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Canada in Europe:
Power, Security and Multilateral Institutions

by

Kevin D. Livingstone

**A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts**

Department of Political Science

**Ottawa, Ontario
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**CANADA IN EUROPE:
POWER, SECURITY AND MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS**

submitted by

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in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts

Chair, Department of Political Science

Thesis Supervisor

Carleton University
May 28, 1996

ABSTRACT

Between the two world wars, Canada participated in European security affairs as a small power. Following World War II, this participation was as a middle power. The end of the Cold War has brought another change in status: Canada is again a small power. Three main factors influence Canada's power status in European security affairs: the European-Canadian relationship, the reasons Canada has for participating in European security, and the resources allocated to participation. Applying these variables at the end of the Cold War shows that Europe does not perceive a need for Canadian involvement to be secure, that Canada emphasized cooperative security, and that this emphasis led to NATO being de-emphasized--a misjudgement of the continuing relevance of the institution. Moreover, the policy options offered by the recognized parties in the House of Commons will not change Canada's present power status.

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ACRONYMS

ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BQ	Bloc Quebecois
CFE	Conventional Forces in Europe
CFM	Council of Foreign Ministers
CPC	Conflict Prevention Centre
CS	Collective Security
CSBM	Confidence and Security Building Measures
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSO	Council of Senior Officials
DEA	Department of External Affairs
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
DND	Department of National Defence
ESDI	European Security and Defence Identity
EU	European Union
FSU	Former Soviet Union
IFOR	Implementation Force
INF	Intermediate Nuclear Forces
MBFR	Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCB	Nuclear, Chemical or Biological
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defence Command
NPT	Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
OAS	Organization of American States
ODIHR	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PFP	Partnership for Peace
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitations Talks
SAM	Sanctions Assistance Missions
SAM	Surface-to-air Missile

SSEA	Secretary of State for External Affairs
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties
UN	United Nations
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
WEU	Western European Union

INTRODUCTION

Hans Morgenthau writes that "International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim." How much power a state is able to accrue leads to a comparative international ranking. Since Canada has been a frequent participant in the various attempts to secure Europe, one would expect a power label to be attached to the Canadian efforts, and such is indeed the case.

Three main factors affect Canada's power status in Europe: the relationship with the continent, the goals Canada has for being involved with European security (including the kind of security pursued), and the resources allocated to participation. Of these, the main determinant is the relationship. If there is a mutual-need relationship, Canada is a middle power. If there is not a perception of mutual need, Canada will be a small power. The other two factors, while subordinate, are nevertheless important; within the bounds set by the relationship, they determine the degree to which Canada is a small or middle power.

Applying this analytical framework shows that between the two world wars, Canada was a small power. It was isolationist, despite espousing collective security. During the Cold War, on the other hand, security was viewed as indivisible. This led to

¹Hans Morgenthau, "Power and Ideology in International Politics," in James Rosenau, ed., *International Politics and Foreign Policy* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), p. 170.

the promotion of, and engagement in, collective security and collective defence. Middle power status was the result.

After the Cold War, Canada began to emphasize cooperative security. Officials expected that this would lead to increased European, and hence Canadian, security. They also expected that it would continue, and possibly even enhance, Canadian power in the post-Cold War era. Joe Clark summed up this attitude when he said: "Canada is important in this world. That is what Barbara Ward meant when she called Canada 'the first international country.' And the world is moving in our direction...."² In a similar vein, one of Ouellet's priorities when he assumed the office of Foreign Affairs Minister was going to be "matching the commitments of the Canadian Forces [in peacekeeping] with a Canadian voice in the diplomatic process."³ Finally, the 1994 Foreign Policy Review states this: "The Committee believes that Canada's continued contribution to international security is essential, both for Canada's interest and for Canada's reputation as a respected member of the international community."⁴ To this, the government replied: "The Government agrees with the Committee that Canada can and must continue to contribute to international security in a manner commensurate with our

²Joe Clark, "Our History Makes Canada the First International Country," *Canadian Speeches/Issues*, November 1991 5(7): 36.

³Andre Ouellet, "The Commitments of a Liberal Foreign Policy," *Canadian Foreign Policy*, Fall 1993 1(3): 3, 4.

⁴Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy, *Canada's Foreign Policy: Principles and Priorities for the Future*, (Ottawa: Publications Service, Parliamentary Publications Directorate, 1994), p. 26. Hereafter cited as *Foreign Policy Review*.

stature and resources."⁵ Nevertheless, Canada is again a small power because Europe no longer needs Canadian participation in its security affairs and because Canada's early promotion of cooperative security led to it misjudging the continuing relevance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Chapter one will examine the concept of power and will establish the validity of the analytical framework as described above. Four approaches to security--collective security, collective defence, common security and cooperative security--will also be analyzed. The second chapter will review Canada's historical approaches to security, and since Canada has often participated through institutions, its activities in the League, the United Nations (UN) and NATO will also be examined. Chapter three will discuss the changes that Europe's trans-atlantic security institutions have made to cope with the end of the Cold War, will introduce the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and will establish NATO's pre-eminence.⁶ Canada's post-Cold War strategy, including the error in judgement that led to our downgraded influence will be examined in chapter four. Finally, chapter five will assess what the next few years hold for Canadian involvement in European security issues by relating the policy options espoused by the three recognized parties in the House of Commons-- the Liberals, the Bloc Quebecois, and the Reform Party.

⁵Government of Canada, *Government Response to the Recommendations of the Special Joint Parliamentary Committee Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy* (Ottawa: Canada Communication Group, 1995), p. 21. Hereafter cited as *Response*.

⁶Other European organizations that deal with security issues, such as the European Union (EU) and the Western European Union (WEU), will not be dealt with because there is little prospect for Canadian membership in them.

CHAPTER ONE

POWER AND SECURITY:

Theoretical Approaches

Prior to World War II, Canada was a small power in European security affairs. After the war, Canada was generally considered a middle power country. That status is now in question, however. This chapter will first examine what power is and provide tools for understanding Canada's international rankings. Since Canada has typically acted through multilateral security institutions,⁷ an important piece of the puzzle is understanding how these institutions approach security. Therefore, the next topic of analysis is the different kinds of security, along with a discussion of which institutions employed which approach, prior to the end of the Cold War.

Power

In order to understand Canada's status as a small or middle power, it is necessary to analyze what power is. Arnold Wolfers says power is "the ability to coerce or, more precisely, to inflict deprivations on others."⁸ Hans Morgenthau defines it as "man's

⁷Tom Keating, *Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto: McLelland and Stewart, 1993), p. 13.

⁸Arnold Wolfers, "The Pole of Power and the Pole of Indifference," in Rosenau, ed., note 1, p. 150.

control over the minds and actions of other men." This initially applies to individuals but nationalism means that this same definition can be used at the state level. And, as defined by Kal Holsti, power is "the general capacity of a state to control the behavior of others."¹¹ Several different aspects of power illuminate these definitions.

First, power is rarely an end in itself. More frequently, it is a means to an end, used primarily "for achieving or defending other goals, which may include prestige, territory, souls, raw materials, security, or alliances."¹² To neglect these goals when studying a state's quest for power would therefore rob it "of any intelligible meaning and, by the way, [make] it impossible to judge its appropriateness or excessiveness."

Second, power is based on resources, which include "any physical or mental object or quality available as an instrument of inducement to persuade, reward, threaten, or punish."¹⁴ Morgenthau has further categorized these resources into geography, natural resources (food and raw materials), industrial capacity, military preparedness, population, national character, national morale, the quality of diplomacy and the quality of

¹¹Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Thompson, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 6th ed. (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1985), p. 32.

¹⁰ibid., pp. 117-120.

¹¹K.J. Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*, 4th ed. (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1983), p. 145.

¹²ibid., p. 145.

¹³Wolfers, "The Pole of Power and the Pole of Indifference," p. 146.

¹⁴Holsti, p. 145.

government.¹⁵ Mere possession of resources is not enough, however: "The use of resources depends less on their quality and quantity than on the external objectives a government formulates for itself."¹⁶ Moreover, these resources must be relevant to the specific issue at hand.¹⁷

Third, power can be explained as a relationship or a process. Influence is rarely exercised in one direction. Instead, it is "multilateral."¹⁸ One state may wish another state to act a certain way, but in turn it may be asked to do something. However, the extent of this process may depend upon the needs of a state--they may be higher on one side than on the other, as in the case of Germany or France's need for Middle Eastern oil. This allows the Arab states to gain important concessions from the German and French governments.¹⁹ Another important consideration is "the ephemeral quality of responsiveness," which is the "disposition to receive another's requests with sympathy...responsiveness is the willingness to be influenced."²⁰ Some states will be more responsive to a particular state's request than other states would be, because of common values, past history and so forth.

¹⁵Morgenthau and Thompson, pp. 127-169.

¹⁶Holsti, p. 149.

¹⁷ibid., p. 151.

¹⁸ibid., p. 147.

¹⁹ibid., p. 151.

²⁰ibid., p. 153.

Finally, power can be crudely measured. In fact, Morgenthau writes that "To chart the course of the stream [of national power] and of the different currents that compose it, and to anticipate the changes in their direction and speed, is the ideal task of the observer of international politics."²¹ There are inherent difficulties in this procedure, however. While power may be a quantity, "as a quantity it is only meaningful when compared to the power of others. Power is therefore relative."²² This relativeness of necessity makes its measurement primitive. Or as Morgenthau warns, because accurate measurement of power is an ideal, it is also "incapable of achievement."²³ There are simply too many variables to allow accurate prediction, and so measuring power thus "resolves itself into a series of hunches...."²⁴ One must not be too inflexible when discussing power.

In summary, power can be viewed as a confluence of several factors. These include the physical, intellectual and moral resources of a state. However, it is also important to take into account the relationship between states and the ends to be achieved; not all capabilities have appropriate power applications. Taken together, these factors constitute a state's ability to control the behavior of others. Finally, while power can be measured, it is only relative to others and should not be construed as infallibly accurate. Understanding power in this way has significant implications for analyzing

²¹Morgenthau and Thompson, p. 172.

²²Holsti, p. 146.

²³Morgenthau and Thompson, p. 172.

²⁴ibid., p. 172.

Canadian security policy in Europe. In the first place, the relationship between the continent and Canada must be taken into account. Next, what Canada has hoped to achieve by being active in European security issues must be examined. Finally, the resources that Canada has applied to these goals need to be scrutinized. Taken together, these factors will provide a basis for understanding Canada's relative position of power in European security.

Security

"Security" is an oft-used, though vague, foreign policy term. It can convey diametrically opposed ideas, and can be employed to garner support for widely divergent actions. In recent years, this confusion has become particularly pervasive, as new world conditions give rise to new definitions of security.²⁵ In Europe, Canada has been involved with four main approaches: collective security, collective defence, common security and cooperative security.

Collective Security

Collective security (CS) has been defined as "the purest example of multilateralism...in which a number of states agree to regard an attack against one as an

²⁵For example, see Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Oxford U Press, 1991); and Helga Haftendorn, "The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline-Building in International Security," *International Studies Quarterly*, March 1991 35(1): 3-17.

attack against all and credibly commit themselves in advance to respond to aggression."²⁶ Prior to the end of the Cold War, states had attempted to institutionalize collective security twice, through the League of Nations and the United Nations. In order to understand what the framers of the League Covenant and the UN Charter hoped to accomplish through collective security, it is necessary to place it within a theoretical framework to show why it could have been useful.

Collective security encompasses at least four crucial dimensions.²⁷ First, there is security from interstate conflict. Second, there is security for the state, since collective security is "intended to strengthen the rights of states to independence and to reinforce an international legal order built around the concepts of sovereignty and non-intervention."²⁸ The third dimension is that the collectivity should be based on a general, world-wide body. Furthermore, it is important that most, if not all, of the states in the system are members. Otherwise, non-compliant states would not be isolated in the international community, rendering collective security ineffective.²⁹ Finally, compliance with the collectivity can be enforced by either political and economic sanctions or coercion by military force.

²⁶David Welch, "The New Multilateralism and Evolving Security Systems," in Fen Osler Hampson and Christopher J. Maule, eds., *Canada Among Nations 1992-93: A New World Order?* (Ottawa: Carleton U Press, 1992), p. 70.

²⁷These dimensions are discussed by Andrew Hurrell in "Collective Security and International Order Revisited," *International Relations*, April 1992 XI(1): 37-55. The following paragraph is based mainly on pp. 38-40 of his article.

²⁸*ibid.*, p. 39.

²⁹Inis Claude, Jr., *Swords into Plowshares*, 3rd ed. (New York: Random House, 1964), pp. 234, 235.

Adhering to these characteristics should provide three major benefits. First, by institutionalizing the all-against-one principle, it should more effectively deter and resist aggressor states than individual states or alliances could do. If all states honour their commitment to collective security, a rogue state should be opposed by a coalition wielding immense power.³⁰ Next, the potency of the security dilemma should be reduced. The security dilemma "refers to the notion that a state's efforts to increase its security, by threatening another state which then responds with steps to increase its own security, paradoxically erodes the first state's security."³¹ Under a functioning collective security regime, there would be no need to engage in activities that lead to spiralling hostilities, since each state's security would be guaranteed by the collective.³² Finally, an international environment should be created in which stability emerges through cooperation rather than competition, not only in the military sphere, but other spheres as well. If states are not as concerned about exploitation, they should be more willing to give up short-term competitive benefits for long-term cooperative gain. Robert Keohane's work on the political economy may be applied here: "Although regimes themselves depend on conditions that are conducive to interstate agreements, they may also facilitate further efforts to coordinate policies."³³ In theory, then, collective security

³⁰Charles Kupchan and Clifford Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," *International Security*, Summer 1991 16(1): 125-129.

³¹*ibid.*, 123.

³²*ibid.*, 130-133.

³³Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton U P, 1984), p. 57, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 130.

offers an attractive vision of how the international system should work. Unfortunately, that attractiveness has lost much of its appeal when theory has met actual practice.

The two best-known examples of attempts to implement collective security are the League of Nations and the United Nations. Their experiences highlight the most pressing difficulty in achieving collective security: acquiring political cohesion. As was mentioned earlier, a collective security organization requires the participation of as many states as possible to be effective. However, the League was essentially a European organization and was not supported by all of the great powers. Despite the efforts of Woodrow Wilson, the United States never joined, while the Soviets did not join until 1934 and then were expelled five years later for attacking Finland.³⁴ Furthermore, members of the League failed to respond effectively to repeated aggressions, notably by Italy, Japan and Germany.³⁵

For its part, although the United Nations did have a large membership, including all of the great powers, its collective security functions were marginalized by the competition of the Cold War. In this regard, the intervention in Korea may represent an

³⁴Andrew Bennett and Joseph Leggold, "Reinventing Collective Security after the Cold War and Gulf Conflict," *Political Science Quarterly*, Summer 1993 108(2): 215.

³⁵For example, in the 1935 crisis over Ethiopia, "when faced with the choice of losing the support of Italy or else defaulting on collective security, France chose the latter course." Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U P, 1962), p. 197, quoted in Richard K. Betts, "Systems for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Europe," *International Security*, Summer 1992 17(1): 16. See also Josef Joffe, "Collective Security and the Future of Europe: Failed Dreams and Dead Ends," *Survival*, Spring 1992 34(1): 37.

exception.¹⁶ While some analysts reject the Korean War as a case of collective security on the grounds that the Soviets were not involved,¹⁷ the understanding that collective security required Great Power consensus was more political than theoretical.¹⁸ Balance-of-power politics simply was not supposed to allow room for collective security to operate. However, the Soviet boycott of the Security Council allowed the UN to implement collective security: that the US was satisfied with the action merely illustrates the point that there must be some political will to use it. Whichever way one decides to interpret the Korean War is, however, not the most important issue: what is vital is that collective security was not used again until after the Cold War had ended. Thus, as the League of Nations and the UN during the Cold War discovered, political cohesion in sufficient quantity to make collective security practically effective is difficult to attain.

Nevertheless, in the last few years there has been a resurgence in the amount of literature written about collective security.¹⁹ Part of the reason for the renewed interest is

¹⁶Harald von Riekhoff, "Canada and Collective Security," in David Dewitt and David Leyton-Brown, eds., *Canada's International Security Policy*, (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1995), pp. 235-240.

¹⁷For example, Arnold Wolfers argues that "Instead of being a case of nations' fighting 'any aggressor anywhere' and for no other purpose than to punish aggression and deter potential aggressors, intervention in Korea was an act of collective military defense against the recognized number-one enemy of the United States and of all the countries that associated themselves with its action." Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration*, p. 176.

¹⁸von Riekhoff, p. 239.

¹⁹For example, Gregory Flynn and David Scheffer, "Limited Collective Security," *Foreign Policy* Fall 1990 #80: 77-101; Kupchan and Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," pp. 114-161; Hurrell, pp. 37-55; Bennett and Lepgold, pp. 213-237; Charles Kupchan and Clifford Kupchan, "The Promise of Collective Security," *International Security*, Summer 1995 20(1): 52-61.

the perceived new opportunities presented by the end of the Cold War and the result of the 1990-91 Gulf War. The action taken against Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait seems to indicate that collective security can work in the post-Cold War era. While some analysts argue that the US manipulated the principle of collective security to suit its own interests,⁴⁰ other analysts point out that "the principle of collective security...was indeed vital in motivating the American decision to attack Iraq."⁴¹ The evidence for this is that "once Saudi oil was guarded by the Desert Shield deployment, there was no crucial material interest requiring the United States to spend blood and treasure for tiny Kuwait."⁴²

Notwithstanding this accomplishment, collective security is still exceedingly difficult to effectively implement. Sir Brian Urquhart, a strong proponent of collective security through the UN admits that:

It would be unwise to base thinking about the future of international security--or indeed of the United Nations-- too much on the Gulf experience. It is highly unlikely that such a clear case of aggression will occur in the near future in an area where the stakes are so high for the major powers, or that its perpetrator and the manner of its perpetration will cause such almost universal outrage as did Saddam Hussein and his assault on Kuwait.⁴³

⁴⁰For example, Josef Joffe writes that "the United States put together the international *posse comitatus*, using the Security Council as forum and legal cover. Hence, [the Gulf War] cannot be used to salvage the historical record of CS since the 1930s." See Joffe, p. 39.

⁴¹Betts, p. 26.

⁴²*ibid.*, footnote 36, p. 26.

⁴³Sir Brian Urquhart, "The United Nations: From Peace-keeping to a Collective System?" *Adelphi Paper* 265, part I, Winter 1991/92, p. 19.

Furthermore, despite the recent success against Iraq, the only other time that Wilsonian collective security--that is to say, CS which focuses on punitive measures and their consequent deterring effect--has been effectively implemented was against North Korea. This leads one to conclude that it is likely that collective security will not be used against most cases of aggression. At the beginning of the Cold War, this conclusion led to the application of another principle--collective defence.

Collective Defence

Another form of security is collective defence. While it may be termed as regional multilateralism, it entails a failure to cooperate with other such groups.⁴⁴ NATO during the Cold War was an example of this form of multilateralism. As with collective security, it is important to understand collective--or alliance--defence in terms of theory and practise, in order to better understand what NATO's members hoped to accomplish, and to understand the limitations under which the organization operated. Before we can discuss NATO in terms of alliance theory, however, we must first define the term "alliance". Ole Holsti defines it as "a formal agreement between two or more nations to collaborate on national security issues."⁴⁵ A fairly similar definition, offered by Stephen Walt, is "a formal or informal relationship of security cooperation between two or more

⁴⁴Welch, p. 69.

⁴⁵Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann and John D. Sullivan, *Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Studies* (Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, 1973), p. 4.

sovereign states."⁴⁶ These definitions seem quite simple, but really there are several components to them.⁴⁷ This can be seen as these elements are applied to NATO.

First, alliances are the exclusive domain of sovereign states. NATO's "sixteen nations" fulfilled this requirement. Next, there is a definite commitment to aid each member of the alliance in case of attack by a non-member. Holsti's and Walt's definitions differ only in that Walt argues that this commitment does not need to be made formal through a written document. Nevertheless, the mutual security clauses contained in the Washington Treaty did provide NATO with a formal commitment. Further, alliances also involve military collaboration. This sets them apart from non-military agreements such as the Commonwealth or NAFTA. The main focus of NATO, of course, was military cooperation. Article 2 of the Washington Treaty was supposed to encourage cooperation in other fields, such as economics and political culture, but this principle was never put into practise and so NATO did not stretch the definitions that have been given.⁴⁸ As well, an alliance implies military cooperation against particular states. This distinguishes them from collective security organizations such as the League of Nations

⁴⁶Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell U P, 1987), p. 12.

⁴⁷These components, as discussed in the next paragraph, are discussed by Glenn H. Snyder in "Alliances, Balance and Stability," *International Organization*, Winter 1991, p. 123.

⁴⁸Lester Pearson writes that "The reality is that the spirit to implement the economic aspects of Article 2 was *never* there and that an economic basis for the realization of its larger political goals was never created." Lester Pearson, *Mike*, Vol. 2, (Toronto: U of T Press, 1973), p. 66.

or the UN. The obvious target of NATO was the Soviet Union and its allies.⁴⁹

Additionally, both of the definitions leave open the issue of what kind of collaboration will take place, so they may include both offensive and defensive alliances. Thus, it can be seen that NATO met all of the requirements to qualify as an alliance.⁵⁰

Having established that NATO was indeed an alliance, it is pertinent to wonder why alliances form. One specific reason can be pointed to. In the words of Michael Ward, "Initially, alliances have as their primary goal the enhancement of national security."⁵¹ A pooling of resources would increase the ability of each member of the alliance to wage war. There is, however, a substantial risk to be taken: "The problem with alliances is that they require confidence in others at precisely those times when faith in treaty compliance is most lacking."⁵² In other words, the increase in national security gained by joining an alliance may be negated by the sudden withdrawal or inaction of other states when the alliance is actually called upon to perform. This was always a controversial issue in NATO: France was not convinced that the US would honour its commitment, and by so doing risk nuclear retaliation, if the Soviet Union had attacked

⁴⁹Although the Treaty of Washington does not mention any specific targets, officials who negotiated the treaty constantly made reference to the Soviet Union. For examples, see *ibid.*, pp. 37-60; and Escott Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope: The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty 1947-1949* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977).

⁵⁰NATO does differ from traditional alliances in that it has been institutionalized; that is, it has established, in peacetime, integrated forces-in-being and command structures. The impact of this will be discussed in chapter three.

⁵¹Michael Ward, *Research Gaps in Alliance Dynamics* (Denver: U of Denver, 1982), p. 11.

⁵²Charles Kegley, Jr., and Gregory Raymond, *When Trust Breaks Down: Alliance Norms and World Politics* (South Carolina: U of South Carolina Press, 1990), p. 264.

western Europe.⁵³ Nevertheless, France decided--as all alliance participants must--that despite the possibility that not all of the treaty obligations would be fulfilled, joining and remaining within the alliance still increased its national security.

