Superior Services included the Foreign

Service, Audit and Accounts Service, Military Accounts Service, Income Tax Service, Customs Service, Military Lands and Cantonments Service, Postal Service, Survey of Pakistan Service, and until 1963, several railway services. The Central Superior Services were different from the all-Pakistan services in one important respect. Unlike the all-Pakistan services, these services worked exclusively for the central government.³⁴ An officer spent his entire career in the service for which he was recruited. Until 1963, members of the all-Pakistan services and other Central Superior Services were recruited through three different examinations. From 1963, these were consolidated into one examination. The cadre assignment of the successful candidates depended on their preference and performance in the examination. The Planning Board of Pakistan found the separation of the Central Superior Services from each other artificial and recommended integration of all these non-technical Central Superior Services ~~into a single civil service.~~³⁵ Paul H. Appleby and Asok Chanda made a similar recommendation about the Indian administration.³⁶

The Provincial Civil Services (PCS) were organized separately in each wing of Pakistan. They included the generalist service and the specialized services in education, agriculture, railway and in some other important areas. The elite cadre of the PCS in East Pakistan was the EPCS (East Pakistan Civil Service). The members of this cadre were

recruited each year by the provincial public service commission through competitive examination. Like the CSP, the EPCS was a small group of officers as recruitment to this cadre was extremely limited. Only the most talented of the qualified candidates in the competitive examination had the opportunity to be included in this cadre. The provincial posts immediately subordinate to those held by the CSP officers were filled by the EPCS officers. Although there was resentment among the EPCS officers at the CSP's monopoly over most of the top positions in the provincial administration, the members of other provincial services resented the superior position of the EPCS vis-a-vis themselves. While the provincial government had only a limited control over the centrally-recruited and controlled CSPs, it had absolute control over the EPCS cadre. Being recruited provincially, the members of this cadre spent their entire career in the administration of a single province. The prospect of job advancement for the EPCS officers was not as bright as that of the CSPs, because most of the top positions in the provincial administration were ~~an~~ almost exclusive prerogative for the CSPs.

The two important organizations dealing with the personnel matters of the all-Pakistan services and the Central Superior Services were the Federal Public Service Commission³⁷ and the Establishment Division. The recruitment and selection to the central civil services was the responsibility of the

Federal Public Service Commission which was dominated by the CSP. The Establishment Division was "by all odds the most influential and powerful" in personnel matters.³⁸ It dealt with the appointment, promotion, transfer, and training of the central civil services.³⁹ In the first fourteen years after independence the Establishment Division was headed by a succession of British members of the old ICS, except for an interlude in 1955. Even after the departure of the British officers from Pakistan bureaucracy the CSP never lost control of this premier personnel agency. The CSP domination of the Establishment Division contributed a great deal in building an image of self-control and self-regulation in this elite cadre.

A very prominent feature of the personnel system in the public services of Pakistan was an extreme compartmentalization which excluded the opportunity of mobility from one service to another or from a lower cadre to a higher one.

Braibanti observed:

The improbability that non-officers would ever become officers, that a clerk would be more than a clerk, or that a superintendent might eventually become a policy making executive was very great. This created tensions deeply affecting social relations within the bureaucracy. Certainly there was great mobility within groups (such as engineers, CSP, Audits and Accounts Service, etc.) but little mobility from one group to another.⁴⁰

The vertical and horizontal job immobility and extreme fractionalization which characterized the public personnel system of Pakistan was a direct continuation of the personnel system of the British colonial administration in India.

Pakistan inherited the established British tradition of making a clearcut distinction between the Secretariat and attached Executive Departments whereby the former played a crucial role in the policy formulation process and the latter were entrusted with the responsibility of implementing the policies without having much voice in the policy process. Most of the high-ranking positions in the Secretariat were an almost exclusive prerogative for the members of the CSP. The members of the specialized services found themselves in the less powerful Executive Departments and were subordinate to the generalist in terms of rank, pay, status, and opportunity for upward mobility in the administrative hierarchy. This fomented a bitter animosity between the generalist and the specialist.

The CSP as Successor to ICS

As the lineal descendant of the ICS, the CSP was the most prestigious, powerful, and elitist of all the services in Pakistan. Official nomenclature referred to the CSP as the "corps d'elite", "premier service", and "superior service" while the other services were called "inferior" and "subordinate".⁴¹ It was "derivative in structure and ethos" from the ICS.⁴² The CSP, as an institution,⁴³ inherited the British administrative values and traditions. As Braibanti observed:

The CSP is perhaps unique among the systems inheriting the imperial tradition of the ICS in the respect that its sense of exclusiveness and imperiousness have been only slightly affected since independence. It remains a distinctive, cohesive entity, with a high degree of elan. It is the matrix through which pre-independence British values are diffused throughout the bureaucratic system.⁴⁴

The ICS officers who joined the elite cadre of the CSP after independence, became the chief sources of radiation of essentially British bureaucratic dispositions in the Pakistan bureaucracy. By occupying the prestigious and powerful posts in the administration, they were in an unparalleled position to mould the behaviour, attitude, values, and bureaucratic style of the administration. With the decrease of British officers in the Pakistan bureaucracy as a result of normal retirement and attrition, a small group of Muslim officers who had been members of the ICS before independence became the agent of diffusion of British administrative values.⁴⁵ The newly recruited members of the CSP were thoroughly indoctrinated in the British tradition of administration by these British-trained Muslim officers.

Another important factor that helped inject the British values in the new recruits to the CSP was the provision of post-entry training in England. All young officers who joined this cadre between 1950 and 1960 spent a year at Oxford or Cambridge as a part of government-sponsored post-entry probation.⁴⁶ The training in England was similar to that formerly imparted to the Indian members of the ICS.⁴⁷ The Oxbridge

training became an influential mechanism for the diffusion and persistence of British administrative norms when the proportion of pre-independence British-trained officers was decreasing gradually.

The Civil Service Academy in Lahore also played a great role in passing the traditions of the ICS to the new CSP recruits. The Director of the Academy from 1951 to 1960 (with a brief break in 1959) was Geoffrey Burgess, a veteran British member of the ICS who joined the service in 1928. He was instrumental in designing the training programme for the CSP probationers in the tradition of training for the ICS. The essentially British orientation of the CSP had been bitterly deplored by many critics. Maulavi Farid Ahmad, a member from Chittagong (East Pakistan) in the National Assembly, said in a speech before the House:

Our service has been formed and drawn up by the best talent in the country, yet what is the training that is imparted? Are they taught any background of our national movement, and the history of Islam and the history of India? They are being taught in the same old tradition of the British days to live in the D.C.'s bungalow in the Punjab and D.M.'s bungalow on the hill top in East Pakistan. They are inaccessible people....Is it that you are going to train your own people to hate your own system, to hate your own civilisation and culture? Are you going to give to the country out of this manufacturing Laboratory of the Civil Service Academy at Lahore some more anglicized officers? If you are really keen that a person should be taught to become an adapt in what dresses should be worn on what particular occasions, if you want to convert the youth of our country into connoisseurs of drinks and cocktails, then what the training would lead to?...So, if you really want to bring up a band of old I.C.S. people stiff-necked with a bow-tie and who know how to bow and say "How do you do?" then bring some from England. They will be better people, with better integrity. Why not do that? So, sir, this made policy (sic) must be revised.⁴⁸

Indeed, the training of the CSP in the Civil Service Academy in Lahore remained "unchanged in its essentials from the education imparted at Haileybury College".⁴⁹

As the corps d'elite of the public service in Pakistan the CSP continued to be a very small and exclusive group. By 1961, only 379 officers administered a country of 100 million people. The membership of the CSP rose to 522 by 1968. However, the factor that contributed most to the elitist position of the CSP within the Pakistani administrative system was the reservation of prestigious and powerful posts in the bureaucracy for members of this cadre. The principle of reservation of seats was devised during the colonial rule to ensure that the key administrative positions would be held by the British members of the ICS. The number of posts reserved for the CSP officers was much higher than the actual strength of this premier service. Moreover, the difference between the number of posts reserved for and the numerical size of the service showed an increasing trend prior to 1968. The reservation of a large number of posts injected an egoistic complex in the members of the CSP which they projected very often in their attitude toward the members of subordinate services, politicians, and the people at large. It was also a principal source of intense conflict and rivalry between the CSP and the specialists, and CSP and the Provincial civil service. The scheme of reservation helped perpetuate the service distinction, hampered the growth of unity in the

services, and adversely affected the morale of other services.

Comparison of Posts Reserved and Number of
CSP Officers, 1947-1968

Year	No. of Officers	No. of Posts Reserved	Difference
1947	158	244	86
1950	175	332	157
1954	258	519	261
1961	379	735	356
1968	522	759	237

Source: All data except for the year 1968 are from Albert Gorvine, "The Civil Service Under the Revolutionary Government of Pakistan", Middle East Journal 19 (Summer 1965), p. 329. The data for the year 1968 are from Lawrence Ziring, "Administrative Reforms", Asian Survey 14, No. 12 (December 1974), p. 1089.

Following the colonial ICS heritage, members of the CSP held most of the key positions in the central and provincial Secretariats, in the personnel agencies like the Federal Public Service Commission and the Establishment Division, in the major training institutes like the Civil Service Academy, National Institute of Public Administration, and Administrative Staff College, and in the government corporations. The CSP also occupied a large number of top positions in the Divisional and District administration. By holding all these strategic posts the CSP was in a very comfortable position to exert enormous influence over the preservation of its status as

a privileged group in the administrative machinery of the government. Goodnow rightly observed:

The C.S.P., like the I.C.S., was autonomous. It controlled its own recruitment, training and indoctrination, disciplinary procedures, performance ratings, promotions and transfers, and administrative investigations.⁵⁰

The autonomy of the CSP was reinforced by the fact that in Pakistan there was no representative institution strong enough to exercise any effective external control on the activities of this powerful cadre. Although the ICS officers exercised enormous discretion in the field, they were nevertheless subject to the overall supervision and control of the British parliament and British government. In this respect the CSP was more autonomous than its parent - the ICS.

Classical generalism was the philosophical foundation of the ICS. The Wellesley-Macaulay prescriptions of erecting a generalist civil service by choosing its members on the basis of knowledge in liberal arts subjects worked remarkably well so far as maintenance of peace and collection of taxes were concerned. The British tradition of generalism has been sustained in the recruitment, training, and placement of the CSP. In every conceivable sense the CSP was a purely generalist service and took pride in being the lineal descendant of one of the most renowned generalistic services in modern administrative history. In an age of technological revolution the wisdom of placing the generalists in policy-making positions by relegating the technical experts to

subordinate positions in terms of pay, status, power, and privileges cannot be defended very easily.⁵¹ The First Five Year Plan of Pakistan pointed out that this type of discrimination "leads to heart burning and frustration and to the diversion of some of the talented technicians to non-technical jobs".⁵² The technical nature of modern public administration strongly suggests that the importance of scientists and technicians must be recognized by placing them in the decision-making positions along with the generalists.⁵³

Occasional efforts, though feeble, were made to accord the recognition due to the scientists and technicians in the public administration of Pakistan. These efforts failed to institute a reorientation toward specialization precisely because of the vigorous resistance by the numerically insignificant but disproportionately powerful members of the CSP who strongly opposed any plan of administrative reorganization detrimental to their privileged status in the administration. The result was the persistence of the unalloyed generalism of the British imperial tradition.

Administrative Reform Efforts in Pakistan

With the achievement of independence in 1947 there was a clear shift of emphasis in government policies from controlling the life of the community to that of systematic efforts to achieve socio-economic development. The political

leaders of Pakistan realized that without some readjustments in the administrative system positive actions for promoting the welfare of the community would be difficult. This had been evidenced by the fact that the formal effort for administrative reorganization and reform started barely six days after the achievement of independence, through the appointment of the Reorganization Committee under the chairmanship of Sir Victor Turner, then Finance Secretary.

Since then, setting up administrative reform commissions became almost a periodic ritual in Pakistan. After Ayub Khan's assumption of power through a coup d'etat in 1958, interest in administrative reform became a veritable obsession of his government. Deploing the inherited administrative system, Ayub Khan in December 1960 said:

The system of stereotype administration which we inherited was devised over a 100 years ago to suit the purpose of a colonial power. Its fundamental emphasis was on the maintenance of law and order and one of the many ways in which this object was fulfilled was to create a superior class of somewhat de-nationalized individuals who could maintain proper distances and rule with awe and disdain under the cover of public service. It was a perfect system for the purpose for which it was intended, but the demands of an independent society are entirely different. --- The old sense of rulership has to yield place to a new sense of service and this requires a high quality of leadership based on honesty, humility and a creative application of one's mind and heart.⁵⁴

The objective of administrative reform efforts in Pakistan was "to change the orientation of the administration from rulership to service, paternalism to fraternalism and from status quo to dynamism; that is, to transform a colonial

bureaucratic institution into a democratic-welfare institution".⁵⁵ It was, by no account, an easy task to accomplish. Because the inherited administrative system produced a privileged class of "brown sahibs" who became the chief defenders of the existing system. Furthermore, there was no strong representative political institution capable of forcing the privileged class of bureaucrats to accept any new administrative arrangement that might jeopardize their inherited privileges. The net result was that although some minor changes took place in the system from time to time, the basic structure, methods of work, and the behaviour pattern virtually remained unaltered.⁵⁶

Since independence in 1947 through 1964, Pakistan produced as many as twenty-eight major reports on administrative reform. These reports totalled 3,621 pages and involved the participation of 146 commission members. Their purpose was to make recommendations to reorganize the structure and procedure of administration.⁵⁷

An analysis of the background of the members of twenty-eight reform commissions revealed some very important information. The administrative reform effort had been predominantly a Pakistani effort in the sense that only seven reports were prepared by foreigners. Of the seven foreigners involved, three were regular employees of the government of Pakistan. So only four reports were prepared by foreigners who were not members of the public service in Pakistan. Two

elite cadres of public service - the CSP and PAAS (Pakistan Audit and Accounts Service) - dominated the reform commissions. Nearly 60% of the commission members were drawn from these two elite cadres. The CSP alone had 53% membership in these commissions. Nearly 84% of the participants were drawn from the various cadres of the public service. The participation by politicians was minimal. Only 19 politicians served as commission members and that was before the military takeover in 1958.⁵⁸

All reports of administrative reform were not equal in importance. Some were of greater significance than others. The documents prepared by Egger and Gladieux had been highly important in the sense that "subsequent surveys filled in the details of the format" of these two documents.⁵⁹ The report of the Administrative Reorganization Committee under the chairmanship of G. Ahmed was a successful document. Some of the important recommendations of this report were implemented. The report of the Pay and Services Commission under the chairmanship of A.R. Cornelius was a "revolutionary document". It suggested radical changes in the public service structure and personnel policy. We will therefore concentrate on an analysis of these four reports on the assumption that this will provide us with a clear picture of administrative reform efforts in Pakistan.

Egger Report

Rowland Egger, a professor of Political Science at the University of Virginia, was employed by Prime Minister Mohammad Ali (Bogra) in 1953 to make a comprehensive study of the administrative system of Pakistan and to make elaborate suggestions as to how the state of public administration in Pakistan could be improved. In his report entitled "The Improvement of Public Administration in Pakistan", Egger criticized the inadaptability of the inherited administrative system to the changing conditions of an independent country. He observed:

The deficiencies in the public administration of Pakistan are not deficiencies of intelligence or understanding, but are deficiencies inherent in an administrative system designed for a day that has gone by. Both the political leaders and the civil service are fully aware of these defects, but the actual shortage of personnel, both in political and administrative circles, and the overwhelming burdens of day to day administration falling upon a corps that is too small in number, have prevented the adjustment of administrative organization and procedure to changing conditions.⁶⁰

The report was extremely critical of the colonial legacy in the civil service. It mentioned that "in large part, the Pakistan civil service is living in the past, and making all its comparisons and value judgments in terms of the civil service of undivided India".⁶¹ Although, under pressure from the natives, representative institutions in India began to develop at the turn of the present century, the civil service was not really subjected to the supervision and control of the elected representatives of the people. As a

result, after independence, the incapacity of the civil service to adapt itself to the idea of democratically controlled administration became well manifested. The Egger Report, therefore, emphasized that the civil service must adapt itself intellectually and emotionally to a very basic fact that politically controlled administration was a sine qua non of democratic government.⁶²

Egger deplored Pakistan's inherited secretariat system which separated policy-making from policy-implementation. Following the British tradition, the Secretariat was a stronghold of the generalist CSP and stood between the politically oriented ministers and the heads of Attached Departments. Any initiative by the department head to contact his minister directly was vigorously resisted by the generalist staff of the ministry. Egger's report suggested that the top technical positions in the Secretariat should be opened to people who belonged to technical cadres in the civil service.

Some of the major defects in personnel policy identified by Egger were: (a) too much emphasis in the recruitment process on the academic standing of the candidates; (b) caste-like barriers among different services and classes prevented the growth of common loyalties and allegiance; (c) posting of personnel without considering seriously the expertise that would be needed to do the job; (d) rigid class distinctions made officers more interested in their status and class

identity than in the substance of their jobs.⁶³

The main recommendations of Egger included: (a) members of Central Superior Services should be recruited through an open competitive examination that would test the aptitudes of the candidates to do the administrative jobs, without putting too much emphasis on a high level of formal education; (b) unification of the various Central Superior Services into a single Civil Service of Pakistan; (c) an Administrative Staff College should be set up to impart in-service training to the middle and higher level officers; (d) an Institute of Public Administration should be established with a view to encourage research on different aspects of administrative problems in the country and to suggest possible remedies; (e) merit should be the main criterion of selection and promotion of public personnel.⁶⁴

The report highly antagonized the Pakistan bureaucracy, especially the elite branch of the civil service. It was labeled secret and was debarred from circulation. Although Prime Minister Mohammad Ali was "generally in agreement with Egger", he "was in no position to support his ideas strongly against the bureaucracy".⁶⁵ However, the impact of the Egger report on subsequent administrative reform efforts in Pakistan was substantial. The major deficiencies in the administrative system of Pakistan that Egger identified had been repeated in most of the major administrative analyses that were prepared subsequently. Judged by that fact, "the

Egger Report unwittingly served as an effective irritant stimulating innovation rather than a master plan acted upon as a massive reform operation".⁶⁶

Gladieux Report

In January 1955 Bernard Gladieux, a retired high-ranking career civil servant in the federal Government of the United States, was invited by the Planning Board to make a comprehensive study of the administrative system of Pakistan. He was specifically asked to pinpoint the deficiencies of Pakistan administration related to national development and to suggest measures to correct them. Gladieux submitted his report in May 1955. The report was more critical of Pakistan bureaucracy than the Egger Report. The general tone of the report was evident in the following observation:

The basic problems surrounding present day administration in Pakistan arise largely from the fact that an administrative system born as an instrument of colonial policy has been carried over with but few modifications and utilized as the machinery for democracy.--- The major weaknesses of the present administrative system with respect to national development stem largely from the fact that the government is still substantially directed to the law and order function in its organizational, procedural, personnel and fiscal aspects.⁶⁷

Like Egger, Gladieux deplored the Secretariat system of artificially separating the policy formation from its implementation without appreciating the inter-dependent nature of these two aspects of government and administration. Technicians were the prisoners of this artificial separation.

As a partial remedy Gladieux recommended the decentralization of development activities from the headquarters to the technical experts engaged in the field. He accused the bureaucracy of impeding the modernization programme for personal and selfish reasons. Gladieux pointed out: "At the root of the problem lies the fact that the public service is self-regulating and self-perpetuating in that those who control the system are at once its beneficiaries".⁶⁸

The most serious concern of Gladieux was about the personnel system. He observed that the personnel system was out-dated, relied heavily on academic standards, was too rigid with respect to services, cadres, and classes, awarded disproportionately high weight to seniority, and technical personnel were not accorded the status they deserved in an age of technological revolution.

The major recommendations of Gladieux included: (a) the creation of a single new Civil Service of Pakistan by bringing together all groups of employees in the Central Superior Services as well as other professional officers such as engineers, doctors, and agriculturalists; (b) strengthening the existing Public Service Commission by empowering it to deal with all personnel management activities such as recruitment, promotions, transfers, etc.; (c) eradication of discrimination against the technical personnel in terms of pay, rank, and job prospects; (d) reorganization of the heretofore sacrosanct edifice of district administration with

a view to stimulate development activities at the district level by relieving the Deputy Commissioner (head of district administration) of his magisterial responsibility so that he could devote more time and energy to the development aspect of his responsibility.

The Gladieux report met the same fate as the Egger report. It also was labeled secret and was restricted in distribution to a select few within the Pakistan bureaucracy. In fact, even before Gladieux started his investigation of Pakistan bureaucracy, the Chief Secretary of East Pakistan, where Gladieux went first, stated "that his study had not been requested and that the governmental system as then constituted was perfectly satisfactory".⁶⁹ The recommendations of Gladieux were a challenge to the power and influence wielded by the CSP. The report was therefore opposed by the members of that cadre. Sayeed revealed that "as an elitist group in Pakistan bureaucracy the CSP wields tremendous power and influence. Indeed, during the parliamentary regimes, it was able to prevent the publication of two reports which were adverse in their comments on its role and efficiency".⁷⁰

The politicians in power did not dare antagonize the administrators by redesigning the administrative structure and personnel policy. Nevertheless, the reports by Egger and Gladieux provided the guidelines for most of the subsequent major analyses of Pakistan administration.

G. Ahmed Report

Pakistan's experiment with the Westminster type of parliamentary democracy ended with the military's seizure of power in October 1958. Within two months of Ayub Khan's assumption of power an Administrative Reorganization Committee was set up under the chairmanship of G. Ahmed. Of the seven members on the committee including the chairman, five were from the CSP, one was from the Police Service, and one was from the Audit and Accounts service. It was the first administrative reform effort to be undertaken by the martial law regime. The committee submitted its report in January 1961.

A prominent recommendation of the committee was the introduction of the "Section Officers' Scheme" in the central Secretariat to improve the decision-making machinery so as to ensure expeditious and efficient disposal of government business. The committee recommended the abolition of a whole hierarchy of subordinate officials in the secretariat who had much power to delay but no power to decide. It was suggested that the Section Officer should combine in himself the tasks that were being performed by a host of clerks, superintendents, assistant secretaries and under-secretaries.⁷¹

The Administrative Reorganization Committee realized the

increasing importance of Attached Departments for the furtherance of economic and social development. The committee therefore recommended that adequate financial and administrative powers should be delegated to the heads of Attached Departments to enable them to perform their functions efficiently and expeditiously. To stop undue interference from the lower level of the Secretariat in the activities of the Attached Departments, the committee proposed that the heads of such departments should be entitled to submit cases direct to the Secretaries and Joint-Secretaries. Heads of department holding ex-officio status of Joint-Secretary might report directly to the Minister.⁷² The committee favoured the retention of separation between the policy-making and policy-implementation functions but would provide the heads of Attached Departments some concessions within the existing framework.

The committee recommended the creation of the Economic Pool to secure a greater degree of specialization in some specific fields where technical expertise was highly necessary. The members of the Economic Pool were to be selected from different cadres of the superior services to fill the top positions in the ministries of Finance, Commerce and Industry.⁷³ Also, the Ministry of Education and the Health Division of the Ministry of Health and Welfare should be manned exclusively by technical officers.

Unlike the two reports discussed before, the report of

the Administrative Reorganization Committee was accepted and implemented by the military government. Apparently, the most important reason behind the government's decision to go ahead with the report was that it did not propose any drastic change in the government structure and was "not ideologically revolutionary".⁷⁴ The report was premised on the retention of the inherited administrative system "with minor alterations to suit the status quo".⁷⁵ It was almost obvious that an administrative committee composed mainly of CSP officers would not propose any radical change in the inherited administrative structure and personnel policy of which they were the main beneficiaries. The reforms proposed by the committee, especially the formation of the Economic Pool, in no way challenged the primacy of the CSP in the Pakistan administration, because 60% of the posts in the Pool was reserved for members of that cadre. In fact, the reform was opposed by the Comptroller and Auditor General, since it gave the CSP further access to finance posts.⁷⁶ It must, however, be acknowledged that to some extent the Economic Pool widened the career prospects for some officers with technical expertise and specialized knowledge.

Cornelius Report

In August 1959 President Ayub Khan appointed the Pay and Services Commission which was chaired by Chief Justice A.R. Cornelius, one of the most senior and highest-ranking CSP

members in the country. Among other things, the terms of reference of the Pay and Services Commission were "to review the structure and organisation of and sources and methods of recruitment relating to civilian services and establishments of all grades under the control of the Central Government.--- and suggest measures designed to secure the maximum efficiency and economy in administration".⁷⁷ The commission submitted its report in June 1962.

The report of the Pay and Services Commission was much more critical of the administrative system of Pakistan than all other reports prepared in the past. It attacked almost all prominent aspects of Pakistan administration and suggested a thorough overhaul of the entire system if the administration was to deliver the services expected of it in an independent country. The greatest concern of the commission was about the existence of a "governing corporation" and the generalist paramountcy left behind by the British rule. The Commission also condemned the existence of all-Pakistan services. It reported:

The ICS and the Indian Police were the "steel frame" of foreign rule from Whitehall, by which a grip was maintained over the subject people....The entire state of things has now disappeared. The question is no longer one of imposition of rule from outside. Law-and-order and public security must take, in Pakistan, the same position among the public affairs of the country as they occupy in other free countries, that is to say, not unimportant, so as to confer the status of rulers upon their officers. Something of the supremacy lingers on by the exclusive recognition of those two services as All Pakistan Services.⁷⁸

The commission strongly deplored the practice of reservation of key positions in the administration for the generalist administrators and emphasized the need to reverse the trend in view of the new philosophy of public administration in an independent country.

The tradition of colonial rule is to reserve the highest remuneration for the "power symbols", namely, those to whom the administration of conquered territory on the civil side is entrusted, and these have hitherto in the subcontinent been non-specialist officers, whose success lay in their capacity to constitute and operate a "governing corporation" or "board of directors". An independent country, if it values its independence, has to discard such an incubus.⁷⁹

Some of the major recommendations of the Pay and Services Commission were as follows:

i) all disparate services should be unified into a seven tiered structure. The top tier, to be known as the Pakistan Administrative Service (PAS), should be constituted with more persons with technical and professional qualifications and there should be no direct recruitment to the PAS;

ii) all reservation of posts in favour of any cadre should be discontinued. People should be assigned positions in the administration on the basis of their qualification, experience and expertise to do the jobs;

iii) the district officer should be stripped of his traditional functions such as judicial and revenue collection which should be placed in the hands of experts. The district officer should rather be entrusted with the coordination of development works as his main responsibility.⁸⁰

The CSP found the report of the Pay and Services Commission unacceptable. A strong note of dissent by the two CSP members (other than Cornelius) of the commission was appended to the document:

We are of the opinion that the system which has stood the test of time, not only during the British regime but also during the tumultuous and important years since independence should be permitted to continue with such changes as experience has shown necessary.⁸¹

President Ayub Khan himself expressed his strong dissent to the recommendations of the report when he stated that national development "required continuity in the functions and organisation of the public services, which have grown with time and become familiar to the people". He further said, "nothing should be done which might involve the risk of disrupting the administrative fabric".⁸² Although in the initial years of martial law Ayub Khan was highly critical of the administrative system of Pakistan and emphasized the need for its drastic reform, he lost his zeal for administrative reform by the time the report of the Pay and Services Commission was submitted. Apparently the President was alarmed by the magnitude of CSP solidarity against the report.⁸³ Another possible reason for Ayub Khan's change of attitude toward the bureaucracy was his realization of the need for active help and cooperation of the bureaucracy to rule the country in a semi-authoritarian style. The administrative reform efforts during the martial law regime dismally failed to bring any major change in the administrative

system of Pakistan. Ayub Khan, himself being a prisoner of the vice-regal heritage, failed to counter the expansion of bureaucratic power and to readjust the relationship of the generalists and specialists. The report was labeled "classified". It was released by the military government of Yahya Khan in 1969 - seven years after it was prepared.

The mass demonstration in 1968-69 that erupted in both wings of Pakistan against Ayub's regime led to his premature retirement and General Yahya Khan's coming to power. One attempt of administrative reform by Yahya Khan was the setting up of the Services Reorganization Committee which was headed again by A.R. Cornelius. The committee was asked to investigate the services and make necessary recommendations for their readjustments. Anticipating an unfavourable report, the CSP Association submitted a memorandum to the committee. The memorandum, written by a senior member of the CSP, contended that, despite the bitter criticisms of the CSP there was "no reason for the service to become defensive as we are proud of our record and our contribution to the development and progress of Pakistan".⁸⁴ The report of the committee, like many other reports prepared previously, was labeled secret and was shelved.

Of the four administrative reform reports discussed in this section, two were prepared by foreign experts and two were the products mainly of high-ranking government officials. Two of these four reports were prepared during the

parliamentary period and the other two were prepared under the aegis of the martial law government. Three of these reports were labeled "classified" and were shelved. Neither of the two reports prepared by foreign experts saw the light of day. The recommendations of only one report were accepted and implemented. That report recommended some minor changes in the administrative structure and personnel policy and in no way challenged the primacy of the CSP. The three reports that were labeled classified were extremely critical of the entire administrative system and recommended drastic changes. The CSP, being the main beneficiary of the existing system, fought back and succeeded in maintaining the status quo.

Bureaucracy and People's Participation in Rural Development

Under pressure from the Indian nationalists, the British permitted some sort of representative political institutions to grow in India after the second decade of 20th century. But the elected representatives of the people did not have any real power to exercise control on the administration at the national or provincial level. At the lower level there was no machinery to inculcate a sense of responsibility in the administration which remained unaccountable to the people and their elected representatives. Local government institutions like the district boards, union boards and municipalities did exist, but the record of their performance was far from satisfactory for a number of reasons such as an acute

shortage of funds, paramountcy of the administrators, and inadequacy of powers to deal effectively with the local problems. People's participation in the management of their community development affairs suffered heavily due to the bureaucratic approach the British adopted to the limited development activities they undertook in the subcontinent. The British policy of excessive centralization in India was diametrically opposed to the growth of effective local government institutions.

In the first decade of Pakistan's independence no major change took place in the structure and functions of local government institutions. The first anniversary of Ayub Khan's assumption of complete power was marked by the establishment of a new system of local bodies known as the Basic Democracies.⁸⁵

The Structure of Basic Democracies

The Basic Democracies was a four-tiered pyramidal structure - the Union Council, the Thana or Tehsil Council, the District Council, and the Divisional Council.⁸⁶ The Union Council (known as "Union Committee" or "Town Committee" in the towns and cities) was the base of the entire structure of the Basic Democracies. On the basis of universal adult franchise 1,000 to 1,500 people elected one representative for the Union Council which consisted of 10 to

15 members. The elected representatives or the "Basic Democrats" (as they were known) of each Union Council elected a chairman from amongst themselves. There were a total of 80,000 Basic Democrats elected for a five year term.

The next higher tier was the Thana Council. The membership of this council consisted of the chairmen of all Union Councils of a Thana, and official members appointed by the district officer. The number of official members could not exceed the number of elected representatives. The sub-divisional officer was the ex-officio chairman of all Thana Councils within the jurisdiction of his sub-division.

Before the introduction of the Basic Democracies the district board was an entirely elected body with a chairman elected from among the elected members of the board. Under the Basic Democracies the District Council lost the democratic aspect of its composition as half of the members of that tier were officials and half appointed. The Basic Democracies Amendment Order of 1962 attempted to inject an element of democracy in the District Council by requiring that at least half of the members of the Council must be chosen from among themselves by an electoral college consisting of the chairmen of all Union Councils and Town Committees in a district. The district officer was the ex-officio chairman of the District Council. The composition of Divisional Council, the next higher tier, followed the same ratio of official and elected members as in the District Council and was chaired by the

Divisional Commissioner.⁸⁷

As a system of local government, the Basic Democracies was not sui generis. Many of its features were borrowed from the old Panchayats that existed in India long before the advent of the British and also from the local government institutions established in Bengal during the colonial rule. However, the most important structural feature of the Basic Democracies that distinguished it from the previous local government system was, as Elliot Tepper observed: "For the first time, local councils have been integrated, from bottom to top, into the provincial governing apparatus".⁸⁸

Only the lowest tier of the four-tiered structure was a democratically elected body. All the three tiers above that were undemocratic in the sense that only half of the members in these tiers were the representatives of the people and that the chairmen of these councils were government officials.

The Functions

Each tier of the Basic Democracies had its own functions but was also a component of the tier immediately above it. The Union Council and the District Council were the operational tiers with the power to levy taxes and the other two tiers had mainly coordinative functions. The institution of the Basic Democracies had administrative, judicial, electoral, municipal, development, and political functions. One important intended goal of the system was to decentralize

the administration and to create an atmosphere of collaboration between the elected representatives of the people and the appointed officials at the local level. Elected representatives were thus put in a position to make suggestions for the improvement of administration in their area. It was intended that career officials who inherited a paternalistic attitude from the prepartition administration would thus face a potential counter to their power.

The lowest tier of the Basic Democracies had some judicial functions to perform. The councillors were entrusted with the power to settle petty civil and criminal disputes in the union conciliatory courts. The Muslim Family Law Ordinances gave the Union Council the power to settle family disputes such as marriage disputes, women's rights, and similar other related matters. The electoral function of the new system was unique. 80,000 Basic Democrats formed an electoral college to elect the President and the members of the national and provincial legislatures.⁸⁹ The system thus snatched away the people's right to directly elect their representatives for the assemblies. The system borrowed the idea of tutelage in democratic practice from the colonial period.⁹⁰

The Union Council had wide development functions. It was made responsible for agricultural, industrial, and community development in the Union. Almost all aspects of community life such as health, education, security, and welfare of the inhabitants of the union came under its jurisdiction. It was

intended that the new system would mobilize the people, especially in the rural areas, for development activities and would inject in them a feeling of participation in their community development and municipal activities.⁹¹

The intended political function of the new system was of great significance. The military regime of Ayub Khan desperately needed a civilian support base to legitimize itself. Through the Basic Democracies the regime wanted to create a cadre of political influentials at the grassroots level who would be imbued with the ideas of the regime and would mobilize support for the policies and programmes of the regime.⁹²

An Evaluation

We now present a brief evaluation of the bureaucracy's role in encouraging people's participation for rural development under the new system. The intended goals of the Basic Democracies were to break the paternal control of the bureaucracy, decentralize the administration, and to foster the growth of responsible leadership at the grassroots level. But strong structural limitations of the system were a great hindrance to the realization of these goals. Bureaucratic presence at all tiers of the system above the Union Council prevented the nonofficial members from asserting themselves in the management of the affairs of their own locality. All these tiers were heavily dominated by the government officials

and official chairmen equipped with better education and enormous administrative power. The nonofficial members found it difficult to challenge the opinions expressed by the powerful official members and chairmen even if they had good reasons to disagree. The decisions of these councils were in fact the decisions of the official members with a minimum of input from the people's representatives.

Even the Union Council, the only elected tier of the whole structure, was by no means absolutely free from the official tutelage. It also had to work under official control and supervision. One study in 1962 by a shrewd analyst of the Basic Democracies found that "85 percent of the items on the agenda for discussion at the Union Council meetings were initiated by letters and visits from government officials".⁹³ The main objective of the system was to encourage the people and their elected representatives to manage their own community development activities. But the bureaucracy, long accustomed to an arbitrary exercise of power and paternalistic control, found it difficult to adjust its ways to the new role. Often complaints were voiced that the officials were reluctant to change their methods and take councillors into their confidence.⁹⁴

The record of popular participation in community activities was not encouraging either. The gloomy picture of participation by the rural masses in the affairs of the Union Council is evident from the following observation:.

