1

PM-1 3½"x4" PHOTOGRAPHIC MICROCOPY TARGET
NBS 1010a ANSI/ISO #2 EQUIVALENT

PRECISIONSM RESOLUTION TARGETS

National Library
of Canada

Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services Branch

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0N4

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Direction des acquisitions et
des services bibliographiques

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa (Ontario)
K1A 0N4

Your file - Votre référence

Our file - Notre référence

NOTICE

The quality of this microform is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us an inferior photocopy.

Reproduction in full or in part of this microform is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30, and subsequent amendments.

AVIS

La qualité de cette microforme dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise au microfilmage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction.

S'il manque des pages, veuillez communiquer avec l'université qui a conféré le grade.

La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer, surtout si les pages originales ont été dactylographiées à l'aide d'un ruban usé ou si l'université nous a fait parvenir une photocopie de qualité inférieure.

La reproduction, même partielle, de cette microforme est soumise à la Loi canadienne sur le droit d'auteur, SRC 1970, c. C-30, et ses amendements subséquents.

Canada

**Interest Groups in The Canadian Grain Sector: Twentieth
Century Developments at the National Level**

by

CHRISTOPHER ADAMS, M.A.

**A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of**

Doctor of Philosophy

**Department of Political Science
Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario**

Copyright 1995, Christopher Adams

National Library
of Canada

Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services Branch

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0N4

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Direction des acquisitions et
des services bibliographiques

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa (Ontario)
K1A 0N4

Your file *Votre référence*

Our file *Notre référence*

The author has granted an irrevocable non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of his/her thesis by any means and in any form or format, making this thesis available to interested persons.

L'auteur a accordé une licence irrévocable et non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de sa thèse de quelque manière et sous quelque forme que ce soit pour mettre des exemplaires de cette thèse à la disposition des personnes intéressées.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in his/her thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without his/her permission.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège sa thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

ISBN 0-612-08832-4

Canada

Name

Christopher Adams

Dissertation Abstracts International is arranged by broad, general subject categories. Please select the one subject which most nearly describes the content of your dissertation. Enter the corresponding four-digit code in the spaces provided.

Political Science

SUBJECT TERM

U·M·I

SUBJECT CODE

Subject Categories

THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

COMMUNICATIONS AND THE ARTS

Architecture	0729
Art History	0377
Cinema	0900
Dance	0378
Fine Arts	0357
Information Science	0723
Journalism	0391
Library Science	0399
Mass Communications	0708
Music	0413
Speech Communication	0499
Theater	0465

EDUCATION

General	0515
Administration	0514
Adult and Continuing	0516
Agricultural	0517
Art	0273
Bilingual and Multicultural	0282
Business	0688
Community College	0275
Curriculum and Instruction	0727
Early Childhood	0518
Elementary	0524
Finance	0277
Guidance and Counseling	0519
Health	0680
Higher	0745
History of	0520
Home Economics	0278
Industrial	0521
Language and Literature	0279
Mathematics	0280
Music	0522
Philosophy of	0598
Physical	0523

Psychology	0525
Reading	0535
Religious	0527
Sciences	0714
Secondary	0533
Social Sciences	0514
Sociology of	0340
Special	0529
Teacher Training	0530
Technology	0710
Tests and Measurements	0288
Vocational	0747

LANGUAGE, LITERATURE AND LINGUISTICS

Language	0679
General	0289
Ancient	0290
Linguistics	0291
Modern	0291
Literature	0401
General	0294
Classical	0295
Comparative	0297
Medieval	0297
Modern	0298
African	0316
American	0591
Asian	0305
Canadian (English)	0352
Canadian (French)	0355
English	0593
Germanic	0311
Latin American	0312
Middle Eastern	0315
Romance	0313
Slavic and East European	0314

PHILOSOPHY, RELIGION AND THEOLOGY

Philosophy	0422
Religion	
General	0318
Biblical Studies	0321
Clergy	0319
History of	0320
Philosophy of	0322
Theology	0469

SOCIAL SCIENCES

American Studies	0323
Anthropology	
Archaeology	0324
Cultural	0326
Physical	0327
Business Administration	
General	0310
Accounting	0272
Banking	0770
Management	0454
Marketing	0338
Canadian Studies	0385
Economics	
General	0501
Agricultural	0503
Commerce-Business	0505
Finance	0508
History	0509
Labor	0510
Theory	0511
Folklore	0358
Geography	0366
Gerontology	0351
History	
General	0578

Ancient	0579
Medieval	0581
Modern	0582
Black	0328
African	0331
Asia, Australia and Oceania	0332
Canada	0334
European	0335
Latin American	0336
Middle Eastern	0333
United States	0337
History of Science	0585
Law	0398
Political Science	
General	0615
International Law and Relations	0616
Public Administration	0617
Recreation	0814
Social Work	0452
Sociology	
General	0626
Criminology and Penology	0627
Demography	0938
Ethnic and Racial Studies	0631
Individual and Family Studies	0628
Industrial and Labor Relations	0629
Public and Social Welfare	0630
Social Structure and Development	0700
Theory and Methods	0344
Transportation	0709
Urban and Regional Planning	0999
Women's Studies	0453

THE SCIENCES AND ENGINEERING

BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES

Agriculture	
General	0473
Agronomy	0285
Animal Culture and Nutrition	0475
Animal Pathology	0476
Food Science and Technology	0359
Forestry and Wildlife	0478
Plant Culture	0479
Plant Pathology	0480
Plant Physiology	0817
Range Management	0777
Wood Technology	0746
Biology	
General	0306
Anatomy	0287
Biostatistics	0308
Botany	0309
Cell	0379
Ecology	0329
Entomology	0353
Genetics	0369
Limnology	0793
Microbiology	0410
Molecular	0307
Neuroscience	0317
Oceanography	0416
Physiology	0433
Radiation	0821
Veterinary Science	0778
Zoology	0472
Biophysics	
General	0786
Medical	0760

EARTH SCIENCES

Biogeochemistry	0425
Geochemistry	0996

Geodesy	0370
Geology	0372
Geophysics	0373
Hydrology	0388
Mineralogy	0411
Paleobotany	0345
Paleoclimatology	0426
Paleontology	0418
Paleozoology	0985
Palynology	0427
Physical Geography	0368
Physical Oceanography	0415

HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES

Environmental Sciences	0768
Health Sciences	
General	0566
Audiology	0300
Chemotherapy	0992
Dentistry	0567
Education	0350
Hospital Management	0769
Human Development	0758
Immunology	0982
Medicine and Surgery	0564
Mental Health	0347
Nursing	0569
Nutrition	0570
Obstetrics and Gynecology	0380
Occupational Health and Therapy	0354
Ophthalmology	0381
Pathology	0571
Pharmacology	0419
Pharmacy	0572
Physical Therapy	0382
Public Health	0573
Radiology	0574
Recreation	0575

Speech Pathology	0460
Toxicology	0383
Home Economics	0386

PHYSICAL SCIENCES

Pure Sciences	
Chemistry	
General	0485
Agricultural	0749
Analytical	0486
Biochemistry	0487
Inorganic	0488
Nuclear	0738
Organic	0490
Pharmaceutical	0491
Physical	0494
Polymer	0495
Radiation	0754
Mathematics	0405
Physics	
General	0605
Acoustics	0986
Astronomy and Astrophysics	0606
Atmospheric Science	0608
Atomic	0748
Electronics and Electricity	0607
Elementary Particles and High Energy	0798
Fluid and Plasma	0759
Molecular	0609
Nuclear	0610
Optics	0752
Radiation	0756
Solid State	0611
Statistics	0463
Applied Sciences	
Applied Mechanics	0346
Computer Science	0984

Engineering	
General	0537
Aerospace	0538
Agricultural	0539
Automotive	0540
Biomedical	0541
Chemical	0542
Civil	0543
Electronics and Electrical	0544
Heat and Thermodynamics	0348
Hydraulic	0545
Industrial	0546
Marine	0547
Materials Science	0794
Mechanical	0548
Metallurgy	0743
Mining	0551
Nuclear	0552
Packaging	0549
Petroleum	0765
Sanitary and Municipal	0554
System Science	0790
Geotechnology	0428
Operations Research	0796
Plastics Technology	0795
Textile Technology	0994

PSYCHOLOGY

General	0621
Behavioral	0384
Clinical	0622
Developmental	0620
Experimental	0623
Industrial	0624
Personality	0625
Physiological	0989
Psychobiology	0349
Psychometrics	0632
Social	0451

The undersigned hereby recommend to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
acceptance of the thesis,

**INTEREST GROUPS IN THE CANADIAN GRAIN SECTOR:
TWENTIETH-CENTURY DEVELOPMENTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL**

submitted by

Christopher J. Adams, B.A. (Hons.), M.A.

in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Chair, Department of Political Science

Thesis Supervisor

External Examiner

Carleton University
May 30, 1995

Abstract

This dissertation examines changes which have occurred in the organizational politics of Canadian grain farmers during the twentieth century. One key question raised is, why did farmers abandon confrontational electoral tactics in exchange for more consultative interest group strategies? Identified are two major influences: the international political economy and federal government policy-making. In contrast to the pre-Depression era, in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s the Canadian government was able to devise agricultural policy under favourable economic conditions. Over time, increasingly strong links were forged between the government and such organizations as the Canadian Federation of Agriculture and the various farmer-owned grain co-operatives. However, with regard to a number of policy issues, and beginning in the late 1960s, the aims of many farmer groups and the government began to once again diverge. Under crisis conditions, Canadian farmers in the 1970 and 1980s resorted to using more traditional protest strategies. In the face of such hazards as fundamental shifts away from the moderate interventionism of Keynesian government policy, an unstable international grain regime, the 1980s drought, and the effects of trade globalization, Canadian farmers have been re-examining what were once-thought resolved questions regarding the extent to which they should rely upon consultative organizational strategies.

Acknowledgements

I wish to thank a number of people and groups for their help in this research project. First and foremost, I want to acknowledge my supervisor, Dr. Miriam Smith, who was supportive while sticking with this project through thick and thin. Both Dr. Jane Jenson and Dr. Jon Pammett were consistently helpful in providing constructively critical comments at each stage of the research. To these members of my doctoral committee I owe heartfelt thanks.

It was my good fortune that I was able to meet many genuinely nice and generous people in the agricultural sector during the research stage of this project. I wish to highlight a few of the many who helped me along the way. The staff at the Canadian Federation of Agriculture was very generous in providing me with their annual reports and financial audits as well as authorizing access to their private holdings at the National Archives of Canada. I am also grateful to Ms. Carol Rogers, the Research Librarian at the United Grain Growers head office in Winnipeg, who facilitated my work greatly during my research trips to Winnipeg. Finally, Barry Wilson, of the Western Producer, acted as a helpful source of ideas and served as a friendly sounding board.

On a personal front, my friend Mr. Tim Thompson deserves no small praise for his patient and thoughtful comments on various drafts of this dissertation. As well, I wish to thank my father for his many hours spent proof-reading the final draft. Finally, I owe unending thanks to Sue Adams and our ever-expanding fold of children for their enduring patience and numerous sacrifices over the past number of years.

Table of Contents

	<u>Page</u>
Abstract.....	ii
Acknowledgements.....	iii
Table of Contents.....	iv
List of Tables.....	v
List of Figures.....	vi
 Chapter 1: Introduction.....	 1
Chapter 2: Early Grain Politics.....	35
Chapter 3: Steps in Transition, 1930s and 1940s.....	89
Chapter 4: The Politics of Consultation, the 1940s to the 1960s.....	 134
Chapter 5: Destabilization.....	181
Conclusion.....	247
Appendix 1: Figures.....	263
Appendix 2: Statements and Documents.....	275
Bibliography	
Primary Research.....	290
Secondary Sources.....	292

List of Tables

<u>Table Number</u>	<u>Page</u>
Table 2.1: Polulation Density (Prairies): 1901-1931.....	38
Table 2.2: Estimate Average Wheat Yield Per Acre, Manitoba Crop District No. 1.....	42
Table 2.3: Department of Agriculture, 1886-1929 Period.....	47
Table 2.4: Formation Period Organizations.....	54
Table 2.5: Growth of Western Pools: 1924-1930.....	63
Table 2.6: Canadian Farmer Party Successes - Provincial.....	66
Table 3.1: Returns on Wheat Production, 1928/29-1940/41.....	92
Table 3.2: Department of Agriculture: Selected Grain Related Acts.....	105
Table 3.3: Wheat Acreage Reduction Payments: 1941-1946.....	111
Table 4.1: Government Expenditures as a Percent of GDP, 1950-1970.....	143
Table 4.2: Department of Agriculture Legislation: Mid-1940s to 1960.....	147
Table 4.3: Price Ranges Under the IWAs (1950s).....	158
Table 4.4: CFA Membership Lists and Payments: 1950, 1970....	162
Table 4.5: Selected UGG Resolutions [Carried].....	168
Table 5.1: Canadian Grain Exports: 1969/70-1979/80.....	186
Table 5.2: CFA and NFU Financial Comparison: 1990.....	214
Table 5.3: CFA Membership Composition: 1970-1990.....	226
Table 5.4: CFA Submissions and Presentations: 1990 and 1993.....	232-233

List of Figures

<u>Figure Number</u>	<u>Page</u>
Figure 1: Department of Agriculture Expenditures: 1926-1950.....	264
Figure 2: Department of Agriculture Expenditures: 1950-1970.....	265
Figure 3: Federal Transfers in Agriculture: 1947-1975.....	266
Figure 4: Federal Government Employment: Department of Agriculture, 1945-1975.....	267
Figure 5: Canadian Federation of Agriculture: Assets, 1940-1970.....	268
Figure 6: UGG: Shifts in Organizational Resources, 1907-1943.....	269
Figure 7: UGG: Shifts in Organizational Assets, 1948-1968.....	270
Figure 8: UGG: Profits, 1948-1968.....	271
Figure 9: UGG: Total Assets, 1969-1992.....	272
Figure 10: Canadian Federation of Agriculture: Assets, 1969-1991.....	273
Figure 11: CFA and NFU: Financial Comparison, 1990.....	274

Chapter One: Introduction

This dissertation will show that the historical relationship between governments and farmer organizations cannot be understood simply by looking at what resources and strategies each particular group was able to muster in the face of a specific policy event. In terms of achieving policy-making victories and with regard to the Canadian agricultural sector, general interest group theories which prescribe specific group strategies over others appear limiting in their explanatory power. This is due to the fact that throughout this century the structuring influence of the international political economy and federal government policy priorities have together acted as constraints calling forth particular forms of organizational patterns. These forms and patterns range from farm unionism and protests, to the use of consultation in order to make the farmer's interests known to those in government. Farm groups which were powerful in one era became either altered or replaced in the face of changing conditions in the political economy. I argue that consultative mechanisms which were used by farm groups and the federal government were forged during a stable period of economic growth. These mechanisms appeared flawed when the interests of governments and farmers began to diverge, especially with the rise of turbulence in the international political economy. In this sense, therefore, there simmered

in the relatively calm post-war era inherent contradictions which revealed themselves in the 1970s and 1980s.

This introductory chapter is divided into three sections. Section one examines the impact which both the federal state and the international regime¹ have on the farm sector. The second section contains a discussion of farmer organizations and their behaviour as interest mediators in state-society relations; more specifically, this section will explore how farm organizations operate as interest groups at the federal level of government. Section Three brings to light the predominant use of pluralism as an explanatory tool for understanding farmer interest groups. In spite of its widespread use in political science, under close examination, the pluralist model appears flawed for examining changes in twentieth century Canadian farmer politics.

I.

Three academics, H.A. Innis,² Vernon Fowke,³ and W.A. Mackintosh⁴ were early in recognizing that Canada's raw resource industries were subject to the structures and changing circumstances within the international political economy. More recently, academics such as Glen Williams,⁵ Kari Levitt,⁶ and Wallace Clement⁷ have shown that Canada continues to be enmeshed and vulnerable within the international economy. Within this context, there are few examples within the nation's economy which match the level of

vulnerability found within Canada's grain sector. This is also the case when comparing this national sector to those of other agricultural economies such as those found in England, France, and the United States.

What are the sources of this historical vulnerability? First, the infrastructure for Canada's export-based staple economy required increasingly large amounts of capital as the grain economy grew. At the beginning of the century, Canada's economy drew an estimated \$1,232 million in foreign funds, in 1921 the figure had climbed to \$4,906 million.⁸ Along with other resource sectors, Canadian agriculture is sensitive to trends in international finance: capital investment for the resource's production and export preparation (such as storage and transportation) is needed for the development of sparsely populated communities. In other words, the establishment of an economically viable agricultural hinterland involved start-up costs and required extensive financing at levels which were beyond the newly developed region's capacity to support. Foreign investment did not stop once the railways and grain handling system were put into place. Foreign investment continues to play an important role in the modern grain sector.⁹

As well, Canada's dependency on export markets continues to this day. In the mid-1980s Canada's total market share of the world trade in wheat and wheat flour was almost 20 per cent.¹⁰ With this commitment to external markets, such

things as changing national diets within non-North American nations became significant developments for the Canadian producer. Such has been the case in regard to the popularization of wheat based foods over traditional foodstuffs.¹¹ Other international factors which may influence Canadian exports are foreign crop conditions or adverse economic conditions within countries that purchase Canadian wheat. The vulnerability of Canadian agriculture to international events and forces is exposed when Canadian farmers feel the economic effects of policy decisions made by foreign governments, including those whose farmers compete with Canadian exports and those whose countries import Canadian goods. Examples reach back to pre-Confederation days. For example, between 1820 and 1846, Canadian wheat in English markets was adversely affected by pricing conditions set by the Corn Laws.¹² A more recent example is drawn from 1986 when the United States federal government decided to extend its Export Enhancement Program (EEP) to the USSR and, in the following year, to China. In the 1980s American attempts were made, through subsidies, to regain its share of the international market. This caused a rapid decline in world wheat prices which, in turn, forced the Canadian federal government to pass legislation for the provision of subsidies to their own farmers who had become caught in the resulting price squeeze.

The need for government assistance has always existed in

Canadian agriculture due to the fact that the financial health of farmers has varied from year to year. The grain farmer's hope is that when a bad year arrives a good year will soon follow. Many find that even one bad year is hard to deal with when undergoing a period of debt financing. Here, the most fundamental problem for farmers is that few farmers have deep enough pockets to weather prolonged periods of difficulty.

Henry Wise Wood of the United Farmers of Alberta, therefore, emphasised the connection between the economic fortunes of the grain trade and farmer politics. He struck a chord when he said "[w]hen we learn to trade right we will have largely learned to live right."¹³ Prairie farm groups have a long history of campaigning for the establishment of a stable international regime for agricultural trade and prices. In a certain sense, these groups were rewarded. I will show later that, due in large part to the actions of a number of countries, Canadian agriculture operated under relatively stable conditions from the 1940s until the late 1960s.

The significance of international forces, and their implications for domestic policies, was not lost on those operating in federal government circles. Appendix III of the Rowell-Sirois Report (the Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion Provincial Relations) reported the following:

...while it is not necessary to assume a recurrence of the purely fortuitous coincidence of agricultural and industrial crises and prairie drought, it is entirely probable that Canada will

experience in the future sharp variations in the proceeds of exports. Under stable world conditions these will be less than under unstable conditions, but under any conditions the Canadian economy will be liable to relatively great fluctuations.¹⁴

Four elements within the international economy act as a constraint for those involved in the process of devising and shaping Canadian agricultural policy. The first is the formulation (and later demise) of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements subsequent to World War Two. The second consists of non-agricultural economic forces such as currency and interest rates. The third aspect consists in changing market conditions including shortages and surpluses. Fourth, changing ideological strains such as the rise and fall of Keynesianism have altered national state priorities.¹⁵

From the above, there is both a synchronic and diachronic dimension to consider when seeking to understand the international political economy's influence on Canadian grain politics. First, the very nature of wheat production and its export orientation - for a country which is relatively small compared to the big traders of Europe and the United States - means that Canadian farmers were, and will probably always be, structurally vulnerable. Second, at certain periods in time, events occurred which have tempered this vulnerability. Most significant were the multi-national efforts in establishing multi-lateral trade policies and reducing protectionist barriers under the International Wheat Agreement in the post-

war era. This cooperative approach among the various grain trading nations allowed Canadian producers and the federal government to operate under relatively stable and predictable economic conditions. These conditions, however, could only last so long as the international community supported these measures. As surpluses mounted in the late 1960s it became increasingly difficult for a number of countries to abide by the new rules. Therefore, a major focus in Chapter Five is the collapse of the IWA in 1968 and the compounding effects of such events as the energy crisis and disruptions to the financial community due to changes in Nixon's American fiscal policies.

Farm Organizations and the International Political Economy

As the state became increasingly involved as an agricultural trade agent, it has incorporated farm groups into its activities, at least since the 1940s. Farm group representatives have been found among various trade delegations ranging from negotiations over the International Grain Agreement of 1949 to the meetings of the Cairns group (which was created by some of the grain producing countries within the GATT in the 1980s and 1990s). There are two reasons for the state to favour group involvement. First, the Canadian government has involved farm groups in order to legitimate policies which arise from successful (or sometimes unsuccessful) negotiations. Second, organizational

involvement provides some of the expertise which governments need. To cite one example, during the FTA negotiations the government established a Sectoral Advisory Group on International Trade (SAGIT) in a number of economic sectors, including agriculture.¹⁶ While such action provided the government with legitimacy and organizational expertise, the organizations in turn hoped to obtain institutional channels for influencing government policy.

In the overall scheme of things, the range of strategic choices for affecting agriculture-related policy in Canadian farmer politics is really very limited. So great are the pressures of the international political economy that even the most tactically astute and well-organized farm groups cannot exercise a high degree of control over their political destiny. Although much has been made in the literature on interest groups of the resources and tactics necessary for a group to win policy rewards (see below), a study of farmer groups and their political history shows that farm policy successes and failures occurred for reasons that were generally outside such considerations as an interest group's ability to muster its institutional resources or professionalism. In short, Canadian interest group theories are limited in their explanatory power when they underplay international structures and historical processes.

II.

In examining any interest organization, three key questions must be addressed. First, what was the initial "spark" for the organization's birth? Was it to address a specific social welfare need in the community or to provide missing services? In the case of farming, causes for group formation are often found in the changing needs of capitalization, technological inputs, debt, and conditions of rural under-population.¹⁷ Second, what major economic and social factors have arisen which have implications for the farm sector? Volatile interest rates, multi- or bilateral trade negotiations, changing ideologies among political elites (such as the acceptance of Keynesian methods in the post-war era) and, of course, changing markets are among the things which need to be considered. Third, what internal organizational forces can be identified which influence the political behaviour of the organization? The changing role of an organization's leadership or its personnel is an obvious example. For example, CFA's President H.H. Hannam's long term as leader from the 1940s through to the 1960s helped create a sense of stability within the organization. Other factors might include changes to the size of the membership, choices made on the convention floor, and policy battles regarding the selection of political strategies. In short and to some extent, the "who, what, when, where, and why" questions are sometimes pertinent to the examination of general

organizational patterns.

There are a number of farm groups examined in this dissertation. Of course, there have been far too many groups involved in prairie grain politics to be covered in detail on a case-by-case basis. Therefore, three groups were chosen which represent different forms of organized action and which reflect different forces and interests in the farm community. The oldest organization is the United Grain Growers Limited (UGG), a farmer-owned grain company which was created by the Grain Growers associations in 1906. The second organization is the Canadian Federation of Agriculture (CFA) which was formed subsequent to the collapse of the Canadian Council of Agriculture and rose in importance during the 1940s. Unlike the UGG, it is not aimed at directly servicing the economic needs of farmers but, instead, acts as a national umbrella for Canada's various commodity and regionally based organizations. The third organizational case-study is the National Farmers Union which was formally created in 1969 through an amalgamation of the provincial farm unions.

Although there are a number of elements which influence the specific behaviour of interest groups at different points in time, farm organizations share with other groups a number of functions. Farm organizations often act like interest groups from other economic sectors, such as the Canadian Manufacturers Association or the Canadian Labour Congress, in that they provide a representative vehicle for farmers in a

manner which is perceived to augment the electoral process. In addition to providing services to its members, interest groups mediate state-society relations. Canadian farmers have a long history of using interest groups such as the farmer unions, the CFA, and UGG to provide a means of representation at the federal government level.¹⁸

One of the first steps taken by western grain farmers to provide a national voice for farmer grievances occurred when thirty-eight local associations joined in 1902 to form the Territorial Grain Growers Association (TGGA).¹⁹ Both the TGGA and such later-formed organizations as the wheat pools, took seriously their multiple roles as service providers, marketers, and interest articulators. A number of these farm groups established strong communication links within the farm community itself, chiefly by committing resources to the operation of such farm newspapers as the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool's The Progressive (later to become the Western Producer) and the Manitoba Wheat Pool's Scoop Shovel (which was later renamed The Cooperator).²⁰

As the old farm organizations evolved, and new ones were formed, farm groups have built upon their own specific histories. In effect, successes and failures of past actions within an organization affect subsequent choices and as such shape future political strategies.²¹ This was made evident after the Progressive Party's disappearance. After the 1920s, many in the UGG believed that few gains had been made by

having the Grain Growers involved in the Progressive Party. Seeing it as bad for business, from the 1930s onward, its leadership ensured that such political activity would be avoided. This behaviour is not isolated. The CFA, having replaced the defunct Canadian Council of Agriculture which had been a major player in the Progressive Party's formation, made inroads into government policy making during the 1940s. Its leadership has often made the case for treating party activities as "taboo" with the argument that non-partisan action has paid off in the policy making arena.

It is worth repeating from the organization's archives a segment of a 1945 letter from the Secretary of the CFA, Colin Graff, to an Albertan member who had suggested forming a parliamentary farmer's bloc:

...the matter has been before the directors of the Canadian Federation in more than one way on several occasions, and so far the opinion has been rather unanimous against any such move. This was because of the feeling that if issues were forced into the political field, by a farm bloc in Parliament, then every issue would become a political one, or would be treated as a party issue or with party bias, and therefore not on its true merits. This would put into political action forces which at present have no political ground on which to fight agriculture, because we do not treat our problems on the political or party basis.²²

In subsequent chapters I will be examining the farm groups to see what strategies were used to pressure government policy makers, to serve the farmers themselves and the extent to which each group participated in consultative or confrontational strategies. Finally, using organizational

financial statements and annual reports, each group will be studied in terms of its fiscal resources and stability. One reason for doing this is to see if difficult economic conditions in the general agricultural community have a direct impact on farm organizations (and if so, which ones) and to see if there is a link between a group's institutional stability (in terms of finances) and a group's propensity for selecting certain types of strategies when lobbying the government (for example, farm rallies or presenting briefs to a government committee).

III.

This section argues that in general, the study of Canadian farm organizations, especially during the past two decades, has not been adequately served by the application of pluralist models. Indeed, events both within Canada and on the international scene have served as constraints on government-group relations and farm politics in general. Before showing its weaknesses, however, let us first examine the pluralist model's origins and how it has been applied by others to the examination of Canadian interest groups.

In both Canada and the United States, research on the political behaviour of farmer groups leans towards society-centric approaches. One reason for this tendency is that Canadians generally interpret the functioning of their own liberal democracy through the eyes provided by American

pluralist frameworks.²³ A. Paul Pross writes that this model treats power struggles within liberal societies, as "the unorchestrated interaction of individual citizens, each striving through political action to improve his or her position and lot in life."²⁴ It has become customary to characterise both the United States and Canada by their general absence of class-based politics.²⁵ Within this context, pluralist interpretations have been used to portray North American state-society relations as operating with governments which act as neutral brokers in a network of competing group interests rather than individuals or classes.

Going one step further, Daniel Bell argues that the New Deal and a subsequent acceptance of the welfare state has legitimized "group rights" rather than individual rights: these include legal measures to protect ethnic minorities and the union "group shop", or financial benefits for seniors, veterans (through state-sponsored pensions) and farmers (through subsidies).²⁶ The New Deal and post-war state produced a particular dynamic as it operated within a society of diverse interests:

...politics, operating through the government, has more and more become the means of registering a social and economic decision. Here, instead of acting independently as in a market, the individual is forced to work through particular collectivities to enforce his will. Since in a managed economy, "politics" not dollars, determines major production, the intervention of the government not only sharpens pressure-group identifications but forces each to adopt an ideology which can justify its claims and which can square with some concept of "national interest."²⁷

Using this analysis, it should come as no surprise that academics who use the pluralist model within the specific case of Canada paint a generally rosy picture of the CFA. Its success story has been that since the Second World War it developed its role as an interest group operating to influence the federal government through consultative methods.²⁸

The pluralist interpretation of interest group strategies such as the CFA runs like this: the Canadian population was once dominated by farmers and because of their large numbers certain strategies could be used in order to win policy rewards. As the proportion of farmers shrank in the Canadian population, so too did the number of opportunities for farm leaders to use mobilization strategies. Since the 1940s, therefore, farm organizations have practiced discrete forms of lobbying. David Laycock portrays this as "interest groups struggling to salvage a reasonable slice of a shrinking pie for their members and families."²⁹

The CFA is an umbrella organization which operates within a federal structure of provincial peak farmer associations and commodity-specific groups (that is, groups which operate to address issues related to specific commodities such as the Dairy Farmers of Canada); it therefore has no direct membership. However, it functions in a political system in which power is legitimized through liberal democratic principles. Whether a commodity group, a farmer union, a farmer-owned cooperative or a peak association, Canadian farm

groups report their membership numbers. Just as corporate leaders must justify their actions by citing profit figures, and newspapers report circulation figures, farm group leaders continually feel it necessary to make such points as these:

The national federation [CFA] acts as national spokesman for all affiliated farm organizations across Canada, embracing an estimated 500,000 individual farmers [in the 1950s].³⁰

As well, the National Farmers Union currently boasts that its membership consists of 7,000 farm families, the Western Canadian Wheat Growers Association reports having 12,000 members, and the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool has 60,000 members.³¹

This pluralistic habit of "counting heads" is found in examples of academic work such as the 1988 collection of essays titled The Political Economy of Agriculture in Western Canada³² and census based government reports such as those produced by Statistics Canada.³³ Although valuable for their information, they are overly attentive to changing population and labour statistics. This is probably due to two things: the data is accessible and the fact that this material easily feeds into questions of voting behaviour.³⁴

What is missing from the pluralist model? While population shifts have important ramifications for state-society relations as they pertain to a particular sector, two aspects can be overlooked by society-centric approaches. The first is that governmental institutions are not perceived to have roles beyond that of being a neutral broker for competing

interests. This is especially problematic with regard to the study of western Canadian agriculture.³⁵ Throughout this dissertation there is abundant evidence to show that Canada's government has played a strong and active role in the agricultural sector. The second aspect is the fact (discussed above and in subsequent chapters) that pluralism underestimates and, as a result, underplays the influence of international forces. The Canadian state goes beyond the role of being the national broker for competing interests due to the fact that influential events often occur outside the country's borders.³⁶ One example in the 1990s where domestic market conditions were affected by external events is the effect of American mid-west floods on the price of Canadian canola.³⁷

For some, the influence of international forces might have been less than apparent during the post-World War Two era as trade and pricing was stabilized both generally through such vehicles as GATT and specifically with regard to agriculture through such multilateral agreements as the IGA. To use a metaphor, just as the doctor's patient only becomes aware of his or her digestive tract when suffering from discomfort, it is in troubled times that the international regime's importance becomes obvious. As things began to fall apart in the late 1960s and continued to do so in subsequent decades, Canadian domestic pressures became dwarfed by an international recession, a monetary crisis,³⁸ unpredictable

markets, and an unresolved grain pricing war between the U.S. and the European Common Market (ECM).

The links between the federal government and the international political economy can be conceptualized as follows. Under generally stable conditions, that is, when the large grain importing and exporting countries cooperate with each other, wheat producers and their organizations are able to make long-term plans, including capital investment decisions. Furthermore, when not governing with a farm sector in crisis, the federal government has been able to implement, in consultation with various farm groups, moderately interventionist policies, such as marketing boards and income stabilization programmes. However, in the absence of multi-lateral cooperation, the international grain system is vulnerable to wild price fluctuations in conjunction with unpredictable shortages and surpluses. The repercussions are immediately felt by grain producers when they try to make plans for their crops and recapitalize their farms. Furthermore, this places an added burden on the farm groups as their members make more demands (in order to address their crisis situation) while having fewer dollars to fill the group's coffers (for example, the CFA's annual fees from their provincial federations are based on the economic condition of the member's provincial agriculture sector for that year). Meanwhile, the federal government is called up to increase its agriculture spending in order that farmer incomes can be

stabilized.

Questions regarding the effects of instability go beyond the agriculture sector. For example, the 1970s energy crisis resulted in escalating farm production costs and general economic inflation. In turn, the federal government's attempts to curtail inflationary expenditures affected the grain farm sector as sky-rocketing transportation subsidies became the target of budget-cutting policy-makers. In this sense, therefore, the federal government's relationship with the farm sector has two dimensions: it acts as an independent variable (or constraint) in terms of policy decisions and commitments to farm sector supports. In Chapter Five especially, I show that the federal government also serves as an intervening variable between the international political economy and the farm community. However, the government's freedom to make choices regarding priorities and changing commitments is strongly constrained by external forces.

Pluralist "Offshoots"

Recognizing that American models of "group government" make no sense in a nation which has an economy largely owned by interests outside its borders, a credible new model must therefore show how the government brokers interests from a wide array of domestic and international sources. It is unfortunate that the writings of academics such as A. Paul

Pross, continue to use what are now titled "post-pluralist"³⁹ interpretations of interest groups which merely adjust the conceptual model to the Canadian parliamentary system of government and federal structure rather than to the country's permeability within the international political economy.

Pross's model of interest group mediation within state-society relations is concerned with describing "policy networks". These are structures of policy formation and implementation in which, to varying degrees, state action occurs with organizational input. Four themes appear important to this approach. First, the location of power; second, the identification of the agents which hold power; third, the proximity of the various actors to the power centre; and, fourth, how the organizations make use of their location in the policy network in performing their articulation function. The more a government confers with a particular group, the more central that group becomes in the network.

In this model, time is considered only in that there is a process by which organizations, if they are to be politically successful, undergo a maturation process. The ability of an interest organization to perform its representative functions is linked to the expansion of its institutional resources and legitimacy. Organizations are divided into four categories: issue-oriented, fledgling, mature, and institutionalized. As one moves along the

spectrum of the four classifications one sees an increasing proximity of the organization to the policy making process. An issue-oriented group is publicity focused, confrontational, has a small membership with no paid staff, and is narrowly defined (usually concerned with only one issue, such as protesting the GST). At the opposite end is the institutionalized organization which is geared towards a methodical public relations approach, has a regularized means for government consultation, participates on advisory boards, maintains extensive financial and human resources, and is broadly defined in terms of goals and membership (for example, in the same year the group might prepare briefs on nonagricultural constitutional issues and follow this with a critique of the grain pricing system).⁴⁰ In other words, over time an organization which is able to develop an effective articulation style will have an internally developed stable membership base, skilled leadership, and sound financing.

This static approach is unable to account for some of the problems faced by farm groups. Understanding interest groups in terms of whether they are "mature" institutional entities or "fledgling" issue-oriented groups makes less sense during periods of instability. Many of the most troubled farm interest groups have been those that were once considered well-developed organizations with a mandate to represent broader farm interests at the provincial and federal level.

The CFA and its provincial affiliates have undergone internal strife and, indeed, "dematuration" in the face of upsets in the international market economy and changing governmental priorities. The destabilizing effects of declining Keynesianism, the Crow Rate debates, mounting farm debt, crop disasters, and various events on the international front have meant that unorthodox forms of farm interest articulation have returned. Some large well established groups have faltered while other types of groups have not. Those organizations which are more narrowly focused on commodity issues such as the wheat pools and UGG have better weathered the storm. Furthermore, farmer unions and farm defence leagues have been rejuvenated as farmers sought out the means to have their grievances vocalized.

Political scientists studying interest group relations over the past few decades have been influenced by the mistaken belief, shared by many in society and government, that certain temporary arrangements, such as the sharing of goals between the governments of the day and the farm organizations in achieving market expansion, price stability, and income supports are permanent. In fact, twentieth century farm politics show that the link between organizational maturation, representative functions, and policy results are explained less by the degree of an organization's "maturation" within a pluralist society and more by how these links are historically bounded and affected by the interlocking constraints of

governmental policy and the international political economy. At least this is the case with regard to farm organizations within changing twentieth century state-society relations.

Of course, there are some alternatives to the pluralist model. Using concepts that are more closely tied to the consociational political science model,⁴¹ William Coleman has studied Canadian agricultural groups as they operate within what he calls "corporatist policy networks."⁴² He argues that three major factors exist which have shaped Canada's agricultural "associational system". First, farm groups arose as a response to "attacks on [the] farmers' economic situation by other classes and groups." Secondly, the banding together of farmers was reinforced by two things: a) the unpredictable nature of international markets and prices and, b) the fact that the production process of specific commodities is regionally concentrated. Thirdly, the state has played a special and important institutional role within the farm community and, as a result, has constructed links with the farm groups themselves when formulating and implementing policies.

This corporatist-consociational approach helps us get past the pluralist's weakness for down-playing the impact of the state. In fact, it helps highlight the fact that in many cases, such as that of the federal government's relationship with the CFA prior to the battles over rail transportation subsidies (see Chapter Five),⁴³ close consultative links were

forged between certain farmer groups and the government.

However, there remains one problem. Even though this approach might include some role for international variables, it fails to give them sufficient emphasis. For example, He studied the CFA's relationship with the government as it deteriorated during the battles over rail subsidies. Coleman highlighted the increasing fragmentation along the narrowing lines of self-interest among the various farm groups. These divisions severely curtailed the influence of such broad-focussed farm groups as the CFA and its regional affiliates. However, while factually correct, he missed the point that among the many factors underlying the government's new focus on the contentious area of rail subsidies was that the international energy crisis was causing costs to balloon. In this sense, therefore, studies of divisions within the national farm community over a particular policy require a sensitivity to the international political economy.

Another example is the Liberal Government's renewed attempts in the 1990s to resolve the transportation subsidy issue, once again antagonizing the various factions within the farm community. In this recent development the government's re-examination of rail subsidies (and decision to eliminate them⁴⁴) is attributed to both an interest in deficit reduction and Canadian international obligations under the newly signed General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.⁴⁵

In the chapters which follow, I will be proposing an

alternative approach to many of the political science interest group models which are currently being used. This is in the hope that the dynamics behind state-society relations as they pertain to the Canadian grain sector may be better understood. This approach will be more sensitive to the international constraints which arise and which are placed on those involved in the federal agricultural policy process, and the fact that certain types of policies call forth certain forms of organizational action.

IV.

The following chapters are structured in a chronological fashion. This is due to the fact that, in part, the aim of this dissertation is to account for change. It provides an examination of changes in farmer politics, chiefly those arising from the western Canadian grain producing sector, at the national level. Chapter Two provides an account of the early years of Canadian farmer politics: the pre-1930s. Canadian agriculture is described in this era as being marked by a wide array of farmer organizational developments.⁴⁶ These developments were in response to two constraining forces: the absence of producer control over production costs and product values and, secondly, a feeling that the western farmer's interests were inadequately presented within the federal party system and such federal government institutions as the House of Commons, the Cabinet, and the bureaucracy.

This period should be useful to the reader in that it provides an historically comparative backdrop for understanding the nature and problems of the politics of consultation which arose in subsequent decades.

Chapter Three shows that it is only with the Depression and soon-to-follow wartime demands that the federal state was pushed to provide farm supports, price stabilization, and grain marketing assistance. In the 1930s, an international economic crisis and poor domestic crop conditions converged to push a reluctant federal government into policy areas not explored before, at least during peacetime.⁴⁷ These first walking steps of the infant activist state were reluctant ones. The fusion of farm and federal government interests did not become accepted as a norm until the 1940s.

Chapter Three shows that those organizations which were both economically pragmatic (what some would call "entrepreneurial") and attuned to political affairs, such as the UGG and wheat pools, survived the historical mid-century shift to consultative arrangements; they shed their confrontational skins and concentrated on the business side of agriculture. Other groups appeared to be less flexible. Groups which were focussed on farm unionism or the mobilization of farmers were swept aside in the wake of new patterns of state-society relations.

In Chapter Four, the discussion moves past the historical shift in farmer politics (that is, when confrontation to

consultation occurred) and focuses on the post-war era. This era includes those years between the Second World War and the 1970s. Once again, farmer groups and their strategies are strongly influenced by international events such as the International Grain Agreement and the discovery of new markets for Canadian grain surpluses (such as China); a federal government committed to expanding Canada's levels of economic productivity; the continuing process of farm capitalization; and, linked to the above, the paradoxical relative decline of western Canadian agriculture in terms of Canada's diversifying economy and labour force.

Chapter Five shows that the post-war arrangements of accommodation wore thin in the 1970s and 1980s. As discussed with regard to the previous eras, various forces, from both within Canada and on the international level, converged to alter the priorities and policies of both the Canadian federal state and farm groups. In brief, the following factors came into play: first, the international wheat system became destabilized without an international grain agreement while the European Common Market gained a larger share of the global grain export market (as the ECM became a more formidable competitor, the United States retaliated with grain subsidies which precipitated the 1980s grain price war). Second, as in a number of other western countries, Keynesian doctrine lost its publicly-sanctioned status in the face of persisting conditions of high inflation and unemployment (the

implications of this reached into the farm sector as neo-liberal strains within both the Liberal and Progressive Conservative governments called for the "rationalization" of Canadian farming and a reduction in farm supports). Third, in order to meet demands for exports, farmers increased their capitalization (unfortunately, this produced increased farm debt in a period beset by high interest rates). Disaster struck in the 1980s with the prolonged western drought and severe drops in wheat price. Canadian farmers could not pay the debts which they had acquired during a brief period of rosier export and production conditions. In short, pre-existing farmer organizations came under severe strain as they faced the two externally constraining forces: the international political economy and federal government policies and priorities.

Endnotes

1. Karl Deutsch defines a political regime as "the basic political order under which persons live." Politics and Government: How People Decide Their Fate, 3rd Ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1980), p. 111. The "international regime" is therefore the basic political order under which countries and regions operate. Those readers who wish to explore this concept in more detail are referred to Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, (Boston: Little Brown, 1977), pp. 19-20.
2. H.A. Innis argued that commercial centres were affected by staple production on the periphery and the periphery was affected by changing conditions in the metropole. The Fur Trade in Canada: An Introduction to Canadian Economic History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1956 [1930]); The Cod Fisheries (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1954).
3. Vernon C. Fowke, Canadian Agricultural Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1946); The National Policy and the Wheat Economy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957).
4. W.A. Mackintosh, The Economic Background of Dominion-Provincial Relations (Toronto: Macmillan, 1978 [1939]).
5. Glen Williams, Not For Export: Toward a Political Economy of Canada's Arrested Industrialization (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1983).
6. Kari Levitt, Silent Surrender: The Multinational Corporatism in Canada (Toronto: Macmillan, 1970).
7. Wallace Clement, Continental Corporate Power: Economic Linkages Between Canada and the United States (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977).
8. W.A. Mackintosh, op. cit., p. 41.
9. One can see how foreign investment decisions still affect the prairies by looking at the tactics used by Cargill, one of the world's largest food trading company. During the 1970s and 1980s it made inroads into Canadian prairie agriculture by building inland grain terminals and large grain elevators. While doing so it pressured the federal government into making favourable policy decisions, such as Otto Lang's action in 1974 to remove the Canadian Wheat Board's monopoly powers over domestic feed grains. Barry Wilson, Farming the System: How

Politicians and Producers Shape Canadian Agricultural Policy (Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1990), pp. 272-273. See also Kathy Baylis's essay in Stephen Langdon and Victoria Cross, ed., As We Come Marching, Windsor: Windsor Works, 1994.

10. Theodore H. Cohn, The International Politics of Agricultural Trade: Canadian American Relations in a Global Agricultural Context (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1990), p. 46.

11. "Wheat can often only be grown in tropical Africa at very great expense, and in some countries rice too; so once the taste for them is ingrained [such as through foreign aid], it cannot be satisfied through domestic production." The Brandt Commission 1983, Common Crisis, North South: Co-Operation for World Recovery (London: Pan Books, 1983), p. 122.

12. Vernon C. Fowke, Canadian Agricultural Policy, op. cit., pp. 79, 194.

13. The U.F.A., 15 April 1922, p.34. Quoted in Macpherson, op. cit., p. 231.

14. W.A. Mackintosh, The Economic Background of Dominion-Provincial Relations (Toronto: Macmillan, 1979).

15. M. Patricia Marchak, The Integrated Circus: The New Right and the Restructuring of Global Markets (Montreal: McGill-Queen's Press, 1991), Chapter 3-5.

16. "The designers of the FTA consultative process knew that they would face three imperatives regarding business and private sector involvement. They needed formal and non-partisan business political support to foster the legitimacy of the entire free trade initiative. They also required good advice to gauge the effects of alternative negotiated outcomes on specific industries. Finally, they needed a buffer to deflect demands for protection that would arise from numerous business interest groups." G. Bruce Doern and Brian Tomlin, Faith and Fear: The Free Trade Story (Toronto: Stoddart, 1991), p. 109. Although Doern and Tomlin are discussing government strategies regarding business groups, such strategies appear applicable to farm organizations. See Barry K. Wilson, op. cit., p. 268.

17. This is common to most interest groups. "Few interest groups can depend on the commitment of their supporters to the position being advocated; most try to demonstrate the worth of the group to members, donors, and even the public by concrete activities and especially by providing services." Peter Finkle, et al., Federal Government Relations With Interest

Groups: A Reconsideration, [Research paper] (Consumer Policy Branch, Industry Canada, Ottawa, 1994), p. 4.

18. It is often the case that representation as practised in liberal democracies is portrayed as an act of individuals. "A representative may be similar to the constituents, so that they can see in him or her a sample of themselves. A representative may give voice to their own vague feelings. A representative may deliver their explicit message and do their will. They may trust their representative to use his or her greater competence and wisdom on behalf of their interests. A representative may serve them as a broker who brings together their diverse and divided groups and interests, in order to make them more powerful in combination. Or a representative may combine any or all of these functions." Karl W. Deutsch, op. cit., p. 14. Farmers, however, in Canadian society have sought representation through MPs and MLAs but also through collective action.

19. Hopkins Moorhouse, Deep Furrows (Toronto: McLeod, 1918), pp. 53-55.

20. An account of the extent to which farm organizations grew and became important service and representative institutions prior to the 1930s is discussed in Chapter Two.

21. An early example of this can be drawn from the United States where the Populist party's 1896 failure strongly influenced subsequent patterns of farmer activity. Twentieth century American farmers followed the old adage, "Once bitten twice shy". It was made evident that this did not stop at the Canadian border. Canadian prairie settlement involved numerous American farmers who could bear witness to the effects of the Populist Party defeat. Nelson Wiseman writes that "in the 1920s Americans outnumbered Britons in all fifteen of Alberta's rural census divisions, by a ratio of two to one...In twelve of the fifteen rural census divisions in Alberta Americans also outnumbered continental-born settlers." He also reports that there was a large number of Americans to be found in Saskatchewan but their influence within the rural community was less than Alberta's (Wiseman, "The Pattern of Prairie Politics," Party Politics in Canada, 5th Ed., Hugh Thorburn, ed. (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1985), p. 246). Therefore, it was only natural that there would exist strong pockets of early opposition to the formation of a Canadian federal farmers party. One notable example of this was the UFA's leader, Henry Wise Wood, who cited the US example when vocalizing his opposition to forming a federal party. Wood's main fight was with Thomas Crerar of the Grain Growers Grain Company. At a meeting in Winnipeg, Crerar and others made the successful case that farm organizations should form a national Progressive Party. Barry Wilson, Beyond the Harvest: Canadian

Grain at the Crossroads (Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1981), p. 243.

22. Letter to George N. Johnston, Loyalist Alberta, from Colin Graff, Secretary to the CFA, 11 January, 1945, CFA Archives, Vol. 25, File 82. The reader is referred to Appendix 2 in this dissertation which contains this correspondence.

23. For an example of how this model is used in the study of American politics see Karl W. Deutsch, op. cit., pp. 273 - 274. Regarding the influence of the United States on Canadian political science see Alan Cairns, "Political Science in Canada and the Americanization Issue," Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 7(2), June, 1972.

24. A. Paul Pross, Group Politics and Public Policy (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 227. cf. Group Politics and Public Policy, 2nd Ed. (Toronto: Oxford, 1992), p. 230.

25. "In the United States, so heterogenous from the start, and striated even further by diverse ethnic, national, and religious differences, it is difficult to read the political order...as a reflection of the economic order [as found in marxism and elite theories]. But even where there was some rough correspondence, the play of diverse interests was immense." Daniel Bell, "Is There a Ruling Class in America?" reprinted in Bishop and Hendel's Basic Issues of American Democracy, 7th Ed., Samuel Hendel, ed. (New York: Meredith, 1973), p. 546.

26. Ibid., p. 548.

27. Ibid..

28. Two examples are A. Paul Pross, Group Politics and Public Policy, 2nd Ed. op. cit., p. 64, and, Helen Jones Dawson, "An Interest Group: The Canadian Federation of Agriculture," Canadian Public Administration, Vol. 6, 1963.

29. David Laycock, "Prairie Farmers in Politics: An Historical Perspective," Farm Interest Groups and Agricultural Policy, Barry Wilson, et al, eds., Occasional Paper #88-04 (Centre for the Study of Cooperatives, Saskatoon, 1988), p. 17.