With this in mind, the circumstances under which this will happen can be examined. According to Christopher Bladen, "Alliances...grow out of coercive and conflict situations. It is a prerequisite that the partners perceive themselves under a common threat, facing a common enemy."⁵⁴ Naturally, there must also be a consensus that an alliance is the best way to counteract the threat. The Soviet Union, of course, was the enemy that stimulated the formation of NATO. Shortly after World War II, the ideological revulsion many in the west felt towards the USSR was joined by a growing unease over Soviet military intentions. Escott Reid has written that "many well informed ordinary men and women in the western world [believed] that the danger of war was imminent."⁵⁵ Pearson offers a similar evaluation: "it appeared that Moscow's advance would not stop as she brought under her control hundreds of thousands of square miles in territory in Eastern and Central Europe and more than 90 millions of people."⁵⁶ The military threat posed by the USSR was initially not, however, the major concern of western government officials. More importantly, there was a fear that the communist parties in states such as Italy and France would seize control in their respective countries-

⁵³Morgenthau and Thompson, pp. 194, 195.

⁵⁴Christopher Bladen, "Alliance and Integration," in *Alliance in International Politics*, eds. Julian R. Freedman et al. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1970), p. 121.

⁵⁵Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope*, p. 22.

⁵⁶Pearson, p. 39.

-possibly at first through legal elections--but then would be turned into Soviet puppets.

Reid again provides an analysis of the situation:

Western governments believed at the time that the Soviet government would try to follow the same sort of methods in gradually taking over western Europe as it had followed successfully in eastern and central Europe...In 1946 and 1947 the ability of the Soviet government to control the governments of these states [Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Roumania and Bulgaria], an ability already strong in 1945, had rapidly increased according to a pattern which became frighteningly clear: first, a government of national unity; then a popular front government; then a Communist government; and finally a purge of Communists who were not considered reliable by the Soviet government, which usually meant liquidating those who had not spent the war years in the Soviet Union. During this process the leaders of the agrarian parties and of the social-democratic parties had been arrested, tortured, killed.⁵⁷

It was thought that the formation of a military alliance that highlighted western unity would be the best possible way to prevent such activity. NATO, then, "was a political response to a political challenge."⁵⁸ Thus, the main purpose of NATO's creation was to counteract the Soviet Union's perceived hostile actions and intentions, be they direct or subversive. This clearly fits with alliance theory.

Aside from a common threat and the consensus about how to react to that threat, an alliance does not need to have any other common interests or values. George Liska has said that "Alliances are against, and only derivatively for, someone or something."⁵⁹ We can witness this tenet as it operated in NATO: despite the fact that NATO was

⁵⁷Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope*, pp. 20, 21.

⁵⁸Carl Jacobsen, "Soviet Strategic Policy Since 1945," in Carl Jacobsen, ed. *Strategic Power USA USSR*, (Great Britain: Macmillan, 1990), footnote 3, p. 119.

⁵⁹George Liska, *Nations in Alliance* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 12.

supposed to have been founded upon the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, one of the original members--Portugal--was a dictatorship. Obviously, the preservation of liberal democracy was not a concern common to all of the alliance members. The admission of Greece and Turkey into the alliance, in 1952, further eroded whatever pretensions NATO may have had about common values.⁶⁰ Clearly, a common threat was all that was necessary to foster the creation of the alliance.

Since an alliance is constructed out of fear, one would expect it to lose much of its purpose when the perception of a common threat begins to wane or disappears altogether. Traditional theory suggests that this does happen, and goes even further in emphasizing that the inevitable result is that the alliance begins to weaken and eventually falls apart. To quote Bladen again, as alliances "succeed in preventing any particular actor or group of actors from achieving dominance within or over the system, they naturally dissolve, having fulfilled their reason for being."⁶¹ If NATO was a traditional alliance, then, it would be expected that it would have disintegrated, or be well on its way to doing so. However, it has not--several years after the Cold War has ended, the alliance is still a significant actor in European security issues. Why this is so will be discussed shortly.

⁶⁰Keating, p. 146.

⁶¹Bladen, p. 121.

Common Security

Another conception of security is "common security". This idea was introduced into public debate by the 1982 report of the Palme Commission,⁶² and is now gaining wider acceptance. The key idea is that nations "can survive only together. They must achieve security not against the adversary but together with him."⁶³ As of yet, however, there is no theory to clearly define how this is meant to work. Instead, specific issue areas are discussed; if these are effectively dealt with then common security has been achieved.

A pitfall in studying common security is the penchant for analysts to mislabel it. For example, Nolan E. Janne has called it "cooperative security,"⁶⁴ and James Goodby "collective security."⁶⁵ Nevertheless, common security may be understood as a branch of cooperative security, as will be discussed shortly, and is involved in specific crisis-prevention activities, as compared to collective security's use at the time of a crisis.

The practicality of common security is seen in Goodby's definition: it "is a strategy and a process that is not now, and possibly may never be, a condition."⁶⁶ This is made more clear by Janne's explanation:

⁶²Olof Palme, chair, Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, *Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982.)

⁶³*ibid.*, p. xiii.

⁶⁴Janne E. Nolan, ed., *Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security into the 21st Century*, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1994.)

⁶⁵James Goodby, "Collective Security in Europe After the Cold War," *Journal of International Affairs*, Winter 1993 46(2): 299-321.

⁶⁶*ibid.*, p. 300.

Cooperative security does not aspire to create an international government, to eliminate all weapons, to prevent all forms of violence, to resolve all conflicts, or to harmonize all political values. The focus is on preventing the accumulation of the means for mass, deliberate, and organized aggression, such as the seizure of territory by force or the destruction of vital assets by remote bombardment for unilateral gain.⁶⁷

This strategy causes common security to focus on specific issue areas, such as arms control, confidence and security building measures (CSBMs), observer missions, peacekeeping missions, and so on.

Many different types of arms--conventional or nuclear, chemical or biological (NCBs)--can be used when making war.⁶⁸ While it may be argued that these weapons are inanimate and hence are not the cause of insecurity, they do provide the state that possesses and is willing to use them, power over the state that does not. Moreover, any attempt to rectify an imbalance could result in an arms race, and arms races "have periodically ignited armed conflicts in the past, and are likely to do so again in the future...."⁶⁹ Common security, therefore, is concerned with arms control. The aim is to take away the means of aggression; to replace "preparations to counter threats with the prevention of such threats in the first place and [to replace] the deterring of aggression with actions to make preparation for it more difficult."⁷⁰

⁶⁷Janne, introduction, p. 8.

⁶⁸Of the NCBs, nuclear weapons are the most prominent and so only they will be discussed here.

⁶⁹Michael T. Klare, "Adding Fuel to the Fires: the Conventional Arms Trade in the 1990s", in Michael T. Klare and Daniel C. Thomas, eds. *World Security: Challenges for a New Century* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), p. 136.

⁷⁰Nolan E. Janne, "The Concept of Cooperative Security," in Janne, ed., p. 5.

Arms control has, in fact, long been a topic for international discussion.⁷¹

Nevertheless, the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by atomic bombs provided a sense of increased urgency. Global efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons include the Baruch Plan, US President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" Proposal, and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).⁷² Bilateral superpower negotiations include the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) I and II.⁷³ One notes, however, that these treaties and talks met with varying, generally limited, success.

The winding down and end of the Cold War, however, dramatically changed this. In accordance with the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1987, continuing with the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START) I and II in 1991 and 1993, and even unilateral announcements, the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers will be reduced to around 4 000 each by the year 2003.⁷⁴ Nonetheless, there is still a need for nuclear arms control. Indeed, Davis states that "After the Cold War, the potential use of nuclear

⁷¹For example, the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817 limited warships on the Great Lakes and the Washington Treaty of 1922 established naval restrictions among Britain, the US, Japan, France and Italy. See Joseph Kruzell, "From Rush-Bagot to START: The Lessons of Arms Control," in Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, eds. *The Global Agenda: Issues and Perspectives*, 2nd ed. (New York: Random House, 1988), pp. 138-140; and Fen Osler Hampson, "Arms Control: Achievements, Relevance, and Purpose," in Robert Matthews et al., eds., *International Conflict and Conflict Management*, 2nd ed. (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1989), pp. 524-534.

⁷²See Zachary S. Davis, "Nuclear Proliferation and Nonproliferation Policy in the 1990s," in Klare and Thomas, eds., pp. 107-110.

⁷³Seyom Brown, *The Causes and Prevention of War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), pp. 175-185.

⁷⁴Allan S. Krass, "The Second Nuclear Era: Nuclear Weapons in a Transformed World," in Klare and Thomas, eds., pp. 97-98.

weapons continues to pose one of the greatest immediate dangers to world security."⁷⁵

While the threat of superpower war has largely dissipated, there are many other ways in which nuclear weapons continue to be a threat to security. They could:

be fired accidentally, change possession due to unexpected changes of government, or fall into the hands of terrorist or subnational groups. Political turmoil is not uncommon in a number of nuclear-capable countries. Actual or threatened use of nuclear weapons could escalate conflicts and perhaps incite the use of chemical or other weapons of mass destruction to counteract nuclear threats. Moreover, ballistic missiles could extend the reach of these threats. As wars escalate, more nations could become involved.⁷⁶

Thus, nuclear weapons continue to be a source of common insecurity.

While nuclear weapons have been the most visible arms control concern post-World War II, arms control has also continued to deal with conventional weapons. Examples include the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks,⁷⁷ and the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty. As with nuclear weapons, conventional arms remain a post-Cold War threat to security. As Klare writes,

The world's failure to establish new constraints on conventional arms transfers will have far-reaching consequences. In several areas--particularly the Middle East and East Asia--we will see reinvigorated arms races at higher levels of lethality and sophistication.⁷⁸

Common security therefore remains concerned with all facets of arms control.

⁷⁵Davis, p. 106.

⁷⁶ibid.

⁷⁷Brown, pp. 186-187.

⁷⁸Klare, p. 136.

Confidence and security building measures are also a part of common security. These are closely related to arms control, for they "require manipulations of military forces or communications describing the whereabouts and disposition of military forces."⁷⁹ CSBMs attempt to increase security by promoting openness and transparency, by facilitating verification of compliance with arms control agreements, and by encouraging dialogue between states before violent conflict occurs. Knowledge that a potential enemy is not preparing to attack--and indeed has common concerns--should decrease tension in the international system.

Even during the Cold War, CSBMs were utilized. Examples include agreements between Israel and Egypt to confirm that the terms of their 1979 peace treaty were being followed; several agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States such as the 1963 "hot line" and the 1971 Accidental Measures Agreement, where each side was required to immediately inform the other of accidental or unauthorized detonations of nuclear weapons; and the 1986 Stockholm agreement among CSCE states which stipulated that advance notice be given to the other signatories if large-scale military exercises were going to be conducted.⁸⁰

After the Cold War, CSBMs continue to be important. The 1992 Open Skies Treaty among members of the CSCE is one example. Open Skies allows aerial inspections of each signatory's territory; its purpose is: "...to encourage openness on the

⁷⁹Brown, 193.

⁸⁰ibid., pp. 194-195. Also see Catherine Kelleher, "Cooperative Security in Europe," in Janne, ed., pp. 296-303.

part of the participating states and to allow the observation of military activities and installations on their territories, thus enhancing confidence and security."⁸¹ Another example is the measures incorporated into the Vienna Document 1990, which, among other things, called for "the annual exchange of data on military capability, including numbers of troops and equipment inventory, as well as military budget information and notification of large weapon systems deployment."⁸² The Vienna Document 1992 replaced and went beyond the earlier edition:

both the information exchanges and the verification and inspection processes were made more elaborate, including for the first time multinational inspection teams and more detailed restrictions on troop movements, force generation capabilities, and data on and demonstration of major weapon and equipment systems.⁸³

Thus, common security makes use of CSBMs to decrease tension in the international system.

Despite whatever other measures of common security may have been taken, violent conflict may still erupt. If one or both of the combatants are determined to fight, there is nothing common security can do, and other states may do nothing or very little, or they may resort to collective defence or collective security. If, however, the combatants are unwilling to see the war to its end, they may allow peacekeeping or observer forces to intervene. Not only does this prevent the destruction that generally

⁸¹Quoted in Frederick Parkinson, "Open Skies: An Assessment of its Impact on DND and the Canadian Forces," *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Autumn 1992 22(2): 28.

⁸²Kelleher, p. 309.

⁸³ibid.

attends war, but it is also intended to allow the combatants time to negotiate an end to their differences.

Peacekeeping was a prominent piece of common security during the Cold War, and was undertaken primarily by the United Nations. Missions undertaken include UNMOGIP (1949), an observer group dealing with India and Pakistan; UNEF I (1956) and II (1973), UNDOF (1974), and MFO (1986), all concerned with the Middle East; ONUC (1961), which sent forces to newly-independent Congo; and UNFICYP (1964), which separated the warring Greek and Turkish factions on the island of Cyprus. Thus, common security through peacekeeping has been actively used in each decade during the Cold War and in many different parts of the world.

The winding down and end of the Cold War produced a rapid proliferation of new peacekeeping missions. Writing in Winter 1992/93, Boutros-Ghali said: "Since 1988 14 new operations have been established...."⁸⁴ Only thirteen had been established in the previous forty years.⁸⁵ Some of these missions, such as the military observers stationed between Iran and Iraq from 1988 to 1991, and much of UNPROFOR's recently ended work in Croatia, may be described as traditional; that is, as deployment between two warring states with their consent. However, other campaigns encompassed a wide range of activities, many going beyond traditional peacekeeping. These missions will be

⁸⁴Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Empowering the United Nations," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1992-93, p. 90.

⁸⁵A. Sean Henry, "The Peacekeeping Legacy," *Forum: Journal of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute*, Winter 1993 7(4): 7.

discussed in connection with cooperative security. Nonetheless, common security continues to be pursued through peacekeeping activities.

In summary, common security attempts to address the shortcomings of collective defence and security. It rejects the notion that security can be achieved in competition with other states, and focuses on specific activities rather than a theoretical world alliance which may or may not be formed in reality. Prior to the end of the Cold War, there were no institutions dedicated solely to common security. However, common security was occasionally practised: the UN carried out many peacekeeping missions and NATO and the Warsaw Pact held arms control talks. Moreover, its use has increased in the last few years. This will be discussed in more detail later.

Cooperative Security

For several years, an even broader definition of security--cooperative security--has been emerging, although it has not yet been formalized into a neat, coherent package. As of yet, there is no seminal work that clearly defines what cooperative security is or how it is to be achieved. However, many analysts and commissions have touched on various aspects of what they think the theory should include: it is multi-faceted, involving not only traditional military issues, but also economic development, environmental degradation, and human rights. In essence, any activity that inhibits a healthy and safe standard of living is a topic for cooperative security. Issues such as these can rarely be solved by individual states, and sometimes states themselves are the

source of insecurity. Cooperative security therefore moves the focus of security from the state level to a global, regional or an individual level.

Some analysts have expressed concern that broadening security in this way makes it so vague as to be meaningless for serious academic study. However, Ken Booth replies:

The more ambitious the conception of security, the greater the expansion of the agenda. Proponents of orthodox strategic studies are quick to seize upon this 'excess of threats'. The narrowness of their own concerns results in an agenda that seems more manageable, with the result that their arguments often appear very tight. But the price of academic rigour is the distortion of reality. The difficulties inherent in expanding the security agenda should not be an excuse for regression into the shrivelled conceptions of realism.⁸⁶

Expanding the agenda to include non-military threats has a dramatic impact upon how security is attained. For example, one aspect of cooperative security includes the well-being of the whole globe. As stated by the *Report of the Commission on Global Governance*:

The unprecedented increases in the scale and intensity of human activity since the Industrial Revolution, combined with equally unprecedented increases in human numbers, have reached the point where human impacts are impinging on the planet's basic life-support systems...Although scientific opinion is far from unanimous about the extent or the urgency of these [ozone layer depletion, climate change, chemical poisoning of the environment, and so forth] and other risks, the consensus is that they are of an unprecedented nature and may threaten the continued capacity of the planet to support its human population. What is new about these hazards is that they pose a danger to the very survival, not

⁸⁶Ken Booth and Peter Vale, "Security in Southern Africa," *International Affairs*, April 1995 71(2): 295.

just the well-being, of whole societies. In this sense, together with nuclear war, they constitute the ultimate security risk.⁸⁷

Defining security in these terms does not allow it to remain a competition between states; instead, it becomes a cooperative venture: "Very few states have the capability to control these macro-developments by themselves, and so the appeal to national security has no practical logic unless it can be linked to collective action."⁸⁸ While this collective action should ideally take place at global level, this is not always possible, as David Dewitt points out: "While cooperative security can offer guiding principles for the pursuit of enhanced global peace and security, in practise it must operate in a regional context."⁸⁹ Thus, cooperative security broadens the debate to include regional and global security.

Cooperative security also focuses on individuals. *The Report of the Commission on Global Governance* emphasizes this orientation:

The security of people recognizes that global security extends beyond the protection of borders, ruling elites, and exclusive state interests to include the protection of people. It does not exclude military threats from the security agenda. Instead, it proposes a broader definition of threats in the light of pressing post-cold war humanitarian concerns.

The Commission believes that the security of people must be regarded as a goal as important as the security of states. Ultimately, the two objectives are not in conflict: states cannot be secure for long unless their citizens are secure. Too often in the past, however, preserving the

⁸⁷Ingvar Carlsson and Shridath Ramphal, co-chairs, *Our Global Neighborhood: The Report of the Commission on Global Governance* (New York: Oxford U Press, 1995), p. 81.

⁸⁸Buzan, pp. 132, 133.

⁸⁹David Dewitt, "Cooperative Security: A Canadian Approach to the Promotion of Peace and Security in the Post-Cold War Era," *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, March 1994 23(3): 18, note 11.

security of the state has been used as an excuse for policies that undermined the security of people."⁹⁰

Ken Booth has elaborated at length upon the security of the individual, linking that theme with emancipation, which means "freeing people from those constraints that stop them carrying out what freely they would choose to do, of which war, poverty, oppression and poor education are a few."⁹¹ "It is emancipation," Booth continues, "not power and order, in both theory and practice, that leads to stable security."⁹² And the proof is around us: "Liberal democracies, committed to levels of social justice and relatively prosperous--though still with a long way to go before achieving full emancipation--do not seem inclined to fight each other."⁹³ Thus, another aspect of cooperative security focuses upon emancipating individuals from harmful constraints. These limitations, as well as the global/regional matters, can be further subdivided into military, environmental, economic and human rights spheres.

Cooperative security remains concerned with military security, and incorporates common security into its agenda. In its peacekeeping activities, however, cooperative security goes beyond the traditional definitions to include humanitarian intervention, peacebuilding and peace-enforcement. When Boutros-Ghali was describing UN peacekeeping activities after the Cold War, he noted that some missions, such as in

⁹⁰Carlsson and Ramphal, p. 81.

⁹¹Ken Booth, "Security in Anarchy: Utopian Realism in Theory and Practice," *International Affairs*, July 1991 67(3): 539.

⁹²ibid.

⁹³ibid.

Cambodia and El Salvador, involved deployment within a sovereign member state; their purpose was peacebuilding. Still other missions, such as in Bosnia and Somalia, were assigned the task of protecting the delivery of humanitarian supplies to civilians.⁹⁴ More recently, IFOR, the mission in Bosnia headed by NATO (but including work by the UN and the OSCE), has the ability to use whatever force is necessary to ensure adherence to the peace agreement, and also includes delivery of humanitarian goods, investigation of human rights abuses, arms control, election monitoring, and CSBMs.⁹⁵ Quite clearly, peacekeeping has evolved. This is because cooperative security is concerned with erasing the root causes of conflict, as well as its violent expression.

There have also been numerous calls to include environmental issues as a topic for security studies.⁹⁶ The reason why is clear, according to Thomas Homer-Dixon: "recent research shows that environmental scarcity can cause widespread social disorder and violence in poor societies, including war, revolution, ethnic violence, riots, and *coups* that topple established governments."⁹⁷ While environmental scarcity--meaning a lack of potable water, arable land, food, fuel and so forth--is most severe in under-developed

⁹⁴Boutros-Ghali, pp. 90-91.

⁹⁵Interview with Philip Hahn, OSCE desk officer, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), 13 February 1996.

⁹⁶Thomas Homer-Dixon, "Environmental and Demographic Threats to Canadian Security," *Canadian Foreign Policy*, Fall 1994 2(2): 7-40; --, "On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict," *International Security*, Fall 1991 16(2): 76-116; Jessica Tuchman Mathews, "Redefining Security," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1989 68(2): 162-177; Richard Ullman, "Redefining Security," *International Security*, Summer 1983 8(1): 129-153.

⁹⁷Homer-Dixon, "Environmental and Demographic Threats to Canadian Security," p. 7.

countries, the resulting disorder and conflict is bound to affect developed countries such as Canada, either directly as when peacekeepers are requested, or indirectly through increased refugee flows.⁹⁸ Moreover, other environmental disturbances, such as ozone layer depletion, chemical pollution of the oceans or the atmosphere, and global warming, will also affect all nations, and will further exacerbate environmental scarcities.

The 1986 Brundtland Report established the link between the environment and security:

Environmental stress is both a cause and an effect of political tension and military conflict. Nations have often fought to assert or resist control over raw materials, energy supplies, land, river basins, sea passages, and other key environmental resources. Such conflicts are likely to increase as these resources become scarcer and competition for them increases.⁹⁹

The conflict that troubled El Salvador for so long was used as one example:

El Salvador, one of the most troubled nations of Central America, is also one of the most environmentally impoverished, with some of the worst erosion rates in the region. 'The fundamental causes of the present conflict are as much environmental as political, stemming from problems of resource distribution in an overcrowded land,' according to a draft USAID environmental profile of El Salvador.¹⁰⁰

Thus, cooperative security seeks to eliminate some conflict by working to eradicate at least one root cause: environmental scarcity.

An issue that is almost invariably linked with the environment is economic security. It is the other side of the same coin, because "the leaders of many poor

⁹⁸ibid.

⁹⁹Gro Harlem Brundtland, chair, *Our Common Future: The World Commission on Environment and Development* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 290.

¹⁰⁰ibid., p. 292.

countries see a trade-off between economic growth and environmental protection, and this encourages overuse and degradation of environmental resources."¹⁰¹ Homer-Dixon writes that part of the problem is that:

Current national income amounts do not incorporate measures of resource depletion: 'A nation could exhaust its mineral reserves, cut down its forests, erode its soils, pollute its aquifers, and hunt its wildlife to extinction--all without affecting measured income.' The inadequacy of measures of economic productivity reinforces the perception that there is a policy trade-off between economic growth and environmental protection; this perception, in turn, encourages societies to generate present income at the expense of their potential for future income.¹⁰²

The key to economic security, therefore, is--to use the phrase made popular by the Brundtland Report--sustainable development:

The first step in creating a more satisfactory basis for managing the interrelationships between security and sustainable development is to broaden our vision. Conflicts may arise not only because of political and military threats to national sovereignty; they may derive also from environmental degradation and the pre-emption of development options.¹⁰³

Thus, cooperative security aims at increasing economic security by promoting long-term sustainable development over short-term environmental exploitation.