...officers and union councillors agreed to dispense with the villagers and to take the total burdens of the works programme on their own shoulders. In many unions, no meetings were held in the project area to discuss the audit report....In some thanas only one meeting was held.⁹⁵

There was, in fact, no motivation on the part of the councillors to activate the rural masses. For obvious reasons the higher income group that was heavily represented in these councils did not want to jeopardize its own power and position by activating the great majority of the poor people who were deprived of human dignity and denied even elementary justice.⁹⁶

The Basic Democracies had been severely criticized by the politicians and intellectuals who "looked upon it as a scantily veiled measure to perpetuate the power of the regime".⁹⁷ The most devastating criticism of the system was related to the formation of the electoral college of 80,000 Basic Democrats, by disenfranchising the rest of the population, to elect the President and the members of national and provincial legislatures. The politically articulate section of the population felt cheated by a system that created a cadre of regime supporters at the cost of the voting rights of the millions.

Conclusion

The British system of administration in India was especially designed to serve the colonial interest of the British. The system was, no doubt, a grand success so far as maintaining a firm grip over the subject people and revenue collection were concerned. Since independence in 1947 the philosophy of the state underwent a process of transformation with more and more emphasis on economic development and social change. It was therefore a natural expectation of all sensible persons that the outmoded instruments of bureaucratic rule would be abandoned and replaced by a new administrative system capable of carrying out the large-scale socio-economic development plans, while the importance of maintaining law-and-order would not be undermined. Contrary to popular expectation, the British tradition of administration persisted with all the fundamental features of its structure, personnel policy, methods of work, values and behaviour patterns.

Although the vice-regal tradition of bureaucratic preponderance was evident even before the death of Mohammad Ali Jinnah in September 1948 and the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in October 1951, after Ghulam Mohammad's rise to the office of the Governor-General in 1951 the state was gradually captured by the higher bureaucracy. Subsequently bureaucratic supremacy in the affairs of Pakistan was almost unresisted. Under Ghulam Mohammad, Iskandar Mirza, Ayub Khan, and Yahya Khan it was the elite cadre of the bureaucracy that ruled

Pakistan with a pretension of bureaucratic infallibility and a very distorted "obsession that only the CSP knew what was good for the nation".⁹⁸ The need for reform was widely felt and many abortive attempts were made to cast the administration of the country in a new mould. An irresistible bureaucratic inclination for self-preservation was mainly responsible for the failure of the administrative reform efforts.

Endnotes

1. Detailed discussion of the religious separatist movement by the Muslims of India can be found in Richard Symonds, The Making of Pakistan (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1950); H.V. Hodson, The Great Divide: Britain, India, Pakistan (London: Hutchinson, 1969); Choudhury Khaliquzzaman, Pathway to Pakistan (Lahore: Longmans, 1961); Istiaq H. Qureshi, The Struggle for Pakistan (Karachi: University of Karachi, 1965).
2. It has been estimated that about 5.5 million Hindus and Sikhs left Pakistan and about 6.5 million Muslim refugees came into Pakistan. See Richard Symonds, op. cit., p. 84. For horrors of refugee repatriation, see Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, Freedom at Midnight (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1975), especially ch. 14, pp. 373-400.
3. Keith Callard, Pakistan: A Political Study (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1957), pp. 288-9.
4. Ralph Braibanti, "Public Bureaucracy and Judiciary in Pakistan", in Joseph LaPalombara, ed., Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 364.
5. Ibid., p. 369.
6. For an analysis of the factors leading to the fall of each of these cabinets, see Mushtaq Ahmad, Government and Politics in Pakistan (Karachi: State Publishers, 1970), pp. 39-72.
7. Keith Callard, op. cit., pp. 5-6.
8. Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat, Establishment Division, Careers in the Pakistan Central Superior Services (Karachi: 1954), p. 3.
9. For an account of the attitude of the administrators toward the politicians, see Muneer Ahmad, The Civil Servant in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1964), ch. 6, pp. 124-41; Henry Frank Goodnow, The Civil Service of Pakistan: Bureaucracy in a New Nation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), ch. 4, pp. 77-103.
10. Khalid B. Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), pp. 62-3.
11. Dawn, October 31, 1954; quoted in Keith Callard, op. cit., p. 285.

12. Albert Gorvine, "The Civil Service Under the Revolutionary Government in Pakistan", Middle East Journal 19 (Summer 1965), p. 322.
13. Khalid B. Sayeed, "The Political Role of Pakistan's Civil Servants", Pacific Affairs 31, No. 2 (June 1958), pp. 132-3.
14. See, for example, Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Vol. 1, No. 68 (February 9, 1956), p. 2778.
15. Ibid., p. 2777.
16. Khalid B. Sayeed, "The Political Role of Pakistan's Civil Servants", op. cit., p. 133.
17. Lawrence Ziring, "Political Science and Pakistan: 1947-1972", in W. Eric Gustafson, ed., Pakistan and Bangladesh: Bibliographic Essays in Social Science (Islamabad: University of Islamabad, 1976), pp. 65-6.
18. Khalid B. Sayeed, "The Political Role of Pakistan's Civil Servants", op. cit., p. 133.
19. Henry Frank Goodnow, op. cit., p. 75.
20. Ibid., p. 241.
21. Nazim (a pseudonym), Babus, Brahmans and Bureaucrats: A Critique of an Administrative System in Pakistan (Lahore: People's Publishing House, 1973), pp. 4-5. Similar comments about some independent countries of Asia can be found in Tarzie Vittachi, The Brown Sahib (London: Andre Deutsch, 1962).
22. Ralph Braibanti, Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1966), p. 132.
23. Ibid.
24. Muzaffar Ahmed Chaudhuri, The Civil Service in Pakistan (Dacca: National Institute of Public Administration, 1969), pp. 60-1.
25. Ibid., p. 61.
26. Naresh Chandra Roy, The Civil Service in India (Calcutta: Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyay, 1958), pp. 11-43.
27. Muzaffar Ahmed Chaudhuri, "The Organization and Composition of Central Civil Services in Pakistan", in Inayatullah, ed., Bureaucracy and Development in Pakistan (Peshawar: Pakistan Academy for Rural Development, 1970), p. 266.

28. The official name of the report is Report of the Public Service Commission, 1886-87, 8 vols. (Calcutta: Superintendent of Government Printing, 1888).
29. Ralph Braibanti, Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan, op. cit., p. 102.
30. Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat, Establishment Division, Resolution No. F-25/4/50 Ests. (S.E.I.), Karachi, November 8, 1950, p. 1.
31. For some of the common arguments in favour of retaining the all-Pakistan services, see Muzaffar Ahmed Chaudhuri, The Civil Service in Pakistan, op. cit., pp. 70-3.
32. G. Burgess, "The Civil Service in Pakistan", The Listener, 58, No. 1486 (September, 1957), p. 420.
33. For an excellent analysis of Pakistan's failure in national integration, see Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972).
34. Careers in the Pakistan Central Superior Services, op. cit., p. 12.
35. Government of Pakistan, Planning Board, The First Five Year Plan, 1955-1960, Draft, vol. 1 (Karachi: Government of Pakistan Press, 1956), p. 123.
36. Paul H. Appleby, Public Administration in India: Report of a Survey (New Delhi: Government of India Press, 1953); Asok Chanda, Indian Administration (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1958).
37. Until 1955 this organization was known as the Pakistan Public Service Commission. In 1956 it was named as the Federal Public Service Commission. The name was later changed to Central Public Service Commission.
38. Albert Gorvine, "Administrative Reforms: Functions of Political and Economic Change", in Guthrie S. Birkhead, ed., Administrative Problems in Pakistan (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1966), p. 200.
39. The Foreign Ministry dealt with these matters in the case of the Foreign Service.
40. Ralph Braibanti, "Bureaucracy and Judiciary in Pakistan", op. cit., p. 393.

41. Ralph Braibanti, "The Civil Service of Pakistan: A Theoretical Analysis", South Atlantic Quarterly 58, No. 2 (1959), p. 285.
42. Ralph Braibanti, Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan, op. cit., p. 97.
43. For treatment of the CSP as an institution, see H.F. Goodnow, op. cit., especially Ch. 10, pp. 230-47.
44. Ralph Braibanti, "The Higher Bureaucracy of Pakistan"; In Ralph Braibanti, ed., Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1966), pp. 244-5.
45. Ibid., p. 247.
46. After 1960 the provision of post-entry training in England ceased to exist.
47. H.F. Goodnow, op. cit., p. 171.
48. National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, quoted in Ralph Braibanti, Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan, op. cit., pp. 365-66.
49. Ralph Braibanti, Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan, op. cit., p. 100.
50. H.F. Goodnow, op. cit., p. 231.
51. Attempts have been made by two senior CSP officers to glorify and defend the generalist tradition. For their views, see Agha Abdul Hamid, "Administration in Pakistan: Civil Service", NIPA Reporter 6 (June 1965), pp. 99-108; M. Mashuazzaman, "Aspects of Generalist Tradition", NIPA Reporter 6 (June 1965), pp. 109-13.
52. Government of Pakistan, Planning Board, The First Five Year Plan, op. cit., p. 126.
53. For a similar view, see J.J. Spengler, "Generalist versus Specialists in Social Science: An Economist's View", American Political Science Review 44 (June 1950), pp. 258-79; F.A.A. Manzler, "The Expert in the Civil Service", in William A. Robson, ed., The British Civil Servant (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1937); F.P. Ridley, Specialists and Generalists: A Comparative Study of the Professional Civil Servants at Home and Abroad (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1968). The Fulton Committee Report (1966-68) of the U.K. also made a similar recommendation. For an excellent summary of the report, see Richard A. Chapman, "The Fulton Report: A Summary", Public Administration (London) 46, (1968), pp. 443-51.

54. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements of Field Marshall Mohammad Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan, 6 vols. (Karachi: Pakistan Publications, 1962), vol. III, pp. 72-3.
55. Abunasar Shamsul Hoque, Administrative Reform in Pakistan (Dacca: National Institute of Public Administration, 1970), p. 70.
56. Ibid., 74.
57. For some impressive data regarding the administrative reform efforts in Pakistan between 1947 and 1964, see Ralph Braibanti, Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan, op. cit., pp. 213-35.
58. All information in this paragraph is from Ralph Braibanti, ibid., pp. 213-4.
59. Ibid., p. 214.
60. Rowland Egger, The Improvement of Public Administration in Pakistan (Karachi: Inter-Services Press, 1953), pp. x-xi; a revised portion of this report was published in Public Administration (London) 39, (1961), pp. 149-73.
61. Ibid., p. 7.
62. Ibid., p. 9.
63. Ibid., p. 86.
64. Ibid., pp. 89-91.
65. Albert Gorvine, "Administrative Reforms", op. cit., p. 189.
66. Ralph Braibanti, Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan, op. cit., p. 220.
67. Government of Pakistan, Reorganization of Pakistan Government for National Development (Karachi: May 1955), p. 4; The report was incorporated almost in its entirety as ch. 7 on "Public Administration", in Government of Pakistan, National Planning Board, The First Five Year Plan, 1955-60 (Karachi: Government of Pakistan Press, 1957), pp. 91-121.
68. Ibid., p. 101.
69. Albert Gorvine, "Administrative Reforms", op. cit., p. 189.

70. Khalid B. Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, op. cit., pp. 155-6, the "Two reports" in the quotation refer to the Egger report and the Gladieux report.
71. Government of Pakistan, Establishment Division, Efficiency and O and M Wing, The Report of the Administrative Reorganization Committee (Karachi: Government of Pakistan Press, 1963). The report was originally released only by the press notification which has been reproduced by Ralph Braibanti, Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan, op. cit., Appendix 8, pp. 433-9.
72. Ibid., pp. 434-5.
73. The idea of Economic Pool was not really new. It was just an extension of the Finance and Commerce Pool constituted but not fully developed in prepartition India.
74. Ralph Braibanti, Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan, op. cit., p. 435.
75. Mohammad Mohabbat Khan, Bureaucratic Self-Preservation (Dacca: University of Dacca, 1980), p. 101.
76. Albert Gorvine, "Administrative Reforms", op. cit., p. 196.
77. The formation of the Pay and Services Commission was announced in the Gazette of Pakistan, Extraordinary (August 31, 1959), pp. 1461-2.
78. Government of Pakistan, Report of the Pay and Services Commission, 1959-1962 (Karachi: Government of Pakistan Press, 1962), pp. 57-8.
79. Ibid., p. 12.
80. Ibid., passim.
81. Ibid., p. 447.
82. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements, op. cit., vol. 6 (1964), p. 188.
83. In the meeting of the CSP's national association in 1963 the elite cadre demonstrated its absolute solidarity against any major change in the administrative system and emphasized that for the sake of continued and rapid economic development a generalist and elitist cadre was a necessity. See, Mohammad Mohabbat Khan, op. cit., p. 107.
84. Civil Service of Pakistan Association, Memorandum Submitted to the Services Reorganization Committee by the C.S.P. Association (Rawalpindi: Perozsans, 1969), p. 52.

85. The Basic Democracies Order, 1959, announced in the Gazette of Pakistan (Extraordinary), October 27, 1959, pp. 1759-1809.
86. It was originally a five-tiered structure with the Provincial Development Advisory Council at the apex of the pyramid. This tier was abolished after the promulgation of the 1962 constitution and the convening of the national and provincial legislatures.
87. For detailed discussion of the structure of the Basic Democracies, see Elliot Tepper, Changing Patterns of Administration in Rural East Pakistan (East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University, 1966), Asian Studies Centre Occasional Paper No. 5, pp. 105-11.
88. Ibid., p. III.
89. No reference to an electoral college was made in the original Basic Democracies Order of 1959. The electoral function was assigned in the Part VII of the 1962 constitution and was later adjusted in the Basic Democracies (Amendment) Act of 1965.
90. Elliot Tepper, Rural Development and Administration in East Pakistan (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Department of Political Science, Duke University, 1970), p. 198.
91. Compared to the previous system, the scheme of Basic Democracies entrusted greater development activities to the local councils. For a comparison of the development functions of the previous and the new system, see Elliot Tepper, Changing Patterns of Administration in Rural East Pakistan, op. cit., p. 107.
92. Roumaq Tahan, op. cit., p. 112.
93. A.T.R. Rahman, Basic Democracies at the Grass Roots (Comilla: Pakistan Academy for Rural Development, 1962), p. 95.
94. Ibid., p. 59.
95. A.T.R. Rahman, An Evaluation of the Rural Works Programme, 1963-1964 (Comilla: Pakistan Academy for Rural Development, 1964), pp. 18-9.
96. For the socio-economic background of the Basic Democrats, see Rehman Sobhan, Basic Democracies, Works Programme and Rural Development in East Pakistan (Dacca: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 77-100; M. Rashiduzzaman, "Pakistan's Local Bodies and Social Change: The Emerging

Pattern of Local Leadership", *Orient* 9 (1968), pp. 125-8; Rounaq Jahan, *op. cit.*, pp. 119-22; and a survey jointly conducted by the Bureau of National Reconstruction and the Pakistan Academy for Rural Development, *An Analysis of the Working of Basic Democracy Institutions in East Pakistan* (Comilla: Pakistan Academy for Rural Development, 1961), pp. 25-9.

97. This was the finding of Rounaq Jahan's interviews with prominent politicians, intellectuals, and civil servants in Pakistan in the summer of 1968. See Rounaq Jahan, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

98. Lawrence Ziring, *The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan, 1958-1969* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1971), p. 121.

Chapter IV

**IMPACT OF A MAJOR CHANGE OF REGIME ON THE BUREAUCRACY OF
BANGLADESH, 1971-75**

The basic purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that the new regime in Bangladesh headed by a charismatic leader like Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, in whom the people had expressed their unquestioned loyalty, was not at all successful in abandoning the colonial administrative system. To show that the support base of the Awami League was strong and wide it is necessary to analyze the party's contribution to the emergence of an organized opposition to the Muslim League in East Pakistan, and subsequently to generating a feeling of Bengali regionalism that ultimately led to the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent country. This will reveal the popularity of the party among the Bengalis and its organizational potentiality to introduce necessary changes in the structure and functioning of the bureaucracy.

Awami League and Bengali Nationalism

Soon after Pakistan emerged as a new country in response to a religious separatist movement by the Muslims of British India, the people of the Eastern wing of Pakistan started to realize that they had got rid of the British colonial yoke only to become the victim of West Pakistani neo-colonialism. A feeling of insecurity began to develop among the Bengalis right in the initial years of Pakistan's independence when the West Pakistani ruling clique attempted to introduce Urdu, a minority language of West Pakistan, as the state language of Pakistan. This attempt generated the first spark of cultural

nationalism in East Bengal and had a far-reaching impact on the development of subsequent politics in that province.¹

The anti-Bengali and closed door policies by the ruling Muslim League created resentment in some prominent Bengali leaders who under the leadership of Moulana Bhasani formed the Awami League in June 1949.² After the language movement the Awami League capitalized on the high emotion of the Bengali masses generated by the movement and soon appeared to be the strongest political party in the province. . The provincial elections of 1954 were the first opportunity for the party to test its electoral popularity among the Bengalis. Although there were indications that the Awami League was the most popular party in the province at that time, it decided to enter into an electoral alliance with other opposition parties to ensure a crushing defeat for the ruling Muslim League. The electoral alliance called the United Front incorporated some popular Bengali demands, such as regional autonomy and fair prices for agricultural products, in its election manifesto. It adopted the strategy of mobilizing mass support for the alliance by criticizing the failure of the incumbent government in defending the interest of East Bengal, especially the ruling elite's willingness to jump on the central government's bandwagon on the language issue.

The 1954 elections gave the United Front a landslide victory and it was a big embarrassment for the Muslim League government at the centre.³ But within two months of United

Front's coming to power the centre's rule was imposed on East Bengal by raising allegations of treason against Fazlul Huq, the Chief Minister. The demand for regional autonomy lost much of its momentum between 1958 and 1965 because of the semi-dictatorial style of ruling by Ayub Khan who in 1958 captured power through a bloodless military coup. However, strong sentiment of regionalism reincarnated in 1966 with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's declaration of the six-point Programme which can be summarized as follows: reintroduction of parliamentary democracy, a federal form of government with only defense and foreign affairs to be administered by the centre, two separate but freely convertible currencies for the two wings of the country, the power of taxation and revenue collection to be solely with the federating units, two separate accounts of foreign exchange for the two wings, and a new militia force to be built for East Pakistan.⁴

Mujib's programme received a spontaneous response from the students, peasants, workers, intellectuals, and the deprived Bengali bourgeoisie. In the early months of 1966 Mujib and his close lieutenants toured the entire province explaining the rationale and the ramifications of the Six-point Programme. The whole province seemed prepared for a nationalist explosion. Mujib's success in mobilizing the support of the Bengalis behind his programme was mainly due to the policy of economic discrimination against East Pakistan by the central government.⁵ Under the leadership of Awami

League and its affiliated student organization East Pakistan experienced a nationalist explosion in late 1968 and early 1969. The repressive rules and actions of the government seemed grossly inadequate to suppress the spontaneous uprising of the Bengalis against the decades of injustice. The administration was on the verge of an imminent collapse. Finding no other alternative, Ayub resigned and handed over power to General Yahya Khan in March 1969. The Awami League, thus, established its credibility as the champion of Bengali nationalism and Mujib emerged as the undisputed leader of the Bengali nationalist movement. What started as a movement for some minor concessions from the federal government in the initial years of Pakistan turned into a full-scale nationalist uprising in the late 1960s.

In view of the tremendous support the Awami League received, especially from the poorer section of the population, it became necessary for the party to change its ideological orientation by incorporating some socialist policies in the party manifesto. This was necessary to keep the economically weak class solidly united behind the party. This strategy paid off very well. In the elections of 1970, the first general elections in the history of Pakistan, the Awami League captured 167 of the 169 seats allotted for East Pakistan with an absolute majority in the National Assembly of Pakistan.⁶ The subsequent events clearly proved that the ruling elite of Pakistan was not mentally prepared for such an

electoral triumph by the forces of Bengali nationalism. On March 1, 1971, Yahya Khan postponed the National Assembly session scheduled to meet on March 3. East Pakistan's reaction to this was violent and spontaneous. It generated a massive nationalist spark in the province. The Bengalis, under instruction from their undisputed leader, Sheikh Mujib, defied government rules and laws. Between March 1 and 25 Mujib seemed to be the de facto ruler of East Pakistan. This was also a period of extensive tripartite dialogue among Yahya, Mujib, and Bhutto - the leader of the majority party in West Pakistan in the 1970 elections.⁷

On March 27 Yahya Khan ordered a military crackdown on East Pakistan and thus chose a military solution to a political crisis. The West Pakistani soldiers launched a campaign of genocide in East Pakistan and shattered all hopes of Pakistan's survival as a united country. The independence of Bangladesh was formally declared on March 26 in the name of Sheikh Mujib. The armed struggle for the liberation of Bangladesh was the climax of Bengali nationalism and was led by Mujib's close associates in his absence.

It can thus be said that the Awami League played the most vital role in implanting a nationalistic feeling among the Bengalis and in achieving the independence of Bangladesh through a successful armed struggle. Through the different mass movements that the Awami League headed since its inception the party was able to organize party-oriented

interest groups among the students, youths, workers, and peasants. The party seemed to be well-prepared to give leadership to an independent country.

Populist Character of Awami League Government

The mass popularity of Mujib and the Awami League led to the League's adoption of a populist stance in its socio-economic policies after independence. An examination of these policies is necessary to comprehend the nature of the regime properly.

In a major policy pronouncement on March 26, 1972 Mujib reiterated the commitment of his government to the ideals of socialism when he said, "My Government believes in internal social revolution. Old social order must give way to a new pattern of society. This is no idle theorising. My government and party are pledged to establish scientific socialistic economy".⁸ In accordance with the 1970 election manifesto, socialism was accepted as one of the four fundamental principles of the state policy. The 1972 constitution of Bangladesh categorically declared "that the high ideals of nationalism, socialism, democracy and secularism, which inspired our heroic people to dedicate themselves to, and our brave martyrs to sacrifice their lives in, the national liberation struggle, shall be the fundamental principles of the Constitution."⁹ It was further mentioned in the constitution that

A socialist economic system shall be established with a view to ensuring the attainment of a just and egalitarian society, free from the exploitation of man by man. ---It shall be a fundamental responsibility of the state to emancipate the toiling masses -- the peasants and workers -- and backward section of the people from all forms of exploitation.¹⁰

However, it must be mentioned here that the Awami League never spelled out in clear terms what it really meant by a socialist economic system.¹¹ The ideological proclamations of the Awami League have been dubbed by critics as nothing more than mere "middle-class romanticism".¹²

The industrial development strategy of Pakistan prior to the independence of Bangladesh was to emphasize private enterprise. Although this strategy generated rapid economic growth, the distributional aspect of the economy was not properly taken care of. The result was an unreasonable economic gap between the rich and the poor. The Awami League condemned this industrial development strategy before independence. Therefore, nationalization of big industries and financial institutions like banks and insurance companies was one of the prominent election promises of the Awami League in 1970. In order to materialize that promise the Planning Commission, which after independence emerged as an influential socio-economic policy recommending body, submitted to the Cabinet in 1972 a paper on "Policy Options and Recommendations for the Nationalisation of Industries".¹³ The paper

suggested that private enterprises in the jute, textile and sugar industries with assets over TK.1.5 million be nationalized. The government set up an inter-ministerial committee to find out the implications of the proposals of the Planning Commission. After extended debate the government approved the Planning Commission's recommended proposals. On March 26, 1972 Mujib in his address to the nation on the first anniversary of the declaration of independence announced that all industries and financial institutions with fixed assets over TK.1.5 million would henceforth be stood nationalized and would be owned and controlled by the state.¹⁴ As a result of this nationalization policy the state's share in industry suddenly jumped from 34% in 1969-70 to 92% after March 1972.¹⁵ Most of the industries nationalized were formerly owned by the non-Bengalis who dominated the local economy before independence.¹⁶

The regime was committed to disallowing the upper bourgeoisie to perpetuate its position in the socio-economic structure of Bangladesh. It, therefore, imposed a ceiling on private investment in industries at TK.2.5 million. The ceiling on private investment created intra-party debate and pressure was mounting on the regime to raise the ceiling as many influential members of the government found the ceiling too low to encourage the Bengali entrepreneurs to contribute to the economic development of the country. After an extended intra-party and intra-cabinet debate the ceiling on private

investment was raised in 1974 to TK.30 million to help the indigenous private entrepreneurs to expand their role in the industrialization of the country within a planned economy framework.

Agrarian reforms were also attempted by the Awami League regime as part of its socio-economic reform programme. To please the small farmers the regime promulgated the Estate Acquisition and Tenancy Order in August 1972. According to that order the land revenue on family holdings up to 25 bighas (approximately 8.3 acres) was exempted. It relieved the small farmers of the land revenue burden and gave the regime a populist complexion. The regime also undertook a policy of recovering excess lands from the rich farmers and distributing those lands among the landless and poor peasants. With that end in view the government in August 1972 promulgated the Landholdings (Limitation) Order. It fixed the landholding ceiling per family at 100 bighas (approximately 33.3 acres) and families with more than 100 bighas of landholding were asked to submit a statement of excess lands in their possession. The government, however, promised a nominal amount of compensation for the surrendered excess lands.

The socio-economic changes that were ushered in by the Awami League regime demonstrated that although the party started its political journey as a party of the deprived Bengali bourgeoisie struggling to achieve an equal share of the Pakistani "capitalist pie",¹⁷ it was gradually

transformed into a broad-based populist party. The regime was determined to reduce the hegemony of the upper bourgeoisie within the system of production relations and thereby class exploitation. The socio-economic policies of the regime were geared to that end. However, the critics have argued that the Awami League regime was an "intermediate regime" and its policies highly favoured the "intermediate class" situated between the classes of upper bourgeoisie and the proletariat.¹⁸

Intra-bureaucratic Conflict

Immediately after independence the Awami League government adopted a parliamentary democratic system with real power vested in the cabinet, collectively responsible to the legislature.¹⁹ The party seemed well prepared in terms of organization, skill and expertise to set the institutional base for the functioning of a parliamentary system. The party-oriented interest groups among the students, workers, peasants, and youth, that the Awami League developed before independence, had the potentiality to provide inputs for shaping the public policies as well as mobilizing support to facilitate the implementation of policies. Given the fact that the Awami League before independence harboured a great antipathy towards the conservative, status-oriented and elitist bureaucracy of Pakistan, it was obvious that the party in an independent setting would attempt to assert itself in

the policy-making process by relegating the bureaucracy to a secondary role. It was, however, a tough task to be accomplished because the bureaucracy had a century-long tradition of preeminence in both the policy formulation and implementation processes.

The bureaucracy as an organized institution of the society lost much of its strength after independence because of severe intra-bureaucratic conflicts. The conflict within the bureaucracy originated from different sources and had different dimensions. One prominent intra-bureaucratic conflict was between those civil servants who joined the Bangladesh government in exile in India during the liberation movement and those who worked with the Pakistani occupation army, 'willy-nilly'. The number of civilian government employees who joined the exile government in India was only 500. An overwhelming majority of them was lower-ranking employees. Only thirteen had been from the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP), two from the Pakistan Police Service (PSP), and some of them were from the East Pakistan Civil Service (EPCS).²⁰ The officials who did not join the exile government were discriminated against by raising allegation of collaboration with the government of Pakistan. The regime rewarded the officials who joined the exile government and who had social connections with the Awami League leaders with rapid promotions and thus violated the established civil service principle. An obvious consequence of this policy of

extending favour to some officials was a high degree of disenchantment among the rest of the government functionaries. These officials argued that although they had fully supported the liberation movement, they had been forced to work with the Pakistani occupation army at gun point. "The distinction between those who submitted themselves to authority because of lack of choice and those who were active 'collaborators' with the military regime was often blurred".²¹ The Awami League politicians wanted to assert themselves in the policy process by weakening the bureaucracy. As a strategy they divided the government officials into "collaborators" and "non-collaborators".

Another potential source of intra-bureaucratic conflict was the rivalry between the former members of the CSP and EPCS. It was argued by the members of the former EPCS that with the emergence of Bangladesh as a sovereign entity the former provincial civil service logically deserved to be transformed into the national civil service of Bangladesh. They further argued that since there had been no difference in the educational qualifications and in the nature of tasks being performed by the members of the erstwhile CSP and EPCS, the cadres should be amalgamated and the status and promotion in the amalgamated cadre should be determined on the basis of seniority. The members of CSP, on the other hand, contended that the members of EPCS joined the provincial service simply because they were not competent enough to compete with the

former members of the CSP for positions in the elite cadre of Pakistan Civil Service. They strongly emphasized merit as opposed to length of service as the main criterion of promotion. They demanded that at least two-thirds of the policy-making positions in the secretariat should be reserved for the former members of the CSP.²² This conflict weakened the solidarity of the bureaucratic institution which once made it possible for the bureaucracy to claim a position of preeminence in the overall structure of government. The conflict between these elite cadres was fueled from time to time by the government's repeated commitment to drastically overhaul the existing bureaucratic structure and also by playing off one group against the other.

The rivalry and jealousy between the generalist administrators and the specialists was another source of conflict within the bureaucracy. Throughout the twenty-four years of Pakistan's existence as a united country the specialists in administration strongly resented the policy of placing the "all-rounders" in policy-making and administrative positions. With the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent country the old conflict got a new momentum. The specialists argued that in an independent country the old colonial practice of preferential treatment to the generalists should be discarded if the specialists were to be motivated properly to contribute their best to the progress and prosperity of the country. The multi-dimensional intra-bureaucratic conflict

was a blessing for the ruling politicians. It increased their strength vis-a-vis the bureaucrats.

Awami League and Job Security of Officials

The most decisive step of the Awami League government to exercise effective control over the bureaucracy was the deliberate attack on the job security of the government officials. Only a few weeks after independence Mujib in a meeting in Tangail said, "I want the officials to eliminate malpractices and corruption from the soil of Bangladesh. There is no guarantee of your jobs. If someone is found guilty, he will be served with a notice -- your services are no longer required".²³ The feeling of job insecurity ran very high among the officials. The President's Order No. 9 made necessary legal arrangements to suspend or dismiss any official of the country without showing any reason or giving the victim the opportunity to appeal in any court of justice "in the interest of the People's Republic of Bangladesh". Naturally enough, the Order had a devastating impact on the morale of the officials who enjoyed solid tenure before independence. Many of them actively considered the idea of quitting the insecure government services and joining the private sector. A very common practice among the officials in this insecure job environment was to avoid any initiative and risk-taking and to keep themselves busy with the performance of mere routine tasks. However, the government exercised

utmost caution in dismissing the higher cadre officials under the President's Order No. 9. Between July 14 and November 30, 1974 over 300 government employees had been sacked under that Order, but only a limited few of them belonged to the higher cadre of government service.²⁴

The constitutional protection of the job security of government employees was totally eliminated under the 1972 constitution of Bangladesh. The tenure security of the officials was well entrenched in the preceding 1956 and 1962 constitutions of Pakistan. Both these constitutions mentioned that a government employee "shall hold office during the pleasure of the President";²⁵ that the person "shall not be dismissed or removed from service or reduced in rank by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed";²⁶ and that an employee shall not be dismissed or removed from office "until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken" unless the action is taken on criminal grounds or the President thinks that such opportunity should be denied in the interest of the security of the country.²⁷ Although all these provisions had been incorporated in the Bangladesh constitution of 1972,²⁸ it differed significantly from the 1956 and 1962 constitutions of Pakistan with respect to the job security of the government employees. While the 1956 and 1962 constitutions did not mention anything about the finality of the dismissing authority's decision regarding not giving

the victim "an opportunity of showing cause", the 1972 constitution stipulated clearly that the decision "of the authority empowered to dismiss or remove such persons or to reduce him in rank shall be final".²⁹ The objective behind the incorporation of this provision in the constitution was to ensure political control over the bureaucrats by implanting a sense of insecurity among them.

Lateral Entry of Professionals in Administration

The number of elite generalist administrators in the senior management positions of public enterprise had been constantly increasing during the Pakistan period.³⁰ But the Awami League government seemed to be convinced that the appointment of generalist administrators to the top managerial positions of public enterprises was not conducive to the dynamic leadership and continuity needed for effective performance of these enterprises. So the government decided to appoint persons with a professional background to the chief executive positions of public enterprises (the importance of which tremendously increased after independence because of the nationalization policy of the government). An analysis of the background of forty-four chief executives appointed initially to public corporations revealed that thirty-five of them came from a professional and/or management background and nine of the chief executives were generalist administrators.³¹ However, this policy of appointing specialists could not be

sustained for long. Of the initial thirty-five professional appointments, sixteen were replaced subsequently, and of them seven were replaced by the generalist administrators.³²

These replacements indicated the reemergence of the previous tradition of appointing generalist "all-rounders" to the senior executive positions of public sector enterprises and agencies.

During the Pakistan period the Planning Commission occupied a very dignified position in the economic policy-making process of the government. The leadership positions in the Pakistan Planning Commission had been an almost near monopoly for the members of the CSP. After 1971 the status of the Planning Commission was elevated further because of the commitment of the new regime to establish a socialist pattern of the economy. Some of the main tasks assigned to the Planning Commission were: (i) to prepare short-term and long-term plans for the socio-economic development of the country; (ii) to allocate resources to the various sectors of the economy which were under the administrative control of various ministries; (iii) to evaluate the performance of the plans and to closely watch the implementation process of the plans in order to advise on the type of administrative machinery needed for the effective implementation of the plans; (iv) to undertake and promote economic research and surveys necessary to support effective planning and implementation; (v) to determine the amount of

foreign aid necessary for the planning and development.³³ To elevate the status of the Commission the Deputy Chairman and Members of the organization were accorded the status of Minister and State Ministers respectively. The Commission became all the more powerful and prominent in the policy process because of Prime Minister's assumption of the position of Minister of Planning and his close contact with the Deputy Chairman and Members of the Commission regarding socio-economic development policies.

