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State Interests and the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy

by

Patrick Mullen

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Norman Paterson School of International Affairs

Carleton University
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Maureen Appel Molot, Director
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Professor B. Tomlin, Supervisor

Abstract

This paper explains the 1991 Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) and related agreements by examining how the eight circumpolar states perceived their interests. It shows that, at the beginning of the negotiations, the Realist security, economic, and political interests of the Nordic countries, Canada, and the Soviet Union accommodated circumpolar cooperation, while those of the United States did not. Going beyond Realism allows consideration of how states, influenced by interest groups, came to perceive environmental problems in the Arctic as a matter of national interest. Such groups, including environmental groups, indigenous peoples, and the scientific community, enlarged states' perceptions of the bargaining set to create a zone of agreement for the AEPS. The groups, especially scientists, were also important in defining the content of the agreement. As well, largely through the influence of the scientific community, the US redefined its interests so that a circumpolar agreement on the environment was perceived as desirable.

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Acronyms

AEPS	Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy
AMAP	Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme
CAFF	Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna
CARC	Canadian Arctic Resources Committee
CHARLIE	Committee for High Arctic Research, Liaison and Information Exchange
EDF	Environmental Defense Fund
IASC	International Arctic Science Committee
ICC	Inuit Circumpolar Conference
ICSU	International Council of Scientific Unions
IMO	International Maritime Organisation
IWC	International Whaling Commission
LRTAP	Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (Convention)
MARPOL	International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
NGO	non-governmental organisation
SCAR	Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research
UNCED	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UN ECE	United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WCED	World Commission on Environment and Development
WWF	World Wide Fund for Nature or World Wildlife Fund

From the Greek word *arktikos*, meaning what we now call the constellation Ursa Major, has come the name of the vast ice and snow-covered region around the northern pole of our planet lying under those stars. In the cold and dry winter sky, the Great Bear constellation should be clearly visible during the long Arctic night. However, the light of those stars is not as strong as it used to be, as proof of the Arctic's vulnerability to human pollution, called "Arctic haze," obscures the vision. This air pollution, first noticed in 1950, is made up of soot, hydrocarbons and sulphates, poured into the air by industry in southern latitudes. The haze absorbs energy from the sun, which allows it to stay aloft in the cold winter air over the Arctic Ocean. The pollution darkens snow, adds to the acidity of waters, and deposits toxic metals.¹

Arctic haze, originating in many different places, and affecting many others, is a good example of the kind of problem that cannot be solved by individual countries acting alone. A significant first step in the cooperation needed to address degradation of the Arctic environment was taken in Rovaniemi, Finland in the summer of 1991, when the eight circumpolar states (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the Soviet Union, and the United States) issued a declaration and adopted the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS).² The non-binding agreement was essentially a blueprint for an on-going process of consultation, information-sharing, and scientific cooperation. The circumpolar states also agreed in 1993 to a Declaration and Report issued at a conference of ministers in Nuuk, Greenland.

¹ Hoff, R.M. and L.A. Barrie, 1986, "Air Chemistry Observations in the Canadian Arctic," in W.A. Bridgeo and H.R. Eisenhauer (eds.), *Arctic Water Pollution Research: Applications of Science and Technology*, pp. 100-106.

² Since June 1991, when the agreement was signed by the Soviet Union and the other seven countries, Russia has "declared itself the legal successor to the Soviet Union," assuming the USSR's international obligations. All of the former Soviet North is contained in Russia.

These agreements were the product of a process started in January 1989 by the government of Finland when it invited the other circumpolar countries to a conference with the assertion, "we believe that the problem of pollution in the Arctic calls for multilateral cooperation as pollution does not recognize nor respect national boundaries."³ In September 1989, the "Finnish Initiative" brought the eight circumpolar countries to Rovaniemi, Finland, where they agreed to gather information about Arctic environmental problems and about the existing international legal regime relevant to the Arctic in order to guide their decisions.⁴

The next negotiating session was held in Yellowknife, Canada, in April 1990. Several non-Arctic states and international organisations, as well as the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC), attended as observers. The meeting reviewed the "State of the Arctic Environment" reports on specific problems and a report on existing international law, and discussed proposals for cooperation on scientific monitoring, flora and fauna conservation, marine pollution, and emergency response.⁵

The Arctic states and observers met again at Kiruna, Sweden in January 1991, to further develop the output of the planned ministerial conference in the spring. A draft text, incorporating all of the issues under discussion, was fleshed out, and the Finnish government introduced a draft Declaration to be issued by the ministers at the planned conference.⁶ In May, the Heads of Delegations (each could bring one advisor) met in Helsinki to finalise the draft Declaration and AEPS.⁷

³ Finland, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1989, *Letter from Kalevi Sorsa, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Finland, and Kaj Barlund, Minister of the Environment, Finland, to the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada*, Helsinki, January 12.

⁴ Consultative Meeting on the Protection of the Arctic Environment, 1989, *Draft Report of the Consultative Meeting*, Rovaniemi, September 26, pp. 5-7.

⁵ Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting, 1990, *Report of the Meeting*, Yellowknife, April.

⁶ Kiruna Preparatory Meeting, 1991, *Report*, Kiruna, January.

⁷ Finland, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1991, *Elements for Draft Memorandum of Understanding on Operational Structure of Future Cooperation in the Arctic*, Helsinki, May 23.

In June 1991, in Rovaniemi, representatives of the eight circumpolar states signed the Declaration on the Protection of the Arctic Environment, adopting the AEPS.⁸ Attending as observers were several non-Arctic states and international organisations as well as three circumpolar indigenous groups. The AEPS spelled out the objectives and principles guiding its implementation, described the main environmental problems of the region, listed existing international agreements relevant to those problems, set up the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP) to coordinate research, initiated a Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF) working group, and established a process to further cooperation on pollution emergency response.⁹

The process continued after the adoption of the AEPS, branching into meetings of groups dealing with the different issues. The AMAP task force, the CAFF working group, and the emergency response working group, each met several times before the next ministerial meeting in 1993. After preparatory meetings in 1992 and 1993,¹⁰ the Second Ministerial Conference on the Protection of the Arctic Environment was held in September 1993, at Nuuk, Greenland. The ministers signed a Declaration which reaffirmed the circumpolar states' responsibility for the Arctic environment and endorsed several measures to implement the AEPS.¹¹ The Report adopted by the 1993 Nuuk ministerial conference assessed the implementation of the AEPS, particularly the work of AMAP and CAFF, and created a working group on sustainable development.¹²

Explanation

This study attempts to explain the existence and content of the AEPS and related agreements produced by the Finnish Initiative process. An explanation of anything makes

⁸ Ministerial Conference on the Protection of the Arctic Environment, 1991, *Declaration on the Protection of the Arctic Environment*, Rovaniemi, June.

⁹ Ministerial Conference on the Protection of the Arctic Environment, 1991, "Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy," *International Legal Materials* 30, pp. 1624-1669.

¹⁰ LeClaire, Alison, Deputy Director, Environment Division, Department of External Affairs and International Trade (Canada), 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, October.

¹¹ Second Ministerial Conference, 1993, *The Nuuk Declaration on Environment and Development in the Arctic*, Nuuk, September 16.

¹² Second Ministerial Conference, 1993, *Report*, Nuuk, September 16, pp. 10-12.

many assumptions about why certain things are important and others are not, about how causal relationships work, even about what consists of an explanation.

The theoretical categories and assumptions used in this paper are set out in Chapter 2. An analytical framework called "negotiation analysis," is used to make sense of the AEPS negotiations.¹³ Central to this approach is the abstraction of negotiations into a "bargaining set," which delineates the "zone of possible agreement" between the parties. This zone represents the set of possible agreements on which the parties could potentially agree. The zone of agreement is formed in relation to the parties' alternatives to agreement. That is, if a possible agreement is better for each player than their alternatives, it is situated within the zone of agreement. The processes of "creating and claiming value" determine the exact content of the agreement, and its specific position within the zone of agreement. Everything is measured according to the interests of the parties to the negotiation. The zone of agreement, alternatives to agreement, possible agreements - all are evaluated according to whether they advance the interests of the negotiators.

The processes of "creating and claiming value," of integrative and distributive bargaining, specify the content of the agreement, within the zone of agreement, the parameters of which are defined by the interests of the parties. The key to understanding the existence of an agreement in its broad outlines is to understand how the parties' interests formed a zone of agreement large enough to accommodate it.

State interests are often analysed from the Realist perspective of international relations theory, as described in Chapter 2. The main assumption is that states invariably act to enhance their power, which is composed of their military, political, and economic capabilities. Thus, a possible agreement is in the interests of a state if it enhances its power.

¹³ Sebenius, James K., 1991, "Negotiation Analysis," in Victor A. Kremeneyuk (ed.), *International Negotiation*, pp. 203-215.

Chapter 3 applies Realist assumptions to explain the existence of a zone of agreement for circumpolar cooperation. It shows that the security, political, and economic interests of Canada, Greenland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Finland, accommodated the possibility of a circumpolar cooperative arrangement. Indeed, their interest in multilateral fora as media to influence the actions of great powers was an active incentive. The Realist interests of the Soviet Union prevented multilateral cooperation in the Arctic until the late 1980s, when they were redefined so that increased interaction with the West was seen as desirable. An Arctic agreement was within the interests of the Soviet Union in that it fit with its ongoing efforts to reduce Cold War tensions. The United States (US) was the only circumpolar state whose Realist-defined interests did not open a zone of agreement for Arctic cooperation. Essentially, the US did not want its freedom of action in the military and economic spheres to be limited by international commitments.

Analysis of the Realist interests of the circumpolar states reveals the existence or not of a zone of agreement, but also specifies its limits. In this case, for example, the economic interests of Norway and Greenland would not allow international management of marine mammal hunting, while those of the US and Soviet Union prevented concrete controls of persistent organic contaminants and heavy metals. Similarly, the security interests of the US and Soviet Union would not allow regulation of potential sources of radioactive contamination, while the political interests of Canada and the Soviet Union resisted substantive participation by non-Arctic states. In the Realist view, the US, as the most powerful state involved, should have been able to block an agreement. It did not, so more of an explanation is needed. In addition, a Realist analysis cannot explain the agreement's content. Any kind of circumpolar cooperation was within the Realist interests of most of the states involved; a focus on the environment was not inevitable.

The negotiation analysis framework recognises the limitations of Realism by allowing for the subjective definition and redefinition of interests. The implication is that the zone of agreement can change as actors redefine their interests. For example, a possible

agreement that would previously have been rejected can be perceived to be acceptable after an actor redefines its interests. The Idealist alternative to Realism is discussed in Chapter 2, showing that changeable human ideas and perceptions can serve as explanatory factors in international politics. An example of such changing ideas are environmental worldviews, which are the prisms through which humans perceive the natural environment. They range from "frontier economics," where the environment is not considered beyond its use as a resource, to "deep ecology," where humans and the environment are intimately connected and the well-being of one depends on that of the other. Intermediary stages on this continuum of paradigms include the "pollution control," "environmental security," and "sustainable development" worldviews.

Chapter 4 describes how the circumpolar states redefined their interests in terms of environmental protection. For the most part, the pollution control paradigm was the defining influence, as policies focused on remedial actions, dealing with pollutants and problems in isolation from the larger social and economic structures that gave rise to them. The environmental security paradigm, which treats the state of the natural environment as a component of national security, was also influential, especially in the Soviet Union. The circumpolar states' redefinition of their interests led them to bring certain priority environmental issues to the AEPS negotiating table. For example, the Nordic states wanted action on acidification and radioactive contamination, Canada was concerned about persistent organic contaminants, and the US was interested in flora and fauna conservation. Also present during the negotiations were ideas associated with the sustainable development paradigm, which attempts to integrate environmental and economic processes in order to achieve lasting development.

How did these ideas reach policy-makers so that they redefined the interests of their states in terms of the new environmental paradigms? Domestic and transnational interest groups were important in bringing environmental protection messages to them. Chapter 2 describes how, in theory, discrete groups can have influence on states' definitions of their

interests, and how groups with transnational links can influence different states in similar ways, thereby encouraging cooperation.

Chapter 5 shows that non-governmental groups representing environmental advocates and indigenous peoples had input in the AEF's negotiations, influencing the circumpolar states to define their interests in terms of the groups' concerns. The involved environmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs) saw the Arctic in the larger context of global problems, did not significantly participate until late in the process, and failed to understand the interests of potential allies, indigenous groups. Their messages, which advocated a binding regulatory regime, including significant participation for themselves, were thus muted, despite support from the US.

Indigenous peoples similarly wished to see concrete action on environmental problems, and advanced the notions of sustainable development. Indigenous groups were able to build on their domestic political bases to establish important transnational links, which led them to develop independent environmental protection programmes. Primarily concerned with their self-determination, indigenous groups focused their attention on achieving substantive participation in the AEPS discussions. They were largely successful, benefiting from substantial support from Canada, and obtaining status as official observers over the resistance of the US and Norway.

Another influential transnational interest group, a community of scientists interested in the Arctic, is analysed using ideas developed to explain international cooperation on technical matters, including environmental protection. This theory, which focuses on the influence of what are called epistemic communities, is described at the end of Chapter 2. Its key insight is that such communities can encourage international cooperation on the subjects on which they have authoritative knowledge. Policy-makers turn to them for advice on such issues as environmental protection with which they have no experience. Since the epistemic community is transnational, they give similar advice to different states.

In the case of the Arctic, as described in Chapter 5, the message given to policy-makers by the epistemic community of scientists was that environmental problems in the Arctic existed and international cooperation was necessary to address them. Scientists had long encouraged circumpolar scientific cooperation, and their successes, including bilateral arrangements and a multilateral treaty on polar bears, provided precedents for the AEPS. More importantly, negotiations for a permanent mechanism, the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC), dealt with difficult political issues, especially concerning non-Arctic participation, which made the AEPS negotiations easier. The IASC discussions also shaped perceptions so that circumpolar cooperation would be identified with scientific cooperation.

Scientists also had considerable influence during the AEPS negotiations themselves, turning them into a learning process where scientific reports on environmental problems were used as the bases for decisions. Scientific knowledge provided negotiators with a common ground for agreement, first, on the problems, and second, on the solutions. The epistemic community also institutionalised its influence by recommending continuing cooperative programmes of scientific monitoring and research. The most substantive results of the AEPS negotiations, the AMAP and the CAFF programme, focus on scientific cooperation and information exchange. The influence of the scientific community goes a good way towards explaining the participation of the US in the AEPS. Science joins security and economics as the main components of US interest in the Arctic. The US perceived the AEPS as primarily useful for furthering scientific investigation of the region.

All of these messages and interests were reflected in the outcome of the negotiations, the AEPS and related agreements, which are described in Chapter 6. Chapter 6 shows how the agreements reflected the environmental interests of the different participants, which in turn reflected the messages of the different interest groups. This occurred, however, strictly within the confines of the Realist interests of the circumpolar

states. In general, this meant that non-binding language was generous in addressing environmental problems and advancing the notions of sustainable development, but that concrete commitments on specific issues were rare. On the other hand, mechanisms for indigenous participation and for scientific cooperation were significant achievements, and promise, through an ongoing process, to result in further redefinitions of state interests, possibly leading to binding commitments to regulation. The following chapter provides a framework for analysing the negotiations leading to this result.

This paper intends to explain the existence and content of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) and related agreements between the circumpolar states. The AEPS was a product of a negotiation, which has been defined as "a process by which contending parties come to an agreement."¹ One way of explaining the AEPS is thus to explain the negotiation process which created it. This can be done using analytical concepts that theorist James K. Sebenius has grouped under the term "negotiation analysis."

Negotiation Analysis

Negotiation analysis can be understood as a framework into which facts are fitted so that the relationships between them become discernible as they follow some of the patterns of the framework. This essentially means the facts are fitted into certain categories, and when they fit, certain patterns of behaviour are expected. In this case, the details of the AEPS negotiation process can be fitted into the negotiation analysis framework to explain the result.

What kind of categories can the facts be fitted into? Sebenius describes several important building blocks for negotiation analysis: actors, interests, the bargaining set, the zone of agreement, alternatives to agreement, processes of "creating and claiming value," and actions to "change the game."

The different actors which come to agreement or have an influence on it are identified. Then, the interests of these actors are determined. Their interests are the measure by which possible agreements are evaluated, therefore delineating the "zone of agreement." An agreement can only occur if it is in the interest of the parties to it - if it fits into the "zone of agreement."² Figure 2.1 is a graphical representation of the "bargaining

¹ Zartman, I. William, 1991, "The Structure of Negotiation," in Victor A. Kremenjuk (ed.), *International Negotiation*, p. 65.

² Sebenius, James K., 1991, "Negotiation Analysis," in Victor A. Kremenjuk (ed.), *International Negotiation*, p. 205.

set," which shows how the zone of agreement is situated where both actor X and actor Y gain value, which is measured by the effect of the agreement on their interests.

Evaluating a possible agreement often means considering the alternatives. The actors' perceived alternatives to a possible negotiated settlement thus also shape the bargaining set.³ In fact, the zone of possible agreement, which represents possible agreements which meet the interests of the bargainers, can be more specifically characterised as lying between the minimum value that each player is willing to accept. On the graph shown in figure 2.1, the alternatives set the limits of the negotiation by locating the origin, representing an actor's bottom line, or the minimum acceptable value of a possible agreement. An agreement valued below that point would not be accepted, since the alternative would be better.

Figure 2.1: The Bargaining Set⁴

What Sebenius calls "creating and claiming value," is simply the process of defining an agreement within the structure of the bargaining set. "Creating value" is defined as the process of "exploring mutually beneficial agreements, improving them

³ Lax, David A. and James K. Sebenius, 1985, "The Power of Alternatives or the Limits to Negotiation," *Negotiation Journal* 1 (2), April, pp. 163-179.

⁴ Sebenius, James K., 1991, "Negotiation Analysis," in Victor A. Kremenyuk (ed.), *International Negotiation*, p. 213.

jointly [...]."⁵ This is integrative, or "win-win," bargaining, which attempts to fashion agreements that benefit all actors, by creating value instead of simply dividing it up. Specific possible agreements are defined and modified so that they become more favourable to both players.⁶

"Claiming value," on the other hand, is the label for dividing up value that is already out there for the taking. It is associated with distributive, or "win-lose," bargaining, which occurs in a situation where the perception is that as one actor gains, the other loses. Usually, options for possible agreements are clearly defined, so that actors focus on claiming the best possible values for themselves rather than trying to create new options.⁷ The possible processes and strategies of creating and claiming value are as interesting as they are numerous, but they all take place within, and are limited by, the zone of agreement.

Sebenius terms "changing the game" anything that affects these limits, or changes the framework of the bargaining set. The different aspects of the bargaining set - actors, interests, and alternatives - are not static, but change as the negotiations progress. They can change because of factors beyond the control of the players or as a result of players' actions. Actors and issues can be added or subtracted from negotiations,⁸ interests can be redefined, and alternatives can be discovered, created, and modified.

Whether the game is static or changing, actors' interests provide the basic scorecard. On the graph, everything - alternatives, issues, positions - are measured against the axes, which are scaled according to their interests.⁹ The value which is created and claimed can only be measured in terms of the interests of the actors. Changing issues and

⁵ Sebenius, James K., 1992, "Challenging conventional explanations of international cooperation: negotiation analysis and the case of epistemic communities," *International Organization* 46 (1), p. 334.

⁶ Raiffa, Howard, 1982, *The Art & Science of Negotiation*, pp. 210-217.

⁷ Sebenius, James K., 1992, "Challenging conventional explanations of international cooperation: negotiation analysis and the case of epistemic communities," *International Organization* 46 (1), p. 336.

⁸ Sebenius, James K., 1983, "Negotiation arithmetic: adding and subtracting issues and parties," *International Organization* 37 (2), Spring, pp. 281-316.

⁹ Lax, David A. and James K. Sebenius, 1986, "Interests: The Measure of Negotiation," *Negotiation Journal* 2 (1), pp. 73-92.

alternatives to agreement are evaluated according to how they affect actors' interests.

Understanding interests is thus key to understanding the shape of the bargaining set.

Indeed, Sebenius asserts that the first priority of negotiation analysis is always to "probe deeply for interests."¹⁰

Realism

Understanding interests can be done from the Realist perspective of international relations theory. In the words of theorist Hans Morgenthau, "The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power."¹¹ Anything that enhances a state's power is within its interests. At the core of the national interest is the security of the state, incorporating its military, political, and economic security and independence.¹² States' actions can therefore be explained by referring to their military, political, and economic interests.

A Realist analysis of the negotiation of the AEPS would therefore start and finish with the interests of the states involved. This interpretation emphasises the Arctic has been a region extremely important to the military security of both superpowers, situated between North America and Eurasia. However, the AEPS was negotiated and signed during a period when the Soviet Union's interests were dramatically changing. The reformist Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev was anxious to build cooperative bridges to the West, partly to lessen the strain of a military budget premised on continuing East-West tension and becoming more and more burdensome on the struggling economy. The other superpower, the United States, was suspicious of Gorbachev's motives, and jealous of its independence of action in the Arctic, in both the military and economic spheres.

The other involved states favoured cooperation in the Arctic precisely as a way of having influence on the superpowers' actions there. The Nordic countries, especially

¹⁰ Sebenius, James K., 1991, "Negotiation Analysis," in Victor A. Kremenyuk (ed.), *International Negotiation*, p. 207.

¹¹ Morgenthau, Hans J., 1967, *Politics among Nations*, p. 5.

¹² Gill, Stephen and David Law, 1988, *The Global Political Economy*, pp. 25-27. Morgenthau, Hans J., 1967, *Politics among Nations*, pp. 106-144.

Finland, wanted an agreement to create an international instrument to address pollution produced in Russia that was having significant effects on their natural environments. For Canada, a circumpolar agreement was better than the *status quo* alternative partly because of the possibility that it could lead to a forum dealing with security and political issues in which Canada would be involved and could perhaps influence superpower actions.

A circumpolar environmental agreement was therefore in line with the Realist-perceived interests of all of the circumpolar states except the US. An agreement was concluded with an American signature, however, raising the possibility that the US, as well as the other countries involved, defined their interests in ways which a Realist analysis would miss.

Idealism

Realist analysis is dependent on the assumption that state action reflects the pursuit of military, economic and political interests, and nothing else. Behind this is the assumption that human nature involves, in the words of philosopher Thomas Hobbes, a "perpetual and restless desire for power after power that ceaseth only in death."¹³ It follows that states, as human institutions, reflect that aspect of human nature. An alternative is to assert that human nature is not fixed, cannot necessarily be assumed as conforming to one particular view of it. Opposed to Realist "rationality" is the "Idealist" or "Subjectivist" assertion that changes in the human mind and character not only occur but have important effects on social structures. This perspective was described by historian Giambattista Vico: "[T]his world of nations has certainly been made by men, and its guise must therefore be found within the modifications of our own human mind."¹⁴ A strong assertion of this kind of Idealism is made by historian R.G. Collingwood, who says history is the history of thought, and events can only be understood by perceiving the

¹³ cited by Cox, Robert W., 1986, "Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory," in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), *Neorealism and Its Critics*, pp. 211-212.

¹⁴ cited by Cox, Robert W., 1986, "Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory," in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), *Neorealism and Its Critics*, p. 213.

human thought behind them.¹⁵ This view of a changeable human nature does not allow *a priori* assumptions about motivations for action. An Idealist approach thus examines the human thoughts behind motivations or perceived interests. This means that an explanation for an event lies in the ideas expressed in the event.

Related to the Realist belief in a fixed human nature is the assumption that interests, defined by this inevitable struggle for power, can be objectively perceived. This is important to the explanatory power of Realist theory. That is, objectively-fixed interests provide a reference point by which actions can be evaluated, explained, or predicted. However, if interests were subjectively defined, motives other than the pursuit of military, economic, and political power would have to be considered. Sebenius, for example, rejects the assumption of objective rationality: "Negotiation analysis is radically subjective in the sense that it is presumed to be up to the parties to decide how they see their interests and how they forecast different events."¹⁶

The point here is that the interests of the circumpolar states, which shape the possibilities for agreement, were not defined only in terms of a Realist pursuit of power. That is, an explanation of the outcome of the AEPS negotiation must consider other, subjective, definitions of the participating states' interests. For example, in the context of the AEPS negotiations, describing the shift in Russia's Realist interests and power at the end of the Cold War helps explain why the agreement was possible at that time, but says little about its specifics, or even why it dealt with the environment and not some other issue. These limitations reflect the basic criticism of Realism: it is just too simple.

Environmental Paradigms

Thomas Kuhn, in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, applies the proposition that truths may be subjective to the field which most vigorously pursued objectivity. With

¹⁵ Collingwood, R.G., 1946, *The Idea of History*, p. 288.

¹⁶ Sebenius, James K., 1991, "Negotiation Analysis," in Victor A. Kremenyuk (ed.), *International Negotiation*, p. 205.

the notion of “paradigm change,” he develops the idea that basic scientific assumptions are not eternally valid. His thesis is that the history of science is not one of progressive discovery of an unchanging and objective truth, but one of revolutions in the way scientists think about the world they study. These changing ways of thinking are called paradigms by Kuhn, and are described as the “puzzle-solutions” that scientific communities use as models to both determine what constitutes a puzzle and what rules are to be followed to solve it. Kuhn also uses a wider definition, writing of “the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given community.”¹⁷

Ecologists have appropriated the idea of paradigms to characterise different ways of thinking about the environment. In their 1985 book *Deep Ecology*, Bill Devall and George Sessions criticise the dominant paradigm, or “worldview,” as a way of thinking which generally separates subject and object, and specifically separates humans and nature, leading to the assumptions that people are fundamentally different from and superior to other forms of life, that the world exists for human benefit, that history is a process of unending economic growth and progress.¹⁸ This dominant worldview is one extreme on a continuum of environmental paradigms (see figure 2.2). It has been called the “frontier economics” point of view, from which nature is seen as an infinite supply of resources and an infinite sink for waste. Also assumed to be infinite is the human capacity to solve problems and continue on the path of “progress,” which means unending economic growth.¹⁹

An adaptation of frontier economics, further along on the continuum of environmental worldviews, can be called the “pollution control” paradigm. The approach is defensive and remedial, focusing on damage control, and can be described as the “end-of-the-pipe.” The environment is now considered, but treated separately from general

¹⁷ Kuhn, Thomas S., 1970, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, in Otto Neurath (ed.), *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science* 1(2), p. 175.

¹⁸ Devall, Bill, and George Sessions, 1985, *Deep Ecology*, pp. 42-43.

¹⁹ Colby, Michael E., 1990, *Environmental Management in Development: The Evolution of Paradigms*, pp. 9-12.

economic processes. Because economic analysis continues to exclude environmental costs and benefits, environmental protection measures are seen to impose *extra* costs. This sets up an “environment versus development” dichotomy, where environmental protection is considered to slow down economic development and (on the other side) economic development is seen to be invariably damaging to the environment.²⁰

Figure 2.2: Environmental Paradigms

Another response to concern about pollution has been to think about environmental degradation as a security threat. This view enlarges the definition of threats to “national security” to include problems such as conflicts over resources and global climate change.²¹ Thinking about it this way, especially after the end of the Cold War, is intended to redirect emotion and resources that are traditionally focused on military defence. Unfortunately, the characteristics typical of militaristic or nationalistic worldviews tag along.²² This leads to identifying the environment as an external problem, assigning fault to someone else rather than looking at one’s own practices.

The “sustainable development” paradigm attempts to reconcile the environment-development conflict by encouraging the sustainable use of resources. This means “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”²³ The basic method of achieving this is to integrate

²⁰ Colby, Michael E., 1990, *Environmental Management in Development: The Evolution of Paradigms*, pp. 16-19.

²¹ Colby, Michael E., 1990, *Environmental Management in Development: The Evolution of Paradigms*, pp. 31-32.

²² Deudney, Daniel, 1990, “The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 19 (3), pp. 467-469.

²³ World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987, *Our Common Future*, p. 43.

thinking about the environment and the economy. This means bringing environmental costs and benefits into economic analysis, including for example, environmental quality in calculations of national accounts and productivity.²⁴

On the other extreme from frontier economics is the "deep ecology" paradigm, which rejects the anthropocentrism and reliance on progress of all the other approaches and proposes a holistic worldview with human interdependence with nature. The basic insight is that everything is connected, that human well-being is joined to the well-being of the natural environment. Application of this philosophy would mean radical changes, including population reduction, and steady-state economies.²⁵

This paper incorporates these ideas with the hypothesis that states defined and redefined their interests in terms of environmental paradigms so that the AEPS was perceived as consistent with their interests. That is, perceptions of the Arctic as a frontier to be exploited for natural resources gave way to the pollution control and, eventually, the sustainable development paradigms. This hypothesis adds to and modifies the Realist view of the situation. The Realist analysis of the military, political, and economic interests of the circumpolar states assumes that the prevailing paradigm is one which sees the Arctic as something which is there to be used - as a military theatre of operations or as a source of raw materials. The intrinsic value of the natural environment is not considered, nor are the interests and values of the indigenous inhabitants of the region. Analysing a change in this worldview helps in explaining why the AEPS negotiations did not follow the course that would be expected if military and economic interests were the only story. The paradigm shift both defined the Arctic environment as an issue to be addressed and shaped the resulting response, the AEPS.

²⁴ Colby, Michael E., 1990, *Environmental Management in Development: The Evolution of Paradigms*, pp. 19-23.

²⁵ Colby, Michael E., 1990, *Environmental Management in Development: The Evolution of Paradigms*, pp. 13-15. Devall, Bill, and George Sessions, 1985, *Deep Ecology*.

Interest Groups

How did this come about? How were states led to redefine their interests in terms of environmental paradigms? Theoretical work on the role of knowledge and ideas in international relations has looked at the process of learning, defined as "the alteration of beliefs by new information."²⁶ In essence, this relates to how new information or ideas affect the perceptions of policy-makers. Learning is thus equivalent to redefining perceived interests.

