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SUPERPOWER RISK-TAKING IN THE CONTEXT OF

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS BARGAINING:

THE MIDDLE EAST 1967 - 1973

by

James Leo LeBlanc, B.A.

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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies and Research in partial
fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
in International Affairs

The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs
Carleton University
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August 3, 1984

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submitted by James Leo LeBlanc , B.A.
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ABSTRACT

The concept of risk is utilized to explore superpower risk-taking behaviour in the context of international crisis bargaining. A critical analysis of two 'real politik' propositions, deduced from an evaluation of the theoretical foundations of risk-taking, is undertaken. This analysis encompasses empirical observations derived from Soviet and American behaviour in the Arab-Israeli Wars of 1967 and 1973, and the Jordanian Civil War of 1970.

From this analysis, it is demonstrated that a perceived threat to superpower interests, during a regional conflict between their respective client states, will increase their propensity to take risks. However, no firm evidence could be demonstrated to support the second proposition's basic tenet that the military balance between the superpowers will influence their risk-taking propensity.

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INTRODUCTION

The concept of risk is inherent in many problems of economics, statistics, decision-making and bargaining. However, nowhere are the dangers of risk-taking more prevalent than in international relations. As Raymond Aron (1966:16) writes:

"The theory of international relations starts from the plurality of autonomous centers of decision, hence from the risk of war..."

The concept of risk associated with statements such as Aron's has little correspondence with the observed frequency of outcomes, because a phenomenon such as nuclear war has not occurred and, as Rapoport (1964:25) adds ironically, "in all likelihood, no more than a few can occur".

With the present deterioration in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, instability and uncertainty have increased in the relationship between the two nuclear superpowers, although it has not yet led to a war-threatening confrontation. Whereas it may be correct that politically and economically the global distribution of power has become more ambiguous and diffuse, the basic pattern of bipolarity has nevertheless remained unaltered in the military-strategic and security spheres (Adameit, 1982:1). Despite the necessary mixture of cooperative and conflictual elements, the basic adversarial relationship between the superpowers remains.

There are few clear choices for war in the relations between sovereign states. While there does not appear to be a foreseeable route by which the U.S. and the Soviet Union would become involved in a major nuclear war, it is by no means an impossibility. A crisis occurring during a time of higher tension may involve greater risk because any given action is more likely to be interpreted as involving a greater threat to the perceiver than if the level of hostility were lower.

In no other region of the world are the risks of an American-Soviet confrontation as much in evidence as in the Middle-East. Throughout the post-war period, this region has been the world's most prominent area of crisis. The area has exemplified in a stark form the complicated tangle of interests and relationships that run through international politics: regional conflict and the continuing struggle for self-determination, the competition between the superpowers and the increased awareness of the West's dependency on imported resources; especially petroleum. The 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars along with the Jordanian civil war of 1970 drove home that combination of factors.

What seemed at first a regional confrontation with the Arab-Israeli War of 1948, became increasingly in the 1950's a superpower issue, as the Soviet Union gradually gained a foothold in the Arab world. That phase culminated in the June war of 1967 and the mix of superpower maneuvering and risk-taking continued through the Jordanian crisis in 1970 and finally peaked with their confrontation during the October war in 1973.

The central concern and purpose of this analysis is the exploration of what system-situational factors influence an actor's risk-taking propensity. In this present research it will pertain to superpower risk-taking in the Middle East during regional conflicts between their respective client states. This study will therefore assume an 'open' model of explanation which itself assumes that the most powerful explanation for a state's conflictual behaviour is external to the state as it responds to the coercive behaviour of other states (Steinberg, 1981:189). In other words, this thesis will be examining superpower risk-taking in the context of the bargaining situation.

A comparative case study analysis of risk-taking can be useful in suggesting insights, ideas and questions, as well as in testing the plausibility of deductively derived propositions regarding superpower risk-taking in the Middle East. The comparative approach is also useful because of the complexity of the topic. What is required is a much more comprehensive survey of the surrounding circumstances than is common in most empirical statistical analyses.

Under ideal conditions, an examination of the risk-taking propensities of the superpowers during regional conflicts between their clients should draw on historical evidence over time and across cases. This would permit both a longitudinal and a comparative analysis under controlled conditions. Although a comprehensive exploration of such magnitude is beyond the parameters of this research, such synchronic and diachronic advantages can accrue from an analysis of the three crises, in sequence, of Soviet-American involvement in the Middle East. The 1967 *

and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars coupled with the Jordanian crisis of 1970 lend themselves to manageable treatment while retaining most of the conditions that are theoretically and practically interesting.

