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The Political Sociology of a Labour Reserve:
Post-War Northern Greece and the Federal Republic of Germany.

by

GEORGIOS ODYSSEUS TSOBANOGLOU, M.A. (McMaster)

A Thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Sociology and Anthropology
Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario

Date 28 September 1991.

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Post-War Northern Greece and the Federal Republic of Germany

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in partial fulfilment of the requirements
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ABSTRACT

This dissertation aims to contribute to the understanding of post-war socio-political processes in northern Greece. Substantively, this is a study of the development of civil institutions as they relate to state political power. The focus is on the category "guest-labour" as it developed after the war in Europe. The attempt is to establish the historical genealogy of this system as it pertains to the German system of foreign labour recruitment.

Greek development in the forties and early fifties led to the formation of an "exceptional" type of a conservative regime. Such a regime may be seen as the specific outcome of external interventions. The role of the British is presented as central to the course of events taken in Greek affairs for the years to come after the second world war. In actual terms, the intervening British forces in Greece (1945) supported a regime which represented a continuity of the pre-war power configuration, while claiming to be engaged in a crusade against Communism.

The emergence of social democratic welfare in Britain, as a result of the impact of "total-war" with Germany, allowed the formation of a labour-inspired social welfare policy with an expanded social basis. The dissertation makes the argument that the Popular Government of the Resistance in war-time Greece represented the first socially equitable and democratically represented government in the Greek countryside, which developed under similar pressures of "total war"

conditions. However, reasons of Empire prevented the continuity of this regime. British intervention in Greece promoted a division of political forces which led to a civil war in 1947. Concomitantly, the British were successful in transferring their responsibility for Greek Affairs to the Americans.

The victors in the civil war built an enormous military apparatus to represent and define state security interests. In the northern provinces of Greece, "security zones" were formed as security measures leading to the formal edifice for the Northern Greece Labour Reserve (N.G.L.R.). State institutions and their legal and economic interventions completed the formation and reproduction of this unique system of labour-rotation in Europe. The establishment of this reserve regime in Greece represents the institutional accumulation of a number of foreign and internal state interventions into society and community in northern Greece. In Greece, the political system which was put in place during the late forties and fifties regulated all activities corresponding to the logic of the pre-war traditional clientelist regime. In the Northern Greece Labour Reserve (N.G.L.R.), a system of controls was established which clearly led to labour exclusion and a subsistence economy. The social control arrangements in the reserve involved two mechanisms. These are the system of labour-control maintained by the state and the mode of industrial employment fostered in Greece. These two systems appeared at the time to keep wages very low and to promote the informal non-wage economy as a means to keep low subsistence levels for the reproduction of labour, which was to be done abroad.

The system in Germany, similar to other advanced liberal social formations, has been able to appropriate labour from other states due to the process of labour reproduction which involves the separation of maintenance and renewal of labour.

This dissertation attempts to establish for the first time the formation and maintenance of the system of labour reserve set in place in post-war Greece.

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I would like to express my deepest appreciation to my thesis committee, Profs Ken Hatt, Adam Podgorecki and Derek Smith.

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It is needless to say that I am responsible for the contents of the entire work.

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For my Parents and Emmanuel and Ioanna

1832 Greek Kingdom

1864 Ionian Islands ceded by Great Britain

1881 Thessaly and part of Epirus ceded by Turkey

1913 Macedonia, Crete, and Aegean Islands ceded by Turkey

1918 Western Thrace ceded by Bulgaria

1920-1923 Eastern Thrace and Smyrna granted to Greece but returned to Turkey after Greco-Turkish War

1947 Dodecanese Islands ceded by Italy

Source: Based on information from Leften S. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, New York, 1965, p. 662.

Chapter 1 Introduction

The purpose of this dissertation is to provide at the macro and micro-sociological level, an understanding of post-war Greek labour migration from northern Greece. Social and politico-administrative changes and developments are considered with a focus on their definition in terms of the general socio-legal development of the Greek state and society. This thesis argues, that the phenomenon of a labour exodus from this part of the European periphery towards the industrial centre of Europe after the Second World War was not spontaneous, as was its parallel migration to America and Australia throughout this century. Rather, it was managed and directed through Greek and West German governmental policies and institutions. This was a unique phenomenon in the history of post war Europe. The benefits of migration for both Greece and West Germany ¹ appear to be obvious: the weak peripheral Greek economy unburdened itself of surplus labour; the German industrial machine received the resulting benefits. However, very little attention has been paid to the political and institutional mechanisms which encouraged and managed out-migration from the sending state. This has probably been the case because the benefits for both parties were considered so great as to obviate closer scrutiny. Out-migration of

1. From now on the name of the now united Germany will be used in the text but the reader must bear in mind that East Germany was not part of this phenomenon.

labour from Greece commenced in the immediate post-civil war period.² Political factors, present at the time, were of paramount importance in the genesis of this phenomenon and are essential to a comprehensive understanding of the mechanisms of mass labour export from Greece to Germany in the late fifties and sixties. This poses a relatively complex problem in clarification, given the multiplicity of interests involved, which are both internal and external. On the external side, the sometimes divided and sometimes combined interests of hegemonic concerns of first Britain, and then the United States of America, (and to a certain extent the regional interests of the Soviet Union) were influential. The internal Greek situation was characterized by the actions of an over-centralized government in Athens, which represented mainly the interests of traditional power holders of Greek society and economy. These "traditional" interests were and are still largely situated in the southern mainland.

1.2 Greek Migration to Germany

During the period from 1946 to the late seventies, migration from Greece amounted to almost 2.2 million people. Half of this number can be accounted for by overseas migration. The remainder was destined for Europe. The population

2. During the fifties migration appeared as an issue involving political refugees. Subsequently, a mass exodus occurred during the late fifties towards Australia, South Africa, Brazil and Canada. Planned temporary migration to Germany started during the early sixties.

of the country in 1949 was 7.5 million, reaching a total of 10 million by 1981. According to official statistics, Greece had a high rate of return migration, totalling about one million people, during the 1946-81 period. This includes the settlers who were deported from Egypt ³ by Nasser, during the Suez Crisis in 1956. Similarly, a persecution has led to a Greek exodus during the period from the early fifties to late fifties and early sixties from Constantinople, Turkey, where a community of over 85,000 Greeks has been reduced to some 3,000 members.

Within this context of Greek postwar migration, northern Greece occupies a very important place. From the beginning of the sixties, the whole of Macedonia and Eastern Thrace, including parts of Epirus, provided the factories of the Federal Republic of Germany with a great number of workers. Between 1962 and 1973, the Deutsche Kommission in Griechenland (German Commission in Greece), acting as the official arm in Greece of the Federal Labour Office (based in Nuremberg, Germany), recruited over 53.4 per cent of the number of Greek labourers for Germany. Officially, the process of recruitment stopped by November 1973, at which time the total number of Greek workers in Germany was 406,394. Partly due to the recession in the seventies, the number of Greeks in Germany declined by 1977 to 328,465. What such numbers do not show is the rotation system of which these workers are a part. In any case, in 1977 the Greeks constituted the third largest contingent of the Gastarbeiter in Germany, after the Turks and Yugoslavs.

During the period 1961-1971, over 214,012 workers migrated from

3. In 1930, there were just over 76,000 Greeks in Egypt. See International Labour Office: World Statistics of Aliens, Studies and Reports, Series O, No. 6 (Geneva 1936).

Macedonia mostly to Germany, as Table 1 shows.

Table 1.

Evolution of Migratory Current from Macedonia, 1961-71.

Population Natural Movement 1961-71.

19 March 1961 :	1,896,112 population.	Births : 354,891
14 March 1971 :	1,890,684 population.	Deaths : -146,307
Overall Evolution:	-5,428 population.	Excess: = 208,584
Migration Loss :	-214,012 or 11.3 per cent of 1971 population.	

Source: National Statistical Service of Greece, 1961, 1971.

Analysis of the post-war migration policies of the Greek state requires consideration of the structure of political power, which defines the roles of the various legally responsible professional bodies. Legal autonomy, which presupposes legal status, is definitely the most important single act on the part of a state in its process of political emancipation and national sovereignty. The development of organized professional combines, as well as of labour, has been historically necessary for the emergence of civil society. In northern Greece, certain institutions were reconstituted after the civil war with clearly undemocratic bias and a resulting denial of civil society.

For reasons of simplification, our attention will be concentrated on the European aspect of Greek migration, that is, mainly on the so called planned

migration, which refers specifically to a process by which the state which demands labour defines the types of work positions available. This focus limits the scope of the analysis of "temporary" migration. This type of migration has also been known as "guest-labour" migration.

The volume of literature on post-war events in Greece is considerable. Indeed, during the past ten years a substantial number of publications have been produced from numerous meetings and symposia in the United States and Europe; however, very little has come from Greece itself. This work, possibly the first to emanate from Canada, is intended as a contribution to that effort by coming to terms with the issue of post-war Greek out-migration to Germany. The literature tends to be either stridently ideological or classically conservative. Ideological arguments of both the left and the right generally focus on aspects of dependency, imperialism and justifications for the imposition of draconian measures to counteract leftist tendencies in the population, respectively.

The present thesis examines labour migration during the 1949 to 1981 period in a macro-sociological perspective. This is undertaken through an examination of Greek institutions with an emphasis on their structures and policies. The objective is to fill a large void in the literature and to steer clear of ideological preconceptions in the interests of building a comprehensive explanation of this important phenomenon. This research focuses chiefly on legal and political institutions, which played a central role in establishing a labour reserve in northern Greece. It is argued, that the Greek state employed a coherent and coordinated

set of institutions and policies which not only established conditions at home needed to sustain the incentive for labour out-migration, but also managed the migration cycle between Greece and Germany. It was from these northern territories that "guest labour" for Germany was recruited after the signing of what was the very first agreement of its kind in Europe, the Labour Exchange Agreement of 1960. The institutional development of a "labour reserve" assumes a relationship between the reserve (the place of recruitment) and the place of work. In this case, Germany is the place of work, and northern Greece is the reserve. The chief characteristic of the labour reserve is its ability to supply cheap labour on a continuous basis.

This is achieved by assigning the costs of social reproduction, pension, unemployment insurance, sickness benefits, and of renewal of labour, as well as the physical costs of rearing workers to productive age, to the sending area, the labour reserve. The special separation under capitalism of the conditions of reproduction of labour into processes of renewal and maintenance of labour has been documented by Burawoy (1977). Guest labour between Germany and Greece resembles the labour flows established between South Africa and the "front-line" states and its interior homelands, as well as some uses of Mexican labour in the United States (Wolpe, 1980; Leggassik & Wolpe, 1976; Burawoy, 1977; Meillassoux, 1972; 1981). The reserve also acts as a buffer against variances in labour requirements in the industrially advanced/developed areas.

In the labour reserve, renewal and reproduction of the labour supply takes

place in the reserve, while direct maintenance occurs in the place at which labour is appropriated. In other words, the labour power of people of productive age from the reserve is fully applied to German industry. The cost of reproduction during unemployment periods and costs of old-age and retirement are deferred to the sending area, where a subsistence agricultural economy, supported by remittances, bears the burden. This also benefits the political interests which oversee the reserve. The actions of the traditional interests (which are invested with the control of the Greek state) revealed active support of this arrangement. This arrangement is articulated in policies and actions of the Greek state apparatus for national security, as well as legislation affecting labour, investment, and development, and most certainly justice.

Greek policies have actively discouraged investment in the labour reserve. Control by the centralised state over the application of capital to regional economic development has effectively stopped the infusion of significant capital investment into the labour reserve area, as well as other parts of Greece. In effect, the social class in power has systematically organized the economy in such ways, that the conditions for growth or development of a competing class could not be generated. Paradoxically, this situation provides the ingredients for civil strife and political instability. This instability is subsequently used as a justification for the existence of an extensive and over-grown apparatus for state security. This apparatus has been heavily financed by Occidental allies concerned with regional security.

The literature on migration commonly assumes that migration is due to two related phenomena. The first is overpopulation; the second is economic underdevelopment and rural poverty. Overpopulation and rural poverty are useful factors in analysing labour flows from the "developing" periphery to the advanced liberal states. However, this superficial explanation cannot fully account for the phenomenon. Mass population displacements also result from extraordinary conditions of a political nature such as war and political arrangements imposed by the victors on the vanquished. Demographic effects may be similar, but the causes are different. This was the case in Greece where British and American military interventions in 1946 and 1947-49 led to policies which created mass population displacements (Laiou, 1987:55-104).

The second phenomenon, that of economic underdevelopment or poverty as another cause of out-migration, has been the common explanation. However, this explanation is far from adequate in the Greek case. This alleged cause is questionable due to the fact that Greece had achieved very high growth rates, in its capital intensive sector, as well as high levels of out-migration. Particularly during the period in consideration, late fifties to early eighties, economic growth in Greece as well as other countries of out-migration, e.g. Korea, has been greater than the economic growth levels of the countries receiving the migrants, namely Germany and the United States respectively.

Regulated migration between designated states is commonly conceived as a process whereby one state "agrees" to send a portion of its working population

to work for a specific period of time in another state. The consequences and structural reasons for this phenomenon (during its first decade), from the point of view of the sending state, have escaped closer scrutiny. It is only since the seventies in Europe, when mass repatriation of migrants emerged as an issue, that light has been shed on the matter. However, a systematic historical analysis of the relation between the sending and the receiving state has not yet been undertaken.

An investigation into the labour migration relation between Greece and Germany will illuminate some of the less visible aspects of the post-war political and economic situation. By emphasizing the historical sources of the processes of population displacement, this work might also help to modify in concrete ways the prevailing analyses of labour emigration, and introduce new dimensions into the field. The political dislocation of the population of the northern region of Greece was based on the principles of a regime of "internal defence" (Carephoris, 1975). The notion of "internal defence" played a central role in legitimizing the physical apparatus of the northern Greece labour reserve. It has deep roots in the pre-war regime which was a fascist totalitarian state (1936-41). The northern Greek labour reserve was largely defined geographically by specific measures which entailed a pass-system; limits to freedom of mobility, or assembly; an almost total discretion of police authorities to search and enter premises without a warrant, etc. Such legislation (Legal Decree 397 of 1947 and Law 2433 of 1953) pertained largely to measures concerning the security of "fortified positions". The terminology was derived from operations enacted during the Civil War (1945-49)

and used long after hostilities ceased in 1949 (Alivisatos, 1986).

Thus, the juridical panoply which was put in place after the Civil War combined aspects of the pre-war repressive apparatus of the Metaxas regime, with somewhat less baroque but more effective mechanisms of control and security. One such Law (Law 376 of 1936) was modified and amended in to Law 2433 of 1953 to designate the northern labour reserve areas as "areas of surveillance". Such areas included most of the country's northern border region (a zone of 1,212 kms long and between 5 and 100 kms wide). It included 420 urban and semi-urban centres in Macedonia and Thrace, 300 centres in the prefectures (nomarchies) of Jannina and Thesproti (Epirus), and 20 centres in the northern part of Corfu. The total population of these areas was about 1 million, or some 15 per cent of the Greek population at the time. Administration was in the hands of the military who were responsible for the control of population movement within the territory. Passes were required for entering and leaving these areas through controlled exit/entry points. The exercise of private or civil rights were subject to approval by the General Chiefs of Staff at the Ministry of National Defence in Athens (Alivisatos, 1986:429-30). In general, the Greek political system was heavily influenced by the pre-war system. In effect, these laws reconstituted the pre-war totalitarian system of political administration and patronage.

Despite the token nature of its liberalism, the democratically elected government of George Papandreou (Centre Union Party 1963-1965) was dismissed by King Constantine in 1965. The events which followed led to political turbulence

culminating in a coup d'état, which was followed by a seven-year dictatorship (Tsoukalas, 1969; Poulantzas, 1976; Iatrides ed., 1981; Baerentzen et al. eds, 1987; Kofas, 1989). The extended arm of the security forces in direct control of such a large area in peace-time severely curtailed the economic dimension of life for all those located in the labour reserve areas.

Military administration of 'command-type' economies and of civil spheres tend to contradict the very process of development, as some recent examples in Eastern Europe appear to indicate. Generally, in advanced state-corporate regimes, socio-political conditions define the rights and functions between the political and the economic spheres, the public and private. In less mature or socially undeveloped regimes, the polity itself cannot be thought of as distinct from the economic sphere. Similarly before the emergence and development of the discipline of economics and therefore of the modern concept of economics by A. Marshall, the dominant conceptions about an "economy" were conceptualized by the Greek concept of "oekonomia" (meaning household management). This term denoted the very principle of political economy as it came to be known by Adam Smith, David Ricardo, William Petty, John S. Mill, Jeremy Bentham, and, of course, Karl Marx. In central and Germanic Europe (Holy Roman Empire), as within the German universities, this principle came to be conceptualized, during the eighteenth century, as an established discipline called "National-Economy".

National-Economy encompassed such categories as administration, government, territory and population. In other words, before the constitution of the

discipline of modern economics, there was a well understood political (institutional) entity addressing itself to power, order and administration. That is to say, "economics" was understood to have a different meaning to that which we normally consider in modern times. Similarly, the issues of "efficiency", "investment", and "policy" ought to be understood as bearing different meanings in different historical settings. The rise of the entrepreneurial class and the assigning, by these historical settings of new functions to the bureaucracy has provided the impetus for the concept of efficiency to denote "a scientific technical expertise pertaining directly to administration conceived as a thing-in-itself" (Heper, 1971:417-445; Raeff, 1987; Tsobanoglou, 1990).⁴ This Janus-faced reality: the political and the economic, associated with earlier systems of governing, requires, in the case of Greece, to address the political and largely personal element in order to understand the post-war social development. Those, of the citizens suspected to be politically guilty by the post-war Greek government, were not only excluded from public sector employment but were also cut off from the market and thus were deprived of the very means of participating in economic life. Producers require communication links, transport and storage facilities as the necessary means of exchange within the market-place. The control of those networks and facilities is very important in establishing the connection between the production

4. For the relation between politics and "economic" policy de-Brunhoff (1982) might be of use. For the relation between the political and the economic in the historical development of liberalism Walther 1980:13(2):178-192, is of help.

site and the market. In the Greek case, organizations at the local level have been so closely monitored and restricted by the central administration, that the means to act in order to establish such connections were never allowed to be developed. It is for this reason that a great deal of Greek agricultural produce has no markets and is "dumped" literally every year, while similar produce are imported.⁵

In post-war Greece, political controls have similarly blocked the organization of popular voluntary associations. For instance, the very "act of assembly" was drastically curtailed and unique measures were established on the labour front. One example is Law 3239 on compulsory arbitration, which curtailed "freedom of association". This law developed an idiosyncratic system of compulsory arbitration and direct interference by the judicial system in internal labour issues. Labour tribunals are absent to this day. Civil courts appointed, and continue to do so, labour leaders directly when asked to do so.

Two principal events which have helped to alleviate this situation: First was the signing of the Greek-German Labour Exchange Agreement in 1960. Second was the liberalization of government with the electoral victory of George Papandreou's Centre-Union Party in 1963. The new government issued passports to migrants. This permitted those interned in the "protected areas" to migrate as guest-labour in Germany.

The type of labour initially produced by the labour reserve was generally

5. Plate on Page 235 of the Appendix A shows an example of how the axis powers occupying Greece divided the country into economic zones. There appear to have been some similarities with such a regime in the system set in place in Greece after the Second World War.

unskilled, non-wage rural labour. It was closely monitored during the whole rotation-process (migration-cycle), from the reserve to the place of work, by the German administrative grid in conjunction with the pass-system existing for the guest-labourers. This labour was not the traditional type of labour which migrated from Greece to the Americas, Australia, Africa, France, and elsewhere. Controlled and rotating guest labour was a post-war phenomenon as far as Greece is concerned. For example, this development was hinted at in the 1949 I.L.O. report on labour conditions in Greece, and in some American documents from the late forties which shaped subsequent Greek policy trends (I.L.O., 1949; Cariotis, 1978). The I.L.O. Mission on the labour conditions in Greece circa 1947 made a direct reference to the type of Greek migrant communities in France as an obstacle to the mass application of Greek workers to aid post war European reconstruction. It was hinted that unskilled or semi-skilled Greek workers might be more appropriate material for export and an appropriate solution for some of Greece's problems. At the time the only sizeable community of Greeks in Europe were to be found in Paris, Venice and London and were mostly professionals, business and students.⁶

It would appear then, that the very notion of a "reserve of labour" requires the existence of a subsistence economy. The establishment of wage employment, the development of skills, a social division of labour as well as capital accumulation, has been arrested in Greece. Conditions for capital accumulation

6. The first office for diaspora Greeks was established in the Foreign Ministry in 1949.

and investment and, indeed, governability within the "reserve" were and still are closely monitored (negatively) by the administrative apparatus in Athens. Monitoring denotes the very process of control aimed at the maintenance of the conditions which reproduce the "reserve": i.e., limits to accumulation and low social costs of maintaining labour. The "cheapness" of Greek labour, i.e. low wages, poor social services and pensions, refers to the special relation with the German labour market rather than the largely non-existent national labour market. Most researchers (Tsoukalas, 1986; Vergopoulos, 1987-88) seem to forget that this is the real reason for the low-level of services provided, i.e., pensions, education, health, by the Greek state. As far as the real cost of labour to local businesses in Greece is concerned, it has been established that it is very high in comparison with other mediterranean economies such as Italy's, Spain's or Portugal's ("To Vema", 1991: D14). According to a recent study made by the British Trade Unions, the wage of the industrial worker in Greece not only remains the lowest in the E.E.C. (with the exception of Portugal) but it continues to lose distance. (In 1970 Irish and Italian wage levels were 92 per cent of Greece's, but by 1987 their wage differential had reached the 133 and 134 percentages respectively.) The cost of labour has been so undervalued in Greece that the cost of local products appears to be among the highest in Europe. Greek products are 17.3 per cent more expensive than the Portuguese and 20.8 per cent higher than the Spanish.

One ought not to confuse the two different relations which are involved here, the domestic labour market and the special relation of migrant labour with the

"labour market" to which it is exported in Germany. Without a labour market and the institutions associated with it, it is difficult to transform labour into labour-power, the commodity which generates value.

In Greece, the level of wages, as it is understood in the West, represents only a small fraction of the wage earners, particularly in the public sector and the foreign-controlled private sector. A great deal of what accounts for wages is, in fact, pay for intermittent daily employment. The issue of low costs for Greek labour is the single most important element in the Greek popular ideology of making the Greek economy competitive. Such "doxa" or common opinion, fits very well with the whole principle of the labour reserve. Labour has to be very cheap in order to make labour exports competitive vis a vis the other states which are exporting labour.

The mechanisms by which accumulation of wealth and capital have been obstructed in Greece are investigated here with some startling results with regard to the country's wage system, employment, and labour relations. The issue of migration represents a most important phenomenon and close scrutiny is necessary in order to understand the present Greek regime's features. Relations between Greece and Germany have been mixed. Greece fought against Germany during the Second World War. In 1961 it signed an associate agreement with the European Economic Community and joined the Community in 1981. Full labour mobility for Greek labour within the Community was established in 1988. By looking at the particular relationship of labour rotation between Greece and

Germany, it is possible to see the significance of labour, in terms of Greek political economy, work, and industrial relations. It is also possible to shed some light on the type of organizational ensemble which was established in the post-war period. Once the issues of labour organization, administrative control of the population, and the constraints on economic activity and voluntary associations are dealt with, the issues of wage formation and endemic labour out-migration are considered. These key factors combine to render intelligible the post-war status of northern Greece during the period under discussion.

This chapter has described the argument of the thesis and its overall problematic. Chapter 2 reviews the historical precedents of the phenomenon of labour migration. It makes the argument that Germany's tradition of using "command" labour, particularly during the Nazi period, has been reformed and continued after the war. This is seen in the continuity between the "guest-labour" system and the war-time foreign labour system. Chapter 3 provides the historical background for the Greek migration phenomenon and describes the characteristics of Greek communities in Germany: It examines the notions of the "diaspora" and "extra-territoriality" as they pertain to the phenomenon of guest-labour.

Chapter 4 closely examines labour migration and analyzes Greek institutions, which have been identified as playing instrumental roles in establishing and maintaining the operation of the northern Greece labour reserve. This chapter also examines external factors which were important in forming the labour reserve.

It focuses on two very important features of the post-war Greek polity which define its political nature. These are: the principle of the "internal enemy" and the principle of warfare-welfare connection as established by Beveridge and Titmuss. The second principle relates to Greece in an indirect manner since it focuses upon the vicissitudes of British internal policies and external intervention as they affected Greece. This chapter brings into focus for the first time a sociologically-based interpretation of the Greek civil-war as well as the Greek institutions and political structures as they affect social welfare. The notion of "national defence" is also discussed as an ideological support for government actions and policies during the period under scrutiny.

Chapter 5 is the key chapter of the thesis. This chapter examines the determinants of the formation of the northern Greek labour reserve. It reviews post-war security measures established by the government and managed by the military, and the police. These measures were instrumental in the political-institutional and physical-geographical definition of the reserve. Political and demographic aspects of recruitment to public sector employment are examined with reference to policies governing the "labour-reserve". This chapter reviews some government policies which discouraged the development of a national labour market through the suppression of skills, wages, training and, restrained the inflow of capital and investment outside of very narrowly defined enclaves. There is also a discussion supporting the theory of the northern Greece labour reserve, namely the mode of industrial development and employment in Greece. A further section

reviews the economic character of the remittance system in the context of Greek economy and politics. The chapter concludes with a synopsis of the economic, social, and political dimensions which characterize the northern Greece labour reserve.

Chapter 6 examines the mechanisms which manage the labour reserve. It begins with a review of the regulatory apparatus which governs Greek-German migration followed by a section which considers briefly some of the economic necessities which define the use of such labour by Germany. The operation of the reserve through the German dual labour market and the rotation of labour are analyzed in an interpretation of the "regulatory framework" provided by the Greek-German Agreement.

Chapter 7 concludes the thesis. Post-war Greek history has been clouded by many ideological controversies. That is happening at a time, when such controversies should not be silenced. In this work, the approach is to furnish a balanced view that accounts for all the seemingly disparate phenomena on the basis of facts and by examining the institutions operant, but without reference to any specific theoretical analysis. The development of the concept of the Northern Greece Labour Reserve (NGLR) represents the main contribution of the thesis. During the period 1949-81 certain political institutions were developed and subsequently crystallized in Greece with the aim to design and manage an idiosyncratic socio-political situation.

Although the Greek state has joined the Western European Community, by

1981, a great challenge awaits it in the resolving of the contradiction between these institutional "artifacts" and the realities of the contemporary European situation. Similarly, from the social perspective, the inability of Greek society to develop social institutions outside those of the state and officialdom places the country in a very difficult and inflexible posture vis-a-vis its own destiny. The dominant class in Greece has systematically organized the "economy", even if such a statement appears as ironic, for as is generally agreed, the economy of Greece is very disorganised, mirroring its own traditional patron client interests, in such a manner that the emergence of a new entrepreneurial class could not be generated.

Such are the ingredients for conflict and social upheaval which may be recognized by the student of modern Greek politics.

The society of the reserve lacks the fundamental constituents of the community. The over-centralized allocation and control of resources of the reserve and its diaspora members further dislocates any attempt to form social security as the social basis of those communities. The draconian monopoly of the state in the licensing of investment for the economy as well as for social overheads from the migrants, effectively blocks the formation of communities - with health and education - by those working abroad. The reserve may never transform itself unless external conditions change.

While the European economic conditions have changed, Greece's traditional internal socio-political structure has remained inert, perpetually seeking to justify

its mirror-image. It is the phenomenon of the Greek diaspora which might be able to furnish some elements of change in the Greek "societe bloque".

Chapter 2 German use of coerced labour

2.1 Guest-Labour Migration and "work-camps": An old concept with Continental history.

Guest labour migration in post-war Germany bears great resemblance to the system of foreign labour recruitment established by the Nazi State in 1936. In fact, a legislative system for control of foreign labour remained in force long after the end of the second world war. It was only in 1966 that a new act regarding foreign workers was passed, which then replaced the notorious Nazi foreign labour system.¹ The old Nazi labour system was based on a "Rotationsprinzip" (rotation principle) and was regulated in part by the Forced-Labour Office, and by final emigration to the concentration camps (Meillassoux, 1981:140). Essentially, German concentration camps were forced labour camps. The Greek concentration camps, established for dissidents during the 1936-41 Metaxas Fascist Dictatorship, the Nazi period, and the subsequent post second world war period were also forced labour camps. This regime of political and social control (camps for dissidents as hard labour camps) continued almost until the 1974 downfall of the April 21, 1967 Dictatorship. Clearly, the concentration camps in Greece can be defined as labour camps, even if they were created for ideological and political

1. The utilisation of foreign labour in Germany predates the post-world war II years. It was generally linked with the war effort reaching the 5.5 million figure (Homze, 1967).

gains as opposed to the national socialist war-motivated effort of Nazi Germany. The aim of the German war time camps was to provide labour, that was as "free" and "flexible" as possible, within the technical constraints of the production process prevalent at the time. For example, the war effort included the Ford Motor Company in Cologne. After the war, during the sixties to seventies, over 50 per cent of the labour force of this corporation consisted of labour from the traditional guest labour reserves in Germany, derived mainly from the Balkans. Foreign workers were "forced" to labour under conditions of absolute disregard for their physical and ethical condition as human beings.

