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Mass Communication and Political
Development in Chile
1973-1978

by

Dean A. Ennes

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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies and Research in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

in International Affairs

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The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs

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ABSTRACT

In January 1978 the Pinochet government in Chile received overwhelming support in a quasi-plebiscite, the consulta nacional. In March of that year a Gallup poll found equally overwhelming support for the junta among respondents in Santiago. The present work is an attempt to come to terms with an apparent paradox: mass domestic support for a repressive and internationally scorned regime. A communications approach was selected to try and understand the reasons for such widespread popular support. The structure and function of mass communication and the symbolic climate created by the mass media in Chile are examined. The resultant picture of mass communication in Chile reveals an environment wholly conducive to the development of pro-junta sentiment among the Chilean people.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

On January 4, 1978 the military government of Chile submitted itself to a test of its popular support in the form of a plebiscite, a so-called "consulta nacional". The junta, led by President Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, offered the following proposition to the voters for a Si or No judgement:

Before the international aggression unleashed against the Government of our country, I back President Pinochet in his defence of the dignity of Chile; and I reaffirm the legitimacy of the Government of the Republic to sovereignly lead the process of institutionalization of the country.

The public had not gone to the polls for any reason since the generals seized power in 1973, and over five and one-half million Chileans cast ballots in the consulta, the greatest number recorded in any election in that country's history. The proposition was supported by 75.3% of the voters; 20.3% cast No ballots; and 4.31% of the ballots were returned spoiled or blank.¹ Pinochet claimed he had received a mandate from the people. The junta will have governed Chile for six uninterrupted years in September 1979.

Outside of Chile the plebiscite was almost universally denounced, and the validity of the result doubted:

¹The Answer of Chile (publication distributed by the Embassy of Chile, Ottawa, 1978), pp. 22-23; see also "Referendum on Military Rule was Rigged, U.S. Says," The Gazette (Montreal), January 6, 1978, p. 6.

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It was a classical dictatorial ploy: the call for a plebiscite on a phony chauvinistic question, and the use of the predictably lopsided 'result' to justify more repression.²

The result of the consulta as an indicator of popular support for the Pinochet regime was lent credence by a Gallup poll conducted in the metropolitan Santiago area in March 1978. Gallup found that 75.3% of the respondents supported the military government and that 80.6% supported Pinochet personally.³

The case of Chile after 1973 offers many problematic phenomena which could become objects of investigation in the field of developmental studies. The military takeover itself confounded many observers at that time.⁴ Chile had enjoyed a period of rule by elected government that spanned some forty years. For some it was considered one of the most "democratic" of countries.⁵

Chileans had prided themselves in a democratic system which traditionally had been able to absorb a marked political pluralism without causing political instability. An example of this pluralism

²"Chile's Referendum Farce," The Nation 226 (January 7-14, 1978): 2.

³"Curbs Eased in Chile as Polls Favor Regime," The Globe and Mail (Toronto), March 10, 1978, p. 10. Regarding the validity of a Gallup poll, Professor Jack Z. Sissors, Medill School of Journalism, Northwestern University, wrote: "Today, I would accept any of its research as reliable and valid, providing that I could see supplementary information about the sample size, selection methods, survey questions used, and all other necessary controls to do an accurate piece of research." Jack Z. Sissors to Dean Ennes, May 16, 1979. Letters to Gallup Chile for supplementary information have gone unanswered.

⁴For example, see Ernest Duff and John F. McCamant, Violence and Repression in Latin America (New York: The Free Press, 1976), p. 293.

⁵See Weston H. Agor, The Chilean Senate (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1971), p. 5.

was the election of a Marxist, Salvador Allende Gossens, to the Presidency in 1970.

Although military intervention is a part of Chilean history, the forty-year period of non-intervention made a coup seem unlikely. In many respects the golpe of 1973 was unique.

Soon after the military takeover, and ever since, there were persistent expectations and predictions of the imminent return to civilian rule.⁶ It seemed inconceivable to many observers that the military would actually become the government. The Chilean military tradition since the Civil War of 1891 was that of only temporary rule between civilian governments.

The return to civilian rule has not materialized, however. On the contrary, the junta appears entrenched. Political parties were placed in permanent recess. A new constitution was proposed which contained provision for the military to be a permanent part of the political machinery, and the generals did not intend to abandon their direct governance of Chile for years.

The paradox of popular support of military rule in Chile offers another problem for research. Accounts of the Pinochet regime's rule to date cite harsh repression, including mass arrests, exiles, murders, torture, and desaparecidos (people who "disappear");

⁶ A careful reading of Latin America/Latin America Political Report, 1973-1978, in its reporting of Chile gives many such examples. LAPR consistently reported schisms within the junta, the revival of democratic forces, and the imminent return to civilian rule. Kaufman speculated that the military would withdraw in three to five years. Robert R. Kaufman, "Transitions to Stable Authoritarian-Corporate Regimes: The Chilean Case?" (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, Inc., 1976), p. 61.

the abolition of political parties; the dismantling of traditional labor organization; persistent states of seige and of emergency; strict control of the mass media; and military presence in the universities.

The economic policies of the junta, decidedly capitalist in tenor, focussed on controlling inflation, stimulating exports, and attracting foreign investment. Wages were tightly controlled. Unemployment soared to 19.8% in Santiago in 1976 from 7.0% just after the golpe.⁷

Various commentators have evaluated the Pinochet regime's performance, prospects, and even bases of popular support. None of these assessments, however, anticipated the level of support indicated by the results of the consulta and 1978 Gallup poll.

Cuadra wrote in 1974: "The dictatorship is holding the people at gun-point."⁸ He compared Chile under the junta to Germany under Hitler. Cuadra contended that support and non-support fell along strict class lines:

The junta can now rely only on the oligarchic top crest. Small and medium businessmen have every reason to be dissatisfied with the junta. For thousands of them, its 'free competition' policy in a situation in which the economy is tightly controlled by the monopolies, has meant ruin.⁹

Cuadra considered the working class of Chile the bulwark of the opposition to the regime because of their "unblemished record of

⁷Quarterly Economic Review: Chile: Annual Supplement 1976. (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, [1976]), p. 3.

⁸Claudio Cuadra, "Regime Without a Future," World Marxist Review 17 (November 1974): 106.

⁹Ibid., p. 105.

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struggle for unity and the purity of class principles."¹⁰ In his estimation, the regime maintained itself through the use of terror, and had very little popular support.

Similarly, Kaufman saw the generals as being extremely dependent upon repression for their continued control of Chile, and also dependent upon the middle and upper classes for any popular support; the working class posed an omnipresent threat to the regime.¹¹

Whitehead also saw the regime's bases of support in strict class terms:

... the dictatorship owes much of its durability to the success of the Popular Unity (Allende) government in transforming Chilean society.. It is precisely because the UP succeeded in winning over most of the working class that the dictatorship can justify to its supporters the current appalling levels of repression and unemployment. Likewise the UP's success in exposing the class nature of Chile's 'democratic' institutions redoubles resistance to the restoration of any kind of democracy.¹²

A slight deviation from the assumption of support based on class was seen in Latin America Political Report's reaction to the consulta result:

Even allowing for the coercive conditions, the undoubted fear of reprisals and the disillusion and apathy felt by some sectors of the population, it is difficult to believe that the country's voting patterns have been turned upside down in the past four years. In previous elections the traditional right has had a steady 20-25 per cent of the vote, with the left and the Christian Democrats each accounting for more than 30 per cent.¹³

¹⁰ Cuadra, p. 100. ¹¹ Kaufman, p. 59.

¹² Laurance Whitehead, "The Chilean Dictatorship," The World Today 32 (October 1976): 376.

¹³ "Chile: Winning Hearts and Minds," Latin America Political Report XII (January 13, 1978): 13-14.

In this instance it was assumed that former supporters of rightist parties would have been pitted against former supporters of leftist and centrist parties in the consulta vote. The regime seemingly was considered a surrogate National Party (the major rightist party in Chile). LAPR attributed passage of the 1978 proposition to fear, disillusion, and apathy, and expressed doubt in the validity of the results.

4? The Christian Century asked:

If the general really had the wide support he boasts of, why would the state of siege have to continue? Why would political parties have to be banned? And why would it be necessary to resort to a sham 'consultation'?¹⁴

Given such assessments as the ones above, the expression of popular support for the Pinochet regime in Chile may be the most problematic phenomenon to have occurred in that country since 1973. On the surface it is confounding. This paradox of popular support provides the stimulus for the present work. The problem will not be whether there actually was or was not popular support for the regime in 1978; the Gallup poll is accepted as a strong indication that there was. Rather, the present work will attempt to uncover some reasons why such support could have developed between 1973 and 1978.

K.W. Kim, in his 1967 essay on behaviorism in political science,¹⁵ presented what he judged to be legitimate alternatives to causal

¹⁴"Pinochet's Plebiscite," The Christian Century XCV (January 25, 1978): 67.

¹⁵K.W. Kim, "The Limits of Behavioural Explanations in Politics," in Apolitical Politics, eds. Charles A. McCoy and John Playford (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1967), pp. 38-54.

explanations that depended upon the "regularity principle". Three classes of problems he considered open to other than causal explanation were described as (1) the "unique event"; (2) the "non-event"; and (3) "questions which can be answered by uncovering 'reasons' rather than 'causes'".¹⁶

In the case of Chile from 1973-1978 there appear to be opportunities to approach problems from each of these angles. The golpe del estado itself constituted a "unique event" in the sense that it defied recent tradition in Chile. Many preconditions made the event unique in terms of the universe of military takeovers, in Latin America or elsewhere: a Marxist was the democratically elected president; the military had adhered to non-intervention for forty years; and many successive, elected regimes had come and gone without so much upheaval as was evident in the Allende years.

The immediate return to civilian rule, expected and/or predicted by many outsiders, could be classified as a "non-event".

Why there was an expression of popular support for the Pinochet regime in 1978 is a "question which can be answered by uncovering 'reasons' rather than 'causes,'". The results of the consulta nacional and the 1978 Gallup poll can be viewed not as an "event" for which determinants are pursued, but rather as a culmination of a multitude of forces and conditions which acted on the polity before and during the period 1973-1978. A general understanding of that period may be expanded through a search for reasons for such a culmination. The task

¹⁶Kim, p. 43.

is, according to Kim, "to relate a particular action to the reasons behind it."¹⁷

* * *

A defining characteristic of the twentieth century is the phenomenal growth of the media of mass communication--television, radio, film, and the press--that channel messages from relatively few sources to large audiences. This is commonly held to be true in the field of mass communication studies.

The mass media today are pervasive on a global scale, less so at the national level, and even less so at the sub-national level. Mass communication media saturate most developed countries with their messages. In some less developed countries (LDC's)¹⁸ the mass media coverage is limited to national capital regions and other large urban centers. In many LDC's where little media development has occurred, communication with large groups of people can take place only by word-of-mouth or through "local" channels like wall posters or the schools.¹⁹

¹⁷Kim, p. 52.

¹⁸By "less developed countries" the author means the countries of Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, Asia, and Oceania outside Australia and New Zealand. This "lesser" development would be in terms of gross national product per capita or Physical Quality of Life Index, whichever indicates low performance. See John W. Sewell, The United States and World Development, Agenda 1977 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977), pp. 147-171; and "A Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI)," International Development Review XVIII (1976): 34-37.

¹⁹See Nan Lin and Ronald S. Burt, "Differential Effects of Information Channels in the Process of Innovation Diffusion," Social Forces 54 (September 1975): 256-274.

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Other things being equal, the probability of any "effect" of the mass media manifesting itself in any country or world region would be directly proportional to the extent of media coverage at the national or world regional level.²⁰ A partial indicator of such coverage in a country or region would be statistics showing: (1) the numbers of television sets, radio receivers, daily newspaper copies, and cinema seats; and (2) the numbers of these same items per one thousand inhabitants. Tables 1 and 2 show such coverage data for Africa, Asia and Latin America.

A recent characteristic of a number of LDC's is the presence of extensive systems of mass communication by way of television, radio, the press, and cinema. Tables 1 and 2 indicate rapid growth in mass media coverage in Asia and Africa between 1963 and 1973, and rapid growth in television and radio coverage in Latin America during the same period. Higher levels of coverage in 1973 make mass media effects in LDC's more likely relative to 1963, but still not a foregone conclusion in all cases.

Latin America in 1973 exhibited much higher levels of media coverage when compared with Africa and Asia. The increased likelihood of media influence inferred by these higher levels must be borne out

²⁰ Ideal coverage data show actual contact with media messages. Such data for LDC's are infrequently encountered. Boyd-Barrett, writing on "media imperialism", lamented the lack of such information: "A great deal more research needs to be done, for example, on the exact degree of penetration of different media systems and different forms of media activity in each country..." Oliver Boyd-Barrett, "Media Imperialism: Towards an International Framework for the Analysis of Media Systems," in Mass Communication and Society," eds. James Curran, Michael Gurevitch, and Janet Woolacott (London: Edward Arnold (Publishers) Ltd., 1977), p. 131.

TABLE 1

COMPARISONS OF MEDIA DEVELOPMENT

Number of Units (000)	Radio Receivers	Television Receivers	Daily Newspaper Copies	Cinema Seats
Africa 1963	6,020	329	3,319	1,105
Africa 1973	18,843	1,503	4,775	1,351
Ratio 1963:1973	1:3.12	1:4.57	1:1.44	1:1.22
Asia 1963	17,059	868	14,028	5,193
Asia 1973	75,987	7,110	21,867	6,163
Ratio 1963:1973	1:4.45	1:8.19	1:1.56	1:1.19
Latin America				
1963	22,482	4,756	15,730	7,101
1973	49,850	19,692	18,073	6,284
Ratio 1963:1973	1:2.22	1:4.14	1:1.15	1:0.88

TABLE 2

TOTAL COMMUNICATION UNITS AND UNITS PER THOUSAND INHABITANTS
(1973)

Number of units (000)	Radio Receivers	Television Receivers	Daily Newspaper Copies	Cinema Seats
Africa	18,483	1,503	4,775	1,351
Asia	75,987	7,110	21,867	6,163
Latin America	49,850	19,692	18,073	6,284
Units per thousand inhabitants				
Africa	54	4	14	4
Asia	41	4	20	6
Latin America	171	68	62	22

SOURCE: Wilbur Schramm, "Data on Communication Systems in Three Developing Regions," in Communication and Change, the Last Ten Years - and the Next, eds. Wilbur Schramm and Daniel Lerner (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1976), pp. 11-12.

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by distributive considerations in the cases of individual countries. This would entail the assessment of horizontal distribution of coverage over space and vertical distribution of coverage among socio-economic groups. This latter coverage data are encountered infrequently in descriptions of the media in LDC's.

Given the available information on the subject, it can be concluded that Chile is an example of an LDC with relatively extensive mass media coverage at the national level. One simple example of this is the findings of a national survey conducted by Gallup Chile in 1977. The survey results showed that in the week prior to questioning, 83.1% of the respondents had watched television; 73.2% had listened to a radio; 66.6% had read a daily newspaper; and 29% had read a magazine.²¹

An analysis of the distribution of mass media coverage over space in Chile will be presented in chapter III.

The "effects" of the mass media have been of concern to scholars and commentators since the sixteenth century and the Gutenberg press. Huizinga's biography of Erasmus is a rich history of the early days of European printing. Huizinga attempted to gauge the effects of the new medium:

Erasmus belonged to the generation which had grown up together with the youthful art of printing. . . . What would Erasmus have been without the printing press? To broadcast the ancient documents, to purify and restore them was his life's passion. The certainty that the printed book places exactly the same

²¹ Interview with Guillermo Chadwick Piwonka, Gallup Chile Limitada, Santiago, August 1977. The survey was commissioned by the Oficina de Planificación, a branch of the Chilean government.

text in the hands of thousands of readers, was to him a consolation that former generations had lacked.²²

Erasmus was an active force in the contemporary trend toward humanism. Printing gave strength to that movement. As a result of Erasmus' publications, wrote Huizinga, "Humanism ceased to be the exclusive privilege of the few."²³

New mass media are not greeted warmly by all members of the societies into which they are introduced. Printing has been feared, and consequently restricted and regulated by states, throughout its long history. Likewise film, radio, and television have been welcomed, feared, and regulated all at once, each in its turn. Defleur observed this historical side of the effects of the mass media:

One of the problems in reviewing this issue objectively is that each generation of intellectual critics seems determined to use the media as scapegoats for trends they find disquieting in their society.²⁴

Harold Innis approached the matter of media effects by examining predominant means of communication in empires.²⁵ He found what he called "biasses" of communication rooted in the physical characteristics of specific media. Innis found heavy and durable media predominated in

²² Johan Huizinga, Erasmus and the Age of Reformation (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1957), p. 65.

²³ Ibid., p. 34.

²⁴ Melvin Defleur, Theories of Mass Communication, 2nd ed. (New York: McKay, 1975), p. 137.

²⁵ Harold Innis, The Bias of Communication, revised by Mary Q. Innis (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1951); and Harold Innis, Empire and Communication (London: Oxford University Press, 1950).

empires of limited territory and great endurance. Lighter, more easily transported media were predominant in extensive empires which did not endure. Innis contended that such duration and extension were effects of the use of specific communication media:

A medium of communication has an important influence on the dissemination of knowledge over space and over time and it becomes necessary to study its characteristics in order to appraise its influence in its cultural setting . . . The relative emphasis on time or space will imply a bias of significance to the culture in which it is embedded.²⁶

Extrapolating from Innis' arguments, it could be assumed that an examination of a single regime's treatment of relevant time and space biassed media would give clues to that regime's relative emphasis on extension or duration.

George Gerbner, another contemporary communication theorist, in examining national media systems,²⁷ was concerned primarily with that which is communicated through the media (the messages), the institutions which create and transmit messages, and the contributions these messages make to cultures in development. To Gerbner, the effects of the mass media derive from the "symbolic climate" which the media help create. This climate represents the domain of symbols through which a society must define and understand ~~it~~ self. For Gerbner this is culture. Where mass media are conspicuous their contributions to the symbolic climate, and hence to culture, are implicitly great.

²⁶ Innis, The Bias of Communication, p. 33.

²⁷ George Gerbner, "Comparative Cultural Indicators," in Mass Media Policies in Changing Cultures, ed. George Gerbner (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1977), pp. 199-205.

The problem of understanding the expression of popular support for the Pinochet regime will be guided by the communication formulations of Innis and Gerbner as they relate to Chilean political development from 1973-1978. The conspicuous presence of the mass media in Chile by 1973 gives reason to suspect that media messages were contributing to Chile's culture in development. These contributions may have had political ramifications. Further, the strict control of the mass media by the junta indicates their attention to the contextually relevant "space biased" media. The regime also focussed their attention on some relevant "time biased" media, such as political parties and labor organizations. These concepts will be presented and examined in chapter VII.

This look at Chile from 1973-1978 is by no means intended to be a thorough examination of a very complex and event-filled period in that country's history. Rather, an attempt will be made to enrich the understanding of political developments in Chile by an examination of communication developments during that period.

Simply stated, the research question is: Is there evidence to reasonably conclude that the Pinochet regime's treatment of the mass media contributed significantly to the overwhelming expression of popular support for them in 1978?

The approach to the problem will have three separate but related elements: (1) an examination of the structure and function of the mass media in Chile; (2) an examination of the Pinochet regime's treatment of relevant time and space biased media; and (3) the relationship of these to the expression of support for the Chilean junta.

Chapter II provides a description of the developmental ideology of the Pinochet regime. The economic and political orientations of the ruling junta are examined in this connection. The economic policies of the regime are seen as openly capitalistic, almost laissez-faire in their preference for private ownership and market forces as against government ownership and control.

The politics of the generals is seen as authoritarian and plainly anti-Marxist. A distaste for all politicians is one of their political values. Their manipulation of the political structure of Chile tended toward a form of authoritarian-corporatism as described by Malloy,²⁸ among others. This is exemplified by the junta's creation of a Council of State, consisting of representatives of various interest groups. This advisory body was the prototype of a restructured system of political participation in which interest groups would replace political parties.²⁹

The description of the structure and geographic coverage of the media in Chapter III is provided to determine if it is reasonable to conclude that the Chilean media are truly national in their coverage and use. The qualities of coverage at the sub-national level are described, as are different qualities of coverage among individual media.

This structure and coverage data establishes the potential for the mass media in Chile to effectively contribute to a national symbolic climate consistent with the regime's ideology.

²⁸James M. Malloy, "Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America: The Modal Pattern," in Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America, ed. James M. Malloy (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), pp. 3-19.

²⁹See David Collier and Ruth Berins Collier, "Who Does What, to Whom and How: Toward a Comparative Analysis of Latin American Corporatism," in Malloy, p. 493.

Chapter IV examines power roles within the media community. This is what Gerbner called "Institutional Policy Analysis", which treats selected actors who are directly or indirectly involved in the mass communication process. It is one of three major elements in Gerbner's conceptual framework "for the comparative investigation of media policies, content, and effects in different social systems and cultures."³⁰

Gerbner's model was intended to treat the mass media at the societal level. This is clear in his definition of communication and of the effects of communications:

Communication is interaction through messages bearing man's notion of existence, priorities, values, and relationships. Codes of symbolic significance conveyed through modes of expression form the currency of social relations. Institutions package, media compose, and technologies release messages into the mainstream of common consciousness.³¹

This is consistent with Cohen's observation that the press "may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about."³³ This was developed further by McCombs and Shaw as the "agenda-setting function" of the mass media.³⁴

³⁰Gerbner, p. 199.

³¹Ibid. ³²Ibid., p. 205.

³³Bernard C. Cohen, The Press and Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 13.

³⁴Maxwell E. McCombs and Donald L. Shaw, "The Agenda-Setting Function of the Mass Media," Public Opinion Quarterly 36 (Summer 1972): 176-187.

The common thread running through the ideas of these writers is an acknowledgement that the thoughts that compose man's vision of his environment come primarily from external information sources. The presence of mass media in a given society implies some significance of those media as competing elements in the formation of man's vision of his environment. As Gerbner has stated, the media and their technologies "release messages into the mainstream of common consciousness."³⁵

In the Institutional Policy Analysis, power is the relevant consideration. It is an analysis of how power is distributed and used by specific actors in the media community. The analysis is expected to shed light on "how mass media relate to other institutions, make decisions, and perform their functions in society."³⁶

In the Chilean case the focus was not unexpectedly on the powerful role of the State. The regime eliminated many media outlets soon after taking power, thereby altering the structure of ownership of the media. The State itself was a major owner of media outlets and hence able to exercise direct controls. The media outlets which survived the elimination campaign operated under strict written and unwritten laws of conduct handed down by the State. It was found, however, that because of the system of commercial patronage which financed the media of the public and private sectors alike, private media outlet owners had a mutuality of interests with state economic orientation.

³⁵ Gerbner, p. 199. ³⁶ Ibid., p. 200.

Chapter V is a description of that part of the overall symbolic climate in Chile that emanated from the mass media. This is what Gerbner called "Message System Analysis". His interest was in "how large bodies of messages can be observed as dynamic systems with symbolic functions that have social consequences."³⁷

The media-climate in Chile was seen as politically subdued, particularly when compared with the media-climate during the Allende years. Commercial advertising was viewed as the single most consistent element in all the Chilean media, a characteristic which was in harmony with the economic policies of the regime.

Observing the media messages, wrote Gerbner, "tell us not so much what individuals think or do as what most people think or do something about in common."³⁸

The "Cultivation Analysis" in Chapter VI represents the "effect" end of Gerbner's framework, drawing on the picture of the structure and function provided by the preceding two parts:

Cultivation analysis begins with the insights of the study of institutions and the message systems they produce and goes on to investigate the contributions that these systems and their symbolic functions make to the cultivation of assumptions about life and the world.³⁹

The object of the Cultivation Analysis is to relate the society's view of its environment to that information which is transmitted through the mass media. Society is the unit of analysis; the relevant indicators are common assumptions, points of view, images, and associations.

³⁷ Gerbner, p. 200.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 204.

³⁹ Ibid.

This approach to analyzing the effects of the media is consistent with Gerbner's general view of the role of communication in society:

Individuals make their own selection of materials through which to cultivate personal images, tastes, views, and preferences, and they seek to influence those available to and chosen by their children. But they cannot cultivate that which is not available. They will rarely select what is scarcely available, seldom emphasized, or infrequently presented.⁴⁰

The end result of applying Gerbner's framework hopefully would be a clear picture not only of what is being communicated in the society in question, but also some notion of why it is being communicated and what the effects of that communication are.

The cultivation of assumptions and values from the media-climate are analyzed in terms of reinforcement of the regime's ideology.

Because all the mass media were considered space biased media in the Chilean case, the relevant time biased media and their treatment by the Pinochet regime needed to be identified and described. This is attempted in chapter VII, where Innis' notion of time biased media is extended to include interest groups, organizations of people in which communication is largely oral but in which memberships may approach mass proportions.

The chapter is included to make more thorough use of communication as the vantage point from which the period is examined, and to take full advantage of Innis' structural approach to media effects.

⁴⁰ Gerbner, p. 204.

Innis established a communication imperative in his study of empires. He distinguished "time" and "space" biased communication media which were determining factors in the political-economies of the areas (or empires) in which they were predominant. Time biased media were durable, but heavy and not easily transported. Reliance on time biased media determined decentralized empire relatively durable over time. Space biased media were light and easily transported, resulting in centralized empire with vast territory. Such an empire was less durable over time.

The dialectics of time and space guided Innis' analyses:

... as long distance communication improves, short distance communication deteriorates. Time and space, then, are largely names for short distance and long distance communication. The dialectical relations between history and geography derive from the contradictory relations between these two forms of communication.⁴¹

Duration and extension are determined by time and space biased media, respectively. It is in this connection that Innis may be useful in a consideration of the duration and extension of a regime in an LDC. By implementing a "bias of communication" our understanding of the development process over time and over space may be increased. Carey expanded on this dialectic:

Attempts to ensure duration limit extent; attempts to increase geography attenuate history . . . wisdom in social policy is the continuous attempt to simultaneously adjust to the demands of time (stability, continuity, duration, succession) and the demands of space (geography, control, political, economic, military necessity.)⁴²

⁴¹James Carey, "Canadian Communications Theory: Extension and Interpretations of Harold Innis," in Studies in Canadian Communications, ed. Gertrude Joch Robinson and Donald F. Theall (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1975), p. 31.

⁴²Ibid.

It was clear from the regime's treatment of the mass media that it had established its extension over space. Chapter VII provides insight into how the regime attempted to determine its duration over time through the development of a corporatist interest group system of political participation.

The final chapter provides a summary and some concluding analysis with respect to the expression of popular support for the Pinochet regime. Part of this concluding analysis will draw on Herbert Kelman's theoretical work on political legitimacy and nationalism.⁴³

Kelman described six different types of attachment to the national system which are determined largely by socioeconomic and personality characteristics of individuals. The manner of actual integration into the system stems from Kelman's earlier work on three "processes of influence": compliance, identification, and internalization.⁴⁴ In this concluding analysis an attempt is made to relate Kelman's sources of attachment and processes of influence to communication in Chile and popular support for the regime.

⁴³ Herbert C. Kelman, "Patterns of Personal Involvement in the National System: A Social-Psychological Analysis of Political Legitimacy," paper presented at the XIth Interamerican Congress of Psychology, Mexico City, December 19, 1967, revised 1969. (Mimeographed.)

⁴⁴ Herbert C. Kelman, "Processes of Opinion Change," Public Opinion Quarterly 25 (Spring 1961): 57-78.

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CHAPTER II

THE DEVELOPMENTAL IDEOLOGY OF THE PINOCHET REGIME

When Chile is examined in the context of "development", it is appropriate to attempt to define the developmental ideology of the Pinochet regime.

The definition of development itself is problematic within the field. Even within the two most basic philosophical divisions of economic development -- capitalist and communist -- there are extremely divergent views of desired ends and appropriate means.

Frederick Yu's definition of development is an apt reaction to the lack of cohesion among developmentalists:

Development is from something to something. It is done by some people and for some people. It may mean survival for one group, growth for another, and quality of life for still another.¹

Yu's definition is contextually relative, not unlike Gurr's definition of poverty as "relative deprivation".² Such a definition allows the investigator to consider Chilean "development" from 1973-1978 without having to justify either the means or ends of that development as right, just, or appropriate.

¹ Frederick T.C. Yu, "Research Priorities in Development Communication," in Communication and Change, the Last Ten Years - and the Next, eds. Wilbur Schramm and Daniel Lerner (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1976), p. 236.

² Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 9.

A simple definition of "ideology" also is appropriate for present purposes. A useful textbook definition is provided by Deutsch. Ideology was seen as essentially the "guidance for . . . behavior and coordination for . . . actions."³ Political ideologies, to Deutsch, can range in sophistication from a "general way of thinking about politics" to "carefully thought-out theories of some particular thinker."⁴

The developmental ideology of the Pinochet regime can be approached in two ways: (1) a legal or constitutional approach which seeks the philosophical bases evident in government pronouncements and documents, and in speeches and statements by Pinochet and other government officials; and (2) a functional approach which observes the actual behavior of the regime. The distinction is between what the State says it will do and what it does. This summary treatment of the regime's ideology will center on political and economic aspects of development.

The Spanish word "institucionalizar" means, "to institutionalize". From the time of the 1973 coup⁴ onward, institucionalizar became the symbol for the junta's developmental ideology. A variation of this symbol appeared the very week of the golpe when it was reported that the generals had made a public plea for national unity and "institutional normality".⁵

The symbolic institutionalization appeared to have both active and reactive implications: the acts were essentially the formalization,

³Karl W. Deutsch, Politics and Government (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1974), p. 10.

⁴Ibid.

⁵"Chile: Sombre Outlook," Latin America VII (September 21, 1973): 300-302.

or legalization (through a new constitution), of the developmental policies of the regime; the reactions were illustrated by the constant references to the relative chaos of the preceding Allende years and to international pressures since the 1973 takeover.⁶

By 1977 the formalization process was making headway. A Commission for the Study of the New State Political Constitution had been appointed, and President Pinochet was giving previews of the document's ultimate contents.

Pinochet discussed the proceso institucional in June 1977, describing it as the immediate response to the threat from the exterior, the perceived international conspiracy to undermine the regime: "Difficult measures are going to come because right now we are facing difficult international problems."⁷

Constitutional commission member Juan de Dios Carmona characterized the conditions under which the new order was being established:

Chile has lived through this period trying to regulate and normalize situations which had provoked, principally by the actions of the last government, a crisis . . . Not only was this a crisis of the economic order, but it was also a crisis of the moral, social, and political order.⁸

⁶ These twin threats, from within and from without, were used as rallying points by the junta in their quest for popular support. An example is Pinochet's speech to the Frente Juvenil de Unidad Nacional. See "S.E. Indicó Grandes Líneas Institucionales," El Mercurio (Santiago, Chile), July 10, 1977, pp. 33;37.

⁷ "Hay que Consolidar Proceso Institucional," El Mercurio (Santiago, Chile), June 8, 1977, pp. 1;12.

⁸ "Carmona Define Itinerario de la Institucionalidad," El Mercurio (Santiago, Chile), July 12, 1977, pp. 31; 34-35.

The present task, in Carmona's estimation, was "to overcome the emergency and restore institutional normality to the country."⁹

It was with no small amount of foresight that Moreno wrote of Chilean politics in 1969:

Political pluralism has traditionally failed in Chile. The relative high degree of stability the country has enjoyed has been the product of its adherence to a monistic system capable of eliciting the allegiance of the politically important sectors . . . Leadership, to be successful, will have to remain caudillistic, or it will have to be firmly institutionalized . . . Sharing of power will be seen as a sign of weakness, and it will lead to a lack of confidence and support. The viable alternatives to authoritarianism, within the Chilean cultural context, are dictatorship and anarchy.¹⁰

It was clear from the time of the coup in 1973 that the military would play the authoritarian role, supplanting the relative anarchy of the last year of Unidad Popular government. Air Force General Gustavo Leigh, a member of the ruling junta, hinted at new constitutional forms when, shortly after the golpe, he said:

We want the armed forces to be represented in legislative bodies; we want to take part in the development and progress of the country; we want a constitution that will ensure the formation of a national political structure of our own, and not give marxism the chance of once again clamping its shackles on our country.¹¹

Nearly four years later, as a new constitution was being formed, President Pinochet expanded on the notions of an authoritarian democracy:

Our task is to give form to a new democracy which will be authoritarian, protected, integrated, technological, and with authentic social participation, characteristics that

⁹"Carmona Define Itinerario de la Institucionalidad," pp. 34-35.

¹⁰Francisco Jose Moreno, Legitimacy and Stability in Latin America (New York: New York University Press, 1969), p. 176.

¹¹"Chile: A Corporate State in the Making?" Latin America VII (September 28, 1973): 310-311.

that are understood when the individual is stripped of his ambitions and selfishness.¹²

Pinochet hoped their new democracy would "reduce the margin of ideological debate to its proper proportions."¹³ Nationality was prescribed as a unifying force, an alternative to the divisive force of "class struggle that does not exist and must not exist."¹⁴

These statements by Leigh and Pinochet indicate some of the hallmarks of the new political structure for Chile as understood by 1978 (the time of the consulta). This structure was based on (1) the absolute rejection of Marxism as an appropriate ideology for Chile; (2) an unwillingness to return to the previous, pluralistic democracy based on competition among political parties; and (3) a general distaste for politicians of every stripe.¹⁵

The new political structure was described in 1977 by Enrique Ortuzar, head of the constitutional commission. The goal was a social order based on law:

The entire constitutional structure will rest on the humanistic, Christian concept of man and society, according to which the dignity of the human being, his freedom, and his rights are before the juridical order, which must preserve certain and effective protection.¹⁶

¹²"Hay que Consolidar Proceso Institucional," pp. 1;12.

¹³Ibid. ¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Cuadra wrote of the new Chilean President: "Pinochet calls the Demo-christians 'hucksters' and says 'there will never be a place for politics' in Chile. He deliberately insults political personalities of every persuasion and every country, declaring: 'I make no promises, I am a soldier, not a politician'." Cuadra, p. 104.

¹⁶Hernan Millas, "Hacia la nueva institucionalidad," Hoy (Santiago, Chile), June 7, 1977, p. 11.

Also in 1977, Pinochet described the transition to "institutionalization".¹⁷ The formulation of the constitution would be completed by 1980. For the next four to five years after that a transition government would rule. Constitutional power would reside in the junta, in consultation with its Council of State, an appointed group of influential Chileans from various sectors of politics, business, labor, and so on. Executive power would reside in the Presidency. Legislative power would be reserved for the President and a House of Representatives. The President and the junta would retain an absolute veto power over legislation.

During the transition period all members of the House would be appointed by the junta, one third at large and two thirds by proportional representation from Chile's thirteen regions. When the House of Representatives was installed it would then elect a President to a six-year term, as well as approve and promulgate the new constitution.

Only after the transition period would there be any elections. In the first elections (perhaps 1984 or 1985), the regional representatives to the House would be elected.

One of the most unique aspects of the proposed new order was the change in the basis of political participation. Although as recently

¹⁷"Hay que Consolidar Proceso Institucional," pp. 1;12. The "institutionalization" process may have been speeded up since 1977. In 1979 the government indicated it would hold a national plebiscite on the new constitution late that year or in 1980. "News in Brief," Latin America Political Report XIII (February 16, 1979): 56. The procedure for framing the constitution was justified by Carmona who stated that the longstanding constitution of 1925 was composed by a presidential commission, then ratified by a national plebiscite. "Carmon Define Itinerario de la Institucionalidad," p. 35.

as 1975 President Pinochet was vowing there would never be elections,¹⁸ they were eventually a part of the political reformation plans. Constitutional commission member Carmona indicated that elections in Chile would assume a new tenor, less crucial to the functioning of the system. He spoke of "new concepts of participation",¹⁹ such as through local neighborhood associations, mothers' clubs, professionals' groups, and unions. He foresaw no return to the "concept of electoral representative democracy"²⁰ where parties monopolized political expression.

This new basis for representation was described further by commission president Ortuzar:

Special importance will be given to intermediate organisms of society, like collegial associations of professionals and technocrats, and trade, feminine, and youth organizations, those which have an unquestionable right to intervene in these great decisions to direct the destiny of the country.²¹

The prototype of this interest group approach to political participation was the Council of State, instituted in July of 1976. This consultative body, placed in the building previously used by the Chilean Senate, included former Presidents Gabriel Gonzalez and Jorge Alessandri (Eduardo Frei declined to be a part); Julio Philippi, representing gremios (professional associations); Pedro Ibañez, representing business interests; Guillermo Medina (of the copper

¹⁸"News in Brief", Latin America IX (June 27, 1975): 200.

¹⁹"Carmona Define Itinerario de la Institucionalidad," pp. 34-35.

²⁰Ibid. Pinochet discussed these "new forms of social participation" in "Hay que Consolidar Proceso Institucional."

²¹Millas, p. 12.