Human rights is another cooperative security issue. Jack Donnelly writes that "Government officials typically present human rights and national security as radically different, even antagonistic, foreign policy concerns."¹⁰⁴ Proponents of cooperative

¹⁰¹Homer-Dixon, "Environmental and Demographic Threats to Canadian Security," p. 35.

¹⁰²Homer-Dixon, "On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict," pp. 95, 97.

¹⁰³Brundtland, pp. 300, 301.

¹⁰⁴Jack Donnelly, "International Human Rights After the Cold War," in Klare and (continued...)

security, however, take a vastly different approach. "What kind of security," they sardonically wonder, "does not include protection of the rights to life, liberty, and security of the person?"¹⁰⁵ Meeting basic human needs is thus a part of cooperative security.

Encouraging democracy is another aspect of promoting human rights. As Francis Fukuyama writes, "a large number of people around the world have finally realized that liberal democracy alone provides the possibility of a fully rational recognition of human dignity."¹⁰⁶ While living in a democratic society provides no absolute guarantee that human rights will be respected, democracies nevertheless "tend to respect rights much more predictably and extensively than their authoritarian counterparts."¹⁰⁷ Cooperative security therefore promotes democratic development.

Human rights issues, while important on their own, also link all of the other aspects of cooperative security discussed above. In the military sphere, increased numbers of democratic states should decrease the number of violent conflicts:

One of the few "laws" of international relations that seems to hold invariably is that democracies do not go to war with other democracies...Its member states will still have international conflicts, but

¹⁰⁴(...continued)

Thomas, eds., p. 236.

¹⁰⁵ibid.

¹⁰⁶Francis Fukuyama, "Democratization and International Security," *Adelphi Paper 266: New Dimension in International Security, Part 2*, Winter 1991/92, p. 15.

¹⁰⁷Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe C. Schmitter, "Democratization Around the Globe: Opportunities and Risks," in Klare and Thomas, eds., p. 57.

where two democracies are concerned, they are much more likely to resort to compromise, mediation, and adjudication in resolving them."¹⁰⁸

A further connection with the military is noted in the 1992 *Human Development Report*:

If a government chooses to spend more on its army than on its people, it cannot be regarded as committed to human development, and this bias should certainly count against it in aid negotiations. High military expenditure should be a legitimate area of policy dialogues in all forums of development cooperation.¹⁰⁹

In terms of cooperative security, areas such as health and education are at least as important as the military.

The same principle holds true in the environmental and economic spheres: "the senseless devastation of the Somali famine reflects, in part, the aftermath of the repressive Siad Barre regime";¹¹⁰ and:

It is now widely recognized that social and economic security is closely intertwined with civil and political rights. While a democratic process promotes a fair distribution of economic benefits, economic security enables people to participate fully in democratic decision-making. One cannot be sustained without the other.¹¹¹

Thus, human rights are an essential component of cooperative security because they increase security for individuals and for the globe.

To summarize, cooperative security represents a radical departure from traditional theories of security. Rather than being defined in strictly military terms, it encompasses a

¹⁰⁸ibid.

¹⁰⁹Quoted in Clyde Sanger and Ann Weston, "Caring About the South--With Good Reason," *Canadian Foreign Policy*, Fall 1994 2(2): 62.

¹¹⁰Donnelly, p. 236.

¹¹¹Sanger and Weston, p. 46.

wide variety of issues, ranging from the environment to the economy to human rights. This approach attempts to eliminate the root causes of conflict, thereby eliminating conflict itself. It also moves the focus of security above and below the state level, to include individuals, regions and the globe as a whole.

Conclusions

Understanding the concept of power will provide some keys to understanding Canada's status in European security issues. Keys to analysis include the relationship between Canada and Europe, the reasons for Canadian interest in European security and the resources allocated to participation. Since institutions have played such a large role in Canadian policy, it is also important to understand the rationale behind each one. This leads to a study of collective security, collective defence, common security and cooperative security.

Two traditional methods of obtaining security are collective security and collective defence. These theories offer insights into the rationale driving the creation of the League, the UN and NATO. In the case of the first two institutions, it has been shown what benefits were expected from collective security. Unfortunately, these benefits were not realized; the many practical difficulties involved in the implementation of collective security were not resolved. In the case of NATO, it has been shown that in most respects the organization may be understood in terms of alliance theory. A significant difference is that NATO continues to operate, even without an identifiable enemy. One is therefore led to the conclusion that the traditional theories of collective

security and defence have little to offer the current debate about European security. After all, one theory did not work, and the other does not apply. One turns, therefore, to the concepts of common and cooperative security. Except in the case of peacekeeping and possibly arms control, neither of these approaches commanded broad support prior to the end of the Cold War. It will be shown later that there has been a dramatic turnaround in the last five years, however, and institutions are now applying these concepts.

CHAPTER TWO

THE HISTORICAL APPROACH:

Canada in Europe from WWI to the end of the Cold War

Prior to World War I, Canada's foreign policy was largely controlled by Britain. After the war, Canada obtained that responsibility for itself. While the country was involved in European security affairs, it was as a small power. After WWII, however, the country was a prominent middle power. This chapter will explain Canada's reasons for acting as a small and middle power during these periods by examining its relationship with Europe; its goals for being involved on the continent, as expressed through the League of Nations, the United Nations and NATO; and by discussing the applied resources, particularly the intellectual and moral effort that went into involvement.

The League of Nations

The League of Nations was the first organization dealing with European security that Canada joined as a fully autonomous member state. At the time, Canada was quite content to act as a small power. This attitude can be explained in terms of Canada's poor relationship with Europe, its foreign policy goals of obtaining more control over foreign policy while avoiding international commitments, and the minimal positive resources devoted to the League.

During most of the time that Canada was a member of the League, it had a poor relationship with Europe. One factor that helps to explain this was the Canadian security situation. The country was far from any belligerents, and so the threats to its territory were minimal. Prime Minister Mackenzie King made this point in a 24 May 1938 address in the House of Commons:

it is...unlikely that at the moment, with the world as it is today, any other country will single out Canada for attack. The talk which one sometimes hears of aggressor countries planning to invade Canada and seize these tempting resources of ours is, to say the least, premature. It ignores our neighbours and our lack of neighbours; it ignores the strategic and transportation difficulties of transoceanic invasion; it ignores the vital fact that every aggressor has not only potential objects of its ambition many thousands of miles nearer which would be the object of any attack, but potential and actual rivals near at hand whom it could not disregard by launching fantastic expeditions across half the world. The truth of this is recognized in every country. At present danger of attack upon Canada is minor in degree and secondhand in origin. It is against chance shots that we need immediately to defend ourselves.¹¹²

James Eayrs argues that this idea was essentially true, since even after the six years of World War II, damage to Canadian lands was minimal.¹¹³ However, both King and Eayrs focus upon territory at the expense of other factors. Politically and morally, Canada found it necessary to enter another European war. Veterans would thus remember with "wry humour" Senator Raoul Dandurand's remarks to the League of Nations about

¹¹²Mackenzie King, 24 May 1938, quoted in *Documents on Canadian Foreign Policy 1917-1939*, Walter Riddell, ed. (Toronto: Oxford U Press, 1962), p. 187.

¹¹³James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada*, Vol. 1 (Toronto: U of T Press, 1964), p. 3.

Canada being "a fire-proof house, far from inflammable materials."¹¹⁴ Nonetheless, the prevailing opinion at the time was that security was divisible.

Another contributing factor to the poor relationship was the profound distrust of European diplomacy that Canada had developed as a result of World War I. This is illustrated by N.W. Rowell's speech to the First Assembly of the League of Nations: "Fifty thousand Canadians under the soil of France and Flanders is what Canada has paid for European statesmanship trying to settle European problems."¹¹⁵ In response to this tactlessness, Prime Minister Meighen wrote Rowell to express his "appreciation of the stand you took in stating to the Conference, as frankly as you did, the price the world has paid for the European diplomacy of the last hundred years."¹¹⁶ A change in government and the passage of time did not modify this sentiment: at a League session in 1936, Prime Minister Mackenzie King contrasted the Canada/US relationship with Europe's

violent...propaganda and recriminations hurled incessantly across the frontiers, the endeavours [in Europe] to draw all countries into one or the other extremist camp, the feverish race for rearmament, the hurrying to and fro of diplomats, the ceaseless weaving and unravelling of understandings and alliances, and the consequent fear and uncertainty of peoples.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁴C.P. Stacey, *Canada and the Age of Conflict*, Vol. 2 (Toronto: U of T Press, 1981), p. 61. See also pp. 264-269.

¹¹⁵League of Nations, *Records of the First Assembly* (1920), p. 379, quoted in Eayrs, Vol. 1, p. 61.

¹¹⁶Arthur Meighen to N.W. Rowell, Jan. 10, 1921, Rowell Papers (Public Archives of Canada), quoted in *ibid.*

¹¹⁷League of Nations, *Verbatim Record of the Seventeenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly*, Sept. 29, 1936, p. 1, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 63.

It is readily apparent that Canada did not have a high regard for European diplomacy during the inter-war years.

Such an attitude might have been expected to lead to greater Canadian involvement in European affairs. As Eayrs puts it, "Ought not the practitioners of the New World's higher morality try by more active participation in the affairs of the Old to lead it into paths of righteousness?"¹¹⁸ Such was not the case: "More potent than the zeal of the missionary was the desire to escape contamination."¹¹⁹ If Europe was going to go up in flames again, then let it burn. It was not Canada's responsibility to put out Europe's fires. Or, as expressed by Frank Underhill:

We must therefore make it clear to the world, and especially to Great Britain, that the poppies blooming in Flanders fields have no further interest for us... Whatever the pretext on which Canadian armed forces may be lured to Europe again, the actual result would be that Canadian workers and farmers would shoot down German workers and farmers, or be shot down by them, in meaningless slaughter. As the late John S. Ewart remarked, we should close our ears to these European blandishments and, like Ulysses and his men, sail past the European siren, our ears stuffed with tax-bills. All these European troubles are not worth the bones of a Toronto grenadier.¹²⁰

This notion was later repeated by an official sailing for an Imperial Conference:

The conference will be interesting, and probably in some ways revealing; but the more I see of the whole thing, the more I am certain that our destiny is on the North American continent and that if Europe is going to

¹¹⁸ibid., p. 64.

¹¹⁹ibid.

¹²⁰In *Canada and the Organization of Peace*, (Mimeographed paper prepared by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs for the International Studies Conference, 1935), p. 63, quoted in R.A. MacKay and E.B. Rogers, *Canada Looks Abroad* (Toronto: Oxford U Press, 1938), p. 269.

insist on destroying itself, it is no part of our mission to destroy ourselves in attempting to prevent it....¹²¹

With anti-European sentiment so strong, it is little wonder that Canada acted as a small power after World War I.

Canada's actions as a small power can also be explained in terms of foreign policy goals and the resources devoted to achieving those goals. One goal of Canadian membership in the League was to increase its control over foreign policy. Previous to World War I, the authority to conduct foreign policy had rested in Britain. However, the war had "acquainted Canadians with the human and political costs of international politics and made many in Canada aware of both the need and the ability for the government to assume more control over foreign policy."¹²² Therefore, membership in the League was desirable since it implied international recognition of Canada's ability to conduct its own foreign policy.

Despite membership in the League, another Canadian foreign policy goal was to avoid international commitments. A large part of this was due to the influence of Mackenzie King, the longest-serving of the four prime ministers who held office during the inter-war years.¹²³ He dominated the process of formulating and implementing

¹²¹T.A. Crerar to J.W. Dafoe, April 17, 1937, Dafoe Papers (P.A.C.), quoted in James Fayrs, "A Low Dishonest Decade," in Hugh Keenleyside et al., *The Growth of Canadian Policies in External Affairs* (Durham, N.C.: Duke U Press, 1960), p. 65.

¹²²Keating, p. 14.

¹²³The four men who held the office of Prime Minister, and their years of service are as follows: Sir Robert Borden, 1911-1920; Arthur Meighen, 1920-21; Mackenzie King, 1921-26; Arthur Meighen, 1926; Mackenzie King, 1926-30; Richard Bennett, 1930-35; Mackenzie King, 1935-48. See Richard Veatch, *Canada and the League of Nations* (Toronto: U of T (continued...))

foreign policy, since the office of Secretary of State for External Affairs (SSFA) was combined with that of Prime Minister.¹²⁴ This double duty meant that foreign affairs were "only sporadically the major centre of the prime minister's interest and attention."¹²⁵ Moreover, insofar as King was interested in foreign affairs, his policy was usually to avoid commitments of any kind.¹²⁶ In this he was encouraged by O.D. Skelton, his most influential advisor.¹²⁷ Thus, although at times King publicly endorsed the League, his "attitude in practice was usually quite different,"¹²⁸ as illustrated by the Abyssinian crisis of 1935 when "his activities ...ensured in no small degree that it [the League] did not emerge triumphant."¹²⁹

¹²³(...continued)
Press, 1975), p. 12.

¹²⁴This situation was in place from 1912 to 1946. See *ibid.*

¹²⁵*ibid.*

¹²⁶Veatch writes that "Above all else he [King] sought to avoid any advance commitments as to the position or action that Canada would take in any future political controversy. His attempts to avoid advance commitments was applied equally to commitments to Britain and the Empire, commitments to the League of Nations and its members, or commitments to the Canadian parliament and public. In so far as possible, he confined himself to platitudinous generalities, statements that his government would make its position known at the appropriate time, and warnings that any public discussion of current international problems might make their solution more difficult. What he sought, in effect, was complete freedom of action for himself as prime minister, freedom to follow any policy he might choose, subject only to the political necessities of the moment." *ibid.*, p. 15.

¹²⁷*ibid.*, p. 21.

¹²⁸*ibid.*, p. 16.

¹²⁹Eayrs, Vol. 1, p. 12.

Moreover, Canada did not become involved in the League in order to be a "helpful fixer," or to promote peace in far-away lands. Quite the opposite was true: during the years that the League was active, "Canada's influence had regularly been on the side of cutting down the obligations of the Covenant."¹³⁰ This seemingly contradictory action resulted from the fear government officials had that Canada would be placed "at the beck and call of a Council not responsible to the nation for its actions".¹³¹ Canada's new-found sovereignty in foreign affairs would have to be delegated to the League if the articles on collective security remained a part of the League charter. This was not palatable to the government, and so it responded with a "strong effort to delete and then to amend Article 10 to make it harmless or inapplicable as far as Canada was concerned...."¹³² This effort was successful--although Article 10 remained in the Covenant, it was rendered ineffective. The Canadian government, then, viewed membership in the League as important since "it secured Canadian independence from Britain and therein reinforced Canadian sovereignty,"¹³³ but it did not want the League to have strong powers of collective action that would have required pooling some of their recently acquired autonomy.

¹³⁰F.P. Walters, *A History of the League of Nations* (Toronto: Oxford U Press, first printing 1952, repr. 1960), p. 811.

¹³¹Canada, *H. of C. Debates*, 1919 (Special Session), pp. 102, 103, quoted in Eayrs, "A Low Dishonest Decade," p. 65.

¹³²Holmes, *The Shaping of Peace*, Vol. 1 (Toronto: U of T Press, 1979), p. 10.

¹³³Keating, p. 14.

While there is some disagreement as to how to interpret Canada's performance in the League¹³⁴, one thing is clear: Canada was a small power between the two world wars. In large measure, this was the result of the European-Canadian relationship. Another important factor was Canada's goals of consolidating foreign policy control and avoiding international commitments. These led to the application of negative resources. However, despite Canada's small power status, the League set an important precedent--it was "the first international political peacekeeping agency that provided a supplementary multilateral mode of conducting foreign policy in addition to the traditional bilateral diplomatic contacts."¹³⁵ Canada's experiences in the League were to serve Canadian officials in good stead during the formation of the United Nations.

The United Nations

Following World War II, Canada was no longer content to act as a small power. This was reflected in the foreign policy aims of a more orderly world system and increased Canadian participation in that system. European security was necessarily

¹³⁴For example, John Holmes writes that "For Canada to have taken a more active part in proclaiming sanctions against Japan and Italy would have been not only futile but also pretentious." Holmes, p. 11. On the other hand, Hugh Keenleyside writes that New Zealand was in a similar situation as Canada, and yet it consistently and persistently tried to convince League members to take their obligations seriously. "If politics is the art of the immediately possible this was probably bad politics," he writes. "But at least it set an example of honesty in a singularly dishonest period of international relations...It would have been gratifying to have been able to say as much of Canada. This is particularly true in light of the ultimate utter failure of the policy of expedient dishonesty." Keenleyside, "Introduction," in Keenleyside, p. 11.

¹³⁵R.A. Preston, *Canada in World Affairs*, volume 9 (Toronto: Oxford U Press, 1965), pp. 237-238, quoted in Keating, p. 15.

included in these goals, which were made possible to achieve because a mutual-need relationship existed between Europe and Canada and because many resources, particularly intellectual and moral, were devoted to the cause.

Although the League of Nations was not formally dissolved until April 1946, it effectively ceased operating in December of 1939.¹³⁶ Despite the failure of the League, the death and destruction of World War II convinced many governments of the need to construct a similar but more effective institution in order to promote a more orderly international system. The Moscow Declaration of 1 November 1943, issued by the US, the USSR, the United Kingdom, and China, included a statement that argued in part for:

the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.¹³⁷

This Declaration led to the Dumbarton Oaks conference of 1944, attended by the three great powers--the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union--plus China, which was "a great power by American decree."¹³⁸ These states called for the establishment of an organization "under the title of the United Nations" and then negotiated the initial draft of its charter.¹³⁹ Other states, including Canada, were then invited to formally join the negotiations. The Charter of the United Nations was signed by representatives from

¹³⁶Veatch, p. 179.

¹³⁷Cited in Keating, p. 25.

¹³⁸Holmes, p. 46.

¹³⁹Keating, p. 26.

the forty-six participating states on 26 June 1945, and on 10 January 1946, the UN convened for the first time.

The Canadian government welcomed the formation of the United Nations; moreover, many of the inhibitions that affected Canada's performance in the League of Nations were not present after World War II. In the first case, the war had taught Canadians as well as Europeans that peace was not divisible; there were no fireproof houses. This kind of thinking changed Canada's foreign policy goals and created a relationship of mutual need. New goals and a better relationship called for more Canadian resources to be devoted to European security, and this Canada was able to provide. Canada had escaped the war relatively unscathed, possessed a large military, and enjoyed a booming economy. Two other differences affecting the willingness to provide resources will be discussed below. These were changes in attitudes about sharing a portion of the state's sovereignty, and changes in the personnel in charge of foreign policy.

By the time of the Moscow Declaration, Canadian officials had already decided that one of the "fundamental principles which would guide its policy on post-war international organization... was that international society required for its safety and well-being an effective system of collective security."¹⁴⁰ Concerns of encroachment upon Canadian autonomy were relatively unimportant. This is amply illustrated by the efforts of the Working Committee on Post-Hostilities Problems, which was formed in 1943 with the mandate to peer into the future to try and anticipate post-war difficulties and to

¹⁴⁰Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada*, Vol. 2 (Toronto: U of T Press, 1972), p. 138.

formulate a Canadian response to them. The Committee was interested in the idea of an international armed force and urged that Canada support the creation of

a small International Force, as part of the world security organization, which would be charged with the performance of specific duties. Such a force would not at first be a combatant force equipped to suppress or deter aggression. It might initially be used in the defence and maintenance of bases held available for the use of the combined military forces of the United Nations operating under a world security organization.¹⁴¹

This idea was explained in greater detail by Hume Wrong:

What the Working Committee had in mind...was the desirability of setting up a small international force as part of the world security organization which would be charged with the performance of such specific duties as defending and maintaining United Nations bases. They had in mind a force with a distinctive uniform which would be responsible to an international body. This force might conceivably be directed by the Military Staff Committee...responsible to a World Council which it would advise on military matters. The ultimate responsibility for the international force would therefore be the World Council. Its relation to the World Council would differ from that of the aggregate of the national forces of the Member States. The latter would be at the disposal of the World Council but the units thereof would continue to be subject to the ultimate authority of their own national governments. The former, however, would be responsible only to the World Council (and would presumably be made up of denationalized persons).

The Working Committee do not wish to seem Utopian. They are not proposing an over-all international police force which could by itself resist aggression by any combination of powers. They do believe, however, that some experiment in the establishment of a truly international force should be undertaken in the hope that further developments might come from the experience. They consider that successful experiments along these lines during the War should not be allowed to lapse.¹⁴²

¹⁴¹23 February 1944. Department of External Affairs files, quoted in Eayrs. *In Defence of Canada*, Vol. 2, p. 150.

¹⁴²Hume Wrong to Charles A.S. Ritchie, 1 April 1944, DEA files, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 151.

Although this proposal was not adopted, it illustrates the marked contrast in Canadian attitudes towards the concept of sharing sovereignty with the League and with the UN. Isolationism had given way to collective security.

Canada's conversion to CS was encouraged by a change of personnel in the Department of External Affairs. Whereas the senior bureaucrats during the interwar years were generally isolationist, that was not the case after 1941 when Skelton died and was replaced as Undersecretary of State for External Relations by Norman Robertson. Other top officials included Hume Wrong and Lester Pearson. Each of these men "had viewed Canada's ambivalence as the world drifted to war in the late 1930s as seriously mistaken."¹⁴³ This was exemplified by a note Pearson wrote to Robertson in 1944:

We now know--or should know--that there is no safety in a League of Nations which does not make adequate provision for peaceful change and police action against any aggressor. We shall, I think, have to revise our attitude toward any future Article X or Article XVI of any international covenant.¹⁴⁴

A few weeks later he expounded this view in a speech to the Canadian Club in Toronto:

That collective system which was spurned in peace has proven to be our salvation in war.... There is no other way to win the peace. If we want it badly enough, we can secure it. If we want other things more, individual and national gain, an easy and comfortable life, then we will once more lose the peace and enter again that wasteland of another post-war world, where queues are for bread and not for hockey tickets, and where peace sits uneasily on the top of a bayonet.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴³Keating, p. 33

¹⁴⁴National Archives of Canada (hereafter NAC), External Affairs Records, RG25 Acc 89-90/029, Vol. 9, file 7V(s) pt. 1, Lester Pearson to Norman Robertson, 1 February 1944, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 34

¹⁴⁵"Organizing the United Nations for Peace," address by L.B. Pearson to the Canadian (continued...)

Despite the conversion from isolationism by many of Canada's leading political figures, the same was not true of the Prime Minister, who was still in charge of External Affairs. However, King was more concerned with day-to-day matters than with the future peace: "long-term planning had never much interested him and postwar planning was not a subject to which a wartime prime minister could give steady attention."¹⁴⁶ King's isolationist views were therefore subordinated to the more internationalist convictions of the bureaucrats.

Unfortunately, the grand hopes and plans of the bureaucrats did not last long. It is sadly ironic that during the time that the United Nations was being created in order to increase cooperation among states, the relationship between the Soviet and western blocs never became friendlier. Escott Reid, one of the Canadian delegates, has written that he has "never been able to understand how anyone who was at the San Francisco Conference could have had high hopes if he had known what was going on there and what was happening at the same time to the relations between the Soviet world and the western world in Europe."¹⁴⁷ What was happening was a rapid deterioration in the relationship that eventually led to the failure of the UN, "or to be more precise, of the permanent members of its Security Council--to make effective the security provisions of

¹⁴⁵(...continued)

Club, Toronto, 13 March 1944 (mimeographed), quoted in Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada*, Vol. 2, p. 35.