It is this legacy from which post-war migration agreements were established by the German state. One basic element, aside from the more baroque aspects of the Nazi period, was the centrality of the Rotationprinzip, which was applied to guest-labour migration. This was a way for Germany to maintain the cultural and national homogeneity of its population while developing its productive potential.

Migrant workers in post-war Germany consisted basically of two kinds of workers: those derived from the European Economic Community (E.E.C.), and those from outside. While the former enjoyed legal rights of mobility, defined by the Treaty of Rome (1958), the latter were subject to the rigours of the regulatory powers of the German state, which determined the demand for such labour.

The number of foreign workers in Germany is outlined on Table 2. The labour force statistics indicate that workers from Greece, along with the other non-

E.E.C. labourers constituted the majority of foreign workers in Germany.²

Moreover, Italian workers in Germany were treated differently from non-E.E.C. foreign workers, since their condition was governed by the Treaty of Rome labour regulations.

The guest-labour system was an administrative system regulating all aspects of the migration process including recruitment, shipment, placement, living conditions, freedom of movement, duration of stay, conditions of mobility and family reunification. All in all, this system allowed the German state to exercise total control over the "guest-workers". The most immediate effect of this regulatory system has been the distinct and disadvantageous position of the guest-workers in the Federal Republic's labour market.

Table 2.

Federal Republic of Germany. Workers in thousands.

	1965	1970	1973	1975
Employment	21,289	21,747	22,054	20,015
Foreign Workers	1,164	1,839	2,519	2,071
% Foreign Workers	5.5	8.5	11.4	10.3
% Euro. Community Workers	2.1	2.2	2.6	2.2

Source: European Economic Community, Eurostat (1978).

Local and European Economic Community workers experience much more

2. Greek labour was considered as guest-labour until the period predating the entry of Greece into the European Common Market's labour market in 1988.

advantageous conditions of employment. There are differentials, of course, between E.E.C. nationals in a host or home territory, for example between Italians and Germans in Germany. There, the absence of legal regulatory constraints, which determine conditions of work and life for the non-E.E.C. workers, does not mean that other ways of institutional discrimination are not in evidence. In a similar way, discrimination, which is based on age or gender, or between categories of "labour" and "capital", exists, indicating that labour markets are riddled with stratified categories. The treatment here of the category "guest-labour", as a subsidiary category of migrant labour, is presented as the category referring to a specific body of workers who are defined and controlled, in socio-economic terms, as totally as possible by the means of a state administration.

This regulatory mechanism acts as an extended part of the machinery which reproduces certain categories of labour power, both in the production sphere and the sphere of reproduction or consumption.³ By explaining the operation of this administrative modality, one can demonstrate the relation which exists between the institution of administration and capital accumulation within a hegemonic liberal state; the relations between such a state and its client states which export labour, as perhaps the only marketable commodity they can export, and last but not least, the intimate relations which exist between the divided families of migrants, the place of work and the place of rearing children. The latter involves two distant states, a remittance economy system, with its very special effects for the donor

3. Such a connection is being made in Chapter 6, i.e. the regulatory framework of guest-labour migration.

states, a remittance economy system, with its very special effects for the donor and host states. In this work however, the emphasis is on the donor state and the implications of this system on its regime of accumulation and development. As Wolpe (1980) and Meillassoux (1981) have shown in Southern Africa, the system of labour appropriation appears to bear great similarities to the guest-labour system developed by Germany after the second world war in Europe. Many European colonial powers, Belgium and Germany, for instance, have certainly used this labour system in their former colonies, namely The Congo, Namibia, South West Africa and former Tanganyika.

Within the European Economic Community, only the Federal Republic of Germany has established such a system of labour imports. As discussed previously this labour recruitment regime in Germany has had a very long tradition, amplified during the National-Socialist Period in the thirties and forties. For instance Yugoslav labour during the war was used in many "teutonic" states, such as Norway, under severe conditions in building, among other things, the northern railway line.

Post-war usage of guest labour from northern Greece bears some interesting elements which might help us understand the nature of post-war capitalism in that part of Greece. While this is not the most comprehensive approach to the general issues of socio-political development of the region, and in consequence of the country, the specific targeting of the category "labour" might help illustrate the dynamics involved in this specific case. The issue of labour

exporting, its exclusion, and the peculiar administrative blockage of conditions for accumulation within the territory, the region, and the country as a whole, is of central importance for understanding the socio-political development of post-war Greece.

2.2 Background of the German use of southern foreign labour

2.2.1 The antecedents to migration situation in Germany

By 1981 the Federal Republic of Germany had 1.87 million registered foreign workers, along with 2.3 million dependents, representing the largest component of foreigners of any industrialized Community country (E.E.C. Publication, 1981). That is, by 1981 9.3 per cent of the German work force of 21,726,000 workers was comprised of foreigners.

The import of foreign workers in Germany is not new. By 1910, the number of foreign workers had climbed to 1.2 million. This number declined during the Weimar Republic years (1918-1933) to 100,000 (Katsoulis, 1978:15,17). During the Nazi period, the so called *Fremdarbeiter* reached the 5.5 million mark (Der Spiegel, 1970: 50ff). In addition, the Germans employed some 1.5 million Prisoners of War.

In total, about seven million foreign "guests" were forcefully moved, from the Balkans (Yugoslavia and Greece), and were engaged in productive activities in

work sites of the German Reich. Work place segregation of foreign workers from the nationals was a key element under those conditions.

Nazi racist ideology and pangermanism ⁴ were used to justify the abject conditions to which the "transit" populations were subjected. It is due to German national ideology, pangermanism, that Germany had been very reluctant to develop an immigration policy after the Second World War, instead of a policy for "foreigners" (fremdarbeider). It is for this reason that the Foreign Workers Act of 1936 was in force until 1965, some twenty years after the surrender of Nazi Germany.

After the War, almost 9 million ethnic Germans from the eastern territories were absorbed, while 3.5 million refugees from the former German Democratic Republic (East Germany), also entered the Federal Republic. All these population movements were taking place until the building of the Berlin Wall in August 1961. It was actually this physical barrier which necessitated the changing composition of labour imports to Germany.

It was then the mediterranean countries which provided the grounds for a fresh labour supply. Even as late as 1968, (West) Germany had between 500 to 600 labour recruiting offices in the countries of the European South (Rist, 1978:

4. The ideology of pangermanism was an ideology whereby the supremacy of the German race was axiomatic, i.e. taken as the foundation. Pangermanism was one of the founding principles of the Third Reich.

xii).⁵ The labour exchange agreement between Greece and Germany has been exemplary of the European type of such treaties. The Greek Ministry of Labour has maintained over 22 offices in major German urban centres throughout the period investigated (Lianos, 1984).

2.2.2 Post-War Migration to Germany: Implications and Theoretical Considerations for the Host and Donor Territories

The process of post-war economic development in the Federal Republic of Germany may be divided into the following periods:

- 1) The period of the fifties decade which is characterized by relatively high rates of growth,
- 2) The period of the sixties which is characterized by slower growth rates, terminating in the crisis of 1966-67, and
- 3) The period which began with the crisis of 1966/67, until the big energy crisis of 1973-74.

The utilization of foreign labour has been clearly linked to such periods : increased labour imports at times of high economic conjuncture, and pressure to return in times of low economic conjuncture.

During the 1952-60 period, the Federal Republic realized high growth rates,

5. In 1951, the Federal Republic had 485,000 foreign workers. The number rose to 4.1 million (including family members) by 1979, after the 1980 SOPEMI Report.

averaging about 7.7 per cent. The twelve million ethnic German workers from the East entered the West German labour market, comprising almost 27 per cent of the employed population by 1961. However in 1950, the number of unemployed was standing at 1.2 million (8.2 per cent unemployment rate). By 1955, the number of unemployed in Germany was standing at 495,000 (2.7 per cent), and in 1960, it was about 130,000 or 0.6 per cent. According to Dohse, however, in 1955 - the year the first labour recruitment agreement was signed with Italy, - there were one million unemployed people in Germany (Dohse, 1984: 495-509,496). This denotes that the labour requirements of the German economy were met by a special type of labour which was imported. At the same time, a process of recomposition of the labour economy was taking place with increasing internationalization taking place. As a result of such developments in the Federal Republic between 1974-77, about 935,000 jobs were lost in the entire economy. Foreign employment was reduced by about 443,000 persons (47 per cent of reductions affected foreigners, by comparison they occupied only 11 per cent of all jobs) (Dohse, 1984: 495-509,496). It appears that a national "full employment policy", a post-war social democratic goal, within the Federal Republic of Germany, was no longer a priority. Wages had to be kept low, and the filling of monotonous, stressful and often dangerous jobs, would have to be economically efficient. It was to this need that the new labour imports were to respond. Table 3 shows the evolution of the share of wages in the Federal Republic from 1950 to 1970.

Table 3.

**Germany's share of employees in the economically active population
based in the year 1950.**

	Real wage share	Net wage share
1950	58,4	58,4
1955	59,3	54,1
1960	60,6	53,7
1964	64,3	54,9
1968	63,9	53,7
1970	66,7	54,8

Source: Welteke, 1976: 69.

The great labour reserves of the East may be considered as one of the key reasons for the extremely high rates of capital accumulation achieved in Germany during the period. Such labour reserves were exhausted by the mid-fifties reaching a halt with the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961. It was then that Germany turned to the Balkans during the sixties, in order to satisfy its labour requirements.

As a result, national labour exchange agreements began to emerge as the new solution to the "labour shortage crisis" of the Federal Republic of Germany. Such agreements were signed, ensuring the opening up of the national German labour market to South Europeans.

The European South had, at the time, an abundance of labour, a class of "dangerous poor", which was being piled up in the newly urbanized areas, awaiting

employment. These "dangerous", ⁶ unemployed peasants, were "citizens" ⁷ of southern and south-eastern European states, which, at the time, were unable to develop systems of welfare-employment as had their Northern counterparts. The mass of peasants in those southern regions, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Andalusia, Calabria, and Sardinia represented a force which, as matters proved to be, could only be accounted for "export" (Coriat, 1985:Chapter 7). Characteristic of this labour was its easy adaptation to seasonal work in the fields, while in the city it could do many types of jobs to supplement its income. This type of labour, found in an "informal type" of economy, outside the wage form proper, was disorganized as labour by virtue of its being outside the very process of the politics of organized production.

The very fact that this labour form was based, for its reproduction, ⁸ upon family and extended kinship ties, rather than the wage form, implied a limited role of the peripheral state in the reproduction of the relations of production and the conditions of work. Instead, a system of administrative controls (in Greece), presented as a "care" mechanism, was sanctioning the very process of labour

6. Dangerous denotes the urban poor in search of employment. Before the emergence of state welfare - as labour market - policies the un-employed were treated as dangerous to the existing social order. In the Mediterranean region and indeed Greece itself the unemployed have been treated as "dangerous" rather than subject to care by the state agencies.

7. The principle of citizenship denotes certain civil, social, legal rights of the person and its associations which corresponds to real democratic constitutionality.

8. Reproduction as a process may be defined as a process composed by maintenance and renewal of labour power. While the host state might be able to provide for the maintenance via the wage form, the donor territory will provide for renewal of labour (Burawoy, 1977).

presented as a "care" mechanism, was sanctioning the very process of labour stability under conditions of labour exclusion.

Labour as a social category has been "marginal" in the south European periphery. The role of state administration, at least as far as the case of Greece was concerned, had been such as to render ineffective successive political attempts by the popular democratic forces. The impact of such "administrative care" was to provide the objective conditions for the transformation of certain regions of the country into veritable labour reserves for foreign labour markets.

Labour in the southern European periphery responded to the "demand" for additional and unskilled labour by the German and other "core" European states. This type of "guest-labour" was to be named there as "temporary", and socially "marginal" as well, however, its particular position in the labour process in Germany was of strategic importance. It was the so called undesirable jobs which were to be filled by foreigners, whose entry to the country was not for settlement, but for the purposes of filling the "supposedly" temporary and therefore provisional jobs in the labour market (Bohning, 1974:50).

In Germany itself, the first phase of labour imports began during the sixties with guest-workers doing work based on the piece-rate system. As a result, they raised production quotas, drawing thus hostility from indigenous union members. The main idea of those who encouraged this type of labour was to undermine partly the power of the industrial labour combines by the gradual displacement of the national by the multinational workers.

In 1961, the population of migrants was standing at 586,160 workers. They were mostly young, with ages ranging between 20 to 30 years, mostly male, and without any other family support structure within their host territory.

By late 1980, the population level was standing at 4,453,300 migrants, and it showed very different demographic characteristics. The age structure had a much more normal demographic representation, the most striking phenomenon being the sharp decline of the 20-30 years age bracket in favour of the 30-40 age bracket. After twenty years passed, the pattern of "guest workers" started to follow, slowly but steadily, tendencies similar to those of any order of the national German population group. This change represented a drastic change from the early constraints of the "foreign" economically active male guest-workers, who were totally subject to administrative regulations of entry and expulsion.

The mainly "ethnic" secondary labour market (Piore, 1971; Nikolinakos, 1975) as it came to be named, could be maintained without resorting to indigenous labour reserves, such as women or youth, at least in the first period of foreign imports. The utilization of women or youth, instead of "guest labour", would have entailed state expenditure for certain provisions such as child care, in the case of the employment of women, while it would have entailed less time for youth to spend off the labour market for studies. For this reason, the proportion of "women" and "youth" in the active labour market remained very low in Germany. At the same time, the type of jobs, which some of the guest workers came to fill, were those of the type which were not likely to be filled, at least under the

conditions prevailing in the secondary labour market in the sixties, by any locals, including women or youth.

One must keep in mind that Germany has managed to keep a very high employment proportion in the secondary sector of the economy, greater by far than other similarly organized states (social democratic), such as Norway's and Sweden's.

German industry in 1965 constituted 49.3 per cent of the overall labour employment sectors. This was reduced to only 41 per cent by 1985, while services increased in the same period to only 13.7 per cent. By German standards, both Sweden and Norway have a smaller secondary industry sector and larger service sectors.⁹

All in all, the high increase of the foreign population in the Federal Republic was dictated initially by a number of requirements. To begin with, night shift and over-time (the industrial flexibility factor) were augmented, in many cases, due to the availability of imported, temporary labour. Such sections in the employment process were stabilized by virtue of their "foreign" content, which laboured, under "unique" conditions. Work environment pressures were somehow postponed, since "national" workers were able to move on to other and better skilled positions. Changes occurred in the organizational structure of the unions as well. Unions normally represent skilled workers who are interested in maintaining, and indeed,

9. The weak representation of women in the German production process, partly due to the fact that the types of jobs which attracted the phenomenal growth of female participation in Scandinavia, was primarily in the tertiary sector, which experienced a phenomenal growth during the past 25 years, a sector which remained until recently rather weak in Germany.

improving the work environment.

Total employment rose by close to 1 per cent during 1960-73, but employment of domestic labour declined by about 0.5 per cent over the same period of time. The proportion of foreign employment rose from 1.29 per cent in 1960, near 10 per cent in 1973, as did foreign male and female participation rates, during the same period.

Table 8 in Dohse, (1982:36) shows the distribution of foreign workers and their sector allocation in three years, 1974, 1977 and 1980. From this, one can see the high concentration of foreigners in Iron and Steel foundries (28.9%), Textiles (22%), Synthetic fibres (21.6%), Construction and Automobiles (18%). The total percentage for 1974 was standing at 11.2% (for foreigners). With few exceptions the concentration of foreigners remained in similar positions until 1980, despite their employment reduction and the overall decline in the percentage of industrial employment.

In this phase, the initially termed "temporariness" of those jobs, which were to be occupied by outsiders, remains as the important aspect. "Temporariness" here refers to the continuous circulation of labour in positions in the work process, which apparently could not be transformed into ones with improved job content. It was under these conditions that foreign labour was to remain "marginal", like its true condition in the reserve-home land, at the very moment that it found itself located in a strategic position within the advanced state's production process. The "dangerous" poor were still in an informal socio-legal status as in their home

country. It was this regime of the provisional which rendered the migrants' situation rather precarious, and, as such, subject to arbitrary and discriminatory treatment. Such a discriminatory treatment was destined to discipline the amorphous groups of "guest-workers" and keep them under the order of such difficult production conditions.

The guest-worker system represents a very closely knit system of legal and administrative controls that has attempted to monitor and regulate behaviour at all costs. Indeed, this sector of the population within the Federal Republic was not so much subject to direct labour market controls, as it was very closely directed and commanded, like the army, by a complex ensemble of the agencies of the host territory. Such controls were very important in order to justify, to public opinion, the intention of the employers, as well as of the host state, regarding the duration of this type of labour (Belessiotis, 1986:37; Dohse, 1982:1-75; Albrecht, 1975:31-34; Nikolinakos, 1972).

When economic growth would slacken and employment would decrease, the "excess" workers, which were by definition borderline "marginals", would be easily sent off back home. This plan has been labelled as the "konjunkturpuffer" (economic buffer). The issue of guest-workers integration was, and still is, a point of contention, within the overall strategy of stabilizing the nationalities issue in the Federal Republic.

The import of labour was realized on the basis of a family system which was spreading across borders. This has been the essence of the "guest-worker"

scheme, which was operationalized on the basis of a unique reliance upon the third generation's up-keeping of young children at home, and of young parents working in Germany for a future back home.

It might be safely asserted that there was a system of connections between the job structures, the mode of consumption of labour power, the type of labour employed and the specific articulation through time of the results of this process in the mode of production, as it relates to technology itself. The displacement of (living) labour by technology affects those jobs in industry which are occupied by "flexible" foreigners (Gramsci, 1971; Coriat, 1985; Burawoy, 1977).

A possible explanation of what happens with the employment of guest-worker systems is that migrants constitute a homogeneous labour mass, multi-ethnic and unskilled, which gives impetus to a double process: a) a greater circulation of homogeneous tasks which amount, in due time, to the very possibility of their being replaced by automata, and b) the formation of the necessary organizational skills acquired through the upward mobility of the managerial staff, occupying the scientific positions developed through the push up factor created by foreign employment (Coriat, 1985).

As a result of this, in Germany, many jobs were rendered redundant, and, as such, they were eliminated.

Table 9 in Dohse, (1982:38) clearly shows the drastic reductions among foreign employment, which increased, in particular, after 1974. Appropriately, it is no wonder that the years 1973-74 were the years which saw a "freeze" upon

further foreign worker recruitment.

This period marks the general reversal of the trends contributing to the composition of the foreign populations, which, from then on, were beginning to acquire properties of a settled population. This trend still continues; it has become the number one social issue in the Federal Republic.

This issue promotes the very possibility of defining foreign workers as a "settled" component of the general population of the Federal Republic. As a result the problem of foreign guest workers' communities comes to be seen as a matter of integration. As a consequence, certain transformations take place within the host country regarding the de facto large presence of ethnic minorities. One of these pertains to the formation of ethnic "reserves" within the host territory. This is another way to describe the social and cultural ghettos in which the migrants find themselves in Germany.¹⁰

Certain new issues emerged as a result of this situation: family reunification, the problem of the second generation, intermarriages are the most obvious examples. Such matters strain the already existing structures of social welfare, since the original idea behind "guest labour" becomes compromised as a result of these developments.

The seventies witnessed, for the first time, a particularly problematic situation, whereby the idiosyncratic condition of a component of the advanced state's labour force (guest-labour), identified, in national and cultural terms, as a

10. Graph. 2, in Dohse (1982: 10) indicates the size of "guest-worker" communities in German cities.

different body from host labour and considering itself as the strategic component of a new composition of the working force.

The formerly "excess" labour of the periphery was finally bearing the fruits of its position in the centre, by virtue of becoming an integral part of a mass worker system which was accountable to the system of mass production and mass consumption known as fordism (Aglietta, 1985; Lipietz, 1982:33-47; Gramsci, 1971; Hirst/Zeitlin, 1991; Hirsch, 1978; Jessop, 1983:89-111).

The seventies witnessed the slow displacement of this type of labour (guest-labour) by the introduction of robots which were to undertake the monotonous and repetitive jobs in the shop floor. The production process was to be altered by the introduction of robotics and numerically controlled machines, while "guest-workers" were then absorbed by newly expanded urban services, such as municipal works and other forms of social (expanded) reproduction. These workers were necessary for the new reconstruction of urban services and the new urban-based information order. Sections of this working labour mass remained in industries which could be competitive only by virtue of utilizing cheap labour.

This gave rise to arguments that foreign workers were a source of retardation in industry, since they aided uncompetitive firms to stay alive with the use of cheap labour and outdated technology. However, a study by Bullinger and Huber in 1974, cited by Saskia (1978:509-545, 528), noted the following:

A 1973 study of 719 firms in the Southeast of the G.F.R. where the use of labour imports has been most intense, had the following results. A greater share of firms employing migrants (54 per cent) had introduced technological or organizational innovations than firms not employing

migrants (40 per cent). The higher the share of migrants in their labour force, the more innovative the firms were.

The development of neo-fordism or post-fordism (Hirst/Zeitlin, 1991; Jessop, 1987; 1990) brought about a global restructuring and a new international division of labour. A new labour organization emerged as a result of such economic restructuring. New labour transfers were realized as a result (Saskia, 1987).

North and South came closer by means of these exchanges of capital and labour. Labour rotation was defined as "return migration", while information, communication, and cheaper transport rates allowed the production of cars, textiles etc, in situ in the periphery. This was done by using local cheap labour and its low maintenance costs in a number of ways, most notable of which was the establishment of "free production" zones and of a system of "home working", particularly in textiles.

The capacity of the system to utilize such labour transfers among areas with different family structures, has had an important effect in lowering the cost of labour reproduction. The reproduction of labour may be understood as a double process of a) maintenance and b) renewal of labour energy. The maintenance is borne by the host (central) state, while the renewal is borne by the donor (peripheral) state (Burawoy, 1977: 1050-56). Also a further increase of the commodity markets of the "core" within the periphery itself occurs by virtue of migrant labour's connection with the fordised wage-system of remittances.

So, new trends in the labour migratory process have emerged since the seventies, which have weakened the further expansion of the "guest labour"

system.

What follows is an attempt to describe the skill property of migrants, in order to show how skills differ in peripheral regimes and how such labour transfers are contrary to what is common belief, namely, that employment as a guest-worker provides skill acquisition. Some alternative views are presented here.

2.2.3 Consideration of the "skill" issue of migrants as an argument for their inferior position in the job structure of the host economy

In Germany, the weak position of the migrants has been justified by the fact that they occupy "unskilled" positions. In fact, this low skill capacity is referred to as the main characteristic of this labour mass drawn from the European south. Studies conducted in the Federal Republic of Germany show that migration to German factories usually means occupational deskilling for many foreign workers:

Among those interviewed who had been skilled workers in their home countries (57% of the Greeks, 31% of the Italians, 56% of the Yugoslavs, 38% of the Spanish and 45% of the Turkish immigrants who were employed immediately after their arrival), 1/3 were able to begin work in the Federal Republic as skilled workers (Dohse, 1982:48).

This denotes that 2/3 of foreign workers who had been skilled workers in their homeland experienced a reduction in their skilled level upon entry into the labour market.

The above observations might give us a clue to the very conditionality within

the employment scene, whereby foreign labour is not necessarily subjected to national labour constraints, but rather is subjected to administrative criteria emanating from the neo-fordist state. After all, this guest-labour "mass" is an expression of the capacity of the advanced neo-liberal state to regulate the reproduction of the conditions "to labour" (Coriat, 1985: Chapter 7). It is the specificity of such administrative criteria which produces the conditions for the distribution of foreigners, and, in particular, immigrant women within the work places in German industry.

A study conducted by Dombois in 1980 (Dohse, 1982: 49-52) in the Hanover plant of Volkswagenwerk, suggests that foreigners "as well as women are in fact excluded from many forms of work (for example hourly paid work) and from more qualified tasks (for example machine setting work)."

Foreigners are concentrated in piece rate work, for they constitute "the flexibility reserve of employment policy" (Dohse, 1982: 50). Guest workers are being largely excluded from hourly work (Table 4).

According to the same researcher, "we can rule out the possibility that the unequal distribution is a consequence of previously acquired skills". Rather the processes which allocate jobs to women as well as to foreigners are discriminatory (Dohse, 1982: 50).

Most of industrial enterprises in the heavy industry sector are composed of unskilled to semi-skilled jobs. Such jobs are allocated by the organization, at the plant level, of on-the-job training processes rather than vocational training outside

the work process (Dohse, 1982: 50).

Table 4.
Hourly and piece rate workers according to sex and nationality in the
Hanover V.W. plant (June 30, 1977).

	German Men Nr %	Foreign Men Nr %	German Women Nr %	Foreign Women Nr %	All Men	All Wom en
Piece Rate	7524 57	1522 91	764 75	200 99	9046	964
Hourly Rate	5624 43	153 9	253 25	2 1	5777	255
Total	13148 100	1675 100	1017 100	202 100	14823	1219

Source: Dohse, "Foreign Workers in the Federal Republic of Germany: Governmental Policy and Discrimination in Employment, IIVG/82-207, 1982, Wissenschaftszentrum, Berlin, Germany, 1-75, 52 (Table 15).

The devaluation of labour power is a very complex process in which certain socio-cultural criteria gain prominence by virtue of the conditions established by the division of labour and the technical process of production. It is in this way that the exchange value of labour is determined. The devaluation of labour power occurs when the labour process is conditioned in such a way that employees find their wage level being determined by a number of social, national, and gender criteria; such criteria determine, then, the exchange value of the labour power. After all, guest-labourers as the bearers and determinants of this commodity

exchange (labour-power) bear historico-cultural constraints, which are condensed into a system of communication. Information and communication, between entry levels in the stratified work place, is important as such a mediation is usually realized through intricate channels. Capacities to labour are being translated into "rights" and "functions" under a complex level which has to do with "connections" and/or "contacts" able to accept the capacities of the bearer ("the who you are, and who you know" relation).

The foreign nationals and women, as the par excellence marginals, make up a great case for this non-recognition, and therefore its devaluation of the "speciality" of the skills and capacity to labour.

For the majority of them, there is very little to be done to alleviate the very nature of their particular job location and condition.

The social definition of skill or property depends greatly upon the openness of an economy, its relation with the international division of labour and national labour market policies. Within a corporate structure, imported skills, particularly those which are part of state administered labour imports in Germany, are easily devalued. This devaluation is realized on the basis of the nature of their being part of the "excess" population in their homelands, and their easy dispensation into a socio-ethnic structure which cannot accommodate them.

In considering the labour imports, the issue of the remittance size exported by foreign workers from (West) Germany ought not to be overlooked. Remittances appear to have been a significant source of foreign exchange for the labour

exporting countries. In the case of Greece, a relative decline in the size of visible remittances can be attributed partly to the declining Greek presence in the Federal Republic, and also due to the greater portion of domestic savings, which increase, as the Greek communities decide to invest in the Federal Republic itself. Remittances, as invisible funds, flow into the home-land and take the form of investments in households and generally mobile property. This is not to say that a similar amount of capital is not repatriated by relatives or through tourism. A great number of these remittances are used for the buying of commodities for the household from Germany itself.

The complete cycle therefore is realized. It is the site of consumption which is expanded, like this type of labour exchange itself.

In summing up the review of this section, we may say that the filling of key job positions by migrant and ethnically heterogenous labour has allowed in Germany the formation, in the space of 20 to 25 years, of a multi-ethnic working class which acted in an unorganized fashion to react to the problems in the production and reproduction process.

This multi-ethnic labour mass had some unique properties, which were not exhausted only by its being set within the positions in the work process itself (Coriat, 1985: Chapter 7). The main contribution of this labour mass has been its capacity to be employable in various forms of work, such as shift-work, part-time, night-shift, over-time, all within the type of jobs we described earlier. Their

distribution has been such as to stimulate a labour process flexibility by filling in the gaps in production, and thus increasing the intensity of that process.

Further, the elaboration of the background to the German/Greek labour migration relation will be dealt with in the following chapter, where the status of the Greek communities in Germany will be illustrated.

2.3 Conclusions

This Chapter described the historical relationship between the war-time work camps, the "reserve-labour" system in Southern Africa and the post-war "guest-labour" system as practised by Germany. The magnitude of the guest-labour imports for the Federal Republic was also demonstrated. The specific nature and utility of southern based "guest-labour" imports for Germany was defined in contrast to other labour imports. The relation of "guest-labour" imports with German economic requirements was specified.

The role of southern labour in Germany and the special separation of the function of reproduction of labour under advanced liberalism was described. The specifics of a system of labour exchanges whereby (biological) "renewal" and partial "maintenance" (when unemployment occurs in the centre) of labour occurs in the "reserve", while immediate maintenance (wages) takes place in the place of work. It was through this regime that "guest-labour" was regulated between

Germany and Greece.

Furthermore, this Chapter brings forward a picture of the demographic mutations of "guest-labour" in Germany, the role of "guest-labour" in gender/social distribution of work positions and the distribution of foreign workers in the field of German economy.

The rationale of "guest-labour" migration as a system of transnational flow of resources from one region to another is established. In the last section of this Chapter an analysis was provided regarding the issue of "skill" and its relation to "guest-labour". In particular, the role of skill definition and the politics of deskilling of "guest-labour", at the very moment that donor country is being deprived of their valuable skills, represents one of the points stressed here.