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workers' union), representing labor; retired heads of the armed forces, the supreme court, and universities; and various other representatives of women's and young people's organizations.²²

The two principal representative bodies under the new constitution, then, would be the wholly appointed Council of State and the one third appointed, two thirds elected House of Representatives. It was not clear what role, if any, was left to be played by the former political parties. Surely the parties of the Left would not be participants at all.

The Pinochet regime's approach to economics can be summed up in one short phrase -- liberal capitalist economics. Private investment, both domestic and foreign, was at the heart of the junta's economic thinking as set forth in the lengthy regionalization plan published in 1976.²³

The generals inherited a disheveled economy, marked by a tremendous rate of inflation, investor skepticism abroad, and bitter labor disputes at home. Their response was a comprehensive approach which simultaneously attempted to (1) rapidly reduce the rate of inflation; (2) attract foreign investment; (3) cut the power of the unions; (4) encourage exports, particularly nontraditional ones (as an effort to reduce the dependence upon copper as an earner of foreign

²²"Chile: Rewriting the Constitution," Latin America X (July 16, 1976): 222-223.

²³See Comisión Nacional de la Reforma Administrativa, Chile Hacia un Nuevo Destino (Santiago, Chile: Editora Nacional Gabriela Mistral, 1976), p. 96.

exchange); (5) dismantle the tariff structure to encourage efficiency in domestic industries; (6) cut government spending; and (7) sell off many of the government-owned enterprises.

The Economist Intelligence Unit described Chile's economic policies in 1976 as follows: "The government planned to follow the Brazilian model of economic development aimed at maximum growth and heavy foreign and domestic investment rather than social reforms or income distribution."²⁴ In 1978 the Intelligence Unit reported: "In principle, the economic philosophy of the government is that of Milton Friedman, relying on monetary control and freeing domestic and international market forces, but many controls, particularly over wages, remain in practice."²⁵

The actual behavior of the Pinochet regime was generally consistent with the ideology espoused at the formal level. Control was probably the outstanding characteristic in both the political and economic spheres after 1973. Saul Bellow described this type of control in his Pulitzer Price-winning Humboldt's Gift:

Then in my head a white flare went off. There was an illumination of curious clarity. I saw the position into which Humboldt had placed Kathleen and I put it into words: Lie there. Hold still. Don't wiggle. My happiness may be peculiar, but once happy I will make you happy, happier than you ever dreamed. When I am satisfied the blessings of fulfillment will flow to all mankind. Wasn't this, I thought, the message of modern power? This was the voice

²⁴ Quarterly Economic Review: Chile: Annual Supplement 1976, p. 2.

²⁵ Quarterly Economic Review: Chile: Annual Supplement 1978 (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, [1978]), p. 4.

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of the crazy tyrant speaking, with peculiar lusts to consummate, for which everyone must hold still. I grasped it at once.²⁶

The sexual analogy is a fitting one, for when the junta seized power in 1973 the body politic of Chile was asked to lie very still. The new regime would make all the moves, and Chile's people were asked to trust they would, in the end, be satisfied too. States of internal war, seige, and emergency were declared. Curfews were imposed. Civil liberties generally were pushed aside. Political parties were recessed. The mass media were censored, some shut down. The traditional power of the unions was stripped away. Individuals were killed, jailed, exiled, or allowed to leave Chile. The legislative bodies of the Chilean State were dissolved and municipal councils dismissed. Laws were enacted by decree. Sub-national boundaries were revised to correspond with military commands. University rectors were replaced with military men.

An irony of the "free market" approach to economics adopted by the junta was that it required authoritarian political power to be implemented. Tightly controlled wages were basic to the battle with inflation. Government jobs ceased to be the primary response to unemployment; joblessness grew. The State began to sell off government-owned industries, particularly those expropriated under the UP regime.²⁷ Chile removed itself from the Andean Group integration scheme to pursue a more independent economic policy. Foreign investment regulations were

²⁶ Saul Bellow, Humboldt's Gift (New York: Avon Books, 1973), pp. 21-22.

²⁷ Latin America reported six weeks after the coup that some 200 expropriated private firms also had been returned to their pre-Allende owners. "Chile: Opposition," Latin America VII (October 26, 1973): 342.

liberalized to attract capital investors from the exterior.²⁸ Government spending was restrained.²⁹ The peso's value was manipulated to encourage exports and, occasionally, to stem the rising costs of imports. Inefficient Chilean-owned businesses were allowed to flounder when the tariff structure was dismantled.³⁰

In essence, the State pursued its preferred policy of allowing the private sector to once again become predominant in the national economy, but could do so only with a great amount of State action and control.

The developmental ideology of the Pinochet regime has caused debate both inside and outside Chile. Chilean lawyer and law professor Juan Agustín Figueroa could see the regime remodelling the political State, but had difficulty seeing clearly the philosophy which underpinned

²⁸ The revised foreign investment laws in place by 1977 removed restrictions on repatriation of profits; invested assets could be liquidated and repatriated after three years; companies could choose between a local (and variable) tax rate or a 49.5% rate guaranteed for ten years; foreign investors would enjoy all the privileges of domestic businesses except access to local capital; and bureaucratic procedures for foreign investment were simplified. Quarterly Economic Review of Chile: 2nd Quarter 1977 (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, [1977]), p. 11.

²⁹ The proportion of deficit to total state expenditure fell from 55% in 1973 to 8% in 1977; the proportion of GNP represented by government expenditure fell from 40% in 1973 to 27-30% in 1977. Quarterly Economic Review: Chile: Annual Supplement 1978, p. 17.

³⁰ See "Chile's Monetarist Model Starts to Come Apart," Latin America Economic Report V (January 14, 1977): 6; and "Chilean Farmers Suffer from New Government Cutbacks," Latin America Economic Report V (August 26, 1977): 132.

the ideology. He observed a simultaneous repudiation of "classical democracy" and "totalitarian marxism". Figueroa was suspicious of such language as "new democracy", "authoritarian democracy", and "protected democracy". He contended that "democracy is like water in that if it is not pure it is not democracy." In Chile's perpetual state of emergency he saw only transitoriness and abnormality. He feared "to institutionalize" meant to institutionalize a situation of abnormality and emergency, "the profound logical contradiction of attempting to create the stable with the unstable, or a normal character with one which is abnormal." If the regime did not make clear its underlying philosophy, wrote Figueroa, "'to institutionalize' is but an expression which, apart from being empty, is disquieting."³¹

Duff and McCamant were similarly confused when they wrote of the military regime in Chile:

Government by the corporate military, without concern for civilian organizations, is a new form of government and experience gives us no guide for guessing how it will end.³²

Nunn claimed the Pinochet regime was difficult to define in ideological, sociological, or even economic terms because they maintained "no clear-cut alliance with an identifiable civilian counterpart political group or social class."³³

³¹ Juan Agustín Figueroa Yávar, "Institucionalizar," Que Pasa (Santiago, Chile), June 30 - July 6, 1977, p. 27.

³² Duff and McCamant, p. 293.

³³ Frederick M. Nunn, "Military-Civilian Relations in Chile: The Legacy of the Golpe of 1973," Inter-American Economic Affairs 29 (Autumn 1975): 49. See also Frederick M. Nunn, "New Thoughts on Military Intervention in Latin American Politics: The Chilean Case, 1973," Journal of Latin American Studies 7 (November 1975): 271-304.

The economic policies of the junta had both its enthusiasts and its critics. A Chilean business periodical commented at the time of consulta:

Better days . . . The stability and security that Chile offers to domestic or foreign investment will not be found today anywhere else on the globe. The political economy now in place - at times dramatically harsh, but essentially sound and just, today receives elegies from technicians all around the world.³⁴

Equally positive was Chilean economist Rolf Luders, writing in Hoy:

The system has incredibly strong, implicit incentives to generate savings and investment, to adapt advanced technologies, to generate more productive work, and to invite entrepreneurs to initiate new activities and to take risks.³⁵

Bizzarro, on the other hand, noted one of the complications of the regime's economic policies:

A government that tells its people that they are out of work because of an improvement in the economy is beginning to annoy Chileans who originally approved the coup as a radical but necessary alternative to Allende.³⁶

MacPherson³⁷ and Kaufman³⁸ offer some guidance as to how to classify the politics of the Pinochet regime in easily understandable terms.

³⁴"Editorial," La Bolsa (Santiago, Chile), January 1978, p. 3.

³⁵Rolf Luders, "El Precio de la Prosperidad," Hoy (Santiago, Chile), June 1-7, 1977, p. 21.

³⁶Salvatore Bizzarro, "Rigidity and Restraint in Chile," Current History 74 (February 1978): 83.

³⁷C.B. MacPherson, The Real World of Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966).

³⁸Kaufman, Transitions to Stable Authoritarian-Corporate Regimes: The Chilean Case?

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MacPherson identified three types of democracies: (1) the Western, "liberal" democracy; (2) the Soviet-style "people's democracy"; and (3) the generally single-party democracies of the "newly-independent underdeveloped countries". These latter two types were considered non-liberal democracies.

As is often the case with categories such as those of MacPherson, it is difficult to find a place for all real states. Chile is an example. MacPherson observed: "Liberal democracy is found only in countries whose economic system is wholly or predominantly that of capitalist enterprise,"³⁹ and, conversely, nearly all capitalist countries are also liberal democracies. Chile after 1973 was no longer a liberal democracy, but was more clearly capitalist than during the most liberal democratic period which it proceeded. In all areas but the political, Chile after 1973 would have qualified as a "liberal" state, but not as a democratic one.

There were some characteristics of what MacPherson called the "Underdeveloped Variant" to which Chile after 1973 corresponded. These included (1) strong political leadership; (2) intolerance of a political opposition; and (3) a lack of civil liberty.⁴⁰ Chile is ~~not~~ a newly independent country, however, and it would be difficult to characterize the Chilean State after 1973 as "rule by and for the oppressed people" as MacPherson described the Underdeveloped Variant. He contended that the development of single-party states was determined by the fact that these new countries had no traditions of political or economic competition.⁴¹

³⁹ MacPherson, p. 4.

⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 26-27.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 24.

Because Chile may be evolving toward some sort of single-party system; because it exhibited strong political leadership, intolerance of political opposition, and restricted civil liberty; and because it implemented a liberal capitalist economic model, Chile does not fit neatly into MacPherson's framework. Chile's tendencies, however, which come out of an application of the framework, help to make more easily identifiable the developmental ideology of the Pinochet regime.

Kaufman applied the so-called "corporate" model to the Pinochet regime, and found Chile to be on the "authoritarian-corporate developmental 'track'".⁴² Chile before 1973 exhibited certain traits, like a medieval-Catholic heritage, delayed industrialization, high external dependence, extreme social inequality, and a weak economy, which made the country susceptible to a corporatist political structure. Despite the development of a pluralistic political environment in the twentieth century, wrote Kaufman, "a variety of authoritarian tendencies did exist beneath the surface of Chilean constitutionalism all along, intertwined with the political-institutional structures of that country."⁴³

The "corporatist" category may be the most suitable for Chile after 1973. The composition of the Council of State, for instance, with

⁴²Kaufman, p. 24. For a brief discussion of corporatist political thought, see James Petras, Politics and Social Forces in Chilean Development (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 199-203. Petras saw the corporate society as one in which elites exercised most of the political power and interest groups of various sorts represented mass interests. Ironically, perhaps, Petras described Eduardo Frei as a corporatist.

⁴³Kaufman, p. 24.

its representatives of various interest groups, corresponds to the corporate system of representation as defined by Collier and Collier in 1977:

. . . a pattern of state structuring of representation that produces a system of officially sanctioned, non-competitive interest associations which are organized into legally prescribed functional groups . . . ⁴⁴

With the political parties of Chile in what appeared to be a permanent recess, it looked as though such a system of political representation would evolve. The Council of State predicted such changes as did previously cited statements by Pinochet and other Chilean officials.

Even the vague "institutionalization" appears to be explicable using the corporate model. Chalmers equated it with depoliticization.

Institutionalization meant:

. . . closing off certain areas from political contention through a structure of power so overwhelming that it precludes fundamental questioning for long periods of time, or through agreement or apathy so profound that the questions are never raised.⁴⁵

Such institutionalization would place only specific elites within the power structure, and the range of allowable ideological debate would be narrowed.

The inclusion of appointed representatives in future governments and the long transition period to even partially-elected governments both correspond to descriptions of an authoritarian-corporate system.

⁴⁴ Collier and Collier, p. 493.

⁴⁵ Douglas A. Chalmers, "The Politicized State in Latin America," in Malloy, Authoritarianism, pp. 41-42.

What then is the developmental ideology of the Pinochet regime? In Yu's terms-- from something to something, by some people and for some people-- that ideology can be described as follows:

In historical terms, Chile has moved from a liberal democratic state of long standing toward the authoritarian-corporate type of political system. The transition was only in progress as of 1978 (the time of the consulta). A prototype for the new basis of political participation - non-competing interest groups - was to be found in the already functioning, advisory Council of State.

In the twentieth century the Chilean economy had moved through a pre-industrial stage, a phase of industrialization through import substitution, a period of increasing government ownership and regulation in the economy, and to the beginnings of the complete state ownership of the means of production. From that point, beginning with the golpe of 1973, there was a return to private enterprise as an economic ideal, and a stated preference for the forces of the marketplace as against economic control by the State.

In terms of more recent history, the developmental ideology of the Pinochet regime can be viewed as a reaction to the Unidad Popular years. Under Allende political pluralism in Chile reached its apogee, as did civil liberty. The economy, however, was near collapse,⁴⁶ with runaway inflation the most obvious symptom. Anarchistic action was growing on both the left and the right, and the country was on the brink of civil war. The military reaction was to do away with civil liberty,

⁴⁶For a discussion of the state of Chile's economy at the time of the coup, see Paul E. Sigmund, The Overthrow of Allende and the Politics of Chile, 1964-1976 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), pp. 279-283.

at least temporarily, to ban all political activity, and to implement an export-oriented, growth-rather-than-distribution-oriented, liberal, capitalist economic policy.

In essence, the junta was guided by a rejection of Marxism, a rejection of pluralistic politics, a dislike of politicos, faith in the exercise of authoritarian power for the common good, and confidence in the ability of market forces to give Chile's economy a boost.

This development was "by" the junta, of course, and its corps of technocrats, many of whom had been civil servants under Allende and Frei, many of whom were new to government service.

Just who the development was "for" presents a virtually insoluble dilemma. Taken at face value, the generals' altruistic statements say that all Chileans eventually would be the beneficiaries of the new order. But, as Abraham Lincoln may have put it, "You can't please all of the people all of the time." The most immediate beneficiaries of the regime's chosen path to national development would be those who enjoyed the political calm and the relatively smooth functioning of the economic marketplace, and those who were able to cash in on economic opportunities created by the new economic policies. There seemingly were more visible losers -- the unemployed, powerless politicians and union leaders, political prisoners, and exiles -- than winners in the early stages.

Yu used the three grand categories of survival, growth, and quality of life to illustrate his definition of development. While the Chilean approach to development after 1973 may engender all three, the most obvious would seem to be growth, an economic growth rooted in

authoritarian politics. For the people of Chile it implied a deferred gratification (in contrast to the immediate benefits of the first Allende years): present toils for future rewards. And like the "message of modern power" described by Saul Bellow, it required submission by the people to the actions of the State.

SECRET
NO FORN DISSEM
NO UNCLASS
NO DECLASS

CHAPTER III

MASS MEDIA COVERAGE IN CHILE

Most generalizations about less developed countries do not serve well their actual diversity. These so-called Third World countries are not monolithic in their respective levels of poverty and/or development.¹

Generalized assumptions about the media in LDC's can be illustrated with two examples:

Everything presently known about the Indonesian media system supports Suhendra Kushwaha's generalization "that for developing countries mass media are in fact not yet for the masses but should be looked upon as elite media."²

and:

In the houses of the "Third World" the TV set is turned on for between five and six hours per day.³

In the former example the author observed that mass media use in Indonesia had a pronounced elite bias. He then applied the findings to an across-the-board statement about all LDC's. Conversely, the latter example implies heavy television viewing by the inhabitants of the Third

¹For comparative data see Sewell, pp. 147-171.

²Astrid Susanto, "The Mass Communication System in Indonesia," in Political Power and Communications in Indonesia, eds. Karl D. Jackson and Lucian W. Pye (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), p. 258.

³Neil P. Hurley, Comunicaciones: Teoría y Estrategia (Santiago: Universidad de Chile, 1974), p. 156.

World. This also is a contentious generalization since television probably is the least used medium (among TV, radio, and the press) in these countries today. Statements about media use and penetration should be made for specific groups of people in specific LDC's, depending upon, among other things, the actual existence of radio and television transmitters, newsstands, movie theatres, radios, TV sets, literacy, and the income to purchase such items. Such coverage considerations limit the pervasiveness of the mass media at the global, regional, national, and local levels.

While it is clear Third World media development does not yet approach the levels achieved by the developed countries, there are broad differences among Third World regions.⁴ Latin America has a much higher level of media coverage than both Asia and Africa (see tables 1 and 2 in chapter II). Moreover, within a region, media development varies between countries.

An example of different levels of media development within a region is an African case. Ethiopia had a 1974 population of 27,800,000. The population of the Ivory Coast in 1975 was 6,673,013. In Ethiopia two Addis Ababa radio stations transmitted to some 250,000 radio receivers (9 per 1,000 inhabitants). Television from Addis Ababa and Asmara was received by an estimated 20,000 sets (.72 sets per 1,000). In the Ivory Coast, on the other hand, Radio Abidjan, with seven relays

⁴Wilbur Schramm, "Data on Communication Systems in Three Developing Regions," in Communication and Change, the Last Ten Years - and the Next, eds. Wilbur Schramm and Daniel Lerner (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1976), pp. 11-14.

or transmitters, broadcasted to some 80,000 radio receivers (12 per 1,000), while Television Ivoirienne transmitted from ten locations to an estimated 154,000 TV sets (23 per 1,000).⁵ One could assume from the information above that the Ivory Coast probably has a slightly higher use of radio and a considerably higher use of television as media of mass communication when compared to Ethiopia.

National level media statistics do not tell the whole story, however. Within a country regional disparities in mass media coverage also can be found. Socioeconomic factors such as literacy and the ability to purchase a newspaper, magazine, movie admission, radio, or TV set limit mass media coverage within a given country. Considerations of media coverage must take into account factors on both the "source" and the "receiver" ends of the communication process, as well as the channels themselves. The existence of a newsstand or a television transmitter in a location is as relevant a consideration to coverage as are people's ability to read or to own television sets.⁶

In the continuing efforts to understand the effects of the mass media in LDC's, an important point may be derived from the preceding discussion: Any direct effect (i.e., an effect which plausibly could be traced to media exposure) is dependent upon media exposure in the first instance. Mass exposure to mass media messages is not a given in all LDC's, particularly when one considers specific media in specific

⁵The Europa Yearbook 1977 (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1977), (Ethiopia) p. 546 and (Ivory Coast) p. 800.

⁶Literacy is not a strict prerequisite to exposure to print media. People often are read to, and often receive visual information (photographs, cartoons, and symbols) from print media without actually reading. Literacy is, of course, a prerequisite to actually reading a newspaper or magazine.

locations. The present work, which includes an analysis of the media role in Chilean politics, must be preceded by a description of the recent state of mass media coverage and use in Chile. The main focus of this chapter will be on television, radio, and the press, with less attention paid to the cinema and various other types of mediated communication.

The press has a long tradition in Chile. On display in the main foyer of the national library in Santiago is the front page of the inaugural issue of La Aurora de Chile. The first edition was February 13, 1812, some thirteen years before Chile's independence from Spain. At least two provincial dailies still publishing in 1977 were begun in the nineteenth century as well, El Sur of Concepción (1882) and El Llanquihue of Puerto Montt (1885). El Campesino, the farmers' monthly magazine, began publishing in 1838.

The electronic media were twentieth century phenomena in Chile as elsewhere. By 1960 over 100 radio stations were operating in Chile, and there were thirteen radio receivers for every 100 inhabitants.⁷ An estimated ninety-five per cent of the populated territory was covered by at least one radio transmitter.⁸

Chile was somewhat of a latecomer to television use, with some

⁷Wilbur Schramm, Mass Media and National Development (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 282.

⁸Ben G. Burnett, Political Groups in Chile (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1970), pp. 25-29.

of the first TV viewing taking place in public places during the broadcasts of the 1962 World Championship Soccer games.⁹

Chile approached the television age with caution during the presidency of Arturo Alessandri (1958-1964), eventually deciding upon a system of university-based television channels. This was considered a compromise between complete government or complete private control.¹⁰

Nearly fifty daily newspapers served Chile during the early sixties.¹¹ El Mercurio enjoyed a daily circulation of about 150,000 copies, and La Tercera 50,000.¹² At least three Chilean magazines (Vea, Ercilla, and Selecciones de Reader's Digest) enjoyed circulations of 100,000 or better.¹³

By the end of Eduardo Frei's presidency (1964-1970) the growth of television as a mass medium was well underway. TV channels were organized in the University of Chile and the Catholic University of Santiago, as well as the Catholic University of Valparaiso. And the

⁹ Neil P. Hurley, "University Satellite for Latin America," Journal of Communication 25 (Spring 1975): 158.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 161.

¹¹ Schramm, Mass Media and National Development, p. 282.

¹² Felipe Diaz Ossa, "Chile," in International Handbook of Advertising, ed. S. Watson Dunn (New York: McGraw Hill, Inc, 1964), pp. 299-305.

¹³ Ibid., pp. 300-303.

state television channel was broadcasting in seven of Chile's largest urban centers (see appendix 1), covering half of the country's population.

Frei's government initiated the national television network, which eventually would become the expansive Televisión Nacional de Chile (TVN):

Confident that they would continue in power for six, even twelve more years, the Christian Democrats did not see any danger in creating a nation-wide channel which later the Marxist-dominated government would control.¹⁴

The greatest expansion of the TVN network occurred under the presidency of Salvador Allende (1970-73). Some thirty-eight transmitters and repeaters were added to the system, resulting in the TV coverage of most of Chile's cities and their surrounding areas (see appendix 1). Many smaller, more remote towns and villages still were not served by television broadcasting, however, prompting one observer to state in 1973: "In the Chilean countryside television is practically absent."¹⁵

Chilean manufacturers, protected by import restrictions, were manufacturing thousands of television receivers in the early seventies, and TV already was moving out of the luxury class and into the homes of the less affluent: "Inexpensive government-subsidized television sets were provided under Allende's administration as a popular measure."¹⁶

¹⁴ Neil P. Hurley, "Chilean Television: A Study of Political Communication." Journalism Quarterly 51 (Winter 1974): 685.

¹⁵ Peter Schenkel, La estructura de poder de los medios de comunicacion en cinco paises latinoamericanos (Santiago, Chile: Instituto Latinoamericano de Investigaciones Sociales, 1973), p. 49.

¹⁶ Patricia Fagen, "Media in Allende's Chile," Journal of Communication, 24 (Winter 1974): 68.

Only in Santiago, Valparaiso, and Coquimbo, however, could more than one channel be received.¹⁷ The rest of the country had only the government-owned TVN. One writer characterized this situation as Allende's "state monopoly in the provinces."¹⁸

The great growth of the television medium between 1964 and 1974 gave that medium a geographic extensiveness approaching that of radio and the press.

Following the golpe del estado of September 1973, numerous leftist radio stations, newspapers and magazines were shut down. Between 1974 and 1978 numerous new radio stations and magazines were begun, and the remaining newspapers took advantage of the reduced competition to expand their circulations.

The third proprietor of TVN, the military junta led by General Augusto Pinochet, continued the expansion of the national television network. Between the time of the coup and 1978 TVN had added over twenty-five transmitters or repeaters to its network (see appendix 1). Although these resulted in but a small increment in the number of potential viewers, it did bring television to rural areas, and made coverage of the national population nearly complete.

To get an idea of just how extensive mass media coverage was at the national level in Chile, a private research firm conducted a nationwide survey in June, July, and August 1977. Respondents were asked about their exposure to four media during the past week, and

¹⁷ Schenkel, p. 49.

¹⁸ Hurley, "Chilean Television: A Study of Political Communication," p. 686.

about exposure to national news by way of those media in the past twenty-four hours. The results suggest that mass media coverage at the national level in Chile in 1977 was quite extensive: 83.1% had watched television in the past week; 73.2% had listened to the radio; 66.6% had read a daily newspaper; and 29% had read a magazine. For news, 43.8% had seen televised news; 35.8% radio; 34.5% newspaper; and 5.3% magazine.¹⁹

These national measures of media use tell only part of the story, however. Chile is a long and narrow country, some 2,600 miles from Arica to Cape Horn, but never exceeding a width of 250 miles. The entire eastern edge of the country is bounded by the towering Andes Mountains. Mass media coverage is not uniform from north to south in Chile. Various regionalized indicators will support this. Likewise, other indicators will infer socioeconomic biases which no doubt affect mass media use in Chile. Table 3 contains indicators of both direct and indirect relevance to mass media coverage and use in Chile.

These regionalized data indicate various disparities over space. As can be seen from this information, the Chilean population is heavily concentrated in the central regions. Adjacent Regions XIII (Santiago) and V (Valparaiso) together contain nearly half of Chile's people. Taken together, Regions V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, and XIII contain 88% of the population. This proximity factor has a bearing on mass media coverage, in that relatively high coverage levels at the national level can be obtained at relatively low cost. For instance, a newspaper publishing in Santiago could make a delivery to Puerto Montt more cheaply

¹⁹ Interview with Guillermo Chadwick Piwonka, Gallup Chile Limitada, Santiago, Chile, August 1977.

ALICIA M. MONTES

TABLE 3

CHILE: REGIONALIZED DEMOGRAPHIC, SOCIOECONOMIC AND MASS MEDIA IN

Region	1975 Popula- tion	Inhab- itants /Km ²	% Total popu- lation	% Urban 1975	% GNP 1972	% Liter- ate 1970	Life expec- tancy 1969-70 (years)	Infant mortal- ity/1000 live births 1975	% Popula- tion "poor"	% Total "poor" popula- tion	Radi sta- tion 1977
I	209,900	3.6	2.0	92	2.7	95	65	55	21.7	1.99	6
II	288,000	2.3	2.8	97	6.7	96	60	60	19.6	2.57	14
III	179,200	2.3	1.8	86	2.6	92	62	64	25.0	1.99	6
IV	385,200	9.7	3.8	65	2.5	86	63	64	29.9	5.33	7
V	1,124,500	66.6	11.0	87	10.9	93	64	51	16.8	7.96	19
VI	529,600	34.3	5.2	52	5.0	84	62	64	22.7	5.68	6
VII	684,000	22.4	6.7	51	4.2	82	60	70	24.6	7.99	11
VIII	1,406,000	39.0	13.7	71	10.0	86	58	80	22.6	15.02	21
IX	649,800	20.0	6.3	54	3.0	82	59	95	27.3	8.50	12
X	831,600	11.5	8.1	54	4.7	86	59	83	20.3	7.91	15
XI	57,300	0.6	0.6	68	0.5	87	62	83	29.5	0.75	3
XII	101,900	0.8	1.0	86	2.1	96	65	35	9.4	0.45	7
XIII(Stgo.)	3,806,000	241.2	37.0	95	45.1	94	64	43	18.8	33.76	34
CHILE	10,253,00	13.6	100.0	78	100.0	90	62	61	21.0	99.9	161

Sources: Population, Anuario Estadístico 1976, p. 12; Urbanicity, Anuario Estadístico 1976, pp. 338 and 340; Literacy, life expectancy, and infant mortality, Instituto Nacional de Estadística to Indicators of Extreme Poverty selected by Universidad Católica de Chile, based on equality of dad Católica de Chile-ODEPLAN, Agosto 1974), urban poor made up 67.82% of total poor population, Compendio Estadístico 1977, pp. 91-96; Newspapers, Compendio Estadístico 1977, pp. 81-82; TVN tra with TV and radio, XIV Censo de Población y III de Viviendas, (Viviendas, Hogares y Familias) (Sa TV sets per 1,000 inhabitants, Informe Sobre Chile 1976, p. 311.

ADULT

TABLE 3

ALIZED DEMOGRAPHIC, SOCIOECONOMIC AND MASS MEDIA INDICATORS

	%	Life	Infant	%	%	Radio	News-	TVN	TV sets/	%	%	% House-
	Liter-	expec-	mortal-	Popula-	Total	sta-	papers	trans-	1000 in-	House-	House-	holds, no
	ate	tancy	ity/1000	tion	"poor"	tions	1975	mitters/	habit-	holds	holds.	radio or
	1970	1969-70	live births	"poor"	popula-	1977		repeaters	ants	with TV	with radio	TV
		(years)	1975		tion			1977	1974	1970	1970	1970
.72	95	65	55	21.7	1.99	6	4	4	129	23	75	22
.7	96	60	60	19.6	2.57	14	4	6	87	19	77	20
.6	92	62	64	25.0	1.99	6	3	8	41	1	72	25
.5	86	63	64	29.9	5.33	7	8	10	44	2	68	30
.9	93	64	51	16.8	7.96	19	8	7	151	24	80	17
.0	84	62	64	22.7	5.68	6	9	3	110	13	70	28
.2	82	60	70	24.6	7.99	11	12	6	95	7	65	33
.0	86	58	80	22.6	15.02	21	8	5	85	8	64	34
.0	82	59	95	27.3	8.50	12	9	7	102	3	51	48
.7	86	59	83	20.3	7.91	15	8	7	106	1	63	36
.5	87	62	83	29.5	0.75	3	3	2	70	1	68	30
.1	96	65	35	9.4	0.45	7	2	6	118	35	85	11
.1	94	64	43	18.8	33.76	34	10	2	142	34	82	15
.0	90	62	61	21.0	99.9	161	88	73	118	19	78	25

p. 12; Urbanicity, Anuario Estadístico 1976, pp. 48-103; GNP, derived from Informe Sobre Chile 1976, infant mortality, Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, Santiago, 1977; "Poor" population, classed according to urbanicity, Universidad Católica de Chile, based on equality of housing and household furnishings (Investigación Urbana), Informe Sobre Chile 1976, p. 358; Radio stations, Compendio Estadístico 1977, pp. 81-82; TVN transmitters, Televisión Nacional de Chile, 1977; Households, de Viviendas, Hogares y Familias (Santiago, Chile: Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, 1970); Informe Sobre Chile 1976, p. 311.

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than to Puerto Natales, other things being equal. Increments to that paper's circulation in the more proximate areas would come more cheaply than ones in more distant regions.

The same reasoning can be applied to the construction of television transmitters. A single transmitter serving the area around San Antonio (Region V) covers about 66,500 persons. A similar transmitter constructed in Posesión (Region XII) serves a mere 1,000 persons. The first seven transmitters of the national TV network, most of which were in the central regions, achieved a potential coverage of nearly half the Chilean population.

Chile's high rate of urbanicity, in its relation to mass media coverage, also involves this proximity factor. Local publications can be more easily distributed. Large percentages of a regional population would reside within the range of city-based radio transmitters. Even movie attendance could be expected to be affected favorably by high urbanicity, simply because movie theatres tend to be located in cities rather than rural areas.

Although the literacy rate is not a strict indicator of a regional population's ability to use print media, the Chilean data do suggest a widespread reading capability.

The regional disparities evident in these data, as well as in the following information pertaining to the location of media outlets, serve as sub-national qualifiers of national media coverage statistics in Chile.

Map 1 shows the approximate distribution of human settlement in Chile. Map 2 shows the approximate locations of transmitters and

Map 1: Population distribution in Chile; 1975 estimated population
10,253,014 (regional populations noted)

Concepción/
Talcahuano

Chillán

Los Angeles

VIII

1,405,273

Temuco

IX

649,869

Valdivia

Osorno

Puerto Montt

Ancud

Castro

X

831,607

Coyhaique

Puerto Aysen

XI

57,337

XII

Puerto
Natales

Sources: Derived from "Chile: Población Urbana y Rural," Chile Hacia un Nuevo Destino, 1976.

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Map 2: Approximate locations of TVN transmitters and repeaters (circled), June 1977.

2 of 2

(Southern half on
following page)

VIII

IX

X

XI

XII

IX

X

XI

XII

2 of 2

Source: Gerencia Tecnica, Tele-
visión Nacional de Chile, June
1977.

and repeaters in the TVN network in 1977. The area from Arica to Castro is served by a single system of transmitters and repeaters linked by microwave. The microwave transmission system was operated by the National Telecommunications Company (ENTEL). Four remote transmitters and/or microwave systems operated in Puerto Aysen/Coyhaique, Puerto Natales, and Punta Arenas, and on Easter Island (not on map). These remote systems received videotaped programming from Santiago. TVN officials claimed a 95% coverage of the population in 1977.²⁰

Covering a much smaller area, and fewer people, were the four university-based channels. Universidad Catolica de Chile had outlets in Santiago, Valparaiso, San Fernando, and Talcahuano (Concepción); Universidad Catolica de Valparaiso broadcasted in Santiago, Valparaiso, and Coquimbo; and the newest network, Universidad del Norte, advertised channels in Arica, Iquique, Antofagasta, and Chuquicamata/Calama, although it was unclear in 1977 how many of these actually were operating. Universidad de Chile operated a single channel in Santiago.

As of 1977, TVN planned to install three more transmitters, at Huasco, Laja, and Quellón. Universidad Catolica de Chile planned to extend its network to Talca and Chillán, while Universidad de Chile intended to add a transmitter at Los Andes.²¹ By and large, it was only the residents of the largest cities who had access to programs other than those of TVN. This included a large percentage of the

²⁰ Interview with Alejandro Olivos, Technical Manager, Televisión Nacional de Chile, Santiago, Chile, June 1977; and Servicios Electricos, de Gas y de Telecomunicaciones (SEGTTEL), "Reseña sobre telecomunicaciones civiles en Chile," Santiago, Chile, 1977, p. 5. (Mimeographed.)

²¹ "TV en provincias: 80 dólares por minuto cuesta llevar la TV a Punta Arenas," El Mercurio (Santiago, Chile), July 6, 1977.

national population, but probably excluded entire regions and certainly many rural areas.

It is difficult to pinpoint exactly how many Chileans actually were capable of watching the results of this extensive national television coverage. One government report stated that, although 95% coverage had been attained, "only 40% of this population have the material possibility of receiving the programming."²² In other words, perhaps 60% of Chileans do not have television sets in their homes. This is perhaps the most conservative estimate of the number of TV viewers in Chile.

The estimated 83% viewers derived from the 1977 viewing poll seems plausible for a number of reasons. Domestic production of television receivers is one collaborating piece of evidence. TV manufacturing began in Chile in 1964. In 1966, 10,000 sets were produced, selling at an average price of US\$1,000. Imports of TV sets were prohibited until 1973, and Chile was not an exporter of televisions. In 1974 alone, some 215,000 sets were manufactured in Chile. With competition from imports increased, and general demand declining, the estimated domestic production of sets for 1977 was 80,000 to 100,000 units, selling at an average price of \$200. There were approximately 1,400,000 TV sets in Chile in 1977.²³ There were an estimated 500,000 sets in Chile in 1970.²⁴ If the number of televisions

²² SEGTEL, "Reseña," p. 5.

²³ Production data from interview with Fernando Sierpe, Corporación de Fomento (CORFO); Director, Empresa Eléctrica Nacional (ELECNA); Director, Industria de Radio y Televisión (IRT), Santiago, Chile, August 1977.

²⁴ Anuario Estadístico 1976 (Santiago, Chile: Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, 1976), p. 180.

had indeed trebled since 1970, the 1970 TV ownership data in Table 3 is terribly outdated.

Although not a measurement comparable to the 1970 TV ownership data, the 1974 TV ownership data found in table 3 appear to be more realistic figures. In addition to implying a larger number of sets in the country, they also show wider distribution over space. Much of the extension of the TVN network into smaller cities and large towns had been completed by 1974.

Again, it is difficult to pinpoint the exact status of television coverage and use in Chile. It is still a relatively new medium, and many TV sets were produced or imported after 1974. A total of 1,400,000 sets gives about 131 sets per one thousand inhabitants against the estimated 1977 population.²⁵ This would be one set for each 7.6 persons.

Because a television set is a relatively costly item, there was undoubtedly a socioeconomic bias operating in Chile as regards television ownership in 1977. As early as 1974, however, Hurley maintained that the poor in Chile viewed their transistor radios and their TVs as primary necessities rather than as luxuries.²⁶

To the visitor to Chile, television is quite conspicuous. Store windows display the latest models, the TV antennas are everywhere to be seen, even on the roofs of sub-standard houses and squatters' shacks. The ENTEL tower dominates the skyline of downtown Santiago. Television

²⁵1977 population estimated at 10,655,757. Ibid., p. 20.