In his attempt to eradicate generalist domination from the Planning Commission, Mujib appointed four academic economists as Deputy Chairman and Members of the Commission. Professionals were also placed in other important positions of the Planning Commission. The appointment of the professionals was viewed by the former members of the CSP as an undesirable reversal of the colonial tradition of placing the generalists in the vital policy-making positions of the government. It was difficult for the generalists to tolerate this "intrusion of 'outsiders'" in their domain as it foiled the expectations of the former Bengali members of the CSP that they would enjoy an unfettered monopoly over the top policy-making positions of the country with the disappearance of their non-Bengali counterparts.³⁴ The higher status and extended functions of the Planning Commission together with the virtual elimination of the generalists from the important positions in that organization became a potential source of jealousy and rivalry

between the Commission and the bureaucracy outside the Commission. To the bureaucracy the Commission had "the image of an academic institution and its analysis and policy proposals were considered to be academic".³⁵ The bureaucracy very often blamed the Planning Commission for "pressing for too many changes at the same time", which in the bureaucracy's opinion originated from "the lack of realism and practical wisdom of the Planning Commission".³⁶ The Planning Commission, on the other hand, expressed its strong reservation about using the bureaucracy as innovator or catalytic agent for social change.³⁷ The Commission also attacked the elitist mentality of the bureaucracy. It wrote in the First Five Year Plan:

...the Government functionaries in Bangladesh are as much the product of socio-economic environment as any one else. They are equally exposed to and affected by the social climate in the country. Indeed the heritage of the colonial structure and the past method of operations tend to influence him [sic] more than those who work outside the system. In independent Bangladesh, such alienation of the government functionary and the people must be replaced by their positive identification with the common man.³⁸

The net result of this antagonism and jealousy between the Planning Commission and the bureaucracy was that the bureaucracy did not cooperate whole-heartedly with the Commission for the implementation of its development programmes.³⁹ In an attempt to improve the relationship between the Commission and the bureaucracy the government in late 1973 appointed a senior generalist administrator as a Member of the Planning Commission. It was hoped that the

induction of the generalist would ease the tension and motivate the fellow generalist administrators to effectively cooperate with the Planning Commission in the proper implementation of its development programmes. But it did not improve the relationship, rather it caused a new type of tension between the academic economists and the bureaucracy within the Planning Commission.⁴⁰

Administrative Reform Efforts

Administrative and Services Reorganization Committee

Both before and after independence the Awami League leaders promised a total overhaul of the administrative system which they considered to be colonial in nature and grossly inadequate to perform the administrative functions of an independent country. Soon after the achievement of independence, the Awami League government set up the Administrative and Services Reorganization Committee (ASRC) on March 15, 1972 with the intention of reorganizing the entire administrative system so that it could become effective in materializing the promises of the government. Professor Muzzafar Ahmed Chaudhuri, Vice-Chancellor of Dacca University and a life-long educationist, was appointed Chairman of the Committee. A representative from the Planning Commission, a Member of the Constituent Assembly (MCA), and a senior civil servant (former member of the CSP) were the members of the ASRC. The terms of reference of the ASRC were as follows:

- a) to examine the structure of various services and to determine the future structure keeping in view the functional requirements of the government;
- b) to consider the question of amalgamation of all civil services into a unified service;
- c) to determine the future mode of recruitment of the government employees at various levels; and
- d) to prepare and recommend a comprehensive design for the administrative reorganization.⁴¹

In preparing its report the ASRC heard representation from 183 service associations, interviewed thirteen ministers and fifty-five high officials like secretaries to the government, heads of autonomous organizations, sector corporations, insurance, banking and other financial institutions. The members of ASRC also made a trip to the Soviet Union to acquire a first-hand knowledge about the administrative and service structure in that country. The Committee submitted a part of its report dealing with the services in April 1973. The ASRC report, popularly known as Chaudhuri report, was highly critical of the existing service structure and recommended its thorough overhaul. About the services the ASRC report contended that

...the existing services divided into too many distinct entities with artificial walls built around them with varying career prospects, lacking in professionalism and too much class and rank-oriented with very little opportunities to rise to the top for those who started their career in the lower ranks. The service structure designed to serve a colonial, federal form of government within a capitalist framework was found unsuitable for the independent, socialist, democratic and unitary Government and inadequate to meet the challenge of quick development and socialist reconstruction of the country.⁴²

Commenting on the administrative side, the ASRC wrote:

The Committee found the structure outmoded, the system sluggish and irresponsible to the people and the procedure complicated, confusing and ponderous....This implies shedding off the traditional class and status consciousness that has characterized the Civil Service trained and brought up in the colonial traditions. With the new social philosophy of the state, it is now the responsibility of the civil servants to demonstrate and assure the nation that their interest lies in serving the people and not in status and privileges for themselves.⁴³

The ASRC report was tremendously influenced by the Fulton Report in the United Kingdom. Like the Fulton report, the Chaudhuri report was extremely critical of the class divided character of the civil service that Bangladesh inherited.⁴⁴

The report pointed out:

The civil servants are arranged in too many firm classes and too many special services with barriers between classes and services too high. Consequently, there is too much and too constant consciousness of ranks, class, title and service membership, too little consciousness of membership in the public service, and too little consciousness turning on particular job responsibilities. Rank has no significance except that it identifies responsibilities; here responsibility tends to become diluted and diffused, and rank exaggerated.⁴⁵

The Committee, therefore, strongly recommended the abolition of the "artificial" division between the former All-Pakistan services, other central superior services and the former provincial services. And it proposed the unification of the entire group of civil servants into a single, classless, and unified grading structure covering the whole service. There would be an appropriate number of different pay levels matching different levels of skills and responsibility, and the correct grading for each post was to be determined by an analysis of job.⁴⁶ The Committee voiced its total

disapproval of the provision of reservation of key posts for the former members of the CSP as it "impeded the growth of homogeneity and unity in the services", and emphasized that "all the key positions at all levels must be open to competent men irrespective of the services to which they might belong".⁴⁷ Because of the growing technological sophistication of the present era, the Committee was convinced of the needs for a variety of skills in the higher administration. "Unalloyed generalism, with which we have been familiar, is losing its validity in several fields and is progressively declining in importance".⁴⁸ The report, therefore, recommended "that the preference for the generalist, pure and simple, should yield place to a preference for those who have acquired competence in the concerned area".⁴⁹ The placement of personnel should be governed by the policy of "the right man in the right place".⁵⁰ The report made a specific recommendation "to provide opportunities for exceptionally talented persons to quickly move into upper levels, in fact from the lowest positions to the higher positions".⁵¹ Recommendations were also made to allow the lateral entry of persons of proved competence from universities, industrial, commercial and banking concerns into the senior levels of the civil service should persons of such competence not be available within the civil service.⁵²

The recommendations of the Chaudhuri report were radical

3

NEC
NATIONAL ELECTRONIC CORPORATION

in nature and aimed at complete restructuring of the inherited bureaucracy. The main attack of the report, however, was on the privileges and prerogatives of the former members of the CSP. It was difficult for them to accept these recommendations that were designed to dilute their cadre identity and to snatch away their traditional hold on the top policy-making and managerial positions in the administration. On the other hand, the report produced enthusiasm among the specialists who on many occasions before independence expressed their strong resentment against an antiquated system of unalloyed generalism. Given the Awami League leaders' repeated assertion about the dysfunctionality of an outmoded colonial bureaucracy, it was expected that the recommendations of the ASRC report would be accepted and implemented by the government.

The second part of the ASRC report was submitted to the government for consideration in October 1973. In this part of the report recommendations had been made regarding the reorganization of the secretariat system and procedure of work, ministerial and departmental organization and district and local government administration. The ASRC observed that "the secretariat system, as it has been operating in Bangladesh, is based on the premise that policy and execution are divisible and the Secretariat is concerned only with the former and the programme departments exclusively with the latter".⁵³ The ASRC members agreed with the Hanumanthaiya

Commission in India that:

The secretariat system of work has lent balance, consistence and continuity to the administration, and served as a nucleus for the total machinery of a ministry. It has facilitated inter-ministry co-ordination and accountability to parliament at the ministerial level. As an institutionalised system, it is indispensable for the proper functioning of Government.⁵⁴

Nevertheless, the Committee was well aware of the notable defects of the secretariat system identified long ago by Sir Richard Tottenham as "excessive noting and file shifting, the combined effects of which is delay and inefficiency".⁵⁵ The Chaudhuri report, therefore, recommended that the attached offices or executive departments in the areas of development administration like agriculture, animal husbandry, fisheries, co-operative, rural development, irrigation and power, public health, education, and social welfare should be merged with the secretariat. In the remaining cases where the government functions were mainly regulatory in nature, or training, survey and research oriented, the existing system could be continued.⁵⁶ For quick and efficient disposal of government business the report recommended reorganization of the ministerial and departmental organizations and their working procedure.⁵⁷ The report also recommended the reorganizations of the local government institutions. In keeping with the clause (i) of Article 59 of the 1972 constitution of Bangladesh the Committee recommended the setting up of directly elected local government institutions

At the district, thana (sub-district) and union levels with the devolution to these bodies of a large number of functions being performed at national level.⁵⁸ The objective of establishing directly elected local government institutions was to devise means to generate administrative accountability to and participation from the masses in the management of their own community affairs.

Non-Implementation of ASRC Report

The ASRC report was highly acclaimed by the intellectual community of the country. It was expected that the recommendations of the report would be accepted and implemented. The reality, however, was contrary to what was expected. The ASRC report was shelved and kept confidential.

We now turn to an analysis of why the recommendations of the Chaudhuri report were not implemented. Or, in other words, why did the government decide to keep alive the colonial administrative system that it once ridiculed? After the success of the liberation struggle it became clear that the future popularity of the Awami League among the masses would, to a larger extent, depend on its performance in the economic sector and on achieving a broad consensus on the basic issues of national importance. The new regime in its initial years successfully averted an economic crisis mainly because of the massive relief operations undertaken by the United Nations, friendly nations, and other international

agencies. But the economic crisis could not be averted for long. Prices of essential commodities started to soar. Production of the industrial and agricultural sectors could not be brought back to the pre-liberation (1969-70) level. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1972-73 was 12-14% lower, in real terms, than the GDP in 1969-70, the last normal year before independence. The GDP per capita in 1972-73 was as much as one-fifth lower than the GDP in 1969-70.⁵⁹ The production of rice (the main staple food of the people) in 1972-73 was 15% less than that of 1969-70.⁶⁰ Industrial output in 1972-73 declined by about 30% of the output in 1969-70. In terms of 1969-70 output, jute industries' output was 28% less, the output of cotton textile was 23% less in yarn, 3% less in cloth, and the output of sugar was only one-fifth.⁶¹ The country's export had dropped about 30% by 1972-73 compared to export in 1969-70.⁶²

Several factors contributed to this disastrous state of the economy. First, while because of the government's nationalization policy all big industries came under direct state control and ownership, these industries were improperly managed by the state. People with good connections with the Awami League stalwarts, in many cases with no managerial capability and expertise at all, were appointed to the top positions of these industries. They took the best possible advantage of their positions to make their own future economic fortune. Inefficient administration coupled with the non-

availability of spare parts and raw materials, and excessive labour unrest contributed to a sharp decline in the volume of production of the nationalized industries.

Secondly, a big slice of whatever meagre economic resources the country had were smuggled out to India by the greedy traders. Smuggling of foodgrains and jute (the major foreign exchange earner) became an institutionalized business. Government attempts to stop this illegal trade was abortive. During the 1973-74 financial year 1.5 million tons of paddy and .8 million tons of rice were drained out to India.⁶³ Smuggling resulted in a sharp decline in the foreign exchange earning and it also added to the food deficit. In addition to these factors, an excessive supply of money and deficit financing heavily contributed to the poor economic health of the country. The Planning Commission in its 1973-74 annual plan admitted:

The difficult economic situation in the country has seriously affected the daily lives of our people, particularly the landless rural workers and generally the urban population. The persistence of the shortages and high prices of basic goods has generated widespread social and political tension.⁶⁴

In June 1974 the Finance Minister publicly declared that since the economy had broken down it would be impossible to implement the 1973-74 development plans.⁶⁵

Because of the poor performance of the regime in the economic sector, political opposition to the regime started to grow. The first political opposition came from the Jatiya

Samajtantrik Dal (National Socialist Party - JSD), a political party formed after independence by the dissident factions of the Awami League's student and labour fronts. The main ideology of the JSD was "scientific socialism" which the party leaders and workers viewed as the only solution to the chronic problems the country was confronting. The party was highly successful in picking up popular support both in the rural and urban areas. The student front of the party became very popular in the colleges and universities. Another potential source of opposition to the regime was the National Awami Party (NAP) led by Bhasani, an octogenarian who proved his worth in agitational politics before independence. The party was well known for its pro-Chinese leaning and dubbed the Awami League government as a "puppet" in the hands of "Soviet-Indian Social Imperialists" —

The most serious threat to the political and social stability in the country came from the radical revolutionary forces who had no respect for constitutional politics and were strongly committed to the idea of establishing a classless society through an armed struggle against the Bengali bourgeoisie. The radical revolutionary forces argued that the main intention behind direct Indian intervention in the liberation struggle was to prevent the completion of a "national democratic revolution" and the establishment of an exploitation-free classless society under the leadership of the workers and peasants. The radical forces vowed to

complete the unfinished revolution by overthrowing the Awami League regime through a guerilla warfare.⁶⁶ The workers of the underground revolutionary parties started to kill the Awami League workers, loot the banks, village markets, and houses of rich farmers, and attack police stations and outposts.⁶⁷

Such incidents were reported in the newspapers almost every day throughout 1973. The Awami League leaders and workers, rich businessmen, and farmers and other "enemies of the revolution" felt extreme insecurity of their lives and properties. The government attempted to fight the revolutionary forces through different coercive measures like the promulgation of Special Power Act, setting up of Special Tribunals, and the deployment of Jatiya Rakkhi Bahani (a para-militia force created by Mujib) and the use of the army. But this failed to stop the activities of the revolutionary forces.

Deterioration of law-and-order was a major headache for the Awami League government. During the liberation struggle arms were distributed indiscriminately among the freedom fighters. After independence the government through a mixed policy of appeals, threats and rewards persuaded many freedom fighters to surrender their arms and ammunition. But it was widely believed that a considerable amount of arms and ammunition were not surrendered and went underground. These weapons were rampantly used by the miscreants for the purpose of murders, burglaries and robberies in all parts of the country. The situation was especially worse in the rural

areas where people had been passing sleepless nights being afraid of dacoits and miscreants.⁶⁸ Many rich villagers migrated to the urban centres to save their lives. Increasing lawlessness weakened the credibility of the Awami League government among the people, who had been solidly behind the party during the nationalist movement. The opposition parties started demanding the resignation of the "inefficient and corrupt" government and formation of a "national government" to save the nation from an imminent disaster.

The ASRC was set up during the heyday of the Awami League government with no dearth of sincerity to bring about a substantial change in the structure and functioning of the bureaucracy. But by the time the ASRC report was handed in to the government, the socio-economic and political atmosphere of the country had changed drastically. Although Mujib still had his charisma, it was a bit tarnished. The economy was at the verge of an imminent collapse, radical revolutionary forces were actively challenging the socio-economic structure of the society, and law enforcing authorities proved to be ineffective in fighting the anti-social elements. The regime, therefore, became increasingly dependent on the bureaucracy to energize the poor state of the economy, to restore law-and-order and to reduce the degree of social instability. Mujib and his close associates in the government were convinced that without effective co-operation from the bureaucracy it would be impossible to implement the socio-

economic development programmes. The consequence of further disrupting an already disrupted bureaucracy would be suicidal for the government. The regime therefore decided not to implement the ASRC report.

The National Pay Commission

Soon after appointing the ASRC the government felt the necessity of restructuring the existing pay structure of government employees. On July 21, 1972 the regime appointed the National Pay Commission (NPS) headed by A. Rab, a retired civil servant who was a member of the pre-1947 Bengal Civil Service.⁶⁹ The full-time members of the NPC were a banker, a retired high-ranking police officer, and an academic engineer. The part-time members included an economist, a senior civil servant, a high-ranking army officer, and a chartered accountant. The Commission was asked to "comprehensively review the existing pay structure relating to all employees in the public sector and recommend a national pay structure embracing the entire public sector".⁷⁰ In preparing its report the NPC was advised to pay special attention to a host of factors such as the cost of living, the resources of the government, the need to narrow down the wage gap between the highest and the lowest paid employees, the need to attract and retain the talented and technically and professionally qualified persons in the public sector, the

requirement of efficiency, equity and incentives for work, and the demand and supply in respect of different professions and occupations.⁷¹ The NPC was also specifically advised to work in close co-operation with the ASRC so that the entire scheme of reform could be well harmonized. For an intensive study of the conditions and pay plans of a few socialist countries the NPC deputed three of its members to Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and the German Democratic Republic.

The responsibility entrusted to the NPS was enormous because "the Commission faced the baffling task of suggesting a rational pay structure evolving out of the anarchical disorder of nearly 2200 scales of pay with several hundred for each class of employees".⁷² What made the task of the NPC all the more difficult was the need to narrow down the disproportionately high gap in pay between the highest and the lowest paid employees, which had been conspicuously maintained during the Pakistani rule. After a thorough consideration of the relevant social, economic, historical, moral, and psychological factors, the NPC determined the principles of the pay policy so that it could be fair to the employees as well as to their employer - the public. The Commission submitted its report to the government on May 18, 1973.

In accordance with the recommendation of the ASRC to organize the existing posts in ten national grades, the NPC report proposed the pay and fringe benefit structure of the ten national grades. To reduce the "unjustifiably wide" pay-

spread between the highest and the lowest the NPC report was guided by the principle that "the 'floor' should be founded on a livable rate of wage" and "the 'ceiling' should be such as will be a socially acceptable multiple of the 'floor'".⁷³

The NPC report, therefore, fixed the 'floor' pay at TK.130-140 and the 'ceiling' at TK.2000 per month.⁷⁴ The disparity between the highest (former CSP secretary) and the lowest (peon) pay including the fringe benefits was thereby proposed to be narrowed down from 1:28.1 to 1:11.5.⁷⁵ The Commission also suggested that the government should provide its employees with dearness allowances in keeping with the rising prices of essential commodities.

Unlike many other administrative and pay reform proposals in the past, the NPC report was accepted by the government. However, the implementation of the recommendations proved to be a very difficult task because of the resistance from senior officials who felt that the NPC report had been too unsympathetic to their interests. The government, therefore, had to implement the recommendations partially. The pay scale of employees belonging to grades X to V were put into effect, and the pay scale for the upper four grades remained unimplemented. It has been observed:

The non-effectuation of pay scales for the higher grades was due to the manipulation of the senior bureaucrats (especially erstwhile CSPs and EPCs) who demanded enhancement in their salaries and associated fringe benefits and were enraged with the Commission for recommending less pay for them. This only shows the tremendous hold of senior bureaucrats in the implementation of major personnel policies in the country.⁷⁶

When the NPC report was submitted to the government in May 1973 the socio-economic and political environment prevailing in the country was not favourable enough for the government to be too rigid with its implementation. This provided the senior bureaucrats with necessary leverage to successfully manoeuvre the implementation of pay scales proposed by the NPC for the higher grades.

The "Second Revolution"

As opposition to the ineffectiveness and corrupt practices of the Awami League regime grew in magnitude and militancy Mujib started to show signs of intolerance of opposition. The press was muzzled. A large number of opposition newspaper offices were locked. Many opposition leaders and workers were put in prison. To eradicate the opposition to the regime the government in December 1974 declared a state of emergency. The fundamental rights granted by the 1972 constitution were suspended. Coercive actions were taken against the underground revolutionary forces. The state of emergency brought the members of the higher bureaucracy, who had maintained a very low profile since independence, to the limelight. However, on January 25, 1975 the constitution was drastically amended by the personal initiative of Mujib and reportedly against the private sentiments of many of his close associates. The amended constitution provided for a one-party presidential system as practised in many Afro-Asian countries.

The constitutional amendment marked the beginning of what Mujib called his "second revolution", the objective of which was to establish the "democracy of the proletariat".⁷⁷

Sheikh Mujib became the President of the Republic and in early June 1975 he announced the constitution of the Bangladesh Krishak-Sramik Awami League (BAKSAL), the only political party legally entitled to function under the amended constitution. He nominated the members of the central and executive committees of the party.⁷⁸ An analysis of the occupational background of the members of the central committee would reveal Mujib's heavy dependence on the bureaucratic elite after the amendment of the constitution. Of the 115 members of the central committee of the party, twenty-one had a civil-military bureaucratic background. Of these twenty-one members nine belonged to the former CSP, four were top-ranking military officers, one was a senior police officer, and seven others were members of other services.⁷⁹

A prominent feature of Mujib's second revolution was a scheme for politically appointed district governors in order to make the district level bureaucracy subservient to the party machinery. Mujib said that the administrative change was designed to end the colonial administrative tradition and to generate administrative responsiveness to and participation from the masses.⁸⁰ Mujib's scheme was supposed to be a serious blow to the career civil servants' almost absolute hold on district level administration since the beginning of

British rule in India. During the British and the Pakistani rule the head of a district's administration was a career civil servant and the entire district administration revolved around him. He was "frequently and variously called the 'pivot', the 'king pin', the 'keystone', the 'arch-stone', the 'backbone', the 'nerve centre' of district administration".⁸¹

The new scheme proposed to bring the politicians to the forefront of district administration by drastically reducing the role of career civil servants. As a step toward implementing the scheme for politically appointed district governors the Sheikh, through a presidential ordinance in June 1975, created sixty-one districts by dividing up the existing nineteen districts. The next month he announced the names of sixty-one governor-designates who were to take charge of district administration in September 1975. It is interesting to note here that fourteen of the governor-designates had a bureaucratic background. Nine of them were former members of the CSP, one was a military officer, and four were from other government services.⁸² This proved that despite Mujib's rhetoric about destroying the colonial administrative tradition, he was in fact convinced that he had more to lose than to gain by antagonising the career bureaucrats.

Conclusion

After independence it was expected that the new regime would bring about substantial change in the inherited administrative system. This expectation was produced by the Awami League leaders' repeated condemnation of the colonial administrative system which they considered to be totally at odds with the needs of an independent country striving to achieve socio-economic development. The new government, during its honeymoon period, showed signs of strong determination to institute major changes in the administrative system of the country. The crackdown on the job security of the officials, the lateral entry of the professionals to the administration, the setting up of the ASRC and the NPC were some of the indications of the regime's strong determination to restructure the administrative system. But by mid-1973 the socio-economic and political atmosphere of the country had changed significantly to the disadvantage of the Awami League government. The economy was in terribly bad shape, political opposition to the regime grew in magnitude and volatility, and law-and-order conditions deteriorated beyond any acceptable limit. The regime, therefore, had to change and soften its attitude toward the bureaucracy and became increasingly dependent on that organized institution for restoration of law-and-order and to energize an almost crippled economy. The most glaring indication of the regime's change of attitude toward the bureaucracy was the non-implementation of the ASRC

report that recommended some radical changes in the structure and functioning of the administration. The regime was convinced that the implementation of the ASRE report would further antagonize an already antagonized bureaucracy. The regime, therefore, decided to shelve the report and allowed the inherited system to continue.

Endnotes

1. For an analysis of the role of language movement in implanting a sense of identity among the Muslims of East Bengal, see Badruddin Umar, "Mussalmaner Sawdesh Pattabartan" [The Muslim's Return Home] in Badruddin Umar, Sanskritik Sampradayikata [Cultural Communalism] (Dacca: Granthana, 1969).
2. Ataur Rahman Khan, Ojaratir Dui Bachar [Two Years of Chief Ministership] (Dacca: Avijan Printing House, 1964), p. 24.
3. The Muslim League won only ten Muslim seats, whereas the United Front won an impressive 223 seats; see Keith Callard, Pakistan: A Political Study (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1957), p. 57.
4. For details of the Six-point Programme, see Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Chaya Dafa Karmasuchi: Amader Bachar Dabi [Six-Point Formula: Our Right to Live] (Dacca: East Pakistan Awami League, March 1966).
5. To comprehend properly the disparity between the two wings of Pakistan, see "Why Bangladesh" by a group of scholars in Vienna, in Bangladesh Document (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, 1971), pp. 15-22; Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972); and Md. Abdul Wadud Bhuiyan, Emergence of Bangladesh and Role of Awami League (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1982), pp. 43-110.
6. For details of the election results, see the Ittefaq (Dacca), January 23, 1971 and the Pakistan Observer (Dacca), January 20, 1970.
7. For an official version of the tripartite dialogue, see White Paper on the Crisis of East Pakistan (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan Press, 1971); for Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's version of the dialogue, see The Great Tragedy (Karachi: Pakistan People's Party, 1971); the Awami League's account of the dialogue has not yet been published; for an account of the dialogue by a strong believer in the territorial integrity of Pakistan, and who once served in Yahya's cabinet, see G.W. Choudhury, The Last Days of United Pakistan (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974).
8. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's speech on the first anniversary of independence, Bangladesh Documents, vol. 1 (Dacca: Ministry of External Affairs, Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, n.d.), p. 11.

9. Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs, Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, The Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh (Dacca: Bangladesh Government Press, 1972), p. 1.
10. Ibid., part ii, articles 10 and 13, pp. 5-6.
11. Rounaq Jahan, Bangladesh Politics: Problems and Issues (Dacca: University Press, 1980), p. 99.
12. See, Syed Serajul Islam, "The Role of the State in the Economic Development of Bangladesh During the Mujib Regime (1972-75)", Journal of Developing Areas 19, No. 2 (January 1985), p. 196.
13. Bangladesh Planning Commission, "Policy Options and Recommendations for the Nationalisation of Industries", mimeographed (Dacca: February 1972).
14. For details of Mujib's speech, see Bangladesh Document, vol. 1, op. cit., pp. 9-12.
15. Rehman Sobhan and Muzaffer Ahmad, Public Enterprises in an Intermediate Regime: A Study in the Political Economy of Bangladesh (Dacca: Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies, 1980), p. 192.
16. Ibid., p. 92.
17. Tariq Ali, Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970), p. 129.
18. For details, see Rehman Sobhan and Muzaffer Ahmad, op. cit.; also see Syed Serajul Islam, op. cit., pp. 185-208.
19. The parliamentary system was introduced according to the Provisional Constitution Order of 1972. For the full text of the Order, see the Bangladesh Observer (Dacca), January 12, 1972.
20. These figures have been taken from Talukder Maniruzzaman, "Administrative Reforms and Politics Within the Bureaucracy in Bangladesh", Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 17, No. 1 (March 1979), p. 47.
21. Nurul Islam, Development Planning in Bangladesh: A Study in Political Economy (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1977), p. 53.
22. The contents of this paragraph are based on an article by Talukder Maniruzzaman, "Administrative Reforms and Politics Within the Bureaucracy in Bangladesh", op. cit., pp. 48-9.

23. Quoted in Emajuddin Ahamed, "Dominant Bureaucratic Elites in Bangladesh", Indian Political Science Review 13, No. 1 (January 1979), p. 34.
24. Talukder Maniruzzaman, "Bangladesh in 1974: Economic Crisis and Political Polarization", Asian Survey 15, No. 2 (February 1975), p. 125, fn. 14.
25. Ministry of Law, Government of Pakistan, The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (March 1956), article 180, p. 120; The Constitution of the Republic of Pakistan (Karachi: Government of Pakistan Press, 1962), article 176, p. 86.
26. Ibid., article 181 of 1956 constitution, p. 120; article 177 of 1962 constitution, pp. 86-7.
27. Ibid., article 181 of 1956 constitution, pp. 120-1; article 177 of the 1962 constitution, p. 87.
28. Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs, Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, The Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh (Dacca: Bangladesh Government Press, 1972), articles 134, 135(1), 135(2), pp. 54-5.
29. Ibid., article 135(3), p. 55. For a comparative study of the tenure security of officials under the 1956 and 1962 constitutions of Pakistan and the 1972 constitution of Bangladesh, see A.T.R. Rahman, "Administration and its Political Environment in Bangladesh", Pacific Affairs 47, No. 2 (Summer 1974), pp. 171-91.
30. Ralph Braibanti, "The Higher Bureaucracy of Pakistan", in Ralph Braibanti, ed., Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1966), table 23, p. 304. Braibanti found that in 1966 the number of CSP officers assigned to government corporations was thirty-seven out of a total strength of 482 members of the CSP.
31. Rehman Sobhan and Muzaffer Ahmad, op. cit., p. 532.
32. Ibid., pp. 533-4.
33. For details of the functions assigned to the Planning Commission, see Ministry of Cabinet Affairs, Cabinet Division, Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Organisation of the Bangladesh Planning Commission (Dacca: January 31, 1972).
34. Nurul Islam, op. cit., p. 54.

35. Ibid., p. 55.
36. Ibid., p. 59.
37. Planning Commission, Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, The First Five Year Plan: 1973-78 (Dacca: Bangladesh Government Press, November 1973), p. 4.
38. Ibid., p. 5.
39. For an elaboration of the obstructionist attitude of the bureaucracy, see Nurul Islam, op. cit., especially chapters 2 and 3.
40. Ibid., p. 59.
41. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Report of the Administrative and Services Reorganisation Committee, Part I, The Services (Dacca: April 1973), Preface, pp. iii-iv.
42. Ibid., p. iv.
43. Ibid., p. v.
44. For details of the class-divided character of the civil service, see ibid., pp. 7-17.
45. Ibid., pp. 16-7.
46. Ibid., p. 26.
47. Ibid., p. 16.
48. Ibid., pp. 18-9.
49. Ibid., p. 19.
50. Ibid., p. 25.
51. Ibid., p. 63.
52. Ibid., p. 65.
53. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Report of the Administrative and Services Reorganisation Committee, Part II, The Administration (Dacca: October 1973), p. 187.
54. Ibid., p. 194; cited from the Administrative Reforms Commission Report on the Machinery of the Government of India and its Procedure of Work (New Delhi: September 1968), p. 30.

55. Ibid., p. 194; cited from Tottenham Reports, NIPA reprint series No. 1 (Karachi: National Institute of Public Administration, 1963), p. 51.
56. Ibid., p. 193.
57. Ibid., chapter viii, pp. 213-50.
58. Ibid., chapters ix and x.
59. Planning Commission, Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Annual Plan 1973-74 (Dacca: Bangladesh Government Press, June 1973), p. 1.
60. Ibid., p. 9.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid., p. 5.
63. Banglar Bani (Dacca), September 29, 1974.
64. Annual Plan 1973-74, op. cit., p. 1.
65. The Holiday (Dacca), June 9, 1974.
66. The most comprehensive analysis of leadership, organization, and doctrinal issues of the various revolutionary parties in Bangladesh is Talukder Maniruzzaman's, "Bangladesh: An Unfinished Revolution?", Journal of Asian Studies 34, No. 4 (August 1975), pp. 891-911.
67. Since independence the armed guerillas had attacked and looted twenty-three police stations and outposts, see A.T.R. Rahman, op. cit., p. 183.
68. The Morning News (Dacca), November 14, 1973, cited in ibid.
69. The National Pay Commission was appointed under the Ministry of Finance Resolution No. MF (Admn.) 2E-1 (300) /72/1081, July 21, 1972.
70. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Report of the National Pay Commission, vol. 1, Main Text, (Dacca: May 18, 1973), p. 1.
71. Ibid., p. 1.
72. Ibid., p. 5.

73. Ibid., p. 73.
74. Ibid., p. 88.
75. Ibid., p. 87.
76. Mohammad Mohabbat Khan and Habib Mohammad Zafarullah, "Public Bureaucracy in Bangladesh", in Krishna K. Tummala, ed., Administrative Systems Abroad (Lanham, MD.: University Press of America, 1982), p. 167.
77. The overthrow of Mujib's regime in August 15, 1975 "was very directly related to the 'second revolution'" because "it threatened the major social groups", Rounaq Jahan, "Bangabandhu and After: Conflict and Change in Bangladesh", Round Table 66, No. 261 (January 1976), p. 79.
78. For organizational structure of the new national party, see Zillur R. Khan, "Leadership, Parties and Politics in Bangladesh", Western Political Quarterly 29, No. 1 (March 1976), p. 122.
79. Cited in Emajuddin Ahamed, op. cit., p. 43.
80. Zillur R. Khan's interview with Mujib on June 28, 1975. See, Zillur R. Khan, op. cit., p. 122.
81. Najmul Abedin, Local Administration and Politics in Modernising Societies: Bangladesh and Pakistan (Dacca: National Institute of Public Administration, 1973), p. 115.
82. These figures have been taken from the life-sketch of governor-designates published in the Ittefaq (Dacca), between July 18 and 25, 1975.

Chapter V

ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM EFFORTS IN

POST-MUJIB BANGLADESH

The main purpose of this chapter is to describe and analyze the administrative reform efforts in post-Mujib Bangladesh. The chapter will focus on the reports on administrative reform and the fate of these reports. But before we delve into a discussion of the reports suggesting reforms, a clear picture of the political setting in which the reform efforts took place should be provided.

The Political Setting of Administrative Reform

The coup in August 15, 1975, in which Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and most of his family members were killed, removed the Awami League from power and opened a new era in Bangladesh politics.¹ A fact that the August coup proved beyond any controversy and confusion was that the Pakistani praetorian tradition of military's non-acceptance of civilian supremacy was very much alive in the armed forces of Bangladesh.² The coup established the military as a formidable force in Bangladesh politics and relegated the political parties and politicians to a secondary role in the affairs of the nation.

After the assassination of Sheikh Mujib, Major General Ziaur Rahman (hereafter Zia) emerged as the new leader of Bangladesh. But because of an intense power struggle within the armed forces Zia was not in a very comfortable position to assert himself in the national affairs. There were clear signs of disagreement between the junior officers who spearheaded the coup and the senior officers on the future

course of action to be followed. The coup also shattered the chain of command in the military institution. All these prepared the ground for another coup and a countercoup in the first week of November 1975 in which many of the senior officers were killed or removed from the service.³ After the traumatic events of November 1975, it seemed, for a while, that Zia had established himself as the unchallengeable leader of the armed forces and of Bangladesh. Following the example set by Ayub Khan, between 1958 and 1969, Zia revived the civil-military bureaucratic complex.⁴ However, clear indications of the presence of sizeable dissatisfied groups within the armed forces convinced Zia that he should widen his support base and earn some kind of political legitimacy for his regime.

In a bid to gain this legitimacy, Zia announced a nationwide referendum to be held in May 1977. Immediately before the referendum he offered a 19-point programme of socio-economic development. Some of the major goals incorporated in the programme were: (a) making the nation self-reliant in every possible way; (b) energizing the rural economy by according topmost priority to agriculture; (c) curbing the rapid rate of population growth; (d) achieving self-sufficiency in food production; (e) ensuring people's participation at all levels of administration through a massive programme of decentralization; (f) getting rid of the curse of illiteracy; and (g) organizing and inspiring the

youth for development activities.⁵ On the whole, the main objective of the programme was to achieve socio-economic development without instituting any structural changes. Zia's leadership was endorsed in the referendum in which 98.99% of voters expressed their confidence in his leadership. M. Rashiduzzaman attributed this overwhelming vote of confidence to the following factors: "(a) participation of the bureaucracies in mobilizing public support; (b) unqualified support of a majority of the newly elected Union Parishad leaders; (c) active help from the moderate and right wing forces; (d) influence of the officially controlled media; and (e) absence of any other candidate".⁶

The good result in the referendum encouraged Zia to be appreciative of the need for a political process to fill what he called the "political vacuum" existing in the country. In February 1978 a new political party called the Jatiyatabadi Ganatantrik Dal (JAGADAL) or Nationalist Democratic Party was formed, evidently with the blessings of Zia. The official blessings for the new political party was "symbolized by its convenor, Vice-President Mr. Justice Abdus Sattar, and executive body dominated by ten presidential advisors".⁷

Through his tactful negotiations Zia persuaded the leaders of some political parties and factions of varied ideological orientation to join the JAGADAL. Within a very short period the party became a dominant political force in the country.

The result of the referendum and the support of the

JAGADAL gave Zia the political courage to order a presidential election to be held in June 3, 1978. To support his candidacy in the election the JAGADAL formed an electoral alliance with some political parties having an ideological orientation ranging from orthodox right to radical left. The partners in the alliance called Jatiyatabadi (Nationalist) Front (JF) were JAGADAL, the Muslim League, the pro-Peking National Awami Party, the United People's Party, and the Tapshili Federation. Zia's main opponent in the election was General (retired) M.A.G. Osmany, the Commander-in-Chief of the freedom forces in the liberation war of 1971 and a former member of the Mujib cabinet. His candidacy was supported by another alliance called Ganatantrik Oikka Jote (Democratic Unity Alliance - GOJ). The Awami League was the most formidable partner in the GOJ. Zia won a landslide victory in the presidential election obtaining 76% of the votes cast and his nearest rival, Osmany, secured only 21% of the votes.⁸

The JF was short-lived. Within a few months after the election the JF was dissolved and was replaced by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). Zia formally joined the BNP in September 1978. Like the Janus he then had two faces - a military and a political one. Zia's personal victory in the presidential election provided him the incentive to further democratise the political process. He ordered the parliamentary elections to be held in February 1979. The BNP nominated 298 candidates for a parliament of 300 members and

the Awami League under the leadership of Malek Ukil, a former member of Mujib's cabinet, fielded 295 candidates. The election results gave the BNP an impressive victory and it captured 207 seats. The Awami League emerged as the largest opposition party with 39 seats in the parliament.⁹ The personal popularity of Zia as an honest and dedicated statesman was the main force behind the victory of the BNP. The parliamentary elections in February 1979 civilianised the political process that had been one of military dominance since the assassination of Sheikh Mujib.

The form of government after the parliamentary elections was a multiparty parliamentary system in which the president was the cornerstone of the political process with a very heavy concentration of power in his office. Although Zia publicly subscribed to the ideals of socialism, he launched a massive programme of denationalizing a large number of industries that were nationalized immediately after independence and were operating as losing concerns. Zia's government also abandoned secularism as a fundamental principle of state policy and replaced it by "absolute faith and trust in the Almighty Allah". This move was aimed at achieving the allegiance of the Islamic fundamentalists who were strongly opposed to the ideals of secular politics. Probably it was also aimed at winning the support, mainly monetary, of the oil-rich Arab countries.