This period is amenable to analysis not only because of the wealth of available information but also because the impact of cultural, domestic and ideological factors remain relatively constant during this time frame. While there was only one change in administrations for the U.S., the Soviet Union remained under Brezhnev's rule. Moreover, while there were regime changes in the Arab states involved in the three crises, in Israel many of the principals participated in all three cases. It should be possible then to discount to some degree the impact of these factors which normally confound the interpretation of evidence. Finally, in order to maintain the strict parameters which encompass this analysis, the primary emphasis shall be on Soviet-American behaviour and interactions during these conflicts; their clients' actions will be used only as an external stimulus for the superpower patrons. It must also be noted that while orientations which deal with personality, cybernetic and cognitive decision-making can have an important impact on an individual's risk-taking behaviour, they fall outside the explicit scope of this present analysis. This analysis intends to concentrate primarily on the 'realpolitik' and 'system-situational' dimension of risk and not the decisional process itself.

The examination of this topic begins with Chapter 1 setting out to explore the theoretical foundations of risk-taking. It attempts to define the concept of risk and examine its analytical relevance to

international relations, its measurement and its relation to the dynamics of crisis. From these theoretical statements and concepts, two propositions are deduced which pertain to 1) the influence that a perceived threat to an actor's interests has on its risk-taking propensity and to 2) the influence the relative military balance between the two actors has on their risk-taking behaviour. In this thesis Soviet and American risk-taking will be analyzed in the context of regional conflicts among their respective clients in the Middle East.

Chapter 2 will encompass the basic factual situations and attendant behaviour of the superpowers during the June war of 1967, the Jordanian civil war of 1970 and the October Arab-Israeli war of 1973. In order to delimit to some degree the case studies, superpower interests, their political and military behaviour, as well as some indication of their respective balance of forces will be illustrated.

The first proposition will be critically analyzed in Chapter 3 as it relates an actor's interests to risk-taking. Chapter 4 will analyze the second proposition relating the relative military balance between the actors again to risk-taking. Both chapters will utilize the empirical observations derived from the three case studies. Finally, Chapter 5 will be comprised of the final discussion and concluding remarks. In this chapter a unified picture of the research will be given along with suggestions for applications and areas for future study.

It must be remembered that although alliances in the Middle East have shifted considerably since 1973, both the U.S. and U.S.S.R.

continue to have important clients who are frontline participants in a regional conflict which remains acute. Historically the Middle East has been a major area of danger for the superpowers, and it promises to be so in the future. The shared constraint of war-avoidance has become more rather than less important, therefore from both a theoretical and policy perspective, an examination of Soviet-American risk-taking in the Middle East between 1967 and 1973 is of continuing relevance.

CHAPTER 1

THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

OF RISK TAKING

In order to analyze superpower risk-taking in the context of bargaining situations, an attempt to identify and resolve several theoretical and conceptual problems regarding 'risk' and 'risk-taking' is necessary. After a brief examination of the economic and game theory approaches to risk, an evaluation of risk in international relations will aid in the development of the attendant propositions.

Probability and the Utility Function

Preliminary studies on risk dealt with the concepts of probability and expected utility as they pertained to individual decision-making. Much of the initial formulation of the probability concept was advanced by Bernoulli (1738) and Venn (1866) both of whom distinguished the concept from its measurement. To accomplish this, both scholars viewed probability as a 'degree of belief', to be measured in a frequency or ratio sense. Others placed this frequency approach on a solid axiomatic footing by defining probabilities as the limiting values of ratios of outcomes associated with an infinite sequence of independent trials (Reichenbach, 1949; De La Place, 1951 and Von Mises, 1957, 1964).

An alternative approach to probability is the 'subjectivist' view promoted by Ramsey (1931), De Finetti (1937, 1954), Savage (1954), Kyburg and Smokler (1964) and Pratt, Raiffa and Schlaifer (1965). This approach holds that probabilities can be assessed from revealed preferences among bets for example. Under certain behavioural axioms which deal with internal consistency, the subjectively derived probabilities can be shown to behave as mathematical probabilities.¹

Considerable agreement exists among experts as to how decision-makers confronting risk ought to choose. The theory advises which alternative to select in non-complex decision situations on the basis of one's basic tastes, preferences about risk and the intrinsic value of the attributes under consideration. These elements are imbedded in a utility function so that maximizing expected utility (EU) becomes the guide to rational behaviour in more complex situations.