²⁶Hurley, Comunicaciones: Teoría y Estrategia, pp. 146 and 157.

viewing is conspicuous even in public places--bus stations, hotel lobbies, dining rooms, and even on some buses between cities. According to Hurley, Chileans in the early seventies watched from sixteen to twenty-five hours of television per week.²⁷

It probably can be concluded that successive governments have endeavored to make television a geographically and socioeconomically extensive medium. The non-stop construction of the TVN network under Frei, Allende, and Pinochet speaks for itself²⁸, as does Allende's subsidizing of TV sets. One more indicator of the State's interest in making the medium extensive is a provision included in the Ley de la Televisión, the Law of Television, which has regulated TV broadcasting since 1970. The provision was for the Central Bank to import battery operated television sets duty-free, to be sold in areas where people had no electricity.²⁹

It is difficult to dispute the extensiveness of the television medium in Chile. On the "source" end was a national network covering 95% of the populated territory. On the "receiver" end was an ever-increasing number of television receivers in the country, and by extension, an increasing number of persons with direct or indirect access to television viewing. One still would expect to find higher incidence of television ownership among the higher income groups in

²⁷Hurley, p. 156.

²⁸By 1977 an estimated US\$15,000,000 had been invested in the electrical links for TV networks in Chile. SEGTEL, "Reseña," p. 5.

²⁹Consejo Nacional de Televisión (CNTV), "Televisión Chilena - Ley No. 17.377," Santiago, Chile, 1977, Artículo 39. (Mimeographed.)

Chile, however. Also, Regions with relatively low TV ownership levels (based on the 1974 data in Table 3), such as Regions III, IV, and XI, would indicate spatial disparities in coverage. Taking into account the 1977 Gallup viewing poll, however, it could be concluded that television was the most extensive mass communication medium in Chile in 1977.

According to the 1977 Gallup poll, radio was the second most extensive medium in Chile. The rather high listening level (73.2%) recorded by the poll does not seem at all inconsistent even with the outdated 1970 figures on radio ownership (Table 3). If anything it seems low.

As of 1977 there were 140 AM radio stations and 21 FM stations in Chile,³⁰ with a geographic coverage similar to that of TVN. Map 3 shows the approximate locations of cities and towns in which there is at least one AM radio transmitter. Map 4 shows approximate daytime broadcast ranges of the strongest AM signal emanating from each of these locations.³¹ Clearly the radio medium is extensive from the "source" end, particularly when Map 4 is compared with Map 1 showing the human settlement pattern.

But do people actually own radios? There are no reliable figures on the number of radios in Chile. A government electrical

³⁰ Compendio Estadístico 1977 (Santiago, Chile: Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, 1977), pp. 91-96. There appear to have been a number of stations of questionable or experimental status. Servicios Electricos, de Gas y de Telecomunicaciones (SEGTEL), which enforces technical standards for radio stations, listed 140 AM and 38 FM stations in 1977.

³¹ Map prepared for the author by SEGTEL, July 1977.

Map 3: Approximate locations of AM radio transmitters
in Chile, April 1977.

2 of 2

XIII Santiago

(Southern half on
following page)

IX

X

XI

XII

Source: Derived from Compendio Estadístico 1977, pp. 92-96.

60

(Northern third)

Map 4: Approximate daytime broadcast
ranges of most powerful AM radio
stations in each Chilean city with at
least one AM transmitter, 1977.

85 km

(Scale is approximate)

61
(Central third)

(Southern third)

Produced by Departamento de Inspecciones y Control, Santiago, Chile, July 1977.

industry official told the author that the recent boom in the sale of transistorized radios in Chile made a current estimate very difficult to make. He said that there were perhaps 3,000,000 radios in Chile as of 1973.³² Thousands had been sold since.

The data contained in Table 3 show that 73% of households reported having radios in 1970. The lowest incidence of radio ownership clustered in Regions VII through X. These four regions also were the four with the highest number of households reporting no TV or radio. They were effectively outside the coverage of the electronic media.

Numerous researchers have correlated increased use of mass media with increased general levels of development or "wealth". The Chileans figures for 1970 would support that. Regions VII through X not only exhibit the lowest incidence of TV and radio ownership, but also low urbanicity; lower percentage of GNP produced relative to percentage of population; lower literacy; shorter life expectancy; higher infant mortality; and higher percentage of "poor" inhabitants, relative to the rest of Chile.

Radio ownership undoubtedly increased from the 1970 level of 73% of households, but it is impossible to say by how much. Likewise, there is no information to indicate that the regional disparities have decreased. The Gallup listening figure of 73.2% does seem low, and given the 1970 data it certainly would not be high.

³²Interview with Fernando Sierpe; Unesco estimated over 3,000,000 radios in Chile in 1974. Unesco Statistical Yearbook 1976 (Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, 1977), p. 1004; Europa Yearbook 1976 estimated 1,500,000 radios in Chile in 1974, p. 357.

The primary difference between coverage of radio and that of television in Chile was that television programming emanated almost entirely from a single location--Santiago. Radio stations, on the other hand, were mostly privately owned and locally operated. Each station served a relatively small population compared to TVN or any of the university-based TV networks. Radio stations were located in some seventy cities and towns in Chile.

Newspapers, read by 66.6% of Chileans surveyed by Gallup in 1977, also were less centralized than television, but were perhaps more centralized than radio. There were about 88 newspapers in Chile in 1975. Although no region had less than two newspapers, nine of Chile's forty-one provinces did not have a single newspaper published within them.

Newspaper distribution cannot be evaluated like radio or television coverage, however. The relative centralization of newspaper publishing vis-à-vis radio station location may be relevant to the present work, but is not directly relevant to extent of coverage at the "source" end of the communication process. For example, over 50% of the circulation of La Tercera, Chile's largest selling daily, was outside the Metropolitan Zone of Santiago where it was published.³³

³³Circulation data from La Tercera, Circulation Department, Santiago, Chile, June 1977. Regional breakdown of circulation as follows:

Region	% National Circulation	Region	% National Circulation
I	2.3	VIII	8.7
II	2.9	IX	3.3
III	2.1	X	4.2
IV	3.4	XI	.3
V	11.4	XII	1.7
VI	5.3	XIII(Stgo.)	49.3
VII	5.1		

In this same vein, regionalized circulation figures of newspapers published in given regions do not also indicate the regional figure for newspaper readership: Most papers appeared to have circulations outside the region of origin, particularly the Santiago dailies.

Regional disparity in newspaper circulation (a surrogate for readership), therefore, is difficult to assess. In an effort to understand some of the qualities of newspaper circulation in an LDC, the author visited numerous cities and towns in Regions VIII and X in July 1977.

By way of comparison, the estimated 1976 circulation of newspapers published in the Santiago region was 183,686,485, about one half million copies per day. Those published in Region VII numbered 6,331,847, and in Region X, 3,658,381.³⁴

Metropolitan Santiago dailies in 1977 included La Tercera, El Mercurio, La Segunda, Las Ultimas Noticias, El Cronista, El Diario Oficial de la Republica, El Cacique de Talagante, El Labrador de Melipilla, and Puerto Alto al Dia. The latter three were not national newspapers, and El Diario Oficial was less a newspaper than a fact-sheet on government laws and pronouncements.

Region VIII newspapers included La Discusión (Chillán), El Sur and La Cronica (Concepción), La Tribuna (Los Angeles), and El Comercio (San Carlos).

Region X dailies included El Correo (Valdivia), La Prensa (Osorno), El Llanquihue (Puerto Montt), La Cruz del Sur (Ancud), and El Correo (Castro).

³⁴ Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, Santiago, Chile, July 1977.

All the major Santiago dailies were available to a greater or lesser extent in Regions VIII and X in 1977. La Tercera delivered 8.7% of its daily circulation to Region VIII and 4.2% to Region X.³⁵

El Mercurio's deliveries to Region VIII on June 15, 1977 included 7,870 copies to Concepción; 1,700 copies to Los Angeles; 1,050 to Chillán; and 110 to Lebu, to name just a few. Likewise in Region X, El Mercurio sent 1,600 copies to Valdivia; 1,100 to Osorno; 1,000 to Puerto Montt; 150 to Castro; and 30 to Futrono. Some 68,000 copies of El Mercurio were destined for newspaper stands outside Santiago that day.³⁶

El Cronista also distributed copies to various, but fewer, locations in Regions VIII and X.³⁷

Newspaper distribution in Chile worked on an agent/sub-agent system. The agent in Concepción, for instance, received copies of El Mercurio from Santiago for distribution, not only in Concepción, but also to sub-agents in nearby towns. Map 5 indicates the approximate locations of these El Mercurio sub-agencies served by the Concepción agency.

It also was not uncommon for sub-agents to forward copies again, to be distributed in even more remote locales. Numerous towns and villages appeared to be without newspaper deliveries, however.

Smaller, regional dailies also distributed copies to agents or to individual subscribers outside of the cities of publication. Map 6

³⁵ La Tercera, Circulation Department, Santiago, Chile, June 1977.

³⁶ El Mercurio, Circulation Department, Santiago, Chile, June 15, 1977. For same-day deliveries, El Mercurio shipped copies by air as far north as Atica (1,100 copies) and as far south as Puerto Huidido (10 copies).

³⁷ El Cronista, Circulation Department, Santiago, Chile, June 1977.

REGION VIII

Map 5: Approximate locations of sub-agencies served by El Mercurio agent in Concepción, July 1977. Locations served are underlined.

Approximately 60 km

REGION X

Map 6: Approximate locations of El Llanquihue deliveries, July 1977. Locations indicated by a, b, etc.

Source: Circulation Department, El Llanquihue, July 1977.

shows the approximate locations of towns and villages served by El Llanquihue of Puerto Montt.

After tracing the distribution of El Mercurio and La Tercera in various parts of Regions VIII and X, as well as the regional circulations of La Discusión, El Sur, La Tribuna, El Llanquihue, and El Correo (Castro), the author has concluded that newspapers had the lowest level of geographic coverage among radio, television, and newspapers in Chile in 1977 (See appendix 2 for circulation data mentioned above).

A newspaper, being a tangible object as opposed to a radio or TV signal, is unidirectional in its distribution. A single copy may be read by numerous people in various locations, but the medium itself does not emanate blanket-like waves which can be captured by anyone within a specific area.

In some ways the newspaper was the most extensive medium in Chile, because a copy can travel anywhere man can. But single copies do not make for the saturation coverage that can be achieved with strategically placed TV or radio transmitters. An example of this limitation is provided in the case of the area surrounding Puerto Montt. Map 6 shows the towns served by the local daily, El Llanquihue. Many towns and villages in the area did not receive the paper on a regular basis. Even those that did may have received only a small number of copies destined for specific individuals, or a bundle to be sold from a newsstand on the main street or plaza. Penetration into the more remote rural areas appears to be slight.

Radio Cooperativa, on the other hand, can reach just about anyone with a radio who lives within a radius which stretches north to La Union, south to Castro, and over the entire width of the country (see map 4). Further evidence of the more intensive coverage of radio in the Puerto Montt area is Cooperativa's daily program, "Mensajes al Campo" (Messages to the Countryside). Local people paid the station to broadcast messages to family and friends in remote locations which lacked telephone or telegraph service. Messages on July 9, 1977 were directed toward twenty-five towns and villages, most of which are too small even to be found on a roadmap.³⁸

The point to be made here is that while a newspaper can go anywhere, in Chile they did not go everywhere. Coverage was extensive at the national level, particularly for the Santiago dailies. But it was not intensive at the regional and local levels. Smaller towns, villages, and rural settlements generally were not the recipients of daily newspapers. This is not to put the onus entirely on the newspapers themselves: Their distribution appeared to be determined by simple demand (like the air deliveries to Tierra del Fuego).

A socioeconomic constraint on newspaper readership in Chile may have been the cost of these papers. El Mercurio and La Tercera each sold for five pesos in 1977, or about twenty-five cents (US). Regional dailies were in the three to four peso range. Although these prices would be comparable, or slightly higher, than those of North American dailies, the per capita income in Chile would have been

³⁸ Interview with Rene Salinas, Managing Director, Radio Cooperativa, Puerto Montt, Chile, July 1977.

only \$1,000 in 1977, compared to perhaps \$7,000 in Canada. Like television and radio ownership, newspaper purchasing would likely be influenced by an individual's personal disposable income.

Again, the Gallup poll figure of 66.6% readership for newspapers, lower coverage relative to TV and radio, appears to be consistent with available information and the author's observations.

Magazines were the fellow travellers of newspapers in Chile. Essentially the same system of agents and sub-agents was used for their distribution.

The magazine is a broad category, embracing everything from political monthlies like Mensaje to news weeklies like Que Pasa, to scandal sheets like Vea, to women's periodicals like Buen Hogar, to sports publications like Estadio, or even Mampato for children.

Most mass circulation magazines like those cited above were published in Santiago, the three most prominent publishers being Lord Cochrane, Editorial Andina, and Editora Gabriela Mistral.³⁹ Of 125 magazines surveyed in 1975, seventy were published in the Metropolitan Zone.⁴⁰

Comic books were quite conspicuous on Chilean newsstands in 1977. Schenkel, writing to 1973, claimed that between 650,000 and 750,000 American comic books were distributed in Chile each month.⁴¹

³⁹ Informe Sobre Chile 1976 (Santiago, Chile: CCC Investigación Limitada, 1976), p. 299.

⁴⁰ Compendio Estadístico, pp. 81-82.

⁴¹ Schenkel, p. 55.

In 1975, 23,575,168 magazine copies were published in Chile,⁴² about 2.3 copies per person for the year. Gallup's 29% readership level for magazines does not seem inconsistent with this figure. Magazines would have had the lowest coverage level among TV, radio, newspapers, and magazines.

The price of a magazine was undoubtedly one deterrent to wide readership in the Chilean case. Weeklies like Ercilla and Hoy were in the \$1.00 to \$1.50 range in 1977, while some monthlies cost as much as \$2.50.

The motion picture, viewed at a public showing in a movie theatre, probably was the mass medium with the lowest level of coverage in Chile in 1977. Total movie attendance in 1975 was 23,702,043.⁴³ That would be just over two movies per year per person at the national level. Movie theatres, however, were even more restricted in the intensity of regional and local coverage than were newspapers and magazines. People go to a movie, of course; it does not come to them. Other things being equal, the unlikelihood of one's movie attendance would increase with distance from residence to the nearest movie theatre.

Although there were movie theatres in every region of Chile in 1977, some provinces had none at all, others only a handful, and most small towns had no theatres. Of 289 movie theatres reported in 1975, a quarter of them were concentrated in the Santiago region.

⁴²Compendio Estadístico, p. 83.

⁴³Ibid., pp. 85-90.

In general terms, mass media coverage in Chile in 1977 was much less intensive in rural areas than in the cities and large towns. In Santiago, of course, the symbolic climate was alive with media messages. Four TV channels offered programs to the viewer, the radio bands were full of news, music, and other entertainment, newsstands were well stocked with newspapers and magazines, and there were many movies being shown at the city's theatres.

To get a feel for mass media coverage in the rural areas, the author travelled to Antuco (Region VIII) and Futrono (Region X), small towns in the foothills of the Andes.

Antuco is one of several small towns in a rural comuna in Bío Bío province. The population of the entire comuna was about 17,000 in 1970.⁴⁴ The author's large transistor radio was able to receive four AM stations in Antuco, but no FM stations. There was one small newsstand on the road running through the town. There one could buy that day's editions of three Santiago dailies, as well as El Sur, published in the regional capital, Concepción. Magazines, the vendor said, were available only sporadically or by special request. Local residents attested to watching TVN on their televisions, and antennas were in evidence. There was no movie theatre in the town, but movies were shown on occasion, according to residents.

Antuco was served by daily buses to and from Los Angeles, and there was a mail and telegraph office on the edge of town.

⁴⁴ Comisión Nacional de la Reforma Administrativa, Chile Hacia un Nuevo Destino (Santiago, Chile: Editora Nacional Gabriela Mistral Ltda., 1976), p. 340.

Futrono is a rural town in the lake district of the tenth region. Perhaps as many as 1,700 persons lived in or around the town in 1970.⁴⁵ Futrono lies on the northern shore of Lake Ranco in the Andean foothills. The author could receive only two AM stations while in Futrono, and no FM stations. TVN was received there, and numerous houses had antennas atop.

On July 16, 1977 copies of that day's El Mercurio, La Tercera, and El Correo (Valdivia) arrived at two o'clock in the afternoon. Magazines such as Que Pasa, Hoy, Vea, and Vanidades were also available at the one small newsstand on the main street. Deliveries of newspapers on the day of publication was no simple task. They probably came from Valdivia, by way of Paillaco. From Paillaco, on the main road, one must travel another fifty kilometers into the hills on an unpaved, pockmarked road. There was no movie theatre in Futrono, although residents said films were shown occasionally at the local school.

Buses come and go between Futrono and Valdivia each day, and a mail and telegraph office was located near the center of town.

The author's observations in Antuco and Futrono tended to support the notion that, although the media in Chile do penetrate the rural areas, this penetration is much less intensive than in the cities.

Other, miscellaneous information about communication in Chile may be of interest. For example, some comparative prices of daily newspapers, TV sets, and movie admissions in various cities appear in appendix 3. These prices varied considerably from city to city.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 375.

There were 643 libraries reported in 1974 (146 public; 78 university; 358 school; and 61 specialized). Their combined holdings consisted of 4,186,771 books, 795,619 magazines and periodicals, and 333,854 pamphlets and other materials. There were local public and school libraries in every province in 1974. Santiago had the most of all types of libraries with a total of 163. Arauco province (Region VIII) had a low total of five. Eight of Chile's then twenty-five provinces were not served by a university library. Well over half of all library resources in Chile were located in Santiago.⁴⁶

Nearly one-half million Chileans attended artistic performances in 1974, mostly in Santiago. Drama, concerts, folklore, and ballet were the most popular in terms of attendance.⁴⁷

Numerous news agencies operated in Chile in 1977, including ANSA (Italy); Associated Press (United States); Chung Hwa (China); DPA (Germany); EFE (Spain); Agence Presse France; Reuter (Great Britain); United Press International (United States); and ORBE (Chile).⁴⁸

Over eighty advertising agencies operated in Santiago alone in 1977, including such large international firms as J. Walter Thompson.⁴⁹

⁴⁶Anuario Estadístico 1976, p. 175. 83 libraries did not report.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 183.

⁴⁸Informe Sobre Chile 1976, p. 318.

⁴⁹Ibid., pp. 315-317.

Chile was the "Latin American pioneer" in telephony. Three and one-half years after the telephone patent was obtained in the United States (1877), the first telephones were in service in Valparaíso. Also in 1881, a telephone conversation between Valparaíso and Santiago was held over telegraph lines.

As of 1975, there were 4.52 telephones for every one hundred Chileans. The South American average at the time was 4.1, the world average 9.6. Only Argentina, Colombia, Venezuela, and Uruguay had a higher level of telephone coverage among countries on the continent. Some 600 localities in Chile were without telephone service in 1977.⁵⁰

Telegraph and telex service in Chile was provided by the government-owned Telegrafo del Estado, with 617 telegraph offices and 16 telex centers. International telegraph and telex services was shared by Telegrafo del Estado and three foreign firms: Transradio Chilena S.A.; ITT Comunicaciones Mundiales S.A.; and Cable West Coast.⁵¹

Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones (ENTEL-Chile S.A.), a state corporation, was responsible for long-distance domestic and international electronic communication. In 1977 there were 460,000 kilometers of microwave circuit from Arica to Chiloé. UHF, VHF, and high frequency networks supplemented the microwave system in the more remote areas. ENTEL represented Chile as a member of the INTELSAT satellite communication group. The INTELSAT land station at Longovilo, Chile was the first such station in Latin America.⁵²

⁵⁰Compañía de Telefonos de Chile, "Chile y la Telefonía," Santiago, Chile, 1977. (Mimeographed.)

⁵¹SEGTEL, "Reseña," pp. 3-4.

⁵²Ibid., pp. 2-3.

Some 300 private radio communication services operated in Chile in 1977, as well as 4,500 amateur radio operators. There also were maritime and aeronautic radio services in operation.⁵³

In summary, the mass media of television, radio, newspapers, and magazines, when taken together, had achieved a high level of coverage in Chile by 1977. The results of the 1977 Gallup mass media poll, while not verified by a cross-check survey, seem plausible given the available information on the geographic coverage and the use of mass media in Chile.

Television probably was the most extensive medium in Chile in 1977, both in terms of geographic extension and local intensity. Its local intensity, however, was qualified by a level of television ownership that exhibited pronounced regional disparities in 1974. Even the estimated figure of 131 sets per one thousand Chileans does not indicate a saturation coverage at the national level.

Radio enjoyed a geographic extension and a local intensity similar to that of television. Regional disparities in radio ownership were evident in 1970, and may have remained in 1977. The assumption that there were more radio in Chile in 1977 than there were television sets does not necessarily dispute the Gallup finding that radio was the second most frequently used mass medium in Chile in 1977. Among potential explanations would be the possibility that the interest in television in Chile recently had superseded that in radio. Issues of predominance aside, it was clear that radio coverage was at a level similar to that of TV.

⁵³ SEGTEL, p. 5.

Newspapers, particularly the large Santiago dailies, also were extensive in their geographic coverage. That overall coverage, and no doubt readership as well, was compromised by a lack of intensity at the local level. Chile's relatively high rate of literacy, with some regional disparities evident, indicated a widespread ability to read newspapers. It did appear, however, that this medium was used less frequently by the general population than were TV and radio.

Magazines appeared to have had a coverage and use level even lower than newspapers.

The motion picture as a mass medium appeared to have been at a level of coverage and use similar to that of magazines.

Information presented about other communication media, such as telephones and telegraph, indicated opportunities in Chile for other types of short and long-distance mediated communication, though not at spectacularly high levels. For example, not every community, much less every household, had telephone service.

The relevance of this information on mass media coverage and use is two-fold. Firstly, it allows for a discussion of a media-climate in Chile with some knowledge of how much of the population actually is exposed to that climate. Secondly, it tells us something about the relative biases of time and space in the Chilean political context.

One object of the present work is to look at the effects of that particular part of the overall symbolic climate which is created by television, radio, and the press in Chile. This would be a vain

exercise if no one in Chile had any exposure to these media. And it would drastically affect the direction of the discussion if the use of each of these media was restricted to a numerical or socioeconomic elite.

The effect of a symbolic climate is to influence man's definition of and understanding of his environment, political or other. It is the basis of culture. With some knowledge of the extensiveness of Chile's mass media at the national level, and their intensity at the local level, it will be possible to assess the symbolic climate created by those media as a factor in the recent development of Chile's national culture, paying particular attention to its recent political development.

Innis gave us cues to assessing the time and space biases of communication media. The biases do not stem from that which is communicated, but rather from the physical characteristics of the media themselves. Television, radio, and the press all would be considered space biased media in the sense that they evidence more attention to extension over space than to duration over time. The TV and radio signals (if not recorded) are gone the same moment they appear. A single newspaper can be read over and over again (implying a time bias relative to radio and TV), but it is superseded each day with a new edition. Its duration is for but twenty-four hours.

In Innis' discussion of preeminent media in empires he observed that the space biased media were used for highly centralized political organization. These empires were expansive yet short-lived.

2

Conversely, the heavier and more durable time biased media were found in more decentralized empires; smaller, yet more able to withstand the test of time.

It may be hazardous to extrapolate from empire to single state, particularly when the present consideration of Chile treats but a short, five-year period. Acknowledging that Chile from 1973 to 1978 was not an empire, however, it is possible to make some statements about decentralization. All of this suggests that mediated information formed a significant part of the overall symbolic climate in Chile. The qualities of that climate will be analyzed in a subsequent chapter. Message content aside, however, it was observed that TV, radio, and the press all were centralized media: Television and radio programming and press publication all originated from a relatively small number of locations. Television, however, was judged to be the most centralized of these media, with most TV programming emanating from Santiago.

In the forthcoming chapter on the ownership of media outlets, it will be shown that ownership of all TV outlets in Chile was by the State or by the para-statal universities. In contrast, private interests had the major stake in radio and in the press.

All the above would indicate a relatively recent centralizing force in Chile. In some fifteen years the television medium moved from non-existence to become a predominant mass medium in Chile. Not only was TV a space biased medium with an extensiveness equal to or greater than that of radio and the press in 1977, but it also was more centralized in its operations, and was tightly controlled by the State through ownership and quasi-ownership.

It is interesting to note that the television medium reached its peak of development in Chile under the authoritarian regime of General Pinochet. The development of the medium coincided with a discernible trend toward increased central authority in the Chilean State.

Television was in its infancy under Frei, an administration committed to social reform and welfare, and an increasing role in the national economy. The greatest geographic extension of the medium took place under Allende, whose socialist coalition pushed further with social reform, and expropriated numerous businesses and industries. The Pinochet junta inherited both the extensive TV network and the State's economic interests which were obtained under Allende. The finishing touches were being put on the national TV network in 1977, making its coverage of the population nearly complete.

Television rose to a position of preeminence vis-à-vis the less centralized radio and press between 1964 and 1977. While not attempting to posit a deterministic relationship, it is worth noting that the central authority (and power) of the State in Chile also increased dramatically in the same period. Although the Pinochet regime sold off some state-owned business enterprises, and was ostensibly committed to political decentralization,⁵⁴ the tremendous, and at times arbitrary, exercise of central authority and power by the State cannot be disputed.⁵⁵ In the case of Chile under the Pinochet regime.

⁵⁴ See Chile Hacia un Destino Nuevo, pp. 11-17.

⁵⁵ By September 1978 the regime had ruled five years without a constitution. Law was by decree during that period, and legal recourse in the face of the State's actions was limited.

the predominant television medium should be viewed as an arm of the State; it was an accessory to the regime's geographic extension and an aid to its central authority.

As regards the duration of the Pinochet regime, a special chapter of the present work will be devoted to the junta's treatment of time biassed communication media which have potential political orientations.

A later chapter on the potential effects of mass communication will draw upon the information contained in this discussion of mass media coverage and use in Chile. The differences in coverage and use among TV, radio, newspapers, and magazines will be of special interest when, combined with ownership data, it is used to assess the symbolic climate in Chile and that climate's relation to political developments.

CHAPTER IV

MEDIA POWER ROLES

The Chilean case would appear to support the notion that there are concrete political benefits (like stability and domestic legitimacy) to be obtained by an LDC regime through the exercise of state "control" over the mass communication media. In the case of imposed regimes, such benefits may be no more than short-term ones, such as temporary stability and the impression of legitimacy.

In the Chilean case there is the Pinochet regime, imposed in the golpe of 1973. This regime has exercised a very particular type of "control" over the mass media in Chile. The State was proprietor of media outlets in television, radio, and the press, over which it exercised absolute control.

A number of media outlets were closed down by the regime after the takeover of 1973. These media were generally the media of the Left, and no doubt considered antithetical to the goals of the regime. Their elimination removed the need for their control by the junta.

Because the television outlets in Chile were either government-owned, or based in and administered by universities, and because the State was able to exert considerable influence over the universities, State or para-statal control over television existed in all areas.

In radio and in the press the State/media relationship was somewhat different. The State owned a number of radio stations, a

daily newspaper, and was engaged in other publishing activities. However, the vast majority of radio stations, newspapers, and other publications were privately owned. State control over the media in Chile, therefore, included written laws relating to the behavior of the media, as well as unwritten laws which demarcated the limits of the freedom to disseminate information and opinion.

Freedom of the press (or of the media) is not the issue at hand, however. There did not exist absolute freedom of the press in Chile during the period under consideration. There never has been absolute freedom of the press anywhere, if one considers such freedom to be an ideal and all real cases to be but imperfect imitations of that ideal. The relevant consideration here rather is the direction in which the symbolic climate in a single location was forced as a result of specific conditions of constrained mass communication. A picture of this symbolic climate, as well as an understanding of its antecedents, is central to the present analysis of political development in Chile from 1973-1978.

Gerbner has offered a framework of analysis with which to describe a symbolic climate and its likely consequences in a given country.¹ This approach entails a description of the power relationships within the media community; a description of the messages disseminated by the media; and the identification of the tendencies, in terms of social (cultural) consequences, that are the result of the structure and function of the media system. The following description of that

¹Gerbner, pp. 199-205.

part of the symbolic climate in Chile that can be attributed to the mass media shall be guided by Gerbner's framework.

The "Institutional Policy Analysis" attempted in this chapter is really an examination of power roles: the ownership of media outlets in Chile will be described, as will the relative power of various actors in the media community. The two subsequent chapters will concern the content of the media and the effects of mass communication, respectively.

The social (cultural) consequences of the Chilean symbolic climate will be assessed by comparing that climate with the ideology and goals of the Pinochet regime. An attempt will be made to relate the media-climate in Chile to popular support for the Pinochet government as expressed in the 1978 consulta and in the 1978 Gallup poll. The contention here is that the Pinochet regime, in its treatment of the mass media, has endeavored to control them with subtlety, but effectively enough to result in a symbolic climate that was complementary to its own goals and ideology, and hence its short-run duration and eventual popular support.

Power and its use, wrote Gerbner, are relevant to an overall understanding of a mass media system.² Various groups and individuals within the media community wield powers that vary both quantitatively and qualitatively. In Chile, for instance, where the democratic process was suspended in 1973, where law often was by fiat, and where labor organizations were rendered impotent, the power that accumulated in the

²Ibid., p. 200.

State (vis-à-vis the media) was considerable. Also, the power of the owners of media outlets increased (among those allowed to continue operating) due to the weakened position of Labor.³

This "power", in the media context, has to do with every aspect of the operations of individual media outlets as well as the operations of the media as a collectivity. Whereas the State may be able to prohibit certain themes or personalities from media exposure at the national level, the owners of individual outlets are capable of the same at the local level. It is perhaps in this regard that ownership is such a crucial power role: The symbolic climate is determined through a power structure that appears to be essentially authoritarian. That, however, says little of the qualities of that climate. The media in Chile, with few exceptions, were commercial enterprises. Even state-controlled media outlets were expected to pay for their operating expenses largely through revenues generated by the sale of advertising time and space. The effect on the symbolic climate is twofold: firstly, and perhaps most importantly, the capitalist marketplace was conspicuously displayed in the media in the form of commercial advertising; and secondly, being commercial enterprises themselves, the specific media outlets needed to maintain a "saleability" sufficient to stay in business or to make a profit. In this second regard, the message content of the media determined sales, viability, and profit. The media in Chile live and die by the vagaries of the marketplace, albeit a less than free one. A mass appeal--in the market and not in the Marxist sense--can be a guarantee of commercial success.

³The junta disbanded many unions, including the powerful Central Unica de Trabajadores. The right to strike was eliminated.

As of June, 1977 the State had by far the most extensive media holdings of any single group or individual in Chile. The State's media interests spanned television, radio, and the press, as well as a minor interest in film-making.

The only national television network was Televisión Nacional de Chile (TVN), with seventy-three transmitters and repeaters covering an estimated ninety-five per cent of the population in Chile.⁴

Radio Nacional de Chile (RNCh) was a powerful, Santiago-based AM radio station. RNCh owned thirteen other AM stations from Arica in the North to Puerto Williams in the far South, and including "Manu Kena" on Easter Island. RNCh owned FM stations in Santiago, Rancagua, and Talca, and seven Santiago-based short wave channels which broadcasted in Arabic, Russian, German, Italian, French, English, and Spanish.⁵ Short wave service in Portuguese, Japanese, and Chinese was being planned in 1977. There also were twenty-five RNCh-affiliated stations throughout Chile which subscribed to news and programs from RNCh in Santiago.⁶

⁴Televisión Nacional de Chile (TVN) data, 1977.

⁵Radio Nacional de Chile (RNCh) data, 1977.

⁶RNCh data in 1977 listed the following stations as being owned by RNCh:

1. RNCh, Santiago	10. Regional, Rancagua
2. RNCh-FM, Santiago	11. Regional-FM, Rancagua
3. Colo Colo, Santiago	12. Regional, Talca
4. Manu Kena, Isla de Pascua	13. Regional-FM, Talca
5. Regional, Arica	14. Regional, Constitución
6. Regional, Iquique	15. Regional, Concepción
7. Regional, Antofagasta	16. Regional, Puerto Montt
8. Regional, La Serena	17. Cabo de Hornos, Puerto Williams
9. El Mar, Valparaíso	

The State also was proprietor of two Santiago daily newspapers, El Cronista and El Diario Oficial. The former was a general interest daily tabloid, while the latter was merely a bulletin for disseminating new laws and government pronouncements. El Cronista had a national circulation, but was considered the least widely read of the three major Chilean dailies (La Tercera, El Mercurio, and El Cronista).

It is noteworthy that State ownership of media outlets reached an unprecedented level under the Pinochet regime, given that regime's ostensible aversion to state-owned commercial enterprises. The move toward state ownership of media outlets began under the Frei presidency (1964-1970) with the commencement of the TVN network. At the time the State was also proprietor of a daily newspaper (La Nación) and some short wave radio channels.

Under Allende (1970-1973) there was a tremendous expansion of the TVN network; the State acquired the Radio Corporación network (four stations), the Radio Portales network (four stations), and Radio Magallanes; another daily newspaper, Puro Chile, was begun; and the State initiated publishing activities through Quimantú.⁷

Further development of TVN under Pinochet, as well as its new radio holdings, had given the State an extraordinary media presence by 1977.⁸

⁷ Schenkel, p. 56.

⁸ Radio Corporación, Radio Portales, and Radio Magallanes were returned to the private sector. Quimantú and Puro Chile were discontinued. La Nación eventually become El Cronista.

The role of the university-based media could be considered para-statal because of the strict controls exercised over Chilean universities by the State after the 1973 golpe⁹. This is the most notable in the case of television. The issue of the introduction of television broadcasting in Chile came to a head in the 1960's. A compromise was reached over the financing of television by providing that the broadcasters be university-based and partially state-supported. The state-owned broadcaster (TVN) was added later. The sale of commercial air time has helped finance Chilean television, particularly since 1977 when state support was removed, but there are no TV broadcasters in the private sector.

The university-based TV broadcasters operating in Chile in 1977 were Universidad de Chile (UChTV), Universidad Catolica de Chile (UCTV), Universidad Catolica de Valparaíso (UCVTV), and Universidad del Norte (UNTV).¹⁰

Universities exercised greater autonomy over their affairs, including television broadcasting, under Allende than under Pinochet. One of the first moves of the junta after coming to power was to replace university rectors with military men. Fagen reported that at one time during the Unidad Popular (Allende's coalition) term UCTV

⁹ For example, some university rectors were replaced with military men after the golpe of 1973. The military rectors reportedly assumed "absolute power over staffing, finance, course programming, and admissions." Michael Sanders, "Book Burning and Brutality," Index on Censorship 3 (Spring 1974): 8.

¹⁰ UChTV broadcasted only in Santiago; UCTV broadcasted in Santiago, Valparaíso, San Fernando, and Talcahuano (Concepción); UCVTV broadcasted in Santiago, Valparaíso, and Coquimbo; UNTV broadcasted in Arica, Iquique, Antofagasta, and Chuquibambilla/Calama.

was staunchly anti-Allende while UChTV was decidedly pro-Allende. These persuasions apparently manifested themselves in the treatment accorded the government by the respective broadcasters' news and political commentary.¹¹ Stricter state control over university affairs since 1973 has eliminated clear pro- or anti-government editorial stances among university TV broadcasters.

University-based radio broadcasters in 1977 included Universidad Tecnica del Estado (UTE) (nine AM stations),¹² Universidad de Chile (one AM, one FM station, both in Santiago), Universidad Federico Santa María (one AM, one FM station, both in Valparaíso), Universidad de Concepción AM and FM, and Universidad del Norte FM (Antofagasta).

Through outright ownership and close supervision within the universities, the Chilean State had a very conspicuous presence in the mass media in 1977. This is not to say that any or all of the media outlets mentioned above engaged in outright propaganda, however defined; rather, control mechanisms existed that prevented anti-government messages from entering the symbolic climate by way of these media.

In summary, all of Chilean television was under close government supervision: The only national network was state-owned, and other TV broadcasters were located in the strictly controlled universities. The State had its own daily newspaper, with a large national circulation.

¹¹Fagen, p. 61.

¹²UTE-AM radio stations were located in Antofagasta, Copiapó, La Serena, Valparaíso, Santiago, Talca, Concepción, Temuco, and Valdivia. UTE also operated an FM station in Santiago.

In radio, a total of thirteen out of 140 AM stations in Chile were owned by Radio Nacional de Chile, to which could be added the twenty-five RNCh affiliates which received RNGh news and other programming. That would be greater than thirty-five per cent of the AM radio outlets in Chile. In addition there were more than fifteen university-based radio outlets.

It has been illustrated above that ownership of television stations in Chile was based solely in the State and in the closely watched universities. Media outlets in radio and in the press, however, were mostly privately owned. Before the Unidad Popular, wrote Schenkel, the "clans and dominant classes" had control of eighty-three per cent of Chile's newspaper circulation and one hundred per cent of the radio stations.¹³ This was at a time when TV had yet to establish itself as the dominant medium in Chile. These "clans" were wealthy families, or groups of businessmen who were owners of media outlets. By "dominant classes" he apparently meant the Chilean bourgeoisie in general.

