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**CONTEMPORARY POVERTY BELIEF SYSTEMS
AND
THE HISTORICAL CHURCH-SECT INFLUENCE:
THE CONTINUING IMPACT OF MAINSTREAM
RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS IN CANADA**

BY

R. SCOTT EVANS

**A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY**

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

**CARLETON UNIVERSITY
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**CONTEMPORARY POVERTY BELIEF SYSTEMS AND THE HISTORICAL
CHURCH-SECT INFLUENCE: THE CONTINUING IMPACT OF MAINSTREAM
RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS IN CANADA**

submitted by

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in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Chair, Department of Political Science

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July 5, 1996

Abstract

This study examines the relationship between contemporary mass poverty belief systems and Canadian mainstream religious communities. An analysis of the historical evolution of church polities in Canada and their institutional heritage provides some basis for understanding mass beliefs about poverty. The historical differences in the way in which Canadian churches reacted to poverty and the development of the welfare state provide a context for understanding the way in which institutional heritage transmits particular orientations toward poverty. Similar to other social variables used to explain belief systems, such as ethnicity, region, language or class, churches and their institutional heritage provide an additional way of explaining a consistent transmission of belief systems and ideological orientations.

An examination of attitudinal data throughout the 1980s and early 1990s demonstrates consistent patterns that distinguish both Protestant and Catholic traditions and religious polities having either a universal church or sectarian heritage. The impact of institutional heritage is underscored in Canadian-United States comparisons, where the broader structural and individual orientations toward poverty are reinforced by greater or lesser sectarian influences and regional religious dominance such as Catholicism in Quebec.

The most pronounced attitudinal and value differences are evident in the affective and normative dimensions of a poverty belief system. The denominational influence is less pronounced in the evaluative dimension of poverty beliefs and suggests the important secularizing influence of contemporary discourse surrounding the welfare state and contemporary social programs and policy debate. However, denominational affiliation remains an influential factor in both the ways in which individuals feel about the poor and the perceived legitimacy of social and economic inequality. This influence exists regardless of church attendance patterns and other measures of institutional attachment. Notwithstanding the continuing role of other social and economic factors in the formation of belief systems, the continuing effect of religion and its institutional manifestations suggests the need for a more thorough examination of the way in which cultural institutions transmit values and attitudes, and how these in turn are manifested in society.

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The completion of this doctoral dissertation is part of an intellectual odyssey that touches the shores of many lives and crosses the borders of many disciplines. First and foremost, my heartfelt thanks are offered to a loving companion who has never known me without university affiliation. Through her vigilant support and appreciated motivation she has walked with me through the frustration and exhilaration of forging an intellectual passion. She too has ventured this path and together we share a common bond and commitment to intellectual inquiry. This legacy we pass to our two sons, born and raised never knowing a life without books and data, and general inquiry. Their inquisitive minds and intuitive insights have often raised my spirit. Their playful *joue de vivre* has always provided a much needed balance that tempers the obsession required to complete a doctoral dissertation.

A special thanks is offered to the members of my committee. Professor McRae played the steady hand as my supervisor, giving me the freedom to explore the rich history of Canadian religion without compromising intellectual rigour. His careful attention to textual quality and the adequacy of arguments speaks to his personal pursuit of academic excellence. It is a special honour to have been one of his last doctoral students and to have benefited from a vast reservoir of experience.

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Finally, I would like to recognize my parents, who have always supported and encouraged free intellectual inquiry, even if they opposed many of the youthful ideas with which I wrestled. The counsel of my mother was the moving force behind my academic interests. Her untimely passing did not still the love of knowledge she passed to me. My father and his commitment to his religious community remain a living testament to the power of individual spirituality and the strength of religious belief in Canadian society. His example within the Mormon community continues to inspire my own commitment and the importance of understanding the role of religion in society.

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CHAPTER 1

Canadian Religion and Mass Beliefs - A Persistent Influence

Defining the Problem

One of the underlying questions in the study of contemporary organized religion is whether churches influence the way in which the world is perceived and evaluated. While few would suggest that churches are without any relevance in modern secular societies, particularly in the private devotions of the individual, there is considerable disagreement as to the current role of churches in public life. The traditional socio-economic role of churches has been increasingly replaced by secular institutions like the welfare state and the secular educational system. There is disagreement, however, on the effect this has had on the role of churches in the formation of public attitudes about social issues and policies. Disagreement is centered on the extent to which churches remain either important socializing agents or are cultural institutions that continue to institutionalize sets of attitudes and beliefs.

Despite the enormous changes that churches have undergone in the twentieth century, religiosity remains an important characteristic of the Canadian population. While church attendance has declined in recent years, an estimated 24-27% of the population continue to attend church at least once a week. In 1991, Gallup reported that 31% of the general public had attended a religious service in the seven day period prior to being interviewed (Bozinoff and MacIntosh, 1991). This trend has remained stable between 1985 and 1990, despite a decline from higher levels of attendance in 1970 (44%) and 1960 (56%).

The profile of contemporary regular attendees is instructive. In 1991, Catholics were more inclined to attend church than their Protestant counterparts (41% versus 27%). Regular attendees tended to be older. However, 19% of regular attendees were between the ages of eighteen and twenty-nine years.

Weekly attendees represent a significant minority of the population. Many of these individuals maintain regular contact with churches. If those who attend once a month are included the proportion of regular church attendees rises to 42-36% of the Canadian population, depending on the year.

Another measure of the role of religion in Canadian life is church affiliation. In 1990 an estimated 75% of the Canadian population claimed affiliation some religious institution or faith (Baril and Mori 1991). In the same study only 12.1% declared no religious affiliation. The "other" and "not stated" categories are comprised of 9% and 1.7% respectively for 1990.

Table 1: Cross-National Comparative Belief in God

Percent Believing in God. ¹	US	CND	Western Europe	UK	France	Italy
believe	94%	89%	78%	76%	72%	88%
don't believe	3%	7%	16%	14%	23%	7%
dk/na	3%	4%	6%	10%	5%	5%
N	1014	1032	2241	307	330	309

Source: Gallup-Kettring Global Survey (1970s)

While the majority of Canadians declare some church affiliation, such declaration does not indicate the strength of their feelings toward their church, nor their commitment to church teachings. Canadian survey data in the 1980s estimate nine in ten Canadians express a belief in God or a Supreme Being (Bibby 1987, 64). In a worldwide survey in the mid-1970s, an estimated 89% of Canadians believed in a God or Supreme Spirit (Gallup and Stoetzel 1978, 173; see Table 1). Only 49% of these believers felt that God was active in punishing and rewarding humanity. This is contrasted with the United States, where 94% of the sample expressed a belief in God. Of that number, 68% believed in a God that actively punishes and rewards humanity (See Table 2).

¹The question used in the survey is: Do you believe in God or a universal spirit? The source of the survey is Gallup-Kettring Global Survey (1970s).

From another perspective, Canadians also scored high in the degree to which they felt that religion was important in their lives. Using the results of the same Gallup-Kettring Global Survey, approximately 72% of the Canadian sample stated that their religious beliefs were either very important or fairly important (See Table 3)

Table 2. Cross-National Comparative Belief in Passive or Active God

Belief in an Active or Passive God²	US	CND	Western Europe	UK	France	Italy
Active - Observes, Punishes, Rewards	68%	49%	43%	34%	37%	56%
Passive - Does not Act Directly	19%	31%	22%	28%	25%	17%
dk/na	7%	9%	13%	14%	10%	15%
N ³	1014	1032	2241	307	330	309

Source: Gallup-Kettring Global Survey (1970s)

Except for the United States and Italy, Canada's believing population does exceed that of all other industrial countries by a considerable margin. The results of these surveys indicate a considerable natural constituency for churches in Canada. However, belief in God or measures of religious practices only provide a partial indication of the extent to which individuals are linked to institutionalized religion. And, such indicators do not help us understand the connection between churches and political beliefs.

Denominational Affiliation and Political Choice

Despite the secularization of our political system the effect of churches is still evident in many of our formal political practices. For example, religious affiliation remains the single most important variable predicting voter preference in Canada (Lijphart 1979).

²The question was asked for respondents who stated a belief in Deity: Do you believe that this God or universal spirit observes your actions and rewards or punishes you for them? Yes implies an active God. No suggests a God that is passive. Percentage of respondents is based on number that stated they believed in a Deity. The source of the survey is Gallup-Kettring Global Survey (1970s).

³ The remaining percentage in each category are those who either did not believe in a Deity or did not know whether they believed.

Early attempts to explain this effect minimized the role of churches in Canadian politics. William Irvine attempts to explain away the role of churches using a socialization model that focuses on the family rather than the church (Irvine 1974). He argues that families perpetuate "old cleavages" such as the traditional Catholic-liberal alliance. In families where individuals cannot name the political preferences of their parents, the religious factor is overshadowed by cultural and urban-rural differences.

Table 3. Cross-National Comparative Belief in Importance of Religion

Importance of Religious Beliefs to Respondent. ⁴	US	CND	Western Europe	UK	France	Italy
very important	56%	36%	27%	23%	22%	36%
fairly important	30%	36%	32%	26%	33%	42%
not too important	8%	19%	26%	26%	23%	16%
not at all important	5%	9%	13%	20%	20%	6%
dk/na	1%	0%	2%	5%	2%	0%
N	1014	1032	2241	307	330	309

Source: Gallup-Kettring Global Survey (1970s)

Richard Johnston challenges this thesis by emphasizing the effect of social context in familial socialization (Johnston 1985). Families may transmit clusters of preferences, including religion and partisanship. However, Johnston found empirical evidence to support the argument that the role of churches as interest groups and the definers of subcultures introduced a powerful non-familial influence on political choices. In the case of traditional alliances between Catholics and the Liberal party, the issues which gave the alliance its original impetus may have disappeared. Johnston's evidence suggests that there are still outstanding issues and social networks rooted in church communities that reinforce patterns in partisan preference.⁵

⁴The source of the survey is Gallup-Kettring Global Survey (1970s)

⁵For Johnston this is primarily rooted in such debates as the public funding of a separate school system, which in turn is an important institution that provides the infrastructure for building a cohesive community.

Johnston found that a major factor why some families were more successful transmitters of partisanship involved extra-familial reinforcement. In this case a Catholic-liberal father was more likely than a non-Catholic liberal to pass on the liberal preference because the larger Catholic community reinforced such a choice. A more recent study supports Johnston's earlier conclusions by analyzing the effect of the geographical distribution of Catholics. In work on the spatial impact on the class and religious determinants of partisan preference, Johnston (1991) concludes that class-based party preferences, measured by union involvement, only surface in areas where the Catholic population is not large enough to suppress class differences. While open to criticisms over the measure of class, these conclusions raise questions concerning the role of churches in sustaining cohesive patterns of preference in the Catholic population. This raises even more important questions about the institutional and ideological character of Canadian Catholicism and other religious denominations and the extent to which they influence political belief systems. Answers to these questions will explain, in part, why positions and debates around social issues remain somewhat stable across time in an environment where political partisanship is highly volatile and brokerage party politics generate shifting party platforms and agendas.⁶

Multiple Tendencies and Group Stability

Despite the growing body of literature on Canadian ideology and culture, there have been few satisfactory explorations of the relationship between churches and mass belief

⁶A relatively stable perspective on social issues is evident in Church communities, particularly among church activists whose general normative thrust is very similar to their Social Gospel counterparts prior to World War II. (See Hutchinson 1989; Williams 1984b; Pulker 1986). The interpretive continuity in Catholic social doctrine is less straightforward and will be discussed in the following chapter. The paradox of stable cultural attitudes and volatile policy attitudes is discussed by Donald J. Devine (1972, 70-71). As Herbert McClosky and John Zaller note, political discourse is inherently fractious and frequently masks broad areas of consensus (1984, 236-237). Despite debates over specific policies, McClosky and Zaller present evidence supporting the idea that most individuals possess general political orientations regardless of participation levels. And, that as political sophistication increases there is a greater tendency to conform to discrete ideologically integrated 'packages' that are formulated by opinion leaders and considered politically "respectable" (1984, 262).

systems. Historical creeds and dogma provide churches with a structured symbolic order that facilitates the institutionalization of legitimate political ideology. This is certainly evident in the articulation of Catholic social doctrine by French Canadian public education organizations such as the *Ecole sociale populaire* and the intellectual forums promoted by the *Semaines sociales*. Yet, like political parties and social movements, churches frequently involve the compromise of a number of orientations towards the world. This becomes more apparent as one moves from formal religious beliefs to social and political issues.

As a representation of a community, churches may interpret the denominational symbolic order as a prophetic voice challenging the legitimacy of political institutions and practices. On the other hand, churches may reinforce the norms of the existing political system, thereby legitimizing the existing distribution of resources and opportunities in society. While organizational interests may predispose church elite toward a particular interpretation of the world, the symbolic order is neither inherently radical nor conservative.⁷ Moreover, community heterogeneity and the ambiguity of religious interpretation and its political relevance may involve parallel radical and conservative tendencies.

Much of the current literature on ideology and political culture challenges the explanatory monism of early studies by suggesting a complex interdependent relationship between the environment within which the symbolic world is organized and the political imagination expressed in action, institutions, or artifacts (cf. Nutbrown 1990, 65ff). Rather than suppose an underlying value consensus, contemporary analysis assumes a "cultural mosaic" from which political communities articulate identities and issues in a constant process of construction and reconstruction (Williams and Williams 1990, 120,

⁷Nowhere is this more apparent than in the divergent paths of Black and White Baptists in the southern United States (Evans and Boyce 1986, 32ff).

Breton 1984, 124ff, cf Edelman 1988)⁸ Evidence of stable beliefs within this vortex of identities and issues may be a function of the extent to which beliefs are embedded in public or cultural institutions (i.e. churches)

Scholars such as Raymond Breton (1984) have increasingly emphasized the interconnection of identity, way of life, and language and how each becomes embedded in public institutions. The weak establishment tradition for Canadian churches has meant that churches are not part of the formal political system. However, as in the United States where the separation of church and state has been pronounced, churches have historically influenced public debate and have embedded in public institutions a particular orientation toward the world (Crysdale 1961; cf Charlton et al. 1986 and Gehrig 1979). This influence is historically evident in the corporatist development of Quebec, the disestablishment movement in Ontario, the Antigonish movement in the Maritimes, and the Social Gospel movement of the prairies. The critical task is to understand how either the historical residues of these movements or unique contemporary developments are carried by churches and influence mass political beliefs.

Mainstream Churches and Poverty

The following study examines the relationship between mainstream churches (i.e. Anglican, United Church, and Roman Catholic) and the way in which denominational belief systems make the concept of poverty meaningful.⁹ The complexity and diversity of denominational beliefs makes the examination of a comprehensive system difficult. It is possible, however, to analyze the impact of churches on various dimensions of a single

⁸Churches have played a vital role in the formation of ethnic identities. Church affiliation has also been identified as an important mechanism promoting or hindering acculturation and socio-economic achievement (Kalbach and Richard 1990).

⁹While the primary focus is on the three aforementioned mainstream denominations, there will be occasional comparisons that include two other groups in the quantitative section. The first group includes all respondents who claim no church affiliation. The second group is similar to Reginald Bibby's "conservative" category which includes Baptists, Evangelicals, and Pentecostals. While the second category is instructive, the congregational autonomy of these churches and their loose affiliation makes it difficult to identify official teachings for analytical purposes.

theme. The clustering of positions and attitudes about poverty in Canadian society provides a common basis for comparison (inter-denominational) from which the relative influence of churches can be studied. By extending the comparison to groups within denominations (intra-denominational comparisons) it is also possible to understand how heterogeneity affects the way in which denominational belief systems are structured.

Poverty is an ideal theme for such an endeavour because it is transhistorical and cuts across numerous cleavages such as language, region, ethnicity, and gender. While groups experience different levels of poverty, poverty within and between groups remains an important reference used to assess and judge group and individual activity within society. The fluidity of social status and changing socio-economic structures have meant that poverty in the general sense remains topical and symbolically relevant in contemporary political language.

A growing number of groups and individuals have addressed the issue of poverty. This number has increased as poverty has been increasingly linked to questions of inequality in power, opportunity, and security (i.e. women's groups, aboriginal people, ethnic and visible minorities, the "working" poor, etc.). This is not just an issue for those defined as poor. The question of poverty involves those who are not poor, in a debate over poverty's inevitability, acceptability, and justification. Where an individual or organization is positioned in this debate reflects an enormous range of assumptions about society. This in turn indicates the boundaries of policy debate and the extent to which some policies are viable options to be articulated in the political arena.

While church leaders have been addressing the issue of poverty in Canada since the late 1800s, a joint brief presented to the Special Senate Committee on Poverty in 1970 represents an important watershed (Sheridan 1987, Document 23). The brief was the joint effort of the Canadian Catholic Conference and the Canadian Council of Churches. It

deserves special reference because it establishes a common point of reference for both the conceptualization of poverty and related policy debates among the mainstream churches.¹⁰

The introduction to the brief stipulates the primary assumptions concerning the role of churches and the questions that must be addressed. First, churches and their members share in the "collective responsibility for human want in the midst of plenty." Second, churches are obligated to act as "watchful critics of society." Third, churches also share responsibility to "seek solutions to social justice" and continue their historical role as "social pioneers."

For churches represented in the brief, poverty is more than economic hardship.¹¹ It is also about power and the erosion of the human personality, "the cramping of a person's sense of what a full life can mean." Combating poverty is essentially a process of liberation.

Authentic policies of liberation will enable people to seek a full life, each in his own way and at his own pace in the company of his neighbours. The challenge of liberation is to enable persons trapped by circumstances to spring loose, to discover their potential, to seek opportunities for change and growth, and to assume the primary responsibility for their own future and share in the building of a just society (ibid., v 14).

The participatory thrust of this conceptualization of poverty means that economic aid is not a sufficient response to poverty. The authors of the brief accept the notion that governments, with their resources, play a critical role in the elimination of economic poverty. It is the responsibility of the voluntary sector (i.e. churches), however, to exert a "countervailing presence" in the policy area and to act as an intermediary force between

¹⁰The document signatories included: the executive and six other Bishops of the Canadian Catholic Conference, the executive of the Canadian Council of Churches and representatives from each of the member churches (Anglican Church, Armenian Orthodox Church of America, Baptist Federation of Canada, Churches of Christ - Disciples, Greek Orthodox Church, Presbyterian Church in Canada, Reformed Church of America - Ontario Classis, Salvation Army, Society of Friends, United Church of Canada, Lutheran Church in America - Canadian Section).

¹¹The broader conceptualization of poverty requires social policy debate to include issues of control over resources such as education, networks, a healthy and affordable living environment, work experience, access to basic services, self-respect, participation in decision-making, and opportunity to advance one's status (Cf. Special Senate Committee on Poverty 1971, p. 2).

citizens and government, thereby permitting previously unheard voices to participate in the decision-making process. On the non-economic side, the brief argues that it is the primary responsibility of the voluntary sector to awaken the "sense of what is possible for man and the responsible steps required to attain it."

In the brief to the Special Senate Committee on Poverty, and in an earlier joint report on strategy, attention is drawn to the critical role of collective evaluation and public education. Implicit in the public education component is the argument that Churches must have the support of their congregations if coalitions are to be effective voices in the policy debates and direct sufficient resources towards poverty issues.

The report of joint committee in 1969, composed of representatives of the Canadian Council of Churches and the Canadian Catholic Conference, argued that churches must examine their priorities and the extent to which there is consensus concerning poverty issues (Sheridan 1987, Document 20). This was considered essential if more resources were to be committed to poverty-related programs and activities. Likewise, the brief to the Special Senate Committee on Poverty argued that the efficacy of church action is impeded by a persisting "attitude lag" between the affluent and the deprived (Sheridan 1987, Document 23).

The critical question for churches is how to generate the social vision or "collective renewal of conscience" necessary to combat poverty. This is a question which has long plagued church activists. A sense of shared meaning, linked to a "greatness of purpose", is absolutely essential if church members are to summon the commitment and generosity necessary for churches to achieve their stated objectives (Leddy 1990, 213).

The problems with public education have a direct link to multidimensional political belief systems. Public education does not operate in a void. If it is to be effective it must address issues in the language and symbols of the audience. One of the conclusions of a study on child poverty public education in the Ottawa-Carleton region, funded by the Toronto-based Laidlaw Foundation, indicates that in addition to an organizational base and media links, successful public education must package information specific to the needs and interests of each target audience (Evans 1991).

While sensational media stories and startling data attract attention, sustained interest or commitment can only be cultivated if the message resonates positively within the already existing belief system of the individual and the group. Although empirical evidence provides a substantive challenge to many popular beliefs about poverty, such evidence is only valid if its interpretation is uncontested and it addresses the experiential perceptions of individuals. As debates surrounding myths and appropriate poverty measures attest, the validity of evidence depends in large measure on an individual's a priori assumptions about poverty.¹²

The problem of public education and attitudes is that educators must use symbols to communicate, and the chosen symbolic order influences the interpretation of the message by the audience. In other words, the packaging of a message influences its meaning. Churches wanting to influence the attitudes and perceptions of their members concerning poverty must use the discourse with which their congregations are most familiar. For many, this is the traditional discourse and symbols unique to each denomination. Social justice advocates may communicate with one another using the specialized jargon of theology and the social sciences. The message concerning poverty will only be communicated to the general membership if the experiential context and symbols remain within a relevant frame of reference.

There are a number of developments that must be considered in understanding the influence of churches on poverty issues. While most church leaders would agree that poverty is a critical issue that must be addressed, there is disagreement as to what must be done. In terms of general positions it is clear that a certain degree of convergence is occurring despite left-right tensions among the church elite. While joint statements give a sense of unified direction, individual church responses incorporate different nuances and

¹²The debates and research on the role of a priori cognitive frameworks for interpreting and explaining poverty are discussed in some detail by Raymond Pong (1983, 15ff). His critique of inference models (where individuals build explanations based on generalizable experiences) suggests an important role for culture in framing cognitive models that explain social phenomena. For further discussion of poverty estimates and myths see Ross and Shillington (1989) and MacKinnon and Evans (1991).

emphasis. As noted in the following chapter, these differences reflect different traditions and modes of expression. The message concerning poverty is framed in the historical discourse of each church. The historical residue evident in the language and symbols of each denomination, if significant, should be evident in slightly different beliefs about poverty at the membership level.

Beliefs concerning the nature of poverty and possible prescriptions are essential for understanding the political viability of policy options. Moreover, from the perspective of social explanation it is important to understand how such beliefs are either maintained, reflected, or transformed through cultural institutions. For this reason it is important to examine the denominational belief systems that legitimize positions related to poverty (e.g. inequality, unemployment, social obligation, social programs, the welfare state, and the economy).

All of the above mentioned factors contribute to a general definition of poverty and provide a helpful framework for describing the way in which poverty is conceptualized by mainstream churches. Although central to the notion of poverty, characteristics such as deprivation and need may be defined in the context of a belief system and its tolerance of an unequal distribution of goods and services (normative), sensitivity to those defined as disadvantaged (affective), and the acceptance of possible remedies (evaluative). These components of a belief system are not exhaustive, but nevertheless, represent a broad approach to the different ways in which poverty can be understood. Within each of these components there may be combinations of positions that form a unique perspective on poverty.

Issue Convergence and Historical Residues

If the growth of interfaith organizations and joint statements since the 1960s are an indication of declining denominational differences on poverty issues, distinct political belief systems should not be evident among church members. A persistence in denominational differences at the mass level would suggest either the persistent influence

of a traditional belief system, a limited socializing role for contemporary church leaders, or a particular tension within a given denomination.

Unique tensions or developments within a denomination, and the socializing role of church leaders, may result from a combination of class, geography, age, or gender factors. In addition to these factors, however, is the influence of historical residues; that part of the explanation which cannot be attributed to any of the above factors. Attitudinal patterns on poverty issues provide information on the nature of this tension, particularly over the two perceived, and often interrelated historical missions of the Christian churches: personal evangelism and social witness.

The degree of polarization or unity between radical and conservative strains within churches not only has an historical foundation, the dialogue between these contending forces continues to be an important factor determining how social issues are legitimately addressed within the contemporary church. At the extreme, proponents of a radical Christianity promote a social witness approach that would conquer "social sin" by transforming the institutions and social relationships of the material world. Conversely, the conservative strain insists upon an "other worldly" mission of personal evangelism that shifts the burden of social problems to the personal level. This calls for individual submission to the injustices of this life in an expectation of justice in the next, or legitimizes for the individual the distribution of happiness as a sign of divine sanction. For most churches, the necessity of coexistence between the two extremes has required a middle position which differs from one denomination to another. This in turn has had an impact on how churches have articulated denominational beliefs about poverty.

The idea of historical residues explains in part how general church positions on poverty converge, while the symbolic boundaries differentiating denominational mass beliefs persist. The role of historical residues involves an argument where theology, dogma, and church practices communicate an individual's relationship to others. In Protestantism the historical emphasis is on the individual, where Christian salvation is achieved through a direct relationship between God and the individual. Salvation is not mediated by temporal representatives who act as God's gatekeepers. It is the "Priesthood

of all Believers", which for the Protestant, diminishes the arbitrary authority of the priest or essential nature of a specific church-sponsored ordinance. This suggests a great deal of emphasis on personal faith (Luther), individual justification (Calvin), and personal choice (Anabaptist tradition).

Conversely, Catholicism has historically emphasized the mediating role of church and priesthood in the salvation of individuals. Individuals exist in a state of dependence. The application of the general thesis concerning cultural institutions and poverty beliefs suggests that the more an institution emphasizes the individual, the greater the tendency to understand poverty as a result of "individual deficits". Protestantism has historically placed greater emphasis on the individual and the individual's direct relationship to God.

However, it is too simplistic to equate Protestantism with an individualistic approach to poverty without taking into account the historical developments that have engendered such individualism. The humanist tradition within the Reformation and the organic symbolism representing a collective approach to poverty were common threads among both Catholics and Protestants throughout the latter part of the Middle Ages. As Abel Alves argues, there is a convincing commonality in the approach to social problems among prominent Christian voices, be they reformers such as Jean Calvin, ardent Catholics such as Ignatius Loyola, or Christian humanists such as Juan Luis Vives. They share a common commitment to the "ideals of brotherhood and organic unity", which influenced the way they organized social projects and poor relief (Alves 1989, 5). This differed from the more secular models that developed at the same time among political elite, which were more often designed for social control than in establishing the unity of purpose, collective good, and mutual obligation inherent in the Medieval social order envisioned by these Christian leaders.¹³

This is not to say that social order did not concern leaders such as Calvin, Loyola, or Vives. As Alves notes, "Social control and social responsibility were interwoven "

¹³ The orientation toward social control is evident in the punitive nature of poor relief laws passed in cities in the Low Countries, Spain, and England throughout the 1500s. A more detailed discussion of the control dimension is found in Chapter Three.

(Alves 1989, 13). There was a mixture of kindness and harshness in the projects of Christian leaders regardless of their theological and ritualistic differences. They all distinguished between the deserving and the undeserving. While this is less pronounced among the Catholics, even Loyola devised punishments for “sturdy” beggars when he worked in Azpeita in 1535.¹⁴

The reason for mentioning these similarities is to underscore the point that it is not only the theology of Protestantism and Catholicism that provides the watershed between different approaches to poverty. There were certainly historical shifts in the way in which the religious elite approached the problem of poverty.¹⁵ These differences, however, are less related to the great split that occurred at the Reformation, than to the organizational developments that continued long after that historical event. These developments affected the way in which Christian institutions related to the state and to the community at large. The differences are rooted in the historical experience of each religious institution, rather than in the individual voices or theologies of their founders or great leaders. For the example of Vives, Calvin, and Loyola, there was certainly a change from the earlier medieval practice of spontaneous almsgiving that benefited the donor spiritually, to a position that recognized the importance of organized relief and acknowledged concern with social control. However, they shared a very similar approach to the concrete problem of poverty than their religious differences might suggest.

The watershed in poverty beliefs is rooted in the extent to which religious institution followed different organizational trajectories within society. The distinction between the universal church and the sect is one way of identifying a heritage that represents very different relationships to the state and to society. These categories are developed more fully in subsequent chapters, but it is sufficient at this time to note that the general thesis of

¹⁴ See Alves (1989) for a more detailed discussion of the similarities in poor relief measures during this period.

¹⁵ These shifts also occur within churches. This is documented by Donna Andrew and her analysis of changing themes and exhortatory patterns in Anglican charity sermons throughout the Eighteenth-Century (1992). Some of these developments are discussed in Chapter Three.

this study is linked to the institutional heritage and concomitant tendencies of mainstream Canadian churches.

The nature of these tendencies, and their implications for historical residues will be discussed more fully in the next chapter. In summary, however, historical residues involve complex patterns that are only partially passed on to subsequent generations. In some respects this is similar to the notion of "congealment" raised by Horowitz, in his discussion of the way in which cultural cleavages or fragments became frozen in Canadian political culture. Thus, while debates and the cultural voice of the church may shift in time, the general predisposition of the membership will be oriented toward a particular belief system. This belief system will certainly change as institutions are modified. However, there will be more cohesion within the membership belief system across time than one would normally expect if comparing broader societal attitudinal transformations. This is particularly true of events such as Church union, which was an important ecclesiastical development tempering contemporary Canadian sectarianism. There are additional complications when one adds the theological and practical influence of a Protestant social gospel and a Catholic social doctrine which have attempted to address a changing socio-economic environment. In total, the unique combination of historical developments makes the symbolic communication of denominational poverty beliefs nuanced and varied.

The Challenge of Religious Consumption

The issue remains whether or not historical residues are simply persistent anachronisms with little political significance. Are churches passive institutions, or dynamic factors that contribute actively to the cultural construction of reality? The current work of students of religion, particularly Reginald Bibby, suggest that churches no longer influence the way in which we perceive the world. This study challenges Bibby's thesis ¹⁶

While attitudinal research is limited in its ability to assess the symbolic richness underlying themes such as poverty, equality, distributive justice, and socio-economic

¹⁶The problems and limits of Bibby's thesis are addressed in an earlier study examining the relationship between churches, attitudes and social issues (Evans 1990). Parts of this study are found in this chapter

rights, it does provide a method of examining group differences. These differences are important indicators of the extent to which the institutional manifestation of religion (i.e. churches) is capable of maintaining the integrated, unifying perspective, that links belief and practice at multiple levels. In other words, if religion is a system of beliefs which "binds together the life of individuals and gives to those lives whatever consistency of purpose they may have" (Grant, 1969, p. 46), and given the historical conflicts and differences of the dominant churches, one should find attitudinal differences based on church affiliation. Moreover, the impact of churches on cultural orientations should increase as individuals demonstrate a desire to maintain a formal and committed link to the institutional church (cf. Whyte, 1981, 5f.).

It is this notion of integrated religion that Reginald Bibby argues is in decline (1987, 139ff.). He suggests that individuals require some form of internal consistency or continuity in order to remain psychologically healthy. In an environment where increasing role specialization is the norm, it is necessary for each individual to resolve the internal conflicts or contradictions that multiple specialized roles engender. According to Bibby, the need to resolve role conflicts has facilitated a shift from religious commitment to religious consumption. In other words, in order to resolve conflicts between the nature of one's work or social practices and the dictates of any given religious norm, it is easier for church members to tailor their spiritual needs in such a manner as to minimize internal conflict with other role demands. The essence of Bibby's argument is that churches have catered to this tendency by broadening their appeal. They have been more willing to adjust to the changing demands of their constituency by offering religion à la carte. And, this in turn, has resulted in the diminishing influence of historical residues and the erosion of denominational boundaries.

If Bibby's thesis is correct then differences over beliefs about poverty could not be attributed to churches. However, religious consumption is a facile explanation that fails to account for the committed efforts of clergy and members to restructure their religious communities and thereby make mainstream churches meaningful and relevant in both a religious and political sense. If cultural institutions, such as churches, are relevant in the

formation of political belief systems, then the way in which they think about poverty will be influenced by the symbolic structure of the denomination. The impact will be greatest on those most closely tied to the institution. There should be a difference between regular attendees and those who attend irregularly or not at all. If there is evidence of salient denominational differences, then one could argue that a historical residue persists and influences the way in which poverty is interpreted or filtered down to the mass level

If denominational differences are insignificant there are two possible explanations. First, a lack of significant difference could mean that secularization theories are correct. Perhaps, as Bibby suggests, the trend in religious consumption has rendered churches insignificant as cultural institutions influencing political beliefs. A second explanation could lie in issue convergence at the elite level. In other words, the growing consensus of religious elite has had an impact on church members and minimized the effect of historical differences. This would certainly require a closer examination of internal divisions, issue polarization and classical left-right differences within each denomination

What is a Belief System?

An empirical understanding of the denominational impact on beliefs about poverty requires an object of analysis. In this case it is the response patterns evident in a number of national surveys taken during the 1980s. However, some conceptual framework must be in place in order to analyze patterns or attitudinal tendencies. The notion of a belief system provides an essential step for understanding both the attitudinal information contained in the surveys and how this relates to churches

Given the difficulty of demonstrating consistent causal links between attitudes and action, a more appropriate approach conceptualizes beliefs as an "intervening process" rather than a tendency dictating action. While helping to direct and form action, the belief system is the symbolic field that structures tendencies: sometimes guiding, sometimes shaping, sometimes transforming, sometimes blocking, and sometimes ruthlessly eliminating (Blumer 1969, 95). In other words, the belief system is the defining process

through which individuals' interpret their world and the appropriateness of behaviour or self-conscious action ¹⁷

Given the limits of causal modeling, there is greater merit in understanding the way in which symbolic organization defines politics and hence contributes to the legitimacy of policies and political action than how attitudes and values cause action. ¹⁸ In other words, beliefs give reasons for acting, and hence, are part of the broader social context within which action is legitimized and organized (cf. Mullins 1972).

In this context it is helpful to understand a belief system that incorporates three primary characteristics. First, a belief system is both cognitive and social. It is cognitive in the sense that individuals interpret their world within the context of some organized mental process. ¹⁹ The belief system is social in that interpretation is not a solitary endeavour, but one that involves a repertoire of symbols and symbolic exchanges with other individuals. The belief system is composed of language, artifacts, and practices infused with meaning. In the structuring of meaning the central focus is the symbol, around which interpretation is enriched and contested by interlocutors engaged in both an internal (cognitive) and external (social) dialectic.

Second, within this cognitive and social framework there exist two levels: cultural codes linked to tradition and "common sense"; and more discursive codes directed

¹⁷ To take this one step further would be to argue that while the individual constructs meaning in the symbolic world the symbolic world is also framing the individual's meaning. This collapses the distinction between the individual and the "other" (subject-object dichotomy). Following this notion, Murray Edelman states that "...observers and what they observe construct one another, political developments are ambiguous entities that mean what concerned observers construe them to mean; and that the roles and self-concepts of the observers themselves are also constructions, created at least in part by their interpreted observations" (1988, 1-2). The problem with advancing this epistemological proposition is that it fails to recognize that from a practical perspective human actors operate as if there is a fixed symbolic order. Regardless of the existential ambiguity surrounding individuals, there is, nonetheless, a tendency to root one's experience in some form of "ultimate reality", be it sensory, philosophical, or theological in nature.

¹⁸ A summary of the many difficulties with the traditional approach to the ideational dimension of politics can be found in Wolfgang Koerner's (1983) criticism of the standard explanations of belief patterns.

¹⁹ This involves a notion of the structuring of perceptions and how they generate meaning or attach meaning to symbols. For a discussion of the various debates on the conceptualization of cognitive structures and their relevance to political belief systems see Conover et al. (1984).

towards self-conscious teleological action. Cultural codes include general assumptions about the world that permeate our language and symbolic expression. The nature of such codes range from crude group stereotypes and affect-driven responses to the basic assumptions underlying sophisticated ideologies. Cultural codes are often described in the context of political culture or *weltanschauung*²⁰

Discursive codes correspond to the non-Marxist concept of ideology, where "teleological reasoning" is the capacity to evaluate systematically a situation and choose among an array of possible actions in an effort to bring about some intentional outcome²¹

An important difference between cultural and discursive codes is the extent to which beliefs and practices are either viewed as natural or an inevitable part of life (cf. Swidler 1986, 279). Ideology or discursive codes frequently challenge cultural codes or operate where there is limited consensus on appropriate action²². The discursive quality of codes becomes salient where new situations require the legitimization of new coalitions and strategies.

Third, the belief system is composed of the dynamic interaction of tradition and common sense (cultural codes) with multiple and often contradictory discursive codes. The hermeneutical study of texts or documents provides a method of identifying the rational structure of discursive codes and the intuitive identification of cultural codes. Such techniques provide a rich understanding of the nuances attached to symbols. The hermeneutical approach, however, is less able to map the complex linkages between multiple actors and components of a mass belief system. Attitudinal data and statistical analysis permit a more systematic analysis of these linkages and describe how orientations towards language symbols (i.e. poverty) diverge and converge in relation to group

²⁰Under the rubric of political culture, the common textbook definitions frequently refer to broad patterns of individual values and attitudes directed towards political objects.

²¹For a more elaborate discussion of ideology and its conceptualization see the account provided by Evans (1986, 39ff.; cf. Mullins 1983).

²²See Swidler's (1986) discussion on the different roles of culture in "settled" and "unsettled" environments.

characteristics and other environmental factors. While the richness of a qualitative approach is lost, the quantitative method compensates with its ability to organize and compare groups using consistent criteria on a large scale.

Structuring Belief Systems

In his early work on working-class authoritarianism, Seymour Martin Lipset makes a special point of challenging models arguing that political support can be predicted based on a knowledge of the psychological predisposition or attitudes of individuals (1963, 91-92). Similar to my concern with cultural institutions and poverty beliefs, Lipset argues that connections with organizations carry commitments to particular agendas or actions and these mediate psychological or attitudinal dispositions. The important difference between Lipset and the approach used in this study is the notion that organizations and cultural institutions are sites of symbolic competition. Unlike the functionalist school influenced by Talcott Parsons, this study does not assume a consensus model of national socializing agents, although cultural institutions may at times act in this capacity.²³

While Parsons and Lipset explicitly view culture and belief systems in the context of institutions and social relationships, many of the early efforts to incorporate these ideas into the study of politics severed the cultural domain from its social context. There is a tendency in these early efforts to view culture and belief systems as direct causal forces determining how individuals adapt to their physical environment (Brym and Fox 1989, 36). Moreover, the race to introduce politics to the study of psychology meant that the

²³Early efforts by Talcott Parsons to elaborate a concept of belief systems provided social scientists with a framework for analyzing the ideational dimension of politics that extended beyond a history of ideas, national character, or normative political philosophy. In conjunction with systems of expressive symbols and systems of value orientation, Parsons considered belief systems an integral part of a cultural system, which in turn generated the necessary shared and relatively stable set of meanings required to have a functional society. Within Parson's functionalist paradigm, shared beliefs are essential if culture is to perform an integrative role. Culture cannot integrate without a belief system that establishes "standards of selective orientation and ordering" and a "complementarity of expectations" (Parsons 1951, 327). The functionalist paradigm, within which Parsons operated, has encountered significant criticism challenging the implicit notion that belief systems are the communicative or cognitive device rendering political systems functional and adaptive (Huaco 1986; Chilcote 1981).

social and institutional context so important in Parsons' work was replaced with cognition and motivational theories using the individual as the unit of analysis ²⁴

The failure, of what Willard Mullins (1983) describes as the "culture-personality" or "psychocultural" approaches to belief systems, is the inability of these early models to understand the significance of the symbolic world that exists outside the individual psychological domain. Externalized symbolic representation, be it in the form of "utterances" or images is mediated or structured by cultural institutions. While psychological attributes (i.e. personality types or development and learning processes) will influence the social expression and interpretation of symbols they do not stand alone as explanations of belief systems. As Clifford Geertz notes, our contemporary notions of culture as structuring or organizing our world of meaning are based on the assumption that "thinking" is social and public. ²⁵

There is a certain degree of fluidity implied in the notion that meaning is constructed publicly or socially. It is necessary to extend this notion by underscoring the competitive nature of the symbolic order. Nowhere is this more evident than in the discourse of political parties, social movements, and interest groups. Each competes for the symbols that convey legitimacy to particular concerns and interests or establish new understandings of universal principles (Pross 1992, 74-81, Cairns and Williams 1985, 8-13).

This has led some to argue that such contemporary relativism has crippled our ability to define substantive values around which stable group life can be formed (Bibby 1990). However, it may just as well be argued that organizational competition has meant greater

²⁴For criticisms of these developments from both a comparative and Canadian perspective see John Shury (1976), Ronald Chilcote (1981, 234ff.), and Robert Brym and Bonnie Fox (1989, 37ff.) For a discussion of developments of politically relevant cognition and motivation models see Pamela Johnston Conover and Stanley Feldman (1984), Serge Guimond and Douglas Palmer (1990), and Patrick Heaven (1990)

²⁵According to Geertz "[the] natural habitat [of human thought] is the house yard, the marketplace, and the town square. Thinking consists not of "happenings in the head" (though happenings there and elsewhere are necessary for it to occur) but of a traffic in what have been called, by George Mead and others, significant symbols - words for the most part but also gestures, drawings, musical sounds, mechanical devices like clocks, or natural objects like jewels - anything, in fact, that is disengaged from its mere actuality and used to impose meaning upon experience." (1973, 45)

difficulty in achieving hegemony. The complicity of churches in political or social movements is certainly less important than in the past (cf. Pross 1992, 32).

Both the institutional role of churches and the environment within which they operate has changed a great deal since the 1950s.²⁶ An organizational explosion has increased dramatically the number of groups competing for resources and legitimacy (Pross 1992, *passim*). From a sociological perspective there has been an "emerging communalism" with an emphasis on group identity and diversity (Blisshen 1986). This pluralism has engendered an increasingly individualized mosaic that Reginald Bibby describes as a situation where "all viewpoints have equal value" (1990, 13).

Churches have historically integrated communities by determining which values are of greater importance. This requires ideological cohesion on social and economic issues. Engaging in such a project has the effect of forcing churches to compete with other institutions, transforming administrative and secular problems into fundamental concerns of a high moral or ethical nature. The growing demands of a complex society and increasing group competition has meant that churches have had to defend their relevance in contemporary society.

A competitive environment does not mean a "value supermarket" from which individuals pick and choose their beliefs at random or at will. There is a certain degree of structure within which individuals operate. And, this structure, while certainly social in nature, is composed of institutions which not only communicate symbols but are also involved in creative adaptation to a changing environment.

Institutionalized networks such as families, peer groups, work, schools, universities, mass media, the judicial system, political parties, legislatures, and churches help organize

²⁶ As the institutional representation of religious beliefs, churches have historically enjoyed varied roles in the maintenance or transformation of society. The dominant accounts of religion in the social sciences range from the Weberian notion of religion as a process beginning with the creative challenge of charisma and finishing with rationalization and routinization; to the Marxian-Durkheimian concept of societal reification, where challenges and modifications to dominant belief systems result from struggles with alienation and anomie. In either case, the way in which churches organize the symbolic order of religion can have a profound effect on the expression of beliefs and how beliefs are transformed or contested. (Baum 1975, 249f.)

ideas and values, and in turn influence the imagination of participants. Once the ideational world takes on symbolic form it becomes part of the general framework within which meaning is constructed and articulated. Symbols represent ambiguous and socially constructed experiential meaning. Without the organizing role of cultural institutions the communication of politics would be diffuse and unfocused. This would render critical political notions of legitimacy and authority obtuse and individualized. Coalitions around practical agendas and strategies for action would become increasingly difficult. On the other hand, the more structured and hegemonic the cultural institutions the more constrained the boundaries of political debate, and the less scope permitted for political imagination (i.e. alternative utopia)

Some of the more compelling studies on the relationship between institutions and poverty beliefs can be found on the effect of academic training on evaluative dispositions (Guimond and Palmer 1990) and the influence of institutional membership on elite attitudes about the welfare state (Williams 1989). In both cases the institutional influence within which an individual worked or studied had a strong effect on how they perceived poverty related issues. In the case of churches some of the more recent studies in the United States suggest that while they have a measurable effect on poverty beliefs it is necessary to analyze the way in which issues are compartmentalized and linked to evaluation, affect, and norms. Given the similarities and differences that exist between Canada and the United States a more systematic empirical analysis is necessary if one is to determine the application of a denominational model in the Canadian context

Dimensions of a Poverty Belief System

The research on attitudes about poverty has identified two principal approaches to the evaluation of poverty (Kane 1987, 407f.; Kluegel 1987; Hill 1985; Elesh 1973). The first approach cites structural factors as the cause of poverty and proposes structural remedies as a solution. It presupposes that the majority of individuals, if having the choice, would choose to be self-sufficient and fully integrated into the labour market. Poverty is attributed to unemployment, underemployment, insufficient education, health problems,

family situations, etc. which cannot be directly attributable to the individual or self-conscious individual choices. Remedies emphasize policies that provide individuals with opportunities in labour markets through education and training or subsidized entry level positions. Adequate income support is provided when employability is an issue or individuals are at a transition stage before full integration in the workforce. This may include health and housing improvements that help individuals reestablish themselves within the broader community.

The second approach focuses on the personal deficits of the poor. Individual values, attitudes, and chosen behaviour patterns are cited as the principal cause of poverty. Using the individualistic "Protestant Work Ethic", this individual approach presupposes that 1) individuals are ethically obligated to work hard and compete; 2) equality of opportunity exists such that hard work will be rewarded with success, and 3) economic failure results from lack of effort or character flaws (Hendrickson and Axelson 1985, 295). Programs that motivate the poor or instill the requisite work ethic are viewed as an appropriate policy response. However, unless there is a direct attack on the values that sustain poverty, structural policies providing opportunities will have little success.

The structural and individual approaches may appear mutually exclusive at the policy level. However, in practice both must address the environmental factors that affect the poor (Elesh 1973, 366ff.).²⁷ The opportunities provided by structural policies will not be effective unless they are formulated in a manner that is realistically accessible both psychologically and socially by those affected by poverty. Likewise, policies derived from the individual approach must address the environment within which values and attitudes are formed and transmitted. In both cases the nature of policy recommendations differs to

²⁷ From the prescriptive angle both the motivational and structural models involve government activity. While addressing similar problems they recommend qualitatively different types of policy (cf. Hill, 1985 43ff.). In the former the state acts to minimize barriers to market forces and encourages the mobilization of the labour force to the changing demands of capital. This assumes a "trickle down" effect as the economy grows, increasing employment potential and rewarding economic activity. In a structural approach there is primary concern for income maintenance and programs designed to facilitate entry into existing labour markets.

the extent that one seeks change through positive inducements or punitive and regulative measures²⁸

The legitimacy of policy within the framework of either the structural or individual approach is mediated by affective and normative dispositions toward poverty. Recent studies have argued, that similar to compartmentalization in schematic models of cognitive structure, individuals may view poverty in individualistic terms yet support policies that assume a structural response to poverty (Kluegel 1987, Hendrickson and Axelson 1985). The proponents of schematic modeling argue that as "cognitive misers" individuals have a limited capacity to deal with information (Conover and Feldman 1984). Cues are abstracted from experience and guide in the retrieval and processing of information. In this context both the affective and normative dimensions mediate evaluative cues. In other words, levels of empathy and a sense of injustice towards poverty will produce a more varied configuration of evaluative beliefs. As the role of churches is explored in greater detail it will become clear that economic forces and political inclinations are not sufficient to explain beliefs about poverty²⁹. One must take into account the extent to which churches engender positive or negative attitudes toward the poor and espouse moral outrage or acceptance of Canadian distributive justice.

Methodology

Central Hypotheses

The general hypothesis in this study involves testing whether there is a relationship between churches and mass belief systems about poverty. This requires attention to

²⁸The motivational category often collapses into "victim blaming" which in turn justifies more punitive measures towards individuals in poverty. This approach becomes problematic when child poverty is considered. While one may attribute blame to parents it becomes increasingly difficult to legitimize the application of punitive measures that also affect children.

²⁹As James Kluegel (1987) notes in his longitudinal study of American attitudes on poverty and welfare, individuals who have suffered economic hardship demonstrate increased support for welfare policies. They differ little from the general public in either their evaluative approach to poverty or their distrust and suspicion of the poor.

denominational affiliation and religiosity and a pattern of correspondence to different components of a poverty belief system. The denominational variable represents different historical combinations of theological and ecclesiastical tendencies. It is these unique combinations that not only distinguish one church from another, but as cultural institutions may have an influence on belief systems.

The objective of the study is to ascertain the nature and extent to which churches influence beliefs about poverty. Such an analysis would permit a more satisfactory understanding of the factors that inhibit or facilitate the influences of cultural institutions on belief systems. The first working thesis is that the influence of churches on belief systems can be tested by measuring the extent to which denominational beliefs differ across a number of dimensions associated with an understanding of poverty. The more pronounced the differences the greater the evidence to suggest that churches, as either historical residues or active contemporary cultural institutions, influence belief systems.

The analysis of church influence involves subsequent tests that measure the degree of denominational attachment and religiosity. A second proposed thesis is that the influence of churches on beliefs increases with high church attendance, a sense that religion is important, and having been educated in a religious context. A closer affiliation to one's church and a sense that religion is important suggest a pronounced attachment to the cluster of symbols and meanings embodied in the institutionalized religion of each denomination. This would make the influence of the historical residue more significant as an explanation of belief patterns.

Before concluding that churches influence beliefs on the basis of denominational differences, it is necessary to control for non-denominational factors which have frequently been cited in the literature as variables affecting belief systems. A third thesis is that when controlling for the influence of non-denominational factors on beliefs, the denominational variable remains significant, and this significance increases as controls for the strength of denominational affiliation are introduced.

Table 4. Description of Working Theses

Working Theses	
1)	There are denominational differences along a number of dimensions measuring different aspects of beliefs about poverty.
2)	Differences between denominations increase as controls for the strength of denominational affiliation are introduced. This includes measures for church attendance, importance of religion, and involvement in religious education.
3)	When testing for the influence of non-denominational factors on beliefs the denominational variable remains significant. This significance increases as controls for the strength of denominational affiliation are introduced.
4)	The pattern of differences across the various dimensions of the poverty belief system may vary. Explanation of these patterns requires:
	A) further testing of the importance of non-church or religion-related factors on different dimensions of the poverty belief system; and
	B) further testing of the extent to which the underlying structure of the poverty belief system of a denomination differs from the Canadian population as a whole; and
	C) further testing of the extent to which there are important differences within denominations between identifiable groups (i.e., class, region, ethnicity, language, etc.).

Belief systems are not simple unidimensional constructs. Therefore, it is important to map and understand the unique pattern of dimensions and influences for each denominational poverty belief system. There must be a closer examination of the relative impact of denominational and non-denominational variables on each dimension of the poverty belief system, as well as the dimensions where denominations differ. This is followed by an analysis of the underlying structure of the poverty belief system, comparing denominational and national scales for each dimension. Denominations with radically different conceptualizations of different dimensions of the poverty belief system may explain why comparisons using nationally based scales do not measure greater denominational differences. Finally, attention will be given to the possible impact of intra-denominational differences. The degree of denominational heterogeneity and internal group differences may explain the strength of denominational differences and the nature of church influence on belief systems.

Operationalizing the Poverty Belief System

It is often difficult to differentiate the way in which poverty is perceived by the general population from the parameters of debate framed by policy experts and advocacy organizations. Much of the literature on policy debates and belief systems agrees that much of the thinking on poverty can be reduced to two approaches. The first approach emphasizes an individual's psychological-motivational disposition, which inhibits the necessary action to transcend impoverished material conditions. The second approach emphasizes structural barriers that prevent socio-economic improvement, regardless of individual motivation. The numerous intermediate positions between individual or structural arguments creates important problems when trying to measure mass beliefs. While an individual or structural position on poverty represents an evaluative component of the belief system, this in turn must be understood in a context of affective and normative positions. The evaluative, affective, and normative positions of respondents represent the three key components of the poverty belief system.

Table 5. Dimensions of the Poverty Belief System

Components and Dimensions of the Poverty Belief System

Affective Component

- 1) affective orientation to nondominant groups

Normative Component

- 2) tolerance of inequality
- 3) social obligation towards nondominant groups
- 4) policy priorities - material and post-material

Evaluative Component

- 5) causes of poverty
- 6) solutions for poverty

For analytical purposes the three components of the poverty belief system are divided into measurable dimensions. This permits a manageable way of analyzing a multidimensional belief.³⁰ A number of the dimensions will have sub-dimensions designed to capture specific tendencies. The dimensions are derived from two basic steps. First, the relevant variables from each of the surveys are grouped according to six dimensions: (Affective) 1) affective orientation to non-dominant groups; (Normative) 2) tolerance of inequality, 3) collective obligation, 4) policy priorities; and (Analytical) 5) causes of poverty and 6) remedies for poverty. Factor analysis provides a technique for generating scales for most of the dimensions (factor scores). This technique is used effectively in Chapter Five. Factors are designed to capture a significant proportion of the sample variation. The resulting factor scores can then be used in multivariate analysis of denominational differences.

The initial dimensions and measures of the poverty belief system are derived from the 1988 Canadian National Election Study for the entire sample. Selected measures will be drawn from the 1992 International Social Survey Project, assorted Gallup Polls, the 1984 Canadian National Election Study, the 1987 Attitudes Toward Civil Liberties and the Charter of Rights Study (Institute for Social Research, York University) and the Comparative Project on Class Structure and Class Consciousness surveys from the 1980s (Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin) and selected Gallup polls from the 1980s. These studies will provide a composite understanding of denominational differences on a number of poverty themes.

The first dimension is affective and refers to sympathies toward non-dominant groups for which the issue of poverty has been identified in public debate. These groups have frequently been targeted by government policy and for this reason have been associated

³⁰Each of the dimensions are treated systematically in Chapter Five. The presentation of the variables used to build scales for each of the dimensions can be found in Appendix I. Additional variables are used in Chapter Four for examining some of the dimensions of the poverty belief system, with the primary focus on the evaluative dimensions.

with debates over poverty. Nondominant groups include aboriginals, the elderly, the poor, ethnic or national minorities, and women. It is theorized that greater sympathy toward diverse subordinate groups will be positively related to higher levels of sensitivity to a wider spectrum of poverty issues.³¹ However, high sympathy scores for subordinate groups could reflect either less tolerance of inequality or a paternalistic inclination in which an acceptance of a high level of inequality is tempered by "noblesse oblige".

The second dimension measures tolerance of inequality. Questions used in this dimension have an ethical component judging the rightness or wrongs of certain types of inequality. The measures range from orientations towards gender stereotypes and distribution of rewards and status to more direct questions asking about the principle of equality and its application in society. This dimension, in combination with the third and fourth dimensions (social obligation and policy priorities respectively), measures a general normative disposition to the "rightness" or "wrongness" of socio-economic relationships. One possible working hypothesis to be discussed in the analysis is whether there is a correspondence between churches stressing the moral imperative to challenge inequality and the dispositions of denominational populations to remedy inequality.

The third dimension, social obligation, extends beyond the simple ethical evaluation of the second dimension and measures the extent to which the collectivity (represented by the state) should be doing more or less for various social groups. The link between the state and collectivity is warranted given the important development of the welfare state outlined in Chapter Four. Unlike the discourse prior to World War II, both Catholic and Protestant leaders agree, or at least tacitly accept, the important role of the state in maintaining and promoting collective obligations toward social and redistributive justice. This tendency is also reflected in general attitudes toward the welfare state in contemporary Canadian society examined in the Chapter Four.

There are also questions measuring the perceived role of the stronger sectors of society and institutions. One important question that must be raised is the extent to which

³¹One reason for grouping these categories is their prevalence in the poverty literature.

denominations distinguish between the collective responsibility of the private and public sectors. While churches certainly fall under the rubric of the private or community sector, much of the current discourse about poverty is linked to the role of the state. This requires, where possible, a careful distinction between policies that are inherently driven by the community or non-governmental actors, and those that are primarily administered by the state.

The fourth dimension, policy priorities, provides some indication of the emphasis placed on different policy areas. There is a distinction between policy goals designed to empower and ensure the material needs of individuals and those which assume that problems of scarcity or material insecurity are either less relevant or have already been significantly resolved. The latter raises important questions concerning the trade-off that must take place when quality of life issues are juxtaposed with basic economic needs such as housing and employment.

The combination of dimensions one through four provide a multidimensional measure of the affective and normative disposition toward poverty. The extent to which each of the dimensions is mutually reinforcing will be analyzed. This is an important component of the poverty belief system and permits comparison of denominations at many different levels.

The fifth and sixth dimensions capture the evaluative character of the belief system. Much of the literature on either policy perspectives or general attitudes about poverty describes the motivational and structural approaches mentioned earlier. The fifth dimension, causes of poverty, examines the attitudes of respondents to private enterprise, the profit system, government regulation, and reasons for success and failure. This measures the tendency of respondents to identify the causes of poverty with either the psychological or cultural make-up of the poor (e.g., insufficient motivation or work ethic) or structural barriers that prevent the poor from gaining adequate employment opportunities and limit the possibilities of marginal groups to participate in society.

The motivational causes of poverty can also be attributed to structural and governmental barriers. Unlike the structural model, the motivational approach focuses on government policies that fail to encourage values that motivate individual economic

activity such as reward-seeking behaviour or a work ethic (Sanders, 1991). The working hypothesis for the fifth dimension is that church teachings stressing the responsibility of the individual will score significantly higher on measures indicating a cultural-psychological model.

The prescriptive sixth dimension, remedies for poverty, measures the two primary models (motivational and structural types of government intervention) through questions examining policies having an impact on selected groups. There are also questions focusing on the perceived viability of reform and global structural causes (i.e. the need for more foreign investment). There should be a strong relationship between denominational tendencies emphasizing state intervention on the prescriptive side and structural causes on the evaluative side. One of the questions that must be raised in this section is the extent to which denominational differences and similarities are the result of the ideological debates of politics or the result of church teachings on basic issues.

Denominational Differences

An understanding of the three central theses mentioned earlier requires further analysis of denominational belief systems along two axes: 1) internal structure; and 2) homogeneity. While there may exist pronounced denominational differences when comparing across dimensions of the poverty belief system, there must be an analysis of the relative impact of non-denominational factors and intra-denominational differences. This necessitates statistical controls using multiple regression to determine the influence of denominational affiliation on the poverty belief system relative to other socio-economic and political factors.

The analysis of internal structure focuses on the different factorial designs for each denomination for each dimension, particularly for a sample of respondents demonstrating higher than average denominational affiliation scores. This is followed by a comparison with the factorial design of the general population. It is quite possible that denominational differences are missed or not sufficiently emphasized in the denominational comparisons for each dimension of the poverty belief system because the underlying denominational

structure of some dimensions differs dramatically from that of the general population. This is important for understanding the nature of the institutional impact on belief systems and provides a background for understanding regression coefficients for denominational and non-denominational independent variables across each dimension of the poverty belief system.

The analysis of denominational homogeneity is equally important because significant variation may demonstrate the uneven effect of cultural institutions on subgroups within a denominational population. One possible thesis is that the history of sectarian compromise within Canadian mainstream Protestantism has encouraged greater diversity in beliefs or less responsiveness to official church teachings than what one would find among the Catholic population. In other words, greater diversity in beliefs within Protestant denominations may be more directly related to an historical process of sectarian compromise (church union or joint ventures in western development) or divergent theological influences, whereas Catholics have been able to maintain a greater degree of ideological cohesiveness because of institutional centralization and an historical unwillingness to compromise with Protestant denominations. Another possible explanation for denominational differences may lie in the historical residue of churches that persists despite the paramount role of non-denominational factors in the formation of mass belief systems today.³²

Finally, there must be a systematic analysis of the various non-denominational factors that may account for denominational differences in the poverty belief system. This involves regression techniques and the inclusion of three general non-denominational categories: 1) socio-economic and regional characteristics, 2) behavioural patterns, and 3) intervening attitudes.

³²The mathematical factors that must be taken into account when analyzing response consistency within groups is carefully documented by Allen Barton and R. Wayne Parsons (1977). The comparative heterogeneity and homogeneity of each denominational sample must be analyzed in order to determine what impact this has on inter-denominational comparisons for each poverty belief dimension.

The first category examines the relative impact of variables such as gender, age, occupation, location in the economy (private/public, employed/self-employed), family income, education, language,³³ region, and population.

The second category measures the impact of individual social networks, political awareness, and political participation. Possible scenarios may entail a significant difference between the influence of church teachings on those who are more politicized or who have multiple allegiances apart from the church.

The third category examines the impact of intervening attitudes such as ideological cues (i.e. left-right placement, "other" orientation, and economic optimism) and orientations toward politics, parties, and governments (i.e. party identification, trust, and efficacy). The possibility exists where some individuals are predisposed towards a particular poverty belief system based on attitudes developed within a non-denominational context. This is important in order to interpret the relative weight of different institutional influences.

Research Outline

The systematic treatment of the poverty belief system, outlined in the previous section is for the analysis of the 1988 Canadian National Election Study in Chapter Five. However, in order to understand the relevance of these results it is necessary to examine the historical nature of mainstream denominations in Canada and their relationship to the issues of poverty. Chapter Two analyzes the symbolic and institutional heritage of mainstream Canadian churches. The historical role of church polities and their respective constituencies is examined, particularly with how each polity developed the concepts of charity and piety, which in turn influenced and reflected their institutional relationship to the state and policies affecting the poor.

