

Policy Entrepreneurs in US-Cuba Policy, 1989-2006:

Testing the Multiple Streams Framework

by

Marina Sistovaris, B.A., M.A.

A thesis submitted to the  
Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Affairs  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

The School of Public Policy and Administration  
Carleton University  
Ottawa, Ontario  
Canada

December 2010

©2010, Marina Sistovaris



Library and Archives  
Canada

Published Heritage  
Branch

395 Wellington Street  
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4  
Canada

Bibliothèque et  
Archives Canada

Direction du  
Patrimoine de l'édition

395, rue Wellington  
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4  
Canada

*Your file* *Votre référence*  
ISBN: 978-0-494-79618-4  
*Our file* *Notre référence*  
ISBN: 978-0-494-79618-4

**NOTICE:**

The author has granted a non-exclusive license allowing Library and Archives Canada to reproduce, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, communicate to the public by telecommunication or on the Internet, loan, distribute and sell theses worldwide, for commercial or non-commercial purposes, in microform, paper, electronic and/or any other formats.

The author retains copyright ownership and moral rights in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission.

**AVIS:**

L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque et Archives Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public par télécommunication ou par l'Internet, prêter, distribuer et vendre des thèses partout dans le monde, à des fins commerciales ou autres, sur support microforme, papier, électronique et/ou autres formats.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur et des droits moraux qui protègent cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

---

In compliance with the Canadian Privacy Act some supporting forms may have been removed from this thesis.

While these forms may be included in the document page count, their removal does not represent any loss of content from the thesis.

Conformément à la loi canadienne sur la protection de la vie privée, quelques formulaires secondaires ont été enlevés de cette thèse.

Bien que ces formulaires aient inclus dans la pagination, il n'y aura aucun contenu manquant.

  
**Canada**

## **Abstract**

John Kingdon's Multiple Streams Framework (MSF) rests on the notion that the agenda setting process involves the movement of three constantly flowing and independent streams—problems, policy, and politics—each competing for the attention of decision makers. The opportunity for an issue to move onto the decision agenda and capture the attention of decision makers occurs with the opening of a policy window which provides a policy entrepreneur (PE) an opportunity to couple the streams. PEs must seize the opportunity to initiate action during this critical period because windows are open for only a short time. Once a window is closed, the three streams separate, signaling that interest in the issue has dissipated, and the opportunity for action is lost.

The MSF's transformation from a descriptive framework to a full fledged theory according to critics has been hindered by a lack of explicit hypotheses. This study attempts to contribute to its transformation by subjecting hypotheses generated from the MSF concerning a key component of the MSF—PEs—to testing. Although the MSF accords PEs a central role in policy making, its operationalization of PEs and their actions in the context of the agenda setting process as depicted by the MSF have been neither formally articulated nor tested.

This study utilizes a quantitative approach as a method of inquiry. Theoretical propositions generated from the MSF serve as the general analytical strategy for the study as well as structure the research design. Drawing upon the experience, knowledge and efforts of individuals to influence US-Cuba policy

between 1989 and 2006, a survey consisting of standardized questions is used as the principal method of data collection. Raw survey data are analyzed using various statistical procedures and tests to either confirm or reject hypotheses generated from the MSF. The results are compared with the empirical evidence to determine whether there is a good fit between fact and theory.

The results of the study provide weak evidence to support the MSF's characterization of PEs and their actions in the agenda setting process as depicted by the framework, suggesting that further refinement of the MSF's entrepreneurial concept is necessary.

## **Acknowledgements**

I would like to thank my supervisor, Brian Tomlin, whose guidance and patience helped bring this dissertation to fruition. I also wish to express my gratitude to members of my supervising committee, Leslie Pal, David Mendeloff and Jose Galdo for their constructive feedback and involvement in the project. Thank you to Nicki Enouy and the faculty and staff at the School of Public Policy and Administration for their assistance over the years.

Thank you to the individuals who generously agreed to participate in this study by taking time to complete questionnaires. Without your input this dissertation would have not been possible.

To my friends, Shivani and Ballu Thakur, Bill and Trish McDonnell, and sister, Dorothy Sistovaris, thank you for your encouragement. A special thank you to Stephan Wasylo for igniting my interest in US-Cuba policy. Finally, there are no words that can adequately express my gratitude to my parents, Cosmas and Ecaterina Sistovaris, for their unwavering love, support and confidence in me without which this dissertation would have never been completed. This dissertation is dedicated to them.

## Table of Contents

Abstract .....	ii
Acknowledgements .....	iv
List of Tables .....	viii
List of Figures .....	ix
List of Appendices .....	x
Acronyms .....	xi
<b>Chapter 1 Introduction .....</b>	<b>1</b>
1.0 Introduction .....	1
1.1 The Case of US-Cuba Policy .....	4
1.2 Research Objectives .....	13
1.3 Methodology .....	13
1.4 Significance of the Study .....	16
1.5 Outline of the Dissertation .....	17
<b>Chapter 2 Competing Explanations of US-Cuba Policy in the Post-Cold War Era.....</b>	<b>19</b>
2.0 Introduction .....	19
2.1 Domestic Politics .....	19
2.2 US Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era .....	34
2.3 Conclusions .....	56
<b>Chapter 3 Decision Making Models, Theories and Frameworks .....</b>	<b>58</b>
3.0 Introduction .....	58
3.1 Foreign Policy: Decision Making Models and Theories .....	59
3.2 Rational Model .....	64
3.3 Policy Sciences: Decision Making Models and Frameworks .....	66
3.4 Conclusions .....	93
<b>Chapter 4 The Multiple Streams Framework.....</b>	<b>96</b>
4.0 Introduction .....	96
4.1 Agendas.....	98
4.2 Participants .....	99
4.3 Processes .....	104
4.4 The Three Streams: Problem, Politics, and Policy.....	108
4.5 Policy Windows, Coupling, and Policy Entrepreneurs .....	118
4.6 Conclusions .....	126

<b>Chapter 5 Modifications to the Multiple Streams Framework and the Generation and Testing of Hypotheses .....</b>	<b>128</b>
5.0 Introduction.....	128
5.1 Two-Level Theories .....	129
5.2 Modifications to the Multiple Streams Framework and the Generation of Testable Hypotheses .....	137
Hypothesis 1: Entrepreneurial Characteristics .....	139
Hypothesis 2: Coupling Strategies .....	140
5.3 Methodology .....	157
5.4 Conclusions .....	184
<b>Chapter 6 Data Analysis: Participants' Assessments of Policy Entrepreneurs in the Policy Process .....</b>	<b>185</b>
6.0 Introduction.....	185
6.1 Definition of a Policy Entrepreneur .....	186
6.2 What Motivates a Policy Entrepreneur .....	187
6.3 Presence and Actions of a Policy Entrepreneur .....	189
6.4 Hypothesis 1: Success and Entrepreneurial Characteristics .....	191
6.5 Hypothesis 2: Success and Coupling Strategies .....	203
6.6 Conclusion .....	218
<b>Chapter 7 Data Analysis: Participants' Involvement in Influencing US-Cuba Policy .....</b>	<b>225</b>
7.0 Introduction .....	225
7.1 Involvement and Impact on Policy .....	226
7.2 Definition of a Policy Entrepreneur .....	226
7.3 What Motivates a Policy Entrepreneur .....	227
7.4 Hypothesis 1: Success and Entrepreneurial Characteristics .....	229
7.5 Hypothesis 2: Success and Coupling Strategies .....	238
7.6 Conclusion .....	249
<b>Chapter 8 Data Analysis: An Assessment of Individuals Identified as Key Figures in Influencing US-Cuba Policy.....</b>	<b>254</b>
8.0 Introduction.....	254
8.1 Definition of a Policy Entrepreneur .....	256
8.2 Aggregate Results .....	257
8.3 Individuals Identified as Successful.....	260
8.4 Individuals Identified as Unsuccessful.....	262
8.5 Conclusions .....	265

<b>Chapter 9 Synthesis and Conclusions .....</b>	<b>272</b>
9.0 Introduction .....	272
9.1 Findings .....	273
9.2 Contribution of Study .....	276
9.3 Limitations of the Study .....	277
9.4 Future Research .....	279
 Appendix A: Chronology of Key Legislative Events in US-Cuba Policy, 1989-2006 .....	 284
Appendix B: Dependent and Independent Variables—Hypothesis 1 .....	294
Appendix C: Dependent and Independent Variables—Hypothesis 2 .....	295
Appendix D: Bivariate Correlations .....	297
Appendix E: Model Utility and Predictors .....	301
Appendix F: Ranking of Successful Policy Entrepreneurs .....	305
Appendix G: Ranking of Unsuccessful Policy Entrepreneurs .....	307
Appendix H: Survey Instrument .....	309
 Bibliography .....	 355

## List of Tables

Table 6.1	Hypothesis 1—Bivariate Correlations.....	193
Table 6.2	Hypothesis 1—Model Summary and ANOVA.....	194
Table 6.3	Hypothesis 1—Coefficients.....	195
Table 6.4	Hypothesis 1—Partial Correlations.....	196
Table 6.5	Hypothesis 1—Effect Sizes and Confidence Intervals.....	201
Table 6.6	Hypothesis 2—Bivariate Correlations.....	206
Table 6.7	Hypothesis 2—Model Summary and ANOVA.....	207
Table 6.8	Hypothesis 2—Coefficients.....	208
Table 6.9	Hypothesis 2—Partial Correlations.....	209
Table 6.10	Hypothesis 2—Effect Sizes and Confidence Intervals.....	215
Table 7.1	Hypothesis 1—Bivariate Correlations.....	231
Table 7.2	Hypothesis 1—Model Summary and ANOVA.....	232
Table 7.3	Hypothesis 1—Coefficients.....	233
Table 7.4	Hypothesis 1—Partial Correlations.....	234
Table 7.5	Hypothesis 2—Bivariate Correlations.....	241
Table 7.6	Hypothesis 2—Model Summary and ANOVA.....	242
Table 7.7	Hypothesis 2—Coefficients.....	243
Table 7.8	Hypothesis 2—Partial Correlations.....	244
Table 8.1	Aggregate Bivariate Correlations—Entrepreneurial Characteristics.....	258
Table 8.2	Aggregate Model Utility and Predictors—Entrepreneurial Characteristics.....	259
Table 8.3	Individuals Identified as Successful.....	260
Table 8.4	Bivariate Correlations—Individuals Identified as Successful.....	261
Table 8.5	Model Utility and Beta Coefficients—Individuals Identified as Successful.....	262
Table 8.6	Individuals Identified as Unsuccessful.....	263
Table 8.7	Bivariate Correlations—Individuals Identified as Unsuccessful.....	264
Table 8.8	Model Utility and Beta Coefficients—Individuals Identified as Unsuccessful.....	265

## List of Figures

Figure 4.1	John Kingdon's Multiple Streams Framework.....	107
Figure 5.1	The Multiple Streams Framework Operationalized as a Two-Level Theory.....	136
Figure 6.1	Defining Characteristics of Policy Entrepreneurs.....	187
Figure 6.2	Motivating Factors for Policy Advocacy .....	189
Figure 6.3	Critical Functions of a Policy Entrepreneur.....	190
Figure 7.1	Defining Characteristics of Policy Entrepreneurs.....	227
Figure 7.2	Motivating Factors for Policy Advocacy .....	228
Figure 8.1	Defining Characteristics of Policy Entrepreneurs.....	256

## List of Appendices

Appendix A: Chronology of Key Legislative Events in US-Cuba Policy, 1989-2006.....	284
Appendix B: Dependent and Independent Variables—Hypothesis 1 .....	294
Appendix C: Dependent and Independent Variables—Hypothesis 2 .....	295
Appendix D: Bivariate Correlations.....	297
Appendix E: Model Utility and Predictors .....	301
Appendix F: Ranking of Successful Policy Entrepreneurs .....	305
Appendix G: Ranking of Unsuccessful Policy Entrepreneurs .....	307
Appendix H: Survey Instrument.....	309

## Acronyms

ACF	Advocacy Coalition Framework
BP	Bureaucratics Politics (Model)
CANF	Cuban-American National Foundation
CACR	Cuban Assets Control Regulations
CDA	Cuban Democracy Act (1992)
CFR	(US) Code of Federal Regulations
D.C.	District of Colombia
EU	European Union
GCM	Garbage Can Model
GAO	Government Accountability Office
H. Amdt.	House Amendment
H. Rpt.	House Report
H.R.	(US) House of Representatives
IM	Incremental Model
IP	Interbranch Politics (Model)
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ITC	(US) International Trade Commission
LIBERTAD	Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (1996)
MRM	Multiple Rounds Model
MSM	Multiple Scanning Model
MSF	Multiple Streams Framework
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OFAC	(US) Treasury Department) Office of Foreign Assets Control
PAC	Political Action Committee
PE	Policy Entrepreneur
P.L.	Public Law
PEM	Punctuated Equilibrium Model
RM	Rational Model
SM	Stages Model
US	United States
UN	United Nations
VIF	Variance Inflation Factor

## Chapter 1 Introduction

### 1.0 Introduction

The theoretical literature on decision making is ripe with models, frameworks and theories that seek to explain the policy process. Each approach offers a unique interpretation of how the process unfolds and the variables that are central to the process. John Kingdon's multiple streams framework (MSF) is one such framework that seeks to unravel the complexities of decision making by focusing on how issues become prominent on the government's decision agenda and how solutions to those issues are identified and adopted from the universe of available alternatives. The MSF rests on the notion that the policy process involves the movement of three constantly flowing and independent streams—problems, policy, and politics—each competing for the attention of decision makers. The opportunity for an issue to move onto the decision agenda and capture the attention of decision makers occurs with the opening of a policy window which provides a policy entrepreneur (PE) an opportunity to couple the streams. PEs must seize the opportunity to initiate action during this critical period because windows are open for only a short time. Once a window is closed, the three streams separate, signaling that interest in the issue has dissipated, and the opportunity for action is lost until the next window opens.

At the heart of the MSF are PEs, an identifiable class of actors that advocate for proposals or for the prominence of ideas (Kingdon, 1995: 122). What distinguishes PEs from other participants in the policy process is their willingness to

invest their resources (time, energy, reputation and money) in hope of some future benefit such as satisfaction derived from solving a problem, the promotion of personal interests, shaping the direction of future policy, and playing an active role in the policy process (Kingdon, 1995: 122-124). However, not all PEs are successful in their efforts. What sets apart successful PEs from other entrepreneurs are four defining characteristics: their claim to a hearing, their political connections, their negotiating skills, and their persistence. In the competitive realm of policy making where individuals must compete for the attention of decision makers, Kingdon's list of entrepreneurial qualities accords an entrepreneur a competitive advantage by not only increasing the likelihood that person's voice will be heard from the many competing voices, but also that he or she will be taken seriously by decision makers. It is during the coupling process that these characteristics prove to be vital in determining if PEs are able to successfully push his or her preferred policy proposal onto the government's decision agenda for adoption.

Although the MSF is considered a classic in the field of agenda setting, providing an effective conceptual map of the policy process, as well as highlighting the central role of PEs in the policy process, the MSF and its operationalization of key components of the policy process have been seen as simply too ambiguous to qualify the framework as a viable theory of decision making. This is apparent, according to analysts (Sabatier, 1997: 5; Bendor, Moe and Shotts, 2001:171), in the MSF's treatment of the individual. Sabatier (1997:5) suggests that in order to have a good understanding of policy-making, which is essentially carried out by human

beings, it is necessary to understand the fundamental element which drives the process—the individual. He (1997: 7-8) argues that without a coherent model of the individual, it is not possible to specify the causal drivers of the framework. This has led to suggestions that the MSF is more of a “heuristic device” than an “empirically falsifiable tool” (King, 1985; Howlett and Ramesh, 1995:138; Moya, 1998; Sabatier, 1997: 5, 1999b; Mucciaroni, 1992:463-465; Bendor et. al., 2001). According to Sabatier, scientific theory should ensure that “major propositions [are] empirically falsifiable. This is what distinguishes science from other fields of human knowledge. To the extent that those propositions are logically related to others, the validity of untested aspects of the theory can also be assessed” (Sabatier, 1997:2).

This study draws upon criticisms of the MSF and recommendations for the advancement of the MSF as a viable theory by subjecting two central propositions concerning PEs and their role in shaping policy generated from the MSF to rigorous analytical testing:

- H<sub>1</sub>: Policy entrepreneurs are more likely to couple the streams successfully during an open policy window if they possess four key entrepreneurial characteristics—have a claim to a hearing, are politically connected, are skilled negotiators, and are persistent.
- H<sub>2</sub>: Policy entrepreneurs are more likely to couple the streams successfully during an open policy window if they use one or more forms of manipulation, alter institutional venues and activate coalition support.

The study draws upon the knowledge, expertise and efforts of individuals to influence US-Cuba policy between 1989 through 2006 to test each hypothesis, and in the process, gain further insight to a unique policy case that has garnered

considerable attention over the years. Theoretical propositions generated from the MSF serve as the general analytical strategy for the study as well as structure the research design. A survey consisting of standardized questions is used as the principal method of data collection. Raw survey data are analyzed using various statistical procedures and tests to either confirm or reject hypotheses generated from the MSF. The results are compared with the empirical evidence to determine whether there is a good fit between fact and theory.

The results of the statistical analyses failed to support the hypothesis that policy entrepreneurs are more likely to couple the streams successfully during an open policy window if they possess four key entrepreneurial characteristics: have a claim to a hearing; are politically connected; are skilled negotiators; and are persistent. However, a closer examination of the associated effect sizes and confidence intervals suggests that further testing is warranted to either confirm or refute the study's findings. Sufficient evidence was found to support the hypothesis that policy entrepreneurs are more likely to couple the streams successfully during an open policy window if they use one or more forms of manipulation, alter institutional venues and activate coalition support. The results should, however be viewed with caution because a single variable—streams—was the single most powerful predictor of success.

### **1.1 The Case of US-Cuba Policy**

Relations between the United States (US) and Cuba have and continue to be

defined by an embargo that was first imposed on Cuba by the US in 1961.<sup>1</sup> Although the embargo has remained in place since 1961, over the years the US government has vacillated between measures that have either strengthened or relaxed the embargo. The complex web of laws, regulations and amendments that constitute the embargo are a testament to those shifts and decisions to change policy. Two fundamental geopolitical events—the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991—provided US decision makers with a critical window of opportunity to reexamine the direction of US-Cuba policy. Without the support of its key political and economic partner, Cuba was more vulnerable to external political and economic forces, and possibly open to the process of rapprochement with the US. The central question for US policy makers was whether to continue with existing policy, which up to 1991 failed to make any inroads in achieving US political objectives or to set a new course in US-Cuba relations by exploring alternative means by which objectives could be attained. What followed were a series of contentious policy decisions.

The decision to strengthen the embargo resulted in the adoption and passage of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, the first significant change in US-Cuba policy since President John F. Kennedy first legislated the embargo, and the first major policy change in the post-Cold War era. The 1992 Act, also known as the Torricelli Bill after its principal sponsor, Representative Robert Torricelli of New

---

<sup>1</sup> For a chronology of key legislative events in US-Cuba relations between 1989 and 2006, see Appendix A.

Jersey, was the first major piece of legislation to modify policy in the post Cold-War era by strengthening the provisions of the embargo. Despite opposition from key congressional committees,<sup>2</sup> the bill was able to reach President Bush's desk for approval in a span of just over eight months on October 15, 1992 (Porotsky, 1995).<sup>3</sup>

Discontent over the direction of policy began to surface in 1994 when several key congressional members, including Senator Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island, Chair of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, and Representative Lee Hamilton of Indiana, the Chair of the House Foreign Relations Committee proposed that the 1992 Act be repealed (Porotsky, 1995; Dunning, 1998). Ardent supporters of the 1992 Act, the most vocal and visible being the Cuban-American National Foundation (CANF) and prominent Cuban-American members of Congress (Representatives Bob Menendez of New Jersey, Lincoln Diaz-Balart of Florida and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, also of Florida) did not waiver in their support, despite growing congressional and public support for less restrictive policy. Any attempts to normalize relations were thwarted with the passage of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, also referred to as "Helms-Burton" after the architects of the law, Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina and Representative

---

<sup>2</sup>The 1992 Act effectively eliminated the issuance of any trade licenses to foreign subsidiaries of US corporations. In tracking the legislative process of the 1992 Act, it is interesting to note that an amendment—H.Amdt.373—was proposed by Representative Sam Gejdenson of Connecticut that would have exempted the licensing provisions for foreign subsidiaries of US corporations in cases where the provisions violated the laws of the country in which the foreign subsidiary was located. However, the amendment was never passed in the House.

<sup>3</sup>The Torricelli Bill was first introduced in the House on February 5, 1992 as H.R. 4168 and S. 2918 in the Senate by Senator Robert Graham on July 1, 1992.

Dan Burton of Indiana, by further tightening the trade embargo against Cuba (Randall, 1998a: 20). Tracking the legislative history of the 1996 Act revealed unsuccessful efforts by members of Congress to counter the legislation by providing an alternative policy. Bill H.R. 883 was introduced in the House by Representative Charles Rangel of New York on February 9, 1995 as the Free Trade with Cuba Act, which sought to promote a peaceful and democratic change in Cuba. However, unlike “Helms-Burton” which tightened restrictions, H.R. 883 proposed that the embargo be lifted. The Clinton administration initially opposed the bill—in fact, President Clinton indicated that he would veto the bill if it reached his desk—yet he signed it into law in 1996 (Dunning, 1998; Lowenfeld, 1996). The President's decision to sign the 1996 Act was even more confounding because it presented a radical departure from previous executive decisions by relinquishing executive power over foreign policy, in this case US-Cuba policy, to Congress.

Shortly after the passage of the 1996 Act, Congress passed Section 211 of the 1998 Omnibus Appropriation Act in 1998, which prohibited the registration or renewal in the US of a trademark if it was previously abandoned by a trademark owner whose property had been confiscated by the Cuban government. The passage of Section 211 was even more perplexing because the legislation, which benefited only a small select group of individuals, risked alienating US trading partners, beyond the 1996 Act, which according to legal analysts violated

international law concerning territorial sovereignty.<sup>4</sup>

Following the controversial passage of Section 211 in 1998, the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act was signed into law in 2000. The 2000 Act, which included critical provisions that permitted trade with Cuba in agricultural commodities, medicines, and medical supplies, but prohibited direct public or private export financing for this trade represented a significant departure from the restrictive measures adopted in 1992, 1996 and 1998. Supported by a bipartisan group of decision makers that included Senator John Ashcroft (Montana), Senator Max Baucus (Montana), Representatives Charles Rangel (New York) and George Nethercutt (Washington), Title 5 of the 2000 Act offered US exporters of agricultural products and other stakeholders the opportunity to expand their export markets to Cuba. Following the passage of the 2000 Act, exports of agricultural products to Cuba increased dramatically (Coleman, 2009: 5). By 2004, the US became the key supplier of agricultural products to Cuba and continued to export more agricultural commodities to Cuba than any other country between 2004 and 2006 (Coleman, 2009: 5).

The periods in between these four pillars of change were also marked with a series of amendments to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR), the regulatory framework which oversees the sanctions imposed on Cuba. Between 1989 and 2006 an estimated 50 amendments were made to the CACR, covering a host of issues including licenses for travel, communications, publishing and exports,

---

<sup>4</sup>Section 211 was referred to as the “Bacardi Law” after its key beneficiary, the Bacardi spirits

travel, remittances, and the trade and transport of Cuban goods (US Federal Registry, 2010). Following the election of George W. Bush in 2001, the government suppressed any efforts to normalize relations with Cuba by strengthening provisions of the embargo by passing a series of amendments to the CACR from 2001 through 2006. The Bush Administration utilized the CACR to implement a series of amendments affecting trade, travel and remittances between 2002 and 2005, with the most dramatic amendment introduced in 2004 which halted people-to-people contact (e.g. travel, remittances and educational exchanges) (Colvin, 2009: 4).

### **1.1.1 The “Unique” Case of US-Cuba Policy**

Why examine the case of US-Cuba policy? As many analysts (Clarke and Ratliff, 2001:28, Hoffmann, 2001; Lowenfeld, 1996:422-423) have suggested, the answer lies in the “uniqueness” of the case. A brief overview of the legislative evolution of US-Cuba policy is effective in not only bringing our attention to the complex policy framework that makes up US-Cuba policy, but also the fact that decisions to modify policy and the alternatives selected by decision makers were markedly controversial, and often counterintuitive, yet were eventually adopted. Despite the lack of any progress in achieving US objectives, decisions to modify policy with even more stringent requirements for rapprochement in the post Cold-War era were labeled as “illogical” and counterproductive by vocal critics of policy such as Wayne Smith. The selection of the appropriate means by which to attain

policy objectives has and continues to be a divisive issue amongst decision makers, politicians, and Americans. According to Clarke and Ratliff (2001: 28), Hoffmann (2001), and Lowenfeld (1996: 422-423), in no other case has the US government imposed such strict conditions and requirements on a country's transition to democracy than it has on Cuba.<sup>5</sup>

The vast body of literature, both scholarly and popular, that has emerged over the years examining US-Cuba policy is a testament to the contentious nature of the case as well as the complex and dynamic forces that underlie the policy and decisions to modify it. From 1989 through 2006, a number of different players entered the policy arena, bringing along their vision of US-Cuba policy and the means by which it could be attained, a fact which is reflected by various decisions that were made during this period to either strengthen or weaken provisions of policy. Although the literature is rich in detail concerning the evolution of policy over the years, there is much more to uncover about the role and influence of individuals in that process. Why were some individuals successful in having their preferred

---

<sup>5</sup> In his research on US-Cuba policy, Lowenfeld (1996:422-423) notes, "the US has never adopted...comparable statute[s]...though there have been a good many countries in whose transition to democracy the United States had (or continues to have) an interest. Considering just the recent past, one thinks of Chile, Argentina and Brazil; of Haiti; of the Soviet Union and its constituent republics; of East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland; of Spain and Portugal; and also of China, Vietnam and Taiwan. Only for Cuba has Congress laid down a prescribed path, and sought to block alternative paths that might lead to the country's reintegration in some measure into the international economy without a change at the top". Lowenfeld's sentiments have been echoed by other analysts such as Clarke and Ratliff in their analysis of US-Cuba policy: "[w]hether one supports or opposes US policy toward Cuba, the claim that it is nothing out of the ordinary is clearly a red herring. Cuba is in every way a special case. Indeed, that may constitute the essence of the problem. While the United States is broadly tolerant of a wide range of political economic practices elsewhere in the world, in Cuba it demands a higher standard...[US policy] has nothing to do with realities in Cuba or whether the policy has any realistic prospect of bringing about the democracy or peaceful transition Washington says it supports" (Clarke and Ratliff, 2001:18).

policies placed on the government's decision agenda, while others failed? Are there any clearly identifiable characteristics that make an individual much more likely to succeed? Are there any particular tools or strategies that are more effective than others? These are central questions that have yet to be fully addressed in the context of US-Cuba policy, and articulated using propositions generated by Kingdon's MSF. This study attempts to fill this void.

### **1.1.2 Conceptualizing Policy Change**

The above brief overview of US-Cuba policy between 1989 and 2006 highlights the complex and intricate web of laws and regulations that have shaped policy and US-Cuba relations since 1961 when the US officially proclaimed a trade embargo against Cuba. A central question that surfaces when discussing the evolution of US-Cuba policy since is whether policy has changed. Because policy change can take many forms, operationalizing change is often fraught with methodological debates about what exactly constitutes "change" (Blomquist, 2007: 270-271); however, existing research on this subject can help us to address any ambiguity surrounding the issue. In his research on policy change, Hall (1993) differentiates between three categories or "orders" of policy change—first, second, and third. First order policy change involves changes to the settings of policy instruments while policy instruments and goals remain the same (Hall, 1993: 278). Hall (1993: 280) suggests that first order policy change mirrors incrementalism, satisficing and routinized decision making. In contrast, second order policy change

involves changes to both the settings of policy instruments and the instruments themselves while policy goals remain the same (Hall, 1993: 279). In this case, policy change best resembles “strategic action” (Hall, 1993: 280). Finally, third order policy change which occurs infrequently, involves radical shifts involving simultaneous changes to all three elements of policy—settings of policy instruments, policy instruments and policy goals (Hall, 1993: 279). Hall (1993: 279) suggests that first and second order policy change best resembles “normal policy making” characterized by continuity and incremental changes whereas third order policy change is much more fragmented and associated with “periodic discontinuities” in policy.

Hall’s research suggests that change can be minor or more fundamental in scope. With respect to US-Cuba policy, the US government has made a series of policy decisions which best resemble Hall’s first and second order policy changes. Between 1989 and 2006, the US government oscillated between policy and decisions that changed policy by altering the settings of the policy instrument (e.g. amendments to the CACR) and/or modifying the policy instrument itself (e.g. allowing limited exports of agricultural commodities, medicines, and medical supplies to Cuba). The objective here is not to assess the magnitude of policy change, but rather bring attention to the fact that although the embargo has remained in place since 1961, policy has been modified in some form from 1989 to 2006, and those changes are reflected by government decisions to strengthen or relax the embargo over time.

## **1.2 Research Objectives**

The primary objective of this study is to test propositions generated by the MSF focusing on three central elements—the inherent features of the policy process within which PEs function, entrepreneurial characteristics, entrepreneurial strategies—and in the process to contribute to the theoretical development of a policy framework. A secondary objective is to utilize insights provided by the MSF to enhance our understanding of the critical role played by individuals in shaping US-Cuba policy between 1989 and 2006.

## **1.3 Methodology**

This study is designed as a quantitative case study to test the power of propositions generated by a framework to account for changes in policy by focusing on the pivotal role of PEs in the agenda setting process and in the process to provide greater insight to the role of individuals in influencing US-Cuba policy in the post-Cold War era. The study spans 17 years beginning in 1989 with the inauguration of the 41<sup>st</sup> President of the United States—George H.W. Bush—and ending in 2006 with George W. Bush's second term in office.<sup>6</sup> The decision to select 1989 as the starting point for the analysis was shaped by two fundamental geopolitical events—a declaration by US President George H.W. Bush and Soviet

---

<sup>6</sup> In terms of the US congressional calendar, this study begins with the 101<sup>st</sup> Congress and ends with the completion of the second session of the 109<sup>th</sup> Congress.

leader Mikhail Gorbachev in December of 1989 that the Cold War had ended<sup>7</sup>, and the collapse of the Soviet Union in December of 1991. The easing of tensions between the US and the Soviet Union, and the disappearance of Cuba's longtime political and economic ally—the Soviet Union—provided US decision makers with a valuable opportunity to reevaluate US-Cuba policy and set the direction for future US-Cuba relations in the post-Cold War era. To move beyond recent studies (Zebich-Knos and Nicol, 2000; Brenner, Haney, and Vanderbush: 2002; Morley and McGillion, 2002) that have examined US-Cuba relations in the Cold-War era, the time period under investigation is extended to coincide with George W. Bush's second term in office, concluding in 2006. Though the case study method is subject to criticism (Flyvberg, 2006; Ruddin, 2006; Yin, 2003, 1989, 1984; Stoecker, 1991); however, it is acknowledged to be a viable research method for testing propositions (Van Evera, 1997:54) and analyzing and explaining relationships (Yin, 1984; Becker, 1966).

Theoretical propositions generated by the MSF were used to structure the research design, as well as to test both the validity of the study's findings and the MSF by comparing results with empirical evidence. Utilizing theoretical propositions as a general analytical strategy is recognized as an effective organizational and analytical tool for the collection and analysis of data, particularly with respect to

---

<sup>7</sup> There are conflicting opinions as to when the Cold War ended. Some argue that the Cold War was brought to an end with the 1989 Malta Summit between US President George H.W. Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev whereas others argue that the 1989 Malta Summit, although important was simply the catalyst. Events that swept Eastern European Communist governments between 1989 and 1991, most notably the reunification of Germany in 1990 and ultimately the dissolution of the Soviet

case studies (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 228; Yin, 2003: 3).

A survey consisting of standardized questions was used as the principal method of data collection. Two central types of surveys, e-mail and mail surveys were used to collect data that: (1) identified the presence of a PE; (2) assessed whether the PE possessed the “characteristics” of a successful PE; (3) identified strategies used by the PE; and (4) assessed the role of specific individuals identified in the literature as central figures in the evolution of US-Cuba policy and the degree to which they “fit” the entrepreneurial label. The survey method was selected as the central method of data collection because it is well suited to quantitative and theory based studies. The study addressed problems often associated with the survey method by utilizing previously validated surveys and incorporating several survey research design and implementation measures identified as effective in increasing survey reliability and validity and as useful guides in the development of the survey and questions to collect necessary data for the study.

Existing published literature—both theoretical and empirical—examining US-Cuba policy was used to identify potential respondents to the survey. In order to be short-listed for the study, it was necessary that individuals satisfied at least two of the following three requirements: possessed extensive experience in the analysis of public policy; possessed extensive experience in the analysis of US-Cuba policy; or were active in efforts to influence US-Cuba policy between 1989 and 2006. Snowball sampling was also used to solicit additional candidates for the study.

Raw survey data were coded and analyzed using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). Descriptive statistics were used to provide summary data concerning the data set. Correlations were calculated and analyzed to assess the relationships between variables. Regression analysis was used to either confirm or reject hypotheses, and to quantify the relationships between variables. Statistical findings were then compared with empirical findings to test the “goodness of fit” between fact and theory.

#### **1.4 Significance of the Study**

Numerous studies have utilized the MSF as an organizational framework to account for policy change in a broad range of policy fields; however, almost none, the exception being Travis and Zahariadis (2002) and Klodnicki (2003), have utilized the MSF in the context of a quantitative analysis of policy and even fewer have subjected hypotheses generated from the framework to rigorous analytical testing. This study attempts to fill this void by subjecting hypotheses generated from the MSF to a series of statistical tests using data from the case of US-Cuba policy between 1989 and 2006. According to Zahariadis (1999: 88), quantitative applications of the MSF are necessary to “add more weight to the lens and enhance its predictive capability”. Rigorous testing of hypotheses about major propositions put forth by a framework should, according to Sabatier (1997: 6), also be viewed as the first step in transforming frameworks, such as the MSF into full fledged theories. A quantitative analysis of US-Cuba policy provides an opportunity to explore

aspects of an issue overlooked by qualitative methods as well as to address some of the limitations of qualitative methods. Studies of US-Cuba policy are numerous, including theoretical and empirical studies; however, absent from the literature is an analysis of policy from a quantitative perspective.

### **1.5 Outline of the Dissertation**

Chapters two and three review two separate literature streams to provide an empirical and theoretical framework for the study. Chapter two reviews the literature, both scholarly and popular, outlining competing explanations of US-Cuba policy in the post-Cold War era. The objective here is to identify the most common propositions and basic assumptions underlying the forces that influenced government decisions to modify US-Cuba policy from 1989 through 2006, and to identify the relevant gaps in the literature. Chapter three reviews the theoretical literature regarding decision making, identifying key models, theories and frameworks that can aid in our understanding of the decision making process. The objective of this chapter is not to test the effectiveness of each approach, but rather to bring attention to the different attributes of each approach and select a framework that incorporates the core elements under investigation in this study.

Chapter four provides a comprehensive discussion of Kingdon's MSF emphasizing PEs and their function within the framework. The framework's operationalization of PEs and their role in decision making is analyzed, and in the process key propositions are highlighted.

Chapter five attempts to address criticisms of the MSF by: (1) utilizing the organizational structure of two-level theories to bring greater clarity to the “mechanics” of the MSF and the underlying relationships between variables; and (2) integrating insights on policy entrepreneurship and decision making extracted from previous chapters to generate testable hypotheses pertaining to the central concept of PEs within the MSF. The chapter also serves as the methodological section of the study by identifying the sources of information for the study, methods that were used to collect the necessary data, and data analysis techniques.

Chapters 6, 7 and 8 represent the empirical component of the study. Descriptive statistics, correlations and regression analysis were used to analyze raw survey data concerning: the role and significance of PEs in the policy process (chapter 6); survey participants’ involvement in efforts to influence US-Cuba policy (chapter 7); and the importance of specific individuals reputed to be PEs in the evolution of US-Cuba policy (chapter 8). The results are used to support or refute the study’s hypotheses concerning PEs and their role in shaping policy. Each chapter provides a synthesis of the results and assesses the degree to which the empirical and theoretical elements of the research are in agreement.

Chapter 9 provides a synthesis of the study’s conclusions and presents possible future avenues of research.

## **Chapter 2 Competing Explanations of US-Cuba Policy in the Post-Cold War Era**

### **2.0 Introduction**

The purpose of this chapter is to extract from the literature, both scholarly and popular, some of the most common propositions and basic assumptions underlying decisions to modify US-Cuba policy between 1989 and 2006. Existing empirical and theoretical literature concerning US-Cuba policy offers a number of competing explanations of the forces that shaped policy in the post-Cold war era. The literature can be organized according to two broad categories: (1) domestic politics; and (2) US foreign policy principles and values. The first category emphasizes two critical components of domestic politics—interest groups and bureaucratic politics—and their role in influencing foreign policy decisions. The second category focuses on the underlying principles and values—national security and the promotion and protection of human rights—that helped guide foreign policy decisions and the means by which these principles and values were protected and advanced. By reviewing the literature, we can highlight the tension surrounding decisions to modify policy as well as the appropriate means for attaining policy objectives, and in the process identify gaps in the literature that can be addressed by this study.

### **2.1 Domestic Politics**

In the field of foreign policy, studies that address the selection of policy

alternatives and the decision phase of the policy process do so through the lens of the domestic policy arena (Durant and Diehl, 1989:184). This is reflected in the extensive body of literature that has developed with respect to the influence of domestic politics on foreign policy. It is within this domain that the majority of propositions and assumptions underlying changes to US-Cuba are to be found (Morley and McGillion, 2002; Groombridge, 2001; Smith, 2000a, 2000b; Pérez, 2000; Bassett, 1998; Keselman, 1996).

### **2.1.1 Interest Groups**

Nathan and Oliver (1994: 215) note that in the American political system, interest groups represent “an important and constitutionally protected form of private power” and through their efforts are able to influence decisions and policy. Because the power of interest groups is inherent to the legislative process, Snyder (1991: 14) suggests that interest groups have the ability to “hijack” the state and ultimately manipulate policy to reflect their own private interests. Pastor (1980: 43) notes that this is of particular relevance to foreign policy because, unlike other policy fields, foreign policy is particularly vulnerable and permeable due to the absence of countervailing groups. Even in cases where opposing groups do exist, the majority may lose out to minority interests if the majority is neither organized nor feels strongly enough about the issue (Ogelman, Money and Martin, 2002; Pastor, 1980:43). A review of the literature pertaining to the case of US-Cuba policy suggests that special interests played a central role in influencing government

decisions to modify policy between 1989 and 2006.

*Cuban-American Community and the Cuban-American National Foundation*

Founded by the late Jorge Mas Canosa, the CANF has become the most prominent interest group credited with shaping the overall direction of US-Cuba policy (Hogan, 2002; Morley and McGillion, 2002; Ogelman et. al., 2002; Mead, 2001; Pérez, 2000; Randall, 1998b; Smith, 1998; Kiger, 1997; Bagchi, 1996; Brenner and Kornbluh, 1995; Moffett, 1995). The CANF's official policy platform encourages the empowerment of the Cuban people in ways that do not aid or legitimize the Castro regime by advocating measures that support Cuban civil society while maintaining international political and economic pressure and isolation of the Castro regime (CANF, 2001). As the foremost Cuban exile organization in the US, the CANF and its members deliver an organized and powerful Cuban-American voice in Washington, D.C. (CANF, 2001). The CANF's success is attributed in part to the organization's strong political activism<sup>8</sup> (Ogelman et. al., 2002; Garcia, 1996) and financial capital<sup>9</sup> (Garcia, 1996; Moffett, 1995). These two attributes have led to

---

<sup>8</sup> In their study of the political power of immigrant groups, Ogelman et. al. (2002:159) find that the Cuban-American lobby has used its narrow geographic base to cultivate its electoral strength, access to political power and influence over policy by focusing on states critical to presidential elections. States with large Cuban-American populations include Florida, New Jersey, California, New York, Texas, Illinois, Georgia, Nevada, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts (US Census Bureau, 2002, 1996, 1992).

<sup>9</sup> Moffett's (1995) research reveals that the Cuban-American lobby has successfully used financial contributions to gain political clout in Congress and the executive branch. Garcia (1996: 147) notes that the CANF's Free Cuba Political Action Committee has been credited with playing a critical role in rewarding members of Congress with financial contributions in exchange for their support of policies that reflect the interests of the CANF.

arguments that the CANF has utilized its political and financial power to influence government decisions to modify US-Cuba policy (Hogan, 2002; Morley and McGillion, 2002; Ogelman et. al., 2002; Warner, 1999; Smith, 1998; Kaplowitz, 1998; Kiger and Kruger, 1997; Garcia, 1996; Brenner and Kornbluh, 1995; Moffett, 1995).

### *Owners of Expropriated Property*

The passage of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act offered US nationals the means by which to reinstate their rights over property confiscated by the Cuban government (O’Heaney, 2000:5; Shamberger, 1998).<sup>10</sup> The most controversial provision and the centerpiece of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act, Title III—Protection of Property Rights of US Nationals, establishes the basis for American citizens and corporate entities to sue foreign investors for damages arising from "trafficking" in confiscated property the Cuban government seized without compensation following the 1959 Cuban Revolution (US Congress, 1996:30).<sup>11</sup> In 1972, the US Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (1972a, 1972b) certified a total of 5,911 claims by American citizens and companies as eligible for compensation with an aggregate value of approximately US\$1.8 billion of which US\$1.6 billion was accounted for by 898

---

<sup>10</sup> For an analysis of the property issue, see Borchers, Kelly, Witmer, Moreno, Pearlstein and Wunsch (2007).

<sup>11</sup> Since the passage of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act, the government has waived the right to sue under Title III.

corporate claimants and US\$220 million by 5,013 individual claimants.<sup>12</sup> The right to sue over confiscated property that was granted to US nationals fueled arguments that both corporate and individual owners of expropriated property were the driving force behind the government's decision to pass the 1996 LIBERTAD Act (Hogan, 2002:6; Muse, 1998; Goldberg, 1997; Moffett, 1995).

### *Claims by Cuban Nationals*

The property rights provisions of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act are unique because they not only award US claimants the right to sue those found to be trafficking in property, but also grant Cuban-Americans a privilege no other group of naturalized citizens holds—the right to sue before they became US citizens (Hogan, 2002:6; Dhooge, 2000; O'Heaney, 2000:3; Smith, 2000b; Muse, 1998; US House of Representatives, 1996: 30, 1995:55). Members of other ethnic groups questioned why this privilege was given only to Cuban-Americans and not to other immigrants who fled countries where hostile regimes confiscated their private property, and who have since become naturalized (Dhooge, 2000; Smith, 2000b). The narrow focus on Cuba made the 1996 LIBERTAD Act an easy target for criticism and fueled suggestions that Cuban exiles pushed for the bill, eventually forcing the government to give in and pass it (Hogan, 2002: 6; Muse, 1998; Goldberg, 1997; Castaneda and

---

<sup>12</sup> In terms of 1995 dollars, the year preceding the passage of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act, the total value of claims was estimated at approximately US\$5.5 billion (Castaneda and Montalvan, 1995:228).

Montalvan, 1995: 228-229; Davis, 1995; Moffett, 1995).<sup>13</sup>

### *Intellectual Property and Trademark Owners*

A corporate entity that is argued to have capitalized on the 1996 LIBERTAD Act along with Section 211 of the 1998 Omnibus Appropriation Act is Bacardi-Martini USA, the American holding company of Bermuda based Bacardi Ltd.. As a key beneficiary of both pieces of legislation, Bacardi-Martini is seen as playing an instrumental role in shaping policy (Morley and McGillion, 2002:101; Stone, 1998:7; Davis, 1995). In fact, Bacardi Martini's influence was reputed to be so strong that the 1996 LIBERTAD Act was referred to as the "Bacardi Bill" when it was being drafted and later, the "Bacardi Rum Protection Act" when it was passed (Stone, 1998:7; Davis, 1995).<sup>14</sup> Bacardi-Martini was not incorporated into American operations until after properties were expropriated in Cuba; however, under

---

<sup>13</sup> Prior to 1995, immigrant groups including Cuban Americans had approached Congress to have their property claims validated by the FCSC; however, their requests were rejected on the basis that they did not meet citizenship requirements (Center for National Policy, 2000: 44; Davis, 1995). It was not until 1994 according to Castaneda and Montalvan (1995) that the government changed its position on the citizenship requirement. Castaneda and Montalvan (1995:228-229) suggest that the initial provisions of the Helms-Burton bill considered by Congress reflected the demands of Cuban exiles, a fact that Davis (1995) corroborates in her review of the Helms-Burton bill. Davis (1995) also found that, although the original bill's provision regarding confiscated property allowed any US citizen to sue individuals "trafficking" in stolen assets, it did not single out Cuba. According to Davis (1995), drafters of the Helms-Burton bill argued that the bill was limited to Cuba only after they realized the consequences and enormity of opening up claims to all US citizens. When asked why previous claimants were not granted the right to sue, Marc Thiessen, spokesman for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee argued that it was neither the fault nor responsibility of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to grant previous claimants the right (Davis, 1995). What Thiessen failed to highlight according to Davis (1995) was the central role played by members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in coordinating the drafting of the Helms-Burton bill.

<sup>14</sup> Bacardi Martini's involvement was highlighted when it held a fund raiser for Jesse Helms and had the company's lawyers assist Helms to draft Title III of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act (Davis, 1995; Stone, 1998:7).

provisions of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act, Bacardi was awarded an equal claim to compensation and the right to sue anyone found to be trafficking in expropriated property (O'Heaney, 2000:3). The Bacardi case is significant because it not only highlights the influence of special interests, but also reveals the magnitude of the property issue which extends beyond physical assets. The term "property" as defined by the 1996 LIBERTAD Act includes not only physical property, but also patents, copyrights, trademarks, and any other form of intellectual property (US Congress, 1996:6).<sup>15</sup> Under the provision of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act, Bacardi Martini could sue not only the Cuban government, but also Pernod Ricard, Havana Club's international distributor for rights to the Havana Club brand name, which would essentially eliminate Bacardi's key competitor in the rum market (Stone, 1998:7).<sup>16</sup> Like the 1996 LIBERTAD Act, Section 211 of the 1998 Omnibus Act provided Bacardi with added protection concerning its rights to the "Havana Club" name.<sup>17</sup> Efforts to repeal the legislation by Senator Max Baucus, Representative

---

<sup>15</sup> Those who fled Cuba following the Cuban Revolution left behind physical assets of their companies under the assumption that they were able to keep ownership of intellectual property such as *trademarks and brand names*. The Cuban government argued that the *expropriation of property* also included trademarks (Perry, Woods and Shapiro, 2000:77).

<sup>16</sup> Controversy over ownership of the brand name surfaced in 1995 when Bacardi-Martini began to market rum under the Havana Club brand name in the US where Cuba had already registered the brand name (Perry et. al., 2000:77). Bacardi-Martini had purchased the rights to the trademark name in 1995 from the original owners who had fled Cuba after their property was nationalized by the Cuban government in 1960 (Perry et. al., 2000:82). Two years earlier in 1993, French spirits company, Pernod Ricard entered into a joint venture with the Cuban government to produce and market Havana Club rum globally (Sullivan, 2003b: 16; Perry et. al., 2000:82; Stone, 1998:7). In 1995, Bacardi-Martini petitioned the US Patent and Trademark Office to revoke Cuba's registration of the trademark and at the same time began marketing rum under the Havana Club brand name in the US (Perry et. al., 2000:82).

<sup>17</sup> Section 211 of the 1998 Act prohibits the renewal, registration and enforcement of legal claims of

Charles Rangel and key business coalitions such as the National Foreign Trade Council and USA\*Engage failed (Landau and Smith, 2001a). According to Wayne Smith (Landau and Smith, 2001a: 1, 3), a staunch critic of US-Cuba policy and former Chief of the US Interests Section in Cuba, (1979-1982), Section 211 is illogical and had it gone through normal legislative procedures, it would have been defeated.

### *Power of Interests?*

A number of analysts (Center for Responsive Politics, 2001; Dhooge, 2000; Center for National Policy, 2000; O'Heaney, 2000; Smith, 2000a; Haney and Vanderbush, 1999; LeoGrande, 1998, 1997; Muse, 1998; Walker, 1996) have challenged these commonly accepted explanations on several grounds. First, Haney and Vanderbush (1999) note that explanations that focus solely on the influence of the CANF and their ability to swing votes and money politics are too simplistic because the case of US-Cuba policy and the CANF are much more complex than is generally understood. In fact, several analysts (Center for Responsive Politics, 2001; Smith, 2000a; LeoGrande, 1998, 1997; Walker, 1996) suggest that, although the CANF is one of the most recognized and prominent Cuban organizations in the US, it does not wield the degree of political and financial influence suggested.<sup>18</sup> The extent to which interests are capable of translating their

---

Cuban nationals or their successors involving trademarks or trade names that were involved in property confiscated after 1959 without prior approval from the original owners (Lee, 2004: 1-2)

<sup>18</sup> In his review of US-Cuba policy, LeoGrande (1998:84, 1997 213) found that despite Clinton's

power into influence, particularly in the field of foreign policy, has been challenged by several analysts within the broader theoretical literature on interest group theory. In their analysis of interest groups, Nathan and Oliver (1994: 215) note that “magnitude, prestige, and intensity of the activity and the resources committed by private power do not easily translate into influence.”

Second, a key assumption of the literature is that the CANF and its position on US-Cuba policy reflects the interests of all Cuban-Americans. This has led to the misperception that Cuban-Americans are a monolithic group with regards to opinions concerning the direction of policy (Cuban Committee for Democracy, 2004; Schmidt, 2004; Ogelman et. al., 2002:158; Garcia, 1996; Elliston, 1995). In her study of the Cuban-American community in South Florida, Garcia (1996:163-164) found that the collapse of the former Soviet Union led to intense debates within

---

support for the 1992 CDA, only 18% of Florida’s Cuban population voted for Clinton in 1992. In his analysis of the 1992 election, Smith (2000a) found that the direction of US-Cuba policy was not the deciding issue or even a significant issue in Florida. This is an important point because it challenges the power of the electoral calculation behind the 1992 CDA (Smith, 2000a). Four years later in 1996, Clinton’s bid for re-election was successful as was his effort to secure Florida’s 25 electoral votes. In his review of the key political and policy issues of the 1996 presidential election, Walker (1996) found that Clinton’s platform on critical domestic issues such as education, Medicare and Medicaid helped him win his bid for re-election. LeoGrande (1998:84; 1997:213) also found that it was Clinton’s platform on Medicare, not his stance on US-Cuba policy that helped him capture over 40% of the Cuban vote in Florida in 1996.

A comprehensive study by the Center for Responsive Politics examining the role and influence of Cuban-American money in elections from 1979 to 2000 challenges arguments that Cuban-American money influenced the eventual outcome of the 1992 CDA and 1996 LIBERTAD Act. The study examined political fund-raising and contributions by the CANF, major donors and their families within the Cuban community, elected officials who have received money from Cuban Americans, Cuba-related legislation and vote correlations in Congress, and political contributions by Cuban Americans compared to that of other ethnic groups. The study confirmed arguments that Cuban Americans contribute heavily to election campaigns as well as to party committees; however, it also found a weak correlation between financial contributions and votes for pro-embargo measures they have pushed for in Congress (Center for Responsive Politics, 2001).

the community regarding the means by which democratic reforms in Cuba could be accelerated. In response to the hard line approach favoured by the CANF, opposition groups favouring a constructive approach began to emerge in 1990 and flourish over the years (Garcia, 1996: 164-167).<sup>19</sup>

Third, the growing generational divide within the Cuban-American community has been pivotal in fueling opposing opinions concerning the direction of policy and challenging the power of the CANF (Bendixen and Associates, 2009; Eckstein, 2009; Eckstein and Barberia, 2002; Center for national Policy, 2000). Lisandro Pérez, Professor at the Florida International University, notes that the CANF's platform on the issue of property rights has been relatively weak for reasons that stem from the generational divide within the Cuban-American community itself (Center for National Policy, 2000:44). For the generation of Cuban exiles that accumulated their wealth in the US, their interests, according to Pérez, lie with the opportunities that are available through investments back in Cuba, rather than through compensation and reclaiming property (Center for National Policy, 2000:44). It is this generation of Cubans, according to Pérez, that wields the greatest power in the community, hence, the issue of compensation for Cuban exiles who were not American citizens at the time of confiscations, although important, was not the driving force for the community that it has been made out to be (Center for National Policy, 2000:44).

---

<sup>19</sup>This includes moderate groups such the Cuban American Coalition, Cambio Cubano, Cuba Committee for Democracy, Cuban American Defense League, and the Cuban American Alliance Education Fund.

Finally, in his research on interest groups, Snyder (1991: 150) points out that the broader literature on interest group theory has yet to fully address questions of how and why groups that are harmed by counterproductive policies are incapable of opposing groups with very narrow interests. This is of particular relevance to the case of US-Cuba policy where business, trade and agricultural interests such as USA\*Engage, US Chamber of Commerce, US National Foreign Trade Council, American Farm Bureau Federation, USA Rice Federation, and US Wheat Associates, interests that have a major stake in the outcome of policy, failed to make any inroads in their demands to have restrictions eased prior to the passage of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000.<sup>20</sup> In 1998, Robert L. Muse, legal representative for American Sugar Company, one of the top ten companies with claims in excess of US\$50 million, testified before Congress that contrary to prevailing beliefs, the majority of corporate claimants did not support any restrictive measures passed by the government in 1996 (Muse, 1998).<sup>21</sup> Muse's sentiments were echoed by congressional members as well as prominent business leaders (Dhooge, 2000; Dunning, 1998: 227; Rosen, 1997; US House of Representatives, 1995:55). As with corporate claimants, the majority of individual claimants argued that it was in their interests that the 1996 LIBERTAD Act not be adopted because it would hinder efforts to have property claims resolved, in that it

---

<sup>20</sup> For an analysis of the economic impact of US policy on business and agricultural sectors, see US International Trade Commission (2007, 2001), Rosson and Adcock (2001), and Stern (2000).

<sup>21</sup> Dunning (1998: 227) and Rosen (1997) note that of the 25 largest certified corporate claims, Colgate-Palmolive Co. was the only company that supported the 1996 LIBERTAD Act.

would increase the number and value of claims (Groombridge, 2001: 304; Dhooge, 2000; US House of Representatives, 1995:55).

### **2.1.2 Bureaucratic Politics**

In what is perhaps the most widely recognized theoretical work in the field of foreign policy decision making, Allison's (1971) study of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis defines foreign policy as the political result of bureaucratic bargaining (Pastor, 1980:30).<sup>22</sup> More specifically, in the words of Allison, "the name of the game is bureaucratic politics: bargaining along regularized channels among players positioned hierarchically within the government" (Allison, 1969:707). The focus of attention here is not the legislative but rather the executive branch and how decisions are made within this branch of government (Rosati, 1981:235; Halperin, 1974:5). Pastor (1980) notes that one of the greatest strengths of the literature on bureaucratic politics is its ability to highlight the irrationality of foreign policy decision making: "the most penetrating and enduring insight of the literature...is the simple point that foreign policy is often more the product of a dysfunctional decision-making process than of a rational assessment of instruments and objects" (Pastor, 1980:32). In terms of power, authority and staff, the most visible bureaucratic organizations involved in foreign policy are the US Department of State and the National Security Council (NSC) (Qingshan, 1992: 15). With respect to US-Cuba

---

<sup>22</sup>The bureaucratic model is also associated with scholarship by Huntington (1960) and Halperin (1974).

policy, studies (Brenner et. al., 2002; Morley and McGillion, 2002; Vanderbush and Haney, 1999; Bassett, 1998); Kaplowitz, 1998; Brenner and Kornbluh; 1995) suggest that a number of bureaucratic organizations have played a pivotal role in shaping policy, a fact that is mirrored by the complex web of laws that make up the embargo.

Following his electoral win in 1992, Clinton indicated that an internal review of US-Cuba policy would take place in 1993. Key members of Clinton's foreign policy team—Warren Christopher, Secretary of State; Tony Lake, National Security Advisor; Mort Halperin and Richard Feinberg, Senior Directors of the NSC; and Peter Tarnoff, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs—advocated a more constructive policy toward Cuba, one that sought to increase dialogue with rather than isolated the Cuban government (Vanderbush and Haney, 1999: 397; Bassett, 1998:2-3; Brenner and Kornbluh, 1995:34, 36-37). In the early part of 1993, there was a “behind-the-scenes” debate within the Administration concerning the direction of policy under the 1992 CDA (Brenner and Kornbluh, 1995:36). There was a push from inside Clinton's foreign policy team to implement what was referred to as a “calibrated response”<sup>23</sup> to changes in Cuba and to expand the Track II<sup>24</sup> provisions

---

<sup>23</sup> According to LeoGrande (1997: 215), a policy of calibrated responses involved changes to policy that were proportionate to reforms carried out by the Cuban government. The benefits of this approach were two fold: they did not require direct negotiations between the American and Cuban governments; and the policy was flexible in that it allowed for improved relations with Cuba by using a “carrot” rather than a “stick”, and in doing so, it helped bolster support for advocates of reform within Cuba's political elite (LeoGrande, 1997: 215).

<sup>24</sup> The two-track policy, which was established by the 1992 CDA provided for outreach to the Cuban people in the form of humanitarian donations, including food and medicines while at the same time it strengthened the embargo by imposing restrictions on US subsidiaries from trading with Cuba (Fisk,

of the 1992 Act, which were favoured by Clinton (LeoGrande, 1997: 215; Brenner and Kornbluh, 1995:36). This option was quickly pushed aside in 1994 as bureaucratic interests voiced their concerns (LeoGrande, 1997:215; Brenner and Kornbluh, 1995:37).

Bassett (1998:1) found that a select group of bureaucratic players from the State Department, the NSC and at times, the Department of Defense and the Department of Justice, pushed for a hard-line approach with Cuba. Within the State Department, Michael Skol, Deputy Assistant Secretary, and Dennis Hays, Director of the Office of Cuban Affairs fought all efforts to soften policy (Morley and McGillion, 2002: 57-70; Brenner and Kornbluh, 1995:37).<sup>25</sup> Conflicts within the NSC focused on whether Cuba was a threat to national security, which, if it was, would justify larger budgets for the NSC (Brenner et. al., 2002:201). The characterization of Cuba as a “rogue state” by Anthony Lake, National Security Advisor helped bolster arguments for a hard line policy (Brenner et. al., 2002:201). The State Department’s Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs battled with the Office of Cuban Affairs to ease current policy in order to improve human rights conditions in Cuba (Brenner et. al., 2002:201). The Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets continued to espouse the value of sanctions as a weapon, despite

---

2001:94).

<sup>25</sup> Skol’s approach reflected what analysts referred to as the “old school” of diplomacy, one that advocated measures that exerted great pain on a target at its weakest moments (Morley and McGillion, 2002:57, 61-70). For Hays, the objective was to deny Cuba access to Latin America, a process that would be accelerated if a much more restrictive policy was passed (Morley and McGillion, 2002:57-58).

evidence that sanctions destabilized trade regimes (Morley and McGillion, 2002:59; Brenner et. al., 2002:201). Trade and commerce agencies did not support the trade sanctions provisions of the 1996 legislation, opting for increased trade relations with Cuba (Bassett, 1998:8). Brenner and Kornbluh (1995:37) argue, that in the end, the battle over the direction of policy was lost by Halperin and others at the NSC to the State Department, Treasury and White House officials who supported a hard-line approach with Cuba. Bureaucratic struggles over US-Cuba policy continued to emerge between the same departments and agencies that were tasked with implementing and enforcing the embargo.

In 2007, the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) released the findings of its investigation concerning the impact of changes to embargo laws and regulations on organizations between 2001 and 2005. The GAO concluded that the complex web of legislation that represented the embargo along with several changes during the period examined led to competing priorities between organizations tasked with implementing and enforcing the embargo (US GAO, 2007).

### *Looking Beyond Bureaucratic Politics?*

Critics of the bureaucratic approach to understanding decision making suggest that it draws almost entirely on vested interests and entrenched ideas of the players and the organizations they represent (Bassett, 1998:10), while ignoring two critical factors that have an impact on decision making and the formulation of

policy—organizational structures (Hammond, 1986) and external forces (Brenner, et. al., 2002:201).<sup>26</sup> In the case of US-Cuba policy, it is argued that the emphasis on divisions within the executive branch overlooked key developments within Congress as well as Cuba itself that had an impact on the decision making process (Brenner et. al., 2002:201; Bassett, 1998). Rosati (1981: 251) suggests that in order to fully comprehend the nature of decision making processes as well as outcomes of processes, it is necessary to look beyond existing bureaucratic variables identified by the literature and incorporate broader factors that are work, as well as understand how their interaction contributes to decision outcomes.

## **2.2 US Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era**

The end of the Cold War played a pivotal role in redefining the concept of security. Containing communism and protecting the US from direct military threats, the principal focus of the government's security strategy during the Cold War was replaced by efforts to combat terrorism, drug trafficking, immigration flows and nuclear threats, issues that embodied the new threats to national security (Center for National Policy, 2003:8; Canrong, 2001:309; US White House, 1996). American foreign policy in the post-Cold War era also reflected a growing interest in the promotion of democracy and respect for human rights (US NSC, 2006, 2002; Center for National Policy, 2003:8). These two pillars—security and the promotion of

---

<sup>26</sup> For a critique of the bureaucratic model, see Bendor and Hammond (1992), Hammond, 1986, Rosati (1981), Caldwell (1977), Freedman (1976), Ball, 1974, Cornford (1974), Desmond, (1974), Perlmutter (1974), and Art (1973).

democracy and human rights—are important from the standpoint of this study because they were used to justify decisions to modify policy and influence the selection of the appropriate policy alternatives.

### **2.2.1 National Security**

During the Cold War, direct threats to national security consisted primarily of military threats to the borders and government of the US. (Franzblau, 1997:1; Rogers and Copeland, 1993; Morgenthau, 1982). This traditional notion of national security which shaped US-Cuba policy during the Cold War began to undergo a transformation during the 1980s to include non-military threats, a transformation that was accelerated by the end of the Cold War and the tragic events of September 11, 2001 (US NSC, 2006, 2002; Franzblau, 1997:1; Rogers and Copeland, 1993; Ullman, 1983; Morgenthau, 1982). It is during this period that state sponsored terrorism, drug trafficking, migration and nuclear threats moved to the forefront of security discussions and US-Cuba policy.

#### *Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism*

The concept of a “rogue state”, arguably an American concept (Cameron, 2002:139), is closely tied to the State Department’s list of states that sponsor terrorism. Following the end of the Cold War, the State Department identified Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism in its annual report to Congress, *Patterns of Global Terrorism*, (hereafter referred to as *Patterns*) because Cuba provided refuge to terrorist organizations and political training to leftist organizations (US Department of

State, 1991:30).<sup>27</sup> Cuba remained on the list from 1992 through 2006 (US Department of State, 2007, 2006, 2005, 2004, 2003, 2002, 2001, 2000, 1999, 1998, 1997, 1996, 1995: 23, 1994:19, 1993:22), despite its efforts to reorient its foreign policy (Council on Foreign Relations, 2002; Landau and Smith, 2002; Dominguez, 1994). Cuba's continued designation as a state sponsor of terrorism fueled arguments that Cuba posed a serious threat to the security of the US (US Senate, 1992; US House of Representatives, 1991), a fact that was highlighted by Section 1702 (3) of the 1992 CDA in which the Castro government was accused of being involved in "military interventions and subversive activities throughout the world" that included narcotics trafficking and support for terrorist organizations (US Congress, 2002). The Cuban "threat" was at the forefront of arguments for revisions to policy in 1996 and served as justification for the passage of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act to ensure the "continued national security of the United States in the face of continuing threats from the Castro government of terrorism" (US Congress, 1996:4).

### *Cuba—A Terrorist Threat?*

Landau and Smith (2002, 2001), critics of US-Cuba policy, suggest that allegations by the State Department that Cuba was a state sponsor of terrorism, and

---

<sup>27</sup> *Patterns* provides data on terrorist trends, groups, activities, and identifies countries designated as state sponsors of terrorism subject to US sanctions. *Patterns* is submitted to Congress in compliance with Title 22 of the US Code, Chapter 38, Section 2656f(a) which defines acts of international terrorism as "involving citizens or the territory of more than one country" and terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience." In 2004, *Patterns* was replaced with *Country Reports on Terrorism*. Cuba was first added to the list in 1982 because of the Cuban government's support for guerrilla organizations in Colombia (Sullivan, 2004; Perl, 2000:

hence by inference, a threat to security, direct or indirect, were false and misleading. In fact, ever since Cuba was first categorized as a state sponsor of terrorism, the State Department has consistently failed to provide sufficient evidence in its annual reviews to justify Cuba's inclusion on the list (Perl, 2004, 2004b; Peters, 2002b, 2001a).<sup>28</sup> Instead, *Patterns*, according to critics, has been successfully used by opponents of Castro to politicize the issue in order to justify retaining Cuba on the terrorism list rather than seriously addressing security issues (Perl, 2004:5; Sullivan, 2004; Washington Office on Latin America, 2003; Peters, 2001a). The characterization of Cuba as a "rogue state" by government officials such was used to bolster arguments for a hard line policy (Brenner et. al., 2002:201).

### *Cuba's Links to Drug Trafficking*

Located in the corridor to the Caribbean, Cuba is geographically situated between leading drug producing countries, Colombia and Venezuela, and the

---

16; Council on Foreign Relations, 2002; Peters, 2001a).

<sup>28</sup> In 1998 the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) undertook a comprehensive assessment of Cuba's military threat to US national security in coordination with other key security agencies—the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, National Security Agency, and US Southern Command Joint Intelligence Center. The agencies assessed traditional military capabilities as well as unconventional threats to security that included the development of chemical and biological weapons, the potential for mass migration, attacks on citizens or residents of the US and possible internal unrest in Cuba that could involve US citizens, residents or the armed services (US DIA, 1998). In terms of Cuba's military capabilities, the DIA (1998) concluded that Cuba's military posed a negligible threat to the US and surrounding countries, hence a military attack by Cuba could easily be thwarted by the US military. Furthermore, the DIA (1998) concluded that any efforts to engage in military actions beyond the defense of its territory and political system would work against Cuba's efforts to improve relations with neighbouring countries (US DIA, 1998).

largest narcotics consumer in the world, the US (Kornbluh, 2000: 2). By virtue of its location, which proved to be strategically valuable to the US during the Cold War, Cuba was, and continues to be, vulnerable as a major transit point in the drug smuggling trade (Sullivan, 2001:17; Kornbluh, 2000: 2). Cuba's limited physical and financial resources, along with a lack of co-operation with the US, have hindered its ability to stem the flow of drugs and have been skillfully used by staunch opponents of the Castro regime to justify restrictive measures against Cuba (Kornbluh, 2001; US Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, 1993). Since 1987, when the State Department first began publishing the *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR)*, Cuba has never been identified as either a major illicit drug producing or transit country, yet the US government continues to label it as a country of "concern" and a threat to national security because of its alleged involvement in drug trafficking activities (US Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2008, 2007, 2006, 2005, 2004, 2003, 2002, 2001, 2000, 1999; US House of Representatives, 1999: 50).<sup>29</sup>

The Cuban "drug threat" was at the forefront of arguments for revisions to policy in 1996, and eventually used as justification for the passage of the 1996

---

<sup>29</sup> The INCSR is used by the President to report to Congress on major drug-transit and illicit drug producing countries (US Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2001). The criterion used to decide whether to place a country on the list is the volume of drug trafficking to the US a country actively contributes to and actively supports (US Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2001; US House of Representatives, 1999: 51). Supporters of a hard-line approach have focused on having Cuba added to the list since 1990 in order to substantiate allegations that Cuba is a security threat to the US (Gedda, 1999).

LIBERTAD Act.<sup>30</sup> Analysts suggest that supporters of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act skillfully used Cuba's diminished capacity to fight trafficking to argue that Cuba was not only uncooperative on drug trafficking matters, but also an active participant in such matters (Gedda, 1999; US House of Representatives, 1999).<sup>31</sup> Two years later in 1998, an aggressive campaign to include Cuba on the list of major drug trafficking countries was launched by Representatives Dan Burton and Benjamin Gilman with the support of Representatives Lincoln Diaz-Balart and Illeana Ros-Lehtinen (Gedda, 1999; Burton, 1998). Representatives Burton and Gilman continued their campaign to have Cuba placed on the list in 1999 and 2000 by voicing their concerns before key congressional committees (US House of Representatives, 2000, 1999). Although efforts to include Cuba on the list of major drug trafficking countries failed, subsequent INCSRs in 2001 through 2006 continued to identify Cuba as a country of "concern" (US Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 2007).

### *Cuban Drug Threat?*

Critics of US-Cuba policy have questioned why Cuba was not included on the government's list of major illicit drug producing and transit countries despite

---

<sup>30</sup> Section 2 (13) of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act identifies Cuba's active involvement in drug trafficking as a threat to the national security of the US (US Congress, 1996:3).

<sup>31</sup> The effects of Cuba's deteriorating economy on the government's ability to control drug trafficking were becoming even more pronounced by 1993, yet the US government failed to recognize efforts by the Cuban government to cooperate with US drug enforcement agencies as well as a series of bilateral agreements with Jamaica and Guyana to combat drug trafficking in the region (US Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, 1993).

allegations that Cuba's involvement in drug trafficking was a major threat to US security (Center for Defense Information, 2003; Kornbluh, 2000). It is suggested that, if the issue was truly a matter of security, a policy of co-operation rather than confrontation would have been much more constructive in combating drug trafficking and assuring that the US was protected (Center for Defense Information, 2003; Kornbluh, 2000). The absence of any formal cooperation or bilateral agreements on narcotics matters between the US and Cuba has, according to critics of policy, been counterproductive in the fight against drug trafficking for both countries (Center for Defense Information, 2003; Kornbluh, 2000).<sup>32</sup> Drug traffickers have been able to capitalize on poor US-Cuba relations by using Cuban territory as a "safe" transit point for drugs destined for the US (Kornbluh, 2000; US House of Representatives, 1999). According to William E. Ledwith (2000), former Chief of International Operations, US Drug Enforcement Agency, as Cuba continues to expand its foreign trade relations, both Cuba and the US will become even more vulnerable to the drug trafficking trade as drug traffickers look to expand their operations. Critics suggest that policies should reflect the fact that counter narcotics is a mutual security interest that the US shares with Cuba, and hence policies that do not reflect this help encourage rather than deter drug trafficking (Kornbluh,

---

<sup>32</sup> Since 1990 the US and Cuba have not had any bilateral narcotics agreements, and any co-operation concerning narcotics matters is on a case by case basis (US Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2008, 2007, 2006, 2005, 2004, 2003, 2002, 2001, 2000, 1999, 1998, 1997, 1996, 1995, 1994). Efforts to increase collaboration on narcotics matters have been met with opposition by the US despite evidence of the benefits of increased co-operation (Kornbluh, 2000: 1; US House of Representatives, 1999).

2000).

### *Cuban Migration*

Since the end of the Cold-War, the expanded scope of threats to national security has made it easier for governments to classify immigrants as security threats (Franzblau, 1997: 2). In a comprehensive review of immigration policy in 1997, the US Commission on Immigration Reform found that perceptions that immigrants pose a threat to a country's national security stem largely from beliefs that immigrants compromise a country's language and culture, drain a country's social and financial resources, and are closely linked to terrorism or increased crime (Franzblau, 1997: 33). According to the US Coast Guard (2008), migrants from Haiti, the Dominican Republic, the People's Republic of China and Cuba account for the greatest share of undocumented migration to the US. Between 1989 and 2006, the Coast Guard interdicted a total of 60,593 Cuban migrants, the second largest number after those from Haiti (US Coast Guard, 2008).

The Cuban migration crisis in 1994 helped fuel arguments that Cuban migration was a threat to national security, which required the government to take all necessary steps to deter mass Cuban migration to the US (Noriega, 2004; US White House, 1998:51; US House of Representatives, 1996:4).<sup>33</sup> With a growing number of refugees reaching Florida's coast, advocates of a more restrictive US-

---

<sup>33</sup> In June of 1994, deteriorating economic conditions in Cuba fueled civil unrest on the island which led to an increase in the number of Cubans attempting to flee to the US (US GAO, 1995a: 2). The problem was compounded by an influx of migrants from Haiti and the Dominican Republic, the majority of whom were arriving in Florida (LeoGrande, 1998:76).

Cuba policy played on fears that the flood of Cuban migrants would drain the country's social and economic resources (US House of Representatives, 1996:9). The US government abruptly changed migration policy in 1994<sup>34</sup> and engaged in a series of discussions with the Cuban government over migration issues which eventually led to the passage of bilateral agreements in 1994 and 1995 that would help stem the flow of Cuban migrants (Sullivan, 2003b: 31; Council on Foreign Relations, 1998; Dominquez, 1997:68). Following the signing of the 1995 accord, supporters of a hard-line approach with Cuba continued to voice their concerns (US House of Representatives, 1996:66, 1995c: 12,30). Castro's "threats" to unleash a mass exodus of Cubans to the US that rivaled the 1980 Mariel boat lift were equated to an act of aggression against the US by opponents of Castro.<sup>35</sup> The passage of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act was a testament to the success of hardliners in capitalizing on the "migration threat." One of the intended objectives of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act, as outlined in Section 3(3), was to "provide for the continued national security of the US in the face of continuing threats from the Castro

---

<sup>34</sup> On August 19, 1994, the US government announced that any Cuban migrants rescued at sea would be returned to the US naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (US Coast Guard, 2004b; Sullivan, 2003b: 31). This was a reversal of earlier policy which permitted Cubans attempting to flee Cuba entry to the US (Sullivan, 2003b: 31).

<sup>35</sup> According to supporters of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act, "in view of the threat to the national security posed by the Castro government's continuing blackmail to unleash another wave of Cuban refugees fleeing from Castro's oppression, most of whom find their way to US shores, further depleting limited humanitarian and other resources of the US, the President should do all in his power to make it clear to the Cuban Government that....any further political manipulation of the desire of Cubans to escape that results in mass migration to the US, will be considered an act of aggression which will be met with an appropriate response in order to maintain the security of the national borders of the US and the health and safety of the American people" (US House of Representatives, 1996:66, 1995c: 12,30).

government”, which included “the political manipulation by the Castro government of the desire of Cubans to escape that results in mass migration to the United States”.

The issue of Cuban migration garnered considerable political attention following a number of key events: an increase in migrant interdictions between 1998 and 1999<sup>36</sup>, the government’s poor handling of the case of Elian Gonzalez in 2000, and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (Sullivan, 2005a: 3; Diaz, 2004; Fletcher, 2003). According to James Cason, former Chief of the US Interests Section in Havana (2002-2005), the terrorist attacks had a fundamental impact on the political environment in the US, such that any mass migration by sea could easily be interpreted as a security threat (Diaz, 2004). According to Dr. Damian Fernandez, former director of the Cuban Research Institute at Florida International University, “if it happened today [post “9-11” era], given the war on terrorism, the United States might be likely to interpret mass migration as an act of war” (Diaz, 2004), a concern that intensified in 2006 as Cuban migrant interdictions reached a record high of 2,810 (Wasem, 2007: 4).

### *A Migration Issue?*

The 1994 and 1995 migration accords were significant because they not only helped to deter mass Cuban migration and to reduce the probability of military confrontation between American and Cuban forces, but also illustrated the

---

<sup>36</sup>The total number of migrant interdictions during the first two years following the passage of the 1995 Accord were relatively low (a total of 411 in 1996 and 421 in 1997); however, there was a dramatic increase in the total number of Cuban interdictions from 903 in 1998 to 1,619 in 1999 (Wasem, 2007: 4).

importance of co-operation between the two countries in developing mutually beneficial policies concerning issues that transcended borders (Dominguez, 1997:68-69). Danielle Barav (2008), an analyst with the Cuba Project at the World Security Institute, suggests that the link between migration and threats to national security has, and continues to be, an effective political tool for politicians in winning the support of a small select group of hardliners in the Cuban-American community. As for the possibility of future “threats” of mass migration from Cuba, Cason along with other members of the intelligence community and the Coast Guard suggest that the risk of mass Cuban migration is low because the migration accords provide sufficient opportunities for those leaving Cuba to leave legally and safely (Barav, 2008; Diaz, 2004). Cason notes that if a mass migration were to occur, US government agencies are capable of handling migration surges, as was evident in the repatriation of 900 Haitians in February of 2004 (Diaz, 2004).

#### *Cuba's Nuclear Threat*

The nuclear issue quickly rose to the top of US concerns in 1995 following a series of high profile congressional hearings in 1991 and 1995, and the publication of government reports that investigated the likelihood of a nuclear accident in Cuba (Alvarado, 1998: 3; US House of Representatives, 1995a, 1995b; US Senate, 1991; US GAO, 1995a, 1995b, 1992). The government highlighted numerous safety, technical and structural concerns with Cuba's Juaragua project arguing that, because of its proximity to the US, Americans would be exposed to radioactive

fallout resulting from an accident (Cereijo, 2000; Alvarado, 1998; Federation of American Scientists, 1999; US House of Representatives, 1995a, 1995b; US Senate, 1991; US GAO, 1995a, 1995b, 1992).<sup>37</sup> According to the US government, the probability of an accident occurring because of inadequate safety measures and poor infrastructure was significant enough that Cuba's operation of a nuclear reactor would pose a threat to national security (Cereijo, 2000; Alvarado, 1998; Federation of American Scientists, 1999; US House of Representatives, 1995a, 1995b; US Senate, 1991; US GAO, 1995a, 1995b, 1992). Concerns were heightened in 1995 when Cuba and Russia engaged in discussions to resume construction at Juaragua (Cereijo, 2000). Although discussions failed to produce an agreement, concerns regarding Cuba's nuclear facilities did not subside (Cereijo, 2000). In addition to safety issues, the government claimed that the real purpose of Cuba's nuclear program was for the development of a secret nuclear weapons program, a claim that was refuted by analysts and scientists working in the nuclear field (Alvarado and Belkin, 1994: 19). Despite any conclusive evidence that Cuba's operation of a nuclear reactor posed a threat to the US, ardent critics of the Cuban government, Senator Jesse Helms and Representative Dan Burton, continued their campaign to label Cuba a threat to US national security. The passage of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act was viewed as a victory by supporters of a hard-line approach with Cuba

---

<sup>37</sup> In 1983, Cuba and the former Soviet Union began the construction of two nuclear reactors at Juaragua situated on the south central coast of Cuba, approximately 180 miles south of Key West, Florida (Cereijo, 2000; US GAO, 1997:2; Sullivan, 1996; Alvarado and Belkin, 1994:1). Construction of the nuclear plant was halted by the Cuban government on September 5, 1992 following the termination of financial assistance from the Soviet Union (Cereijo, 2000; US GAO, 1997:2; Sullivan,

because the 1996 Act prohibited any sources of US assistance, including assistance from third parties to Cuba, that would help fund the construction of nuclear reactors at Juaragua (Alvarado, 1998:6; US Congress, 1996).

### *Cuba—A Nuclear Threat?*

Decisions to strengthen the embargo based on the Cuban “nuclear threat” were unfounded, according to critics (Landau and Smith, 2001; Alvarado, 1998), for a number of reasons. First, Landau and Smith (2001) and Alvarado (1998) argued that there was no immediate threat to US security because Cuba’s nuclear reactors were never fully operational. Dr. Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, former analyst with the Center for Latin American Studies at Georgetown University, noted that the growing unease in the West over the safety of nuclear reactors along with series of reports on the issue helped to encourage “sensational speculation rather than serious evaluation” (Alvarado, 1998: 3).

Second, Cuba did not at any point in time possess nuclear fuel to operate the reactors (Landau and Smith, 2001; Alvarado, 1998). According to (Ret.) Admiral Eugene Carroll, “nuclear Chernobyl in Cuba [did] not exist despite claims of alarmists in the US” (Green, 1997), a fact that was supported by nuclear physicist Thomas Cochran who visited Cuba in 1995 (Rodgers, 1997). As for future threats, the escalating costs of refurbishing or creating new plants and Cuba’s struggle to strengthen the country’s economy prohibited any plans to resume construction of

---

1996; Alvarado and Belkin, 1994:1).

the plants (Benjamin-Alvarado, 1998).<sup>38</sup>

Finally, the US government's failure to acknowledge efforts by the Cuban government to address nuclear concerns through its membership in the IAEA and by becoming a signatory to a number of international treaties and agreements, failed to add any credibility to US claims that Cuba posed a nuclear threat (IAEA, 2004; US GAO, 1997:1; Alvarado and Belkin, 1994:23). With one less source of tension regarding security, analysts suggested that the termination of the nuclear threat that prevailed during the Cold War should have been viewed as an opportunity to move toward strengthening rather than weakening relations with Cuba (Landau and Smith, 2001; Center for National Policy, 2000; Green, 1997; Alvarado, 1998:6).

### *Biological Warfare*

Claims that Cuba posed a nuclear threat, which peaked in 1996, were quickly replaced with claims of a new security threat—biological warfare (BW). Concerns that Cuba possessed the capability to wage BW were voiced by Secretary of Defense William Cohen with the release of the 1998 report, *The Cuban Threat to US National Security* (Sullivan, 2006b: 36-37; US Information Agency). Cohen stated in a letter accompanying the report that he was “concerned about Cuba's

---

<sup>38</sup> The gradual deterioration of Cuban-Russian cooperation on nuclear matters could not be attributed to measures passed by the US in the 1996 LIBERTAD Act which precluded any assistance to Cuba from third parties (Alvarado, 1998: 6). The real impetus for the reduction of Cuban-Russian nuclear co-operation and Cuba's decision to halt the Juaragua project was economic—both Russia and Cuba—lacked the necessary hard currency to continue (Alvarado, 1998:6).

potential to develop and produce biological agents, given its biotechnology infrastructure” (Sullivan, 2006b: 36-37; US Information Agency).<sup>39</sup>

In 2002, allegations that Cuba possessed BW capabilities were brought to the forefront of policy discussions by John Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security (Sullivan, 2006b: 37). In a speech before members of the Heritage Foundation on May 6, 2002, Bolton argued that Cuba's threat to national security had been underestimated by the US government, referring to the findings of the 1998 report (Sullivan, 2006b: 37; Bolton, 2002).<sup>40</sup> Bolton's controversial remarks garnered considerable attention and debate, which led to congressional hearings to assess Cuba's biological capabilities. Committee requests to hear from Bolton were denied by Secretary Powell (US Senate, 2002: 2). Instead, Carl Ford, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, testified on behalf of the Department of State (US Senate, 2002: 3). In his testimony, Ford attempted to temper Bolton's remarks by differentiating between the terms “effort” and “program” with respect to Cuba's biological capabilities (Sullivan, 2006b: 38). Cuba, according to Ford, had a biological “effort” and not a biological weapons “program”. Two years later on March 30, 2004, Bolton reignited the “biological threat” in his testimony before the House Committee on International

---

<sup>39</sup> Cohen's comments were viewed as an apparent attempt to hasten any criticisms of the 1998 report released by the US Defense Intelligence Agency which found that Cuba posed a negligible threat to national security (US Defense Intelligence Agency, 1998).

<sup>40</sup> Bolton's allegations were echoed by Carl Ford, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research a few months earlier in March 19, 2002 before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. However it was Bolton's comments that garnered the greatest share of controversy and attention

Relations examining the Bush Administrations's strategy on non-proliferation (US House of Representatives, 2004). Throughout his testimony, Bolton repeatedly emphasized the government's concern regarding Cuba's efforts to develop biological weapons and reiterated, albeit using much more carefully crafted words, that Cuba remained a security threat because of its BW capabilities (US House of Representatives, 2004). Bolton's confirmation hearings in 2005 for the post of US Ambassador to the United Nations (UN) once again brought the issue to the forefront of policy discussions (Sullivan, 2005a: 33-34).

#### *Cuba—A Biological Threat?*

Claims that Cuba posed a biological threat were undermined by what often seemed to be contradictory comments by key senior government officials. Following Bolton's controversial remarks in 2002, Powell was quick to reiterate that, although the Administration believed that Cuba had the capacity and capability to conduct the necessary research to develop biological weapons, it did not have any evidence to substantiate claims that Cuba in fact had such weapons (Sullivan, 2006b: 37). Former President Carter also echoed his skepticism concerning Cuba's biological threat following his visit to Cuba in 2002 (Gonzalez, 2002). In late June 2003, it was reported that Christian Westermann, a senior intelligence analyst with the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, had testified before a closed-door congressional hearing that he was pressured to modify his findings to reflect

---

(Sullivan, 2006b: 37; Unites States Senate, 2002b: 1-2).

the Administration's views on the biological threat posed by Cuba and that Bolton's assertions that Cuba had a biological weapons program were not based on sufficient intelligence (Sullivan, 2006b: 38; Risen and Jehl, 2003). In 2005, the State Department revised its findings concerning Cuba's biological capabilities, concluding that Cuba had the technical capacity to pursue BW and expressing uncertainty as to whether Cuba had then or ever had an active BW effort in the past (Sullivan, 2006b: 39; US Bureau of Verification and Compliance, 2005). Doubts concerning Cuba's BW capabilities were bolstered with the release of the State Department's 2005 edition of *Country Reports on Terrorism*, which reiterated that there was no conclusive evidence concerning the existence and extent of a Cuban biological weapons program (Sullivan, 2006b: 39; US Bureau of Verification and Compliance, 2005).

### **2.2.2 Democracy and Human Rights**

With the end of the Cold War, the promotion of democracy and respect for human rights emerged as pillars of US foreign policy (US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2004) and a roadblock to constructive US-Cuba relations. The Cuban government's reluctance to carry out substantive political and economic reforms that would lead to democracy or a market economy and its disregard for human rights, was used by the US government to justify strengthening provisions of the embargo. Refusal to allow free and fair elections had contributed, according to the US government, to the

deterioration of the welfare and health of the Cuban people (US Congress, 1996:2, 1992). The US government has also repeatedly drawn attention to Cuba's poor record on human rights, emphasizing the government's restriction of basic rights (Sullivan, 2003b: 2; US Congress, 1996:2, 1992). In its annual review of human rights practices in Cuba, the State Department has identified a number of human rights violations by the Cuban government since 1990 (US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008). US claims of human rights violations in Cuba have been corroborated by human rights organizations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch (HRW), and Global Exchange. The embargo provided the means, in this case, the use of sanctions to address the Cuban government's indifference to democratic reform and continued violation of human rights.

Sanctions in various forms and intensity have been used as the principal means of encouraging Cuba's transformation into a democracy and the protection of human rights. The underlying assumption of the US strategy is to isolate the island, both politically and economically, in order to pressure the Cuban government to carry out the political and economic reforms it deemed necessary. The ends in this case—democracy and the protection of human rights—have not been the primary focus of debate within the literature. Instead, the debate has centred on the

means by which foreign policy objectives could be achieved.<sup>41</sup> Opponents of US strategy argue that the punitive economic and political measures advanced by restrictive measures are counterproductive to the development of democratic principles and the protection of human rights (Human Rights Watch, 2004; Amnesty International, 2003; UN Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2002; Global Exchange, 2001; Groombridge, 2001:6-7; Hoffman, 1999; UN, 1997; UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1997).<sup>42</sup> The use of punitive measures has resulted, according to critics, in the strengthening of the regime and continued violation of human rights (Amnesty International, 2003: 10-13). In its review of US policy and its impact on political and civil rights in Cuba, Amnesty International (2003:10) found that US policy has strengthened rather than weakened the state's capacity to deny citizens basic fundamental rights. The effects of US policy can be seen in a number of areas, the most visible being Cuba's legal system, which has been used to defend all forms of repression on the island since 1996 (Amnesty International, 2003:10). The UN echoed its concerns over the 1992 and 1996 legislation in its 1997 review of US policy, concluding that US legislation had impeded the capacity and efforts of dissidents to induce political and economic reform on the island as well as the advancement of economic, social and cultural

---

<sup>41</sup> This is part of a larger debate within the sanctions literature concerning the effectiveness of sanctions as a foreign policy tool. For a comprehensive discussion of the debate on sanctions and their utility as a foreign policy tool see Baldwin, (2000, 1995), Center for Strategic and International Studies (1999), Haass (1998), Littlefield (1998), Roth (1998), Dashti-Gibson, Davis and Radcliff (1997), Hufbauer and Winston, (1997), Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott (1990) and Pape (1997).

<sup>42</sup> For a review of sanctions and their effectiveness in promoting democracy and/or human rights see

rights of Cuban citizens (Amnesty International, 2003:10; UN, 1997). A comprehensive review of US policy in 2002 by a group of UN agencies concluded that the “negative effects of the [policy were] felt disproportionately, not by the decision makers and authorities whose policies [it was] aimed at influencing, but by the weakest and most vulnerable members of the population” (Amnesty International, 2003:8; UN, 2002).<sup>43</sup>

### *An Alternative to Isolation—Engagement*

Critics of policy argue that the US government should adopt an alternative policy to promoting democracy and protecting human rights in Cuba, this being a policy of engagement that utilizes economic, political or cultural incentives to influence the targeted country’s behaviour (Center for National Policy, 2003; Haass and O’Sullivan, 2000:2; Arendt, 1998; LeoGrande, 1997:220; US House of Representatives, 1995: 57-58). Supporters of engagement argue that this particular approach could provide both countries with opportunities to resolve issues that are of mutual concern as well as to strengthen bilateral relations between the two countries, which could help resolve any future issues (Center for National Policy, 2003:11). A policy of engagement would also allow for increased contact between US and Cuban citizens, which could bring a flow of valuable information, ideas and influence to Cuba and in turn weaken the government’s control and manipulation of

---

Gibbons (1999), Salter (1997), and Center for Economic and Social Rights (1996).