Schenkel's study of Chilean media ownership prior to 1970 revealed both vertical and horizontal concentration within radio and the press: Multiple ownership within radio or the press, as well as ownership of outlets in both media was common. It also was shown that many owners of media outlets had other, extensive commercial holdings. This was seen as symptomatic of a national economy in which inordinate amounts of economic power were wielded by a relatively small group of people: "The owners (of Chile's radio stations and press) constitute,

¹³Schenkel, p. 56.

almost without exception, the economic forces that dominate the country..."¹⁴ Much of that concentration remained in 1977, some four years after the ouster of the Unidad Popular.

Two "clans" stood out as media proprietors with the most extensive holdings in 1971. The Edwards clan owned El Mercurio and ten more daily newspapers, numerous magazines, and the Corporación radio network (four stations). Schenkel called El Mercurio "the most influential daily in Santiago and in all of Chile."¹⁵ Other Edwards interests at the time included Banco A. Edwards; a brewery (Cervecerías Unidas); a sugar refinery; a coal mine; the Kappes insurance consortium; and large farms (latifundias). Agustín Edwards, head of the clan, was president of the bank, owned hotels in Miami, Florida and properties in Brasil and Paraguay, and was made director of Latin American operations of Pepsi Cola in 1971.¹⁶

The second clan of note was the "Piranha" group of "relatively young and very aggressive" businessmen¹⁷ whom Schenkel linked to former President Eduardo Frei and his Christian Democrats. By 1971 the Piranhas controlled the Cooperativa radio network (eleven stations); Radio Balmaceda; La Prensa, semi-official daily of the Christian Democratic Party; and had an interest in the political/news weekly magazine Ercilla. Piranha interests also included Banco Hipotecario; Banco de Chile; finance companies; mines; and insurance companies.

¹⁴ Schenkel, p. 47. ¹⁵ Ibid., p. 45.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 45. ¹⁷ Ibid., p. 46.

Schenkel also claimed that the Piranhas were linked to the Archbishopric of Santiago, which in turn owned three radio stations.¹⁸

Other clans and individuals in Chile were identified as owning media outlets in addition to other commercial enterprises.¹⁹ Almost all of these owners, in Schenkel's estimation, were linked in some way to the most "conservative" interests in Chile, including the Christian Democratic, Radical, National, and Fatherland and Liberty political parties:

Considering that absolutely all of the media belonging to the Edwards, the "Piranhas", the Hirmas, the Yarurs, and other groups that maintained until 1970 (and in a large part until today) one hundred per cent conservative, or at best reformist positions, but basically in favor of the dominant classes and the respective clans and groups, it is easy to see the power to manipulate public opinion which they have in their hands. A great part of the population was exposed to their orientation.²⁰

Schenkel's study also revealed the trend toward concentration of media outlets within the State. At the time of his writing (1973) the Unidad Popular was proprietor of the national television network; La Nación; Puro Chile; Radio Corporación; Radio Portales; Radio Magallanes; and Quimantú publishing (Radio Corporación was sold by the Edwards clan in 1971. The UP also had acquired Radio Portales since coming to power).

Privately held media outlets considered enthusiastically supportive of Allende were UChTV; Radio Recabarren (owned by the Central Unica de Trabajadores, a national labor organization); "leftist"

¹⁸Schenkel, p. 46. ¹⁹Ibid., p. 47.

²⁰Ibid., p. 51.

dailies El Siglo and Ultima Hora; the daily Clarín; and some forty radio stations throughout Chile.²¹

The prominent position of the State as media proprietor already has been described. Concentration in the private sector in 1977 can be illustrated with examples in both radio and the press:

1. The Radio Minería network had stations in Antofagasta, Santiago, and Punta Arenas.
2. Radio Cooperativa's chain included stations in Antofagasta, La Serena, Valparaíso, Santiago, Concepción, Temuco, Puerto Montt, and Punta Arenas.
3. Andrés Bello had radio stations in both Valparaíso and Santiago.
4. Agricultura broadcasted from Valparaíso, Santiago, and Los Angeles.
5. Portales had stations in both Valparaíso and Santiago.
6. In five other cases, outside of Santiago, there were two or more radio stations owned by single families.²²
7. Empresa El Mercurio was proprietor of the following daily newspapers: El Mercurio, La Segunda, and Las Últimas Noticias of Santiago; La Estrella of Arica; La Estrella de Iquique; El Mercurio and La Estrella del Norte of Antofagasta; El Mercurio del Loa of Calama; and El Mercurio and La Estrella of Valparaíso.
8. Sociedad Periodística del Sur (SOPELUR) owned the following newspapers: El Diario Austral of Temuco; El Correo de Valdivia; La Prensa of Osorno; La Cruz del Sur of Ancud; El Correo de Castro; and El Diario de Aysen of Coyhaique.²³

Both Empresa El Mercurio and the Piranhas (owners of Radio Cooperativa) had extensive interests in magazine publications as well as those cited above.

²¹ Schenkel, p. 56.

²² Asociación de Radiofusoras de Chile (ARCHI) data, 1977.

²³ Asociación Nacional de la Prensa (ANP) data, 1977.

The most recent government-forced closing of a media outlet was that of Radio Balmaceda in 1977. The official reason for its closure reportedly was its having been owned by the Christian Democratic Party.²⁴ Given that the junta had banned political activity in Chile, the position of Balmaceda as party mouthpiece appeared sufficient for its closure. A Chilean government official told this writer that Balmaceda had invoked the ire of the regime through inflammatory news and commentary about a scandal involving some of Chile's financial institutions.²⁵

Radio Balmaceda's alleged links with the Christian Democratic Party, and its subsequent closure, exemplify an important facet of the mass media in Chile: Various media have been identified as being party mouthpieces, or as being sympathetic to one group of partisans or another. Burnett, for example, dichotomized Santiago's daily newspapers during the UP into "moderate to right-wing" dailies and "left-wing" dailies.²⁶ El Mercurio was associated with the Liberal Party, La Tercera with the Radicals, and El Diario Ilustrado with the Conservatives. He also considered the government daily, La Nación, to be in the moderate to right-wing group, despite the leftist government. On the left were

²⁴"News in Brief," Latin America Political Report XI (February 18, 1977): 56; Centro de Investigaciones Socioeconomicas (CISEC), "Sector Comunicación Social - Segunda Semestre 1976," Santiago, Chile, 1977. (Mimeographed.)

²⁵Interview with Max Reindl Hauser, Government Information Director, Government of Chile, Santiago, Chile, June, 1977.

²⁶Burnett, pp. 25-29.

Clarín,²⁷ Las Noticias de Ultima Hora of Allende's Socialist Party, and the Communist's El Siglo.

Burnett also identified certain magazines as being party-oriented, such as Vistazo (Communist); Flecha Roja and Boletín PDC (Christian Democratic); Vanguardia Proletaria (Trotskyite); and El Rebelde (Castroite).²⁸

Fagen reported that during the Allende period six Santiago dailies were considered "opposition". They had a combined circulation of 541,000 copies on an average day. The other five Santiago dailies, with a combined circulation of 312,000 copies, were considered pro-Unidad Popular. She suspected an opposition bias in the provincial press, dominated as it was in the North by Empresa El Mercurio and in the South by SOPESUR. She contended that the "major opposition publications" (like Vea, Ercilla, Eva, Paula, and Vanidades) monopolized popular magazine sales. Fagen also claimed that, of 155 AM radio stations in Chile, only forty were pro-government, "while the remainder openly identified with sectors of the political opposition."²⁹

Schenkel's analysis of the political affiliations of various media outlets focussed primarily on the political "right", parties

²⁷ Schenkel contended that Clarín and its editor always supported whomever happened to be in power. Editor Sainte-Marie was a counsellor to former President Ibañez, a friend of former Presidents Alessandri and Frei, and openly supportive of Allende, "not to augment his fortune, as is speculated, but to conserve it." Schenkel, p. 53.

²⁸ Burnett, pp. 25-29.

²⁹ Fagen, p. 60.

outside of Allende's Unidad Popular coalition. He associated the Piranha properties with the Christian Democrats. Concepción daily El Sur was linked to the Christian Democrats as well, editor Aurelio Lamas having been appointed president of Banco del Trabajo by former President Frei.³⁰ Schenkel also associated SOPESUR with the Christian Democrats.

The Edwards media holdings, according to Schenkel, were supportive of the conservative National Party, the coalition of the former Liberal and Conservative Parties. The Santiago daily La Tribuna, edited by National Party President Sergio Onofre Jarpa, also was considered a National Party supporter.³¹

Sociedad Nacional de Agricultura, the guild of the latifundistas and other farmers, was proprietor of Radio Agricultura and El Campesino magazine. Schenkel claimed that one half of SNA's membership belonged to the "ultraright" Partido Nacional (National Party), while the rest belonged to Patria y Libertad (Fatherland and Liberty), of "clearly neofascist and paramilitary tendency."³²

Regardless of the absolute accuracy of the political designations listed above, it should be clear that partisan politics was a remarkable characteristic of Chile's mass media in the years preceding the 1973 coup:

³⁰Schenkel, p. 47.

³¹Ibid., p. 52. Schenkel also cited financial links between La Tercera, Edwards, and former President Alessandri.

³²Ibid., p. 47.

It is unlikely that there exists another country in Latin America in which the press, radio, and television report with such freedom the ever dramatic events of the day and in which the commentaries, analyses, and debates about the most controversial political and socioeconomic problems in the country may be so frank and at such a high level.³³

The Chilean media's proclivity toward partisan politics made them targets for the depoliticizing campaigns of the Pinochet regime. It is clear that not all privately held media outlets were shut down permanently after the events of September 11, 1973. The media of the left, however, were completely eliminated:

Only now has the problem of liberty, license, and freedom of expression been resolved in Chile. A military junta has come to power and is in the process of physically eliminating its opposition. There is no opposition press, radio stations play music and broadcast government notices, and television functions partially and only under military censorship. In the first hours of the takeover, the broadcasting equipment of the left was silenced. All forms of political communication not strictly controlled by the junta and all autonomous political life have been outlawed.³⁴

One of the first actions of the military junta after the golpe was to announce that all media had to clear with it all information intended to be disseminated, or suffer the consequences:

The Military Government is anxious to effect a cleansing of all press publications in order to reject in future all insults to persons and institutions and all extravagant language.³⁵

The only Santiago dailies allowed to publish just after the military takeover were El Mercurio and La Tercera. Even their editions were subject to review by a military censorship board, however.

³³ Ibid., p. 57. ³⁴ Fagen, p. 69.

³⁵ From the junta's Proclamation 15, quoted in Sanders, p. 8.

Newspapers supportive of the Unidad Popular, El Siglo, Clarín, Puro Chile, Las Noticias de Ultima Hora, and La Nación were shut down permanently. La Nación, the government daily, passed to the directorship of the Chilean College of Journalists under the name, La Patria. La Prensa, La Tribuna, La Segunda, and Las Ultimas Noticias (the latter two Mercurio publications) eventually were allowed to resume publication.

The publication of numerous magazines was interrupted, with leftist Punto Final, Plan, Quinta, and Chile Hoy halted altogether. The UP-initiated publishing house, Quimantú, also was shut down. It eventually resumed operations as Editora Gabriela Mistral.

Marxist propaganda of any kind was banned by the junta. There reportedly were public book burnings,³⁶ and both domestic and foreign journalists were intimidated.³⁷ Augusto Olivares, a political columnist for Clarín, an editorial board member of Chile Hoy, and a director of the national TV network, died with Allende during the attack on La Moneda.

Newspapers of the Right were not entirely immune from the Pinochet regime's media controls. The right-wing daily, La Tribuna, operated for less than four months before the government closed it down for "false

³⁶Chilean Admiral Troncoso: "Marxism has been outlawed, so of course we have been burning Marxist books." Sanders, p. 11.

³⁷If the regime's international image depends at all upon its relations with foreign journalists, the Pinochet junta got off to a bad start in that respect. Sanders cited "foreign journalists who were at one time detailed, roughed up and/or expelled from Chile after 11 September 1973." They included correspondents of Aftonblat and Dagens Nyheter (Sweden); Efe (Spain); Le Figaro, Corriere della Sera and Il Messagero (Italy); Dutch Radio; Le Monde and L'Express; Financial Times; and Time, Boston Globe, Washington Post and CBS. Sanders, p. 11.

reporting"³⁸. By March 1974, the ostensibly Christian Democratic daily, La Prensa, had been banned as well.

Other press shut-downs since the 1973 coup included the Christian Democratic magazine, Política y Espíritu in October 1975, and the Concepción daily, Diario Color, in November 1976. The latter allegedly was associated with former Marxist political parties.

Sanders reported that pro-Allende radio was off the air the morning of the golpe.³⁹ The transmitters of Portales and Corporación were actually knocked out by the Chilean Air Force. Radio Universidad Técnica del Estado and Magallanes were taken over by the new military government. Although radio had been subject to the same scrutiny as other mass media since late 1973, the only recent closing of a station occurred in January 1977 when Radio Balmaceda was shut down for allegedly having been owned by the Christian Democratic Party. Political parties had been banned, and this affiliation apparently violated the spirit of the law.

Television came under direct control of the junta immediately after September 11, 1973. In the days following the takeover the regime used TV to slur Allende's personal life and to thank itself for rescuing the country from an inevitable, Allende-led golpe which would have seen him installed as dictator.⁴⁰

Even the offerings of Editorial Universitaria publishing house underwent a transformation after the 1973 coup. The 1974 book list had

³⁸"Chile: Waiting for Justice," Latin America VII (December 21, 1973: 405-406.

³⁹Sanders, p. 12. ⁴⁰"Chile: Sombre Outlook," pp. 300-302.

thirty titles crossed out, indicating those books which the publishers no longer would (or could) sell. Most affected were the books on economics and politics where eighteen of thirty-seven titles were removed, including such works as Socialist Agriculture and Cuba: Toward a New Political-Economy of Socialism?⁴¹

So, what remained of the Chilean media after the new military government's initial purges and delayed strikes? Obviously, the field of contestants for the public's attention was greatly reduced, particularly in the press. The press of the Left was effectively eliminated, and the press of the Right constrained.

Unidad Popular-supportive radio was shut down (at least in Santiago), and television passed to the close supervision of the new government. The number of outlets in radio and television, however, was not greatly reduced. Television was just completing its greatest period of expansion, and that expansion continued, seemingly without interruption.

Ownership of media outlets went through some rather striking changes from the administration of Eduardo Frei to 1977. These changes have been at three different levels. Firstly, commencement of television as a mass medium in Chile resulted in new mass communication channels which eventually would become the most dominant in the country. Because of the legal arrangements governing the ownership and financing of Chilean TV, the actual TV proprietors became the State and the universities. Current radio and press proprietors were not allowed to expand their holdings into television.

⁴¹. "Censorship in Chile," Index on Censorship 3 (Spring 1974): 10.

Secondly, Chile witnessed a spiral in the number of media outlets owned or controlled by the State. During the Frei years major government media holdings consisted of a daily newspaper and the fledgling national television system. The Unidad Popular added radio stations, greatly increased its publishing activities, and dramatically expanded the national television network. The Pinochet government cut back slightly on publishing, altered and expanded its radio interests through Radio Nacional de Chile, and continued with the expansion of TVN to the point where, in 1977, some ninety-five per cent of the Chilean population lived within the TVN coverage area.

The para-statal status of university-based television and radio also should be taken into account when considering the role of the State as media proprietor. Taken as a whole, university-based media make up a substantial entity in radio and television.

Thirdly, the character of political partisanship in Chile's media outlets was greatly altered following the golpe del estado of 1973. Virtually all of the media outlets which were either (1) associated with or owned by UP coalition parties; or (2) enthusiastically supportive of Allende's coalition, were shut down by the new government.

The end result of these changes was two-fold. The State emerged, in 1977, as far and away the most dominant single owner in the mass media community in Chile. In addition, the political character of the rest of the field was altered by the attenuation of the leftist media. Moderate to right-wing media owners, that is to say owners non-Marxist and/or pro-capitalist in their political and economic sympathies, made up virtually the entire ownership field by 1977.

The media power role of the State was double-edged after September 11, 1973. Not only was the State the largest single owner of media interests, but the State also was able to regulate, censor, and otherwise control the country's media with unprecedented force. Often that force was exercised arbitrarily. This control aspect of the State's media power role could be contrasted with the relatively free climate in which the media operated under Allende, and probably under Frei as well:

Whatever their political beliefs, visitors to Chile during the term of the Popular Unity could not fail to be impressed by the incredible growth of freedom of expression. When Allende in December 1972 left Chile to address the United Nations, a leading opposition newspaper, had as its front-page spread a photograph (not a cartoon) depicting the president flushing himself down a lavatory, with the caption 'good riddance'.⁴²

Needless to say, such a depiction of President Pinochet would not have been tolerated by the military government.

State control over mass communication media in Chile after the 1973 golpe consisted of six elements: ownership, quasi-ownership, elimination, coercion and censorship, law, and voluntary assent.

The State exercised complete control over a large part of the media community through its ownership of media outlets such as TVN, RNCh, and El Cronista. Directly owned media could be depended upon not to disseminate information and commentary which would antagonize the regime.

The State also enjoyed a quasi-ownership position with respect to the university-based media. The Pinochet regime replaced rectors with military men, and otherwise whittled away at the autonomy of the universities in Chile. The net result, as regards university-based media, was

⁴²Sanders, p. 13.

a tight control over the institutions which in turn controlled the media outlets. The university-based television channels are examples of media outlets with visible political partisanship prior to the coup, which continued to operate after the coup, albeit without that visible partisanship.

Elimination of individual media outlets by the military government was a keystone of the regime's media control policy. Elimination clearly was preventative, in the sense the the regime anticipated that the most vitriolic criticism would come from the Left, and by extension, from the media of the Left. Elimination of the leftist media outlets altogether removed the need for numerous and constant, ad hoc and reactive measures against such media. More importantly, perhaps, the symbolic climate would be nearly cleared of the type of public commentary most antithetical to the goals and ideology of the Pinochet regime, the Marxist point of view.

Although elimination as a control device was reserved almost exclusively for the Left, the rightist La Tribuna and the Christian Democrats' La Prensa, Política y Espíritu, and Radio Balmaceda were among non-leftist media outlets eliminated after the golpe. This would indicate a tendency on the part of the regime not only to consider the political coloration of a media outlet, but also the qualities of specific irritations, party affiliations aside. This is consistent with President Pinochet's personal, and oft-stated, distaste for all politicians and parties.

Coercion and censorship was the control device that governed the behavior of the media outlets allowed to continue operating after

the September 11th takeover. Media outlets least likely to antagonize the regime were left alone, with the threat of shut-down hanging over their heads. It was a trial and error system that resulted in elimination for some outlets and temporary closure or seizure for numerous others. Selective prior censorship of news also was exemplary of this control device.

At various times the military government made laws which were aimed at controlling the behavior of the media. These laws made specific aspects of which the general system of coercion and censorship left vague. Such laws should be viewed in a similar light as the eliminations, in that they were preventative measures. Spelling out certain rules anticipated numerous infractions which would have had to have been dealt with on a case-by-case basis.

Voluntary assent, as opposed to coercion, must be viewed as a significant control device in the Chilean case. Like-mindedness on the part of various owners, editors, and individual journalists, and the Pinochet regime itself, made the exercise of state power over the media unnecessary in many instances. This voluntary assent could manifest itself in at least two ways. For instance, an editor or publisher could disallow publication of specific news or opinion in the belief that the best interests of the State would be served thereby. Or, in a less conscious manner, a columnist's opinion on a given issue might reflect the government's stance on the same issue. There is no real coercion or control involved, but the appearance of that independent opinion in the symbolic climate serves the State in the same way the non-appearance of an opposing opinion does.

The ownership and quasi-ownership of media outlets by the State have been described elsewhere in this paper. Examples of other measures with which the State controlled the media in Chile after the 1973 golpe will follow:

In June 1977, a Chilean government minister was asked what the rules of censorship were under the current regime. The minister replied that there were no written rules, that people working in the media pretty much knew the limits without having them spelled out.⁴³ This was verified in a conversation with the editors of one of Chile's largest provincial dailies. They told the author that everyone more or less knew the ground rules and, unless they wanted to be shut down, they tried to play by those rules. They explained that the regime's sensitivity to controversial political news resulted in the media having to exploit to the full any exciting, but "safe", events that happened to occur.⁴⁴

An example of the need to exploit "safe" news was the almost week-long reportage of a day-long event, the hijacking of a Chilean airliner which occurred in June 1977. The plane was commandeered by "leftists" in the North. They ordered the craft to Peru and were allowed to land there. The continuing story dominated the media for days on end, appearing on the front page of virtually every newspaper, and placed as the lead story on the television newscasts. A hunger strike on behalf of people who had mysteriously disappeared (desaparecidos), staged in the same month, received limited media attention. It was, no doubt, a topic whose exploitation would have been frowned upon by

⁴³ Interview with Max Reindl.

⁴⁴ Interview with Rafael and Aurelio Maira Lamas, Editors, El Sur, Concepción, Chile, July 1977.

the junta. The hijacking, on the other hand, may have served to illustrate that threats from leftist terror still existed in Chile.

This is not to say that the military regime left everything to chance with silent understandings. While the "unwritten laws" were predominant in controlling the behavior of the previously unbridled media, the junta did commit to paper laws and decrees related to media behavior. For example, formal ownership was announced in Proclamation 15 soon after the takeover:

There is a warning that the publication of any other instrument of the written press which is not duly authorized will be taken over and destroyed.

The Military Government is determined to clean up press publications in accordance with what it considered to be the ultimate solution for the re-establishment of national harmony and ethical norms. It will not, therefore, accept insults to individuals or institutions, nor impertinent language in the press.⁴⁵

Proclamation 15 was among the first in a series of governmental acts which treated the media as a group, as opposed to the numerous ad hoc and reactive moves directed at single media outlets since 1973.

The formal press censorship which came with the military takeover reportedly ended September 19, 1973.⁴⁶ At this point most of the leftist media had been silenced. This period of elimination was brief, and was supplanted by the era of coercion, censorship, and reactive measures.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ Excerpt from Proclamation 15, quoted in "Chile" (in "Index"), Index on Censorship 3 (Spring 1974): ii.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Summary composed from information from Latin America/Latin America Political Report, 1973-1978; Index on Censorship, 1974-1978; CISEC, "Sector Comunicación Social," "Medios de comunicación social: Libertad y bien común," Mensaje (Santiago, Chile), June 1977, pp. 249-252; "Teleteatros con marcha atrás," Ercilla (Santiago, Chile), June 1-7, 1977, p. 56; Sanders; and Fagen.

In the months following the coup many Chilean journalists lost their jobs.⁴⁸ The term "political prisoners" was banned from the press. All Marxist propaganda was banned. La Tribuna and La Prensa was closed down, and government pressure was brought to bear on such dailies as El Mercurio and La Segunda.

In 1974 newspapers were forbidden from printing "political" news, presumably meaning news of political developments which antagonized the regime. The America-made film, Fiddler on the Roof, was prohibited because it contained "disruptive elements against the harmony of Chileans and the process of national reconstruction."⁴⁹ And when schools in Chile reopened that September, many textbooks had been removed by the authorities.

In 1975 Radio Balmaceda was closed for 10 days by the government. The Editors of Clarín, Puro Chile, and Punto Final still were being held by the State. The National Directorate of Social Communication (DINACOS) cancelled the press credentials for all members of the Foreign Correspondents' Association, with the understanding that each member's application would be considered on its own merit. The Christian Democrats' Política y Espíritu also was banned in 1975.

Law Decree 1,281 of October 12, 1975 announced that the State would suspend for six editions or six days media which disseminated "opinions, news, or communications which tend to create alarm or disgust

⁴⁸In 1977, the "Bureau of Political Prisoners in Chile" reported 20 journalists assassinated since the coup; 50 still detained; 200 in exile; and 400 out of work or in another job. "Chile" (in "Index"), Index on Censorship 6 (March-April 1977): 63.

⁴⁹"Chile" (in "Index"), Index on Censorship 3 (Winter 1974): 1.

in the people."⁵⁰

By 1976 it appeared that the remaining media outlets were prepared to test the regime's tolerance of criticism. La Tercera and the weekly Que Pasa were reportedly critical of the Pinochet regime, while former President Frei published a pamphlet which chastised the junta.⁵¹

Radio Balmaceda was shut down for another six days for "anti-patriotic broadcasts"⁵² of commentary on the economy, and the station's manager was banished to the northern desert. One edition of Ercilla was seized for similar reasons.

Also in 1976 newspapers were forbidden from reporting the arrests of members of the Catholic Comité Pro-Paz,⁵³ who were charged with aiding leaders of the Movimiento Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR: Movement of the Revolutionary Left). The government also prohibited dissemination of reports that a group of generals had demanded Pinochet's resignation. A government decree in 1976 empowered local military officials to suspend local publications.

⁵⁰"Medios de comunicación social," p. 249.

⁵¹"News in Brief," Latin America X (February 13, 1976): 56.

⁵²ibid.

⁵³The Comité Pro-Paz (Pro-Peace Committee) operated after the 1973 coup with members throughout Chile. Their activities included aiding refugees wishing to leave Chile, welfare work in shanty towns, providing meals for the hungry and work for the unemployed, negotiating contact between prisoners and their families and lawyers, and publicizing prison conditions and torture.

At one point in 1976, El Mercurio had deliveries to a northern region (Region III) suspended.⁵⁴ In November Diario Color was expropriated. And also in 1976 La Tercera reportedly protested a court ruling against it which prohibited the use of certain reports on the recent investigation of a financial fraud in Chile. An independent research group described the end of 1976 as a "cooling off" period in government action against the media.⁵⁵

Late in 1976 the popular weekly Ercilla was taken over by the Piranhas. In January 1977 editor Emilio Filippi and twenty other Ercilla staff members resigned in a dispute with the new owners over the magazine's investigation of bankrupt investment companies. On January 28, 1977 Radio Balmaceda's license was withdrawn, and it ceased to operate.

In March 1977 the regime issued Bando 107, which formally instituted prior censorship of new publications. The decree provided for military approval of the editing, distribution, and sale of new magazines, newspapers, and books, and the importation of all printed matter. It was argued that the application of Bando 107 was discriminatory: Former Ercilla editor Filippi attempted to initiate a new political/news weekly, Hoy, which had as its motto, "The truth without compromise". Hoy was approved for publication only after rigorous scrutiny and some two months of bureaucratic delay; whereas "pornographic" Bravo, a Playboy-style magazine, was "authorized without problems."⁵⁶

⁵⁴ But it was noted: "...nonetheless, their relations with the Government, and especially with President Pinochet, look good." CISEC, "Sector Comunicación Social," p. 3.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 1. ⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 2.

Not long after the issuance of Bando 107, DINACOS made a public explanation of the import restrictions:

There does not exist nor will there exist any form of restriction on the import of newspapers, journals or publications into the country, except those with a specifically pornographic content, and extremist or subversive pamphlets which attack the fundamental institutions of society, such as the family and the healthy upbringing of young people, on which the future of the fatherland rests.⁵⁷

The DINACOS declaration clearly illustrated the junta's cognizance of a symbolic climate and its determination to control the flow therein. The import restriction policy was invoked. In 1977 the works of Julio Cortazar, Gabriel Garcia Marquez, and Mario Vargas Llosa were barred from entering Chile. All three authors apparently had been critical of the regime.

Also in 1977, two Italian journalists were refused permission to make a television program in Chile. And the Consejo Nacional de Televisión (CNTV) cancelled the broadcast of a series of TV dramas it had helped finance when it learned that some of the actors in the series were former Allende sympathizers.

A controversial play by Nicanor Parra made its debut in Santiago, and was quickly closed down by authorities. La Segunda called the drama an "insolent and incredible criticism of our political development."⁵⁸

When a Chilean Air Force transport crashed near Puerto Montt in July, a news blackout of the mishap was reported.⁵⁹ The media also

⁵⁷"Chile" (in Index), Index on Censorship 6 (July-August 1977): 68.

⁵⁸Ibid.

⁵⁹"News in Brief," Latin America Political Report XI (July 29, 1977): 232. The author was near Puerto Montt at the time of the crash, and remembers hearing radio reports of the mishap the day it occurred.

were told not to report a series of bombings which occurred in Santiago in September. In November five unionists were arrested, and three human rights activists were arrested and deported, all for their having been interviewed for a British documentary. Disseminating news of the arrests and exiles was prohibited. And the Santiago director of United Press International (UPI) and a radio reporter were among those arrested at a demonstration protesting the unknown fate of desaparecidos.

Latin America Political Report in 1977 cited criticism of the government's economic policies by El Mercurio,⁶⁰ and reported that "students, labour organisations and political leaders are now speaking out against the junta in terms which a year ago would have seemed unthinkable."⁶¹

President Pinochet announced the consulta nacional on the evening of December 21, 1977. His speech was carried by every television and radio station in the country, a mandatory link-up called the Red Nacional (national network). Pinochet's December 21st address actually was the first element in the government's media campaign to persuade the electorate to vote Sí on the January 4th proposition.

Although Chilean government propaganda⁶² probably exaggerated the extent of freedom of expression allowed during the ensuing campaign, there were demonstrations and public statements opposing the consulta,

⁶⁰"Chile: Hunger Strike," Latin America Political Report XI (July 1, 1977): 193.

⁶¹"Chile: Not so Happy Anniversary," Latin America Political Report XI (September 16, 1977): 285.

⁶²See The Answer of Chile, pp. 10-21..

and a high visibility of activity by the banned political parties. Frei, the politician most highly regarded both inside and outside of Chile, advised Chileans not to vote at all. Three former Christian Democratic congressmen, Andres Zaldivar, Tomas Reyes, and Rafael Moreno, issued a public statement urging Chileans to vote against the proposition.

The Socialists reportedly advised the electorate to boycott the vote, while the MIR supported a "No" vote.

A correspondent reported from Santiago on the media environment during the campaign:

With regard to the famous 'Consulta' or plebiscite, there was sufficient liberty given to discuss both sides of the question. In fact, most of the magazines here, like Hoy, Que Pasa, and Ercilla, published the opinions of people of political note on both sides. The Christian Democrats were, as always, the more vocal and said the Consulta was not legal and that the people should not vote . . . My impression was that the people were so glad to go to the polls that they went and had a good time. There were no demonstrations and everyone seemed to be enjoying themselves. I think the vote surprised the Military; they didn't expect to do so well.⁶³

The liberty enjoyed by the media during the campaign was, as in all cases, a relative liberty. Radio Balmaceda did not come back on the air, nor did Puro Chile print newspapers again. And many of the regime's most severe critics no longer lived in Chile at all, having been exiled or having left voluntarily. The field, as was noted earlier, had been reduced. Even among media outlets operating at the time of the campaign, one would have expected some hesitance on their parts to test the absolute limits of the junta's tolerance in a short, two-week

⁶³ Confidential letter to the author dated April 20, 1978.

period of relative liberty, particularly if these media anticipated an outcome of the consulta which was favorable to the regime. The relative liberty, however, should not be disparaged. The symbolic environment during the campaign did consist of opposing viewpoints.

It would appear that the coercive atmosphere for the media prevailed even after the government's consulta victory. In 1978 one issue of Nuevo Vea was suppressed because of an article about Chile's border dispute with Argentina. La Segunda was shut down for two days in the wake of U.S. State's Attorney Eugene Propper's visit to Santiago. Propper was investigating Chilean government complicity in the assassination of Orlando Letelier, the Chilean ambassador to the United States under Allende who was killed in Washington, D.C. Segunda's report was called "injurious to the public order."⁶⁴ It also was reported in 1978 that El Mercurio and La Tercera were under government orders to not publish letters from families of desaparecidos. In the early part of 1978 President Pinochet ordered a review of all press legislation, to guarantee freedom and to preserve order.

Television, the most extensive medium in Chile in 1977, also was the most carefully controlled. The State's control of TV through ownership and quasi-ownership has been described above. Television also was controlled by law in a far more determined manner than were any other medium. This was, no doubt, a consequence of the more recent and all-at-once arrival of the medium for the 1960's. Television operated

⁶⁴"Chile: Straight Talk," Latin America Political Report XII (June 30, 1978): 193-194.

under the strict rule of law from the time of its introduction.

Most of the laws governing television in Chile were embodied in Law 17.377 (revised), the Ley de la Televisión. This law was enacted on October 24, 1970, and revised and added to several times since.⁶⁵

The Preamble stated the objectives of Chilean television as of 1977:

Television, as a means of diffusion, must serve to communicate with and to integrate the country, to broadcast the understanding of basic national problems, and to procure the participation of all Chileans in the great initiatives begun to resolve those problems; to affirm national values, cultural values and morals, the dignity and respect of the rights of the individual and of the family; to stimulate education and the development of culture in all its forms; to inform objectively about national and international events, and to entertain sensibly, mindful of the spiritual and intellectual development of children and youth.

In addition, university television will endeavor to exhibit pluralistic free expression of critical consciousness and creative thought.

Television shall not be at the service of any determined ideology, and will respect all the tendencies of thought expressed by the various sectors of the Chilean people.⁶⁶

The television law, with its many liberal sounding ideals, paled in the face of the Pinochet regime's authoritarian rule, but there does remain significance in the law's very existence: The law spelled out ownership requirements (placing television in the hands of the State and the universities), and it instituted a scheme for financing broadcast television in Chile with public funds (this eventually was changed). Its sections pertaining to ownership and political communication provided

⁶⁵The revised law was made available to the author by the Consejo Nacional de Televisión (CNTV) in June 1977.

⁶⁶CNTV, "Televisión Chilena - Ley No. 17.377."

for stations' self-censorship,⁶⁷ and allowed for access to television time for all political parties or "movements" at campaign time. The applicability of these latter provisions is left to doubt, given that political parties were banned during the Pinochet regime.

Other laws pertaining to television included one which established norms for programs of national interest, and the "Cultural Hour" (1977):⁶⁸ instructions for the use of televised commercial advertising (1970, revised 1974);⁶⁹ rules governing the broadcasting of "soap operas" (1974, revised 1975 and 1976);⁷⁰ and minimum percentages of domestically produced programming required for each channel (1975, revised 1976).⁷¹

The Consejo Nacional de Televisión (CNTV) was created by Law 17.377 to supervise and promote television in Chile. CNTV watched for compliance with established advertising, programming, and technical

⁶⁷ Each channel was to have a Programming Assessment Council consisting of a psychologist, a professor of government, a sociologist, a lawyer, and a medical doctor.

⁶⁸ CNTV, "Acuerdo sobre normas para programas de interes nacional y franja cultural," Santiago, Chile, 1977. (Mimeographed.)

⁶⁹ CNTV, "Instrucciones para la autorización de la publicidad televisiva," Santiago, Chile, 1975. (Mimeographed.)

⁷⁰ CNTV, "Acuerdos sobre telenovelas," Santiago, Chile, 1976 (Mimeographed.)

⁷¹ In 1975, CNTV designated the following percentages of Chilean-produced material to appear on Chilean TV: UCVTV and UChTV - 15%; TVN and UCTV - 25%. CNTV, "Porcentajes de programación nacional en canales de televisión año 1976," Santiago, Chile, 1976. (Mimeographed.)

standards, and helped finance Chilean television production. The Council was a symbolic buffer between the television community, and the State could act through the Council and avoid direct contact in conflict cases. The composition of the Council's membership is indicative of the State's power even within the Council itself. The CNTV executive consisted of the Minister of Public Education; two ministers of the Supreme Court; the Rectors of the University of Chile, the Catholic University of Chile, and the Catholic University of Valparaíso; the Director General of TVN; and one member elected freely by the others.

One significant revision of the Law of Chilean Television by the junta was the addition of a clause which radically changed the structure of financing of Chilean television. Public funding was phased out until, starting in 1977, the channels were to be self-financed, mainly through the sale of air time for commercials. No doubt public funds continued to be used by TVN, particularly in the continued placement of transmitters and repeaters for the TVN network.

There was a bias in favor of the national network from 1970. The original financing scheme of Law 17.377 provided for ten per cent of public television funds to go to CNTV and of the remaining ninety per cent, forty per cent to TVN, and twenty per cent each to UCTV, UChTV, and UCVTV. It would appear that the dominance of TVN was state policy at least since the Allende period. As it now stands, its dominance within the television community is tremendous, particularly in the provinces.

In summarizing the Pinochet regime's control of the Chilean mass media, it has been observed that this control consisted of at least

six elements: ownership, quasi-ownership, elimination, coercion and censorship, law, and voluntary assent. State ownership and quasi-ownership gave the State direct and indirect control over the operations of a substantial number of media outlets. There were numerous examples of elimination, particularly of the media outlets of the Left. A general atmosphere of coercion by the State, punctuated by instances of prior censorship and accentuated with periodic but temporary closings and suppressions, characterized the media control environment after the sweep of eliminations in 1973. A handful of laws also were enacted which codified certain practices and intentions of the State vis-à-vis the media. Voluntary assent on the part of owners, editors, and journalists was seen as a less obvious, but still contributory, factor in the constrained environment.

