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"The Evolution of Eastern Ukrainian Nationalism"

by

Olga S. A. Szkabarnicki

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Department of Political Science

**Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario**

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ABSTRACT

The thesis of this dissertation concerns the relationship between modernization and the evolution of ideology. It is argued that it is possible for Western-style liberal nationalism to evolve out of cultural circumstances which are fundamentally different from those which had led to its initial appearance in the West. The case study used to explore this relationship is the evolutionary period of Ukrainian liberal nationalist ideology in Eastern Ukraine between 1906 and 1914.

The thesis is demonstrated by way of a three-fold argument. It is, first, shown that an appeal to nationalism was necessary if Ukrainian society were to modernize as a whole. Second, it is argued that Ukrainian liberal nationalism could not develop along the same lines as in the West because of the peculiar modernization dynamics of nineteenth century Ukraine within the Russian Empire. It is then shown that, between 1906 and 1914, an evolution did, in fact, occur within Ukrainian liberal nationalist ideology, such that, in spite of a rocky start, it eventually came to resemble its Western antecedents.

The primary reference source used is the daily newspaper Rada, published in Kiev between September 15, 1906 and August 2, 1914.

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PREFACE

There are a number of reasons which make the subject of the evolution of Ukrainian liberal nationalism interesting and worthwhile to investigate. First and foremost, it is a topic which is largely unexplored both in contemporary scholarship which addresses the period in question, and in literature in general which addresses nationalism from more of a comparative perspective. Indeed, both contemporary Ukrainian historiography and that which was written by its founder, Mykhailo Hrushevsky, largely ignore this period. For example, Subtelny, in Ukraine, a History,¹ spends a scant two and one-half pages on this period (pp. 297-299), treating it as a sort of insignificant stepping stone between the more important periods of nineteenth century Ukraine and World War I. Even Hrushevsky, a leading figure in the Ukrainian movement of the period in question, barely even glances over it in his treatment of the national struggle in A History of Ukraine.² Only in the Ukrainian language is the documentation of Ukrainian liberal politics during this period treated to any significant extent by O.

¹Orest Subtelny, Ukraine, a History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988).

²Mykhailo Hrushevsky, A History of Ukraine ([London]: Archon Books, 1970).

Lotots'kyi, in Storinky Mynuloho.³ However, this work is largely inaccessible to the non-Ukrainian scholar. Jurij Borys' essay, "Political Parties in the Ukraine,"⁴ examines the Ukrainian political parties which arose from this period, but the emphasis is placed on their activity between 1917 and 1920. Numerous like examples in Ukrainian historiography and political science abound.

G. Y. Boshyk's exhaustive Doctoral Thesis, "The Rise of Ukrainian Political Parties in Russia, 1900-1907: With Special Reference to Social Democracy"⁵ is clearly a step towards the recognition of this period as significant in Ukrainian politics. However, even in this work (which has been of unquestionable assistance in the preparation of this thesis), the development of liberal political philosophy is treated as secondary -- no, even tertiary -- to the development of social democracy amongst Ukrainian political parties. The liberals, thus again, receive only passing treatment with respect to this period, and their significance in Ukrainian politics is minimalized, at best. In the final

³Oleksander Lotots'kyi, Storinky Mynuloho (n.p.: Scientific Theological Institute of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of U.S.A., 1966), Vols. 1-4.

⁴Jurij Borys, "Political Parties in the Ukraine," in The Ukraine, 1917-1921: A Study in Revolution, Ed. Taras Hunczak (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1977), pp. 128-158.

⁵G. Y. Boshyk, "The Rise of Ukrainian Political Parties in Russia, 1900-1907: with Special Reference to Social Democracy," PhD Diss. St. Anthony's College, Oxford, 1981.

analysis, the systematic investigation of the evolution of Ukrainian liberal ideology remains unexplored.

The possible reason behind scholarship's apparent dismissal of the liberals during this period is the fact that the liberals were not the eventual "winners" in the course of Ukrainian political history. History, and political science, is more often than not, written by winners, about winners. The ideological "left" eventually won out in Eastern Ukraine. The most-remembered opponents to the left are those who were involved in the general post-World War I "turn to the right," and who gained a certain amount of notoriety. The liberals, being moderates "by nature," played a less glamorous role in this period of history. Not being as notorious or extreme as their compatriots to the left or to the right, they tried to work within the system (in as much as there was a system which could be worked within), and sank into either obscurity or cooperation with either side. Thus, it is usually considered to be more intellectually "interesting" to trace the roots of the more extreme elements of the Ukrainian political movement, thereby connecting past with present, and, in line with scholarly tradition, clearly illustrate the continuity of political history in the contemporary political context of Soviet Ukraine.

It may be contended, then, that one should not go against the wisdom and experience of scholarship, and,

therefore, not bother treating a movement which scholarship has deemed insignificant. However, the fact remains that disproportionately many Ukrainian intellectuals came from the liberals' ranks and played important roles in the Ukrainian politics and government of 1917-1920. In addition, one cannot help but ask if there is not any room in contemporary scholarship for the treatment of a political phenomenon with potential universal applicability in broader political contexts. Is there not room for the treatment of a political movement, which, in light of current political events in the Soviet Union, may either rear its head again (one must note, with anticipation, the gathering and publication of previously withheld and censored materials concerning, and by, Drahomanov, for display in a Drahomanov museum in Kiev),⁴ or eventually be re-introduced in some form, however altered by current political and ideological circumstances? Furthermore, the very fact that this phenomenon has not been thoroughly explored naturally arouses one's curiosity, and demands that it be addressed.

⁴Personal interview with Raisa Ivanchenko, March 15, 1989.

INTRODUCTION

The thesis of this dissertation is concerned with the relationship between modernization and the evolution of ideology. Generally put, it is argued that it is possible for Western-style liberal nationalism to evolve out of cultural circumstances which are fundamentally different from those which had led to its initial appearance in the West. The case study used to explore this relationship is the evolutionary period of Ukrainian liberal nationalist ideology in Eastern Ukraine between 1906 and 1914.

The argumentation of the thesis is threefold. It is proposed, first of all, that in order for the social emancipation of the entire Ukrainian "People" of Eastern Ukraine to occur -- People as defined by the philosophical trends emerging during the modernization of Ukrainian political thought which began with the Kyrylo-Methodians -- the appeal had to be made, specifically, to Ukrainian nationalism. The emerging Ukrainian liberals were the natural standard bearers for the nationalist struggle, defining and mobilizing support for it. It is, secondly, proposed that because of the nature of the modernization process occurring in Ukraine, the kind of liberal nationalism which developed could not be the same as its Western European antecedents (i.e., the possessive individualism which emerged from Hobbes and Locke, and the political nationalism which

emerged from the French Revolution). However, a distinct evolution did, nonetheless, occur in the nascent liberal ideology between the all-important 1905 revolution and World War I, such that by the end of this period, Eastern Ukrainian liberalism came to resemble its Western European antecedents in many important respects. Thus, by 1914, Eastern Ukrainian liberal nationalism had come to maturity in the Western European sense. It is, therefore, finally proposed that the period between 1905 and 1914 is the formative period of modern Ukrainian liberal nationalist ideology.

The thesis will be demonstrated by way of three principal arguments. First, as an introduction to the topic and period under study, the three main approaches encountered in contemporary scholarship to the analysis of the emergence of Ukrainian nationalism -- concerning when it emerged, amongst whom, and why -- are examined. The purpose of this exercise is not only to provide the background information necessary so that the reader may appreciate the subsequent argument, but also to clarify the theoretical perspective of this paper, and thereby prepare the way for an argument which places premiums on the process of modernization for the development of Ukrainian liberal ideology.

Second, the dynamics of the modernization process which occurred in Ukrainian political thought prior to the 1905

revolution are placed within a Weberian theoretical construct. The notions of *Gesellschaft* and *Gemeinschaft* are employed to illustrate the interplay and confluence of certain key factors which determined the path of development for Ukrainian political thought during this period. The kernel of the peculiar type of Ukrainian liberal nationalism which was to manifest itself in the pages of Rada is traced to, and linked with, the modernization process which occurred during this period.

Finally, after a brief introduction to the emergence of Rada and the key players in its compilation and publication, the evolution of Ukrainian liberal nationalist ideology which occurred from 1906 to 1914 is examined. The daily newspaper Rada, published between September 15, 1906, and August 2, 1914, was the unofficial organ of the Ukrainian liberal movement as embodied in, first, the Ukrainian Democratic Radical Party (UDRP), and then later, the Society of Ukrainian Progressivists, or *Tovarystvo Ukrain's'kykh Postupovtsiv* (TUP). Rada is an extensive primary reference source which actually documents the evolution of Ukrainian liberal ideology. To the present, this newspaper has not been systematically and thoroughly explored in scholarly literature. To remedy the situation and make use of this estimable source of information, Rada forms the core of the body of research material utilized in this paper. Within the various genres of communication found on Rada's pages,

there can be traced a clear-cut picture of what the liberals' ideology began as, and what it eventually developed into through political experience. Rada is an invaluable reference source concerning the evolution of liberal ideology during this quintessential period, documenting its development on a daily basis. Through an in-depth study of the voice of the liberals as it was articulated in the daily newspaper Rada, this final argument will focus on Rada as both instrument of mobilization in, and mirror of, the liberals' efforts to rationalize the nationally dichotomous relationship between *Gesellschaft* and *Gemeinschaft*. It will thereby be shown that the liberals did indeed intend to resolve this dichotomous relationship by developing and appealing to a specific brand of Ukrainian nationalism, one which went through a considerable amount of change and actually matured during Rada's publication.

Of course, due to the circumstances of the time (i.e., censorship restricting free expression), it is not always easy to interpret the liberal political line in Rada. However, Rada treated a wide enough variety of subjects in a wide enough number of ways, such that, with patience, an accurate picture can be readily gained through its careful study. The study of this newspaper is further justified in the importance of the daily written word at a time when no other means of mass communication existed. The liberals had a mission, and Rada was virtually the only means by which

they could publicize their mission and mobilize mass support for it. Rada can thus be concluded to be the fountainhead of dissemination for Ukrainian liberal political thought in the period between 1906 and the war.

CHAPTER ONE

In the mid-nineteenth century, a specifically Ukrainian national consciousness was beginning to emerge in the almost wholly rural and poorly educated population of Russian Ukraine. This national consciousness was quickly shaped into a political nationalism which culminated, on January 22, 1918, in the declaration of the formation of an Ukrainian People's Republic in Eastern Ukraine, "independent, subject to no one, a free, sovereign state of the Ukrainian people."¹ Several months later, on November 1, 1918, a Western Ukrainian People's Republic was also proclaimed in Galicia.

Although the availability of pertinent primary information on the emergence of modern Ukrainian nationalism is limited, there are a number of important scholarly treatises which address it. However, plaguing these works is a lack of consensus on the evolution from national consciousness to political nationalism -- concerning why, when, how, among whom, and in what context it occurred. Indeed, the most compelling arguments expose three distinct approaches to Ukrainian nationalism: the primordialist, the neo-Marxist, and the revisionist approaches. In order to reveal what the key points were in the emergence of Ukrainian nationalism,

¹As quoted from the text of the Fourth Universal in Taras Hunczak, The Ukraine, 1917-1921: a Study in Revolution (New Jersey: Harvard University Press, 1977), p. 392.

this chapter assesses these three main approaches. This exercise will open the discussion to a more in-depth analysis of the complex interrelationships at work in the modernization of Ukrainian political thought, placing them within a concrete theoretical context arising from the conclusions drawn from this introduction.

1.1 The Primordialist Approach

Using Holsti's demarcation of paradigms,² we may identify the primordialist approach through its fundamental preoccupation with the historical development of the organic nation. The primary units of analysis are thus organic nations, all operating within a multinational system.

A leading figure working from the primordialist perspective in the analysis of Ukrainian nationalism is the highly esteemed Ukrainian historian, Mykhailo Hrushevsky. Hrushevsky was, in addition, an active participant in the national movement which he so thoroughly documented and ana-

²Ole Holsti, The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1985). Holsti identifies a paradigm through its problematique, its units of analysis at the micro-level, and its macro-level of analysis.

lyzed. Indeed, in 1918, he was the first designated president of the newly proclaimed Ukrainian People's Republic. Hrushevsky identifies critical points in the evolution from Ukrainian national consciousness to political nationalism by tracing the unilinear development of the Ukrainian people to nation-statehood.³ Hrushevsky wrote from the turn of the century to his death, in 1934.

Hrushevsky's analysis of Ukrainian national consciousness traces its emergence to the nineteenth century in the traditionally Ukrainian territories⁴ within Austro-Hungary and the Russian Empire, thereby embracing the influences of two vastly differing political cultures. Hrushevsky cites the influence of these two disparate Empires as they affected when, why, and among whom Ukrainian national consciousness emerged and how it eventually transformed itself into nationalism.

Under the Russian Empire, Eastern Ukraine was subjected to the three pillars of tsarist rule: Russian nationalism,⁵ autocracy, and Orthodoxy. Russification policies resulted in, for example, the banning of all publication in the Ukrainian language (1863, 1876). Two and one-half centuries

³The main reference book used here is Hrushevsky's concise A History of Ukraine, hereafter referred to as AHU.

⁴This refers to those territories which are today embraced by the Ukrainian SSR.

⁵The official doctrine of Russian nationalism was proclaimed during the reign of Nicholas I.

of cohabitation with Russians in Left Bank Ukraine and one and one-half in Right Bank Ukraine, intense Russification policies, and the Orthodox faith shared with the Russians had the cumulative effect of humbling and pacifying the Eastern Ukrainians concerning their national role in the Russian Empire.

On the other hand, the situation in those provinces which escaped the reach of the Russian Empire, Galicia, Bukovyna, and Transcarpathia, was quite different. There, the Ukrainians shared in the heritage of Central European political traditions, which included a budding parliamentary tradition. The nationalities experienced a considerable amount of cultural freedom under the relatively liberal conditions of Habsburg rule. In addition, Ukrainians living in these provinces had a religion, the Uniate faith, and a separate language which differentiated them from the dominant nationality of the region, the Poles.⁶ Thus, it may be surmised that a greater potential for the evolution of Ukrainian national consciousness into nationalism existed in this region of Western Ukraine.⁷

⁶The Uniate Church was formed as a result of the Union of Brest in 1596. It recognized the Papacy while still retaining the Eastern Rite. It is now known as the Ukrainian Catholic Church. See Bohdan Bociurkiw, "Religious Situation in Soviet Ukraine," in Ukraine in a Changing World, Walter Dushnyk, ed. (New York: Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, 1977), p. 192.

⁷Western Ukraine is comprised of, in addition to Galicia, Bukovyna, and Transcarpathia, the provinces of Volyn' and Polissia.

However, Hrushevsky pinpoints the national awakening as beginning in Eastern Ukraine, in the late eighteenth century. It took the form of a cultural movement or type of "consciousness raising" among the gentry, the descendants of Ukrainian Cossack officers. It revealed itself through nostalgia for the Ukrainian language and efforts to develop and preserve it (e.g., through writing down songs, proverbs, etc.). It also revealed itself in a nostalgia for a Paradise Lost -- the independent Cossack state which had fallen some 100 years earlier. According to Anthony Smith, this notion of a by-gone "golden age" is a fundamental symbol in nationalist struggles, providing the core element around which the legitimacy and direction of the struggle may be focused.* Hrushevsky's reference to the by-gone Golden Age is of cardinal importance in his analysis of the emergence and spread of Ukrainian national consciousness, and to its eventual politicization.

In 1847, the Brotherhood of Sts. Cyril and Methodius (the Kyrylo-Methodians) was formed by a group of young poets, writers, and intellectuals for the purposes of discussion and debate. Among the pertinent concepts addressed were liberty, equality, and freedom of speech and religion. Also on the agenda was debate on the nature of the best political system for all Slavs, which would entail a feder-

*Anthony Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986).

ation of all Slavic peoples, with each nation existing as a separate republic. The Kyrylo-Methodian's membership included those who would become the "fathers" of Ukrainian political thought and culture: Taras Shevchenko, Ukraine's greatest national bard; and Mykola Kostomarov, an eminent historian who wrote the programmatic document for the Brotherhood, The Book of the Genesis of the Ukrainian People.^{*} However, the membership consisted of, on the whole, intellectuals and not politicians, and thus the political-organizational functions of this group were minimal. The Kyrylo-Methodians did, nevertheless, lay the foundation of an articulate Ukrainian national consciousness, and the moment was ripe for the growth of a corresponding Ukrainian politics.

However, due to the autocracy's strict regime, the Kyrylo-Methodians were soon discovered by the secret police and disbanded. Arrests and exile followed. Thus ended the Eastern Ukrainians' initial efforts at organization. The next significant political organizations would appear only some fifty years later, when, upon the 1905 revolution, Ukrainian political activity was allowed to come out of the underground and begin to reorganize along the lines of distinct political parties. Hrushevsky is less interested in the fundamental differences dividing these parties, and more

^{*}Mykola Kostomarov, Knyhy byticia ukrains'koho narodu (L'viv: M. Vozniak, 1921).

in the fact that they were symptomatic of Ukrainian national and political development towards the end goal of independence. However, since they played virtually no role in the Imperial Dumas of the Russian Empire (due to the continually changing nature of the Dumas), he does not attach special significance to them. What bears greater significance to Hrushevsky's analysis is that this period brought with it the overall political development of Eastern Ukraine -- the overall political development of the organic nation -- the result of which was the revolutionary struggle for the establishment of the independent Ukrainian state during the 1917 revolution, reaching its climax in 1918.

In Hrushevsky's analysis of the development of Ukrainian national consciousness in Galicia,¹⁰ he finds that it occurred at a later date than in Eastern Ukraine. This is attributed to the absence, in Western Ukraine, of an Ukrainian gentry, the traditional carriers of national consciousness. The catalyst, in this case, becomes the Ukrainian Uniate clergy. The national awakening among the clergy came as a result of, amongst other things, its growing awareness of its national distinctiveness from the Roman Catholic Poles and the Orthodox Russians. In this way, the Uniate Church became a distinctively Ukrainian (or Ruthenian, as the Ukrainians of Western Ukraine were then called) national church. Furthermore, the clash of Galician na-

¹⁰And to a lesser extent, Bukovyna and Transcarpathia.

tional consciousness with the more nationally developed and inclined Poles added strength to the national awakening. Not only did the Poles serve as a point of conflict which helped to illuminate and exacerbate the we/they dichotomy in national consciousness, they also served as a model for Ukrainian national organization.

Another influence in the Galician national awakening was Germanic romantic nationalism, with its emphasis on glorification of the national past and native customs, language, and traditions. As with the Eastern Ukrainians a generation earlier, the mythic by-gone Golden Age of the Cossack republic thus emerged as a point of reference for Ukrainian national identity and purpose in history.

Although the national awakening in Galicia occurred approximately a generation later than in Eastern Ukraine, it was able to progress to political organization at a faster pace than its Eastern counterpart. This was largely due to the more liberal politics of Austro-Hungary. By the 1880s, two legal political parties based on Ukrainian national lines were already in existence: the Ruthenian-Ukrainian Radical party, made up of petty bourgeois liberals with an eye out for parliamentary democracy and socialism; and the Conservative Nationalists, who soon joined the Radicals in an effort to gain a broader appeal.

According to Hrushevsky, struggle and competition amongst the parties kept national consciousness alive and continued to politicize it toward modern nationalism in Galicia until the advent of World War I:

The national and political self-consciousness which had been aroused originally by a handful of people now permeated the whole nation; the people learned how to safeguard their rights and came to appreciate the value of organization and their own strength. The new movement differed from the policy of 1848 because the people did not wait and hope that the government would do something for them; they learned to build their own future, to rely on the own resources, and to go forward regardless of what their enemies said about them: they learned to be self-reliant.¹¹

The chaos of the war was certainly not conducive to the further development of political organization. Thus, Hrushevsky devotes the bulk of the remainder of his analysis to the formation and development of the Ukrainian People's Republic.

An important underlying current throughout Hrushevsky's analyses of Eastern and Western Ukrainian nationalism is his populist orientation. Hrushevsky states:

I was brought up in the strict tradition of Ukrainian radical populism which originated with the Brotherhood of Sts. Cyril and Methodius, and firmly believed that in the conflict between the people and the government, blame attaches to the government, since the interests of the working

¹¹Hrushevsky, AHU, p. 508.

people are the highest good, and if they are flouted, the people are free to change their social system.¹²

Since the vast majority of the Ukrainian population was of the peasant class, the majority of those being poor peasants,¹³ Hrushevsky saw the main stumbling bloc to Ukrainian political nationalism taking root as being the need of the gentry to adopt a Ukrainian populist ideology. The natural bearers of Ukrainian national consciousness would then go to the masses and confront them with their cultural heritage, and give them the cue and the arms they would need to take matters into their own hands in light of their rightful heritage. In this way, Ukraine would be able to avoid the corrupting influence of Western capitalism and thereby follow a separate path, in harmony with the national spirit, to social betterment.¹⁴ Hrushevsky thus tacitly acknowledges the class-based nature of Ukrainian identity and hence what Ukrainian nationalism should be based on; however, he is far from seeing class as the driving force in the evolution from national consciousness to political nationalism. Indeed,

¹²As quoted in 1920 in Ukrains'ka Partiya Sotsialistiv-Revoliutsioneriv ta ii zavdannia and cited in Thomas M. Prymak, "Mykhailo Hrushevsky: Populist or Statist?" Journal of Ukrainian Studies, Vol. 5-6, No. 10 (Spring, 1981), p. 69.

¹³The 1897 Russian census put 93% of Ukrainians as belonging to peasant estates, with 87% earning their living from agriculture. 57% were listed as poor peasants. See Krawchenko, p. 21-22.

¹⁴Prymak, p. 67.

the primary criterion which he bases the appeal of, and driving force in, the evolution of Ukrainian nationalism is the myth of the Paradise Lost -- a lost time of Ukrainian independence and glory.

1.2 The Neo-Marxist Approach

The neo-Marxist analysis of the evolution of Ukrainian national consciousness to political nationalism occurs within the context of the evolution of fundamental antagonisms at work within the broader class struggle. Nationalism is a transitory stage. Thus, with the emphasis on the evolution of classes placed at the heart of the development of Ukrainian nationalism, the neo-Marxist approach offers an alternative mode of analysis whose focus is on what the primordialist approach only tacitly acknowledges: the class-based nature of the Ukrainian national identity.

Bohdan Krawchenko, a contemporary scholar of Ukrainian studies, uses the neo-Marxist approach in his analysis of the genesis of Ukrainian nationalism.¹⁵ His analysis of the

¹⁵Krawchenko's Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth Century Ukraine, is the primary reference source used here.

evolution of Ukrainian national consciousness into political nationalism focuses on the national development of the Ukrainian peasantry in the Russian Empire.^{1*}

Krawchenko identifies the Ukrainian peasantry as the major unit of analysis in the development of Ukrainian national consciousness in the Russian Empire. Comprising approximately 93% of the Ukrainian population, this class was, on the whole, poor, illiterate, uneducated, and unorganized -- in short, pitifully inchoate as an agent of nationalism. The central issue here is how such underdeveloped masses come to arrive at the stage of national consciousness. Krawchenko proposes that this stage occurs when, as a result of mass economic grievances and growing economic discontent,

^{1*}Such an approach, however, poses several problems, its greatest drawback being the omission of developments in Western Ukraine. Krawchenko acknowledges this omission but offers no explanation. It is likely that the primacy of Krawchenko's class analysis overrides the significance of the impact of nationalism as a cross-boundary phenomenon of complex interdependencies. In light of post-World War II developments in the USSR, the omission of the development of Western Ukrainian nationalism reveals a fundamental lacuna in Krawchenko's analysis. Several scholars in both Western and Soviet academic communities (among them are Yaroslav Bilinsky, Ivan L. Rudnytsky, Roman Szporluk, Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, and John Armstrong) see the incorporation of Western Ukraine into the Ukrainian SSR during World War II as having had profound repercussions in the Soviet republic -- many going as far as to propose that Western Ukrainian nationalism has had a profound influence on Eastern Ukrainian nationalism. We cannot, therefore, address the issue of national consciousness in twentieth century Ukraine, without addressing -- at least in passing -- its development also in Western Ukraine. However, the value of Krawchenko's argument remains in its class-based analysis -- one which places primary importance on the economic class which constituted the majority of the population in question.

the peasantry perceives its chief economic antagonist as being the nobility, and becomes conscious of the nobility's national "otherness". The peasant differentiates him/herself from the exploiters not only on economic grounds, but also on national grounds, and thus becomes an Ukrainian peasant. The emergence of a politically significant Ukrainian national consciousness is thus pinpointed to the year 1902, when 82 noble estates were sacked by peasants in the Poltava and Kharkiv provinces. This signaled an "unfolding wave of agrarian discontent [which] had the potential of being channeled into a national movement."¹⁷

Although the peasant masses may now have been nationally conscious, they were still illiterate, uneducated, disorganized, and without material resources, so that their politicization was yet impossible. The natural leaders in the evolution from national consciousness to political nationalism are the gentry, whose job is to elaborate and politicize objective cultural markers. Like Hrushevsky, Krawchenko identifies the gentry as providing the necessary spark for the beginning of the national movement. However, the gentry did not pick up its role as the leader of the national movement because

[t]heir image of the 'ancient rights' of Little Russia never went beyond aristocratic corporatism. Every stirring of the peasantry drove the gentry

¹⁷Krawchenko, p. 22.

deeper and deeper into the camp of political reaction. ... at the turn of the twentieth century those among the gentry who identified themselves with the national movement were so few and far between that they stood out like 'white ravens' in their own milieu. In the first decades of the nineteenth century the gentry bowed out of Ukrainian history.^{1*}

In contrast to Hrushevsky, Krawchenko finds nothing "noble" in the gentry's role: their's is a false start; they were too far removed from the nature of the Ukrainian struggle to become a part of it.