<sup>43</sup> Participants included the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, UNICEF, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the UN Population Fund, and the World Health Organization.

information which it has used successfully to maintain totalitarian control of the country (Sullivan, 2003a: 7-8; Peters, 2002a; Human Rights Watch, 1999). Supporters of economic engagement—USA\*Engage, American Farm Bureau Federation, Americans for Humanitarian Trade with Cuba—argue that the best means of promoting democratic development is trade. The underlying assumption here is that economic liberalization breeds political liberalization (Dorn, 1996).

HRW and Global Exchange, supporters of people-to-people contact, argue that a nation open to trade is not necessarily one open to advancing democracy and human rights (Global Exchange, 2001; Human Rights Watch, 2001). Advocates of people-to-people contact identify numerous examples of totalitarian and authoritarian regimes that have reaped the economic benefits of increased trade, yet resisted any form of political and legal reforms, China being a prime example (Anderson, Cavanagh and Athreya, 2000; Abrams, 1998). China's economic growth, which has been fueled by increased trade, has led to new human rights abuses that are exploited by companies for profit (Abrams, 1998; Kamm, 1995). Advocates of people-to-people contact also suggest that decisions to tighten embargo measures prohibit the US government from pursuing any policy other than a policy of hostility towards Cuba (Center for National Policy, 2003; Human Rights Watch, 1999; LeoGrande, 1997:220). Supporters of engagement argue that, until the embargo is repealed, lifting the ban on travel is an important first step towards the goals of democracy and human rights (Center for National Policy, 2003: 13-14; Peters, 2003; Sullivan, 2003a; Absten, 2002:8-9; Delahunt, 2002:13; Peters, 2002a;

Vasquez, 2002: 16-17; Human Rights Watch, 1999; LeoGrande, 1997:220). Ardent proponents of engagement and supporters of lifting the travel ban, such as Mavis Anderson, Senior Associate with the Latin American Working Group, question the intent of US policy by pointing out that US citizens have the right to travel to countries with authoritarian or communist governments such as China, Vietnam, Burma and Iran, and could even visit the former Soviet Union prior to the end of the Cold-War, yet they are denied the right to travel to Cuba (Sullivan, 2003a: 8; Absten, 2002:8-9).

*The Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights—Fact or Fiction?*

Although existing literature has focused primarily on the means for advancing democracy and human rights in Cuba, inconsistencies in US foreign policy have elicited a great deal of skepticism regarding whether the true intent of US-Cuba policy is to promote democracy and protect human rights (Center for National Policy, 2003; Fisk, 2001; Warner, 1997; Detroit, 1996; Lisio, 1996; Elliston, 1995). When compared to US decisions to engage with other repressive communist countries such as China, Vietnam or North Korea, US-Cuba policy inevitably elicits the question, why not engage with Cuba (Hogan, 2002; Mowry, 1999; Warner, 1997; Carroll, 1996; Detroit, 1996)? Clinton's decision to normalize relations with Vietnam and China brought up the question as to why similar steps could not be taken with Cuba (Center for National Policy, 2003; Hogan, 2002; Mowry, 1999; Carroll, 1996; Elliston, 1995:39). In the case of China, advancing democracy and

protecting human rights were linked to a policy of constructive engagement through trade, whereas with Vietnam, the full embargo against the country was lifted.<sup>44</sup> Critics of US policy also express concern regarding the criteria for a democratic transition set out by the US government (Ratliff and Fontaine, 2000; Smith, 2000a; Hoffman, 1999: 11-12). Ratliff and Fontaine (2000:24) argue that the magnitude of democratic change the US government is demanding will never happen under the current Cuban government, and even if it did occur, the US government would not accept it.<sup>45</sup> The promotion of democracy and human rights is a legitimate objective according to Ratliff and Fontaine (2000:10); however, there is an “unbridgeable gap” between the high goals the US proclaims and its ability to bring them about in Cuba. Many believe that it is the Cuban people themselves who will ultimately determine the fate of their country (Schoultz, 2002; Center for National Policy, 2000:20).

### **2.3 Conclusions**

A review of the literature shows that a number of possible factors can be used to account for decisions to modify US-Cuba policy and the selection of alternatives from 1989 through 2006—the influence of special interests, divisions

---

<sup>44</sup> For comparisons of policies with China see Arendt (1998) and with Vietnam see Hogan (2002: 22-24) and Mowry (1999).

<sup>45</sup> Analysts who have studied Cuba’s economic reforms suggest that although the reforms have not ended socialism, they have fundamentally altered Cuba’s economic environment by emphasizing the importance of productivity and providing the foundation for an economy governed by capitalist principles (Peters, 2002c: 18-20; Spirtas, 2000:1; Fedarko, 1995; Pérez-López, 1995). Cuba’s political system; however, has undergone very few fundamental changes with the exception of a series of institutional reforms implemented during the early 1990s that were designed to promote a generational change within the political leadership and restructure the state apparatus by decentralizing power (Sullivan, 2003b: 2; Corrie, 1999:21; Ramirez de Estenoz, 1998:164).

within the executive branch of government, and new foreign policy priorities in the post-Cold War era that emphasized security and the promotion and protection of human rights. Although each approach provides a very different window through which decision making and the resulting policies can be understood, each approach alludes to, but does not fully explore, the role of individuals in that process. What is lacking in the literature is a much more comprehensive and systematic analysis of the role played by individuals in moving issues onto the government's decision agenda and influencing the selection of alternatives. Individuals have the capacity and opportunity to influence policy during the policy making process; however, not all individuals have the same power. Why are some policy advocates successful at influencing the government's agenda and policy whereas others fail? Are there any discernable patterns of behaviour, traits, or strategies that set apart successful individuals from all other competitors in the policy process? This study attempts to answer these questions by utilizing and building upon the central role played by PEs in the decision making process as described by the MSF, thus help fill the void in the existing literature. In his study of policy entrepreneurship, Mintrom (1994:2) found that studies that examine the role of individuals in policy development are effective in revealing that policy advocates constitute a clearly identifiable class of actors whose central role in the decision making process can help us understand why certain policy ideas, and hence policies, are adopted and others discarded. The next chapter reviews various theoretical models of decision making to help develop the theoretical component of the study.

## **Chapter 3 Decision Making Models, Theories and Frameworks**

### **3.0 Introduction**

The process of policy making involves making decisions and choices. Howlett and Ramesh (2003: 165-166) note that, regardless of outcomes, a decision involves the intention to embark on a course of action or in some cases inaction: “whether a policy decision is negative or positive, it involves the development and expression of a statement of intent on the part of authoritative decision-makers to undertake some course of action or inaction”. The processes through which decisions and ultimately policy emanate have been and continue to be of interest to scholars in many fields of study (Howlett and Ramesh, 2003: 166). This chapter first identifies and reviews major models, theories and frameworks that have been developed over the years in the fields of foreign policy and the policy sciences to explain how policy choices and decisions are made. Having identified key approaches from both policy fields, the chapter then outlines key features of each approach and offers a critique, identifying strengths and weaknesses of each approach. The objective of this chapter is to bring attention to the different attributes of each approach and thus build and justify the *theoretical foundation for the study that incorporates the core elements under investigation*. Having selected the MSF, the chapter then justifies the selection as an appropriate focus for the study.

### **3.1 Foreign Policy: Decision Making Models and Theories**

In what is now considered to be classic work in the field of foreign policy, Snyder, Bruck and Sapin (1954) and Snyder (1958) first introduced the “decision making approach” to studying foreign policy (Gustavsson, 1998, 16; Hagan, 2001: 5). Snyder et. al (1954) showed that the competing literature on decision making could be used effectively to explain how foreign policy decisions were made (Preface, 2001: 1). In contrast to the then prevailing opinion that viewed states as unitary actors responding to external stimuli, Snyder et al. (1954) argued that foreign policy was the product of the decision-makers’ subjective “definition of the situation” (Snyder et. al., 1954; Snyder, 1958; Gustavsson, 1998: 16). In doing so, they introduced concepts such as “organizational context” and “definition of the situation” that were adopted and modified by subsequent models of decision making (Snyder et. al., 1954; Hagan, 2001: 5). Building on the work of Snyder et al. (1954) and Snyder (1958), Rosenau (1966) outlined a “pre-theory” of foreign policy which by the late 1960s and early 1970s became a major research program and stimulus for additional research on foreign policy decision making (Gustavsson, 1998:17). Their efforts provided the foundation for research on foreign policy decision making and the development of models and theories that seek to explain foreign policy decision making.

This study identifies six core approaches to conceptualizing and explaining US foreign policy decisions—the rational model (RM), interest group theory, the Bureaucratics Politics (BP) model, theories of congressional behaviour, the

interbranch politics (IP) model, and cognitive theories. The focus of this section of the analysis is on theories of congressional behaviour, the IP model, and cognitive theories. The RM is examined separately from the literature on foreign policy and policy sciences, not because it is unique to one particular field of study, but for the central reason that it is common to both fields.<sup>46</sup>

### **3.1.1 Theories of Congressional Behaviour**

Theories that seek to explain congressional behaviour as it affects foreign policy can be grouped according to three schools of thought—constituency, committees, and cue taking (Pastor, 1980:36). Although there is some variation among approaches in their interpretation of what guides congressional behaviour, Dahl (1964) and Carroll (1966) found that they share a common correct view of Congress and congressional behaviour depicting Congress as an institution having a short-term, immediate and concrete vision, being individualistic, and whose participation in the formulation of foreign policy is, according to Carroll (1966: 14) “episodic and fitful” (Pastor, 1980: 42). Consequently, the greater the involvement of Congress in formulating policy, the more distributive, narrow and short-term the resulting policy (Pastor, 1980:61). In his assessment of congressional theories, Pastor (1980: 344-345) suggests that they are effective in providing a road map to the foreign policy making arena, identifying the relevant players in the process, and providing explanations of the “rules of the game”; however, the central focus on a

---

<sup>46</sup>To avoid duplication, interest group theory and the BP model are not examined in this section

single institution—Congress—is limiting because it ignores other institutions central to the process and the impact of their interaction with Congress (Baldwin, 1966; Pastor, 1980: 50-51; Qingshan, 1992: 20). Whiteman (1985: 295) suggests that congressional theories are incomplete because they fail to integrate critical activities such as the identification and definition of problems and the search for alternatives which precede voting choices.

### **3.1.2 Interbranch Politics Model**

Dahl's (1950) study of Congress's role in foreign policy, in which he concluded that "the President proposes and the Congress disposes," served as a foundation for subsequent research that examined the interactive process between Congress and the Executive as a device for understanding policy (Baldwin, 1966; Robinson, 1967; Lehman, 1976; Bax, 1977; Pastor, 1980; Maass, 1983) and the IP model (Pastor, 1980: 53). The IP model, like the BP model, examines institutional policy making to explain policy outcomes; however, unlike the BP model which views foreign policy as the political result of competing agencies within the executive branch, the IP model views policy as the product of competition between the Executive and the Congress (Pastor, 1980: 53). The IP model suggests that to better understand policy outcomes and to improve upon them, it is essential to focus on the relationship between the Executive and Congress (Pastor, 1980: 349). The IP model views interaction between the two branches as conflictual because of

---

because they were discussed in chapter two.

institutional biases and opposing priorities (Pastor, 1980: 53). This tension is often reflected in battles involving the appropriate means by which to achieve policy objectives (Pastor, 1980: 349).

The greatest strength of the IP model is that it broadens the foreign policy arena by looking beyond single institutions to include the Executive and Congress (Qingshan, 1992: 20, 23). The IP model also emphasizes the importance of the interactive component of the policy process, which is often ignored by some theoretical approaches (Pastor, 1980: 346; Qingshan, 1992: 154-155). Pastor (1980: 345) and Qingshan (1992: 155) suggest that the IP model is effective in identifying factors that play a critical role in transforming institutional preferences and interests into policy; however, Pastor (1980: 54) also notes that the IP model does have one very important limitation—it foregoes detail for simplicity. To assume that government is organized in a neat and coherent pyramid with the president making decisions from the top which the various levels implement them is problematic according to Pastor (1980: 54), as the literature on BP demonstrates.

### **3.1.3 Cognitive Theories**

Unlike theories that focus on societal or bureaucratic constraints on decision making in foreign policy, cognitive theories focus on the decision making capacity of individuals (Ikenberry, 2002:465). Tetlock and McGuire note that the central objective of cognitive research is to understand the behaviour of decision makers in the context of demands and pressures placed by their environments. Cognitive

theories posit that political behaviour originates with individuals; hence, characteristics of individual decision makers are critical to understanding decisions (Hudson, 2002: 428). Growth in cognitive research has led to an extensive body of theoretical and empirical literature focusing on the roles cognitive variables play in the foreign policy making process (Holsti, 1976; Tetlock and McGuire, 1985, 2002: 488; Leggold and Lamborn, 2001: 4-8). This includes the influence of perception and misperception in foreign policy decision making (Jervis: 1968, 2002: 466), group think (Janis: 1982, 2002), the use of historical analogies (Khong: 1987, 1992, 2002) and the impact of personality on foreign policy decision making (Browning and Jacob, 1971; Hermann, 1972, 1984; Korany, 1986; DiRenzo, 1977; Greenstein, 1987; Snare, 1992; Winter, 1992; George and George, 1998; Preston, 2000).

In their review of cognitive perspectives on foreign policy, Tetlock and McGuire (1985, 2002) recognize that cognitive theories have made a major contribution to understanding decision making by looking beyond traditional societal and bureaucratic explanations. In their view, the cognitive research program continues to be "heuristically provocative in the sense of suggesting new avenues of empirical and theoretical exploration" (Tetlock and McGuire, 1985, 2002: 499). They hold that further research in the field is necessary in order to strengthen the theoretical underpinnings of the approach as well as generate consensus on the degree to which and the manner in which cognitive variables impact policy. Other theorists (Nisbett and Wilson, 1977; Ebbesen and Konecni, 1980; Herrmann, 1988; Kaufman, 1994) suggest that in order to advance the cognitive paradigm, future

research should focus on addressing inherent methodological problems of cognitive models.

### **3.2 Rational Model**

Firmly rooted in economic reasoning, the RM suggests that policy makers, like their utility maximizing economic counterparts, prefer policies that are “utility maximizing” or as Howlett and Ramesh (2003: 167) put it, policies that “maximize the expected outcomes of the choices they could make”.<sup>47</sup> The RM is “rational” in that it portrays decision making as a logical and sequential process that will lead to the “best” possible choice in attaining the intended goals (Carley, 1980; Denhardt, 1993:97; Stone, Maxwell, and Keating, 2001: 5; Howlett and Ramesh, 2003: 167). According to the RM, decision makers are: completely informed regarding decisions to be made; confront problems that are clear and unambiguous; are able to identify all relevant and available alternatives, and are aware of their consequences; will select the alternative that yields the maximum utility (i.e. the optimal choice); and, exhibit preferences that are constant and transitive (Lahti, 1996; Forester, 1984: 23).

Lahti (1996) suggests that the attractiveness of the RM is attributed to its logical, sequential approach to decision making. Critics are quick to point out; however, that the RM, although effective in providing a description of how decisions

---

<sup>47</sup> Rational theorists include Arrow (1951, 1992), Downs (1957, 1967), Olsen (1965, 1982) and Niskanen (1971).

*ought* to be made does not provide a realistic portrayal of *what is*, in other words, of how decisions are *actually* made (Simon, 1947; Etzioni, 1967, 1989; Forester, 1984: 24; Anderson, 1990; Zey, 1992; Denhardt, 1993; Ham and Hill, 1993; Porter, 1995; Kegley and Wittkopf, 2001; Stone, 2002; Birkland, 2001; Maxwell and Keating, 2001).<sup>48</sup> Critics have suggested that the model imposes unrealistic demands on the decision maker which undermines the notion of rationality (Etzioni, 1967, 1989; Anderson, 1990:112; Birkland, 2001: 210-211). Limited time, imperfect information, difficulty in predicting the future, and measurement problems are just a few factors that constrain a decision maker's ability to act rationally (Anderson, 1990:112; Kegley and Wittkopf, 2001: 53; Stone, Maxwell and Keating, 2001: 5). In his critique of the rationalistic approach, Etzioni (1967: 385-386) challenged a number of key assumptions of the RM, most notably a decision maker's ability to make "rational" decisions. Etzioni (1967: 385-386) noted that separating values and facts, and means and ends was not possible as the model suggested because decision makers do not have at their disposal clearly identifiable set of values that can be used as guidelines to evaluate alternatives. Moreover, according to Etzioni (1967:

---

<sup>48</sup> Simon (1947), perhaps the most noted critic of the RM (Howlett and Ramesh, 2003: 168), developed an alternative model premised on "bounded rationality" and "satisficing". The model suggests that individual rationality is "bound" by imperfect information and inadequate time, skills and resources (Simon, 1947; March and Simon, 1958; Perrow, 1972; Forester, 1984: 24). Recognizing the limitations of their situation, decision makers choose options that "satisfy" organizational goals and are acceptable in the face of competing demands (Simon, 1947; Stone, Maxwell and Keating, 2001: 5). Simon's criticisms helped to stimulate efforts (Bellman and Zadeh, 1970; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981, 1982, 1986; Whalen, 1987; Mendoza and Sprouse, 1989; Haas, 2001) at developing "second best" versions of the RM that took into consideration the limitations of human behaviour under conditions of uncertainty (Howlett and Ramesh, 2003: 170-171) as well as a model of decision making—the incremental model—that took to heart Simon's ideas of bounded rationality and satisficing (Birkland, 2001: 212; Howlett and Ramesh, 2003: 170).

385-386), faced with time constraints and inadequate resources, decision makers are unable to collect the necessary information for rational choice; hence, decisions are often made out of frustration rather than a “rational” decision process. Anderson (1990: 33) later suggested that the model’s rigid and narrow assumptions were not only unrealistic, but also fail to take into full account the politics of decision making. If decisions are in fact made in the manner by which the RM suggests, individuals would according to Anderson(1990: 33) be devoid of altruism, concern for the public interest, and the desire to formulate good policies.

### **3.3 Policy Sciences: Decision Making Models and Frameworks**

Lasswell (1951, 1956, 1971), credited as being the “progenitor” of the policy sciences in the early 1950s (Denhardt, 1993: 140; McCool, 1995c:1; Birkland, 2001:14; deLeon and Kaufmanis, 2000/2001:9), provided the foundation for the development of the policy sciences as a distinct field of study. From a theoretical perspective, the policy sciences have helped bridge the divide between political and administrative sciences and uncover the complexities of the public decision making process (Boix, 1990; Subirats, 1990: 15). As an instrumental tool, the policy sciences have equipped decision makers with the analytical instruments and research techniques necessary for effective decision making (Boix, 1990: 167; Subirats, 1990: 15).

Opinions concerning the state and direction of policy scholarship in the policy sciences are mixed. Those critical of the discipline argue that efforts to develop

systematic generalized theory have been limited (McCool, 1995c: 7; Greenberg, Miller, Mohr and Vladeck, 1977; Hill, 1997:1). Hill (1997) has suggested that the limited theoretical progress can be attributed to: a lack of interest; the complexity of the policy process; the “faddishness” of the discipline; and theoretical timidity. In contrast, others (Dunn, 1988; Schlager and Blomquist, 1996; Schlager, 1997, 1999; Sabatier, 1997, 1999a) argued that, although there is considerable room for improvement, there have been a number of accomplishments that can guide future research. For Schlager (1997:15), the policy sciences should be viewed as dynamic in the sense that the mix of theories, methods and cases is constantly changing and in the process contributing to theory and method building.

The eight core approaches to conceptualizing and explaining policy decision making in the field of policy sciences are: the stages model (SM), the incremental model (IM), the mixed scanning model (MSM), the garbage can model (GCM), the multiple rounds model (MRM), the punctuated equilibrium model (PEM), the advocacy coalition framework (ACF), and the MSF.

### **3.3.1 Stages Model**

What is central to the SM, both in its original version (Lasswell, 1951, 1956, 1971) as a model of decision making and its subsequent transformation (Jones, 1970; Brewer and deLeon, 1983; Kronenberg, 1995; Anderson, 2000) into a model of the policy process, is the idea that choices or policy outcomes are the result of activities that are carried out according to a series of analytically distinct stages

(McCool, 1995b: 109). The model's central idea of a "delineated, sequential framework" (deLeon, 1999: 21) has been argued to be one of the most well recognized contributions to the field of policy sciences (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1993c; Meier, 1993; Jann and Wegrich, 2005). The model helped to simplify the complexity of the policy process by disaggregating the process into distinct components (Ripley, 1995: 157) and to stimulate valuable research on each of the various stages of the process (Suchman, 1967; Ikle, 1971; Rivlin, 1971; Titmuss, 1971; Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973; Cobb, Ross, and Ross, 1976; Kaufman, 1976; Bardach, 1977; Hjern and Hull, 1982; Masmanian and Sabatier, 1983; Quade, 1983; Nelson, 1984; Kingdon, 1995; Nelson, 1984; Weimer and Vining, 1989; Howlett and Ramesh, 2003).

Despite its contribution to the study of the policy process, the SM has also been the subject of considerable criticism (Nakamura, 1987; Sabatier, 1991b; 1999b; Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1993c; Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1994), most notably concerning its underlying assumption of rationality (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1994: 177; Porter, 1995: 10; Sutton, 1999; Neilson, 2001). The SM, in both its original formulation and subsequent revisions, parallels the cognitive steps of the rational approach which many critics argue portrays an unrealistic view of the process (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1994: 177; Porter, 1995: 10; Sutton, 1999; Neilson, 2001). The model's portrayal of the policy process as a series of discrete and sequential stages and the assumption that decision makers follow each of the stages of the process in a sequential and logical order is, according to critics

(Sutton, 1999: 9; Nakamura, 1987; Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1993c: 3; Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1994: 177; and Sabatier, 1999b: 7) far removed from the reality of how decisions are actually made. Neilson (2001) argues that decision makers are motivated not by the need to make the “best possible decision” as suggested by the model, but rather by the need to “satisfy the demands of the public”. These as well as other criticisms have led analysts to suggest that the model has outlived its usefulness (Sabatier, 1999b: 7; Jann and Wegrich, 2005: 30).<sup>49</sup>

### 3.3.2 The Incremental Model

Drawing on his observations of policy making in governments, Lindblom (1955, 1958, 1959) proposed an alternative model of the policy process—the IM which asserts that decision makers arrive at their decisions through “successive limited comparisons” or more specifically, “limit[ed] policy comparisons to those policies that differ in relatively small degree from policies presently in effect”

---

<sup>49</sup> Sabatier (1991b: 145), Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1993c:3), Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1994: 177), Ripley (1995: 157) and Sabatier (1999b) also argue that the SM is not really a causal model which prevents any serious policy scholarship. Without any clear causal drivers, it is impossible to develop and test workable hypotheses within and across the various stages (Sabatier, 1991b: 145; Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1993c: 3; Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1994: 177; Ripley, 1995: 157; Sabatier, 1999b: 7). Sabatier (1986) and Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1994: 177) suggest that the model's attention to a specific cycle of problem identification, policy decision and implementation for a specific policy initiative and legislator makes the model too narrow in its scope. Moreover, focusing on the policy cycle as the temporal unit of analysis ignores the fact that policy evolution is an interactive process involving multiple actors from different levels of government where problems and solutions are constantly being revised and tested against a constantly changing background of external events and associated policy issue areas (Hecl, 1974; Jones, 1975; Nelson, 1984; Sabatier and Pelkey, 1990; Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1994: 177-178). In his review of the SM, Porter (1995) highlights the model's inability to account for collective decision making as new actors appear join the process. Critics (Sabatier, 1991, 1999b; Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1993c: 4; DeLeon, 1999:23-24) also suggest that the stages metaphor is ineffective in integrating policy analysis and policy-oriented learning throughout the public policy process.

(Lindblom, 1959: 84). In his now classic critique, Lindblom suggests that decision makers engage in decision making by following a “mutually supporting set of simplifying and focusing stratagems” (Lindblom, 1959: 517) that included: restricting analyses to narrowly defined policy alternatives; linking policy goals with the practical aspects of the problem; focus on problem solving; analysis of alternatives; and focus on participants in policy making. In the end, decisions and ultimately policies are only marginally or in terms of the model “incrementally” different from the status quo (Lindblom 1959; Howlett and Ramesh, 2003: 171). Empirically, incrementalism advances three major propositions about the policy process: at the heart of policy making is bargaining and compromise between multiple actors with varying degrees of resources, and individual opinions and interests; in the process of policy making, individuals often look to past policies to formulate new policies, which is why “new” policies are often variations of past policies; and lastly, faced with a limited pool of alternatives from which to build upon as well as the need to compromise, final policy outcomes tend to be incremental (Lindblom 1959; Hayes, 2001:3).<sup>50</sup>

Lindblom (1959) argued that the IM was a drastic improvement over earlier RMs of decision making because unlike RMs, the IM provided a much more accurate and realistic depiction of how individuals subject to time constraints, limited resources and imperfect information carry out ‘comprehensive analysis’ of solutions

---

<sup>50</sup> Associated with incrementalism are Braybrooke and Lindblom (1963) and Aaron Wildavsky (1964,1992).

to problems (Anderson, 1990:114; Hayes, 2001). In his assessment of the IM, Hayes notes that its sense of realism is “rooted in realistic assumptions about mankind’s inherent nature and capacities” (Hayes, 2001:5). The model has the added feature of enabling decision makers to “test the water” before any major shift in policy is carried out, thus avoiding the possibility of any serious mistakes (Anderson, 1990; Denhardt, 1993: 96-97). Incrementalism has also been seen as “politically expedient” because arriving at acceptable solutions in matters that involve groups can be accomplished more easily through incremental change to existing policy rather than through major shifts in policy (Lindblom, 1959; Anderson, 1990:114; Denhardt, 1993: 96 ).

Critics (Etzioni, 1967, 1989; Adams, 1979; Lustick, 1980; Gawthrop, 1971; Brewer and deLeon, 1983; Forester, 1984; Nice, 1987; Dryzek and Ripley, 1988; Berry, 1990; Grindle and Thomas, 1991; Hayes, 1992; Weiss and Woodhouse, 1992; Jones, True and Baumgartner, 1997; Sutton, 1999, Kingdon, 1995; Stone, Maxwell and Keating, 2001) have identified a number of fundamental limitations of the IM. First, the ambiguity surrounding key concepts such as an “increment” (Cates, 1979: 528; Dryzek and Ripley, 1988) and processes led to criticisms concerning the model’s ability to provide an adequate theory of causation (Anderson, 1990: 114; Dryzek and Ripley, 1988: 708; McCool, 1995b: 167). Second, critics have suggested that the model is limited in terms of its analytical usefulness because it fails to take into account the dynamic nature of the policy process, which can be subject to instability (Dror, 1964; Etzioni, 1967; Adams, 1979;

Cates, 1979; Howlett and Ramesh, 2003: 172) or bursts of innovation (Etzioni, 1967; Anderson, 1990; Grindle and Thomas, 1991; Dror, 1964; Neilson, 2001; Stone, Maxwell and Keating, 2001), leading to fundamental rather than incremental changes in policy. A third, but closely related, criticism of the model has suggested that it ignores external factors that can influence policy makers' decision making capacity and ultimately policy (Grindle and Thomas, 1991: 29; Neilson, 2001). This problem, according to critics (Brewer and deLeon, 1983: 24; Kingdon, 1995: 80; Neilson, 2001), is compounded by the model's lack of attention to a critical element of the policy process—agenda setting—where ideas take hold and become policy alternatives. Howlett and Ramesh (2003: 172) note that these, as well as other limitations, suggest that incrementalism is "neither the ideal method of decision-making, as suggested by some adherents, nor, as Lindblom himself had alleged...the *only* possible method. Rather, it [is] only one of several possible types or styles of decision-making".

### **3.3.3 Mixed Scanning Model**

In an attempt to overcome the unrealistic assumptions of the RM and the limitations of the incrementalist model, Etzioni (1967, 1968) developed the MSM of decision making, which combined the more constructive elements from both models (Etzioni, 1967, 1986; Howlett and Ramesh, 2003: 173). The MSM is categorized as an "hierarchical model of decision making that combines higher order, fundamental decision making with lower order, incremental decisions that work out and/or

prepare for the higher order ones” (Goldberg, 1975: 934; Etzioni, 1986: 8). Etzioni uses the term scanning to refer to “search, collection, processing, and evaluation of information as well as to the drawing of conclusions, all elements in the service of decision making” (Etzioni, 1986:8). Optimal decisions result from an initial search or “scanning” for alternatives followed by an in depth examination of the most promising alternatives (Etzioni, 1967, 1986; Howlett and Ramesh, 2003: 174). The model suggests that the decision making process consists of two stages—a pre-decision stage and an analytical phase (Alexander, 1979, 1982; Svenson, 1979; Voss, 1998; Howlett and Ramesh, 2003: 174). At the pre-decision stage, problems are assessed and “framed”. It is during this stage that decision makers utilize incremental analysis when assessing the problem. At the analytical phase, decision makers assess specific solutions. Decision making at this stage is considered to be more rational in nature. This two stage approach is according to Etzioni (1967, 1986), a true reflection of how decisions are made in reality.<sup>51</sup>

One of the primary reasons Etzioni (1967, 1986) developed the MSM was to overcome the limitations posed by both the RM and the IM of decision making. According to Etzioni (1967: 390; 1986), the MSM, by combining the more constructive elements of both models, provides a much more realistic and effective

---

<sup>51</sup> Following its introduction in 1967, the model underwent evaluations as both a prescriptive and descriptive theory (Chadwick, 1971; Bradley, 1973; Dyson, 1975; Janis and Mann, 1977; Wright, 1977; Cates, 1979; Lee, 1979; Hackett, 1980; Hanna, 1980; Parkinson, 1980; Smith and May, 1980; Falcone, 1981; Wimberly and Morrow, 1981; Wallace, 1983; Starkie, 1984). In more recent work, a similar two-stage model of decision-making referred to as the poliheuristic model has emerged in the field of US foreign policy decision-making (Mintz and Geva, 1997b; Mintz, Geva, Redd, and Carnes, 1997; Howlett and Ramesh, 2003: 174).

approach to understanding the decision making process.<sup>52</sup> Critics (Hann, 1980; Smith and May, 1980; Howlett and Ramesh, 2003: 175) question, however, whether in fact the MSM avoids problems associated with its predecessors. Howlett and Ramesh (2003: 175) suggest “it is [unclear] how mixed scanning overcome[s] the problems associated with the RM, since without the systematic comparison of all possible alternatives it is impossible to assure that a final decision was a maximizing one”. Howlett and Ramesh (2003: 175) also add that it is questionable whether the model can be differentiated from the two models it purportedly replaces because they, too, share elements of the MSM.<sup>53</sup> Although the MSM has been well received by public policy practitioners, policy scholars have looked to alternative models such as the GCM, which captures the uncertainty and ambiguity decision makers confront in daily decision making (Howlett and Ramesh, 2003: 175).

#### **3.3.4 Garbage Can Model**

Developed by Cohen, March and Olsen (1972:1), the GCM posits that organizational decision making resembles an organized anarchy characterized by problematic, unclear technology, and fluid participation. The opportunity to make a decision is described as a GC into which a broad selection of problems are generated by individuals and solutions are deposited (Cohen et. al., 1972:2). The mixture of garbage in each of the cans depends on the assortment of cans that are

---

<sup>52</sup> See Etzioni (1967: 385-388) for a critique of the rational and incremental models.

<sup>53</sup> Most notably, Lindblom's (1959) techniques of marginal analysis (Howlett and Ramesh (2003: 175).

available, on the labels assigned to alternative GCs, on what garbage is being generated, and on the rate at which the garbage is collected and cleared (Cohen et. al., 1972:2). Cohen et. al. suggest that “problems, solutions, and participants move from one choice opportunity to another in such a way that the nature of the choice, the time it takes, and the problem it solves all depend on a relatively complicated intermeshing of elements” (Cohen et. al., 1972: 16). These elements, which they label “streams”, include the combination of choices that are available at any one time, the combination of problems, the combination of solutions that are in search of problems, and the external requirements placed on the decision makers. The key to understanding the decision making process is the intertwining or “coupling” of the various elements or “streams”, which is determined by temporal sorting.

As first presented by Cohen et. al. (1972), the GCM seemed to contradict the traditional view of how decisions were made in organizations (Masuch and LaPotin, 1989: 1; Howlett and Ramesh, 2003: 175). The model rejected conventional linear models of decision making and the rationality in the decision making process, including the limited rationality of the IM, and replaced it with an alternative form of decision making characterized by ambiguity and unpredictability (Peters, 2002; Howlett and Ramesh, 2003: 175). Howlett and Ramesh (2003: 175-176) note that Cohen et. al. skillfully used the GC metaphor to represent the ambiguity and lack of structure that decision makers are confronted with during the decision making process. The model is recognized by some theorists (Daft, 1982; Lahti, 1996) as a major theoretical contribution to the study of organizational decision making. The

GCM's innovative approach to understanding decision making provides a fresh, and a much more realistic, alternative to existing models such as the rational and IMs, which rely on rationality (or in the case of incrementalism, on "bounded rationality") to explain decision making (Daft, 1982; Lahti, 1996). Howlett and Ramesh (2003: 177) suggest that the GCM played a critical role in shifting attention away from the rationalist and incrementalist debate over the merits of their respective models, to discussions and research of decision making within alternative institutional contexts.

Challenging and controversial, the GCM and its underlying assumptions have been the subject of considerable criticism. One of the most heavily criticized elements of the model has been its underlying assumption of independent streams (Weiner, 1976; Mucciaroni, 1992; Heimer and Stinchcombe, 1998; Bendor et. al., 2001: 172). In their assessment of the GCM, Bendor et. al. (2001: 172) suggest that the notion of independent streams does not stand up to scrutiny because the degree of independence cannot be clearly delineated.

A second issue of contention has been the GCM's inadequate theory of individual choice. Bendor et. al. (2001: 171-172) acknowledge that, since the model was first introduced in 1972, subsequent revisions have attempted to overcome this limitation; however, they contend that little progress has been made in this direction. A third area of criticism has focused on the model's treatment of organizational structure (Argyris, 1976; Perrow, 1977; Padgett, 1980; Carley, 1986; Bendor et. al., 2001:172-173). Bendor et. al. suggest that the model's limited treatment of organizational structure "takes structure as exogenous, thus ignoring where

structure comes from or why it takes the forms it does. The [model's] focus is on the effects of structure, not on its origin, design or change" (Bendor et. al., 2001: 172). This is problematic according to Bendor et. al. (2001: 173) because it ignores a fundamental component of decision making—the "instrumental use of structure by leaders". They suggest that, despite efforts over the years to address the GCM's limitations, it has become "so complex and confusing" that "there is little reason for thinking that it can look ahead to a more fertile future. For fundamental reasons, the theory lacks the rigor, discipline, and analytic power needed for genuine progress" (Bendor et. al., 2001: 169). These as well as other criticisms of the GCM have led to suggestions that it should be thought of as more of a style of decision making rather than a general model of decision making (Howlett and Ramesh, 2003: 176; Mucciaroni, 1992: 466).

### **3.3.5 Multiple Rounds Model**

The MRM of decision making rests on the assumption that policies do not originate from a specific course of action, but rather from a series of decisions made by a number of different actors (Teisman, 1992: 33; Teisman, 2000: 943-944). In his work on public policy decision-making, Scharpf (2000: 943-944) notes that public policy is the product of the interaction between multiple actors, each having a unique understanding and perspective of the problem, and the appropriate solution. From this perspective, the MRM of decision making can be best understood as an interactive approach where decisions occur in multiple venues, each with a distinct

set of participants, procedural rules and ability to influence the outcome of a decision (Weiss, 1980; Klijn, 2001; Mintzberg, Raisinghani and Theoret, 1976; Teisman, 1992, 2000). Decisions made at the beginning of each round have a direct impact on subsequent rounds by defining the context in which they occur (Teisman, 2000: 938-939). Each subsequent round in turn can alter the direction of the process as new participants appear, and in some cases, as procedural rules are modified (Teisman, 2000: 939). Decision outcomes (i.e. policies) are therefore the direct result of the cumulative efforts of various participants in the decision making process.

The defining feature of the model is its interactive approach to decision making . According to Allison and Halperin (1972), Stokman and Baveling (1998), and Sager (2001), interaction allows for predictability regarding the types of decisions that are likely to emerge as a result of the interaction between actors within and between venues, and the various strategies employed by actors to influence outcomes (Howlett and Ramesh, 2003: 178). In their work on networks and decision making, de Bruijn and ten Heuvelhof (2000) suggest that the MRM of decision making allows for the design of decision-making processes that help to specify the roles of different participants and stages in the process, and ensures that outcomes are less “irrational” than might otherwise be the case (Howlett and Ramesh, 2003: 178). In their work on managing complex networks, Kickert et. al. (1997) suggested that the MRM offers an organizing framework that can be effectively used in the field of governance to advance the study of policy networks

(Teisman, 2000: 949). The MRM is often compared to the stages model, IM, and GCM of decision making; however, Howlett and Ramesh (2003: 177) suggest that the comparison of the MRM with the IM and GCM is misleading, because unlike its predecessors, it does not take into consideration the role of intra-organization bargaining in policy formulation. Instead, policies are shaped by the nature of the decision to be made and the structural attributes of the organizations responsible for the policy (Howlett and Ramesh, 2003: 177). In his comparison of the stages model, the GCM and the MRM, Teisman (2000: 945-949) argues that the approaches differ structurally with respect to the paths by which decisions unfold, the underlying assumptions about the nature of the decision making process, and the content of decision making.

### **3.3.6 Punctuated Equilibrium Model**

Originally developed by Baumgartner and Jones (1993),<sup>54</sup> the PEM posits that policymaking is characterized by long periods of stability, punctuated by brief periods of major policy change. Policy change is attributed to “the interaction of subsystem politics and behavioural decision making, a combination that creates patterns of stability and mobilization or punctuated equilibrium” (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; True, Jones and Baumgartner, 1999:98). The PEM emphasizes the

---

<sup>54</sup> See also Baumgartner and True (1998), and True et. al., (1999). The PE concept was first introduced in evolutionary biology (Eldridge and Gould, 1972; Gould and Eldridge, 1977, 1993; Raup, 1991; John, 2003: 15; Birkland, 2001: 227) where species develop at a “very slow process, characterized by long periods of stability with little or no change and interrupted by brief periods of rapid change” (Hensel and Diehl, 1998: 3). What makes the process evolutionary is the process of selection (John, 1999: 43, 2003: 21).

pre-decision activities of the policy process—issue definition and agenda setting (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Schlager, 1999: 254; True et. al., 1999: 97). As issues are defined in different ways, and as issues emerge on and recede from the public agenda, existing policies can be either reinforced or questioned. Reinforcement leads to very little change, if any, whereas the questioning of policies creates opportunities for dramatic changes to policy. What differentiates the PEM from alternative agenda-setting models is the model's dual focus—the PEM explains both policy stasis and punctuations (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; True et. al, 1999: 97-98). Both equilibria and punctuations (minor and major changes) rest on *bounded rational decision making* (Schlager, 1999: 241; True, Jones and Baumgartner, 1999: 194).

A key strength of the PEM, which according to True et. al. (1999: 98-99; 111) differentiates it from all other models is its ability to explain not only stability, but also change in a single theory. The PEM is also credited with highlighting the interactive role *between subsystems of government and bounded rational decision making* (True, Jones and Baumgartner, 1999:111; Dudley and Richardson, 1966; Hardin, 1996; Cioffi-Revilla, 1997).

In her assessment of the PEM, Schlager (1999: 248-249)<sup>55</sup> acknowledges

---

<sup>55</sup> In her work on institutionalism, Schlager (1999: 248) emphasizes the importance of institutions to the decision making process by highlighting the critical functions they serve—institutional structures provide the general context within which decisions are made, and they also provide decision makers with venues that can be used by decision makers to control decision making around a particular issue. Schlager (1999: 248) suggests that maintaining support for existing policies can be achieved by simply controlling the venue that oversees the policy. Alternatively, changes to policy can be instigated by changing venues or involving participants from other venues in the process (Schlager, 1999: 248).

that the PEM pays attention to institutional arrangements; however, she suggests that institutions are conceptualized at a relatively cursory level, which requires further refinement to clearly articulate the dynamics of the underlying micro and macro level processes at work. Other areas of concern to Schlager (1999: 245-246, 252) include the PEM's: limited attention to collective action issues and how they affect policy;<sup>56</sup> lack of predictive power;<sup>57</sup> and inability to provide an explicit explanation of how to determine whether changes in policy are major or minor.<sup>58</sup>

### 3.3.7 Advocacy Coalition Framework

Developed by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999, 1993a),<sup>59</sup> the ACF is a causal theory of the policy process which views policy change and formation as a function of coalitions' (policy actors) beliefs and external changes in non-cognitive factors (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 123, 151). The ACF focuses on pre-decision activities (problem definition and the formulation of alternatives) and the adoption stage (decision) of the policy process (Sabatier and Jenkins Smith, 1999, 1993a; Schlager and Blomquist, 1996: 665; Schlager, 1999: 254). Belief systems

---

<sup>56</sup> Schlager (1999: 245-246) notes that the PEM "does not pay attention to how interests organize themselves. Rather it pays attention to the consequences of such organization and activity."

<sup>57</sup> In her view, "the model can lead us to expect that punctuations will happen and that the magnitude of change will be related to its frequency of occurrence, but it will not help us to make specific predictions for particular policy issues" (Schlager, 1999: 252). True et. al. (1999: 111-12) also acknowledge this point in their analysis of the model.

<sup>58</sup> See also Heck (2004) on this point.

<sup>59</sup> Sabatier (1987, 1988) first presented a conceptual framework of the ACF and later in collaboration with Jenkins-Smith developed the ACF (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999; 1993a).

are the centrepiece of the ACF and are what distinguish the ACF from competing approaches, which typically focus on interests in explaining change (Cairney, 1997: 889; Neilson, 2001). The central role of belief systems in the ACF is highlighted by the framework's treatment of individuals. Individuals in the ACF are boundedly rational, just as are individuals in the PEM (Schlager, 1999: 131). However, unlike the PEM which focuses on the characteristics of the situation to explain individual choices and actions, the ACF centers on belief systems to explain individual decision making (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 130-135; Schlager, 1999: 243). Because an individual's ability to process information is limited by cognitive biases and constraints, belief systems act as a guide for individual behaviour (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 131).

A key strength of the ACF is the framework's identification and integration of factors of the policy process, which earlier approaches had typically overlooked (John, 2003; Mulholland and Shakespeare, 2005). In his assessment of the ACF, John (2003) notes that the ACF's incorporation of the "ideational approach" to the functioning of coalitions helps to provide an understanding of the significance of discourse in the political process (John, 2003: 19; 1998: 146). Mulholland and Shakespeare (2005:29) also note that, unlike earlier approaches to understanding the policy process, the ACF identifies and incorporates a number of external factors that are often overlooked, such as the role of beliefs, economic conditions and core policy values that help to define coalitions. Finally, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999: 151) point out that the ACF has several falsifiable hypotheses.

Despite its strengths, some analysts (Zahariadis, 1995a; Cairney, 1997; Ward, 1997; John, 1998; Schlager, 1999) suggest the ACF has limitations which prevent it from providing an adequate explanation of policy change. Zahariadis (1995a: 381) suggests that the ACF's lack of predictive power reduces the framework to a "heuristic device" rather than an empirically falsifiable guide to policy analysis. This is evidenced, according to Zahariadis (1995a: 381), in the ACF's dependence on a number of variables to help explain policy choice. Second, Schlager (1999: 253) suggests that the ACF fails to make a clear distinction between major and minor policy change, and in doing so, jeopardizes two central aspects of the framework—subsystems and beliefs. According to Mintrom and Vergari (1996: 435), the failure to differentiate between the varying degrees of change prevents the ACF from articulating the conditions under which major policy change takes place. Third, critics (Loeber and Grin, 1999; Cairney, 1997: 891; Mintrom and Vergari, 1996: 425) suggest that the framework's emphasis on beliefs overlooks the importance of other critical elements of the policy process.<sup>60</sup> Fourth, Ward (1997), John (1998) and Schlager (1999) suggest that the framework's treatment of institutional arrangements is problematic.<sup>61</sup> Whereas Ward (1997) and John (1998) are critical

---

<sup>60</sup> Cairney (1997: 891) suggests that attributing change largely to core beliefs, overlooks a large component of political activity which concerns secondary aspects of belief systems. In their critique of the ACF, Loeber and Grin (1999) and Grin and Hoppe (1997) suggest that the framework's focus on actors' beliefs relating solely to public policy ignores more fundamental beliefs individuals have relating to their organization or profession (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 134). Moreover, Mintrom and Vergari (1996: 425) suggest that the ACF's focus on beliefs overlooks a critical component of policy formulation, the processes by which policy actually changes.

<sup>61</sup> Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999: 153) suggest that on a conceptual level, there needs to be

of the framework's lack of attention to institutional arrangements, Schlager (1999) suggests that the real concern is the inadequate level of attention paid to institutional arrangements.<sup>62</sup> Lastly, although the ACF addresses issues of collective action through its definition of a coalition, Schlager (1995, 199: 245-246), and Schlager and Blomquist (1996) suggest that further refinement of the framework's treatment of collective action is necessary.<sup>63</sup> According to Schlager (199: 245), "the [ACF] makes strong claims that imply that coalitions engage in a high degree of coordinated behaviour. Yet the evidence of this coordinated behaviour presented by [the ACF] can be accounted for by competing explanations." Given the critical role collective action plays in the ACF, she (1999: 246) suggests further research to address the issue.

### 3.3.8 Multiple Streams Framework

Drawing upon the GCM, Kingdon (1995, 1984) developed an alternative

---

greater attention to the role of institutions in the ACF.

<sup>62</sup> According to Schlager (1999: 249) institutional arrangements are a prominent feature of the ACF. She points out that institutional arrangements play a critical role in explaining changes in beliefs and policy, they appear in the ACF as both system-level variables and as policy subsystem variables, they are an integral part of the strategy set of coalitions, and they also appear in the hypotheses generated by the ACF. The central issue for Schlager is that although institutional features are an integral component of the ACF, they "appear at a relatively gross level". She (1999: 249-250) argues further development of the ACF's institutional components is necessary because institutional arrangements have a direct impact on individuals' choices of strategies.

<sup>63</sup> Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999: 153) acknowledge that further work on the framework's treatment of collective action is necessary. They suggest that this area provides an opportunity for researchers to develop and test hypotheses generated by institutional analysis and development, the ACF, and other approaches.

approach to understanding the decision making process—the MSF.<sup>64</sup> The MSF explores: how issues, also referred to as problems, are defined, brought to the attention of and chosen by policymakers for action, and how alternatives also referred to as solutions are generated and selected by policymakers (Kingdon, 1995). The MSF rests on the notion that the process by which agenda items and alternatives come to the forefront of the government's agenda involves the movement of three constantly flowing and independent streams—problems, policy, and politics. The problem stream focuses on how and why certain issues come to be defined as problems and how they capture the attention of policy makers. The policy stream contains potential solutions to a problem. It is here where ideas for policy change are generated and discussed by specialists in policy communities. The politics stream captures the political “mood” towards policy change. The joining or “coupling” of the three streams by a PE during critical moments, referred to as “policy windows”, will move an item onto the government's decision agenda and compel an authoritative choice be made and implemented.<sup>65</sup> At this point in time a

---

<sup>64</sup> Although Kingdon (1984, 1995) remains true to the underlying theory of the GCM developed by Cohen et. al. (1972), three modifications are made. First, the original four streams found in the GCM are reduced to three streams—problems, policy and politics. The participants and choice opportunities streams found in the GCM are merged into a single stream, the politics stream in the MSF. Second, the solutions stream found in the GCM is represented by the policy stream in the MSF. Kingdon (1984, 1995) modifies the policy stream by incorporating an “evolutionary” component to describe the process by which ideas emerge and evolve over time. Third, Kingdon (1984, 1995) introduces two critical elements to the MSF—PEs and policy windows.

<sup>65</sup> The governmental agenda represents the “list of subjects to which governmental officials and those around them are paying serious attention” (Kingdon, 1995: 202). Within the governmental agenda is the decision agenda, “a list of subjects within the governmental agenda that are up for an active decision ” (Kingdon, 1995: 202). Kingdon notes that it is here on the decision agenda where “[p]roposals are being moved into position for legislative enactment...or subjects are under review for

problem is recognized, a solution to that problem is available and the politics of the situation support change. Because windows open infrequently, and do not remain open for long, it is important that the PE seize the opportunity to take action. Once a window is closed, the three streams separate, signaling that interest in the issue has dissipated (Kingdon, 1995).

Four key assumptions guide the MSF—ambiguity, temporal sorting, bounded rationality, and independent streams (Zahariadis, 2003: 2-7). First, the MSF rests on the assumption that policy making is made under conditions of ambiguity. Zahariadis (1999: 89-90) notes that ambiguity is a simple fact of policy making, one that makes the process complicated, difficult and less discernible.<sup>66</sup>

Second, unlike models that stress rational action, the MSF pursues an alternative logic based on time—a unique and scarce resource which is of primary concern to policy makers (Zahariadis, 2003: 4). Faced by time constraints, individuals focus their attention not on selecting issues that they can resolve, but rather on addressing the sheer number of problems that are forced on them

---

an imminent decision by the president or a department secretary...[It is here where] the issue is 'really getting hot' which is a step up from saying that the participants are seriously occupied with it" (Kingdon, 1995: 166). The MSF argues that the probability that an item on the decision agenda will move into position for an authoritative choice increases when all three elements—problem, policy proposal and political receptivity are linked into a single package by a PE (i.e. there must be a coupling of the three streams) (Kingdon, 1995: 202).

<sup>66</sup> Zahariadis (2003: 2-3) suggests that ambiguity should not be confused with the related concept of uncertainty. Ambiguity according to Zahariadis should be thought of as a multifaceted way of thinking that allows one to interpret circumstances or phenomena in many different ways whereas uncertainty can be interpreted as a lack of information or ignorance. Zahariadis (1999: 90; 2003: 3) suggests that having more information may or may not reduce uncertainty for analysts, but it will not reduce ambiguity, it will simply make the policy process much more comprehensible (Wilson, 1989: 228; March 1994: 178-179).

(Zahariadis, 2003: 5).

Third, the MSF draws upon Simon's (1947) boundedly rational individual to explain individual decision making. The MSF's underlying assumption of bounded rationality is driven by the context within which policy making occurs, in this case ambiguity. As Zahariadis explains, "the problem under conditions of ambiguity is that we often do not know what the problem is. Its definition is vague and shifting. Distinguishing between relevant and irrelevant information is problematic, which can lead to false and misleading facts" (Zahariadis, 2003: 4). Under such extreme conditions, the central concern for many policy makers is not to solve problems, but to bring some order and clarity to their situation (Weick, 1979: 175; Zahariadis, 2003: 4). Hence, "choice has more to do with the simultaneous evocation of problems and solutions than with any inherent correlation between them" (Zahariadis, 2003: 4).

Fourth, the MSF assumes that the three streams, problem, policy and politics, flowing through the system are largely independent and shaped by their own internal forces (Kingdon, 1984, 1995: 19; Zahariadis, 2003: 6-7).<sup>67</sup> Independence suggests among other things: participants come and go, therefore increasing or decreasing the odds that a specific choice will/will not be made; problems emerge on the government's agenda regardless of whether there are solutions or whether they can be solved; solutions are generated by individuals not

---

<sup>67</sup> In the original GCM there is a strict assumption of the independence of the streams (March, Olsen and Cohen, 1972). Although Kingdon (1984,1995) maintains independence of the streams, he

necessarily because they address a problem, but rather because the solutions happen to cater to a problem that reflects their self-interests; and, changes in the political stream occur regardless of any changes in the nature of problems confronting a country (Zahariadis, 2003: 6). By treating the streams as independent, the individual dynamics of each stream can be highlighted, thus allowing for a much more complete understanding of agenda (Kingdon, 1995).

Kingdon's modification of the GCM through the MSF has garnered both praise and criticism. Proponents (Porter, 1995; Birkland, 1997, 2001; Saint-Germain, 1996; John, 1998; Zahariadis, 1999, 2003; Tiernan and Burke, 2002; Hopkins, 2004) of the MSF highlight a number of praiseworthy features of the framework. Porter (1995: 26-27) and Zahariadis (1999, 2003) suggest that the greatest strength of the MSF is that it not only recognizes the complexity of the policy process, but is able to bring order to the chaotic world of policy making. Ambiguity, according to Zahariadis (1999 89-90), is a fact of policy making, as is serendipity. Whereas ambiguity makes policy making complex and less comprehensible, serendipity reduces the ability to predict future events (Zahariadis, 1999 89-90). The MSF brings order to such conditions through temporal sorting. Saint-Germain and Calamia (1996:57) note that the MSF also provides insight to the process of policy change by identifying relevant institutions, actors, and political processes. By delineating the key elements of the process, the MSF forms the basis for evaluation of that process according to Saint-Germain and Calamia (1996: 57).

---

suggests that they are "loosely coupled" (Kingdon, 1995).

The MSF is also commended by theorists (Porter, 1995; John, 1998) for highlighting the importance of ideas in the policy process.<sup>68</sup> The MSF addresses questions of “what makes an idea’s time come?” and “what makes people in and around government attend at a given time, to some subjects and not to others?” (Kingdon, 1995:1). The MSF elevates the stature of ideas by exploring how ideas become policy. Finally, Hopkins (1984) suggests that the MSF “remains the most developed and coherent account of agenda-setting” (Hopkins, 2004: 4). The framework is considered a classic in the field of agenda setting, and in 2001 Kingdon’s book, *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policy* received top honours as the leading policy related books by the Public Policy Section of the American Political Science Review (Shoup, 2001:14).<sup>69</sup>

Critics like Bendor et. al. (2001: 169) consider Kingdon’s MSF to be “one of the most highly regarded treatments of policymaking in the last two decades.” Yet, they as well as others (Sabatier, 1997, 1999a; Mucciaroni, 1992; Schlager, 1999; King, Keohane and Verba, 1994) also suggest that there are serious limitations to the MSF that can be traced back to its origin—the GCM—developed by Cohen et. al. (1972).<sup>70</sup> The single most criticized aspect of the MSF is its lack of a theoretical

---

<sup>68</sup> For a discussion of the role of ideas in policy making and empirical research on the topic see Goldstein (1993), Goldstein and Keohane (1993a), and Braun and Busch (1999).

<sup>69</sup> The second edition (1995) of Kingdon’s book, *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policy* was ranked the second most influential policy related book or article written in the past ten years (Shoup, 2001: 14).

<sup>70</sup> Although Bendor et. al. (2001) directly critique the GC theory, their critique can be extended to Kingdon’s MSF because the framework is firmly rooted in the theoretical work of the original GCM

structure. This has led to the characterization of the framework as a “heuristic device” rather than an “empirically falsifiable tool” (King, 1985; Howlett and Ramesh, 1995:138; Moya, 1998; Sabatier, 1997: 5, 1999b; Mucciaroni, 1992:463-465; Bendor et. al., 2001).<sup>71</sup> According to Sabatier, scientific theory should ensure that “major propositions are empirically falsifiable...[F]alsifiability is what distinguishes science from other fields of human knowledge. To the extent that those propositions are logically related to others, the validity of untested aspects of the theory can also

---

developed by Cohen et. al. (1972). Bendor et. al (2001: 169) note that “most of its influence is now exercised indirectly, through more recent works that have moved into new terrain and gained much attention in their own right but are grounded in the original theory”.

<sup>71</sup> Zahariadis (1999: 86) argues that the characterization of the MSF as a “heuristic device” is based on arguments that theoretical models should be able to explain how policies are made *and* predict future policy outcomes. According to Zahariadis (1999: 86), in theory, explanation and prediction should act in concert; however, in practice they often do not. Brunner (1991: 70) goes one step further and suggests that prediction is not necessarily the central purpose of scientific study in the realm of the policy sciences, but rather the sharing of knowledge. Other theorists (Forester, 1984:30; deLeon, 1998; Olsen, 2001:194) suggest that the explanatory power of the MSF should not be minimized. Olsen suggests that explanation is just as important as prediction: [t]here is no reason to downgrade the value of raising good research questions, of detailed accounts of how political organizations and institutions really work, and of theoretical speculation based on surprising empirical observations. Such questions, observations, and speculations often advance political science, even when all the elements are not organized into a coherent and powerful theory. [C]ritics attach little value to the process of developing and exploring theoretical ideas, compared to the process of testing such ideas....[I]gnoring the exploration of competing assumptions is likely to impoverish, not enrich, the understanding of politics (Olsen, 2001:194). In his work on decision making styles, Forester (1984: 30) suggests that role of theory may not necessarily be limited to that of prediction: “[t]he role of theory may well *not* be to predict what *will happen if*, instead, the role of theory may be to direct the attention of the decision maker to suggest what important and significant variables, actors, events and signals to be alert to, to look for, to take as tips or warnings”.

The diversity of opinions concerning the MSF’s “atheoretical” label reflect a broader debate, particularly in the realm of political science of what constitutes “theory”. In his review of theories of the policy process, Ravalli notes that there is considerable diversity with regards to what is labeled theory: “one should realize that there are diverse epistemological pathways to theory-building. Kingdon’s [MSF] may appear weak by positivist standards, but extremely strong within an epistemology informed by scientific realism (Lane, 1996)... political scientists are still disagreeing on the meaning of ‘explanation’. Some would look at general laws and prediction as the main litmus test for successful explanations, whereas other would argue that policy problems emphasize diagnosis over prediction and the understanding of specific policy processes in unique historical contexts over general laws” (Dudley, Parsons, Ravalli and Sabatier, 2000: 134).

be assessed” (Sabatier, 1997:2).<sup>72</sup> Sabatier (1997: 5) argues that falsification is difficult with the MSF because the framework has no explicit hypotheses and is too fluid in its structure and operationalization. Building on Sabatier’s criticisms, Mucciaroni argues that the MSF “does not allow us to predict what kinds of problems are likely to be coupled with what kinds of solutions and, in turn, the kinds of political conditions that make it more likely for them to get on the agenda” (Mucciaroni, 1992:464). For Bendor et. al. (2001: 169), the MSF attempts to do too much and ends up being too complex and confusing.

The MSF’s weak theoretical underpinnings are evident in the treatment of such integral components as individuals (Sabatier, 1997: 5; Bendor et. al., 2001:171). Sabatier (1997:5) suggests that, in order to have a good understanding of policy making, which is essentially carried out by human beings, it is necessary to understand the fundamental element which drives the process—the individual. Without a coherent model of the individual, Sabatier (1997: 7-8) argues, it is not possible to specify the causal drivers of the framework. Bendor, et. al. (2001), suggest that the framework’s discussion about individuals and how they make decisions in the context of ambiguity is deeply flawed because “everything inherent to individual choice is left endogenous to the choice process” (Bendor et. al., 2001:

---

<sup>72</sup> Sabatier (1997) identifies four other criteria by which a scientific theory should be judged. First, scientific theory should be logically coherent (Sabatier, 1997:1). Second, a theory should have clear drivers and a causal process (Sabatier, 1997:1-2). For Sabatier, specifying causal drivers and processes is a critical component that many frameworks fail to achieve. Third, the theoretical scope should be clearly defined (Sabatier, 1997:2). Fourth, a theory should be “fertile” such that the theory leads to implications that are not obvious and it produces a number of predictions for each of its assumptions (Sabatier, 1997:2). For a further discussion of the criteria by which a scientific theory

171). Critics (Sabatier, 1996; Schlager, 1999:247; Mucciaroni, 1992:465-470; Bendor et. al., 2001:172-173) suggest this is also reflected by the framework's lack of adequate attention to the context within which individuals act—the institutional setting of decision making. In her work on institutionalism, Schlager (1999: 248) emphasizes the importance of institutions to the decision making process by highlighting that they provide the general context within which decisions are made, and also provide decision makers with venues that can be used by decision makers to control decision making around a particular issue. Schlager (1999: 248) suggests that maintaining support for existing policies can be achieved by simply controlling the venue that oversees the policy. Alternatively, instigating significant changes to policy can be achieved by changing venues or involving participants from other venues in the process (Schlager, 1999: 248).

In addition to concerns regarding the MSF's lack of a sound theoretical basis, which can be seen in its treatment of the individual, critics also point out a number of other limitations: the underlying assumption of independence between the three streams, which according to critics (Mucciaroni, 1992:472-481; Sabatier, 1997: 7, 1999a; Bendor et. al., 2001:172), cannot be justified on theoretical grounds; inadequate attention to how previous solutions affect subsequent debates surrounding an issue, and ultimately policy (Durant and Diehl, 1989; Mucciaroni, 1992:470-472; Weir, 1992:191); failure to take into consideration that change can be either rapid or non-incremental, which is a central feature in the process of

---

should be judged see the work of Lave and March (1975:59-73), and King, Keohane, and Verba

developing policy alternatives; and, finally, a limited scope of inquiry with its emphasis on only one part of the larger policy making process—the pre-decision process (Sabatier, 1991a; Schlager, 1999:253).

### **3.4 Conclusions**

In reviewing the various decision making models, theories and frameworks, it is clear that each approach presents a different picture of the policy process. Although each approach has its strengths and limitations, the MSF is selected as the theoretical foundation for this study for four central reasons.

First, the MSF is one of the few approaches to understanding decision making that accords a prominent role to the individual in the process of decision making, which is the focus of concern in this study. This is important because it allows us to extrapolate critical information that can be utilized to fully account for the actions and influence of individuals in the development and adoption of policies.

Second, the MSF offers a unique approach to understanding decision making and outcomes, one that embraces rather than ignores the complexities and chaos of the decision making process, as is reflected in the case of US-Cuba policy. The MSF assigns participants, processes, and the elements of timing and ambiguity a central role in the decision making process, therefore giving us the power to provide a much more comprehensive picture of the underlying forces that give rise to policy.

It is true that, in selecting the MSF, we are confronted with a number of

criticisms (King, 1985; Howlett and Ramesh, 1995:138; Moya, 1998; Sabatier, 1997: 5, 1999b; Mucciaroni, 1992:463-465; Bendor et. al., 2001) of the framework. However, in his critique of the MSF, Sabatier (1997:6) suggests that the MSF holds great promise as viable theory of policymaking. He holds (1997: 6) that through further elaboration and development, the MSF can be transformed from a rudimentary framework to a full fledged theory. The first step in the transformation of the MSF involves developing testable hypotheses about major propositions it puts forth.<sup>73</sup> This study builds on research carried out by Zahariadis (1992, 1995b, 1996, 1999, 2003), Zahariadis and Allen (1995), Cherry (2000), Schuh (2000) and Travis and Zahariadis (2002), using the MSF<sup>74</sup> as well as the literature on policy entrepreneurship<sup>75</sup> to add greater theoretical weight to the MSF's treatment of

---

<sup>73</sup> As discussed earlier in this chapter, Sabatier (1997: 5) argues that falsification is difficult with the MSF because the framework has no explicit hypotheses and is too fluid in its structure and operationalization. To transform the MSF into a full fledged theory, Sabatier (1997: 2) suggests it is necessary to ensure "major propositions are empirically falsifiable".

<sup>74</sup> In his work on the evolution of privatization policies in Britain and France, Zahariadis (1995b, 1999, 2003) agrees with critics (King, 1985; Howlett and Ramesh, 1995; Moya, 1998; Sabatier, 1997, 1999b; Mucciaroni, 1992; Bendor et. al., 2001) that the MSF leans towards understanding and explanation rather than prediction; however, his work also shows that the framework does in fact possess predictive capabilities. In their respective research, Zahariadis (1992, 1995b, 1996), Zahariadis and Allen (1995) and Cherry (2000) show that the MSF is capable of explaining policy decisions by incorporating institutional arrangements. In her study of change in the US civil service, Schuh (2000) extends Kingdon's (1984) MSF to the authoritative decision process and in the process develops and tests hypotheses relating to the differences in policy-making aspects of the administrative action and legislation decision processes.

<sup>75</sup> See Raines and Prakash (2005), McCowan (2005, 2004), Carter and Scott (2004), Carter, Scott, and Rowling (2004), Mackenzie (2004), Oliver (2004, 1991), Lieberman (2002), Swift (2002), Cline,(2001); Garrett (2001), Mintrom, (2000, 1997a), Oliver and Shaheen (1997), Davis ( 1999), Roberts and King (1996, 1991), Schiller (1995), Schneider and Teske (1995, 1992), Polsby (1994), Roberts (1994), Bryson and Crosby, 1992, Weissert ( 1991), Doig and Hargrove (1987), King and Roberts (1987), Walker (1974), and Price (1971).

PEs.

Lastly, the MSF offers important and necessary potential for cross fertilization. Reviews of decision making approaches from the fields of foreign policy and the policy sciences have shown that there is very little collaboration between the two fields of study, despite evidence that theoretical cross fertilization is not only possible, but also beneficial to further theoretical progress (Lentner, 2006; Hart and Rosenthal, 1998:235; Zahariadis, 2003: 162-163). In his review of theoretical developments in the fields of public policy and foreign policy, Lentner (2006: 178) argues that the two fields of study have largely ignored each other, overlooking the opportunities that cross fertilization of the two fields holds for future theoretical developments. According to Lentner (2006: 178), foreign policy analysts could beneficially employ Kingdon's (1995) two main organizing ideas: participants and processes. By treating each participant and process as an "impetus" and a "constraint," analysts would have a handy means of examining the unfolding of foreign policymaking processes. The MSF is a good candidate for overcoming many of the obstacles to cross fertilization because it is explicitly synthetic—it integrates earlier contributions from research on preferences, interests, choices, ideas, and networks (Sabatier, 1991b: 149; John, 1998, 2003: 14) and can be refined to integrate insights generated by models, theories and frameworks from the realm of foreign policy. Studies by Newmann (1998) and Zahariadis (2003), which have modified the MSF with insights from foreign policy models, suggest that further research in this direction is not only theoretically possible, but also necessary to

acquire a better understanding of the decision making processes that generate policies.<sup>76</sup> Expanding the scope of the MSF to the field of foreign policy is a “first-step” towards further collaboration between two distinct fields of policy analysis. That is not to discredit the validity of alternative approaches or suggest that the MSF should be viewed as a comprehensive theoretical framework for understanding how decisions are made in the fields of foreign policy and the policy sciences. To make such bold claims would require extensive testing of the framework against alternative approaches, which is beyond the scope of this analysis. What this study attempts to do is to help refine the MSF by adding greater substance to its theoretical underpinnings, specifically, the role of PEs in the process of decision making. In the process, this study helps push the MSF closer to being a full fledged theory. As noted by Schlager (1997: 14-15), frameworks that are repeatedly and rigorously revised and tested in response to empirical findings contribute to theory building.

Chapter four provides a detailed analysis of the MSF and the role of PEs in decision making.

## **Chapter 4 The Multiple Streams Framework**

### **4.0 Introduction**

Chapter three extracted some of the basic tenets of the theoretical literature on decision making used to account for policy making. In reviewing the various

---

<sup>76</sup> Newmann (1998) modifies the GCM with foreign decision-making models to explain shifts in policy.

approaches to decision making, the MSF was selected as the conceptual foundation for this study. This chapter provides a comprehensive discussion of Kingdon's MSF and the role of PEs within the framework, and in the process identifies key propositions and concepts that can be used to develop testable hypotheses.

Government decision makers are constantly confronted with an endless number of problems vying for their attention; however, only a few are successful in capturing their attention, and even fewer reach the government's decision agenda for authoritative decision. Just as problems compete for the attention of decision makers, so do policy solutions. In the process by which the list of available alternatives is narrowed, some are able to survive the selection process while others are discarded. In the complex and chaotic environment of government decision making, policy advocates seeking to have their issues heard and acted upon by the government need to understand why and how (1) certain policy issues reach the government's agenda while others fail, and (2) certain policy alternatives survive while others fail to get off the ground. Kingdon's MSF addresses these by exploring the processes of agenda setting and the specification of alternatives (also referred to as the generation of alternatives or solutions), the pre-decision stage of the decision making process which ultimately shapes the decision process, i.e. choice. The literature on agenda setting typically does not make a distinction between agenda setting and the specification of alternatives; however, Kingdon's (1995:4) MSF views them as distinct elements because they are governed by different

participants and processes. Before elaborating on the participants and processes involved in agenda setting and the specification of alternatives, it is important to define the central concept of agendas as used in the MSF to map the decision making process.

#### 4.1 Agendas

Cobb and Elder (1972, 1971), pioneers in the field of agenda setting research (McClain, 1990: 264), recognized early on the importance of agenda dynamics in the process of policy development.<sup>77</sup> Kingdon (1995) draws on their insights to differentiate between two types of agendas—governmental and decision agendas. The governmental agenda is the list of issues that are attracting considerable attention by those in and around the government (Kingdon, 1995: 3).<sup>78</sup> The decision agenda is a subset of the governmental agenda consisting of issues that are in line for an authoritative decision—legislative enactment or presidential

---

<sup>77</sup> Cobb and Elder (1972: 30) note, “[t]he question of how an issue comes to be on a formal agenda for authoritative decision-making is a crucial aspect of the overall governmental process. An issue must command attention before the choice process begins. Moreover, the way in which an issue is defined when it reaches the attention of decision-makers may well delimit the range of alternatives subsequently considered. In fact, by the time an issue arrives at an actual choice point, its fate may already be decided, for all practical purposes. The crucial questions may be whether or not it gets on the governmental agenda, how it is defined by that time, how visible it is, and what social influences have been activated in the process. See also Walker (1977) on the importance of agenda setting in decision making.

<sup>78</sup> Kingdon’s governmental agenda parallels what Cobb and Elder (1972: 85; 1971) refer to as the systemic agenda which “consists of all issues that are commonly perceived by members of the political community as meriting public attention and as involving matters within the legitimate jurisdiction of existing governmental authority.”

choice (Kingdon, 1995: 4, 202).<sup>79</sup> Issues that reach the decision agenda are being positioned for authoritative action, or as Kingdon (1995: 166) describes “really getting hot”.<sup>80</sup> The distinction between governmental and decision agendas is an important one because the processes whereby issues reach the respective agendas are different and critical to an issue moving from relative obscurity to prominence. Before turning our attention to the processes involved in agenda setting and the specification of alternatives, it is important to identify key participants involved in the MSF. Participants, like processes, can act as both catalysts and constraints in the decision making process.

## 4.2 Participants

The literature on decision making has a tendency to provide a very narrow focus of analysis in relation to participants involved in the process, most often analyzing the roles of participants in isolation rather than in relation to other participants in the process (Kingdon, 1995: 68). The MSF looks at the broader community of participants involved, highlighting their roles and level of influence in the process (Kingdon, 1995: 21-44, 45-70). Participants in the MSF are

---

<sup>79</sup> Kingdon's decision agenda parallels what Cobb and Elder (1972: 86) interchangeably refer to as the institutional, governmental, or formal agenda which is defined as “that set of items explicitly up for the active and serious consideration of authoritative decision-makers”.

<sup>80</sup> Kingdon (1995: 166) notes, “[w]ithin the governmental agenda, there is a smaller set of items that is being decided upon, a decision agenda. Proposals are being moved into position for legislative enactment, for instance, or subjects are under review for an imminent decision by the president or a department secretary. In the vernacular of the participants, the issue is “really getting hot” which is a step up from saying that the participants are seriously occupied with it”.

disaggregated according to two clusters—visible and hidden participants.<sup>81</sup>

#### 4.2.1 Visible Participants and Agenda Setting

The “visible” cluster of participants centres on elected and appointed officials which includes the president, high-level political appointees, and members of Congress (Kingdon, 1995: 68-69, 199). It is the visible cluster of participants that sets the governmental agenda (Kingdon, 1995: 68-69).<sup>82</sup> The MSF is careful in recognizing that, although the efforts of visible participants can help push as well as impede an issue from reaching the governmental agenda, not all visible participants yield the same level of power (Kingdon, 1995: 68-69, 199). Although the president does not wholly control the agenda, he or she is a dominant force in agenda setting (Kingdon, 1995: 23, 24-26, 69).<sup>83</sup> Presidential power to set the agenda stems from a number of sources—institutional resources such as the veto and presidential hiring authority, the organizational structure of the executive branch compared with Congress allows for greater unitary decision making, a command of public attention

---

<sup>81</sup> Although the distinction between visible and hidden participants is not absolute, Kingdon (1995: 68-69) suggests that their differences are strong enough to be meaningful and justify their differentiation.

<sup>82</sup> For a detailed discussion see Kingdon (1995: 21-44; 45-70).

<sup>83</sup> Kingdon notes, “[n]o other single actor in the political system has quite the capability of the president to set agendas in given policy areas for all who deal with those policies...The president, of course, does not totally control the policy agenda, for many events beyond his control impinge on the agendas of various participants and even on his own agenda...[nevertheless,] there is little doubt that the president remains a powerful force in agenda setting, particularly compared to other actors” (Kingdon, 1995: 23). Studies by Larocca (2006), Nelson (2002), Cohen (1995), Baumgartner and Jones (1993), Bond and Fleisher (1990), Moe and Teel (1970), and Huntington (1965) provide ample evidence that the president yields significant influence in agenda setting. There are, however, competing studies by Edwards and Wood (1999), Wood and Peake (1998) and Andrade and Young (1996) which suggest that the president’s influence in agenda setting is not as pronounced as the literature suggests.

which can be used to influence governmental officials to support the president's agenda, and the degree of presidential involvement on the agenda itself (Kingdon: 1995: 24-26). The president's power, does not, however extend to the selection of alternatives, which in essence limits the president's power to determine the final outcome.<sup>84</sup> Political appointees include those individuals in departments and bureaus who are appointed by the president, such as cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, and heads of bureaus and administrations (Kingdon, 1995: 27-28). Their influence on agenda setting rests in elevating an issue on the agenda (Kingdon, 1995: 28).<sup>85</sup> Finally, the ability of members of Congress to set the agenda stems from a variety of sources: legal authority, the ability to garner publicity and communicate information concerning an issue by holding hearings and introducing bills, access to a diverse mix of substantive and political information originating from a broad community of experts that includes the bureaucracy, academics, constituencies and interest groups, and the longevity of civil servants (Kingdon, 1995:36-38). The reasons why members of Congress engage in agenda setting activities are numerous, the most common being the need to satisfy constituents, the desire to enhance their political reputations, and to create "good" public policy

---

<sup>84</sup> According to Kingdon, "[s]etting the agenda and getting one's way...are two very different things. The president may be able to dominate and even determine the...agenda, but is unable to dominate the alternatives that are seriously considered, and unable to determine the final outcome" (Kingdon, 1995: 23-24).

<sup>85</sup> Kingdon suggests, "[e]ven when the political appointees do not originate an idea, they still play a large part in placing it on the agendas of important people, both within and outside their agencies. Many times, proposals and ideas float around within executive branch agencies for some time, without being taken very seriously. But should a high-level political appointee take an interest in the project, the issue suddenly attains much greater prominence" (Kingdon, 1995: 28).

(Kingdon, 1995:38-40). Our review of visible participants has identified them as powerful agenda setters; however, their authority does not extend to the generation of alternatives, where we find the “hidden” cluster of participants playing the lead role. The MSF’s differentiation between agenda setting and alternative specification is particularly useful in accounting for this distinction (Kingdon, 1995: 24).

#### **4.2.2 Hidden Participants and the Generation of Alternatives**

The “hidden” cluster of participants is comprised of academics, researchers, consultants, career civil servants, congressional staffers, presidential staff and interest groups (Kingdon, 1995: 69-70). Hidden participants exert their influence in the development of alternatives (Kingdon, 1995: 69, 200). Academics as well as researchers and consultants influence the generation of alternatives by acting as dispensers of both empirical and theoretical information that can be used in the development of ideas (Kingdon, 1995: 53-57). Career civil servants are traditionally associated with policy implementation rather than agenda setting; however, their extensive experience in administering programs, vast body of knowledge, and well established political networks—e.g. relationships with Congress and interest groups, empower them with the necessary skills and knowledge to shape alternatives (Kingdon, 1995:30-34).<sup>86</sup> Congressional staffers exert their influence indirectly through the selection of alternatives and legislative provisions

---

<sup>86</sup> Kingdon (1995: 31) cites the work of Hecl (1974: 301-304) as a prime example of the importance of civil servants in not only implementation, but also the generation of alternatives.

from which senators and representatives choose (Kingdon, 1995: 40-42). Presidential staff make their presence felt in the generation of alternatives through their negotiations with various government departments, Congress and interest groups to produce the administration's proposals (Kingdon, 1995: 26-27). Finally, the last group of hidden participants, interest groups, undoubtedly play a critical role in American politics as is evident in the vast body of literature concerning interest groups and their role in the broader political system.<sup>87</sup> In the context of agenda setting and alternative generation, interest groups represent a unique group of participants because their activities, some of which are quite visible while others are hardly noticeable, allow them to oscillate between agenda setting and the generation of alternatives (visible and hidden). However, it is the latter process in which they wield the greatest degree of influence (Kingdon, 1995: 46-53, 68). The real power of interest groups rests in their ability to attach their own ideas to agenda items that other players have made prominent (Kingdon, 1995:50).<sup>88</sup>

Two factors explain why agenda setting and the specification of alternatives are populated by different clusters of participants: (1) resource requirements to carry out the task at hand, and (2) incentives that attract individuals to the specific task (Kingdon, 1995:70). Generating viable alternatives requires not only an extensive

---

<sup>87</sup> The MSF goes beyond the traditional literature and examines the impact interest groups have on agendas and alternatives (Kingdon, 1995:46).

<sup>88</sup> In Kingdon's words, "[I]obbies often don't begin the push for legislation or the push for agenda status. But even if they haven't started the ball rolling, once it is rolling they try to ensure that their interests are protected in the legislation that emerges...[T]hey affect the alternatives considered, even if they haven't affected the agenda" (Kingdon, 1995:50).

knowledge of the issue area, but also the willingness to devote time, energy, and resources to minute details (Kingdon, 1995:70). As specialists in their fields, players in the hidden cluster are well suited to the task of generating alternatives because they possess the necessary resources—knowledge, expertise, and time required to craft detailed proposals—whereas players in the visible cluster are more focused on using their public profile to bring attention to an issue (Kingdon, 1995: 68-70). The different incentives that motivate participants to carry out their respective tasks also help us to understand the distinction between the two clusters of participants and their respective roles in agenda setting and the generation of alternatives. Elected officials such as senators and representatives are often preoccupied with re-election and ambitions for career advancement and less inclined to deal with the details of policy (Kingdon, 1995: 70). While elected officials focus their efforts on shaping the broader direction of policy, filling in the details is left to congressional staffers, who in turn consult with the hidden cluster of specialists—academics, researchers, consultants, bureaucrats, career civil servants, and interest groups.<sup>89</sup>

### **4.3 Processes**

Agenda setting and the specification of alternatives are not only shaped by different participants, but also governed by different processes. Like participants,

---

<sup>89</sup> In Kingdon's words, "[t]he broad-brush approach of [visible players]—presidents, cabinet secretaries, prominent members of congress, [and] parties, is much better suited to agenda setting than to the generation of policy alternatives. The appeals in the visible cluster would be made to such desiderata as the potential for public support, electoral consequences of doing one thing rather than another, and incentives for political career advancement, rather than things like the technical quality of a proposal. Due to their authoritative governmental positions, elected officials also have several constitutional and

processes can act as both catalysts and constraints in decision making. At the core of the MSF is the notion that running through an organization are three constantly flowing and independent process streams—problem, politics, and policy—whereby issues and alternatives become prominent agenda items. The *problem stream* is where issues become defined as problems and are brought to the attention of government decision makers. The *politics stream* is where a favourable political environment for agenda change is fostered. Finally, the *policy stream* is where alternatives are generated. It is here where ideas emerge and gradually over a period of time are transformed by specialists into viable alternatives. As with the problem stream, the policy stream is populated by competing alternatives; however, only those alternatives that are able to survive the selection process are able to be short listed for serious consideration on the government's decision agenda. Each stream functions independently of the other, or in Kingdon's words "each of these streams has a life of its own, and runs along without a lot of regard to happenings in the other streams" (Kingdon, 1995: 227). This suggests that: (1) issues are defined and recognized as problems regardless of whether solutions are available or of developments in the political stream; (2) political developments unfold according to their own dynamics regardless of problems or the development of alternatives; and (3) alternatives are developed and selected regardless of whether they address problems or political concerns (Kingdon, 1995: 201).


The governmental agenda—the list of issues that are attracting considerable

---

legal prerogatives that enhance their ability to affect agendas" (Kingdon, 1995:70).

attention by those in and around the government—is set by the problem and politics streams (Kingdon, 1995: 20). Problem recognition (problem stream) or a favourable political environment (politics stream) or a combination of both (problem and politics streams) will help to position an item on the governmental agenda; however, neither an individual element nor a combination of the two elements (streams) is capable of positioning an item on the decision agenda for an authoritative choice because moving onto the decision agenda is governed by an entirely different process. Reaching the decision agenda—the list of issues that are in line for an authoritative decision—entails a much more rigorous process involving the coupling of the three streams by a PE during a window of opportunity created by events in either the problem or politics streams. The packaging of a solution to a problem by a PE at a time when the political environment is conducive to agenda change positions an item on the decision agenda for legislative action. Figure 4.0 provides a visual interpretation of Kingdon's MSF.

Figure 4 1 John Kingdon's Multiple Streams Framework



The discussion so far has provided a brief overview of the MSF and in the process has identified a number of key concepts that are central to the functioning of the framework: problem, politics, and policy streams; coupling; policy windows; and PE. Further elaboration of these concepts is necessary to fully outline the dynamics of the processes involved in agenda setting, the specification of alternatives, and the positioning of an item on the decision agenda for an authoritative decision.

## 4.4 The Three Streams: Problem, Politics, and Policy

### 4.4.1 Problem Stream<sup>90</sup>

The problem stream is where issues or what Kingdon (1995: 109-110) refers to as “conditions” come to be defined as problems and are brought to the attention of policy makers (in other words, move onto the governmental agenda). In the day-to-day activities of governing, decision makers are confronted with a host of problems; however, only a few capture the attention of decision makers. Kingdon (1995: 90-103) suggests that there are three mechanisms—indicators, focusing events, and feedback—which in various combinations give that extra “push” needed to push an item onto the governmental agenda. Indicators are not used by decision makers to determine whether a problem exists; instead, they are used as tools to assess the magnitude of a problem and monitor any changes in a problem (Kingdon, 1995: 91). Data that are regularly tracked by government decision makers provide a useful indicator that can be used to bring attention to the breadth of a problem as well as any shifts in the problem. When data deviate from the norm, they can signal that the problem requires attention.<sup>91</sup> Indicators, although effective, are not sufficient on their own to capture the attention of decision makers. Focusing events and variations on focusing events (such as crises, disasters and symbols)

---

<sup>90</sup> Kingdon (1995: 90-115).

<sup>91</sup> What is problematic about indicators is that they are not necessarily a true reflection of the facts because of issues associated with the collection and interpretation of the data. The methods by which data are collected and interpreted can become prominent items for debate because, as Kingdon notes, “the data do not speak for themselves” (Kingdon, 1995:94).

are effective in reinforcing an existing perception of a problem; however, rarely do focusing events themselves position a problem on the governmental agenda (Kingdon, 1995: 98-100). Kingdon suggests that focusing events need to be accompanied by other mechanisms if they are to push an item onto the governmental agenda. Finally, feedback concerning existing policies can bring problems to the attention of policy makers by highlighting inconsistencies with respect to administrative or legislative intent, stated goals, financial considerations, and unanticipated consequences (Kingdon, 1995:100-103).

In sum, the problem stream is where a condition is transformed into a problem and is brought to the attention of government officials. It is here where we come to understand how issues are defined as problems and why some problems are more successful than others in capturing the attention of government officials.

#### **4.4.2 Politics Stream<sup>92</sup>**

The politics stream, which again is independent of the problem and policy streams, is the process whereby factors such as national mood, organized interests, and events in the government interact to influence the direction of government action (Kingdon, 1995: 145). Kingdon (1995: 145) notes that developments in the politics stream have a strong effect on agendas by introducing a new item on the agenda and shelving others until they can be brought back under more favourable circumstances. Of the three factors—national mood, organized interests, and events

---

<sup>92</sup> Kingdon (1995: 145-164).

in the government—the combination of national mood and events in government (specifically, elections) exerts the greatest influence on agendas, even greater than that of organized political forces (Kingdon, 1995: 164).

National mood rests on the notion that a fairly large number of individuals are thinking along common lines (Kingdon, 1995: 146).<sup>93</sup> From time to time, there are noticeable changes in the national mood, and these changes impact agendas and outcomes (Kingdon, 1995:146). Used as a mechanism by which government officials can gauge opinions on issues, the national mood can propel government officials to promote certain items onto agendas, restrain others from ascending to prominence, or push others into the shadows (Kingdon, 1995: 147).

A second component of the politics stream consists of organized political forces, often associated with notions of interest group pressure, political mobilization and the behavior of political elites (Kingdon, 1995: 150). What is important here is not necessarily the activities of organized political forces, but rather “how people in and around government perceive and react to various organized activities” (Kingdon, 1995: 150). Kingdon suggests that decision makers perceive consensus among organized interests (whether this is in support of or against a solution) as an indicator that perhaps they (the decision makers) should also move in that direction. On the other hand, dissent among organized forces is often perceived as an opportunity by decision makers to arrive at their own image of the situation, one that

---

<sup>93</sup> National mood is analogous to the terms “the climate in the country”, “changes in public opinion” or “broad social movements” (Kingdon, 1995: 146).

strikes a balance between the available options; however, if there is a perception that there is a tilt in the balance of opposition or support for an issue, this could have an impact on whether an item reaches the agenda.<sup>94</sup> Kingdon (1995: 153) is quick to point out that policy should not be entirely ascribed to organized interests because they are just one component of the process. In Kingdon's words, "organized forces, far from constituting a comprehensive explanation for public policy outcomes, is but one element—albeit an important one, in a more complete understanding" (Kingdon, 1995:153).

Events within the government represent a third component of the politics stream. Here agendas are affected by turnover of key personnel in the government as well as issues of jurisdiction (Kingdon, 1995: 153). Administrative or legislative turnover of key personnel can bring about dramatic changes in agendas in one of two ways, "either incumbents in positions of authority change their priorities and push new agenda items; or the personnel in those positions changes, bringing new priorities onto the agenda by virtue of the turnover" (Kingdon, 1995: 153). A change in administration is credited with having the most powerful turnover effect (Kingdon, 1995: 154). A new administration brings to the table a new perspective on issues and a list of its own priorities which have a direct impact on agendas. In addition to

---

<sup>94</sup> According to Kingdon (1995: 150), "if there is some conflict among the organized forces, then political leaders implicitly arrive at an image of their environment that strikes some balance between those for and those against a given proposal, or for and against the emergence of an item to agenda prominence. Their perception that the balance of support is tilting against a proposal may not necessarily prevent that item from being seriously considered...On the other hand, support for an item allows it to be pushed, and may be solely responsible in some cases for its rise to agenda prominence".

personnel turnover, agendas can also be affected by what is referred to as the “drawing of jurisdictional boundaries” (Kingdon, 1955: 155-159). The interests of an administrative agency or a congressional committee, as well as the positions of its members, are shaped by its areas of jurisdiction;<sup>95</sup> hence, changes in agendas are typically caused by battles over turf (Kingdon, 1995: 155).<sup>96</sup> Turf battles can prevent items from ever reaching the agenda, but they can also help to propel an item onto the decision agenda faster than it would in the absence of a turf battle (Kingdon, 1995: 157).

National mood, organized interests, and events in the government should not be interpreted as having “equal” impacts on agendas (Kingdon: 1995: 163-164).<sup>97</sup> Kingdon does not however mitigate the role of organized interests, which according to him play an important role once the item has reached the agenda: “once the item is on the agenda, the organized forces enter the picture, trying as best they can to bend the outcomes to their advantage, either by affecting the final compromises over the alternatives to be considered or, in some cases, by defeating proposals

---

<sup>95</sup> This is akin to Graham Allison’s (1971: 176) assertion that “where you stand depends upon where you sit”.

<sup>96</sup> Kingdon notes, “a major impact of constitutions, charters, statutes, and regulations is to establish jurisdictions. In the case of the federal government, administrative agencies and congressional committees have their claims to turf. Their positions are affected by their jurisdiction, agenda setting is affected by battles over turf, and some items are ignored because they are ‘defined away’ by the drawing of jurisdictional boundaries” (Kingdon, 1995: 155).

<sup>97</sup> According to Kingdon, “the forces are not equal in practice. In particular, the complex of national mood and elections seems to create extremely powerful impacts on policy agendas, impacts capable of overwhelming the balance of organized forces... This mood-elections combination has particularly powerful impacts on the agenda. It can force some subjects high on the agenda, and can also make it virtually impossible for government to pay serious attention to others” (Kingdon, 1995: 164).

altogether” (Kingdon, 1995: 166). In the MSF, “impact on the agenda...is different from control over the alternatives or over the outcomes” (Kingdon, 1995: 164).