The general effect of the media control environment in Chile since 1973 was to regulate the entry of information and opinion into Chile's symbolic climate. That, in other words, was censorship. But because of the particular structure of control described above, the need for formal censorship (State approval of all information before it is disseminated) was limited, and the incidence of suppression and reactive measures likewise was low. The regime exhibited a preference for prevention as against reaction. The vast elimination of leftist media after the coup was most important in this connection.

Specifically, and from a politico-economic standpoint, this climate of media control made the Chilean media community more homogeneous: Nearly all media outlets were unashamedly commercial enterprises, and nearly all could be expected to exhibit non-Marxist

political points of view. The Pinochet regime may have been served by such results because its own ideology was unashamedly pro-capitalist in its economics and equally anti-Marxist in its politics.

Gerbner's analysis of power within the media context was intended to illustrate his main area of concern--the symbolic climate and its effects on the society under investigation. Before the mediated messages reach that symbolic environment they must be composed by people. By attempting to characterize the nature of media ownership in Chile, it has been possible to unearth a political bias, not a surprising one, built into the post-Allende media structure. This political bias may also have manifested itself in the symbolic climate which the media created. The very powerful role of the State in the Chilean case, as media owner and ultimate authority, has been assessed. Other power roles did exist in Chile's media community between 1973 and 1978.

A prerequisite to analyzing other power roles in the Chilean media is to regard some assumptions about the power of the State during the period in question. A distinction should be made between authoritarian and totalitarian state power.

In its authoritarian rule the junta appropriated large amounts of power over domestic affairs in Chile, without the benefit of constitutional legitimacy. In its exercise of power the regime exhibited totalitarian methods, such as coercion and terror. It remains, however, that many aspects of Chilean life remained outside the grasp of the new State. The productive capacity of the country was increasingly in the hands of the private sector, an obvious function of the regime's capitalist ideology. And whereas the political freedoms of Chileans were all but

eliminated, the Chileans retained most other freedoms (religious freedom, freedom of movement, freedom to pursue a chosen vocation, and so on).

This is not to say that the State did not utilize totalitarian power in specific instances and toward specific individuals and groups. Clearly it did. But, the State did not attempt to control all aspects of Chilean life, and the individual was not completely subordinate to the Chilean State. The authoritarianism under Pinochet is hard to dispute. Its totalitarianism, however, is too qualified to serve as a characterization.⁷²

Media power roles in a totalitarian state could be analyzed, but one would merely be surveying subordinate roles within a single state apparatus. A polar opposite case, in which a capitalist mode of production exists and the media are relatively unfettered by State control, would require analysis of power with much more substance: unions which strike; editors who challenge and overcome the legal power of the State; and public interest groups which demand and receive attention from media owners and the State.

The analysis of power roles within an authoritarian state may be more complicated than in the other two cases, however, because the lines are not clearly drawn. This is especially true in the case of

⁷² This distinction was brought to mind by an El Mercurio editorial which appeared not long after the consulta. The editorial cited a West German newspaper which said the Pinochet regime was authoritarian rather than totalitarian, without expanding on the idea. The editorial was printed in English translation in The Answer of Chile, p. 28. The distinction may be useful in cases involving non-communist, single party states and non-communist military regimes among LDC's.

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Chile where a capitalist mode of production prevailed, but where the State was also a media owner; where the State was not averse to totalitarian action against the media; where Labor was sapped of its power; and where restrictions on political activity were responsible for the role of the public being little more than that of an agglomeration of willing consumers.

Gerbner's framework delineated nine power roles: authorities patrons, management, colleagues, competitors, auxiliaries, experts, organizations, and publics.

Authorities, according to Gerbner, make the laws and enforce them, backing up their decisions with political and military power. This power role in Chile has been illustrated clearly. Arbitrary action by the authoritarian junta should be added as a type of leverage (through censorship, suppression, and elimination). The authority role in the Chilean case was played by the junta as a whole, by DINACOS, and by CNTV. The State as authority was indisputable, mainly outside of the legal process, strict in its enforcement of written and unwritten standards, and totalitarian in its most severe exercise of power. No substantive authority role for the media rested outside the State.

The State, as has been noted, also assumed the role of patron with its numerous media holdings. Here the type of leverage is control over resources. In state-owned media outlets the employer would be the State, and while the designated management would be largely responsible for programming, editorial content, and personnel matters, the final authority in all such things would be the State, either as patron or as authority. The same situation would prevail in the private sector. An

example of the power of patrons would be the resignation of Filippi and his staff from Ercilla after a row over procedures.

The coercive climate after 1973 probably blurred any previous distinction between the patron and management roles in the Chilean media. Misjudgement by management could result in temporary or permanent closure of the media outlet, so owner vigilance was undoubtedly increased. Day-to-day personnel and editorial affairs probably remained in the hands of designated managers, but potentially controversial issues may have called for the involvement of the owners (again, the Ercilla affair). In many cases, particularly among smaller media outlets, the owners also were the management, so there would have been no distinction at all.

As far as the media outlets also being businesses, it should be remembered that Labor was rendered impotent by the military regime. Media owners and managers thus operated from a more powerful bargaining position. High unemployment probably increased this power as well.

There is evidence of appeals by patrons/management to their publics in exercises of power vis-à-vis the authorities. The title of the editor's column in the inaugural issue of Hoy was the motto of the magazine, "The truth without compromise":

Our desire is to deliver weekly a body of information enriched with considered, serious, and fair analyses of all that happens in Chile and in the rest of the world . . . We are press professionals and because of this we have indicated these essential fundamentals of our creed: that journalism is at the service of the truth; and, for that, we aspire to the public's easy access to information; that the public be given all the information that interests it; that it not be deformed, that it not be distorted, that there be no conditions . . .

Here at Hoy we believe that journalism should be clear and neat. Valiant if necessary, but always well-intentioned. Uncompromising in the defense of great values, but conscious of reality. Intransigent in sustaining the truth. Fair in its intentions and free in its analyses . . .

We do not receive instructions nor do we serve any interests . . . Our responsibility begins and ends with ourselves and from there, as we have said more than once, we will not be used as a Trojan Horse for anyone . . .

. . . this magazine intends to become a positive place of encounter in this ongoing search for the truth for people who think.⁷³

Likewise, Mensaje,⁷⁴ decrying the coercive media climate in Chile, commented in 1977:

Freedom of thought and expression is the only viable guarantee for a scientific and democratic realization of national progress.

On the other hand, a lack of liberty can cruelly affect the creation and transmission of culture. A culture under surveillance is an impoverished culture.⁷⁵

Even El Mercurio, a more conservative publication, protested the prior censorship embodied in Bando 107: "to accept godfathers or inquisitors of ideas or theories, and to submit to a restricted diet . . . constitutes a dangerous retrocession."⁷⁶

⁷³Emilio Filippi, "La verdad sin compromisos," Hoy (Santiago, Chile), June 1-7, 1977, p. 9.

⁷⁴"The only independent magazine surviving is Mensaje, a Jesuit monthly, whose October 1973 edition bore barely veiled criticism of the Military Junta, and a pointed article on torture. Sections of the editorial had been blanked out." Sanders, p. 9.

⁷⁵"Medios de Comunicación social," p. 251.

⁷⁶El Mercurio, May 4, 1977. Quoted in Ibid., p. 251.

Such media as those cited above clearly protested the power of the authorities when they could. The paradox, of course, is that such comments were allowed to appear at all, indicating, perhaps, that the State was able to contain such criticism so obviously directed at itself. Its authority, apparently, was not undermined by such thinly veiled criticism.⁷⁷

Because nearly all media outlets in Chile are commercial enterprises, the power of the advertisers, who buy media time and space, must not be overlooked. They too are in the role of patron. Although the characteristics of the market are likely to be of more concern to the advertisers than the content of the messages carried by the medium, those messages may have a determining effect on the size and character of the market. Thus, in a round-about way, the advertisers wield much power, although probably more in a passive sense than in an active one. In the case of Chilean television, for instance, the rules governing TV expressly forbid advertiser interference with program content.⁷⁸ Such rules have no influence over the vagaries of the marketplace, however, which may dictate higher advertising sales for "The Bionic Woman" than for a domestically produced documentary on Chilean Indians.

The power embodied in the auxiliaries role, the suppliers of necessary goods and services, is difficult to assess without further investigation. The author has encountered no evidence to suggest that power was exercised by auxiliaries through withholding supplies and

⁷⁷ Hoy remains one of the most vocal critics of the regime, but does not seem to have been the object of government reaction. Indeed, the Chilean embassy in Ottawa gave a recent copy of Hoy to the author or his examination in 1978.

⁷⁸ CNTV, "Televisión Chilena - Lay no. 17.377," Título V, Artículo 29.

services, or in any other way. Foreign involvement in the Chilean media, however, is most visible at this point. Much of the hardware needed for broadcasting and printing in Chile was imported. Television software and even news were imported as well.

As is the case in most LDC's, the relatively small size of the domestic market makes difficult the profitable production of quality (in a technical sense) television programs or the economical maintenance of international news agencies. Hurley cited the American Broadcasting Company's (ABC) success at breaking into the Chilean market with low-priced dubs of its American TV shows.⁷⁹ By 1977 Chilean television channels were importing programs from the U.S., Great Britain, Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela, Japan, and other Western countries.

Chilean publications also purchased foreign news through such agencies as UPI, Associated Press (AP), Agence Presse France (APF), and Reuter. Some publications did maintain a limited number of their own foreign correspondents, however.

There were a number of organizations in which people working in the media could come together as colleagues. These included the Colegio de Periodistas (College of Journalists), the Asociación de Radiofusasoras de Chile (ARCHI: Association of Radio Broadcasters of Chile), the Asociación Nacional de la Prensa (ANP: National Press Association), and even GNTV, although CNTV was not in the private sector.

⁷⁹Hurley, "Chilean Television," p. 685.

Gerbner viewed the leverage of colleagues as solidarity. Although there was evidence of collegial solidarity in the Chilean case, it never reached the point of community-wide protests such as refusing to publish or to broadcast.

Mensaje observed national press and media professional organization solidarity with Radio Balmaceda after it was closed for good.⁸⁰ National Press Day was not celebrated in 1976, a silent protest over government-set wages for journalists. Decree 1,281 was protested by the Colegio de Periodistas, ARCHI, and ANP. Community-wide displeasure with Bando 107 also was evident. But the effect on government media policy as a result of such expressions of solidarity was not visible. The fact that the media also are commercial enterprises operating in a coercive environment may explain the lack of more grandiose expressions of solidarity.⁸¹ There also may have existed a collegial schism between the state-owned and university-based media on the one hand, and the media in the private sector on the other.

The power role of competitors was significant in the Chilean case in much the same way as was the role of advertisers. Television broadcasters, for example, engaged in head-to-head competition for viewers in the exact same way North American broadcasters do. Soap

⁸⁰"Medios de comunicación social: Libertad y bien común," p. 249.

⁸¹There appear to have been no great protests over the 1973 eliminations on the part of the survivors. Apart from being political combatants, the various media outlets also were economic combatants vying for the attention of the public as consumer. When the media of the "left" were closed down, the survivors enjoyed a more monopolistic position.

operas competed in the same time slots, likewise with dubbed American series, the news, and so on. Color photos of tragedies and accident victims vied for readers' attentions on the covers of Santiago's tabloid dailies. Whereas the various media outlets may have been colleagues before the power of the State, they were adversaries in the marketplace. The power of the competitor, then, may have laid in the setting of revenue-producing trends in programming, editorial policy, or technique.

Experts as a category include those who labor in the media, critics, and subject specialists. Due to a general loss of power by Labor, the power in the workplace of media employees was negligible. Even their ability to pursue their normal activities was impeded by the coercive environment under the military. CISEC reported journalists' complaints that their professional status had deteriorated since 1973: Government considered them a necessary evil; they were expected merely to report news as given them by government sources, without analyzing or criticizing it; some journalists were discriminated against by government news sources because they worked for media outlets which were critical of the regime; many government sources refused to be interviewed without the express approval of DINACOS; while formal censorship was officially ended, journalists still received phone calls warning them of the consequences of releasing certain information; and the journalists felt that their state-controlled salaries were too low.⁸²

⁸² CISEC, "Sector Comunicación Social," pp. 3-4.

Media workers, therefore, seemed to have felt constraints both from the increased power of management within the workplace and from the coercive behavior of the State. It still remained, however, that these workers were deeply involved in the composition of the messages which eventually reached the symbolic environment, be they cameramen, writers, or typesetters. Their participation, constrained or otherwise, was essential to the continuing activities of the Chilean media. Their role, however, seemed to hold little real power.

Various critics of the media did exist in 1977, but it is difficult to assess their influence within the media community. An example of a negative criticism of Chilean TV is the following comment by Chilean sociologist Pablo Huneeus:

It is the medium most advanced technologically and most backward intellectually. I think that Chilean TV transforms the mind into gelatin: it is a medium of intellectual flattery, a medium of the diffusion of mediocrity . . . I believe that the people who work in television underestimate the cultural level of the Chilean people.⁸³

The author has encountered no evidence to suggest that subject specialists wielded any significant power in the media, apart from the knowledge which they offered for sale.

The power of public organizations in the media context probably was negligible. They certainly were not highly visible. The abolition of political assembly and all other political activity probably prevented public organizations concerned with the media from having much effect, if indeed these organizations existed at all.

The restrictions on political activity in Chile under Pinochet left the role of the public as that of a group of isolated consumers.

⁸³"TV Chilena, ¡Ay!" Revista del Domingo (El Mercurio, Santiago, Chile), July 10, 1977, p. 13.

Given the commercial nature of the Chilean media, these consumers played a crucial role. The commercial success or failure of media outlets depended upon consumers buying the products these outlets advertised. If advertisers did not believe that these consumers were buying the products because they were advertised in the media, they could withdraw their sponsorship. It is better to leave unresolved the question of whether or not the Chilean actually went out of his way to buy product "X" because he saw it advertised in Mensaje. But the assumption that this occurred kept the commercial patronage system on its feet.

Clearly the Chilean people did attend to the media, particularly television, and they may have, as remote voices, made some complaint or compliment about that to which they were exposed, but by and large the public was ignored by the media except as consumers of the media and the products advertised therein.

This assessment of power roles in Chile's mass media points to distinctive political and economic forces which inevitably could affect the symbolic climate which the media create. Political power was heavily concentrated in the authoritarian State. Media owners, managers, individual journalists, critics, and professional associations exercised what little power they had, mostly in the name of a freer media climate.

Economic power rested in the capitalist marketplace, where owners and managers, auxiliaries and competitors, and of course the public, adjusted to the market behavior of one another.

The effect upon the symbolic climate likely was different for each of these two forces. The political force was mostly a negative one, a force which dictated what would not enter the symbolic environment.

Those diminutive powers which contended with the State always sought to expand those limited possibilities.

The economic force was conversely a positive one, the objects being marginal increments in readership, viewers, listeners, advertising revenues, and reading, viewing, and listening pleasure.

The objective of an analysis of power roles is to lay the groundwork for an assessment of actual media messages. These messages, and the subsequent symbolic climate, shall be described and evaluated in the following chapter.

CHAPTER V

THE MEDIA-CLIMATE IN CHILE

Assuming that all political systems are dynamic, or in development, the present discussion will focus on the contribution of the mass media to the developing political culture in Chile from the time of the military takeover in 1973 to the consulta nacional in January 1978. This will entail the application of a posited "effect" of mass communication--contributions to culture which stem from a media-created symbolic climate.

"Culture," wrote Boyd-Barrett, "is a notoriously elusive concept: we cannot hope to trace a precise causal link between mass media exposure and cultural change."¹

One approach to this elusive concept of culture might be guided by Mead's simple definition of culture as "the systematic body of learned behavior which is transmitted from parents to children."² The present investigation is not concerned primarily with the parent-to-child transmission of culture, however. Rather, the focus is on forces at work within the developing political culture of Chile which may have had some short-term effect. Gerbner's framework for analyzing media messages suggests that "large bodies of messages can be observed

¹Boyd-Barrett, p. 132.

²Margaret Mead, Preface to Patterns of Culture, by Ruth Benedict (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1934), p. vii.

as dynamic systems with symbolic functions that have social consequences."³

Calling the media systems "dynamic" allows that the qualities of the actual messages are not consistent over time. Change is implicitly understood, regardless of the causes of that change.

Gerbner described the "symbolic function" of media messages and their "social consequences":

Media content indicators tell us not so much what individuals think or do as what most people think or do about something in common. They will tell us about the shared representations of life, the issues, and the prevailing points of view that capture public attention, occupy people's time, and animate their imagination. They will help us understand the impact of communication media development and social change upon the symbolic climate that affects all we think and do.⁴

The symbolic climate is viewed as a factor in the development of culture. Gerbner did not suggest a narrow cause/effect relationship between specific messages and specific cultural changes; rather than predicting the qualities of such cultural changes, the approach concentrates on observations within a narrowed field of phenomena, and attempts to identify apparent changes which plausibly can be linked to the mass media.

This recognition of the cultural role of the media is not unlike the view Carey ascribed to Innis, a view more specifically related to political culture:

He believed that the fundamental form of social power is the power to define what reality is. Monopolies of knowledge in the cultural sense refer to the efforts of groups to determine the entire world view of a people: to produce, in other words, an official view of reality which can constrain and control human action.⁵

³Gerbner, p. 200. ⁴Ibid., p. 204. ⁵Carey, p. 44.

The entire symbolic climate in a given cultural context (or political state) is not, of course, of direct relevance to the political culture. Likewise, the symbolic climate itself is not limited to those messages which emanate from the mass media. The breadth of a symbolic climate can be illustrated with Leach's description of the "non-verbal dimensions of culture":

. . . styles of clothing, village lay-out, architecture, furniture, food, cooking, music, physical gestures, postural attitudes, and so on are organized in patterned sets so as to incorporate coded information in a manner analagous to the sounds and words and sentences of a natural language.⁶

All of this notwithstanding, the consideration here is primarily with the politico-economic aspects of this media-created part of the climate.

This is not to suggest that non-mass mediated elements of the symbolic climate have no direct bearing on political culture; the forthcoming consideration of time biased organizations and institutions treats such a related, non-mass media factor. Nor does this suggest that ostensibly non-political elements of the media climate do not also have political consequences. Relevant, non-mass media elements and ostensibly non-political elements will be drawn into the discussion wherever possible.

The following section on the symbolic climate in Chile is not intended to be a detailed analysis of Chilean culture with a prediction of enduring cultural effects induced by mass media exposure. The analysis will center on the contributions to Chilean political culture made by a

⁶Edmund Leach, Culture and Communication: The Logic by which Symbols are Connected (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 10.

mass media system under marked political constraints.

The ownership structure of the media in Chile and the political constraints placed on these media were described in the preceding chapter. It was observed that through the elimination of the leftist media, ownership of numerous media outlets, and strict control of non-governmental media outlets, the State had, to some extent, relieved itself of the need for consistent, ad hoc acts of repression against the Chilean media. The State's behavior in relation to the media evolved from reactive to preventative in its attempts to stifle overt opposition. The environment of control and the subsequent constrained behavior of the media were seen as complementary to the short-term duration of the Pinochet regime.

The symbolic climate which the media created between 1973 and 1978 likewise will be viewed as complementary to the Pinochet regime. By examining the messages which both do and do not enter the symbolic climate, it will be seen that the mass media served to reinforce the Pinochet regime in Chile, both by intent and by coincidence. The ideology of the regime, capitalist in its economics and authoritarian in its politics, was served by a constrained system of mass communication. It was a system based on commercial patronage, and was one in which much potential criticism was systematically cut off.

The Chilean media's contributions to the symbolic climate (the media-climate) under Pinochet, might best be understood by first describing the media-climate under his predecessor, Salvador Allende.

The mass media under Allende may have enjoyed a freedom unprecedented in Chilean history. Schenkel observed nearly complete freedom of the media under the Unidad Popular, with neither censorship

nor self-censorship. Indeed, he accused the State of indulging distortion in news and outright sedition in the political criticism of the "ultraright".⁷ Hurley made a similar observation, noting the plain incitement of anti-Allende Universidad Catolica TV in the weeks preceding the 1973 golpe: Channel 13's director, Father Raul Hasbún, in a televised speech, goaded Allende personally, imploring, "Señor Presidente, ¡rectifique o renuncie!" (Mr. President, rectify or resign!).⁸

The media of the Left, meanwhile, apart from pursuing commercial success, focussed on "consciousness raising and mass mobilization" for "the ongoing socialist transformation."⁹ This probably meant persuading Chileans to support the socialist initiatives of the UP coalition. Clark, in her description of the goals and policies of UP, summarized the socialist regime's plans for the media:

These communication media (radio, publishing, television, the press, cinema), are fundamental in helping to form a new culture and a new human being. Therefore it will be necessary to give them an educational orientation and free them of their commercial nature; measures should be taken to see that the social organizations have these media at their disposal, thus getting rid of the harmful presence of the monopolies in these media.¹⁰

Allende was saddled with a mass media situation that was inherently antipathetic to the "socialist transformation". Not only did most media outlets, including those of the Left, reside in the private sector, but

⁷ Schenkel, p. 58. ⁸ Hurley, "Chilean Television," p. 685.

⁹ Fagen, p. 59.

¹⁰ Kate Clark, Chile: Reality and Prospects of Popular Unity (London: Laurence and Wishart, 1972), p. 125.

Allende, a democratically elected president, was required by his opposition-controlled Congress to sign "freedom of expression" legislation before being allowed to take office.¹¹

Although Televisión Nacional de Chile (TVN) was greatly expanded under Allende, and although the State acquired numerous other media outlets in radio and in the press, the media in general never were "freed" of their commercial nature. Throughout his administration Allende faced the imposing task of instituting the "socialist transformation" while most media outlets remained in private hands. Where private ownership generally was threatened one would have expected privately owned media to react angrily, as they apparently did. The high degree of media freedom under Allende enabled anti-government commentary to enter the media-climate freely.

The commercial patronage system also had its effects on the media-climate under Allende. Nearly all media outlets were competing for audiences. The popular press of all political persuasions attracted readers with "sex, scandal, and sports," and the highest levels of leftist political discussion were relegated to esoteric intellectual journals.¹² One observer noted that ". . . light entertainment monopolizes the broadcast time," of Chilean radio and TV under the UP.¹³

Television became increasingly commercialized during the Allende years.¹⁴ The channels engaged in ratings competition not unlike

¹¹Fagen, p. 63. ¹²Ibid.

¹³Schenkel, p. 54. ¹⁴Hurley, "Chilean Television," p. 687.

that which exists in North America, and used imported programming to boost audiences.¹⁵ Fagen wrote that the Chilean public had, at this point, "long-cultivated tastes for the mass culture of the United States."¹⁶

During the Allende years the typical TV fare was Bonanza, Mannix, Dean Martin, and Doris Day.¹⁷ Universidad de Chile TV, supportive of the UP, attacked American imperialism during its newscasts and showed Peyton Place and The Untouchables on prime time, all this with commercial interruptions.¹⁸ In fact, among the four Santiago channels in 1973, the three which were generally supportive of Allende had higher percentages of imported programming than did Universidad Catolica TV, arch-critic of his regime.¹⁹

A state enterprise, Chile Films, existed both to produce and to import films for the "socialist transformation", but movie theatres were privately owned, and most continued to screen popular imports.²⁰

The media-climate of the Left was supplemented by demonstrations, wall paintings in city and countryside, travelling amateur theatre groups, dance companies, and musicians:

¹⁵ Hurley, Comunicaciones, p. 117. ¹⁶ Fagen, p. 63.

¹⁷ Hurley, "Chilean Television," p. 687. ¹⁸ Ibid., p. 685.

¹⁹ Schenkel, p. 54. Percentages of foreign programming were as follows: TVN - 44%; Universidad de Chile TV - 59%; Universidad Catolica TV - 28%; and Universidad Catolica de Valparaiso TV - 70%.

²⁰ Fagen, p. 61.

But the dedicated leftists who participated in all these activities did not significantly influence the presentation of day-to-day political and economic events in the newspapers, on radio, or on television.²¹

Although the Tass and Novosti news agencies operated in Chile during the Allende years, the media which supported the UP were nearly all United Press International subscribers.²²

Chile's media-climate during the Allende years was a crazy quilt of partisan politicking, sensationalism, and "trivial" entertainment:

The contradiction implied by this media pattern is obvious. The political and economic process under way depended on a mobilization of the Chilean people at the grass roots level in support of the new values of socialism. Yet the communication media were largely in the hands of those who opposed the direction of change. Furthermore, even the minority of newspapers, radio stations, and television channels identified with the left were unable to escape from the patterns and style of conventional communications systems.²³

Which is to say, if the media of the Left were not mere competitors for an audience in Chile, and if they did not have to depend upon commercial patronage, then they would have been ~~more~~ able to contribute to "consciousness raising" for the "socialist transformation". As it stood, the "socialist transformation" was attempted in a political environment where other powerful contestants were allowed, and in an economic environment where private interests retained considerable economic power vis-à-vis the State. This fouled the transformation from the onset. The media situation only compounded Allende's problems. Freedom of expression was

²¹Ibid., pp. 59-60. ²²Schenkel, p. 57.

²³Fagen, pp. 62-63.

respected and, apparently, taken to its limits. The commercial patronage system forced the media to cater to popular tastes which seemingly were not in harmony with consciousness raising for socialism.

From a purely political standpoint, it was noted that the media situation under the UP reflected the great political polarization that existed in Chile at the time; forces working for socialism versus forces working for a complete return to capitalism.²⁴

It probably can be concluded that the media climate, among other factors, contributed to the downfall of the UP coalition. The freedom of expression so sorely missed by the Left after 1973 bred a media-climate largely antipathetic to the Left during the Allende period. And the commercial patronage system apparently forced the leftist media to disseminate media content that was not always consistent with their socialist aspirations.

As though they had learned their lesson from Allende himself, the generals who proceeded him moved quickly to ensure that freedom of expression would not compromise their objectives. And because the Pinochet regime opted for a capitalist approach to development, the commercial patronage system offered few problems in terms of media content which was inconsistent with their ideology.

Perhaps the greatest difference between the media climate under Pinochet, when compared to that under Allende, was the absence of Marxist (or leftist) commentary, and partisan politicking generally. Some criticism of the Pinochet regime still existed, but the borders of allowable argumentation were drawn in. And "politics" is a broad enough

²⁴Schenkel, p. 57.

category so that much of what reached the media climate could have been called political, but again, the field was narrowed.

Much of the substance of the Chilean media climate under Pinochet was not much different than that under Allende. If political commentary is ignored in the consideration, it appeared that the rest-- general news, entertainment, music, sports, commercials, and so on-- was simply status quo ante bellum.

The systematic shutting down of the media of the Left was described in an earlier chapter. For all the difficulties which have been encountered in attempts to characterize the politics of the Pinochet regime, it was clear from the onset that they were anti-Marxist, anti-socialist, anti-Left. The elimination of the leftist media had a greater effect on the subsequent media climate than any other single factor. The political character of the Chilean media climate from late 1973 to the beginning of 1978 was determined, to a great degree, by those eliminations.

The absence of the media of the Left tells us what was not a part of the media climate during the period concerned. The rhetoric of socialism was removed. What remained will be described in the present section.

Television appeared to have overtaken radio as the most dominant medium in Chile by 1978. The "dominance" would be in terms of geographic coverage, and actual exposure (see chapter III). A description of Chilean TV in 1974 indicated that the medium was commanding the attention of the public with such offerings as the World Cup of Soccer, transmitted to Chile via satellite from Germany, and broadcast over TVN:

The World Cup was a sort of "Cabaret" that distracted many Chileans from their preoccupations, and induced them to neglect their studies and their work.²⁵

The weekly magazine, Ercilla, called it a "psychosis".²⁶

Imported programming, primarily from the United States, continued to enjoy a pronounced presence on Chilean television:

The Chilean child watches an average of a thousand hours of TV a year, and his favorite programs are the time fillers, those like Kung Fu, Bonanza, Mission Impossible, and The Avengers.

If the idea of having Chilean television based in the universities as a compromise between state and commercial patronage ever worked as intended, it was not clear from the types of TV programs broadcast in Chile. By 1974 the programming on the university channels and on TVN was hardly distinguishable from that on a privately owned North American channel. The State had assumed direct control of the universities after the 1973 coup, and was promoting a capitalist route to Chile's future development:

If one were to perform a content analysis of the programs on Channels 7,9, and 13 in Santiago in the year 1974, it would be discovered that the concept of university TV was impaired, and that, in reality the system is crypto-commercial.²⁸

Whereas prior to the 1973 military takeover the TV channels in Chile received state support, the junta whittled away at it, promoting instead autofinancimiento (self-financing) through the sale of advertising time. Complete autofinancimiento was instituted beginning in 1977.²⁹

²⁵ Hurley, Comunicaciones, p. 118.

²⁶ Ibid. ²⁷ Ibid., p. 148. ²⁸ Ibid., p. 118.

²⁹ Interview with Sergio Rodríguez Olivares, Director of Studies and Promotion, Consejo Nacional de Televisión, Santiago, Chile, June 1977.

This undoubtedly was a determining factor in the qualities of TV programming thereafter. Whatever latitude the channels had enjoyed previously in being able to televise "quality" programming (at government expense) that generated little revenue was eliminated. The "ratings game" was institutionalized, and programming value was determined in the main by its ability to attract viewers, and hence, to attract advertising revenue.

Even a crude socio-psychological explanation as to why a given public will attend faithfully to a given type of television fare is not central to a consideration of the media-climate. Likewise, the complex issue of whether a television audience actually responds to the inducements provided by the various media will not be dealt with directly, although a positive relationship between information and beliefs is assumed. An attempt shall be made to show that television programming in Chile in 1976 and 1977 offered little if anything which could be described as politically antagonistic to the Pinochet regime, that the programming generally was supportive of the capitalistic approach to development promoted by the junta, and that presentations of alternative approaches to development were virtually nonexistent.

The program week of June 24-30 was selected at random from 1977 to illustrate television programming in Santiago. The program descriptions which appeared in the television guide of El Cronista were analyzed in terms of broad programming categories and of country of origin.

Table 4 shows the distribution of the week's programming elements (each program guide entry constituted an element) in various programming categories. The programs of the four Santiago channels were added together for the sub-totals in each category. The categories correspond generally to those used by the Consejo Nacional de Televisión (CNTV) in its own

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TABLE 4

PROGRAMMING ELEMENTS ON CHILEAN TELEVISION,
JUNE 24-30, 1977

TYPE OF PROGRAMMING	NUMBER OF ELEMENTS							Total
	Fri. 24	Sat. 25	Sun. 26	Mon. 27	Tues. 28	Wed. 29	Thurs. 30	
I. Entertainment								
A. Movies	7	14	6	5	5	7	5	49
B. Dramatic and comedic series	10	6	6	14	13	15	12	76
C. Soap operas	12	0	0	13	13	12	13	63
D. Variety shows and sports	9	4	5	10	10	8	8	54
E. Astrology/ music	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	2
F. Miscellaneous or unclassifi- able enter- tainment	5	6	6	5	4	5	5	36
II. Children's programming								
A. Dramatic and comedic series	1	1	2	0	0	0	0	4
B. Variety shows and cartoons	8	5	12	7	7	7	6	52
III. Cultural program- ming (arts, science history, etc.)	2	2	3	2	2	3	6	20
IV. Educational programming	2	3	2	1	1	1	1	11
V. News and journalism	10	7	7	11	10	10	10	65
VI. Miscellaneous								
A. Religious	1	2	5	1	1	1	1	12
B. Other unclassi- fiable	3	0	3	3	4	3	3	19

Total elements for week

463

Source: Derived from "TV Impacto," El Cronista (Santiago, Chile, June 24, 1977).

programming research, but the responsibility for assigning programs to one category for the week surveyed rests with the author.

In terms of program elements (and thus, not necessarily in terms of time) the dramatic and comedic series were the most prevalent. These generally were broadcast in the evening, the typical "prime time".

News and other journalistic programs ranked second. News programs appeared up to three times daily on individual channels, morning, mid-day, and evening. CNTV regulations required at least one newscast per day.³⁰ Each channel broadcast its main national and international newscast at 8:30 p.m. nightly.

Soap operas, a close third, also were governed by CNTV regulations.³¹ These telenovelas competed with one another primarily in the afternoons.

The next largest categories were variety and sports programs, miscellaneous children's fare, and movies. The variety shows generally were of two types, informal talk shows featuring mundane patter and housewife-oriented information; and large musical, comedy, and contest extravaganzas, broadcast live from Santiago theatres or TV studios. This latter type, programs like Sabados Gigantes and Dingolondango, commanded the largest audiences of any programs in Chile.³² The talk

³⁰ CNTV, "Acuerdos del Consejo sobre Franja Noticiosa," Santiago, Chile, 1977. (Mimeographed.) Each channel was required to broadcast at least one news program each day.

³¹ CNTV, "Acuerdos sobre telenovelas."

³² Informe Sobre Chile 1976, pp. 320-325.

shows commonly were aired on weekday mornings, while the extravaganzas appeared on weekend afternoons. Soccer dominated the sports programming.

Movies were not in short supply during the week surveyed. They averaged seven per day, with no less than five offered on any single day. Late evenings and weekends were common times for their broadcast.

Other categories of note were cultural programming and educational programming. The former included documentary films of general interest on "cultural" topics (history, geography, etc.), while the latter included Sesame Street for children, and televised university and pre-university classes.

Slightly better than forty per cent (187 of 463) of the programming elements for the week were programs of foreign origin. Table 5 shows the distribution of these programs by general category and by country of origin. While the United States was far and away the largest single supplier of foreign programs, it is interesting to note that the combined total of programs from other Latin American countries nearly equalled the U.S. total. All foreign programs were from other capitalist countries.

The American imports were distributed over each general category, but accounted for most of the identifiable foreign children's programs, movies, and dramatic series. The Latin American imports tended to cluster in the telenovela category, with some Mexican comedic series.

Imported children's fare for the week included the following programs:

TABLE 5
FOREIGN PROGRAMMING ELEMENTS ON CHILEAN TELEVISION JUNE 24-30, BY COUNTRY OF
ORIGIN AND BY GENERAL PROGRAMMING CATEGORY

COUNTRY OF ORIGIN	ELEMENTS BY PROGRAMMING CATEGORY					Total
	Movies	Soap operas	Dramatic series	Comedic series	Children's	
United States	5	3	41	8	11	78
Mexico	0	25	0	14	0	39
Venezuela	0	20	0	0	0	20
Argentina	0	5	1	0	0	6
Brasil	0	5	0	0	0	6
Argentina/Peru	0	5	0	0	0	5
Great Britain	0	0	1	1	0	2
Japan	0	0	1	0	3	4
France	1	0	0	0	0	1
Italy	1	0	0	0	0	1
Unclassifiable but apparently foreign	20	0	1	0	2	25
Total	27	63	45	23	16	187

Source: Derived from "TV Impacto," El Cronista (Santiago, Chile), June 24, 1977.

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Sesame Street
Johnny Quest
Bomba
Tarzan
Lassie

Walt Disney
Topo Gigio
Spiderman
Heidi
Astroboy

Movie viewers for the week were shown films starring Buster Keaton, Zero Mostel, Ava Gardner, Sofia Loren, Anthony Quinn, Alec Guinness, Gina Lollabrigida, Marilyn Monroe, Rock Hudson, Edward G. Robinson, Ida Lupino, Jean Paul Belmondo, Broderick Crawford, and Paul Newman among others.

The imported soap operas and their respective countries of origin included:

Los que ayudan a dios (Venezuela)
La mujer prohibida (Venezuela)
La zulianita (Venezuela)
La usurpadora (Venezuela)
El velo de la novia (Mexico)
La heina (Mexico)
La imperdonable (Mexico)

Mañana sera otro dia (Mexico)
El hijo de Angela Maria (Mexcio)
Tu rebelde ternura (Argentina)
El adorable Profesor Aldao
 (Argentina/Peru)
El bien amado (Brasil)
Dark Shadows (United States)

Nearly all the dramatic series aired that week were of American origin. These included:

Streets of San Francisco
Zane Grey
The Invaders
The Millionaire
Daktari
Lost in Space
Police Woman
Star Trek
High Chapparral

Police Story
Rich Man, Poor Man
Starsky and Hutch
The FBI
Bionic Woman
Big Valley
S.W.A.T.
The Untouchables
Little House on the Prairie

The imported American comedic series included Hazel, M.A.S.H., and Laurel and Hardy. Imported Mexican comedy series were El Chavo, Chapulín Colorado, and La criada bien criada.