The government of Zia could not proceed far with its 19-

point programme of socio-economic development as Zia was assassinated by some disgruntled soldiers in Chittagong on May 30, 1981.¹⁰ The rebels were crushed quickly due to the prompt action taken by the high-ranking military officers. Vice-President Mr. Sattar was sworn in as the new president within a few hours after the assassination of Zia. Sattar received an overwhelming mandate of the electorate in the presidential election of November 15, 1981. The major policy guidelines of Zia, in both domestic and foreign affairs, were meticulously followed by his successor.

The Chief of the Army Staff, Lt. General H.M. Ershad, could not resist the temptation of capturing the highest office of the country. In a bloodless coup in March 1982 the armed forces under the leadership of Ershad toppled the government of Sattar and put the country under military rule once again. Like the coup leaders elsewhere, Ershad attempted to rationalize the military intervention in civilian politics by raising allegations of widespread corruption in top circles of government, miserable state of the economy, deterioration of law-and-order, etc.

The Need for Administrative Reform

In the literature of public administration the terms "administrative change", and "administrative reorganization" are, very often, used interchangeably. This conceptual deficiency can be attributed to the vagueness of scholars who

have ventured into this new but rapidly flourishing topic. Some scholars, however, make a very clearcut distinction between administrative change and administrative reform. Gerald E. Caiden, for example, defines administrative change as a "self-adjusting" and "ceaseless" response of the administration to adapt itself to the ever changing conditions". He defines administrative reform as "the artificial inducement of administrative transformation, against resistance".¹² According to Caiden, the three basic features of administrative reform are: moral purpose, artificial transformation, and administrative resistance. The need for administrative reform arises when the self-adjusting mechanism of the administration has failed to respond adequately to the changing conditions. Administrative reform has been viewed by Jose V. Abueva "as essentially a deliberate attempt to use power, authority and influence to change the goals, structure or procedures of the bureaucracy, and, therefore, to alter the behavior of its personnel".¹³ Yehezkal Dror has defined administrative reform as the "directed change of the main features of an administrative system".¹⁴ We would therefore view administrative reform as the structural, procedural, and behavioural transformations that are imposed on an administration by forces external to it when the administration demonstrates its inability or reluctance to adapt itself to the constantly changing needs of the society.

Any country, irrespective of its stage of development, feels the necessity of adapting its administrative machinery to the ever changing needs of the society. The need for strengthening the administrative capability to respond adequately to the desires of the citizens is ceaseless for developed and developing countries alike. The newly independent countries feel this need much more seriously than other countries. The administrative system that the newly independent country inherits from its colonial masters was fashioned long ago by the colonial power to specifically meet the needs of the colonialists. The basic philosophy of the state undergoes a rapid process of transformation in the period following independence, with emphasis on administrative decentralization, improvement of the socio-economic conditions of the people, and the establishment of representative political institutions.

The colonial nature of the inherited administrative system is completely at odds with the goals of post-colonial country. The administrative system, therefore, starts to demonstrate definite signs of glaring incapacity to meet reasonably the "revolution of rising expectation" of the impoverished people. With the attainment of independence and the entry of the state in the fields of development and welfare, the old law-and-order administration is no longer suited to the new functions and responsibilities of the government. An administration designed basically to act as

an instrument of control and repression is unable to shoulder the heavy burden of development and welfare. Realization of this undeniable truth has made administrative reform a burgeoning topic in public administration since the 1950s when large numbers of countries began to emerge as independent political entities.

In post-colonial Pakistan several attempts were made between 1947 and 1971 to reform its inherited administrative system so as to make the administration capable of carrying out the huge task of socio-economic development. But these administrative reform efforts did not lead to any substantial change in the administrative system as most of the major recommendations of the reform commissions remained unimplemented. Only those recommendations that did not pose any potential threat to the status, power, and privileges of any dominant cadre of administrators were implemented. The consequence was the continuation of an administrative system designed by an alien power. After the emergence of Bangladesh attempts were made by the Mujib government to overhaul the colonial administrative system. But Bangladesh's experience in administrative reform during the Mujib government was also disappointing. A very comprehensive report containing well-conceived recommendations for administrative reform was shelved. The concern for administrative reform that began with Pakistan's achievement of independence remained alive after the change of government in Bangladesh on August 15, 1975.

Excessive centralization, a dominant feature of British administration in India, remained almost unaltered right up to the end of the era of Sheikh Mujib. Centralization denies people's participation in the administrative process and it is an antithesis of innovative thinking in the field where the bulk of the public officials are engaged in implementing the decisions taken at the nation's capital. In a developing country like Bangladesh, socio-economic development and welfare of the people is almost inconceivable without the active cooperation of a substantial section of the population in the process of administration. The United Nations Technical Assistance Programme points out:

The effectiveness of a modern public administration depends not only on policies and methods developed at the centre but also on the extent and manner in which governmental services are brought to an area, locality and the citizens of the country. In developing countries there tends to be an overwhelming concentration of governmental services in the capital city, at the expense of the rest of the country.¹⁵

Although the need for decentralization is undisputable, no fruitful attempt was made in Pakistan and in Bangladesh during the Mujib era to decentralize the administration with a view to get the people at large involved in the process of administration and to make the best use of the innovative talents of the officials engaged in the field. The net result of the failure to decentralize was the congestion of tasks at the centre, unrealistic policies and decisions taken without giving serious consideration to local peculiarities, under-utilization of the talents of the field administrators, and

above all, to the indifference of the people to the community development activities.

The British practice of reserving the top positions in the administration almost exclusively for a generalist cadre was kept alive until the end of Mujib era. The concept of reservation of positions for a particular cadre had been resented by the members of the specialized services who complained that they were denied many powerful positions in the administration although they had the requisite expertise for those positions.¹⁶ Debate and tension developed, both before and after the independence of Bangladesh, between the generalist officials and the specialists who felt deprived of due recognition in administration.¹⁷ In an age of technological revolution the administration can achieve very little by denying the specialists the recognition due to them. Too much emphasis on unalloyed generalism could not respond adequately to the needs of development and welfare the country was desperately trying to achieve.

Another area in which reform was badly needed was the caste-like classification of the services. Extremely rigid job classification made vertical and horizontal mobility for many employees very difficult. Somebody joining the service as a clerk remained as a clerk the rest of his life even if he gathered experience valuable to shoulder higher responsibilities. Rigid classification of services coupled with the reservation of the topmost positions for members of

an elite cadre had a devastating effect on the morale of the specialists and sapped the team spirit needed for the smooth accomplishment of the task of administration. Quite a few administrative reform commissions pointed out this deficiency in the service structure and made specific recommendations to correct it. But the recommendations remained unimplemented.

The attitude of the officials toward the people was also not conducive to the development and welfare of the society. The officials inherited the British tradition of isolating themselves from the people and lived in their artificially built small and restricted empire. They behaved as the masters of the people whom they were supposed to serve. Such an attitude by public officials was completely at odds with the task of socio-economic development which the government was emphasizing. Without interacting freely and frankly with the people, identification of people's problems becomes a difficult task, let alone solving them.

Administrative Reform Efforts

Administrative reform efforts that started immediately after the independence of Pakistan continued after the change of government in Bangladesh in August 1975. Continuation of the reform efforts was an indication of the ruling elite's realization of the magnitude of the administrative problems emanating from the out-dated colonial administrative system.

The Pay and Services Commission

In February, 1976 the military government of Zia appointed the Pay and Services Commission (PSC) under the chairmanship of A. Rashid, who retired as a secretary of the central government of Pakistan.¹⁸ The PSC had both full-time and part-time members. Among the five full-time members there were two high-ranking retired civil servants, a retired police officer, a retired judge, and a serving senior civil servant who worked as the member-secretary of the commission. The part-time members of the PSC represented various professional groups including doctors, engineers, businessmen, journalists, accountants and general civil servants. The terms of reference of the PSC were to recommend:

- i) a suitable service structure for the civil services along with their method of recruitment, training and deployment;
- ii) rational and simple principles for the amalgamation of the employees of the erstwhile central and provincial governments performing similar duties and functions; and
- iii) suitable pay structure including the fringe benefits for Civil Services and the employees of the autonomous and semi-autonomous bodies, statutory corporations, the universities (minus the teaching posts) and nationalized enterprises.¹⁹

The PSC was given wide-ranging responsibilities covering the entire state of public administration in the country. Its objectives were not very different from the combined objectives of the Administrative and Services Reorganization Commission (ASRC) and the National Pay Commission (NPC), the two administrative reform bodies appointed by the previous

government of Mujibur Rahman.²⁰ The PSC was asked to keep in view the recommendations suggested by the ASRC and NPC and actions taken in the implementation of some of the recommendations of the NPC.²¹

The methodology followed by the PSC in examining and understanding the different aspects of administration was similar to the methodology adopted by the ASRC and NPC. To ascertain the views and opinions of those directly concerned with the reorganization of services and revision of pay structure the commission elicited the written memoranda or oral representation of 154 service associations and unions. The commission members toured the different parts of the country to ascertain the views and opinions of different categories of personnel and a number of leading personalities from different walks of life. It surveyed the attitude of university students and their parents toward the civil service. The reports of reform commissions in India and Britain were also reviewed. The commission members made trips to a number of Asian and European countries to study the pay and service structure and other conditions of civil service of those countries.

The PSC submitted its long report on May 27, 1977. The report encompassed almost all crucial aspects of administration and made elaborate comments on those aspects. The commission was highly critical of the CSP as an institution. It observed that "the organization of the CSP

on exact parallel with the ICS ignoring the social changes as an anachronism".²² The "closed shop" policy of the CSP and reservation of a large number of prize posts for its members "produced complacency and encouraged them to take things easy and remain content with mediocre performance".²³ The PSC pointed out:

Contrasted with the situation of the late nineteenth century, when functional services were non-existent, the need for technocrats of various kinds at all levels, Accountants, Doctors, Engineers, Planners, Economists, Statisticians has become paramount. The centre of gravity of bureaucratic organization has shifted with these changes and it is inevitable that the new class of technocrats whom the society needs urgently should have proper and appropriate measure of participation in the decision-making process. It was, therefore, only inevitable that changes in the service structure in keeping with the changes of social priorities and goals should have taken place in answer to the new demands on the civil service.²⁴

The generalist-specialist controversy, in the view of the commission, was an articulation of the need for a functional approach to the staffing of government positions. The commission believed that the services of talented people were equally required in all the functional areas of the government of which general administration was only one. The commission voiced its opinion against the creation of a privileged elite cadre by reservation of key positions for its members on the basis of the results of one single examination at entry point.²⁵ All functional groups in the administration should have the opportunity of upward mobility to the top policy-making positions if the aspirants for those positions could effectively demonstrate their superior ability.

Some service associations projected a very selfish attitude toward the future service structure in their written memoranda. For example, the erstwhile CSP association suggested "that all Secretariat positions of and above the level of Deputy Secretary should be borne in the cadre of the Administrative Service, entry to which will be made open to officers of the functional services as lateral entrants up to a maximum of 30 per cent of the total cadre strength".²⁶ It also opposed the idea of amalgamation of different civil services into one on the ground that the quality of performance of the public services would be adversely affected. By contrast the Bangladesh Sarkari Praukashali Samity (Government Engineers' Association) ruled out the need for a generalist cadre of administrators in an age of technological revolution. It maintained "that there is nothing professional in general administration and hence there is no need for the constitution of a cadre of general administrators".²⁷ The commission expressed its surprise at the selfish claim made by almost all the service associations and groups that their function was the most important one for running the government and as a corollary, they should get special treatment in respect of status and pay. In the opinion of the commission, "the truth, obviously, is that each functional group is as important as the other and to borrow the analogy of the human body, each part, however small or insignificant, plays an important role in the healthy

functioning of the body."28

In keeping with the above observations the PCS recommended that the Civil Service of Bangladesh should be structured broadly as follows:

- i) The nomenclature "Civil Service" should include all employees of the government from the highest to the lowest not being a military personnel;
- ii) Functional service cadres, wherever viable, should be constituted at the Administrative and Executive levels with identical scales of pay and equitable prospects of promotion;
- iii) Secretariat posts, particularly those from the level of Deputy Secretary and above, should not be reserved in favour of any of the Services;
- iv) There should be enough scope of promotion for employees at all levels so that they may go up the ladder subject, of course, to their having acquired the minimum prescribed qualifications for the next higher level;
- v) The barriers between the erstwhile CSP and other technical and non-technical senior services should be removed by the introduction of equal starting salary, retirement and pension rules, other conditions of service and equal opportunity for advancement in the line service and equal opportunity for rising to the top of the administration;
- vi) The status and pay of specialist functional groups should be raised so that an environment of cooperation and meaningful dialogue between the administrator and the specialist is created;
- vii) A Superior Policy Pool consisting of posts requiring all-round experience, administrative leadership and high-level coordination should be designed. The Superior Policy Pool would thus constitute a new apex cadre of senior officers of proven quality drawn from all branches of the Civil Service on the basis of merit and ability to be tested in a suitable manner.²⁹

The PSC recommended that the Civil Service in Bangladesh should consist of four broad tiers of service in hierarchical

order:

- 1) The Administrative, Top Management and Specialist Group;
- 2) The Executive and Middle Management Group;
- 3) The Inspectorial, Ministerial, Technical and Support Group; and
- 4) Messengerial and Custodian Group.

According to the commission, the bases of this four-tiered division of the Civil Service were "the nature of work and the level of responsibility assigned to various posts in the Civil Service hierarchy, coupled with the corresponding educational, mental, and physical standards demanded of the respective incumbents".³⁰ Entry into these four tiers of services, the commission proposed, should be based on a combination of direct recruitment and promotion from one tier to the next higher tier. The commission thus attempted to eliminate the demerits of a closed shop approach and provided an incentive for the functionaries to prove their worth in the administration.

The recommendations of the PSC pertaining to the future Civil Service structure of Bangladesh were a potential threat to the status and authority of the privileged cadre of CSP. It was quite natural that the members of that cadre would not wholeheartedly welcome the recommendations. It has been revealed by Khan and Zafarullah that

A senior CSP went to the extent of manipulating the recommendations of the PSC. As the member-secretary of the commission, he altered many parts of the draft reports pertaining to recommendations that attempted to curtail

the power and position of the CSPs in the proposed pay and service structure. This move was detected in time by the other members of the commission, and the matter was brought to the notice of the president, who replaced him.³¹

In its terms of reference the PSC was asked to design a suitable pay structure for the public sector. The commission was specifically asked to keep in view the recommendations of the NPC and actions taken in the implementation of some of the recommendations of that body. There were as many as 2,200 scales of pay in the public sector when it started its work after independence. The NPC drastically compressed these scales to ten. When the recommendations of the NPC came to the implementation stage they brought to light serious difficulties in making these ten scales workable. The PSC felt that it was "possible to broadband different scales of pay for work of more or less comparable responsibility".³² After taking into consideration a host of factors such as the resource constraints of the government, the effect of high inflation on the price index, the need to attract the brighter products of the general and technical universities to a career in the government and similar other factors, the PSC designed a pay structure for the public employees. It proposed 52 scales of pay and fixed the highest and lowest salary at TK.4,000 and TK.230 respectively.³³ Abul Husain Choudhury, a member of the commission, could not agree with the chairman and other members of the commission on the fundamental question of fixation of the minimum and maximum salaries. In

a note of dissent to the majority decision of the commission on this issue Mr. Choudhury categorically stated that "the maximum of the scale of the highest paid person in the public sector should not exceed 8 times and in exceptional cases may be 10 times of the minimum wage to be paid to the lowest employees at the point of entry".³⁴

Implementation of the PSC Report

The military government of Zia accepted, in principle, some of the major recommendations of the PSC. A number of cabinet committees were appointed to examine the different aspects of the report and to determine the details of implementation. The most important outcome of the PSC report was the creation of a "classless" civil service called the Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS) which contained 28 services under 14 cadres.³⁵ Equality of status was assured to all the cadres. All designations were made functional and pay scale became the only index of determining the positions and privileges of the government functionaries. Converting a caste-like structure of the public service into a "classless" structure was no doubt a big accomplishment. But an examination of another important outcome of the PSC report will make it clear that although the form of colonial bureaucratic structure was changed, its contents remained virtually untarnished.

The PSC recommended the formation of a Superior Policy

Pool consisting of senior officers drawn from the different services on the basis of proven merit and ability. On the basis of this recommendation of the PSC a Senior Services Pool (SSP) was formed. It is interesting to note that in the SSP of 523 officers only 3 professionals of varying background were included. The rest of the SSP members were the generalists and a great majority of them were members of the CSP.³⁶ The selection of the SSP members without any test of ability facilitated the induction of such a large number of generalist officers. It defeated the whole objective behind the formation of the SSP. The specialists in the public service felt cheated and viewed the formation of the SSP as a recharged apparatus to protect the paramountcy of an elite cadre that had been increasingly coming under attack by the specialists as well as by the administrative reform commissions set up by different governments since the very inception of Pakistan as an independent country. A senior engineer of Public Works Department has succinctly expressed the sentiment of the specialists on this issue. He said:

We (the specialists) were deeply shocked when the list of officers in the Senior Services Pool was disclosed. You could call it a list of CSP officers. It proves, beyond any doubt, that we are the Harijans (untouchables) of our country's administration. Our specialization is our curse.³⁷

To examine the pay structure proposed by the PSC and to determine the guiding principles for the creation of a suitable pay structure the government appointed a Committee of

Advisers to the President, headed by Saifur Rahman, a chartered accountant. On the basis of the recommendation of this committee the New National Grades and Scales of Pay (NNGSP) was announced in December 1977. The NNGSP provided for 21 grades with the lowest and highest salary being TK.255 and TK3,000 respectively.³⁸

The announcement of the NNGSP created a tremendous amount of frustration and resentment among the various categories of professionals in the administration. Doctors, engineers, agriculturalists and economists seriously protested the NNGSP. They felt that the dominant position of the generalists was assured in the administration by according them higher grades and pay. Strikes and demonstrations by the specialists became the order of the day. The generalist officers condemned the PSC report as it recommended the opening up of the policy-making positions in the Secretariat to the members of all services. For a few months after the announcement of the NNGSP "there was virtually no work done in some government offices".³⁹ The pressure of the various sections of the public employees became so irresistible that the government had to ultimately postpone the implementation of the NNGSP. In a new pay scale announced in April 1978 the government attempted to redress, to some extent, the grievances of the specialists.

Committee for Administrative Reorganisation/Reform

Within a few weeks of coming to power through a military coup Lt. General Ershad, the Chief Martial Law Administrator, constituted the Committee for Administrative Reorganisation/Reform (CARR) with Rear Admiral M.A. Khan, Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrator, as chairman of the committee. Of the six members of the committee, there were three former members of the CSP, one high-ranking army officer, one academician, and one senior civil servant. The committee later coopted three other members - a journalist, a member of Planning Commission with specialization in engineering, and a retired senior civil servant. The terms of reference of the CARR were:

- i) To review the structure and organization of the existing civilian administration with a view to identifying the inadequacies of the system for serving the people effectively; and
- ii) To recommend an appropriate, sound and effective administrative system based on the spirit of devolution and the objectives of taking the administration nearer to the people.⁴⁰

The CARR identified the major inadequacies of the administrative system as follows:

- i) Lack of appropriate, consistent and uniform personnel policies with regard to recruitment, promotion and training of public services;
- ii) Tadbir - (Lobbying) based approach to decision-making;
- iii) Difficulties of the common man to comprehend the compartmentalised functions and complexity in governmental decision-making;

iv) Absence of a sound and durable political process to give appropriate, consistent and uniform policies with regard to public welfare;

v) Vertical-functional departmentalism that vitiates area-based coordination;

vi) A weak local government system rendered weaker by lack of appropriate political direction;

vii) Weakening of traditional and administrative and representative institutions at different levels of administration;

viii) Creation of parallel political and administrative institutions leading to conflict in jurisdiction; and

ix) Reluctance on the part of the political authority to devolve power to the representative institutions at local levels.⁴¹

The CARR, in its report, highly emphasized the need for meaningful and effective devolution of authority to the elected local bodies as a means to ensure people's participation in the development process and to bring the administration nearer to the people. It categorically maintained that "the off-repeated argument that local government needs guidance and supervision need not be stretched so far as to impair popular initiative or to dominate the decision-making process of the elected leaders".⁴² To enable the elected local government to plan and implement projects of local importance there should be a decentralized planning and budgeting system. The committee firmly argued that "without adequate decentralisation of planning and budgeting system, the measures for effective devolution of authority will be an exercise in futility".⁴³

The committee was surely correct to point out that in the past

political and constitutional commitments were shamelessly sacrificed for political expediency. --- the ruling political elite --- was the chief stumbling block to a meaningful devolution of authority to popular and representative councils at the local level. It is only a viable political process that can instil the kind of values that are necessary for meaningful and effective change in the society. The political leadership at the top has, since 1972, failed to give the kind of direction necessary to build up a society in which the individual citizens can live with full human dignity and freedom from fear, from oppression of any form.⁴⁴

The CARR based its report on the discussion with the field level officials, academicians, and local leaders of public opinion, examination of the administrative reform reports prepared in the past, in-depth analysis of the local government system in some other countries, and public opinion obtained through a written questionnaire. The report of the committee mainly concentrated on designing a reorganized structure of the local government system with a view to encourage as much popular participation as possible in the local level community development activities. Some of the major recommendations of the report were as follows:

- i) Directly elected chairman at Zilla Parishad, Thana Parishad, and Union Parishad;
- ii) Elected chairman to be the chief coordinator at all levels;
- iii) Elected local government at different levels should take over all functions of development administration while functions of regulatory and static administration may be transferred to the elected councils within a time-bound frame;
- iv) Elected councils to have full functional control over the officials working at that level;

v) Adequate devolution of administrative, judicial and financial powers at District and Thana levels;

vi) Elimination of unnecessary levels such as the Subdivision and Division.⁴⁵

These were undoubtedly very bold recommendations. In the proposed reorganized structure of the local government system the appointed field officials, who for generations dominated the affairs of the local government, were placed under the guidance and leadership of the elected councils. The report shrewdly pointed out "in fact there could be resistance or at least non-cooperation" by the appointed officials to their proposed role.⁴⁶ One possible way of overcoming resistance and non-cooperation, according to the report, was to organize short-term inservice training courses for the appointed officials and elected leaders and to encourage free and frank exchange of views between these two groups about their respective spheres of duty.⁴⁷ It will be shown in a later chapter that the non-cooperation by the appointed officials is a major stumbling block to the success of a decentralized development strategy undertaken by the government.

The report of the CARR suggested that a high-powered National Implementation Committee be constituted to identify the nature of functions that could be transferred to the elected councils, to determine the principles of control mechanisms of the elected councils over the appointed officials and to work out the training needs and training contents for the elected and appointed officials of the local

councils.⁴⁸ The military government of Ershad accepted the major recommendations of the CARR and in September 1982 appointed the National Implementation Committee for Administrative Reorganization/Reform with Rear Admiral M.A. Khan as its chairman. The members of this committee included four cabinet ministers, two senior army officers, and one top-ranking civil servant. The government took all necessary measures to implement the guidelines worked out by this committee. A phase-wise Thana upgrading programme was undertaken by which the administrative infrastructure of the upgraded Thanas was improved. The upgraded Thanas were later named Upazila (subdistrict). Commenting on the measures of upgrading the Thanas, H.M. Ershad said, "the measures taken by the government to bring the administration nearer and closer to the people, are the outcome of the realistic appraisal of the situation in the context of socio-economic conditions and not out of any wishful thinking or half-hearted exercise."⁴⁹ All necessary resolutions were passed and ordinances were issued for the implementation of the recommendations of the CARR.⁵⁰ President Ershad called the beginning of the process of democratic decentralization an "epoch-making step in the history of democracy in the world".⁵¹ From mid-December 1983 into early January 1984 the people elected their leaders for the Union Parishads and in May 16 and 20, 1985 the chairmen of all but two of the 460 Upazilas were elected by the people.

A very pertinent question that should be raised here is: what was the secret of success of the administrative reform efforts under the military government of Ershad? Or, in other words, how can we account for the prompt implementation of the administrative reform measures by the government of Ershad? The importance of this question lies in the fact that the record of administrative reform by the past governments of Mujib and Zia was not a happy one.

The administrative reform commissions appointed by the previous governments recommended massive changes in the public service structure of the country. These commissions vehemently criticized the generalist orientation of the civil service and the practice of reservation of strategic policy-making positions for members of a privileged elite cadre. The reports of these commissions, in keeping with the needs of an age of technological revolution, emphasized the dismantling of the generalist orientation and proposed that the top positions in the administration should not be an exclusive prerogative for any particular cadre, they should rather be open to people with proven ability, irrespective of their cadre identity. This type of recommendation, detrimental to the interests of the privileged cadre, antagonised the generalists who were holding the influential positions in the administration. In the interest of bureaucratic self-preservation the recommendations of the commissions were resisted by the privileged officials.

The CARR, instead of proposing any major changes in the public service structure zeroed in on the restructuring of the local government system. It did not attack the century-old generalist orientation of the Bangladesh administrative system. Its main concern was how to bring the administration closer to the people by ensuring them a participation in local affairs and by making the appointed officials accountable to the people through their elected leaders in the local councils. In the proposed structure of decentralized development the Upazila elected council has been given the functions of preparing the Upazila development plan and programme with the power to oversee, monitor and evaluate the execution of development programmes in all spheres like agriculture, irrigation, roads and communication, fisheries, education, health, etc.

The wide-ranging functions and powers suggested to be devolved to the elected councils definitely meant a curtailment of power of the appointed officials engaged in the field administration. It is interesting to note that the members of the elite generalist cadre of CSP did not have much to lose in this restructuring of the local government system. The last batch of CSP being recruited in 1970, most members of this cadre were too senior to be posted in the field administration.⁵² The CSP, the most formidable group in the administration and the major opponent of administrative reform efforts in the past, did not find any good reason to oppose

the proposed structure of decentralized development in which it had not much to lose.

It can also be argued that political expediency was one of the main motivating factors behind the military government's eagerness to implement the recommendations of the CARR. Many close observers of Bangladesh politics and administration viewed the policy of decentralized development as a means to create a civilian support base for the government of Ershad "by coopting rural elites into its political system".⁵³

This is the main reason why the leaders of the major opposition parties argued that so potentially significant an alteration in the country's local government system would be illegitimate without a free debate, discussion and approval by the parliament.⁵⁴ The inherent political motive of the scheme of decentralization led the opposition politicians to equate it with the "Basic Democracies" of Ayub Khan, "District Governor Scheme" of Mujibur Rahman, and the institution of "Swanirvar Gram Sarkar" (Self-Reliant Village Government) of Zia.⁵⁵

The success in administrative reform efforts of Ershad's government can thus be attributed to: (i) non-interference with the public service structure and the status, authority and predominance of the most powerful cadre of the civil service which in the past played a significant role in defeating the previous reform efforts; and (ii) a calculation of political expediency through the creation of a rural support base.

Martial Law Committee for Examining Organizational Set Up

On April 18, 1982, the military government of Ershad appointed the Martial Law Committee for Examining Organizational Set Up of Ministries/Divisions, Departments and other Organizations. Brigadier Enamul Huq Khan was appointed as chairman of the committee. The other members of this committee were two Lieutenant Colonels, one Major and a Deputy Secretary. The committee was asked to scrutinize the existing and sanctioned manpower in relation to actual requirements in the government organization, to record administrative inefficiency and irregularities and to suggest measures to increase efficiency, to examine the existing policies on telephone accommodation and office equipment and to suggest necessary changes to be made, and to suggest appropriate measures to rationalize the organization and functions of ministries/divisions, departments and related organizations.⁵⁶

The major recommendations of the above committee were related to: (i) disposing of surplus manpower; (ii) simplifying the enquiry procedure in disciplinary cases; (iii) delegation of financial and administrative powers to the subordinates by the secretary in each ministry/division; (iv) revision of the A.C.R. forms on modern lines; (v) promotion of people across the classes on the basis of merit; etc.⁵⁷ The government accepted most of the major recommendations of this committee. On the basis of the recommendations of this

committee the number of ministries was reduced from 44 to 19. Surplus officers and staff of 3,322 in the ministries and divisions were identified and were reoriented for posting at the Upazila level. A moratorium was imposed on hiring staff at certain levels. Strict rules were enforced for private use of public transport and other equipment.

The implementation of these measures proceeded unopposed. The main reason probably was that the measures left the senior level undisturbed and did not in any way pose a threat to the interests of the dominant cadre in the administration. The changes introduced through the above measures were cosmetic at best.

Conclusion

The PSC prepared a well-conceived report to overhaul an inherited administrative system that strongly demonstrated its gross incapacity to respond adequately to the needs of an independent country. Unfortunately, although the recommendations of the PSC were accepted by the government, the main spirit of the report evaporated when it came to the implementation stage.

The changes introduced on the basis of the recommendations of the CARR should not be underestimated. These involved changes in the local government structure of the country. A new kind of relationship between the appointed officials and elected leaders of the local councils was introduced by

bringing the appointed officials under the supervision and control of the elected leaders. But to what extent the appointed officials will be willing to accept the leadership of the elected leaders remains to be observed. It can however be predicted that the appointed officials, not being accustomed to working under political control and supervision, may not cooperate wholeheartedly with the elected officials in the implementation of local level development programmes. One main reason why the government could go ahead with the implementation of the report of the CARR was that the report did not antagonise the dominant cadre in Bangladesh administration that was instrumental in defeating the administrative reform efforts in the past.

Endnotes

1. For details of the coup in August 15, 1975, see Anthony Mascarenhas, Bangladesh: A Legacy of Blood (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1986), pp. 68-78.
2. For an account of military's dominance in Pakistan politics, see Tariq Ali, Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970); K.L. Kamal, Pakistan: The Garrison State (New Delhi: Intellectual Publishing House, 1982); Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1976); Stephen P. Cohen, The Pakistan Army (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).
3. A detailed account of the coup and countercoup in November 1975 can be found in Anthony Mascarenhas, op. cit.; Lawrence Lifschultz, Bangladesh: The Unfinished Revolution (London: Zed Press, 1979).
4. Rounaq Jahan, "The Zia Regime: Once Again at the Starting Point" in Rounaq Jahan, ed., Bangladesh Politics: Problems and Issues (Dacca: University Press Limited, 1980).
5. For a list of the 19-points, see Keessing's Contemporary Archives 23, (July 29, 1977), p. 28480.
6. M. Rashiduzzaman, "Bangladesh in 1977: Dilemmas of the Military Rulers", Asian Survey 18, No. 2 (February 1978), pp. 126-7.
7. M. Rashiduzzaman, "Bangladesh in 1978: Search for a Political Party", Asian Survey 19, No. 2 (February 1979), p. 191.
8. Ibid., pp. 191-2. For a review of the presidential election, see Mohammad Mohabbat Khan and Habib Mohammad Zafarullah, "The 1978 Presidential Election in Bangladesh: A Review", in Rounaq Jahan, ed., Politics and Administration in Bangladesh (mimeo) (Dacca: Department of Political Science, University of Dacca, 1980), pp. 88-109.
9. For an analysis of the 1979 parliamentary elections, see Mohammad Mohabbat Khan and Habib Mohammad Zafarullah, "The 1979 Parliamentary Elections in Bangladesh", Asian Survey 19, No. 10 (October 1979), pp. 1023-36.
10. For an account of the assassination of Ziaur Rahman, see Anthony Mascarenhas, op. cit., pp. 154-84; Marcus Franda, Bangladesh: The First Decade (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1982), pp. 306-20.

11. Gerald E. Caiden, Administrative Reform (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1969), p. 67.
12. Ibid., p. 65.
13. Jose V. Abueva, "Administrative Reform and Culture", in Hahn-Been Lee and Abelardo G. Samonte, eds., Administrative Reforms in Asia (Manila: Eastern Regional Organization for Public Administration, 1970), p. 22.
14. Yehezkal Dror, "Strategies for Administrative Reform", in Arne F. Leemans, ed., The Management of Change in the Government (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), p. 127.
15. United Nations Technical Assistance Programme, A Handbook of Public Administration: Current Concepts and Practice with Special Reference to Developing Countries (New York: 1961), p. 63.
16. An evidence of this resentment can be found in the memorandum submitted by the Sarkari Prakaushali Samity (Government Engineers' Association) to the Administrative and Services Reorganization Committee. For details, see Government of Bangladesh, Report of the Administrative and Services Reorganization Committee, Part IV: The Evidence (January 1975), pp. 69-73.
17. To comprehend the exact nature of the debate between the generalists and the specialists, see Document 1, "Civil Service System in Bangladesh", Indian Journal of Public Administration 26, No. 1 (January-March 1980), pp. 231-2.
18. The P.S.C. was set up by the Cabinet Division Resolution No. 30/1/76 - Rules (February 20, 1976).
19. Ibid.
20. Mohammad Mohabbat Khan and Habib Mohammad Zafarullah, "Administrative Reform and Bureaucratic Intransigence in Bangladesh", in Gerald E. Caiden and Heinrich Siedentopf, eds., Strategies for Administrative Reform (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1982), p. 141.
21. Cabinet Division Resolution of February 20, 1976, op. cit.
22. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Cabinet Division, Report of the Pay and Services Commission (Bangladesh, 1977), Part 1, The Services, vol. 1, p. 41.
23. Ibid., p. 40.
24. Ibid., p. 41.

25. Ibid., p. 44.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid., p. 45.
28. Ibid., p. 50.
29. Ibid., pp. 41-3.
30. Ibid., p. 52.
31. M.M. Khan and H.M. Zafarullah in G.E. Caiden and H. Siedentopf, Strategies for Administrative Reform, op. cit., p. 148.
32. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Cabinet Division, Report of the Pay and Services Commission (Bangladesh, 1977), part II, Pay and Other Benefits, vol. I, p. 45.
33. Ibid., p. 55.
34. Ibid., p. 39. For details, see "Note of Dissent by Mr. Abul Husain Choudhury on Minimum and Maximum Salary", ibid., Annexure C, pp. 38-40.
35. These cadres were: (1) Bangladesh Civil Service (Administrative); (2) Bangladesh Civil Service (Agriculture); (3) Bangladesh Civil Service (Education); (4) Bangladesh Civil Service (Economic and Trade); (5) Bangladesh Civil Service (Engineering); (6) Bangladesh Civil Service (Finance); (7) Bangladesh Civil Service (Foreign Affairs); (8) Bangladesh Civil Service (Health and Family Planning); (9) Bangladesh Civil Service (Information); (10) Bangladesh Civil Service (Judicial); (11) Bangladesh Civil Service (Postal); (12) Bangladesh Civil Service (Enforcement); (13) Bangladesh Civil Service (Railways); and (14) Bangladesh Civil Service (Secretariat).
36. Mohammad Mohabbat Khan and Habib Mohammad Zafarullah, "Public Bureaucracy in Bangladesh", in Krishna K. Tummala, ed., Administrative Systems Abroad (Lanham, MD.: University Press of America, 1982), p. 171.
37. Author's personal interview with the engineer on July 24, 1985 in Dhaka.
38. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Finance (Implementation Division), Notification No. MF(1D)-1-3/77/850, Introduction of New

- National Grades and Scales of Pay, Grades I-XXI, Government Sector (Dacca: Bangladesh Government Press, December 20, 1977), p. 2.
40. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Report of the Committee for Administrative Reorganization/Reform (Dacca: June 22, 1982), p. i, preface.
 41. Ibid., pp. vii-viii.
 42. Ibid., pp. iv-v.
 43. Ibid., p. iv.
 44. Ibid., pp. 93-4.
 45. Ibid., pp. iii and 147-8. Before the publication of the report of the CARR Emajuddin Ahmed, a political scientist in Dhaka University, suggested the elimination of the Subdivision and Division as units of administration for the sake of administrative effectiveness aiming at development. For details, see Emajuddin Ahmed, "Administrative Reorganization: Some Thoughts, Some Suggestions" (In Bengali), The Weekly Bichitra (Dacca), Eid Edition, 1982, pp. 119-27.
 46. The report of the CARR, op. cit., p. 168.
 47. Ibid., pp. 168-9.
 48. Ibid., pp. 173-4.
 49. The Daily Observer (Dacca), October 25, 1982.
 50. Some of the major resolutions and ordinances were: The Local Government (Thana Parishad and Thana Administration Reorganization) Ordinances, 1982, published in the Bangladesh Gazette, Extraordinary, December 23, 1982; The Local Government (Union Parishads) Ordinance, 1983, published in the Bangladesh Gazette, Extraordinary, September 12, 1983; Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Chief Martial Law Administrator's Secretariat, Cabinet Division, Resolution No. DA-12(26)/82-449, Resolution on Reorganization of the Administration at the Thana Level (Dhaka: October 23, 1982); Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Finance and Planning, Planning Division, Planning Commission's Guidelines for Upazilla Parishads (July 31, 1983).
 51. Quoted in Md. Ataur Rahman, "Bangladesh in 1982: Beginnings of the Second Decade", Asian Survey 23, No. 2 (February 1983), p. 153.