30. The same wording is used in the 1954, 1956, and 1959 editions of the National Reference Book (Montreal: Canadian Newspaper Service).

31. The membership of the Pool is large due to the fact that farmers are expected to become members if they want to use Pool transportation, storage, and marketing services.

Membership figures for these three selected organizations are derived from The Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, 18 October, 1988.

32. G.S. Basran and David A. Hay, ed., The Political Economy of Agriculture in Western Canada (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1988).

33. See, for example, a recent collection of papers in the following volume which was edited by a Statistics Canada research economist. Ray D. Bollman, ed., Rural and Small Town Canada (Toronto: Thompson Educational Publishing, 1992).

34. The impact of the rural and farm vote has come under increasing scrutiny with recent court battles over voting rules in both Saskatchewan and Alberta. "Rural Voters Too Mighty in Alberta, Lawyers Say," "Cities Shortchanged, Voter Groups Contend," The Globe and Mail, 5 December, 1990; "Saskatchewan Faces New Election Under Voting Rules From 1981," The Ottawa Citizen, 8 March, 1991; "Court Junks Saskatchewan Election Map," The Western Producer, 14 March, 1991; "Rural Alberta Told to Find New Voice," The Western Producer, 16 May, 1991.

35. Commonly cited are neo-institutionalists such as Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research," Bringing the State Back In, Peter B. Evans, et al, eds. (Cambridge University Press, 1985). The societal focus in which the state is de-centred is no longer provided by behaviouralists and pluralists, such as Robert Dahl (Who Governs (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961)) but by those concerned with the rise and impact of new social movements. See Alain Touraine, The Voice and the Eye: An Analysis of Social Movements (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); and, on the Canadian front, Warren Magnusson and Robert Walker, "De-Centring the State: Political Theory and Canadian Political Economy," Studies in Political Economy, No. 26, Summer, 1988, pp. 37-71.

36. Don Mitchell portrays Canadian agricultural policy as something created from international pressures: "As we examine the role of government in relation to agriculture, agribusiness and the international trade in food commodities, the politicians begin to appear as pawns in the game. They are not altogether devoid of power but the ways in which they can exercise it are greatly predetermined by the faceless authority of an international system of private wealth." The Politics of Food (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1975), p. 9.

37. Laura Rance, "U.S. Misfortune Helps Canada," The Western Producer, 22 July, 1993.

38. See Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), and, Alain Lipietz, Mirages and Miracles: The Crisis of Global Fordism, D. Macey, tran. (London: Verso, 1987), pp. 160 - 167.

39. Post-pluralism revises pluralist theory in that it recognizes the "tendency towards policy specialization and the management of consensus" within liberal democratic government institutions. A. Paul Pross, Group Politics and Public Policy, 2nd Ed., op. cit., p. 236.

40. A. Paul Pross, "Pressure Groups: Talking Chameleons," in Canadian Politics in the 1980s, 2nd Ed., Michael Whittington and Glen Williams, eds. (Toronto: Methuen, 1984), pp. 299.

41. See Arend Lijphart's "Consociational Democracy," which is reprinted in Kenneth McRae, ed., Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974).

42. William D. Coleman, Business and Politics: A Study of Collective Action (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988), p. 100, et passim.

43. Ibid., Chapter 6.

44. Grain transportation subsidies will be eliminated. This was announced by the 1995 Federal Budget. "Farmers Lose Grain Subsidies," The Globe and Mail, 28 February, 1995.

45. See "Opposing Comments on Crow Confuse Everyone," Western Producer, 16 June, 1994.

46. These have been examined closely by a number of Canada's most respected scholars such as H.A. Innis (op. cit.), Vernon Fowke (op. cit.), and C.B. Macpherson. (op. cit.).

47. For an examination of accommodative state-society relations in labour relations following the First World War see James Naylor's "Workers and the State: Experiments in Corporatism after World War One," Studies in Political Economy, Vol. 42, Autumn, 1993.

Chapter Two: Early Grain Politics

There are two components to this chapter. The aim of the first component is to provide the reader with an understanding of the particular conditions which strongly shaped the practice of prairie farm politics prior to the Depression. Many of these conditions continued to play a strong role in subsequent decades. The second component of the chapter examines how prairie farmers before the 1930s responded to their sector's predicament.

What are the two conditions which have traditionally caused prairie farmers to feel both vulnerable and powerless? The first condition is that prairie grain farming is an economically vulnerable practice, due to varying crop conditions (usually weather related) and the fact that prairie grains are grown for international markets. The second condition consists of the institutional arrangements within the federal government which have historically led prairie farmers to feel that their interests were being discounted.

It will be shown that the response of Canadian prairie farmers in this era can be characterized as a "politics of confrontation". Two types of confrontational action can be identified. In response to their economic vulnerability, the first type can be characterized as the need for farmer "self-help" organizations. A list of such organizations would

include the wheat pools, farmer owned grain companies, and locally organized rural cooperatives such as stores and banks.¹ In response to their sense of not having a sufficient level of input into the policy process, the second strategy was based on the belief among farmers that they required a greater voice within the national government. Therefore, it can be said that when farmers responded to their sense of powerlessness they created a bifurcated politics of confrontation: the creation of farmer-owned businesses which confronted the existing system of service delivery and profit, and, farmer parties which confronted the existing arrangements of power within their governmental institutions.²

This chapter, along with those which follow, shows that the link between political action and economic forces is discernible throughout the current century. Of these two elements, the economic one will be discussed first. Following this I will examine the lack of governmental recognition for the farmer's interests.

I.

This section examines the structural roots of the vulnerability of prairie farming. Because prairie farming has been largely grain farming, economic farmer issues are discussed here in terms of wheat production problems rather than in such areas as dairy and livestock. This is not to say that prairie farmers were exclusively wheat producers. It

will be shown, however, that with a few exceptions, the major debates which arose in the Canadian West in terms of federal agricultural policy concerned the grain sector rather than other agricultural sectors such as the livestock, poultry, or dairy industry.

At least until the 1920s, grain farmers faced a number of general problems. These were: social isolation, unstable crop conditions, a need for farm capitalization, the implementation and maintenance of a wheat producing infrastructure, and the volatility of grain markets and prices. Here, I will discuss each in turn, beginning with the basic problem of social isolation.

Population and provincial land size data are shown for each of three prairie provinces in Table 2.1. With most of the population situated on the farm, it is not hard to see that the region's settlers were spread thinly. The social consequences of this have been discussed extensively by a number of people who grew up in farm regions.³ One consequence of this was that economic stratification was minimal and shared efforts were needed among farm families to build churches and schools.⁴ The fact that the various regions were all sparsely populated had consequences other than those which can be classified as strictly sociological. Having a sparse population indicates two things. The first is that agricultural production, if it is to be profitable, must be aimed at export consumption. Western towns and cities

could only consume a fraction of the farmer's crop. Secondly, sources of investment for farm capitalization and constructing the region's infrastructure (such as railways and storage systems) required outside sources of funding. But before exploring what the consequences were when heavy investment occurred in the region's infrastructure let us look first at how the farmer was financially vulnerable with regard to the individual enterprise.

Table 2.1: Population Density 1901-1931

<u>Province</u>	<u>Population</u> (000's)	<u>Land Area</u> (sq. km.)	<u>Density</u> (people/sq.km.)
Manitoba	1901 - 255 1911 - 461 1921 - 610 1931 - 700	548,360	1901 - .465 1911 - .841 1921 - 1.112 1931 - 1.277
Saskatchewan	1901 - 091 1911 - 492 1921 - 756 1931 - 922	570,700	1901 - .159 1911 - .862 1921 - 1.324 1931 - 1.616
Alberta	1901 - 073 1911 - 374 1921 - 589 1931 - 732	644,390	1901 - .113 1911 - .580 1921 - .914 1931 - 1.136
Canada (Including Northern Territories)	1901 - 5,371 1911 - 7,207 1921 - 8,788 1931 - 10,377	9,215,430	1901 - .58 1911 - .78 1921 - .95 1931 - 1.13

Source: Calculations derived from The Canadian Global Almanac: 1993, pp. 27, 40.

Investment was required at a number of levels within the farm economy. At the most basic level, establishing a farm enterprise involved a various array of purchases including, according to Lewis Thomas, the land itself:

...the so-called staple of land policy was the free homestead, but it would be misleading to suppose that all quartersections of a township were available for this purpose. Normally a little less than one half the acreage of a township could be acquired free by homesteaders. The remainder had to be bought from the government or from the C.P.R. and other land-grant railways, or from the Hudson's Bay Company.⁵

The provinces were not settled and made productive by free land grants. In total, the money involved in land sales was considerable. In fact, between 1893 and 1930 western land sales of what was once Hudson's Bay territory totalled \$276 million.⁶

Once the farmer had acquired land there were other basic costs. Farmers faced such start-up costs as house-building materials and manual farm implements and supplies including ploughs, shovels, flails, twine, barbed wire, pails, and mowers. To plough the fields they required animals. Early settlers could barely afford oxen, let alone horses. Such an investment was no small matter. For example, in 1914 an unbroken horse which would serve on a prairie farm (once it had been broken in) cost one hundred dollars.⁷ As the farm became increasingly mechanized, the farmer's productivity rose. But there arose problems in association with this

process. As the need for investment increased so too did the enterprise's vulnerability. This was clear during periods of economic crises as was shown by one Albertan newspaper's account of a farmer in 1930:

A farmer living a few miles north of Hanna [Alberta] cropped about two thousand bushels of wheat last year from little better than two hundred acres. Living expenses, crop payment, and seed for this year left no wherewithal to purchase feed for spring work. His horses wintered poorly and without feed could not be worked. Unable to arrange credit for feed, a second-hand tractor was purchased on deferred payments and credit arranged for gas.⁸

Turning now to how the region's infrastructure was put into place, it is apparent that the farmer's vulnerability did not stop at the farm-gate. This was in spite of growing exports. The region's productivity was increasing. Between 1896 and 1911, the prairies contained 17.7 million acres of field crops and by 1911 were producing an annual amount exceeding 230 million bushels of wheat.⁹ All three prairie provinces, however, required huge investments in order that such fundamental infrastructural needs as railway lines, storage facilities, towns, roads, sewers, and, later, telephone and hydro-power could be built and maintained. The importance of supporting grain production within the provincial economies in Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba could not be overstated. There were returns to be made on the invested dollars yet the potential danger to high debts within a sparsely populated region was not lost on early Canadian

political economists. W.A. Mackintosh observed that the prairie economy's

...vulnerability had been greatly increased by the fact that in the period of expansion and settlement, heavy overhead costs, public and private, had been assumed to make expansion possible and to provide the vast equipment of production and of social life necessary for a population of 2,000,000 people. Highly fluctuating incomes made heavy fixed charges difficult to carry. To a marked degree the Prairie region was "trading on the equity." The practice was unavoidable in a pioneer economy; the danger lay in the degree.¹⁰

Aside from debt, there are specific characteristics to Canadian grain production and marketing which add to the farmer's vulnerability. At root is the long-standing export orientation of Canadian wheat. As early as 1900 Canada was exporting thirty-eight per cent of its 1.5 million wheat tonnes. Just as war was breaking out in 1914, Canada was contributing 20 per cent of the world's international wheat exports. By 1920, Canada was exporting 63 per cent of its total production, which was 7.2 million tonnes at the time. Expanding productivity required investment, markets, and stamina.

Since they first arrived, Canadian farmers have had to contend with variations in changing crop conditions (both within their region as well as with other regions as they compete for a share of the world market). Furthermore, grain farming is not suited to all parts of the prairies. More than a third of Manitoba's land is considered to be unsuitable for

grain farming. More than a third of Alberta's land has "poor soil structure, while another 21 per cent offers difficult topography", and in Saskatchewan, more than half of the land has "inadequate moisture-retaining ability."¹¹ Many early farms had to be abandoned simply because of their location.

Even within those areas which are suited to grain production, crop conditions vary. It was well before the Depression's years that farmers were experiencing drought and other damaging factors such as grasshoppers, soil drifting, saw-fly damage, and events like the 1916 "severe wheat-rust epidemic". All of these factors curtailed returns on the farmer's investment.¹² Table 2.2 shows that in one sampled crop district, year to year production in the 1920s varied at rates of almost 100 per cent.

**Table 2.2: Estimated Average Wheat Yield Per Acre
Manitoba Crop District No. 1**

Year	1921	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926	1927	1928	1929	1930
Bushel per Acre (Mean)	4.8	17.7	8.9	16.2	18.3	23.0	17.0	20.5	13.2	14.2

Source: Ellis, pp. 305-306

In addition to these domestic matters, once the crop reached world markets other factors contributed to the product's vulnerability. A list of such factors would include levels of production within competing nations, fluctuating currencies and interest rates, and policy changes within those

nations which import Canadian wheat.¹³ A lack of policy coherence at the international level prior to the 1940s was exemplified by the lack of a functioning international wheat agreement; this led farm organizations, such as the wheat pools, to call for export quota's for all countries involved in the grain trade.¹⁴

Another basic element within the wheat system's volatility is what economists refer to as its "inelastic demand".¹⁵ Put simply, demand does not increase quickly if supplies increase. Unlike consumer goods, consumption patterns of wheat remain relatively stable over short periods of time, regardless of price. Prices, therefore, must take a drastic drop in the event of surpluses if a country is not to be over-burdened with agricultural surpluses. It is true that grain shortages bring price increases, but here too the Canadian farmer may not be rewarded. Just because Canada is an exporting nation does not mean it is a major international force. A shortage of Canadian grain will not necessarily translate into a shortage of grain on world markets. For example, international figures in the 1920s show that Canada's percentage of the world's total production hovered at five per cent.¹⁶ The international system thus affects Canada while Canada plays only a minor role within that system. In one year a good crop might have occurred in Argentina while Canadian crops failed.

To summarize, farmers became economically vulnerable by

more than just individual debts. They lacked controls over wheat marketing, transportation, and industrial standards such as grading, docking, and storage. All of this was in addition to the effects of changing international markets with unpredictable prices.

The next section examines the extent to which the federal government enacted policies in response to the farmer's economic dilemma. Following this, there is a discussion of how farmer organizations and their strategies became shaped at the federal level by forces arising from both within the federal government and the international economic regime.

II.

Unlike many other policy areas which are placed either within provincial or federal jurisdiction by Canada's constitution, since Confederation the federal government has been expected to play a strong but shared role with regard to agriculture. This is defined by Section 95 of the British North America Act.¹⁷ Generally, where a conflict between the two levels occurs, the federal government prevails.¹⁸ One would expect, therefore, that studying the history of federal policy would show that Ottawa became heavily involved in farming issues from the beginning. However, what is written into law does not always translate into practice. This chapter's section examines the narrow focus of federal government activity within the agriculture sector.

For those years which make up what some have termed the "nation building period,"¹⁹ issues regarding farm policy and the farmer's welfare were subordinate to national policies which promoted centrally based economic and political interests.²⁰ This period's character is best and most characteristically represented by the National Policy, which spelled out three federal government priorities: to erect tariff barriers in order to encourage the development of a Canadian industrial base while increasing Ottawa's revenues; second, to speed up the settlement of the western frontier in order to increase resource production and provide a guaranteed market for the protected manufacturers in central Canada; and third, to established a trans-national railway.²¹ In short, federal economic policy, at least as it was applied to the expanding frontier, was not focused on providing benefits to newly settled western farmers but to extract profit from their activities.²² In framing the character of pre-Depression federal policy, David Smith writes:

Described succinctly, the policy was one of reluctant intervention. Except in response to wartime disruptions, the Canadian federal government had largely stayed clear of involvement in the industry other than to set the ground rules early in the century.²³

From the farmer's perspective this is an accurate picture. However, objectively speaking this picture is only partly accurate. Monies were spent following the turn of the century, dissatisfaction arose due do the fact that the funds were not aimed directly at the farmer. It was not until the

1930s that the first direct payments were given to the farm producer by the federal government. This is discussed in Chapter Three.

From the National Policy to the Great Depression, federal agriculture policies were aimed at settling the frontier through immigration and increasing the frontier's productivity (see below). Expenditures for settlement were not meant to provide supports to the new farmers. In 1903, Clifford Sifton, the long-time Minister of Immigration, described in The Manitoba Free Press the character of his government's aid:

The Government of Canada has never, since Canada was a Dominion, given any settlers or body of settlers a bonus to induce him or it to locate in Canada. The offer of free land, the protection of liberal laws, freedom from oppression and disability, and the prospects of a competence acquired through industry - these are among the inducements Canada offers to the individual settler. But for those who will send settlers to the Dominion - to steamship and immigration agents in other countries - Canada has for years established a system of bonuses. [Emphasis added]²¹

Agricultural Policy

Table 2.3 lists major programme events in the Canadian Department of Agriculture's early history. Aside from some temporary war-time measures, federal legislation was geared toward implementing standards within the grain industry and increasing the nation's agricultural viability in the West. Included within this framework were federal government commitments to scientific research. Such research often took place through the establishment of the "experimental farm

system" which began in the 1880s.²⁵ There were two major consequences to this action. The first was the introduction of land fallow techniques to the West with the aim of preventing soil exhaustion. The second was the development of Marquis Wheat which replaced the slower growing Red Fife.²⁶

Table 2.3: Department of Agriculture, 1886-1929 Period

1886	Experimental Farm Station Act: research to improve volume of farm yields.
1890	Dairy Branch established: to inform farmers on dairy enterprise methods.
1897	Crow's Nest Act: railway construction coupled with freight rate reduction.
1900	Manitoba Grain Act: changes to grain selling rules, licensing of grain dealers, and to increase grain trade competitiveness.
1911	Agricultural Instruction Act: \$10 million grant to provinces over ten year period.
1912	Canada Grains Act: government supervision of grain trade, board of grain commissioners.
1917	Board of Grain Supervisors empowered to fix uniform price of wheat. Terminated 1919.
1919	Canadian Wheat Board operation of compulsory wheat pool. Terminated 1920.
1925	Crow's Nest Pass rates became statutory to make transportation rates uniform. Aim was to enhance exportability of western grain shipments.
1927	Canadian Farm Loans Act: long term mortgage funds at competitive rates.

Source: D. Berthelet, op. cit., p. 7; Fowke, op. cit., pp. 246-247.

The so-called "Crow's Nest Pass" legislation authorized the granting of both transportation subsidies of up to 3.4 million dollars and substantial land grants in order that railway links could be constructed between Lethbridge, Alberta, and Nelson, B.C. In exchange, the Canadian Pacific Railway committed itself to three things. Firstly, it agreed to the principle of rate regulations as set by a commission or government appointee. Secondly, the CPR agreed to a perpetual reduction of charges on the westward shipment on such necessities as food and farm implements. And thirdly, the railway agreed to reduce the transportation rates of grain and flour exported from the West by three cents for every hundred pounds. These rates came into effect in 1899. (Later, they were suspended in 1918 due to war-time inflation. In 1922, the Crow's Nest rates were restored.²⁷)

At the turn of the century, through the Manitoba Grain Act (1900), the federal government was responding to other infrastructure related issues. In addition to its support for new transportation links to the West, and accommodating the export of prairie wheat through the Crow Rate, the Manitoba Grain Act was the federal government's first major response to policy issues arising from within the transportation industry and, in part, from farmer grievances. Much of this was articulated through the Royal Commission on the Shipment and Transportation of Grain which attempted to address three major complaints raised by prairie grain farmers. Grain farmers had

complained that grain dockage fees (ie. charges for the use of the storage facilities) were unfair and excessive, that doubts existed regarding the use of proper weights for measuring the delivered product, and that elevator monopolies were being maintained by preventing flat warehouses from loading onto railcars.²⁸

The Manitoba Grain Act established new standards concerning grain transportation and storage.²⁹ While addressing some of the problems within the grain infrastructure, it was seen by many as an inadequate response to many of the concerns raised by the prairie farmer. The new law was effective only to the extent that it attempted to ensure a sense of stability and quality control within the prairie grain system. It was ineffective in addressing problems related to a shortage of railway cars. With the bumper crop of 1901 this caused a number of problems. Railway agents were once again refusing to load from flat warehouses, grain elevators were offering "to buy top-grade wheat at lower-grade prices" due to a shortage of top-grade bins, and elevator operators were deducting additional dockage for winter storage.³⁰

Subsequent to the Manitoba Act of 1900, a series of amendments were passed in the House of Commons. These included the Grain Inspection Act of 1904 and three amendments to the Manitoba Grain Amendment Act in 1902, 1903 and 1908.³¹ In 1912, the Canada Grain Act allowed the federal government

to establish a Grain Board with responsibilities in such areas as grain inspection, weighing, and the supervision of grain elevators and transportation related facilities. It also gave Ottawa the power to own elevators.

This power was put to some use in a number of ways. The federal government built a 2.5 million bushel capacity public grain elevator at Port Arthur (which is now known as Thunder Bay) in 1913. In Saskatoon, Moose Jaw, and Calgary in 1914 and 1915, it built three large interior terminal elevators. In Vancouver one year later it built a small transfer elevator in order to meet the new transportation generated by the newly opened Panama Canal.³² However, this type of intervention by the state was limited. In spite of demands from western grain growers, the federal government resisted, when drawing up the Grain Act, a move towards nationalizing the Canadian elevator system.³³

Thus, for the most part, the federal government invested its efforts into transportation, research, and implementing standards within the grain industry. It had yet to enter into the area of farm credit (although all three provincial governments had enacted farm loan acts), it continued to maintain tariffs which protected central Canadian industrial interests, and supported free market arrangements within the Canadian grain system. From the farmer's perspective, therefore, the federal government was doing little to offset the prairie farmer's sense of marginalization within the grain

trade. After the legislative dust had cleared, farmers continued to have little control over their product.

Farm organizations drew support on the prairies as farmers became disenchanted with the federal government and those operating the grain industry. The next section shows how farm groups have become important agents for addressing both the inadequacies of the free market system and the manner in which problems were addressed by the Canadian government.

III.

This section explores the various developments of pre-Depression prairie farmer organizations. These can be divided into two general categories. The first consists of farmer "self-help" groups which, in turn, owned or operated organizations with two aims: (1) to aid in the operation of the business side of farming and (2) to address social needs within the farm community. The second category includes developments which led to direct political confrontation with non-farmer business interests and the federal government. This section first looks at the 19th century sources of these organizational developments which can be traced to developments in the United States. Following this the discussion moves into an examination of those organizations which were later spawned by the particular conditions of Canadian prairie farming. These organizations are: the Grain

Growers, the wheat pools, provincial and federal level peak associations, farm unions, and farmer parties.

Table 2.4 shows that strong links existed between the early Canadian West and American farm movements. Unlike the Canadian labour movement which was divided by having dual origins in the United States and Europe,³⁴ major farm groups born in Western Canada derive their ancestry from the United States.³⁵ It is, therefore, impossible to describe properly early Canadian farm organizations without looking first at American farm politics.

One of the first major American farm groups, the Grange, was also an early Canadian farm organizations during the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Chapters were formed both in Western Canada and Ontario.³⁶ Other examples include the Non-Partisan League,³⁷ the Progressive Party (an outgrowth of North American "progressivism"³⁸) and the cooperative movement.³⁹ Briefly, the American influence can be understood in the following way. First, in a geographic sense, the western Canadian agrarian frontier is closer to the United States frontier than to the central Canadian metropole. For example, river transportation to Minnesota was the strongest link which the Red River settlement had to outside population centres.⁴⁰ Second, along with the simple element of geographic proximity, both the northwest region of the United States and the Canadian prairies share a grain producing region. Thus, as exporters of agricultural

resources, farmers in these regions have often shared similar economic conditions and fortunes. Third, farmers in both the Canadian prairie region and the American agricultural West faced opposing interests which were located outside the agrarian region. Specifically, they opposed a number of industrial interests including monopolies within their national wheat systems, which included grain elevators, bank rates and policies, and the transportation system. Fourth, although some argue that the American party and legislative system is better able to accommodate regional political factions at the national level,⁴¹ both the American West and western Canada provided locations for the growth of political protest parties which responded to national party neglect for regional grievances.⁴² The fifth point is that the two national wheat growing regions have been predominantly English speaking regions. English has been the major language of the local newspapers, party literature, organizational literature, and government proceedings; immigration factors not withstanding.⁴³ Together, these factors have led to the following observation. In every case found West of Quebec,⁴⁴ major Canadian farm organizations had roots in the United States.⁴⁵

By the early part of the twentieth century, the Canadian prairie region spawned its own organizations which addressed the many problems which were specific to the western Canadian

Formation Period Organizations

<u>Early Organizational Developments</u>	<u>Year</u>
Grange (U.S.) enters Ontario	1872
Grange enters Western Canada	1876
American Farmers' Alliance inspires Farmers' Union of Manitoba	c.1880
Manitoba and North-West Farmers' Protective Union (extinct by 1887)	1883
Patrons of Industry (100 subassociations reported in Western Canada)	1892
Patrons and Populist defeats in U.S.	1896
Territorial Grain Growers' Association (TGGA) of Assiniboia	1901
Manitoba Grain Growers' Association (Southwestern Manitoba)	1902
TGGA organizes in Alberta rivalling the Alberta Society of Equity	1905
Grain Growers' Company	1906
United Grain Growers' Grain Co. Ltd. enters the Winnipeg Exchange	1907
Canadian Society of Equity joins with the Alberta Farmers' Association to found the United Farmers of Alberta	1909
Western GGA, Grange, and Farmers' Association of Ontario form the Canadian Council of Agriculture	1909
Non-Partisan League enters Western Canada from North Dakota	1916
Non-Partisan League elects 2 of 4 candidates in Alberta Prov. Election	1917

Table 2.4: Source: Moorhouse, Deep Furrows, Morton, The Progressive Party, and Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta.

farmer. As discussed earlier in this chapter, farmers faced specific problems which were related to the operation of Canadian railways, monopoly interests within the elevator system, Ottawa's policy priorities, and the effects of the particular position of the Canadian grain farmer within the international political economy.

The Grain Growers Movement

The Grain Growers movement stands out in the history of Canadian farm politics due to its ninety year history and its ongoing status as a significant national cooperative with both business and organizational clout. Its history began with the first organizational meeting of the Territorial Grain Growers Association (TGGA) which was held in December, 1901, in the old Northwest Territory centre of Indian Head.⁴⁶ W. R. Motherwell, who later became a Liberal minister in both provincial and federal cabinets, acted as the meeting's chair.⁴⁷ The TGGA's structure was tied to the following principles:

1. Limited returns on share capital
2. One "man", one vote organizational control
3. Limit on the number of shares for one person
4. Patronage dividends as a return on savings
5. Surpluses would be partly dedicated to education.⁴⁸

Having become the most influential prairie farmer organization in western Canadian farm history, its first campaigns were not so much against the federal government⁴⁹ but against the monopoly control of both the railways and grain elevator system, and the fact that profit was being made by speculators rather than farmers when grain was traded according to free market principles on the floor of the Winnipeg Grain Exchange.

As an early tactic for addressing the farmer's economically vulnerable situation vis-a-vis market forces and private monopolies, the strategy of creating cooperative

enterprises seemed to be the least risky and most promising route towards acquiring alternative farm services and marketing arrangements. The following is a quick overview of the Grain Growers' expanding role prior to the 1930s. In 1906 the Grain Growers' Grain Company, Canada's first cooperative grain company, was established by the Grain Growers Association.⁵⁰ In 1907, its first year of operations, it merchandised a reported estimated 6,000 tonnes of grain (compared to more recent UGG tonnage such as the 1984 figure of 4.9 million⁵¹).⁵² In 1912, the UGG established a subsidiary called the Grain Growers Export Company which sold directly to millers in eastern Canada and Great Britain, thus sidestepping the Winnipeg Grain Exchange.⁵³ The first two decades included such essentials as the creation and purchase of a grain elevator network.⁵⁴ UGG Grain terminals were built at both Port Arthur and on the Pacific coast. Having built and acquired a total of 109 elevators while leasing 73 to the pools, by the 1920s the UGG had built an extensive grain marketing system.⁵⁵

Aside from grain handling and marketing, the association responded to other economic needs within the grain growing community. For example, in 1909 it established a seed business in response to a seed shortage from the previous year's frozen crop.⁵⁶ Dating back to 1913 the association also began to buy and sell bulk products such as coal, twine, flour, and feed.⁵⁷ By 1918 it was selling its own insurance

policies to farmers.⁵⁸ Although this organizational movement has been painted by some as a picture of idealism,⁵⁹ and or as part of a crusade for the social gospel,⁶⁰ the Grain Growers were practical in aim.

Far from being a movement of idealists, the Grain Growers operated on a pragmatic level in order to address farmer problems. This was embodied in the Saskatchewan section's slogan "Our Objective - Economic Security".⁶¹ Its leadership resisted the temptation of over-expansion. It refused to support annual convention motions for moving the UGG into such operations as establishing retail stores, farm machinery factories and tanneries.⁶² One area in which the UGG was committed from its beginnings was in communications in order to address the particular problem of isolating conditions of prairie agriculture. A farm newspaper provided, among other things, education to address economic problems on the farm and to help make farm business decisions,⁶³ and a means for "raising the consciousness" of the farm membership.

The fact that the socially isolated prairie farmer needed a newspaper was made clear by its growing circulation. The first issue of the Grain Growers' Guide was published in June, 1908. By 1917 its circulation was 50,000 and was the most widely read Canadian farm newspaper. This figure climbed to 80,000 in 1920. In 1926, under the new name, The Country Guide, its circulation had reached 120,000.⁶⁴

By the 1920s the Grain Growers was recognized as both an

important communications and business institution within the Canadian grain trade. At its 1921 annual meeting in Calgary, it reported handling 36.5 million bushels of grain for the previous year with a year-end profit of \$233,743 and a reserve fund of \$2.77 million. In its last crop year prior to the Depression, its 1929 reported volume was over 39 million bushels with a profit of \$493,372. Its reserve fund was \$3.16 million.⁶⁵

In addition to business and communications, however, the Grain Growers eventually became an important political actor in Canadian agriculture. But before turning to the political strategies used by grain farmer groups and the effect which they had, it is important to recognize and discuss those other important organizations which belonged to this period and which also had a role in addressing the prairie farmers economic vulnerability. The most notable cases were the wheat pools. It is to this form of organization that the discussion will now turn.

According to C.F. Wilson, the formation of the provincial wheat pools in 1923 and 1924 was a later parallel to the earlier formation of the grain growers' grain company. The grain growers had unsuccessfully "agitated" for a publicly owned elevator system and ended up forming their own farmer grain company. In the 1920s, the prairie farmers' failure to obtain a national wheat board with effective powers to replace the existing system of futures marketing resulted in the

formation of provincial wheat pools.⁶⁶ In effect, the wheat pools were a compromise to the existing wheat marketing system. The trade in wheat futures by speculators on the floor of the Winnipeg Grain Exchange would continue. The idea was that each farmer could choose to sell his or her crop in the fall to the private grain companies or could make a deal at the beginning of the crop year with the provincial pool in order to obtain an early "initial payment" and a final payment once the total pool crop holdings had been sold. The farmer's victory was limited by the fact that this system allowed the federal government to remain outside the grain trade. It also was of limited use in that a regional voluntary pool system had no way of affecting international wheat prices. (The workings and weakness of the pools is discussed in a later part of this section.)

Alberta was the first of the three prairie provinces to establish a voluntary farmer-owned wheat pool. The proposal for a provincial wheat pool was put forward at the 1923 annual convention of the United Farmers of Alberta. On the 18th of August, 1923, the Alberta Wheat Pool was founded. The following month it opened its head office in Calgary. Signing on to the pool was not without some sacrifice. Those who signed on to the pool agreed to have 3 cents per bushel deducted on grain deliveries with the understanding that it would be put into the operation and construction of pool elevators. This garnered a total of \$8 million from its

founding members.

Being a new organization, the pool did not have its own elevator system for storing and grading the grains for which it had contracted. Its first elevator, in Leo, Alberta, was not opened until 1925. It therefore had to make deals with the already established elevator companies. For example, Henry Wise Wood, one of the UFA's founders and president and, later, head of this new Alberta pool, led a delegation to Winnipeg and struck a deal with the North West Line Elevator Association to use its services for grain handling.⁶⁷

The pools in Manitoba and Saskatchewan were formed the year after Alberta's first year. In the case of Manitoba, the elevator construction charge to its members was set at 2 cents per bushel. While building up its client base, between 1924 and 1931 the Manitoba Pool Elevators had either constructed or acquired 152 grain elevators.⁶⁸ The Saskatchewan pool's early history proved to be less smooth than its eastern cousin. At its 2nd Annual Conference in Saskatoon in early July 1923, the Farmers' Union of Canada (FUC), a Saskatchewan based group which had opposed the existing management of the large farmer organizations and parties, called for the formation of a wheat pool. Unlike the Grain Growers Associations, which operated its farmer companies within the existing system of grain marketing, the FUC was ideologically opposed to the existing market structure (which is discussed in Section IV).⁶⁹ At its convention in mid-July of the same

year, the Saskatchewan Grain Growers Association announced that it would be forming a second provincial wheat pool. It was only with the help of a prominent farm cooperative organizer from the United States, Aaron Sapiro, that the FUC and SGGA agreed to work towards a single pool.⁷⁰

The initial rationale for the farm groups moving into such ventures as grain marketing was to do things that were being left undone by federal government policy. Once formed, they also operated to address farmer needs which were seen as unfulfilled by existing companies within the grain system. Initially, few foresaw that the farm pools would expand their operations beyond wheat marketing. This move proved to be no small affair. Before the 1930 financial collapse of the three wheat pools, the capacity of the pools' elevator system was reported to be almost 49 per cent of the total capacity of western Canada's elevator system.⁷¹

The reasoning behind the pools' expansion into the grain elevator business was as follows: first, to provide some producer control over prairie grain shipping; second, to have revenues from grain handling and terminal operations returned to the pools; third, in order to distinguish pool grain from other grains in the system; to have elevators aimed at service rather than profit; fourth, to confirm that honest weights and grades were used.⁷²

All three pools operated on the same principles. Farmers

would be provided with an initial partial payment for their grain in the spring-time. Once the crop was harvested and delivered, the farmer would share in the left-over profits that had been "pooled". The idea behind this was that farmers would be free to deliver their product without worrying what the market price for wheat was for that particular day or week. Secondly, it was argued that because the pools were owned by farmers the marketing of their product would be conducted with their best interests in mind. Thirdly, the farmers would have the benefit of being provided with an initial payment which would give them spring capital for the season's work.

The pools were assuming risk in two ways. First, they established an extensive business venture by investing in the grain handling system. Second, in a similar manner to those trading grain futures, they risked that they could predict grain prices by making partial payments to their members. In a similar way to banks, the pools maintained reserves in order to protect themselves from sudden drops in price. Between 1925 and 1929, for Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta the commercial reserves were respectively as follows: \$932,860, \$6,572,706, 2,436,511 with a regional total of \$9,942,077. The pool elevators operated with a cash reserve as well. For the same years, the total amount was \$18,589,501.⁷³

In order to make its first annual spring payments to farmers, the pools were able to acquire credit through the

United Grain Growers Limited and the Canadian Bankers Association.⁷⁴ Once their operations were underway, the pools were considered a prairie success. Along with maintaining the aforementioned reserves, they were operating an extensive grain elevator system with four grain terminals at the Lakehead and two in Vancouver. Additionally, they owned three seed plants and several farm supply warehouses. By the end of the 1920s, more than half of the western wheat crop was flowing through the hands of the pools. The farmer-owned pools were expanding their operations, providing their members with services, and were maintaining what appeared to be at the time, a healthy set of reserves. Who could question the prudence of farmers in being involved in this form of organizational activity?

Table 2.5: Growth of Western Pools 1924-1930

Crop Year	Pool Deliveries	Total Western	Pool Deliveries (percent)
1924-25	81668348	219241130	37
1925-26	187364999	358715990	52
1926-27	179993435	338936053	53
1927-28	209908536	410617091	51
1928-29	243929491	475711628	51
1929-30	121655589	236967251	52

Source: Canadian Wheat Pool Year Book, 1930.⁷⁵

Within one year events within the international political economy put an end to the growth in the wheat pools' economic powers. From the beginning to its end, farmers in the 1929-30 crop year saw the world prices for their wheat plummet. In July 1929, what seemed to be a conservative figure, the pools had set an initial payment price of \$1 a bushel while the free market price was \$1.44. By July 1930 the market price for wheat had dropped to ninety-five cents and to sixty-eight cents in November.⁷⁶ Together, the three pools were forced to pay out \$23 million more than they could recover from grain sales. In desperation the farm groups turned to government aid. As they watched their domestic economies collapse, the provincial and federal governments were forced to react. In Alberta and Saskatchewan, the provincial governments guaranteed loans made to the pools. In the case of Manitoba, the provincial government took over the pool's assets before it guaranteed funds. This difficult period in the pools' history and the influence of the world economy on the behaviour and options for the pools and other farm organizations in the 1930s is discussed in the next chapter.

IV.

This section moves the discussion away from the business side of farm organizations and looks at how governing institutions at the federal level became the target of farm group strategies. Up until the First World War, political

strategies aimed at influencing federal government farm related policies were sometimes haphazardly planned and sporadically timed. Many of the tactics and strategies used were more in line with what Paul Pross would term a "fledgling" group.⁷⁷ However, there were well structured groups which were less concerned with the business side of farming (compared to the cooperative type venture) but which were effective in representing the broad interest of farmers. Farm unions, farmer parties, as well as umbrella associations became major actors prior to the 1930s.

While sometimes linked to the farmer business structures, all three types of organizations were focused on altering the general conditions of federal policy making. In terms of what has been published, the story of early western farmer parties has been told already,⁷⁸ and to a lesser extent, so has that of the farm unions.⁷⁹ This chapter now turns to these two types of farm organizations as well as a third type, the umbrella association.

Turning first to the subject of farmer parties, Table 2.6 shows that Canadian farmers had some success in the provincial electoral arena prior to the Depression. Except for one term in Ontario, Canadian farmer parties have been limited to regions that are West of the Ontario-Manitoba border. What is also interesting is that Saskatchewan lacked a successful farmer's party prior to the much heralded rise of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation. Both W.L. Morton⁸⁰ and

Evelyn Eager⁸¹ attribute this to the permeability of the provincial liberal party to those within the farm groups. According to David Smith, between 1905 and 1925 57.7 per cent of the Liberal members who sat in the provincial assembly were otherwise involved in agriculture (compared to 34.8 per cent of Conservative members).⁸²

Table 2.6: Canadian Farmer Party Successes - Provincial

1900-1930	Premier	Term	Party
Ontario	Ernest C. Drury	1919-1923	United Farmers of Ontario
Manitoba	John Bracken	1922-1943	United Farmers/ Progressive*
Alberta	Herbert Greenfield John E. Brownlee	1921-1925 1925-1934	United Farmers of Alberta

Source: Howard A. Scarrow, Canada Votes and John Colombo, op. cit.

* United Farmer/Progressive 1922-1927; Coalition 1927-1937; Liberal Progressive 1937-1943.

The problem facing farmers was that addressing problems related to the economically vulnerable nature of prairie farming required focused activity which went beyond provincial government jurisdiction. It was pointed out that not only does the federal government have a major role to play in Canadian agriculture as defined by the Canadian Constitution,⁸³ its responsibilities lay also in regulating and promoting investment within the prairie economy's infrastructure. Thus, if parties were to be successful in their fight for the interests of farmers, they would have to move into the federal electoral arena.

Unlike the large number of farmer parties which could be found at the provincial level, there was really only one major Canadian farmer party prior to the Depression. This was the Progressive Party of Canada. Its initial aim was to address policy concerns such as the existing tariff policies which protected central Canadian industrial interests. Secondly, its even more basic purpose was to seek redress in establishing the farm sector's representative voice within the Canadian government. W.L. Morton describes the general nature as systematic under-representation which was felt by western farmers prior to the 1930s:

After 1896 the decennial revision of representation in the federal House of Commons lagged behind the growth of its population, and because of this the West was to be inadvertently denied the representation to which it was entitled until 1925.⁸⁴

The rise of the party, therefore, was in response to an institutional imbalance of representation at the federal level. However, before embarking on an account of the Progressive Party, it is necessary to discuss what actions had been taken prior to the party's formation.

The means by which the provincial farm groups originally vocalized their concerns at the federal level had been through the creation of an umbrella organization: the Canadian Council of Agriculture (CCA). The Council was formed in 1909 and its membership consisted of the United Farmers of Manitoba (UFM), the United Farmers of Alberta (UFA), the Saskatchewan Grain Growers (SGGA), and Ontario farm groups which would later become the United Farmers of Ontario (UFO).⁸⁵ As an umbrella for provincial farm interests, the CCA expressed the national position of farmers through a series of "Farmers' Platforms" which were released in 1910, 1916, and as the "New National Policy" in 1918.

The Farmers' Platform expressed the interests of farmers in relation to federal policy on a number of fronts. In 1916, these included trade issues, taxation, state intervention, and federal government institutional reform.⁸⁶ Regarding trade, it called for a reduction of the British preferential tariff, a schedule for having free trade with Great Britain, reciprocity with the US, a reduction of the tariff on goods deemed to be "the necessities of life", and free trade in agricultural implements and supplies.

The platform called for taxing unimproved land values (in order to strike at land speculation), an inheritance tax, and a sharply graduated tax schedule for both personal incomes and corporations. Regarding state intervention, the Council proposed that railways, telegraph services, and parcel express companies be nationalized. Also, the CCA proposed that leases on natural resources would be limited to short terms. Lastly, it called for provincial government control over the alcohol trade. In terms of reforming federal institutions, the Farmers' Platform called for the publication of political campaign funds, abolition of patronage, and the expansion of the franchise to women who were already qualified to vote within their provinces.

The Farmers' Platform has often been thought of as the initial bugle-call by farmer groups for a political party. This, however, was not the case. Although there were pressures from within the farm community for the formation of a national party, the CCA's platform was meant to articulate the interests of farmers and their organizations rather than indicate that the Council was forming a party. Indeed, in response to such a suggestion regarding the issuance of the 1918 revised platform, the Secretary of the CCA, N.P. Lambert stated, "the draft of the Farmers' Platform was issued [to the farmer associations] to develop an intelligent, well-informed electorate, not to create a party machine."⁸⁷

Almost since its inception, the Council struggled against

pressures for federal party formation. The Grain Growers' Guide, for example, had this to say in 1915:

Week by week, the feeling is growing that the only way the West can secure a square deal in federal legislation is by sending down to Parliament men free from obligations to either of the old parties.⁸⁸

At the Manitoba Grain Growers convention in 1916, a proposal for supporting a new federal party was put forward by a number of delegates. The motion was defeated following this response given by President R.C. Henders:

The banker, the manufacturer, the railway interests, when they have personal interests to serve[,] know no politics. With them, business is their politics. Until we learn that lesson - further, until we go home and practise that lesson - we need not hope or expect to succeed in bringing to rural life that consideration which it merits.⁸⁹

Similarly, in Alberta, Henry Wise Wood was able to lead to defeat a similar proposal on the convention floor of the United Farmers of Alberta.⁹⁰

Let us look at the convergence of forces and events which led to the federal party's eventual formation. Since the defeat of the pro-reciprocity Liberal campaign in 1911, it appeared increasingly impossible for farmers to look at either the Conservatives or the Liberals for a resolution of the farmer's dilemma. Following the end of the First World War, those MPs who considered themselves farm representatives within the Union Government were disappointed with what they saw as inadequate measures taken by Prime Minister Borden to reduce tariffs.⁹¹

The ramifications of the tariff issue and its connection to the interests of the prairie farm sector remain unresolved. On the 6th of June, 1919, T.A. Crerar, who was a Grain Grower leader and later to become the head of the Progressive Party's parliamentary caucus, stepped down from his position as federal minister of agriculture. This was followed by nine western Unionist MPs leaving their government party seats and crossing the House of Commons floor. But where could they go? The Liberal Party seemed to be the obvious answer except for two things. By 1917 the Liberal Party had been wounded by two issues. First, the formation of a war-time "Union Government" with the Conservative Party caused a split between the Quebec Liberal caucus and Liberal caucuses in the rest of Canada. This was in addition to the internal divisions caused by the 1916 Manitoba School Act.⁹² When the farmer MPs turned down the Liberal Party's solicitations, they were left without a party. Thus had begun what Morton calls the "parliamentary Progressive Party".⁹³

Outside Parliament there were also a number of factors which increased the call for a third party. With the end of the war, some of the old internal struggles within the Canadian political economy returned. The CCA had resumed its anti-tariff campaigns while the Canadian Manufacturers Association and its affiliate, the Canadian Reconstruction Association gave battle.⁹⁴ Inflation was on the increase, labour was moving to the cities from the countryside, and

persistent drought conditions had hit the prairie's south-western areas.

In the same year, and as an attempt to incorporate the organized farm voice, the CCA and its provincial affiliates had been invited to send representatives to the August 1919 Liberal Party leadership convention. This was declined. The following November, the CCA called a conference after consulting with its affiliated members. The purpose of this meeting was to consider whether or not the farm organizations should form a federal party. Farm leaders belonging to both factions believed that something needed to be done. It was the "how" which caused the dispute.

Those who attended the 1920 Winnipeg meeting of the CCA saw the farm movement split into two factions: the first, being represented by J.J. Morrison of Ontario and Henry Wise Wood of the UFA, which supported a farmer lead "group government" party which would heighten the class consciousness of farmers while incorporating the voice of other occupational sectors (that is, economic groups within society would send delegates to work within the government).⁹⁵ The second faction was considered less idealistic. It was led by T.A. Crerar, of the Manitoba Grain Growers Association, and Ontario Premier Drury who argued that the farmers required a pragmatic CCA supported Progressive party which would directly represent the concerns of farmers in the federal government.⁹⁶ This second group won the day. The CCA supported the formalization

of a farmers' party in Ottawa while the first "group government" faction gave its support grudgingly. Anthony Winson argues that it was the second faction's (those in the successful Crerar-Drury camp) lack of vision which led to the party's decline as the 1920s proceeded.⁹⁷

The lack of vision by the farm leadership serves as only a partial explanation for the decline of the Progressives. Once again we must look at what was happening within the international political economy. The Progressive Party's spectacular climb in the 1921 federal election (winning 65 seats with 23 per cent of the national vote) and its subsequent decline coincided with changes in the world's agricultural economy. Morton, in his history of Manitoba,⁹⁸ raises the point that the 1921 federal election occurred in a period beset by tumbling returns on livestock and rapidly declining wheat prices. Between December 1920 and August 1922 the price per bushel declined from \$3.19 to \$1.10.⁹⁹ By 1924, however, conditions were improving with wheat prices almost doubling themselves.¹⁰⁰ For the Conservative and Liberals this was just in time for the 1925 election in which the Progressives dropped from their 23 per cent of the national vote to 9 per cent.

What the role of the CCA should have been with regard to political parties was never fully resolved, even when the Progressives were at their zenith. The Council was later

squeezed out of its supporting position by Crerar's campaign for a national party organization and by the continual desire shown by other CCA leaders such as Wood who felt that the Council should remain outside federal party politics.¹⁰¹ In March, 1923, the CCA broke its formal links with the Progressive Party. In the end it had become clear that unlike the character of the provincial prairie electorate, the farmers were only one sector among many at the national level. If farm groups were going to be successful participants in federal politics they would have to contain their activities to areas outside the electoral arena. It is ironic that with improving farm conditions and entreaties to its MPs from the Liberals, the 1925 election broke the Progressive Party's back. It had been reduced to 24 seats with 9 per cent of the national vote. In 1926, it won only 24 seats and declined to 5 per cent of the national vote. The party disappeared in the 1930s with barely a whimper. In 1930 the Canadian electorate had its final chance to elect a national farmer's party. The party was reduced to 12 seats with only 3 per cent of the national vote.¹⁰²

The Progressive Party can at best be considered a partial success for the prairie farmer. Anthony Winson lists the following as Progressive victories: they persuaded the Liberals into reducing some parts of the tariff wall, caused the reinstatement of the Crow's Nest Pass Agreement which had been suspended during the war, pushed the federal government

into supporting the completion of the Hudson's Bay Railway, and supported the introduction of a new Combines Investigation Act.¹⁰³

Farm Unions

Before concluding the discussion of farm politics prior to the 1930s, there is still one other type of organization which should be discussed: the farm union. Nowhere is it more true than with the farm union that all prairie farm groups share a common heritage: they grew from the sense of economic vulnerability and a periodical sense of powerlessness. In the 1920s and later, farm union membership has usually grown in areas where the farm population perceived that the existing farm organizations - that is, the Grain Grower associations, umbrella organizations and farmer parties - were inadequately representing their interests within the political system.

One example of a farm-union arising in response to an unserved need in the farm sector was the case of the Saskatchewan based Farmers Union of Canada (FUC). The FUC's birth occurred in 1921 in the Saskatchewan district of Ituna.¹⁰⁴ Deriving most of its support from the province's more remote northern farm regions and among farmers whose ancestors were not Anglo-Saxon,¹⁰⁵ the farm union attacked what Lipset refers to as the "bureaucratic conservatism of farm leaders"¹⁰⁶ which were seen as channelling farmer efforts into narrow strategies: that is, the promotion of

political parties and farmer companies. Indeed, the complaint grew that the Grain Grower associations and elevator companies were pragmatic by nature and not sufficiently forceful when challenging threats to prairie farm families. Furthermore, it has been argued that non-union responses served the specific commodity interests of the more well-off farmers which, in turn, tended to atomize the farm community. Those within the union made the case that Grain Grower Associations and their farmer companies were far from being agrarian idealists; they were inhibiting factors in the development of a farmer class consciousness (see below).