¹⁴⁶Holmes, p. 26.

¹⁴⁷Escott Reid, *On Duty: A Canadian at the Making of the United Nations, 1945-1946* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1983), p. 24.

the Charter."¹⁴⁸ Many in the west viewed the Soviet Union not only as the culprit in this failure, but also as a menace to world peace and security.

NATO

During this time, Canada continued to play the role of a middle power. However, the goal of collective security was partially replaced by the desire for collective western defence against the Soviet Union. Balance of power and deterrence were the new watchwords, and the hope of cooperation with the Soviet Union was replaced with the attempt to contain it. Again, a mutual-need relationship existed between western Europe and Canada, and Canada poured many resources into European security.

Canada was prominent in the effort to organize collective defence. As St. Laurent argued, "The spread of aggressive communist despotism over western Europe would ultimately almost certainly mean for us war, and war on most unfavourable terms. It is in our national interest to see to it that the flood of communist expansion is held back."¹⁴⁹ In fact, an earlier speech to the UN Assembly on 18 September 1947 by St. Laurent, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, is considered by many to mark the beginning of the alliance.¹⁵⁰ The key paragraph is as follows:

Nations, in their search for peace and co-operation, will not, and can not, accept indefinitely an unaltered council which was set up to ensure their security and which, so many feel, has become frozen in futility and divided by dissension. If forced, they may seek greater safety in an

¹⁴⁸Pearson, p. 37.

¹⁴⁹quoted in Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope*, p. 106.

¹⁵⁰Pearson, p. 41.

association of democratic and peace-loving states willing to accept more specific international obligations in return for a greater measure of national security. Such associations, it has already been pointed out, if consistent with the principles and purpose of the Charter, can be formed within the United Nations. It is to be hoped that such a development will not be necessary. If it is necessary, it will have to take place. Let us not forget that the provisions of the Charter are a floor *under*, rather than a ceiling *over*, the responsibilities of member states.¹⁵¹

This speech led to the tripartite talks among Canada, the US, and Britain, which in turn led to the discussions resulting in the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on 4 April 1949.¹⁵² Canada was thus a significant actor, from the very beginning, in the alliance that was soon to evolve into a formal organization.

Although it had helped to create it, Canada was not completely comfortable with the alliance. Collective security was still the preferred ideology, for two main reasons. In the first place, collective defence does not allow much freedom of action for middle powers; instead, the great powers dominate. Canada had learned this lesson during World War II and did not want a repeat performance. The solution for Canada was the development of the functional principle during the UN negotiations. "Functionalism," writes Nossal, "asserted that in those areas where a smaller state had both interest and expertise...it should be regarded as a major power, and given the right to be represented on the decision-making bodies in those areas."¹⁵³ Under a pure realist regime, such a

¹⁵¹Pearson, p. 41.

¹⁵²The original members were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Greece and Turkey became members in 1952; West Germany in 1955; and Spain in 1982.

¹⁵³Kim Richard Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, 2nd ed. (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1989), p. 47.

procedure would not have happened, since military strength is the most important factor determining the power of a state in the international system.¹⁵⁴ Thus, unless Canada also wished to abandon functionalism and the corresponding prominent position it had created for itself in the United Nations, it could not totally abandon collective security.

If that use of CS seems somewhat self-serving, the other reason for retaining it was not. Some of Canada's foreign policy-makers, such as Pearson and Reid, hoped that even if cooperation did not work on a global scale, it could be applied at a regional level.

As noted by Reid,

The belief in Ottawa [was] that...the goal should be a spiritual, cultural, economic and political union of the North Atlantic countries which would, in St. Laurent's words, trench much more upon old-fashioned concepts of national sovereignty than any of the international institutions which had been established in the past. Our hope was that the federal institutions for the North Atlantic community would emerge and gradually grow stronger.¹⁵⁵

This was also a motivating principle for others involved in negotiating the alliance:

Hickerson, Kennan, Achilles, Jebb, St. Laurent and Pearson all hoped that a supranational institution... would emerge in the 1950s and 1960s. They believed that the formation of a North Atlantic alliance would make more likely the emergence of the supranational institution on which their hopes were fixed.¹⁵⁶

However, while some states were satisfied that this could be accomplished merely by organizing the alliance, Canada was not. It therefore argued for Article 2, the famous

¹⁵⁴For example, Morgenthau writes that "What gives the factors of geography, natural resources, and industrial capacity their actual importance for the power of a nation is military preparedness." Morgenthau and Thompson, p. 139.

¹⁵⁵Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope*, p. 138.

¹⁵⁶*ibid.*, p. 28.

"Canadian Article" which was meant to strengthen the free institutions of member states, to promote conditions of stability and well-being, and to encourage economic collaboration.¹⁵⁷ The government believed in this article to the extent that it threatened not to sign the treaty if it was not included.¹⁵⁸ Although it was never implemented, the article's inclusion seemed at the time to be a minor triumph for CS.

Another clash with realism emerged during the discussions as to which countries should be allowed to join the alliance. As reported by Reid,

It was with reluctance that Pearson had gone along with the decision reached at the tripartite meetings to invite Portugal to be an original member of the alliance Pearson had raised the matter again at the tripartite meetings; he "mentioned the disadvantage of including Portugal from the ideological point of view." It was felt, he reported, "that this disadvantage was more than neutralized by the strategic advantage of Portugal's membership in the pact."¹⁵⁹

While realist considerations carried the day with that issue, it is clear that collective security was still on the Canadian agenda. This uneasy co-existence with realism was to exist for the next four decades, despite Pearson's hope that the alliance would be a temporary expedient.¹⁶⁰ Thus, although unhappy with the theory behind the alliance, Canada continued to play a middle power role in it because European security was considered vital to Canadian security. This led to a goal of participation in European

¹⁵⁷Keating, p. 89.

¹⁵⁸ibid.

¹⁵⁹Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope*, p. 185.

¹⁶⁰ibid., p. 187.

security affairs, even through the alliance if necessary, which in turn led to the application of the necessary resources.

Threads of Continuity

The historical experiences show that Canada's European power status depended upon foreign policy goals, the relationship between Canada and Europe, and the resources devoted to the security institutions. In retrospect, it was understandable that Canada as a young state acted as a small power by embracing isolationism, despite membership in a League that espoused collective security. It was also understandable that Canada, emerging from World War II, began to act as a middle power by promoting collective security through the UN, and then collective defence in NATO as the Cold War began. Thus, there is a strong relationship between security and power. A similar analysis of the post-Cold War era may be expected.

CHAPTER THREE

SECURITY INSTITUTIONS TODAY:

The OSCE, the United Nations and NATO

As has been discussed previously, Canadian efforts in European security often involved institutions. It is therefore relevant to examine how these institutions have adapted to the end of the Cold War. Cooperative security in the OSCE will be examined, as will the types of security used in the UN. It will be shown, however, that NATO has become the dominant transatlantic security institution and that common and cooperative security are NATO's preferred approaches.

The OSCE

Since most of the OSCE's institutionalization has occurred since the end of the Cold War, a short history is in order. It began as a process, under the name Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), on 3 July 1973, with a membership that initially included most European states, the United States and Canada. The first meetings resulted in the *Helsinki Final Act* of 1 August 1975. The Final Act specified the CSCE's mandate: it was to provide a forum for discussion in three specific issue areas, or "baskets". These were (1) security questions; (2) cooperation on economic issues, the environment and science and technology; and (3) cooperation on humanitarian and other fields. Cooperative security was to be the guiding rationale. While the CSCE included

most of Europe's neutral states, the Conference still had Cold War overtones. The Soviet Union and its allies wanted the *de facto* boundaries that had existed since the end of World War II officially recognized by the west, while the west wanted the Warsaw Pact to commit to improving its human rights records. Both sides agreed to these things.

The CSCE laboured in relative obscurity for a number of years. It was considered by many to be secondary in importance to the alliance-to-alliance negotiations (such as the MBFR talks) between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. However, the winding down and end of the Cold War modified this perception. The CSCE's mandate already included all of the issue areas that presented possible threats to Europe's security. Furthermore, it was recognized that there was a need for a strong European institution which could provide a forum for cooperation. Cooperative security appeared to be on the way in.

To this end, the CSCE was given institutional form at the November 1990 Summit in Paris.¹⁶¹ Three permanent bodies were established: a secretariat in Prague, a Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) in Vienna, and an Office for Free Elections (since renamed the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)) in Warsaw. It was further agreed that the foreign ministers of the member states would meet annually to act as the Council (CFM). Also established was the Committee of Senior Officials

¹⁶¹Information on the CSCE's institutionalization, as discussed below, may be found in "Interlocking Institutions: The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe," *Basic Fact Sheet No. 6*, NATO Office of Information and Press, September 1993, pp. 1-3; John Halstead, "International Security Institutions: NATO and the CSCE," *Canadian Foreign Policy*, Spring 1994 2(1): 53, 54; Jill Sinclair, "Canada's Role in the CSCE," in Alex Morrison and Susan McNish, eds. *NATO and Europe: How Relevant to Canadian Security?* (Toronto: CISS, 1994): 72-77; and in *The Disarmament Bulletin*, volumes 13 (Spring 1990), 14 (Fall 1990), 17 (Fall 1991), 19 (Winter 92/93), 20 (Spring 1993), 21 (Summer 1993), and 23 (Winter 93/94).

(CSO), which was to review current issues, prepare the work of the Council and carry out the Council's decisions.

At the June 1991 Council meeting, held in Berlin, an emergency consultation procedure was agreed upon. Institutionalization continued at the July 1992 Helsinki Follow-up meeting, where a High Commissioner on National Minorities and a Forum for Security Cooperation--under whose auspices new negotiations on arms control, disarmament and confidence and security-building measures now take place--were established. As well, the CSCE was declared a regional security organization under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.

At the third meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers on 14 December 1992, the Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration was adopted, and the post of Secretary General was established. Other organisational changes occurred in December 1993, when the CFM endorsed the Permanent Committee--the first permanent body of the CSCE for political consultation and decision-making--as well as the creation of a single general secretariat, both located in Vienna.

The CSCE Summit Meeting in Budapest, held on 5-6 December 1994, concluded the fifth CSCE review conference. Here, the CSCE was renamed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); the CSO was replaced by the Senior Council, which would meet at least twice a year, as well as before the Ministerial Council Meetings, and also would convene as the Economic Forum; and the Permanent Council (formerly Committee) was established as the regular body for political consultation and

decision-making. These changes have increased the visibility and effectiveness of the Conference. This has led some analysts to argue that:

The potential of the CSCE, as an institution which deals with more than simply military questions, and which now includes all European states as well as some of the republics from the former Soviet Union, the US and Canada, has thus taken on new importance.¹⁶²

Despite increased awareness of the OSCE, there is, however, no guarantee that the Conference will become a primary security institution in Europe. One of the OSCE's biggest problem is the lack of support from member states and from other institutions.

The low level of support, some analysts write, is:

most clearly reflected in the 1992 budget contributions to its new institutions of some \$270,000 dollars each for nations such as the US, UK and Germany. The total budget in 1992 for the new CSCE institutions is just \$3,000,000: about the cost of a single tank.¹⁶³

While this assessment may be true, it ignores the fact that the OSCE does not require a large operating overhead for its missions; the host state sponsors the OSCE team and pays for all expenses except for a daily living allowance.¹⁶⁴ It also raises an interesting question: how much money does the OSCE need to be effective? As with other institutions, the OSCE's answer will likely always be "More than the current budget!"

Nevertheless, finances are not the only means of supporting the OSCE. Political support is also important, and the organization is not receiving that either. For example,

¹⁶²Jane Boulden and David Cox, *The Guide to Canadian Policies on Arms Control, Disarmament, Defence and Conflict Resolution 1992* (Ottawa: CHPS, 1992), p. 274.

¹⁶³Otfried Nassauer and Daniel Plesch, *NATO 2000*, BASIC/BITS Report 92.2, 1992, pp. 11, 12.

¹⁶⁴Interview with Philip Hahn.

Alexander Moens writes that the Bush administration "did not seriously consider giving it [the CSCE] a real mandate or capability in crisis management or conflict resolution."¹⁶⁵

Members of the European Union, for their part, "fundamentally doubted that the CSCE...could prevent or resolve conflicts."¹⁶⁶ Low political support for the OSCE has caused it to become a marginal player in European security issues.

Another major difficulty faced by the organization is that it operates by "consensus minus one," and currently there are 53 members with a wide range of ideas and opinions.¹⁶⁷ Disagreements are bound to occur far more frequently than any near consensus. Critics argue that the evidence for this is found in the OSCE's failure to have any impact on the war in Yugoslavia. For example, Gregory Treverton has written:

Sadly but surely, Yugoslavia has made plain that a future European order based [on] the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe...is a distant one. The CSCE is too large and, moreover, operates by consensus. It has turned out to be an artefact of The Cold War; it was useful when the purpose was formally reassuring communist leaders about the sanctity of their borders, while informally subverting them through humanitarian and

¹⁶⁵Alexander Moens, "A New Security Strategy for Europe," in Maureen Appel Molot and Harald von Riekhoff, eds., *Canada Among Nations 1994: A Part of the Peace* (Ottawa: Carleton U Press, 1994), p. 158.

¹⁶⁶*ibid.*

¹⁶⁷Participating states include: Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Uzbekistan, United States of America, and Yugoslavia (suspended). Also, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is an observer.

other East-West contacts. In Yugoslavia, though, it never became engaged.¹⁶⁸

This evidence, however, should not be given too much weight since there were very few successes by any of the institutions, European or global, concerned with the former Yugoslavia until the IFOR mission, and even its success is still not assured.

Moreover, the OSCE has had an impact in the former Yugoslavia. Beginning in September 1992, the organization began operating Sanctions Assistance Missions (SAM) in Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Hungary and Romania, to assist in monitoring the implementation of UN-mandated sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;¹⁶⁹ and is a part of the IFOR effort on several fronts. Its representatives are monitoring and investigating human rights abuses, observing elections, and are involved in arms control and CSBM talks. In all, the OSCE is sending about 300 participants.¹⁷⁰ As the OSCE has developed as an institution, it has been more able to fulfill assigned, though secondary, roles. Whether or not this will be enough to prompt increased use of the organization remains, however, to be seen.

To sum up, the OSCE, as a cooperative security institution, has great potential to deal with certain aspects of the European security environment. Issue areas it could be involved with include preventive diplomacy, arms control, CSBMs, investigation of human rights abuses, and other such tasks. For the time being, however, the organization

¹⁶⁸Gregory F. Treverton, "America's Stakes and Choices in Europe," *Survival*, Autumn 1992 34(3): 123, 124.

¹⁶⁹See *The Disarmament Bulletin*, #21 (Summer 1993), p. 18.

¹⁷⁰Interview with Philip Hahn.

is not at the forefront of efforts to deal with these issues; it has a back-up role. Moreover, due to political disinterest in the institution, it is not yet clear if the OSCE will be able to become more prominent.

The United Nations

As was previously discussed, the Cold War denied the UN virtually any role in European security. Cyprus was the exception rather than the norm. Therefore, the question that must be considered here is whether or not the UN has a role in Europe today. The answer is that the UN is still limited, it has been superseded by NATO. This will be covered only in broad fashion here; more detail will be provided when NATO peacemaking is discussed.

For a time, events in the former Yugoslavia did make it appear that the UN would become the most important trans-atlantic security institution on the continent, because it implemented common--along with a shade of cooperative--security. While NATO expressed concern about the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, it did not initially do much because it was out-of-alliance and the conflict did not directly threaten any alliance members. Then when NATO finally did get involved, it almost tore the organization apart, as will be shown later. The OSCE, for its part, did not have the tools to play a large role in a hot conflict. Therefore, almost by default the responsibility to try and contain the war fell to the United Nations. The response was to send in peacekeepers. This action was more revolutionary than it first appears. While the UN had conducted numerous peacekeeping operations before this, Russia had strong ties in the region, and

most of the peacekeepers were from NATO countries. Thus, it appeared that the organization had overcome the paralysis that was the legacy of the Cold War. UN peacekeeping in the former Yugoslavia was not, however, an instant panacea to the conflict, nor was it ultimately successful.

One problem that initially detracted from the effectiveness of the peacekeeping operation was the lack of suitable UN command and control facilities. "If you are a commander of a UN mission, don't get in trouble after five P.M. or on the weekend. There is no one in the UN to answer the phone!"¹⁷¹ So criticized Major-General Lewis MacKenzie, chief of staff with UNPROFOR in 1992. It seemed to serve its purpose, however. Within a month the UN began to rectify the situation with a small operations centre across the street from the main UN buildings.¹⁷²

A more serious problem was the speed at which peacekeepers were deployed to the trouble spot. Boutros-Ghali writes that "under current procedures three or four months can elapse between the Security Council's authorization of a mission and its becoming operational in the field."¹⁷³ In the case of the former Yugoslavia, this was an overly optimistic time frame; it took five months. This undermined the boundaries of the United Nations Protected Areas in Croatia, according to Major-General MacKenzie:

When they had been drawn by Mr. Vance in November 1991, the boundaries had followed a combination of municipal borders and the ceasefire line between the Yugoslavian National Army (JNA) and the

¹⁷¹Lewis MacKenzie, *Peacekeeper: The Road to Sarajevo* (United States: HarperCollins, 1993), p. 510.

¹⁷²*ibid.*

¹⁷³*ibid.*, p. 92.

Croatian Army. The boundaries had made sense at that time; but, during the intervening five months, the war had continued, the "ceasefire line" had moved, and some municipal governments had actually changed their borders in anticipation of our arrival....The disputed areas between the original Vance Plan boundaries and the March 1992 ceasefire line became known as the "Pink Zones". They were to become a major irritant for the combatants and ourselves, and still threaten to be the spark that could set off a major resumption of fighting between Serbia and Croatia.¹⁷⁴

It is difficulties such as this that have led to suggestions that the United Nations needs to develop a rapid deployment capability.

Perhaps the most serious difficulty experienced by the UN in the former Yugoslavia was its lack of operational ability. While the organization had passed resolutions declaring certain cities as "safe areas," these were shelled at will by the Bosnian Serbs. The UN simply did not have the military resources to deal effectively with these attacks. The solution was to enter into a partnership with NATO. The relationship had some successes, but was also often filled with much acrimony, as will be shown below.

The result of the difficulties experienced by the UN in the former Yugoslavia and its subsequent partnership with NATO ended up pushing the UN to the sidelines in Europe. It is instructive to note that the peacekeeping troops provided as a result of the December 1995 Dayton peace talks are under NATO-not UN--command. Thus, despite a long history of peacekeeping, other organizations have apparently reached the stage where they can do the same job better.

¹⁷⁴ibid., pp. 196, 197.

The New NATO

Throughout most of the Cold War, a large part of western security interests were handled through NATO. Collective defence was the guiding rationale. However, traditional alliance theory implies military cooperation against particular states, and suggests that when the perception of a common threat begins to wane or disappears altogether, the inevitable result is that the alliance begins to weaken and eventually falls apart. While Russia may still represent a military threat to the west, the immediacy of that threat has been greatly reduced. Therefore, many analysts have expected the organization to collapse or fade into oblivion since its *raison d'être* has disappeared.¹⁷⁵ Nonetheless, NATO is still around, and is still active. This discrepancy between theory and reality needs to be resolved.

A plausible explanation may be found in the fact that NATO, unlike any other alliance, has been institutionalized. Some of its unique assets include standing forces and an integrated command structure, shared infrastructure and logistic support, standardized operating procedures and inter-operable equipment.¹⁷⁶ This means that the theory of liberal institutionalism may be applied to NATO:

states understand the value of institutions and are very reluctant to dismantle them, even when their merits are in doubt, because they

¹⁷⁵For example, Charles Kegley, Jr., "Does the US Have a Role in the Future European Security System?" in *Redefining the CSCE: Challenges and Opportunities in the New Europe*, ed Ian Cuthbertson (Finland: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 1992.); James Steinberg, *The Role of European Institutions in Security After the Cold War: Some Lessons from Yugoslavia*, Rand Note N-3445-FF, 1992; and Jonathan Clarke, "Replacing NATO," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1993/94 #93: 22-40.

¹⁷⁶Halstead, p. 52.

understand the grave difficulties involved in forming new institutions to replace them.¹⁷⁷

Therefore, NATO's member states continue to cooperate through the alliance simply because it is there, and will continue to do so unless it is absolutely clear that the institution has no practical value. In other words, they will "hedge their bets."¹⁷⁸ Moreover, there is the role of the institution itself--institutions are loathe to be dissolved and thus find new reasons to justify their existence; they have to transform themselves in some way to ensure their continued relevancy. This is the process that NATO is engaged in.

There has been much rhetoric in NATO circles about how the alliance is effectively adjusting to the new security environment. Perhaps the most vocal supporter has been, unsurprisingly, the secretary general of NATO. In February of 1991, then Secretary General Manfred Woerner proclaimed that:

The Alliance has once again demonstrated an extraordinary capacity to anticipate events and adapt to new circumstances. It has shown imagination, even radicalism in devising new proposals and then hard work and perseverance in pursuing them.¹⁷⁹

In December of the same year, he wrote that "Our Alliance has come far on its way to transformation. Its relevance derives not only from its original purpose but from what it

¹⁷⁷Fred Chernoff, "Can NATO Outlive the USSR?" *International Relations* April 1992 11(1): 10.

¹⁷⁸The phrase comes from Andrew Cohen, "Security and NATO," in eds. Fen Osler Hampson and Christopher J. Maule, *Canada Among Nations 1993-94: Global Jeopardy* (Ottawa: Carleton U Press, 1993.)

¹⁷⁹Manfred Woerner, "The Atlantic Alliance in the New Era," *NATO Review*, February 1991 39(1): 10.

has become over time...It has evolved into an agent of change."¹⁸⁰ To a surprising degree, he is right. While the collective defence of its member states remains one of NATO's core tasks,¹⁸¹ the alliance is adjusting to include many characteristics that are normally considered to be aspects of common and cooperative security, as will be shown below.

The NACC

The "Declaration on Peace and Cooperation" issued at the Rome summit in November of 1991 has been hailed as the document which shows that NATO is successfully transforming itself. In it, the participants stated that two features of NATO's new security policy would be dialogue and cooperation with its former enemies--in other words, common security.¹⁸² One attempt to implement the new standards was to invite the leaders of the former Warsaw Pact countries to meet annually with NATO, beginning the next month. This was to be the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC).

It was hoped that the NACC would "create over time a common Euro-Atlantic zone of cooperative security."¹⁸³ A more short-term goal was "to promote understanding and trust through increasing transparency and knowledge of one another and our armed

¹⁸⁰--"NATO Transformed: The Significance of the Rome Summit," *NATO Review*, December 1991 39(6): 8.

¹⁸¹This was reiterated in NATO Press Communique M-1(94)3, 11 January 1994, p. 3, #7.