How to measure utility and whether it could be measured in an absolute sense was debated for many years among economists (Walsh, 1970). In 1947 Von Neumann and Morgenstern developed an important new cardinal utility theory. This new theory was used as an underpinning in their economic theory of games which expanded economic theory into the realm of risky commodities and has maintained its present position as a predominant economic choice model. Empirically, the results of several experimental works on expected utility have led to weak confirmation of the relationship between EU and probability (Mosteller and Nogan, 1951; Davidson, Suppes and Seigal, 1957; Yaari, 1965 and Rossett, 1971). The hypothesis that the higher the EU of a bet, the greater the probability

of it being chosen; was also found to be highly dependent on the complexity of the experiment.

Further challenges to EU theory from Allais (1953), Ellsberg (1961) and Tversky (1975) led to the development of 'subjective expected utility' (SEU). This theory essentially states that an individual in a decision situation evaluates probabilities and payoffs and then rationally selects the alternatives that maximize something of value to him (Edwards, 1953, 1954a, b, c; Kogan and Wallach, 1967; Coombs, 1964, 1975; Coombs and Huang, 1969; Coombs and Pruitt, 1960).

Although SEU theory has refined the way risk has been conceptualized, the problem still exists in that a completely deterministic rational model of the SEU form of decision making may be an unrealizable aspiration. If such a model had proven viable, a concept of risk-taking would have been rendered superfluous.

Simon (1957) points out, however, that the character of rational economic man, as assumed by the mathematical decision theorists, does not seem to match the nature of the decision-makers to be found in real life. Whereas rational economic man is completely informed of all possible decision alternatives and their potential consequences, and performs computations in order to decide on a choice that maximizes value to him, real life decision makers reach decisions with only partial information about alternatives and their consequences, and without carrying out the kinds of complicated computations that maximizers in SEU and other similar theories require. Rather, decision-makers adopt the goal of 'satisficing', a course of action that is good

enough. In essence, the decision-maker searches about until he locates an alternative that meets some minimum standard of satisfaction. To talk of risk-taking in this instance then, is to refer to behaviour in situations where there is a desirable goal and a lack of certainty that it can be obtained or the occurrence of negative effects if something happens. However, because of the overly general nature of the satisficing model, it is not much help in explaining risk-taking behaviour.

Another major weakness with decision and game theories dealing with risk-taking is echoed by Harsanyi (1977). He claims that both theories state merely what will happen if all participants have consistent preferences, actually follow these preferences and actually follow their own interests as defined by these preferences in a fully consistent and efficient manner. Classical game theory requires complete information and a fully cooperative or non-cooperative strategy, not a mixed strategy as occurs in reality (Schelling, 1960; Snyder and Diesing, 1977).

The theory of rational choice under conditions of uncertainty claims that if a decision-maker's choice behaviour satisfies the appropriate rationality postulates, then it can be represented as a form of maximization of expected utility. At one level rational choice is the most appropriate means to a given end. Classical economic and game theories extend this to include choices among alternative ends, whereby choices are rational if they are based on clear and consistent priorities or preferences. However, this is not only difficult, but it

can also be questioned whether it is meaningful to apply this type of rational choice to international relations where priorities and preferences are often poorly articulated and transient, especially throughout the course of a conflict.

The complexity of the problem contributes to the "burial of game theory man" (Adameit 1982:28), as the actors required for game theory type of behaviour bear little resemblance to policy in international relations especially during times of crisis. Although some researchers such as Howard (1976, 1971) and Radford (1976) have attempted to alleviate the rationality problem using a metagame analysis, limitations continue to exist with regard to applying game theory and probability theories, consisting of strictly objective elements, in this instance. Modification would be needed to approach a higher degree of reality, with emphasis on the environment of risk. Some of these limitations are:

1. The probability of outcomes were assumed to be known exactly and could be stated meaningfully in numerical terms.
2. The level of risk is unaffected by the action of the players.
3. The players did not communicate with each other.
4. Only two players were playing the game.
5. There were no time constraints.

Thus risk must be analyzed with regard to the more subjective dimension, approaching more closely the requirements of Simon's definition of rationality.