Initially, its growth occurred in a period in which existing groups such as the Grain Growers were perceived to be inadequately responding to economic unrest and dropping wheat prices.¹⁰⁷ S.W. Yates, an activist in the later formed United Farmers of Canada (Saskatchewan Section),* argued that the FUC was formed

...with the object in view of supporting and affiliating with farmers' organizations in all the large producing countries to obtain control of all main farm produce, to regulate and obtain reasonable prices above cost of production, and also to protect the farmers' interests by the support and strength of their own organization.¹⁰⁸

Although David Smith writes that its radicalism was by no means consistent, members within the FUC once described themselves as part of the "one big union of the farmers of

* The UFC(SS) was a later amalgamation of farm groups including the SGGa and the FUC.

Canada" (the "OBU" was believed at the time to have been behind the 1919 Winnipeg General Strike) and, in the case of the union's local in Sturgis Saskatchewan, its local leadership called for both a "mass resistance to sheriff officers" who were seizing the property of debt ridden farmers and a farmers' boycott on farm auctions.¹⁰⁹

FUC activities went beyond being a mere farmer movement's gadfly. While campaigning against the use of political parties, it worked towards the establishment of farmer educational programmes in areas of Saskatchewan that had previously been unserved. It also sought the formation of a farmer operated wheat pool and vigorously reacted against the campaigns of both the Grain Growers Grain Company and the Saskatchewan Cooperative Elevator Company which were aimed to protect their own interests by preventing the establishment of prairie wheat pools. Both the leadership of the SGGG and the Elevator Company believed that a wheat pool would eventually cut into their business territories.¹¹⁰

Things came to a head in 1923 and 1924 when the FUC successfully campaigned for a farmers' contract wheat pool in Saskatchewan. As discussed earlier in this chapter, this pushed the Saskatchewan Grain Growers to quickly follow suit with their own wheat pool. This untenable situation - having two new and competing wheat pools operating within one province - was resolved by the amalgamation of the two pools into one. By 1926 the SGGG and FUC were themselves

amalgamated into the United Farmers of Canada (Saskatchewan Section)¹¹¹ which would itself play a role in the later founding of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) during the Depression.

The farm union's importance signals two things for those studying developments within the prairie farm system. As with all other farm groups, it too is an organizational response to the farmer's dilemma. Farm union growth signals that in some way a region's farmers continue to feel both their vulnerability within the agricultural system and, in addition, a sense that they are being inadequately served by the other farmer organizations. This was the case in the crisis-ridden 1920s and 1930s and it occurred again in the 1970 and 1980s. But this is a story which is best left to a later chapter.

Conclusion

This chapter has dealt with farmer politics as they responded to prairie crop conditions, changing economic forces in the international political economy, and federal policy priorities before the 1930s.¹¹² Federal government policies subordinated the interests of farm producers and, instead, serviced economic and political interests which were based outside the prairie region.¹¹³ Grain farmers organized together in response to a two-fold problem: their sense of economic vulnerability and political powerlessness. As this period evolved, many farm organizations such as the Canadian

Council of Agriculture, United Farmers, and the Grain Growers responded to their unsympathetic environment by turning to electoral party strategies. It was felt that this was a necessary step to take if farmers were to have any say over agriculture policy and to have an effective and representative voice within federal government institutions.

In the next chapter I will show how both the international political economy and federal policy changed during the 1930s and 1940s. Whereas conditions following the First World War acted as a catalyst for the formation and success of farmer parties, cooperatives, and farm unions, this was not so under other conditions. The double "whammy" for farmers in the 1930s occurred when producers faced disastrous crop conditions, and the general collapse of the international economy (including grain markets). The behaviour of both federal government policy makers and western farm organizations came to be strongly shaped by the Depression's negative economic consequences. In fact, some of the organizations mentioned in this chapter, the United Farmers and CCA, to name two, would not survive. Those which survived during and after the 1930s, such as the UGG, did so only by adapting themselves to the changing conditions.

Endnotes

1. Brett Fairbairn, Building a Dream: The Cooperative Retailing System in Western Canada, 1928 - 1988 (Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1989), Chapters 3 to 6.
2. Nowhere is it more obvious than in the study of twentieth century western farm politics that issues of governmental representation are linked to economic relations. Two studies which clearly make this link are Macpherson's Democracy in Alberta and Lipset's Agrarian Socialism. C.B. Macpherson linked the rise of the United Farmers of Alberta and Social Credit to Alberta's homogenous class structure and economic relations between regions (C.B. Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962)). Seymour Martin Lipset argued that frontier conditions and the unpredictable returns on grains produced an agrarian socialist party in Saskatchewan (S.M. Lipset, Agrarian Socialism: The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation in Saskatchewan (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1968); and, "Political Participation and the Organization of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation in Saskatchewan," Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 2 (4)).
3. One has only to open up a biography such as Diefenbaker's One Canada (John G. Diefenbaker, One Canada: Memoirs of the Right Honourable John G. Diefenbaker, Volume One (Toronto: Macmillan, 1975)) to feel the sense of isolation felt by those living within a prairie grain growing community.
4. R. Douglas Francis and Howard Palmer, eds., The Prairie West: Historical Readings (Edmonton: Pica Pica Press, 1985), p. 336. Reasoning inductively, Lipset argued that the spatial orientation of wheat growing alters political organizational developments (Lipset, op. cit.).
5. Lewis H. Thomas, "A History of Agriculture on the Prairies to 1914," The Prairie West: Historical Readings, R. Douglas Francis and Howard Palmer, eds., op. cit., pp. 229-230.
6. W.A. Mackintosh, Economic Problems of the Prairie Provinces (Toronto: Macmillan, 1935), p. 74.
7. Thomas, op.cit., pp. 232-235.
8. Hanna Herald, 24 April, 1930, cited in Jean Burnet, Next Year Country: A Study of Rural Social Organization in Alberta (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978 [1951]), pp. 11-12 ff.

9. Doug Owram, The Economic Development of Western Canada: An Historical Overview Discussion Paper no. 219 (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada, 1982), pp. 11-12.

10. Mackintosh op. cit., p. 75.

11. Barry Wilson, Beyond the Harvest: Canadian Grain at the Crossroads (Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1981), pp. 24-25.

12. J.H. Ellis, The Ministry of Agriculture in Manitoba: 1870-1970 (Manitoba Department of Agriculture, 1970), pp. 274, 304.

13. Murray Fulton, et al, Canadian Agricultural Policy and Prairie Agriculture (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada, 1989), p. 2.

14. C.F. Wilson, A Century of Canadian Grain: Government Policy to 1951 (Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1978), pp. 786-787.

15. Richard G. Lipsey, et al, Economics: Seventh Canadian Edition (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), p. 112.

16. Paul Earl, op. cit., pp. 429-430.

17. "95. In each province the Legislature may make Laws in relation to Agriculture in the Province, and to Immigration into the Province; and it is hereby declared that the Parliament of Canada may from Time to Time make laws in relation to Agriculture in all or any of the Provinces, and to Immigration into all or any of the Provinces; and any Law of the Legislature of a Province relative to Agriculture or to Immigration shall have effect in and for the Province as long and as far as it is not repugnant to any Act of the Parliament of Canada." Department of Justice, Canada, A Consolidation of the Constitution Acts 18⁶⁷ to 1982 (Ottawa: Supply and Services, Consolidated as of October 1, 1989), p. 35.

18. R. MacGregor Dawson, The Government of Canada, 4th Ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), p. 89.

19. D. Berthelet, "Agriculture Canada Policy and Expenditure Patterns: 1868-1983," Canadian Farm Economics, Vol. 19 (1), p. 5.

20. C. B. Macpherson, op. cit.; W. A. Mackintosh, "Economic Factors in Canadian History," Approaches to Canadian Economic History, W.T. Easterbrook and M.H. Watkins, eds. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1967); and, Janine Brodie, "The Political Economy of Regionalism," The New Canadian Political

Economy, Wallace Clement and Glen Williams, eds. (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1989).

21. Roger Gibbins, Conflict and Unity (Toronto: Methuen, 1985), p. 186.

22. Macdonald's Liberal-Conservative Party was "the party of centralization; ...[it] believed in identifying itself with the propertied, commercial, and industrial interests...[and] used these interests to advance nationalist as against local causes, and received in return the powerful support which they could give. The centralizing influences of Macdonald and the Liberal-Conservative party did not stop at Confederation; they found expression in the "national policy" of a protective tariff, in the construction of the transcontinental railway, and in many other secondary policies which bore in the same general direction." R. MacGregor Dawson, op. cit., p. 456.

23. David E. Smith, "Grits and Tories on the Prairies," Party Politics in Canada, 5th Ed., Hugh G. Thorburn, ed. (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1985), p. 264.

24. Quoted in D.J. Hall, Clifford Sifton, Volume Two: A Lonely Eminence (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1985), p. 75.

25. Vernon C. Fowke, op. cit., p. 224.

26. Ibid., pp. 234-235.

27. The return of these rates was made official by parliamentary legislation in 1925. C.F. Wilson, op. cit., p. 5.

28. Report and Evidence of the Royal Commission on the Shipment and Transportation of Grain, Sessional Paper No.81a, 1900, pp. 8-12. As cited by C.F. Wilson, op. cit., p. 29.

29. C.F. Wilson, op. cit., p. 31.

30. Ibid., pp. 32-33.

31. For details see C.F. Wilson, Ibid., pp. 34-41.

32. Ibid., pp. 42-45.

33. Fowke, op. cit., p. 247.

34. "While the tendency to establish loose associations with British and American unions existed, national trade unions were predominant in [the first few decades following Confederation]," M. Janine Brodie and Jane Jenson, Crisis

Challenge and Change: Party and Class in Canada (Toronto: Methuen, 1980), p. 29.

35. It is beyond this study to delve into this matter. Suffice to say that it is only later that third parties with farmer support would have their ideological ancestry traced, at least in part, to 19th and 20th century European ideologies. The two most prominent examples are the Social Credit Party and the C.C.F.

36. The Grange, popularly known as the Grangers and formally titled The Patrons of Husbandry, was founded in 1867 (Richard B. Morris, ed., Encyclopedia of American History, NY: Harper and Brothers, 1953, p. 248, and Daniel Boorstin, The Americans: Volume 2, The Democratic Experience (New York: Vintage, 1974), p. 122). It adopted at its 1873 convention the following organizational objective: to battle monopolies and unfair transportation rates (Richard Slotkin states that their focus was at the state level rather than the national level of government: "the Grangers' and other local organizations of farmers...sought to use their power in state legislatures to regulate the railroad rates that were driving them into tenancy or out of farming altogether," The Fatal Environment: The Myth of the Frontier in the Age of Industrialization, 1870 - 1890 (Middletown, Conn: Wesleyan University Press, 1986), p. 316). By 1874, the movement had spawned farmer parties in eleven states, of which nine could be found in the prairie region. Evidence of the organization's influence could be found in a number of state governments. Granger legislation was passed as early as the 1870s in Illinois, Wisconsin, and Iowa (Richard B. Morris, ed., op. cit., p. 248.). Historically less influential in Canada, the Grange's organizational power in the United States was at its zenith prior to Canadian prairie farm settlement. It did have some success in Ontario yet this did not affect the prairies. By the time that the prairies were being settled the Grange was outdated. Throughout North America the organization was being replaced by newer organizations more suited to the changing American farm community and its political needs. When the Canadian prairie frontier was undergoing rapid settlement, American farm numbers had reached their zenith as a proportion of the U.S. population.

37. Lipset, op. cit.

38. Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York: Vintage Books, 1955); W. L. Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967 [1950]).

39. It might interest some Canadians that the State of Oregon was once governed by a party with the familiar title of the "Cooperative Commonwealth".

40. See Doug Owsram, Promise of Eden: The Canadian Expansionist Movement and the Idea of the West, 1856 - 1900 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980).

41. "Congressional members must represent the interests of local elites; they are not as free as the president or the executive elites to direct themselves to national problems or concerns. Moreover, congressional members represent a more homogenous constituency than does the president; a congressional constituency is usually well defined - rural or urban, mining or manufacturing or agricultural, defense oriented or cotton producing or citrus growing." Thomas Dye and Harmon Zeigler, The Irony of Democracy, 7th Ed. (Monterey: Brooks/Cole, 1987), p. 326.

42. Concerning the United States, see James L. Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States, rev. ed. (Washington: Brookings Institute, 1983).

43. Regarding the influence of immigration in Canadian prairie politics, see Nelson Wiseman's "The Pattern of Prairie Politics," Political Parties in Canada, 5th Ed., Hugh Thorburn, ed. (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1985).

44. Because the emphasis of this project is on grain farmer concerns and federal politics, no direct research work was conducted on Quebec nor on the Atlantic region.

45. Of course there were such entities as Ukrainian farmer associations but these played only a minor role as interest groups seeking to influence the economic and political well-being of their members. Regarding the Ukrainian influence in the Manitoba CCF see Nelson Wiseman, Social Democracy in Manitoba: A History of the CCF/NDP, (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 1985), pp. 85-87.

46. UGG, "Facts You Should Know About United Grain Growers," pamphlet, n.d. [1985?].

47. United Grain Growers Limited, Grain Growers Record: 1906 to 1943 (Winnipeg: Public Press, 1944), p. 14.

48. UGG, "Facts You Should Know..." op. cit.

49. Hopkins Moorhouse writes that at least for the organization's first few years, the founders of the Grain Growers Association held the belief that "[p]olitics...would

have to be kept out of the movement at all costs or it would land on the rocks of defeat in the same way that the Farmers' Union and Patrons of Industry had been wrecked." Deep Furrows (Toronto: McLeod, 1918), p. 46.

50. United Grain Growers, informational booklet, n.d. [1988?] (Winnipeg: Public Press), p. 6, and UGGL, The Grain Growers Record, op. cit., p. 7.

51. The year 1984 is selected here due to it being prior to the 1980s prairie drought.

52. "Facts You Should Know...", op. cit.

53. The Grain Growers Record, op. cit., p. 15 and Chapter 3.

54. Ibid., p. 16.

55. Ibid., p. 29.

56. Ibid., and The Grain Growers Record, op. cit., p. 10.

57. Ibid.

58. The modern group insurance plans put forward for the membership began in 1960. "Facts You Should Know..." Ibid.

59. Two treatments of the farmers movement which are idealistic are Hopkins Moorhouse, Deep Furrows (op. cit.), and William Irvine, The Farmers in Politics (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976 [1920]).

60. See Janice Staples, Beyond the Social Gospel: A Study of the Intellectual Foundations of Radical Protest Politics in Early Twentieth Century Canada, PhD. Dissertation, Carleton University, (Ottawa, 1985).

61. Evelyn Eager, Saskatchewan Government: Politics and Pragmatism (Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1980), p. 10.

62. The minutes of the annual shareholders' meetings of the Company, record resolutions asking the Company to establish retail stores, branch warehouses, factories for manufacturing farm machinery, tanneries, flour mills and abattoirs. Ibid., p. 46.

63. Lipset, op. cit., p. 87.

64. Ibid., Chapter 7.

65. The Grain Growers Record, op. cit., Appendix III.

66. C.F. Wilson, op. cit., p. 211.
67. Patricia and Anthony Lefsrud, "Getting Started," Western People, 25 June, 1992.
68. "The Story of Manitoba Pool Elevators," [pamphlet], n.d.
69. C.F. Wilson, op. cit., p. 212.
70. Ibid., p. 214.
71. Ibid., p. 217.
72. Earl, op. cit., pp. 366-367.
73. Canadian Wheat Pool Year Book, 1930, cited in C.F. Wilson, op. cit., p. 218.
74. C.F. Wilson, op. cit., p. 213.
75. Cited in C.F. Wilson, Ibid., p. 225.
76. Garry Fairbairn, From Prairie Roots: The Remarkable Story of Saskatchewan Wheat (Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1984), Chapter 4.
77. A. Paul Pross, "Pressure Groups: Talking Chameleons," Michael S. Whittington and Glen Williams, Canadian Politics in the 1980s, 2nd Ed. (Toronto: Methuen, 1984), pp. 297-300. Examples include the Grain Growers participation in the 1910 "Siege of Ottawa" in which Grain Grower representatives and 300 Grange members (from eastern Canada) organized a rally in Ottawa. These groups occupied the House of Commons in order to address the federal government on farm concerns and the problems of tariffs (Fowke, op. cit., pp. 246 and 265).
78. A number of these have already been mentioned. Any list should automatically start with the following four: Lipset, Agrarian Socialism, op. cit.; Macpherson, op. cit.; Wiseman, op. cit.; W.L. Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967 [1950]).
79. James Napier McCrorie, In Union is Strength (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Press, 1964).
80. Morton writes that the Saskatchewan Liberal Party was "an agrarian party, and the administration was a farmers' government in everything but personnel." The Progressive Party, op. cit., p. 35.
81. Evelyn Eager, op. cit., pp. 47-52.

82. David E. Smith, "The Membership of the Saskatchewan Legislative Assembly: 1905-1966," Politics in Saskatchewan, Ward and Spafford, eds. (Don Mills: Longman's, 1968), p. 191.
83. W.H. McConnell, Commentary on the British North America Act, Toronto: Macmillan, 1977, pp. 300-307.
84. W.L. Morton, op. cit., p. 8.
85. Ibid. p. 14.
86. Ibid., p. 46.
87. Ibid., p. 63.
88. Cited in Morton, Ibid., p. 41.
89. Ibid., p. 42.
90. Ibid., p. 43.
91. Anthony Winson, The Intimate Commodity: Food and Development of the Agro-Industrial Complex in Canada (Toronto [?]: Garamond, 1992), pp. 35-36.
92. Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada, op. cit., pp. 46-55.
93. Ibid., p. 66.
94. Ibid., p. 62.
95. For a full description of the group government concept see C.B. Macpherson, op. cit., pp. 44-54.
96. Winson, op. cit., p. 36.
97. Ibid., pp. 36-37.
98. W.L. Morton, Manitoba: A History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961 [1957]).
99. Ibid., p. 174.
100. Ibid., pp. 380, 391.
101. Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada, op. cit., p. 174.
102. Figures from the federal elections of 1921, 1925, 1926, and 1930 are from Hugh Thorburn, ed., Party Politics in Canada, op. cit., Appendix, p. 349.

2

PM-1 3½"x4" PHOTOGRAPHIC MICROCOPY TARGET
NBS 1010a ANSI/ISO #2 EQUIVALENT

PRECISIONSM RESOLUTION TARGETS

103. Winson, op. cit., p. 37.
104. David E. Smith, Prairie Liberalism: The Liberal Party in Saskatchewan, 1905-71 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), p. 98.
105. Ibid., pp. 131-132, 137.
106. Lipset, op. cit., p. 84.
107. Smith, Prairie Liberalism, op. cit., p. 99.
108. Quoted in Lipset, op. cit., p. 84.
109. Smith, Prairie Liberalism, op. cit., p. 101.
110. Lipset, op. cit., p. 84.
111. Smith, Prairie Liberalism, op. cit., p. 66; and Barry Wilson, Beyond the Harvest: Canadian Grain at the Crossroads (Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1981), p. 244.
112. D. Berthelet, op. cit., p. 5.
113. C. B. Macpherson, op. cit.; W. A. Mackintosh, "Economic Factors in Canadian History," Approaches to Canadian Economic History, W.T. Easterbrook and M.H. Watkins, eds. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1967); and, Janine Brodie, "The Political Economy of Regionalism," op. cit.

Chapter Three: Steps in Transition, 1930s and 1940s

In the previous chapter, the combined effect of governmental policy and priorities and the structures and events of the international political economy were explored as they contributed to organizational developments within the farm sector during the pre-Depression era. This chapter shows how these constraints continued to operate during two subsequently critical historical periods: the Depression and the Second World War. Prior to the 1930s, few efforts were made by the federal government to consult directly with farm groups. Furthermore, any policies which were devised to address problems within the vulnerable prairie grain farming community appeared to serve everyone except the farm producer. Indeed, not until the 1930s (the first of the two decades studied in this chapter) did the federal government introduce legislation which authorized direct payments to the farmer.

It would take much more than a farmer's party from the West with representatives sitting in the House of Commons to shake the federal government from its previously established pattern of "laissez-faire" behaviour. One simple explanation for this is that as Canada's industrial economy was developing and diversifying, the farm sector was quickly being reduced to being one sector among many. One symptom of this was the federal election of 1930 which reduced the Progressive Party's

caucus to twelve elected MPs.

Few in the 1920s predicted that a force other than a national farmer's party would alter the federal government's anti-interventionist policy orientation. The storms of change came in two forms: the Great Depression and the Second World War. As the flood conditions receded, many of the old landmarks were gone. With a new peacetime Canadian Wheat Board with monopoly powers, the Winnipeg Grain Exchange had lost its control over the wheat futures market, both the Canadian Council of Agriculture and its affiliated Progressive Party had disappeared, and farmer unions were in decline. However, a few of the old landmarks managed to survive through adaptation. These were the groups such as the UGG and pools which narrowed their political activities while focusing their attentions on the interests of specific commodities. As well, a new national umbrella group rose in prominence: the Canadian Federation of Agriculture (CFA).

This chapter is divided into two sections. The first deals with the conditions which influenced and shaped farmer politics and state policy in the Depression. The second section deals with the forces and consequences of wartime conditions on Canadian farm politics in the 1940s. Turning first to the 1930s, the first object of discussion is how the state introduced temporary measures - which later became permanent - to address crisis conditions on the farm and within the Canadian economy. The most notable examples were,

first, the guaranteeing of loans made to the three wheat pools during the rapid decline of wheat prices for the 1929/30 and 1930/31 crop years; second, the massive purchases of grain surpluses with the aim of preventing further price declines on the world market; third, the introduction of a peacetime Canadian Wheat Board, albeit with limited powers; and, fourth, programs which directly subsidized farmers who suffered widespread losses due to crop conditions. Before turning to the specifics of federal governments policies in the 1930s and 1940s, and the changes which occurred within the politics of farm organizations, I will discuss economic conditions both within the international and national political economy, and in terms of grain farm conditions.

I.

What sets the 1930s apart from other eras of crisis in North American farming is that there was a confluence of crisis forces, both within agriculture and within industrial nations. The story has been often told about how hard the Canadian economy was hit.¹ In his account of the Canadian Grain Trade, D.A. MacGibbon notes that from 1929 to 1933 the world index for industrial prices for manufactured goods declined by 48 per cent while the price levels for agriculture declined by 56 per cent.²

For the Canadian wheat farmer, Table 3.1 shows variations in productivity and returns during the Depression and the

1940s. First, this table reveals that the number of acres committed to wheat production remained surprisingly stable between the 1928/29 and 1940/41 crop years. However, a second feature is revealed. What varied was the yield per acre, the amount of wheat produced, and the prices obtained for the crop once it was harvested and delivered.

Table 3.1: Returns on Wheat Production, 1928/29 - 1940/41

Year	Acreage (acres 000)	Yield Per Acre (bu.)	Production (bu. 000)	Price (cents)
1928/29	23,159	23.5	544,598	124
1929/30	24,297	11.5	279,336	124/3
1930/31	23,960	16.6	397,300	64/2
1931/32	25,586	11.8	301,181	59/7
1932/33	26,395	16.0	422,947	54/2
1933/34	25,177	10.4	263,004	68
1934/35	23,296	11.3	263,800	81/6
1935/36	23,293	11.3	264,096	84/5
1936/37	24,838	8.1	202,000	122.5
1937/38	24,599	6.4	156,800	131/4
1938/39	24,946	13.5	336,000	62
1939/40	25,813	19.1	494,000	76/4
1940/41	27,750	18.5	513,800	74

Source: D. A. MacGibbon, The Canadian Grain Trade: 1931 - 1951, p. 6.

According to the 1940 Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, the percentage change in the average income of those dependent upon agriculture between the 1928/29 crop year and 1932/33 declined by 94 per cent.³ The implications of this decline went beyond the obvious problem of poverty. First, it delayed progress in terms of farm capitalization. Farmers became increasingly unable to take on extra debt as crop yields and investment returns dropped. Secondly, farm organizations saw their membership numbers dwindle and, with regard to farmer company services, saw a reduction in their membership's purchasing power.

It was only a matter of time that as the crisis deepened, pressures for federal government action increased. The first casualties of the Depression were the wheat pools. With world prices hovering at \$1.50 a bushel, in the fall of 1929 it appeared reasonable for the pools to issue its members an initial payment of \$1.00 per bushel for its 1929/1930 crop. By the 31st of July, 1930, wheat prices on the Winnipeg Grain Exchange fell below \$1.00 per bushel level. In the fall of 1930, the pools were forced to lower their initial payments to 50 cents. These two years resulted in a loss of 25 million dollars to the three prairie pools.⁴

The three provincial governments guaranteed the debts of their provincial pools to the banks.⁵ The Federal Government passed an Order in Council on the 12th of September 1931 which guaranteed bank loans made to the Canadian Co-operative Wheat

Producers Limited (the central selling agency for the three provincial pools).⁶ Some of these supports came with strings attached. In the case of Manitoba, the government placed a lien on the pools assets and forced it to work with the grain exchange. In turn, the federal government appointed John McFarland in 1930 to the Canadian Co-operative Wheat Producers Limited's position of General Manager. MacGibbon reports that it was the federal government's intention to have at the agency's head a person who would represent the interests of the federal government.⁷ The actions of the federal government are discussed in some detail in a later section in this chapter. I will turn now to the effects of the Depression on the farm organizations.

Because the system of grain pooling was meant to reduce risk for farmers dealing with the open market system of grain futures and pricing, it took on the risk performed by speculators by using an initial payment system. In fact, it was making what were considered fairly safe gambles that grain prices would not drop, over a number of months, to levels below the price set as the initial payment. With the aim of reducing the risk of guesswork by farmers regarding what grain prices would be when harvest came, the pools set initial prices so that farmers would have something to work with at the beginning of the crop year.

Unlike the pools, the UGG was not involved in such risk taking therefore it was not subject to the losses faced by the

wheat pools. Its commitment was not to orderly marketing but rather in sharing on a cooperative basis with its members, the profits derived by the company's storage and marketing of wheat. What saved the UGG was its concern with profits rather than with reducing risk.

At least in terms of resources, using the rough measure of capital holdings, Figure 3.1 shows that this organization had become a fully institutionalized economic entity: it continued to perform services in grain marketing, storage, and transportation. In spite of profit variation, the organization showed a steady increase in capital holdings up until the 1930s and held its position in the 1930s. The company did undergo some internal changes. For example, in the 1933/34 year its 347 shareholder locals were reorganized into 281 larger units, thus reducing its annual meeting costs by \$5,000.

The most noticeable change to the UGG in the 1930s was its complete withdrawal from the electoral arena. In part, this was due to the disappearance of the Grain Grower Associations into other farm groups such as the United Farmers of Canada (Saskatchewan Section)⁸ while the United Grain Growers business operation continued. In the 1920s the UGG had been involved in the Progressive Party through two avenues: first, its membership in the Canadian Council of Agriculture and, second, in providing many of the party's candidates and leaders, the most notable example of these

being T.A. Crerar who had been the head of the Grain Company before becoming the head of the Progressives. By the 1930s and 1940s farmer parties were simply perceived to be bad for business. On the one hand, farmers were struggling merely to survive, while on the other hand, the coffers of their organizations were depleted. Whether true or not, those operating the UGG felt that during the 1920s the "Company's business undoubtedly suffered...as a result of its identification with a political party."⁹

This is not to say that farmers remained outside party politics. Indeed, the 1930s proved to be a watershed for the rise of third parties. However, it was only to a limited degree that these parties were a reflection of the older farmer parties. Farmer parties in the 1920s and the new parties of the 1930s were similar mainly by the fact that their major victories occurred at the provincial level. In a sense, the parties of the 1930s, the Social Credit Party with its success in the Alberta Provincial election of 1935¹⁰ and the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation in Saskatchewan arose from the ashes of earlier farm organizational developments. However, both the Social Credit Party and the CCF can be distinguished from earlier western farmer parties along two fronts. First, while both parties had strong segments of support from the farm community, they were not strictly farmer parties. That is, they derived their support from a number of rural and urban sectors within Canadian society. As a theory,

Social Credit was aimed at reforming national financial arrangements and institutions. This may have drawn sympathy from farmers suffering from hard times however, it lacked the agrarian-related coherence of the old CCA's "Farmers' Platform" (which was discussed in Chapter Two). The CCF's Regina Manifesto addressed a number of agricultural issues yet it too went beyond this and addressed issues which were not directly related to the farm sector. Since Macpherson's Democracy in Alberta was published, there have been numerous critiques which contain evidence to show that neither the successes of the Social Credit nor the CCF were the result of Saskatchewan and Alberta having a homogenous agrarian class structure.¹¹ Furthermore, in the case of the CCF, its founding parliamentary members were from both the United Farmers and the urban labour movement.¹²

A second distinguishing feature, which is linked to the above, is that these new protest parties were winning a large proportion of the prairie farm vote¹³ (albeit only in some areas¹⁴) but in many cases were operating in spite of, rather than because of, the existing farmer organizations. In fact, the internal organizational structures of these new third parties were not based on already established organizational entities. The organization of the Social Credit Party was based on local "study groups"¹⁵ rather than locals derived from the farmer associations. The CCF also had its own party organization and, at the national level, a party council which

was similar to the two major traditional parties.¹⁶ It is not the purpose of this chapter, let alone this dissertation, to provide a detailed account of the protest parties of the 1930s. Suffice to say that at the national level, the links which these parties had with the major farm organizations such as the UGG and the pools, were tenuous and were not forged from strategies arising from within these groups. Furthermore, these parties were not presented to the Canadian electorate as farmers' parties. A space had opened in the Canadian electorate for these new parties by the fact that Canada's economy had collapsed, the Progressive Party had failed, and farm groups had retreated from the electoral arena. It is to other concerns that this dissertation now turns.

The 1930s signalled defeat for the "go it alone" strategy of western farmers. Building farmer companies and farmer parties proved to be an inadequate response to the farmer's problems. The financial collapse of the wheat pools and the demise of the Progressive Party are only two examples of what can be considered here as demobilization. Regional government strategies could only go so far. It had become clear that provincial governments were easy targets for farmer strategies yet they provided an inadequate tool for resolving difficult problems. The provinces had neither the constitutional powers¹⁷ to address grain trade problems nor, with the effect

of declining revenues, the financial powers to come to the farmer's aid. This was caused by the fact that between 1928 and 1931, the total cash income from wheat to the three prairie provinces dropped from 441 million dollars to 92 million. Between 1930 and 1937 rural municipal debt in bank loans doubled in Saskatchewan and Alberta while the total outstanding debt for the three provinces increased from 343 to 507.5 million dollars.¹⁸ Such conditions could only restrict the freedom of provincial policy makers during the crisis. The feebleness of the governmental response was illustrated in the case of Manitoba where, in spite of its collapsing of the agricultural economy, the provincial Department of Agriculture budget underwent only a moderate change, going from a figure of 284 million dollars in 1926 to 333 million in 1939.¹⁹

It was from the federal government that the farmers hoped to find some remedy for this deepening crisis. Because of the unpredicted and sudden drop in the international price of wheat, the entire Canadian grain economy along with its infrastructure was collapsing. Some steps had already been taken by the farmers themselves. For example, like banks, each of the wheat pools operated with a sizeable reserve fund in case prices dropped. However, the crisis was too deep for even these measures. With the destruction of the farmer organizations, both large and small, only the federal government had the resources to buffer the effects arising from the international political economy. Five major steps

were taken by the federal government, many of which were achieved without formal legislation but through orders in council: supporting the existing farmer wheat pools, purchasing wheat surpluses in the hope of maintaining price levels, establishing a peacetime Canadian Wheat Board, making direct payments to farmers hit hard by crop failures and low prices, and working on the international stage for an international grain agreement with the aim of stabilizing the international grain system.

In terms of federal action concerned with preventing the collapse of the existing wheat pools, a September 1931 Order-in-Council guaranteed the bank loans of the pools' central selling agency, the Canadian Co-operative Wheat Producers Limited.²⁰ While doing so it appointed John McFarland to act as its manager. McFarland's original duties had been to liquidate approximately 70 million bushels of surplus wheat holdings which remained with the pools' agency. However, the government directed McFarland to enter into price support operations in 1931. In an attempt to strengthen a declining wheat market (and stabilize prices), the government made massive purchases of Canadian wheat. Its growing involvement is indicated by the following CCWP's figures of the 1930s. In November of 1930 it held just under 37 million bushels in wheat and wheat futures. By July, 1931, this figure was just over 75 million bushels. The holdings peaked in the summer of 1935 when the agency was holding over 213 million bushels.²¹

This period of policy-making proved that what was thought to be a temporary action involving the federal government turned into the unintentional entry of the federal state into wheat stabilization policy.

Transportation rates also brought about increasing government involvement. In its June 1931 budget, the federal government proposed adjusting freight rates through the federal treasury's absorption of 5 cent per bushel. Although the federal government had been involved in transportation subsidies before, especially in the Crow Rate, what is noteworthy about this legislation is that on the 24th of July it was announced that the payment would go directly to the producer. This turned out to be a sum of 12.7 million dollars which was paid out through the Board of Grain Commissioners. Although this amount was described by one of the Boards's members, MacGibbon, as "parsimonious", it was ground-breaking in that the western farmer "now became, for the first time, a direct beneficiary under the federal government." Furthermore, as a sector in the Canadian economy, "wheat growing in Western Canada entered into the category of a government-aided industry."²²

Aside from legislation which allowed some adjustment for debt payment arrangements for farmers in debt (The Farmers Creditors Arrangements Act of 1934) and The National Farm Products Marketing Act, which was declared ultra vires in 1935, the most significant piece of legislation was The

Canadian Wheat Board Act of 1935. Originally conceived to take over the Canadian grain export system, including transportation, marketing, and storage, the proposed CWB was opposed by the privately-owned grain companies and the UGG while supported by the cooperative elevator companies. In a 1935 brief to the Parliamentary committee which was reviewing the matter, the UGG argued for a wheat board which would maintain a minimum price for wheat prices but would have neither control over the elevator system nor monopoly powers in regard to the marketing of wheat exports.²³

The resulting legislation provided for a board more suited to the private grain trade than to the wheat pools. Farmers would have the option of selling none, part, or all of their wheat crop through the CWB. The Board was to set a minimum price. Surpluses at the end of the year would be paid out on a pool basis with shortages drawn from the federal treasury.²⁴ According to Anthony Winson, the floor price of the CWB was so low in the 1930s that the Winnipeg Grain Exchange was left to market most of the Canadian farmers wheat harvest.²⁵

As international surpluses declined and the private grain trade strengthened in 1937, the CWB was losing its purpose. It was reduced to such activities as acting as a seed purchaser for the Saskatchewan government, acting in association with the Board of Grain Commissioners to deal with British millers, and publicizing Canadian wheat in overseas

markets.²⁶ According to MacGibbon, in spite of the fact that a window was opening up for the federal government to close down the CWB, the federal government was waiting for the report of the Royal Grain Inquiry Commission (otherwise known as the Turgeon Commission). Of course, there was also the unavoidable fact that both the farmers were increasingly supporting such new mass-based protest parties as the CCF and Social Credit. Political expediency as well as economic necessity were operating together to promote federal governmental interventionism.

In contrast to what was being called for by farm groups such as the three western wheat pools, the Commission recommended that the federal government withdraw from its involvement in grain marketing, that it expand its supervisory role in connection with the Winnipeg Grain Exchange, and that it implement a system of flexible and voluntary wheat pooling based on the Australian system. The CWB fate was saved by the Commission's prudent suggestion that the board be temporarily maintained in the event of problems with the 1938 crop. In response to these considerations, the federal government announced in 1939 that it was withdrawing from the grain trade and revising its aid to farmer methods. Still fearful of giving up all of its control to free market forces, it passed The Grain Futures Act in May, 1939, which was designed to empower the Board of Grain Commissioners to interfere with events on the floor of the grain exchange if they threatened

the system's stability. Because war occurred that same year, this act was never implemented.

A second component to the federal response in 1939 was The Wheat Co-operative Marketing Act which set out to establish a voluntary system based on what was being used in Australia for wheat pooling and to provide a government floor price of 60 cents a bushel (well below the free market 74 cent level). Prairie farm organizations found little use for this legislation and the new and insignificant cooperatives which were spawned by the 1939 legislation disappeared during the 1940s. The third piece of grain-related legislation that was passed that year was more significant: The Prairie Farm Assistance Act. Addressing a problem which the CWB did not, in that floor prices only provide protection against collapsing prices and not other calamities such as droughts and grasshoppers, this new act authorized the federal government to pay acreage subsidies to the farm producer when a drastic drop in wheat production occurred in a farm region.²⁷

On the international front, the Canadian federal state was drawn into arrangements with other states in an attempt to forge some stability within grain markets. At the 1930 Imperial Conference in London, the Canadian government was blocked by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Philip Snowden, from obtaining a trade preference for Canadian wheat in British markets. Canada renewed its attempts at the Imperial

Economic Conference which was held two years later in Ottawa. A preference was secured for Canadian wheat at the level of approximately 6 cents a bushel. This bilateral arrangement lasted until 1938.²⁸

Table 3.2: Department of Agriculture: Selected Grain-Related Acts, 1930-1939.

1934	National Farm Products Marketing Act: Federal marketing boards delegated powers to local producer boards. Declared unlawful by courts in 1935.
1935	Canadian Wheat Board: established to provide a minimum guaranteed price for wheat. Not compulsory. Open market remained for wheat.
1935	Prairie Farm Rehabilitation Act: to address immediate problems caused by Depression conditions.
1939	Prairie Farm Assistance Act: provision of financial assistance to farmers with crop failure.
1939	Wheat Cooperative Marketing Act: to facilitate orderly cooperative marketing.

Source: D. Berthelet, "Agriculture Canada Policy and Expenditure Patterns 1868 - 1983."²⁹

However, in order to find stability for the pricing and marketing of Canadian grains what was really required was some form of multilateral action. Making widespread purchases through government funds for Canadian wheat surpluses was a hopeless strategy when Canada controlled so little of the international export supply.³⁰ Here is a brief account of the direction taken on this front. In London, on the 21st of

August, 1931, just after the Monetary and Economic Conference had convened, Canada met with Argentina, Australia, the United States, and eighteen European countries in order to strike an agreement on limiting exports and to increase and stabilize wheat prices.

The International Wheat Agreement was signed on the 25th of August in 1933. The agreement fell apart the following year when Argentina, undergoing bumper crop conditions within its own agricultural sector, exceeded its quota by 40 million bushels. As well, in the following year, having few powers to discipline its members, the International Wheat Advisory Committee was unable to force Argentina to honour its commitments for the 1935 crop. Attempts to renew the agreement were made in 1939 but the advent of war prevented further action.

Before concluding this discussion, it should be noted that while new measures were taken to support farmers as they were buffeted by the economy and natural conditions, it was not until the 1940s that the government began to make large financial commitments to farm supports. An indication of this is found in Figure 1 in the Appendix which shows that government commitments to the Federal Department of Agriculture expenditures were relatively stable in the 1930s.

In summary, this section has shown that the collapse of the international and domestic agricultural economy pulled the federal government into new spheres of activity. What were

originally thought to be temporary solutions to a downturn in the economic cycle became long-term policies. It is quite probable that the federal government would have retreated further from its activities in the grain trade if wartime conditions had not followed the Depression. Tools used in the 1930s with the aim of propping up grain prices were useful during the 1940s as well, only they were being used for preventing prices from escalating. This is discussed later in this chapter.

II.

Although international grain markets appeared to be on a healthier road, by the end of the 1930s Canadians found that the Depression had left the prairie farm sector in a state of under-capitalization. According to one account "this fact was strikingly evident in the badly depreciated state of farm machinery and buildings, mute evidence of the inability to finance capital replacements."³¹ Just as stability appeared to be on the horizon (for it was not the war which resolved the 1930s economic crisis in wheat - as shown by the 1936 and 1937 yields and prices), the escalating conflict in Europe precipitated an increase in grain market volatility.

The first stage of World War Two brought an increased return to those selling wheat. In August 1939 the bushel price for wheat hovered at 55 cents. By September the price rose to 90 cents and lasted at this level until the invasion

of western Europe by Germany in May of 1940. The consequence of this invasion was that for Canada its continental European grain markets quickly disappeared.³² As a result, wheat prices soon dropped to 30 cents a bushel.³³ While these international events rocked those involved in the Canadian grain trade, the federal government continued to operate with the interim measures left over from the 1930s.³⁴ According to Drummond et al, federal policy from September 1939 to December 1940 took on the character of "wait and see" planning.³⁵

By late 1941 the federal government had moved agriculture policy into a wartime policy setting. This had a number of consequences for those in the farm sector. It established a number of agricultural Wartime Price and Trade Boards (WPTB - see below) in conjunction with the implementation of quotas and price controls to address wartime inflation. Furthermore, in recognition of the consequence that this would push the farmer into a cost/price squeeze scenario (that is, costs of production increase while returns do not) the government instituted special tax and tariff exemptions and direct subsidies to the producer. The most heralded wartime grain-related action taken by the government, however, was the 1943 Order-in-Council which closed down the marketing of wheat futures on the Winnipeg Grain Exchange and gave the CWB a monopoly over Canadian wheat exports. It is to each of these wartime measures that the discussion now turns.

The establishment and operation of price controls and the WPTBs is the first area of focus here. The first formal price controls came into effect in the summer of 1940. These were aimed at wool, sugar, and butter.³⁶ These measures were not aimed at controlling wartime shortages. Instead, they were anti-inflationary measures which were aimed at preventing both increasing production costs for processors and wartime speculation. The government stepped up its efforts from the summer of 1940 to the fall of 1941 authorizing price controls in a wider area of goods and services in order to address wartime shortages of foreign exchange, industrially essential raw materials, labour, and capital equipment. By December of 1941 the federal government declared a "universal price ceiling". This ceiling, of course, affected the price of farm produce. With regard to wheat, soybeans, flaxseed, sunflower and rapeseed (which is now known in its modern form as canola) the government provided some subsidies to curtail farmer losses and, as well, established floor prices in addition to ceilings.³⁷

The instrument by which the federal government monitored and sought controls over prices was the Wartime Prices and Trade Board. The WPTB was first narrowly applied in September 1939 to simply monitor prices, but with the national wholesale price index having increased by 27 per cent between the appointment date of the Board and the summer of 1941, the government became more active. There were what can be called

loosely institutional "spin-offs" from the WPTB. With regard to overseeing floor prices in the agricultural sector, the federal government made use of the Agricultural Supplies Board.³⁸ The WPTB, in December, 1941, established the Commodity Prices Stabilization Corporation which was responsible for the handling of the wartime subsidies.

Under the corporation, subsidies were paid out for a number of costs including farm machinery, binder twine, feed fertilizer, fuels, and pesticides.³⁹ By 1943 most of the wartime stabilization subsidies were placed under the jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture through the Agricultural Food Board. Among the wide array of subsidies for farmers throughout Canada, the two types of subsidies which were of particular importance to wheat farmers were, firstly, farm income payments to help offset costs incurred by price constraints and, secondly, "wheat acreage reduction payments" which were meant to reward farmers who switched to grains which were better suited to domestic market needs (such those related to feeding livestock).⁴⁰ Regarding the first type, federal government payments were centred on the 1941/1942 and 1942/1943 crop years. For the two years, the Department of Agriculture paid out, respectively, 16.3 and 2.68 million dollars to western farmers.

Because wheat was one of the few agricultural items in surplus after 1940, there continued to be a need for policies which would help reduce wheat surpluses. This could be done

in conjunction with measures aimed at increasing the volume of coarse grain production which would, in turn, serve the Canadian livestock industry. Therefore, subsidies were devised which would simply shift grain production from the export-oriented wheat grain to grains more suited to the domestic market. In March, 1942, the government issued an Order-in-Council which empowered the CWB to set a floor price of 60 cents a bushel for barley and 45 cents a bushel for oats. These floors were below current prices yet they provided a sense of confidence for producers operating in these areas. In part, changes in production reflected government action. According to MacGibbon, the 1942 crop year showed a 35.8 per cent estimated increase in the acreage sown for barley. Less dramatic yet significant was the increase in acreage devoted to oats which rose by 18.6 per cent.⁴¹ Below, Table 3.1 shows annual expenditures for acreage reduction during the war.

Table 3.3: Wheat Acreage Reduction Payments, 1941-1946

Year	Canada	Manitoba	Sask.	Alberta
1941	22,412,000	2,867,000	12,442,000	7,103,000
1942	22,789,000	3,720,000	12,488,000	6,581,000
1943	31,015,000	5,053,000	17,090,000	8,872,000
1944	9,505,000	763,000	5,577,000	3,165,000
1945	822,000	133,000	262,000	427,000
1946	112,000	1,000	51,000	60,000

Source: Data compiled from Cameron and Shefrin, Federal Agricultural Assistance Programs, Tables 30 to 34.

Before moving on to other major wheat related policies, it is worth commenting on the fact that the need to introduce increasingly interventionist wartime measures meant that the federal government would have to open its doors into the policy process for the farm lobby. Generally speaking, it was recognized that the government needed to incorporate farm groups into its decision-making spheres if its wartime policies were to have any effect. The reasons for this were two-fold. First, because the government was attempting to curtail inflation, this meant that farmers would be prevented from obtaining large returns with each crop. Therefore, Ottawa required help from the farm groups in order to legitimate its new anti-inflationary policies. In order to do so a tacit bargain was struck. In exchange for organizational cooperation, the groups were consulted on how these policies should be applied and, the means by which farmers would be compensated (chiefly through subsidies) for their trouble. In this way, the WPTBs allowed the CFA to position itself as the legitimate voice of farmers at the federal level. By the end of the war, the CFA's President, H.H. Hannam, was able to list the following committees within which CFA people were members:

1. The Agricultural Advisory Committee, to the Food Board and the Minister of Agriculture;
2. The Agricultural Advisory Committee of the Wheat Board;
3. The Advisory Committee to the Canadian Wheat Board;
4. The National Employment Committee;

5. The National War Finance Committee;*
6. The National Selective Service Advisory Board;
7. The War Assets Corporation;
8. The Central Committee on Demobilization and Rehabilitation;
9. The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation;
10. The Central Committee, Production Goals for 1945;
11. The Beef Advisory Committee, WPTB
12. The Dairy Producers Advisory Committee, WPTB
13. The Poultry Producers Advisory Committee, WPTB
14. The Honey Producers Advisory Committee, WPTB
15. The Maple Syrup Advisory Committee, WPTB
16. The Fresh Fruits and Vegetables Advisory Committee, WPTB
17. The Seeds Advisory Committee.⁴²

As the reader will note, two of these policy committees pertain to the Canadian Wheat Board. It is to this major institution that we now turn.

Developments behind the 1935 founding of the Canadian Wheat Board have already been discussed in Section One of this chapter. What was originally perceived to be an interim measure to combat problems related to wheat pricing and marketing under conditions of international surpluses, the wheat board survived with its limited powers intact when war broke out. With the amendments to The Wheat Board Act in 1940, in the face of problems within the grain storage and delivery system, the government gave the CWB powers to regulate deliveries and to set producer quotas regarding what a producer might deliver at any one time. The significance behind this measure was that for the federal government the

* For Ontario.

CWB had become its instrument in the grain handling system.⁴³

Because storage facilities were overtaxed, groups such as the pools demanded that farmers who were forced into storing their own harvest should be compensated. In addition to the government allowing the UGG to write off on its income taxes a "huge annex-building programme" in which 357 temporary storage facilities were built (with a capacity of 10.6 million bushels),⁴⁴ between the end of October 1940 and August 1st, 1941, the CWB disbursed over six million dollars to those producers who were storing their own wheat.⁴⁵

As the war progressed and the federal government became more involved in the economy and agricultural stabilization, the CWB's importance was increasing. So much so that in 1943 the wheat futures market was closed on the Winnipeg Grain Exchange and the Canadian Wheat Board was given exclusive powers over all western Canadian wheat exports. James McKinnon, the Minister of Trade and Commerce, argued that

[b]y placing control of the purchase and sale of Canadian wheat in the hands of the Wheat Board it will be possible to deal with current and future marketing problems on a basis more suitable to war conditions.⁴⁶

It should be noted that this measure was taken in response to the exceptional circumstances of wartime conditions and without loss to those who had holdings in wheat at the time that this action was taken. Rarely mentioned is the fact that the government bought out all existing wheat futures contracts estimated at between 200 and 300 million bushels. MacGibbon

writes that this provided a "substantial profit" to those operating on the Winnipeg Grain Exchange floor, including privately owned elevator companies and the pools.⁴⁷

Some have argued that it is impossible to predict what would have happened to the CWB and other forms of state intervention had the Second World War not occurred.⁴⁸ This author feels that the war prevented the dismantling of Depression-era measures and provided an environment which was conducive to government policy flexibility. The War Measures Act allowed the government to by-pass the House of Commons and pass laws by executive fiat.⁴⁹ (Robert MacGregor Dawson notes that executive fiat during the Second World War precipitated in the 1940s Parliament a proliferation of council "minutes" and orders-in-council. So extensively were they used that between the 25th of August, 1939 and the 2nd of September, 1945, over 56 thousand minutes and orders-in-council were issued. It can be calculated that over twenty thousand of these can be classified as legislative actions.⁵⁰)

Therefore, when the Government of Canada issued on the 12th of October, 1943, Order-in-Council Number 7942⁵¹ (regarding the CWB's powers) it was seen as a routine measure within a series of legislative actions taken by the wartime cabinet. George McIvor, the CWB's Assistant Chief Commissioner in the 1940s, recalled later in a letter that both those involved in the marketing of grains and CWB

management "felt generally that the closing of the market was a temporary war action and it was hard to believe that the market was still closed" after many decades.⁵²

For the wartime crop years, the CWB had sold over 1.7 million bushels of wheat. Its annual business had ranged from a low of \$300 million to \$600 million. The government was operating a smoothly running board which had only moderate operational costs.⁵³ Furthermore, many westerners made known their feelings of support for the board's continuance. In addition to the pool organizations, which had finally won the rewards of a long-time campaign and "were particularly active in whipping up support," each of the three prairie governments passed motions of support for a peacetime wheat board with exclusive powers over Canadian wheat exports.⁵⁴ In retrospect, by the end of the war it was clear that step by step, the federal government had been pulled by the necessity of the prolonged international conflict into becoming the major player in Canadian wheat marketing. While doing so, it was supported along the way by the activities of those farm groups which had survived the Great Depression: the wheat pools, the UGG, and the CFA. This dissertation now turns to the changes which occurred to these organizations which represented the interests of prairie farmers.