¹⁸²"Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation," *NATO Review*, December 1991 39(6): 19.

¹⁸³Manfred Woerner, "The Transformed Atlantic Alliance: An Anchor of Stability and Security for Central and Eastern Europe," *NATO Review*, Autumn 1992 Special Edition 40(4): 5.

forces..."¹⁸⁴ Practically, this meant that the NACC became "a venue for pan-European discussions relating to arms control, defence cooperation, crisis management and peacekeeping."¹⁸⁵ Thus, the NACC helped to open a dialogue between NATO and the former Warsaw Pact states.

All did not go smoothly for the NACC, however. In the first place, the new relationship was asymmetrical right from the start; only the western states had the right to vote and set the agenda. Moreover, Bruce George, the rapporteur of the North Atlantic Assembly's (NATO's independent parliamentary arm) *Presidential Task Force on America and Europe* writes that:

We were confronted with disturbing evidence that the work of the NACC continues to encounter difficulties...Most importantly, we were informed of inadequate consultation on substantive issues, reliance on bilateral cooperative projects rather than NATO-wide endeavours, attachment to theoretical exercises and military tourism....¹⁸⁶

These criticisms are serious. Nevertheless, common security is not a condition; as was suggested by Goodby, it is a process. This implies that there are lessons to be learned. So while the NACC may have been at the lower end of a common security scale, it played an important role in the initial stages of the process. Moreover, it led to a higher level--the Partnership for Peace.

¹⁸⁴Sir Richard Vincent, "NATO--Where Next?" *RUSI Journal*, December 1993 138(6): 9.

¹⁸⁵Douglas Stuart, "NATO's Future as a pan-European Security Institution," *NATO Review*, August 1993 41(4): 17.

¹⁸⁶Bruce George, "The Alliance at the Flashpoint of a New Era," *NATO Review*, October 1993 41(5): 8, 9.

Partnership for Peace

Partnership for Peace (PFP) was introduced at the 10-11 January 1994 NATO Summit meeting. The press communique after the first day of meetings reveals that the Partnership was to exceed the activities of the NACC: "This new programme goes beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a real partnership..."¹⁸⁷ In practical terms, it

will allow Partner states to work towards the development of cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training, and exercises, in order to strengthen their ability to undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.¹⁸⁸

Moreover, the Partnership for Peace has been linked to the issue of expanding NATO's membership. Several central and eastern European states have expressed interest in becoming full-fledged members of the alliance in the immediate near-term. In the interest of calming Russian fears, this has been rejected. However, the Partnership "offers to our partners a programme that will facilitate interoperability, thereby helping future candidates to prepare for membership."¹⁸⁹ It is also hoped that this will produce a narrower list of aspiring members:

it is the Central and Eastern European countries themselves that will, through a process of self-selection--according to their level of participation in the programme--signify their desire to draw closer to NATO.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁷"Partnership for Peace: Invitation," NATO Press Communique M-1(94)2, 10 January 1994, p. 1.

¹⁸⁸Manfred Woerner, "Shaping the Alliance for the Future," *NATO Review*, February 1994 42(1): 5.

¹⁸⁹*ibid.*, p. 6.

¹⁹⁰*ibid.*

While it is still too early to tell if PFP will be as successful as its architects hope, it is clear that non-NATO members will participate. As of 30 April 1995, 26 of them had officially signed the Framework Agreement.¹⁹¹ Participants include Russia,¹⁹² other east and central European states, and some of Europe's traditionally neutral states. Thus, NATO is continuing to advance the process of common security through the Partnership for Peace program.

Peacemaking

NATO is also engaging in cooperative security through peacemaking. NATO got around its out-of-area restrictions by offering its resources and expertise to missions that the OSCE or the UN approved. The purpose for doing this was to allow the alliance to become involved in the war in the former Yugoslavia. While there had previously been criticism that NATO was a paper tiger, this assessment began to change in early 1994. In

¹⁹¹Signatory states, as of 30 April 1995, include Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. See *NATO Review*, May 1995 43(3): 5.

¹⁹²Russia, which in the past had expressed deep concern over the Agreement apparently reversed course by becoming the 21st country to sign it, on 22 June 1994. At the same time, the Russian foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev stated that Russia no longer had any concerns about its former satellites joining NATO, and that Russia itself might also be interested. See Nicholas Doughty, "New Era Begins for NATO, Russian Relations," *The Edmonton Journal*, Thursday 23 June 1994, D16. Unfortunately, this reversal was only temporary: at the CSCE Summit in December 1994, Yeltsin attacked NATO's plans for eastern expansion and warned that "Europe has not yet freed itself from the heritage of the Cold War (and) is in danger of plunging into a cold peace." See "Canada Begged to Stay," *The Edmonton Journal*, 6 December 1994, A5.

February of that year, NATO officials gave the Bosnian Serbs an ultimatum to withdraw their heavy weapons from around Sarajevo within two weeks or face airstrikes. It was the first time that the alliance had put a date on its threats; this may have prompted the Bosnian Serbs to believe that this time, NATO was serious. On the 17th of that month, they capitulated and began moving the weapons, defusing the crisis.¹⁹³ While force was not used that time, a few days later six Serbian planes were caught bombing ground targets in a no-flight zone. Using authority previously delegated by the UN, four were shot down by NATO jets. It was "the first time that North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces [had] engaged in military action since NATO's inception..."¹⁹⁴ This action was followed on April 10 by a bombing raid against Serb forces attacking the Muslim enclave of Gorazde.¹⁹⁵ Other attacks ensued. Thus, for a short time it appeared that NATO was no longer acting only in collective defence; under the direction of the UN it was also engaging in the process of cooperative security.

However, events in the latter part of 1994 threw NATO's peacemaking efforts into disarray for a few months. Late in the year, the Bosnian government went on the offensive and captured about 95 square miles of Serb-held territory. This success did not last long; the Serbs used superior firepower to halt the advance, and at the end of

¹⁹³Kitty McKinsey, "Serbs Ease Stranglehold on Sarajevo," *The Ottawa Citizen*, 18 February 1994, A1.

¹⁹⁴Paul Koring, "NATO Flexes Muscles Over Bosnia," *The Globe and Mail*, 1 March 1994, A1.

¹⁹⁵Julian Beltrame, "US Jets Bomb Serb Forces to Save Muslims," *The Ottawa Citizen*, 11 April 1994, A1.

November, to move on Bihac, a UN "safe area."¹⁹⁶ Previous Serb assaults on UN protected areas--Srebrenica and Gorazde--had stopped short of actually entering the zones. These events led to bitter infighting among UN and NATO members as to the proper response.

Previous NATO actions had been limited to non-human targets, but now the United States favoured tough military action through NATO against the Serbs to stop their attack on Bihac. One suggestion was a major air campaign that would directly target the Bosnian Serb troops.¹⁹⁷ This idea was met with fierce resistance by those NATO members, led by Britain and France, who also had ground forces serving with the United Nations in the area. They feared that a harsh campaign would cause the Serbs to retaliate against UN forces, instead of forcing them to back off. This was emphasized in a 22 November telephone conversation that was recorded between Lt. Gen. Sir Michael Rose, the UN military commander in Bosnia, his aide, Michael Stanley, and John Zametica, an aide to the Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic. Zametica said to Stanley that it was the Serbian intention to overrun the Bihac pocket, and then stated: "If you hit us, it means war. Repeat. If you hit us this means an all-out war."¹⁹⁸ The conversation came a day after NATO had launched a bombing raid against the Udbina airfield in Serb-held

¹⁹⁶John Pomfret, "Serbs Push Into Bihac 'Safe Area'," *The Washington Post* 27 November 1994, A44, A45.

¹⁹⁷Julian Beltrame and Juliet O'Neill, "NATO Plunges Deeper Into War," *The Ottawa Citizen* 24 November 1994, A1.

¹⁹⁸"Bosnian Serbs Threaten War if NATO Slows Bihac Advance," *The Ottawa Citizen* 24 November 1994, A6.

Croatia,¹⁹⁹ and a day before the Bosnian Serbs began detaining UN soldiers.²⁰⁰ It became clear that any action taken against the Serbs would exact heavy costs, most of which would be born by the UN troops on the ground.

The rift caused by the disagreement over the proper course of action to take in Bosnia was described as "the most serious breach of trust between the United States and the European allies in almost four decades," and "perhaps the gravest challenge yet to the survival of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the post-Cold War era."²⁰¹ Eventually, the United States was forced to drop its proposed bombing program. It was not, however, a pleasant decision: in the words of one *New York Times* columnist, "the leader of the alliance had to take a back seat to its junior partners, Britain and France."²⁰² Nevertheless, NATO unity had been preserved.

While NATO's solidarity survived that crisis, there were warning signals that it had been a close call. On the one hand, the US and NATO blamed the UN and European officials for destroying whatever role NATO may have had in Bosnia.²⁰³ For example,

¹⁹⁹There was a caveat, however: NATO had been instructed to avoid hitting the planes kept there so as not to excessively anger the Serbs. See Michael Gordon, "U.S. and Bosnia: How a Policy Changed," *The New York Times* 4 December 1994, A1, A10.

²⁰⁰"Serbs Box in Canadian Troops," *The Ottawa Citizen* 24 November 1994, A6

²⁰¹William Drozdiak, "The U.S. and Europe in Serious Rift Over Bosnia War," *The Washington Post* 27 November 1994, A1.

²⁰²Gordon, A10.

²⁰³Considering that most of NATO's members are European, and that most NATO members are also involved with the UN in Bosnia, it appears to be a paradox to list NATO on the US on side of the debate. One supposes, therefore, that either the NATO spokesmen quoted below are US and speak more for it than for the organization, or they are permanent (continued...)

US Secretary of Defense William Perry implied that the Serbs had won the war: "The Serbs have occupied 70 percent of the country. There's no prospect, as I see it, of the Muslims winning that back."²⁰⁴ This was the result of UN inaction: "NATO is prepared to respond with airstrikes if the United Nations asks them...[but] the United Nations has not been asking for airstrikes, and therefore we are really powerless to conduct airstrikes to influence that situation."²⁰⁵ More than just not asking for NATO involvement, the UN specifically denied NATO requests to take out six surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites near Bihac. One military official described that as "the last NATO bid for an airstrike in Bihac and possibly in Bosnia as well."²⁰⁶ For several months after that, NATO had a much lower profile in the area, limiting its operations to a small number of patrols, with no strikes.²⁰⁷ The situation incensed NATO Secretary General Willy Claes, who is reported to have

told a Dutch magazine after the Bihac siege began that NATO 'made itself look ridiculous' by working with the UN. 'If we cannot set the rules of our military operations, they (the UN) will have to find other idiots to support peacekeeping,' he said.²⁰⁸

(...continued)

NATO employees who fear for their jobs if NATO is put out of work.

²⁰⁴John Pomfret, "Hope Erodes for Muslims in Bosnia," *The Washington Post* 28 November 1994, A1, A20.

²⁰⁵ibid.

²⁰⁶ibid.

²⁰⁷Chuck Sudetic, "Serbs Pound a Neighborhood in Bihac," *The New York Times* 13 December 1994, A6.

²⁰⁸Ray Moseley, "Mixed Reviews as UN Gen. Leaves Bosnia," *The Edmonton Journal*, (continued...)

The United Nations and European officials, meanwhile, noted that NATO and the US were not without their share of the blame. It seems that NATO, too, feared the Serbs: UN officials "said NATO officers only appeared interested in punishing Serb troops attempting to shoot down NATO planes flying over Bosnia and were ignoring for the time being the Serb attacks on the "safe area"..."²⁰⁹ The reason: the Serbs had placed numerous antiaircraft missile sites in strategic locations near Bihac. Furthermore, even though Bihac had not received a convoy of food since October 1, NATO refused a UN request to airdrop food into the pocket because of fears that the Serbs would shoot down the cargo planes.²¹⁰ UN and European officials cited the NATO strike on the Udbina airfield as another example. The preparations for that strike

reflected the Pentagon's extreme caution that a French official said 'bordered on paranoia.' It took nearly 72 hours after orders were given before the raid could be carried out because of American concerns about less than crystal-clear visibility and the absence of sufficient 'spotters' on the ground. French and British military officials acknowledged that the skills and resources of American soldiers are first-rate. But such extensive precautions, they said, can cripple the most powerful army if the political leadership refuses to buck the tide of public opinion and make the case, when necessary, that there are causes worth defending on the battlefield.²¹¹

Perhaps most damaging to NATO and US-European unity, however, was the United States' refusal to send any ground troops to Bosnia. Those countries with soldiers serving

(...continued)
30 January 1995, A6.

²⁰⁹Drozdiak, A1, A44, A45.

²¹⁰ibid, A44.

²¹¹ibid.

under the UN resented the United States for talking tough without having to worry about Serb reprisals.²¹²

Some European officials even argued that the Bihac crisis could serve as the shock therapy needed "to galvanize their governments behind a continental army and other common defense structures that could blossom into the security arm of the European Union."²¹³ French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe agreed with this assessment: "The conflict in Bosnia has shown the necessity to move beyond NATO and American guarantees to build a credible European defense that could back up our common foreign policy interests," he said. "This crisis has revealed the doubts we had all along that Europe's interests are not necessarily those of America."²¹⁴ Thus, while the US did preserve NATO unity by backing down on its bombing campaign plans, much harm had already been done.

On the other hand, it is said that time heals all wounds. If this is the case, it may be that the acrimony between the US and Europe has been resolved. Many events have occurred in the last few months that make the Bihac crisis appear as a distant memory. In the first place, NATO airstrikes were used again: on 25 May 1995, several NATO planes bombed an ammunition depot near Pale, in response to repeated shelling of UN safe zones by the Bosnian Serbs.²¹⁵ The Bosnian Serbs retaliated by taking hundreds of UN

²¹²ibid., A1, A44.

²¹³ibid., A44.

²¹⁴ibid.

²¹⁵"More NATO Airstrikes Likely," *The Edmonton Journal*, 26 May 1995, A1, A5.

soldiers hostage, including Canadian Captain Patrick Rechner, who was beaten and chained to a pipe near an ammunition dump; television images of him were seen around the world.²¹⁶ This stalemate continued for several weeks, and it appeared that nothing had changed.

Later in the summer, however, the Bosnian Serbs again went on the offensive and captured Srebrenica and Zepa, formerly UN safe havens.²¹⁷ Bihac was also under attack, and in order to help defend it, Croatian troops entered Bosnia, causing fear that an all-out war in the region was soon at hand.²¹⁸ Instead, the Bosnian Serbs were held off; Serbia did not enter the war as was dreaded; NATO resumed bombing on a more massive scale than ever before, in order to force the Bosnian Serbs to withdraw their heavy artillery from around Sarajevo and to protect Gorazde; and as a hoped-for but still pleasantly surprising consequence, talks began and a peace agreement was signed on 14 December 1995.²¹⁹ Moreover, the new peacekeeping force is under NATO command.²²⁰ Thus, from

²¹⁶David Pugliese, "'...We Would Die for the Sake of NATO'," *The Edmonton Journal*, 27 May 1995, A1; and "8 More Canadians Hostage," *The Edmonton Journal*, 28 May 1995, A1, A4.

²¹⁷"Srebrenica Overrun by Serbs," *The Edmonton Journal*, 12 July 1995, A1, A8; "Evacuation Set as Serbs Enter Zepa," *The Edmonton Journal*, 26 July 1995, A5; "No Embargo, No Canucks," *The Edmonton Journal*, 27 July 1995, A1, A5; and "UN Warning as Serbs, Croats Mass Troops," *The Edmonton Journal*, 28 July 1995, A5.

²¹⁸Mike Trickey, "Fear of All-Out War Grows as Croatian Troops Enter Bosnia," *The Edmonton Journal*, 29 July 1995, A1.

²¹⁹"UN Delivers Ultimatum to Serbs," *The Edmonton Journal*, 24 July 1995, A1; "NATO Jets Pound Serb Targets," *The Edmonton Journal*, 30 August 1995, A5; "Bosnian Serbs Ready to Talk Peace," *The Edmonton Journal*, 31 August 1995, A1; John Ward, "Canada's Decision Gets Tougher," *The Edmonton Journal*, 6 September 1995, A5; "Serbs Refuse to Move Guns," *The Edmonton Journal*, 6 September 1995, A5; "Progress Seen in Bosnia (continued...)"

a dismal low of acrimony and disunity a few months ago, NATO is now savouring success because it has moved beyond collective defence to common and cooperative security.

To summarize, many analysts predicted NATO's demise after the Cold War ended. This was expected because according to alliance theory the organization lost its rational purpose for existence when the USSR ceased being its enemy. Instead of collapsing however, NATO incorporated common and cooperative security into its own activities. The transformation began with the creation of the NACC, continued with the Partnership for Peace, carried on with NATO's cooperation with the UN in Bosnia, and continues with NATO's peacemaking in the former Yugoslavia.

Summary

In order to more fully understand the current European security environment, one must examine the theories of common and cooperative security. It has been shown that the OSCE was organized to implement cooperative security, that the UN mostly used a common security approach through peacekeeping, and finally, that NATO did not collapse as some expected; instead it reorganized and implemented common and cooperative security. It has also been shown, however, that the relationship between the

(...continued)

Talks," *The Edmonton Journal*, 7 November 1995, A5; "Serbs Defiant Over Future of Sarajevo," *The Edmonton Journal*, 16 December 1995, A4.

²²⁰⁰"NATO Troops Take Control in Bosnia," *The Edmonton Journal*, 21 December 1995, A14.

three institutions is not based on equality. The OSCE is little-used, the UN has been superseded, and NATO has become dominant. Unless Canadian officials planned for NATO's dominance, they will have misjudged the requirements for participation in European security issues today.

CHAPTER FOUR

SECURITY IN EUROPE AFTER THE COLD WAR:

The Canadian Experience

Canada's present relationship with Europe, its security goals, and allocated resources will be discussed in this chapter. The primary focus will be on the strong emphasis on cooperative security, first generally and then institutionally, since this affected the distribution of resources. Canada's support for the OSCE and the UN will be shown, as will its downgraded NATO presence. It will be shown that Canada was bound to become a small power in European security affairs, but that Canada did not help its cause by misjudging NATO's continued relevance.

Relationship

For the purposes of this paper, a few words about the current Canadian-European relationship will suffice. Quite bluntly, Europe does not think it requires a strong Canadian presence in order to be secure. Several reasons account for this attitude. The most important was the elimination of the overt threat of continent-wide war. This allowed other factors to develop: the emerging European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI); "the gradual fading of memories of the Second World War..."; and "an awareness of the impressive resources available to the recovered European powers..." which offset

the need for Canadian resources.²²¹ These changes fortify "the view that the Europeans are well placed to help themselves."²²²

The effects of the European attitude can be seen most clearly in NATO, which was the primary security institution in Europe for decades. Instead of a community of interests, NATO is now visualized as being composed of "twin pillars" or "dumbbells". Whatever the metaphor, Canada is left by the wayside and Europe and the United States become the major partners.²²³ Since NATO is still the primary security institution in Europe, it is quite clear that Canada is not as important to Europe's security as it once was. Moreover, Canada had no control over this factor: it would have occurred whatever Canada did. The end of the Cold War thus meant a return to small power status in European security issues.

However, the length of the fall down the power scale was exacerbated by Canadian goals and resource allocation, which Canada did have more control over. As was discussed in the Introduction, two goals of foreign policy were increased European, and hence Canadian, security; and more voice in the decision-making processes. These goals led to a particular kind of security being emphasized, and this had an impact on what resources were applied and where. After the Cold War, Canada stressed

²²¹Dennis Stairs, "Contemporary Security Issues," in Report of the Special Joint Committee Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy, *Canada's Foreign Policy - Position Papers*, (Ottawa: Canada Communication Group, 1994), p. 14.

²²²*ibid.*

²²³For example, see Moens, note 23, p. 347.

security; this led to emphasis of the OSCE and the UN over NATO. In turn, this served to decrease Canadian power in Europe.

Canada's Approach to Security

Since the end of the Cold War, the Canadian government has made limited mention of collective defence and more mention of collective security. The main focus, however, has been cooperative security. This has been true despite the fact that since 1990, Canada has had three prime ministers, four SSEA foreign ministers, a general election and a change in the ruling party.

Speaking very clearly in 1990, Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark had this to say about security after the Cold War:

I believe our first challenge is to re-define the concept of security. Security has ceased to be something to be achieved unilaterally. Security has ceased to be something to be attained through military means alone. Security has become multidimensional and it has become co-operative.

In a world where poverty and underdevelopment plague most of the planet, the developed world cannot pretend to be secure simply because it alone is prosperous. In an era of nuclear and chemical weapons, of ballistic missiles, of terrorism, of interdependent markets and economies, of diseases, the development of prosperity throughout the world is not a question of charity but of security.

That mandates continued emphasis on Official Development Assistance, on more open and freer markets, on innovative debt strategies. Those are not only economic or humanitarian actions; they are security imperatives.

In a world where the frontiers of States may be secure but the air, land and water is being poisoned, environmental action is also a fundamental security question. And in a period of burgeoning population and rapid industrialization, where winds and water know no borders, environmental security will only be achieved through co-operation....

A new concept of security also requires that we address more effectively the political and military tensions which persist in so many regions of the world.²²⁴

This theme continued in 1991 when Prime Minister Mulroney said thus:

In 1991, at the end of World War III [the Cold War], the dangers are less defined but more numerous--nations drifting into chaos and despair; ancient hatreds backed by modern weapons; a natural environment so damaged that our children stand to inherit a devalued legacy; drug abuse so destructive that it consumes the freedom on which it depends; and poverty so pervasive and so unyielding, in Africa and elsewhere, as to mock the very idea of human progress. In the global age, danger respects no border. Opportunity admits few limits. And responsibility is indivisible: global problems yield only to global solutions....²²⁵

Mulroney then offered several suggestions to correct--at least in Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union--the dangers he had noted. His proposals included both short-term and long-term solutions.

Barbara McDougall, the next Secretary of State for External Affairs, continued to advance the same viewpoint. On 10 December 1991, she said that one of the three pillars of Canadian foreign policy was strengthening cooperative security, which meant "establishing a more co-operative world order based on the rule of law, especially through a stronger United Nations."²²⁶ The next year, in a speech to the UN, she argued

²²⁴Secretary of State for External Affairs, "Notes for a Speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, to the 45th Session of the United Nations General Assembly," *Statement 90-55*, 26 September 1990, pp. 4-5.

²²⁵Office of the Prime Minister, "Notes for an Address by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney on the Occasion of the Centennial Anniversary Convocation, Stanford University," 29 September 1991, p. 1.