The responsibility of leadership in the national movement thus had to fall to another class. The leadership dynamics of national movements are such that if the main interests of the established upper class of the movement

lie elsewhere, perhaps outside the country, or if it has accepted alien speech, habits or religion, or if, finally, it has come to care only for its own group interests in quite a narrow manner, then the national and social leadership may devolve upon the next class below it, or still further down to whichever class is sufficiently strong, respected and locally accessible to become in fact the leading group of the national movement.^{1*}

Since there were very, very few Ukrainian capitalists (e.g., in the Kiev and Kharkiv provinces -- the urban heartland of

^{1*}Ibid., p. 32.

^{1*}Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, 2nd ed. (Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1966), pp. 101-102.

Ukraine -- there were only six) and virtually no Ukrainian petty bourgeoisie, the task of leadership fell to the Ukrainian intelligentsia. Krawchenko cites the founding of the Kyrylo-Methodians as the political debut of this class.

The emergence of the intelligentsia as the *de facto* leadership of the national movement could not have occurred without the advent of capitalism in the Russian Empire. Exploitative internal colonialism and agrarian overpopulation and economic discontent led to an influx of Ukrainian intelligentsy into the cities that were largely Russian in Left Bank Ukraine, and Polish and Jewish in Right Bank Ukraine. When confronted with the national "otherness" and de-nationalizing influences of the city (especially Russifying influences, which were a matter of policy in Russia), the Ukrainian intelligent either assimilated to the dominant nationality, or became culturally alienated. Many became alienated: like the Ukrainian peasant, the intelligent, pursuing his/her economic inclination in the city, was faced with advantaged national "otherness," and had little choice other than to reflect upon the political order. S/he thus became a nationally conscious Ukrainian intelligent.

Modernization is also a key determinant in the emergence of the nationally conscious intelligentsia. The emancipating air of the city, education, travel, and technology gave the intelligentsia the necessary tools so that when they would return to the villages, they could carry on the

education and national politicization of the peasantry. The loosening of restrictions on the printed Ukrainian word after the 1905 revolution was a further boon to the intelligenty who wanted to reach the people. Printing presses sprang up literally over night and numerous different newspapers abounded.

However, because the Ukrainian peasantry was still largely illiterate (substantial inroads against illiteracy still needed time), the propaganda and educational potentials of the printed media were yet underutilized. Among other factors working against the intelligentsia in its leadership role were that it still constituted a very small layer of the population, and that it did not occupy many of the positions which commonly serve as the focal point of a national movement. With the majority of Ukrainian intelligenty occupying positions such as clerks and petty officials, there was not very much opportunity to develop the necessary drive and effective leadership skills. And finally, the influence of Russification policies was always a strong factor to contend with.

Nonetheless, Ukrainian national consciousness was beginning to become organized and politicized as a result of the efforts of the intelligentsia. By the end of 1905, the same peasants which in 1902 had sacked 82 estates were forwarding petitions to the government demanding the right to the Ukrainian language, Ukrainian schools, and Ukrainian po-

litical autonomy. However, it must be emphasized that this political nationalism emerged only after the peasantry had been fighting for years on economic grounds.

Krawchenko treats the emergence of Ukrainian political parties in 1905 as a failure, attributable to the low level of Ukrainian economic development and sophistication. The parties turned to socialism in an effort to solve Ukraine's problems, but this only led to political confusion; e.g., in clarification of how to create socialism without a working class; in trying to organize working class parties without a working class. The result of this political confusion was the division of the nationally conscious Ukrainian intelligentsia. Lacking cohesive leadership, the Ukrainian peasant class was also fragmented along political lines, thereby weakening the national movement as a whole. This negative development is seen as the primary factor behind the Central Rada's inability to fully consolidate its government in the Ukrainian People's Republic. Indeed, Krawchenko does not even consider the 1917 "Ukrainian revolution" in his analysis, which would be unthinkable from the primordialist perspective.

1.3 The Revisionist Approach

The revisionist approach is the last one to be examined in this chapter. Although it is essentially based in the pluralist paradigm and often smacks of the realism found in International Relations theory, its fundamental concern is with the complex forces and influences of modernization, and it thus provides an alternative tool for the analysis of Ukrainian nationalism. The revisionist central thesis is that although modernization can promote politicization of ethnicity, modernization is a process to which some groups - in this case, ethnic groups -- are more receptive than others. The key variable determining this receptiveness is the "modernizing ethos" (of the Western variety) within the ethnic group and the political system within which it finds itself, which, in turn, varies with the peculiar ingredients, both objective and subjective, of the particular ethnic group and political system. These ingredients include, among other things, religion (e.g., whether it is fatalistic or concomitant to social action, and whether it is authoritative dogma or open to individual interpretation), social structure, and character of the elites -- in short, the political culture of the group.²⁰ The group is further influ-

²⁰James Scarritt and William Safran, "The Relationship of Ethnicity to Modernization and Democracy: A Restatement of the Issues," International Studies Notes, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Summer, 1983), p. 16.

enced by the dynamics present within the political system in which it is situated. Thus, ethnic groups within pluralist states are essentially treated as distinct units in the revisionist analysis. Nationalism is a stage through which an ethnic group may pass. However, it is not an obligatory stage in an ethnic group's development. Whether the particular ethnic group passes through this stage largely depends on the various modernizing dynamics and forces present within the socio-political system. The type of nationalism which may emerge as a result of these dynamics and forces largely depends on the modernizing ethos of the particular group and the system itself. Thus, when addressing the emergence of nationalism, and the key points of revisionist analysis examine modernization as the essential catalyst in the development of ethnic groups to this stage.

Several prominent scholars of Ukrainian studies have addressed the evolution of Ukrainian national consciousness to political nationalism within the revisionist approach.²¹ The work of Ivan L. Rudnytsky, supplemented by the work of other revisionists on special points of interest, is examined here as the exemplar of the revisionist analysis of this evolution.²² Rudnytsky's concise analysis focuses on

²¹E.g., John Reshetar, Ivan L. Rudnytsky, Jurij Borys, John Armstrong.

²²This section refers primarily to the analysis in Ivan L. Rudnytsky, "The Ukrainian National Movement on the Eve of the First World War," East European Quarterly, Vol. XI, No. 2 (Summer, 1977), pp. 141-154.

the key points in national development which resulted when agrarian Ukrainian society collided with modernizing forces.

Unlike Krawchenko, the distinctiveness of the political cultures of Eastern and Western Ukraine is central to Rudnytsky's analysis. However, equally important are the interrelationships between the two cultures, and how these interrelationships influenced their development. The degree to which these interrelationships are important substantially differentiates Rudnytsky's approach from that of Hrushevsky.

Like Hrushevsky and Krawchenko, Rudnytsky traces the emergence of Ukrainian national consciousness to the early nineteenth century in Eastern Ukraine and the coming together of the Kyrylo-Methodians. Because of political backwardness and repression in the Russian Empire, few inroads were made in the development of a national movement, which remained in a state of spiritual stagnation until the turn of the century. This is virtually the only point of consensus shared among the three approaches.

In the revisionist analysis, one of the primary factors affecting the dichotomy in the development of Ukrainian nationalism is Western Ukraine's location as a border area.²³

²³John S. Reshetar, The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-1920 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), p. 10. Raymond Pearson expands on the significance of border lands in the development of nationalism: "It is well known that extreme nationalists tend to come from the borderlands, the

Linguistic, religious, and cultural differences were accentuated in the clash between Ukrainians and Poles, which influenced the development of national consciousness on a scale which was never attained in Eastern Ukraine, where this confluence of religious, class, and language boundaries was absent.

In the revisionist approach, national differentiation in political life is only possible under a political system which recognizes freedom of assembly and organization.²⁴ The centre of gravity of the Ukrainian national movement thus moved to Galicia, where it was revitalized by the modernizing influence of Austro-Hungary. The constitutional arrangements of Austro-Hungary were essential for the politicization of national consciousness. Elections were beginning to make mobilization of the masses the norm (universal manhood suffrage was declared in 1907), and a Galician modernizing ethos geared toward parliamentary

friction zones of their nation. 'Border dwellers' are more sensitive about national identity and loyalty through day-to-day proximity to the state frontier, develop firmer commitments through awareness of the alternatives and are more subject to neuroses about territorial adjustment and therefore national security. ... Least nationalist of all is likely to be the population of the rural heartland of a territory, where the demands of economic self-interest and the absence of contact with aliens lull the 'core dwellers' into a comfortable, even complacent sense of well-being." See Raymond Pearson, National Minorities in Eastern Europe, 1848-1945 (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1983), p. 20.

²⁴Jurij Borys, "Political Parties in the Ukraine," in The Ukraine, 1917-1921: a Study in Revolution, ed. Taras Hunczak (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977), p. 129.

democracy was developing. The struggle for the democratization of Austria's constitution is thus seen as central to the political development of the Galician Ukrainians. In Eastern Ukraine, by contrast, the lack of the development of a modernizing ethos in the political arena is seen as holding back the development of the national movement.

Another important factor which allowed for the national movement's centre of gravity to move to Galicia was religion. The Uniate faith is seen as a modernizing force in its ties to the West, and its concurrent protection of Ukrainians from Polish and Hungarian Roman Catholicism and the regressive influences of Russian Orthodoxy. It is for this reason that the Uniate clergy in Western Ukraine were the first ones to take up the national struggle. Indeed, Rudnytsky points to the Metropolitan of the Galician ecclesiastical province, Andrei Sheptyts'kyi, as being almost synonymous with the Ukrainian independence movement after 1900. Religion and nationalism had mutually reinforcing interests.

The positive atmosphere toward national development in Galicia thus attracted the talents of nationally-motivated Eastern Ukrainians. Since publications and teaching in the Ukrainian language were illegal in the Russian Empire until 1905, Easterners would contribute regularly to Galician journals and would have their books published in L'viv. Thus, Galicians had the added benefit of Eastern Ukrainian

thought and cultural tradition, which included the Cossack myth, to draw on, which helped transform their movement into one with a "pan-Ukrainian" ideology.²⁹ In addition, important Ukrainian personages, such as Drahomanov, who would found the Ruthenian-Ukrainian Radical Party in 1891, and Hrushevsky, spent considerable amounts of time in Galicia.

The modernizing influences of Austria coupled with the cultural and intellectual influences of Eastern Ukraine thus made Galicia and Bukovyna a fertile ground for the development of a modern national movement. Organizational and political skills, plus the emergence of an Ukrainian national consciousness combined to result in a network of cultural and economic institutions: schools, cooperatives, the use of the Ukrainian language in social communications, and most important of all, an intelligentsia interested in fostering and maintaining Ukrainian culture among the masses.

The development of the Ukrainian movement under such modernizing influences also resulted in the sophistication of politicized ethnicity. In 1898, the Western Ukrainians were campaigning for the establishment of an Ukrainian university in L'viv. This had important repercussions amongst the intelligentsia across the border, in Eastern Ukraine. The emergence of the Ukrainians as a legitimate national force with the right to their own university is seen to have

²⁹Borys, p. 147.

had a legitimizing effect on the Eastern Ukrainian national movement, thereby encouraging it to intensified activism.²⁶

The dynamism of the Ukrainian community in Galicia and, to a lesser extent, Bukovyna, is believed to have profoundly influence events in Eastern Ukraine. By 1900, Easterners were organizing themselves along political party lines in the underground. Galicia was used as the base of these political activities. The liberalizing policies brought on the 1905 revolution resulted in an overnight flowering of Ukrainian cultural and political activity. Cultural and educational organizations emerged along the lines of the ones already in existence in Western Ukraine. The political parties were successful in forming an Ukrainian caucus of 40-50 deputies to be sent to the First and Second Imperial Dumas (although, as Hrushevsky is quick to point out, these delegations never had any significant effect on the government). However, it is important to note that because of the backwardness of the Eastern Ukrainian movement at the time, the 1905 revolution certainly was not an Ukrainian revolution, but the catalyst for the beginning of the growth of politicized ethnicity as the norm:

the Ukrainian movement, however, could no longer be contained. Russia had become a semi-constitu-

²⁶The struggle for an Ukrainian university in L'viv resulted in an Ukrainian-Polish compromise and the establishment of an Ukrainian history chair at the University of L'viv.

tional state, and wholesale repression, in the style of the ukase of Ems [a decree making the Ukrainian language illegal], was no longer feasible. When the administration harassed and closed down Ukrainian associations, new substitute forms of activity were found.²⁷

Such a politicization could not have occurred without the brief liberalizing period after 1905, which allowed the Eastern Ukrainians to learn political skills and openly found Ukrainian organizations.

The revisionist approach does not discount the impact of class in the development of an Ukrainian national movement. An important contribution made by John Armstrong points out the influence of the fundamental cleavage in the social structure of Russian Ukraine, where nationality largely coincided with social class.²⁸ The peasant base of Ukrainian nationality was largely responsible for the populist ideology which developed in the national movement. Thus the political parties which appeared on the scene in 1905 made their appeals to the masses mainly in the language of agrarian reform and socialism. Indeed, relative to the primordialists and neo-Marxists, revisionists devote a considerable amount of space to the analysis of the development of political parties in Eastern and Western Ukraine as play-

²⁷Borys, p. 151.

²⁸John Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), p. 10.

ing a significant role in the modernization of the Ukrainian movement.

Mass mobilization is clearly a critical stage in the revisionist analysis of nationalism. Thus, a key date in the evolution from national consciousness to political nationalism is said to have occurred in 1914, when the national movement showed distinct signs of becoming a mass, pan-Ukrainian movement. In February, the Western Ukrainians won a political victory in having a new provincial statute adopted which made Galicia a legal province with its own electoral system. The Ukrainians as a bloc conquered a significant share in political power, thus breaking the Polish monopoly. In Eastern Ukraine, that same month, organized mass demonstrations, with the numbers of participants running into the tens of thousands, occurred simultaneously in several cities. These demonstrations, organized by a Kiev students' committee, were in protest to the official prohibition of the commemoration of the centenary of the national poet Shevchenko's birth. The demonstrations were of such a proportion that they had to be broken up by detachments of mounted police. Although it could not be said that the Ukrainians were already a fully crystallized nation, the Ukrainian movement had changed from a cultural trend into a mass movement almost simultaneously in Eastern and Western Ukraine.

This burgeoning mass movement culminated in the declaration of an independent Ukrainian state in both Eastern and Western Ukraine in 1918. However, in the revisionist analysis, there is considerable controversy over the significance of the 1918 period concerning the crystallization of Ukrainians into a cohesive nation. Much of the literature overlooks the Western Ukrainian People's Republic.²⁹ For those who address Eastern Ukraine, some consider the 1918 government a bourgeois administration which failed because it was out of touch with the peasant masses, the soldiers, and the urban proletariat.³⁰ Others consider it to have been democratic and strongly socialist in ideology, but unable to survive largely due to the chaos of war and revolution.³¹

However, the power of modernization as an influence during the revolutionary period prevails throughout all of these approaches. It is neatly summed up by Jurij Borys:

Ukrainian political parties in the period before the fall of the tsarist regime could be characterized as revolutionary parties proposing different political ideologies but representing, nevertheless, a single national liberation movement. Only after assuming *de facto* political power in the

²⁹On the Western Ukrainian People's Republic, see Michael Yaremko, From Separation to Unity (Toronto: Shevchenko Scientific Society, 1967).

³⁰Reshetar, p. 48.

³¹Armstrong, p. 11.

middle of 1917 did they begin to transform themselves into national governmental parties.³²

Notwithstanding the controversy over the government and the back-stage role given to the Western Ukrainian People's Republic in the revisionist approach, the 1917 revolutionary period is generally considered by revisionists to be the marker of the development of Ukrainian national consciousness into political nationalism seeking the establishment of a modern nation-state.

1.4. Conclusion

This cursory overview of the main approaches to the discussion of the evolution of Ukrainian nationalism exposes a fundamental controversy over the nature of Ukrainian nationalism itself. What is Ukrainian nationalism? Is it a transitory historical stage, or a point in the continuum of the development of the organic nation? Why does it occur, and how does it develop? Who are its bearers? Although the above three analyses offer fundamentally different answers to these questions, there nonetheless appears to be a common

³²Borys, p. 135.

thread running through each of them. This common thread is the influence of *modernization* in the evolution from national consciousness to political nationalism. For the primordialist, national consciousness develops to a point of political significance first under the modernizing influences of the democratizing state; it cannot occur to such a significant and sophisticated extent under the backward conditions of tsarist political culture. The advent of capitalism is pivotal in the neo-Marxist approach for the politicization of national consciousness. For the revisionist, the process of modernization holds the key to the course of the evolution of national consciousness to political nationalism.

Indeed, the excellence of the revisionist approach lies in its emphasis on the complex, interdependent relationships between modernization and national development. What determines the nature, direction, pace, and ultimately, success, of the evolution of nationalism is the group's modernizing ethos -- a concept which adds a new dimension to the neo-Marxist explanation of the failure of the Ukrainian national movement in the early twentieth century, and forces a re-examination of the primordialist interpretation of the significance of the ideological differences of the budding Ukrainian political parties during the 1905 period. Indeed, the fate of the movement was actually determined in the development of these political parties, in whether they could

ever become viable mass parties capable of national unification and mobilization in the name of the end goal of Ukrainian nationalism. It may be thus concluded that the revisionist approach provides the best point of departure for the examination of Ukrainian nationalist ideology which began with the birth of the Kyrylo-Methodians.

CHAPTER TWO

A theory of Ukrainian political development and initiation to political "modernity" drawn from the revisionist approach is forwarded in this chapter. The purpose of this exercise is to examine the various factors at play in the development of a specifically Ukrainian modernizing ethos, in order that the very nature of that ethos may be identified. It will be thereby shown that the further development of Ukrainian nationalism was essential for the continued modernization of Ukrainian society as a whole. It is proposed that religion was a key determinant in the triggering and shaping of modern Ukrainian nationalism (i.e., the impulse to political self-determination) which emerged in nineteenth century Ukraine. The Ukrainian reaction to the imposition of Russian Orthodoxy provided the initial impetus for modernization and the development of a specifically Ukrainian modernizing ethic, which was, in turn, shaped by the particular political circumstances of the time.

The relationship between religion and incipient Ukrainian nationalism is placed within a Weberian theoretical context as pertaining to the modernization of a nation under imperial rule. This relationship is explored in an expose and analysis of the main currents of thought influencing the development of a modern Ukrainian political consciousness, focusing on the Kyrylo-Methodians, the political

thought of Mykhailo Drahomanov, and the historiographical contribution of Mykhailo Hrushevsky. The expose explores the role of religion in the process of modernization, the implications of its role for the philosophical orientations which subsequently emerged among the articulators of Ukrainian nationalism, and the type of nationalism which emerged out of the modernization process.

2.1 Theoretical Framework

At the root of the two main theoretical approaches to modern development theory which could help to explain the Ukrainian case is the thought of Karl Marx and Max Weber. Both offer philosophical approaches to history which largely come out of the Hegelian tradition, as modified by various of their contemporary philosophical trends. Although their two very different reactions to Hegelian philosophy ultimately have a similar telos (based on the notion of time as progress), their approaches to the end of history differ substantially. This difference lies in their different conceptualizations of truth: Marx offers scientific laws as the basis on which social science may be put into practise; Weber holds that since history is subjective because a given

individual is necessarily selective (i.e., cannot comprehend the totality of history) and cannot escape the intellectual confines of his/her moment in history, no social science can result in absolute laws of history. It can only result in particular theory based upon ideal types.

The approaches of Marx and Weber to modernization both focus on the development of capitalism, and the telos of their theories lies in the transcendence of this historical stage. This transcendence involves the simplification and homogenization of social relations. However, the nature of this transcendence and its meaning is very different in both of their approaches. The logic behind this notion of transcendence is of particular importance in the treatment of a national group in a pre-capitalist stage of history. For Marx, capitalism will necessarily and inevitably be transcended due to its own inherent contradictions as dictated by the laws of historical materialism. The logic of history, which has culminated in the division of humanity into two hostile classes under capitalism, will take humanity into a new stage of communist economic relations after the final elimination of class tensions. For Weber, the transcendence of capitalism will also bring about social homogeneity through simplification. However, it will come about not according to the logic of the scientific laws of history nor necessarily the complete downfall of capitalism, but because of the logic of bureaucracy. Bureaucratization, un-

derstood in sum as a process of rationalization of social relations, creates its own demands, forces, and institutions which are self-perpetuating and tend towards aggrandizement. Depending on a multiplicity of factors (which do not exclude the class contradictions that Marx envisaged), this process may go in various directions, and not only "forward" towards increased rationalization, or modernity. This "multiplicity of factors" may be subsumed under the simplified title of political culture, which is defined as the "attitudinal and behavioural matrix within which the political system is located."¹

Indeed, the issue of culture is at the very heart of the differences between Marx and Weber. This has important implications for how one is to approach the subject of modernization. For the Marxist, culture is less of an issue than a self-evident "law." Culture is part of the super-structure which is ultimately determined by the relations of production, and thus necessarily reflects the interests of the dominant class. A general change in the relations of production will concurrently produce a change in culture, thus ushering in a new historical stage. The implications of this approach for modernization theory are that once a particular historical mode of production has been transcended in a given society, the development of the subse-

¹Stephen White, Political Culture and Soviet Politics (London: The Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1979), p. 1.

quent contradictions in production and class tensions will occur *along the same lines* as that which has occurred largely in Western Europe, with culture (superstructure) also following along the same path. This is an *universal*, unilinear process, punctuated with violent upheavals as historical contradictions work themselves out.

Weber, in rejecting Marx's historical determinism, grapples with culture as problematic. Although rationalization is taken to be the most fundamental process in historical development, it cannot be divorced from the political culture within which it occurs. Weber thus introduces the concepts of *Gesellschaft* and *Gemeinschaft* in order to clarify the historical interplay of culture and bureaucracy. *Gesellschaft* signifies the bureaucratic element of a state. It is manifest in the territorial unit of coercive political organization, whose form of allegiance is citizenship and whose units of recognition are other states, and is typified by rational, institutional, and legal relationships between the state and individual. In the case under study, *Gesellschaft* may be defined almost exclusively by, and in terms of, Russian tsarist (and to a lesser extent, Polish) socio-political organization. *Gemeinschaft* signifies the "culture" of a state, or its "peopleness." Its features are both subjective and objective, its unit of allegiance ranges from shared communal identity to "shared blood," and its

unit of recognition is itself.² The relationship between the individual and *Gemeinschaft* is primordial, familial, and traditional. *Gemeinschaft* is not initially self-conscious, and cannot therefore be construed to signify a nation. Only upon the politicization of *Gemeinschaft* does the nation come into being. Mid to late nineteenth century Ukrainians, virtually totally excluded from the official *Gesellschaft*, can only be regarded in *Gemeinschaft* terms.³

According to Weber, *Gesellschaft* initially arises from the demands of *Gemeinschaft*; this is the first stage of civilized history. Once triggered, because of the self-perpetuating and expansive nature of bureaucracy, *Gesellschaft* can develop on its own; i.e., disproportionately to *Gemeinschaft*, and tends to want to institutionalize itself as the culture's end. However, this is ungenial to *Gemeinschaft*, and the social sickness caused by it manifests itself in increasing tensions within the social system. At such stress points, charismatic authority, the antithesis of *Gesellschaft* may emerge and lead the society into a new era. Otherwise, social disintegration ensues.

²Indeed, the idea of *Gemeinschaft* is similar to the definition of a nation which is given in Walker Connor, "A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group, is a ..." in *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 4 (October, 1978), pp. 377-400.

³This generalization excludes the assimilated Ukrainian gentry, which, while in positions of power, either played no role in the Ukrainian movement, or participated in the repressive policies of the administration against ukrainstvo.

Once spent, the institutionalization or bureaucratization of charisma is inevitable, and the direction of this routinization largely depends on political forces already present within *Gemeinschaft*.⁴ Thus, the Weberian approach to development, although implicitly teleological,⁵ focuses more on the interplay of *Gesellschaft* and *Gemeinschaft*, with the notions of modernization and progress implied in the increasing efficiency of *Gesellschaft*, and the increasing sophistication of *Gemeinschaft* necessary to control *Gesellschaft* -- as much as it can be controlled.

Thus, the thought of Marx and Weber offer two different approaches to political development, largely centering on two different conceptualizations of culture. The Marxist approach is inherently optimistic concerning "modernization," since it depends on the universal laws of historical materialism. Any particular society can modernize to and through a stage of Western-style capitalism, contingent on its harnessing of the mode of production. The Weberian approach is far more ambivalent on the issue of Western-style modernization. The process of modernization is part of the interplay of the forces of bureaucracy and culture, while its form is shaped by the political propen-

⁴"[I]t is not the ethical doctrine of a religion, but that form of ethical conduct upon which premiums are placed that matters." Max Weber, From Max Weber (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 321.

⁵This is apparent moreso in his analysis of the relationship of Protestantism to capitalism.

sities which are part of the attitudinal and behavioural matrix of culture. Implicit herein is that the direction of "modernization" is not necessarily unilinear.

It is far beyond the scope of this dissertation to resolve the differences at the root of these two approaches to modernization. Both offer valid insights as to the progress of history. However, in assessing the impact of religion on a particular form of consciousness as significant, and perhaps even quintessential, one inevitably takes a Weberian standpoint; i.e., one takes a decisive look at culture as problematic to modernization. Indeed, the critical stress points occurring in the interplay of the *Gesellschaft* of Russian imperial rule and the *Gemeinschaft* of incipient Ukrainian nationhood reveal the dynamics which made possible the emergence of a modern type of Ukrainian nationalism. It is at the points of tension between *Gesellschaft* and *Gemeinschaft* in nineteenth century Eastern Ukraine that we find the first stage of the processes of social rationalization - secularization, or the beginning of the modernization process.