³³The principal control for language is in the division of Catholics into francophone and non-francophone categories. The impact of other language groups cannot be measured effectively because of sample size and the predominance of English-speaking members in the Protestant churches.

Chapter Three examines the development of Canadian mainstream churches as cultural institutions and the way in which these institutions have historically institutionalized the concept of poverty and related practices of charity and social action. The traditional notion of charity and social service is examined in the context of denominational debates around church-based social action and the contemporary dominance of the state in the delivery of social services. This chapter also addresses the issue of secularization and provides a context for understanding some of historical reasons why similarities and differences in denominational belief systems persist in contemporary Canadian society.

Chapter Four tackles the complex development of the contemporary welfare state in Canada and its implications for denominational belief systems. There is a close examination of the way in which contemporary Canadians and Americans conceptualize poverty, using the rich data provided in the open poverty questions in the Comparative Project on Class Structure and Class Consciousness survey. This provides a background for understanding the complex attitudinal patterns of Canadians throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, evident in other surveys, and also presented in this chapter. Using a range of surveys and instruments, it is possible to establish the extent to which denominational differences are persistent factors influencing Canadian political culture.

The denominational patterns presented in Chapter Four remain crude because of the limitations imposed by the sample size and question pools. However, they provide a way of contrasting the results of Chapter Five, which uses a multivariate technique for testing the various dimensions of a poverty belief system, with other types of questions and different points in time.

Chapter Five develops a multivariate statistical model of denominational poverty belief systems. Unlike the surveys examined in the Chapter Four, this involves a broader range of controls that evaluate the significant effects of denominational affiliation and religiosity on the different components of the poverty belief system. This chapter also introduces controls for more general political culture. Evidence of patterns in mass belief

systems supports the general thesis about the continuing influence of religious institutions in Canada

Chapter Six compares the results of previous chapters and discusses the implications for understanding contemporary churches as relevant cultural institutions that influence political culture. This provides an evaluation of the cultural heritage of churches and its contemporary influence on mass beliefs. This chapter summarizes the evidence supporting the thesis of the dynamic relationship between historical residues, contemporary trends in secularization, and efforts at making denominations relevant and political in the last quarter of the Twentieth Century.

Conclusion

The preceding introduction has emphasized the importance of studying the question of cultural institutions and belief systems from an empirical and quantitative perspective. The notion of historical residues suggests a continuing influence of the values and beliefs that are carried in the modern form of traditional institutions, such as churches. The key to this influence helps us understand how the past influences the present. This is not to forget the current tensions within churches and the dynamic role of church leaders struggling to make religion both relevant and significant in contemporary society. The following chapter: *poverty* addresses these questions by briefly examining the significant historical developments affecting churches and how they structure the symbolic world, followed by a detailed analysis of the denominational factor in the formation of beliefs about poverty in contemporary Canadian society.

CHAPTER TWO

Conceptualizing Religious Politics: Universal Churches and Sects

Introduction

The history of poverty in Western society has included three principal social agents those defined as poor, the state, and churches. The poor have often been left with little opportunity to influence proactively the environment that shapes and defines their role as social agents. While recognizing the constraints on the type of action or influences of the other two principal agents, both the state and churches have played an important role in defining poverty and in sanctioning or promoting action affecting the poor in society. An examination of the changing historical composition and definition of the poor is beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, some discussion of the changing relationship of state and churches to developments in poverty is necessary for understanding churches and their relationship to mass belief systems.

The critical theme underlying the relationship between the state and churches and poverty has been their respective relationship to issues of **social order and charity**. This in turn has influenced how poverty becomes meaningful and institutionalized in different historical periods. Even if the state is defined as the organization of public life and public decision-making, and churches are defined as the organization and public expression of a metaphysical-moral vision, they both have something to say regarding the legitimacy of authority and power and the appropriateness of a wide variety of individual and collective action.

There have been historical examples of a highly organized collusion of the state and churches regarding both social order and charity. At other times there has been conflict and tension. In the early Middle Ages the limited nature of the state and the more comprehensive role assigned the church and Christians in general by the ethic of charity,

and sophisticated ecclesiastical structure of Catholicism, meant that the church and its religious orders became the primary agent providing a variety of services for the needy. Conversely, the unwillingness of either the state or the dominant religious tradition to address the impoverishment of large sectors of society prompted sectarian religious movements that frequently not only rejected the legitimacy of existing political and religious institutions, but took steps to provide for the needs of their constituency. This was certainly the case during the German Peasants' War from 1524-26 and the prominent role of clergy such as Thomas Münzer. While rejecting violence, experiments in anarchical collective life by members of the Anabaptist tradition likewise rejected the state and attempted to redefine charity by rejecting the regulation of property dominant at the time.¹

It is the outgrowth of institutional imperatives and subsequent reaction to the changing nature of poverty that has given rise to the basic symbolic foundation upon which many of the contemporary debates over poverty are based. There are few normative surprises in contemporary discussions over the remedies and causes of poverty, be it over workfare, benefits, eligibility, rights, or obligations. Much of the same implicit normative reasoning of contemporary policy debates resonates in the arguments of clergy, pamphleteers, parliamentarians, and social activists of yesteryear. Current debates have dropped the theological references frequently expressed in the debates of centuries past, and have adopted a purportedly non-religious language of utility, market forces, incentives, individual rights, social obligations, and human dignity. Each of these terms, however, presumes a particular understanding of human nature and social relationships. These assumptions, in turn, can often be traced to the Judeo-Christian beliefs systematized by the churches of Medieval Europe and adapted by adherents to each political and socio-economic development.

The linkages between contemporary ideologies and Judeo-Christian beliefs have been sufficiently documented in the history of ideas of contemporary political thought. What is

¹The tension between social order and charity is evident in Luther's rejection of church exploitation of the needy and acceptance of civil authority.

less well known, and certainly contested, is the way in which institutionalized Judeo-Christian beliefs have influenced contemporary mass belief systems.² While subsequent chapters compare contemporary attitudinal differences among those affiliated with different religious institutions, this chapter explores the historical development of the principal religious institutions influencing Canada and their respective understanding of poverty.

If we are to maintain the thesis presented in the preceding chapter, that there is a certain degree of elite convergence among the mainstream churches around the issue of poverty, then any denominational differences at the mass level could be explained by 1) socio-economic and political differences not influenced by religious institutions, or 2) the historical differences of religious institutions in both their organizational and ideological approach to poverty.³

The separation of these two possible explanations requires some understanding of the changing ways in which poverty has been understood within Christianity, and the extent to which this is reflected in the practices and beliefs of religious institutions. This means examining the symbolic and institutional heritage of Canadian churches.

Symbolic Heritage: Poverty and Charity

Etymology provides some interesting clues about the historical nature of meaning and symbolic representation. Given the primary significance of charity in Christian thought,

²The continuing debate among social historians about the relationship between Protestantism and capitalism provides ample evidence of the intricacies of linking institutionalized religion and mass beliefs. An illuminating symposium on Weber's *The Protestant Ethic* is found in *Telos* 76 (Winter 1988-89). A debate between Luciano Pellicani (1988 and 1989) and Guy Onkes (1988-89) provides substantial insights into the historiographical implications surrounding the Protestant Ethic debate. For the Canadian context see Robert Brym and Bonnie Fox (1989) and their criticism of the "entrepreneurial thesis"

³Conversely, similarities at the mass level would indicate two explanations: 1) mass beliefs are directly influenced by the religious elite which is supported by increased similarity as institutional attachment increases; or 2) secularization has minimized the effect of religious institutions and any differences simply reflect differences that are due to non-religious influences. These explanations are dealt with in subsequent chapters.

and the equally important notions of social relationship implicit in the concept of poverty, it is helpful to look at the historical meaning of both terms in Judeo-Christian cultures. The way in which meanings have changed in turn reflects both the tensions and consensus found within different European and North American Christian traditions.

First, the importance of biblical symbols in the Medieval period suggests an important starting point to examine the roots of the symbolic meaning of charity and poverty. As John A. Garraty (1978:17) notes, an important distinction between Greco-Roman and Medieval society is the medieval commitment to caring for the unfortunate. This is linked to Christian influences where common belief held that "... poverty was a holy state, accepting alms no disgrace, and charity both a proof of piety and a key to eternal salvation." (Garraty 1978:17). There was a symbiotic relationship between the beggar who received alms and the alms-giver afforded an opportunity to give. The acceptance of poverty and importance of alms did not resolve the fundamental tension between moral obligation or the penitent role of charity and limited resources. Underlying this tension is the biblical injunction that "In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return unto the ground ..." (Genesis 4:19, King James Version). Implicit in this injunction is the distinction between the deserving and undeserving poor. How this distinction is determined varies according to the way in which the principal social agents define the poor and regulate social behaviour.

The transposition of poverty-related terms in Biblical translation provides some indication of the tensions inherent in Medieval thought. This is particularly evident in the tension between poverty expressed as a social or material situation and expressions describing an internal or spiritual condition. From Hebrew the biblical meaning of poverty ranges between "indigence" and a less outward notion of being in a condition of misery, oppression, and affliction before others and God (Leclercq 1974, 36ff.). As Leclercq notes, the Greek translations of similar expressions expand the meaning of poverty to include three key dimensions: those who labour; those who are in need of others in order to live

(i.e., mendacity); and those suffering affliction.⁴ Finally, the Latin translations broaden the scope of poverty to include: those who produce little, those who are in need, those who lack abundance (i.e., resources); and those with physical deficiencies (i.e. the infirm, including mendicants).

According to Leclercq, it is during the Latin phase that translators insisted on linking the preceding notions of poverty with the Latin term "humilis" which denotes a spiritual disposition. Following from this tendency was the conceptualization of spiritual poverty. This in turn provides the foundation for a persistent paradox in orthodox Christianity. On one hand all are equally subject to spiritual poverty regardless of economic or social status. On the other, being poor is essentially about being indigent, weak and without defense, and dependent upon others for material and physical sustenance.⁵ The ambiguity of this position is exemplified in a sermon by Leo the Great, Bishop of Rome, circa 461:

... all can be equal in their willingness to give, however unequal they may be in earthly fortune. Indeed, their inequality in regard to worldly means is unimportant, provided they are found equal in spiritual possessions. (Evans and Wright 1991, 73).

Closely associated with poverty is the concept of charity. As mentioned earlier the Christian commitment to the less fortunate was a characteristic that distinguished the Christian community from their counterparts in Antiquity. Christian tradition describes charity (agape) as an altruistic commitment to God and the well-being of others. In Greco-Roman culture philanthropy was an obligation of the rich to provide gifts for public welfare. Legitimate motives were a sense of public duty, political expediency, or fame (Latourette 1970 vol. 1, 265f.). Within the early Christian community such philanthropy

⁴ This is in general agreement with expository dictionaries such as W. E. Vine's (1966: 192-193, 196), where the English translations of Greek poverty terms are variously accorded meanings such as "needy", "destitute", and "labourer".

⁵ Leclercq describes the paradox in the following manner:

... être pauvre, c'est avant tout avoir faim et soif de Dieu et de sa justice, n'être point satisfait des biens terrestres si on les possède; mais aussi être soit indigent, soit, surtout, faible et sans défense devant ceux qui ont un pouvoir, un moyen de domination qui peut engendrer une forme quelconque d'oppression. (Leclercq 1974, 43)

was required of all, regardless of economic status. Each should give according to ability.⁶ And, this meant contributions of oneself, as well as one's means; thereby including personal ministrations and donations of property (*ibid.*, 267). Such charitable acts were legitimately motivated partly by a love of God, and partly by the hope of spiritual rewards.

The generous impulses derived from this notion of charity were initially focused on the small Christian community.⁷ As Christians became co-extensive with Roman society, legitimate motives for philanthropy broadened. There remained, however, a continued emphasis on channeling charitable donations through church institutions. As Medieval institutions replaced Roman institutions the notion of charity changed but retained many of its original Christian influences.

The medieval church was the paramount administrative institution.⁸ It maintained a dual role as the principal service provider for the infirm and indigent and as the primary socializing agent, "...indoctrinating the laity in the belief that alms bought them merit and a foothold in Heaven." (Tuchman 1978, 35). Even the early notion of personal ministrations, as charitable acts, found its place in the washing of beggars' feet by notables on Holy Thursday and nobility giving alms and left-over food to all who came to the castle gate (*ibid.*, 35). This ethic of charity was so well entrenched throughout Medieval society that even guilds and merchants had systematic and religiously legitimized mechanisms for collecting and distributing charitable gifts.

⁶We must be careful in our generalizations for there was considerable debate in the early church regarding personal property and the distribution of resources. As Hengel (1974, 35) notes, the transition from a Judaic sect to a world-wide movement within Antiquity meant new concerns about survival. First, the sense of imminent end diminished and hence the renewed concern with preserving property and property relations that would ensure the economic survival of the community. Second, the form of "love communism" practiced in Jerusalem was not feasible without a structured organizational framework within which the basic needs of the community could be met. Third, the organizational imperative of a more structured common-property system meant a more legalistic and compulsory system than the broader movement was willing to endure or accept.

⁷For a more detailed discussion of this period see Latourette (1970, 266ff.).

⁸This was true until the reformation and development of the early modern state, after which there was growing tension between national states and the effort of the Catholic church to maintain its supranational influence (Miller 1983; c.f. Vaillancourt 1980, 34ff.).

Despite the theological debates concerning the nature of charity prior to the 16th century, there was a growing consensus that in practical terms charity meant "help for the needy" (R. Williams 1983, 54). This, however, did not resolve the tension between the traditional concept of charity linked to voluntary almsgiving and the increasingly important policy pressures for more effective mechanisms of social control. Frequently this involved more rigorous distinctions between "deserving" and "undeserving" poor, which in turn meant a more arbitrary role for the state and its magistrates. It was under the watchful eye of Calvin, and his influence in Protestantism that one sees the seeds of a fully legitimate secularization of poor relief.

By the mid-1500s, Geneva had introduced severe restrictions on indiscriminate charity. Laws were passed, however, that introduced careful communal administration of poor relief. Church and state roles in poor relief were fused with lay hospitallers becoming recognized within the church polity as official Deacons.⁹ Beginning as an attempt by Calvin to ensure the organic link between the power of the state and the moral dictates of the church, poor relief was administered by the hospitaller-deacons. There was an attempt to secure permanent funding from both state (revenue from fines) and religious sources (gifts and the sale of items). Calvin supported laws limiting conspicuous consumption as a way of demonstrating the unity of the community and diminishing "sinful" distinctions between rich and poor.¹⁰ As a measure to diminish poverty, Calvin promoted price controls and higher wages for workers coping with inflation (Alves 1989, 19).

As the state became an increasingly dominant voice in the administration of poor relief, there was an important shift in places such as Geneva. As Alves documents, Calvin's organic fusion of church and state gave way to the degeneration of charity to "mere social control" (Alves 1989, 19). This pattern is reflected in developments in other

⁹ See Alves 1989, 9; Durrant 1957, 474-475

¹⁰ As Alves notes, this did not involve egalitarianism. Calvin was an advocate of a distinct hierarchy in dress and life-styles (1989, 18).

countries and is particularly evident in the development of the Enclosure movement and the English Poor laws

The English example is important, especially given its influence on developments in Canada. While it is beyond the scope of this study to provide a synopsis of the early Industrial Revolution and the concomitant social changes affecting England, it is sufficient to note some of the cultural norms that shifted during this period. One of these important shifts is evident in the developments surrounding the English Poor Laws.

The importance of the Poor Laws lies in the shift in policy that occurred at the time of the 1834 reforms. The 1834 reforms to the Poor Laws mark an important shift in the way in which poverty and unemployment are institutionalized in British society. These changes coincide with the rising political power of the middle class, which itself was more firmly attached to Protestantism than the aristocracy.

At this point it is important to recount the incisive analysis of Karl Polanyi.¹¹ Polanyi argues that the 1834 reforms mark the unraveling of the final barrier to a national labour market in England, and in doing so represent a radical break with Tudor custom and Elizabethan Law. This break is exemplified in the change in the Speenhamland Poor Law established in 1795, to the more restrictive and punitive measures adopted in 1834. Speenhamland was an extension of Tudor paternalism, where all individuals tied to the community are assured the "right to live" (Polanyi 1957, 78). Based on the cost of bread, Speenhamland policy granted all workers a subsidy to supplement low wages. The subsidy was based on the difference between the price of bread and the worker's income, with the size of family taken into account.

Speenhamland was an extension of Tudor paternalism that contradicted, however, Elizabethan Law. As Polanyi notes:

Under Elizabethan law the poor forced to work at whatever wages they could get and only those who could obtain no work were entitled to relief; relief in aid of wages was neither intended nor given. Under Speenhamland Law a man was relieved even if he was in employment, as long as his wages amounted to

¹¹ Polanyi's (1957) analysis of the Poor Laws is detailed in chapters 3-10 and in appendices 8-10. 12

less than the family income granted to him by the [Speenhamland] scale (Polanyi 1957, 79).

During the latter half of the 1700s, developments such as Speenhamland represented a broader shift to more paternalism. As Polanyi (1957, 79) and Garraty (1978, 79) note, this period introduced more liberal maintenance for the poor than in preceding generations. This did not last. By the early 1800s the Speenhamland system was roundly criticized by an increasingly powerful middle class. The number of workers receiving subsidies had tripled between 1784 and 1813. With the advent of anti-combination legislation and the inflexibility of Elizabethan wage scales, the income of workers became significantly depressed. It is at this juncture that a less paternalistic attitude toward poverty began to prevail.

Rural insurrections in 1830 were most intense in those regions where subsidies were most widely available (Garraty 1978, 82). This gave the critics of the Speenhamland system the evidence they needed to convince their political colleagues that the Poor Laws had to be reformed. By 1832 new legislation had been passed prohibiting relief for any able-bodied individual. Such individuals who could not find work were sent to workhouses. These establishments were explicitly designed on the principle that conditions should be less desirable than those of the "independent labourer of the lowest class" (Garraty 1978, 82). In such circumstances children were made wards of the state, their care and employment were to become the direct responsibility of the parish. The prevailing attitude was that the poor must be made to work, and thereby improve themselves and contribute to society.

The legacy of these changes to the Poor Laws, however, was less the result of unique Protestant beliefs than the inability of any one religious group to dominate political life. The disruption of religious institutions, beginning with Henry VIII, and the subsequent vacillation between religious rivals over the control of the state meant that the infrastructure used to develop church-based relief systems was completely disrupted in England. Both Catholics and Protestants denounced the great impoverishment caused by

the enclosures in the mid-1500s, yet the English Parliament passed legislation (1530-1531) whereby any able bodied mendicant,

whether man or women, was to be 'tied to the end of a cart naked, and be beaten with whips throughout the town till his body be bloody'; for a second offense an ear was to be cutt off; for a third, another ear; in 1536, however, the third offense incurred death (Durrant 1957, 572).

It is not that the English state was less cruel to its poor than elsewhere, but rather, there were few institutions capable of mediating the state's obsession with controlling and punishing the poor. Almshouses and hospitals had been abandoned during this period with the religious chaos and the dissarray of the traditional Catholic institutions (diocese and monasteries), and the response of the state was to impose punitive laws to control the lower orders (Durrant 1957, 583).

By the 17th century the term charity in Great Britain became linked to institutions which provided for the needy. At the same time charity begins to take on a negative sense with respect to the dignity and worth of recipients. By the late 1800s the term becomes increasingly tied to a reward for the appropriate social conduct of the "deserving poor" (ibid., 55). Missing is the sense of benevolence of the provider. By the early 1900s charity began to be replaced by the term welfare as a means of dissociating services and practices from unacceptable associations (ibid., 332f.).

One cautionary note to Raymond Williams' etymological commentary is that his reference to changing word usage is more applicable to the Protestant domains of the English-speaking world. The Catholic tradition, with its medieval root, has given poverty a somewhat "mystical glamour" (Pong 1983, 33.) There is less inclination to blame the poor for their circumstances. The negative connotations appear to be more closely associated with Protestant developments. This point will be developed later.¹²

The changing meaning of charity and poverty reflect changing historical circumstances. Along with a changing socio-economic context, coterminous changes in

¹²See Pong's discussion of the structural and ideological changes that affected Great Britain throughout the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (1983, 42-54).

the institutions of Christianity following the Reformation infused each religious movement with slightly different notions of charity and poverty. There are many similarities in the way in which each of these movements adapt Christian symbols of charity and poverty to changing socio-economic conditions. Each orientation to these symbols conveys implied relationships between religious communities to society and the state. It is within each message and its relationship to the religious polity that one finds some of the clues explaining the connection between institutional influences and belief systems about poverty.

Poverty and Piety: Organizing the Metaphysical-Moral Vision

Poverty is political to the extent that it raises fundamental questions about the distribution of material wealth. And, politics is essentially about the accumulation, organization and utilization of power within society. Politics is about governing the way in which society is organized, in particular, the way in which resources are allocated, be it through markets or otherwise. Issues raised by poverty have the potential to question the legitimacy of the institutions through which power is utilized and by which the distribution of resources is sustained or determined. The question of legitimate power inextricably ties religion and politics. As Max Stackhouse suggests, it is religion that has historically shaped and institutionalized the "contours of acceptable wisdom, and the definitions of which interests and which forms of rationality are to be given approval and which are to be repressed...." (1987, 409). A notion of legitimate authority apart from such context is incomprehensible.¹³

Following Stackhouse's argument, religion is defined by an appeal to something which transcends the world. This transcendent vision predisposes groups and individuals to respond to social and political situations in a predictable manner. The nature of the

¹³The popularity of models such as Hartz's fragment thesis is in large measure the importance placed on identifying the historical basis for ideological and cultural boundaries which influence the existing contours of legitimate political debate and political programs

response depends on each community's internal religious polity, historical understanding of piety, the practice of piety (i.e., worship and behaviour), and the types of use or alliances with institutions and organizations external to the religious polity (Stackhouse 1987, 411ff)

Piety in this context is the "subtle web of values, meanings, expectations, purposes, and obligations that constitute the operating norms of a culture and within which leadership must operate" (Stackhouse 1987, 411). As such, this piety has the potential to influence the general ethos of a society across time. However, piety cannot exist without form and it is the religious polity that institutionalizes and thereby conveys the meaning or sense of piety from one generation to the next. It is certainly via polity that religious communities adopt or entrench practices and develop their contacts outside the immediate community. In this context the polity embodies the rules and procedures determining authority and governance of the religious community.

For social theorists, such as Max Weber, there is a definite connection between the way in which the religious polity is organized and the meaning of piety. Without proposing a linear notion of causality, Weber makes the argument that there are two fundamental mechanisms affecting the organization of religion: rationalization and charisma.¹⁴ From the perspective of religious studies this relates to the development of canon, theology, and ecclesiology in the case of rationalization, and the prophetic voice and the experiential side of religion in the case of charisma. The extent to which such developments relate to social order and charity are a function of the way in which a church rationalizes charisma and organizes its relevance in society.

Rationalization and charisma are two heuristic tools that help us understand key developments through which goal-oriented human action and institutions are ultimately legitimized. Summarizing Weber's account of the institutional nature of polity, Pierre Bourdieu (1987, 132) outlines three distinctive features. First, rationalized religious polities exist where there is a body of professionals distinct from "worldly life" and who

¹⁴ Likewise, such fundamental developments are critical for the legitimacy of the state.

are regulated in matters of career, remuneration, professional duties, and practices outside of these duties. Second, religious polities involve the rationalization of dogma and ritual. This occurs as dogma and ritual are codified in sacred books, from which develop commentaries and systematic instruction that encompass more than mere technical preparation for ritual observation. Finally, all of the above tasks take place within an institutionalized community where rules of behaviour, the organization of authority, and social relationships are codified.

The nature of the institutionalized community is important because it provides a method of understanding the relationship between church and society. For Weber, institutionalization means the process whereby charisma is detached from the individual or prophet and posited in the church. The church becomes the institution that possesses and administers the prophetic charisma which was the original impetus of religious formation. As a permanent mechanism for interpreting "ultimate meaning" the church is capable of sanctioning or promoting all forms of behaviour. However, the task of defending against competing interpretations or contending prophetic charisma influences the church's willingness to sanction or promote particular types of action. The latitude of the church depends in large measure on its ability to build a unifying organizational structure and a power base within society. It is this requirement or organizational imperative that introduces an important dynamic in ecclesiastical development. This is the dynamic that contributes to institutional differences in beliefs about poverty and accounts for the apparent longevity of the religious influence and its relative resistance to the forces of secularization and elite convergence.

The principal thesis proposed by Weber is that the more the professional body of the church attempts to regulate both itself and the laity in conformity to a particular religious interpretation, and the more this involves efforts to aggrandize the socio-economic and political status of the church, the more priests and clergy compromise their position with the view of the laity (Bourdieu 1987, 133). In other words, the need to establish a legitimate social base within society means that church elite must compromise their religious message with those groups with whom they are attracted or attempting to

assimilate ¹⁵ This is often possible ideologically given the initial ambiguity of the original prophetic impetus underlying most religious movements and the role of the institution as the authoritative custodian of the meaning of the original charismatic vision. As the church develops its agents engage in a constant process of adaptation and assimilation which not only maintains a viable social base but permits "contact to be established between the religious message and ever new recipients of it, who may be profoundly different in both religious interests and world-view from the original audience." (Bourdieu 1987, 133).

While much of the historical work following Weber's line of reasoning focuses on European developments a case can be made for the Canadian example. The type of development noted by Weber is evident in both the institutional dominance of the Catholic church in Quebec and its efforts to adapt to both the structural changes involved in industrialization and urbanization and the politics associated with such transformations. While less hegemonic in an institutional sense, such developments are paralleled within Canadian Protestantism. In the face of such developments, there is a noticeable transformation of polity which is frequently examined under the rubric of secularization.

Constructing Meaning: Church and Sect

At this point it is helpful to develop two types of religious polity for the purpose of comparison: the universal church and the sect. Understanding denominational belief systems and how they influence notions of poverty requires an understanding of the institutional character of churches and how they have historically structured religious dogma and practices and how this is connected to social and political beliefs. There is little doubt that the small and often highly personalized community of the sect constitutes a significant influence on the general belief system of its members. There is considerable

¹⁵ As in all forms of brokering, churches are increasingly pressured to appeal to the lowest common religious denominator if the church is driven to become the dominant religion. In essence,

The nearer the body of priests is to holding *de facto* monopoly of the administration of the goods of salvation in a class-divided society, the more divergent, indeed contradictory, are the religious interests to which its preaching and pastoral activities must respond and the more those activities and agents charged with carrying them out tend to become diversified (Bourdieu 1987, 133).

evidence supporting this thesis in studies examining members of Anabaptist, evangelical, and fundamentalist organizations in North America. The emphasis on separation and adherence to sectarian distinctiveness accentuates sectarian differences in their respective social, political, and economic perspectives. Conversely, the ideational demarcations between churches or denominations are less pronounced. For non-theologians the differences in belief systems are more diffuse and ambiguous. This is certainly true at the mass membership level where the growth and survival of churches has necessitated consensus and compromise. The size and heterogeneity of church or denominational membership means the necessary mediation of a complex array of conditions and conflicting interests which the much smaller sects frequently resolve through schisms and fragmentation.

In order to understand the nature of Canadian churches and their relationship to beliefs about poverty it is important to elaborate the difference between contemporary churches and their historical predecessors. Ernst Troeltsch's classic ideal-types, the universal church and the sect, provide a useful basis for comparing churches in Canada and understanding the different way in which they approached the question of poverty (Troeltsch, Vol. 1, 331ff.). While contemporary mainstream churches in Canada lie somewhere between Troeltsch's church and sect, and hence are best referred to as denominations, their respective historical sources bear close resemblance to the institutional and ideological characteristics of Troeltsch's ideal-types.

According to Stackhouse, Troeltsch's argument emphasizes two predominant impulses in Western Christianity which have important implications for the relationship between religion and politics (1987, 417). The first impulse involves a movement toward compromise between religious polities and the established political power. In this context political power was legitimized by the religious polity as long as this did not threaten the religious community's relative independence. The second impulse lies in the opposite direction with an emphasis on an "anti-establishment direction". This was the primary domain of the sect-type churches which either withdraw from political life or aggressively pursue action against established power.

First, the church-type is universalizing. It is driven to dominate the "whole of human life" and accepts or operates within secular institutions implicating all of society. Sects are smaller and more personalized. They focus on personal inward perfection and direct personal fellowship. The attitude of sects towards secular institutions ranges from hostility or avoidance to uneasy tolerance. Unlike the universal church, this does not imply efforts to dominate or incorporate secular institutions, although there may be a desire to replace such institutions with sectarian counterparts.

The second distinction between church and sect is their relationship to the way in which power is organized and the way in which social order is maintained. The developed church-type utilizes and weaves itself into the life of the state. This directly connects the church polity to questions of power and the dominant groups and institutions regulating society. Sects have historically opposed the state and this opposition was frequently rooted in the fact that the more sectarian groups often represented marginal and subordinate groups within society. This was certainly the case with the Anabaptist tradition, with some of the groups in this category explicitly refusing to cooperate with the state on moral grounds (Latourette 1975, 178ff.).

An important distinction between the less sectarian Protestants and the more radical Anabaptist factions was that the former sought to be the church of the entire community. Infant baptism, in this context, was an effort by the church-type institutions to ensure that all were brought into the "visible church" (ibid., 778). This was the position of prominent Protestant movements ranging from Lutheranism to the more orthodox Reformed and Presbyterian traditions. While more supportive of an independent church than their Catholic counterparts, Protestants in this category still argued for a close church-state relationship.

The more sectarian groups viewed themselves as "gathered" churches, which were not identical to the community and were composed of primarily those who experienced a spiritual witness that tied them to the sect (ibid., 778-779). Consequently baptism was a covenant and recognition by the participant of a spiritual witness and a commitment to be

part of the religious group and had nothing to do with membership in a larger institution such as the state

The way in which church-state relations evolved and were interpreted by religious leaders is certainly more complicated than implied in a simple church-sect dichotomy. As the English Reformation undoes, the tensions within the church-type Protestantism often surfaced around control of the state or rejection of the state's right to control religious beliefs. Puritanism is a good example of this tension. On the one hand, many English Puritans in the 1500s and 1600s wanted to remain within Anglicanism despite demanding important reforms. Their acceptance of the state and its importance is affirmed in the political successes of Cromwell and their willingness to transform Anglicanism under the Long Parliament, but not to abolish it.

It is during this period that one finds the ancestral spirit of Congregationalism (*ibid.*, 815). The Independents and Separatists, during the 1600s, accepted the covenant theology of the Puritans, but unlike the Puritans they insisted upon the autonomy of the local church. Similar to the Anabaptists, they believed in the "gathered" church consisting of only those individuals who consciously chose affiliation. This faction within Puritanism believed in self-government by elected officials in each local church. The corollary of such demands is greater independence from the state.

Finally, there are important differences in orientation toward the transcendent and ascetic message of Christianity which has important implications for the conceptualization of poverty and charity. For the church-type it is through the institutional manifestation of the religious polity that all have access to grace and salvation. If one is a member of society one is part of the church and hence participating in the salvation and grace offered by the church. As a vehicle preparing for the advent of the Kingdom of God at a societal level, the church focuses its attention on the "objective possession" of religious truth and religious power (*ibid.*, 335). Such acquisition is rendered objective by the practice and monopoly of sacerdotal power that claims absolute control over the rites and manifestations dispensing salvation or expressing divinity. The universalizing and "inward dominion" over the hearts of individuals is only possible if the universal church

compromises with the state, social order, and economic conditions. Such compromise is not construed as immoral or unethical. Rather, as the objective organization of divine power, the church overcomes the imperfections of individuals and the ethical dilemma of compromise by its fundamental drive to expose all to its influence via institutional domination. The presumed power to influence inwardly justifies compromise externally with secular institutions

In reality the relationship between the universal church and the state was in constant tension. This is certainly reflected in the ultramontane and gallican tendencies within Catholicism. While both tendencies agree that in the last instance the worldly arm should submit to the spiritual arm, both sides disagreed as to who rightly represented the spiritual arm. From the ultramontane perspective it was papal authority which presided as the final arbiter. From the gallican tradition the legitimate political order constituted an equally important spiritual voice by virtue of governance being a divinely mandated adjunct of God's Kingdom on Earth.

Within the Protestant tradition the church-type has a definite gallican tendency. But even here the tension is still palpable. Following the 18th century reasoning of Bishop Warburton, William Paley, and Edmund Burke, to whom early Canadian Anglicans appealed for their understanding of Anglican polity, the relationship between the universal or established church and the state was a contractual alliance between two independent institutions (Westfall 1989, 89). This alliance was predicated upon the preeminence of social order as the keystone of society. The essential syllogism can be summarized as follows: order is essential to society; the state can only exist within an ordered society; only religion can inculcate and sustain this social ideal; therefore the state must support the church to ensure its own survival. From this syllogism is derived the argument that the church is the most efficient institution to maintain order because its fusion of religious and social ideals maintains the legitimacy of political authority by convincing and admonishing through an inexpensive clergy rather than through the use of coercion with its more costly expense of maintaining a large army (Westfall 1989, 87). The church, it was argued, produced more religious individuals who, by definition, led more ordered lives that

contributed to social order. Finally, the charitable and philanthropic acts derived from religious virtue created a system of social welfare that presumably forestalled rebellion and revolt. In many respects this argument promotes a notion of public or social piety which does not contradict the Gallican tradition in Quebec. As the Dumont Report notes, the Catholic Church in Quebec preached loyalty and submission of its members to the state in New France and under the colonial rule of Great Britain (*Commission d'étude sur les laïcs et l'Eglise* 1971, 64-65).

Rather than grace and salvation in the context of societal transcendence envisioned in the universal church, sects focus on the transcendence of the individual. In this sense personal piety is emphasized. Group life is voluntary and identity is understood in contradistinction with the universal church which is perceived as degenerate. The inward focus of the sect requires a constant emphasis on the external degeneration of society outside the group and the importance of personal experience, hence the renewal of personal intimacy or conversion, or a renewal of ideals demarcating the sacred and the profane, sect and church. There is conscious rejection of the assimilation or compromise which is a critical attribute of the universal church and its mass organization. Lacking the collective long-term view of the universal church, sects maintain their group boundaries and limit the destabilizing and fragmenting influence of religious enthusiasm by rejecting the evolving and organic canonical tradition of the church-type and substituting this with legalism based on biblical authority, personal fellowship, or emphasis on the evidence of "good works".

The two approaches to transcendence denote divergent emphases where the universal church focuses on the collective and the sect on the individual. An understanding of how these different approaches suggest alternative understandings of poverty requires further discussion of the respective orientation of the universal church and the sect to asceticism. For the universal church, asceticism is a method of acquiring individual virtue (Troeltsch 1931, Vol. 1, 332). This involves a repression of the individual's "sense-life" which permits the detachment necessary for the contemplative life or for special achievements. Conversely, asceticism for the sects is understood as opposition to the world and its

institutions, not the "sense-life". Renunciation in this context is a means to charity and a more thorough-going fellowship. Unlike monasticism, sectarian asceticism rejects the mortification of the senses, and does not view supererogation in poverty and obedience as ends in themselves. Asceticism individualizes virtue in the context of the universal church. For the sect, asceticism is collective in nature because the individual accumulation of good works and virtue sustains fellowship and thereby supports its more precarious group life.

The paradox surrounding poverty is that churches, despite their collective orientation, rationalize societal inequality as a necessary compromise required to maintain the Kingdom of God on earth.¹⁶ Personal charity is encouraged but does not threaten the power structure because it is understood in the context of a highly individualized asceticism where evidence of poverty is highly ambiguous. On the one hand choosing a life of poverty can be praised as the attainment of virtue. On the other hand a broader evidence of societal poverty can be condemned as the result of laziness or as a fundamental feature of society where the poor receive recompense in the afterlife. Conversely, the sect challenges social inequality within itself as a method of engendering fellowship and solidarity. At the societal level such inequality is ignored because it is the profane world and separate from the concerns of the sect which involve the internal regeneration or purification of the individual. The emphasis on the individual reinforces personal obligations towards charity which is highly effective in the personalized environment of the sect. Such rationale is rooted in individual good works not societal obligation. Hence, there is no real basis for legitimizing collective acts aimed at remedying social inequality throughout society. There is, however, a highly rationalized impetus to devise systems to alleviate poverty within the sectarian community itself, rooted in the personalized nature of the community and the role of good works.¹⁷

¹⁶See de Tocqueville for his discussion of the Catholic notion of poverty (1945, Vol. 1, 311).

¹⁷The challenge for those attempting to argue that one can find a definitive Christian approach to poverty is evident in Martin Hengel's (1974) balanced examination of the early Christian church's response to property and riches. The debate amongst early church leaders ranged from "love communism" to the legitimacy of all non-injurious possessions. The important contribution of Hengel's analysis is the extent to which such debates took their clues from the changing social and institutional nature of religious life.

Polity and Charity

While a discussion of early Christianity is beyond the scope of this study, it is helpful to discuss the Christian approach to charity and its implications for the conceptualization of poverty. According to Troeltsch (1931, vol. 1, 134ff.), the early practice of charity in Christianity can be understood in the context of its objectives, the chosen method of philanthropy, and the limitations of social reform.

The objective of charity was, according to Troeltsch, the awakening of a god-like spirit of love. While charity brought relief to those suffering from poverty, its primary objective was not the elimination of poverty. Frequently relief meant securing the minimum requirements necessary to live. Originally informed by its primary intent to invoke and evoke love rather than simply relieve misery, which was its result, charitable intent led to the rationalization of "good works" (creating merit and penance). The objective of charity "was no longer the welfare of others but the salvation of one's own soul" (Troeltsch 1931, vol. 1, 135). This tendency takes on slightly different forms in the corresponding asceticism of universal churches and sects

The emphasis on the voluntary nature of charity follows from its principal objective. Coercion or constraint are incompatible with charity as an expression of love or as a personal manifestation of "good works". As Troeltsch notes, the aim was a "new spirit, not a new social order" (1931, Vol. 1, 135). As Christian communities developed church-type institutions they increasingly engaged in larger and more inclusive acts of charity, moving the impetus of charitable acts from individuals to institutions. Society, rather than the community, became the focus of attention. The resources of the state were increasingly co-opted by the early churches in their charitable actions even as the Christian community maintained its distance from state institutions.¹⁸ As Troeltsch clearly states

¹⁸The duality inherent in this development is discussed in further detail by Troeltsch who argues that the Pauline emphasis on acquiescence to the existing order and opposition to the state involve an inherent discord which constantly raises the question of how the opposing ideals are reconciled at different points in time (1931, Vol. 1, 148ff.)

In the post-Constantine period certainly the Church permitted her institutions, her legal system, and her bishops to receive privileges from the State, and then she placed at the disposal of the State authorities, and then of the legal administration, her own methods of charity and discipline, her authority and her registers, but she did not seek to urge the spirit of social responsibility upon the administration; preferring to use it for her own ends, merely requiring from the State support for her own charitable activity (Troeltsch 1931, Vol. 1, 135).

While broadening and institutionalizing the application of charity, the early Christian church still maintained the distinction between Church and World (see Troeltsch 1931, Vol. 1, 100). Despite obfuscating the demarcation between the Christian community and society, the post-Constantine Christian communities maintained a distinction between the World with its subjection to sin and Satan, and the world of church which was the "place of pilgrimage and of preparation for Heaven" (*ibid.*, 136). As such, the charitable impulse is rooted in the voluntary role of the church or the individual. There was no impulse to reform the social order which was the location of sin and depravity.¹⁹

From an historical perspective, the shift from a small community-focused sect to a universal church in early Catholicism represented a change in impulse from a filial relationship with God and fellowship with the rest of humanity to relationships mediated by the Church and understood in the context of church-type asceticism. This was a transformation in the guiding impulse rationalizing the mediation of the church in charitable acts:

Self-consecration in free obedience of conscience, with the goal of the infinite value of the soul, heart purity, and the love of God, become humility and meekness towards the Church, which involves the sacrifice of one's own will and of one's own knowledge, and is ethically most valuable when the renunciation is most difficult. It is precisely in obedience to the Church, and in sacrifice for the unity of the Church, that the destruction of the ego and the self-sacrifice for others is exercised, good works are acquired, and future salvation is assured (Troeltsch 1931, Vol. 1, 111).

¹⁹Troeltsch argues that when times were prosperous the Church was a successful ameliorative force in society. Despite its immense resources the post-Constantine and feudal Church did little to eliminate poverty. From this it is concluded that increasingly the Church came to the conclusion that misery was a "punishment from God and a sign of the imminent end of the world." (1931, Vol. 1, 136).

As a practical arrangement, charity informed by the spirit of love or "good works", and practiced voluntarily, is influenced by its institutional context. In the case of the sect the personalized "spirit of love" is based upon a certain class homogeneity as was the case of the primitive church and the early Protestant sects. Voluntary acts are reinforced by the pressure of external forces threatening the viability of the intimate spiritual community. In the case of the church-type community depersonalized charity is driven by the individual need for merit or penance (Troeltsch 1931, Vol. 1, 136f.). Despite the enlarged possibilities provided by the institutionalization of charity its logic is primarily driven by the voluntary contributions of individuals seeking "good works" and not by the particular needs of the destitute. In both cases there is little to suggest an inherent impulse towards social reform.

It was in response to the industrial revolution, the rise of liberalism, and the deleterious effects of early urbanization that churches and sects began to reinterpret their traditional ethos in the context of social reform (Charlton et al. 1986). This in turn gave rise to left-right splits within religious communities and a concerted effort by the church elite to develop a religious social doctrine. The conflict surrounding this development was tempered in some measure by the institutional imperative requiring some degree of consensus on the nature of these new expressions of poverty. This also necessitated an expression of the community's stance on the appropriate and legitimate policy direction to be taken by individuals, the church, and the state.

Regulating the Poor: Church-State Relations

There are two important historical watersheds in society's understanding of poverty and the institutionalized reaction embodied in churches and the state. First, the period between the 11th and 15th centuries was a critical period of transition that shaped the fundamental symbolic contours of contemporary debates about poverty. Second, the Industrial Revolution and the development of the Welfare State in the 19th and 20th Centuries precipitated the institutional developments that influenced the way in which churches and the state structured beliefs about poverty. It is these two periods that have

left a profound legacy on the way in which poverty is understood today. This relates to the structuring of beliefs about the causes and remedies of poverty, the emotional content associated with poverty and charity, tolerance of inequality, and social obligation.

It is important to focus first on the Medieval influence which is marked by a growing tension between a Christocentric exaltation of poverty (*pauperes Christi*) and the perception that the "ugliness" of poverty and sickness dishonoured humanity (Mollat 1974, 28). Prior to the 11th Century poverty was not conceived as a social problem. Indigence and infirmities were considered natural conditions affecting a portion of all societies. Remedies were understood in terms of a "gift economy"; where those with power were obliged, in the context of justice, to share superfluous riches with the less fortunate in the form of charitable benefices (*ibid.*, 25).

It was initially Bishops and religious orders, however, that institutionalized mechanisms for redistributing essential items to the poor (i.e., tithes and *asiles* [*aumônerie*]) and establishing buildings and services to meet more chronic needs (i.e., *hospitale pauperum*). However, by the end of the 11th century the growing number of poor placed an inordinate stress on the resources of the medieval church. In this context, the Christian community's emphasis on charitable gifts as a mechanism for cleansing sin promoted and legitimized charitable gifts from the powerful.²⁰ Growing needs, however, meant that ecclesiastical control was being increasingly shared by a nascent bourgeoisie who were becoming important donors in urban centres (Favreau 1974). Monastic and diocesan shelters for occasional clientele such as travelers and pilgrims were giving way to a more numerous, more constant clientele in urban centres. This gave the laic bourgeoisie a more important role in charitable assistance, particularly where assistance and poverty became linked to social order within towns and cities.²¹

²⁰This increasingly sustained an egocentric notion of charity rather than a collective sense more often associated with non-western societies (cf. Schwartz 1993, 327ff. and Tuchman 1978, 38).

²¹As Mollat notes, the church did not easily adapt its mode of assistance to the growing urban poor. Consequently, lay individuals became increasingly important in the delivery of services and assistance. Mollat warns, however, that this did not imply secularization in the modern sense. Rather, there was increasing cooperation between ecclesiastical organizations and the laity. As services became

As the growing number of poor became increasingly viewed by the elite as a threat to social order, there was pressure to distinguish between deserving and undeserving poor. This culminated in greater emphasis on methods of grouping the poor together to enhance control and treatment (i.e., health). Likewise, there was a growing trend to discourage traditional assistance which was more indiscriminate in nature and thought by some to promote laziness. The proposed alternatives included offers of interest free loans which would maintain the dignity of the recipient and stimulate productivity in the community (Mollat 1974, 29). Both of these tendencies contain the ideological seeds legitimizing the subsequent poor laws and their application in Great Britain.

During the 12th Century there was general sympathy for the poor, but with hostility towards healthy beggars. By the 13th Century there was a growing awareness of deep social unrest among the lower orders of society. By the 14th Century poverty was no longer perceived as a marginal phenomenon and the poor were increasingly identified as a social group that did not fit the feudal ideal of harmonious class structure (Batany 1974).

While these developments were taking place, some religious orders were trying to reinvigorate a Christocentric concept of poverty by attaching a social dimension to the notion of "spiritual poverty". This increased the tension between the ideal of "spiritual poverty" and its practice and promotion by mendicant orders, and political pressure defining poverty as a social problem. These tensions corresponded with an increasing exclusion of the poor from traditional religious rituals such as funeral practices, and thereby forcing the poor to rely on charitable institutions to provide essential funeral rites which they could no longer afford (Aries 1974).

Within Catholicism, Franciscan and Dominican voices politicized the social dimension of poverty by associating with the lower orders in society. For example, the Dominicans in 13th Century Florence influenced the discourse of the working poor by increasingly replacing "indigence" with "bondage" as the definition of poverty. This in turn gave

increasingly specialized. Bishops appointed lay administrators and cooperated with local councils or committees formed to administer assistance to the needy (Mollat 1974, 29).

poverty political content by offering the idea that the poor have a right to power (de la Roncière 1974)

By the 14th Century the dominant perception of poverty as an undesirable social disturbance became entrenched in the period's governing institutions. As a prelude to the development of the early modern state, municipal councils began imposing strict regulations on not only the amount of assistance, but also the type of assistance to be received by the poor. There were strict controls on begging and frequently there was little effort to distinguish between those who could legally request assistance and those who were subject to harsh punishments reserved for "vagabonds".²²

The results of the developments that occurred between the 12th and 14th Centuries have had far reaching implications for our contemporary understanding of poverty. What is of equal importance is the extent to which the changing meaning of poverty is institutionalized, through the interplay of ecclesiastical assistance, the regulation of poverty through the by-laws of nascent city councils, and national policies such as the "workhouse". In each instance, institutionalization embodies new forms of meaning.

Prelude to the Welfare State

In many respects the beliefs about poverty that came out of the Middle Ages persisted until the great ideological debates generated by the Industrial Revolution. In general, both early churches and sects were silent on the matter of poverty as a social or political issue. This changed once it became impossible to ignore the radical changes caused by the Industrial Revolution. Both the wretchedness of the working class and the increasingly effective political organization of the lower orders of society threatened the social order to a degree not imaginable by the governing forces in the 14th Century.

The secularization of the state, the erosion of the aristocracy, and the increasing democratization of power through parliaments and free charters meant a permanent realignment of social forces which in turn meant a changing role for religious institutions

²²Note the issue of compliance and the different reactions of Catholics and Protestants. (cf. Piven et al. 1993, Garraty 1978)

The rise of Puritan power and its transformative role in England under the Long Parliament and the protectorship of Cromwell broke the hegemony of universal church models (Anglican and Presbyterian models) in Great Britain. The temporary success of the Puritans provided a basis upon which later sectarian developments (i.e., Methodism, Free Kirk, and Baptists) found support.

The Reformation in Germany and Switzerland gave rise to sectarian voices challenging the hegemony of Rome and lent support to the idea of national churches. Likewise, the rise of Gallican forces in France under the Bourbons and Josephism in Austria meant an increasing subordination of the national church by the state, even in a country dominated by Catholicism. In some respects the increasing religious plurality of Europe, the growing economic power of a non-titled class with sectarian tendencies (i.e., Puritans and Huguenots), and the declining political influence of the Vatican created a situation of political stalemates or prudent realignments. This resulted in a degree of tolerance which would have been unforeseen at an earlier period. While all of the churches and sects indicated a marked preference for intolerance for their religious counterparts, limited tolerance was forged out of political necessity, particularly in the non-Catholic states.²³

During this period the state was becoming increasingly powerful throughout Europe. Religious institutions became less dominant as the tools of bureaucracy and the military became less dependent on the church and aristocracy. The clergy, which had provided the administrative infrastructure of the state, were increasingly replaced by individuals trained outside the traditional institutions controlled by the church. The allegiance of this group became firmly linked to the state rather than the dual or singular allegiance of former administrative personnel to the church.²⁴

²³ Although the notion that a state church was essential for the maintenance of social order still predominated in much of Europe, the North American example and subsequent French Revolution gave arguments, to those so inclined, that there were alternatives to the traditional notion of a state church which could at the same time sustain social order.

²⁴ This development is discussed in Fischer and Lundgreen (1975, 471-477).

While these changes certainly created a new political context for religious institutions, it was the economic changes wrought by industrialization that reformed the institutional voice of religion regarding poverty and its political implications. Both churches and sects were slow to address the great transformation affecting initially Great Britain and subsequently Europe. While churches remained the primary administrative arm of social services and charitable institutions, they tended to react conservatively to industrialization. Given the predisposition of both the universal church-type and the sect towards charity and poverty, neither was organizationally disposed towards a critical analysis of the way in which the social fabric of society was being transformed.

It was the individual voices and social movements affecting the religious polity that necessitated both a symbolic response (i.e., social doctrine or social gospel) and a practical response (i.e., new charitable endeavours and political intercession). These responses were necessary in order to ensure the integrity and cohesion of the social base of the church or sect. In this context both universal churches and sects eventually became significant voices proffering social reform and at times inadvertently sustaining or legitimizing more radical voices within the population. However, the nature of this voice differs, depending on the social and institutional nature of the religious polity.

Institutional Heritage: Religious Polities

The rules of church government are determined in part by the power matrix within the religious community during formative stages of a religious movement and during periods of social and economic transition. These rules also take on a sacred life of their own. The religious mantle under which the rules of church government are frequently articulated legitimizes practices within the community. The association of religious truth with these practices not only helps sustain a polity, but also creates a certain degree of rigidity. This often buttresses the influence of founding social groupings within a religious community and frequently makes it difficult for church polities to adapt to changing social and political circumstances.

The stability of the institutionalized polity creates a level of continuity that has been a key factor in the ability of religious polities to weather successfully revolutionary transformations in both the socio-economic and political structures of society. This in turn influences that way in which such polities frame their understanding of issues such as poverty. The church-type attempted to act as the great mediator, caring for the poor without threatening the state. This meant focusing on the structural causes of poverty. The sects were more concerned with internal cohesion and hence their theological disposition towards notions of individual salvation and election, and their distance from the state, meant that it was easier to develop an individual approach to poverty. Poverty was the result of individual sin or weakness.

In England, the Anglican and Presbyterian influence was effectively countered by the rising power of a merchant class which was influenced by Puritanism or sectarian tendencies. The church-type compromise with sectarian influence is evident in the passing of the English poor law reform of 1834. The sectarian predisposition toward this approach to poverty is underscored by its support in the United States.

The poor law reform abolished support for those who were unable to obtain adequate employment. The reform assumed that the "able-bodied" were entirely responsible for their economic well-being. This rejection of public responsibility for individual welfare was introduced in similar reforms in the United States throughout the 1820s. Such reform was evident in states such as New York, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania, where congregational polities predominated (Pong 1983, 72). In Canada, only in the region where sects were strongest did government demonstrate a similar proclivity to adopt reform modeled on English poor laws.²⁵

The impact of polity on orientations toward poverty is complicated given the range of models. The polity that exhibits the church-type tendency is the episcopal organization of Roman Catholicism and to a lesser extent, Anglicanism. The episcopal emphasis on a

²⁵The regional approaches to poverty and poor laws in Canada is discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.

clerical hierarchy is contrasted with the voluntary congregational pattern of association prevalent in the Anabaptist and Puritan traditions of the sect-type. This Protestant tradition supports laic power and congregational autonomy. In between the episcopal and congregational polities lies the presbyterian model. The presbyterian polity emphasizes laity-clergy parity, authority residing in the representative body rather than the entire congregation, and unity based not only on "faith and order" but also through the legitimacy created by a graduated series of church courts representing the interests of the entire congregation (Lynch 1987, 478).

The primary difference between each of these types of polities lies in their respective institutionalization of authority and the process whereby divine will is expressed, represented, or mediated. This in turn has implications in the way in which a polity and ideological approach to poverty are mutually reinforcing. In the episcopal context the socio-economic differences of individuals have less theological importance given the egalitarian necessity of all members to pass through the clergy in their interaction with God. As de Toqueville notes, the Catholic church is composed of the priest and the people, and the "priest alone rises above the rank of his flock, and all below him are equal" (1945 vol. 1, 311).

The clergy as a social class often had resources that were not available to the general laity. These resources were not the private domain of the clergy. Rather, their use was embodied in clerical usufruct rights. The Church owned property, the clergy had user rights (Miller 1983, 286). Hence, the clergy were technically "poor" despite the resources at their disposal.

The apparent contradiction between a religion that devalued material wealth, but permitted the great amassing of church wealth, required some degree of rationalization. At one level the contradiction resulted in the creation of religious orders dedicated to vows of poverty which required integration (Vaillancourt 1980, 30). In this manner the contradictions between social class within Catholicism remained attenuated by a theological disposition that continued to value poverty and the poor, and an ecclesiastical

structure that subordinated all individuals, regardless of class, to a clerical hierarchy. This provided an ideological disposition towards a structural approach toward poverty.

Episcopal Polity

Among religious polities adopting an episcopal model, Roman Catholicism represents the most developed differentiation between laity and clergy. In the Catholic example, the episcopal polity attaches primary importance to a linear succession of priesthood authority unified around and tied through priesthood lineage to the office of the Pope. Since 1025 a college of cardinals has elected the Pope (Bishop of Rome), and since 1965 a Synod of Bishops advises the Pope. The papal figure is the presiding authority around which each particular church (diocese) unites as a member of a single unique Roman Catholic church. Except for a few dioceses with the historical right of election, it is the Pope who appoints or confirms a bishop. The bishop, in turn, acts as legislator, executive, and judiciary within the boundaries of his diocese. He may appoint vicars or a clergy-based presbyteral council to aid his responsibilities. But, decision-making authority for a diocese remains invested in the office of the Bishop. Laity participation in a parish financial council is the only formal voice of the non-clergy within the diocesan system.

The amalgamation of the three principal governing functions in a single office of the Bishop makes this figure an extremely powerful force within the church. The Bishop is only formally constrained, once appointed, by the jurisprudence of canon law and the boundaries of the diocese. In practice, supradiocesan bodies such as archbishops and episcopal conferences frequently have circumscribed roles and limits.

In some cases episcopal conferences can make binding decisions for member dioceses. But, it is not via supradiocesan bodies that the unity or compliance of bishops is ensured. Rather, it is the person and office of the Pope that constitutes the unifying force within Roman Catholicism. With the Gregorian reform beginning in 1059, it was the corporate pattern, superimposed on the traditional sacramental church that permitted the realization

of the Gelasius formula²⁶ Gregory VII, in his Dictates of the Pope (1075), formulated the institution of papal supremacy which eventually legitimized the organization of the church in a well articulated corporate form which could unify and coordinate each and every part via the bishop of Rome²⁷

Gregory VII proclaimed that emperors and kings had no authority over the church, that the bishop of Rome alone had authority to ordain, discipline, depose, and reinstate bishops, to convoke and control councils, and to establish and administer abbeys and bishoprics; that only the pope had authority "to enact new laws according to the needs of the time"; that the papal court was "the court of the whole of Christendom," to which all Christians had a right to resort in matters within the ecclesiastical jurisdiction; and indeed, that the pope "may depose emperors" and that "the pope is the only one whose feet are to be kissed by all princes" (Berman and Witte 1987, 491).

It is in the context of a papal driven episcopal polity that Catholicism must be understood. By the 1100s the ecclesiology of the Roman Catholicism perceived the church transcending political boundaries and hence was driven to build the church of God on a world scale. While state and church imperatives were at times similar, the church increasingly emphasized its proselytizing role and the importance of formal membership to the church as a "social body" which is universal in nature (Congar 1987, 483). Implicit in the emphasis on proselytizing and visible membership was the central institutional role of the church in society. The Church acted as supplier of charity and the educated elite administering feudal states. But more importantly from an ideological perspective, it also claimed a monopoly in its mediation between God and society. In the middle ages this included direct supervision of many activities that provided some semblance of a social safety net.

²⁶The Gelasius formula stated that the world is ruled by two powers in this sense "church" or ecclesia included temporal powers such as kings. Temporal powers were conceived as "ministers of the church and, like the church, made salvation of human beings their goal." (Congar 1987, 482).

²⁷The importance of the Catholic Church's organizational evolution and how it dealt with questions of legitimacy and divisions of power should not be underestimated. Papal authority and control of membership were not developments that went uncontested. For some background on these developments see Miller (1983) and Vaillancourt (1980).

The great centralizing power of the Pope promoted a tension between church and state. The church was put forward as an instrument of both spiritual and material salvation. While the church promoted greater intrusion into the lives of individuals, it was suspicious of relinquishing this power to the state

Protestant Politics

Unlike Catholicism, Protestantism was less enmeshed in the state. The universal and true church was redefined as *abscondita* or hidden. In practice this meant that the church was a community of believers through which religious associations exist. This departed from the Catholic notion where the religious institution, through priesthood, was the organic embodiment of Christ, thereby mediating the relationship between God and humanity.

Protestantism promoted the idea of a community of like-minded individuals, each voluntarily choosing to join together in a common belief. There was no longer mediation through priesthood because of the acceptance of universal priesthood, which in turn was based on personal reading of the scriptures and individual justification through faith rather than sacraments. In its extreme forms this meant the radical autonomy of the individual to participate in religious associations. The congregational polity represents this ambivalence towards universal inclusion inherent in the notion of the universal church, and certainly limits the legitimate means whereby religious institutions act as mediating organizations, not only in the spiritual realm, but also in temporal activities. While such activities are not rejected they are certainly circumscribed from the perspective of a formal religious institution.

The notion of voluntary association and an individual role in determining religious orientation meant a different relationship between church and state. This in turn had important ramifications of the way in which religious institutions organized themselves. The concrete implications involved a changing relationship between the church elite and the general membership.

Membership Models

In order to understand the three types of polities it is helpful to describe the way in which they encompass their constituency. Avery Dulles proposes three membership models that accompany polities: organic, juridical, and voluntarist (1987, 487). Each model corresponds to an historical period. Organic models were developed during the Middle Ages and insisted, as in the case of the Augustinian tradition, on ecclesiological dualism: 1) where membership involves the communion of grace and spiritual gifts; and 2) the visible organization of the church with its doctrine, and its ministerial and sacramental mechanisms. The Augustinian tradition recognized that membership of both sides did not always correspond. Within this framework developed the notion that membership in the visible church was primarily inclusive but with an hierarchy of connection. Sinners belonged to the church but in an external manner (Augustine). The "damned" were excluded and infidels were members only in "potency" (Aquinas).

The implications of an organic-juridical form of membership are underscored in the case of excommunicated individuals. In the early Middle Ages excommunication meant that individuals under such ecclesiastical sanction were not only refused rites and ordinances, they were unable to be magistrates, perform military functions, or hold public office.

The Counter-Reformation and subsequent fragmentation and nationalization of religious institutions meant a shift from the organic to a juridical model of membership. In response to Calvinist and Lutheran tendencies to deny or minimize the mediating role of the visible church (with their respective emphasis on predestined elect, grace, and justification by faith), Catholicism began to accent the visible church and institutionalize membership. As nation-states formed there was a growing recognition of two co-existent memberships: civil and ecclesiastical.

By the 17th century the voluntarist model began its ascendance. This model was based on voluntary association rather than the juridical inclusiveness of earlier models. For the new dissenting movements of this period voluntary affiliation was linked with the

willingness of an individual to accept either doctrinal positions or sacramental authority. This conformed to the idea of a congregational polity which maximized the influence of voluntary association and local control of religious matters.

For Catholicism and other episcopal-presbyterian churches more closely linked with the state (i.e., Lutheranism, Anglicanism, and Scottish Presbyterianism) greater emphasis was placed on an external profession of the true faith, sacramental communion, and subjection to the legitimate pastors. The unbaptised, excommunicated, or convicted heretics and schismatics were no longer considered members of the church and therefore ineligible to receive the saving mediation of the church.²⁸ For the sects the notion of voluntary association predominated. The implications of membership in the sect lacked the broader societal implications of its universal-church counterpart.