Organizational Developments

The Second World War proved to be a watershed for both the commodity oriented organizations and the CFA. These were the types of organization which, when it came to issues of public policy, were willing to work within existing institutions. Some groups were left behind. In the 1930s and the wartime 1940s, the biggest of the prairie farmer unions, the United Farmers of Canada which had resulted from the 1926 amalgamation of the UFC(SS) and the FUC, hardly fit into the new form of the consultative interest group. In the 1930s it had joined hands with the labour movement in Regina which led, in turn, to the Regina Manifesto and the CCF's founding. Contrary to what some might think, according to Barry Wilson, the Depression and the war-years may have proved beneficial for mass protest party movements yet they were, essentially, a period in which farm unionism declined.⁵⁵ In contrast, the groups which gained the most were groups such as the wheat pools and the UGG as well as the so-called "umbrella" or "peak" associations which, at both the national and provincial level, served to channel the voice of various interests within the farm sector at the policy level. This section takes the case of two major organizations which were shaped by changing circumstances and which represented Canadian farmers during the war years: the United Grain Growers Limited and the "new kid on the block", the CFA. As an umbrella for a wide array of Canadian commodity and provincial organizations, the CFA

had the most to gain by the new consultative policy arrangements within the federal state and it was first able to prove its worth as it represented farmer interests within the system of wartime planning.

Initially representing the provincial federations, in the 1940s the CFA added to its list of provincial members "trans-provincial" groups such as the UGG. By 1942 a list of its membership contained the following: The United Farmers of Alberta, the United Farmers of Canada (Saskatchewan Section), the Manitoba Federation of Agriculture, the United Farmers of Ontario, the United Grain Growers' Limited, the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, The Alberta Wheat Pool, the Manitoba Wheat Pool, as well as some smaller cooperatives.⁵⁶ In addition to a broadening membership, the CFA was also expanding its financial base at a stable rate. In its founding year, 1935, the association's membership fee was set at \$100.⁵⁷ In 1940 it reported a revenue figure of \$2,360⁵⁸ in paid memberships (compared to the paltry 1939 figure of \$180⁵⁹). In its 1941 budget statement, the CFA was collecting a wide range of amounts from its various members. Of its contributors, the largest was the Ontario Federation which paid \$600 followed by the CFA's Saskatchewan affiliate (the Saskatchewan Co-operative Conference) which paid \$420. When looking at the total contributions (that is, membership dues plus donations) made by its organizational affiliates, the CFA's income grew from \$10,257 in 1940 to \$12,475 in 1945.⁶⁰

In 1940, its budget item for salaries amounted to \$1,800 for one secretary. By June of 1945 it was paying its president \$2,500, its Secretary-Treasurer \$2,000 and its office assistant \$1,504. Along with using its financial resources for its office staffing and operations, it worked to publicize itself in a number of ways. It worked to have its voice heard through the nationally broadcasted radio show "The Farm Radio Forum" and through such printed bulletins regarding its lobbying efforts such as the "Farmers Meet the Cabinet".⁶¹

Helen Jones Dawson writes that the CFA is a good example of a Canadian interest group which has developed institutionally as it moved from its tiny condition in the mid-1930s to that of being a national member of the policy process. Its early years were fairly difficult as it was felt by those within the organization that the government was not taking the federation seriously. Things came to a head in London, Ontario, when the CFA was forced to confront the Minister of Agriculture in what has been called "The Battle of London". At the 1941 annual meeting of one of the CFA's affiliates, the Ontario Federation of Agriculture in London, Ontario, Agriculture Minister James Gardiner was attacked by an "especially scathing address by [CFA President] Dr. Hannam with the vocal support of 2,000 extremely angry farmers." When the minister attempted to defend the record of his department

...the farmers present became even more enraged and hurled further accusations at him. They refused to allow him to leave the meeting until they had extracted some concessions from him in the early hours of the next morning.⁶²

What followed two weeks later was a government invitation to the CFA leaders to submit a brief to the federal cabinet (this was the first time for what became an annual event). The CFA leadership was also asked to nominate representatives to the aforementioned WPTBs. Therefore, as the government moved into an activist role within the economy, the CFA and its affiliates evolved in their role within the consultation process. Following the end of the war, in 1947, Agriculture Minister Gardiner was able to claim that "never before in the history of Canadian agriculture has the voice of agriculture been more effectively and unitedly expressed than during the past six years."⁶³

While the CFA's strategy was proving to be successful as the federal state became increasingly interventionist, the UGG, as well, was also taking on a shape more suited the demands of the new era. Having undergone a number of low profit years, the last being the fiscal year of 1938/39 when it reported a profit of \$5,662 with no dividends issued to its stockholders, the grain company had put off an overdue capital restructuring and was beginning to grapple with new federal government policies. This section will provide a discussion of the following things in turn: the UGG's evolving financial

health, the restructuring of the grain company's capitalization - the means by which investment was conducted, and the policy issues which brought about UGG lobbying efforts.

In part, changes within the UGG were less a result of wartime conditions than the alleviation of the Depression era conditions. There was no doubt that the 1930s proved to be difficult years as illustrated by the fact that it had lost money in three years (1929/30, 1932/33 and 1936/37). Its finances became normalized in the following decade. In its report on the 1939/40 fiscal year, the UGG's directors informed the UGG's membership at its annual meeting in Calgary that its profits had been just under 600,000 dollars. Indeed, profits remained in the six digit range in subsequent years. In the fiscal years ending in 1941, 1942, and 1943, the respective profit figures were \$463,770, \$350,810, and \$469,768.⁶⁴

In the hope of providing a better way for the company to obtain capital, there had been a number of proposals at its membership meetings during the 1930s.⁶⁵ Since its beginnings, there had been only one type of share that could be purchased and these were restricted to those who used the company's services. At the 1939 annual meeting, the directors were authorized to apply to parliament for an amendment to its company charter. Because private bills were being kept to a minimum during the war, the amendment to the company's charter

was stalled. However, in 1940, the UGG membership adopted a plan which was essentially to call in all of the company's shares which were sold at 25 dollars and re-issue the shares in the form of "Class A" shares and "Class B" shares. The Class A shares with a par of \$20 could be sold to anyone within the investment community. The Class B shares were "voting shares" and these had a par of \$5.00. The company protected itself from being controlled by outside interests by restricting the sale of the Class B shares to UGG customers, who were, of course, mostly farmers. Furthermore, no shareholder was allowed to purchase more than four Class B shares.

This restructuring proved to be a success. At its 1942 meeting the project was reported as complete with ten thousand new investors being brought into the fold of the UGG with the issuance of 144,739 Class A shares and 63,065 Class B shares. In managing its relationship with the federal government despite repeated delays by the House of Commons, the company did what other successful companies do when dealing with difficult government situations: it hired a high-profile lawyer to help the company through the appropriate channels. Success was achieved by hiring the former Attorney General and Premier of Alberta, J.E. Brownlee.

The UGG had other reasons for dealing with the federal government. One major area of concern was in regard to agriculture pricing policies. In 1940 the UGG lobbied to have

the federal government purchase the CWB's current holdings in order that wheat farmers could be paid for their grains which had yet to be sold by the board. Claiming that wartime conditions were already placing a heavy burden on the federal treasury, the government did not follow the company's suggestion.

In 1941, the UGG submitted to the government a request that in order to help grain farmers survive the cost-price squeeze they should be paid a bonus of \$3.00 per acre at an estimated total cost of \$55 million. The government adopted this suggestion but for only one year and with conditions applied which translated into only \$19 million being paid out. There were other mixed successes as well. Through its membership in the CFA, the UGG pushed for a barley floor price. The government responded with a 60 cent per bushel floor price which was below current market barley price. Those in the company considered it "meagre" yet having a "reassuring effect."⁶⁶

As in the case of the pools, the UGG was interested in having the government enact policy which would guarantee good returns for the farmer. However, the company differed from the pools with regard to the extent to which the government should be involved in the grain trade. In other words, it did not support the closing down of the wheat futures market. Unlike the pools, its mandate was not to reduce the speculative nature of wheat marketing, such as paying out to

its member "initial payments". The UGG derived its profit from operating within the existing open market system. In the end, its official position became that of supporting the new CWB powers on the condition that they not be used to the detriment of farmers.⁶⁷

The Grain Growers had their biggest fight in the 1940s over income tax policy.⁶⁸ With the turn-around in profits at the end of the Depression the company began to pay dividends to its shareholders. Because of questions regarding whether these monies were taxable, the UGG held the payments in reserve. The Dominion Income Tax Branch soon ruled that these funds were not exempt. At stake were annual figures exceeding \$200,000. In its presentation to the 1944 Royal Commission on Co-operatives, the company claimed that it was being treated unfairly; that just because it paid dividends this did not mean it should be treated like other corporations. Its position was that the UGG should be treated more like other farm cooperatives which were left off the tax hook.

The Royal Commission agreed with the UGG's position and, in 1946, amendments were made to the Income War Tax Act which were generally in line with the company's position. However, the tax exemption did not cover the years prior to 1946. In other words, the reserves which had built up were still subject to taxation. Under pressure, Ottawa allowed the new laws to apply to the pre-1946 funds. What followed was the issuance to farmers of 200,000 cheques with a combined figure

of \$2.5 million.

By 1948, the UGG's assets were valued at over \$14 million and its reported net profit was \$287,370. As with the CFA, it is ironic that the war-years provided a positive environment for the UGG. This set the pattern for subsequent years and even decades. The post-war era proved to be a period in which farmer companies and consultative lobbying groups such as the CFA and its provincial affiliates found favour. In a number of ways, the interests of the post-war government coincided with the interests of farmers: expanding exports and income stabilization. Public policies directly involved the federal government in the grain industry, farm groups were being consulted on public policy issues, and a new era of internationally stabilizing agreements in the grain trade had developed.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that the international political economy and federal governmental action together continued to act as a major organizational challenge to Canadian farmers. In this chapter the most notable examples were the UGG and CFA. Two major events, the collapse of the international economy and a subsequent world war, strongly affected the federal government's relationship with grain-related farm organizations. Here, the state operated as a mediator between events and forces in the international political economy and

the Canadian farm community. This was made evident by the following actions: it guaranteed the loans which the three wheat pools were holding for the 1929/30 and 1930/31 crop years when the grain economy collapsed, made massive purchases of Canadian grain surpluses in an attempt to bolster falling prices, introduced income stabilization policies, and introduced a peacetime Canadian Wheat Board. From this, it is clear that with regard to the effects of the international economic depression of the 1930s, the federal government was moving into new policy directions. While being pushed into this moderately interventionist role within the domestic economy, the federal government supported discussions on the international stage concerning the establishment of multilateral agreements in order that the international grain trade could be stabilized. However, while this signalled a new direction for the Canadian government on the international level, the first IWA of 1933 was both short-lived and ineffective.

There is no evidence to show that government policy-makers thought of themselves as establishing a new pattern for long-term government intervention. In fact, and in contrast to the post-war era, each new measure was introduced as a temporary means to address what was perceived to be a cyclical economic downturn in the farm economy and international markets. As expected, this upturn eventually occurred. With it, however, the Second World War was erupting. The end

result was that these once-thought temporary state measures became permanent fixtures to the agricultural policy community, even as the economic crisis abated.

Depression-era governmental measures were quickly adapted to wartime planning. Those farm organizations which survived the Depression were now invited to help in formulating new wartime policies. Pushed together by wartime necessity, by the end of the Second World War the farm groups and federal policy makers were tacitly agreeing that these newly forged bonds were mutually beneficial. Many of the old temporary policies were becoming almost permanent features on the agricultural landscape, this was especially so with regard to income stabilization programmes and the CWB. In the post-war era, policies continued to be hammered out within a framework where major farm organizations could and would be consulted regularly. This was especially the case concerning the agreed-upon need for a campaign to seek out and have implemented a new and effective multilateral grain agreement between the world's grain exporters and importing nations. The consultative pattern which evolved from the 1930s and early 1940s, and which found their place in the Canadian political system subsequent to the war's end, is the subject of Chapter Four.

Endnotes

1. For a summary article see Michiel Horn, "The Great Depression: Past and Present," The Depression in Canada: Responses to Economic Crisis, Michiel Horn, ed. (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1988).
2. D.A. MacGibbon, The Canadian Grain Trade: 1931-1951 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1952), p. 3.
3. The figures for other sources are as follows: fisheries - 72%, construction wages and salaries -68%, total national income -50%. Quoted in S.M. Lipset, Agrarian Socialism (New York: Anchor, Updated Ed., 1968), p. 123.
4. Ibid., pp. 103-104.
5. In Manitoba, the government's liability under the guarantee of the pool's debts came to an approximate \$3,400,000. Manitoba Pool, "The Story of Manitoba Pool Elevators," pamphlet (Winnipeg, 1986), p. 3.
6. C.F. Wilson, A Century of Canadian Grain (Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1978), p. 1111.
7. MacGibbon, op. cit., p. 17.
8. Walter D. Young, The Anatomy of a Party: The National CCF, 1932-61 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), p. 20.
9. n.a., The Grain Growers Record: 1906 to 1943 (Winnipeg: United Grain Growers Limited, 1944), p. 26.
10. The three best works on the subject are the following: C.B. Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta: Social Credit and the Party System, 2nd Ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962); John A. Irving, The Social Credit Movement in Alberta (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959), and; Alvin Finkel, The Social Credit Phenomenon in Alberta (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989).
11. Cashore uses census data to show that academic works such as those done by Macpherson and Lipset have exaggerated the class differences between and within the two provinces. Furthermore, he makes a convincing argument that the first-past-the-post electoral system has misled many to think that the prairie provinces were not internally diverse. Ben Cashore, "Lack of Economic Homogeneity in CCF Saskatchewan and Social Credit Alberta: Intra and Inter Class Divisions

Explored," Political Science Paper, Carleton University, unpublished (November, 1985).

12. "It was the combination of Labour and UFA [parliamentary] members that hatched the idea of a new national political party, which later took the name Co-operative Commonwealth Federation." Finkel, op. cit., p. 21.

13. While this is not the case throughout all of the prairies, this was found to be the case with regard to the CCF and Saskatchewan. M. Janine Brodie and Jane Jenson, Crisis, Challenge and Change: Party and Class in Canada (Toronto: Methuen, 1980), p. 178.

14. CCF support does not appear to be overly agrarian in nature when Saskatchewan is controlled for. Furthermore, Social Credit "while a western partisan manifestation, appears to have an ambiguous identity. Urban constituencies were not markedly supportive of the Social Credit [Party] and neither were rural ridings." Ibid., p. 178.

15. Ibid., p. 31.

16. R. MacGregor Dawson, The Government of Canada, 4th Ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), p. 535.

17. This was made clear by the case of the Saskatchewan Grain Marketing Act of 1931. The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal declared it ultra vires and an appeal by the pools was held up by an injunction by the Privy Council. MacGibbon, op. cit., p. 19.

18. Ibid. pp. 7, 9-10. Saskatchewan was the hardest hit. The individual provincial figures for 1930 and 1937 (in millions of dollars) are as follows: Manitoba 107.6 and 122.4; Saskatchewan 98.4 and 215.2; Alberta 137.0 and 169.9.

19. In Manitoba, for example, the annual supply voted for the Manitoba Department of Agriculture between 1926 and 1939 (in current dollars) was as follows: \$283,530, \$307,110, \$311,610, \$313,700, \$364,680, \$367,488, \$354,081, \$288,699, \$217,931, \$245,405, \$233,571, \$244,268, \$254,328, \$307,498, and \$332,665. J. H. Ellis, The Ministry of Agriculture in Manitoba, 1870-1970 (Winnipeg: Manitoba Department of Agriculture, 1970), pp. 282-284.

20. C.F. Wilson, op. cit., p. 1111.

21. Vernon C. Fowke, The National Policy and the Wheat Economy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957), pp. 258-259.

22. MacGibbon, op. cit., p. 21.

23. The Grain Growers Record, 1906 to 1943, op. cit., pp. 37-38.

24. Anthony Winson, The Intimate Commodity: Food and the Agro-Industrial Complex in Canada (Toronto [?], Garamond Press, 1992), p. 72.

25. Ibid., p. 73.

26. Much of this discussion on the CWB is derived from MacGibbon, op. cit., pp. 32-44.

27. Ibid., p. 50-52.

28. This discussion on international trade negotiations in the 1930s is largely based on MacGibbon's account, op. cit. pp. 18-30. The reader is also referred to C.F. Wilson's A Century of Canadian Grain, op. cit., Chapter 18.

29. D. Berthelet, "Agriculture Canada Policy and Expenditure Patterns: 1868-1983," Canadian Farm Economic, Vol. 19 (1), p. 8.

30. "Only in limited parts of the Canadian market, and nowhere on international markets do prairie producers command a dominant or near monopolistic position, so that they generally have little impact on market prices." Bruce Proudfoot, "Agriculture," The Prairie Provinces, P.J. Smith, ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), p. 63.

31. W.M. Drummond, et al., A Review of Agricultural Policy in Canada (Ottawa: Agriculture Economics Research Council of Canada, 1966), p. 45.

32. This meant that Canada needed to increase its sales to Britain, which it did. However, the English market was not sufficiently large enough to resolve Canada's wheat surplus problem. The University of Manitoba and the University of Minnesota, "Agriculture in the Prairie Provinces in Wartime, 1939-42," The Interests of Western Canadian Agriculture in the Peace Settlements (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1943), p. 1.

33. Drummond, et al., op. cit., p. 46.

34. The 1939 minimum price for the wheat producer was, however, different from earlier floor prices. That is, it was set by Parliament rather than by the wheat board. This was due to the fact that the CWB would have contravened its 1935 mandate: to set prices which reflected market conditions. The 1939 price was in response to heightened competition from the U.S. and Argentina which prevented Canada from disposing its

surpluses in wheat. The CWB was therefore unable to set a price higher than 60 cents. MacGibbon argues that the government stepped in and raised the price in response to international markets and surpluses which heightened domestic concerns regarding the living standards of prairie farmers and western Canadian political pressures. MacGibbon, op. cit., pp. 90-91.

35. Drummond, et al, op. cit., p. 47.

36. "Informal" controls existed also. These covered bread, millfeeds, and hides. Ibid., p. 50.

37. Ibid., pp. 50-51.

38. C.F. Wilson, op. cit., pp. 718-720.

39. Marjorie Cameron and Frank Shefrin, Federal Agricultural Assistance Programs Canada, 1900 - 1951 (Ottawa: Department of Agriculture, Economics Division, 1952), p. 26.

40. Ibid., pp. 26-27.

41. MacGibbon, op. cit., p. 109.

42. CFA Members Bulletin [confidential], 23 August 1945, No. 3, National Archives Vol. 51, File 73.

43. MacGibbon, op. cit., pp. 91-92.

44. R.D. Colquette, The First Fifty Years: A History of United Grain Growers Limited (Winnipeg: Public Press, 1957), p. 228.

45. The following year the figure dropped to less than \$.7 million. MacGibbon, op. cit., p. 92.

46. Quoted by Drummond, et al, op. cit., p. 54.

47. MacGibbon, op. cit., p. 102.

48. "An interesting if futile question is: what would have been the structure and condition of Canadian agriculture by 1950 without the Second World War? The question should probably be described as unanswerable rather than futile, for to ask it is to admit and recognize that wartime influences were superimposed on basic forces working constantly, if with irregular result toward change in the agricultural economy. It is clear that events and demands of the war years acted in some cases to expedite changes already under way and in other cases to retard them. In many areas of activity the balance of influence would be extremely difficult to assess." G.E.

Britnell and V.C. Fowke, Canadian Agriculture in War and Peace: 1935-50 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), p. 406.

49. Richard Van Loon and Michael Whittington, The Canadian Political System: Environment, Structure and Process, 4th Ed. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1987), p. 197.

50. These calculations are based on A.D.P. Heeney's figures which are cited by Dawson. The total minutes, orders-in-council and Treasury Board minutes for the period cited are reported to total 92,350. From this, in a note on page 253, 4 to 5 per cent of these issuances are classified as "Acts of a legislative character." Dawson, op. cit., pp. 252-253.

51. C.F. Wilson, op. cit., p. 1112.

52. Letter to C.F. Wilson, Ibid., Appendix 7, p. 1108.

53. According to MacGibbon, for the 1946/47 year, the CWB cost \$1.8 million of which \$1.3 million was charged back to the producer for services. op. cit., p. 117.

54. Ibid., p. 118.

55. Barry Wilson, Beyond the Harvest: Canadian Grain at the Crossroads (Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1981), p. 244.

56. The Grain Growers' Record, op. cit., p. 45.

57. Each year the CFA based its fees for a particular provincial organization on an assessment of the province's farm income situation. Helen Jones Dawson, "An Interest Group: The Canadian Federation of Agriculture," Canadian Public Administration, June, 1960, p. 136.

58. This works out to be \$26,809.60 in constant 1991 dollars.

59. If using the Consumer Price Index, this figure of 180 dollars in 1939 is equal to \$2,046.5 in 1991 dollars.

60. CFA, "Statement of Cash Receipts and Payments," December, 1940 and June, 1945.

61. Dawson, op. cit., pp. 139-140.

62. Ibid., p. 143. See also, Drummond et al., op. cit., pp. 47-48.

63. Dawson, et al., Ibid., p. 144.

64. What is interesting is that Figure 6 in this dissertation's Appendix shows that while profit levels fluctuated from the 1920s to the 1940s, the company's capital holdings (such things as property and facilities) remained almost unchanged. UGG, The Grain Growers Record: 1906 to 1943 (Winnipeg: Public Press, 1944), Appendix 3: Financial Statements.

65. The following account of the UGG's recapitalization is drawn from R.D. Colquette, op. cit., pp. 232-235.

66. Ibid., p. 226.

67. Ibid., p. 227.

68. The discussion which follows is drawn from Ibid., pp. 239-242.

Chapter Four: The Politics of Consultation, the 1940s to the 1960s

In the last chapter much of the discussion focussed on the growing relationship between the federal government and Canada's major farm groups, much of which could be attributed to a series of crisis conditions within the international political economy. The subject of Chapter Four is what can be called, in retrospect, the golden era of Canadian wheat farming: the period which begins in the 1940s, as the federal government policy shifted from a war footing to peace-time, to the late 1960s which was marked by the collapse of the International Wheat Agreement (IWA).

This chapter shows that in spite of the fact that the Depression and the Second World War had ended, both the federal government and those organizations which represented prairie grain farmers continued to have their strategies and actions shaped by conditions which were largely beyond their control.¹ However, unlike earlier eras which were marked by crises and conflicts within the international political economy, this was a period of relative stability for Canadian farmers as Canadian policy shifted to income stability, expanding exports, and rising productivity. Indeed, Chapter Three revealed that international crises precipitated integrationist governmental-group relations. In contrast,

this chapter shows that as the conditions of the international crises receded, stabilizing forces of economic integration were strengthened. International wheat prices were stabilizing under a new multi-lateral agreement, new markets such as those in the third world were opening up, and a widespread acceptance had emerged among western political elites that a moderate level of state intervention could benefit a nation's economy. In this sense, therefore, Canadian agricultural policy was devised under generally stable conditions.

In this chapter, I demonstrate that those farm organizations which survived the Depression and thrived under the conditions of wartime planning were able to respond to three historically bounded elements in the post-war era. First, within the grain sector, Canada's farm groups were increasingly representing a farm population which was quickly losing interest in older-style agrarian type movements. Instead, now that the economic environment was relatively stable, grain farmers were more interested in having their interests represented in the same way as other well-established industrial sectors in the political system: through existing sub-governmental channels. Second, the interests of such organizations as the CFA and UGG coincided with those of the federal government in that widespread support for moderate government intervention in the agricultural sector was increasing. Of course, those groups

which were deemed to legitimately represent Canadian agriculture became increasingly needed by the government. Farm groups provided expertise and helped to legitimize new policies. Third, the establishment of multilateral agreements within the grain exporting and importing community allowed farmers, their representative organizations, and the federal government to make long-term decisions concerning resource commitments without many of the dangers which existed prior to the 1940s. This was made evident by the fact that farmer co-operatives were expanding their operations, farmers planted crops with a more clear picture of what their returns would be, and governments operated income stabilization programmes (with less fear that it would exhaust the public purse), and consulted with farm groups and other countries with the aim of establishing mutually beneficial trade agreements.

The Changing Farm Community

While national policies were undergoing a shift in focus in response to the new conditions in the international political economy, large-scale demographic changes were occurring within the national farm community. Compared to the historical period discussed in Chapter Three, the 1930s and early 1940s, Canada's prairie provinces and their agricultural sectors were going through an industrial revolution. One indication of this is found by examining population and labour

force statistics. Turning first to general population figures, in 1931 31 per cent of the national population lived on farms and, by 1951, this figure had declined to 21 per cent.² On the prairies, the farm population's relative decline continued. Between 1941 and 1971, Manitoba's farm population declined from 34 per cent to 13 per cent. In the case of Saskatchewan, the figure dropped from 47 per cent to 25 per cent. The Alberta farm population dropped from 48 per cent to 15 per cent. By grouping these three provinces together, the regional figures show a decline from 47.2 in 1941 to 17.0 in 1971.³ In terms of labour force data, Grace Skogstad reports that between 1946 and 1969 the farm labour force dropped by 55 per cent.⁴ However, declining numbers did not mean a decline in farm investments and productivity. In spite of the fact that the western farm continued to be operated as a farm family enterprise, just the opposite occurred.

The farm enterprise was now entering a much delayed era of re-capitalization. In the mid-1940s most farms were operating under conditions of under-capitalization. Prior to the war and during the Depression (discussed in Chapter Three), poor returns on harvests meant that few operators could maintain their farms, let alone, upgrade their facilities. Any large scale efforts to correct this problem once wheat prices rose, were delayed by the war, which demanded a diversion of capital investments from the specific

needs of the farm enterprise into the general war effort. In an article on developments within the prairie economy, Bruce Proudfoot shows that farm sizes increased at a slow rate until the mid-1940s "and rapidly thereafter as the scale of mechanization altered with the disappearance of horse-drawn equipment."⁵ In addition to increasing mechanization, the application of fertilizers and herbicides became increasingly prevalent.⁶

Did these era-specific developments have an impact on the forms and tactics of organizations which represented the interests of prairie grain farmers? If so, in what way? This chapter will show that as both the national and international political economy created supportive conditions for Canadian grain farming, the larger farm organizations increasingly came to represent the concerns of a relatively shrinking yet well-capitalized farm sector. Furthermore, these groups developed increasingly strong links with the federal state, links that had been forged by the need for the wartime government to become increasingly interventionist.

The Stable International Economy and Domestic Policy

Throughout this dissertation the point has been made that the major influence on governmental-group relations is how historically bounded conditions and demands change for those devising government policy making. In terms of grain sector

policy, by the late 1940s the Canadian government was now operating in an era in which there existed a global trend⁷ towards multi-lateral agreements and trade, a direction for which Canada had campaigned on the international stage since the 1930s.⁸ Without an agreement among the wheat producing nations, those in government recognized that price wars would always be inevitable.⁹ Unlike the case of the failed IWA of 1933,¹⁰ the IWA of the post-war era remained effective for almost two decades after 1949. Buoyed by the need and desire to promote stable economic growth, national governments also devised and implemented new policy measures at the domestic level. This was especially the case regarding Canada due to its export orientation in the grain sector. Without the threat of price wars and grain surpluses, Canadian policy makers and organizational leaders could, for the first time in Canadian history, work together and focusing at the same time on all three of the following: expanding markets, increasing productivity, and income stabilization.

In many cases, programs which had been implemented under wartime and Depression era conditions were quickly adapted to suit the new era's needs. In the United States, New Deal policies devised prior to the war continued to shape both industrial and agricultural policies well into the 1950s and 1960s.¹¹ In Canada, what were later labelled as "Keynesian" measures were, in fact, hold-overs from the Depression and World War Two. Within the grain sector the continuation of

the CWB with its monopoly powers over prairie wheat exports and government payments, through the Prairie Farm Rehabilitation Act (PFRA), to farm producers are two examples of the government's moderate interventionism.

With these new directions in policy it was inevitable that Ottawa would be willing to maintain already established consultative organizational links, especially with those organizations which were now considered to be the legitimate voice of agriculture. In this chapter the reader will find that those organizations which represented the specific interests of grain producers, such as the UGG and the three wheat pools, as well as the CFA which had become widely accepted by both farmers and non-farmers as the legitimate farmer's voice regarding national issues when they pertained to agriculture, were increasingly drawn into an institutionalized relationship with the government. They provided expertise, were generally supportive of existing agricultural policies, and, in the case of the pools and the UGG, were important components within the grain economy.

Before discussing the particular case of the farm organizations, Section One provides an overview of developments in federal government policy from the 1940s to the late 1960s. In essence, an account of how federal policy during this period was expansionary yet tempered by a continuing support for the market system; in other words, the means and rationale by which the federal government became

moderately interventionist. The second section shows how those organizations which were suited to the federal government's orientation thrived within a policy network characterized by consultation rather than confrontation. In other words, organizations such as the UGG and the CFA were well-suited to the emerging rules of this game.

I. Federal Government Activity

This section begins with a brief discussion of new governmental policies and, following this, how the rise of Keynesian approaches affected federal agricultural policy. Increased governmental activity in the agriculture sector under peace-time conditions was one component of the new and broad pattern of changes in the post-war era as the state became a more active player in all parts of the economy.¹²

Understanding these changes in state activity is important at this stage because later in this chapter I show that for those fighting within the political trenches new strategies evolved in conjunction with the new government behaviour. Both on the convention floors (at the various annual general farm-group meetings), and within the circles of organizational directors, decisions were made which steered Canadian farmers away from confrontational partisanship and, instead, pushed for close consultation with the federal government. Citing a need to use the general media, to

communicate the farmers message to the public, and to sit on government advisory boards and make presentations to government inquiries and committees, the interest group with its institutional means for articulating the concerns of members was now the accepted tool for political action. This newly enhanced placement of the interest group within federal policy networks would redirect farmer demands away from the legislative assemblies and towards more discrete consultative channels.

In contrast to pre-1940s activity, state policy between the mid-1940s and late 1960s was marked by what some have termed the "post-war settlement" or, to use Peter Gourevitch's terminology, an "historic compromise" within a "bounded capitalism."¹³ In part, this was a response to widespread worries that a post-war economic depression, similar to that which befell the western world after the First World War, was imminent, and such warnings as a 1944 poll showing that the national wing of the CCF was on the verge of making an electoral breakthrough.¹⁴ As such, fears were inevitably raised within the national media and among Canada's leaders regarding the consequences of a general dismantlement of wartime economic interventionism. In consequence, national economic policy immediately following the war was not radically different during the peace. Armed with climbing support from all levels of society for Keynesian-based economic policies, government expenditures within agriculture

were legitimized by claims that they nurtured general economic stability while expanding staple and industrial exports, enhancing productivity, and stabilizing farm incomes.¹⁵

Table 4.1: Government Expenditures as a Percent of GDP, 1950 - 1970

<u>Year</u>	<u>% GDP</u>
1950	21.3%
1955	25.6
1960	28.8
1965	28.7
1970	34.9

Source: J. C. Strick, Canadian Public Finance, p. 30.

Robert Campbell has identified three characteristics of this "new" state role. They include the following: an ability "to defuse the class and ideological dimensions of political economic discourse in Canada"; a movement towards a "technocratic orientation" when formulating economic policy; and relative stability in the nation's political institutions.¹⁶ An indication of this new era's character is found in the recorded expressions by King's Minister of Finance, James Ilesley, who, on the question of tax policy and inflation, remarked:

The real...constructive answer to the inflationary pressures...is to work and produce goods that are wanted in greater volume, so that our greater buying power will result in more goods and

reasonable prices, rather than fewer at high prices...production then should be our primary objective both for our own sake...and as a safeguard against the present dangers of inflation.¹⁷

Agriculture Policy

Along with general concerns about the post-war economy, so too in agriculture was the federal government expected to play a more interventionist peacetime role. The government eventually developed a set of policy aims with regard to prairie wheat in the post-war era which can be identified through its activities within two programs, the CWB and the PFRA. Following the war, Canadian government involvement in the grain sector through the CWB and the PFRA had two policy foci: establishing an orderly international export structure and ensuring farm income stability.¹⁸

The Department of Agriculture underwent its own Keynesian revolution. Annual expenditure levels for the Department of Agriculture (in constant 1971 dollars) went from 30 million dollars in 1938/39 to 271 million dollars for the 1945/46 budget year. The figure for the 1950/51 year was 261 million dollars. Also, using constant dollars, the department's budget would never again drop below 100 million, let alone the pre-war average of under 30 million.¹⁹

State involvement, while expanding, was certainly not revolutionary. Farmers of course continued to own their

property and use private banks for much of their credit needs. The transportation system was a mixed bag of government and private holdings (the CNR and CPR) while grain elevators were owned by the cooperatives and such huge multi-national companies as Pioneer and Cargill. However, in the 1940s there were a number of issues which needed addressing and which could have involved state ownership. For example, in spite of calls emanating from within the CFA and wheat pools for the continuance of state-owned nitrogen plants in the hope that there would continue to be a good national supply of cheap fertilizer, the federal government sold its holdings to the private sector.²⁰

After the 1940s, a number of agricultural measures were introduced under both the St. Laurent and Diefenbaker administrations. By 1952, the federal government had both extended and enhanced a number of the CWB's peacetime powers.²¹ These powers are listed in Table 4.2. This occurred while other less grain-related state measures were enacted (the 1952 Canadian Dairy Products Act for establishing product standards, the Agriculture Products Marketing Act which was enacted in 1949 and amended further in 1951, and the 1955 Agriculture Products Standards Act which implemented grades and standards for agricultural products in the context of both inter-provincial and international trade²²).

In general there were few losers and many winners when new measures were passed into law. Everyone, with the

possible exception of the consumer,²³ appeared to benefit, although in different ways and to varying degrees, from the post-war arrangements of accommodation. Farm producers made gains by the fact that farm prices, standards, and exports were becoming stabilized. Farm organizations such as the three wheat pools and United Grain Growers continued to thrive as they were regularly consulted on new and changing policies while their organizational holdings expanded. Private interests within the distributional chain benefitted also from the post-war arrangements and would naturally have resisted state encroachments of ownership in the food industry. Here, especially, the profits were not small. Canada Safeway Limited, for example, experienced an increase in total assets from less than 16 million dollars to just under 50 million dollars between the years of 1948 and 1958. In the same time period, Loblaws grew from just over 12 million dollars to 195 million dollars.²⁴

The election of the Progressive Conservative Party and its leader John Diefenbaker neither signalled a radical alteration of the state's relationship with private capital nor with farm groups.²⁵ What changes there were can be attributed more to the fact that the new government elected more new members who were more inclined to commit additional resources to farm support programs. A list of examples from this late 1950s period would include the following pieces of legislation: The Agriculture Stabilization Act, The Crop

Insurance Act, and The Farm Credit Act.²⁶ The first of these three measures provided price protection concerning nine commodities but was generally dairy oriented.²⁷ However, the latter two were beneficial to the grain sector. The Crop Insurance Act provided protection against crop failure and sudden drops in price. At the same time, The Farm Credit Act allowed farmers to restructure their enterprise.²⁸

Table 4.2: Department of Agriculture Legislation: Mid-1940s to 1960.

1947	<u>CWB Act</u> amended in order to maintain monopoly wheat marketing powers for prairies and parts of B.C.
1948	<u>CWB Act</u> expanded Board's powers to oats and barley.
1949	<u>Agriculture Products Marketing Act</u> allowed for the delegation of federal power for the implementation of provincial farm marketing boards.
1951	<u>Agricultural Products Board Act</u> gave CWB powers to buy, sell, store and process farm products in order to promote marketing and price stabilization.
1952	Dairy product standards established by <u>The Canadian Dairy Products Act</u> .
1955	International and interprovincial trade of farm products became governed by grades and standards set by <u>The Agricultural Products Standards Act</u> .
1958	<u>The Agricultural Stabilization Act</u> listed nine commodities to have pre-determined minimum prices.
1959	Crop failure protection put in place by <u>The Crop Insurance Act</u> .
1959	<u>The Farm Credit Act</u> was enacted.

Source, D. Berthelet, "Agriculture Canada Policy and Expenditure Patterns: 1868-1983."

One policy battle in the late 1950s and early 1960s was particularly revealing with regard to how priorities in the agriculture sector were set, and deserves some attention here. In spite of the new programs initiated by the federal government in the late 1950s, a concentrated lobby was organized in the prairie farm sector with the aim of securing deficiency payments; that is, support payments to farmers hurt by poor returns on their harvest. Because the PC caucus contained a large western component sympathetic to agricultural concerns, western farm groups knew that they had potential allies within the federal cabinet. In the autumn of 1958, the president of the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, Jack Wesson, led a western Canadian campaign which included ten Canadian farm organizations. A petition with 3,000 signatures was presented to the government and a loose coalition of prairie church, business, and other groups was formed. In March of 1959, 1,000 representatives of this coalition travelled to Ottawa.²⁹

By 1960, with party strategists becoming increasingly concerned about grumblings of discontent within the prairie rural population, the lines had become clearly drawn within the government between those who were resistant to farmer demands and those dependent upon farm votes in their own ridings.³⁰ Arguing that federal funds were not limitless, Minister of Finance Donald Fleming expressed his belief that the government was already providing adequate and "sensible

measures in the circumstances."³¹ Committed already were such items as government guarantees for short-term bank loans to prairie grain farmers, along with measures allowing the Canadian Wheat Board to provide advance payments for the 1959-60 crop year (due to the poor harvest in 1959).

While attempting to defend balanced budgeting, Fleming was pitted against a Prime Minister and a number of caucus westerners who were sensitive to the mounting lobbying efforts arising from the West. Fleming later recalled:

The Prime Minister opened his campaign for outright payments to western farmers on May 31. He declared to cabinet that the net income of Canadian farmers was falling while the prices of goods they must buy were rising. He was concerned over votes of the prairie farmers and was determined not to lose them. He chilled my blood and exposed his own thinking by declaring that while balanced budgets were desirable, governments did not lose elections because of budget deficits.³²

After much delay by those continuing to oppose increased government spending, the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool and its allies won their acreage payments. It is worth noting that support was not limited to the Progressive Conservatives; both the Liberals and CCF supported this measure, which represented an expenditure of \$42 million.³³

In addition to opening the government purse-strings, the actions of Diefenbaker's Minister of Agriculture, Alvin Hamilton, provided evidence that the federal government was willing to take on additional grain sector responsibilities by

actively seeking new markets for Canadian grain. Through the efforts of Hamilton and other government members,³⁴ in 1961 Canada reached its first long-term trade agreement with China which involved 3 to 5 million bushels of wheat over a two-and-one-half year period.³⁵ Many within the government caucus felt that this would help win back some of the farm support which had been drifting since the 1958 electoral landslide.³⁶

Once the deal with China was signed, the government won accolades from the farm organizations themselves. For example, the following resolution was passed at the 1962 Saskatchewan Wheal Pool convention:

Resolved that the delegates...wish to express to the Federal Minister of Agriculture, Hon. Alvin Hamilton, our appreciation of his efforts in having the necessary credits available in order to make it possible to negotiate grain sales with China.³⁷

Even the sometimes surly National Farmers Union Council (a precursor to the NFU) was impressed:

We have watched with interest the efforts of the Minister of Agriculture to increase foreign sales of western grains, and have expressed to him our appreciation on the occasion of the recent transaction with China covering 40,000,000 bushels of western grain.³⁸

In retrospect it is easy to see that in spite of the myths which have been built up around Diefenbaker's agrarian populism, subsequent Liberal administrations were not radically different in their treatment of the farm sector (see below). Furthermore, with the chief exception being acreage

payments and sales to China, Diefenbaker and Hamilton were essentially building and expanding policies formulated under previous administrations. As well, few major developments occurred with regard to grain policy during subsequent minority Conservative and Liberal administrations. Best characterized as "staying the course", Pearson's Liberals were more concerned with policy developments in areas other than agriculture.³⁹

Here is a picture of government activity in agriculture drawn from an examination of state expenditures. Figure 2, in the appendix, charts federal government Department of Agriculture expenditures (in constant 1971 dollars) for 1950 to 1970. Spending escalated with the Diefenbaker majority victory yet remained high throughout the Pearson years. For those interested in the question of whether agriculture policy reflects the party in power, here are a few noteworthy figures. The following results are found when calculating and comparing post-war mean expenditures (in constant 1971 dollars) for the St. Laurent/King, Diefenbaker and Pearson/Trudeau administrations, ending with the 1969/70 fiscal year. The Liberal average expenditures for 1945 to 1957 totalled \$169.1 million, the Diefenbaker PC expenditures averaged \$284.6 million. The Liberal Government expenditures under Pearson and Trudeau, until 1970, had an annual average of \$298.9 million. The Diefenbaker era expenditures show that the government was attentive to farmer demands yet subsequent

Liberal administrations, not known in recent decades for their strong ties to the Canadian farmer, appear to have been comparably active in the agriculture sector.

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, increased federal transfers⁴⁰ coupled with an expanding Department of Agriculture meant that Ottawa was supporting agriculture on a number of levels. Figure 3 in the appendix illustrates the fact that expenditures in the area of agriculture-specific federal transfers to the provinces were also significantly changing. With the exception of 1967, federal agriculture-specific transfers to the provinces rose at a stunning rate throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s. Between 1950 and 1958, agricultural transfers ranged from a mere one to two million dollars. In 1959, this rose to \$7 million and settled down to \$4 million in 1960. By 1969, however, this figure well exceeded 50 million.⁴¹

Transfers to the provinces did not signify a devolution of federal resources. When looking at the Department of Agriculture's employment figures it is apparent that expansion was occurring at the federal bureaucratic level. The number of Department of Agriculture employees climbed from 3,195 in 1945 to 6,667 in 1950, 8,025 in 1960, and reached 9,026 by 1970.⁴² Figure 4 shows that compared to the doubling in size of the total civil service for the same years,⁴³ the Department of Agriculture almost tripled in size between 1945 and 1970. Taken all together, in the agricultural sector, the

federal government was expanding in numerous ways: in financial resources distributed to the provinces, and in the administration and operation of its own federal Department of Agriculture.

II. Organizational Developments

The arrangements between groups and the state which arose from wartime conditions became cemented following World War Two as the major farm groups and the federal government continued to realize the benefits which could be accrued through cooperation. Through what some would refer to as "clientele politics",⁴⁴ the proponents of new and existing government policies were able to make claims of legitimacy by the fact that they had consulted and sought help from farm organizations. At the same time, those within the farm organizations were pleased to find themselves welcomed within the agricultural policy network.

Consultation following the war's end can be divided into four areas. First, a number of farm groups were consulted regarding the transition of wartime agricultural policies to peacetime measures. Second, these farm groups were regularly consulted at the subgovernment level regarding the implementation and operation of agricultural policies and programmes. Third, it became a routine procedure, especially in the case of the CFA, for representatives from the farm organizations to appear before parliamentary committees, royal

commissions, and even the federal cabinet. Finally, with regard to international trade, it became established procedure for the government to include farm group representatives when putting together a trade delegation.

Consultations and Trade

This section deals with the relations between the groups and the federal government with regard to trade. Concerning wheat exports, two major trade deals were negotiated in the latter half of the 1940s which illustrate the point that there was an old and newer style in farmer organizational relations with the state. The first case following the war was the 1946 Canada-United Kingdom wheat trade contract which was signed without organizational input.⁴⁵ While the CFA, the UGG, and the three provincial wheat pools were campaigning for a multi-lateral trade agreement, the federal government, through its Minister of Agriculture James Gardiner, was working towards a bilateral agreement with Great Britain.⁴⁶ Believing that prices would drop, the federal government obtained a floor price and locked itself into a four-year deal with Great Britain. A ceiling price of \$1.55 was also included in the deal. Reflecting an older style of politics, Gardiner angered the CFA and others by restricting the consultative process to one day: the day of the agreement's signing.

Events in the summer of 1947 revealed the government's folly: the open market price for wheat had climbed from \$2.00

to \$2.56 in one year. By December 1948, wheat prices peaked at \$3.40, more than double the price of what Britain was paying. The political fallout was inevitable. What compounded the government's problems with the organizations was that while the government had been negotiating this trade agreement with Britain, the wheat pools had been campaigning for prices at levels which were closer to the then current market level (in Chicago, this was at \$2.00) rather than those pegged at wartime ceiling levels (\$1.55).⁴⁷

In regard to both the CFA and UGG's reaction, R.D. Colquette writes:

The attitude of [the] United Grain Growers Limited toward the British Wheat Agreement was made clear in successive reports of the Directors and approved by the delegates at the 1946 and subsequent Annual Meetings. They made it plain that the Company had not been consulted, directly or indirectly, with respect to the terms of the Agreement. Neither had the Canadian Federation of Agriculture been consulted. It was true, they said, that the Federation and the Company were both on record as urging the Government of Canada to participate in negotiations for a general international agreement that would lead to the stabilization of world wheat prices over a period of years but that, of course, was something vastly different from the contract actually made with Great Britain...⁴⁸

In the end, the total costs of the BWA to western farmers was judged by the UGG to be an estimated \$365 million. In order to help offset the losses, on March 2, 1951, the federal government announced that it would pay a sum of \$65 million to help defray the BWA's costs. When outcries from outside western Canada were heard against this payment, the UGG

behaved as would any other large business: it purchased full pages of newspaper advertising across Canada in order to give its side of the story.⁴⁹

The government learned its lesson. To predict mistakenly that prices would drop, and sign a deal to this effect was one thing, but to do so without consulting farm leaders (and, furthermore, implicating them if the deal turned sour) was the second mistake. One member of the Canadian government's delegation at the BWA trade talks, C.F. Wilson, subsequently argued that when the government soon began making close consultations with farm groups regarding trade, it was done so with the rationale that farmer inclusion would help deflect any criticism which might arise from future trade deals. Hence, governmental choices and actions could be legitimized by farm input.⁵⁰ Additionally, consulting with farmers was a strategy which allowed Ottawa to hedge its bets. In other words, with the farm leaders involved, any failure to sign a "pro-farm" agreement would make the government less of an easy target for complaints within the farm sector.

The first real sign that the federal government was moving in this new consultative direction was in its multi-lateral negotiations over the IWA.⁵¹ This was illustrated by its appointment of Saskatchewan Wheat Pool President J. H. Wesson, and R.C. Brown, a UGG Director and soon-to-be Vice President (in 1948), to the Canadian delegation of the London Conference which convened in March, 1947.⁵²

Although the 1947 conference ended in failure, an agreement was struck in Washington at a second conference in 1948. Ratified in 1949, the new IWA consisted of 46 countries, three of which were major wheat exporters: Canada, Australia, and the United States. In short, it was a four-year agreement with a price-ceiling of \$1.80 and a minimum price of \$1.50.⁵³ Under the IWA, open-market prices remained higher than the IWA's ceiling. However, the western farm groups showed that they were basically content with the new arrangements. This was illustrated by the following statement made in a unanimously adopted UGG Directors' report which was issued at its 1949 Annual Meeting:

The Canadian producer, under the Agreement, is to some extent sacrificing present income in return for a measure of security offered in future years by the undertaking of importing countries to buy at minimum prices. This, of course, is in accordance with what Canadian producers desired and intended when they supported the idea of such an Agreement.⁵⁴

In 1953 the IWA was renewed, again with support from the farm groups.⁵⁵ During the Agreement's negotiations, the UGG's president, J.E. Brownlee, represented the CFA (being a director of the Federation) as one of the four Canadian advisors sent with the Canadian delegation to London in 1952 and Washington in 1953. Table 4.3 shows both the minimum and maximum prices which were successfully negotiated throughout the 1950s by the IWA.