Building consensus in the political stream takes place through a process of bargaining (Kingdon, 1995:159-162).<sup>98</sup> The process is best described as one based on mutual benefit: “you give me my provision, and I’ll give you yours” rather than on persuasion; “let me convince you of the virtue of my provision” (Kingdon, 1995:160). Ideas diffused through the politics stream gain acceptance through the support of coalitions that are built on bargaining. Coalitions are built using “concessions in return for support” which requires that participants be willing to compromise their positions (Kingdon, 1995: 159). The decision to join a coalition is based not only on the promise of some benefits, but also on the fear that not joining would exclude an individual from receiving any future benefits of participating in the coalition (Kingdon, 1995: 160-161). Although initial positions are often set in stone, there comes a point in time when compromise offers participants greater benefits than not compromising.<sup>99</sup> Once the bandwagon is rolling, the entry of new coalition members, sometimes quite suddenly, can contribute to sudden changes in the agenda because not only do such interests receive benefits from membership, but

---

<sup>98</sup> See also Dawson (2005: 68) for a discussion of consensus building in the politics stream.

<sup>99</sup> Kingdon (1995: 161) notes, “[i]nitially, participants stake out their positions somewhat rigidly, refusing to compromise on their principles...[however] [t]he time comes when rigid adherence to one’s original position would cost one dearly. These times are the real opportunities for passage, the policy windows...when compromise is in the air. At these times, participants of all types conclude that the bandwagon is rolling, and that they should be active in shaping the outcome. Advocates of change push hard for their proposals. Even enemies of change introduce their own proposals in an attempt to bend the outcomes as much as they can to their own purpose”.

their appearance creates an image of a movement being created for or against certain agenda items (Kingdon, 1995:163).

In sum, the politics stream is where a political environment conducive to agenda change is created. Whether an item appears on or disappears from the governmental agenda is shaped by three central elements: national mood, organized interests, and events in the government. Arriving at a consensus within the politics stream requires building coalitions through a system of bargaining.

#### **4.4.3 Policy Stream<sup>100</sup>**

The policy stream, or what Kingdon (1995: 116) also refers to as the “policy primeval soup”, is where alternatives are generated and undergo a process of selection in anticipation of ultimately reaching the decision agenda. The process by which the list of alternatives is generated and narrowed down to only a select few does not resemble rational decision making, but rather a biological evolutionary process (Kingdon, 1995: 124). Alternatives undergo a gradual transformation where ideas compete and combine with one another, some ideas catch on while others die before they get off the ground, and some combine and mutate into new ideas (Kingdon, 1995: 131).<sup>101</sup> Independent of the problem and politics streams, the

---

<sup>100</sup> Kingdon (1995: 116-144).

<sup>101</sup> According to Kingdon (1995: 124), “[m]any proposals are possible—a theoretical infinity of them. This policy primeval soup does not closely resemble a rational decision-making system with a few well-defined alternatives among which decision makers choose...The process is evolutionary, a selection process in which some of these ideas survive and flourish. With this reasoning, the origins become less important than the processes of mutation and recombination that occur as ideas continuously confront one another and are refined until they are ready to enter a serious decision

policy stream is driven by entirely different forces—policy communities, softening activities, and feasibility criterion (Kingdon, 1995: 117-118).

Policy communities play the central role in generating the list of potential alternatives from which government decision makers make an authoritative choice. Policy communities consist of specialists: researchers, academics, congressional staffers, bureaucrats, and interest group analysts in a given policy area, our familiar hidden cluster of participants (Kingdon, 1995: 117). Policy communities from different policy areas exhibit varying levels of fragmentation (Kingdon, 1995: 118).<sup>102</sup> While some communities are closed and tightly knit, others are open and fragmented (Kingdon, 1995:118). The degree of fragmentation has a direct bearing on what is generated by the policy communities and community agendas. Policy communities that are highly fragmented are likely to produce alternatives that are fragmented, lack focus, and are disjointed (Kingdon, 1995: 119). In contrast, a tightly knit community is likely to generate alternatives that are much more unified and succinct in their outlook (Kingdon, 1995:119-120). In terms of agenda stability, Kingdon (1995: 120-121) suggests that agendas in fragmented communities are

---

state. Thus, the order in which ideas are tried out sometimes approaches randomness, but the key to understanding the process is knowing the conditions under which ideas survive”.

<sup>102</sup> The health and transportation communities in the US are two such examples. Kingdon (1995: 118-119) notes, “[h]ealth and transportation provide an instructive contrast because health is far less fragmented. The health community does have diverse elements, including biomedical researchers, manpower specialists, health insurance advocates, and budget makers. But most health specialists deal with problems related to making people healthy and paying for their medical care, and there is a fair amount of interaction among the admittedly diverse elements... The transportation community is much more fragmented, partly because it is divided into different modes [railways, urban mass transit, highways, aviation]... There is also a division between those involved in regulation and those involved in federal grants programs”.

much more unstable than those of highly integrated communities. Agenda stability is attributed to what Kingdon refers to as “structural anchors”, such as agreed upon paradigms and susceptibility to crisis.<sup>103</sup>

Softening up is the process by which advocates, or what Kingdon (1995: 122, 128) refers to as “PEs”, attempt to garner interest and support for a new idea or proposal. PEs attempt to “soften up” both policy communities and the broader public using various softening activities such as floating trial balloons, holding congressional hearings, publishing reports, speeches, and introducing bills (Kingdon, 1995: 128-130). Kingdon emphasizes that the “softening” process should not be understood solely in terms of “lobbying muscle” but rather as one where the substance of an idea matters as much as pressure.<sup>104</sup> Softening is necessary to ensure that the relevant audience is receptive to a particular proposal when one is required.<sup>105</sup>

---

<sup>103</sup> According to Kingdon (1995:120-121), “agenda stability is due to structural anchors to the agenda. [A fragmented policy community] with its greater fragmentation, fewer agreed-upon paradigms, and greater susceptibility to crisis, is simply less completely structured. That relative lack of structure leaves the agenda free to shift from one time to another in a more volatile fashion. In the more tightly knit [policy] community, with its greater sharing of paradigm, there is less chance for [its] agenda to shift abruptly. The fragmentation of a policy system affects the stability of the agenda within the system”.

<sup>104</sup> According to Kingdon (1995: 125), “[p]olitical scientists are accustomed to such concepts as power, influence, pressure, and strategy. If we try to understand public policy solely in terms of these concepts, however, we miss a great deal. The content of the ideas themselves, far from being mere smokescreens or rationalizations, are integral parts of decision making in and around government. As officials and those close to them encounter ideas and proposals, they evaluate them, argue with one another, marshal evidence and argument in support or opposition, persuade one another, solve intellectual puzzles, and become entrapped in intellectual dilemmas”.

<sup>105</sup> According to Kingdon (1995: 130), “[s]oftening up seems to be necessary before a proposal is taken seriously. Many good proposals have fallen on deaf ears because they arrived before the general public, the specialized publics, or the policy communities were ready to listen. Eventually,

Ideas in the policy stream undergo a transformation, one best described as a “process of biological selection”. In this process, some ideas survive while others disappear. Surviving the selection process requires an idea to be technically feasible, compatible with the values of policymakers involved, and capable of anticipating and accommodating future constraints (Kingdon, 1995: 137-139). If an idea can pass these selection criteria, it can be diffused within the policy community. Consensus in the policy stream is built through a process of persuasion and diffusion.<sup>106</sup> Persuasion involves convincing others of the virtues of a specific provision (Kingdon, 1995: 160). Once an idea has passed the criteria for survival, it becomes diffused within the policy community, gradually receiving the support of a widening group of specialists (Kingdon, 1995: 140-141, 159). There is a clear distinction to be made between the processes that guide consensus building in the policy stream and those in the politics stream. Whereas the policy stream emphasizes persuasion, the politics stream is governed by bargaining. Kingdon (1995: 160) is quick to note that it is important not to associate specialists with the sole activity of persuasion and politicians with bargaining. The purpose of highlighting the distinction between the policy and politics streams is to bring attention to the processes involved.<sup>107</sup>

---

such a proposal might be resurrected, but only after a period of paving the way”.

<sup>106</sup> See also Dawson (2005: 71-75) for a detailed discussion of consensus building in the policy stream.

<sup>107</sup> Kingdon (1995: 160) notes, “[l]et us be clear once again that the processes are different from the participants, and that we are discussing processes here. In fact, policy specialists do not have

## **4.5 Policy Windows, Coupling, and Policy Entrepreneurs**

Our discussion of the three streams—problems, politics, and policy—has so far focused on the independent processes at work in structuring each of the streams. As important as it is to understand that the individual streams evolve independently, it is equally important to understand the processes by which the three independent streams come together and thus move an issue onto the decision agenda for an authoritative choice. There are three elements of the MSF that are central to our understanding of these processes—policy windows, coupling, and PEs.

### **4.5.1 Policy Windows**

Policy windows provide the opportunity for a “launch”, in other words, the opportunity for policy advocates to push their proposals or draw further attention to their problems (Kingdon, 1995: 165-166). In his research, Kingdon (1995: 165) found that a window resembles what one interest group analyst refers to as the “big wave”: “people who are trying to advocate change are like surfers waiting for the big wave. You get out there, you have to be ready to go, you have to be ready to paddle. If you are not ready to paddle when the big wave comes along, you’re not going to ride it in”. Kingdon identifies two categories of windows that can

---

monopoly on persuasion; nor do politicians have a monopoly on bargaining. One often observes politicians persuading and specialist bargaining. We are making this distinction between the two different types of coalition building to draw attention to the differences between the processes in the political and policy streams, not to argue that one process is the exclusive preserve of one type of actor”.

open—politics and problems. Politics windows open because of events in the politics stream—a change in administration, a change in the distribution of seats in Congress, or a shift in national mood (Kingdon, 1995:168). In contrast, problem windows open because of events in the problem stream, specifically, a new problem catches the attention of key political actors or a problem becomes pressing (Kingdon, 1995:168). Predicting when a window will open is a difficult task because there is a perceptual element involved.<sup>108</sup> In some cases, the task of predicting when a window will open is not as difficult because of the activities that cause a window to open. Some windows open with considerable consistency because of routine activities that help open and close windows on a schedule (Kingdon, 1995: 164).<sup>109</sup> Predictable windows are often cyclical in nature, opening and closing according to a schedule determined by formal institutional requirements. It is important for advocates to take advantage of an open window because windows open infrequently, and when they do open, their time is brief. There are several reasons why a window closes: participants feel that they have resolved the problem through a decision or enactment; participants fail to have action taken on their problem; events that caused the window to open dissipate; there are no available

---

<sup>108</sup> According to Kingdon (1995: 171), “[s]ome objective features define a policy window, such as a change of administration, a renewal, or the imminent collapse of a major sector of the economy. But the window exists in the perceptions of the participants as well. They perceive its presence or absence, they estimate the likelihood of its future occurrence, and they sometimes misestimate or misperceive. Beyond misperceiving, even highly skilled and knowledgeable people may disagree on whether a window is or will be open because the nature of the beast is complex and a bit opaque”.

<sup>109</sup> Examples of such activities include formal requirements such as policy renewals, the budget cycle, and annual reports (Kingdon, 1995: 186).

alternatives; and /or here may be a turnover in personnel who caused the window to open in the first place (Kingdon, 1995:169-170).

An open window plays a central role in the underlying process of agenda setting. Recall two central types of agendas—governmental and decision agendas—are of interest. The governmental agenda is the list of issues that are attracting attention by those in and around the government, whereas the decision agenda is a subset of the governmental agenda consisting of issues that are in line for a decision. Moving an item from the governmental agenda to the decision agenda is facilitated by an open window, often bringing about a change in policy.<sup>110</sup> The absence of an open window strongly diminishes a participant's willingness to push for an issue. Without an opportunity for an authoritative decision, policy advocates will fail to invest time and resources in pushing for an item. Kingdon notes that in many cases "potential items never rise on the [decision] agenda because their advocates conclude it isn't worth their effort to push them" (Kingdon, 1995: 167).

#### **4.5.2 Coupling**

At critical points in time, such as the opening of a policy window, these three otherwise independent streams join to push an item onto the decision agenda for an authoritative decision. The joining or "coupling" of the three elements by a PE

---

<sup>110</sup> Kingdon (1995: 166-167) notes: "[p]olicy windows open infrequently, and do not stay open long. Despite their rarity, the major changes in public policy result from the appearance of these opportunities...Think of a queue of items waiting their turn on a decision agenda. Somehow, the items must be ordered in the queue. The opening of a window often establishes the priority in the queue. Participants move some items ahead of others, essentially because they believe the proposals stand a decent chance of enactment".

suggests that a problem has been recognized, a solution has been developed, and a favourable political climate for agenda change exists. Kingdon (1995: 178) emphasizes that individually the streams are not powerful enough to propel an item onto the decision agenda. The absence of just one element will also have a weak impact on the agenda by making a subject's time on the agenda brief.<sup>111</sup> Throughout the process, there may be what Kingdon (1995: 202) refers to as partial couplings—solutions to problems; politics to solutions; or politics to problems. However, each pairing is missing a critical third element for the complete package. In the case of the first pairing (solutions to problems), a receptive political climate is absent whereas with the second pairing (politics to solutions), there is no sense that a pressing problem is being addressed, and finally, with respect to the third pairing (politics to problem), a viable alternative is absent (Kingdon, 1995: 202). Partial couplings, although they occur, are not powerful enough to fix an item on the decision agenda.

The opportunity for the coupling of the three streams is created by the opening of a policy window. Recall that there are two types of policy windows that

---

<sup>111</sup> Kingdon (1995: 179) notes, “[p]roblems or politics by themselves can structure the *governmental* agenda. But the probability of an item rising on the *decision* agenda is dramatically increased if all three streams—problems, policies, and politics—are joined...None of the streams are sufficient by themselves to place an item firmly on the decision agenda. If one of the three elements is missing—if a solution is not available, a problem cannot be found or is not sufficiently compelling, or support is not forthcoming from the political stream—then the subjects’ place on the decision agenda is fleeting...Since it cannot move from governmental agenda status to a decision agenda, attention turns to other subjects” (Kingdon, 1995: 178). Kingdon reinforces the importance of coupling by highlighting the powerful “joint effect” of coupling the three streams: there are very few single-factor explanations for high placement on the agenda. Generally, the rise of an item is due to the joint effect of several factors coming together at a given point in time, not to the effect of one or another of them singly...It [is] their *joint* effects that [are] so powerful...Generally, no one factor dominates or precedes the

can open—problem and political windows. This distinction is an important one because the type of window that opens (i.e. the events that caused the governmental agenda to change) has an impact on what is selected from the policy stream.<sup>112</sup> Problem windows indicate to decision makers that a serious problem exists which requires their attention. In response to a pressing problem, decision makers “reach into the policy stream for an alternative that can reasonably be seen as a solution” (Kingdon, 1995: 174). In contrast, changes in the politics stream which induce the opening of a politics window call for a solution that fits with the new political situation.<sup>113</sup> Policy advocates are constantly on the look out for opportunities to couple the three streams; however, also laying in wait are policy opponents who wish to derail the process. Open windows for opponents of particular policies provide them with the opportunity to prevent action on a particular issue by overloading the governmental agenda with more solutions than decision

---

others”.

<sup>112</sup> Recall that in the MSF, the problem and politics streams have the greatest impact on agenda change whereas the policy stream is focused on the development of alternatives. The problem and politics streams have the added importance of influencing the type of window that opens: “[w]hat does an open window call for? The answer depends on what opened the window in the first place, or, to put it another way, what caused the agenda to change...[C]hange usually comes about in response to developments in the problems and political streams, not in the policy stream. So the two categories of windows—problem and political windows—call for different borrowings from the policy stream (Kingdon, 1995: 173-174).

<sup>113</sup> According to Kingdon (1995: 174), “a window can be opened by an event in the political stream—a change of administration, a shift in national mood, an influx of new members of Congress. Politicians decide to undertake some sort of initiative on a particular subject, and cast about for ideas. Putting themselves in the market for proposals creates an [opportunity] for advocates, and many alternatives are then advanced by their sponsors. One or more of the proposals worked up and available in the policy stream thus becomes coupled to the event in the political stream that changed the agenda. The problems may not have changed at all; nor did the solutions. But the availability of an alternative that responds in some way to a new political situation changes the [governmental] agenda”.

makers can adequately process.<sup>114</sup>

The process of coupling is contentious because it challenges traditional rational models of decision making which argue that solutions are generated only after a problem is identified. In the MSF, solutions are constantly being developed and revised in the policy stream regardless of whether a problem exists. They drift around government, looking for political developments that will increase their chances of being adopted or problems to be attached to (Kingdon, 1995: 172). Solutions that are perceived by politicians as being expedient or a solution to a pressing problem move onto the governmental agenda (Kingdon, 1995: 172). The coupling of the three elements into a single package is the pivotal process by which an item moves onto the decision agenda for an authoritative choice.

#### **4.5.3 Policy Entrepreneurs**

Kingdon (1995:179) describes PEs as “advocates who are willing to invest their resources—time, energy, reputation, and money to promote positions in return for anticipated future gain in the form of material, purposive, or solitary benefits”. PEs can be found in many different locations: in or out of government, in elected or appointed positions, in interest groups or research organizations; thus no single

---

<sup>114</sup> Kingdon (1995: 176) notes, “strategists sometimes deliberately overload an agenda to frustrate all action. If they want to prevent action on a particular item, they load in many other items to compete. What happens when such an unmanageable multitude of problems and alternatives get dumped into the deliberations? One possibility, indeed not uncommon, is that the entire complex of issues falls of its own weight. Most participants conclude that the subject is too complex, the problems too numerous, and the array of alternatives too overwhelming. Their attention drifts away to other, more manageable subjects”.

type of player dominates the entrepreneurial pool (Kingdon, 1995:122, 204). What makes PEs successful is their persistence, their political connections or negotiating skills, and their claim to a hearing (Kingdon, 1995: 180-181).<sup>115</sup> PEs appear at critical points in the decision making process—pushing their concerns about a problem higher on the agenda, pushing their proposals during the softening up of the system, and the coupling of streams (Kingdon, 1995:204). It is the coupling of the streams during an open window when the PE's presence and qualities—persistence, their political connections or negotiating skills, and their claim to a hearing—are most needed to push problems and solutions into prominence (Kingdon, 1995: 204-205). Kingdon suggests that, without the presence of an entrepreneur at this point in the process, “the linking of the three streams may not take place. Good ideas lie fallow for lack of an advocate. Problems are unsolved for lack of a solution. Political events are not capitalized for lack of inventive and developed proposals” (Kingdon, 1995:182).

The importance of individuals in shaping policy has led to a growing body of work examining policy entrepreneurship (Raines and Prakash, 2005; McCowan, 2004; Carter and Scott, 2004; Carter, Scott, and Rowling, 2004; Meo, Ziebro and Patton, 2004; Cline, 2001; Mintrom, 2000, 1997a, 1997b; 1994; and Ziebro, 2000).<sup>116</sup> In their study of corporate environmental practices, Raines and Prakash

---

<sup>115</sup> A “claim to a hearing” refers to an individual’s right to participate in the process. Kingdon (1995: 180) suggests that policy entrepreneurs are awarded this right on the basis of their expertise, their ability to speak on behalf of others, or their position as an authoritative decision maker.

<sup>116</sup> See also earlier studies by Oliver and Shaheen (1997), Davis (1999), Schiller (1995), Schneider

(2005: 3, 8) found that the presence and the actions of an entrepreneur increased the likelihood that corporations would adopt environmentally progressive policies. Individuals identified as entrepreneurs were instrumental in not only advocating for “greener” policies, but also in the adoption of such policies by corporate leaders. (Raines and Prakash, 2005: 10-11). Carter and Scott (2004) and Carter et. al. (2004) investigated the role of members of Congress in advancing their foreign policy agendas. They found that congressional foreign policy PEs are a clearly identifiable group of entrepreneurs because of their willingness to initiate their own agendas without action from the Administration (Carter and Scott, 2004; Carter et. al., 2004). Meo et. al. (2004) examined the relationship between entrepreneurs and policy innovation, drawing upon the experience of Tulsa’s municipal government in developing innovative natural hazards mitigation and environmental policy as their case study. They concluded that not only are PEs a clearly identifiable group of individuals who shape policy, but there are also different categories of PEs (Meo et. al., 2004). Cline (2001) examined the role of individuals as catalysts of change in extending health policy at the local level, and found that the presence and actions of PEs were critical in increasing the probability of the successful development and adoption of policy innovations. Mintrom (2000, 1997a, 1997b, 1994), one of the leaders in policy entrepreneurial research, has provided significant evidence that PEs play a central role in the diffusion of policy innovation. Using educational policy

---

and Teske (1995, 1992), Polsby (1994), Roberts (1994), Bryson and Crosby (1992), Weissert (1991), Doig and Hargrove (1987), King and Roberts (1987), Walker (1974), Bardach (1972), and Price (1971).

as his case study, Mintrom has provided considerable insight to the critical role of PEs, their actions, entrepreneurial motivations and strategies in the successful adoption of choice based school reform. Ziebro (2000) analyzed the role of specific individuals involved in the development of Tulsa's environmental policies. Her (2000: 235) findings confirmed that PE's played a pivotal role in overcoming barriers to policy innovation and social learning. Berry and Flowers (1999) investigated the role of individuals in the budget reform policy process of the state of Florida. Through a series of interviews, they were able to identify key individuals involved in the development, adoption and implementation of major policy changes to budgetary practices, the role of specific individuals during the development and adoption stage of the policy process, and strategies used by individuals that proved to be effective in initiating change (1999: 616-617). They concluded that policy change requires "purposive and strategic actions from public entrepreneurs" (1999: 578) and that different types of entrepreneurs can be found throughout the different stages of the policy process (1999: 585-607).

#### **4.6 Conclusions**

Our discussion of Kingdon's MSF has highlighted key participants and processes involved in agenda setting and the specification of alternatives—streams, policy windows, coupling, and PEs. Central to Kingdon's MSF is the notion of three constantly flowing and independent streams—problem, politics, and policy—each competing for the attention of decision makers. Independence means that each

stream “has a life of its own,” allowing it to develop according to a unique set of factors. The politics and problem streams are where we find a visible cluster of participants, whereas the policy stream is populated by a hidden cluster of participants. Governmental agendas—the list of issues that are attracting considerable attention by those in and around the government—are set by developments in the problem or politics streams. Moving an issue from the governmental agenda to the decision agenda—a subset of the governmental agenda consisting of issues that are in line for an authoritative decision—is governed by an entirely different process. An issue is propelled onto the decision agenda for an authoritative decision when the three streams are coupled by a PE during an open policy window. Partial couplings occur along the way; however, a position on the decision agenda requires that all three elements—problem, a receptive political environment, and solution—are joined into a “single package” by a PE (Kingdon, 1995: 202). As agents of policy change, PEs play a central role in decision making, a fact that is supported by the growing body of literature on policy entrepreneurship. Chapter five utilizes the discussion of Kingdon’s MSF and insights from existing literature to address the MSF’s atheoretical label and provide greater substance and clarity to the framework’s central concept of PEs, and in the process generate testable hypotheses. The chapter also serves as the methodological section of the study by identifying the sources of information for the study, methods that were used to collect the necessary data, and how the data were analyzed to arrive at the study’s conclusions.

## Chapter 5 Modifications to the Multiple Streams Framework and the Generation and Testing of Hypotheses

### 5.0 Introduction

This chapter builds on the discussion of the MSF by first organizing the critical pieces of the MSF into a coherent organizational structure using the concept of two-level theories which explains outcomes by organizing variables according to two distinct levels—basic and secondary—with different logical structures between levels (Goertz and Mahoney, 2006, 2004: 1-2). One of the many criticisms of the MSF is that it lacks structure and that it is too ambiguous in terms of the processes that drive the framework. Operationalizing the MSF as a two-level theory will provide us with the opportunity to organized variables and identify relationships. In the process, we can push further on theorizing about PEs and in the process generate testable hypotheses. As noted by Goertz and Mahoney (2004: 1-2), many prominent theories, although they are neither officially recognized nor structured as two-level theories are in fact two-level in nature.<sup>117</sup> The chapter also serves as the methodological section of the study by identifying the sources of information for the study, methods that were used to collect the necessary data, and how the data were analyzed to arrive at the study's conclusions.

---

<sup>117</sup>

According to Goertz and Mahoney (2004: 534), examples of two-level theories can be found in the literature on states, public policy and social movements. Four prominent theories identified by Goertz and Mahoney (2004) as two-level include: Skocpol's (1979) theory of social revolution, Ostrom's (1991a) theory of institutional functioning; Downing's (1992) theory of the origins of liberal democracy; and Hicks, Misra and Nah Hg (1995) theory of the creation of welfare states.

## 5.1 Two-Level Theories

The organizational structure of two-level theories provides us with the opportunity to identify relationships between variables that underlie Kingdon's MSF and move ahead on theorizing within the framework by developing theoretically grounded explanations of the dynamic and complex processes at work. It is common for theories to utilize nonhierarchical, single level structures to explain outcomes; however, two-level theories provide explanations of outcomes by organizing variables at two levels of analysis—basic and secondary—with different logical structures between them (Goertz and Mahoney, 2004: 1-2). The organizing structure of a two-level theory really embodies two theories, one at the basic-level and the other at the secondary-level (Ragin and Pennings, 2005: 427). The underlying theory at the basic (or first) level centres on the predictors of the outcome variable (or the main dependent variable), whereas the theory at the secondary (or second) level seeks to explain the predictors of the basic (or first) level (Ragin and Pennings, 2005: 427). The structure of a two-level theory uncovers the mechanisms at work using necessary and sufficient conditions to define relationships between levels. A key defining feature of two-level theories is the high degree of abstraction at the basic-level which requires greater specification at the secondary-level in order to account for the structure at the basic-level (Goertz, 2001: 7).<sup>118</sup>

---

<sup>118</sup> Goertz (2001: 7) notes: “[o]ne of the key aspects of all the necessary conditions proposed by Kingdon...is that they are pitched at a fairly high level of abstraction. The second level...requires a specification of what should count as fulfilling the necessary condition at the first structural level.

### 5.1.1 Basic and Secondary Level Variables

#### *Basic-Level*

At the heart of a two-level model is the basic-level because it provides the underlying rationale for the outcome variable (Ragin and Pennings, 2005: 427). It is here where we find the main variables of the theory as a whole (Goertz and Mahoney, 2004: 3). Basic-level variables can be organized using different logical structures, the most prominent being the conjuncture of necessary causes, and equifinality (Goertz and Mahoney, 2004: 3). Conjuncture of necessary causes suggests that “a combination of necessary conditions are sufficient to produce an outcome”, whereas equifinality suggests that “there are various conditions that are sufficient to produce the same outcome and hence multiple paths to the same outcome” (Goertz and Mahoney, 2004: 3).

#### *Secondary-Level*

The secondary-level has an indirect impact on the outcome variable through the basic-level. Recall that the causal conditions at the basic-level are the effects of the secondary-level causal conditions (Ragin and Pennings, 2005: 428); hence secondary-level variables serve as an indirect link to the main outcome variable (Goertz and Mahoney, 2006: 242). Goertz and Mahoney (2006: 242-243) identify three types of relationships that can exist between the secondary and basic

---

Hence, [there are] two levels, the core one involving multiple necessary conditions which are jointly sufficient and a second level which permits multiple and substitutable factors to fill the necessary condition slots”.

levels—causal, ontological, and substitutable. A *causal relationship* can be described as the “causes of causes” (Goertz and Mahoney, 2006: 242). With an *ontological relationship*, the secondary-level variables represent the central components of the basic-level variables whereas with a *substitutable relationship*, secondary-level variables are substitutes to a given basic level variable (Goertz and Mahoney, 2006, 242-243). The logical structure of relationships between variables at the two levels can vary. Traditionally, analysts use either AND or OR to connect variables (Goertz and Mahoney, 2006: 243).

The power of two-level theories stems from the systematic relationship between the two levels (Goertz and Mahoney, 2006: 244). Although the addition of the secondary-level variables adds complexity to the argument developed at the basic-level, it also helps to corroborate the argument at the basic-level empirically (Goertz and Mahoney, 2006: 244). To test claims at the basic-level, Goertz and Mahoney (2006: 244). suggest “analysts draw on the information at the secondary-level, which allows them to move down levels of analysis and examine factors that further elaborate the causal relationship”. Uncovering causal relationships provides researchers with a deeper understanding of the underlying basic-level causes that contribute to the outcome of interest. An analysis of ontological relationships provides researchers with an opportunity to dissect the defining features of basic-level variables that impact the outcome. According to Goertz and Mahone (2006: 244-245): “the specific properties identified in the secondary-level are “mechanisms” that explain why the basic-level variables have the effects they do.” Finally, by

examining substitutable relationships, researchers are able to uncover the various combinations by which basic-level variables can be satisfied. The basic level, according to Goertz and Mahone (2006: 244-245), “taps a factor which is common across cases, while the secondary-level permits differentiation among cases in the ways in which this can occur.”

### **5.1.2 Conceptualizing the Multiple Streams Framework as a Two-Level Theory**

Kingdon’s MSF posits a complex web of actors, events, and processes which come together at critical points in time to propel items onto the decision agenda for an authoritative decision. Drawing on our detailed analysis of Kingdon’s MSF, we use the guidelines set out by Goertz and Mahoney (2004: 24-25) and insights to the MSF provided by Goertz and Levy (2005) and Goertz (2003, 2001) to formally construct Kingdon’s MSF as a two-level theory and to clarify relationships between the levels of analysis. In the process, we can begin to push forward towards the theoretical development of the framework and the generation of testable hypotheses.

#### *Basic-Level*

Within the structure of a two-level theory, the basic-level consists of the central variables and the outcome variable of the theory (Goertz and Mahoney, 2004: 3). In the case of the MSF, the outcome variable is the decision agenda which is operationalized as a subset of the governmental agenda consisting of issues that

are in line for an authoritative decision as in a legislative vote or a presidential decision. A thorough review of the MSF and insights provided by Goertz and Levy (2005) and Goertz (2003, 2001) suggest that *problems, politics, policy, policy window, and PE* can be identified as the main variables (basic-level variables): problem—a pressing problem is recognized; politics—a favourable political environment for change exists; policy—a solution is available; policy window—an open window provides the catalyst for change; and PE—a policy advocate capable of coupling the three streams is present. Our analysis of the MSF suggests a *conjuncture of necessary variables* relationship between the basic-level variables and the outcome variable. In other words, a combination of necessary conditions—problem, politics, policy, policy window, and PE, are influential predictors of the outcome—movement of an issue from the governmental agenda to the decision agenda for an authoritative decision, as in a legislative vote or a presidential decision.

### *Secondary-Level*

Secondary-level variables serve as a link to the main outcome variable. Their theoretical significance is derived from their relationship to the main outcome which is determined through their relationship to the basic-level variables. Using our detailed analysis of the MSF and insights provided by Goertz and Levy (2005) and Goertz (2003, 2001), we can extract the relevant secondary variables and the logical structures underlying their relationship with the basic-level variables.

The first group of secondary-level variables—the release of statistical indicators used to monitor the progression of policy (indicators), the release of studies assessing the viability of policy (studies), a focusing event such as a crisis or disaster that brings attention to policy (focusing event), feedback from the public to decision makers concerning existing policy (public feedback), and feedback from bureaucrats to policy makers concerning existing policy (bureaucratic feedback)—provide the link to the basic-level variable—problem (a pressing problem is recognized). In this case, the combination of the necessary conditions (indicators, studies, focusing event, public feedback and bureaucratic feedback) act, as an influential predictor of the basic-level variable (problem stream).

The second group of secondary-level variables—a change in public opinion concerning existing policy (public opinion), a change of administration (change in administration), a change in party status in congress (change in party status), turnover of key government bureaucratic personnel (bureaucratic turnover), and influence of interest groups (interest groups)—provides the link to the basic-level variable—politics (a favourable political environment). In this case, the combination of the necessary conditions (public opinion, change in administration, change in party status, bureaucratic turnover, interest groups) acts as an influential predictor of the basic-level variable (politics stream).


The third group of secondary-level variables—policy communities, softening activities, and feasibility criteria—provide the link to the basic-level variable—policy (an available alternative). In this case, the combination of the necessary conditions

(a solution is generated in the policy community and “softened” and passes the feasibility criteria) acts as an influential predictor of the basic-level variable (policy stream).

The fourth group of secondary-level variables—problem and political events—provides the link to the basic-level variable—policy window. In this case, the logical structure of the relationship can be best categorized as one of “equifinality” such that there are multiple paths (problem or political events) that can be influential predictors of the outcome (policy window).

The final group of secondary-level variables—a claim to a hearing, political connectivity, skilled negotiator, and persistence—provides the link to the basic-level variable—PE (a policy advocate capable of coupling the three streams). In this case, the relationship between the secondary-level variables and the basic-level variables is ontological; in other words, the secondary-level variables are the defining features of the basic-level variable. In this case, the combination of the necessary (a claim to a hearing, political connectivity, negotiation skills, and persistence) acts as an influential predictor of the basic-level variable (PE). Figure 5.0 provides a visual representation of the MSF utilizing the concepts of a two-level theory as the organizing structure.

Figure 5.1 The Multiple Streams Framework Operationalized as a Two-Level Theory



Source: Author.

If the MSF is correct in its characterization of the decision making process, we expect the positioning of a policy proposal for authoritative action to be consistent with the MSF's underlying hypothesis that an issue reaches the governmental decision agenda for an authoritative decision when three constantly flowing and independent streams—problems, politics, and policy—are coupled by a PE during a critical window of opportunity. Two-level theories are inherently complex; however, they also equip us with “a powerful set of tools to model social phenomena” (Goertz and Mahoney, 2004: 6). Operationalizing the MSF as a two-level helps to uncover relationships between variables and the dynamic processes at work. In the process, we can bring clarity to a framework which is criticized for being atheoretical as well as aid in its theoretical development.

## **5.2 Modifications to the Multiple Streams Framework and the Generation of Testable Hypotheses**

Having sketched the organizing structure of the MSF, we can now shift our attention to refining the concept of PEs and developing testable hypotheses. Recall that one of the key criticisms of Kingdon's MSF, which has contributed to the framework's “atheoretical label” and prevented it from becoming a “full fledged theory” is its lack of explicit and testable hypotheses. PEs play a pivotal role in the conceptualization of the MSF, yet Kingdon fails to develop formally any testable hypotheses that contribute to its theoretical development.

### 5.2.1 Policy Entrepreneurs

Kingdon's MSF not only acknowledges the importance of PEs, but also assigns them a critical role in the policy process. Recall that in the MSF, PEs can be found in many different locations—in or out of government, in elected or appointed positions, as members of interest groups or research organizations; thus no single type of player dominates the entrepreneurial pool (Kingdon, 1995:122, 204). What distinguishes PEs from other participants in the policy process is their willingness to invest their resources (time, energy, reputation and money) in hope of some future benefit, such as satisfaction derived from solving a problem, the promotion of personal interests, shaping the direction of future policy, and playing an active role in the policy process (Kingdon, 1995: 122-124).

PEs can be found at critical points in the agenda setting process actively pushing for their proposals during the “softening” of the system and the opening of windows. During the softening of the system, PEs attempt to make their proposals palatable to policy communities and decision makers in order to solidify support for their proposals when it is needed. It is during the opening of a window, however, that a PE's presence is perhaps the most critical during the agenda setting process. Windows provide PEs with the opportunity to “couple” the three streams by selling their preferred package of problem and solution to a receptive political environment (Zahariadis, 2007a: 1). The joining of the three streams is necessary to propel an item onto the decision agenda for an authoritative choice. Kingdon (1995: 178) emphasizes that without the presence of a PE during this critical period, coupling is

unlikely to occur; therefore, issues often fail to move from the governmental to the decision agenda, and attention by decision makers shifts to other issues. Kingdon (1995: 182) is careful to note that the presence of a PE increases the likelihood, but does not necessarily ensure, that concerns will be heard, policy ideas promoted, and streams coupled.

*Hypothesis 1: Entrepreneurial Characteristics*

What makes PEs successful according to Kingdon (1995: 180-181) is their claim to a hearing, their political connections, their negotiating skills, and their persistence. An entrepreneur's claim to hearing, or what Kingdon also refers to as an individual's right to participate in the process, can originate from one of three sources: expertise on the issue, the ability to speak on behalf of others, or a position as an authoritative decision maker. An entrepreneur's political connections and negotiation skills help to create influence. Persistence implies that individuals are willing to devote a significant share of their personal time and resources to achieving their desired outcome. Using Kingdon's conceptualization of a successful PE we derive the following hypothesis:

H<sub>1</sub>: Policy entrepreneurs are more likely to couple the streams successfully during an open policy window if they possess four key entrepreneurial characteristics—have a claim to a hearing, are politically connected, are skilled negotiators, and are persistent.

Michael Mintrom (2000, 1997a, 1997b, 1994),<sup>119</sup> a leading scholar on the role of PEs in policy innovation and diffusion, argues that in order for PEs to succeed in

shaping policy, they must be perceived as trustworthy by those they seek to influence. Mintrom sees Kingdon's list of entrepreneurial as effective in signaling to decision makers an individual's trustworthiness: "all of these qualities serve to signal understanding of the policy issues at stake and serious commitment to the positions espoused; matters that decision makers...interpret as evidence of trustworthiness" (Mintrom, 2000: 48-49). In the competitive realm of policy making, Kingdon's entrepreneurial qualities accord an entrepreneur a competitive advantage by not only increasing the likelihood that his or her voice will be heard from among the many competing voices, but also be taken seriously by decision makers.

### *Hypothesis 2: Coupling Strategies*

Kingdon's MSF accords considerable significance to the presence and activities of PEs in pushing for agenda change. Yet although effective in communicating their importance in the agenda setting process, it fails to provide a comprehensive account of their efforts to couple the streams (Zahariadis, 2003, 1996). To address this issue, this study incorporates insights from research on agenda setting and policy entrepreneurship to bring greater clarity to the precise notion of coupling and the actions of PEs in that process.

Coupling in the context of the MSF is a crucial link in our understanding of how a problem moves from the governmental to the decision agenda for an authoritative decision. Recall that in the MSF, the three streams—problem, politics,

---

<sup>119</sup> Also see Mintrom and Vergari (1998, 1996).

and policy—evolve according to their own dynamics. There is, however, a pivotal point in time—the opening of a policy window—when the three independent streams align to be coupled, a solution is attached to a problem, and the solution-problem package is matched to a receptive political climate. Successful coupling of the streams suggests that a problem has been recognized, a solution is readily available, and a receptive political climate for agenda change exists. In his work on policy entrepreneurship and policy innovation, Mintrom notes that it is vital for those seeking to influence policy to view policy making as “a complex series of interconnected elements, where problem framing and the presentation of solutions is always done with an eye toward the broader political situation” (Mintrom, 2000: 281). The central participant in the coupling process is our familiar PE whose presence and actions increase the likelihood that the streams will be successfully coupled. Without the presence of a PE, Kingdon (1995: 182) suggests, the coupling of the streams may not take place—problems remain unrecognized, solutions lay dormant, and political events are not exploited. Zahariadis (2007a: 17, 22; 2007b; 2003; 1996), one of the few scholars to have examined the MSF extensively (Sabatier, 1997: 7), reinforces the pivotal role played by PEs during this critical phase in the policy process, referring to them as an “important piece of the puzzle”.<sup>120</sup> Mintrom (1997a: 738) reiterates the importance of PEs in not only

---

<sup>120</sup> Zahariadis (2007a: 17, 22) notes, “[e]ntrepreneurs not only fix attention to particular problems and solutions, but they also direct the search process, actively support their own or oppose rival solutions, and skillfully use time, access, and resources to couple the streams together. As (Pierre and Peters, 2005: 59-60) [*sic*] categorically assert, “individual entrepreneurs become the crucial means of producing action”...[They help] to couple solutions and problems to a receptive political audience.

agenda setting, but also policy change, suggesting that their presence and actions substantially increase the likelihood of not only legislative consideration, but also approval of innovative policy alternatives.<sup>121</sup> In his innovative and influential research on agenda setting, Walker (1981: 91; 1977: 435) recognized early on the power of PEs to bring together the critical components for successful agenda and policy change. A broad body of research on the subject of policy entrepreneurship provides ample evidence of the critical role played by PEs in both agenda and policy change.<sup>122</sup> What remains to be articulated by the MSF is how PEs couple the streams, an issue which, according to Simon and Alm (1995: 461), lies at the heart of our understanding of the agenda setting process.

### *Heresthetical Strategies*

Zahariadis' research on decision making provides insight on coupling strategies.<sup>123</sup> Using Riker's (1986, 1984) work on heresthetics and political strategy, Zahariadis (2007a: 2003, 69; 1996: 404-405) posits that PEs are much more likely to succeed at coupling the streams if they use one or more heresthetical

---

They are clearly an important piece of the puzzle."

<sup>121</sup> See also Jeon and Haider-Markel (2001: 215) on this point.

<sup>122</sup> See Blomquist (2000), Hutto (2006), Jones and Baumgartner (2005), Carter and Scott (2004), Mackenzie (2004), Jeon and Haider-Markel (2001), Oliver and Shaheen (1997), Simon and Alm (1995), Baumgartner and Jones (1993), Roberts and King (1991), Berry and Flowers (1999), and Cobb and Elder (1972).

<sup>123</sup> It is important to note that Zahariadis (2007a, 2007b, 2003) develops a number of hypotheses concerning entrepreneurial strategies, but he does not formally test them.

strategies—manipulation of dimensions, agenda control, strategic voting, or salami tactics.

The term “heresthetics” was coined by Riker (1986: ix) to refer to a political strategy which seeks to structure a situation to attract the support of others in order to attain the preferred outcome. Heresthetics, according to Riker, involves more than just persuasion; it involves the strategic manipulation of choice.<sup>124</sup> Under conditions of ambiguity, Zahariadis (2003: 21) suggests manipulation is an effective tool for PEs to provide “meaning, clarification, and identity” to a situation.<sup>125</sup> Zahariadis (2003: 17-18, 20-21) notes that, although the final decision to select the “best” solution is made by legislators, not the manipulators. Manipulators are able to influence or “bias” choice by redirecting support away from one alternative towards another. With this in mind, attention can now shift to the various forms of manipulation or “heresthetical strategies” PEs can use to successfully couple the streams. Informational and procedural manipulation have been identified in the

---

<sup>124</sup> For a discussion of manipulation and policy making, see Shepsle (2003: 310), Schofield (2000), and Maoz (1990: 77).

<sup>125</sup> From a rationalist perspective, manipulation is traditionally associated with deceitful and opportunistic behaviour (Zahariadis, 2003: 19). Zahariadis (2003: 21-22) presents an alternative view of manipulation, however, one that incorporates some of the basic tenets of the rationalist perspective, yet reflects a “multiple streams” view of the policy making process. Zahariadis (2003: 18) defines manipulation as “the systematic distortion, misrepresentation, or selective presentation of information by skilled policy entrepreneurs who exploit opportunities in a world of unclear goals, opaque technology, and fluid participation”. Manipulation in the context of the MSF, as described by Zahariadis (2003: 21-22), “aims primarily to provide *meaning, clarification, and identity*. In a world replete with ambiguity, the most important aspect of entrepreneurial activity is not to pursue self-interest but to clarify or create meaning for those policymakers, and others, who have problematic preferences. It is precisely the inability to formulate interests on the part of policymakers that makes entrepreneurs rationalists in their narrow pursuit of their pet proposal, but meaning suppliers and identity providers in their coupling efforts.”

literature as means by which individuals can engineer a favourable decision making environment for their preferred proposals (Hoyt, 1997: 775).

*Informational Manipulation—The Manipulation of Dimensions or “Framing”*

The first category of manipulation—informational manipulation—involves the strategic selection, presentation, and interpretation of information to alter preferences (Hoyt, 1997: 775). Riker (1986: 150) identifies the manipulation of dimensions as the most frequently used and readily accessible strategy to alter choice. Dimension manipulation “is a distinct strategy in that it occurs prior to any actual collective decision (unlike strategic voting) and is concerned with how one thinks about a decision, rather than the order in which decisions are to be made (unlike agenda control)” (Paine, 1989: 38). The central goal of dimension manipulation is to sway individuals to select from your list of alternatives by highlighting an existing or new dimension of the issue that captures the attention and support of your target audience (Paine, 1989: 38-39). The terms “framing” and “issue definition” are often used (Zahariadis, 2007a, 2007b; Mintrom, 2000; Hoyt, 1997; Baumgartner and Jones, 1993) to refer to Riker’s strategy of dimension manipulation.<sup>126</sup> Framing, as with dimension manipulation, facilitates coupling by enabling PEs to influence decision makers’ perceptions of problems and solutions.<sup>127</sup> By manipulating preferences, and ultimately choice, PEs can “upset a

---

<sup>126</sup> For purposes of consistency, the term “framing” is used throughout this study.

<sup>127</sup> Coupling, according to Zahariadis (2003: 91) requires policy entrepreneurs to become “sellers” and

political equilibrium” (Zahariadis, 2003: 69-70), that is, break up winning coalitions, or reduce/expand the range of conflict (Bryson and Crosby, 1992: 262-263) in order to shift support in favour of their preferred proposal. Zahariadis (2007a: 18) underscores the importance of framing to coupling by arguing that PEs are more likely to succeed at coupling if they “frame issues appropriately” such that alternatives appeal to a broad spectrum of decision makers.<sup>128</sup> Framing is an arduous task; however, when successful, it can, as Jean and Haider-Markel (2001:227) found in their research, be a powerful force in shaping agendas. The power of new policy frames to dismantle policy monopolies, or what Mintrom (1994: 84) refers to as “institutionally induced and maintained equilibria”, makes framing a driving force in both agenda stability and instability (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993: 16). Empirical research provides ample cases of how framing has been used to not only initiate, but also prohibit, changes to agendas and policy.<sup>129</sup>

---

in the process manipulate attributes of their product: “to ‘sell’ their pet solution and problem to a receptive political audience [policy entrepreneurs] manipulate ambiguity by framing alternatives...and by biasing policymakers to adopt their solution and reject the others. Hence, frames are viewed not simply as different alternatives but as different packages of problems linked to alternatives. Information is manipulated to highlight certain aspects and to hide others”.

<sup>128</sup> Zahariadis (2007a: 18) notes, “[c]oupling the three streams is more likely when *entrepreneurs frame issues appropriately*. Coupling involves more than persuading policy makers to adopt a particular proposal. It involves activating particular dimensions of the problem to fit the solution in language that appeals to different policy makers (Mintrom 2000, 137). Information is not value-neutral. Entrepreneurs build frames that convey particular meaning to different audiences, building coalitions and containing conflict”.

<sup>129</sup> See Korkchi, 2007 (examines the appearance of terrorism as a policy issue on the security agendas of Sweden and the United Kingdom); Pralle, 2006 (traces the decision to adopt legislation prohibiting the use of pesticides in Canada); Jean and Haider-Markel, 2001 (trace changes to disability policy in the US); Menashe and Siegel, 1998 (explain why public health advocates have failed to pass legislation that effectively regulates smoking in the US); Oliver and Shaheen, 1997 (trace the emergence and passage of comprehensive health care reforms in various US states);

*Procedural Manipulation—Agenda Control, Strategic Voting, Salami Tactics*

Procedural manipulation involves the exploitation of the formal processes of decision making to obtain a winning outcome (Hoyt, 1997: 775). Agenda control, strategic voting, and salami tactics are the most identified forms of procedural manipulation (Hoyt, 1997: 775), usually restricted to government leaders and members of legislatures (Zahariadis, 1996: 405).<sup>130</sup>

*Agenda Control*

Agenda control centers on structuring the terms of debate by determining the queue of issues, proposals, amendments or alternatives to be considered by decision makers (Bryson and Crosby, 1992: 260). Riker argues that agendas have a predictive capacity in that they “foreshadow outcomes”, adding that “the shape of an agenda influences the choices made from it...making agendas seem just about as significant as actually passing legislation” (Riker, 1993: 1).<sup>131</sup> Agendas can be manipulated because choice is not independent of the method by which it was made (Riker, 1986: 142-143).<sup>132</sup> In their research on choice and agenda change,

---

Kingdon, 1995 (explains why and how a federal program for mass transit was adopted in the US); and Mintrom, 1994 (investigates the adoption of school choice in the US).

<sup>130</sup> For a discussion of the different strategies available to individuals seeking to influence policy based on their position (e.g. government “outsiders” as opposed to “insiders”), see Victor (2001).

<sup>131</sup> Quoted in Mackie (2003: 171).

<sup>132</sup> Riker notes (1986: 142-143), “[t]he reason why agendas are manipulable and indeed why, in general, all institutions are manipulable is that for no such institution can it be guaranteed in all cases that the social choice will be independent of the method by which it was chosen...[a]nd if the choice depends in part on the way it was chosen, then politicians can reasonably expect to change the

Plott and Levine (1978), and Levine and Plott (1977) found that altering the structure of an agenda alters outcomes by limiting information and alternatives available to decision makers. Agenda control is typically exercised by those in positions of leadership in the government (Riker, 1986: 18). By virtue of their position, those in positions of leadership have the ability to directly control the agenda through the removal, addition or ordering of alternatives under consideration (Mackie, 2003: 166; Epstein and Shvetsova, 2002: 96-99; Bryson and Crosby, 1992: 260; Riker, 1986: 18). Riker notes, "one of the main advantages of being the leader of a legislative body [or] a committee...is that leaders have considerable control over the agenda, sometimes even enough control to determine which motions, bills, amendments [sic] are approved" (Riker, 1986: 18). Individuals in non-leadership positions such as members of Congress also have some power to control the agenda by introducing "divisive amendments" (Riker, 1986: 78). In his work on the US legislative process, Krutz (2002) argues that the rise of "omnibus legislating" offers members of Congress a tool for controlling the agenda by attaching their bills to a single larger bill—an omnibus bill.<sup>133</sup> Krutz adds that "the move to omnibus legislating is particularly important because these packages

---

*outcome if they can change the way that questions are posed, or the considerations that influence participants' judgment, or the way votes are counted, or which votes are counted, and so on".*

<sup>133</sup> Krutz (2002: 205-206 notes, "[o]mnibus legislating is the controversial practice of combining numerous measures from disparate policy areas in one massive bill. This technique has proliferated on Capitol Hill across the post-World War II period...[It] is a technique for directing the attention of policy makers to certain things and way from others...The omnibus strategy affects outcomes because omnibus bills (consisting of the nucleus plus previously controversial attachments) are a different set of outputs than what would be achieved if all the bills ere processed sequentially". See also See also Krutz (2001).

present a viable alternative route for PEs pushing legislation” (Krutz, 2002: 207). In either case, PEs can use agenda control to ensure favourable voting results for their preferred alternatives as well as suppress issues for which they do not have solutions or are less likely to win support (Zahariadis, 1996:404).

### *Strategic Voting*

Strategic voting, sometimes referred to as “tactical voting” or “sophisticated voting”, can be viewed as the “flipside of agenda control” in that it enables individuals to manipulate the agenda through their votes (Riker, 1986: 149). Unlike agenda control, which is generally limited to those in leadership positions, strategic voting can be exercised by individuals in government regardless of whether they hold leadership positions. Individuals that engage in strategic voting do so by voting contrary to their true preferences in order to attain their preferred outcome (Riker, 1986: 78). Empirical research (Calvert and Fenno, 1994; Enelow and Koehler, 1980) on strategic voting provides strong support for the argument that strategic voting not only occurs, but is effectively used by individuals to achieve their preferred outcome.<sup>134</sup> Calvert and Fenno (1994) and Enelow and Kohler (1980) found that strategic voting is commonly used by members of Congress to increase

---

<sup>134</sup> Enelow and Koehler (1980: 396) note that strategic voting allows us to understand how individuals are able to maximize the power of their votes: “[t]he theory of [strategic] voting addresses the problem of how an individual can make the best use of his votes. Circumstances may arise when it is advantageous to vote contrary to one’s own preferences. When votes are taken on several issues, an individual may be better off after the last vote if he does not vote in accordance with his preferences on every issue. A [strategic] strategy is a plan telling him how his votes can best be used when others are doing likewise.”

the likelihood that legislative outcomes reflect their preferences.

### *Salami Tactics*

Salami tactics—a form of procedural manipulation, sometimes referred to as “disjointed incrementalism” (Allison, 2003: N/A)—involve the “strategic manipulation of sequential decision-making” (Zahariadis, 2007a: 19; Maoz, 1990). A salami tactic mobilizes support for a PE’s proposal through a series of incremental steps leading to the desired outcome (Zahariadis, 2007a: 19; Maoz, 1990: 90). Rather than trying to mobilize support for a proposal in its entirety, PEs attempt to mobilize support for a series of smaller related policy proposals that build towards the preferred outcome. In his research on decision making in foreign policy, Maoz (1990: 90) refers to the salami tactic as “making big decisions through small steps”.<sup>135</sup> The salami tactic, according to Maoz (1990: 91), allows the manipulators to take advantage of both the “cognitive and situational constraints on rational choice” in policy making.<sup>136</sup> Decision making under conditions of uncertainty, commitments to past decisions, time constraints, and in many cases, crisis conditions characteristic of policy making, particularly foreign policy, not only constrain rational decision making, but also facilitate the use of the salami tactic for purposes of manipulation

---

<sup>135</sup> According to Maoz (1999: 90): “[w]ith the salami tactic one innovates by breaking down the radically novel course of action into a series of gradual policy options. Although each change deviates only marginally from the previous policy, each one also sets the stage for the subsequent decision in the series. Instead of having one sharp departure from the previous policy, the group takes a series of steps that ultimately has the same effect as the ‘innovative’ alternative the manipulator desired all along. This...is a continuous effort at structuring a series of decisions”.

<sup>136</sup> For a detailed discussion on this point, see Maoz (1990: 90-93).

(Maoz, 1990: 91-94). A salami tactic can also be used simultaneously with other forms of manipulation, such as framing, to mobilize the necessary support for a proposal (Zahariadis, 2007a: 19; Maoz, 1990; 93).

### *Strategic Venue Shopping*

In addition to using various forms of manipulation, Zahariadis (2007a: 21) argues that PEs are more likely to succeed at coupling the streams if they “engage in strategic venue shopping”—the search for authoritative decision making institutions that offer the greatest level of support for a proposal. Shifting venues provides PEs with the opportunity to “exploit institutional biases”, which according to Zahariadis (2007a) is inherent to both agenda setting and decision making. Policy venues include government institutions such as the legislature, executive and the courts at the local, state, national or international level that are traditionally associated with policy making (Pralle, 2003; Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). Other venues that are garnering greater attention for their influence over policy include the media, the marketplace and the private sector (Pralle, 2003: 237; Baumgartner and Jones, 1993: 31-32).<sup>137</sup> Baumgartner and Jones (1993: 240) find that multiple

---

<sup>137</sup> The venues discussed by Baumgartner and Jones include decision-making institutions as well as the media and stock markets. While policy images certainly can be influenced (even dramatically) in the media and in markets, these are not institutional loci in which images are turned into authoritative policy decisions. The focus here is on those institutional venues where actual policy making occurs and authoritative decisions concerning policies are made—traditional government institutions. This study adopts Timmerman’s definition of “institutional” which he refers to as “the existence of relatively stable structures and procedures containing conditions for access, jurisdictions, and decision making” (Timmermans, 2001: 314). As Timmermans notes, “[i]n democracies, [venues] and their specific institutional properties are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for policies to be made, changed, or blocked. They facilitate attempts by strategically acting policy entrepreneurs and counteraction by veto players” (Timmermans, 2001: 314).

venues are of particular importance to those seeking to influence policy because they offer multiple opportunities to challenge existing policy monopolies.<sup>138</sup> Policy issues can fall under the jurisdiction of a single policy venue or sometimes multiple venues as they evolve over time (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993: 32).

To gain greater insight into venue shopping and its relation to coupling, this study incorporates insights from research on agenda setting, institutional venues, and decision making by Pralle (2006, 2003), Baumgartner and Jones (2005, 1993, 1991), Timmermans (2001), Timmermans and Bleiklie (1999), and Bryson and Crosby (1992). In their research on agenda setting, Baumgartner and Jones (1993: 32) found that shifting policy venues—"the institutional locations where authoritative decisions are made concerning a given issue"—are a powerful mechanism PEs can use to influence agendas and policy. Baumgartner and Jones argue that how policies are understood is closely related to the venue in which they reside: "the image of a policy and its venue are closely related. As venues change, images may change as well; as the image of a policy changes, venue changes become more likely" (Baumgartner and Jones, 1991:1047). In her research on venue shopping

---

In her research on agenda setting and policy change, Pralle (2003: 236-237) found that opportunities for venue shifting in traditional policy making venues in the US have increased over the years. Pralle (2003: 236-237) attributes the increase largely to the opening and decentralization of Congress, the encroachment of the judiciary in policy issues traditionally outside their realm, increased transparency in decision making processes of bureaucratic agencies, and increasing cooperation among the various levels of government in not only the development, but also the implementation of policy.

<sup>138</sup> Baumgartner and Jones note (1993: 240), "[t]he existence of multiple policy venues is especially critical in the process of disrupting policy monopolies. Where opponents have many potential venues for appeal, chances are greater that they may succeed. Where a single institution maintains monopolistic control over a particular issue with no chance of appeal to other venues, those with power stand little chance of losing it. The many venues of the American political system therefore

and policy change, Pralle (2003: 255) argues that venue shopping is essential to any political strategy designed to change policy. PEs who are “strategically savvy”, according to Pralle (2006: 175), will not only search out policy venues that provide the greatest level of support for their proposals, but also avoid policy venues that offer the greatest opposition.<sup>139</sup> In their work on venues and policy making, Timmermans and Bleiklie (1999: 11) find that PEs are methodical in their search for appropriate venues by first selecting venues that are accessible, whose rules are favourable to their proposals, and whose institutional rules can be manipulated. This suggests that venue shopping requires PEs to not only search for venues that are amenable to their beliefs, but also venues whose institutional rules—“the rules of the game”—can help to structure a favourable decision making process (Timmermans and Bleiklie, 1999: 11). Empirical studies investigating policy formation suggest that venue shopping is strategic in nature because it involves making critical decisions concerning “what venues to target, when to target them, and why” (Pralle, 2003: 256).<sup>140</sup> In his review of the policy literature, Blomquist (2007: 275) notes that shifting policy venues is a vital strategic tool that empowers PEs with the ability to

---

make the system amenable to considerable policy change”.

<sup>139</sup> Being able to understand the behaviour of policy entrepreneurs is critical according to Pralle (2003: 237) because “[t]heir actions, along with the reactions of their opponents and institutional actors, shape the frequency and pace of venue shifting and policy change. In other words, venue shopping strategies are the key variable linking policy venues to policy stability or change”.

<sup>140</sup> See MacKenzie (2004), Bryson and Crosby (1992), Ginsberg (1989), McAdam (1982), and Handler (1978). Studies by Ginsberg (1989), McAdam (1982), and Handler (1978). Quoted from Pralle (2003: 256).

shift the jurisdiction or authority of a governing body over a proposal.<sup>141</sup> Recognizing that institutions markedly differ in terms of their structures—accessibility, decision making procedures, constituencies and incentives—is central to understanding how venue shopping is linked to changes in agendas (Pralle, 2003: 237). Differences in institutional structures, according to Pralle (2003: 237), provide PEs with opportunities to exploit institutional biases which may otherwise impede efforts to influence policy. In their research on leadership and decision making, Bryson and Crosby (1992: 103) find that individuals are more likely to attain their preferred policies if they can identify and skillfully use institutional arenas such as legislatures that are an integral part of the policy making process to structure decisions. Institutional arenas, according to Bryson and Crosby, represent the “structural basis for a set of potential non-decisions and decisions about policy, and transformation of that set into actual non-decisions and decisions” (Bryson and Crosby, 1992: 103). A PE able to exploit institutional arrangements—rules, resources, and actors—particularly during the coupling process, according to Bryson and Crosby (1992: 89), is able to influence what issues are up for discussion, and ultimately, policy outcomes.

---

<sup>141</sup> Evidence of policy entrepreneurs using venue shopping to influence agendas and policy is provided by a number of empirical studies that cover a broad spectrum of policy issues that include: the use of pesticides in Canada (Pralle, 2006); forest policy in Canada (Pralle, 2003, 2002); language policy in Australia (Mackenzie, 2004), forest policy in the US (Burnett and Davis, 2002); disability policy in the US (Jeon and Haider-Markel, 2001), military base closures in the US (Hansen and Krejci, 2000); education policy in the US (Mintrom, 2000); and health care reform in the US (Oliver and Shaheen, 1997).

### *Activating Coalitions*

In addition to manipulating choice and changing venues, Zahariadis (2007a: 16) suggests that entrepreneurial efforts to successfully couple the streams require activating coalitions during the critical opening of a policy window.<sup>142</sup> In its simplest form, a coalition is an alliance, usually a temporary one of individuals working toward a common goal (Spangler, 2003: N/A). Coalition building, according to Mintrom, can be understood as “an act of bringing others to see the merits of a particular set of ideas” (Mintrom, 2000: 227). Like their counterparts in the business world, PEs must be able to persuade their “consumers” of the merits of their “product” and how that product could be of benefit to them in order to gain their support.<sup>143</sup> The natural starting point for PEs seeking to build coalitions is to work alongside individuals they know relatively well and can count on for support (Mintrom, 2000: 232). Once a base of support is established, PEs can begin to expand it by targeting individuals “whom they see as natural allies in particular policy battles” (Mintrom, 2000: 232). The selection of appropriate partners is critical,

---

<sup>142</sup> Zahariadis (2007a: 16) notes, “[d]eveloping a good understanding of how [a policy entrepreneur’s] concerns fits within developments elsewhere helps [them] refine their proposals and arguments (Mintrom, 2000, 141). In other words, coalitions and networks need to...be built and nurtured outside the policy stream in order to facilitate coupling. While preparing the ground for coupling is a constant part of entrepreneurial life, activating coalitions outside the policy stream takes place during open policy windows.”

<sup>143</sup> Mintrom (2000: 227) uses the analogy of an entrepreneur in the business world to illustrate the integral role and process of coalition building in entrepreneurial strategy.“

particularly in politics because it is difficult to detach how a policy proposal is viewed from opinions concerning individuals associated with it (Mintrom, 2000: 141). Mintrom (2000: 248) suggests that as “sellers” of a product (e.g. alternatives), PEs must be willing to make compromises concerning their proposals when building coalitions.<sup>144</sup> In many cases, PEs reluctant to modify their proposals often risk losing out on valuable opportunities to influence policy (Mintrom, 2000: 274). PEs can use a host of activities to build and maintain coalitions, and often do so based on their context, resources and objectives (Mintrom, 2000: 228).<sup>145</sup> In the process of building coalitions, PEs can ignite a “bandwagon effect” (Bryson and Crosby, 1992: 252) in which individuals are enticed to join the coalition based on necessity rather than their true preferences (Kingdon, 1995: 161-162). Individuals “jump on the bandwagon” out of fear that not joining will exclude them from receiving any benefits associated with membership (Kingdon, 1995: 161-162; Bryson and Crosby, 1992: 254).<sup>146</sup> Bryson and Crosby (1992: 254) argue that PEs must work quickly to capitalize on the power of the bandwagon effect to mobilize support if they are to successfully compete against rival entrepreneurs trying to not only push their own

---

<sup>144</sup> See also Kingdon (1995: 161-62) on this point.

<sup>145</sup> Policy entrepreneurs also have a variety of techniques to choose from when maintaining coalitions as they do when they build coalitions (Mintrom, 2000: 232-234; 1994: 259). Some of these include stressing public goals, the most widely used technique, providing information to coalition members, talking directly to groups, providing private benefits, providing non-pecuniary benefits, and simply maintaining contact (Mintrom, 2000: 232-234) The literature on collective action provides a thorough review of techniques that are available to policy entrepreneurs (Mintrom, 2000; 232, 250; 1994: 259).

<sup>146</sup> In Kingdon's (1995: 161) research, participants described this as “wanting to be in the game,” “trying to be dealt in,” and “jumping on before it's too late.”

proposals but also prevent opposing proposals from winning.<sup>147</sup>

In their work on coalitions, Bryson and Crosby (1992: 252) found that coalitions are invaluable to PEs seeking to mobilize support for a proposal, both when moving a proposal into position for legislative consideration and adoption. Adding members to a coalition during the critical coupling phase provides PEs with the extra push towards legislative adoption (Bryson and Crosby, 1992: 252). This requires extensive bargaining and negotiation, what Bryson and Crosby refer to as the “gritty work of politics, in which concessions are given or ‘sweeteners’ added in exchange for support” (Bryson and Crosby (1992: 252). Elmer Schattschneider recognized very early on the power of groups to influence outcomes in his influential work *The Semisovereign People*, noting: “conflicts are frequently won or lost by the success that the contestants have in getting the audience involved in the fight or in excluding it” (Schattschneider, 1960: 4).<sup>148</sup> The strategic value of coalitions to PEs seeking to influence policy is supported by a number of influential studies.<sup>149</sup>

The literature on policy entrepreneurship provides us with valuable insight to possible strategies that can be used to couple the streams. Kingdon’s MSF,

---

<sup>147</sup> According to Bryson and Crosby, “[policy entrepreneurs] always should be alert to opportunities for creating this effect, because—to the extent that it designates the proposal as “an idea whose time has come”—it makes proposal adoption easier. A powerful bandwagon effect can make a proposal virtually unstoppable...[It] is particularly important for a major policy change, which is unlikely to occur without strong, and sometimes overwhelming, support” (Bryson and Crosby, 1992: 254).

<sup>148</sup> Cited in Mintrom (2000: 235).

<sup>149</sup> See Roberts (2006), Mintrom (2000), Mintrom and Vergari (1996), Mintrom (1994), Baumgartner and Jones (1991), Waddock and Post (1991), Doig and Hargrove (1987), and Eyestone (1978).

although effective in highlighting the critical role of PEs in influencing policy decisions, fails to formally delineate the means by which this is accomplished. Drawing upon the review of the literature on policy entrepreneurship and agenda change, we derive the following hypothesis:

H<sub>2</sub>: Policy entrepreneurs are more likely to couple the streams successfully during an open policy window if they use one or more forms of manipulation, alter institutional venues and activate coalition support.

By using various forms of informational (framing) or procedural (agenda control, strategic voting, salami tactics) manipulation to influence choice and either identifying institutional venues that provide the greatest level of support for and least resistance to a proposal, or activating the support of coalitions, PEs are able to successfully couple the streams, pushing the issue into prominence onto the government's decision agenda for executive or legislative action.

## **5.3 Methodology**

### **5.3.1 Case Study**

This study is designed as a quantitative case study that seeks to test propositions generated by the MSF concerning the pivotal role of PEs, and in the process, contribute to the theoretical development of the MSF and understanding of the role of individuals in shaping US-Cuba policy in the post-Cold War era.<sup>150</sup>

Propositions are generated and tested, and compared with existing evidence. By

---

<sup>150</sup> Policy in the context of this study is understood as the product of a series of micro-level decisions and discrete choices made by decision makers concerning the selection of goals and the means of achieving them that have culminated in broader macro-level US-Cuba policy.

doing so, relevant PEs are identified, and connections between their actions and agenda setting are articulated.

This study acknowledges that, as a research endeavour, the case study method is subject to criticism (Flyvberg, 2006; Ruddin, 2006; Yin, 2003, 1989, 1984; Stoecker, 1991); however, it also follows literature that argues that the case study method is a powerful method of analysis that lends itself to testing propositions and theory building (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Walton, 1992; Eckstein, 1975), two key objectives of this study. In his analysis of case study research, Van Evera (1997: 54) notes that case studies often result in strong tests of predictions, particularly when they concern the actions of individual policy actors by capturing unique evidence that either supports or refutes hypothesized associations.<sup>151</sup> By drawing upon the knowledge and experience of individuals who have been both successful and unsuccessful in their efforts to influence US-Cuba policy, this study is able to test propositions linking their actions to agenda setting, and in the process test the predictive capacity of the MSF. Van Evera (1997: 54-55) also suggests that, in contrast to large-*n* studies, case studies are more effective in analyzing and explaining relationships between variables, which lies at the core of this analysis by generating detailed data that can be used to test propositions and ultimately

---

<sup>151</sup> Van Evera (1997: 54) notes, "tests performed with case studies are often strong, because the predictions tested are quite unique (these predictions are not made by other known theories...[C]ase studies allow the test of predictions about the private speech and writings of policy actors...The confirmation of such predictions strongly corroborates the test theory. Case studies are the best format for capturing such evidence. Hence case studies can supply quite decisive evidence for or against political theories."

contribute to theory building.<sup>152</sup> The case study method was also selected as the method of enquiry for this study because of what it does best—study process (Yin, 1984; Stoecker, 1991; and Becker 1966). Scholars interested in studying the agenda setting process have typically relied on the case study approach to identify the forces that shape decision agendas, and answer questions of “why” and “how” associated with the movement of issues onto decision agendas, and ultimately the adoption of policy (Mortensen, 2010; Dearing and Rogers, 1996: 73). Finally, case studies, particularly policy case studies, are reputed to provide researchers with a richness and depth of analytical information that very few other research methods are capable of providing (Hecló, 1972: 94-95).<sup>153</sup> In the context of this research, this includes information concerning the inherent features of the policy process within which PEs function as well as patterns of entrepreneurial behaviour and characteristics that influence agenda setting.

This study relies on the theoretical propositions generated by the MSF as a general analytical strategy for the study to provide greater insight to the role played by individuals in the decision making process that has shaped US-Cuba policy in the post-Cold War era. The underlying propositions of the MSF help to organize the

---

<sup>152</sup> Van Evera (1997:54-55) asserts that, “inferring and testing explanations that define how the independent causes the dependent variable are often easier with case-study than large-*n* methods...[A] large-*n* test of a hypothesis provides little or no new insight into the causal process that comprises the hypothesis’ explanation, nor does it generate data that could be used to infer or test explanations of that process”.

<sup>153</sup> According to Hecló, (1972: 94-95), “in terms of analytic depth, policy case studies have at least the potential for encompassing and bringing to bear a remarkable variety of factors from individual motivations and perceptions to comprehensive socioeconomic movements....The case study is a

entire case study according to its component parts and define what is to be examined. According to Yin (2003: 3), relying on theoretical propositions as a general analytical strategy is not only an effective organizational and analytical tool to guide data collection and analysis, but also critical for the completion of successful case studies.<sup>154</sup> Using theoretical propositions generated by the MSF as an analytical strategy also provides us with the opportunity to strengthen the theoretical foundation of the framework by undertaking a much more rigorous and thorough articulation of key concepts and testing of theoretical propositions (Eckstein, 1975: 103-104). In his review of case study research, Flyvbjerg (2006: 227-228) asserts that “falsification is one of the most rigorous tests to which a...proposition can be subjected. If just one observation does not fit with the proposition, it is considered not valid generally and must therefore be either revised or rejected” (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 228).

### *Level of Analysis*

Foreign policy is broadly understood to represent strategies used by states to protect national interests and define relations with other countries. As a field of

---

mode of analysis capable of dealing systematically with the question of policy innovation.”

<sup>154</sup>Yin (1989: 106-107) notes, “[t]h first and more preferred strategy is to follow the theoretical propositions that led to the case study. The original objectives and design of the case study presumably were based on such propositions, which in turn reflected a set of research questions, reviews of the literature, and new insights. The propositions would have shaped the data collection plan and therefore should have given priorities to the relevant analytic strategies...[P]roposition[s] help to focus attention on certain data and to ignore other data. The proposition also helps to organize the entire case study and to define alternative explanations to be examined. Theoretical propositions about causal relations—answers to ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions—can be very useful in guiding case study analysis in this manner”.

study, foreign policy analysis involves “the study of the process, effects, causes or outputs of foreign policy decision-making in either a comparative or case specific manner” (Foreign Policy Analysis, 2010). Traditional analysis typically focuses on examining the impact of these factors in the context of the international environment; however, there are alternative perspectives from which policy can be analyzed. As noted by White (1989), foreign policy “straddles the boundary” between academic disciplines, therefore enabling analysts to analyze foreign policy from a plethora of alternative approaches.<sup>155</sup> This study pursues an alternative approach to analyzing a foreign policy case, one that looks beyond the international level and focuses on the domestic context of foreign policy decision making, highlighting the central concepts of decisions, decision-makers and the decision making process integrated from the field of policy sciences.<sup>156</sup> Just as White (1989: 8) suggests, there are many levels of analysis from which to study foreign policy, this study represents just one such alternative as the organizing framework for the

---

<sup>155</sup> White (1989: 7-8) notes: “foreign policy presents what William Wallace calls “boundary” problems... Foreign policy crosses the boundary of the state and its international environment. Given that an understanding of foreign policy requires the analysts not only to know something about interactions between states but also something about political processes within the state, the study of foreign policy also straddles the boundary between two academic disciplines, International Relations and Political Science... [E]ach of these disciplines has its own corpus of assumptions, concepts and modes of analysis... If the analyst views foreign policy behaviour from the perspective of International Relations, he or she will be predisposed to see elements of the international environment as the major determinant of foreign policy. A Political Science perspective, on the other hand predisposes the analyst to highlight domestic determinants like governmental politics, pressure group activity and public opinion. The tendency is for analysis from this perspective to provide a more detailed, perhaps ‘messier’ picture of foreign policy formulation. In essence, there are many levels of analysis from which to study foreign policy”.

<sup>156</sup> In his research on foreign policy analysis, White (1989) notes analyzing foreign policy involves concepts—decisions, decision makers and the decision-making process—which seem “deceptively simple”, but critical to the study.

study.

### **5.3.2 Data Collection**

A survey consisting of a series of standardized questions was used as the principal method of data collection to: identify the presence of a PE; assess whether the PE possessed the “characteristics” of a successful PE; identify coupling strategies used by the PE; and assess the role of specific individuals identified in the existing empirical literature as central figures in the evolution of US-Cuba policy and the degree to which they “fit” the entrepreneurial label. Secondary data sources consisting of published reports concerning US-Cuba policy, media publications, and government documents were used to compile the necessary evidence used to either support or refute the hypothesized associations between variables. A central advantage of using multiple data sources, according to Yin (1989), is that it allows for “the development of converging lines of inquiry, a process of triangulation... Thus, any finding or conclusion in a case study is likely to be much more convincing and accurate if it is based on several different sources of information” (Yin, 1989: 97). This can also address problems of construct validity because “multiple sources of evidence essentially provide multiple measures of the same phenomenon” (Yin, 1989: 97).<sup>157</sup>

The survey method was selected as the primary method of data collection for

---

<sup>157</sup> Yin (2003: 83) also notes that “[w]hen findings, interpretations, and conclusions are based on such multiple sources, the case study data will be less prone to the quirks derived from any single source”.

a number of reasons, the most important being that it is an effective method for hypothesis testing, a key objective of this study. As recognized by Backstrom and Hursh-César (1981: 3) and Labaw (1980: 8-9), survey research is theory based, and embedded in survey questions are hypotheses which can be used for hypothesis testing.<sup>158</sup> Second, surveys are effective in producing quantitative information about the phenomenon under investigation (Fowler, 2002: 1; Backstrom and Hursh-César, 1981: 4), a key rationale for this study. Third, survey research lends itself to replication, a key feature of quantitative studies (Backstrom and Hursh-César, 1981: 4) and theory building. Fourth, survey research is designed to be systematic and impartial, which allows for a data collection process that is relatively free from personal biases (Backstrom and Hursh-César, 1981: 3-4). Finally, survey data can be analyzed using an array of readily available and inexpensive data analysis techniques (Klodnicki, 2003: 166). E-mail and mail surveys have the added advantages of being cost and time efficient, allowing research to target large populations.<sup>159</sup>

---

<sup>158</sup> In her review of survey research, Labaw (1980: 37) argues that a well designed questionnaire can be an indispensable tool for testing hypotheses: “[a] good questionnaire is a research tool used to support or refute hypotheses. It is a problem-solving instrument...[A] questionnaire becomes an actively probing instrument rather than a fishing expedition or blank slate upon which data are imprinted. Hypotheses in research questionnaires provide the structure, purpose, and meaning for the overall research project. When firm hypotheses are held in mind during questionnaire design, they act as the winnowing agent, sorting out the useful from the non-useful questions, eliminate the extraneous ‘itch-scratch’ questions that meets the needs of curiosity.”

<sup>159</sup> See Jansen, Corley and Jansen (2007), Sheehan (2001), Simsek and Veiga (2000), Bachmann, Elfrink, and Vazzana (1996), Kittleson (1995), Mehta and Sivadas (1995), Parker (1992), Sproull (1986) and Linsky (1975).

### *Survey Instrument*

A survey consisting of 31 questions which included both open and closed ended questions was given to each participant in the study to collect data.<sup>160</sup> The survey was organized in four sections (A through D) with an optional fifth section (E). A five-item Likert scale was used to itemize responses to closed ended questions. In some cases survey participants were instructed to simply record their responses as either yes or no, or select the appropriate response from a list of options. Respondents were also given the option of supplementing their responses to closed ended questions with additional comments.

Sections A and B consisted of 12 questions designed to collect the necessary data for analysis in chapter seven by drawing upon the behaviour and actions of the participant to influence US-Cuba policy between 1989 and 2006. Research questions assessing individual behaviour are often best answered by individuals themselves—in this case, by individuals directly involved in efforts to influence policy—because they possess first hand knowledge through their experiences of what is necessary to succeed. The data collected by sections A and B served as the data source for chapter seven.

Section C included eight questions designed to solicit the participant's opinions regarding the role and behaviour of PEs in the broader foreign policy

---

<sup>160</sup>

Two types of surveys, differentiated according to the method by which they were administered were used to collect the necessary data for the study. E-mail surveys were distributed, completed, and returned electronically in the form of an e-mail attachment. Mail surveys were distributed and returned by post in paper form, and completed by pen or pencil. See Appendix H for a copy of the survey document.

process based on their knowledge of and/or experience with policy formulation. By extending the scope beyond the single case of US-Cuba policy, we are able to provide a stronger test of the hypothesized associations. The data collected by section C served as the data source for chapter six.

Section D consisted of 11 questions designed to assess the entrepreneurial status of 74 individuals reputed to be PEs.<sup>161</sup> Based on their knowledge of and experience with US-Cuba policy, participants were requested to assess: (1) the degree to which the individuals “fit” the entrepreneurial label; and (2) whether each of the individuals possessed the characteristics of a successful PE. The data collected by section C served as the data source for chapter eight.

Finally, section E provided respondents with the opportunity to provide any additional information or comments they felt would be pertinent to the study. Respondents were also requested to provide the names and, if possible, contact information of other individuals involved in US-Cuba policy who should be contacted for the study.

#### *Distribution of Survey*

Upon confirmation of their interest in the study, individuals were forwarded a survey package electronically in the form of an e-mail attachment or in print by mail. The survey package included: a covering letter briefly outlining the study’s

---

<sup>161</sup> Existing studies of US-Cuba policy, along with media and government documents were used to compile the list of 74 individuals.

objectives, the structure of the survey and a deadline for completion; a letter of information outlining the purpose of the research study, procedural requirements, benefits and risks associated with their participation, extent of anonymity and confidentiality, details concerning the security, ownership and future use of research data, the availability of the completed study, contact information for the study, and acknowledgment of participant consent; and the survey which included completion and return instructions.<sup>162</sup> Individuals who agreed to participate by completing a paper survey were also forwarded a self addressed, pre-paid envelope to return the completed survey. Snowball sampling was used to solicit other potential candidates for the study by requesting that participants identify individuals that in their opinion would be ideal candidates for the study.

*Design and Implementation Measures Used to Increase the Reliability and Validity of the Survey Instrument*

As with any method of data collection, surveys have their share of limitations; however, a number of measures were taken to overcome issues associated with survey research as well as those specific to e-mail and mail surveys.<sup>163</sup> This study

---

<sup>162</sup> E-mail and print surveys differed slightly in terms of format to take into account the technical requirements of completing the survey electronically.

<sup>163</sup> What are considered to be the four central pillars of survey accuracy—coverage, sampling, non-response, and measurement (Dillman, 2000: 197)—also yield potential sources of errors (Schonlau, Fricker, and Elliott, 2002c: 13-16; Groves, 1989). Moreover, survey items can be designed (both intentionally and unintentionally) to create biased answers as a result of questions that are ambiguous, poorly structured response scales, loaded terminology, leading questions, unfamiliar terms, demands on participants to recall past behavior, excessive burden on participants' cognitive abilities, the use of hypothetical items, and inappropriate assumptions (Garcon, 2007; Schwarz, 1999). E-mail and mail surveys have the added limitations of potential low response rates and poor data quality due to item non-responses (Kwak and Radler, 2002: 258; Truell and Goss, 2002;

utilized previously validated surveys<sup>164</sup> as guides in the development of the survey and questions used to collect the necessary data for the study. The survey and questions used in this study were modeled on a number of studies that have used surveys to identify and examine the role of PEs in the policy making process. This included studies by Raines and Prakash (2005), Meo, Ziebro and Patton (2004), Garrett (2001), Klodnicki (2003)<sup>165</sup>, Berry and Flowers (1999), Mintrom (2000, 1997a, 1997b; 1994), and Ziebro (2000), Simon and Alm (1995), and Bardach (1972). In addition to modeling the survey on previously validated surveys, a number of design and implementation measures identified in the literature on survey methodology were incorporated in the construction and distribution of the survey. This included: offering participants multiple modes for participation; incorporating design and layout features that typically maximize response rates; reviewing and testing survey questions for comprehension; personalizing communications with participants; providing pre-paid postage for the return of completed mail surveys; ensuring participants anonymity and/or confidentiality; targeting participants with knowledge and interest in the issue under investigation; pre-notifying participants of the survey; using follow-up reminders to encourage completion and return of surveys; and pre-testing the survey on a targeted group of individuals.

---

Schonlau, Fricker and Elliott, 2002a, 2002b; and Sheehan and MacMillan, 1999, 46).

<sup>164</sup> For a discussion of using previously validated surveys, see University of Texas, (2007d).

<sup>165</sup> Although Klodnicki's (2003) focus was not policy entrepreneurs, his study is effective in illustrating the effectiveness of surveys as a method of data collection in the evaluation of policy models.

### 5.3.3 Survey Participants

Political analysis often involves asking questions about human behaviour; in other words, how individuals think and act (Moore et. al, 1994: 236). Answering these questions requires directly involving individuals. Often only a small select group of individuals has the specialized knowledge necessary to provide researchers with answers to questions concerning specific issues or events (Moore et. al, 1994: 236). In his study of agenda setting, Hacker (1997: 6) found that individuals are a logical source of information when studying the process of agenda setting because of their direct involvement in the process. Individuals selected for and participating in the study were required to satisfy at least two of the following three requirements: possess extensive experience in the analysis of public policy; possess extensive experience in the analysis of US-Cuba policy; or active in efforts to influence US-Cuba policy between 1989 and 2006. Of the 40 individuals that completed the survey, 39 or 98% were active in attempting to influence US-Cuba policy between 1989 and 2006.<sup>166</sup> Of the 39 survey respondents that were active, 24 or 61% were successful and 15 or 39% were unsuccessful in their efforts to position their preferred policy proposal onto the government's decision agenda for authoritative action.

Participants in the MSF are disaggregated according to two clusters—visible and hidden. Individuals were carefully screened and selected for the study to ensure that someone from each of the clusters participated in the study. Because PEs can

originate from either cluster (Kingdon, 1995: 122) and for analytical purposes, survey candidates and participants were organized according to three sample categories: *political actors*; *non-political actors*; and *other*. The first category, *political actors*, included: current and former members of Congress, bureaucratic officials directly/indirectly responsible for overseeing Cuba related policies; sponsors and cosponsors of Cuba related legislation; congressional staff of Congressional members active in US-Cuba policy; and members of key congressional committees tasked with issues affecting US-Cuba policy. The second category, *non-political actors*, included: representatives and members of key Cuban, business and human rights associations; Cuba policy analysts; legal experts well versed in the interpretation and application of US-Cuba laws and regulations; and academic professionals with extensive training and knowledge of US-Cuba affairs. The third and final category included individuals who agreed to participate on the condition that they remained anonymous. A total of 1,328 individuals were identified and screened as possible survey participants for the study. The pool of pre-test survey participants consisted of 18 individuals, of whom 10 or 56% were political actors (category 1) and 8 or 44% were non-political actors. Following the pre-test, 599 individuals were contacted by e-mail to participate. Of the total 599 survey candidates contacted, 451 or 75% were political actors (category 1) and 148 or 25% were non-political actors (category 2). The final sample of survey participants consisted of 40 individuals, of which 11 or 28% were political actors (category 1), 27

---

<sup>166</sup> The single survey participant not active during this period is well versed in US-Cuba policy.

or 67% non-political actors (category 2), and 2 or 5% who wished to not reveal their identity (category 3).<sup>167</sup>

### 5.3.4 Operationalization of Variables

Two central hypotheses were generated using the MSF and literature on policy entrepreneurship:

- H<sub>1</sub>: Policy entrepreneurs are more likely to couple the streams successfully during an open policy window if they possess four key entrepreneurial characteristics—have a claim to a hearing, are politically connected, are skilled negotiators, and are persistent.
- H<sub>2</sub>: Policy entrepreneurs are more likely to couple the streams successfully during an open policy window if they use one or more forms of manipulation, alter institutional venues and activate coalition support.

#### *Policy Entrepreneurs*

Kingdon (1995: 122) labels those who advocate for proposals or the prominence of an idea as PEs; however, their defining characteristic is their willingness to invest their resources—time, energy, reputation, and money—to draw attention to their preferred policy. PEs who seek to influence policy are motivated by a desire to: address problems with existing policy; promote personal interests; promote personal values; shape future policy; and play an active role in the policy

---

<sup>167</sup>

Of the 1,328 individuals identified as potential participants, 599 were short listed for the study. Of the 599 e-mails that were sent, 264 were returned because of invalid e-mail addresses. No follow-up messages were sent because current contact information was not available. No responses were received from 108 of the individuals contacted. Hence, the final sample of 40 individuals was drawn from a total sample of 227 individuals. Of the total 227 individuals approached: 133 declined to participate; 47 tentatively agreed to participate; 7 agreed to participate but failed to return completed surveys; and 40 agreed to participate and submitted their completed surveys.

process.

The PE term was measured using the three items: (1) time and energy; (2) reputation; and (3) financial resources. In section A of the survey, the participant was asked (question A3) to indicate, on a scale from 1 (none) to 5 (very high), how much of their time and energy, reputation, and financial resources they were willing to invest in order to influence US-Cuba policy. In section C of the survey, the same three items were used; however, the wording of the question (C1) was modified to reflect the fact that the participant was requested to evaluate each of the items in the context of the broader foreign policy field. For example, for time and energy, the participant was asked the following: “on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), please indicate the extent to which you disagree or agree with the statement that policy advocates are willing to invest their time and energy to draw attention to their preferred policy”. In section D of the survey, the participant was requested (questions D3, D4, D5) to indicate on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), the extent to which statements incorporating each of the three items accurately described each of the individuals reputed to be PEs.

A PE’s motivation for advocacy was measured using five items: (1) a desire to address problems with policy; (2) the promotion of personal interests; (3) the promotion of personal values; (4) interest in shaping future policy; and (5) an interest in playing an active role in the policy process. In section A of the survey, the participant was asked (question A4) to indicate, on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (entirely), the extent to which their efforts to influence US-Cuba policy were

motivated by a desire to address problems with existing policy, the promotion of personal interests, the promotion of the personal vision of US-Cuba policy, an interest in shaping the future of US-Cuba policy, and a desire to play an active role in the policy process. In section C of the survey, the same five items were used; however, the wording of the question (C2) was modified to reflect the fact that the participant was requested to evaluate each of the items in the context of the broader foreign policy field. For example, the participant was asked the following: “on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), please indicate the extent to which you disagree or agree with the statement that policy advocates who seek to influence policy are motivated by a desire to address problems with policy”. Frequencies were calculated as the percent of the sample for a specified response.

### *Success*

Success is defined as “positioning a proposal on the government’s decision agenda for authoritative action”. Success was scored as 0 (not successful) and 1 (successful). In section C of the survey, success was scored using a 5 point Likert scale ranging from (1) not successful to (5) completely successful. The participant was requested to assess the degree to which an individual was successful in efforts to influence policy between 1989 and 2006.

### *Entrepreneurial Characteristics*

The MSF asserts that any individual involved in the policy process can play the role of a policy entrepreneur; however, not all policy entrepreneurs can be

successful in their efforts to influence policy. What distinguishes successful PEs from their non-successful counterparts, according to the MSF, are four defining characteristics: their claim to a hearing, their political connections, their negotiating skills, and their persistence. A PE's claim to hearing, or what Kingdon also refers to as an individual's right to participate in the process, can originate from one of three sources: their expertise on the issue, their ability to speak on behalf of others, or their position as an authoritative decision maker. A claim to a hearing was measured using three items: (1) policy expertise; (2) ability to speak on behalf of others; and (3) position as an authoritative decision maker. Single items were used as measures for each of the remaining characteristics: "an ability to develop and maintain good relations with key political actors" for political connections; "well developed negotiation skills" for negotiation skills; and persistence.

In section B of the survey, the respondent was first asked (question B8) to select from a list of six characteristics, those characteristics that accurately described them. The respondent was then requested to assess on a scale from 1 (no importance) to 5 (utmost importance) how important each of the characteristics was in terms of positioning their policy proposal(s) on the government's decision agenda. In section C of the survey, the same six items were used; however, the wording of the question (C4) was modified to reflect the fact that the participant was requested to evaluate each of the items in the context of the broader foreign policy field. The participant was asked the following: "in your opinion, how important on a scale from 1 (no importance) to 5 (utmost importance), is it that individuals possess

the following characteristics if they are to succeed in having their policy proposal(s) positioned on the government's decision agenda". In section D of the survey, the participant was requested (questions D6, D7, D8, D9, D10 and D11) to indicate on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), the extent to which statements incorporating each of the six items accurately described each of the individuals reputed to be PEs.