Risk in International Relations

While much of the research on risk-taking that has been done suggests that risk-taking orientations are homogeneous, Pollatsky and Tversky (1970) and Bueno de Mesquita (1975) reject this assumption. They assume that risk-taking is normally distributed with the mode located at or near the risk neutral position at any given time, thus, most decision makers would behave in a risk neutral manner while some would be risk acceptant and others risk-avoidant. Bueno de Mesquita, however, admits that risk indicators are especially problematic when applied to the major powers, in particular the Soviet Union and the United States. He claims that because they are so powerful, even without allies, they are likely to be secure against outside aggression - except against each other - and should therefore, be treated as risk neutral. While it is acknowledged that the superpowers can engage in risk-taking in other issue areas, such as trade and finance (embargos and sanctions, for example), the main purpose of this present research is to examine only the more military aspects of risk-taking.

A critical risk model developed by Ellsberg (1961) expressed the notion that there is a threshold of risk that equals the maximum risk a party can stand without capitulating or conceding. If the credibility (or probability) of the adversary being committed to stand firm is higher than his risk threshold, the party must give in; if it is lower, the party will continue to stand firm. In other words, the party estimates whether the likelihood of the adversaries being really committed to firmness is too high to take a chance or low enough to be worth risking.

Ellsberg's model drops certain standard game theory assumptions: the first being that the preference schedules of the parties remain fixed during bargaining and secondly, that each party knows or can find out the preference schedule of the other. In dropping these assumptions, Ellsberg takes a small step towards reality in which values do change during interaction and where there is always a degree of uncertainty about the adversary's values.³

Therefore, risk is essentially a liability to error. Risk-taking can refer to the probability of success that a decision-maker demands before pursuing a course of action. It is a function of possible change and may involve a level of uncertainty. Uncertainty in this instance refers to the degree to which the probability of success of a course of action is unknown (Bueno de Mesquita, 1981b:33). Analytically speaking, we may assume that decision-makers cope with uncertainty in a twofold manner: first, they assign priorities to alternative courses of action in terms of their own estimates of the probable outcome (or outcomes of each alternative assuming a satisficing model of rationality); and second, they act on the basis of such priorities and probabilities. If a state perceives that its priorities or interests are 'at odds' with those of another state, it may nevertheless 1) estimate that the realization of such priorities is rather probable and 2) decide to achieve such priorities by engaging in a risk situation with the other state. Thus, risk-taking may occur under varying degrees of uncertainty or under conditions of certainty.

Precise probability estimates and the previously discussed schools of thought concerning the basic mathematical principles underlying probability theory are important and may go a long way, in some instances, in aiding decision-makers. However, for the purposes of this present research, it is only important to note the existence of these schools and remember that estimates of probable outcomes of events may be more or less subjective. It should also be remembered that while cognitive, and cybernetic-type decision theories have great significance in the area of risk-taking, this research intends to concentrate primarily on the 'realpolitik' and 'system-situational' dimension of risk and not the decisional process in which numerical estimates of probability would better lend themselves.

This concentration on political realism stems from the influential work of Morgenthau (1978) and his distillation of the realpolitik tradition. Political realism according to Morgenthau (1978:42-43) posits three basic foreign policy objectives: expand power, maintain power, and demonstrate power. In a more general sense, these may be thought of as policies of imperialism, protecting the status quo and prestige (Gochman and Leng, 1983:99). Morgenthau begins by arguing that prudent actors attempt to 'minimize risks and maximize benefits' in the pursuit of national interests (1978:8). While some are reluctant to accept in all situations Morgenthau's view that realism provides a way of thinking about international politics - an orientation, or interpretation of reality - that is accepted, perhaps unconsciously, by policy makers (Gochman and Leng, 1983:99; Ashley, 1981:213), it is argued that the precepts of political realism may provide the best general description

of why actors are risk-acceptant or risk-avoidant in certain conflictual situations.

Therefore, when speaking of the risk which a state takes in acting in a certain way, it will refer to the probability (in this case corresponding to the concept of degree of belief) that the action would achieve the benefits of political or military success as opposed to the costs of political or military failure in terms of the issues at stake (Gochman and Leng, 1983:100) and in relation to the actions of its opponents. Being concerned with the Soviet Union and the United States at the present time, a high risk action may refer specifically to the probability that such an action may result in a direct confrontation between the superpowers. Lower degrees of risk may pertain to the acquisition or maintenance of prestige and the reputation for resolve in order to achieve other interests. Inherent in this is the assumption that an action which reduces the number of perceived options (actions) remaining before a direct confrontation must be contemplated as risk-acceptant behaviour. Risk-avoidant behaviour in effect increases the number of perceived possible options before an action is contemplated which might involve the superpowers in a direct confrontation. Thus we may regard the risk attached to any action as the potential result of the action in a particular situation.