So far, only one of the four points raised earlier

regarding consultation have been discussed, that is, consultative arrangements which developed when the federal state negotiated wheat trade agreements. If the reader

Table 4.3: Price Ranges Under the IWAs (1950s)

Crop Year	Minimum \$	Maximum \$
1st Agreement*		
1949/50	1.50	1.80
1950/51	1.40	1.80
1952/53	1.30	1.80
2nd Agreement**		
1953/54	1.55	2.05
1954/55	1.55	2.05
1955/56	1.55	2.05
3rd Agreement**		
1956/57	1.50	2.00
1957/58	1.50	2.00
1958/59	1.50	2.00

* Price excludes carrying charges

** Price includes carrying charges

Source: Colquette, p. 276.

recalls, the other three were the following: (1) the transition of Canadian agricultural policy from wartime to peacetime, (2) how the groups became imbedded within a network of subgovernment consultations, and (3) remained visible through such formal consultative activities as appearances

before the cabinet, various task forces, the House of Commons Standing Committee on Agriculture, and various royal commissions. After the war, it became clear to those within the CFA that if farmers were to continue playing a consultative role in the policy-making process they would have to "stay the course" established during the war. In other words, as long as the federal government continued to play a role in the farm sector, farm organizations could expect that they would have a role in helping them to formulate policy. In his 1950 annual presidential address, CFA President H.H. Hannam made this connection as follows:

There was a time when governments took no direct hand in the economic affairs of their people; felt that they had no right to interfere in business affairs... I believe - and I am convinced that the majority of Canadians also believe - that day has passed; that governments must accept responsibility for maintaining an equitable balance between major groups in the nation; and that government have undoubted responsibility to step in and take emergency action in crises affecting large groups of citizens.⁵⁶

Unlike the leadership of its predecessor, the more confrontational Canadian Council of Agriculture with its partisan electoral strategies, the CFA leaders were sensitive to the need to play by the new technocratic rules of the game. As a result, they avoided confrontational tactics whenever possible. Evidence that they were explicitly aware of this strategy is found in a 1947 confidential bulletin issued by the CFA's head office to its directors:

We have heard a good deal in the recent past about

the lack of militancy in the CFA....What we do mind is the charge of lack of militancy from those people who so obviously interpret the word militancy to mean a continual snapping at the heels of authority, a continual chip on the shoulder, a continual and aggravating opposition to governments in power, or a constant rushing to the press with indictments of this and that.

That is not the kind of policy that has got the CFA where it is today -- enjoying the prestige of being the recognized voice of organized agriculture in Canada, and consulted by government authority and officers in practically every major development affecting industry.⁵⁷

Its peacetime strategy was working. The CFA continued to be systematically consulted within the government apparatus. In 1953, for example, the CFA had representation on various advisory boards and committees, including the following governmental bodies:

1. The National Agricultural Advisory Committee
2. The Federal-Provincial "Outlook" Conference
3. The National Employment Committee
4. The National Advisory Manpower Council
5. The Transport Board
6. The Tariff Board
7. Various Royal Commissions
8. Parliamentary Committees
9. Senate Committees.⁵⁸

During this era the CFA's internal workings and resources were consistently stable. This is evident in a number of ways. First, between 1945 and the mid-1960s the value of the CFA's assets ranged from a low of around \$10,000 to a high of \$30,000 (see Figure 5 in the appendix). Secondly, its

membership fees, while voluntary, remained constant until the mid-1960s when they were increased. Thirdly, during the 1950s and 1960s its organizational composition remained unchanged (see Table 4.4 which illustrates that the composition of its membership was virtually without change between 1950 and 1970). This stability manifested itself across space as well as time. Throughout the same period, the CFA maintained a consistent set of provincial affiliates from all regions, including the British Columbia Federation of Agriculture, the Saskatchewan Federation of Agriculture, and the Maritime Federation of Agriculture. In addition, in both 1950 and 1970, the same three commodity groups were registered as contributing members: the UGG, the Dairy Farmers of Canada, and the Canadian Horticultural Council. It was only later, in the 1970s and 1980s, that the CFA's membership and its financial position became destabilized (a subject best left until Chapter Five).

Table 4.4: CFA Membership Lists and Payments - 1950, 1970.

<u>Federation Member</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1970</u>
British Columbia Federation of Agriculture	\$ 2,900	\$ 7,255
Unifarm (previously the Alberta Federation of Agriculture)	7,200	7,255
Saskatchewan Federation of Agriculture	10,500	45,476
Manitoba Federation of Agriculture (1970 - Manitoba Farm Bureau)	5,300	16,385
Ontario Federation of Agriculture	12,000	44,687
L'Union Catholique des Cultivateurs	3,250	9,612
Co-operative Federee de Quebec	3,250	9,612
Quebec Farm Forums (1970 - Quebec Farmers Association)	300	1,118
Maritime Federation of Agriculture	2,500	4,118
P.E.I. Federation of Agriculture	630	1,612
United Grain Growers	5,500	17,940
Dairy Farmers of Canada	500	56,022
Canadian Horticultural Council	100	510
Totals	\$54,130	\$246,714

Source: CFA Auditor's Reports, 1951, 1971.

Unlike other farm organizations, such as the wheat pools and the UGG (these are discussed later), the CFA did not undergo an expansion of institutional resources such as assets or staff. One cogent and persuasive explanation is provided by Helen Jones Dawson who takes an institutional approach when arguing that the CFA was hampered by the fact that its umbrella structure prevented it from making direct contact

with its farm membership.⁵⁹ A second constraint (discussed earlier in Chapter One) is the fact that agricultural authority is constitutionally divided between Ottawa and the provinces. Therefore, the CFA's sphere of operation only covered half of the world of agriculture policy; leaving much territory to its provincial affiliates.

Aside from the more astute observers such as Dawson, these weaknesses in the CFA were disguised as long as the interest group operated in conjunction with a supportive national government and a stable international political economy. Chapter Five will show that subsequently, under changing and more difficult economic and political circumstances, the contradictions inherent in the CFA and in its relationship with the federal government became increasingly apparent.

In contrast to the CFA, the UGG operated under fewer constraints. Its finances, operations, and general institutional holdings underwent a process of expansion and solidification throughout the 1950s and 1960s. The present section provides an overview of developments within the organization and the means by which it expanded its operations. Both its capacity to do business as well as the changing value of its assets are examined.

Figures 7 and 8 (see appendix) depict the company's climbing fortunes following World War Two. In the 1940s, the

UGG's assets were valued at less than \$25 million. In just two decades its holdings more than tripled, exceeding \$70 million. The growth of the UGG occurred in its expanding handling capacity and in the growing volume of Canadian grain which passed through its own facilities. Its expansion in operations occurred through acquiring the capital holdings of other companies and by investing in new projects.

After purchasing 110 grain elevators from the Reliance Grain Company in 1947,⁶⁰ it owned 515 country elevators and 324 annexes. The UGG's capacity grew from 25.6 million bushels in the 1946/47 crop year (while handling 49.7 million bushels) to a capacity of 32.3 million (while handling 55.2 million) in 1949/50. By the mid-1950s, the UGG's capacity had grown to 46 million (handling 63 million).⁶¹ In 1952, it expanded its Port Arthur Terminal capacity by erecting a one-million bushel annex and, in 1954, purchased 65 elevators from the Midland and Pacific Corporation. In July 1956, its elevator holdings were reported to have grown in number to 691 elevators and 716 annexes and, according to Colquette, this signified that between the end of the war and 1956 the UGG "had added over one-third to the capacity of its grain handling system."⁶² This growth continued for the rest of the decade. On April 16, 1959, it made one of its last major elevator purchases by obtaining 129 elevators and one terminal from the Canadian Consolidated Grain Company.

The UGG continued to grow in the 1960s, but at a more

moderate pace. Its handling capacity grew from 57.6 million bushels in the 1959/60 crop year to 66.6 for the 1969/70 crop year. Without grain to handle, the company's expanding capacity would have been useless and costly. However, as its directors and members hoped, its business thrived. In the 1959/60 crop year it handled 71.3 million bushels and in the 1960s the amount which the company handled reached a peak of 114 million bushels in 1966/67.⁶³

Much of this growth was connected to the above listed UGG acquisitions in the 1950s. In addition, its activities in the 1960s involved more acquisitions and new capital project investments. In 1964, it completed its largest construction program ever by building 14 elevators and 20 annexes and, in 1966, purchased its Vancouver terminal, which it had been leasing previously. Its last major purchasing "hurrah" in this decade occurred when, in February 1968, it purchased a Port Arthur terminal and 72 elevators from the McCabe Grain Company. A breakdown in the international wheat economy in the late 1960s temporarily inhibited the UGG's operational growth. However, by this time the UGG's assets had grown to a figure amounting to just under \$140 million.

A third way of looking at the UGG's expansion is by looking at how its operations reached into areas other than grain shipping and handling. In terms of communications, it continued to operate The Grain Growers Guide, a farmer's newspaper which was founded in 1908. In 1953 and 1955 it took

over the publication of The Canadian Cattleman and The Country Gentleman and expanded the operations of its publishing company, The Public Press, by opening its new Winnipeg building in 1958.⁶⁴

In addition to its operations within the farm media, it has also been extensively involved in providing competitively priced goods and services for its farmer members by selling fertilizer, weed chemicals, twine, coal, and feeds for livestock and poultry.⁶⁵ Furthermore, until the 1990s the company offered a number of insurance plans to its shareholders. These included health and accident plans and income protection plans.⁶⁶

At this point the discussion will move away from an account of the UGG's changing operations and holdings and turn to the political issues about which the UGG membership debated and made decisions. A review of the minutes from the UGG's annual membership meetings reveals that on the convention floor there regularly arose a number of issues concerning the company which went beyond internal operational considerations. Public policy issues as they related to grain were debated by the membership almost every year. In many cases, the company's directors were authorized and directed to lobby the government. Table 4.5 provides a selected list of resolutions which were debated and carried.

Other issues surfaced on an almost regular basis,

especially when they concerned the CWB. It was only natural that a grain marketing company would be concerned with this agency. In spite of its initial concerns about the closing of the futures market, at the 1946 Annual General Meeting the membership defeated a motion which called for a return of wheat export controls to the Winnipeg Grain Exchange.⁶⁷ In two subsequent meetings, in 1947 and 1948, and later, in 1955 and 1959, the membership passed resolutions expressing its support for the CWB's continuation. However, unlike the case of wheat, other grains such as flax and rye, and coarse grains in general, continued to inspire much debate, especially around the question of whether or not these commodities should be traded on the open market. This issue arose in 1948, 1953, 1954, and 1957.

Concerns over the government's international commitments and the IWA were also raised regularly. In general, the UGG's members were supportive of the current government initiatives. It did, however, seek compensation from the federal government after Ottawa had signed the British Wheat Agreement. In 1951, the membership authorised a UGG lobbying campaign with the aim of acquiring government payments to western farmers who had suffered losses under the agreement. In 1952, it passed two resolutions which called upon the government to sign the new IWA and to push for an increase in floor prices. Again, in 1955, it restated its support for a renewed IWA.

Table 4.5: Selected UGG Resolutions [Carried]

Annual General Meeting	Subject and Aim of Resolution
1946	That the government consult with the UGG regarding prices.
1951	That the government consult with the UGG regarding the problem of inflation.
1954	That a farmer representative sit on the Board of Grain Commissioners.
1955	That the government be pushed to combat foreign subsidies of export wheat.
1955	That "sterling for barter" be used in order to move Canada's wheat surplus.
1955	That the existing tariff structure be studied by the federal cabinet.
1957 & 1958	To join with other organizations in order that a united voice be raised to push for deficiency payments.
1959	To defend the Crow Rate.
1960	To join with other organizations in order to campaign for measures to reduce the "cost-price squeeze."
1965, 1968	That a two-price system of wheat be implemented.
1969	Appeal to the government; that a 2 cent/lb. price be implemented for cereal grains.
1969	That farmers get 1 cent/bu. for grain storage on farms.

Source: UGG Annual Meetings [Minutes], 1945 - 1970.

One issue which received increasing attention on the convention floor, as the 1960s came to a close, was the UGG's relationship with other organizations, as well as its membership within the CFA. Generally speaking, the UGG was expected by the CFA to rely on the Federation when dealing with federal government policy issues. Many in the UGG agreed that the CFA should speak for all Canadian farmers. For example, at the 1955 Annual General Meeting, the UGG's membership called for the CFA to push the federal government to make efforts on the international stage to curb foreign export subsidies. A decade later, a resolution was passed at the 1965 Annual General Meeting which committed the UGG to the CFA's "strengthening" as the united voice of farmers. However, it was clear that as both the UGG and the CFA were speaking on issues related to the grain sector; accordingly, difficulties were bound to arise. Chapter Five will show how this "two-pronged" UGG organizational approach to government relations underwent a change, subsequent to the late 1960s.

Before concluding this section one question needs to be answered: was the UGG successful during this era in getting what it wanted from the government? Although it is impossible to trace precisely the results of a particular group's efforts, the answer to this can only be in the affirmative. If some of the Annual General Meeting resolutions are taken from those listed in Table 4.5 above, it is possible to get a

sense of how government action coincided with the wishes of the UGG's membership. The government continued to consult with UGG representatives both directly and through the CFA (as called for in 1946 and 1951). Furthermore, the membership's support for an international wheat agreement coincided with government action in renewing its negotiations and participation in the IWA. Although no rule was implemented forcing the government to appoint organizational representatives on the Board of Grain Commissioners (as expressed by a 1954 resolution), by the 1970s most commissioners were expected to have an agricultural background, if not personal experience in farming.⁶⁸ Following the 1959 resolution, the Crow Rate remained unchanged. As a last illustration, government legislation was enacted in large part as a response to western grievances regarding the cost-price squeeze (as raised by the 1965 and 1968 resolutions).

Of course, as many in the labour union movement will attest, it is rarely the case that a resolution's adoption at an annual general meeting will directly affect public policy. However, the significance here is that there exists a discernible pattern which highlights the fact that the organizational membership was no longer at loggerheads with the federal government. When comparing this period with the early decades of this century, it is clear that farmers within the UGG had few feelings of alienation from the governmental

process. It was now appearing as if everyone in groups such as the UGG, the CFA, and the federal government were agreeing on the ground-rules, and leaving for debate the small inevitable adjustments found in any evolving game.

Conclusion

In the post-war era and until the late 1960s, international events and forces continued to play a strong role in shaping both federal policy priorities and farm organizational behaviour. What distinguishes the historical era covered by this chapter from other periods is that this period was marked by stability within the international political economy, a federal government which provided supports to its grain sector, and farm organizations which were able to use consultative approaches when seeking to win policy rewards for its members. There were three stabilizing factors in the international political economy. First, from the end of the 1940s to the late 1960s the international wheat trade was governed by the IWA which ensured that wheat prices would remain stable⁶⁹. Second, throughout the industrial West there was a general sense of rising prosperity, modernization, and expansion. Third, as a number of countries, such as China, underwent a change in their national diets changes, changes were occurring within the world trade system which opened new markets for Canadian grain. As a result of these factors, Berthelet is correct when he writes

that from the late 1950s to the beginning of the 1970s "Canada's overall economic prospects were perceived to be excellent and more government intervention was believed to be the most appropriate means of dealing with Canada's social and economic issues."⁷⁰

Canadian grain farmers were able to capitalize on more stable price conditions and new markets while federal government policy making was aimed at ensuring that productivity and grain sales would continue to grow. Farm credit, income stabilization, and the CWB were cited in this chapter as three areas in which the government remained active in the grain sector. In this era, therefore, federal government policies reinforced the positive effects of such new and growing international forces such as multilateralism.

The CFA thrived as it was treated by the federal government as the one legitimate voice for the national interests of farmers. Maintaining its role at the sub-governmental level as a consultative actor, which had been born through the conditions of wartime state planning, the CFA maintained within its ranks a membership which remained virtually unaltered from the 1940s to the end of the 1960s. Furthermore, throughout this period it acted as an umbrella for not only commodity-specific interests but as the national representative for each province's agricultural federation.

Those farm organizations which provided services to the farm community and which helped market the farm product,

specifically the three provincial pools and the UGG, benefitted as well. As did the CFA, the UGG generally supported new and existing government agricultural policies as they related to the grain sector.⁷¹

In the next chapter I will show that the stable post-war era, which nurtured a harmony between farmers, the farm groups, and the federal government, was replaced by disharmony in the 1970s and 1980s. Problems arose on a number of fronts: the 1968 IWA proved to be ineffective, the world grain system became glutted by wheat surpluses which were followed by unpredictable shortages, and national governments began to shift their concerns away from interventionism and towards controlling inflationary spending and mounting deficits. In conjunction with the government's re-evaluation of its spending priorities, farm groups began to undergo a process of fragmentation. The study of this interest group sector became more complex with each new disruption in the international political economy.

Endnotes

1. More basically, organizations which were suited to earlier periods of confrontation, such as agrarian parties and farm unions, became marginalized by the new national politics of consultation.

2. Canadian census data, The Canadian Global Almanac: 1992, Toronto: Global Press, 1991. It should be noted that Canada was following a world-wide trend. In the United States, for example, the farm population as a proportion of the total population declined from 25 per cent in 1930 to 15 per cent in 1950. United States Census data, John W. Wright, ed, The Universal Almanac: 1990 (New York: Andrews and McMeel, 1989).

3. Roger Gibbins, Prairie Politics and Society: Regionalism in Decline (Toronto: Butterworths, 1980), p. 78.

4. Grace Skogstad, The Politics of Agricultural Policy-Making in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), p. 44.

5. Bruce Proudfoot, "Agriculture," The Prairie Provinces, P.J. Smith, ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), p. 57.

6. Skogstad, op. cit., p. 44. This had an effect on differentiating farmers within the farm community in terms of output. For example, a clear echelon in farm enterprises could be seen in the fact that by 1962, 30 per cent of Canada's farms were producing 70 per cent of all farm products (Ibid., pp. 44-45).

7. Within, of course, the context of the Cold War.

8. See Chapter Three.

9. This was the case with Argentina in the 1930s and the United States in the 1980s.

10. D.A. MacGibbon, The Canadian Grain Trade: 1931-1951 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1952), pp. 26-29.

11. In 1967 Senator George McGovern wrote "since 1940, Congress has for the most part simply modified agricultural laws enacted in the 1930s." Agricultural Thought in the Twentieth Century, McGovern, ed. (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967), p. XXVI.

12. J. C. Strick, Canadian Public Finance, 4th Ed. (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1992), p. 30.

13. Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 18.

14. 1943 Gallup poll results had the CCF at 29 per cent, the Liberals at 28, and the Conservatives at 28. CCF support dropped to third place in 1944. Walter D. Young, The Anatomy of a Party: The National CCF, 1932-61 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), p. 320. cf. M. Janine Brodie and Jane Jenson report this CCF high as being in a September, 1944 poll. Crisis, Challenge and Change: Party and Class in Canada (Toronto: Methuen, 1980), p. 207.

15. W.M. Drummond et al find three characteristics in Canadian post-war policy: "One is a continuing emphasis in agricultural policy upon the productivity of individual resources such as yield per acre and output per animal unit. This aspect is a direct carryover from the main theme of policy prior to 1930... A second feature of policy has been in the field of marketing, to promote the sale of agricultural products; the Federal and provincial governments have been active in both the domestic and international markets. The third characteristic has been the policy concerned with the maintenance of stability in prices and incomes. (A Review of Agricultural Policy in Canada, (Ottawa: Agricultural Economics Research Council of Canada, 1966), p. 55.)

16. Robert M. Campbell, Grand Illusions: The Politics of the Keynesian Experience in Canada, 1945-1975 (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1987), p. 59.

17. House of Commons, Debates, 1945, p. 2913, cited in Campbell, Ibid., p. 73.

18. Income stability and farm family welfare measures fall under two categories: 1) policies which are farm sector specific; and 2) policies which are designed for the national population such as a national health plan. The second category is described in Gordon Boreham and Richard Leftwich, Economic Thinking in a Canadian Context (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), pp. 521-524. The PFRA program derived a 1 per cent levy on prairie wheat, oats, barley and rye which was marketed through the CWB. It was, however, more a system for subsidies rather than an insurance program. Between the crop years of 1939-40 and 1953-54 the total amount levied was \$83,212,674 and the total payments amounted to \$146,217,782. Fowke, op. cit., p. 293. See also, David Berthelet, "Agriculture Canada Policy and Expenditure

Patterns: 1868-1983," Canadian Farm Economics, Vol. 19, No. 1, p. 9.

19. Berthelet, Ibid., Table 1, p. 10.

20. Beginning in 1944, the CFA expressed its support for publicly owned fertilizer plants. A committee organized by the CFA, which included managers and presidents of the wheat pools, livestock cooperatives, and cooperative wholesalers, met with the Minister of Reconstruction and Supply. Expressions of concern continued into 1947. The CFA reported being assured that they would be consulted prior to a full privatization of the industry. Here, the federal government offered them to the farm organizations themselves but with what were considered overly restrictive conditions. The end result was that the consultative approach failed the CFA regarding issues of public ownership. (This was reported by Edward George McCullough, MP for Assiniboia, in debate with the Minister of Agriculture, James Gardiner, House of Commons, Debates, 13 June, 1947, pp. 4149 to 4154.

21. MacGibbon argues that the CWB's post-war survival can be attributed to the pools which "were particularly active in whipping up support" for the CWB's continuance (MacGibbon, op. cit., p. 118). However, Linda McCombs Young points out that the continued government operation of the CWB was tied to its international trade obligations: the Canada-UK wheat contract in the late 1940s and the IWA. Appendix 1, p. 210.

22. Berthelet, op. cit., p. 10.

23. For a discussion of the power of the consumer, or the lack thereof, see Barry Wilson, Farming the System: How Politicians and Producers Shape Canadian Agricultural Policy (Saskatoon, Western Producer Prairie Books, 1990), pp. 150 - 166.

24. The Financial Post Survey of Industrials: 1951 (Montreal: Maclean-Hunter, 1951), pp. 195-196; The Financial Post Survey of Industrials: 1959 (Montreal: Maclean-Hunter, 1959), pp. 252-253.

25. One factor in the West which contributed to the Liberal's 1957 defeat was the Liberal Government's reluctance to become directly involved in helping prairie grain sales in the mid-1950s (Grace Skogstad, op. cit.). The cracking of the old Liberal Party's shell in Ottawa, with the election of a minority PC government was led by a Saskatchewan leader with rural roots. John Diefenbaker was born in Ontario. His family moved at an early age to Saskatchewan in order that his father could teach. The young Diefenbaker was raised under tough early agrarian conditions. He became a lawyer and leader of the provincial Conservative Party. (John G.

Diefenbaker, One Canada: Memoirs of the Right Honourable John G. Diefenbaker, Volume One (Scarborough: Signet, 1978). Regarding the effect of the electoral significance of Diefenbaker's farm related strategies see Peter Regenstreif, The Diefenbaker Interlude: Parties and Voting in Canada (Toronto: Longmans, 1965), pp. 37-39.) The 1957 minority government election was soon followed by the 1958 PC electoral landslide. Already opened, the door to opportunities for new farm sector policy rewards was pushed wider.

26. Patrick Kyba, Alvin: A Biography of the Honourable Alvin Hamilton, P.C. (Regina: Canadian Plains Research Center, 1989), p. 151, and D. Berthelet, op. cit., p. 10.

27. Berthelet, op. cit., p. 12.

28. Ibid., pp. 10 - 12.

29. Kyba, Ibid., pp. 155-158.

30. Ibid., pp. 159-161.

31. Donald M. Fleming, So Very Near: The Political Memoirs of the Honourable Donald M. Fleming: Volume Two (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1985), p. 217.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid., p. 219-220.

34. cf. Donald M. Fleming, Ibid., pp. 255-257.

35. McCombs Young, op. cit., p. 210.

36. Kyba, op. cit., p. 171.

37. Ibid., p. 172.

38. NFU Letter submitted to cabinet, 15 Feb., 1961, cited in Kyba, Ibid.

39. An examination of Pearson's three volume autobiography reveals a general disregard for farm issues and agriculture in general. L. B. Pearson, The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson: vol.1, 1897-1948; vol.2, 1948-1957; vol.3, 1957-1968 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972, 1973, 1975).

40. "Canada's overall economic prospects were perceived to be excellent and more government intervention was believed to be the most appropriate means of dealing with Canada's social and economic issues. The period can be described as that during

which the Department of Agriculture began to assume a more pronounced role in direct transfer payments to producers." Berthelet, op. cit., p. 12.

41. M.C. Urquhart and K. Buckley, eds., Historical Statistics of Canada, 2nd Ed. (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1983), pp. H474-H493. These are expressed in current dollar figures.

42. Ibid., p. Y211-223.

43. From 115,908 to 244,197. Ibid.

44. "The descriptions of the interactions of interest groups and [governmental] administration in clientele politics leads to the characterization of these relationships as being symbiotic." B. Guy Peters, "Insiders and Outsiders: The Politics of Pressure Group Influence on Bureaucracy," Administration and Society, Vol. 9 (2), August, 1977, p. 192.

45. The farmer organizations (that is, the CFA, the wheat pools, and representatives of the Ontario wheat producers) did meet with the Agriculture Minister James Gardiner but only on the day in which the two countries were signing the negotiated deal. C. F. Wilson, A Century of Canadian Grain: Government Policy to 1951 (Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1978), pp. 868-870.

46. Ibid., pp. 871-873.

47. This account is drawn largely from Colquhette's Chapter 32, "The British Wheat Agreement," op. cit.

48. Ibid., p. 266.

49. Ibid., p. 269. The author wishes to note here that this advertisement could not be found after scanning the Toronto Globe and Mail for the months of March and April, 1951. Unfortunately the UGG's biographer did not provide the dates and newspaper names.

50. C. F. Wilson, op. cit., pp. 896-901.

51. As discussed in Chapter 5, in the 1970s and 1980s the federal government consistently attempted to consult with the farm leadership regarding international agreements, even when the interests of the organizations pushed for opposing the government's international goals. This was made apparent during the FTA negotiations during the 1980s. The need to consult caused headaches for both the government and organizations such as the CFA. G. Bruce Doern and Brian W. Tomlin, Faith and Fear: The Free Trade Story (Toronto: Stoddart, 1991), p. 114.

52. This discussion of the IWA is drawn from Colquette's Chapter 33, "International Wheat Agreements," op. cit.

53. As with the 1933 IWA, established also were quotas. However, this part of the agreement was never applied.

54. Quoted in Colquette, op. cit., p. 273.

55. The UGG Board of Directors' Report in 1952 included the following: "Your Board believes that the Government of Canada should enter negotiations prepared to commit this country to a renewal of the Agreement but only if maximum and minimum prices are set at reasonable levels, having regard to the cost of production." Quoted in Ibid., p. 274.

56. H.H. Hannam, President's Address, Annual CFA Meeting, Niagara Falls, 31 January, 1950, File 10, Vol. 67, archival holdings.

57. Membership Bulletin [confidential], 15 Oct. 1947, No. 16, CFA archival holdings, Vol. 51, File 73.

58. H.H. Hannam, President's Annual Address, Victoria, B.C., 27 January, 1953, p. 10, File 10, Vol. 67, archival holdings.

59. One spin-off of this was that farm unions have preserved a place for itself in the representative world of farmer organizations. Helen Jones Dawson, "An Interest Group: The Canadian Federation of Agriculture," Canadian Public Administration, Vol. 6, 1963, p. 137.

60. n.a. ,United Grain Growers Limited Directors' Handbook: 1993, [Internal document], p. 5.

61. Ibid., p. 39.

62. The UGG also added to its holdings the following: "33 coal sheds, 52 local warehouses, and 150 agents' dwellings..." Colquette, op. cit., p. 277.

63. Director's Handbook, op. cit., p. 39.

64. Directors' Handbook: 1993, p. 6. Although The Country Gentleman is no longer in circulation, its other newspaper has grown. In 1992, the UGG sold over 34,000 subscriptions to what is now called the Cattlemen and close to 140,000 subscriptions to The Country Guide (Director's Handbook: 1993, p. 51).

65. Ibid., pp. 48-50.

66. Ibid., p. 53.

67. This motion and those mentioned in the following discussion are derived from the minutes of each of the Annual General Meetings between 1945 and 1970.

68. Taking 1976 as an example, the three commissioners were Delmer Pound, C.L. Shuttleworth, and George Leith. All three were born in a small prairie community. Shuttleworth originally was a grain grower near Minnedosa, Manitoba, before becoming a Liberal member of the Manitoba Legislative Assembly. Leith was a Liberal member of the Saskatchewan Assembly prior to his appointment and a farm operator near Rosetown Saskatchewan at the time of his appointment. The Western Producer, Prairie Farm Policy Guide: 1976-77 (Saskatoon: The Western Producer, 1976), p. 7.

69. This was made evident in Table 4.3 which shows that between 1950 and 1960 the price floors and ceilings allowed the price per bushel to vary by only \$.75

70. Berthelet, op. cit., p. 12.

71. Table 4.5 in Section Two revealed that most government related issues which were supported on the UGG convention floor between 1945 and 1970 defended the *status quo* on long-term issues (for example, the Crow Rate), called for short-term policies to alleviate temporary conditions (for example, the call for deficiency payments in the late 1950s), and statements of support for the CFA (in that it should continue to act as the national voice of farmers).

Chapter Five: Destabilization

The evidence presented in this dissertation shows that we must go beyond many of the current accounts of Canadian interest group behaviour if we are to understand the increasing diversity of forms through which farm organizational activity occurs. In contrast to the period discussed in the last chapter, by the end of the 1960s prairie farmers and their organizations were entering an era in which they would be battered by a number of forces and a series of unsettling events within the international political economy: the collapse of the IWA, the energy crisis, a burgeoning US trade war with the ECM, and trade globalization.¹ The negative consequences were manifested on two levels: they have directly affected the economic well-being of grain farmers as they have tried to contend with unpredictable returns on their investments and, secondly, they have indirectly affected farmers by steering government priorities away from moderately interventionist policies.

In addition to prairie grain farmers and the national government becoming adversely affected by international economic events, a number of major farm organizations underwent a prolonged period of strain. Unlike their situation in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, in this new era the best organized groups could no longer rely on their

institutional resources nor their subgovernmental connections when seeking to win important policy battles. Smaller and more "ideological" groups, more prone to using confrontational tactics, were sprouting up throughout a number of Canada's farm regions. Old questions and issues, which appeared resolved and permanently retired, have since resurfaced.

One crucial question is the extent to which farm organizations should make it a strategic priority to commit themselves (as consultative actors) to being participants within the government policy process.² Indeed, while some observers might be drawn into pointing at the extensive consultative process and institutional resources which groups such as the UGG, wheat pools, and the CFA currently maintain, the variations in farm politics in the 1970s and 1980s demonstrate that under difficult conditions, interest group politics takes on a different form.

The discussion in this chapter will proceed as follows. First, a summary is provided of the unsettling events in the international political economy and how they influenced the Canadian grain sector. Following this, I take a look at Canadian federal policy developments and show how Canadian agricultural policy, at least with regard to grain, has diverged from the established pattern of the post-war era. Two policy fields are chosen in order to illustrate the changes which have occurred: transportation subsidies and international trade.

I. The Destabilized International Political Economy

Surpluses and Domestic Responses

While much attention has been paid to general disruptions in international finance in the early 1970s, one early strain on the international agricultural community came from within the grain trade itself. In the second half of the 1960s, the Canadian government and those in other wheat-exporting nations became troubled by the problem of mounting surpluses. Canada's wheat surplus climbed from 11.5 million tonnes at the end of the 1965/66 crop year to 27.5 million tonnes by the end of the 1969/70 crop year. In the United States, surpluses increased over the same period from 14.6 million tonnes to 24.1 million tonnes. On the other side of the world, Australia's surpluses grew from 453 thousand tonnes to almost sixteen times this amount, 7.2 million tonnes.³ In order to reduce their own domestic grain stock piles, national governments were pressured into side-stepping their international obligations and began undercutting each other's prices.

Under these conditions, in 1968 the last of the IWAs was signed (the Sixth International Grains Arrangement). What distinguished this IWA from earlier agreements was that the apparently unresolvable surplus problems made the new IWA doomed from the start. In addition to surpluses in exporting countries, a number of inter-related factors contributed to

the agreement's collapse. First, importing nations such as the Soviet Union experienced an increase (albeit short-term) in domestic yields. Second, throughout the world, crop conditions were generally good. Third, non-members undercut price guarantees by purchasing wheat surpluses at prices below the established level. Fourth, American agricultural policy was shifting from a multilateral orientation toward more unilateral strategies.⁴ Fifth, the European Community's productivity in grain had been steadily increasing since the end of the Second World War and was beginning to undercut IWA price levels.⁵

It was only natural that in the face of international and domestic wheat surpluses - and declining prices - the 1969 Federal Task Force on Agriculture, in a report titled Canadian Politics in the Seventies, recommended that the federal government abandon its focus on agriculture policies which aimed at expanding productivity and exports:

...we should assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the government as an allocator of resources (a) from the rest of the economy to agriculture and (b) among competing projects in agriculture.... [A] considerable number of programs are of dubious value. Many programs are apparently being carried on without the tough minded, systematic procedures desirable for evaluation of total costs, benefits and return on investment. There does not seem to be enough pressure to cancel programs that have either served their purpose or proven unsatisfactory. Lacking tight criteria and practical routines for evaluation, programs tend to be carried on from year to year.⁶

In place of previous policies, it recommended targeting policies along four lines: phasing out subsidies and price

3

PM-1 3½"x4" PHOTOGRAPHIC MICROCOPY TARGET
NBS 1010a ANSI/ISO #2 EQUIVALENT

PRECISIONSM RESOLUTION TARGETS

supports; making the food industry become more self-sufficient; reducing the number of farmers; and reducing the country's wheat production.⁷

Although governmental policies and programs are discussed in the next section, there is one program which deserves mention here, due to the fact that it highlights the limitations that those in government face when devising policies in response to difficult conditions. In 1970, the federal government introduced the Lower Inventories for Tomorrow (LIFT) program. Its aim was the reduction of national wheat stocks by fifty percent. Farmers were paid six dollars for each acre of land that was converted from wheat production to summer fallow. An additional four dollars per acre was paid if this summer fallow was used for perennial forage.⁸ The almost immediate result was that millions of acres were effectively taken out of production.⁹ However, instead of stabilizing the country's wheat supplies, it ultimately worsened the domestic effects of the destabilized grain regime. This was due to the fact that LIFT was implemented on the eve of a major shift in the condition of world wheat stocks; that is, a movement from surpluses to severe shortages. In consequence, prices rose from less than sixty-two dollars in 1971 to \$168.21 in 1974. Canadian farmers were left scrambling to regain their earlier levels of productivity (the reader is referred to Table 5.1).

Table 5.1: Canadian Grain Exports, 1969/70 - 1979/80

Crop Year	CWB Total Payment (\$ per Tonne)	Wheat (000's Tonnes)	All Grains (000's Tonnes)
1969/70	61.73	8,896	12,536
1970/71	61.40	11,169	17,826
1971/72	58.64	13,047	20,861
1972/73	79.14	15,057	21,383
1973/74	168.21	10,902	15,818
1974/75	164.39	10,229	14,878
1975/76	146.28	11,637	18,507
1976/77	117.15	12,711	19,879
1977/78	120.30	15,246	22,022
1978/79	160.53	12,302	20,048
1979/80	196.43	15,215	23,714

Source: CWB Annual Report 1992-93, pp. 63, 76.

Shortages and Domestic Responses

On the international stage, a series of events occurred which would have a profound impact on the Canadian grain trade and farm incomes and which signalled that the international agricultural economy was returning to its pre-1940s state of volatility (see Chapter Two). In 1972, the Soviet Union purchased massive amounts of North American wheat.¹⁰ International wheat prices rose by 200 per cent from 1971 to 1973 while surpluses dwindled to levels not seen since the early 1950s.¹¹ Theodore Cohn characterizes these new arrangements, in the absence of a functioning IWA, as unstable

both in terms of prices and supplies. The market, according to Cohn, "was operating essentially on a competitive basis."¹²

In addition to a breakdown in orderly marketing arrangements between those nations involved in the grain trade (and which had operated under the old IWA), other more general economic disruptions were occurring which had their own negative consequences for the global economy. One notable example being the 1973 oil crisis which followed on the heels of the "Nixon economic shocks" (the US administration's move to address its balance of payment problems by taking the US dollar off the gold standard in 1971).¹³ The result was that while wheat prices rose, producers also were forced to contend with rising production costs. Skogstad reports that with the onslaught of the financial problems of the 1970s, including the oil crisis, the cost of goods and services purchased by farmers rose by 64 per cent between 1970 and 1975, a much steeper incline compared with the full ten-year increase of 40 per cent in the previous decade.¹⁴ Therefore, even in this period of rising demand there were few rewards for the grain farmer.

Another way of looking at the farmer's dilemma is provided by comparing two historical periods. In 1989, the Economic Council of Canada issued a report which gave the following information regarding farming prior to the 1970s and, secondly, during the 1970s. Using constant 1981 dollars

as a measure, average capital per farm remained under \$200 thousand between 1926 and 1970. In the ten years subsequent to this, the average capital value of farms in Manitoba rose to \$350 thousand, \$450 thousand in Saskatchewan, and \$650 thousand in Alberta.¹⁵ Furthermore, while capital values were climbing there occurred a steep climb in interest rates. So steep was this climb that between 1974 and 1980, the prime lending rate ranged from 8.5 to 14.25.¹⁶ For those who had increased their debt loads in response to more profitable market conditions, it could only be a matter of time until disaster would strike. And strike it did. In the 1980s farmers contended with a prolonged drought and plummeting prices on the world market.

But why did prices fall? Falling returns resulted from policy decisions made in Europe and the United States; actions which precipitated a trade war with smaller countries caught in the cross-fire. In 1985, after losing much of its market share to other wheat-growing nations, especially those in Western Europe (which, since the 1960s had moved from being a net importer to a net exporting grain producing region), the United States Congress passed the 1985 Farm Bill which led to a \$1.30 (Cdn.) drop in the price per bushel. In addition, subsidies under the US Export Enhancement Program (EEP) were increased in order to drive world prices lower. In a nutshell, Ronald Libby provides a good description of this program in his 1992 account of American grain trade policy:

...the EEP was meant to increase the financial burden of the EC's Common Agricultural Policy to a politically unacceptable level. The plan was to exacerbate political tensions within the EC, especially between Great Britain and France. The British resented the large and growing burden of financing agricultural exports primarily for France's benefit. If the EC could be persuaded to reduce its budgetary support for agricultural exports, the United States might be able indirectly to pressure the French government into negotiating reductions in agriculture export subsidies in the context of the GATT. The Americans reasoned that without the EC's high export subsidies, the French could not retain the markets they had taken from the United States. The United States would reestablish its dominance of the world grain trade and thus improve its deteriorating balance of payments.¹⁷

As prices plummeted, prairie farmers were unable to recover their costs without governmental assistance. Wheat prices dropped below \$3.00 per bushel in 1986 while a typical grain farmer's costs per bushel hovered around \$4.00 excluding land costs.¹⁸

Things worsened as the international grain war continued while prairie harvests in both the US and Canada were ravaged by the 1980s drought.¹⁹ On the world stage, wheat production fell from 510.4 million tonnes to 502.3. In the Canadian case, the annual average (over a ten year period) tonnage of wheat produced was 22.9 million. In 1988, only 14.7 million was produced.²⁰

II. Government Action Under Pressure

This section deals with two aspects of government policy over the past twenty-five years: firstly, the government's across the board shift away from moderate interventionism in an attempt to constrain expenditures and, secondly, government policies within the agriculture sector as they pertained to the grain sector. The discussion will show that there are now two generally incongruent features in agriculture policy in Canada. The first is the continuing need to stabilize farmer incomes when they have been reduced by droughts or when they have become caught in a "cost-price squeeze". The second feature relates to government efforts to rationalize farm policy insofar as the policy contributes to governmental efforts to curb inflationary spending or to reduce the size of the nation's deficit.

General Changes in Governmental Priorities

Turning first to general, and not agriculturally specific, changes in federal policy, from the late 1960s and into the 1990s it is clear that the federal government has moved away from its previously established pattern of post-war interventionism. One indication of this has been a heightened concern with inflation and deficit management.²¹ For example, the 1968/1969 Federal Budget address contained the government's expressed design to "short-list" government priorities in order to fight inflation rather than to expand

aggregate demand.²²

In spite of such claims, the problem of inflation worsened.²³ By 1974, the Liberal government responded by stepping up its anti-inflation battle by enacting price and wage controls. In August 1979, the government declared that two billion dollars would be cut in federal government expenditures.²⁴

In varying degrees and with mixed success, federal budgets and throne speeches throughout the 1980s continued to pay homage to budgetary constraint. With the landslide victory of Brian Mulroney's Progressive Conservative Party in 1984, calls for government restraint soon became a war-cry. This story has been told elsewhere.²⁵ Suffice to say here that currently there are few signs that the federal government will be returning to its Keynesian activism. Seeking to reassure international financial markets and maintain current risk premiums on the national debt,²⁶ statements such as those made by the Progressive Conservatives in their February 1992 Federal Budget,²⁷ and various Liberal government announcements which have been made since the November 1993 election,²⁸ reveal that regardless of who is in power, policies continue to be made within the general context of deficit control priorities.

Agriculture Policies

The grain farmer's interests as they related to income stabilization continued to be served by such endeavours as the Western Grain Stabilization Act (WGSA) (which was first introduced to the House of Commons in 1970 as a response to the destabilizing effects of the IWA's breakdown and subsequent farm losses²⁹). Given royal assent in 1976, the WGSA was designed to stabilize farm incomes through a voluntary arrangement under which farmers would pay into a government operated stabilization fund 2 per cent of their gross sales (to a maximum of \$500) and, in turn, the federal government would pay an amount which was double the farmer's contribution. Payments to farmers would occur when incomes on grains fell below the average of the previous five years.³⁰ The end result was not an inconsiderable expense for the government. In 1976, the federal government paid \$105 million into the fund, \$115 million in 1977, and \$253 million in 1978.³¹

In 1973, the federal government expanded its contributions under the Crop Insurance Act and in the following year it introduced a new feed grain policy which was designed to maintain an adequate supply of feed grain at price levels which were suited to both grain producers and livestock feeders.³² Furthermore, the Department of Regional Economic Expansion (DREE) was responsible for a variety of farm-related regional development programmes and expenditures: the

Agricultural and Rural Development Act (ARDA) and the Prairie Farm Rehabilitation Administration Act (PFRA - this was moved to Agriculture Canada under the Government Reorganization Act of 1983³³). Other general agricultural activities included inspection and control services, technical and food aid programs, as well as marketing and trade promotion programs.³⁴

Ottawa's attempts to curb runaway transportation subsidy expenditures which, since 1950, according to the Economic Council of Canada in its 1989 report, "constituted the largest proportion of total [governmental] transfers to producers" provides a major example of agricultural policy being devised with expenditure restraint in mind.³⁵ It should be to no one's surprise that this was the first area to be targeted. The escalating expenditure figures were alarming. In the 1970/71 year, the contribution to the railways under Section 258 of the Railway Act was \$23,364,000. By the 1979/80 budget year this was \$149,332,000 and, in 1982/83, the figure was \$258,941,000.³⁶

For those unacquainted with the Crow Rate story, the following summary of events might prove helpful. As low freight rates led to a general decline in branch line maintenance, the federal government was under increasing pressure to improve rail conditions. In 1969, the government announced that it was paying \$114 million (with a downward sliding annual scale) to the railways for "losses attributable

to [the] operation of lines required as public services."³⁷ When international demands for Canadian grains increased in the 1970s, the rail system became over-burdened. A reassessment of the overall grain handling and transportation system was inevitable. One hard-to-swallow suggestion came from the Minister of Transport himself, Otto Lang, who expressed support for a user-pay system for grain freight rates.

As is common in Canadian political history, the need to make hard and unpopular decisions led to the establishment of a Royal Commission: in 1975, the federal government appointed Justice Emmett Hall to chair a Royal Commission to look into revising the government's transportation policies. After consulting with the railways, the three provincial pools, grain companies, provincial governments, and local groups, the Commission reported in 1977 that the government should, among other things, abandon 2,165 of 6,300 miles of track.³⁸ In response to the Hall report, the Manitoba government voiced concern that one-half of its rails would be abandoned. However, both the Alberta and Saskatchewan governments and respective pools supported the recommendation, as did the CFA and NFU.

Meanwhile, the transportation system continued to deteriorate. In 1980, railway losses were reported to be \$244.4 million and rising, while a one billion dollar shortfall was forecast for 1990. Although the federal government

finally capitulated in 1982 by announcing that it would retain freight subsidies, in spite of rising costs, Ottawa's policy makers were still not in the clear. They had yet to deal with the divisive issue of who should receive the government payments. The railways wanted the producers to be the recipients while farm organizations remained divided.

Following a series of hearings on the issue, Clay Gilson, a respected agricultural economist, recommended that the government should switch its subsidy payments to the producers. Resistance to this change by groups representing grain farmers arose because producers recognized that as railways abandoned branch-lines, they would have to truck their harvests long distances to delivery points. Furthermore, the provincial governments balked at what they saw as an extra burden on provincially maintained roads.

In looking back at the "Crow Rate Debates", it is evident that in many ways the previously established consultative process between many of the well-organized and institutionalized farm groups and the federal government had broken down. That is, it was becoming unclear as to whether or not the farmer's interests were being served. With the farm sector seriously divided along commodity lines and a federal government which was hoping to curb spending, no amount of consultation could resolve the problems involved. Lined up against the government's proposed changes were the NFU,³⁹ the three provincial wheat pools, Quebec farmers,

municipal politicians in Saskatchewan, and the provincial governments of Manitoba and Saskatchewan. In addition, a coalition of provincial umbrella organizations was hammered together. Known as the Western Agricultural Conference, it included Alberta's Unifarm (although it was known to be internally divided on the matter⁴⁰), the Saskatchewan Federation of Agriculture, and the Manitoba Farm Bureau. Against this array of interests, groups, and governments was an equally diverse group: the Canada Grains Council, farmers in the cattle sector, the UGG, the Alberta government, and various non-agricultural business interests.⁴¹

Because the issue was so divisive for farmers and for those with an interest in Canada's grain system, problems which are inherent to umbrella organizations (in this case the broadly based CFA and its provincial affiliates) quickly became visible. The problem's source was that regardless of their institutional strength, such a contentious issue as that which pitted various commodity interests against each other immobilized the very same broad farm organizations which were thought to be the "voice" of Canadian farmers in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. Claiming that grain export subsidies inflate the price of local livestock feed-grains, the interests of western cattle production opposed those of the grain producers. Furthermore, farmers operating outside the western region felt that the prairies were being given an unfair advantage (these divisions are explored more fully

later when trade issues are discussed). Faced with fights among its membership, and the pull-out by the UGG (as discussed in a later section in this chapter), the CFA withdrew from the Crow debate. Even at the provincial level the foundations of those umbrella organizations which operated on the prairies were undergoing serious crises. Both the Saskatchewan and Manitoba umbrella organizations collapsed⁴² and to this date, the CFA continues to lack a CFA affiliated federation in Saskatchewan.

Later, but still with regard to the same policy issue, in 1983 the Federation's leaders expressed their awareness that their organization was incapable of dealing with such internally divisive and contentious issues. In a letter to the House of Commons Transportation Committee, it admitted that the CFA

...would not as an organization play an active advocacy role in the complex ongoing debate which evidently was in prospect. It was felt that the interests of all our members and of our organization itself would be best served by our associated organizations pursuing their own representations and consultations in an ongoing way.⁴³

While the effect of these debates damaged and divided the CFA's membership, there were other smaller, flexible, and what some would term "ideological", groups that were better suited to the political battles of the day. In a later section on the National Farmers' Union, I will return to this topic.

Agriculture Policies in the 1980s

Just as debates over the extent to which the government should be committed to its program of transportation subsidies spilled over from the 1970s and into the 1980s, new issues in the agriculture sector have also demanded the government's continued attention. Much of this was due to the unstable farm economy. Pushing to increase farm production to meet world demand in the 1970s, farmers over-stepped the boundaries of careful planning by increasing their levels of capitalization and personal debt during a period of high interest rates. Such was the vulnerable condition of the prairie farm sector which was inherited by federal policy makers in the 1980s.