Two American religious programs were aired during the week surveyed, featuring evangelists Billy Graham and Rex Humbard, respectively. Other

assorted imports included Young People's Concert with Leonard Bernstein and the New York Philharmonic Orchestra; The Wide World of Sports from ABC; a documentary on Jawaral Nehru; the documentary, In Search of the Nile; and The Avengers and Upstairs Downstairs from Great Britain.

The domestically produced television shows aired during the week concerned were largely live, studio productions. These included news and weather; women's talk shows; musical variety shows; fashion notes; children's variety shows; teen dance shows (with American and British music, and videotaped snatches of American and British rock stars in performance); promotions for the national lottery; religious messages; and Catholic masses.

There were domestic productions that were not simple entertainment or trivial information. Rostro de Chile (TVN) was a series of features on the geography and culture of Chile's thirteen regions. Sentencia (TVN) was a series of TV plays which illustrated how Chilean law was applied and how citizens could defend their rights. Universidad Catolica's Teleduc offered basic mathematics, statistics, learning skills, the psychology of marriage, and world literature from its TV classrooms. Lo que ud. quiere saber (What you want to know) was a program of commentary on the week's news events by a panel of specialists. Desde mi pueblo featured works of the theatre performed by Chilean players.

Numerous other examples of programs with less than trivial content could be cited. But by and large the national productions, not unlike the imported ones, consisted of light entertainment or non-controversial information. Perhaps typical of national productions in Chile in 1977 was the July 9th installment of Ahora aqui, a woman's talk show broadcast by Universidad Catolica. That day's program was

entitled, "Sandwiches: A Solution for Many Occasions".

A number of CNTV programming studies both verify and supplement these observations. A survey of programming for October 1976, for example, showed that over sixty-two per cent of the combined air times of the four channels was devoted to entertainment. The distribution over all categories broke down as follows:³³

OCTOBER 1976 Category	Hours	% of total programming	Annual minimum % required by CNTV
Education	62.49	4.93	4
Cultural	108.37	8.53	6
Children's	101.15	7.95	8
Journalistic	201.46	15.85	12
Entertainment	798.40	62.74	30
TOTAL	1273.07	100.00	

In the entertainment category movies accounted for 297 hours that month, dramatic and comedic series 243 hours, soap operas 120 hours, and variety shows 111 hours. Given the fact that imported programs were most prevalent in the movie, series, and soap opera categories these time data confirm the suspected high level of overall foreign content in Chilean TV programming.

It might be noted that the CNTV category minima were met that month in all cases but children's programming. Except in the case of entertainment, the levels achieved were not much greater than the minima required.

For February 1977 the proportion of entertainment programming was higher yet, and the proportions of educational and cultural

³³ CNTV, Departamento de Estudios y Promoción, "Estudio de las programaciones de las canales de televisión, Octubre 1976," Santiago, Chile, 1976. (Mimeographed.)

programming both fell short of the required annual minimum percentages:³⁴

<u>FEBRUARY 1977</u>			
<u>Category</u>	<u>Hours</u>	<u>% of total programming</u>	<u>Annual minimum % required by CNTV</u>
Educational	10.01	1.00	4
Cultural	49.22	4.93	6
Children's	97.01	9.69	8
Journalistic	98.53	9.88	12
Entertainment	745.41	74.50	30
TOTAL	1000.58	100.00	

To give some idea as to how the individual channels allotted general types of programs to their broadcasting schedules, Table 6 shows the distribution over categories for each channel during April and May 1977. Marked deviations from that period's norms included a substantially higher percentage of children's programming by Universidad de Chile, and a substantially lower percentage of children's programming and a higher percentage of entertainment by Universidad Catolica de Valparaiso.

No channel met all the required CNTV category minima for the two months. Educational and cultural programming were most conspicuously absent.

There was an apparent desire on the part of CNTV to have more domestically produced programming shown on Chilean TV. It was observed in the October 1976 programming survey that an unusually large number of foreign film had been aired that month. CNTV commented:

These figures, and even moreso, the figures on series and soap operas which are detailed in other chapters, constitute a constant bombardment of images and ideas of foreign origin to which the viewers are subjected.³⁵

This would indicate general xenophobic sentiments without obvious regard for the qualities of foreign programs. This

³⁴ CNTV, Departamento de Control y Supervisión, "Situación programática de los canales de televisión, Febrero 1977," Santiago, Chile 1977. (Mineographed.)

³⁵ CNTV, "Estudio de las programaciones, Octubre 1976," p. 4.

TABLE 6

DISTRIBUTION OF TELEVISION PROGRAMS IN CHILE BY GENERAL PROGRAMMING CATEGORY
AND BY CHANNEL, APRIL AND MAY 1977

PROGRAMMING CATEGORY	PERCENTAGE OF MONTH'S TOTAL PROGRAMMING								Minimum % required by CNTV (annual)
	Channel 7		Channel 13		Channel 9		Channel 4		
	April	May	April	May	April	May	April	May	
Educational	1.18*	2.03*	7.03	7.76	2.38*	3.83*	2.35*	2.44*	4
Cultural	13.37	7.93	7.04	5.14*	5.59*	3.67*	3.95*	6.73	6
Children's	10.63	11.05	8.76	8.93	15.66	17.45	5.22*	5.40*	8
Journalistic	14.86	15.49	13.89	11.61*	12.73	13.69	10.38*	17.12	12
Entertainment	59.96	63.50	63.28	66.56	63.64	61.36	78.10	68.31*	30
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	

Source: Departamento de Control y Supervisión, Consejo Nacional de Televisión, Santiago, Chile, 1977.

Note: Channel 7 - Televisión Nacional de Chile; Channel 13 - Universidad Católica de Chile TV; Channel 9 - Universidad de Chile TV; Channel 4 - Universidad Católica de Valparaíso TV.

* Below annual minimum percentages required by Consejo Nacional de Televisión. In a session of CNTV on March 25, 1977, it was agreed to establish for Channel 4 minima of 4.3% and 5.2% for Cultural and Children's programming, respectively, for a period of four months.

apparent xenophobia did not, however, manifest itself in very restrictive "Canadian Content" rules for Chilean TV programming. As of May 1976, TVN was required to broadcast 25% domestically produced programs; Universidad de Chile and Universidad Catolica, 20%; and Universidad Catolica de Valparaíso, 15%.³⁶

These seemingly lax requirements undoubtedly came about in response to a double-edged economic condition that faces television systems in all but a few countries. Because the market is relatively small in a country like Chile, national production is relatively costly, absolutely prohibitive for grandiose productions. Many imports, on the other hand, are proven money-makers in terms of generating advertising revenue. Produced for much larger markets in the first place, such imports already have returned originally large investments by the time they are offered to LDC's at cut rates. These low-priced imports are very attractive as moneymakers in the face of the relatively higher cost of domestic production. As can be noted in the Chilean programming data, some LDC's (like Mexico, Venezuela, Argentina, and Brasil) are now exporting television programs. This larger view of the market, domestic use plus exportation, enables economic domestic productions in some cases. TVN was considering competing in the export market in 1977, probably with soap operas.³⁷

As can be surmised by the mere existence of annual minimum percentages for educational, cultural, children's, and journalistic programming, CNTV was concerned lest entertainment completely dominate

³⁶ CNTV, "Porcentajes de programación nacional año 1976."

³⁷ Interview with Alejandro Olivos.

the TV airwaves in Chile. Given the channels' apparent inability to meet even the minimum requirements in some of these categories, one can only speculate as to what the TV-climate might have been like without such regulation.

Of especial concern to CNTV was "cultural" programming or "programs of national interest".³⁸ A special fund was created in 1975 to assist in the national production of programs which would, among other things, "integrate the country", "stimulate integral community development", and "affirm national and cultural values."³⁹

A mere one hour of program time per week was to be allotted by each channel for the "Cultural Hour" (Franja Cultural). The idea behind the Cultural Hour was to give vent to programs which centered on art, science, history, and culture. All channels would broadcast their weekly offerings simultaneously to assure that anyone turning on his set at that time received at least some "culture". This also equalized the risk of running cultural fare where the Bionic Woman might more likely (and more profitably) have appeared. The head-to-head ratings competition also provided incentive to broadcast "cultural" programs which would be of sufficient quality to attract viewers, the failure to do so being losses in advertising revenues. Examples of programs televised on the Franja Cultural in 1976 appear below. National or foreign origin of each program is noted in parentheses:⁴⁰

³⁸See CNTV, "Acuerdo sobre normas para programas de interes nacional y franja cultural."

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰CNTV, Departamento de Control y Supervisión, "Informe sobre transmisión 'Franja Cultural' por los canales de T.V. durante el año 1976," Santiago, Chile, 1976. (Mimeographed.)

TELEVISION NACIONAL DE CHILE

Documentary on Antarctica (Nat.)
Benjamin Franklin - a four part
 television play (For.)
 Jaques Cousteau documentary (For.)
 Celebration of the 3rd anniversary
 of the Pinochet government
 (Nat.)
 Interview with President Pinochet
 (Nat.)
Rescue at Entebbe (For.)

UNIVERSIDAD DE CHILE

The Mysterious Danakil Desert (For.)
 Ford - Carter presidential
 debate (For.)
134 Years of University (Nat.)
 Interview Jorge Luis
 Borges (Nat.)

UNIVERSIDAD CATOLICA

The Love of Napoleon - a nine-
 part series (For.)
 Homage to Don Bernardo
 O'Higgins (Nat.)
Elizabeth Regina - a four
 part series (For.)
 Recital of Spanish music by
 Naty Mistral (Nat.)

UNIVERSIDAD CATOLICA DE
VALPARAISO

Preludio - a twenty part
 series (Nat.)
 Biographies of Nobel Prize -
 winners Gabriela Mistral
 and Pablo Neruda (Nat.)
 ABC's Wide World of Sports
 (For.)

Because the commercial patronage system prevailed in Chilean TV during the period 1973-1978, it would be expected that advertising would have had a distinct presence in television programming. In terms of accumulated broadcast time on a monthly basis, this was true.

Like other aspects of Chilean TV, advertising was regulated by CNTV.⁴¹ For instance, ads which "provoke fear or anxiety" in the viewer were prohibited; the volume of commercials' audio tracks was not to exceed that of normal programming;⁴² and commercials could not average more than six minutes per hour of program transmission, with twelve minutes the maximum allowed for any single hour.⁴³

⁴¹See CNTV, "Instrucciones para la autorización de la publicidad televisiva."

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³CNTV, "Televisión Chilean - Ley No. 17,377," Título V, Artículo

Shown below are the monthly averages of time taken up by commercial messages and channel self-promotion for each of the four channels in Santiago in 1976:⁴⁴

COMMERCIAL TIME 1976

Monthly Averages:	TVN	UCTV	UChTV	UCVTV
Commercial Messages	30.12:53	31.32:15	8.16:44	16.11:55
Self-promotion	1.35:08	1.07:51	1.26:01	1.41:11

To get some idea of the presence of advertising relative to other programming, the respective percentages, commercial time as a percentage of total broadcast time, for February and May 1977 are shown below:⁴⁵

RELATIVE PERCENTAGES OF COMMERCIAL TIME, FEBRUARY AND MAY 1977

	TVN	UCTV	UChTV	UCVTV
February 1977	6.57%	6.96%	4.06%	4.57%
May 1977	9.41%	9.78%	3.13%	6.01%

Clearly, commercial advertising must be counted as a remarkable aspect of the Chilean TV-climate during the period concerned. Depending upon the channel watched, one would have seen one minute of advertising for every six to twenty minutes of other programming. The second highest percentage of air time taken by advertising recorded in May 1977 was that of TVN, the only receivable channel in many parts of the country.

In summary, the TV-climate in Chile was characterized by a marked presence of foreign programming; the predominance of light entertainment; a smattering of news, educational, cultural, and children's

⁴⁴ CNTV, Departamento de Control y Supervisión, "Tiempo de publicidad transmitida por los canales de televisión durante el año 1976," Santiago, Chile, 1977. (Mimeographed.)

⁴⁵ CNTV, Departamento de Control y Supervisión, "Situación programática de los canales de televisión, Febrero 1977" and "Situación programática de los canales de televisión, Mayo 1977," Santiago, Chile, 1977. (Mimeographed.)

programs; and a commercial patronage system which manifested itself in numerous and frequent televised advertisements. Overtly political discourse antagonistic to the regime appeared not to have been aired. While the media-climate was depoliticized in this regard, it also could be said that it was subtly repoliticized relative to the Allende period.

Radio in Chile was structurally quite different from television. As was noted earlier in this study, most radio outlets were privately owned, their control was relatively decentralized, and single outlets had diminished geographic coverage relative to the television networks.

Because of the large number of radio stations in Chile, and the different types of programming offered by each one, it is beyond the scope of this study to present an exhaustive survey of the radio-climate in Chile. Rather, some examples from Santiago and the provinces will be presented.

The radio-climate, not unlike that of television, was composed largely of light entertainment (music), with news and advertising the most notable secondary elements. This is very similar to the radio broadcasting style one encounters in North America. Like television, the commercial patronage system prevailed in Chilean radio.

Radio Chiloé, the only station in Castro (Region X), was perhaps typical of stations serving remote areas. The program log for July 11, 1977 featured a special agricultural news show, notices of the transportation schedules, and a "Messages to the Countryside" program. This latter considered of messages to individuals within the broadcast range of Radio Chiloé, but without telephone or telegraph service. Such a program was no doubt needed in such an area; many persons in the region

lived on small, isolated islands and in remote parts of the island of Chiloé itself.

Nine different newscasts were given in the course of the day, including both local and international news. A half-hour program of news and music from the British Broadcasting Corporation also was transmitted.

Music was the staple of the broadcast day. Individual time slots were allotted to Chilean, Mexican, Latin America, International, and Chilean folk music. There also was a record request program from 9:30 p.m. to sign-off at midnight.

Radio Cooperativa in Puerto Montt served rural areas in addition to Puerto Montt proper, capital of the tenth region. Like that of Radio Chiloé, Radio Cooperativa's programming for July 9, 1977 featured a "Messages to the Countryside" program. "Punta de Arado" was a program aimed at farmers, while "Entre Cordillera y Mar" offered agricultural education.

Music was the mainstay of Cooperativa's programming, although on that particular day much of the morning was taken up with a live, remote broadcast of Flag Day ceremonies. The sounds of an army band and the speeches of local and national dignitaries were sent to the station from the parade review stand a few blocks away, and then retransmitted.

National and international news at the station was received from the Cooperativa network headquarters in Santiago and retransmitted. The station manager said the Cooperativa network was the only radio system in Chile linked by microwave at the time.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ Interview with Rene Salinas.

On Sunday, July 24, 1977, Radio La Discusión in Chillán (Region VIII) featured a live Chilean folk music program, "Americanissima", broadcast via remote transmission from an auditorium in the city. "Nuestra Universidad" presented notices of the activities at the Universidad de Concepción and its extensions in the eighth region.

Prerecorded musical/cultural programs from the French and West German embassies and the Organization of American States were broadcast that Sunday, as well as a Mozart concert from the German Information Service. Other musical offerings included "Pictures at an Exhibition" by Moussorgsky and the programs "Rock Time" and "conversing with the Tango".

Radio Nacional de Chile in Santiago was one of the most powerful stations in the country in 1977. Its programming followed a fixed routine with no scheduled deviations, Monday through Saturday. Light entertainment was the basic element in its program day of music, news, and sports.

Nacional began its broadcast day at 6:00 a.m. with "wake up" music and announcer chit-chat. "Chile Fertil, Provincia y Señalada" was a twenty-five minute program of Chilean music with features on national tourism, culture, industry, agriculture, and artisanry interspersed.

The main morning newscast, over an hour in length, featured seven different reporters and announcers. The morning sports reports lasted forty-five minutes. News was read hourly for five minutes, and one forty-five minute newscast was given from 1:30 to 2:10 p.m.

The central programming for the morning was entitled "Musical 114", ostensibly aimed at the housewife, mixing in tips on housekeeping,

child care and education, cooking, and home economics with the music and news.

The end of the mid-day newscast, 2:10 p.m., coincided with the end of the traditional main meal in Chile. The program which began at that point was described as

A block of just under two hours with a selection of invigorating music conceived for the period following lunchtime, the time when spirits are a bit low and it is necessary to end the working day on a positive note.⁴⁷

The late afternoon music switched to a young people's format featuring popular tunes combined with news of interest to teens; promotion of school songfests, cultural events, and course offerings; and participation on the show of young people who belonged to clubs associated with the program.

The music format changed again in the evening to "oldies" from the 1950's and 1960's on the programs "When My Father Danced" and "In the Days of the Motor Scooter".

Ten minutes of selections from Chilean literature, more music, and a news summary constituted the final hour until sign-off at midnight.

Again, these descriptions are not intended to represent an exhaustive survey of Chilean radio programming. The examples are, however, indicative of the types of radio programming one would have found in Chile in 1977. It consisted mainly of light entertainment: music, news, and sports. Virtually all stations featured commercials, the aspect perhaps most common to Chilean radio programming after the

⁴⁷Radio Nacional de Chile, "Programación Lunes a Sábado - 1977," Santiago, Chile, June 1977. (Typewritten).

general categories of music and news.

Like radio, the press was decentralized relative to television. The press, however, ~~was~~ more heavily concentrated in Santiago when compared with radio, particularly in the case of magazines. Whereas people all over Chile read Santiago dailies and magazines, the radio listener generally listened to local or regional radio by virtue of the relatively smaller coverage areas of individual radio stations.

The Santiago dailies, particularly El Mercurio, La Tercera, and El Cronista, all were national newspapers. This was reflected not only in their national circulations but also in their more comprehensive coverage of national and international news. There also were regional dailies in Chile in 1977, like El Sur (Concepción); provincial dailies like El Llanquihue (Puerto Montt); and local dailies like El Correo de Castro. These newspapers served smaller geographic areas, and their attention to national and international news varied inversely with the size of their coverage areas.

Because there were so many different newspapers in Chile, and because they printed such a wide variety of news, features, and commentary, it would be difficult to present an exhaustive survey of the newspaper-climate in Chile. A generalized summary will be offered instead.

General topics and themes in Chilean newspapers in 1977 did not differ greatly from those found in North American dailies--sports, scandal, accidents, horoscopes, economic and business news, and summaries of world, national, and local events. If one were to look for news related to national development--agricultural production, export opportunities, foreign investment, meetings of local organizations,

cultural and artistic events--one would find it. Likewise with political opinion as expressed in editorials, regular columns, and letters to the editors. There were cartoons, literary supplements, readings for TV classes, crossword puzzles, advertisements of all sorts, and so on. In other words, the diversity of topics and themes which reached the printed page in Chile was tremendous. But it was limited all the same. The limitation was largely political.

Judging from descriptions of the newspaper-climate during the Allende regime, it was clear that much political discourse in newspapers was removed after the 1973 coup. One did not read in 1977 vociferous attacks on the Pinochet government, nor on anything else for that matter. It would be wrong to say that no criticism of the junta surfaced in Chilean newspapers. It did. Written and unwritten rules governed the limits of this criticism, however, preempting outward antagonism by newspapers which did not want to be shut down.

There was no Marxist analysis of anything to be found in Chile's newspapers in 1977, and probably no daily accurately could be linked with any political party.

El Mercurio, an attractive, full-size daily, was considered the most politically conservative of Santiago's newspapers (discounting the State's El Cronista). La Tercera, the largest selling daily in Chile, was a tabloid with sensationalistic, four color front pages. Inside, however, it contained numerous and critical columnists and plenty of analysis of contemporary Chile. La Tercera presented a "liberal" outlook, along the lines of the reformist Christian Democrats.

The other Santiago dailies included the government-owned El Cronista, and Mercurio-owned La Segunda and Las Ultimas Noticias. Like El Mercurio and La Tercera these latter dailies contained an infinite variety of topics for their readers. Politically, they all followed a center/right line; El Cronista was as close to outright propaganda as any Chilean publication in 1977, while La Segunda and Las Ultimas Noticias were restrained enough in their criticisms to avoid being shut down permanently.

A typical edition of a Santiago daily newspaper in 1977 might have carried as its front page, headline story something on the flooding in the rainy southern portions of the country. Other stories on crime and natural disasters would have been displayed prominently. National economic news and news of the activities of the government surely would have been evident. There would have been a lot of international news, primarily reset copy from an agency like AP or UPI. Daily editorials and columns, sports and entertainment news would have rounded out the issue. Advertising would have been prominent throughout.

Ignoring the subtle and outright censorship at the time, the form and content of these Santiago newspapers in 1977 were not much different from contemporary issues of Toronto's Globe and Mail or Chicago's Sun Times.

Provincial dailies in Chile in 1977 generally contained fewer pages, somewhat less topical variety, and less coverage of national and international news. Local news was, not surprisingly, given equal footing with national news. The smallest local dailies, like El Correo de Castro, appeared to do little reporting of their own,

relying on national (like Orbe) and international agencies for copy.

Like the Santiago newspapers, the provincial ones followed essentially center/right political lines, and were not outwardly antagonistic toward the Pinochet government.

The significance of newspaper content in Chile in 1977 is appreciated only when compared with the descriptions of the newspaper-climate prior to the 1973 golpe. The media enjoyed unprecedented freedom under Allende. The great political polarization in Chile during the UP years, coupled with the existence of media outlets which offered competing political commentary representative of that polarization, resulted in a newspaper-climate which was both vitriolic and violent. Slander, antagonism, and outright incitement abounded. The platforms and ideologies of political parties and subgroups proliferated the newspaper-climate.⁴⁸ This politically lively newspaper atmosphere was both a manifestation of the political climate and a catalyst for further polarization.

The newspaper-climate of 1977, however, was devoid of political warmaking. The State was not under seige by opposition editors and columnists. Party mouthpieces had been eliminated. The press of the Left had been shut down. Excitement on the pages was limited to crime reporting, natural disasters, and sports. The newspaper-climate in 1977, therefore, was distinguished more by what was not printed than by what was. This prevailed to a lesser degree in the other media as well.

Magazines in Chile in 1977 presented an interesting look at the significance of media coverage and its relationship to media freedom. Among television, radio, newspapers, and magazines, the latter was shown to have had the lowest coverage level in Chile; far fewer people read

⁴⁸ See Fagen, pp. 59-70.

magazines than read newspapers, listened to radio, or watched TV. The relatively high prices of magazines also implied a bias in favor of persons with greater disposable incomes. It was in Chilean magazines, however, that the most diverse, critical, and antagonistic political news and commentary were found. This would imply that the State, acknowledging the less-than-mass character of antagonistic magazines, was willing to tolerate greater freedom for these publications.

To appreciate fully this situation it should be recalled that Gallup's media use survey of 1977 found only 29% of the respondents had read a magazine in the past week. Only 5.3% had read national news in magazines in the past twenty-four hours. Magazines as a category were not very extensive in their coverage.

It also should be pointed out that magazines presented the most diversity of content among Chile's media, and that those magazines which by virtue of their content might have been expected to have had some intended effect on the political climate, were not necessarily the most widely read. The most popular magazines, like Vea and Selecciones de Readers' Digest, were not ostensibly political, although their "trivial" content may have reinforced the subdued political climate of 1977. And numerous specialized, occupation-oriented magazines counted in overall readership statistics. These were journals like Boletín Minero for the mining industry, Revista Medica de Chile for doctors, and Rosita for dressmakers.

Popular political/news magazines like Ercilla, Que Pasa, and Hoy were displayed prominently on Santiago newstands, but much less so in the provinces. More esoteric magazines with more sophisticated social

and political analysis, like Mensaje and Vigilla, were not easy to locate even in Santiago. Although recent circulation data for Chilean magazines was not obtained for this study, it appeared that the general availability (and by extension, the readership) of specific magazines was directly proportional to the "triviality" of their content.

Short descriptions of some Chilean magazines published in 1977 may be of some use in assessing the general magazine-climate, taking into account the relatively low coverage level of the medium and the even lower coverage levels of individual publications:

Ercilla was a general interest political/news magazine with a format not unlike those of MacLean's or Time. This weekly included world and national news and news features, a number of regular columnists, and miscellaneous general interest information.

Ercilla was controlled by the Christian Democratic-oriented Piranha's and exhibited a liberal, mildly reformist political viewpoint. The June 1, 1977 edition included feature articles on desaparecidos (including an interview with a young man who had been "disappeared" and who eventually emigrated to Canada⁴⁹); the pros and cons of Chile joining the Landsat satellite group; the contemporary political situation in Viet Nam; and the first in a series on the territorial advances of international communism.

Ercilla was published by Empresa Editorial Lord Cochrane, and sold for about one dollar (U.S.) on the newstand.

Que Pasa, another political/news weekly, was like Ercilla in most respects. Its June 30, 1977 issue contained economist Milton

⁴⁹The young man's (Carlos Veloso) story was related by his father and published in English in Canadian Enquiry into Human Rights in Chile (Toronto: Canadian Enquiry into Human Rights in Chile, 1977), pp. 21-29.

Friedman's explanation of his ties with the Pinochet regime; commentary on the junta's process of "institutionalization"; an article on the newly sovereign state of Djibouti; and "Guia"--highlights of television and the cinema in Chile for the week. The cover story of Que Pasa that week was "Corvalan's View of the Chilean Church," derived from the recent writings of the former communist party head in exile in the Soviet Union at the time.

Que Pasa was published by the Cooperativa Editora Minerva Limitada, and sold for about \$1.25.

Hoy ("The Truth Without Compromise"), yet another political/news weekly, made its first appearance in June 1977. Hoy openly proclaimed being patterned after American Time.⁵⁰ Its inaugural issue exhibited much more political commentary than its two Chilean counterparts, and although still in the liberal-democratic mold, it was ostensibly more critical of the regime and its exercise of power.

The cover story of the June 1, 1977 edition was "Carter and Latin America." Other elements included a feature on the political direction of the Pinochet government; a description of the problems encountered in getting the government's approval to publish Hoy; a critical commentary on the Chilean economy entitled, "The Price of Prosperity"; and letters from other media representatives wishing the magazine staff luck on their new venture.

It should be noted that the Hoy slogan, "The Truth without Compromise," had more bark than bite. The "truth" as defined by these reform-minded liberals was not wholly incompatible with the general ideology of the junta, except perhaps on the issues of elections, economic

⁵⁰ Filippi, p. 9.

management, and human rights. Hoy was not Marxist, did not appear anticapitalist, and did not bait the regime excessively. It merely represented the limits of press freedom accorded by the State to the less-than-mass-circulation magazine medium.

Hoy was published by Editora Gabriela Mistral, and sold for about \$1.25.

The three major political/news magazines, Ercilla, Que Pasa, and Hoy, all contained substantial amounts of advertising.

Even closer to that invisible limit of press freedom in Chile was the esoteric Mensaje, the Jesuit social and political criticism monthly. Mensaje was regarded as the most free-wheeling of Chilean magazines in terms of both political subject matter and social and political commentary.

The June 1977 issue of Mensaje contained an article on the state of the media freedom in Chile; a feature on the Vicaria de la Solidaridad human rights group; the text of Cardinal Silva's May Day sermon; a critique of the recent political-economic policies of the Pinochet government; and a review of Mel Brooks' Silent Movie.

Mensaje was relatively expensive at \$1.35 per copy, and contained little, but some, advertising.

Mensaje's implicit ideology was social-democratic, probably consistent with the center- to left-wing factions of the Christian Democratic party. While not Marxist, it was clear from the text that the editors were not at all supportive of the regime's outwardly capitalistic route to the country's development.

In this same area of Church-related publications was the polar opposite of Mensaje, the rightly monthly Vigilia. This magazine first appeared in Chile in April 1977. Vigilia was an anti-Marxist, Catholic magazine, an obvious alternative to the left-leaning Mensaje.

Vigilia, like its polar opposite, was all commentary. Its inaugural edition displayed critical features on Christians for socialism and on Dietrich Bonhoeffer, and presented an analysis of communism by Chilean Bishop Manuel Larraín. Vigilia looked like an attempt to present rightist, church-based commentary to highly literate readers--learned Catholics who were not well-served by Mensaje. This very object was expressed in the lead editorial:

We believe that many of the catholic publications in Chile today exhibit a type of orchestrated, propagandistic action which, with a force even more orchestrated, would appear to be the expression of all catholics . . . Because of this we have resolved to found this publication in the spirit of dialogue with other sectors representative of the thought of the Church.⁵¹

Vigilia was published by Editorial Vaitea, contained little advertising, and sold for one dollar.

Revista de Educación and El Campesino were illustrative of special interest and occupation-oriented magazines in Chile. The former was aimed at educators. The March-April 1977 issue included articles on teaching methods; shop talk; cultural news and features; book reviews; documents relevant to the teaching profession; and feature articles on education, such as "A New Perspective on the Teaching of Philosophy." Revista de Educación was published by the government Ministry of Education, and sold for one dollar.

⁵¹"Proposito," Vigilia (Santiago, Chile), April-May 1977, p. 3.

El Campesino, the farmers' monthly, was the official organ of the National Society of Agriculture, an organization often linked with the most politically conservative forces in Chile. El Campesino appeared to be aimed at large holders, although much of what was contained in the June 1977 edition would have been of interest to small holders as well. There were articles on agricultural technique, opportunities, and marketing, as well as numerous advertisements for new or improved agricultural products. There was a report on agricultural cooperatives in Chile, a report on the plight of the small holder, and a technical article on irrigation. There was nothing outwardly political about the contents of El Campesino.

One of the most expensive magazines in Chile in 1977 was Bravo, a Playboy-style men's monthly which sold for \$2.50. In many ways Bravo was a magazine wholly consistent with the ideology of the Pinochet regime: It was essentially apolitical and it was very much consumption-oriented. There was little "news" contained in Bravo's July 1977 issue, apart from mundane tidbits about international celebrities. The bulk of the content consisted of feature articles: a color spread of photos of Playboy's monthly "playmates"; articles about Roman Polansky, Idi Amin, King Kong, and Jerusalem; and a photo spread on men's fashion.

The advertising included in Bravo, not to mention the price, implied a decidedly affluent male market toward which the magazine

was directed. Full-page, four color ads were displayed for Chivas Regal Scotch whisky, General Motors' Chevette (\$9324 over thirty-six months plus deposit), Honda motorcycles, Johnson's Clothes, Michelle Perret shirts from France, and an \$11,000 Peugeot automobile.

Bravo was an international publication, produced in Belgium, and published in Santiago with Chilean advertising by Editora Gabriela Mistral.

Women's magazines like Paula and the Chilean editions of Vanity, Cosmopolitan, and Good Housekeeping were not unlike Bravo in that their contents were essentially apolitical; they served the readers general interests, but also served as vehicles for the promotion of consumer goods and services.

Magazines in Chile in 1977 represented the most topically diverse medium. Individual magazines ranged from the basically trivial to the borderline leftist. Magazines exhibited the greatest freedom of social and political expression among major media, but because of limited circulations they were probably of only limited concern to the junta.

Films shown in Santiago's movie theatres in June and July of 1977 appeared to be mainly of foreign origin. They included U.S. movies like The Sailor Who Fell From Grace with the Sea, Moses, Network, The Prophecy, and Silent Movie. Numerous European imports appeared as well.

Advertisements were screened between features, and it was not uncommon to see a Chilean-produced short subject in addition to the main attraction.

A visitors' guide to Chile distributed by the American embassy in Santiago said the following about the cinema there: "After September 11, 1973, there was an upswing in movie attendance, since U.S. and European films that had been barred between 1971-1973 appeared on Santiago movie screens."⁵²

There did not appear to be films produced in communist countries being shown in Chile in 1977. Rather, Chileans queued up for new and old American and European imports, generally subtitled in Spanish. Films from communist countries, it should be recalled, were imported by the government's Chile Films during the UP regime.

It often has been remarked that the modern mass communication media are unidirectional communication channels; they transmit to large audiences but are ill-suited to receive "feedback".⁵³ Letters to the editors of magazines and newspapers, however, are a common, if circumscribed, feedback phenomenon in the modern media. In Chile, for instance, a number of letters to El Mercurio's Sunday magazine supplement were on the subject of the increasing use of English words in Chilean advertising:

Our beautiful language has sufficient richness that we can find the equivalents for any foreign vocabulary, without sacrificing the commercial intent of the store or firm. . . . If the expression "centro de compras" doesn't seem modern or explanatory enough for the consuming public, perhaps it would be interesting

⁵² Chile (Santiago: Cultural and Press Services of Embassy of United States of America, ca. 1977).

⁵³ See Hans Magnus Enzenberger, "Constituents of a Theory of the Media," in Sociology of Mass Communications, ed. Denis McQuail (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd, 1972), pp. 99-116. Enzenberger disputes the unidirectional nature of modern electronic media.

to incorporate another, like "complejo comercial", instead of the absurd "shopping center".⁵⁴

In a climate of constrained mass communication, like that in Chile after September 11, 1973, the letters to editors may have afforded publications opportunities to communicate opinions they would hesitate to propagate as their own. The first anniversary edition of Hoy, for example, contained a letter calling for amnesty for all victims of the Pinochet regime, quoting from Solzhenitsen's Gulag Archipelago for pathetic support.⁵⁵ Editors could not avoid all responsibility for their readers' ideas, however. Even feedback communication was constrained when, in 1978, the regime forbade Santiago dailies from publishing letters from families protesting "disappeared" relatives.

A broader view of mass communication, taking into account the symbolic power of wall paintings, demonstrations, and the like, allows an even better understanding of Chile's constrained communications environment between 1973 and 1978. The effective policies of the Pinochet regime in this connection were captured nicely in a Chilean government propaganda piece entitled, Chile: Ayer - Hoy (Chile: Yesterday - Today).⁵⁶ This photo essay offered visual contrasts between life in Chile under Allende and under Pinochet. On one page appeared a photo of a wall painted with a political slogan in Russian; opposite appeared

⁵⁴"Boicot al Frangles!" Revista Del Domingo (El Mercurio, Santiago, Chile), July 10, 1977, p. 14.

⁵⁵"El lector tiene la ultima palabra," Hoy (Santiago, Chile), May 31, 1978, p. 83.

⁵⁶Chile Ayer - Hoy (Santiago: Editora Nacional Gabriela Mistral, ca. 1975).

a photo of the same wall, peacefully empty with a fresh coat of whitewash. Likewise appeared photographs of angry helmeted demonstrators in downtown Santiago opposite photos of the same locations, peopled only by passive pedestrians going about their day-to-day business.

Any in-depth consideration of the symbolic climate in Chile after Allende must take into account these non-mass media elements. Wall paintings, demonstrations, political rallies, and even mob violence were remarkable elements of the symbolic climate during the Unidad Popular years. Under Pinochet, however, the walls were mostly empty, and the largest assemblage of people witnessed by the author in 1977 was for a stage show in downtown Santiago's new outdoor shopping mall. The stage show commemorated the birthday of Radio Portales, the capital's most popular radio station.

Under Allende political communication no doubt competed with commercial communication for the attentions of the public; under Pinochet the commercial communications (billboards and the like) competed only with one another.

CHAPTER VI

THE EFFECTS OF THE MASS MEDIA IN CHILE,
1973-1978

Perhaps the most difficult stage in Gerbner's framework for the analysis of a national media system is the "cultivation" stage. At this point the "effects" of the structure and function of the system must be described in terms of resultant "assumptions about life and the world."¹ In the present case the cultivation analysis cannot be a very precise exercise.

Chilean communications researcher Neil P. Hurley wrote in 1974 of a University of Chile study which found two-year-old children able to identify certain commercial labels and products, apparently a result of their having seen television commercials.² In this instance the presence of commercial advertising had a rather precise effect.

Although the commercial patronage system looms large in the consideration of the Chilean media, the cultivation analysis will not proceed in a narrow cause/effect mode. There is not the evidence to sustain such argumentation. Rather, and despite their subtle and complex nature, "assumptions about life and the world" which plausibly could derive from Chile's media-climate after 1973 will be examined.

¹Gerbner, p. 204.

²Hurley, Comunicaciones, p. 146.

Such effects will be delimited mainly to those with political and economic ramifications, in harmony with earlier descriptions of the media system and the symbolic climate it created.

In the earlier examination of power relationships in the Chilean media, it was argued that the State was the single most powerful actor, both in terms of its ownership and quasi-ownership of media outlets and in terms of its regulation of all media. Because nearly all media were financed through commercial patronage, the capitalist marketplace also was seen as a powerful force; market prerogatives determined, to a great extent, the types of content which appeared in the mass media. Another key aspect of power relationships was the outright elimination of all left-leaning and some other party-influenced media outlets, and the prohibition of Marxist propaganda.

The media-climate after 1973 was found to be composed mainly of light entertainment and non-controversial news. Partisan politicking was absent, as was Marxist argumentation. Unrestrained criticism of the regime was rare. The presence of commercial advertising was the one consistent thread running through the entire media-climate.