The creation of risk in international relations is usually shared, thereby leading to what Thomas Schelling (1966:91) has called a 'competition in risk-taking'. It involves initiating an activity that may get out of hand, starting a process that carries some risk of

unintended disaster, although it need not be limited to 'total' disaster.⁴ The risk is intended, but not the disaster. Schelling claims that one cannot initiate 'certain' disaster as a profitable way of putting compellent pressure on someone, but one can initiate a 'moderate' risk of mutual disaster if the other party's compliance is feasible within a short enough period, thus keeping the cumulative risk within tolerable bounds.

There would be little or no risk of disaster if all threats made in the international arena were credible. Uncertainty would not exist in regards to action which would or would not escalate to violence. In reference to the U.S.S.R. and the United States, the existence of unambiguous and well-defined 'thresholds' or 'trip-wire' actions (Kahn, 1965) would leave little risk of one side miscalculating and overstepping the bounds leading to disaster. However, while some strategic doctrines may be well-defined, such as 'massive retaliation', this does not automatically translate it into a 'credible' doctrine or threshold.

Uncertainty and ambiguity do exist, however, in international relations; and while it may be questioned from a deterrence perspective whether this uncertainty is beneficial or not, its effects on risk-taking are important. It would be possible to get into a situation in which either side felt that to yield now would create such an asymmetrical situation, it would be a gratuitous act of surrender; that whoever backed down would not be able to persuade anyone else that they would not do otherwise in the future. Therefore, a competition in risk taking is characterized not so much by tests of force as by tests of

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nerve.

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This 'game' of disaster (Adomeit, 1982:16) also involves an outcome that is equally disadvantageous and unacceptable to both players as the negative payoff connected with this outcome must be higher than just losing the game (Schelling, 1966). The new dynamic is the essence of the game; it is the acceptance of risk in exchange for a restriction in the opponent's freedom of manoeuvre. Logically this can lead to the position of unacceptability in placing oneself or the opponent into a position where the choice is all or nothing; humiliation or defeat. In this game there is always some final step or last clear chance to turn the course of events away from disaster. However, political and technical reality, does not allow for the construction of such an unambiguous or clear border line. Risk implies uncertainty, thus any model of risk-taking must include risky choices for both players, thereby making outcomes probabilistic..

Risks can be of two types; 'calculated' or what Synder and Diesing (1977:210) call 'autonomous' risk. Both types shall be the focus of this research. Autonomous risk is the danger that the parties will lose control of events. Such risks are analytically external to the bargaining process; if the latter is conceived as a deliberately controlled affair, although they do impinge on the bargaining in various ways (such as accidents). The calculated type of risk emerges in a competition in risk-taking between parties. It is inherent in the bargaining process itself, conceived as a controlled process based on reasoned calculation. There is a conscious process of behaviour which

weighs means for the achievement of ends in which the key risk is miscalculation. The parties calculate, and have their behaviour under control, but for a variety of possible reasons, including misperceptions of the adversary's interests and intentions, they calculate badly.

The actor's decision will depend on the perceived risk itself and on the relative payoffs connected with the different outcomes (Adomeit, 1982). Prior to Bernoulli's St. Petersburg Paradox, it was generally agreed that the absolute payoff, that is, the maximum mathematical expected gain, decided the choice for one strategy over the other. Adomeit claims that today it is widely and more accurately postulated that it is not the expected absolute payoff, but the subjective utility function of the actor which determines the choice among alternatives, in other words, the actor decides for himself what the different values connected with individual outcomes are to him and not the mathematically produced absolute payoff.

Another factor which may shape calculated risk-taking is that the actor may realize that it is necessary to do something, no matter how high the risks. This coincides with the strategy of risky behaviour commonly called 'brinkmanship' which can be conceptualized as the deliberate creating of a risk shared with the opponent; credible precisely because its consequences are not within either party's control. Thus, calculated risk-taking is a conscious choice by an actor choosing among several alternatives. The choice depends on factors such as the perception of risk and the taking into account the actors' objectives and values (Schelling, 1966:94).