52. In 1982, when the report of the CARR was prepared, only a few CSP officers who were recruited during the last days of united Pakistan, but were not posted in time because of the turmoil in 1971 and confusion and misunderstanding immediately after the achievement of independence, were engaged in the district level administration.
53. Peter J. Bertocci, "Bangladesh in 1985: Resolute Against the Storms", Asian Survey 26, No. 2 (February 1986), p. 229; for similar view, see Md. Ataur Rahman, "Bangladesh in 1983: A Turning Point for the Military", Asian Survey 24, No. 2 (February 1984), p. 245.
54. See Peter J. Bertocci, "Bangladesh in 1984: A Year of Protracted Turmoil", Asian Survey 25, No. 2 (February 1985), p. 159.
55. A.K.M. Shahidullah, "Upazilla Administration: A Milestone in Administrative Decentralization in Bangladesh", Administrative Science Review 12, No. 4 (December 1982), p. 89.
56. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Report of the Martial Law Committee for Examining Organizational Set-up of Ministries/Divisions, Departments, Directorates and Other Organizations under Them, Phase I, Ministries/Divisions, (Dhaka, May 31, 1982), p. 45.
57. Ibid., pp. 35-9.

Chapter VI
SPECIALIST-GENERALIST RELATIONSHIP

The twentieth century has witnessed an unprecedented wave of social complexity, specialization of human knowledge and professionalization of groups that can reasonably claim to possess expertise or skill of some kind. Planning for economic development; "social engineering", and planned efforts for the development of science and technology are at the top of priority list of governments, irrespective of their ideological beliefs and orientations. These developments have brought the issue of the generalist-specialist relationship to the fore of public administration literature. What should be the relationship between the specialist and generalist in the administration? To what extent is the "gifted amateur" theory of Lord Macaulay true in an era of technological revolution? What status do the professionals deserve in administration because of their ability to deal effectively with technical matters? There has been a proliferation of academic works addressing these questions. James Fesler nicely summarized the specialist vs. generalist debate in an editorial comment of the Public Administration Review. He wrote that the specialists' argument was that "a man must administer something and that a knowledge of that something is a necessary qualification for high administrative rank". The generalists, on the other hand, argued that "at the higher reaches of administration, the bulk of the job is administration and general policy-making rather than practice of the specialty; that a bright higher administrator could

master quickly the vocabulary and concepts of the specialized subject matter".¹

It is no surprise that in the last few decades the generalist theory has been confronting a serious attack both from the scholars in administrative studies and the specialists engaged in the administration of those countries in which they have not yet been accorded the status they think they deserve. In a well-argued article Robert Presthus pinpointed the generalist's inadequacy in making the sophisticated fiscal decisions required in the modern industrial state. He recommended for England "an equal partnership between amateurs and experts", but cautioned that "change is difficult in a society where tradition is so honored and pervasive".² Introducing a relationship of equality between the amateur and the expert is equally difficult in those countries in which the British deliberately established a tradition of glorification of the generalist during the colonial rule.

This chapter has two major purposes. The first is to demonstrate that despite attempts to improve the status of the professionals in Bangladesh administration, generalist domination is still a major feature of the country's administration. The second purpose of the chapter is to highlight the alienation of the professionals caused by denying them adequate recognition and a status of equality vis-a-vis the generalists.

Attempts to Improve the Status of Professionals

Since Bangladesh's inception as an independent country intra-bureaucratic conflicts have disrupted its administrative fabric. The conflicts within the bureaucracy took different dimensions, i.e., conflict and rivalry between those bureaucrats who actively participated in the struggle for independence and those who worked with the Pakistan government during that struggle; intense rivalry between the former members of CSP and EPCS; and conflict between the generalists and the professionals. With the passage of time the first two dimensions of intra-bureaucratic conflict have almost died down. But the antagonism and rivalry between the generalists and the professionals endures and has reached an unprecedented stage. The latest manifestation of this antagonism was that on December 22, 1985 about 40,000 government physicians, engineers and agriculturalists defied a martial law order and went on strike to demand an end to what they said was generalists bureaucrats running their lives. The strikers demanded administrative reorganization of their services in order to award them an equality of status with the generalist bureaucrats.³ The strike by the professionals bears testimony to the fact that the past efforts to give due recognition to them did not produce any tangible results.

As explained in Chapter IV, the Administrative and Services Reorganization Committee (ASRC) of 1972 made some well-conceived suggestions to improve the status of the

professionals in administration, considering their undeniable importance to materialize the development programmes of the government.⁴ The recommendations of the ASRC have had a tremendous impact on all the administrative reform reports prepared in Bangladesh in the post-Mujib era. By favouring a better status for the specialists in the administration the ASRC report raised the expectations of that group and contributed to its frustration when the report went unimplemented. An unfavourable response to the ASRC report by the Mujib government made the specialist in administration more vocal than ever before in pushing what they considered their legitimate demands.

The Pay and Services Commission (PSC) of 1976 could sense the deep frustration prevailing among the professionals. It was partly for this reason that the PSC suggested the creation of an apex cadre the members of which were to be drawn from the different services on the basis of their expertise and experience. Although a Senior Services Pool (SSP) was formed on the basis of this suggestion, the induction of a very small number of professionals in this so-called "open structure" of the SSP further added to the disenchantment of the already disenchanted professionals. One major demand in the fourteen-days strike by the professionals in December 1985 and January 1986 read:

The Senior Services Pool was formed to fill the higher positions in the ministries by efficient and competent people selected through open competition. By violating this basic principle 80% of the positions in the Pool

have been filled by people from a particular cadre (an obvious reference to the ex-CSP)....Twenty-four cadres of Bangladesh Civil Service including the engineers, doctors, and agriculturalists demand the abolition of the Senior Services Pool forthwith.⁵

Some other major demands of the professionals that led to the strike included: filling positions in the ministries by the members of relevant cadres only, making heads of department responsible directly to the minister, creating cadres for professionals working in the autonomous bodies, improving promotional prospect for the professionals, changing the procedures and contents of the civil service examination that disfavour the professionally trained candidates, allowing the same pay and status to officers at the same level of all cadres, etc.⁶ The demands of the professionals amply proved that the creation of the SSP did not in any way improve the relationship between the generalist and the specialist. About the formation of the SSP a senior doctor in the public service remarked:

When the formation of the SSP was suggested by the Pay and Services Commission I personally did not feel very enthusiastic about it. Because to me it was nothing but a new device to ensure the dominant position of the ex-CSP and ex-EPCS in the face of growing pressure from the doctors, engineers and agriculturalists for a more important role in the policy-process of the country.⁷

The most important development in the specialist-generalist relationship since independence in 1947 has been the abolition of the practice of formally reserving the powerful positions in the administration for the members of any particular cadre. However, this could not weaken the hold

of the generalist on positions of strategic and policy-making importance. What was so long a formal arrangement became an informal one without causing any major damage to the privileges and prerogatives traditionally enjoyed by the generalists. The dominant positions in the secretariat, which were once an almost exclusive jurisdiction for the so-called "all-rounders", remained firmly in their grip even after the elimination of the practice of reservation of positions for officials belonging to any cadre. An overwhelming number of ministries and divisions have been headed, as before, by the former members of CSP. More surprising is the fact that as of July 7, 1985 many technical ministries and divisions such as irrigation, water development and flood control, health and population control, finance, agriculture and forestry, petroleum and mineral resources, etc., were not headed by professionals but by former members of the CSP.⁸ Among the thirty-three additional secretaries to the government appointed between February 4, 1980 and April 11, 1984 as many as twenty-two belonged to the erstwhile CSP and four to the erstwhile Pakistan Audit and Accounts Service. Only three professionals with a background in medicine and engineering were appointed to that rank. The remaining four additional secretaries were chosen from non-professional all-Pakistan services such as postal and taxation services.⁹

The situation was equally gloomy for the professionals in the district administration, a vital unit of field administration. Following the British tradition, the powerful

and prestigious position of deputy commissioner, the administrative head of a district, remained as an informally reserved domain for the generalist administrator. As the administrative head of a district the deputy commissioner exercises his supervisory authority over the activities of all government departments in the district including the departments dealing with technical matters and headed by the professionals. The deputy commissioner also has the responsibility of coordinating the activities of all government departments in the district. The supervisory and coordinating role of the deputy commissioner has been a potential source of rivalry and misunderstanding between the generalist deputy commissioner and the specialist heads of some government departments in the districts. One district-level engineer expressed his resentment over the all-encompassing role of the deputy commissioner by saying:

I find it ridiculous to believe that the deputy commissioner who is not at all familiar with our specialized vocabularies and the technical aspects of our work is competent enough to coordinate properly the activities of technical departments. Also I don't understand why we should be relegated to a secondary status in the district administration by awarding the generalist deputy commissioner a position of domination over us. The system introduced by the British is out-dated and must be discarded.¹⁰

This view is widely shared by all mid-career professionals who have been denied the top-most position in the district administration because of their specialization in a particular field of learning. The frustration of the professionals can

be observed from the following remark by a doctor:

I made a wrong choice at the beginning of my career. Being a doctor I should not have chosen a career in the government. We are neglected here.¹¹

The system of administration that generates so much conflict and rivalry between the generalist and specialist can make very little contribution toward a concerted effort necessary to eradicate hunger, poverty, ignorance, and diseases from an impoverished country. Attempts to reduce the magnitude of conflict and rivalry between these two groups through establishing a partnership of equality have miserably failed. The generalists are as dominant in the administration as they were during the colonial rule.

Reasons for the Failure of Reform Efforts

A critical analysis of the factors responsible for the continuation of the tradition of generalist domination is warranted here. No scheme of administrative reform can be carried through without a strong determination and commitment on the part of government. Unless a reform effort is wholeheartedly backed by those in political office it cannot produce the desired results. However, a commitment on the part of the government is not enough to ensure the implementation of the reform measures proposed by the administrative reform commissions. The socio-political and economic situation of the country must be favourable. The task of administrative reform becomes very difficult when

meaningful alterations in the public service structure necessitate a curtailment of the power and privileges of any group of officials that is dominant in the existing administrative set-up. Being the privileged group in the administration, it is capable of effectively opposing any schemes of reform that might cause an erosion in the time-honoured tradition favourable to this segment of officials.

Immediately after coming to power in December 1971 the Awami League government expressed its firm commitment to overhaul the administrative system that Bangladesh inherited. But the euphoria to do something about it evaporated by the time the ASRC reported (October, 1973). While the ASRC's investigation was in progress the economy started to indicate alarming signs of an imminent collapse, formidable political opposition to the Mujib government and its socio-economic policies began to emerge, radical revolutionary forces were engaged in creating a reign of terror in the countryside, and the country had been earning a bad reputation in the outside world because of the scandalous handling of the huge amount of relief goods donated by foreign governments and agencies. Unfavourable socio-economic and political realities strongly discouraged the Mujib government from going ahead with the implementation of the reforms suggested by the ASRC.¹² The government did not want to antagonize the dominant group in administration by introducing a massive change in the public service structure at a time when the government was gradually

losing its effective control on politics and the society. The generalist bureaucrats, it is now widely believed, played their part in stopping the implementation of the ASRC report by persuading the top Awami League leaders that any radical change in the administration would disrupt the country's administrative fabric and would be detrimental to the interest of the government.

Although the government of Ziaur Rahman (1975-81) expressed its commitment to bring about a substantial reform in the administrative system of Bangladesh, it was not prepared to proceed very far with the ideas of reform. In the absence of organized political support in the initial years, the government had to rely heavily on the civil and military bureaucracies as its main support base. The dependence of Zia's government on the civil bureaucracy both for the framing and implementation of policies put it in no better position than the previous government to jeopardize the administrative status quo. Nevertheless, realizing the high degree of frustration among the professionals caused by their secondary status in the administration, the government, in an attempt to pacify them, formed the open structure of SSP. It later became evident that the formation of the SSP did in no way reduce the frustration and anger of the professionals; it rather became a source of renewed agitation for them. Zia was a cautious reformer unwilling to go beyond a certain limit with his commitment of reforming the administrative system.

He shrewdly avoided the reforms that could antagonize the generalist administrators, who were holding almost all strategic administrative positions in his government.

Complaints of the Specialists

A relationship of cordiality between the generalist and the professional is a sine qua non for smooth operation of administrative activities in any country. This is more so in a country in which the policy-making positions are occupied mostly by the generalist and policy-implementation responsibility is mainly assigned to the professional. In Bangladesh the separation of the secretariat from the attached offices and the awarding of the top positions in the secretariat to the generalist have caused a high degree of resentment among the professionals.

This section concentrates on how the professionals perceive their own role and status in the administration, their attitude toward the dominant position of the generalist, and their opinion about the needed changes in Bangladesh's administration. The entire section is based on the interviews I conducted with twenty professionals in May and June 1985. To ensure the representativeness of the interviewees, the professionals were chosen carefully from the various professional groups such as doctors, engineers, agriculturalists, economists and so on. Care has also been

taken to make the chosen professionals representative in terms of their seniority. I therefore interviewed some senior professionals and some professionals in the mid-level of service hierarchy. Junior professionals who were in the initial stage of their service career had been deliberately excluded from the list of interviewees by assuming, to some extent arbitrarily, that their feeling would not be very different from that of the top and mid-level professionals interviewed. As preferred by the interviewees, their complete identity will not be disclosed.

After the completion of the interviews I was convinced that the frustration of the professionals regarding their subordinate position in the administration vis-a-vis the generalists was really profound. A feeling of deep resentment against the existing administrative system was extremely common among the professionals I interviewed. I was, therefore, not at all surprised when 40,000 professionals went on strike on December 22, 1985 for two weeks to press their demands for a better position in the country's administration.

There is an almost absolute unanimity among the professionals that the way the administrative sector in Bangladesh is structured is a direct continuation of the British administrative system, virtually uninterrupted ever since the British left India. The consequence is the secondary status of the professionals in administration. One professional argued:

The British neglected the professionals simply because socio-economic development was not their priority. After independence the priority of government has changed. Socio-economic development can no more be deemphasized. But the administrative system has remained unreformed. Can the new goals of the society be achieved through a well-established, long-followed, and seldom questioned colonial administrative system?¹³

One main contention of the professionals is that under the existing system of administration they do not have the scope of playing a meaningful role in the vital policy-making process of the country. Most major policies originate and take a concrete shape in the secretariat where the generalist officials occupy a great bulk of the top positions. Although the heads of attached departments have the scope of conveying their expert opinions on policy proposals, these are very often reviewed and scrutinized by the secretariat officials who may not have the technical competence to appreciate the technical wisdom of such opinions. The professionals, therefore, do not feel very enthusiastic about coming up with well-conceived and well-reasoned advice. One agricultural specialist explained his experience in this regard by saying:

It happened on many occasions that the advice I communicated to the secretariat was, to a great extent, discarded there by officials about whose fitness to do so I have serious doubt in my mind. I really feel embarrassed when I find that my advice has been turned down by persons not qualified to do that. I'm sure my professional colleagues also feel the same way.¹⁴

A conviction widely shared by the professionals is that the lack of opportunity for them to play a significant role in the policy process is one of the main reasons why many

policies often fail to achieve their intended goals. In Bangladesh the professionals who are virtually neglected in the policy-making process are assigned the responsibility to implement the policies. Naturally enough, there is a great dearth of motivation among the professionals to put their best efforts to achieve the intended goals of the policies. The same professional agriculturalist did not hide his lack of motivation to implement policies when he said:

We really find it difficult to be serious about implementing a policy in the framing of which our role was deliberately denied. We very often ask ourselves: should we sweat to earn credit for those in the secretariat who play God with us?¹⁵

The alienation of the professionals is best depicted in the words of a senior engineer:

We are so much neglected in the administration that we don't really feel to be a part of it. We are here to be dominated by the non-professionals. It's their administration.¹⁶

A very frequent argument against placing the professionals in the top administrative positions is that they cannot properly weigh and balance the different factors involved in the governmental decisions, such as technical, organizational, financial, and political. Or, in other words, the professionals cannot make a balanced adjustment among what is financially viable, technically desirable, organizationally possible, and politically profitable. It has been argued that the professionals are so much preoccupied with the technical aspects of a policy that they fail to give proper weight to

its political aspects, which might cause an adverse political repercussion. It is interesting to note that the professionals do not refute this argument as totally baseless. But they tend to blame the administrative system of the country if they admit that the above argument has any amount of truth in it. The same engineer argued assertively:

If there is any incapacity on our part to smoothly perform the administrative functions, the inherited system of administration is solely responsible for that. The professionals never had the opportunity of acquiring wide-ranging training and experience. If through training and experience the generalist can understand the art of administration, why can't we? It is the system which should be blamed, not the professionals. So we demand that the system should be changed.¹⁷

A similar argument was made by another professional who said:

Under the existing system we are far removed from the limelight of administration. Given the opportunity we can prove our worth in every aspect of administration within a short time. Nothing is tougher than the technicalities of our profession.¹⁸

The specialists also condemn the practice of frequently and indiscriminately transferring the generalist administrators from one ministry to another. It is true that the transfer is so frequent that before an incumbent becomes familiar with the details of work of a ministry he is transferred elsewhere.¹⁹ The professionals do not hide their suspicion about the ability of the generalist officials to run many ministries in which the technical content of work is very high. As one professional remarked:

A basic assumption of our administration is that a general administrator can run any ministry. That's why we find that the CSPs and their close allies are indiscriminately transferred from the ministry of health to education, from

there to finance, and from finance to public works. This is a wrong assumption. It is not humanly possible to earn expertise to run each and every ministry of the government.²⁰

About the same issue another professional said:

It's hard to believe that the person who headed, for example, the ministry of finance last year can competently serve the ministry of petroleum and mineral resources this year, and the ministry of fisheries and livestock the next year. Something is grossly wrong with the system. It needs to be corrected on an urgent basis.²¹

There is an absolute unanimity among the professionals about the need for reform. They find the practice of denying them the high positions in the general administration as totally unacceptable. The professionals emphasize that the colonial pattern of administration must be scrapped if the government is serious about socio-economic development of the country. They argue that the changed philosophy of the state in the post-independence Bangladesh dictates a change in the pattern of administration. In the opinion of a professional statistician,

It is really unfortunate that the reform efforts in the past could not produce any major changes in our country's administration. One obvious reason for the failure of past reform efforts had been the resistance by the generalist administrators who were frightened by the reform proposals. Unless the status of the specialist is improved the intended goals of development cannot be achieved.²²

The most common demand of the professionals is that the generalist orientation of the administration must be replaced by a new approach that accords due recognition and attaches highest value to the expertise and skills of the officials.

As one official said:

The right man for the right job should be the only criterion of assigning positions to the government officials. The office-holder must have the skill and expertise needed to discharge the responsibility of his office. This is high time we stop appointing generalist administrators to positions that have a high content of technical duties.²³

What the professionals very often suggest is that many positions in the administration that are to deal with complicated technical matters which are beyond the ability of the general administrators to comprehend fully and properly should be filled by professionals of proven ability. In the words of a professional:

Our demands are very clear and rational. Our most important demand is that all necessary arrangements, not fake arrangements, must be made by which professionals of demonstrated ability and merit will be the first choice for positions that deal with matters of a complicated technical nature.²⁴

Responses of the Generalists

This section focuses on the following specific questions. How do the generalists justify their dominant status in administration? What is their attitude toward the expertise and importance of the professionals? What kind of reform do the generalists think is necessary? This section, like the previous one, is based on personal interviews conducted by me between July and September 1985. Fifteen generalists were interviewed. They were chosen from the former members of the CSP and EPCS, the two dominant groups of generalists in terms

of rank, status, prospect of promotion, and control over the country's administration. Measures had been taken to ensure the representativeness of the chosen generalists in terms of rank and seniority. Their positions in the service hierarchy ranged from deputy secretary to secretary of a ministry. The views expressed by the interviewees were almost identical. They clearly projected their strong defence for the existing administrative system that has carefully protected their prerogatives in the face of repeated attacks by the different administrative reform commissions.

The generalist administrators have their own way of justifying the status quo in administration. The argument they use very often is that a well-established system of administration that has worked "reasonably well" for decades does not need a total overhauling. As one generalist said:

No body can and should ignore the fact that the CSP as an institution gave Pakistan a sense of continuity during the years of extreme political instability. The CSP is proud of its contribution to the economic development of Pakistan in the 1960s. So we firmly believe there is sufficient scope of achieving socio-economic development in Bangladesh without disturbing the administrative status quo.²⁵

For the generalists, another way of rationalizing their preponderance over the key decision-making positions in the administration is to argue that they are far more competent than any other groups of people in the administration to strike a healthy balance among the different factors involved with a decision. Although they have deep respect for the

technical expertise of the professionals, they question their ability to make an effective adjustment between the technical and non-technical factors. As one former member of EPCS put it:

The most important limitation of the specialists is that, they miserably fail to give proper weight to the non-technical factors of an issue. They cannot clearly foresee the political implications of a proposed policy. They are not sufficiently cost-conscious. They don't really understand what is organizationally feasible and what is not.²⁶

This attitude about the incapacity of the professionals to handle effectively the non-technical factors is quite widespread among the generalists.

While the generalists strongly defend their dominant status in the administration, they do not however claim that the top positions in the administration should be their exclusive prerogative. They maintain that the top positions, should be made open to the professionals of proven ability and they view the formation of the SSP as a right step in that direction. About the SSP a former senior member of CSP said:

Through the formation of the SSP the top positions have been made open to the competent and efficient professionals. We welcomed the idea. But the professionals seem to be unhappy, because many of them could not make their place in the SSP list. Can we be blamed for that?²⁷

Some former members of CSP and EPCS strongly deplore the idea of being branded as "generalist". They assert that having acquired the training and skills to run the government machine they have become, what they call, "administrative

specialists" or "professional administrators". In the words of a self-styled "administration specialist":

I hate to see the label "generalist" on us. If an engineer or a doctor deserves to be branded as a "specialist" because of his training and experience in his own profession, why can't we be called "administration specialist". We have acquired the training and experience necessary to manage the administrative task of the state.²⁰

The generalist or the "administrative specialist" (as some of them prefer to be called) do not buy the argument that they lack the necessary ability to hold many top positions in the secretariat that are to deal with complicated technical matters. They attempt to justify their position by arguing that dealing with technical matters constitute a very small portion of the duties of any higher position in the secretariat. Besides technical aspects, the top officials in the secretariat are to deal with social, financial, and organizational aspects of every matter. Our "administration specialist", who has the experience of working in the secretariat for more than a decade, said:

If officials in the top positions of secretariat were to deal only with technical matters, the professionals could be the perfect choice for those positions. But the non-technical contents of these positions are much higher than the technical contents. So I firmly believe that the general administrators are far more competent to hold the higher ranks in the secretariat than the specialists.²⁹

The general administrators do not, however, refute the argument that through proper training and experience the professionals can acquire the administrative skill necessary to discharge the duties of top secretariat positions.

Nevertheless, they utter a note of caution. As one former member of CSP said:

Through proper training and experience the professionals can learn the art of administration. But a hasty process of large-scale appointment of professionals in general administration will have a devastating effect on the standard of administration. Furthermore, it will cause frustration among the general administrators. So the process should be slow and well-restrained.³⁰

Being the principal beneficiaries and consequently the ardent defenders of the existing administrative system, the generalists rule out the need for any drastic change. The reform they seem to emphasize most is simplification of work procedure. As one of them pointed out:

We never say that our administrative system is flawless. There are definitely some weak points. They should be streamlined. Simplification of work procedure should be the primary concern of the reformers if they sincerely desire to introduce dynamism, efficiency and similar other virtues in our country's administration.³¹

Conclusion

The antagonism and rivalry between the generalist and specialist is based on mutually opposed assumptions. The specialists are convinced that in an independent country striving to alleviate mass hunger, poverty, and illiteracy they should be charged with the task of providing administrative leadership. The specialists insist that the ever increasing application of modern science in the practice of administration calls for an abandonment of the old myth of generalism. The generalists are not prepared to accept such

arguments. Their assumption is that the trained mind can deal with any problem that comes before the administration. They assert that administration is an art in itself. One can acquire mastery in that art through a career in administration which can provide with the necessary background knowledge, training and skills to run the administrative machine of the state.

Another assumption of the generalists is that the professionals are insufficiently cost-conscious, rarely politically aware, and poorly socially informed. The specialists insist that if the above assumption is correct, it is not because the specialists belong to professional groups but solely because of the lack of opportunity to acquire broad administrative skills and experience. They confidently argue that practical experience and training can turn the specialist into an administrator. The core of their argument is that the administrator is not a born administrator. He comes to the job totally inexperienced. If he can pick up administrative skills through his exposure to the administrative responsibilities, why cannot the specialist? This argument of the specialist cannot be refuted easily, because there is no evidence that the professionals cannot pick up the administrative skills as well as the generalists. Many military professionals are appointed to civilian administrative positions by the military governments. If they can run the administration without any previous experience, the civilian

professionals also should be able to perform administrative tasks.

The specialist-generalist conflict highlighted in the above two sections may create an impression that the antagonism between these two groups would cease to exist in future as the last batch of the CSP and EPCS officers, being recruited in 1970, would retire from the public service in the next twenty years or so. We have mentioned in Chapter III that the Muslim ICS and IPS officers who joined the public service in Pakistan became the chief source of radiation of the pre-independence administrative values, norms, and behaviour. The newly recruited members of the CSP were indoctrinated by the British-trained ICS and IPS officers. They ultimately became the principal beneficiaries and defenders of the British administrative system in Pakistan. In independent Bangladesh the former members of the CSP have diffused the pre-independence administrative values and norms among a new generation of administrators who came in contact with them. Following the recommendation of the PSC (1977), an integrated civil service called the Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS) has been created on a functional basis. Although not intended by the PSC, the members of the BCS (Administration) might internalize the conviction that their cadre is the successor to the CSP in Bangladesh administration. The members of this cadre are generalist in the sense that a great majority of them have a background in liberal arts and they

are recruited to the service not on the basis of their knowledge in any particular field of learning, but on the basis of their intellectual ability and general knowledge. It is, therefore, a natural expectation of the members of the BCS (Administration) that with the gradual retirement of the former members of the CSP and EPCS they will have a near monopoly on the top policy-making positions in the secretariat and other administrative institutions of vital importance. If something is not done now to remove this expectation then the conflict, which has plagued the country's administration since independence, would persist even after the retirement of the last batch of the ex-CSP and EPCS officers.

This raises the question: how to resolve the conflict between the generalist and the specialist? In the existing administrative system of Bangladesh the secretariat is by far the most strategic place in terms of policy-making. The secretariat posts are in the heart of government activities. They are close to the power base and therefore very attractive. The main complaint of the professionals is that they cannot effectively participate in the policy process of the government as they are deprived of their due share in the secretariat positions. Thus the specialist-generalist conflict revolves mainly around the higher positions in the secretariat.

There are some possible solutions to the problem. One solution has been suggested by the Coordination Committee of

Doctors, Engineers and Agriculturalists that led the strike by the professionals in December 1985 and January 1986. The committee suggested that the higher positions in the ministries should be staffed by the relevant cadres only. One important limitation of this suggestion is that it would lead to an extreme compartmentalization in the public service. The higher officials in the secretariat would not be exposed to the problems of some other functional areas as they would spend their entire career in their narrow professional grooves. At the secretariat level many decisions involve wide consultation between ministries and also between ministries and various interests outside the public service. Without being exposed to the peculiar problems of some other related ministries the higher officials cannot perform their job effectively. The other limitation of this suggestion is that it cannot guarantee administrative competence. It does not allow to look for competent administrators from other services if suitable personnel to staff the higher positions in a ministry are not available in the relevant service.

The other possible solution to the problem is to form a Policy Pool of few hundred officials in which the various services will be represented in proportion to their cadre strength. All secretariat positions of policy-making importance can be filled by the members of this Pool. There is an inherent demerit of such a solution. Since the numerical strength of a cadre will determine the number of

members to be inducted into the Pool it cannot ensure that all equally competent members of the various services will have equal opportunity to get into the Pool. The competent members of the smaller services will be the main losers in this arrangement. It will obviously favour the members of the larger services even if they lack the necessary competence. This will create frustration among the qualified officials who will be denied position in the Pool simply because they belong to the smaller services.

Another solution to the problem has been suggested by the PSC (1977). The suggestion of the PSC can be summarized as follows:

i) Within the first few years of career in the service, the controlling ministry of a service will, through constant watch, find out the officers who have demonstrated good potential for administrative works.

ii) These officials will then be assigned to a related ministry in the secretariat where they will hold junior administrative posts. This will expose the promising administrators to the actual administrative works and will enable them to prove their ability to handle administrative responsibility effectively. After spending about three years in the secretariat they will be sent back to their parent department where they will be expected to acquire further specialization in their own line of work.

iii) By the time these officers are about ten years old

in the service they will be asked to take a competitive test to enter into the Senior Policy Pool. The test should be so designed as to discover the essential qualities required at the managerial and policy planning level. Care must be taken to ensure that the test does not put the candidates from any particular service in an advantageous position and disfavour the members of other services.

iv) The successful candidates in the test will spend a year on probation. The training will be so designed as to improve the managerial and administrative skill of the Pool members. It will prepare them for heavy administrative responsibility in future.

v) The Pool members will staff all secretariat positions above the level of section officer. The deployment of Pool officials will normally be made according to their aptitude and past professional experience. It does not, however, necessarily mean that the Pool officials will not be allowed to move beyond the orbit of their narrow profession. An official showing considerable knowledge of and interest in an area not related to his past professional experience will be provided with the opportunity to make the best use of his newly acquired knowledge and interest.³²

There is one important weakness of the PSC suggestion. The secretariat positions having better remuneration and greater prestige, will draw the better officers from all the services. It will have an adverse effect on the quality of

field administration. One solution to this problem is to make provision of sending the Pool officials back to the field administration for few years after they have completed their term as deputy secretary in the secretariat. This will enrich the quality of officials to acquire further specialization in their own functional areas.

Zia's government accepted the suggestion of the PSC, but substantially distorted its spirit in the implementation process. An apex cadre was created hastily with a minimum of representation from the professionals. We believe that the PSC suggestion, with slight modification, can be a good solution to the generalist-specialist conflict.

A possible solution to the conflict at the local level is to entrust the people's elected representatives with the function of general administration and coordination. The CARR (1982) recommended the creation of elected councils at the district and Upazila (sub-district) levels. In May 1985 the elected councils took over the responsibility of supervising and coordinating the activities of Upazila level administration. The district council elections are yet to be held. We believe that an elected council at the district level will considerably reduce the magnitude of specialist-generalist conflict at that level.

Endnotes

1. James W. Fesler, "Editorial Comment: Specialist and Generalist", Public Administration Review 18, No. 4 (Autumn 1958), p. 370, emphasis in the original.
2. Robert Presthuis, "Decline of the Generalist Myth", Public Administration Review 24, No. 4 (December 1964), p. 216.
3. The Bangladesh Observer (Dhaka), December 23, 1985.
4. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Report of the Administrative and Services Reorganisation Committee, Part I, The Services (Dacca: April 1973), passim.
5. The Bangladesh Observer (Dhaka), December 25, 1985.
6. Ibid.
7. The doctor, who was in the office of the Director-General of Health Services, was interviewed on May 22, 1985. This doctor and the professionals quoted in endnote no. 10 and 11 are among the twenty professionals interviewed by me during my field research in Summer 1985. They will be introduced to the reader in a later section of this chapter which is entirely based on research interviews with the professionals.
8. List of Secretaries to the government prepared by the Cabinet Secretariat on July 7, 1985.
9. Compiled from the Gradation List of Additional Secretaries to the Government, prepared on May 30, 1984.
10. The engineer of Public Works Department in a typical district of Bangladesh was interviewed on June 30, 1985.
11. A doctor of a district hospital in the same district as above was interviewed on May 27, 1985.
12. Talukder Maniruzzaman, "Administrative Reforms and Politics within the Bureaucracy in Bangladesh", Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 17, No. 1 (March 1979), p. 52.
13. Interview with an economist of the Planning Commission on May 23, 1985.
14. Interview with an agriculturalist of the Department of Agricultural Extension on May 18, 1985.
15. Ibid.

16. Interview with an engineer of the Public Works Department on June 27, 1985.
17. Ibid.
18. Interview with a senior railway engineer on June 10, 1985.
19. About the frequent transfer of the CSP officers during the days of united Pakistan, Goodnow wrote: "They are transferred to a different assignment every two or three years --- in some cases much more frequently". - Henry F. Goodnow, The Civil Service of Pakistan: Bureaucracy in a New Nation (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1964), p. 222. Goodnow substantiates his statement by a table in Appendix vi (p. 306). The practice of frequently transferring the generalist officials has survived well in Bangladesh.
20. Interview with a soil scientist of the Department of Soil Survey on June 11, 1985.
21. Interview with an economist, op. cit.
22. Interview with a statistician in the Bureau of Statistics on May 25, 1985.
23. Interview with a geologist of the Geological Survey of Bangladesh on June 25, 1985.
24. Interview with an engineer of Roads and Highways on May 29, 1985.
25. Interview with a former member of the CSP in the Finance Division on August 14, 1985.
26. Interview with a former member of the EPCS in the Commerce Division on July 15, 1985.
27. Interview with the chief of a public corporation on August 5, 1985.
28. Interview with a former member of the EPCS in the Ministry of Education on July 13, 1985.
29. Ibid.
30. Interview with the chief of a public corporation, op. cit.
31. Interview with a former member of the CSP in the Roads and Road Transport Division on September 4, 1985.

32. For details of the PSC suggestion pertaining to the formation of a Senior Policy Pool, see Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Cabinet Division, Report of the Pay and Services Commission, Part I, The Services (May 1977), pp. 61-75.

Chapter VII

OFFICIAL CONTROL OVER LOCAL BODIES

- AN IMPEDIMENT TO RURAL DEVELOPMENT

Bangladesh is one of the poorest countries in the world, with a per capita income of TK.2,991 (US\$120). In 1984 the total population of the country stood at 89.91 million and the population is expected to reach 139.01 million by the end of this century if the present rate of population growth persists. The economy of the country is predominantly agrarian, with agriculture's contribution to the Gross Domestic Product being 49.40%. About eighty-five percent of the population live in the rural areas and are directly dependent on agriculture for their livelihood.¹ Half of the rural population are either landless or near landless and their number had been inflating constantly. One study commissioned by the US-AID revealed that while more than half of Bangladesh's cultivable land is owned by less than ten percent of rural families, about sixty percent of rural families own less than ten percent of such land.² A big percentage of the country's population is ill-fed, ill-clothed and uneducated. The situation in the rural areas is much more shocking than in the urban centres. The importance of rural development in Bangladesh therefore does not need to be exaggerated.

The concern for rural development became a dominant one after Bangladesh achieved independence. Every government since 1971 has felt an extreme necessity to improve the quality of life of the rural people. Given the meagre resources of the country, no amount of rural development can be achieved

without the active participation of the rural people in the development process. It is now widely acknowledged that a bureaucratic approach to rural development is largely ineffective in bringing any appreciable change in the socio-economic conditions of the rural populace. This is so precisely because the tacit assumption behind such an approach is that the rural people are inactive, fatalistic and incapable of undertaking rural development activities. No attempt is therefore made to associate the local population with the planning and implementation of development programmes. This is, however, not to argue that the rural people are fully capable of achieving all-round development of the rural areas if they are just left alone by the government officials. We are rather insisting that official domination of local government institutions and rural development activities hinders popular participation in the development programmes.