The average score for the variable, "a claim to a hearing", was calculated as the summed average score of the three items used as measures of the variable. For each of the three items, the participant used a five-point Likert scale to record their responses to the corresponding questions. The overall score for the variable was calculated by summing the participant's scores for the individual items and calculating the average response (e.g. in this case divided by three).

### *Streams*

At the core of the MSF is the notion that running through an organization are three constantly flowing and independent process streams—problem, politics, and policy—whereby issues and alternatives evolve and take form. Government perception of a serious problem was used as a measure of the problem stream. Favourable political support for policy change was used as a measure of the politics stream. The availability of a viable solution to an existing problem was used as a measure of the policy stream.

In section B of the survey, the participant was asked (question B3) to indicate

the importance, on a scale from 1 (no importance) to 5 (utmost importance), of each of the three items used as measures of streams in increasing the likelihood that their policy proposal was positioned on the government's decision agenda for an authoritative decision. In section C of the survey, the participant was asked (question C7) how important on a scale from 1 (no importance) to 5 (utmost importance) in their opinion the same list of items in increasing the likelihood that a policy advocate's preferred policy is positioned on the government's decision agenda for an authoritative decision.

The average score for the variable, "streams", was calculated as the summed average score of the three items used as measures of the variable. For each of the three items, the participant used a five-point Likert scale to record their responses to the corresponding questions. The overall score for the variable was calculated by summing the participant's scores for the individual items and calculating the average response (e.g. in this case divided by three).

### *Policy Window*

Two categories of windows—problem and politics—fueled by developments in either the problem or politics streams can open. The opening of a problem window is operationalized using five items: (1) the release of statistical indicators used to monitor the progression of policy; (2) the release of studies assessing the viability of policy; (3) a focusing event such as a crisis or disaster that brought attention to policy; (4) feedback from the public to decision makers concerning

existing policy; and (5) feedback from bureaucrats to decision makers concerning existing policy. The opening of a politics window is operationalized using five items: (1) a change in public opinion concerning US-Cuba policy; (2) a change of Administration; (3) a redistribution of seats in Congress; (4) turnover of key government bureaucratic personnel; and (5) the influence of interest group(s).

In section B of the survey, the participant was asked (question B1) to indicate how important on a scale from 1 (no importance) to 5 (utmost importance) a list of events, which included the measures for both problem and politics windows, were in providing them with a critical opportunity to draw attention to their preferred policy proposal. In section C of the survey, the participant was asked (question C6) how important on a scale from 1 (no importance) to 5 (utmost importance) in their opinion the same list of events is in providing policy advocates with a critical opportunity to draw attention to their preferred policy proposal(s).

The average scores for each of the variables (problem and politics windows) were calculated as the summed average score of the items used as measures of the variable. For example, five items were used as measures for the “problem window” variable. For each of the five items, the participant used a five-point Likert scale to record their responses to the corresponding questions. The overall score for the variable was calculated by summing the participant’s scores for the individual items and calculating the average response (e.g. in this case divided by five). The same method was used to arrive at the score for the “politics window” variable.

### *Manipulation Strategies*

Manipulation refers to a strategy which seeks to structure a situation to attract the support of others in order to attain the desired outcome.<sup>168</sup> Four categories of manipulation strategies were identified: framing, agenda control, strategic voting and salami tactics. Four items were used to measure framing: (1) “finding out the attitudes of key government decision-makers towards my proposal”; (2) “using or developing perceptions of crises to increase interest in and support for alternatives to existing policy”; (3) “framing problems with existing policy to make my proposal an appealing alternative”; and (4) “presenting problems with existing policy in a way that leads to a realignment of interests into a new coalition supporting my proposal.” Five items were used to measure agenda control: (1) “structuring an agenda to ensure support for my proposal by removing competing alternatives under consideration”; (2) “structuring an agenda to ensure support for my proposal by adding to the number of alternatives under consideration”; (3) “structuring an agenda to ensure support for my proposal by modifying the order in which alternatives were considered”; (4) “introducing amendments”; and (5) “attaching my proposal to an omnibus bill”. “Voting against my true preferences” was used as a measure of strategic voting. “Breaking down my proposal into a series of smaller yet interconnected policy alternatives” was used as a measure of salami tactics.

In section B of the survey, the respondent was asked (question B5) to first

---

<sup>168</sup>

Developed using Riker’s (1986: ix) definition of “heresthetics” which refers to a political strategy which seeks to structure a situation to attract the support of others in order to attain their preferred

select from the list, tactics they used to position their proposal on the government's decision agenda and then assess how important on a scale from 1 (no importance) to 5 (utmost importance) each tactic was in their efforts. In section C of the survey, the participant was requested (question C5) to assess on a scale from 1 (no importance) to 5 (utmost importance) how important the identified strategies, which included each of the measures for framing, altering institutional venues, strategic voting and salami tactics, are in helping policy advocates to successfully position their proposals onto the government's decision agenda.

The average scores for the variables (framing and agenda control) were calculated as the summed average score of the items used as measures of the variable. For example, four items were used as measures for "framing". For each of the four items, the participant used a 5 point Likert scale to record their responses to the corresponding questions. The overall score for the variable was calculated by summing the participant's scores for the individual items and calculating the average response (e.g. in this case divided by four). The same method was used to arrive at the score for "agenda control".

### *Altering Institutional Venues*

Venues are defined as institutions within the government where formal decisions on policy are made. This includes the House of Representatives and the Senate; House and Senate committees, commissions, and task forces; executive

---

outcome.

departments, agencies, and commission; and the judiciary. Six possible venue “shopping” strategies are identified: (1) shifting the debate to an institutional venue that provides the greatest support for my proposal; (2) avoiding institutional venues that do not share my view of the problem and solution; (3) shifting the debate to an institutional venue that can help structure a problem to fit my proposal; (4) seeking multiple institutional venues; (5) shifting the debate to an institutional venue that shares my view of the problem and solution; and (6) avoiding institutional venues that provide the greatest opposition to my proposal.

In section B of the survey, the participant was first provided with the following statement: “frequently, policy advocates seek out institutional venues that can help mobilize sufficient support for their proposal. Venues are institutions within the government where formal decisions on policy are made. This includes the House of Representatives and the Senate; House and Senate committees, commissions, and task forces; executive departments, agencies, and commission; and the judiciary.” The participant was then asked to assess how important on a scale from 1 (no importance) to 5 (utmost importance) each of the six venue shopping strategies was in terms of helping them to mobilize support to position their policy proposal onto the government’s decision agenda. In section C of the survey, the participant was requested to assess on a scale from 1 (no importance) to 5 (utmost importance) how important the identified strategies, which included the six venue strategies, are in helping policy advocates to position their proposals onto the government’s decision agenda.

The average score for altering institutional venues was calculated as the summed average score of the items used as measures of the variable. For each of the six items used as measures of altering institutional venues, the participant used a five-point Likert scale to record their responses to the corresponding questions. The overall score for the variable was calculated by summing the participant's scores for the individual items and calculating the average response (e.g. in this case divided by six).

#### *Activating Coalition Support*

Entrepreneurial efforts to successfully couple the streams require activating coalitions, defined as “alliances...of individuals working toward a common goal” (Spangler, 2003: N/A), in this case the promotion and support of a particular proposal. Coalition support is critical during the coupling phase in order to provide PEs with the “extra” push needed to move a proposal onto the government's decision agenda. Coalition building strategies may involve establishing new coalitions, enlisting the support of an existing coalition or adding new members to an existing coalition.

In section B of the survey, the participant was first provided (question B7) with the following statement: “policy advocates often attempt to develop coalitions to help promote and mobilize support for their proposals” and then asked to assess on a scale from 1 (no importance) to 5 (utmost importance) how important each of the three coalition strategies were in terms of positioning their policy proposal(s) onto

the government's decision agenda. In section C of the survey, the participant was requested to assess on a scale from 1 (no importance) to 5 (utmost importance) how important the identified strategies, which included the three coalition building strategies, are in helping policy advocates to successfully position their proposals onto the government's decision agenda.

The average score for activating coalition support was calculated as the summed average score of the items used as measures of the variable. For each of the three items used as measures of the variable, the participant used a five-point Likert scale to record their responses to the corresponding questions. The overall score for the variable was calculated by summing the participant's scores for the individual items and calculating the average response (e.g. in this case divided by three).

### **5.3.5 Data Analysis<sup>169</sup>**

For each hypothesis that was generated, an accompanying multiple regression model was estimated:

---

<sup>169</sup> SPSS Data Entry Builder was used to enter the survey data into a SPSS file. All survey data were analyzed using SPSS.

<u>Hypothesis</u>	<u>Estimated Multiple Regression</u> <u>Model</u> <sup>170</sup>
H <sub>1</sub> : Policy entrepreneurs are more likely to couple the streams successfully during an open policy window if they possess four key entrepreneurial characteristics—have a claim to a hearing, are politically connected, are skilled negotiators, and are persistent.	$y = b_1x_1 + b_2x_2 + b_3x_3 + b_4x_4 + b_5x_5 + b_6x_6 + \dots + b_7x_7 + c$ <p>where <math>y = \text{success}</math>, <math>x_1</math> <math>x_7</math> represent the independent predictor variables</p>
H <sub>2</sub> : Policy entrepreneurs are more likely to couple the streams successfully during an open policy window if they use one or more forms of manipulation, alter institutional venues and activate coalition support.	$y = b_1x_1 + b_2x_2 + b_3x_3 + \dots + b_9x_9 + c$ <p>where <math>y = \text{success}</math>, and <math>x_1</math> <math>x_9</math> represent the independent predictor variables</p>

The data were analyzed and hypotheses tested using basic descriptive statistics, multiple regression, correlation analysis, estimates of effect sizes, and confidence intervals. Descriptive statistics (e.g. frequencies) are used to provide simple summary data concerning the data sets. Correlation analysis using Pearson's  $r$  is used to identify the direction and magnitude of associations between the dependent and independent variables.

Multiple regression analysis is used to either confirm or reject the hypotheses, and test the predictive capacity of the estimated models. Beta coefficients for each of the independent variables are presented and analyzed to assess their relative power as predictors.

Partial correlations and associated t-tests were calculated for each of

---

<sup>170</sup>

For a list and description of each variable, see Appendix B and C.

independent predictor variables. Partial correlation analysis is effective in uncovering associations between variables that may be overlooked because of non-significant results often associated with a small sample size as is the case with this study. With small samples, correlations may not reach significance whereas with large samples statistical significance is often attained (Morgan, 2003; Finch, Cumming and Thomason, 2001; Lipsey, 1998). Under such circumstances, avoiding further analysis of non-significant outcomes would overlook possible associations masked by the non-significant results.

Effect size estimates were calculated and confidence intervals estimated if the results for the full model were found to be statistically insignificant. With small sample sizes, non-significant outcomes can occur if the null hypothesis is actually true, or the null hypothesis is not rejected but is actually false (i.e. type II error). A small sample size prevents tests from being able to differentiate between the two outcomes (Colegrave and Ruxton, 2003). Effect size estimates and confidence intervals are effective in assessing findings separately from the influence of sample size and statistical significance (Neill, 2008; LeCroy and Krysik, 2007; Sink, 2006; Urdan, 2005; Coe, 2002). Cohen's (1988)  $f^2$  is widely recognized as an appropriate measure of effect size in the context of multiple regression, and  $f^2$  effect sizes of 0.02, 0.15, and 0.35 are considered small, medium, and large, respectively (Cohen, 1988).

Responses to closed ended questions scored using a five-item Likert scale were collapsed to a three-item Likert scale by combining the lower and upper bound

categories to ensure that a sufficient number of responses were available to run the appropriate statistical test.<sup>171</sup>

#### **5.4 Conclusions**

To briefly review, this study is designed as a quantitative study of PEs and their role in policy decision making using US-Cuba policy as the case study. This chapter integrated insights to decision making offered by existing theoretical research to operationalize the MSF as a two-level model and generate testable hypotheses pertaining to the framework's central concept of PEs. Chapters six, seven and eight, the empirical components of the study, present the results of various statistical tests and a synthesis of the results. Hypotheses were tested and relationships between variables quantified. Three different frames of reference are used to analyze and present the results. Chapter seven tests the two central hypotheses in the context of the broader policy realm. Chapter eight tests the two central hypotheses by drawing upon the experience and expertise of individuals that have been directly involved in efforts to influence policy. Chapter nine tests the hypothesized association between success and entrepreneurial characteristics by utilizing survey participants' expertise and knowledge of US-Cuba policy to assess the role of specific individuals identified as central figures in shaping policy. Using three different frames allows for more rigorous testing of the hypotheses.

---

<sup>171</sup>

Since responses to open ended questions were minimal, they did not have an impact on the final results of the analysis.

## Chapter 6 Data Analysis: Participants' Assessments of Policy Entrepreneurs in the Policy Process

### 6.0 Introduction

This chapter represents the first of three empirical components of the study. The raw survey data analyzed in this chapter draw upon the participants' knowledge of and experience with the policy process to test the two central hypotheses beyond the specific case of US-Cuba policy.<sup>172</sup> Extending the frame of reference to the broader policy field is an effective way of testing the applicability of the MSF to different policy fields. Descriptive statistics were used to assess whether the MSF's definition, motivations for policy advocacy, and functions of PEs were supported by the survey data. Correlation analysis and multiple regression were used to assess relationships between variables, as well as the MSF's predictive power, and to test the two central hypotheses:

- H<sub>1</sub>: Policy entrepreneurs are more likely to couple the streams successfully during an open policy window if they possess four key entrepreneurial characteristics—have a claim to a hearing, are politically connected, are skilled negotiators, and are persistent.
- H<sub>2</sub>: Policy entrepreneurs are more likely to couple the streams successfully during an open policy window if they use one or more forms of manipulation, alter institutional venues and activate coalition support.

To address the limitations imposed on the study by the small sample size, partial

---

<sup>172</sup> Recall that the sample of survey participants consisted of 40 individuals of which 28% were political actors and 67% non-political actors well versed in policy formulation. Political actors included: current and former members of Congress, bureaucratic officials; congressional staff; and members of key congressional committees. Non-political actors included: representatives and members of interest

correlations and associated t-tests, along with effect size estimates and confidence intervals, were calculated for each of the predictor variables.

The results of the various statistical tests failed to provide sufficient evidence to support the two central hypotheses; however, an analysis of the effect size estimates and associated confidence intervals for each of the estimated models suggests a larger sample is necessary to either confirm or refute the results.


### **6.1 Definition of a Policy Entrepreneur**

Kingdon (1995: 122) labels those who advocate for proposals or the prominence of an idea as PEs; however, their defining characteristic is their willingness to invest their resources—time and energy, reputation, and sometimes money—in hope of a future return. As shown by figure 6.1, of the total survey participants who responded, 25 (78%) agreed that PEs are willing to invest financial resources in order to influence policy. An overwhelming 23 (96%) of respondents also agreed that a willingness to invest time and energy is a defining characteristic of PEs who seek to influence policy. Finally, 17 (90%) of total survey participants who responded agreed that PEs are willing to use their reputation in order to influence policy.

---

groups; policy analysts; and academic professionals. The third category of survey participants included individuals who agreed to participate on the condition that they remained anonymous.

Figure 6.1 Defining Characteristics of Policy Entrepreneurs




The descriptive data support the MSF's categorization of PEs as a unique group of individuals with clearly identifiable characteristics. PEs can be differentiated from other players in the policy process based on their willingness to invest their resources—time and energy, reputation, and finances. Survey participants ranked PEs high on all three factors; however, an overwhelming majority of total survey participants who responded agreed that investing time and energy to draw attention to their preferred policy is a key defining trait of PEs followed by a willingness to use their reputation and financial resources.

## 6.2 What Motivates a Policy Entrepreneur

Kingdon suggests that PEs are motivated by: a desire to address problems with existing policy; the promotion of personal interests; the promotion of personal values; an interest in shaping policy; and the playing of an active role in the policy

process. As shown by figure 6.2, of the total survey participants who responded, 22 or 100% agreed that PEs who seek to influence policy are motivated by a desire to address problems with existing policy. Twenty-one or 58% of total survey participants who responded agreed that the promotion of personal interests is a strong motivator for entrepreneurial involvement in the policy process. Of the 27 individuals who responded, 21 or 78% agreed that the promotion of personal values is a strong motivator for entrepreneurial involvement in the policy process. An overwhelming 12 or 92% of individuals who responded agreed that shaping future policy is a key motivator. Finally, 16 or 89% of respondents agreed entrepreneurial involvement is motivated by an desire to play an active role in the policy process.

Figure 6.2 Motivating Factors for Policy Advocacy




Again, the descriptive statistics provide strong support for the idea that PEs who seek to influence policy are motivated by a clearly identifiable set of factors, the most important being a desire to shape future policy followed by: an interest to play an active role in the policy process, the promotion of personal values; the promotion of personal interests.

### 6.3 Presence and Actions of a Policy Entrepreneur

Kingdon assigns PEs a prominent role during three critical stages of the policy decision making process: the development of viable policy alternatives;

pushing policy alternatives onto the government's agenda for an authoritative choice; and the adoption of a preferred policy alternative. As shown by figure 6.3, of the total survey participants who responded, 26 (96%) agreed that the presence and actions of PEs were important during both the development of viable policy alternatives and movement of policy proposals onto the government's agenda for an authoritative choice by decision leaders. Twenty-seven (93%) of total survey participants who responded agreed that the presence and actions of PEs were important during the policy adoption stage.

Figure 6.3 Critical Functions of a Policy Entrepreneur



Finally, the descriptive statistics confirm that the presence and actions of PEs are critical during three significant stages of the policy decision making process: the development of viable policy alternatives; pushing policy alternatives onto the government's agenda for an authoritative choice; and the adoption of a preferred

policy alternative. When combined with the previous results, the findings provide strong evidence to suggest that a PE as conceptualized by the MSF is not an abstract concept, but rather a clearly identifiable group of individuals whose presence and actions are critical during each of the stages of policy making.

#### **6.4 Hypothesis 1: Success and Entrepreneurial Characteristics**

The MSF suggests that PEs who are able to successfully position their proposals onto the government's decision agenda for authoritative action exhibit four unique entrepreneurial characteristics—they have a claim to a hearing, are politically connected, are skilled negotiators, and are persistent in their efforts. To test the MSF's underlying assertion concerning success and entrepreneurial characteristics, the following hypothesis was generated:

H<sub>1</sub>: Policy entrepreneurs are more likely to couple the streams successfully during an open policy window if they possess four key entrepreneurial characteristics—have a claim to a hearing, are politically connected, are skilled negotiators, and are persistent.

The research hypothesis was tested against the null hypothesis of no effect. Bivariate correlations were used to assess relationships between the hypothesized entrepreneurial characteristics and successful positioning of a PE's policy alternative on the governments' decision agenda for an authoritative decision. A Pearson correlation analysis was conducted to assess relationships between variables. Multiple regression analysis was used to: assess whether the hypothesized entrepreneurial characteristics were good predictors of success; test the MSF's predictive power; and test the hypothesis that policy entrepreneurs are

more likely to couple the streams successfully during an open policy window if they possess four key entrepreneurial characteristics—have a claim to a hearing, are politically connected, are skilled negotiators, and are persistent. The multiple regression model:  $y = b_1x_1 + b_2x_2 + \dots + b_7x_7 + c$  was estimated where  $y$ =success and  $x_1, \dots, x_7$  represented the independent predictor variables.<sup>173</sup> Finally, as discussed in chapter five, to address the study's small sample size, partial correlation analysis, effect sizes and confidence intervals were utilized in the analysis of the data. The variables were entered simultaneously into the analysis. Listwise deletion was used to exclude cases with missing variables. Data were analyzed for any possible outliers and outliers with a standard score of +/-2.5 (the benchmark for sample sizes with 80 or fewer cases) were removed.

#### **6.4.1 Bivariate Correlations<sup>174</sup>**

The results of the Pearson correlation analysis provided by table 6.1 failed to reveal statistically significant associations between success and the hypothesized entrepreneurial characteristics. Two of the hypothesized characteristics revealed statistically insignificant weak positive associations with success: claim to a hearing with  $r(40) = .100$ ,  $p(\text{two-tailed}) > .05$  and skilled negotiator with  $r(40) = .110$ ,  $p(\text{two-tailed}) > .05$  respectively. The remaining two characteristics exhibited weak negative

---

<sup>173</sup> For a summary of the variables used in the analysis, see Appendix B.

<sup>174</sup> Statistics used for analysis were rounded to one decimal.

associations with success—politically connected with  $r(40)=-.120$ ,  $p(\text{two-tailed})>.05$ , and persistent with  $r(33)=-.124$ ,  $p(\text{two-tailed})>.05$ .

Of the remaining three variables—streams, problem window and politics window—problem window was the only variable to exhibit a statistically significant moderate (positive) association with success with  $r(40)=.336$ ,  $p(\text{two-tailed})<.05$ . The remaining two variables revealed statistically insignificant, but positive, associations with success: streams with  $r(40)=-.072$ ,  $p(\text{two-tailed})>.05$ ; and politics window with  $r(40)=.257$ ,  $p(\text{two-tailed})>.05$ .

Table 6.1 Hypothesis 1—Bivariate Correlations

Bivariate Correlations <sup>a</sup>		
Variable		Pearson r
claim to hearing	Correlation Coefficient	.100
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.540
politically connected	Correlation Coefficient	-.120
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.461
skilled negotiator	Correlation Coefficient	.110
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.501
persistent	Correlation Coefficient	-.124
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.446
streams	Correlation Coefficient	.072
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.658
window (problem)	Correlation Coefficient	.336
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.034*
window (politics)	Correlation Coefficient	.257
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.110
Listwise N=40		
a. Dependent Variable=success		
* $p<.05$		

The results of the Pearson correlation analysis failed to provide sufficient evidence to support the proposition that successful positioning of a proposal on the government's decision agenda is associated with any of the four hypothesized

entrepreneurial characteristics, streams and the opening of a politics window. The results did, however, reveal a statistically significant positive association between success and problem window, suggesting that success is associated with the opening of a problem window. Windows are an integral component of the MSF, offering PEs an opportunity to propel their policy alternative onto the government's decision agenda for authoritative action. The opening of a problem window is fueled by events in the problem stream.

#### 6.4.2 Model Utility and Influence of Predictors<sup>175</sup>

Results of the multiple regression analysis, presented by table 6.2, revealed that the overall model explained approximately 18% ( $R^2=.181$ ) of the variance in success, which was statistically insignificant,  $F_{7,32}=1.009$ ,  $p>0.05$ .

Table 6.2 Hypothesis 1—Model Summary and ANOVA

Model Summary <sup>b</sup>					
R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Sig. F Change	
.425 <sup>a</sup>	.181	.002	.500	.443	
ANOVA <sup>b</sup>					
	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	1.768	7	.253	1.009	.443 <sup>a</sup>
Residual	8.007	32	.250		
Total	9.775	39			
a. Predictors: (Constant), politics window, persistent, skilled negotiator, streams, claim to a hearing, politically connected, problem window					
b. Dependent Variable: success					

As shown by table 6.3, each of the four hypothesized entrepreneurial characteristics were revealed to be statistically insignificant predictors of success;

<sup>175</sup> Statistics used for analysis were rounded to one decimal.

however, a claim to a hearing and skilled negotiator revealed statistically insignificant but weak positive ( $\beta=.080$  and  $\beta=.074$  respectively) associations with success. The remaining two characteristics, politically connected and persistent, revealed weak negative associations ( $\beta=-.080$  and  $\beta=-.084$  respectively) with success. Of the remaining three predictor variables—streams, problem window and politics window—problem and politics windows revealed statistically insignificant (weak positive) associations ( $\beta=.176$  and  $\beta=.045$  respectively) with success. No association was revealed between streams and success ( $\beta=.005$ ).

Table 6.3 Hypothesis 1—Coefficients

Coefficients <sup>a</sup>							
Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
	B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
claim to hearing	.080	.121	.113	.667	.510	.888	1.126
politically connected	-.080	.094	-.156	-.846	.404	.752	1.329
skilled negotiator	.074	.113	.124	.653	.518	.715	1.398
persistent	-.084	.085	-.166	-.978	.335	.894	1.119
streams	.005	.108	.008	.046	.963	.826	1.211
window (problem)	.176	.123	.289	1.430	.162	.625	1.599
window (politics)	.045	.120	.074	.374	.711	.662	1.510

a. Dependent Variable: success

The results of the regression analysis provide little evidence that the model is a good predictor of success and that success is associated with the hypothesized entrepreneurial characteristics, streams and opening of a window (either politics or problem). An inspection of the individual predictors also failed to produce sufficient evidence any of hypothesized predictors are statistically significant predictors of

success.<sup>176</sup> Based on the results, it is necessary to retain the null hypothesis and conclude that in combination, the hypothesized variables are not positively associated with PEs who are able successfully to position their preferred policy alternative onto the government's decision agenda for an authoritative decision.

### 6.4.3 Partial Correlations<sup>177</sup>

The results of the partial correlation analysis and associated t tests for each of the hypothesized variables are provided by table 6.4.

Table 6.4 Hypothesis 1—Partial Correlations

Partial Correlations <sup>a</sup>						
		Correlations				
	t	Zero-order	Partial (pr)	Part (sr)	pr <sup>2</sup>	sr <sup>2</sup>
claim to hearing	.619	.100	.117	.107	.029	.012
politically connected	.783	-.120	-.148	-.135	.022	.018
skilled negotiator	.607	.110	.115	.105	.013	.011
persistent	.907	-.124	-.170	-.156	.029	.024
streams	.040	.072	.008	.007	.000	.000
window (problem)	1.351	.336	.245	.229	.060	.052
window (politics)	.345	.257	.066	.060	.004	.004

a. Predictors: (Constant), politics window, persistent, skilled negotiator, streams, claim to a hearing, politically connected, problem window  
b. Dependent Variable: success

After controlling for the effects of all other predictor variables, the semi-partial correlation between a claim to a hearing and success remained virtually unchanged

<sup>176</sup> Although statistically insignificant, entrepreneurial characteristics "a claim to a hearing" and "skilled negotiator" revealed positive association with success, as did "problem" and "politics" windows. Politically connected and persistent each had negative associations with success while streams did not reveal an association with success.

<sup>177</sup> Statistics used for analysis were rounded to one decimal.

( $sr=.107$ ) when compared to the zero-order correlation ( $r=.100$ ),<sup>178</sup> suggesting that the weak positive association between a claim to a hearing and success cannot be attributed to the shared effects of the controlled variables, but rather to a direct association between a claim to a hearing and success.<sup>179</sup> The results of the significance test revealed that the semi-partial correlation between a claim to a hearing and success was statistically insignificant. We therefore conclude that having a claim to a hearing is not associated with successfully positioning a policy alternative on the government's decision agenda for an authoritative decision.

For the predictor politically connected, the zero-order correlation revealed a weak negative association with success ( $r=-.120$ ). When the effects of all other predictors were controlled, the semi-partial correlation virtually remained the same ( $sr=-.135$ ),<sup>180</sup> suggesting that the weak negative association between politically connected and success cannot be attributed to the shared effects of the controlled variables, but rather to a direct association between politically connected and success. The results of the significance test revealed that the semi-partial correlation between the two variables was statistically insignificant. We therefore conclude that being politically connected is not associated with successfully

---

<sup>178</sup> The predictor variable a claim to a hearing explained approximately one percent ( $sr^2=.012$ ) share of the total unique variance in success not explained by all other predictor variables.

<sup>179</sup> A direct relationship is defined as one in which a third variable (Z) has no effect on the association between X and Y (Healey, 2010: 363). The variable (Z) is irrelevant to the study. When partial correlation coefficients are essentially the same as the bivariate correlation, this is indicative of a direct relationship (Healey, 2010: 363).

<sup>180</sup> The predictor variable politically connected explained approximately 2% ( $sr^2=.018$ ) share of the total unique variance in success not explained by all other predictor variables.

positioning a policy alternative on the government's decision agenda for an authoritative decision.

The zero-order correlation between success and skilled negotiator revealed a weak positive association ( $r=.110$ ). When the effects of all other predictors were controlled, the semi-partial correlation virtually remained the same ( $sr=.105$ ),<sup>181</sup> suggesting that the weak positive association between skilled negotiator and success cannot be attributed to the shared effects of the controlled variables, but rather to a direct association between skilled negotiator and success. The results of the significance test revealed that the semi-partial correlation between the two variables was statistically insignificant. We therefore conclude that being a skilled negotiator is not associated with successfully positioning a policy alternative on the government's decision agenda for an authoritative decision.

For the final entrepreneurial characteristic persistent, the zero-order correlation revealed a weak negative association between persistent and success ( $r=-.124$ ). When the effects of all other predictors were controlled, the semi-partial correlation increased ( $sr=-.156$ ), but the direction of the association remained negative.<sup>182</sup> Suppressor effects can be attributed to unusual patterns of negative and positive effects between the success, persistent, and controlled variables. The results of the significance test revealed that the semi-partial correlation between the

---

<sup>181</sup>The predictor variable skilled negotiator explained approximately 1% ( $sr^2=.011$ ) share of the total unique variance in success not explained by all other predictor variables.

<sup>182</sup>The predictor variable persistent explained approximately 2% ( $sr^2=.024$ ) share of the total unique variance in success not explained by all other predictor variables.

two variables was statistically insignificant. We therefore conclude that being persistent is not associated with successfully positioning a policy alternative on the government's decision agenda for an authoritative decision.

For the variable, streams, the zero-order correlation revealed a weak positive association ( $r=.072$ ) between the variable and success; however, after controlling for all other predictor variables, the association decreased dramatically, virtually disappearing ( $sr=.007$ ). This suggests that the zero order association can be attributed to the effects of the controlled variables rather than a substantive association between the hypothesized characteristic and success. This is consistent with two possible relationships—spurious or intervening—each resulting in patterns of weaker correlation. If we had looked simply at the original bivariate correlation between streams and success, we would have overlooked the effects of the controlled variables and incorrectly suggested a weak positive association between the variables when in fact the semi-partial correlation revealed no association. The results of the significance test revealed that the semi-partial correlation between the two variables was statistically insignificant. We therefore conclude that the streams (a political climate receptive to policy change, government recognition of a pressing problem, and the availability of a viable solution) are not associated with successfully positioning a policy alternative on the government's decision agenda for an authoritative decision.

For the predictor problem window, the zero-order correlation revealed a moderate positive association between the variable and success ( $r=.336$ ). When the

effects of all other predictors were controlled, the semi-partial correlation was lower than the zero-order correlation ( $r=.229$ )<sup>183</sup> however, the direction of the association remained positive. The results of the significance test revealed that the semi-partial correlation between the two variables was statistically insignificant. We therefore conclude that the opening of a problem window is not associated with successfully positioning a policy alternative on the government's decision agenda for an authoritative decision.

Finally, for the predictor politics window, the zero-order correlation revealed a moderate positive association between the variable and success ( $r=.257$ ). When the effects of all other predictors were controlled, the semi-partial correlation was lower than the zero order correlation, revealing a weaker association between the variable and success ( $sr=.060$ )<sup>184</sup>; however, the direction of the association remained positive. The results of the significance test revealed that the semi-partial correlation between the two variables was statistically insignificant. We therefore conclude that the opening of a politics window is not associated with successfully positioning a policy alternative on the government's decision agenda for an authoritative decision.

---

<sup>183</sup>The predictor variable problem window explained approximately 2% ( $sr^2=.016$ ) share of the total unique variance in success not explained by all other predictor variables.

<sup>184</sup>The predictor variable politics window explained less than one percent ( $sr^2=.004$ ) share of the total unique variance in success not explained by all other predictor variables.

#### 6.4.4 Effect Sizes and Confidence Intervals

Table 6.5 provides estimates of the effect sizes and associated confidence intervals for the full model and each of the hypothesized predictors of success.

Table 6 5 Hypothesis 1—Effect Sizes and Confidence Intervals

Effect Sizes and Confidence Intervals							
	Unstandardized Coefficients	Standard Error	95% Confidence Interval for B		Effect Size Estimate	Partial Correlations	
	Beta		Lower Bound	Upper Bound	Cohen's $f^2$	pr	sr
full model			01	35	0 22		
claim to hearing	080	121	-0 17	0 33	0 02	107	029
politically connected	- 080	094	-0 27	0 11	0 02	- 135	022
skilled negotiator	074	113	-0 12	0 30	0 01	105	013
persistent	- 084	085	-0 25	0 09	0 03	- 156	029
streams	005	108	-0 22	0 23	0 00	007	000
window (problem)	176	123	-0 08	0 43	0 07	229	060
window (politics)	045	120	-0 20	0 29	0 01	060	004
R <sup>2</sup> = .181							

For the full model, a medium effect size was estimated ( $f^2=.22$ ) and a 95% confidence interval obtained in the range of 0.01 to 0.35. Based on the sample data, we conclude that the true effect size in the population from which the sample was taken is 95% certain to be in the range of .01 to .35. Since the 95% confidence interval does not enclose the value of “no effect” (i.e. does not include 0), this represents a difference that is statistically significant. We can therefore overturn the null hypothesis; in other words, there is insufficient evidence to support the null hypothesis of no association of success to the hypothesized variables. The width of the confidence interval suggests that we can be assured of the direction of the effect (i.e. positive), and that the effect is probably large enough to be of

significance; however, our estimate of the strength of the effect is imprecise—it could be very small or large. In order to increase the power of the study to detect a more precise effect size, it is necessary to replicate the study with a larger sample size.

Small effect sizes ( $f^2=.02$ ) were estimated for the hypothesized entrepreneurial characteristics a claim to a hearing and politically connected and confidence intervals from -0.17 to 0.33 and -0.27 to 0.30, respectively. No effect size was estimated for the entrepreneurial characteristic, skilled negotiator ( $f^2=.01$ ) with a  $CI_{.95}$  from -0.12 to 0.30. For persistent, a small effect size was estimated ( $f^2=.03$ ) with a  $CI_{.95}$  from -0.25 to 0.09. The associated confidence intervals for each of the variables include the value of “no effect” (i.e. include 0), representing a difference that is statistically insignificant. This suggests that, individually, the hypothesized entrepreneurial characteristics are not associated with success.

For the predictor variable, problem window, a small effect size was estimated ( $f^2=.07$ ) with a  $CI_{.95}$  from -0.08 to 0.43. No effect sizes were estimated for streams and politics windows ( $f^2=.00$  and  $f^2=.01$  respectively). The confidence intervals were:  $CI_{.95}$  from -0.22 to 0.23 for streams; and  $CI_{.95}$  from -0.20 to 0.29 for politics window. The associated confidence intervals for each of the variables include the value of “no effect” (i.e. include 0), representing a difference that is statistically insignificant. This suggests that, individually, the variables problem and politics windows and streams are not associated with success.

## 6.5 Hypothesis 2: Success and Coupling Strategies

Kindgon's MSF accords PEs a critical role in agenda setting; however, the MSF fails to clearly delineate the means by which PEs are able to influence government agendas. We are told that PEs must couple the streams in order to successfully push an issue into a prominent position on the government's decision agenda for authoritative action; however, the mechanics of the coupling process remain unclear. To answer the question of "how", we drew upon the empirical and theoretical literature on policy entrepreneurship and agenda setting to uncover possible coupling strategies. Three categories of coupling strategies were identified: various forms of manipulation consisting of framing, agenda control, strategic voting, and salami tactics; altering institutional venues which involves shifting attention to institutional venues that provide the greatest level of support for and least resistance to a proposal; and activating the support of coalitions. To test the association between success and the hypothesized coupling strategies, the following hypothesis was generated:

H<sub>2</sub>: Policy entrepreneurs are more likely to couple the streams successfully during an open policy window if they use one or more forms of manipulation, alter institutional venues and activate coalition support.

The research hypothesis was tested against the null hypothesis of no effect. Bivariate correlations were used to assess relationships between the hypothesized coupling strategies and successful positioning of a policy entrepreneur's policy alternative on the government's decision agenda for an authoritative decision. A Pearson correlation analysis was conducted to assess correlations between

variables. Multiple regression analysis was used to: assess whether the hypothesized coupling strategies were good predictors of success; test the MSF's predictive power; and test the hypothesis that policy entrepreneurs are more likely to couple the streams successfully during an open policy window if they use one or more forms of manipulation, alter institutional venues and activate coalition support. The multiple regression model:  $y = b_1x_1 + b_2x_2 + \dots + b_ix_i + c$  was estimated where  $y = \text{success}$ , and  $x_1 \dots x_9$  represented the independent predictor variables.<sup>185</sup> Partial correlation analysis was used to assess the degree to which the hypothesized coupling strategies could be used to explain variance by controlling for the effects of other predictor variables that may be correlated with the hypothesized relationship. Effect sizes were estimated and confidence intervals obtained for the full model and individual predictors to assess the study's findings separate from the influence of sample size and statistical significance. The variables were entered simultaneously into the analysis. Listwise deletion was used to exclude cases with missing variables. The data were analyzed for any possible outliers and outliers with a standard score of  $\pm 2.5$  (the benchmark for sample sizes with 80 or fewer cases) were removed.

### **6.5.1 Bivariate Correlations**

The results of the Pearson correlation analysis provided by table 6.6 failed to reveal statistically significant associations between success and the hypothesized

---

<sup>185</sup> For a list and description of the variables used in the analysis, see Appendix C.

coupling strategies. A statistically insignificant, but weak, positive association was revealed between manipulation strategies involving framing and success with  $r(40)=.066$ ,  $p(\text{two-tailed})<.05$ . Weak negative associations were identified between success and four hypothesized coupling strategies: manipulation strategies involving agenda control with  $r(40)=-.115$ ,  $p(\text{two-tailed})>.05$ , strategic voting with  $r(40)=-.120$ ,  $p(\text{two-tailed})>.05$ , and salami tactics with  $r(40)=-.209$ ,  $p(\text{two-tailed})>.05$ ; and activating coalition support with  $r(40)=-.048$ ,  $p(\text{two-tailed})>.05$ . No association was revealed between success and altering institutional venues with  $r(40)=-.011$ ,  $p(\text{two-tailed})>.05$ . Of the remaining three variables—streams, problem window and politics window—problem window was the only variable to exhibit a statistically significant moderate (positive) association with success with  $r(40)=.336$ ,  $p(\text{two-tailed})<.05$ . Statistically insignificant, but weak positive associations were revealed between success and streams  $r(33)=.072$ ,  $p(\text{two-tailed})>.05$ , and between success and politics with  $r(40)=-.257$ ,  $p(\text{two-tailed})>.05$ .

Table 6.6 Hypothesis 2—Bivariate Correlations

Correlations <sup>a</sup>		
Variables		Pearson r
framing (manipulation strategies)	Correlation	.066
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.685
agenda control (manipulation strategies)	Correlation	-.115
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.478
strategic voting (manipulation strategy)	Correlation	-.120
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.461
salami tactics (manipulation strategy)	Correlation	-.209
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.196
venues	Correlation	-.011
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.947
coalitions	Correlation	-.048
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.768
streams	Correlation	.072
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.658
problem window	Correlation	.336
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.034*
politics window	Correlation	.257
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.110
a. Dependent Variable=success Listwise N=40 *p<.05		

The results of the Pearson correlation analysis failed to support the proposition that successful positioning of a proposal on the government's decision agenda is associated with the hypothesized coupling strategies, streams or politics window. The results, did, however, reveal a statistically significant positive association between success and the opening of a window, in this case a problem window.

### 6.5.2 Model Utility and Influence of Predictors<sup>186</sup>

Results of the multiple regression analysis presented by table 6.6 revealed that the overall model explained approximately 24% ( $R^2=.240$ ) of the variance in success, which was statistically insignificant,  $F_{9,30}=1.052$   $p < 0.05$ .

Table 6.7 Hypothesis 2—Model Summary and ANOVA

Model Summary <sup>b</sup>					
R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Sig. F Change	
.490 <sup>a</sup>	.240	.012	.498	.424	
ANOVA <sup>b</sup>					
Model	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	2.345	9	.261	1.052	.424 <sup>a</sup>
Residual	7.430	30	.248		
Total	9.775	39			
a. Predictors: (Constant), politics window, salami tactics (manipulation), streams, framing (manipulation), strategic voting (manipulation), coalitions, problem window, agenda control (manipulation), venues					
b. Dependent Variable: success					

As shown by table 6.8, each of the hypothesized coupling strategies was found to be a statistically insignificant predictor of success; however, manipulation strategies involving framing and altering institutional venues revealed statistically insignificant but weak positive associations with success ( $\beta=.064$  and  $\beta=.222$  respectively). Manipulation strategies involving strategic voting, salami tactics, and activating coalitions revealed weak negative associations ( $\beta=-.074$ ,  $\beta=-.255$  and  $\beta=-.047$  respectively) with success. Manipulation strategies involving agenda control did not have an effect on success ( $\beta=.030$ ). Of the remaining three predictor variables—streams, problem window and politics window—problem window was the

<sup>186</sup> Statistics used for analysis were rounded to one decimal.

only predictor to reveal a statistically insignificant, but weak positive effect ( $\beta = .259$ ) on success. Streams revealed a statistically insignificant weak negative association and politics window no association ( $\beta = -.056$  and  $\beta = -.009$  respectively) with success.

Table 6.8 Hypothesis 2—Coefficients

Coefficients <sup>a</sup>							
	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
	B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
framing (manipulation)	.064	.128	.092	.501	.620	.754	1.326
agenda control (manipulation)	.030	.154	.046	.192	.849	.444	2.250
strategic voting (manipulation)	-.074	.128	-.106	-.581	.566	.760	1.316
salami tactics (manipulation)	-.255	.142	-.449	1.797	.082	.405	2.470
venues	.222	.166	.369	1.343	.189	.335	2.984
coalitions	-.047	.121	-.084	-.387	.702	.534	1.872
streams	-.056	.111	-.092	-.505	.617	.770	1.298
problem window	.259	.130	.425	1.995	.055	.558	1.792
politics window	-.009	.131	-.015	-.069	.945	.551	1.815

a. Dependent Variable: success

Results of the multiple regression revealed that the combined effect of the hypothesized coupling strategies and three additional predictor variables—streams, problem and politics windows—explained approximately 24% of the variance in success which was statistically insignificant. We therefore retain the null hypothesis and conclude that, in combination, the hypothesized variables are not associated with PEs that are successful in their efforts to position their preferred policy onto the government's decision agenda for an authoritative decision. An inspection of the individual predictors revealed that each of hypothesized predictors was a statistically insignificant predictor of success.<sup>187</sup> The results confirm that the model is not a good

<sup>187</sup> Although statistically insignificant, coupling strategies involving framing and altering institutional

predictor of success.

### 6.5.3 Partial Correlations

The results of the partial correlation analysis and associated t tests for each of the hypothesized variables are provided by table 6.9.

Table 6.9 Hypothesis 2—Partial Correlations

Partial Correlations <sup>a</sup>						
	t	Correlations				
		Zero-order	Partial (pr)	Part (sr)	pr <sup>2</sup>	sr <sup>2</sup>
framing (manipulation)	.447	.066	.091	.080	.008	.006
agenda control (framing)	.195	-.115	.035	.031	.001	.001
strategic voting (manipulation)	.587	-.120	-.105	-.092	.011	.009
salami tactics (manipulation)	1.66	-.209	-.312	-.286	.097	.082
venues	1.22	-.011	.238	.214	.057	.046
coalitions	.346	-.048	-.070	-.062	.005	.004
streams	.447	.072	-.092	-.080	.008	.006
problem window	1.87	.336	.342	.318	.007	.101
politics window	.061	.257	-.013	-.011	.000	.000

a. Predictors: (Constant), politics window, salami tactics (manipulation), streams, framing (manipulation), strategic voting (manipulation), coalitions, problem window, agenda control , venues  
b. Dependent Variable: success

Manipulation strategies involving framing revealed a weak positive zero-order correlation ( $r=.066$ ) with success. After the effects of all other predictors were controlled, the semi-partial correlation remained virtually unchanged ( $sr=.080$ ) when compared to the zero-order correlation.<sup>188</sup> The results of the significance test

---

venues revealed positive association with success as did problem window. Manipulation strategies involving strategic voting, salami tactics, altering institutional venues and streams each had negative associations with success while agenda control and politics window did not reveal associations with success.

<sup>188</sup> The predictor variable manipulation strategies involving framing explained less than one percent ( $sr^2=.006$ ) share of the total unique variance in success not explained by all other predictor variables.

revealed that the semi-partial correlation between manipulation strategies involving framing and success was statistically insignificant. We therefore conclude that manipulation strategies involving framing are not associated with successfully positioning a policy proposal on the government's decision agenda for an authoritative decision.

Manipulation strategies involving agenda control revealed a weak negative zero-order correlation ( $r = -.115$ ) with success. After the effects of all other predictors were controlled, the semi-partial correlation between the variable and success was higher ( $sr = .031$ ) than the zero-order correlation<sup>189</sup> suggesting that the control variables were suppressing the association between the two variables; however, the semi-partial correlation was not strong enough to reveal an association. If we were to look at the original zero order correlation, we would have incorrectly suggested a weak negative association when in fact there is no association. The results of the significance test revealed that the semi-partial correlation between manipulation strategies involving agenda control and success was statistically insignificant. We can therefore conclude that manipulation strategies involving agenda control are not associated with successfully positioning a policy proposal on the government's decision agenda for an authoritative decision.

Manipulation strategies involving strategic voting revealed a weak negative zero-order correlation with success ( $r = -.120$ ). When the effects of all other

---

<sup>189</sup> The predictor variable manipulation strategies involving agenda control explained less than a one percent ( $sr^2 = .001$ ) share of the total unique variance in success not explained by all other predictor variables.

predictors were controlled, the semi-partial correlation with success virtually remained unchanged ( $sr = -.092$ ) when compared to the zero-order correlation.<sup>190</sup> The results of the significance test revealed that the semi-partial correlation between manipulation strategies involving agenda control and success was statistically insignificant. We can therefore conclude that manipulation strategies involving strategic voting are not associated with successfully positioning a policy proposal on the government's decision agenda for an authoritative decision.

Manipulation strategies involving salami tactics revealed a weak negative zero-order correlation with success ( $r = -.209$ ). When the effects of all other predictors were controlled, the semi-partial correlation with success was higher ( $sr = -.286$ ) than the zero-order correlation<sup>191</sup> suggesting that the control variables suppressed the association between the two variables; however, the (negative) direction of the association was maintained. The results of the significance test revealed that the semi-partial correlation between manipulation strategies involving salami tactics and success was statistically insignificant. We can therefore conclude that manipulation strategies involving salami tactics are not associated with successfully positioning a policy proposal on the government's decision agenda for an authoritative decision.

---

<sup>190</sup> The predictor variable manipulation strategies involving strategic voting explained approximately one percent ( $sr^2 = .009$ ) of the unique variance in success left unexplained by all other predictor variables.

<sup>191</sup> The predictor variable manipulation strategies involving salami tactics explained approximately 8% ( $sr^2 = .082$ ) of the unique variance in success left unexplained by all other predictor variables.

The zero-order correlation between altering institutional venues and success failed to reveal an association between the variables ( $r=-.011$ ). When the effects of all other predictors were controlled, the semi-partial correlation was significantly higher ( $sr=.214$ ) than the zero-order correlation.<sup>192</sup> In this case, the controlled variables suppressed the association between altering institutional venues and success, therefore masking the positive association. The results of the significance test revealed that the semi-partial correlation between altering institutional venues and success was statistically insignificant. We can therefore conclude that altering institutional venues is not associated with successfully positioning a policy proposal on the government's decision agenda for an authoritative decision.

For the final hypothesized coupling strategy involving activating coalitions, a direct association was revealed between the variables. The semi-partial correlation between success and activating coalition support virtually remained unchanged ( $sr=-.062$ ) once the effects of all other variables were controlled, suggesting that the negative zero order association ( $r=-.048$ ) can be attributed to the direct association between the two variables rather than the effects of the controlled variables.<sup>193</sup> This suggests that a negative association exists between activating coalitions and success. The results of the significance test revealed that the semi-partial correlation between the two variables was statistically insignificant. We can

---

<sup>192</sup>The predictor variable institutional venues explained approximately 5% ( $sr^2=.046$ ) share of the total unique variance in success not explained by all other predictor variables.

<sup>193</sup>The predictor variable activating coalition support explained less than one percent ( $sr^2=.004$ ) of the unique variance in success not unexplained by all other predictor variables.

therefore conclude that activating coalition support is not associated with successfully positioning a policy proposal on the government's decision agenda for an authoritative decision.

For the predictor, streams, the zero-order correlation revealed a weak positive association with success ( $r=.072$ ). When the effects of all other predictors were controlled, the semi-partial correlation was lower ( $sr=-.080$ ) than the zero order correlation<sup>194</sup> suggesting two possible relationships—spurious or intervening—each resulting in patterns of weaker correlation. If we were to focus only on the original zero order correlation, we would have incorrectly concluded that there was weak positive association between the two variables when, in fact, after controlling for the effects of all other variables, a weak negative association was revealed. The results of the significance test revealed that the semi-partial correlation between the two variables was statistically insignificant. We conclude that streams are not associated with successfully positioning a policy proposal on the government's decision agenda for an authoritative decision.

For the predictor problem window, the zero-order correlation revealed a moderate positive association with success ( $r=.336$ ). When the effects of all other predictors were controlled, the semi-partial correlation remained virtually unchanged ( $sr=.318$ )<sup>195</sup> suggesting a direct association between the two variables. In this case,

---

<sup>194</sup> The predictor variable streams explained approximately 42% ( $sr^2=.419$ ) share of the total unique variance in success not explained by all other predictor variables.

<sup>195</sup> The predictor variable problem window explained approximately 10% ( $sr^2=.101$ ) share of the total unique variance in success not explained by all other predictor variables.

the controlled variables had no effect on the original association between the two variables. The results of the significance test also revealed the semi-partial correlation between success and streams to be statistically significant, thus confirming that successfully positioning a proposal onto the government's decision agenda is associated with the opening a problem window.

Finally, for the predictor politics window, the zero-order correlation revealed a weak positive association between the variable and success ( $r=.257$ ). When the effects of all other predictors were controlled, the semi-partial correlation was lower ( $sr=-.011$ ) than the original zero order correlation<sup>196</sup> suggesting a possible spurious or intervening effect on the association between success and politics window. If we were to focus only on the zero order correlation, we would have incorrectly concluded that there was weak positive association between the two variables when in fact, after controlling for the effects of all other variables, no association was present. The results of the significance test revealed that the semi-partial correlation between the two variables was statistically insignificant. We therefore conclude that the opening of a politics window is not associated with successfully positioning a policy alternative on the government's decision agenda for an authoritative decision.

#### **6.5.4 Effect Sizes and Confidence Intervals**

Table 6.10 provides estimates of the effect sizes and associated confidence intervals for the full model and each of the hypothesized predictors of success.

---

<sup>196</sup>The predictor variable politics window did not account for any ( $sr^2=.000$ ) of the unique variance in

Table 6 10 Hypothesis 2—Effect Sizes and Confidence Intervals

Effect Sizes and Confidence Intervals							
	Unstandardized Coefficients	Standard Error	95% Confidence Interval for B		Effect Size Estimate	Partial Correlations	
	Beta		Lower Bound	Upper Bound	Cohen's $f^2$	pr	sr
full model			.066	.414	.315		
framing (manipulation)	.064	.128	-.198	.325	.007	.091	.080
agenda control (manipulation)	.030	.154	-.284	.345	.001	.035	.031
strategic voting (manipulation)	-.074	.128	-.335	.187	.011	-.105	-.092
salami tactics (manipulation)	-.255	.142	-.545	.035	.108	-.312	-.286
venues	.222	.166	-.117	.561	.061	.238	.214
coalitions	-.047	.121	-.294	.200	.005	-.070	-.062
streams	-.056	.111	-.283	.171	.008	-.092	-.080
problem window	.259	.130	-.001	.525	.133	.342	.318
politics window	-.009	.131	-.277	.259	.000	-.013	-.011
R <sup>2</sup> = .181 (full model)							

For the full model, a medium effect size was estimated ( $f^2=.32$ ) and a 95% confidence interval obtained in the range of .07 to .41. Based on the sample data, we conclude that the true effect size in the population from which the sample was taken is 95% certain to be in the range of .07 to .41. Since the 95% confidence interval does not enclose the value of “no effect” (i.e. does not include 0), this represents a difference that is statistically significant. We can therefore overturn the null hypothesis, in other words, there is insufficient evidence to support the null hypothesis of no association of success to the hypothesized variables. The width of the confidence interval suggests that we can be assured of the direction of the effect (i.e. positive), and that the effect is probably large enough to be of significance; however, our estimate of the strength of the effect is imprecise—it

---

success not explained by all other predictor variables

could be very small or large. In order to increase the power of the study to detect a more precise effect size, it is necessary to replicate the study with a larger sample size.

Only two coupling strategies—salami tactics and altering institutional venues—revealed small effect sizes ( $f^2=.11$  and  $f^2=.06$  respectively). For the remaining four coupling strategies—framing (manipulation), agenda control (manipulation), strategic voting (framing) and activating coalitions—zero effect sizes were estimated. Confidence intervals for each of the variables contained the value of “no effect” (i.e. includes 0), requiring us to retain the null hypothesis of no difference between success and each of the hypothesized variables. The width of the confidence intervals for each of the hypothesized coupling strategies suggests that additional data are necessary to increase the precision of the estimated effect sizes. In the case of the variable, salami tactics (manipulation), although we cannot be confident of the direction of the effect because of the width of the interval, it is likely negative (but statistically insignificant).<sup>197</sup> Similarly, for the variable altering institutional venues, although we cannot be confident of the direction of the effect because of the width of the interval, it is likely in this case to be positive (but statistically insignificant).<sup>198</sup>

---

<sup>197</sup> For the variable, salami tactics (manipulation), the obtained 95% confidence interval runs from -0.55 to 0.04, suggesting that there is a strong chance that the direction of the effect is negative, but additional data are necessary to increase the precision of the estimate.

<sup>198</sup> For the variable altering institutional venues, the obtained 95% confidence interval runs from -0.12 to 0.56, suggesting that there is a strong chance that the direction of the effect is positive, but additional data are necessary to increase the precision of the estimate.

Of the remaining three variables, problem window is the only variable to reveal a small effect size ( $f^2=.13$ ) and a 95% confidence interval containing “no effect” (i.e. includes 0) which requires us to retain the null hypothesis of no difference between success and problem window. For each of the remaining variables—streams and politics window—zero effect sizes were estimated ( $f^2=.01$  and  $f^2=.00$  respectively). Since the null hypothesis always means the effect size is zero,<sup>199</sup> we conclude that there is insufficient evidence to reject the hypothesis of no association of success to each of the variables. An inspection of the confidence intervals reveals wide intervals, suggesting that additional data are necessary to increase the precision of the estimated effect sizes. We can add that in the case of the variable, problem window, although we cannot be confident of the direction of the effect because of the width of the interval, it is likely positive (but statistically insignificant).<sup>200</sup>

---

<sup>199</sup> Cohen (1988: 10).

<sup>200</sup> The obtained 95% confidence interval runs from -0.00 to 0.53, suggesting that there is a strong chance that the direction of the effect is positive, but additional data is necessary to increase the precision of the estimate.

## 6.6 Conclusion

This chapter analyzed survey data assessing the importance, characteristics and behaviours of PEs in the context of the broader field of policy. Survey respondents were asked, based on their knowledge of and experience with the public policy process, to assess whether successful positioning of a policy alternative on the government's decision agenda was associated with the hypothesized variables.

### *Hypothesis 1*

The first hypothesis was constructed to assess the relationship between success and entrepreneurial characteristics. It was hypothesized that PEs are more likely to couple the streams successfully during an open policy window if they possess four key entrepreneurial characteristics—a claim to a hearing, politically connected, skilled negotiators, and persistent. The initial bivariate correlations between success and the hypothesized variables revealed statistically insignificant associations; however, positive (but statistically insignificant) associations were identified between success and a claim to a hearing, skilled negotiator, streams and politics window. Problem window was the only variable to reveal a statistically significant positive correlation with success. It is important to note that, although the correlation results are effective in uncovering associations between the variables, they do not provide us with any information concerning the underlying causes of the associations; hence, they cannot be used to infer causal relationships between the

variables. The results should be interpreted as a “first step” in uncovering the underlying processes at work.

An assessment of the full model revealed that the hypothesized entrepreneurial characteristics, streams and windows, in combination were statistically insignificant predictors of success. We concluded, based on the regression results, that the hypothesized model was not a good predictor of success. A partial correlation analysis confirmed the original bivariate correlations between success and the hypothesized entrepreneurial characteristics as well as problem and politics window; however, rejected the original association between streams and success. The associated significance tests revealed the semi-partial correlations to be statistically insignificant, thus reaffirming the conclusion that the hypothesized variables are not associated with success.

As a final step in our analysis, effects sizes and confidence intervals for the full model and individual predictors were calculated to assess the study's findings separately from the influence of sample size and statistical significance. For the full model, a medium effect size was estimated and a 95% confidence interval obtained that did not include the value of “no effect”. Based on results, we concluded that the true effect size in the population from which the sample was taken was 95% certain to be in the range of the obtained confidence interval, and since the confidence interval did not include the value of “no effect”, statistically significant. A closer analysis of the width of the confidence interval reaffirmed the direction (positive) of the effect and that the effect was large enough to be significant. Hence, there was

sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis of no effect, providing partial support for the research hypothesis.

The effect size estimates for the hypothesized predictors ranged from zero to small. For each predictor, the obtained confidence interval included the value of “no effect”. Based on the results, we concluded that the true effect size for the population from which the sample was taken for each predictor was 95% certain to be in the range of the obtained confidence interval; however, since the confidence intervals included the value of “no effect”, this represented a difference that was statistically insignificant. Hence, there was insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis of no effect. A closer analysis of the width of the confidence intervals revealed positive associations for the variables skilled negotiator and problem window, and negative associations for the variables politically connected and persistent. However, given the width of the intervals, additional data are necessary to confirm our results.

Overall, based on the aggregate results (bivariate correlations, regression analysis, and partial correlation analysis) there is insufficient evidence to support the hypothesis that PEs are more likely to successfully couple the streams during an open policy window if they possess four key entrepreneurial characteristics—have a claim to a hearing, are politically connected, are skilled negotiators, and are persistent. However, the results of the effect size estimates and associated confidence intervals for the full model revealed a medium effect size and model that

is statistically significant, suggesting replicating the study with a larger sample is necessary to assess the reliability of the findings.

### *Hypothesis 2*

The second hypothesis was designed to assess the relationship between the successful positioning of a policy alternative on the government's decision agenda by a policy entrepreneur and the selection of coupling strategies. It is hypothesized that policy entrepreneurs are more likely to couple the streams successfully during an open policy window if they use one or more forms of manipulation, alter institutional venues, and activate coalition support. The initial bivariate correlations between success and the hypothesized variables did not reveal statistically significant associations between success and any of the hypothesized coupling strategies. In fact, manipulation strategies involving framing were the only form of coupling strategies that revealed a positive (but statistically insignificant) association with success. Of the remaining three variables—streams, problem and politics windows—problem window was the only variable to reveal a statistically significant correlation with success. Streams and politics window also revealed positive associations with success, but the correlations were statistically insignificant. Although the results do not support the hypothesized positive associations between coupling strategies, streams and politics window, they did reveal a positive correlation between success and the opening of a problem window. As mentioned earlier, correlation results are effective in uncovering associations between

variables; however, they should not be used to infer causal relationships between variables because they do not provide any information concerning the underlying causes of associations. The results should be used as a stepping stone to uncovering the underlying processes at work.

An assessment of the full model revealed that the hypothesized coupling strategies, streams and windows, in combination were statistically insignificant predictors of success. We concluded based on the regression results that the model was not a good predictor of success. A partial correlation analysis confirmed the original bivariate correlations between success and framing, strategic voting, salami tactics, activating coalitions and problem window, but rejected the original correlations for agenda control, altering institutional venues, streams and politics window. The associated significance tests for each semi-partial correlation, excluding the test for problem window were statistically insignificant, thus affirming that success is not associated with the hypothesized coupling strategies, streams and politics window.

The final step in our analysis involved the calculation of effect sizes and confidence intervals for the full model and individual predictors that were free from the influence of sample size and statistical significance. For the full model, a medium effect size was estimated and a 95% confidence interval obtained that did not include the value of "no effect". Based on results, we concluded that the true effect size in the population from which the sample was taken was 95% certain to be in the range of the obtained confidence interval, and since the confidence

interval did not include the value of “no effect”. This represented a difference that was statistically significant. A closer analysis of the width of the confidence interval reaffirmed the direction (positive) of the effect and that the effect was large enough to be significant. Hence, there was sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis of no effect, providing partial support for the research hypothesis.

The effect size estimates for the hypothesized predictors ranged from zero to small. For each of the predictors, the obtained confidence intervals included the value of “no effect”. Based on results, we concluded that the true effect size for the population from which the sample was taken for each predictor, was 95% certain to be in the range of the obtained confidence interval; however, since the confidence intervals included the value of “no effect”, this represented a difference that was statistically insignificant. Hence, there was insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis of no effect. A closer analysis of the width of the confidence intervals revealed positive associations for the variables venues and problem window and a negative association for the variable venues; however, we cannot be certain of the results without additional data.

Overall, based on the aggregate results (bivariate correlations, regression analysis, and partial correlation analysis) there is insufficient evidence to support the hypothesis that policy entrepreneurs are more likely to successfully couple the streams during an open policy window if they use one or more forms of manipulation, alter institutional venues, and activate coalition support. However, the results of the effect size estimates and associated confidence interval for the full

model revealed a medium effect size and model that is statistically significant, suggesting the study should be replicated with a larger sample to assess the reliability of the findings.

Chapter seven, the second empirical component of the study draws upon survey participants' expertise and direct involvement in efforts to influence US-Cuba policy to assess whether there was a goodness of fit between the hypothesized propositions and the experiences of the survey respondents.

## **Chapter 7 Data Analysis: Participants' Involvement in Influencing US-Cuba Policy**

### **7.0 Introduction**

This chapter represents the second of three empirical components of the study. In contrast to the previous chapter which situated the analysis in the context of the broader policy field, this chapter focuses on the efforts and experiences of survey participants to influence policy between 1989 and 2006. When asking questions about human behaviour, the logical source of information is often individuals themselves (Hacker, 1997 and Moore et. al, 1994). In this case, as participants in the policy process that has shaped US-Cuba policy, the individuals surveyed have first hand experience and knowledge of how the process unfolds and what is necessary to succeed. Descriptive statistics were used to assess whether the MSF's definition, motivations for policy advocacy, and functions of PEs are supported by the survey participants. Correlation analysis and multiple regression are used to assess relationships between variables, the MSF's predictive power and test the two central hypotheses:

- H<sub>1</sub>: Policy entrepreneurs are more likely to couple the streams successfully during an open policy window if they possess four key entrepreneurial characteristics—have a claim to a hearing, are politically connected, are skilled negotiators, and are persistent.
- H<sub>2</sub>: Policy entrepreneurs are more likely to couple the streams successfully during an open policy window if they use one or more forms of manipulation, alter institutional venues and activate coalition support.

An analysis of the data revealed that there was sufficient evidence to support the two central hypotheses; however, an inspection of the individual predictors revealed that only one predictor—streams—accounted for the greatest variance in the model.

### **7.1 Involvement and Impact on Policy**

Of the 40 survey participants, 39 or 98% were active in attempting to influence US-Cuba policy between 1989 and 2006.<sup>201</sup> Of the 39 survey participants that were active, 24 or 61% were successful and 15 or 39% were unsuccessful in their efforts to position their preferred policy proposal onto the government's decision agenda for authoritative action.

### **7.2 Definition of a Policy Entrepreneur**

PEs, described as individuals who advocate for proposals or the prominence of an idea can hold many different positions, but their defining characteristic, like business entrepreneurs, is their willingness to invest their resources—time and energy, reputation, and money—in exchange for future returns (Kingdon, 1995: 122). As shown by figure 7.1, of the total survey participants who responded: 8 (73%) invested a significant share of their time and energy; 21(55%) relied heavily on their reputation to influence policy; and finally, 12 (32%) invested a significant share of their financial resources in order to influence policy.<sup>202</sup> The descriptive data


---

<sup>201</sup> The single survey participant not active during this period is well versed in US-Cuba policy.

<sup>202</sup> An equal number of participants, 12 (32%) invested a small share of their financial resources in

reveals that PEs are not necessarily willing to invest financial resources in the course of their efforts to influence policy, as suggested by the MSF or perhaps, there is no opportunity or need for them to do so.

Figure 7.1 Defining Characteristics of Policy Entrepreneurs



### 7.3 What Motivates a Policy Entrepreneur


What distinguishes PEs from other players in the policy process is their motivation for advocacy. Kingdon's MSF suggests that PEs are motivated by: a desire to address problems with existing policy; the promotion of personal interests; the promotion of personal values; an interest in shaping policy; and a desire to play an active role in the policy process. As shown by figure 7.2, of the total survey participants who responded: 22 (56%) were motivated by a desire to address

---

order to influence policy. A slightly higher share, 14 or 37% of the total participants invested a

problems with US-Cuba policy; 5 (13%) were motivated by a need to promote personal interests; 18 (46%) were motivated by a desire to promote their vision of US-Cuba policy; 19 (50%) revealed a desire to shape the future direction of US-Cuba policy as a key motivating factor; and finally, 18 (46%) were motivated by a desire to play an active role in the policy process.

Figure 7.2 Motivating Factors for Policy Advocacy



The descriptive statistics reveal that for participants involved in efforts to influence policy between 1989 and 2006, an interest in addressing problems with current policy and shaping the direction of future policy were the two central motivators for

---

moderate share of their financial resources in order to influence policy.

their advocacy. An interest in promoting personal visions of policy and a desire to play an active role in the policy process and to a lesser extent the promotion of personal interests were not as significant. The results suggest that further refinement of the entrepreneurial label may be necessary. For example, two possible categories of motivators—"altruistic" and "policy"—can be used to account for entrepreneurial behaviour. Altruistic motivators can include the promotion of personal values and interests, whereas policy motivators can include a desire to address problems with existing policy, shape future policy and finally, play an active role in the policy. The categories can possibly be used as tools to uncover links between behaviour and outcomes.

#### **7.4 Hypothesis 1: Success and Entrepreneurial Characteristics**

The MSF suggests that PEs who are able to successfully position their proposals onto the government's decision agenda for authoritative action exhibit four unique entrepreneurial characteristics—they have a claim to a hearing, are politically connected, are skilled negotiators, and are persistent in their efforts. To test the MSF's underlying assertion concerning success and entrepreneurial characteristics, the following hypothesis was generated:

H<sub>1</sub>: Policy entrepreneurs are more likely to couple the streams successfully during an open policy window if they possess four key entrepreneurial characteristics—have a claim to a hearing, are politically connected, are skilled negotiators, and are persistent.

The research hypothesis was tested against the null hypothesis of no effect. A Pearson correlation analysis was conducted to assess relationships between the

hypothesized variables and successful positioning of a PE's policy alternative onto the government's decision agenda for an authoritative decision. Multiple regression analysis was used to: assess whether the hypothesized entrepreneurial characteristics were good predictors of success; test the MSF's predictive power; and test the hypothesis that policy entrepreneurs are more likely to couple the streams successfully during an open policy window if they possess four key entrepreneurial characteristics—have a claim to a hearing, are politically connected, are skilled negotiators, and are persistent. The multiple regression model:  $y = b_1x_1 + b_2x_2 + \dots + b_ix_i + c$  was estimated where  $y = \text{success}$  and  $x_1$ – $x_7$  represented the independent predictor variables.<sup>203</sup> The variables were entered simultaneously into the analysis. Listwise deletion was used to exclude cases with missing variables. Data were analyzed for any possible outliers and outliers with a standard score of  $\pm 2.5$  (the benchmark for sample sizes with 80 or fewer cases) were removed.

#### **7.4.1 Bivariate Correlations<sup>204</sup>**

The results of the Pearson correlation analysis provided by table 7.1 failed to reveal statistically significant associations between success and the individual hypothesized entrepreneurial characteristics. Two of the hypothesized characteristics revealed statistically insignificant weak positive associations with success: a claim to a hearing with  $r(35) = .048$ ,  $p$  (two-tailed)  $> .05$  and politically

---

<sup>203</sup> For a summary of the variables used in the analysis, see Appendix B

<sup>204</sup> Statistics used for analysis were rounded to one decimal

connected with  $r(35) = .167$ ,  $p$  (two-tailed)  $>.05$ . The variable persistent did not reveal an association with success with  $r(35) = .025$ ,  $p$  (two-tailed)  $>.05$ . Skilled negotiator revealed a weak negative association with success with  $r(35) = -.093$ ,  $p$  (two-tailed)  $>.05$ . Of the remaining three variables—streams, problem window and politics window—streams was the only one to exhibit a statistically significant strong (positive) association with success with  $r(35) = .657$ ,  $p$  (two-tailed)  $<.05$ . Problem window revealed a weak negative association with success  $r(35) = -.119$ ,  $p$  (two-tailed)  $>.05$ . Politics window was uncorrelated with success with  $r(35) = .000$ ,  $p$  (two-tailed)  $>.05$ .

Table 7.1 Hypothesis 1—Bivariate Correlations

Bivariate Correlations <sup>a</sup>		
Variable		Pearson r
claim to hearing	Correlation Coefficient	.048
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.786
politically connected	Correlation Coefficient	.167
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.339
skilled negotiator	Correlation Coefficient	-.093
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.594
persistent	Correlation Coefficient	.025
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.889
streams	Correlation Coefficient	.657
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000*
window (problem)	Correlation Coefficient	-.119
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.497
window (politics)	Correlation Coefficient	.000
	Sig. (2-tailed)	1.000
Listwise N=35		
<sup>a</sup> Dependent Variable=success		
* $p < .05$		

The results of the Pearson correlation analysis failed to provide sufficient evidence to support the proposition that successful positioning of a proposal on the

government's decision agenda is associated with any of the individual hypothesized entrepreneurial characteristics and windows (problem or politics).

#### 7.4.2 Model Utility and Influence of Predictors<sup>205</sup>

Results of the multiple regression analysis presented by table 7.2 revealed that the overall model explained approximately 51% ( $R^2=.511$ ) of the variance in success, which was statistically significant,  $F_{7,27}=4.033$ ,  $p<0.05$ .

Table 7.2 Hypothesis 1—Model Summary and ANOVA

Model Summary <sup>b</sup>					
R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Sig. F Change	
.715 <sup>a</sup>	.511	.384	.780	.004	
ANOVA <sup>b</sup>					
	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	17.174	7	2.453	4.033	.004 <sup>a</sup>
Residual	16.426	27	.608		
Total	33.600	34			
a. Predictors: (Constant), politics windows, politically connected, claim to a hearing, persistent, streams, skilled negotiator, problem windows					
b. Dependent Variable: success					

As shown by table 7.3, each of the four hypothesized entrepreneurial characteristics were found to be a statistically insignificant predictor of success; however, politically connected revealed a moderate positive association with success ( $\beta=.319$ ). Entrepreneurial characteristics, a claim to a hearing and skilled negotiator were shown to have moderate negative associations with success ( $\beta=-.253$  and  $\beta=-.330$  respectively). Persistent was not associated with success ( $\beta=.003$ ). Of the remaining three predictor variables—streams, problem window and

<sup>205</sup> Statistics used for analysis were rounded to one decimal.

politics window—streams was the only predictor to reveal a statistically significant (strong positive) association ( $\beta=1.121$ ) with success. Problem window revealed a moderate negative association ( $\beta=-.295$ ) with success and the predictor politics window, a moderate positive association ( $\beta=.311$ ).

Table 7.3 Hypothesis 1—Coefficients

Coefficients <sup>a</sup>							
Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
	B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
claim to hearing	-.253	.334	-.126	-.757	.456	.650	1.539
politically connected	.319	.324	.159	.983	.334	.689	1.452
skilled negotiator	-.330	.375	-.169	-.882	.385	.496	2.017
persistent	.003	.312	.001	.009	.993	.791	1.264
streams	1.121	.231	.690	4.859	.000*	.897	1.115
window (problem)	-.295	.314	-.178	-.939	.356	.506	1.976
window (politics)	.311	.316	.179	.986	.333	.548	1.824

a. Dependent Variable: success  
\*p<.05

Results of the multiple regression revealed that the combined effect of the hypothesized entrepreneurial characteristics and three additional predictor variables—streams, problem and politics windows—explained approximately 51% of the variance in success, which was statistically significant. We therefore reject the null hypothesis and conclude that policy entrepreneurs are more likely to couple the streams successfully during an open policy window if they possess four key entrepreneurial characteristics—have a claim to a hearing, are politically connected, are skilled negotiators, and are persistent. However, an inspection of the individual predictors revealed that all of the four hypothesized entrepreneurial characteristics were statistically insignificant predictors of success, and that a single

predictor—streams—had the strongest association with success. Streams was the only statistically significant predictor of success with a strong positive association.

### 7.4.3 Partial Correlations<sup>206</sup>

The results of the partial correlation analysis and associated t tests for each of the hypothesized variables are provided by table 7.4.

Table 7.4 Hypothesis 1—Partial Correlations

Partial Correlations <sup>a</sup>						
	t	Correlations				
		Zero-order	Partial (pr)	Part (sr)	pr <sup>2</sup>	sr <sup>2</sup>
claim to hearing	.543	.048	-.144	-.102	.021	.010
politically connected	.705	.167	.186	.132	.035	.017
skilled negotiator	.634	-.093	-.167	-.119	.028	.014
persistent	.005	.025	.002	.001	.000	.000
streams	4.575*	.657	.683	.654	.467	.428
window (problem)	.672	-.119	-.178	-.126	.032	.016
window (politics)	.710	.000	.186	.133	.035	.018

a. Dependent Variable: success  
\*significant

After controlling for the effects of all other predictor variables, the semi-partial correlation between a claim to a hearing and success was lower ( $sr = -.102$ ) than the zero-order correlation ( $r = .048$ )<sup>207</sup> suggesting that the zero order association was due to the effects of the controlled variables rather than to a substantive association between the hypothesized characteristic and success. This is consistent with two possible relationships—spurious or intervening—each resulting in patterns of

<sup>206</sup> Statistics used for analysis were rounded to one decimal.

<sup>207</sup> The predictor variable a claim to a hearing explained approximately one percent ( $sr^2 = .010$ ) share of the total unique variance in success not explained by all other predictor variables.

weaker correlation. If we looked simply at the original bivariate correlation between a claim to a hearing and success, we would have overlooked the effects of the controlled variables and incorrectly suggested a weak positive association between the variables when in fact the semi-partial correlation revealed a weak negative association. The results of the significance test revealed that the semi-partial correlation between a claim to a hearing and success was statistically insignificant. We therefore conclude that having a claim to a hearing is not associated with successfully positioning a policy proposal on the government's decision agenda for an authoritative decision.

For the predictor politically connected, the zero-order correlation revealed a weak positive association with success ( $r=.167$ ). When the effects of all other predictors were controlled, the semi-partial correlation was somewhat lower ( $sr=.132$ ) than the zero order correlation, but remained positive<sup>208</sup> suggesting a spurious or intervening association between the variables. The results of the significance test revealed that the semi-partial correlation between the two variables was statistically insignificant. We therefore conclude that being politically connected is not associated with successfully positioning a policy alternative onto the government's decision agenda for an authoritative decision.

The zero-order correlation between success and skilled negotiator revealed a weak negative association ( $r=-.093$ ). When the effects of all other predictors were

---

<sup>208</sup> The predictor variable politically connected explained approximately 2% ( $sr^2=.017$ ) share of the total unique variance in success not explained by all other predictor variables.

controlled, the semi-partial correlation virtually remained the same ( $sr = -.119$ ) suggesting that the weak negative association between skilled negotiator and success cannot be attributed to the shared effects of the controlled variables, but rather to a direct association between skilled negotiator and success. The results of the significance test revealed that the semi-partial correlation between the two variables was statistically insignificant. We therefore conclude that being a skilled negotiator is not associated with successfully positioning a policy alternative on the government's decision agenda for an authoritative decision.

For the final entrepreneurial characteristic—persistent—the original zero-order correlation did not reveal an association between it and success ( $r = .025$ ). When the effects of all other predictors were controlled, the semi-partial correlation maintained the zero-order correlation between the variables ( $sr = .001$ ).<sup>209</sup> The results of the significance test revealed that the semi-partial correlation between persistent and success was statistically insignificant. We therefore conclude that being a skilled negotiator is not associated with successfully positioning a policy alternative on the government's decision agenda for an authoritative decision.

For the predictor streams, the zero-order correlation revealed a statistically significant strong positive association between the variable and success ( $r = .657$ ). When the effects of all other predictors were controlled, the semi-partial correlation

---

<sup>209</sup> The predictor variable skilled negotiator explained approximately one percent ( $sr^2 = .014$ ) share of the total unique variance in success not explained by all other predictor variables.

remained virtually unchanged ( $sr=.654$ ),<sup>210</sup> thus confirming the original association between the variables. The results of the significance test revealed that the semi-partial correlation between streams and success was statistically significant, confirming that successful positioning of a preferred policy alternative onto the government's decision agenda by a policy entrepreneur is associated with the alignment of the three streams—(politics) a favourable political climate support exists for an alternative, (problem) government recognition of a pressing problem, and (policy) a viable solution is available.

For the predictor problem window, the zero-order correlation revealed a weak negative association between the variable and success ( $r=-.119$ ). When the effects of all other predictors were controlled, the semi-partial correlation remained virtually unchanged ( $sr=-.126$ )<sup>211</sup> suggesting a direct association between the two variables. The results of the significance test revealed that the semi-partial correlation between problem window and success was statistically insignificant. We can therefore conclude that the opening of a problem window is not associated with successfully positioning a policy alternative onto the government's decision agenda for an authoritative decision.

Finally, for the predictor politics window, the zero-order correlation did not reveal an association between the variable and success ( $r=.000$ ). When the effects

---

<sup>210</sup> The predictor variable streams explained approximately 43% ( $sr^2=.428$ ) share of the total unique variance in success not explained by all other predictor variables.

<sup>211</sup> The predictor variable problem window explained approximately 2% ( $sr^2=.016$ ) share of the total unique variance in success not explained by all other predictor variables.

of all other predictors were controlled, the semi-partial correlation was higher than the zero order correlation, revealing a weak positive association between the variable and success ( $sr=.133$ ).<sup>212</sup> Suppressor effects can be attributed to unusual patterns of negative and positive effects between the dependent (success), independent (problem window) and controlled variables. If we were to focus only on the original zero order correlation, we would have incorrectly concluded that there was no association between the two variables when in fact, after controlling for the effects of all other variables, a weak positive association was revealed. The results of the significance test revealed that the semi-partial correlation between politics window and success was statistically insignificant. We can therefore conclude that the opening of a politics window is not associated with successfully positioning a policy alternative onto the government's decision agenda for an authoritative decision.

## **7.5 Hypothesis 2: Success and Coupling Strategies**

Kingdon's MSF suggests that PEs must couple the streams during an open policy window in order to successfully push an issue into a prominent position on the government's decision agenda for executive or legislative action; however, the question of how this is accomplished remains unclear and untested. Drawing upon the literature on policy entrepreneurship and agenda setting, three categories of

---

<sup>212</sup> The predictor variable politics window explained approximately 2% ( $sr^2=.018$ ) share of the total unique variance in success not explained by all other predictor variables.

coupling strategies were identified: various forms of manipulation (framing, agenda control, strategic voting, salami tactics); shifting attention to institutional venues that provide the greatest level of support for and least resistance to a proposal; and activating the support of coalitions. To test the MSF's underlying assertion concerning success and coupling strategies, the following hypothesis was generated:

H<sub>2</sub>: Policy entrepreneurs are more likely to couple the streams successfully during an open policy window if they use one or more forms of manipulation, alter institutional venues and activate coalition support.

The research hypothesis was tested against the null hypothesis of no effect. A Pearson correlation analysis was conducted to assess relationships between success and the hypothesized variables. Multiple regression analysis was used to: assess whether the hypothesized coupling strategies were good predictors of success; test the MSF's predictive power; and test the hypothesis that policy entrepreneurs are more likely to couple the streams successfully during an open policy window if they use one or more forms of manipulation, alter institutional venues and activate coalition support. The multiple regression model:  $y = b_1x_1 + b_2x_2 + \dots + b_ix_i + c$  was estimated where  $y = \text{success}$ , and  $x_1 \dots x_9$  represented the independent predictor variables.<sup>213</sup> Finally, partial correlation analysis was used to assess the degree to which the hypothesized variables could be used to explain variance by controlling for the effects of other predictor variables that may be correlated with the hypothesized relationships. The variables were entered simultaneously into the

analysis. Listwise deletion was used to exclude cases with missing variables. The data were analyzed for any possible outliers and outliers with a standard score of +/- 2.5 (the benchmark for sample sizes with 80 or fewer cases) were removed.

### 7.5.1 Bivariate Correlations<sup>214</sup>

The results of the Pearson correlation analysis provided by table 7.5 failed to reveal statistically significant associations between success and the hypothesized coupling strategies. Statistically insignificant weak positive associations were identified between success and manipulation strategies involving agenda control with  $r(33) = .255$ ,  $p(\text{two-tailed}) > .05$ . Altering institutional venues did not reveal an association with success with  $r(33) = .038$ ,  $p(\text{two-tailed}) > .05$ . Weak negative associations were identified between success and manipulation strategies involving framing  $r(33) = -.144$ ,  $p(\text{two-tailed}) > .05$  and salami tactics  $r(33) = -.143$ ,  $p(\text{two-tailed}) > .05$ , and activating coalition support  $r(33) = -.271$ ,  $p(\text{two-tailed}) > .05$ .

Of the remaining three variables—streams, problem window and politics window—streams was the only variable to exhibit a statistically significant strong (positive) association with success with  $r(33) = .711$ ,  $p(\text{two-tailed}) < 0.05$ . Problem window did not reveal an association with success with  $r(33) = -.012$ ,  $p(\text{two-tailed}) > .05$ . Politics window revealed a weak positive association with success with  $r(33) = .078$ ,  $p(\text{two-tailed}) > .05$ .

---

<sup>213</sup> For a list and description of the variables used in the analysis, see Appendix C.

<sup>214</sup> Statistics used for analysis were rounded to one decimal.

Table 7.5 Hypothesis 2—Bivariate Correlations

Bivariate Correlations <sup>c</sup>		
Variables		Pearson r
framing (manipulation strategies)	Correlation	-.144
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.423
agenda control (manipulation strategies)	Correlation	.255
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.152
strategic voting (manipulation strategies)	Correlation	. <sup>a</sup>
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.
salami tactics (manipulation strategies)	Correlation	-.143
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.427
venues	Correlation	.038
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.835
coalitions	Correlation	-.271
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.128
streams	Correlation	.711
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000*
problem window	Correlation	-.012
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.949
politics window	Correlation	.078
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.667
a. Statistics not computed because at least one of the variables is constant.		
b. Listwise N=33		
c. Dependent Variable=success		
*p<.05		

The results of the Pearson correlation analysis failed to provide sufficient evidence to support the proposition that successful positioning of a proposal on the government's decision agenda is associated with the hypothesized coupling strategies and windows (problem or politics). The results, did, however, provide sufficient evidence supporting the claim that successfully positioning a proposal onto the government's decision agenda is positively correlated with streams. Individually the streams are not powerful enough to propel an item onto the decision agenda; however, as supported by the data, their joint effect is strongly correlated

with success.

### 7.5.2 Model Utility and Influence of Predictors<sup>215</sup>

Results of the multiple regression analysis presented by table 7.6 revealed that the overall model explained approximately 62% ( $R^2=.618$ ) of the variance in success, which was revealed to be statistically significant,  $F_{8,24}=4.849$   $p < 0.05$ .

Table 7.6 Hypothesis 2—Model Summary and ANOVA

Model Summary <sup>b</sup>					
R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Sig. F Change	
.786 <sup>a</sup>	.618	.490	.708	.001	
ANOVA <sup>b</sup>					
	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	19.470	8	2.434	4.849	.001 <sup>a</sup>
Residual	12.045	24	.502		
Total	31.515	32			
a. Predictors: (Constant), politics window, venues, manipulation (salami tactics), streams, manipulation (agenda control), manipulation (framing), coalitions, problem window					
b. Dependent Variable: success					

As shown by table 7.7, each of the hypothesized coupling strategies was found to be statistically insignificant predictors of success; however, manipulating strategies involving agenda control and altering institutional venues revealed statistically insignificant, but positive moderate positive associations with success ( $\beta=.579$  and  $\beta=.282$  respectively). Manipulation strategies involving salami tactics did not reveal an association with success ( $\beta=.027$ ). Coupling strategies involving manipulation (framing) revealed moderate negative associations with success ( $\beta=-.328$ ) and activating coalition a weak negative association ( $\beta=-.143$ ).

<sup>215</sup> Statistics used for analysis were rounded to one decimal.

Of the remaining three predictor variables—streams, problem window and politics window—streams was the only predictor to reveal a statistically significant strong (positive) association ( $\beta=1.081$ ) with success. The predictors—problem and politics windows—revealed statistically insignificant weak negative associations ( $\beta=-.086$  and  $\beta=-.107$  respectively) with success.

Table 7.7 Hypothesis 2—Coefficients

	Coefficients <sup>a</sup>						Collinearity Statistics	
	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Tolerance	VIF	
	B	Std. Error	Beta					
framing (manipulation strategies)	-.328	.273	-.223	-1.203	.241	.464	2.157	
agenda control (manipulation strategies)	.579	.504	.170	1.148	.262	.723	1.382	
salami tactics (manipulation strategies)	.027	.291	.013	.094	.926	.849	1.178	
venues	.282	.308	.144	.916	.369	.642	1.558	
coalitions	-.143	.233	-.108	-.613	.545	.516	1.937	
streams	1.081	.211	.722	5.130	.000*	.804	1.243	
problem window	-.086	.267	-.057	-.324	.749	.508	1.967	
politics window	-.107	.353	-.058	-.303	.765	.432	2.314	

a. Dependent Variable: success  
\*p<.05

Results of the multiple regression revealed that the combined effect of the hypothesized coupling strategies and three additional predictor variables—streams, problem and politics windows—explained approximately 62% of the variance in success which was statistically significant. We therefore reject the null hypothesis and conclude that policy entrepreneurs are more likely to successfully couple the streams during an open policy window if they use one or more forms of manipulation, alter institutional venues, and activate coalition support. An inspection of the individual predictors revealed that each of the hypothesized coupling

strategies was a statistically insignificant predictor of success and that a single predictor—streams—had the strongest association with success. Streams was the only statistically significant predictor of success with a strong positive association.<sup>216</sup>

### 7.5.3 Partial Correlations<sup>217</sup>

The results of the partial correlation analysis and associated t tests for each of the hypothesized variables are provided by table 7.8.

Table 7.8 Hypothesis 2—Partial Correlations

Partial Correlations <sup>a</sup>						
		Correlations				
	t	Zero-order (r)	Partial (pr)	Part (sr)	pr <sup>2</sup>	sr <sup>2</sup>
framing (manipulation strategies)	.769	-.144	-.239	-.152	.057	.023
agenda control (manipulation strategies)	.733	.255	.228	.145	.052	.021
salami tactics (manipulation strategies)	.060	-.143	.019	.012	.000	.000
venues	.584	.038	.184	.116	.034	.014
coalitions	.386	-.271	-.124	-.077	.015	.006
streams	4.24*	.711	.723	.647	.523	.419
problem window	.205	-.012	-.066	-.041	.004	.002
politics window	.190	.078	-.062	-.038	.004	.001

a. Dependent Variable: success  
\*significant

Manipulation strategies involving framing revealed a weak negative zero-order correlation ( $r = -.144$ ) with success. After the effects of all other predictors were controlled, the semi-partial correlation was higher ( $sr = -.152$ ) than the zero-order

<sup>216</sup> Of the seven statistically insignificant predictors, coupling strategies involving agenda control and altering institutional venues revealed positive associations with success. Predictors, framing, activating coalitions, problem and politics windows each had negative effects with success. Salami tactics, did not have an effect on success.

<sup>217</sup> Statistics used for analysis were rounded to one decimal.

correlation, suggesting possible suppression by the control variables on the association between the variables; however, the relationship remained negative.<sup>218</sup>

The results of the significance test revealed that the semi-partial correlation between the two variables was statistically insignificant. We therefore conclude that manipulation strategies involving framing are not associated with successfully positioning a policy proposal onto the government's decision agenda for an authoritative decision.

Manipulation strategies involving agenda control revealed a weak positive zero-order correlation ( $r=.255$ ) with success. After the effects of all other predictors were controlled, the semi-partial correlation between the variable and success was lower ( $sr=.145$ ) than the zero-order correlation.<sup>219</sup> This is consistent with two possible relationships—spurious or intervening—however, the results of the semi-partial correlation, although lower than the original zero-order correlation maintained the original magnitude (weak positive). The results of the significance test revealed that the semi-partial correlation between the two variables was statistically insignificant. We therefore conclude that manipulation strategies involving agenda control are not associated with successfully positioning a policy proposal on the government's decision agenda for an authoritative decision.

---

<sup>218</sup> The predictor variable manipulation strategies involving framing explained approximately 2% ( $sr^2=.023$ ) share of the total unique variance in success not explained by all other predictor variables.

<sup>219</sup> The predictor variable manipulation strategies involving agenda control explained approximately 15% ( $sr^2=.145$ ) share of the total unique variance in success not explained by all other predictor variables.