The Idealist challenge to Realism, by undermining its assumptions of objective interests and of the determinism of power structures, also calls into question the Realist view of the state as a unitary "black box." That is, as long as all states were assumed to act the same in accordance to objectively defined interests, it did not matter what went on inside them. However, when interests can be subjectively defined and power is not necessarily the only motive for action, how states define their interests becomes important. This can mean looking into their domestic politics.

Domestic political groups are important in the definition of state interests. The concept of international politics as a "two-level game," describes the interaction of domestic and international politics, influencing the decisions of policy-makers. This approach explains outcomes as the result of both domestic and international politics and negotiations. The game simile is elaborated into a scene where the policy-maker sits at two game tables: a domestic game where the players are domestic groups; and an international game, where the players are representatives of other countries, who also have their own domestic tables to attend to. Agreement is necessary at both tables. "Any key player at the international table who is dissatisfied with the outcome may upset the game board, and conversely, any leader who fails to satisfy his fellow players at the domestic table risks being evicted from

²⁶ Nye, Joseph S. Jr., 1987, "Nuclear learning and U.S.-Soviet security regimes," *International Organization* 41 (3), Summer, p. 379.

his seat."²⁷ The basic idea is that national representatives at international negotiations are mindful of the domestic political implications of their actions, which indeed may be their main concern.

Domestic interest groups help define issues and interests for policy-makers' in terms of what is necessary to get or retain their political support. In terms of the negotiation analysis framework, the domestic game is an important part of the definition of a party's interest and therefore of its perception of the bargaining set. A state's zone of agreement on the international level is larger or smaller depending on the interests of the groups playing on the domestic level. In an integrative negotiation such as this, the chances for cooperation and for joint gains are enhanced when domestic influences expand a state's zone of agreement.²⁸

Domestic political groups can have transnational links,²⁹ thereby shaping their respective governments' perceptions in similar ways. The idea here is that groups in different countries, whether they are bureaucrats, political activists, or business-people, have links across national borders through which they develop and communicate shared viewpoints and interests. They then advance these interests by influencing their national governments, and even governments of other nations, in similar directions. Such connections add a third dimension to the two-level game analogy.³⁰

The hypothesis here is that the domestic game played by the AEPS negotiators involved environmental activists and indigenous groups, both of which had transnational links. As well as advancing their specifically "political," interests, these groups were a medium for the new "sustainable development" environmental paradigm, contributing to its

²⁷ Putnam, Robert D., 1988, "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games," *International Organization* 42 (3), Summer, p. 434.

²⁸ Mayer, Frederick W., 1992, "Managing domestic differences in international negotiations: the strategic use of internal side-payments," *International Organization* 46 (4), Autumn, p. 804.

²⁹ Nye, Joseph S., Jr., and Robert O. Keohane, 1972, "Transnational Relations and World Politics: An Introduction," in Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (eds.), *Transnational Relations and World Politics*, p. xiv.

³⁰ Knopf, Jeffrey W., 1994, "Beyond two-level games: domestic-international interaction in the intermediate-range nuclear forces negotiations," *International Organization* 47 (4), Autumn, pp. 599-628.

impact on circumpolar politics. Indigenous groups had more effect on the negotiations than did environmental groups, seeing their concerns incorporated in the AEPS. This is partly due to their growing political power "on the ground" in the northern regions of several of the circumpolar countries, including of course Greenland, whose population is mostly indigenous. In addition, their concerns were often championed by Canada. Indigenous groups attained status as observers, able to sit at the AEPS negotiation table, and thus able to be play in both the domestic and the international games.

Epistemic Communities

Another definition of learning is, "the process by which consensual knowledge is used to specify causal relationships in new ways so that the result affects the content of public policy."³¹ The definition of learning mentioned previously referred simply to the incorporation in decisions of new information. That definition accommodated consideration of the messages of domestic and transnational interest groups, which are heard usually because of policy-makers' desire for their political support. This second definition relates more to how new information causes policy-makers to see problems in new ways - or even to see new problems. As mentioned above, interest groups such as environmental and indigenous organisations can transmit such information so that policy-makers see, for example, Arctic issues in terms of the sustainable development paradigm rather than the frontier economics paradigm. The messages of such groups can be characterised as self-interested, however.

Other groups can be seen as more objective, and therefore more authoritative. Theoretical work on what have been called "epistemic communities," describes how this works. The term was borrowed from philosopher Michel Foucault's notion of *epistème*, describing a pattern of discourse which defines the form knowledge takes - a way of

³¹ Haas, Ernst B., 1990, *When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations*, p. 23.

looking at social reality, a set of shared symbols and references.³² An epistemic community is characterised by "a shared set of normative and principled beliefs," and "shared causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of [...] a central set of problems in their domain."³³ The community advances its ideas and knowledge by providing policy-makers with guidance. To do so, it must possess "recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area."³⁴

The influence of epistemic communities is exercised through a process that can be described as passing through different stages of uncertainty, interpretation, and institutionalisation. In a situation where policy-makers are uncertain about the nature of the issues, how their interests should be defined, and what policies are applicable, they often turn to epistemic communities whose knowledge can reduce this uncertainty. In this regard, the definition of an epistemic community as having "recognized expertise" and an "authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge" is crucial. Policy-makers turn to epistemic communities for advice because they trust their abilities.³⁵ The next step in the process, interpretation, involves an epistemic community's shaping of the debate by defining the problem, identifying national interests, and proposing policies. Then, epistemic communities have influence in proposing specific measures.

The ability of epistemic communities to define issues, interests, and policies in a way that affects international politics is related to how their ideas are diffused. Their knowledge and ideas are spread transnationally through communication between members situated in different countries. The transnational community then uses its shared

³² Ruggie, John Gerard, 1989, "International Structure and International Transformation: Space, Time, and Method," in Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau (eds.), *Global Changes and Theoretical Changes: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s*, pp. 569-570. Foucault, Michel, 1969, *L'archéologie du savoir*, pp. 250-251.

³³ Haas, Peter M., 1992, "Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination," *International Organization* 46 (1), Winter, p. 3.

³⁴ Haas, Peter M., 1992, "Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination," *International Organization* 46 (1), Winter, p. 3.

³⁵ Haas, Peter M., 1992, "Banning chlorofluorocarbons: epistemic community efforts to protect the stratospheric ozone," *International Organization* 46 (1), p. 189.

knowledge to influence different policy-makers in similar ways. This is the most important insight of theorising about epistemic communities as applied to international relations: that, by influencing states in similar ways, they encourage and facilitate cooperation between them.

The final phase in the process, and one which can preserve the epistemic community's influence after uncertainty has passed, is institutionalisation. In one case, once their influence was in place, government bureaucracies were content to leave the epistemic community "in charge of issues they did not fully understand and that were not characterized by recurrent crises."³⁶ The strength of an epistemic community's influence depends on several factors: its size and cohesiveness, the consistency and authority of its beliefs, the positions and influence of its members, and the strength of opposing forces.³⁷

In the context of the AEPS, the hypothesis is that an international epistemic community of scientists was instrumental in shaping the negotiations. The typology of stages discussed above is evident: uncertainty, interpretation, and institutionalisation. When the end of the Cold War opened the possibility of circumpolar cooperation, environmental protection became the focus largely because of this epistemic community. After this context became defined, because policy-makers in the circumpolar countries were uncertain both of the issues and of their interests related to each issue, the interpretive lead was again taken by this community. The negotiations themselves, characterised by significant exchanges of information, were crucial to the process of "learning," as issues and interests became clearer to policy-makers. In addition, the transnational membership of the community allowed it to influence state policies in similar ways. The most concrete achievements of the AEPS institutionalise programmes of scientific cooperation and will likely further enhance the epistemic community's role in the future.

³⁶ Haas, Peter M., 1990, *Saving the Mediterranean: The Politics of International Environmental Cooperation*, pp. 224-228.

³⁷ Sebenius, James K., 1992, "Challenging conventional explanations of international cooperation: negotiation analysis and the case of epistemic communities," *International Organization* 46 (1), p. 360.

Conclusion

This discussion of the theory applied in this paper starts with a description of how negotiation analysis concepts can illuminate international negotiations such as those which produced the AEPS and related agreements. Actors' interests are key to understanding the possibilities for agreement, and are the measure by which actors' actions can be evaluated. From the Realist perspective of international relations theory, state interests are defined in terms of their pursuit of military, political, and economic power.

As described in Chapter 3, the Realist interests of the circumpolar states, with the exception of the US, opened a zone of agreement for circumpolar cooperation on the environment. Essentially, for Canada and the Nordic states, a regional cooperative regime was attractive because it provided a forum for them to exercise influence on the larger powers, the Soviet Union and the US. The interests of the Soviet Union changed after the end of the Cold War so that circumpolar cooperation was acceptable and even desirable insofar as it encouraged further reductions of tension and further connections with the West. Only the US was reluctant to tie itself to any kind of regional regime, preferring to maintain its freedom of military and economic action in the Arctic. More than the Realist analysis is therefore needed to explain American participation in the AEPS.

In fact, more is needed to explain the positions of the other circumpolar states - indeed, to explain the issues on which they took positions. That is, the Realist analysis shows the possible existence of a zone of agreement for circumpolar cooperation, but says little about its focus and content. It only sets limits to the agreement's content. That is, the AEPS was limited in certain areas that were sensitive to various states' Realist interests. Its lack of binding, concrete commitments can be explained this way, in particular on radioactive contamination and marine pollution, which had implications for Soviet and American security interests, on persistent organic contaminants and heavy metals, which affected Soviet and American economic interests, and on marine mammal hunting, which involved Norwegian and Greenlandic economic interests.

Why these issues were even on the table, however, demands an explanation, and Realism cannot provide it. This is why the negotiation analysis framework looks for how subjective and changing perceptions of interests shape negotiations. This departure echoes debates about the basic character of social science theory in general and international relations theory in particular, pitting Realism against Idealism. The result is the proposition that ideas and knowledge affect international politics - in terms of negotiation analysis, by helping to define interests. Examples of ideas that can have such effects are different environmental worldviews, from "frontier economics" to "deep ecology."

Chapter 4 describes how the environmental problems in the Arctic intruded into the consciousness of policy-makers, leading them to redefine state interests through the prisms of the pollution control, environmental security, and eventually, sustainable development, paradigms. Evidence for this is provided by domestic and international action to protect the Arctic environment. It is also provided by the positions taken by the circumpolar states during the AEPS negotiations. Each had different priorities; the Nordic states, for example, wanted action on acidification and radioactive contamination, while Canada was concerned about persistent organic contaminants. Canada and the Nordic states had redefined their interests toward environmental protection to a greater extent than the Soviet Union, which did not actively pursue action on any issue, and the US, whose greatest interest was in flora and fauna conservation.

However, as Chapter 5 shows, all the circumpolar states were affected by the pressures of various interest groups which encouraged redefining their interests towards cooperation on the environment. Such groups had transnational links and were thus able to influence different states in similar ways. Although public opinion worldwide during the period of the AEPS negotiations was concerned with environmental degradation, its attention was caught more by global problems than by the Arctic.

Discrete groups, including environmental advocates, indigenous peoples, and the scientific community, had more influence. Environmental advocates generally pushed for

concrete and binding regulation of pollution problems, and wanted significant participation in the AEPS process. They were less successful in transmitting their messages, however, than indigenous groups or scientists, because of their late involvement in the process and their failure to ally with other groups. Indigenous groups also wanted to see concrete commitments, but were very focused on increasing their participation in the AEPS discussions. They achieved considerable success, assured of Canada's advocacy and of the sympathy of the Soviet Union and most of the Nordic states. Norway and the US were the most resistant to indigenous demands.

Norway and the US, however, were most receptive to the messages of a circumpolar epistemic community of scientists. This group, nurtured by domestic and bilateral Arctic science programmes, had long encouraged circumpolar cooperation, and were largely successful with the establishment of the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) in 1990. The IASC negotiations were a precursor to the AEPS discussions, diffusing some political disputes, and identifying circumpolar cooperation with scientific cooperation. The epistemic community of scientists used their authoritative knowledge to convince policy makers of the existence of Arctic environmental problems and of the need for international cooperation to address them. It also shaped the AEPS negotiation so that it was a process of learning, where scientific evidence collected during the process was used to justify decisions. This learning, and the scientists' role, was institutionalised by policy-makers' acceptance of their message that further study was needed. The two significant products of the AEPS, the AMAP and the CAFF programme, thus focused on scientific research.

The outcome of the negotiations is described in Chapter 6, which shows that all of the messages of the various groups were heard, and were reflected in non-binding language in the agreements, but the Realist-imposed limits were adhered to in that concrete commitments were rare. Within those limits, the environmental interests of the circumpolar states were evident, and the influence of indigenous groups and the scientific community

was obvious. Their input was institutionalised, and through a continuing learning process, led to incremental advances between the 1991 Rovaniemi and the 1993 Nuuk meetings. The ongoing process initiated by the AEPS in 1991 can thus be expected to result in further redefinition of the interests of the circumpolar states. The following chapter describes how the Realist interests of the circumpolar states shaped the framework of the negotiations.

"Is it in my country's interest?" This is the question that negotiators and their principals ask when evaluating proposals or possible agreements. The AEPS was initiated, negotiated, and adopted because it was perceived to be in the interests of the eight circumpolar states. Interests are the measure by which a zone of agreement is created or not. In other words, a proposal lies within the zone of agreement if it is within the interests of the negotiating parties. The challenge here is to attempt an explanation of how the circumpolar states perceived their interests, how those perceptions affected the negotiations, and how they were reflected in the final agreements.

From the theoretical perspective of Realism, interests are defined in terms of power. That is, whatever will increase a state's power, or further its military, political, or economic well-being, is in its interest. The analysis in this chapter of the AEPS negotiation concurs with the idea that states define at least part of their interests in terms of military, political, and economic power. The chapter shows that, with the exception of the US, the circumpolar states' perceptions of their interests in Realist terms held open a window for cooperation on the Arctic environment. At the same time, these Realist perceptions limited how far the window could be opened, circumscribing the actions of the AEPS in several areas.

The Nordic States

The AEPS was the product of what came to be called the "Finnish Initiative," initiated in 1988 when the government of Finland sent out feelers to the other circumpolar countries, expressing its concern about environmental degradation in the Arctic and suggesting cooperative action.¹ In January 1989, the Finnish government formally invited

¹ Finland, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1988, *Protection of the Environment in the Arctic*, Helsinki, November 4.

the circumpolar countries to attend a "Conference on the Protection of the Environment of the Arctic."²

Circumpolar cooperation was clearly in Finland's interests, and the same was true for the other Nordic countries (Sweden, Norway, Iceland, and Denmark/Greenland). Although their security, political, and economic interests were not identical, they were close enough so that their perceptions of the negotiation framework were similar, seeing a zone of agreement large enough to accommodate a wide range of possible accords. Some of their priorities on specific issues differed, so that possible agreements would be more or less attractive depending on the country, but by and large, almost any circumpolar environmental agreement was consistent with the interests of the Nordic states.

Security Interests

From a security perspective, the Nordic countries shared a basic interest in influencing the actions of the United States and the Soviet Union to prevent being sideswiped, and getting the two superpowers into a circumpolar multilateral forum was a good way to attempt to influence their behaviour.³

The AEPS did not directly deal with security issues, but the Nordic countries challenged the superpowers by pushing for measures to deal with the threat of radioactive contamination.⁴ These included banning nuclear weapons from the Arctic and controlling nuclear-powered vessels, such as submarines and icebreakers. For example, at a press conference after the signing of the AEPS, the Swedish Minister of the Environment expressed disappointment that it was not possible to include a statement on the need to prohibit nuclear activities in the Arctic.⁵ Similarly, the Norwegian representative to the

2 Finland, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1989, *Letter from Kalevi Sorsa, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Finland, and Kaj Barlund, Minister of the Environment, Finland, to the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada*, Helsinki, January 12.

3 Osherenko, Gail and Oran R. Young, 1989, *The Age of the Arctic*, p. 35.

4 Arnaudo, Raymond, Chief, Division of Polar Affairs, United States Department of State, 1993, *Interview*, Washington, October.

5 Canada, Department of the Environment, 1991, *Memorandum from E.F. Roots, Science Advisor Emeritus, to Dr. Len Gôod, Deputy Minister: Ministerial Meeting on Protection of the Arctic Environment - Rovaniemi, Finland*, Ottawa, June 25, p. 8.

Rovaniemi ministerial conference criticised Soviet nuclear tests in the Arctic.⁶ In general, military activity was not looked upon favourably by the Nordic states. For example, in a background paper prepared for the first AEPS preparatory meeting in 1989 which describes the value to wildlife of polynyas (areas of open water), Finland also questioned the navigational freedom of naval vessels, saying that the "main threat against the polynyas seems to be military activities and traffic."⁷

Political Interests

More important than its direct influence on military activities was the potential for the AEPS process to lead to wider and more comprehensive discussions and agreements. Finland, for example, saw its initiative as an on-going process, which would lead to further discussions and agreements after the planned ministerial conference in 1991. Finland drafted a specific proposal for "permanent contacts between the Arctic countries," involving regular ministerial meetings.⁸

Saying that "[i]t is only natural that this initiative has stimulated new ideas of broadening the scope of cooperation beyond the environment," Finland endorsed in 1991 Canada's proposal for an Arctic Council.⁹ Underlining the link between the AEPS process and the Arctic Council proposal, Finland, along with Sweden and Iceland, announced their support at the 1991 ministerial meeting which adopted the AEPS.¹⁰ Norway also showed interest,¹¹ and in May 1993, Sweden proposed taking the AEPS forum and simply calling

⁶ Norway, 1991, *Statement by Mr. Jens Stoltenberg, Deputy Minister of Environment* [to the Ministerial Conference], Rovaniemi, June 13, p. 3.

⁷ Finland, Ministry of the Environment, 1989, *International Conference on Environmental Protection in the Arctic, Preparatory Meeting, Rovaniemi, Finland, 1989, Background Information*, Helsinki, July 12, p. 4.

⁸ Finland, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1991, *Elements for a Draft Memorandum of Understanding on Operational Structure of Future Cooperation in the Arctic*, Helsinki, May 23.

⁹ Finland, 1991, *Opening Statement by Dr. Paavo Väyrynen, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland* [to the Ministerial Conference on Protection of the Arctic Environment], Rovaniemi, June 13, p. 3.

¹⁰ Iceland, 1991, *Statement by Mr. Eidur Gudnason, Minister for the Environment, Iceland* [to the Ministerial Conference], Rovaniemi, June 13, p. 4. Sweden, 1991, *Statement by Birgitta Dahl, Minister of the Environment of Sweden* [to the Ministerial Conference], Rovaniemi, June 13, p. 7.

¹¹ Canada, 1991, *Background Paper: The Arctic Council* [in the briefing book for the Canadian delegation to the Ministerial Conference], Ottawa, June.

it the Arctic Council, expanding its mandate beyond environmental issues.¹² A multilateral forum, such as the AEPS or the Arctic Council, was interesting to the Nordic countries as a way of having influence on activities in the Arctic. Another possible benefit related to involving others in issues that were formerly limited to bilateral interactions.

For example, sovereignty disputes, involving the Svalbard archipelago and the continental shelf under the Barents Sea, made Norway reluctant to pursue bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union.¹³ The AEPS process, by providing a multilateral forum to potentially deal with issues of bilateral concern, was thus attractive to Norway, and to the other Nordic countries, as a way of restraining the political power of larger states. Indeed, the Americans were suspicious of being drawn into that kind of situation, suggesting that Finland's proposal was an effort to use a multilateral forum to pursue bilateral issues with the Soviet Union.¹⁴ Finnish motivations were seen this way also in Canada.¹⁵

Economic Interests

Along with its security and political implications, the Nordic states evaluated the AEPS process in terms of their economic interests in the region. These centred on natural resource exploitation, such as forestry and hydroelectric development. Of greater importance to Norway was hydrocarbon exploitation, especially in the North Sea and potentially in the Barents Sea.¹⁶ An interest in developing this resource unimpeded shaped Norway's input into the AEPS discussions, where its position on most aspects of marine pollution, including regulation of offshore activities, was that the application or extension

¹² Breton, Gilles, Chief, Circumpolar Affairs Division, Circumpolar and Scientific Affairs Directorate, Department of Indian and Northern Affairs (Canada), 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, November.

¹³ Pharand, Donat, 1989, "Les problèmes de droit international dans l'Arctique," *Revue études internationales* 20 (1), mars, pp. 133, 138. Stokke, Olav Schram, 1989, "Arctic Environmental Cooperation: Incentives and Obstacles," *Current Research on Peace and Violence* 12 (3), p. 159.

¹⁴ Canada, Department of the Environment, 1989, *Finnish Initiative file*, Ottawa.

¹⁵ Bangay, Garth, Director, Environment and Renewable Resources Directorate, Department of Indian and Northern Affairs (Canada), 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, November.

¹⁶ Osherenko, Gail and Oran R. Young, 1989, *The Age of the Arctic*, p. 252.

of existing measures would be sufficient.¹⁷ In other words, Norway was willing to adhere to regulations to which it had already committed in other fora. With regard to regulation of pollution from ships on the high seas (areas outside national control), Norway believed that protection of the especially vulnerable ice-covered Arctic Ocean was inadequate. However, its position was that the problem should be addressed by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) or under the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution by Ships (MARPOL), not by regional arrangements.¹⁸

Arctic living resources are also economically valuable. The extraordinary biological productivity of Arctic waters on the edge of the ice cap, due to temperature differences, has made fishing a major economic activity in many areas. Among these are the west coast of Greenland, where cod and shrimp fisheries have become a basis of the economy over the last generation, and the Barents Sea, where Norway and Russia share large cod and capelin fisheries. Greenland, Iceland, and Norway are sensitive to the possibility of outside meddling in their fishing and whaling industries. For example, while continuing to pursue whaling under the guise of "scientific research," Iceland and Norway threatened to withdraw from the International Whaling Commission (IWC), which had declared a moratorium on the whale kill.

When Canada submitted to the 1990 Yellowknife preparatory meeting a draft "Memorandum of Understanding on the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna," the limits to the enthusiasm for circumpolar cooperation of some of the Nordic countries became apparent. The memorandum envisaged a program of information exchange and scientific cooperation on wildlife conservation. On a list of species that could be subjects of the agreement, attached for illustrative purposes, were Monodontidae (which includes

¹⁷ Norway, 1990, *Norwegian Statement in Working Group 1 Regarding Oil Pollution in the Arctic*, Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting, April 19.

¹⁸ Norway, 1990, *Norwegian Statement in Working Group 1 Regarding Oil Pollution in the Arctic*, Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting, April 19, p. 6. LeClaire, Alison, Deputy Director, Environment Division, Department of External Affairs and International Trade (Canada), 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, October. Marr, Ian McG., Manager, Arctic Marine Systems, Coast Guard Northern, Canadian Coast Guard, 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, October.

narwhal and beluga whales) and Balaenidae (which includes bowhead whales).¹⁹ Norway was not happy with this list,²⁰ and at one of the last negotiation sessions, in Helsinki in May 1991, its representative stated that the proposal "would be unacceptable unless it was altered to refer distinctly to terrestrial flora and fauna."²¹ In further discussions on the programme, Norway was insistent that it be limited to information exchange and not become an international resource management regime.²² Greenland also registered opposition to the Canadian proposal. The issue was so touchy that a display on Arctic flora and fauna set up by Canada at the ministerial meeting in Rovaniemi excluded whales and marine mammals for fear of offending Norway.²³

Figure 3.1: Possible Bargaining Set

The economic interests of several of the Nordic countries therefore set some limits to the type of circumpolar agreement they perceived as attractive. The vertical axis of figure 3.1 represents a Realist definition of the Nordic countries' interests (the horizontal axis represents an hypothetical aggregate of the other participants' interests). Point A is a

¹⁹ Canada, 1990, *Memorandum of Understanding on the Conservation of Flora and Fauna* [submitted to the Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting]

²⁰ Pagnan, Jeanne, Canadian Wildlife Service, Department of the Environment, 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, October.

²¹ Canada, 1991, *CANDEL Report: Protecting the Arctic Environment, Helsinki Heads of Delegation Meeting, May 6-8, 1991*, Helsinki, May, p. 4

²² Kostash, Janice, Director, External Relations Branch, Canadian Wildlife Service, Department of the Environment (Canada), 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, October

²³ Pagnan, Jeanne, Canadian Wildlife Service, Department of the Environment, 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, October

possible agreement which includes provisions that were objectionable to some of the Nordic states. These involved regional oil pollution regulation and management of fisheries and marine mammals. Point A is outside the zone of agreement. Almost any other form of agreement, however, would be inside the zone, since circumpolar cooperation was so clearly in the security and political interests of the Nordic states. Some would be farther within it than others; for example, an agreement (Point B) doing nothing about radioactive contamination would lie low on the Nordic countries' scale of interests.

Canada

A circumpolar agreement was also in Canada's interests, defined from a Realist point of view. Its security goals of lessening tension and preventing further militarisation of the Arctic were served by circumpolar cooperation, while its political obsession with sovereignty in the Arctic was satisfied by strictly regional arrangements that resisted wider international involvement. Canada's economic interests, although important, did not affect its perception of the AEPS.

Security Interests

A briefing document on security issues received by the Canadian delegation to the 1990 AEPS preparatory meeting in Yellowknife stated that Canadian "[d]efence policy is currently undergoing a new review in light of the rapidly changing nature of East/West relations."²⁴ At the end of the Cold War, Canada's security policy moved away from improving defence capabilities and strengthening ties with the US and towards arms control and international cooperation.²⁵ Canada, in line with the US, opposed negotiation of security issues in a regional context. A 1990 policy document unequivocally stated that "we would find it unthinkable to deal with Arctic-based weapons in a forum that excluded

²⁴ Canada, 1990, *The Northern Dimension to Canada's Foreign Policy* [in the briefing book for the Canadian delegation to the Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting], Ottawa.

²⁵ Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, 1989, *Security Co-operation in the Arctic: A Canadian Response to Murmansk: Report of the Panel on Arctic Arms Control* [presented at the Canada-USSR Conference on Canadian-Soviet Arctic Co-operation], Ottawa, October 24, p. 3. Canadian Institute of International Affairs, National Capital Branch, 1988, *The North and Canada's International Relations*, pp. 5-7.

our non-Arctic allies." The Canadian government believed that its energies should be applied to obtaining more ambitious arms control goals in larger fora rather than to narrowly focus on the Arctic.²⁶

Canada was sending other signals at the same time, however. For example, on a 1989 visit to the Soviet Union, Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney rhetorically asked, "And why not a council of Arctic countries eventually coming into existence to coordinate and promote cooperation among them?"²⁷ In November 1991, the Secretary of State for External Affairs announced that Canada was suggesting the establishment of an Arctic Council, and a formal proposal was made in January 1991.²⁸ In May 1992, officials from the eight Arctic countries met in Ottawa to discuss the idea and all but the Americans approved in principle.²⁹ Although Canada made clear that since the agenda was to be decided by consensus, the US could keep security off of it,³⁰ much of American resistance to the Arctic Council was based on security concerns. Was the US misreading Canadian intentions, or did Canada want to draw the US into a forum which it hoped would eventually deal with security issues?

Political Interests

In any case, Canada saw an environmental agreement as the first step in the establishment of comprehensive circumpolar cooperation. For example, in internal discussions, the Department of External Affairs and International Trade took the position that the mandate of any circumpolar forum should not be limited to environmental matters, "but should be broad enough to coordinate the actions of the Arctic states in a variety of

²⁶ Canada, Department of the Environment, 1990, *Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting file*, Ottawa.

²⁷ Canada, Department of the Environment, 1990, *International Arctic Environmental Institution: Proposal*, Ottawa, February, p. 5.

²⁸ Canada, 1991, *Arctic Sovereignty* [in the briefing book for the Canadian delegation to the Ministerial Conference], Ottawa, June.

²⁹ Breton, Gilles, Chief, Circumpolar Affairs, Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, Government of Canada, 1992, "Plenary Session: The Case for an Arctic Council," in *Proceedings: New Perspectives on the Arctic. The Changing Role of the United States in the Circumpolar North*, p. 136.

³⁰ Canada, 1991, *Arctic Sovereignty* [in the briefing book for the Canadian delegation to the Ministerial Conference], Ottawa, June.

fields.”³¹ Underlining the link between the AEPS and the Arctic Council, Canada used the AEPS negotiations to advance its proposal. A description of Canadian objectives for the 1990 Yellowknife meeting noted that a circumpolar environmental agreement “could be a first step towards the creation of a supervisory Arctic Council.”³² Similarly, one of the Canadian government’s main objectives at the 1991 Rovaniemi meeting was to further its Arctic Council proposal, discussing the idea in meetings there with the Americans and Soviets.³³

Similar to the Nordic countries, Canada’s security and political interests were served by such circumpolar fora as platforms for exercising influence in the Arctic. Canada opposed opening up participation to non-Arctic states for fear of diluting such influence. The Canadian position was that participation in the AEPS should be limited to the eight circumpolar countries because of their special responsibility for “Arctic resources, peoples and the environment,” through their jurisdiction over the region’s lands and waters.³⁴ Canada’s public position hinted at its fear of losing clout in a larger forum: “[T]he number of observers should be kept small in the early stages, so as not to overwhelm those countries directly affected by the problem.”³⁵ The political motivation was more explicit in internal discussions, where it was stated that non-Arctic states could participate in scientific and technical discussions but they should be excluded from “political” fora.³⁶

A specific political motivation was stated in a Canadian document on the Arctic Council which said that failure to retain control of the process in the hands of the eight

³¹ Canada, Department of the Environment, 1990, *Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting file*, Ottawa.

³² Canada, 1990, *Broad Canadian Objectives for the Yellowknife Meeting*, [in the briefing book for the Canadian delegation to the Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting], Ottawa.

³³ Canada, 1991, *Draft Communications Strategy: Minister’s Trip to Rovaniemi, Finland, and Copenhagen, Denmark, June 11-18, 1991* [in the briefing book for the Canadian delegation to the Ministerial Conference], Ottawa, June 4, pp. 1, 4.