²²⁶Secretary of State for External Affairs, "McDougall Details Foreign Policy Priorities," *News Release No. 281*, 10 December 1991.

for a "deeper understanding of the root causes of conflict between nations...."²²⁷ and then proceeded to describe "three fundamental weakness [within Nation States] that can cause disputes to go beyond their borders." These included the absence or abuse of fundamental human rights, the absence of a developed system of democratic values and institutions, and an inability to make responsible choices in the management of public policy.²²⁸ The last focused on issues such as social justice, health, education, and the economy. McDougall cited attention to these issues as long-term conflict prevention, and then also mentioned the need for short-term measures, specifically through UN activities such as peacekeeping.²²⁹

The cooperative security theme persisted despite the resignation of Mulroney; the introduction of a new Prime Minister, Kim Campbell; and a new Secretary of State for External Affairs, Perrin Beatty. In a speech to the Freedom Forum, Beatty noted that in the past, peacekeeping was primarily a military operation. Then he stated that the requirements for security had changed:

So much more is involved today. So much more is needed today....

Soldiers aren't the only ones on the front lines. There are also legal experts, medical personnel, and specialists in the area of election organization and monitoring. In other situations, there may be a need for

²²⁷ --, "An Address by the Honourable Barbara McDougall, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the 47th Session of the United Nations General Assembly," *Statement 92/46*, 24 September 1992, p. 2.

²²⁸ *ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

²²⁹ *ibid.*, pp. 5-7.

professional police, experts on infrastructure and municipal administration, or human rights observers.²³⁰

Prime Minister Kim Campbell also reiterated this theme in her address to the UN General Assembly, when she summarized four recent lessons about security:

First, that our security is inter-dependent. Within each specific area of concern, whether military, economic, environment or health, no nation can stand alone. We are all affected, positively and negatively, by developments beyond our borders. And our own actions, within our own countries, inevitably resonate throughout the wider community of nations.

Second, that our security is indivisible. We cannot escape the connections linking issues: between, for example, economic growth, environmental safety, and population flows. Deterioration in any one area can destabilise the whole. We must think about security more broadly, in terms which address fundamental sources of insecurity; of freedom from crime and physical threat; of health; of membership in communities which reflect our values, traditions and aspirations.

Third, genuine security is not about control and repression; it is about striking the right balance of interests, within countries and across borders.

Fourth, we have to find more cooperative ways of addressing security issues, one which maximizes the relative strengths of many existing institutions. We foresee a network of collaborative arrangements--local, regional, and global--forming the building blocks of a new system of collective security, all hinged on the focal point of the U.N....

For decades, the Cold War hemmed us in. That time is over. We have it within our grasp to fulfill the promise of our Charter, to build a global, cooperative security system centred on the United Nations.²³¹

The 25 October 1993 general election ended the Conservatives run as the governing party. Foreign policy ideology did not change, however. Comments by

²³⁰Secretary of State for External Affairs, "An Address by the Honourable Perrin Beatty, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Freedom Forum, The United Nations: The Will to Reform," *Statement 93-53*, 18 August 1993, pp. 2-5.

²³¹Office of the Prime Minister, "Notes for an Address by Prime Minister Kim Campbell," 29 September 1993, pp. 1-2.

Foreign Minister Andre Ouellet to the Peacekeeping Brainstorming Session could have been made by Clark, McDougall, or Beatty.

Canadians have long believed our interests to be served by the rule of the law and by international agreements which promote collective security. We have long recognized that the most complex problems facing the world are best solved through multilateral co-operation. The causes of these problems are too diverse and the solutions too multifaceted to permit any one nation, or group of nations, to succeed in solving them unilaterally. Peacekeeping is obviously one tool in this process.²³²

In a speech in the House of Commons on Canada's role in peacekeeping, Ouellet noted that due to the UN's expanding number of missions, Canada probably would not be able to participate in every one, and that therefore some guidelines to determine which missions we would participate in were necessary. His third suggestion was that we should focus Canadian efforts where they will "make a contribution to the broader reconstruction of society--the 'peacebuilding phase' which follows a peaceful settlement."²³³

And to the General Assembly of the United Nations: "Mr. Chairman, the economic and social problems facing the international community often receive less headline attention than the armed conflicts. However, they are every bit as urgent "²³⁴

²³²Government of Canada, Notes for an Address by the Honourable Andre Ouellet, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Peacekeeping Brainstorming Session in Ottawa, *Statement 94 18*, 29 April 1994, p. 2.

²³³--, "Notes for an Address by the Honourable Andre Ouellet, Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the House of Commons on Canada's Role in Peacekeeping," *Statement 94 52*, 21 September 1994, p. 2.

²³⁴--, "Notes for an Address by the Honourable Andre Ouellet, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the 49th General Assembly of the United Nations," *Statement 94 55*, 29 September 1994, p. 3.

Ouellet then listed several problems: poverty, unequal economic development, unprecedented numbers of refugees, AIDS, drug trafficking, human rights abuses and environmental degradation. He again emphasized this when he said:

At the first Summit in January 1992, the Security Council recognized that "non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to international peace and security." Let us recognize once and for all the need to expand the traditional concept of security, and mobilize all the components of the UN system in order to attack conflict at its very roots.²³⁵

Christine Stewart, Secretary of State for Latin America and Africa, in describing Canada's involvement in those regions, has added the following:

We reach out to Africa not for economic gain--the continent, for the most part, is too impoverished for us to have a major trading relationship. Rather we are motivated by humanitarian concerns and a vision for long-term human security. If we do not act with vigor and creativity, disease, poverty and environmental degradation will wash up on our own shores in the form of refugees, drugs and crime.²³⁶

She further stated:

The brave actions of Canadian General Romeo Dallaire and his peacekeepers in Rwanda highlight the need to maintain our peacekeeping initiatives. However, averting emergencies, crises and disasters must be a higher priority even though it is usually overlooked by the media...Effectively addressing these broader issues [economic equity, the arms trade, drugs, and so forth] will ultimately indicate the extent of any nation's genuine commitment to peace and security.²³⁷

The government response to the foreign policy review is also instructive:

²³⁵ibid., p. 5.

²³⁶Christine Stewart, "Making a Difference: Canada in Latin America and Africa," *Canadian Foreign Policy*, Fall 1994 2(2): 1,2.

²³⁷ibid., pp. 4, 5.

The government agrees on the need to adopt a broader concept of security. In addition to taking into account traditional military threats, security policy must include recognition of threats to stability, democracy and sustainable development as well as the threats posed by such factors as environmental degradation, overpopulation, involuntary population movements and organized crime.²³⁸

Finally, Jill Sinclair, Deputy Director of the International Security and Defence Relations Division at the Department of Foreign Affairs, has provided an excellent summary of the government's conception of security:

For the past several years, Canada has been advocating a new approach to, and concept of, security. We have been speaking about the need to build cooperative security. This is not a radical notion--it simply recognizes the reality that security is complex and is made up of many different elements, of which traditional military security (the sort that can be secured or defended by the use or threat of use of armed force) is simply one part of a larger equation.

Cooperative security takes into account traditional military concerns and traditional threat assessments, but it focuses equally on non-traditional elements of security. These range from building democratic institutions, implanting the rule of the law, and ensuring respect for human rights to looking at new types of security threats which may emerge in areas such as environmental degradation, illegal immigration, or economic underdevelopment.

Conceptually, that is the breadth of the approach that Canada takes to security. To build cooperative security, Canada advocates the development of linkages, contacts and cooperation across this range of issues between governments, experts and individuals at all levels, official and non-official. The basic idea is to build a habit of dialogue, whether by strengthening multilateral organizations or by launching smaller, ad hoc consultative efforts, in order to deal with problems and hopefully head-off tensions at the lowest possible level, before they become problems.

This is an approach we have advocated in many parts of the world, from this hemisphere to Asia-Pacific and the Middle East. However, it is

²³⁸Response, p. 8.

above all an approach which we have applied in Europe as a way of promoting security and stability.²³⁹

Thus, each Canadian government since the end of the Cold War has advocated cooperative security.²⁴⁰ In Europe, this has led to specific actions in the OSCE, the UN and NATO.

The OSCE

Jane Boulden and David Cox wrote in 1992 that Canada had been a consistent supporter of the CSCE. This reflected "both a strong belief in the value of the CSCE and a desire to ensure ongoing Canadian connections to Europe at a time when Europe and the CSCE are undergoing significant changes."²⁴¹ Sinclair expanded upon this theme in 1994. She said that the CSCE fit Canada's idea of cooperative security.

it offers a comprehensive approach to security, one which includes military confidence-building measure and arms control, human rights, cooperation on economic and environmental issues, the consolidation and strengthening of democratic institutions and the rule of law, and the

²³⁹Sinclair, pp. 72, 73.

²⁴⁰This trend has been the subject of recent academic analysis. For example, see Paul Buteux, "Sutherland Revisited: Canada's Long-Term Strategic Situation," *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, September 1994 24(1): 5-9; David Dewitt, "Cooperative Security: A Canadian Approach to the Promotion of Peace and Security in the Post-Cold War Era," *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, March 1994 23(3): 11-18; Tom Keating and Nicholas Gammer, "The 'New Look' in Canada's Foreign Policy," *International Journal*, Autumn 1993, Volume 4: 720-748; and Keith Krause, "Canadian Defence and Security Policy in a Changing Global Context," *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, June 1994 23(4): 6-12.

²⁴¹Boulden and Cox, p. 277.

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development of market economies. In this sense, the CSCE really is the world's first cooperative security institution.²⁴²

Finally, in 1996, Michael Cleary expressed Canada's continued support of the institution:

"We're one of the great believers in the OSCE."²⁴³

Canada has done more than just morally support the institution. Since the end of the Cold War, the government has been active in proposing and developing ideas to strengthen the Conference. As explained by Sinclair, this was not always an easy task:

When we first started talking about these ideas in the heady days of 1990, they were not well received. Many preferred to celebrate change rather than prepare for problems. But Canada persisted and, due to our efforts, we succeeded in institutionalizing the CSCE, from an ad hoc process to the first post-Cold War institution.²⁴⁴

Canada's efforts began early in 1990, when Joe Clark noted that "A leading role for this institution in the design and implementation of a new order in Europe is vital...For Canada, the CSCE is the most important forum for discussions relating to building a new peace and prosperity in Europe."²⁴⁵ Clark followed this up on 26 May 1990, when he gave a speech in which he noted that "the role of the CSCE must now be expanded so that it becomes the drawing board for the new European architecture," and then listed several ways in which the CSCE could be reformed. Proposals included a parliamentary assembly; establishment of a CSCE Verification Agency, to increase the

²⁴²Sinclair, p. 73.

²⁴³Interview with Michael Cleary, NATO desk officer, DFAIT, 1 February 1996.

²⁴⁴Sinclair, p. 74.

²⁴⁵"Canada and the Future of the CSCE," *The Disarmament Bulletin*, #13 (Spring 1990): 12.

CSCE's role in arms control verification and confidence-building measures; an Institute for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, to allow the CSCE to be involved in mediation, arbitration and peacekeeping; and modification of the consensus principle.²⁴⁶ Prime Minister Mulroney repeated this theme at the November 1990 Summit Meeting:²⁴⁷ "...we have an institution to build. If the CSCE is to achieve its full potential, continuing political direction will be crucial."²⁴⁸ His list of proposals included a framework for regular meetings among government leaders, a parliamentary forum and a conflict prevention centre. All of these proposals were later instituted, in one form or another.

This process continued in 1992, when it was pointed out that the political impetus for much of the CSCE's work came from the Council of Foreign Ministers, which only met occasionally. Canada therefore encouraged "the establishment of a body in Vienna where the CSCE can meet on an ongoing basis to take decisions on important operational issues."²⁴⁹ At the same time, Canada also expressed support for the establishment of a CSCE Secretary General, "to act as a chief administrator to ensure that CSCE institutions

²⁴⁶Joe Clark, "Canada's Relationship With the New Europe," *Canadian Speeches/Issues*, 4(5): August, September 1990, pp. 52-54.

²⁴⁷Canada's goal for the Summit was "to have the leaders arrive at a powerful and concise document that confirms and enhances the role of the CSCE as the key pluralistic, pan-European and transatlantic process within which a true cooperative security framework can be developed." See "Canada's Goal for the CSCE Summit," *The Disarmament Bulletin* #14 (Fall 1990), p. 22.

²⁴⁸Office of the Prime Minister, "Notes for an Address by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney," 19 November 1990, p. 2.

²⁴⁹External Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Canada's Objectives at the CSCE Council Meeting in Stockholm," *Statement* #230, 11 December 1992, p. 2.

and missions operate efficiently and effectively."²⁵⁰ Also in 1992, the CSCE "with a good deal of support from Canada" appointed a High Commissioner on National Minorities.²⁵¹ Further, as a result of Canadian initiatives, the 1992 Helsinki Document made provision for peacekeeping by the CSCE,²⁵² and also "an active program to help newly-admitted participating States to participate fully in the structures and work of the CSCE."²⁵³ CSCE institutionalization was declared adequately complete in 1993: "The way ahead seems fairly clear, if not easy. The CSCE's institutional development is more or less complete; what is now required is fine-tuning to ensure the various institutions function in a coordinated and effective manner."²⁵⁴ Suggestions for fine-tuning have included improvements to the Conflict Prevention Centre, a readiness to share Canadian peacekeeping expertise with the OSCE, and calls for:

new areas of intervention for the OSCE, particularly including the monitoring of communications media to help prevent these from becoming propaganda instruments that contribute to instability and conflict."²⁵⁵

Along with encouraging reform, Canada also participates in many of the OSCE's missions. Writing in 1994, Sinclair said:

²⁵⁰*ibid.*

²⁵¹Sinclair, p. 76

²⁵²"Regional Peacekeeping: The CSCE," *The Disarmament Bulletin*, #20 (Spring 1993), p. 11.

²⁵³"Shaping a New Europe: The CSCE," in *ibid.*, p. 13.

²⁵⁴"CSCE Council Meeting: Building Cooperative Security," *The Disarmament Bulletin*, #23 (Winter 93/94), p. 6.

²⁵⁵*Response*, p. 15.

Canada has led, headed or participated in many of these [CSCE] missions: we are currently heading the mission in FYR Macedonia, participating in the mission in Moldova, and providing an expert to the High Commissioner for his work in Hungary and Slovakia.²⁵⁷

During 1995 and the first couple months of 1996, Canada has had three representatives in Vienna, planned to participate in a mission to Nagorno-Karabakh, which was called off because of the lack of a ceasefire; continues to head a mission in Kiev, Ukraine; has sent two representatives to Bosnia, and is preparing to send several more.²⁵⁷

Other states, however, are not so keen about the OSCE. Barbara McDougall, speaking at the 1992 CSCE Summit in Helsinki, reminded her listeners that "Canada has been a leading force in developing CSCE peacekeeping," and in that capacity, urged that the CSCE capabilities be promptly utilized.²⁵⁸ However, she recognized that it would be a difficult task to persuade others: "Our challenge now is to translate the unique political and moral authority of the CSCE, which we struggled so long to establish, into effective machinery to manage our problems."²⁵⁹ The problem persisted several months later:

"In Canada's view...the CSCE has the framework of principles and commitments, institutions and operational instruments necessary to address effectively future challenges in Europe. The last obstacle to the CSCE's effectiveness is one that rests with each CSCE state: political will."²⁶⁰

²⁵⁶ibid.

²⁵⁷Interviews with A. Chabot, staff member at DND, 8 September 1995; and Philip Hahn.

²⁵⁸"CSCE: A Comprehensive Approach to Security," *The Disarmament Bulletin*, #19 (Winter 92-93), p. 17.

²⁵⁹ibid.

²⁶⁰"CSCE Council Meeting: Building Cooperative Security," *The Disarmament Bulletin*, (continued...)

To summarize, Canada has led the way in OSCE reform and has been an active participant in its missions. However, in terms of Canada being able to influence security issues, this has not been extremely important because the OSCE does not wield vast influence in Europe. So while Canada may find that this institution fits its vision of cooperative security because of its organizational features and because it is low-cost and even cost-effective, it is also low-profile and is not yet a prominent piece of the post-Cold War security architecture in Europe. Thus, Canada has not experienced increased influence in European security issues through its active involvement in this organization.

The United Nations

The United Nations has often played an important role in Canadian security policy. As reported by Kenneth Calder, the 1994 Defence White Paper makes it clear that this will continue:

The United Nations' pre-eminent authority to address security issues...makes it Canada's preferred means for undertaking certain operations--such as peacekeeping--where its accumulated experience and reputation for neutrality are valued assets in addressing many of today's pressing challenges to Euro-Atlantic security.²⁶¹

This institution, with its long experience with common security and its potential for cooperative security, has received much practical support from Canada: its dues are paid on time, peacekeepers are sent around the world, and much effort is devoted to reforming

²⁶⁰(...continued)
#23, p. 6.

²⁶¹Kenneth J. Calder, "Doing the Things That Matter: Canada and Euro-Atlantic Security," *International Journal*, Autumn 1995 50(4): 711.

the UN to make it more effective. Sometimes this is even recognized outside of Canada.

Jonathan Fyal, Director of Studies at the Royal United Services Institute in London,

England, has said:

Since the end of the Cold War, most governments have paid lip-service to the idea of transforming the United Nations into the linchpin of international security. Few western leaders ever acknowledge that almost every proposal for the reform of the UN under discussion today has already been proposed by Canada at one time or another. Indeed, the major premises of Canada's foreign policy, so often dismissed in the past as Utopian or flaky, are now received wisdom...²⁶²

When the Cold War ended, Canada immediately began to re-emphasize the United Nations. Speaking in September 1990, Joe Clark said:

That war [the Cold War] is now over. The promise is renewed, and the dream is re-kindled...Let us do now what we have been unable to do before. Let us shake off our past failings, confront our present and in so doing build a new future. Let us behave as United Nations.²⁶³

Two months later, Mulroney echoed these sentiments: "The end of the Cold War presents us with an opportunity to realize, at last, the full potential of the United Nations."²⁶⁴

During 1991, Canadian interest in the UN increased even further, as Mulroney was being considered for the position of Secretary-General. At first, he disavowed any official interest, but as one newspaper reported:

²⁶²Jonathan Fyal, "Canada's Contributions Too Quickly Forgotten," *The Edmonton Journal*, 5 July 1994, A11.

²⁶³Secretary of State for External Affairs, Notes for a Speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, to the 45th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 26 September 1990, p. 10.

²⁶⁴Office of the Prime Minister, 19 November 1990, p. 3.

Despite the Prime Minister's denial, the idea of his candidacy was not being dismissed out of hand by foreign diplomats in Ottawa or New York.

One observer, who is close to the United Nations, said "You're not going to get a name like this without Ottawa winking and saying 'This is what we'd like'."

Mr. Mulroney has to be considered a serious candidate because his name would otherwise not have appeared on a list emerging from the Security Council...²⁶⁵

In the end, however, there did not appear to be enough support to sustain Mulroney's candidacy, so he formally withdrew. The 28 October 1991 letter he sent to Mr. Yves Fortier, Canada's Ambassador to the UN included the following: "Please thank the Security Council Members for their generous and unsolicited support, which I construe as a tribute to Canada's unswerving dedication to the United Nations since its inception."²⁶⁶ He also pledged continuing support for the UN and for the new secretary-general.

This did continue in 1992. Speaking on the 24th of May, Mulroney told the International Conference of Young Leaders:

With the end of the Cold War, the most important question humanity now faces is whether the old order will be replaced by competition and disorder or by cooperation and common purpose, whether the forces of nationalism and globalization can be reconciled and harnessed for the benefit of all. I believe that the answer to that question will be found in the vision and evolution of the United Nations.²⁶⁷

²⁶⁵Graham Fraser, Jeff Sallot, Linda Hossie, "PM laughs off Questions on UN Post," *The Globe and Mail*, 23 October 1991, A1, A2.

²⁶⁶Office of the Prime Minister, *Release*, 28 October 1991.

²⁶⁷Brian Mulroney, "World Peace Demands Stronger UN role," *Canadian Speeches: Issues of the Day*, June/July 1992 6(4), p. 30.

He also stated "that the United Nations and its well-being will remain a vital and unshakable cornerstone of Canada's foreign policy."²⁶⁸ Mulroney further noted that Canada leads by example:

It is firm Canadian Government policy to pay its share of the U.N. regular budget on the first day of the U.N.'s fiscal year, January 1. And it is now also firm Canadian Government policy to pay our other assessments on the day they are due. I call upon the political leadership in the debtor countries also to pay their assessments in full and on the dates due.²⁶⁹

In following years, other officials continued to stress the significance of the U.N. For example, in an 18 August 1993 speech given to the Freedom Forum in Toronto, External Affairs Minister Perrin Beatty stated that "The UN remains the single most important instrument we have for promoting peace, democracy and freedom in the world."²⁷⁰ He then suggested several possible reforms: a permanent general staff to plan and conduct peacekeeping operations, a military college to train a corps of officers who can work effectively together, the ability to stockpile equipment and to airlift material and personnel quickly to a theatre of operations, a code of conduct and common operating procedures for all personnel under the UN flag, and a pledge from member states to commit troops on a stand-by basis for use by the Secretary-General on short

²⁶⁸Office of the Prime Minister, Notes for an Address by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney at the International Conference of Young Leaders, 24 May 1992, p. 6.

²⁶⁹*ibid.*, p. 3.

²⁷⁰Secretary of State for External Affairs, *Statement 93-53*, p. 2.

notice as crises develop. He also mentioned the need for member states to resolve the UN's financial crisis by paying their dues on time.²⁷¹

The emphasis on the UN continued with the election of the Liberal government in late 1993. "UN reform is central to his government's international objectives, Chretien said."²⁷² Speaking in April of 1994, Foreign Minister Andre Ouellet said:

This government came to power last fall on a pledge to consult Canadians more broadly on foreign policy decisions. It is indicative of the central importance of the United Nations to international relations today, and to Canadian foreign policy, that two of the three debates held on foreign policy issues by parliament since the election have focused on Canada's peacekeeping role, especially in the former Yugoslavia.

These debates have revealed strong support within Parliament, and throughout the country as a whole, for UN efforts to provide humanitarian relief to the victims of war and for the UN's efforts to facilitate negotiations among warring parties. Canadians do not shrink from strong measures in support of these goals.²⁷³

Support for peacekeeping is not confined to providing troops. Canada is also studying ways to improve its effectiveness. One suggestion has been to create a standing army. This is not a new idea, but very little has been done about it. Consequently, Ottawa announced that it was "proceeding with a feasibility study alone in order to try to start the debate and build consensus."²⁷⁴ A few days after this report, it was announced that Canada and Russia had reached an agreement "on a common agenda for reforming

²⁷¹ibid., p. 5.

²⁷²Dave Todd, "Canada's UN Ambassador Moved to Finance Dept.," *The Edmonton Journal*, 25 October 1994, A4.

²⁷³Government of Canada, *Statement 94-18*, p. 2.

²⁷⁴Laura Eggertson, "Canada to Study Plan to Create UN Armed Forces," *The Edmonton Journal*, 30 September 1994, A5.

and strengthening the United Nations," including as a first priority a "rapid response capability."⁷⁷ However, it is likely that there was little practical cooperation, when Ouellet announced the results of the year-long study, no mention was made of Russian input.⁷⁸

Despite its enthusiasm for the UN, however, Canada's experiences in the former Yugoslavia indicate that its UN activity has not enhanced its influence in European security issues. As described by Jonathan Eyal:

Canadians have participated in every UN peacekeeping operation ever mounted. Unlike the Europeans, who agonized for months over whether to deploy troops in former Yugoslavia, the Canadians were there from the beginning, in large numbers and in the most dangerous areas. Unlike the Americans, who proclaimed high principles but refused to send any soldiers, the Canadians never presumed that they knew better than the Europeans what should be done in the Balkans. The result? Having assured Chretien that he did not want air strikes in Bosnia, John Major changed his mind overnight and, without consulting the Canadians, fell in line with the Americans by advocating air attacks.