In spite of attempts to curb inflationary spending it seemed that truly, agriculture was above the law. The proportion of a farmer's income attributed to government spending increased rather than decreased during this time period. For example, according to Michael Prince, federal income transfers to prairie agriculture before the mid-1970s accounted for less than 10 per cent of realized net farm income. From the mid-1970s until the early 1980s this had moved to a figure of between 20 and 25 per cent. Between 1984 and 1988, federal income transfers accounted for an estimated 80 per cent of realized net farm income.⁴⁴

Here, once again, state expenditures and policies as they related to agriculture were reactions to international

pressures and varying natural conditions: an economic recession, the mid-1980s prairie drought, and the ongoing international grain pricing wars. Indeed, in one account of the Progressive Conservative's agriculture policy, Prince argues that

...many key initiatives in Ottawa's actual agriculture policy agenda, especially pertaining to farm income protection, developed in response to unexpected events. While some of these initiatives are consistent with specific elements of the initial agenda, such as promoting national reconciliation, perhaps most policy responses over the 1984-88 period deviated and even detracted from the intended goals of government restraint and a "depoliticized" agri-food industry. Instead, Agriculture Canada has an increased presence in the sector, not less, and government transfers now account for a larger share of farm income in Canada.⁴⁵

Unless the federal government was prepared to see its western grain sector close down, in the absence of an international agreement on wheat pricing and export volumes, it was forced to commit large amounts of funds in order to not only redress the injuries caused by drought but also those which were caused by the international grain trade war. In 1986, under the Special Canadian Grains Program, Ottawa paid \$1 billion to the western grain producers. The following year it paid \$1.1 billion. In 1988, under the Canadian Crop Drought Assistance Program it paid \$850 million.⁴⁶

However, the federal government was committed to priorities other than simply bailing out the farm sector. In two other areas agriculture was affected by new aims in

government policy: trade liberalization and state privatization. Beginning with its termination of the Canadian Agriculture Export Corporation (Canagrex), the Progressive Conservatives were seeking to remove the remnants of Keynesianism from federal government policy. Focusing on new "market-oriented" policies (as articulated in the 1985 Study Team Report on Agriculture which was issued to the Ministerial Task Force on Program Review), in the following year the government announced in its federal budget that \$260 million would be cut from Agriculture Canada.⁴⁷

The Federal Government and Globalization⁴⁸

In the 1980s and 1990s agriculture was put on the negotiating table in a way that had never been done before. In this section I argue that in addition to divisions over transportation subsidies in the 1970s, in the 1980s and 1990s Canadian government policy makers continued to be forced to deal with competing interests arising from Canada's diverse agricultural sectors. Two related forces contributed to this dilemma: support among both Canada's business and governmental elites for closer economic ties with the United States and, secondly, international pressures for a more comprehensive link of Canadian economic policy to changes in the world-economy and arising trade globalization.⁴⁹ From these transnational forces there arose new trade agreements which forced

both the federal government and farm organizations to reconsider traditional trade policies pertaining to the entire national agriculture sector: the continentalist Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) (and its more recent cousin, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)) and the newly negotiated multilateral General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

When the GATT was first signed in 1947, the signatory nations were accepting "a certain loss of sovereignty in favour of global regulation of trade and finance." However, agriculture was "virtually omitted"⁵⁰ meaning that at the national level, Ottawa could deal with agriculture issues in a "hodge-podge" ad hoc fashion. More recently, agriculture has had a less privileged status. Canadian trade negotiators have been pushed into a dilemma of options: choosing between a hard-line protectionist position (in order that the interests of the chiefly central-Canadian dairy, egg, poultry, vegetable, and fruit sectors will remain protected behind their marketing boards) or supporting trade liberalization (a position supported chiefly by western interests, most notably the UGG, Prairie Pools, the Western Wheat Growers Association, the prairie hog marketing boards, and the Canadian Cattlemen's Association).⁵¹

In an attempt to keep its head above water in this increasingly troubled pool, the government insured that nondisruptive farm groups would be brought into the

consultative process. With regards to the FTA negotiations, this was the case when the Sectoral Group on Agriculture, Food and Beverages included representatives from the food manufacturing sector and the farm marketing boards.⁵² The consultative process here helped to serve the ends of trade liberalization policy:

The designers of the FTA consultative process knew that they would face three imperatives regarding business and private sector involvement. They needed formal and non-partisan political support to foster the legitimacy of the entire free trade initiative. They also required good advice to gauge the effects of alternative negotiated outcomes on specific industries. Finally, they needed a buffer to deflect demands for protection that would arise from numerous business interest groups. The formal consultative machinery established for the FTA process would answer all three needs. The 38-member International Trade Advisory Committee (ITAC) was designed to provide legitimacy, and the 15 Sectoral Advisory Groups on International Trade were established to provide advice. Together, they offered a buffer against demands for special treatment.⁵³

Doern and Tomlin argue that agriculture continued to be a specially protected sector in the negotiations. In fact, by participating in the consultative process, farm interests were able to preserve their marketing boards in the face of heavy pressures from the manufacturing and brewing sectors for agricultural trade liberalization.⁵⁴ However, what troubled many producers was that this consultative process was sometimes considered damaging to their interests rather than helpful in furthering the voice of farmers. According to the Western Producer's Ottawa Bureau Editor:

The Conservatives had effectively silenced most of the country's farm leadership by asking them to sit on trade policy advisory panels and then swearing them to secrecy about details being discussed during the meetings. For the cattlemen [CCA] and other members of the pro-free-trade faction of the farm community, this was no real problem. They agreed with the government agenda and used their access as advisors to reinforce it. For farm leaders representing constituencies with more complicated views of their self-interest, the consultation process posed some problems. How could farmers be kept aware of threats to their livelihood emerging in the trade talks if their leaders were insiders to the negotiations, unable to speak publicly about what they knew?⁵⁵

III. Farm Organizations in the 1970s and 1980s

Much has been written on the effect which the international economic crisis had on what were thought-to-be permanent patterns of representative national democratic politics.⁵⁶ Many of these discussions centre on the declining importance of political parties. This section diverges from this previously established pattern by showing that in some ways the opposite has happened. It is true that the days of the farmer's party are long gone yet other traditional agrarian organizational forms have resurfaced. In the 1970s and 1980s difficult conditions, arising from both the interlocking effects of the international political economy and changing national government priorities, produced two major political consequences within the Canadian grain sector. First, it revitalized the western Canadian farm sector's radicalism. Yet while doing so it had a second

effect, atomizing the farm community along both ideological and commodity specific lines.

Generally speaking, the ideological spectrum as it relates to the grain sector is represented on the left by the NFU and on the right by the Western Canadian Wheat Growers Association (WCWGA) (a relatively new member of the organizational community), the UGG, and the Canadian Cattlemen's Association. Coupled with these ideological divisions are the natural divisions which arise along the sector's commodity lines, many of which became apparent during the aforementioned battles over grain transportation subsidies.⁵⁷

The following discussion is structured as follows. First, because of its relative newness on the national stage,⁵⁸ some time will be spent on discussing the NFU. The analysis will be along a number of fronts: the union's formation and history, the political strategies it has used in the 1970s and 1980s, and the extent to which it has developed its office staff and organizational assets. Once this section is completed the discussion will proceed to two more familiar cases: the UGG and the CFA, which have both undergone a period of internal restructuring while facing the constraints of difficult economic times and the changing directions of federal agricultural policy.

The National Farmers Union

This section explores the peculiar case of the NFU and shows how its story in many ways forces us to rethink our approach to the study of interest group activity and state-society relations (see Chapter One). One reason for the relatively scant attention paid so far to the NFU has been the fact that prior to the 1970s farm unions generally confined their activities to the regional and provincial levels.⁵⁹ However, the farm union movement as it responded to national level policies predates the 1969 founding of the National Farmers Union.

Early Farm Union Developments

In 1947, the Alberta and Saskatchewan farmer unions formed the Interprovincial Farm Union Council (IFUC).⁶⁰ Largely considered weak and ineffective, the IFUC was insufficiently autonomous from its regional affiliates and was more of a forum for meetings between regional leaders rather than an organization in itself. The first step taken towards establishing a national level farm union with its own resources was taken in 1960 when the regional unions transformed the IFUC into a new entity titled the National Farmers Union Council (NFUC).⁶¹ Its membership continued to consist of executive representatives from each regional union. In this sense, it resembled the CFA by its federal umbrella structure. In addition to facilitating a dialogue among the

regional leaders, the mandate of this new council was to coordinate the regional organizations when farm-related issues arose at the national level. For example, one responsibility was the making of farm union presentations to the federal cabinet.⁶²

Although the union council's mandate was now broader in order that it could coordinate national activities, it continued to be hampered by its dependency on voluntary financial contributions from its regional members. Additionally, the regional unions continued to send their executives to annual "Joint Board Meetings" (and on occasion, joint executive meetings) which remained outside the Council's orbit.⁶³ As such, to the extent that it was meant to behave as a federal interest group, the Council's task was an impossible one. Truly, the NFUC could make few claims to be the legitimate national voice of Canadian farm unionism. It would require one more step before farmers could establish a stronger farm union voice within the federal political system.

This step was taken with the founding convention of the National Farmers' Union which was held on the last two days of July, 1969. In attendance were two thousand members belonging to various provincial farmer unions. The decision taken here was to merge the provincial groups into one major group. In less than a year, following its 1969 formation, the provincial unions, with the exception of Alberta,⁶⁴ moved their assets and liabilities to the new national organization.⁶⁵

Farm Union Objectives and Structure

The NFU's three official objectives are as follows. First, it is aimed at organizing farmers from all of Canada's agricultural commodity sectors in order to address problems and concerns affecting farm families. The second objective is to fight for the survival of the farm family as the basic unit of Canadian agricultural production. Third, the NFU must, in order to fulfil its mandate, campaign for the survival of Canada's rural communities⁶⁶ (it is worth noting that the NFU's current executive secretary, Kevin Arsenault, previously served as the Vice-President of Rural Dignity⁶⁷).

Unlike the CFA's umbrella structure which effectively prevented it from making claims that it directly represented farmers themselves, the new NFU structure was established with a membership comprised of individual farmers and farm families. Working in a fashion similar to many labour unions, decisions on policy worked their way through the locals and up to the district and provincial levels. Another difference between the NFU and the CFA was that instead of relying on commodity groups or what could be termed their regional "federalional" components for raising specific concerns at the organization's national level (which was how the CFA operated) the farm union locals each sent delegates to the annual policy convention.

Farm Union Tactics in the 1970s and 1980s

According to the post-pluralist model outlined in Chapter One, the NFU's propensity to conduct protest politics might be blamed on being a young "single-issue group". That is, in contrast to the CFA and UGG, NFU activities might merely reflect its "fledgling" nature. However, recent evidence which will be presented here, shows that as this organization aged, or as some would say, "matured", it has not abandoned confrontation in exchange for consultative arrangements. Since its founding convention in 1969, with 2,000 delegates attending, the NFU has both organized and participated in a wide range of confrontational activities.⁶⁸ There are a number of examples.

In 1970, 2,000 farmers marched on the Alberta legislature to demand organizational recognition. At the same site, two hundred people gave away 2,000 dozen eggs in protest of low prices. In the same year on another issue, marches were held in Regina (with 7,500 people attending) and Winnipeg (where 2,800 people attended) in support of orderly agricultural marketing. At a meeting in Ontario, 1,600 farmers decided to picket the Bordens plant in protest of imports, and began making plans for a national boycott.

During the following year, the NFU President was arrested at a PEI tractor blockade which had been set up to protest provincial policies; a boycott against Kraft began when the corporation refused to bargain collectively over milk pricing;

and 3,500 western farmers demonstrated in Edmonton, Winnipeg, and Regina with "hog cavalcades" to protest hog prices.⁶⁹

Adding to its arsenal, the "sit-in" became a popular tactic among NFU activists in 1974. In its drive for orderly marketing policies for livestock, for example, the NFU held sit-ins in conjunction with making formal presentations to the federal government. "Operation Country Mouse", another notable case, consisted of a trans-national occupation, by union members, of federal agricultural buildings in both Ottawa and the three prairie capital cities. (This tactic would be used again in April 1986 when NFU members occupied several FCC offices throughout Canada, and in 1987 in Saskatchewan when members held sit-ins in land bank offices to protest the cancellation of crown land lease agreements.⁷⁰)

Protest tactics appear to have their own fashions; the popularity for staging sit-ins gave way to using road-blocks by the mid-1970s. Demonstrating for a resolution of the beef farmer's financial crisis in 1975, 200 people demonstrated on Alberta's Syncrude Highway (this was followed by 1,000 people pitching their tents on the grounds of the Alberta legislature). In 1976, 300 New Brunswick farmers vocalized their grievances on the Trans-Canada Highway and gave away 50,000 pounds of potatoes.

The more traditional union picket was also a favourite means of making the farmer's case publicised. In 1977, the Alberta members of the NFU picketed a meat packers plant to

protest a continuing absence of competitive bidding on pork. Numerous pickets were held that year and later when the federal government held transportation meetings regarding the changing of the Crow Rate. One of these pickets was staged at a 1977 Saskatoon meeting held by the Transportation Minister, Otto Lang.⁷¹

As with many other Canadian organizations in the 1980s,⁷² the NFU has included litigation as part of its arsenal of weapons. In Toronto, on October 11, 1979, the NFU held preliminary hearings for a class action suit against the railways. The following year the Federal Court dismissed the suit. The NFU appealed and the suit was dismissed again in 1981. The NFU claimed that, regardless of the outcome, this action helped stimulate the railways into improving parts of its grain moving services.⁷³

The Canadian farm union movement had its watershed during the prolonged Crow Rate debates (discussed earlier in this chapter). Whereas in the CFA's case, where the debates over rail subsidies caused an internal sense of paralysis, it proved to be the catalyst for farm unionism. With regard to this particular issue, a wide array of its previously used tactics were used in order to combat the government's proposals. In 1981, approximately 200 farmers took part in a "Crow Train" to Ottawa. In Regina, three hundred and fifty angry farmers made an appearance to protest the arrival of

Transport Minister Pepin who was visiting to conduct farm-government consultations. When Pepin again presented Ottawa's plan for revising the Crow Rate system in 1983, the NFU organized major rallies in Winnipeg, Saskatoon, Regina and Edmonton. Meanwhile, its leadership made use of official channels by picking and choosing the times at which it would consult with the government. For example, in 1982 it refused to participate in the series of government sponsored forums whereas in 1983 it submitted briefs at each of the regional government hearings concerning on Bill C-155 in conjunction with lobbying the federal NDP's MPs to hold up the passage of the bill (which they did).⁷⁴

As the Crow Rate issue receded,⁷⁵ the NFU was not left idle. There were two issues which continued to concern grain farmers within the movement. The first was the persistent and worsening farm financial crisis. The second was the advent of serious federal government negotiations towards trade liberalization measures, the most notable example being the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement (which was eventually signed after the 1988 federal election).

With regard to the first issue, the NFU helped resurrect a tactic, shunned by the more established groups and rarely seen since the Depression era: the "farm gate defences". These were simple last ditch efforts to save individual farm enterprises on a case-by-case basis. In both the United States and Canada it was generally the new farm organizations

which tried to rescue troubled farmers. These new groups were willing to mobilize against the local legal authorities, the government, and financial institutions when moving in to close down a farm and remove the farmer's capital holdings.

In Canada, the NFU was not the only Canadian group to venture forth into these so-called "survivalist strategies".⁷⁶ However, the point here is that the NFU was the only well-funded national farm organization which exhibited, in addition to "mature" strategies, a willingness to use the farm gate defence tactic, as shown by the following example. In 1983, the NFU women's president Darlene Henderson in Manitoba participated in a farm gate defence in Portage La Prairie. Other NFU members followed her example by participating in a farm gate defence in Virden, Manitoba, the following year. This action was repeated with success in Charlottetown and, in 1985, at a farm in Dawson Creek, British Columbia.⁷⁷

Did the NFU's propensity to use protest tactics preclude its access to consultative mechanisms? The answer is both yes and no. In its battles with the government, the NFU has at times taken a consultative approach to lobbying the government. It has, but not always, accepted government invitations to submit briefs and appear before official committees and agencies. For example, in 1971 and 1975 the

Trudeau, appeared before the Federal Cabinet Committee to discuss farm related legislation. In 1973, it appeared before the House of Commons Committee on Agriculture concerning issues related to the existing agri-food system.⁷⁸

In spite of its entry into some consultative avenues, the NFU's relationship with the federal cabinet was tumultuous. Although the Minister of Agriculture Eugene Whelan went to the occasional NFU meeting (when invited to do so), there were other ministers, one example being Otto Lang, who steadfastly turned down all NFU invitations.⁷⁹ One case where relations had clearly deteriorated occurred in 1974 when the NFU was forced to make a submission to the Senate Committee on Agriculture following a federal government refusal to hear the NFU's submission.⁸⁰

If neopluralists such as Paul Pross are correct when they categorize Canadian interest groups by their level of maturity within the policy network, the NFU ought not to have continued its confrontational antics. This has not been the case. Instead, evidence suggests that over time the NFU has continued to play two games at once. The NFU maintains consultative links with the government while resorting to confrontational strategies when necessary.

Table 5.2: CFA & NFU Financial Comparison, 1990

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Assets</u>	<u>Membership Income</u>	<u>Total Income</u>
CFA	\$236,840	\$281,817	\$811,323
NFU	187,297	\$637,765	939,705

Source: CFA Annual Auditor's Report, 1991; NFU Annual Auditor's Report, 1991.

It has a sizeable number of resources as indicated by both a permanent staff and assets and has been increasingly recognized as a legitimate voice for the troubled farm sector. The most remarkable feature of the NFU is that in terms of institutional resources, using the 1990 figures which are shown in Table 5.2, the NFU does not appear to be much weaker than its more traditionally institutionalized cousin, the CFA. It is weaker in terms of assets (having \$187,297 compared with the CFA's \$236,840). However, its income which is derived from membership dues is much higher (\$637,765 compared with the CFA's membership - albeit of a different kind due to the Federation's umbrella structure - payments which are reported to be \$281,817). It is to the less confrontational groups that this discussion now turns.

The United Grain Growers

Unlike the Farm Union's mandate, which is to protect the farm family operation within the rural community, the UGG's orientation as a farmer's grain company is geared to the business concerns of grain farmers as they become channelled through the company.

This section deals with three modern day facets of the UGG. The first is the organization's financial health as its income and assets have become destabilized. In contrast to its organizational health in the 1950s and 1960s, towards the end of the 1980s the company was reporting its first losses in fifty years. Second, the UGG has increasingly supported "free-market" positions with regard to a number of significant national policy issues including the Crow Rate, the Canadian Wheat Board, and such new trade agreements as the FTA and GATT. Third, the UGG has undergone a series of changing relationships with other organizations. In many ways the differences between the UGG and other groups, such as the three provincial wheat pools and the NFU, has followed along ideological lines: that is, the extent to which its members feel that the government should "interfere" in the grain industry. Furthermore, seeking to have more control over the articulation of its own interests, the UGG withdrew from the CFA (this is discussed below).

UGG: Finances

In Chapter 4, I was able to show that prior to 1970 a certain pattern had evolved concerning the company's growth: UGG assets rose steadily from under \$20 million in 1948 to over \$120 million in the late 1960s. It was also profitable. Without a single year of losses, the UGG's profits ranged between \$220 thousand and \$800 thousand between 1948 and 1965. Profits subsequently sky-rocketed between 1965 and 1967 in conjunction with burgeoning national grain surpluses.

Turning now to the case of the UGG's changing assets and income between 1969 and 1992 (see also Figure 9 in the appendix) we find the following. Between 1969 and 1973 its assets ranged between \$100 and \$150 million. At the same time, its income ranged from a quarter of a million dollars to just under \$2 million. Drastic changes occurred in conjunction with the world grain shortages which were sparked by the aforementioned Soviet grain purchases. Between 1973 and 1981, UGG assets grew from just over \$100 million to \$450 million while net income grew from under \$2 million to over \$7 million. From 1983 to 1990, the company's assets dropped from over \$400 million to under \$150 million. Its net income in the 1980s dropped from a high of over \$10 million in 1984 to a loss of over \$5 million in 1989. As prairie crops recovered from the drought, UGG business picked up. In its 1990 annual report, UGG President Lorne Hehn was able to report a 24 per cent increase in country grain handling with a \$1.8 million

earnings on its integrated grain operations.⁸¹

In 1993, the UGG underwent major financial restructuring. After moving its office location from Winnipeg's Main Street and into the Toronto Dominion Building sky-rise in the centre of this prairie city's financial district, its leaders recapitalised its operations by selling company stocks on the Toronto Stock Exchange. In its first year under this new financial set-up the UGG drew \$34 million in the sale of public shares. According to one report, since the summer of 1992, this has allowed the company to double its spending on its capital infrastructure by committing \$25 million on capital improvements (\$10 million more than had been its customary annual average).⁸²

Changing Policies

While the 1970s and 1980s seemed like a roller-coaster for its members who were pondering the UGG's fortunes, it also proved to be unsettling with regard to the organization's official position on a number of public policy issues. This section provides evidence along three policy fronts which shows that the UGG's position concerning the federal government's involvement in the grain trade resembles more closely that of such private grain companies as Pioneer and Cargill rather than farmer groups like the farm unions or the pools. The first was the UGG's changing position with regard to the maintenance of the Crow Rate, which eventually turned into

its official support for the federal's government position. The second issue involving the company was the Trudeau government's implementation of the UGG-opposed Canagrex, which was subsequently dismantled by the Mulroney government. And, thirdly, the UGG began to support federal government endeavours to weaken the CWB.

Turning first to the debates surrounding the Crow Rate, it became clear in the 1970s that the UGG's membership was undergoing a transformation in its support for how these subsidies ought to be paid out. This group's membership had a long-standing commitment to the existing subsidy arrangements. For example, at the annual general meetings (AGMs) of 1948 and 1975, motions declaring the UGG's support for the status quo were passed by the general membership.⁸³ However, by the early 1980s, in conjunction with the Canada Grains Council, farmers in the cattle sector, the Alberta Government, and various non-agricultural business interests, the UGG supported the federal government's position.⁸⁴ At its 1982 AGM the membership supported a motion calling for changing the subsidy; namely, that it be paid to the farmers rather than to the railways.⁸⁵ More recently, the transportation subsidy issue has been rekindled in 1994 by a report calling for paying the current monies to the producer and phasing out the subsidies over a seven year period.⁸⁶ The UGG's Manager of Corporate Affairs, Paul Earl,⁸⁷ has coordinated recent efforts by the Agricultural Diversification

Alliance (ADA) to lobby for these types of changes. It is worth noting also that the UGG's involvement in the ADA signifies that the UGG's leadership now considers that the organization's interests coincide not with the broadly focused farm organizations but, at least with regard to this issue, with a list of twenty-five other more narrowly defined interest groups, which includes the likes of the following: the right-wing and anti-CWB WCWGA,⁸⁸ the Canadian Canola Growers which supports open-market policies, and the giant multinational company, Cargill.⁸⁹

Secondly, the UGG has joined the anti-CWB lobby in campaigning for a revision of the CWB's powers; the marketing of barley being one pertinent example. Here, the company has undergone change as well. If the reader will recall the discussion in Chapter 4, evidence shows that the UGG was committed, through a number of motions which were passed at the UGG's AGMs, to support the government's CWB operations and monopoly powers over prairie wheat exports. For example, in one 1955 AGM motion the following words were included: "...we re-affirm our faith in the Canadian Wheat Board as our grain marketing agency."⁹⁰ In 1970, however, a very different motion was carried with the loaded words that the CWB "be made responsible to producers" rather than Parliament. In 1973, a motion to have the government place rye and flax under the CWB was defeated.⁹¹ In 1978, the membership passed a motion supporting the idea of allowing for the private trade of

barley exports instead of using the CWB. In 1986, the UGG's membership supported the motion that the sale of canola continue to be on the open market rather than through the CWB (this was a substitute motion for one which called for both the CWB and private handlers to market canola).⁹²

With regard to trade issues and the food industry, the UGG has worked against state ownership and governmental protectionism. Once more, this was evident in its alliance with the major corporations in the food sector when lobbying against the establishment of a government funded and operated agricultural marketing and sales agency, Canagrex.⁹³ Furthermore, the UGG has supported the Canadian government's efforts in free trade and the GATT negotiations on the basis that they deemed that they were leading towards a reduction in European and American wheat subsidies.⁹⁴

UGG Relations With Other Groups

It is interesting to read through the minutes of the Annual General Meeting and trace the changing relationship which the UGG had with other organizations, especially its relationship with the CFA. As events within the international political economy unfolded, the UGG appeared to withdraw into its own narrow interests. In other words, the increasing economic strains led to a straining of UGG commitments to other organizations. In effect, the company began to adopt policies which were narrowly focused on the company's

financial interests rather than on those of the general farm community. Examples of this shift arise when examining a number of decisions - between 1965 and 1990 - which were made on the UGG convention floor.

Starting first with the issue of the UGG's membership in the CFA, in 1965 the members supported a motion which called for the strengthening of the CFA as the united voice of farmers.⁹⁵ However, four years later, as government policy was becoming less supportive of grain farmers in the face of surpluses, its members at the 1969 AGM felt that the CFA was not doing enough to protect the grain grower's interests. The following resolution was voted upon and carried:

WHEREAS grain marketing and production is now in a crisis situation,
AND WHEREAS the United Grain Growers as a member of the Canadian Federation of Agriculture, [sic] finds its voice somewhat indirect and far off,
AND WHEREAS the grain crisis is a western problem in particular,
THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that matters dealing with grain marketing and production be presented to Government [sic] by the representatives of the Western Agricultural Conference⁹⁶ or as direct as possible.⁹⁷

In 1983, its executive reported that the total annual cost incurred by supporting other organizations was \$220,000. A resolution from the UGG's directors in that same year which called for the UGG to seek a "leave of absence" from the CFA and its four western provincial federations (the British Columbian Federation of Agriculture, Unifarm, The Saskatchewan Federation of Agriculture, and the Manitoba Farm Bureau) was

carried "by a very heavy majority."⁹⁸

It should be noted here that the UGG has not traditionally opposed the formation of other farm groups within the grain sector, in fact many of its members have long-term ties to more than one organization. Furthermore, they supported their grain company's link to these other groups. For example, at the end of the 1960s the UGG's directors were authorized to contribute \$2,000 to the NFU and, in the mid-1980s, they made a \$6,000 donation to help with the start-up costs of the Keystone Agricultural Producers (KAP) (which replaced the defunct Manitoba Farm Bureau). However, just as its support for the CFA was dwindling, so too was its support for these other organizations. At the 1985 AGM the following motion was carried: "Be it resolved [that the] UGG withdraw financial support from all farm organizations." Those groups with which the UGG maintained memberships were the commodity oriented ones rather than the broader umbrella organizations.⁹⁹ In 1985 it continued to be a member of the Canola Council of Canada, the Flax Council of Canada, and the Canada Grains Council. All three of which represent "both the industry and farmers in marketing and research areas."¹⁰⁰

In summary, it is fair to say that in the face of difficult policy issues and destabilizing prairie economic conditions for the prairie farmer, the UGG is a prime example of how organizationally farmers have retreated into their specific interest areas and commodity concerns. Since the

late 1960s the UGG has severed many of its links to farm organizations and has increasingly linked itself with business interests both within the agriculture sector and non-agricultural sector.

The CFA

This section shows that in comparison with other types of farm organizations, the CFA's fortunes, along with its provincial affiliations,¹⁰¹ changed dramatically in the 1970s and 1980s. Concerning the particular case of the CFA, the discussion in this section first shows how the difficulties in the nation's agriculture sector, and the grain sector in particular, led to dissent and conflict within the ranks of the CFA. Second, the Federation increasingly had to cope with a loss of status. That is, in contrast to the post-war era in which it successfully made the claim that it was the one legitimate voice of the national farm sector, it became one voice among many. Groups which had previously worked through the CFA, such as the UGG and the wheat pools, have shown their independence when asserting their concerns on federal policies. Additionally, new groups such as the NFU and the WCWGA now compete with the CFA for government attention when national grain-related issues are raised. Third, and related to the first two points, the CFA's basic financial health was damaged in the 1980s, chiefly by the loss of members.

However, in spite of these set-backs and the relative loss of influence, it continues to practice what it does best: interacting on a regular basis with federal government policy makers.

By 1985, the composition of the CFA was reduced to eleven members (this is shown in Table 5.3). Furthermore, concerning its ability to speak for the western grain sector, it no longer had within its ranks two-thirds of the prairie provincial federations, having lost both the Saskatchewan Federation of Agriculture and the Manitoba Farm Bureau. Since then it has recovered some of its losses. The Manitoba federation was reborn under a new title: the Keystone Agricultural Producers (it also acquired a number of commodity specific marketing agencies such as the Egg Marketing Agency - however, none of these are related to the grain sector).

Insofar as it has seen a rebirth of sorts at the provincial level, it is too early to consider these new members as proof of the CFA's recovery. Both the Alberta and Manitoba federations are continually on the brink of bankruptcy (see below), and still absent from the CFA ranks are the UGG and a provincial federation from Saskatchewan. In short, it is clear that there no longer exists one organization or umbrella of farm-groups that can claim to express the one collective voice of grain-farmers.

Canadian farmers also lack a single united voice which can speak to agricultural trade issues. Prior to the 1980s it

was possible for the CFA and the federal government to defend a number of contradictory positions in agriculture. For example, in the cases of the dairy and poultry industries, which are chiefly centred in Ontario and Quebec, the government took a protectionist stand while implementing the 1972 Farm Products Marketing Agencies Act, which placed into national law what had previously been a fragmented provincial system of marketing boards and agencies.¹⁰² Of course this pleased the Ontario Federation of Agriculture, the L'Union des Producteurs Agricoles, and the Dairy Farmers of Canada, all being members of the CFA. However, while taking this protectionist stand, the Canadian government has traditionally favoured the dismantling of those international trade barriers which pertain to grain exports. This so-called "free-market" stand was strongly supported by the UGG, the Saskatchewan Federation of Agriculture, and the Manitoba Farm Bureau (the reader should recall the fact that at one time these were long-time members of the CFA).

Table 5.3: CFA Membership Composition, 1970 - 1990¹⁰³

1970	1975	1980	1985	1990
B.C. Fed. of Agric.	B.C. Fed. of Agric.	B.C. Fed. of Agric.	B.C. Fed. of Agric.	B.C. Fed. of Agric.
Unifarm (Alberta)	Unifarm (Alberta)	Unifarm (Alberta)	Unifarm (Alberta)	Unifarm (Alberta)
Sask. Fed. of Agric.	Sask. Fed. of Agric.	Sask. Fed. of Agric. (Outgoing)	Co-op Fed. de Québec	Keystone (Man.) (New)
Man. Farm Bureau	Man. Farm Bureau	Man. Farm Bureau (Outgoing)	Prairie Pools (Outgoing)	Prairie Pools
Ont. Fed. of Agric.	Ont. Fed. of Agric.	Ont. Fed. of Agric.	Ont. Fed. of Agric.	Ont. Fed. of Agric.
L'union Cath. Cul.	L'union Prod. Agr.	L'union Prod. Agr.	New Brun. Fed. Agr.	Co-op Fed. Que.
Co-op Fed. Que.	Co-op Fed. Que.	Co-op Fed. Que.	L'union Prod. Agr.	L'union Prod. Agr.
Quebec Farmers Assoc.	Quebec Farmers Assoc.	New Brun. Fed. Agric.	P.E.I. Fed. Agric.	P.E.I. Fed. Agric.
P.E.I. Fed. of Agric.	P.E.I. Fed. of Agric.	P.E.I. Fed. of Agric.	Dairy Farmers of Canada	Dairy Farmers of Canada
Maritime Fed. Agric.	New Brun. Fed. Agric. (New)	Nova Scot. Fed. Agric.	Nova Scot. Fed. Agric.	Nova Sco. Fed. Agric.
UGG	UGG	UGG (Outgoing)	Horticul. Council	Horticul. Council
Dairy Farmers of Can.	Dairy Farmers of Can.	Dairy Farmers of Can.		Turkey Marketing Agency (New)
Horticul. Council	Horticul. Council	Horticul. Council		Chicken Marketing Agency (New)
	Nova Scot. Fed. Agric. (New)			Broiler Hatching Mrk. Agen. (New)
				EggMrktng Agency/ Prd. Cncl. (New)
				Sugar St. Prod. Ass. (New)
Total=13	Total=14	Total=13	Total=11	Total=16

One reason why the Canadian government was able to promote these generally pragmatic and contradictory agricultural trade policies is that Canada's international trade obligations have been tied to trade agreements. These international agreements have, for the most part, allowed agricultural policies to be treated as "exceptional" cases in each country's policy communities.¹⁰⁴ However, such exceptionalism is no longer taken for granted. As Canadian agriculture moved into the 1980s, issues with regard to agricultural trade on the international stage have increasingly been placed on the negotiating table.

The fact that agricultural trade became a subject of debate precipitated a dilemma for the CFA, especially with regard to the FTA, NAFTA, and GATT. Taking first the case of the FTA, it provided one of the first unavoidably clear signs that the federal government's priorities in respect to the domestic political economy had shifted towards trade liberalizing policies and away from more nationalistic protectionism. Both the Liberal and Progressive Conservative governments in the 1980s moved towards an acceptance that Canada should further reduce its barriers to North American trade.¹⁰⁵ It is true that agriculture was generally left out of the FTA, however, it contains rules regarding the use of tariffs and other protectionist devices which should ultimately cause a reduction in the government's flexibility when renegotiating the GATT. This became evident when Canada

signed on to the new GATT in the 1990s and committed itself to abandoning its system of marketing boards. The government's defenders claimed that tariff walls will replace the older system (in order that the farm sector will not be swamped by American competition in such sectors as dairy). However, it is doubtful that this substitute arrangement will survive FTA-based challenges.

Summarizing the effect of the new trade negotiations and the debates which have surrounded them, these new issues have placed a burden on the CFA as the provincial and federal governments, as well as a number of other farmer interest groups, have had to formulate positions regarding the future of Canada's national agricultural policies. In other words, the world trade system has pushed Canada into a position where it can no longer make ad-hoc regionally based policy decisions; national policies must now be either on the side of trade liberalization or of protectionism.¹⁰⁶ The CFA's role as the national voice of farmers which operate within their own sector-specific and regional perspectives has, therefore, become almost impossible. Calling for a "balanced position" in this policy area, the CFA has ultimately served no particular individual concern.¹⁰⁷ It is no wonder that its role as the major national voice of the farmer's interests continues to be taken up by other more focused organizations.

Institutional Resources

This new section shows the extent to which events within the agricultural community and the international political economy led to a fragmentation of the farmer's voice at the national level and a destabilization of institutional resources within the CFA. In this case, the organization's resources appear more as a dependent variable rather than as an independent variable. In the last section, Table 5.3 shows the changing composition of the organization as it appeared every five years (1970 to 1990). As outlined in Chapter Four, the CFA's membership remained virtually unchanged between 1950 and 1970, while a very different picture has appeared over the past two decades. In contrast to its unchanging composition between 1950 and 1970, the CFA membership list became porous as a number of organizations gained entry while other organizations disaffiliated themselves. Between 1970 and 1975 two new maritime federations joined: the New Brunswick Federation of Agriculture and the Nova Scotia Federation of Agriculture. Five years later three western based organizations dropped out. These were the Manitoba Farm Bureau, the Saskatchewan Federation of Agriculture, and the UGG. By 1985 the three wheat pools, which were represented by their own umbrella - Prairie Pools Inc. - had withdrawn. By 1990, Manitoba again became represented by the entrance of KAP. Four new groups had gained entry: the Turkey Marketing Agency, the Chicken Marketing Agency, the Broiler Hatching

Marketing Agency, and the Sugar Beet Producers Association.

Not only did the composition of the CFA's membership undergo stress and transformation, its financial situation was destabilized also. In terms of the CFA's annual financial statements, one finds that the organization's assets remained temporarily stable (allowing for inflation), climbing from under \$100 thousand in 1970 to \$250 thousand in 1980 and, in 1985, peaking at \$400. However, between 1985 and 1986 its assets fell by more than 50 per cent and dropped below \$150,000 in 1988. By this time it had lost two provincial federations and its long-time ally, the UGG. There is a sense of cautious optimism in the 1990s as the CFA's fortunes have rebounded in conjunction with some of the receding crisis conditions in the farm economy. One indication of this is that by 1991 CFA assets have reached \$300,000.

Recent CFA-Government Relations

The CFA continues to be a major, if somewhat weakened, player in the agricultural policy community. So far this chapter has highlighted the contentious areas which have caused problems in the sense of bringing to the surface the differing and conflicting interests of the organizational members within the Federation. However, a number of issues which are less "hot" continue to require the facilitation of organizational consultation. Table 5.4 shows that in reviewing two recent years, 1990 and 1993,¹⁰⁸ the CFA has

remained very active within the agricultural policy community.

When looking at Table 5.4, five general categories concerning CFA presentations should be discernible. First, the CFA provides technical information regarding complex matters being considered by government policy makers, such as the need in 1990 for the CFA's input regarding legislation on plant breeders rights. A second type of presentation was the regular pre-budget brief to the government in the hope that any hasty and damaging governmental action pertaining to the CFA membership's interests could be prevented. Third, the CFA showed itself to be active regarding making its own members' various positions on trade issues known, especially regarding both North American Free Trade and the GATT negotiations. Fourth, it has made its presence known to parliamentary committees and various task forces when agriculture policies have come under governmental review. Last, it has participated, in a non-partisan fashion, electoral activities in order to raise the profile of the agriculture sector and to help publicize the official position of each party on farm-related matters.¹⁰⁹

**Table 5.4: CFA Submissions and Presentations,
1990 & 1993¹¹⁰**

<u>1990</u>	<u>1993</u>
CFA submissions presented to the Government Dairy and Poultry Task Forces.	CFA statement to the Legislative Committee regarding <u>The Farm Credit Corporation Act</u> (Bill C-95).
CFA submission to the Review Committee of the Canadian Wheat Board	Pre-budget CFA presentation to the Minister of Finance, Don Mazankowski.
CFA submission to the Farm Finance and Management Working Group.	CFA presentation regarding farm incomes to the Standing Committee on Agriculture.
CFA appearance before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Agriculture regarding Bill C-15, Plant Breeders' Rights.	Presentation to the Legislative Committee regarding NAFTA legislation (Bill C-115).
CFA appearance before the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry regarding Bill C-15.	CFA President, Jack Wilkinson, presents keynote address to the Agriculture Canada Management Council Meeting.
CFA appearance before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Agriculture regarding two pieces of legislation: Health of Animals Act and the Plant Protection Act.	CFA wide-ranging brief to the Standing Committee on Agriculture.
CFA appearance before the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce concerning agriculture concerns and the GST.	CFA presentation submitted to the federal and provincial ministers of agriculture prior to a federal provincial agricultural meeting.
CFA's <u>Policy Statement on Sustainable Agriculture</u> was presented to the Minister of Agriculture, Don Mazankowski.	CFA Council and Staff meet with Prime Minister Kim Campbell at the CFA Semi-Annual Meeting.

CFA's <u>Statement on the GATT Negotiations</u> was presented to the Minister of Agriculture.	CFA All-Party Agricultural Debate is held during the federal election campaign.
CFA's <u>Statement to Ministers of Agriculture on the Federal Agriculture Policy Review Task Force Process</u> was sent to the media, provincial and federal agriculture ministers, and those on the Agriculture Committee.	CFA meets with Agriculture and Agri-food Minister Charlie Mayer regarding trade issues.
Parliament Hill press conference held where <u>Towards a Better Understanding</u> was presented regarding cost-price squeeze.	CFA presents a brief to Trade Minister Tom Hockin.
CFA pre-budget presentation to Minister of Finance, Michael Wilson.	CFA trade delegation presents its position to the GATT Ambassador and other trade delegations.
	CFA Executive meets with newly elected Agriculture and Agri-food Minister, Ralph Goodale regarding trade issues.

Source: CFA Executive Director's Report, 1990 and Executive Director's Report, 1993

Of course the CFA continues to do more than merely present briefs and hold meetings. Continuing the tradition established in the 1940s, the CFA is represented on a number of government boards, agencies, and committees. Citing two examples from the 1990s, the CFA's president, Don Kncerr, was a member of the agriculture SAGIT while the CFA maintained its membership on the Advisory Committee on Plant Breeders' Rights.

In summary, the CFA clearly continues to play an important role in Canada's agriculture community but it can no longer be considered as the only major national group which speaks for grain farmers. Since the 1960s, the following factors are found accounting for the CFA's weakening status within the national policy community: the economic crises in the farm sector, the changing federal government priorities and their divergence from the general interests of the CFA's members, and the changing relations among and between Canada's farm organizations. As raised in an earlier section of this chapter, underlying many of these factors is the destabilized international political economy.¹¹¹

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that identifying and understanding an organization's institutional resources provides only a partial explanation for an organization's success or failure. A review of the past twenty-five years and the effects of the destabilized international political economy reveals that when government policies shift in priorities, and the interests of an organization begin to diverge from the government as a result of this, a political space may open in which other more narrowly focused, or confrontationally oriented, groups will thrive. In addition to the changing and sometimes increasingly desperate economic needs of farmers (as interest rates soared and farmers took on debt in order to respond to

rising prices), the articulated interests of farmers have become fragmented along ideological and commodity specific lines.

The CFA has been the biggest loser. At times it has appeared to be ensnared within a network of government consultative mechanisms which are sometimes perceived to be simple instruments for legitimizing unpopular governmental policies (as was the case with the use of SAGITS during the FTA negotiations). At other times the CFA has been divided internally by increasingly contradictory forces within the national farm community and alienated from the frequently besieged farm producer. As such, the CFA has been forced to face the fact that while it continues to be the only national umbrella for Canadian agriculture, it is no longer regarded as the only national representative for the farm sector.

As was the case in this century's earlier decades, the form of organizational action taken by Canadian farmers continues to be directly and indirectly affected by the constraining forces of both federal government policies and the international political economy. Post-war arrangements between the government and farm organizations which lasted into the 1950s and 1960s faded due to changing conditions.

Endnotes

1. In general, this can be described as the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system. See Robert Cox, "Global Restructuring: Making Sense of the Changing International Political Economy," Political Economy and the Changing Global Order, Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey Underhill, eds. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1994).
2. A parallel question earlier this century concerned the links between the farm groups and the two major parties. See Chapter Two.
3. Theodore H. Cohn, The International Politics of Agricultural Trade: Canadian American Relations in a Global Agricultural Context (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1990), p. 73.
4. Which, of course, ultimately led to the 1985 US Farm Bill which was aimed at reducing international grain prices while maintaining the income of American farmers. G. Lermer and K. Klein, "Problems and Prospects of Canadian Agricultural Trade," Canadian Agricultural Trade: Disputes, Actions and Prospects, Lermer and Klein, eds. (Calgary: University of Calgary Press), p. 2.
5. Gary C. Carlson, Farm Voices: A Brief History and Reference Guide of Prairie Farm Organizations and Their Leaders, 1870 to 1980 (Regina: Saskatchewan Federation of Agriculture, 1981), p. 18. See also, Cohn, op. cit., pp. 67-72.
6. Canada, Task Force on Agriculture, Canadian Agriculture in the Seventies, (Ottawa, 1970), excerpt printed in K.J. Rea and J.T. McLeod, eds., Business and Government in Canada: Selected Readings, 2nd Ed. (Toronto: Methuen, 1976), pp. 163-165.
7. Cited in Grace Skogstad, The Politics of Agricultural Policy-Making in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), pp. 27-28.
8. Linda McCombs Young, The Formation of Wheat Policies in the U.S., Canada and Japan: Case Studies of Endogenizing Policy Behavior, Ph.D. Dissertation (University of California, 1987), p. 211.
9. Barry K. Wilson, Farming the System: How Politicians and Producers Shape Canadian Agricultural Policy (Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1990), p. 278, n.11.

10. The impact of the Soviet grain purchases and other events have been described elsewhere. See Dan Morgan, Merchants of Grain (Middlesex: Penguin, 1980), pp. 47-51.

11. Theodore Cohn writes: "With the production cutbacks in the major exporting countries, the world was especially vulnerable to inclement weather, massive Soviet grain purchases, and other unexpected events, and carryover stocks in 1972-73 fell to their lowest levels in twenty years." op. cit., p. 75.

12. Ibid., p. 75.

13. At the national level, the federal government's policies began to be aimed less at income supports and more on curbing government expenditures. From 1968 onward, Budget and Throne Speeches began taking aim at making "tough priorities" and curbing inflation. G. Bruce Doern and Richard Phidd, Canadian Public Policy: Ideas, Structure, Process (Toronto: Methuen, 1983), pp. 235-236.

14. Skogstad, op. cit., p. 29.

15. Murray Fulton, et al, Canadian Agricultural Policy and Prairie Agriculture (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada, 1989), p. 15.

16. Bank of Canada figures, cited in The Canadian World Almanac & Book of Facts: 1990 (Toronto: Global Press, 1989), p. 331.

17. Ronald T. Libby, Protecting Markets: U.S. Policy and the World Grain Trade (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), p. 1.

18. Fulton, et al, op. cit., p. 14.

19. The drought's repercussions hit more than the average farm. It was blamed for Manitoba's "anemic" economic growth (.9 per cent) and Saskatchewan's loss of 5.1 per cent in 1988. "Saskatchewan Loser in Growth Forecast," The Globe and Mail [Report on Business], 2 November, 1988. Even Premier Devine's farm was reported to be on the brink of bankruptcy. "Divine Family Shares in Pain of Farm Crisis," The Ottawa Citizen, 6 March, 1990; "Hard Times: Grant Devine Finding Family Farm No Refuge," The Globe and Mail, 5 March, 1990. For a description of the prairie drought see Barry Wilson, op. cit., pp. 38-40.

20. Canadian Wheat Board, Report to Producers in the 1988/89 Crop Year, [Booklet], p. 6.

21. Robert M. Campbell, Grand Illusions: The Politics of the Keynesian Experience in Canada, 1945-1975 (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1987), Chapter 7; and G. Bruce Doern and Richard Phidd, op. cit., p. 236.

22. Another shift occurred with the 1972/73 fiscal year when the priorities also included a concern with unemployment. Material used here to discuss budget priorities in the 1970s and early 1980s is based on G. Bruce Doern and Richard W. Phidd, op. cit., Chapter 10. See also G. Bruce Doern, "Priorities and Priority Setting in the Trudeau Era: The Political Problems of Doing First Things First," How Ottawa Spends: The Liberals, The Opposition and Federal Priorities, 1983, G.B. Doern, ed. (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1983).

23. See William Coleman, "Macroeconomic Policy: Dwindling Options," Governing Canada: Institutions and Public Policy, Michael Atkinson, ed. (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1993), p. 226-227.

24. Later that same year, in the Speech from the Throne, it was announced that priority would be given to policies aimed at industrial expansion but with public wage and general expenditure constraint. When not dealing with inflation, the government was dealing with issues of national unity. In the October 1976 Throne Speech the new priority was to be national unity and language policy. This, along with the PQ victory in Quebec, set additional items on the government's policy agenda for subsequent years. Doern and Phidd, op. cit., passim.

25. See, for example, W.T. Stanbury, "Privatization and the Mulroney Government, 1984-1988," Canada Under Mulroney: An End-of-Term Report, Andrew Gollner and Daniel Salee, eds., (Montreal: Vehicule Press, 1988).

26. The provinces have started along this road as well. In the early months of 1993, Saskatchewan announced an objective of cutting its deficit by half. British Columbia's objective was a 25 per cent cut, and Newfoundland's aim was to reduce the deficit by 36 per cent. It has yet to be determined what impact this has had on Canada's agriculture sector. The Ottawa Citizen, 13 April, 1993.

27. Fanny S. Demers, "The Department of Finance and the Bank of Canada: The Fiscal and Monetary Policy Mix," How Ottawa Spends: The Politics of Competitiveness, 1992-93, Frances Abele, ed. (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1992), pp. 79-80.

28. "Liberal Talking Points on the Fiscal Situation and the Unacceptably High 1992-93 Deficit," Government briefing

document, 16 November 1993. See also the "Speech From the Throne," Hansard, 18 January, 1994, p. 10.

29. Skogstad, op. cit., p. 58.

30. Ibid., pp. 58-59.

31. No contributions were made from 1979 to 1981. Ibid., p. 82.

32. David Berthelet, "Agriculture Canada Policy and Expenditure Patterns, 1868 - 1983," Canadian Farm Economics, Vol. 19 (1), pp. 11-13.

33. Ibid., p. 14.

34. This discussion is based on Monique Rodier, "Federal Government Expenditures in the Agri-Food Industry: 1970-71 to 1982-83," Canadian Farm Economics, Vol. 19(1), 1985, Section 2.

35. Fulton, et al, op. cit., p. 36.

36. See Monique Rodier, op. cit., Section 2.

37. Skogstad, op. cit., p. 123.

38. This account, and the discussion which follows, is largely derived from Skogstad, Ibid., p. 126-153.

39. In spite of being considered by some as an outside and radical actor in the policy game, the NFU was able to "maintain an excellent pipeline into the government. It obtained documents that quickly were passed to sympathetic reporters. These disclosures often cast[ed] doubt on government sincerity and gave the opponents more ammunition." (Wilson, op. cit., p. 226.)

40. J.D. Forbes, Institutions and Influence Groups in Canadian Farm and Food Policy (Toronto: Institute of Public Administration of Canada, 1985), p. 103.

41. More research is needed regarding the extent to which mixed farming tempered the differences between the organizations, which were merely following the interests of their particular commodities. In a recent letter to me, this point was raised by a University of Regina rural sociologist, Bob Stirling.

42. Barry Wilson, op. cit., p. 144.

43. Letter issued to the House of Commons Transportation Committee, cited in Barry Wilson, op. cit., p. 145.

44. Michael Prince, "Little Help on the Prairie: Canadian Farm Income Programs and the Western Grain Economy," How Ottawa Spends: 1990-91, K. Graham, ed. (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1990), p. 150.

45. Ibid., p. 141.

46. Prince, Ibid.

47. David Berthelet, op. cit., pp. 13-14, and Michael Prince, op. cit., pp. 162-166.

48. For a discussion of this term as it relates to the Canadian political economy see David Crane, The Canadian Dictionary of Business and Economic (Toronto: Stoddart, 1993), pp. 276-277. Essentially, globalization is defined as the "shift in investment, production, and trade decisions from serving national markets to serving world markets."

49. M. Patricia Marchak ties economic restructuring (globalization) to the decline of Keynesian policies in the following manner. "The world is undergoing several revolutions at the same time.... The new right...was a response to the decline of American hegemony, to the rise of Japan and a united Europe, to the technological changes that were taking place in the 1960s and 1970s, and to the mobility of capital. It provided the ideological basis for a massive restructuring of industry and labour in all countries, and it provided the rationale for the dismantling of the Keynesian welfare state in the industrial countries." The Integrated Circus: The New Right and the Restructuring of Global Markets (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993), p. 252

50. Ibid., p. 53. This is part of a general pattern: most national governments treat agriculture as a policy field separate from general trade policy. Gordon L. Weil, Trade Policy in the 70's, (Washington, D.C.[?]: Twentieth Century Fund, 1969), p. 47.

51. Andrew F. Cooper, "Agriculture and the GATT: The Search for Balance in Canadian Trade Policy," Canada: The State of the Federation, 1992, Douglas Brown and Robert Young, eds. (Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, 1992), pp. 207-212.