Secularization, the initial stage in the process of rationalization or modernization, is the conscious "disenchantment of the world."² It is the transformation of a religio-political system, which is stable not because of

²Weber, p. 51.

efficiency but through religious integration and legitimacy, whose ideological component is largely provided by religion, whose political community largely corresponds to its religious community, whose religious specialists perform essential rituals which legitimate royal power, and whose ruler has extensive religious functions; into a secular political system, where, on the institutional, *Gesellschaft* side, there is a separation of the polity from religion so that the polity does not derive its legitimacy from religion, and on the *Gemeinschaft* side, where there is a transformation of political culture so that politically relevant values assume a secular orientation.⁷ Generally, the process of secularization is taken to entail three stages: 1) the separation of the polity from religious ideologies and ecclesiastical structures; 2) the expansion of the polity to perform regulatory functions in the socio-economic sphere formerly performed by religion; and 3) the transvaluation of political culture to emphasize nontranscendental, temporal goals and rational pragmatic means; i.e., secular political values.⁸ Needless to say, this is not an irreversible process, nor does it necessarily occur in the above sequence. There is an interdependence of influence of structure and culture in the development of society, which may fluctuate in various direction at various paces. It is a process which is not

⁷Donald E. Smith, Religion and Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970), pp. 5-11.

⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 85-114.

unilinear nor cyclical, but is marked by discontinuities when the existing institutions cannot cope with the stress caused by increasing *Gesellschaft* demands.*

The significance of the secularization process to the development of a modern Ukrainian national consciousness and subsequent nationalism is unequivocal because of the structural, societal circumstances within which it occurred. the widening cleavage which developed between the bureaucratic and cultural elements of the state in Eastern Ukraine, which triggered the beginning of the secularization of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, occurred along ethnic lines. Thus, the modernization and development of the Ukrainian *Gemeinschaft* was not only a response to the social malaise created by an increasingly oppressive *Gesellschaft*, but also to what was increasingly perceived as being an ethno-nationally, and hence culturally, foreign *Gesellschaft*.

It may also be contended that the emergence of this stress point between *Gesellschaft* and *Gemeinschaft* also created the potential for the influence of the Ukrainian intelligentsia by any type of foreign ideological source which was compatible to, and encouraging of, Ukrainian *Gemeinschaft* values. Thus, a distinctly Polish influence -- Poles being the closest neighbours, in proximity and culture, to Ukrainians in Right-Bank Ukraine -- may be discerned in the

*Weber, p. 52.

early awakenings of Ukrainian nationhood. This is evident in the adaptation of many Polish modes of expression to the Ukrainian cause. The Poles, aptly described as a nation of petty nobles without a state, became a model of nationhood and national struggle. In addition, the impact of Polish romanticism on the Ukrainian intelligentsia, those who would ultimately give definition to Ukrainian nationhood, was far-reaching.

2.2 The Articulation of Ukrainian National Consciousness

Out of the national awakening which occurred in mid-eighteenth century Eastern Ukraine emerged an Ukrainian populist movement during the late eighteenth century, represented principally by Hryhorii Skovoroda. The advent of what is now referred to as "Skovorodism" was characterized by blatant anti-clericalism and a conspicuous movement "to the People;" i.e., the Ukrainian people, thereby implying a positive valuation and elevation of Ukrainian culture and the Ukrainian "common folk." Hrushevsky attributes the emergence and increasing popularity of this movement not simply to the attractiveness of its leadership and ideas, but moreso because it was a response to the "general dispo-

sition and demands" generated by Ukrainian society of the time¹⁰ -- an inherent impulse to democratization.

The populism of Skovoroda was part of a broader trend which had already taken root in urban Russia under the influence of Germanic romanticism (with its fundamental concern with *Gemeinschaft*, as exemplified in the philosophy of Schelling).¹¹ The highly organized Freemason movement, also imported from the Germans, is likewise believed to have had a tremendous impact on Ukrainian populism. Hrushevsky maintains that German-style Freemasonry, with its emphasis on anti-clericalism, held a special attraction for Ukrainian intellectuals living in Russian cities seeking to escape the ideology and morality engendered by Russian feudal social stratification as legitimated by the official Orthodox church.¹² Indeed, Skovoroda openly associated himself with Freemasonry, and his social sermons contained not only many parallels with eighteenth century Freemason doctrine, but

¹⁰Mykhailo Hrushevsky, Z istorii relegiinoi dumky na Ukraini (L'viv: Drukarnia Naukovoho Tovarystva im. Shevchenka, 1925), p. 103; hereafter cited as Z istorii.

¹¹Schellingian philosophy places an emphasis on the foremost relevance of poetry and language to peoples' lives. Within poetry may be found the intellectual and creative spirit of a people, with its language developing in connection with the landscape of the nation's homeland. Poetry and folklore are not only closely connected with the "spirit" of a people, but also with its physical being -- its existence as a nation. See Dmitry Cizevsky, "The Influence of the Philosophy of Schelling (1774-1834) in Ukraine," in Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.A., Vol. II, No. 1 (Spring, 1952), pp. 1128-1139.

¹²Hrushevsky, Z istorii, p. 103.

even direct phraseology.¹³ The "trickle-down" effect of Freemasonry from Russia led to the establishment of Freemason lodges in the urban centres of Eastern Ukraine, and according to Hrushevsky, Freemasonry in Ukraine ultimately took on an Ukrainian political character (as exemplified by Skovoroda and his followers, most prominent among them being Ivan Kotliarevsky).

The emergence of Skovorodism is symptomatic of the clash of *Gemeinschaft* with *Gesellschaft* which was to lead to the modernization of Ukrainian culture into an Ukrainian political culture. The pervasive social malaise in Ukrainian society was already apparent in a general dissatisfaction among the peasantry and intelligentsia with the traditional source of legitimacy of tsarism, the official Orthodox church. There was a general social alienation from the official church as a source of spirituality, and a concurrent movement for the pursuit of spirituality outside of it. Not only was the Church an instrument of political propaganda for the tsarist regime, its schools were also tools of Russification. Indeed, theological academies were, in effect, "Russian schools,"¹⁴ which served to alienate Ukrainian theological aspirants from their cultural roots.¹⁵ Hence, the

¹³Ibid., p. 104.

¹⁴Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia, Volume 2 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971), p. 165.

¹⁵I. Vlasovs'ky, Narys istorii ukrains'koi pravoslavnoi tserkvy (New York: Ukrainian Orthodox Church, 1955), Vol.

attraction to the Freemason movement for the intelligentsia, while the disgruntled peasantry formed a growing affiliation with Protestant evangelical sects brought in with German settlers (Mennonites and Hutterites) and Russian settlers (Dukhobors), which the Ukrainian peasantry came in contact with as hired labour. The evangelical-conversionist nature of these sects and their disdain for, and outright rejection of, the official "tsarist" church led to the phenomenon of proselytism among many Ukrainians by the new evangelical religious doctrines. During the 1870's many German Baptists (who were very well organized, energetic, and held high moral standards) came to Eastern Ukraine as missionaries to the German settlers. Eventually, the Baptist influence reached the Ukrainian peasantry and was manifest in numerous conversions. It is estimated that the Baptist-evangelical movement had spread all over Ukraine to such an extent that by the coming of the First World War, their numbers were in the several hundreds of thousands.¹⁶ The Ukrainian conver-

III, p. 261. However, it must be noted that much of the Ukrainian intelligentsia was recruited from priestly families, since virtually the only form of education to be had in nineteenth century Ukraine for Ukrainians was found in the seminaries. Ukrainian radicals and activists were, in fact, often graduates, or at least "expellees" from theological seminaries, or children of priests. Ukrainian nationalist ideology eventually did penetrate the seminaries to a certain extent (for example, after the 1905 revolution, Bishop Parfenii Levyts'ky allowed Ukrainian to be used in sermons, and he also edited a translation of the Gospels into Ukrainian). However, the maturation of this movement within the church would not come to be until the 1917 revolution and the struggle for an Autocephalous Church.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 125-130, 135.

sions were not only a demonstration against the official Orthodox church, but also a protest against the religio-political tsarist order. Indeed, leaving the official church was then considered to be a political act in itself, since it was, in fact, a highly illegal act.¹⁷ However, it must be noted that, although these conversions occurred along ethno-national lines, they were not of an Ukrainian political character. The Baptist-evangelical sects were of an "enthusiastic" religious nature, and thus strictly a-political. Indeed, many converts, because of their aloof, overt and even militant religious self-righteousness, succeeded in totally alienating their fellow villagers.

It is also important to recognize how deep-rooted the Orthodox faith actually was among the Ukrainian peasantry. Although they may have been pessimistic about, and even hostile to, the official tsarist church, their faith in Orthodoxy persisted not only outside of, but also in spite of the official church. The conservative peasant strove to maintain traditional religious rites,¹⁸ many of which were tied to ancient pagan rituals and cycles of nature which determined an agrarian society's activities. The Orthodox church

¹⁷Ibid., p. 134. Separate religious tolerance was granted only to the German settlers, and was categorically refused to Ukrainian offshoots of these Protestant sects. A special law of 1894 specifically forbade the gatherings of one of the principal Ukrainian Protestant sects, the Shtundbaptists, deeming them to be of the "particularly pernicious" category of religious heresies.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 262.

was perceived to be an ancient, eternal institution in which past generations were connected to the present and future. It was an institution that was not created by human beings, but was a gift of God.¹⁹ Although its present keepers, the Russian or Russified Orthodox clergy, may have been perceived to be corrupt, the church itself (as the embodiment of faith), remained eternal and true.

However, the key to understanding the emergence of a modern Ukrainian national consciousness lies in the national dichotomy between *Gesellschaft* and *Gemeinschaft* which was accentuated during the process of secularization; i.e., in the rebellion against the official church, dramatically manifest in proselytism by the evangelical sects, and generally manifest in pervasive alienation from, suspicion of, and pessimism towards official Orthodoxy. This national dichotomy between structure and culture is responsible for the peculiar path of specifically Ukrainian secularization: because Ukrainians were, on the whole, excluded from Russian Imperial civil administration,²⁰ and because power to effect social change flowed from the top down, the secularization which occurred among Ukrainians was almost entirely cultural, with no corresponding secularization on the legal,

¹⁹Ibid., p. 263.

²⁰Krawchenko, pp. 20-21.

institutional level.²¹ A peculiar type of modernization thus occurred, with the development of *Gemeinschaft* outpacing that of *Gesellschaft*, which at the same time (because of the imperial nature of the *Gesellschaft*), retarded the development of *Gemeinschaft*. The Ukrainian masses were in a state of social malaise and ferment due to alienation from the official purveyor of religion, the Russian Orthodox Church, an institution which, at the same time, retarded the development of the popular Ukrainian national consciousness which was being engendered by this social ferment. This circumstance had many implications for not only the subsequent organizational capabilities of the emerging Ukrainian nationalist movement, but also for the ideal type of *Gesellschaft* that it would strive for. It is precisely because of the lag in institutional development of Ukrainian culture relative to cultural needs, and the concurrent imperial institutional stranglehold over cultural development, that the modernization of an Ukrainian national movement into a nationalist one could not develop along Western European lines.

The articulation of the Ukrainian response to nineteenth century *Gesellschaft* is now examined.

²¹Due to the nature of the tsarist system, institutional secularization would only occur upon social revolution.

2.3 The Kyrylo-Methodians

Amongst the three approaches to the coming to modernity of Ukrainian nation discussed in the preceeding chapter, the one point of agreement as to the critical event which signaled the emergence of a significant Ukrainian national consciousness is the appearance of the Kyrylo-Methodians in 1847.

The Kyrylo-Methodians were an intellectual association formed by a group of youthful Kiev poets, writers, and intelligenty. These youths were characteristically enlightened through personal interpretation of biblical scripture, and were consequently stridently anticlerical. Their philosophical orientation centered on the literal interpretation and implementation of the biblical "golden rule"; i.e., "do unto others as you would have them do unto you." Thus, among the pertinent concepts that they addressed were the nature of liberty, equality, and freedom of speech and religion. On the basis of their Christian philosophy, they preached the emancipation of serfdom to the enlightened Ukrainian gentry, justifying it on the grounds of enlightenment, Christian love, and progress.²² Also on the agenda was debate about the nature of the best political system for

²²Hrushevsky, 2 istorii, p. 111.

all Slavs, which would entail a federation of all Slavic peoples, with each nation existing as a separate republic.

The Kyrylo-Methodians were soon uncovered by the secret police and subjected to arrests and exile. Thus ended the Eastern Ukrainians' initial efforts at modern political organization. The next significant political organizations would appear only some fifty years later, when, upon the 1905 revolution, Ukrainian political activity was allowed to come out of the underground and begin to re-organize along the lines of distinct political parties.²³ However, it is in the literature produced by the Kyrylo-Methodians that is found the kernel out of which modern Ukrainian nationalism developed.

The political treatise by Kostomarov, Knyhy Byticia Ukraïns'koho Narodu ("The Book of Genesis of the Ukrainian People"), may be contended to be the first modern Ukrainian nationalist programmatic document.²⁴ Although it did not actually come to light until 1911 and was not published in

²³In the interim, clandestine societies of Ukrainian intellectuals, called the *Hromady*, played an important role in the growth of an Ukrainian national consciousness throughout Eastern Ukraine. Their political orientations and cultural goals largely grew out of the Kyrylo-Methodian tradition. For general information, see Encyclopedia of Ukraine, Volume II (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), pp. 244-247.

²⁴Rudnytsky argues the contrary, holding that the first modern Ukrainian political programme was forwarded in Drahomanov's introduction to the journal, Hromada. See Ivan L. Rudnytsky, Essays in Modern Ukrainian History (Edmonton: University of Alberta, 1987), p. 262.

full until 1918 (since it had been seized during tsarist police raids), it is nonetheless an important indicator of the currents of Ukrainian political thought of the epoch, and the already present impulse to modern nationalism. The ideas expressed concisely and systematically within it were seminal to the Ukrainian underground political associations which emerged during the latter half of the nineteenth century. Although the original *Knyhy*, in its entirety, was denied circulation during this period, one readily had access to its essential ideas in the poetry of Shevchenko and the works of other Kyrylo-Methodians.²⁹

There are three central themes to *Knyhy*. Most importantly, it is a profoundly Christian work both in content and structure (it is written in the form and style of the Book of Genesis), which concerns itself with biblical history. However, out of the central, Christian theme emerge two political sub-themes. The first is that of anti-clericalism, with an emphasis on the incompatibility of politics and contemporary official religious practise. The second sub-theme, which is closely related to the first, develops the idea of an organic Slavic people, destined to form a federation based on Christian, democratic love and "chosenness." The mission of the Ukrainian people in this destiny is that of leadership. Intertwined within this second theme is a rejection of Western secular philosophy,

²⁹Ibid., p. 261.

since, for Kostomarov, Christianity is the basis of philosophy and society. Although the political order the Knyhy envisages is utopian, hinging on the replacement of politics with spirituality, it nonetheless bares evidence as to the beginnings of a modern type of Ukrainian nationalism. The we/they dichotomy which clearly distinguishes the Ukrainians from other nations, including the "brotherly" Slavs, is well defined, and the will to national self-determination in the form of federalism is stated in unequivocal terms.

The anti-clericalism of Knyhy is closely connected to, and indeed justifies, rejection of official tsarist authority over the Ukrainian nation. As Kostomarov traces the history of nations from the beginning of the Old Testament through the New Testament, he places special emphasis on the hoodwinking of the masses by political leadership professing to have spiritual ties with God. An example of this is the conversion of the Roman leadership to Christianity so that the "Ceasars" could have better control over the masses. This example is shown to have been repeated throughout history, resulting in the creation of popes, Jesuits, and divine kings (amongst other figures of religious authority) -- all illegitimate representatives of God, and religious-political mystifiers on earth. The lesson to be learned from biblical history is that because only God is Lord, it is impossible to be a tsar or any type of noble and a true Christian at the same time. The message is clear: official

ecclesiastical sanction has been used since time immemorial to justify an illegitimate secular authority and social authority, to the detriment of true believers and God's purpose on earth. Therefore, the realization of a truly Christian society on earth requires the rejection of not only traditional authority, but also of the traditional underpinnings provided to it by religion. A true Ukrainian, no matter of what class, should honour neither tsar nor noble, but solely the only true God, Jesus Christ, tsar and lord of heaven and earth.²⁶

This anticlerical, Christian vision is nonetheless tied to a belief in the primordality of nationhood, and specifically the holy mission of the Ukrainian nation. Although the first verse of *Knyhy* begins similarly to the first verse of the Book of Genesis, with the creation of heaven and earth, there is an added "twist." Upon the creation of humanity, God ordained that it be divided into races and tribes, so that each mortal could seek and worship God in his/her own country, in his/her own way, in historical continuity with itself.²⁷ Biblical history is thus the passing of the responsibility of faith along through the great races, through the ages: from the Hebrews to the Greeks, to the Romans, to the Germans, and finally to the Slavs, who

²⁶Kostomarov, p. 21.

²⁷*Ibid.*, p. 7.

will be led by Ukrainians to salvation and social betterment.

Kostomarov sees a very special destiny for the Slavs in Christendom based on the biblical prophecy that the meek shall inherit the earth. The salvation of Slavdom lies in its uncorrupted "peoplener," i.e., its peasant base. A strong current of Ukrainian populism underlies the messianic role of the Ukrainians in realizing the divine plan for the liberation and brotherhood of Slavdom. The Ukrainians are deemed as the least corrupt of the Slav nations because of their lack of a nobility and their adherence to, and protection of, Christian principles as had been demonstrated in the political goals and administration of the seventeenth century Cossack republic.²⁰ These factors, plus its strategic geographical position at the centre of all Slavdom, makes Ukraine the logical centre of an all-Slav federation. Kostomarov ends with the prophesy that one day Ukraine will rise out of her grave and call to her Slavic brothers, who will answer in the formation of an independent, all-Slav federation, based on Christian social democracy and equality, as ordained by the gospel of Jesus Christ.

A Polish influence on this, Kostomarov's most important work, has been noted by Hrushevsky, who cites its similarity

²⁰Ibid., pp. 17-18. Although Kostomarov's interpretation of the organization of the Cossack republic is controversial, its significance lies in the promulgation of a "by-gone golden age" myth.

in structure and content to Ksiegi narodu i pielgrzymstwa polskiego ("Books of the Polish Nation and Its Pilgrimage) by Adam Mickiewicz, published in 1832, concerning a universal mission of the Polish nation.²⁹ Although Kostomarov emphatically denied having taken his ideas from Mickiewicz, the growth of Polish nationalism and romanticism certainly would not have discouraged the disgruntled member of the Ukrainian intelligentsia from envisaging a like vision for his own people.

It is important to note that throughout Kostomarov's treatise, there is no sanction of the Russian Orthodox Church. Indeed, his may be seen as a programmatic quest for spiritual life outside of the official church, characteristic of the disgruntled Ukrainian intelligentsia which had come under the influence of Skovorodism and romanticism. The emphasis on the discovering of, and adherence to, the true nature of Christianity, along with the structure of Knyhy, indicates that its primary inspiration came from a profound anti-clerical reaction to the official church and its role in the legitimation of Russian autocratic rule over Ukrainian society. However, Kostomarov's thoughtful, anti-clerical analysis of the progress of history in relationship to his contemporary historical circumstances inevitably had to a self-conscious appraisal of the cleavage between Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft as expressed in national

²⁹Hrushevsky, Z istorii, p. 117.

terms. His proposed solution to this social malaise is to bring *Gesellschaft* more in line with the needs of *Gemeinschaft* through the political independence and unification of all Slavdom on Christian democratic principles. The paradox of Kostomarov is that although the impulse to the actualization of Ukrainian national independence arises out of a secularizing ethic, it is justified not on the grounds of legitimacy in itself, but on the grounds of holy destiny. This paradox serves to categorize the political thought of Kostomarov as characteristic of the transitory stage between Ukrainian national consciousness and modern political nationalism.

The most important member of the Kyrylo-Methodians in terms of influence on the Ukrainian national movement was, however, Taras Shevchenko. Having resided in his youth in Warsaw and Wilno (Vilnius) exposed to Polish culture, Shevchenko undoubtedly had also come under the influence of Polish romanticism. However, the object of his affections was, unmistakably, the Ukrainian common-folk. Through his revolutionary poetry, Shevchenko castigated not only the tsarist regime for keeping the peasantry in serfdom, but also, if indirectly, the official church for its role in legitimizing the regime and subsequent enserfment of the peasantry. Ultimately, Shevchenko's criticisms were expressed in national terms, and brought to the fore the national gap between *Gesellschaft* and *Gemeinschaft*. Indeed, although

Shevchenko was profoundly Christian, he saw little worth in any of the Orthodox traditions, which for him signified only religious despotism, the parasitism of foreign upper classes, and the forthright exploitation of common working people.³⁰

Shevchenko's method is immersed in the Christian tradition. His poetry is rife with biblical allusions, and his most sever criticisms of the tsarist regime draw from parallels found in the Book of Kings of the Old Testament,³¹ which allegorically show the inevitable and ultimate demise of tsarist autocracy. Similarities between Shevchenko and seventeenth century English puritan-independents who used like methods to criticize English society have been noted by several authors.³²

Shevchenko had a profound influence on Ukrainian society and the Ukrainian national movement in his role as national myth-maker and visionary. His thought drew heavily on populism and a Protestant style of Christianity in its reaction to Orthodoxy. His lyricism allowed his work to be readily memorized by the illiterate common-folk, and the meaning of his populist imagery (e.g., the earthy, trusting Ukrainian peasant woman who is tricked, raped, and left des-

³⁰*Ibid.*, p. 114.

³¹*Ibid.*, p. 111.

³²For example, Hrushevsky and Drahomanov, as cited in Hrushevsky, *Z istorii*, p. 113.

titute by the foreigner (typically a Muscovite) of a higher social standing) was readily understood by his Ukrainian audience. Indeed, he eventually became a type of Ukrainian cult figure, symbolizing the struggle of the Ukrainian "little man" against Russian imperialism.

Shevchenko is an example of a figure which could have developed into what Weber terms "charismatic authority," which emerges at critical stress points in the interplay of *Gesellschaft* and *Gemeinschaft*, and is capable of leading society into a revolutionary, new era. However, the awakening of an Ukrainian national consciousness did not transform itself into a mass movement during Shevchenko's time because of the nature of tsarist imperial rule coupled with the Ukrainian intelligentsia's dismal lack of experience in matters of organization and mobilization, not to mention the general lack of economic development throughout Ukraine. Shevchenko himself was exiled for ten years, where he was denied the privilege to write a single word of poetry or prose. The modernizing ethic which was at the core of the Kyrylo-Methodians' political orientation was still in an embryonic stage in Ukrainian society. Thus, the democratizing and modernizing ethos which grows out of the secularization process and is necessary if the impetus for secularization is to come from the cultural element of society -- which is the only direction that it could come from if Ukrainians

were to be the instigators -- was yet far from being developed enough to warrant social action.

2.4 Mykhailo Drahomanov

Mykhailo Drahomanov, writing in the late nineteenth century, can be seen as the logical, modern conclusion to the political thought first articulated by the Kyrylo-Methodians. Drahomanov takes Kostomarov's utopic political treatise enshrouded in mystical Christian imagery, demystifies it, elaborates it into a constitutional proposal, and pushes it through to its logical end as demanded by modernity: total secularization of authority. The Kyrylo-Methodians' central focus of state activity is thus transformed from Christianity into science; its anti-clericalism into ostensible atheism, and its "chosen" Slavic federation to be based on the principles of anarchy and federal democracy as extolled by Proudhon.³³

Drahomanov, who spent considerable amounts of time in Western Europe, is a liberal in the European, cultural sense

³³On anarchy and federalism, see P. J. Proudhon, The Principle of Federation (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), especially pp. 30-49.

of the Enlightenment, and a radical in his anarchistic political values. Although born and raised in Eastern Ukraine, he was sent to Western Europe by the Ukrainian underground organization, *Hromada*, in order to publicize the Ukrainian cause (the Ukrainian language was banned in Eastern Ukraine at the time). He is the author of many publications dealing primarily with Ukrainian folklore and the nature of Ukrainian politics. He was instrumental in the establishment of the first adult "folk" schools in the Russian empire, and, while in exile in Geneva, he founded the periodical-journal, *Hromada*, in 1878.

Western European influence is apparent in Drahomanov's philosophy of history:

The Biblical myth of Paradise, like similar myths among other peoples, shows how men, dissatisfied with reality, began to imagine a better life, even if in the remote past. The next step was Persian dualism, with its belief in the final victory of good. Then came Christian chiliasm, the hope of Christ's coming to reign during the millenium. From the sixteenth century men began to turn their eyes from heaven toward the earth, no longer hoping for the victory of good as a supernatural event at the end of time, but as the result of their own conscious efforts.²⁴

What is evident here is a modern, Western interpretation of history which has emerged from a full internalization of

²⁴As translated by Ivan L. Rudnytsky, "Drahomanov as a Political Theorist," in Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts in the U.S.A., Vol. II, No. 1 (Spring, 1958), p. 81.

secular values. It is typical of modern political science arising from a liberal tradition in that the values underlying it are 1) that history is rational and, therefore, knowable; and 2) that there is no absolute truth, but scientific truth. Such superbly mundane, rational thought is at the basis of Drahomanov's rejection of all state ties with religion, and his elevation of the value of unhindered scientific investigation as the key to individual freedom and progress.