Canadian Religious Politics: The Growth of Denominationalism

The development of religious politics in Canada has been influenced by all three polity types and membership models. As outlined in Table 6, the principal sources of religious influence in Canada are France, Great Britain, and the United States. While the development of Canadian politics will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter, it is important to link the denominational focus of this study with institutional heritage.

American influences on Canadian presbyterian and congregational politics certainly emphasized the voluntarist and congregational dimension of church organization. However, the threat of American invasion and subsequent anti-Americanism tempered this trend. As a later discussion of Canadian Presbyterianism and Methodism underscores, there was significant compromise in the institutionalization of polity and membership models throughout English-speaking Canada. Canadian presbyterian and congregational

²⁸The Catholic organic-juridical form was evident in Quebec from the Quebec Act of 1774 until the Quiet Revolution in the 1960s (Maheu 1986, 101ff. cf. Doyle 1984b, 417ff.). During this period there was the presumption that the Catholic Church represented Quebecers. The Catholic Church controlled civil records and marriages. Competent legal testimony required witnesses to accept certain religious tenets. The province had legislated fiscal rights for the Catholic Church that permitted taxing for religious purposes (maintenance and repair of buildings and cemeteries). These were privileges not accorded other denominations.

models were less evangelical and factious than their American counterparts, but remained more open to compromise than their English influences. Religious groups that retained greater affinity toward their American counterparts remained marginalized in the broader religious landscape. Yet, even for these groups, such as the Baptists and Lutherans, there are suggestions that they have a more structural approach to poverty than their American affiliates

The distance between Canadian Baptists and Lutherans and their American counterparts should not be surprising given the more general anti-statist orientation of American political culture (Lipset 1990, 140-142). There has been historical support in Canada for national policies that involve the state as a principal actor in both economic and regional development. While there are certainly political implications for these policies (i.e., protection from US expansionism), there was little resistance to this role from ideological sources, as the two main national political parties maintained similar support for a policy of “defensive expansion” when in power (Aitken 1988, 203ff.; cf. Fowke 1988, 238ff.). Similar levels of support for such large scale state intervention has been less evident in the United States.

The most telling difference in the Lutheran and Baptist polities is their different historical trajectories. One difference for Lutherans is the pre-confederation affinity of many early Canadian Lutheran congregations with Anglicanism. A number of these early congregations assimilated into Anglican parishes (Handy 1976, 131). Such a pattern was not evident in the United States where early Lutheran churches tended not to maintain external ties.²⁹ They were more inclined to maintain their congregational autonomy (Handy 1976, 152). The shared affinity toward the strong role of the state between Anglicanism and non-American forms of Lutheranism is evident in the similar political nature of their break with the Roman Catholic church. As Anglicanism in Great Britain, Lutheranism was the state church in many of the German principalities and in the Scandinavian kingdoms (especially Sweden and Denmark). Similar to Catholicism, state

²⁹ There are some exceptions to this pattern, such as the Pennsylvania Swedish parishes

Lutheran and Anglican churches shared a similar institutional dynamic common to all churches claiming to be coterminous with the state and claiming religious representation of all the population within the state's jurisdiction

The Baptist example is the most important expression of the way in which congregational polities in Canada differed from their American counterparts. It was the purportedly conservative Maritime Baptists that were the most vocal supporters of the Social Gospel movement in the 1920s, adopting a nineteen plank platform that implied considerable state intervention in civil society (Rawlyk 1991, 105-106). Similar strains of the Social Gospel were evident as a significant minority position among Baptists elsewhere in Canada. However, as Rawlyk notes, this tendency gave way to a decidedly "right-wing" shift in the politics of most Baptist conventions in the East and West, with an uneasy compromise in the political centre in the convention representing central Canada (idem., 112). Intimated as the cause of this shift is the more recent influence of American culture Rawlyk argues that the relative declining influence of Baptists throughout Canada has resulted in a growing reliance on "a largely imported variant of American-fundamentalist neo-conservatives", which in turn increasingly marginalized the political voice of Baptists (idem., 118).

Rawlyk's analysis points to the growing Americanization of congregational polities such as the Baptists. This development underscores the importance of the institutional context. The congregational polity is probably more susceptible to the ebb and flow of ideological currents than its more hierarchical counterparts. Given its fragmented nature, it is also more susceptible to congregational raids by competing congregational polities. Such raiding is much more difficult in religious organizations that are presbyterian or episcopal in nature. This is even more pronounced with Baptist conventions which accord considerable autonomy to their affiliated congregations.

The pattern suggested in Rawlyk's assessment of trends among Baptist churches must be nuanced. First, the theological range within the Baptist community, like in other religious denominations, is capable of including very different political positions, all of which attempt to root themselves in a common theology. It is not the theology that

determines the political culture of a religious community, but rather the social context within which members of the community institutionalize the practice of their beliefs. This is evident in the contrast between social credit ideology of William Aberhart and the CCF doctrine of Tommy Douglas³⁰ Both experienced the distress of the Great Depression and both promoted radical forms of state intervention. Differences in how they proposed to solve social and economic issues are not easily linked to their respective theologies, despite a general inclination to Social Gospel themes on the part of each.³¹

Second, openness to certain policy orientations is constrained by the way in which the public beliefs are institutionalized. This institutionalization includes a role for churches and the way in which they legitimize responses to social and economic problems. Thus, Rawlyk's suggestion of an Americanized Baptist community is also evident in the important shift in the political orientation of Alberta's Social Credit party when Aberhart's protégé, Ernest Manning, became the new leader. It is with Manning that more pronounced themes in American fundamentalism surface in social credit politics. It is Manning who attempts to make the explicit linkages between a theology of salvation and the rightness of a non-interventionist state. Accordingly, the "doctrine of state control" diminishes the role of the individual struggling for divine salvation. An interventionist state prevents an individual from independently working toward a "state of grace and hence salvation" (Finkel 1989, 136f.)

The heightened emphasis on the individual parallels the individualism institutionalized in the United States, and in many respects promoted by American churches (Lipset 1990, *passim*). Moreover, there is an interesting correspondence between the public openness to such positions and the extent to which the population has strong ties to the United States. As Wiseman argues, the very success of the populist version of social credit developed in

³⁰ Aberhart was originally Presbyterian, but aligned with a Baptist congregation a few years after arriving in Calgary. Douglas was a Baptist minister in Saskatchewan. Both were strongly influenced by the negative impact of the Great Depression on the Canadian prairies and a growing recognition that the state must play a greater role in the regulation of society.

³¹ For Aberhart's less known Social Gospel proclivities see Finkel (1989, 28) and Rawlyk (1991: 121-122).

Alberta is due, in some measure, the wave of American immigrants who supported such an orientation (Wiseman 1985, 251ff.). Interestingly, it is in Alberta that one finds the province with one of the largest proportions of the population affiliated with churches that are part of congregational polities.

The discussion of Lutherans and Baptists should not diminish the more critical role of another denomination with a corresponding congregational heritage and voluntarist membership tradition. The union of a significant proportion of the Presbyterian, Methodist, and Congregational denominations resulted in the formation of the United Church of Canada. The sheer size of this denomination suggests a critical influence on Canadian culture.

The United Church of Canada is a unique blend of presbyterian and congregational tendencies, some of which are only reconciled in the ambiguous ecumenical nature of its creed and practices. Its importance is reflected in the fact that in 1981, the United Church represented 3.8 million Canadians.³² With a membership constituting 16% of the Canadian population, the United Church is the second largest religious organization in Canada. It is the largest Protestant body.

The two major episcopal and organic-juridical influences in Canada were Anglicanism and Roman Catholicism. While Anglicanism has played an important historical role in Canada, it has never enjoyed the degree of "establishment" influence of its English counterpart. Competition with presbyterian and congregational organizations tempered the episcopal model and influenced the gradual movement of Canadian Anglicanism away from the organic-juridical tendencies of the mother church.

Theological pluralism is another factor influencing the particular development of Canadian Anglicanism. Inherent in Anglicanism, theological pluralism can be traced to the tensions between its political origins and the persistent influence of Puritanism. Unlike its Protestant counterparts in Europe, the English Reformation was driven by political reform. Theology was secondary (Powles 1991, 13). As long as obedience to the crown and

³²Data on religious affiliation in Canada are taken from the 1981 census.

national unity were paramount, Anglicanism was prepared to accept a range of theological expressions

In terms of poverty the Church often perceived itself working harmoniously with the state. The Church was the soul or conscience of the state. This differed from the earlier Roman Catholic tradition which developed a theory of tension between the authority of the "Emperor" and that of the Pope. In Anglicanism, the "church was no longer considered to be a kind of spiritual state, set over against, a secular state" (Powles 1991, 15)

The Canadian experience of the Anglican version of the episcopal model is instructive. On the one hand, a pragmatic development in the early 1800s created a synodical structure that included lay representation in the election of a Bishop. However, unlike the Anglican developments in the United States which followed a presbyterian line, episcopal decisions in Canada were not made within a "collegial framework of the Standing Committee, made up of clergy and laity" (Powles 1991, 18). Rather, Anglican Bishops in Canada followed the British example. The British tradition was similar to their Catholic counterparts, albeit without the predominance of a papal authority.

The dominance of the Bishop was eventually tempered by the influence of voluntary membership patterns of the Anglican church's more sectarian and congregational counterparts, and the need to maintain a social base. This created two problems. First, the Anglican social base was derived in large measure from the prominent English-speaking classes in Canada. This meant a tempered non-threatening paternal approach to poverty. Second, the notion of "corporate dependence" or "corporate relationship" within Anglican social thought supported an active role of institutions (state and church) in the material welfare of individuals. Less suspicious of the state than their Catholic counterparts, Anglicanism was more open to the role of the state and less accepting of the ideals of laissez-faire liberalism (Pulker 1986, 12ff).

Anglicanism is the third largest religious organization in Canada. In 1981 an estimated 2.4 million Canadians claimed affiliation with the Anglican Church of Canada. The potential impact of its symbolic and institutional heritage is significant.

Table 6 : Historical Influences and Canadian Church Polities

Origin of Influence	Historical Expression	Polity Type	Membership Model
France	Roman Catholicism (pre-Revolution)	Episcopal	Organic-Juridical
Great Britain	Anglicanism	Episcopal	Organic-Juridical
	Scottish Kirk	Presbyterian	Juridical-Voluntarist
	Wesleyan Methodism	Episcopal	Juridical-Voluntarist
	Irish Roman Catholicism	Episcopal	Organic-Juridical
United States	Congregationalism	Congregational	Voluntarist
	Methodism	Congregational	Voluntarist
	Baptist	Congregational	Voluntarist

Catholic Factor

The influence of Catholicism was far greater in Canada than in the United States, and hence, suggests a greater influence for the episcopal and organic-juridical heritage. In 1981, 11.2 million individuals claimed affiliation with the Roman Catholic church. This constitutes 47% of the Canadian population. Of all Canadian Catholics, 50% reside in Quebec.

The relative importance of Canadian and Quebec Catholicism is underscored if one compares levels of Catholic participation in the industrialized world. As the 1960s data in Table 7 indicate, Canada is ranked fourth in percentage of population classified as active Catholics.³³ However, if Quebec is examined by itself, it ranks second in the Western world in percentage of population as active Catholics.

³³Whyte (1981) uses attendance records in the 1960s to estimate active Catholics.

Table 7: Practicing Catholics in Cross-National Comparison

Country	Estimated Percentage of National Populations Considered Practicing Catholics in the 1960s (% of population)
Ireland ^d	85
Belgium	48
Italy	43
Canada	37
Quebec	75
Non-Quebec	19
Austria	36
The Netherlands	32
France	23
West Germany	23
Switzerland	21
United States	16
Australia	13
New Zealand	9
Great Britain	6

Source: Whyte 1981, 20

The levels of participation are a good indication of the extent to which the discourse of Canadian Catholicism is influenced by activities within Quebec, as well as the extent to which Quebec embodies an entrenched Catholic influence in North America. The entrenchment of Catholicism in Quebec is reinforced by the federal nature of the Canadian state. The powers of the province and the rather unique historical tension between the provincial government of Quebec and its federal counterpart permitted the church to develop a form of cultural hegemony that is more akin to unitary states in Catholic Europe. Regional concentration of Catholics in a federal structure such as Canada has meant that Catholic institutions historically developed in North America with the assurance and support of a strong and secure base located in Quebec. The role of the Quebec church is evident in the historical role of its clergy and religious orders in missionary work throughout North America,

The number of Catholics in Canada continues to grow, both in absolute numbers and as a proportion of the population. In this sense, Catholicism will continue to be a major influence in the shaping the belief systems of Canadians.¹⁴

Conclusion

Both poverty and its corollary, charity, are important symbols that have been institutionalized within Christianity. The principal argument in this chapter is that the meaning of these symbols and their relationship to belief systems can be understood in the historical context of the organization of the religious community. Organization in this sense refers to the religious polity, which in turn refers to how the church regulates or governs its internal affairs, determines its membership, and establishes its relationship to the state.

If there remains a statistically significant influence of denominational affiliation in contemporary attitudes about poverty then the historical roots of such denominations may be part of the explanation of deeply entrenched belief systems. While the organizing dynamic of a religious community may change over time, and it has in the case of secularization and the rise of denominationalism, the institutional heritage of a community carries with it established symbols that convey meaning across time and from one generation to the next. The heritage of different types of church polities and membership models transmits different symbolic meaning for poverty and charity.

The first point is that the dominant religious communities in Canada have very different organizational roots. While the metaphysical-moral vision of each church may be converging in the contemporary setting of ecumenical approaches to poverty, their respective institutional heritage provides suggests the possibility of the transmission of a different symbolic context in which each community understands poverty and the ways in

¹⁴In historical statistics published by Statistics Canada the relative importance of Catholicism continues to grow. Conversely, the proportion of the population affiliated to Anglicanism or the United Church continues to decline. F. H. Leacy, Historical Statistics of Canada, Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1983, Series A164-184.

which such social issues should be addressed. Despite the convergence discussed in Chapter One, there is the possibility that the general belief system of church members is influenced by the symbolic relics of the institutional past. While these symbols may be diluted or subliminal in nature, they continue to influence the way in which individuals formulate their premises and give meaning to the personal and cultural experiences that inform their beliefs about poverty.

The second point is that the two ideal-types of religious organization - universal and sectarian churches - provide a conceptual framework for understanding the relationship between religious institutions and poverty belief systems. Applied to Canada, the Catholic and Anglican communities are imbued with the influence of the universal church. The United Church is infused with the historical influence of more sectarian-styled organizations such as revivalist Congregationalism and Methodism, and Evangelical-Calvinist Presbyterianism. The offshoot of this heritage is the proposition that the more sectarian communities, with their congregational politics and voluntarist membership models, carry a more individual orientation toward poverty. Conversely, communities with the heritage of episcopal and organic-juridical institutions of a universal church have transmitted a more structural understanding of poverty.

The nuances and refinement of the classification of Canadian churches are best left to scholars of church history. Nevertheless, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the universal church-sect construct provides a useful way of understanding the way in which particular belief systems have become entrenched within religious communities. The historical roots of the institutional differences between religious communities provide a way of explaining contemporary attitudinal differences.

The symbolic and institutional heritage are some of the identifiable features that differentiate denominations in Canada. In general, the church-type, with its episcopal and organic-juridical institutions, are structural in their approach to poverty. The sect, with its congregational and voluntary institutions tends toward an individual understanding of poverty. These generalizations, while pointing in the right direction remain crude. For this reason it is necessary to understand more fully the nature of religious politics in Canada,

and how their poverty beliefs evolved across time. The following chapter examines some of these developments and provides some reasons why one should find certain similarities and differences between Canadian denominations.

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Chapter Three

Canadian Churches - Historical Development of Differentiated Symbolic Heritage

Introduction

The following chapter discusses the historical development of the mainstream Christian churches in Canada. This involves an examination of secularization and changing church-state relationships. These developments are examined in the context of a US-Canadian comparison and regional historical developments in Canada. Special attention is given to Quebec because of its role in fostering the episcopal and organic-juridical model within North America. If subsequent attitudinal patterns are to be explained by either the contemporary organizational response or historical denominational patterns it is necessary to examine the relationship between institutional development of Canadian denominations and the changing way in which churches construct social agendas. This addresses the important interdependence of cultural baggage, institutional rigidity, and the organizational imperative imposed by a changing socio-economic and political environment.

Secularization: Religious Polity and Political Agendas

Understanding how churches approached poverty in the 19th and 20th Centuries requires an account of their historical development as institutions and their changing relationship to society. Similar to Troeltsch and his attempt to understand the way in which religion responds to the "actual pressure of events", it is necessary to understand not only how religion addresses questions raised by the historical moment, it is critical to examine the imperative of ecclesiastical institutions and how this influences the response of churches to a changing world (Troeltsch 1931, Vol. 1, 207). This imperative provides

clues as to how religious institutions influence beliefs, or more appropriately come to embody or co-opt emerging beliefs

Churches respond to events. The nature of the response (be it visionary or reactive) is a function of a particular relationship between the symbolic world of a denomination's theology and dogma and organizational imperatives of the church. As S.D. Clark notes repeatedly in his classic study of the relationship between religion and Canadian society (1968), Protestant organizations were constantly modifying their institutions in response to frontier experiences, urbanization, and a changing class composition.

Clark's thesis does not make churches less relevant in Canadian history. Rather, following in the tradition of classical sociology, Clark was attempting to establish the dynamic factors influencing the way in which religion organized and hence sustained or challenged societal norms. Accordingly, the religious response to these developments secured a sense of "social solidarity". For Clark, the "religious institution as an integral part of the whole institutional complex of the community served as one of the means of entering into social relationships and of becoming a part of a recognized group life." (1968, 433).

Despite this emphasis in Clark's early work, he underscores the extent to which formal religious institutions confronted serious limitations in their ability to attract support from large sections of the population (Clark 1968, 434). Churches and sects were essentially organizational responses, similar in nature to any other form of social movement. If this line of reasoning is combined with the growing evidence of secularization, it is reasonable to conclude that the organizational response to societal change is increasingly non-religious in nature. This explains in part the declining importance of churches as an institutional expression of religion. This is certainly sustained in the traditional literature on secularization, as well as the functional arguments that redefine religion as a ubiquitous "dechurched" phenomenon (cf. O'Toole 1984a, O'Toole 1984b).

What is interesting is the contemporary challenge to the secularization thesis among scholars from diverse backgrounds. Contemporary religious development and conflict in

Iran, India, Latin America, and the former Eastern Bloc can be explained away under the traditional development model so well elaborated by scholars such as Donald Smith (1970). Within such a framework it could be argued that the less developed countries currently undergoing religious resurgence or conflict will see a decline in the importance of religion as the political culture of a region begins to focus on "nontranscendent temporal goals and rational, pragmatic means" rather than religious values. As these less developed societies build the modern state infrastructure it is assumed that there will be a gradual differentiation between political and religious ideology. The state will increasingly perform regulatory functions currently controlled by religious institutions (Smith 1970, 85ff.). Whether this in fact will occur remains to be seen.¹

The issue of secularization in the developmental model, however, raises the question of the contemporary relevance of religion in the industrialized world. For example, Bibby (1990, 141-147) makes the case that the church response to societal transformation in Canada has been to promote a "consumer", "truthless", and "innocuous" religion. In other words, contemporary Canadian religion is no longer the hegemonic force influencing all aspects of life. It is only one of many institutions trying to attract the interest of consumers.

There are certain precautions that must be recognized when introducing the concept of secularization. It is a multi-dimensional process involving laicization, religious change, and declining religious involvement (Broughton and Rudd 1984, p. 446). According to Broughton and Rudd (1984, 446), laicization is the process whereby religion withdraws from social, economic, political, and educational spheres. It ceases to be an all-encompassing ideology. Religious change involves organizational and doctrinal reforms.

¹The work of Johnston and Figa (1988) does not rely on a secularization model to explain the important role of the Catholic church in mobilizing opposition to authoritarian regimes. Rather than secularization, the role of religious organizations become pronounced as the state increasingly controls all other cultural or political organizations capable of legitimizing politics. And, given the often diverse membership of organizations such as Roman Catholicism, there is great potential for bridging cleavages between different sectors of society, thereby increasing the Church's potential to be an effective force for political alliances and mobilization.

permitting adjustments to new social situations. Declining involvement refers to decreasing participation in religious institutions and traditional practices. However, it is important to note that secularization is frequently a "hodgepodge of loosely employed ideas rather than a systematic theory" (Hadden 1987, 598). While there have been changes in the way in which churches relate to society, one should not assume that there is a natural and inherent historical trajectory that necessitates the demise of churches and institutionalized religion.

This is not to deny that secularization has had an important impact on the influence of religious institutions and the way in which churches influence the symbolic world. Secularization has not only expanded the reference points whereby individuals make their world meaningful, it has also forced churches to diversify (Bibby 1987, 131ff). According to Bibby, "Roman Catholic, Anglican, United Church, or Conservative Protestant members now have their choice within their own denominations of being evangelical or agnostic, charismatic or formal, detached or involved, socially concerned or pietistic" (1987, 131). He argues that this process has introduced relativism into institutional religion and thereby rendering churches dysfunctional as a legitimizing force.²

Bibby's "Contentless Commodity" Thesis

That religion and churches have undergone considerable change in the past one hundred years is of little surprise. What is of interest is the extent to which Canadian churches have survived the collapse of the "nineteenth-century Christian program" and have responded to a transformation severing Canadians from a tradition that placed great emphasis on religious values (O'Toole 1984b, 84). Certainly the role once played by Presbyterian, Methodist, or Baptist churches, with elite lay participation and rotating clergy, is no longer the nationalizing backbone of the English Canadian elite described by

²Bibby's argument presupposes the historical interpretation that churches forged a hegemonic consensus regarding Canada's social vision. It is tenuous, however, to over-emphasize this point in order to magnify the sense of contemporary fragmentation. A careful reading of the various waves of Protestant "awakenings" and the difficulty of the Catholic church in controlling its members suggest that there have always been a significant degree of conflict and dissension within the "Christian program".

Margaret Prang in her work on networks and associations (Prang 1986) No longer does the Catholic church have the formative dominance it had when the clergy controlled the denominational school system and screened the elite in Quebec through the Collèges classiques These institutions were the critical filters through which the French speaking Quebec elite was developed and linked together (Porter 1965, 528)

Bibby's argument in both Mosaic Madness and Fragmented Gods fails to address the historical impact of churches and the extent to which this factor helps explain attitudinal differences in the 1980s A failure to test the possible effect of historical residues resulting from denominational differences in the analysis of cross-sectional attitudes certainly weakens the conclusions Bibby makes about the changing role of churches in Canadian society Lower levels of church attendance and affiliation do not shed light on the historical manner in which churches framed the contours of public debate and how this affects our current social and political discourse Nor does a declining emphasis on orthodox doctrinal beliefs support the claim that heterodoxy nullifies symbolic relevance, particularly with respect to social issues such as poverty, around which there has been considerable convergence in official church pronouncements since the 1960s³

The principal thrust of Bibby's analysis is rooted in his assumption that the declining relevance of churches is due to the failure of church leaders to dictate in an uncompromising manner the substantive content of religion (1987, 111) This is strange coming from an academic presumably familiar with the considerable historical and sociological literature on the interaction between religious institutions and society Bibby fails to address the extent to which many social groups were unable to make sense of their world in the context of the historical message and experience of churches This means that historically both clergy and lay members have examined closely the changing needs of

³As Gramscian theorists often note, "the people" do not experience the dominant ideology in either its rarefied intellectual form or as an absolute Rather, it is experienced in a compromised format necessary to accommodate opposing interests sufficient to sustain its predominance and legitimacy And, this accommodation is constantly being renegotiated (Gruneau 1988, 21-24) In many respects this is similar to Bourdieu's understanding of how churches survive by balancing between inclusivity and maintaining the integrity of their core symbolic framework

society and the extent to which the institutionalized expression and practice of their beliefs linked their constituency to the divine. Was this not the basis of the Protestant Reformation and the Catholic Counter Reformation, Protestant social gospel and Catholic social doctrine? Has not the success of prophecy and charisma been linked to its ability to render the world more meaningful to a particular constituency?

Bibby's suggestion that Canadian churches act as corporations plumbing market demand is misleading (1987, 111ff). Rather, the doctrinal fluidity that Bibby describes as hallmark of declining influence is more accurately attributed to the healthy efforts of churches having to confront the internal tensions of their active members and clergy, and adapt anachronistic organizational structures and mediums of communication. Certainly secularization has meant that the historical influence of churches over education, social services, and communication has been significantly diminished. However, the historical influence and continuing presence of denominational organizations cannot be easily discounted as important factors influencing contemporary belief systems.

Understanding the immediate effect of secularization is not without its difficulties. While those claiming the "no denominational affiliation" category are increasing in number with each census, this does not preclude a leveling off or resurgence in the near future. Moreover, from the empirical side, the relationship between education and religiosity in Bibby's own work suggest that a simple linear understanding of secularization is not in order. On the one hand higher levels of education are associated with only modest decreases in the belief in God (1987, 98). Conversely, higher levels of education are associated with modest increases in commitment to Christianity and church attendance. Age appears to have a greater influence on susceptibility to experiencing God than education. All this suggests that declining church affiliation is perhaps due to the discordance between churches and a changing social and cultural context, and not necessarily in the inherent historical differences in levels of religiosity resulting from secularization.

The almost automatic socializing role of pre-Twentieth century churches was only gradually replaced by the secularizing demands of the state, which increasingly dominated critical socializing institutions such as the mass media or education. This dominance took the form of regulations, financial incentives, research orientation, and a growing recognition of pluralistic society where not all members subscribed to traditional Christian points of view.⁴

The secularization of education in the system of universities and public secondary and primary schools did not become pronounced until the 1960s. At this time provincial governments began to eliminate Christian religious content in primary and secondary public schools, eventually eliminating all references to God and activities such as the public prayer or daily scripture reading (cf. Grant 1972, 179).

Secularization in education is not uniform, nor is it hegemonic. Many provinces maintain publicly funded schools that have prescribed religious instruction or exercises (Pfalzner 1988, 20). Thus, while greatly diminished in influence, church influence has not been entirely extirpated from primary and secondary education.

The secularizing process began much earlier in the universities, as post-secondary institutions gave growing credence to "positivism" in the 1940s. The post war expansion of the university system was financed by the state and essentially excluded churches in its development. As Clifford notes, the 1960s resulted in the ecumenical clustering of colleges and faculties that emphasized the study of religion and theology (1990, 5ff). This resulted in the declining influence of denominational control of the very students who would eventually form the backbone of the clergy. This left much of the preliminary training of clergy candidates in the hands of more secular university institutions.

The less pronounced role of churches as socializing agents makes it all that more difficult to understand the link between religious politics and belief systems. However, the

⁴One regulatory measure that has had an important limiting effect on the influence of churches in the mass media was the prohibition of denominationally controlled radio and TV services (Zolf and Taylor 1989, 154ff.)

organizational reach of many local denominational organizations extends beyond the Sunday pew. This reach has as much to do with the role of churches in education and communication, as it does with direct lobbying efforts on public policy issues.⁵

Church commitment to a variety of community based social services remains quite impressive. In Ottawa, for example, a 1985 survey by the Christian Council of the Capital Area indicates a high proportion of local churches supports multiple programs ranging from counseling and summer camps to more ambitious projects involving housing and child care.⁶

Of the ninety responding congregations (42.7% response rate) a large majority were implicated in programs providing low income families and individuals with basic needs (i.e., clothing, finances, and food). A few were involved in more ambitious non-profit housing projects. Many had social action committees suggesting some degree of mobilization around social service and policy issues. Similar community activity is evident in other major urban centres throughout Canada given the continued presence and voice of church organizations in urban social planning councils and social action groups. The most recent evidence of the continued interest of churches in such issues is the support of 144 religious leaders for the Ecumenical Coalition for Economic Justice and its letter to the Prime Minister of Canada. This letter expressed concern over social policy reform and the ramifications such reform will have on the poor in Canadian society.⁷

⁵ See Blackie's (1974) study of United Church lobbying; see Zolf and Taylor (1989) on religious broadcasting and mass media. For a critical view of the extensive involvement of churches in current provincial education systems see Pfalzner (1988). As Pfalzner notes, at the time of the article two provinces had entirely "religion based" public school systems (Quebec and Newfoundland). Alberta, Saskatchewan, Ontario, Yukon, and the Northwest Territories had a mixed public system. Within the non-religious based public system only Alberta, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island did not have some mechanism permitting prescribed religious exercises and bible readings.

⁶ In 1985 the Christian Council of the Capital Area produced A Register of Inter-Church Social Action Coalitions or Projects in the Ottawa Area based on a questionnaire sent to 211 local churches. The sample includes a number of local churches from all of the major denominations in the area (i.e., Anglican, Baptist, Lutheran, Presbyterian, Roman Catholic, and United). There were some responses from Mennonite, Pentecostal and Salvation Army congregations. None of the Orthodox churches responded.

⁷ Larry Welsh, "Churches plead for needy in letter to Chrétien," Edmonton Journal, January 10, 1995, A3.

It is in this context that Bibby fails to take into account the tremendous effort made by churches to make themselves relevant, in terms of both individual spirituality and social influence. This effort goes far beyond the more superficial impact of official statements on social issues. Such statements, although, reflect the internal struggles over the issues of church relevance and moral action. The growing importance of merging both components is exemplified in Brian Stiller's autobiographical commentary on the pressures on the evangelical community to respond to social concerns and the effects of having refused to address social concerns in a concerted manner (Stiller 1991). Likewise, the United Church's traditional attitudes on social issues have raised concerns among some members as to its inability to sustain an evangelical message. Such concerns are not new, and extend back to earlier debates on the implications of supporting a social gospel trend.

Church renewal has often meant debate and division, but it has also meant a strengthening of commitment and resolve. The divergent positions on homosexuality, gender and priesthood, contraception and abortion are no less divisive than the schisms in past centuries created by disagreements over creedal formulations, dogma, ecclesiastical structure, and theology. Without longitudinal data, however, it is difficult to determine the extent to which such debates affect the relevance of religion.

Cook's Fusion Thesis

Kamsay Cook makes a far more interesting argument than Bibby concerning the declining relevance of religion (1985). In his analysis of social criticism in late Victorian Canada, Cook argues that the rise of the social gospel, as a legitimate response to socio-economic crises, abolished the distinction between the sacred and the profane and transformed the sacred into civic responsibility.⁸ The substitution of sociology for theology by proponents of a social gospel meant that the certainty or moral absolutism of

⁸ An alternative course is more apparent today where the laws of the market are frequently accepted as the laws of nature, which in turn are the laws of God, with which conformity would bring about the greatest happiness. Hence the task is to maintain the moral order of the past while liberating humanity with the laws of economics. This is in essence the position of Goldwin Smith (Cook 1985, 35) which finds an interesting resonance in the discourse of the New Christian Right in the United States.

traditional theology was challenged. Without a theoretical base to assert social practices, Christ becomes a moral teacher and social reformer to be explained in historical and sociological terms and to be imitated by clergy and lay members. Losing their status as purveyors of individual salvation and absolute divine sanctions, the clergy were forced to adopt the more muted moral leadership of social workers and politicians.

Cook's analysis of the social gospel may be partially correct given the fact that a number of the prominent ministers in the movement found their role as clergy too confining. His position is less applicable to Catholicism. For Catholics, the same issues and themes addressed in the "detheologized" social gospel could be debated and promoted in the context of papal encyclicals, without threatening traditional authority or the divine magisterium of the Vatican. The papal encyclicals provided sufficient space for discussing various forms of collective action that did not diminish the relevance of the church. However, unlike its Protestant counterparts, the Catholic church in Quebec was less willing to relinquish to the state its control over the design and administration of its human services.

One of the ironies of Cook's analysis is that the explanation of religious decline in the 1900s is the explanation of religious "awakening" in the 1800s. In the 1900s, Cook identifies issue of social utility and the fusion of the sacred and the profane which he points to as the hallmarks of religious decline in the 1900s. These are precisely the symbolic points around which denominational growth and renewal was legitimized in the 1800s. As Westfall (1989) notes in his careful analysis of Anglican and Methodist compromises in the mid 1800s, both denominations were struggling to adapt to political and organizational circumstances that required a tempered acceptance of the interrelatedness of religion and society.

The Anglicanism of John Strachan had to accept the state's rejection of publicly supported church monopolies which meant that its traditional concern with social order

had to be addressed on a different organizational foundation.⁹ Likewise, the Methodism of Egerton Ryerson had to temper its emphasis on the experiential and other-worldly side of conversion and address the organizational requirement of embedding the denomination within Canadian social institutions and developing a stable and committed membership. Interestingly, neither Strachan nor Ryerson accepted the Jeffersonian "wall of separation" approach advocated in the United States.¹⁰

As we will see in the following section, Cook's argument concerning the fusion of the sacred and the profane fails to take into account a history in which Canadian Protestantism developed a unique form of voluntarism. This voluntarism did not maintain the distinction between the sacred and the profane to the same degree as its neighbour to the south. Nor did this form legitimize the same degree of separation of church and state. There was greater acceptance of the need of a closer relationship between church and state than what one finds in the United States. This was the result of a gradual convergence of Protestant establishmentarians and voluntarist sects in their understanding of the nature of religion and its relation to society. The old dichotomy of the sacred and profane had broken down long before the rise of the social gospel. There was a shared understanding that while heaven and earth may not be entirely fused, human institutions could make significant efforts to bring heaven into the grasp of humanity (Westfall 1989, 194f). This tendency resulted in neither the civic religion nor sectarianism of the United States. The unique trajectory of Canadian Protestantism is combined with an equally unique path for its Catholic population.

⁹See Westfall (1989) and Grant (1988) for detailed accounts of the developments influencing significant changes in Strachan's understanding of establishmentarianism and its relevance to the Canadian branch of Anglicanism. This must be understood in conjunction with the organizational changes affecting Canadian Anglicanism in the mid-1800s.

¹⁰The "wall of separation" refers to Jefferson's interpretation of the first amendment while President of the United States. In a letter to Baptist supporters in 1800, Jefferson wrote, "I contemplate with solemn reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislation should 'make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,' thus building a wall of separation between Church and State" (as cited in Gaustad 1987, 46). This is reminiscent of the phrase used by Roger Williams in his criticism of Massachusetts' conformity laws in 1636 (*ibid.* 23).

As Baum (1991) notes in his study of Quebec Catholicism, the gradual retreat of the Catholic church as a major social institution did not result in the type of cultural schism that characterizes Catholic societies that have undergone modernization. This can be explained in part by the Church's accepted role in early Quebec nationalism and the late introduction of modernizing forces that were not explicitly anti-clerical in nature. However, another important factor was the way in which the Quebec church chose to address modernization once it was determined that it was irreversible. This is evident in the shift in the way in which the Quebec clergy treated nationalism. As Turcotte notes in his study of Quebec Catholic education, the initiatives of the teaching brothers' congregations resulted in a pragmatic nationalism that adopted a scientific and technical approach to nationalist claims of subordination and exploitation (1984, 365ff.) This contrasted with the clergy responsible for the classical humanities school system which serviced the elite Francophone community.

The Quebec Church gradually relinquished its control over social institutions. This retreat began in the area of health and social services as early as 1957. In the area of social services this hastened a trend that had begun in 1921 with the legislated recognition of the role of the provincial government in the provision of social services (Hamelin 1984, 246ff.)¹¹ Legislation on hospitals in 1962 finalized the provincial government's control over health. Deconfessionalization of unions commenced in 1960 with the executive of the primary Catholic union deciding to drop references to "Catholic" in its name, eliminate the need to adhere to Catholic social doctrine, and replace its clergy representatives with lay individuals (Hamelin 1984, 244).

While more pronounced in their resistance to state control over education, the Church hierarchy was eventually forced to relinquish its monopoly in 1964. However, as a testament to its historical influence, the Quebec Church attempted to maintain some

¹¹ See Boucher Report 1963, 27-33

degree of influence in the direction and nature of education in Quebec through its continued presence on policy decision-making bodies ¹²

The initial compromise in educational reform meant a tenuous check and balance between the Church and the provincial government. The Church retained the right to veto appointments to the Catholic school board. The state maintained the right to veto certain board decisions (Hamelin 1984, 258). The gradual erosion of the control of the Church hierarchy over Catholic school boards opened the door to Catholic forces which opposed clerical authority on educational matters. This trend culminated in 1964 with Bill 60 and the formation of a Ministry of Education. With Bill 60 control over the educational system became effectively secularized, at least to the degree that legal ecclesiastical control over board decisions was eliminated.

Accompanying this retreat was a shift in the way that the Church hierarchy conceived the role of the Church in society. Vatican II opened the door to a more thorough examination of the role of the church in society and how it should best meet its new challenge. Vatican II also represented a radical reconceptualization of the institutionalized church. The emphasis on the cleric-laity distinction was diminished. This accented the collegial nature of the Church ministry and shifted the focus from authority and juridical status to service and witnessing. These changes also centred attention on community bonds rather than dogma and ritual (Hamelin 1986, 188).

The encyclical Pacem in Terris also legitimized a shift from an ideal society structured on family, church, and state, to one that focused on freedom of conscience and the rights of individuals (Hamelin 1984, 256). Within Quebec, it was a process of introspection reflected in documents such as the Dumont Report that began the task of redefining the church's new role in Quebec in the late 1960s, and adjusting to the fact that the Church

¹²Compare the early erosion of Catholic influence over education in Ontario and Manitoba (Choquette 1975 and Crumican 1974)

control was no longer hegemonic¹³ This meant hesitantly giving ground on the church-type notion of the Catholic church in Quebec society, and sharing a leadership role in various social projects. On the one hand, the Dumont Report recognizes the diminished influence of the church. As a solution, it recommends that the church become even more active as an advocate for the “non-représentés”. The objective is to increase church involvement in the non-partisan political life of the community in support of those social and economic projects that would sustain the most marginalized groups in society. By this action the authors of the report hoped to nourish the spiritual life of the community by engaging church members in the material struggles of the less fortunate. The loss of power and influence within traditional Quebec institutions would be replaced by a more active role in social advocacy.

Canadian-U.S. Differences: Historical Context

Whatever strengths can be attributed to the arguments of secularization and relativism in both Bibby and Cook, they seem less credible in the context of contemporary developments in the United States. This is particularly true of the rise of the New Christian Right and its effect on American political debate. The issues raised in these debates have certainly touched on social themes, including poverty, and have contested conventional notions of the welfare state and its role in society (Midgley 1991). The rise of the Evangelical influence in movements such as Falwell's Moral Majority movement suggest that Lipset may be correct in asserting that Americans tend to moralize their political issues into great crusades against evil (1990, 79).

The influence of churches in the United States has not been restricted to the Christian Right or to a narrow band of issues. As Allen Hertzke notes in his detailed study of religious lobbying in Washington, the number of active religious lobbies has grown from

¹³Commission d'étude sur les laïcs et l'Église and was published as L'Église du Québec: un héritage, un projet (Montréal: Fides) in 1971), hereafter cited as the Dumont Report. The bulk of the report deals with the difficult task of adapting the church to new social needs.

sixteen in 1950 to approximately eighty lobbies in 1985 (Hertzke 1988, 4-5) Just as important has been his identification of the remarkable diversity in ideological stances, issues, and participation by lay members and clergy.

For the Canadian scholar, the durability and continuing relevance of religious life in the United States poses an interesting challenge. Do we accept the claim that differences in the historical development of religion in Canada and the United States are of such magnitude that any inferences derived from the experience of one country has little application to the other? Is Seymour Martin Lipset correct in asserting that many of the differences in political orientation can be attributed to the divergent paths of revolution and counterrevolution and concomitant developments in institutions such as religion? In religious terms this is translated into a bifurcation of either "American utopian moralism" and Canadian religious coexistence or American sectarian voluntarism and Canadian establishmentarianism (1990, 76-82).

There is considerable evidence to suggest that the sweeping generalizations made by Lipset are far too crude to provide a satisfactory framework for understanding the current role of religion in either country. On the one hand there remain important differences in the ideological orientations of the general public in Canada and the United States

These differences can be seen at many levels. For example, Steger et al (1989) found in a comparative attitudinal study of Michigan and Ontario that there were distinct national differences in the attitudinal orientations regarding environmental issues. Sampling both the general public and environmental activists, Steger et al. found that both the Michigan public and activists perceived higher levels of conflict among the policy elite and were less supportive of government regulation than their Canadian counterparts (1989, 246). The explanation is found in the larger number of entry points within the policy process which contributes to a greater sense of political efficacy. On the other hand, the conflictual policy arena suggests greater skepticism about the ability of government to regulate effectively. This interpretation extends to welfare reform, where work by Christopher Leman (as cited by Steger et al. 1989, 249) argues that American policy making circles appear more

"porous" than their Canadian counterparts. This purportedly promotes higher levels of participation and feelings of political efficacy among those active in welfare reform in the United States.

American political institutions do offer more opportunities for direct electoral participation involving political agents who can influence the policy process. However, the Lemen and the Steger et al. interpretations must be qualified in that the two largest provinces in Canada, Ontario and Quebec, have undergone considerable public debate on the issue of welfare reform in the 1970s and 1980s. Whether or not this has resulted in a greater sense of political efficacy is debatable.

The way in which Ontario sponsored and encouraged community-based social assistance recipient committees and community consultations did give the social service community a greater sense of political efficacy. Few of the proposed reforms were ever implemented, and the optimism of the 1980s turned to cynicism as programs were downsized or cut in the 1990s. This is in large measure the result of the inability of either the Liberals or the NDP governments in Ontario, to follow through on their policy positions once in office.¹⁴

Likewise in Quebec, experiments in the 1970s and 1980s with local community service centres (CLSC) were designed to give greater accountability to the general public on program design and implementation in health and social services. These developments, while initially encouraging grassroots participation in decision-making, eventually emphasized the bureaucratization of the system and gave rise to the same types of barriers to policy influence that exist elsewhere in government (Leseman 1984, 256ff.).

Public demonstrations over reforms to social programs have, in recent years, been vociferous. Protests on the steps of the Ontario legislative building in Fall 1995 have

¹⁴There are certainly many economic and budgetary reasons preventing Ontario governments from acting on the reform initiatives elaborated during the 1980s. What was frustrating for participants in the consultation process was the repeated acceptance of recommendations by the government and subsequent failure to implement reforms. The current policy orientation of the newly elected Conservative government of Mike Harris which has explicitly rejected the purported reform orientation of the two previous Ontario governments. (Cf. Deniger et al. 1995, 11ff.)

become violent, involving altercations with the police. Large mass protests such as the Bread and Roses march to Quebec City in the Summer of 1995, likewise indicate a willingness to express political dissatisfaction with provincial welfare reforms. The trend is also evident at the federal level where violent protest erupted at a number of hearings on income security reform held by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Human Resources Development in late 1994 and early 1995. While the policy arena may differ between Canada and the United States, it may be difficult to argue that Canadians are less willing to influence or challenge the system.

From a broader comparative perspective national differences suggest a closer proximity between Canada and the United States than between Canada and other developed countries. Nevitte and Gibbins (1990), in their cross-national study of university students, found a striking number of similarities between a number of Anglo-American populations. Differences were more relative, and in this sense do not refute the general thesis of scholars such as Ronald Inglehart (1990) and Russell Dalton (1988). According to these scholars Western democracies have been undergoing value convergence since the 1960s. What was interesting about Canada, in the Nevitte and Gibbins study, is that elite youth in Canada tend to be ideologically benign or in the middle group between polarities on a number of ideological dimensions (i.e., state intervention, equality, minorities). However, when studied more closely, Nevitte and Gibbins find some support for Canadian exceptionalism regarding its Anglo-American counterparts. The primary differences are rooted in the French-English cleavage. As Nevitte and Gibbins argue, it is the social, institutional, and normative support for a unique political culture in Quebec that mediates any notion of a Canadian political culture or ideological orientation (1990, 127) ¹⁵

Unlike other linguistic or cultural groups in Canada, except for those of English descent, French-speaking Québécois have developed an array of legal-institutional

¹⁵ This tendency is also found by Clement and Myles, where Quebec respondents demonstrated cultural and ideological tendencies that distinguished the French-speaking Quebec population from its non-Francophone counterparts elsewhere in Canada (1994, 219ff.)

mechanisms for ensuring a supportive infrastructure capable of promoting distinctive cultural expressions. The exceptionalism of Canada lies in the fact that French Canada has been able to institutionalize a degree of territorial control in the province of Quebec. This has permitted a degree of autonomy and social expression that has been denied less powerful minority groups such as aboriginals and other linguistic or cultural groups. The historical influence of the Catholic church within Quebec, in turn, has meant that the cultural expression of the French-speaking community has had a distinctively Catholic influence that is less prevalent in areas where denominational competition was more acute.

This raises some interesting questions about the different historical developments of Canadian and American cultural institutions, particularly the way in which churches have developed and their respective impact on belief systems. The preceding literature on ideological and value differences does not take into account the religious factor. However, if Quebec is key to understanding Canadian exceptionalism it is not difficult to extrapolate key institutions that may have contributed to this pattern. One key institution would be Catholicism and the way in which it developed in both Canada and the United States. However, if Catholicism is a factor then testing the same institutional impact of other denominations would also be reasonable. Understanding some of the differences between religion in Canada and the United States provides a context for understanding unique denominational differences in poverty belief systems in Canada and the United States, examined in the following chapter. But first it is important to understand basic differences in religiosity.

US-Canadian Religious Beliefs

The greater sectarian diversity in the United States, with its tendency to accentuate theological differences, would suggest greater ideological diversity influenced by denominational affiliation. There is, however, little evidence to support this claim. Rather, sectarianism appears to have spawned or contributed to the development of a "civil religion" that makes the distinction between sectarian theology and political beliefs.

Table 8: Comparative Canada-US Belief in Deity

Percent of Sample Believing in Deity? ¹⁶	US CATHOLIC	US PROTESTANT	CAN CATHOLIC	CAN PROTESTANT
Believe in God	98%	98%	96%	92%
Don't believe in God ¹⁷	--	--	3%	4%
dk/na	1%	--	--	3%
Estimated N ¹⁸	All US N=1014		All Canadian N=1032	

Source: Gallup-Kettring Global Survey (1970s)

The sustaining nature of a civil religion generates a collective focus that is absent in the divisive and pluralistic religious individualism of the United States. This reinforces a tendency to foster theological differences under the consensus of political ideology. For Americans, it is difficult to comprehend the religious community or institutions apart from the political "nation" (see Bellah et al. 1985, 225ff.) This becomes an important difference in denominational influence and how it affects political beliefs in Canada and the United States. For in the United States there was a persistent historical erosion of the collective dimensions associated with American episcopal and organic-juridical traditions (1955, 145ff.). Conversely, as Bell (1992) demonstrates, the Canadian tradition was one of reaffirming collective distinctions and limiting the fusion of divergent traditions or institutions.

While the next chapter will focus on contemporary belief systems it is important to underscore some important US-Canadian differences. The survey results presented in Chapter One demonstrated the middle position held by Canada. While more willing to place importance on religious beliefs than their European and Commonwealth counterparts, Canada lagged behind the United States. The difference between Canada

¹⁶Source: Gallup-Kettering Global Survey 1978. Response to "Do you believe in God or a universal spirit?"

¹⁷The symbol "--" indicates less than one percent

¹⁸The Gallup-Kettering tables do not provide a breakdown of the N for each denomination. There are less respondents in each sample resulting from individuals who claim no denominational affiliation, but stated a belief in God.

and the United States is underscored however, when the comparison includes Protestant and Catholic differences in belief about Deity (see Table 8).

Table 9 Comparative Canada-US Belief in Active or Passive Deity

Percentage of Sample Believing in Deity that:	US Protestant	US Catholic	Canada Protestant	Canada Catholic
(active) observes, punishes, or rewards.	78%	76%	61%	55%
(passive) doesn't	15%	15%	26%	29%
dk/na	6%	7%	10%	8%
Estimated N ²⁰	All US Believers N≅953		All Canadian Believers N≅918	

Source: Gallup-Ketting Global Survey (1970s)

Another important difference is that among respondents believing in a God, Canadians view Deity as less intrusive. God is less involved as an arbiter of justice (see Table 9). This applies to both Protestants and Catholics. Within the Canadian sample there is a larger difference between Protestants and Catholics, whereas the Protestant and Catholic differences are minimal in the US sample.

A similar set of differences exists for Canada-US differences on the importance of religion (see Table 3). The largest differences are national in nature, with both Catholic and Protestant Americans placing far greater importance in religion.

American Protestants place the greatest importance on their religious beliefs. It is the opposite in Canada. This pattern corresponds to the difference in institutional strength of Protestantism and Catholicism in the two countries. In addition, the difference in overall importance accorded religious beliefs does not necessarily mean that Canadians are less

¹⁹ Responses for those who believe in God or a universal spirit, asked: Do you believe that this God or universal spirit observes your actions and rewards or punishes you for them? Source: Gallup-Kettering Global Survey 1978

²⁰ The Gallup-Kettering tables do not provide a breakdown of the N for each denomination. The N is an estimate based on those who indicated a belief in God for each country. There may be less respondents in

religious. An alternative interpretation may suggest less emphasis in Canada on personal religion of the variety prominent in the United States. The organic-juridical tradition of Catholicism, especially in Quebec, means that personal importance questions have less relevance. Such questions do not reflect the influence a religious institution may have on a community or society, and in particular, how this influence affects beliefs about poverty.

Table 10: Comparative Canada-US Belief in the Importance of Religion

Percent of Sample: Importance of Religion? ²¹	US CATHOLIC	US PROTESTANT	CAN CATHOLIC	CAN PROTESTANT
very important	60%	69%	45%	43%
fairly important	35%	27%	37%	41%
not too important	5%	4%	13%	14%
not at all important ²²	--	--	4%	2%
dk/na	--	--	--	--
Estimated N ²³	All US N=1014		All Canadian N=1032	

Source: Gallup-Kettering Global Survey (1970s)

Religious Influence on Welfare Ideology

There is certainly evidence to support the claim that both public and elite opinion in Canada have been more supportive of a developed welfare state than that which has been demonstrated in the United States (Lipset 1990, 140-142). And, as Chapter One suggests, this is related to a range of beliefs about the impact and importance of individuals and structural conditions. The question remains: are these differences related to the historical development of denominationalism in Canada and the United States? Studies by Stark and Christiano (1992), Jelen (1990), and Dudley and Van Eck (1992b) suggest that both the historical and contemporary denominational affect is extremely limited across a range of

²¹ Respondents were asked, "How important to you are your religious beliefs?" Source: Gallup-Kettering Global Survey 1978.

²² The symbol "--" indicates less than one percent.

²³ The Gallup-Kettering tables do not provide a breakdown of the N for each denomination. There may be less respondents in each sample resulting from individuals who claim no denominational affiliation but stated a belief in God.

political movements and ideological developments in the United States, which are related to positions taken on poverty issues. The qualitative impression that such an effect exists is perhaps due to the politicized nature of some American clergy. Their role in formulating debate and discussion within the political arena is combined with the fact that American clergy tend to be more extreme or pronounced in their ideological positions than their congregations (Hunter 1987).

A more detailed discussion of survey data in Chapter Four will examine US-Canadian differences in greater detail, specifically regarding poverty beliefs. At this point it is helpful to look at developments in Canada to understand the historical influence of religious institutions in structuring the discourse on poverty and the welfare state.

Robert Hardy's (1976) historical comparison of churches in Canada and the United States certainly provides ample evidence to support the thesis that the revolutionary period was an important watershed in the organizational development of churches in the American colonies. The voluntarist nature of the American experiment is most apparent in the churches with the greatest reliance on external links to England and Rome. The organizational imperative meant that American-Irish Catholics, Anglicans, and Methodists gradually accepted institutional mechanisms giving practical primacy to the "consent of the governed", abolition of the "religious test", the entrenchment of tolerance (Hardy 1976, 145ff.)²⁴

The voluntarist influence was, however, present in Canadian developments. It was tempered by more limited competition and coloured by the politicized tension between American and British influences. While Strachan was the architect of the Canadian ideology of "establishment", he was also engaged in developing indigenous Anglican institutions that were often presbyterian in nature. These institutions were certainly more

²⁴The assimilationsist policies of the American-Irish Catholic hierarchy was often at odds with other American Catholics who wished to maintain a separate identity. The Fall River parish conflict, in the mid 1800s, demonstrates the divergent positions of French and Irish Catholics in the United States and the desire of the latter to become "american" (Chodos and Hamovitch 1991, 106ff.)

democratic in nature than their contemporary English counterparts, particularly in their representation of laity in councils and synods

Canada did experience a pattern of sectarian voluntarism and fragmentation similar to the American religious community. However, it was significantly attenuated by three factors. First, the dominance of the Catholic church in Quebec meant that the open competition evident in the United States was significantly circumscribed in Canada.

The institutional entrenchment of Quebec Catholicism is rooted in the strategic importance of French Canadian loyalty in the maintenance of a secure and stable British North America. In exchange for its allegiance, British authorities endowed the Catholic church with the power to collect tithes under civil law, guarantees against the types of civil disabilities that were imposed on Catholics in both the American colonies and Great Britain, and eventual control over the appointment of ecclesiastical leaders. Some of these powers were entrenched as early as the Quebec Act of 1774, and gave the Church greater power than it had enjoyed in New France under the tutelage of the royal *intendant*. In many respects, this placed the Catholic Church on par with its Anglican counterpart, at least in Quebec.

By the first quarter of the nineteenth century there was considerable evidence to suggest that the church had become a critical institution in Lower Canada. In a letter to Lord Liverpool in 1810, Governor J. H. Craig complained that the Bishop of Quebec had patronage at least equal to that of the government (Moir 1967, 131f). This was compounded by the ability of the Church to control the principal means of communication (i.e., parish clergy) thereby tempering or influencing any information the government wished to pass on to the general population.

Governor Craig's comments probably reflect more the frustration of governing with a limited state infrastructure than the absolute power of the Catholic church in Lower Canada. As Nicole Laurin-Frenette and Louis Rousseau demonstrate, the elevated legal and political status of the Catholic church following the Quebec Act of 1774 *vis à vis* colonial authorities did not translate into control over the general population. The latter part of the eighteenth century was a period of declining political and religious control over

the inhabitants of the region (1983, 261-262) The centralized control and dominance that historians attribute to the Catholic church at confederation were absent. In its place was a synod model similar to the presbyterian polity The elite clergy such as Mgr. Briand were forced to rely on moral persuasion with his clergy rather than explicit instruments of state or ecclesiastical authority The ability to impose ecclesiastical authority grew as the infrastructure of the church developed This is evident in the ability of Bishop of Montreal (Ignace Bourget) to suppress effectively the *Institut canadien* and punish the non-compliant.²⁵ The earlier periods of accommodation, however, meant that a predominantly foreign ecclesiastical elite had developed patterns that promoted a French Canadian approach to Catholicism and ecclesiastical leadership The eventual institutional strength of Catholicism meant that Canada was faced with a level of accommodation that was foreign to the United States

Second, with the Church of England only marginally larger than its Protestant counterparts, and with a colonial power willing to bestow privileges on religious institutions, there was dynamic competition for some form of co-establishment. This reached its zenith in the debate over the clergy reserves in Upper Canada. The critical point made by Westfall (1989, 96-102) is that the clergy reserves meant that the establishment church would not have to rely on the impoverishing policies of church rates and tithes However, the reserves were crown land dedicated to support a Protestant clergy The reserves were not church land *per se* Nor, as Presbyterians contested, was Protestant clergy to be construed as ministers employed by the Church of England (Grant 1988, 88-89). As such, the reserves were dominated by political debate and because of continuing attacks by proponents of the separation of church and state, were not subject to the same types of compromises that had been successful for earlier educational funding. The failure of the reserves forced churches to rely on the reluctant generosity of the

²⁵ One reason why the draconian approach of the Church in 1869 was effective was the popularity of the action. This was eventually demonstrated in public outrage at the ruling of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council when it attempted to reverse the decision to deny a leading member of the Institut, Joseph Guibord, interment in a Catholic cemetery

membership or seek external funding from missionary organizations in England and the United States, and thereby open themselves to external influences

Finally, the revivalism, which was the cause of considerable religious unrest in the United States was more tempered in Canada (Westfall 1989, 50ff, Clark 1968, 48ff) Part of this was due, at least in Upper Canada, to the predominance of a more doctrinally stable and disciplined Methodism. This meant that other Protestant sects were comparatively less successful than in the United States (Grant 1988, 74) Another influence came as a conscious effort to de-americanize religious institutions

Despite the competitive edge, or perhaps in an effort to maintain advantage, Canadian Methodists increasingly cut their ties with their American co-religionists, forging an alliance with Methodists in Montreal and Quebec who were more linked to England While neutralizing the claim of disloyalty frequently directed at organizations with American ties, the alliance exacerbated divisions over whether methodism was to be viewed as an ancillary to Anglicanism or a church in its own right; and whether or not methodism should be linked to the political reformism developing in Upper Canada

By the 1840s, Canadian methodism had become increasingly fragmented A similar pattern of de-americanization occurred in Upper Canada with Presbyterians and Baptists Both groups became increasingly influenced by the more conservative and orthodox Scottish influence, which was less prone to the religious "enthusiasm" characteristic of American revivalism.²⁶

The impact of ethnicity as a barrier to revivalism is referred to by Clark, who argues that Maritime revivalism was less successful among Scottish highlanders This lack of success was because this group inherited strong cultural institutions and was less influenced by socio-economic changes occurring in the last half of the 18th century and first half of the 19th century From a functionalist perspective, Clark argues that there was not the need for new forms of social integration proposed by sectarian revivalism, but

²⁶The old establishment denominations were more entrenched in the Maritimes, pushing the revivalists to the more marginal sectors of the population (cf Clark 1967, 45ff)

which favoured other more alienated and dislocated groups in Maritime society (Clark 1968, 88) Likewise, many of the non-anglo groups that left the United States after the War of Independence were those which had maintained a strong ethnic culture (Bell 1992, 72) As loyalists, these groups would be less susceptible to the loss of identity and cultural dislocation that seemed most conducive to successful revival movements

English Canada's Voluntarist Approach to Poverty

The irony of Lipset's description of Canadian establishmentarianism is that it was in actuality another form of voluntarism. It was a voluntarism, however, that carried a very different message and form than its American counterpart. As John Webster Grant states, the task of Canadian churches has historically been to adapt existing Christian society to the Canadian context. Even the successful experience of church union was "typically conceived not as a new ecclesiastical model but as a projection of existing ones" (Grant 1972, 214).²⁷ Conversely, the United States was a place of "endless experimentation", bent on the development of new Christian societies. Paradoxically, this endless experimentation demanded a high degree of conformity.

Within the American example the forging of a civil religion was a mechanism whereby religion could be politicized around a broad consensus that did not threaten the relative strength of dominant sects.²⁸ No one particular sect was sufficiently strong to back its own establishmentarian presence beyond its local dominance. In order to protect their local presence, sects demanded that the state protect religious freedom. Ironically, this meant that the government enlarges its role as a religious arbiter (Hammond 1980a, 67).

In line with the "civil religion" thesis, the American experience constitutes a situation where political discourse is infused with religious language and symbols. While somewhat generic in nature, such language still requires a basic consensus on ideological matters.

²⁷ From a different perspective David Lochhead argues that union was more than just an organizational merger. Rather, the new church was to be a "national church" that would embody an indigenous voice independent of "cultural, racial, national, or religious loyalties outside of Canada". In Lochhead's opinion this permitted the United Church to function as the "conscience of nation" (1991, 27).

²⁸ Bellah argues that Canada's historical situation impeded the development of a civil religion (1980, xiii).

regardless of the plurality of organizations representing different interests or practices. Group practices are a national threat, when they deviate from the norm and are rationalized on religious terms that reject the legitimacy of the sectarian status quo. Certainly, the early Mormon experience is an example where radical practices were legitimized internally by discourse that fundamentally challenged the sectarian consensus, and concomitantly the political norms of the period (Evans 1990). Unable to defeat the American state, the Mormon church eventually relinquished its practice of polygamy and dreams of a theocratic state. It increasingly adopted the political and cultural norms of its Protestant counterparts (White 1978).

A similar case could be made for Catholicism as it struggled for social status within the United States.²⁹ In the case of both Catholicism and Mormonism, the eventual institutional strategy of the religious polity was to conform to the dominant discourse and practices legitimized in American political culture. The homogenizing demands of the American state left few alternatives that would permit institutional survival of organizations with goals of expansion.

It is a short distance between a sectarian culture that gives primacy to the individual and an unmediated relationship with the divine and a perception of poverty that reverently devalues the role of broader social institutions and over-values the capacity of the individual to surmount any obstacles with sufficient will. In this context, C. B. Macpherson's analysis of early British liberalism, and its Puritan-Calvinist corollaries, underscores a theory of poverty that treats poverty as a "mark of moral shortcoming" (Macpherson 1962, 226).³⁰ While subject to the political community, the poor were denied political rights because they lacked the capacity to make moral choices and hence were to be subject to the management of those moral beings who formed civil society (i.e.

²⁹See Chodos and Hamovitch 1991, 106ff.; Hardy 1976, 140ff.