To add insult to injury, the Europeans and the U.S. established a "contact group" with Russia to impose peace on Bosnia. Canada was not only excluded from this group: it was not even consulted. Germany, which has sent no forces to Yugoslavia, is now fully engaged in Balkan peace negotiations while Canada, with soldiers on the ground, is expected to implement decisions taken secretly by others.⁷⁹

The biggest reason that Canada opposed the airstrikes was the potential for increased danger to the peacekeepers on the ground. This was partially born out by later events: in response to the strikes, the Bosnian Serbs took UN peacekeepers as hostages.

⁷⁷Dave Todd, "Canada, Russia Team Up to Work on Reforming UN," *The Edmonton Journal*, 7 October 1994, A16.

⁷⁸Christ Morris, "Canada's Plan Outlined for New UN Force," *The Edmonton Journal*, 26 September 1995, A5.

⁷⁹Eyal, A11.

and airstrikes were not used again for several months, despite frequent, flagrant violations of the safe areas.²⁷⁸ When airstrikes finally were called in again, hostages were again taken, bringing the cessation of bombing.²⁷⁹ A few weeks later, two of the "safe areas" were taken by the Bosnian Serbs.²⁸⁰ In response, the UN and NATO threatened massive strikes to protect the remaining safe areas. These threats became reality beginning on 30 August 1995.²⁸¹ This time, however, the strikes led to peace talks for the region. Thus, while Canada's concern was relevant- peacekeepers did face increased danger because of the airstrikes--the rewards now appear to justify the risk.

As for the contact group, Canada, naturally, was not impressed with being left out. One newspaper reported in November 1993 that "Mr. Ouellet said he was rather miffed that Canada's allies in Europe had forgotten to invite a representative from Ottawa..."²⁸² A year later, the issue continued to wound Ottawa's sensitivities:

"Basically, Canada wanted to be in the contact group and got snubbed. Canada wanted in very much," a high ranking diplomat in one European country told Southam News.

He added that Canadian officials continue to be upset about being shut out of the contact group.

²⁷⁸"Serbs Emboldened by UN Inaction, Bring Out Tanks in Bosnian Attack," *The Edmonton Journal*, 9 May 1995, A4.

²⁷⁹David Pugliese, "Canuck Handcuffed as Human Shield," *The Edmonton Journal*, 27 May 1995, A1.

²⁸⁰"Evacuation Set as Serbs Enter Zepa," *The Edmonton Journal*, 26 July 1995, A5.

²⁸¹"Serbs Defiant as Raids Continue," *The Edmonton Journal*, 31 August 1995, A5.

²⁸²Jeff Sallot, "Tories in Diplomatic Posts Face Scrutiny," *The Globe and Mail*, 27 November 1993, A4.

The source added that it isn't "any particular secret about the fact that Canada wants to be in the contact group," but continues to be refused admission.⁷

The reason for this, according to one official, is that the European allies did not see peacekeeping on par with keeping troops in Europe under the NATO umbrella, a view which Canada continues to "bitterly refute."⁸ In this case, then, Canada learned that active involvement in the UN mission did not give it added voice in the decision-making process.

Another problem with Canada's UN policy presented itself in the former Yugoslavia, as well as in other parts of the world: sometimes none of the sides in the conflict want the kind of help that the UN offers. And because of a lack of operational ability, as discussed in the previous chapter, peacemaking through the UN--the reform that was supposed to resolve this difficulty--was not successful:

Peacemaking is a noble idea that simply hasn't worked, says Foreign Affairs Minister Andre Ouellet.

It was supposed to be the bold innovation of the '90s.

Rather than merely monitoring ceasefires, United Nations peacekeepers would go into war zones and help stop the killing. They would protect innocent civilians, head off incipient conflicts and deliver aid to besieged regions.

Canada supported the concept eagerly. It wanted to be one of the moral leaders of the post-Cold War world.

But after two trying years--and 10 deaths--in the former Yugoslavia, Ottawa has lost its enthusiasm for peacemaking.

⁷Dave Todd, "Canada Upset For Being Left Out in Talks Over Bosnian Solution," *The Edmonton Journal*, 15 November 1994, A5.

⁸Interview with Michael Cleary, 1 February 1996.

I think the United Nations will have to rethink its commitment to intervening in areas where the parties are not ready to make peace. Ouellet said in an interview this week.²⁸⁷

One result of a revised UN commitment could have been the withdrawal of UN forces. "If warring parties in Bosnia cannot accept peace, they must face the fact that UN peacekeepers will pull out," Foreign Affairs Minister Andre Ouellet said.²⁸⁸ This possibility was raised several times throughout the course of the conflict, but particularly in 1995. For example, in a special parliamentary debate held in March 1995 on Canada's role in former Yugoslavia, Defence Minister David Collenette said, "We don't want to let the UN down but we do believe that we're coming very close to the point when Canada has to perhaps make some significant changes in its commitment in the region."²⁸⁹ A couple of months later, with the UN in the midst of another hostage crisis, Chretien argued that the peacekeepers needed to be redeployed to more easily defended positions, although he did reject calls to withdraw the Canadian troops as soon as possible.²⁹⁰

The late summer bombing attacks by NATO, however, made the decision much more difficult, since Canada's commitment to keep troops in Bosnia expired at the end of

²⁸⁷Carol Goar, "Canada's Foreign Affairs Minister Speaks Out Against UN Peacemaking," *The Edmonton Journal*, 7 July 1994, A12.

²⁸⁸Larry Walsh, "UN May Have to Quit Bosnia, Ouellet Says," *The Edmonton Journal*, 5 December 1994, A5.

²⁸⁹"Inquiry Demanded Into Peacekeeper's Suicides," *The Edmonton Journal*, 30 March 1995, A3.

²⁹⁰Dave Todd and Aileen McCabe, "PM Wants Changes to UN Rules," *The Edmonton Journal*, 30 May 1995, A1.

September. On the one hand, the bombing may have convinced the Serbs that continuing the war was futile, thus leading to sincere peace efforts--in which case the withdrawal of Canadian troops would come at a bad time. On the other hand, the respite offered by the peace process may only have been temporary, making the continued presence of peacekeepers futile.²⁸⁹ Canada ended up not having to make a decision, however: the UN ordered the withdrawal of 9 000 soldiers "because of the improved chances for peace in the region."²⁹⁰ This meant that the bulk of the Canadian troops serving with the UN were home by the end of November.²⁹¹ However, more troops have been sent to help broker the peace agreement signed in December 1995--this time under NATO command. There are, however, considerably fewer troops than NATO requested.²⁹²

Other problems with Canada's UN policy are more general in nature, but will impact any UN action in Europe. A prime example is the high financial cost of UN missions. While Canada prides itself on meeting its financial responsibilities, many other states do not: "Canada believes that all Member States should pay their bills in full and on time. We do, and we find it unacceptable that while we meet this obligation, others do

²⁸⁹See John War, "Canada's Decision Gets Tougher," *The Edmonton Journal*, 6 September 1995, A5.

²⁹⁰David Pugliese, "Troops to Leave Bosnia as Hopes for Peace Improve," *The Edmonton Journal*, 6 October 1995, A3.

²⁹¹*ibid.*

²⁹²Diane Rinehart, "Size of Bosnia Force Loaded With Meaning," *The Edmonton Journal*, 8 December 1995, A12.

not."²⁹³ However, Canada's domestic fiscal woes mean that additional obligations may have to be curtailed. As Keating reports:

Operating under severe budgetary constraints, the Canadian Armed Forces have been stretched to the limit in meeting existing UN commitments. Despite its campaign promise, it is not at all clear what additional financial support a Liberal government will supply to maintain, let alone expand, these commitments. Any policy to save defence dollars may substantially impair the government's ability to respond to requests for additional peacekeeping contributions.²⁹⁴

This has in fact already occurred. Although money was not specifically mentioned as a factor, the rising cost of financing UN missions may have led to Canada's 1992 decision to pull out of Cyprus.²⁹⁵ While this decision was reversed, the mission was greatly scaled back. Previous to the 1992 decision, Canada had a battalion committed to the island, which meant about 500 to 600 troops. In February of 1994, there were only six Canadian soldiers in Cyprus,²⁹⁶ and in 1995 Canada was represented by two members of the signals corps.²⁹⁷ Elsewhere, Andre Ouellet announced that "Canada is having trouble meeting its commitment to send 600 troops and 100 Mounties to Haiti... 'We simply lack the resources to be part of every operation,' he told a Common debate on

²⁹³Government of Canada, *Statement 94/18*, p. 5.

²⁹⁴Keating, p. 63.

²⁹⁵"Canada Wants Peacekeeping Duties to End," *The Ottawa Citizen*, 2 April 1992, A12.

²⁹⁶"Canada's Peacekeeping Activities," *The Disarmament Bulletin*, Spring 1994 #24: 15.

²⁹⁷Interview with Andrew Rasiulis, DND staff member, 6 September 1995.

peacekeeping...²⁹⁸ Thus, Canada's emphasis on security through the UN is diminished by financial constraints.

To summarize, Canada has led the way in UN reform and has been an active participant in its missions. Nonetheless, the UN is not an influential institution in Europe. Its major role on the continent was in the former Yugoslavia, and it is perceived--probably unfairly, given the UN's mandate and the resources allocated to it--to have failed there. The UN's role in the former Yugoslavia was supposed to signal the beginning of a new era; cooperation, in part through this organization, was supposed to guide Europe through the vast changes ushered in by the end of the Cold War. However, the lengthy lack of a permanent ceasefire and the lack of protection offered so-called "safe areas" engendered doubt about the UN's ability to play a large, constructive role in Europe. It has, in fact, been superseded by NATO. Thus, while Canada is particularly fond of the UN, Canada's influence in European security issues has not been enhanced by its involvement in the organization; this even applies to issues directly related to events in the former Yugoslavia, such as the airstrikes and the contact group.

NATO

Canada's attitude towards NATO is perhaps best summed up with these words from Joe Clark, spoken in 1990:

NATO, although it is of enduring value, has its limitations, a function of its mandate and its membership. There are other institutions whose role must be enhanced and transformed if they are to play a useful role in the

²⁹⁸"Too Much Peace for us to Keep," *The Edmonton Journal*, 22 September 1994, A1.

elaboration of a new European system. And it is here that Canada must focus its efforts."²⁹⁹

The problem with NATO, from a Canadian perspective, was that it was an alliance, based on a realist world-view. The blunt wielding of military power was not supposed to be the preferred method of operation in a world freed from the grips of the Cold War.

Therefore, NATO would become less important in the post-Cold War world.

This thinking led to efforts to reform NATO, not only in its programs, but also in its governing philosophy. Collective defence was to be replaced with cooperative security. As Clark once said, "To a large extent, the future relevance of NATO will depend on the degree to which it adopts, reflects and strives for a broader definition of security. Security must become co-operative rather than competitive."³⁰⁰ However, given the numerous speeches in support of security through the OSCE and the UN, one suspects that officials did not expect NATO reforms to be successful, or if they were, that the alliance would become a junior partner in Europe. In this regard, it is interesting to notice that in 1995:

The government agrees on the important role that regional organizations can play in a security system under UN auspices. Canada supports the efforts of the UN Secretary General in encouraging regional organizations such as the Organizations for Security and Co-operation in Europe...to accept more of the international peacekeeping burden under the rules established by the United Nations.³⁰¹

²⁹⁹Joe Clark, "Canada's Relationship With the New Europe," *Canadian Speeches/Issues*, 4(5): August, September 1990, p. 52.

³⁰⁰*ibid.*

³⁰¹*Response*, p. 11.

At that point in the document, no mention was made of NATO, which appears to be a rather conspicuous omission. The entry summarizing Canada's activities in 1994-95, under the heading "North American and Euro-Atlantic Security and Defence Relations" in the *1995-96 Estimates* is also telling: "Canada continued to promote the transformation of NATO so as to increase its role in conflict management in support of CSCE/OSCE and UN efforts...."³⁰² Nevertheless, Mulroney could argue in 1990 that "Canada's interests in Europe are concrete, compelling and enduring. They lie at the heart of our membership in NATO [which]...continues to provide much-needed stability in a rapidly changing world...."³⁰³ because NATO was not to be left alone. This priority remains a key government concern; Cleary reports that Canada is still seeking a "leaner" NATO.³⁰⁴

Canada's agenda for reform began with a Mulroney speech at Stanford University. At that time, the prime minister made the initial suggestion that associate membership needed to be offered to the former Warsaw Pact states; this proposal evolved into the NACC.³⁰⁵ Canada's efforts continued with the Partnership for Peace program, and continues to be expressed with the desire that other states be allowed to join NATO. It is

³⁰²Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, *1995-96 Estimates, Part III, Expenditure Plan* (Ottawa: Canada Communication Group, 1995), p. 48.

³⁰³Office of the Prime Minister, "Notes for an Address by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, CSCE Summit, Paris," 19 November 1990, pp. 1, 2.

³⁰⁴Interview with Michael Cleary, 1 February 1996.

³⁰⁵Office of the Prime Minister, "Notes for an Address by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney on the Occasion of the Centennial Anniversary Convocation, Stanford University," p. 2. See also External Affairs and International Trade Canada, "North Atlantic Co-operation Council," *Statement #230*, 11 December 1992.

instructive to note that prior to the January 1994 NATO summit, Ouellet is reported to have criticized the NATO bureaucracy as being "slow to change to deal with the new realities since the end of the Cold War."³⁰⁶ and that upon arriving at the Summit, he is reported to have said that some Eastern European countries "should be asked to join us [NATO] almost immediately."³⁰⁷

Prime Minister Chretien supported this view, some officials report. They said that at the Summit, "Mr. Chretien will urge leaders of the 16-nation alliance...to issue a clear statement of intent to give full NATO membership eventually to Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and other former Cold War adversaries."³⁰⁸ One official also stated that "The objective itself is quite clear. We are for the admission of new members and we think this should be done as soon as practicable."³⁰⁹ It should further be noted that "Canada was the only NATO member to support full Polish membership at the NATO summit in Brussels in January [1994]."³¹⁰

³⁰⁶Jeff Sallot, "Tories in Diplomatic Posts Face Scrutiny," *The Globe and Mail*, 27 November 1993, A4.

³⁰⁷Paul Koring, "NATO Seats Unlikely for Old Foes From East," *The Globe and Mail*, 10 January 1994, A1, A7.

³⁰⁸Jeff Sallot, "Caution Urged on NATO Additions," *The Globe and Mail*, 5 January 1994, A1, A5.

³⁰⁹*ibid.*

³¹⁰"Walesa to Push for Investment, NATO Status," *The Edmonton Journal*, 9 September 1994, B7.

Even though Canada did agree to a gradual transition through Partnership for Peace, it did not remain quiet on the issue. When Ouellet announced that he would attend NATO meetings in June of 1994, he said:

These meetings will allow me to reaffirm Canada's strong support for the opening of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) towards Central and Eastern Europe, particularly the Partnership for Peace initiative. I will be telling my colleagues that we must continue to work for actual NATO expansion in the near future...³¹¹

Michael Cleary notes that in 1996, that difference of opinion still exists.³¹² In light of these statements, it is quite clear that Canada wants NATO to be more than a defensive alliance; security encompassing the whole continent is envisioned.

Another example of Canada's changed priorities is seen through the withdrawal of its troops from European bases. The new world situation meant that collective defence was no longer as important as finances.³¹³ The pull-out occurred despite the insistence from European allies, especially Britain's Prime Minister Thatcher, that Canada needed to maintain a European presence.³¹⁴ At least a partial explanation for this pressure has been offered by Alex Morrison:

...when there are no longer Canadian troops in Europe under NATO command and control...the distance between Canada and Europe will be greater from a psychological point of view than the actual number of kilometres and the decision to be taken by the government of Canada will

³¹¹Government of Canada, *News Release No. 114*, 3 June 1994.

³¹²Interview with Michael Cleary, 1 February 1996.

³¹³See William Johnston, "The Stationed Task Force: Requiem for a Commitment or a Policy Process?", *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Winter 1992 22(3): 6.

³¹⁴Paul Koring and John Gray, "NATO to ask Gorbachev to Address Next Summit," *The Globe and Mail*, 6 July 1990, A2.

be a decision of a vastly increased magnitude. It will not be a decision to commit more troops to Europe but it will be an ab initio decision of whether to commit troops to Europe at all.³¹⁵

The European allies were relieved, therefore, that the 17 September 1991 defence policy announcement committed a continuing Canadian troop presence in Europe, though at reduced levels. Any presence was better than no presence at all. This, however, was followed by the announcement on 25 February 1992 that Canada was going to pull all of its NATO troops out of Europe. Even more disturbing was the method of disclosure: it was announced in the budget speech, not by Defence Minister Marcel Masse. For his part, Masse assured the allies that Canada would not pull completely out of NATO. "Canada's commitment to the alliance is as strong as ever," he said. "The pullout decision is based on budgetary and fiscal reasons and we have absolutely no philosophical differences with NATO...Everyone knows that when the chips are down Canada is on the side of Europe."³¹⁶

However, there was not universal agreement with Masse's assessment:

Canada was sharply criticized by several of its closest allies yesterday for what they describe as its abandonment of an important commitment to European security...The decision 'sends a regrettable message' to Europeans that North Americans are no longer concerned about their security issues and think NATO is irrelevant, US official Robert Beecroft said...A Belgian delegate said that even if Canada kept only a token force

³¹⁵Alex Morrison, "Opening Remarks," *A Continuing Commitment: Canada and North Atlantic Security*, ed. Alex Morrison (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1992), p. 3.

³¹⁶"Masse Tells NATO Troop Withdrawal Decision is Final," *The Ottawa Citizen*, 2 April 1992, A12.

of 500 soldiers somewhere in Europe it would have tremendous symbolic and political importance.³¹⁷

Moreover, the pullout was expected to have a negative effect on Canada's role within the alliance: "the European allies wonder why Ottawa would so readily risk its influence in NATO circles by abandoning a military presence in Europe that goes back five decades."³¹⁸ Some Canadians wondered the same thing. Brigadier-General (ret'd) George Bell, voicing his opposition to the cuts, said:

I am not saying that we should not make change. I am saying that the long term effects on Canada will be costlier than the 900 million dollars we think we are saving. I am sure that we will be losing key staff positions throughout the NATO structure; positions that we fought very hard to reclaim after the debacle of 1969-1970, when we reduced our staff positions from 400 to 125. Some of the positions that were later held by Major-General Christie and others, we obtained only through very hard diplomatic and military negotiations over a period of years. These key positions which are in areas of importance to us in terms of information, of access, and of influence will gradually disappear. One cannot hold onto them if one does not have anything in the game.³¹⁹

According to one staff member at the Department of National Defence, Canada has indeed lost some positions in NATO headquarters; however, these have generally been low-level posts.³²⁰

³¹⁷Jeff Sallot, "Allies Let Fly at Canada Over Pullout," *The Globe and Mail*, 9 April 1992, A3.

³¹⁸--, "Canadian Troop Pullout Upsets Allies in NATO," *The Globe and Mail*, 5 March 1992, A1, A2.

³¹⁹George Bell, "Whither Canada? Long Term Strategic Requirements," *A Continuing Commitment: Canada and North Atlantic Security*, ed. Alex Morrison (Toronto: CISS, 1992), p. 46.

³²⁰Interview with Andrew Rasiulis.

Nevertheless, this may indicate the beginning of a trend; if history repeats itself, the loss of higher level posts will follow. Given the political ramifications, therefore, Canada's complete withdrawal from NATO bases in Europe, with not even a token force left behind, is easier to understand if something other than just finances are taken into account. That "something else" was--despite Masse's protestations--a philosophical difference with NATO: the government no longer considered the alliance to be an important piece of the European security puzzle because they did not think it would be able to successfully incorporate cooperative security into its agenda, or at least did not think that participating in cooperative security required a troop presence.

Canada may have known that it would lose influence in NATO, but it may not have expected this to matter. After all, if other institutions, such as the OSCE or the UN were more directly involved in European conflicts, then NATO's importance should decrease. Symbolic devotion to the alliance would be meaningless:

The Maple Leaf still flies over enough locations in Europe to prove Canada's commitment to the continent's security, associate defence minister Mary Collins said Monday [in May 1992]...

Canada will keep some NATO staff in Europe and has about 1,700 peacekeepers divided between Cyprus and Yugoslavia, Collins told a North Atlantic Assembly conference.

"With roughly 2,000 of our people in Europe, dedicated to working for European security, I question the need for further symbols."

The world is changing with the emergence of democracies in Eastern Europe and the role of NATO members must change accordingly, she said. "In this new environment, the old standards of alliance security no longer apply."³²¹

³²¹"Canada Stands Firm on NATO Pullout," *The Ottawa Citizen*, 19 May 1992, A4.

This thinking did not fly in Europe, however. Several years after the event, Cleary reports that some European countries are still [unjustly] concerned that Canada is not committed to Europe. Nevertheless, Canada continues to abide by the belief that its troops in the former Yugoslavia--[ironically now under NATO command]--are evidence of Canada's commitment.³²² However, the fact that Canada's contribution to IFOR was less than asked for causes concern about the depth of that commitment.³²³

Another difficulty with Canada's troop withdrawal is the effect this has had on our participation in Partnership for Peace. As it relates to Canada, the signing of the Partnership for Peace documents was the major NATO event of 1994. It dramatically changed the relationship of the organization with the non-alliance European states. While the NACC was already in operation, it had been intended mainly for the former Warsaw Pact states, and it functioned primarily as a forum for consultation and dialogue. PFP, on the other hand, has been joined by many of the traditionally neutral countries as well as NACC members, and it calls for practical exercises along with dialogue. This has served to rejuvenate NATO.

NATO's renewal has significant ramifications for Canadian influence. By pulling its troops out of Europe, Canada has forfeited the ability to participate in much of the work done by PFP. A 1990 statement by Joe Clark returned to haunt Canada: "Canada's wishes will not necessarily determine Canada's role....A European role will not be

³²²Interviews with Michael Cleary, 6 June 1995 and 1 February 1996.

³²³Rinehart, A12.

bestowed upon us because we decide it is in our interest. It must be earned."³²⁴ He was right; and the PFP's accepted currency is troops in Europe. For example, Canada did not participate in the three 1994 PFP exercises, and of the 11 exercises held in 1995, Canada actively participated in only one of them--"Cooperative Nugget," held in Louisiana, USA.³²⁵ Given this level of participation, it is not likely that Canadian views will be given the same weight as more involved members when discussing matters concerning PFP. Moreover, Canada cannot complain about this turn of events; we championed the principle of functionalism.