However, the influence of Western Europe formed only part of Drahomanov's philosophical secular orientation. He was, nonetheless, a product of the Eastern Ukrainian intellectual milieu enshrouded in the Kyrylo-Methodian tradition. Indeed, while still at home, Drahomanov was active in the underground *Hromada* organization, which later financed his activities abroad. His initial movement in the direction of anti-clericalism, which later turned into atheism, was undoubtedly inspired by the same forces which had led Shevchenko and Kostomarov along the same path: the official Orthodox church. Drahomanov explicitly stated that in order for any social progress to occur in Ukraine, one had to "begin to preach widely against the roots of belief and priestcraft with the assistance of natural and social science."³⁹ His reaction against the Uniate Church in Galicia was equally as vehement: "In Austria our communalists must

³⁹As quoted in Rudnytsky, *Essays*, p. 266.

come out against the clergy perhaps even more strongly than in Little Russian Ukraine, precisely because the clergy there has not renounced Ukrainian nationality so openly and, at times, deceives itself and others and even peasant communities into thinking that it stands behind these communities and can improve their lot".³⁶ Drahomanov held individual freedom as the highest good, and religion only served to obscure this essential reality.

It is noteworthy though, that in spite of Drahomanov's militantly anti-religious stand, he nonetheless devoted a considerable amount of literature, largely in a favourable light, to the topic of Protestantism in Ukrainian society. His treatment of Protestantism is even considered to be "disproportionate" to its influence in Eastern Ukraine.³⁷ A possible explanation may be that Drahomanov may have recognized the ethics peculiar to Protestantism which could be instrumental to the modernization (i.e., secularization and democratization) of Ukrainian society, and thus sought out its sources and possibilities in Ukrainian society. Rudnytsky proposes that Drahomanov's fascination with Protestantism may have been a testimony of the depth of his commitment to liberalism.³⁸ Needless to say, the matter of Drahomanov's religious orientation is open to debate. How-

³⁶Ibid., p. 275.

³⁷Rudnytsky, *Annals*, p. 83.

³⁸Ibid., p. 84.

ever, his importance lies in his promulgation of distinctly Ukrainian political thought with historical continuity, which had finally escaped the confines imposed by religio-political authority. It is in Drahomanov's writings that we find the completion of the third stage of secularization; i.e., the transvaluation of political culture to emphasize secular political values.

2.5 Summary and Conclusion

This overview of the progression of Ukrainian political thought to the point at which it may be considered to be modern in the Western sense of the word reveals that religion has played a key role in the development of a peculiarly Ukrainian type of nationalism. The religious factor is at the root of the triggering of the modernization process, and is of substantial consequence in the shaping of emergent Ukrainian political orientations. However, this process has been far from a smooth one. External factors, such as the nature of the *Gesellschaft-Gemeinschaft* relationship and the overall lack of Ukrainian economic development go far in explaining the vast incongruities in the of-

ten divergent paths of the development of the nationalist ideology, and the nation itself.

Reaction against the increasingly oppressive *Gesellschaft* as represented by the Russian Orthodox Church, which was virtually the only universalizing institution able to reach into the very core of peasant life, occurred along Ukrainian ethno-national lines. The demands for secularization can be linked to the emergence of the perception of a ethno-nationally and socially definable "other" -- the imperial Russian. This demand for secularization and the concurrent national awakening is thus inextricably tied to an attack on one of the three pillars of tsarism, Russian Orthodoxy -- and hence, on tsarism itself. The simultaneous occurrence of these three factors -- the secularization impulse, the emergence of an ethno-national we/they dichotomy, and the attack on Russian imperial rule -- opened up the possibility for not only the process of social modernization to occur, but also for it to occur in the direction of modern nationalism. Indeed, the socio-political situation demanded that socio-political progress of Ukrainians as a whole could only occur along a path established by the further development of Ukrainian nationalism.

However, the burgeoning Ukrainian nationalist movement could never have developed according to the standards set by Western Europe. The modernization of a nation under backward, reactionary imperial rule is ultimately restricted to

the parameters drawn by the empire. Secret police infiltration, officially sponsored suppression of Ukrainian culture, over-all low Ukrainian cultural self-esteem and social development, and a general lack of Ukrainian participation in *Gesellschaft* are only some of the major factors determining the course of modernization in late nineteenth century Ukraine. Ironically, it is the absence of an alliance with the very institution that the intelligentsia criticized -- a formal church -- which also impeded the development of Ukrainian nationalism, for it was only through the organization of the Church that the national message could have been carried to every village. In addition, Ukrainian peasant life was yet so tied to Orthodox ritual and mysticism, that the ideas of a figure such as Drahomanov would have, if not confounded, then alienated, the average Ukrainian peasant. The kernel of incipient Ukrainian nationalism in the Russian Empire was thus deprived of the "holy water" which could have possibly allowed it to germinate and gain strength, as had been the case in Galicia, with the Uniate Church.

Two main philosophical trends arose out of this modernization process. The first, as exemplified in the thought of the Kyrylo-Methodians, reflected an anti-clerical orientation coupled with a sincere desire for spirituality and Christian democracy; it was a trend similar to that of Protestantism. The second, as exemplified by Drahomanov, reflected an outright rejection of religion, but nonetheless

maintained an almost idyllic goal of social democracy, which was very similar to the Christian democracy espoused by his predecessors. The rejection of religion can be seen as having pushed the developing Ukrainian political orientation to its logical extreme as demanded by Western rationale. However, this second trend also represents an incongruity in the modernization process, for it was yet unpalatable to the majority of those whom the new concept of the nation wished to represent. It must be understood, that, while this second trend remained dominant among the Ukrainian intelligentsia until far into the 1917 revolution, the government of the newly independent Ukrainian republic was finally forced to face the religious question and recognize the demands of the Ukrainian people for the institution that social-democratic political wrangling had heretofore neglected: the Church. Thus, on January 1, 1919, an official act was passed by the Central Rada concerning the establishment of an Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church.³⁹

The political orientation which unified these two incompatible philosophical trends was that of Slavic federalism. The idea of federation hinged on secularization, and, in effect, an implementation of the ideal presented in the Scriptures as modified by Eastern European circumstances: a type of Christian social democracy highlighted by a roman-

³⁹O. Lotots'ky, Ukrains'ki dzherela tserkovnoho prava (Warsaw: Ukrainian Scientific Institute, 1931), p. 297).

tic, populist vision. The federalist inclination is an integral part of the Ukrainian nationalism which had developed to its modern extreme in Drahomanov. It did not immediately develop into a movement for independent nation-statehood because of the paradox of Ukrainian national modernization. The Ukrainian "modernizing ethic" had developed in a peculiar interplay of *Gesellschaft* and *Gemeinschaft* in which these two essential components of a good, secure, and modern state were not only isolated from each other, but one where *Gesellschaft* was culturally foreign and dominated over the institutional and cultural development of the Ukrainian *Gemeinschaft*. The role of religion in the outcome of this interplay was problematic. Although quintessential as the impetus for modernization, it was also detrimental to it at the turn of the twentieth century. Modern Ukrainian nationalist ideology, and its neglect of the spiritual concerns of the Ukrainian peasantry which continued to cling to its faith, had outpaced the development of the very people that it wished to represent.

CHAPTER THREE

The discussion now moves to the period in question, 1905-1914, when restrictions were taken off the Ukrainian printed word and mass political parties were allowed to openly form and send elected deputies from Ukraine to the State Duma in Russia. This period witnessed the crystallization of distinct political parties out of the philosophical trends of the time, ranging from ultra-conservative, reactionary Russian nationalist parties to revolutionary variants of Marxism. The political movement which had grown out of the Kyrylo-Methodians and the thought of Drahomanov crystallized slightly to the left of centre in this spectrum, into the Ukrainian Democratic Party (UDP) and the Ukrainian Radical Party (URP), which merged to form the Ukrainian Democratic Radical Party (UDRP) late in 1905. However, by the end of 1907, tsarist repressions had led to the general demise of political parties throughout Russia. The Ukrainian centrist movement nevertheless continued to organize and evolve in the direction of leftist Ukrainian liberal democracy, but now within a non-political, clandestine association: the Society of Ukrainian Progressivists (*Tovarystvo Ukrain's'kykh Postupovtsiv*, or TUP). This turn in Ukrainian centrist politics occurred not only because of the general state of Russian parliamentary and autocratic affairs of the time (there is little dispute on this point), but equally importantly, because of the nature of the

Ukrainian liberal project. Theirs was an evolving approach to the "creation" of a nation which was yet in a developing phase at this stage, and this approach would not mature until later in Rada's publication. Their work needed to continue at a grass-roots level, whether within political parties or not.

It is proposed that, amongst the heirs to the Kyrylo-Methodians and Drahomanov, the growth and encouragement of a Ukrainian national consciousness was of primary concern, for it was upon this national consciousness that the foundation of a just politics would be laid. Such a focus demanded the establishment of institutions for the development of an Ukrainian national consciousness. To this end, the Ukrainian liberals created what they hoped would be the fountainhead of development of an Ukrainian national consciousness -- the daily newspaper, Rada. A brief description of the evolution of TUP and its organ Rada will expose their direct and indirect links to the Kyrylo-Methodian and Drahomanov traditions. This historical interpretation will be discussed with reference to the liberal approach to the concept of the Ukrainian national consciousness and its function in Ukrainian liberal politics.

Through a series of associations, the political philosophy and membership of TUP can be traced back directly to the Kyrylo-Methodians and the later work of Drahomanov. After the Kyrylo-Methodians had been officially disbanded,

some of its members, most notably Shevchenko, Kostomarov, and Kulish, united with other members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia in St. Petersburg to form the first Ukrainian *hromada* (community) in 1858. This was an organization whose focus was on cultural work (primarily education) that would promote the growth of a Ukrainian national consciousness within the Russian Empire. Soon other *hromady* sprang up in Moscow and urban areas of Ukraine, the most important being located in Kiev (established in 1861). One of the main tasks of the *hromady* was to mobilize support for lifting the prohibition of the Ukrainian language imposed by the Ukase of Ems.

By 1869, Drahomanov was amongst the ranks of the Kiev Hromada. Drahomanov's ideas were shared by most of the *hromadys'* members, and these ideas inspired several students' reading circles. Drahomanov himself was supported in exile in Geneva as a promoter of the Ukrainian movement by the Kiev Hromada until 1886. The Hromada then broke off relations with Drahomanov because of his increasing political outspokenness and radicalization -- which was quickly outpacing the strictly cultural approach that was being emphasized in Eastern Ukraine. Although the *hromady* avoided any direct political activity (in spite of this being unusually difficult, since cultural work could be considered to be political when the very language of the culture being promoted was illegal, and many books used in the national-cultural education were themselves banned) or contact with revolu-

tionary circles, as the turn of the century approached, a younger generation of Ukrainian intelligenty was beginning to join them -- one which was restlessly more interested in activism, and inevitably, politics. These new members would soon initiate a distinct political programme in the very tradition of Drahomanov. From their ranks would grow TUP, the primary agent of Ukrainian nation-building in tsarist Ukraine until the 1917 revolution.

With the influx of young activist blood at the turn of the century, which included the wealthy landowner and patron of Ukrainian culture, Yevhen' Chykalenko, and the prolific literary critic and writer Serhii Iefremov, coupled with the omni-presence of Hrushevsky,¹ the activities of the Kiev Hromada intensified. In 1897, with the Hromada's encouragement, the clandestine General Ukrainian Non-Party Democratic Organization² (hereafter referred to as VZO) was formed. This organization united the Kiev Hromada with members of other *hromady* and also the Brotherhood of Taras.³ The

¹While a student in Kiev, Hrushevsky had been very active in the Hromada, and continued to act as an inspiration to the *hromady* throughout their existence. See Thomas M. Prymak, Mykhailo Hrushevsky: The Politics of National Culture (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), p. 75.

²Known as the *Zahal'na Ukrains'ka Bezpartiina Demokratychna Orhanizatsiia* or *Vseukrains'ka Zahal'na Orhanizatsiia*. Although Hrushevsky was no longer living in Kiev when this organization was formed, he nonetheless served as its figurehead. *Ibid.*, p. 75.

³Or *Bratstvo Tarasivtsiv*, which was founded in Kharkiv in about 1891 or 1892 by a group of students and civic leaders in honour and promotion of Shevchenko and *ukrainstvo*. It was disbanded in 1898, and the younger generation among

Brotherhood also helped to bring the focus of the movement back to the political ideas of social justice and national autonomy for all peoples of the Russian Empire. Borys Hrinchenko, a prominent public figure, educator, writer, folklorist, linguist, and ethnographer, was added to the movement's ranks. In 1900, this organization had approximately 150 members, and by 1901 it had formulated a political programme advocating the national autonomy of Ukraine and the federal restructuring of Russia.

Increasing social ferment and radicalization of the intelligentsia precipitated the full politicization and transformation of this group into the Ukrainian Democratic Party in 1904. Chykalenko, Iefremov, and Hrinchenko spearheaded the move. The programme of the UDP was an extension of its parent organization's programme, advocating the cancellation of absolutism throughout the Empire through the institution of constitutional law.⁴ It further elaborated full national autonomy for Ukraine, which would entail a local Ukrainian

its ranks who did not join the VZO branched off to form the short-lived Revolutionary Ukrainian Party (RUP) in 1900. Lotots'kyi describes RUP as a "bloc of various elements, who, did not so much as give themselves a mission of a positive nature, as much as they strove to spread the word that the circle of Ukrainian political tasks which had theretofore prevailed was too restrictive. Thus, they united on the foundation of, primarily, the negation of the leading tendencies of Ukrainian thought. Having this kind of programme and organization, it is little wonder that RUP existed for only a very short period of time." Lotots'kyi, Vol. 2, p. 307.

⁴The UDP somewhat resembled the Russian liberal Kadet (Constitutional Democratic) Party, but differed on the questions of national autonomy and Ukrainian language rights.

parliament, and the institution of the Ukrainian language in schools, courts, and the administration. Social justice was addressed through a proposal for the gradual regional nationalization of industry and the creation of agricultural cooperatives, and a general redistribution of land so that peasants with little or no land would have their own private plots to work.⁵ However, late that year, the leftist elements, represented by Hrinchenko and Iefremov, split away to form the Ukrainian Radical Party. Their ranks were joined by Modest Levyts'kyi, political and civic activist, doctor, and writer; and Fedir Matushevs'kyi, community activist and writer. However, the URP did not substantially differ from the UDP,⁶ except in that national independence was proposed as a maximum goal.⁷

The 1905 revolution saw a reunion and merger of these two parties into the Ukrainian Democratic Radical Party. The maximum goal of independence was dropped from its programme in favour of Drahomanovian federalism with Russia. Its ideology has been described as "a mix of syndicalist socialism and conventional liberalism."⁸

⁵Boshyk, pp. 339-340.

⁶It is believed that the split occurred primarily due to personality conflicts, with Hrinchenko spearheading the move. Yevhen' Chykalenko, Spohady 1861-1907 (New York: The Ukrainian Free Academy of the Sciences in the USA, 1955), pp. 359-367.

⁷Boshyk, p. 340.

⁸Borys, pp. 130-131.

Although the UDRP enjoyed considerable success during the elections to the First Duma,⁹ the mere existence of this political organization was not the single most important Ukrainian liberal achievement between the years 1905 and 1914. The UDRP's major contribution came in the form of the creation of a daily press which would act as a sounding board and rallying point for its political ideas and aspirations. The importance of the press during this period cannot be overstressed. In the words of Dmytro Doroshenko:

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of the written word in the life of the [pre-revolutionary Ukrainian] nation. The press is an important organizational force in national-political and civic life. Under the conditions of tsarism, when the administration had wrecked all other organizations of potential -- not only political parties, but also organizations of a strictly cultural character like the Prosvitas¹⁰ and clubs; the press, and especially the daily press, was the single legal centre around which the scattered individuals of the nation could unite. Thus, to maintain such a centre ... was a great national achievement.¹¹

This is related to the all-pervasive issue in Ukrainian-Russian political relations concerning the actual existence of the Ukrainian People itself. From the times of the Ukase

⁹See Thomas Prymak, Mykhailo Hrushevsky: The Politics of National Culture (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), p. 75 for the exact breakdown of delegates.

¹⁰Prosvitas were organizations openly established throughout Ukraine after the 1905 revolution for the purposes of furthering a national education amongst the Ukrainian population.

¹¹Chykalenko, p. 7.

of Ems when the Ukrainian language was prohibited, official Imperial policy towards the idea of the Ukrainian People was that "it has never existed, does not exist, and cannot exist".¹² The Ukrainian movement was said to be the invention of a handful of Ukrainophiles and *mazepysty*,¹³ in the pay of the Germans or Austrians, aimed at the unification of "Little Russia" with Austria, and the demise of Russia.¹⁴ Indeed, by the time of the 1905 revolution, the Ukrainian People was said to be the "invention" of Hrushevsky, who was trying to somehow create a new people out of those in the Slavic family who were brother Russians by blood, faith, and language.¹⁵ Thus, the very existence of the Ukrainian People remained a central issue in Russian politics towards Ukraine. Shchegolev's Ukrainskoe dvizhenie: kak sovremennyi etap iuzhnorusskogo separatizma¹⁶ is an example of one of the efforts taken to systematically prove the non-existence of a separate Ukrainian People. Where an "intellectual" approach to the issue did not suffice, the

¹²This phrase was actually coined by Alexander II's minister Valuev in 1863. Lotots'ky, Vol. III, p. 271.

¹³For a definition of *mazepynstvo*, see Chapter Four, p. 131, footnote 39.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 273.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 275.

¹⁶S. Shchegolev Ukrainskoe Dvizhenie: Kak Sovremennyi Etap Iuzhnorusskogo Separatizma (Kiev: Kushnerev i Ko., 1912)

administration would engage in outright suppression of *ukrainstvo* wherever it would rear its head.

Thus, central to the liberals' mission was to prove the existence of the People -- both to the administration, who constantly attacked this stance, and to the People themselves, who had to be raised to national self-consciousness. The Ukrainian liberal daily press would have to constantly defend *ukrainstvo* against slander and libel from the government and the Russian and Polish reactionary press, as it would have to, at the same time, act as a legitimator of that which it was defending.

The 1905 revolution made possible the establishment of an Ukrainian press, and the combined forces of the newly formed UDRP made feasible the prospects of an Ukrainian daily newspaper. The idea was initially conceived of by Chykalenko, who published the newspaper using his own funds and the financial assistance of Vasyl' Symyrenko, a wealthy industrialist and patron of Ukrainian culture, and Volodymyr Leontovych, lawyer, civic activist, and member of the editorial board of *Literaturno-naukovyi-visnyk*. From the early planning stages, it is evident that the focus of the newspaper was clearly aimed at the rationalization of an Ukrainian national self-consciousness. The newspaper was aimed at the promotion of a primordial Ukrainian national identity, interpreted as the fountainhead of moral community upon which the legitimate social contract was to be established.

Thus with Fedir Matushevs'kyi (civic activist and publicist) as chief editor, Chykalenko published the first edition of Hromads'ka dumka on December 31, 1905. Although the newspaper's first edition was confiscated by the authorities, publication continued until late in January, 1906, when it was closed temporarily by the government, and then completely banned in August of that year. However, thanks to some behind-the-scenes diplomacy and maneuvering by Chykalenko and Hrushevsky, the newspaper was re-opened under the title Rada on September 15, 1906, and would continue publication until August 2, 1914. The platform and approach of Rada differed from that of its predecessor only in name and the addition of more people to its editorial and general staff.¹⁷

From its initial conception, Chykalenko had a clearly formulated plan for the direction of the newspaper. Aside from the usual fare of a daily newspaper (for example, the reportage of current events), two regular features would provide the paper with a distinctly national focus.

¹⁷Chykalenko continued to publish it with the financial assistance of Symyrenko, and now L. Zhebun'ov. The principal editor remained Matushevs'kyi, who was now assisted from 1907 to 1913 by Metodii Pavlovs'kyi, a journalist, folklorist, and community activist, and from 1913 to 1914 by Andrii Nikovs'kyi, a literary expert, journalist, and community activist. Iefremov and Levyts'kyi continued to collaborate with the newspaper as authors of numerous articles throughout its life-span. For a complete list of contributors and their departments, see Enstyklopedia Ukrainoznavtstva, Vol. 7 (1973), pp. 2432-2433. Needless to say, the new membership was entirely of the same ideological bent as UDRP, and almost without exception were future members of TUP.

Hrinchenko was to prepare a biography of some great Ukrainian figure for each issue, and his/her portrait would be printed on the front page; and Levyts'kyi was to contribute a section on Ukrainian history to the paper.¹⁸ In the choice of this particular format, the creators of Rada showed that they well understood that

the history of culture is not simply the dynamics of various prohibitions and commandments. It is also the dynamics of a culture's self-consciousness, which to varying degrees explains the corresponding changes in normative positions. ... Thus, culture -- a system of collective memory and collective consciousness -- is at the same time a unified value structure for the group. A culture's need for self-description, coupled with the necessity, at a certain stage, for a unified structuring of its values, has a strong effect on the culture being described. In creating its own model for itself, a culture has an active effect on the process of self-organization.¹⁹

The purpose of the Rada was thus to affirm a Ukrainian national consciousness, so that this cultural self-consciousness could be re-integrated into society and re-appear in the form of norms and values toward societal organization. This format is of great significance in what it reveals concerning the liberals' conceptualization of Ukrainian national consciousness, and how they foresaw its rationalization. Rada functions as an agent in the defini-

¹⁸Chykalenko, p. 430.

¹⁹Iurii M. Lotman and Boris Uspenskii, "Binary Models in the Dynamics of Russian Culture," in The Semiotics of Russian Cultural History, eds. Alexander and Alice Nakhimovsky (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), pp. 30-31.

tion and mobilization of a liberal Ukrainian national consciousness. This thesis is confirmed when examining the goals professed by many of Chykalenko's colleagues who were also involved in establishing periodicals (for example, Hrushevsky), their primary purpose being "the enlightenment of the masses and the creation of a nationally conscious population."²⁰

The period of reaction following the dissolution of the Second Imperial Duma in June, 1907 signaled a shift in the regime's politics from that of relative openness and hope for constitutional law and liberalization, to increasing political repression and restrictions on the Ukrainian movement. This led to the final demise of legal Ukrainian political parties, and a general shift back to explicitly cultural work. The UDRP was dissolved. However, in its place and out of its membership arose TUP in 1908. TUP rose to defend the inroads already made in the Ukrainian movement, and to subtly press for new rights and concessions. Its actual, but unofficial chairman was Chykalenko. New blood was added from the Social Democratic and non-aligned parties (a notable example being Symon Petliura, future head of the Ukrainian National Republic's Directorate).²¹ The unofficial organ of TUP became Rada.

²⁰Prymak, Mykhailo Hrushevsky, p. 83.

²¹For more examples, see Entsyklopedia Ukrainoznavtsva, Vol. 9 (1980), pp. 3230-3231.

It can thus be concluded that TUP took on all of the former duties of the UDRP except those which had been formally carried out in the Duma (and TUP had no need to assume these duties in light of the changed nature of the Duma). What is significant here is that this move did not represent the political capitulation of the Ukrainian liberals, but rather their resoluteness and adaptive capacity. The Ukrainian liberal project, aimed at the generation of an Ukrainian national consciousness, remained intact. The main instrument of this project, Rada, continued to publish, despite increasing oppression and censorship. Through an in-depth study of the voice of the liberals as it was articulated in Rada, the following will focus on this newspaper as mirror and agent of mobilization for the Ukrainian liberal rationalization of the nationally dichotomous relationship between *Gesellschaft* and *Gemeinschaft*. It will be thereby shown that the liberals did, indeed, intend to resolve this dichotomous relationship by appealing to nationalism. The variety and nature of nationalism appealed to will be exposed through a careful study of the type of national consciousness that the liberals tried to foster amongst its readership.

The interpretation of the liberals' approach to nation-building in Rada will focus on their treatment of the Ukrainian *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, and the relationship of these two to non-Ukrainians and the Imperial order. The Ukrainian liberal conceptualization of *Gemeinschaft* is

the primordial Ukrainian national consciousness made politically relevant in the contemporary context. *Gesellschaft* is the "national form of politics," the political programme and structure which arises out of Ukrainian national consciousness. Nationalism is the state of being where there is a desire for the congruence of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*; thus, the examination of Ukrainian liberal *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* formulations must be placed within the context of their rationalization with respect to the foreign powers that the liberals see as hindering the development of a politically and sociologically complete Ukrainian nation.

It is argued that since a well-formulated Ukrainian political programme had already been articulated and framed by TUP's ideological predecessors (the Kyrylo-Methodians and Drahomanov), the liberals had to concentrate on the politicization of the Ukrainian *Gemeinschaft* in order to bring about an equilibrium in the Ukrainian *Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft* dichotomy. The best Ukrainian political ideals and programmes had already been established; Rada's mission was to make the People receptive to these, and thereby become a political nation.

This approach to nation-building did, nevertheless, undergo an evolution during Rada's publication. The politicization of culture was quickly taken to its limits (as far as censorship would allow), and became increasingly inadequate in the working out of an active Ukrainian liberal ideology. Thus, by 1908, as the political sophistication of

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the liberals grew through the political experience gained in the Duma, the focus shifted away from *Gemeinschaft* towards a fuller elaboration of an Ukrainian *Gesellschaft* in terms of *realpolitik*. The significance of this shift is that it opened the way for a re-evaluation of the political ideals and programmes which were at the very foundation of the Ukrainian liberal approach to nation-building. Fundamental tensions within the ideology concerning the nature of the relationship between the individual and political society, and the relationship of that society to other societies were addressed in numerous polemical articles, editorials, and literary reviews on Rada's pages between 1911 and 1914. The ideology went through a fundamental change during these years away from its populist roots, and in the direction of a more Western interpretation of liberal nationalism. These were the formative years of Ukrainian liberal nationalist ideology.