³⁰The direct connection between Puritan thought and American institutions is discussed in Hammond's analysis of American common law (1980b, 146ff.). The individualism of Puritan thought is embedded in legal institutions and certainly has some influence in the way in which socio-economic relationships are judged. Conversely, the Canadian system is a hybrid of British common-law with its Puritan-Anglican blend and the Catholic-influenced Civil Code.

social elite or the dominant class).³¹ In a less extreme format, this position recognized that many of the negative effects of poverty could be remedied if the poor would behave in a manner prescribed by religious institutions. This included conforming to the religious elite's notion of environmental conditions, family life, sexual behaviour, leisure activities, consumption of alcohol, etc.

At a superficial level this is a message that one finds in many of the positions of religious spokespersons prior to the late 1800s, regardless of the institutional type, sect or universal church. The difference in the positions of the universal church-type and the sects lies in their respective willingness to entertain the regulation of social life by mediating institutions. This is more than simply paternalism. Many religionists shared this attitude regardless of denominational differences. At the most basic level, mediation is linked to the acceptance that individual salvation is mediated by the priest. At a social level this is connected to collective salvation, which in turn is mediated by the church as an overarching institution concerned with all of society. Both the state and the church are linked and have an obligation to sustain the various collectivities within society regardless of their status or function.

In practical terms, the Canadian experience involved a tempered ideological environment where survival often meant pragmatic compromise on the respective role of the state and church in society. This was particularly true of English-speaking Canada, where from an organizational perspective this meant movement toward denominationalism, or what J. M. Yinger describes as the "class church".³² The denomination is unlike the sect with its rigidly enforced community discipline, and hostility or indifference to the rest of society. It is unlike the church-type in that it is less encompassing or hegemonic as a collective mediation between God and the masses. On

³¹ Even the more radical liberalism of the Levellers refused political rights to the poor, albeit for different reasons. The poor were ineligible for political rights because of their economic dependency, not for any moral deficit (Macpherson 1962, 227).

³² J. M. Yinger, *The Scientific Study of Religion*. New York: Macmillan, 1970, 250ff., as discussed in Fraser (1988: 52-53).

the one hand, the denomination tacitly accepts religious pluralism. On the other hand, denominationalism involves broadening a sect's social base while at the same time minimizing the types of contradictions or antagonisms inherent in any class-based society.

The organizational imperative in the Canadian context has a long pedigree. Canadian Presbyterianism is one example of a Canadian hybrid that involves ideological mutations. Beginning in Scotland for example, the factionalism within the Church of Scotland in the 18th century challenged the principle of Erastianism or establishmentarianism, where state funding and control were exercised by the local patron, who in many instances was the largest land owner in the area. Presbyterian secessionists felt that the Church of Scotland compromised religious principle in order to cater to the demands of the dominant social groups. The response of the secessionists was to break with the patronage system that permitted the state to control the church, and emphasize a more voluntarist response to church-state relations. In the theological domain the two largest secessionist groups, the Associate Synod (1733) and the Presbytery of the Relief Church (1761), adhered more rigorously to the Covenanting tradition and held stricter doctrinal and ethical codes.³³ Both of these sects catered to the social groups that were excluded from the government of the Church of Scotland.

These sects, in Troeltsch's language, had a limited capacity to enlarge themselves without modifying the way in which they were organized. However, it was the development of the Scottish commercial class and their conflict with the ecclesiastical patron class that pushed the church-state debate to an alternative organizational compromise than that propagated by the secessionists of the 1700s and the Church of

³³ A covenant or federalist theology was a departure from the reformation emphasis on salvation through grace. Accordingly, a covenant tradition argued that God's promised blessings were conditioned upon an individual's obedience to God's laws. The Puritan version of covenant theology was used to argue a political theory of social contract. Latourette argues that the version of the covenant tradition emphasizing "works" was used extensively in England and Scotland to legitimize positions limiting the power of the monarch (1975, 814). In its extreme form covenant theology "held both state and Church to be associations or contracts entered into voluntarily by those who constituted these units and therefore subject to modifications or even revolution as the members of these units might agree." (ibid., 814)

Scotland³⁴ In 1843, 102 commissioners left the Church of Scotland and formed the Free Kirk. Resulting from a disagreement over the right of lay patrons to determine ministerial nominees in parishes, the Free Kirk represented those who adhered to the principle of non-intrusion; the church controlled its internal matters, but the state remained obligated to provide financial support.

Less narrow theologically than earlier secessionists, the Free Kirk retained an evangelical dimension while remaining more open to the rest of society and the existence of competing religious groups. It was this "denominational" wing of Presbyterianism that eventually became extremely influential in English-speaking Canada (Fraser 1988, 53ff.). Interestingly, by 1860 and 1861, Canadian presbyterian secessionists and ecclesia (Church of Scotland) proponents joined together to form the Presbyterian Church of the Lower Provinces (Maritimes) and the Canada Presbyterian Church.³⁵

It is this version of Presbyterianism that develops an important and practical ideological bridge between the orientation towards poverty that one finds in the church-type and that which one finds among the sects. Unlike Methodists and Baptists, but similar to Anglicans, Presbyterians rejected the emotionalism of revivalism. This meant focusing their energies on more traditional approaches to religious education, including building universities and colleges.

Following the Clergy Reserves debates, the Canadian Presbyterians accepted *de facto* a voluntarist position. This was accompanied by a doctrinal shift with less emphasis on traditional Calvinism with its doctrine of "primitive election" and justification by faith alone (Westfall 1989, 175). The evangelical influence could be felt in the greater emphasis placed on "good works", and the importance of sustained proselytizing to "win the whole world for Christ". However, the church retained an insistence on the old Free Kirk position "on God's universal sovereignty over both church and state" (Fraser 1988, 55).

³⁴The account of this development is taken from Fraser (1988, 53).

³⁵Fraser also cites the example of ecclesiastical changes in the Church of England after the 1830s which were disestablishment in nature and moving in the direction of the denomination-type (1988, 55).

This position justified adopting an aggressive attitude in matters of social policy ranging from temperance and Sabbath observance, to anti-slavery.

Along with this aggressive approach came a focus on institutional change suited to an urban setting (i.e., adapting city presbyteries to organize local missions, settlement work, and relief). This also includes more effective centralization at the national level and professional support for presbytery assemblies. The church developed specialized committees to address social issues such as Sabbath observance and temperance and prominent Presbyterians were active in efforts to coordinate an inter-denominational voice.

The experience of the Presbyterians was in many respects a variation on similar developments occurring among Anglican and Methodists. Anglicans had experienced a presbyterian polity during Strachan's tenure as a way of organizing Upper Canada (Kilbourn 1968, 41ff.). Methodists were trying to give consistent direction and organizational stability to congregations to which revivalism had given birth. Presbyterians were walking a "middle road" between the evident success of proselytizing evangelism and their historical attachment to religious "rationalism" rooted in Scottish evangelical liberalism.

The reality of religious pluralism necessitated a movement towards denominationalism for the organizations with historical ties to establishmentarianism. A similar direction was evident in Methodism, which was influenced, in part, by its links to Anglicanism. Its direction was also determined by its successful proselytizing and subsequent desire to sustain and control religious enthusiasm.

What was key to each of their respective organizational experiences is cultural flux confronting religious belief systems. Westfall's description of the 1800s and religious reaction to major social change mirrors in many respects the type of rapid change and adaptation to which Bibby attributes to the modern churches. However, during the 1800s the dynamic was between a religion of order and a religion of experience (Westfall 1989, 194ff. and 20ff.).

It was the dialectic of these two positions that resulted in a unique synthesis. Both schools of thought believed that religion was integrally connected with order and change. Both accepted change and the role of religion in tempering the rapidity and the direction. Neither agreed as to what constituted appropriate order nor appropriate change, and neither agreed on the proper role of religion in either case. However, with the changing role of the state these divergent positions became moot.

The Development of the State

For the proponents of a close church-state relationship the state was to produce laws that would complement the church's moral teachings. In return, these moral teachings would ensure social stability. From the perspective of a religion of order, state and religion worked together to temper the predispositions of humanity and channel them toward appropriate behaviour. Working in unison in this manner meant close institutional relationships. This was in keeping with the Anglican and Catholic idea that government and political life were not just about social maintenance, but about using political means to achieve a perfect spiritual community.³⁶

From the perspective of the religion of experience, the state provided a general framework from within which the rejuvenating work of spiritual experience could transform individuals. Religious institutions would retain their autonomy and in return would not expect institutional privileges not accorded to those of other religious beliefs. Social order would be a natural result of the transformed individual acting within society.

The 19th century state, however, contradicted such assumptions, from either perspective. The great transformation in England and Europe, from feudalism to a market society meant radical changes in the way in which religion was able to act as a social agent. Traditional religious notions of greed and self-interest were gradually redefined to sanction the social acceptance of new market efficiencies and the perceived acquisitive

³⁶ For the Anglican tradition see Duncan Forrester's commentary on the Anglican Richard Hooker (1987, 361). This organic linkage between politics and spiritual progress is central to Catholic social doctrine which is discussed later.

behaviour of the merchant classes. The issue of poverty was hotly contested as social evil or essential to the productivity of social wealth (Heilbroner 1992, 40f.). In large measure the advance of the market economy meant a shift in power, which in turn required new forms of legitimacy that "destroyed the credibility of deference and tradition" (Caton 1988, 516). This meant a challenge to all religion and was part of the broader process of secularization influencing the Western world.

The social agendas of the state and religion were increasingly perceived as diverging toward the latter half of the 19th century. This tension became more pronounced as the problems associated with rapid urbanization and industrialization soon outpaced the ability of churches to develop social services based on the traditional notion of settlement work, supports for the traditional family structure, Sunday observance, and temperance. As traditional techniques became increasingly inadequate the proponents of the social gospel movement became increasingly vocal and united in all the major denominations.

According to Richard Allen (1973, 17), the developments between 1890 and 1914 precipitated three different social policy orientations. The proponents of a radical social gospel viewed evil as endemic to the social order and hence there could be no personal salvation without social salvation. God was an immanent being working in the social processes to bring about salvation. Social projects and legislative recommendations challenged many of the commonly held assumptions about the limited role of the state and the norms surrounding property rights and collective obligations.

The conservative stream was more closely linked to traditional evangelism and thereby emphasized personal-ethical issues and identified sin with individual acts. Legislative strategies for this group focused on changing the environment (i.e., prohibiting alcohol and cleaning up slums) and teaching the poor and marginalized proper values. In between were those who attempted to find a middle ground, using the state as an instrument of change, but without revolutionizing society, and without putting their entire faith in moral instruction.

It was in this context that as the proponents of social gospel sought concrete solutions they sought like-minded allies in other denominations. And, as churches

increasingly became involved with other community partners in the delivery of social services and the social disruption evident at the turn of the century the traditional sectarianism became a lessening concern and the door was opened to the type of union that eventually resulted in the United Church of Canada.

Canadian Catholic Corporatism: The Quebec Influence

Unlike the Catholic countries in Europe, Canada lacks religious homogeneity except in one important region. And, unlike its Anglo-American counterparts, the particular federal nature of the Canadian polity accentuates the potential impact of a dominant religious institution within a province such as Quebec. As the primary cultural organization within French Canada until the 1950s, the Catholic church embodied the "nation". This was exemplified in the political expressions of early nationalists such as Henri Bourassa and Lionel Groulx, and the extent to which they made a firm connection between politics, faith, and language (Monière 1977, 241ff.).

The combination of federal political institutions, regional homogeneity, and historical advocacy for an ethno-linguistic group provided a context within which Quebec Catholicism could develop its own unique version of social doctrine. It was a doctrine that took an interpretive stance to papal encyclicals that emphasized the harmonious and cohesive nature of French Canada. The emphasis on a harmonious collective interest that was bounded by the moral teachings of the church constituted the core beliefs of traditional Quebec social doctrine. As the diversity of Catholic politics suggests, the encyclical teachings of the church provide considerable latitude in interpretation, particularly when such teachings must be given practical applications (cf. Baum 1984; Trudeau 1974, Ratzinger and Bovone 1984). The political and historical context, however, provided the cues for interpretation by the Quebec hierarchy. The Church's fear of losing control over social institutions often meant interpreting social doctrine conservatively.

There are four interwoven themes in Quebec Catholic social doctrine ³⁷ First, there is emphasis on ideological unity. Catholic ideals are to be integrated into the social and political-legal fabric of society. The notion of a pluralistic society is subsumed under the guiding principles of Catholicism. The ethical grounding of social activity is based upon Catholic justice and universal church-type charity.

Second, there is an abiding faith in the inherent unity of classes. This doctrine recognizes functional differentiation of groups within society, but asserts an inherent social harmony based on each group understanding its collective and individual obligations. The practical manifestation of this social harmony is in the practice of social corporatism. The subsidiarity of the State and Church is inscribed in a non-competitive, functionally differentiated, and hierarchically organized system of interest management. Each corporate body governs specific activities and integrates group interests in the broader collectivity, that is managed under the administrative guise of the state and the ethical-moral supervision of the Church.

Fourth, the general interest is defined in terms of the family, local community, and representative organizations (corporations) which are guided by the moral and ethical teachings of the Church. A non-directive State restricts itself to protecting the weak and oppressed in society by ensuring legal protection, providing financial support and legal mechanisms for the church and its representatives to administer charity and moral guidance, and acting as a neutral arbiter managing conflict between representative organizations.

The language of traditional Quebec social doctrine was organic. It privileged the notion that group interests were not mutually exclusive and that any conflict could be mediated via collective organizations. These organizations, including the state, were guided by the moral and ethical tutelage of the church.

It was the notion of mediation and unity, in the form of non-state associations and the church, that distinguished French Canadian Catholic social doctrine from its Protestant

³⁷ Themes are drawn from Brooks and Gagnon (1988, 31) and Monière (1977, 276ff.)

counterpart. While both gave particular emphasis to moral tutelage as a valid response to poverty, the Catholic version emphasized to a much greater extent the fusion of the sacred and civil society. While sect-oriented Protestants emphasized teaching morality to the poor, the proponents of traditional Catholic social doctrine balanced the moral environment of the poor with the social obligation of the more affluent sectors of society. The non-francophone Catholics tended to find a middle ground between the models proposed by Protestants and the more extreme collectivism promoted by the traditional Quebec clergy (see Baum 1980).

In its practical application Quebec social doctrine focused on developing a Catholic labour movement, cooperatives, developing intermediary organizations to represent functional interests. For labour, Quebec social doctrine recognized the right of workers to organize unions. A necessary condition for legitimate unions, however, required that they be governed by the rules and ethical guidelines of the Catholic church. The required linkages with the Church meant fighting the rise of "neutral" unions or those with socialist or communist ties. Finally, a legitimate labour movement could not premise its activities on an inherent antagonism between labour and capital. Socio-economic relations were to begin on the premise that classes were complementary, and that they could collaborate for the mutual benefit of society and their respective class members (Monière 1977, 256). This premise was key if society was to be equitable and provide for the needs of the weaker members of the collectivity.

As a moral critique of capitalism, the Quebec cooperative movement sought to protect the poor and less fortunate from the unscrupulous exploitation of financial interests (Monière 1977, 275). The *caisses populaires*, in particular, were sanctioned as a way of organizing the financial interests of the "popular" classes (i.e., farmers). The cooperatives were not a rejection of capitalism, in the social doctrine context, only a mechanism for redressing certain inequities resulting from an over-extension of market forces.

The promotion of intermediary organizations was also as a method to regulate the negative effects of market forces by limiting the managing role of "private enterprise".

This was also to provide a method of integrating the various collective interests within Quebec society under the tutelage of the Church (Archibald 1984, 356) From the 1930s to the 1950s, the Church developed Action catholique as a method of penetrating all sectors of society with both an evangelizing message and corporatist structure. It was hoped that this would bridge the gap between the moral tutelage of the Church hierarchy and all of the groups who were not effectively organized in corporate bodies or who did not have an effective clerical presence.

While such Catholic movements were not restricted to Quebec, other regions, such as the Antigonish movement in Nova Scotia, lacked the supporting infrastructure and dominating influence of the Catholic church to have the broad social success of its Quebec counterpart. This provides further support for the unique role of the Catholic church in Quebec, despite sharing similar strategies with its Catholic counterparts elsewhere in the country.

Open and Closed Catholicism

The traditional social doctrine promulgated in Quebec has been used to explain the collectivist orientations of French-speaking Canadian Catholics and antipathy toward left-wing politics. The question is less about an antipathy towards left-wing politics than it is about protecting a vested institutional interest. This interest combines the church's historical role in the protection of a minority ethno-linguistic group and its primacy in the fields of education, health, and social services.

One method of explaining the unique situation of Quebec is to examine John Whyte's distinction between open and closed Catholic societies (1981, 7-8). Pre-1960 Quebec Catholicism parallels the closed systems found in Western Europe. In some respects Whyte's concept of "closed" refers to the balance of power among ethno-religious communities and the extent to which institutions have to accommodate pluralism.

While Quebec political parties were not explicitly defined in religious terms, the predominance of the Catholic church meant that the contours of political debate and conflict were influenced by Catholic clergy and active lay members. The population was

under clerical guidance via the Church's significant involvement in social organizations ranging from education and hospitals, to labour unions, cooperatives, and rural development. There were no groups outside the government that were capable of effectively challenging the hegemony of the Catholic church in Quebec.

Catholicism outside Quebec was the "open" variety, which in Whyte's terms means a limited institutional role in setting political agendas or establishing the community's political culture. Either as a minority or moderate majority, Catholics in other regions of Canada could not dominate politics in a manner similar to Quebec. Hence, the official voice of the church outside Quebec was more tempered in its political pronouncements and role in education and social services. In the case of the some Atlantic provinces (i.e., Newfoundland and New Brunswick) the Catholic influence was important but tempered by the important role of Protestant denominations who also made claims concerning education and social services.

Gregory Baum's comparison of Catholic debates over the CCF (Cooperative Commonwealth Federation) denotes an important contrast between Catholic anglophones and the francophone network that was dominated by the Quebec clergy (1980, 119-134). The Quebec Catholic clergy attacked the CCF as the scourge of Christianity. Their English-speaking confreres in Ontario and Quebec were more conciliatory, recognizing that there were some similarities between the CCF platform and Catholic social doctrine. Catholics in the West were more influenced by American anticommunists such as Father Coughlin, and exhibited a strong initial reaction to the CCF. The intensity of this opposition by the clergy diminished, at least rhetorically, as the CCF gained electoral success in the West.

The "open" and "closed" distinction tended to follow a linguistic cleavage. Non-francophone Catholics appeared more willing to engage in political compromise or collaborate in non-Catholic political movements. Francophone Catholics were able to dominate movements within Quebec and were more effective in propagating an ideological solidarity among Francophone Catholics.

Much of this capacity was the result of well-organized Quebec-based cultural production prior to the Second World War. The Catholic position was articulated and propagated by groups and events such as Action catholique, Semaines sociales and École sociale populaire. As late as 1956, even significant political voices such as the Tremblay Commission supported a Catholic vision of social programs. This vision opposed the type of state intervention proposed by many Protestant advocates of the welfare state. This was evident in the Tremblay Commission's support of the Catholic church's "triple foundation" approach to poverty and social assistance: family, voluntary associations, and the church (c.f. Behiels 1985, 98).

In the context of the "triple foundation", social doctrine supported income supports for the family. Catholic opposition in Quebec to the establishment of federal programs (i.e., late 1940s) must be understood against fear that government was gradually usurping the ability of the church to control charity and the impact of charity on family life. This fear was particularly acute given the perceived limits of Quebec influence on a more distant "Protestant" government (Trudeau 1974, 14f.). It is not so much opposition to the principle of family allowance but the manner in which the support would be provided.³⁸

The reaction to family allowances was similar to the Quebec clergy's response to federal old age pensions, which were initiated as early as 1927. Once again, the Catholic elite feared that government would soon dominate the delivery of social services and family supports. While government acted properly in supplementing programs or services, it was not to be the main directing force (Trudeau 1974, 15). The Church was to mediate all such activity, thereby ensuring an appropriate moral or ethical context and framework for social action.

The grassroots organizations that socialized young French Canadian Catholics also facilitated the separation between social doctrine and nationalism. At the same time they

³⁸ It should also be noted that the fear of government intrusion had an important theological premise. As noted in Chapter Two, the redemptive qualities of charity inscribed in the symbolic heritage of the universal church require voluntary acts of individual giving. This is clearly diminished as the state becomes central in collecting and distributing income and services.

legitimized social questions that could not be addressed under the traditional categories espoused in the social doctrine promoted by the church. As early as the 1930s, there was growing tension between Catholic nationalists in organizations such as the Association catholique de la jeunesse canadienne-française (ACJCF) and a growing number of youth and adults participating in the activities of Action catholique.

The ACJCF served as a mechanism for recruiting and training young French Canadian nationalists.³⁹ Conversely, the specialized elements of Action catholique were more directly concerned with the spiritual welfare of specific groups within Quebec society. While the original mission of Action catholique was ambiguous and organized differently in each Quebec diocese, the movement was forced to confront issues that had been easily ignored in traditional associations emphasizing nationalism.

Specialized Action catholique organizations such as Jeunesse étudiante catholique, Jeunesse agricole catholique, and the Jeunesse ouvrière catholique, were increasingly forced to make the connection between the spiritual and material welfare of their target groups.

By the 1940s the specialized organizations were moving away from being the simple "exécutants de la Hiérarchie". Increasingly their evangelizing among their specific groups meant addressing social questions that challenged the way in which Quebec society was organized. Among the more radical elements of the movement this meant challenging the traditional role of the state and the clergy. Action catholique increasingly pressed for a new role for the laity in determining the way in which society would be organized. This often meant resorting to "la rationalité scientifique". As Action catholique became increasingly integrated into the Quebec church, it created considerable tension with those who traditionally placed the social and political dimension under the rubric of nationalism (Hamelin 1984, 74ff).

³⁹ This role was confirmed by the Church hierarchy in the early 1950s as attempts were made to minimize friction between leaders of the AJCJ (which became AJC, Association de jeunesse canadienne-française in 1952) and Action catholique. See Hamelin (1984, 120ff.)

In the 1950s and 1960s Quebec underwent a major transformation. In addition to the major socio-economic changes brought about by a massive urbanization and industrialization, there was a growing acceptance of the importance of developing a modern welfare state. This involved an ideological transformation throughout Quebec that was already foretold in developments affecting movements such as Action catholique.

What is important in this transformation was the ability of the church to minimize the anti-church backlash that affected other predominantly Catholic communities undergoing rapid modernization. At one level this was possible because of the gradual movement away from the identification of Catholicism with Quebec "nationalism" (Behiels 1985, 44f). Conflating Catholicism and Quebec nationalism meant that state policy perceived as threatening the institutional church was understood as a threat to Quebec nationalism. Making the distinctions also meant that Catholics could openly recognize social conflict without such criticism being perceived as an attack on the broader community. The moral and material support of striking miners in the 1949 Asbestos Strike by the official Catholic Church helped open the way to exploring more effective means of counteracting exploitation and poverty.

Such a position placed the Church in a difficult position regarding the laissez-faire policies of the Duplessis regime. On the one hand the Church supported such policies in that they favoured the Church's level of autonomous involvement in Quebec society. On the other hand, the social strife created by the unregulated management practices of large companies meant social disruption, which increased legitimacy of secular social organizations claiming to have solutions (i.e. international labour unions).

While the low clergy (i.e. union chaplains) were the most closely associated with the movements beginning to challenge the status quo, Quebec Bishops were also becoming aware of the vulnerable status of the Church. Ecclesiastical authorities had begun to provide tacit recognition of social and economic suffering that could not be solved through moral tutelage, the good-will of corporate bodies, or the charitable acts of voluntary associations. This was evident in the support given by the Episcopal Commission on Social Issues to public statements by the Sacerdotal Commission of Social

Studies, supporting workers during the Asbestos strike (Dion 1974, 210). While the Archbishop of Montreal, Mgr Charbonneau, spearheaded the drive to support the workers in the Asbestos strike, and framing his addresses as an issue of social justice, the majority of Bishops supporting the workers did so under the auspices of charity.⁴⁰

As Hamelin notes, the Church hierarchy was aware of aggravated social and economic issues long before the Asbestos strike. Prior to the strike the Sacerdotal Commission was preparing a letter outlining the Bishops' position on labour.⁴¹ As Hamelin summarizes, this letter marked Ecclesiastical recognition that Quebec was becoming an urban society and that the past solutions based on a conception of a rural Quebec were no longer adequate (1984, 100ff.)

The Asbestos strike underscored tensions within the Church hierarchy over the issue of justice and social order. Traditional social doctrine emphasizing social order was increasingly difficult to defend as the growing demands for social services surpassed the capacity of the Church and private associations. The Church attempted to rationalize its delivery of social services by developing a provincial body (Caritas-Canada) to organize Church services. By the late 1950s the financial role of the provincial government and the inability of municipalities to carry out their traditional role promoted public opinion that viewed the traditional approach to social services as *passé*. By 1956, the Quebec government began passing legislation that permitted government to by-pass effectively the traditional Catholic agencies that delivered social services, thereby forcing the Church elite to rethink their role in the community (Hamelin 1984, 143).

At another level, important sectors of the Catholic church were complicit in Quebec's adaptation to industrial and urban problems by supporting the development of a new

⁴⁰ Public diocesan support for the workers and the organization of material aid was sponsored by Mgr. Douville, Mgr. Desranleau, and Mgr. Roy (Dion 1974, 211ff.). Union Chaplains successfully lobbied Mgr. Courchesne and Mgr. Roy to intercede directly with Duplessis over the plight of the Asbestos workers (Hamelin 1984, 99). However, as Hamelin notes, the Bishops were careful to avoid a direct challenge to the provincial government (1984, 100).

⁴¹ The letter was published in 1950 under the title, "Le problème ouvrier en regard de la doctrine sociale de l'Église."

intellectual elite that was capable of addressing contemporary problems (Brooks and Gagnon 1988). Within the Church the struggle for ideological control could be seen in the tensions between two religious communities: Jesuit factions supporting traditional social doctrine and Dominican factions supporting the development of the modern welfare state (Hamelin 1984, 185).

Finally, Vatican II provided the catalyst that prevented a rupture between those supporting a traditional approach to social issues and those advancing projects similar to their Protestant counterparts. Vatican II created the necessary impetus for compromise within the Quebec Church hierarchy and legitimized its acceptance of the loss of its monopoly claim on social institutions. This propelled the Church to seek a new role in society.

The assessment of current attitudinal differences between anglophone and francophone Catholics would indicate the extent to which secularization and the restructuring of the church has had an impact on church influence. Given the transformation of Quebec and the extent to which the state has directly replaced the Catholic church in education and social services, attitudinal orientation of Quebec francophone Catholics should approximate patterns among non-francophone Catholics in the rest of Canada. Likewise, the patterns of Canadian Catholics should parallel the open Catholicism of American Catholics. However, the data discussed in the following chapters do not support this hypothesis. Rather, as will be demonstrated later, differences in Catholic populations do follow a pattern that corresponds to the degree to which a religious community can be described as "open" or "closed". This pattern is consistent with US-Canadian comparisons, as well as comparisons between general Catholic populations in Canada.

What this pattern suggests is the need to examine the changing role of the church in Canadian society, and in particular, how this role has been influenced by the development and expansion of the welfare state. If churches, or their cultural baggage, do have an impact on social attitudes then there should be a consistent pattern of differences that can be explained, at least in part, by the societal role of religious institutions. Part of the

explanation for these differences lies in the way in which value systems have endured based on earlier formative events that have institutionalized certain dispositions toward social issues. It is certainly beyond the scope of this study to examine the transmission of these values and attitudes. The historical involvement of churches in the field of social services provides a basis for understanding contrasts in their respective contemporary mass belief systems. This historical context is important given the contemporary period of considerable convergence among the religious elite on social issues, which tempers the theory that religious leaders are key agents influencing the belief systems of their congregations. Differences, once ethnic and socio-economic factors have been controlled, can only be explained through historical linkages with institutions that have carried particular values and attitudes.

Charitable Service to Welfare State: Changing Role of the Church

The reason why the influence of churches on the symbolic construction of poverty requires careful treatment is rooted in two factors. First, Canadian churches played an instrumental role in the early development of charitable activity and social services. While many of the responsibilities of the church were subsequently taken over by the state, the church remains an ideological institution legitimizing moral obligations concerning social responsibility and social obligations. Second, while liberalism has often been described as the optic through which politics have been historically expressed in Canada, the dialectic of such expression (i.e., juxtaposing toryism and socialism) has been channeled through the prism of religion. It is the turn-of-the-century activism of religious institutions that set the stage around which explanations and remedies for poverty were given a moral stature.

Early Response to Poverty

The response of Canadian Protestant churches to the issue of poverty began as early as 1763 in Nova Scotia and 1786 in New Brunswick where the parish became formally responsible for public relief along the lines of the British model (Irving 1989, 15). During

the early 1800s, debates centred around the primacy of personal and voluntary charity. Among the dissident sects the heavy emphasis on the salvation of the individual, "free will" and personal piety, left little room for emphasis on social obligation (Elgee 1964, 161ff.) This, however, did not always mean opposition to more systematic direct relief. In Nova Scotia in the 1840s it was the more establishmentarian Presbyterians arguing for more local and private relief while the voluntarist Baptists supported more direct government involvement (*ibid.*, 164-165).⁴² Also, while the voices of Anglicanism and the Presbyterian Kirk in Upper Canada accepted greater cooperation between church and state, the prevailing attitudes toward poverty accepted that there were abundant opportunities for all if individuals were willing to live by the precepts of thrift and hard work.

This orientation should be noted. Charity for the widow and the orphan were not contested, but required that only the basic necessities be provided. Conversely, much of the debate surrounded the able-bodied employable individuals. In this respect there were few notions of structural or seasonal forms of unemployment, or other factors that prevented those physically capable of employment from meeting their needs through labour. It was not until the 1850s that the seasonal nature of poverty assailed the idea that poverty was a permanent characteristic of a certain sector of urban society (Irving 1989, 15).

The early Canadian response to poor relief varied from region to region with a mixture of the older Elizabethan Poor Laws in the Maritimes to reliance on grants-in-aid for private organizations (i.e., religious charity organizations) in Upper and Lower Canada.⁴³

⁴² For Baptists, however, this did not necessarily imply a role for the church in the distribution or administration of relief. For dissenting sects there was considerable internal debate as to the proper boundaries between church and state (i.e. Methodists). This was true of both Upper Canada and the Maritimes (cf. Elgee 1964, 166; Westfall 1989, 82ff.).

⁴³ As Fingard indicates in her assessment of pre-industrial Canadian attitudes about poverty, there was a general trend toward a self-help model that by extension placed much of the blame for poverty on the individual (1982, 72). Successful remedies involved educating the poor how to better manage their resources.

The distinction between types of relief is important. The Maritimes were more disposed toward the implementation of placing poor relief under the direct responsibility of the smallest level of government. This is similar to the English Poor Laws, which made the parish political administrators responsible for directing poor relief. This administration also involved control over special local taxes to finance local relief. This pattern was evident in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. In Newfoundland, the colonial executive retained authority to appropriate funds for the poor from colonial revenues (Martin 1985, 61)

Organizing relief differently, the Canadas were less willing to intervene directly in relief programs. Instead, governments in Upper and Lower Canada provided grants to charitable organizations to help support their private relief activities. This method contributed to a fragmented and balkanized approach to relief that was often based along ethnic and religious lines. But, as Martin notes, this trend developed in the Maritimes as well (Martin 1985, 62).

The gradual recognition of structural problems such as seasonal unemployment, in the latter half of the 19th Century, resulted in proposals for relief projects or workhouses that would employ the unemployed poor. Following the British workhouse tradition, this work was to be "sufficiently unattractive" to discourage individuals from viewing such employment as a viable alternative to the regular labour market (Fingard 1982, 72).

These developments were particularly important given the seasonal nature of much of the labour market in Canada. Under the tutelage of Lieutenant-Governor John Graves Simcoe and later Sir Francis Bond Head, Upper Canada pursued a policy that clearly distinguished between the deserving poor and able-bodied individuals. Of the latter, it was presumed that failure to work meant laziness or immorality. There was a concerted effort to restrict or penalize the "undeserving" lest philanthropy foster socially disruptive individuals (Irving 1989, 16). This should not detract from the evidence that in most pre-industrial cities there was a considerable charitable spirit manifested during difficult times. During winter, for example, the poor could usually find welfare provisions from religious

institutions and philanthropists regardless of whether they were designated as undeserving (See Fingard 1982, 76 and Martin 1985, 61ff).

In order to understand the workhouse response and some of its antecedent developments influencing Canadian policy-makers, especially those in Upper Canada, it is important to look briefly at the British tradition on poverty policies. The British Poor Laws of 1598 and 1601 and their earlier cousin the Speenhamland Law were predicated on the principle of "the right to live". This involved the paternalistic administration of outdoor relief and allowances to all in need by local parish authorities.⁴⁴ This was in keeping with collective or societal orientation of church-type religious institutions (i.e., the Anglican influence) and the intrinsic role of politics in furthering the well-being of society.

There was an important and critical modification of the Poor Laws in the early 1830s. The first change was to centralize the administration of poor relief. The second, and most important in terms of attitudinal changes, was the application of the principle of "less eligibility". The result of this latter reform was to "forbid all public assistance to the able-bodied poor" (Garraty 1978, 83). The result was the creation of workhouses that in effect operated like prisons. The workhouse was explicitly designed to create conditions that were inferior to the "situation of the independent labourer of the lowest class" (ibid., 83). The objective was to create a condition that would inspire the able-bodied pauper to be industrious and avoid the necessity of the workhouse.

These changes were in part a response to the unmanageability of the earlier system in an increasingly volatile labour market. The change was also predicated on a shift in values among the dominant elite, who increasingly viewed poverty among the able-bodied as a

⁴⁴According to Karl Polanyi (1944, 78), the "aid in wages" of the Speenhamland law was based upon the price of bread and was granted to the poor irrespective of their earnings. It is also important to note that the concept of those in need was relatively expansive. According to the recent estimates by historians, some parishes were providing relief to as many as 10-20% of households (Beier 1989, 208). Also, it should be noted that there were accepted gradations among the poor which involved partial exemptions (i.e. Hearth Tax and Relief Tax) and occasional relief. As Beier notes, it is unwarranted to ascribe "destitution" as the principal description of those defined as poor and eligible for official poor relief in England. As Beier notes, the poor on official records were often widows and children, but *ad hoc* forms of relief and informal methods of defining those in need were in place (ibid., 209ff.).

function of laziness or moral ineptitude. While still providing for the needs of destitute individuals, it was argued that those capable of working should be forced to work.

State and Social Control

Whether or not individual Protestant or Catholic clergy protested the policy emphasis of civil authorities in Upper Canada or elsewhere does not detract from the basic precepts of charity and poverty entrenched in the religious community. Clergy, regardless of their religious persuasion, tacitly supported most of the initiatives of the government. This support was for clergy administered eligibility criteria dictated by political authorities in New France, or continuing involvement in charitable works in Upper Canada. As Garraty notes, many of the debates on poverty in Europe and Great Britain were almost indistinguishable (Garraty 1978, 40).⁴⁵

The role of the state in policies affecting the poor should be underscored. Despite the important role of churches in the administration of charity, the state's preoccupation with social stability mediated the cultural heritage of religious communities. The nuances of this mediation can be seen in the experience of the clergy in New France and in particular the transition to a British colonial system.

Both France and Great Britain, in the 1500s, established the principle of direct taxation to finance poor relief.⁴⁶ The important difference is that their administration differed. In Great Britain public authorities played a critical role in the administration of relief and in determining eligibility. In France, the clergy were given a primary role in determining eligibility. This placed the church in a strong position to control the administration of welfare once power had been relinquished by New France and handed to the British in 1763.

⁴⁵ The fact that both Catholic and Protestant writers were raising similar concerns about the lack of moral discipline non-productive nature of the poor does not exclude a cultural heritage that made the belief systems of religious more or less susceptible to these new positions on poverty. The fact that both Protestant and Catholic countries experimented with the workhouse model does not detract from the argument that religious institutions have different ways of rationalizing or legitimizing such actions.

⁴⁶ These taxation policies are found in the Royal Edict of Moulins in 1566 (France) and the British Poor Laws of 1572 (Great Britain).

Marie-Aimée Cliche's detailed study of early Catholicism in New France provides empirical data supporting the notion that the institution of charity was modeled on the traditional church-type precept of almsgiving. Charity was a religious act of supererogation that brought forth heavenly merit and spiritual rewards (Cliche 1988, 131). While the distinction between charitable acts of piety and philanthropy was often blurred, the Catholic clergy tended to emphasize the pious dimension. In documents describing donations and charitable gifts, Cliche found that explicit pious intent tended to be the principal basis for charitable acts in those cases where motivation was mentioned (Cliche 1988, 89ff.).

Although church institutions were the principal agent dispensing charitable services to the poor in New France, descriptions of the population's attitude toward poverty are instructive. Based on primary sources and records on charity, Cliche argues that the population in general was generous toward the disadvantaged (Cliche 1988, 78ff.). This is equally true of the less secure sectors of the population, which demonstrated a certain degree of solidarity with the less advantaged. This may be attributed to church teachings on pious charity or a shared sense of mutual precarity that gave less well-to-do individuals a more caring attitude to their impoverished peers. Regardless of the underlying motivations the acts conformed with the expressed doctrine of the church regarding almsgiving.

It is noteworthy that the primary effort to differentiate the deserving and undeserving poor came from civil authorities, not the clergy. According to Cliche, it was the *intendant* Jean Bochart de Champigny, who in the late 1600s introduced the *Bureau des Pauvres* to combat the possibility of social unrest resulting from the rising number of roaming paupers soliciting private charity (1988, 79f.). This involved the prohibition of begging, centralizing the distribution of charity, and regulating a door to door collection by "dames quêteuses", a pattern that was developing in France as well. As Martin notes, however, the women collecting alms were "instructed not to press people for donations", but permit each to give according their conscience. This was in keeping with the voluntary nature of charity in the church-type tradition.

Charity was distributed by the *Directeurs du Bureau*, but parish priests were required to recommend individuals whom they deemed worthy of assistance (Cliche 1988, 79-80). Those considered deserving were,

... les pauvres honteux, les vieilles gens et les véritables nécessiteux invalides qu'il fallait traiter avec beaucoup de ménagement et de considération. Les pauvres <<passants d'un lieu à l'autre>> avaient droit aussi à des secours, mais pas les <<fainéants et glorieux>> qu'il convenait de renvoyer travailler (Cliche 1988, 80).⁴⁷

In addition to the alms collection, the *Bureau des Pauvres* also received the fines collected from felonies and misdemeanours. Despite these sources, the main source of income came from crown subsidies (Martin 1985, 57). Once the British took control of New France the former state involvement in poor relief was withdrawn and the Catholic church became the primary institution financing and delivering services to the poor. It was not until 40 years later that the British government assumed limited responsibility for church-administered poor relief.

The distinction between deserving and undeserving in New France is somewhat less attenuated than that which is found in the workhouse orientation of the more sectarian Upper Canada of later years. The difference lies in the extent to which the religious elite were considered to be a critical agent in the administration of charity. In Catholic communities, particularly in Quebec, the clergy and church retained a primary role in determining who was eligible for relief. Conversely, there was a tendency in English Canada, particularly in Upper Canada, to secularize the process and establish a non-religious or at least an ecumenical method of administration. This did not exclude Protestant churches from involvement in charitable services, but it did establish a different power dynamic than that which existed in Quebec. While the research for this period prevents a more exacting comparison that controls for general historical discourse and

⁴⁷ During this period the "pauvres honteux" were defined as "les gens de bonne famille que les accidents de fortune avaient réduits à la misère." In order to avoid the shame of requesting charity they were discreetly aided in special institutions. The "pauvres nécessiteux" were common people for which poverty was not considered shameful. (See Cliche 1988, 80 fn. 14)

socio-economic trends, the differences suggest a more varied response to poverty, which can be attributed to denominational influences and the way in which churches translate or mediate the way in which the state attempts to maintain social order

The fact that civil authorities were the principal authors of policies institutionalizing distinctions between the deserving and undeserving poor suggests an interesting link between the state's priorities around social order, the preservation of the status quo, and the politics of legitimacy. While the notion of poverty in Upper Canada and New France may have resonated with the perceptions of particular sectors of the population, there was nothing inherently linking such notions with the conceptualization of poverty in the Christian tradition. The administrative duties of the church and its growing reliance on state subsidies and private donations may have facilitated the tacit acceptance and legitimization of social policies and practices toward the poor. However, as changing socio-economic structures posed new problems and churches attempted to respond, their responses soon confronted the contradictions of the more ambiguous notion of poverty held in the past. By the latter part of the 19th century churches were developing their unique responses to social questions in the context of the Protestant and Catholic traditions. It is the uniqueness of these responses, explained in part by different organizational imperatives, that provide the backdrop for understanding the historical influence on the contemporary meaning of poverty among denominational populations.

Social Practices: Organizing Services and Denominational Differences

The institutional efforts to address poverty near the end of the 19th century demonstrate the differences between Protestant and Catholic approaches. In general, Protestants were more willing to implicate the state and engage in broader ecumenical forms of action. In Quebec, where Protestantism was probably weakest, it was Protestants who argued that the deleterious effects of poverty could not be addressed without a more systematic coordination of social services. Montreal Protestants formed the General Organization of United Charity in Montreal in 1900. In 1902 the organization obtained

Quebec legal status for its efforts to organize charitable activity among Protestant social services

Principal Catholic social services, such as the Société de Saint-Vincent-de-Paul, refused to participate in Protestant efforts to coordinate social services in the Montreal area. It was not until 1916 that Montreal Catholics began to coordinate their social service activities through the Secrétariat des oeuvres de charité.

This did not mean that Catholic organizations were less active in their efforts to address the rising social problems resulting from the turn of the century socio-economic dislocation caused by industrialization and urbanization. Rather, as Hamelin and Gagnon (1984, 254) note, the Catholic church created 71 of the 90 new social service institutions in Quebec between 1898 and 1931.⁴⁸

The development of the welfare state in Quebec underscores the differences between the Catholic and Protestant approaches to poverty. On the one hand, the Catholic tradition recognized the primacy of the church in the fields of charity and social service. The British tradition, with its more fragmented Protestant institutions, made local and municipal authorities responsible for the poor. While this had not always been true even in Great Britain, the historical need to maintain social order rather than meet the needs of the poor frequently meant that the British tradition supported a shift in the burden of responsibility from church or parish officials to local state officials (Piven and Cloward 1993).

In Quebec where poverty was reaching epidemic proportions at the turn of the century, there was concern that the existing network of church-based social services could not meet the growing need (Hamelin and Gagnon 1984, 253). Labour unions were some of the first groups doubting the capacity of charitable institutions to satisfy the levels of assistance and aid required in the modern urban and industrial setting (Hamelin and Gagnon 1984, 252). Union leaders promoted precursors of the welfare state with policies such as old age pensions, unemployment insurance, and worker's compensation or

⁴⁸This included 32 hospitals, 4 sanitariums, and 35 assistance institutions (Hamelin and Gagnon 1984, 254).

accident insurance. Churches themselves recognized their individual or institutional limitations, and as noted above, made efforts to cooperate and coordinate services. Despite the limitations of these efforts it was still not apparent to all that the state would have to take a more immediate and direct role in providing assistance. It was not until 1910 that the growth of poverty in Quebec had reached such levels that appeals for provincial intervention became irresistible (Hamelin and Gagnon 1984, 254)

In 1921, Quebec politicians passed the Public Assistance Act. The legislation provided voluntary financial incentives for municipalities and private charitable institutions to increase their services to the poor through a provincial cost-sharing arrangement. The province would share the cost of providing assistance, and in return municipalities and private institutions would be administered by a provincial agency, the Service de l'assistance publique.

The irony is that at the local level there was already a history of cooperation between the Catholic church and municipalities. Catholic organizations delivered services and assistance and municipalities provided some of the funds. The difference with the Public Assistance Act was that the infusion of state dollars was tied to state control through its agency.

Unlike their Protestant counterparts who frequently favoured a more important role for the state, state intrusion created two important problems for the Catholic church. From the perspective of service provision, the Social Assistance Act was restrictive and discriminatory.

elle [la Loi de l'assistance publique] ne distingue pas les catégories d'assistés, elle ignore les indigents secourus en dehors des institutions et elle est humiliante à l'égard des assistés qui devront fournir des certificats assermentés. (Hamelin and Gagnon 1984, 255)

With provincial aid restricted to those confined to registered institutions or legally defined as unable to work, the bulk of non-institutional assistance fell to the church. In fact, it was in the non-institutional sector that demand for services outgrew demand in the

institutional setting The number of individuals served in the period between 1916 and 1931 grew by 116% in the institutional sector and 292% in the non-institutional sector

Comparée à l'accroissement de la population l'augmentation des investissements dans le domaine du bien-être semble indiquer un progrès spectaculaire à un accroissement de 74% de la population correspond une augmentation de 82% pour le nombre d'institutions, de 212% pour le nombre de lits et de 1155% pour le nombre des indigents assistés hors institutions. (Hamelin and Gagnon 1984, 258).

The rise in demand for poor relief and services, particularly outside the institutional sector, not only stretched the limits of the church but also raised questions concerning the primacy of charity in relation to poverty The inability of the old system of charity to respond to the needs of the poor supported claims that poverty was about questions of social justice Social justice involved claims about appropriate entitlements Against the wishes of the high clergy in Quebec, but in response to growing financial demands, Catholic organizations began to register under the Public Assistance Act ⁴⁹ This in turn forced the question of poverty into the debate over justice and the appropriate role of different social and political actors

Advocacy and Social Concern

The attempt by clergy and lay members to address the growing number of social issues in Canada at the turn of the century is rooted in the ideological tensions of the day How were churches to explain moral obligation without addressing the array of internal ideological influences ranging from the hierarchical and class-based society of Anglican Toryism and European-influenced Catholicism; to the predominant sway of liberalism and Puritan remnants with their emphasis on individualism, and the acceptance of market driven society? Likewise, how were churches to respond to the challenge of socialism that seemed to preach the possibility of a humane collective millennialism?

⁴⁹ By 1922 five Bishops had given permission for charitable organizations under their jurisdiction to contract with the government according to the new funding regulations for social assistance According to Hamelin and Gagnon numerous Catholic organizations followed suit despite not having received permission from their respective Bishops (1984, 257)

One response was the "rural utopianism" that reached its apogee between 1885 and 1910 (Rasporich 1987, 221ff). During this period, the prairies and British Columbia became the site for a number of communitarian experiments that linked sectarian ethno-religious groups with new forms of socio-economic organization. Few of the secular socialist or ethnic-nationalist experiments resulted in enduring communities.⁵⁰ Such was not the case for those communities that linked their religious commitment to social experimentation. The Mennonites, Hutterite Brethren and the Doukhobors all formed relatively successful settlements that incorporated a strong collective dimension. The Mormons in southern Alberta, also formed a strong community that was initially based on a cooperative economic system that included the development of an irrigation system, cheese factory, sawmill, and their own form of currency.

These sectarian experiments had a limited influence on the Canadian public. Rather, it was the broader influence of the Social Gospel and Catholic social doctrine that served as the basis for ideological and political debate. This debate certainly involved the church and its religious mission in a new form of dialogue with the state.

In many respects the corporatism of Quebec Catholicism attempted to construct a middle way. One that accepted only a limited reliance on markets, defined the state in the context of moral objectives, and desired to forge a notion of the collective good through the church rather than state institutions. Through this latter effort the church hoped to safeguard the components of free choice regarding charity and benevolence, which it considered essential for the maintenance of a healthy Christian society.

While the state would play an important role in the maintenance of justice, in the broader sense, its role in practical terms was somewhat ambiguous when it came to poverty issues. While the church accepted state funds, the clergy felt that intrusion in the

⁵⁰ Rasporich documents a range of Scandinavian, Jewish, and Hungarian ethnically based experiments that had limited success in establishing unique and enduring communities. The same is true of a number of secular-socialist experiments such as Harmona (Harmony Industrial Association) and the Canadian Co-operative Commonwealth at Ruskin (Rasporich 1987, 221ff).

form of administration or policy decisions was beyond the appropriate scope of state action. This was particularly true where such action affected the power of the church.

Quebec social assistance legislation in 1921 brought forth a critical response from Quebec's Bishops. In a letter, dated January 13, 1922, the Quebec Bishops expressed a fear that the new method of administering funds for the poor would seriously jeopardize the autonomy of official church organizations. Arguing for separate spheres of jurisdiction, the Bishops stated that the problem of poverty resided in the realm of prudence and charity. It was not a question of justice, which would fall under state jurisdiction (Hamelin and Gagnon 1984, 255). The response of the Catholic press was more pointed, claiming that the law threatened to destroy the social fabric of Quebec society by making religious organizations ancillary to the state (Hamelin and Gagnon 1984, 256).

This tendency to distinguish between the sphere of charity and a separate sphere of justice was in keeping with the church-type tradition on the relationship between piety and voluntary charity. However, it is at this point that the difference between Catholics and Protestants widens.

Among Protestants voicing a new agenda via a social gospel, there was greater acceptance of the role of the state in responding to poverty. While the Protestant churches would act as a catalyst, the radical agenda of the social gospel fully expected the state to replace the church when it came to resolving the socio-economic dislocation causing poverty. From an ideological perspective this route was, however, less than straightforward. For unlike their Catholic counterparts, Protestants had no common authority or foundation around which they could unite and forge a unified voice. It is interesting to note, however, that as the call for greater state intervention became more acute within the more radical wing of the Social Gospel movement, its leadership became increasingly secular in both their private and political lives. As Rasporich summarizes, by the mid-1920s "the millennialist traditions of the social gospel had become instruments of human rather than divine will." (1987, 233). In other words, the political party and an interventionist state became the method of providing a distributive justice that had little to do with either the sect or church-type notions of charity. The gulf between the radical

and conservative wings of the Social Gospel movement in the 1920s and 1930s widened. There was a split between the traditional evangelism of the conservative faction vying for a theology of social service and the more radical wing that wanted to build a new society through the direct and coercive intervention of the state.⁵¹

The irony of this situation is the historical emphasis of Protestantism on individualism and policies prompting voluntary association and competition, and the equally historical suspicion of Catholicism of such ideological inclinations. The Catholic voice emphasizes the corporate nature of society where the church has the specific task of ensuring benevolence and the state restricts itself to the issue of justice. There is a proper division of power and function between state and church which is contrasted with the greater emphasis of the separation of church and state within Protestantism. The Catholic ideology of corporatism presents the state as the composite of government (justice) and church (benevolence). In this context the institutional unity of the church and its continued expansion in the field of poverty is a natural and legitimate progression. Conversely, the liberal heritage and fragmented nature of Canadian Protestantism quickly lead to the conclusion that the role of churches regarding poverty has important limitations. The demarcation between charity and justice is less pronounced. The limitations of resources were more pronounced given the degree of institutional fragmentation and the need to find an overarching authority to coordinate and enhance the use of resources. The state was a likely candidate for this role.

⁵¹ With respect to the more radical wing of the Social Gospel movement, Cook's thesis concerning the secularization of the sacred is an apt depiction of the their theological departure from traditional Protestantism (Cook 1985, 228ff.). The tension between an evangelical approach and one that involves a more secular and coercive dimension (i.e. the control of and intervention by the state) is epitomized in King Gordon's struggle to adopt political action that did not carry the "evil and unreason" necessary to be politically effective (Janzen 1987, 352ff.). This tension is also evident in the analysis of the Christian obligation to act and the implicit need for more secular forms of organization to struggle over issues of poverty and justice, found in the 1936 collection of essays of prominent social gospel radicals in Towards the Christian Revolution. The dovetailing of this Christian tempering of the divisive dimension of political change and the secular dimension among the radical elements of the Social Gospel movement manifests itself in their influence on the League for Social Reconstruction and the publication of Social Planning for Canada. The phrases used to explain the cooperative transition to a socialist government in Social Planning for Canada are drawn directly from Towards the Christian Revolution (Horn 1980, 97)

The Quebec Catholic church was accorded special monopolies (i.e., control over civil registers) and legal privileges (i.e., clerical exemption from *capias* or civil action regarding debt). These privileges included enforceable payment of tithes and other taxes used to maintain church property and tax exemption for many of their income generating organizations affiliated with religious orders and teaching institutions (Maheu 1986, 104ff.) These advantages were not available to the more sectarian denominations and hence provided a relatively stable environment within which the Catholic church could build a social service infrastructure.

Protestant and Jewish organizations were forced to rely more heavily on voluntary support in an environment where competition for donations was more intense. For this reason there was probably a greater willingness to use the state as a unifying force and a vehicle for effective social action. This is evident in Protestant efforts to merge and coordinate their respective efforts to alleviate poverty. The formation of inter-faith organizations, designed to lobby and educate concerning the need for broader state social services, suggested a recognition that there were limits on the capacity of the voluntary sector to address poverty. By 1914, many of the Protestant church committees and departments formed to deal with the question of temperance or the Lord's Day movement had made the shift to social service issues. In combination with the Church Union movement it was a logical step to organize broader coalitions. One such coalition was as the Social Service Council of Canada (and its provincial counterparts. This was tied to lobbying government for greater involvement in social services and suggested that this trend was more acceptable to Protestants than Catholics (Grant 1972, 147).⁵²

The unifying authority can be easily linked to the state in Protestant thought, particularly with the state's broader function and given the acceptance of the principle of

⁵²Cf. Crysdale (1961, 34); Allen (1973, 239ff.). See developments around the Inter-Church Forward Movement and its ability to raise money for a range of services (Allen 1973, 137). The predecessor of the Social Service Council of Canada was the Protestant alliance of 1907, the Moral and Social Reform Council of Canada (Allen 1973, 14ff.) This organization was led by a Presbyterian and Methodist co-secretary (Shearer and Moore). The Moral and Social Reform Council of Canada changed its name to the Social Service Council of Canada in 1913.

separation of church and state. This does not mean that there is not a great deal of room for cooperation between churches and the state in the delivery of services. The Protestant rationale and explanation of this partnership differ fundamentally from that given by the Catholic church. Part of this difference lies in the different institutional heritage of Canadian Catholicism and Protestantism.

Stewart Crysedale's (1961) discussion of the late 1800s and the first half of the 1900s provides a good summary of some of the key developments confronting Protestant churches and the different manner in which they responded to social change. The first critical period identified by Crysedale was from 1872 to 1905. During this phase Protestant churches favoured the status quo and were "socially lethargic". The primary emphasis was on the "sufficiency of personal conversion" and relative trust in market forces and individual freedom.⁵³

The second period extended from 1906 to 1918. During this time a number of the largest Protestant denominations began to advocate radical changes to existing socio-economic institutions. Methodists began calling for radical state intrusion such as public ownership of key industries, legislated fair wage, regulation of profits, and state-backed social security measures (Crysedale 1961, 31). While less radical, Presbyterians and Anglicans recognized the importance of ensuring that workers have an equitable share in the fruits of productive activity. Other denominations gave tacit approval to the themes supported by moderate Presbyterians and Anglicans.

The period from 1919 to 1938 was a social and political cauldron from which Protestant churches struggled to gain a sense of mission in the context of depression and social dislocation, which disturbed all but the most sectarian branches of Protestantism. The Methodists, Presbyterians and later the United Church became increasingly forthright in their demands for social reform.

⁵³The voice of concern was being raised in England where even the 1888 Anglican Lambeth Council began to take notice of the growing disparity between the rich and the poor. The 1888 Lambeth Encyclical opened the door for British churchmen by suggesting the important role of the church in examining possible solutions to the inequitable distribution of goods in society.

Of such importance was this shift for Methodists that it has led some observers to suggest that the Methodist church abandoned evangelism for humanitarianism (Crysdale 1966, 79). The constitution of the Department of Evangelism was amended such that the application of Gospel principles to social, economic, and political life was given equal status with the "promotion of Evangelism" (Crysdale 1966, 79). Without forgetting the careful balance maintained by the more moderate members of the Canadian Methodism, there was certainly a growing acceptance that an important barrier to evangelization could be found in the way in which society organized itself. While some of the more radical elements within Methodism found the church ultimately unable to address this "social sin", and by corollary unable to evangelize, the majority of Methodists accepted the need to find a balance between addressing societally structured factors while maintaining the traditional emphasis on the personal spiritual experience.⁵⁴

Similar to their Methodist counterparts, Presbyterians felt an important need to address the social issues of the day. Summarizing an impatience with the existing social order, resolutions to the 1919 General Assembly indicted laissez-faire liberalism, championed labour's claims to an equitable share of the profits of production, and challenged the federal government to enact legislation establishing "widowed mothers' pensions, industrial insurance, equal remuneration for men and women for same work, and strict abolition of child labour except by permit."⁵⁵

The movement towards church union culminated in the United Church of Canada in 1925. Its creation, however, deeply divided Presbyterians. The only thing that united those Presbyterians who opposed union was their "common resistance to a particular model of ecumenicity" (Fraser 1991, 100). Reasons for opposition varied, but the dominant tendency of those who retained their allegiance to a Presbyterian church was a diminished interest in social reform. Beginning in 1939 and culminating in the adoption of the

⁵⁴See Allen's argument on the factions within Methodism and the general acceptance of at least the broader call for social reform.

⁵⁵Acts and Proceedings, Forty-Fifth General Assembly, cited in Crysdale (1966, 82).

Declaration of Faith Concerning Church and Nation in 1955, Presbyterians eventually institutionalized their distrust of politics. With time, the constitutional parameters of the Presbyterian Church officially circumscribed its political voice, preventing it from taking a position on matters such as poverty or oppression (Fraser 1991, 102).

By 1920, the Congregational churches recognized social service as a fundamental part of their denominational programme. In 1922 they discussed the adoption of resolutions that encouraged the sharing of responsibility for management between labour and business, recognized the rights of labour to organize and bargain collectively, and supported some form of cost-shared industrial insurance (Crysdale 1966, 87). It was the faction supporting these positions that eventually opted for union with like-minded Methodists and Presbyterians.

The newly created United Church, while seeming to align the more radical elements of three important churches, was less radical in its new setting than what its constituents had been in their previous church councils. Institutional survival of a new church during the Great Depression probably sapped the radical voices as activists dealt with practical issues. The necessity of cooperation, on the other hand, meant gain in unity (Grant 1972, 148f.). The hard edge of radical proposals softened after 1935.⁵⁶ There was less willingness to accept a 1933 resolution stating that the application of the principles of Jesus necessarily meant the end of capitalism. A policy of socializing of key services and industries was increasingly replaced by acceptance of an evolutionary form of change (Grant 1972, 147).

Anglican pronouncements during 1919-1938 period were certainly less radical than their United Church counterpart. This tempered and often non-committal voice masked

⁵⁶Cf Crysdale (1966, 88); Grant (1972, 146f.) This was all part of a larger trend where the more radical elements within the Protestant churches were beginning to drop their religious affiliation. These elements became more enmeshed in secular organizations. This is evident in the gradual collapse of organizations such as the Fellowship for a Christian Social Order. The members from this organization tended to move to broader coalitions that were not religious in their defining elements, such as the League for Social Reconstruction. This in turn meant a more explicit linkage between Protestant radicals and political parties, particularly as the League for Social Reconstruction became more closely affiliated with the CCF.

important cleavages within the church (Crysdale 1966, 102). There was a group of vocal and radical voices within the Anglican church but they remained an important minority. This is significant given the radical statements of the 1920 Lambeth Council and their prominent publication in the Bulletin, which was the voice of the Anglican Council on Social Service. The Council's position reflected strong support for fundamental structural changes. The position firmly rejected the competitive nature of capitalism. These positions were not echoed in the official voice of Canadian churchmen (Crysdale 1966, 104).

The position of the Anglican church during this period is best described as the pursuit of an ambiguous policy. On the one hand official Anglicanism argued that the state must play an increasingly important role in the delivery of social assistance and in the regulation of economic life. Conversely, there was remarkable silence on the "practical means of bringing about a more Christian social order." (Crysdale 1966, 106f.). While Anglican laity was given the message that reform was of critical importance there were no guidelines as to what shape these reforms should take, except perhaps encouraging the federal government to play a more important role and ensuring that social justice was uniformly available to all.

Social concern among the more sectarian or fractious branches of Protestantism was considerably more attenuated than their mainstream counterparts. It was, however, not without its own political manifestation. The political voice of sectarian Protestantism was prominent among Christian "fundamentalists" in the Prairies. As Wiseman (1981, 111) notes, populist voices such as that of Aberhart vilified "old line politicians and their henchmen" as those who betrayed Christ. The principal religious victim of these attacks was the United Church, "with its highly trained pastorate, substantial lay participation, and humanitarian ethic" (Wiseman 1981, 111). Ironically, Aberhart's promotion of social credit and his use of religious language is more akin to a "civil religion" associated with the United States. While the language of God is present throughout, the institutions of religion are presented as separate from the political arena (cf. Finkel 1989, Schultz 1986).