Manipulation strategies involving salami tactics revealed a weak negative zero-order correlation with success ( $r=-.143$ ). When the effects of all other predictors were controlled, the semi-partial correlation with success was higher ( $sr=.012$ ) than the zero-order correlation; however, the correlation was not significant enough to reveal an association.<sup>220</sup> The results of the significance test revealed that the semi-partial correlation between manipulation strategies involving salami tactics and success was statistically insignificant. We therefore conclude that manipulation strategies involving salami tactics are not associated with successfully positioning a policy proposal on the government's decision agenda for an authoritative decision.

The zero-order correlation between altering institutional venues and success failed to reveal an association between the variables ( $r=.038$ ). When the effects of all other predictors were controlled, the semi-partial correlation was higher ( $sr=.116$ ) than the original zero-order correlation<sup>221</sup> suggesting that an association exists between the two variables. In this case, the controlled variables suppressed the association between altering institutional venues and success, therefore masking the weak positive association. The results of the significance test revealed that the semi-partial correlation between strategies involving altering institutional venues and success was statistically insignificant. We therefore conclude that altering

---

<sup>220</sup>The predictor variable manipulation strategies involving salami tactics did not explain any ( $sr^2=.000$ ) of the unique variance in success left unexplained by all other predictor variables.

<sup>221</sup>The predictor variable institutional venues explained approximately 1% ( $sr^2=.014$ ) share of the total unique variance in success not explained by all other predictor variables.

institutional venues is not associated with successfully positioning a policy proposal on the government's decision agenda for an authoritative decision.

For the final hypothesized coupling strategy—activating coalition support—a weak negative zero-order correlation with success ( $r=-.271$ ) was revealed. When the effects of all other predictors were controlled, the semi-partial correlation with success was lower ( $sr=-.077$ ) than the zero-order correlation, but remained negative.<sup>222</sup> The lower correlation suggests that the zero order association can be explained by the effects of the controlled variables rather than a substantive association between success and the coupling strategy. The results of the significance test revealed that the semi-partial correlation between activating coalition support and success was statistically insignificant. We therefore conclude that manipulation strategies involving activating coalition support are not associated with successfully positioning a policy proposal onto the government's decision agenda for an authoritative decision.

For the predictor, streams, the zero-order correlation revealed a statistically significant, strong positive association with success ( $r=.711$ ). When the effects of all other predictors were controlled, the semi-partial correlation remained virtually unchanged ( $sr=.647$ ), thus confirming the original association between the variables.<sup>223</sup> In this case, the controlled variables had no effect on the original

---

<sup>222</sup> The predictor variable activating coalition support did not explained approximately one percent ( $sr^2=.006$ ) of the unique variance in success not unexplained by all other predictor variables.

<sup>223</sup> The predictor variable streams explained approximately 42% ( $sr^2=.419$ ) share of the total unique variance in success not explained by all other predictor variables.

association between success and streams. The results of the significance test also revealed the semi-partial correlation between success and streams to be statistically significant, thus confirming that success is associated with the alignment of the three streams. We therefore conclude that streams is associated with successfully positioning a policy proposal onto the government's decision agenda for an authoritative decision.

For the predictor—problem window—the zero-order correlation did not reveal an association with success ( $r=-.012$ ). When the effects of all other predictors were controlled, the semi-partial correlation remained virtually unchanged ( $sr=-.041$ )<sup>224</sup> suggesting a direct association between the two variables. The results of the significance test revealed that the semi-partial correlation between problem window and success was statistically insignificant. We therefore conclude that the opening of a window, in this case a problem window, is not associated with successfully positioning a policy proposal on the government's decision agenda for an authoritative decision.

Finally, for the predictor—politics window—the zero-order correlation revealed a weak positive association between the variable and success ( $r=.078$ ). When the effects of all other predictors were controlled, the semi-partial correlation was lower ( $sr=-.038$ ) than the original zero order correlation, revealing no

---

<sup>224</sup> The predictor variable problem window explained less than one percent ( $sr^2=.002$ ) share of the total unique variance in success not explained by all other predictor variables.

association between the variable and success.<sup>225</sup> If we were to focus only on the original zero order correlation, we would have incorrectly concluded that there was weak positive association between the two variables when in fact, after controlling for the effects of all other variables, there was no association. The results of the significance test revealed that the semi-partial correlation between politics window and success was statistically insignificant. We therefore conclude that the opening of a window, in this case a politics window, is not associated with successfully positioning a policy proposal on the government's decision agenda for an authoritative decision.

## 7.6 Conclusion

This chapter analyzed survey data collected from individuals involved in efforts to influence US-Cuba policy between 1989 and 2006. The data were used to assess whether successful positioning of a policy alternative on the government's decision agenda by a PE is associated with specific entrepreneurial characteristics and coupling strategies.

### *Hypothesis 1*

The first hypothesis was constructed to assess the relationship between success and entrepreneurial characteristics. It was hypothesized that PEs are more likely to couple the streams successfully during an open policy window if they

---

<sup>225</sup> The predictor variable politics window explained less than one percent ( $sr^2=.001$ ) share of the total unique variance in success not explained by all other predictor variables.

possess four key entrepreneurial characteristics—a claim to a hearing, politically connected, skilled negotiators, and persistent. The initial bivariate correlations between success and the hypothesized variables revealed that streams was the only variable to have a statistically significant positive correlation with success. Entrepreneurial characteristics—a claim to a hearing and politically connected—were the only other predictors that revealed positive (but not statistically significant) associations with success. An assessment of the full model revealed that the variables in combination were statistically significant predictors of success, with streams being the only statistically significant predictor of success and single greatest contributor to the model. We concluded based on the regression results that the model was a good predictor of success, and that alignment of the three streams—problem (recognition by the government of the existence of a problem that requires attention), politics (a political climate receptive to changes in policy exists) and policy (a viable solution has been developed and is available)—was strongly associated with success, as suggested by the MSF. A partial correlation analysis confirmed that the streams were a statistically significant predictor of success and that entrepreneurial characteristic politically connected had a positive (but not statistically significant) correlation with success. Controlling for the effects of the predictor variables also uncovered a positive (rather than no) association between success and altering institutional venues, and a reversal of the original positive association between success and politics window to reveal no association between the variables.

Overall, the regression results suggest that in combination the hypothesized variables are associated with success; however, individually, with the exception of the streams variable, they are not good predictors of success. Upon closer examination of the individual predictors, it is evident that the streams variable accounts for the greatest share of variance in success. An analysis of the partial correlations also confirmed that streams was statistically significant. Although we can, based on the results of the regression analysis, reject the null hypothesis, we do so with caution as the streams variable is the single “explanation” of success. For participants that were successful in their efforts to influence policy, we find that the combined effect of favourable political support, the recognition of a pressing problem and the availability of a viable solution were central to propelling a proposal onto the government’s decision agenda; however, individually the entrepreneurial characteristics were not. Replicating the study with a larger sample would be necessary to assess the reliability of the findings.

### *Hypothesis 2*

The second hypothesis was designed to assess the relationship between the successful positioning of a policy alternative onto the government’s decision agenda by a policy entrepreneur and the selection of coupling strategies. It is hypothesized that PEs are more likely to couple the streams successfully during an open policy window if they use one or more forms of manipulation, alter institutional venues and activate coalition support. The initial bivariate correlations between success and the

hypothesized predictors revealed that streams was the only variable to have a statistically significant positive correlation with success. Manipulation strategies involving agenda control and politics window were the only other predictors that revealed positive (but not statistically significant) associations with success. An assessment of the full model revealed that the predictors, in combination were statistically significant predictors of success, with streams being the only statistically significant predictor of success and single greatest contributor to the model. We concluded based on the regression results that the model was a good predictor of success, and that alignment of the streams was strongly associated with success, as suggested by the MSF. A partial correlation analysis confirmed that streams was a statistically significant predictor of success and that manipulation strategies involving agenda control had a positive (but not statistically significant) correlation with success. Controlling for the effects of the predictor variables also uncovered a positive (rather than no) association between success and altering institutional venues, and a reversal of the original positive association between success and politics window to reveal no association between the variables.

Overall, as with the first hypothesis, the regression results suggest that in combination the hypothesized variables are associated with success; however, individually, with the exception of the streams variable they are not good predictors of success. Upon closer examination of the individual predictors, it is evident that the streams variable is accounting for the greatest share of variance in success. An analysis of the partial correlations also confirmed that streams was statistically

significant. Although we can, based on the results of the regression analysis, reject the null hypothesis, we do so with caution as the streams variable is the single “explanation” of success. For participants that were successful in their efforts to influence policy, we know that the combined effect of favourable political support, the recognition of a pressing problem and the availability of a viable solution were central to propelling a proposal onto the decision agenda; however, the question of “how”, i.e. the means by which this is achieved remains unanswered. Again, replicating the study with a larger sample is necessary to assess the reliability of the findings.

Chapter eight, the third and final empirical component of the study draws upon survey participants’ expertise and involvement in efforts to influence US-Cuba policy to assess the characteristics and behaviours of individuals identified in the literature as central figures in the evolution of US-Cuba policy.

## **Chapter 8 Data Analysis: An Assessment of Individuals Identified as Key Figures in Influencing US-Cuba Policy**

### **8.0 Introduction**

This chapter represents the last of three empirical components of the study. Raw survey data used for the analysis were collected from the same participants that were involved in efforts to influence US-Cuba policy between 1989 and 2006. Their role as not only participants in the policy process that has shaped US-Cuba policy, but also as observers, makes them a valuable source of information. Survey participants are asked, based on their knowledge of and experience with US-Cuba policy, to assess whether specific individuals identified in the empirical literature as playing a central role in US-Cuba policy between 1989 and 2006: (1) were successful in their efforts to attain their policy objectives; and (2) possessed the hypothesized characteristics of successful entrepreneurs: they have a claim to a hearing, are politically connected, are skilled negotiators, and are persistent in their efforts to influence policy. To test the MSF's underlying assertion concerning success and entrepreneurial characteristics, the following hypothesis was generated:

H<sub>1</sub>: Policy entrepreneurs are much more likely to succeed at having their preferred policy proposals adopted if they possess four key entrepreneurial characteristics—have a claim to a hearing, are politically connected, are skilled negotiators and are persistent.

Descriptive statistics are used to assess whether individuals “fit” the MSF's definition of a PE. A Pearson correlation analysis was conducted to assess relationships

between success and the hypothesized entrepreneurial characteristics. Multiple regression analysis was used to determine whether the model is a good predictor of success and test the hypothesis that policy entrepreneurs are much more likely to succeed at having their preferred policy proposals adopted if they possess four key entrepreneurial characteristics—have a claim to a hearing, are politically connected, are skilled negotiators and are persistent. The multiple regression model:  $y = b_1x_1 + b_2x_2 + b_3x_3 + b_4x_4 + c$  was estimated where  $y = \text{success}$  and  $x_1, x_2, x_3,$  and  $x_4$  represented the independent hypothesized entrepreneurial characteristic.<sup>226</sup> The variables were entered simultaneously into the analysis. Listwise deletion was used to exclude cases with missing variables. Data were analyzed for any possible outliers and outliers with a standard score of  $\pm 2.5$  (the benchmark for sample sizes with 80 or fewer cases) were removed.

The results of the various statistical analyses failed to provide sufficient evidence to support the hypothesis that policy entrepreneurs are much more likely to succeed at having their preferred policy proposals adopted if they possess four key entrepreneurial characteristics—have a claim to a hearing, are politically connected, are skilled negotiators and are persistent. The analysis, did, however, uncover an association between success and an entrepreneur's formal position within the decision making hierarchy. Individuals identified as successful by the respondents were more likely to hold formal elected positions within the government.


---

<sup>226</sup> For a list and description of the variables used in the analysis, see Appendix B.

## 8.1 Definition of a Policy Entrepreneur

PEs are defined by the MSF as individuals who advocate for proposals or the prominence of an idea in hopes of some form of a future return; however, what sets them apart from all others in the policy process is their willingness to invest their resources—time and energy, reputation, and sometimes money—in hope of a future return (Kingdon, 1995: 122). As shown by figure 8.1, of the total survey participants who responded, 71% agreed that individuals identified by the survey as PEs were willing to invest their time and energy in their quest to influence policy, followed closely by their reputation (64%) and finally, their financial resources (45%).

Figure 8.1 Defining Characteristics of Policy Entrepreneurs



The results suggest that, although PEs scored high on all three dimensions, they are much more likely to invest their time and energy, and reputation, rather than financial resources in pursuit of their policy objectives.

## 8.2 Aggregate Results

### 8.2.1 Bivariate Correlations<sup>227</sup>

Of the 74 individuals identified by the survey, 28 individuals were described as successful and 40 as unsuccessful in their efforts to attain their policy objectives.<sup>228</sup> The results of the correlation analysis provided by table 8.1 indicate that for cases identified as successful, only a single case, that of Jorge Mas Canosa, revealed statistically significant positive correlations between success and each of the four hypothesized entrepreneurial characteristics.<sup>229</sup> For cases identified as unsuccessful, no correlations were identified between success and all four hypothesized characteristics.<sup>230</sup>

---

<sup>227</sup> See Appendix D for full results.

<sup>228</sup> Six individuals were identified as both successful and unsuccessful.

<sup>229</sup> Statistically significant positive (ranging from moderate to strong) correlations between success and fewer than 4 hypothesized entrepreneurial characteristic were identified in 11 of the 28 cases revealed to be successful.

<sup>230</sup> Statistically significant positive (ranging from moderate to strong) correlations between success and fewer than 4 hypothesized entrepreneurial characteristic were identified in 9 of the 40 cases revealed to be unsuccessful.

Table 8 1 Aggregate Bivariate Correlations—Entrepreneurial Characteristics

Identified Successful (Percent) <sup>c</sup>	Identified Unsuccessful (Percent) <sup>c</sup>	Individual	Pearson Correlation <sup>a</sup> (Sig. 2 tailed)			
			Claim to a Hearing	Politically Connected	Skilled Negotiator	Persistent
78%	0%	Representative Lincoln Diaz-Balart	537 (.032)*	387 (.127)	356 (.147)	405 (.056)
58%	5%	Jorge Mas Canosa	902 (.000)*	692 (.001)*	551 (.001)*	563 (.012)*
48%	5%	Senator Mel Martinez	<sup>b</sup>	839 (.000)*	499 (.070)	176 (.530)
35%	10%	Otto J Reich	721 (.004)*	728 (.007)*	345 (.298)	621 (.008)*
28%	8%	Frank Calzón	646 (.023)*	855 (.000)*	274 (.364)	769 (.001)*
25%	8%	Roger Noriega	469 (.124)	811 (.001)*	889 (.003)*	514 (.105)
23%	8%	Dan Fisk	726 (.017)*	392 (.233)	066 (.847)	830 (.000)*
23%	8%	Francisco José "Pepe" Hernández	614 (.034)*	635 (.015)*	453 (.120)	511 (.036)*
20%	10%	John Ashcroft	724 (.018)*	186 (.562)	101 (.755)	408 (.188)
18%	5%	José Pepin Bosch	436 (.240)	218 (.573)	375 (.286)	625 (.040)*
15%	10%	Representative Connie Mack IV	590 (.073)	642 (.062)	724 (.018)*	715 (.020)*
15%	25%	Wayne S Smith	258 (.373)	688 (.005)*	578 (.030)*	153 (.546)
5%	20%	Mavis Anderson	677 (.032)*	410 (.186)	600 (.039)*	093 (.740)
5%	15%	Raúl Cantero	487 (.221)	586 (.222)	- 226 (.591)	807 (.028)*
5%	15%	Brice M Clagett	1 00 (.000)*	577 (.423)	612 (.272)	775 (.070)
5%	15%	Representative Eliot L Engel	672 (.033)*	559 (.118)	399 (.287)	781 (.008)*
5%	18%	Albert A Fox, Jr	642 (.062)	043 (.912)	725 (.027)*	229 (.553)
5%	25%	John Kavulich II	354 (.351)	641 (.046)*	641 (.046)*	338 (.310)
5%	8%	Representative Steven R Rothman	919 (.025)*	- 647 (.165)	500 (.312)	468 (.427)
5%	23%	Former Representative Esteban Edward Torres	712 (.048)*	487 (.221)	424 (.222)	406 (.279)

a Dependent Variable success  
b Statistics could not be computed  
c N=40  
\*p< .05

### 8.2.2 Model Utility and Influence of Predictors

Of the 28 cases identified as successful, the model predicted success in 5 cases. Of the 40 cases identified as unsuccessful, the model predicted success in a single case. Results of the multiple regression analysis revealed that the overall model correctly predicted success in only 18% of the cases identified as successful (5 of the 28 possible cases identified as successful).<sup>231</sup> The results of the multiple regression analysis are presented by table 8.2.<sup>232</sup> No cases were identified in which all four variables were statistically significant predictors of success.

Table 8.2 Aggregate Model Utility and Predictors—Entrepreneurial Characteristics

Identified Successful (Percent) <sup>d</sup>	Identified Unsuccessful (Percent) <sup>d</sup>	Individual	Model R <sup>2</sup> (Sig.)	Unstandardized B (Sig. 2 tailed)			
				Claim to a Hearing	Politically Connected	Skilled Negotiator	Persistent
58%	5%	Jorge Mas Canosa	.814 (.000)*	<sup>a</sup>	<sup>a</sup>	1.250 (.001)*	-.091 (.700)
28%	8%	Frank Calzón	.777 (.037)*	.341 (.309)	1.140 (.131)	-.023 (.914)	-.369 (.563)
25%	8%	Roger Noriega	1.00 (.000)*	2.00 ( <sup>a</sup> )	-1.00 ( <sup>a</sup> )	1.53 ( <sup>a</sup> )	4.90 ( <sup>a</sup> )
23%	8%	Dan Fisk	.837 (.033)*	-.517 (.486)	.414 (.378)	-.241 (.385)	1.586 (.041)*
23%	5%	Former Senator Robert "Bob" Graham	.765 (.026)*	1.239 (.019)*	-1.119 (.030)*	<sup>b</sup>	1.552 (.019)*
5%	15%	Brice M. Clagett	1.00 (.000)*	<sup>a</sup>	<sup>a</sup>	.000 ( <sup>b</sup> )	2.00 ( <sup>b</sup> )

a. Statistics could not be computed. Tolerance levels were reached.  
b. Variable was removed due to high multi-collinearity (MC>10).  
c. Statistics could not be computed. No valid cases for the model.  
d. N=40  
\*p<.05

<sup>231</sup> Alternatively, one can state that the model failed to predict success in 82% of the cases identified as successful (23 of the 28 possible cases identified as successful).

<sup>232</sup> See Appendix E for full results.

### 8.3 Individuals Identified as Successful

As shown by table 8.3, of the 74 individuals identified as playing an active role in US-Cuba policy, the top one-third identified as successful were: Representative Lincoln Diaz-Balart, having achieved the greatest success (78%), followed by Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (68%), Robert G. Torricelli (60%), Jorge Mas Canosa (58%), Former Senator Jesse Helms (53%), Representative Dan Burton (50%), Representative Mario Diaz-Balart (50%), Senator Mel Martinez (48%), Representative Robert Menéndez (43%), and Tom Delay (38%).<sup>233</sup>

Table 8.3 Individuals Identified as Successful

Identified Successful <sup>a</sup>	Identified Unsuccessful <sup>a</sup>	Individual
78%	0%	Representative Lincoln Diaz-Balart
68%	0%	Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen
60%	5%	Robert G. Torricelli
58%	5%	Jorge Mas Canosa
53%	3%	Former Senator Jesse Helms
50%	5%	Representative Dan Burton
50%	3%	Representative Mario Diaz-Balart
48%	5%	Senator Mel Martinez
43%	3%	Representative Robert Menéndez
38%	3%	Tom DeLay

a. N=40

#### 8.3.1 Bivariate Correlations

As shown by table 8.4<sup>234</sup>, of the top one-third group of individuals identified as successful in their efforts to influence policy, statistically significant positive

<sup>233</sup> See Appendix F and G for complete rankings for all 74 individuals.

<sup>234</sup> See Appendix D for complete results for all 74 individuals.

correlations between success and all four of the hypothesized entrepreneurial characteristics were identified in only a single case, that of Jorge Mas Canosa.<sup>235</sup>

Table 8.4 Bivariate Correlations—Individuals Identified as Successful

Successful		Individual	Pearson Correlation (Sig. 2 tailed)			
YES <sup>a</sup>	NO <sup>a</sup>		Claim to a Hearing	Politically Connected	Skilled Negotiator	Persistent
78%	0%	Representative Lincoln Diaz-Balart	.537 (.032)*	.387 (.127)	.356 (.147)	.405 (.056)
68%	0%	Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen	-.139 (.607)	.429 (.098)	.258 (.302)	.256 (.263)
60%	5%	Robert G. Torricelli	.477 (.072)	-.020 (.947)	.081 (.782)	.030 (.920)
58%	5%	Jorge Mas Canosa	.902 (.000)*	.692 (.001)*	.551 (.001)*	.563 (.012)*
53%	3%	Former Senator Jesse Helms	.484 (.132)	.329 (.297)	.298 (.281)	.374 (.139)
50%	5%	Representative Dan Burton	-.050 (.865)	-.043 (.889)	-.119 (.685)	.000 (1.00)
50%	3%	Representative Mario Diaz-Balart	.326 (.255)	-.074 (.792)	-.205 (.429)	.111 (.640)
48%	5%	Senator Mel Martinez	<sup>b</sup>	.839 (.000)*	.499 (.070)	.176 (.530)
43%	3%	Representative Robert Menéndez	.023 (.940)	-.198 (.497)	-.247 (.416)	-.019 (.944)
38%	3%	Tom DeLay	.203 (.550)	.091 (.803)	.186 (.562)	.014 (.965)

a. N=40  
b. Statistics could not be computed. Tolerance levels were reached.  
c. Of 74 individuals assessed.  
\*p<.05

### 8.3.2 Model Utility and Correlation Coefficients

Table 8.5 shows the results of the multiple regression analysis for the top one-third of individuals identified as successful.<sup>236</sup> The analysis revealed that the overall model was a statistically significant predictor of success in a single case, that

<sup>235</sup> Statistically significant positive correlations between success and fewer than four characteristic were identified in three cases: Representative Lincoln Diaz-Balart; Jorge Mas Canosa; and Senator Mel Martinez.

of Jorge Mas Canosa. The overall model explained approximately 81% ( $R^2=.814$ ) of the variance in success. Skilled negotiator was the only predictor to reveal a statistically significant positive association with success ( $\beta=1.250$ ). The characteristic, persistent revealed a statistically insignificant, but negative association with success ( $\beta=-.091$ ).

Table 8.5 Model Utility and Beta Coefficients—Individuals Identified as Successful

Successful		Individual	Model R <sup>2</sup> (Sig)	Unstandardized B (Sig 2 tailed)			
YES <sup>a</sup>	NO <sup>a</sup>			Claim to a Hearing	Politically Connected	Skilled Negotiator	Persistent
78%	0%	Representative Lincoln Diaz-Balart	380 (.315)	277 (.456)	137 (.263)	-.063 (.589)	-.002 (.988)
68%	0%	Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen	.041 (.940)	-.044 (.783)	-.062 (.687)	<sup>b</sup>	.049 (.837)
60%	5%	Robert G. Torricelli	.271 (.747)	.787 (.241)	-.107 (.814)	.173 (.864)	-.187 (.857)
58%	5%	Jorge Mas Canosa	.814 (.000)*	<sup>b</sup>	<sup>b</sup>	1.250 (.001)*	-.091 (.700)
53%	3%	Former Senator Jesse Helms	.242 (1.680)	.600 (.524)	<sup>b</sup>	-.200 (.667)	-1.00 (.925)
50%	5%	Representative Dan Burton	.184 (.807)	-1.00 (.460)	-1.214 (.404)	-1.00 (.396)	.571 (.456)
50%	3%	Representative Mario Diaz-Balart	.272 (.587)	.686 (.324)	-.026 (.939)	-.314 (.372)	-.013 (.975)
48%	5%	Senator Mel Martinez	.020 (.736)	<sup>b</sup>	<sup>b</sup>	<sup>b</sup>	-.071 (.736)
43%	3%	Representative Robert Menéndez	.073 (.903)	.375 (.830)	<sup>b</sup>	.375 (.784)	-.750 (.704)
38%	3%	Tom DeLay	.200 (.572)	1.600 (1.314)	<sup>b</sup>	<sup>b</sup>	-1.00 (.354)

<sup>a</sup> N=40  
<sup>b</sup> Statistics could not be computed. Tolerance levels were reached. Tolerance levels were reached. \*p < .05

#### 8.4 Individuals Identified as Unsuccessful

As shown by table 8.6, of the 74 individuals identified by as playing an active role in US-Cuba policy, the top one-third identified as least successful in their efforts

<sup>236</sup> See Appendices E for full results for all 74 individuals

to influence policy were: Salvador Diaz-Verson (25%), Senator Christopher Dodd (25%), Wayne Smith (25%), Kirby Jones (25%), John Kavulich II (25%), Esteban Edward Torres (23%), Maria Elena Torano (23%), Representative Charles B. Rangel (20%), Representative Delahunt (20%) and Mavis Anderson (20%).<sup>237</sup>

Table 8.6 Individuals Identified as Unsuccessful

Identified Unsuccessful <sup>a</sup>	Identified Successful <sup>a</sup>	Individual
25%	18%	Salvador Diaz-Verson
25%	18%	Senator Christopher J. Dodd
25%	15%	Wayne S. Smith
25%	10%	Kirby Jones
25%	5%	John Kavulich II
23%	5%	Former Representative Esteban Edward Torres
23%	3%	Maria Elena Torano
20%	13%	Representative Charles B. Rangel
20%	10%	Representative William D. Delahunt
20%	5%	Mavis Anderson

a. N=40

#### 8.4.1 Bivariate Correlations

As shown by table 8.7<sup>238</sup>, of the top one-third group of individuals identified as unsuccessful in their efforts to influence policy, no statistically significant positive correlations between success and any of the hypothesized entrepreneurial characteristics were identified.<sup>239</sup>

<sup>237</sup> See Appendices F and G for complete rankings for all 74 individuals.

<sup>238</sup> See Appendix D for full results for all 74 individuals.

<sup>239</sup> However, statistically significant positive correlations between success and fewer than four characteristics were identified in four cases: Wayne Smith, John Kavulich, Former Representative Esteban Edward Torres, and Mavis Anderson.

Table 8.7 Bivariate Correlations—Individuals Identified as Unsuccessful

Successful		Individual	Pearson Correlation (Sig. 2 tailed)			
YES <sup>a</sup>	NO <sup>a</sup>		Claim to a Hearing	Politically Connected	Skilled Negotiator	Persistent
25%	18%	Salvador Diaz-Verson	.370 (.367)	-.250 (.685)	.174 (.680)	.117 (.783)
25%	18%	Senator Christopher J. Dodd	-.029 (.928)	.199 (.495)	.165 (.540)	.275 (.255)
25%	15%	Wayne S. Smith	.258 (.373)	.688 (.005)*	.578 (.030)*	.153 (.546)
25%	10%	Kirby Jones	.586 (.222)	.462 (.153)	.474 (.120)	.366 (.180)
25%	5%	John Kavulich II	.354 (.351)	.641 (.046)*	.641 (.046)*	.338 (.310)
23%	5%	Former Representative Esteban Edward Torres	.712 (.048)*	.487 (.221)	.424 (.222)	.406 (.279)
23%	3%	Maria Elena Torano	-.061 (.887)	.408 (.275)	.508 (.163)	.00 (1.00)
20%	13%	Representative Charles B. Rangel	.067 (.821)	-.025 (.464)	.110 (.695)	-.197 (.449)
20%	10%	Representative William D. Delahunt	-.187 (.657)	-.476 (.340)	-.100 (.798)	-.183 (.664)
20%	5%	Mavis Anderson	.677 (.032)*	.410 (.186)	.600 (.039)*	.093 (.740)

a. N=40  
\*p<.05

### 8.4.2 Model Utility and Correlation Coefficients

As shown by table 8.8, results of the multiple regression analysis for the top one-third of individuals identified as least successful revealed that the model was not a statistically insignificant predictor of success in any of the ten cases.<sup>240</sup>

<sup>240</sup> See Appendix E for full results for all 74 individuals.

Table 8.8 Model Utility and Beta Coefficients—Individuals Identified as Unsuccessful

Successful		Individual	Model R <sup>2</sup> (Sig )	Unstandardized B (Sig 2 tailed)			
YES <sup>a</sup>	NO <sup>a</sup>			Claim to a Hearing	Politically Connected	Skilled Negotiator	Persistent
25%	18%	Salvador Diaz-Verson	785 (.217)	1.500 (.084)	1.00 (.154)	-.500 (.353)	-.033 (.556)
25%	18%	Senator Christopher J Dodd	101 (.689)	305 (1.00)	<sup>b</sup>	<sup>b</sup>	1.00 (.407)
25%	15%	Wayne S. Smith	570 (.156)	673 (.242)	1.534 (.103)	-.445 (.506)	-.569 (.211)
25%	10%	Kirby Jones	377 (.769)	<sup>b</sup>	909 (.545)	-1.00 (1.568)	636 (.643)
25%	5%	John Kavulich II	272 (.704)	-.192 (.814)	<sup>b</sup>	685 (.480)	-.041 (.950)
23%	5%	Former Representative Esteban Edward Torres Edward Torres	542 (.446)	900 (.355)	-5.099 (1.00)	<sup>b</sup>	100 (.911)
23%	3%	Maria Elena Torano	592 (.266)	-.321 (.193)	<sup>b</sup>	500 (.077)	-.179 (.434)
20%	13%	Representative Charles B Rangel	156 (.778)	215 (.773)	552 (.698)	602 (.381)	<sup>b</sup>
20%	10%	Representative William D DeLahunt	246 (.655)	227 (.801)	<sup>b</sup>	<sup>b</sup>	-.591 (.484)
20%	5%	Mavis Anderson	785 (.217)	1.500 (.084)	1.00 (.154)	-.500 (.353)	-.033 (.556)

a N=40  
b Statistics could not be computed. Tolerance levels were reached  
\* $p < .05$

## 8.5 Conclusions

Survey participants were asked, based on their knowledge of and experience with US-Cuba policy, to assess whether specific individuals identified in the empirical literature as playing a central role in US-Cuba policy between 1989 and 2006: (1) have been successful in their efforts to attain their policy objectives; and (2) possess the hypothesized entrepreneurial characteristics. Bivariate correlations and multiple regression analysis were used to assess associations between variables and test the hypothesis that PEs are much more likely to succeed at having their preferred policy proposals adopted if they possess four key

entrepreneurial characteristics—have a claim to a hearing, are politically connected, are skilled negotiators and are persistent. The results of the analysis for all 74 individuals provided insufficient evidence to support the hypothesized association between success and entrepreneurial characteristics. Similar results were revealed by an analysis of the top one-third of individuals identified as successful as well as the top-one third of individuals identified as unsuccessful.

### *Aggregate Results*

Of the 74 individuals reputed to be PEs, 28 individuals were identified as successful and 40 as unsuccessful.<sup>241</sup> For cases identified as successful only a single case, Jorge Mas Canosa, revealed statistically significant positive correlations between success and all four of the hypothesized characteristics.<sup>242</sup> In other words, correlations were correctly identified in only 4% of cases identified as successful. For cases identified as unsuccessful no statistically significant positive correlations were identified.<sup>243</sup> Results of the multiple regression analysis revealed that the overall model correctly predicted success in only 18% of the cases identified as successful (5 of the 28 possible cases identified as successful).<sup>244</sup> An analysis of

---

<sup>241</sup> Six individuals were identified as both successful and unsuccessful.

<sup>242</sup> Statistically significant positive correlations (ranging from moderate to strong) between success and fewer than four characteristics were identified in 10 of 28 cases identified as successful.

<sup>243</sup> In other words, correlations were correctly not identified in 100% of cases identified as unsuccessful. For cases identified as unsuccessful, statistically significant positive correlations (ranging from moderate to strong) between success and fewer than four characteristics were identified in 9 of 28 cases.

<sup>244</sup> Alternatively, one can state that the model failed to predict success in 82% of the cases identified as successful (23 of the 28 possible cases identified as successful).

the cases identified as unsuccessful revealed that the model incorrectly predicted success in 3% of cases (1 of 40) that were identified as unsuccessful.<sup>245</sup> Taken together, the results of the correlation and regression analysis provide insufficient evidence to support the hypothesis that PEs are much more likely to succeed at having their preferred policy proposals adopted if they possess four key entrepreneurial characteristics—have a claim to a hearing, are politically connected, are skilled negotiators and are persistent. Although the results of the correlation analysis are effective in highlighting that all four of the hypothesized entrepreneurial characteristics are not associated with being unsuccessful, there is relatively weak evidence to confirm that they are associated with being successful (only 4% of cases identified as successful revealed statistically significant positive correlations between success and they hypothesized characteristics).<sup>246</sup> Similarly the model was effective in predicting success in only 18% of cases (5 of 28) identified as unsuccessful.

---

<sup>245</sup> Alternatively, it can be stated that the model accurately predicted that 97% of the cases were not successful (39 of the 40 cases identified as unsuccessful).

<sup>246</sup> Correlations between success and fewer than four of the hypothesized characteristics were revealed in 10 of the 28 cases identified as successful, suggesting that success is not necessarily associated with all four hypothesized entrepreneurial characteristics. For example, a PE can have a claim to a hearing but not be politically connected, nor a skilled negotiator, nor persistent but still be successful. Moreover, for cases identified as unsuccessful, although no cases were revealed in which all four of the hypothesized characteristics were correlated with not being successful, correlations between being unsuccessful and fewer than four of the hypothesized characteristics were revealed. If we were interested in assessing the importance of individual characteristics, the results suggest that entrepreneurial characteristics are unimportant in helping to distinguish between successful and unsuccessful PEs. For example, a PE may be unsuccessful, but also be persistent.

*Individuals Identified as Successful*

The top one-third group of individuals identified by survey participants as successful included Representative Lincoln Diaz-Balart, identified as the most successful followed by Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Robert G. Torricelli, Jorge Mas Canosa, the late Senator Jesse Helms, Representative Dan Burton, Representative Mario Diaz-Balart, Senator Mel Martinez, Representative Robert Menéndez, and Tom Delay. Of the ten individuals, only a single case, Jorge Mas Canosa, revealed statistically significant positive correlations between success and all four hypothesized characteristics.<sup>247</sup> Results of the multiple regression analysis revealed that the overall model correctly predicted success in only 10% of the cases (1 of 10 successful cases), that of Jorge Mas Canosa. The model failed to accurately predict success in 90% (9 of 10) of cases identified as successful. Furthermore, only a single predictor, skilled negotiator revealed a statistically significant (positive) association with success.

Together, the results of the correlation and regression analysis provide insufficient evidence to support the hypothesis that successful PEs are much more likely to succeed at having their preferred policy proposals adopted if they possess four key entrepreneurial characteristics—have a claim to a hearing, are politically connected, are skilled negotiators and are persistent. Of the top one-third individuals identified as being successful in their efforts, statistically significant

---

<sup>247</sup> Statistically significant positive correlations were identified in two cases—Representative Lincoln Diaz-Balart and Senator Mel Martinez, however only 1 of 4 characteristics were statistically correlated with success in each case. The remaining 70% of cases (7 of 10) identified as successful did not

positive correlations between success and all four hypothesized entrepreneurial characteristics were identified in only a single case. In order to substantiate the claim that success is associated with the hypothesized characteristics, we would have expected correlations to have been revealed with all ten cases. Moreover, results of the regression analysis correctly predicted success in only a single case identified as successful. Once again, if the hypothesized proposition were true, we would have expected the model to have accurately predicted success for each of the remaining 9 cases identified as successful.

*Individuals Identified as Unsuccessful*

The top one-third group of individuals identified by survey participants as unsuccessful in their efforts to influence policy included Salvador Diaz-Verson, identified as the least successful, followed by Senator Christopher Dodd, Wayne Smith, Kirby Jones, John Kavulich II, Former Representative Esteban Edward Torres Edward Torres, Maria Elena Torano, Representative Charles B. Rangel, Representative William Delahunt, and Mavis Anderson. Results of the bivariate correlation analysis did not reveal statistically significant correlations between the hypothesized variables for the sample of ten individuals identified as unsuccessful, confirming that the hypothesized entrepreneurial characteristics are not correlated with being unsuccessful. Results of the multiple regression analysis revealed that the model did not predict success in any of the ten cases as we would expect since the individuals were not identified as successful. Taken together, the results of the

---

reveal statistically significant correlations between the hypothesized variables.

correlation and regression analysis provide evidence to suggest that the hypothesized entrepreneurial characteristics are not associated with being unsuccessful; however, there is no evidence to suggest that they are.

A closer analysis of the data for the top-one third individuals identified as successful and those identified as unsuccessful provides some interesting information about possible alternative factors that may be associated with success. PEs as conceptualized by MSF can be found in many different locations—in or out of government, in elected or appointed positions, in interest groups or research organizations. It is implied that a PE's position within the formal decision making framework is of no importance to the functioning of a PE. However, the results suggest that this may not necessarily be the case. Of the top one-third individuals identified as successful, 90% of the individuals (Representative Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Former Senator Robert G. Torricelli, the late Senator Jesse Helms, Representative Dan Burton, Representative Mario Diaz-Balart, Senator Mel Martinez, Representative Robert Menéndez, and Former Representative Tom Delay) held formal elected positions within the government. Of the top one-third individuals identified as unsuccessful in their efforts, 60% (Salvador Diaz-Verson, Wayne Smith, Kirby Jones, John Kavulich II, Maria Elena Torano and Mavis Anderson) of the individuals held positions outside the formal government structure and 40% (Senator Christopher Dodd, Former Representative Esteban Edward Torres, Representative Charles B. Rangel, and Representative William Delahunt) within the government. Perhaps a key link to distinguishing

between successful entrepreneurs and their unsuccessful counterparts lies not with their entrepreneurial characteristics, but their formal position within the decision making hierarchy. The data suggest a possible association between success and a PE's position.

Existing research by Victor (2001) and Roberts and King (1996, 1991) provide strong evidence that entrepreneurial position does impact entrepreneurial activities and functions, and if explored further, possibly success. One only need to look at the hypothesized coupling strategies to fully appreciate the possible effect entrepreneurial position can have on the selection of coupling strategies. For instance, manipulation strategies can be disaggregated according to two categories: information and procedural manipulation. While information manipulation (involving framing) can be used by those inside and outside the government, procedural manipulation (involving agenda control, strategic voting, and salami tactics) is generally restricted to government insiders—government leaders and members of legislatures. This opens the door to a refinement of the MSF's concept of PE that accords greater significance to a PEs formal position within the decision making framework, rather than characteristics. This would also suggest a possible refinement to the list of hypothesized coupling strategies may be necessary to reflect the significance of entrepreneurial position.

Chapter nine, the last chapter of the study, provides a brief synthesis of the study's results and conclusions, identifies limitations to the study, and offers possible future avenues of research.

## Chapter 9 Synthesis and Conclusions

### 9.0 Introduction

This study was designed as a quantitative case study to assess whether the characterization of PEs and their selection of appropriate coupling strategies was consistent in practice with that posited by the MSF. In selecting the MSF, we were confronted with the suggestion that the MSF resembles more a “heuristic device” than an “empirically falsifiable tool”. To address this criticism, we paid close attention to recommendations requiring the development of testable hypotheses of the MSF’s major propositions, as a first step towards its transformation into a full fledged theory. The study first introduced the idea of two-level theories and drew upon the central concepts of basic and secondary levels to provide greater structure to the MSF, and in the process help push forward on theorizing within it. Having disaggregated the MSF into its component parts, we turned our focus to generating testable hypotheses for a key component of the framework—PEs. PEs play a pivotal role in Kingdon’s conceptualization of the MSF, yet the framework fails to formally develop any testable hypotheses. Drawing upon the empirical and theoretical literature on decision making and policy entrepreneurship, two central hypotheses were generated:

H<sub>1</sub>: Policy entrepreneurs are more likely to couple the streams successfully during an open policy window if they possess four key entrepreneurial characteristics—have a claim to a hearing, are politically connected, are skilled negotiators, and are persistent.

H<sub>2</sub>: Policy entrepreneurs are more likely to couple the streams successfully during an open policy window if they use one or more forms of manipulation, alter institutional venues and activate coalition support.

Together these two hypotheses were designed to address the ambiguity surrounding the MSF's conceptualization of PEs and their role in the policy making process, and in the process contribute to the theoretical development of the MSF.

### **9.1 Findings**

Drawing upon changes to US-Cuba policy from 1989 through 2006, survey data were disaggregated into three distinct data sets to test the hypothesized relationships between the successful positioning of a policy proposal onto the government's agenda and two critical elements—(1) entrepreneurial characteristics and (2) entrepreneurial coupling strategies. The first data set was used to test the hypothesized relationships in the context of the broader framework of policy. Drawing upon survey respondents knowledge of, and experience with decision making, they were asked to assess the characteristics and actions of PEs beyond the case of US-Cuba policy to the general policy process. The second data set was used to test the hypothesized relationships by drawing upon participants' expertise, knowledge and efforts to influence US-Cuba policy from 1989-2006. Finally, the third data set utilized the expertise and knowledge of survey participants as not only active participants in the policy process, but also as observers to test the hypothesized association between success and entrepreneurial characteristics of individuals identified in the empirical literature as playing a central role in the

evolution of US-Cuba policy between 1989 and 2006. The results of the study provided very weak support for the two hypotheses, indicating that further refinement of the entrepreneurial concept may be necessary.

*Hypothesis 1—Entrepreneurial Characteristics*<sup>248</sup>

For the first data set, the evidence does not support the hypothesized relationship between success and entrepreneurial characteristics; however, an analysis of the effect size estimates and associated confidence interval for the full model suggested that the null hypothesis may be false, providing possible, but weak support for the model. The results would therefore suggest that, in the broader policymaking process (i.e. in cases not involving US-Cuba policy); there may be a correlation between success and the hypothesized variables; however, additional data are necessary before this can be confirmed. The second data set revealed that the individual variables in combination are good predictors of success, affirming the association between success and the hypothesized variables for survey participants that were successful; however, the data indicate that a single variable—streams—accounts for the greatest share of variance in success. Although we can, based on the results of the regression analysis, reject the null hypothesis, we do so

---

<sup>248</sup> The hypothesis was tested using all three data sets. For the third data set, the hypothesis was revised slightly: policy entrepreneurs are more likely to successfully couple the streams if they possess four key entrepreneurial characteristics—a claim to a hearing, politically connected, skilled negotiators, and persistent. It was necessary to revise the hypothesis to take into account the fact that we were asking individuals their opinions about individuals, and could not ask them to respond to questions that only the individuals would be able to answer involving streams and the opening of a window.

with caution as the streams variable is the single most powerful “explanation” of success. Replicating the study with a larger sample is necessary to assess the reliability of the findings. Finally, although the results of the various analyses for the third data set did not provide sufficient evidence to support the association between success and the hypothesized variables, a closer analysis of the results detected a pattern between success and a PE’s position. Individuals were more likely to be successful if they held formal (elected) positions within the government. Although this claim cannot be substantiated without further testing, it does challenge the importance of entrepreneurial characteristics and also suggests that entrepreneurial position may be associated with the type of coupling strategy that is selected.

#### *Hypothesis 2—Entrepreneurial Coupling Strategies*<sup>249</sup>

For the first data set, there was insufficient evidence to support the hypothesized relationship between success and coupling strategies; however, an analysis of the effect size estimates and associated confidence interval for the full model suggested that the null hypothesis may be false, providing possible support for the model. The results would therefore suggest that in the broader policymaking process (i.e. in cases not involving US-Cuba policy), there may be a correlation between success and the hypothesized variables; however, additional data are necessary before this can be confirmed. The second data set revealed that the

---

<sup>249</sup>The hypothesis was tested using data sets 1 and 2. It was not possible to ask individuals their opinions about what strategies individuals used, as it was unlikely that they would be able to answer the question.

individual variables in combination are good predictors of success, affirming the association between success and the hypothesized variables for survey participants that were successful; however, the data indicate that a single variable—streams—accounts for the greatest share of variance in success. Although we can, based on the results of the regression analysis, reject the null hypothesis, we do so with caution as the streams variable is the single most powerful “explanation” of success. Replicating the study with a larger sample is necessary to assess the reliability of the findings.

## **9.2 Contribution of Study**

The MSF has been the subject of much criticism. One of the most serious weaknesses of the MSF is that it lacks explicit hypotheses and is too fluid in its structure and operationalization which makes falsification, a defining feature of science, difficult (Sabatier, 1997: 5). This has been a major impediment, according to Sabatier (1997: 6), to the transformation of the MSF from a descriptive framework to a full fledged theory; however, he also suggests that the task is not insurmountable. The first “step” in this transformation involves testing hypotheses about major propositions generated by the MSF.

This study represents a contribution to the process by subjecting two central hypotheses generated by the MSF to rigorous statistical testing. The results were compared with empirical evidence to assess the “fit” between fact and theory, and in the process build the foundation for more thorough tests of the MSF. This study is

also one of the few studies that has not only generated but also subjected hypotheses to quantitative testing. A single case study is certainly not sufficient to either reject or advance a framework as a viable theory; however it is, as noted by Sabatier (1999a: 269) a valuable contribution to building a sound body of research involving the elaboration and rigorous testing of frameworks that is critical to their transformation into full fledged theories. This study is also the first to articulate and operationalize the full MSF as a two-level theory. The structure of a two-level theory is effective in organizing, identifying and clarifying relationships between variables central to the functioning of the framework. Moreover, although the MSF has been used as an organizational framework to account for policy change in a broad range of policy fields, very few scholars, with the exception of Travis and Zahariadis (2002) and Klodnicki (2003) have utilized the MSF in the context of a quantitative analysis of policy. This study has attempted to fill this void by providing a quantitative analysis of a policy case, that of US-Cuba policy from 1989 through 2006. Studies of US-Cuba policy are numerous, including theoretical and empirical studies; however, absent from the literature is an analysis of policy from a quantitative perspective.

### **9.3 Limitations of the Study**

A central limitation of the study is the small sample size. As reported by Moher, Dulberg and Wells (1994), a significant proportion of studies that report non-significant results can attribute outcomes to inadequate sample sizes. This raises

the question of whether the findings were “true” or simply the product of a small sample size. It is important to note that with small “N” studies, tests of statistical significance can be misleading because of an increased chance of Type II errors (Neill, 2008) which has led to suggestions that statistical significance tests and their interpretation should be used as “guidance rather than sanctification” (Abelson, 1995: 9).<sup>250</sup> This is certainly open to debate, and beyond the scope of this analysis; however, we do subscribe to suggestions that statistical significance tests are effective tools in the development of viable theories, and repeated tests are necessary to either confirm or refute findings of studies with small samples. Statistical significance tests, if used correctly, can be effective and powerful tools, particularly in areas of new research.

Second, although a number of measures were used to address limitations often associated with survey research, further refinements to the design of the survey instrument may aid in the future collection of data. Reconfiguring the survey instrument in order to reduce the overall length of the survey and perhaps offering participants an on-line survey option could help to increase completion rates. Moreover, offering an on-line version of the survey would not only address possible issues associated with confidentiality brought up by individuals that were approached about participating, but would also aid in reducing the time necessary to input data for analysis.

---

<sup>250</sup> Original quoted by LeCroy and Krysik (2007:N/A).

Third, the use of hypothesis testing, which is subject to its own criticisms and methodological issues,<sup>251</sup> becomes even more difficult when venturing into uncharted territory—testing hypotheses generated from a framework that has largely been used as a descriptive framework and untested using formal statistical methods. As a descriptive framework, the MSF offers a unique approach to understanding decision making and policy outcomes, one that unlike other approaches, embraces rather than ignores the complexities and chaos of the decision making process as is reflected in the case of US-Cuba policy. However, the framework's major strength is also one of its major weaknesses. Because the MSF tries to be all encompassing, it ends up being "complex and confusing...lack[ing] rigour, discipline and analytical power needed for genuine progress" (Bendor et. al., 2001: 169). Trying to make "sense" of the chaos by developing testable hypotheses about major propositions put forth by the framework and then subjecting them to rigorous testing is a "messy" process involving trial and error. However, as suggested by Sabatier (1997: 6), this is a critical and necessary first step in the transformation of the MSF from a rudimentary framework to a full fledged theory.

#### **9.4 Future Research**

Future research can begin by replicating the study with a larger sample. In order to be 95% confident in the results of the study (with an acceptable margin of

---

<sup>251</sup> See White and Doherty (2007).

error of 10%), researchers should aim for a sample of 384 participants.<sup>252</sup> The purpose of replicating the study with a larger sample size is not to ensure “statistically significant” results, but rather to assess the reliability of the study’s results. Larger sample studies might replicate existing results, therefore confirming our findings, or might result in quite different outcomes, suggesting possible alternative conclusions.

Second, further theorizing within the MSF is not only recommended, but necessary as there are a number of key concepts that have yet to be fully articulated and subjected to testing. This study focused on a single, but important component of the MSF—PEs. Another key concept that warrants further attention is the concept of windows. The MSF suggests that the type of window (problem or politics) that opens influences the selection of an appropriate policy (Kingdon, 1995: 173-174). There is extensive research substantiating the existence of windows (Medler, 2005; Zahariadis, 2003; Avery, 2004; Galligan, 2003; Cherry, 2000; Medler, 2005; Howlett, 1998; Solecki, 1996; Simon and Alm, 1995; Keeler, 1993; Lebow, 1984); however, the correlation between window type and policy outcome has yet to be fully explored. In their respective research, Medler (2005), Zahariadis (2003; 1992), and Schuh (2000) provide strong qualitative evidence of a possible correlation between the two; however their findings have yet to be formally tested.

---

<sup>252</sup> With a sample size of 40, the margin of error is 15%.

Third, this study has concluded that there is very weak evidence to suggest that there is a good “fit” between fact and hypothesized relationships. With the MSF, if entrepreneurial success in getting policy proposals onto the decision agenda is not correlated with any of the hypothesized entrepreneurial characteristics or coupling strategies, how can we account for success? A possible answer to this question may require a refinement of the MSF’s concept of PE. PEs as conceptualized by MSF can be found in many different locations—in or out of government, in elected or appointed positions, in interest groups or research organizations. It is implied that a PE’s position within the formal decision making framework is of no importance to the functioning of a PE; however, the empirical findings here suggest otherwise, as does existing research on the subject. The rich literature on policy entrepreneurship provides ample evidence that the presence and actions of PEs increase the likelihood that specific policy alternatives will not only be considered but also adopted. However, it also suggests that a PE’s formal position within the formal decision making framework influences entrepreneurial activities and functions. This opens the door to a refinement of the MSF’s concept of PE that accords greater significance to a PE’s formal position within the decision making framework rather than characteristics. Perhaps a key link to distinguishing between successful entrepreneurs and their unsuccessful counterparts lies not with their entrepreneurial characteristics, but their formal position within the decision making hierarchy. This would also suggest a possible refinement to the list of hypothesized

coupling strategies may be necessary to reflect the significance of entrepreneurial position.

Finally, the case of US-Cuba policy, which is as complex and intricate as one would ever encounter in the policy process, has garnered and continues to garner the attention of politicians, analysts and the general public. The election of Barack Obama in 2008 as America's 44<sup>th</sup> President represented a new era in American politics, one that emphasized change and a departure from the policies of the Bush Administration. This was reflected by a series of revisions to US-Cuba policy in 2009, the most important being the lifting of restrictions on travel and remittances to Cuba for family members (White House, 2009).<sup>253</sup> During the Bush Administration, countless efforts to lift the travel and remittances restrictions failed, only to be countered with even tighter restrictions. Extending the analysis to include President Obama's first term in office would be effective in uncovering possible correlations between changes to policy and the emergence of new political and bureaucratic players and possibly by definition, PEs to the policy arena.

This study suggests that there is a poor fit between the empirical evidence and the MSF's characterization of PEs and their actions. Although the study failed to reveal associations between the hypothesized variables, this should not deter

---

<sup>253</sup> Other measures that have been taken include: the authorization of US telecommunications network providers to enter in agreements establishing links between the US and Cuba, licensing of US telecommunications service providers to establish agreements with Cuba's telecommunications service providers, the licensing of US radio, television and service providers to engage mutual transactions with Cuba's providers to sell services to customers in Cuba, authorizing the sale of telecommunications devices without a license, and the expansion of the list of humanitarian items eligible for export (White House, 2009).

similar studies. In fact, future research is the key to determining whether the MSF can be transformed into a full fledged theory. As suggested by Sabatier (1999a: 269) and Schalger (1997: 14), accomplishments in the sciences require long term research programs that are firmly rooted in frameworks that are repeatedly and rigorously tested and revised among a network of scholars in response to empirical findings. This study should be viewed as a small contribution to such a research program.

## Appendix A: Chronology of Key Legislative Events in US-Cuba Policy, 1989-2006

### 1989

November 20	Title 31 US Code of Federal Regulations Part 515 Cuban Assets Control Regulations (Amendment) The Treasury Department limits travel related expenses for US citizens to Cuba at \$100 per day.
February 2	Title 31 US Code of Federal Regulations Part 515 Cuban Assets Control Regulations (Amendment)
	Title 31 US Code of Federal Regulations Part 515 Cuban Assets Control Regulations (Amendment)

### 1990

February 16	Television Broadcasting to Cuba Act Public Law 101-246, 104 Stat. 15 at 58
-------------	---

### 1991

September 27	Title 31 US Code of Federal Regulations Part 515 Cuban Assets Control Regulations (Amendment)
October 2	Title 31 US Code of Federal Regulations Part 515 Cuban Assets Control Regulations (Amendment)

### 1992

January 14	Title 31 US Code of Federal Regulations Part 515 Cuban Assets Control Regulations (Amendment)
February 24	Title 31 US Code of Federal Regulations Part 515 Cuban Assets Control Regulations (Amendment)
April 24	Title 31 US Code of Federal Regulations Part 515 Cuban Assets Control Regulations (Amendment)
October 15	Congress passes the Cuban Democracy Act, also known as the "Torricelli Bill" which prohibits foreign-based subsidiaries of US companies from trading with Cuba; prohibits ships with Cuban goods from entering US ports; prohibits travel to Cuba by US citizens, and prohibits family remittances to Cuba. The law allows private groups to deliver food and medicine to Cuba.
October 23	Cuban Democracy Act Public Law 102-484, Title XVII See also Title 22, US Code Section 6001
November 10	Title 31 US Code of Federal Regulations Part 515 Cuban Assets Control Regulations (Amendment)
November 16	Title 31 US Code of Federal Regulations Part 515 Cuban Assets Control Regulations (Amendment)

## Appendix A: Chronology of Key Legislative Events in US-Cuba Policy, 1989-2006 (Continued)

### 1993

June 29	Title 31 US Code of Federal Regulations Part 515 Cuban Assets Control Regulations (Amendment)
July 4	Clinton signs Executive Order 128854 for the Implementation of the Cuban Democracy Act.
August 26	Title 31 US Code of Federal Regulations Part 515 Cuban Assets Control Regulations (Amendment)
September 10	Title 31 US Code of Federal Regulations Part 515 Cuban Assets Control Regulations (Amendment)

### 1994

May 14	The Bureau of Exports issued guidelines describing expedited procedures for licensing medical exports to Cuba.
June 13	Title 31 US Code of Federal Regulations Part 515 Cuban Assets Control Regulations (Amendment)
August 26	Title 31 US Code of Federal Regulations Part 515 Cuban Assets Control Regulations (Amendment)
August 30	Title 31 US Code of Federal Regulations Part 515 Cuban Assets Control Regulations (Amendment)
September 9	Joint Communiqué on US-Cuba Immigration Agreement The US and Cuba issue a joint communiqué agreeing to take measures to ensure that migration between the two countries is safe, legal, and orderly.

### 1995

February 14	The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (LIBERTAD) which is commonly known as the Helms-Burton Law is introduced by Congressmen Jesse Helms of North Carolina and Dan Burton of Indiana.
May 2	Joint Statement on US-Cuba Immigration Agreement The US and Cuba issue a joint statement reaffirming their commitment to promote safe, legal, and orderly migration. Cubans interdicted at sea or who enter the Guantanamo Naval Base illegally are returned to Cuba provided that they do not have any protection concerns.
June 26	Title 31 US Code of Federal Regulations Part 515 Cuban Assets Control Regulations (Amendment)
August 2	Title 31 US Code of Federal Regulations Part 515 Cuban Assets Control Regulations (Amendment)
October 5	President Clinton announces measures ("Track II") to expand people-to-people contacts between the US and Cuba, to allow US non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to fund projects in Cuba, and to provide aid funding to US NGOs for Cuba-related projects.
October 20	Title 31 US Code of Federal Regulations Part 515 Cuban Assets Control Regulations (Amendment)

## Appendix A: Chronology of Key Legislative Events in US-Cuba Policy, 1989-2006 (Continued)

### 1996

March 12	Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, Public Law 104-114 President Clinton signs the LIBERTAD Act that penalizes foreign companies doing business in Cuba, permits US citizens to sue foreign investors who make use of American-owned property seized by the Cuban government, and denies entry into the US to foreign investors in violation of the property stipulation.
June 26	Title 31 US Code of Federal Regulations Part 515 Cuban Assets Control Regulations (Amendment)
July 16	President Clinton suspends enforcement of Title III provisions of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act for six months. Title III of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act permits suits to be filed in US courts against foreign investors who are profiting from US-claimed confiscated property.
July 18	Title 31 US Code of Federal Regulations Part 515 Cuban Assets Control Regulations (Amendment)
August 23	Title 31 US Code of Federal Regulations Part 515 Cuban Assets Control Regulations (Amendment)
October 23	Title 31 US Code of Federal Regulations Part 515 Cuban Assets Control Regulations (Amendment)
September 30	Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act Division C of Public Law 104-208 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, 110 Stat. 3009

### 1997

January 3	President Clinton suspends (2 <sup>nd</sup> suspension since the passage of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act) enforcement of Title III provisions of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act for six months.
February 12	The Administration approves licenses for American news organizations to open bureaus in Cuba. Only CNN is allowed in by the Cuban Government.
July 16	President Clinton suspends (3 <sup>rd</sup> suspension since the passage of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act) enforcement of Title III provisions of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act for six months.
August 25	Title 31 US Code of Federal Regulations Part 515 Cuban Assets Control Regulations (Amendment)

### 1998

January 16	President Clinton suspends (4 <sup>th</sup> suspension since the passage of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act) enforcement of Title III provisions of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act for six months.
	Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act
March 3	Title 31 US Code of Federal Regulations Part 515 Cuban Assets Control Regulations (Amendment)

## Appendix A: Chronology of Key Legislative Events in US-Cuba Policy, 1989-2006 (Continued)

### 1998

May 13	Title 31 US Code of Federal Regulations Part 515 Cuban Assets Control Regulations (Amendment)
May 18	Title 31 US Code of Federal Regulations Part 515 Cuban Assets Control Regulations (Amendment)
March 20	Clinton Administration announces new measures to support people of Cuba and strengthen their ties to US citizens.
June 1	Title 31 US Code of Federal Regulations Part 515 Cuban Assets Control Regulations (Amendment)
July 1	Title 31 US Code of Federal Regulations, Part 515 Cuban Assets Control Regulations (Correction to final regulations)
	Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act Public Law 105-277, Title II Department of Commerce and Related Agencies, Section 211 of Division A
July 16	President Clinton suspends (5 <sup>th</sup> suspension since the passage of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act) enforcement of Title III provisions of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act for six months.
October 21	Section 211 of the Omnibus Appropriation Act makes impermissible the registration or renewal in the US of a trademark if it was previously abandoned by a trademark owner whose property had been confiscated by Cuba.

### 1999

January 5	Clinton Administration announces additional measures to support Cuban people.
January 15	President Clinton suspends (6 <sup>th</sup> suspension since the passage of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act) enforcement of Title III provisions of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act for six months.
	Department of Commerce and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999 Division A, Sec. 101(b), Title II of the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999 Public Law 105-277; H.R. 4328], 112 Stat. 2681, at 2681-88
July 16	President Clinton suspends (7 <sup>th</sup> suspension since the passage of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act) enforcement of Title III provisions of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act for six months.
May 13	Title 31 US Code of Federal Regulations Part 515 Cuban Assets Control Regulations (Amendment)

### 2000

January 14	President Clinton suspends (8 <sup>th</sup> suspension since the passage of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act) enforcement of Title III provisions of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act for six months.
May 18	US-Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act Public Law 106-200
July 14	President Clinton suspends (9 <sup>th</sup> suspension since the passage of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act) enforcement of Title III provisions of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act for six months.

## Appendix A: Chronology of Key Legislative Events in US-Cuba Policy, 1989-2006 (Continued)

### 2000

October 3	Title 8 US Code of Federal Regulations, Part 234 (Amendment)
October 28	Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 Division A of Public Law 106-386
	Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-387) The Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 is signed into law. Regarding Cuba, the Act essentially allows trade with Cuba in agricultural commodities, medicines, and medical supplies, but prohibits direct public or private export financing for this trade.
December 13	Title 31 US Code of Federal Regulations Part 515 Cuban Assets Control Regulations (Amendment)

### 2001

January 17	Outgoing President Clinton (10 <sup>th</sup> suspension since the passage of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act) enforcement of Title III provisions of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act for six months.
April 11	Title 31 US Code of Federal Regulations Part 515 Cuban Assets Control Regulations (Amendment)
April 13	Title 31 US Code of Federal Regulations Part 515 Cuban Assets Control Regulations (Amendment)
May 30	Title 31 US Code of Federal Regulations Part 515 Cuban Assets Control Regulations (Amendment)
June 11	Title 31 US Code of Federal Regulations Part 515 Cuban Assets Control Regulations (Amendment)
June 12	Bridges to the Cuban People Act of 2001 (S. 1017) introduced in Senate and House (H.R. 2138).
July 12	Title 31 US Code of Federal Regulations Part 515 Cuban Assets Control Regulations (Amendment)
July 12	Title 15 US Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 740, 742, 746, 772 and 774 Exports of Agricultural Commodities, Medicines and Medical Devices
July 12	Title 31 US Code of Federal Regulations Part 515 Cuban Assets Control Regulations (Interim Rule)
July 13	Bush pledges to strengthen the embargo and support for the democratic opposition in Cuba. Key initiatives include increased funding for non-governmental organization pro-democracy programs, human rights activists and dissidents, enforcing limits on cash payments Cuban-Americans send to relatives on the island, and further prevention of American tourists traveling to Cuba. Bush appoints Salvador Lew to head the anti-Castro stations Radio and TV Marti.
July 16	President Bush suspends (11 <sup>th</sup> suspension since the passage of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act, and the first since being elected President) enforcement of Title III provisions of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act for six months.
September 24	Title 31 US Code of Federal Regulations Part 515 Cuban Assets Control Regulations (Executive Order 13224)

## Appendix A: Chronology of Key Legislative Events in US-Cuba Policy, 1989-2006 (Continued)

### 2002

January 16	President Bush suspends (12 <sup>th</sup> suspension since the passage of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act) enforcement of Title III provisions of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act for six months. Bush appoints Otto Reich as Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs. The Administration's foreign policy team is tasked with conducting a thorough review of current Cuban policy.
	House of Representatives launches the House Cuba Working Group, a bipartisan group of congressional members.
	The Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act
May 20	President George W. Bush outlines the government's policy for a transition to democracy in Cuba. In a report entitled "Initiative for a New Cuba," the President calls for political and economic reform, free and fair elections and an open economy in Cuba in exchange for lifting American restrictions on trade and travel to Cuba.
July 16	President Bush suspends (13 <sup>th</sup> suspension since the passage of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act) enforcement of Title III provisions of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act for six months.
November	Jesse Helms, a key supporter of US sanctions against Cuba and member of the Senate Committee on International Relations retires from the Senate.

### 2003

January 16	President Bush suspends (14 <sup>th</sup> suspension since the passage of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act) enforcement of Title III provisions of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act for six months.
February 20	Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act Division E Public Law 108-7
March 7	A contingency of eight lawmakers, also members of the Cuba Working Group and the largest single delegation of American lawmakers visit Cuba to push for changes in American policy toward Cuba. Members of the group include Representatives Jeff Flake (R-AZ), Jo Ann Emerson (R-MO), Denny Rehbert (R-MT), Ottoer Idaho (R-OH), Jahon Tanner (D-TN), Nita Lowey (D-NY), Dennis Moore (D-KS), and William Delahunt (D-MA).
March 21	US Senate launches the Senate Working Group on Cuba, a bipartisan group of Senators tasked with re-examining US policies toward Cuba, including trade and travel restrictions.

## Appendix A: Chronology of Key Legislative Events in US-Cuba Policy, 1989-2006 (Continued)

### 2003

March 24	Title 31 US Code of Federal Regulations Part 515 Cuban Assets Control Regulations (Amendment) The US Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), issues new regulations restricting travel and remittances to Cuba. Most notably, licenses granted to US organizations for educational travel to Cuba are eliminated.
April 29	Title 31 US Code of Federal Regulations, Part 515 Cuban Assets Control Regulations
July 16	President Bush suspends (15 <sup>th</sup> suspension since the passage of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act) enforcement of Title III provisions of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act for six months.
September 20	Bridges to the Cuban People Act of 2003 introduced in House (3422).
September 30	Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the US Treasury Department issued a regulation to ban the publication of scientific articles from countries subject to a sanctions regime by the US government, including Cuba.
October 10	The Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba, created by President Bush is tasked with finding the appropriate means by which the US can encourage and assist a democratic transition in Cuba. The Commission, also known as the "Powell Commission", is co-chaired by Secretary of State Colin Powell and Mel Martinez, the Cuban American Secretary of Housing and Urban Development. Members of the Commission include representatives from all Cabinet level agencies. The government's Cuba Transition Coordinator, Caleb McCarry, is tasked with overseeing the day-to-day operations of the Commission.

### 2004

January 16	President Bush suspends (16 <sup>th</sup> suspension since the passage of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act) enforcement of Title III provisions of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act for six months.
May 6	Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba releases report.
June	President Bush accepts and institutes as policy recommendations of the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba. In response to the President's direction to implement recommendations from the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba, the Departments of Treasury and Commerce published new rules on travel and exports to Cuba.
June 16	Title 31 US Code of Federal Regulations Part 515 Cuban Assets Control Regulations (Interim Final Rule) US Treasury Department issued regulations (most of which went into effect on June 30 <sup>th</sup> ) that tightened restrictions on travel and remittances.
June 16	Title 31 US Code of Federal Regulations Part 515 Cuban Assets Control Regulations (Notice)
June 22	US Department of Commerce issued tighter export restrictions.
June 25	Title 31 US Code of Federal Regulations Part 515 Cuban Assets Control Regulations (Amendment)
July 8	Title 33 US Code of Federal Regulations Parts 107 and 165 (Amendment)

## Appendix A: Chronology of Key Legislative Events in US-Cuba Policy, 1989-2006 (Continued)

### 2004

July 16	President Bush suspends (17 <sup>th</sup> suspension since the passage of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act) enforcement of Title III provisions of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act for six months.
November 1	Title 31 US Code of Federal Regulations Part 515 Cuban Assets Control Regulations (Amendment)
December 17	Title 31 US Code of Federal Regulations Part 515 Cuban Assets Control Regulations (Amendment)
	Consolidated Appropriations Act, Section 507

### 2005

January 14	President Bush suspends (18 <sup>th</sup> suspension since the passage of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act) enforcement of Title III provisions of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act for six months.
February 22	Title 31 US Code of Federal Regulations Part 515 Cuban Assets Control Regulations (Amendment)
	Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005
July 15	President Bush suspends (19 <sup>th</sup> suspension since the passage of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act) enforcement of Title III provisions of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act for six months
August 22	Title 31 US Code of Federal Regulations Part 515 Cuban Assets Control Regulations (Amendment)

### 2006

October 20	Title 31 US Code of Federal Regulations Part 515 Cuban Assets Control Regulations (Amendment)
December 19	Commission for Assistance to Free Cuba reconvened by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to identify additional measures to aid Cuba's transition to democracy. Full report is scheduled to be submitted to President Bush by May 2006.
	Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, Section 507
	Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act
	Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act
January 10	Continuation of the National Emergency Relating to Cuba and of the Emergency Authority Relating to the Regulation of the Anchorage and Movement of Vessels
January 17	President Bush suspends (20 <sup>th</sup> suspension since the passage of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act) enforcement of Title III provisions of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act for six months.
February 9	Agricultural Products and Export Facilitation Act 2005 (H.R. 719) introduced in House. Related legislation introduced in Senate (S. 328).
	Bureau of Industry and Security Amendment Title 15 US Code of Federal Regulations Part 740 Export Administration Regulations

## Appendix A: Chronology of Key Legislative Events in US-Cuba Policy, 1989-2006 (Continued)

### 2006

July 10	Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba releases an updated version of its first report in an attempt to revive US-Cuba policy. The report which was initially to be released on May 20 <sup>th</sup> (Cuban Independence Day) was officially released on July 10 <sup>th</sup> .
July 17	President Bush suspends (21 <sup>st</sup> suspension since the passage of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act) enforcement of Title III provisions of the 1996 LIBERTAD Act for six months.
April 5	Title 31 US Code of Federal Regulations Part 515 Cuban Assets Control Regulations
August 11	Title 31 US Code of Federal Regulations Part 515 Cuban Assets Control Regulations
October 23	The Bureau of Industry and Security requests public comments on the effectiveness of its licensing procedures as defined in the Export Administration Regulations for the export of agricultural commodities to Cuba.

### Sources

- American Farm Bureau Federation <[http //www fb org](http://www.fb.org)>  
AmericasCanada.org <[http //www americascanada org](http://www.americascanada.org)>  
Arizona Central <[http //www azcentral com](http://www.azcentral.com)>  
Bates, A (2000) (Editor) *World in Focus Volume 1 Cuba Issues and Bibliography* New York  
Nova Science Publishers Inc  
CIP Online <[http //www ciponline org/Cuba](http://www.ciponline.org/Cuba)>  
CNN.com Online <[http //www cnn com](http://www.cnn.com)>  
CubaNet <[http //www cubanet org](http://www.cubanet.org)>  
Canadian Foundation for the Americas <[http //www focal ca](http://www.focal.ca)>  
Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba <[http //http //www caafc gov](http://http://www.caafc.gov)>  
Council on Hemispheric Affairs <[http //www coha org](http://www.coha.org)>  
Franklin, J (1997) *Cuba and the United States a Chronological History* Ocean Press New York  
Global Exchange <[http //www globalexchange org](http://www.globalexchange.org)>  
International Trade Commission (2001) *The Economic Impact of US Sanctions With Respect to Cuba* Washington International Trade Commission  
Latin American Working Group Education Fund (2006) *Retreat from Reason US-Cuban Academic Relations and the Bush Administration* Washington, D C Latin American Working Group Education Fund  
Malloy, M P (2006) *Study of New US Unilateral Sanctions, 1997-2006* USA\*Engage and National Foreign Trade Council  
<[http //www usaengage org/storage/usaengage/Publications/2006\\_study\\_of\\_new\\_%20us\\_unilateral\\_%20sanctions pdf](http://www.usaengage.org/storage/usaengage/Publications/2006_study_of_new_%20us_unilateral_%20sanctions.pdf)> (15 November 2009)  
Ospina, H C (2002) *Bacardi The Hidden War* London Pluto Press  
Rennack, D E and Sullivan, M P (2005) *US-Cuban Relations An Analytic Compendium of US Policies, Laws & Regulations* Occasional Paper Washington, D C The Atlantic Council of the United States  
——— (1996) *Cuba US Economic Sanctions Through 1996* Report 95-248 F Congressional Research Service Library of Congress  
United Nations United Nations Bibliographic Information System Voting Records <[http //unbisnet un org 8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp?profile=voting&menu=search&submenu=alpha#fo cus](http://unbisnet.un.org/8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp?profile=voting&menu=search&submenu=alpha#focus)>  
United Nations General Assembly Resolutions/Regular Sessions

<<http://www.un.org/documents/resga.htm>>  
United States Bureau of Industry and Security <<http://www.bis.doc.gov>>  
United States Department of State (2000) *International Information Programs Chronology of US  
Cuba Relations, 1958-1999* Washington US Department of State  
United States Department of the Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control *OFAC Recent  
Decisions* <<http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/actions>>  
United States Federal Register <<http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov>>  
United States Government Printing Office *Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)*  
<<http://www.gpoaccess.gov/cfr/index.html>>  
United States Government Accountability Office (1998) *Cuban Embargo Selected Issues  
Relating to Travel, Exports, and Telecommunications* Report GAO/NSIAD 99-10  
United States House of Representatives <<http://www.house.gov>>  
United States Senate <<http://www.senate.gov>>  
White House <<http://www.whitehouse.gov>>

## Appendix B: Dependent and Independent Variables—Hypothesis 1

### Composite Independent Variables—Hypothesis 1

	Variable	Component Variables
DV (y)	success	
IV x <sub>1</sub>	claim to a hearing	X <sub>d1</sub> , X <sub>e2</sub> , X <sub>r3</sub>
IV x <sub>2</sub>	politically connected	X <sub>g4</sub>
IV x <sub>3</sub>	skilled negotiator	X <sub>h5</sub>
IV x <sub>4</sub>	persistent	X <sub>i6</sub>
IV x <sub>5</sub>	streams	X <sub>j7</sub> , X <sub>k8</sub> , X <sub>l9</sub>
IV x <sub>6</sub>	problem window	X <sub>m10</sub> , X <sub>n11</sub> , X <sub>o12</sub> , X <sub>p13</sub> , X <sub>q14</sub>
IV x <sub>7</sub>	politics window	X <sub>r15</sub> , X <sub>s16</sub> , X <sub>t17</sub> , X <sub>u18</sub> , X <sub>v19</sub>

### Dependent and Independent Variables—Hypothesis 1

	Variable Label	Measure(s)/Description
DV (y)	SUCCESS	Positioning preferred proposal on the government's decision agenda for authoritative action—legislative or administrative.
c	c	constant
b	b	regression coefficients
IV x <sub>d1</sub>	claim to a hearing	Are known for their expertise in US-Cuba policy.
IV x <sub>e2</sub>	claim to a hearing	An ability to speak on behalf of others because of their leadership position(s).
IV x <sub>r3</sub>	claim to a hearing	An ability to make authoritative decisions because of their position(s).
IV x <sub>g4</sub>	politically connected	An ability to develop and maintain good relations with key political actors.
IV x <sub>h5</sub>	skilled negotiator	Skilled negotiators.
IV x <sub>i6</sub>	persistent	Are persistent in their efforts to modify policy.
IV x <sub>j7</sub>	stream	Favourable political support
IV x <sub>k8</sub>	stream	Government perception of a serious problem.
IV x <sub>l9</sub>	stream	Availability of a viable solution.
IV x <sub>m10</sub>	problem window	Release of statistical indicators used to monitor the progression of policy.
IV x <sub>n11</sub>	problem window	Release of studies assessing the viability of existing policy.
IV x <sub>o12</sub>	problem window	A focusing event such as a crisis or other event that brings attention to existing policy.
IV x <sub>p13</sub>	problem window	Feedback from the public to policy makers concerning existing policy.
IV x <sub>q14</sub>	problem window	Feedback from bureaucrats to policy makers concerning existing policy.
IV x <sub>r15</sub>	politics window	A change in public opinion concerning existing policy.
IV x <sub>s16</sub>	politics window	A change of Administration
IV x <sub>t17</sub>	politics window	A change in party status in Congress.
IV x <sub>u18</sub>	politics window	Turnover of key government bureaucratic personnel.
IV x <sub>v19</sub>	politics window	Influence of interest groups.
DV dependent variable		
IV independent variable		

## Appendix C: Dependent and Independent Variables—Hypothesis 2

### Composite Independent Variables—Hypothesis 2

	Variable	Component Variables
DV (y)	success	
IV x <sub>1</sub>	manipulation strategy (framing)	X <sub>d1</sub> , X <sub>e2</sub> , X <sub>f3</sub> , X <sub>g4</sub>
IV x <sub>2</sub>	manipulation strategy (agenda control)	X <sub>h5</sub> , X <sub>i6</sub> , X <sub>j7</sub> , X <sub>k8</sub> , X <sub>l9</sub>
IV x <sub>3</sub>	manipulation strategy (strategic voting)	X <sub>m10</sub>
IV x <sub>4</sub>	manipulation strategy (salami tactics)	X <sub>n11</sub>
IV x <sub>5</sub>	altering institutional venues	X <sub>o12</sub> , X <sub>p13</sub> , X <sub>q14</sub> , X <sub>r15</sub> , X <sub>s16</sub> , X <sub>t17</sub>
IV x <sub>6</sub>	activating coalitions	X <sub>u18</sub> , X <sub>v19</sub> , X <sub>w20</sub>
IV x <sub>7</sub>	streams	X <sub>x21</sub> , X <sub>y22</sub> , X <sub>z23</sub>
IV x <sub>8</sub>	problem window	X <sub>aa24</sub> , X <sub>bb25</sub> , X <sub>cc26</sub> , X <sub>dd27</sub> , X <sub>ee28</sub>
IV x <sub>9</sub>	politics window	X <sub>ff29</sub> , X <sub>gg30</sub> , X <sub>hh31</sub> , X <sub>ii32</sub> , X <sub>jj33</sub>

### Dependent and Independent Variables—Hypothesis 2

	Variable	Measure(s)/Description
DV (y)	success	Positioning preferred proposal on the government's decision agenda for authoritative action—legislative or administrative.
c		constant
b		regression coefficients
IV x <sub>d1</sub>	manipulation (framing)	Finding out the attitudes of key government decision makers.
IV x <sub>e2</sub>	manipulation (framing)	Using or developing perceptions of crises to increase interest in and support for alternatives to existing policy.
IV x <sub>f3</sub>	manipulation (framing)	Framing problems with existing policy to make their proposal an appealing alternative.
IV x <sub>g4</sub>	manipulation (framing)	Presenting problems with existing policy in a way that leads to a realignment of interests into a new coalition supporting their proposal.
IV x <sub>h5</sub>	manipulation (agenda control)	Structuring an agenda to ensure support for their proposal by removing competing alternatives under consideration.
IV x <sub>i6</sub>	manipulation (agenda control)	Structuring an agenda to ensure support for their proposal by adding to the number of alternatives under consideration.
IV x <sub>j7</sub>	manipulation (agenda control)	Structuring an agenda to ensure support for their proposal by modifying the order in which alternatives were considered.
IV x <sub>k8</sub>	manipulation (agenda control)	Introducing amendments.
IV x <sub>l9</sub>	manipulation (agenda control)	Attaching their proposal to an omnibus bill.
IV x <sub>m10</sub>	manipulation (strategic voting)	Voting against their true preferences.
IV x <sub>n11</sub>	manipulation (salami tactics)	Breaking down their proposal into a series of smaller interrelated policy alternatives.
IV x <sub>o12</sub>	alter institutional venues	Shifting the debate to an institutional venue that shares their view of the problem and solution.
IV x <sub>p13</sub>	alter institutional venues	Shifting the debate to an institutional venue that provides the greatest support for their proposal.
IV x <sub>q14</sub>	alter institutional venues	Avoiding institutional venues that do not share their view of the problem and solution.