³⁴ Canada, 1990, *Participation of Non-Arctic Countries in Circumpolar Arctic Environment Initiative* [in the briefing book for the Canadian delegation to the Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting], Ottawa.

³⁵ Canada, 1990, *Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting - Potential Q and A’s* [in the briefing book for the Canadian delegation to the Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting], Ottawa.

³⁶ Canada, Department of the Environment, 1990, *Memorandum from Jane Barton, Chief, Multilateral Affairs, External Relations Directorate, Department of the Environment, to Peter Burnet, Advisor, Circumpolar Affairs, Department of External Affairs and International Trade: Arctic Environment Forum*, Ottawa, February 26.

circumpolar countries "could prejudice Canada's sovereignty claims over Arctic waters."³⁷ This statement revealed a number of things. It showed that Canada anticipated that on a practical level possible non-Arctic participants, which included Britain, Germany, Poland, and the Netherlands, would take contrary positions on issues which affected Canadian sovereignty claims, on vessel pollution regulations, for example. On the level of precedent or principle, the inclusion of non-Arctic countries in a regional forum would internationalise that forum, and by extension, internationalise responsibility for the Arctic. This concerned Canada because it had implications for whether or not the waters of its Arctic archipelago were considered internal or international.

Another fact revealed by that statement was, despite assertions to the contrary,³⁸ Canada expected the Arctic Council to have an impact on its sovereignty claims. With the exception of a small uninhabited island between Greenland and Ellesmere Island over which Canada and Denmark are in dispute, Canada's sovereignty over the land of its Arctic archipelago is well-established. The waters running through the archipelago are a different story, however. Canada asserts that they are internal waters, including the Northwest Passage. However, the US recognizes only a 12-mile territorial limit off the Arctic islands, which would leave much of the water area, including the Northwest Passage, considered part of the high seas.

The Finnish Initiative explicitly excluded consideration of sovereignty issues,³⁹ and the resulting agreements did not directly affect them. However, because there is a link in international law between the exercise of authority over territory and claims to jurisdiction, states could be expected to be reluctant to manage resources cooperatively in disputed areas.⁴⁰ The Canadian government's interpretation, however, was quite different. It

³⁷ Canada, 1991, *Arctic Sovereignty* [in the briefing book for the Canadian delegation to the Ministerial Conference]. Ottawa, June.

³⁸ Canada, 1990, *The Arctic Council* [in the briefing book for the Canadian delegation to the Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting]. Ottawa.

³⁹ Finland, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1989, *Working Paper*, Helsinki, January 1.

⁴⁰ Stokke, Olav Schram, 1989, "Arctic Environmental Cooperation: Incentives and Obstacles," *Current Research on Peace and Violence* 12 (3), p. 158.

expected the AEPS to lead to domestic programmes and legislation implementing its provisions. Such domestic action would be explicitly sanctioned by the other circumpolar states as part of the implementation of the AEPS. Since these domestic programmes would entail activity in or regulation over Arctic lands and waters, they would buttress Canada's sovereignty claims. The other states' acceptance of the domestic programmes implementing the AEPS could therefore be seen as supportive of Canadian activity in the Arctic, and by extension, Canadian sovereignty.⁴¹

The Canadian government therefore perceived the AEPS as congruent with its sovereignty interests in the Arctic; first, by further regionalising the area, and second, by encouraging Canadian activity and control over its Arctic territory. It remained to ensure that specific provisions of the AEPS did not adversely affect Canada's sovereignty claims. A clear example was provided by Canadian government discussions of the possibility of establishing the Arctic Ocean as an "international biosphere reserve." The Department of the Environment proposed that Canada advance this idea, but the Department of External Affairs demurred, saying that any form of international management or control over the Canadian Arctic would interfere with Canadian sovereignty.⁴² Canada ultimately proposed cooperation "in research, planning and management activities related to national networks of protected areas [...],"⁴³ which is quite different than the establishment of an international park.

Canada opposed a Norwegian proposal to deal with marine pollution in the Arctic Ocean under the IMO legal regime.⁴⁴ One reason for this involved Canada's belief that stronger regulation was needed than that provided by existing international legal

⁴¹ Canada, 1990, *The Northern Dimension to Canada's Foreign Policy* [in the briefing book for the Canadian delegation to the Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting], Ottawa.

⁴² Canada, Department of the Environment, 1990, *Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting file*, Ottawa.

⁴³ Canada, 1990, *Briefing Note: Circumpolar 8 Network of Protected Areas, Habitats and Biosphere Reserves in the Arctic* [in the briefing book for the Canadian delegation to the Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting], Ottawa, April 4.

⁴⁴ LeClaire, Alison, Deputy Director, Environment Division, Department of External Affairs and International Trade (Canada), 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, October.

instruments,⁴⁵ but it was also consistent with Canada's resistance to internationalizing the Arctic Ocean and echoed Canada's rationale for the 1970 *Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act*, which was an important assertion of Canadian sovereignty over the waters of the Arctic archipelago. Thus, although a circumpolar environmental agreement was in accordance with Canada's sovereignty concerns, not just any one would do. Canadian negotiators were careful to ensure that the AEPS did not undermine Canada's jurisdiction over its Arctic.

Economic Interests

Canada's economic interests in the region centred on natural resource exploitation. In 1987, Arctic mineral production was worth about \$1.2 billion. Most of the mining is done in more southerly regions, but there are several operations in the High Arctic, at Nanisivik and Little Cornwallis Island for example.⁴⁶ In addition, oil and gas deposits in the Canadian North represent more than 40 percent of the country's estimated potentially recoverable reserves.⁴⁷

Such economic interests did not seem to have had a direct effect on the Canadian perception of the desirability of the AEPS. Although security and sovereignty interests called for circumpolar cooperation, an analysis confined to Realist interests would expect Canadian resistance to strong measures on issues such as marine pollution and environmental impact assessment which would have an effect on mining and oil production. This was not the case, so other factors, discussed in following chapters, must have been at play.

A Realist perception of Canada's interests would produce a negotiation framework very much like that of the Nordic countries (figure 3.1). It created a zone of agreement

⁴⁵ Marr, Ian McG., Manager, Arctic Marine Systems, Coast Guard Northern, Canadian Coast Guard, 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, October

⁴⁶ Canadian Institute of International Affairs, National Capital Branch, 1988, *The North and Canada's International Relations*, pp. 19, 24.

⁴⁷ Canadian Institute of International Affairs, National Capital Branch, 1988, *The North and Canada's International Relations*, p. 19. Osherenko, Garl and Oran R. Young, 1989, *The Age of the Arctic*, p. 54.

wide open to almost any type of circumpolar cooperative arrangement, but with a few limitations. In Canada's case, a possible agreement would fall outside the zone if it somehow threatened Canada's political interests by, for example, including non-Arctic countries as full participants or by further internationalising Arctic waters.

United States

American policy in the Arctic was set out by the 1983 National Security Decision Directive Number 90, which stated that "the United States has unique and critical interests in the Arctic region related directly to national defense, resource and energy development, scientific inquiry and environmental protection."⁴⁸ A Realist analysis would emphasise the order of that list, with the first priorities being security and economic development.

Security Interests

The policy was signed at one of the high points of the Cold War, when the American military presence in the Arctic was increasing.⁴⁹ During the AEPS negotiations, occurring after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the signature of breakthrough arms control agreements in Europe, American security concerns in the Arctic remained relevant. In 1992, a staff member of the US Senate intelligence committee made clear that the end of the Cold War in the Arctic "does not mean that we scrap our subs, ground our aircraft, and withdraw our troops. The U.S. does retain security obligations that require us to maintain a variety of capabilities, to continue training, and prepare for contingencies."⁵⁰

One symptom of the continued American preoccupation with military security was their refusal to discuss related issues in any regional forum.⁵¹ For example, the possibility of a ban on nuclear weapons in the Arctic came up during the AEPS negotiations and the

⁴⁸ United States, 1983, "Appendix B: United States Arctic Policy Statement [National Security Decision Directive Number 90, April 14, 1983]," in *Proceedings: New Perspectives on the Arctic, The Changing Role of the United States in the Circumpolar North*, p. 195.

⁴⁹ Osherenko, Gail and Oran R. Young, 1989, *The Age of the Arctic*, pp. 18-30.

⁵⁰ Garman, David, Professional Staff Member, US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 1992, "Panel V - Evolving Issues of National Security in the Arctic," in *Proceedings: New Perspectives on the Arctic, The Changing Role of the United States in the Circumpolar North*, p. 117.

⁵¹ Canada, 1991, *Arctic Sovereignty* [in the briefing book for the Canadian delegation to the Ministerial Conference], Ottawa, June.

US held that the issue should be left to larger East-West arms control negotiations.⁵² The Americans were also very sensitive to any reference in the AEPS to underground nuclear testing.⁵³ Concern that security issues would be on the agenda was one of the key reasons for US hesitancy about the Canadian proposal for an Arctic Council. At a 1992 meeting in Ottawa of officials of the circumpolar countries to discuss the Arctic Council, while the other seven countries agreed in principle, the US reserved its position.⁵⁴ They did not want to let "the Arctic tail wag the US foreign policy dog"⁵⁵ on security issues.

For example, with its submarines still cruising around under the ice, the US opposed any singling out in the AEPS of nuclear vessels as an environmental threat.⁵⁶ In general, the US was "very sensitive to references to radioactive discharges from ships [...],"⁵⁷ during the negotiations. The US also resisted strong language on radioactive waste dumping in the 1992 Nuuk Declaration.⁵⁸

Political Interests

The only example of "essential security interests" provided by the 1983 US Arctic policy was preservation of "the principle of freedom of the seas and superjacent airspace [...]"⁵⁹ This emphasis on maintaining freedom of navigation was repeated almost a decade later by a US Coast Guard official who said that there should be "free and open use" of the Arctic Ocean by ships, governed by "some form of international management,"

⁵² Arnaudo, Raymond, Chief, Division of Polar Affairs, United States Department of State, 1993, *Interview*, Washington, October.

⁵³ Canada, 1991, *CANDEL Report: Protecting the Arctic Environment, Helsinki Heads of Delegation Meeting, May 6-8, 1991*, Helsinki, May, p. 3.

⁵⁴ Breton, Gilles, Chief, Circumpolar Affairs, Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, Government of Canada, 1992, "Plenary Session: The Case for an Arctic Council," in *Proceedings: New Perspectives on the Arctic, The Changing Role of the United States in the Circumpolar North*, p. 136.

⁵⁵ Arnaudo, Raymond, Chief, Division of Polar Affairs, United States Department of State, 1993, *Interview*, Washington, October.

⁵⁶ Arnaudo, Raymond, Chief, Division of Polar Affairs, United States Department of State, 1993, *Interview*, Washington, October.

⁵⁷ Canada, 1991, *CANDEL Report: Protecting the Arctic Environment, Helsinki Heads of Delegation Meeting, May 6-8, 1991*, Helsinki, May, p. 3.

⁵⁸ LeClaire, Alison, Deputy Director, Environment Division, Department of External Affairs and International Trade (Canada), 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, October.

⁵⁹ United States, 1983, "Appendix B: United States Arctic Policy Statement [National Security Decision Directive Number 90, April 14, 1983]," in *Proceedings: New Perspectives on the Arctic, The Changing Role of the United States in the Circumpolar North*, p. 195.

perhaps involving the IMO.⁶⁰ This interest shaped US positions in a variety of ways. For example, on marine pollution, a US Department of Defense official stated, "We would favor cooperative efforts with other countries to come up with pollution prevention regulations. We would, however, oppose anything that would keep our vessels from exercising high seas freedoms, transients, and innocent passage through territorial seas."⁶¹

The US much preferred internationalising the Arctic to regionalising it. During the AEPS negotiations, the US was consistent in resisting the creation of new regional bodies, saying that it is better to work through already established international organisations and regimes, such as, for air pollution, the Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) Convention.⁶² Similarly, the US favoured the participation of non-Arctic states.⁶³

Economic Interests

With regard to the international legal status of the Arctic Ocean, security interests merged into political interests. They also merged with economic interests when the oil supplies of Alaska were considered. In 1992, a US Senate intelligence committee staff member stated that American policy was that the petroleum reserves in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge were "an important aspect of our national security," related to maintaining secure oil supplies.⁶⁴ One of the potential effects of further oil development on the Arctic Ocean coast and offshore is increased ship traffic. The US concern with navigational freedom was therefore not only related to security but also to the potential for increased oil tanker traffic to carry Alaskan crude to market. In the context of the AEPS, it follows that

⁶⁰ Brigham, Lawson, Captain, Chief, Strategic Planning Staff, US Coast Guard Headquarters, 1992. "Information Session: Access to the North," in *Proceedings: New Perspectives on the Arctic, The Changing Role of the United States in the Circumpolar North*, p. 61.

⁶¹ Baggett, Joseph, Head, International Law Division, Office of the Judge Advocate General, and US Department of Defense Deputy Representative for Ocean Policy Affairs, 1992. "Panel V - Evolving Issues of National Security in the Arctic," in *Proceedings: New Perspectives on the Arctic, The Changing Role of the United States in the Circumpolar North*, p. 123.

⁶² Mühling, Brian, United States Environmental Protection Agency, 1993, *Interview*, Washington, October.

⁶³ Canada, 1990, *Participation of Non-Arctic Countries in Circumpolar Arctic Environment Initiative* [in the briefing book for the Canadian delegation to the Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting], Ottawa. The emphasis is mine.

⁶⁴ Garman, David, Professional Staff Member, US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 1992, "Panel V - Evolving Issues of National Security in the Arctic," in *Proceedings: New Perspectives on the Arctic, The Changing Role of the United States in the Circumpolar North*, p. 124.

the US would encourage having oil pollution dealt with under existing international regimes, such as the MARPOL Convention, rather than through regional regulation.⁶⁵ Mining is also an important industry in Alaska. For example, there are a significant number of gold and silver mining operations, both in the Alaska Panhandle region and in the Arctic areas to the north. The Red Dog lead and zinc open-pit mine is a US\$5 billion mega-project in northwestern Alaska straddling the Arctic Circle.⁶⁶

Such economic interests made the US reluctant to commit to anything which might limit its freedom to develop its resources as it wished. For one thing, it did not want to add an international dimension to domestic battles over resource exploitation. For example, Canada has expressed concern about oil development in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. Providing another forum for such interference would not be in the US interest. The US did not want to "internationalise" *its* Arctic.

An interesting dispute occurred at the 1990 Yellowknife preparatory meeting, where the US insisted that the proposed "Arctic Sustainable Development Strategy" be renamed the "Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy."⁶⁷ All references but one to "sustainable development" were deleted from the draft text.⁶⁸ The stated American objection to the phrase was related to its imprecision,⁶⁹ but it signaled a more general concern that environmental protection would, first, affect economic development, and second, cost money. During the AEPS negotiations, the American delegation saw itself as a *garde-fou*, reining in the ambition of other countries' ideas, always asking whether a proposal could

65 United States, Environmental Protection Agency, 1991, *Statement of Robert C. Worrest, Ph.D., Office of Research and Development, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, before the Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space, Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, U.S. Senate, Washington, May 13, pp. 3-4.*

66 Osherenko, Gail and Oran R. Young, 1989, *The Age of the Arctic*, p. 49.

67 Canada, Department of the Environment, 1990, *Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting file*, Ottawa.

68 Griffiths, Franklyn and Oran R. Young, 1990, "Impressions of the Co-Chairs: Protecting the Arctic's Environment," in *Working Group on Arctic International Relations, Third Session, Moscow and Murmansk, USSR, 22-27 January 1990: Reports and Papers*, p. 17.

69 Arnaudo, Raymond, Chief, Division of Polar Affairs, United States Department of State, 1993, *Interview*, Washington, October.

be effectively implemented and funded.⁷⁰ Canadian negotiators saw this as resistance to substantive action, as making sure that nothing done through the AEPS would affect American security and energy production interests. The US negotiators resisted any use of action verbs, and if there was a way to study a problem further, that is what they would advocate.⁷¹ It was apparent to some that American negotiators were under instructions to resist any arrangement that would lead to a new international institution or commit the US in any way to new actions.⁷²

A specific example of such resistance to concrete action involved organic chemicals, which are commonly used in pesticides. In negotiations on the 1992 Nuuk Declaration, the US did not want to include phrases involving control of the "use and production of persistent organic contaminants," taking the position that the issue should be addressed in other fora.⁷³ In an example of resistance to measures that involved financial commitments, the US opposed reference in the Nuuk Declaration to the need to assist Russia with disposal of nuclear wastes.

American security, political, and economic interests all tended therefore to make the US reluctant to commit to a circumpolar agreement. American positions and actions during the AEPS negotiations provided ample evidence of this reluctance. Before the 1989 Rovaniemi preparatory meeting, at a meeting in Washington with a Canadian representative, a US State Department official described how the US was concerned that Finland had not provided a clear rationale for the meeting, and that its characterisation of it as preparatory implied that participants were already committed to some further action, such as a ministerial conference. The US was not convinced of the need for this and wanted to

70 Arnaudo, Raymond, Chief, Division of Polar Affairs, United States Department of State, 1993, *Interview*, Washington, October.

71 Bangay, Garth, Director, Environment and Renewable Resources Directorate, Department of Indian and Northern Affairs (Canada), 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, November.

72 Canada, Department of the Environment, 1991, *Memorandum from E.F. Roots, Science Advisor Emeritus, to Dr. Len Good, Deputy Minister: Ministerial Meeting on Protection of the Arctic Environment - Rovaniemi, Finland*, Ottawa, June 25, p. 10.

73 Canada, 1991, *CANDEL Report: Protecting the Arctic Environment, Helsinki Heads of Delegation Meeting, May 6-8, 1991*, Helsinki, May, pp. 2-3.

be able to reflect on the results of the meeting before deciding if any further action was appropriate. It was for this reason that a junior official, who could plead the need for reflections in Washington before taking a decision on further action, was sent to the 1989 Rovaniemi meeting.⁷⁴

The US sent higher level officials to subsequent meetings but continued to show reluctance. The US was the only country that did not send a minister to Rovaniemi to sign the Declaration in 1991. The other participants expected an Assistant Secretary of State,⁷⁵ but it was the US Ambassador to Finland who attended. In his speech to the conference he said that, "while the Strategy is not a binding document, it is a call to action and a plan for cooperation."⁷⁶ This was taken with dismay by the other delegations as a statement that the US retained the right to do what it wanted, regardless of the AEPS.⁷⁷ At home, before a Senate committee, American officials were careful to specify that the AEPS was "intended to be a set of non-binding principles [...]."⁷⁸ It was a similar story during the lead-up to the 1993 Nuuk ministerial conference. The US continued to resist institutionalisation, balking at committing to ministerial meetings every two years. Nor were the Americans keen on having a formal signing ceremony at the conference.⁷⁹

Why, then, did the US get involved in the AEPS at all? If the analysis is confined to Realist-defined interests, it is difficult to answer that question. The negotiation set from the American point of view is represented in Figure 3.2. Point A, which is far outside the zone, is a possible agreement that is clearly opposed to US interests, by for example,

⁷⁴ Canada, Department of the Environment, 1989, *Finnish Initiative file*, Ottawa.

⁷⁵ Canada, 1991, *CANDEL Report: Protecting the Arctic Environment, Helsinki Heads of Delegation Meeting, May 6-8, 1991*, Helsinki, May, pp. 2-5.

⁷⁶ United States, 1991, *Remarks of John Giffen Weinmann, Ambassador of the United States of America [to the Ministerial Conference]*, Rovaniemi, June 13, p. 2.

⁷⁷ Bangay, Garth, Director, Environment and Renewable Resources Directorate, Department of Indian and Northern Affairs (Canada), 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, November.

⁷⁸ United States, Environmental Protection Agency, 1991, *Statement of Robert C. Worrest, Ph.D., Office of Research and Development, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, before the Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space, Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, U.S. Senate*, Washington, May 13, pp. 3-4.

⁷⁹ LeClaire, Alison, Deputy Director, Environment Division, Department of External Affairs and International Trade (Canada), 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, October.

containing binding commitments regulating activities on a regional basis. Point B represents a hortatory statement of intentions containing few concrete intentions to control specific activities and creating programmes and processes rather than institutions. From the Realist viewpoint, Point B, which is similar to the agreement ultimately accepted by the US, is still outside the zone of agreement.

Figure 3.2: Possible Bargaining Set

Soviet Union / Russia

In 1987, in the northern port city of Murmansk, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev spoke of extending to the Arctic the on-going warming of East-West relations in Europe, proposing circumpolar cooperation in several fields.⁸⁰ This speech was a reflection of the Soviet Union's perception of its interests in the Arctic during the AEPS process. It survived the transition from the Soviet Union to Russia; for example, its proposals were repeated and advocated by a Russian diplomat at a 1992 conference on the Arctic.⁸¹

⁸⁰ Soviet Union, 1987, Mikhail Gorbachev: *The Speech in Murmansk at the ceremonial meeting on the occasion of the presentation of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star Medal to the city of Murmansk, October 1, 1987*, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, p. 31.

⁸¹ Malayan, Edward, Counselor for Russian-American Relations, Embassy of the Russian Federation, 1992, "Keynote Address: The Changing Arctic: A Russian Perspective," in *Proceedings: New Perspectives on the Arctic. The Changing Role of the United States in the Circumpolar North*, p. 128.

Security Interests

The strategic importance of the region⁸² was behind long-standing Soviet resistance to international cooperation in the Arctic, especially multilateral. At the end of the 1980s, however, the Gorbachev regime in the Soviet Union was "gradually realising the high costs for the USSR that would accompany the sharpening of superpower military competition in the Arctic."⁸³ The Soviet leadership was in fact realising the high costs of military competition everywhere, and started a Soviet pull-back from Afghanistan to Berlin that constituted the end of the Cold War. The Soviet Union also reduced its military presence and activities in the Arctic.⁸⁴

This change in the Soviet Union's perception of its security interests in the Arctic removed the most important block to circumpolar cooperation. In 1989, when the Finnish Initiative emerged, the Soviet Union took it as an opportunity to move toward the circumpolar cooperation advanced by the Murmansk speech.⁸⁵ At the adoption of the AEPS in 1991, the Soviet Union also publicly endorsed the Canadian proposal for an Arctic Council.⁸⁶

If the lower-rank American presence at Rovaniemi in 1989 reflected a lack of enthusiasm for circumpolar cooperation, the Russian delegation to the 1991 ministerial meeting in Rovaniemi showed that the AEPS was accorded a high priority in Moscow. The 20-person delegation included a large number of senior officials, who in the words of a Canadian participant, "'out-ranked' the rest of us on nearly every subject."⁸⁷ During the

⁸² Osherenko, Gail and Oran R. Young, 1989, *The Age of the Arctic*, pp. 18-27.

⁸³ Scrivener, David, 1989, *Gorbachev's Murmansk Speech: The Soviet Initiative and Western Response*, p. 15.

⁸⁴ Garmza, David, Professional Staff Member, US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 1992, "Panel V - Evolving Issues of National Security in the Arctic," in *Proceedings: New Perspectives on the Arctic, The Changing Role of the United States in the Circumpolar North*, p. 117.

⁸⁵ Soviet Union, 1990, *Statement from the Soviet Delegation* [to the Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting], Yellowknife, April, pp. 2, 3.

⁸⁶ Canada, Department of the Environment, 1991, *Memorandum from E.F. Roots, Science Advisor Emeritus, to Dr. Len Good, Deputy Minister: Ministerial Meeting on Protection of the Arctic Environment - Rovaniemi, Finland*, Ottawa, June 25, p. 6.

⁸⁷ Canada, Department of the Environment, 1991, *Memorandum from E.F. Roots, Science Advisor Emeritus, to Dr. Len Good, Deputy Minister: Ministerial Meeting on Protection of the Arctic Environment - Rovaniemi, Finland*, Ottawa, June 25, p. 3.

negotiations, the Soviet Union generally favoured a substantive agreement, for example hoping that the ministerial meeting produced "a very formal U.N.-type declaration [...]"⁸⁸

By the time of the Nuuk Declaration in 1993, Gorbachev's revolution had borne its fruit and the very least of Russian worries were its security interests in the North. Nevertheless, Russian security concerns had an effect on the AEPS negotiations when the agenda turned to radioactive contamination. For one thing, because of its fleet of nuclear-powered submarines and ships, the Soviet Union was "very sensitive" to references in the AEPS to nuclear contamination from ships and submarines.⁸⁹

Another sensitive issue was nuclear weapons testing. From 1955 to 1963, 87 atmospheric and underwater nuclear weapons tests were carried out on the Arctic island of Novaya Zemlya. After the 1963 ban on atmospheric tests, 42 tests were done underground.⁹⁰ At Rovaniemi in 1991, in response to a media question about nuclear weapons testing, the Soviet Deputy Prime Minister stated that his government "had no plans for 'extensive' future tests at Novaya Zemlya." He said that although the Soviet Union had declared in 1990 a moratorium on such tests and had offered to ban future tests if other countries would do the same, the US continued to improve its weapons technology, leaving the Soviet Union with no option but to continue testing.⁹¹ Unwilling to bind its hands, the Soviet Union opposed references in the AEPS to nuclear weapons testing.⁹² In 1991 and 1992, it was revealed that the Soviet Union was dumping nuclear reactors and thousands of barrels of radioactive waste off the coast of Novaya

⁸⁸ Canada, 1991, *CANDEL Report: Protecting the Arctic Environment, Helsinki Heads of Delegation Meeting, May 6-8, 1991*, Helsinki, May, p. 4.

⁸⁹ Canada, 1991, *CANDEL Report: Protecting the Arctic Environment, Helsinki Heads of Delegation Meeting, May 6-8, 1991*, Helsinki, May, p. 3.

⁹⁰ *International Herald Tribune*, 1992, "Loneliness of the Russia Test Site Worker," October 20, p. 7.

⁹¹ Canada, Department of the Environment, 1991, *Memorandum from E.F. Roots, Science Advisor Emeritus, to Dr. Len Good, Deputy Minister: Ministerial Meeting on Protection of the Arctic Environment - Rovaniemi, Finland, Ottawa, June 25*, p. 9.

⁹² Canada, 1991, *CANDEL Report: Protecting the Arctic Environment, Helsinki Heads of Delegation Meeting, May 6-8, 1991*, Helsinki, May, p. 3.

Zemlya.⁹³ In the negotiations leading to the 1993 Nuuk conference, Russia was frank about this dumping, but said that assistance was needed to develop the capacity to deal with the waste in other ways.⁹⁴

Political Interests

Russia inherited the Soviet concern with maintaining sovereignty and control over its Arctic waters, including the Northeast Passage. Similar to Canada, it resisted "internationalising" the Arctic Ocean. Jurisdictional conflicts included the boundary between Norway and the Soviet Union in the Barents Sea and between the Norwegian Svalbard Islands and the Soviet Franz Joseph islands.⁹⁵ The Soviet Union's interest was to keep the rest of the world out of the argument, since it could count on dominating bilateral arrangements.⁹⁶

This kind of consideration led to the Soviet position on non-Arctic participation in circumpolar fora. In 1987, during the IASC discussions, the Soviet Union took the position that only states touching the Arctic Ocean should be included, which would leave out Finland, Sweden and Iceland.⁹⁷ Although this position changed in 1989, the Soviet Union resisted expanding the club any further. For example, Russia's position on non-Arctic participation in the Arctic Council was that the eight circumpolar countries should retain control over "what they see as essentially a regional process."⁹⁸ As the country with the largest territory, population, and economy in the Arctic, the Soviet Union could hope to exercise considerable influence in a forum limited to the states in that region.

⁹³ Handler, Joshua, Nuclear Free Seas Research Coordinator, Greenpeace, 1992, "Panel V - Evolving Issues of National Security in the Arctic," in *Proceedings: New Perspectives on the Arctic, The Changing Role of the United States in the Circumpolar North*, p. 112.

⁹⁴ LeClaire, Alison, Deputy Director, Environment Division, Department of External Affairs and International Trade (Canada), 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, October.

⁹⁵ Pharand, Donat, 1989, "Les problèmes de droit international dans l'Arctique," *Revue études internationales* 20 (1), mars, p. 138.

⁹⁶ Scrivener, David, 1989, *Gorbachev's Murmansk Speech: The Soviet Initiative and Western Response*, pp. 61-64.

⁹⁷ Canada, Department of the Environment, 1989, *Memorandum from E.F. Roots, Science Advisor, to R. Page, Chairman, Canadian Environment Advisory Council: Finland Initiative toward environmental protection in the Arctic*, Ottawa, January 13, p. 2.

⁹⁸ Canada, 1991, *Arctic Sovereignty* [in the briefing book for the Canadian delegation to the Ministerial Conference], Ottawa, June.

Economic Interests

The Russian North constitutes over 60 percent of the country's territory, accounting in 1990 for 10 percent of economic production, including 77 percent of oil production, 90 percent of gas production, and 40 percent of timber production.⁹⁹ Recoverable natural gas reserves in the Russian Arctic are immense, while hydrocarbon reserves under northern seas could be as large as Russia's current sources on the continent.¹⁰⁰ Mineral resources in Siberia and the Kola Peninsula are equally huge, attracting the development of industrial complexes much bigger and farther north than anything seen in the other Arctic states. For example, Norilsk, 300 kilometres north of the Arctic Circle, is a city of 240,000 people devoted to a huge mining and metallurgical combine which produced in 1990 two thirds of the Soviet Union's nickel, as well as large quantities of copper and other metals.¹⁰¹ Other significant economic activities include shipping and hydroelectric and nuclear power production.¹⁰²

During the AEPS negotiations, the Soviet Union was careful not to compromise its ability to exploit the resources of its North. In answer to a question about the smelters in Norilsk and the Kola Peninsula at a press conference in Rovaniemi in 1991, the Soviet representative made clear that his country's ability to protect the environment "was dependent on maintaining a productive industry, for the USSR needed the products of those smelters."¹⁰³ A specific example of the Soviet Union's unwillingness to contemplate concrete controls involved persistent organic contaminants. The Soviets wished to focus

⁹⁹ Malayan, Edward, Counselor for Russian-American Relations, Embassy of the Russian Federation, 1992. "Keynote Address: The Changing Arctic: A Russian Perspective," in *Proceedings: New Perspectives on the Arctic, The Changing Role of the United States in the Circumpolar North*, p. 128.