In general, the social issues raised at the turn of the century, and the role of churches in the delivery of social services, required all religious denominations to address the issue

of poverty. Many of the current attitudes about social programs and the welfare state were first raised by churches (Allen 1973, 352) Each denomination approached this task differently

The problem of Protestants was to transform a general bias into general state policy, that of Catholics was to adapt a fairly rigid line to new state encroachments into the field of charity while reasserting the role of the church in civil society The Catholic church needed state resources so that it could respond to unprecedented circumstances (cf Grant 1972, 145).

Social Perfectionism to Social Pragmatism

The Depression forced churches to pay attention to social concerns in a manner with which they were unfamiliar. The effects of the Depression distracted Presbyterians and Baptists from their internal bickering The successful rebuilding of the Anglican church during this period encouraged a sense of self-reliance and self-confidence that was absent in the pre-Depression church. The adversity of the Great Depression helped forge a cohesive community within the newly formed United Church (Grant 1972, 149) For Quebec Catholics, the Depression renewed the clergy's preoccupation with the "family farm" and the rural parish This trend reinvigorated the "Back to the Land" movement in Quebec and mobilized considerable support from both secular and religious organizations (Hamelin 1984, 33ff)

The post-Depression period heralded a different direction among those churches which had given rise to the loudest voices of social concern. Emphasis shifted from utopian Christian societies to more incremental struggles against oppression Official churches grew impatient with internal social radicals. Appeals for revolutionary social reconstruction disappeared from church agendas Despite this rejection of the social perfectionism of the 1930s, churches began to accept policies and propositions in the 1940s that had been bitterly opposed during the depression As Grant notes, Anglicans began to call for a pan-Canadian program of social security (1972, 154) The United

Church accepted a closed shop for its publishing house. The Quebec Catholic hierarchy exempted the CCF and its policies from papal condemnation.⁵⁷

Social Pragmatism and Convergence

The adoption of social pragmatism opened the way for greater cooperation among churches. This permitted, in some respects, a degree of convergence on economic issues affecting the less advantaged in Canadian society. Despite its accurate description of church debates on social issues, convergence is problematic. On the one hand, the evidence of convergence is at an elite level. The statements and positions of the Catholic church are often developed within regional or national associations of Bishops. Among Protestants there are either institutional barriers to developing a unified voice on social issues (i.e., congregational autonomy of Baptists and Evangelicals) or the presbyterian model with its emphasis on lay and clergy elite (United and Anglican churches).

The type of polarization and ideological conflict that existed before World War II is no longer possible. No one particular group, through links with the state or an established elite, is capable of dominating church agendas. Both the left and right have been forced to coexist.

Similar to the early 1900s and the Depression years, the years following World War II have generated a growing concern with issues of social justice and the necessity of churches to act as a force for change. In contemporary terms this role is often referred to as a social witness for the oppressed, exploited, and marginalized in society. Despite differences in approach, there has been a significant agreement among all the mainstream churches regarding socio-economic issues. While differences exist over doctrinal positions regarding abortion and the ordination of women, conflict over questions of social justice has been moderate when compared to the polarization of the 1930s and 1940s. The conflict between advocates of radical Christian socialism and those promoting a more reactionary defence of the status quo has subsided.

⁵⁷ See Baum (1980) on the changing position of the Catholic Church on Canadian socialism.

In the Anglican church tensions have diminished between the groups like the Anglican Fellowship for Social Action and the Lambeth League, which formed to counter the social critique of the Fellowship (Pulker, 1986, 161ff.). Similarly, the reactionary Catholic clergy who attacked the CCF in the 1930s were gradually replaced or subdued by moderate social reformers and those influenced by liberation theology. The Asbestos strike in 1949 raised tensions between low and high clergy. This encouraged the Quebec hierarchy to examine the modern state and the interests of capital in urban society, a radical departure in practice although predictable given the moral obligations toward workers found in Catholic social doctrine (Cf. Dion, 1974 and Trudeau, 1974).

In terms of the traditional tension between the evangelical and social witness missions of Christian churches, there is a more equitable distribution of advocates for an assortment of positions than at any time since World War II. There has been a growth in Catholic advocates for social witness in Quebec, as noted by Jean-Guy Vaillancourt (1984). In the United Church and Anglican churches, the active committees involved in social issues have been paralleled by organizations promoting the evangelical position (i.e., the United Church Renewal Fellowship and the Anglican Renewal Ministries). While the Catholic clergy has been more tolerant of the charismatic and evangelical groups developing within the church, the United Church has experienced conflict over its position on social issues (Bibby 1987, 127-131.)

Despite the growing pluralism or diversification within mainstream Canadian churches, there has been a relatively high degree of convergence over the interest in social justice.⁵⁸ This convergence has been accelerated since Vatican II, which has encouraged Catholic leaders to join interfaith organizations and seek a common language and basis of organization. While a union similar to that which brought forth the United Church is not immanent, Catholic and Protestant churches are working in unison to influence the political agenda. Groups such as the Aboriginal Rights Coalition (formerly Project North),

⁵⁸For an indication of the degree to which churches are converging, at least in their concern with the socio-economic structure of Canadian Society see John R. Williams' collection of church briefs and statements regarding social issues (1984a)

PLURA, Inter-Church Commission on the Social Impact of Resource Development, and the Taskforce on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility are only a few of the interfaith organizations attempting to influence the political agenda in Canada. In addition, the mainstream churches operate their own organizations designed to formulate responses to social questions. The Anglican Unit for Social Responsibility, the Baptist Social Action Committee, the Catholic Episcopal Commission for Social Affairs, and the United Church Working Unit on Social Issues and Justice are some of the principal denominational organizations addressing social issues.

In addition to the organizational indicators of convergence the current debates over economic policy indicate a common suspicion that there are serious injustices created by the way in which Western economies operate. If the themes in church statements, resolutions, newsletters, newspapers, and journals are mapped, there is consensus over what constitutes the most relevant questions concerning social justice and the economy. However, there are important nuances that may affect the way in which such messages are perceived by the general membership.

If one follows the positions of the church organizations specifically responsible for social issues, there is a great deal of consensus. Both the United Church's Action Agenda (published by the Working Unit on Social Issues and Justice) and the Anglican Church's Needle's Eye (published by the Unit on Public Social Responsibility) contain articles informing readers of pan-Canadian and international events and issues relating to the environment, aboriginal questions, unemployment, housing, underdevelopment, and apartheid.

Of the two groups, the United Church takes a more critical approach to issues and is more willing to promote specific plans of action.⁵⁹ This tendency is paralleled in their respective journals, the United Church Observer and the Canadian Churchman. The different nuances are also pronounced in the resolutions and reports presented to the United Church's General Council and the Anglican Church's General Synod. While both

⁵⁹Articles by Fletcher Stewart (1985) and Diane Marshal (1985) are the exception to this rule.

churches deplore the injustices created within the economy, the Anglican church is more reluctant to act as an advocate of policy options, particularly options that may involve challenges to existing economic relationships. This is evident in the church's praise of the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops' *Ethical Reflections on the Economic Crisis*, but the unwillingness of their own ad hoc committee to produce an equally critical and committed position on the economic crisis (Lind 1988)

As Lind's analysis suggests, the Anglican position reflects an unwillingness to promote the concept of social sin and the responsibility of community.⁶⁰ Conversely, the United Church's "The Church and Economic Crisis", as reported in the 1984 General Council, is more critical of structural factors and takes firm positions on policy orientations and the need for specific action. There is a clear indication in the report that many impediments to social justice are structural in nature, and hence structural adjustments are required before social justice can be obtained. This has followed the historical tendency of the United Church to support government programs that ensure full employment or employment insurance, income guarantees, and universal supports.⁶¹

For Canadian Catholics, the mid-1960s were an important watershed in the social teachings of Canadian Bishops. According to E. F. Sheridan, the close of Vatican II occasioned a "notable increase in the social justice statements of the bishops" (1987, 36). This marked a shift from a pastoral, exhortatory, and moralizing approach to one that focused on the rights and duties of individuals, groups, and corporate bodies required to organize a just socio-political order (Sheridan 1987, p. 36). While Canadian Catholics have historically been uneasy with reliance on market forces, which is evident in the sessions of the *Semaines sociales du Canada* from 1920-1938 and 1952-1964, it has also been unsympathetic to socialism.

⁶⁰This tendency within the Anglican church was also evident in the Report to the Anglican Church of Canada of the National Task Force on the Economy, "For the Elimination of Poverty and Social Justice" (April 1977, 1-3).

⁶¹See Kate Middleton, "In the Public Arena: Social Policy Positions of The United Church of Canada," n.p.: The United Church of Canada, Division of Mission in Canada, 1988, section on Economic Justice.

During these periods there was considerable concern over the moral implications of restructuring society. As Hulliger notes in his survey of Canadian Catholic social teachings throughout the first half of the twentieth century, ecclesiastical statements are not lacking in proposals for reform (1958, 227). Unlike their Protestant counterparts, however, there was a greater reluctance to adopt a statist perspective. Charity and justice were to be blended. While the state had some responsibility to help provide for the needs of individuals in society, this aid was not to be degrading. For this reason the church was to have a role in the distribution of assistance. The virtue of almsgiving must be tied to the act of receiving assistance. This would, according to the teachings of the Bishops, result in a spirit of friendship, reciprocity and cooperation. The Bishops remained consistent with the church's historical position on charity. On the eve of important developments in the welfare state, the Quebec Bishops argued in a 1941 address that the desire to transform society must be accompanied by a transformation of the spirit.⁶² Reforming the state and social programs without the spiritual dimension of charity would not ensure the dignity of the recipients of such assistance. This in turn would not ensure social harmony realized when self interest is mediated by the spirit of charity.

However, as Baum notes, the emphasis on the dignity of labour and "preferential option for the poor" since the 1960s and 1970s has emphasized a synthesis of the traditional tension between evangelism and social witness. This makes the church a firmer advocate of social welfare policies which in turn has moved the official church to the left (Baum 1984).

This shift is not without its problems. While the proponents of this position argue that critical positions on the economy link the clergy to the unrepresented members of society, the poor and marginalized, there has not been unanimity on the positions taken by bodies such as the Catholic Episcopal Commission on Social Affairs (Baum 1984, p. 82). Nevertheless, the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops has supported the general

⁶²The description of this tendency is derived from Hulliger's summaries and portions of letters cited in his treatise on the teachings of Canadian Catholic Bishops (Hulliger 1958, 234ff.)

thrust of the Commission in its brief to Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada. And, the Commission has continued to promote its conception of social obligation in subsequent positions on workers' rights and Christian support of labour unions.⁶³

The general trend within each of the mainstream churches is the growing awareness of society's obligation to protect the weak and less fortunate. In terms of policy this often means a greater role for the state in mediating the impact of market forces (i.e., employment projects and regulating corporate practices) or establishing programs and services that ensure a certain standard of living (i.e., guaranteed annual incomes and housing projects). In the case of specific groups that have been historically marginalized, as is the case with Canadian native peoples, the churches have actively lobbied on their behalf. It is important to note that the paternalism that traditionally marked the relationship between native peoples and the churches has changed. Stressing themes such as empowerment, the mainstream churches have let aboriginal leaders direct the strategies and affairs of the native peoples movement. For example, the transformation of the interfaith coalition Project North to the current Aboriginal Rights Coalition emphasizes the supportive role of the churches and the leadership role of native people.⁶⁴

The current convergence and willingness to cooperate are best exemplified in the Canadian Council of Churches 1984 and 1988 federal election packages. The packages cover a wide range of social issues and include background information, candidate questionnaires, and organizing manuals. What is important is the extent to which the primary contributors agree on the nature of social and economic problems and possible policy solutions.⁶⁵ The background documents address the full range of social policy issues.

⁶³For these documents see Sheridan (1987).

⁶⁴The United Church, Anglican Church and various Catholic organizations were members of Project North and are members of the Aboriginal Rights Coalition.

⁶⁵Members of the Ecumenical Forum on Economic Justice were the Presbyterian Church of Canada, the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Canada, the United Church of Canada, and Anglican Church of Canada, and the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops. They circulated a series of "election bulletin inserts" prior to the 1988 Federal election. In a cover letter for the election package, Donal Sjöberg

and place emphasis on structural solutions rather than the moral-individual choice models of their religious predecessors

Conclusion

The historical differences in the way in which Canadian churches reacted to poverty provide a context for understanding the institutional and symbolic heritage that distinguishes Canadian denominational traditions from those that exist in similar denominations in the United States. More importantly, these differences provide a way of understanding current differences in the poverty beliefs of Canadians. Unlike other structural variables used to explain belief systems, such as those using class or ethnicity, churches have historically played a direct and an influential role in determining the nature of public discourse on poverty. They provide a direct link between social institutions and the formation of a meaningful system of beliefs.

Churches have shared this role with other institutions, such as the education system. However, the idea of secularization has discounted their contemporary influence and has tended to marginalize an institutional explanation of belief systems that is linked to the unique developments of religious communities. This influence is a contributing factor in the way in which important institutions, such as social services have developed by religious communities. Other developments such as the evolution of Quebec nationalism and the role of the Catholic church suggest a unique relationship that did not exist elsewhere in Canada. The impact of this relationship, both directly and indirectly had an impact on the development of a federal welfare state. This underscores the different role of the Catholic church in different parts of Canada. In broader context the degree of institutional hegemony or competition had an impact on both the nature of poverty

President of the Canadian Council of Churches, stated that, "Elections, it seems to me, are a particularly good opportunity for Christians to think about how their common faith and social life reflect (sic) God's intentions." Other documents included background information such as "Will the Candidate Please Explain?" and "Election '84: Faith in Action for Justice". Additional documents from the Election Priorities Project included a Candidates Survey kit and an elections organizing manual.

discourse. The differences in discourse are a result of the way in which each denomination synthesized its symbolic heritage and contemporary organizational imperatives

The resulting synthesis of religious institutional heritage provides a useful construct for explaining discrepancies between the current elite discourse of churches, that is converging on social issues, and current differences in the belief systems of their constituencies. These differences are part of the tapestry that forms the general disposition of Canadian society toward the issue of poverty

CHAPTER FOUR

Church Heritage and the Mediation of a Welfare State Culture on Contemporary Attitudes

Introduction

Current debates on poverty and the welfare state are seldom framed in the religious language that was common place in the early twentieth century. As chapters two and three suggest, however, there is some evidence to suggest that even our current secularized discussion of poverty remains embedded in the premises elaborated within a religious context. Certainly the centrality of the church is no longer evident in contemporary Canadian society. However, the displacement of churches as key socializing institutions should not lead to the facile assumption that their institutional influence is no longer felt. Rather, the effect of religious institutions on poverty belief systems may still be present, albeit mediated by our present debates and perceptions of the welfare state.

The previous chapter provided an historical context that suggests some reasons why denominations differ in their approach to poverty. Understanding the current relationship between churches and beliefs about poverty, however, also requires an understanding of the way in which poverty is understood in the context of the contemporary welfare state.

Popular Conceptualization of Poverty

The more generic notions of poverty found in church documents, outlined in chapter one, are somewhat misleading in their simplicity, particularly if used as an index of denominational mass beliefs. In these documents poverty has complex dimensions. There is certainly reference to economic hardship. Poverty also implies a need for liberation, a redressing of an imbalance of power and its effects on the human personality.

These documents pass from the definitional to the practical in their commentary on social policies of the day. The more contemporary church statements, often in the form of briefs to government, raise the question of policy reform and the changing role of the welfare state.

Many of the poverty themes expressed in church documents may be present in the beliefs of the general public. However, for the general population poverty is inextricably tied to the language and presence of the welfare state. Poverty is less tied to the broader moral concerns raised by churches.

The welfare state has evolved historically. The programs and the role of government have changed across time. Consequently, the broader meaning of poverty has evolved a changing statist dimension. This is concomitant with the development of income maintenance programs (i.e., pensions, unemployment insurance), universal medicare, and a host of government interventions designed to diminish both the cost and risk of poverty. General beliefs and attitudes about poverty have increasingly incorporated the interventionist role of the modern welfare state in its language and definitions.

Churches and the general public have adopted symbols associated with the welfare state (i.e., universality, social security, etc.). The prominence of these symbols in so much of the literature on poverty should not imply that churches and other social institutions are simply reflecting broader structural transformations. Churches and other social institutions are active participants in the debates over the welfare state, and as such, contribute to the construction and modification of the symbols and meaning surrounding poverty.¹

The contemporary church documents on poverty, discussed in previous chapters, all allude to the importance of maintaining and broadening state interventions. In many respects there are often few differences between the recommendations of contemporary

¹ This is not simply a structural argument, where changing social forces determined new attitudes and values. Rather, as O'ram indicates in his study of Canadian intellectuals, there was a concerted effort on the part of social scientists and civil servants during the latter half of World War II to change public perceptions of social programs and policy developments leading to the inauguration of the modern welfare state (O'ram 1986, 297).

social activists advocating for more secure and liberal social programs. Churches may stress a more active role for community groups, including churches, in the design and delivery of programs. There is not a great distance, however, from the pro-participatory stance of many activists defending the welfare state

The similarities between poverty activists, whether religious or secular, suggest the convergence thesis discussed in the first chapter. Despite this convergence, as this chapter will demonstrate, there remain significant differences between religious communities in the structure of their poverty belief systems. Despite the broader influence of the welfare state on social attitudes, differences between religious communities persist.

Testing Embedded Welfare State Discourse

The centrality of the welfare state in contemporary mass beliefs about poverty is certainly implied in both the language of poverty activists and in many of the surveys dealing with the welfare state. This does not give a detailed reflection of how a general understanding of poverty is infused with the symbols and language salient in the policies and procedures of the contemporary welfare state.

One method of mapping the symbolic influence of the welfare state is to examine more detailed explanations of poverty by individuals who are neither experts in the field of social programs and the welfare state, nor who have direct experience in advocacy on behalf of more marginalized groups. While such a tactic will not provide the basis for statistical testing, the rich detail of such a qualitative approach would provide important insights into the contemporary contours of mass poverty belief systems.

The Carleton Qualitative Content Analysis Experiment

As an assignment in qualitative analysis, in a third year political science class on Canadian Political Culture, students were asked to analyze written statements on poverty. Responses outlined a personal understanding of the causes of poverty and preferred solutions. The statements were provided by the Carleton University students of two separate Canadian Political Culture classes in the winter and summer semesters of 1994. The length of statements ranged from 20-250 words. Statements were anonymous.

The volume of statements required sampling. A random selection of statements provided a manageable sample for analysis. An anonymous sample of statements was then compiled and provided to students for qualitative analysis.

The original intent of the exercise was to provide students with detailed statements on poverty from which they could analyze the way in which ideas of the welfare state were integrated into beliefs about poverty. However, both the content and subsequent analysis underscored the extent to which the welfare state and its various dimensions were central as an underlying construct linking many of the statements about poverty, its causes and its solutions.

Method

Most of the student classification schemes generated by the Winter 1994 class produced sets of causes and solutions that could be assigned to either a broad structural or individual approach. This is similar to that which was discussed in Chapter One. In this case, students attempted to find common threads or general categories that would explain patterns in the statements on poverty.²

A more sophisticated computer-based classification technique was applied by student teams in the Summer 1994 class using the randomly selected statements, drawn from a combined set of statements for the 1994 academic year. In this case the centrality of the welfare state was also evident, but the classification technique permitted a more systematic mapping of the various dimensions of the welfare state associated with the issue of poverty.³

²Students were given the choice of using variations on Greimas's Semiotic Square method or the Glaser-Strauss Constant Comparative method. Both methods provide a methodological technique for comparing and interpreting qualitative statements. For a more detailed discussion of these designs see Joan Pennell's methodological discussion in her work on collaborative action research (1992, 10-14). These techniques were discussed in the methodological sessions of the National Welfare Grants poverty research section in Montreal, 1993.

³Students used multidimensional scaling/classification software (Concept System) to generate clusters of statements which had been similarly grouped by each member of the project team. While all students provided statements on poverty, only those choosing the group project assignment worked on the poverty data in the second class. A more detailed discussion of the application of the methodology and applied multidimensional scaling procedures can be found in Trochim (1989a) and Trochim (1989b). The 1989

The cluster mapping used by the second group of students involved working groups. Each group examined the sample of poverty statements and divided each statement into discrete references or opinions about poverty. Each member of the group individually assigned the discrete references to general categories using the same methodologies as the former class. Once each member of the group had assigned all of the discrete references to their own unique categories, the information was entered into the computer.

At this point the software, Concept System, generated a mathematical construct estimating the most common groupings and the distance between each discrete reference and cluster of discrete references. The students were then provided a visual display of the clusters of discrete references and then attempted to interpret each cluster by the degree to which the constituent discrete references represented a common theme or dimension.

Findings

One of the central findings in both classes was the degree to which poverty is viewed in the context of government and social programs. These are central themes in how students conceptualize poverty.⁴

Statements on power and inequality were grouped more closely with the broader structural themes such as the economy, capitalism, and social programs. Each was linked to interventions of the state. Conversely, statements on personal deficiencies, family issues, and natural causes were closely related; and they tended to be linked to statements concerning a non-interventionist state or an interventionist state that has caused the

special issue of *Evaluation and Program Planning* (12:1) contains a number of articles examining both the practical and theoretical applications of the techniques found in the methodology associated with the "Concept System"

⁴One objection to the generalizations of these findings is the bias of using young political science students. In response, the Canadian Political Culture course has a much higher mix (mature/young) than what one would find in second year courses. Also, the course has an interdisciplinary appeal that attracts a number of students enrolled in Canadian studies. There is certainly the bias toward a structural interpretation of poverty, given the disproportionate number of students with a social science or humanities background (Guimond and Palmer 1990). However, in an overview of the statements on poverty there were significant numbers that used an individual approach in their description of the reasons for and solution for poverty.

personal deficits associated with poverty (i.e., dependency, lack of motivation or incentives).⁵

The educational items tended to be grouped together and occupied an intermediate position between clusters of statements that were more explicitly either structural or individual in approach. The educational items, in general, tended to be closer in proximity to the individual approach clusters.⁶ The educational theme, however, did not effectively bridge the structural and individual approaches. A lack of education was certainly perceived as a cause of poverty, but the educational solution was closely linked to groupings that were associated with the individual approach. The implication is that education is a somewhat open vehicle for opportunity, but which may be difficult for some individuals to achieve because of personal impediments.

Central to all of these clusters was government action and policy, be it interventionist or non-interventionist. Clusters grouping positive references to a non-interventionist government corresponded to a more individual approach to poverty. Conversely, clusters grouping positive references to interventionist government policy corresponded to a more structuralist approach to poverty. The issues superimposed on these axes represent issues that are central to welfare state policies (i.e., unemployment, training and education opportunities, job creation, health, income). While the linkages between poverty related issues and the welfare state were evident, attitudes varied as to whether interventions were to be associated with causes or solutions to poverty. The orientation of a cluster was often

⁵The student projects provided a detailed portrait of the clusters that form our general belief system about poverty. Copies of the project reports are in the possession of the author. Special mention should be directed to the two teams that worked diligently at applying the concept system to the qualitative data. Team One - Ivan Basic, Marie-France Gosselin (team coordinator), Tracy Hartman, Bob Johnston, Paul Okalik, Nancy Robitaille (software specialist), and Kevin Tappin. Team Two - Aaron Goldstein (team co-coordinator), Matt Sanford (software specialist), Andrew Pidcock, Grant Beesley, Okwudiri Thioha, and Sidney D. Hall (team co-coordinator).

⁶There are some exceptions to this rule, particularly for statements that reflect socio-economic barriers to education or training. However, the students who provided responses tended to be quite optimistic about the ability of any individual to "get ahead" if they "make the effort" to become educated or trained. This tendency is not surprising considering the generally positive orientation toward education as a method of advancement among the student population.

linked to whether or not the majority of discrete references favored an individual or structural perspective

Conclusions based on the responses of university students are insufficient grounds for generalizing about mass belief systems. The Carleton Experiment, however, does suggest a strong link between attitudes about the welfare state and poverty.

Canadian-US Beliefs

The Comparative Project on Class Structure and Class Consciousness (Class Structure Survey) provides another method of examining the question of poverty beliefs and the welfare state. The Class Structure Survey provides comparable open-ended questions asking Canadian and American respondents for multiple unprompted positions on poverty causes and solutions.⁷ The responses confirm that not only is the welfare state central to our understanding of poverty, but Canadians have a more structural orientation to poverty than their southern counterparts.⁸

Canadian-US Attitudes on Causes of Poverty

For the Canadian sample, unemployment was cited as the cause of poverty by the largest number of respondents. While unemployment was the cause most cited by American respondents, it was closely followed by reasons such as "lack of education" and

The American survey open-ended preamble and question reads as follows:

These next questions are about various social problems in America. For each of these problems we would like to know what you think are some major reasons for the problem and what think is the most important thing that should be done about it. The first problem is poverty. What would you say are some major reasons for poverty in the United States? ... What do you think should be done about poverty?

⁸The US and Canadian open-ended responses for poverty causes were classified into 8 comparable categories (i.e. cultural values, personal characteristics, childhood-family history, insufficient government intervention, government income programs, excessive government, economy, and miscellaneous). The coded statements in each of these categories were then assessed for their individual or structural orientation. This enabled the broader classification of individual statements and general categories into the 5 groups listed in Table 11. The solutions to poverty underwent a similar procedure, although general coding in this case was much more difficult given the diversity of solutions and the extent to which many solutions did not fit neatly into an individual or structural solution. Consequently, greater emphasis is placed on the more specific statement codes of respondents.

"lack of ambition". As noted earlier, educational reasons are more closely associated with an individual orientation to poverty

Table 11 demonstrates the differences between Canadians and Americans. There is a greater inclination to cite causes of poverty that are individual in nature (i.e., related to or affecting the psychological disposition of individuals) among American respondents. In contrast, there is greater consensus among Canadians on the structural causes of poverty reflected in the thirty percent that cited unemployment and the relatively low numbers citing attitudes and personal disincentives as causes.⁹

Table 11: Comparative Canada-US Causes of Poverty (Open-Ended Responses)¹⁰

Causes of Poverty (multiple responses) US Survey 1980 Canada Survey 1983	% of US respondents citing cause at least once (1,574 valid cases)	% of Canadian respondents citing cause at least once (2,426 valid cases)
1 Bad Attitudes	12.6	10.6
2 Not Ambitious	19.8	13.9
3 Lack of Education	20.0	15.0
4 Welfare Disincentives	15.4	2.7
5 Unemployment	23.6	30.1

Source: Comparative Class Consciousness Study - 1980s

Using a series of five point scale questions on poverty in the same Canadian and US surveys, it is possible to assess statistically national and denominational differences on attitudes toward poverty. The questions ask to what extent the respondent agrees or disagrees with a statement on one of the main reasons for poverty.¹¹ Similar to the

⁹ A May 1985 Gallup poll suggests some caution when forcing respondents to choose between individual and structural explanations. In this case 30% of respondents, when given the choice, elected to state that poverty was equally the result of "lack of effort" and circumstances beyond the individual's control. This tendency is complicated when denominational differences are introduced. For example, francophone Roman Catholics are the most structural in their orientation toward poverty but also have the highest percentage choosing both the structural and individual explanation.

¹⁰ Open-ended responses were grouped into similar categories. Percentage is those citing cause and includes multiple responses.

¹¹ The following is the preamble and question phrasing for each question in

tendencies evident in the open-ended questions, there are statistically significant national and denominational differences ($p < .001$) on all five reasons for poverty (lack intelligence, lack opportunities, laziness, capitalism, natural inequality) ¹²

*Table 12: Comparative Canada-US Causes of Poverty (Close-Ended Questions)*¹³

Main Causes of Poverty (Total cases in each cross-tabulation was greater than 4,000)	US Respondents	Canada Respondents
lack intelligence	49.8% agree	38.7% agree
lack job and educational opportunities	78.7% agree	75.3% agree
laziness	66.1% agree	58.1% agree
capitalism	46.7% agree	50.6% agree
natural inequality	54.3% agree	57.1% agree

Source: Comparative Class Consciousness Study - 1980s

Canadian-US Attitudes on Solutions for Poverty

There is considerably less consensus on the solutions to poverty among both Canadians and Americans. This is reflected in the lower frequency of the most prominent or frequently cited responses. American respondents, however, demonstrated greater

Now here are some opinions that other people have given about these social issues. For each statement please tell me whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree with this statement

- 1 One of the main reasons for poverty is that some people are not intelligent enough to compete in this modern world
- 2 One of the main reasons for poverty is lack of education and job opportunities for the poor
- 3 One of the main reasons for poverty is that many poor people simply do not want to work.
- 4 One of the main reasons for poverty is that the economy is based on private ownership and profits
- 5 One of the main reasons for poverty is that in every society some people have to be on the bottom and some on the top

¹²Significance tests use χ^2 on unweighted cases for the comparative class structure data.

¹³ Five point agree-disagree scale is used to code responses. Strongly agree and agree responses are collapsed. Sample is unweighted

consensus than their Canadian counterparts. Americans emphasized approaches that focused on non-governmental solutions.

Non-government solutions refer to policies or interventions where market forces or natural inequalities in ability act as the primary determinants of resource allocation and rewards. This may include macro-economic policy that favours market forces as the primary agents of change (i.e. monetarist policies). Non-government orientations may also refer to political positions where decision-makers are reluctant to have the state become involved in micro-interventions (i.e., specific training programs or allowances).

Non-governmental approaches do not mean an absence of state intervention, but rather the adoption of interventions that circumscribe the way in which the state intervenes. For example, non-government programs in labour market integration are not interventionist in that they reject full employment policies that do not conform to market-induced labour demands. Underlying the non-governmental solutions is the acceptance of market solutions as being the most efficient and having the most desirable long-term effect. While there are comparative differences in the way in which the non-governmental and non-interventionist trends have developed in Western countries throughout the 1980s, many of the basic programs and patterns remain in place, suggesting that the welfare state and the attitudes that legitimize its status are relatively durable (Mishra 1990, 18ff, 103ff).

Both Canadian and American respondents favoured a mixed approach to poverty solutions. The three most cited solutions in the American sample referred to increasing welfare restrictions and job creation, with scattered reference to educational and training opportunities. For the Canadian sample, job creation was the dominant solution, with similar references to educational and training opportunities.¹⁴

¹⁴There was little difference in the job creation solution. 16.9% of US respondents cited "create more jobs - reduce unemployment". 15.3% of Canadian respondents cited "general job creation".

The single largest difference between Canadian and US respondents was on welfare eligibility. For American respondents, 19% suggested "restricting welfare eligibility"¹⁵. This is compared to 7% of the Canadian sample indicating a similar policy. Another important difference in orientation toward social assistance policy was that where Canadian respondents focused on such policies they tended to emphasize combating fraud rather than making fewer people eligible¹⁶.

Educational solutions were second in popularity, following job creation and welfare eligibility. Among American respondents there was a general inclination toward solutions improving educational opportunities, with respondents often citing various educational solutions such as general increases in education (9.1%), improving educational opportunities for the poor (10.2%), and job training programs that reflect a private sector orientation (8.5%)¹⁷. Canadians were less inclined toward the educational solution with less than 5% citing any one particular educational solution. The structural orientation of the Canadian sample was reinforced with both the diversity of solutions, of which job creation dominated, and more general political categories ranging from new political leaders and counter inflationary policies¹⁸.

Canadian-US Denominational Differences

The national differences in Table 12 suggest that Canadians are more inclined to view poverty as a function of structural factors such as the socio-economic system (capitalism)

¹⁵The negative orientation toward social assistance is a general trend identified by Auclair (1982). In his work on the US General Social Survey between 1976 and 1982, he found that a majority of US respondents felt that too much was being spent on social welfare. The only other spending category that elicited a greater anti-spending response was foreign aid. This anti-spending attitude declined by 12 percentage points between 1976 and 1982, where the 1982 survey was the first time in seven years that less than 50% of respondents exhibited anti-spending sentiment for social welfare.

¹⁶On the welfare issue, 5.2% of Canadians cited "decreasing fraud" rather than focusing on the restriction solution. This differs dramatically from American responses which focused on more severe eligibility criteria.

¹⁷Note that respondents may have more than one response.

¹⁸Statements in this general structural orientation include specific reference to government job creation. Six percent of the Canadian sample falls under this category (i.e., government job creation, new political leaders, and reduce inflation).

or inherent societal barriers. Conversely, Americans tend to view poverty as a function of opportunity and individual motivation

Table 13: Canada-US Denominational Individualist Comparisons - Intelligence¹⁹

Lack Intelligence - not intelligent enough to compete	Percent Agree	N
Canadian Francophone Catholics	22.4	437
Canadian Anglicans	46.3	108
Canadian Non-Francophone Catholics	41.1	368
Canadian United Church	48.9	182
US Catholics	49.0	251
US Methodist	54.4	112
US Baptist	57.3	185

Source: Comparative Class Consciousness Study - 1980s

The particular tendencies evident at a national level are magnified when denominations are compared (see Table 13 and Table 14). For the questions referring to individual reasons for poverty there is a consistent order where denominational affiliations with a church-type heritage tend to agree less with the individual approach than sect-type denominational affiliates. The most sect-type churches, such as US Baptists, are consistently at opposite ends of the spectrum from the most church-type institution, represented by Canadian francophone Catholics.

Table 14: Canada-US Denominational Individualist Comparisons - Laziness²⁰

Laziness - Simply do not want to work	Percent Agree	N
Canadian Anglicans	51.9	108
Canadian Non-Francophone Catholics	54.6	368
Canadian United Church	59.5	180
Canadian Francophone Catholics	61.3	437
US Catholics	66.2	251
US Methodist	70.6	116
US Baptist	71.5	186

Source: Comparative Class Consciousness Study - 1980s

¹⁹Source: Comparative Class Consciousness Study - 1980s. Five point agree-disagree scale used to code response. Strongly agree and agree responses are collapsed. Sample is unweighted.

²⁰Source: Comparative Class Consciousness Study - 1980s. Five point agree-disagree scale used to code response. Strongly agree and agree responses are collapsed. Sample is unweighted.

With minor deviations, the rest of the denominations follow the tendency that institutional heritage would suggest. The sectarian Protestantism of the United States suggests a pervasive influence where even American Catholics are more individual in orientation than Canadian United Church members. American Catholics are, however, less individual in orientation than their Methodist compatriots

Table 15: Canada-US Denominational Structuralist Comparisons - Capitalism²¹

Capitalism - Economy is based on private ownership and profits	Agree	N
Canadian Francophone Catholics	59	426
US Baptist	56.1	182
Canadian Non-Francophone Catholics	54.3	353
US Catholics	49.4	247
US Methodist	44.7	114
United Church of Canada	43.5	177
Anglican Church of Canada	41.4	104

Source: Comparative Class Consciousness Study - 1980s

The denominational pattern for structural responses is more complex. As noted earlier, the educational issue bridges both individual and structural orientations to poverty. The questions on "capitalism" and "natural inequality" are less ambiguous in their measurement of structural orientation (see Table 15 and Table 16). However, the institutional factor in the response pattern of each of these questions is more complicated than that which is evident in responses to questions measuring the individual approach.

On the issue of capitalism, the Catholic emphasis is explainable on the basis of the historical antipathy of Catholic social doctrine to the materialism often associated with liberalism and laissez-faire policies in the marketplace (see Table 15). The high level of identification of capitalism as a reason for poverty among US Baptists and the opposite tendency among Canadian Anglicans departs from our hypothesis concerning institutional relationship where church-type and sects reside on different ends of any poverty scale.

²¹ Strongly Agree and Agree responses are collapsed. Sample is unweighted.

Table 16: Canada-US Denominational Structuralist Comparisons - Inequality

Natural Inequality - In every society some people have to be on the bottom and some on the top	Agree	N
United Church of Canada	68 0	177
Canadian Non-Francophone Catholics	64 8	182
Anglican Church of Canada	63 5	104
US Methodist	57 9	353
US Baptist	54 6	185
US Catholics	54 1	114
Canadian Francophone Catholics	46 1	247

Source: Comparative Class Consciousness Study - 1980s

One explanation for the Baptist and Anglican positions, however, may lie in the more complicated nature of structural understandings of poverty. For example, the US Baptist population may emphasize individualism at a theological level but its southern and black components represent major constituencies that have fought against the domination of powerful interests who have promoted laissez-faire market policies.²² On the one hand, the southern Baptist has the heritage of the Civil War and subsequent defence against the exploitative forces of Yankee capitalism. On the other, American Black Baptists have been active in the struggle against an oppressive social structure that has been sustained and promoted by a powerful economic class that defends market liberalism. Activists among Black denominations promoted the active intervention of the state in social and economic relationships.²³ This tendency is also evident in general beliefs, where American surveys

²²For a more detailed account of theological and political differences between White and Black Protestants in the Southern United States see Evans and Boyte (1986). Two examples noted by Evans and Boyte are the deliverance and redemption themes of the Old Testament stressed in popular Afro-American Christianity. This is contrasted with the ante-bellum Pauline emphasis of the Southern White Protestants which stressed obedience and submission (ibid., 32ff). The theological shifts in the civil rights movement are seen in Martin Luther King's synthesis of Catholic personalism and Gandhi's *Satyagraha* in a religious-political Protestantism advocating racial equality (ibid., 54ff).

²³This tendency is also reflected in the general US attitudinal data (Auclair 1984, 141). In all years whites showed a far greater tendency to oppose social welfare spending than did nonwhites with the percentage of whites sharing this opinion ranging from 63% in 1978 to 52% in 1982. Differences between percentages of whites and nonwhites opposing welfare spending ranged from 24 percentage points in the 1976 survey to 38 percentage points in the 1978 survey.

suggest that Afro-Americans are more inclined to attribute poverty to structural causes than their white counterparts (Pong 1983, 149)

A plausible explanation for the Anglican tendency is less apparent. At one level it suggests a class explanation, with the historically elite status of the Canadian Anglican supporting an economic structure from which the Anglican community has benefited. This, however, fails to explain the conformity of the Anglican response to a less individual orientation to poverty. The ambiguous position of Anglicans in their failure to support either an individual or structural approach to poverty suggests the need for a more multidimensional understanding of both the structural and individual approaches to poverty.

Table 17: Canada-US Denominational Comparisons - Education

Lack of Education and Job Opportunities for Poor	Agree	N
US Catholics	79.4	114
Anglican Church of Canada	78.5	104
US Methodist	77.0	353
United Church of Canada	75.7	177
Canadian Non-Francophone Catholics	72.8	182
US Baptist	72.8	184
Canadian Francophone Catholics	71.5	247

Source: Comparative Class Consciousness Study - 1980s

The problem of determining the underlying denominational belief structure of poverty is underscored in the policy area of education and training. As noted earlier, education and training are a complex bridge between the individual and structural approaches to poverty. The ambiguity of this aspect of the welfare state is manifested in the limited variation in denominational responses on the structural impact of education and job opportunities (see Table 17). The pattern does not correspond to the sect-church pattern evident in most of the other measures. Neither, however, does there appear to be much denominational difference.

Class Effect on Denominational Poverty Beliefs

Some of the ambiguity in denominational influence on responses to questions about poverty may have to do with the class composition of churches. The social base of a religious organization cannot be discounted. But, class does not articulate itself without the help of social or cultural institutions. As the attempts to understand the absence of a European form of class politics in Canada attest, class conflict is mediated by institutions that are not consciously engaged in class politics, or, with the exception of the capitalist-executive class, have not organized their constituency in a manner that forms a cohesive class conscious group (Clement and Myles 1994, 102ff)

In terms of the general effect of class on poverty beliefs the majority of research has focused on patterns in Great Britain and the United States. In Great Britain the most severe or punitive attitudes toward the poor were generally found among the poor themselves and manual workers (Taylor-Gooby 1991, 120). A similar pattern can be found in Canada. Analysis of an October 1988 Gallup poll found a significant relationship between level of education and being in favour of forcing welfare recipients to work.²⁴ Support for workfare among those with high school or less ranged from 91% to 96% for each educational category. Conversely, support among those with university degrees or some university was 85%. However, as a caveat, this effect might be the result of institutional socialization. Such an effect was found by Guimond and Palmer (1990), where humanities and social sciences tended to give a more structural interpretation to poverty than their science and engineering counterparts. The former group sought solutions that were not premised on the need for punitive or compulsory programs. It should be emphasized, however, that the differences between educational categories in the October Gallup poll are not great.

The attitudinal patterns in Great Britain provide another example of the way in which class affects the poverty belief system. Throughout the 1980s there was considerable

²⁴For X^2 $p < .01$. Cramer's $V = .15$

debate over the merits and viability of the welfare state. The Conservatives, under Margaret Thatcher, launched a rhetorical campaign against the welfare state. During this period, however, there was little evidence to support the notion that there was widespread dissatisfaction with the social programs provided by the state, by either the affluent or non-affluent members of British society (cf Schwarz 1987, 128; cf Krieger 1987, 181ff.).

The political rhetoric of the British Conservatives implied that the more affluent taxpayers of Great Britain should be concerned, if not outraged, at the extent to which the modern welfare state eroded the social values of self-reliance and private charity (mutual assistance). The welfare state was presumed to diminish incentives to work because of high taxes and generous benefits. Underlying these claims was the idea that the welfare state had created a class of dependents who lacked the self-motivation or work ethic required to advance their economic position.

Compounded with the implied pitting of affluent against less affluent in the political rhetoric of the British Conservative party, was a growing gap in income distribution. The growing social polarization and income inequality in Great Britain in the 1980s did not result in a hardening of feeling toward the poor on the part of the more affluent classes (Taylor-Gooby 1991, 122f.). If the individual approach to poverty was paramount among the more affluent then one would expect growing hostility toward the poor or less affluent. As taxpayers and economic successes, one would expect the affluent to be greater proponents of an individual approach that legitimizes their personal success. This in turn would legitimize negative or hostile attitudes toward the recipients of welfare state programs, viewed as individuals who were not sufficiently motivated to succeed economically. Reports on attitudinal surveys in Great Britain suggest another pattern.

As Table 18 indicates the patterns differ depending on the degree to which respondents feel that they are able to cope economically. In the first instance there appears to be a class bias in favour of the individual approach to poverty in that the affluent or "comfortable" have a greater tendency to view the welfare state as making people less self supporting and independent. The pattern stays the same between 1984 and 1989, but with a consistent decline in all class categories in the acceptance of the view that the welfare

state creates dependency Likewise, the question on tendency to "help each one another" the class differences are minimal As in the first question, there is a marked decline in the willingness of respondents, regardless of class, to accept the view that the welfare state impedes personal obligation to assist others in need

Table 18: British Attitudes on the Welfare State

British Social Attitudes Surveys: Percentage Agreeing²⁶		Self-Assessed Degree of Economic Distress		
<i>Survey Question</i>	<i>Year of Survey</i>	<i>Comfortable</i>	<i>Difficult to Cope</i>	<i>Very Difficult to Cope</i>
The welfare state makes people less willing to look after themselves.	1984	52	44	42
	1989	42	37	26
The welfare state encourages people to stop helping each other	1984	39	42	39
	1989	33	36	27
Percentage supporting more taxes and more welfare spending	1984	35	48	53
	1989	55	56	61

Source Taylor-Gooby 1991, 121

Another important trend is that both affluent and non-affluent categories demonstrated support for the expansion of welfare spending, to be sustained by increased taxation (Taylor-Gooby 1991, 122f) The relative influence of political discourse and economic conditions are underscored by the way in which support for the welfare state among the "comfortable" increased dramatically between 1984 and 1989, reaching similar levels of support as those having greater difficulty coping economically

The results of research in the United States are more mixed Earlier studies in the 1960s and 1970s suggested that the American white middle class was more predisposed to

²⁶The calculations are taken from Table 5.6 in Taylor-Gooby (1991: 121)

individual explanations of poverty than was the case with Blacks, Jews and those at a lower socio-economic status (Pong 1983, 106-107). Pong's analysis of the 1972 American National Election Study suggests that many of these studies are misleading. When controls are taken into account there is little evidence supporting the capacity of unidimensional measures of socio-economic status to predict the way in which poverty is explained (Pong 1983, 149)

When class was placed in a broader social and institutional context, Pong found significant differences in the way in which groups explained poverty (Pong 1983, 149-150). For example, beneficiaries of the existing system, such as professionals and proprietors/farmers, were diametrically opposed in their explanations of poverty. Unlike their fellow beneficiaries, professionals were more willing to adopt structural explanations of poverty. Conversely, those disadvantaged by the existing system, such as the southern white working class and Blacks, also adopted opposing explanations. The former blamed the poor for their situation. Blacks tended to explain poverty as "structural injustice and unsound institutional arrangements"²⁶

Without entering into a discussion of current debates over the nature of class-based politics in Canada, it is nonetheless important to test the potential impact of class on denominational differences. Evidence of such an influence, however, does not diminish the importance of denominational institutions as the historical residues or institutions that have helped structure belief systems. But, such an effect may provide clues as to the way in which denominations have adapted to their social base.

To begin, there are basic differences in the class composition of denominations in Canada. One proxy measure of class, if conceptualized as strata, is education. The 1991 Canadian Census confirms the suspicion that there are important denominational differences in the socio-economic bases. As Table 19 indicates, members of the United Church have the highest percentage of its membership with a university education. This is

²⁶ An institutional explanation for these tendencies is suggested in the work of Guimond and Palmer (1990) and Williams (1989).

followed by the Anglican church. Dropping below the national percentage are Baptists and Roman Catholics. The more extreme forms of the sect-type denomination, such as Pentecostal, are considerably lower than the more mainstream churches

If measured as education, class does not appear to be evenly distributed among denominations. Hence, the class nature of denominational membership may be reflected in response patterns about poverty. However, if class was a primary determinant rather than institutional affiliation then one would expect Roman Catholics to be more closely aligned with the responses of the more sectarian Protestants, and United Church and Anglican patterns approximating one another. A closer examination of class location and its impact on poverty beliefs does shed some light on the potential interaction of class and religious institution

Table 19: Canadian Church Membership and University Education

Canadians With University Education: Census 1991	Percent of Population 22-45 Years
All Canada	17%
Roman Catholic	14%
United Church	18%
Anglican	17%
Baptist	15%
Pentecostal	8%

Source: Statistics Canada 1993 (#93-319)

Using the same class location scheme applied in Clement's and Myles's (1994, 17, 257-260) analysis of the comparative Class Structure data, there are significant differences between Canada and the United States. As Table 20 indicates, there is greater class differentiation in poverty beliefs in Canada than in the United States. Class response patterns are only similar on the issue of capitalism.

Table 20: Canada-US Comparisons of Class Influence on Poverty Beliefs

Main Reasons for Poverty ²⁷	US Respondents	Canada Respondents
lack intelligence	No	Yes the capitalist-executive and working classes tended to advance this reason (Cramer's V = .05)
lack job and educational opportunities	No	No
laziness	No	Yes. the old middle class and to a lesser extent the capitalist-executive class advance this reason (Cramer's V = .07)
capitalism	Yes working class are strong proponents of this reason, with the capitalist-executive being the least supportive of this reason (Cramer's V = .14)	Yes working class are strong proponents of this reason, with the capitalist-executive being the least supportive of this reason, the new middle class accepts this reason to a much larger extent than their old middle class counterpart (Cramer's V = .15)
natural inequality	No	Yes the new middle class were the least supportive of this reason (Cramer's V = .05)

Source: Comparative Class Consciousness Study - 1980s

In Canada the capitalist-executive class emphasizes an individual approach to poverty.²⁸ The working class looks to both structural reasons (capitalism) and individual reasons (intelligence). The new middle class is more critical of capitalism and less accepting of reasons such as natural inequality. The old middle class places greater weight on laziness as an explanation or cause. These patterns, however, lack the consistency often evident in an explanatory model using the sect-church scheme format to explain belief.

²⁷ Significance of class noted where $X^2 \geq .05$ for unweighted data.

²⁸ Clement and Myles operationalize class as a cluster of empirical relationships. Members of the executive-capitalist class are those who employ three or more permanent employees and/or are involved in key decision-making that influences the way in which work is carried out and the type of product or service being delivered. This would include members of top, upper, and middle management. The new middle class are those individuals who function in a supervisory capacity and have the power to affect an individual's pay scale and promotion, work rate, and continued employment. The old middle class are those who are self-employed and do not employ more than three permanent employees. The working class is the residual group made up of all those who are employed by someone else or who do not work for pay and who do not belong to any of the above categories (Clement and Myles 1994: 257f).

patterns on poverty. These patterns suggest that while class may be one factor influencing beliefs on poverty, there is evidence to support further investigation of the effect of religious institutions. However, none of these effects can be clearly understood without first analyzing the way in which the culture of the welfare state influences the way in which the general public currently approaches the issue of social programs affecting poverty and mediating group conflict or class tensions.

The Canadian Welfare State

The welfare state in Canada was incremental in nature. In many respects its development was a pragmatic response to growing political demands for greater equity and security. This has meant government involvement in health, education, housing, child care, employment and training, and income supports. Within the past fifty years Canadian governments have developed programs that redistribute both income and services throughout society.

Despite the debilitating effects of the Great Depression, it was not until the early 1940s that the federal government began to marshal its considerable resources to provide a basic infrastructure for broad national programs that were to reduce poverty and disadvantages throughout Canadian society.²⁹

With constitutional changes a national unemployment insurance program was instigated in 1940.³⁰ While initially limited to jobs for which there was an unpredictable

²⁹ Prior to 1942 the primary federal income support was the 1927 Old Age Pensions Act which provided a means-tested pension for persons over 70 years of age.

³⁰ One of the important differences between the Canadian and US welfare state at their early inception was the different way in which each approached unemployment insurance. Unlike Canada and Great Britain the United States rejected a centralized program that used a "pooled funds" design. Like Canada, federal policy specialists feared challenges to the federal unemployment insurance scheme and hence opted for state-based initiatives. In Canada there was sufficient consensus on the need for a nationally administered and funded unemployment insurance program that provinces were willing to permit federal intrusion in their traditional jurisdiction through constitutional amendment. More importantly, the American UI initiative modeled on the Wisconsin initiatives in the early 1930s established a "tax-off" incentive for states to develop unemployment insurance programs that were based on an "employer reserve." This meant that UI was a deferred salary rather than compensation for being unemployed. As Berkowitz (1991) notes, this approach favoured segregating each employer's contributions and forcing each

risk of unemployment, benefits were extended in 1946 to include seasonal work. By the mid-1940s a universal family allowance program was implemented. During this same period Saskatchewan began experimenting with programs that ensured affordable health care throughout the province. With the growing involvement of women in the workforce governments in Quebec and Ontario temporarily experimented with federal cost-sharing arrangements for child care services.

While the federal government had been involved in housing as early as 1935 (Dominion Housing Act), it was not until 1946 that the government formed the predecessor of the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation. This was to provide greater assistance to Canadians purchasing homes. By 1949, the federal government had amended the National Housing Act to encourage greater federal-provincial cooperation in the construction of low-cost housing.

In the early 1950s the federal government instituted income supplements to the elderly and income supports for persons with designated disabilities.³¹

The federal government became involved by funding some medical services under its Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act in 1957. By 1958, hospital insurance programs were established in five provinces.

The 1960s and 1970s were the zenith of the welfare state. In 1961 the Saskatchewan Medical Care Insurance Act was passed. By the mid 1960s a series of programs was established to directly contribute to a national and universal safety net. The federal Medical Care Act opened the way for universal medical coverage throughout Canada. In the field of housing, rent supplement programs and greater federal cooperation in public housing ventures meant reduced shelter expenses for low income families and individuals. Student loan programs increased opportunities for low income youth to acquire post-secondary education.

employer to be responsible only to their employees. This limited participation of state and federal governments in a broader, more universal program of the type initiated in Europe and Great Britain.

³¹The Old Age Security Act and the Old Age Assistance Act provided a pension to everyone over 70, and means-tested pension for those between 65 and 69.

Growing concern over poverty prompted income supplements for low-income seniors (Old Age Security - Guaranteed Income Supplement). Likewise, the 1966 Canada Assistance Act extended federal resources to aid provinces to carry out their responsibility to provide social assistance and other social services. This included cost-sharing for child care for low income families. But more importantly, this provided implicit social rights whereby those in need would be assured assistance regardless of the precipitating factors. Furthermore, provinces could not require that social assistance recipients provide services in return for their assistance. The rejection of the "workfare" notion of social assistance reinforces the notion of social rights and associated entitlements to which all individuals are entitled by virtue of living in Canada.³²

In 1971 the Senate Committee on Poverty reported, recommending a guaranteed annual income to combat poverty. At this time Statistics Canada began to publish regular data on poverty and an important watchdog, the National Council of Welfare, was established.

By the late 1970s the Established Programs Financing Act firmly established a federal role in health care. There were significant financial penalties for provinces that did not provide comprehensive coverage, uninhibited access, universality, portability, and non-profit administration. In 1977 provincial politicians rejected the federal government's offers regarding a guaranteed annual income. Instead, the federal government implemented a Child Tax Credit to aid low income families.

Throughout 1980s and 1990s both provincial and federal governments recognized the growing importance of poverty issues. However, it was during this period that governments initiated reforms, some designed to improve existing social programs, and others designed to reduce costs or restrict scope or eligibility. As governments grappled with recessions and rising debt, there was increasing interest in downsizing social programs. Political reaction was often pronounced as in the case of Old Age Pension and

³²For further discussion of the concept of social rights in the current Canadian context see Certosimo (1992).

Unemployment Insurance reform Others, particularly at the provincial level, exhibited little political backlash

During the 1980s the two largest provinces, Ontario and Quebec, studied proposals for large scale reforms to their social assistance programs Quebec chose to increasingly link its social programs to labour market integration and restrict eligibility It had made significant changes by the early 1990s While opposed by some community activists, the reforms met little opposition from the general population

The original recommendations of the Ontario Task Force on Social Assistance suggested enlarging the scope and relaxing eligibility requirements of social assistance in Ontario Despite public support generated by an elaborate system of hearings and community networks, these recommendations were eventually set aside as the Ontario government was increasingly forced to grapple with a recession and growing debt in the 1990s The reforms calling for enhanced assistance and relaxed eligibility were initially delayed and eventually scrapped Eventually, Ontario began to introduce reforms that paralleled many of those implemented in Quebec, particularly with respect to integrating the recipients of social programs into the workforce In recent years other provinces, such as Alberta and New Brunswick, have followed a similar course of action

Equality and Freedom and the Welfare State

Today the role of the state in health, income supports, and education is often contested in public forums Few suggest a return to the limited role of the state prior to World War Two Current debates over government spending and debt in the 1990s have brought about a new willingness to assess the validity and merit of many programs that have formed the pillars of the Canadian welfare state

Regardless of these debates the question remains concerning the general level of support towards the principles upon which the welfare state was legitimized during an earlier period Attitudes towards these principles provide important clues about our poverty belief system and the continuing influence of churches on mass beliefs

The principles legitimizing the welfare state rest on the advocacy of equality and freedom. Both equality and freedom are complex multidimensional symbols around which opposing political positions are often organized. The traditional left-right differences in Canada have been explained as opposing emphases: equality of condition versus equality of opportunity. Similar differences in the left-right split on freedom are represented in the balance between positive and negative freedom. Positive freedom represents interference by the state in individual lives that purports to enhance well-being. In the case of negative freedom the political message is an absence of interference, thereby permitting choice without barriers.

As David Heald (1983, 67) underscores, both positive and negative freedom represent two incomplete conceptions of one complex relationship. An individual is affected simultaneously by positive and negative freedoms. From a practical perspective, an absence of interference is of little benefit if the range of choices is acutely circumscribed by poverty. Likewise, intervention by the state imposes choices, which often result in trade-offs which individuals may not choose if given the opportunity (i.e. choosing higher levels of personal risk in exchange for less restrictions on the use of private property). The legitimacy of the welfare state rests on the extent to which political forces forge consensus on the way in which the principles of equality and freedom are manifested or implemented in public policy. This means that the social institutions that give meaning to symbols such as equality and freedom may play an instrumental role in legitimizing whatever form the welfare state takes.

Equality and freedom are the terms used by philosophers, social scientists, politicians and ideologues. For the broader public the rise of the welfare state had more to do with establishing safeguards against the possibility of poverty and providing a higher level of standard services. This makes sense from a political perspective and suggests a compromise on the part of various interests. As John Richard (1994, 58) suggests, the modern welfare state is a cooperative solution to a prisoners' dilemma game. Social programs step in where markets fail or where the consequences of open conflict or class strife would threaten the stability of society (cf. Kerans 1981).

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From an international perspective the Great Depression did much to legitimize the idea of an interventionist state (Garraty 1978)³³ While responses varied, the degree of poverty and its concentration throughout the industrialized world propelled criticism of the orthodox understanding of some of the leading causes of poverty. This generated growing acceptance of social policies that ensured income supports and safeguards against the vicissitudes of the labour market. It also brought about a climate where forces could be mobilized in favour of programs that brought greater security to a broader spectrum of citizens.

This trend is evident in the "about face" of the two traditional parties in Canadian politics. Throughout the thirties both party leaders refused to adopt state intervention as an explicit form of social policy. Mackenzie King even rejected the idea of federal unemployment relief in the first year of the Great Depression. However, R. B. Bennett promised greater federal relief, which helped ensure that his party formed the government after the 1930 election.

Bennett provided unemployment relief that amounted to ten times more than that which had been provided by the federal government during the entire decade of the 1920s. Only twenty percent of the relief was to be given as direct assistance. The rest was to be spent on municipal public works. As growing unemployment gave rise to fears of social unrest, Bennett's conservative government became more punitive in its application of relief. Ottawa resorted to work camps and applied eligibility rules that were similar to those used under the later British Poor Laws. The emphasis was on forcing individuals to take personal initiative in resolving the poverty question (Struthers 1986).

This approach was severely criticized by a growing number of social activists, many of whom were influential in the mainstream denominations throughout Canada. Prominent intellectual organizations such as the League for Social Reconstruction began to develop. Within such organizations coalitions were formed drawing from other associations whose

³³The form of the interventionist state, however, cannot be deduced from the political culture or ideological debate. For an excellent discussion of the factors influencing national responses to the Great Depression and other international crises see Peter Gourevitch (1986).

members had more formal links to denominations (i.e. Fellowship for a Christian Social Order). There was a certain religious flavour to the criticism of the existing capitalist system in organizations such as the League, despite having members who had ceased to be affiliated with any Christian denomination (Horn 1980, 89).

The experience of the Great Depression and the subsequent success of an interventionist state with World War Two precipitated new ways of thinking about poverty. As Campbell notes, the "1930s and 1940s saw Canadians debating controversial issues like property rights, economic distribution, capitalism and socialism, economic morality, etc." (1987, 59).

The 1943 Progressive Conservative platform embraced individual social and economic rights such as commitment to full employment and rising incomes, low-cost housing, social security, pensions, health care, and extended educational opportunities (Campbell 1987, 27). During this same period Liberal ministers were openly supporting the right to sufficient food, the capacity to enjoy leisure, free and equal opportunities for education, and security against unemployment, ill-health, old age, and the financial strain of raising children (Campbell 1987, 28). While the positions of the traditional parties may appear moderate by today's standards, they would have branded the politician as "radical and dangerous" ten years earlier (Campbell 1987, 28). These statements were not just the political flourish of a new utopianism, but rather reflected a gradual shift in the two main federal parties towards an acceptance of a greater intervening role for the state. Provincial governments had already begun experimenting with new forms of social programs and state intervention (i.e., Social Credit under Aberhart, CCF in Saskatchewan, Liberal Premier Patullo's "socialized capitalism" in British Columbia).

Consensus and the Welfare State

In the context of poverty, the consensus on principles of the welfare state means that there is less acceptance of extreme inequality. This is reflected in the transatlantic influence of the Beveridge Report and Keynesian economics. The consensus is also reflected in the rising electoral influence of the CCF at the provincial level after World War II, and the

gradual adoption of the more moderate aspects of its political agenda by a number of governments

During the early stages of the Canadian welfare state there was a sense that the state was capable of maintaining a minimum level of material security for its citizens. There was a greater willingness to intervene with the state to secure the basic necessities for disadvantaged individuals. When this came to policy decisions, however, there was often disagreement and dissent. This was certainly evident in the negative response of the medical profession to efforts at instituting universal medical insurance.

Along with the development of programs, the welfare state has also generated its own symbols. As Michael Valpy notes, political culture in Canada adopted social programs as a symbol of how Canadians are endowed with "the grace of social justice and collective caring." (1993, 182) While this may be part of the political discourse of Canadian nationalism it is difficult to infer on this basis that our social programs are the natural product of a society bestowed with a collective sense of "caring" and social justice. The mythology of a compassionate and caring society, while possibly part of the collective imagination, must be rooted in some symbolic form, which in turn is rooted in the way in which social institutions have helped entrench values and attitudes in belief systems.

Commitment to "caring" and social justice cannot be reduced to a willingness to donate income or volunteer time.³⁴ If this was the case francophone Canadians would be considered less caring and less interested in social justice than non-francophone Canadians. As Martin notes in his analysis of the language and class effects on donations and volunteerism, French-speaking Canadians demonstrate a significant propensity to give less than other Canadians.