With reference to the superpowers, Adomeit (1982) claims that the basic pattern of bipolarity has remained unaltered in the military-strategic and security spheres between the United States and the Soviet Union since the Second World War. The basic adversarial relationship between the two superpowers remains unchanged, including the necessary mixture of cooperation and conflict between themselves and in areas of interest to them. Although military increases and developments, especially in naval power, have changed their ability to project commitment and force, these increases can be said to widen the geographic scope of possible crises and confrontation. While the Soviet Union has intervened in areas contiguous to their territory; Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968 and Afghanistan 1979; they also have important interests, along with the U.S., in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Africa and Central America. Schelling (1960) also believes that East-West issues are not decided by who can bring the most force to bear in a region but who is eventually willing to bring more force to bear or who is able to project the appearance that more force is forthcoming.

Risk in International Crises

Risk must be identified as being fundamental and inherent in an international crisis,⁵ particularly one involving military activity. The probabilistic elements and the likelihood of war enhance the sheer preoccupation with risk during a crisis. The frequency of incidents and alarms also contribute to this preoccupation because of the increased readiness of the key decision-makers to act on them. The intensity of a crisis thus becomes a function of the level of risk. The unpredictable,

indeterminate or uncertain nature of the outcome during this severe form of conflict contributes to the whole essence of crisis.

Much research has been focused on the situation of crisis by analysts of foreign-policy decision-making. However, because of the strict parameters of this present research, an in-depth survey of such general work on crisis is inappropriate. The reader is directed to studies of exceptional quality such as Holsti (1972a, 1972b), McCormack (1975), George, Hall and Simons (1971), Hermann (1969, 1972), Janis (1972), Milburn (1972), North et al. (1963), Paige (1972), Robinson (1972), Snyder (1972), and Young (1968). Although others such as Snyder and Diesing (1977), and especially McClelland (1968, 1972) have examined the impact of crisis from a systematic perspective as well, it appears the core element in a crisis situation is a perception by decision-makers of a threat to basic values. This threat to basic values generally implies an increase in the probability of violence (Snyder and Diesing, 1977:492).

Relations among states will always contain elements of cooperation and conflict; coercion by diplomatic, economic and military-political means short of the overt use of force may form part of their 'normal interaction'. However, while there is always some chance of crisis in relations among adversaries, any increase in the coercive and conflictual elements will increase the probability that a crisis will occur (Snyder and Diesing, 1977; Adameit, 1980). The risk that certain actions or situations would lead to a crisis can then turn into risk of war and a qualitatively new situation would then prevail. The crisis

ends either in war, capitulation or compromise (Adomeit, 1982:44).

For this heightened situation to exist two actions and two conditions must be met. A challenge posed by one power and a response in kind by the adversary comprise the actions. The commitment and resolve by both powers to engage in competition in risk-taking, and the evolution of an escalatory situation, coupled with imperfect control over local actors, that is, the general force of events, make up the conditions. The Soviets call this the 'nekontroliruemiy element' or the uncontrollable element in crisis (Adomeit, 1982:44). When the challenge collides with the response, an acute phase of the crisis, the confrontation, has begun.

Figure 1:

THE PHASES OF CRISIS

(Adomeit:44)

Thus, risk is accepted or rejected depending not only on objective conditions, but to a large extent on perceptions of the adversary's actions and commitments. The strategic position and mutual expectations and beliefs about the probability of responses, and counteractions under the conditions decision-makers find themselves also determine the acceptability of risk. Objective risk in international relations deals with probabilities in which information and measurable indices are unaffected by changes in the level of that information, as well as by perceptions of the actors. Because of these inadequacies the concept of subjective risk is needed in order to include those subjective elements which are important in determining the calculation of reality. Subjective risk contains none of the limitations that exist in game or economic theories of risk. It requires only a degree of belief about the objective situation in which the actions take place and the assignment of a certain level of risk to the action, without necessarily expressing it in numerical terms (Adameit, 1982). This applies wherever the factors responsible for outcomes are too complex by their very nature to be measured accurately and expressed in statistical relationships. Under conditions such as these, decision-making is of necessity, a subjective process.

The assumption that risk is perceptual and subjective, requires an understanding of risk that includes the external conditions or environment in which the situation takes place. With all else held constant, perceived risk increases when the probability of negative consequences (losing) increases and when the probability of positive consequences (winning) decreases. As well, *ceteris paribus*, the greater

the variance of probability, the greater the perceived risk of extreme outcomes (Adomeit, 1982).