¹⁰⁰ Osherenko, Gail and Oran R. Young, 1989, *The Age of the Arctic*, pp. 47-48.

¹⁰¹ Saunders, Alan, 1990, "Poisoning the Arctic skies," *Arctic Circle* (1) 2, September/October, pp. 23-31.

¹⁰² Brigham, Lawson, Captain, Chief, Strategic Planning Staff, US Coast Guard Headquarters, 1992, "Information Session: Access to the North," in *Proceedings: New Perspectives on the Arctic, The Changing Role of the United States in the Circumpolar North*, pp. 57-61. Finland, 1990, *Radioactivity in the Arctic Region: A Status Report* [submitted to the Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting], Yellowknife, April. Osherenko, Gail and Oran R. Young, 1989, *The Age of the Arctic*, p. 48.

¹⁰³ Canada, Department of the Environment, 1991, *Memorandum from E.F. Roots, Science Advisor Emeritus, to Dr. Len Good, Deputy Minister: Ministerial Meeting on Protection of the Arctic Environment - Rovaniemi, Finland*, Ottawa, June 25, p. 9.

actions on "future" activities or development, precluding the need to address existing problems.¹⁰⁴

However, economic considerations also provided a strong incentive for the Soviets to participate in circumpolar discussions. Just as it connected environmental cooperation with security cooperation, Gorbachev's 1987 Murmansk speech made a link with economic cooperation, calling for the participation of Western companies in the development of natural resources in the Kola Peninsula and the Arctic continental shelf.¹⁰⁵ This fit with the context of Gorbachev's wider programme of economic restructuring, which aimed at bringing the Soviet Union into the world market economy.¹⁰⁶

According to a Russian diplomat in 1992, Russia needed to address environmental problems in its North, but "as you can understand, all of this means a lot of money and investment, which is now, unfortunately, in a very big shortage in my country."¹⁰⁷ This was not only a call for Western aid, but an excuse for not committing to concrete measures. For example, in the negotiations leading to the Nuuk meeting, Russia was very open to the proposals of others but did not take a lead on anything, and admitted not possessing the resources to commit to concrete action.¹⁰⁸ Russia hoped to obtain assistance through the AEPS, proposing, for example, technology transfer measures during the lead-up to the 1993 Nuuk ministerial conference.¹⁰⁹ Similarly, during the Helsinki preparatory meeting

¹⁰⁴ Canada, 1991, *CANDEL Report: Protecting the Arctic Environment, Helsinki Heads of Delegation Meeting, May 6-8, 1991*, Helsinki, May, p. 3.

¹⁰⁵ Soviet Union, 1987, *Mikhail Gorbachev: The Speech in Murmansk at the ceremonial meeting on the occasion of the presentation of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star Medal to the city of Murmansk, October 1, 1987*, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, p. 30.

¹⁰⁶ Scrivener, David, 1989, *Gorbachev's Murmansk Speech: The Soviet Initiative and Western Response*, pp. 20-22, 42-44.

¹⁰⁷ Malayan, Edward, Counselor for Russian-American Relations, Embassy of the Russian Federation, 1992, "Keynote Address: The Changing Arctic: A Russian Perspective," in *Proceedings: New Perspectives on the Arctic, The Changing Role of the United States in the Circumpolar North*, p. 129.

¹⁰⁸ LeClaire, Alison, Deputy Director, Environment Division, Department of External Affairs and International Trade (Canada), 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, October.

¹⁰⁹ Arnaudo, Raymond, Chief, Division of Polar Affairs, United States Department of State, 1993, *Interview*, Washington, October.

in 1991, the Soviet Union was "concerned with ensuring provisions for assistance and cooperation on all actions,"¹¹⁰ meaning financial and technical assistance.

Russia's lack of leadership during the AEPS negotiations can also be attributed to the political and economic turmoil it was experiencing. Russian participation in negotiations was often poorly organised and lacked expert personnel.¹¹¹ For example, the Soviet Union did little work on the item, monitoring, for which it took the lead with Norway at Rovaniemi in 1989.¹¹² Similarly, Russia was not able to attend a 1991 meeting of the AMAP Task Force in Norway. "The reason was apparently nothing more than the general state of disorganization which exists in Moscow at this time, together with a complete lack of hard currency [...]."¹¹³

Gorbachev's reforms, driven by the Soviet Union's deteriorating economy, opened the window for circumpolar cooperation. The Finnish Initiative was only possible after the Soviet Union redefined its security interests in terms of cooperation and confidence-building rather than military confrontation and suspicion. Once this redefinition occurred, the Soviet perception of the negotiation framework, as interpreted from a Realist perspective, was quite straightforward. Almost any kind of circumpolar cooperation was within the zone of agreement. The limits of the zone were set by the issues of radioactive contamination, non-Arctic participation, and to a lesser extent, whether assistance would be forthcoming to allow Russia to meet its commitments.

¹¹⁰ Canada, 1991, *CANDEL Report: Protecting the Arctic Environment, Helsinki Heads of Delegation Meeting, May 6-8, 1991*, Helsinki, May, p. 4.

¹¹¹ Bangay, Garth, Director, Environment and Renewable Resources Directorate, Department of Indian and Northern Affairs (Canada), 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, November.

¹¹² Canada, Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, 1991, *Letter from G.E. Bangay, Director, Environment and Renewable Resources Directorate, to Distribution: Preparation for the first meeting of the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP) Task Force*, Ottawa, November 18, p. 1.

¹¹³ Canada, Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, 1991, *Letter from David Stone, Chief, Environmental Services and Research, to Garth Bangay, Director, Environment and Renewable Resources Directorate, Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, and others: Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme. Preliminary report of the first Task Force Meeting, Tromsø, December 2-6, 1991*, Ottawa, December 16.

Conclusion

A Realist evaluation shows that a circumpolar agreement was largely consistent with the security, political, and economic interests of the Nordic countries, Canada, and the Soviet Union, but not with those of the US. The Realist analysis is therefore insufficient to explain American participation in the AEPS. Nor does a description of the Realist interests of those favourable to an agreement explain the focus and content of the agreement. Other factors must be considered. The analysis must move beyond Realism to consider other ways in which interests may have been defined.

Analysed from a Realist perspective, the Arctic states' definition of their interests was based on security, political and economic factors. In 1989, when the Finns proposed circumpolar discussions, the bargaining set perceived by the circumpolar countries, except probably the US, formed a zone of agreement wide enough to accommodate a range of possible agreements. The states' Realist interests imposed certain limits to the zone of agreement, making unlikely any agreement involving, for example, action on threats of radioactive contamination, substantive participation of non-Arctic countries, regional control of specific pollution sources, or regional regulation of marine mammal harvesting. Within these limits, states went beyond Realism, and allowed perceptions of the Arctic's natural environment, drawing on different environmental paradigms, to define their interests and shape the content of possible agreements.

The Last Frontier

The paradigm termed "frontier economics," which has been characterised by critics as the dominant worldview, is a way of perceiving nature solely as a resource to be exploited for the benefit of humans. Since the first expeditions there by non-indigenous people, the Arctic has been viewed as a frontier to be challenged, explored, and conquered. For example, "For decades, Soviet economic policy and practice in the use of Arctic resources and spaces were dominated by the attitude that the more the country takes from the Arctic, the better."¹ This perception - in which the Arctic is a stage for military manoeuvres, an area on a map to be claimed and possessed, a source of natural riches to be taken - fits well with the Realist definition of interests.

As is the case elsewhere in the world, however, eyes have been opened to the environmental damage caused by the unrestrained military and economic activity. Air and

¹ Vartanov, Raphael V. and Alexei Yu. Roginko, 1990, "New Dimensions of Soviet Arctic Policy: Views from the Soviet Union," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 512, November, p. 73.

marine pollution problems, involving acidification, chemical and heavy metal contamination, oil, sewage, radioactivity, and noise, have become evident. Conservation of Arctic wildlife and plants has also become a concern.

Air pollution is a significant problem, especially in the Russian North, where for example, in the words of local environmental activists, the "factories of death" of Norilsk have killed millions of hectares of northern forests. In the late 1980s, the complex produced an estimated annual emission of 2.5 million tonnes of sulphur, which was equivalent to the amount produced by all Canadian industries combined.² Sulphur and nitrogen emissions cause acidification of soils and waters, which causes damage to aquatic life and to plants, especially trees, and accelerates natural releases of toxic heavy metals from soils. In the North American Arctic, although a significant amount of Arctic air pollution comes across the pole from industry in the Russian North, sources from much farther away also contribute.³

Toxic substances, particularly organic contaminants (dioxins, furans, PCBs) and heavy metals (mercury, lead, cadmium, nickel) have been found in significant amounts in the Arctic, poisoning animals and the humans who hunt them. For example, some studies found levels of cadmium in narwhal kidney that were among the highest ever reported in marine mammals.⁴

Marine pollution can include such toxic substances, as well as oil, sewage, and garbage. Water can also carry radioactive contamination. Most serious is the dumping of radioactive wastes at sea, and accidents and sinkings of nuclear-powered vessels. Radioactivity from atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons in the 1960s and early 1970s is still present in lichens and mosses eaten by caribou and reindeer, while adult Inuit from

² Saunders, Alan, 1990, "Poisoning the Arctic skies," *Arctic Circle* (1) 2, September/October, pp. 23-31.

³ Canadian Institute of International Affairs, National Capital Branch, 1991, *The Arctic Environment and Canada's International Relations*, pp. 14-15, 18. Hoff, R.M. and L.A. Barrie, 1986, "Air Chemistry Observations in the Canadian Arctic," in W.A. Bridgeo and H.R. Eisenhauer (eds.), *Arctic Water Pollution Research: Applications of Science and Technology*, p. 105.

⁴ Ministerial Conference on the Protection of the Arctic Environment, 1991, "Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy," *International Legal Materials* 30, sections 3.1, 3.3.

affected regions have higher levels of radioactivity than the North American average. The 130,000 people on the Chukotka peninsula have one of the highest cancer rates in the world and an average life expectancy of 45 years.⁵ The Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident provided another source of radioactive contamination in 1986, severely affecting the Scandinavian reindeer herding economy.⁶

Noise is another type of pollution that is an issue in the Arctic, affecting marine and terrestrial wildlife.⁷ Like the pollution from which they suffer, Arctic wildlife ignores national boundaries. Migrating species include bowhead and beluga whales, bearded seals, walrus, fish, polar bears and caribou. A good example of an important and vulnerable habitat is the North Water, a large open stretch of water between Greenland and Ellesmere Island which provides seasonal refuge to walrus, seals, and polar bears.⁸

Global environmental problems are also felt in the Arctic. As part of global climate change, warming in the Arctic will be two to four times as much as the global average.⁹ Similarly, thinning of the stratospheric ozone layer over the Arctic will have severe effects in northern latitudes. Depletion is greatest over the poles because ice clouds form in the ozone layer, providing nuclei that facilitate the chemical reactions that destroy ozone.¹⁰

Pollution Control and Environmental Security

The dying forests of Scandinavia, the poisoned rivers and lakes of Siberia, and the contaminated milk of Inuit mothers in Canada and Greenland, demanded a response. To provide one, governments redefined their interests to include environmental protection. The results were domestic policies and regulations as well as international cooperative

⁵ Caron, David D., 1990, "Arctic," *Yearbook of International Environmental Law* 1, p. 183.

⁶ Osherenko, Gail and Oran R. Young, 1989, *The Age of the Arctic*, pp. 126-128.

⁷ Ministerial Conference on the Protection of the Arctic Environment, 1991, "Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy," *International Legal Materials* 30, section 3.4.

⁸ VanderZwaag, David, 1989, "Canada and Marine Environmental Protection: The Changing Tides of Law and Policy," in Donald McRae and Gordon Munro (eds.), *Canadian Oceans Policy: National Strategies and the New Law of the Sea*, pp. 122-123.

⁹ Canadian Institute of International Affairs, National Capital Branch, 1991, *The Arctic Environment and Canada's International Relations*, pp. 27-29.

¹⁰ Canadian Institute of International Affairs, National Capital Branch, 1991, *The Arctic Environment and Canada's International Relations*, p. 20.

arrangements. It was to the pollution control paradigm that the Arctic states turned when environmental damage revealed the inadequacy of strictly Realist or "frontier economics" perceptions of their interests. The focus of environmental policies in the Arctic was usually limited to problems that had direct impacts on economic interests or human health, and solutions were usually limited in scope, considering issues in isolation and curing rather than preventing. For the most part, the response was to clean up the messes made and then to reduce pollutant emissions "at the end of the pipe."

Domestic policies included a range of land and water-use regulations, wildlife management, and pollution controls, that have been promulgated in the last two decades in the North American and Nordic Arctic regions. The priority was to address problems which had direct impacts on human well-being. For example, an Icelandic official made the link between self-interest and environmental protection: "For Iceland, a country which is totally dependent upon sustainable utilization of its resources of the sea, the protection of the marine environment is of paramount importance."¹¹

The circumpolar states also instituted international arrangements to address the transboundary nature of many environmental problems. In the 1970s and 1980s, a multitude of global agreements were completed which had relevance to the Arctic. The circumpolar states also created arrangements focused on the Arctic, but these, with one exception, were limited to bilateral agreements.¹² Consistent with the pollution control worldview, most agreements focused on a discrete problem, such as conservation of an animal species, oil spill response, or nuclear accident response, failing to take a wider look at the processes giving rise to them.

While the circumpolar states' redefinition of interests occurred for the most part from the perspective of the pollution control paradigm, the Soviet Union put on an interesting

¹¹ Iceland, 1991, *Statement by Mr. Einar Gudnason, Minister for the Environment, Iceland [to the Ministerial Conference]*, Rovaniemi, June 13.

¹² Consultative Meeting on the Protection of the Arctic Environment, 1989, *List of Major International Instruments and Policy Declarations Pertaining to the Arctic Environment*, Rovaniemi, September 22

twist, expanding the notion of security to include environmental security. The Soviet Union realised its interest in environmental protection relatively late. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms in the late 1980s allowed revelations of serious environmental damage everywhere in the country, including the North, and led to various environmental protection measures.¹³ However, according to the Soviet representative at Rovaniemi in 1991, the Soviet Union's Arctic environmental plans were not being effectively implemented.¹⁴

A Soviet statement during the AEPS negotiations emphasised that "[p]rotection of the environment, ensuring international environmental security have emerged as matters of national priorities for the Soviet Union, as one of the main directions of foreign policy of our State."¹⁵ This echoed the 1987 Murmansk speech and fit with a theme that had been increasingly evident in Soviet public discourse, that of "international ecological security."¹⁶ Not only did environmental protection come to be seen as beneficial in its own right, but international cooperation on the subject was perceived to advance the country's security interests.

Environmental Interests

This redefinition of interests, whether through the prism of the pollution control paradigm or through that of the notion of environmental security, was reflected in the circumpolar states' input into the AEPS process. Most importantly, of course, the redefinition filled the window of opportunity for circumpolar cooperation with the subject matter of environmental protection. In 1989, Finnish background papers helped shape the

¹³ Scrivener, David, 1989, *Gorbachev's Murmansk Speech: The Soviet Initiative and Western Response*, pp. 23-24. Soviet Union, 1990, *Statement from the Soviet Delegation* [to the Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting], Yellowknife, April, pp. 1, 7-8.

¹⁴ Canada, Department of the Environment, 1991, *Memorandum from E.F. Roots, Science Advisor Emeritus, to Dr. Len Good, Deputy Minister: Ministerial Meeting on Protection of the Arctic Environment - Rovaniemi, Finland*, Ottawa, June 25, pp. 6, 8.

¹⁵ Soviet Union, 1990, *Statement from the Soviet Delegation* [to the Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting], Yellowknife, April, pp. 3-4.

¹⁶ Scrivener, David, 1989, *Gorbachev's Murmansk Speech: The Soviet Initiative and Western Response*, pp. 16, 44-45.

agenda for the first Rovaniemi meeting, by asserting that the Arctic was increasingly at risk from environmental degradation, and that urgent measures were necessary.¹⁷

Acidification

The Nordic states were concerned with the damage caused to their forests and lakes by transboundary air pollution. For example, the Finnish representative at the adoption of the AEPS in 1991 expressed the desire to see concrete action on the problem, saying the polar states should "jointly commit ourselves to such levels of emissions that will protect the Arctic against acidification and heavy metal depositions."¹⁸ The North American states were much less affected by acidifying air pollution, so it was not a significant priority for them during the negotiations. A Canadian briefing document for example, said that acidification was not a concern to Canada, since acid levels in Arctic precipitation were 10 to 20 times lower than in many areas of eastern Canada.¹⁹

Radioactive Contamination

Because of their vulnerability to it, also because of their proximity to Russia, radioactive contamination was another priority for Finland, Norway, and Sweden. At Rovaniemi in 1989, Finland took the lead on preparing a report on the problem. It recommended action on emergency preparedness and response, listing possible threats from nuclear-powered vessels, nuclear-powered satellites, nuclear waste, weapons transport and testing, and nuclear power and fuel reprocessing plants.²⁰ Norway and Sweden were less circumspect about their position on the issue. At the 1991 Rovaniemi conference, Norway's Minister of the Environment stated, "We have repeatedly brought to the attention of the Soviet authorities our concern about the plans to transfer all Soviet

¹⁷ Finland, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1989, *Working Paper*, Helsinki, January 1, pp. 1-4. Finland, Ministry of the Environment, 1989, *International Conference on Environmental Protection in the Arctic, Preparatory Meeting, Rovaniemi, Finland, 1989, Background Information*, Helsinki, July 12, pp. 1-17.

¹⁸ Finland, 1991, *Statement by Ms. Sirpa Pietikäinen, Minister of the Environment, Finland* [to the Ministerial Conference on Protection of the Arctic Environment], Rovaniemi, June 13, p. 2.

¹⁹ Canada, 1990, *State of Environment Reports* [in the briefing book for the Canadian delegation to the Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting], Ottawa.

²⁰ Finland, 1990, *Radioactivity in the Arctic Region: A Status Report* [submitted to the Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting], Yellowknife, April.

nuclear tests to the Arctic island of Novaya Zemlya. We strongly requested that these plans not be implemented [...].”²¹ In discussions before the Nuuk ministerial meeting, Sweden wanted to include a commitment to end dumping of radioactive waste in the Arctic Ocean.²² The Soviet Union and the US resisted substantive measures on radioactive contamination. Nor was it a priority for Canada, where studies showed low levels of radioactivity in caribou and other animals.²³

Persistent Organic Contaminants and Heavy Metals

Due to their human health effects, Canada was far more concerned about toxic contaminants - organic chemicals and heavy metals - making them its top priorities for the negotiations. Its delegation was told that “Canada should be looking to advance this issue as much as possible through a circumpolar agreement to conduct joint research, identify sources and control emissions.”²⁴ The Nordic states were also forceful on the issue. At the 1991 Rovaniemi conference, Sweden, for example, expressed disappointment that the AEPS did not contain a ban on the use and production of persistent organic contaminants, saying that enough scientific knowledge exists so that “there should be no reason for inaction. Such substances should be banned.”²⁵ The US and the Soviet Union resisted substantive controls of toxic contaminants in the AEPS.²⁶

Marine Pollution

Because of the threat to their fisheries, the Nordic states were worried about marine pollution. According to the Norwegian minister at the 1991 conference, “[b]eing one of the

²¹ Norway, 1991, *Statement by Mr. Jens Stoltenberg, Deputy Minister of Environment* [to the Ministerial Conference], Rovaniemi, June 13, pp. 2-3.

²² L. Claire, Alison, Deputy Director, Environment Division, Department of External Affairs and International Trade (Canada), 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, October.

²³ Canada, 1990, *State of Environment Reports* [in the briefing book for the Canadian delegation to the Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting], Ottawa.

²⁴ Canada, 1990, *State of Environment Reports* [in the briefing book for the Canadian delegation to the Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting], Ottawa.

²⁵ Sweden, 1991, *Statement by Birgitta Dahl, Minister of the Environment of Sweden* [to the Ministerial Conference], Rovaniemi, June 13, p. 6.

²⁶ Canada, 1991, *CANDEL Report: Protecting the Arctic Environment, Helsinki Heads of Delegation Meeting, May 6-8, 1991*, Helsinki, May, p. 3.

countries with a long coast line, Norway attaches great importance to the marine pollution strategy.”²⁷ Sweden produced in 1990 a proposal on protection of the marine environment which contained some strong measures, including the prohibition of all dumping of wastes at sea, and of intentional pollution discharges from ships and offshore installations. It also recommended designating the Arctic as a special area under the IMO MARPOL Convention.²⁸ In the negotiations before the 1993 ministerial conference, the Nordic countries, especially Norway, wanted the circumpolar states to jointly advocate this special designation.²⁹

The Nordic states were also keen on emergency preparedness and response. Greenland was particularly anxious to strengthen cooperation in the area, since any serious accident, an oil spill for example, could have devastating effects on the subsistence and lifestyle of its citizens. In 1990, Sweden made a proposal on emergency response calling for the establishment of “agreed-upon safety standards and regulations.”³⁰

On one side, the US resisted any hint of regional regulation of marine pollution, while on the other, Canada was unhappy with internationalising the problem. Before the Nuuk conference, Canada worked to have Norway withdraw its proposal for dealing with Arctic marine pollution through the IMO. It also wanted to emphasize land-based sources of marine pollution,³¹ which is the main medium for contamination by persistent organics and heavy metals.³²

²⁷ Norway, 1991, *Statement by Mr. Jens Stoltenberg, Deputy Minister of Environment* [to the Ministerial Conference], Rovaniemi, June 13, pp. 4.

²⁸ Sweden, 1990, *Measures to Protect the Marine Environment in the Arctic* [submitted to the Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting], Yellowknife, April, pp. 2-3.

²⁹ Marr, Ian McG., Manager, Arctic Marine Systems, Coast Guard Northern, Canadian Coast Guard, 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, October.

³⁰ Sweden, 1990, *Framework for co-operation: possible measures concerning emergency prevention, preparedness and response in the Arctic* [submitted to the Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting], Yellowknife, April.

³¹ LeClaire, Alison, Deputy Director, Environment Division, Department of External Affairs and International Trade (Canada), 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, October.

³² Finland, 1991, *Statement by Ms. Sirpa Pietikäinen, Minister of the Environment, Finland* [to the Ministerial Conference on Protection of the Arctic Environment], Rovaniemi, June 13, p. 5.

Flora and Fauna Conservation

Canada sought an agreement on Arctic flora and fauna which would encourage information exchange, scientific collaboration, common management criteria, and protection of endangered species.³³ A draft "Memorandum of Understanding" was submitted to the 1990 Yellowknife preparatory meeting. Article 1 stated, "The Parties will cooperate to coordinate research on the conservation of the flora and fauna of Arctic ecosystems," and Article 6 stated that they "will seek to develop more effective laws and regulations [...]."³⁴

As discussed in the previous chapter, Norway and Greenland were cold to the Canadian proposal, especially as it related to marine mammals. The Soviet Union, Sweden, Iceland, and Finland, were all supportive,³⁵ while the US, especially the US Fish and Wildlife Service, was particularly receptive.³⁶ At the 1991 Helsinki negotiating session, the US joined Canada in working to overcome Norwegian opposition to the flora and fauna programme.³⁷

Noise

Another wildlife-related issue was noise pollution, the report on which Denmark/Greenland took the lead at the first meeting. Greenland's interest, because of the importance of marine living resource harvesting to its residents, was focused on the effects of sound on marine mammals.³⁸ Noise pollution was "a relatively minor issue" for Canada,³⁹ and the same for the other participants.

³³ Canada, 1990, *Briefing Note: Agreement on the protection and conservation of Arctic/Northern Wildlife Species* [in the briefing book for the Canadian delegation to the Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting], Ottawa.

³⁴ Canada, 1990, *Memorandum of Understanding on the Conservation of Flora and Fauna* [submitted to the Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting].

³⁵ Canada, Department of the Environment, 1991, *Briefing Note on the Proposed Memorandum of Understanding for the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna*, Ottawa, March 1.

³⁶ United States, Department of State, 1990, *Letter from Raymond Arnaudo, Chief, Division of Polar Affairs, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Department of State, to Adrian de Hoog, Director, Energy and Environmental Division, Department of External Affairs (Canada)*, Washington, November 27.

³⁷ Canada, 1991, *CANDEL Report: Protecting the Arctic Environment, Helsinki Heads of Delegation Meeting, May 6-8, 1991*, Helsinki, May, p. 4.

³⁸ Canada, Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, 1990, *Letter from Garth Bangay, A/Director General, Natural Resources and Economic Development, to Alan Beesley, Special Advisor to the Secretary of State for*

Global Climate Change and Ozone Depletion

Despite the public profile of global climate change and ozone depletion, the circumpolar states agreed early that those problems should be left to global programmes. They saw the contribution of the AEPS in terms of scientific research; Norway's monitoring proposal, for example, made climatic observations a priority.⁴⁰

Concrete Commitments

Where the circumpolar states stood on the various pollution problems was an indication of how and how far they had defined their interests in terms of environmental protection. Their hopes for the AEPS in general and the concreteness of the results they wished to see were also evidence of the extent of this redefinition.

The Nordic states generally wanted the process to produce the most concrete results possible, hoping for binding commitments. Greenland's statement at the 1991 adoption of the AEPS said that "[i]n some areas some of us would have liked to have seen even stronger action agreed upon."⁴¹ A 1989 Finnish working paper envisioned "a declaration, convention or other multilateral agreement."⁴² Norway was unhappy with hortatory language, asserting, for example, that the circumpolar states should "ensure that our Ministerial declaration will become something more than a mere political paper [...]."⁴³ The Nordic states were also willing to talk about money. Finland put funding and technical assistance on the agenda, tabling a proposal on the subject at the January 1991 negotiation

External Affairs in Environmental Affairs, Department of External Affairs and International Trade: Finnish Initiative - Consultation mechanism for "state of the arctic environment" reports, Ottawa, January 23

39 Canada, 1990, *State of Environment Reports* [in the briefing book for the Canadian delegation to the Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting], Ottawa.

40 Norway, 1990, *Arctic Monitoring: A draft discussion paper* [submitted to the Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting], Oslo, April

41 Denmark, 1991, *Speech by the Greenland Home Rule Minister for Health and Environment, Mr. Ole Rovsing Olsen, Rovaniemi, June, p. 3*

42 Finland, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1989, *Working Paper*, Helsinki, January 1, p. 3

43 Norway, 1991, *Statement by Mr. Jens Stoltenberg, Deputy Minister of Environment* [to the Ministerial Conference], Rovaniemi, June 13, p. 5

session in Kiruna, Sweden.⁴⁴ During the negotiations, Denmark pushed for the idea of a fund to which the circumpolar countries would contribute.⁴⁵

Canada also was eager to obtain a substantive result from the Finnish Initiative. A 1990 Canadian government draft paper on its objectives stated that success would involve "tangible circumpolar environmental cooperation," and that the "optimum result" would be "agreement on [an] Arctic environmental convention." It considered that to be unlikely, and advanced the goal of "a formalization of intergovernmental work on the Arctic environment," which could take the form of an "Arctic council of some kind," an intergovernmental "panel," or a plan of action.⁴⁶

Judging by its role in the negotiations, the US had not redefined its interests in the direction of circumpolar environmental cooperation to the same extent as the Nordic states and Canada. American reluctance to commit to substantive measures, on radioactive contamination or persistent organics for example, was discussed in the previous chapter. According to a Canadian official, "the 'policy disinterest' of the USA, evident at the beginning, was consistent at the senior level, and was in conspicuous contrast to the high policy profile given by the Nordic countries, the Soviet Union and Canada."⁴⁷ The only exception to this lack of enthusiasm was American support for the flora and fauna proposal.

Stated Soviet goals for the outcome of the negotiation process focused on improved coordination on scientific research and monitoring, citing the need for improved information as the basis of future actions. Because of the need for a substantial amount of such preparatory work, the Soviet Union aimed for "the possibility of having at an initial

⁴⁴ Canada, 1991, *CANDEL Report: Protecting the Arctic Environment, Helsinki Heads of Delegation Meeting, May 6-8, 1991*, Helsinki, May, p. 4.

⁴⁵ Bangay, Garth, Director, Environment and Renewable Resources Directorate, Department of Indian and Northern Affairs (Canada), 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, November.

⁴⁶ Canada, 1990, *Canadian Objectives for the Yellowknife Meeting on the Protection of the Arctic Environment* [draft], Ottawa, February 1.

⁴⁷ Canada, Department of the Environment, 1991, *Memorandum from E.F. Roots, Science Advisor Emeritus, to Dr. Len Good, Deputy Minister: Ministerial Meeting on Protection of the Arctic Environment - Rovaniemi, Finland*, Ottawa, June 25, p. 10.

stage a relatively simple instrument," which would serve as the basis for further cooperation on concrete measures in specific areas.⁴⁸ The Soviet Union was generally favourable to substantive cooperation, but never actively proposed anything except for making clear its need for financial and technical assistance.

Sustainable Development

The priorities and positions of the circumpolar states on the different environmental issues raised during the AEPS negotiations indicated how they had defined their interests taking in account environmental issues. They also showed, like their domestic and bilateral actions on the circumpolar environment, that this was largely done from a pollution control perspective.

A 1989 Finnish background paper stated, "With the passing of time, conflicts have arisen between the exploitation of natural resources and the protection of the Arctic areas. The problem seems to have a permanent character."⁴⁹ This characterisation of environmental protection and economic development as inevitably incompatible is typical of the pollution control paradigm. Also typical is the focus on specific pollutants, in isolation from the economic processes that produce them. For example, many of the pollution problems treated separately by the circumpolar states, such as acidification, heavy metals, and persistent organic contaminants, are byproducts of related industries, metal processing in the Russian North, for example.