The effects on the political and economic culture of Chile, the "cultivation", may be predicted in Gerbner's terms as available choices: ". . . they cannot cultivate that which is not available. They will rarely select what is scarcely available, seldom emphasized, or infrequently presented."³ By delimiting the qualities of the media

³Gerbner, p. 204.

climate, the regime delimited the materials with which the public's picture of their political and economic culture could be constructed. Innis called this "monopolies of knowledge".⁴ Similarly, Marx wrote:

The class which is the ruling material force is at the same time its ruling intellectual force . . . (it) has control of the means of mental production so that, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it . . . (they) regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age.⁵

Unless the Chilean case is viewed in strict, Marxian class terms, the "ruling material force" was a combination of the separate yet complementary authoritarian State and private entrepreneur. Political restrictions and market prerogatives determined media content in Chile after 1973. The images of the national environment which the public could cultivate were extremely limited after the golpe.

The structure and function of the mass media from 1973-1978 promoted the cultivation of images which were supportive of the regime's economic policies and, as a corollary, its authoritarian rule. Milliband made a similar conclusion when he assessed the media in capitalist society:

Given the economic and political context in which they function, they cannot fail to be, predominantly, agencies for the dissemination of ideas and values which affirm rather than challenge existing patterns of power and privilege, and thus to be weapons in the arsenal of class domination.⁶

⁴Carey, p. 44.

⁵Karl Marx, The German Ideology (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1965), p. 60. Quoted in Stuart Hall, "Culture, the Media, and the 'Ideological Effect'," in Mass Communication and Society, eds. James Curran, Michael Gursvitch, and Janet Woolcott (London: Edward Arnold (Publishers) Ltd., 1977), p. 321.

⁶Ralph Milliband, The State in Capitalist Society (London: Quartet Books Limited, 1973), p. 211.

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Hurley contended in 1974 that the power of the mass media over human consciousness in Chile already exceeded that of the family, schools, and religion.⁷ He observed direct effects stemming from media exposure:

It is known in Latin America that girls change their hairstyles, style of dress, and manner of speech to the styles of the stars; boys dream of being detectives, doctors, lawyers, and astronauts, and try to imitate the heroes of the programs.⁸

Milliband wrote that although the owners of media outlets may 'have only profits in mind when they program what appears to be simple entertainment', this content "is not therefore by any means free from political and ideological connotations of a more or less definite kind."⁹ This implied interdependence between system and content can be illustrated in the Chilean case. The Pinochet regime depended, to a great extent, on the cultivation of the images of: (1) a stable political situation; (2) the absence of serious political conflict; (3) the availability of an abundance of goods and services; and (4) an attainable "good life" available to those who worked for it.

The regime possessed the coercive capability to dispose of most political protest; better to rely on the cultivation of the images of political calm. The economic plans of the junta required a difficult period of fighting inflation and of capital accumulation; the immediate cultivation of images of abundance lessened the stressfulness of that process.

⁷ Hurley, p. 148. ⁸ Ibid., p. 147.

⁹ Milliband, p. 202.

It should not be surprising to find an apparent feeling of affinity for the United States, western Europe, Japan, and even most other Latin American countries in a state which has chosen the capitalist route to economic development. That affinity existed prior to 1973, and was cultivated even further after the coup, as evidenced by the television programming information discussed earlier. In the survey of Chilean TV programming in June 1977, it was found that around 40% of the programming elements in a single week were foreign productions. Of these, over 40% were from the United States. The remainder were produced in Mexico, Venezuela, Argentina, Brasil, Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy. All these countries had capitalist economies: No programs were shown from other than capitalist countries.

Critics of foreign content in the mass media use such terms as cultural penetration, cultural imperialism, and communications colonialism. Behind such terminology is the belief that the development of an authentic, national culture is compromised by the unfettered dissemination of foreign images and values. In the Chilean case, it was to the advantage of the regime to have certain foreign images and values cultivated through mass media exposure. TV programs from the United States, for instance, represented a refined stage in the development of popular television programming which was consonant with national values in a capitalist society. Boyd-Barrett saw in the mass media

. . . possibly the single most important component of cultural imperialism outside formal educational institutions, from the view-point of those who are actively engaged in extending or containing given cultural influences.¹⁰

Most of the American-made dramatic series which appeared on Chilean TV in 1977 were shown during the evening "prime time" when audiences were large.¹¹ The two most common types of series were westerns and detective/police stories. The general images and values found in these television shows were wholly consonant with the ideology of the Pinochet regime. Programs like Zane Grey, High Chaparral, Big Valley, and Little House on the Prairie glamorized the pioneer spirit of the American West in days gone by, where hard work and risks reaped great rewards. In a more political vein, series such as Streets of San Francisco, Police Story, The F.B.I., S.W.A.T., and The Untouchables portrayed the power of the authorities against criminal elements and the consistent triumph of good over evil. They delivered the message that "crime"--particularly against property and the State-- "does not pay".

Such implicit images and values may have seemed more heavy-handed in the eyes of Chilean viewers than in those of their North American counterparts. McLuhan made the following observation in this connection:

¹⁰Boyd-Barrett, p. 119.

¹¹For television rating samples in 1975 see Informe Sobre Chile, 1976, pp. 322-325.

Seen outside the United States, any American movie looks like subtle political propaganda. Acceptable entertainment has to flatter and exploit the cultural and political assumptions of the land of its origins.¹²

Such entertainment may also "flatter and exploit the cultural and political assumptions" of people in countries which have a long-established affinity for the United States. Fagen, writing just after the 1973 military takeover, blamed "cultural penetration . . . particularly from the United States"¹³ for the failure of socialist-oriented media to capture the imaginations of Chileans. The Chilean people had, she wrote, "long-cultivated tastes for the mass culture of the United States."¹⁴

It is possible, then, that Chileans were cultivating an even grander image of the "good life" when exposed to the TV programs, recorded music, films, photographs, and printed matter from more highly developed capitalist societies than their own. American television programs, rooted in an advanced capitalist culture, produced to generate advertising revenue, and completely removed from contemporary Chilean politics, were particularly well suited to the cultivation of images and assumptions consistent with the junta's ideology.

The focal point of the effects of the mass media in Chile after 1973 should be the media's reinforcement of the ideology of the State. This reinforcement was both intentional and coincidental; intentional because the operation of media outlets as private enterprises was

¹² Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media (New York: Signet Books, 1964), p. 271.

¹³ Fagen, p. 63.

¹⁴ Ibid.

wholly consistent with the current economic policy; coincidental because the continued operation of media outlets, in the face of the shut-down of others, implied tacit corroboration with the generals and the unwillingness seriously to challenge the status quo.

In his assessment of Innis' view of communication media, Carey wrote:

The impact of forms of communication, then, resides in the forms of social order and organization they call forth and facilitate, the forms of consciousness they support and the points at which they locate forms of authority. If this is what the phrase means then, in fact, the medium is the message.¹⁵

This represents the structural end of the cultivation analysis. The mass media in Chile were, as a group, relatively space biased. The most spatially biased medium among them, television, was the predominant medium by 1977, in terms of exposure. Such space biased media lend themselves to centralized control over the national territory. Ownership was reduced to two main groups: the statal and quasi-statal media; and the privately owned media. The two groups were not at cross purposes because commercial patronage financed both.

From a structural standpoint, then, the media called forth a centralized (and in this case authoritarian) social order and political organization. Authority was located in the State and in the marketplace.

By way of actual media content, complementary, reinforcing images and assumptions were cultivated. Values rooted in capitalist society were disseminated in both Chilean and foreign media content. Antagonistic political content was largely absent. Commercial advertising carried

¹⁵Carey, p. 51.

with it a subtle legitimizing apologia for the junta's economic program.

Specific symbols were cultivated by way of the media as well. The news media, doing only what came naturally, hung on the generals' every word in the process of reporting the activities of these politicians--without-competitors. By doing so, Salvador Allende and the Unidad Popular years became symbols of chaos and national destruction. "La Patria" became a symbol of nationalism, a force with which the regime attempted to rally the Chilean people--threats to La Patria were being mounted from within and from without. "Institucionalizar" became a symbol for national reconstruction, setting things right after a brief, illicit, and failed affair with false ideology. "Inflación" became a symbol for a failed economic policy, and the justification for a new one.

Such was the symbolic climate in Chile after 1973. Gerbner wrote that in the process of cultivating images of their environment, people use the media-climate ". . . to support their ideas, actions, or both, in ways that, on the whole, tend to match the general composition and structure of message systems . . ."¹⁶ The images and values transmitted, then, are largely the same ones which will be cultivated. In a politically circumscribed media-climate there should be fairly consistent cultivation within a fairly narrow range.

This is not to say that the mass media "caused" the Chilean people to express their support of the Pinochet regime in the 1978

¹⁶Gerbner, p. 205.

Gallup poll. Rather, images and values which reinforced the ideology of the regime, and hence the regime itself, were being cultivated in the Chilean public after 1973 as a result of their contact with the mass media. This may aid our understanding of subsequent expressions of popular support.

It is possible to assign too much importance to the mass media when examining culture or politics in any society. Defleur wrote: ". . . each generation of intellectual critics seems determined to use the media as scapegoats for trends they find disquieting in their society."¹⁷ Gerbner similarly was cautious when he advised the researcher to be aware that "other environmental support" must be present in order that the cultivation of images disseminated by the media actually takes place.¹⁸ In other words, the cultivation of images from the media-climate would be less likely if that climate bears little or no resemblance to the rest of the environment.

In the Chilean case, the cultivation of values and images found in the media-climate was not seriously compromised by a wholly different non-media environment. Chile was a highly urbanized, highly literate society. Its cultural ties to Europe and North America are plainly visible to the outsider. And although the streets of Santiago bear little resemblance to the Streets of San Francisco, Chileans who are not wealthy can see the manifestations of wealth close by in their own cities; the most affluent Chileans live a life not unlike that of middle and upper class Canadians and Americans.

¹⁷Defleur, p. 137. ¹⁸Gerbner, p. 205.

On the whole, Chilean society was capable of cultivating the images they found in the mass media. It was clear that Chileans were attending to the media in 1977, particularly to television. Because the structure and function of the Chilean media appeared to have reinforced the ideology of the Pinochet regime, the resultant effect on the political views of the Chilean citizenry should not be underestimated.

CHAPTER VII

THE TIME BIASSED MEDIA

A comprehensive communications approach to the examination of Chilean development after 1973 cannot end with a description of the space biased media. The adaption of Innis' notion of time biased media will enrich the understanding of the actions of and popular support for the Pinochet regime.

Two key terms in Innis' writings were extension and duration. In his consideration of empires,¹ Innis observed that a predominant communication medium, when identified as relatively space biased or relatively time biased, generally corresponded to a particular empire's relative strength in the area of geographic extension or duration over time. The papyrus scroll, for example, because of its light weight, was an aid to centralized political administration and vast empires. The hieroglyphics carved into stone, on the other hand, still can be read today; but these stones were largely immobile. Their use generally corresponded with an empire which lasted many years, but which was geographically circumscribed and politically decentralized.

Innis' observations often were made in broad historical sweeps. Entire reigns, indeed entire dynasties, often were treated summarily in a few paragraphs. The application of Innis' ideas to a single regime

¹See Innis, Empire and Communication and Bias of Communication.

in a single state during a very short period of time is not intended simply to duplicate his particular approach. Rather, the analysis of this short period in Chilean history is guided by Innis' general observations in the area of communication media: that space biased media favor extension and that time biased media favor duration.

The usefulness of Innis' technique need not be limited to whole empires. He provided communication researchers with a useful method for classifying communication media, according to relative biases of time and space, for understanding their political effects in single states.

In Chile it was possible to observe the relatively greater spatial bias of radio and TV when compared with the press: more people were exposed to the electronic media due to the omnidirectional quality of broadcast. The press also was extensive geographically, but was only multidirectional and reached fewer people. The press had a relative time bias in that the single issues of newspapers and magazines were heavy and durable relative to the waves of the electronic media. Newspaper content generally was not obsolete for twenty-four hours, that of magazines for a week or a month; the content of TV and radio could be made obsolete instantaneously.

Television, it was seen, was by far the most centralized of the Chilean mass media. Most TV transmissions emanated from TVN in Santiago, covering virtually the entire populated territory with its microwave transmission system. There were additional broadcasts which originated from but a handful of other cities. Radio, with stations located in many cities, was much less centralized.

It is possible, however, that in assessing the relative time and space biases of the Chilean mass media, one against the other, the relevance of Innis' technique to the Chilean case is lost. In actual fact, all the mass media--radio, television, and the press--are space biased forms of communication. Coverage by all media was seen to be national in scope, and all these media entailed the movement of information from a small number of sources to a large number of receivers. By extension, there were but two major "sources" of mediated information in Chile by 1978: the State and the private entrepreneur.² In this light, centralization of the mass media was acute. The media were less centralized in this sense when the highly competitive political organizations were also owners of media outlets prior to 1974.

The concentration of media outlets in the hands of the State and of private entrepreneurs was, in fact, the keystone of the State's media policy. Such concentration resulted in the vast extension over space of: (1) the symbolic presence of the State as represented by the military government; and (2) the symbolic presence of the capitalist marketplace in the form of commercial advertisement. The potential competitors of the State/marketplace complement were eliminated (or, very severely constrained) early on. The result was the extension over space of a symbolic climate conducive to control over space by the Pinochet regime.

²Universities rightfully should qualify as a "major source", but given the tight control by the State over educational institutions in 1977, it was difficult to divorce them from the State itself.

A return to the previous descriptions of the symbolic climate in Chile would bear out this attempt at control over symbolic space. The mass media themselves were found to be extensive, particularly at the national level.

The content of the media was found to be: (1) nearly devoid of antagonistic, partisan politicking; (2) devoid of Marxist argumentation; (3) financed almost entirely by commercial patronage, with a resultant high visibility of commercial advertising; and (4) generally consisting of light entertainment, non-controversial news, music, and sports. This content was quite uniform over space, with some exceptions in the more specialized, magazine medium.

Interpreting Innis, Carey wrote: "Wisdom in social policy is the continuous attempt to simultaneously adjust to the demands of time . . . and the demands of space . . ."³ If all the mass media in Chile were relatively space biased, and if through an examination of the regime's treatment of these media we approach an understanding of their attention to the demands of space, what, then, are relevant communication factors in the junta's attention to the demands of time? First, it must be assumed that in cases such as the Chilean one there are both time and space biased media operating simultaneously. The focus of the present work thus far has been on those space biased media commonly called the mass media. There remains a discussion of coexisting time biased media.

Because Innis dealt with much longer time periods than the one under consideration here, it is not possible to take cues directly

³Carey, p. 31.

from him. Rather, his technique will be extrapolated from, with fundamentals intact, to accommodate the five-year Children case.

The very relativity Innis himself used must enter the analysis here. He viewed time biased media as heavy and durable relative to space biased media. If all mass media were found to be space biased in the Chilean case, then perhaps the relevant time biased media were to be found in what Lin and Burt called "local" media.⁴ "Interpersonal" communication sources include family, neighbors, acquaintances--anyone with whom conversations are held. This is the level of information dissemination most far removed from the "mass" media. In between mass and interpersonal media Lin and Burt placed local media:

Like the mass media, they must reach a target population much wider than that accessible through interpersonal sources. Yet like the interpersonal sources, they must be able to 'customize' messages for specific groups of receivers which are smaller than those typically addressed by the mass media.⁵

Such "local" media in the Chilean case would include political parties, labor organizations, young people's organizations, and the Catholic Church, among others. In the corporate system being constructed by the Pinochet regime these organizations might also be identified as interest groups. Membership in such groups are limited to those with similar needs or interests. In-group (customized) communication takes place in such organizations which often is of relevance only to their members.

These interest groups can be classified as time biased media; they are organizations composed of people; the people--the actual media--

⁴Lin and Burt, p. 257.

⁵Ibid.

are relatively "heavy and durable" vis-à-vis the paper and electronic waves which constitute the space biased mass media. A party official may hold his post for years, for instance, and be a source of customized information in a geographically delimited area for a specific group of party adherents and potential electors.

While it is unlikely that the Pinochet regime approached its national policies with Innis in mind, it is tempting to speculate that it might have. In any event, Innis' dichotomy of time and space, duration and extension, invites an understanding of development in Chile after 1973 not suggested by other approaches. Just as the Pinochet regime's treatment of mass media was found to be generally consistent with its overall ideology, likewise the treatment of interest groups followed a pattern of repression, control, and reformation, all to the benefit of the regime. If the regime established its symbolic presence over space through control of the mass media, it also attempted to establish its symbolic presence over time through the control and manipulation of the time biased interest groups.

In the authoritarian-corporate system the generals sought to implement, the basis of political participation and representation was to change from the political party to the institutionalized, state-sanctioned interest group. Trade unions, the universities, and the Church were extragovernmental vehicles for political participation prior to 1973. Within the new corporate structure such interest groups, and others, like professional associations and women's groups, would become the formalized vehicles for participation.

The restructuring of such interest groups would put another part of the overall symbolic climate of Chile under the control of the State. This control would not be direct in the end result; trade unions and universities could maintain facsimile autonomy and not necessarily become organs of the State. This structure, however, would have control built into it. When the sanctioned interest group becomes the vehicle for participation, groups choose between cooperation or remaining unrepresented. Participation by an interest group (like representation on the Council of State) indicates a willingness to work within the system; not participating leaves a group unrepresented. In a country where the repressive power of the military has been clearly demonstrated, the opportunity for extra-systemic participation or representation, through symbolic violence for example, is extremely limited.

Chile's political parties were among the most obvious victims of the developmental policies of the Pinochet regime. Particularly victimized were the parties of the Center and the Left.⁶ In the first month following the golpe, all Marxist parties were abolished, and the activities of all others were suspended indefinitely.

The junta originally had the support of the leadership of the centrist Christian Democrats⁷ and the rightist Partido Nacional,⁸

⁶ Gil wrote of the Chilean political party system in 1966: "Chile is the only Latin American country where political forces are clearly and distinctly aligned, as in many European countries, into three great blocs: the Right, the Center, and the Left." Federico Gil, The Political System of Chile (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966), p. 244.

⁷ "Chile: Sombre Outlook," pp. 300-302.

⁸ "Chile: A Corporate State in the Making?" p. 311.

but these parties never were asked, as parties, to participate in the governance of the new Chile. At the time of the 1978 consulta parties were not officially recognized; they were in permanent recess.

After the coup the assets of the Unidad Pópular parties were confiscated by the junta. Allende had died in the battle for La Moneda, and Community Party chief Luis Corvalán was arrested, as was Pablo Henriquez Barra, secretary-general of the Miristas. Supporters of the UP coalition and members of Allende's government were hunted down.⁹

The Christian Democrats similarly were harassed. In 1974 Bernardo Leighton, a party founder, was refused permission to return to Chile from a trip to Rome. Former party president Renan Fuentealba was exiled by the regime, as was the party's 1970 presidential candidate, Radomiro Tomic.¹⁰ Ostensibly more rightist Christian Democrats, like former President Eduardo Frei, were simply ignored, or criticized with all other políticos.

The parties of the Right, silenced like all others, were not the objects of such blatant repression. The closure of the rightist daily, La Tribuna, was probably the most notable act committed against conservative political elements in Chile after 1973.

Although it would be inaccurate to characterize the Pinochet regime as a surrogate National Party, there was much less of an ideological chasm between the two than between the junta and the Center or Left. Probably for that reason there was less outward violence directed toward the Right by the regime. Former President Jorge Alessandri (of the

⁹"Chile: Purge," Latin America VII (October 5, 1973): 316-318.

¹⁰"Chile: Frei Enters the Fray," Latin America VIII (December 6, 1974): 381-382.

Liberal Party, part of the subsequent National Party) joined the Council of State, as did former President Gabriel Gonzalez. The latter was head of the centrist Radical Party when president, but is remembered for the Laws in Defense of Democracy he pushed through during his term. These laws outlawed the Communist Party from 1948-1958. Ironically, the laws were rescinded under Alessandri.

What the corporatist reformation sought to replace was a pluralist, yet disjointed, system of competitive politics. Burnett made the following observation just prior to the election of Allende:

Such an assortment of ideological stands, while offering choice to the voters, also points up a political fragmentation that almost always has necessitated coalition governments - leading to immobilist features not unlike the French Fourth Republic.¹¹

The parties of the Unidad Popular coalition included Allende's Socialists; the Communists; the Radicals; the Christian Left; the Movement of Popular Action; the Independent Popular Action; and an independent Senator. The opposition parties often acted as a coalition against Allende. These included the Christian Democrats (by far the single party with the most Senators and Deputies); the Nationals (a consolidation of the former Liberal and Conservative parties); the Radical Left; and Radical Democracy. The UP coalition was outnumbered by the combined opposition throughout the period 1970-1973.¹²

Throughout the century Chile had a multiplicity of political parties. In 1949, for example, members of fourteen different parties were elected to the Chamber of Deputies.¹³ By 1953 there were thirty-six active parties in Chile.¹⁴

¹¹Burnett, p. 225. ¹²Nunn, "New Thoughts," p. 278.

¹³Gill, p. 74. ¹⁴Agor, p. 5.

Ten parties were represented in the 1973 Congress, but only three candidates had contested the 1970 Presidential election. Allende, running for the UP coalition of the Left, garnered 36.2% of the popular vote and was declared the winner by the Congress. Radomiro Tomic, the centrist Christian Democratic Party's candidate, received only 27.8% of the vote. Former President Jorge Alessandri earned 34.9% of the vote for his rightist National Party. Allende's margin of victory consisted of about 39,000 votes out of some three million cast.¹⁵

The elimination of political parties as vehicles for political participation in Chile directly affected no more than three or four hundred thousand party faithful. Approximate party memberships in the mid sixties were as follows: Socialists - 35,000;¹⁶ Communists - 30,000; Christian Democrats - 120,000; Radicals - 70,000; Liberals - 26,000; and Conservatives - 20,000.¹⁷

The entire voting public would have been indirectly affected; Party members as communication media were used to spread party doctrines and to get out the vote. There were over five million Chileans eligible to register to vote in 1970. About three million votes were cast. By extension, then, it could be concluded that after the golpe of 1977 perhaps three-fifths of the adult population were deprived of their traditional vehicles of political participation with the banning of the parties.

¹⁵Sigmund, p. 107.

¹⁶Gil, p. 288.

¹⁷Burnett, pp. 197-218.

The 1978 consulta nacional, however, is an example of how political participation can be channeled into a corporate framework. Over five and one-half million Chileans cast votes in the consulta, the largest election turnout in Chilean history.¹⁸

As of 1978 the political party in Chile was a thing of the past.¹⁹ The "institutionalization" process was well underway, organizing the population into corporatist interest groups for purposes of participation. The system's prototype, the Council of State, was composed of representatives of business, professional associations, labor, the armed forces, the judiciary, universities, young people, and women, as well as two former presidents of Chile.

With the political parties eliminated, the greatest single challenge to the regime's corporate reformation was the Chilean labor movement. Burnett noted in 1970 that although less than thirty per cent of the Chilean work force was unionized, the number of union members approached one half million. Of these about 300,000 were members of unions in the left-leaning Central Unica de Trabajadores (CUT).²⁰

¹⁸ The Answer of Chile, p. 23.

¹⁹ In 1975 there was evidence that a single, corporatist political party - Movimiento de Unidad Nacional - was being formed, but little has been written about it since. See "Chile: Belt Tightening Breeds Discontent," Latin America IX (May 26, 1975): 134.

²⁰ Ben G. Burnett, "Chile," in Political Forces in Latin America, eds. Ben G. Burnett and Kenneth F. Johnson (Belmont California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Incorporated, 1970), pp. 451-453. Angell cited the following political affiliations among delegates to the 1968 CUT convention: Communist - 45.5%; Socialist - 24.6%; Christian Democrat - 10.2%; Radical - 8.1%; MIR - 1.4%. Alan Angell, Politics and the Labour Movement in Chile (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 218. CUT was dissolved by the junta in September 1973.

When compared with previous party memberships, the unions represented an even greater interest group, even more extensive time biased communication media.

Partisan politics historically were interwoven with labor organizations. Angell made the following observation at the 1968 CUT convention:

The discussions and speeches in the general meetings and in the commissions are more often of a political than a union nature; speakers are as likely to identify themselves by their political affiliation as their union membership . . . ²¹

The Pinochet regime's treatment of the Chilean labor unions consisted of: (1) immediately stripping them of their power, particularly the right to strike; (2) outlawing the CUT, the largest national labor organization; and (3) reshaping the labor movement to fit the corporatist mold.

The military government decried labor's ties to the Left, and saw the right to strike as incompatible with their plans to revive the economy and halt inflation. So, in the face of the power of the military, the unions were made virtually impotent. They were not summarily abolished, however. Rather, the unions were depoliticized, were encouraged to tend to parochial, job-oriented matters, and were subject to new laws which reduced their power vis-à-vis management and the State.

Pinochet indicated the new role of labor organizations when he addressed a Labor Day (May Day) audience in 1977:

²¹Angell, p. 219.

... on one side, serious and authentic social participation, principally through depoliticized labor organizations which understand as part of their mission the realization of a technical and constructive role destined to enlighten the decisions of the Government; and on the other side, the restoration of the dignity of work as the route to the true realization of the human being.²²

Henceforth the labor unions, like all corporate interest groups, would cooperate with the State. "Tripartite Commissions" were formed to resolve labor-management disputes. The negotiating committees, formalized in 1976,²³ were composed of representatives of the workers (or their union), the management, and the government. The prescribed function was that of a binding arbitration board, presumably with the government representative holding the balance of power.

In the President's Labor Day speech he announced that 117 new unions had registered their existence in the year previous, and that union membership in Chile had reached an all-time high of 1,100,000.²⁴

Efforts to create a government-sanctioned replacement for CUT did not appear to be successful. Only passing mention was to be found of a Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores in 1974²⁵ and a

²²Semana Laboral (Santiago, Chile: Corporación Nacional del Cobre de Chile, 1973), p. 8.

²³"Chile: An Orchestrated Exercise," Latin America X (November 26, 1976): 366-367.

²⁴Semana Laboral, p. 9.

²⁵"Chile: What about the Workers?" Latin America VIII (March 14, 1974): 85-86.

Union Nacional Laboral in 1976.²⁶

The regime appeared to have enjoyed more success in finding a corporatized young people's organization in the Frente Juvenil de Unidad Nacional. On June 9, 1977 President Pinochet addressed a mass meeting of the Frente Juvenil, a show of support for the then two-year-old organization. The President reminded them of the dark days of the Allende period, and encouraged them to participate in the process of "institutionalization."²⁷

Burnett wrote in 1970:

The university student in Latin America knows a long-established tradition of political activism, and his institutions of higher learning usually operate as autonomous agencies when they are not fettered by governmental oppression. Universities serve both as centers for planned political action and as refuges for those escaping police pursuit.²⁸

The universities were the object of junta repression soon after golpe. Rectors were replaced with military men, thousands of students

²⁶"News briefs," Latin America X (December 10, 1976): 384. By 1979 at least four labor organizations were attempting to fill the void left by the banning of CUT. These were the leftist Coordinadora Nacional Sindical, the center-left Frente Unitario de Trabajadores, The Christian Democrats' "Group of Ten", and the pro-government Union de Trabajadores de Chile. See "Chilean Regime Makes May Day Concessions to Unions," Latin America Economic Report VII (May 11, 1979): 144.

²⁷"S.E. Indicó Grandes Líneas Institucionales," pp. 33;37.

²⁸Burnett, Political Groups, p. 72.

reportedly were denied readmission because of their political activities, some 300 professors were expelled, and student unions were banned.²⁹

"Ideologically," wrote Burnett, "Chilean students fall into a center-left category."³⁰ Youth wings of the competing parties included university-based organizations prior to 1973. Christian Democratic students reportedly held sway over nearly all the universities in Chile at the time of the coup, and were expected to win the upcoming Chilean Student Federation elections.³¹

It is clear that the generals feared the consequences of uncontrolled university communities. In step with their corporatist ideology, the pressure of the State was brought to bear on both the institutions and their students. Opportunities for political participation were channeled into such groups as the Frente Juvenil de Unidad Nacional.³² The universities were depoliticized, like the unions, and became almost exclusively places of study.

The Catholic Church is an example of an interest group which the Pinochet regime has had difficulty fitting into its corporate framework. The Church maintained an unequalled autonomy in the face of the powers of the State. As of 1978 the regime did not appear to have any alternative to acceptance of the Church's autonomy while exercising what leverage it could.

²⁹"Chile" (in "Index"), Index on Censorship 3 (Autumn 1974): 11.

³⁰Burnett, Political Groups, p. 84. ³¹Sigmund, p. 254.

³²The author has seen no membership data on the Frente. It is not clear to what extent the group had displaced former student organizations in the universities. In April 1979 the election of course representatives was allowed for the first time since the coup. Government supporters reportedly garnered 28.65% of the vote, opposition candidates 59.20% and independents 12.15%. "Chile: Lonely Man," Latin America Political Report XIII (May 11, 1979): 140-141.

Like all Latin American countries, Chile can be considered a "Catholic" country. But the generalization is compromised on several fronts. First, only 88% of Chileans are even nominally Catholic, low by Latin American standards. Only about 13% of women and 8% of men were regularly attending mass in the sixties. At least 11% of the population belonged to Protestant Christian sects. Chile also has a history of anticlericalism, visible in such parties as the Radicals, and even more obvious in the irreligion of the Marxists.³³

Chile was not monolithically Catholic. But some attachment to 88% of the people, and regular contact with perhaps a million or more, indicated that the Church was in a position to communicate its doctrines, and even its political positions, to large numbers of Chileans through its clergy and through its affiliated organizations. In fact, it may have been the large number of nominal and active Catholics that accounted for the Church's relative autonomy vis-à-vis the State. Junta members were no doubt Catholics themselves.

Chilean Cardinal Raul Silva Henriquez initially was supportive of the coup of 1973.³⁴ Two months after the golpe, however, when the violent repression of the junta had made itself clear, Silva denounced the bloodshed and urged reconciliation. By that time observers were calling the Church the only active political force outside the junta itself.³⁵

The Catholic Church's ties to Christian Democracy are obvious

³³Burnett, Political Groups, pp. 55-58.

³⁴"Chile: Sombre Outlook," pp. 300-302.

³⁵"Chile: Rendering unto Caesar," Latin America VII (November 23, 1973): 369-370.

and historically based, but the party was careful not to exclude non-Catholics and the Church did not overtly support one party against others.³⁶ By the time of Allende, the Chilean Church was seen as a progressive force in society:

No other clergy in Latin America today possesses so many liberals, so much dynamism; nor can one locate a hierarchy in any Latin American church that has stepped forth as a force for social change to the same degree as has the Chilean leadership.³⁷

The Chilean Church before the sixties ". . . stood alongside the most aristocratic elements in society, acting as a brake on social progress."³⁸ Even during and after the UP years there were conservative clergy as well as conservative faithful, but the general political bent of Chilean Catholicism under Silva was center-left.³⁹ For that reason the Church earned the attention of the generals after 1973.

Even with its relative autonomy intact, Cardinal Silva's Church had to exercise caution, criticizing the regime where possible, yet always wary of the regime's power. Silva regularly chastised the junta in his sermons, particularly its economic policies. The Cardinal had harsh words for liberal capitalism in his May Day 1977 sermon:

Is it true that man only develops effectively with the ambition to have more, always more, and that all the dynamism of the economy must be oriented and regulated by this law of free rivalry that terminates fatally by making man a wolf for man?⁴⁰

Even with his regular criticism, the Cardinal did attend

³⁶Burnett, Political Groups, pp. 70-72. ³⁷Ibid., p. 64.

³⁸Ibid., p. 62. ³⁹See Ibid., p. 68.

⁴⁰Cardinal Raul Silva Henriquez, "Dignidad y Unidad," Mensaje (Santiago, Chile), June 1977, p. 301

anniversary celebrations of the golpe in some years,⁴¹ and he maintained a direct line of communication with the generals through the regular visits to government headquarters of his secretary, Father Renato Poblete.⁴²

The regime, for its part, struck the Church when and where it could. In 1975, for example, numerous foreign clergy were expelled and a Catholic relief organization shut down when both were alleged to have aided the renegade Miristas.⁴³ The relief group, Comité Pro-Paz, had operated since the coup helping refugees leave Chile, investigating prison conditions, and giving charity to the needy in Santiago's shanty towns.

In 1976 it was reported that Silva was under pressure not only from the generals for his attacks from the pulpit, but also from rightist Catholics for allegedly having supported the Unidad Popular.⁴⁴ There was speculation at the time that Pinochet was exploiting this apparent rift in the Church. He felt he had the support of a number of Chilean bishops and the papal nuncio in Santiago.⁴⁵

⁴¹See "Chile: King of the Castle," Latin America X (September 17, 1976): 286-287.

⁴²Salvatore Bizzarro, "Chile Under the Jackboot," Current History 70 (February 1976): 82.

⁴³See "Chile: Revolutionary Swansong," Latin America IX (November 14, 1975): 357-358 and "Chile: Peace without Justice," Latin America IX (November 28, 1975): 372-373.

⁴⁴"Chile: Christian Disunity," Latin America X (March 26, 1976): 102.

⁴⁵"Chile: The Church Outraged," Latin America X (August 27, 1976): 266;268.

Despite the occasional attempts to keep the Church in line, the regime seemed to accord it extraordinary freedom of action. In many ways the Church, its affiliated agencies (like Comité Pro-Paz and the Vicaria de la Solidaridad, advocate for desaparecidos), and the Jesuit magazine, Mensaje, were the only authentic counter-voices in the Chilean political climate after 1973. The Pinochet regime did not appear to even attempt to "corporatize" the Church. The possibility of rightist Catholics exercising influence was the best Pinochet could hope for.

Some of the other interest groups represented on the Council of State--the armed forces, business, professional associations, and women's groups--may have been of less concern to the regime because of their ostensible likemindedness. The armed forces were under the direct control of the ruling generals; business elements often were disgruntled by the economic policies, but were largely benefitting from them; professionals, or "technocrats", posed less of a threat than unionized workers, and accrued benefits not unlike business; and women traditionally were more conservative politically in Chile than were men.⁴⁶ All the same, it was not clear by 1978 to what extent inroads had been made toward corporatizing such groups.

The overall effectiveness of the Pinochet regime in attempting to "adjust to the demands of time" through the manipulation of the relevant time biased media (interest groups) is difficult to evaluate. At the time of the 1978 consulta it was clear that a corporatist-type

⁴⁶ Around 78% of women's votes in the consulta were "sí".
The Answer of Chile, p. 23. See also Sigmund, p. 107.

ideology had been adopted, and that efforts were being made to redirect political participation into sanctioned interest groups. The Council of State was the prototype for such a system.

But the success or failure of the interest group formation is not the whole question. From a communication standpoint, the Pinochet regime was remarkably successful at altering the structure of these time biased media. The most notable changes took place through eliminations, of people and of organizations. It already has been noted that leftist parties were banned from the onset, and that all other parties were placed in permanent recess. It also should be noted that individuals associated with organizations, particularly the parties, were eliminated as well. The elimination of the people who composed potentially antagonistic interest groups was at least as crucial a phenomenon as the elimination of the groups themselves. With key people no longer in Chile, clandestine activity was made more unlikely. Some particularly notable politicians who died, were arrested, or were exiled have been mentioned earlier in this chapter; there were many more, of equal or lesser import.

As early as December 1973, three months after the coup, it was reported that some 2,600 persons had been granted asylum in other Latin American countries, nearly 1,900 in European countries. Over five hundred foreigners had been expelled, and thirty Chileans abroad had been stripped of their citizenship.⁴⁷ Amnesty International estimated

⁴⁷"Chile: Waiting for Justice," pp. 405-406.

that 13,000 had been killed since the military takeover.⁴⁸ Official Chilean government statistics released in 1975 showed that 41,359 persons had been arrested for political reasons since the coup. Of that number, 9,167 had been expelled.⁴⁹ A Church group reported in 1976 that 1,400 political prisoners still were being held. Over twelve hundred prisoners had been allowed to commute their sentences to exile. An estimated 2,000 persons had disappeared since 1973, allegedly abducted for opposing the junta.⁵⁰

The elimination campaigns were largely successful: Political parties were placed in abeyance, the CUT was disbanded, and undesirables were allowed to leave the country or were expelled. The more complicated "institutionalization" of political participation into sanctioned interest groups was only underway as of 1978.

The difficulty that faced the Pinochet regime in its efforts to control time biased media may have stemmed from a contradiction which is built into the authoritarian-corporate approach to political participation. The interest group as a device represents a decentralization of political participation; such groups would be numerous, and in theory autonomous and not necessarily organs of the State. The contradiction lies in the fact that authoritarian power--highly centralized--is needed to bring about the transformation from a pluralist form of democratic participation, where competing parties are the vehicles, to a corporatist system.

⁴⁸"News in Brief," Latin America VII (December 14, 1973): 400.

⁴⁹"News in Brief," Latin America IX (March 28, 1975): 104.

⁵⁰"Chile: Learning from Experience," Latin America X (November 5, 1976): 338.