52. G. Bruce Doern and Brian W. Tomlin, Faith and Fear: The Free Trade Story (Toronto: Stoddart, 1991), p. 115.

53. Doern and Tomlin, op. cit., p. 109.

54. Ibid., pp. 115-116.

55. Wilson, Farming the System, op. cit., p. 268.

56. "...parties, interest groups, and public bureaucracies attempt to manage what is represented in the political system. In efforts to manage their own policy agendas, parties, interest groups, and public bureaucracies exclude certain issues and social problems. The established system of representation often becomes rigid and closed. At times, pressure to consider new problems and issues originates outside parties and the institutionalized network for interest-group consultation. Increasingly, new social movements have performed this function of innovation." Claude Galipeau, "Political Parties, Interest Groups, and New Social Movements: Toward New Representations?" Canadian Parties in Transition, Alain Gagnon and A. Brian Tanguay, eds., p. 405. See also, Claus Offe, "New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics," Social Research, Vol. 52 (4).

57. For example, cattle producers are unhappy that farmers have a grain export freight subsidy. Export subsidies mean that local prices of feed grains remain inflated.

58. Canadian farmer unions have a long history within a number of regions. It is only in the past twenty-five years that it has had a coherent voice at the national level. This is covered later in this chapter.

59. Regional farmer unions have been operating with various degrees of success throughout the twentieth century. In 1943, the United Farmers of Canada (Alberta Section) was renamed the Alberta Farmers' Union. The Manitoba Farmers' Union was organized in 1948 and in the following year the United Farmers of Canada (Saskatchewan Section) became the Saskatchewan Farmers' Union. In 1952, the Ontario Farmers' Union was founded as was the British Columbia Farmers' Union in 1955. Each regional union had full autonomy with its own elected officials and board of directors. (NFU, "Historical Background to the National Farmers Union," fax release to UGG, 19 Nov., 1991. Also, printed in the NFU January, 1990, Annual Convention report.)

60. Carlson, op. cit., p. 15.

61. Ibid., p. 17.

62. NFU, "Historical Background..." op. cit., p. 1.

63. NFU, "Historical Background...", op. cit..

64. Dissent arose in the Alberta camp as the Alberta Farmers' Union formally joined the CFA's provincial federation, Unifarm. However, many Alberta union members were displeased with this move and opted to join the new NFU. In the end various Alberta locals came to be born outside the old provincial union's structure.

65. NFU, "Historical Background...", op. cit., p. 2.

66. Carlson, op. cit., p. 64.

67. "New NFU Official Faces Challenge," The Western Producer, 9 July, 1992.

68. This account is drawn from "1969 - 1989: Two Decades of Progressive Farm Policies," in the 1990 NFU 20th Annual Convention publication, pp. 18-19, 21-34.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid., p. 31.

71. Confrontational politics between the NFU and the government were heightened when the NFU claimed in 1977 that they were on a RCMP blacklist. Ibid., p. 23.

72. Included in a list would be the National Citizens' Coalition and various environmental groups, not to mention the numerous cases which have been linked to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. A. Paul Pross, Group Politics and Public Policy (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 170-173 (Pross also covers this subject in the second edition of this book, Group Politics and Public Policy, 2nd Ed. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 181-184).

73. NFU, "1969 - 1989...", op. cit., p. 25.

74. Ibid., p. 26.

75. This issue has cropped up again with the recent signing of the GATT agreement which will probably force Canada into revising its rail subsidies. See the articles by Barry Wilson in the July 1994 issues of The Western Producer.

76. In the deepening farm crisis, the NFU was not the only organization participating in such activities. Developing in the political spaces made open by worsening financial conditions in the 1980s, and beyond the scope of the general organizations, groups such as the Canadian Farmers Survival Association were born. Activities included farm gate defences, as well as penny auctions in which the farm assets were bought by the neighbours and given back to the original

owner. General protest tactics such as hunger strikes, legal battles, and other pre-1940s tactics were once again finding their usefulness. See Alan Wilford, Farm Gate Defense: The Story of the Canadian Farmers Survival Association (Toronto: New Canada Publications, 1985).

77. Of course, such activities saved only a fraction of a percent of the annual 650 Canadian farms declaring bankruptcy in the mid-1980s. The annual bankruptcy rate for Canadian farms was estimated in 1987 to be 650 a year. "Canadian Farming," CBC Ideas, CBC Radio, 1987.

78. Two points should be made here. The first point is that an overview of the 1970s and 1980s reveals that the NFU continued to be an outsider in the policy making process, that is, it vocalized opposition to already formulated policy measures. For example, it expressed opposition in 1971 to the Natural Farm Products Marketing Act and the Prairie Grain Income Stabilization Act. Both these bills were later withdrawn. In 1972, it submitted reports regarding how eggs should be regulated under the National Farm Products Marketing Act (which oversees the national marketing board system).

Secondly, it is beyond the scope of this study to examine provincial agricultural politics. However, it is apparent that provincial governments have often been the target of NFU lobbying. Here are a few examples. In 1977, 600 Saskatchewan members made a submission to the provincial government calling for a beef marketing commission. In the same year, it made a submission to the Ontario Porter Commission regarding future hydro activities. In 1980, it presented a plan to the Ontario Farm Products Marketing Board in order to outline a plan for a Corn Marketing Agency. (NFU, "1969 - 1989: Two Decades...", op. cit.)

79. Whelan, telephone interview, op. cit.

80. NFU, "1969-1989: Two Decades..." op. cit., p. 22.

81. There were two main reasons for the UGG's drastic decline in profits for the 1989 year. First, its Vancouver grain terminal was shut down for a number of months in order that major renovations could be done. According to the company's report to its shareholders, this alone was responsible for "a \$10 million decline in terminal earnings." Second, its country elevator business lost \$2.3 million while its grain shipments fell by 1.2 million tonnes due to the drought-stricken crops of 1988. Lorne Hehn, "Letter to Shareholders and Employees," UGG Eighty-Fourth Annual Report, p. 5.

82. Bill Redekop, "Co-op Era Withers as Pool Goes Public," Winnipeg Free Press, 22 July, 1994. As the reader will note from the title of my source here, the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool

has followed the UGG's example by entering its stock on the TSE.

83. UGGL, Minutes of the Annual Meeting: 1948; UGGL, Minutes of the Annual Meeting: 1975.

84. Chris Adams, "Institutionalized Lobbying: Mixed Successes in Canadian Grain Politics," Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association (Calgary, June, 1994), p. 26.

85. UGGL, Minutes of the Annual Meeting, 1982. This was to be in exchange for the railways' commitment to maintain unprofitable rail-lines.

86. Delivering the Western Grain Transportation Act Benefit to Producers: Final Report of the Producer Payment Panel (Ottawa: June, 1994), p. 66.

87. United Grain Growers Limited, Directors' Handbook: 1993, p. 27.

88. In the summer of 1994 the WCWGA's president, Hubert Esquirol, renewed his organization's call for sacrificing the CWB in exchange for a more open US market for Canadian wheat. The Western Producer, 11 August, 1994.

89. n.a. "Perennial WGTA Subsidy Lobby Gathering Steam Again," The Lobby Monitor, Vol. 5 (18), 11 July, 1994, p. 4.

90. UGGL, Minutes of the Annual General Meeting: 1955.

91. UGGL, Minutes of the Annual General Meeting: 1973.

92. UGGL, Minutes of the Annual General Meeting: 1986.

93. UGGL, Minutes of the Annual General Meeting: 1982. For a full account of the fight over Canagrex see Barry K. Wilson, Farming the System, op. cit., Chapter 6.

94. In 1987, the AGM supported a motion which contained two features: 1) that the UGG encourage government endeavours in the FTA talks and 2) that the organization pressure the government to continue talks with the aim of reducing subsidies in competing countries. UGGL, Minutes of the Annual General Meeting: 1987.

95. UGGL, Minutes of the Annual General Meeting: 1965.

96. The WAC was an umbrella for western farm interests and it included the provincial CFA affiliates. Adams, op. cit., p. 26.

97. UGGL, Minutes of the Annual General Meeting: 1969.

98. UGGL, Minutes of the Annual General Meeting: 1983.

99. The CFA was not the only group under attack. In 1972 a motion which read that all support from the UGG to farm unions be withdrawn was amended to read "organizations" instead of "unions". However, being somewhat drastic, the motion was defeated on the floor. UGGL, Minutes of the Annual General Meeting: 1972.

100. UGGL, Minutes of the Annual General Meeting: 1985.

101. While the CFA was destabilized, the provincial affiliates on the prairies underwent their own series of internal crises. Already mentioned is the closing of the Manitoba Federation's doors in the early 1980s. While it has since been replaced by KAP in 1984 (KAP, "Keystone Agricultural Producers: Manitoba's General Policy Organization," pamphlet, n.d.. To use their own descriptive words, "Keystone Agricultural Producers Inc. is a democratically controlled organization with STRENGTH THROUGH UNITY as its underlying principle. It was established in 1984 by farmers to represent the farming community in Manitoba on policy matters of common importance to all agricultural producers." Ibid. However, along with its Albertan cousin, Unifarm, it continues to suffer chronic financial problems. Regarding the case of KAP, see "Keystone Executive Decides to Launch Emergency Membership Drive," Western Producer, 27 June, 1991; and "Money Problems Continue to Plague Farm Group," Western Producer, 10 October, 1991.

102. See David Berthelet, op. cit., pp. 11-13.

103. CFA Annual Reports, selected years.

104. Gordon Weil, op. cit.; and McCombs Young, op. cit.

105. See Kenneth Woodside, "Trade and Industrial Policy: Hard Choices," Governing Canada: Institutions and Public Policy, Michael M. Atkinson, ed. (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1993), pp. 265-266.

106. Canada's position within the GATT negotiations was that a balance should be struck. That is, the grain war should be ended without an end to a country's ability to have marketing boards (which are deemed to be trade protectionist in nature).

107. CFA Executive Director's Report 1993, p. 2.

108. These years were chosen chiefly for the reason that 1990 was a mid-term year between federal elections while 1993 was an election year. The reader will note that the CFA continued its policy of non-partisanship and that its behaviour was barely altered by the election's advent.

109. There is nothing new here. A review of the CFA's correspondence in archival holdings, going back to the 1940s, shows that the CBC would, as a matter of course, invite the CFA to speak on farm issues in a "non-partisan" fashion during each federal election. (CFA Archival Holdings, Box 2, 1945 correspondence between President Hannam and the CBC.)

110. CFA, Executive Director's Report, 1990 (Ottawa: February, 1991), p. 6; CFA, Executive Director's Report, 1993 (Ottawa: February, 1994), p. 12.

111. The reader will recall that the international political economy's instability (both in general and in the particular area of agriculture trade) had two consequences for grain politics. First, it made operating a prairie grain farm an increasingly precarious job. Without an operating IWA, prices were unstable as were world grain supplies. The second implication was that state policy shifted away from promoting post-war economic expansionism and, instead, focused on controlling inflationary expenditures while, in the 1980s, supporting trade liberalization.

Conclusion

After winning 65 seats with almost one-quarter of the national vote in the 1921 Federal Election,¹ T.A. Crerar in his first major address to the House of Commons as the leader of the agrarian-based Progressive Party stood up in the House of Commons and demanded government measures which would help serve western farmers.² What has happened since the 1921 federal election to farmer organizations and such forms of political action? At least with regard to the Canadian prairies, early farm organizations were formed in order that grain producers could respond to their economic powerlessness and a growing sense that their concerns were not being vocalized within the policy process. They were able to form a number of provincial governments under a variety of labels, and were represented by the second largest party - the Progressive Party - in the House of Commons in 1921, yet forming political parties was generally viewed by the farmers themselves as a desperate measure. Farmers inside such prominent organizations as the Grain Growers and Canadian Council of Agriculture, initially rejected the notion of affiliating themselves with a national farmers' party. However, regardless of which of the two major parties was in power, much of the CCA's "Farmer's Platform"³ continued to be ignored, especially those parts which called for reduced

tariffs and state measures to control profiteering within the grain handling system.

Once formed under the auspices of Canada's first national umbrella farm group, the Canadian Council of Agriculture, the Progressive Party was immediately successful within the national electoral arena. It was, however, in spite of its early successes that the Progressives won few long-term victories. Canadian economic history shows that forces beyond the control of a national legislative assembly are usually the source of domestic disruptions.

In part, this dissertation has proved to be an account of political history. That is, it threads a path from this century's early years up to the 1990s, and shows how the organizational politics of western Canadian farmers have taken a number of forms. The devastating economic events in 1929 and the subsequent decade crippled such major groups as the CCA (which folded in the mid-1930s) and the three provincial wheat pools (which were forced to beg for government bail-outs in order to survive). In other words, powerful farm organizations which grew in response to the farmer's marginalized position and which in the 1920s were threatening to take over the government as well as many parts of the grain system itself, were now in themselves revealed to be vulnerable by a combination of unpredictable crop conditions, the destabilized international political economy, world-wide grain surpluses, and glutted grain export markets.

Chapter Three, however, shows that by the 1930s those within the provincial and federal government realised that a number of farm organizations, insofar as they had become important to the prairie economy's operations, could not be allowed to collapse. This was in addition to the obvious concerns regarding electoral fall-out (this has been covered quite well by a large number of academic accounts including those produced by Seymour Martin Lipset,⁴ C. B. Macpherson,⁵ and, more recently, Alvin Finkel⁶). The evidence provided in Chapters Two and Three in this dissertation supports the claim that more than votes were at stake. The reader should recall the contents of Table 2.5 in which the extent to which the farm organizations had become an essential part of the prairie's economic machinery is shown. For example, by the second half of the 1920s, the three farmer-owned wheat pools in the West were consistently delivering over one-half of Canada's western grain supply. Allowing these groups to disappear would have had serious consequences. If the provincial and federal governmental refused to support the collapsing pools in 1930 it would have meant a complete collapse of not only wheat prices but the Canadian grain economy's structure.⁷ In this sense, the economic crisis forced the federal government to take its first steps towards working with farm groups. Two aspects of the grain sector needed attention: the maintenance of the grain system's infrastructure and farm incomes.

By the end of the 1930s government intervention appeared in three forms: price stabilization through the new Canadian Wheat Board, income stabilization for farm regions undergoing a severe reduction of income, and international diplomatic efforts to curb international disruptions within the grain trade. However, these early actions, especially concerning the new wheat board (which had yet to be granted its currently held powers over western wheat exports), were considered to be half-hearted attempts to placate western farmers.

In the 1940s, with the Canadian economy set on a wartime footing, and a federal government which was committed to maintaining a smoothly running agricultural sector, a number of farm organizations, both new and old, were drawn into close consultative arrangements within the policy process. Two categories of groups benefitted from these new arrangements. In the first category were those organizations which operated important prairie farm services in aid of farm production, processing, and delivery; in terms of the grain sector, these were the wheat pools and the UGG. The second category included organizations which belonged to no specific farm sector (such as dairy, grain, or livestock) but were able to make legitimate claims that they represented all farmers; these were the CFA and its provincial affiliates.

Regardless of whether they could be found in the first or second category, these organizations had a number of characteristics. First, these groups were institutionalized

entities in that under the guidance of a stable leadership, they were capable of operating a permanent head office with hired staff (to name just a few of the characteristics). Secondly, they maintained an air of legitimacy. That is, they contained a formalized democratic structure, including regular leadership elections and regularly scheduled membership meetings. The CFA, with its claims to being the national voice of Canadian farming, and such specialized groups as the three provincial pools, the UGG, and the Canadian Cattlemen Association, all came to be seen as the legitimate representatives for specialized interests within their respective fields. Thirdly, during the Second World War and in subsequent decades, Canada's major farm groups became aggressively neutral with regard to questions of party affiliation. So much was this the case that in the 1940s the CFA forced one of its directors, P.D. McArthur, who had become the president of the Progressive Conservative Party, to resign (the reader is referred to the first and second letters which are presented in Appendix 2).⁸ Fourthly, since the 1930's and aside from a few exceptional cases, such as the campaign for acreage payments in the late 1950s (as discussed in Chapter Four), major farm groups have eschewed confrontational tactics when seeking to influence the policy-making process. Instead, all of the Canadian major farm groups, especially the CFA, took great care to let their members know the extent of their lobbying operations. Annual reports and speeches are filled

with examples of how farm groups have attended government hearings and committees and their successes in working within subgovernmental spheres. With regard to the CFA, one obvious example since the 1940s is the fact that the Federation annually appeared before the Prime Minister and Cabinet. As a second example, the CFA made regular presentations to Royal Commissions including no less than three appearances before the Royal Commission on Taxation in 1963.⁹ Third, for a number of decades the CFA has been formally represented within a number of government advisory boards and agencies.¹⁰

Chapter Five shows that the dominance of these forms of organizational action has weakened with the crises of the 1970s and 1980s. What can be termed the post-war politics of "demobilization" has become more complicated. Now, western farmers find a number of avenues along which their interests are channelled at the national level. The CFA, the wheat pools, and the UGG continue to operate in the 1990s in much the same way as they did in the 1940s and 1950s.¹¹ In spite of this they now operate in a policy field which now contains a number of voices which are sometimes contradictory. At the same time as the CFA was pushed into a neutral position on the issue, in the 1970s and 1980s the National Farmers Union played a major role in combatting the federal government's attempts to alter rail transportation subsidies. On another issue, whereas both the wheat pools and CFA are long-time supporters of the Canadian Wheat Board, other groups which

claim to represent western grain farmers, such as the Western Canadian Wheat Growers Association, have called for its dismantlement.¹²

William Coleman argues that the increasingly specialized nature of Canadian farming has contributed to the fragmentation of the farm organizations. He writes:

The trend in agriculture since the end of the Second World War, particularly since 1960, has been...towards specialization. As farmers have become more specialized, the interest in and support for associations with more restricted, commodity-based domains have also increased. Consequently, the past decade has seen a series of challenges by groups such as the Canadian Cattlemen's Association to the CFA and its claim to speak for all farmers. The specialist commodity groups depart from the approach of the CFA by stressing the uniqueness of their given sectors rather than the problems farmers have in common.¹³

Indeed, drawing from observations which were originally raised by Grace Skogstad, Coleman argues that these narrowly defined groups share a number of characteristics. They are economically conservative in that they support policies which are market oriented rather than those which involve the government. Secondly, there is a sense of general distrust for the government. Thirdly, the prairie farm is conceptualized as a business enterprise. One consequence of this is that members within these farm groups identify themselves with those involved in agribusiness, processing, distributing, and retailing rather than more traditionally based farm groups such as the CFA or the grain cooperatives.¹⁴

The farmer-owned cooperatives have not been immune to the political shift identified by Coleman. For example, within the cooperative organizations there has been a fundamental reconsideration of how a farmer-owned company should be capitalized. Since 1992, both the UGG and the largest of the three wheat pools, the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, have committed themselves to placing their stocks on the Toronto Stock Exchange.

While farm groups have increasingly contradicted one another over a number of national agricultural issues, the tactics used for lobbying the government have increasingly varied. In contrast to an abhorrence for confrontational activity expressed especially by such leaders as the CFA's long-term leader H.H. Hannam (and in addition to the above mentioned retreat by some farmers into the folds of narrow commodity groups), grain farmers have varied the means by which their grievances could be expressed as the agricultural crisis deepened in the 1970s and 1980s. No longer assured that the quiet lobbying measures used by the Federation in the backrooms of Ottawa are the best and only tactics available, many of those farmers who have been hit hard by their changing economic fortunes have resorted to such confrontational strategies as farm-gate defences and protest rallies.¹⁵

Section 3.1 in Chapter Five provides, at some length, an account of how one organization, the NFU, was able to play

both sides of the fence. That is, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, it has used a wide array of strategies including preparing briefs and making appearances before government committees and hearings while, at the same time, organizing more rambunctious events such as highway blockades as well as preventing an unpopular federal cabinet minister (Jean-Luc Pepin) from attending a Saskatchewan meeting on transportation subsidies

Throughout this dissertation and within each chapter various historical periods in Canadian western agriculture have been identified with certain forms of organized activity. Prior to the 1930s, prairie farmers began forming a wide-array of organizations including farmer unions, federal and provincial farmer parties, and co-operative ventures. The farmer co-operatives ranged in size from various local town stores¹⁶ to mammoth province-wide wheat pools and delivery systems. These farmer-owned ventures continued to operate in later years, however, between 1930 and 1940, the political channelling of farmer interests increasingly went through broadly focused provincial and national agricultural federations which were drawn into consultative policy-making arrangements within the government.

Quickly disappearing at the national level were the more confrontational farmer unions and farmer parties. Farm groups in the post-World War Two era and up to the late 1960s consolidated their consultative roles which had opened up

under conditions of economic depression and wartime. Both the CFA and its provincial federations, while maintaining a stable membership, enjoyed a lengthy period in which they were recognized as the legitimate voice of farmers. Finally, over the past few decades this era of organizational stability was replaced by a period beset by conflicting farm voices and varying political strategies. Some provincial farm federations folded (in Manitoba and Saskatchewan), the CFA lost its claim as being the sole legitimate voice for the national farm sector, the farm union movement became invigorated, and commodity groups with their narrow interests and general support for "free-market" solutions rose in prominence.

Describing the changing forms of farm organization activity is one thing, explaining them is another. Throughout this dissertation a number of explanatory factors were identified, the most influential being events and forces external to Canada's borders: international conflicts, subsidy and price wars, wheat surpluses on the international market, escalating prices on production costs (such as energy), and the widespread trend towards trade liberalization. At different times and in different ways such events and forces have had both a direct and an indirect impact on the farm groups.

Declining farm incomes and a sense of economic unpredictability are the direct result of external sources of

turbulence, their organizations suffered along two fronts. First, the farm membership diminished and became less capable of purchasing the various services which organizations offered, let alone paying annual membership dues. This occurred in the 1930s with regard to the wheat pools, and in the 1980s with the collapse of two western provincial federations. Second, additional strain was placed on the existing organizations as their members became increasingly desperate for solutions. Examples range from the wide-scale abandonment of traditional parties in the 1920s and 1930s to the more recent rejuvenation of a national farm union movement.

While it is only natural that farm organizations are affected by the economic health of the sectors they represent, they also become directly affected by changes in federal government policy priorities and the means by which new policies are shaped. However, the determinants of policy-change do not always originate in Ottawa. The federal government's policies and priorities within each historical era have been, by and large, determined by external forces within the international political economy.

In addition to providing a political history of the politics of organized grain farmers, this dissertation has attempted to assess the extent to which a post-pluralist model

successfully explains variations in interest group behaviour and successes. Post-pluralism over-emphasizes the importance of institutional resources and organizational "maturity". That is, the most successful groups are those organizations which avoid public confrontations with the government and, instead, muster together their resources and work their way into sub-governmental policy fields. However, historical evidence appears to show that this type of political process (the solidification of consultative arrangements between well equipped groups and government) is not always found in a parliamentary democracy.

Furthermore, the height of consultative arrangements between interest groups and the Canadian government appears to have occurred in an era in which pluralist theorising was at its own height: the 1950s and 1960s. At least with regard to Canadian agriculture, this period was marked by moderately interventionist policy-making and a healthy system of international grain markets governed under the IWA, not to mention the more general context of trade multilateralism. Under such conditions it was only natural that those groups which could draw the most members and resources while committing themselves to non-confrontational relations with the government would be the most successful.

Chapter Five explores the fact that events in the 1970s and 1980s revealed that the post-war conditions underlying

mutually beneficial government-group relations should not always be assumed. It is true that many of the most mature and institutionalized groups survived and continue to play a role in the federal policy-process yet even they lost ground to an increasingly capable set of new groups. Although they are more prone to using confrontational tactics when lobbying the government, groups such as the WCWGA and NFU have proved themselves to be neither single-issue groups nor temporal entities.

In short, the post-pluralist model may explain some aspects of interest group politics, however with regard to agriculture politics it falls short in two ways. Leaving aside the debates over its society-centric features,¹⁷ post-pluralism is overly attentive to pressures from within the national polity, thus leaving out external pressures. Second, it emphasizes an idealized notion that the best equipped group will win the most policy rewards. In fact, during times of trouble these groups occasionally appear inflexible or vulnerable to disruptions within the ranks of their own membership.

What then does a study of interest groups representing grain farmers at the national level tell us? First, aside from the forceful entry of farmer parties into Canadian legislative assemblies, the history of grain farm politics at the federal level shows that in general farm groups were brought into consultative arrangements due to changing

government priorities rather than through organizational strength. Second, the successful group which consults closely with government policy makers may not be able to disentangle itself when the government makes a damaging decision, hence it appears that on occasion it is simply best not to be caught in the backrooms. Finally, institutional resources are important yet they rarely supersede structural influences arising from the international political economy.

Endnotes

1. Hugh G. Thorburn, ed., Party Politics in Canada, 5th Ed. (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1985), Appendix, p. 349.
2. Hansard, 14 March, 1922, Vol. 151, pp. 53-55.
3. The reader is referred to the Appendix in Hopkins Moorhouse's Deep Furrows (Toronto: McLeod, 1918) for the text of the Farmer's Platform.
4. Seymour Martin Lipset, Agrarian Socialism: The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation in Saskatchewan. A Study in Political Sociology (New York: Anchor Books, 1968 [1950]).
5. C. B. Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta: Social Credit and the Party System (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1953).
6. Alvin Finkel, The Social Credit Phenomenon in Alberta (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989).
7. As well, one can draw parallels with other sectors in the Canadian economy. One example is the bail-out of Chrysler Canada in 1980. Charlotte Yates, "Public Policy and Canadian and American Autoworkers: Divergent Fortunes," Driving Continentally: National Policies and the North American Auto Industry, Maureen Appel Molot, ed. (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1993), p. 216.
8. Letter to CFA President H.H. Hannam from Henri C. Bois, Cooperative Federée de Quebec, 12 May, 1944; CFA letter to R.H.M. Bailey, President, Dairy Farmer of Canada, 17 May, 1944; CFA Statement [Draft], "Interpretation of Non-Partisanship Policy," circulated 23 May, 1944, to the CFA Directors. CFA Holdings, National Archives, File 82, Volume 25.
9. CFA holdings, National Archives, Box 1. Another example is its appearance before the Royal Commission on Farm Machinery in 1968. CFA holdings, National Archives, Box 2.
10. For example, in his 1953 Presidential Address to the CFA, H.H. Hannam listed the following boards and agencies as having CFA representatives: The National Agricultural Advisory Committee, the Federal-Provincial "Outlook Conference", the National Employment Committee, the National Advisory Manpower Council, the Transport Board, the Tariff Board, various Parliamentary Committees, Senate Committees, and advisory bodies to the Income Tax Division. CFA "President's Annual

Address", 27 January, 1953, Victoria, B.C., CFA holdings, National Archives, Vol. 67, File 10.

11. Of course, notwithstanding the fact that both the UGG and the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool sell, or are committed to sell, their stocks on the Toronto Stock Exchange.

12. In the summer of 1994 the WCWGA's president, Hubert Esquirol, renewed his organization's call for sacrificing the CWB in exchange for a more open US market for Canadian wheat. The Western Producer, 11 August, 1994. As well, the UGG has supported an open-market policy with regard to many currently held CWB powers, including the marketing of barley (see Chapter 5).

13. William Coleman, Business and Politics: A Study of Collective Action (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988), p. 109.

14. Ibid., p. 109-110.

15. Skogstad reported in her PhD dissertation that in general, NFU supporters reported being economically discontent and alienated from the political system. "In summarizing the major trends in Tables E.1 and E.2 [not shown here] the most important finding is the close link among Economic Discontent, Political Powerlessness, and the NFU Belief Cluster." Grace Skogstad, Farmers' Political Belief Systems, PhD. Dissertation (University of British Columbia, 1976), p. 330.

16. See Ian MacPherson, Each For All: A History of the Co-operative Movement in English Canada 1900-1945 (Toronto: Macmillan, 1979), Chapter 4; Brett Fairbairn, Building a Dream: The Co-operative Retailing System in Western Canada, 1928-1988 (Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1989), Chapter 3.

17. cf. my discussion in Chapter One regarding William Coleman's thesis (Business and Politics: A Study of Collective Action (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988), Chapter 6) on collective action and Canadian agricultural politics.

18. This aspect to pluralist theory (which was not considered to be an important issue in this dissertation) is covered in some detail by the following two APSR articles. Gabriel Almond, "The Return to the State," APSR, Vol. 82 (3), September, 1988; Eric Nordlinger, et al., "The Return to the State: Critiques," APSR, Vol. 82 (3), September, 1988.

Appendix 1

Figures

Figure 1

Source: Urquhart and Buckley, Historical Statistics of Canada.

Figure 2

Source: Berthelet, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

Figure 3

Source: K. Buckley, ed., Historical Statistics of Canada, 2nd Ed., pp. H474-H493.

Figure 4

Source: K. Buckley, ed., Historical Statistics of Canada, 2nd Ed., pp. Y211-Y223.

Figure 5

Figure 6

Figure 7

Figure 8

Figure 9

Figure 10

Figure 11

Appendix 2

Statements and Documents

CFA Statement [Draft]: "Interpretations of Non-Partisanship Policy." This document was circulated to the directors of the CFA's member organizations on the 23rd of May, 1944. The issue arose due to the fact that one of the CFA directors (who represented the interests of the Dairy Farmers of Canada on the CFA board) had become the President of the Progressive Conservative Party.

...members holding permanent office in the Federation cannot at the same time accept and assume prominent posts in the political field without running counter to the spirit of the Federation's declared policy of non-partisanship as set forth in its constitution.

Accordingly, in conformity with this established policy, those members of the Federation holding prominent official positions in the Federation who assume political posts of a prominent character, will be required to resign from their posts in the Federation. This does not necessarily involve the relinquishment of their membership, because the Federation recognizes that it is entirely proper that they should retain their membership in our organization.

Source: National Archives, CFA Volume 25, File 82.

The following is an excerpt of a confidential letter sent to Mr. J.S. Woodward, Managing Editor of the Saskatoon Star-Phoenix.

We have the utmost respect for Mr. McArthur, who has played a big part in organizing agriculture for many years. But it was quite obvious that when he accepted the National Presidency of the [Progressive Conservative] political party he could not very well continue in any national post in organized agriculture. Consequently he gave up both, the Dairy Farmers' post and his place on the [CFA] Directorate.

I do not mind telling you privately, that we feel that the party organizers are going out of their way to capitalize on Mr. McArthur's excellent record on organized Agriculture. This is alright, but it is time that they should cease using his former positions in the Federation for this purpose. Trusting you will keep this matter confidential and use it very wisely as we do not want to be drawn in any public controversy.

C.G. Graff

Secretary-Treasurer, CFA

Source: National Archives, CFA Volume 25, File 82.

The following two pages contain excerpts from letters which were exchanged in 1945 between a farm activist and the CFA's head office.

Letter to Mr. Colin Graff, Secretary of the CFA

From George N. Johnston, Loyalist, Alberta, 4 January, 1945.

...I had hoped you might be attending the Alberta Federation annual Convention in Calgary in December, and that I might be there to renew our acquaintance that began so many years ago [in the UFA].

I sponsored there a resolution recommending that the Federation set up in Parliament a farm block or links suitable to our Canadian set-up. This resolution will no doubt be discussed at the Dominion Federation meeting in Regina this month, as it passed, I believe, unanimously at Calgary.... The tremendous power wielded by the Block in the States - and admitted by all, convinces me that something somewhat similar only adapted to our conditions in Canada would strengthen the hand of your organization to probably a greater extent than any other course available at the date.

Colin Graff's response (on CFA letterhead) was as follows:

11 January, 1945.

Your letter was of great interest because it touches on a matter which still agitates many of our members who feel that more rapid progress might be made if we had political power within Parliament. I appreciate your honest view of the matter, and it is easy to agree with you in many respects. However, the matter has been before the directors of the Canadian Federation in more than one way on several occasions and so far the opinion has been rather unanimous against any such move. This was because of the feeling that if issues were forced into the political field, by a farm bloc in Parliament, then every issue would become a political one, or would be treated as a party issue or with party bias, and therefore not on its true merits. This would put into political action forces which at present have no political ground to fight agriculture, because we do not treat our problems on the political or party basis.

Source: National Archives, CFA Volume 25, File 82.

The following is a statement from the CFA's confidential bulletin which was sent regularly to each director of the Federation's members.

It has been said that the Canadian Federation of Agriculture does not take enough credit to itself in the public press for what it does on occasions. If this is true, it is not because of modesty, but because of policy. It is not good policy from several standpoints to rush into the press the minute the government does something we have asked them to do, and take a lot of credit for it. That sort of thing would soon upset the good standing we now have with the government at Ottawa - it would with any government, because no government likes that sort of thing. If we get what we want, it is often best to let the government announce it, and take credit for it. The main thing is to get the government to do the things we want them to do, and it is so much the better if the government makes it a matter of its own policy.

Source: CFA Membership Bulletin, No. 6, circa 1946. National Archives, File 73, Series 3, Vol. 51.

The following is taken from H.H. Hannam's CFA Presidential Address, Edmonton, 25 January, 1955.

The Canadian Federation of Agriculture has reached the place in national recognition and influence and prestige where it has become one of the main constructive forces shaping national and international agricultural policies in this country. In a healthy democracy, the rise of influence and power should always be accompanied by a corresponding rise in the measure of responsibility accepted by the citizen or association. So it is that the CFA is long past the point where a program of protest alone is fitting or proper. I do not suggest that a people's organization will or should ever reach the point where protest at times is likely to be undesirable but I do agree with the editor of the Farmer's Advocate and Canadian Countryman when he said in a recent issue of his paper that the Federation of Agriculture cannot merely voice a demand, toss all its serious problems on the doorstep of Government and then pack up and go home. On the contrary, he says, it is expected to tell the Federal Ministers how what they demand might be accomplished. In other words constructive leadership to its industry and a constructive approach to national programs should go hand in hand with the maturity and strength achieved by the Canadian Federation of Agriculture.

Source: National Archives, CFA Volume 67, File 12(c).

4

OF/DE

4

PM-1 3½"x4" PHOTOGRAPHIC MICROCOPY TARGET
NBS 1010a ANSI/ISO #2 EQUIVALENT

PRECISIONSM RESOLUTION TARGETS

The following statement is taken from the draft of a 1965 CFA submission to the Agricultural Committee of the Federal Cabinet on Farm Policy Requirements in Canada.

We do not come to you with a full slate of pat answers to farm problems. Like you yourselves, we are in the process of searching for the best ways of meeting farm problems. We believe that our organization, with its basis in farm membership and its experience has an essential contribution to make. Fundamental to this process on both our parts is to start as far as possible from agreed principles. By principles we mean basic agreements on objectives and responsibilities, both of government and farmers. We also mean basic concepts of what needs to be done to meet the problems and challenges that face the farm industry. The sale of wheat by international agreement is an example of such a basic concept. Such principles can never be worked out to the point where they provide a simple blueprint for action. There will, for one thing, be differences of view on the principles themselves - or at least on the emphasis to be placed on various aspects of them.

There will be differences too on the analysis of the economic mechanisms operating in the economy, and therefore of what can and should be done, and what the results of particular action might be. There is a lot of research to be done on how the farm economy works. It should however be our aim in this case to reduce the areas of doubt and disagreement to a minimum, since these are essentially matters of getting the facts and analysis right.

If we are going to successfully establish these principles, arrive at a satisfactory analysis of our problems, and find acceptable solutions, the farm organization and government must, we believe, increasingly work together through satisfactory formal consultative channels. There must be such channels, so that the responsibility of the

government, through Parliament, to make decisions, is retained, and to ensure that there are rules of consultation. Otherwise the position of both the farmers' organization and the government and Parliament, would of course become difficult and often confused. We attach a great deal of importance to this matter of consulting and working together, and of doing it in a proper orderly and effective way.

Source: Drafted presentation, June, 1965, National Archives, CFA archival holdings, Box 4, [Unprocessed].

Excerpts from the 1990 pamphlet titled, Canadian Federation of Agriculture: Serving Canada's Farmers

Aims and Objectives of the CFA

- to co-ordinate the efforts of agricultural producer organizations throughout Canada for the purpose of promoting their common interest through collective action.
- to promote and advance the social and economic conditions of those engaged in agricultural pursuits and to render such services to them as conditions may justify.
- to assist in forming and promoting national agricultural policies to meet changing national and international economic conditions; and to collaborate and co-operate with organized groups of producers outside Canada to further this objective.

CFA Policy

It is fundamental to CFA policy that the productive potential of Canadian agriculture must be preserved and fostered as an essential part of the economic, social and political fabric of Canada. To achieve this:

- There should be significant participation of farmers in the development of government farm policies.
- The farm industry should be based on family controlled and operated enterprises.
- A significant and viable farm industry should be developed and maintained in all provinces.
- Levels of return to labour, capital and management in farming should be comparable to those in other sectors in society.
- There should be stable prices and incomes for farmers.
- Farmers require credit on terms compatible with the heavy capital requirements of modern agriculture.
- There must be programmes that ensure farmers are able to effectively deal with the climatic market risks inherent in agriculture.
- Farmers should be permitted to develop and operate systems for marketing commodities domestically and internationally.
- Good conservation practices should govern the use of soil, water and other natural resources.
- The infrastructure necessary to maintain healthy rural communities must be maintained.

Excerpt from the United Grain Growers Limited Directors' Handbook, 1993, pp. 24-25.

The Reason for Organization

At the opening of the present century western agriculture was expanding at an unprecedented rate. Thousands of acres of new land were being brought under cultivation and new production records were being established. Grain handling facilities were in the hands of private companies and producers were very dissatisfied with their treatment under existing conditions. The Territorial Grain Growers Association was formed in 1902 followed by the Manitoba Grain Growers Association in 1903. These organizations did much to improve conditions but many inequities remained. Finally a small group of prairie farmers decided that the solution to their marketing problem lay in forming their own grain handling organization. Out of this arose the Grain Growers' Grain Company Limited, the first Farmer-Owned and Farmer-Managed Co-operative Grain Handling Organization in Western Canada....

Basis of Organization

The company was organized on the principle of the world's original Co-operative - The Rochdale Pioneers of England. These basic principles, which are still adhered to by the Company, are as follows:

- a) Open Membership - that is the right of anyone to join on the same terms as existing members.
- b) Democratic Control - one vote per member regardless of the number of shares held.
- c) Limited return on Share Capital.
- d) Return of savings to members by way of patronage dividend.
- e) Use of part of trading surplus for educational work.

Ted Allen, UGG President, "Letter to Shareholders and Employees" [excerpt], 1992.

...We continually advocate changes in barley marketing policies, specifically to allow farmers to market their barley in the United States. In our day-to-day contacts, we constantly appeal for less regulation, more efficient government spending, less intrusion from subsidies into grain markets and for an agreement with other agricultural trading nations on a more market-driven international playing field. At every opportunity, we call for changes in domestic policies which improve our efficiency and our competitive position....

Farmers' share of the political votes will shrink in number, likely in absolute numbers and certainly proportionately compared to the rest of the country's voters. That makes it even more critical to ensure our voice be heard by politicians. I believe any industry which grosses \$10 to \$12 billion worth a year, has \$80 to \$100 billion worth of assets and \$10 to \$12 billion worth of debt should make sure it has not only a political voice, but also a pipeline into the political machinery.

Our challenge, during these turbulent times, is to operate effectively under today's rules while keeping in mind that under a less regulated system, huge opportunities would be created for managers who have the vision and creativity to take advantage of them.

Source: UGG, UGG Eighty-Sixth Annual Report, 31 July, 1992, pp. 6-7.

The following is an excerpt from the NFU's Constitution.

The objects of the union shall be:

Section 3

(a) To promote the betterment of farmers in the attainment of their economic and social goals;

(b) To conduct projects for the benefit of farmers in the development of markets for and marketing of farm products;

(c) To achieve the reduction of costs and other measures designed to increase the economic benefits of farming;

(d) To conduct education and research projects for the benefit of farmers;

(e) To promote and secure legislation and other forms of government action for the benefit of farmers;

(f) To promote a higher standard of community life in agriculture.

(g) To provide services for its members consistent with its objects and work jointly with any other persons or organizations for the attainment of its objects.

Section 4

The Union shall not have any political affiliation and shall be non-partisan in politics and free from racial, religious and political discrimination.

Source: NFU, Constitution and Bylaws of the National Farmers Union, As Amended - January, 1991, pp. 1-2.

Excerpt from Wayne Easter's "NFU President's Message", 1990.

Sadly, for many farmers and their communities, the farm financial crisis continued in 1989 and worsened with too little or too much rain, low prices, increasing numbers of farm foreclosures, and a continuous withdrawal of government programs....

1989, in perspective, is what the New Market Economy, being fostered by the present federal government and several of its provincial accomplices, will mean for farmers. The new market economy is one in which the government abdicates its responsibility and turns decision-making over to the market - a market increasingly controlled and manipulated by a few major powerbrokers for their short-term profit....

In reality, if the federal planners and their corporate friends have their way, the farmers' role in this "new economy" will be to provide cheap raw materials for processors.

The New Market Economy must be challenged. The NFU can focus opposition and offer alternatives - alternatives based on non-predatory objectives; alternatives aimed at building strong rural communities and nation-building.

Source: NFU, National Farmers Union 20th Annual Convention, 11-14 January, 1990, p. 7.

The following text is an excerpt from a letter sent from the Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, Hon. Ralph Goodale, to Canadian farm organizations and their members.

November, 1994

Dear...

During my first year as Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, I have frequently referred to the necessity of reforming the Western Grain Transportation Act (WGTA). Reform is essential to achieve compliance with the new General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), to respond to the country's fiscal realities, and to foster economic diversification and growth. The federal government will be making its WGTA decisions early in 1995, and I would appreciate your input on the reform options currently under consideration.

Consistent with my previous undertakings, I plan to meet personally in the period immediately ahead with a number of farm and industry leaders, and with my provincial counterparts, to discuss the WGTA. At the same time, Transport Canada has been holding broad discussions with industry about grain freight rates and efficiency issues. Following both sets of consultations, the Minister of Transport and I will make recommendations to Cabinet covering all the various aspects of grain transportation reform.

As you will know, legislation signalling our international obligations under the new GATT has been introduced in Parliament....In summary, the present WGTA as applicable to shipments through West Coast ports and Churchill falls within the definition of an "export subsidy" under GATT, and must be adjusted accordingly. Consequently, we must either change the WGTA so it is no longer an "export subsidy", or we can continue to pay the railways but only to the extent allowed by the new GATT rules....

Hon. Ralph Goodale, Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada

Bibliography

Primary Research

A. Archival Collections and Library Collections

Canadian Federation of Agriculture

Series 2 Volumes 11, 12, 14, 19, 25, 28, 30.

Series 3 Volumes 49-51, 63, 65, 67-70.

Series 4 Volumes 81, 85, 87, 95, 96, 126.

CFA President H.H. Hannam

Series 5, Volumes 133, 185.

Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, polling archives,
Carleton University Social Science Archives.

B. Selected Organizational Reports and AGM Proceedings

Alberta Wheat Pool, Annual Report, Selected Years.

CFA, Policies, Annual Release to the Membership.

CFA Annual Meetings, Proceedings, 1941 - 1992.

CFA Membership Bulletins (to Directors), 1940 - 1948.

CFA Executive Director's Report, Selected Years.

CFA End-of-Year Financial/Auditor's Statements, 1940 - 1990.

Canadian Wheat Board, Annual Report, Selected Years.

Manitoba Pool Elevators, Annual Report, Selected Years.

National Farmers Union, Selected Annual Reports, 1970 - 1992.

Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, Annual Report, Selected Years.

UGG, Minutes of Annual Meetings, 1945 - 1993.

UGG, Annual Reports to Shareholders, Selected Years.

UGG, Director's Handbook, 1993.

C. Organizational and Business Directories

Canadian Newspaper Services International, The Blue Book of Canadian Business, 1976 - 1990.

Canadian Newspaper Service, Limited, The National Reference Book, 1950s onward.

The Financial Post Survey of Industrials, 1951 - 1992.

D. Newspapers

With regard to recent developments in Canadian grain politics the The Western Producer and, less frequently, The Manitoba Cooperator were used as farm media sources.

In addition to the above, the author used the following newspapers:

The Globe and Mail
The Ottawa Citizen
The Winnipeg Free Press
The Saskatchewan Star-Phoenix

E. Polls and Surveys

The Angus Reid Group, The Farm Media Study, 1989.

Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, Selected Gallup poll press releases, 1940 - 1990.

AgDecision, 1990 Prairie Farmer Profile, Privately Commissioned Study, Winnipeg: Grainews, 1990.

F. Interviews

- Dr. Paul Earl, Manager of Business Development, UGG.
- Mac McCorquodale, Keystone Agricultural Producers.
- W. F. (Bill) Morriss, Former Editor, The Manitoba Cooperator.
- Hon. Eugene Whelan, former Minister of Agriculture.
- Barry Wilson, The Western Producer, Ottawa Bureau.

Secondary Sources:

Books, Articles, Government Reports, Academic Papers, Dissertations and Theses

Adams, Christopher, "The COR and Reform Parties: Locations of Canadian Protest Party Support," Paper presented to the Canadian Political Science Association, Kinston, Ont., 1991.

Adams, Christopher, "Institutionalized Lobbying: Mixed Successes in Canadian Grain Politics," Paper presented to the Canadian Political Science Association, Calgary, June, 1994.

Adams, Christopher, "Needles in the Haystack: Public Opinion and the Canadian Farmer as found in CIPO Polling Data, 1940 to the 1970s," Paper presented to the CPSA, Ottawa, 1993.

Adams, Christopher, "The Reform Party and the Roots of Western Protest," Parliamentary Government, Vol. 9, No. 1, Fall, 1989.

Albo, Gregory and Jenson, Jane, "A Contested Concept: The Relative Autonomy of the State," The New Canadian Political Economy, Wallace Clement and Glen Williams, eds., Kingston, Ont.: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1989.

Allen, Kristen, and Smith, Murray, "An Overview of Agricultural Issues in the U.S.-Canadian Free Trade Agreement," U.S.- Canadian Agricultural Trade Challenges: Developing Common Approaches, K. Allen and K. Macmillan, eds., Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, 1988.

Allen, W., and Hope, C. C., The Farm Outlook for Saskatchewan, Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Press, 1936.

Almond, Gabriel, "The Return to the State," American Political Science Review, Vol. 82, No. 3, Sept., 1988.

Anderson, Owen, The Alberta Social Credit Party: An Empirical Analysis of Membership, Characteristics, Participation and Opinion, PhD. Dissertation, University of Alberta, 1972.

- Anstett, Andy, and Thomas, Paul, "Manitoba: The Role of the Legislature in a Polarized Political System," Provincial and Territorial Legislatures in Canada, Gary Levy and Graham White, eds., Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989.
- Asimakopulos, A., An Introduction to Economic Theory: Microeconomics, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1978.
- Atkinson, Michael M., and Coleman, William, The State, Business, and Industrial Change in Canada, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989.
- Aucoin, Peter, Party Government and Regional Representation in Canada, Vol. 36 Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985.
- Badgley, Kerry, The Social and Political Thought of the Farmers' Institutes of Ontario, 1884 - 1917: Manifestations of Agrarian Discontent, M.A. Thesis, Carleton University, 1988.
- Baron, Donald, "Regional Development - Agriculture," Proceedings of One Prairie Province: A Question for Canada, David Elton, Lethbridge: Lethbridge Herald, 1970.
- Bashevkin, Silvia, Canadian Political Behaviour: Introductory Readings, Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1980.
- Basron, G.S., and Hay, David A., eds., The Political Economy of Agriculture in Western Canada, Toronto: Garamond Press, 1988.
- Bell, Daniel, "Is There a Ruling Class in America?" Bishop and Hendel's Basic Issues of American Democracy, 7th Ed., Samuel Hendel, ed., New York: Meredith, 1973.
- Bell, David, and Tepperman, Lorne, The Roots of Disunity, Toronto: McClelland, 1979.
- Bell, Edward, "Class Voting in the First Alberta Social Credit Election," Canadian Journal of Political Science, 13(3), Sept., 1990.
- Bellamy, David, et al, The Provincial Political Systems, Toronto: Methuen, 1976.
- Benedict, Murray R., Farm Policies of the United States, 1790 - 1950, New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1953.

- Bercuson, David, and Bucknew, Philip, eds., Eastern and Western Perspectives, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981.
- Berger, Carl, and Cook, Ramsay, eds., The West and the Nation: Essays in Honour of W. L. Morton, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976.
- Berger, Suzanne, Peasants Against Politics: Rural Organization in Brittany, 1911-1967, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972.
- Berry, Jeffrey, The Interest Group Society, Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1984.
- Berthelet, D., "Agriculture Canada Policy and Expenditure Patterns 1868 - 1983," Canadian Farm Economics, 19(1), 1985.
- Betke, Carl F., "Farm Politics in an Urban Age: The Decline of the United Farmers of Alberta after 1921," Essays in Western History, Lewis H. Thomas, ed., Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1976.
- Bicha, Karel Denis, The American Farmer and the Canadian West, 1896-1914, Lawrence, Kansas: Coronado Press, 1968.
- Bicha, Karel Denis, Western Populism: Studies in an Ambivalent Conservatism, Lawrence, Kansas: Coronado Press, 1976.
- Bird, Richard M., The Growth of Government Spending in Canada, Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1970.
- Bloch, Joseph, et al, Reader in Marxist Philosophy: From the Writings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, New York: International Publishers, 1963.
- Bollman, Ray, "Distribution Across Farms of Benefits of Selected Government Programs," Presented to the Rural Studies Conference, Quebec City, 1989.
- Bollman, Ray D., ed., Rural and Small Town Canada, Toronto: Thompson Educational Publishing, 1992.
- Bollman, Ray, and Ehrensaft, Philip, "Changing Farm Size Distributions on the Prairies Over the Past One Hundred Years," The Political Economy of Agriculture in Western Canada, David Hay and G.S. Basran, eds., Toronto: Garamond Press, 1988.
- Boorstin, Daniel, The Americans: Volume 2, The Democratic Experience, New York: Vintage, 1974.