The selection of articles to illustrate this argument has been restricted primarily to front-page editorials and literary reviews which treat *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* features of Ukrainian nation-building. These two literary genres are the ones which are most frequently employed in Rada to the ends of either expressing the liberal approach to nation-building, or mobilizing support for it. In addition, the importance of these two literary genres as a vehicle for the political expression of Rada's staff is reflected in the prominent physical positions that they occupy

in Rada. These articles are most often found on the front page, and are rarely found after the second page. Rada wanted its audience to read these articles first.

Although Chykalenko had originally intended that each issue of the daily press contain the biography of some important Ukrainian individual and a brief chapter in Ukrainian history, the format of the newspaper was somewhat changed by the time that Rada began publication. Commemoratives to certain Ukrainian individuals would appear on significant dates (e.g., on the anniversaries of their births and deaths, etc.), but not in every issue. Instead, the subject matter of current political events, coupled with a limited budget for publication, took priority over the more idealistic goals of the paper. Nevertheless, Rada did manage to publish commemoratives to Shevchenko every year on the dates of his birth and death, as well as the odd commemorative article about Kostomarov and Drahomanov.²² The same happened with historical articles of a "general educational" nature, which were also infrequently published, usually on the second or third page. Too much was happening in Imperial politics and on the Ukrainian national front to allow for more than a minimal allocation of scarce resources to

²²The vast majority of commemoratives in Rada were in honour of Shevchenko. Kostomarov, although referred to in passing on numerous occasions, was officially honoured only once, in No. 82 (07.04.07), p. 1. The same can be said about Drahomanov, whose death was officially commemorated in No. 129 (09.06.10), p. 2. Other leading Ukrainian figures (literati, politicians, etc.) would be treated in the same manner.

issues not directly concerned with the current political situation of ukrainstvo.

It is necessary to make one more qualification concerning the selection of articles before beginning the interpretation of Ukrainian liberal views of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*. The Ukrainian national rebirth in Eastern Ukraine was not occurring in a political vacuum. Eastern Ukrainians constantly had the example of Galicia to look to for direction in the national struggle. Great inroads in the Ukrainian national movement had already been made in the Habsburg Empire while the Eastern Ukrainians were just gasping at the first breathes of relative political freedom brought on by the 1905 revolution. Indeed, Rada kept a close eye on events in Galicia, and kept a full-time correspondent (Mykhailo Lozyns'kyi) in L'viv. Galician parliamentary politics were frequently covered on the front pages of Rada. By 1910, regular columns entitled, for example, "Ukraintsi v Halychyni" ("Ukrainians in Galicia) and "Z Halyts'koi Ukrainy" ("From Galician Ukraine") were appearing. These columns would treat the day-to-day life of Ukrainians in Galicia and announcements of cultural events, meetings, organizations, publications, educational and political issues, etc.. The study of these articles -- of Rada's interpretation of Galician Ukrainian politics and their relationship and role with respect to Eastern Ukraine -- would be enough to constitute a major research paper in itself. Although the cross-boundary influences of Galician politics on

Eastern Ukrainian life were substantial and deserve in-depth analysis, this will not occur in the following pages. Such a study would increase the breadth of this paper to an unmanageable size in terms of both time and space. This exclusion of Galician Ukrainian politics is somewhat further justified in the hypothesis that what the liberals learned from the Galician politics that they so astutely observed will be reflected in their approach to Eastern Ukrainian politics. However, this hypothesis will remain, for the time being, unproven.

CHAPTER FOUR

Gemeinschaft and *Gesellschaft* features of the Ukrainian liberal conceptualization of the nation are revealed in the various literary genres employed in Rada. These features are addressed to the ends of their rationalization, the creation of a sociologically and politically complete nation. This nation will become fully rational upon the restoration of rightful sovereignty in Ukraine, when political society will be formed by the whole of the Ukrainian people.¹ Careful study of Rada reveals that the liberals believed that this would occur upon the political re-organization of Russia into a federation of fully autonomous, national-territorial states. Let us now turn to an examination of the overt and covert treatment of nation-building in Rada.

Front page editorials are the dominant literary genre found in Rada, and are thus the most important vehicle for the expression of the liberals' concerns in the newspaper. The editorials comment primarily on various aspects of

¹This distinguishes the Ukrainian liberal conception of sovereignty from that of its Western antecedents. Western liberal theory of the sovereign generally relies on the two social contracts conceptualized by Locke; the first one being between all the individuals who agree to forsake the state of nature and form a political society, and the second one being between the members of this society and the government or prince that they set up. The Ukrainian liberal approach to the state is closer to the romantic, conservative reaction to liberalism elaborated by Rousseau, where there is only one social contract, that of forming the political society. This in itself constitutes the sovereign, the inalienable possession of which remains the rights of sovereignty. See Alfred Cobban, Rousseau and the Modern State (London: Archon Books, 1964), p. 72.

Ukrainian life, with analysis of the all-Russian situation and international affairs (particularly those which deal with the national question in the context of other peoples) playing a supporting role. Significantly, most editorials are concerned with the national question in Ukrainian politics, and reflect the liberals' evolving approach to nation-building. To a lesser extent, the editorial acts as an agent of socio-political mobilization on the basis of this approach.

The second most prevalent genre in Rada, the literary review, is discussed here in conjunction with the editorial. In the context of the definition and evolution of the liberals' approach to nation-building, the literary review often responds to and embellishes themes treated in the editorial. In this way, the review develops and gives positive reinforcement to various aspects of Ukrainian liberal ideology as expressed in Rada.

Between 1906 and 1914, dozens of literary reviews can be found which ultimately mirror the liberals' evolving definition of the Ukrainian *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, and their attempts to resolve the dichotomous relationship between the two in theory. In this way, these reviews function as a vehicle for political reform, the object of which is the rationalization of the liberal vision of Ukrainian political culture. They generally perform this function in five capacities. First, the review most often appears as a

condensation of an important work in line with the liberals' position on the Ukrainian nation, thereby expressing the essential ideas of this position, and increasing the accessibility of these ideas. Second, the review also often bestows public honours on select individuals and ideas on the basis of their roles and status in the Ukrainian liberal conceptualization of the nation. In doing so, Rada reinforces these roles and status, thereby fostering an attachment to them amongst its readership. These individuals and ideas are thus encouraged, as is the emulation of them. The goal of this activity is the creation of a common Ukrainian national consciousness. In the same vein, the review also serves to denounce certain individuals and ideas antipathetic to the process of liberal nation-building. Fourth, the review purveys, through allusion, "unorthodox" concepts, myths, and symbols fundamental to the Ukrainian liberal project. Lastly, the review often serves to reinforce local folklore, myth, and legend for the purposes of intensification of what the liberals define as primordial features of the nation and their linkage to the notion of a common fate.

Thus, the function that the review serves as a vehicle for political reform is twofold. Not only is the review a reflection of the liberals' approach to nation-building, it is also an agent of political mobilization on the basis of this approach. The review performs this function in a covert, almost subliminal manner.

Although the ultimate aim of the editorial with respect to nation-building is the same as that of the literary review, the editorial seeks to achieve this aim in a different manner. Through Rada's commentary on current events, primarily of a *Gesellschaft* nature, via the editorial, the reader is made aware of which events the liberals hold to be significant, why they are significant, and what course of action should be taken (if any) in that respect. The editorial has, in effect, more of a theoretical nature, where various aspects of the liberals' ideology are worked out with reference to daily issues and events. However, the shape of the editorial adds a twist to what would otherwise be a purely theoretical article: the liberal values and ideology mirrored in the editorial are often expressed in the form of explicit, concrete demands. Thus, the editorial clearly and directly expresses the essential ideas of Ukrainian liberal ideology, and simultaneously blatantly seeks to mobilize support for these ideas.

The first issue of a new periodical sets the tone of the publication, and articles featured prominently in it are usually a good indication of what is to come in subject matter. Thus, featured prominently on the front page of the first issue of Rada (15.09.06) is an interview with a French author, Alexandre Ouliare, who has just published a book about the Russian Empire entitled, Probudzhennia Rossii ("Russia's Awakening"). This book is lauded in a favourable review for placing a special emphasis on the Ukrainian popu-

lation in Russia. The Ukrainian "people"² is described as being, in particular, "lively, intelligent, well-disposed to progress, and extraordinarily talented in skills and learning." Such words of praise paint a positive, if rather inaccurate, picture of the Ukrainian masses in strictly cultural, seemingly apolitical terms.³ This passage is indicative of three fundamental concerns of the liberals. First, this passage expresses the liberals' concern with the People as primary. The conceptualization is democratic within the construct of the nation. Second, the approval which Rada bestows on the French author's romanticized vision of the nature of this People functions as a vehicle for self-description. Because the liberals' vision is indeed a national one, the self being described is their vision of the nation. Indeed, the liberals, acting as agents of the nation on behalf of the nation, are creating a cultural model

²Translated from the word *narod*, which emphasizes the primordial interpretation of the nation (in contrast to the modern usage of the term, which places premiums on citizenship). The root of this word is "rod," meaning clan. *Narod* also carries with it the connotation of the "common" people, thus implying a democratic approach.

³It is not the purpose of this essay to evaluate the appropriateness of the French author's views, even though they are open to debate. For example, contrary to the author's vision of the Ukrainian People, the dismal state of general education in the villages considerably held back the Ukrainian peasantry in all aspects of formal learning. Indeed, this sad situation remained a thorn in the side of the national rebirth in spite of the best efforts of the budding *Prosvita* movement after 1905. The poor state of education and the overwhelming task that the "sometimes only existent on paper" *Prosvity* had before them is well-documented in Rada throughout the eight years of its publication.

for the People, so that they, as agents of the People, may thereby have an active effect on the process of self-organization. By canonizing some texts and excluding others, Rada is actively creating such a model, to the ends of its incorporation into the Ukrainian cultural history.⁴ The liberals want the People to be well-disposed to progress on the basis of a solid national education. Third, honours are bestowed on the French author himself. In the first issue, Rada establishes what kind of works are to be valued, and indicates what kind of prestige will be accorded to similar works.

Thus, on the first page of the first issue of Rada, the review article sets the tone for the newspaper's approach to the Ukrainian *Gemeinschaft* as being a very moderate one, aimed at primarily cultural ends. An ideal type is proposed and sanctioned, and there is no apparent deviation or significant expansion of the subject for the remainder of the year.

However, to illustrate the extent to which the liberals were concerned with the nation, it is noted that in 1906, virtually every issue of Rada contains an editorial which somehow addresses the national question. Similar to the review of 1906, the focus of the editorial which is concerned with nation-building is on the cultural aspects of the nation. These cultural issues are addressed, however, in the

⁴See Lotman and Uspenski, p. 31.

context of *Gesellschaft*. The vast majority of such articles address the issue of an Ukrainian national education. Closely related to, and intertwined within this theme is the language issue, which is treated to a lesser extent.

What is interesting about Rada's treatment of the school issue is that this cultural issue is always tied with the larger, political issues which affect and shape it. This is an ingenious approach which indirectly raises the political through the cultural, and thereby saves Rada from possible reprimands from the authorities. Rada cannot therefore be accused of directly inciting political unrest, since the concrete demands made are indeed, strictly cultural ones. However, by pointing out the political context of the cultural state of affairs, the editorial serves to, in effect, politicize culture -- marking a decisive step in the direction of nationalism. These tactics are employed throughout Rada's publication.

The beginning of the editorial's assault on the school question is in the leading item in the fifth issue, "*Chy mozhna buty samosvidomym?*" ("Is it possible to be self-conscious?") (20.09.06). The answer is an unqualified 'yes', as is exemplified in the work of *Prosvity*, which are springing up all over the cities of Ukraine. Rada heartily applauds this kind of activity, and directly encourages it in this editorial. Rada places a high value on national self-consciousness, and emphasizes the need for more *Prosvita* work.

The next time that an editorial appears about the *Prosvity*, the tone is urgent, and the demands specific. In "*Nashi Prosvity i narodnia prosvita*" ("Our *Prosvity* and the enlightenment of the people") (no. 51, 12.11.06), the thesis is forwarded that the enlightenment of the Ukrainian masses can only occur if education is taken out of the hands of Russians and the clergy, who use education merely to carry out Russification policies. The theory is that as long as "Muscovite" schooling prevails in Ukraine, true enlightenment of the masses is impossible. Valid education occurs only in the national context: when it is for the People, by the People. Education given by foreigners serves foreign interests. In order to rectify the situation, the editors call for the establishment of private Ukrainian schools, before the Russian and Polish private schools are established in their place.

The responsibility for the rectification of the situation is placed squarely on the national "we" ("my"). Ukrainians are implored not to wait for unforeseen reforms from above, but take the situation into their own hands. Thus, the idea of national self-determination, albeit in cultural terms, is present in the liberals' ideology from the beginning of *Rada*'s publication. This 'will to power' is actually in response to two threats which are, however, perceived as one: that posed by a very conservative, slow-to-move government, and that posed by foreigners in positions of privilege and power. The frequent coincidence of

these two threats, and, indeed, their virtual synonymy, only serves to compound their impact. The perception of this compound threat is at the core of the beginnings of Ukrainian liberal nationalist ideology. It is the driving force behind its development.

This theme is continued in review articles that deal with Ukrainian *Gesellschaft* features in 1906. The general current of demands forwarded in all of these is in the direction of the "nationalization" of schools in Ukraine. A representative example is found on the front page of no. 43 (03.11.06). Dmytro Doroshenko reviews Symon Petliura's article in Kievskii golos, which directly relates the act of the democratization of schools -- a current, popular political issue -- with their nationalization in Ukraine (the same argument is equally applicable to other national cases). What is meant by the nationalization of Ukrainian schools is the introduction of Ukrainian (which had heretofore been banned), as the language of instruction within the school system of Ukraine,^a a curriculum of Ukrainian studies (Ukrainian history, art, literature, music, geography, etc.), and the employment of Ukrainian teachers -- in short, the "Ukrainianization" of schools in Ukraine.^b Petliura's

^aIn "Ukraine" (*Ukraina*), Rada refers to the unified territory comprised of the following provinces: Kholm, Volyn', Kiev, Podillia, Kherson, Poltava, Chernihiv, Katerynoslav, and Kharkiv.

^bIn some articles, it is also argued for the "Ukrainianization" of schools in other territories where the majority of the population is Ukrainian.

scheme would see this process begin with the lower schools, and continue up until it would one day encompass the universities. The entire education project is a long-term one, hinging on gradual evolution towards a self-perpetuating institution built on, and reinforcing, national criteria.

The identification of democratization with the nationalization of the all-important institution of education is significant in two respects. First, it places the particular, national struggle on a higher plane which transcends the particular for the universal principle of democracy, while at the same time it also justifies the particular in the name of the universal. Second, it is symptomatic of the inevitable long-term goals of the liberal project. The demand for the democratization of Ukrainian schools -- the act of making schools for the People, by the People -- is for the creation of a social institution which will reinforce the national distinctiveness of its patrons. Ukrainian schools will produce Ukrainian citizens. The institutionalized intensification of national peculiarity is an essential ingredient in any nationalist struggle, for it elevates the individual to national status. This national status is defined by the rules and teachers provided by the education system. The Ukrainianization of this system would take an important instrument of socialization serving legitimating functions for the Russian autocratic order out of the hands of that order, and place it in the hands of Ukrainians. Although it is never explicitly stated in Rada, it can thus be

concluded that articles of this nature are aimed at the establishment of necessary conditions that would prepare the People for a corresponding national form of government, i.e., an Ukrainian government.

A second theme intimately tied with the above in this first year of Rada's publication is the encouragement of rebel members of the clergy who wish to go against the Russian Orthodox Church policy. These "rebels" advocate the "Ukrainianization" of church schools and seminaries -- that these institutions teach courses in Ukrainian literature and history, in the Ukrainian language.⁷ The editors admonish clergy who are not with the rebels that it is more honourable and fruitful to be with the People rather than against them. The clergy not actively involved in the national struggle -- which is the majority -- is thus cast away as alien by the liberals. They are, furthermore, portrayed as having betrayed their ancestors, who had been the primary agents of national enlightenment and defenders of the People and motherland in "old Ukraine," in a Golden Age when national enlightenment was of the highest priority. In attacking the policies of the Russian Orthodox Church, Rada is, in fact, attacking a major pillar of tsarist authority. Since this attack is carried on in the name of the People, Rada is portraying tsarist authority as being against the People.

⁷No. 8 (23.09.06), p. 1, and "Na pevnim shliakhu" ("On the right path"), and no. 25 (13.10.06), p. 1.

Thus, in its treatment of the importance of the work of *Prosvity* and the need for the Ukrainianization of church schools and seminaries, the editorial and the review make an issue out of the national dichotomy in society between the Ukrainian *Gemeinschaft* and the largely Russian (and to a lesser extent Polish) *Gesellschaft*. This is further evidenced in the vast majority of the editorials which deal with national school reforms, the aim of which is the lessening of this dichotomy.

A specific issue which arises after the 1905 revolution which is exemplary of the tactics that Rada employs for the purposes of nation-building, and the role that it perceives itself playing in this process, is the question of the establishment of an Ukrainian chair at the University of Kiev.^a This issue begins as the demands of some students' groups at the university. It is then widely publicized in Rada as being the most important current issue in Ukrainian national life. In the process, the Kiev students' demands are popularized to the extent that, for the following year, Rada receives petitions containing "thousands" of signatures from Ukrainians from all walks of life voicing their support for this issue.

The way that Rada popularizes the Ukrainian university question is significant. Rada publishes a number of the pe-

^aTreated in no. 12 (28.09.06), no. 30. (19.10.06), no. 34 (24.10.06), no. 43 (03.11.06), no. 73 (08.12.06), and no. 74 (09.12.06).

titions it receives in each issue, and also provides a running commentary on these petitions in the editorials.

Through the publication of the petitions, Rada demonstrates to its readers that an Ukrainian national consciousness does indeed exist (no. 73, 08.12.06). It is defined as being one which is inherently democratic. The petitions provide the evidence which speaks for itself; the editors want their readership, the intelligentsia, to recognize the spontaneity and pervasiveness of this national consciousness amongst the masses throughout Ukraine.

Through the publication of the petitions, Rada is also reinforcing its status as a spokesman for the People; as a legitimate representative of the People. Rada thus performs a leadership function. In the editorials about the petitions, Rada reiterates its concern with the People as primary, and places their demands within a meaningful theoretical, or political, context. The vision that Rada expounds is a democratic, national one, whose ultimate goal is the eradication of the cleavage between the national intelligentsia and the peasantry (to be attained through a national education) -- the unification of the nation. In order for the nation to become sociologically complete, the system of education must first be taken away from the current controllers of *Gesellschaft* and placed in Ukrainian hands. It is here that the possibility of an Ukrainian *Gesellschaft* would begin.

This idea is then tied to the political concept of national autonomy in "*Studenty-ukraintsi i avtonomiia Ukrainy*" ("Ukrainian students and Ukrainian autonomy") (no. 74, 09.12.06). This is an editorial in which the concept of national-territorial autonomy is named in the title, and is said to be becoming an issue of "increasing interest," especially among those advocating the establishment of an Ukrainian university chair. There is, however, a curious lack of elaboration of the concept. This is a sure indication of Rada's hesitation on political subjects in view of censorship in that area. However, in encouraging the students' demands for an Ukrainian chair, and at the same time equating these demands with the demand for autonomy, Rada is, in effect, encouraging demands for autonomy.

Apart from the issue of the Ukrainianization of schools, the definition of an Ukrainian Gesellschaft in the editorial is yet in an embryonic stage in 1906. The editorial generally identifies universal ideals and themes, and bases demands of universal bearing upon them. Without specific mention of the national question in the Ukrainian context, the editorial is used to advocate the idea of constitutional parliament (no. 14, 30.09.06), the end of class privileges before the law and the institution of equality of all before the law (no. 7, 22.09.06, and no. 26, 14.10.06), and a lessening of the huge economic and social cleavage between the rich and poor (no. 18, 05.10.06). Extreme right-wing groups, such as the Black Hundreds and "istinno russkie

liudi" and "Soiuz russkogo naroda" are denounced, in language reminiscent of the Kyrylo-Methodians, as being enemies of democracy, freedom, equality, and political and social pluralism (no. 19, 06.10.06, and no. 20, 07.10.06). In addition, there is expressed non-partisan support for the development of all Ukrainian political parties, on the principle of the inherent justice of political pluralism (no. 4, 19.09.06). The political "programme" (if it can even be called that) revealed in the first calendar year of Rada's publication can thus be summarized as being a moderate, liberal one, whose primary reference point is not specifically national (apart from the case of the school question), but is rather concerned with Russia's constitution and its reform. It is entirely aimed at working within this political context.

However, there are two editorials which indicate that there is a hidden force which smolders below the surface of this moderation and enthusiasm to work within the system. The leading editorial of no. 20, "Choho vchyt' istoriia" ("What history teaches"), contains a direct comparison of the contemporary political situation with that of France before the French Revolution, whereby the editors clearly associate themselves with the modern ideals of nation-statehood (liberty, fraternity, and equality). But, the editorial is short, and the idea relatively undeveloped. However, a few issues later, in "V velykykh revoliutsiiakh rodiat'sia natsii" ("In great revolutions nations are born")

(no. 27, 15.10.06), the same theme is picked up again. The flavour of this editorial is that the dawn of the age of nations is upon Russia. It is stated that amongst Ukrainians, "the idea of the nation has not died, and that this idea contains within it a tremendous strength" (p. 1). But, this idea remains, yet again, undeveloped.

These ideas do not remain undeveloped, however, for long. The following year of publication signals the radicalization of the Ukrainian *Gemeinschaft* formulation from that of passive, cultural "being" into *Gemeinschaft* as activity. Such a change is significant in that it prepares the way for the politicization of *Gemeinschaft* in the direction of the impulse to construct a corresponding *Gesellschaft*. The logic of this kind of an evolution works towards the rationalization of the two to result in the coming of the nation into play as an historical force -- the inclination to nationalism. The success of this evolution (i.e., the success of nationalist ideology -- whether its course is unilinear and progressive) largely depends on the balancing of these two concepts. This shift is evident primarily in the literary review. The editorials, on the other hand, continue to push for the Ukrainization of schools and universities, and the "democratization" of the Ukrainian language, using much the same tactics as in the previous

year. The editorial continues to act as "lobbyist" in this area.*

In a lengthy two-part review of an article written by Hrushevsky in Literaturno-naukovyi visnyk, Rada inadvertently reveals an irredentist impulse in its interpretation of Ukrainian *Gemeinschaft* that transcends the Austro-Russian border.¹⁰ Galician Ukrainians are lauded for holding their own on the cultural front against the "insatiably dominating Poles" (the actual allusion is to a "war"), the implication being that Russian Ukrainians should take this as an example in their own struggle for cultural progress. It is important to note that by this time, the Ukrainian cultural struggle in Galicia has grown into a full-blown political, economic, and social emancipation struggle. Thus, when Hrushevsky refers to Galicia's cultural gains and aspirations, he is, by implication, also referring to their socio-political and economic activities. Rada then quotes Hrushevsky concerning his thoughts on the reviews that his article received in the Polish press:

*On the school issue, see especially "Pid rozvahu asimiliatoram" (Concerning the assimilators"), no. 2 (13.02.07), p. 2; and D. Doroshenko, "Do natsionalizatsii ukrains'koi shkoly" ("Towards the nationalization of the Ukrainian school") no. 52 (03.03.07), p. 2. On the language issue, Rada published a series of editorials by Hrushevsky under the title of "Pro movu," in no. 8 (11.01.07), p. 1; no. 31 (07.02.07), p. 2; and no. 83 (08.04.07), p. 1.

¹⁰Entitled "Na ukrains'ki temy" ("On Ukrainian themes") beginning in no. 16 (20.01.07) pp 2-3, and ending in no. 65 (18.03.07), pp. 2-3.

In particular, they [the Polish press] were infuriated by my motives -- that a close community with Russian Ukraine will help Galicia break free from the Polish nobility's yoke, and that it is for this very community that Galicia should shake off Polish-German cultural influences -- those which so strongly disunite Galician life from Ukrainian.¹¹

The emphasis is clearly on the unity of the Ukrainian people which transcends political boundaries. The inference drawn from this passage is of cooperative communal struggle. It is not surprising that such standpoints would serve to add fuel to the accusations of an Ukrainian "conspiracy" and separatism made by both the Polish and the Russian reactionary press (e.g., Kievlianin), and so-called "authorities" on the Ukrainian question (such as the conservative Russian Kiev censor, Shchegolev). Indeed, in another "Na ukrains'ki temy" article in a later issue, Hrushevsky will have to "clarify" his views and even superficially revise them in order to dissociate them from the Russians accusations of treason that were levied on him in the controversy that ensued.¹²

A review of another article written by Hrushevsky about Kulish in no. 120 serves to elevate Hrushevsky to an even higher status in the Ukrainian movement.¹³ It also intro-

¹¹No. 65 (18.03.07), p. 2.

¹²No. 213 (21.09.07).