Chapter 3 Historical pre-conditions to Greek Migration to Germany and Characteristics of Greek Communities in Germany Some factual evidence.

3.1 Historical pre-conditions of Greek labour migration: The Demographics of the problem of post-war migration

In this Chapter we turn to consider the historical pre-conditions of Greek labour migration. Despite the "ethnos" and the legal edifice originating from the Byzantine, the Greek state apparatus was and still is an amalgam in which the various historical epochs have been fused in the collective memory of the people and their customary laws, as different moments of one great lineage. This tradition has created a system, which has allowed the powers in place to conduct their affairs by admitting or not individual "cases" to the benefit of legal jurisdiction.

The shaping of the "true" identity of Hellenism has been the result of competition among western and eastern variants of what Hellenism was supposed to be. After Greek Independence, one side was claiming the heritage of Classical Greece as the most rightful lineage while the other was claiming the legacy of the Orthodox Byzantium.

In a similar vein, the country has been divided into political groups

representing the main influences upon the young state, namely the French, English and Russian interests. Inland Rumeli, land of Romans (as the heirs of the Roman Empire were called), was the domain of the so called French Party, while Island Greece represented English interests. It is true, that well before the War of Independence, British interests were using maritime Greece as a means of promoting their mercantile interests in the Levant against French concerns.

Moreas or Peloponessos was the domain of the Russian (political) Party. Moreas was the site of the Despotate of Moreas, a bastion of Byzantine splendour.

These lineages notwithstanding, New Post-Ottoman Greece became a state, bearing some elements of modern governance, only during the course of the twentieth century. Important events were the unification with "Old Greece" of the New Lands of Thessaly, Macedonia and Thrace. This was a result of the Balkan Wars and the Exchange of Minorities with Turkey, Bulgaria and the Soviet Union in 1922.

The Greek polity during the 1843-1974 period, for 131 years, experienced about 154 Governments. The average duration of each was approximately ten months. This might be indicative of the degree of political instability in the country. During this period, many non-democratic governments ruled. Only during the 1922-1990 period, Greece had non-democratic governments (26 years, or about 38 per cent of the 68 years). This percentage suggests the lack of continuity in the political-civil process and is a very important indicator of the state political institutions. The years from 1922 to 1928 have been referred to by one of the

students of this era as the period of democratic nationalism (ethnismos) (Vergopoulos, 1978:122; Mavrokordatos, 1986). The subsequent period of 1929-1940 was the period of the monarchist nationalism. This period culminated, as a result of the British-German conflict and the mounting strife pertaining to the social forces seeking expression (namely the labour unions), in the Dictatorship of Metaxas from 1936 to 1941.

During this time, most migration from Greece was unplanned and primarily directed towards America, both North and South. Migration to Europe was minimal and directed towards London and Paris, where small mercantile communities existed since the eighteenth century.

The modern Greek state was recognized as a sovereign polity in 1829 with the signing of the London Protocol, which specified the territory of Greece from Ambrakikos to Pagasitikos Bay in the middle of present-day Greece. At the time of its declaration of Independence in March 25, 1821 the country had 938,765 inhabitants while by 1828 (the date of Independence) the figure was 753,400. At the time, Greece was only 47,156 square kilometres. From 1920 until 1981 seven population censuses were completed. During this period, the agrarian population diminished by half while the number of Greek households increased by 2.5 times, and the average number of household size was reduced from 4.29 to 3.12. The most recent census of March 17, 1991 registered the economically active population at 3,543,797, while the economically non-active population stood at 4,517,862. Among the economically active 155,279 were registered as

unemployed.

The current word for "unemployment" in Greece - a semantic category which is constituted institutionally by the legal and social agencies of the state - is registered as "an-ergia",¹ denoting literally the absence of work. A direct translation of the category "un-employment" into modern Greek would certainly have to be invented, for such a category presupposes the positive determinations of the category "employment". Such a category is absent as it will be elaborated further in Chapter 5. In Greece the category employment as "apascholisis" is usually referred to engagements in the formal and public sectors of the Greek political economy. In the private sector whereby most of (a-nergia -unemployment- and under-employment) occur, the wage-form and therefore the visible economy is rather limited. Among the employed workers 73.3 per cent were male and 26.7 per cent female while among those registered as unemployed 63.9 per cent were male and 36.1 per cent female. This is an issue which will be pursued later on in the study.

Immigration and international migration has been recorded as follows by the National Statistical Service of Greece (hereafter NSSG): From 1946 until 1977 2,502.094 Greeks migrated overseas. The majority of migrants from the northern part of the country were "guest-labourers" to Germany. The magnitude of this migration movement from the north can only be compared with the migration

1. Anergia is derived from the Greek adjective "an-ergos" which denotes "not done", or "not carried out". Furthermore the word "a-ergos" denotes "idleness". The addition of the "n" after the "a" in the Greek word is for euphonic reasons.

which occurred during the 1905-16 period whereby 236.500 Greeks emigrated to the United States. At the time northern Greece was part of the Ottoman Empire.

Table 5 shows the general population status of Greece.

Table 5

Territory, Population and its distribution.

Census	Territory	Population	Density	Urban	Semi	Rural
1920	127,000	5,016.889	39.50	22.9%	15.2%	61.9%
1928	129,281	6,204.684	47.99	31,1%	14.5%	54.4%
1940	129,281	7,344.860	56.81	32.8%	14.8%	52.4%
1951	131,957	7,632.801	57.84	37.7%	14.8%	47.5%
1961	131,957	8,388.553	63.57	43.3%	12.9%	43.8%
1971	131,957	8,768.641	66.45	53.2%	11.6%	35.5%
1981	131,957	9,740.417	73.82	58.1%	11.6%	30.3%

Source: National Statistical Service of Greece, (N.S.S.G.) various censuses.

Post-war migration was registered as follows: permanent migration 1,304.493 and temporary migrants 1,197.601. Such registration was based upon the individual declarations of the migrants themselves, an event (registry of declarations) which ceased to exist by 1977. There are no official records since that date. Out of the 2.5 million of population who migrated since the end of second world war, about one half million are registered as transatlantic migrants. The migration wave happened during the 1960-70 decade. At that time, about 830,424 migrated to Europe, most of whom (256,000) belong to the transatlantic migration. During the 1963-65 period alone 323.000 Greeks left their home-land

(Tables 6; 7; 8).

3.2 Diaspora and "Extra-Territoriality" in Post-War Greece

This principle of extra-territoriality set the pace for the post-war economic activity of a dynamic ethnos (nation) located in centres of world finance like New York, London, the Caribbean (Serafetinidis, et al, 1981: 289-310). Of course, diaspora labour had to work under conditions which had been stringently defined, namely in an autocratic and "command" way, with the overarching power of global maritime activities. In shipping, for example, a specific type of work place was established whereby quasi-military commands defined the work conditions. The Greek Merchant Marine Ministry operates under a military command structure.

Planned emigration, as in the "guest labour" system employed by Germany, was also actualized under similar regimes of command control. The phenomenon has had a direct impact on Greece's development of certain mutations within the principle of "territoriality", as it combines with the principle of citizenship. Greek citizens residing across the globe are always regarded by Greek authorities as being part of Greece (despite the fact that they cannot vote outside their community of registration in Greece). A system of dual citizenship has been established, whereby a Greek national may acquire another passport while holding his original Greek. The reasons for such intended connections may be only

understood through the role of diaspora in the reproduction of the communities in Greece itself.

Transfers of payments among which migrants' remittances represent a third of invisible receipts, were to sustain a powerful "mediating" stratum soon to play an important role (as rentiers) in the post-war direction taken by Greek society. Along with shipping came the first labour-agreement in 1960 with the Federal Republic of Germany. This agreement will be discussed in Chapter 6.

In 1989, shipping remittances were standing at \$ 1,380.000 U.S. and migrant workers remittances at \$ 1,727.000 U.S. They both accounted for almost thirty per cent of the total Greek invisible receipts which were \$ 10,099.000 U.S. (NSSG, 1989).

In the aftermath of the erection of the Berlin Wall, Germany (1961) required cheap and relatively docile labour to continue to fuel its economic growth. Greece was the first country to be contracted for such purposes. The Greek migration flows from the Northern Greece Labour Reserve (NGLR) to Germany were permitted only after a decade of strict surveillance, under military rule, of the ten northern provinces classified as being under a state of siege (Alivisatos, 1986)

The NGLR was ready to send workers therefore and so it did as the following Table 6 indicates.

Table 6.**Overall Migration from Greece 1960-67.**

	Permanent	Temporary	Total 1960-76	Returnees
1960	47,768	27,454	75,222	
1961	84,054	26,668	110,722	
1962	100,072	35,437	135,509	
1964	117,167	59,141	176,408	
1965	86,896	61,518	148,414	
1966	59,732	102,462	162,194	
1967	42,360	59,732	115,004	
1968	50,866	64,138	115,004	18,832
1969	91,552	67,123	158,675	18,132
1970	92,681	70,570	163,251	22,665
1971	61,745	75,229	136,974	24,709
1972	43,397	72,741	116,138	27,522
1973	27,525	85,116	112,641	22,285
1974	24,448	92,595	117,043	24,478
1975	20,330	80,349	100,679	34,214
1976	20,374	84,896	105,270	32,067

Source: Greece in Numbers, Electra Press, Athens, 1984.

Table 7 shows the percentages of workers from Macedonia a chief region in northern Greece.

Table 7.**Migration by Region 1968-1975.**

Region in percent.	Out-migration							
	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Athens	22.0	14.9	14.1	15.2	16.3	19.1	23.1	25.0
Sterea	4.8	4.1	4.2	4.3	4.7	6.9	5.0	5.2
Pelop.	11.6	7.6	6.8	7.6	7.8	9.6	8.9	8.0
Epirus	5.3	7.4	8.1	7.7	6.7	5.8	4.8	6.0
<u>Macedonia</u>	<u>33.0</u>	<u>40.9</u>	<u>41.3</u>	<u>38.8</u>	<u>32.8</u>	<u>31.4</u>	<u>28.5</u>	<u>28.3</u>
Thrace	6.6	4.5	4.1	4.9	4.8	6.1	6.6	6.1
Thessaly	5.7	7.1	9.0	9.5	7.5	5.7	4.5	4.1
Aegean	6.5	4.5	4.1	4.9	4.8	6.1	6.6	6.1
Crete	2.3	2.8	3.5	4.2	3.2	2.7	2.5	2.4
Ionian I.	2.7	2.3	2.1	2.0	2.1	2.3	2.2	1.9
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Source: N.S.S.G., 1968; 1969; 1970; 1971; 1972; 1973; 1974; 1975.

The "Rotazionprinzip" is clearly manifested in the return rates as manifested in Table 8.

The social impact of the security decrees to the Northern Greece Labour Reserve (N.G.L.R.) was great. It reduced the inhabitants to their bare essentials, i.e. family networks. The break-up of political and economic associations created the preconditions for the mass exodus in the early sixties.

Table 8**Return Migration.****Population
percentage**

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
Athens	29.0	32.7	29.1	27.9	25.0	20.8	16.8
Central	11.3	3.5	3.8	3.3	3.4	3.2	2.6
Pelop.	11.3	8.6	8.8	7.3	6.5	4.6	4.2
Ionian Is.	2.1	2.4	2.2	2.1	1.9	1.4	1.3
Epiros	3.5	4.8	5.5	5.4	4.9	4.9	5.7
Thessaly	7.5	4.5	5.7	5.8	6.6	6.7	6.2
Makedonia	21.6	30.8	31.7	34.9	38.7	39.6	45.5
Thrace	3.8	5.6	5.6	5.6	5.8	6.1	8.1
Aegean Is.	4.8	5.1	5.2	5.1	4.1	3.9	2.5
Crete	5.2	2.0	2.4	2.6	3.1	2.6	2.5
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Source: NSSG, 1970; 1971; 1972; 1973; 1974; 1975; 1976.

The radical nature of the security policy in the ten northern provinces, encompassing over one million people, had a catastrophic impact upon those communities. It virtually uprooted them. They were literally refugees and were treated as such by the UNRRA ² at the time, yet they were not provided with any positive means for a settlement, as in post-war Europe.

The unity of the Allied States of Europe against the Axis Powers cemented the post-war unity necessary for reconstruction. The post-war full-employment policies in the west were based upon a national-popular unity fostered in opposition to fascism and nazism. In the Greek case the pattern which was

2. The United Nations established United Nations Refugee Relief Assistance (UNRRA) in 1943 as a relief agency for war torn areas. It played a very important role during the forties in Greece (Kofas, 1989: 13-18).

followed was different. Those who fought in the resistance were persecuted after the withdrawal of the Nazis, in particular after the Varkiza Agreement in December of 1945. Consequently, the post-war path taken by Greece was different from the path taken by other western states.

The state institutions of the army, the judiciary, the administration, and the civil service in general (Papastratis, 1987:41-54) became purged of most of the republican elements, thus constituting a de facto "Dual Greece" between the polity and the popular masses.

Under the existing prevailing political regime, one social class the petty rentier class, was to benefit and see its ranks grow (Vergopoulos, 1981; 1987-88:106-144). Their wealth was accumulated in shipping which was intimately linked to migration, primarily in the various diaspora communities in Africa, Asia and South America. This in turn provided the ingredients for the formation of a strong movement for the creation of a stratum that lived off speculative activity, mainly concerned with rents and transfers of funds from the international market (Mouzelis, 1978; Poulanzas, 1975; Petras, 1984; Vergopoulos, 1987-88).

3.3 Empirical evidence and condition of Greek guest-workers during the sixties and seventies

In this section, a consideration of the presence and condition of the Greek community in Germany will be given. This reference is peripheral to the main

analysis of the impact of labour migration from Greece to that country. Empirical evidence is provided by the use of tables indicating the distribution of Greeks in Germany; their level of education; and their distribution within the economy. An attempt will be made to establish the relations between their location, distribution in the economy and the type of work related activities for the second generation of Greek guest-workers in Germany.

3.3.1 Presence

The overall presence of Greeks in the Federal Republic is presented as follows:

Table 9

Greeks in the Federal Republic of Germany.

1971 = 394,949	1978 = 305,523
1972 = 389,426	1979 = 296,803
1973 = 407,614	1980 = 297,518
1974 = 406,394	1981 = 299,300
1975 = 390,455	1982 = 300,824
1976 = 353,733	1983 = 292,349
1977 = 328,465	1984 = 287,099

**Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (Hrsq.) a.a.O., S. 20
f. Fleischer, 1986**

The Greek population in comparison with the other "guest-labour" communities presents the following picture.

Table 10**Foreigners in the Federal Republic of Germany.****Year (every Sept. 30).**

	Total		Greeks	
	in 1000	in %	in 1000	in %
1973	3,966.2	100	407,6	10.3
1974	4,127.4	100	406,4	9.9
1983	4,534.9	100	292,3	6.4
1984	4,331.0	100	286,0	6.6
1985	4,378.9	100	280,6	6.4

as opposed to

1973	+ 412,7	+ 10.4	-127,0	-31.2
1974	+ 251,5	+ 6.1	-125,8	-31.0
1983	- 156,0	- 3.4	-11,7	-4.0
1984	+ 47,9	+ 1.1	- 5,4	-1.9

Percentage of Foreigners in Overall Population:

1974	= 6.7 %
1982	= 7.6 %
1983	= 7.4 %
1984	= 7.1 %
1985	= 7.2 %

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (Hrsg.), Bevölkerung und Erwerbstätigkeit, Fachserie 1, Reihe 2, Ausländer 1984. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer 1985, S. 9. Fleischer, 1986; eigene Berechnungen cited in CEDEFOP Dokument in Hassid, Kioulafas, 1987.

We notice a gradual decline of the Greek population in Germany, but we should note that many Greeks, who acquired German citizenship, do not appear in these recent population statistics. Besides, the nature of the guest-labour

system is such that the principle of rotation on which it is based makes it very difficult to establish the actual numerical strength of such communities, due to the extension of the family system. It is meant that once the physical aspect of the community remains of a certain size there are many workers who rotate continuously between Greece and Germany. One cannot see such population dynamics through such static measures.

Nonetheless, the overall physical size of the foreign communities in Germany appeared to show signs of growth.

What follows is the particular work location of Greek "guest-workers" in the German Federal Republic.

3.3.2 Location

Approximately over a quarter of a million Greeks currently live in the Federal Republic of Germany. During the sixties, almost 270,000 workers migrated from Greece to Germany.

During the sixties, the Greeks from northern Greece represented 54 per cent of all Greek workers in Germany. They reached the 75.5 per cent mark by 1973 (Ahl, 1975: 23-30, 23). The distribution of Greeks in Germany indicates their location in areas of the Federal Republic which are heavily industrialized, as mentioned earlier: Nordrhein-Westfalen, Baden-Wurtemberg and Bavaria. These

are the areas where economic activity is highest and key industries are to be found.

Table 11 shows the distribution of Greeks in the Federal Republic by town in contrast with the rest of the foreign population.

Table 11

Cities of 100,000 with over 2,000 Greeks (30.9.1984)

City	Foreigners		Greeks
	Total	in 1,000 pop. (total)	
Berlin (West)	240,256	130	7,634
Bielefeld	28,469	94	3,212
Dortmund	52,662	90	3,904
Dusseldorf	85,681	151	9,563
Essen	34,887	56	2,034
Frankfurt	145,016	241	8,914
Hagen	20,709	99	3,366
Hamburg	168,634	106	8,011
Hanover	51,034	99	4,927
Koln	139,151	150	7,918
Krefeld	24,181	111	2,324
Ludwigshafen(Rhein)	21,375	137	3,069
Mannheim	44,941	152	2,872
Munchen	209,485	165	19,499
Nurnberg	57,266	122	8,369
Offenberg	22,051	206	3,207
Stuttgart	98,680	176	14,255
Wiesbaden	30,789	115	2,854
Wuppertal	36,775	97	5,590

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (Hrsq.), a.a.O. S.34.

Table 12**The distribution of Greeks in the Federal German Lander by 30.9.84.**

Germany	Greeks	Greeks in Per cent
Baden Wurtemberg	63,000	8.1
Bayern	48,500	7.3
Hessen	31,000	6.1
Nieder-sachsen	14,800	5.4
Nordrhein-Westfalen	97,600	7.4
Rheinland-Pfalz	6,700	4.1
Saarland	0,600	1.3
Schleswig Holstein	3,000	3.5
Berlin	7,600	3.2
Bremen	1,000	2.2
Hamburg	8,000	4.8
Total	287,100	6.6

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (Hrsq.), a.a.O., S.24 ff.**3.3.3 Distribution in the economy**

During the period 1960 to 1980, almost half of the Greeks were employed in the iron and metal industries as the following Table indicates:

Table 13**Distribution of Germans and Greeks in Areas of Economic Activity,****30.09.85 (In 1,000 workers).**

	Germans	Greeks	Total	%	Total	%
Agriculture	236265	1.1	221567	1.2	145	
Energy	481870	2.3	447868	2.3	487	0.5
Raw Materials						
Processing	8147566	39.2	7289574	37.9	73435	72.0
Services	3949186	19.0	3661731	19.0	14781	14.5
Transport	996329	4.8	935744	4.9	2267	2.2
Credit Inst's.	823256	4.0	810826	4.2	569	0.6
Social Ins.	1406912	6.0	1360493	7.1	1731	1.7
Household						
duties	430793	2.1	414593	2.2	690	0.7
Trade	2812659	13.5	2704511	14.1	4900	4.8
Construction	1516628	7.3	1368515	7.1	2975	2.9
Total 1)	20,806.607	100.0	19,220.004	100.0	102035	100.0.

1) einschliesslich Beschäftigte ohne Angabe einer Wirtschaftsabteilung.

Source: Mitteilung der Bundesanstalt für Arbeit; eigene Berechnungen.

According to Table 13, most of the Greek workers are engaged in the "metal-processing" industrial sector. Their high concentration, 72 per cent of all Greek workers, appears to exceed by far the national German percentage of 37.9 per cent. While we have ascertained from Table 12 the general work-location of the majority of the Greek workers in Germany, it is not very clear as to what type of position within the work structure they occupy. For example, it is important to establish what type of labour they perform. Table 14 indicates that the majority

of Greeks have been engaged in manual work. Their percentage (60.0 %) far exceeds the German (38.1 %) and even the other foreign (55.0 %). By comparison with other worker groups, under the category Industry and Commerce, the Greek percentage is lower than the corresponding percentages of both Germans (47.0 %) and foreigners (41.0 %).

Table 14**Areas of the economy whereby the Greeks have been concentrated.**

Field of Activity.							
Total		Germans		Foreign		Greeks	
in 10000	in %	in 10000	in %	in 10000	in %	in 10000	in %
Industry and Commerce.							
841,1	46.7	821,0	47.0	20,1	41.0	1,2	36.0
Manual Work							
693,2	38.5	666,2	38.1	27,0	55.0	1,9	<u>60.0</u>
Agriculture							
53,2	3.0	53,0	3.0	0,18	0.4	0,004	0.1
Public Occup.							
69,2	3.8	68,8	3.9	0,38	0.8	0,04	1.2
Liberal Occupations							
143,3	8.0	141,8	8.1	1,53	3.1	0,09	2.8
Total							
18,001	100.0	1,750.8	100.0	49,18	100.0	3,2	100.0

Source: Bundesministerium für Bildung und Wissenschaft, 1985, S. 86, 96; Statistisches Bundesamt 1985 a, S. 40, 55, 1985 b, S. 31, 34; eigene Berechnungen.

As we see from the previous tables, the Greek population is distributed in areas of high capital accumulation. The quality of their work is exhibited by their

distribution in the economy. As Table 14 indicates, the Greek average in the manual work category is higher than the average of the Germans and of the other "guest-workers". The type of labour we study here is guest-labour, a special labour engaged under specific conditions. The totality of the Greek community is composed of "guest-labourers", hence, it is defined by the nature of these work activities.

The "guest-labour" condition appears as a command type of situation, akin to being in the army. The Greek "guest-labour" community, therefore, does not appear to be engaged over the spectrum of activities which one might compare with the activities of the local German population.

3.3.4 Demographics and Education of Greek population in Germany

In the following section, aspects of the educational attainment of the Greeks in Germany are presented, as well as, some basic facts regarding their perceived reasons for returning home.

Table 15

**The demographics of the foreign population in Germany and the Greeks
(30.9.1984).**

In a 1,000 persons.

Foreigners.

	under 6	6-18	18-25	25-35	35-45	45-55	55-65	65-
Total	7.8	19.4	11.9	20.2	21.3	12.3	4.8	2.4
Greeks	6.1	22.3	10.9	14.8	19.5	19.1	6.0	1.1

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (Hrsg.), a.a.O., S. 10.

The Greeks appear to have a considerably greater percentage of workers in the 45-55 age bracket in comparison with other foreign populations. It is possible that this is due to the fact that they were one of the first ethnic groups of guest-workers to arrive in Germany. However, they appear to have a low percentage in the 25-35 age bracket. This means possibly, that many young Greeks may stay in Greece for studies. This is related to their parents dissatisfaction with their educational prospects in Germany. This might be an indication, that the renewal aspect of the reproduction of the labour force is somewhat weakened as far as the GNLR is concerned.

The Greek section of "guest-workers" in Germany had the greater "quota of women". As of the Spring of 1972, 43 per cent of Greek workers' children were

under the age of 6, 22 per cent were between 6 and 11, 20 per cent between the ages of 11 and 16, and 15 per cent between 16 and 21. In absolute numbers, there were 111,000 minors. Of these, 7 per cent attended kindergarten, 36 per cent regular schools, 3 per cent were in vocational training, and 12 per cent were ready for employment. These figures scarcely changed in 1974 (Ahl, 1975:23-30, 25). However, another researcher reached different results as the following table indicates regarding the same phenomenon.

Table 16

Greek Students in German schools of general education during the 1975-76 year.

Total	Basic School	Technical Lyceum	Gymnasium	General School	Special Schools
50.176	46,841	976	1274	249	851
100%	93%	1.8%	2.5%	1.7%	0.5

Source: Kotsioni, The Education of the children of Greek migrants in West Germany, 24-26, 25, Anti, No 136, 1979.

Table 17

Greek students in German vocational schools during the school year 1975-76.

Total	Special Vocational Schools	Higher Vocational Schools
7,890	7,096	750
100%	89%	11%

Source: Kotsioni, The Education of the children of Greek migrants in West Germany, 24-26, 25, Anti, No 136, 1979.

Table 18**A Sample of the Educational Status of Greeks in Germany during 1982-83.**

School and Vocational Training.	Total	In %
Illiterate.	21	5.7
With some Classes of Elementary School.	85	23.2
Elementary School Graduates.	167	45.5
With some Classes of Gymnasium.	49	13.4
Gymnasium Graduates.	31	8.4
Vocational Training.	8	2.2
University Education.	3	0.8
Without Education.	3	0.8
Total	367	100.0

Source: KSPM, Mitteilung 6 (1983), Seite 39 und 46.

3.3.5 Cultural life of "guest-workers"

In the Spring of 1972, the German Federal Ministry of Labour distributed a questionnaire among "guest-workers". Among the Greek workers, 11 per cent stated that they intended to remain in Germany permanently (Ahl, 1975:23-30; 25).

A study done by two Greek researchers on Greek return migration reached the following conclusion regarding the reasons for return to Greece.

Table 19

**Reasons for Return by Greek guest-workers.
in %**

1. Studies for the children	17.6 %
2. Some sense of loss of the children	12.6 %
3. Homesickness - Stress	12.2 %
4. Health Problems	3.4 %
5. Family Problems	14.0 %
6. Accomplished goals	7.4 %
7. Closure of business, retirement	3.6 %
8. Problems with children	4.6 %
9. Followed Family back Home	1.8 %
10. Military Service	1.2 %
11. Children grown-up	2.6 %
12. Children grown-up and related reasons	5.0 %
13. Other grounds	6.4 %
14. Not disclosed	2.6 %
Total	100.0 %

Source: Collaros-Moussourou, The Return Home, Athens, 1985 (Table 56).

The previous Table exhibits in a strong sense how the Greek communities in Germany have not been satisfied with their children's educational prospects in Germany. It also appears that structural determinations within the labour market for "guest-labour" define the type of jobs to be filled by the second generation of migrants in the German environment. It is for this reason they register with such a high percentage their wish to return home in order to educate their children. In fact many do send their children to attend schools in Greece. One can only begin to see the tremendous possibilities of a research intervention into this field and explore possibilities for enhancing such cross-border relations as the second

generation grows. The German educational system indicates in another way the true nature of the condition of the "guest-worker". Their children will culturally remain at the same level as their parents, despite the plethora of opportunities which apparently surrounds them.

In general, the Greek community in Germany appears to exist in a mode of "cultural-suspension" and occupational-residential segregation vis a vis the cultural environment of their host country, but also the environment they left behind. It appears as if their "cultural-clock" was arrested at the time of departure, a time as it was, of deprivation and of very poor conditions. That is to say, that Greeks in Germany ceased to be active participants in a real sense within the general cultural and political process of their home country. Their cultural life in Germany appeared to gravitate around representations of Greek political life. Sports activity and religious activity have also been very important in defining communal activities. However, as the situation in Greece moves irrevocably forward, those who stay for long periods outside the Greek cultural environment seem to be arrested in the past. They seem to abstract certain general artifacts from Greek popular culture, from music, song and dance and reproduce them in their communal cultural centres, as a means of communication with the Greece they left behind. Their station seems to remain culturally situated in the "moment" of their departure from their homeland. This lowers the prospects for reintegration back in Greece. The second generation of Greeks in Germany faces similar integration problems, as in Germany, whenever a return to Greece occurs. The first generation appears to

have remained behind bearing a "generation" which belongs literally in a utopia (denoting "no place" in Greek). The second generation of Greeks in Germany seems to exhibit the symptoms of "acculturation" and emotional "borderline" (Fabrega, 1969,(10):314-326; Luria, 1973, (II):417-421). Such symptoms, along with psychosomatic disorders, are also very common among first generation Greeks.³

Their self-defence mechanism appears to be rallied around the possibility of gaining material wealth. Such an accumulation tends somehow to compensate for this problem, when they return periodically home.

3.1 Conclusion

In this Chapter the aim was to present the historical preconditions for Greek labour migration, by providing a profile of the various forces influencing the formation of the Greek polity since Independence. Diaspora is a Greek word. It denotes the dispersal of seeds. Greek communities may be found all over the world. However, European migration of the kind developed between Greece and Germany after the war, bears some new elements which are worth exploring. To begin with, they bear a strong relation to the political security system which

3. Interview with Dr. Giannopoulou of The Maudsley Hospital, University of London, England, Sept. 1989.

developed after the war in northern Greece.

The principle of diaspora is connected with the concept of extra-territoriality and refers (among others) to Greek shipping interests.

The last section of the Chapter presents a view of the Greek communities in Germany in the following stages. It describes their numerical status in relation to the Germans and the other foreigners. Their location and activities in the economy are then presented. It is evident that the Greek workers are located in the most heavy industrial sectors, doing mostly manual work. Their level of education is presented as is that of their children, which appears to be such a cause of concern to them. The low opportunity level of the second generation Greeks in Germany corresponds to the guest-labour migratory system of which they are part. They follow in the low level positions their parents occupied. It is indicative of this that the parents cited the education of their children as reason for returning to their home-land.