There was little mention of the possibility of taking a holistic look at the economic and social systems that led to the environmental problems in question. The more holistic approach is, of course, the alternative and successor to the pollution control worldview. The "sustainable development" paradigm integrates economics and environment, in an attempt to address root causes of problems rather than just symptoms. The term was

⁴⁸ Soviet Union, 1990, *Statement from the Soviet Delegation* [to the Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting], Yellowknife, April, pp. 14-20.

⁴⁹ Finland, Ministry of the Environment, 1989, *International Conference on Environmental Protection in the Arctic, Preparatory Meeting, Rovaniemi, Finland, 1989, Background Information*, Helsinki, July 12, p. 8.

defined by the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) in 1987 as "development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs."⁵⁰ The 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro, whose preparatory work was contemporary to the AEPS negotiations, brought the idea to the mainstream.

How thinking changed during this period was well described by a Canadian working group of governments and indigenous groups: "The meaning of the term 'northern conservation' has broadened considerably over the last two decades from a narrow preoccupation with the designation and management of protected areas to a concern over integrated resource management to the explicit consideration of economic factors [...], as part of sustainable development strategies."⁵¹ Policy-makers in the circumpolar states were not immune to this evolution, and it was reflected in their input to the AEPS, illustrating how the redefinition of interests was influenced by the sustainable development paradigm. On a practical level, the influence of the larger context of international environmental diplomacy was that the bureaucrats negotiating the AEPS could be confident that they could insert language similar to that contained in other international agreements, such as those signed at UNCED, because it had already been approved in those contexts by their political masters.⁵²

As a title for the circumpolar agreement, Canada proposed the "Arctic Sustainable Development Strategy," putting it on the draft text it produced for the 1990 Yellowknife meeting. Canada also proposed a draft for the 1993 Nuuk Declaration which contained references to sustainable development. Canadian officials realised, at least on paper, that economic and social forces would have to be tackled in order to protect the environment. A

⁵⁰ World Commission on Environment and Development. 1987. *Our Common Future*. p. 43.

⁵¹ Working Group on Northern Conservation, 1990. *Towards a Circumpolar Arctic Sustainable Development Strategy: The Canadian Experience* [submitted to the Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting], Yellowknife, April.

⁵² Bangay, Garth, Director, Environment and Renewable Resources Directorate, Department of Indian and Northern Affairs (Canada), 1993. *Interview*. Ottawa, November.

briefing document for the Canadian delegation to the 1990 Yellowknife meeting stated that "[i]n the long term, if the integration of the environment and economy is to succeed," the government must be prepared to deal with oil and mineral development, hydroelectric projects, pulp mill operations, transportation, including shipping, and pressure on renewable resources due to pollution and a "young and expanding population."⁵³ One could not find a clearer statement of the practical implications of adopting the sustainable development approach. However, Canada focused its efforts during the negotiations on the level of principle, hoping that the practical details of implementing sustainable development would come later.

The Canadian proposal for an Arctic Sustainable Development Strategy ran into American opposition at the 1990 Yellowknife preparatory meeting. The US insisted on deleting most references to sustainable development in the text, changing its title to the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy. According to a working group on circumpolar cooperation, the difference between taking the words out and leaving them in "may be stated in terms of comprehensiveness and readiness to address problems in their industrial origins versus functional selectivity and an inclination to deal with the consequences rather more than the character of industrial activity."⁵⁴ This is a convoluted statement of the difference between the sustainable development paradigm and the pollution control perspective.

The US government was not immune, however, from the new international consciousness of the desirability of sustainable development. At the adoption of the AEPS in 1991, the US Ambassador, somewhat hypocritically but in acknowledgement of the power of the idea, stated, "Our challenge is to devise a course of sustainable development in which apparent conflicts are reconciled: showing that Arctic resources can be extracted

⁵³ Canada, 1990, *A Federal Arctic Environmental Strategy (FAES)* [in the briefing book for the Canadian delegation to the Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting], Ottawa.

⁵⁴ Griffiths, Franklyn and Oran R. Young, 1990, "Impressions of the Co-Chairs: Protecting the Arctic's Environment," in *Working Group on Arctic International Relations, Third Session, Moscow and Murmansk, USSR, 22-27 January 1990: Reports and Papers*, p. 17.

in a way that minimizes adverse impact on environment and culture, that growth and development can be compatible with environmental protection, and that indigenous lifeways can be preserved without foregoing the benefits of modern society.”⁵⁵

Such a statement was evidence of an evolution in thinking that was accentuated with the 1992 election of President Bill Clinton, whose administration embraced environmental concerns. The new administration set in motion a review of US Arctic policy, giving environmental concerns a high profile in the process. The change affected US positions in the AEPS context, making them more compatible with the sustainable development perspective.⁵⁶

The Soviet Union advocated, at least in principle, sustainable development as a framework for addressing the environmental problems created by the substantial industry in the Soviet North. As early as 1990, before the term became fashionable, the Soviet representative stated at the Yellowknife meeting that one of its goals for the Finnish Initiative was the development of a strategy for “sustained development.”⁵⁷

Conclusion

Going beyond Realism to consider subjective or Idealist definitions of state interests allows discussion of how environmental paradigms influenced the circumpolar states. This changes somewhat the picture of the bargaining set, making a circumpolar environmental agreement even more attractive to the Nordic states, Canada, and the Soviet Union, and slightly more appealing to the US. Different possible agreements were more or less attractive to the different states depending on their specific content. For example, a possible agreement containing concrete controls on specific organic contaminants was very interesting to Canada, but put off the US and the Soviet Union. Although this redefinition

⁵⁵ United States, 1991, *Remarks of John Giffen Weinmann, Ambassador of the United States of America* [to the Ministerial Conference], Rovaniemi, June 13.

⁵⁶ Amaudo, Raymond, Chief, Division of Polar Affairs, United States Department of State, 1993, *Interview*, Washington, October.

⁵⁷ Soviet Union, 1990, *Statement from the Soviet Delegation* [to the Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting], Yellowknife, April, pp. 5, 18.

of interests was done from the pollution control perspective, sustainable development ideas were evident, and became more important as the negotiations advanced. In particular, the US, which was actively hostile to the concept before the adoption of the AEPS in 1991, warmed up considerably after the election of a new President in 1992.

This description of how environmental problems in the Arctic intruded into the policy consideration of the circumpolar states shows that environmental paradigms helped define their interests. What is now needed is an explanation of exactly how this occurred, a description of who brought these messages to policy-makers.

Environmental degradation in the Arctic occurs, and the circumpolar states redefined their interests so that they saw it as a problem. They took both domestic and international action, including participation in the AEPS, and this was conditioned by the frameworks provided by different environmental worldviews. The elements of cause and effect have been described: environmental problems, accompanied by increased general awareness of the importance of the environment caused the circumpolar states to act through, in this case, negotiation of the AEPS. The links between the cause and the effect, however, are not so clear.

The simile of the two-level game is useful here. On the domestic level, interest groups transmitted messages that led governments to redefine their interests, changing their perceptions of the bargaining set on the international level. At the same time, such groups used their transnational links, and sometimes a place at the international game, to influence different governments in similar ways.

Public Opinion

In focusing on the environment as the subject of circumpolar cooperation, there can be little doubt that governments were responding to increased environmental awareness on the part of their voting publics. The late 1980s and early 1990s saw a groundswell of concern about the environment almost everywhere in the developed world. A 1990 Canadian briefing document for the AEPS negotiations noted that "public concern over environmental threats is at an all-time high."¹ Governments wanted to be seen to be responding. One of the objectives of the Canadian public relations plan for the 1991 Rovaniemi conference was to show Canadians that their government was taking action on

¹ Canada, 1990. *Yellowknife Meeting on Protection of the Arctic Environment: Communications Strategy* [in the briefing book for the Canadian delegation to the Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting]. Ottawa.

environmental problems.² This was true to a greater or lesser extent for all of the circumpolar governments, including the Soviet Union, where increasing openness and democracy both revealed and made important the public's interest in the environment. General public concern with the environment played a part in the 1992 election of US President Bill Clinton, which significantly altered American perceptions of national interest, supporting international environmental cooperation and advocating sustainable development. Insofar as public awareness of environmental problems increased in all of the circumpolar countries, the domestic games of each government were similarly affected. That is, for each involved state, acting on the environment on the international stage brought benefits at home.

Whether the public was concerned specifically with the Arctic environment was another matter, however. One way this can be measured is by the extent of media coverage of Arctic environmental issues. The Arctic environment was the subject of sporadic news reports, which multiplied when crises or unusual events occurred. For example, the 1987 rescue of whales caught in Bering Sea ice or the 1991 *Exxon Valdez* oil tanker spill in Alaska received extensive coverage. The AEPS negotiations themselves were also subject of some journalistic interest. The Yellowknife session was well-covered by the Canadian local and national media, and a number of journalists attended the 1991 Rovaniemi ministers' meeting.

Interviewing the chairman of the IASC, one journalist asked whether the region is being studied for its own sake or because the studies may have an effect on what people and industry do in the rest of the world.³ This was an example of how much of the media coverage of the Arctic environment linked it to global problems. According to a 1989 draft

² Canada, 1991, *Draft Communications Strategy: Minister's Trip to Rovaniemi, Finland, and Copenhagen, Denmark, June 11-18, 1991* [in the briefing book for the Canadian delegation to the Ministerial Conference], Ottawa, June 4, p. 3.

³ Canada, Department of the Environment, 1991, *Memorandum from E.F. Roots, Science Advisor Emeritus, to Dr. Len Good, Deputy Minister: Ministerial Meeting on Protection of the Arctic Environment - Rovaniemi, Finland*, Ottawa, June 25, pp. 9-10.

briefing note for a Canadian minister, "There appears to be a preponderance of political and public attention on air and climate related impacts on the Arctic environment."⁴

In any case, the media coverage of the AEPS was in no way extensive. For example, the 1991 Rovaniemi conference was, according to a participant, "not a highly public event," which he partly attributed to its remote location.⁵ Nor were there any American journalists present at the conference.⁶ It cannot be said that the Arctic states' agreement was due to public pressure expressed by the news media. If the public was more focused on global problems, and the news media, especially in the US, was not exceptionally interested in the Arctic, who brought Arctic environmental issues to the circumpolar states' attention so that they redefined their interests to make the AEPS possible?

Environmental Groups

An obvious candidate for helping the circumpolar states redefine their interests are non-governmental environmental advocacy and lobby groups. Such groups were active in every Arctic state, including the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's liberalisation during this period allowed the formation of groups like the Green Front in Norilsk, a group of intellectuals and scientists who challenged official pollution figures concerning the industry in that region. The Front's president stated in 1991 that his group's goal was to "make politicians more accountable and force them to see ecology as a priority."⁷

The Green Front was not present in the AEPS process, and neither were similar local groups in the other circumpolar states, like the Northern Alaska Environmental Center

⁴ Canada, Department of the Environment, 1989, *Draft Briefing Note: Finnish Proposal, Conference on the Protection of the Environment in the Arctic* [by C.A. Lewis, Senior Advisor-Northern Affairs], Ottawa, February 28, p. 1.

⁵ Canada, Department of the Environment, 1991, *Memorandum from E.F. Roots, Science Advisor Emeritus, to Dr. Len Good, Deputy Minister: Ministerial Meeting on Protection of the Arctic Environment - Rovaniemi, Finland*, Ottawa, June 25, Attachment 7, p. 1.

⁶ Canada, Department of the Environment, 1991, *Memorandum from E.F. Roots, Science Advisor Emeritus, to Dr. Len Good, Deputy Minister: Ministerial Meeting on Protection of the Arctic Environment - Rovaniemi, Finland*, Ottawa, June 25, p. 10.

⁷ cited by Saunders, Alan, 1990, "Poisoning the Arctic skies," *Arctic Circle* (1) 2, September/October, p. 28.

or the Yukon Conservation Society. Political action concerning the Arctic environment on the national and international scales tended to be dominated by groups based in capital cities in southern latitudes.⁸ Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) were involved through European offices, the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee (CARC) is based in Ottawa, and the most active American groups were the National Audubon Society, Friends of the Earth-US, and the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF).

Messages

These groups hoped to influence the circumpolar states to strengthen their commitments on various specific Arctic environment issues, with the input of each group often shaped by its general focus. In line with their general orientation as conservation groups, the WWF and the Audubon Society emphasised wildlife protection. For example, a WWF statement distributed at the 1991 Rovaniemi meeting called on the AEPS to include measures regarding the long-term management of marine living resources and advocated the negotiation of a "Protocol on Specially Protected Biotopes and Wild Species of Flora and Fauna."⁹

Expanding from their focus on wildlife conservation, the WWF and the Audubon Society wanted controls on sources of radioactive pollution and the prohibition of the production by American companies of persistent organic chemicals that are "poisoning Arctic food chains."¹⁰ The Environmental Defense Fund, Friends of the Earth-US, and the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee also focused on contamination of the Arctic by air and water pollutants. For example, in 1993, the Environmental Defense Fund presented to the Nuuk ministerial conference a series of maps of the Arctic which showed data on major pollutants, including pesticide and heavy metal concentrations in water and snow, mercury

⁸ Osherenko, Gail and Oran R. Young, 1989, *The Age of the Arctic*, p. 119.

⁹ World Wide Fund for Nature, 1991, *WWF Position Statement on the Arctic*, Rovaniemi, June

¹⁰ World Wide Fund for Nature, 1991, *WWF Position Statement on the Arctic*, Rovaniemi, June Cline, Dave, Regional Vice President, National Audubon Society, 1992, "Panel III - Conserving Arctic Biodiversity," in *Proceedings: New Perspectives on the Arctic, The Changing Role of the United States in the Circumpolar North*, p. 72.

levels in the blood of indigenous people, persistent organic contaminants in polar bears, and radioactive waste in water and on land. They were intended "as evidence of the need for a new Arctic treaty."¹¹

Consistent with the fact that they were not exclusively concerned with the Arctic, environmental NGOs greatly emphasised the Arctic's role in global environmental problems like ozone depletion and climate change. The Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, for example, warned in a 1990 publication that as they set up a regional arrangement, the circumpolar states "must recognize the difficulty inherent in addressing a global problem on a regional basis."¹² Environmental NGOs recommended that the circumpolar states act on ozone depletion and global climate change in coordination with larger international programmes.¹³ NGOs also encouraged acting through international agreements to address biodiversity, marine pollution, and air pollution in the Arctic.¹⁴

NGOs encouraged the application of sustainable development principles. In the negotiations before the 1993 Nuuk ministerial conference, the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee supported the creation of a task force on sustainable development, predicting that it could evolve into a regime to regulate industrial development.¹⁵ Friends of the Earth-US, representing other US groups at a 1991 hearing, stated, "Realistic solutions must involve complex trade-offs between pure environmental protection, social equity, and economic activity."¹⁶

¹¹ Environmental Defense Fund, 1993, "Large-Scale Pollution Revealed Throughout the Arctic," *EDF Letter* 24 (5), September, pp. 1, 5.

¹² Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, 1990, "Arctic Pollution: How Much is Too Much?" *Northern Perspectives* 18 (3), p. 2.

¹³ Friends of the Earth, 1991, *Hearing on Arctic and Antarctic Issues: Statement of James N. Barnes before the Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space of the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation* [US Senate], Washington, May 13, p. 10.

¹⁴ Friends of the Earth, 1991, *Hearing on Arctic and Antarctic Issues: Statement of James N. Barnes before the Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space of the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation* [US Senate], Washington, May 13, p. 10.

¹⁵ Fenge, Terry, Executive Director, Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, November.

¹⁶ Friends of the Earth, 1991, *Hearing on Arctic and Antarctic Issues: Statement of James N. Barnes before the Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space of the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation* [US Senate], Washington, May 13, p. 3.

In general, the environmental groups interested in the AEPS process called for strong and concrete action. For example, Friends of the Earth-US, the WWF, and other American NGOs wanted a binding treaty with a permanent secretariat, with clear goals and timetables for implementation. On specific issues, Friends of the Earth-US advocated an international fund be set up to support AMAP and that the CAFF include a list of species to be protected, while a group of US NGOs agreed that a liability regime for pollution accidents was needed, and that uniform environmental assessment procedures should be adopted.¹⁷

Many NGOs endorsed the Canadian proposal for an Arctic Council. The National Audubon Society, for example, advocated American support for the Council, "to deal on an ongoing basis with the many social, economic and environmental issues of mutual concern."¹⁸ The Canadian Arctic Resources Committee favoured merging the AEPS into an Arctic Council, and proposed that the sustainable development task force created at the 1993 Nuuk conference be assigned to the question.¹⁹

Environmental NGOs also wanted to institutionalise their participation in the AEPS process. In a 1991 letter to the State Department, Friends of the Earth-US stated its desire for the AEPS participants to establish an International NGO Advisory Committee and requested observer status at AEPS meetings.²⁰ Similarly, the Canadian Arctic Resources

¹⁷ World Wide Fund for Nature, 1991, *WWF Position Statement on the Arctic*, Rovaniemi, June. Friends of the Earth, 1991, *Hearing on Arctic and Antarctic Issues: Statement of James N. Barnes before the Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space of the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation [US Senate]*, Washington, May 10, pp. 8-9. Friends of the Earth, 1991, *Letter from James N. Barnes, Senior Attorney, and others, Friends of the Earth, to Raymond V. Arnaudo, Chief, Division of Polar Affairs, Department of State*, Washington, February 28, p. 4. National Audubon Society, Alaska-Hawaii Regional Office, 1991, *Letter from Dave Cline, Regional Vice President, National Audubon Society, Alaska-Hawaii Regional Office, to Elizabeth Leighton, Polar Affairs Officer, OES/OA, Department of State*, Anchorage, March 15.

¹⁸ Cline, Dave, Regional Vice President, National Audubon Society, 1992, "Panel III - Conserving Arctic Biodiversity," in *Proceedings: New Perspectives on the Arctic, The Changing Role of the United States in the Circumpolar North*, p. 73.

¹⁹ Fenge, Terry, Executive Director, Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, November.

²⁰ Friends of the Earth, 1991, *Letter from James N. Barnes, Senior Attorney, and others, Friends of the Earth, to Raymond V. Arnaudo, Chief, Division of Polar Affairs, Department of State*, Washington, February 28, p. 6.

Committee requested observer status, citing its expertise on the Arctic and its position as the only Canadian NGO focusing on the region.²¹

Influence

All of the AEPS participants supported some NGO involvement. Sweden, for example, stated at the 1991 Rovaniemi conference that "[e]nvironmental NGOs, with particular interest or expertise in Arctic matters, must also be given opportunities to contribute and participate in our work."²² Several countries included NGO representatives on their delegations to AEPS meetings.²³ Governments were sensitive to NGO pressure. In Canada, for example, the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee was a prominent critic of the government's domestic Arctic Environmental Strategy (AES), which it called "little more than a collection of finely tuned phrases for public consumption."²⁴ This shaped Canada's position on the AEPS. A draft Canadian communications strategy for the 1991 ministerial conference stated, "To critics of the AES, like the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, the signing of the AEPS will prove that the federal government is able to achieve important agreements with its circumpolar neighbours to ensure the success of the Arctic Environmental Strategy's goals and programs."²⁵

Environmental interest groups found their champion in the US government, which, at the 1991 Kiruna preparatory meeting, raised the issue of NGO participation at future meetings. It was decided that countries may include NGO representatives in their delegations.²⁶ During the negotiations leading to the Nuuk conference, the US was the

²¹ Fenge, Terry, Executive Director, Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, November.

²² Sweden, 1991, *Statement by Birgitta Dahl, Minister of the Environment of Sweden* [to the Ministerial Conference], Rovaniemi, June 13, p. 8.

²³ Conference on the Protection of the Arctic Environment, *List of Participants*, Rovaniemi, June 12. Environmental Defense Fund, 1993, "Large-Scale Pollution Revealed Throughout the Arctic," *EDF Letter* 24 (5), September, p. 5. Fenge, Terry, Executive Director, Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, November.

²⁴ Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, 1990, "Arctic Pollution: How Much is Too Much?" *Northern Perspectives* 18 (3), p. 2.

²⁵ Canada, Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, 1991, *Draft Communications Strategy: Minister's Trip to Rovaniemi, Finland, and Copenhagen, Denmark, June 11-18, 1991*, Ottawa, June 4, p. 2.

²⁶ Canada, 1991, *CANDEL Report: Protecting the Arctic Environment, Helsinki Heads of Delegation Meeting, May 6-8, 1991*, Helsinki, May, p. 5.

strongest proponent of granting observer status to environmental NGOs.²⁷ The Clinton administration also involved NGOs in its reassessment of US Arctic policy.²⁸ Thus, environmental interest groups joined general public concern with the environment to influence the US government's perception of its interests so that a circumpolar environmental agreement became more attractive than when strictly Realist defined interests were considered.

Environmental NGOs thus exercised some influence on circumpolar governments, getting them to redefine their interests in terms of environmental protection. However, their influence may have been limited by several factors. In 1991, Friends of the Earth-US suggested a moratorium on economic development in the Arctic until standards were developed which would prohibit environmentally-harmful projects.²⁹ With its similarity to action being taken on the Antarctic, this proposal was evidence of how the Arctic was perceived, especially by American NGOs, as comparable to the southern pole. The perceptions of environmental NGOs were shaped by their long experience with the Antarctic. Once this was taken care of with the 1991 Madrid Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty, which imposed a moratorium on development, they were free to turn their attention to the Arctic.³⁰ One of the results of this was the relative tardiness of their involvement in the AEPS process. European-based groups only made their presence felt in 1991, at the Rovaniemi conference, while American groups did not seem to get moving until after the adoption of the AEPS.

In 1991, Friends of the Earth-US and the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee floated the idea of a mechanism to coordinate the activities of environmental groups

²⁷ LeClaire, Alison, Deputy Director, Environment Division, Department of External Affairs and International Trade (Canada), 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, October.

²⁸ Environmental Defense Fund, 1993, "Large-Scale Pollution Revealed Throughout the Arctic," *EDF Letter* 24 (5), September, p. 5.

²⁹ Friends of the Earth, 1991, *Letter from James N. Barnes, Senior Attorney, and others, Friends of the Earth, to Raymond V. Arnaudo, Chief, Division of Polar Affairs, Department of State, Washington, February 28*, pp. 2, 3.

³⁰ Fenge, Terry, Executive Director, Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, November.

interested in the Arctic modeled on the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition. Representatives of the coalition would attend, "ideally as observers [...]," all inter-governmental meetings concerned with the Arctic, such as the AEPS or proposed Arctic Council.³¹ The proposal never got off the ground, and although the Environmental Defense Fund started promoting a similar network,³² the actions and positions of NGOs continued to be poorly coordinated.

Cooperation with indigenous groups was a possibility. NGOs attempted to incorporate in their positions the interests of indigenous people. For example, Friends of the Earth-US advocated a binding agreement "which includes full respect for the subsistence lifestyle of the indigenous people."³³ Environmental NGOs and indigenous groups were potential allies in the AEPS process, as non-state actors with many common concerns. However, there seemed to be a lack of communication and understanding that prevented closer links. For example, according to a participant in the 1991 Rovaniemi conference, several of the NGO representatives appeared to be "non-plussed" by the cooperative attitude of the indigenous groups, expecting confrontations between indigenous organisations and governments. "Instead they found that the indigenous organizations, while not without injustices and grievances and severe economic and social problems, considered themselves to be participants in the process rather than victims of it."³⁴

Nor was the comparison with the Antarctic welcome to indigenous peoples, who perceive the Arctic as a homeland, not an uninhabited conservation reserve. The Friends of the Earth-US moratorium proposal, which drew on the Antarctic experience, was stunning

³¹ Canadian Arctic Resources Committee and Friends of the Earth (U.S.), 1991, *An Arctic Environmental Coalition: Discussion Paper*, Ottawa, p. 2.

³² Environmental Defense Fund, 1993, "Large-Scale Pollution Revealed Throughout the Arctic," *EDF Letter* 24 (5), September, p. 5.

³³ Friends of the Earth, 1991, *Letter from James N. Barnes, Senior Attorney and others, Friends of the Earth, to Raymond V. Arnaudo, Chief, Division of Polar Affairs, Department of State*, Washington, February 28, p. 5.

³⁴ Canada, Department of the Environment, 1991, *Memorandum from E.F. Roots, Science Advisor Emeritus, to Dr. Len Good, Deputy Minister: Ministerial Meeting on Protection of the Arctic Environment - Rovaniemi, Finland*, Ottawa, June 25, Attachment 7, p. 3.

in its lack of consideration of the interests of the inhabitants of the Arctic, whose well-being could often depend on development projects. Very important was the indigenous groups' fear of the animal rights movement, whose anti-fur harvesting campaigns have severely affected their lifestyles and incomes. Although some groups, like the WWF and the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, have tried to distance themselves from the animal-rights activists, Greenpeace, for example, was active in stopping the hunting of baby Harp seals in Canada.

Another issue involved the status and participation of NGOs and indigenous peoples in the AEPS process. The National Audubon Society advocated in 1991 the creation of an "Arctic International Citizen's Advisory Council," on which "[i]ndigenous peoples and conservationists should be well represented [...]."³⁵ In testimony before a US Senate committee in 1991, Friends of the Earth-US stated that indigenous peoples should be included in official delegations of each country.³⁶ The problem was that indigenous groups did not want to participate on a par with other non-governmental groups, nor did they want to be part of national delegations. First, their position was that they represent peoples, and are not mere advocacy groups. Second, they were working on getting observer status, and did not want anything lower. After it became clear in 1991 that indigenous groups would have observer status, environmental NGOs took the position that they should be observers too. Indigenous groups feared this would dilute their hard won gain.

To summarise, environmental advocacy groups had influence on the circumpolar states' redefinition of their interests, generally advocating strong and binding measures to address environmental problems, and advancing a participatory role for themselves. All the

³⁵ National Audubon Society, Alaska-Hawaii Regional Office, 1991, *Letter from Dave Cline, Regional Vice President, National Audubon Society, Alaska-Hawaii Regional Office, to Elizabeth Leighton, Polar Affairs Officer, OES/OA, Department of State, Anchorage, March 15*

³⁶ Friends of the Earth, 1991, *Hearing on Arctic and Antarctic Issues: Statement of James N. Barnes before the Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space of the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation [US Senate], Washington, May 13, p. 11*

circumpolar states were sensitive to their pressure, and their influence on the US, especially after 1992, was important to that country's perception of its interests. However, their late involvement and their inability to ally with indigenous groups limited effectiveness of NGOs.

Indigenous Groups

The definition of indigenous peoples used by the Saami people includes four elements: pre-existence, non-dominance, cultural difference, and self-identification as indigenous.³⁷ In the Arctic, these characteristics apply to several groups, including the Saami of the Nordic states and the Kola Peninsula, the Inuit of North America, Greenland, and Siberia, and the "Small Peoples" of Russia, all of whom were represented at the AEPS negotiations.

Messages

The positions advanced by these groups were shaped by their inter-related cultural, economic, and political interests, which can be summed up as the desire for control over their own destiny to ensure their survival as distinct peoples. The Nordic Saami Council, the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC) and the USSR Association of Small Peoples of the North met in Kiruna, Sweden, in January 1991 to come up with a common position for the AEPS negotiations. The result, stated in the form of principles, composed the messages sent to the circumpolar states by indigenous peoples.

The first principle was, "The indigenous peoples of the north are an integral part of the environment."³⁸ This is related to how the culture and lifestyle of indigenous people is tied to the land and sea, to their herding, hunting, and fishing activities. Given their cultural and economic dependence on the natural environment, its protection is essential to their survival. In the words of the Greenland Home Rule Minister for Health and

³⁷ Finland, 1990, *The Circumpolar Peoples and the Protection of the Arctic Environment: A Saami Viewpoint* [submitted to the Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting by Pekko Aikio, member of the Finnish delegation], Yellowknife, April 17, p. 7.

³⁸ Nordic Saami Council, 1991, *Press Release*, Kiruna, January 14.

Environment, environmental problems "are a threat to our very lifestyle and our cultural roots [...]."39

Indigenous peoples thus had a definite interest in the protection of the Arctic environment. This led to calls for control of pollutant emissions. Of specific concern were persistent organic contaminants and heavy metals, which are ingested by indigenous peoples eating wildlife and fish in which the substances bio-accumulate. An oft-cited study of breast milk from Inuit women living near Hudson Bay showed PCB concentrations five times greater than milk from women in southern Canada.⁴⁰ During the AEPS negotiations, indigenous groups therefore pushed for action on persistent organic contaminants, such as PCBs.⁴¹ Before the Nuuk ministerial meeting, the ICC also aimed at the problem by working to get involved in the AEPS group on marine pollution, hoping to make the focus land-based sources, from which much contamination flows.⁴² Another concern was radioactive pollution. In 1992, the ICC's president commented on the threat posed by nuclear waste and reactors dumped by the Soviets: "People are concerned about how nuclear contamination is going to affect the marine mammals and everything else that our people depend on in the Arctic to survive."⁴³

Wildlife conservation also has a direct impact on indigenous peoples, who rely on hunting and fishing for subsistence and cultural reasons. This interest was reflected during the AEPS process. For example, the ICC's concern with the marine pollution working group was partly motivated by a desire for the AEPS to address the conservation of

39 Denmark, 1991, *Speech by the Greenland Home Rule Minister for Health and Environment, Mr. Ove Rosing Olsen*, Rovaniemi, June, p. 1.

40 Friends of the Earth, 1991, *Hearing on Arctic and Antarctic Issues: Statement of James N. Barnes before the Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space of the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation [US Senate]*, Washington, May 13, p. 6.

41 Nordic Saami Council, 1991, *Statement by Leif Halonen, Nordic Saami Council President [to the Ministerial Conference]*, Rovaniemi, June 14, p. 3.

42 Reimer, Chester, Environmental Coordinator, Inuit Circumpolar Conference, 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa October.

43 *Globe and Mail* [Toronto], 1992, "Ailing Arctic Ocean focus of Inuit talks," July 20, pp. A1-A2

whales.⁴⁴ Although suspicious at first of the Canadian proposal on flora and fauna conservation, after the adoption of the AEPS in 1991, indigenous groups came to focus on the CAFF programme as a vehicle for advancing their interests.