¹³"Na ukrains'ki temy" ("On Ukrainian themes"), no. 120 (26.05.07), pp. 2-3.

duces the notion of activity into Ukrainian *Gemeinschaft*. In his belief in the great future of the Ukrainian people and in his "impassioned speech to all of Ukrainian society,"¹⁴ Hrushevsky is likened to the Old Testament prophet Jeremiah. The article goes on to define the liberals' notion of Ukrainian *Gemeinschaft*, and the role of the intelligentsia within it:

'The People' -- this is a broad enough idea in which today's generations are tied not only with their own deeds, defects, and mistakes, but also with past generations, who are also tied with their sufferings and achievements. In the concept of "People" is understood millions of blind, dark, irresponsible masses, as well as tens of thousands of people, who have at their disposal all the provisions of culture and assign them to the blind masses, deprived of the possibility of independence, initiative, and organization. So to these strata, to these tens of thousands, to the Ukrainian society, turns Hrushevsky.¹⁵

Here, the primordial nature of the nation is stressed, so that past sufferings and achievements may be claimed as today's. In this condensation of time, Rada asserts the abiding presence of primordial and sacred realities in the temporal world of everyday affairs. It can, therefore, be stated that Rada has an active role in the national myth-making process.¹⁶ Such activity is essential on Rada's part.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 2.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Henry Tudor, Political Myth (London: Pall Mall Press, 1972), p. 62.

if it is to help foster a primordial Ukrainian national consciousness. Coupled with this is the "activation" of the notion of the People: the equation of the People with their acts. The national "I" comes into being out of an ethnographic "us"; the transition is from object of politics to subject/maker of politics. Responsibility for the state of the nation is rhetorically passed to the individuals who make it up. The mass dissemination of an active interpretation of the nature of the People is crucial if the national vision is a democratic one, and furthermore, if it is one which ultimately derives its strength from, and depends on, the communal action of the people.

The unity of national past with national present, combined with the notion of the People as an ongoing, self-responsible activity, places a tremendous weight on the shoulders of the national intelligentsia, who are identified as being the directors of this activity. The national intelligentsia are admonished to work within the context of the national historical struggle. What exactly this struggle is will be defined on the pages of Rada in the national myths and symbols referred to. In this respect, the review functions as an agent for the mobilization of the intelligentsia to its national task, or duty. Rada defines this task as being the intelligentsia's going to the Ukrainian masses, armed with the national wisdom, so that independence, initiative, and organization may be regained; so that the People may enter into the realm of national self-

responsibility. Undoubtedly, the historical struggle is in the direction of the "great future of the Ukrainian people" (p. 2) envisaged by Rada and the prophet Hrushevsky in this article.

The remainder of the article addresses the incongruity in the great numerical status of the Ukrainian People (comparing it to other "first European nations") and its political, cultural, and economic obscurity. Taken the notion of an active *Gemeinschaft* and the intelligentsia's role in it, this passage signifies a further specification of this role. It is the job of the intelligentsia to rectify this disequilibrium; the People's socio-political status ought to correspond to its numerical greatness. The liberals clearly see their People in the same category as European nation-states.

In 1907, the strictly cultural focus becomes increasingly specific, aimed at the identification of the most fundamental laws necessary for the constitution of Ukrainian sovereignty, and the development of national customs and manners necessary for the healthy growth and maintenance of Ukrainian *Gesellschaft* institutions. The goal of Rada's focus on *Gesellschaft* is, ultimately, its arrangement in such a way so as to produce moral agents, self-legislating members of a commonwealth of ends.¹⁷ A notable example of this

¹⁷This argument draws on the discussion of autonomy in the context of Rousseau's social contract in Andrew Levine, The Politics of Autonomy: a Kantian Reading of Rousseau's

shift in focus is found in "Na ukrains'ki temy," an almost entirely prescriptive review article concerning organizational features of national life.^{1*} This review begins by expressing the fear that on the Ukrainian cultural front, things are worse now than they were in 1905, when the Ukrainian written word was yet forbidden.^{2*} The remainder

Social Contract (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1976), p. 159.

^{1*}No. 16 (20.01.07), pp. 2-3. Part 2 of this two-part article has already been discussed on pages 110-111.

^{2*}Rada cites the reasons behind this fear as being the fact that there is still only one Ukrainian daily, one weekly, and one monthly, and only a few new Prosvitas have emerged. The responsibility for this dismal state of affairs lies in two areas. First, there was an overall lack of development in Ukrainian cultural institutions due to a lack of initiative coming from the Ukrainian intelligentsia itself. Throughout its publication, Rada will chastise the Ukrainian intelligentsia for not doing enough to actively promote and develop ukrainstvo. Second, it can be quite justifiably be stated that the underdevelopment of the Ukrainian intelligentsia arose out of official policy aimed at the total eradication of ukrainstvo. Writes Lotots'kyi on this period: "... The battle against ukrainstvo began, first of all, with the Ukrainian language on all imaginable fronts. Prosvitas and clubs were banned, the publication of Ukrainian notices was banned, as was the singing of Ukrainian songs not only for concerts, but even on the village streets; Ukrainian kobzars were not allowed to sing in the market place, school children were not free to sing carols; teachers confiscated the Gospel in the Ukrainian language from the school children, etc." Lotots'kyi, Vol. III, 254. This poor state of affairs is directly related to Stolypin's policy of "pacification," which was already enacted by the end of 1906. This policy was aimed at the eradication of the political terrorism" which continuously threatened the regime. This policy involved the placement of various regions of the Empire under special regulations, the closing down of newspapers, and summary courts-martial for those accused of terrorism and rebellion. See Nicholas Riasanovsky, A History of Russia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp 413-414. Thus, there is little doubt as to the reasons behind the underdevelopment of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, and their hesitation to get in-

of the article, in the form of a review and enlargement of Hrushevsky's views on the subject in Literaturno-naukovyi visnyk, outlines what must be done to rectify this dismal state of affairs. Significantly, the cultural deficit is not to be tackled on its own terms, but through a political solution.

The political solution comes in the form of what Hrushevsky advocates first and foremost, which is Ukrainian national self-responsibility. What this means is that every Ukrainian citizen must participate in cultural and political life as an Ukrainian. This is accomplished by making the national form the organizing point of Ukrainian life: every cultural or political demand must be made in and with respect to the national form, and every accomplishment must be understood within the context of the national form. In this way, "the various strata and classes of the entire Ukrainian territory's community must be united by national feeling, and build that national foundation upon which every people, every contemporary nation, develops its own culture or germinates its civic evolution."²⁰ Otherwise, Hrushevsky warns, the Ukrainian people is doomed to national extinction. Thus, each Ukrainian should approach the upcoming elections to the Second Imperial Duma by evaluating the appropriateness of specific demands within the context of the

involved in anything which might be considered to be subversive by the regime.

²⁰No. 16 (20.01.07), p. 2.

national form, and formulate demands based on the same criteria. Rada concludes this review with unqualified support of Hrushevsky's approach:

May the voice of our revered professor awaken informed and uninformed Ukrainians from their sleep, allow them to understand their responsibilities as sons of their people, and jolt them into more active and productive work for the welfare of their nationality.²¹

Active participation in politics based on national criteria is an Ukrainian duty, even if the concerned individuals are not aware of their "Ukrainian-ness," and hence their duty. They must be made aware. In the publication of Rada, the liberals are fulfilling their duty to the People.

Noteworthy is the fact that the national form is never explicitly defined in this article. The only hint of what this entails is found in the irredentist quality of the conclusion to the review, published some 49 issues later. Based on past precedent, national form could be interpreted to refer primarily to the Ukrainian language, the language issue being the dominant cultural issue of this period. However, Hrushevsky is careful to include the need for national form also in the consideration of politics, and this point is repeated several times. Its emphatic inclusion and concurrent lack of elaboration, both on Hrushevsky's part and on that of Rada's editorial staff, is undoubtedly an act

²¹Ibid., p. 3.

of political expediency. In 1907, censors were already cracking down on anything politically suspect in the press, and heavy fines were constantly being levied on Rada.²² Since it is alluded to, there is, surely, a specific national form for Ukrainian politics that Rada has in mind, and Rada is advocating it without directly naming it.

The national form of politics alluded to is finally explicitly named in a two-part editorial by Maksim Hekhter entitled, "Iak rozviazaty natsional'ne pytannia" ("How to solve the national question"), (no. 113, 18.05.07 and no. 114, 19.05.07). Here Hekhter extolls the virtues of national territorial autonomy over simple national-cultural autonomy. On the basis of economics and efficiency, national-territorial autonomy is stated to be the most just system of political organization for Russia. Simply put, each autonomous, national state within a Russian federation would be best able to determine what its own needs are, and then delegate resources in order to fulfill these needs. Because only the People can truly determine what their needs are, mere national-cultural autonomy is unacceptable, since the ultimate power of economic decision making would not be in the hands of the People. Thus, their true needs could never be fulfilled, and any kind of true national cultural development would be impossible.

²²Boshyk, pp. 384-385.

A book relating to this theme is quickly found and discussed four issues later, revealing the high priority of this issue in the liberals' political agenda. The national form of politics which has been alluded to and then finally named, is further developed in "*Natsional'ne pytannia i avtonomiia*" ("The national question and autonomy"), No. 118 (24-.05.07), pp. 1-3. This article condenses and discusses Hrushevsky's views on national autonomy put forward in two brochures, *Natsional'nyi vopros i avtonomiia* and *Edinstvo ili raspadenie Rossii* ("The National Question and Autonomy," and "Unity or Dissolution of Russia"). Hrushevsky is lauded as one who is best able to speak on behalf of the entire Ukrainian people because of his non-partisanship in the realm of politics, and because of *Rada's* opinion that his work on the national question is the culmination of that of generations of Ukrainian activists, beginning with the Kyrylo-Methodians. "The ideas which are at the basis of Professor Hrushevsky's brochures are the final word in Ukrainian political thought, working towards the development of the best conditions of civic life for the nation."²³

The article goes on to propose the two principles that Hrushevsky holds as necessary for the safeguarding of national freedom in the new political era: 1) national-territorial autonomy, within 2) a federally organized state (similar in form to Switzerland or the U.S.A.). These would

²³No. 118 (24.05.07), p. 1.

be realized by, first, basing all civic-territorial organizations, beginning with village assemblies, and working up to provincial jurisdictions, on national principles (based on "the national form"), until the boundaries of the ethnographic territory are established. This minimum of national organization is to be marked by the establishment of a corresponding national-territorial *oblast'*, which must, in turn, have a corresponding organization of self-government.

The article concludes by stating that such an organization would by no means pose any threat to the "prison of peoples",²⁴ Russia. On the contrary, it would create the unity of goodwill necessary for a strong federal state, which, Rada states, Russia has never heretofore had with respect to Ukraine. Thus, through the review of Hrushevsky's two brochures, Rada puts forward what it itself advocates as the best political programme for Russia.

In the following year, 1908, the literary review is used to further specify the liberals' socio-political demands and make firm Rada's moderate liberal ideological stand. The liberals also engage in cutting self-critique, thereby revealing the fundamental tensions between the individual and the nation within their philosophy. National differentiation from the "other" is more clearly cut and firmly based on political criteria in the editorial. The notion of Ukrainian *Gemeinschaft* is radicalized to the point

²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 3.

of crossover into the realm of *Gesellschaft*. Since it is no longer sufficient to simply describe the People in passive, cultural terms, the next meaningful description can only occur in political terms, or not occur at all. Thus, the focus is shifted from mere description of the People to the incorporation of *Gesellschaft* into their definition.²⁵ The review and editorial provide testimony to efforts to combine *Gesellschaft* and *Gemeinschaft* features into a coherent ideological whole. This period thus represents a bench-mark in the liberals' definition of the Ukrainian political nation.

In "Pro avtonomiiu Ukrainy" ("On the autonomy of Ukraine"),²⁶ Hekhter forwards a scathing critique of the poverty of Marxist political analysis with respect to the national question in his review of a new book by M. Porsh (of the same title as the article). Hekhter argues that by narrowly treating the working class as *prima* in the historical struggle, Porsh's Marxist analysis does not address the complexity of society, nor can it acknowledge other forces

²⁵For the remainder of *Rada*'s publication after 1908, however, there is no further expansion of any consequence of the Ukrainian *Gemeinschaft* formulation within the literary review genre. There are, instead, numerous repetitions of the pre-1907 variety of *Gemeinschaft*, with few intimations of any further "active" interpretation. This state of affairs is not only indicative of the consequences of increasing crackdowns by censors on the Ukrainian movement (censors who could not tolerate an increasing politicization of *Gemeinschaft*). It also illustrates the exhaustion of a strictly cultural approach to *Gemeinschaft* by 1908. The eternal recurrence of the same, in this case, illustrates the end of the evolution of this particular approach.

²⁶No. 90 (19.04.08), pp. 2-3.

at work in the shaping of society. In order to address the ills of Russia, Hekhter continues, the enlightened portion of Ukrainian society must closely tie Ukrainian national-political demands with the economic interests of the national masses. In this way, it would be proven that the autonomy of Ukraine is not just an idle thought, but an urgent and burning need of the Ukrainian people, without which there will be no economic, political, nor cultural progress.

This example of political critique goes far to clarify the liberals' economic programme. A socialist approach to land and industrial issues had prevailed in the political programmes released by RUP, URP, UDP, and UDRP in previous times: the means of production were to go to the people who worked them. The specific word employed then to describe the process by which this would occur is the same one still used today: nationalization. However, this approach should be understood in the same way as is the school issue: democratization = nationalization = Ukrainianization. While a socialist approach to class exploitation is accepted, it is never interpreted outside of the context of the national question in Rada. The oppressed class is at the same time a national category, and the oppressing class is a foreign national category. Thus, for the question of class to be resolved, the national question must simultaneously be resolved. Furthermore, the national question must be resolved in order that the class imbalance be rectified. The very desirable resolution of class conflict would only occur upon

the full autonomy of Ukraine, when autonomous state and social ownership would be congruent. Nationalism is the opinion that when the nation and state are congruent, a good political order will ensue.²⁷

Liberal-type ideologies do not escape the same type of critique. In the leading editorial of no. 92, "Rosii's'ki liberaly i ukrainstvo" (Russian liberals and ukrainstvo) (22.04.08) by S. Prosvitianyyn, the Ukrainian liberals distance themselves from Russian liberal parties (Kadets, SDs, Octobrists, etc.) because of the Russian lack of recognition of the Ukrainian national struggle. This critique is then extended to the Jews and Poles in Ukraine, whom the editors liken to direct competitors against the Ukrainians for the scarce, limited resource of national rights. Rada's perception of these groups as a threat is compounded by the Russian liberals' pandering to Jewish and Polish demands for national rights within Ukraine, while at the same time ignoring the same demands of Ukrainians.

The political differentiation from these three foreign nationalities is accentuated by Rada's political interpretation of sociological characteristics of these groups. Thus, for example, the Ukrainian People is equated with its peasant sociological status, which is said to make this People necessarily democratic by nature. Thus,

²⁷Cohler, p. 4.

[t]he entire Ukrainian history is comprised of the history of the struggle of the Ukrainian people for its nationality, faith, and economic well-being, for the democratic principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity.²⁰

The Polish national "other" -- the entire People -- is then differentiated from this vision of the Ukrainian People on the basis of political criteria which are held to be endemic to that people by nature. Thus,

[t]he entire history of Poland is the history of the aristocratic Polish classes and their struggle for their own privileges, for supremacy within community, society, and state, for its domination over Ukrainian and Polish ordinary people.²⁰

Differentiation from the alien nationality is thus not based on strictly ethno-centric reasons, but on ones in which ethnicity is related to a specific socio-economic threat. This interpretation arises from the historiographical approach developed by Kostomarov, based on three national "typologies."²⁰ These typologies actually served to differentiate the political cultures of the Ukrainians (an anarchistic, democratic political culture), the Poles (an aristocratic political culture), and the Russians (a fatalistic, despotic political culture). In this article, the Kosto-

²⁰No. 92 (22.04.08), p. 1.

²⁰Ibid.

²⁰Encyclopedia of Ukraine, Vol. II (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), p. 690.

marovian historiographical approach is employed without specific reference to the Russians, undoubtedly for fear of censorship.

Although there is no national animosity expressed against the Polish peasantry, this class is not held to be "representative" of the Polish People, whose history and hence nature is aristocratic (by the same token, there is a latent mistrust of the Polish peasantry because the potential exists that it would tend to follow in the footsteps established by that which is inherent to the Polish People).

It is interesting to note, once again, the Ukrainian liberals' identification with the ideals initially expressed in the French Revolution, tempered, nevertheless, by Ukrainian socio-political conditions (i.e., colonial-type relations with dominant, alien nationals throw a different light on the meaning of "liberty, fraternity, and equality"). This recurring theme in the various genres of Rada serves to reinforce the type of struggle that the liberals see themselves as being engaged in: a world-historical, universal struggle against political oppression in the name of the People, by the People. The exception here is that this universal struggle must be conducted utilizing the

strength of the particular (Ukrainian national) against the particular (foreign national).³¹

Another review, "Ideina borot'ba rosiis'kykh natsional-istiv z ukrains'kym anarkhizmom"³² ("The ideological battle of Russian nationalists with Ukrainian anarchism") forwards a critique of an article from the Kadet newspaper, Moskovskii ezhenedel'nik, which labels the Ukrainian movement as reactionary. In defence against the accusation of reaction, Rada invokes the name of Drahomanov. The editors of M. E. are advised to become familiar with the Drahomanovian approach to politics, which "has so clearly formulated the principal Ukrainian demands, the majority of which are still held fast to by our community today."³³ Thus, the Drahomanovian programme, which was once considered to be too radical by even the Kiev Hromada, is now directly advocated by its heir, TUP.

The most significant review article of 1908 in terms of what it reveals concerning the political foundation myths at the base of the liberals' philosophy is "Bratia malorossy"³⁴ ("Our Little Russian brothers"), written by V. Pravoberezhets'. In its back-reference into *Gemeinschaft* to

³¹An editorial addressing similar themes is "Shyla v mishky ne skhovaiesh" ("You won't hide an awl in a sack"), no. 162 (15.07.08), pp. 2-3.

³²No. 174 (30.07.08), p. 1.

³³*Ibid.*

³⁴No. 221 (27.09.08), p. 1.

name the political myths and symbols which are to be construed as the philosophical building blocks of Ukrainian self-organization, this article marks the apex of the evolution of a politicized conceptualization of *Gemeinschaft* within the review genre. To make sense of the present, Pravoberezhets' harkens to unmentionable symbols of Ukrainian cultural and political identity through the device of allusion. Pravoberezhets' (and through complicity, *Rada*) is thus himself engaged in the process of national myth-building and reinforcement, the eschatology of which is concerned with Ukrainian national independence. This review stands out particularly for its poetic, highly emotive quality.

Through the discussion of Shevchenko's poem, "Velykyi l'okh" ("The Great Dungeon"), Pravoberezhets' takes a critical, introspective look at what is, in his opinion, fundamentally wrong with the Ukrainian movement, and thereby tackles the insidious problem of internal dissent and disunity in the Ukrainian historical struggle. In the process, the author employs powerful national mythic images and symbols to emphasize his point. This serves to help link national past with present, along with notions of national responsibility (to past generations and for present actions) and destiny (national responsibility within the national historical context). This account of the past and the future in the light of which the present is rendered coherent

is not only an explanation of these events. This account also contains a practical argument within it.²⁸

In *Velykyi l'okh*, Shevchenko speaks of the birth of twins in Ukraine, one of whom will defend his brothers (the People), the other of whom will aid his People's enemies. Pravoberezhets' interpretation of this poem, given in the context of the future of the People, has distinctly apocalyptic overtones, reminiscent of prophecies about the second coming of Christ. After centuries of gestation in darkness and national ignorance, the time has now come that both twins are stirring within their cradles. While a national rebirth is indeed in motion (the work of the good twin), the spectre of the dark one looms ominous from within the family ranks, ever-threatening to undo all the good work done for the People. The coming of the Golden Age will be determined by the outcome of this domestic strife.

The author identifies the dark twin within the Ukrainian family as being the *bratia malorossy* (or *tozhe malorossy* -- those who identify themselves as "Little Russians"). To illustrate his point, Pravoberezhets' invokes the national Golden Age of the past, the Cossack era. He uses it to explain the present not as a mere description, but as a determination to act.

Pravoberezhets' warns of the inherent danger of the maloros phenomenon by placing it in the same context of that

²⁸According to Tudor, pp. 137-140, this type of argument structure is characteristic of political myths.

which was at the root of epic Ukrainian defeats of the past. He refers, in specific, to five scenes of horrific bloodshed from the Cossack era of rebellion and national independence: Kumeiky, Berestechko, Baturyn, Poltava, and Kodnia. The reader is commanded to look closely at the lessons that these Cossack defeats hold for the contemporary Ukrainian. The author's sense of history is astute, for his choice is of events which mark decisive points in the formative phase of this era, the defeats of its two greatest heroes, and the final great rebellion at the era's end.

At the battle at Kumeiky in 1637 the Cossacks suffered a decisive defeat. It was the last battle between Cossack forces and the Polish army before the decade-long "Golden Peace" that would precede Khmelnytsky's rise to power.³⁶ Two aspects of this battle are pertinent to Pravoberezhets' argument: the theme of national unity, and the theme of defeat due to allegiance to foreigners (specifically, the Polish king).³⁷

The battle of Berestechko in 1651 marked a humiliating defeat of epic proportions for Khmelnytsky in the Polish-Ukrainian war. Some 300,000 men were involved in the week-

³⁶Subtelny, pp. 117-118.

³⁷*Ibid.* First, this battle witnessed the unification of Cossack forces from the Zaporozhian Sich, peasants from Right Bank Ukraine, and for the first time, also from the newly colonized Left Bank. Second, the rebellion which led to this infamous defeat had its roots in the problem of mixed allegiances within Cossack ranks and the desire on the part of a group of registered Cossacks to curry favour with an outsider, the Polish king.

long battle, with the Ukrainians suffering about 30,000 casualties. Defeat came when Khmelnytsky's allies in the battle, the Tatar calvary (numbering some 50,000), deserted him. The Poles' victory resulted in the treaty of Bila Tserkva, where the rights and freedoms of the Cossacks were severely restricted by the Poles. In the disarray and general war-weariness that ensued, Khmelnytsky would come to the conclusion that he would need foreign support if he were to succeed in liberation from Poland. This would result in, as is known, the controversial Pereiaslav Agreement. The significance of this event with respect to Pravoberezhets' argument lies in the Ukrainian defeat due to reliance on foreign powers, which would lead to an even greater reliance on foreign support (alliance with Russia), and ultimately subjugation and suspension of national independence.

In referring to Baturyn and Poltava, Pravoberezhets' alludes to the symbol of Ukrainian separatism and independent statehood, whose name had been anathema for almost two centuries: Ivan Mazepa. Baturyn, the site of the bloody massacre of the civilian population (numbering some 6,000) in Mazepa's capital at the hands of Prince Alexander Menshikov, symbolizes the fate of the People when placed in the hands of a foreigner, namely, the Imperial Russian. The battle of Poltava, 1709, refers to the final battle which marked the end of Ukrainian attempts to break away from Russia: Peter the Great's final defeat of Mazepa, who had just concluded an alliance with Sweden. The reasons behind this

defeat is largely measured in the Ukrainian populace's refusal to join Mazepa -- they were frightened by Baturyn, continually harrassed by Russian troops, and put off by the Protestant Swedes. Their response was passivity.³⁸

This invocation of Mazepa thus injects Pravoberezhets' argument with even more powerful national imagery. The active struggle for Ukrainian independent statehood is incorporated into Pravoberezhets' argument, as is the staunch Russian stand against, and defeat of, it. However, in the allusion to Mazepa's demise, Pravoberezhets' does not take the lack of a political will amongst the People lightly. Instead, he identifies it as being behind Mazepa's eventual failure, and hence that of the people themselves.³⁹

The final event alluded to, Kodnia, was the bloody denouement to the last great *haidamaky*⁴⁰ revolt against the Poles, which marked the demise of the Cossack era. This last attempt at Ukrainian popular uprising was quashed by

³⁸Subtelny, p. 164.

³⁹The cardinal symbolic importance of Mazepa for centuries in the struggle for the Ukrainian state is discussed in Subtelny's *The Mazepists*. For the following two centuries after Mazepa's anathemization (November 10, 1708), opponents of the burgeoning Ukrainian movement in the Russian Empire would label its activists as Mazepists, and their movement, *mazepynstvo* -- thus identifying such activity with treason. Orest Subtelny, *The Mazepists* (Boulder, Colorado: East European Monographs, 1981).

⁴⁰The *haidamaky* were the successors to the Cossacks in the late eighteenth century, when Cossackdom was disbanded in Right Bank Ukraine. *Haidamaky* represented the last Ukrainian popular revolt against the Polish gentry.

Catherine the Great in 1768. The punishment levied on the *haidamaky* and implicated Ukrainian peasants was carried out by the Polish commander, Jozef Stepkowski, who tortured thousands to death over the next several years at his headquarters at Kodnia.⁴¹ The allusion to Kodnia once again refers to the bloody fate of the People at the hands of foreigners in their struggle for justice.

Although Pravoberezhets' does not discuss the specific aspects of these events (indeed, he could not), he demands that the reader make a detailed inquiry into their meaning. Only the well-informed intelligent would be able to respond to the complexities of the allusions to past battles fought and lost. It is precisely to this intelligent that Pravoberezhets' is addressing his argument when he implores, through the call of the sacred icon of Ukrainian national spirit, Shevchenko, to leave no stone unturned in the re-examination of history. The lesson to be drawn from these symbols is about how "their fathers [the Ukrainian ancestors] deceived themselves".⁴² The nature of the defeats and deceptions essentially lies in blindness to the familial ties of the organic nation, and the lack of recognition of the nation as the true sovereign to whom allegiance must be pledged. The message is not to blame the victors for the misfortunes of the nation. Instead, the root of the prob-

⁴¹Subtelny, *Ukraine*, pp. 191-193.