Although one might not intend to start a war or serious dispute with a particular action, it is difficult to imagine that the risks inherent in such an action are not considered before it is committed. The evaluation of such risks takes place within a framework of circumstances that render the level of risk sometimes acceptable and sometimes unacceptable (Bueno de Mesquita, 1981:4). From a framework of circumstances one must have a set of necessary conditions, to be outlined presently, which must be satisfied before extreme risks, as in a situation of crisis between the superpowers, are taken.

It is recognized that the cognitive, bureaucratic and organizational aspects of decision-making in which the actual decision still remains with the individual or aggregate decision unit are important. However certain external conditions, over some of which the superpowers have little or no control, must be met in order to establish a framework for risk-taking. For example, East and Gregg's (1967) analysis demonstrates that a nation's actions are systematically related to its international situation and the external environment. More specifically, Gamson and Modigliani (1971) have analyzed the behaviour between the United States and the Soviet Union for the period of the Cold War, focusing on the hypothesis that the actions of either party will be reciprocated in the actions of the other. As with this present work, much of this type of research focuses on the behaviour of states in a particular region.

It will also be assumed that the decision, as an end product, is the result of the influence of a single or aggregate decision unit, although not necessarily the result of a single utility function (Howard, 1976:7). While substantial research has been done on the structure and process of decision making (Allison, 1971; Brady, 1975; Halperin, 1974; Steinbruner, 1974; March and Simon, 1958; Collins and Guetzkow, 1965; De Rivera, 1968; Snyder and Diesing, 1977; and Janis and Mann, 1977), the present boundaries of this research do not allow a thorough examination of decision structure. However, as with Bueno de Mesquita (1980, 1981), Stein (1980) and Brecher (1980) it is assumed that the shortage of time, or the scope of the threat, or both, in a severe conflict, limit the play of domestic political factors, as well as bureaucratic and organizational pressures. In times of crisis, decisions are usually taken at the highest level and closely approximate a unitary actor.

In particular, Kogan and Wallach (1967) examined the role of individual and group decision-making involving risk. They found that when the responsibility for the making of a risky decision is invested in a group rather than in an individual, or when an individual with this responsibility seeks the counsel of others, no strong consensus evolved on whether positive or negative value-judgements could be applied as a result. As with Janis and Mann (1977) and Stein and Tanter (1980), Kogan and Wallach did however, find moderate support for the proposition that an individual, after discussing the matter at hand with a group, evidenced a 'risky-shift' in their decisions moving from moderate

conservative to more risk proneness. The researchers postulated that this was a result arising first of all from either a person-centered factor of greater persuasiveness on the part of high risk-takers in the group; secondly a group centered factor of diffusion of responsibility, in which individuals felt less cautious knowing that responsibility was spread around, or thirdly, both of the above. Although the research results on risk in individual and group decision-making are nebulous, they should be kept in mind while discussing the external conditions.

Therefore, along with the theoretical statements and assumptions considered so far, there remains the task of establishing the attendant propositions. These propositions will be developed from a theoretical framework, pertaining to superpower risk-taking during a regional conflict between their client states.⁶

The Interest at Stake and Risk-Taking (PROPOSITION 1)

Using the examples of the Berlin crises of 1958 and 1961, Adomeit (1982:51) differentiates between levels of risk-taking using American and Soviet behaviour. In 1958, the Berlin ultimatum involved only the 'announcement' of an intention to do something which was never done, while the construction of the Berlin wall in 1961 involved physical measures and the mobilization of military forces. As the crisis in 1961 posed the risk of western counteraction or riots of the German population, it would seem a matter of common sense, claims Adomeit, to allocate a higher level of risk to the later crisis. Because this present research contains many of the same assumptions and theoretical

statements as Adomeit's work, a similar analytical measurement will be employed to determine the level of risk-taking between the superpowers.

Gochman and Leng (1983:100) take this a step further by claiming that the demonstration of power in the context of militarized disputes involves the willingness to risk escalation for the purpose of showing resolve. The initial threat of force sets the tune for the subsequent bargaining in a conflict, it signals the level of risk that the threatened is willing to accept to achieve his objective. It also crystalizes the military options that decision-makers confront.

There is a distinction between overt physical military threats (such as military maneuvers, shows of force and alerts) and verbal threats. Physical threats are concrete actions generally requiring additional actions to remove them, while verbal threats - with the possible exception of ultimatums - can be permitted to fade away. Gochman and Leng also pointed out that decisions to show force are not independent of decisions to use force. The former carry their own momentum, tending to reduce perceived options in subsequent decisions. Therefore, as a consequence physical threats are more likely than verbal threats to presage high levels of escalation in crisis bargaining (Gochman and Leng, 1983:101).