In general, indigenous groups addressed wildlife conservation, as well as most environmental issues, in terms of the sustainable development framework. That is, the positions and statements of indigenous groups were not limited to insisting on controls of specific pollutants or protection of individual species, but addressed the root causes of environmental degradation. In a clear description of the idea of economy/environment integration, the Nordic Saami Council representative stated at Rovaniemi in 1991 that the environmental costs of "so called modern development" needed to be incorporated in project planning. If this is not done, he said, economic progress is really a regression.⁴⁵ In a written submission to the AEPS negotiations in 1990, the ICC stated that sustainable development must "be implemented solely in the context of fairness or equity in relation to indigenous peoples." The group pushed hard for use of the term "sustainable and equitable development" in the AEPS text.⁴⁶ Development must accommodate indigenous values and concerns, must obtain the consent of indigenous peoples, and must "only take place at a rate and pace compatible with the local communities affected [...]." In addition, "development initiatives by indigenous peoples themselves should be encouraged [...]."⁴⁷ Thus, not only was development to be environmentally-friendly, but it must also involve and benefit indigenous peoples.

Indeed, for indigenous peoples, development that they controlled is by definition sustainable, since their beliefs and practices are in tune with the environment. A Saami

⁴⁴ Reimer, Chester, Environmental Coordinator, Inuit Circumpolar Conference, 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, October.

⁴⁵ Nordic Saami Council, 1991, *Statement by Leif Halonen, Nordic Saami Council President* [to the Ministerial Conference], Rovaniemi, June 14, p. 1-2.

⁴⁶ Inuit Circumpolar Conference, 1990, *Towards an Arctic Sustainable and Equitable Development Strategy: Some Preliminary Views*, March, pp. 1-2. Reimer, Chester, Environmental Coordinator, Inuit Circumpolar Conference, 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, October.

⁴⁷ Inuit Circumpolar Conference, 1990, *Towards an Arctic Sustainable and Equitable Development Strategy: Some Preliminary Views*, March, pp. 2-3.

position paper stated: "We are part of the ecosystem. Our cultural manifestations are adapted to an ecological balance between what nature can give and what we can utilize in relation to nature's productive capacity."⁴⁸ Indigenous groups advocated inserting in the AEPS references to their traditional knowledge and practices, which they consider consistent with the principles of sustainable development.

Basic to the political position of indigenous groups was the second principle of the 1991 Kiruna position paper, which stated that they have the right to self-determination and their use of natural resources should be free of interference.⁴⁹ These rights were accompanied by a responsibility of stewardship. The Nordic Saami Council claimed this responsibility, summarising its political programme: "It is our inalienable right to preserve and develop our economic activities and our communities in keeping with our own common conditions, and together we wish to preserve our lands, natural assets and national heritage for future generations."⁵⁰

These assertions, to self-determination and to responsibility for the Arctic environment, accompanied the domestic political development of indigenous groups.⁵¹ Taking political control on local levels has allowed indigenous groups to manage and regulate environmental resources that previously had been the domain of central governments.⁵² Political development at home also equipped the Inuit to cooperate effectively across international borders. On the local level, for example, Inuit hunters in northern Alaska cooperate with their counterparts in Canada in the management of beluga whale and polar bear harvesting. The North Slope Borough in Alaska also conducts joint

⁴⁸ Nordic Saami Council, 1990, *Saami Programme for the Environment*, Utsjoki, p. 3.

⁴⁹ Nordic Saami Council, 1991, *Press Release*, Kiruna, January 14.

⁵⁰ Nordic Saami Council, 1990, *Saami Programme for the Environment*, Utsjoki, p. 2.

⁵¹ Working Group on Northern Conservation, 1990, *Towards a Circumpolar Arctic Sustainable Development Strategy: The Canadian Experience* [submitted to the Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting], Yellowknife, April, p. 7.

⁵² Klein, David, Senior Scientist, Alaska Cooperative Fish and Wildlife Research Unit, University of Alaska Fairbanks, 1992, "Panel I - Native Concerns in the North: Local involvement in identifying and addressing local and regional needs," in *Proceedings: New Perspectives on the Arctic, The Changing Role of the United States in the Circumpolar North*, pp. 23-24.

research on the bowhead whale with the Naukan native Cooperative on the Chukotka Peninsula in Russia.⁵³

On the regional level, the ICC, founded in 1977, represents Inuit in Alaska, Canada, Greenland, and Russia. According to one of its pamphlets, "The fundamental purpose of the ICC is to ensure the endurance of the Inuit culture and the Arctic environment for future generations."⁵⁴ In 1986, the ICC adopted the Inuit Regional Conservation Strategy, a plan for international cooperation to protect the Arctic environment. The strategy's stated aim was to enable the Inuit to achieve their aspirations to: "maintain their culture and identity as a distinct people; continue to harvest wildlife as the basis of their culture; conserve the wildlife they harvest and the ecosystems on which they depend; develop socially and economically [...]; and look after themselves and control their own lives."⁵⁵

The political development of the Saami also allowed them to act internationally. A Saami document asserted that their identity transcended national borders, "[b]y virtue of their common origin and language, the Sami in the Nordic area feel themselves to be one people."⁵⁶ The Saami of Sweden, Norway, and Finland set up the Nordic Saami Council in 1956. In 1986, spurred on by the Chernobyl accident, the Nordic Saami Conference adopted an environmental programme.⁵⁷

The Saami environmental programme and the Inuit Regional Conservation Strategy were important efforts at international cooperation to protect the Arctic environment, but they were not enough. At the 1991 meeting in Rovaniemi that adopted the AEPS, the Greenland Home Rule Minister said, "as a non governmental organisation, the ICC can

53 Kaleak, Jessie, Mayor North Slope Borough, 1992, "Panel 1 - Native Concerns in the North: Local involvement in identifying and addressing local and regional needs," in *Proceedings: New Perspectives on the Arctic. The Changing Role of the United States in the Circumpolar North*, pp. 20-21.

54 *Globe and Mail* [Toronto], 1992, "Ailing Arctic Ocean focus of Inuit talks," July 20, pp. A1-A2.

55 Inuit Circumpolar Conference, 1986, *Towards an Inuit Regional Conservation Strategy*.

56 National Union of the Swedish Sami People, 1990, *The Sami - a Nordic people*.

57 Finland, 1990, *The Circumpolar Peoples and the Protection of the Arctic Environment: A Saami Viewpoint* [submitted to the Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting by Pekko Aikio, member of the Finnish delegation], Yellowknife, April 17, p. 10.

merely point to the problems. It cannot solve them and it does not cover the full Arctic region." That is, indigenous groups simply do not have the power and authority commanded by governments. The Greenland Home Rule Minister also pointed out that even where indigenous people possess the power to act on domestic problems, such as in Greenland, they cannot act on pollution originating outside the Arctic.⁵⁸

Indigenous groups therefore had to look to governments, which possessed the necessary resources and jurisdiction, for effective action to protect the Arctic environment. However, their insistence on self-determination and responsibility for Arctic natural resources necessitated their participation. The 1991 Kiruna position paper stated, "Any discussions, research or activity in the Arctic must be consistent with the needs of the Arctic indigenous people."⁵⁹ During the negotiations, indigenous groups consistently pushed to be included in all meetings.⁶⁰

Indigenous groups were not invited to the first AEPS discussions in 1989 in Rovaniemi, and none of the national delegations there included indigenous representatives.⁶¹ At the meeting, however, the Arctic states agreed to the principle that indigenous peoples should be involved in some way. It was left to each country to deal with the issue on its own, meaning that they could choose to include indigenous representatives on their national delegations. Indigenous groups preferred independent status as participants in the negotiations so that they could speak for themselves. Besides, given their aspirations to self-government, for the ICC, asking why it is not represented on the Canadian delegation "[i]s like asking why Iceland is not represented on it."⁶²

58 Denmark, 1991, *Speech by the Greenland Home Rule Minister for Health and Environment, Mr. Ove Rosung Olsen*, Rovaniemi, June, p. 2.

59 Nordic Sami Council, 1991, *Press Release*, Kiruna, January 14.

60 Reimer, Chester, Environmental Coordinator, Inuit Circumpolar Conference, 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa October.

61 Consultative Meeting on the Protection of the Arctic Environment, 1989, *List of Participants*, Rovaniemi, September 25.

62 Reimer, Chester, Environmental Coordinator, Inuit Circumpolar Conference, 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa October.

Nonetheless, at the following AEPS meeting in 1990, in Yellowknife, indigenous peoples were present on several national delegations. At the same time, indigenous groups obtained formal recognition as independent observers. The ICC, the Nordic Saami Council, and the Association of Small Peoples of the North participated in subsequent meetings with that status, but only in plenary sessions. They continued to push for involvement in preparatory meetings of officials, and only obtained access in 1993, at the Nuuk ministerial meeting. This came as a result of direct pressure by indigenous representatives, most importantly at a private breakfast meeting with the politicians representing the circumpolar states.⁶³

After the 1993 Nuuk meeting, the concept of traditional indigenous knowledge was used as a vehicle to advance indigenous participation in the AEPS. The ICC produced a report on the application of the ecological knowledge of indigenous peoples commissioned by the CAFF working group. It recommended creation of a Circumpolar Indigenous Peoples' Implementation Programme under the AEPS to provide "a platform from which the concerns, perspectives and knowledge of indigenous peoples can be articulated and understood by non-indigenous scientists and researchers."⁶⁴ Also recommended were a mapping project and creation of a working group on sustainable use of Arctic living resources.⁶⁵ The recommendations were not discussed by the circumpolar states during their preparations for the 1993 Nuuk meeting, and indigenous groups were not involved in these negotiations. At the Nuuk meeting itself, however, the presence of indigenous observers allowed them to apply pressure to bring the traditional knowledge report's recommendations to the table. During the discussions, the proposals evolved into the idea

⁶³ Fenge, Terry, Executive Director, Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, November.

⁶⁴ Canada and the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, 1993, "Preliminary Report on 'The Application of Ecological and Environmental Knowledge of Circumpolar Indigenous Peoples Within the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy,'" in Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna Working Group, *Report of the Working Group: 1992-1993*, Appendix VIII, Anchorage, p. 5.

⁶⁵ LeClair, Alison, Deputy Director, Environment Division, Department of External Affairs and International Trade (Canada), 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, October.

of creating a new task force on sustainable development, which indigenous groups hoped would advance their concerns. After Nuuk, the debate shifted to the terms of reference of the new task force, and indigenous groups lobbied for a focus on indigenous economies, as opposed to a wider scope.

Indigenous groups resisted the involvement of non-Arctic states. The Kiruna position paper stated: "The nations that are causing transboundary pollution of the Arctic have no right to influence Arctic decisions just because they are polluters."⁶⁶ This position was motivated both by the fact that indigenous groups could hope to have more influence in a smaller forum and by the fact that they could act domestically on several of the circumpolar governments, something that would not be possible with non-Arctic governments. The 1991 joint position paper produced at Kiruna stated that indigenous groups' "right to utilize resources must be free from influences by other non-Arctic groups whose motivations and understanding of the environment are not consistent with those of the Arctic indigenous peoples."⁶⁷ This was their fear of animal-rights groups. The ICC, for example, opposed granting observer status to environmental NGOs because it was concerned about possible interference in wildlife management issues. In addition, once they achieved observer status, indigenous groups feared its dilution by the inclusion of other non-state groups.⁶⁸

Indigenous groups thus used their domestic and circumpolar political bases to encourage the circumpolar states to redefine their interests to reflect indigenous concerns. They were successful to varying degrees.

Influence

The Nordic states had different reactions to the demands of indigenous groups according to their domestic political situation. Greenland, the majority of whose population

⁶⁶ Nordic Saami Council, 1991, *Press Release*, Kiruna, January 14.

⁶⁷ Nordic Saami Council, 1991, *Press Release*, Kiruna, January 14.

⁶⁸ Reimer, Chester, Environmental Coordinator, Inuit Circumpolar Conference, 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa October.

is indigenous, was the most sympathetic. Sweden and Finland, where about 20,000 and 6,000 Saami reside respectively, generally adopted positions favourable to indigenous groups. Iceland, with no indigenous population, was indifferent. Norway, with 40,000 Saami, experienced ongoing domestic political disputes over indigenous rights, and was the least supportive of the Nordic states during the AEPS negotiations.⁶⁹

The most important issue was whether indigenous groups would have independent status as observers. Norway in particular was reluctant to strengthen the influence of indigenous groups, opposing before the Nuuk meeting, for example, their access to meetings of officials.⁷⁰ According to the ICC, Norway was "adamantly opposed" to formal indigenous participation in the AEPS.⁷¹ In general, the other Nordic states took a neutral stance on the issue, leaving the debate to Canada and the US.

On the issue of consideration of indigenous traditional knowledge, the positions of the Nordic states, like with other issues, were not uniform. At the 1993 Nuuk conference, Denmark offered to establish a secretariat in Greenland for the sustainable development task force that grew out of debate on the application of indigenous knowledge. Finland, like Iceland and Sweden, was passive on the issue, but indicated sympathy for the concept. The significant Norwegian contribution to the AEPS, its proposal on scientific monitoring, did not mention any role for indigenous peoples,⁷² and Norway resisted attempts to incorporate indigenous traditional knowledge. Norway also actively opposed the creation of a sustainable development task force.⁷³

⁶⁹ Finland, 1990, *The Circumpolar Peoples and the Protection of the Arctic Environment: A Saami Viewpoint* [submitted to the Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting by Pekko Aikio, member of the Finnish delegation], Yellowknife, April 17, p. 8. Breton, Gilles, Chief, Circumpolar Affairs Division, Circumpolar and Scientific Affairs Directorate, Department of Indian and Northern Affairs (Canada), 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, November. Reimer, Chester, Environmental Coordinator, Inuit Circumpolar Conference, 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, October. Osherenko, Jai and Oran R. Young, 1989, *The Age of the Arctic*, p. 90.

⁷⁰ Fenge, Terry, Executive Director, Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, November.

⁷¹ Reimer, Chester, Environmental Coordinator, Inuit Circumpolar Conference, 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, October.

⁷² Norway, 1990, *Arctic Monitoring: A draft discussion paper* [submitted to the Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting], Oslo, April.

⁷³ Breton, Gilles, Chief, Circumpolar Affairs Division, Circumpolar and Scientific Affairs Directorate, Department of Indian and Northern Affairs (Canada), 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, November.

Almost half of the 80,000 people that live in the Canadian North are indigenous, of whom the majority are Inuit and the rest Indian. In the 1980s and 1990s, the Canadian government was able to come to several significant agreements with indigenous groups in the region, including land claims agreements with Yukon Indians, with the government of the Northwest Territories and the Dene/Metis, and with the Tungavik Federation of Nunavut representing the peoples of the eastern Arctic. According to a Canadian report to the AEPS participants, "Not only will northern native people become the largest private land owners in the North, having title to hundreds of thousands of square kilometres of land, but perhaps more importantly they are guaranteed full involvement in resource management bodies here in the North."⁷⁴

Canada's priorities during the AEPS negotiations reflected indigenous concerns. The reduction of contaminants in the food chain is extremely important to indigenous peoples; in initial internal discussions, the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs (DIAND)⁷⁵ pushed for inclusion of the issue on the Finnish Initiative agenda. As DIAND assumed the lead for developing the Canadian position with respect to the Finnish initiative,⁷⁶ the issue was given a high priority. In fact, the human health effects of persistent contaminants, and accompanying alarmist media reports, were important in obtaining bureaucratic support in Ottawa for active Canadian support for the Finnish Initiative.⁷⁷ During the negotiations, Canada put much effort into advancing the issue; its State of the Arctic Environment report on persistent organic contaminants was "the furthest

⁷⁴ Canada, 1990, *Canadian National Report [to the Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting]* Yellowknife, April 18, pp. 4-5.

⁷⁵ The acronym dates from when the ministry was named the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development.

⁷⁶ Canada, Department of the Environment, 1991, *Memorandum from E.F. Roots, Science Advisor Emeritus, to Dr. Len Good, Deputy Minister: Ministerial Meeting on Protection of the Arctic Environment - Resolutions*, Finland, Ottawa, June 25, p. 2.

⁷⁷ Breton, Gilles, Chief, Circumpolar Affairs Division, Circumpolar and Scientific Affairs Directorate, Department of Indian and Northern Affairs (Canada), 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, November.

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advanced of the scientific studies and was adopted as a model" at the 1990 Yellowknife meeting.⁷⁸

Another Canadian contribution to the AEPS, the flora and fauna conservation plan, originated from the Department of the Environment, which was less sensitive to indigenous interests. The original proposal, for example, nowhere mentioned indigenous people.⁷⁹ Similarly, Canada's support for the participation of indigenous groups in the AEPS met some resistance within the Canadian bureaucracy.

By and large, however, Canadian positions were consistent with the interests of indigenous peoples. One of the stated objectives of the 1990 Canadian proposal for a sustainable development strategy was to provide for the "sustained utilization of resources, in particular, their use by Arctic peoples." The guiding principles of the proposed strategy included "incorporation of the social, economic and cultural needs and values of Arctic peoples [...]."⁸⁰ Canada also advanced the concept of traditional knowledge; for example, it had to "push hard" at the first AMAP task force meeting to include the idea in AMAP's mandate.⁸¹

Although Canada did not bring any indigenous representatives to the 1989 Rovaniemi meeting, it soon started working on getting them involved. At the beginning of 1990, DIAND provided funding to the ICC to consult with circumpolar indigenous groups on their opinions of the proposals to be discussed at the upcoming Yellowknife meeting.⁸² Canada invited the ICC to the 1990 Yellowknife meeting as an observer, infuriating several

⁷⁸ Canada, Department of External Affairs and International Trade, 1990, *Memorandum from D. Chernushenko, Energy and Environment Division, to the Secretary of State for External Affairs: Report on the Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting on the Protection of the Arctic Environment: April 18-23, 1990*, Ottawa, May 8.

⁷⁹ Canada, Department of the Environment, 1990, *Proposal for an Agreement on the Protection and Conservation of Arctic/Northern Wildlife and Habitat*, Ottawa.

⁸⁰ Canada, 1990, *Towards an Arctic Sustainable Development Strategy: Proposal by the Government of Canada* [submitted to the Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting], Yellowknife, April 18, p. 2.

⁸¹ Canada, Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, 1991, *Letter from David Stone, Chief, Environmental Services and Research, to Garth Bangay, Director, Environment and Renewable Resources Directorate, Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, and others: Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme. Preliminary report of the first Task Force Meeting, Tromsø, December 2-6, 1991*, Ottawa, December 16.

⁸² Canada, Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, 1990, *Draft Contract Between the Inuit Circumpolar Conference and DIAND in Support of the Finnish Initiative - Phase I*, Ottawa, January 9.

of the other circumpolar states.⁸³ The Canadian chair of an *ad hoc* working group at Yellowknife offered the ICC a spot at the table, and faced down the US, which wanted him removed as chairman over the issue.⁸⁴ Once the status of indigenous groups as observers was assured, Canada pushed for their participation in working group and officials' meetings, until the matter was decided in Nuuk in 1993.⁸⁵ Similarly, Canada supported indigenous resistance to granting observer status to other groups. Suggesting that doing so would dilute the special recognition of indigenous peoples, Canada proposed before the 1993 Nuuk meeting that NGOs be represented on national delegations.⁸⁶

Although the first Canadian proposal on flora and fauna conservation neglected indigenous interests, the CAFF working group, established under the AEPS in 1991, was soon used by Canada to advance its goals regarding indigenous participation. Canada funded a study by the ICC on indigenous knowledge commissioned by the CAFF working group. It recommended, among other things, a working group on sustainable use of Arctic living resources and a programme area devoted to indigenous issues. During the lead-up to the Nuuk meeting, Canada made it a priority to build support for acceptance of the CAFF report's recommendations.⁸⁷ The debate over these recommendations produced a proposal for a task force on sustainable development, which Canada envisioned as a means of furthering indigenous influence on the AEPS.

Canada's Arctic Council proposal also reflected indigenous interests. In 1991, the formal Canadian proposal for an Arctic Council called for a "direct participatory role for northern native peoples [...]." A briefing document noted that "[t]he Government should

⁸³ Canada, Department of the Environment, 1991, *Memorandum from E.F. Roots, Science Advisor Emeritus, to Dr. Len Good, Deputy Minister: Ministerial Meeting on Protection of the Arctic Environment - Rovaniemi, Finland*, Ottawa, June 25, p. 1.

⁸⁴ Bangay Garth, Director, Environment and Renewable Resources Directorate, Department of Indian and Northern Affairs (Canada), 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, November.

⁸⁵ Fenge, Terry, Executive Director, Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, November.

⁸⁶ LeClaire, Alison, Deputy Director, Environment Division, Department of External Affairs and International Trade (Canada), 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, October.

⁸⁷ LeClaire, Alison, Deputy Director, Environment Division, Department of External Affairs and International Trade (Canada), 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, October.

expect some public pressure to secure a significant status for northern native organizations in an Arctic Council."⁸⁸

Public and media perceptions of the Canadian government's actions were indeed an important motivation for Canada's sensitivity to indigenous concerns. A draft communications analysis for the 1991 ministerial conference stated, "Media interest and approval of these initiatives will depend on the degree to which the Minister's activities are seen as an active response to Canadians' concerns about the environment and the aspirations of native peoples." The document added, "Recent polls indicate that Canadians in general are concerned about the well-being of both the environment and native peoples. This initiative, which responds to their concerns, will likely gain their approval."⁸⁹

Contemporary to the AEPS negotiations, Canada, through land claims agreements and constitutional negotiations, was in the process of coming to terms with the separate identity and rights of indigenous peoples. The United States, however, like Norway, had difficulty in recognising any kind of special status for indigenous groups. In Alaska, 65,000 indigenous people make up only 16 percent of the state's population. Debates over their rights have been shaped by the 1971 Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, which granted indigenous groups about 12 percent of the state's territory and almost one billion dollars (US), and can be seen as "a business deal, a one-time settlement, rather than as a political or social accommodation of another group of peoples."⁹⁰

During the AEPS negotiations, the US was reluctant to prejudice its domestic debates by agreeing to any special status.⁹¹ For example, according to an ICC representative, the ICC worked to insert in the text of the AEPS the principle that

⁸⁸ Canada, 1991, *Background Paper: The Arctic Council* [in the briefing book for the Canadian delegation to the Ministerial Conference], Ottawa, June.

⁸⁹ Canada, Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, 1991, *Draft Communications Strategy: Minister's Trip to Rovaniemi, Finland, and Copenhagen, Denmark, June 11-18, 1991*, Ottawa, June 4, pp. 2-3.

⁹⁰ Jull, Peter, 1986, *Politics, Development and Conservation in the International North*, Canadian Arctic Resources Committee Policy Paper 2, Ottawa, p. 33.

⁹¹ Bangay, Garth, Director, Environment and Renewable Resources Directorate, Department of Indian and Northern Affairs (Canada), 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, November.

protection of the Arctic environment is for the benefit of future generations of indigenous people. "We were able to do this despite strong objections of the U.S. Department of Interior, which opposed the mention of indigenous people's rights in the statement."⁹²

The US reacted strongly to Canada's *fait accompli* at Yellowknife, insisting that including indigenous representatives on national delegations was enough. Once indigenous groups became official observers, the US resisted at every step any enhancement of that status, opposing their participation in officials' meetings. The US also opposed allowing the indigenous observers a veto on new observers.⁹³ It was only after the AEPS was adopted that the US included indigenous people on its delegations to working group meetings. Although a former official of the ICC was on the US delegation to the 1993 Nuuk meeting, he was not an official representative of the ICC, nor was the ICC invited to internal meetings to develop US positions, as was the case in Canada.⁹⁴

The US also resisted the recommendations of a CAFF report on indigenous ecological knowledge. The report was a subject of dispute before the 1993 Nuuk conference at a preparatory meeting in Copenhagen. As a result, the report's recommendations were not included before the meeting to the decisions to be endorsed by the ministers.⁹⁵ After indigenous groups, supported by Canada, were able to "steamroll" the issue at the last minute past the US and Norway at Nuuk,⁹⁶ the US worked to widen the scope of the terms of reference of the new sustainable development task force. The US wanted the indigenous subsistence economy to be considered as only part of the wider

⁹² Johnson, Charlie, Delegate Member, Inuit Circumpolar Conference, 1992, "Panel V - Evolving Issues of National Security in the Arctic," in *Proceedings: New Perspectives on the Arctic, The Changing Role of the United States in the Circumpolar North*, p. 111.

⁹³ Reimer, Chester, Environmental Coordinator, Inuit Circumpolar Conference, 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, October.

⁹⁴ Reimer, Chester, Environmental Coordinator, Inuit Circumpolar Conference, 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, October.

⁹⁵ LeClaire, Alison, Deputy Director, Environment Division, Department of External Affairs and International Trade (Canada), 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, October.

⁹⁶ Breton, Gilles, Chief, Circumpolar Affairs Division, Circumpolar and Scientific Affairs Directorate, Department of Indian and Northern Affairs (Canada), 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, November.

economy. Indigenous groups considered this an attempt to soften the focus on their concerns.⁹⁷

According to a Soviet speaker at the 1991 Rovaniemi conference, 75 percent of the two million people in the Soviet Arctic are indigenous, grouped in 26 recognized nations. He said that almost all of them have been affected by environmental degradation.⁹⁸ Over the last 40 or 50 years, economic exploitation of the Soviet Arctic threatened the existence of indigenous people by drastically changing their environment, lifestyles and social organization. While some were forcibly resettled onto large collective farms, other nomadic peoples considerably reduced their hunting areas, gradually losing their traditions of reindeer herding, hunting and fishing. Those living in towns suffer from alcoholism and high criminal and suicide rates. The average life expectancy for Northern peoples is 45 years for men and 55 years for women.⁹⁹

In the late 1980s, public attention on these problems translated into administrative actions. For example, laws were changed so that construction of industrial facilities became subject to environmental review involving local populations, and a programme of scientific research aimed at conserving natural habitats used by indigenous peoples was instituted.¹⁰⁰ The Soviet Union's statement at the 1990 Yellowknife meeting indicated that its domestic environmental programme for the Arctic was to take into account "the priority interests of the indigenous population."¹⁰¹

⁹⁷ Reimer, Chester, Environmental Coordinator, Inuit Circumpolar Conference, 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, October.

⁹⁸ Canada, Department of the Environment, 1991, *Memorandum from E.F. Roots, Science Advisor Emeritus, to Dr. Len Good, Deputy Minister: Ministerial Meeting on Protection of the Arctic Environment - Rovaniemi, Finland*, Ottawa, June 25, p. 6.

⁹⁹ Vartanov, Raphael V. and Alexei Yu. Roginko, 1990, "New Dimensions of Soviet Arctic Policy: Views from the Soviet Union," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 512, November, pp. 74-75.

¹⁰⁰ Canada, Department of the Environment, 1991, *Memorandum from E.F. Roots, Science Advisor Emeritus, to Dr. Len Good, Deputy Minister: Ministerial Meeting on Protection of the Arctic Environment - Rovaniemi, Finland*, Ottawa, June 25, p. 6.

¹⁰¹ Soviet Union, 1990, *Statement from the Soviet Delegation [to the Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting]*, Yellowknife, April, p. 8.

Reform in the Soviet Union also allowed indigenous peoples to start organising themselves politically, both domestically and internationally. For example, the Constituent Congress for the All-Union Association of the Peoples of the North was held in Moscow in March 1990, where the delegates approved a draft Integrated Programme of Further Economic and Cultural Development of Small Peoples of the North, which included social, economic, and environmental measures.¹⁰² On the international scene, Soviet Inuit were allowed to attend a 1989 ICC conference in Greenland.¹⁰³

Despite the recent advances made by Russian indigenous peoples, despite the fact that they are the most numerous of the Arctic indigenous peoples, and despite their having been the most grievously hurt by environmental problems, their voice was muted during the AEPS negotiations. Although the (Russian) Association of Small Peoples of the North was present as an observer, indigenous input was dominated by the activities of the ICC and the Nordic Saami Council, which enjoyed strong domestic political bases and support from the Canadian and Nordic governments. The Russian government provided no financial resources to the Association of Small Peoples of the North.¹⁰⁴ Nor did Russia put much effort into consulting indigenous peoples on its AEPS negotiating positions. Its delegations were invariably composed of central government officials. On the other hand, Russian representatives acknowledged indigenous interests in their rhetoric, stating at the 1990 Yellowknife meeting, for example: "Evidently, appropriate policies cannot be worked out without the participation of indigenous peoples of the North."¹⁰⁵ The attitude was summed up at a press conference during the 1991 Rovaniemi meeting, when the Soviet deputy prime minister referred to criticisms made by the chairman of the USSR

¹⁰² Soviet Union, 1990, *Statement from the Soviet Delegation* [to the Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting], Yellowknife, April, p. 9.

¹⁰³ Scrivener, David, 1989, *Gorbachev's Murmansk Speech: The Soviet Initiative and Western Response*, p. 55.

¹⁰⁴ Reimer, Chester, Environmental Coordinator, Inuit Circumpolar Conference, 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, October.

¹⁰⁵ Soviet Union, 1990, *Statement from the Soviet Delegation* [to the Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting], Yellowknife, April, p. 18.

Association of Small Peoples of the North, saying that they were "unpleasant" but true.¹⁰⁶ Russia acknowledged the issues, but did not have the will or resources to actively address them domestically. In the context of the AEPS, Russia went along with whatever decisions the other participants achieved.

In sum, Russia joined the Nordic countries, Norway excluded, in passive sympathy for indigenous concerns. In the perception of these states, the zone of agreement was large enough to accommodate action on indigenous priorities, in particular toxic contaminants, participation, and traditional knowledge. For Canada, on the other hand, the influence of indigenous groups was such that the zone of agreement could not accommodate inaction on those issues. At the same time, Norway and the US were opposed to many of the indigenous groups' demands, and their zones of agreement would embrace them only with difficulty.