### Appendix C: Dependent and Independent Variables—Hypothesis 2 (Continued)

#### Dependent and Independent Variables—Hypothesis 2

IV $X_{r15}$	alter institutional venues	Avoiding institutional venues that provide the greatest opposition to their proposal.
	Variable	Measure(s)/Description
IV $X_{s16}$	alter institutional venues	Shifting the debate to an institutional venue that can help structure a problem to fit their proposal.
IV $X_{t17}$	alter institutional venues	Seeking multiple institutional venues.
IV $X_{u18}$	activate coalition support	Establishing a coalition of supporters.
IV $X_{v19}$	activate coalition support	Enlisting the support of existing coalitions.
IV $X_{w20}$	activate coalition support	Adding members to an existing coalition.
IV $X_{x21}$	streams	Favourable political support
IV $X_{y22}$	streams	Government perception of a serious problem.
IV $X_{z23}$	streams	Availability of a viable solution.
IV $X_{aa24}$	problem window	Release of statistical indicators used to monitor the progression of policy.
IV $X_{bb25}$	problem window	Release of studies assessing the viability of existing policy.
IV $X_{cc26}$	problem window	A focusing event such as a crisis or other event that brings attention to existing policy.
IV $X_{dd27}$	problem window	Feedback from the public to policy makers concerning existing policy.
IV $X_{ee28}$	problem window	Feedback from bureaucrats to policy makers concerning existing policy.
IV $X_{ff29}$	politics window	A change in public opinion concerning existing policy.
IV $X_{gg30}$	politics window	A change of Administration.
IV $X_{hh31}$	politics window	A change in party status in Congress.
IV $X_{ii32}$	politics window	Turnover of key government bureaucratic personnel.
IV $X_{jj33}$	politics window	Influence of interest groups.
DV dependent variable		
IV independent variable		

## Appendix D: Bivariate Correlations

### Bivariate Correlations

Successful		Individual	Pearson Correlation <sup>a</sup> (Sig 2 tailed)			
YES (%) <sup>c</sup>	NO (%) <sup>c</sup>		Claim to a Hearing	Politically Connected	Skilled Negotiator	Persistent
78	0	Representative Lincoln Diaz-Balart	537 (.032)*	387 (.127)	356 (.147)	405 (.056)
68	0	Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen	- 139 (.607)	429 (.098)	258 (.302)	256 (.263)
60	5	Robert G Torricelli	477 (.072)	- 020 (.947)	081 (.782)	030 (.920)
58	5	Jorge Mas Canosa	902 (.000)*	692 (.001)*	551 (.001)*	563 (.012)*
53	3	Former Senator Jesse Helms	484 (.132)	329 (.297)	298 (.281)	374 (.139)
50	5	Representative Dan Burton	- 050 (.865)	- 043 (.889)	- 119 (.685)	000 (1.00)
50	3	Representative Mario Diaz-Balart	326 (.255)	- 074 (.792)	- 205 (.429)	111 (.640)
48	5	Senator Mel Martinez	<sup>b</sup>	839 (.000)*	499 (.070)	176 (.530)
43	3	Representative Robert Menéndez	023 (.940)	- 198 (.497)	- 247 (.416)	- 019 (.944)
38	3	Former Representative Tom DeLay	203 (.550)	091 (.803)	186 (.562)	014 (.965)
35	10	Otto J Reich	721 (.004)*	728 (.007)*	345 (.298)	621 (.008)*
28	8	Frank Calzón	646 (.023)*	855 (.000)*	274 (.364)	769 (.001)*
25	3	José "Tito" Argamasilla Bacardi	179 (.599)	031 (.920)	- 332 (.318)	- 348 (.223)
25	3	Alfonso "Alfie" Fanjul	462 (.179)	484 (.132)	477 (.163)	247 (.415)
25	5	Jose "Pepe" Fanjul	425 (.193)	446 (.146)	448 (.194)	119 (.686)
25	8	Roger Noriega	469 (.124)	811 (.001)*	889 (.003)*	514 (.105)
23	8	Dan Fisk	726 (.017)*	392 (.233)	066 (.847)	830 (.000)*
23	5	Former Senator Robert "Bob" Graham	576 (.064)	209 (.538)	175 (.629)	466 (.127)
23	8	Francisco José "Pepe" Hernández	614 (.034)*	635 (.015)*	453 (.120)	511 (.036)*
20	10	Former Senator John Ashcroft	724 (.018)*	186 (.562)	101 (.755)	408 (.188)
18	5	José Pepin Bosch	436 (.240)	218 (.573)	375 (.286)	625 (.040)*
18	25	Salvador Diaz-Verson	370 (.367)	- 250 (.685)	174 (.680)	117 (.783)

### Appendix D: Bivariate Correlations (Continued)

#### Bivariate Correlations

Successful		Individual	Pearson Correlation <sup>a</sup> (Sig. 2 tailed)			
YES (%) <sup>c</sup>	NO (%) <sup>c</sup>		Claim to a Hearing	Politically Connected	Skilled Negotiator	Persistent
18	25	Senator Christopher J. Dodd	-.029 (.928)	.199 (.495)	.165 (.540)	.275 (.255)
18	3	Connie Mack III	.283 (.429)	.324 (.394)	.220 (.52)	.395 (.230)
15	15	Dante B. Fascell	.587 (.058)	.319 (.338)	.477 (.138)	.575 (.064)
15	8	Dennis Hays	.319 (.368)	.517 (.126)	.302 (.397)	.359 (.229)
15	10	Representative Connie Mack IV	.590 (.073)	.642 (.062)	.724 (.018)	.715 (.020)*
15	8	Jorge Mas Santos	.000 (1.00)	-.123 (.675)	.346 (.248)	-.026 (.926)
15	8	Senator Bill Nelson	.565 (.070)	.449 (.225)	.397 (.290)	.538 (.136)
15	25	Wayne S. Smith	.258 (.373)	.688 (.005)*	.578 (.030)*	.153 (.546)
13	8	Dwayne O. Andreas	.598 (.068)	.535 (.111)	.603 (.086)	.270 (.421)
13	13	Senator Max Baucus	.592 (.071)	.547 (.102)	.160 (.638)	.603 (.065)
13	13	Senator Byron L. Dorgan	-.158 (.606)	.463 (.152)	-.069 (.846)	-.037 (.901)
13	18	Representative Jeff Flake	.490 (.106)	.420 (.174)	.369 (.195)	.335 (.188)
13	10	Carlos Miguel Gutierrez	.635 (.066)	.604 (.113)	.254 (.544)	.570 (.067)
13	15	Representative James McGovern	.600 (.087)	.530 (.142)	.575 (.082)	.583 (.077)
13	15	George R. Nethercutt, Jr.	.580 (.101)	.255 (.477)	.118 (.730)	.184 (.635)
13	13	Richard Nuccio	-.524 (.080)	.408 (.275)	.516 (.104)	.419 (.228)
13	20	Representative Charles B. Rangel	.067 (.821)	-.025 (.464)	.110 (.695)	-.197 (.449)
13	18	Representative José E. Serrano	.070 (.820)	-.106 (.718)	.159 (.490)	.147 (.574)
10	8	John R. Bolton	.134 (.830)	-.302 (.698)	-.102 (.870)	.034 (.948)
10	20	Representative William D. Delahunt	-.187 (.657)	-.476 (.340)	-.100 (.798)	-.183 (.664)
10	15	Representative Jo Ann Emerson	-.043 (.912)	.184 (.611)	.424 (.194)	.209 (.515)

### Appendix D: Bivariate Correlations (Continued)

#### Bivariate Correlations

Successful		Individual	Pearson Correlation <sup>a</sup> (Sig. 2 tailed)			
YES (%) <sup>c</sup>	NO (%) <sup>c</sup>		Claim to a Hearing	Politically Connected	Skilled Negotiator	Persistent
10	15	Senator Michael B. Enzi	.450 (.165)	.286 (.423)	.580 (.101)	.529 (.095)
10	15	Senator Chuck Hagel	.415 (.205)	.245 (.443)	.370 (.236)	.309 (.329)
10	25	Kirby Jones	.586 (.222)	.462 (.153)	.474 (.120)	.366 (.180)
10	15	Ignacio Sánchez	.586 (.222)	.462 (.153)	.474 (.120)	.366 (.180)
8	8	James (Jim) Bacchus	.000 (1.00)	.000 (1.00)	.061 (.887)	.301 (.407)
8	15	Manuel Jorge Cutillas	.794 (.059)	.468 (.427)	.364 (.422)	.532 (.175)
8	13	Senator Patrick J. Leahy	.129 (.722)	.072 (.833)	.431 (.675)	.310 (.353)
8	10	George "Chip" Reid	.378 (.460)	.375 (.534)	.159 (.764)	.562 (.324)
5	20	Mavis Anderson	.677 (.032)*	.410 (.186)	.600 (.039)*	.093 (.740)
5	15	Raúl Cantero	.487 (.221)	.586 (.222)	-.226 (.591)	.807 (.028)*
5	15	Paul L. Cejas	-.367 (.418)	-.794 (.059)	-.379 (.354)	-.508 (.199)
5	15	Brice M. Clagett	1.00 (.000)*	.577 (.423)	.612 (.272)	.775 (.070)
5	13	Thomas Cox	.866 (.33)	.500 (.667)	.500 (.667)	.500 (.667)
5	13	Carlos M. de la Cruz, Sr.	-.294 (.572)	-.476 (.340)	-.476 (.340)	-.476 (.340)
5	15	Representative Eliot L. Engel	.672 (.033)*	.559 (.118)	.399 (.287)	.781 (.008)*
5	18	Albert A. Fox, Jr.	.642 (.062)	.043 (.912)	.725 (.027)*	.229 (.553)
5	10	Robert Freer, Jr.	.108 (.838)	-.327 (.591)	-.294 (.572)	-.294 (.572)
5	13	Nicolás J. Gutiérrez	-.108 (.817)	.162 (.701)	.340 (.410)	.408 (.275)
5	25	John Kavulich II	.354 (.351)	.641 (.046)*	.641 (.046)*	.338 (.310)
5	5	Jeanne Kirkpatrick	.853 (.147)	.866 (.333)	.535 (.275)	.535 (.275)
5	5	Tom Lantos	.686 (.132)	.845 (.071)	-.171 (.745)	.333 (.667)

### Appendix D: Bivariate Correlations (Continued)

#### Bivariate Correlations

Successful		Individual	Pearson Correlation <sup>a</sup> (Sig 2 tailed)			
YES (%) <sup>c</sup>	NO (%) <sup>c</sup>		Claim to a Hearing	Politically Connected	Skilled Negotiator	Persistent
5	10	Representative Barbara Lee	250 ( 685)	802 ( 103)	632 ( 178)	293 ( 573)
5	10	Representative Jerry Moran	240 ( 604)	- 542 ( 266)	462 ( 297)	- 175 ( 707)
5	13	Domingo R Moreira	<sup>b</sup>	<sup>b</sup>	<sup>b</sup>	<sup>b</sup>
5	8	Juan Prado	869 ( 056)	- 174 ( 826)	434 ( 390)	- 200 ( 747)
5	8	Representative Steven R Rothman	919 ( 025)*	- 647 ( 165)	500 ( 312)	468 ( 427)
5	15	Diego R Suarez	647 ( 083)	354 ( 437)	647 ( 083)	542 ( 132)
5	23	Former Representative Esteban Edward Torres	712 ( 048)*	487 ( 221)	424 ( 222)	406 ( 279)
3	18	Henry Adorno	632 ( 178)	091 ( 846)	000 (1 00)	354 ( 437)
3	13	Carlos P Portes	<sup>b</sup> ( 000)	<sup>b</sup> ( 000)	000 (1 00)	174 ( 826)
3	23	Maria Elena Torano	- 061 ( 887)	408 ( 275)	508 ( 163)	00 (1 00)

a Dependent Variable success  
 b Statistics could not be computed  
 c N=40  
 \*p< 05

## Appendix E: Model Utility and Predictors

Model Utility and Predictors

Successful		Individual	Model R <sup>2</sup> (Sig.)	Unstandardized B (Sig. 2 tailed)			
YES (%) <sup>d</sup>	NO (%) <sup>d</sup>			Claim to a Hearing	Politically Connected	Skilled Negotiator	Persistent
78	0	Representative Lincoln Diaz- Balart	.380 (.315)	.277 (.456)	.137 (.263)	-.063 (.589)	-.002 (.988)
68	0	Representative Ileana Ros- Lehtinen	.041 (.940)	-.044 (.783)	-.062 (.687)	<sup>a</sup>	.049 (.837)
60	5	Robert G. Torricelli	.271 (.747)	.787 (.241)	-.107 (.814)	.173 (.864)	-.187 (.857)
58	5	Jorge Mas Canosa	.814 (.000)*	<sup>a</sup>	<sup>a</sup>	1.250 (.001)*	-.091 (.700)
53	3	Former Senator Jesse Helms	.242 (1.680)	.600 (.524)	<sup>a</sup>	-.200 (.667)	-1.00 (.925)
50	5	Representative Dan Burton	.184 (.807)	-1.00 (.460)	-1.214 (.404)	-1.00 (.396)	.571 (.456)
50	3	Representative Mario Diaz-Balart	.272 (.587)	.686 (.324)	-.026 (.939)	-.314 (.372)	-.013 (.975)
48	5	Senator Mel Martinez	.020 (.736)	<sup>a</sup>	<sup>a</sup>	<sup>a</sup>	-.071 (.736)
43	3	Representative Robert Menéndez	.073 (.903)	.375 (.830)	<sup>a</sup>	.375 (.784)	-.750 (.704)
38	3	Tom DeLay	.200 (.572)	1.600 (1.314)	<sup>a</sup>	<sup>a</sup>	-1.00 (.354)
35	10	Otto J. Reich	.803 (.052)	.688 (.090)	1.250 (.078)	-.563 (.243)	-.312 (.582)
28	8	Frank Calzón	.777 (.037)*	.341 (.309)	1.140 (.131)	-.023 (.914)	-.369 (.563)
25	3	José "Tito" Argamasilla Bacardi	.602 (.349)	1.296 (.090)	-.778 (.206)	-.130 (.712)	-.315 (.238)
25	3	Alfonso "Alfie" Fanjul	.246 (.673)	<sup>a</sup>	.402 (.620)	.134 (.855)	-.207 (.612)
25	5	Jose "Pepe" Fanjul	.339 (.521)	<sup>a</sup>	.817 (.381)	-.061 (.941)	-.451 (.341)
25	8	Roger Noriega	1.00 (.000)*	2.00 (.000)*	-1.00 (.000)*	1.53 (.000)*	4.90 (.000)*
23	8	Dan Fisk	.837 (.033)*	-.517 (.486)	.414 (.378)	-.241 (.385)	1.586 (.041)*
23	5	Former Senator Robert "Bob" Graham	.765 (.026)*	1.239 (.019)*	-1.119 (.030)*	<sup>b</sup>	1.552 (.019)*

### Appendix E: Model Utility and Predictors (Continued)

Model Utility and Predictors

Successful		Individual	Model R <sup>2</sup> (Sig.)	Unstandardized B (Sig. 2 tailed)			
YES (%) <sup>d</sup>	NO (%) <sup>d</sup>			Claim to a Hearing	Politically Connected	Skilled Negotiator	Persistent
23	8	Francisco José "Pepe" Hernández	.661 (.339)	.528 (.969)	.876 (.686)	-.022 (.953)	-.612 (.447)
20	10	John Ashcroft	.600 (.253)	1.554 (.079)	.085 (.855)	-.408 (.467)	-.177 (.677)
18	5	José Pepin Bosch	.602 (.254)	<sup>a</sup>	-1.469 (.144)	1.375 (.172)	.562 (.245)
18	25	Salvador Diaz-Verson	.773 (.227)	1.818 (.130)	<sup>a</sup>	<sup>a</sup>	-1.727 (.126)
18	25	Senator Christopher J. Dodd	.101 (.689)	.305 (1.00)	<sup>a</sup>	<sup>a</sup>	1.00 (.407)
18	3	Connie Mack III	.113 (.698)	<sup>a</sup>	<sup>a</sup>	-.194 (.828)	.484 (.581)
15	15	Dante B. Fascell	.309 (.274)	<sup>b</sup>	.069 (.911)	<sup>b</sup>	.583 (.231)
15	8	Dennis Hays	.067 (.996)	.167 (.912)	-.167 (.944)	.167 (.826)	.167 (.912)
15	10	Representative Connie Mack IV	.113 (.698)	<sup>a</sup>	<sup>a</sup>	-.194 (.828)	.484 (.581)
15	8	Jorge Mas Santos	.345 (.261)	<sup>b</sup>	-.911 (.150)	.689 (.062)	.178 (.652)
15	8	Senator Bill Nelson	.794 (.148)	<sup>a</sup>	1.500 (.103)	2.00 (.092)	-2.00 (.092)
15	25	Wayne S. Smith	.570 (.156)	.673 (.242)	1.534 (.103)	-.445 (.506)	-.569 (.211)
13	8	Dwayne O. Andreas	.429 (.710)	.214 (.853)	.179 (.909)	.571 (.567)	-.214 (.853)
13	13	Senator Max Baucus	.375 (.465)	<sup>a</sup>	.500 (.538)	-8.828 (1.00)	.500 (.463)
13	13	Senator Byron L. Dorgan	.307 (.499)	<sup>a</sup>	.263 (.167)	-.105 (.920)	-.737 (.395)
13	18	Representative Jeff Flake	.484 (.640)	1.00 (.367)	1.00 (.519)	2.11 (1.00)	-1.00 (.450)
13	10	Carlos Miguel Gutierrez	.454 (.797)	1.715 (1.00)	.636 (.643)	<sup>a</sup>	-.091 (.949)
13	15	Representative James McGovern	.297 (.414)	<sup>a</sup>	<sup>a</sup>	-.268 (1.00)	.583 (.624)
13	15	George R. Nethercutt, Jr.	.806 (.351)	1.33 (.184)	-1.00 (.533)	1.00 (.553)	-4.00 (1.00)
13	13	Richard Nuccio	.289 (.860)	.178 (.854)	.711 (.685)	.333 (.600)	-.533 (.699)

### Appendix E: Model Utility and Predictors (Continued)

Model Utility and Predictors

Successful		Individual	Model R <sup>2</sup> (Sig.)	Unstandardized B (Sig. 2 tailed)			
YES (%) <sup>d</sup>	NO (%) <sup>d</sup>			Claim to a Hearing	Politically Connected	Skilled Negotiator	Persistent
13	20	Representative Charles B. Rangel	.156 (.778)	.215 (.773)	.552 (.698)	.602 (.381)	. <sup>b</sup>
13	18	Representative José E. Serrano	.520 (.282)	-.426 (.512)	-.577 (.181)	.801 (.063)	.008 (.986)
10	8	John R. Bolton	.250 (.667)	<sup>a</sup>	<sup>a</sup>	<sup>a</sup>	.250 (.667)
10	20	Representative William D. Delahunt	.246 (.655)	.227 (.801)	<sup>a</sup>	<sup>a</sup>	-.591 (.484)
10	15	Representative Jo Ann Emerson	.798 (.612)	-1.250 (.224)	.500 (.500)	.750 (.184)	1.250 (.209)
10	15	Senator Michael B. Enzi	.425 (.595)	.409 (.620)	<sup>b</sup>	-.136 (.913)	.409 (.620)
10	15	Senator Chuck Hagel	.219 (.421)	.438 (.516)	.438 (.516)	<sup>b</sup>	<sup>b</sup>
10	25	Kirby Jones	.377 (.769)	<sup>a</sup>	.909 (.545)	-1.00 (1.568)	.636 (.643)
10	15	Ignacio Sánchez	.810 (.344)	1.613 (.194)	.645 (.482)	.226 (.817)	-.548 (.615)
8	8	James (Jim) Bacchus	.818 (.426)	<sup>a</sup>	<sup>a</sup>	-2.00 (.295)	1.500 (.333)
8	15	Manuel Jorge Cutillas	.647 (.353)	.913 (.260)	-.087 (.896)	<sup>b</sup>	<sup>b</sup>
8	13	Senator Patrick J. Leahy	.000 (1.00)	<sup>a</sup>	.000 (1.00)	.000 (1.00)	.00 (1.00)
8	10	Georg "Chip" Reid	1.00 (. <sup>a</sup> )	1.00 (. <sup>a</sup> )	-6.733 (. <sup>a</sup> )	-2.00 (. <sup>a</sup> )	2.00 (. <sup>a</sup> )
5	20	Mavis Anderson	.785 (.217)	1.500 (.084)	1.00 (.154)	-.500 (.353)	-.033 (.556)
5	15	Raúl Cantero	.772 (.172)	.455 (.426)	<sup>b</sup>	-.303 (.517)	.545 (.188)
5	15	Paul L. Cejas	.766 (.591)	.750 (.644)	<sup>a</sup>	-.750 (.580)	-1.00 (.392)
5	15	Brice M. Clagett	1.00 (.000)*	<sup>a</sup>	<sup>a</sup>	.000 (. <sup>b</sup> )	2.00 (. <sup>b</sup> )
5	13	Thomas Cox	1.00 <sub>a</sub>	2.00 <sub>a</sub>	<sup>a</sup>	<sup>a</sup>	-1.00 <sub>a</sub>
5	13	Carlos M. de la Cruz, Sr.	.246 (.655)	.227 (.801)	<sup>a</sup>	<sup>a</sup>	-.591 (.484)
5	15	Representative Eliot L. Engel	.667 (.535)	.286 (.622)	-1.70 (1.00)	-.429 (.571)	.857 (.345)

### Appendix E: Model Utility and Predictors (Continued)

#### Model Utility and Predictors

Successful		Individual	Model R <sup>2</sup> (Sig)	Unstandardized B (Sig 2 tailed)			
YES (%) <sup>d</sup>	NO (%) <sup>d</sup>			Claim to a Hearing	Politically Connected	Skilled Negotiator	Persistent
5	18	Albert A Fox, Jr	781 (122)	154 (595) <sup>a</sup>	-923 (138) <sup>a</sup>	1323 (063) <sup>a</sup>	-015 (947)
5	10	Robert Freer, Jr	327 (591)	<sup>a</sup>	<sup>a</sup>	<sup>a</sup>	-500 (591)
5	13	Nicolás J Gutiérrez	318 (682)	<sup>a</sup>	<sup>a</sup>	-182 (787)	-091 (909)
5	25	John Kavulich II	272 (704)	-192 (814) <sup>a</sup>	<sup>a</sup>	685 (480) <sup>a</sup>	-041 (950)
5	5	Jeanne Kirkpatrick	750 (333)	<sup>a</sup>	<sup>a</sup>	<sup>a</sup>	500 (333)
5	5	Tom Lantos	333 (816)	<sup>b</sup>	<sup>b</sup>	500 (677)	172 (100)
5	10	Representative Barbara Lee	100 ( <sup>a</sup> )	<sup>a</sup>	<sup>a</sup>	000 ( <sup>a</sup> )	100 ( <sup>a</sup> )
5	10	Representative Jerry Moran	100 ( <sup>a</sup> )	<sup>a</sup>	5672 ( <sup>a</sup> )	100 ( <sup>a</sup> )	-100 ( <sup>a</sup> )
5	13	Domingo R Moreira	<sup>c</sup>	<sup>c</sup>	<sup>c</sup>	<sup>c</sup>	<sup>c</sup>
5	8	Juan Prado	100 ( <sup>a</sup> )	200 ( <sup>a</sup> )	<sup>a</sup>	-100 (-100) <sup>b</sup>	-441 ( <sup>a</sup> )
5	8	Representative Steven R Rothman	100 ( <sup>a</sup> )	100 ( <sup>a</sup> )	-500 ( <sup>a</sup> )	<sup>b</sup>	250 ( <sup>a</sup> )
5	15	Diego R Suarez	510 (487)	200 (675)	-100 (867)	300(624)	<sup>b</sup>
5	23	Former Representative Esteban Edward Torres	542 (446)	900 (355)	-5099 (100)	<sup>a</sup>	100 (911)
3	18	Henry Adorno	400 (930) <sup>a</sup>	500 (667) <sup>a</sup>	2017 (100) <sup>a</sup>	-2017 (100) <sup>a</sup>	-547 (100) <sup>a</sup>
3	13	Carlos P Portes	<sup>a</sup>	<sup>a</sup>	<sup>a</sup>	<sup>a</sup>	<sup>a</sup>
3	23	Maria Elena Torano	592 (266)	-321 (193)	<sup>b</sup>	500 (077)	-179 (434)

a Statistics cannot be computed  
 b Variable was removed due to high multi-collinearity (MC>10)  
 c Statistics could not be computed No valid cases for the model  
 d N=40  
 \*p< 05

## Appendix F: Ranking of Successful Policy Entrepreneurs

Ranking of Successful Policy Entrepreneurs

Individual	Rank (Successful)	Successful (Percent) <sup>a</sup>	Unsuccessful (Percent) <sup>a</sup>
Representative Lincoln Diaz-Balart	1	78	0
Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen	2	68	0
Robert G. Torricelli	3	60	5
Jorge Mas Canosa	4	58	5
Former Senator Jesse Helms	5	53	3
Representative Dan Burton	6	50	5
Representative Mario Diaz-Balart	6	50	3
Senator Mel Martinez	7	48	5
Representative Robert Menéndez	8	43	3
Tom DeLay	9	38	3
Otto J. Reich	10	35	10
Frank Calzón	11	28	8
José "Tito" Argamasilla Bacardi	12	25	3
Alfonso "Alfie" Fanjul	12	25	3
Jose "Pepe" Fanjul	12	25	5
Roger Noriega	12	25	8
Dan Fisk	13	23	8
Former Senator Robert "Bob" Graham	13	23	5
Francisco José "Pepe" Hernández	13	23	8
John Ashcroft	14	20	10
José Pepin Bosch	15	18	5
Salvador Diaz-Verson	15	18	25
Senator Christopher J. Dodd	15	18	25
Connie Mack III	15	18	3
Dante B. Fascell	16	15	15
Dennis Hays	16	15	8
Representative Connie Mack IV	16	15	10
Jorge Mas Santos	16	15	8
Senator Bill Nelson	16	15	8
Wayne S. Smith	16	15	25
Dwayne O. Andreas	17	13	8
Senator Max Baucus	17	13	13
Senator Byron L. Dorgan	17	13	13
Representative Jeff Flake	17	13	18
Carlos Miguel Gutierrez	17	13	10
Representative James McGovern	17	13	15
George R. Nethercutt, Jr.	17	13	15
Richard Nuccio	17	13	13
Representative Charles B. Rangel	17	13	20
Representative José E. Serrano	17	13	18
John R. Bolton	18	10	8
Representative William D. Delahunt	18	10	20
Representative Jo Ann Emerson	18	10	15
Senator Michael B. Enzi	18	10	15
Senator Chuck Hagel	18	10	15

## Appendix F: Ranking of Successful Policy Entrepreneurs (Continued)

### Ranking of Successful Policy Entrepreneurs

Individual	Rank (Successful)	Successful (Percent) <sup>a</sup>	Unsuccessful (Percent) <sup>a</sup>
Kirby Jones	18	10	25
Ignacio Sánchez	18	10	15
James (Jim) Bacchus	19	8	8
Manuel Jorge Cutillas	19	8	15
Senator Patrick J. Leahy	19	8	13
George "Chip" Reid	19	8	10
Mavis Anderson	20	5	20
Raúl Cantero	20	5	15
Paul L. Cejas	20	5	15
Brice M. Clagett	20	5	15
Thomas Cox	20	5	13
Carlos M. de la Cruz, Sr.	20	5	13
Representative Eliot L. Engel	20	5	15
Albert A. Fox, Jr.	20	5	18
Robert Freer, Jr.	20	5	10
Nicolás J. Gutiérrez	20	5	13
John Kavulich II	20	5	25
Jeanne Kirkpatrick	20	5	5
Tom Lantos	20	5	5
Representative Barbara Lee	20	5	10
Representative Jerry Moran	20	5	10
Domingo R. Moreira	20	5	13
Juan Prado	20	5	8
Representative Steven R. Rothman	20	5	8
Diego R. Suarez	20	5	15
Former Representative Esteban Edward Torres	20	5	23
Henry Adorno	21	3	18
Carlos P. Portes	21	3	13
Maria Elena Torano	21	3	23
a. N=40			

## Appendix G: Ranking of Unsuccessful Policy Entrepreneurs

Ranking of Unsuccessful Policy Entrepreneurs

Individual	Rank (Unsuccessful)	Unsuccessful (Percent) <sup>a</sup>	Successful (Percent) <sup>a</sup>
Salvador Diaz-Verson	1	25	18
Senator Christopher J. Dodd	1	25	18
Wayne S. Smith	1	25	15
Kirby Jones	1	25	10
John Kavulich II	1	25	5
Former Representative Esteban Edward Torres	2	23	5
Maria Elena Torano	2	23	3
Representative Charles B. Rangel	3	20	13
Representative William D. Delahunt	3	20	10
Mavis Anderson	3	20	5
Representative Jeff Flake	4	18	13
Representative José E. Serrano	4	18	13
Albert A. Fox, Jr.	4	18	5
Henry Adorno	4	18	3
Dante B. Fascell	5	15	15
Representative James McGovern	5	15	13
George R. Nethercutt, Jr.	5	15	13
Representative Jo Ann Emerson	5	15	10
Senator Michael B. Enzi	5	15	10
Senator Chuck Hagel	5	15	10
Ignacio Sánchez	5	15	10
Manuel Jorge Cutillas	5	15	8
Raúl Cantero	5	15	5
Paul L. Cejas	5	15	5
Brice M. Clagett	5	15	5
Representative Eliot L. Engel	5	15	5
Diego R. Suarez	5	15	5
Senator Max Baucus	6	13	13
Senator Byron L. Dorgan	6	13	13
Richard Nuccio	6	13	13
Senator Patrick J. Leahy	6	13	8
Thomas Cox	6	13	5
Carlos M. de la Cruz, Sr.	6	13	5
Nicolás J. Gutiérrez	6	13	5
Domingo R. Moreira	6	13	5
Carlos P. Portes	6	13	3
Otto J. Reich	7	10	35
John Ashcroft	7	10	20
Representative Connie Mack IV	7	10	15
Carlos Miguel Gutierrez	7	10	13
George "Chip" Reid	7	10	8
Robert Freer, Jr.	7	10	5
Representative Barbara Lee	7	10	5
Representative Jerry Moran	7	10	5

### Appendix G: Ranking of Unsuccessful Policy Entrepreneurs (Continued)

#### Ranking of Unsuccessful Policy Entrepreneurs

Individual	Rank (Unsuccessful)	Unsuccessful (Percent) <sup>a</sup>	Successful (Percent) <sup>a</sup>
Frank Calzón	8	8	28
Roger Noriega	8	8	25
Dan Fisk	8	8	23
Francisco José "Pepe" Hernández	8	8	23
Dennis Hays	8	8	15
Jorge Mas Santos	8	8	15
Senator Bill Nelson	8	8	15
Dwayne O. Andreas	8	8	13
John R. Bolton	8	8	10
James (Jim) Bacchus	8	8	8
Juan Prado	8	8	5
Representative Steven R. Rothman	8	8	5
Robert G. Torricelli	9	5	60
Jorge Mas Canosa	9	5	58
Representative Dan Burton	9	5	50
Senator Mel Martinez	9	5	48
Jose "Pepe" Fanjul	9	5	25
Former Senator Robert "Bob" Graham	9	5	23
José Pepin Bosch	9	5	18
Jeanne Kirkpatrick	9	5	5
Tom Lantos	9	5	5
Former Senator Jesse Helms	10	3	53
Representative Mario Diaz-Balart	10	3	50
Representative Robert Menéndez	10	3	43
Tom DeLay	10	3	38
José "Tito" Argamasilla Bacardi	10	3	25
Alfonso "Alfie" Fanjul	10	3	25
Connie Mack III	10	3	18
Representative Lincoln Diaz-Balart	-	0	78
Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen	-	0	68

a. N=40

## Appendix H: Survey Instrument

### SECTION A

A1. At any point in time between 1989 and 2006, were you active in attempting to influence US-Cuba policy? *(please click the appropriate box to record your response)*

- YES  $\longrightarrow$  Please continue with next question.
- NO  $\longrightarrow$  Please skip all questions in SECTIONS A and B, and go to SECTION C.

A2. During what period of time were you most active in your attempt(s) to influence US-Cuba policy? *(please check all that apply by clicking on the appropriate box(es) to record your response)*

- 1989-1992
- 1993-1996
- 1997-2000
- 2001-2006

A3. On a scale from 1 (none) to 5 (very high), please indicate how much of the following you were willing to invest in order to influence US-Cuba policy *(please click the appropriate box to record your response for each period you were most active in your attempt(s) to influence US-Cuba policy):*

	None	Low	Moderate	High	Very High
	1	2	3	4	5
<b>my time and energy</b>					
<input type="checkbox"/> 1989-1992	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1993-1996	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1997-2000	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 2001-2006	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<b>my reputation</b>					
<input type="checkbox"/> 1989-1992	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1993-1996	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1997-2000	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 2001-2006	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<b>financial resources</b>					
<input type="checkbox"/> 1989-1992	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1993-1996	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1997-2000	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 2001-2006	<input type="checkbox"/>				

- A4 On a scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (entirely), please indicate the extent to which your efforts to influence US-Cuba policy were motivated by each of the following (*please click the appropriate box to record your response for each period you were most active in your attempt(s) to influence US-Cuba policy*)

		Not At All 1	Slightly 2	Moderately 3	Significantly 4	Entirely 5
<b>address problems with US-Cuba policy</b>						
<input type="checkbox"/>	1989-1992	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/>	1993-1996	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/>	1997-2000	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/>	2001-2006	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<b>promote personal interests</b>						
<input type="checkbox"/>	1989-1992	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/>	1993-1996	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/>	1997-2000	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/>	2001-2006	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<b>promote my vision of US-Cuba policy</b>						
<input type="checkbox"/>	1989-1992	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/>	1993-1996	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/>	1997-2000	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/>	2001-2006	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<b>shape future US-Cuba policy</b>						
<input type="checkbox"/>	1989-1992	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/>	1993-1996	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/>	1997-2000	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/>	2001-2006	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<b>play an active role in the policy process</b>						
<input type="checkbox"/>	1989-1992	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/>	1993-1996	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/>	1997-2000	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/>	2001-2006	<input type="checkbox"/>				

## SECTION B

- B1. How important on a scale from 1 (no importance) to 5 (utmost importance) were each of the following in providing you with a critical opportunity to position your policy proposal onto the government's decision agenda for authoritative action (*please click the appropriate box to record your response for each period you were most active in your attempt(s) to influence US-Cuba policy*):

	No Importance	Little Importance	Moderate Importance	Great Importance	Utmost Importance
	1	2	3	4	5
the release of statistical indicators used to monitor the progression of policy					
<input type="checkbox"/> 1989-1992	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1993-1996	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1997-2000	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 2001-2006	<input type="checkbox"/>				
the release of studies assessing the viability of policy					
<input type="checkbox"/> 1989-1992	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1993-1996	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1997-2000	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 2001-2006	<input type="checkbox"/>				
a focusing event such as a crisis or other event that brought attention to US-Cuba policy					
<input type="checkbox"/> 1989-1992	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1993-1996	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1997-2000	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 2001-2006	<input type="checkbox"/>				
feedback from the public to policy makers concerning existing policy					
<input type="checkbox"/> 1989-1992	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1993-1996	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1997-2000	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 2001-2006	<input type="checkbox"/>				
feedback from bureaucrats to policy makers concerning existing policy					
<input type="checkbox"/> 1989-1992	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1993-1996	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1997-2000	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 2001-2006	<input type="checkbox"/>				

(continued on next page)

B1 How important on a scale from 1 (no importance) to 5 (utmost importance) were each of the following in providing you with a critical opportunity to position your policy proposal onto the government's decision agenda for authoritative action (please click the appropriate box to record your response for each period you were most active in your attempt(s) to influence US-Cuba policy)

	No Importance	Little Importance	Moderate Importance	Great Importance	Utmost Importance
	1	2	3	4	5
<b>a change in public opinion concerning US-Cuba policy</b>					
<input type="checkbox"/> 1989-1992	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1993-1996	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1997-2000	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 2001-2006	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<b>a change of Administration</b>					
<input type="checkbox"/> 1989-1992	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1993-1996	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1997-2000	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 2001-2006	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<b>a change in party status in Congress</b>					
<input type="checkbox"/> 1989-1992	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1993-1996	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1997-2000	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 2001-2006	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<b>turnover of key government bureaucratic personnel</b>					
<input type="checkbox"/> 1989-1992	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1993-1996	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1997-2000	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 2001-2006	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<b>influence of interest group(s)</b>					
<input type="checkbox"/> 1989-1992	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1993-1996	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1997-2000	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 2001-2006	<input type="checkbox"/>				

Please use the following box to provide a description and assess the degree of importance of events not listed that helped draw attention to your preferred policy proposal Provide as much information as you can The document will automatically repaginate as you type

B2 At any point in time between 1989 and 2006, were you able to successfully position your preferred policy proposal onto the government's decision agenda for authoritative action? *(please click the appropriate box to record your response)*

YES → During which period(s)? *(please check all that apply and then continue with next question)*

- 1989-1992
- 1993-1996
- 1997-2000
- 2001-2006

NO → Please go to QUESTION B4

B3 In your opinion, how important on a scale from 1 (no importance) to 5 (utmost importance) were each of the following in terms of increasing the likelihood that your preferred policy proposal was positioned on the government's decision agenda for an authoritative decision *(please click the appropriate box to record your response for each period you were most active in your attempt(s) to influence US-Cuba policy and then go to QUESTION B5)*

	No Importance	Little Importance	Moderate Importance	Great Importance	Utmost Importance
	1	2	3	4	5
<b>favorable political support</b>					
<input type="checkbox"/> 1989-1992	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1993-1996	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1997-2000	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 2001-2006	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<b>government perception of a serious problem</b>					
<input type="checkbox"/> 1989-1992	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1993-1996	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1997-2000	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 2001-2006	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<b>the availability of a viable solution</b>					
<input type="checkbox"/> 1989-1992	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1993-1996	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1997-2000	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 2001-2006	<input type="checkbox"/>				

B4. In your opinion, how important on a scale from 1 (no importance) to 5 (utmost importance) were each of the following in terms of preventing your preferred policy proposal from being positioned on the government's decision agenda for an authoritative decision (please click the appropriate box to record your response for each period you were most active in your attempt(s) to influence US-Cuba policy and then continue with next question):

	No Importance	Little Importance	Moderate Importance	Great Importance	Utmost Importance
	1	2	3	4	5
<b>lack of political support</b>					
<input type="checkbox"/> 1989-1992	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1993-1996	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1997-2000	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 2001-2006	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<b>no perception of a serious problem</b>					
<input type="checkbox"/> 1989-1992	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1993-1996	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1997-2000	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 2001-2006	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<b>no viable solution available</b>					
<input type="checkbox"/> 1989-1992	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1993-1996	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1997-2000	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 2001-2006	<input type="checkbox"/>				

B5. **PART A** Please select from the list, tactics you used to position your preferred policy proposal on the government's decision agenda for an authoritative decision (please check all that apply by clicking on the appropriate box to record your response).

**PART B** Of the tactics you selected, how important on a scale from 1 (no importance) to 5 (utmost importance) were they in terms of helping you to position your preferred policy proposal on the government's decision agenda for an authoritative decision? (please click the appropriate box to record your response for each period you were most active in your attempt(s) to influence US-Cuba policy)

PART A Tactics	PART B				
	No Importance	Little Importance	Moderate Importance	Great Importance	Utmost Importance
	1	2	3	4	5
<input type="checkbox"/> Finding out the attitudes to my proposal of key government decision-makers.					
<input type="checkbox"/> 1989-1992	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1993-1996	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1997-2000	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 2001-2006	<input type="checkbox"/>				

(continued on next page)

B5. PART A Please select from the list, tactics you used to position your preferred policy proposal on the government's decision agenda for an authoritative decision *(please check all that apply by clicking on the appropriate box to record your response)*.

PART B Of the tactics you selected, how important on a scale from 1 (no importance) to 5 (utmost importance) were they in terms of helping you to position your preferred policy proposal on the government's decision agenda for an authoritative decision? *(please click the appropriate box to record your response for each period you were most active in your attempt(s) to influence US-Cuba policy)*

PART A Tactics	PART B				
	No	Little	Moderate	Great	Utmost
	Importance	Importance	Importance	Importance	Importance
	1	2	3	4	5
<input type="checkbox"/> Using or developing perceptions of crises to increase interest in and support for alternatives to existing US-Cuba policy.					
<input type="checkbox"/> 1989-1992	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1993-1996	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1997-2000	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 2001-2006	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> Framing problems with existing US-Cuba policy to make my proposal an appealing alternative.					
<input type="checkbox"/> 1989-1992	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1993-1996	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1997-2000	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 2001-2006	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> Presenting problems with US-Cuba policy in a way that led to a realignment of interests into a new coalition supporting my proposal.					
<input type="checkbox"/> 1989-1992	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1993-1996	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1997-2000	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 2001-2006	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> Structuring an agenda to ensure support for my proposal by removing competing alternatives under consideration.					
<input type="checkbox"/> 1989-1992	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1993-1996	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1997-2000	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 2001-2006	<input type="checkbox"/>				

(continued on next page)

B5. **PART A** Please select from the list, tactics you used to position your preferred policy proposal on the government's decision agenda for an authoritative decision *(please check all that apply by clicking on the appropriate box to record your response)*.

**PART B** Of the tactics you selected, how important on a scale from 1 (no importance) to 5 (utmost importance) were they in terms of helping you to position your preferred policy proposal on the government's decision agenda for an authoritative decision? *(please click the appropriate box to record your response for each period you were most active in your attempt(s) to influence US-Cuba policy)*

PART A Tactics	PART B				
	No	Little	Moderate	Great	Utmost
	Importance	Importance	Importance	Importance	Importance
	1	2	3	4	5
<input type="checkbox"/> Structuring an agenda to ensure support for my proposal by adding to the number of alternatives under consideration.					
<input type="checkbox"/> 1989-1992	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1993-1996	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1997-2000	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 2001-2006	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> Structuring an agenda to ensure support for my proposal by modifying the order in which alternatives were considered.					
<input type="checkbox"/> 1989-1992	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1993-1996	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1997-2000	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 2001-2006	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> Introducing amendments.					
<input type="checkbox"/> 1989-1992	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1993-1996	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1997-2000	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 2001-2006	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> Attaching my proposal to an omnibus bill.					
<input type="checkbox"/> 1989-1992	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1993-1996	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1997-2000	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 2001-2006	<input type="checkbox"/>				

*(continued on next page)*

B5 PART A Please select from the list, tactics you used to position your preferred policy proposal on the government's decision agenda for an authoritative decision *(please check all that apply by clicking on the appropriate box to record your response)*

PART B Of the tactics you selected, how important on a scale from 1 (no importance) to 5 (utmost importance) were they in terms of helping you to position your preferred policy proposal on the government's decision agenda for an authoritative decision? *(please click the appropriate box to record your response for each period you were most active in your attempt(s) to influence US-Cuba policy)*

PART A Tactics	PART B				
	No	Little	Moderate	Great	Utmost
	Importance	Importance	Importance	Importance	Importance
	1	2	3	4	5
<input type="checkbox"/> Voting against my true preferences.					
<input type="checkbox"/> 1989-1992	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1993-1996	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1997-2000	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 2001-2006	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> Breaking down my proposal into a series of smaller interrelated policy alternatives.					
<input type="checkbox"/> 1989-1992	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1993-1996	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1997-2000	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 2001-2006	<input type="checkbox"/>				

Please use the following box to provide a description and assess the importance of other tactics you used to position your policy proposal on the government's decision agenda for an authoritative decision Provide as much information as you can The document will automatically repaginate as you type

B6. Frequently, policy advocates seek out institutional venues that can help mobilize sufficient support for their proposal. Venues are institutions within the government where formal decisions on policy are made. This includes the House of Representatives and the Senate; House and Senate committees, commissions, and taskforces; executive departments, agencies, and commission; and the judiciary.

Please assess how important on a scale from 1 (no importance) to 5 (utmost importance) each of the following were in terms of helping you to mobilize support to position your preferred policy proposal on the government's decision agenda for an authoritative decision (*please click the appropriate box to record your response for each period you were most active in your attempt(s) to influence US-Cuba policy*):

	No Importance	Little Importance	Moderate Importance	Great Importance	Utmost Importance
	1	2	3	4	5
<b>Shifting the debate to an institutional venue that provided the greatest support for my proposal.</b>					
<input type="checkbox"/> 1989-1992	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1993-1996	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1997-2000	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 2001-2006	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<b>Avoiding institutional venues that did not share my view of the problem and solution.</b>					
<input type="checkbox"/> 1989-1992	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1993-1996	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1997-2000	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 2001-2006	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<b>Shifting the debate to an institutional venue that could help structure the problem to fit my proposed solution.</b>					
<input type="checkbox"/> 1989-1992	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1993-1996	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1997-2000	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 2001-2006	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<b>Seeking multiple institutional venues.</b>					
<input type="checkbox"/> 1989-1992	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1993-1996	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1997-2000	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 2001-2006	<input type="checkbox"/>				

- B7. Policy advocates often attempt to develop coalitions to help promote and mobilize support for their proposals. Please assess how important on a scale from 1 (no importance) to 5 (utmost importance) each of the following were in terms of mobilizing support to position your preferred policy proposal on the government's decision agenda for an authoritative decision (*please click the appropriate box to record your response for each period you were most active in your attempt(s) to influence US-Cuba policy*):

	No Importance	Little Importance	Moderate Importance	Great Importance	Utmost Importance
	1	2	3	4	5
<b>Establishing a coalition of supporters.</b>					
<input type="checkbox"/> 1989-1992	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1993-1996	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1997-2000	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 2001-2006	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<b>Enlisting the support of existing coalitions.</b>					
<input type="checkbox"/> 1989-1992	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1993-1996	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1997-2000	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 2001-2006	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<b>Adding members to an existing coalition.</b>					
<input type="checkbox"/> 1989-1992	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1993-1996	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1997-2000	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 2001-2006	<input type="checkbox"/>				

- B8. **PART A** Of the characteristics listed in the box, which best apply to you? (*please check all that apply by clicking on the appropriate box to record your response*)

<input type="checkbox"/> policy expert
<input type="checkbox"/> an ability to speak on behalf of others because of my leadership position(s)
<input type="checkbox"/> an ability to make authoritative decisions because of my position
<input type="checkbox"/> an ability to develop and maintain good relations with key political actors
<input type="checkbox"/> well developed negotiation skills
<input type="checkbox"/> persistent

**PART B** Of the characteristics you selected, how important on a scale from 1 (no importance) to 5 (utmost importance) were they in terms of positioning your policy proposal onto the government's decision agenda for each period you were most active in your attempt(s) to influence US-Cuba policy? (please click the appropriate box to record your response for each characteristic you selected)

Characteristics	No Importance	Little Importance	Moderate Importance	Great Importance	Utmost Importance
	1	2	3	4	5
<b>policy expert</b>					
<input type="checkbox"/> 1989-1992	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1993-1996	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1997-2000	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 2001-2006	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<b>an ability to speak on behalf of others because of my leadership position(s)</b>					
<input type="checkbox"/> 1989-1992	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1993-1996	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1997-2000	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 2001-2006	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<b>an ability to make authoritative decisions because of my position</b>					
<input type="checkbox"/> 1989-1992	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1993-1996	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1997-2000	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 2001-2006	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<b>an ability to develop and maintain good relations with key political actors</b>					
<input type="checkbox"/> 1989-1992	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1993-1996	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1997-2000	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 2001-2006	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<b>well developed negotiation skills</b>					
<input type="checkbox"/> 1989-1992	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1993-1996	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1997-2000	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 2001-2006	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<b>persistent</b>					
<input type="checkbox"/> 1989-1992	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1993-1996	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 1997-2000	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<input type="checkbox"/> 2001-2006	<input type="checkbox"/>				

(continued on next page)

If you wish to include additional characteristics not identified in PART A, please use the following box to provide a description and assess their degree of importance. Provide as much information as you can. The document will automatically repaginate as you type.

SECTION C

- C1. On a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), please indicate the extent to which you disagree or agree with each of the following statements (*please click the appropriate box to record your response*):

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly Agree
	1	2	3	4	5
policy advocates are willing to invest their time and energy to draw attention to their preferred policy	<input type="checkbox"/>				
policy advocates are willing to use their reputation to draw attention to their preferred policy	<input type="checkbox"/>				
policy advocates are willing to invest financial resources to draw attention to their preferred policy	<input type="checkbox"/>				

- C2. On a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), please indicate the extent to which you disagree or agree with each of the following statements (*please click the appropriate box to record your response*):

<i>"policy advocates who seek to influence policy are motivated by a desire to..."</i>	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly Agree
	1	2	3	4	5
address problems with policy	<input type="checkbox"/>				
promote personal interests	<input type="checkbox"/>				
promote personal values	<input type="checkbox"/>				
shape future policy	<input type="checkbox"/>				
play an active role in the policy process	<input type="checkbox"/>				

C3. In your opinion, how important on a scale from 1 (no importance) to 5 (utmost importance) are the presence and actions of a policy advocate to each of the following during the decision making process (please click the appropriate box to record your response):

	No Importance	Little Importance	Moderate Importance	Great Importance	Utmost Importance
	1	2	3	4	5
the development of viable policy alternatives	<input type="checkbox"/>				
pushing policy alternatives onto the government's agenda for an authoritative choice	<input type="checkbox"/>				
the adoption of a preferred policy alternative	<input type="checkbox"/>				

C4. In your opinion, how important on a scale from 1 (no importance) to 5 (utmost importance) is it that individuals possess the following characteristics if they are to succeed in having their policy proposals positioned on the government's decision agenda (please click the appropriate box to record your response):

	No Importance	Little Importance	Moderate Importance	Great Importance	Utmost Importance
	1	2	3	4	5
policy expertise	<input type="checkbox"/>				
an ability to speak on behalf of others because of his/her leadership position(s)	<input type="checkbox"/>				
an ability to make authoritative decisions because of his/her position	<input type="checkbox"/>				
an ability to develop and maintain good relations with key political elites	<input type="checkbox"/>				
well developed negotiation skills	<input type="checkbox"/>				
persistence	<input type="checkbox"/>				

If a characteristic is not listed, please use the following box to provide a description and assess its degree of importance. Provide as much information as you can. The document will automatically repaginate as you type.

- C5. In your opinion, how important on a scale from 1 (no importance) to 5 (utmost importance) are each of the following in helping policy advocates succeed in having their policy proposals positioned on the government's decision agenda (*please click the appropriate box to record your response*):

	No Importance	Little Importance	Moderate Importance	Great Importance	Utmost Importance
	1	2	3	4	5
Finding out the attitudes of key government decision-makers towards their proposal.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Using or developing perceptions of crises to increase interest in and support for alternatives to existing policy.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Framing problems with existing policy to make their proposal an appealing alternative.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Presenting problems with existing policy in a way that leads to a realignment of interests into a new coalition supporting their proposal.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Structuring an agenda to ensure support for their proposal by removing competing alternatives under consideration.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Structuring an agenda to ensure support for their proposal by adding to the number of alternatives under consideration.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Structuring an agenda to ensure support for their proposal by modifying the order in which alternatives were considered.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Introducing amendments.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Attaching their proposal to an omnibus bill.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Voting against their true preferences.	<input type="checkbox"/>				

(continued on next page)

- C5. In your opinion, how important on a scale from 1 (no importance) to 5 (utmost importance) are each of the following in helping policy advocates succeed in having their policy proposals positioned on the government's decision agenda (*please click the appropriate box to record your response*):

	No Importance	Little Importance	Moderate Importance	Great Importance	Utmost Importance
	1	2	3	4	5
Breaking down their proposal into a series of smaller interrelated policy alternatives.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Shifting the debate to an institutional venue that shares their view of the problem and solution.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Shifting the debate to an institutional venue that provides the greatest support for their proposal.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Avoiding institutional venues that do not share their view of the problem and solution.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Avoiding institutional venues that provide the greatest opposition to their proposal.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Shifting the debate to an institutional venue that can help structure a problem to fit their proposal.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Seeking multiple institutional venues.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Establishing a coalition of supporters.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Enlisting the support of existing coalitions.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Adding members to an existing coalition.	<input type="checkbox"/>				

If a strategy is not listed, please use the following box to provide a description and assess its degree of importance. Provide as much information as you can. The document will automatically repaginate as you type.

C6. In your opinion, how important on a scale from 1 (no importance) to 5 (utmost importance) are each of the following in providing policy advocates with a critical opportunity to position their proposals onto the government's decision agenda (*please click the appropriate box to record your response*):

	No Importance 1	Little Importance 2	Moderate Importance 3	Great Importance 4	Utmost Importance 5
the release of statistical indicators used to monitor the progression of policy	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
the release of studies assessing the viability of existing policy	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
a focusing event such as a crisis or other event that brings attention to existing policy	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
feedback from the public to policy makers concerning existing policy	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
feedback from bureaucrats to policy makers concerning existing policy	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
a change in public opinion concerning existing policy	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
a change of Administration	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
a change in party status in Congress	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
turnover of key government bureaucratic personnel	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
influence of interest group(s)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

If an event is not listed, please use the following box to provide a description and assess its degree of importance. Provide as much information as you can. The document will automatically repaginate as you type.

- C7. In your opinion, how important on a scale from 1 (no importance) to 5 (utmost importance) are each of the following in terms of increasing the likelihood that a policy advocate's preferred policy is positioned on the government's decision agenda for an authoritative decision? *(please click the appropriate box to record your response)*

	No Importance	Little Importance	Moderate Importance	Great Importance	Utmost Importance
	1	2	3	4	5
favorable political support	<input type="checkbox"/>				
government perception of a serious problem	<input type="checkbox"/>				
the availability of a viable solution	<input type="checkbox"/>				

- C8. In your opinion, how important on a scale from 1 (no importance) to 5 (utmost importance) are each of the following in terms of preventing a policy advocate's preferred policy from being positioned on the government's decision agenda for an authoritative decision? *(please click the appropriate box to record your response)*

	No Importance	Little Importance	Moderate Importance	Great Importance	Utmost Importance
	1	2	3	4	5
lack of political support	<input type="checkbox"/>				
no perception of a serious problem	<input type="checkbox"/>				
no viable solution available	<input type="checkbox"/>				

#### SECTION D

- D1. In your opinion, how important on a scale from 1 (no importance) to 5 (utmost importance) were each of the following individuals in affecting US-Cuba policy between 1989 and 2006 *(please click the appropriate box to record your response or leave the corresponding box blank if you do not know)?* If there are other individuals who you feel should be included, please type the name of each individual in the allotted space after "Other" and click the appropriate box to record your response.

	No Importance	Little Importance	Moderate Importance	Great Importance	Utmost Importance
	1	2	3	4	5
Henry Adorno	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Mavis Anderson	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Dwayne O. Andreas	<input type="checkbox"/>				

*(continued on next page)*

- D1. In your opinion, how important on a scale from 1 (no importance) to 5 (utmost importance) were each of the following individuals in affecting US-Cuba policy between 1989 and 2006 (please click the appropriate box to record your response or leave the corresponding box blank if you do not know)? If there are other individuals who you feel should be included, please type the name of each individual in the allotted space after "Other" and click the appropriate box to record your response.

	No Importance	Little Importance	Moderate Importance	Great Importance	Utmost Importance
	1	2	3	4	5
John Ashcroft	<input type="checkbox"/>				
José Bacardi	<input type="checkbox"/>				
James (Jim) Bacchus	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Max Baucus	<input type="checkbox"/>				
John R. Bolton	<input type="checkbox"/>				
José Pepin Bosch	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Dan Burton	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Frank Calzón	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Raúl Cantero	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Paul L. Cejas	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Brice M. Clagett	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Thomas Cox	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Manuel Jorge Cutillas	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Carlos M. de la Cruz, Sr.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative William D. Delahunt	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Tom DeLay	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Lincoln Diaz- Balart	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Mario Diaz- Balart	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Salvador Diaz-Verson	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Christopher J. Dodd	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Byron L. Dorgan	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Jo Ann Emerson	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Eliot L. Engel	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Michael B. Enzi	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Alfonso "Alfie" Fanjul	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Jose "Pepe" Fanjul	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Dante B. Fascell	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Dan Fisk	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Jeff Flake	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Albert A. Fox, Jr.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Robert Freer, Jr.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Robert "Bob" Graham	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Carlos Miguel Gutierrez	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Nicolás J. Gutiérrez	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Chuck Hagel	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Dennis Hays	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Jesse Helms	<input type="checkbox"/>				

(continued on next page)

D1. In your opinion, how important on a scale from 1 (no importance) to 5 (utmost importance) were each of the following individuals in affecting US-Cuba policy between 1989 and 2006 (please click the appropriate box to record your response or leave the corresponding box blank if you do not know)? If there are other individuals who you feel should be included, please type the name of each individual in the allotted space after "Other" and click the appropriate box to record your response.

	No Importance 1	Little Importance 2	Moderate Importance 3	Great Importance 4	Utmost Importance 5
Francisco José "Pepe" Hernández	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Kirby Jones	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
John Kavulich II	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Jeanne Kirkpatrick	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Tom Lantos	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Senator Patrick J. Leahy	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Representative Barbara Lee	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Connie Mack III	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Representative Connie Mack IV	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Senator Mel Martinez	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Jorge Mas Canosa	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Jorge Mas Santos	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Representative James McGovern	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Representative Robert Menéndez	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Representative Jerry Moran	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Domingo R. Moreira	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Senator Bill Nelson	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
George R. Nethercutt, Jr.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Roger Noriega	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Richard Nuccio	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Carlos P. Portes	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Juan Prado	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Representative Charles B. Rangel	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Otto J. Reich	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
George "Chip" Reid	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Representative Steven R. Rothman	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ignacio Sánchez	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Representative José E. Serrano	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Wayne S. Smith	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Diego R. Suarez	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Esteban Edward Torres	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Maria Elena Torano	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Robert G. Torricelli	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

(continued on next page)

D1 If there are other individuals who you feel should be included, please type the name of each individual in the allotted space after "Other" and click the appropriate box to record your response

	No Importance 1	Little Importance 2	Moderate Importance 3	Great Importance 4	Utmost Importance 5
Other _____	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Other _____	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Other _____	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Other _____	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Other _____	<input type="checkbox"/>				

D2 At any point in time between 1989 and 2006, how successful were the following individuals in having their preferred policy proposal(s) adopted by the government (please click the appropriate box to record your response or leave the corresponding box blank if you do not know)? If there are other individuals who you feel should be included, please type the name of each individual in the allotted space after "Other" and click the appropriate box to record your response

	Not Successful 1	Marginally Successful 2	Moderately Successful 3	Very Successful 4	Completely Successful 5
Henry Adorno	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mavis Anderson	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Dwayne O Andreas	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
John Ashcroft	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
José Bacardi	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
James (Jim) Bacchus	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Senator Max Baucus	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
John R Bolton	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
José Pepin Bosch	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Representative Dan Burton	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Frank Calzón	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Raúl Cantero	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Paul L Cejas	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Brice M Clagett	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Thomas Cox	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Manuel Jorge Cutillas	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Carlos M de la Cruz, Sr	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Representative William D Delahunt	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Tom DeLay	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Representative Lincoln Diaz-Balart	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Representative Mario Diaz-Balart	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Salvador Diaz-Verson	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Senator Christopher J Dodd	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Senator Byron L Dorgan	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

(continued on next page)

D2 At any point in time between 1989 and 2006, how successful were the following individuals in having their preferred policy proposal(s) adopted by the government (*please click the appropriate box to record your response or leave the corresponding box blank if you do not know*)? If there are other individuals who you feel should be included, please type the name of each individual in the allotted space after "Other" and click the appropriate box to record your response

	Not Successful	Marginally Successful	Moderately Successful	Very Successful	Completely Successful
	1	2	3	4	5
Representative Jo Ann Emerson	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Eliot L Engel	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Michael B Enzi	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Alfonso "Alfie" Fanjul	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Jose "Pepe" Fanjul	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Dante B Fascell	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Dan Fisk	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Jeff Flake	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Albert A Fox, Jr	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Robert Freer, Jr	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Robert "Bob" Graham	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Carlos Miguel Gutierrez	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Nicolás J Gutiérrez	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Chuck Hagel	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Dennis Hays	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Jesse Helms	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Francisco José "Pepe" Hernández	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Kirby Jones	<input type="checkbox"/>				
John Kavulich II	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Jeanne Kirkpatrick	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Tom Lantos	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Patrick J Leahy	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Barbara Lee	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Connie Mack III	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Connie Mack IV	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Mel Martinez	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Jorge Mas Canosa	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Jorge Mas Santos	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative James McGovern	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Robert Menéndez	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Jerry Moran	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Domingo R Moreira	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Bill Nelson	<input type="checkbox"/>				
George R Nethercutt, Jr	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Roger Noriega	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Richard Nuccio	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Carlos P Portes	<input type="checkbox"/>				

(continued on next page)

D2 At any point in time between 1989 and 2006, how successful were the following individuals in having their preferred policy proposal(s) adopted by the government (*please click the appropriate box to record your response or leave the corresponding box blank if you do not know*)? If there are other individuals who you feel should be included, please type the name of each individual in the allotted space after "Other" and click the appropriate box to record your response

	Not Successful	Marginally Successful	Moderately Successful	Very Successful	Completely Successful
	1	2	3	4	5
Juan Prado	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Charles B Rangel	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Otto J Reich	<input type="checkbox"/>				
George "Chip" Reid	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Steven R Rothman	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Ignacio Sánchez	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative José E Serrano	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Wayne S Smith	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Diego R Suarez	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Esteban Edward Torres	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Maria Elena Torano	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Robert G Torricelli	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Other _____	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Other _____	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Other _____	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Other _____	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Other _____	<input type="checkbox"/>				

D3 On a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), please indicate whether the italicized statement accurately describes each of the individuals (*please click the appropriate box to record your response or leave the corresponding box blank if you do not know*) If there are other individuals who you feel should be included, please type the name of each individual in the allotted space after "Other" and click the appropriate box to record your response

<i>"he/she was willing to invest his/her time and energy to draw attention to their preferred policy"</i>	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly Agree
	1	2	3	4	5
Henry Adorno	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Mavis Anderson	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Dwayne O Andreas	<input type="checkbox"/>				
John Ashcroft	<input type="checkbox"/>				
José Bacardi	<input type="checkbox"/>				
James (Jim) Bacchus	<input type="checkbox"/>				

(continued on next page)

D3. On a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), please indicate whether the italicized statement accurately describes each of the individuals (*please click the appropriate box to record your response or leave the corresponding box blank if you do not know*). If there are other individuals who you feel should be included, please type the name of each individual in the allotted space after "Other" and click the appropriate box to record your response.

<i>"he/she was willing to invest his/her time and energy to draw attention to their preferred policy"</i>	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly Agree
	1	2	3	4	5
Senator Max Baucus	<input type="checkbox"/>				
John R. Bolton	<input type="checkbox"/>				
José Pepin Bosch	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Dan Burton	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Frank Calzón	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Raúl Cantero	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Paul L. Cejas	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Brice M. Clagett	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Thomas Cox	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Manuel Jorge Cutillas	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Carlos M. de la Cruz, Sr.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative William D. Delahunt	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Tom DeLay	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Lincoln Diaz-Balart	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Mario Diaz-Balart	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Salvador Diaz-Verson	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Christopher J. Dodd	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Byron L. Dorgan	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Jo Ann Emerson	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Eliot L. Engel	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Michael B. Enzi	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Alfonso "Alfie" Fanjul	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Jose "Pepe" Fanjul	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Dante B. Fascell	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Dan Fisk	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Jeff Flake	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Albert A. Fox, Jr.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Robert Freer, Jr.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Robert "Bob" Graham	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Carlos Miguel Gutierrez	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Nicolás J. Gutiérrez	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Chuck Hagel	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Dennis Hays	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Jesse Helms	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Francisco José "Pepe" Hernández	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Kirby Jones	<input type="checkbox"/>				

(continued on next page)

D3 On a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), please indicate whether the italicized statement accurately describes each of the individuals (*please click the appropriate box to record your response or leave the corresponding box blank if you do not know*) If there are other individuals who you feel should be included, please type the name of each individual in the allotted space after "Other" and click the appropriate box to record your response

<i>"he/she was willing to invest his/her time and energy to draw attention to their preferred policy"</i>	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly Agree
	1	2	3	4	5
John Kavulich II	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Jeanne Kirkpatrick	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Tom Lantos	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Patrick J. Leahy	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Barbara Lee	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Connie Mack III	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Connie Mack IV	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Mel Martinez	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Jorge Mas Canosa	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Jorge Mas Santos	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative James McGovern	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Robert Menéndez	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Jerry Moran	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Domingo R. Moreira	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Bill Nelson	<input type="checkbox"/>				
George R. Nethercutt, Jr	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Roger Noriega	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Richard Nuccio	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Carlos P. Portes	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Juan Prado	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Charles B. Rangel	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Otto J. Reich	<input type="checkbox"/>				
George "Chip" Reid	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Steven R. Rothman	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Ignacio Sánchez	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative José E. Serrano	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Wayne S. Smith	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Diego R. Suarez	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Esteban Edward Torres	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Maria Elena Torano	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Robert G. Torricelli	<input type="checkbox"/>				

(continued on next page)

D3 If there are other individuals who you feel should be included, please type the name of each individual in the allotted space after "Other" and click the appropriate box to record your response

<i>"he/she was willing to invest his/her time and energy to draw attention to their preferred policy"</i>		Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly Agree
		1	2	3	4	5
Other	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Other	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Other	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Other	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Other	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>				

D4 On a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), please indicate whether the italicized statement accurately describes each of the individuals (please click the appropriate box to record your response or leave the corresponding box blank if you do not know) If there are other individuals who you feel should be included, please type the name of each individual in the allotted space after "Other" and click the appropriate box to record your response

<i>"he/she was willing to use his/her reputation to draw attention to their preferred policy"</i>	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly Agree
	1	2	3	4	5
Henry Adorno	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Mavis Anderson	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Dwayne O Andreas	<input type="checkbox"/>				
John Ashcroft	<input type="checkbox"/>				
José Bacardi	<input type="checkbox"/>				
James (Jim) Bacchus	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Max Baucus	<input type="checkbox"/>				
John R Bolton	<input type="checkbox"/>				
José Pepin Bosch	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Dan Burton	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Frank Calzón	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Raúl Cantero	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Paul L Cejas	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Brice M Clagett	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Thomas Cox	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Manuel Jorge Cutillas	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Carlos M de la Cruz, Sr	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative William D Delahunt	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Tom DeLay	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Lincoln Diaz-Balart	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Mario Diaz-Balart	<input type="checkbox"/>				

(continued on next page)

D4. On a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), please indicate whether the italicized statement accurately describes each of the individuals (*please click the appropriate box to record your response or leave the corresponding box blank if you do not know*). If there are other individuals who you feel should be included, please type the name of each individual in the allotted space after "Other" and click the appropriate box to record your response.

<i>"he/she was willing to use his/her reputation to draw attention to their preferred policy"</i>	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly Agree
	1	2	3	4	5
Salvador Diaz-Verson	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Christopher J. Dodd	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Byron L. Dorgan	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Jo Ann Emerson	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Eliot L. Engel	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Michael B. Enzi	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Alfonso "Alfie" Fanjul	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Jose "Pepe" Fanjul	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Dante B. Fascell	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Dan Fisk	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Jeff Flake	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Albert A. Fox, Jr.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Robert Freer, Jr.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Robert "Bob" Graham	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Carlos Miguel Gutierrez	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Nicolás J. Gutiérrez	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Chuck Hagel	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Dennis Hays	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Jesse Helms	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Francisco José "Pepe" Hernández	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Kirby Jones	<input type="checkbox"/>				
John Kavulich II	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Jeanne Kirkpatrick	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Tom Lantos	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Patrick J. Leahy	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Barbara Lee	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Connie Mack III	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Connie Mack IV	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Mel Martinez	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Jorge Mas Canosa	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Jorge Mas Santos	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative James McGovern	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Robert Menéndez	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Jerry Moran	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Domingo R. Moreira	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Bill Nelson	<input type="checkbox"/>				

(continued on next page)



D5. On a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), please indicate whether the italicized statement accurately describes each of the individuals (*please click the appropriate box to record your response or leave the corresponding box blank if you do not know*). If there are other individuals who you feel should be included, please type the name of each individual in the allotted space after "Other" and click the appropriate box to record your response.

<i>"he/she was willing to invest financial resources to draw attention to their preferred policy"</i>	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly Agree
	1	2	3	4	5
Henry Adorno	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Mavis Anderson	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Dwayne O. Andreas	<input type="checkbox"/>				
John Ashcroft	<input type="checkbox"/>				
José Bacardi	<input type="checkbox"/>				
James (Jim) Bacchus	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Max Baucus	<input type="checkbox"/>				
John R. Bolton	<input type="checkbox"/>				
José Pepin Bosch	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Dan Burton	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Frank Calzón	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Raúl Cantero	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Paul L. Cejas	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Brice M. Clagett	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Thomas Cox	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Manuel Jorge Cutillas	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Carlos M. de la Cruz, Sr.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative William D. Delahunt	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Tom DeLay	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Lincoln Diaz-Balart	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Mario Diaz-Balart	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Salvador Diaz-Verson	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Christopher J. Dodd	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Byron L. Dorgan	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Jo Ann Emerson	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Eliot L. Engel	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Michael B. Enzi	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Alfonso "Alfie" Fanjul	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Jose "Pepe" Fanjul	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Dante B. Fascell	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Dan Fisk	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Jeff Flake	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Albert A. Fox, Jr.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Robert Freer, Jr.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Robert "Bob" Graham	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Carlos Miguel Gutierrez	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Nicolás J. Gutiérrez	<input type="checkbox"/>				

(continued on next page)

D5. On a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), please indicate whether the italicized statement accurately describes each of the individuals (please click the appropriate box to record your response or leave the corresponding box blank if you do not know). If there are other individuals who you feel should be included, please type the name of each individual in the allotted space after "Other" and click the appropriate box to record your response.

<i>"he/she was willing to invest financial resources to draw attention to their preferred policy"</i>	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly Agree
	1	2	3	4	5
Senator Chuck Hagel	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Dennis Hays	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Jesse Helms	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Francisco José "Pepe" Hernández	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Kirby Jones	<input type="checkbox"/>				
John Kavulich II	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Jeanne Kirkpatrick	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Tom Lantos	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Patrick J. Leahy	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Barbara Lee	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Connie Mack III	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Connie Mack IV	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Mel Martinez	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Jorge Mas Canosa	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Jorge Mas Santos	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative James McGovern	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Robert Menéndez	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Jerry Moran	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Domingo R. Moreira	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Bill Nelson	<input type="checkbox"/>				
George R. Nethercutt, Jr.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Roger Noriega	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Richard Nuccio	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Carlos P. Portes	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Juan Prado	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Charles B. Rangel	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Otto J. Reich	<input type="checkbox"/>				
George "Chip" Reid	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Steven R. Rothman	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Ignacio Sánchez	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative José E. Serrano	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Wayne S. Smith	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Diego R. Suarez	<input type="checkbox"/>				

(continued on next page)

D5 On a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), please indicate whether the italicized statement accurately describes each of the individuals (*please click the appropriate box to record your response or leave the corresponding box blank if you do not know*) If there are other individuals who you feel should be included, please type the name of each individual in the allotted space after "Other" and click the appropriate box to record your response

<i>"he/she was willing to invest financial resources to draw attention to their preferred policy"</i>	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly Agree
	1	2	3	4	5
Esteban Edward Torres	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Maria Elena Torano	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Robert G Torricelli	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Other _____	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Other _____	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Other _____	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Other _____	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Other _____	<input type="checkbox"/>				

D6 On a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), please indicate whether the italicized statement accurately describes each of the individuals (*please click the appropriate box to record your response or leave the corresponding box blank if you do not know*) If there are other individuals who you feel should be included, please type the name of each individual in the allotted space after "Other" and click the appropriate box to record your response

<i>"he/she was known for his/her expertise in US-Cuba policy"</i>	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly Agree
	1	2	3	4	5
Henry Adorno	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Mavis Anderson	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Dwayne O Andreas	<input type="checkbox"/>				
John Ashcroft	<input type="checkbox"/>				
José Bacardi	<input type="checkbox"/>				
James (Jim) Bacchus	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Max Baucus	<input type="checkbox"/>				
John R Bolton	<input type="checkbox"/>				
José Pepin Bosch	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Dan Burton	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Frank Calzón	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Raúl Cantero	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Paul L Cejas	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Brice M Clagett	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Thomas Cox	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Manuel Jorge Cutillas	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Carlos M de la Cruz, Sr	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative William D Delahunt	<input type="checkbox"/>				

(continued on next page)

D6. On a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), please indicate whether the italicized statement accurately describes each of the individuals (*please click the appropriate box to record your response or leave the corresponding box blank if you do not know*). If there are other individuals who you feel should be included, please type the name of each individual in the allotted space after "Other" and click the appropriate box to record your response.

<i>"he/she was known for his/her expertise in US-Cuba policy"</i>	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly Agree
	1	2	3	4	5
Tom DeLay	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Lincoln Diaz-Balart	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Mario Diaz-Balart	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Salvador Diaz-Verson	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Christopher J. Dodd	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Byron L. Dorgan	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Jo Ann Emerson	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Eliot L. Engel	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Michael B. Enzi	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Alfonso "Alfie" Fanjul	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Jose "Pepe" Fanjul	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Dante B. Fascell	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Dan Fisk	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Jeff Flake	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Albert A. Fox, Jr.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Robert Freer, Jr.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Robert "Bob" Graham	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Carlos Miguel Gutierrez	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Nicolás J. Gutiérrez	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Chuck Hagel	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Dennis Hays	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Jesse Helms	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Francisco José "Pepe" Hernández	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Kirby Jones	<input type="checkbox"/>				
John Kavulich II	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Jeanne Kirkpatrick	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Tom Lantos	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Patrick J. Leahy	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Barbara Lee	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Connie Mack III	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Connie Mack IV	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Mel Martinez	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Jorge Mas Canosa	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Jorge Mas Santos	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative James McGovern	<input type="checkbox"/>				

(continued on next page)



D7. On a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), please indicate whether the italicized statement accurately describes each of the individuals (please click the appropriate box to record your response or leave the corresponding box blank if you do not know). If there are other individuals who you feel should be included, please type the name of each individual in the allotted space after "Other" and click the appropriate box to record your response.

<i>"he/she was able speak on behalf of others because of his/her leadership position(s)"</i>	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly Agree
	1	2	3	4	5
Henry Adorno	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Mavis Anderson	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Dwayne O. Andreas	<input type="checkbox"/>				
John Ashcroft	<input type="checkbox"/>				
José Bacardi	<input type="checkbox"/>				
James (Jim) Bacchus	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Max Baucus	<input type="checkbox"/>				
John R. Bolton	<input type="checkbox"/>				
José Pepin Bosch	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Dan Burton	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Frank Calzón	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Raúl Cantero	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Paul L. Cejas	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Brice M. Clagett	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Thomas Cox	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Manuel Jorge Cutillas	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Carlos M. de la Cruz, Sr.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative William D. Delahunt	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Tom DeLay	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Lincoln Diaz-Balart	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Mario Diaz-Balart	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Salvador Diaz-Verson	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Christopher J. Dodd	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Byron L. Dorgan	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Jo Ann Emerson	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Eliot L. Engel	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Michael B. Enzi	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Alfonso "Alfie" Fanjul	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Jose "Pepe" Fanjul	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Dante B. Fascell	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Dan Fisk	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Jeff Flake	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Albert A. Fox, Jr.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Robert Freer, Jr.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Robert "Bob" Graham	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Carlos Miguel Gutierrez	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Nicolás J. Gutiérrez	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Chuck Hagel	<input type="checkbox"/>				

(continued on next page)

- D7. On a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), please indicate whether the italicized statement accurately describes each of the individuals (*please click the appropriate box to record your response or leave the corresponding box blank if you do not know*). If there are other individuals who you feel should be included, please type the name of each individual in the allotted space after "Other" and click the appropriate box to record your response.

<i>"he/she was able speak on behalf of others because of his/her leadership position(s)"</i>	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly Agree
	1	2	3	4	5
Dennis Hays	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Jesse Helms	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Francisco José "Pepe" Hernández	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Kirby Jones	<input type="checkbox"/>				
John Kavulich II	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Jeanne Kirkpatrick	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Tom Lantos	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Patrick J. Leahy	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Barbara Lee	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Connie Mack III	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Connie Mack IV	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Mel Martínez	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Jorge Mas Canosa	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Jorge Mas Santos	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative James McGovern	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Robert Menéndez	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Jerry Moran	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Domingo R. Moreira	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Bill Nelson	<input type="checkbox"/>				
George R. Nethercutt, Jr.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Roger Noriega	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Richard Nuccio	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Carlos P. Portes	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Juan Prado	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Charles B. Rangel	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Otto J. Reich	<input type="checkbox"/>				
George "Chip" Reid	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Steven R. Rothman	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Ignacio Sánchez	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative José E. Serrano	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Wayne S. Smith	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Diego R. Suarez	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Esteban Edward Torres	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Maria Elena Torano	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Robert G. Torricelli	<input type="checkbox"/>				

(continued on next page)

D7 On a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), please indicate whether the italicized statement accurately describes each of the individuals (*please click the appropriate box to record your response or leave the corresponding box blank if you do not know*) If there are other individuals who you feel should be included, please type the name of each individual in the allotted space after "Other" and click the appropriate box to record your response

<i>"he/she was able speak on behalf of others because of his/her leadership position(s)"</i>	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly Agree
	1	2	3	4	5
Other _____	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Other _____	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Other _____	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Other _____	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Other _____	<input type="checkbox"/>				

D8 On a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), please indicate whether the italicized statement accurately describes each of the individuals (*please click the appropriate box to record your response or leave the corresponding box blank if you do not know*) If there are other individuals who you feel should be included, please type the name of each individual in the allotted space after "Other" and click the appropriate box to record your response

<i>"he/she was able to make authoritative decisions because of his/her position(s)"</i>	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly Agree
	1	2	3	4	5
Henry Adorno	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Mavis Anderson	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Dwayne O. Andreas	<input type="checkbox"/>				
John Ashcroft	<input type="checkbox"/>				
José Bacardi	<input type="checkbox"/>				
James (Jim) Bacchus	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Max Baucus	<input type="checkbox"/>				
John R. Bolton	<input type="checkbox"/>				
José Pepin Bosch	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Dan Burton	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Frank Caizón	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Raúl Cantero	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Paul L. Cejas	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Brice M. Claggett	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Thomas Cox	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Manuel Jorge Cutillas	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Carlos M. de la Cruz, Sr	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative William D. Delahunt	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Tom DeLay	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Lincoln Diaz-Balart	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Mario Diaz-Balart	<input type="checkbox"/>				

(continued on next page)

D8. On a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), please indicate whether the italicized statement accurately describes each of the individuals (*please click the appropriate box to record your response or leave the corresponding box blank if you do not know*). If there are other individuals who you feel should be included, please type the name of each individual in the allotted space after "Other" and click the appropriate box to record your response.

<i>"he/she was able to make authoritative decisions because of his/her position(s)"</i>	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly Agree
	1	2	3	4	5
Salvador Diaz-Verson	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Christopher J. Dodd	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Byron L. Dorgan	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Jo Ann Emerson	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Eliot L. Engel	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Michael B. Enzi	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Alfonso "Alfie" Fanjul	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Jose "Pepe" Fanjul	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Dante B. Fascell	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Dan Fisk	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Jeff Flake	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Albert A. Fox, Jr.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Robert Freer, Jr.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Robert "Bob" Graham	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Carlos Miguel Gutierrez	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Nicolás J. Gutiérrez	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Chuck Hagel	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Dennis Hays	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Jesse Helms	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Francisco José "Pepe" Hernández	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Kirby Jones	<input type="checkbox"/>				
John Kavulich II	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Jeanne Kirkpatrick	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Tom Lantos	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Patrick J. Leahy	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Barbara Lee	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Connie Mack III	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Connie Mack IV	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Mel Martinez	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Jorge Mas Canosa	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Jorge Mas Santos	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative James McGovern	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Robert Menéndez	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Jerry Moran	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Domingo R. Moreira	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Bill Nelson	<input type="checkbox"/>				
George R. Nethercutt, Jr.	<input type="checkbox"/>				

(continued on next page)

D8 On a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), please indicate whether the italicized statement accurately describes each of the individuals (*please click the appropriate box to record your response or leave the corresponding box blank if you do not know*) If there are other individuals who you feel should be included, please type the name of each individual in the allotted space after "Other" and click the appropriate box to record your response

<i>"he/she was able to make authoritative decisions because of his/her position(s)"</i>	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly Agree
	1	2	3	4	5
Roger Noriega	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Richard Nuccio	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Carlos P Portes	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Juan Prado	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Charles B Rangel	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Otto J Reich	<input type="checkbox"/>				
George "Chip" Reid	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Steven R Rothman	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Ignacio Sánchez	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative José E Serrano	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Wayne S Smith	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Diego R Suarez	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Esteban Edward Torres	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Maria Elena Torano	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Robert G Torricelli	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Other _____	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Other _____	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Other _____	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Other _____	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Other _____	<input type="checkbox"/>				

D9 On a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), please indicate whether the italicized statement accurately describes each of the individuals (*please click the appropriate box to record your response or leave the corresponding box blank if you do not know*) If there are other individuals who you feel should be included, please type the name of each individual in the allotted space after "Other" and click the appropriate box to record your response

<i>"he/she was known for his/her ability to successfully develop and maintain good relations with key political actors"</i>	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly Agree
	1	2	3	4	5
Henry Adorno	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Mavis Anderson	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Dwayne O Andreas	<input type="checkbox"/>				

(continued on next page)

D9. On a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), please indicate whether the italicized statement accurately describes each of the individuals (please click the appropriate box to record your response or leave the corresponding box blank if you do not know). If there are other individuals who you feel should be included, please type the name of each individual in the allotted space after "Other" and click the appropriate box to record your response.

<i>"he/she was known for his/her ability to successfully develop and maintain good relations with key political actors"</i>	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly Agree
	1	2	3	4	5
John Ashcroft	<input type="checkbox"/>				
José Bacardi	<input type="checkbox"/>				
James (Jim) Bacchus	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Max Baucus	<input type="checkbox"/>				
John R. Bolton	<input type="checkbox"/>				
José Pepin Bosch	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Dan Burton	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Frank Calzón	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Raúl Cantero	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Paul L. Cejas	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Brice M. Clagett	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Thomas Cox	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Manuel Jorge Cutillas	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Carlos M. de la Cruz, Sr.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative William D. Delahunt	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Tom DeLay	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Lincoln Diaz-Balart	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Mario Diaz-Balart	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Salvador Diaz-Verson	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Christopher J. Dodd	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Byron L. Dorgan	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Jo Ann Emerson	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Eliot L. Engel	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Michael B. Enzi	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Alfonso "Alfie" Fanjul	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Jose "Pepe" Fanjul	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Dante B. Fascell	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Dan Fisk	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Jeff Flake	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Albert A. Fox, Jr.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Robert Freer, Jr.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Robert "Bob" Graham	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Carlos Miguel Gutierrez	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Nicolás J. Gutiérrez	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Chuck Hagel	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Dennis Hays	<input type="checkbox"/>				

(continued on next page)

D9. On a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), please indicate whether the italicized statement accurately describes each of the individuals (*please click the appropriate box to record your response or leave the corresponding box blank if you do not know*). If there are other individuals who you feel should be included, please type the name of each individual in the allotted space after "Other" and click the appropriate box to record your response.

<i>"he/she was known for his/her ability to successfully develop and maintain good relations with key political actors"</i>	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly Agree
	1	2	3	4	5
Jesse Helms	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Francisco José "Pepe" Hernández	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Kirby Jones	<input type="checkbox"/>				
John Kavulich II	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Jeanne Kirkpatrick	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Tom Lantos	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Patrick J. Leahy	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Barbara Lee	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Connie Mack III	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Connie Mack IV	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Mel Martinez	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Jorge Mas Canosa	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Jorge Mas Santos	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative James McGovern	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Robert Menéndez	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Jerry Moran	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Domingo R. Moreira	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Bill Nelson	<input type="checkbox"/>				
George R. Nethercutt, Jr.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Roger Noriega	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Richard Nuccio	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Carlos P. Portes	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Juan Prado	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Charles B. Rangel	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Otto J. Reich	<input type="checkbox"/>				
George "Chip" Reid	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Steven R. Rothman	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Ignacio Sánchez	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative José E. Serrano	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Wayne S. Smith	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Diego R. Suarez	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Esteban Edward Torres	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Maria Elena Torano	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Robert G. Torricelli	<input type="checkbox"/>				

(continued on next page)

D9. If there are other individuals who you feel should be included, please type the name of each individual in the allotted space after "Other" and click the appropriate box to record your response.

<i>"he/she was known for his/her ability to successfully develop and maintain good relations with key political actors"</i>	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly Agree
	1	2	3	4	5
Other: _____	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Other: _____	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Other: _____	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Other: _____	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Other: _____	<input type="checkbox"/>				

D10. On a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), please indicate whether the italicized statement accurately describes each of the individuals (please click the appropriate box to record your response or leave the corresponding box blank if you do not know). If there are other individuals who you feel should be included, please type the name of each individual in the allotted space after "Other" and click the appropriate box to record your response.

<i>"he/she was known for his/her exceptional negotiating skills"</i>	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly Agree
	1	2	3	4	5
Henry Adorno	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Mavis Anderson	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Dwayne O. Andreas	<input type="checkbox"/>				
John Ashcroft	<input type="checkbox"/>				
José Bacardi	<input type="checkbox"/>				
James (Jim) Bacchus	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Max Baucus	<input type="checkbox"/>				
John R. Bolton	<input type="checkbox"/>				
José Pepin Bosch	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Dan Burton	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Frank Calzón	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Raúl Cantero	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Paul L. Cejas	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Brice M. Clagett	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Thomas Cox	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Manuel Jorge Cutillas	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Carlos M. de la Cruz, Sr.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative William D. Delahunt	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Tom DeLay	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Lincoln Diaz-Balart	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Mario Diaz-Balart	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Salvador Diaz-Verson	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Christopher J. Dodd	<input type="checkbox"/>				

(continued on next page)

D10 On a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), please indicate whether the italicized statement accurately describes each of the individuals (please click the appropriate box to record your response or leave the corresponding box blank if you do not know) If there are other individuals who you feel should be included, please type the name of each individual in the allotted space after "Other" and click the appropriate box to record your response

<i>"he/she was known for his/her exceptional negotiating skills"</i>	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly Agree
	1	2	3	4	5
Senator Byron L. Dorgan	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Jo Ann Emerson	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Eliot L. Engel	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Michael B. Enzi	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Alfonso "Alfie" Fanjul	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Jose "Pepe" Fanjul	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Dante B. Fascell	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Dan Fisk	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Jeff Flake	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Albert A. Fox, Jr.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Robert Freer, Jr.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Robert "Bob" Graham	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Carlos Miguel Gutierrez	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Nicolás J. Gutiérrez	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Chuck Hagel	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Dennis Hays	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Jesse Helms	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Francisco Jose "Pepe" Hernández	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Kirby Jones	<input type="checkbox"/>				
John Kavulich II	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Jeanne Kirkpatrick	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Tom Lantos	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Patrick J. Leahy	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Barbara Lee	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Connie Mack III	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Connie Mack IV	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Mel Martínez	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Jorge Mas Canosa	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Jorge Mas Santos	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative James McGovern	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Robert Menéndez	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Jerry Moran	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Domingo R. Moreira	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Bill Nelson	<input type="checkbox"/>				
George R. Nethercutt, Jr.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Roger Noriega	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Richard Nuccio	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Carlos P. Portes	<input type="checkbox"/>				

(continued on next page)

D10. On a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), please indicate whether the italicized statement accurately describes each of the individuals (*please click the appropriate box to record your response or leave the corresponding box blank if you do not know*). If there are other individuals who you feel should be included, please type the name of each individual in the allotted space after "Other" and click the appropriate box to record your response.

<i>"he/she was known for his/her exceptional negotiating skills"</i>	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly Agree
	1	2	3	4	5
Juan Prado	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Charles B. Rangel	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Otto J. Reich	<input type="checkbox"/>				
George "Chip" Reid	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Steven R. Rothman	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Ignacio Sánchez	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative José E. Serrano	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Wayne S. Smith	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Diego R. Suarez	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Esteban Edward Torres	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Maria Elena Torano	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Robert G. Torricelli	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Other: _____	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Other: _____	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Other: _____	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Other: _____	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Other: _____	<input type="checkbox"/>				

D11. On a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), please indicate whether the italicized statement accurately describes each of the individuals (*please click the appropriate box to record your response or leave the corresponding box blank if you do not know*). If there are other individuals who you feel should be included, please type the name of each individual in the allotted space after "Other" and click the appropriate box to record your response.

<i>"he/she was persistent in his/her efforts to modify US-Cuba policy"</i>	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly Agree
	1	2	3	4	5
Henry Adorno	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Mavis Anderson	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Dwayne O. Andreas	<input type="checkbox"/>				
John Ashcroft	<input type="checkbox"/>				
José Bacardi	<input type="checkbox"/>				
James (Jim) Bacchus	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Max Baucus	<input type="checkbox"/>				
John R. Bolton	<input type="checkbox"/>				
José Pepin Bosch	<input type="checkbox"/>				

(continued on next page)

D11. On a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), please indicate whether the italicized statement accurately describes each of the individuals (*please click the appropriate box to record your response or leave the corresponding box blank if you do not know*). If there are other individuals who you feel should be included, please type the name of each individual in the allotted space after "Other" and click the appropriate box to record your response.

<i>"he/she was persistent in his/her efforts to modify US-Cuba policy"</i>	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly Agree
	1	2	3	4	5
Representative Dan Burton	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Frank Calzón	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Raúl Cantero	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Paul L. Cejas	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Brice M. Clagett	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Thomas Cox	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Manuel Jorge Cutillas	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Carlos M. de la Cruz, Sr.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative William D. Delahunt	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Tom DeLay	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Lincoln Diaz-Balart	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Mario Diaz-Balart	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Salvador Diaz-Verson	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Christopher J. Dodd	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Byron L. Dorgan	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Jo Ann Emerson	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Eliot L. Engel	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Michael B. Enzi	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Alfonso "Alfie" Fanjul	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Jose "Pepe" Fanjul	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Dante B. Fascell	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Dan Fisk	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Jeff Flake	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Albert A. Fox, Jr.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Robert Freer, Jr.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Robert "Bob" Graham	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Carlos Miguel Gutierrez	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Nicolás J. Gutiérrez	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Chuck Hagel	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Dennis Hays	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Jesse Helms	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Francisco José "Pepe" Hernández	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Kirby Jones	<input type="checkbox"/>				
John Kavulich II	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Jeanne Kirkpatrick	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Tom Lantos	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Senator Patrick J. Leahy	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Representative Barbara Lee	<input type="checkbox"/>				

(continued on next page)



SECTION E (OPTIONAL)

- E1. Please provide any additional information, comments, or opinions concerning individuals that played an active role in influencing US-Cuba policy between 1989 and 2006 not addressed by this questionnaire. Provide as much feedback as you wish. The document will automatically repaginate as you type.

- E2. Is there an issue or issues not addressed by the questionnaire that you consider important in the evolution of US-Cuba policy between 1989 and 2006?  YES  NO

If you answered YES, please specify (*provide as much information as possible*):

- E3. Are there any other individuals you feel would be ideal respondents for this study?  YES  NO

If you answered YES, please specify:

Name	Organization	Contact Information

RETURN INSTRUCTIONS FOR QUESTIONNAIRE

Please return the completed survey questionnaire by MONTH/DAY/YEAR using one of the following methods:

E-MAIL
<p>Save the completed questionnaire and send it as an e-mail attachment to the following e-mail address with the accompanying subject line:</p> <p>E-mail Address: XXXXX Subject Line: US-Cuba Policy Study</p>

MAIL
<p>Mail the completed questionnaire to the following:</p> <p>NAME ADDRESS CITY, PROVINCE CANADA POSTAL CODE</p> <p>Please contact me if you require a self addressed, postage paid return envelope.</p>

THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION!

### Bibliography

- Abelson, R. P. (1995). *Statistics as Principled Argument*. Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Abrams, E. (1998). "When Trade Lets Down The Flag," *American Purpose*, Vol. 12, Issue 1. <[http://www.eppc.org/publications/pubID.1782/pub\\_detail.asp](http://www.eppc.org/publications/pubID.1782/pub_detail.asp)> (14 January 2000).
- Absten, G.T. (2002). *National Summit on Cuba—Summary Report*. Washington, D.C.: National Press Club.
- Adams, B. (1979). "The Limitations of Muddling Through: Does Anyone in Washington Really Think Anymore?," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 39, Issue 6: 545-552.
- Alexander, E.R. (1982). "Design in the Decision-Making Process," *Policy Sciences*, Vol. 14: 279-292.
- . (1979). "The Design of Alternatives in Organizational Contexts: A Pilot Study," *Administrative Sciences Quarterly*, Vol. 24, Issue 3: 382-404.
- . (1972). "Choice in a Changing World," *Policy Sciences*, Vol. 3: 325-337.
- Allison, G. (1971). *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Boston: Little Brown.
- . (1969). "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 63, Issue 3: 689-718.
- Allison, G. and Halperin, M.H. (1972). "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications," *World Politics*, Vol. 24: 40-79.
- Allison, G. and Zelikow, P. (1999). (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition) *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. New York: Longman.
- Allison, L. (2003). "Disjointed Incrementalism," in McLean, I. and McMillan, A. (Eds.) *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics*. Location: Oxford University Press, Oxford Reference Online.  
<<http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t86.e366>> (10 February 2008).
- Alvarado, J.B. (1998). *Cuba's Nuclear Program: A Hollow Threat?* Center for Latin

American Studies, Georgetown University. Cuba Briefing Paper Number 19. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University.

Alvarado, J.B. and Belkin, A. (1994). "Cuba's Nuclear Power Program and Post-Cold War Pressures," *The Nonproliferation Review*. Winter: 18-19.

Alvarez-Garcia, A.F. (2003). *Cuban Opposition Organizations*. Ottawa: Canadian Foundation for the Americas.

American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR). *Standard of Definitions: Final Dispositions of Case Codes and Outcome Rates for Surveys*. Ann Arbor: AAPOR. <[http://www.aapor.org/pdfs/standarddefs\\_3.1.pdf](http://www.aapor.org/pdfs/standarddefs_3.1.pdf)> (1 July 2007).

American Farm Bureau Federation (2003a). *Cuba Briefing Book #3*. Washington, D.C.: American Farm Bureau Federation. <[http://www.fb.org/issues/analysis/Cuba\\_Briefing\\_Issue3.html](http://www.fb.org/issues/analysis/Cuba_Briefing_Issue3.html)> (28 February 2003).

———. (2003b). *Trade Sanctions*. Washington, D.C.: American Farm Bureau Federation. <<http://www.fb.org/issues/backgrd/sanctions108.html>> (1 February 2003).

American Immigration Law Foundation. (2003). *Cuban Migration: Averting a Crisis*. Washington, D.C.: American Immigration Law Foundation. <[http://www.aifl.org/ipc/policy\\_reports\\_2003\\_CubanMigration.asp](http://www.aifl.org/ipc/policy_reports_2003_CubanMigration.asp)> (1 August 2004).

Americans for Humanitarian Trade with Cuba. (2003). *Americans for Humanitarian Trade with Cuba Profile*. <<http://www.ahtc.org/History.html>> (1 February 2003).

Amnesty International. (2004). *Amnesty International Profile*. London: Amnesty International. <<http://www.amnesty.org>> (1 July 2004).

———. (2003). *Cuba: Essential Measures? Human rights Crackdown in the Name of Security*. London: Amnesty International. <<http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR250172003?open&of=ENG-CUB>> (1 July 2004).

Anderson, J. (2000). (4<sup>th</sup> Edition) *Public Policy-Making*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

———. (1990). *Public Policy-Making: An Introduction*. New York: Praeger.

- . (1975). *Public Policy Making*. New York: Praeger.
- Anderson, J.R. (1980). *Cognitive Psychology and Its Implications*. San Francisco: Freeman.
- . (1978). "Arguments Concerning Representations for Mental Imagery," *Psychological Review*, Vol. 85: 249-277.
- Anderson, S., Cavanagh, J. and Athreya, B. (2000). *Don't Strengthen the WTO by Admitting China*. Foreign Policy in Focus Discussion Paper: US-China Relations. Washington, D.C.: Foreign Policy in Focus. <[http://www.fpif.org/papers/chinawto/index\\_body.html](http://www.fpif.org/papers/chinawto/index_body.html)> (12 September 2000).
- Andrade, L. and Young, G. (1996). "Presidential Agenda Setting: Influences on the Emphasis of Foreign Policy," *Political Research Quarterly*, Vol. 49, Issue 3: 591-605.
- Andrews, D., Nonnecke, B., and Preece, J. (2003). Conducting Research on the Internet: Online Survey Design, Development and Implementation Guidelines. <[http://www.ifsm.umbc.edu/~preece/Papers/Online\\_survey\\_design\\_IJHC104.pdf](http://www.ifsm.umbc.edu/~preece/Papers/Online_survey_design_IJHC104.pdf)> (1 July 2007).
- Ansell, C.K. (2001). "Garbage Can Model of Behaviour," in Smelser, N.J. and Baltes, P.B. (Eds.) *International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences*, New York: Esvier.
- Arendt, M. (1998). "The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996: Isolationist Obstacle to Policy of Engagement," *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law*, Vol. 30, Issue 1: 251-285.
- Argyris, C. (1976). "Single-Loop and Double-Loop Models in research on Decision Making," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 21: 363-375.
- Arrow, K.J. (1992). "Rationality of Self and Others in Economic System," in Zey, M. (Ed.) *Decision Making: Alternatives to Rational Choice Models*. London: Sage Publications.
- . (1951). *Social Choice and Individual Values*. New York: Wiley.
- Art, R. (1973). "Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique," *Policy Sciences*, Vol. 4: 467-490.

- Aspin, L. (1974). "Why Doesn't Congress Do Something?" *Foreign Policy*, Vol. 15: 70-82.
- Austen-Smith, D. (1987). "Sophisticated Sincerity: Voting over Endogenous Agendas," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 81: 1323-1329.
- Avery, G. (2004). "Bioterrorism, Fear, and Public Health Reform: Matching a Policy Solution to the Wrong Window," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 64, Issue 3: 275-288.
- Axelrod, R. (1976). *Structure of Decision*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Babbie, E.R. (1973). *Survey Research Methods*. Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company Inc..
- Bachmann, D., Elfrink, J., and Vazzana, G. (1996). "Tracking the Progress of E-Mail Versus Snail-Mail," *Marketing Research*, Vol. 8: 31-35.
- Bachrach, P. and Baratz, M. (1962). "The Two Faces of Power," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 56, Issue 4: 947-952.
- Backstrom, C.H. and Hursh-César, G. (1981). (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition) *Survey Research*. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
- Baer, V.E.H. (1996). "Computers as Composition Tools: A Case Study of Student Attitudes," *Journal of Computer-Based Instruction*, Vol. 15: 144-148.
- Bagchi, A. (1996). "Breaking the Ice: The Need to Improve US-Cuba Relations," *Harvard International Review*, Vol. 18, Issue 3: 62-63.
- Baldwin, D. A. (2000). "The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice," *International Security*, Vol. 24, Issue 3: 80-107.
- . (1985). *Economic Statecraft*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- . (1966). "Congressional Initiative in Foreign Policy," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 28: 754-753.
- Ball, D. (1974). "The Blind Men and the Elephant: A Critique of Bureaucratic Politics Theory," *Australian Outlook*, Vol. 28: 71-92.
- Balzer, A.J. (1979). "Reflections on Muddling Through," *Public Administration*

*Review*, Vol. 39, Issue 6: 537-545.