The basic purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that a non-bureaucratic and tutelage-free approach to local government and rural development is yet to emerge in Bangladesh. And as a consequence, a spirit of participation in the development process has been lacking among the people. The main focus of this chapter is on Bangladesh's experiment with a number of strategies for rural development and the institutions used for that purpose from 1971 to 1985. To put the post-1971 experiment with local government and rural

development efforts in its historical perspective a brief but critical evaluation of the past strategies has been attempted. This will enable us to show that the British traditions of official domination and control over the local government institutions has been persisting ever since the British left.

The Colonial Experience

The British in India, for understandable reasons, did not design any viable institutional framework within which the natives could meaningfully participate in the community development activities. The local bodies were established reluctantly, half-heartedly and restrictively. In this regard the British rulers were not different from other colonial powers elsewhere. The British effort to evolve local bodies in Bengal started with the Bengal Village Chowkidari Act of 1870 and the Local Self-Government Act of 1835 and culminated into the Local Government Act of 1919. The actual working of the local government institutions in India during the British period provides a very dismal picture. As Tinker wrote:

Indian local self-government was still in many ways a democratic facade to an autocratic structure. The actual conduct of business was carried on by district officials with non-official members as spectators.³

The introduction of self-governing local institutions, in the true sense of the term, was deliberately avoided by the British not only because they had doubts about the abilities

4 of /de 4

100% COPY QUALITY

MICRO

100% COPY QUALITY

of the Indians to effectively manage the local institutions, but also because they feared that such institutions would undermine the British authority in India. Moreover, the colonial power could realize that self-governing local institutions would significantly politicize an already "difficult to rule" society and the consequence would be detrimental to the overall interest of the British. The local governments which the British created were therefore denied any appreciable autonomy by placing them under constant official tutelage and control. But the British did not fail to mention repeatedly the virtues of delegation of some functions to the local bodies.⁴ The people showed apathy in and indifference to the local development affairs. The minimum amount of rural development activities that took place in such areas as road construction, health and sanitation, epidemic control, education, canal digging, etc. were initiated, supervised, executed and co-ordinated by the appointed government officials with little or no input at all from the elected representatives who had little scope to be assertive under the prevailing arrangements. It can legitimately be argued that the approach to rural development was decisively bureaucratic. Moreover, the local bodies were created mainly for the purpose of maintaining law-and-order. It has been observed:

--- Local government institutions set up by the British in the late 19th and early 20th centuries were concerned mainly with providing local fund for local police staff (such as Chowkidar) for helping to maintain law and order in the rural areas in favour of British Raj.⁵

Up until the last days of British rule in India centralization as a prominent feature of Indian government and administration was meticulously maintained. Local government institutions lacked any real autonomy to operate independently of official control and miserably failed to encourage the rural masses to participate meaningfully in the community development activities. One hundred and ninety years of British rule did not bring any worth-mentioning change in the rural life of Bengal; it essentially remained as it was under the Mughal administration.

Bureaucratic Approach of Basic Democracies

In the initial years of Pakistan's independence no substantive attempt was made to associate the rural people with the development activities of their locality. Extreme instability in the national political scene was probably the main reason for this. However, one year after Ayub Khan staged a successful military coup Pakistan was awarded a new local government structure known as the "Basic Democracies". Broadly speaking, the major purposes of the Basic Democracies were: to decentralize power to the local government institutions, to mobilize the rural people for development activities and to generate in them a sense of participation in local affairs. Ayub Khan himself said that the purpose of Basic Democracies was to ensure that "every village and every inhabitant in every village - would become an equal partner

with the Administration in conducting the affairs of the state".⁶ In his autobiography Ayub Khan wrote that the objective of the Basic Democracies was "to organize the people to take care of the problems of their areas and to inculcate in them spirit of self-help".⁷ Ayub Khan's creation of the Basic Democracies was one of the reasons why Samuel Huntington wrote:

More than any other political leader in a modernizing country after World War II, Ayub Khan came close to filling the role of a Solon or Lycurgus or "Great Legislator" on the Platonic or Rousseauian model.⁸

However, the system of Basic Democracies did not receive similar acclamation from all quarters. Many close observers of the system "Looked upon it as a scantily veiled measure to perpetuate the power of the regime".⁹

Only the Union Council, the lowest tier of the four-tiered Basic Democracies, was a popularly elected body of people's representatives without any official representation. In all the three tiers above the Union Council the preponderance of the appointed government officials was clearly evident. The Basic Democracies thus brought "into existence an amalgamated structure combining bureaucratic and popular elements, with the popular element stronger at the bottom of the structure and the official or bureaucratic element stronger at the top".¹⁰ The dominating position of the bureaucratic element at the higher tiers made the popular element disappointingly passive and powerless in the policy-making process of these

liers. Resolution No. 4 of the Rangpur District Council meeting of August 22, 1963 recorded:

The main defect of the present system is not the lack of technical staff, but too much centralisation. Moreover, the authority exercised by the Deputy Commissioner as the Chairman and the Assistant Director of Basic Democracies, as the Secretary of the District Council made the position of elected Vice-Chairman of the District Council obscure and powerless.¹¹

The presence of powerful official members in the council meeting was a constant source of much discomfort for the people's representatives as they were unaccustomed to a relationship of equality with the government officials. The decisions of the higher councils were, therefore, basically the decisions of the bureaucratic element. An amalgamated structure of the bureaucratic and popular elements hindered effective participation by the representatives of the people in the policy-process of higher councils.

Although the Union Council was a wholly elected body, it was required to perform its functions under the close supervision of appointed government officials. The official supervision was more real than apparent as the Union Council was, to an extraordinary degree, dependent on government grants as the major source of its income. Furthermore, the development plans of the Union Council were subject to the approval of a wholly official body, known as the "Approving Authority", composed of the Sub-Divisional Officer (SDO), the Circle Officer (CO), and two official members of the Thana Council chosen by the SDO. The approving authority was

empowered to accept or reject or amend the development plans submitted to it for approval. The SDO as the "Controlling Authority" of the Union Council had enormous power to keep that local body in his close grip. He could take necessary actions if he was convinced that "anything done or intended to be done by or on behalf of a local council is not in conformity with the law or is in any way against public interest".¹² The SDO had the authority to nullify the proceedings and suspend the execution of a resolution passed by the Union Council and could force the council to take such steps as might be specified by him.¹³ The controlling authority even had the right to suspend the chairman of a Union Council.¹⁴

The Basic Democracies of Ayub Khan was, in some important respect, different from the local government institutions of any other country in the world. An electoral college of 80,000 Basic Democrats (members of the lowest tier of Basic Democracies) was constituted to elect the President of the country and the members of national and provincial legislatures. The rest of the adult population of the country was thus disenfranchised.¹⁵ The electoral function of the Basic Democracies made the system "very unpopular" in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and caused a "serious lack of public respect for and confidence in those bodies".¹⁶ The awarding of electoral functions to the Basic Democrats created a widely shared feeling among the politically articulate people

of East Pakistan that the major objective of the entire scheme of Basic Democracies was to build a solid group of regime supporters who would be prepared to defend the "constitutional autocracy" of Ayub Khan against all imaginable oppositions. As Ayub Khan's scheme substantially enhanced the prestige, power and prominence of the Basic Democrats vis-a-vis the rural masses the Basic Democrats soon became the close allies of the regime. They were convinced that "no successor regime would ever be relied upon to save their interests so completely".¹⁷ The electoral right of the adult population was transferred to the Basic Democrats mainly because it was "felt that during elections it would be much easier to manipulate and to exert pressure on 80,000 people than the entire adult population of the country".¹⁸

The government funnelled a substantial amount of resources to the local bodies for the rural development programme, known as the Works Programme. In the absence of proper audit a large amount of national money was misappropriated by the Basic Democrats. It is now believed that the absence of proper audit was probably intentional in order to make scope for the Basic Democrats to build their fortune and to lend their unqualified support to the regime in return.

A spirit of effective participation could not be generated among the rural populace, as the major development policies and programmes were formulated and executed by the government officials in the name of elected representatives of the

people. No real decentralization of power and debureaucratization of rural development activities took place under Ayub Khan's "institutional innovation" of Basic Democracies. The approach to rural development remained as bureaucratic as it was during the colonial rule. It seemed that Ayub Khan was less interested in mobilizing and activating the rural masses for development activities than in devising an institutional mechanism on which he could rely to keep the society and politics under his tight control.

Survival of Bureaucratic Approach under Mujib Government

After the independence of Bangladesh the first step taken by the government of Mujibur Rahman in regard to the local bodies was the abolition of the institution of Basic Democracies. The local bodies created by Ayub Khan were declared dissolved by promulgating a Presidential Order.¹⁹ It was not an unanticipated decision on the part of the Mujib government because ever since the introduction of the Basic Democracies the Bengali nationalist leaders had been condemning it as nothing more than a mere device to consolidate and perpetuate the power of Ayub Khan and his close associates. The Union Council was renamed as the Union Panchayat and the functions of that body were to be performed by a committee appointed by the SDO. The Thana Council was replaced by a Thana Development Committee consisting of the officers of the nation building departments of the concerned

Thana. And the District Council was renamed as Zilla Board with the Deputy Commissioner of the concerned district as its administrator.

In the initial years following Bangladesh's independence official domination of the local councils thus became absolute in the absence of any elected representatives in these bodies. It is interesting to note that the Awami League leaders, who before independence were extremely critical of the undemocratic nature of the local bodies (above the Union Council), introduced after independence a local government system in which the concept of democratic representation had no place at all. This new arrangement of the local bodies was resented by the politically conscious people as unacceptable. The government, therefore, came up with words of hope and assured the people that the existing arrangement would soon be replaced by democratically elected local bodies. The 1972 constitution of Bangladesh mentioned: "Local government in every administrative unit of the Republic shall be entrusted to bodies, composed of persons elected in accordance with law".²⁰ In December 1973 Mujib reassured the nation by saying:

Elections are to be held soon to the union councils throughout the country. This will result in a close liaison between the administration and the people and popular representatives will be enabled to run the administration at the village level.²¹

In Part II of the report of Administrative and Services Reorganization Committee (ASRC), appointed by Mujib in March 1972, elaborate recommendations were made regarding the

reorganization of the country's local government system. The report vehemently criticized the undemocratic nature of the Basic Democracies. It argued:

Good government is no substitute for self-government and that is the foundation of the Local Self-government. People must govern themselves and that is democracy. The success of a government and also of the development programmes upon which the country has embarked depends on the active participation of the people themselves in the administration and in the development activities at the grass-root level. The local self-governing bodies provide the people with opportunity to participate in the local administration.²²

This argument and article 59(1) of the constitution provided the basis of the ASRC report regarding the local government reorganization. The major recommendations of the committee were: introduction of self-governing local government institutions at Union, Thana and Zilla levels to be composed of people directly elected on the basis of universal adult franchise; the elected chairman of the local body at each level should be the chief coordinator of administrative and development functions; abolition of the Divisional and Sub-Divisional levels of administration as they were found superfluous; increased financial strength of the local bodies by providing them with more tax-levying power than before; transfer of government activities "not central in nature, i.e., those which do not affect the country as a whole" to the local bodies; etc.²³ The principal objective of these recommendations was to usher in self-governing local government institutions in which popularly elected leaders

would come to the fore of local level administration and development endeavours.

We have already mentioned in Chapter IV that the report of ASRC was treated very unsympathetically by the Mujib government and the entire report was shelved. However, between December 19 and 31, 1973, elections for the chairmen, vice-chairmen and members of the 4249 Union Parishads²⁴ and 69 Paurashavas (municipalities) took place. But the election for the local bodies above the level of Union Parishad was never held during the era of Mujibur Rahman. The Deputy Commissioner and SDO continued to be the administrator of the Zila Parishad and the Thana Parishad respectively. In these bodies the pattern of official domination thus remained as it was in the pre-independence period. Although the Union Parishad was a directly elected body, it was unable to operate independently of official control and tutelage. Despite all the democratic rhetoric of the Mujib government to associate the people with the process of administration at all levels, no substantive change in the local government structure took place. The government miserably failed to capitalize on the unprecedented wave of solidarity and enthusiasm demonstrated by the populace during the liberation movement and immediately after it. It was a rare opportunity for the Mujib government to use this sense of national solidarity for community development activities.

Bureaucratization of Swanirvar Movement

In 1972-73 a movement for Swanirvar, literally meaning self-reliance or dependence on one's own self, started as a non-official development programme. This movement was a replication of an earlier experiment tried by the people of Gumai Beel in the Rangunia Thana of Chittagong district in 1967 when a flood destroyed the crops in that area. The villagers organized themselves for a recropping programme on the basis of self-reliance instead of depending wholly on the relief goods supplied by the government. The endeavour of the villagers was a grand success. The example set by Gumai Beel was followed in some villages of Bangladesh to overcome the problem of rural development through self-help.²⁵

The growth of the Swanirvar movement can be divided into three phases: (i) isolated and locally organized programmes in 1972-73; (ii) district development programmes in 1974-75; and (iii) the consolidation of the district development programme into a national programme in the later part of 1975.²⁶

During the first phase the movement was basically a non-governmental development programme under the guidance and supervision of students, village leaders and committed social workers who mobilized public opinion in favour of voluntary participation in the development activities. The movement showed some degree of success in the application of the principle of self-reliance. But the local level administration did not feel very comfortable with the

development activities in their locality in which they did not have the leadership role. In their assessment, phase I of the Swanirvar movement was a failure in motivating the people to participate in development affairs. In the opinion of Shawkat Ali, himself a former member of the CSP, who was the Deputy Commissioner of Sylhet district in 1973-74:

If the localised and isolated programmes under phase I failed to generate popular consciousness on a massive scale with regard to the need for voluntary labour utilisation strategy, the involvement of the Collectors (district administrators) in phase II, since the middle of 1974, proved beyond doubt the efficacy of the Collectorial pattern in influencing and mobilizing rural public opinion for application of the principle of self-reliance.²⁷

What started as a sporadic and spontaneous movement for development in 1972-73 became an official programme under the leadership of the Deputy Commissioner in the second phase of the Swanirvar movement. Achieving autarky in food production by mobilizing local resources was the basic thrust of the Swanirvar district programme. Bureaucratic domination of the Swanirvar movement became so prominent that one close observer of rural development in Bangladesh wrote:

Rural development efforts under Swanirvar became heavily dependent on the traditional administrative apparatus and resulted in the steady bureaucratization of its operations, allowing little opportunity for people's participation in its activities.²⁸

In the second phase of the Swanirvar movement it was felt that all the district projects "were functioning more or less in an isolated manner" and therefore needed to be "coordinated and integrated under a well knit national umbrella".²⁹

After the first National Swanirvar Conference, held on September 24 and 25, 1975 a six-tiered organizational structure came into being to coordinate and accelerate the pace of the programme. Below the National Committee of Swanirvar there were committees at district, sub-division, thana, union, and village levels. The local administrators were made the chairmen of Swanirvar committees of the district, sub-division and thana. They were also assigned the task of organizing committees at the union and village levels. The movement was thus thoroughly bureaucratized by the end of 1975.

Experiment with Gram Sarkar

After the change of government in August 1975 the movement for Swanirvar was intensified. At the Second National Swanirvar Conference, held in January 1976, an assessment of the experience gained so far was made and the future strategy was set. This included, among other things: (a) emphasis on making cooperatives as a basic tool of Swanirvar, (b) organizing the Swanirvar movement on a non-political and non-partisan basis, and (c) evolving a model for village level planning, and participation by local people and local experts in its formulation and execution.³⁰

The primary objective of the Swanirvar movement was to organize and mobilize the rural people and the resources they had at their disposal for the development of their own locality

instead of depending on and waiting for help to come from without. To achieve that objective Swanirvar village committees with representatives from various professional groups were formed by consensus or by election in a meeting of the adult residents of the village or the heads of the families of the village. In order to help the villagers in the preparation and implementation of a plan for the total development of the village, the need for Swanirvar workshops was felt. One village in each thana was chosen by the Circle Officer (Development) to hold Swanirvar Workshops. The officials from various levels and nation building departments attended the workshops in some selected thanas. It was a good opportunity for the government officials to work with the villagers, to know about their various problems and to strengthen their commitment to rural development. But the workshops failed to serve the intended purpose. As one observer pointed out:

(a) the Swanirvar villages selected by the C.O. Dev. (or other district officers) were usually very near the thana centres. These villages also had better communication facilities and better record of development in the past;

(b) the Swanirvar camps in many cases reduced themselves to picnic spots for officers with substantial wastage of money, time and energy of the officers and also of the villagers.³¹

Another observer commented:

The gorgeous arrangements for and glamorous appearance of officials (in the eyes of villagers) with motor vehicles and helicopters remind them of visits of VIPs to villages in pre-Swanirvar period to raise expectations in vain.³²

About the overall performance of the Swanirvar programme it has been revealed that

In fact, in many cases Swanirvar programmes failed to create sufficient enthusiasm among the villagers to bring them to join the programme either because (a) it had nothing new to attract them or because (b) they were not given a sense of participation and implementation of the same. Thus though many achievements are publicised in papers, little is seen to happen in practice.³³

By 1977 one Swanirvar village committee was formed in each union of the country. With Ziaur Rahman's assumption of the chairmanship of National Swanirvar Bangladesh Committee in 1979 the movement got an added impetus. In keeping with Article 85 of the Local Government Ordinance, 1976, that authorized the government to form village councils for the development of the village,³⁴ Zia's government in 1980 decided to introduce a massive programme of constituting Gram Sarkar (village government) in every village of Bangladesh. Despite serious objections raised by the opposition members of parliament to the bill proposing the establishment of Gram Sarkar, it was passed by the parliament, which was dominated by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), in June 1980.³⁵ The government ignored the concerns of the opposition members of parliament that the bill did not propose a democratically elected village body and that the village government should be awarded full autonomy so that it could operate without being hindered by the dominance of government officials.³⁶ Some members expressed their apprehension that the entire scheme was designed to give the supporters of the regime at the

village level a share in the administration.

The Gram Sarkar was a new institutional innovation of the Zia government "to organize better mobilization of development efforts and fuller utilisation of existing indigenous resources".³⁷ One major objective of Gram Sarkar was to bring the administration closer to the people. The Circle Officer was authorized to form a Gram Sakar in each village in a meeting of Gram Shava (the village assembly) according to the consensus of the people present at the meeting "in such a manner as may be agreed upon". It was required by rules that the representation of people from all walks of life and various functional groups was to be ensured. The Gram Sarkar was to consist of the Gram Pradhan (village headman) and eleven other members, including at least two representatives of women. This village body was entrusted with the task of increasing food production, maintaining law-and-order, popularizing the idea of family planning, increasing the rate of literacy, and any such functions as it deemed necessary for the overall development of the village.³⁸

Like all other local bodies in the past, the new village institution of Gram Sarkar was also placed under official control and tutelage. As Huque pointed out:

The government had laid down the rules for constituting and operating Gram Sarkar in such a way as to allow government officials to play a prominent role. The C.O. could determine the boundaries of a village and was responsible for convening meetings of the Gram Shava and constituting Gram Sarkars. There were provisions for the supersession of the village body in case of failure or inability to discharge its duties, acting in a manner contrary to public interest, or abuse of power.³⁹

As an institutional innovation Gram Sarkar was not very successful in encouraging people's participation in the development process of the village. In most cases the chief of the village body and its members were hand-picked by the Circle Officer without giving much consideration to the opinion of the people. In a study of three areas in the districts of Rangpur, Kushtia and Jessore it was found that "the participation was lowest among the landless, and in general, higher landownership was associated with wider participation".⁴⁰ This study also revealed that the members of Gram Sarkar were chosen from the rich landowning group. In another study of three villages in the districts of Comilla, Mymensingh and Rajshahi, it was found that some members of Gram Sarkar did not know that they had a position in the village body, some others knew about it but neither attended any meetings nor knew what their responsibilities were. So only a few members of the Gram Sarkar in each of these villages were active in the development affairs of the village body.⁴¹ The picture of people's participation in the development process was thus not at all encouraging:

As mentioned before, one major objective of the scheme of Gram Sarkar was to bring the administration closer to the people and to create a better rapport between the people and the government officials. This objective also remained unachieved. The government officials' visit to villages remained as infrequent as before. The officials "came (to

a village) only when the influential villagers needed help".⁴² The idea of working closely with the villagers was never taken seriously by the officials. They rather preferred to confine themselves in their office where the ordinary villagers never had an easy access. The colonial practice of maintaining a "safe" distance from the "commoners" remained undiluted. The attitude of administrators toward the people has been typified in the following quotation:

During the colonial days, the "white colour" and "blue eyes" of the administrators were enough for them to remain aloof (from the people), but today "we (the administrators) have to make conscious efforts to remain detached for the sake of impartiality of administration".⁴³

Some of the major reasons for the ineffectiveness of Gram Sarkar as an institutional innovation for rural development can be identified as follows:

- i) the traditional pattern of official domination over local government institutions was retained through prescribed rules and regulations enumerated in the Swanirvar Gram Sarkar (Constitution and Administration) Rules, 1980. No appreciable degree of autonomy was granted to the village-based body;
- ii) despite the vehement criticism of the opposition members in parliament, Gram Sarkar was not made a democratically elected body. As a consequence, the workers of the party in power (BNP); who in many cases did not have much support in the village, occupied the positions in the village body;
- iii) the new institution of Gram Sarkar was not properly integrated with the existing institution of Union Parishad. So there were frequent cases of jurisdictional conflict between these two bodies;
- iv) the sources of revenue of Gram Sarkar were vaguely enumerated and the income generated from such sources was grossly inadequate to undertake any meaningful programme of village development;

v) government officials could not develop the spirit of working with the villagers as their own people and thereby the objective of achieving a better rapport between the officials and the villagers remained unattained.

The civilian government was overthrown in a bloodless military coup in March 1982. With the military's coming to power the Gram Sarkar in most villages became almost inoperative and in July 1982 the only village-based body in the history of Bangladesh was formally abolished by the military government. It is now widely believed that the main reason behind the abolition of Gram Sarkar was that the military government of H.M. Ershad did not want to use the same institution for political support which Ziaur Rahman once used as his support-base in the villages.

Recent Programme of Decentralization

Within a few weeks after coming to power the government of Ershad appointed the Committee for Administrative Reorganization/Reform (CARR). The committee was asked to design "an effective administrative system based on the spirit of devolution and the objective of taking the administration nearer to the people".⁴⁴ One major inadequacy of the administrative system identified by the CARR is "reluctance on the part of the political authority to devolve power to the representative institutions at the local levels".⁴⁵ The committee, therefore, suggested to increase the viability of the local government institutions by making them elected

representative bodies and by placing the local bodies under their control. To invigorate the local bodies and to eliminate the scope of government intervention the CARR recommended the devolution of developmental, administrative and financial powers to the Zila (district) and Thana (now named Upazila - sub-district) levels.

To implement the recommendations of the CARR the government appointed the National Implementation Committee for Administrative Reorganization/Reform (NICARR). On the basis of the recommendations of NICARR, 460 Thanas were upgraded into Upazilas by 1984. Even before the process of upgrading the Thanas started, the government announced its intention of using the Thanas as "the focal point of all administrative activities".⁴⁶ Between May 16 and 20, 1985, the chairmen of 460 Upazilas were elected on the basis of universal adult franchise. The chairmen of Union Parishads became the members of their respective Upazila Parishad.

The Local Government (Upazila Parishad and Upazila Administration Reorganization) (Third Amendment), Ordinance, 1983 has elaborately prescribed the structure and functions of the Upazila Parishad and its relation to the government. The Upazila Parishad shall consist of the directly elected chairman, the chairmen of all Union Parishads within the Upazila, the chairman of Upazila Central Cooperative Association (UCCA), three nominated women members, one nominated member, and official members to be nominated by the

government.⁴⁷ The composition of the new council shows that the chairman is the only directly elected person in the Parishad. The only other category of members in the Parishad who can claim to have a mandate from the people are the chairmen of the Union Parishads. All other members are either ex-officio members representing their organizations or nominated members. Although the official members have no right to vote in the council meetings, they have ample opportunity to influence the council decisions by virtue of their superior education, skill, and above all, their administrative powers as agents of government in the Upazila. It is obvious that the nominated and official members who form the majority of Parishad membership would owe their allegiance to the government - their nominating authority.⁴⁸ If and when the government wants, it can exercise its control over the activities of the Parishad through the non-elected members. Like the Thana Council in the Basic Democracies the presence of official members has been retained in the new Upazila Parishad with a view to exercise government control.

The Upazila Parishad has been entrusted with a long list of functions. These are:

- 1) All development activities at the Upazila level; formulation of Upazila level development plans and programmes and implementation, monitoring and evaluation thereof.
- 2) Preparation of Upazila Development Plans on the basis of Union Development Plans.
- 3) Giving assistance and encouragement to Union Parishads in their activities.

- 4) Promotion of health, family planning and family welfare.
- 5) Provision for management of the environment.
- 6) Training of Chairmen, Members and Secretaries of Union Parishads.
- 7) Implementation of Government policies and programmes within the Upazila.
- 8) Supervision, control and co-ordination of functions of officers serving in the Upazila, except Munsifs, Trying Magistrates and officers engaged in regulatory functions.
- 9) Promotion of socio-cultural activities.
- 10) Promotion and encouragement of employment-generating activities.
- 11) Such other functions as may be specified by the government from time to time.
- 12) Promotion and execution of a co-operative movement in the Upazila.
- 13) Assistance to Zilla Parishad in development activities.
- 14) Planning and execution of all rural public works programmes.
- 15) Promotion of agricultural activities for maximising production.
- 16) Promotion of educational and vocational activities.
- 17) Promotion of livestock, fisheries and forests.⁴⁹

The Upazila Parishad would need a huge amount of money to effectively perform the above-mentioned tasks. If the revenue generated by the Parishad from within the Upazila is not enough to meet its development requirements, it would have to depend on government allocations and grants. The autonomy of the Parishad would thus be substantially reduced because of

its dependence on government funds. The sources of income of the Upazila Parishad have been enumerated as follows:

- 1) Lease money on Jalamahals (swampy lands used for natural fisheries) situated entirely within the Upazila boundaries.
- 2) Tax on professions and trades.
- 3) Tax on dramatic and theatrical shows and other entertainment and amusement.
- 4) Street lighting tax.
- 5) Fees for fairs, agricultural and industrial shows and exhibitions and tournaments.
- 6) Fees for licences and permits granted by the Parishad.
- 7) Toll on services and facilities maintained by the Parishad.
- 8) Lease money from bazaars and ferries to be determined by the government.⁵⁰

Some of the sources listed above have not produced substantial revenue in the past and the other items are also not likely to yield a handsome amount of revenue to enable the Parishad to carry out its development tasks.⁵¹ The consequence of this will be the Parishad's dependence on government for funds and will thereby make it highly susceptible to government pressures.

The government has retained a long list of regulatory and development functions, probably being convinced that the Upazila Parishad is not competent enough to perform these functions. These included civil and criminal judiciary, maintenance of law-and-order, maintenance of essential supplies including food, technical education and education

above primary level, large-scale seed multiplication and dairy farms, large-scale industries, flood control and development of water resources, generation and distribution of electric power, and similar other functions.⁵²

The government has devised a large number of mechanisms through which it can exercise its control over the activities of the Upazila Parishad. A close examination of the rules regulating the operation of the Parishad reveals that its autonomy from government interference is more in appearance than in reality. The functions transferred to the Upazila Parishad are not permanent in nature. At any time "any institution and service maintained by a Parishad" can be "transferred to the management and control of the government".⁵³ The Upazila Parishad has been empowered to prepare its annual budget, but the government retained the authority to modify the budget prepared by the Parishad. A budget modified by the government "shall be deemed to be the sanctioned budget of the Parishad".⁵⁴ While the Upazila Parishad has been authorized to prepare and implement its development plans, the government has reserved the right to "direct that any specified item of income of a Parishad shall wholly or in part be earmarked for and applied in the implementation of a development plan".⁵⁵ Furthermore, the government has set a pattern of sectoral allocations of funds for the Annual Upazila Development Programme (AUDP) indicating the minimum and maximum percentage of funds to be spent in

each area of development, i.e., physical infrastructure, socio-economic infrastructure, agriculture and irrigation and industry, and so on.⁵⁶ Such a tight control over the AUDP has been rationalized by arguing that experience and expertise available at the Upazila level are limited.

In addition to the above mentioned mechanisms, it has been provided that "the Government shall exercise general supervision and control over the Parishads in order to ensure that their activities conform to the purpose of" the local government ordinance of 1983.⁵⁷ "If the Government is satisfied that anything done or intended to be done by or on behalf of a Parishad is not in conformity with law, or is inconsistent with or contrary to national policy, the Government may, by order,

- a) quash the proceedings;
- b) suspend the execution of any resolution passed or order made by the Parishad;
- c) prohibit the doing of anything proposed to be done; and
- d) require the Parishad to take such action as may be specified.⁵⁸

The existence of such rules will allow the national government to direct, control and interfere in the affairs of the council if and when the government so desires. Provisions have also been made to enable the government to make an inquiry "into the affairs of a Parishad generally, or into any particular matter concerning the Parishad".⁵⁹ If the government is satisfied after such inquiry that a Parishad is unable to

discharge its duties or unable to meet its financial obligation or exceeds or abuses its powers, the government can supersede the Parishad but for not more than 180 days.⁶⁰

The services of officers dealing with the transferred subjects "have been placed at the disposal" of the Upazila Parishad and they have been made "accountable" to this body.⁶¹ Such accountability of the Upazila officials is, to a great extent, meaningless in the absence of ultimate control of the Parishad over them. The same resolution that makes the officials responsible to the Parishad mentions that "Government and respective Departments however will continue to be responsible for the appointment, transfer, promotion, discipline and remuneration of these officers".⁶² Khan has commented:

Quite clearly, the Upazila Parishad has been given the responsibility but no control over civil servants working there. This has undoubtedly strengthened the position of the national government vis-a-vis Upazila Parishad and made the centrally-controlled officers independent of Upazila Parishad.⁶³

It can therefore be argued that an autonomous local institution of administration and development is yet to emerge in Bangladesh. The declared objective of the government in establishing the institution of Upazila Parishad was to usher in a new era in the local government history of the country. But the rules and regulations governing the operations of the Upazila Parishad prove that official control, a prominent aspect of the local government institutions set up by the

British, has not been discarded. Rather, elaborate provisions have been made to ensure substantial government control over the day-to-day administration and development affairs of the Upazila Parishad. "The authority of government to interfere in the matters of the Upazila Parishad is almost unlimited".⁶⁴ The nature of official control over the

Upazila Parishad is evident in the following observation:

The elected chairman and representative members of the Upazila Parishad in Bangladesh have very little to do in planning, programming and project design (PPPD). In fact, in performing their functions in the arena of PPPD they are directed, guided, controlled, monitored and evaluated by the designated officials of the national government.⁶⁵

It can be said, in short, that the democratic and autonomous appearance of the Upazila Parishad is an attempt to camouflage the fact that, in reality, control by the national government persists as ever before.

Time is not yet ripe to make an objective evaluation of the performance of Upazila Parishad and its role in encouraging people's participation in the rural development efforts. But available information indicates that the Parishad is not very optimistic about the chance of performing its job satisfactorily. A very common concern of the Upazila chairmen is that "they have been entrusted with responsibility in many areas, but this has not been matched by sufficient authority".⁶⁶ Principal Abdur Rashid, chairman of Bochaganj Upazila Parishad in Dinajpur district, said metaphorically, "we can't change the shirt, but we could at least put a patch

on it. We have not been given the power to do that even".⁶⁷

The Parishad chairmen showed a total lack of interest in their week-long training programme in early June 1985 held at the Academy for Rural Development (Comilla and Bogra). One Upazila chairman said, "what's the use of this training? Do we have any power to use the training in development works?"⁶⁸

Soon after the Upazila chairmen elections in May 1985, signs of conflict and tension between the Upazila chairmen and Upazila Nirbahi Officer (UNO) began to emerge. The guidelines governing the operations of Upazila Parishad clearly mention that the UNO "will be the staff officer of the elected Chairman of Upazila Parishad who will be the Chief Executive of Upazila. He will also be the chief executive officer of the Upazila Parishad, shall be responsible to the Chairman of Upazila Parishad and assist him in implementation of policies and decisions of the Upazila Parishad".⁶⁹ The most probable cause of conflict between the Parishad chairman and the UNO is that the UNO, being unaccustomed to working under the direction and supervision of elected elements, finds it difficult to accept the subordination to an elected chairman. A tendency of non-cooperation may ultimately develop among the UNO, and this will have a devastating effect on the quality of administration and the rural development efforts of the Parishad.

Problems and Prospects of Rural Development under the
Recent Programme

Since the Upazila Parishad went into operation in the summer of 1985, it was too early to evaluate the performance of this newly constituted body during my field research between May and September of that year. I, therefore, decided to acquaint myself with the opinions of the Upazila chairmen and UNOs about the recent programme of decentralization of administrative and development functions. My assumption was that the future performance of the Upazila Parishad, to a considerable degree, would depend on how the scheme of decentralization is perceived by the chairmen and the UNOs. To gather the opinions of the chairmen and UNOs I concentrated my research on five Upazilas, one from each of the districts of Chittagong, Feni, Comilla, Chandpur, and Brahmanbaria. In terms of the level of socio-economic development, distance and accessibility from the district headquarters, and size and population, the five Upazilas can be considered well-representative of the Upazilas of Bangladesh. The names of the five Upazilas will not be used in this study in order to maintain the anonymity of the interviewees who agreed to talk frankly only after I assured them that in no way their identity would be disclosed in my writing.

The Upazila chairmen are highly critical of the past local government structure in which the Thana was never headed by an elected representative of the people. They deplore the past

system for its failure to give the people's representatives any considerable voice in the planning process of the development programmes. The Upazila chairmen think generally that one main reason for people's apathy to the rural development activities in the past was the defective structure of the local government system in which development plans were formulated and attempted to be implemented by the initiative of government officials who had no contact with the villagers. One chairman said assertively: "Any attempt to get the people involved in the process of development is nonsense unless the role of elected representatives is properly recognized in such process". Another chairman asked "How can you expect the people to participate in the rural development activities when their leaders are denied the leadership role in the planning and implementation of development programmes?" One Upazila chairman who previously represented his union in the Thana Parishad explained the nature of official domination on the policy process of Thana Parishad. He said: "In the Parishad meetings the representative members were almost helpless in the presence of powerful official members and chairman. Most decisions were taken by the government officials without seriously considering our opinions". The Upazila chairmen therefore strongly disapprove a local government system that denies the people's representatives a strong voice in the local bodies.

The new arrangement of placing the Parishad under the

chairmanship of an elected person is highly acclaimed by the Parishad chairmen. They consider it a major improvement over the past structure of Thana Parishad which was headed by a government official. But they condemn the presence of official members in the Upazila Parishad. One Upazila chairman said: "The Parishad should be a wholly elected body; officials should not have any place in that body". Another chairman said: "Official representation is one of the many ways by which the government wants to exercise its control over the activities of Upazila Parishad. This is a colonial practice. It should be discarded". Although the official members have not been given voting rights in the deliberation of the Parishad, the chairmen feel that the very presence of official members in the Parishad is "undemocratic" and reduces the "autonomy" of the Parishad. The chairmen are also critical of the provision according to which the government nominates three women members to the Parishad from among the residents of the Upazila. They feel that the women members should also be elected if the Parishad is to be a truly democratic body.

A common feeling among the chairmen is that the Parishad has not been awarded sufficient authority to effectively manage the affairs of the Upazila. They seem to be concerned that their responsibility far exceeds their authority. One chairman said: "We have many responsibilities, but we don't have much authority to do our job. Responsibility without

authority is meaningless". The chairmen strongly deplore the many ways in which the government can exercise control over the activities of the Parishad. One chairman commented wrathfully: "The Parishad can make its annual development plan and prepare its yearly budget, but the government has the right to modify them and force the Parishad to act the way the government likes. The Parishad will therefore end up doing what the government wishes it to do. What autonomy do we have?" The Parishad chairmen seem to be worried that they may not be able to do the development works they promised during the election campaign. They are concerned that because of the "tight control" of the Dhaka government the Parishad cannot decide what percentage of available resources should be spent for what type of development programmes.