Chapter 4 The Formation of a Labour Reserve from the perspective of Greek State Policy

4.1 Introduction The Political, Economic and Social Context of Post- War Greece

This chapter examines the framework established through state policies which served to define, contain and perpetuate the NGLR.

Since the Greek Liberation in 1828-29, political divisions in Greece have generally reflected the interests of the great European powers, England, France, Russia. Internal political agendas concerning national internal affairs have taken a secondary position. Since 1860, Britain, has been the single most influential European power in Greek affairs. This has been particularly so through the practices of the institution of monarchy, which was imposed upon Greece after independence. This is seen in the dependence of Greece on Britain. As the Royal Institute of International Affairs said:

This dependence, which is perhaps most remarkable in the case of Greece, may be illustrated by the fact that at the end of 1931 the proportion of ordinary budget expenditure allocated to debt service (almost entirely that of the foreign debts)... was actually over 30 % ... It was estimated by the financial committee of the League in 1933, that the amount in drachmas required to pay the full foreign debt service, including amortisation, was no less than 4,746.6 million drachmas, as against total draft estimates of expenditure of that year of 7,054.6 millions (The Balkan States I. Economic, 1936, 9, 103, cited in Solley), [who continues as follows]: "The greatest part of this debt burden was due to British capitalist interests" (1946:6-7).

The interwar Metaxas Dictatorship (1936-41), initially a pro-German fascist regime, was made possible by the support of the King as well as the British. Metaxas banned all political parties, terrorized labour activists and popular liberal democrats. This brought about a strong underground movement, which eventually led to the successes of a grass-roots social resistance movement, which emerged during the Axis Occupation (1941-44). Political conditions established under the Metaxas regime created a situation whereby the moderates and the liberal centre were pushed towards the extremes of the political spectrum, thus ultimately dividing the country into factions: those who welcomed the Germans in 1941, and those who fought against them. The paradox of the Anglo-German janus-faced unity of the traditional Greek power structure, before and during the war, led to an antinomy due to the fact that Britain was at war with Germany. Yet, in the case of Greece, the necessities of the struggle against the Axis were tempered with the struggle to restore the pre-war quasi fascist monarchy in the country. There is a plethora of information on the subject which never fails to draw interest and generate animated discussion, particularly due to its having been rendered obscure until recently, for obvious reasons.

The seeds of resistance developed under the Metaxas regime in the form of labour, civil, and political associations, which eventually developed into a Resistance Movement. These included both the National Liberation Front (E.A.M.) and its military arm the National Popular Liberation Army (E.L.A.S.) referred to hereafter as E.A.M.-E.L.A.S.). Both served greatly the Allied war effort in the

Eastern European and North African fronts. The departure of the Nazis from Greece was followed by a British Intervention, which itself led to the Battle of Athens in December 1944 and caused over 10,000 casualties for Greece and 500 for Britain (former Greek Premier Kafandaris, cited in Couvaras 1982:128). The armistice known as the Varkiza Agreement, signed on February 12th, 1945, between the E.A.M.- E.L.A.S. Resistance Organisation and the British presence was based on the following terms:

a) The free expression of the political opinions of citizens, repealing any existing illiberal law.

b) Amnesty is granted for political offenses committed from December 3rd, 1944, up to the signing of this Agreement.

c) The Government will proceed, through committees, or councils, to be established by a special law, to the purging of the staffs of the state, municipal, community and the Government agencies, and of institutions under state control" on the basis of competence, character, morals or "collaboration with the enemy or service as a tool of the dictatorship".

d) "The purge of the Security Battalions", the Gendarmerie and the "city police". ("White Book of E.A.M.", published by the Greek-American Council, August, 1945 from Solley, 1946:5).

This agreement, demonstrates that the views expressed were never fulfilled. On the contrary, the army, police, civil service were purged of those who resisted the Nazis even more thoroughly under conditions of terror, intimidation, internal exile, physical and economic deprivations, imprisonment and torture.

As a result, the general elections provided by the Varkiza Agreement to be held in March 31, 1946, were boycotted by Republicans, Socialists, Liberals and the Left alike. An eyewitness account of April 3, 1946 (memo 1 Solley 1946:7),¹

1. Solley was a member of the British Parliament who headed a mission of British M.P.s to investigate the situation in Greece after the departure of the Germans.

states that some 500,000 of the 2,211,000 names on the electoral register were of non-existent persons. The official admission that fifty per cent abstained is remarkable, and, as Premier Sophoulis said on April 2, "represents the people's protest against the way in which the election was held". Furthermore,

Of those who voted for the winners of those elections, the Monarchist Party (Populists) received over half the votes. As women were not allowed to vote, the Populists received about one-eighth of the votes of the Greek adult population.

Solley goes on to say, It is an irresistible inference from the facts that not a single Greek Government has held office since December, 1944, without the consent of Sir Rex Leeper, the British Ambassador, or his successor.

and

Britain's power of intervention in Greek affairs is of course, based upon the presence of British troops. which number at least 40,000. A British "advisory" mission under General Rawlings has a direct say in all military questions. A police mission under Sir Charles Wickham has complete supervisory powers over the Greek gendarmerie and police. Greek currency is now under the control of the Currency Committee on which there are a British and a United States representative, and whose decisions must be unanimous. To complete the picture, there is a "highly qualified" consultative mission on financial, economic and industrial matters under the leadership of Lt-Gen. Clark. Nor must one forget the British representatives working in a number of Greek Ministries. Thus justified E.A.M.'s complaint that "the colonization of Greece is complete" (Solley, 1946:7).

The key post-world war situation in Greece is summarized by Richter (Richter, 1986:84) as follows:

The Dekemvriana [British Intervention] were by no means a previously prepared Communist revolution. In December 1944 the alternatives did not read dictatorship of the proletariat or liberal democracy, but national independence, peoples' sovereignty and democratic socialism or foreign tutelage and oligarchical rule. The Dekemvriana was the intervention which Churchill had prepared with all diplomatic and military diligence since 1943 in order to destroy the entire Greek Resistance Movement and to re-

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establish the post-war semi-colonial dependency. The Intervention in Greece was part of the policy to re-establish the Empire... They were an element of the spheres-of-interest policy the rules of which the British Ambassador in Greece Sir Edmund Lyons had phrased in 1841 and which were still considered valid in 1944:

A Greece truly independent is an absurdity. Greece is Russian or she is English; and since she must not be Russian it is necessary that she must be English....The decisive factor was Churchill's extreme dislike of social change (Richter, 1980: 81, in Sarafis, 1980).

The principal cause for internal and external Greek post-war migration is rooted in the devastating socio-political environment resulting from the Civil-War 1946-49 (Eudes, 1975; Dodds, et al., 1946; Solley, 1946; Iatrides, 1981; and Laiou, 1987). The Greek Royalist right was allied with an English force, (one must recall that the Greek King George II had actively supported the Metaxas Fascist Dictatorship, 1936-41, (Kofas, 1983; Koliopoulos, 1978). It was able to reinstate the monarchy after the departure of the Axis powers in 1944 and restore many aspects of the political regime of the 4th of August, 1936 (Metaxas). This specific power combination was constituted as a democratic facade misrepresenting the legitimate democratic interests of the popular democratic masses (Alivisatos, 1986). In social terms, the hegemonic bloc of traditional Greek economic interests fragmented as it was due to its strong dependence upon its international fraction (Poulantzas, 1976). It lacked any interest in advancing the cause of national socio-institutional development and social security/welfare, as was the case for most of the post-war allies. This international section of the Greek traditional ruling classes was part of the world hegemonic international class, representing its sea-transport and finance component (Serafetinidis, 1981:289-310) along with Western strategic

interests in the Near East and the Balkans.

The Marshall Plan was initially directed, as a matter of principle, to Greece (Kofas, 1989) along with other Western European states. Most of the funds for Greece went to support the "security" aspect of the situation, which developed soon after the Occupation Forces (Germany, Italy, Bulgaria) departed (Kofas, 1989).

The following quotation from the 1947 mission of the International Labour Organisation (I.L.O.) portrays very graphically, the reality of the post-war situation in Greece.

In a political climate such as this, everything becomes subordinate to the question of security. Political tests come to the fore in the selection of officials, and the administrative machinery of the State is inevitably brought to bear on the internal struggle. The atmosphere is supercharged with politics, and this affects every aspect of Greek life. Political insecurity distorts public administration, the public employment services and the social insurance system; it interferes with trade union organization and prejudices relations between employers and workers. Most important, perhaps, it serves to delay economic recovery (I.L.O., 1949:23).

In this situation, the strength of the "exceptional" state apparatus was commensurate with reliance upon the military. Soon the military encompassed the police without having to declare martial law and therefore formally suspend civil liberties.²

Civil society, therefore, was and still remains under difficult conditions. Its social and economic dimensions are under stress, which, in comparison with other Western European states, poses a problem of differences in kind rather than in

2. To this day, the police is structured like the army. It is neither controlled by the Ministry of Justice nor the Ministry of the Interior, as it is commonly the case with the other EEC member states. Prof. Alivisatos in his 1987 study on the constitutional status of the armed forces has shown that this Greek institution is not subject to civil-political control by the Greek Parliament.

degree. The strongest economic group, the shipowners, was and is established under the U.S.A. hegemonic umbrella. U.S.A. remains the principal economic power behind the lanes in the seven seas. This combination of the most powerful economic group within Greek society, with international and unrestrained trade operations, had only one interest as far as Greek domestic social policy was concerned: acquisition of easy and cheap labour from the "reserve".

The power that was invested in the state by means of the police-army security combination provided a type of iconic or symbolic, as opposed to real, regulation of civil society, that was not separate from the state, as was the case with other western social formations (Vergopoulos, 1987-88; Tsobanoglou, 1988; 1991). In fact, the state tried to develop a type of society within the bureaucratic apparatus large enough to mirror the Greek diaspora communities (Tsoukalas, 1976). The "iconicity", or imaginary constitution of civil society within the Greek post-war state, evolved according to the long-established patterns of world diaspora Greek interests, represented under the regime of post-war power in the country (Alivisatos, 1985; Tsoukalas, 1986; Haralambis, 1985; Kofas, 1989).

The two basic principles of government, i.e., territoriality and population, have been absent in the case of Greece.

In reality, the scientific basis for the constitution of national polity in a modern sense, namely, the intelligible constitution by the state of "territoriality", denotes that reliable geographical data: land registry, forest registry, land surveys, all essential categories which aim at providing knowledge to the state regarding its

territory, have been conspicuously absent in post-Civil War Greece. The very existence of the discipline of geography, a Greek word which became established thanks to, among others, the works of Arian and Ptolemy, has been absent until recently from the curricula of Greek Universities.

Similarly, regarding demography, population and vital statistics, there is little evidence to suggest that Greek government institutions have a clear view of the national population, either in Greece or abroad. There is the infamous principle of the "eterodemotes" (meaning literally those from another municipality). It applies to, say, residents registered in Greece who live permanently in Melbourne, Frankfurt, Stockholm and/or Greeks who live and work in Athens while their nominal place of registered residence is in the provinces to which they return only for reasons of voting or holidaying.

The weak means of registering the population within the national territory and the high number of rotating migrants allow for the great number of informal labourers in Greece. Their continuous transit towards extra-territorial (international) activities, and the absence of a national labour market are results of the low percentage (less than 48 %) of the economically active population which is engaged in the formal sector of the economy, see Table 20.

In the Greek case, the mechanism of selection by the market and the appropriation of socio-technical knowledge by the state have been mediated by the political patronage (Mouzelis, 1978). The economically active population in the non-agricultural sector was, by 1981, standing at 2,446.000, up from 1,921.000 in

1971. Of these, the wage-earners were 1,624.000 (66.4%) in 1981, down from 1,307.000 (68.0%). The remaining 33.6% of the economically active in the non-agricultural sector are mostly self employed family labour.

Table 20

Percentages of economically active population (over 15 years).
1981.

Greece	<u>48</u>	(46) (N.S.S.G. 1983).
Netherlands	58	
Spain	60	
Portugal	71	
Sweden	83	
Germany	65	
Turkey (1980)	64	
Italy	60	

Source: O.E.C.D. Labour Force Statistics 1970-81, Paris 1983.

Table 21

Wage earners as a percentage of the economically active population.

	1970	1981
Greece	<u>42.1</u>	<u>48.1</u>
Portugal	76.2	67.1
Norway	80.4	86.1
Sweden	89.1	92.1

Source: O.E.C.D. Labour Force Statistics, 1983.

4.2 British Intervention: Political and Social Dislocation in Greece

After the institutions of the Greek Right, assumed power following the rout of the democratic left-liberals, a quasi-parliamentary regime was set in place. The

regime which was formed had a seemingly "open" franchise. In reality, there was endemic electoral fraud throughout the fifties and sixties and systematic exclusion of a large part of the electorate (Mouzelis, 1978). The job of maintaining this regime fell to the agency which had created it, the army. The Greek state was nominally headed by the monarchy, while political power supposedly rested with Parliament. In reality, however, the army and a powerful group of anti-communist officers within it, played the key role in maintaining the state apparatus (Mouzelis, 1978:116). Mass depopulation resulting from forced population movements during the Civil War created a socio-political imbalance within Greece. Security arrangements which were subsequently instituted subjected every consideration of economic welfare to a narrowly defined set of security criteria. One example of this has been the fact that the Greek state has been chronically overspending on the military at a rate as great as that of the South Vietnamese military spending at the height of the Indo-China war (Kofas, 1989: Roubatis, 1987). Greece has not engaged in a war since the Korean conflict of the early fifties.

While the Greek polity ostensibly appears to be conforming to the Western model of a democratic national political economy, this is not the reality. In fact, during the period of this study, civil society and voluntary associations were systematically undermined as they were perceived to be a threat by those in power.

Those in power in Greece were antithetical to the clear majority of the

population. The resistance forces (both E.A.M.- E.L.A.S. and E.D.E.S.)³ and their supporters stood at 6,110.000 people, out of a total population of 6,934.000 at the time of Liberation in 1944 (Bernardakis/Mavris, 1987). One must have some reservations regarding the numbers given as the numbers of those in support of the resistance and those who participated in it. The figures, nonetheless, are very high. Such a high participation rate suggests that the forces which allied themselves with the British forces after the withdrawal of the Axis powers were acting primarily against the political will of the popular majority in the country (Kofas, 1989; Iatrides, 1987; Eudes, 1975; Sarafis, 1980). In the case of Greek-British relations, the British "distrust of sovereign power" in those areas which were considered irresponsible in defining their own future proved to be detrimental to the development of the Greek social and political systems. British intervention, after Greece was liberated from the Germans in 1945, destroyed the political unity cemented by the national democratic forces which had been engaged in "total war" against the Axis. What has subsequently been called the Greek Civil War, was a product of policies promulgated by a foreign state, Britain. It is remarkable that while Britain was governed by a Conservative-Labour Coalition, it actually quashed similar trends in a European state which was under its immediate influence, Greece.

It should be borne in mind that the historical role of the E.A.M. during the Occupation represented a social reaction to the "total war" conditions which the

3. E.D.E.S. is the acronym for the "Greek Democratic National League" headed by Napoleon Zervas.

population experienced (Appendix A). Similar tendencies developed in war-time England which led, for instance, to the Beveridge Plan. The historically grounded relation between warfare and welfare, as established in the British experience during the early forties, might be entertained as a plausible explanation to settle socially and historically the ideological and political status of the Greek resistance organisations. This of course is the usually discarded, sociological explanation. Most students of Greek post-war history have been either defenders or apologists of either side, without any recourse to sociological explanations of war, welfare, state and society.⁴

Foreign intervention in Greece was led by a conservative head of state (Winston Churchill) who was in charge of a coalition of social reformers in his own country. He twisted the political and economic realities in Greece, and succeeded in turning the clock back to a quasi-colonial past, as far as the institutions of the Greek state were concerned. This was the mechanism of the old empire, which was subsequently given over to those who were to take responsibility for the Western sphere of influence, the United States. The American intervention (best exemplified in the 1947 Truman Doctrine), however, did not manage to transform political, academic and social institutions in Greece as it did for other parts of Europe with developmental requirements.

In short, the British head of a Labour-Conservative coalition intervened into

4. The social sciences, aside from the usual "economics", are still a very underdeveloped discipline in Greek institutions of higher learning.

Greek social and political affairs and dislocated the political process of change. One may see as the exposition advances, that the political and administrative grid, which subsequently emerged after the war in Greece, incorporated some unique features of a principle for "national defence".

4.3 The Warfare-Welfare concept and the (e)mergency) Greek notion of "National Defence"

In this section, a parallel is drawn between the emergence of the conception of the welfare state within the post-war parliamentary coalition in Britain and the emergence of the popular resistance organizations in Greece during the 1941-49 period. While Conservatives dominated Britain in the foreign-policy, a series of soft labour social policies were devised during the war by Labour Party members for the welfare of that country. The Greek resistance organizations were the product of similar conditions. The E.A.M. organization provided a social and technical infrastructure in the Greek countryside in a manner in which the fruits of civilization, telecommunications, theatre, transport, welfare, were seen for the first time in the history of modern Greece (Couvaras, 1982; Hajis, 1981). For the first time, a democratically elected government-of-the-mountains managed to establish itself in the Greek countryside and rescue the majority of the population from famine and forced exile to the war-time German factories. There is evidence therefore to

support the parallelism between Greece and Britain, whereby both countries facing total war conditions were to forge a social democratic consensus for social defence.

The British warfare-welfare combination was preempted however, in the case of Greece. Greece was designed to remain as the garrison state which would guard British colonial interests in the Levant.

In the West, the concept of "internal defence" has been connected with the concept of "national defence" in a positive way. Recent studies (Addison in Jefferys, 1987;123-144) indicate that the relationship between party politics and social reform in the Second World War was extremely strong, a matter which was raised initially by Titmuss (1950). Titmuss argued that "total war" and Churchill's coalition in 1940 led to a fundamentally new attitude to welfare issues (Titmuss, 1950; Jefferys, 1987). While Churchill, a patrician conservative, dominated foreign affairs, domestic policy was managed by the Labour Party.

...the influence of labour ministers in the coalition made the government the most radical since Asquith's Liberal administration in the Edwardian period. The war, he notes, clearly placed on the agenda the major items of the post-war welfare state: social security for all, a national health service, full employment policies, improved education and housing, and a new system of family allowances (Addison in Jefferys, 1987: 123).

Otherwise there was an interesting disjunction between internal social welfare as a means of defending the nation-state, and the general conservative imperial interests pursued by Churchill.

Ironically, some of the dramatis personae such as Bevin, who participated

actively in fostering social policy in post-war Britain, were quite active in dismantling those forces in Greece which would have had the will and capacity to build an equitable social-(welfare) state after the war.

Since Greece was under war conditions during the forties due to the Italian and German wars, society was oppressed. The Greek resistance movement can be seen as a "total defence" mechanism brought about by a state and society struggling for survival, in the face of a most dramatic threat against its integrity and constitution.⁵

After the war, most Western European states embarked on general welfare measures under the aegis of the Marshall Plan for economic and social reconstruction. Competition in the post-war international division of labour developed different types of interior measures which required new investments in social welfare, new professions, health, social policy, welfare, and education. In Greece, the emergence of new civil professions (either outside the army or within it), the civil control of the police, the effective separation of church and state were all steps towards greater civil autonomy and flexibility which helped to upgrade the skills of the work force (Rose, 1985).

In Greece itself, wartime destruction and the Athens famine, which took the

5. Historians are struggling with the innuendos in the affairs of the Greek resistance and the "missing" papers in the Public Records Office in London, England and in the files of the Burrows Library at King's College, University of London, England (Sarafis, 1980; Smith, et al., 1987). They are still in search of the identity and ultimately policy decisions of the Communist Party of Greece, the nature of the Democratic Army and the Liberation Struggle Movement (E.L.A.S. and E.A.M.) in relation to the Germans, the British, the Soviets. Here I advance a sociological explanation for the phenomenon of the resistance movement.

lives of some 350,000 people, due to a British naval blockade of the port of Pireus in conjunction with German food control policies (Appendix A), it created the basic conditions necessary for unifying the Greek population in its drive for social justice and welfare. However, while the war placed the major items of the post-war welfare state on the British agenda which led to the development of a social-welfare system, (i.e. a national health service, full-employment, and housing), similar pressures in Greece were unfulfilled. The Greek politico-historical process was interrupted and the social policy of E.A.M. was broken by the intervention, after the war, of the British.

The Greek resistance movement was labelled Communist by those who had the power to define and delegate authority. The issue, therefore, was not the perceived threat of Greek Socialism or Communism, as claimed by Britain, but the Greek social and national sovereignty. Thus, external concerns were in opposition to Greek national interests, which were brought to heel by the intervention of the British army. There was a continuity of the type of political power definition existing before the war, during the war-time occupation, and after the war, as far as the Greek domestic politics were concerned.

During the second world war, the issue of the internal class enemy was somehow obfuscated by virtue of the reality of the external threat posed by Germany. The institutional mechanism which acted after the war in the politico-administrative field, as a way of restoring the quasi-colonial status of the Greek State, was based on the concept of internal defence/internal enemy. This concept

was narrowly defined by military institutions. Such institutions remained, for decades to come, outside any civil, constitutional controls (Alivisatos, 1986; 1987). They formed an almost parallel state which acted with the Greek administration in almost every instance. The contacts that this garrison-state had with society remained exclusively defined by the age-old system of political patronage (Graziano, 1986; Arlacchi, 1983; Mouzelis, 1978; 1987). Thus, local government and labour, the main sources for political party recruitment were undermined for political reasons, leaving only the system of patronage as the predominant mechanism of control for social and political relations. In other words, a system of government was set up whereby a parallel state emerged, recruiting power through the patronage system. At the same time, the concept of "internal defence" permitted the establishment of a regime which was aimed at excluding the majority of the population from political and economic work and life. This was specially pronounced in the NGLR areas. The magnitude of this disenfranchisement meant that civil institutions, the economy, and private society were also effectively excluded and remained largely without "legal status". A hydrocephalic type of government emerged under these conditions. Furthermore, the concept of the internal enemy gave the impression of a garrison state in constant warfare against an internal enemy.

The quality of this relationship, in other words, was different from political engagements which aimed, after the Second World War, towards the peaceful struggle for political and social partnership for reconstruction and development

integration.

4.4 Greek Policies of Internal Defence.

Under conditions of crisis, the Greek state formulated the concept of the internal enemy and its attendant principle of internal defence. The principle of internal defence was applied to an enemy within the state. This principle bears a different semantic and legal connotation in liberal regimes than in autocratic ones. In autocratic regimes, the internal enemy is not merely the common criminal, who is subject to clauses of the penal code. The actions of the internal enemy can only be dealt with preventively in anticipation of certain political practices. The very principle of the internal enemy denotes the commission of crimes of a political nature against state security, such as treason, mutiny etc. The "suspect" subject in this case is detained as a potential actor who is capable of committing acts according to his/her beliefs or ideas. The perpetration of the act could be either ethical/moral, physical, or both. During the fifties and sixties in Greece there were cases whereby alleged perpetrators of such acts were identified and detained, although no actions were established in reality, but which were fabricated by the authorities. Individuals were routinely arrested as moral perpetrators and were charged and sentenced as being guilty by suspicion.

The key issue here pertains to the political ideas of citizens. It is the ideas

which are seen as dangerous by the authorities, whether or not they have been acted upon. In undemocratic societies, the human subject whose ideas are deemed dangerous is persecuted. It is impossible to be charged and found guilty under such conditions in a democratic system. In totalitarian, non-democratic societies, the act itself becomes part of the universal world of ideas and is not legally established as an institution, since the actual moment of an act is missing. In a totalitarian polity, the ideological enemy is not dealt with by judicial authority, but by the persecuting agencies of the police, the army, and the whole political and administrative apparatus. The internal enemy is outside the parameters of the law like a foreigner or a criminal. Since such a system wants to control its ideological and political enemies directly, its political institutions very narrowly define the field of (socio-economic) activity of the institutions of private society. Economic, political, social, and administrative mechanisms are geared to address the issue of the internal enemy. The posture of internal defence of the state turns it against parts of society, which come to be treated like an external enemy. This enemy is not acknowledged as such by international laws, as a foreign enemy would be, for it is designated as an "enemy" only by an internal and increasingly parallel quasi-legal regime (Alivisatos, 1986) ⁶. Consequently, the treatment of the enemy is not sanctioned by any laws other than those of the regime itself and its quasi-legal forces of control.

Within such a state, society is divided into those who are "law-abiding" (i.e.,

6. In this section, I must mention my debt to Profs. Manesis and Maniatakis, the constitutional law experts at present at the University of Athens and the University of Thessalonica respectively.

who bear the correct beliefs according to those in power) and those who are "enemies" and who therefore can only be outcasts, subject to worldly expulsion; exile is their destiny.

Simultaneously, this polarization leads to such phenomenal discontinuities between the polity and society that, as a result of the previous disjuncture (in the state-society relation), the very concept of civil society, as known to Western sociologists is not in evidence in modern Greece. Such has been the political and social reality for almost thirty percent of those who survived the Greek Holocaust of the 1936-49 period (Greek Ministry of Reconstruction, 1946). For Greek subjects who stayed in the reserve, the situation was one of constant socio-political warfare under the pretence of parliamentarism.

In post-war Greece, the political regimes of the right continue to face strong resistance and always resort to ballot rigging or some extra measures so as to block the emergence of democratic political representation. On the legal level, state activities continue to extend over a broad sphere of activities without requiring the services of personnel with the professional qualifications of lawyers. Many new professionals,⁷ trained as they are in new modes of thinking, are closer to the social division of labour and the social market, bearing a different logic. As the late Aubert wrote :

many (professionals) are trained in modes of thinking quite different from the syllogistic core of legal reasoning. More often they tend to apply a

7. The emergence of professions is closely associated with the emergence of the liberal state and the establishment of an advanced civil society. See the recent works by Halliday and Lewis, 1988.

pragmatic discourse on means and ends which is not codified in terms of distinctions between right and wrong, valid or invalid, but in terms of probabilities. Their decision making is often based upon legal rules which offer general directives and assignment of goals. Discretion is a salient element in the implementation of such legal rules. We take it for granted - although less today than a generation ago - that one can not legislate in detail about surgical interventions or about the pedagogic performance of teachers, notwithstanding that these activities take place within the framework of the state (Aubert, 1988: 90).

The Greek State's determination to insist on strictly defining legal responsibility for each sphere of activity (including science, i.e. the activity of surgeons and teachers), commands the total control over rights and functions of institutions. Personal control by the administrator in charge may delegate and define even minute activities in the field of politics, social activity and economic investment.

The modern system of government brings about a government of a remote control nature (from a distance), denoting the capacity to handle and discipline labour economies of scale (Latour, 1987). This activity of governing is associated with the extensive application of technological knowledge and science which modern states employ. It is a relation between legal and administrative power and knowledge of things in "nature", be they physical, ideological, or social. One might say that it is a measure of democracy, i.e. how knowledge of such worlds becomes translated into the state, and how the state allows, by its accommodation of "experts" and education, the moulding and redefining of laws so as to accommodate the "other" world, which ultimately is the world of society. Arguably, the licensing by the state of civil corporate bodies with a legal status represents the

single most important act in the emancipation of society. It is at that moment, when the citizen becomes a subject inscribed in the letter of the law and becomes responsible in the name of an acting. In other words, the bestowing upon civil society the legal power to act, in a field of its concern, is the single most important distinction between democratic and totalitarian or autocratic states, as it gives the people some power vis-a-vis the state and therefore validates the new state which articulates the interests of civil society.

In the Greek case, this process of social legalization and legitimation of civil society did not happen. There was no such delegation of legal responsibility to civil bodies in a real sense, thus the state remained limited in its capacity to accommodate reform and change. For example, the Centre Union Party made liberal overtures in Greece during the sixties, which achieved, among others, the political freedom for many to emigrate by the provision of passports. However, this never reached a level of institutional or legal reform that would allow some measure of social emancipation and a "free civil economy".

In the sixties, political liberalism under George Papandreou led to the mass guest-labour emigration to Germany in the space of a few years. At least, productivity would be unleashed abroad. (This political paradigm did not last, partly because the King intervened and impeached the prime minister over the issue of the appointment of the minister of national defence.)

Throughout the period under examination, it was a minority that excluded the others from the legitimate fields of public, private, political, economic, and

social activity. It was a minority that defined both policy and the public enemy. This political oligarchy also reserved for itself most positions in the public sector, the security forces, and the general surveillance apparatus.

The Greek political oligarchy also bore a bias to certain regional linkages, (the South of Greece) an easy matter to confirm when one attempts to analyse the public sector in Greece (Argyriades, 1966). Once the larger part of the population becomes defined and sanctioned as an "enemy", then the logic of internal war prevails. Unless there are some political reforms to ensure some measure of fair play, then the conflict soon leads to its logical conclusion, i.e. displacement, exile or ostracism. In effect, therefore, the definition of the "state of internal defence", which was in effect in Greece almost until the mid-seventies, amounted to a perpetual civil war being fought after the actual war ended in 1949. The climax of this situation was reached in 1965 during which the institution of monarchy (defunct since the plebiscite of 1973) brought down a democratically elected government, leading to a protracted crisis which eventually led to the intervention of the armed forces and the establishment of the military dictatorship between 1967-74.

4.5 Demographic Impact of the Greek Civil-War

In 1947, an International Labour Office Mission visited Greece. It is interesting to quote some of their observations, as their visit coincided with one of the most bitter moments in Greek history, the Civil War.