Bangert, Drowns, R.L. (1993). "The Word Processor as an Instructional Tool: A Meta-Analysis of Word Processing in Writing Instruction," *Review of Educational Research*, Vol. 63: 69-93.

Banks, J. S. (1989). "Equilibrium Outcomes in Two-Stage Amendment Procedures," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 33: 25-43.

Barav, D. (2008). *Mass Migration from Cuba: How Likely?* Washington, D.C.: World Security Institute.

Barber, J.D. (1965). *The Lawmakers*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Bardach, E. (1977). *The Implementation Game*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

———. (1972). *The Skill Factor in Politics: Repealing the Mental Commitment Laws in California*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

———. (1969). *The Politico as Virtuoso: The Skill Factor in California Mental Health Politics*. Ph.D. Dissertation. University of California, Berkeley.

Baro-Diaz, M. (2004). "Post-9/11 US Security Perceives Mass Migration as a Security Threat," *Sun-Sentinel*. August 2, 2004. <<http://www.sun-sentinel.com>> (2 August 2004).

Baruch, Y. (1999). "Response Rates in Academic Studies—A Comparative Analysis," *Human Relations*, Vol. 52, Issue 4: 421-438.

Bassett, L.(1998). *Struggling for Change: Applying the Bureaucratic Model to US Policy Toward Cuba*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Library.

Bauer, R., De Sola Pool, I. and Dexter, L.A. (1972). *American Business and Public Policy*. Chicago: Aldine-Atherton.

Baumgartner , F.R. and Jones, B.D. (1993). *Agendas and Instability in American Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

———. (1991). "Agenda Dynamics and Policy Subsystems," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 53, Issue 4:1044-1074.

Bax, F.R. (1977). "The Legislative-Executive Relationship in Foreign Policy: New

- Partnership or New Competition?," *Orbis*, Vol. 20: 881-904.
- Becker, H. (1966). "Introduction" in Shaw, C. *The Jack-Roller: A Delinquent Boy's Own Story*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Bell, M. (2002). Experts Debate Taking Cuba off Terrorism List. *Orlando Sentinel*. April 7, 2002. <<http://www.orlandosentinel.com>> (16 August 2008).
- Bellman, R.E. and Zadeh, L.A. (1970). "Decision-Making in a Fuzzy Environment," *Management Science*, Vol. 17, Issue 4: B141-B164.
- Bendixen and Associates. (2009). *National Poll of Cubans and Cuban Americans on Changes to Cuba Policy*. Miami: Bendixen and Associates.
- Bendor, J. (1995). "A Model of Muddling Through," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 89, Issue 4: 819-840.
- Bendor, J. and Hammond, T.H. (1992). "Rethinking Allison's Models," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 86, Issue 2: 301-322.
- Bendor, J., Moe, T.M., and Shotts, K.W. (2001). "Recycling the Garbage Can: An Assessment of the Research Program," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 95, Issue 1:169-190.
- Bendor, J., Taylor, S., and Van Gaalen, R. (1987). "Politicians, Bureaucrats and Asymmetric Information," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 31, Issue 4:796-828.
- Bennett, A. and George, A.L. (2005). *Case Studies and Theory Development*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- . (1997). Process Tracing in Case Study Research. Paper presented at the Mac Arthur Foundation Workshop on Case Study Methods. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (BCSIA), Harvard University, October 17-19, 1997. <<http://www.georgetown.edu/faculty/bennetta/PROTCG.htm>> (10 November 2003)..
- Benson, J.K. (1982). "A Framework for Policy Analysis," in Rogers, D. and Whetten, D. (Eds.) *Inter-organizational Coordination: Theory, Research, and Implementation*. Ames: Iowa State University Press.
- Bernell, D. (1994). "The Curious Case of Cuba in American Foreign Policy," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, Vol. 36: 65-103.

- Bernstein, R. A. (1989). *Elections, Representation and Congressional Voting Behavior: Myth of Constituency Control*. Englewoods Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
- Bernstein, R. A. and Dyer, J.A. (1984). *An Introduction to Political Science Methods*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
- Bernstein, R. and Anthony, W. (1974). "The ABM Issue in the Senate, 1968-1970: The Importance of Ideology," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 68: 1198-1206.
- Berry, F.S. and Berry, W.D. (1999). "Innovation and Diffusion Models in Policy Research," in Sabatier, P.A. (Ed.) *Theories of the Policy Process*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- . and Flowers, G. (1999). "Public Entrepreneurs in the Policy Process: Performance-Based Budgeting Reform in Florida," *Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting and Financial Management*, Vol. 11, Issue 4: 578-617.
- Berry, W.T. (1990). "The Confusing Case of Budgetary Incrementalism: Too Many Meanings for a Single Concept," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 52: 167-196.
- Best, J. J. (1971). "Influence in Washington House of Representatives," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 15, Issue 3: 547-562.
- Birkland, T.A. (2001). *An Introduction to the Policy Process: Theories, Concepts and Models of Public Policy Making*. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.
- . (1997). *After Disaster: Agenda Setting, Public Policy and Focusing Events*. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
- Blake, C.H. and Adolino, J. (2001). "The Enactment of National Health Insurance: A Boolean Analysis of Twenty Advanced Industrial Countries," *Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law*, Vol. 26: 679-708.
- Blankenau, J. (2001). "The Fate of National Health Insurance in Canada and the United States: A Multiple Streams Explanation," *Policy Studies Journal*, Vol. 29, Issue 1: 38-55.
- Blomquist, W. (2007). "The Policy Process and Large-N Comparative Studies," in Sabatier, P.A. (Ed., 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition) *Theories of the Policy Process*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Boix, C. (1990), "Promesas y límites de policy analysis en los Estados Unidos", in

Documentación Administrativa (número especial: "Políticas públicas y organización administrativa"), Instituto Nacional de Administración Pública, nos. 224-225.

Bolton, J.R. (2004). *Testimony Before the House International Relations Committee*. March 30, 2004. <<http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/31029.html>> (16 August 2008).

———. (2002). *Beyond the Axis of Evil: Additional Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction*. Remarks to the Heritage Foundation. Washington, D.C. May 6, 2002. <<http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/9962.htm>> (1 August 2008).

Bond, J.R. and Fleisher, R. (1990). *The President in the Legislative Arena*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Borchers, P.J., Kelly, M.J., Witmer, R.C., Moreno, E., Pearlstein, A.B., and Wunsch, J.S. (2007). *Report on the Resolution of Outstanding Property Claims Between Cuba and the United States*. Creighton University School of Law and Department of Political Science. Omaha: Creighton University.

Bourque, S.E. (1995). "The Illegality of the Cuban Embargo in the Current International System," *Boston University International Law Journal*, Vol. 13. <<http://www.lexisnexis.com>> (22 January 2004).

Bradley, M. (1973). "Decision making for Environmental Resources Management," *Journal of Environmental Management*, Vol. 1: 289-302.

Braumoeller, B.F. and Goertz, G. (2000). "The Methodology of Necessary Conditions," *American Journal of Political Science Review*, Vol. 44, Issue 4: 844-858.

Braun, D. and Busch, A. (1999). (Eds.) *Public Policy and Political Ideas*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Braybrooke, D. and Lindblom, C. (1963). *A Strategy of Decision: Policy Evaluation as a Social Process*. New York: Free Press of Glencoe.

Brenner, P. and Kornbluh, P. (1995). "Clinton's Cuba Calculus," *NACLA Report on the America's*, Vol. 24: 33-41.

Brenner, P., Haney, P. and Vanderbush, W. (2002). "The Confluence of Domestic and International Interests: US Policy Toward Cuba, 1998-2001," *International Studies Perspectives*, Vol. 2, Issue 2: 192-208.

- Bressers, H. (1995). *Networks for Water Policy: A Comparative Perspective*. London: Frank Cass.
- Brewer, G. and DeLeon, P. (1983). *The Foundations of Policy Analysis*. Monterey: Brooks and Cole.
- Bristow, J. (2003). *Canada and the Cultural Trade Quandary: Rethinking National Identity, Economic Liberalization, and Policy Capacity*. Ph.D. Dissertation. Carleton University. Ottawa, Ontario.
- Browning, R.P. and Jacob, H. (1971). "The Interaction Between Politicians' Personalities and Attributes of Their Roles and Political Systems," in Greenstein, F.I. and Lerner, M. (Eds.) *A Source Book for the Study of Personality and Politics*. Chicago: Markham.
- Brunner, R. D. (1991). "The Policy Movement as a Policy Problem," *Policy Sciences*, Vol. 24, Issue 1: 65-98.
- Brunsson, N. (1985). *The Irrational Organization*. New York: Wiley.
- Bryson, J.M. and Crosby, B.C. (1992). *Leadership for the Common Good: Tackling Public Problems in a Shared-Power World*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers.
- Buchanan, W., Eulau, H., Ferguson, L.C., and Wahlke, J.C. (1960). "The Legislator as Specialist," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 13, Issue 3: 636-651.
- Burnett, M. and Davis, C. (2002). "Getting Out The Cut: Politics and National Forest Timber Harvests-1995," *Administration and Society*, Vol. 34, Issue 2: 202-228.
- Burton, D. and Gilman, B. (1998). *The Compelling Case of Castro's Cocaine*. <<http://www.house.gov/burton/oped11.htm>> (17 August 2008).
- Busch, A. (1999). "From 'Hooks' to 'Focal Points': The Changing Role of Ideas in Rational Choice Theory," in Braun, D. and Busch, A. (Eds.) *Public Policy and Political Ideas*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- . (1998). *Why the New Focus on Ideas? An Introduction*. Cambridge: Center for European Studies, Harvard University.
- Cairney, P. (1997). *Advocacy Coalitions and Policy Change*. Conference Paper. University of Strathclyde. <<http://www.psa.ac.uk/cps/1997/cair.pdf>> [April 1,

2004].

- Caldwell, D. (1977). "Bureaucratic Foreign Policy-Making," *American Behavioural Scientist*, Vol. 21: 87-110.
- Calvo, H. and Declercq, K. (2000). *The Cuban Exile Movement: Dissidents or Mercenaries?*. Melbourne: Ocean Press.
- Cameron, F. (2002). *US Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff?* London: Routledge.
- . (2000). Speech. European Commission Delegation at the Luncheon of the American Chamber of Commerce of Cuba in the United States. (February 24). Washington, D.C.: European Union.  
<<http://www.eurunion.org/nnews/speeches/2000/000224fc.htm>> (23 January 2001).
- Canada. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (2000). *Cuba: Trade and Economic Overview*. Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. <[http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/geo/html\\_documents/cubatrad-e.htm](http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/geo/html_documents/cubatrad-e.htm)> (31 October 2000).
- Canrong, J. (2001). "The US Global Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era and Its Implications for China-United States Relations: A Chinese Perspective," *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 10, Issue 27: 309-315.
- Carley, K. (1986). "Measuring Efficiency in a Garbage Can Hierarchy," in March, J.G. and Weissinger-Baylon, R. *Ambiguity and Command: Organizational Perspectives on Military Decision Making*. New York: Pitman Publishing.
- Carr, A. (1992). *Presidential Elections of 1992: Popular Vote and Electoral College Vote By State*. Melbourne: Carr. <<http://psephos.adam-carr.net/us/pres/1992.txt>> (27 July 2003).
- Carr, J. and Johnson, L. (2006). *A War of Words: The Heresthetics of Creating Regional Government*. Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. April 15, 2004. Chicago, Illinois.
- Carroll, E.J. (1996). *Cuba: A New Approach*. Washington, D.C.: Center for Defense Information. <<http://www.cdi.org/issues/cuba/approach.html>> (1 July 2004).
- Carroll, H.N. (1966). *The House of Representatives and Foreign Affairs*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.

- Carter, R.G. and Scott, J.M. (2004). "Taking the Lead: Congressional Foreign Policy Entrepreneurs in US Foreign Policy," *Politics and Policy*, Vol. 32, Issue 1: 34-70.
- Carter, R.G., Scott, J.M. and Rowling, C.M. (2004). "Setting a Course: Congressional Foreign Entrepreneurs in Post-World War II US Foreign Policy," *International Studies Perspectives*, Vol. 5: 278-299.
- Castaneda, R.H. and Montalvan, G.P. (1995). *Economic Factors in Selecting an Approach to Confiscation Claims in Cuba*. Proceedings of the Fifth Annual Meeting of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy. University of Miami, Florida. August 10-12, 1995. <<http://lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/asce/cuba5/>> (1 August 2004).
- Cater, D. (1964). *Power in Washington*. New York: Random House.
- Cates, C. (1979). "Beyond Muddling: Creativity," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 39, Issue 6: 527-532.
- Center for Defense Information. (2003). *US-Cuba Issues: Counterdrug Operations*. Washington, D.C.: Center for Defense Information. <<http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=1048>> (1 July 2004).
- Center for Economic and Social Rights. (1996). *Unsanctioned Suffering. A Human Rights Assessment of United Nations Sanctions on Iraq*. New York: Center for Economic and Social Rights.
- Center for International Affairs. (1998/1999). "An Exceptionally Blunt Instrument," *Foreign Policy* (Winter). Washington, D.C.: Center for International Affairs. <[http://www.ciaoneet.org/oj/fp/fp\\_99jaa01a.html](http://www.ciaoneet.org/oj/fp/fp_99jaa01a.html)> (23 January 2001).
- Center for National Policy. (2003). *US-Cuban Relations: Time for a New Approach*. Report of the CNP Cuba Advisory Group. Washington, D.C.: Center for National Policy.
- . (2000). *Issues in US-Cuban Policy: Panel Group Discussion*. Washington, D.C.: Center for National Policy. <<http://www.cnponline.org/Press%20Releases/Transcripts/transcript-cuba.PDF>> (23 November 2002).
- Center for Responsive Politics. (2001). *The Cuban Connection*. Washington, D.C.:

Center for Responsive Politics.

<<http://www.opensecrets.org/pubs/cubareport/legislation.asp>> (10 October 2003).

Center for Strategic and International Studies. (1999). *Beyond Unilateral Economic Sanctions: Better Alternatives for US Foreign Policy*. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies

Cereijo, M. (2000). *Part III: Juaragua: Radioactive Fallout Threat*. Florida International University. Miami, Florida.

<[www.canf.org/ingles/ENSAYOS/2003-nov-11-juaragua-radioactive%20fallot-manuel-cereijo.htm](http://www.canf.org/ingles/ENSAYOS/2003-nov-11-juaragua-radioactive%20fallot-manuel-cereijo.htm)> (1 May 2004).

Chadwick, G.F. (1971). *A Systems View of Planning*. New York: Pergamon Press.

Cherry, B. (2000). "The Irony of Telecommunications Deregulation: Assessing Role Reversal in US and EU Policy" in Vogelsang, I. and Compaire, B. (Eds.) *The Internet Upheaval*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Cho, H. and LaRose, R. (1999). "Privacy Issues in Internet Surveys," *Social Science Computer Review*, Vol. 17, Issue 4: 421-434.

Cioffi-Revilla, C. (1997). "The Political Uncertainty of Interstate Rivalries: A Punctuated Equilibrium Model" in Diehl, P.F. (Ed.) *The Dynamics of Enduring Rivalries*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Clagett, B.M. (1996). "Title III of the Helms-Burton Act is Consistent With International Law," *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 90, Issue 3: 434-440.

Clark, W.R., Gilligan, M.J., and Golder, M. (2006). "A Simple Multivariate Test for Asymmetric Hypotheses," *Political Analysis*, Vol. 14, Issue 3: 311-331.

Clarke, J.G. and Ratliff, W. (2001). "Report from Havana: Time for a Reality Check on US Policy Toward Cuba," *Policy Analysis*, Issue 418: 1-21. <<http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa418.pdf>> (1 August 2004).

Clarke, M. (1989). "The Foreign Policy System: A Framework for Analysis" in Clarke, M. and White, B. (Eds.) *Understanding Foreign Policy: The Foreign Policy Systems Approach*. Aldershot: Edward Elgar.

Clarke, M. and White, B. (1989). (Eds.) *Understanding Foreign Policy: The Foreign Policy Systems Approach*. Aldershot: Edward Elgar.

- Clausen, A.R. (1973). *How Congressmen Decide: A Policy Focus*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Cline, G. (2001). *Change Agents and Policy Entrepreneurs at the Local Level*. Ph.D. Dissertation. Michigan State University. East Lansing, Michigan.
- Cobanoglu, C., Warde, B., and Moreo, P.J. (2001). "A Comparison of Mail, Fax and Web-Based Survey Methods," *International Journal of Market Research*, Vol. 43, Issue 4: 441-452.
- Cobb, R.W. and Elder, C.D. (1972). *Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics of Agenda Building*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc..
- . (1971). "The Politics of Agenda Building: An Alternative Perspective for Modern Democratic Theory," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 33, Issue 4: 892-915.
- Cobb, R.W., Ross, J.K., and Ross, M. (1976). "Agenda Building as a Comparative Political Process," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 70, Issue 1: 126-138.
- Coe, R. (2002). It's the Effect Size, Stupid: What Effect Size Is and Why it is Important. Paper presented at the Annual conference of the British Educational Research Association, University of Exeter, England. September 12-14, 2002. <<http://www.leeds.ac.uk/educol/documents/00002182.htm>> [20 April 2010].
- Cohen, B.C. (1963). *The Press and Foreign Policy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Cohen, J. (1995). "Presidential Rhetoric and the Public Agenda," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 39: 87-107.
- Cohen, J. and Cohen, P. (1983). *Applied Multiple Regression/Correlation Analysis For The Behavioral Sciences*. 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed. New Jersey: Erlbaum.
- Cohen, M.D., March, J.G., and Olsen, J.P. (1979). "People, Problems, Solutions and the Ambiguity of Relevance," in March, J.G. and Olsen, J.P. *Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations*. Bergen: Universitetsforlaget.
- . (1972). "A Garbage Can Model of Organization Choice," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 17, Issue 1:1-25.

- Colegrave, N. and Ruxton, G.D. (2002). "Confidence Intervals are a More Useful Complement to Nonsignificant Tests than are Power Calculations," *Behavioral Ecology*, Vol. 14, Issue 3: 446-447.
- Coleman, W.D., Skogstad, G. and Atkinson, M. (1996). "Paradigm Shifts and Policy Networks: Cumulative Change in Agriculture," *Journal of Public Policy*, Vol. 16, Issue 3: 273-301.
- Collins, M.C. (2002). *An Elaboration and Analysis of Two Policy Implementation Frameworks to Better Understand Project Exile*. Ph.D. Dissertation. Blacksburg: Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.
- Colvin, R. A. "Understanding Policy Adoption and Gay Rights: The Role of the Media and Other Factors," *The Innovation Journal: The Public Sector Innovation Journal*, Vol. 11, Issue 2: 1-19.
- Combs, J.A. (2002). "Embargoes and Sanctions," in DeConde, A., Burns, R.D. and Logevall, R. (Eds.), 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, *Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy*, Vol. 2, New York: Gale Group, Thomson Learning.
- Converse, J.M. and Presser, S. (1986). *Survey Questions: Handcrafting the Standardized Questionnaire*. Beverly Hills: Publications.
- Cook, C., Heath, F., and Thompson R.L. (2000). "A Meta Analysis of Response Rates In Web or Internet Based Surveys," *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, Vol. 60, Issue 6: 821-836.
- Cornford, J.P. (1974). "Review of Essence of Decision by Graham Allison," *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 4: 231-243.
- Corrales, J. (2004). "The Gatekeeper State: Limited Economic Reforms and Regime Survival in Cuba, 1989-2002," *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. 39, Issue 2: 35-65.
- Corrie, J. (1999). *Where Does Cuba Go From Here?* ACP/European Union. <[http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/publications/courier/courier179/en/en\\_020\\_ni.pdf](http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/publications/courier/courier179/en/en_020_ni.pdf)> (8 September 2003).
- Council on Foreign Relations. (1998) *Independent Task Force Report: US-Cuban Relations in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations.
- Couper, M.P., Blair, J., and Triplett, T. (1999). "A Comparison of Mail and E-Mail for

- a Survey of Employees in Federal Statistical Agencies," *Journal of Official Statistics*, Vol. 15: 39-56.
- Crawford, S. D., Couper, M. P. and Lamias, M. J. (2001). "Web Surveys. Perceptions of Burden," *Social Science Computer Review*, Vol. 19, Issue 2: 146-162.
- Creative Research Systems. (2006). "Survey Design," in Creative Research Systems, The Survey System's Tutorial. <<http://www.surveysystem.com/sdesign.htm>>. (1 July 2007).
- Cuba Net Cuba News. (2001). "Will Bush try to Refreeze Cuban Thaw?" January 31, 2001.
- Cuba Trader. (2000). "Condoleezza Rice, Representative Lincoln Diaz-Balart Agree on Blueprint for Bush's Cuba Policy," *Cuba Trader*. December 2, 2000, 1.
- Cuban-American National Foundation. (2001). *Cuban-American National Foundation. Profile*. Miami: Cuban American National Foundation. <<http://www.canfnet.org>> (19 November 2001).
- Cuban Committee for Democracy. (2004). *Mission Statement*. Locations: Cuban Committee for Democracy. Washington, D.C.: Cuban Committee for Democracy. <<http://www.us.net/cuban/mission.html>> (1 August 2004).
- Cueto, E. (1995). *Property Claims of Cuban Nationals*. Papers and Proceedings of the Cuban Transition. Washington, D.C., January 26, 1995.
- Daft, R.L. (1982). "Bureaucratic Versus Nonbureaucratic Structure and the Process of Innovation and Change," *Research in the Sociology of Organizations*, Vol. 1: 129-166.
- Dahl, R. (1967). *Pluralist Democracy in the US: Conflict and Consent*. Chicago: Rand, McNally.
- . (1950). *Congress and Foreign Policy*. New York: Norton.
- Dahl, R. and Lindblom, C.E. (1953). *Politics, Economics and Welfare: Planning and Politico-economic Systems Resolved Into Basic Social Processes*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Dalkie, K. (1998). *The Making of US Policy Towards Cuba*. M.A. Thesis. Ottawa: Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University.

- Daniel, F., Whitten, S., and Graesser, A.(2002). QUAID: Comprehensibility of Questions Evaluated Through an Eye-tracker. Paper presented at the Southern Association of Public Opinion Research. Raleigh, North Carolina. <<http://mnemosyne.csl.psyc.memphis.edu/QUAID/SAPPOR.pdf>> (1 June 2007).
- Daoudi, M. and Dajani, M. (1983). *Economic Sanctions: Ideals and Experience*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Dashti-Gibson, J., Davis, P. and Radcliff, B. (1997). "On the Determinants of the Success of Economic Sanctions: An Empirical Analysis," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 41, Issue 2: 608-618.
- Davidson, R.H. (1977). "Breaking Up Those Cozy Triangles: An Impossible Dream" in Welch, S. and Peters J.G. (Eds.) *Legislative Reform and Public Policy*. New York: Praeger.
- Davies, H.T. and Crombie, I.K. (2009). *What are Confidence Intervals and P-Values? 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition*. London: Hayward Group Ltd.
- Davis, A. (1995). "Helms to Cuba: See You in Court," *The National Law Journal*. July 10, 1995: Vol. 17, Issue 45: A1, A22.
- Davis, G. (1999). *Policy Entrepreneurship: A Case Study of the Maryland Governors Commission on Welfare Policy*. Ph.D. Dissertation. George Mason University. Fairfax, Virginia.
- Dawson, L.R. (2005). *Making Canadian Trade Policy: Domestic Decision Making and the Negotiation of the Auto Pact and the CUFTA*. Ph.D. Dissertation. Ottawa: Carleton University.
- Dayley, R. (1997). *Modeling Chaos: Alternative Images of Policy Formation in Thailand*. Ph.D. Dissertation. Northern Illinois University. Dekalb, Illinois.
- Dearing, J.W. and Rogers, E.M. (1996). *Agenda Setting*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
- DeBruijn, J.A. and ten Heuvelhof, E.F. (2000). *Networks and Decision-Making*. Utrecht: Lemma Publishers.
- DeGregorio, C. (1988). "Professionals in the US Congress: An Analysis of Working Styles," *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 17, Issue 4: 459-476.

- Delahunt, W. (2002). Remarks: Democratic and Economic Impetus for Free Travel. National Summit on Cuba. September 17-18, 2002. Washington, D.C.: National Summit on Cuba.  
<<http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/uscuba/SummitBookComplete.pdf>> (20 October 2003).
- DeLeon, P. (1999). "The Stages Approach to the Policy Process: What Has it Done? Where is it Going?" in Sabatier, P.A. (Ed.) *Theories of the Policy Process*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- . (1998). "Models of Policy Discourse: Insights Versus Prediction," *Policy Studies Journal*, Vol. 26, Issue 1: 147-161.
- Denhardt, R.B. (1993). *Theories of Public Organization*. Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing.
- Denzau, A. and MacKay, R. (1983). "Gatekeeping and Monopoly Power of Committees: An Analysis of Sincere and Sophisticated Behavior," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 27: 740-762.
- Destler, I.M. (1972). *Presidents, Bureaucracies and Foreign Policy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Detroit, M. (1996). "The Imperialist Helms-Burton Law and the Myth of Cuban Socialism," *Communist Voice*, Vol. 2, Issue 10.  
<<http://home.flash.net/~comvoice/10cHelms.html>> (14 November 2000).
- Deutsch, K.W. (1966). *The Nerves of Government*. New York: Free Press.
- Dexter, L.A. (1969). *The Sociology and Politics of Congress*. Chicago: Rand, McNally.
- . (1957). "The Representative and His District," *Human Organization*, Vol. 16: 2-13.
- DeYoung, D.A. (2004). *Of Problems, Policies and Politics: Using Multiple Streams to Describe and Explain State Reading Policy Development*. Ph.D. Dissertation. University of Michigan. Ann Arbor, Michigan.
- Dhooge, L.J. (2000). "Fiddling with Fidel: An Analysis of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996," *Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law*, Vol. 14: 575-635.

- Diaz, M.B. (2004). *Post-9/11 US Policy Perspectives Perceives Mass Immigration as Security Threat*. August 2, 2004. <<http://www.sun-sentinel.com>> (1 October 2008).
- Diehl, P.F. (1991). "Ghosts of Arms Control Past: SALT II and the Regan Administration 1981-1984," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 105, Issue 4:597-615.
- Diehl, P.F. and Goertz, D. (2000). *War and Peace in International Rivalry*. Ann Arbor: University Of Michigan Press.
- Dillman, D.A. (2000). (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition) *Mail and Internet Surveys: The Tailored Design Method*. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
- . (1991). "The Design and Administration of Mail Surveys," *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 17: 225-249.
- DiRenzo, G.J. (1977). "Politicians and Personality" A Cross-Cultural Perspective," in Hermann, M.G. (Ed.) *A Psychological Examination of Political Leaders*. New York: Free Press.
- Doig, J.W. and Hargrove, E.C. (1987). (Eds.) *Leadership and Innovation: A Biographical Perspective on Entrepreneurs in Government*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Dominguez, J.C. (2005). *Collective Action Frames and Policy Windows: The Case of the Project to Export Liquefied Natural Gas from Bolivia to California*. QEH Working Paper Series. Working Paper Number 127.
- Dominguez, J.I. (1997). "US-Cuban Relations: From the Cold War to the Colder War," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, Vol. 39, Issue 3: 49-75.
- . (1994). "US Policy Toward Cuba in the 1980s and 1990s," *The Annals of the American Academy*, Vol. 533: 165-176.
- Dorn, J. (1996). "Trade and Human Rights: The Case of China," *CATO Journal*, Vol. 16, Issue 1. <<http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj16n1-5.html>> ( 7 October 2000).
- Dowding, K. (2000). "How Not to Use Evolutionary Theory in Politics: A Critique of Peter John," *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, Vol. 2,

Issue 1: 72-80.

- . (1995). "Model or Metaphor?," A Critical Review of the Policy Network Approach," *Political Studies*, Vol. 43: 136-159.
- Downing, B. (1992). *The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Downs, A. (1967). *Inside Bureaucracy*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- . (1957). *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Dror, Y. (1997). "Revitalizing the Senior Public Service for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Workshops, Lectures, Conversations with Yehezkel Dror," Prepared by Dr. Jim Armstrong for Canadian Centre for Management Development, Public Service Commission of Canada
- . (1964). "Muddling Through—Science or Inertia?," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 24, Issue 3:153-157.
- Dryzek, J. and Ripley, B. (1988). "The Ambitions of Policy Design," *Policy Studies Review*, Vol. 7: 705-719.
- Dudley, G. (2003). "Ideas, Bargaining and Flexible Policy Communities: Policy Change and the Case of the Oxford Transport Strategy," *Public Administration*, Vol. 81, Issue 3: 433-458.
- Dudley, G. and Richardson, J. (1996). "Why Does Policy Change Over Time? Adversarial Policy Communities, Alternative Policy Arenas and British Trunk Roads Policy 1945-1995," *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 3, Issue 2: 63-83.
- Dudley, G., Parsons, W., Radaelli, C.M., and Sabatier, P. (2000). "Symposium: Theories of the Policy Process," *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 7, Issue 1: 122-140.
- Dunn, W. (1988). "Methods of the Second Type: coping with the Wilderness of Conventional Policy Analysis," *Policy Studies Review*, Vol. 7: 720-737.
- Durant, R. and Diehl, F. (1989). "Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policy: Lessons from the US Foreign Policy Arena" *Journal of Public Policy*, Vol. 9, Issue 2: 179-205.

- Durant, R.F. and Haynes, D. (1993). "The Politics of Growth Management Reform in the States: A Comparative Analysis," *Policy Studies Review*, Vol. 12, Issue 3/4: 30-54.
- Dye, T.R. (2002). (10<sup>th</sup> Edition) *Understanding Public Policy*. Upper Saddle River: Prentice-Hall.
- Dyson, K.H.F. (1975). "Improving Policy-making in Bonn: Why the Central Planners Failed," *Journal of Environmental Management*, Vol. 1: 289-302.
- Easton, D. (1964). *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*. New York: John Wiley.
- Ebbesen, E.B. and Konecni, V.J. (1980). "On the External Validity of Decision-Making Research: What do We Know About Decisions in the Real World?" in Wallsten, T. (Ed.) *Cognitive Processes in Choice and Decision Behaviour*. Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Eckstein, H. (1975). "Case Study and Theory in Political Science," in Greenstein, F.J. and Polsby, N.W. (Eds.) *Handbook of Political Science Vol. 7*. Reading: Addison-Wesley.
- Eckstein, S. (2009). *The Immigrant Divide: How Cubans Changed the US and Their Homeland*. New York: Routledge.
- Eckstein, S. and Barberia, L. (2002). "Grounding Immigrant Generations in History: Cuban Americans and their Transitional Ties," *International Migration Review*, Vol. 36, Number 3: 799-837.
- Edwards, G.C. and Wood, D.B. (1999). "Who Influences Whom? The President, Congress, and the Media," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 93, Issue 2: 327-344.
- Edwards, W. (1954). "The Theory of Decision Making," *Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. 51, Issue 4: 380-417.
- Einhorn, H. and Hogarth, R.M. (1981). "Behaviourial Decision Theory," *Annual Review of Psychology*, Vol. 32:53-88.
- Eldridge, N. and Gould, S.J. (1972). "Punctuated Equilibria: An Alternative to Phyletic Gradualism." in Schopf, T.J.M. (Ed.) *Models in Paleobiology*. San Francisco: Freeman Cooper.

- Elliston, J. (1995). "The Myth of the Miami Monolith," *NACLA Report on the Americas*, Vol. 29, Issue 2.  
<<http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/43b/027.html>> (13 February 2004).
- Enelow, J.M. (1981). "Saving Amendments, Killer Amendments, and an Expected Utility Theory of Sophisticated Voting," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 43: 1062-1089.
- Enelow, J.M. and Kohler, D. (1980). "The Amendment in Legislative Strategy: Sophisticated Voting in the US Congress," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 42: 396-413).
- Ertman, T. (1997). *Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Etzioni, A. (1989). "Humble Decision Making," *Harvard Business Review*, July/August: 122-126.
- . (1986). "Mixed Scanning Revisited," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 46, Issue 1: 8-14.
- . (1968). *The Active Society: A Theory of Societal and Political Processes*. New York: The Free Press.
- . (1967). "Mixed Scanning: A 'Third' Approach to Decision Making," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 27, Issue 5: 385-392.
- Eustis, J.D. (2000). *Agenda Setting: The Universal Service Case*. Ph.D. Dissertation. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. Blacksburg, Virginia.
- Evans, P., Jacobson, H. and Putnam, R. (1993). *Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Eyestone, R. (1978). *From Social Issues to Public Policy*. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
- Fairhurst, G.T. and Sarr, R.A. (1986). (1<sup>st</sup> Edition) *The Art of Framing: Managing the Language of Leadership*. San Fransico: Jossey-Bass Publishers.
- Falcone, D. (1981). "Health Policy Analysis: Some Reflections on the State of the Art," *Policy Studies Journal*, Vol. 9, Issue 1: 188-197.
- Farkas, A. (1996). "Evolutionary Models in Foreign Analysis," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 40: 343-361.

- Fat, L.L. (1982). "Testing The Aptness of The Multiple Regression Model," *CUHK Education Journal*, Vol. 10 No. 2: 27-35.
- Fedarko, K. (1995). "Open for Business," *Time*, February 20, 1995: 37-45.
- Federation of American Scientists. (1999). *Cuba's Nuclear Reactors*. Washington, D.C.: Federation of American Scientists.  
<<http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/cuba/main.html>> (4 August 2004).
- Feldman, M.S. (1989). *Order Without Design: Information Production and Policy Making*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Feldman, M. S. and March, J.G. (1981). "Information as Signal and Symbol," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 26, Issue 2: 171-186.
- Fenno, R.F. (1978). *Home Style*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- . (1973a). *Congressmen in Committees*. Boston: Little Brown.
- . (1973b). "The Internal Distribution of Influence: The House," in D.B. Truman (Ed.) *The Congress and America's Future*. Englewood: Prentice Hall.
- . (1966). *The Power of the Purse*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
- Fennor, R. F., Fernandes, R. and Simon, H.A. (1999). "A Study of How Individuals Solve Complex and Ill-Structured Problems," *Policy Sciences*, Vol. 32: 225-245.
- Fielding, J. and Gibert N. (2006). (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition) *Understanding Social Statistics*. London: Sage Publications.
- Finch, S., Cumming, G., and Thomason, N. (2001). "Reporting of Statistical Inference in The Journal of Applied Psychology: Little Evidence of Reform," *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, Vol. 61: 181–210
- Fink, A. (1995). *How to Ask Survey Questions*. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications.
- Fiorina, M.P. (1974). *Representatives, Roll Calls, and Constituencies*. Lexington: Lexington Books.
- Fiorina, M.P. and Plott, C.R. (1978). "Committee Decisions Under Majority Rule: An Experimental Study," *American Political Studies Review*, Vol. 72, Issue 2: 575-

598.

- Fisk, D.W. (2001). "Cuba: The End of an Era," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 24, Issue 1: 93-1017.
- Fletcher, K. (2003). CUBA: US Employs Weapons of Mass Migration. May 14, 2003. *Green Left Weekly*. <<http://www.grenleft.org.au>> (1 October 2008).
- Flyvbjerg, B. (2006). "Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research," *Qualitative Inquiry*, Vol. 12, Issue 2: 219-245.
- Font, M.A. (1997). *Advancing Democracy in Cuba: The International Context*. Paper presented at symposium "Economic Integration and Democracy: Latin America and Cuba," Instituto de Estudios Internacionales, Santiago de Chile, May 26-27. <<http://www.soc.qc.edu/procuba/advancingdemocracy.html>> (17 November 2000).
- Foreign Policy Analysis. (2010). Foreign Policy Analysis. <<http://foreignpolicyanalysis.org/index.html>> ( 1 April 2010).
- Forester, J. (1984). "Bounded Rationality and the Politics of Muddling Through," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 44, Issue 1: 23-30.
- Fowler, F.J. (2002). *Survey Research Methods* (3<sup>rd</sup> Edition). Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
- . (1988). (Revised Edition) *Survey Research Methods*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
- Francis, W.L. (1962). "Influence and Interaction in A State Legislative Body," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 56, Issue 4: 953-960.
- Franzblau, K.J. (1997). *Immigration's Impact on US National Security and Foreign Policy*. Research Paper. US Commission on Immigration Reform. Washington, D.C.: US Commission on Immigration Reform.
- Freedman, L. (1976). "Logic, Politics and Foreign Policy Processes: A Critique of the Bureaucratic Politics Model," *International Affairs*, Vol. 52: 434-449.
- Freeman, G.P. (1985). "National Styles and Policy Sectors: Explaining Structural Variation," *Journal of Public Policy*, Vol. 5, Issue 4: 467-496.
- Freeman, J.L. (1955). *The Political Process*. New York: Random House.

- Freer, R.E. (1995). *Helms-Burton Myths and Reality*. Proceedings of the Fifth Annual Meeting of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy. University of Miami, Florida. August 10-12, 1995.  
<<http://lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/asce/cuba5/>> (1 August 2004).
- Friedman, B. (2002). *Cuba: Bioweapons Threat or Political Punching-Bag?* Washington, D.C.: Center for Defense Information.  
<<http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/cuba-pr.cfm>> (25 July 2004).
- Froman, L.A. (1963). *Congressmen and Their Constituencies*. Chicago: Rand, McNally.
- Galligan, A.M. and Burgess, C.N. (2003). *Moving Rivers, Shifting Streams: Perspectives on the Existence of a Policy Window*. Paper presented at the 29<sup>th</sup> Annual Social Theory, Politics and Arts Conference. Ohio State University.
- Garcia, M.C. (1996). *Cuban Exiles and Cuban Americans in South Florida: 1959-1994*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Garibaldi, O. and Kirby, J. (2003). "The Treatment of Expropriated Property in a Post-Castro World," in Garibaldi, O., Kirby, J. and Traviesco-Diaz, M., *Expropriated Properties in a Post-Castro Cuba: Two Views*. Miami: Institute for Cuban and Cuban American Studies.
- Garret, B. (2001). *The Role of Policy Entrepreneurs in Policy Diffusion*. Ph.D. Dissertation. University of Kentucky. Lexington, Kentucky.
- Garson, D.G. (2007). *Survey Research*.  
<<http://www2.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/pa765/survey.htm>> (1 July 2007).
- . (2006). *Sampling: Key Concepts and Terms*.  
<<http://www2.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/pa765/sampling.htm>> (13 February 2007).
- Gawthrop, L.C. (1971). *Administrative Politics and Social Change*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Gedda, G. (1999). *CIA Probes Cuban Link to Drug Trade*. Associated Press. August 16, 1999. <<http://www2/fcf/ciaprobe81699.html>> (5 July 2004).
- Gendall, P. (2005). "The Effect of Cover Letter Personalization on Mail Surveys," *International Journal of Market Research*, Vol. 47, Issue 4: 365-380.

- George, A.L. (1980). *Presidential Decision Making in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice*. Boulder: Westview Press,
- . (1969). "The Operational Code: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 13, Issue 2 :190-222.
- George, A.L. and Bennett, A. (2005). *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- George, A.L. and George, J.L. (1998). *Presidential Personality and Performance*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- German, R., and Oppenheim, C. (1996). "Should Academic Libraries Lend LIS Journals?," *Journal of Librarianship and Information Science*, Vol. 28, Issue 4: 191-202.
- Gerston, L.N. (2004). *Public Policy Making: Process and Principles*. New York: M.E. Sharpe.
- Gibbons, E. (1999). *Sanctions in Haiti: Human Rights and Democracy Under Assault*. Westport: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Praeger Press.
- Gill, H.S., and Yates-Mercer, P. (1998). "The Dissemination of Information by Local Authorities on the World Wide Web," *Journal of Information Science*, Vol. 24, Issue 2: 105-112.
- Ginsberg, F. (1989). *Contested Lives: The Abortion Debate in an American Community*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Giscard, J. C. (2002). *US-Cuba Relations: Revisiting the Sanctions Policy*. M.A. Thesis. Naval Postgraduate School. Monterey, California. Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School.
- Global Exchange. (2001). *Global Exchange Profile*. San Francisco: Global Exchange. <<http://www.globalexchange.org>> (19 November 2001).
- Godwin, M.L. and Schroedel, J.R. (2000). "Policy Diffusion and Strategies for Promoting Policy Change: Evidence From California Local Gun Control Ordinances," *Policy Studies Journal*, Vol. 28, Issue 4: 760-776.
- Goertz, G. (2006). *Social Science Concepts: A User's Guide*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- . (2003). *International Norms and Decision Making: A Punctuated Equilibrium Model*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
- . (2001a). *Increasing Concept-Indicator Validity: The Case of Democracy*. Draft Paper. Department of Political Science. University of Arizona.
- . (2001b). *Necessary Condition Theory: What Kingdon, Ostrom, and Skocpol Have in Common*. Paper presented at the Training Institute on Qualitative Research Methods. Tucson, Arizona. Arizona State University. <<http://www.asu.edu/clas/polisci/cqrm/papers/Goertz4.pdf>> (16 May 2006).
- Goertz, G. and Levy, J.S. (2005a). "Causal Explanation, Necessary Conditions, and Case Studies," in Goertz, G. and Levy, J.S. (Eds.) *Causal Explanations, Necessary Conditions, and Case Studies: World War I and the End of the Cold War*. Book Manuscript. <[http://www.compass.org/goertz\\_levy2005.pdf](http://www.compass.org/goertz_levy2005.pdf)> (16 May 2005).
- . (2005b). (Eds.) *Causal Explanations, Necessary Conditions, and Case Studies: World War I and the End of the Cold War*. Book Manuscript.
- Goertz, G. and Mahoney, J. (2006). "Concepts in Theories: Two-Level Theories," in Goertz, G. *Social Science Concepts: A User's Guide*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- . (2004). *Two-Level Theories and Fuzzy Sets*. Paper presented at the Second Annual Training Institute on Qualitative Research Methods. Tucson, Arizona. Arizona State University. <[http://www.asu.edu/clas/polisci/cqrm/papers/goertz\\_mahoney2004.pdf](http://www.asu.edu/clas/polisci/cqrm/papers/goertz_mahoney2004.pdf)> (16 May 2005).
- Goertz, G. and Starr, H. (2003). (Eds.) *Necessary Conditions: Theory, Methodology, and Applications*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Goldberg, L.R. (1997). "Trade Policy and Election-Year Policies: The Truth About Title III of the Helms-Burton Act," *Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business*, Vol. 18: 217-245.
- Goldberg, M.A. (1975). "On the Inefficiency of Being Efficient," *Environment and Planning*, Vol. 7: 921-939.
- Goldstein, J. (1993). *Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy*. New York: Cornell University Press.
- Goldstein, J. and Keohane, R.O. (1993a). (Eds.) *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs,*

*Institutions and Political Change*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

- . (1993b). "Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework," in Goldstein, J. and Keohane, R.O. (Eds.) *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Gonzalez, D. (2002). Carter and Powell Cast Doubt on Bioarms in Cuba. *New York Times*. May 14, 2002. <<http://www.nytimes.com>> (1 August 2008).
- Gordenker, L., Coate, R. A., Jönsson, C., and Söderholm, P. (1995). *International Cooperation in Response to AIDS*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Gould, S.J. and Eldridge, N. (1993). "Punctuated Equilibrium Comes of Age," *Nature*, Vol. 366: 223-227.
- . (1977). "Punctuated Equilibria: The Tempo and Mode of Evolution Reconsidered," *Paleobiology*, Vol. 3: 115-151.
- Graesser, A.C., Cai, Z., Louwse, M., and Daniel, F. (2006). "Question Understanding Aid (QUAID): A Web Facility That Helps Survey Methodologists Improve the Comprehensibility of Questions," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 70, Issue 1: 3-22.
- Graesser, A.C., Karnavat, A.B., Daniel, F.K., Cooper, E., Cai, Z., Whitten, S.N., Louwse, M., Bartlett, K., Tenneti, R., and Ratnakar, V.(2002). *QUAID: A Computer Tool that Helps Survey Methodologist Improve the Comprehensibility of Questions*. Paper presented at American Association of Public Opinion Research. St. Petersburg, Florida. <<http://mnemosyne.csl.psyac.memphis.edu/QUAID/AAPOR.pdf>> (1 June 2007).
- Graesser, A.C., Karnavat, A.B., Daniel, F.K., Cooper, E., Whitten, S.N., and Louwse, M. (2001). A Computer Tool to Improve Questionnaire Design. Statistical Policy Working Paper 33, Federal Committee on Statistical Methodology. Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Labor Statistics. <<http://mnemosyne.csl.psyac.memphis.edu/QUAID/statistical%20policy.pdf>> (1 June 2007).
- Graesser, A.C., Wiemer-Hastings, K., Kreuz, R., Wiemer-Hastings, P., and Marquis, K. (2000). *QUAID: A Questionnaire Evaluation Aid for Survey Methodologists*. <<http://mnemosyne.csl.psyac.memphis.edu/QUAID/abstractpub.pdf>> (1 June 2007).
- Graesser, A.C., Wiemer-Hastings, K., Wiemer-Hastings, P., and Kreuz, R. (2001).

*The Gold Standard Of Question Quality On Surveys: Experts, Computer Tools, Versus Statistical Indices.* Proceedings of the American Statistical Association.

<<http://mnemosyne.csl.psyc.memphis.edu/QUAID/goldstandard.pdf>> (1 June 2007).

Gamma International. (1995). "Foreign Investment Act," *Gamma International Supplement*, October 25, 1995: 5-12.

Green, E. (1997). *Unfinished Cuban Nuclear Plants Said Not to Threaten US* Washington, D.C.: United States Information Services.

<[http://www.fas.org/news/cuba/97111019\\_lpo.html](http://www.fas.org/news/cuba/97111019_lpo.html)> (1 August 2004).

Greenberg, G.D., Miller, J.A., Mohr, L.B. and Vladeck, B.C. (1977). "Developing Public Policy Theory: Perspectives from Empirical Research," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 71, Issue 4: 1532-1543.

Greenstein, F.I. (1987). *Personality and Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Grin, J. and Hoppe, R. (1997). *Towards a Theory of the Policy Process: Problems, Premises and Prospects of the ACF*. Paper presented at the Polybios Workshop, University of Amsterdam. February 1997.

Grindle, M. and Thomas, J.W. (1991). *Public Choices and Policy Change: The Political Economy of Reform in Developing Countries*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

Groombridge, M.A. (2001). *Missing the Target: The Failure of the Helms-Burton Act*. Washington, D.C.: CATO Institute.

<<http://www.free-trade.org/pubs/briefs/tbp-012es.html>> (14 August 2002).

Groves, R. (1989). *Survey Errors and Survey Costs*. New York: John Wiley and Sons.

Groves, R.M., Presser, S. and Dipko, S. (2004). "The Role of Topic Interest in Survey Participation Decisions," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 68, Issue 1: 2-31.

Gunn, G. (2002). *Cuba Today*. Washington, D.C.: Center for National Policy.

———. (1994). *Balancing Economic Efficiency, Social Concerns and Political Control*. Center for Latin American Studies, Georgetown University. Cuba Briefing Paper 5. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University.

<<http://www.trinitydc.edu/academics/depts/Interdisc/International/caribbean%20briefings/BalancingEconomic.pdf>> (1 July 2004).

- Gustavsson, J. (1998). *The Politics of Foreign Policy Change: Explaining the Swedish Reorientation on EC Membership*. Ph.D. Dissertation. Lund: Lund University. <[http://www.svet.lu.se/Fulltext/Jakob\\_G.pdf](http://www.svet.lu.se/Fulltext/Jakob_G.pdf)> (12 December 2010).
- Haas, M.L. (2001). "Prospect Theory and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 45: 241-270.
- Haass, R.N. (1998). (Ed.) *Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations.
- Haass, R.N. and O'Sullivan, M.L. (2000). (Eds.) *Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy*. Washington: Brookings Institution.
- Hacker, J. (1997). *The Road to Nowhere: The Genesis of President Clinton's Plan for Health Security*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Hackett, J.A. (1980). *A Theoretical Model for the Predictive Analysis of Power*. Ph.D. Dissertation. Nashville: George Peabody College for Teachers, Vanderbilt University.
- Hall, P.A. (1993). "Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 25, Issue 3: 275-296.
- . (1988). *Policy Paradigms, Social Learning And The State*. Paper presented to the International Political Science Association. Washington, DC.
- Hallachar, P. (2000). *Effects of Policy Subsystem Structure on Policymaking: The Case of the Advanced Technology Program and the Manufacturing Extension Partnership*. Ph.D. Dissertation. Pennsylvania State University. University Park, Pennsylvania.
- Halperin, M.H. (1974). *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute.
- Hammond, T.H. (1986). "Agenda Control, Organizational Structure and Bureaucratic Politics," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 30, Issue 2: 379-420.
- Handler, J. (1978). *Social Movements and the Legal System: A Theory of Law Reform and Social Change*. New York: Academic Press.

- Haney, P. J. and Vanderbush, W. (2005). *The Cuban Embargo: The Domestic Politics of An American Foreign Policy*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- . (2002). "The Helms-Burton Act: Congress and Cuba Policy," in Carter, R.G. *Contemporary Cases in US Foreign Policy*. CQ Press: Washington, D.C..
- . (1999). "The Role of Ethnic Interest Groups in US Foreign Policy: The Case of the Cuban American National Foundation," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 43: 341-361.
- Hann, A. (1995). "Sharpening Up Sabatier: Belief Systems and Public Policy," *Politics* Vol. 15, Issue 1: 19-26.
- Hanna, A.A. (1980). *Settlement and Energy Policy in Perspective: A Theoretical Framework for the Evaluation of Public Policy*. Ph.D. Dissertation. London: University of Western Ontario.
- Hansen, K.N. and Krejci, D. (2000). "Rethinking Neoinstitutional Interaction: Municipal Arena-Specific Strategies and the Base Closure Process," *Administration and Society*, Vol. 32, Issue 2: 166-182.
- Hardin, J.W. (1996). "Fishing for Constituents, Promoting Certainty: The Dynamics of Committee Jurisdiction Concentration." Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago.
- Hart, P. T. (1990). *Groupthink in Government: A Study of Small Groups and Policy Failure*. Amsterdam: Swets and Zeitlinger.
- . (1991). "Irving Janis' Victims of Groupthink," *Political Psychology*, Vol. 12: 247-278.
- Hart, P. T. and Rosenthal, U. (1998). "Reappraising Bureaucratic Politics," *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol. 32, Issue 2: 233-240.
- Hart, P.T., Stern, E.K., and Sundelius, B. (1997). *Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policymaking*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Hawisher, G.E. (1989). "Research and Recommendations For Computers and Composition," in Hawisher, G.E. and Selfe, C.L. (Editors) *Critical Perspectives on Computers and Composition Instruction*. New York: Teachers College Press.

- Hayes, M.T. (2001). *The Limits of Policy Change: Incrementalism, Worldview and the Rule of Law*. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
- Healey, J. (2010). *The Essentials of Statistics: A Tool for Social Research*. Belmont: Wadsworth.
- Heath, C. and Tversky, A. (1991). "Preference and Belief: Ambiguity and Competence in Choice Under Uncertainty," *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty*, Vol. 4, Issue 1: 5-28.
- Heberlein, T.A. and Baumgartner, R. (1978). "Factors Affecting Response Rates to Mailed Questionnaires: A Quantitative Analysis of the Published Literature," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 43, Issue 4: 447-462.
- Heck, R. H. (2004). *Studying Educational and Social Policy: Theoretical Concepts and Research Methods*. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Hecllo, H. (1974). *Social Policy in Britain and Sweden*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Heimer, C.A. and Stinchcombe, A. (1998). *Remodeling the Garbage Can: Implications of the Causal Origins of Items in Decision Streams*. American Bar Foundation Working Paper #9805. Chicago: Northwestern University.
- Heintz, H. T. and Jenkins-Smith, H.C. (1988). "Advocacy Coalitions and the Practice of Policy Analysis," *Policy Sciences*, Vol. 21, Issue 2/3: 263-277.
- Hensel, P.R. and Diehl, P.F. (1998). *Punctuated Equilibrium or Evolution? A Comparative Test of Two Models of Rivalry Development*. Florida State University. <<http://garnet.acns.fsu.edu/~phensel/Research/jcr00.pdf>> (1 June 2005).
- Heradstveit, D. (1981). *The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Psychological Obstacles to Peace*. Oslo: Universitatforlaget.
- Hermann, M.G. (2001). "How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Framework," *International Studies Review*, Vol. 3, Issue 2: 47-81.
- . (1984). "Personality and Foreign Policymaking: A Study of 53 Heads of Government," in Sylvan, D. and Chan, S. (Eds.) *Foreign Policy Decision Making: Perceptions, Cognitions and Artificial Intelligence*. New York: Praeger.
- . (1980). "Explaining Foreign Policy Behaviour Using the Personal

Characteristics of Political Leaders," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 24, Issue: 7-46.

- Herrmann, R. (1988). "The Empirical Challenge of the Cognitive Revolution: a Strategy for Drawing Inferences About Perceptions," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 32, Issue 2: 175-203.
- Hicks, A., Misra, J. and Nah Ng, T. (1995). "The Programmatic Emergence of the Social Security State," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 60: 329-349.
- Hicks, D.B. (1996). "Dueling Decisions: Contrasting Constitutional Visions of the United States President's Foreign Policy Role," *Policy Studies Journal*, Vol. 24: 245-258.
- Hill, K.Q. (1997). "In Search of Policy Theory," *Policy Currents*, Vol. 7, Issue 1: 1-20.
- Hirschman, A.O. and Lindblom, C.E. (1962). "Economic Development, Research and Development, Policy Making: Some Converging Views," *Behavioral Science*, Vol. 7: 211-222.
- Hjern, B. and Hull, C. (1982). "Implementation Research as Empirical Constitutionalism," *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 10: 105-115.
- Hoffman, A. (1989). "15 Years Later: Punctuated Equilibrium in Retrospect," *Journal of Social and Biological Structures*, Vol. 12, Issues 2/3: 185-194.
- Hoffmann, B. (2001). "Transformation and Continuity in Cuba," *Review of Radical Political Economics*, Vol. 33: 1-20.
- Hoffmann, S. (1968). *Gulliver's Troubles or the Setting of American Foreign Policy*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Hogan, T. (2002). *The Cuba Conundrum: Analyzing the United States Embargo on Cuba*. Provo: Brigham Young University.
- Hogwood, B.W. and Gunn, L.A. (1984). *Policy Analysis for the Real World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Holland, L. (1996). "Who Makes Weapons Procurement Decisions?: A Test of the Subsystem Model of Policymaking," *Policy Studies Journal*, Vol. 24, Issue 4: 607-624.
- Holsti, O. (1969). *Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities*.

Reading: Addison-Wesley.

- Holsti, O.R. (1977). "The Operational Code As An Approach to the Analysis of Belief Systems." *Final Report to the National Science Foundation*. Grant No. SOC 75-15368. Duke University.
- . (1976). "Foreign Policy Formation Viewed Cognitively" in Axelrod, R. (Ed.) *Structure of Decision*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Holyoke, T.T. and Henig, J.R. (2001). *Shopping in the Political Arena: Venue Selection and the Advocacy Behavior of Charter Schools*. Paper prepared for the 2001 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, California.
- Hood, C. (2002). "The Risk Game and the Blame Game," *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 37, Issue 1: 15-54.
- Houlihan, B. and Green, M. (2006). "The Changing Status of School Sport and Physical Education: Explaining Policy Change," *Sport, Education and Society*, Vol. 1, Issue 1: 73-92.
- Howard, C. (2001). "Bureaucrats in the Social Policy Process: Administrative Policy Entrepreneurs and the Case of Working Nation," *Australian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. 60, Issue 3: 56-65.
- Howell, D.C. (2002). "Multiple Regression #3" <http://www.uvm.edu/~dhowell/gradstat/psych/> (2 July 2004).
- Howlett, M. (1999). "Rejoinder to Stuart Soroka, "Policy Agenda-Setting Theory Revisited: A Critique of Howlett on Downs, Baumgartner and Jones, and Kingdon," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 32, Issue 4: 773-779.
- . (1998). "Predictable and Unpredictable Policy Windows: Institutional and Exogenous Correlates of Canadian Federal Agenda-Setting," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 31, Issue 3: 495-524.
- . (1997). "Issue Attention and Punctuated Equilibrium Models Reconsidered: An Empirical Examination of the Dynamics of Agenda Setting in Canada," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 30, Issue 1: 3-29.
- . (1994). "Policy Paradigms and Policy Change: Lessons from the Old and New Canadian Policies Towards Aboriginal Peoples," *Policy Studies Journal*, Vol. 22, Issue 4: 631-649.

- Howlett, M. and Ramesh, M. (2003). 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition. *Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystems*. Don Mills: Oxford University Press.
- . (1995). *Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystems*. Don Mills: Oxford University Press.
- Hoyt, P.D. (1997). "The Political Manipulation of Group Composition: Engineering the Decision Context," *Political Psychology*, Vol. 18, Issue 4: 771-790.
- Hudson, V.M. (2002). "Decision Making," in DeConde, A., Burns, R.D., and Logevall, F. (Eds.) *Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy*, Vol. 1. New York: Scribner.
- Hufbauer, G.C. and Schott, J.J. (1983). *Economic Sanctions In Support of Foreign Policy Goals*. Washington: Institute for International Economics.
- Hufbauer, G.C., Schott, J.J. and Elliott, K.A. (1990). *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*. Washington: Institute for International Economics.
- Hufbauer, G.C. and Winston, E. (1997). "Smarter Sanctions: Updating the Economic Weapon," *National Strategy Reporter*, Vol. 7, Issue 2: 1-5.
- Huff, A.S. (1988). "Politics and Argument as a Means for Coping With Ambiguity and Change," in Pondy, L.R., Boland, R.J. and Thomas, H. (Eds.) *Managing Ambiguity and Change*. New York: Wiley.
- Human Rights Watch. (2004). *Human Rights Watch Profile*. New York: Human Rights Watch. <<http://www.hrw.org>> (19 November 2001).
- . (1999). *Cuba's Repressive Machinery: Human Rights Forty Years After the Revolution*. New York: Human Rights Watch. <<http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/cuba/>> (2 July 2004).
- . (1994). *Human Rights Watch World Report 1994*. New York: Human Rights Watch. <<http://www.hrw.org/reports/1994/WR94>> (1 July 2004).
- . (1993). *Human Rights Watch World Report 1993*. New York: Human Rights Watch. <<http://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/WR93>> (1 July 2004).
- . (1992). *Human Rights Watch World Report 1992*. New York: Human Rights Watch. <<http://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/WR92>> (1 July 2004).
- . (1991). *Human Rights Watch World Report 1991*. New York: Human Rights Watch. <<http://www.hrw.org/reports/1991/WR91>> (1 July 2004).

- . (1990). *Human Rights Watch World Report 1990*. New York: Human Rights Watch. <<http://www.hrw.org/reports/1990/WR90>> (1 July 2004).
- Hunt, S.D., Sparkman, R.D., and Wilcox, J.B. (1982). "The Pretest in Survey Research: Issues and Preliminary Findings," *Journal of Marketing Research*, Vol. 19, Issue 2: 269-273.
- Huntington, S.P. (1965). "Congressional Responses to the Twentieth Century," in Truman, D.B. (Ed.) *The Congress and America's Future*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
- . (1960). "Strategic Planning and the Political Process," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 28: 285-299.
- Hutto, W. T. (2006). *An Analysis of the Punctuated Equilibrium Model Applied to Congressional Approval of Passenger Facility Charges*. Ph.D. Dissertation. Auburn University. Auburn, Alabama.
- Ikenberry, G.J. (2002). "Perceptions, Personality and Social Psychology" in Ikenberry, G.J. (Ed.) (4<sup>th</sup> Edition) *American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays*. New York: Longman.
- Ikle, F.C. (1971). *Every War Must End*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- International Studies Review. (2001). "Preface," *International Studies Review*, Vol. 3, Issue 2: 1-4.
- Ioannou, C. (2000). *Bacardi*. London: Cuba Solidarity Campaign. <<http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uczxcia/ecoguide/boycotts/bacardi.htm>> (1 August 2004).
- Iyengar, S. (1988). "New Directions of Agenda Setting Research," in Anderson, J.A. (Ed.) *Communication Yearbook: Vol. 11*. London: Sage Publications.
- Jackson, J.E. (1972). *Constituencies and Leaders in Congress: Their Effects on Senate Voting Behaviour*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Jacobsen, J.K. (1995). "Much Ado About Ideas: The Cognitive Factor in Economic Policy," *World Politics*, Vol. 47: 283-310.
- Jacobson, G. (1987). *The Politics of Congressional Elections*. Boston: Little Brown.
- Jacoby, W. (2001). *Imitation and Politics: Redesigning Modern Germany*. Ithaca:

Cornell University Press.

Janis, I.L. (2002). "Escalation of the Vietnam War: How Could It Happen?" in Ikenberry, G.J. (Ed.) (4<sup>th</sup> Edition) *American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays*. New York: Longman.

———. (1982). (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition) *Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.

Janis, I.L. and Mann, L. (1977). *Decision Making*. New York: The Free Press.

Jann, W. and Wegrich, K. (2005). "Theories of the Policy Cycle," in Fischer, F., Miller, G., and Sidney, M. (Eds.) *Handbook of Public Policy Analysis: Theory, Politics, and Methods*. (Fourthcoming). <[http://www.uni-potsdam.de/u/ls\\_verwaltung/Mitarbeiter/docs/wegrich\\_Theories%20of%20the%20Policy%20Cycle.pdf](http://www.uni-potsdam.de/u/ls_verwaltung/Mitarbeiter/docs/wegrich_Theories%20of%20the%20Policy%20Cycle.pdf)> (22 June 2005).

Jansen, K.J., Corley, K.G., and Jansen, B.J. (2007). *E-Survey Methodology*. <[http://ist.psu.edu/faculty\\_pages/jjansen/academic/pubs/esurvey\\_chapter\\_jansen.pdf](http://ist.psu.edu/faculty_pages/jjansen/academic/pubs/esurvey_chapter_jansen.pdf)> (28 June 2007).

Jenkins, W. I. (1978). *Policy Analysis: A Political and Organizational Perspective*. London: M. Robertson.

Jenkins-Smith, H.C. (1991). "Alternative Theories of the Policy Process: Reflections on Research Strategy for the Study of Nuclear Waste Policy," *Political Science and Politics*, Vol. 24, Issue 2: 157-166.

———. (1988). "Analytical Debates and Policy Learning: Analysis and Change in the Federal Bureaucracy," *Policy Sciences*, Vol. 21: 169-212.

Jenkins-Smith, H.C. and Sabatier, P.A. (1994). "Evaluating the Advocacy Coalition Framework," *Journal of Public Policy*, Vol. 14, Issue 2: 175-203.

———. (1993a). "The Dynamics of Policy Oriented Learning," in Sabatier, P.A. and Jenkins-Smith, H.C. (Eds.) *Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach*. Boulder: Westview Press.

———. (1993b). "Methodological Appendix: Measuring Longitudinal Change in Elite Beliefs Using Content Analysis of Public Documents," in Sabatier, P.A. and Jenkins-Smith, H.C. (Eds.) *Policy Change and Learning: And Advocacy Coalition Approach*. Boulder: Westview Press.

———. (1993c). "The Study of Public Policy Processes," in Sabatier, P.A. and

Jenkins-Smith, H.C. (Eds.) *Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Jenkins-Smith, H.C. and St. Clair, G.K. (1993). "The Politics of Offshore Energy: Empirically Testing the Advocacy Coalition Framework," in Sabatier, P.A. and Jenkins-Smith, H.C. (Eds.) *Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Jervis, R. (2002). "Hypotheses on Misperception" in Ikenberry, G.J. (Ed.) (4<sup>th</sup> Edition) *American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays*. New York: Longman.

———. (1982). "Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics: An Updating of the Analysis" Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology, Washington, D.C., June 24-27.

———. (1976). *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

———. (1968). "Hypotheses on Misperception," *World Politics*, Vol. 20, Issue 3: 454-479.

John, P. (2003). *Is There Life After Policy Streams, Advocacy Coalitions and Punctuations: Using Evolutionary Theory to Explain Policy Change?* London: University of London.  
<[http://www.bbk.ac.uk/polsoc/download/peter\\_john/mpsa03g.pdf](http://www.bbk.ac.uk/polsoc/download/peter_john/mpsa03g.pdf)> (2 August 2004).

———. (2000). "The Uses and Abuse of Evolutionary Theory in Political Science: A Reply to Alan McConnell and Keith Dowding," *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, Vol. 2, Issue 1: 89-94.

———. (1999). "Ideas and Interests; Agendas and Implementation: An Evolutionary Explanation of Policy Change in British Local Government Finance," *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, Vol. 1, Issue 1: 39-62.

———. (1998). *Analysing Public Policy*. London: Continuum

Johnson, L.C. (2002). Remarks: Our National Interest, Our National Security. National Summit on Cuba. September 17-18, 2002. Washington, D.C.: National Summit on Cuba.  
<<http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/uscuba/SummitBookComplete.pdf>> (20 October 2003).

Jones, B.D. (2003). "Bounded Rationality and Political Science: Lessons from

Public Administration and Public Policy," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, Vol. 13, Issue 4: 395-412.

- . (1994). *Reconceiving Decision Making in Democratic Politics: Attention, Choice and Public Policy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Jones, B.D. and Baumgartner, F.R. (2005). *The Politics of Attention: How Government Prioritizes Problems*. Chicago: University of Chicago.
- . (2004). *A Model of Choice for Public Policy*. Pennsylvania State University. <[http://polisci.la.psu.edu/faculty/Baumgartner/Jones\\_Baumgartner\\_JPART\\_2005.pdf](http://polisci.la.psu.edu/faculty/Baumgartner/Jones_Baumgartner_JPART_2005.pdf)> (24 June 2005).
- Jones, B.D., Baumgartner, F. and True, J.L. (1998). "Policy Punctuations: US Budget Authority, 1947-1995," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 60, Issue 1: 1-33.
- Jones, B.D., True, J.L., and Baumgartner, F.R. (1997). "Does Incrementalism Stem from Political Consensus or from Institutional Gridlock?," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 41, Issue 4: 1319-1339.
- Jones, C.O. (1975). *Clean Air: The Policies and Politics of Pollution Control*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- . (1970). *An Introduction to the Study of Public Policy*. Belmont: Wadsworth.
- Josephine, C. (2003). *Jumpstarting the Motor City: The Role of Values and Ideas in Policymaking*. Ph.D. Dissertation. University of Michigan. Ann Arbor, Michigan.
- Kagan, R. (1978). *Regulatory Justice: Implementing a Wage-Price Freeze*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. (1979). "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk," *Econometrica*, Vol. 47: 263-289.
- Kalu, K. N. (2005). "Competing Ideals and the Public Agenda in Medicare Reform: The "Garbage Can" Model Revisited," *Administration and Society*, Vol. 37, Issue 1: 23-56.
- Kamm, J. (1995). *The Role of Business in Promoting Respect for Human Rights*. Statement to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. November 13-14, 1995. Washington, D.C.: OSCE. <<http://www.usip.org/research/rehr/eastwest.html>> (4 November 2000).

- Kaplowitz, D. (1998). *Anatomy of a Failed Embargo: US Sanctions Against Cuba*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Kaplowitz, M.D., Hadlock, T.D., and Levine, R. (2004). "A Comparison of Web and Mail Survey Response Rates," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 68, Issue 1: 94-101.
- Karon, T. (2001). *Clinton Tosses Bush a Cuba Hot Plantain*. Washington, D.C.: Center for International Policy.  
<<http://ciponline.org/cuba/cubainthenews/archives/newsarchives/january2001/time12201karon.htm>> (1 August 2002).
- Kaufman, C.D. (1994). "Out of the Lab and Into the Archives: A Method of Testing Psychological Explanations of Political Decision Making," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 38: 557-586.
- Kaufman, H. (1976). *Are Government Organizations Immortal?* Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
- Kawasaki, J.J. and Raven, M.R. (1995). "Computer Administered Surveys in Extension," *Journal of Extension*, Vol. 33, Issue 3.  
<<http://www.joe.org/joe/1995june/rb3.html>> (1 July 2007).
- Kay, B. and Johnson, T. J. (1999). "Research Methodology: Taming the Cyber Frontier. Techniques for Improving Online Surveys," *Social Science Computer Review*, Vol. 17, Issue 3: 323-337.
- Kay, J.A. and Thompson, D.J. (1986). "Privatization: A Policy in Search of a Rationale," *Economic Journal*, Vol. 96: 18-32.
- Keeler, J.T.S. (1993). "Opening the Window For Reform: Mandates, Crises and Extraordinary Policy-Making," *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 25, Issue 4:433-486.
- Kegley, C.W. (1980). *The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy: Paradigm Lost?* Institute of International Studies Essay Series, Number 10. Columbia: University of South Carolina.
- Kegley, C.W. and Wittkopf, E.R. (2001). (6<sup>th</sup> Edition) *World Politics: Trend and Transformation*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Kendall, J. (2001). *The Third Sector and the Development of European Public Policy: Frameworks for Analysis?* Working Paper 19. Centre for Civil Society. London: London School of Economics.

- . (2000). *The Mainstreaming of the Third Sector Into Public Policy in England in the Late 1990s: Whys and Wherefores*. Working Paper 2. Centre for Civil Society. London: London School of Economics.
- Keselman, G. (1996). *Cuba and Helms-Burton*. Dearborn: University of Michigan.
- Keynes, J.M. (1936). *The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money*. New York: Harcourt Brace.
- Khong, Y.F. (2002). "Seduction by Analogy in Vietnam: The Malaya and Korea Analogies" in Ikenberry, J.C. (Ed.) (4<sup>th</sup> Edition) *American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays*. New York: Longman.
- . (1992). *Analogies of War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- . (1987). "Seduction by Analogy in Vietnam: The Malaya and Korea Analogies" in Thompson, K. (Ed.) *Institutions and Leadership: Prospects for the Future*. Lanham: University Press of America.
- Kickert, W., Klijn, E.H., and Koppenjan, J. (1997). *Managing Complex Networks*. London: Sage.
- Kiesler, S. and Sproull, L.S. (1986). "Response Effects in the Electronic Survey," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 50: 402-413.
- Kiger, P. and Kruger, J. (1997). *Squeeze Play: The United States, Cuba, and the Helms-Burton Act*. Washington, D.C.: The Center for Public Integrity.
- Kim, D.Y. (2006). The Roles of Government Officials as Policy Entrepreneurs in Consensus Building Process. Working Paper. KDI School of Public Policy and Management.
- King, A. (1985). "Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies," (Book Review) *Journal of Public Policy*, Vol. 5: 281-283.
- King, G., Keohane, R.O., and Verba, S. (1994). *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- King, P. J. (1989). *Policy Entrepreneurs: Catalysts in the Policy Innovation Process*. Ph.D. Dissertation. City: University of Minnesota.
- King, P.J. and Roberts, N.C. (1992). "An Investigation Into the Personality Profile of Policy Entrepreneurs," *Public Productivity and Management Review*, Vol. 16,

Issue 2: 173-190.

- . (1987). "Policy Entrepreneurs: Catalysts for Policy Innovation," *Journal of State Government*, Vol. 60, Issue 4:172-178.
- Kingdon, J. W. (2001). *A Model of Agenda-Setting, With Applications*. Speech delivered at the Second Annual Quello Telecommunications Policy and Law Symposium, held jointly by The Law Review of Michigan State University-Detroit College of Law and The Quello Center for Telecommunication Management and Law at Michigan State University. April 4, 2001. Washington, D.C..
- . (1995). (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition) *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies*. New York: Harper Collins.
- . (1994). "Agendas, Ideas and Policy Change," in Dodd, L.C. and Jillson, C. (Eds.) *New Perspectives on American Politics*. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press.
- . (1993). "Politicians, Self-Interest, and Ideas," in Marcus, G.E. and Hanson, R.L. (Eds.) *Reconsidering the Democratic Public*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University.
- . (1989). *Congressmen's Voting Decisions*. (3<sup>rd</sup> Edition). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- . (1984). (1<sup>st</sup> Edition) *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- . (1973). (3<sup>rd</sup> Edition) *Congressmen's Voting Decisions*. New York: Harper and Row.
- . (1968). *Candidates for Office: Beliefs and Strategies*. New York: Random House.
- Kirst, M. and Jung, R. (1982). "The Utility of a Longitudinal Approach in Assessing Implementation: Title I, ESEA," in Williams, W. (Ed.) *Studying Implementation*. Chatham: Chatham House.
- Kittleson, M.J. (1997). "Determining Effective Follow-Up of E-Mail Surveys," *American Journal of Health Behavior*, Vol. 21: 193-196.
- . (1995). "An Assessment of the Response Rate Via the Postal Service and E-Mail," *Health Values*, Vol. 18: 27-29.

- Klijn, E.H. (2001). "Rules as Institutional Context for Decision Making in Networks: The Approach to Postwar Housing Districts in Two Cities," *Administration and Society*, Vol. 33, Issue 2: 133-164.
- Klir, G. and Yuan, B. (1997). *Fuzzy Set Theory: Foundations and Applications*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.
- Klodnicki, R. (2003). *Kingdon, Lindblom and Lavell: Assessing Three Models of the Public Policy Making Process*. Ph.D. Dissertation. University of Denver. Denver, Colorado.
- Klucking, T.V. (2003). *Kingdon on Defense: An Analysis of the Policy Streams Approach and a Policy Streams Analysis of the Goldwater-Nichols Act*. Ph.D. Dissertation. Auburn University. Auburn, Alabama.
- Korany, B. (1986). "When and How Do Personality Factors Influence Foreign Policy? A Comparative Analysis of Egypt and India," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 9: 35-59.
- Kornbluh, P. (2000). *Cuba, Counternarcotics, and Collaboration: A Security Issue in US-Cuban Relations*. Cuba Briefing Paper Number 24. Center for Latin American Studies, Georgetown University. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University.
- Kosicki, G.M. (1993). "Problems and Opportunities in Agenda Setting Research," *Journal of Communication*, Vol. 43, Issue 2: 100-127.
- Kost, W. (1998). "Cuba's Agriculture: Collapse and Economic Reform," *Agriculture Outlook* (October), Washington, US Department of Agriculture.
- Krasner, S. (2002). "Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison Wonderland?)" in Ikenberry, G.J. (Ed.) (4<sup>th</sup> Edition) *American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays*. New York: Longman.
- . (1972). "Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison Wonderland)," *Foreign Policy*, Issue 7:159-179.
- Kronenberg, P.S. (1995). "Chaos and Re-Thinking the Public Policy Process" in Albert, A. (Ed.) *Chaos and Society*. Amsterdam: IOS Press.
- Krosnick, J. A. (1999). "Survey Research," *Annual Reviews: Psychology*, Vol. 50, Issue 1: 537-567.

- Krutz, G.S. (2002). "Omnibus Legislation: An Institutional Reaction to the Rise of New Issues," in Baumgartner, F.R. and Jones, B.D. (Eds.) *Policy Dynamics*. University of Chicago Press: Chicago.
- . (2001). *Hitching a Ride: Omnibus Legislation in the US Congress*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.
- Kwak, N. and Radler, B. (2002). "A Comparison between Mail and Web Surveys: Response Pattern, Respondent Profile, and Data Quality," *Journal of Official Statistics*, Vol. 18, Issue 2: 257-273.
- Labaw, P.J. (1980). *Advanced Questionnaire Design*. Cambridge: Abt Books.
- Lahti, R.K. (1996). *Group Decision Making Within the Organization: Can Models Help?*. CSWT Papers. Denton: University of North Texas, Center for the Study of Work Teams. <<http://www.workteams.unt.edu/reports/lahti/htm>> (1 December 2003).
- Landau, A. and Smith, W. (2002). *Cuba on the Terrorist List: In Defense of the Nation or Political Calculation?* Washington, D.C.: Center for International Policy. <<http://ciponline.org/cuba/ipr/CubaontheTerroristList.pdf>> (27 July 2003).
- . (2001a). *American Trademarks Threatened*. Washington, D.C.: Center for International Policy.
- . (2001b). *Keeping Things in Perspective: Cuba and the Question of International Terrorism*. Washington, D.C.: Center for International Policy. <<http://www.ciponline.org/cuba/ipr/keepingthingsinperspective.pdf>> (8 September 2002).
- Landau, S. (1993). "Clinton's Cuba Policy: A Low-Priority Dilemma," *NACLA Report on the Americas*, Vol. 26, Issue 5: 35-37.
- Lane, R. (1996). "Positivism, Scientific Realism and Political Science. Recent Developments in the Philosophy of Science," *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, Vol. 8, Issue 3: 361-382.
- Larocca, R.T. (2006). *The Presidential Agenda: Sources of Executive Influence in Congress*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.
- Lasswell, H.D. (1971). *A Pre-View of Policy Sciences*. New York: American Elsevier.

- . (1956). *The Decision Process: Seven Categories of Functional Analysis*. College Park: University of Maryland Press.
- . (1951). "The Policy Orientation," in Lerner, D. and Lasswell, H.D. (Eds.) *The Policy Sciences*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Lave, C. and March, J. (1975). *An Introduction to Models in the Social Sciences*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Lebow, R.N. (2000). "Contingency, Catalysts, and International System Change," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 115, Issue 4: 591-616.
- . (1984). "Windows of Opportunity: Do States Jump Through Them?" *International Security*, Vol. 9, Issue 1: 147-186.
- LeCroy, C.W. and Krysik, J. (2007). "Understanding and Interpreting Effect Size Measures," *Social Work Research*, December. <[http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_hb6481/is\\_4\\_31/ai\\_n29405442/](http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb6481/is_4_31/ai_n29405442/)> (13 June 2010).
- Ledwith, W. E. (2000). Statement of William E. Ledwith, Chief of International Operations, Drug Enforcement Administration, United States Department of Justice Before the House Government Reform Committee. January 4, 2000. <[http://www.usdoj.gov:80/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct010400\\_01p.htm](http://www.usdoj.gov:80/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct010400_01p.htm)> (1 June 2004).
- Lee, K. (1979). "Health Care Planning, Policies and Incentives," *Futures*, December: 482-490.
- Lee, M.M. (2007). *Restricting Trademark Rights of Cubans: WTO Decision and Congressional Response Summary*. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service.
- Lehman, J.F. (1976). *The Executive, Congress and Foreign Policy: Studies of the Nixon Administration*. New York: Praeger.
- LeoGrande, W.M. (2000). "A Politics-Driven Policy: Washington's Cuba Agenda is Still in Place—For Now," *NACLA Report on the Americas*, Vol. 34, Issue 3. <[http://www.nacla.org/art\\_display\\_printable.php?art=79](http://www.nacla.org/art_display_printable.php?art=79)> (13 October 2003).
- . (1998). "From Havana to Miami: US Cuba Policy as a Two-Level Game," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, Vol. 40, Issue 1: 67-86.
- . (1997). "Enemies Evermore: US Policy Towards Cuba after Helms-Burton,"

*Journal of Latin American Studies*, Vol. 29, Issue 1: 211-221.

- Leppgold, J. and Lamborn, A.C. (2001). "Locating Bridges: Connecting Research Agendas Bridging on Cognition and Strategic Choice," *International Studies Review*, Vol. 3, Issue 2: 3-29.
- Levine, M.E. and Plott, C.R. (1977). "Agenda Influence and Its Implications," *Virginia Law Review*, Vol. 63, Issue 4: 561-604.
- Lieberman, J.M. (2002). "Three Streams and Four Policy Entrepreneurs Converge: A Policy Window Opens," *Education and Urban Society*, Vol. 34, Issue 4: 438-450.
- Lindblom, C.E. (1979). "Still Muddling, Not Yet Through," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 39, Issue 6: 517-527.
- . (1968). *The Policy-Making Process*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
- . (1965). *The Intelligence of Democracy: Decision-Making Through Mutual Adjustment*. New York: The Free Press.
- . (1959). "The Science of Muddling Through," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 19, Issue 2: 79-88.
- . (1958). "Policy Analysis," *American Economic Review*, Vol. 48, Issue 3: 398-312.
- . (1955). *Bargaining: The Hidden Hand in Government*. Los Angeles: Rand Corporation.
- Lindblom, C.E. and Woodhouse, E.J. (1993). *The Policy Making Process*. Englewoods: Prentice Hall.
- Lindquist, E.A. (2001). *Discerning Policy Influence: Framework for a Strategic Evaluation of IDRC-Supported Research*. Victoria: University of Victoria.
- Lindsay, J.M. (1994). *Congress and the Politics of US Foreign Policy*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Linsky, A.S. (1975). "Stimulating Responses to Mailed Questionnaires: A Review," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 39, Issue 1 (Spring): 82-101.
- Lippmann, W. (1922). *Public Opinion*. New York: MacMillan.

- Lipsey, M. W. (1990). *Design Sensitivity: Statistical Power for Experimental Researchers*. London: Sage
- Lisio, S.A. (1996). "Helms-Burton and the Point of Diminishing Returns," *International Affairs*, Vol. 72, Issue 4: 691-711.
- Little, D. (1998). *Microfoundations, Method, and Causation*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
- Littlefield, N. (1998). *Self-Enforcement and Economic Sanctions: Obligation or Self-Interest, Rationality or Ideology*. Andover: Phillips-Academy.
- Lober, D.J. (1997). "Explaining the formation of Business-Environmentalist Collaborations: Collaborative Windows and the Paper Task Force," *Policy Sciences*, Vol. 30: 1-24.
- Loeber, A. and Grin, J. (1999). "From Phosphate Policy to Eutrophication Control: Policy Change and Learning in the Netherlands, 1977-89," in Sabatier, P. (Ed.) *An Advocacy Coalition Lens on Environmental Policy*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Longley, J. and Pruitt, D.G. (1980). "Groupthink: A Critique of Janis' Theory," in Wheeler, L. (Ed.) *Review of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 1. Beverly Hills: Sage.
- Lowenfeld, A.F. (1996). "Congress and Cuba: The Helms-Burton Act," *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 90, Issue 3: 419-434.
- Lowi, T. (1972). "Four Systems of Policy, Politics, and Choice," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 32, Issue 4: 298-310.
- . (1964). "American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies and Political Theory," *World Politics*, Vol. 16, Issue 4: 677-693.
- Lustick, I. (1980). "Explaining the Variable Utility of disjointed Incrementalism: four Propositions," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 74, Issue 2: 342-353.
- Luttbeg, N. (1981). (Ed.) (3<sup>rd</sup> Edition) *Public Opinion and Public Policy: Models of Political Linkage*. Itasca: F.E. Peacock.
- Maass, A. (1983). *Congress and the Common Good*. New York: Basic Books.
- MacDonald, and Adam, (2003). "A Comparison of Online and Postal Data Collection Methods in Marketing Research," *International Journal of Market*

*Research*, Vol., 21 Issue 2: 85-95.

- Mackenzie, C. (2004). "Policy Entrepreneurship in Australia: A Conceptual Review and Application," *Australian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 39, Issue 2: 367-386.
- Mackenzie, R.A. (1972). *The Time Trap*. New York: AMACOM.
- Mackie, G. (2003). *Democracy Defended*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mahood, H.R. (1990). *Interest Group Politics in America: A New Intensity*. Englewood Cliffs: New Jersey.
- Majone, G. (1996). "Public Policy and Administration: Ideas, Interests and Institutions," in Goodin, R. E. and Klingemann, H.D. (Eds.) *A New Handbook of Political Science*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- . (1989). *Evidence, Argument and Persuasion in the Policy Process*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Maloney, W.A. (1996). "Regulating the Privatized Water Industry: Complexity, Conflict and Compromise," *Contemporary Political Studies*, Vol. 2: 957-967.
- Mandelbaum, M. (1987). *Purpose and Necessity in Social Theory*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Mansbach, R.W. and Vasquez, J.A. (1981). *In Search of Theory: A New Paradigm for Global Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Maoz, Z. (1990). "Framing the National Interest: The Manipulation of Foreign Policy Decisions in Group Settings," *World Politics*, Vol. 43, Issue 1: 77-110.
- March, J.G. (1994). *A Primer on Decision Making*. New York: Free Press.
- March, J.G. and Olsen, J.P. (1976). *Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations*. Bergen: Universitetsforlaget.
- March, J.G. and Romelaer, P.J. (1976). "Position and Presence in the Drift of Decision," in March, J.G. and Olsen, J.G. (Eds.) *Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations*. Bergen: Universitetsforlaget.
- March, J.G. and Simon, H.A. (1958). *Organizations*. New York: John Wiley.
- March, J.G. and Weissinger-Baylon, R. (1986). *Ambiguity and Command*:

*Organizational Perspectives on Military Decision Making*. New York: Pitman Publishing.

- Marquis, C. (1998). Cuba Still No Threat, Pentagon Insists. May 7, 1998. *The Miami Herald*. <<http://www.miamiherald.com>> (16 August 2008).
- Martin, C.L. (1994). "The Impact of Topic Interest on Mail Survey Response Behavior," *Journal of the Market Research Society*, Vol. 36, Issue 4: 327-337.
- Masuch, M. and LaPotin, P. (1989). "Beyond Garbage Cans: An AI Model of Organizational Choice," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 34: 38-67.
- Matthews, D.R. and Stimson, J. A. (1975). *Yeas and Nays: Normal Decision-Making in the US House of Representatives*. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
- . (1970). "Decision Making by US Representatives," in Ulmer, S.S. (Ed.) *Political Decision Making*. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold.
- Mavis, A. and Brocato, J.J. (1998). "Postal Surveys Versus electronic Mail Surveys: The Tortoise and the Hare Revisited," *Evaluation and The Health Professions*, Vol. 21, Issue 3: 395-498.
- May, I.G. (2004). "Riding the Wave of Opportunity: Termination in Public Policy," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, Vol. 14, Issue 3: 309-333.
- May, P.J. (1986). "Politics and Policy Analysis," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 101, Issue 1: 109-125.
- Mayhew, D. (1974). *Congress: The Electoral Connection*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Mazmanian, D.A. and Sabatier, P.A. (1983). *Implementation and Public Policy*. Glenview: Scott Foresman.
- . (1980). "A Multivariate Model of Public Policy Making," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 24, Issue 3: 439-468.
- McAdam, D. (1982). *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930- 1970*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- McClain, P.D. (1990). "Agenda Setting, Public Policy, and Minority Group Influence: An Introduction," *Policy Studies Review*, Vol. 9, Issue 2: 263-272.

- McCombs, M.E. and Shaw, D.L. (1972). "The Agenda Setting Function of the Mass Media Public," *Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 36, Issue 2: 176-185.
- McCool, D.C. (1995a). "The Process of Public Making: Discussion," in McCool, D.C. *Public Policy Theories, Models and Concepts: An Anthology*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- . (1995b). "The Process of Public Making: Introduction," in McCool, D.C. *Public Policy Theories, Models and Concepts: An Anthology*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- . (1995c). "The Theoretical Foundation of Policy Studies," in McCool, D.C. *Public Policy Theories, Models and Concepts: An Anthology*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- McCormick, J.M. (1993). "Decision Making in the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees," in Ripley, R.B. and Lindsay, J.M. (Eds.) *Congress Resurgent: Foreign and Defense Policy on Capitol Hill*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- McCormick, J.M. and Black, M. (1983). "Ideology and Voting on the Panama Canal Treaties," *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 8: 45-63.
- McCowan, T.L. (2005). *Policy Entrepreneurs and Policy Change: Strategies Beyond Agenda Setting*. Paper presented at the 2005 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. September 1-4, 2005.
- . (2004). *Policy Entrepreneurs and Policy Change: Examining the Linkages Between TANF, Domestic Violence and the FVO*. Ph.D. Dissertation. West Virginia University. Morgantown, West Virginia.
- McCubbins, M. and Sullivan, T. (1987). (Eds.) *Congress: Structure and Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- McKenna, B. (2001). "Bush to Continue Waiver on Cuba Law," *Globe and Mail Online*, July 17, 2001.
- Mead, W.R. (2001). "End this Cuba Embargo Now," *Esquire*. (September).
- Medler, A. (2005). *Building Windows: The Strategic Manipulation of Frames and Policy Details to Create Opportunities for Change*. Paper presented at the 2005 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. September 1-4, 2005.

- Mehta, R. and Sivadas, E. (1995). "Comparing Response Rates and Response Content in Mail Versus Electronic Mail Surveys," *Journal of the Market Research Society*, Vol. 37: 429-439.
- Meijerink, S. (2005). "Understanding Policy Stability and Change. The Interplay of Advocacy Coalitions and Epistemic Communities, Windows of Opportunity, and Dutch Coastal Flooding Policy 1945-2003," *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 12, Issue 6: 1060-1077.
- Mendoza, G. A. and Sprouse, W. (1989). "Forest Planning and Decision Making Under Fuzzy Environments: An Overview and Illustration," *Forest Science*, Vol. 35, Issue 2: 481-502.
- Meo, M., Ziebro, B. and Patton, A. (2004). "Tulsa Turnaround: From Disaster to Sustainability," *Natural Hazards Review*, Vol. 5, Issue 1: 1-9.
- Miami Herald. (2000). "Bush's Cuba Policy" December 20, 2000.
- Miller, S.H. and Green, S. (2007). *Incorporating Meditation as a Professional Skill Within the Business Curriculum: Theory, Attitudes and Expectation*. Proceedings of the American Society of Business and Behavioral Sciences. Downloaded from <<http://www.asbbs.org/proceedings/PDF/M/MillerS.pdf>>. (1 February 2008).
- Miller, W.E. and Stokes, D.E. (1963). "Constituency Influence in Congress," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 57: 45-56.
- Mintrom, M. (2000). *Policy Entrepreneurs and School Choice*. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press
- . (1997a). "Policy Entrepreneurs and the Diffusion of Innovation" *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 41, No. 3:738-770.
- . (1997b). "The State-Local Nexus in Policy Innovation Diffusion: The Case of School Choice," *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, Vol. 27, Issue 3: 41-60.
- . (1994). *Policy Entrepreneurship in Theory and Practice: A Comparative State Analysis of the Rise of School Choice as a Policy Idea*. Ph.D. Dissertation. State University of New York. Stony Brook, New York.
- Mintrom, M. and Vergari, S. (1998). "Policy Networks and Innovation Diffusion: The Case of State Education Reforms," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 60, Issue 1: 126-148.