By far the greatest concern of the chairmen is the attitude of the government officials toward the Parishad and its non-official members. Four of the chairmen are convinced that there has been a tendency on the part of government officials in general, and the UNO in particular, not to extend their whole-hearted cooperation to the Parishad to enable it to perform its assigned functions. It is well understood by the chairmen that it will be almost impossible to achieve the goals of development without the active cooperation of the officials. When asked why are the UNOs reluctant to cooperate with the Parishad, one chairman replied: "The UNO is not prepared to work under the guidance and supervision of

people's elected leaders. They are not used to it". Another chairman stated: "In the new arrangement the elected chairman has been made the chief executive officer and chief coordinator of the Upazila administration and the UNO has been asked to work as the staff officer of the chairman. This arrangement is diametrically opposed to the role the UNO has previously played in the Upazila administration". It must however be mentioned that one chairman has nothing but words of praise for the UNO of his Upazila. He finds the UNO "highly cooperative, eager to work with the people, and appreciative of the wisdom of existing arrangements in which the UNO has been subordinated to the chairman". The chairman realizes that the UNO of his Upazila is different from many other UNOs. He said thankfully, "We are extremely lucky that we have such a dedicated UNO. Every Upazila should have an UNO like him". The four chairmen displeased by the attitude of the UNOs strongly emphasize the need for reorientation so that the UNOs can adapt themselves to their changed role in the Upazila administration. One chairman said grudgingly: "If the UNO does not discipline himself soon, I will do everything possible to get him transferred elsewhere. I cannot make myself a fool to the people of Upazila".

Four of the five UNOs interviewed are totally disillusioned by the scheme of decentralized development in which an elected chairman has been apparently placed at the helm of the affairs of Upazila administration. They seem to

glorify Ayub Khan's Basic Democracies as a model for a local government system and for rural development. As one of them said: "I am a firm believer in the Ayubian model. The local bodies above the level of Union Parishad should be under strong official control". With regard to the delegation of power from the centre to the peripheral levels, another UNO said: "It may be desirable, but there must be enough mechanisms to ensure that the central government can exercise its control through the appointed officials. I am against delegation of power to the unscrupulous politicians". When asked what should be the role of elected representatives in the local bodies, one UNO replied: "They should be the link between the people and the administration. It is unwise to leave the affairs of local bodies to the elected representatives". Three other UNOs expressed a similar view in different words. One UNO, however, is critical of the Ayubian model of local government because it "failed to establish self-governing local bodies" in Pakistan and consequently "effective local leadership for rural development did not emerge". He is strongly against the institution of Basic Democracies as "it had no faith in the competence of the people and their leaders" to manage the local affairs. "The Basic Democracies therefore relied on official control".

A great majority of the UNOs (80%) are decisively against the structure of Upazila Parishad and are unprepared to accept an elected leader as the chief coordinator and chief executive

officer of the Upazila administration. When asked what is the most important limitation of the present system of decentralization, one UNO replied: "The villagers are illiterate; they don't know what is good for them; they are therefore easily cheated by the fraudulent politicians. The people should not be allowed to be cheated by the politicians". Another UNO said: "What do they (people's representatives) know about planning and programming? These are not easy tasks. Anybody is not good enough to do these things. What training do they have in the art of administration and development?" Before the Upazila election the UNO administered the affairs of the Upazila as an almost authoritarian administrator. He was virtually a tiny lord in his Upazila. After the election his status has changed and he is now the staff officer of the elected chairman and "responsible" to him. This is the main reason why a great majority of the UNOs are so disenchanted with the new structure of Upazila administration. They are not accustomed to working under the supervision of people's elected leaders. As one UNO admitted frankly: "I find it difficult to work under the direction of an elected person. I am not used to it".

Four of the five UNOs interviewed do not seem to believe that rural development efforts are more successful when they are initiated by the people's leaders than by the appointed government officials. One UNO said: "This is a false academic assumption without any practical relevance

whatsoever". Another UNO argued: "It is wrong to assume that the people are motivated to participate in the development activities when their leaders are planning the development programmes. People's participation depends on the nature of the programme undertaken, not on who plans the programme". The four UNOs are not optimistic about the prospect of rural development under the guidance of Upazila Parishad. They believe that the present scheme of decentralization will soon unravel its limitations and will ultimately be abolished by the government. One UNO stated: "To me it is an experiment in rural development strategy like the Gram Sarkar of Ziaur Rahman. The fate will not be different from that of Gram Sarkar". Another UNO said: "Any experiment in rural development that ignores the primacy of government officials is bound to be a failure". One of the UNOs interviewed, however, is optimistic about the prospect of rural development under the present arrangements. He said: "The present system, more than any system in the past, has a better prospect of rural development. However, much will depend on the commitment of elected leaders to rural development and also on active cooperation of the government officials".

Summarizing the interviews, it can be said that the chairmen of Upazila Parishad welcome the scheme of decentralization as a genuine improvement over the past structure of Thana Parishad which was never headed by an elected leader. They are optimistic that people's

participation in the rural development activities will substantially increase under their leadership. The chairmen, however, resent the various devices by which the government can exercise control over the activities of Upazila Parishad and argue that the Parishad is far from being an autonomous body. But the greatest concern of the chairmen is that they are deprived of the active cooperation of the UNOs who appear to be disillusioned by the scheme of decentralization. To a great majority of the UNOs the recent scheme of decentralization is unacceptable, because it has denied the primacy of government officials in the Upazila administration. They have little respect for the elected representatives of the people and they perceive the present scheme as one of the many experiments in rural development strategy, which will soon reveal its limitations and will be abolished by the government. It can therefore be concluded that the success in rural development will be very limited unless the officials change their attitude toward the Parishad and are willing to cooperate with its development efforts.

Elimination of bureaucratic control and a change in the attitude of officials, however, will not necessarily guarantee widespread popular participation in the rural development activities. Given the extreme economic inequality prevailing in rural Bangladesh, it is always the members of affluent class who get elected to the local government institutions. So there is sufficient reason for the vast majority of the

poor and landless people to feel unrepresented in and alienated to the local bodies and their development activities. A probable solution to this problem is profession-based representation to the local councils.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have demonstrated that a non-bureaucratic, tutelage-free approach to local government and rural development has not yet emerged in Bangladesh. The British in India did not advocate the idea of establishing self-governing local bodies for two main reasons. First, their apprehension was that the self-governing local government institutions would ultimately weaken the British control over rural areas. Second, the British had a lack of confidence in the ability of the natives to manage their local affairs. As a consequence, the local government institutions created by the British were kept under official control. Whatever rural development activities took place were planned, implemented and evaluated under the official initiative.

Pakistan's approach to rural development through the Basic Democracies that generated much debate and discussion at home and abroad was a predominantly bureaucratic approach. Only the tier at the bottom of the hierarchically arranged four-tier structure had an elected chairman. All other tiers were headed by appointed officials. Even the tier at the bottom of the hierarchy was under constant official control.

and tutelage. No attempt was made to get the rural people involved in planning for rural development, which was mainly done by the government officials. The involvement of the rural populace was sought, if at all, only when the rural development programme came to the implementation stage.

In independent Bangladesh successive regimes have repeatedly emphasized the importance of a non-bureaucratic approach to local government and rural development. The ruling elites at different times condemned centralized administration as an essentially colonial principle which needed to be discarded if an accelerated pace of development was to be achieved in rural Bangladesh. The Mujib government abolished Ayub Khan's Basic Democracies but failed to create a new local government structure that could deal with the problems of rural development more effectively and could free the local government institutions from official control. The movement for Swanirvar that initially started as an isolated and locally arranged non-official endeavour was ultimately bureaucratised thoroughly under the auspices of district administration. The government of Ziaur Rahman devised for the first time in the history of Bangladesh a village-based local body. But elaborate rules were made to ensure official control on that body. Critics argue that the purpose behind the formation of Gram Sarkar was to create a rural support-base for Ziaur Rahman who desperately needed it when indication of dwindling support for his regime among the armed

forces became evident.

A renewed effort for decentralized administration and development has been attempted by the Ershad government by transferring most of the development activities at Upazila level to a partially elected Parishad headed by an elected chairman. A close examination of the rules regulating the operation of Upazila Parishad reveals that the ultimate control over the planning, decision-making and management functions of the Parishad has been retained, as ever before, by the central government. It therefore seems that following the colonial tradition the Bangladeshi rulers have been attempting to retain control of the rural populace by denying them genuinely self-governing local bodies. Bureaucratic control is still a prominent feature of the local government institutions in Bangladesh.

Endnotes -

1. The above figures have been taken from Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, 1983-84 Statistical Yearbook of Bangladesh (Dhaka: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistical Research, 1984).
2. F.T. Januzzi and J.T. Peach, Report on the Hierarchy of Interests in Land in Bangladesh (Washington, D.C.: Agency for International Development, 1977).
3. Hugh Tinker, The Foundations of Local Self-Government in India, Pakistan and Burma (London: The Athlone Press, 1954), p. 70.
4. See, for example, Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms (Montagu-Chelmsford Report), Calcutta, 1918.
5. Shaikh Maqsood Ali, M. Safiur Rahman and Kshanda Mohan Das, Decentralization and People's Participation in Bangladesh (Dhaka: National Institute of Public Administration, 1983), p. 45.
6. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements, vol. 2 (Karachi: Pakistan Publications, 1962), p. 35.
7. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 207.
8. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 251.
9. Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), p. 111.
10. Samuel P. Huntington, op. cit., p. 253.
11. Quoted in Sheikh Maqsood Ali et al., op. cit., p. 49.
12. Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Law, The Basic Democracies Order (Karachi: Government of Pakistan Press, 1959), Article 74.
13. Ibid., Article 74.
14. Ibid., Article 75.

15. It is pertinent here to mention that the Constitution Commission appointed by Ayub Khan in 1961 to make recommendations about the future constitution of Pakistan was highly critical of the idea that the right to elect the President and the members of legislatures should be confined to the Basic Democrats. The Commission voiced its opinion in favour of direct elections, but insisted that the franchise should be restricted by imposing "educational equalifications" and "property ownership". For details see, Government of Pakistan, Report of the Constitution Commission, 1961 (Karachi: Government of Pakistan Press, 1962), paras. 108-10.
16. Najmul Abedin, Local Administration and Politics in Modernising Societies: Bangladesh and Pakistan (Dacca: National Institute of Public Administration, 1973), p. 174.
17. Rehman Sobhan, Basic Democracies, Works Programme and Rural Development in East Pakistan (Dacca: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 259.
18. Najmul Abedin, op. cit., p. 383.
19. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, The Bangladesh Gazette, Extraordinary (President's Order No. 7 of 1972), January 20, 1972.
20. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs, The Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh (Dacca: Bangladesh Government Press, 1972), Article 59(1).
21. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangladesh Document 2, No. 2 (October-December 1973), (Dacca: Bangladesh Government Press, n.d.), p. 14.
22. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Report of the Administrative and Services Reorganization Committee, Part II: The Administration (Dacca: October 1973), Para. 10.3.
23. The composition, functions, sources of income of the local bodies and their relationship with the government have been spelled out in, ibid., paras. 10.1-10.6.
24. In June 1973 the Union Panchayats were renamed as Union Parishads. See, Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, The Bangladesh Gazette, June 30, 1973.

25. M.A. Chashi, "Self-Reliant Rural Bangladesh - Problems and Prospects: A Case Study of Swanirvar Movement", Political Economy 2, No. 1 (June 1977).
26. A.M.M. Shawkat Ali, Field Administration and Rural Development in Bangladesh (Dacca: Centre for Social Studies, Dacca University, 1982), p. 173.
27. Ibid., p. 177.
28. Mohammad Mohabbat Khan, "Rural Development Programme in Bangladesh", in Jean-Claude Garcia-Zamor, ed., Public Participation in Development Planning and Management: Cases from Africa and Asia (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985), p. 193.
29. M.A. Chashi, op. cit., p. 4.
30. Ibid., p. 5.
31. Shaikh Maqsood Ali, "The Sense and Sensibility of Swanirvar Gram Sarkar Format for Rural Development", Administrative Science Review 9, No. 4 (December 1979), quoted in Ahmed Shafiqul Huque, The Problem of Local Government Reform in Rural Bangladesh: The Failure of Swanirvar Gram Sarkar (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Dept. of Political Science, University of British Columbia, 1984), p. 76.
32. H.I. Latifee, "Swanirvar Bangladesh: Problems and Prospects", Political Economy 2, No. 1 (June 1977), p. 253.
33. Ibid., p. 254.
34. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, The Local Government Ordinance, 1976 (Dacca: Bangladesh Government Press, 1976), Article 85.
35. For the process of legislation and the objections voiced by the opposition members see, Ahmed Shafiqul Huque, "Politics, Parliament and Local Government Reform: The Case of Bangladesh", Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 23, No. 3 (November 1985), especially pp. 219-22.
36. Ibid.
37. Mohammad Mohabbat Khan and Habib Mohammad Zafarullah, "Rural Development in Bangladesh: Policies, Plans and Programmes", Indian Journal of Public Administration 26, No. 3 (July-September 1980), p. 781.

38. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, The Bangladesh Gazette, Extraordinary (Dacca: Bangladesh Government Press, May 24, 1980), Rule 17.
39. Ahmed Shafiquel Huque, "Politics, Parliament and Local Government Reform: The Case of Bangladesh", op. cit., p. 219.
40. Mahbub Hossain, Raisul Awal Mahmood and Qazi Khaliquzzaman Ahmad, "Participatory" Development Efforts in Rural Bangladesh: A Case Study of Experiences in Three Thanas, (Mimeo), (Dacca: Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies, 1980), p. 29.
41. Ahmed Shafiquel Huque, The Problem of Local Government Reform in Rural Bangladesh, op. cit.
42. Ibid., p. 220.
43. Emajuddin Ahamed, "Bureaucratic Elites in Bangladesh and Their Development Orientation", Dacca University Studies 28 (Part A), 1978, p. 62.
44. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Report of the Committee for Administrative Reorganization/Reform (Dacca: June 1982), preface, para. 3(b).
45. Ibid., para. 4.
46. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, The Bangladesh Gazette, Extraordinary (Dacca: October 23, 1982).
47. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, The Local Government (Upazila Parishad and Upazila Administration Reorganization) (Third Amendment) Ordinance, 1983, Section 4.
48. Ahmed Shafiquel Huque, "The Illusion of Decentralization: Local Administration in Bangladesh", International Review of Administrative Sciences 52, No. 1 (March 1986), p. 89.
49. The Local Government Ordinance, 1983, op. cit., Second Schedule.
50. Ibid., Third Schedule.
51. Ahmed Shafiquel Huque, "The Illusion of Decentralization", op. cit., pp. 87-8.
52. The Bangladesh Gazette, Extraordinary, October 23, 1982, op. cit., Annexure I.

53. The Local Government Ordinance, 1983, op. cit., Section 26(a).
54. Ibid., Section 36(3).
55. Ibid., Section 40(2)(c).
56. See, Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Finance and Planning, Planning Division, Guidelines for Utilisation by the Upazila Parishad of the Development Assistance Provided by the National Government Through ADP (Dhaka: July 31, 1983).
57. The Local Government Ordinance, 1983, op. cit., Section 49.
58. Ibid., Section 50.
59. Ibid., Section 51.
60. Ibid., Section 52(1).
61. The Bangladesh Gazette, Extraordinary, October 23, 1982, op. cit., Section 2.
62. Ibid.
63. Mohammad Mohabbat Khan, "Implementation of Decentralization Policy and the Role of Public Bureaucracy in Bangladesh", paper presented in an international conference on Managing Development at the Periphery: Issues in Programme Effectiveness and Efficiency in the Third World, held in Ottawa, Canada from September 25-27, 1986, p. 12.
64. Mohammad Faizullah, "Functioning of Local Government in Bangladesh", in Hasnat Abdul Hye, ed., Decentralisation, Local Government Institutions and Resource Mobilisation (Comilla, Bangladesh: Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development, 1985), p. 280.
65. Mohammad Mohabbat Khan, "Implementation of Decentralization Policy and the Role of Public Bureaucracy in Bangladesh", op. cit., p. 12.
66. Sangbad [a Bengali Daily] (Dhaka: June 11, 1985).
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
69. The Local Government Ordinance, 1983, op. cit., Annexure II.

CONCLUSION

...there is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things. For the reformer has enemies in all those who profit by the old order, and only lukewarm defenders in all those who would profit by the new order---

(Niccolo Machiavelli)

It is inevitable that the deeply and solidly entrenched vested interests of an existing system would do anything and everything possible to frustrate the attempts at reforming the system. This is however not to argue that an established order of things is unchangeable or unreformable. The success of a reform effort depends, to a considerable degree, on the capacity and determination of the reformers and their advocates to effectively neutralize and destabilize the deeply-rooted vested interests of the system they seek to reform. This is a difficult, though not impossible, task to accomplish. Many reform efforts are incapable of producing the intended outcome because the reformers and their supporters do not possess the capacity and determination to go ahead with the reform ideas by weakening the hold of the privileged whose interests are well served by the existing order of things. An abortive reform effort immensely strengthens the sense of group solidarity and confidence among the beneficiaries of the existing system and prepares them to conspire forcefully against any subsequent attempt to reform the system.

In this thesis our central focus has been on the persistence of the British administrative system in Pakistan and in Bangladesh after the Eastern wing of Pakistan seceded from the rest of the country in 1971. The most prominent features of the British administrative system in India can, easily be discerned as a high degree of centralization, glorification of generalism as opposed to specialism, excessive elitism and consequent aloofness of officials from the general people, a dichotomous relationship between the secretariat and attached departments in that the secretariat was the hub of policy-making and the attached departments were entrusted with the task of policy-implementation. The members of Indian Civil Service (ICS), a generalist and elitist cadre of the public service, were the cornerstone of administration and occupied virtually all strategic and influential positions at the central and provincial, and even at the local, levels of administration. All vital policy-making positions close to the Governor-General and provincial Governors as well as other positions of strategic importance were almost an exclusive prerogative of the ICS cadre, which has been called the "steel frame" of British administration in India.

The colonial bureaucracy, more specifically the ICS, wielded enormous power over affairs in India and was subject only to the remote control of the Secretary of State for India and the British parliament. With the introduction of dyarchy in the Indian provinces under the Indian Act of 1919 it was

expected that there would be a readjustment in the role and position of the bureaucracy in the governmental system by making the bureaucracy responsible to the elected representatives of the people. But no such readjustment took place as the ICS officers, many of whom held positions of importance in the provincial governments, were substantially immune from control by the elected representatives.

The system of administration devised by the British amply served their purpose and they were proud that they could build a "modern" administrative system on the medieval framework they inherited from their immediate predecessor, the Mughals.

At independence from colonial rule Pakistan inherited the colonial administrative system and its idiosyncrasies. The ICS was reproduced in the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) as a small elite cadre which monopolized all positions of policy-making and strategic importance in the administration. Following the footsteps of its predecessor, the CSP became the cornerstone of Pakistan administration and contributed enormously to the emergence of an "administrative state" in Pakistan.¹ The overlordship of the CSP generalist disenchanted the members of other services in general and specialized and professional services in particular who had been denied many important positions in the administration. The British policy of excessive centralization was also meticulously retained in Pakistan.

Throughout Pakistan's existence as a "united" country

(1947-1971) the need to reform the administrative system inherited from the British was seriously felt. Successive regimes appointed a large number of reform commissions to make recommendations so as to restructure and refashion the administrative machinery, procedures and personnel system which had time and again been discovered to be deficient in their capacity to make any major contributions to the socio-economic development of the Pakistani society. The commissions made elaborate suggestions to make the administrative system compatible with the development needs of an independent country.

It would be a misstatement of fact to claim that the recommendations of the reform commissions did not have any impact on the administrative system of Pakistan. Some recommendations did receive favourable consideration of the government. The introduction of the "Section Officers Scheme" and the creation of the "Economic Pool" can be cited as examples. However, the reform reports that suggested major changes in the structure and organization of the civil service were treated very unsympathetically by the government. It has been well documented in the literature on Pakistan's administrative reform efforts that the central reason why the major administrative reform reports could not be implemented was the resistance by the vested interest of the CSP. The system of administration relied so heavily on the CSP for both policy-making and its implementation that no regime was strong

enough to introduce any change that would deny the preeminence of that cadre in the system. The CSP thereby retained all the structural characteristics of the ICS, i.e., an open-entry system based on academic achievement, permanency of tenure, reservation of a large number of crucial positions in the central, provincial and district administrations for members of that cadre, a system of promotion based predominantly on seniority, etc. The inherited administrative system of Pakistan was changed very little between 1947 and 1971.

Although there were slight modifications in details, the basic structure of the administrative system and its personnel practice remained virtually unchanged.

Pakistan's experience in administrative reform provides credibility to the argument that, despite the eagerness of the ruling political elites of the newly independent countries for major administrative reform, success in this area is extremely limited. The following reasons can be given for Pakistan's failure at introducing far-reaching changes in the administrative system.

(a) The CSP, which was reminiscent of the ICS of the pre-independence period, became the vested interest of the administrative system, as was its predecessor. As an institution the CSP wielded so much power in Pakistan administration that it had the capability to defeat any reform effort that posed even the slightest threat to its future power and status.

(b) Although setting up administrative reform commissions became a ritual in Pakistan, the political leadership lacked the capacity and determination to implement the recommendations of the commissions. Like the leaders of many other developing countries, the leaders of Pakistan were so besieged by the issue of their political survival that they hardly had the willingness and determination to push the reform proposals to a success.

(c) As a sub-system of the greater social system, the administrative system constantly interacts with other sub-systems of the society. It is therefore logical to argue that an attempt to reform the administrative system is likely to be successful when it is accompanied by reforms in the other sectors of the society. In Pakistan administrative reform efforts were undertaken without making a concurrent attempt to reform the other sub-systems of the society.

(d) A great majority of the Pakistani population being illiterate, a strong public opinion against the dysfunctional nature of the existing administrative system could not be created. Popular indignation about the inherited administrative system could strengthen the hands of the political leadership to go all the way to implement the major reorganization proposals. It did not exist in Pakistan.

During the moribund years of united Pakistan the Bengali nationalist leaders demonstrated their utmost hatred for the colonial nature of the administrative system which they

perceived to be totally out of tune with the realities of an independent country. They vowed to get rid of the elitist, authoritarian and paternalistic traits of the bureaucracy by introducing wide-ranging changes in the administrative structure, personnel system and work procedures. After Bangladesh achieved independence the Awami League government, under the charismatic leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, reiterated its earlier promise of overhauling the administrative system. A committee was appointed to design a blueprint for the administrative reorganization. The committee provided the government with a well-conceived reform package. But the government stepped back from its avowed position. The report was shelved. The consequence was the reproduction of the colonial administrative system even after Bangladesh's second birth.

The Awami League's strong determination to restructure the administrative system did not last long. It soon realized its incapacity to meet the rising expectations of the people generated by the party itself during the nationalist movement. The party, therefore, decided to keep the Bangladeshi society in its grip by using the law-and-order oriented administrative machinery. Thus, Mujib became a defender of the colonial administrative system which he himself once ridiculed.

The experience of Bangladesh with an administrative reform effort during the Mujib era is not very different from what

many other newly independent countries experienced in this field. The leaders of the nascent countries felt the necessity of redesigning the inherited system to make it capable of performing the administrative tasks. But the leaders could not go ahead with their ideas of administrative reform. In many countries the reform efforts were thwarted by the bureaucracy which was wedded to the ethos and values of the prevalent administrative system. Even a country like India, whose success at operating within a democratic framework is an elusive goal for many Third World countries, could not proceed too far with administrative reform.

One very common concern about administrative reform is that even when some reform proposals get implemented, they may often be tampered with and executed in such a way as to twist, distort or defeat their original purpose and underlying spirit. In Bangladesh the Senior Services Pool (SSP) was formed to accommodate the long-standing demands of the professionals for a reasonable share in the policy process. But the cadre identity of the officials in the so-called "open structure" of the SSP deeply frustrated the purpose behind the formation of such a structure. An overwhelming representation of the ex-CSP in the SSP provides credibility to the argument that the form of colonial bureaucratic structure has been changed but its contents have remained virtually unchanged.

The most successful administrative reform report in the history of Bangladesh so far has been the report of the

Committee for Administrative Reorganization/Reform (CARR) that proposed the creation of partially-elected and partially-autonomous Upazila Parishad. We have argued that the success of the CARR report was mainly due to the fact that it zeroed in on restructuring the local government system and did not pose any threat to the interest of the most cohesive and powerful group in Bangladesh administration, the ex-CSP. The lesson that can be learned from this is that the task of administrative reform is relatively easy when the interest of the dominant group of officials in the administration is not threatened and when large-scale changes in the public service structure are not proposed.

Summary of the Findings

We are now in a position to summarize the major findings of this thesis:

(a) The administrative system introduced by the British during the colonial rule has survived very well in post-independence Pakistan (1947-1971) and Bangladesh (1971-1985), with only slight modifications in the details. The need for reform and reorganization was seriously felt, but very little success in the reform effort could be achieved.

(b) The single most important factor responsible for the non-implementation of the reform proposals was the lack

of firm commitment and determination on the part of political leadership to overcome the bureaucratic resistance to administrative change. Of course, lack of commitment was a product of structural constraints that compelled the political leadership to swallow the bitter pill of status quo.

(c) Reform efforts were least successful when far-reaching changes in the public service structure were proposed. The single most important aspect of the colonial administration that Pakistan and then Bangladesh inherited was its systematic bias toward generalism, as opposed to specialism. Those reform commissions that suggested abandoning the generalist orientation of the public service as an out-dated and out-moded principle and emphasized the importance of according proper recognition to the professionals were the least successful. This was so precisely because of the resistance by the generalists who found their interests threatened by such proposals.

(d) The reform efforts that were the most successful were those that avoided the question of reorganizing the public service structure and did not pose any threat to the interest of the major beneficiaries of the existing administrative system. Such reform efforts did not face any vigorous bureaucratic resistance.

(e) Administrative reform efforts had been undertaken without any concurrent effort to reform the socio-economic and political structures of the society. The administrative reform

efforts thus failed to realize that the administrative sub-system of the society is in constant interaction with similar other sub-systems and it influences and is being influenced by those sub-systems.

(f) The legacy of colonial administration is visible in the form and functioning of the local government institutions. Following the colonial practice, bureaucratic control over the local bodies still continues. The local bodies thereby have very little autonomy to operate independently of official control. As a consequence, the involvement of the community in the development activities has been minimum. Unless local bodies are allowed to operate as self-governing institutions, people's participation in the development process will be difficult to achieve.

Applicability of Findings in Some South Asian Ex-British Colonies

We will now make an attempt to examine the applicability of the major findings of this thesis to some other South Asian countries that also experienced the British colonial rule for many decades. The countries that will be examined are Pakistan (after 1971) and India since independence. Since this is not the right place to make an elaborate analysis of the administrative system of these countries, our attention will be focused on the extent to which the colonial administration inherited by these countries has been reformed

since independence.

Pakistan

In Chapter III we have already mentioned how the colonial administrative traditions survived in Pakistan from independence in 1947 until the secession of the Eastern wing in 1971. Here we will focus our attention to the administrative reform efforts undertaken in post-1971 Pakistan to put the colonial legacy to rest. After the civil war in 1971, military rule in Pakistan at least for a while, came to an end. General Yahya Khan handed over power to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and his Pakistan People's Party (PPP) on the basis of the party's clear majority in the 1970 parliamentary elections in the Western provinces.

Bhutto had a great antipathy toward the Pakistani bureaucracy in general and CSP in particular, which he condemned on many occasions by using various terms such as "Naukarshahi" (rule by officials), "Bara Sahib" (overlord), "Brahmins" (the highest caste among the Hindus), etc. To assert himself and his party in the policy process Bhutto felt the necessity of bending the "steel frame" of the CSP. The most important strategy adopted by Bhutto to weaken the position of the bureaucracy in the power structure was the abolition of the constitutionally-based service security afforded to the civil service in the 1956 and 1962 constitutions of Pakistan. To reorganize the country's

administrative system he appointed the Administrative Reforms Committee (ARC) under the chairmanship of Khurshid Hasan Meer, a minister in Bhutto's cabinet. The ARC was specifically asked to review the previous reform reports and to make suggestions about how to make the administrative system capable of social engineering.

The recommendations of the Meer Commission were not very different from those of the Cornelius Commission appointed by the military government of Ayub Khan. On the basis of the recommendations of the Meer Commission the following announcements were made by Bhutto in August 1973:

- (a) All the services and cadres will be merged into a unified grading structure with equality of opportunity for all who enter the service at any stage based on the required professional and specialized competence necessary for each job.
- (b) All "classes" among government servants will be abolished and replaced by a unified grading structure, a peon or equivalent at the bottom, a Secretary or Departmental Head at the top. The existing classification of the services into Class I to Class IV will no longer operate. The road to the top will be open to all on merit.
- (c) The use of "service" labels [such as CSP, PFS, etc.] will be discontinued forthwith.
- (d) The unified structure will enable promotions to the higher posts throughout the range of public service for horizontal movements from one cadre to another, including the movement of technical personnel to the cadre of general management. There will also be scope for out of turn promotion to exceptionally able officers.
- (e) The correct grading of each post will be determined by job evaluation.
- (f) There will be provision for entry into Government service for the talented individuals from the private sector in fields such as banking, insurance, industry and trade.²

The above changes made a sharp break with the colonial traditions in Pakistan administration. An analysis of the factors that enabled the adoption of such massive measures by the Bhutto government is needed here. The secession of the Eastern wing of Pakistan in 1971 severely destroyed the credibility of the CSP as an integrative force in the ethnically segmented society of Pakistan. Moreover, the alliance between the civilian and military bureaucracies that crystallized during Pakistan's existence as a united country, and on which the CSP flourished, ruptured in 1971 when 93,000 Pakistani soldiers surrendered helplessly in Bangladesh and thus earned an irreparable and unprecedented national humiliation for Pakistan. When the administrative reforms were proposed and implemented by the Bhutto government the CSP was not in a position to effectively resist the reform measures. It can thus be argued that the success of administrative reforms in 1973 was facilitated by a full-blown civil war that led to Pakistan's military debacle and the secession of the majority province of Pakistan (in terms of population).

After leaving Ayub Khan's cabinet in the Summer of 1967 Bhutto started to espouse a political philosophy known as 'Islamic Socialism', a mixture of populism with social democratic and Islamic overtones. Bhutto's political ideals were overwhelmingly endorsed by the electorate in the 1970 general elections. The PPP realized the ineptness of the

existing administrative system for the implementation of its ideology and election manifesto. The PPP manifesto mentioned that a "socialist regime will need a different structure of administration".³ The charisma of Bhutto coupled with the ideological incongruity between the elitist civil service and the populist stance of the party provided him with the determination to make massive changes in the structure of administration.

Pakistan's post-1971 experience in administrative reform provides credibility to the argument that administrative restructuring efforts tend to be successful when they are attempted in conjunction with political, economic and social reforms. It also substantiates the thesis that a strong determination on the part of political leadership can go a long way toward breaking the colonial tradition in the administration of a post-colonial state.

What made Bhutto's administrative reform effort successful, while his counterpart in Bangladesh, Sheikh Mujib, decided not to implement the recommendations of the ASRC? A comparative study of the socio-economic and political situations in the then Pakistan and Bangladesh can answer this question. The Mujib government took charge of a state that did not exist in the past. Consequently, the government had to tackle many pressing problems other than administrative reform. Contrary to this, the Bhutto government inherited a pre-established state. Compared to the political opposition

confronted by the Mujib government, opposition to Bhutto's government was much weaker. The economy of Pakistan was in much better shape than that of Bangladesh. In Pakistan the law-and-order situation was not as bad as in Bangladesh. Indiscriminate distribution of arms and ammunition among the Bengalis during the movement for liberation heavily contributed to the precarious law-and-order condition of Bangladesh in the post-independence period. These factors placed the Bhutto government in a much better position to undertake the task of administrative reforms more vigorously than the Mujib government.

In July 1977 the civilian government of Bhutto was overthrown in a bloodless coup led by Zia-ul-Haq, the Army Chief of Staff. The next year Zia set up a Civil Services Commission (CSC) under the chairmanship of S. Anwarul Haq, the Chief Justice of the Pakistan Supreme Court. The commission was asked to "recommend measures for making the public services an effective instrument for national development and for the promotion of the good and the welfare of the people".⁴ The appointment of the CSC indicated the continuation of "reform ritualism" that started barely a few days after Pakistan achieved independence from the British colonial rule.

The CSC report was submitted to the government in November 1979. Like many other administrative reform reports in the past, the CSC report remained unimplemented. It pointed out that many of the recommendations of the Meer Commission were

not implemented properly. The result was that the bureaucracy could not prove itself to be an instrument which could materialize the expectations of the society. This is evident in the preface of the CSC report, which reads:

Public services in Pakistan have been the object of persistent and mounting criticism by the public. There are complaints of inefficiency, dishonesty, discourtesy, arrogance and unhelpfulness, so much so that many a time bureaucracy is derisively referred to as afsar-shahi, daftar-shahi, or naukar-shahi, or a relic of the colonial past. All these terms are meant to denote public resentment against the apathy, the insensitivity, the lack of responsiveness and accountability of the public services to the needs and requirements of the public. --- What is needed is to make the bureaucracy perform effectively and efficiently within the bounds and norms set by, and in the manner reflective of, the popular will.⁵

India

After independence the total environment and ethos of India underwent a major qualitative change. Political parties, parliament, competitive politics, periodic elections, etc. have politicized the Indian masses. The purpose and the functions of the state have undergone a transformation from a police state to that of a positive or welfare state. In 1964 India adopted democratic socialism as a goal for the nation. The traditional social hegemony of the high caste has been replaced by the numerical strength of various castes. This change in the caste equation is a product of India's democratic framework of politics and degree of success in the process of industrialization. In short, it can be said that the social context of administration in India today is

radically different from what it had been during the colonial rule. Has the system of administration inherited by India from the British undergone any major change to adapt itself to the new realities of Indian society?

The Indian Administrative Service (IAS) was constituted after independence as the successor to the ICS, despite the reluctance of some prominent leaders.⁶ As the top cadre of the Indian administration the IAS retained most of the major features of the ICS, i.e., recruitment by open competitive examination, continuous exchange of officers between the central and state governments, security of service guaranteed by the constitution, and reservation of many key positions at the central, state and even at the district levels for members of that cadre.

Thus the administrative system developed by the British has been imitated by independent India even though the environment and requirements have changed significantly from what they had been prior to independence. Can a democratic country committed to the ideals of the positive state meet its socio-economic and political obligations by using an administrative system that was once used essentially for regulatory functions? In 1953 Paul Appleby in his report on public administration on India pointed out: "There is too much and too constant consciousness of rank, class, title and service membership, too little consciousness of membership in 'the' public service, and too little consciousness turning on

particular job responsibilities".⁷ In 1966 Morris-Jones wrote, "The well-organized bureaucracy left by the British has not yet been replaced by an equally well-ordered one more fitted to the needs of the new planning and welfare state".⁸ These comments are still applicable today.