In hindsight, then, Canada acted too hastily in downgrading its NATO presence by pulling all of its troops out of Europe. While the organization does still retain many collective defence characteristics, it remains the primary trans-atlantic security institution because it emphasizes common and cooperative security much more than Canadian officials expected. It is a hybrid organization, and Canada has opted for the worst of both worlds: a commitment to European security but with less influence in the organization because no troops are permanently stationed there, and an inability to take full part in Partnership for Peace for the same reason. Thus, Canada's influence in European security issues has been decreased by its actions within NATO.

³²⁴Joe Clark, "Canada's Relationship With the New Europe," p. 50

³²⁵However, observers were sent to several of the exercises. Interview with Andrew Rasiulis. Also see NATO Press Release (95)46, 22 May 1995.

Summary

Canada was bound to become a small power in post-Cold War European security affairs because of the changed Canadian-European relationship. However, the Canadian goal of increased influence was further damaged because of allocation of resources to the wrong institution. This occurred because Canadian policy makers expected the end of the Cold War to lead to an increased use of cooperative security in international affairs. They therefore positioned Canada to emphasize the OSCE and the UN, and to de-emphasize NATO. NATO's use of common and cooperative security, however, has renewed the alliance, and so Canada's influence in European security affairs has decreased even further than it might have. The next chapter will discuss what the future holds for Canadian security policies in Europe.

CHAPTER FIVE

POLICY OPTIONS:

The Liberals, the Bloc Quebecois and the Reform Party

The priority that Canada assigns to European security in the future will undoubtedly have been affected by recent experiences. Speaking generally, but with applications to Europe, Jonathan Eyal has expressed his concern about a negative possibility:

No other government takes global duties more seriously; no other foreign ministry's officials spend so much time debating the future of international law and security. The least that Canadians could have expected was to be taken seriously by others--but this is not happening....Ottawa's persistent inability to transform its large international commitment into any discernible advantage could ultimately have severe consequences: next time the UN seeks to recruit people to mop up yet another international crisis that no one wants to touch, it may find the Canadians less compliant.³²⁶

Given Canada's decline to small power status, one may predict that Canada will decrease its involvement in European security in the next few years to a more commensurate level. This possibility will be examined by comparing the policy options offered by the recognized parties in the House of Commons: the Liberals, the Bloc Quebecois, and the Reform Party.

³²⁶Eyal, A11.

The Liberals

In principle, the Liberals continue to espouse an activist security policy for Europe. The present government's position on the matter has been discussed in the previous chapter. This section will therefore serve as a brief review of Canada's relationship with, goals for, and resources allocated to Europe, and will also discuss the Asia-Pacific region and the western hemisphere--particularly the "Other Americas"³²⁷ (South and Central America)--as areas of growing government interest. The Foreign and Defence Policy Reviews³²⁸, and the government response to the foreign policy review are guidelines for this approach.

It has already been suggested that Europe does not have as much need for a strong Canadian presence as it once did. This has served to devalue Canadian influence on the continent, despite Ouellet's goal of an increased Canadian voice in the diplomatic process commensurate with Canada's participation. It should also be noted, however, that the Liberals are increasingly concerned with non-European areas of the world. For example, the Defence Policy review states:

The end of the Cold War has been accompanied by the emergence of new centres of economic and, eventually, military power in the world. The Asia-Pacific Region, for example, is generally expected to become the driving force of the global economy after the turn of the century. This will have implications for Canada's defence and security policy.³²⁹

³²⁷Stairs, p. 16.

³²⁸While members of all recognized parties were involved, the reports nevertheless reflect the majority view of the Liberals. The Bloc and Reform Parties felt it necessary to append dissenting opinions.

³²⁹The Report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy, *Security in a* (continued...)

The Foreign Policy review offers a similar assessment: Canada "now has important reasons for according Asia-Pacific security a higher priority."³³⁰ Moreover, "The Government agrees with the Committee and has taken and will continue to take measures to demonstrate our commitment to the creation of an inclusive, co-operative security dialogue in the Pacific."³³¹ The western hemisphere also receives some attention, and so as other areas of the world become more significant to Canadian security, Europe will undoubtedly become less important.

The Liberals' security goals have also been well-documented by the Defence and Foreign Policy Reviews:

The Committee believes that Canada's continued contribution to international security is essential, both for Canada's interest and for Canada's reputation as a respected member of the international community.³³²

Traditionally, this has meant Europe. And indeed, Canada still has a "general, fundamental interest" in promoting European peace and stability, said OSCE desk officer

³²⁹(...continued)

Changing World (Ottawa: Publications Service, Parliamentary Publications Directorate, 1994), p. 9. Hereafter cited as *Defence Policy Review*.

³³⁰*Foreign Policy Review*, p. 23.

³³¹*Response*, p. 18.

³³²*Foreign Policy Review*, p. 26.

Philip Hahn.³³³ NATO desk officer Michael Cleary echoes similar sentiments.³³⁴ Nonetheless, changed relationships mean altered goals, and so the Liberals are aiming to be more active in other areas of the world. Speaking of the Asia-Pacific region, the Defence Policy Review states: "to put it in most general terms, we want to see the region evolve in a way that is compatible with our national interests and values."³³⁵ A related goal is to increase Canadian influence in the Asia-Pacific region: "if we are to have influence in the region, in security terms as well as economic ones, we must 'see and be seen'.³³⁶ The same principle holds true in the Other Americas: "The Government is deeply committed to building a new relationship with other states in this hemisphere, a relationship that underlines Canada's role as a full partner."³³⁷ Consequently, the foreign policy review and the government response to it noted several recent and continuing activities, drawing the conclusion that "Canada is well placed to play a useful role in the OAS in an expanded security sense."³³⁸ Increased priority placed on other parts of the world will undoubtedly impact the allocation of security resources.

³³³Interview with Philip Hahn. Requests for interviews with the government were passed on to DFAIT officials, who, while not representing Liberal Party policy did represent government policy. Since the Liberals are the governing party, this should present no difficulties.

³³⁴Interview with Michael Cleary, 1 February 1996.

³³⁵*Defence Policy Review*, p. 9.

³³⁶*ibid.*, p. 11.

³³⁷*Response*, p. 17.

³³⁸*Foreign Policy Review*, p. 23.

The Liberal goal of promoting a stable world order led to some specific recommendations in Europe:

Canada should remain an active member of NATO...[and] should encourage a closer working relationship between NATO and the UN...[and] should also urge the CSCE to strengthen further those institutions that deal with conflict prevention and resolution..."³³⁹

The Liberals, however, continued the Conservative's emphasis of the UN and the OSCE over NATO, and this devalued Canada's power in Europe even further. On the other hand, the Liberals are also encouraging more resources to be spent outside of Europe. As outlined in the Defence Policy Review, "we must demonstrate a more visible Canadian presence in Pacific waters," and "we need to engage our Pacific neighbours in a continuing dialogue on security issues." Further:

"If Canadians want to be able to influence events in the Asia-Pacific region, we must show that we have a stake in the region, that we see a Canadian security interest and are prepared to invest resources in protecting that interest."³⁴⁰

In line with this, "HMCS *Vancouver* visited Japan and the Republic of Korea in 1994,"³⁴¹ two ships were sent to the ASEAN region in 1995, and DND is planning for more ships to visit Asian ports in 1996.³⁴² It is also instructive to note that the present Liberal government appointed the first Secretary of State for the Asia-Pacific region. More

³³⁹ibid., p. 21.

³⁴⁰*Defence Policy Review*, p. 11.

³⁴¹*Response*, p. 18.

³⁴²Interview with Michael Cleary, 1 February 1996.

resources are also being allocated to the South and Central America.³⁴³ Thus, in the future more resources will likely be directed away from Europe and towards other parts of the world.

In summary, the Liberals continue to voice a middle-power concern about European security issues. In practise, however, Canada is now a small power in Europe. The primary reason for this is that the Canadian-European relationship does not allow room for Canada to participate more fully. However, the Liberals' goals and resources further exacerbated the fall from middle-power status. Furthermore, the attention devoted to Europe is likely to decrease as the Asia-Pacific region and South and Central America receive more attention from the Liberals. Thus, Canada governed by the Liberals will remain a small power in European security affairs.

The Bloc Quebecois

Although they have no intention of forming the governing party, and run candidates only in Quebec, the Bloc viewpoint is important because they are the official opposition and therefore impact the direction of foreign policy by virtue of the questions they ask and the events they make issues of. While one spokesman said that the Bloc follows the Liberal program except as outlined in the Bloc's dissenting reports attached to the foreign and defence policy reviews,³⁴⁴ there are significant differences as it pertains to

³⁴³*Foreign Policy Review*, pp. 22, 23; *Response*, p. 17; and Interview with Michael Cleary, 1 February 1996.

³⁴⁴Interview, office of Stephane Bergeron, 29 January 1996.

European security, and implementing the Bloc's recommendations would decrease even further Canada's power.

While not addressing explicitly Canada's security relationship with Europe, the Bloc's goals suggest that they still consider Canada to be a middle power. One goal is to promote cooperative security. In Europe, this means encouraging democracy and human rights: "The active participation of open societies such as ours in the post-Cold War democratization process is one of the essential pillars of any security policy."³⁴⁵ The government is therefore encouraged to assist "countries that are struggling to become democracies, in particular the countries of eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union."³⁴⁶ The reason for this is implied in another statement: "Canada, and a future sovereign Quebec, must continue to encourage democracy on the world scene."³⁴⁷ Such action in Europe is meant to validate the Bloc's aspirations for a separate Quebec.

The BQ also sees improving Canada's security relationship with other states on the American continent as an imperative.³⁴⁸ Rather than being motivated by the same sentiments as in Europe, however, the Bloc sees interconnections with trade: "we consider that now is the time to broaden the mandate of NORAD, in order to include in this agreement our economic partners in the rest of the Americas and thus extend our

³⁴⁵Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy, *Canada's Foreign Policy: Dissenting Opinions and Appendices* (Ottawa: Publication Service, Parliamentary Publications Directorate, 1994), p. 3. Hereafter cited as *Dissenting Opinions*.

³⁴⁶ibid.

³⁴⁷ibid.

³⁴⁸Interview, office of Stephane Bergeron, 29 February 1996.

economic agreements."³⁴⁹ Membership in NORAD "by several Central and South American countries would give new member countries security that could only be advantageous to Canada's political and economic interests..."³⁵⁰ Moreover, Canada has a middle-power role to play in this effort:

Canada enjoys high credibility with all the countries in the Americas, and must use that reputation to offer those countries a new form of partnership that allows them to provide more adequately for their security, economies, political institutions and prosperity...

In terms of relationships and goals, therefore, the Bloc is emphasizing cooperative security, though for different reasons, in Europe and in the Americas.

In terms of resources, the Bloc approach would mean increased activism in arenas which promote cooperative security:

The Bloc quebécois recommends that Canada's foreign policy reiterate that Canada has a duty to condemn attacks on democracy and human rights and to use all appropriate forums (whether it be the House of Commons, special debates, bilateral diplomatic meetings, regional forums such as the OAS, the human dimension aspect of the CSCE or multilateral organizations, in particular the UN) to unconditionally denounce abuses of this nature.³⁵¹

Priority is given to the UN, as the Bloc's dissenting defence policy report makes clear:

Whereas the UN is the ideal institution to monitor respect for human rights in the world but has no concrete power to prevent certain countries from violating such rights...Whereas, lastly, the other international security institutions (NATO, CSCE, etc.) are seen as competing with the UN in conflict resolution, and multi-institution participation only creates confusion over mandates and activities in the field; We, the Bloc Quebécois members of the Special Joint Committee, recommend: (1)

³⁴⁹*Defence Policy Review*, p. 76.

³⁵⁰*ibid.*, p. 77.

³⁵¹*Dissenting Opinions*, p. 16.

That Canada bring strong pressure to bear and use its international credibility and leadership to force the UN to speed up its reform process within deadlines of two or three years...[and]; (5) That Canada review its current military alliances (NATO and NORAD)) accordingly, so that their strategic missions reflect the UN's needs....³⁵²

The UN is not the only preferred institution, however. NORAD is also considered essential to Canadian cooperative security. The party recommends that new partners from the Americas be admitted and "that Canada commit itself to supporting a redefinition of NORAD's mandate, making it a military alliance that gives new member countries political and economic stability...."³⁵³ In this effort, NORAD would be called upon to support the efforts of the UN, and would also be heavily involved in curtailing the drug trade: "NORAD will act as a top enforcement agency and will provide very strong support for Central and South American countries in the fight against drug traffickers."³⁵⁴

The BQ emphasis on the UN and NORAD would affect Canada's actions within NATO. Although the party does "not regard the UN and NORAD as taking priority over NATO..." and "believe[s] that all these bodies have unique and significant roles to perform..."³⁵⁵ it is nevertheless recommended that resources be shifted to those former institutions from the latter. At the same time, however, it is recommended "That Canada maintain its full political presence within NATO in order that it may participate in the

³⁵²*Defence Policy Review*, pp. 72-73.

³⁵³*ibid.*, p. 78.

³⁵⁴*ibid.*, pp. 78-79.

³⁵⁵Interview, office of Stephane Bergeron, 22 March 1996.

process of redefining the alliance's strategic mission."³⁵⁶ As has been previously shown, however, retaining political power while decreasing physical resources is a difficult, if not impossible, task to accomplish.

In summary, the Bloc believes Canada still has a middle power role to play in Europe, particularly in encouraging democracy and human rights. This concern would lead to more attention being given to the OSCE and especially to the UN. As was shown in this paper, however, NATO is the dominant security institution in Europe. Therefore, following the BQ's recommendations would leave Canada a small power in European security issues. This may not be a major cause for concern, however, as the BQ also supports a much larger Canadian role in security affairs on the American continent.

The Reform Party

At the present time, the Reform Party does not have a highly-developed foreign policy; their priority has been domestic issues. Foreign policy critic Bob Mills was therefore unable to provide official Reform policy, but only his personal opinion.³⁵⁷ Nevertheless, the general trends should still present themselves accurately. To begin with, Mills' conception of Canada's current position in Europe is radically different from the government's: "Canada is a very, very, very minor player." Moreover, changed world conditions mean that Canada will be increasingly forced to focus on the Americas.

³⁵⁶*Defence Policy Review*, p. 75.

³⁵⁷Unless otherwise stated, the following section is based on an interview conducted with Bob Mills, 23 January 1996.

Reform recognizes that the end of the Cold War decreased the need for a strong European-Canadian security relationship, and so Canadian power was also bound to decrease. This will be further decreased, according to Mills, because of the rise of three major world regions: the Americas, Europe and Asia-Pacific. Canada's location on the American continent will force it to pay less attention to Europe and more to the Americas.

Another contributing factor to the devalued relationship, according to Mills, was an image problem. Mulroney was the source for part of this--although he had an "in-your-face" managerial style, he followed the lead of the Americans: they responded by outwardly playing the part of jovial companion, but neither they nor the Europeans respected him. Chretien, for his part, has not repaired the damage because he has gone to the other extreme as far as managerial styles go--he does not want to ruffle any feathers, and so it appears as though he has no vision. This was illustrated when Canada was left out of the contact group:

Chretien did not demand to have Canada included in the contact group, and he showed no political leadership; therefore, we should not be surprised at how events transpired. In the future, the PM would be wise to not politically abandon our troops again.

Reformers also see Canada's constant constitutional bickering as contributing to the image problem. It has made others see us as a fragile country. With poor-quality leaders guiding a fragile country, it does not matter what else Canada does, according to Reform, because others do not take us seriously. Even 3 000 troops in Europe could not give Canada decision-making influence.

Canada's decline to small-power status in European security issues would not be a burning issue for the Reform Party. While increased cooperative security,¹³⁸ including in Europe, was mentioned as a goal of the Reform Party, it was not viewed as attainable anytime in the near future, or even as something that should be pursued immediately. On the other hand:

Our debt and deficit...are realities that undermine our long term economic security. Therefore, controlling the debt and deficit is one of the highest priorities of the Reform Party. Once these are under control, we will have more available resources to dedicate to other matters.

The search for cooperative security would therefore be subordinated to economic matters. Another Reform goal would be to increase Canadian participation in affairs on the American continents. At the present time, says Mills, Canada does not have a strategy to deal with the rise of regionalism: we are "in the wilderness," "flopping along," and we have "knee-jerk reactions" to this trend. Nevertheless, Canada will be forced to focus more on the Americas.

A re-ordering of the resources applied to Europe necessarily follows from Reform's goals. Since economic difficulties are contributing to Canada's decline of influence in Europe, it is necessary to devote more attention to the economy: "If Canada gets its economy in order, this will do more than anything else to increase our influence." More specifically, Reform's dissenting report to the foreign policy review offers three areas for "substantial budgetary cuts: 1) bilateral (government to government) aid; 2)

¹³⁸Mills' definition of cooperative security focused on three things: "a) sustainable economic prosperity, b) international stability, regionally managed and c) increased democracy." Environmental concerns were also mentioned as being relevant.

international grants and non-mandatory contributions; and 3) dropping our membership from non-essential international organizations."³⁵⁹ Although no concrete recommendations have been given, these suggestions are meant to be reviewed and applied globally, including to Europe.³⁶⁰

Nonetheless, a particular area of concern for Reform is Canada's activities in Europe's security institutions. The government currently focuses too much on the wrong institutions, says Mills:

NATO is the only security organization with real power. Anyone who thinks the OSCE...or the Western European Union (WEU) can replace NATO is wrong. Those other organizations showed their weakness during the former-Yugoslavia fiasco. They might look formidable on paper, but that is an illusion.

The OSCE is therefore "acceptable as a forum for discussion" but not much else. As for the UN:

Many of the new security concerns (non-military ones) require effective international organizations and regimes to address them properly. Because the UN is currently ineffective, though, progress in these areas is likely to remain quite slow...However, unless the UN is fundamentally reformed to be much more accountable, effective and transparent in its activities, no amount of wishing on our part will change this.

Moreover, the rapid-reaction UN force favoured by the government is an impractical "sixties or seventies" idea. By focusing on the OSCE and the UN as well as NATO, the government therefore wasted valuable resources.

³⁵⁹*Dissenting Opinions*, p. 30.

³⁶⁰Interview with the office of Bob Mills, 29 February 1996.

In summary, the Reform Party considers Canada to be a small power in European security issues. Some reasons for this are the combined effects of regionalism, a stagnant economy, a poor image and a scattered institutional focus. Reform would attempt to adjust to these problems by focusing more on the American continents, on the economy and on NATO. One also presumes that Reformers consider Preston Manning as the leader to correct Canada's poor image. However, even if all of Reform's agenda was successfully implemented, Canada would remain a minor player in European security affairs.

Conclusions

Examining the policy options offered by the Liberals, the Bloc Quebecois and the Reform Party suggest that Canada will remain a small, diminishing power in European security over the next few years. This is not necessarily a major cause for concern, however. Securing Europe is no longer an urgent priority. Asia-Pacific and the Other Americas, on the other hand, are becoming more important. Consequently, it is likely that resources will be diverted away from the European theatre to these new areas of interest. Thus, while Canada's star may be on the decline in Europe, it may be rising in other parts of the world.

CONCLUSION

Canada has been a frequent participant in European security affairs. Between the two world wars, it was a small power, and after WWII it was a middle power. The end of the Cold War was expected to increase or at least maintain this ranking. However, that did not occur, and Canada is again a small power. Using Canada's participation in the League of Nations, the OSCE, the United Nations and NATO as a measuring stick shows the fluctuations in power ranking. Further, this participation can be explained in terms of relationship, goals and resources.

In the first place, the European-Canadian relationship is the most important variable determining Canada's power status in European security affairs. When a mutual-need relationship does not exist, Canada will be relegated to small power status. This is amply illustrated by Canada's actions in the League of Nations, when Canada stood aloof from the continent, and by post-Cold War security affairs, when Europe does not perceive a need for Canadian involvement. However, when Canada and Europe do sense a mutual need, as during the Cold War, Canada is able to act as a middle power.

The second variable is the reasons that Canada has for participating in European security. Different goals are apparent for each of the three eras of involvement. After World War I, two goals were to secure Canadian autonomy in foreign affairs and to avoid international obligations. Following World War II, the major goal was to prevent another global war. This was to be achieved by promoting collective security through the UN,

and then as the Cold War settled upon the world, by adhering to collective defence through NATO. The end of the Cold War again changed Canada's goals. This time, the object was to promote cooperative security through the UN and the OSCE.

Resources are the third variable affecting Canada's power status in Europe. Since Canada did not want international obligations during the League years, it did not allocate large resources to the organization. However, following World War II, many more resources were devoted to the UN and NATO in the effort to prevent another major war. After the Cold War, the goal of establishing cooperative security was thought to be best achieved by promoting the UN and the OSCE, consequently more resources were devoted to these institutions than to NATO.

The combination of relationship, goals and resources has been shown to determine Canada's power status in European security affairs. A poor relationship, negative goals and few resources made Canada a small power after World War I. A mutual-need relationship, positive goals and more resources following World War II turned Canada into a middle power. Today, Canada is again a small power--and further down on the scale than anticipated--because of a neutral relationship and mis-allocated resources despite positive goals.

Moreover, analyzing the policy options offered by the Liberals, the Bloc and the Reform Party show that this last status is likely to continue in the next few years. While none of the parties expound the kind of relationship or the negative goals that marked Canada's League years, all anticipate other parts of the world becoming more important to Canadian security, which will likely lead to less resources being devoted to Europe.

Also, in the case of the Reform Party, the goal of cooperative security would be subordinated to deficit and debt reduction. Thus, Canada under any of these parties would remain a small power in European security affairs.

Some further questions remain to be answered, however. In the first place, Canada's withdrawal of troops from European bases has been mentioned as having a negative impact upon its influence. It is true that Canada is not able to participate in many of the Partnership for Peace exercises. However, the effect that those troops would have on Canada's influence within the traditional 16-member alliance if they remained in Europe, is another matter. It may be that certain activities, such as combined troop exercises, have decreased in importance with the end of the Cold War, while more political activities have increased in importance. In this scenario, Canada may have lost tactical influence by withdrawing troops, but not relative influence. This would mean that Canada, although still a small power, has not slid as far down the scale as was outlined in this paper.

Another question relates to a comparison of security and economic issues. How does one decide which is most important? That may be unanswerable, or at least extremely situation-dependent. Nevertheless, a trend in recent years has been to stress economics. Japan, for example, is considered a prime candidate for a permanent seat in the UN's Security Council because of its economic might, not its military strength. Closer to home, the economic emphasis was seen in the stringent criteria governing eligibility to write the 1994 Foreign Service Exam: a law degree or an economics degree, or any other degree as long as the candidate possessed an acceptable level of proficiency,

determined by the government, in one of five languages--Japanese, Mandarin, Korean, Russian or Arabic.³⁶¹ Even a PhD in International Affairs would not have been sufficient! A common complaint was that under these terms, Lester Pearson would not have been able to write the test. Be that as it may, the point is that economics is clearly a high priority with DFAIT. If the Department is experiencing success in that field, then small power status in European security is likely not a critical issue. Thus, Canada's world-wide position as a middle power may still be secure.

³⁶¹Public Service Commission, recruitment information package, 1994.

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