- . (1996). "Advocacy Coalitions, Policy Entrepreneurs, and Policy Change," *Policy Studies Journal*, Vol. 24: 420-434.
- Mintz, A. (1993). "The Decision to Attack Iraq: A Non-compensatory Theory of Decision Making," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 37: 595-618.
- Mintz, A. and Geva, N. (1997a). *The Poliheuristic Theory of Decision: A Non-compensatory Approach to Foreign Policy Decision Making*. Mimeo.
- . (1997b). "The Poliheuristic Theory of Foreign Policy Decisionmaking," in Geva, N. and Mintz, A. (Eds.) *Decisionmaking on War and Peace: The Cognitive-Rational Debate*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Mintz, A., Geva, N., Redd, S.B., and Carnes, A. (1997). "The Effect of Dynamic and Static Choice Sets on Political Decision Making: An Analysis Using the Decision Board Platform," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 91, Issue 3: 553-566.
- Mintzberg, H., Raisinghani, D. and Theoret, A. (1976). "The Structure of 'Unstructured' Decision Processes," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 21, Issue 2: 246-275.
- Modelski, G. and Poznanski, K. (1996). "Evolutionary Paradigms in the Social Sciences," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 40, Issue 3: 315-319.
- Moe, R. C. and Teel, S.C. (1970). "Congress as a Policy Maker: A Necessary Reappraisal," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 85: 443-470.
- Moffett, G. (1995). "Clinton Shuns Potent Anti-Castro Lobby," *Christian Science Monitor*. <<http://www.lexisnexis.com>> (8 February 2004).
- Moher, D., Dulberg, C.S., and Wells, G.A. (1994). "Statistical Power, Sample Size, and their Reporting in Randomized Controlled Trials," *JAMA*. Vol. 272, Issue 2: 122-124.
- Mohr, L.B. (1978). "Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations," (Book Review), *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 72, Issue 3: 1033-1035.
- Montgomery, J.D. (1995). "Beyond Good Policies," in Montgomery, J.D. and Rondinelli, D.A. (Editors) *Great Policies: Strategic Innovations in Asia and the Pacific Basin*. Westport: Praeger.
- Moore, N., Carroll, T. and Church, R. (1994). *Studying Politics: An Introduction to Argument and Analysis*. Toronto: Copp Clark Longman.

- Morgan, P. L. (2003). "Null Hypothesis Significance Testing," *Exceptionality*, Vol. 11, Issue 4: 209-221.
- Morgenthau, H.J. (1982). "Another Great Debate: The National Interest of the United States," in Vasquez, J.A. (Ed.) *Classics of International Relations*. New Jersey: Englewood Cliffs.
- Morley, M. and McGillion, C. (2002). *Unfinished Business: America and Cuba After the Cold War, 1989-2001*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mortensen, P.B. (2010). "Political Attention and Public Policy: A Study of How Agenda Setting Matters," *Scandinavian Political Studies* (forthcoming).
- Mowry, D. (1999). "Lifting the Embargo Against Cuba Using Vietnam as a Model: A Policy Paper for Modernity," *Brooklyn Journal of International Law*, Vol. 25. <<http://www.lexisnexis.com>> (30 July 2004).
- Moya, S.D. (1998). "Growth Management in Maricopa County, 1988-1992: An Application of Kingdon's Agenda Setting Model," *Social Science Journal*, Vol. 35, Issue 4:525-542.
- Mucciaroni, G. (1992). "The Garbage Can Model and the Study of Policy Making: A Critique," *Polity*, Vol. 24, Issue 3: 459-482.
- Mulholland, S. and Shakespeare, C. (2005). *An Analysis of Frameworks for Higher Education Policy Studies*. New York: Alliance for International Higher Education Policy Studies. <[http://www.nyu.edu/iesp/aiheps/downloads/final\\_reports/May%202005/Policy\\_Framwork\(June2005\).pdf](http://www.nyu.edu/iesp/aiheps/downloads/final_reports/May%202005/Policy_Framwork(June2005).pdf)> (1 July 2005).
- Muse, R.L. (1998). Statement of Robert L. Muse, Muse and Associates, Washington, D.C.. Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Trade of the House Committee on Ways and Means. Hearing on US Economic and Trade Policy Toward Cuba. May 7, 1998. Washington, D.C.: US House of Representatives. <<http://www.waysandmeans.house.gov/legacy/trade/105cong/5-7-98/5-7muse.htm>> (1 August 2004).
- . (1995a). Letter to US Senate Regarding the Cuba and Democratic Solidarity Act. Washington, D.C.: Law Offices of Mansfield and Muse.
- . (1995b). *Provisions of S.381 and H.R. 927 (Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1995) that Violate International Law, Deviate From Long Established United States Policy and Practice and in So Doing,*

*Adversely Affect the Interests of Those Who Possess Certified Claims Against Cuba.* Washington, D.C.: Law Offices of Mansfield and Muse.

Myers, S.L. (1998). A Pentagon Report Now Belittles the Menace Posed by Cuba. May 7, 1998. *The New York Times*. <<http://www.nytimes.com>>(16 August 2008).

Nachmias, D. (1980). *The Practice of Policy Evaluation*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Nakamura, R. (1987). "The Textbook Process and Implementation Research," *Policy Studies Review*, Vol. 1: 142-154.

Narins, P. (1999). *Get Better Info from All Your Questionnaires: 13 Important Tips to Help You Pretest Your Surveys*. <<http://www.ryerson.ca/~mjoppe/ResearchProcess/PretestingTips.htm>> (1 July 2007).

Nathan, J. and Oliver, J. (1994). *Foreign Policy Making and the American Political System*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

Neill, J. (2008). Why Use Effect Sizes Instead of Significance Testing in Program Evaluation? <<http://wilderdom.com/research/effectsizes.htm>> (10 April 2010).

Neilson, S. (2001). *Knowledge Utilization and Public Policy Processes: A Literature Review*. City: IDRC. <[http://idrinform.idrc.ca/archive/corpdocs/117145/litreview\\_e.html](http://idrinform.idrc.ca/archive/corpdocs/117145/litreview_e.html)> (30 June 2003)

Nelson, A.K. (2002). "National Security Council," in DeConde, A, Burns, R.D. and Logevall, R. (Eds.), 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, *Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy*, Vol. 2, New York: Gale Group, Thomson Learning.

Nelson, B.J. (1984). *Making an Issue of Child Abuse*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Nelson, M. (2002). (Ed.) (3<sup>rd</sup> Edition). *Guide to the Presidency*. Washington, DC: CQ Press.

Newmann, W.W. (1998). "Foreign Policy Decision Making: Garbage Cans, and Policy Shifts: The Eisenhower Administration and the 'Chances for Peace' Speech," *American Review of Public Administration*, Vol. 28, Issue 2: 187-212.

- Nice, D.C. (1987). "Incremental and Nonincremental Policy Responses: The States and the Railroads," *Polity*, Vol. 20: 145-156.
- Nisbett, R. E. and Wilson, T.D. (1977). "The Halo Effect: Evidence for Unconscious Alteration of Judgements," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 35: 250-256.
- Niskanen, W. A. (1971). *Bureaucracy and Representative Government*. Chicago: Aldine-Atherton.
- Noriega, R.F. (2004). Remarks to the Cuban Liberty Council by Ambassador Roger F. Noriega, Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs. Washington, D.C.: US State Department. <<http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/rm/29151pf.htm>> (1 March 2004).
- Nuclear Threat Initiative. (2004). *Inventory of International Non-Proliferation Organizations and Regimes: Cuba*. Washington, D.C.: Nuclear Threat Initiative. <[http://www.nti.org/e\\_research/official\\_docs/inventory/index.htm#npt](http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/inventory/index.htm#npt)> (1 August 2004).
- Ogelman, N., Money, J. and Martin, P. (2002). "Immigrant Cohesion and Political Access in Influencing Foreign Policy," *SAIS Review*, Vol. XXII, Issue 2: 145-165.
- Oliver, T.R. (2004). "Policy Entrepreneurship in the Social Transformation of American Medicine: The rise of Managed Care and Managed Competition," *Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law*, Vol. 29, Issue 4-5: 701-733.
- . (1991). "Ideas, Entrepreneurship and the Politics of Health Care Reform," *Stanford Law and Policy Review*, Vol. 3: 160-180.
- Oliver, T.R. and Shaheen, P. (1997). "Translating Ideas into Actions: Entrepreneurial Leadership in State Health Care Reforms," *Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law*, Vol. 22, Issue 3:742-788.
- Olsen, J.P. (2001). "Garbage Cans, New Institutionalism and the Study of Politics," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 95, Issue 1:191-198.
- Olsen, M. (1982). *The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation and Social Rigidities*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- . (1965). *The Logic of Collection Action*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

- Oppenheim, A.N. (1992). *Questionnaire Design, Interviewing and Attitude Measurement*. New York: Pinter Publishers.
- Oppermann, M. (1995). "E-Mail Surveys: Potentials and Pitfalls," *Marketing Research*, Vol. 7: 28-33.
- Ostrom, E. (1999). "Institutional Rational Choice: An Assessment of the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework," in Sabatier, P.A. (Ed.) *Theories of the Policy Process*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- . (1991a). *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . (1991b). "Rational Choice Theory and Institutional Analysis: Toward Complementarity," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 85, Issue 1, 237-243.
- Padgett, J.F. (1980). "Managing Garbage Can Hierarchies," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 25, Issue 4: 583-604.
- Page, B.I. (1976). "The Theory of Political Ambiguity," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 70: 742-752.
- Paine, S.C. (1989). "Persuasion, Manipulation, and Dimension," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 51, Issue 1: 36-49.
- Palmer, G. and Bhandari, A. (2000). "The Investigation of Substitutability in Foreign Policy," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 44, Issue 1: 3-10.
- Paolo, A.M., Bonaminio, G.A., Gibson, C., Patridge, T., and Kallail, K. (2000). "Response Rate Comparisons of E-Mail and Mail Distributed Student Evaluations," *Teaching and Learning in Medicine*, Vol. 12, Issue 2: 81-84.
- Pape, R.A. (1997). "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," *International Security*, Vol. 22, Issue 2: 90-136.
- Parker, L. (1992). "Collecting Data the E-Mail Way," *Training and Development*, Vol. 4: 52-54.
- Parkinson, G.W. (1980). *Policy-Making at the State Level for K-12 Education*. Ph.D. Dissertation. Columbus: Ohio State University
- Pastor, R. (1980). *Congress and the Politics of US Foreign Economic Policy 1929-1976*. Los Angeles: University of California Press.

- Paul, J.A. and Senwan, A. (1998). "Sanctions: An Analysis," *Global Policy Forum* (August). <<http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/analysis2.htm>> (1 August 2000).
- Pérez, L. (2002). "Fear and Loathing of Fidel Castro: Sources of US Policy Toward Cuba," *Journal of Latin American Studies*, Vol. 34, Issue 2: 227-235.
- . (2000). *US-Cuba Relations: Trends and Underlying Forces*. Ottawa: Canadian Foundation for the Americas. <<http://www.cubasource.org/pdf/us-cuba.pdf>> (1 July 2001).
- Pérez-López, J.F. (1995). "Odd Couples: Joint Ventures Between Foreign Capitalists and Cuban Socialists," *North-South Agenda Papers*, University of Miami, Issue 16: 1-38.
- Perl, R. F. (2004a). *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress: The Department of State's Patterns of Global Terrorism Report: Trends, State Sponsors and Related Issues*. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress.
- . (2004b). *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress: Terrorism and National Security: Issues and Trends*. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress.
- . (2003). *Congressional Research Service Issue Brief for Congress: Terrorism and National Security: Issues and Trends*. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress.
- . (2001). *Congressional Research Service Issue Brief for Congress: Terrorism, The Future and US Foreign Policy*. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress.
- Perlmutter, A. (1974). "The Presidential Political Center," *World Politics*, Vol. 27, Issue 1: 87-106.
- Perrow, C. (1977). "Review of Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations," *Contemporary Sociology*, Vol. 6: 294-298.
- . (1972). *Complex Organizations*. New York: Scott, Foresman.
- Perry, J.M., Woods, L.A. and Shapiro, S.L. (2000). *Intellectual Property Rights and International Trade in Cuban Products*. Proceedings of the Eleventh Annual Meeting of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy. University of Miami, Florida. August 3-5, 2000. <<http://lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/asce/cuba10/>>(1 August 2004).

- Peters, B.G. (2002). *Governance: Garbage Can Perspective*. Vienna: Institute for Advanced Studies.
- . (1994). "Agenda Setting in the European Community," *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 1, Issue 1: 9-26.
- . (1982). *American Public Policy: Promise and Performance*. New York: Franklin Watts.
- Peters, P. (2003). *Ban Undercuts Our Influence on Cuba*. Washington, D.C.: Lexington Institute. <<http://lexingtoninstitute.org/cuba/030515.asp>> (10 October 2003).
- . (2002a). *Cuba, the Embargo and American Travel: The State Department's Distorted Vision*. Washington, D.C.: Lexington Institute. <<http://lexingtoninstitute.org/943.shtml>> (21 July 2004).
- . (2002b). Remarks by Phillip Peters, Vice President, Lexington Institute at the National Summit on Cuba. September 17-18, 2002. Washington, D.C.: National Summit on Cuba. <<http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/uscuba/SummitBookComplete.pdf>> (20 October 2003).
- . (2002c). *Survival Story: Cuba's Economy in the Post-Cold War Decade*. Washington, D.C.: Lexington Institute. <<http://lexingtoninstitute.org/cuba/pdf/survivalstory.pdf>> (21 July 2004).
- . (2001a). *Cuba, the Terrorism List, and What the United States Should Do*. Washington, D.C.: Lexington Institute. <<http://lexingtoninstitute.org/cuba/cubaterrorism.htm>> (19 July 2004).
- . (2001b). *State Enterprise Reform in Cuba: An Early Snapshot*. Washington, D.C.: Lexington Institute. <<http://lexingtoninstitute.org/cuba/pdf/enterprisereform.pdf>> (21 July 2004).
- . (2000). "A Policy Toward Cuba That Serves US Interests," *Policy Analysis*, Issue 384: 1-14. <<http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa384.pdf>> (19 July 2004).
- Piczak, C.T. (1999). "The Helms-Burton Act: US Foreign Policy Toward Cuba, The National Security Exception to the GATT and the Political Question Doctrine," *University of Pittsburgh Law Review*, Vol. 61. <<http://www.lexisnexis.com>> (30 July 2004).

- Pierre, J. and Peters, B.G.. (2005). *Governing Complex Societies: Trajectories and Scenarios*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Pincus, W. and Roberto, S. (1994). *Ripple in Florida Straits Overturned US Policy*. Washington Post. September 1, 1994: A31.
- Pisano, C.M. (1998). "Unrealized goals and Unintended Consequences: Why the Helms Burton and Iran-Libya Sanctions Laws are Counterproductive to the Interests of the United States," *Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law*, Vol. 6: 235-275.
- Plott, C.R. and Levine, M.E. (1978). "A Model of Agenda Influence on Committee Decisions," *American Economic Review*, Vol. 68, Issue 1: 146-160.
- Polsby, N. W. (1984). *Political Innovation in America: The Politics of Policy Initiation*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Pons, E. (2001). *Castro and Terrorism 1959-2001: A Chronology*. Occasional Paper Series. Institute for Cuban and Cuban American Studies. September 2001. Miami: Institute for Cuban and Cuban American Studies.
- Popper, K. (1959). *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*. New York: Basic Books.
- Porter, R.W. (1995). *Knowledge Utilization and the Process of Policy Formation*. Washington, D.C.: US Agency for International Development. <[http://sara.aed.org/publications/crosscutting/knowledge\\_utilization/knowledge%20util%20\(print%20version\).pdf](http://sara.aed.org/publications/crosscutting/knowledge_utilization/knowledge%20util%20(print%20version).pdf)> (19 May 2003).
- Porter, S.R. and Whitcomb, M.E. (2003). "The Impact of Content Type on Web Survey Response Rates," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 67: 579-588.
- Portz, J. (1996). "Problem Definitions and Policy Agendas: Shaping the Educational Agenda in Boston," *Policy Studies Journal*, Vol. 24: 371-386.
- Prados, J. (1991). *Keepers of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council from Truman to Bush*. New York: Morrow.
- Pralle, S. (2006). "The 'Mouse That Roared': Agenda Setting in Canadian Pesticides Politics," *Policy Studies Journal*, Vol. 34, Issue 2: 171-194.
- . (2003). "Venue Shopping, Political Strategy, and Policy Change: The Internationalization of Canadian Forest Advocacy," *Journal of Public Policy*, Vol. 23, Issue 3: 233-260.

- . (2002). *Venue Shopping as Political Strategy*. Paper prepared for presentation at the 2002 meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, Massachusetts, August 28-September 2.
- Preeg, E.H. (1999). *Feeling Good or Doing Good with Sanctions: Unilateral Economic Sanctions and the US National Interest*. Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies.
- . (1998). *US Economic and Trade Policy Toward Cuba*. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies. <<http://www.csis.org/media/csis/congress/ts980507preeg.pdf>> (13 November 2002).
- Presser, S., Couper, M.P., Lessler, J.T., Martin, E., Martin, J., Rothgeb, J.M., and Singer, E. (2004). "Methods for Testing and Evaluating Survey Testing," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 68: 109-130.
- Pressman, J.L. and Wildavsky, A.B. (1973). *Implementation*. Berkeley: University of California Press
- Preston, T. (2000). "The President's Inner Circle: Personality and Leadership Style in Foreign Policy Decision Making," in Shapiro, R.Y., Kumar, M.J. and Jacobs, L.R. (Eds). *Presidential Power: Forging the Presidency for the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Price, D. E. (1978). "Policy Making in Congressional Committees: The Impact of 'Environmental Factors'," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 72, Issue 2: 548-574.
- . (1971). "Professionals and "Entrepreneurs": Staff Orientations and Policy Making on Three Senate Committees," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 33, Issue 2: 316-336.
- Qingshan, T. (1992). *The Making of US China Policy: From Normalization to the Post-Cold War Era*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Quade, E. S. (1983). *Analysis for Public Decisions*. New York: American Elsevier.
- Ragin, C. C. (2000). *Fuzzy-Set Social Science*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Ragin, C.C. and Pennings, P. (2005). "Fuzzy Sets and Social Research," *Sociological Methods and Research*, Vol. 33, Issue 4: 423-430.

- Raine, M. (1995). *Real Truth About Helms-Burton: Other Countries Negotiated Acceptable Compensation When Cuba Nationalized Private Property*. New York: Gale Group.
- Raines, S. and Prakash, A. (2005). "Leadership Matters: Policy Entrepreneurship in Corporate Environmental Policy Making," *Administration and Society*, Vol. 37, Issue 1: 3-22
- Ranchhod, A. and Zhou, F. (2001). "Comparing Respondents of E-mail and Mail Surveys: Understanding the Implications of Technology," *Marketing Intelligence and Planning*, Vol. 19, Issue 4: 254-262.
- Randall, C.L. and Fenno, R. F. (1994). "Strategy and Sophisticated Voting in the Senate," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 56, Issue 2: 349-376.
- Randall, S.J. (1998). "Not So Magnificent Obsession: The United States, Cuba, and Canada from Revolution to the Helms-Burton Law," *Canadian-American Public Policy*, Vol. 36: 1-30. <<http://www.lexisnexis.com>> (25 June 2001).
- Ratliff, W. and Fontaine, R. (2000). *A Strategic Flip-Flop in the Caribbean: Lift the Embargo on Cuba*. Stanford: Stanford University.
- Raup, D.M. (1991). *Extinction: Bad Genes or Bad Luck?* New York: W.W. Norton.
- Remirez de Estenoz, F. (1998). *Cuba and the United States in a Changing World*. Los Angeles: World Affairs Council.
- Rennack, D.E. and Shuey, R.D. (1998). *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress: Economic Sanctions to Achieve US Foreign Policy Goals, Discussion and Guide to Current Law*. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress.
- Rhodes, R. (1988). *Beyond Westminster and Whitehall*. London: Unwin & Hyman.
- Rhodes, R. and March, D. (1992). "Policy Networks in British Politics. A Critique of Existing Approaches," in Marsh, D. and Rhodes, R. (Eds.) *Policy Networks in British Government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Riker, W. H. (1993) "Rhetorical Interaction in the Ratification Campaigns" in Riker, W.H. (Ed.) *Agenda Formation*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press
- . (1990) "Heresthetics and Rhetoric in the Spatial Model" in Enelow, J.M. and Hinich, M.J. (Eds.) *Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

- . (1986). *The Art of Political Manipulation*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- . (1984) "The Heresthetics of Constitution-Making: The Presidency in 1787, with Comments on Determinism and Rational Choice," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 78: 1-16
- . (1983). "Political Theory and the Art of Heresthetics," in Finifter, A. (Ed.) *Political Science: The State of the Discipline*. Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association.
- Ripley, R.B. (1995). "Stages of the Policy Process," in McCool, D.C. *Public Policy Theories, Models and Concepts: An Anthology*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Ripley, R.B. and Franklin, G.A. (1984). *Congress, the Bureaucracy and Public Policy*. Homewood: Dorsey Press.
- Risen, J. and Jehl, D. (2003). *Experts Said to Tell Legislators He Was Pressed to Distort Some Evidence*. June 25, 2003. New York Times. <<http://www.nytimes.com>> (1 August 2008).
- Ritter, A.R.M. (2002). *Cuba's Economic Performance and the Challenges Ahead*. Ottawa: Canadian Foundation for the Americas.
- Rivlin, A.M. (1971). *Systematic Thinking for Social Action*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
- Roberson, M.T. and Sundstrom, E. (1990). "Questionnaire Design, Return Rates and Response Favorableness in an Employee Attitude Questionnaire," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, Vol. 75, Issue 3: 354-357.
- Roberts, G.K. (1971). *A Dictionary of Political Analysis*. London: Longman.
- Roberts, N.C. (1998). "Radical Change by Entrepreneurial Design," *Acquisition Review Quarterly*, Spring: 107-128.
- . (1994). "Public Entrepreneurship and Innovation," *Policy Studies Review*, Vol. 11, Issue 1: 55-74.
- Roberts, N.C. and King, P. J. (2000). "The Process of Public Policy Innovation" in Van de Ven, A. H., Angle, H.L., and Poole, M.S. (Eds.) *Research on The Management of Innovation: The Minnesota Studies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- . (1996). *Transforming Public Policy: Dynamics of Policy Entrepreneurship and Innovation*. Jossey-Bass Publishers: San Francisco.
- . (1991). "Policy Entrepreneurs: Their Activity Structure and Function in the Policy Process," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, Vol. 1, Issue 2: 147-175.
- Robinson, J.A. (1967). (Ed.) *Congress and Foreign Policy Making: A Study in Legislative Influence and Initiative*. Homewood: Dorsey Press.
- Rocheftort, D. A. and Cobb, R.W. (1994). (Eds.) *The Politics of Problem Definition: Shaping the Policy Agenda*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Rodgers, B. (1998). Cuba Report. *Voice of America*. (January 4, 19998). <<http://www.fas.org/irp/news/1998/04/980401-cuba.htm>> (16 August 2008).
- Rogers E.M. (1993). "The Anatomy of Agenda Setting Research," *Journal of Communication*, Vol. 43, Issue 2: 68-99.
- Rogers, E.M. and Dearing, J.W. (1988). "Agenda Setting Research: Where Has It Been?, Where Is It Going?" in Anderson, J.A. (Ed.) *Communication Yearbook: Vol. 11*. London: Sage Publications.
- Rogers, R. and Copeland, E. (1993). *Forced Migration*. Medford: Tufts University.
- Rosati, J.A. (1981). "Developing a Systematic Decision-Making Framework: Bureaucratic Politics in Perspective," *World Politics*, Vol. 33, Issue 2: 234-252.
- Rosati, J.A., Hagan J.D. and Sampson, M.W. (1994). (Eds.) *Foreign Policy Restructuring. How Governments Respond to Global Change*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Rosen, J. (1997). "Companies Fret Over Helms-Burton Law," *News and Observer*, February 24, 1997: A5.
- Rosenau, J.N. (1966). "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in Farell, R.B. (Ed.) *Approaches to Comparative and Institutional Politics*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
- Rosenthal, R., Rosnow, R. L., and Rubin, D. B. (2000). *Contrasts and Effect Sizes In Behavioral Research*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rosson, P. and Adcock, F. (2001). *Economic Impacts of US Agricultural Exports to*

Cuba. Texas A&M University.

- Roth, K. (1998). *Sanctions Legislation Threatens Important Foreign Policy Tool*. New York: Human Rights Watch.
- Ruddin, L.P. (2006). "You Can Generalize Stupid! Social Scientists, Bent Flyvberg, and Case Study Methodology," *Qualitative Inquiry*, Vol. 12, Issue 4: 797-812.
- Rushefsky, M. E. (2002). (3<sup>rd</sup> Edition) *Public Policy in the United States: At the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century*. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.
- Rynning, S. and Guzzini, S. (2001). *Realism and Foreign Policy Analysis*. Columbia International Affairs Online.
- Sabatier, P.A. (2004). *Advocacy Coalition Framework*.  
<<http://www.des.ucdavis.edu/faculty/Sabatier/Research.htm>>. (5 August 2009)
- . (1999a). "Fostering the Development of Policy Theory," in Sabatier, P.A. (Ed.) *Theories of the Policy Process*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- . (1999b). "The Need for Better Theories" in Sabatier, P.A. (Ed.) *Theories of the Policy Process*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- . (1998). "The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Revisions and Relevance For Europe," *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 25, Issue 1: 98-130.
- . (1997). "The Status and Development of Policy Theory: A Reply to Hill," *Policy Currents*, Vol. 4, Issue 7:1-15.
- . (1996). "The Suitability of Several Models for Comparative Analysis of the Policy Process," in Imbeau, L.M. and McKinlay, R.D. (Eds.) *Comparing Government Activity*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- . (1993) "Policy Change Over A Decade or More" in Sabatier, P.A. and Jenkins-Smith, H.C. (Eds.) *Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- . (1991a). "Political Science and Public Policy," *PS: Political Science and Politics*, Vol. 24, Issue 2: 144-147.
- . (1991b). "Toward Better Theories of the Policy Process," *PS: Political Science and Politics*, Vol. 24, Issue 2: 147-156.

- . (1988). "An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change and the Role of Policy-Oriented Learning Therein," *Policy Sciences*, Vol. 21: 129-168.
- . (1987). "Knowledge, Policy-Oriented Learning, and Policy Change: An Advocacy Coalition Framework," *Knowledge: Creation: Diffusion, Utilization*, Vol. 8, Issue 4: 649-692.
- . (1986). "Top-down and Bottom-Up Approaches to Implementation Research: a Critical analysis and Suggested Synthesis," *Journal of Public Policy*, Vol. 6, Issue 1: 21-48.
- Sabatier, P.A. and Brasher, A.M. (1993). "From Vague Consensus to Clearly Differentiated Coalitions: Environmental Policy at Lake Tahoe, 1964-1985," in Sabatier, P.A. and Jenkins-Smith, H.C. (Eds.) *Policy Change and Learning: And Advocacy Coalition Approach*. Boulder: Westview Press,
- Sabatier, P.A. and Jenkins-Smith, H.C. (1999). "The Advocacy Coalition Framework: An Assessment" in Sabatier, P.A. (Ed.) *Theories of the Policy Process*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- . (1993a). "The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Assessment, Revisions and Implications for Scholars and Practitioners," in Sabatier, P.A. and Jenkins-Smith, H.C. (Eds.) *Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- . (1993b). (Eds.) *Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- . (1988). "Symposium Editor's Introduction," *Policy Sciences*, Vol. 21: 123-127.
- Sabatier, P. and Pelkey, N. (1990). *Land Development at Lake Tahoe*. David: Institute of Ecology.
- Sager, T. (2001). "Manipulative Features of Planning Styles," *Environment and Planning A*, Vol. 33: 765-791.
- Saint-Germain, R.A. and Calamia, R.A. (1996). "Three Strikes and You're In: A Streams and Window Model of Incremental Policy Change," *Journal of Criminal Justice*, Vol. 24, Issue 1: 57-70.
- Salter, G. (1997). *Sanctions in Burundi*. London: Action Aid.
- Sanchez, I. (1995). Testimony of Ignacio Sanchez. Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs of the

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act. Washington, D.C.: US Senate.

- Sanchez, L.P. (2003). "Foreword," in Garibaldi, O., Kirby, J. and Traviesco-Diaz, M., *Expropriated Properties in a Post-Castro Cuba: Two Views*. Miami: Institute for Cuban and Cuban American Studies.
- Sardell, A. and Johnson, K. (1998). "The Politics of EPSDT Policy in the 1990s: Policy Entrepreneurs, Political Streams, and Children's Health Benefits," *Milbank Quarterly*, Vol. 72, Issue 2: 175-205.
- Schaefer, D.R. and Dillman, D.A. (1998). "Development of a Standard E-Mail Methodology: Results of an Experiment," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 62: 378-397.
- Scharpf, F. (1997). *Games Real Actors Play: Actor Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Schattschneider, E.E. (1960/1975). *The Semisovereign People*. Hinsdale: Dryden Press.
- Scheberle, D. (1994). "Radon and Abestos: A Study of Agenda Setting and Causal Stories," *Policy Studies Journal*, Vol. 22, Issue 1: 74-86.
- Schiller, W.J. (1995). "Senators as Political Entrepreneurs: Using Bill Sponsorship to Shape Legislative Agendas," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 39, Issue 1:186-203.
- Schlager, E. (1999). "A Comparison of Frameworks, Theories and Models of Policy Process" in Sabatier, P.A. (Ed.) *Theories of the Policy Process*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- . (1997). "A Response to Kim Quail Hill's In Search of Policy Theory," *Policy Currents*, Vol. 7, Issue 2:14-17.
- . (1995). "Policy Making and Collective Action: Defining Coalitions Within the Advocacy Coalition Framework," *Policy Sciences*, Vol. 28, Issue 4: 243-270.
- Schlager, E. and Blomquist, W. (1996). "A Comparison of Three Emerging Theories of the Policy Process," *Political Research Quarterly*, Vol. 49, Issue 3: 651-672.
- Schmidt, P. (2004). *Ignored Minority: Thee Moderate Cuban American Community*. Washington, D.C.: Latin America Working Group Fund.

- Schmidt, W.C. (1997). "World-Wide Web survey Research: Benefits, Potential Problems, and Solutions," *Behaviour Research Methods*, Vol. 29: 274-279.
- Schneider, C.Q. and Wagemann, C. (2006). "Reducing Complexity in Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA): Remote and Proximate Factors and the Consolidation of Democracy," *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 45: 751-786.
- . (2004). The Fuzzy-Set/QCA Two-Step Approach to Middle Range Theories. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. September 2-5, 2004. Chicago, Illinois.
- Schneider, M. and Teske, P. (1995). *Public Entrepreneurs: Agents for Change in American Government*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- . (1992). "Toward a Theory of the Political Entrepreneur: Evidence From Local Government," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 86, Issue 3: 737-747.
- Schneider, M., Teske, P., Marshall, M., Mintrom, M., and Roch, C. (1997). "Institutional Arrangements and the Creation of Social Capital: The Effects of Public School Choice," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 91, Issue 1: 82-93.
- Schneider, M., Teske, P., Mintrom, M. and Best, S. (1993). "Establishing the Micro Foundations for Macro-Level Theory," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 87, Issue 3: 702-716.
- Schneier, E. (1970). "The Intelligence of Congress: Information and Public Policy Patterns," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 388: 14-24.
- Schoch, N.A., and Shooshan, S.E. (1997). "Communication on a Listserv For Health Information Professionals: Uses And Users of MEDLIB-L," *Bulletin of the Medical Library Association*, Vol. 85, Issue 1: 23-32.
- Schofield, N. (2000). "Core Beliefs and the Founding of the American Republic," *Homo Oeconomicus*, Vol. 16, Issue 4: 433-462.
- Scholz, J. (1984). "Cooperation, Deterrence and the Ecology of Regulatory Enforcement," *Law and Society Review*, Vol. 18, Issue 2: 179-224.
- Scholz, J., Pinney, N. Twombly, J. and Headrick, B. (1991). "Street-Level Political Controls over Federal Bureaucracy," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 85: 829-850.

- Schonlau, M., Fricker, R.D., and Elliott, M.N. (2002a). "Appendix A: Literature Review of Response Rates," in *Conducting Research Surveys via E-mail and the Web*. Santa Monica: Rand.  
<[http://rand.org/pubs/monograph\\_reports/MR1480/MR1480.appa.pdf](http://rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1480/MR1480.appa.pdf)> (1 July 2007).
- . (2002b). "Appendix B: Summary of Evidence in Literature," in *Conducting Research Surveys via E-mail and the Web*. Santa Monica: Rand.  
<[http://rand.org/pubs/monograph\\_reports/MR1480/MR1480.appb.pdf](http://rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1480/MR1480.appb.pdf)> (1 July 2007).
- . (2002c). "Chapter Two: Background on the Survey Process," in *Conducting Research Surveys via E-mail and the Web*. Santa Monica: Rand.  
<[http://rand.org/pubs/monograph\\_reports/MR1480/MR1480.ch2.pdf](http://rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1480/MR1480.ch2.pdf)> (1 July 2007).
- . (2002d). "Chapter Three: Literature Review of Web and E-mail Surveys," in *Conducting Research Surveys via E-mail and the Web*. Santa Monica: Rand.  
<[http://rand.org/pubs/monograph\\_reports/MR1480/MR1480.ch3.pdf](http://rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1480/MR1480.ch3.pdf)> (1 July 2007).
- . (2002e). "Chapter Five: Guidelines for Designing and Implementing Internet Surveys," in *Conducting Research Surveys via E-mail and the Web*. Santa Monica: Rand.  
<[http://rand.org/pubs/monograph\\_reports/MR1480/MR1480.ch5.pdf](http://rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1480/MR1480.ch5.pdf)> (1 July 2007).
- . (2002f). "Chapter Seven: Conclusions," in *Conducting Research Surveys via E-mail and the Web*. Santa Monica: Rand.  
<[http://rand.org/pubs/monograph\\_reports/MR1480/MR1480.ch7.pdf](http://rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1480/MR1480.ch7.pdf)> (1 July 2007).
- . (2002g). "References," in *Conducting Research Surveys via E-mail and the Web*. Santa Monica: Rand.  
<[http://rand.org/pubs/monograph\\_reports/MR1480/MR1480.refs.pdf](http://rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1480/MR1480.refs.pdf)> (1 July 2007).
- Schultz, L. (2002). "Blessings of Liberty: The United States and the Promotion of Democracy in Cuba," *Journal of Latin American Studies*, Vol. 34: 397-425.
- Schuh, A.M. (2000). *Timing Successful Policy Change: Lessons from the Civil Service*. Lanham: University Press of America.

- . (1997). *The Policies of Civil Service Reform: Legislative Versus Administrative Response in Policy Making*. Ph.D. Dissertation. University of Illinois at Chicago. Chicago, Illinois.
- Schuldt, B.A. and Totten, J.F. (1994). "Electronic Mail Versus Mail Survey Response Rates," *Marketing Research*, Vol. 6: 36-39.
- Schwarz, N. (1999). "Self-reports: How the Questions Shape the Answers," *American Psychologist*, Vol. 54, Issue 2: 93-105.
- Shamberger, D. M. (1998). "The Helms-Burton Act: A Legal and Effective Vehicle for Property Claims in Cuba and Accelerating the Demise of the Castro Regime," *Boston College International and Comparative Law Review*, Vol. 497. <<http://www.lexisnexis.com>> (1 November 2000).
- Shanahan, J. (1992). *How Cuba's Nuclear Plants Threaten America*. Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation.  
<<http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/EM335.cfm>>> (1 April 2003).
- Sharkansky, I. (2002). *Politics and Policymaking*. London: Lynne Rienner.
- Shaw, D., and Davis, C.H. (1996). "The Modern Language Association: Electronic and paper surveys of computer-based tool use," *Journal of the American Society for Information Science*, Vol. 47, Issue 12: 932-940.
- Sheehan, K B. (2001). "E-mail Survey Response Rates: a Review," *Journal of Computer Mediated Communication*, Vol. 6, Issue 2.  
<<http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol6/issue2/sheehan.html>> (1 July 2007).
- Sheehan, K. B. and Hoy, M. B. (1999). "Using E-mail to Survey Internet Users in the United States: Ethodology and Assessment," *Journal of Computer Mediated Communication*, Vol. 4 Issue 3.  
<<http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol4/issue3/sheehan.html>> (1 July 2007).
- Sheehan, K. B. and McMillan, S. J. (1999). Response Variation in E-mail Surveys: an Exploration. *Journal of Advertising Research*, Vol. 39, Issue 4: 45-54.
- Shepsle, K. (1989). "Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach," *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, Vol. 1, Issue 2:131-147.
- Shepsle, K. and Weingast, B. (1987). "The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 81, Issue 1: 85-104.

- Shepsle, K. A. (2003). "Losers in Politics (And How They Sometimes Become Winners) William Riker's Heresthics," *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol. 1, Issue 2: 307-315.
- Shiffman, J. (2003). "Generating Political Will For Safe Motherhood in Indonesia," *Social Science and Medicine*, Vol. 56, Issue 6: 1197-1207.
- Shoup, B. (2001). "Policy Section Members Vote for the Most Important Works in Public Policy," *Policy Currents*, Vol. 11, Issue 2: 14.
- Shull, S.A. (1983). *Domestic Policy Formation: Presidential Congressional Partnership?* Westport: Greenwood Press.
- Simon, H.A. (1997). *Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization*. (4<sup>th</sup> Edition). New York: Free Press.
- . (1991). "Bounded Rationality and organizational Learning," *Organization Science*, Vol. 2, Issue 1: 125-135.
- . (1985). "Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 79: 293-304.
- . (1983). *Reason in Human Affairs*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- . (1977). "The Logic of Heuristic Decision-Making," in Cohen, R. S. and Wartofsky, M.W. (Eds.) *Models of Discovery*. Boston: D. Reidel.
- . (1973). "The Structure of Ill Structured Problems," *Artificial Intelligence*, Vol. 4: 181-201.
- . (1965). "Administrative Decision Making," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 25, Issue 1: 31-37.
- . (1957a). *Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization*. (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition). New York: Free Press.
- . (1957b). *Models of Man, Social and Rational: Mathematical Essays on Rational Human Behavior in a Social Setting*. New York: Wiley.
- . (1955). "A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 69, Issue 1: 99-118.
- . (1947). *Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization*. (1<sup>st</sup> Edition). New York: Free Press.

- Simon, M.V. and Alm, L.R. (1995). "Policy Windows and Two Level Games: Explaining the Passage of Acid-Rain Legislation in the Clean Air Act of 1990," *Government and Policy*, Vol. 13:459-478.
- Simsek, Z. and Veiga, J.F. (2000). "The Electronic Survey Technique: An Integration and Assessment," *Organizational Research Methods*, Vol. 3, Issue 1: 93-115.
- Singer, J.D. (1961). "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," in Rosenau, J.N. (Ed.) *International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory*. New York: Free Press.
- Sink, C.A. and Stroh, H.R. (2006). "Practical Significance: The Use of Effect Sizes in School Counseling Research," *ASCA*, June: 401-411.
- Skocpol, T. (1979). *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Skok, J.E. (1995). "Policy Issue Networks and the Public Policy Cycle: A Structural Functional Framework For Public Administration," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 55, Issue 4: 325-332.
- Smagula, J.W. (1995). "Redirecting Focus: Justifying the US Embargo Against Cuba and Resolving the Stalemate," *North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation*, Vol. 21. <<http://www.lexisnexis.com>> (1 November 2000).
- Smee, A. and Brennan, M. (2001). *Electronic Surveys: A Comparison of E-Mail, Web and Mail*. Paper presented at the ANZMAC 2000 Visionary Marketing for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Facing the Challenge. <<http://websm.org/uploadi/editor/1140638472Smee1.pdf>> (1 July 2007).
- Smith, A. (2000). "Policy Networks and Advocacy Coalitions: Explaining Policy change and Stability in UK Industrial Pollution Policy", *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy*, Vol. 18: 95-114.
- Smith, C.B. (1997). "Casting the Net: Surveying and Internet Population," *Journal of Communication Mediated by Computers*, Vol. 3, Issue 1: N/A. <<http://www.usc.edu/dept/annenber/vol3/issue1/>>. (1 July 2007).
- Smith, G. and May, D. (1980). "The Artificial Debate Between Rationalist and Incrementalist Models of Decision Making," *Policy and Politics*, Vol. 8: 147-161.

- Smith, J. C. (1998). "Foreign Policy for Sale? Interest Group Influence on President Clinton's Cuba Policy," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 28, Issue 1: 207-220.
- Smith, S. (1986). "Theories of Foreign Policy: A Historical Overview," *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 12, Issue 1: 13-29.
- Smith, W. (2000a). *Our Cuba Diplomacy: A Critical Re-Examination*. Washington, D.C.: Center for International Policy.  
<<http://ciponline.org/cuba/ipr/OurCubaDiplomacy.htm>> (1 April 2003).
- . (2000b). *The US-Cuba Imbroglio: Anatomy of a Crisis*. Washington, D.C.: Center for International Policy.
- Smith, W. and Landau, A. (2002). *Groundless Allegations Squander US Credibility on Terrorism*. Washington, D.C.: Center for International Policy.  
<<http://ciponline.org/cuba/cubainthenews/newsarticles/cippresrelease7.12.02bioterror.htm/>> (4 August 2003).
- Snare, C.E. (1996). "Windows of Opportunity: When and How Can the Policy Analyst Influence the Policymaker During the Policy Process," *Policy Studies Review*, Autumn/Winter: 407-430.
- . (1992). "Applying Personality Theory to Foreign Policy Behaviour: Evaluating Three Methods of Assessment," in Singer, E. and Hudson, V.M. (Eds.) *Political Psychology and Foreign Policy*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Snare, C.E. and Soroka, S. (1999). "Policy Agenda-Setting Theory Revisited: A Critique of Howlett on Downs, Baumgartner and Jones, and Kingdon," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 32, Issue 4: 763-772.
- Snyder, G.H. and Diesing, P. (1977). *Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision-Making and System Structure in International Crises*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Snyder, J. (1991). *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Snyder, R.C. (1958). "Decision-Making as an Approach to the Analysis of Political Phenomena," in Young, R. (Ed.) *Approaches to the Study of Politics*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
- Snyder, R.C., Bruck, H.W. and Sapin, B. (1954). *Decision-Making as an Approach*

*to the Study of International Politics*. Monograph Number 3. Foreign Policy Analysis Project Series. Princeton: Princeton University.

- Solecki, W.D. and Shelley, F.M. (1996). "Pollution, Political Agendas, and Policy Windows: Environmental Policy on the Eve of *Silent Spring*," *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy*, Vol. 14, Issue 4: 451-468.
- Soroka, S.N. (2002). *Agenda Setting Dynamics in Canada*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.
- . (1999). "Policy Agenda-Setting Theory Revisited: A Critique of Howlett on Downs, Baumgartner and Jones, and Kingdon," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 32, Issue 4: 763-772.
- Spadoni, P. (2001). *The Impact of The Helms-Burton Legislation on Foreign Investment in Cuba*. Papers and Proceedings of the Eleventh Annual Meeting of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy. University of Miami, Florida. August 3-4, 2001. <<http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/asce/pdfs/Vol.11/> (1 August 2004).
- Spangler, B. (2003). "Coalition Building," in Burgess, G. and Burges, H. (Eds.) *Beyond Intractability*. Conflict Research Consortium. Boulder: University of Colorado. <[http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/coalition\\_building/](http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/coalition_building/)>. (1 February 2008).
- Spirtas, M. (2000). *US Cuba Policy: Directions For Change*. Center for National Policy Conference at the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center. Washington, D.C.: Center for National Policy.
- Sproull, L. (1986). "Using Electronic Mail for Data Collection in Organizational Research," *Academy of Management Journal*, Vol. 29: 159-169.
- Stanton, J.M. (1998). "An Empirical Assessment of Data Collection Using the Internet," *Personnel Psychology*, Vol. 51: 709-725.
- Starkie, D. (1984). "Policy Changes, Configurations, and Catastrophies," *Policy and Politics*, Vol. 12: 71-84.
- Starr, H. (2000). "Substitutability in Foreign Policy," *Journal of conflict Resolution*, Vol. 44, Issue 1: 128-138.
- Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) Inc.. (1998). *SPSS Survey Tips*. <<http://www.spss.com/PDFs/STIPIr.pdf> > (1 June 2007).

- Steinbruner, J.D. (1974). *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Stern, P. (2000). *The Impact on the US Economy of Lifting the Food and Medical Embargo on Cuba*. Washington, D.C.: The Stern Group.
- Stewart, J. (1971). "Public Administration and the Study of Public Policy Making," *Public Administration Committee Bulletin*, Vol. 11: 42-56.
- Stoecker, R. (1991). "Evaluating and Rethinking the Case Study" *The Sociological Review*, Vol. 39:88-112.
- Stokman, F.N. and Berveling, J. (1998). "Predicting Outcomes of Decision-Making: Five Competing Models of Policy-Making," in Fennema, M., Van der Eijk, C. and Schijf, H. (Eds.) *In Search of Structure: Essays in Social Science and Methodology*. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis.
- Stone, D. (2002). *Policy Paradox and Political Reason*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- . (1989). "Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 104, Issue 2: 281-300.
- Stone, D., Maxwell, S., and Keating, M. (2001). *Bridging Research and Policy*. Paper presented at an International Workshop Funded by the UK Department for International Development, Radcliffe House, Warwick University, July 16-17, 2001.  
<<http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/research/keytopic/other/bridging.pdf>>(5 July 2003).
- Stone, R. (1998). "The High Cost of a Good Drink," *The New Yorker*, January 26, 1998: 6-7.
- Stone, W. (1980). "The Dynamics of Constituency: Electoral Control in the House," *American Politics Quarterly*, Vol. 8: 399-424.
- Stout, K.E. and Stevens, B. (2000). "A Case of the Failed Diversity Rule: A Multiple Streams Analysis," *Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis*, Vol. 22, Issue 4: 341-355.
- Subirats, J. (1990), "La Administración pública como problema. El análisis de políticas públicas como propuesta", in Documentación Administrativa (número especial: "Políticas públicas y organización administrativa"), Instituto Nacional de Administración Pública, nos. 224-225.

- Suchmann, E.A. (1967). *Evaluative Research*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Suedfeld, P. (1992). "Cognitive Misers and Their Critics," *Political Psychology*, Vol. 13: 435: 453.
- Suedfeld, P., Tetlock P.E. and Streufert, S. (1992). "Conceptual/Integrative Complexity," in Smith, C.P. (Ed.) *Motivation and Personality: Handbook of Thematic Content Analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sullivan, M.P. (2006a). *Congressional Research Service: Cuba and the State Sponsors of Terrorism List*. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress.
- . (2006b). *Congressional Research Service: Cuba: Issues for the 109<sup>th</sup> Congress*. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress.
- . (2005a). *Congressional Research Service: Cuba: Issues and Legislation for the 109<sup>th</sup> Congress*. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress.
- . (2005b). *Congressional Research Service: Cuba and the State Sponsors of Terrorism List*. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress.
- . (2004). *Congressional Research Service: Cuba and the State Sponsors of Terrorism List*. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress.
- . (2003a). *Congressional Research Service: Cuba: US Restrictions on Travel and Legislative Initiatives*. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress.
- . (2003b). *Congressional Research Service: Cuba: Issues and Legislation for the 108<sup>th</sup> Congress*. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress.
- . (2002). *Congressional Research Service: Cuba: Issues and Legislation for the 107<sup>th</sup> Congress*. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress.
- . (2001). *Congressional Research Service: Cuba: Issues and Legislation in the 106<sup>th</sup> Congress*. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress.
- . (1996). *Congressional Research Service: Cuba: Issues for Congress*. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress.
- Sutton, R. (1999). *The Policy Process: An Overview*. Working Paper 118. London: Overseas Development Institute
- Svenson, O. (1979). "Process Descriptions of Decision Making," *Organizational Behaviour and Human Performance*," Vol. 23, Issue: 86-112.

- Swanson, D.L. (1988). "Feeling the Elephant: Some Observations on Agenda Setting Research," in Anderson, J.A. (Ed.) *Communication Yearbook: Vol. 11*. London: Sage Publications.
- Sweig, J. (2000). "The Cuban Economy at the End of History," *Milken Institute Review*, Second Quarter: 15-29.
- Swift, C. (2002). *A Model for Education Leaders: Problems, Solutions and Policy Entrepreneurs*. Ph.D. Dissertation. Eastern Michigan University. Ypsilanti, Michigan.
- Talbert, J.C. and Potoski, M. (2002). "The Changing Public Agenda Over the Postwar Period," in Baumgartner, F.R. and Jones, B.D. (Eds.) *Policy Dynamics*. University of Chicago Press: Chicago.
- Tanter, R. (1998). *Rogue Regimes: Terrorism and Proliferation*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Taylor, S. and Fiske, S. (1984). *Social Cognition*. Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley.
- Teisman, G.R. (2000). "Models for Research Into Decision Making Processes: On Phases, Streams and Decision Making Rounds," *Public Administration*, Vol. 78, Issue 4:937-956.
- . (1992). (1<sup>st</sup> Edition) *Complex Decision-Making, A Pluricentric View*. The Hague: Vuga.
- Tepper, S.J. (2004). "Setting Agendas and Designing Alternatives: Policymaking and the Strategic Role of Meetings," *Review of Policy Research*, Vol. 21, Issue 4: 523-542.
- Tercent. (2005). *Super Survey—Survey Questions*. <<http://knowledge-base.supersurvey.com/survey-questions.htm>> (1 July 2007).
- Thomas, S. (2004). *Using Web and paper Questionnaires for Data-Based Decision Making: From Design to Interpretation of the Results*. Thousand Oaks: Corwin Press.
- Tieman, A. and Burke, T. (2002). "A Load of Old Garbage: Applying Garbage-Can Theory to Contemporary Housing Policy," *Australian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. 61, Issue 3: 86-97.

- Timmermans, A. (2001). "Arenas as Institutional Sites for Policymaking: Patterns and Effects in Comparative Perspective," *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice*, Vol. 3: 311-337.
- Timmermans, A. and Bleiklie, I. (1999). *Institutional Conditions for Policy Design: Types of Arenas and Rules of the Game*. Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops Mannheim, March 26-31, 999.
- Tetlock, P.E. (1983). "Policy-Makers' Images of International Conflict," *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. 39, Issue 1: 67-86.
- Tetlock, P.E. and McGuire, C. (2002). "Cognitive Perspectives on Foreign Policy" in Ikenberry, G.J. (Ed.) (4<sup>th</sup> Edition) *American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays*. New York: Longman.
- . (1985). "Cognitive Perspectives on Foreign Policy" in Long, S. (Ed.) *Political Behavior Annual*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Tetlock, P.E., Peterson, R.S., McGuire, C., Change, S. and Feld, P. (1992). "Assessing Political Group Dynamics: A Test of the Groupthink Model," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 63: 403-425.
- Thomas, S.J. (2004). *Using Web and Paper Questionnaires for Data-Based Decision Making: From Design to Interpretation of the Results*. Thousand Oaks: Corwin Press.
- Thurber, J.A. (2003). "Foreword," in Kingdon, J.W. (Reissue of 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition) *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies*. Longman: New York.
- Titmuss, R. (1971). *The Gift Relationship*. New York: Pantheon books of Random House.
- Tomlin, B.W. (2001). "Leaving the Past Behind: The Free Trade Initiative Assessed," in Michaud, N. and Nossal, K.R. (Eds.) *Diplomatic Departures: The Conservative Era in Canadian Foreign Policy, 1984-1993*. UBC Press: Vancouver.
- . (1998). "On a Fast Track to a Ban: The Canadian Policy Process," in Cameron, M.A., Lawson, R.J., and Tomlin, B.W. (Eds.) *To Walk Without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines*. Don Mills: Oxford University Press.
- Traviesco-Díaz, M.F. (2003). "Property Rights in the Post-Castro Cuban Constitution," in Garibaldi, O., Kirby, J. and Traviesco-Díaz, M., *Expropriated*

*Properties in a Post-Castro Cuba: Two Views*. Miami: Institute for Cuban and Cuban American Studies.

- Travis, R. and Zahariadis, N. (2002). "A Multiple Streams Model of US Foreign Aid Policy" *Policy Studies Journal*, Vol. 30, No. 4:495-514.
- True, J.L, Jones, B.D., and Baumgartner, F. (1999). "Punctuated Equilibrium Theory: Explaining Stability and Change in American Policymaking," in Sabatier, P. (Ed.) *Theories of the Policy Process*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Truell, A.D. and Goss, P. (2002). "Business Education Leaders Compare E-Mail and Regular Mail Research," *The Journal of Technology Studies*, Winter/Sprint: 81-83. <<http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/ejournals/JOTS/Winter-Spring-2002/pdf/truell.pdf>> (1 July 2007).
- Tse, A. (1998). "Comparing Response Rate, Response Speed and Response Quality of Two Methods of Sending Questionnaires: E-mail vs. Mail," *International Journal of Market Research*, Vol. 40, Issue 4: 353-361.
- Tse, A., Tse, K.C., Yin, C.H., Ting, C.B., Yi, K.W., Yee, K.P., and Hong, W.C. (1995). "Comparing Two Methods of Sending Out Questionnaires: E-Mail Versus Mail," *Journal of Market Research Society*, Vol. 37: 441-446.
- Tull, D. S. and Hawkins, D.I. (1976). *Marketing Research Meaning, Measurement, and Method*. New York: Macmillan Publishing.
- Turner, J. (1951). *Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.
- Tuten, T. (1997). *Electronic Methods of Collecting Data: A Review of E-Research*. <[http://www.gesis.org/Publikationen/Berichte/ZUMA\\_Arbeitsberichte/97/97\\_09.pdf](http://www.gesis.org/Publikationen/Berichte/ZUMA_Arbeitsberichte/97/97_09.pdf)> (1 July 2007).
- Tversky, A. (1972). "Elimination by Aspects: A Theory of Choice," *Psychological Review*, Vol. 79: 281-299.
- Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1986). "Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions," *Journal of Business*, Vol. 59, Part 2: S251-S279.
- . (1982). "Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases," in Kahneman, D., Slovic, P. and Tversky, A. (Eds.) *Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . (1981). "The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice," *Science*,

Vol. 211: 453-458.

Ullman, R. H. (1983). "Redefining Security," *International Security*, Vol. 8, Issue 1: 129-153.

United Nations. (1997). *Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Cuba*. Submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Carl-Johan Groth. New York: United Nations.

———. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. (1997). *The Relationship Between Economic Sanctions and Respect for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights*. New York: United Nations.  
<<http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/974080d2db3ec66d802565c5003b2f57?Opendocument>> (1 July 2004).

———. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. (2002). *Necessity of Ending the Economic, commercial and Financial Embargo Imposed by the United States of America Against Cuba*. Report of the Secretary General. 57<sup>th</sup> Session. New York: United Nations.

United States. Bureau of Verification and Compliance. (2005). *Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State.  
<<http://www.state.gov/t/vci/rls/rpt/51977.htm#chapter1>> (1 August 2008).

United States. Census Bureau. (2002). *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2001. Section 1: Population*. Washington, D.C.: US Census Bureau.

———. (1997). *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1996. Section 1: Population*. Washington, D.C.: US Census Bureau.

———. (1993). *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1992. Section 1: Population*. Washington, D.C.: US Census Bureau.

United States. Central Intelligence Agency. (2003). *Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions*. Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency.  
<[http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721\\_reports/jan\\_jun2003.htm](http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/jan_jun2003.htm)> (1 July 2004).

United States. Coast Guard. (2008). *Alien Migrant Interdictions Total Interdictions - Fiscal Year 1982 to Present (September 23, 2008)*. Washington, D.C.: US Coast Guard. <<http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg531/AMIO/FlowStats/FY.asp>>

(1 November 2008).

- . (2004a). *Mariel Boat Lift*. Washington, D.C.: US Coast Guard. <<http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-o/g-opl/mle/mariel.htm>> (1 August 2004).
  - . (2004b). *Migrant Interdiction Statistics*. Washington, D.C.: US Coast Guard. <<http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-o/g-opl/mle/amiostats1.htm>> (1 August 2004).
  - . (2004c). *Operation Able Manner: 1994 Haitian Exodus*. Washington, D.C.: US Coast Guard. <<http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-o/g-opl/mle/AbM.htm>> (1 August 2004).
  - . (2004d). *Operation Able Vigil. 1994 Cuban Rafter Crisis*. Washington, D.C.: US Coast Guard. <<http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-o/g-opl/mle/AbV.htm>> (1 August 2004).
- United States. Congress. (1996). *Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996*. Public Law 104-114. Washington, D.C.: US Congress. <<http://thomas.loc.gov>> (1 August 2001).
- . (1992). *Cuban Democracy Act of 1992*. Public Law 102-484, Title XVII. Washington, D.C.: US Congress. <<http://thomas.loc.gov>> (1 August 2001).
- United States. Defense Intelligence Agency. (1998). *The Cuban Threat to US National Security*. Washington, D.C.: US Defense Intelligence Agency. <<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/cubarpt.htm>> (1 July 2004).
- United States. Department of Energy. (1997). *Nuclear Power Generation and Fuel Cycle Report, 1997*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of Energy.
- United States. Department of Justice. Drug Enforcement Administration. (2003). *The Drug Trade in the Caribbean: A Threat Assessment*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of Justice. <<http://www.usdoj.gov:80/dea/pubs/intel/03014/03014.html>> (1 June 2004).
- United States. Department of State. (2008). *Country Reports on Terrorism 2007*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State. <<http://www.terrorisminfo.mipt.org/pdf/Country-Reports-Terrorism-2007.pdf>> (15 August 2008).
- . (2007). *Country Reports on Terrorism 2006*. Washington, D.C.: US

Department of State.  
<<http://www.terrorisminfo.mipt.org/pdf/Country-Reports-Terrorism-2006.pdf>>  
(15 August 2008).

- . (2006). *Country Reports on Terrorism 2005*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State.  
<<http://www.terrorisminfo.mipt.org/pdf/Country-Reports-Terrorism-2005.pdf>>  
(15 August 2008).
- . (2005). *Country Reports on Terrorism 2004*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State.  
<<http://www.terrorisminfo.mipt.org/pdf/Country-Reports-Terrorism-2004.pdf>>  
(15 August 2008).
- . (2004). *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State. <<http://www.terrorisminfo.mipt.org/pdf/2003pogt.pdf>>  
(15 August 2008).
- . (2003). *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State. <<http://www.terrorisminfo.mipt.org/pdf/2002pogt.pdf>> (1 July 2004).
- . (2002). *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State. <<http://www.terrorisminfo.mipt.org/pdf/2001pogt.pdf>> (1 July 2004).
- . (2001). *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State. <<http://www.terrorisminfo.mipt.org/pdf/2000pogt.pdf>> (1 July 2004).
- . (2000). *Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State. <<http://www.terrorisminfo.mipt.org/pdf/1999pogt.pdf>> (1 July 2004).
- . (1999). *Patterns of Global Terrorism 1998*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State. <<http://www.terrorisminfo.mipt.org/pdf/1998pogt.pdf>> (1 July 2004).
- . (1998). *Patterns of Global Terrorism 1997*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State. <<http://www.terrorisminfo.mipt.org/pdf/1997pogt.pdf>> (1 July 2004).

- . (1997). *Patterns of Global Terrorism 1996*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State. <<http://www.mipt.org/pdf/1996pogt.pdf>> (1 July 2004).
- . (1996). *Patterns of Global Terrorism 1995*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State. <<http://www.mipt.org/pdf/1995pogt.pdf>> (1 July 2004).
- . (1995). *Patterns of Global Terrorism 1994*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State.
- . (1994). *Patterns of Global Terrorism 1993*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State.
- . (1993). *Patterns of Global Terrorism 1992*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State.
- . (1992). *Patterns of Global Terrorism 1991*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State.
- . (1991). *Patterns of Global Terrorism 1990*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State.
- United States. Department of State. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. (2008). *Cuba: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2007*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State. <<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100635.htm>> (12 September 2008).
- . (2007). *Cuba: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2006*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State. <<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78887.htm>> (12 September 2008).
- . (2006). *Cuba: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2005*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State. <<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61723.htm>> (12 September 2008).
- . (2005). *Cuba: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2004*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State. <<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41756.htm>> (12 September 2008).

- . (2004). *Cuba: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2003*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State.  
<<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27893.htm>> (12 September 2008).
- . (2003). *Cuba: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2002*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State.  
<<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18327.htm>> (12 September 2008).
- . (2002). *Cuba: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2001*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State.  
<<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/wha/8333.htm>> (12 September 2008).
- . (2001). *Cuba: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2000*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State.  
<<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/wha/751.htm>> (12 September 2008).
- . (2000). *Cuba: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 1999*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State.  
<<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/382.htm>> (12 September 2008).
- . (1999). *Cuba: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 1998*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State.  
<[http://www.state.gov/www/global/human\\_rights/1998\\_hrp\\_report/98hrp\\_report\\_toc.html](http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1998_hrp_report/98hrp_report_toc.html)> (12 September 2008).
- . (1998). *Cuba: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 1997*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State.  
<[http://www.state.gov/www/global/human\\_rights/1997\\_hrp\\_report/97hrp\\_report\\_toc.html](http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1997_hrp_report/97hrp_report_toc.html)> (12 September 2008).
- . (1997). *Cuba: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 1996*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State.  
<[http://www.state.gov/www/global/human\\_rights/1996\\_hrp\\_report/cuba.html](http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1996_hrp_report/cuba.html)> (1 July 2004).
- . (1996). *Cuba: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 1995*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State.  
<[http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1995\\_hrp\\_report/95hrp\\_report\\_ara](http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1995_hrp_report/95hrp_report_ara)>

/Cuba.html> (1 July 2004).

- . (1995). *Cuba: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 1994*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State.  
<[http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1994\\_hrp\\_report/94hrp\\_report\\_ara/Cuba.html](http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1994_hrp_report/94hrp_report_ara/Cuba.html)> (1 July 2004).
- . (1994). *Cuba: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 1993*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State.  
<[http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1993\\_hrp\\_report/93hrp\\_report\\_ara/Cuba.html](http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1993_hrp_report/93hrp_report_ara/Cuba.html)> (1 July 2004).
- . (2004). *Democracy*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State.  
<<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/democ/>> (19 August 2004).
- United States. Department of State. Bureau of International Narcotics Matters. (2008). *2008 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State.  
<<http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2008/index.htm>> (15 August 2008).
- . (2007). *2007 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State.  
<<http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2007/index.htm>> (15 August 2008).
- . (2006). *2006 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State.  
<<http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2006/index.htm>> (15 August 2008).
- . (2005). *2005 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State.  
<<http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2005/index.htm>> (15 August 2008).
- . (2004). *2003 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State.  
<<http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2003/index.htm>> (15 August 2008).
- . (2003). *2002 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State.  
<<http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2002/pdf/>> (15 August 2008).

- . (2002). *2001 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State.  
<<http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2001/c6085.htm>> (15 August 2008).
- . (2001). *2000 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State.  
<<http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2000/index.htm>> (15 August 2008).
- . (2000). *1999 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State.  
<[http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics\\_law/1999\\_narc\\_report/index.htm](http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics_law/1999_narc_report/index.htm)  
|> (15 August 2008).
- . (1999). *1998 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State.  
<[http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics\\_law/1998\\_narc\\_report/index.htm](http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics_law/1998_narc_report/index.htm)  
|> (15 August 2008).
- . (1998). *1997 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State.  
<[http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics\\_law/1997\\_narc\\_report/index.htm](http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics_law/1997_narc_report/index.htm)  
|> (15 August 2008).
- . (1997). *1996 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State.  
<[http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics\\_law/1996\\_narc\\_report/index.htm](http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics_law/1996_narc_report/index.htm)  
|> (20 June 2004).
- . (1996). *1995 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State.
- . (1995). *1994 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State.  
<<http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/law/INC/1995/05.html>> (20 June 2004).
- . (1994). *1993 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State.  
<<http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/law/INC/1994/05.html>> (20 June 2004).
- . (1993). *1992 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*. Washington,

D.C.: US Department of State.

<<http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/law/INC/1993/03.html>> (20 June 2004).

United States. Federal Election Commission. (1997). *Federal Election 1996*. Washington, D.C.: US Federal Election Commission. <<http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe1996/tcontent.htm>> (27 July 2003).

United States. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission. (1972a). *Final Report of the Cuban Claims Program, Part 1*. Washington, D.C.: US Foreign Claims Settlement Commission.

———. (1972b). *Final Report of the Cuban Claims Program, Part 2*. Washington, D.C.: US Foreign Claims Settlement Commission.

United States. Government Accountability Office. (2007). *Economic Sanctions: Agencies Face Competing Priorities in Enforcing the US Embargo on Cuba*. Report GAO-08-800. Washington, D.C.: US GAO.

———. (1997). *Nuclear Safety: International atomic Energy Agency's Nuclear Technical Assistance for Cuba*. Washington, D.C.: Government Accountability Office.

———. (1995a). *Cuba: US Response to the 1994 Cuban Migration Crisis*. Washington, D.C.: US GAO.

———. (1995b). *Nuclear Safety: Concerns With the Nuclear Power Reactors in Cuba*. Washington, D.C.: US GAO.

———. (1992). *Nuclear Safety Concerns About the Nuclear Power Reactors in Cuba*. Washington, D.C.: US GAO.

United States. House of Representatives. (2004). *The Bush Administration And Nonproliferation: a New Strategy Emerges*. Hearing Before the Committee on International Relations. 108<sup>th</sup> Congress, 2<sup>nd</sup> Session. March 30, 2004. Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office.

———. (2002). *Annual Country Reports on Terrorism*. United States Code. Title 22: Foreign Relations and Intercourse, Chapter 38, Section 2656f. <<http://uscode.house.gov>> (19 July 2004).

———. (2000). *Drug Trafficking in the Caribbean: Do Traffickers Use Cuba and*

*Puerto Rico as Major Transit Locations for United States-Bound Narcotics?* Hearings Before the House Committee on Government Reform. 106<sup>th</sup> Congress, 2<sup>nd</sup> Session. January 3-4, 2000. Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office.

- . (1999). *Cuba's Link to Drug Trafficking*. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources, House Committee on Government Reform. 106<sup>th</sup> Congress, 1<sup>st</sup> Session. November 17, 1999. Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office.
- . (1996). *Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996*. Conference Report 104-468. 104<sup>th</sup> Congress, 2<sup>nd</sup> Session. March 1, 1996. Washington, D.C.: House of Representatives.
- . (1995a). *The Cienfuegos Nuclear Plant in Cuba*. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, House Committee on International Relations. 104<sup>th</sup> Congress, 2<sup>nd</sup> Session. August 1, 1995. Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office.
- . (1995b). *Cuba and the Juaragua Nuclear Power Complex*. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, House Committee on International Relations. August 1, 1995. Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office.
- . (1995c). *Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1995*. Report of the House Committee on International Relations. Report 104-202, Part 1. 104<sup>th</sup> Congress, 1<sup>st</sup> Session. July 24, 1995. Washington, D.C.: House of Representatives.
- . (1991). *Cuba in A Changing World: The US-Soviet-Cuban Triangle*. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, House Foreign Affairs Committee. April 30, 1991; July 11, 1991; July 31, 1991. Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office.

United States. Information Agency. (1998). *Text: Defense Secretary's Letter to Thurmond on Cuban Threat*. May 6, 1998.

United States. Interests Section.

<<http://usembassy.state.gov/havana/wwwhusi.html>> (6 November 2004).

United States. International Trade Commission. (2007). *US Agricultural Sales to*

*Cuba: Certain Economic Effects of US Restrictions*. Washington, D.C.: US International Trade Commission.

———. (2001). *The Economic Impact of US Sanctions With Respect to Cuba*. Washington, D.C.: US International Trade Commission.

United States. Library of Congress. (2004). *Congressional Research Service: The Department of State's Patterns of Global Terrorism Report: Trends, State Sponsors and Related Issues*. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress.

United States. National Security Council. (2006). *2006 National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington, D.C.: White House. <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss.pdf>> (15 August 2008).

———. (2002). *2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington, D.C.: White House. <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss.pdf>> (15 August 2008).

United States. Senate. (2003). *Challenges for US Policy Toward Cuba*. Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. 108<sup>th</sup> Congress, 2<sup>nd</sup> Session. October 2, 2003. Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office.

———. (2002a). *Bridges to the Cuban People Act of 2001, S. 1017*. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps and Narcotics Affairs, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. 107<sup>th</sup> Congress, 2<sup>nd</sup> Session. June 19, 2002. Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office.

———. (2002b). *Cuba's Pursuit of Biological Weapons: Fact or Fiction?* Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps and Narcotics Affairs, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. 107<sup>th</sup> Congress, 2<sup>nd</sup> Session. June 5, 2002. Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office.

———. (1996). *Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States and Its Interests Abroad*. Select Committee on Intelligence. 104<sup>th</sup> Congress, 2<sup>nd</sup> Session. February 22, 1996. Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office.

———. (1992). *Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, S. 2918*. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs, Senate

Foreign Relations Committee. 102<sup>nd</sup> Congress, 2<sup>nd</sup> Session. August 5, 1992. Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office.

- . (1991). *International Commercial Reactor Safety*. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Nuclear-Regulation of the Committee on the Environment and Public, Senate. 102<sup>nd</sup> Congress, 1<sup>st</sup> Session. July 25, 1991. Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office.

United States. White House. (1996). *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*. Washington, D.C.: White House.

<<http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/national/1996stra.htm>>(1 June 2004).

- . (1991). *National Security Strategy of the United States 1991*. Washington, D.C.: White House. <<http://www.fas.org/man/docs/918015-nss.htm>> (1 June 2004).

University of Memphis. (2007). QUAID Tool.

<<http://141.225.14.26/quaid/quaid.htm>>. (1 June 2007).

University of Texas. (2007a). *Types of Survey Questions*. Instructional Assessment and Evaluation. Division of Instructional Innovations and Assessment. <[www.utexas.edu/academic/diia/assessment/iar/how\\_to/methods/survey\\_tables\\_questiontypes.pdf](http://www.utexas.edu/academic/diia/assessment/iar/how_to/methods/survey_tables_questiontypes.pdf)>. (1 June 2007).

- . (2007b). *Quick Tip 6.10—Data Gathering: Surveys*. Instructional Assessment and Evaluation. Division of Instructional Innovations and Assessment. <[http://www.utexas.edu/academic/diia/assessment/iar/resources/quicktips/quicktip\\_6-10.pdf](http://www.utexas.edu/academic/diia/assessment/iar/resources/quicktips/quicktip_6-10.pdf)> (1 June 2007).

- . (2007c). *Quick Tip 6.12—Data Gathering: Sampling Strategies*. Instructional Assessment and Evaluation. Division of Instructional Innovations and Assessment. <[http://www.utexas.edu/academic/diia/assessment/iar/resources/quicktips/quicktip\\_6-12.pdf](http://www.utexas.edu/academic/diia/assessment/iar/resources/quicktips/quicktip_6-12.pdf)> (1 June 2007).

- . (2007d). *Quick Tip 6.13—Data Gathering: Designing a Survey*. Instructional Assessment and Evaluation. Division of Instructional Innovations and Assessment. <[http://www.utexas.edu/academic/diia/assessment/iar/resources/quicktips/quicktip\\_6-13.pdf](http://www.utexas.edu/academic/diia/assessment/iar/resources/quicktips/quicktip_6-13.pdf)> (1 June 2007).

- . (2007e). *Quick Tip 6.15—Data Gathering: Choosing a Response Scale*.

- Instructional Assessment and Evaluation. Division of Instructional Innovations and Assessment.  
 <[http://www.utexas.edu/academic/diia/assessment/iar/resources/quicktips/quickt看ip\\_6-15.pdf](http://www.utexas.edu/academic/diia/assessment/iar/resources/quicktips/quickt看ip_6-15.pdf)> (1 June 2007).
- . (2007f). *Quick Tip 6.16—Data Gathering: Survey Response Rates*. Instructional Assessment and Evaluation. Division of Instructional Innovations and Assessment.  
 <[http://www.utexas.edu/academic/diia/assessment/iar/resources/quicktips/quickt看ip\\_6-16.pdf](http://www.utexas.edu/academic/diia/assessment/iar/resources/quicktips/quickt看ip_6-16.pdf)> (1 June 2007).
- . (2007g). *Quick Tip 7.21—Data Analysis: Interpreting Response Scales*. Instructional Assessment and Evaluation. Division of Instructional Innovations and Assessment.  
 <[http://www.utexas.edu/academic/diia/assessment/iar/resources/quicktips/quickt看ip\\_7-21.pdf](http://www.utexas.edu/academic/diia/assessment/iar/resources/quicktips/quickt看ip_7-21.pdf)> (1 June 2007).
- . (2007h). *Quick Tip 7.22—Data Analysis: Data Analysis: Basic Quantitative Procedures*. Instructional Assessment and Evaluation. Division of Instructional Innovations and Assessment.  
 <[http://www.utexas.edu/academic/diia/assessment/iar/resources/quicktips/quickt看ip\\_7-22.pdf](http://www.utexas.edu/academic/diia/assessment/iar/resources/quicktips/quickt看ip_7-22.pdf)> (1 June 2007).
- . (2007i). *Quick Tip 7.31—Data Analysis: Basic Qualitative Procedures*. Instructional Assessment and Evaluation. Division of Instructional Innovations and Assessment.  
 <[http://www.utexas.edu/academic/diia/assessment/iar/resources/quicktips/quickt看ip\\_9-10.pdf](http://www.utexas.edu/academic/diia/assessment/iar/resources/quicktips/quickt看ip_9-10.pdf)> (1 June 2007).
- . (2007j). *Quick Tip 9-10—Data Analysis: Reporting Quantitative Data*. Instructional Assessment and Evaluation. Division of Instructional Innovations and Assessment.  
 <[http://www.utexas.edu/academic/diia/assessment/iar/resources/quicktips/quickt看ip\\_9-10.pdf](http://www.utexas.edu/academic/diia/assessment/iar/resources/quicktips/quickt看ip_9-10.pdf)> (1 June 2007).
- Urduan, T.C. (2005). *Statistics in Plain English*. 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- USA\*Engage. (2001). *Organizational Profile*. Washington, D.C.: USA\*Engage.  
 <<http://www.usaengage.org>> (19 November 2001).
- Vanderbush, W. and Haney, P. (1999). "Policy Toward Cuba in the Clinton Administration," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 114, Issue 3: 387-408.

- Van Evera, S. (1997). *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Vasquez, I. (2002). Remarks: Democratic and Economic Impetus for Free Travel. National Summit on Cuba. September 17-18, 2002. Washington, D.C.: National Summit on Cuba.  
<<http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/uscuba/SummitBookComplete.pdf>> (20 October 2003).
- Vertzberger, Y.Y.I. (1998). *Risk Taking and Decisionmaking: Foreign Military Intervention Decisions*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Vincent, C.H. (1994). *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress: The Committee System in the United States Congress*. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress.
- Viotti, P.R. and Kauppi, M.V. (1997). *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism*. New York: Macmillan Publishing.
- Voss, J.F. (1998). "On the Representation of Problems: An Information-Process Approach to Foreign Policy Decision Making," in Sylvan, D.A. and Voss, J.F. (Eds.) *Problem Representation in Foreign Policy Decision Making*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Voss, J.F. and Post, T.A. (1988). "On Solving of Ill Structured Problems," in Chi, M.T.H., Glaser, R. and Farr, M.J. (Eds.) *The Nature of Expertise*. Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Waddington, H. (2000). "Types of Survey Questions," in Hoffman, B. (Editor) *Encyclopedia of Educational Technology*. San Diego Stat University.  
<<http://coe.sdsu.edu/eet/Articles/surveyquest/index.htm>> (1 July 2007).
- Wahlke, J.C., Eulau, H., Buchanan, W. and Ferguson, L.C. (1962). *The Legislative System*. New York: Wiley.
- Walker, J. L. (1981). "The Diffusion of Knowledge, Policy Communities and Agenda Setting: The Relationship of Knowledge and Power," in Tropman, J.E., Dluhy, M.J. and Lind, R.M. (Eds.) *New Strategic Perspectives on Social Policy*. New York: Pergamon Press.
- . (1977). "Setting the Agenda in the US Senate: A Theory of Problem Selection," *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 7, Issue 4: 423-445.
- . (1974). "Performance Gaps, Policy Research and Political Entrepreneurs:

Toward A Theory of Agenda Setting," *Policy Studies Journal*, Vol. 3, Issue 1: 112-116.

- . (1969). "The Diffusion of Innovations Among the American States," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 63: 880-899.
- Walker, M. (1996). "The Presidential Election 1996," *International Affairs*, Vol. 72, Issue 4: 657-675.
- Walker, S. G. (1998). Models of Foreign Policy Decisions: Rivals or Partners?," *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol. 42, Issue 2: 343-345.
- Wallace, D. N. (1983). *An Exploratory Study of the Utility of the Decision Information Display System for Decision Making and Policy analysis*. Ph.D. Dissertation. Washington, D.C.: American University.
- Walton, J. (1992). "Making the Theoretical Case," in Ragin, C.C. and Becker, H.S. (Eds.) *What Is a Case? Exploring the Foundations of Social Inquiry*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ward, R.C. (1997). *The Chaos of Convergence: A Study of the Process of Decay, Change and Transformation Within the Telephone Policy Subsystem of the United States*. Ph.D. Dissertation. Blacksburg: Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.
- Warner, G. (1997). "Report of Cuba Case Study Group," in *Assessing Economic Sanctions*. Report on Project Ploughshares Forum on Economic Sanctions, November 1997. Ploughshares Working Paper 98-1. <<http://ploughshares.ca/CONTENT/WORKING%20PAPERS/wp981.html>> (22 August 2004).
- Warner, R.M. (2007). *Applied Statistics: From Bivariate Through Multivariate Techniques*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
- Wasem, R. E. (2007). *CRS Report for Congress. Cuban Migration Policy and Issues*. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service.
- Washington Office on Latin America. (2003). *Response to Allegations that Cuba is a Bio-Terrorist Threat*. Washington, D.C.: Washington Office on Latin America. <[http://www.wola.org/cuba/cuba\\_terrorism\\_allegations.htm](http://www.wola.org/cuba/cuba_terrorism_allegations.htm)> (3 July 2004).

- Watt, J.H. (1999). "Internet Systems for Evaluation Research," in Gay, G. and Bennington, T. (Editors) *Information Technologies in Evaluation: Social, Moral, Epistemological and Practical Implications*. San Francisco: Josey-Bass.
- Wayman, F. (1983). *Arms Control and Strategic Arms Voting in the US Senate: Patterns of Change, 1967-1982*. Paper presented to the International Studies Association Meetings in Mexico City, April 5-9, 1983.
- Weaver, R.K. (1986). "The Politics of Blame avoidance," *Journal of Public Policy*, Vol. 6, Issue 4: 371-398.
- Weible, R. and Wallace, J. (1998). "Cyber Research: The Impact of the Internet on Data Collection," *Marketing Research*, Vol. 10: 19-25.
- Weick, K.E. (1979). (2<sup>nd</sup> Editions) *The Social Psychology of Organizing*. New York: Random House.
- Weimer, D.L. (1992). "The Craft of Policy Design: Can It Be More Than Art?," *Policy Studies Review*, Vol. 11, Issue 3/4: 370-388.
- Weimer, D.L. and Vining, A.R. (1989). *Policy Analysis: Concepts and Practice*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
- Weiner, S. (1976). "Participation, Deadlines, and Choice," in March, J.G. and Oslen, J.P. *Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations*. Bergen: Universitetsforlaget.
- Weir, M. (1992). "Ideas and the Politics of Bounded Innovation" in Steinmo, S., Thelen, K., and Longstreth, F. (Eds.) *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Weiss, A. and Woodhouse, E. (1992). "Reframing Incrementalism: A Constructive Response to Critics," *Policy Sciences*, Vol. 25, Issue 3: 255-273.
- Weiss, C. (1980). "Knowledge Creep and Decision Accretion," *Knowledge: Creation, Diffusion, Utilization*, Vol. 1, Issue 3: 381-404.
- . (1977). "Research for Policy's Sake: The Enlightenment Function of Social Research," *Policy Analysis*, Vol. 3: 531-545.
- Weissberg, R. (1976). *Public Opinion and Popular Government*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

- Weissert, C.S. (1991). "Policy Entrepreneurs, Policy Opportunists and Legislative Effectiveness," *American Politics Quarterly*, Vol. 19, Issue 2: 262-274.
- Welch, D.A. (1998). "A Positive Science of Bureaucratic Politics?," *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol. 442, Issue 2: 210-216.
- . (1992). "The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms: Retrospect and Prospect," *International Security*, Vol. 17: 112-146.
- Weldes, J. (1998). "Bureaucratic Politics: A Critical Constructivist Assessment?," *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol. 42, Issue 2: 216-225.
- Whalen, T. (1987). "Introduction to Decision-Making Under Various Kinds of Uncertainty," in Kacprzyk, J. and Orlovski, S.A. (Eds.) *Optimization Models Using Fuzzy Sets and Possibility Theory*. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
- White, B. (1989). "Analysing Foreign Policy: Problems and Approaches" in Clarke, M. and White, B. (Eds.) *Understanding Foreign Policy: The Foreign Policy Systems Approach*. Aldershot: Edward Elgar.
- White, G. C. and Doherty, P.F. (2007). *Problems with Hypothesis Testing*. Colorado State University.  
<[http://warnercnr.colostate.edu/class\\_info/fw663/testing.pdf](http://warnercnr.colostate.edu/class_info/fw663/testing.pdf)> (1 July 2010).
- White House. Office of the Press Secretary. (2009). Fact Sheet: Reaching out to the Cuban People. April 13, 2009. (24 April 2009).
- Whiteman, D. "The Fate of Policy Analysis in Congressional Decision Making: Three Types of Use in Committees," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 38, Issue 2: 294-311.
- Wickham-Crowley, T. (1996). *Guerillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes Since 1956*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Wilcox, F.O. (1971). *Congress, the Executive and Foreign Policy*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Wildavsky, Aaron. (1992). *The New Politics of the Budgetary Process*. New York: Harper Collins Publishers.
- . (1964). *The Politics of the Budgetary Process*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Wilhelm, C. (2002). National Summit on Cuba. Remarks: Our National Interest, Our

National Security. September 17-18, 2002. Washington, D.C.: National Summit on Cuba.

<<http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/uscuba/SummitBookComplete.pdf>> (20 October 2003).

Wilkerson, J.D., Feeley, T.J., Schiereck, N.S., and Sue, C. (2002). "Using Bills and Hearings to Trace Attention in Congress: Policy Windows in Health Care Legislating," in Baumgartner, F.R. and Jones, B.D. (Eds.) *Policy Dynamics*. University of Chicago Press: Chicago.

Wilks, S. and Wright, M. (1987). "Conclusion: Comparing Government-Industry Relations: States, Sectors and Networks" in Wilks, S. and Wright, M. (Eds.) *Comparative Government-Industry Relations: Western Europe, the United States and Japan*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Williams, R. (2009). Multicollinearity. South Bend: University of Notre Dame. <<http://www.nd.edu/~rwilliam/stats2/l11.pdf>> (2 March 2010).

Williamson, O.E. (1975). *Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications*. New York: Free Press.

Wilson, C.A. (2000). "Policy Regimes and Policy Change," *Journal of Public Policy*, Vol. 20, Issue 3: 247-274.

Wilson, J.Q. (1989). *Bureaucracy*. New York: Basic Books.

Wimberley, T. and Morrow, A. (1981). "Muddling Over 'Muddling Through' Again," *International Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. 3: 483-508.

Winter, D.G. (1992). "Personality and Foreign Policy: Historical Overview," in Singer, E. and Hudson, V.M. (Eds.) *Political Psychology and Foreign Policy*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Winter, D.G., Hermann, M.G., Weintraub, W., and Walker, S.G. (2002). "The Personalities of Bush and Gorbachev Measured at a Distance: Procedures, Portraits and Policy" in Ikenberry, G.J. (Ed.) (4<sup>th</sup> Edition) *American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays*. New York: Longman.

Witmer, D.F., Colman, R.W. and Katzman, S.L. (1999). "From Paper-and-Pencil to Screen-and-Keyboard." in Jones, S. (Editor) *Doing Internet Research: Critical Issues and Methods for Examining the Net*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Wolfe, J.D. (1989). "Reorganizing Interest Representation: A Political Analysis of Privatization in Britain" in Foglesong, R.E. and Wolfe, J.D. (Eds.) *The Politics*

*of Economic Adjustment: Pluralism, Corporatism, and Privatization*. Westport: Greenwood.

- Wolfe, E.W., Bolton, S., Feltovich, B., and Bangert, A.W. (1996). "A Study of Word Processing Experience and Its Effects on Student Essay Writing," *Journal of Education Computing Research*, Vol. 14: 269-283.
- Woll, P. (1963). *The American Bureaucracy*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company.
- Wollin, A. (1999). "Punctuated Equilibrium: Reconciling Theory of Revolutionary and Incremental Change," *Systems Research and Behavioral Science*, Vol. 16, Issue 4: 359-367.
- Wood, D.B. and Peake, J.S. (1998). "The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Agenda Setting," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 92, Issue 1: 173-184.
- Wright, K. (1977). "An Exchange Strategy for the Interface of Community-Based Corrections into the Service System," *Human Relations*, Vol. 30: 879-897.
- Wuensch, K.L. (2010). *Standardized Effect Size Estimation: Why and How?* Greenville: K.L. Wuensch.
- Yin, R. (2003). *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*. (3<sup>rd</sup> Edition). Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications
- . (1989). *Case Study Research: Design and Methods (Revised Edition)*. Newbury: Sage Publications.
- . (1984). *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
- Yun, G.W. and Trumbo, C.W. (2000). "Comparative Responses to Survey Executed by Post, E-mail and Web Form," *Journal of Computer Mediated Communication*, Vol. 6, Issue 1.  
<<http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol6/issue1/yun.html#abstract>> (1 July 2007).
- Zahariadis, N. (2007a). *Ambiguity and Choice in European Public Policy (Draft)*. Paper prepared for presentation at the biannual meeting of the European Union Studies Association, Montreal, Canada, May 17-19, 2007.  
<<http://www.unc.edu/euce/eusa2007/papers/zahariadis-n-10f.pdf>>. (1 October 2007).
- . (2007b). "The Multiple Streams Framework: Structure, Limitations,

- Prospects" in Sabatier, P.A. (Ed., 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition), *Theories of the Policy Process*. City: Westview Press.
- . (2003). *Ambiguity and Choice in Public Policy: Political Decision Making in Modern Democracies*. Georgetown University Press: Washington, D.C..
- . (1999). "Ambiguity, Time and Multiple Streams" in Sabatier, P.A. (Ed.) *Theories of the Policy Process*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- . (1996). "Selling British Rail: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?," *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 29, Issue 4: 400-422.
- . (1995a). "Comparing Lenses In Comparative Public Policy," *Policy Studies Journal*, Vol. 23, Issue 2: 378-382.
- . (1995b). *Markets, States and Public Policy: Privatization in Britain and France*. University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor.
- . (1994). "Garbage Cans and the Hiring Process," *Political Science and Politics*, Vol. 27: Issue 1: 98-99.
- . (1992). "To Sell or Not to Sell? Telecommunications Policy in Britain and France," *Journal of Public Policy*, Vol. 12, Issue 4: 355-376.
- Zahariadis, N. and Allen, C.S. (1995). "Ideas, Networks and Policy Streams: Privatization in Britain and Germany," *Policy Studies Review*, Vol. 14, Issue 1/2: 71-98.
- Zaller, J.R. (1992). *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Zebich-Knos, M. and Nicol, H.N. (2005). (Eds.) *Foreign Policy Toward Cuba: Isolation or Engagement?*. Lanham: Lexington Books.
- Zey, M. (1992). "Criticisms of Rational Choice Models," in Zey, M. (Ed.) *Decision Making: Alternatives to Rational Choice Models*. London: Sage.
- Zhang, Y. (1999). "Using the Internet for Survey Research: A Case Study," *Journal of the American Society for Information Science*, Vol. 51, Issue 1: 57-68.
- Ziebro, B.M. (2000). *Social Learning for Sustainability: A Local Government Approach*. Ph.D. Dissertation. University of Oklahoma. Norman, Oklahoma.
- Zimmerman, W. (1973). "Issue Area and Foreign-Policy Process: A Research Note

in Search of a General Theory," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 67,  
Issue 4: 1204-1212.