Concern has been expressed by the political leadership of India on many occasions about the ineffectiveness of the inherited administrative system to undertake the herculean planning and development functions, and how an essentially regulatory agency could be transformed into a service-oriented one. A vivid manifestation of this concern has been the appointment of a long series of reform commissions since independence to bring the administrative system in tune with the requirements of an independent and democratic country committed to welfare ideals.⁹ Administrative reform became such a grave concern for the nation that in 1964 the Department of Administrative Reforms was created in the Ministry of Home Affairs. It would be a mistake to say that the reform reports did not have any impact on the country's administration. The setting up of an O and M organization in the central government and of an institute of public administration were the direct outcome of the Appleby report submitted in 1953. But the fact remains that "the original administrative structure had not been radically changed and whatever reforms were undertaken were all within that [the original colonial] framework".¹⁰ Bhambhri has argued:

The system of Bureaucracy as it exists in India has a continuous history of one hundred years. While these hundred years have been revolutionary from the point of view of the country's social, economic and political life, the organization of bureaucracy and the assumption on which it is based have remained unaltered -- even unquestioned. The legacy has been accepted.¹¹

The Fourth Five Year Plan of India (1969-73) criticized the generalist orientation of Indian administration and emphasized that "This has to undergo modifications in that the specialist, the technician and expert have to be enabled to make their contribution in a responsible manner at all levels of administration".¹²

The single most comprehensive effort to reorganize and reconstruct the administrative system in India has been the effort of the Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) appointed in 1966. The ARC entrusted the initial investigation of various areas to study teams and working groups. The report of the study team on promotion policies, conduct rules, discipline and morale asserted that "the real solution to the problem [specialist-generalist conflict] lies in a reorientation of the present system. The system of personnel management should really be such as will secure to the specialist, technical and professional services, an equal status with that of a generalist elite considering the value judgement of their special skill and knowledge which are admittedly not readily acquired".¹³ As many as nineteen reports covering almost every aspect of public administration in India were produced by the ARC. Some of the major

recommendations of the commission were: (a) introduce specialists into the administrative hierarchy; (b) devise a functional grouping of positions; (c) fill senior management positions in these functional areas by their own members; (d) provide for lateral entry into the prevailing closed system; (e) change the Annual Confidential Report (ACR) to a performance report; (f) rationalize pay scales by establishing nine pay scales with junior, middle and senior levels.¹⁴

The ARC was strongly against the practice of staffing the top policy-making positions by the generalist only and suggested that the generalist-bias of the senior management positions should be discarded by making provision for appointing talented people from all specialized services and from outside the civil service, i.e., from business and universities. The ARC recommendations pertaining to personnel policy were not acceptable to the IAS. The secretaries' committee, a body predominantly of IAS officers, voiced its opinion against the ARC recommendations. It stated:

It is to be recognised that the minister in charge of the department is a generalist who has to take the broad overall view keeping the national and public interests firmly in mind even while deciding cases having a high technical content. The assistance in the secretariat to the minister, who is not a professional administrator, in discharging these functions has to be rendered not by a pure specialist but by an officer who has acquired broad administrative experience and outlook.¹⁵

As a means to open the road to the administrative top to everyone in the civil service with the requisite merit, the ARC recommended an end to the elite position of the IAS. This

recommendation has been "virtually rejected by the Government".¹⁶ The recommendations of the ARC and all previous reform efforts have made no major dent in the inherited administrative system of India. The generalist monopoly of the key policy-making positions is as strong today as it was when the country achieved independence. An assimilation of the specialist and generalist in the vital policy-making positions is yet to be achieved. The system of administration in India is not yet in tune with the democratic political framework. As Robert Hardgrave has commented, "... the bureaucracy remains essentially an instrument of order rather than of democratic responsiveness".¹⁷

Importance of Bureaucratic Inheritance

Compared with Regime Type

There is a plethora of explanations in the public administration literature as to what determines the nature of public bureaucracies in the developing countries. Influenced by the relevant works of Esman and Painsod, Heady has argued that the type of regime could be profitably used to make a comparative analysis of the public bureaucracies of developing countries. While Heady's scheme is interesting and perceptive, it is of limited utility for an adequate understanding of the administration of new countries that had been under colonial rule for many decades. In such countries the administrative system rarely undergoes a process of

metamorphosis with a change in the regime type, i.e., when a competitive political system is replaced by a strongman military system and vice versa.

What is most crucial for a proper understanding of the bureaucracies in the newly independent countries is the bureaucratic tradition established by the colonial powers. India suffered a longer period of colonial domination than many other British colonies. Consequently, the British bureaucratic tradition became well-entrenched and thorough in India. The administrative practices developed by the British in India were later transplanted to their African colonies. But the length of colonial period in Africa being shorter than in India, the transplantation could not be very thorough. It thus appears that the length of colonial rule in India played a prime function in shaping the administrative system of India. The successor states of the British Indian empire displayed the fundamental features of that administrative system under different regime types. The period of colonial rule in some Caribbean countries was longer than in India. It is now widely recognized that the British colonial rule in those Caribbean countries extending over a period of over 300 years has left deep impressions on their administrative institutions.¹⁸

In many newly independent countries a change in the regime type often does not produce any change in the inherited administrative system. Variations in the regime type may

take place over time without a corresponding change in the administrative sector. The same administrative system that once served the colonial interests is being used to try to attain the new goals of an independent country. While some modifications in the details of the administrative system can be observed, the predominant features of the old colonial administration are retained by the bureaucracy by effectively defying the zeal of political leaders in many new countries to make far-reaching changes in the administrative structure, personnel practices and work procedures. The reform efforts of successive regimes are successfully defeated by the chief beneficiaries of an inherited bureaucracy.

Our concluding finding, then, is that for developing countries that have a long history of colonial rule, historical bureaucratic tradition is the most crucial determinant of the administrative system. Administrative traditions established over a long period of time cannot be broken by anything short of a profound change in the socio-economic and political structures of the society. Pakistan had partially experienced such a change when Bhutto came to power and his regime achieved partial success in discarding the colonial administrative tradition. However, our finding needs to be tested by further comparative study of countries with a history of colonial rule.

Since a thorough over-hauling of the colonial administrative system is difficult to accomplish, a strategy of incremental change is likely to produce some good results.

Endnotes

1. The concept of "administrative state" has been defined by V. Seymour Wilson and O.P. Dwivedi as "---a system of governance through which public policies and programs, affecting almost all aspects of public life, are influenced by the decisions of public officials". See, V. Seymour Wilson and O.P. Dwivedi, "Introduction", in O.P. Dwivedi, ed., The Administrative State in Canada (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1983), p. 5. Some other prominent works on this concept are: Dwight Waldo, The Administrative State: A Study of the Political Theory of American Public Administration (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1948); Fritz Morstein Marx, The Administrative State: An Introduction to Bureaucracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957); O.P. Dwivedi and R.B. Jain, India's Administrative State (New Delhi: Gitanjali Publishing House, 1985).
2. Quoted in Robert LaPorte, Jr., "The Civil Bureaucracy - Twenty Five Years of Power and Influence", Asian Survey 14, No. 12 (December 1974), p. 1099.
3. Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto, 1971-1977 (London: The Macmillan Press, 1980), p. 101.
4. Quoted in Robert LaPorte, Jr., "Administrative Reform and the Evolution of the Administrative System of Pakistan", in Krishna K. Tummala, ed., Administrative Systems Abroad (Lanham, MD.: University Press of America, 1982), p. 143.
5. Quoted in ibid., p. 127.
6. Although Jawaharlal Nehru was strongly against the reproduction of an ICS-type administrative cadre, it was because of the insistence by Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, the then Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Home Affairs, that the IAS was created as the core of India's public service.
7. Paul H. Appleby, Public Administration in India: Report of a Survey (New Delhi: Government of India, Cabinet Secretariat, 1953), p. 1.
8. W.H. Morris-Jones, The Government and Politics of India (London: Hutchinson, 1966), pp. 127-28.
9. For an analysis of the reports of committees and commissions appointed between 1947 and 1967, see Shriram Maheshwari, The Evolution of Indian Administration (Agra: Lakshmi Narain Agarwal, 1970). In this book the author has not covered the report of the Administrative Reforms

Commission (ARC) appointed in 1966 which alone is the subject matter of a separate book by the same author. See below.

10. Krishan K. Tummala, "Higher Civil Service in India", in Krishna K. Tummala, ed., op. cit., p. 101.
11. C.P. Bhambhri, Bureaucracy and Politics in India (Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1971), p. 57.
12. Government of India, Planning Commission, Fourth Five Year Plan, 1969-74 (New Delhi: Government of India Press, 1969), p. 111.
13. Government of India, Administrative Reforms Commission, Report of the Study Team on Promotion Policies, Conduct Rules, Discipline and Morale, Vols. I and II (New Delhi: Government of India Press, 1968), p. 26.
14. For a detailed analysis of the ARC reports, see Shriram Maheshwari, The Administrative Reforms (Agra: Lakshmi Narain Agarwal, 1972).
15. Quoted in ibid., p. 12.
16. S.R. Maheshwari, "Strengthening Administrative Capabilities in India", Public Administration and Development 4, No. 1 (January-March 1984), p. 55.
17. Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., India: Government and Politics in a Developing Nation, second edition (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975), p. 69.
18. G.E. Mills, "The Environment of Commonwealth Caribbean Bureaucracies", International Review of Administrative Sciences 39, No. 1 (1973), pp. 14-24.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

- Abedin, Najmul. Local Administration and Politics in Modernising Societies: Bangladesh and Pakistan (Dacca: National Institute of Public Administration, 1973).
- Ahmad, Abul Mansur. Amar Dekha Rajnitir Panchas Bachar (Dacca: Nauraj, 1968).
- Ahmad, Muneer. The Civil Servants in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1964).
- Ahmad, Mushtaq. Government and Politics in Pakistan (Karachi: Space Publishers, 1970).
- Ahmed, Ali. Role of Higher Civil Servants in Pakistan (Dacca: National Institute of Public Administration, 1968).
- Albrow, Martin. Bureaucracy (London: Pall Mall Press, 1970).
- Ali, A.M.M. Shawkat. Field Administration and Rural Development in Bangladesh (Dacca: Centre for Social Studies, Dacca University, 1982).
- Ali, Shaikh Maqsood, M. Safiur Rahman, and Kshanda Mohan Das. Decentralization and People's Participation in Bangladesh (Dhaka: National Institute of Public Administration, 1983).
- Ali, Tariq. Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970).
- Appleby, Paul H. Public Administration in India: Report of a Survey (New Delhi: Government of India, Cabinet Secretariat, 1953).
- Arora, Ramesh K. Comparative Public Administration: An Ecological Perspective (New Delhi: Associated Publishing House, 1972).
- Berger, Morroe. Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).
- Bhambhri, C.P. Bureaucracy and Politics in India (Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1971).
- Bhuiyan, Md. Abdul Wadud. Emergence of Bangladesh and Role of Awami League (New Delhi: Vikas Publication, 1982).

- Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali. The Great Tragedy (Karachi: Pakistan People's Party, 1971).
- Birkhead, Guthrie S. ed., Administrative Problems in Pakistan (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1966).
- Blau, Peter M. The Dynamics of Bureaucracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955).
- _____. Bureaucracy in Modern Society (New York: Random House, 1956).
- Blomstrom, Magnus and Bjorn Hettne. Development Theory in Transition (London: Zed Books, 1984).
- Blunt, Edward. The I.C.S.: The Indian Civil Service (London: Faber and Faber, 1937).
- Braibanti, Ralph. ed., Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1966).
- _____. Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1966).
- Burki, Shahid Javed. Pakistan Under Bhutto, 1971-1977 (London: The Macmillan Press, 1980).
- Caiden, Gerald E. Administrative Reform (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1969).
- _____. and Heinrich Siedentopf, eds., Strategies for Administrative Reform (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1982).
- Callard, Keith. Pakistan: A Political Study (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1957).
- Chaudhuri, Muzaffar Ahmed. The Civil Service in Pakistan (Dacca: National Institute of Public Administration, 1969), second edition.
- Choudhury, G.W. The Last Days of United Pakistan (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974).
- Cohen, Stephen P. The Pakistan Army (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).
- Cole, R. Taylor. The Canadian Bureaucracy (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1949).
- Collins, Larry and Dominique LaPierre. Freedom at Midnight (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1975).

- Crozier, Michel. The Bureaucratic Phenomenon (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964).
- Day, U.N. Administrative System of Dehli Sultanat, (1206-1413 A.D.) (Allahabad, India: Kitab Mahal Publishers, 1959).
- Dodwell, H.H. ed., The Cambridge History of India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1929).
- _____. ed., The Cambridge Shorter History of India (New York: Macmillan and Co., 1934).
- _____. Dupleix and Clive: The Beginning of Empire (London: Archon Books, 1968).
- Dwivedi, O.P. ed., The Administrative State in Canada (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1983).
- _____. and R.B. Jain. India's Administrative State (New Delhi: Gitanjali Publishing House, 1985).
- Finkle, Jason L. and Richard W. Gable. eds., Political Development and Social Change (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966).
- Franda, Marcus. Bangladesh: The First Decade (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1982).
- Friedrich, Carl J. Man and His Government (New York: McGraw Hill, 1963).
- Garcia-Zamor, Jean-Claude, ed., Public Participation in Development Planning and Management: Cases from Africa and Asia (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985).
- Gaus, John M. Reflections on Public Administration (Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1947).
- _____. Leonard D. White, and Marshall E. Dimock. The Frontiers of Public Administration (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936).
- Ghosal, Aksboy Kumar. Civil Service in India Under the East India Company (Calcutta: Calcutta University Press, 1944).
- Goodnow, Henry F. The Civil Service of Pakistan: Bureaucracy in a New Nation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964).
- Gouldner, Alvin W. Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1954).
- Griffiths, Percival. The British Impact on India (London: Macdonald, 1952).

- Gustafson, W. Eric, ed., Pakistan and Bangladesh: Bibliographic Essays in Social Science (Islamabad: University of Islamabad, 1976).
- Hardgrave, Robert L. India: Government and Politics in a Developing Nation (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975).
- Heady, Ferrel. Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective (New York: Marcel Dekker, second edition, 1979).
- _____ and Sybil Stokes. eds., Papers in Comparative Administration (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1957).
- Holtzman, James. The Nabobs in England: A Study of the Returned Anglo-Indians, 1760-85 (New York: n.p., 1926).
- Hope, K.R. The Dynamics of Development and Development Administration (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1984).
- Hoque, Abunasar Shamsul. Administrative Reforms in Pakistan (Dacca: National Institute of Public Administration, 1970).
- Hunter, William Wilson. The Indian Musalmans (London: 1871).
- Huntington, Samuel P. Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968).
- Hye, Hasnat Abdul. ed., Decentralisation, Local Government Institutions and Resource Mobilisation (Comilla, Bangladesh: Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development, 1985).
- Inayatullah. ed., Bureaucracy and Development in Pakistan (Peshawar: Pakistan Academy for Rural Development, 1962).
- Islam, Nurul. Development Planning in Bangladesh: A Study in Political Economy (London: C. Hurst and Co., 1977).
- Jahan, Rounaq. Pakistan: Failure in National Integration (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972).
- _____. ed., Bangladesh Politics: Problems and Issues (Dacca: University Press, 1980).
- Januzzi, F.T. and J.T. Peach. Report on the Hierarchy of Interest in Land in Bangladesh (Washington, D.C.: Agency for International Development, 1977).

- Kamal, K.L. Pakistan: The Garrison State (New Delhi: Intellectual Publishing House, 1982).
- Khaliquzzaman, Choudhury. Pathway to Pakistan (Lahore: Longmans, 1961).
- Khan, Aatur Rahman. Ojaratir Dui Bachar (Dacca: Avijan Printing House, 1964).
- Khan, Mohammad Ayub. Speeches and Statements of Mohammad Ayub Khan, Vol. 3, (Karachi: Pakistan Publications, 1962).
- _____. Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967).
- Khan, Mohammad Mohabbat. Bureaucratic Self-Preservation: Failure of Major Administrative Reform Efforts in the Civil Service of Pakistan (Dacca: University of Dacca, 1980).
- LaPalombara, Joseph. ed., Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963).
- Lee, Hahn-Been and Abelardo G. Samonte. eds., Administrative Reforms in Asia (Manila: Eastern Regional Organization for Public Administration, 1970).
- Leemans, Arne F. ed., The Management of Change in the Government (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976).
- Lifschultz, Lawrence. Bangladesh: The Unfinished Revolution (London: Zed Press, 1979).
- Lowell, Abbott Lawrence. ed., Colonial Civil Service (New York: Macmillan and Co., 1900).
- Maheshwari, Shriram. The Evolution of Indian Administration (Agra: Lakshmi Narain Agarwal, 1970).
- _____. The Administrative Reforms (Agra: Lakshmi Narain Agarwal, 1972).
- Majumdar, R.C., H.C. Raychaudhuri, and Kalikinkar Datta. An Advanced History of India (London: Macmillan and Co., 1963).
- Malik, Amita. The Year of the Vulture (New Delhi: Orient Longmans, 1972).
- Maniruzzaman, Talukder. Radical Politics and the Emergence of Bangladesh (Dacca: Bangladesh Books International, 1975).

- _____. The Bangladesh Revolution and its Aftermath (Dacca: Bangladesh Books International, 1980).
- Marx, Fritz Morstein. The Administrative State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957).
- Mascarenhas, Anthony. The Rape of Bangladesh (New Delhi: Vikas Publication, 1971).
- _____. Bangladesh: A Legacy of Blood (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1986).
- Misra, B.B. The Central Administration of the East India Company (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1959).
- _____. The Administrative History of India, 1834-1947 (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1970).
- Montgomery, J.D. and W.J. Siffin. eds., Approaches to Development (New York: McGraw Hill, 1966).
- Moreland, W.H. India at the Death of Akbar (London: 1920).
- Morris-Jones, W.H. The Government and Politics of India (London: Hutchinson, 1966).
- Muir, Ramsay. The Making of British India, 1765-1858 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1915).
- Nazim. Babus, Brahmans and Bureaucrats (Lahore: People's Publishing House, 1973).
- Nehru, Jawaharlal. An Autobiography (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1962).
- O'Malley, L.S.S. The Indian Civil Service, 1601-1930 (London: Frank Cass and Co., 1965).
- Prasad, Ishwari. The Mughal Empire (Allahabad, India: Crugh Publications, 1974).
- Puri, B.N. History of Indian Administration, Vol. 2, Medieval Period (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1975).
- Qureshi, Ishtiaq Hussain. The Administration of the Sultanate of Delhi (Lahore: Ashraf, 1944).
- _____. The Struggle for Pakistan (Karachi: University of Karachi, 1965).
- _____. The Administration of the Mughul Empire (Patna, India: Janaki Prakashan, 1979).

Rahman, A.T.R. Basic Democracies at the Grass Roots (Comilla: Pakistan Academy for Rural Development, 1962).

_____. An Evaluation of the Rural Works Programme, East Pakistan, 1963-64 (Comilla: Pakistan Academy for Rural Development, 1964).

Rahman, Sheikh Mujibur. Chaya Dafa Karmasuchi: Amader Bachar Dabi (Dacca: East Pakistan Awami League, 1966).

Reynolds, Reginald. White Sahibs in India (London: The Socialist Book, 1946).

Ridley, F.F. Specialist and Generalist (London: Allen and Unwin, 1968).

Riggs, Fred W. The Ecology of Public Administration (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1961).

_____. Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964).

_____. ed., Frontiers of Development Administration (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1970).

_____. Prismatic Society Revisited (Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1973).

Rizvi, Hasan Askari. The Military and Politics in Pakistan, rev. ed. (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1976).

Robson, William A. ed., The British Civil Servant (London: Allen and Unwin, 1937).

Roy, Naresh Chandra. The Civil Service in India (Firma K. L. Mukhopodhyay, 1958).

Sarkar, Jadunath. Mughal Administration (Calcutta: 1935).

Sayeed, Khalid B. The Political System of Pakistan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967).

Selznick, Philip. TVA and the Grassroots (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949).

Siffin, W.J. ed., Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1957).

Singh, Gurmukh Nihal. Landmarks in Indian Constitution and National Development, Vol. 1, 1600-1919 (Delhi: 1952).

Sobhan, Rehman. Basic Democracies, Works Programme and Rural Development in East Pakistan (Dacca: Oxford University Press, 1968).

_____ and Muzaffer Ahmad. Public Enterprises in an Intermediate Regime: A Study in the Political Economy of Bangladesh (Dacca: Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies, 1980).

Subramaniam, V. Transplanted Indo-British Administration (New Delhi: Ashish Publishing House, 1977).

Symonds, Richard. The Making of Pakistan (London: Faber and Faber, 1950).

Tinker, Hugh. The Foundations of Local Self-Government in India, Pakistan and Burma (London: The Athlone Press, 1954).

Tummala, Krishna K. ed., Administrative Systems Abroad (Lanham, MD.: University Press of America, 1982).

Umar, Badruddin. Sanskritik Sampradayikata (Dacca: Granthana, 1969).

_____. Purba Banglar Bhasha Andolan O Tatkalin Rajniti (Calcutta: Anandadhara Prakashan, 1971).

Van Loon, Richard J. and Michael S. Whittington. The Canadian Political System (Toronto: McGraw Hill Ryerson, third edition, 1981).

Vittachi, Tarzie. The Brown Sahib (London: Andre Deutsch, 1962).

Waldo, Dwight. The Administrative State: A Study of the Political Theory of American Public Administration (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1948).

Weber, Max. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, translated and edited by Hans Gerth and C.W. Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946).

_____. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, edited with an introduction by Talcott Parsons (New York: The Free Press, 1947).

_____. The Methodology of Social Sciences, translated and edited by Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1949).

Weidner, Edward W. ed., Development Administration in Asia (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1970).

- Wheeler, Richard S. The Politics of Pakistan: A Constitutional Quest (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970).
- Woodruff, Philip. The Men Who Ruled India, 2 Vols. (London: Jonathan Cape, 1953 and 1954).
- Ziring, Lawrence. The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan, 1958-69 (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1971).

Journal Articles

- Ahamed, Emajuddin. "Bureaucratic Elites in Bangladesh and Their Development Orientation", Dacca University Studies 28 (Part A), 1978, pp. 52-67.
- _____. "Dominant Bureaucratic Elites in Bangladesh", Indian Political Science Review 13, No. 1 (January 1979), pp. 30-48.
- Alavi, Hamza. "The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh", New Left Review, No. 74 (July-August 1972), pp. 55-81.
- Bertocci, Peter J. "Bangladesh in 1984: A Year of Protracted Turmoil", Asian Survey 25, No. 2 (February 1985), pp. 155-68.
- _____. "Bangladesh in 1985: Resolute Against the Storms", Asian Survey 26, No. 2 (February 1986), pp. 224-34.
- Braibanti, Ralph. "The Civil Service of Pakistan: A Theoretical Analysis", South Atlantic Quarterly 58, No. 2 (Spring 1959), pp. 258-304.
- Burgess, Geoffrey. "The Civil Service in Pakistan", The Listener 58, No. 1486 (September 1957), pp. 319-21.
- Burki, Shahid Javed. "Twenty Years of the Civil Service of Pakistan: A Reevaluation", Asian Survey 9, No. 4 (April 1969), pp. 239-54.
- Chapman, Richard A. "Prismatic Theory in Public Administration: A Review of the Theories of Fred W. Riggs", Public Administration (London) 44, (Winter 1966), pp. 415-33.
- Chashi, M.A. "Self-Reliant Rural Bangladesh - Problems and Prospects: A Case Study of Swanirvar Movement", Political Economy 2, No. 1 (June 1977), pp. 172-79.

- Dahl, Robert A. "The Science of Public Administration: Three Problems", Public Administration Review 7, No. 1 (Winter 1947), pp. 1-11.
- Dimock, Marshall E. "Bureaucracy Self-Examined", Public Administration Review 4, No. 3 (Summer 1944), pp. 197-207.
- Dwivedi, O.P., and J. Nef. "Crises and Continuities in Development Theory and Administration: First and Third World Perspectives", Public Administration and Development, No. 1 (January-March 1982), pp. 59-77.
- Fesler, James W. "Editorial Comment: Specialist and Generalist", Public Administration Review 18, No. 4 (Autumn 1958), p. 370.
- Gorvine, Albert. "The Civil Service Under the Revolutionary Government in Pakistan", Middle East Journal 19, (Summer 1965), pp. 321-36.
- Hall, Richard H. "Intraorganizational Structural Variation: Application of the Bureaucratic Model", Administrative Science Quarterly 7, No. 3 (1962), pp. 295-308.
- Hamid, Agha Abdul. "Administration in Pakistan: The Civil Service", NIPA Reporter 6, (June 1965), pp. 99-108.
- Heper, Martin, Chong Lim Kim, and Seong-Tong Pai. "The Role of Bureaucracy and Regime Types: A Comparative Study of Turkish and South Korean Higher Civil Servants", Administration and Society 12, No. 2 (August 1980), pp. 137-57.
- Honadle, George. "Development Administration in the Eighties: New Agendas or Old Perspectives?", Public Administration Review 42, No. 2 (March-April 1982), pp. 174-79.
- Huntington, Samuel P. "Political Development and Political Decay", World Politics 17, (April 1965), pp. 386-430.
- Huque, Ahmed Shafiqul. "Politics, Parliament and Local Government Reform: The Case of Bangladesh", Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 23, No. 3 (November 1985), pp. 212-25.
- _____. "The Illusion of Decentralization: Local Administration in Bangladesh", International Review of Administrative Sciences 52, No. 1 (March 1986), pp. 79-95.
- Islam, Syed Serajul. "The Role of the State in the Economic Development of Bangladesh During the Mujib Regime (1972-1975)", Journal of Developing Areas 19, No. 2 (January 1985), pp. 185-208.

Jackson, Robert H. "An Analysis of Comparative Public Administration Movement", Canadian Public Administration 9, No. 1 (March 1966), pp. 108-29.

Jahan, Rounaq. "Bangabandhu and After: Conflict and Change in Bangladesh", Round Table 66, No. 261 (January 1976), pp. 73-84.

Khan, Mohammad Mohabbat. "Reform for Decentralized Development: Bangladesh's Experiment with Major Administrative Reforms/Reorganization in the '80s", Politics, Administration and Change 9, Nos. 1-2 (January-December 1984), pp. 147-67.

_____ and Habib Mohammad Zafarullah. "The 1979 Parliamentary Elections in Bangladesh", Asian Survey 19, No. 10 (October 1979), pp. 1023-36.

_____. "Rural Development in Bangladesh: Policies, Plans and Programmes", Indian Journal of Public Administration 26, No. 3 (July-September 1980), pp. 779-84.

Khan, Zillur R. "Leadership, Parties and Politics in Bangladesh", Western Political Quarterly 29, No. 1 (March 1976), pp. 102-25.

LaPorte, Robert. "Civil Bureaucracy - Twenty Five Years of Power and Influence", Asian Survey 14, No. 12 (December 1974), pp. 1094-1103.

Latifee, H.I. "Swanirvar Bangladesh: Problems and Prospects", Political Economy 2, No. 1 (June 1977), pp. 249-55.

Leys, Colin. "The 'Overdeveloped' Post Colonial State: A Re-evaluation", Review of African Political Economy 5, 1976, pp. 39-48.

Lowi, D.A. "Lion Rampant", Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies 2, (1963-64), pp. 235-52.

Luke, David Fashole. "Trends in Development Administration: The Continuing Challenge to the Efficacy of the Post-Colonial State in the Third World", Public Administration and Development 6, No. 1 (January-March 1986), pp. 73-85.

Maheshwari, S.R. "Strengthening Administrative Capabilities in India", Public Administration and Development 4, No. 1 (January-March 1984), pp. 49-62.

Mamuruzzaman, Talukder. "Bangladesh in 1974: Economic Crisis and Political Polarization", Asian Survey 15, No. 2 (February 1975), pp. 117-28.

_____. "Bangladesh: An Unfinished Revolution?", Journal of Asian Studies 34, No. 4 (August 1975), pp. 891-911.

_____. "Administrative Reforms and Politics Within the Bureaucracy in Bangladesh", Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 17, No. 1 (March 1979), pp. 47-59.

Martin, Roscoe. "Technical Assistance: The Problem of Implementation", Public Administration Review 12, No. 4 (Autumn 1952), pp. 258-66.

Mashiuzzaman, M. "Aspects of Generalist Tradition", NIPA Reporter 6, (June 1965), pp. 109-31.

Merton, Robert K. "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality", Social Forces 18, (1940), pp. 560-68.

Mills, G.E. "The Environment of Commonwealth Caribbean Bureaucracies", International Review of Administrative Sciences 39, No. 1 (1979), pp. 14-24.

Milne, R.S. "Formalism Reconsidered", Philippine Journal of Public Administration 14, No. 1 (January 1970), pp. 21-30.

Misra, B.B. "Efforts for Administrative Reforms Before Independence", Indian Journal of Public Administration 9, No. 3 (July-September 1963), pp. 311-35.

Monroe, Michael. "Prismatic Behaviour in the United States", Journal of Comparative Administration 2, No. 2 (August 1970), pp. 229-42.

Presthus, Robert V. "Behaviour and Bureaucracy in Many Cultures", Public Administration Review 19, (1959), pp. 23-35.

_____. "Decline of the Generalist Myth", Public Administration Review 24, No. 4 (December 1964), pp. 211-16.

Rahman, A.T.R. "Administration and its Political Environment in Bangladesh", Pacific Affairs 47, No. 2 (Summer 1974), pp. 171-91.

Rahman, Md. Ataur. "Bangladesh in 1982: Beginnings of the Second Decade", Asian Survey 23, No. 2 (February 1983), pp. 149-57.

_____. "Bangladesh in 1983: A Turning Point for the Military", Asian Survey 24, No. 2 (February 1984), pp. 240-49.

Rashiduzzaman, M. "The Awami League in the Political Development of Pakistan", Asian Survey 10, No. 7 (July 1970), pp. 574-87.

_____. "Bangladesh in 1977: Dilemmas of the Military Rulers", Asian Survey 18, No. 2 (February 1978), pp. 126-34.

_____. "Bangladesh in 1978: Search for a Political Party", Asian Survey 19, No. 2 (February 1979), pp. 191-97.

Riggs, Fred W. "Trends in the Comparative Study of Public Administration", International Review of Administrative Sciences 27, (1962), pp. 9-15.

_____. "Introduction: Shifting Meanings of the Term 'Bureaucracy'", International Social Science Journal 31, No. 4 (1979), pp. 563-84.

Rondinelli, Dennis A. "The Dilemma of Development Administration: Complexity and Uncertainty in Control-Oriented Bureaucracies", World Politics 35, No. 1 (October 1982), pp. 43-72.

Saul, John. "The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Tanzania", Socialist Register, 1974, pp. 349-72.

Sayeed, Khalid B. "The Political Role of Pakistan's Civil Servants", Pacific Affairs 31, No. 2 (June 1958), pp. 131-46.

Schaffer, Bernard. "Administrative Legacies and Links in the Post-Colonial State: Preparation, Training, and Administrative Reform", Development and Change 9, No. 2 (April 1978), pp. 174-200.

Selznick, Philip. "An Approach to a Theory of Bureaucracy", American Sociological Review 8, (1943), pp. 47-54.

_____. "Foundations of a Theory of Organization", American Sociological Review 13, (1948), pp. 25-35.

Shahidullah, A.K.M. "Upazilla Administration: A Milestone in Administrative Decentralization in Bangladesh", Administrative Science Review 12, No. 3 (December 1982), pp. 80-90.

Spengler, J.J. "Generalist versus Specialist in Social Science: An Economist's View", American Political Science Review 44, (June 1950), pp. 358-79.

Udy Jr., Stanley. "Bureaucracy and Rationality in Weber's Organisation Theory: An Empirical Study", American Sociological Review 24, (1959), pp. 791-95.

Theses, Conference Papers, Mimeo and Occasional Papers

Abueva, Jose V. "Administrative Doctrines Diffused in Developing States: The Filipino Response", paper presented for the International Conference on Theoretical Problems of Administrative Reform in Developing States, Lake Como, July 16-22, 1967.

Hossain, Mahbub, Raisul Awal Mahmood and Qazi Khaliquzzaman Ahmad. "Participatory Development Efforts in Rural Bangladesh: A Case Study of Experiences in Three Thanas (mimeo), (Dacca: Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies, 1980).

Huque, Ahmed Shafiqul. The Problem of Local Government Reform in Rural Bangladesh: The Failure of Swanirvar Gram Sarker (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of Political Science, University of British Columbia, 1984).

Khan, Mohammad Mohabbat. "Implementation of Decentralization Policy and the Role of Public Bureaucracy in Bangladesh", paper presented in an international conference on Managing Development at the Periphery: Issues in Programme Effectiveness and Efficiency in the Third World, held in Ottawa, Canada, September 25-27, 1986.

Tepper, Elliot L. Changing Patterns of Administration in Rural East Pakistan (East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University, 1966), Asian Studies Centre Occasional Paper No. 5.

_____. Rural Development and Administration in East Pakistan (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of Political Science, Duke University, 1970).

Official Publications

Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh. The Bangladesh Gazette, Extraordinary (Dacca):

_____, Ministry of Cabinet Affairs. Organisation of the Bangladesh Planning Commission (Dacca: 1972).

_____, Planning Commission. "Policy Options and Recommendations for the Nationalisation of Industries", mimeographed, (Dacca: 1972).

_____, Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs. The Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh (Dacca: Bangladesh Government Press, 1972).

_____, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Bangladesh Document 1 (January '72-June '73).

_____, Planning Commission. The First Five Year Plan: 1973-78 (Dacca: Bangladesh Government Press, 1973).

_____, Report of the National Pay Commission, Vol. 1, Main Text (Dacca: May 1973).

_____, Planning Commission. Annual Plan 1973-74 (Dacca: Bangladesh Government Press, 1973).

_____, Report of the Administrative and Services Reorganisation Committee, Part I, The Services (Dacca: April 1973); Part II, The Administration (Dacca: October 1973); and Part IV, The Evidence (Dacca: January 1975).

_____, The Local Government Ordinance, 1976 (Dacca: Bangladesh Government Press, 1976).

_____, Cabinet Division. Report of the Pay and Services Commission (Dacca: 1977).

_____, Ministry of Finance. Introduction of New National Grades and Scales of Pay, Grades I-XXI, Government Sector (Dacca: Bangladesh Government Press, December 1977).

_____, Report of the Martial Law Committee for Examining Organizational Set-up of Ministries/Divisions, Departments, Directorates and Other Organizations under Them (Dacca: May 1982).

_____, Report of the Committee for Administrative Reorganization/Reform (Dacca: June 1982).

_____, The Local Government (Upazila Parishad and Upazila Administration Reorganization) (Third Amendment) Ordinance, 1983 (Dhaka: 1983).

_____, Ministry of Finance. Guidelines for Utilisation by the Upazila Parishad of the Development Assistance Provided by the National Government Through ADP (Dhaka: July 1983).

_____, Bureau of Statistical Research. 1983-84 Statistical Yearbook of Bangladesh (Dhaka: 1984).

Government of India, Administrative Reforms Commission. Report of the Study Team on Promotion Policies, Conduct Rules, Discipline and Morale, Vols. I and II (New Delhi: Government of India Press, 1968).

_____, Planning Commission. Fourth Five Year Plan, 1969-74 (New Delhi: Government of India Press, 1969).

Government of Pakistan, Establishment Division. Careers in the Pakistan Central Superior Services (Karachi: 1954).

_____, Constituent Assembly (Legislature). Debates (Karachi: Government of Pakistan Press).

_____, Planning Board. The First Five Year, 1955-1960 (Karachi: Government of Pakistan Press, 1956).

_____, Ministry of Law. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (Karachi: Government of Pakistan Press, 1956).

_____, Ministry of Law. The Basic Democracies Order (Karachi: Government of Pakistan Press, 1959).

_____, Report of the Constitution Commission, 1961 (Karachi: Government of Pakistan Press, 1962).

_____, Ministry of Law. The Constitution of the Republic of Pakistan (Karachi: Government of Pakistan Press, 1962).

_____, Report of Pay and Services Commission, 1959-1962 (Karachi: Government of Pakistan Press, 1962).

_____, White Paper on the Crisis of East Pakistan (Islamabad, 1971).

United Nations Technical Assistance Programme. Handbook of Public Administration: Current Concepts and Practice with Special Reference to Developing Countries (New York: 1961).

Miscellaneous

Banglar Bani (Dacca).

Bichitra (Dacca).

The Holiday (Dacca).

Ittefaq (Dacca).

Keesing's Contemporary Archives.

Pakistan Observer (Dacca).

END

20|06|88

FIN