Villages have been looted and burnt; in some areas others have recently been evacuated in order to facilitate military operations. In October 1947 these refugees were estimated to number 300,000, but the figure was constantly increasing. They are housed in halls, churches, refugee camps or under any other kind of shelter that can be found, and they swell the already crowded ranks of the unemployed or try to make out a livelihood by joining the large army of street traders and hawkers which is so conspicuous a feature of Greek towns today.

[and]...

As a result of this situation the Government is obliged to devote a very large share of the budget to military and police functions. When the Mission was in Greece the size of the Army was being increased, with the help of the American Mission for Aid to Greece, from 150,000 to 200,000 men. Thus, a large proportion of the country's manpower, instead of being harnessed to the urgent tasks of reconstruction, is still engaged in warlike activities which are essentially destructive. The psychological effects of this situation are equally serious. Greece's desperate plight and critical strategic position have caused international agencies and foreign Powers to intervene. This has made the Greek people feel that their fate does not lie in their own hands and, in combination with the sufferings they have undergone, has made it more difficult for them to brace themselves to the task of reconstruction.

In a footnote in the same page, the report mentions that certain drastic measures, many of which involve a curtailment of civil liberties, were introduced by the present regime:

They include the setting up of standing courts-martial to deal with a very wide range of security offenses, restrictions on the freedom of the press, and the prohibition of strikes ...(International Labour Office, 1949:21-22)

This highly charged security apparatus was maintained long after the termination of the civil war in 1949. One must mention that the guerillas numbered about 10,000 (Kofas, 1989:94). The armed forces did not confine their efforts to the containment of the guerillas, but were also directing them towards opponents of the regime.

In his study of post-war Greece, Colonel A. W. Sheppard argued that, between 1945 and 1947, the period of considerable foreign assistance and British intervention, unemployment jumped 11 per cent in the urban sector. During this period, the drachma was devalued from 600 to 20,000 per pound sterling, and the cost of living soared 34 per cent between March 1945 and December 1946. The national income in 1947 was 62.6 per cent of the pre-war level, and the per-capita income was 59.6 per cent of the pre-war level. The average income per head was \$ 52.8 U.S. annually, in 1947, as compared to \$ 90 U.S. in 1938, measured in 1938 dollars (Kofas, 1989:93) and,

Greece today is a police state....In every hotel and large block of flats, every large factory or place of employment and in every street, there was a security officer who was responsible to the Minister of Public Security or his representatives. It is a little known fact that the Gendarmerie have been under [the] command of the Military Forces for the past 12 months, but martial law has not been declared (Sheppard cited in Kofas, 1989 : 94).

During the winter of 1946-47, the government developed as part of its counter-insurgency relocation policy a mass program for the peasants. In view of the fact that the majority of the activities were taking place in northern Greece, most of such activities of population movement took place there.

At the beginning of 1947 there were 20,000 refugees in Thrace and Macedonia, and by October of the same year their number reached 310,000. The army relocated about 15,000 peasants a month to "security camps" where the population was under the care of the state. The number of refugees soared to 517,135 in March 1948 and peaked at 700,000, or about 9 per cent of the entire population, in 1949 when the Civil War ended. Professor L.S. Stavrianos estimates that if the servicemen and the people on welfare were added to the refugee population, the total number of unproductive people was 2,402,864, or 32 per cent of the population (Kofas, 1989:95).

At the same time, the fiscal policy in post-Axis Greece has been better suited to the interests of a small oligarchy who collaborated with the Axis Powers; was in power under Metaxas; and supported the British nominated King George the II. Paul Porter of the Porter Mission, in January 1947, discovered soon that these wealthy former quisling Greeks were so powerful that no government could control their actions. "The profiteers, the merchants and the black market operator," he wrote, "are swimming in money and luxury and no government has been able to confront them effectively. In the meanwhile, the popular masses are barely able to survive."

It is worth noting the policy aims of the U.S. Government at the time, regarding economic considerations:

Economically, U.S. policies in Greece have three main purposes: (1) to provide relief; (2) to sustain the Greek economy; (3) to lay the groundwork for Greek reconstruction. Fundamentally, however, our economic policy is primarily directed toward the support of the military operations of the Greek Government. Our financial assistance to Greece must be in the form of an outright grant since it would not be possible to support an application from the Greek Government for a loan from the International Bank or the Export-Import Bank. In Greece's relations with other countries, the U.S. has not always supported the Greek position; for instance, we do not believe

Greece should press its claims against Albania for Northern Epirus. Similarly the U.S. has urged upon Greece a relaxation in her policy of insisting on reparations from Italy.

("Memorandum for General Wedemeyer," War Department, 10/22/48 qtd. in 89 of Kariotis T.C., 1978)

Another memoranda dated August 4, 1949, was titled "Capital Investment in Greece for Economic Development". G.C. McGhee, the Coordinator of Aid to Greece and Turkey, remarked

that it would be necessary to bear constantly in mind the political consequences of negative decisions on Greek industrial development projects. It might be desirable to reduce the doses of American aid to Greece, so that the Greek standard of living would gradually be brought down to a level which the economy of the country could support. However, this process would have to be carried out gradually and very carefully to avoid violent or unfavourable political reaction in Greece. It would have to be accompanied by some plan for large scale emigration... [I]t would be pleasant for the Greeks to have more electricity for civilian consumption and convenience, but the question [is] whether there would be a productive industrial market for the additional electric power which would help raise the Greek standard of living. And again in the same discussion: Mr. Dort commented that Greece will achieve economic viability at some level, and that we have to decide what that level will be.

Prof. Kariotis comments further "It appears that the policy of "large-scale emigration" followed by all post war Greek governments was not formulated by Greek policy makers but by their American advisors (Kariotis, 1985:92).

The more extensive and protracted the profiteering and economic dislocation, the deeper Greece sank into dependence on the United States, until the organs of the state fell under the control of American officials" (Katsoulis, Istoria : 6:26 qtd in Kofas, 1989:83).

Once this extensive process of physical and political dislocation started taking place, the central government and its allies were slowly beginning to

formulate a veritable warlike society (whose target was the "internal enemy"). The mass army and its supports in the security apparatus were clearly one dimensional, as far as the political economy of the nation-state was concerned. The security of the regime, from those demanding social justice, was tenuous enough to require some displacement of the population into the Greek island system which was serving as a vast concentration camp. Makronessos, off the coast of Attica, Aghios Efstratios, Samos, Leros, Gavdos, and others formed part of such a system along with emigration places for settlement, like Australia, South Africa, Brasil or Argentina. It was a type of state security which was devoid of a national economy. Being purely parasitic it could only survive by large payments from abroad, which were used simply as revenue for luxuries rather than investment. The creation of a displaced population (Table 21), as very clearly articulated for the first time by Laiou (1987:55-104), was baptized by the post-war authorities as a "surplus" population, which might be put to some use in other European states which had become more successful in democratizing themselves.

Table 22**Displaced Persons in Northern Greece circa Jan.'47-Jul.'48.**

Jan.'47		16.VII.'47	15.IX.'47	15.X.'47
20,000 Source: OIR Report, no. 4583 (PV) 7.I.48	200,000 Source: American Consulate Thessalonica, 868.00/9-647	192,487 Class A Source: Welfare Office, Thessalonica 868.00/10- 1047	212,478 Class A Source: 868.00/11-747	310,000 Source: OIR Report no. 4583 (PV), 7.I.48
15.I.'48	15.II.'48	15.VI.'48	15.VII.' 48	
270,727 Source: Social Welfare Service, Government, N. Greece: 868.00/3-1048	287,247 Source: same	339,943 Source: 848, US Relief Assistance (Conf.)		

Source of this Table is Table II.1 of Laiou's Population Movements in the Greek Countryside During the Civil War, in Baerentzen et al, Studies in the History of the Greek Civil War 1945-1949, 1987, 55-104;70.

The I.L.O. Report on the Problems of Labour in Greece, in reviewing the phenomenon of unplanned Greek migration to France, by then the largest Greek community in Europe, makes the suggestion that the small percentage of the Greek participation there might be due to the unplanned nature of migration and the lack of understanding, in Greece, of the labour needs in the migration countries.

The most conspicuous feature, however, is the extremely high proportion of Greeks engaged in commercial and other similar activities, in particular as compared with other foreign workers (I.L.O., 1949:58).

These remarks would appear to show that the development of emigration along planned lines and the training of emigrants would help to adapt the Greek emigration movement more closely to the economic needs of the immigration countries than was the case earlier with unplanned migration. This was to increase the acceptability of the (Greek) emigrants, without prejudice to the Greek interests. (I.L.O., 1949: 57-8). This revealing statement from the International Labour Office group of experts visiting Greece in 1947 represents one important step in the shaping, by an international organization, of a national migration policy regarding the manpower reserves of a war torn south eastern European state. While before the war emigration to Europe from Greece was very small, after the war it became unprecedented despite the great population losses, and physical condition resulting from ten years of war, military occupations and a bloody civil war.

4.6 Conclusion

In the Greek case, total and perpetual civil war by a victorious army, hermetically sealed from civil institutions of the state, (with an armed police and a clergy to control the community down to the basic local level), generated a social stratum which has been in control of the "warfare" apparati of the state,

while mirroring in it their own narrowly defined political class interests.

By the successful breaking of the national-social alliance of popular democratic forces, the foreign interventions in Greek affairs disrupted the process of social and political change in the country. Therefore, the well-established issues of post-war reconstruction, welfare, full-employment, and health insurance were greatly undermined in the Greek case. A narrowly defined national interest devoid of social basis was established. Post-war institutions, as state institutions, represented, since the defeat of the popular resistance movement, an antithesis and an opposition to Greek society. As mechanisms of power, they were almost total regimes, stifling the movement of a social economy.

Side by side with these political ensembles, certain economic mechanisms developed an informal or submerged economy by targeting tendencies for the accumulation of wealth, money, skills within this system. An analysis will be offered regarding the system of labour relations, as institutionalized after the war, as a very intricate mechanism mirroring the contradictory make-up of the post-war Greek anti-capitalist state power and ideology.

Chapter 5 Socio-Civil determinants in the formation of the Northern Greece Labour Reserve (N.G.L.R.)

This Chapter complements the previous one by focusing upon the social dimension of life in the NGLR itself. The shell of administrative parameters had been set following the events of the civil war. We shall see how the anatomy of the economy and society after the war was constrained by the nature of the polity. Without attempting to develop general theories about the nature of the Greek polity, this section will examine the Greek polity and its relation to Greek society. The aim is to present some of the main reasons which, in my judgement, establish and perpetuate labour exclusion in Greece.

Bearing in mind the theory of the labour reserve, references will be made to some of the phenomena that Meillassoux would have been looking for, had he been interested in applying his theories to post-war migration processes in north Greece.

More specifically, the sections developed and described in this chapter are the following: a) the description of the impact of "security" conditions for capital accumulation (the economic sector); b) the impact of the highly centralized government apparatus as it relates to the development of markets and capital formation; c) the mode of capital intensive industry and employment development

in Greece; d) the specific politics for labour exclusion ensured through the mechanism of a labour legislation which maintains low subsistence levels and e) presentation of some features of the remittance regime. The main point presented in this chapter involves the isolation of key elements which contribute to and maintain the labour reserve situation in Greece.

The relation between migration, the Greek public-sector form and the labour issue are finally drawn together in the final section of the chapter.

5.1 Post-War Security Measures

As a result of the civil-war (1946-49) in Greece great movements of population took place. Their implications for the subsequent situation of labour in the country and indeed northern Greece cannot be underestimated. For this reason some details which have recently been made public need to be mentioned here for the purposes of this study.

It is quite clear that for various reasons the Greek rural population was considered the source of support for the Democratic army (ELAS), "the guerrillas". For this reason the rural population constituted a source of anxiety for the Greek National army.

The Blue Book of the Provisional Government of Greece stated in August 1949,

The monarcho-fascists, knowing full well the sympathy and the support of the population toward the struggle of the G.D.A. (Greek Democratic Army), ordered the evacuation of the villages in order to create a "vacuum" around our fighting units. (Deuxieme livre bleu 62. Cf. F. Grigoriadis (Athens n.d.III 741), quoted in Laiou, 1987: 62.)

Northern Greece had the largest concentration of displaced persons in absolute numbers throughout the civil-war period. General Markos ¹ as President of the Provisional Democratic Government, when presenting an appeal to the U.N., wrote,

700,000 people (men, women and children) were thrown out of their homes and transported into the cities... Systematic raids against the civilian population of the free territories create numerous victims among the women and children... (Laiou, 1987:62)

For 1947, there are estimates which vary from 192,000 for September, to 212,000 or an estimated 300,000 in October. In terms of proportion to population, the figures are sometimes catastrophic. Taking as a base the population given in the census of 1940, we find that in Kilkis 25 per cent of the population in January 1948, and 33 per cent in June of the same year was displaced (the latter figure remains stable through June 30, 1949, and drops to about 25 per cent again in August 1949). In the prefecture of Kozani there is a population displacement of 16 per cent in January and 23 per cent in June. In the nomi of Florina and Kastoria combined, the figures are 12 per cent and 14 per cent respectively, and for Evros 11 per cent and 13 per cent. The nomos of Thessalonica, combined with the nomos Imathias, to make the figures comparable to the census 1940, had a displacement figure of 14-15 per cent in 1948 (Welfare office of Thessalonica cited in Laiou, 1987:77).

Population displacements by the end of 1947 reached 250,000 in Macedonia and Thrace, about 17.5 per cent of the rural population (Laiou, 1987:77).

As a result of the civil war in northern Greece (1947-49) there was serious

1. General Markos Vafiades is at present a member of the Greek Parliament.

disruption in food production. It has been reported that the production of wheat had declined in 1947 due to population displacement by 50 per cent, although the cultivated areas had declined by only 16 per cent. Tobacco production decreased by 46 per cent in 1946, compared to the 1936-38 period (Laiou, 1987:76).

The cereals available for export to the rest of Greece had declined by 75 per cent in 1947. As for livestock, before the war the proportion of large farm animals per head of population was higher in Thrace and Macedonia than in the rest of Greece. By 1946, the number of large animals had decreased by 50 per cent and was expected to decrease further in 1948 (R & A, O.I.R. Report no. 4583 (PV) as cited by Laiou, 1987:77).

There were drastic attempts to resettle the refugees after the civil war in 1949 but most such attempts were ineffective since welfare measures were not backed by adequate social institutions to carry them out. In fact the post-war political and administrative combination was such that it did not allow for the emergence of a civil economy and political participation for the citizenry, requirements for the emergence of welfare institutions.

As a matter of fact, the state institutions of welfare, largely in charge of the refugees, were defined by certain peculiar features similar to those known in the West only in name. They lacked an economy of labour employment, being as they were pure political forms of a polity without sound economic foundations. This will be dealt with below. In practice such institutions enacted legislation - Law 397 of 1947 and Law 2433 of 1953 - which pertained to "measures for the security of

fortified positions". This terminology, derived from the operations held during the civil war, was used long after hostilities ceased in 1949 (Alivisatos, 1986). In other words, a juridico-legal panoply was enacted in 1949, after the civil-war, which bore the combined effects of the pre-war Metaxic regime's (1936-41) repressive apparatus coupled with some new mechanisms for control and security. One such Metaxic Law, Law 376 of 1936, modified and amended with Norsothetic Order 397 of 1947 and in Law 2433 of 1953, defined conditions in those areas as "areas of surveillance". Such areas included most of the country's northern border areas, a length of well over 1,200 kms and about 5 to 100 kms from the northern borders of the country in width (Alivisatos, 1986:429).

Such areas included 420 urban and semi-urban centres in Macedonia and Thrace, 300 in the nomi of Jannina and Thesprotia, in Epirus and 20 in the northern parts of Corfu. The population of these areas stood at about one million (1 mn) by 1961.

The administration of such areas was in the hands of the military forces who were responsible for the control of movements within the territory. Exit points and passes were required for those who wanted to visit those areas. Exercise of private civil, or public rights was subject to approval by the defence policy established by the General Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon in Athens (Alivisatos, 1986:429-30). The meaning of defence had been defined in such a way, as to include both defending the external and internal enemy, thereby allowing political events to define the practice of this law (Alivisatos, 1986:429-430).

As a result, the economic and political prospects for those disenfranchised masses experiencing living conditions in a "security zone", which was a de facto "labour reserve", were not very good, as far as the national economic life was concerned. Ultimately, both people and the economy of this territory came to be based upon family work-forms, simple commodity production. Every productive activity was stifled by the system of centrally imposed state controls. Those controls were not only administrative; they would be incomplete had they excluded other aspects of social activity. Every daily movement or interaction with the local authorities (the police, the municipality, the nomarchy) required certain passes. The most important of these was the pass bearing one's "certificate of social beliefs". In case s/he were stigmatised, a certificate bearing a "repentance declaration" for the so called asocial beliefs was required. Such certificates were necessary when seeking a job, entering the compulsory military service and so forth. In addition, labour legislation and taxation policy was amplified by the ever-strong custom of the dowry system, and it proved to be a very important cause for emigration. This will be illustrated later on in this chapter by discussing in some detail the labour policy of the post-war Greek governments and some of the mechanisms employed in the formation of new diaspora communities. As a result of these developments, the members of the labour reserve could not avoid being coerced by the circumstances to work outside the labour reserve (Meillassoux, 1972:93-105;1981).

The principle of labour reserve was well formulated by the British colonial

administration in Africa.

It is clearly to the advantage of the mines that native labourers should be encouraged to return to their homes after the completion of the ordinary period of service. The maintenance of the system under which the mines are able to obtain unskilled labour at a rate less than ordinary paid in industry depends upon this, for otherwise the subsidiary means of subsistence would disappear and the labourer would tend to become a permanent resident upon the Witwatersrand, with increased requirements... (cited from a report of the Mine Native Wages Commission in Meillassoux, 1981).

South Africa, like the German state at all periods has, perhaps a tactless honesty -meticulous recordings of everything which pertains to state prerogatives. (It seems hardly a coincidence that statistics was named thus by the German Conringius.) The labour reserve has other important categories which might be worth considering, namely the strong "traditionalist" ideology which glorifies the pastoral aspects of a group's or nation's culture, the importance of the family etc. In reality ethno-culturalism in the "reserves" may also take other concrete forms which are well articulated by the polity of the "reserve". The polity supervising the reserve takes the concrete form of a system which blocks mechanisms for capital investment, accumulation, and social development. That is, it does not lead to the constitution of a sound credit system, facilities for collective consumption, health, education, public works, licensing of local government, universities, or civic corporate autonomy. In fact the issues of local government, the taxation system, and voluntary associations of labour, as civil private corporations, would be considered indicators of the existence of a polity. The polity of the labour reserve bears similarities with the description provided by Meillassoux:

the capitalist system does not provide adequately for old-age pensions, sick leave and unemployment compensations, they have to rely on another comprehensive socio-economic organisation to fulfil these vital needs... it follows that the ... preservation of the relations with the village and the familial community is an absolute requirement for the wage-earners, and so is the maintenance of the traditional mode of production as the only one capable of ensuring survival (Meillassoux, 1972:103).

and

The agricultural self-sustaining communities, because of their comprehensiveness and their *raison d'être* are able to fulfil functions that capitalism prefers not to assume... the functions of social security (Meillassoux, 1972:102).

5.2 The attenuation of Local Government

We have thus far noted how in Greece central government expansion has been a noted aspect of political, social and economic life. Subsequent conservative governments, after the war, have had privileged access to public sector employment, and thus they provided for their political supporters an avenue for social (employment) ² security. However those identified as "asocial", were excluded from the graces of such a "public" sphere. Such a certificate was based upon a subject's and/or his or her associations' record of political or social activities. The usage of such certificates, which were in force throughout the post-war period until the early eighties, was pervasive. Such a certificate was used in order to obtain employment, in order to acquire licenses for selling or buying, or

2. By this reference is being made to the main principle of modern welfare and social security which is the principle of "full-employment" policy. The periodicity of the concept of "full-employment" policy does not alter the initial importance attached to post war growth in connection to employment and the general expansion of the wage-form.

in order to obtain a loan from the bank. In other words it was used as a means of certifying activity, be it economic or political. As a result, many skilled entrepreneurs, particularly those coming from regions from the north of the country, were excluded from the so-called state economy due to political stigmatisation resulting from the civil-war. There has been partiality in the treatment of northern Greece, by the central Government in Athens. For a comparison of the financial power of local and central government in Greece see the following Table 22.

Table 23

Public expenditure and the central/local government
 Greece: Relative Expenditure Shares of Local and Central
 Government in General Government. (Figure 3.3 In p. 63 of
 Giannaris, N. (1984)

Source: OECD, National Accounts, various issues.

City municipalities in present-day Greece do not legally have fiscal jurisdiction over "their territory", unless a specification is made by the Ministry of Economics itself.

Local "government" controls only some technical services, which are necessary for street cleaning activities, but this, too, is subject to funding from the Ministry of Interior. Public transport in the key Greek cities of Thessalonica, Patras, Kavala, Herakleon is not yet established.

Without effective control over their own jurisdiction and with total control residing in the Athenian capital, local government in the northern Provinces of Greece has been virtually transformed into an acephalic socio-political entity. This is further exacerbated by the dominance of political patronage which favours networks based in southern Greece.

As one can understand, such a system of political and social control with such weak supports from its popular base is very unstable. It is inevitable that some other institutions will enter into the power equation in order to fill the power void. Such institutions are most likely to be those of the kind that tend to reproduce order and discipline. In post-war Greece, the surveillance mechanisms of the army and the police, which was (and still is) under its jurisdiction, remained the true overseer of public activity. They were soon to encompass in their jurisdiction the totality of the security considerations of the state.

This totality, the state-security-police-administration, encompassed political, social and physical aspects of security which delegated direct control to a central

authority structure away from even minimal local-communal responsibility. This rather extended notion of security would not have been complete had it not included a system of institutionalized moral authority, which has been provided by the Church.

Indeed, the interior of the country has been divided into a religious-based commune system consisting of 11,000 communities throughout Greece. The local parishes are the only authorities in the country which enjoy the right to draw revenue from the community, a privilege which is not extended to local-civil authorities. The central government displays a preferential attitude towards the church, as far as the handing over of the responsibility for the welfare of the community is concerned.³ It is in this way, that local government is cut off from local labour and the community in general.

Since the institutions of the community are blocked, from articulating social-communal requirements, they cannot develop fully, and have to regress gradually to the family labour form. It is for this reason, that the family remains the most important socio-economic unit within such a political environment.

The militaro-religious constitution of the community by the state acts as an additional retarding mechanism to the development of both the labour and capital markets. These mechanisms are basically quasi-feudal and may be easily defined as mechanisms of "stability", inertia or under-development.

In addition, it is necessary to consider the prevailing system of taxation and

3. It is indicative of this phenomenon that the Greek word for "welfare" denotes the concept of "providence". A concept heavily loaded with religious overtones.

the burden it imposes upon the low income classes in the country. It is well known that direct taxation affects high income groups while indirect taxation affects low income groups. Without going into the complexity of the tax structure and its general implications, one could mention that direct taxes as percentages of Central Government Revenue in 1960 were 16.7 per cent, in 1970 18.3 per cent and in 1980 about 23.1 per cent. Indirect taxes ⁴ in 1960 were at the 76.3 per cent mark, in 1970 at 77.2 per cent and by 1980 they were still at the 74.4 per cent level (O.E.C.D., National Accounts; United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, cited in Giannaris, 1984:157).

In Greece, direct taxes absorb only 5 percent of the Gross Domestic Product. In the European Economic Community direct taxes account for around 14 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), as are indirect taxes. In the United States direct taxes are about 17 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), while indirect taxes constitute about 10 per cent (Giannaris, 1984:156,188).

Similarly, within the Greek social strata, over forty per cent, in the lowest income groups, receive 9.5 per cent of the national income (after deduction of taxes and social benefits), whereas the 17 per cent, in the top income brackets receive 58 per cent (Karagiorgas, 1973). For those in the primary sector, the agricultural per capita income in 1951 amounted to 83.3 per cent of the average

4. An example of an indirect tax is the charge of television viewing fees on the electricity bill. This is done irrespectively of whether one has a television set or not. The electricity bill in Greece is a very popular means of adding taxes to households or businesses. Sales taxes are also ways for indirect taxes. Farmers to this day have been exempted from taxation while their chronic debts to the state agricultural bank are written off every 10 (ten) years.

national income; the proportion dropped to 60.3 per cent in 1962 and 51.1 per cent in 1971 (Vernicos, 1975:116). These data suggest how this taxation system may have contributed to the mass emigration. The taxation system is an integral part of the phenomenon of the "reserve".

Within the Greek system of government, there is no distinction between "public good" and "private good", in terms of fiscal policy matters as is found in western democracies. For example, facilities for the general care of the public, ambulances, hospitals, schools or non-profit charities or voluntary organisations are subject to a different taxation regime in Greece to its corresponding tax regime in the West. Donations for charitable civil organisations are not only non-tax deductible but are taxed while they are subject to administrative approval by the central government.

In addition, expenditures in social welfare, education and facilities for collective consumption are very low; certainly the lowest among the World Bank member states or those of the E.E.C. member states.

Family labour forms have been persisting as the key social organisational forms in Greece during the fifties, sixties and seventies.

In this study, the emphasis on the role of the family in the donor state is important in order to understand the linkages between the emigrant families with their members at "home", whom they have been providing with revenue for daily living. Regulatory mechanisms, that could invest local government with the legal and fiscal responsibilities needed for running of the affairs of the communities,

such as in health, education, welfare, sanitation, i.e. the properties of population and territoriality, do not exist.

Three recent incidents illustrate the general atmosphere in the northern part of the country. During the Winter of 1989 the Esso-Pappas refinery, by now nationalised as E.K.O., was ignited and there was serious danger that the fire would spread into the second largest city of Greece, the capital of northern Greece, Thessalonica. The militarily controlled fire-department, was unable to act effectively, as was the army itself. After a considerable amount of time and fruitless efforts, the most populous national army system in the E.E.C. declared surrender to the conflagration. Yugoslav firemen were called in to put out the fire and soon they did.

A similar incident, occurred in the monastic Republic of Mount Athos in the summer of 1990 when a fire endangered the monasteries. The Greek state, which apparently spends a lot of money in order to preserve the cultural inheritance found in this monastic State, was completely ineffective. This time it was the German Army which paid a friendly visit and quickly put out the fire in a few days.

A third and more interesting example follows. A Princeton trained physicist, Professor at the University of Athens, Dr. Varotsos, has developed an instrument, named by himself "Van", which provides early warnings for impending earthquakes. Greece is quite earth-quake prone, having suffered considerable damage in the last forty years in a series of catastrophic tremors. The "Van" instrument is a best

seller in places as far as China and Sweden, yet the Greek state refuses to adopt, buy, or recognize the merits of this device.

The reason is somewhat prosaic. Another professor has placed obstacles for personal reasons and having considerable clout within the administration has managed to frustrate all efforts by the inventor to have the instrument admitted for a demonstration of its merits before the relevant committee of the Greek Ministry of Science and Industry. The E.E.C. finally stepped in and expressed support for the scheme, as it seems to be the most simple and effective means for tremor detection, on the world market at present.

The stories are endless. They cover all areas of socio-technical life. Patrons who wish to contribute towards the building of hospitals, to provide for ambulances, for libraries, to name a few public instruments will not be accepted as sponsors by the city authorities for it is not at their discretion to accept such funds. It is not at their legal or fiscal jurisdiction to receive such revenue. The local communities are likely to be subjected to a system of "controls" aimed at discouraging those, from the country or abroad (migrants, expatriates), who want to contribute to the benefit of the community.

While some changes have been made during the Pa.So.K. (Pan Hellenic Socialist Movement) Administration, 1981-88, ⁵ regarding the domain of social welfare, the Greek State is still far from being considered a welfare state. In particular, its labour employment policy has been defined by certain legal

5. See the study of M. Spourdalakis, 1986.

regulations, and legal alone, which are devoid of social or communal institutions as is the case in the liberal west.

Labour policy in Greece took the shape and characteristics of the state institutions. The Greek state, being as it was, antithetical to an understanding that labour is the source of value or to an employment based development, pursued an economic policy based upon a capital accumulation corresponding to an enclave form. As a result, a recent study indicated the following:

The emergence and expansion of multinational corporations affect economic conditions...particularly in Greece, ... where foreign investment controls about 30 per cent of the total industrial assets and 60 per cent of industrial exports, primarily in oil, refining, chemicals, basic metals, and transportation equipment. Also, about 90 per cent of the trade deficit of Greece comes from the transactions of 11 large companies in which the average share of foreign capital is 54 per cent (Giannaris, 1984:212).

We shall return to this when we deal with the wage form and its particular effects in the Greek case, particularly regarding the issue of labour export.

5.3 Aspects of Public Sector Employment and Organisation

During the 1948-49 period, there were 144,000 public servants in Greece, 69 per cent more than during the period 1938-39. At the same time there were about 65,000 permanent military personnel (Psyroukis, 1975:393).

According to the National Statistics in 1951 the non-agrarian economically active population was 1,414,000 persons, of which 1,039,000 appear as wage-

earners. The Ministry of Labour during 1948 estimated the total labour force of workers and salaried employees to be almost 548,000 (Tsoukalas, 1986:22).