Scientific Community

An epistemic community of scientists interested in the Arctic can be considered in a similar way as environmental advocacy groups and indigenous peoples. It had significant input into the AEPS negotiations, carrying a coherent message to policy makers that led them to see circumpolar scientific cooperation as within their states' interests.

The poles have long been a focus of scientific inquiry and much research in the Arctic has supported sovereignty claims or military goals. One of the effects of such research efforts was the creation and development of programmes and institutions which fostered a scientific community interested in the Arctic. All of the circumpolar countries have substantial scientific resources devoted to the Arctic, which are, except in the US, coordinated by a central administrative entity.¹⁰⁷ This scientific community was often

¹⁰⁶ Canada, Department of the Environment, 1991, *Memorandum from E.F. Roots, Science Advisor Emeritus, to Dr. Len Good, Deputy Minister: Ministerial Meeting on Protection of the Arctic Environment - Rovaniemi, Finland*, Ottawa, June 25, p. 8.

¹⁰⁷ Untersteiner, Norbert, Vice Chairman, Polar Research Board, and Vice President, International Arctic Science Committee, 1992, "Panel IV - Arctic Research: Asking the Right Questions," in *Proceedings: New Perspectives on the Arctic, The Changing Role of the United States in the Circumpolar North*, p. 99.

critical of the narrow national aims of scientific research in the Arctic, and encouraged international information sharing and cooperation. The initiator of the International Polar Year of 1882-1883, an Austro-Hungarian naval officer and physicist, Karl Wyprecht, described Arctic exploration as an activity where "immense sums were being spent and much hardship endured for the privilege of placing names in different languages on ice-covered promontories, but where the increase in human knowledge played a very secondary role." The International Polar Year was a successful cooperative effort, still providing useful information to scientists.¹⁰⁸

Efforts since then have focused on specific technical issues or projects, were part of larger global programmes, or were bilateral arrangements rather than circumpolar. Recent examples include the International Tundra Experiment, the Northern Sciences Network of the UNESCO Man in the Biosphere (MAB) Programme, and the 1983 Canada-Greenland Marine Environmental Cooperation Agreement.¹⁰⁹ Scientific cooperation led directly to the sole circumpolar agreement on any subject, the 1974 Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears. According to a Canadian official, the agreement evolved "through scientific discussion first and negotiation of protection measures later."¹¹⁰ After its adoption, the treaty continued to encourage cooperative research and information sharing on polar bears and their habitat.¹¹¹

There have been periodic efforts to create a permanent coordinating institution focused specifically on Arctic science. After the International Polar Commission's demise

¹⁰⁸ Roots, E.F., Science Advisor, Department of the Environment [Canada], 1984, "International and Regional Cooperation in Arctic Science: A Changing Situation," presented to *Nordisk Konferanse Om Arktisk Forskning*, Ny Alesund, Svalbard, August 2-8, pp. 4-6.

¹⁰⁹ Roots, E.F., Science Advisor, Department of the Environment [Canada], 1984, "International and Regional Cooperation in Arctic Science: A Changing Situation," presented to *Nordisk Konferanse Om Arktisk Forskning*, Ny Alesund, Svalbard, August 2-8, pp. 18-20. Canadian Institute of International Affairs, National Capital Branch, 1991, *The Arctic Environment and Canada's International Relations*, pp. 17, 53-54.

¹¹⁰ Canada, Department of the Environment, 1990, *Memorandum from Jane Barton, Chief, Multilateral Affairs, International Affairs, Corporate Policy Group, to Distribution: Finnish Initiative: Proposed Memorandum of Understanding on the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna*, Ottawa, October 22.

¹¹¹ Roots, E.F., Science Advisor, Department of the Environment [Canada], 1984, "International and Regional Cooperation in Arctic Science: A Changing Situation," presented to *Nordisk Konferanse Om Arktisk Forskning*, Ny Alesund, Svalbard, August 2-8, p. 22.

in 1891, different proposals for such an institution came and went.¹¹² In 1976, the Committee for High Arctic Research, Liaison and Information Exchange (CHARLIE) was an informal association of Arctic scientists who were frustrated by the lack of a coordination of Arctic scientific research. CHARLIE's newsletter, published in Copenhagen, encouraged information exchange, "but it also helped to weld interested scientists into a feeling of arctic community [...]."

In 1979, a more formal organisation, the Comité Arctique International, was created in Monaco, with members from academia, industry, and government. Since then, "the Comité has not really found another role than that of promoting conferences and publishing the proceedings." The Arctic Ocean Sciences Board, whose stated purpose is to advance scientific knowledge by "bringing together resources into cooperative programs," was formed in 1984. In practice, the Board has experienced difficulty in maintaining the involvement of senior governmental officials, which limited the resources it could call on from governments.¹¹³

International Arctic Science Committee (IASC)

The scientific community interested in the Arctic, having become established domestically, and having established transnational links through global and bilateral programmes and through non-governmental organisations such as the Comité Arctique International, became a constituency for circumpolar cooperation on Arctic science. In 1986, during a conference of the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) the possibility of an Arctic equivalent to SCAR was discussed. A follow-up meeting set up a working group, consisting of three scientists, to draft a proposal. It distributed a feasibility

¹¹² Roots, E.F., Science Advisor, Department of the Environment [Canada], 1984, "International and Regional Cooperation in Arctic Science: A Changing Situation," presented to *Nordisk Konferanse Om Arktisk Forskning*, Ny Alesund, Svalbard, August 2-8, pp. 24-25.

¹¹³ Roots, E.F. and O. Rogne, 1987, *Some Points for Consideration in Discussions on The Need For, Feasibility, and Possible Role of an International Arctic Science Committee*, prepared for February 13, 1987 meeting in Oslo on the proposed IASC, pp. 9-11.

study to the eight circumpolar capitals, receiving replies from all but Moscow.¹¹⁴ Nothing was heard until Gorbachev's speech on circumpolar cooperation in Murmansk in October 1987, with which he proposed an Arctic Research Council, using similar language to that of the feasibility study.¹¹⁵

Once the Soviets accepted the idea, it took four years of dealing with the various political issues, especially regarding governmental involvement and non-Arctic participation,¹¹⁶ before the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) was founded. In Stockholm in 1988, government officials and scientists agreed in principle to the creation of the IASC, designating it a political body rather than a purely scientific organisation.¹¹⁷ The decision addressed the failures of the Comité Arctique International and the Arctic Ocean Sciences Board to maintain the political interest necessary to attract resources from the circumpolar governments.

Because a purely scientific organisation would be governed by the rules of the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU), which would open participation to any UN member, making the IASC a political body also allowed the circumpolar states to limit membership. This issue became the main sticking point during the negotiations, with the Soviet Union and Canada wanting to limit the organisation to the circumpolar states, and the US favouring a wider membership.¹¹⁸ Finally, in 1990, they agreed on a compromise that structured the IASC so that its Council was open to representatives from any country

¹¹⁴ Rogne, Odd, 1990, "The International Arctic Science Committee: From Conception to Birth," *Arctic Research of the United States* 4, Fall, p. 65. Roots, E.F., Science Advisor Emeritus, Department of the Environment (Canada), 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, October.

¹¹⁵ Soviet Union, 1987, *Mikhail Gorbachev: The Speech in Murmansk at the ceremonial meeting on the occasion of the presentation of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star Medal to the city of Murmansk, October 1, 1987*, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, p. 30.

¹¹⁶ Canada, 1990, *Briefing Note on the International Arctic Science Committee* [in the briefing book for the Canadian delegation to the Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting], Ottawa.

¹¹⁷ Roots, E.F., Science Advisor Emeritus, Department of the Environment (Canada), 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, October.

¹¹⁸ Roots, E.F., Science Advisor Emeritus, Department of the Environment (Canada), 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, October.

engaged in significant Arctic research and its Regional Board was limited to the eight circumpolar states.¹¹⁹

The formation of the IASC was extremely important to the AEPS negotiations through the precedent it provided for circumpolar cooperation, especially with its Regional Board, whose mandate allowed consideration of issues beyond those strictly scientific.¹²⁰ The IASC negotiations broke the Cold War ice which until then had frozen any moves toward circumpolar cooperation. In addition, the IASC negotiations dealt with controversial political issues, most importantly involving non-Arctic participation, so that the debates were well-advanced by the time the AEPS negotiations were underway. According to E.F. Roots, who was involved in both the IASC and the AEPS discussions, "[T]he protracted IASC debates contributed directly to resolution of these problems under the Finnish Initiative, if for no other reason than that the same players were involved in most of the countries concerned."¹²¹ It also worked the other way, in that remaining disagreements were transferred to the Finnish Initiative so that the IASC could get started in August 1990.¹²²

Indeed, the IASC discussions provided a forum for getting the Finnish Initiative going. For example, the Finnish delegation to a March 1988 meeting in Stockholm on the proposed IASC presented a statement of Finland's interest in international cooperation on the Arctic environment. In December 1988, at a large research conference in Leningrad organised by the Soviet Union to show its interest in the IASC, the Finnish Ambassador for Polar Affairs arranged a private dinner to informally discuss circumpolar cooperation on

¹¹⁹ International Arctic Science Committee, 1990, "Founding Articles," *Arctic Research of the United States* 4, Fall, p. 68.

¹²⁰ International Arctic Science Committee, 1990, "Founding Articles," *Arctic Research of the United States* 4, Fall, p. 68.

¹²¹ Canada, Department of the Environment, 1991, *Memorandum from E.F. Roots, Science Advisor Emeritus, to Dr. Len Good, Deputy Minister: Ministerial Meeting on Protection of the Arctic Environment - Rovaniemi, Finland*, Ottawa, June 25, p. 12.

¹²² Roots, E.F., Science Advisor Emeritus, Department of the Environment (Canada), 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, October.

the environment. The favourable response encouraged Finland to make a formal proposal the next month.¹²³

The IASC also figured prominently in proposals for the content of the AEPS. Before the negotiations, a 1998 Finnish discussion paper stated that the IASC "might be instrumental to prepare scientific grounds for concrete action."¹²⁴ According to a Canadian report on a 1990 meeting in Oslo on the AMAP proposal, the potential role of the IASC was "frequently discussed," with some representatives advocating a prominent role.¹²⁵ Through the IASC, the circumpolar epistemic community of scientists was thus able to encourage the Arctic states to cooperate, not only on the IASC itself, but also through the AEPS.

Messages

Above all, the IASC precedent identified circumpolar cooperation with scientific collaboration. From the beginning of the AEPS negotiations, no one questioned that scientific knowledge was a necessary input into the AEPS discussions and that any agreement would involve scientific cooperation. Scientific input was necessary most importantly in order to show that environmental problems existed in the Arctic and that something needed to be done about them. A 1989 Finnish discussion paper supporting the Finnish Initiative attempted a summary of existing knowledge about Arctic environmental issues;¹²⁶ as such, it was a message from the Arctic scientific community.

Scientists were well aware of the need for unassailable scientific data to justify action. For example, a Canadian scientist proposed changes to Canada's report on organic

¹²³ Canada, Department of the Environment, 1989, *Memorandum from E.F. Roots, Science Advisor, to R. Page, Chairman, Canadian Environment Advisory Council: Finland Initiative toward environmental protection in the Arctic*, Ottawa, January 13, pp. 3-4.

¹²⁴ Finland, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1988, *Protection of the Environment in the Arctic*, Helsinki, November 4.

¹²⁵ Canada, Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, 1990, *Memorandum from David Stone, Chief, Environmental Services and Research, to File: Report on the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program meeting (Oslo - November 12-16, 1990) held under the Finnish Initiative*, Ottawa, November 26, p. 2.

¹²⁶ Finland, Ministry of the Environment, 1989, *International Conference on Environmental Protection in the Arctic. Preparatory Meeting, Rovaniemi, Finland, 1989, Background Information*, Helsinki, July 12.

contaminants to make sure that it was "scientifically accurate and defensible." "This text may come under close scrutiny, nationally and internationally, by all sorts of people who may wish to pull it apart or use it to bolster their own interests, and we don't want what is essentially a paper on legal frameworks to be discredited because the scientific introduction can be challenged by nit-pickers."¹²⁷ Canada, for which organic contaminants were a priority, made sure that its report on the problem was the most complete possible; so much so, that it was asked to cut it down "to bring it in line with the other reports."¹²⁸

Unchallengeable scientific knowledge about all Arctic environmental problems was, however, not immediately available. The 1989 Finnish discussion paper urged further research, stating that knowledge of Arctic ecosystems was incomplete. It said that although concrete protection measures should figure in an agreement, "at least at the outset, the role of research and monitoring would be prominent [...]."¹²⁹ Other states agreed; the Soviet Union, for example, stated at the 1990 Yellowknife meeting that "Soviet scientists believe that there is a clear shortage of comprehensive biospheric studies in the Arctic region [...]. This, in our view, is the ultimate scientific basis for appropriate political solutions both at the national and international level."¹³⁰ In essence, the scientific community was telling policy-makers that environmental problems existed in the Arctic, but, with a few exceptions, further monitoring and research was needed in order to develop effective responses. The chairman of the IASC stated at Rovaniemi in 1991 that although states should not wait for scientific certainty before acting, "the best policy decisions cannot be made unless the best available scientific information [is] taken into account."¹³¹

¹²⁷ Canada, Department of the Environment, 1990, *Memorandum from Jane Barton, Intergovernmental Affairs, Corporate Planning Group, to E.F. Roots, Science Advisor: Finnish Initiative - Background Paper on Organic Contaminants*, Ottawa, February 9, p. 1.

¹²⁸ Canada, 1991, *CANDEL Report: Protecting the Arctic Environment, Helsinki Heads of Delegation Meeting, May 6-8, 1991*, Helsinki, May, p. 3.

¹²⁹ Finland, Ministry of the Environment, 1989, *International Conference on Environmental Protection in the Arctic. Preparatory Meeting, Rovaniemi, Finland, 1989, Background Information*, Helsinki, July 12, p. 17.

¹³⁰ Soviet Union, 1990, *Statement from the Soviet Delegation* [to the Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting], Yellowknife, April, pp. 14-15.

¹³¹ International Arctic Science Committee, 1991, *Remarks by Dr. Fred Roots, Chairman, International Arctic Science Committee (IASC)* [to the Ministerial Conference], Rovaniemi, June 14, p. 3.

The scientific community also advanced the message that international cooperation was needed, with regard to both research and regulation. This message was partly based on the principle of free and open scientific inquiry and exchange which had been suppressed in the Arctic during the Cold War. In 1991, the chairman of the IASC evoked this principle by citing the founder of the International Polar Commission in 1875: "Science in the Arctic is not a territory for National possession."¹³² Along with principle, international cooperation on Arctic scientific research was justified by the concrete benefits arising from information sharing and pooling of resources. In 1988, therefore, Finland's thinking about Arctic environmental cooperation included "exchanges of data on emissions and information on research work done by individual countries [...]"¹³³ The other states concurred, including, for example, the Soviet Union, which stated in 1991 that cooperative scientific studies were needed to provide the data necessary for environmental protection.¹³⁴ Most importantly, Canada's proposal on flora and fauna conservation was essentially a proposal to cooperate on scientific research, while Norway's plan for a monitoring programme was an obvious product of the scientific community.

International cooperation was also justified by research showing that Arctic environmental problems were international in origin. A 1989 Canadian government document stated that an upcoming conference of the Comité Arctique International on persistent organic contaminants "will provide some important factual inputs which, together with on-going studies of arctic ozone, will bolster the need and urgency of an international agreement on policies for arctic protection."¹³⁵ There was a conscious effort to interpret the research that way. For example, during internal Canadian discussions in 1989 on the

¹³² International Arctic Science Committee, 1991, *Remarks by Dr. Fred Roots, Chairman, International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) [to the Ministerial Conference]*, Rovaniemi, June 14, p. 2.

¹³³ Finland, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1988, *Protection of the Environment in the Arctic*, Helsinki, November 4.

¹³⁴ Canada, Department of the Environment, 1991, *Memorandum from E.F. Roots, Science Advisor Emeritus, to Dr. Len Good, Deputy Minister: Ministerial Meeting on Protection of the Arctic Environment - Rovaniemi, Finland*, Ottawa, June 25, p. 6.

¹³⁵ Canada, Department of the Environment, 1989, *Memorandum from E.F. Roots, Science Advisor, to C.A. Lewis, Senior Advisor-Northern Affairs: Finnish Initiative*, Ottawa, July 24.

Finnish Initiative, it was suggested that a Finnish working paper "could be restructured somewhat in order to justify the need for a circumpolar approach to solutions."¹³⁶ These considerations led scientists to advocate not only circumpolar cooperation, but the widest cooperation possible.¹³⁷ Generally, their point of view was that non-Arctic countries carry out much research in the region, accumulating useful data and expertise.¹³⁸

In their broad outlines, the messages of the scientific community were consistent: environmental problems existed in the Arctic, further research on them was needed, and international cooperation was desirable. In the particulars, however, their messages were sometimes not unanimous. One example involved the question of whether research would be organised according to contaminants, which was advocated by Canada and the US, or by the media the contaminants pass through, which the Europeans wanted to see.¹³⁹ The political implications of this debate over scientific methodology were limited, but other differences in orientation had wider significance.

For example, differences between scientists focused on the life sciences and those working with the physical sciences became evident as the CAFF programme and AMAP competed for priority and resources. As early as 1990, a Canadian Wildlife Service official expressed concern about the potential for conflict between the Norwegian proposal on monitoring and the Canadian proposal on flora and fauna. "We would not want work on Flora and Fauna to be "outweighed" by the higher priorities accorded to pollution monitoring set forth in the Norwegian proposal."¹⁴⁰ This continued to be an issue in the form of attempts to improve coordination between the two programmes.

¹³⁶ Canada, Department of the Environment, 1989, *Commentary: Background Paper on the Finnish Initiative*, Ottawa, p. 1.

¹³⁷ Scrivener, David, 1989, *Gorbachev's Murmansk Speech: The Soviet Initiative and Western Response*, p. 58.

¹³⁸ Canada, Department of the Environment, 1991, *Memorandum from E.F. Roots, Science Advisor Emeritus, to Dr. Len Good, Deputy Minister: Ministerial Meeting on Protection of the Arctic Environment - Rovaniemi, Finland*, Ottawa, June 25, pp. 12-13.

¹³⁹ Canada, Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, 1990, *Memorandum from David Stone, Chief, Environmental Services and Research, to File: Report on the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program meeting (Oslo - November 12-16, 1990) held under the Finnish Initiative*, Ottawa, November 26, p. 4.

¹⁴⁰ Canada, Department of the Environment, 1990, *Memorandum from Jeanne Pagnan, Canadian Wildlife Service, to John Whiting and C.M. Ramsay: Norwegian Proposal on Arctic Monitoring*, Ottawa, August 3.

It also reflected differences in how the scientific community viewed environmental protection. The mainstream worldview among this community was similar to what has been called the "pollution control" paradigm, where environmental issues are seen as strictly pollution problems, isolated from the larger economic and social context. AMAP, to a great extent, was a product of the pollution control paradigm. In fact, some scientists, from the Soviet Union, the US, and several Nordic countries, indicated in 1991 that the AMAP proposal, "while a good start, reflected too much the priorities of one fairly narrow pollution control agency." They felt that the AMAP task force should be more broad and versatile.¹⁴¹ On the other hand, the CAFF programme included consideration of ecosystems as a whole and of economic and social factors, especially related to the indigenous subsistence hunting and trapping economy. It was thus more amenable to considering broader sustainable development issues, and did so most importantly by commissioning a report on indigenous ecological knowledge.

Influence

The scientific authority of the circumpolar scientific community was the basis of the legitimacy of its messages. Its knowledge and opinions were given weight by policy makers because they were seen to have been objectively formed, uninfluenced by political considerations. The IASC chairman described his speech at the 1991 Rovaniemi meeting as "the only 'non-political' statement made formally at the Conference. I attempted to take a non-national tone and emphasize to the politicians and the press how the success of the [AEPS] and the [AMAP] was dependent on knowledge of the arctic environment and its processes, [...]."¹⁴²

¹⁴¹ Canada, Department of the Environment, 1991, *Memorandum from E.F. Roots, Science Advisor Emeritus, to Dr. Len Good, Deputy Minister: Ministerial Meeting on Protection of the Arctic Environment - Rovaniemi, Finland*, Ottawa, June 25, p. 14.

¹⁴² Canada, Department of the Environment, 1991, *Memorandum from E.F. Roots, Science Advisor Emeritus, to Dr. Len Good, Deputy Minister: Ministerial Meeting on Protection of the Arctic Environment - Rovaniemi, Finland*, Ottawa, June 25, p. 7.

The scientific community could not rely on intellectual authority alone, however. It was able to disseminate its knowledge and opinions through members who were in positions to influence policy-makers. In developing its approach to the AEPS, every circumpolar government drew on the expertise of its scientists interested in the Arctic. However, the importance of the bureaucratic position of those scientists was illustrated by how the Canadian government selected those responsible for reviewing other countries' State of the Arctic Environment reports by laying "emphasis on an individual's access to a ready made inter-agency consultation network, rather than on the particular expertise of that individual."¹⁴³ Scientists also exercised influence from their positions on delegations sent to AEPS negotiations. For example, they were very well represented on delegations to the 1989 Rovaniemi and 1990 Yellowknife meetings.¹⁴⁴

As well as inter-acting at AEPS negotiation sessions, scientists also continued to maintain informal contacts. For example, the AMAP proposal was a subject of unofficial discussions between Canadian and Norwegian scientists. In 1990, E.F. Roots prefaced a letter by saying, "This is an informal letter from one scientist to another, rather than a formal submission between our governments [...]."¹⁴⁵

The AEPS negotiation process was very clearly shaped by the influence of scientists. It was, in itself, a process of the application of this influence, whereby policy-makers learned from scientists what were the issues and policy options. At the beginning of the negotiations, the agenda was amenable to such shaping. According to a 1989 Canadian document on the Finnish proposal for discussions, "the agenda for such a

¹⁴³ Canada, Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, 1990, *Letter from Garth Bangay, A/Director General, Natural Resources and Economic Development, to Alan Beesey, Special Advisor to the Secretary of State for External Affairs in Environmental Affairs, Department of External Affairs and International Trade: Finnish Initiative - Consultation mechanism for "state of the arctic environment" reports*, Ottawa, January 23.

¹⁴⁴ Consultative Meeting on the Protection of the Arctic Environment, 1989, *List of Participants*, Rovaniemi, September 25. Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting, 1990, *List of Participants*, Yellowknife, April.

¹⁴⁵ Canada, Department of the Environment, 1990, *Letter from E.F. Roots, Science Advisor Emeritus, to Dr. Thor Larsen, Director of Research, Norsk Polarinstitutt: Inter-governmental Agreement to Protect the Arctic Environment ("The Finnish Initiative") - Paper on Arctic Monitoring*, Ottawa, July 24.

conference is very much in the formative stages.¹⁴⁶ Scientific knowledge about Arctic environmental problems formed the agenda, first setting out what problems should be the subject of the State of the Arctic Environment Reports assigned to individual countries at the first meeting in Rovaniemi. These reports, as well as other studies on monitoring and international law, were intended to shape eventual policy responses. The scientists not only defined the issues at the beginning of the negotiations, they taught policy-makers about the issues through the reports and studies they prepared as the negotiations progressed.

In general, scientific knowledge provided policy-makers common ground on which to base their decisions. According to a senior Canadian negotiator, without the input of scientists, no one would have agreed to anything.¹⁴⁷ The Canadian statement to the 1991 Rovaniemi conference acknowledged the negotiations as a learning process: "[W]e know a great deal more now that we did when we first met in Rovaniemi. Now we can act more decisively."¹⁴⁸ The American statement made a similar point by saying that "[t]he efforts of our scientists, technical experts, and policy specialists have helped us all define the problems and develop our goals."¹⁴⁹

The two main products of the AEPS negotiations, AMAP and the CAFF programme, were designed by the scientific community. Norway's monitoring proposal was based on an existing scientific research programme, the North Sea Task Force, which coordinates monitoring and research between eight countries.¹⁵⁰ The Canadian flora and fauna conservation proposal was also a clear example of agenda-shaping by the scientific

¹⁴⁶ Canada, Department of the Environment, 1989, *Memorandum from C.A. Lewis, Senior Advisor - Northern Affairs, External Relations Directorate, to Distribution: Finnish Proposal for a Conference on the Protection of the Arctic Environment*, Ottawa, February 28.

¹⁴⁷ Bangay, Garth, Director, Environment and Renewable Resources Directorate, Department of Indian and Northern Affairs (Canada), 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, November.

¹⁴⁸ Canada, 1991, *Notes for Remarks: The Honourable Tom Siddon, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development* [to the Ministerial Conference], Rovaniemi, June 13, p. 4.

¹⁴⁹ United States, 1991, *Remarks of John Giffen Weinmann, Ambassador of the United States of America* [to the Ministerial Conference], Rovaniemi, June 13, p. 2.

¹⁵⁰ Norway, State Pollution Control Authority, 1990, *Letter to Participants to the Arctic monitoring expert meeting in Oslo: Arctic Monitoring Programme (AMP)*, Oslo, November 3.

community. The issue was not a subject of discussion at the 1989 Rovaniemi meeting, but once the Canadian Wildlife Service was informed of the Finnish Initiative, three months before the 1990 Yellowknife meeting, it put together a proposal and brought the matter to the table.¹⁵¹

The AEPS process also institutionalised scientific influence through AMAP and the CAFF programme. This ensured that the messages of the circumpolar scientific community would continue to form the basis of policy decisions. Indeed, that was the explicit intention of both AMAP and CAFF - to gather the information necessary to develop regulation. Institutionalisation also improved the position of the scientific community by providing new programmes and resources internationally, and enhancing the status of their work at home. E.F. Roots reported to his superiors that "several areas of study and policy development that we [...] have been wanting for some time to put into action but have not been able to undertake have been identified internationally as high priority, and this should, in the medium term, help us do our own work more effectively."¹⁵²

Two of the more disagreeable states at the table, especially concerning indigenous issues, were Norway and the US. However, with regard to scientific study and monitoring, they were quite cooperative, and this can be attributed to the influence of the Arctic scientific community. In the case of Norway, its AMAP proposal is ample evidence of that influence. Norway saw a significant role for AMAP, and even offered to pay for a secretariat.¹⁵³

Since the US did not make any such positive proposals during the negotiations, the influence of the scientific community on American policy was less obvious. However, scientific research was clearly an important priority for US government policy towards the

¹⁵¹ Pagnan, Jeanne, Canadian Wildlife Service, Department of the Environment, 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, October.

¹⁵² Canada, Department of the Environment, 1991, *Memorandum from E.F. Roots, Science Advisor Emeritus, to Dr. Len Good, Deputy Minister: Ministerial Meeting on Protection of the Arctic Environment - Rovaniemi, Finland*, Ottawa, June 25, p. 1.

¹⁵³ Norway, 1991, *Statement by Mr. Jens Stoltenberg, Deputy Minister of Environment [to the Ministerial Conference]*, Rovaniemi, June 13, p. 4.

Arctic. In 1991, for example, twelve US agencies spent a total of US\$134 million on Arctic research.¹⁵⁴ One of the four elements of the 1983 policy directive on the Arctic was "promoting scientific research in fields contributing to knowledge of the Arctic environment [...]." In 1984, Congress passed the Arctic Research and Policy Act which focused attention on Arctic science, establishing an independent Arctic Research Commission and an Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee.¹⁵⁵ These structures provided a platform for Arctic researchers to provide input into US policy.

Both the 1983 directive and the 1984 act mandated the promotion of international cooperation on Arctic science. The rationale was summed up by an official of the National Science Foundation, which chairs the Interagency Arctic Research Committee: "International cooperation will continue to be a significant contribution to the U.S. scientific activities in the Arctic. We stand to gain far more than we give, particularly taking into account the availability of substantial foreign logistics and vast territories involved."¹⁵⁶

In the context of the Finnish Initiative, the US was most interested in cooperation on science. In sounding out the other circumpolar states on the possibility of environmental cooperation, Finland saw science to be the easiest point of entry into the American policy-making process. When the Finnish Ambassador for Polar Affairs went to the US to discuss the idea in 1988, he met, along with the State Department, primarily science-oriented organisations, including the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the National Science Foundation, and the Arctic Research Commission.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁴ National Science Foundation, 1991, *Statement of Dr. Robert Corell, Assistant Director, Geosciences Directorate, before the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space, U.S. Senate*, Washington, May 13, p. 3.

¹⁵⁵ Fry, Samuel E., 1990, "The Arctic and United States Foreign Policy: 1730-1990," *Arctic Research of the United States* 4, Fall, p. 44.

¹⁵⁶ National Science Foundation, 1991, *Statement of Dr. Robert Corell, Assistant Director, Geosciences Directorate, before the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space, U.S. Senate*, Washington, May 13, p. 4.

¹⁵⁷ Canada, Department of the Environment, 1989a, *Memorandum from E.F. Roots, Science Advisor, to R. Page, Chairman, Canadian Environment Advisory Council: Finland Initiative toward environmental protection in the Arctic*, Ottawa, January 13, p. 3.

Although the State Department was the lead agency for the negotiations, such organisations provided substantial input. It was indicative that of the seven members of the American delegation to the 1990 Yellowknife meeting, four were from scientific organisations and two were from wildlife conservation agencies, which are also science-oriented.¹⁵⁸ The EPA was the main advisor to the State Department on technical issues, and it advocated focusing the AEPS on research and monitoring because of the need for more data. Consistent with the broader circumpolar scientific community, the EPA's position was that without more information, action would be ineffective and expensive. Similar also to scientists in the other polar states, the EPA advocated the involvement of non-Arctic countries and organisations.¹⁵⁹

The EPA also wanted to see a binding treaty, something which the State Department adamantly opposed. According to a Canadian description, the US officials negotiating the AEPS were in a difficult position: "[S]ome were very knowledgeable and personally cared deeply about the subject, and well acquainted with their colleagues from other countries," but they were under instructions to resist concrete commitments.¹⁶⁰

The American statement at the 1991 adoption of the AEPS stressed the value of the agreement for scientific cooperation, saying that AMAP "forms a cornerstone of the strategy. One cannot address problems until one can identify and define the problems [...]."¹⁶¹ The American evaluation of the AEPS was summarised by an EPA official who said that, except for AMAP, the AEPS generally referred to other organisations for substantive action. This was appropriate because other international agreements exist to deal with the problems and because many of the contaminants originate outside the Arctic.