Carey wrote: "Innis argued that the effect of modern advances in communication was to enlarge the range of reception while narrowing the points of distribution."⁵¹ Innis was referring to the mass media, but the point can be applied to the Pinochet regime and time biassed media. Despite attempts to "corporatize" and develop the time biassed media, the regime's authoritarian character prevented it from risking true decentralization of power and authority. They enlarged the range of reception by encouraging the development of sanctioned interest groups, but that very encouragement, leading actually, was the built-in contradiction. It "narrowed the points of distribution."

C Perhaps the most relevant question which faced the Pinochet regime after its vote of confidence in the 1978 consulta nacional was whether self-propelled corporate interest groups which offered genuine political participation actually could evolve without the excessive (and contradictory) direction of the State. The regime's success with the mass, space biassed media was a direct result of the exercise of centralized, authoritarian power. Whether a complementary symbolic climate, emanating from local, time biassed media, could grow from the same authoritarian roots was an unanswered question as of 1978. According to Innis, the duration of the regime depended upon such a development.

⁵¹Carey, p. 42.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION: A QUEST FOR SYSTEM LEGITIMACY

The phenomenon that provided the stimulus for this study was a confounding expression of popular support for a regime universally condemned outside the country it ruled. The problem was in the form of a question: Is there evidence to reasonably conclude that the Pinochet regime's treatment of the mass media contributed significantly to the overwhelming expression of popular support for the regime in 1978?

The search for reasons for the expression of popular support was framed in a communications approach, drawing primarily on the writings of Innis and Gerbner. The examination revealed a variety of forces and conditions in interaction. Perhaps the most telling result in the investigation was finding that both the structure and function of the mass media in Chile provided reinforcement for the developmental ideology of the Pinochet regime.

The description of the geographic coverage of the mass media in Chile established that these media were indeed national in their scope. The extent of coverage was qualified on many fronts, however. Television was considered the most extensive medium in terms of both coverage and actual use, followed by radio, newspapers, and magazines, respectively.

In Innis' terms of centralization, these space biased mass media all exhibited centralizing tendencies. TV and the press were

seen as more centralized than radio. Television was particularly crucial to the centralized location of authority and to the extension of the regime over symbolic space. Television Nacional de Chile, the state-run network, relied on a system of microwave transmission to reach people in virtually every inhabited part of the country. Given that TVN's only competitors were the university-based networks, and given that the universities were provided with junta-approved rectors after the 1973 coup, the administrative centralization of the television medium was nearly complete. General controls on all aspects of TV broadcasting provided auxiliary support to the State's television dominance.

Although there existed regional and provincial newspapers in all parts of Chile, the major Santiago dailies delivered their issues from Arica to Punta Arenas and to most cities in between. This, combined with the fact that nearly all magazine publishing took place in Santiago, was complementary to the location of authority in the capital. It reinforced the structured dominance of Santiago vis-à-vis the rest of the country.

Radio was the least centralized of the major media in Chile; local stations appeared to predominate. But even here the stations in Santiago exercised a centralizing force. The most powerful radio signals, emanating from the capital, had broadcast ranges which took in nearly half the population of the Chile, concentrated as it was in the central valley regions.

The sum of this, then, is that these space biased media exhibited a tremendous extension over the national space. The centralization apparent in television, and in the press and radio to a lesser extent, was consistent with Innis' contention that space

biased media have a centralizing effect. Further, in the case of television, the location of authority was clearly in the capital and more subtly in the State itself. The press and radio reinforced this dominance of Santiago.

The examination of power roles also helped illustrate this centralization of authority and extension over space. The developmental ideology of the Pinochet regime was essentially authoritarian in its politics and capitalist in its economics; media ownership reflected this ideology.

The elimination of all leftist-oriented media outlets, as well as nearly all other outlets with clear party affiliations, had a drastic effect on the media ownership situation in Chile. After this flurry of eliminations, all that remained were (1) the media-for-profit outlets of private entrepreneurs and conglomerate groups like the Piranhas; (2) university-based outlets; and (3) state-owned outlets. None in these groups had clear party affiliations, consonant with the generals' distaste for Chile's politicians. All media outlets which continued to operate did so because they assented to following the written and unwritten rules which governed media conduct under Pinochet. This was consonant with the junta's authoritarian demeanor.

Nearly all media outlets which continued to operate after 1973, including those of the State, were financed through commercial patronage. This was consistent with the regime's economic policies: advertising revenues would be the main source of income; content would at least in part be determined by this commercial patronage; media outlets would live or die by their ability to generate advertising revenue (state-

owned media were no doubt excepted); and the capitalist marketplace would be extended over symbolic space in the process, through the presence of commercial advertising.

It was pointed out earlier that ownership of media outlets in Chile in 1977 fell into only two relevant categories: (1) statal and quasi-statal (university) outlets; and (2) privately owned outlets. This too reflects back on Innis' notion of centralization. There were perhaps four ownership categories during the Unidad Popular years; (1) state-owned outlets; (2) outlets with clear affiliations with political parties; (3) the relatively autonomous university outlets; and (4) the ostensibly apolitical media-outlets-for-profit. Under the Pinochet regime ownership was limited to the media of the State, the media of the state-controlled universities, and the media-for-profit. This can be viewed as a politico-economic centralization consistent with an authoritarian-capitalist ideology.

The analysis of power roles along the lines of Gerbner's framework resulted in a similar conclusion. Power, it seemed, resided in the junta, which could eliminate, warn, threaten, or otherwise regulate the media; and in the capitalist marketplace, which could determine the ultimate viability of individual media outlets.

These twin powers--State and marketplace--in turn affected the content of the media, the media-climate. Perhaps the most obvious manifestation of the power of the State in this regard was the prohibition of Marxist argumentation, something which clearly had been a part of the media-climate prior to 1974 by way of leftist media outlets. Such media content was taken off the agenda, so to speak. Likewise, antagon-

istic criticism of the regime rooted in any political ideology, was forbidden. The resulting media-climate, when viewed from a political standpoint, was vastly different from the one it proceeded.

Political criticism and partisan politicking was a remarkable feature of the media-climate in the Allende years; it conceivably contributed to his downfall. While the political content of the media-climate after 1973 was not uniformly complimentary of the junta, the absence of harsh criticism and partisan politicking made that climate complementary to the regime's authoritarian rule.

Certainly years of pluralistic political commentary in the media-climate had effects which four years of censorship and control could not erase. But for those sectors of society where commitments to specific political ideologies were not deeply felt, the constrained media-climate may have been ideologically effective. Repeating Gerbner's words: ". . . they cannot cultivate what is not available."¹

The commercial patronage system manifested itself in at least two ways to affect media content. Most obviously, the system resulted in the conspicuous presence of commercial advertising. Such advertising was the most consistent type of specific content found in TV, radio, and the press in Chile in 1977.

The relevance of the presence of advertising, as far as cultivation is concerned, does not necessarily involve the specific desire to purchase product X or service Y. Rather, it has to do with the consistent pairing of media exposure with advertising, per se. Such advertising was a manifestation of the commercial patronage system,

¹ Gerbner, p. 204.

a media patronage system rooted in capitalist practice. Given that the mass media are space biased, and that the coverage of the media was extensive in Chile, this commercial patronage system resulted in the extension over symbolic space of the capitalist marketplace. The extension of this marketplace was a subtle extension of the underlying capitalist ideology itself.

The less obvious manifestation of the commercial patronage system was the determining effect on actual media content, apart from the advertising itself. This is not to introduce the notion of direct causality; the point can be made through sylogistic reasoning: The media depended upon advertising sales for their continued operation; the ability to generate such sales is largely a function of audience size; it is known both through trial and error and through market research that certain types of media content draw larger audiences than do others; it also is known that the Chilean media, particularly television and radio, made use of market research in determining audience size and subsequent advertising rates; therefore, decisions on media content were subject to the need to attract audiences and advertising revenue.² This is what is meant by the effect of the commercial patronage system on media content.

Light entertainment predominated in Chilean television programming in 1977, and much of this was imported from the United States and from other Latin American countries. Music, both domestic and foreign, was the mainstay of radio programming. The press contained the most variety

²For rating data in Chilean radio and television see Informe Sobre Chile 1976, pp. 316-330.

of subject matter, ranging from soft pornography to borderline leftist political commentary.

Not every media outlet attempted to cater to the same audience, of course, a qualification which must be placed on the content-determining power of commercial advertising. In some cases, such as with the Playboy-like Bravo magazine for men, it was possible to deduce the intended audience from the advertising it displayed.

In sum, the relationship between media content and advertising was clear, if not overpoweringly blatant. Because of the universal commercial patronage system, media content in Chile in 1977 must be viewed in terms of advertising imperatives, taking into account the concomitant political restrictions. Most blatant was the existence of the commercial patronage system itself, and the conspicuous presence of advertising in the media-climate.

It is difficult to attribute a very precisely defined world-view to Chileans as a result of their being exposed to the media-climate. In terms of actual cultivation, the best that can be done is to draw on Gerbner's notion of available choices, which is given support by Innis' notion of monopolies of knowledge and Marx's notion of control of the means of mental production.

It already has been observed that available images of the national environment disseminated by the mass media were relatively limited after 1973, particularly in political terms. Therefore, what was made available to the public for its cultivation was limited as well.

What did find its way into the media-climate between 1973 and 1978 was almost without exception material which was acceptable to

the regime on two counts: (1) it was not obviously Marxist in its political orientation; and (2) it was not excessively critical of the Pinochet government. Such material is exemplary of what was not cultivated by the public as a result of its exposure to the Chilean media-climate.

What did find its way into the media-climate were what Milliband described as "ideas and values which affirm rather than challenge existing patterns of power and privilege . . ."³ As was contended in an earlier chapter on the effects of mass communication, the Pinochet regime depended upon the cultivation of certain images of political calm and economic prosperity to avoid having continually to resort to coercion while maintaining power. Much of the media content examined in 1977 provided material for such cultivation. Imported American TV programs were prime examples of media content supportive of capitalist society; the prohibition of all contentious political material from the Chilean media made the rest of the visible content seem relatively apolitical.

The long-established affinity for American media fare in Chile made the cultivation of American-like values and assumptions even more likely than if such material were new to the media-climate as of 1973.

Another relevant characteristic of the media-climate was its dissemination of the symbols of the regime's ideology, symbols like Allende, La Patria, Institutionalization, and Inflation. In the

³Milliband, p. 311.

most direct sense, such symbols were subject to cultivation when the government requested the link-up of all radio and television outlets for addresses to the nation. The consulta was announced to the public by President Pinochet in such a national address. The news media disseminated the regime's symbols merely in the course of reporting "the news". When Pinochet and members of the constitutional commission in June 1977 outlined plans for the "institutionalization" of Chile, the media in turn reported and discussed "institutionalization". It would be difficult to argue that the public, in its turn, did not also talk about the "institutionalization" of Chile.

In this attempt to account for the expressed popular support for the Pinochet regime in 1978, it may be of some value to divert to Herbert Kelman's social-psychological analysis of political legitimacy.⁴ That writer proposed a six-celled model showing various sources of attachment to the national system. These sources of attachment, when combined with Kelman's earlier work on processes of opinion change,⁵ appear to be of some use in understanding the actions of the individuals who voted in the 1978 consulta nacional.

Si votes, No votes, and spoiled or unmarked ballots all can be viewed as positive actions on the part of the voters. These actions can be regarded as varying degrees of attachment (or rejection) of the national system, and can be subjects of an application of Kelman's processes of influence.

⁴Kelman, "Patterns."

⁵Kelman, "Processes."

Kelman wrote: "The underlying condition . . . for the effective functioning of the state is its perceived legitimacy in the eyes of the population."⁶ Legitimacy, in turn, depends upon the population's acceptance of the system's ideology. This acceptance "implies that the individual regards the authority of the state and hence its specific demands (within some broadly defined range) legitimate."⁷ Acceptance of legitimacy was seen as personal involvement with the system.

The consulta nacional can be examined in terms of the population's acceptance of the system's ideology. Note the text of the consulta proposition:

Before the international aggression unleashed against the Government of our country, I back President Pinochet in his defence of the dignity of Chile; and I reaffirm the legitimacy of the Government of the Republic to sovereignly lead the process of institutionalization of the country.

Not only did the proposition ask the voter to declare the Pinochet government legitimate, it also invoked some of the same symbols used throughout the period in question by the Pinochet regime: international aggression, the dignity of Chile, the process of institutionalization.

Kelman contended that nationalism often is used as a tool in the quest for system legitimacy: "Once a group has developed a sense of nationality, strong psychological and social forces can be mobilized to sustain and perpetrate it."⁸

⁶Kelman, "Patterns," p. 7.

⁷Ibid., p. 6.

⁸Ibid., pp. 2-3; 21.

Because Chileans traditionally have felt a strong sense of nationalism,⁹ such feeling provided fertile ground for the manipulation of symbols of nationalism by the junta in the propagation of their ideology. These symbols, as has been shown, found vehicles for their dissemination in the mass media. Such images were extended over symbolic space through an extensive system of mass communication.

An illuminating example of this State/media interaction was the President's July 9, 1977 speech to the Frente Juvenil de Unidad Nacional. In his address Pinochet outlined the process of "institutionalization". His audience, the young members of the Frente, constituted the leadership and part of the membership of what can be considered a corporate interest group, also a time biased communication medium. That night Pinochet's speech was on the television in the lounge of a small boarding house in Puerto Montt. The text of the President's address was published the following morning in the Santiago daily, El Mercurio.

In the quest for system legitimacy, the State often relies on devices:

. . . through which the role of national attains paramountcy at critical time - such as the use of national symbols to heighten emotional arousal and cooptation of various groups and institutions...¹⁰

In the Chilean case there was evidence of both symbol manipulation and group cooptation, the latter coming into play through the formation of the Council of State and related attempts to engender a corporate interest group system of political participation.

⁹ See Burnett, Political Groups, pp. 5-8.

¹⁰ Kelman, "Patterns," p. 7.

Kelman described six different types of attachment to the national system, three types in each of two broad categories: Sentimental attachment and Instrumental attachment. Sentimental attachment is very personal; the individual sees the system as a "reflection and extension of himself."¹¹ Instrumental attachment, on the other hand, is more pragmatic; the system is seen as an "effective vehicle for achieving his own ends and the ends of other system members."¹²

The three sources of attachment which correspond to these two broader categories are illuminated by the key terms, values, roles, and norms. The respective categorical headings are Ideological, Role-Participant, and Normative.

The individual who attaches himself to the system for Sentimental-Ideological reasons does so in his heartfelt love for his culture. His very personal attachment to the system and to national cultural values are the salient characteristics. To him, the system and these cultural values are interdependent. Persons in this category would have responded to images of threats to "the dignity of Chile"--threats to La Patria, the embodiment of national cultural values.

The self-defined role of national is salient in cases of attachment in the Sentimental-Role Participant group. These individuals also hold cultural values in high esteem, but their attachment derives less from their emotional response to culture than from the need to participate as a national. These persons derive satisfaction from such a role, and support the system in that role, particularly in threat

¹¹Ibid., p. 11. ¹²Ibid., p. 13.

situations and when national symbols are invoked. A perceived "international aggression" directed toward Chile would have incited persons whose self-defined roles would have been threatened in the process.

Individuals in the Sentimental-Normative category are loyal to the State because it is sacred to them. Their role is servanthood, and they exhibit "unquestioning obedience to the demands of the state."¹³ This obedience derives from the perception of positive and negative sanctions provided by the system.¹⁴ These individuals are the most malleable and the least genuinely committed. In the Chilean case, the mere existence of a "new" State after the 1973 golpe was sufficient for their attachment to the system.

Individuals in the Instrumental-Ideological category attach themselves to the system if the system appears to be acting in the best interests of the people. Such attachment is based on the system's perceived attention to the needs and interests of the population. Such persons may have responded positively to the symbol of Allende and the Unidad Popular years as representing the ultimate breakdown of the system. They also may have responded to the largely uncontested claims by the Pinochet regime that its economic policies were in the best interests of Chile. Sigmund wrote:

The economic factor is . . . central to an understanding of the breakdown of Chilean democracy, since no democratic political system, no matter how stable initially, could have withstood the pressures of runaway inflation, a very widespread black market, deepening shortages of essential commodities, and continually declining production.¹⁵

¹³ Kelman, p. 13. ¹⁴ Ibid., p. 27.

¹⁵ Sigmund, p. 282.

The Pinochet regime's draconian measures to revive the economy caused an initial rise in unemployment and also alienated such groups as large landowners and industrial producers of consumer goods. Falling tariffs threatened the viability of both.¹⁶ But the regime could claim many economic successes, on its own terms, by 1978.¹⁷ Unemployment in the Santiago area, for instance, averaged only 3.7% in 1972. It reached a peak of 19.1% in January 1976, and had been pared to 13.2% by December 1977.

Prices, rising at rates in excess of 50% per year in Chile, were expected to rise at a much lower rate in 1978.¹⁸ The real increase in the gross domestic product per capita was 5.7% in 1977, recovering from a decline of 12.7% in 1975.

Efforts to diversify exports, intended both to generate foreign exchange and to break the traditional dependence upon copper exports, were succeeding particularly in forestry products, where the value of such exports increased from \$36.4 million in 1973 to \$180 million in 1977. Copper production, meanwhile, increased 44% from 1973-1977.

¹⁶See "Chile's Monetarist Model Starts to Come Apart," Latin America Economic Report V (January 14, 1977): 6 and "Chilean Farmers Suffer from New Government Cutbacks," Latin America Economic Report V (August 26, 1977): 132.

¹⁷Summary derived from Quarterly Economic Review: Chile: Annual Supplement 1978.

¹⁸Latin America Economic Report quoted Chilean government statistics which showed a 29.8% increase in the cost of living, 1978-1979. The rate of increase for the previous twelve month period had been 52.1%. "News in Brief," Latin America Economic Report VII (March 9, 1979): 73.

The general index of industrial production (1968 - 100) peaked at 122.6 in 1972. It had dipped to 81.2 by 1975, and recovered to 93.8 in 1977.

Fiscal restraint also was in evidence. The proportion of deficit to total state spending fell from 55% in 1973 to 8% in 1977. Government consumption represented 12.1% of expenditure on GNP in 1977, compared with 15.8% in 1972. Private consumption rose from 74.9% to 80.1% of the total in the same period.

Just prior to the consulta, in December 1977, the government unveiled its "austerity" budget for 1978. The junta was quick to point out that "social" expenditure on housing, health, social security, education, and regional development was to increase to 53.6% of the total, up slightly from the previous year.¹⁹ The junta also announced on the eve of the consulta campaign that some \$11 million would be invested by Atlantic Richfield and Amerada Hess for oil exploration and drilling in Chile. And in a nationally broadcast speech by finance minister Sergio de Castro, tax reductions for fuel and electricity were announced, as was the easing of credit and the further scaling down of import barriers.²⁰

Given the fact that the news media regularly reported on the economic performance of the Pinochet government--good and bad--the economic achievements of the regime cannot have been lost on the public in general and on the Instrumental-Ideological group in particular.

¹⁹"Newsbriefs," Latin America Economic Report V (December 9, 1977): 233.

²⁰"Chile Signs First Long-Term Oil Deal with Foreign Companies," Latin America Economic Report V (December 16, 1977): 241 and "Chile Takes a Gamble on Reflation of the Economy," Latin America Economic Report V (December 16, 1977): 242.

Judged on its own terms, the junta delivered what it promised when it inherited a disheveled economy in 1973: inflation was slowed, government fiscal restraint was introduced, exports were diversified and increased, and foreign investments were attracted. Those who looked for evidence of social welfare could be assured that social security payments were continued, low-income housing was built, health care was sub[redacted], and some government works programs to provide jobs for the [redacted] employed were continued. It was hardly a welfare state, but the junta could not be properly accused of abolishing welfare spending out of hand. The potential existed for people to attach themselves to the system because it appeared to be tending to the needs and interests of the people.

Also to be found in the Instrumental-Ideological group would be those individuals who were in agreement with the regime's developmental ideology regardless of actual performance.

Kelman's Instrumental-Role Participant category contained those whose social roles provided them with a vested interest in the maintenance of the system. Such individuals see themselves as linked to the system through their jobs in government, state-owned industries, or the military, or through some other vested interest which makes them dependent upon the system. The Pinochet regime's commitment to private enterprise may have made many owners, managers, and even workers perceive such dependence. Likewise, leaders and even members of groups sanctioned by the State in the Council of State or through other corporate devices may have perceived a vested interest. System attachment in these cases implies no ideological commitment; it is rooted in social roles.

The Instrumental-Normative group is rules oriented. If rules appear not to be arbitrary, these persons will oblige the authority of

the State. They also are responsive to positive and negative sanctions. Their obedience is not emotional and blind, but rather pragmatic and rooted in respect for law and order. Such individuals may have needed to be convinced that a society based on law was in fact developing in the face of the harsh repression that followed the 1973 coup.

Details of some of the repressive measures instituted by the junta after their takeover have been provided in earlier sections. In the case of the regime's treatment of the mass media, repression was swift and harsh, but it decreased over time to the point where, by 1978, ad hoc and reactive measures were very infrequent. Likewise, the regime's overall repression initially was harsh. It too decreased over time to the point where, by 1978, arrests of individuals or small groups became the most conspicuous acts of repression reported in such periodicals as the Latin America Political Report.

On the first anniversary of the golpe del estado, President Pinochet announced that the "state of internal war" would be replaced by a "state of siege", implying a reduction in arbitrary actions by the military.²¹ Eventually the even less restrictive "state of emergency" was introduced, and the nightly curfew got progressively shorter. Possibly because of its symbolic value, the state of emergency remained in effect even in 1979.²²

²¹See Alan Angell, "Chile One Year After the Coup," Current History 68 (January 1975): 11-14; 42.

²²In March 1979 the state of emergency was extended for another six months. "Chile: Lonely Man," pp. 140-141.

In 1975 the government released statistics showing that 41,359 persons had been arrested since the coup. All but 5,000 had been released at that point.²³ In June 1977 the junta claimed to have released the last political prisoner it held, although human rights organizations said that over 400 prisoners remained.²⁴

In 1977, when the president of the constitutional commission discussed the philosophy behind the forthcoming document, he explained that Chile's new order would be based on "the humanistic, Christian concept of man and society, according to which the dignity of the human being, his freedom, and his rights are before the juridical order."²⁵ Such statements found their way into the media-climate. They were reinforced by a gradual scaling down of general repression, particularly the arbitrary exercise of power by the military. Such may have been sufficient for rules oriented individuals to attach themselves to the system.

Kelman believed that the State can rely on coercion, and generally has the means to do so, but cannot do so for extended periods of time:

... the fear of punishment is not a dependable method of enlisting the sustained support of wide segments of the population, which is necessary to meet a national crisis or to mobilize a nation's energies.²⁶

Six sources of attachment to the national system have been described, as have some characteristics of the media-climate which may

²³"News in Brief," Latin America IX (March 28, 1975): 104.

²⁴"News in Brief," Latin America Political Report XI (June 24, 1977): 192.

²⁵Millas, p. 11. ²⁶Kelman, "Patterns," p. 7.

have engendered such attachment. Assuming that a positive vote in the 1978 consulta was a manifestation of system attachment, six qualitatively different types of Si votes would have been cast. Likewise, six types of No votes may have been cast due to the State's inability to fulfill specific expectations rooted in individuals' values, roles, or norms.

The Si vote itself, that is the manner of attachment, would have been a response to one of Kelman's three processes of influence: internalization, identification, or compliance.²⁷ These correspond to the Ideological, Role-Participant, and Normative sources of attachment, respectively.

Of those three quarters of the voters who cast Si ballots, some were voting so because of perceived congruence between their personal value systems and the conduct of government by the regime. The potential for such congruence may have existed prior to 1973; it may have developed since. The Si vote may have been an emotional response to a threatened culture the regime sought to preserve; it may have been the result of assessing benefits to the people stemming from the junta's policies. Internalized values were the same as those perceived to be held by the junta.

Some Si votes were cast because certain individuals found they could fulfill self-determined roles under the status quo. This may have been in the sentimental role of national or in the instrumental role with a vested interest. These voters identified with the junta.

²⁷ Kelman, "Processes," pp. 62-66.

Finally, some Sí votes were cast because such was expected of them. The positive response may have been a ritual blessing of the sacred State or a dutiful assent to the powers of a just State. Such a Sí vote may have been stimulated by the prospect of reward or by the fear of punishment. This manner of attachment is compliance.

All this is not to suggest the Pinochet regime by 1978 had achieved legitimacy in a conventional sense, although Chileans may have regarded the military government as legitimate. Rather, in the movement from imposed rule to legitimate rule, the regime appeared to have reached the point of having obtained mass popular support. Some reasons for this support are to be found (1) in the structure and function of the mass media in Chile; and (2) in the cultivation of images found in Chile's media-climate.

The three manners of attachment which were applied to positive votes in the 1978 consulta were forms. Much of the content of those expressions of support plausibly can be traced to communication factors in Chile from 1973-1978.

From a structural standpoint, Chile contained a space biased system of mass communication which engendered the centralized location of authority, an authority shared by authoritarian political forces and capitalist economic forces. The corresponding concentration of media ownership in the hands of the State and private entrepreneurs resulted in what Innis called monopolies of knowledge and what Marx called control of the means of mental production. The sum of this was a media-climate

which reinforced the system of power.

From a cultural standpoint, the media-climate consisted mostly of images which were sympathetic to, or at least not excessively disdainful toward, the system of power. Because, as Gerbner wrote, people cannot cultivate that which is not available, it can only be assumed that four years of system-sympathetic images and values in the media-climate had a reinforcing effect on the system of power.

Specific images and values seen in the Chilean media-climate were both supportive of the developmental ideology of the regime in subtle ways, and contributive toward popular support in more obvious ways. The conspicuous presence of the regime's symbols is exemplary of the latter.

Even in the area of time biased communication it was clear that the Pinochet regime was attempting to exercise control. By 1978 corporate interest groups were being formed for the redirection of political participation.

It is not central to the present analysis to attempt to assign specific percentages of Chileans voters to each of Kelman's three manners of attachment in the case of the 1978 consulta. Introducing Kelman's typology was not intended to convince the reader that Chileans actually did express support for Pinochet. Rather, in keeping with the quest for reasons, Kelman's sources and manners of attachment to the national system illustrate how complex such expressions are; they are not simply yes/no in the manner of an actual ballot. It was possible in the Chilean case to relate communication factors in that country to these qualitatively different sources and manners of attachment to the national system.

The confounding expression of popular support for the Pinochet regime provided the stimulus for this work. The relevance of this work to the field of development studies, however, probably resides in the examination of the structure and function of mass communication in Chile, a less developed country.

Chile belongs to a special class of LDC, as do many other Latin American countries. They are "poor", or less developed, relative to Canada, the United States, and most European countries, but they are decidedly more prosperous than most other LDC's.²⁸ These countries are not "emerging nations"; they long ago gained their independence from Spain or Portugal. Many Latin American countries have developed sizeable industrial infrastructures in the twentieth century. Many exhibit relatively long life expectancy in their populations. Many, like Chile, have highly urban, highly literate societies. Many LDC's, at various levels of development, have, again like Chile, developed extensive systems of mass communication.

It is not enough to say that because mass media are there--like some academic Mt. Everest--they must be studied. Rather, mass communication in media rich LDC's should be examined because of its potential contributions to culture in the broadest sense; because of its potential role, intended or incidental, in the very process of development itself.

If all mass media truly are space biassed, then Innis tells us something that may be of interest in development studies; mass media systems will engender the centralized location of authority. They also

²⁸For relative standings among the countries of the world in terms of GNP per capita and Physical Quality of Life Index, see Sewell, pp. 147-171.

will enable the extension of the authority of the State (or economic system) over symbolic space. It also may be of interest to students of the development process that the predominance of space biased media, in the absence of policy which ensures duration through the development of time biased communication, may result in political rule of relatively short tenure.

Gerbner intended his framework for the analysis of national systems of mass media to be used in comparative investigations. He looked at media in terms of contributions to culture. His framework can be applied to countries at varying levels of media development to see what, if any, contributions the media do indeed make to the development process.

For politico-economic analyses, such as the one attempted here, Gerbner's framework might be applied to such cases as that of Cuba from 1959 to the present, making use of Innis' time/space bias schema to embellish the examination. The Castro regime, imposed like Pinochet's, took control of a country where some media development already had taken place. The system was extended, and Castro's lengthy televised speeches became a regular part of an extensive Cuban media-climate. Great similarities in structure and function may exist between the media systems of Cuba and Chile, albeit from different politico-economic bases

Likewise, Castro's treatment of time biased communication media--eliminating the political opposition and forming state-sanctioned organizations--would be revealing in terms of his regime's duration; Cuba has been one of the most "stable" countries in Latin America over the past twenty years.

If corporate interest groups truly are time biased communication media, the Gerbner/Innis approach might be of interest in all cases where authoritarian-corporate political systems are developing coexistent with extensive systems of mass media.

Lastly, there may be opportunities for the comparative application of a Gerbner/Innis/Kelman approach to communication and its relation to system legitimacy. The Chilean case examined here was an attempt at such an application.

The Chilean case may have been fit for a myriad of other types of analysis. This approach was delimited to communication factors both for reasons of economy and to accommodate a personal curiosity.

Chile from 1973-1978 clearly was in the throes of dramatic political and economic change. In the Pinochet regime's quest for legitimacy the media of communication were manipulated. The results, in the short-term, seem to have favored those who sought to alter the complexion of the Chilean State. Similar manipulation may have taken place in other LDC's. In development studies such manipulation may be something to take into account, particularly in light of the recent growth of media systems in less developed countries.

The expression of popular support for the Pinochet regime in 1978 was not explained here in the sense that unequivocal "causes" have been articulated. Rather, by concentrating the analysis and discussion on communication phenomena, a portrait has been drawn of a symbolic climate for the period that was conducive to the growth of pro-regime sentiment.

Appendix 1

Development of Television Nacional de Chile Network, Locations of Transmitters and repeaters with Approximate Potential Viewing Audiences, June 1977

Time of Installation:

Pre-1970 (Frei)

1970-Oct. 1973 (Allende)

Oct. 1973-June 1977.
(Pinochet)

Location; Potential Audience	Location; Potential Audience	Location; Potential Audience
Arica 92,000	Iquique 68,200	Taltal 7,500
Antofagasta 131,700	Intermedio Oficina	Cuesta Llanta 1,000
Santiago 3,055,200	Victoria 2,000	Caldera 1 800
San Fernando 492,800	Oficina Victoria 3,000	Caldera 2 10,000
Talca 318,000	Maria Elena y Pedro de Valdivia 14,300	Isla de Pascua 1,800
Talcahuano (Concepción) 588,700	Tocopilla 22,200	Vicuña 13,806
Punta Arenas 71,600	Chuquicamata 68,200	Andacollo 10,000
SUB-TOTAL 4,750,000	Chañaral 9,900	Punitaqui 10,000
	Salvador 15,500	Monte Patricia 10,000
	Chopiapo 58,200	Combarbalá 17,332
	Vallenar 35,500	El Espino 500
Source: Gerencia Técnica, Televisión Nacional de Chile, Santiago, Chile, June 1977.	La Serena 36,300	Illapel 15,300
	Ovalle 48,000	Los Vilos 4,238
	La Ligua 10,100	Saladillo 2 1,000
	El Roble 841,100	Coya 1 1,000
	Saladillo 4,200	Coya 2 7,500
	Valparaíso 451,200	Licanten 15,000
	Algarrobo 6,100	Cañete 11,400
* TVN did not list a potential audience figure for a repeater at Tres Puntas, established in 1972.	San Antonio 66,500	Galvarino 6,000
	San José de Maipo 9,600	Villarica 40,796
	Constitución 9,600	Panguipulli 33,000
	Toconey 2,200	Achao 2,500
	Cauquenes 16,800	Puerto Aysen 15,000
	Chillán 672,900	Cullen 1 unknown
	El Toro 1,500	Cullen 2 1,000
	Lebu 17,000	El Salade 1,100
	Angol 21,300	Posesión 1,000
	Victoria 42,400	SUB-TOTAL 238,572
	Intermedio Traiguén 3,500	
	Traiguén 10,100	
	Temuco 364,900	
	Valdivia 119,200	
	Osorno 219,200	
	Puerto Montt 153,700	
	Ancud 32,300	
	Castro 24,300	
	Coyhaique 17,500	
	Puerto Natales 13,600	
	Cerro Sombrero 800	
	SUB-TOTAL 3,612,900*	

Appendix 2

Cities and Towns Served by Various Newspaper Agencies
and Provincial Dailies, 1977A: Distribution of El Mercurio and El Sur from Chillán:

Yungay	Portezuelo	Bulnes
Cholguan	Quirihue	Cabrero
Huepil	San Nicolas	Corhueco
Pemuco	Monte Aguila	Cobquecura
Quiriquina.	Nipas	
El Carmen	Coelemu	
Tucapel	Quillón	

B: Distribution of El Mercurio, La Tercera, and magazines from Los Angeles:

Mulchen	Negrete	Canteras
Nacimiento	Albanico	Antuco
Laja	Rayenco	Sante Fe
Sta. Barbara	Cuatro Juntas	
Coigue	Renaico	

C: Distribution of El Mercurio, La Segunda, and Las Ultimas Noticias from Puerto Montt:

Fresia	Chacao	Magazines delivered by
Calbuco	Parra	air to Chaiten, Alto
Caremapu	Rio Frio	Palena and Futaleufú

D: Distribution of El Mercurio from Concepción:

Laraquete	Los Alamos	Yumbel
Lébu	Santa Juana	Bulnes
Cañete	Hualqui	Quillón
Arauco	San Rosendo	Florida
Curanilahue	Chaimavida	Monte Aguila

E: Distribution of El Mercurio and La Tercera from Valdivia:

Los Lagos	Futrono	Llifén
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F: Distribution of La Discusión from Chillán:

Nebuco	Los Lleugues	El Carmen
Rucapequen	Portezuelo	Ninhue
Nipas	San Carlos	Linares
Quinchamali	Yangay	San Gregorio
Coelemu	Pemuco	Rancagua
Concepción	Neblinto	Antofagasta
Quirihue	General Cruz	San Carlos
Cobquecura	Quillón	Talca
Pueblo Seco	Bulnes	Valparaiso
		Santiago

G: Distribution of El Sur from Concepción:

Chillán	Talacamavida	Curanilahue
Florida	Buenuraqui	Cañete
Quillón	San Rosendo	Contulmo
Bulnes	Laja	Los Alamos
Quirihue	Rafael	Lebu
Coelemu	Dichato	Santa Juana
Nipas	Campanario	Hualqui
Los Angeles	Rio Claro	Lirquen
Angol	Turquia	Victoria
Cabrero	Laraquete	Tomé
Monte Aguila	Carampanque	Santiago
Yumbel	Arauco	

H: Distribution of La Tribuna from Los Angeles:

Laja	Quilleco	Tucapel
Mulchén	Quilaco	San Rosendo
Nacimiento	Negrete	Yumbel
Santa Barbara	Cabrero	

I: Distribution of El Llanquihue from Puerto Montt:

Chacao	Alerce	Colegual	Mechuque
Maullín	Cañitas		Nueva Braunau
Frutillar	Pargua	Osorno	
Frutillar Alto	Purranque	Valdivia	
Caremapu	Las Quemas	Temuco	
Los Muermos	Quicavi	Concepción	
Quellón	Queilén	Valparaiso	
Ancud	Ensenada	Talca	Aysén
Fresia	Llanquihue	Curico	Balmaceda
Puerto Varas	Río Frío	Santiago	Talcahuano
Calbuco	Loncotoro	Coyhaique	Rancagua
Chonchi	Río Pescado	Chillán	Víña del Mar
Castro	Casma		

J: Distribution of Correo del Sur from Castro:

Achao

Queilén

Curaco de Vélez

Sources: Local agents of Santiago dailies, and circulation departments and editors of provincial dailies, June and July 1977.

Appendix 3

Prices of Daily Newspapers, TV Sets, and Movie Admissions
in Various Cities, Chile, 1975
(Prices in 1975 Pesos)

City	Local Daily Newspaper	23" TV Set	16" TV Set	Movie Admission
Arica	.50	1,269.97	unknown	2.04
Iquique	.43	1,211.00	1,182.00	2.12
Copiapó	.52	1,327.40	1,183.59	1.78
La Serena	.55	1,175.65	1,078.04	1.89
Valparaíso	.72	1,304.12	1,372.29	1.65
Santiago	.62	1,120.80	1,055.66	2.17
Rancagua	.42	1,197.42	1,086.58	2.02
Talca	.28	unknown	962.46	1.96
Chillán	.41	1,202.64	1,160.12	1.76
Temuco	.54	1,530.36	1,262.85	1.87
Valdivia	.66	1,369.13	1,200.08	2.63
Osorno	.66	1,309.02	1,197.14	1.75
Puerto Montt	.57	1,301.72	1,288.53	1.96
Punta Arenas	.66	1,514.91	1,358.03	2.61

Source: Anuario Estadístico 1976, p. 359.

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