During the 1948-49 period, wages and pensions of the public employees absorbed about 52.4 per cent of public expenditures. During the same year, wages, transfers of payments and all other provisions absorbed over 65 per cent of the ad hoc and emergency military budget (Tsoukalas, 1986:216-217).

The peasants removed from their home base, due to the civil-war operations (1947-49), depended upon the state for provisions. The national level of unemployment was about 25 to 30 per cent, while in the rural areas the level of concealed unemployment was at about 40 per cent (Stavrianos, 1958:842).

The situation was so desperate, that many depended upon the remittances sent by their next of kin who had migrated abroad. A study by Langrod (1965:46-47), established that 42 per cent of the tenured public servants belonged to the category of "administration". The corresponding figure for Britain and France was 4 (four) to 5 (five) per cent.

The issue of public administration in Greece is a rather lengthy subject, which cannot be examined in depth here. However, one ought to mention that there might be a connection between the high number of "administrative" positions in Greece, who are without organic links to an "economy", forming a bureaucratic stratum in itself, and the high percentage of Greek communities of the diaspora which have organic links with Greece (Tsoukalas, 1976). If the state requires for its survival the contacts with the communities of the Greek diaspora, then it will

have to service such relations. As a result of such a relationship, a plethora of layers of administrative activity emerges. The point here pertains to the correspondence of the national bureaucracy to its national society at home and abroad.

An ever surfacing issue in Greek public administration, regarded the relation between the "work-positions" established in the service and their correspondence to the objective needs of a state such as Greece. Many positions in the Greek administration have been defined in ways resulting from a system of nepotism and political patronage! In fact, political patronage defines the labour market and the employment system. As a result, the "employment" market is a political patronage market determining even the content of the work positions to the detriment of a social division of labour.

As a result of the separation of the "administration" from the "economy", (which remained almost without any legal status in a material sense during this period), the administration itself became a self-defining entity bearing in itself the unity of a reproductive and productive apparatus of political and social power. This has been partly due to the low skill levels, which the "economy" was able to absorb. As a result, the technical and scientific apparati have not emerged as separate entities.

The drive for wage employment and social security has been dominated by the hegemonic system of political patronage, which is regionally based, and mainly in the southern part of the country. The non-privileged areas of Greece, the

northern labour reserve, are exposed to the reality of a southern based political patronage system.

What appears to be keeping the administrative regime together is the system of extra-economic controls which result from the patronage system and the command nature of a civil economy which conceals the huge but "unobserved" official "economy".

For example, two Athenian papers "To Vema" (Haikalis, May 5, 1991) and "Eleutherotypia" (May 12, 1991), indicated the apparent contradiction which exists in Greece between legal rules or ordinances and their relation to a concept of economic development.

Writing in the Athenian weekly "To Bema" Haikalis, the economist, understood by such a process the fact that Greek state legislation while it modernizes only the existing Greek legal-as-institutional "protocol", leaves untouched the issue of material connections between government (administration) and legislation and the realm of work and industry. In his view, the level of "legal-institutional protocol" is disconnected from the realm of daily work-life. As such, it is next to impossible for those representing the legal protocols to act effectively in implementing economic development, for it is outside their logic of constitution. The absence of a connection between legal protocols and the system of economy, as in modern developmental economy, makes all new legislation for development in Greece empty or suspended.

The general point regarding the effectiveness of Greek government directives, may also be investigated, by focusing on the conditions for the licensing of civil or human agency to act. For example to this effect, the accumulation of knowledge about society by the polity itself, as represented by the emergence and development of such disciplines as sociology, political science, demography, social work and pedagogy, represents an important level of knowledge aiding in the political technology of government. These disciplines tend to enhance its capacity to govern the national and social economy (Miller & Rose, 1990; Meuret, 1981/82:29-38; Foucault, 1979:5-22; Walther, 1985:178-192; Procacci, 1979:55-72; Tribe, 1984:263-284).

It is the formation of such disciplines, as the knowledge effects, which allows modern government to "act at a distance" by its specialized agencies who are located within the social economy (Latour, 1987; Meuret, 1981/82).

The very existence of a decision making capacity with power to implement, requires some of the responsibility which comes along with the concept of social regulation understood as modern government. It is in this way that plausible public accounts are made possible. Decisions within organizations require degrees of responsibility representing some kind of "action", or some kind of investment by the hegemonic power in acting. There are, of course, modalities of "action". There is the traditional "personal action", which is usually associated with the action imbued with the mechanism of the patron-client system. This type of action predates the modern democratic era. There is also the modern mechanism of

group-activated social action which requires measures of (popular) democratic representation. Indeed, such a group pressure defines the "public" form of modern government. Such a popular democratic representation is itself responsible for the general knowledge effect in the realm of state power. Such democratic representation results from society's struggles against the (totalitarian or mercantilist) state in the periphery.

The very phenomenon of a "security in action", which represents an important developmental process of investing citizens, social groups, or classes with legal status, remains a very complex yet important point. Modern policy requires democratic means to conceptualise and deal with the socio-technical dimension and the issue of economic development. Such an absence suggests a great deal about the idiosyncrasies of the Greek post-war political theatre. The reading of the facts pertaining to the post-war Greek political environment indicates that the polity which "manages" the labour reserve by bearing little responsibility for generating employment and work conditions in a national economy - as opposed for the international economy, or a foreign economy -, ends up reproducing the political process of the patron-client regime. This regime has a very different legal status than the "public" sectors of modern democracies.

This section dealt with the type of public employment in Greece and its paradoxical interconnection with legal institutions, which remain isolated from the realm of work-life, development and action.

The section that follows enters into an analysis of the conditions present in the economic sector which contribute to the weak base for capital formation, itself one of the essential characteristics of the political economy of the reserve, the N.G.L.R.

5.4 Aspects of the Economics of the Reserve Political Economy

We begin here with an important aspect of the primary sector by referring to the phenomenon of land fragmentation in Greece. This represents a very important point to consider in understanding the reserve since the issue such a phenomenon is directly linked with the limitations it imposes on agrarian capital formation.

The average size of the agricultural plot in Greece is less than 5 ht (O.E.C.D., 1984).

Table 24**Size, Distribution of Land Area and Operations of Agricultural Units in 1950**

Size of Grouping (Hectares)	No of Agricultural Families (Per cent)	Land Area (Per cent)
Below 1	28.50	6.4
1.0 - 4.9	56.92	43.4
5.0 - 9.0	11.50	22.1
10.0 -19.9	2.57	10.1
20.0- 49.9	0.53	4.7
50.0 -99.9	0.06	1.7
100.0 and over	0.05	11.6

(a) 1950 Agricultural Census, reprinted in L. Swaw, 376, in Vernardakis, Econometric models for the developing countries: a case study of Greece, Saxon House, 1978: 27.

The mean average is 6.5 plots per family (Vernardakis, 1987:29-30). The restricted size of the farms limits the process of accumulation and therefore of agricultural surplus.

The secondary sector in Greece employs 28 per cent of the population, mainly in the manufacturing of light consumer goods and to some extent in producer goods. However the average production establishment in the country remains the small family-owned shop. As is indicated by Alexander in his study "The Greek Industrialists" (1964), the leading Greek company is either a family based enterprise, a partnership or individual proprietorship. This allows one to see that corporate firms are not a leading economic form in the Greek economy. In consequence the role of the capital market is rather limited. Vernardakis states that the capital market in Greece is in a state of a " ... virtual nonexistence or to

put it more mildly, the embryonic state of the capital market, is a consequence of this fact" i.e. due to the family nature of the enterprises. (Bernardakis, 1987:29-30).

The following descriptions of the capital market in Greece defines the economic conditions prevalent in what we define as a labour reserve for an extra-territorial continental (German) labour market.

Table 25
Size Distribution, Output and Employment of the
Manufacturing Sector, 1958-59.

Size Group Employment (No. of Persons Employed)	Percentage Shops	Percentage Shops(a) (Value Added)	Percentage Output(b) Manufact.
Up to 5	84.9	33	55
5 - 9	9.8		
10 -19	3.2	9	9
20 -49	1.4	13	9
50 -99	0.4	45	27
100 and over	0.3		

(a) George Koutsoumaris, *The Morphology of the Greek Industry*, KEPE, Athens 1963:37.

(b) National Statistical Service of Greece, *Results of the 1959 Annual Industrial Survey*, Publ. L: 4, Industry (Athens 1962), reprinted in Koutsoumaris 1963:62.

Table 26**Men and Women in Industry, Mines, Handicrafts, 1973.**

	Men	%	Women	%
Total	449,913	100.0	166,025	100.0
Employers	125,167	27.8	7,799	4.7
Unpaid family members	13,897	3.1	13,872	8.3
Waged	70,792	15.7	18,502	11.1
Paid by day	240,057	53.4	125,852	75.8

Source: N.S.S.G., Census on Industry, Mines, Handicrafts, 1973.

Table 27**Varieties of Secondary Sector Occupations****1971**

	Men	%	Women	%
Total	404,268	100.0	150,112	100.0
Own				
Account	87,280	21.6	30,144	20.1
Employers	40,184	9.9	2,792	1.9
Non paid	7,736	1.9	8,828	5.9
Waged	267,440	66.1	107,220	71.4
Non respondents	1,628		1,128	

Source: N.S.S.G., 1971 Census.

Table 28**Wage earners of the economically active population**

Greece	1970	42.1	1981	48.1
Portugal		76.2		67.1
Norway		80.4		86.1
Sweden		89.1		92.1

Source: O.E.C.D. Labour Force Statistics, 1983.

It is easy to discern from the above that in Greece the category of wage-earner is comprised of two sub-categories. There are those receiving wages by day who constitute the majority of workers, and those who are employed as salaried workers, constituting the minority of all wage workers. This means that seasonal workers may be recorded as wage earners. More than anything else, these categories indicate the special features of the labour market in the country. They indicate, among other things, that while there is probably a local labour market, it is doubtful that a national market for labour exists.⁶ Similarly in Tables 25 and 26 the categories of employers include both the category "own account" worker and employer. The "own account" workers might be subcontracting for industrial enterprises using their own capital and labour, but relying also on the labour of their family.

International agencies, such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), have lumped together those "paid by the day" and

6. In a recent poll of the Athenian labour force by the Labour Centre of Athens it was found that: Sixty percent of workers interviewed reported that they landed their job through a friend or relative, (U.S. Embassy, Athens, Greece: Foreign Labour Trends Report, 1989-9, May 4, 1990).

those considered as employed earning a regular wage (Table 27). If we were to separate such categories, then the percentage for both male and female workers quoted as 67.58 per cent (Table 26) ought to become no more than 14.6 per cent of those who are economically active. Similarly, if we account for those considered as employers who are in reality "own account" workers or self-employed workers (as in Table 26), then the percentage of those considered as independent capital owners from 21.6 per cent (Table 25) diminishes to 7.7 per cent for both the sexes. The employment categories therefore seem to be very fluid. It is for this reason, that in many instances, researchers may project upon the actual situation categories they are mostly familiar or accustomed to, i.e. a developmental model. The previous illustration indicates the very fragility of the system of analyzing the categories of labour and capital in Greece.

The analysis of the role of post-war state administration, in the regulation of the economy via industrial labour relations, will bring a more accurate picture of economic and political life in Greece.

The economically active population, non-agricultural sector, was estimated by the census of 1971 to be 1,921.000 out of which 1,307.000 were the wage earners. During the census of 1981 they were standing at 2,446.000 of which wage earners were 1,624.000 (N.S.S.G., 1971; 1981). According to Koutsoumaris (1964) it is banking capital which bears the main burden for productive investments in the Greek economy for the weak capital stock market leaves the banking and state sectors as the only exogenous sources of business financing in Greece.

Psilos (1964), however, stated that the banking system actually interfered with attempts to create a capital market in Greece, due to the nature of its activities (mercantile) and the original source of their funds (Vernardakis, 1978:35; Kay:1975: Chapter 5).

Once the possibilities for national capital accumulation have been hindered by an administration, which does not provide for the corporate self-autonomy of civil corporate bodies one may see that the very principle of "regulation" that is commonly associated with liberal democracies is absent or could be considered as iconic/symbolic, in Greece.

The absence of the principle of socio-legal regulation appears to correspond with the existence of the labour reserve, since its hindrance is positively linked with the suppression of the process of accumulation and wage-labour formation. Incidentally, such was par excellence the role of the regulatory principle in the states of post-war Europe. Because of the existence of such a traditional regulatory regime, the system continuously pressures its members to seek out employment as labourers in the closest national or international capitalist sector.

Given the absence of a national labour market in Greece, the German labour market and its administrative channels provided an outlet. This type of understanding ought to be considered when the remittance issue is analyzed. The process of development and local accumulation becomes frustrated by the controls imposed in the administration of the labour "reserve". This reserve represents a "pastoralized" regime geared only for providing for a subsistence

economy. The dominant ideology and *raison d'être* of this regime is anti-capitalism. Such a regime is maintained under conditions of minimal employment, as opposed to unemployment (assuming that the category "economic surplus" is historically defined) (Dalton, 1983). Similarly, the category "employment", was historically developed under the impact of post-war (welfare) full employment policy (Jefferys, 1987:129 in reference to the 1942 Beveridge Report).

If one utilizes an approach based on the political sociology of a labour reserve for a whole region and a state, then these relations may be more readily understood. For example, the development of underdevelopment; the issue of permanent poverty for those who stay and try to appropriate funds (as rents) from those who work abroad; the procrustean bed of the administration which behaves as an occupying regime coercing the population to the point of exodus, are all features of the regime of the labour reserve.

Every political or social movement aiming to change the situation becomes frustrated by either the official state agencies (the police, the army, the administration) or popular opinion. The Greek Communist Party, and indeed parts of the "progressive" opposition, appear to act, albeit "unconsciously" - by sheer virtue of their direct opposition to the Right's ideological supports - as the mirror image of the (anti-liberal) principles of the polity. The result is the preservation of the stability of the reserve society (Demaras, 1983).

Therefore, the opposition, as the alternative political paradigm, finds itself circulating into an imaginary and historical place, the other pole of the similar place of the peripheral quasi-mercantilism of the Greek administrative state.

The irony is that the labour reserve can appear to change at the level of the individual subject, the very moment it actually becomes reproduced itself (as a reserve) by virtue of the diaspora and rotation of its members abroad. It does not make any difference how successful abroad such migrant members are. Once the line, from the mere passive consumption of commodities from abroad, is passed, and an engagement to develop employment conditions - the wage relation or some infrastructure - is achieved, then the balance of forces will certainly respond.

According to Greek law, the state ought to nominally provide the means for all socio-economic "activity" for the subjects of the republic. This represents an expression of its non-democratic character, an indication that all control over "action" rests nominally upon its power. Perhaps, the state anticipates such a capacity, but in reality, the means are lacking. In the actuality, the system of patronage reigns supreme, forcing everything else to take its shape. Everything must be provided solely by the "poor state" (Aubert, 1989) which has limited economic resources but a tremendous security concern.⁷

7. The security concern of the state while it burdens it provides justification for its character. For its general character resembles the character of the general Polizei found in Central Europe. The aim of the polizei was not necessarily growth and development but stability and simple reproduction. In the Greek case part of the "security" problem of the Greek State emanates from its antiquated structure, i.e., in coming to terms with its community and society. The non-development of socio-civil institutions creates a grave social security issue for the polity which defends itself by developing a truly "garrison policy" (Raef, 1987; Tsobanoglou, 1991; Tribe, 1987).

The official logic is as follows; if there is no provision, say, for roads or hospitals due to various fiscal constraints, then neither the community nor its expatriate supports may provide such services. What happens in reality is the following: The "right to development" provisions for such institutions do not belong to the professions staffing those institutions. Only the state administration, in its very limited way, has "discretion" over development and growth. If we introduce into the picture the fact that the criteria for employment selection are personal patronage linkages as opposed to professional criteria, then we can understand the dismal reality of the public system in Greece.

It is this kind of system which leaves three big university hospitals almost empty from staff for over three years (since 1989). The reason is that the local power brokers cannot agree on who to hire so as to maximize their political clout. It is noteworthy that some of the candidates considered are world-renowned doctors.

5.5 Labour and Politics in Greece

The Greek trade union movement has been characterised by extreme fragmentation and overlapping responsibilities in organisation. There are approximately 5,000 locals which include handicraft, industrial, commercial and general unions. Local unions affiliate with a trade union, being either national or regional or both. In turn, both local labour centres and trade unions affiliate with

the Federation of Greek Workers at the National Federal Level the G.S.E.E. (General Confederation of Greek Trade Unions). The G.S.E.E. claims to represent 82 federations and almost 86 labour centres with almost 600,000 members. During most of the period with which we are concerned (1949-80) there was in existence in Greece a system of a triple representation for workers at the local, regional-federal and national levels. The system operated with emphasis on the rural unions. At the time, such locals were subject to direct intimidation by armed Right wing gangs, the police and the army (Jenkins, 1988:141-157). In the northern part of the country, the situation was even more precarious for democratic representation due to the prevailing "security" conditions. At the national level of the G.S.E.E., there was a tendency to undermine the representation of certain regions of the country, the northern provinces, and the most populated urban settlements, whereby voting was more free from outside political pressure (Pollis, 1981:269). The double or triple accounting of members allowed for the easy win of conservative candidates at the national level (Jecchinis, 1976:47; Davies, 1961: 137-40). In addition, "ghost" (paper only) unions existed allowing the final manipulation of election results. Political representation at the national, confederation level, was thus divorced from the actual representation of the work-places. It is common knowledge in Greek labour affairs, that the judiciary may intervene directly by appointing union-officers. During the Metaxas regime (1936-41) the labour situation was described as follows:

Trade union officials were appointed by the government while the minister of labour was also the secretary general of the G.S.E.E.. Compulsory

contribution (drs.) from all employees were collected and dispersed by the government to the G.S.E.E. and to other federations and unions affiliated with it. All unions had to register and the courts were empowered to approve or reject their constitutions, and many trade unionists were imprisoned (Pollis, 1981:263).

The United States labour policy as a result of U.S. responsibility over Greek Affairs was caught between:

On the one hand its stated objectives were the establishment of a labour movement in Greece free of government intervention and the modernization of Greek labour law and of the trade union movement; on the other, it sought to thwart the actual or potential communist control of the movement and the "prevention of communist infiltration (Pollis, 1981:269).

In practice this led to what the American charge d'affaires of the U.S. Embassy in Athens, James Keeley, discussed at a dinner with British and Greek government officials:

the problem of manipulating trade union elections in such a manner as to make them appear democratic while preventing perceived communists or their sympathizers from either running or influencing the results. (Keeley's unpublished aide memoire to the Department of State, April 12, 1947, DSR,868. 504/5-947 quoted in Pollis, 1981:269).

It is for these reasons that the I.L.O., which visited upon the invitation of the Greek government in 1947 to provide recommendations for the labour scene in Greece, reported:

it may be asked whether these measures [restrictions on freedom of assembly, searches, imprisonment of trade unionists, and so forth], the justification for which was the exceptional situation of the country at the time, have served as a pretext for reducing trade union opposition to impotence (I.L.O. report, 1949 cited in Pollis, 1981:270).

The mission's report reached some very broad conclusions regarding the character of Greek trade unions and appraised the situation as a "drift towards a

form of official trade unionism deprived of any real autonomy or freedom of action" (I.L.O., 1949: 265). The previously described blend of social and political factors in Greece may help us understand how industrialization, private associations, and economic activity in general were hindered by means of the political manipulation of the labour force (Kofas, 1989). The problem was not necessarily the recomposition of workers as "economic subjects" by means of a "passive revolution" à la fordism (Christine-Buci Glucksmann, 1980; Tsobanoglou, 1985), subject to dictation and tutelage by state social policy. This was the case in America and most-post war European states. The issue in the Greek case read for the "export" of labour "en masse" to the European north, be it east or west. Labour organizations along with the corresponding political parties that represented them, were left outside a legitimate space of socio-economic organization (Tzannatos/Catephoris, 1986).

One way to analyze the labour issue is to consider the development of the wage-form in the system of Greek post-war accumulation. The regime of accumulation in mature industrial societies draws the trajectory of the norms of production and consumption in such a way, as to permit the extended reproduction of capital for a certain period of time without any major crises emanating from its imbalances and contradictions (Doukakis, 1988: 62-63; Boyer, 1988; Coriat, 1985).

The transfer into Greece of a certain work-related legislation (collective bargaining) originating from a western socio-political environment, was proved to

be alien to the conditions in Greece. As a result, it took the form of the existing institutions which were non other than those southern based patron-client relations. In the West the macro-economic function of collective agreements was tied to mechanisms of wage formation in a broad sense including vocational education, skill upgrading, productivity, conditions of work, voluntary freedoms, job security, etc. In Greece all wage negotiations were narrowly limited to the wage salary. The basic minimum wage in Greece covers about 30 per cent of all the wage earners (Babanasis, 1981, nos b, c.).

The regional variation (in wage earning) in Greece has been so great that in some areas minimum wages, as established by collective agreements, have been covering large parts of the working class. There are available statistics for the northern areas, only for the area of Epirus, in N.W. Greece, where the percentage of labour defined by the minimum wage was 80 per cent (Fakiolas, 1974).

According to Samaras (Samaras, 1975), the basic minimum wage was essential in shaping the main form for Greek labour, and in consequence, labour itself. In fact the wage form was controlling the level of pay of the unskilled labour power.

Collective bargaining was empowered with compulsory arbitration in Law 3239/1955. This was so as to maintain a situation which effectively reproduced the conditions for unskilled labour.

The labour regime formally established by Law 3239/1955 represented the traditional role played in Greece's labour and trade union scene by the Ministry of Labour. This 1955 law established the authority of the Ministry to refer employer/employee disputes to compulsory arbitration.

The absence of certain practical as well as institutional provisions in support of labour, such as operational funds or strike funds meant that there was no basis on which to establish a system of collective bargaining. Trade unions in Greece have been mainly financed by the "Workers Hearth", an institution whose function has been, until recently, under the complete discretion of the Minister of Labour.

Furthermore, the small and paternalistic (mostly family based) nature of enterprises, the absence of indigenous capital and labour markets, all facilitated the rendering capital and labour in the total control by the state. Therefore, collective bargaining within the political conditions of Greece took the form of compulsory arbitration. It was in this way that the state regulated minimum wage levels. The judiciary was incorporated into this ensemble by acquiring the right to appoint labour leadership in cases of dispute. The dismissal and appointment of elected labour representatives has as a result, been pervasive. The court system has imposed upon the industrial system a legislative regime, which assisted by the strong administrative tutelage (of the Ministry of Labour), ended up blocking the diffusion of work skills, and the development of the social division of labour. Furthermore, it exacerbated the labour employment situation by the regulation of the system of minimum wage.

The imposed legislative system acted primarily as a "procrustean" bed for social and production skills required for developing the economy and its administration.⁸

The state was mediating all relations between labour and capital. So relations within and between workshops, factories and society were highly suppressed by the administration.⁹

Law 3239/1955 represented the labour form promoted by the state to act as the actual mechanism of the regime of administrative controls which have been blocking capital formation in the Greek labour "reserve" and particularly the N.G.L.R.

The introduction of labour Law 3239/1955, under conditions of strong family labour forms and strong administrative systems was an administrative act introduced from without sociality, which went over and above it. This state (labour regulatory mechanism of labour) defined the wage form itself, by controlling and defining the friction between capital and labour, themselves being fragmented (balkanised) social categories.

When wages are narrowly defined as a cost of production (Vergopoulos, 1989) the result is their compression to the barest (subsistence) minimum. This barest minimum is socially defined by the institutions of the community and the level of social organisation. The extent of the basic wage (over 40 per cent, in

8. See on this theme the recent contribution of Miller & Rose, 1990, 19(1).

9. Ironically enough the Greek economy has been considered an open one. This applied to the case of Greek labour export of course.

northern Greece), indicates that the consumption norm, which is tied up to it, will also be low (Doukakis, 1988: Chapter III; Boyer, 1988).

The system of labour legislation in this regard, practised in Greece by the application of Law 3239/1955, produced two basic effects: a) it blocked the formation of "skills", and b) the wage form was treated only as a cost of production. It had, therefore to be kept at a minimum, while the consumption norm was defined by the basic minimum wage affecting as it was life in the NGLR.¹⁰

As these denote, a system has been in operation whereby subsistence level has been imposed in the area.

Regarding the first (a) effect, it must be mentioned that it was the World Bank which established vocational training institutes for the first time in 1982 in Greece. One can therefore say, that international institutions have been responsible for the development of technological institutions aimed at the upgrading of work skills in Greece. It was international institutes therefore which intervened into the Greek educational policy, in order to form a layer of technical infrastructure for the economy.

Regarding the second effect of such policies, namely the wage-form, the reader will realize that such a form has been defined in the Greek case mostly as a non-salaried daily wage.

Such a fact bears weight in appraising the extent of wage labour in social systems with developed welfare regimes. Accordingly, the accounting of the

¹⁰. The negative value of this relationship between consumption and the basic wage will be understood as the thesis elaborates further on the issue of labour migration from Greece.

system of social security in Greece ought to be viewed with this phenomenon in mind. In Greece, besides the fact that the minimum wage is the predominant wage, particularly in the northern provinces of Thrace, Macedonia and Epirus, there is evidence that the majority of the wage form is also non-salaried and is understood as "daily-wage".

The system operates by the establishment of a regime of social security stamps which registers the number of work-days. Due to the nature of the system, a great deal of "home-working", particularly in textiles, is not registered to the benefit of workers, since it largely depends on the discretion of the sub-contractor-cum-employer.

A great deal of what we refer to as the daily wage form, whereby a worker works in essence part-time, with a high degree of flexible variability, represents in essence a spontaneous economic transaction reproduced by extra economic means, i.e. cultural, regional and familial ties.

During the period of study (1949-81) there has been no part-time work legislation in Greece. In fact, part-time work has been considered as illegal in Greece throughout this period. Our understanding of the situation indicates that the reason for this is the idiosyncratic definition of the wage form and the predominance of daily wage, which as said before is in fact a type of part-time labour.

However, this was the wage form in post war Greece, the wage form developing in other European countries has had different effects because mainly it has been accompanied by the necessary socio-legal reforms.

Legal institutions play different roles under different regimes of capital formation. For instance, the legal institutions which shape labour relations and especially collective bargaining in Greece differ to those existing in Germany. In the Greek case, the socio-legal basis for the labour institutions has been administratively curtailed. Labour institutions have been prevented from translating into issues the social security problems involved. It has been issues of personally defined political expediency by those who controlled the judiciary and the state administration which provided disruption in the articulation and acceptance of such labour forms.

The idea therefore behind Law 3239/55 was to enforce collective bargaining but in reality it sanctioned compulsory arbitration.

The system of labour analyzed above corresponds to a system of industry. It is now to this system that we turn to examine some of its properties, which according to our understanding are of key importance in this analysis.

5.6 Industry and Employment in Greece in the Post-War period

The legacy of the post war years was addressed rather well by the Nicolaides article in an Athens weekly business magazine the Financial Post (1971). In it was stated, that after the war, the Europeans and the Americans opposed Greece's industrialisation. More appropriately, there is a report in a recent book (Kofas, 1989) according to which the American mission in Greece blocked the acquisition of a German steel mill which was part of the war reparations.

Similarly an Italian offer for a steel mill was also blocked. Recent reports (Angelopoulos, 1988), have claimed that the German occupation forces borrowed the yet unreturned gold reserves of the Bank of Greece. Their current estimated value is about 13 billion in U.S. funds. War reparations from Germany are still pending, as is a Peace Treaty between Greece and Germany.

It is against such a background that the issue of the Greek industrial employment needs to be addressed here.

One of the immediate outcomes of the Greek labour regime has been a capital intensive regime in the modern foreign owned economic sector, and a labour intensive regime in the indigenous and largely informal economic social sector. Comparing Greece with other countries, it might be said that the pattern followed after the war was closer to patterns exhibited in third world countries.

More specifically, in El Salvador the average increase of the industrial product during the 1960-67 period was 14.2 per cent, while the increase in employment in the secondary sector was 5.5 per cent during the same period. For Chile the percentages were 5.6 per cent and 1.1 per cent, the Philippines 6.1 per cent and 1.5 per cent, Venezuela 7.4 per cent and 3.1 per cent and for Greece 7.8 per cent and 2.2 per cent (U.N. Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, 1968).

There has been therefore an increasing gap between the level of wage formation and industrialisation, in which it is easy to see a gap between the developing and developed worlds. The weak capacity to absorb labour to correspond to levels of industrial growth is one key characteristic which is also part of the Greek social problem, which maybe added to the migration issue. Industrialisation, for instance, in both Greece and South Korea, although intensive, did not lead to an employment increase commensurate with the level of industrialisation in other developed O.E.C.D. states. For example: In 1960 Korea had industrial production comprising 21 per cent of its Gross National Product (G.N.P.), while the percentage of the active population employed in industry was 13.2 per cent by 1971.

For Greece, the two percentages were 23 per cent (1971) (production sector) and 15.9 per cent (1971) (share of employment in economically active population); for Germany 43 per cent (1969) and 38.9 per cent (1971); for Japan 33 per cent (1968) and 25.5 per cent (1970); for Portugal 32 per cent (1969) and 20.3 per cent (1966); for Belgium 31 per cent (1969) and 32.3 per cent (1971); for

Sweden 28 per cent (1969) and 28.4 per cent (1971); for Mexico 30 per cent (1967) and 16,7 per cent (1970); and Iran 32 per cent (1967) and 16.7 per cent (1966) (I.L.O., 1973; U.N.C.T.A.D., 1972).