Using 1980 national donation data, Martin estimates that francophone Canadians give one third less than the Canadian average (Martin 1985, 166). The facile explanation is that

³⁴In terms of class, family donation data in the early 1980s confirms the maxim that the rich give the most, but the poor are more generous (Martin 1985, 148). Giving, hence, is a partial function of socio-economic factors and the extent to which these factors are tied to different belief systems and values. This is hardly the general orientation implied in Valpy's suggestions of a political culture of "caring."

French Canadians have relied historically on religious institutions and religious orders to administer programs in the voluntary sector. As Michel Roquet, a President of Montreal's United Way (Centraide) stated, "the problem in the francophone sector is that they still believe the (Roman Catholic) Church takes care of everything, even though no one goes any more or gives it any money" (cited in Martin 1985, 166). With only half the per capita non-religious voluntary organizations in provinces such as Ontario, francophones in Quebec have not experienced the same degree of competition for donations.³⁵

The explanation of the francophone pattern should not lead to the conclusion that Catholic society in general, or Quebec society in particular, are less caring or less interested in social justice issues affecting the poor.³⁶ As subsequent analysis of attitudinal data suggests, the primary difference between Catholics and other Canadians is the extent to which "caring" and social justice involve the collective interventions of the state, or whether such activities are the primary responsibility of the non-religious voluntary sector.

Richard Johnston's (1986, 90ff) study on public opinion provides some useful insights into the development of general consensus on various programs associated with the welfare state. Consensus on the redistributive nature of social programs developed over time. This is evident in responses to Gallup Poll questions on pensions and Family Allowance and the willingness of respondents to accept the implications for taxation.³⁷

³⁵In 1980 there were an estimated 0.8 non-religious voluntary organizations for every 1,000 individuals in Ontario. In Quebec, the ratio of non-religious voluntary organizations to population was 0.4 to 1,000 (Martin 1985, 166).

³⁶In fairness to linguistic differences, the donations and volunteerism of the Anglo-Saxon category was only slightly greater than the national average. The significant difference for this category was in predicting higher proportions of income donated to religious institutions. This is a partial reflection of the church-sect differences, where institutions having a universal church heritage have considerably lower rates of individual giving than their more sectarian counterparts. This is reflected in published donation trends in the *Yearbook of American and Canadian Churches*. The larger percentage of giving within the sectarian churches is probably due in some measure to the more tightly knit communities which these institutions have historically formed. Other explanations may involve combinations of ethnic and low income compositions which have demonstrated significant effects on donation behaviour (Martin 1985, 164ff).

³⁷This pattern of developing consensus is less evident in the medicare questions. This is probably the result of a important difference in the way in which the taxation component was phrased. There is an important difference between the phrasing of the medicare questions and that of the pension and Family

In a regression analysis of responses to questions on pensions, Johnston found that regional differences became less pronounced between 1951 and 1966. A similar reduction in differences across time was evident for linguistic influences.³⁸ Differences in regional and linguistic support for Family Allowance also declined between 1971 and 1979. Religious affiliation and support for programs followed the same pattern.

The religious affiliation measure used by Johnston is a dummy variable and only differentiates between Catholic and Protestant. Its significance as a coefficient in the regression analysis suggests, nonetheless, that there remains an important influence on program support which is associated with the social role of religious institutions. These differences evident in the surveys analyzed by Johnston exist despite a general convergence in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s among church spokespersons. During this period the church elite were becoming increasingly vocal in their support of social programs. Social justice was the rallying point around which both Catholic and Protestant clergy promoted the interests of the disadvantaged in Canadian society.

As noted in the previous chapter, convergence around social justice themes was not uniform, nor is there exacting evidence to support the extent to which the influence of outspoken church elite penetrated the membership. Pierre Berton's anecdotal study (1965) portrays the Anglican clergy as an ecclesiastical caste defending the status quo. The general Anglican body is portrayed similarly. Conversely, Stewart Crysedale finds the clergy of the United Church stronger proponents of the welfare state than their laic counterparts. In fact, support for state intervention in social welfare and economic planning increased as clergy became less associated with congregational charges and more tied to the General Council and field supervision (Crysedale 1965, 53). While the Catholic clergy have had a historical "love-hate" affair with social programs and their advocates,

Allowance questions. The 1967 medicare question emphasizes increased taxes which probably precipitated a larger number of negative responses. The 1956 medicare question was more passive in its reference to taxes, asking approval of financing medicare with tax dollars.

³⁸"Other" languages (i.e. other than French or English) is an exception to this rule for both pensions and Family Allowance questions.

Baum's optimistic assessment of the predominance of the social justice theme within Canadian Catholicism suggests a movement which has considerable latent support at the grassroots level (Baum 1984). Whether this is sufficient leverage against more traditional forms of Catholicism remains an outstanding question.

The question of direct clergy influence is beyond the scope of this study. While the voices of prominent church elite may exert a countervailing force against institutional heritage, it is important to test the extent to which denominations encompass a distinct belief system. It is possible to map denominational differences in support of various aspects of the welfare state and the way it addresses inequality and need (i.e., income supports, housing, workfare, health care, education grants, training programs, and unemployment insurance). And, these differences will provide information about the way in which religious institutions structure contemporary beliefs about poverty.

Mapping Consensus

While Johnston's analysis (1986) suggests a developing consensus within Canada around a narrow spectrum, we need to examine attitudes that reflect the period after the 1970s. It is during this period the welfare state reached its zenith. This was also a period where the legitimacy of the welfare state has been increasingly challenged by political forces. Disagreement or dissent at this point would represent possible cleavages that are rooted in different conceptions of equality or redistribution.³⁹ This in turn will provide a context for understanding denominational differences.

Current attitudes about social programs suggest a degree of consensus and durability in attitudes about the welfare state. A study commissioned by Human Resources Development Canada (Angus Reid Group 1994), notes that while a majority of Canadians favour social security reform, they still attach considerable importance to the current

³⁹While differences may exist around these points this does not imply that such differences be constructed around traditional Left-Right themes. As Nevitte and Gibbins (1990) note in their comparative study of ideology among university students, Canada is exceptional in the weakness of the Left-Right framework and its applicability to the way in which young Canadian elites structure their perceptions and attitudes.

system⁴⁰ Similar to the social justice and compassionate symbols referred to by Valpy (1993) in his discussion of Canadian mythology, the current system is described by respondents in terms such as "essential", "helping people in times of need", and "compassionate" (Angus Reid Group 1994)

As caveats on the support for the general welfare state, there are different perceptions of how programs should be modified or social spending targeted. When respondents were asked about their support for continuing government delivered benefits to those in need there was a relatively high level of agreement (see Table 21)

Only 47% of respondents supported continuing federal support for social assistance. This lower level of support should be qualified because there is a split between those who view different roles for federal and provincial governments. Public support for social assistance may be deeper than suspected, especially when children are included as recipients. Only 32% agreed that the government should be providing financial assistance to only the poorest families, cutting supports to all others, and only 29% believed that government "should not provide any more financial assistance than it is now to low income families with children because people shouldn't have children unless they can afford them"

The family-child factor is important. Sixty-eight percent of respondents agreed that families with dependent children should be entitled to tax benefits to which others are not entitled. Similarly, an estimated 70% agreed with the statement "if I heard the government was going to create 150,000 more licensed child care spaces to help lower income working parents, I'd think this was good news". What these results indicate is the support for family targeted programs designed to alleviate the impoverishment of parents and children.

⁴⁰The public opinion survey was conducted by the Angus Reid Group between June 26 and June 28, 1994, see "Social Security Reform - Wave II", July 1994. Results are those presented in the Angus Reid report. Another study by Ekos, earlier in 1994, supports this general acceptance of a relatively active welfare state by a majority of Canadians (Greenspon 1995). This support for the welfare state, however, does not translate into confidence in current politicians or the way in which programs are currently delivered.

Table 21. Support for Canadian Social Programs in the Early 1990s

Policy Categories	% Support
Supported benefits for those with disabilities	89%
Supported benefits for middle and low-income families with children under 18 at home	69%
Supported unemployment insurance	67%
Supported workers compensation	67%
Supported helping unemployed people upgrade job skills	66%

Source: Source: Angus Reid Survey 1994

There is an underlying tension between support for social programs that encompass the middle class and "deserving poor" (i.e. persons with disabilities and families with children) and those who are less deserving.⁴¹ Support for programs declines as programs are increasingly targeted to those who may be deemed, by some, to be less deserving.

From a denominational perspective there are some interesting differences between Quebec and Alberta.⁴² Both provinces represented extreme positions on social programs and both have dominant religious institutions: Catholicism in Quebec and sect-type institutions in Alberta.⁴³ Quebec was more collectivist in orientation, with an implicit structural orientation to poverty related issues. Conversely, Alberta demonstrated a more individual approach to social programs. These patterns are evident in provincial positions on social assistance and tax breaks in Table 22.

⁴¹The Angus Reid study does not examine attitudes about the health care system which constitutes an important part of the Canadian welfare state.

⁴²One should not dismiss these differences as a simple reflection of provincial culture. As McDermid (1990) notes in his study of Ontario, there are important intraprovincial differences in attitudes that must be taken into account when talking about provincial systems. This supports the emphasis that must be placed on examining the role social institutions play in the formation and maintenance of belief systems. And, as in the case of churches, these social institutions transcend provincial boundaries.

⁴³Over 51% of Protestants in Alberta belong to denominations other than the Anglican Church or United Church. This is compared to Ontario and British Columbia where this non-mainstream portion of the Protestant population is 44% and 48% respectively. Non-mainstream Protestants represent 25% of the provincial population in Alberta, compared to 20% in Ontario and 21% in British Columbia. In contrast, Nova Scotia has a proportionately smaller non-mainstream Protestant population as a percentage of all provincial Protestants, but this group represents 23% of the provincial population. Percentages are calculated by the author using Statistics Canada base numbers (Statistics Canada 1993).

Table 22: Support for Social Assistance and Tax Breaks - Alberta and Quebec

Policy Categories	Quebec	Alberta
Family Tax Breaks	78% Agree	68% Agree
Limiting Assistance to "poorest families"	32% Agree	44% Agree

Source: Angus Reid Survey 1994

The issue of deserving/undeserving or universal/targeted is complicated by the way in which social programs have evolved. In the case of unemployment insurance differences occur over how an individual perceives UI, whether it is understood as an insurance program or a social program (Angus Reid 1994, 8). In the former, 60% of respondents agreed that people who contribute are eligible to draw on funds when needed. If UI is understood as a social program, only 38% of respondents agreed that it is a mechanism through which government should protect "those who need help."

The evolution of unemployment insurance as a social policy instrument to aid seasonal workers and foster training initiatives has not been as successful in fostering public support as health care initiatives. In a Gallup poll (March 1989), 76% of respondents expressed satisfaction with their hospital/medical plan and 80% were satisfied with the health care services in their province.⁴⁴

The debate around social programs and the restructuring implies a range of assumptions about who is "deserving" and the collective obligations of society. On the one hand, programs such as health care are easily viewed as collective benefits regardless of one's income or socio-economic status. Illness and expensive medical procedures are events that all families experience at some point in the life cycle.

The likelihood of experiencing poverty is not perceived as an imminent possibility for a majority of Canadians. Nevertheless, social programs that target children are generally supported regardless of how one understands poverty. Whether one adheres to a

⁴⁴Unless otherwise stated, Gallup poll results are calculated using weighted data sets from Carleton University's Social Sciences Data Archives. Data were collected by the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup Poll). Codebook preparation and data cleaning were completed by the Carleton University Social Science Data Archives, under the auspices of the Machine Readable Archives Division of the Public Archives of Canada. These organizations provided the data but can not be held responsible for the analyses or interpretations presented nor for any problems with the data.

structural or individual explanation of poverty, it is difficult to blame children for the plight of their parents. As the type of program (i.e., UI, social assistance, post-secondary education) moves away from targeted groups such as children or persons with disabilities the questions of eligibility or "deservedness" become politicized.

Despite these tendencies there is still considerable support for the welfare state. Support remains stable despite increasing concerns for the current fiscal crisis. Despite general concern with the federal deficit, a 1995 Ekos survey found that Canadians still wish to retain their social programs. The study found that Canadians continue to "see a major role for the government in developing human resources and in helping to create jobs regardless of fiscal pressures" (Greenspan 1995, A6).

Stability of Consensus

An important characteristic of attitudes toward the welfare state is the remarkable durability of support, despite the rise of political forces opposing state intervention and fiscal crises eroding the capacity of governments to pay for social programs. Thatcherism and its American embodiment in Reagan's Republicanism provided ample reason to delegitimize the welfare state (Whitaker 1987). Despite the way in which the British Conservative party dominated the debate over the welfare state in the 1980s, popular sentiment in Great Britain maintained considerable support for social programs (Taylor-Gooby 1991, 106ff).

In his analysis of British attitudes, Taylor-Gooby found stable support for social programs in Great Britain and few significant differences in class positions on social spending. The harsher environment of the 1980s only increased sympathy for the poor. Moreover, despite the anti-social program spending policies of the British Conservative government throughout the 1980s, he found that support for more social spending increased between 1983 and 1989 (1991, 111-112).

While general support for the welfare state remains relatively high in both Great Britain and Canada, Taylor-Gooby identifies a number of qualifying tendencies that

provide some background for understanding the limits to support for the welfare state⁴⁵ First, British surveys in the 1980s indicate high priority for universal programs such as national health services, pensions, child benefits, and targeted benefits for "highly deserving" persons with disabilities This is contrasted with decreasing support for the unemployed and single parents (1991, 113-118) Second, there is growing acceptance of co-existing private and public sector services or provisions that are complementary Third, Taylor-Gooby finds evidence of a "moralistic disquiet" about the way in which the welfare state creates an undesirable dependency that imposes a stigma on recipients and erodes self-sufficiency and community spirit This is combined with a growing awareness of the needs of the poor and willingness to increase taxes to meet these needs Finally, while there is stable support for the welfare state there is growing dissatisfaction with the way in which government delivers services and entitlements This latter point may explain the apparent contradiction between a perceived induced dependency resulting from actual program delivery and an acceptance of the needs of low income individuals and families It is not so much the principle of social programs, but rather, the way in which they are currently designed and administered which is the cause for concern

The example of attitudinal trends in Great Britain is not directly applicable to the Canadian context, but it does indicate the importance of qualifying the general support for the welfare state⁴⁶ More importantly, some of the factors that qualify support in Great Britain are less applicable in the Canadian context and suggest the need to explore other influences such as religious institutions and their associated regional and linguistic cleavages

⁴⁵Some of the reason for the stability of support for the welfare state in Canada may have to do with the way in which politicians tempered their attack on social programs in the 1980s This can be compared with Great Britain where the more pronounced polemic against the welfare state is contrasted with a longer and more pronounced tradition in social programs (see Mishra 1990: 70ff)

⁴⁶This is particularly true of young Quebec elites (Neville and Gibbins 1990: 129)

General Factors Influencing Support of the Welfare State

Taylor-Gooby found that rather than class, it was party preference that most differentiated positions on the British welfare state. In the Canadian context, parties and class institutions have not advanced their politics in traditional left-right ideological formats. It is this ideological framework that defines the contours of beliefs and attitudes about the welfare state in most other industrial countries. This is not to diminish the importance of ideological differences that may exist, at least between active members of Canadian parties and social activist (Blake 1988, 44, Johnston 1988). However, the cleavages of ethnicity, language and region tend to play a more important role in the brokering discourse of at least the traditional parties, and continue to dominate in the absence of Canadian class-based social and political institutions (Brodie and Jenson 1988, Stevenson 1991).

The limited importance of traditional left-right discourse in the Canadian party system or in its mass beliefs is reinforced in the findings of Clement and Myles (1994). In their comparative study they found important differences between Nordic countries and Canada and the United States. Data collected in the early eighties provide evidence of a strong current of populism dominating North American attitudes. This prevailing populism in Canadian political culture pits the "unorganized many" against "big" business, "big" government, and "big" labour (1994, 100). In other words, North Americans tend to be suspicious of large powerful organizations. This leaves an opening for the legitimacy of less powerful local institutions such as community groups, voluntary associations, and other local organizations that are more intimately connected to communities. This would include local churches.

The importance of populism in Canada and the United States means that the traditional way of organizing ideas about the welfare state along a left-right continuum may not be an effective model. The populist model constructed by Clement and Myles in essence denotes a predominant distrust of large institutions that cannot be controlled or held accountable. Churches, interestingly, score higher on confidence measures than most institutions associated with big business, big government (i.e., federal), and organized

labour (Johnston 1986, 56). However, it is important to differentiate the local church and its community setting from the larger organizational setting. As Johnston's analysis of trust indicators notes, organized religion enjoys considerably less confidence among the general population than banks and schools, and only marginally less confidence than newspapers and provincial governments.⁴⁷

The irony is that while there is a strident distrust of the welfare state in both American and Canadian populism, there is in Canada, at least, a greater acceptance of the role of the state.⁴⁸ This acceptance is evident in the extent to which Canadian governments have been historically more active in the extension and development of social programs (i.e., health care and universal income supports) than their American counterparts.

The difference is most pronounced in the unwillingness of the Progressive Conservatives under Mulroney to pursue the type of agenda that dominated in the United States in the 1980s. Despite rhetorical posturing on the fiscal crisis of the state, the federal government limited its cuts to social spending. While publicly arguing that universal programs were part of the Canadian "social fabric", the federal government attempted to target social spending by eliminating historic universal programs such as family allowance and replacing it with a new family benefits package that involved partially de-indexed tax credits (Moscovitch 1990, 200ff.). Early attempts to restructure old age pension income was temporarily stopped after an effective lobbying campaign by seniors.

Efforts by the Federal government to reform income security programs such as UI are encountering local opposition as they attempt to limit the use of such programs to offset

⁴⁷ This is probably more indicative of the lack of confidence in the professional hierarchy that dominates most ecclesiastical and administrative structures in mainstream Canadian religious institutions. Such conclusions do not, however, suggest a diminished role for the local organization and the symbolic world which it institutionalizes and transmits.

⁴⁸ Compare Clement and Myles (1994, Chapter Five) and Lipset (1990, Chapter Eight). Supporting evidence for Canadian populism even among the elite is found in a comparative study of university students by Nevitte and Gibbins (1990). In line with a notion of populism that rejects an influence hierarchy of large institutions, right-wing Canadian respondents tended to be the least tolerant of influence hierarchies. Left-wing Canadian respondents, while giving less status to consumers than their American counterparts, were less supportive of influence by major institutions, including unions, than their counterparts in other countries (1990, 148-150).

regional disparities. Proposals to reform UI, since the 1986 Forget Commission and continuing to the Axworthy proposals in 1994, have leaned toward an employment insurance model that is more akin to that which operates in the United States (cf. Muszyński 1992, 173ff). The difficulty of moving in this direction is noted in the way in which regional protests have generated opposition to reforms that would eliminate the way in which the existing UI program takes into account regional differences and helps bolster depressed or seasonal economies.

Similar protests have developed over provincial reforms in Quebec and more recently in Ontario. Efforts to limit eligibility and benefits for social assistance programs have resulted in broad protest coalitions such as the Bread and Roses march to Quebec City and the demonstrations in front of the Ontario Legislature building, protesting the reforms of the Harris government. Despite growing skepticism about the effectiveness of current social programs there remains relatively significant support for the welfare state.

Canadian Attitudes and the Welfare State

The 1992 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP92) provides an interesting profile of the current importance of the welfare state in Canadian culture.⁴⁹ This same profile also points to the underlying dissatisfaction with the way in which welfare state currently operates.

The majority (71%) of Canadian respondents agreed that differences in income are too large. When asked what was the role of government just under half supported more extreme state interventions than what exists under current social programs. For example, 48% of respondents agreed that it is the responsibility of government to reduce differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes. Another 49% agreed that government should provide a guaranteed basic income. In the area of labour

⁴⁹The data for this survey is housed in the Carleton University Social Science Data Archives. Percentages were calculated by the author using data set weights for national population adjustments.

market intervention 41% agreed that government should provide a job for everyone who wants one.⁵⁰

The tendency to support a more egalitarian society should be qualified. Respondents in the 1992 International Social Survey Programme were presented with five diagrams showing different kinds of societies. The diagrams depicted a range of elitist and egalitarian societies. At one extreme the diagram depicted an inverted "T" shape showing a small elite at the top, very few people in the middle, and the great mass of people at the bottom. Another depicted a pyramid shape with a small elite at the top, more people in the middle and the most at the bottom. The third diagram kept the pyramid shape but had fewer people at the bottom. The fourth diagram represented a society with the most people in the middle. The last diagram was an inverted pyramid with many people near the top and few near the bottom.

The majority of respondents chose diagrams four and five when asked what Canadian society "ought to be like". These diagrams represented a more equal distribution of socio-economic status. While 30% chose the fifth diagram and its more egalitarian society represented in the inverted pyramid, more than 44% chose the fourth diagram where most of the people were in the middle.

The hoped for society can be contrasted with the choice of respondents when asked to identify the diagram that best represents what type of society Canada is today. In this case 22% chose the first diagram with its inverted "T". Another 32% chose the second diagram with its pyramid shape. Ironically, when asked to choose the diagram that depicts what Canada was like in the 1960s, there was less of a tendency to chose the diagrams depicting greater inequality. This may be a reflection of the halcyon days prior to the string of economic recessions that plagued the 1970s and 1980s. The responses may also reflect the optimism and faith in the welfare state that accompanied the introduction of many social programs in the 1960s. Nonetheless, only 14% of respondents chose the first

⁵⁰The question phrasing matches that used in describing the results. Responses are based on a 5 point scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. Reported percentages combine strongly agree and agree responses.

diagram. Another 24% chose the fourth diagram, with its bulging middle, to represent society in the 1960s.⁵¹ This is very different from the most popular diagrams chosen to depict Canadian society in 1991.

The differences in choices in the way in which Canadian society is structured and the perceived role of the state suggest two possibilities. First, there remains a longing for the equality that the welfare state promised. Second, there is recognition that such equality may not be possible in the context of what is feasible politically and economically. What is consistent is the broader sense that the majority of individuals in poverty can move up the socio-economic ladder with the assistance of the welfare state. Where this assistance comes from and how it is to be delivered raises numerous questions, but the question of reform does not detract from the basic underlying support for the general principle of the welfare state.

Reforming the Welfare State - Qualifying Support

The efforts to reform social programs throughout the 1980s and 1990s resulted in a number of surveys focusing on attitudes toward various aspects of the welfare state. These surveys provide a more detailed understanding of the relationship between denominational affiliation and perceptions of the welfare state and poverty.⁵²

While Gallup polls do not provide a method of distinguishing between Protestant denominations, their frequency and variety permit some insights into the general relationship between churches and poverty beliefs. One of the earliest efforts by Gallup to document attitudes toward welfare reform is the August 1978 poll.⁵³

When provided with an open response to reforms, the two most popular suggestions focused on tougher requirements and better screening. Twenty percent of respondents

⁵¹Percentages include respondents who did not choose. Those not choosing range between 5-10%. The percentages of those choosing diagrams would be slightly higher if those who did not choose were excluded in the calculation.

⁵²See Johnston (1988, 65) and his hint about non-ideological variation.

⁵³Of the Gallup data only the 1978 survey results are unweighted. Weights were not provided with the data set.

supported tougher requirements. Twenty-three percent proposed better screening procedures to eliminate cheaters. Similar to the findings in the Class Structure survey, both francophone and non-francophone Catholics favoured screening procedures (34% and 21%).⁵⁴ This is compared to the 18% of Protestants favouring this reform measure. Protestant support aligned with tougher requirements and demonstrated greater support for measures that would make it more difficult to receive social assistance. Twenty-four percent of Protestants proposed this measure, while only 19% and 14% of Non-Francophone and Francophone Catholics mentioned similar reforms. This suggests that there is a stronger perception among Protestants that individuals currently receiving assistance do not merit assistance, could be self-sufficient without assistance, or that such assistance is detrimental to their integration in society.

Table 23: Welfare Initiative Survey Questions

Welfare Initiative Survey Questions

- Should the Prime Minister be committed to expanding welfare?
- Should family allowance go only to the needy?
- Pensions to only those who needed them?
- Do People really need welfare?
- Favour guaranteed annual income?
- Favour forcing welfare people to work?

Source: CIPO October 1988

Using reform suggestions in the 1978 poll as a dummy variable (suggested=1 not suggested=0), only "tougher restrictions" was significantly correlated with year of birth ($r=.1$ $P<.01$), income ($r=.13$ $p<.01$), and education ($r=.13$ $p<.01$).⁵⁵ Protestant support for this reform, and the significance of other factors, suggests the importance of using data that can distinguish between Protestant denominations. Conversely, the proposition with greatest Catholic support was not significantly correlated to other socio-economic factors.

⁵⁴Findings are based on a multiple response analysis where frequencies are a percentage of respondents.

⁵⁵Sex was insignificant for both suggested reforms.

Evidence of this denominational effect on welfare reform initiatives deserves further attention. The October 1988 Gallup survey asked a series of questions designed to assess attitudes toward social program reforms (see Table 23).

Table 24: Socio-Economic Influences on Support of Social Program Initiatives

Socio-economic Indicators⁵⁶	Pattern: Percent feeling that the Prime Minister should expand welfare and; percent favouring a GAI.
Age 18-29 Years 30-49 Years 50+ Years	Younger respondents were more supportive of a GAI with a thirteen point spread between the youngest and the oldest categories. * Age did not have a significant effect on feelings about expanding welfare.
Income <\$10,000 \$10,000-\$14,999 \$15,000-\$19,999 \$20,000-\$29,999 \$30,000-\$39,999 \$40,000-\$49,999 >\$50,000	As total family income decreases respondents increasingly favour both expanded welfare and a GAI (83.6% in favour of expanding welfare for those with incomes under \$10,000 and 44.7% for those with incomes greater than \$50,000**); similarly, there were 64% in favour of a GAI for those with incomes under \$10,000 and 38.3% for those with incomes between \$40,000 and \$49,000*).
Sex	Women were more in favour of a GAI (50.1% female to 41.5% male)*; and women were more supportive of expanding welfare (60.9% female to 51.4% male*).
Education	Education had no significant effect on support for expanding welfare or a Guaranteed Annual Income.

Source: CIPO October 1988

The patterns of groups defined by age, sex, and income, on positions about guaranteed annual income (GAI) and welfare expansion, are statistically significant with the exception of age on expanding welfare. Education was not a significant factor for either reform proposal.

Table 24 summarizes the Gallup poll results showing significant relationships in response patterns on two welfare reform proposals prevalent in the 1980s. The first deals

⁵⁶ Support for expanding welfare and implementing a Guaranteed Annual Income (GAI) among committed dichotomous responses based on a significant X^2 where $p < .01$ is * and $p < .001$ is **. Category percentages and X^2 are calculated excluding cases where there was at least one non-response, "can't say", "don't know", or "not stated". In some tabulations almost one third of the sample is excluded.

with the implementation of a GAI and the second examines openness toward the general expansion of social assistance

The group patterns suggest a sense of group interest associated with positions on reform. The more economically marginalized or dependent the more in favour the group was toward GAI and welfare expansion. Hence, youth, women, and low income categories were supportive of a more egalitarian and distributive welfare state

Despite the results of this particular survey we must be cautious. As our earlier discussion of class suggests, a facile explanation of recognized group interest presupposes a group or class consciousness. Groups interests can also be unconscious social constructions in that a large number of individuals sharing similar social characteristics arrive at similar preferences, but without consciously recognizing these preferences as a collective characteristic.

Table 25: Comparing Denominational Support for Social Policies

Denominations <i>Percent Agreeing or Strongly Agreeing⁵⁷</i>	Too Much Income Inequality	Gov't Should Redistribute Income	Gov't Should Provide Jobs	Gov't Should Provide GAI
Fr RC	79.0	56.0	53.5	65.3
NonFr RC	75.8	53.4	46.3	49.2
Anglican	57.0	30.2	21.3	41.6
United Church	69.0	50.6	32.3	51.0
No Affiliation	69.6	48.9	33.8	41.6
<i>X² sig. p=</i>	<i>0.01401</i>	<i>0.0187</i>	<i>0.00001</i>	<i>0.00019</i>
<i>Cramer's V</i>	<i>0.13722</i>	<i>0.13477</i>	<i>0.20548</i>	<i>0.18309</i>
<i>Total N</i>	<i>664</i>	<i>651</i>	<i>657</i>	<i>660</i>

Source: ISSP 1992

Unconscious collective characteristics and institutional mechanisms, whereby collective interests are articulated and recognized, are part of the broader tension between the determining influences of structural forces and the agency of institutions attempting to legitimize policies or generate counter claims in the political arena. The irony of a

⁵⁷ Percentages are calculated from weighted data using the 1992 Canadian survey of ISSP

denominational influence is that it is part of the broader pattern of structural forces that transmit beliefs across time, yet associated with dynamic institutions that actively attempt to articulate the voice of a specific community such as the church.

The absence of a legitimate and well-organized voice for groups such as youth, women, or low income individuals in Canada may suggest an explanation of why such group effects are insufficient in and of themselves to explain the patterns of support for social programs or more general beliefs about poverty. The weakness of the social group or class explanation of orientations toward social programs is evident if the type of question or reform proposals are expanded. The irony is that the idea of convergence among mainstream Canadian religious elite and denominational differences suggest that the institutional effect is more complicated than what models emphasizing church leadership would suggest

Denominational Effect - Simple Bivariate Evidence

The first presentation of evidence on denominational influence on beliefs about the welfare state, and by implication poverty, is found in denominational response patterns in the 1992 Canadian survey of the International Social Survey Programme. As Table 25 indicates there are significant denominational differences in how church members perceive income inequality and the role of the welfare state.

Catholics, regardless of language, agree that income differences are too large in Canada. Anglicans are less likely to agree with this position. The most distinguishing pattern in perceptions of income inequality is the Catholic-Protestant split.

The denominational patterns for questions on the role of government are more mixed. Catholics indicate the greatest support for state intervention in both income redistribution and the labour market. Anglicans appear to be the least supportive.

Table 26: Denominational Differences on Inequality and Redistribution

Paired Denominations Percentage Point Differences⁵⁸	Too Much Income Inequality	Gov't Should Redistribute Income	Gov't Should Provide Jobs	Gov't Should Provide GAI
Fr RC and Anglicans	22.0	25.8	32.2	23.7
Fr RC and United Church	10.0	5.4	21.2	14.3
NonFr RC and Anglicans	18.8	23.2	25.0	7.6
NonFr RC and United Church	6.8	2.8	14.0	-1.8

Source: ISSP 1992

The degree of denominational differences in levels of support for state intervention is indicated in Table 26. In keeping with the Catholic-Protestant split, the largest and most consistent differences are in state labour market intervention. While the linguistic characteristic appears to influence larger differences, the difference between non-francophone Catholics and their Protestant counterparts is relatively important in all but two areas. The similarities are found between non-francophone Catholics and United Church members in the role of government in income redistribution and in providing a guaranteed annual income (GAI). The largest and most consistent Catholic-Protestant differences are found in the role for government in the provision of jobs. The statistical tests confirm this pattern. The measure of association between denominational affiliation and government provision of jobs is higher than any of the other patterns listed in Table 25.

Disagreement Within Denominations

The percentage of respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing with the role of the welfare state provides a general indication of support for programs designed to minimize the threat of poverty. While there are substantial differences in some areas, in others the differences are minimal. While the Catholic-Protestant cleavage is most pronounced, this

⁵⁸The difference is calculated by subtracting the percentage of agree or strongly agree for one denomination from another.

does not exclude a church-sect dimension that contributes to denominational differences. One of the tests for this possibility is a brief examination of the variance of responses within each denomination.

Using the same data in the preceding tables, variance is calculated for each denomination. While variation is limited due to the restrictions of a five point agreement scale, there are some interesting differences.⁵⁹ As Figure 1 suggests, the degree of variability is somewhat greater for Protestants than Catholics. The differences are most pronounced for the questions on inequality of income distribution and the role of government in providing a guaranteed annual income.

As noted earlier, the aberration in the church-sect pattern is most closely associated with the non-conformity of Anglican response patterns with those that are Catholic. Interestingly, it is among Anglicans that one also finds the greatest amount of over all variation in response patterns. This does not explain why the Catholic-Protestant cleavage is more prevalent than the church-sect pattern. It does, however, suggest the importance of probing more deeply into the various dimensions of the welfare state and the numerous ways in which policy and poverty are understood within each denomination.

⁵⁹Variance is calculated by subtracting the mean from each score. The differences are then squared individually and added together.

Figure 1: Intrad denominational Variation in Responses⁶⁰

Source: ISSP 1992

Different Dimensions to Denominational Differences

The preceding section provides some evidence of bivariate relationships between denominational affiliation and policies that decrease the extent of poverty in Canadian society. While a more stringent test of partial effects is found in the following chapter, it is important to examine more detailed aspects of the welfare state and explore other bivariate relationships that may explain preferences and attitudes among members of different denominations. This can be done by exploring patterns that exist in other surveys.

Analysis of patterns in different Gallup polls suggests that the denominational effect and other socio-economic characteristics interact differently with each dimension of welfare state and poverty beliefs. For example, Table 27 presents significant bivariate relationships between four socio-economic variables and different questions relating to the welfare state. The results are surprising in that the only socio-economic factor that has as

⁶⁰Variance is calculated using weighted data from the 1992 Canadian sample of the International Social Survey Programme.

many significant bivariate associations as denomination is income. Just as importantly, the pattern of association among different questions and the four socio-economic variables is clustered around the GAI and expanding welfare questions.

Comparing significant influences on the social policy questions in the 1988 Gallup poll is especially intriguing given the extent to which the pattern for denominational effects remains significant across a number of policy areas. The strength of this significance is even more relevant given the fact that the general Protestant category fails to capture some of the important institutional differences associated with Protestant denominations discussed in earlier chapters.⁶¹

Table 27: Contrasting Influences on Social Policy Attitudes

Category ⁶²	Should Family Allowance go only to the needy?	Pensions to only those who needed them?	Do people really need welfare?	Favour Guaranteed Annual Income?	Favour forcing welfare people to work?	Should PM commit to expanding welfare?
Age	-	-	-	p= .01 V= .11	-	-
Income	-	-	p= .02 V= .16	p= .00 V= .16	-	p= .00 V= .26
Sex	-	-	-	p= .01 V= .09	-	p= .01 V= .10
Education	-	-	-	-	p= .00 V= .15	-
Church Protestant Non-Fr RC Fr RC	p= .01 V= .11	-	-	p= .00 V= .18	-	p= .00 V= .22

Source: CIPO October 1988

⁶¹ The indication of influence must be treated with caution in Table 27 because the significance test does not represent a partial effect. As most sophisticated analysis of partial effects in Chapter Five indicate, these results are indicative of a general influence. The point of this exercise (i.e. Table 27) is to demonstrate that denominational effects are in many cases valid as general indicators, as are the standard socio-economic variables used in the majority of attitudinal analysis.

⁶² Significance of pattern determined by X^2 , strength of association measured with Cramer's V

In two of the three significant response patterns in Table 27 there are denominational differences supporting the general hypothesis on church-sect approaches to poverty. The structural approach of Catholics is indicated in their support for an expansion of welfare and the guaranteed annual income. Support for these reforms is suggestive of a collective orientation with a rationale that does not depend on individual motivations or psychological dispositions as an explanation or justification for eligibility or levels of support.

For the expanded welfare question both non-francophone and francophone Roman Catholics favour expansion (70% and 62% respectively) while only 46% of Protestants indicated a similar orientation. An analogous pattern is evident on the question of favouring a guaranteed annual income. In this instance 58% of francophone Roman Catholics favoured a GAI, followed by 48% of non-francophone Roman Catholics and only 39% of Protestants.

Table 28: Denominational Attitudinal Comparisons - Effort and Control

Denominations <i>Poverty is the result of...⁶³</i>	Lack of Effort	Circumstances Beyond Individual Control	Both Equally	No Opinion	N
Protestant	25.8%	41.5%	29.3%	3.5%	436
Non-Francophone Catholic	26.9%	45.6%	24.3%	3.3%	195
Francophone Catholic	12.6%	45.9%	37.2%	4.4%	239

Source: CIPO May 1985

The response pattern on restricting Family Allowance to only the needy was the significant response pattern that did not correspond to the church-sect hypothesis. In this example Catholics differed in their approval, with 88% of non-francophone Catholics favouring a more restrictive Family Allowance program. The Protestant rate lay between

⁶³ $\chi^2 = 21.85, p = .001$

the two Catholic categories. However, it should be noted that the two patterns corresponding to the church-sect hypothesis had higher measures of association.⁶⁴

While much of the preceding evidence suggests a continuing influence of the denominational factor we should be cautious before drawing a firm connection between attitudes toward poverty and the welfare state. Not all of the evidence points directly to a church-sect pattern. A question posed in a May 1985 Gallup poll provided a measure of individual or structural orientation toward poverty. The results were statistically significant when denomination was introduced. However, as Table 28 indicates, the church-sect pattern was only apparent on the structural category (circumstances beyond individual control). In the other categories Protestants are the intermediate position between the two Catholic groups.

The results in Table 29 also suggest that the denominational relationship between beliefs about poverty and the welfare state is less than straightforward. In a December 1990 Gallup poll, when asked if the government is spending too much money, francophone Catholics are more evenly spread across each of the categories. Emphasis was on the "about right" category. Conversely, non-francophone Catholics greatly favoured the "too much" category, and were considerably less inclined to choose "too little" than Protestants or their French-speaking counterparts.

Table 29: Denominational Attitudes on Amount Spent on Welfare

Is government spending too much on welfare? ⁶⁵	Too much	Too little	About right amount	N
Protestants	42.9%	28.4%	28.7%	286
Non-Francophone Roman Catholics	51.5%	15.4%	33.1%	68
Francophone Roman Catholics	29.9%	30.0%	40.1%	234

Source: CIPO December 1990

⁶⁴Cramer's V for the expanded welfare question is .22, it is .18 for the GAI question. It is only .11 for the Family Allowance question.

⁶⁵ $\chi^2=18.14$ $p=.0011$

Conclusion

The preceding discussion underscores both the importance and difficulty of examining the influence of religious institutions on mass beliefs about poverty. One of the important considerations that must be taken into account is the multidimensional nature of poverty and the extent to which our conceptualization is embedded in the context of the welfare state.

There is certainly evidence to support the claim that religion remains an important factor that must be examined if we are to understand belief systems. However, the data from Gallup polls were too crude to grapple with the issue of a multidimensional belief system that captures the relationship between attitudes toward the welfare state and poverty. More importantly, Gallup's umbrella category for Protestants did not permit the type of analysis required to test adequately the church-sect hypothesis.

Even the Class Structure data, while superior in many respects to the Gallup data, raises the question about the multiple ways in which the issue of poverty dovetails with policy issues directly related to the welfare state. This relationship must be understood before it is possible to measure the effect of denominations on poverty beliefs.

In some respects the problem with measuring poverty beliefs and the denominational effect is the limits of using such crude attitudinal measures of policy orientation and institutional affiliation. The positive results demonstrated in significant denominational differences, however, only indicate a potential relationship between the church affiliation and poverty beliefs. Confirmation of a significant relationship between denominational affiliation now requires more sophisticated multivariate procedures that can determine the extent to which the denominational effect evident in attitudinal patterns is spurious. This leads us to the next chapter which analyzes the denominational effect of various dimensions of a multidimensional poverty belief system, and which introduces controls capable of determining the relative importance of denominational affiliation as a primary factor influencing beliefs.

CHAPTER FIVE

Testing the Church-Sect Hypothesis on Contemporary Poverty Belief Systems

Introduction

The central objective of the study, outlined in Chapter One, is to establish the extent to which churches influence beliefs about poverty. Chapter Two and Three provide an historical basis for distinguishing institutional differences in the way in which poverty was conceptualized by Christian communities. These differences were associated with ecclesiastical structures which, in many cases, involve different social bases and relationships to the dominant political institutions. More importantly, these chapters provide a framework for classifying the institutional heritage of the mainstream Christian denominations in Canada. The two primary categories that are of importance in this study are the universal church and the sect.

In many respects the fragmentation and separation of church and state have meant that the church-sect distinction often reflects the Catholic-Protestant cleavage, particularly in Canada. Moreover, the contemporary trend toward denominationalism has meant that previously opposing sects have united under the same ecclesiastical structure. In Canada, the sparse populations in some areas have encouraged cooperation among some denominations which formally eschew unification (i.e., Anglicans and United Church clergy). Despite these contemporary trends the basic hypothesis being tested presumes an institutional residue that influences the way in which religious communities understand poverty

The more contemporary development of the denominational organization has meant that the relevance of the sect and the universal church as archetypes have diminished in

importance. The rise of the welfare state and its qualified legitimacy throughout Canadian society means that a certain degree of ideological constraint has emerged. The role of the state and its involvement in job creation and employment training to alleviate poverty and unemployment is certainly a post-World War II phenomenon. Such intrusions by the state were certainly radical as late as the Great Depression.

As noted in Chapter Four, our conceptualization of poverty has been increasingly defined in secular terms. Absent are the allusions to charity and almsgiving. Instead the notion of social rights has gained prominence. Despite the declining relevance of religious institutions, and the increased secularization of poverty beliefs with the growth of the welfare state, there continue to be significant attitudinal differences between the poverty beliefs of members of different Christian churches.

While differences in attitudes are evident in Chapter Four, the nature of the data and the limited use of controls suggest three basic problems. First, the emphasis on the evaluative dimension of the belief system in Chapter Four does not take into account the possible differences that may exist between denominations in the affective and normative dimensions of the belief system. Chapter Four is primarily concerned with the way in which individuals rationalize poverty and the types of social policies that affect this situation. This does not address the question of how the poor fit in a system of norms, nor does it address the basic feelings groups have toward those in a situation of poverty. The fact that there are significant differences in the evaluative oriented questions presented in the previous chapter is interesting given the traditional emphasis of churches on affective and normative issues.

The second problem is the lack of controls that would rule out alternative explanations of significant relationships between denominational affiliation and poverty beliefs. In part, this is the limitation of the many data sources used in Chapter Four. Gallup polls seldom differentiate between Protestant sects.

The linguistic cleavage is controlled by distinguishing between French-speaking and non-French-speaking Catholics. This is an important factor influencing the cultural life of Canada. Controlling for the influence of the two principal language groups in Canada does

not, however, adequately address the possible importance of other socio-economic factors such as gender, age, class, and provincial institutions.¹ Likewise, the relative importance of political culture cannot be taken into account as an alternative explanation of denominational differences

Third, the limited number of questions in each Gallup poll limits the ability to explore the relationship between different dimensions of the poverty belief system. This is not the case with the Class Consciousness Study. However, it is expedient to use the more current data from the 1988 Canadian National Election Study, which is used in this chapter to analyze a poverty belief system

This chapter addresses the problem of a multidimensional belief system and introduces controls for alternative explanations. The application of scaling techniques and multivariate regression permits a more sophisticated comparison of the relative influence of denominational affiliation on different dimensions of the poverty belief system. The first section will describe the denominational patterns for each dimension. This is followed by a discussion of multivariate regressions that control for political culture and socio-economic influences.

Hypotheses: Significance of Religious Institutions

Previous chapters argue that there are institutional differences in the way in which poverty is understood. These differences are primarily evaluative in nature. Testing the contemporary relevance of denominational differences will clarify the extent to which theories about belief systems must take into account the relative durability of the influence of cultural institutions. In the case of religious institutions this refers to the socializing or inculcating potential of dogma, ecclesiastical structure, and devotional practices that transcend generations.

¹Sample size in most Gallup polls limits the controls that can be introduced with most nonparametric designs (i.e., Chi Square)

Given the emphasis on devotional practices among religious institutions it is important to understand the extent to which emphasis on affect and norms is carried over to the more ideological nature of the evaluative dimension of belief systems. Consequently, the first hypothesis is that the greatest denominational influence will be in the affective and normative dimensions of the poverty belief system. It is in this area where the church-sect and Catholic-Protestant cleavages are most divergent. In terms of the Catholic-Protestant cleavage, this differentiation is the most developed. Most Protestant denominations have not invested in the elaboration of a social doctrine to the same extent as Catholicism. There is some truth in Ramsay Cook's (1985, 231) position that the Protestant elaboration of a social position moved away from a theologically founded moral position to a more general ethical stance that rationalized their position on poverty-related issues. This is not the case with Catholicism, which invested considerable intellectual resources carving out a unique position on social issues and their relationship to the normative structure of Catholic theology.

The following hypotheses are based on the explanatory role of the church-sect and Catholic-Protestant dichotomies. Considering the historical orientation of these two ideal-types, denominations with a sectarian heritage will be less positively inclined toward the poor in the affect dimension. As argued in Chapter Two, this is the result of divergent efforts to address the needs of different polities and social bases.

For the normative orientation the more sectarian denominations will be less inclined toward collective obligation to the poor and their well-being. This, it is argued in Chapter Two, is the result of very different notions of community and the inherent obligations of the institutions governing that community, be they political or religious. Conversely, denominations will have a minimal influence on the evaluation dimension of the poverty belief system.

The reasons for declining denominational differences in the evaluative dimensions, as argued in Chapter Three, are rooted in the transition from charitable service to the welfare state. For Protestants and many non-Quebec Catholics this entailed a shift in the way practical social policies were advanced. Within Quebec Catholicism, advocacy and

delivery of services remained within the context of Catholic institutions. This is witnessed in the popularity of the *Semaines sociales* and the *École sociale populaire*. Catholic social movements, such as the Desjardins and Antigonish cooperative movements, likewise, maintained a close affinity with Catholic institutions. In a similar manner Catholic syndicalism, particularly after the Asbestos Strike in 1949, took on a radical tenor but maintained a connection with Catholic institutions for many years following their more conflictual stance toward employers. Even in the early 1970s, after the dramatic decline of Catholic influence in Quebec, the Dumont Report stressed the importance of social doctrine advocacy in the renewal of Quebec Catholicism.

For Protestant denominations after the First World War, their social activists increasingly moved to secular institutions to advance social positions. Given the ecumenical and secular nature of this development there was less of an opportunity for the unique elaboration of a poverty belief system that could be linked directly to a particular denomination. Rather than denominational advocacy, lobbying and the development of social policy positions took place in the context of more secular socio-political movements such as those that came out of the prairies at the turn of the century. Unlike similar movements in Quebec, cooperatives and unions outside Quebec did not have formal links with denominations. The distance between such movements and denominations only increased as political parties and other advocacy groups formed to advance particular social and economic issues (United Farmers, Maritime Rights, CCF, etc.)

Operationalizing the Poverty Belief System

The generic belief system outlined in Chapter One includes three primary dimensions: affect, norms, and evaluation. The array of attitudinal measures in the 1988 Canadian National Election Study provides various methods of measuring different aspects of poverty and social policy. Both the size of the survey and the broad scope of its questions permit a more statistically controlled analysis of the influence of religious institutions on poverty belief systems.

Table 30: Poverty Belief Scales Developed in CNES 1988

Poverty Belief System Scales	Type	Description
Affect-Emotional Dimension		High Scores Indicate
Affect Scale	Contrasted Summated Score	Positive Feelings for Poor
Normative Dimension		High Scores Indicate
Social Obligation Scale	Factor Score	Government Should Provide More Help for the Poor and Historically Subordinate Groups in Society
Equality Scale	Factor Score	Intolerant of Economic Inequality - System Does Not Reward Workers Fairly
Humane/ Participatory Scale	Factor Score	Priority Should be Given to Developing a Humane and Participatory Society
Traditional Economy Scale	Factor Score	Priority Should be Given to Maintaining Traditional Economic Growth and Social Stability
Evaluative Dimension		High Scores Indicate
Systemic Rewards Scale	Factor Score	Existing System Adequately Rewards Individual Effort - Poverty Caused by Insufficient Individual Effort, not the System
Individual Effort Scale	Factor Score	Laziness and Failure to Care Determine Individual Effort - Poverty is Caused by Personal-Character Deficits
Market Efficiencies Scale	Factor Score	Unencumbered Markets Efficiently Promote Hard Work and Individual Prosperity
Universality Scale	Factor Score	Protect Universal Programs Such as Medicare
Income Supports Scale	Factor Score	Protect and Maintain Existing Income Support Programs

Unlike the previous chapter, with its analysis of singular questions, this chapter builds scales using Principal Components Analysis (PCA).² The scales described in Table 30 are

²PCA constructs a factor (PCA constructed variable) that represents an underlying relationship connecting a larger number of variables. A factor is interpreted by analyzing the strength of the relationship of each variable that loads on the factor. Those with the strongest relationship to the factor are used to interpret its meaning. The scale is a score calculated for each case, which represents the underlying relationship identified in the PCA.

constructed using multiple questions that are summarized with a single score for each respondent

The advantage of such a technique is that it captures the underlying structure that connects a number of variables. This in turn can generate a score that compresses the number of variables forming the poverty belief system. Another advantage is that the metric properties of each score or scale permit the application of multivariate regression. Such statistical procedures allow a more sophisticated method of controlling for numerous influences that affect the poverty belief system.

The factor scores (PCA) and additive techniques are used to develop scales measuring the different dimensions of the poverty belief system.³ Once the basic denominational patterns are described, each scale is regressed using variables that measure institutional attachment to a church. This includes church affiliation, church schooling, and attendance at religious services. Various political, socio-economic and linguistic controls are introduced to eliminate spurious relationships that may exist between religious institutions and their influence on each component of the belief system.⁴

Affect

The affect dimension measures the extent to which an individual feels warm toward the poor, contrasted with the same individual's warmth toward other groups. This is the only scale in the belief system that does not use a PCA factorial design.

In the survey, individuals are presented with a thermometer scale and asked to what extent they feel warm to a number of groups. Contrasting feelings toward the poor and other groups provides a better sense of the extent to which emotional orientation toward the poor is distinguishable from feelings for other groups.⁵ For example, subtracting one's

³The factorial designs use Principal Components Analysis (varimax rotation). The best designs were determined by eliminating variables that had low communality scores (<.4 in some cases) or loaded ambiguously across more than one factor.

⁴For a technical presentation on each scale see Appendix I: Scales and Statistical Results.

⁵Warmth toward the poor is contrasted with warmth toward the following groups: farmers, French Canadians, Americans, English Canadians, small business, ethnic minorities, unions, natives, elderly, and feminists.

warmth toward aboriginals or ethnic minorities from one's warmth toward the poor controls for those who indicate greater or lesser warmth across all categories. The final calculation represents a more standardized score that measures the degree to which an individual has relatively unique feelings toward the poor.

Norms

The normative dimension of the poverty belief system is composed of four scales: social obligation, intolerance of economic inequality, priority to a humane and participatory society, and priority for traditional economic growth and social stability. The scale most directly related to poverty is social obligation because one of the questions used in the scale makes direct reference to the poor.⁶ The other scales are related because they touch upon the broader notion of social problems that are indicated in the attitudinal research in Chapter Four.⁷ The various issues raised in these scales also touch upon the broader issues outlined in the more contemporary church pronouncements on poverty discussed in Chapter One.

The social obligation scale measures the extent to which individuals feel that government should do more for the poor or the less powerful within society. Similar to the affect scale, this measure includes a statement that directly mentions the poor. While other groups (i.e. elderly, single parents, women, and ethnic minorities) are included in the factorial design, it is the variable measuring social obligation to the poor that has the highest factor loading. The other groups included in the analysis are those that are frequently cited in the poverty research as targeted populations.⁸ Hence, the high loading of the "poor" category suggests that the social obligation scale is capturing an underlying dimension that links less dominant groups with questions of poverty.

⁶The question asks whether the respondent feels that the government should do more or less for the poor.

⁷See Tables 4.6 to 4.9.

⁸The poverty literature often analyzes the demographics of poverty, which raises an interesting debate about trends such as poverty among the elderly or the immiserization of women. For an article that raises concerns about the way in which poverty and target groups are analyzed see Battle (1994, 148-173).

The equality scale measures the extent to which respondents view the current distribution of income as fair. In some respects this is a class-oriented scale. The questions used in the factorial design refer to the fairness of remuneration for workers and executives. While not dealing with poverty *per se*, the scale measures the broader question of equitable distribution within society. This certainly touches on the issue of the working poor and underscores questions about the capacity of the existing system to meet the basic needs of all its members. Conversely, the issue of class in this scale may obfuscate the poverty question. Poverty issues are subordinated to the issue of conflicting interests between groups that are key actors in society. The marginalized sectors become peripheral in the struggle of workers to gain a greater share of society's resources. As such, this measure captures the tension between the traditional discourse of left-wing politics and its championing of the working class and its attempted representation of those groups who are marginalized in society and confront poverty directly.

The priority scales measure the degree to which respondents emphasize humane and participatory goals or more traditional policies that ensure stability and traditional economic growth. Similar to the points raised in the ecumenical briefs on poverty discussed in Chapter One, it is difficult to imagine a society that is both humane and participatory, yet maintains a significant minority classified as poor. Conversely, those who wish to promote stability and traditional economic growth suggest an acceptance that the existing system works. This could imply that issues of poverty are either insignificant, or will be resolved via the "trickle-down effect" of traditional economic prosperity. It may also indicate that individuals believe that poverty will always exist and must be accepted to some degree.

Evaluation

The evaluative dimension is composed of perceived causes of poverty and policy responses. Of all the scales, these are more easily placed under the headings of structural or individual approaches to poverty. In this instance there are five scales that provide

measures suggestive of the individual-structural continuum described in previous chapters systemic rewards, individual effort, market efficiencies, universality, and income supports

Causation Scales

The first three scales pertain to causal explanations systemic rewards, individual effort, and market efficiencies. The other two components suggest policy responses whereby traditional universal programs such as Medicare, or the current level of welfare payments and UI eligibility are protected against deficit reduction strategies

The systemic rewards scale measures the extent to which a competitive, profit based system effectively rewards individual effort and ability Those that score high on this scale feel that such a system rewards individual effort and ability For this group poverty is not structural, it is the result of an individual failing to excel or make a sufficient effort Low scores on this scale view the problem of rewards as systemic or structural In other words, effort or ability have little to do with how an individual is rewarded By corollary, poverty is structural in nature and affects individuals regardless of their abilities or individual efforts.

The individual effort scale measures the extent to which failing to work hard is the result of individual deficits or the external environment Those who score high on the scale feel that individuals do not work hard because they do not care or are lazy Consequently, failure is the result of laziness or a lack of self-discipline Poverty in this context is related to the personal deficits of the individual Low scores on the individual effort scale indicate that the respondent views structural constraints as the main factor affecting individual effort For example, the work environment is such that dull routines do not encourage effort Individuals fail to work hard because they are not given a "chance" The problem is with a system that discourages effort and minimizes the types of "chances" that motivate effort

The final causation scale measures the extent to which market efficiencies provide the basis for hard work and individual effort Those who score high on the market efficiencies scale believe that interventions (i.e. government regulation) that affect "private enterprise"

harm the work ethic. The extension of this position is that the system would operate to the greater advantage of hard working individuals if the government removed itself from the regulation of economic activity. Market forces are considered the best adjudicators of equitable distribution in society. Those with low scores on the market efficiencies scale favour more government regulation and do not feel that a "private enterprise" system determines whether or not individuals work hard. In this respect, a more interventionist state is a legitimate policy instrument for combating poverty.

Policy Response Scales

There are two policy response scales. The first measures orientation towards medicare, particularly in respecting the existing way in which medical services are paid. The questions in this scale indicate the extent to which medicare should be protected from deficit cutting strategies. High scores on this scale indicate a respondent's desire to maintain the existing medicare system. Given the importance of medicare in the Canadian conception of the welfare state, such a measure acts as a proxy for universal programs. High scores suggest a greater reluctance to erode universal programs that constitute a primary bulwark guarding individuals against the impoverishing effect of illness.

The second scale indicates the extent to which respondents want to protect targeted social programs that provide income supports. High scores in this instance indicate a willingness to protect UI eligibility and social assistance rates from deficit cutting measures. These programs are more directly related to the needs of the poor and represent direct interventions designed to improve the situation of the less advantaged in Canadian society.

Relationship Between Dimensions of Belief System

The interpretation of each of the scales is substantiated by their respective correlation with one another (Table 31 and Table 32). The affect scale is significantly correlated with three of the normative scales and two of the evaluative scales. The scales more directly related to poverty issues have stronger correlations. For example, support for welfare

programs is a critical part of the income supports scale. The social obligation scale, likewise, has as its central component greater government help for the poor. A similar connection can be made with the perceived inequities in the distribution of incomes in the equality scale. While the inter-scale correlations are not strong, they are in the appropriate direction. This indicates an underlying consistency linking the majority of the scales with the affect dimension.

The evaluative dimension is most problematic with respect to the affect dimension. The more explanatory or causative components do not correlate with affect. In this category only income supports is significantly correlated with affect. This may have to do with the ideological nature of the evaluative dimension and the extent to which such positions are rational and analytical, with little basis in an emotive appeal. It may also have to do with more distant influence of churches in this category and the more important role of other institutions such as political parties or the educational system.

Table 31: Affect and Inter-Scale Correlates

Poverty Belief Scales: Correlation Coefficients	Affect ⁹
Social Obligation	1583**
Equality	1693**
Humane/Participatory	0767**
Economic Stability	- 0071
Systemic Rewards	- 0615*
Individual Effort	- 0109
Market Efficiencies	- 0168
Universality	0140
Income Supports	1101**

Source: CNES 1988

Despite this limited association with the affect scale, the significant correlation between the normative and evaluative scales supports their respective inclusion as part of a general poverty belief system. In many respects, the normative dimension represents a

⁹A two tailed test where * =Significance is less than .05. and ** =Significance is less than .01

bridge between the emotional character of the affect dimension and the rational-analytical orientation of the evaluative dimension. For example, the social obligation scale, with its direct reference to the poor, demonstrates a relatively high degree of association with the income supports scale. Both are significantly correlated and indicate a similar direction with the affect scale. The bridging effect is also apparent in a more moderate form with the other three normative scales. Except for the economic stability and the universality scales, these scales are also significantly correlated with both the affect and evaluative dimensions.

As expected, the direction of the correlations follows a similar pattern (Table 32). For example, scores on social obligation are negatively correlated with scores on systemic rewards, individual effort, and market efficiencies. Similarly, social obligation is positively correlated with the universality scale. In general, as the normative orientation toward the poor suggests a positive obligation to equality or a more humane society, the corresponding evaluative orientation opts for a structural approach to poverty.

Despite the class implications for the equality scale, discussed earlier, this scale demonstrates a relatively strong relationship with the evaluative scales. Its strongest relationship is with systemic rewards (negative) and income supports (positive). This is consistent with the general trend throughout the belief system.

Table 32: Inter-Scale Correlates for the Normative and Evaluative Dimensions

Poverty Belief Scales: Correlation Coefficients¹⁰	Systemic Rewards	Individual Effort	Market Efficiencies	Universality	Income Supports
Social Obligation	- .1343**	- .2380**	- .2391**	.1394**	.3480**
Equality	- .3483**	- .1637**	- .1253**	.2129**	.2789**
Humane-Participatory	- .1277**	- .1050**	- .1301**	.0691*	.1587**
Economic Stability	.2258**	.1461**	.0911**	-.0157	-.1776**

Source: CNES 1988

¹⁰ A two-tailed test where * = Significance is less than .05, and ** = Significance is less than .01

The weakest scales, in terms of consistency within the belief system are economic stability, humane-participatory, and universality. This weakness, however, is only in degrees. Each scale demonstrates some commonality with the majority of scales in the other dimension.

The significant relationships between the majority of scales provide some support for the notion of connectedness between dimensions of the poverty belief system. The relationship between normative and evaluative dimensions is closely associated. This is similar to the relationship between the normative and affect dimension. The connection between the affect and evaluative dimensions is more tenuous. However, bridging role the normative dimension provides a link to both the affect and evaluative dimensions.

Previous work on ideology and ideological systems in earlier chapters suggests some degree of consistency between the normative and evaluative dimensions of a belief system using a more traditional left-right scheme. Such frameworks have little to say about the emotional or affect dimension of beliefs. Political parties and other ideological institutions (i.e. schools and universities) can be expected to influence the more structured ideational systems that are akin to the evaluative dimension. The primary role of ideology, in this instance, is to rationalize or promote particular actions or policy in the public domain.

While the evaluative dimension of ideological institutions is linked to norms and values, one would not expect the same emphasis in religious institutions. In this case, the experiential and devotional foundation of religion is rationalized in the context of normative systems that establish values and the determinants of appropriate behaviour. The normative dimensions in this context place less emphasis on the rational or analytical quality than do most ideological systems. With its emphasis on action the ideological system must move more readily between values that are implicit in its design, and the necessity of giving adequate reasons for promoting a particular set of behaviours within a given situation.

Religious institutions are continually criticized by the policy community and the media in Western countries for the ethical positions that are the idealistic positions of church intellectuals, and which are not accompanied by "practical" and "well-researched" policy

propositions. This was certainly the type of reaction exhibited by a number of prominent newspapers, politicians, and economists toward the church statements such as the Catholic Bishops' "Ethical Reflections on the Economic Crisis", published in January 1983.¹¹

While church leaders may be criticized as non-experts by some, they cannot be faulted for not having made significant efforts to support their ethical positions with policy recommendations. This is evident in the many briefs presented to government representatives and the willingness of church bodies to speak out on specific policy areas such as income redistribution, housing, economic development, and banking. As noted throughout John William's (1984a) collection of church statements from the 1970s and early 1980s, denominations with either sectarian and universal church heritage have consistently discussed the theological and ethical underpinnings of their social and economic concerns; which are tied explicitly to policy recommendations.