⁴²No. 221, p. 1.

lem, the darker *tozhe maloros* twin, is the adversary to be contended with.

However, the more important aspect of this review article lies in its very naming of powerful forbidden national symbols, and alluding to their *continued* power. While the average reader of Rada might not be able to respond to the subtleties of these allusions in the same way that a well informed *intelligent* would, s/he would undoubtedly be familiar with myths and legends associated with these illustrious events. Thus, the significance of their evocation would not be lost on this reader. The point is, moreover, that these symbols were part of Rada's framework of mythological cultural referents. The act of naming them and reinforcing their status as significant in the contemporary context is evidence of their incorporation into the Ukrainian liberal ideological notion of cultural time. This is extremely important in that

[t]he essence of culture is such that the past contained in it does not 'depart into the past' as in the natural flow of time; it does not disappear. It becomes fixed in cultural memory, and acquires a permanent, if background, presence. The memory of a culture is constructed not only as a store of texts, but as a certain mechanism for their generation. Culture, united with the past through memory, generates not only its future, but also its past, presenting, in this sense, a mechanism that works against natural time.⁴³

⁴³Lotman and Uspenski, p. 65.

The political past that Rada is generating and disseminating is one based on symbols of independent Ukrainian statehood, and heroic communal struggle with an emphasis on the need for unity of all classes. These political referents are those which the generation of the future is to be based on. As these events are brought into the national historical present, the Sorelian eschatological definition of a political myth comes to mind. The purpose behind Pravoberezhets' words is to evoke "all the strongest inclinations of a people, ... inclinations which recur to the mind with the insistence of instincts in all circumstances of life" in order to "give an aspect of complete reality to the hopes of immediate action by which, more easily than by any other method, men can reform their desires, passions, and mental activity."⁴⁴

Another example of an article, this time in the form of the editorial, which constructs a *Gesellschaft* argument out of a *Gemeinschaft* feature, is found in no. 108, "Kyivs'ki 'ievanhelisty'" ("Kievan 'Evangelists'") (10.05.08, p. 2). Here, the editors offer a scathing critique of the evangelical movement in Kiev on the grounds that it has a distinctly de-nationalizing effect. Social phenomena, even inherently apolitical ones, cannot be seen outside of the context of the national question, and their relationship to it. Thus, the social phenomenon of the evangelical movement, which had

⁴⁴Georges Sorel, Reflections on Violence (New York: Collier Books, 1961), p. 125.

been interpreted as a positive and progressive development for Ukraine in the thought of Drahomanov on the basis of the expansion of individual freedom, cannot be condoned by the liberals. Progress which does not explicitly occur in the direction of nation-building is not considered to be progress at all.

This tension between individual and national development in the liberals' ideology is further evidenced in the leading editorial of no. 34 (10.02.08). The editors place the blame for the lack of progress in fund-raising efforts for the erection of a monument to Shevchenko squarely on the shoulders of the Ukrainian intelligentsia. Although the editors concede that national paranoia and insecurity engendered by the repressive politics of the tsarist regime are important factors behind this dismal state of affairs, they also put a significant amount of the blame on the particular interests and actions of Ukrainian individuals which are not specifically aimed at the national struggle.

On the one hand, on the principle of the necessity of universal development and progress, and the ideal of pluralism, the liberals wish to encourage the individual initiatives of all Ukrainians. The spiritual, economic, and political development of each individual Ukrainian contributes to the general development of the People, and must therefore be encouraged. Yet, on the other hand, development which is not directly and explicitly nationally oriented is chastised, identified as being antipathetic to the national

struggle, and is thus strongly discouraged (similar to the old adage, "Those who are not with us, are against us"). Thus, any type of work which is carried out at the individual or group level and is not explicitly stated as being on behalf of the People is interpreted as the work of particular, selfish interests, and hostile to the Ukrainian primordial national spirit and its continuing development.

This theme reappears in the leading editorial of no. 184, "Nasha nezorhanizovanist'" ("Our disorganization") (12.08.08). The Ukrainian intelligentsia is accused of passiveness and a lack of national self-promotion in the arena of world culture. In the context of active nation-building, these are serious accusations. The intelligentsia is portrayed as being nationally ambivalent and only narrowly self-interested. For the national intelligentsia, Ukrainian national customs and traditions are said to be habitual when convenient, conventional when not, and never primary. Rada criticizes the intelligentsia for placing too much emphasis on the individual, and thus not allowing the initial allegiance to be to the nation. Individual self-interests should come second to national self-interests. This tension between the whole and the sum of the parts is typical of liberal ideology. The tipping of the scales towards emphasis on the whole leads to nationalist variations of the ideology, while their tipping in the opposite direction tends toward anarchy. The Ukrainian liberals are here tipping the scales towards nationalism.

After 1908, there is a very noticeable decline not only in the quantity of such articles, but also in their quality. For example, the editorials which, in the previous three years had treated primarily *Gesellschaft* features of nation-building, address only *Gemeinschaft* features in 1909, thus shying away from explicit political statements. Not one of these editorials forwards any new ideas about the People, and political aspects of the People are entirely avoided. Otherwise, the most significant demand made in the editorials of this year is the demand for the nationalization of schools -- a familiar theme which has already been developed to its limits in previous issues. In 1909, furthermore, there are no review articles even indirectly related to *Gesellschaft* or *Gemeinschaft*. The approach returns to a strictly cultural one. This shift in approach undoubtedly occurs in response to increasing political repressions against ukrainstvo by the tsarist authorities. Indeed, in the 1911 review of the preceeding two years' activities on the national front (such reviews traditionally bedecked the first issue of every new year), 1909-1910 are lamented as being "dark" years, where each step forward in ukrainstvo was countered by a heavy stomp backward levied by "hindrances from above".⁴⁹

⁴⁹See, for example, no. 1 (1.1.11), p. 2.

The most exemplary article of this shift appears in no. 233, entitled "Svitlo."⁴⁶ M. L. reviews the new Ukrainian pedagogical journal, *Svitlo*, and at the same time analyses the meaning of education within the context of the nation. The entire critique is, in essence, a formulation of what constitutes the healthy life of the organic nation.⁴⁷ The emphasis is on national life as primary; without participation in it, there is no hope for personal progress.

The author prescribes a list of the essential elements for a national upbringing, the most important ingredient for the building of a nation. While on this very political theme, the author, curiously enough, shies away from any political demands. Apart from rather vague cultural demands (concerning, for example, the development of national art and literature), the closest that the author comes to poli-

⁴⁶No. 233 (15.10.10), pp. 2-3. This article is probably in response to an earlier piece in no. 198 (26.08.10), p. 1, entitled "*U nas i v liudei (Pro potrebu ukrains'koho pedahohychnoho zhurnalu)*" ("Here and amongst the people (concerning the need for a pedagogical journal)"), by the teacher Ia. Z., about the need for a pedagogical journal in the name of national progress, and the moral obligation of the community to support such a project. This is the moral obligation of the society to the nation. Here, the review article identifies a need, and *Rada* thus functions as a voice for the demands of national interests which have no other organ to be channeled through.

⁴⁷It is quite interesting that when referring to national issues, such as education in the spirit of the nation, the author gives repeated qualifications emphasizing that this is not a chauvinistic approach. Presumably this is in response to possible accusations of reaction by the Russian reactionary press, and the tendency in *Rada* to associate the word nationalism with reaction, primarily of the Russian variety (*istinno-russkii narod*).

tics is in the call for the development of a national industry. In the place where a discussion of Ukrainian national autonomy would have been appropriate and would have likely occurred two years ago, the most radical statement that is made is the identification of the mission of the nation as lying in the national education of its youth, so as to avoid assimilation into the dominant Russian culture, and national extinction.

What is interesting, however, is that by this point, the term *narod* has been generally replaced by the term *natsiia*. The difference is a subtle, but important one, signifying the embracing of a more modern, Westernized conceptualization of the nation by the liberals. Whereas the emphasis had previously been on the "common people" aspects of the nation, *natsiia* introduces the more formalized, political aspects of citizenry. Ironically, this shift to a more political terminology is accompanied by the shift to a less political approach, signifying the growing importance of code language in a time of increasingly repressive measures and censorship by tsarist authorities.

The dialectical tension between the freedom of individual self-determination and the confinement of national self-determination, which seems to be pushing the developing liberal ideology towards modern nationalism from 1908, remains unresolved during this period. In this vein, the leading editorial of no. 188, "*Lysty ukrains'koho khliboroba*" ("Letters from an Ukrainian farmer"), (20.08.10)

provides the capital example. The editors implore the members of the Ukrainian peasantry to change their nature, so that they may open-heartedly embrace the principles of efficiency and scientific technique. Only by embracing such principles, based in Western European philosophy and technique, will the peasantry shed its fatalistic "Dast' Boh .. i khlib bude!" ("God willing ... there will be bread!") world view and be able to act self-responsibly to better its own lot. The irony of this approach with respect to the development or "progress" of the People has since been well-documented in Jacques Ellul's The Technological Society.⁴⁰

The introduction of the principles of technique serves to destroy the fundamental principle of *Gemeinschaft*. Ellul elaborates on the disastrous consequences of Western technique in underdeveloped societies:

Technical invasion does not involve the simple addition of new values to old ones. It does not put new wine into old bottles; it does not introduce new content into old forms. The old bottles are being broken. The old civilizations collapse on contact with the new.⁴¹

The Ukrainian traditional way of life that the liberals so adore and base their populist philosophy on would be destroyed through the introduction of technique, and then replaced by structures entirely alien to the most fundamental

⁴⁰Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society (New York: Vintage Books, 1964).

⁴¹*Ibid.*, p. 121.

bases of this life. That the liberals are indeed unwittingly participating in the actual demise of that which they wish to elevate to the level of politics and base the organization of a state on ("the national form"), is evident in the fact that the liberals implore the people whom they consider to be the core of Ukrainian society and national identity, the peasantry, to change its nature. At the same time, however, the liberals are not willing to accept the principle of possessive individualism. The tension thus remains unresolved.

This fundamental tension within the liberals' ideology is finally come to terms with in the editorial of 1911. An easing in the pressures of censorship results in renewed, revived onslaught on the national front in Rada's editorials. Rada's political vision has not died, in spite of three years of seeming-hibernation. Not only is the pre-1909 approach returned to, but it reappears as a more sophisticated and vastly improved approach to nation-building.

The tension between the individual and the communal will, which has been a matter of considerable ambiguity and confusion thus far in the liberals' approach to nation-building, appears to have come close to resolution in a new emphasis on economic issues in the editorial of 1911. What had seemed to be a sore spot in liberal ideology that was driving in a right-hand direction towards ethno-centric domination of the community over the individual is resolved in

the favour of personal progress and individual development. The general principle is forwarded in a number of editorials that the sum of the economic progress of Ukrainian individuals, in whatever initiatives, will equal the progress and betterment of the nation as a whole.⁹⁰ Each individual effort of every Ukrainian at economic self-betterment, in whatever capacity -- even if not explicitly related to the national struggle -- contributes to the development of the Ukrainian body politic. For example, in the leading editorial of no. 106, "Natsional'na samodiial'nist'" ("National initiative") (11.05.11), the "turning away" of the national intelligentsia from strictly cultural work to concentrate on private enterprise is actually applauded and taken to be the mark of the healthy growth of a nation. Formerly, Rada treated such activity was generally treated as an act of treason in the national struggle, not to be condoned. However, Rada now perceives such phenomena in a different light. The fact of Ukrainians participating in the development of the economic resources of Ukraine, in whatever capacity, is now interpreted to signify the nationalization, or Ukrainianization of economics (recall that democratization = nationalization = Ukrainianization). Furthermore, this situation is interpreted to represent the beginnings of the unification of spirit with material -- of

⁹⁰No. 106 (11.05.11), "Natsionalizatsiia torhovli" ("The nationalization of commerce"), no. 162 (20.07.11); "Koooperatyvnyi natsionalizm" ("Cooperative nationalism"), no. 185 (18.08.11).

Gemeinschaft with *Gesellschaft* -- which, in order for the health of the national "organism," must be in equilibrium with each other. The editors are not interested in which of these elements is primary (that is to be left to the materialist and idealist philosophers to hash out amongst themselves). Rada's only concern is that these two elements be present and in equilibrium.

The equalization of the relationship between material and spirit in the Ukrainian case represents the equalization of *Gesellschaft* and *Gemeinschaft*. However, the way that Rada proposes that this relationship be equalized marks a turning point in the development of Ukrainian liberal ideology away from its populist roots and romanticism. Here, the direction of liberal ideology comes more in line with its Western antecedents. Through this new emphasis on private initiative and the recognition of the positive aspects of individualism, Rada recognizes the vital importance of the emergence of a middle class and capitalism for the development of the Ukrainian nation. It is no longer sufficient to simply believe that the masses, with no previous political experience, will rise and organize themselves according to "national forms" and principles upon recognizing their "national destiny". An economic infrastructure built up by an nascent bourgeoisie is thus seen as a very desirable development. It is, furthermore, a development which is seen as essential to nation-building.

The Ukrainian national-historical idea and its relationship to the state is further developed by Iefremov, who reviews the book *Ocherki gosudarstvennogo prava* by Baron B. Nol'de of St. Petersburg in a two-part article, "Nova pratsia pro avtonomiiu" ("A new work about autonomy").⁵¹ By addressing the section dealing with Ukrainian autonomy, Iefremov elaborates an historical argument which sees the history of Russia as being one of increasing centralization, especially from the XVII to the XIX centuries. Iefremov argues that peoples and regions that were once independent or autonomous have been incorporated gradually into Russia until they could act on their own no longer -- hence the current crisis situation, where Russia has simply extended herself beyond her own capacities. Russian government, based on a tradition of increasing centralism, is now obsolete, Iefremov declares. The conclusion is that the only succour to this degenerating situation is radical decentralization, and re-organization through a federalist system based on national autonomy.

Thus, through the medium of literary review, *Rada* forwards not only a theory of history based on Russian imperialist aggression resulting in the unjust incorporation of its present resident nations into its politics, but also a plan for the rectification of this situation in the present. In this review, the only one to deal with either *Gemein-*

⁵¹No. 206 (13.09.11), pp. 2-3 and no. 207 (14.09.11), p. 2.

schaft or *Gesellschaft* features of nation-building in 1911, the focus has departed from the strictly cultural approach of recent times, and gone back to the 1907-8 emphasis on political organization. Interestingly, there are no romantic allusions to "peopleness," nor national heritage and ancient obligation as operative in the contemporary political scenario. When the Ukrainian people or other peoples of the Empire are referred to, it is the *natsiia* which is named. The focus has returned to the political tradition of Ukrainian *Gemeinschaft* while the emphasis is concurrently on legalistic, formalized state-provincial relations.

Indeed, Rada, finally, for the first time, labels the Ukrainian movement which it is advocating a *nationalist* movement. At the symbolic level, this change is extremely important. In previous years, Rada strongly dissociated itself from this term, which it identified with the reaction of the Black Hundreds and groups of the *istinno russkii narod* variety -- not to be condoned in any circumstances. Throughout its publication, Rada had to go to great lengths to defend itself from accusations of nationalism made by the authorities and other national-political opponents. However, in the leading editorial, "*Pid novomu firmoiu*" ("Under new management") by Iefremov in no. 156 (12.07.11), the Ukrainian movement is explicitly defined as a nationalist movement. But Iefremov's definition of Ukrainian nationalism seeks to place it in a progressive category of positive universal development.

Iefremov begins by stating that "nationalism and reaction are synonymous when on Russian soil."⁵² This is so because Russian nationalism is that of a dominating nation, and is thus

ruinous [nationalism], which pulls a nation down to discord, hostilities and strife, to the isolation of the nation from the whole of humanity, to the placing of one nation in opposition to the entire world, to national arrogance and blindness.⁵³

Ukrainian nationalism, on the other hand, is that of an oppressed nation, and is thus

progressive, creative nationalism, which leads the nation upward to rebirth, to consciousness of itself as a member of all of humanity -- albeit unjustly wronged and despised, but on principle, nonetheless equal to all other nations.⁵⁴

Furthermore,

the nationalism of the oppressed, plebeian nation is necessarily democratic, for in fighting for national liberation and its legitimate national rights, its primary considerations are in the interests of the vast majority of the People, and not just one little handful among them.⁵⁵

⁵²No. 156 (12.07.11), p. 1.

⁵³Ibid.

⁵⁴Ibid.

⁵⁵Ibid.

Thus, nationalism for Ukrainians is a virtuous path to development. However, because of the nature of the nationalism of its very important neighbour, Russian, the question of Ukrainian nationalism is also the question "to be, or not to be" (p. 1). Ukrainians must become nationalists in order to survive as a People.

All further pronouncements concerning nation-building or various aspects of Ukrainian *Gemeinschaft* or *Gesellschaft* must now be interpreted within the context of overt nationalism. It is in this light that the editors' quest to establish concrete, contemporary symbolic referents for possible use in the Ukrainian nationalist struggle must be regarded. The search for the appropriate colours to represent the Ukrainian political idea and one's adherence to it, and hence the colours which would be used for a Ukrainian flag (a very important symbol in nationalist struggles), is a prime example of this. In a two-part editorial entitled, "*Ukrains'kyi natsional'nyi kolir*" ("The Ukrainian national colour"), (no. 179, 10.08.11, p. 1; and no. 196, 31.08. 11, p. 2), K. Shyrots'kyi specifies why gold and blue should be adopted as the Ukrainian nation's official colours. These colours are deemed most suitable to represent the Ukrainian nation because they tie the contemporary nation to its ancient roots in the Kievan Rus'. Hence, this period and its traditions are "claimed" by the nationalist struggle as the antecedents of the contemporary nation.

These colours are then linked to various "epochs" in Ukrainian history, thus showing the continuity of the history of the organic nation. Their origins as "Ukrainian colours" are, for example, also connected to the crest of L'viv (a golden lion on a blue background) and surrounding territories of the Rus'ian palatinate from before the Polish period -- thereby reinforcing the ancient unity of the nation that transcends political boundaries. The majority of the analysis, however, traces the roots of these colours to the Golden Age Cossack period. The author evokes the blue standard that was presented to Khmelnytsky by Wladyslaw IV, and the gold and blue banners of the Cossacks who faced persecution under Catherine the Great. Last but not least,

the blue and gold ensign was the symbol of the virility of the Cossack, his powers (scholarly research has shown that men always find these colours to be more pleasing than women) and everything which rightfully belonged to the Cossack, everything that concerned him.²²

Thus, these colours should be adopted as the national ones because they are "in good keeping with national taste and character, and Cossack custom and specific traditions among contemporary Ukrainian society." In the context of nationalism, one can only hypothesize that these specific Ukrainian traditions are political ones, ultimately tied to the continuing influence of Cossack political tradition of

²²No. 179 (10.08.11), p. 1.

rebellion and political independence in the contemporary context. It is also very important to note that these colours had already been adopted by the Ukrainian national struggle in Galicia and Bukovyna, thus further symbolizing the cross-boundary unity of all Ukrainians.

The following year, 1912, witnesses a "turning in" of this ideology onto itself. Its very moderate, liberal approach firmly based in universal ideals and principles which had, quite frankly, placed a lot of faith in the peaceful cooperation and support of other nations for the Ukrainian national struggle -- one which had had faith in a just federation of Slavic peoples, is shed. It is revealed that Rada no longer believes that there is hope for the Ukrainian nation to be treated as an equal by its brother Slavs (particularly the Russians and Poles), so the Ukrainian nation must, therefore, fend for itself on the world scene. Federalism is still advocated, but now only on the principles of realpolitik. The sentimental affinity that liberals had once felt for all Slavs is no longer of any political consequence. This transition from a moderate liberal ideology to one which is more explicitly nationalist in the conventional sense of the term is not a smooth one, however. This is yet another formative period, as the liberals begin to come to terms with the nature of a nationalist struggle, and its necessary ethno-centrism.

Already early in the year, in the eighth issue, it is proposed that the Ukrainian movement distance itself from the national struggles of its neighbours, especially those which make overtures to pan-Slavism. This is an important move, for in recent years, and indeed from the genesis of the Kyrylo-Methodians, the role of Ukraine had always been situated within the broader context of the brotherhood of Slavs -- hence the impetus to federalism. The entire political philosophy was founded on this principle. However, in the review of Hrushevsky's article in Literaturno-naukovyi visnyk, "V slavians'kykh obliimakh" ("In the embrace of the Slavs"),⁵⁷ not only does Rada strive to cut off any ties that the Ukrainian movement has with Slavophilism, but it also distances itself from its political antecedents who firmly based Ukrainian political thought in the principle of an all-Slavic federation.

Rada distances itself from the neo-Slavophile movement which is gaining ground amongst Russians and Poles who seek Russian protection from the Prussian state largely because the liberals do not have faith that either of these two will give up their domineering or messianic tendencies towards the Ukrainian nation. Thus, the possibility of true Slavic federation with either of these is concluded to be unlikely. However, more importantly, it is evident that what is of

⁵⁷"Nove slavianofil'stvo i ukrainstvo" ("New Slavophilism and the Ukrainians"), no. 8 (11.01.12), pp. 1-2.

greater concern to Rada about the Slavophile movement is the liberals' fear of the homogenizing tendencies inherent to participation in such a movement, one which "strongly neutralizes our aspirations in our cultural and national mission".²⁰ The liberal strategy in nation-building, at this point, lies in an intensified national differentiation of its People. The Ukrainian liberal concept of nation-building at this point is nearing the concept of nationalism within the construct of state sovereignty as defined by Hans Kohn, where intra-nationally, nationalism leads to a lively sympathy with fellow members within the nationality, and internationally, it finds its expression in indifference to or distrust and hate of fellow men outside the national orbit.²¹

To further justify this cut with Slavophile ties, the author unequivocally states that a different "approach" must be taken, since Ukrainian demands have far outgrown the political programmes and demands of Kostomarov, Antonovych, and Drahomanov. What this new approach would entail is not specified, nor are the referred to Ukrainian demands. There are only vague admonitions to the need to set one's focus more on the Ukrainian nation in politics, instead of wasting time with the struggles of potentially unsympathetic foreign

²⁰Ibid., p. 2.

²¹Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944), p. 20.

Slavic "brothers." This presents a problem in the genesis of the emerging ideology. The liberals have now distanced themselves from their philosophical fountainhead, claiming that it is obsolete. The problem is that as of yet, there is little evidence of anything as clear-cut and well-formulated in the pages of Rada which can replace these programmes for a national politics. Rada has cut itself off from its political tradition, and has thus entered unexplored ideological territory. The success of this break with tradition will depend on Rada's being able to put forth, in following issues, a new programme to replace it. Otherwise, the fate of the entire liberal project will be on very precarious grounds, having no unifying approach. Considering the circumstances of the time; i.e., restrictions on expression by the censors and the internal dissent developing in Rada, the prospects for Rada's success in this area seem dim.

Editorials which treat *Gesellschaft* features of the Ukrainian nation give an indication of the direction that this ideology may be evolving in. In previous years, Rada refused to lend its support to any Duma candidates solely on the basis of their ethnicity. Ukrainian candidates, in order to receive Rada's sanction, had to be "progressive." However, in "*Ukraintsi na vyborakh*" ("Ukrainians at the elections") (no. 105, 09.05.12, p. 2), Ukrainians are strongly encouraged to elect only Ukrainian delegates in the

elections for a new Imperial Duma, for only Ukrainians, of whatever political leaning, can truly understand Ukrainian needs and demands. This is another example of a departure from that which has come before. The liberals here are working towards the mobilization of a movement which would result in what Cohler defines as a nation-state. Cohler defines the collective attitude which supports the nation-state (the unification of nonpolitical similarities with the political order that is to rule it), as being the fact that members of the same nation believe that they have conspired and fought to be ruled together, and these people seem to assume that being ruled together, by their own kind, will produce good government.*°

An interesting tangent to this same theme is revealed in the editorial, "Ukrains'ka sprava v tretii Dumi" ("The Ukrainian issue in the Third Duma") (no. 133, 12.06.12). In a retrospective look at the work of the Third Imperial Duma over the past five years, the editors come to the conclusion that the Duma has brought nothing of positive value to the Ukrainian movement, and has been utterly useless as a forum for Ukrainian demands. The editorial, nonetheless, ends on an optimistic note, saying that since the Ukrainian movement has gained political and social weight over this period, it will make sure to better utilize the Fourth Duma this time around. However, now that Rada has brought the very useful-

*°Cohler, p. 4.

ness of the institution of the Duma into doubt, it is apparent that the potential exists for the liberals to drop the Duma entirely from their political agenda.