One can discern from the above statistics that the Greek case is closer to the cases of Mexico, Korea and Iran and bears less resemblance to other European Common Market States such as Germany and Belgium.

In Greece, there is a rather striking continuity in the percentage of industrial employment during the twenties, forties and seventies.

One of the most perceptive analysts of the Greek phenomenon (Photopoulos, 1978) provides as an indicator of the absorption of labour in Greece (in relation to the population increase) the following indicator: the Greek population decreased by 30 per cent during the post war period while it remained stagnant in comparison to the economic indicators in construction and services.

The percentage of employment in the secondary sector was 14.1 per cent in 1928, 14.5 per cent in 1940, 13.3 per cent in 1951, 13.4 per cent in 1961 and 15.9 per cent in 1971 (Koutsoumaris, 1963; Photopoulos, 1978: 61-121, 79). This means that in Greece, after such a prolonged industrialisation process of half a century, very little expansion of the value generating wage-form has occurred. As the post-war model of intensive capital accumulation occurred in Greece, this accumulation took the form of an enclave and left areas of the country and society outside any redistributive benefits, normally emanating from the generation of employment.

By 1961, about 24 per cent of the economically active population were unemployed (O.E.C.D., 1965). A study realised eighteen years ago (Financial Post (Greek), 13.12.73), showed a decrease in the unemployment and an underemployment figure of about 11 per cent. It was thanks to the blessings of mass migration to Germany that such a ... social progress was made. Without this labour exodus, almost half of the employable population would have been unemployed.

Due to this migration, the economically active population decreased, from 43.5 per cent of the total population in 1961 to 37.4 per cent in 1971. Migration was an important phenomenon in maintaining the socio-political environment in Greek society.

No reforms were to be introduced by a political regime which could use its "political capital", with those exogenous forces directly responsible for such affairs, in order to obtain its own "social" and political security.

The idea of "political capital" refers to a field that remains rather weakly researched and understood, particularly among neo-Marxists who may wish to undermine the importance of the political in favour of economics. Since the issues of intervention and imperialism involve exchanges between unequal powers, local power brokers might be understood as operating a type of political "rents" which are appropriated as personal rents to the detriment of the general welfare. Stability is the name of the process whereby resources of strategic or even economic nature may be derived due to external power pressure. A theory for the system

of states in the world market and their political economies is rather weakly formulated to this day.

In this section of Chapter 5, so far, the attempt has been to illustrate how the specific employment system in Greece was set up in order to act as follows: first, as the socio-legal arm of the state ensemble aiming at the suppression of the wage form, skill levels and the general division of labour in the country; ¹¹ and second, to show how the post-war growth in certain countries such as Greece, did not lead to employment generation, to complement the level of industrial growth, but was artificially kept at low levels by extra-economic means, i.e. a command system of repression.

The similarities of Greece and Korea, Iran and Mexico have been drawn in this regard, similarities which indicate that there is a cleavage on the employment front between Greece and the other Common Market Member States. Greece has been the tenth member state of the E.E.C.

5.7 Economic characteristics of the Remittance Regime

National boundaries within the world economic system act primarily as the main mechanism which reproduces the migration system through the international

11. The Law 3239/55 represents the specific mechanism whereby the economic disarticulation of the Greek post war accumulation regime was sanctioned by means of the state administration.

system of labour (Saskia, 1987). The nation states represent one novel way for the intricate intertwining of the processes of composition of world capital.

The development of regimes of strictly codified national territoriality, coupled with equally sophisticated systems of population control, e.g. as personal control, are intimately linked with the system of citizenship. By definition most foreigners are, as veritable marginals, assigned - to certain criteria of legal definition, which pertain to their status as "outsiders". Therefore, nominally they are subject to investigation in the host-country by the criminal branch of the national police.

Sweden and Germany for example, which have large foreign populations, have some of the most sophisticated systems of general population control in the West. The rendering of the foreigners into the parapets of law, puts also in the long run, the national citizens into the same control constraints as the foreign "minorities".

The advanced liberal states of Europe (particularly Germany, and Sweden) have developed a system of selective enforcement of their respective aliens' acts to complement their active labour market policies.

In the cases of intra-European migration, the case of a donor state, like Greece, represents a typical category of a state that is economically integrated with the state which host's its labour, namely Germany. Under this migratory labour-process, the wage form which constitutes the labour power of emigrants, constitutes at the same time their capacity as consumers. Indeed, this mode of production and reproduction of labour, renders the bearers of labour capacity, the

(Greek) migrants, as the consumers of (their) wages within the reserve homeland. This is done due to the system of divided families which remains an integral part of the reserve. The wages of guest-workers are derived from their "distant" production site (Germany), while they are consumed as remittances in the state to which the reserve belongs. The key element to pay attention to in this case is the issue of the wage-form in the country of migration. There is a logic to it closely connected with the issue of production and consumption and their interconnection as two spheres of a production system. The usage of the wage within a social structure, linked with a system of labour rotation, is bound to bring about some very important material effects regarding the national market of the country which exports labour.

If the most dynamic part of the population labours abroad, then their consumption must also be derived from abroad; it is only distance that is involved. Families of the migrants are divided across a wide frontier, ranging from Europe to Australia via America. The reproduction of those communities is bringing to the "labour reserve" site those products necessary for the recomposition of that labour, namely their family supports.

Since it is a specific labour process (fordism) that brought those workers to the late liberal state, then their revenue renders them as consumers sited within the same analytical accumulation form (known as fordism), no matter where that consumption takes place. The difference appears to be made when the donor country has the capacity to intervene. One antidote is import substitution. This

however cannot come about without some measure of influence from the "national" working class as it organizes its labours at home. It is no surprising therefore, that Greece is at present the best per capita customer of German products.

The transfer of remittance funds in the periphery, represents as an expenditure of the wage form in Germany, the reproduction costs of (Greek) migrant labour in that country. Remittances allow for the lowering of the costs of labour in the centre (Germany), for less is spent by a great portion of the industrial labouring class, i.e. lower inflationary pressures. Similarly, less is invested in terms of social security expenditures due to the rotating nature of the migratory chain.

The main impact of all these phenomena is the development of the conditions that lead to an "illusionary" modern economy in the periphery, (Greece), which obtains a great deal of undocumented economic activity, due to the magnitude of remittances. Such is the economy of the "labour reserve".

The accounting procedures of the reserve economy are problematic and incomplete as those of the host state are complete and accountable. In other words, there are no conditions for accountability due to the nature of the regime in the peripheral reserve, which lacks responsible government. In comparison, the conditions for plausible public accounts in the centre are sound.

It is possible to find the connection that may explain the causes of such differences by focusing on the relations of political and economic exchange between the two countries.

On the migration side, the individual migrant who accumulates revenue and brings it back to the home country faces problems of a structural nature: s/he are parts of a more general and all pervasive system, which is not coherent or understandable to them. The migrants themselves cannot transfer those relations of production that may "employ" them in a similar manner in their home country. The main blue-print for social capital accumulation is found in the advanced liberal host-state.

The migrant recruitment process which has absorbed workers already employed or unemployed, gives rise to certain long term effects.

Data from West Germany show that there is a considerable amount of saving realized on social expenditure on two grounds

First, via access to foreign labour, and secondly, via the use of kinship ties and other filial relations in the home country of migrants, which help considerably in the reproduction of children, in rearing (grandparents) and schooling (the donor state). As a matter of fact, the Greek Ministry of Education and Religion allocates about one third of its expenditure for the education of Greek children abroad.¹²

In the German-Greek case therefore, not only the costs of reproduction of labour are exported from Germany, as unemployment, disability, medical care and social services in general (via the resource to informal communal networks outside the formal channels provided by the welfare state), but there is also a net import

12. Interview with the Secretary in charge of educating Greeks Abroad, Kourtalidis, Sept 1983, Ministry of Education and Religion, Athens, Greece.

to the host country in the manner of certain social services, which are provided by the Orthodox Church and the Greek Ministry of Education and Religion.

Certain regions in Greece such as Epirus, Macedonia, and Thrace maintain their organic links with the social market of the immigrating state, in this case Germany, to the point of being characterized as being part of it via the remittance receipts. The key to this relation may be found in the weak market forces operating in the domestic economy of the country.

The 1985 economic report on 28 countries of the Swiss E.M.F. Foundation, Greece ranked first in its tendency to import among 28 countries. The corresponding figure for the Common Market average (9 members) was a 0.9 out of a scale of 10. The Greek figure was a 9.2 out of 10 as the measure of the propensity to import (Financial Times, 1986:16).

Remittances in 1978 amounted to almost one billion dollars for Greece. This sum however, does not include the sums transferred through informal channels. There are also sizeable savings in West German banks. Remittance size is an indication of the low consumption to production ratio in the immigration state. Low consumption rates usually lower the rate of inflation and allow the intensification of production, in the host country, while they amplify the opposite effects in the "home-market". Guest labourers are sited in a reproductive regime that is part of the communities of the donor territory. The linkages of those economic territories are somehow submerged and informal. In fact, the very basis of the "informal"

economy, found in the periphery, is the epiphenomenal appearance of this dispersal of the "peripheral" communities.

Out of a total 1,080 million in U.S. funds, as invisible receipts, over 48 per cent were from Germany, out of a total of 56 per cent from the EEC. Since then there have been new trends in favour of both non-European and non-German origins (SOPEMI, 1982:140).

One particular expression of the remittance economy is manifested in the establishment of a mode of stabilization among the emigrants in their home base.

A rentier economy on a small-scale, specifically associated with the better-off is much in evidence. The income becomes a means of establishing a real estate market for returnees, tourists and for those locals who can afford them. The most significant aspect of post war development in Greece has been the immense proportion of investment allocated for construction. Over 45 per cent of all investments were to fuel this most important sector in the Greek economy. It is needless to say that part of this tremendous growth has been due to the lack of a coherent public housing policy.

Thus, the sizeable construction section has been providing a social base, for both the two biggest sources of invisible receipts in the country, namely for tourism and return-migrants. At the same time, the development of a property boom exacerbated the weak economic status of the local, mostly informal, workers.

One can understand their precarious position if one realises the weak support provided by the financial institutions of the state for such purposes. The Manpower Employment Organisation (O.A.E.D.) budget was 517 million drs in 1984 and 3.2 million in 1986. Most returnees are registered with O.A.E.D.

In general, the situation of the migrants is regulated by the regime of the provisional. Migrants represent a permanently circulating "social" mass, quite critical as far as the labour process of the host country is concerned. This "social labour mass" is constituted as a very parenthesis within the guest state's sociality. The "guest labour" community is experiencing the abstraction of its values and culture, a phenomenon much in evidence in the second generation. The cultural heterogeneity of the migrants is the determining element which stimulates their return. The "rotation" issue of "guest-labour" is further exacerbated by the strong nationalist tendencies of the host state which are not aiming at integrating socially the migrants but ends up stimulating a rotation system which terminates upon age retirement.

After the discussion of the issue of remittance conditions from the Greek and the German sides of the migratory relation, more focus will be given to the analysis of the phenomenon of the Greek "public form" and its special relation to "society" which is antinomic. Part of the problem pertaining to the issue of labour exodus and return to Greece is the pertinence of the issue of political admissibility of the social question. This is the main reason for turning now to a consideration of the problem of the Greek state.

The unity of migration, the Greek public-sector and the problem of society are brought together in the following section.

5.8 Summary; State level Social and Political Incentives for Migration

Since the end of the civil war, 1949, the Greek political environment has been politically autocratic and dictatorial in the sense that most of political parties during long periods were outlawed. The two Communist Parties (two splits occurred in 1968 and incidentally in 1991) were legalized in the fall of 1974. This was also the time when the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (Pa.So.K.) and New Democracy (N.D.) parties, which are in control of the present Greek Parliament, were officially launched. In other words, the totality of modern parties in the present Greek Parliament did not exist, at least in their present form, before 1974. That was the year the Colonels withdrew from power after the Cyprus imbroglio in the summer of 1974, which led to the Turkish occupation of the northern part of the island state of Cyprus.

The Greek state itself has kept itself outside democratic participation and outside production per se, by operating at two levels: first, on an articulation of the coercive apparatus (army and church), based in turn upon the legality and form of the Constitution of 1952; second, upon the creation of a social class (Petras, 1986; Vergopoulos, 1987-88) as the basis for this system of power which permitted

the issue of a "limited legitimacy". The latter emerged via the development of a rentier class which was partially reproduced by the migratory system.

From its perspective, this migratory system was envisaged as cyclical. Yugoslavia, by comparison, adopted a more "national" approach, which envisaged the migratory system as a type of a primitive accumulation process whereby, remittances were channelled for socially reproductive infrastructure like roads, machinery and hospitals. Migration was never integrated under such a process of national development in the Greek case.

It is clear that the process of migration might be also due to a number of external causes, like the international division of labour, but it is nonetheless depended upon the political and social forces operating in the country of origin.

Migratory flows produce resources which, as rents, maybe practically utilized for the purposes of a "national economy". In fact, the utilization of those invisible receipts, remittances, indicates the type of control exercised by the dominant power bloc in a country. The mode of appropriation of resources mirrors the type of control exercised and the nature of politics, i.e. the composition of the public-private continua.

Liberal politicians were considering this exodus, which was regulated by strictly enforceable bilateral agreements in a very strict selection process, as a necessary step for the "modernization" process. It was commonly considered that unskilled (Greek) labour would acquire skills during its sojourn abroad (Germany)

and thus bestow the country with those skills upon its return, on an individual basis of course.

Migrant labour's return was always subject to speculation, whether in personal terms, as defined by the migrants themselves, or by the state agents responsible for their affairs.

It appears that we are dealing here with a specific "case", whereby the individual "subject" (administrator) is little more than the hypostasis of the state's "policy" which in its turn mirrors the moral politics of the patronage system.

The very characteristics of what is taken to represent the "public good", as the polity par excellence, are somewhat misconceived by the representatives of the "state". To the contrary, these characteristics represent their own individual interests. Social institutions, embedded in forms of social cooperation and the principle of productivity, have in effect been blocked in Greece. This political suppression of civil-communal associations, led to a type of order reminiscent of internal political war to contain an internal political enemy. The two tier system of pseudo-parliamentarianism during the 1949-74 period resulted from this system (Alivisatos, 1986). Anomy was the epitome of a state rule that was characterised by the complete lack of a policy-making capacity for policy determinations were always exogenously imposed. Political power was not mediated through the "market", by some measure of formal "knowledge categories" (skilled-based hierarchies), which constitute the "intelligence" system of the state. Such basic categories as social statistics, land registration, private and public autonomy of

corporations to use their property, were all restrained in their constitutive applicability. By contrast, the above categories have been the constituent principles of the "polity" in the Occident. Military relations in Greece appear to determine civil relations which under the best of circumstances, at present, are immune from civil control (Alivisatos, 1987). The "public" polity is constituted as a private and personal regime under the sphere of influence of the local family head who appears to control, if not production, then at least communication and access to the main market.

It appears that the market is both political and economic, with the political being the determinant form in this system. In general, the sum of these determinants are such that certain types of security are achieved while lacking the didactic goal which the accumulation of capital at the national level brings about.

The exodus of the economically active population from Greece left an anaemic state unable to articulate the political, civil- body. It appeared almost as if the state was not interested in the development of a civil society at all. In this regard the following quote is pertinent:

The ban on collecting donations or subscriptions is a very real weapon for making the carrying on "legal" organisations almost impossible. This method involves the arrest and beating up of collectors and the confiscation of the money collected by organisations varying from the G.C.L. (Greek T.U.C.), to the E.A. (the Red Cross of the Resistance), and the Panhellenic Union of Democratic Associations. Even the League of Greek Women for Women's Rights was forbidden to take part in an international collection for the benefit of child victims of the war! in (Dodds, 1946: 58).

This legacy has not ceased to exist till the present time.

Similarly, the state politico-administrative security ensemble was not intended to absorb knowledge (Miller, & Rose, 1990), and therefore it was not deemed safe to have as "organs" of the politeia/polity, members educated in a modern sense. This praetorian guard was loyal and secure by virtue of its permanent employment. Weak education prerequisites have been used to make the receivers of any type of information as disciplined instruments under a process of delegation from top to bottom.

The absence of sound principles for the control of the body politic denoted the necessity of abjection for the objects of the "administration". In the absence of the mediation of the market, the principles of movement and circulation of the subjects within the domain have been defined in basically pre-liberal terms

The Ministry of Interior (along with the Ministries of Public Order, National Defence and Merchant Marine) is the de facto agent for the control of labour migration outside the country's territories. But, indeed, how similar in comparison with the other nation-states is the Greek principle of territoriality ? This question which might lead one to the recognition of the principle of national extra-territoriality (as it is loosely articulated with other Hellenic principles such as the Orthodox Church and the Greek language, see the addendum for further elaboration of such themes).

Since the post-war settlement, the polity in Greece has been characterized by the principle of a "permanent" mobilization and a continuous rotation of its labour in the global markets. Emergency regimes, as the infamous Greek Military

Junta of 1967-74, practising continuous "mobilisation", provided for the maintenance of low cost conditions for the reproduction of Greek labour, which was circulating for the world market. Such regimes acted as regimes which were part of the sphere of labour reproduction for the world market.

The remittance economy of the migrants, sailors and immigrants was invested in the "personal" networks of patron client relations in the national metropolis. Such relations became the dominant relations, intertwined with the family formations. The state was left to mediate its policy actions via a system of clientelism (Graziano, 1976; Arlacchi, 1983; Polanyi, 1968; Mauss, 1983; Sahlins, 1972).

Accordingly, petty rentier interests, sided with kinship networks, shaped the polity and rendered it intelligible after their own logic. The main power of organized interests in the polity has been resting upon those social forces who control the market of imported goods and command communication networks. The latter, ironically, appear to belong in part to the "security" axis of the Greek government.

The development of principles of "free association" puts this polity under pressure to accommodate the newly organized interests, i.e. labour. However, this is the heart of the social question itself, a matter of political importance. This social pressure from labour develops within the state those qualifications that are necessary to accommodate the main problems of organized labour, its market and administration and of those civil, (as opposed to military institutions), required to

mediate those tensions. The above allows the national "administration" to articulate those controls which, in the end, are necessary for the politics and instrumentality of the public sphere in constituting factors of production.

In the Greek case, the lack of success of the endogenous social forces, during the period studied, left an "administration" which acted by modifying existing autopoietic (self-producing) administrative and legal protocols with weak connections to the materiality of production. Emigration was the physical outcome of such policies. The quality of this process was such that it clearly left out "popular" representation and participation schemes. The security apparatus rendered the necessary coherence to the "politics" of public space. In fact, the army constituted the only effectively organised part of the public sector during the 1947-74 period.

The category "population" became abstracted, in the only meaningful way known to this extra-civil regime, i.e. by expulsion or continuous internal and external-internal rotation. This took the form of internal exile, imprisonment and/or physical annihilation as well as "transfers" abroad.

A great portion of the working class was transferred abroad thus leaving undeveloped the categories of population, social statistics and other modern features of post war government unattended.

The development of socio-ethnically meaningful categories within the state administration was retarded since the key element in the constitution of these categories, the labour form, did not develop legally and organizationally within the

state boundaries. The weak development of the socio-civil (in Gramscian terms) forms meant that civil and private or voluntary organizations were left atrophied. This atrophy meant the weakness of a particular state, which emerged after the post war Reconstruction period not based upon the abstraction of the modern economy, the categories of labour and capital regulated by public policy. In other words, the new categories of economic policy and employment which emerged after the war in Europe as a result of the Marshall Plan.

In the Greek case such principles of government did not develop, largely as a result of the distance established between the diaspora of labourers and capitalists abroad and the state at home. Thus the post war Greek "state" maintained its pre-war, political status keeping its physiognomy as a militarized society-state.

The principle of extra-territoriality is an explanatory framework utilized to understand such a politico-economic situation whereby a continuously rotating population over the globe has been monitored by a peculiarly crafted national political power whose value from labour (as rents) is derived by such labour's employment abroad (Saskia, 1987).

In the interior of Greece there is high unemployment and under-employment, concealed by the character of the family and kinship networks, and a big underground economy. The formal sector of the economy, largely located in the Capital Region of Attica, has been fuelled by the regionally (southern based),

dominant patron client relations. Therefore, no transformation of labour into labour power is being promoted.

In the exterior of the Greek nation state, an impressive array of state administrative mechanisms, security, labour, educational, aimed at the "regulation" of the diaspora labour has been in operation. This situation allows the careful student of Greek political practices to understand the nominalism, or legal formalism that prevails in the Greek state, after Mouzelis has called it (Mouzelis, 1978: Chapter on Greek Formalism).

Another way to describe the situation is to define it as one of "suspended animation", whereby the Greek state in its internal conditions is solely represented, by liturgies, panegyrics, eulogies, inertia, instead of welfare (employment) policy.

The peculiarity of the problem of apprehending the reality of the Greek state, forces one to reconsider the issues normally utilized in the understanding of the Greek polity. One has to diverge into some themes which identify issues of socio-legal nature as they specify the conditions for entry into civil society. The problems of "action", and movement itself are very important in understanding some of the issues involved.

For the Greeks "action" in an economic sense has been permitted abroad in the world market under the aegis of local national state systems, but not within the parameters of the Greek nation state.

The results of such a diaspora of workers, the invisible earnings from (tourism, migrants, shipping), fuel the "submerged" economy of the Greek

peripheral regions, the source of origin of such labourers, in a very "personal" way. For example, the lack of post war housing policy, provided a void which was to be filled by the returnees remittances who contributed to the rebuilding of the country more than anyone else (O.E.C.D., 1983).

Had the system of political patronage not been in existence, the system of present political power and economy in Greece would be very close to a realm bordering idealist metaphysics. The reasons are linked to the absence of a sound socio-scientific abstraction (of the body politic) within a field of government. Such a scientific abstraction denotes the means of the development of principles of population, statistics and territoriality.

This political system left out most areas of the social territory exposed directly to changes in the foreign labour market (Arlacchi, 1983; Chapter 2). Such things happened in the main areas whereby out-migration occurred during the late fifties and sixties.

The absence of regional labour markets, as horizontal networks, running counter to the established vertical system of patronage, has been primarily the main reason for the peculiarities of the economy of those regions outside the privileged areas, where the state has been drawing its "public" employment from. In fact, these areas usually acted as the "reserve" for the labour market of the areas with the dynamic accumulation processes, namely the Attica and Thessalonica regions (based on oil-related branches, chemicals, textiles, tobacco and shipbuilding). The weak social and technical infrastructure was substituted by

a religious-cum-military regime (a command economy for a command polity), that was anticipating its "constitution", as a socio-civil polity (in Gramscian terms).

In the absence of a strong civil polity and an autonomous civil society, and therefore of a real labour market policy, the returnees became a virtual diaspora in their own territory, restrained only by the contours of their community family networks (Unger, 1981; Unger, 1983: 369-374). Table 28 is a clear illustration of this trend.

Table 29

Occupational status of Greeks before, during and after migration to Germany.

Before emigration.	Last job in Greece	Occupation in Germany	recent job in Greece.
Unskilled worker	32 %	28 %	13 %
Semiskilled worker	31 %	51 %	27 %
Skilled worker	4 %	16 %	4 %
Clerical worker	8 %	4 %	14 %
Self-Employed	22 %	1 %	36 %
Employer	1 %	----	6 %
	(N = 514)	(N=574)	(N=498)

Source: Unger, "Greek emigration to and return from West Germany", *Ekistics*, 290, Sept-Oct., 1981: 369-374, 373.

Table 28 indicates that the provision of new jobs for those who return to Greece by remigration is limited to the tertiary sector and the self-employed. According to the same study 74 per cent of the self employed are working in the tertiary sector, 22 per cent in handicrafts, and 3 per cent in the productive sector. The easy absorption of return migrants in the so called self-employed sector indicates the type of economic conditions prevailing in the place of their return.

The Unger study shows also that the returnees from Germany have the inclination to settle in areas where there are some facilities for collective consumption, namely health and education. The pattern of workers, unskilled and semi-skilled comprise 63 per cent of the migrants to Germany in the Unger sample. While their last job in Germany was on the semi-skilled category, an increase from 31 per cent to 51 per cent in the transition from Greece to Germany occurred. This matter amplifies our point that skills in the Greek structure of labour relations are compressed since arrival in Germany also means an upgrading of skill status. The irony is that in a "developing" state, such as the one of Greece, we have had 31 per cent semiskilled workers while in the advanced state such as Germany the rate of skill increased to 51 per cent for the Greek sample.

Similarly the Greek workers' positions in Greece were comprising only 4 per cent skilled jobs, going up to 16 per cent in skilled jobs in Germany. Another startling feature of this study is the category of the self-employed which from the high 22 per cent in northern Greece was almost eliminated to a mere 1 per cent in Germany.

If one looks again at those who "returned" to Greece, their occupation was very similar to the one they had before departure. What a startling manifestation of discipline ! Generally, it so appears that very little happened by way of transformation of their conditions of employment since their departure.

Specifically, the level of unskilled workers positions was reduced by almost 2/3, from 32 per cent to 13 per cent; and those in previously semiskilled and

skilled occupations declined from 31 per cent (semiskilled), to 27 per cent and those skilled remained in the same percentage upon their return, to 4 per cent of jobs. The real increase occurred in the so called self-employed or informal sector, from 22 per cent before departing Greece the percentage went up to 36 per cent upon their return to Greece, while those in the public employment sector found a jump of 6 per cent points after return. A small 5 per cent increase occurred in the category of "employer", indicating that some skilled workers in Germany accumulated enough capital to set up a business in Greece, by hiring outside their immediate family, thus being treated separately from the category self employed.

The institutional situation in the place of emigration constituted the "negative/blue-print", which, parenthetically, was interrupted during the "time" abroad. The unique inflexibility of the polity in altering the conditions prevalent in the "reserve" is clearly manifested in the previous demonstration.

The unique flexibility of Greek labour was never utilized for the purposes of national development. In fact the regime of power has been taking as its own the mutations within the world market, forcing with its draconian arm (the military), its labour into the world.

The precariously constituted labour market, and indeed the inadequate conditions for the reproduction of the social parameters for its supports (labour), appear to have led to the formation of a "civil-state" that is situated outside the main parameters of what is denoted as a re(s)public. ¹³ The term civil state is

13. In the Greek language there is no difference between the words republic and democracy. The Latin word "res" denotes in Greek an object.

used to denote the state that is inclusive of civil society, which is as yet to be emancipated. There are variations regarding this civil state which appear to denote also another level of interpretation, namely that such a polity represents a mode of power exclusive of civility. In a sense, this is the very basis of autocratic politics. The latter is the main element which creates certain conditions for development of a separate economic mass outside that state, a mass that greatly depends upon its direct links with the areas of work, namely with northern Europe.

5.9 Conclusions

This Chapter is the micro-sociological chapter of the thesis. It attempted to illustrate in a concrete way how the "reserve" was made possible by the unique combination of a state power modality which articulated the field of labour in a manner which by the mirroring of its own political economy it has led to the "export" of it by certain strategic means.

Such means have been identified and arguments have been presented to support such identification, as the following political parameters restraining the activity and movement of labour and individuals in general and the economic parameters which were defined by the following developments : a) the system of centralized local government, b) the system of wage-labour legislation imposed, c) the system of industrial development in relation to employment generation. It

is clear, after this illustration, that the point on the feasibility of interpreting the post war economy and its polity in northern Greece as one which might fit the description of what Meillassoux described as a labour reserve has been presented convincingly (Meillassoux, 1983).

This chapter essentially aimed at bringing together seemingly disparate bits and pieces of facts which might be put together to present a structure of internal arrangements which might be defining the nature of the regime in post war Greece.

In the following chapter, which is the last one before the concluding chapter, a presentation is made of the administrative regime which regulates labour from Greece and Germany. The German side has a double axis. First the juridico-administrative regulations are presented by the reference to the labour agreement between Greece-Germany. Second an attempt is made to present the anatomy of the economic factors which necessitate the use of foreign labour.

Chapter 6 Aspects of the Regulatory Apparatus for Greek-German Migration

This Chapter addresses the issue of administrative regulatory mechanisms employed in the labour recruitment and labour rotation process between Greece and Germany. It is therefore essential to mention both the types of Greek and German administrative interventions. The reference to Germany pertains to the main agreement reached by Germany and Greece in 1960. (Incidentally, this was the year the associate membership of Greece with the European Economic Community was signed.)

6.1 Greek State Strategies to Manage Migration

This is an attempt to account for the administrative nature of an apparatus overseeing the NGLR. It is an account of its absences, silences as well as its direct and draconian interventions when the system appears to run off its course. The aim here, is to point to those areas in the management of the reserve in which the Greek state articulates a direct or indirect responsibility. This presentation is however elliptical and should be treated as such. To begin with, there are no Greek migration statistics since 1977. The

only Greek report ever to appear in the SOPEMI (the O.E.C.D. system of continuous reporting on migration), annual report was during the 1982 year. The report was composed by some figures and some syntagmatic statements about the new immigration policy of the Socialist Government (1981-1988). This was the first such declaration for an immigration policy. However, it was short-lived, as the plans for the formation of a special secretariat for migrants never crystallised. After a five year meandering, the secretariat came under the jurisdiction of Ministry of Culture and Sciences, while the original section, for Greeks Abroad, was to remain under the control of the Foreign Ministry. During the period of our study, there was a plethora of agencies which were involved in the "regulation" of Greek migrant labour. As far as Europe was concerned, there was the representation of the Labour Ministry in selected E.E.C. countries along with Sweden, in the manner of labour attaches.