Examples of these explicit linkages are evident in the Eastern Canada Synod of the Lutheran Church in America's 1973 presentation of the biblical roots of social obligation, followed by recommendations in the fields of taxation and income supports that correspond to their understanding of collective duty. A similar approach to economic justice is utilized in the 1979 statement of the Roman Catholic Bishops of the Atlantic Provinces. Other briefs, such as the one on poverty presented by the Salvation Army, spend little time on ethical considerations and focus their attention on policies. A similar tack is taken by the United Church on its 1975 brief on economic injustice. Despite the different approaches of each of the denominations, each focuses on policy.

There has been an effort by church intellectuals to respond to criticism about their "naive" idealism. They have focused on documenting solutions and specified concrete policy alternatives in their briefs to government commissions. It is unlikely, however, that their efforts have penetrated all levels of their membership. This is particularly true where regular attenders are less than 30% of those claiming denominational affiliation.

¹¹See Baum (1984, 21) and Cameron (1984, 95). Baum and Cameron refer to open criticism directed at the Catholic Bishops from *Globe and Mail* editorials, the Prime Minister and the Finance Minister.

Consequently, the effect of church affiliation should be evident in the more emotive and normative scales, and less pronounced among the more evaluative scales with their connection to policy issues.

As noted in previous chapters, the denominational form of the religious institution, much like the universal church, engages in a continual process of brokering in order to maintain some cohesion within a diverse community. Few churches are willing to accept the schismatic solutions to differences once so commonplace among the sects ¹² Hence, an emphasis on the affective and normative dimensions is most likely an important unifying factor in the mass belief system of contemporary religious institutions, more so than the ideologically motivated positions within the evaluative dimension. The divisive nature of the latter is left to political parties and social groups

Emotional Dimension - Affect Scale

As predicted, there is a distinct difference between denominations in their average scores on the affect scale (Figure 2). Catholics, on average, feel more positively about the poor. All of the denominations exhibit higher averages than those who claim no church affiliation. Moreover, there is a general tendency toward greater affection for the poor among respondents if their religious affiliation is with a denomination that has a more significant universal church heritage.

The only anomaly to the church-sect pattern is the historical character of Anglicanism, which is not readily apparent in the graph depicting average scores on the affect scale. Anglicans are more similar to their Protestant counterparts than to those with whom they

¹²This pattern is evident in the growth ecumenical movement within Protestantism since the turn of the century. According to Latourette, this heightened cooperation went against the historical pattern of Protestant "individualism and fissiparousness" (Latourette 1971, vol 7, 27ff). Part of the transition into a denominational pattern, the cooperation of formerly opposing churches was evident in the growth and prominence of multi-denominational organizations such as the World's Evangelical Alliance, the World's Christian Federation, international YMCA and YWCA organizations, World Missionary Conference, Student Volunteer Movement, the International Missionary Council, and the World Council of Churches are a few of the organizations that played a growing role in interdenominational cooperation and planning (ibid., 26-29).

share a universal church heritage. However, given the greater influence of Protestant sectarianism on the Anglican church, enormous differences from their Protestant counterparts would be surprising. However, among Catholics, their Catholicism is more of a factor influencing their disposition toward the poor than their respective linguistic differences

Figure 2: Affect Dimension and Average Denominational Scores

The limits of the church-sect distinction are underscored in the application of a Student-Newman-Keuls test of significance.¹³ The results of this test indicate significant distinctions between all Catholics and respondents affiliated with the United Church. There is a significant difference between French Catholics and Anglicans, but not between non-French Catholics and Anglicans.

¹³For results see Appendix I

These differences suggest a complex relationship between church affiliation and feelings toward the poor. Part of this complexity lies in the extent to which the scores of church members are polarized or varied. The calculation of a coefficient of variation (CV) underscores the degree to which each denomination varies internally.¹⁴ French Catholics are relatively homogeneous in their responses (CV=1.75). Variation increases as one moves from non-French Catholics (CV=2.03) to the United Church (CV=2.86) and the Baptist category (CV=2.65). The coefficient of variation for Anglicans is 2.08, similar to non-French Catholics. Greater variation in churches with a sectarian heritage would be expected if a more unified symbolic heritage is affecting the emotional orientation of church members toward the poor. Ruptures or discontinuities in this symbolic field for the more sectarian groups have some foundation in their respective historical roots. The unification of three different traditions in the United Church, and the anarchical theology and ecclesiology of the Evangelical, Pentecostal, and Baptist traditions, reduce the likelihood of the type of historical symbols that exist in Catholicism. Within the institutional framework of Catholicism (i.e. religious orders and educational system) the symbolic notions of charity have a greater chance of being transmitted in a manner that promotes continuity between the past and the present.

Despite the often tenuous connection between Catholics and Anglicans, there are a number of tendencies that suggest similarity. First, their coefficient of variation is similar, indicating a higher degree of consensus than that which is found among the more sectarian Protestants. Second, there is a statistically significant difference in average affect scores when Anglicans and Catholics are treated as a single group. When denominations are collapsed into the categories of universal church and sect, the average score of the universal church category is considerably higher than that of the sect.¹⁵ The magnitude of

¹⁴The coefficient of variation is calculated by dividing the standard deviation by the mean. This calculation adjusts for large differences in mean and thereby facilitates the comparison of variation between two groups. See Scott Bennett, *The Quantitative Approach in Political Science*, Queenston Edwin Mellen Press, 1986, p. 254-255.

¹⁵Denominations included in the sect category are the United Church, Baptists, Reformed, and Pentecostals. The universal church or non-sect category includes all Catholics and Anglicans.

this difference is important as indicated by significant t-values reported in Appendix II. The results of the t-tests confirm significant differences between the universal church and sect categories.¹⁶ Analysis in subsequent sections further substantiates the importance of church affiliation as a key factor explaining the affect dimension of the poverty belief system

Normative Dimensions

Similar to the affect dimension, churches would be expected to have an impact on the structuring of norms. Based on Figure 3, there is a pronounced slope moving from the more universal churches (French Catholics) toward denominations with a sectarian heritage. This is particularly evident for the social obligation and humane-participatory scales. The slope is less pronounced for the traditional economic stability and equality scales.

A closer examination of each of the scales suggests the emergence of a complex pattern linking church affiliation and norms. Part of this complexity lies in the unique nature of Quebec Catholicism, its prominence among French Catholics, and its adaptability to political changes that have occurred since the Quiet Revolution. The corporate nature of Quebec society, with its Catholic imprint, has been successfully secularized without the type of anticlericalism that prevailed in Europe during similar transformations.

The Quebec influence may explain the lower support in the traditional economic scale. Contemporary Quebec politics emphasizes the issue of an independent trajectory. Earlier emphasis focused on "rattrapage" and modernization with respect to the rest of Canada. This suggests a greater willingness to experiment with the state and alternative methods of creating economic growth through indigenous and state capital provides a plausible explanation for the lower emphasis on traditional economic growth and social stability.

¹⁶The results of t-tests are found in Appendix II: T-Tests and Oneway ANOVA Results.

Figure 3: Normative Dimension and Average Denominational Scores

The moderate average score on the equality scale for French Catholics may denote the influence of Catholic corporatism, which as an ideology is more concerned with collective representation and social integration than it is with individual economic equality. Also, the French Catholic category does not have the parallel slopes that are indicative of the other categories. The gap between high average scores in social obligation and the humane-participatory scales and the rest of the normative dimension suggests a definite emphasis on the more collective aspect of the normative scales. While non-French Catholics score high on the more collective aspect of the normative dimension, the convergence of their averages suggests a synthesis with the norms that prevail among the Protestant denominations. Non-French Catholics, as a minority, have likely found some common ground with their Protestant co-religionists. Such compromises may have forced them to attenuate some of the more corporate orientations inherent in Catholic social doctrine. This type of pattern is evident in the comparisons of Canadian and American

Catholics in Chapter Four, where the latter have positions on poverty that are more closely related to the more extreme patterns among Canadian Protestants.

The importance of the general sloping pattern in Figure 3 is underscored when the results of t-tests (Table 33) are examined for denominations grouped in their respective church-sect categories. Three of the four normative scales have significant differences. In each case where significant differences exist, sect averages are lower than their universal church counterparts. The generalization is those religious institutions with a universal church heritage tend to be more supportive of an ethical position that involves broader societal commitment to the less advantaged in society.

The lack of any significant difference on the issue of equality is likewise important. It is suggestive of the general consensus on the basic issue of equality, at least from a normative perspective. Some of this consensus, in the context of the questions used to construct the scale, may be rooted in the acceptable tempering effect of the welfare state on the more extreme distribution of income by market forces.

Table 33: Normative Dimension and Church-Sect Differences

T-Test Results: Church and Sect Differences	Significant Difference¹⁷
Social Obligation	Yes
Equality¹⁸	No
Humane-Participatory	Yes
Traditional Economic Stability	Yes

Source: CNES 1988.

Social Obligation

The respondents affiliated with the three religious institutions most closely associated with a universal church heritage demonstrate the highest average support for governments

¹⁷ Each of the significant scales has a $P < .001$.

¹⁸ Although the equality scale is not significant at the standard .05 level it should be noted its actual significance level is relatively close with $p = .07$.

doing more for the poor. In this context there is a link between churches with a history of church-state relations and the value accorded state intervention on behalf of the less fortunate in society. This tendency is reinforced with a significant t-test indicating that the difference in average scores for churches and sects is not likely due to chance (Table 33)

A closer examination of denominational differences underscores what is more appropriately described as the watering down effect of Anglicanism and the influence of the French-English cleavage. Student-Newman-Keuls tests indicate significant differences between Catholics and the two most sectarian categories, the United Church and Baptists etc. However, French Catholics are also significantly different from Anglicans and non-French Catholics (Appendix II). While the linguistic cleavage remains important, the non-French Catholic and Anglican connection supports the church-sect thesis

Equality

The non-significant difference of church and sect for the equality scale is intriguing, particularly in light of the slope evident in Figure 3. Non-French Catholics indicate greater average interest in promoting economic equality. They are followed by Anglicans and French Catholics. The sectarian churches have lower scores.

Table 34: Equality Scale Coefficients of Variation for Denominations

Economic Equality	Coefficient of Variation
French Catholic	13.3
Non-French Catholic	10.5
Anglican	29.3
United Church	7.6
Baptists, Reform, Pentecostals	4.6

Source: CNES 1988

The comparison of average scores does not tell the entire story. When the coefficient of variation is compared in Table 34, the three universal churches exhibit much greater diversity of opinion than their sectarian counterparts. Anglicans have the greatest degree of diversity or variation in their responses, which probably underscores the historical tension between the proponents of a form of left-wing Anglicanism, with its red Tory

dimension, and more dominant faction within the Canadian Church that has resisted the more radical positions espoused in Great Britain. This tension, according to Pulker, has tempered the social position of the Canadian Anglican Church relative to that of the Presbyterians and Methodists since the turn of the century.¹⁹ The more liberal or radical proponents among the Presbyterians and Methodists formed an important contingent supporting church union

For Catholics, language does not unify opinion. French Catholics are even more diverse in opinions than their non-French co-religionists. Neither, however, exhibit the same magnitude of diversity found among Anglicans.

As subsequent analysis indicates, the class effect is the most pronounced in this scale. While this will be discussed in the next section, it is important to note that this is the only scale in the normative or affect dimensions where religious affiliation does not play some role in explaining scores. Part of the explanation may lie in the historical brokering of the universal churches, and to the extent that this is true the official church has had to minimize the polarizing effect of class conflict within a relatively diverse membership. Consequently, the ideological tension may have been directed toward party politics rather than within the church. This may suggest why religious affiliation has little influence on the evaluative dimension, which is more easily discussed using traditional left-right ideological points of reference.

Humane-Participatory

While the church-sect split indicates a significant difference, the difference is somewhat deceptive. Catholic-Protestant split is more evident in this scale than in any of the others. An initial comparison of averages, as indicated in Figure 3, shows a progressive decline in the average of the humane-participatory scale as one moves from church to sect. However, the Student-Newman-Keuls test indicates a distinct cleavage between Catholics and Protestants. Despite a relatively diverse pattern of responses for non-French

¹⁹These developments are discussed somewhat in Chapter Three. A more detailed description of this tension is found in Pulker (1986, 161ff.).

Catholics, Catholics are similar in their orientation toward the humane-participatory priority.²⁰ Anglicans and the sectarian churches do not differ significantly from one another and all differ significantly from their Catholic counterparts, with the more sectarian the group the greater the homogeneity of responses.

The Catholic-Protestant cleavage is perhaps understandable in light of recent history. Vatican II and the recent media attention on papal encyclicals have certainly emphasized the priority of developing a humane and participatory society. As noted in Chapter Three, the last few decades have witnessed a shift in the statements of Catholic bishops, which have moved from a pastoral and exhortatory approach to one that focuses on social justice and the rights and duties of individuals and groups. Catholic intellectuals, likewise have attempted to mobilize the Catholic community around themes such as the "dignity of labour" and the "preferential option for the poor" as popular vehicles for promoting social justice.

While Protestants cannot compete with the international resources of the Catholic church, a more important factor may be the relative strength of Catholic institutions in Quebec. While the general orientation of French and non-French Catholics are the same, the diversity of opinion among the latter suggests greater non-Catholic influences from which French Catholics are insulated. Catholics outside Quebec are more susceptible to American forms of Catholicism and English Protestantism than their Quebec counterparts.²¹ This is witnessed in the aftermath of the historical debacles over religious education in Manitoba, Ontario and New Brunswick. In 1871 the New Brunswick legislature passed the Common Schools Act, which required Catholics to support public

²⁰The coefficient of variation for non-French Catholics is 16.9, compared to 5.4 for French Catholics. The coefficients for Protestants range from 2.9 to 8.3, with the more sectarian groups being more homogeneous.

²¹As Baum notes, the prominent attacks on left-wing movements in Western Canada that influenced Catholics in this area during the 1930s and 1940s often came from their co-religionists in the United States. For example, a prominent Catholic newspaper in Saskatchewan, the *Prairie Messenger*, often used the writings of American Catholics to support an attack on the purported egalitarianism and socialism of the CCF (Baum 1980, 151, 227.)

schools regardless of their intention to support a religious system. A similar bill was passed in Manitoba in 1890, and was only slightly modified in 1897 through a federal-provincial agreement. Likewise, the passing of Regulation 17 in 1912, in Ontario, fostered a divisive rift between Catholics of French and Irish origins. Similar to the Irish Catholic clergy in the United States, Bishops such as Fallon in the London, Ontario diocese pushed for greater Catholic assimilation in an English-speaking Canada.²² Such tendencies created considerable conflict in parts of Ontario where French-speaking Catholics were prominent.²³ Such developments did not permit the type of institutional hegemony that was characteristic of Quebec during this same period. This in turn impeded the way in which the education system could be used to socialize each generation.

Traditional Economic Stability

The only significant pattern linking religious affiliation with the traditional economic stability scale is a linguistic cleavage. Based on the Student-Newman-Keuls test there is no significant difference between Catholics and Protestants, only between French and non-French Catholics. The relevance of this finding is somewhat diminished by the fact that there is considerable diversity in responses within each group.

As noted in Table 35, the two groups with the greatest diversity in responses are also the denominations at opposite ends of the church-sect spectrum (i.e. French Catholics and the Baptist category). As well, the average score for both of these groups is lower than the rest. The diversity measured by the coefficient of variation and the similarity of the average scores makes little sense in the context of the general hypothesis about church and

²²A similar rift between Irish and French clergy occurred in the north eastern United States in the late 1800s. The final result was the dominance of the Irish clergy and their policy of assimilation (Chodos and Hamovitch 1991, 90ff.).

²³The general impression in Robert Choquette's description of this period is the destabilizing influence of the French-Irish conflict in Ontario (1975, 139ff.). In some respects the Irish clergy's implicit alliance with Protestants over the language and education issue (i.e. teacher certification) created an almost irreparable schism between the two prominent linguistic groups in the Ontario Catholic community. This could hardly have contributed to the efficient allocation of educational resources, nor could this situation have contributed to a more unified vision of Catholicism.

sect This confusion, however, is clarified when multivariate regression is used to control for province and language. In anticipation of the results presented later in the chapter, it is the church-sect cleavage and Quebec residence that simultaneously influence this scale

Table 35: Traditional Economic Stability Scale and Coefficients of Variation for Denominations

Traditional Economic Stability	Coefficient of Variation
French Catholic	15.1
Non-French Catholic	8.0
Anglican	6.2
United Church	12.1
Baptists, Reform, Pentecostals	20.2

Source: CNES 1988.

Evaluative Dimensions

The evaluative dimension is more often associated with ideology, and in particular the traditional left-right ideological framework. If placed on a structural-individual continuum, left-wing approaches to poverty would score high on the structural side of the continuum and right-wing approaches would score high on the individual side. However, as noted in previous discussions of causal explanations of poverty and associated solutions, the evaluative dimension is not straightforward.

Part of the problem lies in the complexity of the poverty problem and a combination of individual and structural approaches. The five scales used in the evaluative dimension do not force respondents into either a structural or individual approach; rather, they provide a combination of positions. Each combination involves different nuances regarding a respondent's affinity toward an individual or structural approach to poverty.

In terms of the institutional effect of churches, the more sectarian orientation of the church, the more likely members will associate with an individual approach to poverty. The results of t-tests in Table 36 indicate that only the individual effort and market efficiencies scales have significant differences between church and sect institutions. In both cases the average scores of the sectarian category are much higher than the universal

church category Both scales are strong indicators of tendencies to blame the poor for their situation (i.e. laziness and self-motivation) and extol the efficient and equitable distributive role of the unencumbered market This is consistent with the analysis in previous chapters that identified a tendency of more sectarian religious communities to adopt a more individual approach to poverty

Table 36: Evaluation Dimension and Significant Differences Between Sect and Church

T-Test Results: Church and Sect	Significant Difference
Systemic Rewards	No
Individual Effort	Yes
Market Efficiencies	Yes
Universality	No
Income Supports	No

Source: CNES 1988.

The results of the t-tests only provide one perspective on the influence of churches on poverty belief systems Separate discussion of the causative and remedial nature of the poverty problem reveals a more intricate combination of influences

Causes of Poverty

The general pattern of church-sect differences is evident in the depiction of average scores in Figure 4 The tendency to attribute causes to the individual and accept the existing method of rewarding effort increases as one moves from the more extreme church-type (French Catholics) to the more sectarian group (Baptists, Reformed, Pentecostals)

The church-sect slope is most pronounced in the market efficiencies scale, where government interference is thought to harm business and inhibit the effective operation of the market system A similar tendency is evident for the individual effort scale, measuring acceptance of the argument that no effort is the result of laziness and lack of self-motivation

Figure 4: Evaluative Dimension and Denominational Scores on Causes of Poverty

The systemic rewards scale, on the other hand, is quite flat except for the difference between the most sectarian group and the rest of the religious categories. In this case, the average of the United Church is more closely aligned with the church-type denominations. This is interesting given the United Church's official position supporting a more structural analysis of poverty and advocating greater government intervention in social affairs (i.e. greater regulation of business and guaranteed annual incomes) ²⁴ This has only slightly tempered the tendency of the general membership to lean toward a more individual approach to poverty. The full implications of this tendency are evident in the gap between the systemic scale and the other two causation scales. Contrary to the official position of

²⁴The United Church resolution, "The Church and the Economic Crisis", 30th General Council, 1984 explicitly supports increasing minimum social assistance rates, introducing a "guaranteed adequate income", a national program of full employment, and a range of regulations that would monitor and influence business activities and in general "increase public planning and democratic participation in investment decisions, ownership and control in Canada."

the United Church, its members are among the most opposed to government interference and similarly support the claim that poverty is the result of laziness and lack of self-motivation.

A similar type of straddling, to that of United Church members is evident for French Catholics. On one hand there is a tendency to reject the claim that market efficiencies are superior to more direct government intervention. On the other, French Catholics feel that the existing system adequately rewards individual effort. The ambivalence of these two positions suggests greater acceptance of the mediating role of the existing welfare state. In the context of the historical ambivalence of Catholicism to markets, the response to the market efficiencies scale and the systemic reward scale are not inconsistent with Catholic social doctrine and its unwillingness to support unfettered markets. Hence, tempered by appropriate government restrictions, market systems will provide equitable rewards for individual effort.

Solutions for Poverty

The French-English cleavage is the most apparent tendency evident in Figure 5. There is an inverted pattern of support for general universal programs such as medicare and income supports programs. French-speaking Catholics are more supportive of protecting income supports more than any other religious category. Their non-French counterparts are the least supportive.

The opposite is true of universality. In this case, the average support of French speaking Catholics for universal programs is similar to that of other denominations. But, non-French Catholic support for universal programs such as medicare is the highest for all denominations.

There is little evidence among the solution scales of the church-sect pattern demonstrated in the slope of the causative scales. While there is support for social programs in general, as noted in Chapter Four, there is considerable diversity of opinion as to the form these programs should take. This may explain why averages in this instance

are not particularly helpful when examining denominational differences. The coefficients of variation are extremely high for the two solution scales.

Figure 5: Evaluative Dimension and Denominational Scores on Poverty Solutions

Controlling for Other Factors

The discussion of religious influence on each dimension of the poverty belief system is not complete without first systematically controlling for other possible explanations of denominational patterns. It is important to begin with the standard socio-economic variables that many social psychological studies cite as influences on attitudes and beliefs. Some of the denominational differences and the church-sect patterns may be attributed to these non-religious factors. There is certainly sufficient evidence to suspect the influence of class and language on many scales within the poverty belief system. The primary question is to what extent such factors rule out the influence of religious affiliation.

As Table 37 indicates, large and extreme coefficients suggest considerable differences or perhaps polarization within denominations over the desired design and delivery of social programs. The heterogeneity of responses within groups is particularly evident in the evaluative dimension, and is especially apparent in the scales measuring solutions to poverty. Given the effect these programs have on income status it is not surprising that non-religious factors play a more determinant role. This tendency is supported in subsequent analysis of multivariate patterns.

Table 37: Evaluative Scales and Denominational Coefficients of Variation

Denominations and Coefficients of Variation	Individual Effort Scale	Market Efficiencies Scale	Universality Scale	Income Supports Scale
French Catholic	7.8	3.1	23.5	5.1
Non-French Catholic	26.8	37.8	5.5	4.4
Anglican	28.9	21.4	15.1	275.7
United Church	8.6	4.7	8.4	7.4
Baptists, Reform, Pentecostals	4.7	5.2	31.2	20.3

Source: CNES 1988

Socio-Economic Profile of Church Communities

The socio-economic make-up of each denomination may explain certain differences or similarities between religious communities. Before proceeding with multivariate analysis it is important to assess the variables that will be used to test the durability of the religious influence. Use of weights helps adjust the sample to more accurately reflect the known profile of the larger population. But weights do not take into account the different composition of each denomination. The key socio-economic factors that need to be discussed are gender, age, family income, education and language.

Gender

The gender breakdown of each denomination indicates important differences in the church-sect categories (Table 38). In this sample, males consistently make up a larger percentage of members for each of the denominations that fall into the universal church

category. Conversely, females represent a larger proportion of each of the denominations falling under the sect category.

Table 38: Gender Breakdown of Respondents by Denomination

Gender	NONE	FRENCH CATHOLIC	NON-FRENCH CATHOLIC	ANGLICAN	UNITED CHURCH	BAPTIST, REFORM. PENTECOST
Male	65.6%	51.4%	52.0%	52.4%	41.1%	44.4%
Female	34.4%	48.6%	48.0%	47.6%	58.9%	55.6%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
N	328	893	898	303	499	179

Source: CNES 1988.

The significance of this pattern lies in the influence of gender on the affect scale and two of the four normative scales. In each case females tend to have more positive scores on affect, social obligation, and economic equality. Despite the larger proportion of females within the sect category, this does not seem to affect the general tendency of this category to score low on each of these scales.

Age

Average age does not differ dramatically from one denomination to the next, although those who are not affiliated with any denomination are much younger than their affiliated counterparts.

Table 39: Average Age of Respondents by Denomination

Categories ²⁵	Mean	SD	N
ENTIRE POPULATION	41	15.9570	3084
NONE	35	13.4280	326
FRENCH CATHOLIC	41	14.9571	891
NON-FRENCH CATHOLIC	40	15.8458	890
ANGLICAN	44	16.8811	302
UNITED CHURCH	45	16.9301	495
BAPTIST, REFORMED, PENTECOSTAL	42	17.2217	179

Source: CNES 1988.

²⁵The age variable in the regression uses year of birth

Catholics are generally younger than their Protestant counterparts. While age is a factor in many of the scales, it does not seem to have an effect on whether or not a denominational effect is significant.

Class

The two variables used to measure class are family income and education. While not the best indicator of the structural effect of an individual's location within the labour market, such indicators have a lengthy pedigree as factors influencing both beliefs and behaviour.

Table 40: Denominational Family Income - High, Middle, and Low

Family Income	French Catholic	Non-French Catholic	Anglican	United Church	Baptist, Reformed, Pentecostal
high	16%	22%	29%	24%	25%
middle	39%	42%	34%	37%	40%
low	45%	37%	37%	40%	35%
Total	100%	100% ²⁶	100%	100% ²⁷	100%
N	780	777	279	433	156

Source: CNES 1988.

For family income, French Catholics are disproportionately represented in the lowest of the three income categories in Table 40. An estimated 45% of French Catholics have a family income less than \$30,000. Conversely, Anglicans are disproportionately represented in the highest income categories. Approximately 29% of Anglicans have family incomes that exceed \$60,000. All of the denominations have similar proportions in the middle income range (Table 40).

Table 42 indicates some interesting differences between denominations in education. In terms of educational background, French Catholics have a disproportionately lower

²⁶ Total does not equal 100 due to rounding.

²⁷ Total does not equal 100 due to rounding.

number of individuals having a university background. A similar condition exists for the category containing Baptists, Reformed and Pentecostal churches. Anglicans have the highest percentage of members with university backgrounds. The 31% of Anglicans with some university education contrasts with 19% for French Catholics.

Table 41: Denominational Family Income - Intervals

Family Income	NONE	FRENCH CATHOLIC	NON-FRENCH CATHOLIC	ANGLICAN	UNITED CHURCH	BAPTIST, REFORMED, PENTECOSTAL
<\$10,000	5.4%	6.4%	5.7%	7.3%	5.5%	4.3%
\$10,000-\$19,000	12.9%	19.5%	13.7%	12.6%	13.4%	16.3%
\$20,000-\$29,000	11.1%	18.7%	17.2%	16.8%	20.7%	14.1%
\$30,000-\$39,000	17.9%	18.8%	17.4%	13.0%	14.2%	12.6%
\$40,000-\$49,000	13.7%	11.7%	12.6%	15.0%	13.0%	16.6%
\$50,000-\$59,000	13.6%	8.9%	11.8%	6.2%	9.6%	10.8%
\$60,000-\$69,000	5.7%	5.5%	6.8%	8.2%	6.4%	13.4%
\$70,000-\$79,000	9.5%	3.2%	4.8%	8.6%	5.5%	2.0%
\$80,000 or More	10.3%	7.3%	10.2%	12.3%	11.7%	10.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
N	297	780	777	279	433	156

Source: CNES 1988.

Low educational status and low income are certainly characteristic of French Catholics. This is not the case for the Baptist category. The income levels in this category are comparable to non-French Catholics and members of the United Church despite having lower levels of educational attainment and income for the evangelical-fundamentalist wing of Canadian Protestantism.

Table 42: Highest Educational Attainment by Denomination

Highest Educational Attainment ^{2a}	NONE	FRENCH CATHOLIC	NON-FRENCH CATHOLIC	ANGLICAN	UNITED CHURCH	BAPTIST, REFORM, PENTECOST
No Schooling	3%	4%	3%		3%	
Some Elementary	2.1%	5.9%	3.7%	1.0%	1.8%	5.3%
Complete Elementary	1.1%	5.5%	4.9%	2.3%	4.5%	2.7%
Some Sec. High School	14.1%	20.7%	19.2%	25.6%	23.3%	25.9%
Complete Sec. HS	26.9%	27.8%	27.3%	21.1%	29.0%	33.1%
Some Tech. CC. etc	8.6%	9.2%	8.6%	9.0%	7.4%	5.9%
Complete Tech. CC. etc	11.0%	10.9%	10.7%	9.9%	8.0%	8.1%
Some University	10.9%	6.7%	9.9%	12.7%	7.4%	8.0%
Bachelors	16.7%	9.8%	11.6%	13.2%	12.9%	8.2%
Masters	4.7%	2.0%	3.0%	4.5%	3.1%	2.3%
Profesnl. Ph.D	3.7%	1.1%	.8%	.6%	2.3%	.5%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
N	327	890	892	302	498	179

Source: CNES 1988

The only educational difference between French Catholics and the Baptist category is that a larger percentage of French Catholics have a technical background as their highest educational achievement than their sectarian counterparts (20% to 14%). The opposite is true of those completing high school. In this case, there is a greater percentage of Baptists etc., with high school diplomas than French Catholics (30% to 27%). This difference, despite crediting French Catholics with a slightly higher level of educational attainment, has not effected the relative earning power of members of the Baptist category.

The discussion of the class effect on denominational poverty beliefs in Chapter Four suggests an influence on the evaluative dimension of the poverty belief system. The varied

^{2a}Table abbreviations are as follows: Some Sec=Some Secondary; HS= High School; Tech=Technical School; CC=Community College; Profesnl=Professional Degree.

way in which different classes in Canada approach the causes of poverty makes this factor difficult to predict in the context of the denominational influence ²⁹ Nonetheless, it is important to test the effect of class where the low income and educational status of French Catholics, the middle class status of non-French Catholics, and the upper class status of many Anglicans suggest very different orientations to poverty for denominations with a universal church heritage

Language and Province

The linguistic cleavage is a factor that has already been broached in the discussion of the traditional economic stability scale and the two scales measuring orientation to poverty solutions. The potential differences between French and non-French Catholics are critical. Nowhere is this more important than in the distinction between the closed and open Catholic communities discussed in Chapter Three. The institutional influence is likely mediated by the historical ability of Catholicism to control or dominate a particular region. Quebec is a primary example where Catholic institutions were able to form what John Whyte (1981, 7-8) describes as a closed Catholic society. This was not the case for Catholics outside Quebec. As a minority, these Catholics were forced to make compromises and compromising alliances that Quebec Catholics could forego.

Quebec and its relatively unique history in Canada is complicated, however, by the fact that the province is predominantly French. This introduces not only a geopolitical factor, but a linguistic dimension as well. Moreover, 84% of the respondents falling in the French Catholic category are also residing in Quebec. Another 9% of French Catholics live in Ontario. The majority of these Catholics live in Eastern Ontario and have both family roots and religious connections to Quebec. Another 3% of the French Catholic sample live in New Brunswick, and are thereby influenced by Quebec Catholicism by

²⁹A sense of the potential complexity of the class effect is outlined in Table 20 in Chapter Four

virtue of the traditional recruitment of Quebec educated clergy, despite having developed an indigenous Acadian Catholic culture ³⁰

Catholics in general represent a heterogeneous group. In the sample the Catholic community is split almost evenly between French and non-French speakers. Among the non-French Catholic group, 40% claim a first language other than French or English. The potential divergence of French and non-French Catholic institutions is underscored by the fact that 10% of non-French Catholics in the sample reside in Quebec. This number is roughly equivalent to the number of non-French Catholics living in either Alberta or British Columbia. These two Western provinces have contributed the largest number of non-French Catholics in the sample, apart from Ontario, where approximately half of the non-French Catholic sample resides.

Table 43: Respondent Breakdown by Province and Denomination

MEMBERSHIP BY PROV	NONE	FRENCH CATHOLIC	NON- FRENCH CATHOLIC	ANGELICAN	UNITED CHURCH	BAPTIST, REFORMED, PENTECOST
Nfld	.2%	.1%	2.8%	6.9%	1.7%	.7%
P.E.I.	.2%	.1%	.6%	.3%	.6%	.8%
N.S.	.8%	1.0%	4.2%	5.5%	3.3%	4.2%
N.B.	.9%	3.0%	2.5%	2.0%	1.6%	1.4%
P.Q.	14.1%	83.7%	9.9%	4.5%	2.0%	3.2%
Ontario	36.1%	8.8%	49.0%	51.8%	50.8%	67.4%
Manitoba	2.9%	.9%	4.9%	3.2%	6.4%	4.3%
Sask.	3.1%	.3%	5.7%	2.9%	6.8%	1.4%
Alberta	12.7%	1.0%	10.2%	8.1%	14.3%	8.4%
B.C.	29.1%	1.2%	10.3%	14.9%	12.5%	8.1%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	328	893	898	303	499	179

Source: CNES 1988

The Protestant denominations are predominantly English-speaking. The most homogeneous is the Anglican community, with 97% of respondents citing English as the language they first learned and still understand. Ninety-four percent of United Church

³⁰The Quebec influence is a product of the dominant role of Quebec seminaries in the training of French-speaking Catholic clergy.

respondents are in a similar category. Among Baptists, Reformed, and Pentecostals the number is somewhat less, dropping to 89%.

Controlling for the influence of the French-English cleavage and Quebec Catholicism requires two steps. Operationalizing these two conditions, while avoiding problems such as multicollinearity, involves constructing variables that are not highly correlated. Consequently, the following multivariate regression controls for the Quebec effect by using a dummy variable that measures whether or not an individual lives in Quebec.³¹

Given the large correlation between the French language and Quebec, the language variable measures whether or not the respondent is English-speaking in order to avoid the problem of multicollinearity.³² As in the case of Quebec, language is measured using a dummy variable.³³ As indicated in the discussion of the regression results, Quebec and language do not eliminate the influence of churches on the poverty belief system.

Institutional Attachment

Another factor that has yet to be taken into consideration is the extent to which respondents are attached or linked to religious institutions. One measure of this attachment is church attendance. Another indicator of the formative influence of religious institutions is whether or not individuals attended church schools. Attachment in this sense reflects the extent to which a religious based educational system is instrumental in inculcating particular beliefs.

The hypothetical implications of institutional attachment are twofold. As noted in Chapter One, those that have closer affiliation with their denomination are more likely to be influenced by current developments and by a denomination's heritage. If institutional attachment has little effect on poverty beliefs, and religious affiliation is a significant

³¹The coding is: 1=lives in Quebec, 0=does not live in Quebec. For a detailed discussion on the methodology of dummy variables and their application to regression see Hardy (1993).

³²For a more technical discussion on the problem of multicollinearity (where independent variables are highly correlated) see Nie et al. (1975, 340-341).

³³The coding is: 1=English as mother tongue, 0=English is not mother tongue.

influence, then an active historical residue is a plausible explanation of denominational differences

Table 44: Church Attendance by Denomination

Church Attendance	FRENCH CATHOLIC	NON-FRENCH CATHOLIC	ANGLICAN	UNITED CHURCH	BAPTIST, REFORMED, PENTECOSTAL
Never	11%	11%	16%	16%	11%
Less than Once a Year	4%	4%	13%	13%	7%
Once/Twice a Year	19%	16%	25%	22%	18%
Several Times a Year	14%	15%	18%	15%	11%
Once a Month	9%	8%	4%	10%	2%
Couple Times a Month	7%	6%	7%	7%	10%
Nearly Every Week	6%	4%	4%	3%	11%
Every Week	27%	32%	13%	14%	19%
More than Once a Week	3%	4%	0%	0%	11%
Totals	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	885	846	302	492	177

Source: CNES 1988.

In terms of church attendance, the two extremes of the church-sect continuum (Catholics and the Baptist category) have the highest percentage of members who are regular church attenders (Table 44). Approximately half of all Catholics attended a religious school. This differs dramatically for Protestants, for whom few members attended church schools. Members in the Baptist category have the highest proportion with a church school background (15%). Less than 8% of either Anglicans or United Church members attended church schools.

The implications for Catholic-Protestant differences suggest a greater formative role for the church in the lives of Catholics. For this reason it is important to measure the effect

of both the church-sect factor and the Catholic-Protestant cleavage. In some respects the two measures are representing two sides of the same coin. For in Canada, Catholicism represents the archetypical universal church.³⁴

Multivariate Regression Results

Much of the discussion of the results has described general patterns. These patterns support the hypothesis that denominational affiliation has some effect on poverty belief systems. This relationship can be tested further by using multivariate regression to provide a more controlled analysis of the way in which religious affiliation interacts with socio-economic variables. The stepwise procedure used in the following regression eliminates all non-significant relationships and calculates coefficients for the significant variables.

The standardized (beta) coefficients and the multiple R are reported for each scale in Table 45. The advantage of using standardized coefficients is that the relative importance of each significant independent variable can be ascertained. The larger the coefficient the more important the variable. This takes into account the influence of all of the other significant variables, and consequently, the coefficient measures only the amount of influence that is directly attributable to that particular variable.

As the beta coefficients in Table 45 indicate, the institutional influence of churches is found in the affect and normative dimensions of the poverty belief system. There are significant coefficients for religious affiliation in the affect scale and in three of the four normative scales. The Catholic-Protestant cleavage and religious attendance have a positive effect on emotional disposition toward the poor. The significance of church attendance suggests that closer affiliation with contemporary religious institutions does have an effect on dispositions toward the poor, at least on the emotional level. This reinforces the importance of an immediate denominational affiliation.

³⁴The regression uses sect and Catholic as the two dummy variables measuring different dimensions of religious institutions. The problem of multicollinearity is minimized because Anglicans are not Catholic, nor have they been classified in the sect category. Their numbers are sufficiently large to offset the correlation between the Catholic and sect variables.

The Catholic-Protestant cleavage and the church-sect factor are both significant factors affecting social obligation. Consistent with the earlier discussion of institutional differences, there is opposite effect. Catholic affiliation tends to increase social obligation to the less privileged while sect affiliation diminishes such an orientation. This supports the general hypothesis about institutional differences and the residual impact of very different notions of charity and the obligations of public bodies toward subordinate groups in society.

The effect of church affiliation is mixed on the other normative measures. There is no significant effect for the intolerance of inequality scale. It is important to note that of the ten categories, this scale registered the largest multiple R^2 (.42), which means that the significant coefficients are more effective in predicting attitudes. In addition, the primary coefficients for this scale are relatively large and are restricted to the standard socio-economic variables: sex, age, income, and education. Of the four significant coefficients, education is the most important factor influencing the equality scale.

The significance of the church-sect indicator in both the humane-participatory and the traditional economic stability scales is consistent with the general distinction between the external-oriented universal church influence and the more inward-oriented sectarian tradition. The negative coefficient in the humane-participatory scale denotes an antipathy toward this priority among the more sectarian groups. The negative coefficient for sectarian influences in the traditional economic stability scale suggests that sectarian affiliation is less concerned with the broader societal issues of economic growth and social order. This may be in keeping with the general "other-worldly" orientation of the less mainstream sects and a more inward focus on their immediate community.

As noted in Chapter Two, this has been the historical tradition of sects as they placed greater emphasis on membership criteria. Conversely, the universal church has emphasized the societal focus, where all are members by virtue of the broader political umbrella of the state.

Table 45: Significant Beta Coefficients for the Poverty Belief System

Beta Coefficients: Poverty Belief Scales	Catholic	Sect	Attend Church	Church School	Que	English	Sex Female	Age (Year)	Family Income	Education	R Squared
Positive Feelings for Poor	0.09		0.08				0.05			-0.10	0.0289
Social Obligation to Help Poor	0.08	-0.07			0.12		0.09	0.12	-0.10	-0.08	0.0961
Intolerant of Economic Inequality							0.17	0.20	-0.18	-0.25	0.1764
Priority to Humane and Participatory Society		-0.07				-0.16			-0.16		0.0676
Priority for Traditional Economic Growth and Stability		-0.07			-0.10			-0.18		-0.22	0.1024
Cause Systemic Rewards								-0.13	0.13		0.0289
Cause Individual Effort					-0.11			-0.12			0.0289
Cause Market Efficiencies						0.22			0.12		0.0676
Remedy Universal Medicare								0.13	-0.12	-0.13	0.0529
Remedy Income Supports				-0.08	0.21				-0.23		0.0961

Source: CNES 1988

The only religious effect in the evaluation category is the attendance at a church school on the protection of existing income support programs such as UI and social assistance. Those who attended church schools are less supportive of such programs. However, this does not appear to have much to do with church affiliation, although the majority of individuals who have attended church schools are Catholic. Ironically, the coefficients for Quebec and church school attendance are in opposite directions in the income supports scale. The large negative coefficient for family income reinforces church school attendance in the sense that class may be a factor and those with higher incomes and who attended church schools are less sympathetic to social programs incorporating income supports. Conversely, living in Quebec increases the likelihood that an individual supports such programs.

Language and Class

Language and class are definitely factors in the poverty belief system. Both represent broad social structures, and therefore it is not surprising that they have an effect on how belief systems are constructed. More importantly, the two categories are often mutually reinforcing. For example, English and high incomes denote lower priority to a 'humane and participatory society; and they also indicate greater support for a market-based economy.

The Quebec variable, with its Catholic and French connotations, is particularly interesting. The direction of the Quebec coefficients indicates a more collective orientation to social problems. The coefficients suggest greater support for structural approaches to poverty in the evaluative dimension and social obligation on the part of government in the normative dimension. This is evident in the significant coefficients for Quebec in the social obligation, individual effort, and income supports scales. However, it must be noted that of the four scales where Quebec is significant, two scales also contain a significant coefficient for either the Catholic-Protestant or church-sect variables.

The effect of class is quite apparent in most of the scales. The only scale where neither family income nor education is significant is in the individual approach to poverty measured by the individual effort scale. In the context of this study, however, it is important to underscore that neither class nor language eliminate the effect of denominational affiliation in a significant proportion of the poverty belief scales.

Age and Gender

Age and gender are two variables that figure prominently in the determinants of the poverty belief system. Age is a factor in six of the ten scales. In general, younger individuals adopt a structural approach to poverty.³⁵

The significant impact of gender is more focused in the affect and normative dimensions. Females tend to have positive emotions toward the poor and demonstrate

³⁵It is important to remember that the age variable in the regression uses year of birth. Hence, a negative coefficient has the opposite effect from what one would expect if the variable was measuring years.

greater commitment to a government role in helping the poor. Females are also less tolerant of economic inequality.

Like language and class, age and gender pose complex combinations affecting poverty belief systems. Yet, despite controls for these factors, the measures of denominational affiliation are still significant in the majority of scales in the affect and normative dimensions.

Political Culture and the Denominational Effect

The fact that denominational affiliation remains a factor in the affect and evaluative dimensions raises questions as to the possibility of factors such as political culture influencing or mediating the development of poverty belief systems. While there is considerable debate about the role of political parties and elections in the structuring of ideology, most studies agree that both play some role in defining the contours of what constitutes politics in Canada.³⁶

The proponents of the brokerage thesis argue that the ideological contours of electoral politics often mean the avoidance of traditional left-right themes that involve debate on class and the role of the state. Instead, Canadian electoral politics have historically emphasized ethno-linguistic and regional cleavages. This argument is only partially supported in the studies by Donald Blake (1986) and Richard Johnston (1988). Both studies analyze the opinions of activists in the Liberal and Progressive Conservative parties. Both find significant ideological differences between activists of the two main parties. They also find considerable variation suggesting considerable limits on ideological constraints that can be imposed by the party organization.

³⁶The strongest proponents of the ideological role of parties are Christian and Campbell (1990). They take the position that the mainstream parties in Canada, while overlapping, constitute distinguishable ideological positions that have evolved over time and influence the boundaries of political discourse. While they have been criticized by the proponents of the brokerage thesis for placing too great of an emphasis on the ideological role of parties, recent analysis of election platforms provide evidence of significant ideological patterns in the way in which the mainstream parties attempt to infuse ideology into electoral politics and government policies. For further discussion of parties and their ideological impact on policy see McAllister (1989) and Petry (1995).

An interesting contrast to Blake and Johnston is Keith Archer's and Alan Whitehorn's (1991) study of opinion data, collected from convention delegates from all three main political parties. This study provides additional support for the argument that there is a reasonable degree of internal consistency within each of the three parties, with the NDP demonstrating the highest level of consistency. In addition, there is an interesting contrast in support for the welfare state. The analysis of party differences notes that there is greater ideological consensus among NDP members and that they demonstrated larger levels of support for the programs such as social security. Comparative support for the welfare state is evident in the mean score of the social security scale used by Archer and Whitehorn. The mean NDP score is 4.06. This is contrasted with a mean Liberal score of 2.63 and a 1.67 score for Conservatives (1991, 151 - Table Two). While the differences between the Liberals and Conservatives exist, they are smaller than the differences that exist between the NDP and either the Liberals or Conservatives.

The conclusions that can be drawn from each of the studies on party activists are that there is some degree of ideological differentiation between the three main parties. While the ability of parties to convey this difference at the electoral level may be limited, the evidence of limited ideological voting in cases where individuals identify with a particular class suggests a mediating role for parties in the formation of a poverty belief system that organizes political ideas in a left-right format.³⁷

Unfortunately, evidence presented by Jon Pammett (1991) suggests that the vast majority of Canadians do not perceive their social or economic relationships in class terms. This limits the effect of class on voting behaviour, and by extension would appear also to limit the utility of the left-right role in the formation of ideologies within more broadly based belief systems. Nevertheless, class does seem to have an effect on the majority of scales in the poverty belief system. And, parties do seem to differentiate themselves, at

³⁷ For an explanation of the effect on the subjective perception of class on voting behaviour see the work of Lambert et al. (1991). This study argues that the effect of subjective class orientation is dependent on whether individuals define their relationships in society in class terms. And, where this is most present there is a discernible influence on voting behaviour.

least among activists, in a manner that would suggest an influence on poverty beliefs.³⁸ In this sense, parties and electoral politics contribute to a political culture that may influence the way in which church members perceive poverty.

The notion of qualified consensus about the legitimacy of the welfare state, discussed in Chapter Four, suggests that where there are differences they may be difficult to associate with broad social groups. Second, the nature of these differences may be rooted in very particular or idiosyncratic ideological systems. In Chapter Four there appeared to be differences in the way in which denominations emphasized either the individual or structural approach to poverty. This suggests a more systematic ideological basis for rationalizing one or the other. Analyzing political culture is one way of determining the extent to which these differences or ideological proclivities mediate the institutional influence of churches.

The presence of significant coefficients for variables measuring Quebec or English orientations suggest the possible importance of broad cultural factors that may be influenced by the political culture of denominations. The role of political parties and electoral politics is especially problematic in Quebec. It is difficult separating the historical role of the Catholic church in influencing the province's political culture from the process of secularization that has occurred since the Quiet Revolution. Since the Quiet Revolution, political parties and a secular nationalism have had greater influence in the way in which individuals perceive or debate social obligation, state-society relations, and participatory democracy.

The influence of political culture on the scales influenced by denominational affiliation can be tested by combining political culture variables and religious affiliation measures in

³⁸The most apparent difference is evident in a more recent study of Reform Party activists. The study by Archer and Ellis (1994, 294ff.), while less germane to the 1980s, does provide evidence of a homogeneous and pronounced opposition to the welfare state and all social policies that have been designed to limit the effects of poverty among the newly formed Reform Party. While such ideological constraint was not evident in earlier studies of mainstream parties, the eventual rise of the Reform Party does indicate a relatively active and ideologically cohesive group within Canadian society that wishes to structure political discourse that has very explicit ideological boundaries.

regressions³⁹ Political culture can be understood by looking at trust and interest in politics, use of left-right labels, and party identification and voting The measures of trust and interest in politics provide an indication of the extent to which different denominations are comprised of individuals who are either actively following or distanced from mainstream political debate The analysis of left-right labels and their use indicates the extent to which more traditional political language is applicable to church members and the way in which they organize the symbolic world of politics Finally, party identification and voting measure the extent to which parties and electoral politics play a more important role in structuring beliefs about poverty than do religious institutions

Trust and Interest in Politics

The trust scale is the combination of the four questions in a single factor loading.⁴⁰ Positive scores indicate trust in the ability of government to do what is right Figure 6 shows a marked difference between French Catholics and other denominations in their respective levels of trust. French Catholics are the most trusting with the closest mean scores coming from the more sectarian denominations

Similar to the trust scale, the political interest scale is constructed as a single factor loading of five questions asking about the respondent's interest in electoral politics⁴¹ The difference between French Catholics and other denominations is even more pronounced. In both trust and interest, there is an absence of the Catholic-Protestant or church-sect cleavages evident in the majority of scales in the poverty belief system. The suggest the presence of a Quebec-non-Quebec difference But, as subsequent regression analysis

³⁹A left-right label measure is not included in the regression because there are few respondents using such labels

⁴⁰The trust scale is constructed using the same PCA technique applied to the poverty belief scales. The four questions used in the scale are summarized as follows. People running government are not crooks. People in government do not waste tax money. Always trust government to do what is right and. People running government are smart

⁴¹The questions used in the political interest scale are summarized as follows: Interested in federal election campaign (at two different stages). Pay much attention to campaign news on TV; Pay much attention to campaign news articles. and. Pay much attention to politics generally.

underscores, this has only a marginal effect on the significance of denominational affiliation

Figure 6: Denominational Average Scores on Trust and Interest in Politics

Left-Right Labels

The majority of Canadians do not use the traditional left-right ideological codes to describe politics. Based on the 1988 election study, 81% of respondents fall into this category. Those affiliated with churches tend to follow this pattern with the least use of the left-right codes being among French Catholics (87%). Conversely, only 67% of individuals claiming no religious affiliation are in this category.

There are some interesting differences between churches when individuals who use the left-right category are asked to place themselves along the ideological continuum (Table 46). Catholics have a greater propensity to identify themselves as part of the centre. The Anglican community is the most polarized with a higher contingent identifying with

either the left or right than in any of the other religious communities. Of this number, the majority identify with the right (59%)

The respondents affiliated with the more sectarian churches identify less with the right than their Protestant counterparts and the percent that identify with the left are second only to those not affiliated with any church. However, it should be noted that this group is particularly small and hence may not be an accurate reflection of the general pattern of ideological identification among the larger body of sectarian churches.

Table 46: Ideological Self-Placement by Denomination

Ideological Self-Placement and Church Affiliation⁴²	Left	Centre	Right	N
None	37%	27%	37%	104
French Catholic	21%	44%	35%	114
Non-French Catholic	25%	33%	42%	166
Anglican	28%	13%	59%	60
United church	25%	29%	46%	90
Baptist, Reformed, Pentecost	30%	28%	43%	32

Source: CNES 1988

The significance of ideological placement is twofold. First, the majority of church members do not conceptualize the elements that would be central to the normative and evaluative dimensions of a belief system in left-right terms. This makes it difficult to ascribe explanations to belief systems that imply internal coherence that is regulated by positions that are intrinsic to traditional left-wing or right wing ideologies.

Second, the polarization within the Anglican community constitutes an interesting tendency that may explain why Anglicans have had an ambivalent history concerning their involvement in either the Social Gospel or the Social Justice movements. While Anglicans using a left-right scheme are a small proportion of the sample, this tendency does suggest a degree of polarization that is not evident in the other denominations. Unfortunately, the possibility of "red tories" and left liberals means a differentiation that may be less

⁴² $\chi^2 = 25.63$ df=10 (p= .004), Cramer's V= .15

important in determining position within the poverty belief system, particularly for the affect and normative dimensions where denominational affiliation has the greatest influence

Parties and Voting

To the extent that left-right labels may not be particularly useful in explaining orientation to poverty beliefs, it is necessary to explore the extent to which parties and electoral politics provide an alternative framework within which individuals come to understand their respective position in each dimension of the poverty belief system

In terms of general voting turnout, there is no significant difference between denominations. There is an equal willingness on the part of church members to vote during federal or provincial elections, at least in the 1980s. The only real difference lies in the degree to which church members identify with political parties. Given the ideological cohesiveness and differentiation between the two parties, one would expect those who closely identify with the NDP to be more supportive of the welfare state. Those identifying with the Liberal Party would be the next most supportive category. Both affect and normative positions toward the poor would hypothetically range in a similar direction, with PC supporters being the least supportive of the poor.

Figure 7 shows the denominational differences in party identification. Given the historical roots of the three main parties it is not surprising that the greatest percentage of strong Liberal identifiers is found among non-French Catholics. The historical perception of the Liberal party as protector of minority interests underscores its influence among Catholics living outside Quebec. Likewise the historical base for Conservatives has been among Anglo-Saxon elite, linking the party to Anglicanism.

Given the free market orientation and purported opposition to state intervention of the Progressive Conservatives during the 1980s, it is not surprising that denominational support is found among the more sectarian denominations. Another interesting pattern is the polarization among Anglicans between those who identify with Conservatives and those identifying with the NDP. This parallels the pattern evident in self-assigned left-right

labels discussed earlier. While the largest percentage of NDP identifiers is in the "No Denomination" category, it is among French Catholics where one finds the lowest percentage. This is likely a function of the party's limited activity in Quebec.

Figure 7: Percent of Denominations as Strong Party Identifiers

In general there is a perceptible slope moving from church to sect with respect to Conservative identification. The aberration in this trend is among Anglicans, which may be offset by the larger percentage of NDP identifiers. Any other pattern, such as the Catholic-Protestant cleavage is muted by the more moderate levels of party identification among Catholics, French Catholics in particular.

Controlling for Political Culture

Of the four scales where denominational affiliation influenced beliefs, only the affect and social obligation scales involved a significant religious factor when political culture

variables are introduced. For the affect scale there are three significant coefficients. The original coefficients measuring denominational affiliation remain important despite a drop in the multiple R. Of the political culture variables, only voting affects emotional orientation toward the poor. If anything, this variable provides some indication of those who are either apathetic or disaffected with electoral participation.

Table 47: Significant Beta Coefficients - Political Culture and Poverty Beliefs

Beta Coefficients of Poverty Belief Scales	Catholic	Sect	Attend Church	Que	English	Id-NDP	Id-LIB	Id-PC	Political Interest	Trust	Voter	R Squared
Positive Feelings for Poor	.12		.07								-.09	0.0289
Social Obligation to Help Poor	.14			.15		.22	.07					0.1024
Priority to Humane and Participatory Society					-.21	.12		-.08		-.11		0.0841
Priority for Traditional Economic Growth and Stability				-.08		-.08	.12	.17	.09			0.0484

Source: CNES 1988

For social obligation the Catholic-Protestant cleavage remains significant and the church-sect indicator is dropped. Quebec remains significant and also included in the regression is identification with either the NDP or Liberal parties. Denominational affiliation becomes non-significant for the final two scales in the normative dimension: humane-participatory and traditional economic stability scales. The fact that PC identification is not significant suggests that it is the tempered centrism of the Liberal party and their historical involvement in the development of the welfare state that modestly influences commitment to greater government obligation to the poor. Conversely, the ideological orientation of the NDP is a natural fit for greater social obligation. The party system, however, does not sufficiently mold this component of the poverty belief system to rule out the influence of the Catholic-Protestant cleavage. Even the inclusion of the Quebec variable does not diminish the relative importance of this cleavage. Rather, the

combination of the Catholic-Protestant cleavage and the influence of Quebec institutions, suggests an interactive effect rooted in the deep Catholic roots of Quebec society and its universal church heritage

Conclusion: Persistent Influence of Churches

The final results of the multivariate analysis confirm and qualify the hypothesis concerning the role of religious institutions in the poverty belief system. The institutional effect, from a quantitative perspective, remains present in the belief system despite the introduction of numerous structural and cultural controls. Where the institutional effect is minimized is in the scales that are more evaluative in nature. This confirms the more important role of denominational affiliation for the affective and normative dimensions of the poverty belief system.

The influence of religious institutions in the affective and normative orientation of individuals indicates a rather complex set of factors that are not often addressed in the literature on ideology. For example, in the section controlling for political culture, Catholicism remains a determinant of relative importance. The Catholic factor is not eliminated when the other significant influences are introduced, such as NDP party identification, Quebec residence, and to a lesser extent Liberal party identification.

None of the non-religious variables cancels the influence of Catholic affiliation. Likewise, when controls for socio-economic influences are introduced, both the Catholic-Protestant and church-sect dimensions remain important, both affecting the scale of social obligation according to the hypothesized structural-individual pattern.

The denominational factor appears to be of little importance in the determination of the evaluative scales. However, the denominational differences presented in Chapter Four still suggest grounds for arguing that churches continue to influence the ideological or evaluative dimension of poverty beliefs. Nevertheless, as evaluative questions become less directly linked to poverty or the poor as an identifiable group, the influence of churches becomes less important in defining positions.

The regressions in Chapter Five point to the continuing influence of socio-demographic influences while at the same time indicating that institutions such as religion also play a role in structuring beliefs. This confirms the more tentative conclusions drawn from the bivariate relationships between denomination and poverty beliefs demonstrated in Chapter Four.

The very restricted influence of church attendance is also important to note. Attendance was only a significant factor in the affect dimension. This suggests that the importance of attendance as a socializing process is quite limited. There is something more deeply entrenched in the symbolic world of the denomination that influences poverty beliefs. Such influence does not rely on the institutional connection which is reinforced by frequent contact with the church and clergy. The absence of attendance as a factor in the normative scales suggests a more historical influence suggestive of an historical residue that is being transmitted from one generation to the next despite the relative convergence of the religious elite. In this sense, there is a normative orientation that is distinctly influenced by an institutional affiliation reflecting the historical differences in the way in which churches have addressed the question of poverty.

This chapter provides important empirical evidence indicating the potential for explaining one aspect of poverty beliefs. The historical residues of Canadian churches continue to influence contemporary mass beliefs about poverty. This influence persists despite the concomitant influence of both political culture and socio-economic factors.

The church-sect thesis presents an important step in theorizing the role of cultural institutions in the maintenance of particular belief systems. These beliefs, slow to change, are the core values and attitudes that form the basis of contemporary "common sense." It is essential to understand the institutions carrying these beliefs, of which churches are but one example, prior to understanding the core values of a society.

CHAPTER SIX

Conclusion

The persistent and measurable influence of denominational affiliation suggests the need for more detailed analysis of the way in which churches and their communities construct belief systems. At this point it is important to summarize some of the main findings of this study.

The impetus for focusing on the historical effect of religious institutions on contemporary poverty beliefs is the result of an earlier study on denominational differences in attitudes toward social policy issues (Evans 1990). This analysis of attitudinal data from the 1984 Canadian National Election Study indicated that there were few significant denominational differences. Those that did exist appeared to be linked to church attendance rather than denominational affiliation.

However, in careful reflection, the study raised a number of important issues. Despite the limited effect of denominational affiliation on attitudes toward social policies, there was a persistent pattern also reflected in other literature examining religion and political culture. In the 1990 study (Evans), the significant relationships were most evident for Catholics and Conservative Protestants. Church members in both categories shared similar positions with their church leaders as their church attendance increased. The conclusion was that while Catholics and conservative Protestants were organized differently, their church leaders had a greater likelihood of influencing the beliefs of their congregations than that of their Anglican and United Church counterparts.

The paradox was more apparent if one contrasted the media coverage and policy positions of the mainstream churches, both Catholic and Protestant. The general convergence in official church policy positions, however, was not evident at the membership level. The partial conclusion was that while the church elite or church tradition may influence an ethical stance, neither had a particularly profound effect on the policy orientation of church members. The policy positions of religious elite in the

mainstream Christian churches in Canada were only having a limited impact on the attitudes of their members, with the greatest effect evident among Catholics. The extension of this finding was that elite discourse may facilitate limited moral outrage among church members, but it is ineffective in helping members derive consistent and uniform policy positions (Evans 1990, 30)

The conclusions of the 1990 study raised a number of questions. First, the historical roots of each of the churches suggested different orientations toward social policies. The Catholic-Protestant cleavage suggested differences based on a collective or organic understanding of society versus one that espoused individualism. In reflecting on church history, such a facile cleavage was misleading. Protestant churches with an establishment tradition had many similar organic tendencies that compared with the traditional discourse of their Catholic counterparts. These similarities are also evident when the more contemporary Protestant social gospel is compared with Catholic social doctrine. Both eventually converged in their support of the welfare state.

The second question involved the historic rupture of the church as a primary social agent. This was part of the historical process of secularization. According to the secularization thesis, churches have become marginalized as important socializing agents in society. Their doctrine and practices have become socially inert as they each compete in an increasingly consumer driven market. In a functionally specialized world, individual allegiances and identity are forged by the individual taste of the consumer and the demand to compartmentalize the world into discrete areas, none of which involves the overarching ethos of a religious institution.

The problem with the secularization thesis was the persistence of religious institutions. They had not disappeared and are still engaged in renewal and revitalization. While this does not disprove the theory of secularization, it does suggest the need to find an explanation for religious persistence. This becomes even more intriguing as one maps the discrepancies between the organizational position of churches on social issues and that which is found among the general membership.¹ The divergence suggests other factors could be paramount in the way in which belief systems are formed.