¹⁵⁸ Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting, 1990, *List of Participants*, Yellowknife, April.

¹⁵⁹ Mühling, Brian, United States Environmental Protection Agency, 1993, *Interview*, Washington, October.

¹⁶⁰ Canada, Department of the Environment, 1991, *Memorandum from E.F. Roots, Science Advisor Emeritus, to Dr. Len Good, Deputy Minister: Ministerial Meeting on Protection of the Arctic Environment - Rovaniemi, Finland*, Ottawa, June 25, p. 10.

¹⁶¹ United States, 1991, *Remarks of John Giffen Weinmann, Ambassador of the United States of America [to the Ministerial Conference]*, Rovaniemi, June 13, p. 2.

"In contrast, there is no existing organization to develop information on the status of the Arctic environment."¹⁶²

After the adoption of the AEPS, American interest was evident in AMAP and in the CAFF programme, which is also essentially a scientific cooperation arrangement. For example, the US seemed to take over the lead from Canada with regard to the CAFF programme, hosting a meeting of the working group in Fairbanks in 1993 and making sure that the 1993 Nuuk ministerial communiqué contained comprehensive language on the subject.¹⁶³

The epistemic community of Arctic scientists fits the definitions and typology described in Chapter 2. It is a self-aware community of people with similar knowledge and ideas, giving similar messages to their respective governments. The stages of uncertainty, interpretation, and institutionalisation are evident, as the circumpolar states turned to scientists to explain Arctic environmental problems and to propose solutions. Their proposals for further study led to institutionalisation of their influence through mechanisms like the AMAP and the CAFF programme. Above all, through the process, the Arctic epistemic community encouraged cooperation, both through the ice-breaking of the IASC and by pushing their messages transnationally.

Conclusion

The interest groups that had influence on the AEPS discussions, whether environmental NGOs, indigenous groups, or an epistemic community of scientists, all helped the circumpolar states redefine their interests so that circumpolar environmental cooperation became attractive. The Realist interests of Canada, the Nordic states and the Soviet Union were already favourable to circumpolar cooperation, but the messages of

¹⁶² United States, Environmental Protection Agency, 1991, *Statement of Robert C. Worrest, Ph.D., Office of Research and Development, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, before the Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space, Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, U.S. Senate, Washington, May 13*, pp. 3-4.

¹⁶³ LeClaire, Alison, Deputy Director, Environment Division, Department of External Affairs and International Trade (Canada), 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, October.

these interest groups defined the content of such cooperation. They fixed more clearly the boundaries of possible agreements. Only on certain issues did the agenda of interest groups run into a brick wall of Realist interests. For example, this occurred with the Soviet Union on radioactive contamination, which brought in security interests, and with Norway, Greenland and Iceland on the possibility of whaling and fishing regulation, which called up economic interests.

The US was a different case. The messages of interest groups were needed to redefine American perceptions of interests to accommodate circumpolar cooperation. That is, environmental groups and scientists showed the US government that despite its military, economic, and political interests in the *status quo*, the benefits of environmental cooperation made an agreement, if not attractive, than at least acceptable. They enlarged the American perception of the zone of agreement so that Arctic environmental cooperation could be included.

Figure 5.1: Possible Bargaining Set

Figure 5.1 provides an illustration. Level 0 on the scale of value to the US is the location of the origin when only Realist interests are considered, creating a restrained zone of agreement which excludes point B, representing the AEPS. Level 0ⁱ shows how the input of environmental groups changed American perceptions so that the zone of agreement moved a bit closer to circumpolar environmental cooperation. Level 0ⁱⁱ shows how

American perceptions of what is valuable changed under the influence of the epistemic community of scientists, enlarging the zone of agreement to embrace point B. Note that point A, representing a possible agreement that directly challenges American Realist interests, by for example containing binding commitments on pollution emissions or nuclear activities, is still outside the zone of agreement. The following chapter summarises how the content of point B, the AEPS, reflected all of the different forces and interests described previously.

This paper shows in Chapter 2 how an analysis of a negotiation is dependent on a good understanding of the interests of the participants. Such an understanding often focuses on how states define their interests in terms of increasing their military, political, and economic power. Chapter 3 describes these interests, emphasising how the end of the Cold War provided an opening for circumpolar cooperation, making it within the Realist-defined interests of the Soviet Union. Although the interests of the Nordic states and Canada were in line with regional cooperation on the Arctic, those of the remaining superpower, the US, were less accommodating. This is too narrow a view, however, which fails to explain either the focus or content of international cooperation on the Arctic environment.

More subjective definitions of interests must be considered, including the possibility that different environmental worldviews had influence on the circumpolar states' perceptions. Evidence for this is provided in Chapter 4, which describes how the circumpolar states viewed environmental problems in the Arctic, as illustrated by their positions on various issues during the AEPS negotiations. Their actions showed that they had incorporated into their definition of interests the pollution control paradigm, and had started to perceive environmental problems through the sustainable development worldview.

The media through which such new ideas and perceptions reached state policy-makers included general public opinion and domestic interest groups, such as environmental activists and indigenous peoples, who also had transnational links. In addition, a circumpolar epistemic community of scientists had considerable influence in shaping the AEPS negotiations. Chapter 5 describes the messages of these groups, the bases of their influence, and how policy makers responded to them.

All of this is intended to explain the existence and content of the AEPS and connected agreements. The documents agreed to by minister-level representatives of the eight circumpolar states at meetings in Rovaniemi in 1991 and in Nuuk in 1993 were the outcome of the negotiations described in this paper. They are the 1991 Declaration on the Protection of the Arctic Environment, the 1991 Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), the 1993 Nuuk Declaration on Environment and Development in the Arctic, and the 1993 Nuuk Report. The 1991 Declaration adopted the AEPS, while the Nuuk Declaration and Report can be considered implementing documents of the AEPS.

The AEPS agreements cover several issues that were subject to little disagreement between the negotiators. For the most part, once the circumpolar states accepted how these issues were defined by interest groups, especially the epistemic community of scientists, consensus was easily obtained. Other issues were more controversial, often calling into play the Realist interests of one or more states. The input of interest groups was less influential and compromises between conflicting positions were often necessary.

Non-Controversial Issues

Agreed action on acidification, noise, global environmental problems, and emergency response, corresponded to the desires of the states for which those issues were a priority, the Nordic countries for the most part. On acidification, the AEPS and the Nuuk Report rely on the LRTAP Convention, with regional cooperation confined to monitoring and research. On noise pollution, the AEPS asserts that evaluation and mitigation of its effects "should" be part of project planning and approval processes. The AEPS refers to global mechanisms to deal with global problems. It specifies that with regard to ozone depletion and climate change, AMAP is to cooperate with and encourage an Arctic component in programmes developed in other international fora. The Nuuk Report repeats this. A working group was formed on emergency prevention, preparedness and response,

which established a reporting system and was tasked with promoting "mutual aid mechanisms."¹

Also non-controversial were the agreements' provisions involving scientific cooperation. The epistemic community did an exceptional job of influencing the different states, achieving consensus on the need for circumpolar cooperation on scientific monitoring and research. In the AEPS, the circumpolar states agree to base AMAP on existing national programmes, with a small secretariat set up by Norway. AMAP's primary objective is "the measurement of the levels of anthropogenic pollutants and the assessment of their effects [...]" in the Arctic. The assessments are to be presented in regular "State of the Arctic Environment" reports as a basis for action to reduce the pollution. AMAP is to identify possible causes for changing ecological conditions, detect emerging problems, assess risks, and recommend actions. The Nuuk conference accepted a status report from AMAP, noting the development of "a comprehensive monitoring program."²

AMAP is the most concrete result of the AEPS process, and can be seen as the heart of the agreement since clauses on specific environmental problems invariably call for research under AMAP. Once the US accepted the desirability of circumpolar scientific cooperation, consensus was ensured and neither brilliant bargaining nor complicated trade-offs were needed to obtain an agreement along the general lines of the AEPS.

Controversial Issues

That is not to say that all issues were easily settled. A clear conflict was evident on radioactive contamination, where the Nordic states were increasingly alarmed about Russian dumping and the risk of accidents involving nuclear-powered vessels, while

¹ Ministerial Conference on the Protection of the Arctic Environment, 1991, "Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy," *International Legal Materials* 30, Sections 5, 5.4, 6, 8. Second Ministerial Conference, 1993, *Report*, Nuuk, September 16, pp. 2-8.

² Ministerial Conference on the Protection of the Arctic Environment, 1991, "Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy," *International Legal Materials* 30, Section 6. Second Ministerial Conference, 1993, *Report*, Nuuk, September 16.

Russia and the US resisted substantive controls because of their security interests. The AEPS stated that the present international legal framework dealing with nuclear accidents was sufficient. Action on radioactivity consisted of monitoring and analysis through AMAP as well as giving "consideration" to developing cooperation on nuclear accidents.³ The 1993 Nuuk Report also relied on continued monitoring. The Report goes a bit farther than the 1991 AEPS by singling out the Russian problem and by committing the parties to adhere to the 1972 London Convention.⁴ It also says the circumpolar states will "initiate action" to prevent further increases in levels of radionuclides, to reduce such levels, and to clean up contaminated areas. Because of their Realist interests, the US and Russia prevented concrete action, but they did compromise enough to allow mention of the issue in the agreements.

The same was true for persistent organic contaminants and heavy metals, whose control was a high priority for the Nordic states, Canada, and indigenous peoples. The AEPS action items pertaining to those pollutants rely on other international fora, especially the LRTAP Convention, and on research under AMAP. However, it is on this problem that the AEPS comes closest to concrete controls of specific pollutants. The participants agree to "implement measures to reduce and/or control the use of the following polluting substances: chlordane, DDT, toxaphene and PCBs." As far as production of these substances is concerned, the text says that controls *may* be required. It is weaker and less specific on heavy metals, with participants agreeing to "implement measures to control conditions that lead to the release of heavy metals by industrial activities [...]" The Nuuk

³ Ministerial Conference on the Protection of the Arctic Environment, 1991, "Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy," *International Legal Materials* 30, Sections 4.5, 5.5.

⁴ The 1972 London Convention prohibits the dumping only of "high-level" radioactive matter, and requires the dumping of low-level radioactive waste to be conducted according to IAEA guidelines. ("Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter," 1972, *International Legal Materials* 11, p. 1294.) A later version of the Nuuk Report, produced by Denmark a week after the conference, includes the following sentence which is not present in the earlier version: "They will work and cooperate to provide, in the nearest possible future, a ban on all dumping of radioactive waste in Arctic waters, taking into account the revision of the London Convention [...]" (Denmark, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993, *The Nuuk Declaration on Environment and Development in the Arctic*, Report, Copenhagen, p. 10.) In early 1994, the parties to the London Convention, except Russia, agreed to a total ban on radioactive waste dumping at sea.

Report contains similar language, indicating that the parties agree to "undertake urgent measures" on information exchange and research, and to develop "proposals aimed at reduction of discharges, contamination and cleaning up by countries of their regions affected by severe contamination."⁵ Although the economic interests of the US and Russia were in play, they went along with this. It is likely that Canada's forceful insistence, supported by indigenous groups, was enough to convince the US and Russia to concede on an issue that was not of high priority for them. Besides, no specific regulations were applied.

On marine pollution, including oil pollution, the issue, discussed for example at Yellowknife, was whether regional transport standards should be elaborated or whether it should be left to the global IMO regime.⁶ The sovereignty interests of Canada and Russia favoured setting the Arctic apart as a special region, while the security and economic interests of the US favoured internationalising it. The AEPS's action on marine pollution is consistent with American interests. The parties agree "to take measures as soon as possible to adhere to the strictest relevant international standards within the conventions, to which the countries are parties [...]" and to take joint action in international fora to further strengthen recognition of the vulnerability of the Arctic Ocean. The Nuuk Report establishes a working group tasked with evaluating the need for coordinated action to obtain international recognition of the sensitive character of the Arctic Ocean.⁷ These decisions not only reflect the general US interest in avoiding regional controls, but also the facts that the Nordic states, for which the issue was a high priority, favoured the global approach, and that Canada, which resisted internationalisation, did not rank marine pollution as an important issue.

⁵ Ministerial Conference on the Protection of the Arctic Environment, 1991, "Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy," *International Legal Materials* 30, Sections 5.1, 5.3. Second Ministerial Conference, 1993, *Report*, Nuuk, September 16.

⁶ Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting, 1990, *Report of the Meeting*, Yellowknife, April, p. 13.

⁷ Ministerial Conference on the Protection of the Arctic Environment, 1991, "Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy," *International Legal Materials* 30, Section 5.2. Second Ministerial Conference, 1993, *Report*, Nuuk, September 16, pp. 6-7.

The title of the AEPS is evidence of how the economic interests of the US limited, even on the level of rhetoric, the impact of the sustainable development paradigm. Canada and indigenous groups, for whom the issue was important, were willing to let the US veto the "Arctic Sustainable Development Strategy" as a title, content to state in the Introduction that implementation of the AEPS should allow for sustainable economic development. Similarly, the Objectives and Principles of the AEPS cover such notions as sustainable use of natural resources, intergenerational equity, environmental impact assessment, preservation of biodiversity, and environmental technology transfer, all associated with the sustainable development paradigm.⁸ This was clearly a compromise - the title for the text. Things were different for the US in 1993, however, and the Nuuk Declaration on Environment and Development in the Arctic contains a strong statement of the principle of sustainable development, saying that "environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the development process and cannot be considered in isolation from it [...]."⁹

The AEPS section on flora and fauna conservation closely follows the Canadian proposal, as Canada, the US, and indigenous groups won out over Norway's resistance. It includes agreement to "establish a mechanism [...]" which, according to a Canadian Wildlife Service official, is the key: "Everything else is fluff."¹⁰ The CAFF mechanism was tasked with exchanging information and personnel, making recommendations on research programs, disseminating information, and proposing "strategies for enhanced conservation of Arctic species and their habitats." In addition, the parties "will seek to develop more effective laws, regulations and practices" for conservation.¹¹

⁸ Ministerial Conference on the Protection of the Arctic Environment, 1991, "Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy," *International Legal Materials* 30, Section 1.

⁹ Second Ministerial Conference, 1993, *The Nuuk Declaration on Environment and Development in the Arctic*, Nuuk, September 16.

¹⁰ Pagnan, Jeanne, Canadian Wildlife Service, Department of the Environment, 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, October.

¹¹ Ministerial Conference on the Protection of the Arctic Environment, 1991, "Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy," *International Legal Materials* 30, Section 9.

The 1993 Nuuk Report notes the CAFF programme's ongoing research, saying this work is leading to the development of conservation strategies, such as a proposed Circumpolar Murre Conservation Strategy, for the protection of a species of seabird. As for concrete action, the parties request the working group prepare a plan for developing a network of protected areas in the Arctic and to develop a process for integrating indigenous ecological knowledge. They also endorsed the administrative structure adopted by the CAFF programme, including an interim secretariat funded by Canada for its first year.¹² The CAFF programme is not a cooperative management or regulatory regime, but focuses on information exchange and scientific cooperation. As such, it was acceptable to Norway and Greenland, fearful of interference in their regulation of marine mammal harvesting. However, reflecting the support of Canada and the US, the programme benefits from institutionalisation and has achieved considerable momentum.

Controversy surrounded the role of indigenous peoples. The AEPS Principles and Objectives amply acknowledge indigenous interests. One of the objectives, for example, is "[t]o recognize and, to the extent possible, seek to accommodate the traditional and cultural needs, values and practices of the indigenous peoples as determined by themselves [...]." Similarly, the CAFF programme is to meet its aims "in close cooperation with Arctic indigenous peoples [...]." On the other hand, AMAP, reflecting the original Norwegian proposal, does not mention a role for indigenous peoples.¹³

More important than the text, however, was the actual status of indigenous groups during the AEPS discussions. As described in a previous chapter, indigenous participation gradually increased, from precarious status as observers at the 1990 Yellowknife meeting, to official observer status at the plenary sessions of the 1991 Rovaniemi meeting, to participation in meetings of officials at the 1993 Nuuk meeting.

¹² Second Ministerial Conference, 1993, *Report*, Nuuk, September 16, pp. 8-10.

¹³ Ministerial Conference on the Protection of the Arctic Environment, 1991, "Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy," *International Legal Materials* 30, Sections 2.1, 9.1, 8.1.

With the Nuuk Declaration, the circumpolar states recognise "the special role of indigenous peoples in management and development in the Arctic," and promote "their effective participation" in achieving sustainable development in the region.¹⁴ The Nuuk Report was a significant advance for indigenous interests. It assigned the CAFF programme to developing a process for integrating indigenous knowledge in conservation actions and for "better defining participation of indigenous peoples" in the AEPS. The Report also set up a task force to promote sustainable development "including the sustainable use of renewable resources by indigenous peoples." Funding for indigenous groups was also broached, as the ministers agreed to explore sources of support for indigenous organisations.¹⁵

In much the same way as the US and Russia conceded some ground with regard to radioactivity and toxic substances, Norway and the US budged on the status of indigenous peoples. However, unlike those other concessions, substantive measures were agreed to, most importantly the granting to indigenous groups of a place at the table. This can be explained by the strength of Canadian pressure on the issue but also by some specific bargaining tactics. First, at the Yellowknife meeting, the Canadians presented the other states with the *fait accompli* of the ICC's participation, strongly committing to a position early in the negotiations, successfully gambling that the other states would not walk away because of it.¹⁶ Second, by pushing for and eventually achieving observer status for indigenous groups, Canada was adding a player to the table,¹⁷ which added a voice in support for its positions. Indeed, at Yellowknife, the US accused Canada of attempting to inflate its influence by including indigenous groups in the negotiations.¹⁸ In addition, this

¹⁴ Second Ministerial Conference, 1993, *The Nuuk Declaration on Environment and Development in the Arctic*, Nuuk, September 16, p. 3.

¹⁵ Second Ministerial Conference, 1993, *Report*, Nuuk, September 16, pp. 9, 10-11.

¹⁶ Schelling, Thomas, 1960, *The Strategy of Conflict*, pp. 21-52.

¹⁷ Sebenius, James K., 1983, "Negotiation arithmetic: adding and subtracting issues and parties," *International Organization* 37 (2), Spring, pp. 307-309.

¹⁸ Bangay, Garth, Director, Environment and Renewable Resources Directorate, Department of Indian and Northern Affairs (Canada), 1993, *Interview*, Ottawa, November.

move provides an example of what has been called "reverberation," where actions on the international game table have effects on domestic games.¹⁹ Canada's domestic game was changed so that, by including indigenous peoples in the international game, legitimacy was added to the process and domestic indigenous opposition to an eventual agreement was precluded. The move also changed the domestic games of the other states by reinforcing the political profile of domestic indigenous groups, such as the Alaskan Inuit who are prominent in the ICC, by providing them with an additional avenue of influence, the international negotiations.

Figure 6.1: Possible Bargaining Set

Participation by non-Arctic states and groups was, along with the role of indigenous groups, one of the most controversial issues of the negotiations. The matter held up the establishment of the IASC for several years. The Soviet Union and Canada wanted an inter-governmental organisation limited to the circumpolar states while the US wanted an arrangement open to non-Arctic participation and limited to scientific matters. A simple bargaining manoeuvre helped settle the issue. This involved linking the IASC to the

¹⁹ Putnam, Robert D., 1988, "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games," *International Organization* 42 (3), Summer, pp. 453-456.

AEPS, allowing the founding of the IASC in August 1990. That is, the Soviet Union agreed to a substantial role in the IASC for the scientific establishments of non-Arctic states. In return, the US agreed to limiting decision-making power in the AEPS to the eight Arctic countries.²⁰ Figure 6.1 illustrates how this linkage enhanced the parties' perception of the bargaining set.²¹ The line AB represents a range of possibilities for the IASC, from an arrangement open to non-Arctic participants (A) to an organisation limited to the Arctic states (B). The line CD represents a range of possibilities for the AEPS, from an organisation open to non-Arctic states (C) to one dominated by the circumpolar countries. No point on either line is in the zone of agreement. The linkage creates point E, situated in the zone of agreement, and resulting from the addition of point A (the IASC open to non-Arctic participation) and point D (the AEPS limited to the Arctic states).

So non-Arctic states, despite some protest,²² were relegated to observer status in the AEPS, and the 1990 Yellowknife meeting produced a consensus that observers should be invited on a case-by-case basis, depending on the agenda of the meeting in question.²³ This practice was re-affirmed by the 1993 Nuuk Report.²⁴ Germany, Poland, Great Britain, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN ECE), were invited as observers to the 1991 Rovaniemi meeting, and the Netherlands and Chile were added for the 1993 Nuuk conference. Because of the resistance of Canada and indigenous groups, non-governmental advocacy groups, however, did not have the clout, even with American backing, to obtain status as official observers.

20 Griffiths, Franklyn and Oran R. Young, 1990, "Impressions of the Co-Chairs: Protecting the Arctic's Environment," in *Working Group on Arctic International Relations, Third Session, Moscow and Murmansk, USSR, 22-27 January 1990: Reports and Papers*, p. 23.

21 Sebenius, James K., 1983, "Negotiation arithmetic: adding and subtracting issues and parties," *International Organization* 37 (2), Spring, pp. 292-294.

22 Canada, Department of the Environment, 1991, *Memorandum from F.F. Roots, Science Advisor Emeritus, to Dr. Len Good, Deputy Minister: Ministerial Meeting on Protection of the Arctic Environment - Rovaniemi, Finland, Ottawa, June 25*, p. 12.

23 Canada, Department of the Environment, 1990, *Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting file*, Ottawa.

24 Second Ministerial Conference, 1993, *Report*, Nuuk, September 16, p. 11.

Conclusion

A Canadian report describing a 1990 Oslo meeting on AMAP stated that the guiding principles and the administration of the programme "enjoy a reasonable degree of consensus." It added: "On the other hand, the technical working group reports include some recommendations which most countries (including Canada) would find difficult to implement." The heads of delegations therefore decided to use them as resource documents only.²⁵ This was an example of how commitments to concrete action were avoided. On each of the environmental issues discussed above, the circumpolar states agreed to hortatory statements of intent, but did little more concrete than agree to further discuss the problems while cooperating on scientific research and monitoring. The CAFF programme, for example, was assessed by an American official: "The draft makes no effort to go beyond what are perceived as the existing financial and political limits in Canada (and probably here) and does not anticipate a regulatory or management role for the coordinating committee."²⁶ The Realist interests of the circumpolar states, often leading them to avoid concrete commitments, provided a limit to the effectiveness of their cooperation. On the other hand, a progression on several issues, funding and institutionalisation for example, can be discerned between the 1991 AEPS and the 1993 Nuuk Report. This can be attributed to the learning process which continued through the different working groups, especially AMAP and the CAFF programme. For example, beyond some allusions to technical assistance, the AEPS did not mention financing, but the 1993 Nuuk meeting approached the issue, stating in its Declaration that resources should be sought "to enable each country to fully participate in the program activities [...]." The Nuuk Report assigns officials of the circumpolar governments the task of developing

²⁵ Canada, Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, 1990, *Memorandum from David Stone, Chief, Environmental Services and Research, to File: Report on the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program meeting (Oslo - November 12-16, 1990) held under the Finnish Initiative*, Ottawa, November 26, p. 2.

²⁶ United States, Department of the Interior, 1990, *Memorandum from Lawrence N. Mason, Chief, Office of International Affairs, to Ray Arnaudo, Head, Division of Polar Affairs, US Department of State: Arctic Issues*, Washington, May 24.

recommendations on a financing strategy, noting that the AMAP and CAFF status reports to the conference described the need for additional support for their programmes.²⁷

Similarly, institutionalisation of the process was gradually advanced. At the Yellowknife preparatory meeting, Canada suggested regular meetings of the environment ministers of the circumpolar countries as a way to regularise interactions. The idea "was discussed but not pursued assertively because the time was too early [...]"²⁸ The 1991 agreement, however, provided for regular meetings which were to further develop the AEPS, initiate cooperation in new fields, make policy recommendations, and report on implementation.²⁹ Between the 1991 Rovaniemi conference and the 1993 Nuuk meeting, the AMAP task force, the CAFF working group, and the emergency response working group, each met several times to come up with implementation plans and recommendations for the circumpolar governments. The Nuuk Report, noting that the next ministerial conference is planned for 1995 in Canada, adds that officials will hold consultative meetings at least once a year.³⁰

This was designed as a learning process, with the production of State of the Arctic Environment reports and other studies intended to guide the negotiators, and it goes a long way towards explaining American participation in the AEPS. An American official at the 1991 Rovaniemi conference acknowledged this: "We have made significant progress in two years. Agencies and senators that never heard of the Arctic except in terms of Alaskan oil or Soviet submarines have now agreed to a major continuing international commitment!"³¹

27 Second Ministerial Conference, 1993, *The Nuuk Declaration on Environment and Development in the Arctic*, Nuuk, September 16. Second Ministerial Conference, 1993, *Report*, Nuuk, September 16, p. 11.

28 Canada, Department of the Environment, 1990, *Draft memorandum from R.W. Slater, Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy, to the Assistant Deputy Minister, Conservation and Protection, and others: International Initiative on the Protection of the Arctic Environment*, Ottawa, April 27.

29 Ministerial Conference on the Protection of the Arctic Environment, 1991, "Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy," *International Legal Materials* 30, Section 10.

30 Second Ministerial Conference, 1993, *Report*, Nuuk, September 16, pp. 10-12.

31 cited by Canada, Department of the Environment, 1991, *Memorandum from E.F. Roots, Science Advisor Emeritus, to Dr. Len Good, Deputy Minister: Ministerial Meeting on Protection of the Arctic Environment - Rovaniemi, Finland*, Ottawa, June 25, p. 10.

It also explains the content of the agreements. Policy-makers filled in the initially undefined agenda as they learned of the issues from different groups. The most influential of these was a circumpolar epistemic community of scientists, which brought its knowledge of environmental problems to the table and so shaped the agreement that its only concrete achievements so far involve scientific cooperation. Also important, however, were indigenous groups, which transmitted several messages, most significantly involving their participation and the notion of sustainable development. Less influential were non-governmental advocacy groups, but they echoed many of the messages of scientists and indigenous peoples while contributing awareness of the global context of environmental policy.

This learning has been institutionalised, which enhances the prospects for further expansion of the circumpolar states' definitions of their interests. First, the agreements provide for regular meetings of the AEPS working groups, as well as ministerial conferences and meetings of senior officials. These ongoing interactions provide the occasions for further learning to occur. Second, the participation of scientists and indigenous groups is assured - the former through AMAP, and the latter through their observer status and the new sustainable development task force. Third, the authoritative knowledge of scientists will be reinforced and will gain further exposure through the various AEPS working groups, especially AMAP and the CAFF programme, central to whose mandates is the development of recommendations for future policy.

It should be remembered, however, that other circumpolar arrangements, the Comité Arctique International, the Arctic Ocean Sciences Board, and even the IASC, have been limited in their effectiveness by a lack of political support from circumpolar governments. This has been attributed both to a lack of direct governmental involvement and control, and to the various organisations' inability to deal with political obstacles to cooperation. These factors have been addressed by the AEPS, which is directly controlled by the eight polar states and which, in bringing government representatives together,

provides a forum to deal with political issues. However, a caution is provided by a non-governmental working group on Arctic cooperation, which said in 1990 that "[...] short on public interest, ministers will be constrained in securing resources; short on resources, ministers will be obliged to constrain cooperation [...]"³² In the period after the 1993 Nuuk ministerial conference, the political profile of Arctic environmental problems, indeed of the environment in general, softened somewhat. The attention of southern majorities turned to other things, especially economic recession. Government priorities reflected this; for example, the much-vaunted Canadian Green Plan, which includes Arctic programmes, was gutted by funding cuts, while the US considerably reduced its Arctic research budget.³³

The ups and downs of political attention spans aside, the AEPS must be seen as a success when it is compared to the absence of significant circumpolar cooperation during the Cold War. In the words of E.F. Roots, we must "acknowledge the overall good-will, and the enormous strides that had been made toward developing enthusiasm for a common goal, compared with the cautious suspicion or skepticism that was prevalent at the first meeting in 1989."³⁴

Analysis of this process ties together several different strands of international relations theory, fitting into negotiation analysis the two-level game metaphor and thinking about transnational interest groups and epistemic communities. In essence, how states define their interests is seen as essential to explaining this negotiation. The conclusion is that within boundaries set by Realist considerations of military, economic, and political power, Idealist definitions of state interests allowed the circumpolar states to see

³² Griffiths, Franklyn and Oran R. Young, 1990, "Impressions of the Co-Chairs: Protecting the Arctic's Environment," in *Working Group on Arctic International Relations, Third Session, Moscow and Murmansk, USSR, 22-27 January 1990: Reports and Papers*, p. 26.

³³ Bankes, Nigel, Terry Fenge, and Sarah Kalf, 1993, "Toward Sustainable Development in Canada's Arctic: Policies and International Relations," in Christopher J. Maule and Fen Osler Hampson (eds.), *Canada Among Nations 1993-94: Global Jeopardy*, p. 188. Sterne, John, Environmental Defense Fund (US), 1993, *Interview*, Washington, December.

³⁴ Canada, Department of the Environment, 1991, *Memorandum from E.F. Roots, Science Advisor Emeritus, to Dr. Len Good, Deputy Minister: Ministerial Meeting on Protection of the Arctic Environment - Rovaniemi, Finland*, Ottawa, June 25, p. 10.

environmental cooperation as attractive. This was encouraged by the messages of domestic interest groups, in particular environmental NGOs, indigenous peoples, and an epistemic community of scientists. The negotiations themselves were a learning process through which such interest groups were able to define issues and influence positions. They were most influential on issues, most notably scientific cooperation, which did not call into question the Realist interests of any of the parties.

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