In Greece, there are agencies with the same field of jurisdiction which appear to overlap and as a result the symbiosis between government agencies is not very well coordinated or cooperative. Similarly, redundant old legislation is still in power, rendering substance to the principle of a selective application of law. The determining point in the choice of appropriate rule then appears to rest upon a regime of personal favouritism. The careful observer will realize that the relation between such "organizational" settings, determined by vertical ways of integration, is absent, as such (settings) are quite often mutually exclusive in their concerns.

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In the case of the Greek rotating migrant workers, the relation to their respective field of "care" is also weak, depending greatly upon the interests of those eleemosynary (church based aid institutions) institutions, rather than on the state agencies' functions. In this case, the Union of German Churches has been instrumental in providing the most coherent service for return migrants to Greece.

The previous description of Greek legislative overlaps indicates the type of ad hoc and perhaps sui generis "regulatory" regime which operates in the country. Such a regime mirrors the general status of the state's relation to law and society.

The post-war regime in Greece tried to fall back upon the nation's old tradition of the "diaspora". It attempted, for obvious political reasons, to maintain those diaspora communities and to develop more of them out of the recent (migration) experience.¹ The specific combination of those interests with the international economy, albeit in a rather dynamic manner, rendered coherence to the objectives of a traditional political power holders which had only exogenous plans for the economy.

In short, the principles of a "national economy" were never allowed to develop. "Regulation" has always been dissociated from a material orientation

1. A continuous transfer of resources via mainly the Ministry of Education and Religion to the authorities of the communities abroad has been in effect through the period of examination. As mentioned earlier, over 30 per cent of the national budget for Greek education is spent on the diaspora communities. Very little is known regarding the sums sent by the same ministry in support of the activities of the Greek Church in Europe.

aiming at the specifics of development of the national resources. In Greece labour was never able to become registered within the national parameters of the territory, i.e. accepted by the state administration. Its level of organisation and criteria of conduct were such that rendered impossible any accommodation by means of its licensing to action and voluntary association away from the feudal "care" of the "polity". To this day, due to the unique constraints imposed upon them, voluntary labour forms and professional associations are not functioning (Mavrokordatos, 1989).

Since the Second World War, the Greek state developed certain activities which allowed for the growth of an "institutional" apparatus, grounded upon quasi-juridical terms, to regulate "political bodies", their movement, circulation and position. These political bodies were elements of the population subject to control, according to politicized criteria, established by a minority in collaboration with U.S.A. and Britain. As a consequence, labour migrated for political reasons, since elements of civil cooperation were restrained and effectively blocked by the "authorities". Security constraints, which were defined in a very limited way imposed upon the country the fate of an agrarian based labour reserve. It has been stated, (Serafetinidis et al., 1981) that some sections of the Greek upper classes benefited by the emergence of cheap sites for the provision of relatively cheap and reliable labour for their maritime fleets. At the same time, the labour reserve in the northern part of Greece was to benefit another land based factory system, in another country.

The argument advanced here is that modern productivist capacities of an organizational form, were neither developed nor thoroughly pursued by the Greek state. The state which presides over labour reserves does not require the disciplinary apparatus which corresponds to a labour market. Such a state obtains a disciplinary apparatus which is of an undemocratic nature, for it only requires to suppress the level of subsistence and the tendency to economic accumulation. To that effect, the use of the labour legislation was to primarily keep labour skills undeveloped (Chapter 5).

The development of the international division of labour and the specificity of a labour process attached to it, renders the state as the true mirror of its organizational capacities, which in their turn are part of the managerial weaknesses of the indigenous labour.

Indeed, the Greek civil state, as a veritable "societe bloquee", allows its living labour to be accommodated only as the marginal force of an advanced labour process or as rentiers or shop keepers back home (Greece has more retail outlets than Great Britain itself and only 48 per cent of its labour is wage - labour).

The military nature of the "public" sector allows for a civil society within the militarized state to be expressed as part of an informal economy. The strategic part of this informal or submerged economy is principally constituted by the very rotation of migrant labour. The system of permanent labour-rotation denotes a principle of non-jurisdiction of the socio-civil agency and its private

economy. This is the very basis of the "informal" nature of the economy. Instead of being irregular, as it is treated in Greece, it ought to be viewed for what it represents, namely an economic form corresponding to the principle of the reserve. According to another study, (Tsobanoglou, 1988) the author has established that the periodicity of the Greek state allows for the development of an "economy" that is not analytically and historically distinct from its "polity". The polity itself is identified by virtue of its "stability" as opposed to principles of development.

The very composition of the legal parameters of the polity indicates the degree of freedom that civil society might enjoy, even if it is found within the "regulating" principle of the polity.

The military control of the state (Alivizatos, 1986; 1987; Haralambis, 1987) renders the civil status of the "estates" of political bodies dependent upon certain exogenous parameters.

The principle of nationality is brought into sharp focus here, taking account of the possibility of extra-nationality and extra-territoriality, as the main elements of a combination of controls which are mediated by supranational powers. The unique integration of the Greek diaspora shipping and mercantile capital with the Anglo- American forces, is an interesting element which might, in the long run, develop special relevance for theories of social development. The weak basis for a nation state in Greece leaves many regional forces represented in a multiplicity of laws, being expressed as conflicts.

The non-civil nature of the polity renders the state as a simple, direct and personally administered power (political patronage system) that controls without a resource to integrative measures (horizontal). The confluence of the mutually exclusive powers are regulated via the mediation of a non civil and para-judicial ensemble, defined by the polymorph of the power grid. At the local level, the regimes are "governed" by the forces of family and kinship ties.

It is a pity that so little is known about the Greek family and community.²

One can see that migration cannot be understood outside this regime of mediation (family, kinship) at the local, reproductive (renewal of life) level.

The main labour form is structured, so, as to feed the highly regimented labour market at the core, and the mainly informal sector at home, the periphery. Recent industrial capital flight to the south did not appear to have a great impact on Greece as it had on Spain or Portugal. The mediating capacities of the state in Spain and Portugal have historically developed a corporatist labour-community based, on "civil-society" principles (the Mondragon cooperative system as such an example) (Logan, 1988). In the Greek case this was deemed illegitimate during the 1944-1974 period. In this section an attempt has been made to present elements of "regulation" and "control" for the maintenance of the system of labour export and rotation between Greece and Germany. What we notice is the very absence of policy,

2. There are of course classic studies of rural Greece as Campbell's, 1964, and E. Friedl's, 1954. However, the single most important article on migration and development of northern Greece was written according to my judgement by Prof. H. Vermeulen of the University of Amsterdam, (1975).

or, more accurately the specific character of Greek policy which in relation to the German policy is rather "passive". (It's aims are more domestic, namely to keep wages low and the level of subsistence low so as to continue to supply German industry with required workers.)

The phenomenon of the diaspora shows that other areas of Greece, maritime Greece, are having the same relationship with outside industries. Now that we have had a glimpse of the elusive character of the Greek state, very experienced with the maintenance of politically and economically safe labour reserves, we turn to the German-Greek agreement. The nature of this agreement represents the type of command labour, which is what guest-labour has always been.

6.2 German State Policies to Control Migrant Labour

Reference here will be made to the bilateral agreements established between the Greek and German governments. It is the demand side which defines the terms of these regulatory agreements. The purpose of this chapter is to describe the dynamics of the administrative regulation of guest-labour in Germany. ³

The agreement signed between Greece and Germany in 1960, was the first of its kind with non-European Economic Community states. Others were

3. This issue has many points for those who are interested to know the intimate relationship between state and labour markets in an advanced liberal environment.

soon to follow with Spain, 1960; Turkey, 1961; Morocco, 1963; Portugal, 1964; Tunisia, 1965; and Yugoslavia, 1968. The Greek-German Agreement is typical of the rest. Its main provisions have been as follows: ⁴

- a) potential migrants from non-EEC origins are screened on the basis of their human capital and in the light of the labour market characteristics needed by the host country; the final decision about employment is left with the West German employers, who have to draw a contract between the worker and the firm;
- b) contrary to the case of EEC national, the West German authorities will provide selected workers with work permits ("legitimationskarte") valid for one year, which are specific to a particular employer and location. Upon its expiry, the worker must request a regular work permit which is issued according to domestic laws;
- c) workers may export their earnings in West Germany subject to the country's legislation regarding exchange control;
- d) the source country's government must accept repatriation of her national who migrated on the grounds of the agreement, without further procedures;
- e) the agreement does not supersede in its application other more favourable agreements when the latter are binding for the West German government such as the EEC agreements;
- f) after five years of uninterrupted employment a permanent work permit may be granted.

If comparison between the E.E.C. and non E.E.C. workers is made one can see the different positions these two classes of workers are situated:

- a) the principle of non-discrimination in employment is not extended to non-EEC workers;

4. The provisions of this agreement are cited in Belessiotis, 1986:240-45 and are quoted here ad verbatim with the author's consent.

b) their entry and residence (in West Germany) is regulated by the authority of the host country and it is not an EEC affair;

c) the work permit and the residence permit control spatial mobility of non EEC nationals, as well as competition in the labour market and imbalances in the labour market; the right to obtain employment in other regions, or with other employers, or in other member states is not extended to them.

One can easily discern from the above that in times of recession the burden is borne by non-EEC nationals, i.e. the guest-workers.

More specifically, the German and Greek agreement of 1960 defined the frame of cooperation between the Greek and (West) German governments to facilitate labour mobility for the purpose of achieving full realization of the production possibilities in the two countries. Labour exports were understood to be one such means to this end.

The implementation of the agreement rested with the Federal Employment Institute (F.E.I.) and with the Greek Ministry of Labour. Both bodies were responsible for the selection and employment of immigrants (Art. 2(1)). In particular, on Germany's side, the Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (Nuremberg) in order to fulfil this task, could establish an agency in Greece, bearing the cost of operation, and correspondingly, the Greek Ministry could establish a similar agency in West Germany (Art. 3). These agencies, established by the Federal Republic of Germany in all labour exporting countries, have been instrumental in the operation of the system of labour imports.

Both these national offices were responsible for the initiation of labour

imports. According to Articles 4 and 5, the West German Office would communicate to the Greek Ministry information the economic and occupational categories where manpower needs existed, as well as information concerning conditions of work, earnings and tax rates. This communication was characterized as an offer of employment. The Greek Ministry could, independently of the West German offer, provide information to the West German agency concerning potentially exportable Greek workers, under the proviso, that these workers were trained or working professionally (Art. 6 (3)). In addition, the Greek Ministry would respond to the West German offer of employment stating the availability of manpower, and would communicate the offer to Greek workers. The Greek Ministry would collect the applications of Greek workers willing to work in West Germany according to the offer of employment, and it would screen the candidates on the basis of their suitability, providing them with a health and professional certificate (Art. 7 (1), (2)), as well as travelling documents. The West German agency would then screen the selected candidates and the final decision for the employment was left with the West German employers (Art. 10), the latter having to draw a contract between the worker and the firm.

The West German agency would provide selected workers with work permits ("legitimationskarte") valid for one year, which substitute for the general requirement for work in West Germany by non-West German nationals (Art. 12 (2)). Upon its expiry the worker ought to request a regular work permit issued

according to domestic laws (Art.12 (3)). The granting of residence to "guest-workers" is governed by an administrative act (No 13 General Administrative Order to implement Sec. 7 of the Law Concerning Foreigners, which does not permit the exercise of any trade). Strict occupational control is the norm.

Article 17 provides that unification of families will depend on the availability of housing and on a contractual agreement between the employer and the worker. Three other Articles also deserve special attention: Article 16 states that workers will be able to export their labour earnings subject to the host country's laws concerning exchange controls. Article 18 states that the Greek government will accept, at any time, and without further procedures, Greek workers exported on the basis of this agreement. Finally, Article 20 states that this agreement does not supersede in its application other more favourable agreements, when the latter are binding for the West German Government (Belessiotis, 1986:246).

The legal position of the foreign workers in Germany has been nominally defined by the Aliens Act (Ausländergesetz) of 1965, which replaced the Third Reich's Alien Act of 1938, valid till then. As was already noted, upon expiry of the "legitimationskarte" after one year, renewal of the residence permit depends on renewal of the work permit, in the absence of which the worker has to leave the country. However, the residence permit can be denied independently of the work permit (offer), if the worker's presence is against the interest of the Federal Republic. While these are the nominal regulations, German laws

concerning guest-workers contravened in practice by administrative acts and by local employment agencies. As Albrecht mentioned :⁵

-if a foreign employee without his own fault finds himself in a situation of distress, just as it occurs to local employees, and wishes to make use of the social welfare institutions, he can be expelled or deported. Even though the use of a basic right should exclude burdening sanctions, Paragraph 10, Section 1, No. 10 of the Law Concerning Foreigners ties the fact of receiving social welfare assistance to the legal effect of expulsion.

- social housing planning disregards foreigners. Cooperative housing institutions are not required, when receiving credit, to give due consideration in the assignment of apartments to foreign employees in accordance with their proportionate share in the total population and their need to catch up with the rest of the population.

- the "due process of law" doctrine assured by the Basic law (Art. 19, Sec. 4: "If the rights of a person are violated by the public administration, he is entitled to the due process of law") remains a formal right, and thus ineffective, in that the effectiveness of the protection of the law for foreigners is defeated by measures with immediate effectiveness (accordance with Paragraph 21, Section 3, Sentence 3, in connection with Paragraph 12 of the Law for the Foreigners) or by an order of immediate execution of an expulsion decision.

As there are General Administrative Regulations governing the implementation of the Foreigners Law, such law and the Labour Promotion Law allow for wide powers of discretionary interpretation by the administration itself as the former paragraphs documented. The Foreigners' Law clearly discriminates in favour of domestic workers. As it is, it is a legal document which governs generally with high discretionary powers. The system which it regulates is not, however, immediately intelligible, unless we spend some time

5. Albrecht, " The Laws concerning foreigners from the perspective of a social worker for foreign labourers (employees)". Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, Vol. II, No. 2, April 1975:31-34, 32.

analysing the contours of the exchange of guest-labour from Greece to Germany.

6.3 The Economic and Political Regulation of Foreign "Guest Labour"

The previously presented administrative and juridical conditions governing the recruitment, shipment, maintenance and rotation of Greek "guest-labour" in Germany means that in that country there is a clearly distinct line separating the national labour market from the "market" of the "guest-workers", if one can still call it a market since its command nature is very obvious. In any case, the subsequent dual labour market denotes the existence of two types of labour each defined in political, social, economic, ideological, cultural and administrative ways in terms of its relation to the main economy and society. There are those national workers who are integrated and those foreigners who are not. Those integrated receive both direct and indirect wages, that is wages and social security benefits etc. Those who are non-integrated receive only direct wages. This separation is very crucial as it also corresponds to the other separation, namely that of the process of maintenance of labour, which we shall name as simple and extended (maintenance), and renewal. Simple maintenance denotes direct reconstitution of labour-power via the direct wage. Extended maintenance denotes social security, health, unemployment

provisions. Renewal denotes the generational replacement of workers-conventional biological reproduction. To begin with, both the system of direct and indirect wages and the system of reproduction are closely linked. Guest-workers receive only direct wages in their place of work, i.e. simple reproduction.

Extended reproduction maintenance is transferred to their national reserve. Renewal (concerning the second generation) of guest-labour denotes the return of retired or exhausted workers to their homeland and their replacement by new workers born and reared in the reserve. The reserve undertakes the responsibility to cover the costs, at a very low subsistence level, of renewal of labour. The permit system and the juridico-administrative regime, which was sampled above, form the structure which "rotates" labour between the reserve and the place of its consumption. Both the political power holders in the reserve and the advanced centre must bear the seemingly paradoxical quality of attracting and expelling of the same type of labour, according to the contours of the production process. The lack of provisions for extended maintenance in times of sickness, unemployment, force guest-workers to return home. The repressive and weak juridical status in their own homeland force them to seek greener pastures. The lack of a labour market in the northern Greek labour reserve means that once one is unemployed he/she seek employment abroad.

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There is an interesting parallelism between the simple maintenance

system for guest-workers and for labourers back home in Greece, whereby wage is defined as low subsistence basic wage with no extensive benefits.

In summary, this section briefly discussed the juridico-administrative presentation of the regulatory system established between Greece and Germany. The provisos provide a very clear description of the conditions and the administrative discretion of the German-Greek Agreement.

What follows is a theoretical description of the process in the system of labour exchange within the reserve and the centre of guest-labour employment. This section will enhance the understanding of the general process of transnational labour flows and will allow us to situate the "reserve" in the international system.

6.4 Transnational Labour Exchanges and the Principle of the "Reserve". A Theoretical Appraisal of the Migration Process

Within the present conditions which are necessary for the recomposition of labour power, guest-labour migration, and its particular agency the guest (multi-ethnic) worker, plays the following economic role: it enables the economic integration, within the work process, of a special type of worker. This worker comes from a place where social organization is not developed. It is this social atrophy which constitutes the very reason for labour export.

The lack of organization allows this labour its great mobility and sub-legal

status. Its costs of reproduction are provided only partially by the host country, since it requires a reliance upon the home country/family. Pre-capitalist relations (subsistence domestic economy) therefore contribute to the recomposition of labour power. The home economy, produces, at no cost to the centre, able bodied workers whose productive years are spent in the capitalist sector.

The home-economy of the reserve is greatly supported by state transfers, extensive family networks which support the aging workers when they return home to retire, and income saved as remittances.

In the European case, the cyclical migration of labour allows the divided family system to be reproduced. This cyclical system terminates upon retirement age or occupational health problems, whichever comes first ⁶.

It seems that the general policy of the Federal Republic has been to keep one type of migrant - the young male without a family - who circulates between host and home fronts.

International migration exchanges entail a particular type of labour reproduction. This reproduction is normally met by the wage-form, by facilities for collective consumption, or from family supports and pension schemes which compensate for the loss of activity.

6. The author estimates a 20-25 % rate of severely handicapped Greek return migrants from Germany, on the basis of an investigation of medical cases and interviews conducted in two municipalities with heavy return migration, in the cities of Thessaloniki and Drama. Furthermore, over 30-40% of mental patients in the Thessalonica Psychiatric Hospital are "returnees" from Germany or other places such as Australia. (The interviews were conducted in 1983.)

There are various situations in which these phenomena appear in peripheral or core social formations. Core social formations, such as "welfare" states, have had, until recently, full employment policies. Through these income policies, they developed regimes of accumulation, whereby the extensive reproduction of the labour category has been realized through social security provisions. The direct reproduction of labour power has been met by the net wage and direct as well indirect taxation. In fact, this is the main legitimacy for the taxation schemes, since taxation is accompanied by representation of economic activity.

The periphery, being exclusive of labour and its organization, relies for its immediate reproduction in part upon the "rural" reserves and the non-economic family networks which support the political patronage system. The social service support structure of the "reserve" is to be found in family kinship ties, inter-generational ties, family labour and "collective responsibility", as opposed to individual responsibility, established in civil and common law advanced liberal countries. The former represents, in the "legal" field, this uniquely pre-liberal structure. Within the reserve itself, however, the political danger of the "dangerous" poor labour is exchanged for this transfer to economic centres, whereby its activity would allow the maintenance of the reserve itself. Migration reproduces the home-land as such. In this way, the "reserve" is reproduced since the state can tax the labour fruits from the centre without resort to developing the wage economy and a labour market itself. At

the same time, wages are kept low, since they mostly relate to "unproductive" services, which are being fed by invisible receipts and commodities. The core is also contented, since its imported labour is kept rotating at a very low cost. The labour that remains in the core faces, through the combined pressures of racism, xenophobia, cultural deprivation and absence of legal rights, the real danger of non integration (Meillassoux, 1981:Part II).

Not many migrants or immigrants may have access to justice to fight for their civil or employment rights. The unions are too big to deal with the special cases of these ethnics. The occupational segregation, however, might potentially allow for the internal organization of the ethnic communities. Historical experience from North America shows that the occupational segregation of ethnic communities, and the experience of the Greek communities in Sweden, tell the following tale: ethnic communities will more or less acquire the properties of a "reserve" within the host territory. The role of women will be to work increasingly within the reserve for the reproduction of the immigrant family, while the role of men will be to work outside the community reserve. Such reserves need not take the form seen in many North American cities; they are often not visible at all. Rather, they might be diffused as islands into the urban archipelago according to its spatial arrangements.

6.5 Conclusions

This chapter has attempted to describe the following:

- Aspects of "regulation" of labour export by the Greek and German states.

One can realize the weak position of the Greek government, which out of a political and economic necessity has had to accept terms of labour "exchange" with Germany as described in this chapter.

- The regulatory intervention of the German state, which constituted the labour market for "guest-labour" and indeed continues to do so.

The regulation of guest-labour has many aspects, like the phenomenon itself, it is very simple and very complex at the same time. It involves a number of very important actors whose actions always seem to complement each other in the end.

The complementarity of the guest-labour system with the site of a reserve has already been made previously (Chapters 4 and 5). The regulatory mechanism of the "demand" state (Germany) is very important in showing first how states regulate (labour) markets. The German state's regulation of its labour market done in such an extraordinary way, as to go over its borders and recruit labour from another state, indicates the importance of such political functions in the late liberal state. The question of course is, if Germany is so actively managing its labour regime, then what is the Greek state doing in

undermining its own social power base ?

The last section of this chapter intended to provide for an overview of the transnational rotation of labour resources and their repercussions for the labour sending states.

Chapter 7 Summary and Conclusions

In the research presented here, the attempt has been a rather modest one. The plethora of evidence emanating from post-war Greece which existed scattered and dispersed, has been looking for an author to put it together into a coherent tale. The name of this tale is the real event of the northern Greece post-war labour diaspora, its causes and possibly its remedies. While the emphasis on the causes has to point to certain painful events, it should not prevent us from engaging in a sociological analysis and interpretation of such events.

The issue is always the condition of Greek society and the meaning of the war-time and post-war traumas which were inflicted by a series of political agencies, emanating from both the East and the West. In our judgement, it was phenomena such as the post-war mass exodus, planned and intended being the immediate result of civil-war population removals, coupled with a "security" ensemble which provided the political and administrative facts for the conditions for "labour export" and the formation of the Northern Greece Labour Reserve (NGLR).

The detailed analysis of the pertinent labour legislation (Chapter 5), suggested that internal labour measures, provided the added means for setting of mechanisms for cheap labour production and a weak capital accumulation basis. The Unger study provided some revealing facts about the condition of Greek

labourers "rotating" between Greece and Germany.

The main thesis of this research is that the confluence of turbulent events, which stormed Greece after the second world war, was to lead to the formation in the northern part of the country, of a labour-reserve regime, the N.G.L.R. This regime incorporated institutions and practices which can be identified on the socio-economic plane as : a) the legal labour relations system practised in Greece, and b) the type of economic development, whereby there has been a disjuncture between the capital intensive nature of Greek development and its employment absorption capacity. In the field of legal and administrative institutions, certain regulations ratified after the Greek civil-war allowed the reconstitution in the northern provinces of pre-war "security zones". This constitutes the formal indicator of an institutionalized reserve system.

It is not coincidental that the most appropriate form of labour exchange is the "guest-labour" system, which was originally applied by Germany to labour from northern Greece.

The principle of the reserve requires that administrative and legal means are applied to maintain an area in which "guest-labour" can renew and maintain itself during periods of unemployment or in case of impairment. The "guest-labour" rotates between the "reserve" and the foreign industrial sector so that they do not become dependent upon public or company funds. Extended maintenance or the so-called social-extended wage is the assumed responsibility of the reserve. The reserve has to make sure that labour is reproduced at the subsistence level. This

is amply illustrated in Chapter 5 in the analysis of the system of industrial relations and the specific regulation of the minimum wage in Greece. The aim is to transfer to the domestic community the burden of social (extended) maintenance, "welfare", along with the cost of renewal, or physical reproduction of labour. Because of the renewal aspect of the labour reproduction process, the level of life in the reserve has to remain at the subsistence level i.e., outside any capitalist relations.

It is for this reason that means of infrastructure such as roads, irrigation and transport systems; or export-structures for agricultural production, storage and packaging, are undeveloped in the reserve. In fact, one can go as far as to say that, with the advent of nominal democracy, the formal structures of the reserve-zone might be replaced by other "economic" means. Such means would mirror the internal order of the total (over-centralised) state as it manages investments for the labour reserve.

This is a very contradictory process for the very maintenance of the reserve requires the blocking of such processes.

The status of the state, as aspects of it have been presented in Chapter 4, allows for the understanding that traditional clientelist alliances with a military hydrocephalic order played a very significant role in defining the post-war Greek political regime. Such tenures have been instrumental in defining the "public" and "private" domains. This defines the character of the regime in Greece, its capacity to accommodate change and reform.

In conclusion this dissertation has attempted to define the concept of the

Northern Greece Labour Reserve. This position is based on the interpretation of the combination of the following points:

1. The welfare-warfare connection might allow another interpretation of the over-politicized course of events in Greece, in the 1940-49 decade,
2. The issue of Empire, as the cause of the Greek civil-war (1946-49) and the demise of the popular and sovereign Greek government, might be established as a fact canonized by social science rather than political ideology.
3. The Greek state in the aftermath of the ruinous civil war, 1946-49, required certain organic links with world centres for the accumulation of capital. Through these links it siphoned-off living labour, in order to solve its domestic problem of control in two ways: first, by means of the physical exodus of the economically active population, and secondly, by the use of remittances to form an economy that reproduces a minimum social base, that is necessary for the reproduction of the legitimacy of the state-form. This formation is constitutive, of a type of an economy that is manifested as a family labour-form, found in both the rural and urban areas.
4. Post-war conditions in Greece and in the N.G.L.R. in particular systematically promoted a traditionalist policy based on pre-war power configurations.
5. The extraordinary state apparatus erected a formal edifice for a labour reserve system, the N.G.L.R. Organisations of civil-society were suppressed as a result of this.
6. Institutions of organized labour were not tolerated nor were they incorporated by the state in a corporatist sense. The national institutions of labour, the key to the analysis of the migration policy of the state, have been in a state of complete atrophy. In reality, labour was represented, up to 1981, in reality, only by the two Communist Parties which carried a mere 10 per cent of the popular vote, while a considerable number of the socialist unions remained outside the umbrella of the Socialist party. During the 1960-80 period, the financial basis for the unions was in the hands of the Ministry of Labour. This had repercussions for both regional development and the integration of returnees. Regional development therefore has been and is suspended, and it cannot be thought of outside the regime of state-power. Key mechanisms for the export of labour have

been identified as the labour legislation enacted in 1955, the taxation system, and the security regulatory controls imposed as a result of the policy for "internal defence" after the civil-war in 1949.

7. The lack of regional policies and the prevalence of patron-client relations have led to the shaping of a recruitment process for the "state-bureaucracy" that is determined by personal contacts.

8. Germany's state agencies have had a unique historical experience in the utilisation of foreign labour throughout the forties. The guest-labour system is a very unique system of labour appropriation by industrial societies. The issue of labour imports for brief periods of time determined by the economic conjuncture indicates the prevalence of the "demand" side in the labour rotation process. This regime also provides some real facts regarding the active role of the state administration in the reproduction of conditions of accumulation in the territory of a nation-state.

9. The recruitment of labour from another territory by the German administrative machinery implies the importance of reproductive labour regimes across borders. It denotes that the process of labour generation (in the reserve) is separated from the process of maintenance (realized via the wage-form).

10. Considerations in the political economy of the "reserve" presupposes a consideration of the political power combination which oversees the reserve, the type of institutions and the type of legal and social "action" permitted. Some elements towards the conceptualization of the political governance of the "reserve" are being put forward.

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APPENDIX A

The following maps have been reproduced from a document published by the Greek Ministry of Reconstruction in 1946 under the supervision of Doxiades, K. A.

The maps reproduced here are representing Plates 15, 16, 17, 57, 53, and 81 of the above mentioned document.

The map appearing at the end of the Appendix A is taken from UNSCOB report A/574 (New York, 1948) as reproduced by Baerentzen, (1987:156-157)

POPULATION MOVEMENT DUE TO ENEMY INVASION
1940-1941

• areas evacuated due to enemy invasion
• population movement

AREAS UNDER OCCUPATION-DIVISION OF THE COUNTRY.
FIRST PERIOD 1941-1942

DIVISION OF THE COUNTRY DURING OCCUPATION.
ECONOMIC ISOLATION OF THE DIVIDED AREAS.

ENEMY OCCUPATION-DIVISION OF Greece
SECOND PERIOD 1943-44.

- german occupation
- bulgarian
- temporary bulgarian occupation

MAP OF WAR TIME DESTRUCTION

BURNED DOWN VILLAGES

Map of northern Greece showing the location of the U.N. Observation Group zones 1-4.
(Reproduced from UNSCOP report A578 (New York 1948) Annex 3).

Pp. 156-157 of Baerentzen, L. "The "Paidomazoma" and the Queen's Camps". in Baerentzen, L. et al (eds.), Studies in the History of the Greek Civil War 1945-1949. Copenhagen Museum Tusculanum Press.

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