The focus in the editorial in general in 1912 is again on Ukrainian nationalism versus Russian nationalism. The ideology is toying with this conflict as its organizing point. It is likely that this national-political conflict is moving in to replace earlier pan-Slavic ideas. In "Dva natsionalizmy na Ukraini" ("Two nationalisms in Ukraine") (no. 164, 19.08.12, pp. 1-2), Russian nationalism is explicitly defined as the enemy of Ukrainian nationalism, in social-class, political, and national terms. The forces which support Russian nationalism in Ukraine are identified as the Russian large land-holders of all political leanings (including Russian liberals). These people should be recognized as the social-class, political, and national enemies of the People. The situation is described to have deteriorated between these two Peoples such that the "the civic and class essence of the Ukrainian movement could not have helped but to put the large-landholding Russian nobility in the position of the enemy of the national demands of *ukrainstvo*".^{*1} Thus, the conclusion to the editorial firmly states that

ukrainstvo cannot, under any circumstances, take Russian nationalism lightly. On the contrary, one of the most important tasks of the Ukrainian move-

^{*1}No. 164 (19.08.120), p. 2.

ment is to lead an energetic ideological battle against Russian nationalist ideology, clarify its real class nature and national idea; while at the same time develop national and civic self-consciousness among the various classes of our People and throw a truthful light on the multi-ethnic relations in Ukraine and the class relations between the various nations which inhabit our country (Ukraine).²²

In this vein, it is important to note that the primary symbol of national-political independence, Mazepa, is again evoked in 1912. No. 27 (02.02.12), p. 2 contains the article "Het'man Mazepa v zakhidnii Ievropi" ("Hetman Mazepa in Western Europe"), by S. Podolianyn. Here the extensive treatment of Mazepa in the literature of Western Europe is reviewed: Byron's poem "Mazeppa" (1819), "Mazeppa" in Hugo's *Orientale* (1829), Rudolf Hottshal's tragedy, "Mazeppa," Vernel's paintings of Mazepa, a host of English novels about Mazepa from the end of the century, and the romantic play "Mazepa," "or the wild horse from Ukraine" presented in London's Royal Amphitheatre in 1831, and its comeback in the Astleys Theatre in 1864. By disclosing, through such a preamble, Mazepa's romantic heroic status in Western Europe from a time when his name was anathema in Ukraine, *Rada* reinforces Mazepa's legitimacy not only as an Ukrainian cultural and political icon, but as one with international respect and status.

²²Ibid.

The author goes on to give a very positive review of a new book which had recently appeared in France by the *Vicomte de Vogue, Mazeppa*.³³ The book is praised for its frankness and factualness, and the sympathetic view it gives of Mazepa's significance in history. The author recommends that it be translated into Ukrainian as soon as possible, so that it may breathe fresh life into the national vision of Ukrainians who may be tiring in their work for the People.³⁴

³³Viconte E. M. De Vogue, *Trois Drames de l'Histoire de Russie* (1. *le Fils de Pierre le Grand*; 2. *Mazeppa*; 3. *Un Changement de Regne*) (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1911).

³⁴However, soon afterwards, an article by the same author appears, entitled "*Dorepetuvalysia!*" (No. 56 (08.03.12), p. 1.), which refutes any political conclusions about Mazepa which could have been drawn from the previous review. Lotots'kyi cites several Russian newspapers, which, beginning in 1912, would continually levy accusations of *mazepynstvo* against the Ukrainian movement (e.g., *Delo*). Official policies resulting from these charges included, for example, the naming of only Russians to teaching positions, and the dissemination to school children the idea that "there is no such idea as Ukraine, and that the Little Russian language is only a dialect," etc (Lotots'kyi, Vol. III, 257). *Rada*, in order to dissociate itself from the serious charge of *mazepynstvo* and separatism (for example, *Delo* charged that *Rada* "is undoubtedly promoting, to the population of the Little Russian territory, national self-consciousness and the beginnings of separatism and hostile relations towards all things Russian" (Lotots'kyi, Vol. III, 259), must, therefore, "clarify" its position. Thus Podolianyn asserts that there is nothing political about the Ukrainian movement, and that the only demands that they have are for the rights to use their own language, to develop their own national culture, and to raise the standard of living for the majority of the People (*narod*, not *natsiia*). The tightening of censorship is further evidenced in the choice of other books that are reviewed. Hrushevsky's *Kul'turno-natsional'nyi rukh na Ukraini v XVI - XVII vitsi*" (No. 143, 23.06.12, pp. 2-3) is a case in point. The period in question is an important one as the formative phase of the Cossack era. However, the political aspects of this period are entirely ignored in the review; political myths or symbols are not even alluded to -- although they are present

1913 does not signal any deviation from this newly-forming approach. The emphasis continues to be on *Gesellschaft* features in the editorial, focusing on the same themes as in the previous year, with a view to their theoretical refinement in terms of a national ideology and political proposals. The difference is that such articles are fewer in number, indicating that it is becoming increasingly difficult to get articles of such a nature past the censors. In view of the yet nascent new focus in the ideology, the lack of opportunity to work out certain political wrinkles in it, or open it up to polemics, serves to retard its refinement.

The theme of economic nationalism is continued from the previous two years, and now is even more closely tied to national politics. It is advocated on the grounds of not only efficiency, as before, but now also on the grounds of justice and national rights. The argument begins in no. 181,⁸⁸ with the proposition that Russia's economic policy towards Ukraine has been one of colonial exploitation from the times of Peter I. This policy continues to contemporary times, the author states, only for the benefit of the bourgeoisie of the "reigning nation".⁸⁹ The editorial ends with the

in the book itself. The emphasis is strictly on culture. Hrushevsky's book, nevertheless, is lauded as being one of the best, destined to become a popular history book.

⁸⁸"Bulo i iest'" ("The way that it was, and still is"), no. 181 (09.09.13), pp. 1-2.

⁸⁹*Ibid.*, p. 1.

statement and ominous question, "That's the way that it has been in the past, and remains now. Surely, this is not the way that it will continue to be?"⁴⁷

This theme is continued and expanded throughout Rada's editorials in 1913, as exemplified by M. Melenovs'kyi's article in no. 294, entitled, "Natsional'na ekonomychna polityka" ("The politics of a national economy"), (25.12.13, pp. 6-7). Normally, an editorial of this nature would appear on the front page. However, perhaps due to the radical nature of Melenovs'kyi's argument, this editorial is "hidden" near the end of the paper on pages six and seven, usually reserved for commercial advertisements and announcements.

Melenovs'kyi begins by flatly stating that it is quite evident that the People (*narod*) is now becoming a nation (*natsiia*). Ukrainians must, therefore, defend their position from the standpoint of that of a nation. In order for the growth of Ukrainian industry and commerce in Ukraine (that is, run by and for Ukrainians), the adage "*Svii do svoho!*" ("Support our own People!") must be avidly employed in Ukrainian economic dealings. Melenovs'kyi states that this is already occurring to a large extent. This is occurring

not even because of some kind of *'khokhlats'kyi* [derogatory term for Ukrainian peasantry] nation-

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 2.

alism,' as the Muscovites are fearfully imagining -- but simply because the healthy, clear understanding that the "neighbourly-brotherly" preparations that Moscow has in store for Ukraine bring very little good to Ukraine."⁶⁶

Furthermore,

the domination of Ukraine's economy by elements foreign to Ukraine is holding back the development of our own Ukrainian strength, our own experience, our own financial powers."⁶⁷

In order to ensure the "rightful" development of the Ukrainian economy, the author advises Ukrainians to buy only Ukrainian-made products, and thereby "support only those who are for our national liberation, only those who are for Ukraine!"⁷⁰

The author states that Ukrainian civic politics will develop alongside this economic development, and this will lead to development in yet other areas. Specifically, the author believes that this will lead to the democratization, and hence Ukrainianization of the local electoral process, and thus to the "almost full Ukrainianization of the organs of municipal self-government."

⁶⁶No. 254 (25.12.13), p. 7.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*

⁷⁰*Ibid.*

This "embourgeoisation" of Ukrainian economics represents a radicalization of the developing Ukrainian cooperative movement towards liberal nationalist economic relations. Ukrainian farm and small consumer cooperatives, which had been developing from the turn of the century, had always been encouraged in Rada on the principle of economic efficiency and the most practical means to material progress for the peasantry. However, the issue of Ukrainian economics has now become explicitly political, and linked to capitalist-type, explicitly nationalist economic relations.

Rada also attacks the issue of Ukraine's national-territorial autonomy from a judicial perspective in 1913. A sophisticated legal argument is forwarded in no. 205 by S. Pavlenko, in the editorial, "*Iedyna derzhava, avtonomiia i prava mistsevykh mov*" ("The single state, autonomy, and local language rights"), (07.09.13, p. 2). Here, Pavlenko demonstrates the constitutionality of all of the Ukrainian demands made thus far, and places them in the context of a better social organization of Russia. It is reiterated that the political autonomy of any countries or lands within the state does not contravene Russian Imperial law, threaten the integrity or unity of the state in any way, nor does it represent separatism. Specific articles of the law are quoted which serve to prove the legitimacy of Ukrainian demands,

and thereby promote Ukrainian national autonomy as something that Ukrainians should not be afraid to support.⁷¹

1914, the final year of Rada's publication, ends on a rather ambiguous note with respect to Rada's approach to nation-building. The greatest emphasis is still placed on national territorial autonomy and the principle of federation, the only two *Gesellschaft* features of the liberals' politics that have remained constant for the majority of Rada's publication; and the legalistic approach and argument is strengthened. However, there is confusion as to the best means of achieving these political goals. For example, there is considerable debate as to whether the fate of *ukrainstvo* rests on the back of the peasantry or the intelligentsia, with no conclusive resolution.⁷² Apart from this, there is little deviation from the line towed in the previous two years.

The crackdown of the censors reaches a climax on August 2, 1914, upon Germany's declaration of war on Russia, when Rada is one of the first newspapers to be permanently shut

⁷¹This same type of political critique has continued in modern Soviet Ukraine; e. g., Ivan Dziuba's Internationalism or Russification? (Munich: Suchasnist Publishers, 1968).

⁷²For example, the leading editorial of no. 100, "Zaiava katerynoslavs'kykh selian" ("Declaration of the Katerynoslav villagers") (04.05.14, p. 1) argues that *ukrainstvo* rests in the peasant, not the intelligent; while the editorial "Kil'ka dumok pro velyku vahu nashoho chasu" ("A few thoughts concerning the great importance of our times"), in no. 151 (05.07.14, p. 2), advocates that all efforts should be directed towards the development and enhancement of the intelligentsia.

down in Ukraine. Had not the war intervened, the path was already clear, nonetheless, for an almost wholesale repression of ukrainstvo with the publication of Shchegolev's influential Sovremennoe ukrainstvo, ego proiskhozhdenie, rost i zadachi,⁷³ described by Lotots'kyi as "a handbook for the persecution of ukrainstvo."⁷⁴ All forms of ukrainstvo were being regarded as variations of mazepynstvo, aimed at the independence of Ukraine through union with Austria. The chiefs of police in the "hotbeds" of mazepynstvo, the Kiev, Chernihiv, Poltava, Podillia, Kharkiv, Volyn', Kherson, and Kuban provinces, were instructed to deal with the separatists in the "appropriate" manner (e.g., stricter censorship of the Ukrainian word, prohibition of the word "Ukraine" and imposition of the term "Little Russian" instead, etc.).⁷⁵ Thus, the upcoming celebrations planned all across Ukraine for the centennial of Shevchenko's birth scheduled for, February 25, 1914, were banned by the administration.

However, as Rudnytsky points out, the official prohibitions of the commemorations to Shevchenko's birth were of no avail. Ukrainstvo was indeed now taking on characteristics of a mass movement, as is evidenced in the mass demonstra-

⁷³S. Shchegolev, Sovremennoe ukrainstvo, ego proiskhozhdenie, rost i zadachi (Kiev: Tipografiia Tovaryshchestva I. N. Kushnerev i Ko., 1914).

⁷⁴Lotots'kyi, Vol. III, p. 255

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 257.

tions which occurred throughout Ukraine on February 25 in honour of Shevchenko and his symbolic representation of the national movement, in defiance of Imperial law and dispatches of armed Imperial Cossack units. Rada exploits the publicity opportunities of this significant event to the hilt, spreading the word of the spontaneous, primordial action of the People on behalf of themselves. The entire issues of No. 46 (25.02.14) and No. 47 (27.02.14) are almost exclusively dedicated to the unfolding of events concerning the mass Ukrainian demonstrations not only throughout Ukraine, but also in Russia, Galicia, Transcarpathia, and any other area in which they occurred. Commemorative articles about Shevchenko are interspersed with bulletins informing readers about various commemorative events taking place, and a continuous update of arrests and punishments levied on participants in these events. Even though censorship by this time was so severe that direct political commentary could not be made on these events, the very fact of their reportage provided as much political commentary as was necessary.

CONCLUSION

The argument of this dissertation has been threefold. It has been argued that because of the dichotomous *Gesellschaft/Gemeinschaft* relationship which existed in Ukraine when the impulse to Western-style intellectual modernity reared its head, the appeal had to be made to Ukrainian nationalism if the progress and development contingent to this modernization of thought were to take root amongst the Ukrainian population. The emerging Ukrainian intelligentsia understood the nature of this political problem, and the political debut of this class in the formation of the Kyrylo-Methodians marked the first attempts to rectify the situation through nationalistic appeals on behalf of the Ukrainian People.

The second part of the argument has stemmed from a paradox revealed in the first: the seed of Western-style modernity had germinated in non-Western soil. This had significant implications concerning the possibilities available for Western-style progress and development. Because of the peculiar relationship which existed between *Gesellschaft* and *Gemeinschaft* (colonial-type domination of foreign nationals over the Ukrainian population, which was almost wholly excluded from *Gesellschaft*), the process of intellectual modernization could not follow along the same path as that which had led to Western-style modernity in other countries.

Thus, although the impulse to nationalism initially came from the same modernizing tendencies which had resulted in Western liberal democracies, the type of liberal nationalism which had developed by the end of the intellectual modernization process (i.e., upon the full internalization of secular rationale as found in the thought of Drahomanov) did not, and could not, resemble its Western antecedents or counterparts.

The final part of the argument has focused on the period of relative easing of restrictions in tsarist politics between 1906 and 1914, when the proponents of Ukrainian liberal nationalism gained political experience through participation in Imperial politics, and most importantly of all, through the working out of their ideology on a day-to-day basis in the newspaper, Rada. It has been argued that a very important evolution in Ukrainian liberal nationalist ideology took place during this period, such that by 1914, the ideology had come to maturity in the Western sense. This evolution can be clearly seen within the pages of Rada, which acted as both mirror of Ukrainian liberal nationalist thought, and mobilizer for its support. During this short period of time, the Ukrainian liberal nationalist way of thinking had come to closely resemble the type of reasoning which had produced its Western liberal nationalist antecedents. The import of this argument is of great interest when considering the transplant of modern ways of thinking

into pre-modern societies, especially concerning the possibilities for success.

In conclusion, let us briefly re-capitulate the key points in the evolution of Ukrainian liberal nationalism between 1906 and 1914 as seen in the newspaper, Rada, with special emphasis on the development of the Western-style modernizing ethos.

5.1 The articulation of Ukrainian liberal nationalism in Rada

Rada began publication in 1906 under a group of Ukrainian liberal intellectuals immersed in the political traditions of the Kyrylo-Methodians and Drahomanov. Their moderate political agenda for the Russian Empire largely came from the Drahomanovian programme based on a federal system of fully autonomous national states. A strong undercurrent of populism and faith that the Ukrainian peasantry would enter into collective sovereignty immediately upon the formation of a political society permeated the political philosophy of the liberals. Their mission was thus to prepare the Ukrainian populace -- the organic nation -- for national sovereignty as pre-ordained by a model of political organization based on a mix of romantic populism and fully-secularized Western liberal rationale.

The way in which the liberals intended to accomplish this mission was to bring the Ukrainian populace to national self-consciousness. For this reason, Hromads'ka dumka and then Rada were created. It was through the medium of the printed daily word that the liberals intended to disseminate the seeds of what would develop into an Ukrainian nationalist self-consciousness, and mobilize popular support for it. Indeed, Rada was the only means of mass communication at the liberals' disposal between 1906 and 1914 for the accomplishment of such a task.

Although restricted by the confines of censorship, the liberal mission is already being carried out in the first year of Rada's publication. The approach that the liberals take in 1906 is an overtly cultural one, with emphasis placed on the Ukrainian language and school issues. It is a year when the grounds are being tested as to what can pass by the censors, and what cannot. This undoubtedly influences the liberals' choice of shying away from explicitly political positions concerning the national question which carried with them the possibility of interpretation as "revolutionary," and which could thereby result in the closing of the paper. However, equally important is the fact that the nascent liberal nationalist ideology is yet in an embryonic stage. It is still couched in the populist tradition that emphasizes the cultural over the political; which envisages the political as something which would arise spon-

taneously upon the Ukrainian People's coming to full national self-consciousness.

However, hidden within the rhetoric and polemics concerning the cultural approach to national self-consciousness is an understated identification with the political ideals first elaborated during the French Revolution: liberty, fraternity, and equality. Although this may be more indicative of a sensitivity to the political spirit of the time in Europe (i.e., "the age of nations is upon us"), it also demonstrates that behind the explicitly cultural approach taken by the liberals there lurks a hidden political agenda based on notions of modern nation-statehood. Thus, already in 1906, we can detect the seeds of modern nationalism on the pages of Rada. The liberals are interested in an Ukrainian national movement, but this movement is already showing its potential to grow into a nationalist one.

The following year, 1907, marks the beginning of the radicalization of the liberals' approach to the dichotomous *Gesellschaft/Gemeinschaft* relationship. In the previous year, only *Gemeinschaft* features of the national question had been explicitly addressed, and at that, they were addressed in such a manner which placed responsibility for national amelioration on the Imperial political system. However, in 1907, the conceptualization of Ukrainian *Gemeinschaft* is "activised" through the incorporation of the notion of national self-responsibility into its definition.

This significant change is from a passive, almost fatalistic "Eastern" approach to national destiny to an active, dynamic "Western" approach entrenched in the notion of free will. One must note that it is not, however, individual free will which is introduced here, but the communal free will of the organic nation, the People. In addition to the changed nature of the approach to Ukrainian *Gemeinschaft*, for the first time, the political aspirations of the liberals with respect to *Gesellschaft* are explicitly named; the national-territorial autonomy within a federal state of the Kyrylo-Methodian and Drahomanovian tradition is advocated.

The year 1908 marks a turning point in the development of Ukrainian liberal nationalist ideology. The activated conceptualization of the People is now politicized through the incorporation of specific *Gesellschaft* features into its definition. The nationally self-responsible People is now explicitly identified with potent symbols of Ukrainian political rebelliousness and independent nation-statehood, with frequent references made to the by-gone Golden Age of the independent Cossack republic. Here, we clearly see the movement of the ideology in the direction of nationalism in the contemporary sense of the word.

However, it is also evident, during this period, that the emerging nationalist ideology is going through the birthing pains of a modern, specifically liberal nationalist ideology. The tension between whether the path to progress

lies in the individual or the group is evident in many articles, with the tendency being to place a greater emphasis on the whole at the expense of the individual. Indeed, individual progress which is not explicitly concerned with solving the national question is often viewed with suspicion, and is discouraged. By the end of the year, this tension is still unresolved. The liberals have not yet become fully "liberal," in that they have difficulty incorporating the notion of individualism into a *Weltanschauung* which is bordering on full-blown nationalism.

Between 1909 and 1910, the "dark years" for *ukrainstvo*, little evolution in TUP's ideology can be detected in *Rada*. Increased repression and censorship severely restrict political expression, such that only cultural issues can safely be addressed in the daily press. Nevertheless, this is not a period of ideological stagnation for the liberals, as is evidenced in the subtly changed language employed to describe the People. Whereas in previous years the apolitical word *narod* had been used when referring to the People, between 1909 and 1910, the vocabulary is shifted to the political term *natsiia*. Thus, while there is an overt shift back to a strictly cultural approach during these two years, the change in terminology signals a covert embracing of a more Westernized liberal nationalist conceptualization of the People.

It becomes apparent in 1911, however, that a profound internalization of Western-style liberal nationalism has, indeed, taken place amongst TUP. Most importantly, the tension between the choice of the individual or the group as the best vector for progress and development is finally resolved in favour of the individual. The romantic, populist communalism of before is replaced with a new stress on possessive individualism and private initiative and enterprise, and the collective hopes for the national future are placed in the emergence of a nascent bourgeoisie. Furthermore, the liberals now openly label the Ukrainian movement a nationalist one, and openly advocate nationalism as the only viable alternative if Ukrainian society is to progress at all. Such a move would have been unthinkable in previous years, both from an ideological view-point, and from fear of being labelled as separatists and thus having to face severe reprimands. Thus, it can be concluded that at the end of 1911, the synchrony of the open positive valuation of individualism, private enterprise, a middle class, and nationalism is not merely coincidental. It marks a fundamental change in the philosophical orientation of Ukrainian liberal nationalist ideology. 1911 is the real birth date of Ukrainian liberal nationalism, when it appears in its purest and most just form.

The following year, 1912, reveals the logical radicalization of this new philosophical orientation, so that it

comes to resemble contemporary nationalism in even more respects. This period marks the final explicit break of Ukrainian nationalist ideology with its philosophical antecedents in favour of a modern, Western approach to politics. The political programmes of the Kyrylo-Methodians and Drahomanov are formally deemed as being outmoded. As this new way of thinking develops, the logic of its development begins to push it towards the right-hand side of the political spectrum. Although the emphasis is now placed on individual rights and freedoms for the purposes of the general advance of the group, this principle is not entirely extended to foreigners. There is a growing mistrust of individual members of other ethnic groups merely on the basis of their membership in those groups. This emergent ethnocentrism is furthermore apparent in Rada's advocacy of the political support of nationally-conscious Ukrainians of any ideological leanings solely on the basis of their ethnicity. In addition, as competitive, modern liberal nationalism becomes more entrenched amongst TUP, the support of a Slavic federation on moral grounds is completely dropped from the political agenda in favour of a federation based on strictly contractual terms. Ukraine's interests lie in greater differentiation from, and not closer moral association with, its Slavic "brothers."

During the following year-and-a-half, until the final closing of Rada August 2, 1914, there is little change in

the development of the Ukrainian liberal nationalist ideology. It had come to fruition in 1911, became perhaps a little "overripe" in 1912, and due to repressive tsarist politics and censorship in the period that ensued, did not further ripen, nor was it harvested before the First World War. What is apparent, however, is the effect that the liberals' efforts at the mass dissemination of an Ukrainian national consciousness and mobilization of support for it had on Ukrainian society. The mass demonstrations all across Ukraine for the centenary of Shevchenko's birth in February, 1914, bear witness to the pervasiveness of the national idea amongst the Ukrainian populace, and give a hint as to the preparedness of the People to go not only to the defence of that national idea, but to do it in defiance of Imperial rule.

5.2. Epilogue

The role and influence of Rada as mirror of, and mobilizer of support for, Ukrainian liberal nationalism did not end with the closing of its doors on August 2, 1914. After the devastation and confusion engendered by the First World War, Rada was renewed by virtually the same staff in the form of the newspaper, Nova Rada after the 1917 October Revolution. Indeed, some of the leading members of the Central Rada came from the ranks of Rada's original editorial staff.

The group of individuals behind this publication continued to play an important role in Ukrainian politics right through to the years of the Hetmanate. After the Hetmanate's demise and the closing of Nova Rada, the liberals' work continued, nonetheless, through the establishment of The Tribune. This continuity signals the important and enduring role in politics of the intellectual team whose liberal nationalist ideology had come to maturity on the pages of Rada between 1906 and 1914. The thought of these individuals was the best that Ukrainian liberal nationalism had to offer at the time.

One can only speculate as to what may have occurred had the process of the coming together of an Ukrainian Gesellschaft with the Ukrainian Gemeinschaft not been interrupted by civil war and strife after the 1917 revolution. The usefulness of such speculation is without question when considering what the possibilities are for the successful transplant of political ideologies from one social system to another. It is apparent that, although the conditions for the development of liberal nationalism were far from ideal on Ukrainian soil, it did, nevertheless, come to fruition on that very soil in a small matter of time. It would thus seem that the chances of success for the transplanting of Western liberal ideologies into foreign soil are worth investigating.

The necessary ingredient for the development of Ukrainian liberal nationalism in the Western-style direction of political modernity seems to have been the political experience gained after the 1905 revolution, coupled with the existence of a medium of mass communication in which problems of ideology could be worked out in a public forum. Indeed, it can be stated that without the experience of political competition and the existence of a relatively free press (as compared to prior to the 1905 revolution), the evolution of Ukrainian liberal nationalism towards Western-style modernity would not have occurred.

To be sure, the pre-1905 ideology would have, nonetheless, continued to develop without the above two conditions. However, one may reasonably speculate that it would not have moved towards Western-style modernity, but in a direction more in line with the socio-political dynamics which had shaped pre-1905 Ukrainian nationalist ideology. In addition, due to the great gap between *Gesellschaft* and *Gemeinschaft*, the ideology would likely have moved in this direction at a far slower pace than that which was required for the maturity of liberal nationalism between 1906 and 1914.

The liberal nationalism found in Rada did not develop isolated from the rest of the world, and especially not from its Galician counterparts. Undoubtedly, the role of Galicia for the liberals as a model of Ukrainian political development is an important factor to consider in the examination

of the evolution of Eastern Ukrainian liberal nationalism. Faithfully reporting and commenting on the unfolding of Galician politics in Rada, TUP eagerly watched as substantial inroads were made in the realm of parliamentary democracy in Galicia. Thus, the development of Ukrainian liberal nationalism before World War I was not only resultant of the peculiar modernization forces at work within the Russian Empire, but it was also a cross-boundary phenomenon of complex interdependencies. While it was not intended to be within the scope of this dissertation to address the influence of Galicia over the development of Eastern Ukrainian liberal nationalism, one cannot ignore it. It is hoped that the preceeding argument has not minimalized the impact of Galician politics on Eastern Ukraine, since it is believed that what the liberals learned from Galicia was reflected in their approach to politics in Rada. However, this topic would be the subject of another dissertation in itself. Needless to say, having studied, in depth, the dynamics of the relationship between modernization and the rise of modern Ukrainian liberal nationalist ideology, and the possibilities opened therefrom, the author feels that she may now be well enough prepared to study the effects of the addition of one more variable -- the Galician factor -- to this relationship. However, that is a topic for a dissertation which remains to be conceived, let alone born.

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