The attempt to answer these questions contains two strategies. First, the contemporary influence of the welfare state suggests that the denominational influence is unlikely to be found on social policies unless the issue is linked to a traditional theme within the denomination. Poverty was the ideal theme because it embodies both the traditional discourse of charity and the more contemporary and secular themes of social justice. It is via beliefs in poverty that one can make the connection between an historical tradition and contemporary debates within the context of the welfare state. From this basis denominational differences were analyzed using contemporary attitudinal data.

The key to the poverty belief system was differentiating between the affective, normative, and evaluative dimensions of poverty. The failure to find many significant denominational differences in the 1990 study was the result of emphasizing the evaluative side of poverty or social policy beliefs. Given the historical role of churches one would expect to see a more profound relationship between denominational affiliation and beliefs in the affective and normative dimensions of poverty. The evaluative component is more intrinsic to the traditional ideological system and its social and political institutions (i.e., political parties, unions, etc.).

The second strategy involved mapping the institutional heritage of each of the mainstream churches. The objective was to find some method of categorizing mainstream denominations, based on their institutional heritage and the cultural messages about poverty each embodies. This institutional heritage includes the theological tradition regarding charity, the practice of charity and its institutionalization as social services and almsgiving. This heritage also includes the relationship between church and state and the extent to which there was a specialized role for the church or church leaders in the provision of assistance to the less affluent.

The use of Troeltsch's categories of sect and church resulted in a classification scheme that qualitatively differentiated institutional heritage among Canadian churches. This was the basis from which the impact of institutional heritage could be differentiated. What was being tested was the extent to which values and attitudes were transmitted from one historical period to the next via the embedded symbols of a particular church polity.

The historical differences in the way in which Canadian churches reacted to poverty provide a context for understanding the way in which institutional heritage transmits particular orientations toward poverty. Similar to other social variables used to explain belief systems, such as ethnicity or class, churches in the church-sect framework provide an additional way of explaining a consistent transmission of beliefs.

Not only is a church polity relevant, but so is the broader environment within which the polity evolved. For this reason the Canadian-US comparison is instructive. An examination of the historical trajectory of church polities in Canada and the United States provides one more potential element affecting the way in which values are transmitted. Certainly numerous American studies have demonstrated a consistent Catholic-Protestant cleavage. As the Canadian-US comparisons underscore, this cleavage is also strengthened by the church-sect dimension. If any thing, this comparison underscores the importance of French Canadian Catholicism in the more collective or structural orientation of Canadian poverty beliefs. The Canadian-US differences also suggest a way in which church polities can be mutually reinforcing. While failing to have the type of establishment tradition of British and European churches, the tensions between Canadian and US branches of the same denomination provided an impetus for a universal church dimension in Canada that is largely absent in the United States.

Chapter Four provides an initial mapping of contemporary denominational differences in poverty and social policy beliefs. The essence of this chapter is to demonstrate both the complexity of the poverty belief system and the extent to which much of our contemporary understanding of poverty is linked to the historical development of the welfare state. In this context it is quite reasonable to presume that other socio-economic variables, such as class, will play a more important role in determining or influencing poverty beliefs. However, Chapter Four presents a strong case for arguing that the denominational factor remains significant at a number of different levels despite the relevance of factors such as income and education, and at times, language.

The issue of language is important given the relationships between French Canadians, Quebec, and Catholicism. On a number of survey questions the differences between

francophone and non-francophone Catholics were substantial. Yet, on other questions there was a distinct Catholic-Protestant cleavage.

There are three factors that account for inconsistencies in either the Catholic-Protestant cleavage or church-sect differences. First, the Canadian-US comparisons demonstrate a pattern that is relatively consistent with the church-sect explanation, regardless of language. Catholics that were in a more sectarian environment (i.e., US Catholics) demonstrated a more individual approach to poverty than their co-religionists from environments that reflected a more universal church heritage (i.e., francophone Catholics), followed by Catholics from a more intermediate position (i.e., non-francophone Catholics). This suggests that a broader national environment has a significant effect on the way in which institutional heritage evolves and manifests itself.

The second factor is the attitudinal heterogeneity of the Protestant denominations, particularly Anglican members. Greater variability in responses reflects internal tensions that may diminish the underlying influence of a denomination's institutional heritage. The heterogeneity of Protestant denominations may also reflect greater fluidity in attitudinal dispositions. This may mean that Protestant institutions are relatively less influential as cultural institutions than their Catholic counterparts or that by their nature do not enforce conformity to the same degree.

The third factor is the degree to which denominational influence declines as values and attitudes become less connected to the issue of poverty. The relatively larger national denominational differences in the Canada-US comparisons are less apparent in the smaller Gallup surveys, which focus more directly on policies related to the welfare state.

It is in Chapter Five that the church-sect thesis is more rigorously tested. The 1988 Canadian National Election Study provides the sample size and range of questions necessary to construct a multidimensional poverty belief system and apply multivariate tests on the influence of denominations. Scales are developed to represent the three main dimensions of the poverty belief system: affect, norms and evaluation.

These scales permit statistical tests for the relationship between church membership and beliefs about poverty and permit conclusions for the following hypotheses outlined in

Chapter One 1) there is evidence of denominational differences in beliefs about poverty, 2) degree of attachment to a denomination is a factor influencing individual poverty beliefs, 3) the significance of denominational influence on poverty beliefs remains relevant when non-denominational factors are controlled, and 4) some of the failure to conform to a denominational pattern is explained by the multidimensional quality of poverty beliefs and the degree of variation that exists within aberrant denominations

The conclusions that can be drawn for the multivariate analysis are that there are significant denominational differences in beliefs about poverty, but that these differences are more pronounced on dimensions reflecting an affective or normative orientation. On the question of institutional attachment it was found that church attendance and church schools (including separate public schools) tended not have a significant impact on beliefs. While attendance was a factor in affective orientation it did not exclude the significance of denominational affiliation. When contrasted with the influence of other variables the denominational effect remained relatively important. This included contrasts with both socio-economic variables and different political culture measures, including party identification. In most cases the denominational effect persisted.

What do these results tell us? First, the fact that the denominational effect persists in numerous surveys suggests that it is more than a spurious or secondary influence on beliefs. Second, despite the relatively low percentage of variation explained in the multivariate analysis, denominational affiliation remained significant on the dimensions that are relatively more open to the influence of institutionalized religion (i.e., affect and norms). In many of the non-multivariate examples in earlier chapters the denominational influence was often as strong or stronger than other significant explanatory variables. This indicates a need to formulate a more consistent explanation of the current impact of religion in a secularized society. Finally, the church-sect model shows some promise as a way of understanding the historical residue affecting beliefs concerning poverty.

The church-sect generalizations must be qualified. No one denomination can be described as either a sect or a universal church. This is evident in the discussions of church politics and historical development of church-state relations. As history unfolds religious

institutions have both varied and contradictory relationships with the state. Internal and external conflict with competing religious communities also contributes to the diversity of religious expression. This diversity is compounded when one moves from Europe to Canada and the United States.

Despite the variation of religious institutions and their respective historical development, they each have a heritage that permits each to be placed on a general sect-church continuum. And, this framework augments the more traditional understanding of a Catholic-Protestant cleavage that persists in Canadian society. Notwithstanding the continuing role of language, ethnicity, region, and class in the formation of belief systems, religion and its institutional manifestations suggest the need for a more thorough examination of the way in which cultural institutions transmit values and attitudes, and how these in turn are manifested in society.

Appendix I

Poverty Belief System Scales and Statistical Results

Independent Variable Key for Regression Results

RSEX	Respondents Gender
N1	Year of Birth
N3	Highest Educational Attainment
N4	Attended Church School
N12	Church Attendance
N19	Family Income

Affect Scale - Feelings for Poor

Formula for Scale

Compute affect scale = (xh2-xh1)+(xh2-xh3)+(xh2-xh4)+(xh2-xh5)+(xh2-xh6)+(xh2-xh7)+(xh2-xh8)+(xh2-xh9)+(xh2-xh10)+(xh2-xh11)

Table 48: Variables in Affect Scale - C'NES 1988

Variable Name	Label	Score Range
XH1	farmers	0 neg - 100 pos
XH10	French Canadians	0 neg - 100 pos
XH11	Americans	0 neg - 100 pos
XH2	poor	0 neg - 100 pos
XH3	English Canadians	0 neg - 100 pos
XH4	small business	0 neg - 100 pos
XH5	ethnic minorities	0 neg - 100 pos
XH6	unions	0 neg - 100 pos
XH7	natives	0 neg - 100 pos
XH8	elderly	0 neg - 100 pos
XH9	feminists	0 neg - 100 pos

Preamble read to respondents:

Here is a drawing of a thermometer. It is called a feeling thermometer because it helps us to measure feelings toward various groups of people. Here is how it works. Scores between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favourable and warm toward a group of people -- the higher the score, the warmer and more favourable your feelings. Scores between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel too favourable and are cool toward a group of people -- the lower the score, the cooler and less favourable your feelings. If you don't have any feelings at all toward a group of people, just say so and we'll go on to the next one.

Direction of Scale

Summaries of Affect Scale
By levels of GOVERNMENT SHOULD DO FOR> THE POOR

For Entire Population Value/Label	Mean	Std Dev	Cases
	67.7875	154.8415	2528
1 More	85.5308	148.7803	1999
3 Same	9.2233	153.3773	481
5 Less	-82.3014	189.6919	48

Total Cases = 3609

Missing Cases = 1080 or 29.9 Pct

Multiple Regression

Multiple R .17420
R Square .03035
Adjusted R Square .02810
Standard Error 149.98647

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	4	1217199.81180	304299.95295
Residual	1729	38894701.41430	22495.94208

F = 13.52688 Signif F = .0000

----- Variables in the Equation -----

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
CATHOLIC	22.168986	7.410095	.088382	3.666	.0003
N12	4.703577	1.467314	.077811	3.206	.0014
RSEX	3.727805	1.827912	.048906	2.039	.0416
N3	-77.430228	1.747205	-.100943	-4.253	.0000

(Constant) 70.900567 13.700099 5.175 .0000

----- Variables not in the Equation -----

Variable	Beta In	Partial	Min Toler	T	Sig T
QUE	.031207	.027522	.729401	1.144	.2526
ENGLISH	-.017271	-.015301	.743099	-.636	.5248
SECT	.026564	-.019009	.494837	-.790	.4295
N4	-.017161	-.015005	.741275	-.624	.5328
N1	.037893	.036835	.898050	1.532	.1257
N19	-.020129	-.018844	.849825	-.783	.4335

Normative Dimension

Social Obligation - Government Should Do More for the Poor

PCA Varimax Rotation

Eigenvalue 1.77981 Percentage of Variance 44.5

Found only one factor-no rotation:

Government Should Do More For...

Poor .71273

Single Parents .69839

Elderly .59090

Women .66003

Direction of Scale

Summaries of OBLIGATE

By levels of GOVERNMENT SHOULD DO MORE FOR THE POOR

	Mean	Std Dev	Cases
For Entire Population	-1.751E-14	1.0000	1762
Value/Label			
1 More	.4567	.6847	141
3 Same	-1.2839	.639	61
5 Less	-2.7170	1.1170	54

Total Cases = 3609

Missing Cases = 847 or 23.5 Pct

Multiple Regression

Multiple R .30806

R Square .09486

Adjusted R Square .09141

Standard Error .92863

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	7	166.21849	23.74550
Residual	1839	1586.00404	.86235

F = 27.53583 Signif F = .0000

----- Variables in the Equation -----

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
QUE	.122040	.054671	.122040	4.808	.0000
CATHOLIC	.075561	.065174	.075561	2.284	.0225
SECT	-.068990	.068655	-.068990	-2.236	.0255
RSEX	.089778	.011083	.089778	3.948	.0001
N1	.121989	.001451	.121989	5.365	.0000
N19	-.104187	.010300	-.104187	-4.271	.0000
N3	-.084815	.011301	-.084815	-3.508	.0005
(Constant)	-14.964525	2.810060		-5.325	.0000

----- Variables not in the Equation -----

Variable	Beta In	Partial	Min Toler	T	Sig T
ENGLISH	.031942	.024102	.443506	1.034	.3014
N12	-.035433	-.034712	.433084	-1.489	.1366
N4	-.047193	-.042872	.389033	-1.840	.0660

Equality Scale - Intolerance of Economic Inequality

PCA Varimax Rotation

Eigenvalue 1.62899 Percentage of Variation 54.3

Found only one factor:

Working People Get:

(1) Not Fair Share or (2) What Deserve -.81920

Unskilled Workers Wages:

(1) About Right or (2) Much Too Low .72338

Most Business Executives:

(1) Deserve High Salary or
(2) Receive More than Deserve .65926

Direction of Scale

Summaries of Intolerance of Inequality Scale
 By levels of QC14 WORKING PEOPLE IN THIS COUNTRY GET:

Variable	Value	Label	Mean	Std Dev	Cases
For Entire Population			-1.200E-15	1.0000000	749
QC14	1	Not Fair Share	.7643497	.5337658	400
QC14	2	What Deserve	-.8268221	.6167199	349

Total Cases = 3609

Missing Cases = 2860 or 79.2 pct

Multiple Regression

Multiple R	.41604
R Square	.17309
Adjusted R Square	.16077
Standard Error	.92895

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	4	94.61837	23.65459
Residual	524	452.02206	.86294

F = 27.41153 Sig.(1) F = .0000

----- Variables in the Equation -----

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig. T
RSEX	.089553	.020941	.41604	4.276	.0000
N1	.013105	.002649	.22046	4.947	.0000
N19	-.079857	.020138	-.17574	-3.966	.0001
N3	-.122919	.021194	-.246143	-5.800	.0000
(Constant)	-24.56463	5.171147		-4.750	.0000

----- Variables not in the Equation -----

Variable	Beta In	Partial	Min Toler	T	Sig T
QUE	-.022760	-.024935	.801704	-.570	.5687
ENGLISH	-.004467	-.004901	.802410	-.112	.9108
CATHOLIC	.017078	.018483	.800982	.423	.6727
SECT	-.063774	-.069339	.797175	-1.589	.1126
N12	-.029586	-.031578	.798778	-.722	.4704
N4	-.037420	-.040720	.801008	-.932	.3518

Humane-Participatory Scale - Priority for Humane and Participatory Society

FCA Varimax Rotation

Factor 2 is Humane and Participatory Society Scale.

Factor	Eigenvalue	Pct of Var	Cum Pct
1	2.78988	31.0	31.0
2	1.91809	21.3	52.3

Factor Matrix:

Rotated Factors (Varimax)	Traditional Stability Factor 1	Humane- Participatory Factor 2
[scored 1-12 with 1 as most important goal]		
Maintain high rate of economic growth	.75905	-.10742
Country has strong defence forces	.66909	.11754
People have more say in work/community	.19437	.72939
Maintaining order in the nation	.60360	.10466
Give people more say in govt decisions	.24403	.66379
Fighting rising prices	.68777	.19990
Maintaining a stable economy	.62427	.02557
Less impersonal/more humane society	-.08429	.79399
Ideas count more than money in society	-.01789	.81996

Direction of Scale

Summaries of Policy Priority for Humane and Participatory Society
By levels of QH10 GOAL>LESS IMPERSONAL,MORE HUMANE SOCIETY

Variable	Value	Label	Mean	Std Dev	Cases
For Entire Population			-1.626E-14	1.0000	2015
QH10	1	Most Important	1.1030	.5488	392
QH10	2		.8589	.6469	235
QH10	3		.5214	.7065	162
QH10	4		.2596	.6816	114
QH10	5		-.0707	.6395	126
QH10	6		-.1365	.6741	117
QH10	7		-.5113	.5395	133

QH10	8		-.13504	.58884	124
QH10	9		-.17468	.59971	156
QH10	10		-.18808	.4705	180
QH10	11		-.19979	.4802	200
QH10	12	Least Important	-.19930	.5806	224

Total Cases = 3609
Missing Cases = 1594 or 44.2 Pot

Multiple Regression

Multiple R .25715
R Square .06612
Adjusted R Square .06412
Standard Error .98136

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	3	45.5171	15.17236
Residual	1401	1346.97165	.96198

F = 33.05972 Signif F = .0000

----- Variables in the Equation -----

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
ENGLISH	-.324911	.068943	-.158129	-4.711	.00000
SECT	-.155130	.065981	-.067664	-2.351	.01824
N19	-.071671	.011689	-.158547	-6.136	.00000
(Constant)	.570104	.067639		8.429	.00000

----- Variables not in the Equation -----

Variable	Beta In	Partial	Min Toler	F	Sig F
QUE	.055461	.044104	.540517	11.81	.00000
CATHOLIC	.023516	.017003	.488236	1.69	.19747
N12	-.027786	-.028347	.094266	11.81	.00000
N4	.012799	.021689	.050891	.611	.43171
RSEX	-.010334	-.010498	.094166	1.39	.16937
N1	-.018150	-.018497	.500074	1.69	.19747
N3	-.011586	-.011192	.094044	1.412	.16351

Traditional Economic stability - Priority for Traditional Economic Growth and Stability

PCA Varimax Rotation

Factor 1 is Economic Growth and Stability Scale.

Factor	Eigenvalue	Pct of Var	Cum Pct
1	2.78988	31.0	31.0
2	1.91809	21.7	52.7

Factor Matrix:

Rotated Factors - Varimax	Factor 1	Factor 2
[scored 1-11 with 1 as most important goal]		
Maintain high rate of economic growth	.77908	-.11740
Country has strong defence forces	.66909	.11784
People have more say in work community	.12417	.72949
Maintaining order in the nation	.60300	.10400
Give people more say in govt decisions	.12413	.66379
Fighting rising prices	.68777	.12990
Maintaining a stable economy	.62427	.10258
Less impersonal more humane society	-.108409	.70300
Ideas count more than money in society	-.10789	.61990

Direction of Scale

Summaries of Economic Growth and Stability Scale
By Levels of QH1 GOAL - MAINTAIN HIGH RATE ECONOMIC GROWTH

Variable	Value	Label	Mean	Std Dev	Cases
For Entire Population			-.17743E-14	1.0000	101
QH1	1	Most Important	.1111	.6011	61
QH1	2		.14007	.6101	263
QH1	3		.11401	.60007	173
QH1	4		.10800	.60100	119
QH1	5		-.11041	.60061	110
QH1	6		-.14100	.60007	103
QH1	7		-.11041	.60300	74
QH1	8		-.10100	.60400	91
QH1	9		-.14001	.60007	48
QH1	10		-.11114	.60500	101
QH1	11		-.13000	.60100	101

Q1: 12 Least Important 10.00 104.00 1.00

Total Cases = 3009

Missing Cases = 1994 or 64.11%

Multiple Regression

Multiple R .2207
 R Square .0487
 Adjusted R Square .046
 Standard Error .9426

Analysis of Variance

	df	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	4	14.111	3.5278
Residual	144	29.111	.2022

F = 4.1111 19.915 1.0000

----- Variables in the Equation

Variable	B	df	t	Prob. > t
Q1E	-.11111	1	-.11111	.92187
SECT	-.11111	1	-.11111	.92187
N1	-.11111	1	-.11111	.92187
N2	-.11111	1	-.11111	.92187
Constant	1.00000	1	1.00000	.31831

----- Variables Not in the Equation

Variable	beta in	Partial	Mean Square	Prob. > F
ENGLISH	-.11111	-.11111	.00000	.99999
CATHOL	-.11111	-.11111	.00000	.99999
N1E	-.11111	-.11111	.00000	.99999
N2E	-.11111	-.11111	.00000	.99999
PCEN	-.11111	-.11111	.00000	.99999
N1E	-.11111	-.11111	.00000	.99999

4

OF/DE

4

PM-1 3 1/2" x 4" PHOTOGRAPHIC MICROCOPY TARGET
NBS 1010a ANSI/ISO #2 EQUIVALENT

PRECISIONSM RESOLUTION TARGETS

Causes of Poverty

PCA Varimax Rotation

NWQC13

Government regulation of business:

(1) does more harm (0) neither (-1) is necessary.

NWQC15

People do not work hard on job because:

(1) do not care (0) neither (-1) job is dull.

NWQC17

Competition:

(1) leads to excellence (0) neither (-1) often wasteful.

NWQC2

Profit system:

(1) values hard work (0) neither (-1) worst of human nature

NWQC3

If system of private enterprise abolished:

(1) work hard anyway; (0) neither (-1) very few do best.

NWQC6

Getting ahead in world mostly matter of:

(1) ability, hard work (0) neither (-1) getting breaks.

NWQC8

People fail:

(1) lazy, lack self-discipline (0) neither (-1) not given chance.

Variable	Communality	*	Factor	Eigenvalue	Pct of Var	Cum Pct
NWQC13	.71457	*	1	1.86172	26.6	26.6
NWQC15	.74873	*	2	1.02465	14.6	41.2
NWQC17	.43631	*	3	1.00293	14.3	55.6
NWQC2	.47520	*				
NWQC3	.43424	*				
NWQC6	.60103	*				
NWQC8	.47923	*				

Rotated Factor Matrix:

	cause 1	cause 2	cause 3
NWQC13	-.04472	.05525	.84233
NWQC15	-.03721	.86449	-.00324
NWQC17	.61929	.06823	.21938
NWQC2	.66204	.13069	.14078
NWQC3	-.24746	-.03465	-.60976
NWQC6	.76871	.04081	-.09193
NWQC8	.24473	.64034	.09647

Cause 1: System Rewards Scale

Individual effort and ability are rewarded in the existing system. Poverty is the result of either failing to excell or insufficient effort on the part of the individual.

Direction of Scale

Summaries of SYSTEMIC REWARDS - market system rewards individual effort

By NWQOC6

Getting ahead in world mostly matter of:

(1) ability, hard work (0) neither! (-1) getting breaks.

Variable	Value	Label	Mean	Std Dev	Cases
For Entire Population			3.781E-15	1.0000000	1203
NWQOC6	-1.00		-1.8152771	.8990925	145
NWQOC6	.00		-.9587687	.6866016	106
NWQOC6	1.00		.3934760	.5806323	952

Total Cases = 3609

Missing Cases = 2406 or 66.7 Pct

Multiple Regression

Multiple R	.16929
R Square	.02866
Adjusted R Square	.02634
Standard Error	.98001

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	2	23.77242	11.88621
Residual	839	805.72472	.96041

F = 12.37615 Signif F = .0000

----- Variables in the Equation -----

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
N1	-.008354	.002211	-.130411	-3.778	.0002
N19	.057817	.015117	.132013	3.825	.0001
(Constant)	15.980165	4.286929		3.728	.0002

----- Variables not in the Equation -----

Variable	Beta In	Partial	Min Toler	T	Std T
QUE	.010093	.010183	.962551	.235	.1682
ENGLISH	.023911	.024197	.966125	.701	.4837
CATHOLIC	.034912	.034947	.946051	1.112	.7117
SECT	-.018862	-.019052	.963033	-.155	-.5814
N12	.003951	.003928	.944440	.114	.6095
N4	.013714	.013901	.970435	.402	.6825
RSEX	-.008039	-.008026	.940965	-.123	-.5163
N3	-.064889	-.061127	.861975	-1.773	-1.0766

Cause 2: Individual Effort Scale

Individuals do not work hard because they do not care or are lazy. Failing to work hard means that the system will not reward the individual thereby contributing to poverty.

Direction of Scale

Summaries of EFFORT individuals do not make effort
By NWQC15

People do not work hard on job because:

(1) do not care (0) neither (-1) job is dull.

Variable	Value	Label	Mean	Std Dev	Cases
For Entire Population			-8.508E-16	1.0000000	1203
NWQC15	-1.00		-.9375027	.5026644	485
NWQC15	.00		-.9248891	.3886051	266
NWQC15	1.00		1.0226204	.5580462	451

Total Cases = 3609

Missing Cases = 2406 or 66.7 Pct

Multiple Regression

Multiple R .16867
R Square .02845
Adjusted R Square .02613
Standard Error 1.00191

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	2	24.65917	12.32958
Residual	839	842.14858	1.00383

F = 12.28255 Signif F = .0000

----- Variables in the Equation -----

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
QUE	-.235018	.076441	-.105051	-3.074	.0022
N1	-.008045	.002237	-.122855	-3.596	.0003
(Constant)	15.709736	4.349240		3.613	.0003

----- Variables not in the Equation -----

Variable	Beta In	Partial	Min Toler	T	Sig T
ENGLISH	-.017952	-.014224	.605033	-.412	.6806
CATHOLIC	.006597	.005787	.747615	.168	.8670
SECT	.022460	.021357	.878457	.618	.5365
N12	-.018504	-.018456	.958890	-.534	.5932
N4	.044136	.013315	.929817	1.255	.2098
RSEX	-.046034	-.046542	.985184	-1.349	.1778
N19	.059065	.058984	.962551	1.710	.0876
N3	-.060262	-.059828	.954290	-1.735	.0831

Cause 3: Markets Scale

Direction of Scale

Summaries of MARKETS market interference harms individuals
By NWQC13

Government regulation of business:

(1) does more harm (0) neither (-1) is necessary.

Variable	Value	Label	Mean	Std Dev	Cases
For Entire Population			7.563E-16	1.0000000	1203
NWQC13	-1.00		-.7117197	.5854590	658
NWQC13	.00		.2453899	.4520210	195
NWQC13	1.00		1.2056873	.4914007	349

Total Cases = 3609

Missing Cases = 2406 or 66.7 Pct

Multiple Regression

Multiple R	.25614
R Square	.06561
Adjusted R Square	.06338
Standard Error	.97429

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	2	55.91765	27.95883
Residual	839	791.35463	.94320

F = 29.45360 Signif F = .0000

----- Variables in the Equation -----

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
ENGLISH	.429541	.067629	.21253	6.351	.0000
N19	.056980	.014855	.128352	3.836	.0001
Constant	-.548023	.056163		-9.750	.0000

----- Variables not in the Equation -----

Variable	Beta In	Partial	Min Toler	T	Sig T
QUE	-.060541	-.049067	.611483	-1.420	.1554
CATHOLIC	-.050136	-.044999	.748868	-1.304	.1926
SECT	.051779	.047409	.779197	1.374	.1698
N12	.019024	.019506	.982280	.165	.8724
N4	.001951	.001898	.880285	.1055	.9561
RSEX	-.051494	-.052078	.955720	-1.510	.1315
N1	-.042270	-.043109	.966728	-1.249	.2120
N3	.045144	.043845	.876858	1.270	.2044

Solutions- Policies Affecting Poverty

PCA Varimax Rotation - Remedies

QB2

Cut deficit/harder to get UIC

1)st approv 4)st disapp

QB3

Cut deficit/allow doctors to bill directly

1)st approv 4)st disapp

QB4

Cut deficit/allow hospitals to bill directly

1)st approv 4)st disapp

QB6

Cut deficit/reduce welfare payments

1)st approv 4)st disapp

Variable	Communality	Factor	Eigenvalue	Pct of Var	Cum Pct
QB2	.65520	1	2.01533	50.4	50.4
QB3	.87321	2	1.10282	27.6	78.0
QB4	.86937				
QB6	.72036				

Rotated Factor Matrix:

	remedy 1	remedy 2
QB2	.19445	.78575
QB3	.92713	.11673
QB4	.92291	.13265
QB6	.03624	.84797

Remedy 1: Protect Universal Programs - Medicare

Direction of Scale

Summaries of CURE1 protect universal medicare
By levels of QB4 CUT DEFICIT> ALLOW HOSPITALS BILL DIRECT

Variable	Value	Label	Mean	Std Dev	Cases
For Entire Population			-3.270E-15	1.0000000	1095
QB4	1	Strongly Approve	-2.5009646	.5570748	46
QB4	2	Approve	-1.4235552	.4629269	132
QB4	3	Disapprove	-.3852500	.3319592	340
QB4	4	Strongly Disapprove	.7523893	.3777881	577

Total Cases = 3609

Missing Cases = 2514 or 69.7 Pct

Multiple Regression

Multiple R .22801
R Square .05199
Adjusted R Square .04829
Standard Error .94130

Analysis of Variance

	LF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	3	37.41408	12.47136
Residual	770	682.26124	.88605

F = 14.07531 Signif F = .0000

----- Variables in the Equation -----

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig.
N1	.118471	.132076	.1132062	.8922	.3701
N19	-.050759	.1316259	-.123578	-.3849	.7017
N3	-.158949	.17113	-.190449	-.9441	.3479
(Constant)	-15.82916	4.418479		-3.5891	.0004

----- Variables not in the Equation -----

Variable	Beta In	Partial	Min Toler	T	Sig.
QUE	-.034824	-.035635	.848905	-.484	.6281
ENGLISH	-.034045	-.034958	.848724	-.430	.6627
CATHOLIC	.026397	.026745	.847342	.741	.4584
SECT	-.047975	-.049074	.848891	-.863	.3834
N12	-.003517	-.003561	.844914	-.094	.9214
N4	.017497	.017807	.844720	.494	.6215
RSEX	-.046650	-.047183	.823520	-.871	.3890

Remedy 2 Protect Income Supports

Direction of Scale

Summaries of CURE2 protect income supports
 By levels of QB6 CUT DEFICIT + REDUCE WELFARE PAYMENTS

Variable	Value	Label	Mean	Std. Dev.	Cases
For Entire Population			-.7112E-15	1.0000000	1095
QB6	1	Strongly Approve	-1.4942514	.6293178	154
QB6	2	Approve	-.6377947	.4691841	257
QB6	3	Disapprove	.1992116	.4995851	466
QB6	4	Strongly Disapprove	1.1686429	.6599656	218

Multiple Regression

Multiple R	.30801
R Square	.09487
Adjusted R Square	.09134
Standard Error	.93456

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	1	70.48837	23.49612
Residual	67	672.52936	.87341

F = 26.9171 Sig. F = .000

----- Variables in the Equation -----

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
QUE	.485397	.177647	.218538	5.790	.0000
N4	-.167748	.172154	-.083800	-2.325	.0203
N19	-.111751	.114689	-.124837	-6.842	.0000
Constant	.43691	.086956		4.642	.0000

----- Variables not in the Equation -----

Variable	Beta In	Partial	Min Toler	T	Sig T
ENGLISH	-.117887	-.014929	.556053	-.389	.6975
CATHOLIC	-.008714	-.007167	.611038	-.199	.8427
SECT	-.002017	-.001904	.806648	-.053	.9579
N12	.017988	.018227	.856792	.506	.6133
RSEX	.067638	.070157	.903584	1.950	.0515
N1	.022854	.023638	.902266	.656	.5122
N3	.002643	.002560	.848922	.071	.9434

Appendix II

Oneway ANOVA and T-Test Results

Results Key

- Group 1 = French Catholics
 Group 2 = Non-French Catholics
 Group 3 = Anglicans
 Group 4 = United Church
 Group 5 = Baptists, Reformed, Pentecostals

Affect Scale - Oneway

- - - - - O N E W A Y - - - - -

Variable Affect Scale
 By Variable CHURCH

Source	D.F.	Analysis of Variance		F Ratio	F Prob.
		Sum of Squ res	Mean Squares		
Between Groups	4	416702.5870	104175.6467	4.6141	.0010
Within Groups	1985	44816526.53	22577.5952		
Total	1989	45233229.12			

Group	Count	Mean	Standard Deviation	Standard Error	95 Pct Conf Int for Mean		
Grp 1	621	85.4270	149.2103	5.9836	73.6765	TO	97.1775
Grp 2	625	76.6885	155.6112	6.2235	64.4670	TO	88.9100
Grp 3	215	56.3139	157.3592	10.7229	35.1779	TO	77.4500
Grp 4	380	49.1108	140.1398	7.1878	34.9778	TO	63.2439
Grp 5	147	54.6346	146.2759	12.0607	30.7986	TO	78.4707
Total	1989	70.3150	150.8182	2.3812	63.6839	TO	76.9460

GROUP	MINIMUM	MAXIMUM
Grp 1	-655.0000	595.0000
Grp 2	-560.0000	565.0000
Grp 3	-670.0000	550.0000
Grp 4	-505.0000	470.0000
Grp 5	-370.0000	430.0000
TOTAL	-670.0000	595.0000

- - - - - O N E W A Y - - - - -

Levene Test for Homogeneity of Variances

Statistic	df1	df2	2-tail Sig.
1.1286	4	1985	.341

Variable Affect Scale

By Variable CHURCH

Multiple Range Tests: Student-Newman-Keuls test with significance level .050

The difference between two means is significant if

$MEAN(J) - MEAN(I) \geq 106.2488 * RANGE * \sqrt{1/N(I) + 1/N(J)}$

with the following value(s) for RANGE:

Step	2	3	4	5
RANGE	2.81	3.33	3.65	3.87

(*) Indicates significant differences which are shown in the lower triangle

G G G G G

r r r r r

P P P P P

4 5 3 2 1

Mean CHURCH

49.1108	Grp 4			
54.6346	Grp 5			
56.3139	Grp 3			
76.6885	Grp 2	*		
85.4270	Grp 1	*	*	

Social Obligation Scale - Oneway

- - - - - O N E W A Y - - - - -

Variable Social Obligation Scale

By Variable CHURCH

		Analysis of Variance				
		Sum of	Mean	F	P	
Source	D.F.	Squares	Squares	Ratio	Prob.	
Between Groups	4	112.2914	28.0728	30.5871	.0000	
Within Groups	2144	1967.7624	.9178			
Total	2148	2080.0537				

Group	Count	Mean	Standard Deviation	Standard Error	95 Pct Conf Int for Mean
Grp 1	670	.3123	.8301	.0321	.2493 TO .3752
Grp 2	686	.0081	.9817	.0375	-.0655 TO .0816
Grp 3	245	-.1109	1.0089	.0644	-.2377 TO .0160
Grp 4	392	-.2937	1.0312	.0520	-.3960 TO -.1914
Grp 5	153	-.2612	1.0868	.0876	-.4342 TO -.0881
Total	2148	.0149	.9841	.0212	-.0267 TO .0565

GROUP	MINIMUM	MAXIMUM
Grp 1	-2.7677	1.0645
Grp 2	-4.1245	1.0645
Grp 3	-4.8690	1.0645
Grp 4	-4.8690	1.0645
Grp 5	-3.3800	1.0645
TOTAL	-4.8690	1.0645

- - - - - O N E W A Y - - - - -

Levene Test for Homogeneity of Variances

Statistic	df1	df2	2-tail Sig.
11.2999	4	2144	.000

Variable Social Obligation Scale

By Variable CHURCH

Multiple Range Tests: Student-Newman-Keuls test with significance level .050

The difference between two means is significant if

$$|\text{MEAN}(J) - \text{MEAN}(I)| \geq .6774 * \text{RANGE} * \text{SQRT}(1/N(I) + 1/N(J))$$

with the following value(s) for RANGE:

Step	2	3	4	5
RANGE	2.81	3.33	3.65	3.87

(*) Indicates significant differences which are shown in the lower triangle

G G G G G

r r r r r

P P P P P

4 5 3 2 1

Mean CHURCH

-.2937	Grp 4			
-.2612	Grp 5			
-.1109	Grp 3			
.0081	Grp 2	*	*	
.3123	Grp 1	*	*	*

Equality Scale - Oneway

- - - - - O N E W A Y - - - - -

Variable Equality Scale
By Variable CHURCH

		Analysis of Variance					
		Sum of	Mean	F	F		
Source	D.F.	Squares	Squares	Ratio	Prob.		
Between Groups	4	6.7368	1.6842	1.6608	.1575		
Within Groups	608	616.5734	1.0141				
Total	612	623.3102					

Group	Count	Mean	Standard Deviation	Standard Error	95 Pct Conf Int for Mean		
Grp 1	201	-.0727	.9680	.0682	-.2072	TO	.0618
Grp 2	200	.0961	1.0098	.0713	-.0445	TO	.2367
Grp 3	58	-.0355	.0408	.1367	-.3093	TO	.2383
Grp 4	110	-.1306	.9988	.0951	-.3191	TO	.0579
Grp 5	42	-.2514	1.1447	.1753	-.6054	TO	.1027
Total	612	-.0368	1.0093	.0408	-.1169	TO	.0433

GROUP	MINIMUM	MAXIMUM
Grp 1	-1.5641	1.1738
Grp 2	-1.5641	1.1738
Grp 3	-1.5641	1.1738
Grp 4	-1.5641	1.1738
Grp 5	-1.5641	1.1738
TOTAL	-1.5641	1.1738

- - - - - O N E W A Y - - - - -

Levene Test for Homogeneity of Variances

Statistic	df1	df2	2-tail Sig.
1.5663	4	608	.182

Variable Equality Scale
By Variable CHURCH

Multiple Range Tests: Student-Newman-Keuls test with significance level .050

The difference between two means is significant if

$MEAN(J) - MEAN(I) \geq .7121 * RANGE * SQRT(1/N(I) + 1/N(J))$
with the following value(s) for RANGE:

Step	2	3	4	5
RANGE	2.81	3.33	3.65	3.88

- No two groups are significantly different at the .050 level

Humane-Participatory Scale - Oneway

- - - - - O N E W A Y - - - - -

Variable Humane-Participatory Scale
By Variable CHURCH

		Analysis of Variance			
Source	D.F.	Sum of Squares	Mean Squares	F Ratio	F Prob.
Between Groups	4	44.6150	11.1537	11.1628	.0000
Within Groups	1590	1588.7071	.992		
Total	1594	1633.3221			

Group	Count	Mean	Standard Deviation	Standard Error	95 Pct Conf Int for Mean
Grp 1	477	.1815	.9802	.0448	.0934 TO .2696
Grp 2	513	.0608	1.0271	.0453	-.0283 TO .1498
Grp 3	176	-.1311	1.0819	.0814	-.2919 TO .0296
Grp 4	311	-.2073	.9738	.0552	-.3158 TO -.0988
Grp 5	115	-.3028	.8874	.0827	-.4665 TO -.1390
Total	1594	-.0030	1.0124	.0254	.0527 TO .0468

GROUP	MINIMUM	MAXIMUM
Grp 1	-2.0169	1.8887
Grp 2	-1.7287	1.8208
Grp 3	-1.7922	1.7657
Grp 4	-1.7554	1.7588
Grp 5	-1.5427	1.6453
TOTAL	-2.0169	1.8887

- - - - - O N E W A Y - - - - -

Levene Test for Homogeneity of Variances

Statistic	df1	df2	2-tail Sig.
3.6656	4	1590	.006

Variable Humane-Participatory Scale
By Variable CHURCH

Multiple Range Tests: Student-Newman-Keuls test with significance level .050

The difference between two means is significant if

$$|\text{MEAN}(J) - \text{MEAN}(I)| \geq .7068 * \text{RANGE} * \text{SQRT}(1/N(I) + 1/N(J))$$

with the following value(s) for RANGE:

Step	2	3	4	5
RANGE	2.81	3.33	3.65	3.87

(*) Indicates significant differences which are shown in the lower triangle

G G G G G
 r r r r r
 P P P P P

5 4 3 2 1

Mean CHURCH

-.3028 Grp 5
 -.2073 Grp 4
 -.1311 Grp 3
 .0608 Grp 2 * * *
 .1815 Grp 1 * * *

Economic Growth and Stability Scale - Oneway

- - - - - O N E W A Y - - - - -

Variable Economic Growth and Stability Scale
 By Variable CHURCH

		Analysis of Variance					
Source		D.F.	Sum of Squares	Mean Squares	F Ratio	F Prob.	
Between Groups		4	13.1132	3.2783	3.3372	.0099	
Within Groups		1590	1561.9370	.9824			
Total		1594	1575.0502				

Group	Count	Mean	Standard Deviation	Standard Error	95 Pct Conf Int for Mean		
Grp 1	477	-.0697	1.0555	.0483	-.1646	TO	.0252
Grp 2	513	.1244	.9942	.0439	.0382	TO	.2106
Grp 3	176	.1614	.9939	.0748	.0138	TO	.3091
Grp 4	311	.0753	.9080	.0514	-.0259	TO	.1765
Grp 5	115	-.0450	.9110	.0849	-.2131	TO	.1231
Total	1594	.0485	.9941	.0249	-.0003	TO	.0973

GROUP	MINIMUM	MAXIMUM
Grp 1	-2.3373	1.7484
Grp 2	-2.3370	1.7218
Grp 3	-2.0586	2.0100
Grp 4	-2.3626	2.0421
Grp 5	-1.9211	1.5782
TOTAL	-2.3626	2.0421

- - - - - O N E W A Y - - - - -

Levene Test for Homogeneity of Variances

Statistic	df1	df2	2-tail Sig.
3.7152	4	1590	.005

Variable Economic Growth and Stability Scale
By Variable CHURCH

Multiple Range Tests: Student-Newman-Keuls test with significance level .050

The difference between two means is significant if

$$\text{MEAN}(J) - \text{MEAN}(I) \geq .7008 * \text{RANGE} * \text{SQRT}(1/N(I) + 1/N(J))$$

with the following value(s) for RANGE:

Step	2	3	4	5
RANGE	2.81	3.33	3.65	3.87

(*) Indicates significant differences which are shown in the lower triangle

G G G G G

r r r r r

p p p p p

1 5 4 2 3

Mean CHURCH

-.0697	Grp 1
-.0450	Grp 5
.0753	Grp 4
.1244	Grp 2 *
.1614	Grp 3

Universality Scale - Oneway

- - - - - O N E W A Y - - - - -

Variable Universality Scale
By Variable CHURCH

			Analysis of Variance			
			Sum of	Mean	F	F
Source	D.F.		Squares	Squares	Ratio	Prob.
Between Groups	4		10.5484	2.6371	2.8751	.0221
Within Groups	860		788.8137	.9172		
Total	864		799.3621			

Group	Count	Mean	Standard Deviation	Standard Error	95 Pct Conf Int for Mean
Grp 1	262	-.0415	.9747	.0602	-.1601 TO .0770
Grp 2	269	.1623	.8976	.0547	.0547 TO .2699
Grp 3	99	-.0623	.9411	.0946	-.2500 TO .1254
Grp 4	165	-.1245	1.0499	.0815	-.2854 TO .0365
Grp 5	68	-.0292	.9106	.1103	-.2493 TO .1909
Total	864	.0047	.9619	.0327	-.0595 TO .0689

GROUP	MINIMUM	MAXIMUM
Grp 1	-3.0476	1.1742
Grp 2	-2.8228	1.1742
Grp 3	-2.7067	1.1742
Grp 4	-2.8228	1.1742
Grp 5	-2.2335	1.1742
TOTAL	-3.0476	1.1742

- - - - - O N E W A Y - - - - -

Levene Test for Homogeneity of Variances

Statistic	df1	df2	2-tail Sig.
1.4402	4	860	.219

Variable Universality Scale
By Variable CHURCH

Multiple Range Tests: Student-Newman-Keuls test with significance level .050

The difference between two means is significant if

$$MEAN(J) - MEAN(I) \geq .6772 * RANGE * \sqrt{1/N(I) + 1/N(J)}$$

with the following value(s) for RANGE:

Step	2	3	4	5
RANGE	2.81	3.33	3.65	3.87

(*) Indicates significant differences which are shown in the lower triangle

G G G G G
r r r r r
p p p p p
4 3 1 5 2

Mean CHURCH

-.1245	Grp 4		
-.0623	Grp 3		
-.0415	Grp 1		
-.0292	Grp 5		
.1623	Grp 2	*	*

Income Supports Scale - Oneway

- - - - - O N E W A Y - - - - -

Variable Income Supports Scale

By Variable CHURCH

		Analysis of Variance				
		Sum of	Mean	F	F	
Source	D.F.	Squares	Squares	Ratio	Prob.	
Between Groups	4	24.8430	6.2108	6.5990	.0000	
Within Groups	860	809.3986	.9412			
Total	864	834.2417				

Group	Count	Mean	Standard Deviation	Standard Error	95 Pct Conf Int for Mean	
Grp 1	262	.1852	.9529	.0589	.0693 TO	.3011
Grp 2	269	-.2343	1.0220	.0622	-.3569 TO	-.1118
Grp 3	99	-.0038	1.0477	.1053	-.2127 TO	.2052
Grp 4	165	-.1233	.9139	.0709	-.2634 TO	.0168
Grp 5	68	-.0041	.8309	.1006	-.2049 TO	.1968
Total	864	-.0413	.9827	.0334	-.1069 TO	.0243

GROUP	MINIMUM	MAXIMUM
Grp 1	-2.0875	2.2825
Grp 2	-2.0875	1.9478
Grp 3	-2.0875	1.8604
Grp 4	-2.0875	1.9478
Grp 5	-2.0875	1.7804
TOTAL	-2.0875	2.2825

- - - - - O N E W A Y - - - - -

Levene Test for Homogeneity of Variances

Statistic	df1	df2	2-tail Sig.
3.3507	4	860	.010

Variable Income Supports Scale

By Variable CHURCH

Multiple Range Tests: Student-Newman-Keuls test with significance level .050

The difference between two means is significant if

$$MEAN(J) - MEAN(I) \geq .6860 * RANGE * \sqrt{1/N(I) + 1/N(J)}$$

with the following value(s) for RANGE:

Step	2	3	4	5
RANGE	2.81	3.33	3.65	3.87

(*) Indicates significant differences which are shown in the lower triangle

G G G G G
r r r r r
p p p p p

2 4 5 3 1

Mean	CHURCH
-.2343	Grp 2
-.1233	Grp 4
-.0041	Grp 5
-.0038	Grp 3
.1852	Grp 1 * *

Systemic Rewards Scale - Oneway

- - - - - O N E W A Y - - - - -

Variable Systemic Rewards Scale

By Variable CHURCH

		Analysis of Variance					
Source	D.F.	Sum of Squares	Mean Squares	F	F	Ratio	Prob.
Between Groups	4	3.3320	.8330	.8832	.4733		
Within Groups	957	902.5629	.9431				
Total	961	905.8949					

Group	Count	Mean	Standard Deviation	Standard Error	95 Pct Conf Int for Mean
Grp 1	296	.0334	.8951	.0520	-.0690 TO .1358
Grp 2	294	.0268	1.0279	.0599	-.0910 TO .1447
Grp 3	108	-.0031	1.0046	.0965	-.1945 TO .1882
Grp 4	176	-.0200	1.0501	.0790	-.1759 TO .1359
Grp 5	86	.2096	.7961	.0858	.0389 TO .3802
Total	961	.0332	.9711	.0313	-.0282 TO .0947

GROUP	MINIMUM	MAXIMUM
Grp 1	-3.5525	1.1252
Grp 2	-3.7482	1.1252
Grp 3	-3.5616	1.1252
Grp 4	-3.6647	1.1252
Grp 5	-2.5872	1.1252
TOTAL	-3.7482	1.1252

- - - - - O N E W A Y - - - - -

Levene Test for Homogeneity of Variances

Statistic	df1	df2	2-tail Sig.
3.5161	4	957	.007

Variable Systemic Rewards Scale
By Variable CHURCH

Multiple Range Tests: Student-Newman-Keuls test with significance level .050
The difference between two means is significant if

$$MEAN(J) - MEAN(I) \geq .6867 * RANGE * \sqrt{1/N(I) + 1/N(J)}$$

with the following value(s) for RANGE:

Step	2	3	4	5
RANGE	2.81	3.33	3.65	3.87

- No two groups are significantly different at the .050 level

Individual Effort Scale - Oneway

- - - - - O N E W A Y - - - - -

Variable Individual Effort Scale
By Variable CHURCH

		Analysis of Variance			
		Sum of	Mean	F	F
Source	D.F.	Squares	Squares	Ratio	Prob.
Between Groups	4	10.9816	2.7454	2.7214	.0285
Within Groups	957	965.4514	1.0088		
Total	961	976.4330			

Group	Count	Mean	Standard Deviation	Standard Error	95 Pct Conf Int for Mean		
Grp 1	296	-.1277	.9980	.0580	-.2419	TO	-.0136
Grp 2	294	.0390	1.0459	.0609	-.0809	TO	.1590
Grp 3	108	-.0344	.9935	.0955	-.2237	TO	.1548
Grp 4	176	.1145	.9889	.0744	-.0323	TO	.2614
Grp 5	86	.1960	.9244	.0997	-.0021	TO	.3942
Total	961	.0073	1.0082	.0325	-.0565	TO	.0711

GROUP	MINIMUM	MAXIMUM
Grp 1	-1.8062	1.9495
Grp 2	-1.7944	1.8096
Grp 3	-1.7944	1.6024
Grp 4	-1.7944	1.7454
Grp 5	-1.7944	1.8108
TOTAL	-1.8062	1.9495

- - - - - O N E W A Y - - - - -

Levene Test for Homogeneity of Variances

Statistic	df1	df2	2-tail Sig.
1.3266	4	957	.258

Variable Individual Effort Scale
By Variable CHURCH

Multiple Range Tests: Student-Newman-Keuls test with significance level .050

The difference between two means is significant if

$$MEAN(J) - MEAN(I) \geq .7102 * RANGE * \sqrt{1/N(I) + 1/N(J)}$$

with the following value(s) for RANGE:

Step	2	3	4	5
RANGE	2.81	3.33	3.65	3.87

- No two groups are significantly different at the .050 level

Market Efficiency Scale - Oneway

- - - - - O N E W A Y - - - - -

Variable Market Efficiency Scale

By Variable CHURCH

Source	D.F.	Analysis of Variance		F Ratio	F Prob.
		Sum of Squares	Mean Squares		
Between Groups	4	39.0952	9.7738	10.1215	.0000
Within Groups	957	924.1257	.9656		
Total	961	963.2209			

Group	Count	Mean	Standard Deviation	Standard Error	95 Pct Conf Int for Mean	
Grp 1	296	-.3019	.9357	.0544	-.4089	TO -.1949
Grp 2	294	.0257	.9723	.0566	-.0858	TO .1372
Grp 3	108	.0469	1.0032	.0964	-.1442	TO .2380
Grp 4	176	.2266	1.0640	.0801	.0686	TO .3846
Grp 5	86	.1882	.9780	.1054	-.0214	TO .3979
Total	961	-.0213	1.0013	.0323	-.0847	TO .0420

GROUP	MINIMUM	MAXIMUM
Grp 1	-2.0434	2.0161
Grp 2	-1.9980	2.0959
Grp 3	-1.8053	1.7792
Grp 4	-2.0063	2.0917
Grp 5	-1.7267	1.9405
TOTAL	-2.0434	2.0959

- - - - - O N E W A Y - - - - -

Levene Test for Homogeneity of Variances

Statistic	df1	df2	2-tail Sig.
3.9566	4	957	.003

Variable Market Efficiency Scale

By Variable CHURCH

Multiple Range Tests: Student-Newman-Keuls test with significance level .050

The difference between two means is significant if

$$| \text{MEAN}(J) - \text{MEAN}(I) | \geq .6949 * \text{RANGE} * \text{SQRT}(1/N(I) + 1/N(J))$$

with the following value(s) for RANGE:

Step	2	3	4	5
RANGE	2.81	3.33	3.65	3.87

(*) Indicates significant differences which are shown in the lower triangle

G	G	G	G	G
r	r	r	r	r
p	p	p	p	p
1	2	3	5	4

Mean	CHURCH
-.3019	Grp 1
.0257	Grp 2
.0469	Grp 3
.1882	Grp 5
.2266	Grp 4

T-Tests: Church-Sect

T-tests for independent samples of CHURCH-SECT

Affect Scale - T-Test

Variable	Number of Cases	Mean	SD	SE of Mean
CHURCH	1462	77.4039	153.383	4.011
SECT	527	50.6520	141.760	6.174

Mean Difference = 26.7519

Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 1.537 P= .215

t-test for Equality of Means					95%
Variances	t-value	df	2-Tail Sig	SE of Diff	CI for Diff
Equal	3.50	1988	.000	7.640	(11.766, 41.738)
Unequal	3.63	1000.01	.000	7.362	(12.301, 41.202)

Social Obligation Scale - T-Test

Variable	Number of Cases	Mean	SD	SE of Mean
CHURCH	1602	.1171	.941	.024
SECT	547	-.2845	1.046	.045

Mean Difference = .4016

Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 9.363 P= .002

t-test for Equality of Means					95%
Variances	t-value	df	2-Tail Sig	SE of Diff	CI for Diff
Equal	8.37	2147	.000	.048	(.307, .496)
Unequal	7.95	865.76	.000	.051	(.302, .501)

Equality Scale - T-Test

Variable	Number of Cases	Mean	SD	SE of Mean
CHURCH	460	.0056	.997	.046
SECT	153	-.1643	1.039	.084

Mean Difference = .1699

Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: $F = 2.109$ $P = .147$

t-test for Equality of Means					95%
Variances	t-value	df	2-Tail Sig	SE of Diff	CI for Diff
Equal	1.81	611	.071	.094	(-.015, .355)
Unequal	1.77	251.30	.078	.096	(-.019, .359)

Humane-Participatory Scale T-Test

Variable	Number of Cases	Mean	SD	SE of Mean
CHURCH	1168	.0812	1.021	.030
SECT	427	-.2331	.951	.046

Mean Difference = .3142

Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: $F = 10.118$ $P = .001$

t-test for Equality of Means					95%
Variances	t-value	df	2-Tail Sig	SE of Diff	CI for Diff
Equal	5.54	1593	.000	.057	(.203, .426)
Unequal	5.73	808.32	.000	.055	(.206, .422)

Traditional Economic Stability - T-Test

Variable	Number of Cases	Mean	SD	SE of Mean
CHURCH	1168	.0506	1.024	.030
SECT	427	.0428	.909	.044

Mean Difference = .0077

Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: $F = 10.177$ $P = .001$

t-test for Equality of Means					95%
Variances	t-value	df	2-Tail Sig	SE of Diff	CI for Diff
Equal	.14	1593	.891	.056	(-.103, .118)
Unequal	.15	845.91	.884	.053	(-.097, .112)

Universality Scale - T-Test

Variable	Number of Cases	Mean	SD	SE of Mean
CHURCH	631	.0424	.941	.037
SECT	234	-.0967	1.010	.066

Mean Difference = .1391

Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: $F = 1.921$ $P = .166$

t-test for Equality of Means					95%
Variances	t-value	df	2-Tail Sig	SE of Diff	CI for Diff
Equal	1.89	863	.059	.074	(-.005, .283)
Unequal	1.83	392.53	.068	.076	(-.010, .288)

Income Supports Scale - T-Test

Variable	Number of Cases	Mean	SD	SE of Mean
CHURCH	631	-.0238	1.015	.040
SECT	234	-.0886	.890	.058

Mean Difference = .0648

Levene's test for Equality of Variances: $F = 9.277$ $P = .002$

t-test for Equality of Means					95%
Variances	t-value	df	2-Tail Sig	SE of Diff	CI for Diff
Equal	.86	863	.389	.075	(-.083, .212)
Unequal	.91	471.60	.361	.071	(-.074, .204)

Systemic Rewards Scale - T-Test

Variable	Number of Cases	Mean	SD	SE of Mean
CHURCH	699	.0250	.969	.037
SECT	263	.0552	.979	.060

Mean Difference = -.0303

Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: $F = .257$ $P = .613$

t-test for Equality of Means					95%
Variances	t-value	df	2-Tail Sig	SE of Diff	CI for Diff
Equal	-.43	960	.667	.070	(-.168, .108)
Unequal	-.43	466.23	.669	.071	(-.169, .109)

Individual Effort Scale - T-Test

Variable	Number of Cases	Mean	SD	SE of Mean
EFFORT individuals do not make effort				
CHURCH	699	-.0430	1.019	.039
SECT	263	.1412	.967	.060

Mean Difference = -.1842

Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= .875 P= .350

t-test for Equality of Means

95%

Variances	t-value	df	2-Tail Sig	SE of Diff	CI for Diff
Equal	-2.53	960	.011	.073	(-.327, -.041)
Unequal	-2.59	493.46	.010	.071	(-.324, -.045)

Market Efficiency Scale - T-Test

Variable	Number of Cases	Mean	SD	SE of Mean
CHURCH	699	-.1098	.975	.037
SECT	263	.2140	1.035	.064

Mean Difference = -.3238

Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 7.478 P= .006

t-test for Equality of Means

95%

Variances	t-value	df	2-Tail Sig	SE of Diff	CI for Diff
Equal	-4.51	960	.000	.072	(-.465, -.183)
Unequal	-4.39	446.57	.000	.074	(-.469, -.179)

Appendix III

Political Culture Regression Results

* * * * * M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N * * * * *

Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable... Affect Scale

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number

3.. N12 HOW OFTEN ATTEND PLACE OF WORSHIP

Multiple R .16625

R Square .02764

Adjusted R Square .02446

Standard Error 150.95966

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	3	594575.52248	198193.17416
Residual	918	20916830.79667	22788.82009

F = 8.69695 Signif F = .0000

----- Variables in the Equation -----

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
CATHOLIC	36.399349	10.136378	.118408	3.591	.0003
N12	3.971456	2.005565	.066025	1.980	.0480
VOTER	-22.478380	8.147714	-.090890	-2.759	.0059
(Constant)	74.981298	16.471692		4.552	.0000

----- Variables not in the Equation -----

Variable	Beta In	Partial	Min Toler	T	Sig T
QUE	-.014787	-.012996	.733519	.394	.6940
ENGLISH	.037919	.033540	.743400	1.016	.3098
SECT	-.036140	-.025385	.470757	-.769	.4422
IDNDP	.018078	.018109	.940428	.548	.5835
IDLIB	.033551	.033564	.943368	1.017	.3095
IDPC	-.053732	-.053960	.950722	-1.636	.1021
POLITICS	.033847	.032974	.922818	.999	.3181
TRUST	3.644E-04	.000368	.945646	.011	.9911

***** MULTIPLE REGRESSION *****

Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable Social Obligation Scale

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number

4.. IDLIB Strong Liberal Identifiers

Multiple R .31645
R Square .10014
Adjusted R Square .09645
Standard Error .93263

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	4	94.21310	23.55327
Residual	973	846.56613	.86980

F = 27.07902 Signif F = .0000

----- Variables in the Equation -----

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
QUE	.340036	.076608	.154256	4.439	.0000
CATHOLIC	.283523	.068617	.143900	4.132	.0000
IDNDP	.668320	.095520	.219701	6.997	.0000
IDLIB	.164896	.070406	.073838	2.342	.0194
(Constant)	-.352991	.049939		-7.068	.0000

----- Variables not in the Equation -----

Variable	Beta In	Partial	Min Toler	T	Sig T
ENGLISH	-.007195	-.005741	.557009	-.179	.8580
SECT	-.051670	-.039494	.457668	-1.232	.2181
IDPC	-.038503	-.034237	.711503	-1.068	.2857
VOTER	-.040926	-.043119	.762168	-1.346	.1787
POLITICS	.034575	.035377	.738642	1.104	.2700
TRUST	-.004748	-.004903	.757261	-.153	.8785

***** MULTIPLE REGRESSION *****

Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable..
Humane-Participatory Scale

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
4.. IDPC Strong PC Identifiers

Multiple R .29412
R Square .08651
Adjusted R Square .08285
Standard Error .98085

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	4	91.14597	22.78649
Residual	1000	962.48898	.96207

F = 23.68491 Signif F = .0000

----- Variables in the Equation -----

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
ENGLISH	-.443101	.063886	-.212737	-6.936	.0000
IDNDP	.390565	.100579	.122482	3.883	.0001
IDPC	-.170506	.070527	-.076574	-2.418	.0158
TRUST	-.111311	.031297	-.110150	-3.557	.0004
(Constant)	.234984	.052820		4.449	.0000

----- Variables not in the Equation -----

Variable	Beta In	Partial	Min Toler	T	Sig T
QUE	.055066	.044577	.598636	1.411	.1587
CATHOLIC	.047099	.043702	.786492	1.383	.1670
SECT	-.020360	-.019106	.793555	-.604	.5459
IDLIB	-.024502	-.022112	.712962	-.699	.4846
VOTER	-.037719	-.039388	.908886	-1.246	.2130
POLITICS	.012494	.012837	.904677	.406	.6849

***** MULTIPLE REGRESSION *****

Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable
Traditional Economic Stability Scale

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
5.. IDNDP Strong NDP Identifiers

Multiple R .22384
R Square .05010
Adjusted R Square .04535
Standard Error .94780

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	5	47.35556	9.47111
Residual	999	897.81272	.89832

F = 10.54316 Signif F = .0000

----- Variables in the Equation -----

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
QUE	-.176248	.070219	-.080485	-2.510	.0122
IDNDP	-.230640	.103626	-.076367	-2.226	.0263
IDLIB	.264248	.079615	.119421	3.319	.0009
IDPC	.353598	.076863	.167665	4.600	.0000
POLITICS	.090564	.032923	.087742	2.751	.0061
(Constant)	-.038682	.058932		-.656	.5117

----- Variables not in the Equation -----

Variable	Beta In	Partial	Min Toler	T	Sig T
ENGLISH	-.017991	-.014383	.585835	-.455	.6496
CATHOLIC	-.009898	-.008896	.713294	-.281	.7787
SECT	-.027822	-.026732	.714053	-.845	.3983
VOTER	.046087	.045912	.715208	1.452	.1467
TRUST	-.044694	-.044185	.707566	-1.398	.1626

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