- Boreham, Gordan and Leftwich, Richard, Economic Thinking in a Canadian Context, Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971.
- The Brandt Commission, Common Crisis, North South: Co-Operation for World Recovery, London: Pan Books, 1983.
- Breimer, Harold F., "The American Agriculture Movement - Its Proposals and Selected Responses," The World Food Problem and U.S. Food Politics and Policies: 1978, Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1977.
- Brennan, J. William, ed., Building the Cooperative Commonwealth: Essays on the Democratic Socialist Tradition in Canada, Regina: Canadian Plains Research Centre, 1985.
- Brinkman, George L., Farm Income in Canada, Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada and Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1982.
- Bronson, H.E., "Continentalism and Canadian Agriculture," Capitalism and the National Question in Canada, Gary Teeple, ed., Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972.
- Britnell, G.E., and Fowke, V.C., Canadian Agriculture in War and Peace, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962.
- Brodie, N. Janine, and Jenson, Jane, Crisis, Challenge and Change: Party and Class in Canada, Agincourt, Ont.: Methuen, 1980.
- Brym, Robert J., "Regional Social Structure and Agrarian Radicalism in Canada: Alberta, Saskatchewan, and New Brunswick", People, Power, and Process: A Reader, Himelbarb and Richardson, eds., Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1980.
- Brym, Robert J., "Social Movements and Third Parties", Models in Canadian Sociology, Toronto: Butterworth, 1984.
- Burnet, Jean, Next-Year Country: A Study of Rural Social Organization in Alberta, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1951.
- Buttel, Frederick H., et al, "Social Class and Agrarian Political Ideology: A Note on Determinants of Political Attitudes Among Full- and Part-Time Farmers", Social Forces, 61(1), Sept. 1982, pp. 277 - 283.
- Buttel, Frederick H., et al, The Sociology of Agriculture, N.Y.: Greenwood Press, 1990.

- Cairns, Alan, "Political Science in Canada and the Americanization Issue," Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 7, No. 2, June, 1972.
- Caldarola, Carlo, ed., Society and Politics in Alberta: Research Papers, Toronto: Methuen, 1979.
- Caldwell, C.D., "The American Agriculture Movement," The World Food Problem and U.S. Food Politics and Policies: 1978, Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1977.
- Cameron, Duncan, and Watkins, Mel, eds., Canada Under Free Trade, Toronto: James Lorimer, 1993.
- Cameron, Marjorie R. and Frank Shefrin, Federal Agricultural Assistance Programs: Canada, 1900 - 1951, Ottawa: Department of Agriculture, Economic Division, 1952.
- Campbell, Robert M., Grand Illusions: The Politics of the Keynesian Experience in Canada, 1945 - 1975, Peterborough, Broadview Press, 1987.
- Canada, Dept. of Agriculture, Orientation of Canadian Agriculture, Ottawa, 1977.
- The Canadian Global Almanac, Toronto: Global Press, Annual Editions, 1990 to 1994.
- Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Economic Division, Canadian Economic An Financial Outlook: Winter 1990, Nov. 7, 1990.
- Canadian Senate, Soil at Risk, Ottawa, 1984.
- Careless, J. M. S., "Frontierism, Metropolitanism and Canadian History", Canadian Historical Review, 1954, pp. 1 - 21.
- Carlson, Gary, Farm Voices: A Brief History and Reference Guide of Prairie Farm Organizations and Their Leaders, 1870 to 1980, Regina: Saskatchewan Federation of Agriculture, 1981.
- Carstensen, Vernon, ed., Farmer Discontent, 1865 - 1900, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1974.
- Cashore, Ben, "Lack of Economic Homogeneity in CCF Saskatchewan and Social Credit Alberta: Intra and Inter Class Division Explored," Research paper, Department of Political Science, Carleton University, November, 1985.

- Clark-Jones, Melissa, A Staple State: Canadian Industrial Resources in Cold War, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987.
- Clement, Wallace, The Challenge of Class Analysis, Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1988.
- Clement, Wallace, and Williams, Glen, eds., The New Canadian Political Economy, Kingston, Ont.: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1989.
- Coffin, H. Garth, "Driving Forces, Instruments, and Institutions in Canadian Agricultural Policies," U.S.-Canadian Agricultural Trade Challenges: Developing Common Approaches, K. Allen and K. Macmillan, eds., Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, 1988.
- Cohn, Theodore H., The International Politics of Agricultural Trade: Canadian American Relations in a Global Agricultural Context, Vancouver: UBC Press, 1990.
- Coleman, D., and Grant, Wyn P., "Regional Differentiation of Business Interest Associations: A Comparison of Canada and the United Kingdom", Canadian Journal of Political Science, 18(1), March, 1985.
- Coleman, William, Business and Politics: A Study of Collective Action, Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988.
- Coleman, William, "Macroeconomic Policy: Dwindling Options," Governing Canada: Institutions and Public Policy, Michael Atkinson, ed., Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1993.
- Coleman, William, Regionalism, Business Interests and Public Policy, London: Sage, 1982.
- Coleman, William, and Jacek, Henry, "The Roles and Activities of Business Interest Associations in Canada," Canadian Journal of Political Science, 16(2), June, 1983.
- Colquette, The First Fifty Years: A History of the United Grain Growers' Limited, Winnipeg: The Public Press, 1957.
- Conway, John F., "The Distribution of the Benefits of the Saskatchewan Production Loan Programme", Presented to the Rural Studies Conference, Quebec City, 1989.
- Conway, John F., "Populism in the United States, Russia and Canada: Explaining the Roots of Canada's Third Parties," Canadian Journal of Political Science, 11:1, March, 1978.

- Conway, John F., "The Prairie Populist Resistance to the National Policy: Some Reconsiderations," Journal of Canadian Studies, 14:3, Autumn, 1979.
- Conway, J. F., To Seek a Goodly Heritage: The Prairie Populist Resistance to the National Policy in Canada, PhD. Dissertation, Simon Fraser University, 1979.
- Conway, J. F., The West: A History of a Region in Confederation, Toronto: James Lorimer, 1984.
- Cooper, Andrew F., "Agriculture and the GATT: The Search for Balance in Canadian Trade Policy," Canada: The State of the Federation, 1992, Douglas Brown and Robert Young, eds., Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, 1992.
- Cooper, Andrew Fenton, and Skogstad, Grace, eds., Agricultural Trade: Domestic Pressures and International Tensions, Halifax: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1990.
- Courville, L. D., The Saskatchewan Progressives, M.A. Thesis, University of Regina, 1971.
- Cox, Robert, "Global Restructuring: Making Sense of the Changing International Political Economy," Political Economy and the Changing Global Order, Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey Underhill, eds., Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1994.
- Craddock, W. J., and Lewis, Errol T., "Agriculture in the Canadian Economy", Issues in Canadian Economics, L. Officer and L. Smith, eds., Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1974.
- Craig, R. A., and Phillips, K. J., "Research Note: Agrarian Ideology in Australia and the United States", Rural Sociology, Vol. 48, No. 3, Fall, 1983, pp. 409 - 420.
- Crampton, John A., The National Farmers Union: Ideology of a Pressure Group, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1965.
- Crane, David, The Canadian Dictionary of Business and Economics, Toronto: Stoddart, 1993.
- Crown, Robert W., and Heady, Earl O., Policy Integration in Canadian Agriculture, Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University, 1972.
- Darling, Howard, The Politics of Freight Rates, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1980.

- Dahl, Robert, Democracy in the United States: Promise and Performance, 2nd Ed., Chicago: Rand McNally, 1972.
- Dahl, Robert A., Who Governs? Democracy in an American City, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961.
- Dawson, Helen Ingrid, Agricultural Interest Groups in Canada and Great Britain, Bachelor's Thesis, St. Hilda's College, Oxford University, 1963.
- Dawson, Helen Jones, "An Interest Group: The Canadian Federation of Agriculture," Canadian Public Administration, Vol. 6, 1963.
- Dawson, R. MacGregor, The Government of Canada, 4th Ed., Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963.
- Dawson, Helen Jones, "Relations Between Farm Organizations and the Civil Service in Canada and Great Britain," Canadian Public Administration, 10(4).
- Demers, Fanny S., "The Department of Finance and the Bank of Canada: The Fiscal and Monetary Policy Mix," How Ottawa Spends: The Politics of Competitiveness, 1992 - 93, Frances Abele, ed., Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1992.
- Denzau, Arthur T., and Munger, Michael, "Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented," American Political Science Review, 80(1), March, 1986.
- Department of Justice, Canada, A Consolidation of the Constitution Acts 1867 to 1982, Ottawa: Supply and Services, Consolidated as of October 1, 1989.
- Deutsch, Karl W., Politics and Government: How People Decide Their Fate, 3rd Ed., Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1980.
- Diefenbaker, John G., One Canada: Memoirs of the Right Honourable John G. Diefenbaker, Vols. 1-3, Toronto: Macmillan, 1975, 1976, 1977.
- Doern, G. Bruce, "Priorities and Priority Setting in the Trudeau Era: The Political Problems of Doing First Things First," How Ottawa Spends: The Liberal, the Opposition, and Federal Priorities, 1983, G. B. Doern, ed., Toronto: James Lorimer, 1983.

- Doern, G. Bruce, and Devlin, John F., "The Farm Credit Corporation and the Federal Business Development Bank," Privatization, Public Policy and Public Corporations in Canada, Allan Tupper and G. Bruce Doern, eds., Halifax: Institute for Research and Public Policy, 1988.
- Doern G. Bruce, and Phidd, Richard, Canadian Public Policy: Ideas, Structure, Process, Toronto: Methuen, 1983.
- Doern, G. Bruce, and Tomlin, Brian, Faith and Fear: The Free Trade Story, Toronto: Stoddart, 1991.
- Drummond, W. M., "The Role of Agricultural Marketing Boards", The Canadian Economy: Selected Readings, J. J. Deutsch, et al, eds., Toronto: Macmillan, 1961.
- Drummond, W. M., Anderson, W. J., and Kerr, T. C., A Review of Agricultural Policy in Canada, Ottawa: Agricultural Economics Research Council of Canada, 1966.
- Durost, Donald D., and Bailey, "What's Happened to Farming," Changes in Rural America: Causes, Consequences and Alternatives, Richard Rodefeld, et al, eds., St. Louis: C.V. Mosby, 1978.
- Dye, Thomas, and Zeigler, Harmon, The Irony of Democracy, 7th Ed., Monterey: Brooks/Cole, 1987.
- Eager, Evelyn, Saskatchewan Government: Politics and Pragmatism, Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1980.
- Earl, Paul D., Rhetoric, Reality and Righteousness: The Ideological Debate Between the Farm Organizations and the Grain Trade, 1917 - 1935, PhD. Dissertation, University of Manitoba, 1992.
- Easterbrook, W.T., and Aitken, Hugh G.J., Canadian Economic History, Toronto: Gage, 1982 [1956].
- Easterbrook, William, and Watkins, Mel, eds., Approaches to Canadian Economic History, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1967.
- Economic Council of Canada, Handling the Risks: A Report on the Prairie Grain Economy, Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1988.
- Economic Council of Canada, Western Transition, Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1984.

- Ellis, J. H., The Ministry of Agriculture in Manitoba: 1870 - 1970, Department of Agriculture [Manitoba], 1970.
- Fairbairn, Brett, Building a Dream: The Cooperative Retailing System in Western Canada, 1928 - 1988, Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1989.
- Fairbairn, Garry, From Prairie Roots: The Remarkable Story of Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1984.
- Farmer, Val, "Broken Heartland", Psychology Today, April 1986, pp. 54 - 62.
- Farmers' Union and Co-operative Development Association, "Survey on Farmers' Attitudes," Report, Edmonton, 1964.
- Federal Task Force on Agriculture, Canadian Agriculture in the 70s, Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970.
- Finkel, Alvin, The Social Credit Phenomenon in Alberta, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989.
- Finkle, Peter, et al, Federal Government Relations With Interest Groups: A Reconsideration, [Research Paper], Ottawa: Consumer Policy Branch, Industry Canada, 1994.
- FitzSimmons, Margaret, "The Social and Environmental Relations of US Agricultural Regions," Technological Change and Rural Environment, Philip Lowe, et al, eds., London: David Fulton, 1990.
- Fleming, Donald M., So Very Near: The Political Memoirs of the Honourable Donald M. Fleming: Volume Two, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1985.
- Fora, Jan, and Rodefelf, Richard D., "The Nature, Magnitude, and Consequences of Changes in Agricultural Technology," Change in Rural America: Causes, Consequences, and Alternatives, Richard Rodefelf, et al, eds., St. Louis: C.V. Mosby, 1978.
- Forbes, H.D., ed., Canadian Political Thought, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1985.
- Forbes, J.D., Institutions and Influence Groups in the Canadian Food System Policy Process, Study prepared for the Economic Council of Canada, Jan., 1982.
- Forbes, J.D., et al, Economic Intervention and Regulation in Canadian Agriculture, Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada, and Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1982.

- Foster, John E., ed., The Developing West: Essays on Canadian History in Honour of Lewis H. Thomas, Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1983.
- Fowke, Vernon C., Canadian Agriculture in War and Peace: 1935 - 1950, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962.
- Fowke, Vernon C., Canadian Agricultural Policy: The Historical Pattern, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978 [1946].
- Fowke, Vernon C., The National Policy and the Wheat Economy, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973 [1957].
- Fowke, V.C., "Political Economy and the Canadian Wheat Grower," Politics in Saskatchewan, Ward and Spafford, eds., Don Mills: Longmans, 1968.
- Fowke, Vernon C., "Royal Commissions and Canadian Agricultural Policy," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 14(2), May, 1948, pp. 163 - 175.
- Francis, R. Douglas, "Changing Images of the West", Journal of Canadian Studies, 17(3), Fall, 1982.
- Francis, D., and Ganzevoort, H., eds., The Dirty Thirties in Prairie Canada: 11th Western Canada Studies Conference, Vancouver: Tantalus Research, 1980.
- Francis, R. Douglas, and Palmer, Howard, eds., The Prairie West: Historical Readings, Edmonton: Pica Pica Press, 1985.
- Friedmann, Harriet, "The Political Economy of Food: The Rise and Fall of the Postwar International Food Order," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 88(Supplemental), 1982, pp. S248-S286.
- Friedmann, Harriet, The Transformation of Wheat Production in the Era of the World Market, 1873 - 1935: A Global Analysis of Production and Exchange, PhD. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1976.
- Fulton, Murray, "Agricultural Policy Formation: The Role and Experience of Co-operatives," Farm Interest Groups and Canadian Agricultural Policy, Barry Wilson, et al, Occasional Paper #88.04, Saskatoon: Centre for the Study of Co-operatives, September, 1988.
- Fulton, Murray, Rosaasen, Ken, and Schmitz, Andrew, Canadian Agricultural Policy and Prairie Agriculture, Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada, 1989.

- Gaffney, Mason, "The Benefits of Farm Programs," American Journal of Economic and Sociology, 26(3), July, 1967, pp. 237-250.
- Gagan, David P., ed., Prairie Perspectives, Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970.
- Gagnon, Alain, and Tanguay, Brian, eds., Canadian Parties in Transition: Discourse, Organization and Representation, Toronto: 1988.
- Galipeau, Claude, "Political Parties, Interest Groups, and New Social Movements: Toward New Representations?" Canadian Parties in Transition, Alain Gagnon and A. Brian Tanguay, eds., Broadview Press, xx
- Gallagher, John, To Kill the Crow, Moose Jaw: Challenge Publishers, 1983.
- Giangrande, Carole, Down to Earth: The Crisis in Canadian Farming, Toronto: Anansi, 1985.
- Gibbons, Roger, Conflict and Unity: An Introduction to Canadian Political Life, Toronto: Methuen, 1985.
- Gibbons, Roger, Prairie Politics and Society: Regionalism in Decline, Toronto: Butterworths, 1980.
- Gibbons, Roger, Regionalism: Territorial Politics in Canada and the United States, Toronto: Butterworths, 1982.
- Goldstein, Jonah, "Public Interest Groups and Public Policy: The Case of the Consumers' Association of Canada," Canadian Journal of Political Science, 12(1), March, 1979.
- Gordon, Elizabeth, "Stress in the Farm Family: Implications for the Rural Human Service Worker," The Political Economy of Agriculture in Western Canada, Basran and Hay, eds., Toronto: Garamond Press, 1988..
- Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986.
- Government of Canada, The Report of the Grain Handling and Transportation Commission, Vol. 1, Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1977.
- Government of Canada, Federal Task Force on Agriculture, Canadian Agriculture in the Seventies, Ottawa: Information Canada, 1970.

Government of Canada, Department of Justice, A Consolidation of the Constitution Acts 1867 to 1982, Ottawa: Supply and Services, Consolidated as of October 1, 1985.

Graham, Katherine, ed., How Ottawa Spends 1990-91: Tracking the Second Agenda, Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1990.

Grigg, D. B., Agricultural Systems of the World, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974.

Gruending, Dennis, Promises to Keep: A Political Biography of Allan Blakeney, Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1990.

Hall, D. J., Clifford Sifton, Volume Two: A Lonely Eminence, Vancouver: UBC Press, 1985.

Hall, D. J., "The Manitoba Grain Act: An 'Agrarian Magna Charta'?" Prairie Forum, Vol. 4(1), 1979.

Hall, Stuart, "Popular-Democratic vs. Authoritarian Populism: Two Ways of 'Taking Democracy Seriously'", Marxism and Democracy, A. Hunt, ed., London: 1980.

Hambridge, Gove, "The Nature and Magnitude of Changes in Agricultural Technology," Changes in Rural America: Causes, Consequences and Alternatives, Richard Rodefeld, et al, eds., St. Louis: C.V. Mosby, 1978.

Hann, Russell, The Farmers Confront Industrialism: Some Historical Perspectives on Ontario Agrarian Movements, Toronto: New Hogtown Press, 1975.

Hannam, H.H., "The Interest Group and Its Activities," The Institute of Public Administration, Proceedings of the Fifth Annual Conference, 1953.

Hanson, E. J., A Financial History of Alberta, 1905 - 1950, PhD. Dissertation, Clark University, n. d.

Harvey, David R., Christmas Turkey or Prairie Vulture?, Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1981.

Havens, A. Eugene, "Capitalist Development in the United States: State, Accumulation, and Agricultural Production System," Studies in the Transformation of U.S. Agriculture, A. Eugene Havens, et al, eds., Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986.

- Havens, A. Eugene, and Newby, Howard, "Agriculture and the State: An Analytical Approach," Studies in the Transformation of U.S. Agriculture, Havens, et al, eds., Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986.
- Hay, David A., and Basran, G.S., "The Western Canadian Farm Sector: Transition and Trends," The Political Economy of Agriculture in Western Canada, Basran and Hay, eds., Toronto: Garamond Press, 1988.
- Hefferman, William D., "Examining the Consequences of Recent Agricultural Policy on Farm Families and Rural Communities," Restructuring Policy for Agriculture: Some Alternatives, Sandra Batie and J. Marshall, eds., Virginia: Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1984.
- Herring, Cedric, "Acquiescence or Activism? Political Behaviour Among the Politically Alienated," Political Psychology, Vol. 10 (1), 1989.
- Hesseltine, William, B., Third-Party Movements in the United States, New York: Anvil, 1962.
- Hofstadter, Richard, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R., New York: Vintage Books, 1955.
- Horn, Michiel, "The Great Depression: Past and Present," The Depression in Canada: Responses to Economic Crisis, M. Horn, ed., Toronto: Copp Clark Pittman, 1988.
- House of Commons, Hansard, Proceedings, Selected Years.
- Howe, Carolyn, "Farmers' Movements and the Changing Structure of Agriculture," Studies in the Transformation of U.S. Agriculture, A. Eugene Havens, et al, eds., Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986.
- Hughes, Robert, "Empowering Rural Families and Communities", Family Relations, 36(4), Oct. 1987.
- Hussain, Athar, and Tribe, Keith, eds., Paths of Development in Capitalist Agriculture: Readings from German Social Democracy, 1891-99, London: MacMillan Press.
- Innis, H. A., The Cod Fisheries, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1954.
- Innis, H. A., Essays in Canadian Economic History, M. Q. Innis, ed., Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1956.

- Innis, H. A., The Fur Trade in Canada: An Introduction to Canadian Economic History, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1956 [1930].
- Innis, H. A., Problems of Staple Production in Canada, Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1933.
- Irvine, William, The Farmers in Politics, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart [Carleton Library Series], 1976 [Reprint].
- Jackson, Robert, et al, Politics in Canada, Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall, 1986.
- Jenson, Jane, "All the World's a Stage: Ideas, Spaces and Times in Canadian Political Economy," Studies in Political Economy, No. 36, Autumn, 1991, pp. 43-72.
- Johnson, Myron, The Failure of the CCF in Alberta: An Accident of History?, M.A. Thesis, University of Alberta, 1974.
- Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S., Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, Boston: Little, Brown, 1977.
- Kerr, William A., The Diversification of Prairie Agriculture: Opportunities Arising from Changes in the International Trade Environment, Discussion Paper 359, Economic Council of Canada, Ottawa: March, 1989.
- Key, V. O., Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups, 5th Ed., New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1964.
- Klein, K. K., "Problems and Prospects of Canadian Agricultural Trade," Canadian Agricultural Trade: Disputes, Actions and Prospects, Lerner and Klein, eds., Calgary: University of Calgary Press.xx
- Knuttila, K. Murray, The Impact of the Western Canadian Agrarian Movement on Federal Government Policy, 1900-1930: An Assessment and Analysis, PhD. Dissertation, University of Toronto, March, 1992.
- Kubat, D., and Thornton, D., A Statistical Profile of Canadian Society, Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1974.
- Kyba, Patrick, Alvin: A Biography of the Honourable Alvin Hamilton, P.C., Regina: Canadian Plains Research Center, 1989.
- Landes, Ronald, The Canadian Polity: A Comparative Introduction, Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall, 1987.

- Larson, Hennrietta M., The Wheat Market and the Farmer in Minnesota, 1858 - 1900, PhD. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1926.
- Larson, Oscar W, et al, "Sources of Social Class Identification Among Farmers", Rural Sociology, 48(1), Spring, 1983.
- Laslovich, Michael J., "Changing the Crow Rate: State-Societal Interaction," Occasional Paper No. 11, Department of Political Science, Carleton University, Ottawa, April, 1985.
- Laycock, David, Co-operative Government Relations in Canada: Lobbying, Public Policy Development and the Changing Co-operative System, Saskatoon: Centre for the Study of Co-operatives, 1987.
- Laycock, David, Populism and Democratic Thought in the Canadian Prairies, 1910 to 1945, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990.
- Laycock, David, "Prairie Farmers in Politics: An Historical Perspective," Farm Interest Groups and Canadian Agricultural Policy, Barry Wilson, et al, Occasional Paper No. 88.04, Saskatoon: Centre for the Study of Co-operatives, 1988.
- Laycock, David, "Representative Economic Democracy and the Problem of Policy Influence: The Case of the Canadian Co-operatives," Canadian Journal of Political Science, 22 (4), December, 1989.
- Leadbeater, David, ed., Essays on the Political Economy of Alberta, Toronto: New Hogtown Press, 1984.
- Lenin, V.I., "The Agrarian Programme of Social Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905," On the United States of America, C. Leiteizen, trans., Moscow: Progress Publisher, 1967.
- Lenin, V.I., "Capitalism and Agriculture in the United States of America," On the United States of America, C. Leiteizen, trans., Moscow: Progress Publisher, 1967.
- Leslie, Peter M., ed., Canada: The State of the Federation 1985, Kingston: Queen's University, Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, 1985.
- Libby, Ronald T., Protecting Markets: U.S. Policy and the World Grain Trade, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992.

- Lindblom, Charles, Politics and Markets, New York: Basic Books, 1977.
- Lipietz, Alain, Mirages and Miracles: The Crisis of Global Fordism, D. Macey, tran., London, U.K.: Verso, 1987.
- Lipset, S. M., Agrarian Socialism: The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation in Saskatchewan, Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1968.
- Lipset, S.M., "Political Participation and the Organization of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation in Saskatchewan," The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 14(2), May, 1948.
- Lipset, S. M., Revolution and Counter-Revolution, London, U. K.: Heinemann, 1968.
- Lipset, S.M., and Rokkan, Stein, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments," Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives, Lipset and Rokkan eds., New York: The Free Press, 1967.
- Lipset, S. M., and Rokkan, Stein, eds., Party Systems and Voter Alignments, New York: The Free Press, 1967.
- Lipsey, Richard G., et al, Economics: Seventh Canadian Edition, New York: Harper Collins, 1991.
- Little, Linda F., et al, "The History of Recent Farm Legislation: Implications for Farm Families", Family Relations, 36(4), Oct. 1987, pp. 402 - 406.
- Loftsgard, Laurel D., and Voelker, Stanley W., "The Consequences of Changes in Agricultural Technology for Rural Neighborhoods and Communities," Changes in Rural America: Cases, Consequences and Alternatives, Richard Rodefell, et al, eds., St. Louis: C.V. Mosby, 1978.
- Lowe, Philip, et al, eds., Technological Change and the Rural Environment, London: David Fulton, 1990.
- Lowi, Theodore J., The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of Public Authority, New York: W. W. Norton, 1969.
- Lowi, Theodore, "How the Farmers Get What They Want," American Government: Readings and Cases, 3rd Ed., Peter Woll, ed., Boston: Little, Brown, 1969.
- Lowi, Theodore J., Incomplete Conquest: Governing America, 2nd Ed., New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981.

- Lyon, Vaughan, "The Future of Parties," Authority and Influence: Institutions, Issues and Concepts in Canadian Politics, Carla Cassidy, ed., Oakville, Ont.: Mosaic Press.
- MacDonald, Martha, "Post-Fordism and the Flexibility Debate," Studies in Political Economy, No. 36, Autumn, 1991.
- MacDougall, John, Rural Life in Canada, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973.
- MacGibbon, D. A., The Canadian Grain Trade, Toronto: Macmillan, 1932.
- MacGibbon, D. A., The Canadian Grain Trade: 1931 - 1951, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1952.
- Mackintosh, W. A., Economic Problems of the Prairie Provinces, Toronto: Macmillan, 1935.
- Macpherson, C. B., Democracy In Alberta, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962.
- MacPherson, Ian, Each For All: A History of the Co-operative Movement in English Canada, 1900 - 1945, Toronto: Macmillan [Carleton Library series], 1979.
- Macridis, Roy C., "Interest Groups in Comparative Analysis," The Journal of Politics, Vol. 23, 1961.
- Magnusson, Warren, and Walker, Robert, "De-Centring the State: Political Theory and Canadian Political Economy," Studies in Political Economy, No. 26, Summer, 1988.
- Mahon, Rianne, "Sectoral Politics and the Policy Process," The Politics of Industrial Restructuring: Canadian Textiles, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984.
- Mahler, Gregory S., "Parliament and Congress: Is the Grass Greener on the Other Side?" Comparative Politics 88/89, Guilford, Connecticut: Dushkin, 1988.
- Mallory, James R., Social Credit and the Federal Power in Canada, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1954.
- Manitoba Pool, "The Story of Manitoba Pool Elevators," [Pamphlet], Winnipeg, 1986.
- Marchak, M. Patricia, The Integrated Circus: The New Right and the Restructuring of Global Markets, Montreal: McGill-Queen's Press, 1991.

- Marsh, James G., and Olsen, Johan P., "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life," American Political Science Review, 78(3), 1984, pp. 734-749.
- McCalla, Douglas, ed., Perspectives on Canadian Economic History, Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1987.
- McCombs Young, Linda, The Formation of Wheat Policies in the U.S., Canada and Japan: Case Studies of Endogenizing Policy Behaviour, PhD. Dissertation, Agricultural Economics, University of California, 1987.
- McConnell, Grant, The Decline of Agrarian Democracy, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959.
- McConnell, W.H., Commentary on the British North America Act, Toronto: Macmillan, 1977.
- McCormick, Peter, Manning, Ernest, and Gibson, Gordon, Regional Representation: The Canadian Partnership, Calgary: Canada West Foundation, 1981.
- McCrorie, James Napier, In Union is Strength, Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Press, 1964.
- McCutcheon, Brian R., "The Birth of Agrarianism in the Prairie West," Prairie Forum, No. 1, 1976.
- McCutcheon, Brian R., "The Patrons of Industry in Manitoba, 1890 - 1898," Historical Essays on the Prairie Provinces, Donald Swainson, ed., Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1970.
- McGovern, ed., Agricultural Thought in the Twentieth Century, New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967.
- McHenry, Dean E., The Third Force in Canada: The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, 1932 - 1948, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1950.
- McMillan, Melville, ed., Provincial Public Finances: Provincial Surveys, Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1991.
- McNally, D., "Staple Theory as Commodity Fetishism: Marx, Innis and Canadian Political Economy," Studies in Political Economy, Autumn, 1981.
- McRae, Kenneth D., "The Plural Society and the Western Political Tradition," Canadian Journal of Political Science, 12(4), December, 1979.

- Meekison, Peter J., Canadian Federalism: Myth or Reality, 3rd Ed., Toronto: Methuen, 1977.
- Michels, Robert[o], Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy, Eden and Cedar Paul, trans., New York: Collier, 1962.
- Mitchell, Don, The Politics of Food, Toronto: James Lorimer, 1975.
- Monod, David, "The End of Agrarianism: The Fight for Farm Parity in Alberta and Saskatchewan," Labour/Le Travail, 16, 1985.
- Moorhouse, Hopkins, Deep Furrows, Toronto: McLeod, 1918.
- Morgan, Dan, Merchants of Grain, Middlesex: Penguin, 1980.
- Morris, Richard B., ed., Encyclopedia of American History, New York: Harper and Borthers, 1953.
- Morton, W. L., Manitoba: A History, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957.
- Morton, W. L., The Progressive Party in Canada, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967 [reprint].
- National Farmers Union, "Historical Background to the National Farmers Union," Fax Release to the UGG, 19 Nov., 1991.
- Naylor, James, "Workers and the State: Experiments in Corporatism after World War One," Studies in Political Economy, Vol. 42, Autumn, 1993.
- Newman, Peter C., Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1973.
- Nordlinger, Eric, and Lowi, Theodore, "The Return to the State: Critiques," American Political Science Review, Vol. 82, No. 3, Sept., 1988.
- Nye, Russel, B., Midwestern Progressive Politics: A Historical Study of its Origins and Development, 1870 - 1958, New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1959.
- Offe, Claus, "Competitive Party Democracy and the Keynesian Welfare State," Contradictions of the Welfare State, John Keane, ed., London, U.K.: Hutchinson, 1984.
- Offe, Claus, "New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics," Social Research, Vol 24, No. 4.

- Offe, Claus, and Wiesenenthal, Helmut, "Two Logics of Collective Action: Theoretical Notes on Social Class and Organizational Form," Political Power and Social Theory, Vol. 1, 1980, pp. 67 - 115.
- Olling, R. D., and Westmacott, M. W., eds., Perspectives on Canadian Federalism, Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall, 1988.
- Olson, Mancur, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971 [Reprint].
- Olson, Mancur, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982.
- Owram, Doug, The Economic Development of Western Canada: An Historical Overview, Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada, Discussion Paper #219, 1982.
- Owram, Doug, The Promise of Eden: The Canadian Expansionist Movement and the Idea of the West, 1856 - 1900, Toronto: University of Toronto, 1980.
- Palmer, Howard, ed., The Settlement of the West, Calgary: University of Calgary, 1977.
- Panitch, Leo, ed., The Canadian State: Political Economy and Political Power, Toronto: University of Toronto, 1977.
- Patton, Harald, Grain Growers Cooperation in Western Canada, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1928.
- Paulsen, Gary, Farm: A History and Celebration of the American Farmer, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1977.
- Pearson, Lester B., The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, Volumes 1 - 3, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972, 1973, 1975.
- Pellicer, Henri, Moncrieff, P. M., and Weaver, George, Canada's Agricultural Systems, Quebec: Department of Agricultural Economics, MacDonald College, McGill University, 1977.
- Perry, J. Harvey, A Fiscal History of Canada - The Postwar Years, Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1989.

- Peters, B. Guy, "Insiders and Outsiders: The Politics of Pressure Group Influences on Bureaucracy," Administration and Society, Vol. 9, No. 2, August, 1977.
- Phidd, Richard W., "The Agricultural Policy Formulation Process in Canada," Paper presented to the CPSA, Montreal: June, 1980.
- Philip, Alan Butt, "The European Community: Balancing International Pressures and Domestic Demands," Agricultural Trade: Domestic Pressures and International Tensions, Grace Skogstad and Andrew Fenton Cooper, eds., Halifax: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1990.
- Phillips, Paul, Regional Disparities, Updated Ed., Toronto: James Lorimer, 1982.
- Pinard, Maurice, The Rise of a Third Party: A Study in Crisis Politics, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971.
- Porter, John, The Canadian Social Structure: A Statistical Profile, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart.
- Porter, John, The Vertical Mosaic, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965.
- Pratt, Larry, ed., Socialism and Democracy in Alberta: Essays in Honour of Grant Notley, Edmonton, NeWest Press, 1986.
- Pratt, Larry, and Richards, John, Prairie Capitalism: Power and Influence in the New West, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1979.
- Pratt, Larry, and Stevenson, Garth, eds., Western Separatism: The Myths, Realities and Dangers, Edmonton: Hurtig Pub., 1981.
- Presthus, Robert, "Interest Groups and the Canadian Parliament: Activities, Interaction, Legitimacy, and Influence," Canadian Journal of Political Science, 4(4).
- Prince, Michael J., "Little Help on the Prairie: Canadian Farm Income Programs and the Western Grain Economy," How Ottawa Spends 1990-91: Tracking the Second Agenda, Katherine A. Graham, ed., Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1990.
- Privy Council of Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada, Vols. 1 - 3, Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1985.

- Producer Payment Panel, Delivering the Western Grain Transportation Act Benefit to the Producers: Final Report to the Producer Payment Panel, Ottawa: Supply and Services, June, 1994.
- Pross, A. Paul, Group Politics and Public Policy, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1986.
- Pross, A. Paul, Group Politics and Public Policy, 2nd Ed., Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1992.
- Pross, A. Paul, ed., Governing Under Pressure: The Special Interest Groups, Special edition of Canadian Public Administration, Summer, 1982, Vol. 25 (2).
- Pross, A. Paul, ed., Pressure Group Behaviour in Canadian Politics, Toronto [?]: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1975.
- Pross, A. Paul, "Pressure Groups: Talking Chameleons," Canadian Politics in the 1980s, 2nd Ed., Michael Whittington and Glen Williams, eds., Toronto: Methuen, 1984.
- Proudfoot, Bruce, "Agriculture," The Prairie Provinces, P. J. Smith, ed., Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972.
- Przeworski, Adam, Capitalism and Social Democracy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
- Pugh, Terry, ed., Fighting the Farm Crisis, Saskatoon: Fifth House, 1987.
- Rasporich, A. W., ed., The Making of the Modern West: Western Canada Since 1945, Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1984.
- Rea, K. J., and Mcleod, J. T., eds., Business and Government in Canada: Selected Readings, 2nd ed., Toronto: Methuen, 1976.
- Reaman, G. Elmore, A History of Agriculture in Ontario: Volume Two, Toronto: Hazel Watson and Viney, 1970.
- Regenstreif, Peter, The Diefenbaker Interlude: Parties and Voting in Canada, Toronto: Longmans Canada, 1965.
- Robertson, Heather, Grass Roots, Toronto: James Lewis & Samuel, 1973.

- Rodefeld, Richard, et al, ed., Changes in Rural America: Causes, Consequences, and Alternatives, St. Louis: C.V. Mosby, 1978.
- Rodier, Monique, "Federal Government Expenditures in the Agri-Food Industry: 1970-71 to 1982-83," Canadian Farm Economics, Vol. 19, No. 1, 1985.
- Rogers, Susan Carol, and Salamon, Sonya, "Inheritance and Social Organization Among Family Farmers," American Ethnologist, 1983.
- Rokkan, Stein, Economic Territory Identity: Politics of West European Peripheries, London, U. K.: Sage, 1983.
- Rokkan, Stein, and Urwin, D., eds., The Politics of Territorial Identity, London, U. K.: Sage, 1982.
- Rosenstone, Steven J., et al, Third Parties in America: Citizen Response to Major Party Failure, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.
- Salisbury, Robert H., Governing America: Public Choice and Political Action, New York: Meredith, 1973.
- Salisbury, Robert, et al, "Who Works With Whom? Interest Group Alliances and Opposition," American Political Science Review, 81(4), December, 1987.
- Saskatchewan Department of Agriculture and Food, Agriculture Statistics: 1989, Regina: Government of Saskatchewan, 1989.
- Scarrow, Howard A., Canada Votes: A Handbook of Federal and Provincial Election Data, New Orleans: Hauser Press, 1962.
- Schmitz, Andrew, and McCalla, Alex, Comparison of Canadian and U.S. Grain Marketing Systems, Study prepared for the National Grain and Feed Association, March, 1976.
- Schultz, Theodore, "On Economics, Agriculture, and the Political Economy," Decision-Making and Agriculture, Theodor Dams, ed., Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1976.
- Self, Peter, and Storing, Herbert, The State and the Farmer, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1962.
- Serfaty, Meir, "The Conservative Party of Alberta under Lougheed, 1965-71: Building an Image and an Organization," Prairie Forum, 6:1, Spring, 1981.

- Serfaty, Meir, Structure and Organization of Political Parties in Alberta, 1935 - 71, PhD. Dissertation, Carleton University, 1977.
- Sharp, Paul F., The Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada, New York: Octagon Books, 1971 [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1948].
- Shortt, S.E.D., "Social Change and Political Crisis in Rural Ontario: The Patrons of Industry, 1889 - 1896," Oliver Mowat's Ontario, Donald Swainson, ed., Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1972.
- Shumiatcher, Morris C., "Alberta Election," Canadian Forum, 24:284, Sept., 1944.
- Sinclair, Peter R., Populism in Alberta and Saskatchewan, PhD. Dissertation, University of Edinburgh, 1972.
- Sinclair, Peter, "The Saskatchewan CCF: Ascent to Power and the Decline of Socialism", Canadian Historical Review, 1973, pp. 419 - 433.
- Singer, Edward Gerald, and de Sousa, Ivan Sergio Friere, "The Sociopolitical Consequences of Agrarianism Reconsidered", Rural Sociology, Vol. 48, No. 2, Summer, 1983, pp. 291 - 307.
- Skocpol, Theda, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research," Bringing the State Back In, Peter B. Evans, et al, eds., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
- Skogstad, Grace, "Canada: Conflicting Domestic Interests in the MTN," Agricultural Trade: Domestic Pressures and International Tensions, Cooper and Skogstad, eds., Halifax: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1990.
- Skogstad, Grace, Farmers' Political Belief Systems, PhD. Dissertation, University of British Columbia, 1976.
- Skogstad, Grace, "The Farm Products Marketing Agencies Act: A Case Study of Agricultural Policy," Canadian Public Policy, 6(1), Winter, 1980.
- Skogstad, Grace, The Politics of Agricultural Policy-Making in Canada, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987.
- Slotkin, Richard, The Fatal Environment: The Myth of the Frontier and the Age of Industrialization, 1870 - 1890, Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1986.

- Smiley, D. V., Canada in Question: Federalism in the Eighties, 3rd Ed., Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1980.
- Smiley, D. V., The Federal Condition in Canada, Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1987.
- Smith, David E., "The Membership of the Saskatchewan Legislative Assembly: 1905 - 1966," Politics in Saskatchewan, Norman Ward and Spafford, eds., Don Mills, Longman's, 1968.
- Smith, David E., Prairie Liberalism: The Liberal Party in Saskatchewan, 1905-71, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975.
- Smith, David E., The Regional Decline of a National Party: Liberals on the Prairies, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981.
- Smith, David E., "Saskatchewan: Approximating the Deal," Provincial and Territorial Legislatures in Canada, Gary Levy and Graham White, eds., Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989.
- Smith, Martin J., The Politics of Agricultural Support in Britain: The Development of the Agricultural Policy Community, Hampshire: Dartmouth Publishing, 1990
- Spafford, D. S., "The Origins of the Farmers' Union of Canada," Saskatchewan History, 28(3), 1965.
- Stanbury, W.T., "Lobbying and Interest Group Representation in the Legislative Process," Authority and Influence: Institutions, Issues and Concepts in Canadian Politics, Carla Cassidy, ed., Oakville, Ont.: Mosaic Press, 1985.
- Stanbury, W. T., "The Mother's Milk of Politics: Political Contributions to Federal Parties in Canada, 1974 - 1984," Canadian Journal of Political Science, December, 1986.
- Stanbury, W. T., "Privatization and the Mulroney Government, 1984 - 1988," Canada Under Mulroney: An End of Term Report, Andrew Gollner and Daniel Salee, eds., Montreal: Vehicule Press, 1988.
- Staples, Janice, Beyond the Social Gospel: A Study of the Intellectual Foundations of Radical Protest Politics in Early Twentieth Century Canada, PhD. Dissertation, Carleton University, Ottawa, 1985.

- Stevenson, Garth, "Canadian Regionalism in Continental Perspective," Journal of Canadian Studies, Summer, 1980, pp. 16 - 28.
- Stirling, Bob, "The State and Rural Community: Notes on Political trends in Rural Saskatchewan," Paper presented to the Rural Studies Conference, Kingston, Ontario, June, 1991.
- Stirling, Bob, and Conway, Bob, "Fractions Among Prairie Farmers," Paper presented to the CPSA, Montreal, June, 1985.
- Stirling, Bob, and Diaz, Polo, "Farming to Win: Degradation of Farm Work in the Canadian Prairies," Presented to Rural Studies Conference, Quebec City, 1989.
- Strick, J. C., Canadian Public Finance, 4th Ed., Toronto: Holt, Rinhart and Winston, 1992
- Sundquist, James L., Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States, Revised Ed., Washington: Brookings Institute, 1983.
- Swainson, Donald E., ed., Historical Essays on the Prairie Provinces, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1970.
- Tarrow, Sidney, Between Center and Periphery: Grassroots Politicians in Italy and France, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977.
- Taylor, Carl C., "The Farmer's Movement and Large Farmers' Organizations," Changes in Rural America, Rodefeld, Richard, ed., St. Louis: C.V. Mosby, 1978.
- Thompson, Elizabeth A., and McCubbin, Hamilton I., "Farm Families in Crisis: An Overview of Resources", Family Relations, Vol. 36, No. 4, pp. 461 - 467.
- Thompson, Peter, et al, The Prairies: Alienation and Anger, [Prepared under The Telegram Canada 70 Team], Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1969.
- Thorburn, Hugh G., Interest Groups in the Canadian Federal System, Vo. 69 MacDonald Commission, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985.
- Thorburn, Hugh G., ed., Party Politics in Canada, 5th Ed., Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 1985.

- Tickamyer, Ann. R., "Research Note: Rural-Urban Influences on Legislative Power and Decision Making", Rural Sociology, Vol. 48, No. 1, Spring, 1983, pp. 133 - 147.
- Touraine, Alain, The Voice and the Eye: An Analysis of Social Movements, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
- Truman, David, The Government Process, New York: Alfred Knopf, 1951.
- Turner, Allan R., "W.R. Motherwell: The Emergence of a Farm Leader," Historical Essays on the Prairie Provinces, Donald Swainson, ed., Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1970.
- United Grain Growers Limited, The Grain Growers Record: 1906 to 1943, Winnipeg, Public Press, 1944.
- The University of Manitoba, and the University of Minnesota, "Agriculture in the Prairie Provinces in Wartime, 1939-42," The Interests of Western Canadian Agriculture in the Peace Settlement, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1943.
- Urquhart, M. C., and Buckley, K., eds., Historical Statistics of Canada, Toronto: Macmillan, 1965.
- Urquhart, M. C., and Buckley, K., Historical Statistics of Canada, 2nd Ed., Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1983.
- Valelly, Richard M., Radicalism in the States: The Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party and the American Political Economy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989.
- Van Loon, Richard, and Whittington, Michael, The Canadian Political System: Environment, Structure, and Process, 3rd Ed., Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1981.
- Van Loon, Richard, and Whittington, Michael, The Canadian Political System: Environment, Structure, and Process, 4th Ed., Scarborough, Ont., McGraw-Hill, 1987.
- Verney, Douglas, British Government and Politics: Life Without a Declaration of Independence, 2nd Ed., New York: Harper and Row, xx.
- Vinning, Grant, Regulation and Regulatory Modes in Canadian Agriculture, M.A. Thesis, Carleton University, School of Public Administration, 1978.

- Walker, James L., and Walker, Lilly J. S., "Self-Reported Stress Symptoms in Farmers", Journal of Clinical Psychology, 44(1), Jan., 1988.
- Ward, Norman, and Smith, David, Jimmy Gardiner: Relentless Liberal, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990.
- Ward, Norman, and Spafford, Duff, eds., Politics in Saskatchewan, Toronto: Longmans, 1968.
- Warley, T. K., Agriculture in an Independent World: U. S. and Canadian Perspectives, Montreal: C. D. Howe Institute (Canadian-American Committee), 1977.
- Weil, Gordon L., Trade Policy in the 70's, Washington, D.C. [?], Twentieth Century Fund, 1969.
- The Western Producer, Prairie Farm Policy Guide: 1976-77, Saskatoon: The Western Producer, 1976.
- Whelan, Eugene (with Rick Archbold), Whelan: The Man in the Green Stetson, Toronto: Irwin, 1986.
- Whitaker, Reginald, The Government Party: Organizing and Financing the Liberal Party of Canada 1930-58, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977.
- Whittington, Michael, and Williams, Glen, eds., Canadian Politics in the 1990s, 4th Ed., Toronto: Nelson, 1985.
- Wiebe, Nettie, "If the Rain Doesn't Get You, Low Prices Will: Grain," Compass: A Jesuit Journal, Sept., 1990.
- Wilford, Alan, Farm Gate Defence: The Story of the Canadian Farmers Survival Association, Toronto: New Canada Publications, 1985.
- Williams, Glen, Not for Export: Toward a Political Economy of Canada's Arrested Industrialization, Revised Ed., Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986.
- Wilson, Barry, Beyond the Harvest: Canadian Grain at the at the Crossroads, Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1981.
- Wilson, Barry, Farming the System: How Politicians and Producers Shape Canadian Agricultural Policy, Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1990.
- Wilson, Barry, Politics of Defeat: The Decline of the Liberal Party in Saskatchewan, Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1980.

- Wilson, Barry, et al, "Farm Interest Groups and Canadian Agricultural Policy," Occasional Paper # 88.04, Centre for the Study of Co-operatives, Saskatoon, Sept., 1988.
- Wilson, Barry, and Finkle, Peter, "Is Agriculture Different? Another Round in the Battle Between Theory and Practice," Agricultural Trade: Domestic Pressures and International Tensions, Grace Skogstad and Andrew Fenton Cooper, eds., Halifax: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1990.
- Wilson, Charles F., A Century of Canadian Grain: Government Policy to 1951, Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1978.
- Wilson, Graham, "Farmer's Organizations in Advanced Societies," International Perspectives in Rural Sociology, Cichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1978.
- Winham, Gilbert, "Formulating Trade Policy in Canada and the U.S.: The Institutional Framework," Agricultural Trade: Domestic Pressures and International Tensions, Grace Skogstad and Andrew Fenton Cooper, eds., Halifax: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1990.
- Winson, Anthony, The Intimate Commodity: Food and the Development of the Agro-Industrial Complex in Canada, Toronto [?], Garamond, 1992.
- Winson, Anthony, "The Uneven Development of Canadian Agriculture: Farming in the Maritimes and Ontario," Canadian Journal of Sociology, Vol. 10, No. 4, 1985.
- Wiseman, Nelson, "The Character and Strategy of the Manitoba CCF, 1943 - 1959," Prairie Forum, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1979.
- Wiseman, Nelson, "An Historical Note on Religion and Parties on the Prairies", Journal of Canadian Studies, 16 (1981), pp. 109 - 112.
- Wiseman, Nelson, "The Pattern of Prairie Politics," Party Politics in Canada, 5th Ed., Hugh G. Thorburn, ed., Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall, 1985.
- Wiseman, Nelson, Social Democracy in Manitoba: A History of The CCF/NDP, Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 1985.
- Wolf, Eric R., "On Peasant Rebellions," International Social Science Journal, 21(2), 1969.

- Wood, Louis Aubrey, A History of Farmers' Movements in Canada, Toronto: [Ryerson, 1924], University of Toronto Press, 1975.
- Woodside, Kenneth, "Trade and Industrial Policy: Hard Choices," Governing Canada: Institutions and Public Policy, Michael M. Atkinson, ed., Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1993.
- Wright, John W., ed., The Universal Almanac, 1990, Kansas City: Andrews and McMeel, 1989.
- Yates, Samuel W., History of the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool: Its Origin, Organization and Progress, 1924 - 1935, Saskatoon: United Farmers of Canada, 1947.
- Young, Walter D., Anatomy of a Party: The National CCF, 1932-62, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969.
- Young, Walter D., Review of David Smith's Prairie Liberalism", Canadian Journal of Political Science, March, 1977, pp. 169 - 170.

END

0 6-0 6-9|6

FIN