Following from the previous statements it must be assumed that risk-taking can also be a form of non-verbal communication. Under conditions where verbal communication may not be sincere, risk-taking becomes in fact a form of communication between the actors (Triska and

Finley, 1968:322-323). This coincides with the idea that verbal moves are of lesser importance than actions. A participant must signal his intention, either explicitly or implicitly, with a concrete move, that is, he must incur a risk to show that his intentions are serious.

For analytical purposes, the level of risk-taking may be defined and measured in terms of the situation in which particular actions might occur. While it would be of great value to combine the situation in terms of the actors' motives for risk-taking, no adequate way to measure motives could be found. Thus, in analyzing the dependent variable of risk-taking in terms of the situation, not only must the actions of the superpowers be examined, but also the military actions of the client states on the ground and the more global state of affairs between the superpowers. Included in the behaviour of the superpowers is an examination of any increase in commitment and involvement with their clients. This will be analyzed by examining increases in military aid and political support by the superpower patrons to their respective clients. Evidence pertaining to the relevance of this commitment can be found in Slovic (1964) and Milburn and Billings (1976) where it is found that the extent of commitment demanded affects the aspects of the decision situation considered in determining risk.

An examination of the military actions of the clients will allow an assessment of the impact that the hierarchical relationships between patrons and clients have on the risk-taking propensities of the patrons. As well, an analysis of the global state of affairs between the superpowers will, out of necessity, include the influence of detente on

the superpower's risk-taking behaviour (Stein, 1980:481).

With the concept of risk in international relations being relational, involving the interaction of two or more states, the concept of bargaining is important in qualifying the relational properties of risk. Bargaining in this instance becomes the principle of mutually expected rationality. The outcome of a situation must be determined by explicit or implicit bargaining (signaling) among the actors (Harsanyi, 1977; Snyder and Diesing, 1977). In order to find a solution from which to incorporate some form of satisficing rational behaviour into bargaining situations, the Zeuthen principle becomes appropriate (Zeuthen, 1930:156). Basically, this principle states that at any given stage of bargaining between two 'rational' actors, the next concession must always come from the actor less willing to risk a conflict. This will occur if each actor's willingness to risk a conflict is measured by the highest probability of conflict that he would be prepared to face rather than accept the terms proposed by the other party.

With reference to the goods or benefits that are allocated, bargaining becomes a process of deciding on a distribution of these goods between the actors and the bargain (or outcome) as an allocation of these goods or benefits. Specifically, the bargaining problem - the situation that induces bargaining - consists of conflicting wants or demands. The two actors both want the same benefit or set of benefits but they cannot both have the whole set (Snyder and Diesing, 1977:34).

For the development of the first proposition, two further assumptions must be made regarding the actor's perceived interests;

1. The value attached by a state to its objectives and the consequences from any actions involving the objectives, affect perceived risk.

In other words, any actions involving the perceived vital interests of a state will affect the perceived risk inherent in addressing such action. Vital interests may range from a high of national survival and security; to the maintenance of long standing foreign policies; to disputes over territory that is neither within the existing borders of a disputant nor contiguous to those borders; and to issues of prestige, reputation and economic considerations. While the issue of national survival remains utmost in the concerns of decision makers, the value placed on the other issues at stake may vary depending upon the situation.

2. The more negative the perceived consequences, the greater the risk.

For example, an alternative course of action which includes war as a consequence is riskier than an alternative which has the breaking of diplomatic actions as the worst consequence (Milburn and Billings, 1978).

Risk-taking in the present sense will thus be analyzed with regard to a perceived threat to the interests of one or the other of the superpowers, thus causing an increase in risk behaviour. This will occur when there is a threat to the opposing objectives and interests of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in a particular area (notably the Middle East during a regional conflict between their respective client states).

Thus, proposition one stated more formally claims that:

"An actor's interests affect its risk-taking behaviour such that the greater the perceived threat to those interests, the greater will be its propensity to take risks."

The Military Balance and Risk Taking (PROPOSITION 2)

Following from the first proposition, an analysis of the second independent variable; the comparable strengths of the superpowers involved in the conflict, is also necessary in order to further understand risk-taking behaviour.

Inherent in this analysis is the concept of deterrence. What deters the taking of risks, according to classical formulations, are primarily fears of punishment. Thus, the proposition advanced in the Western deterrence literature claims that the greater the punitive means available to an opponent, the lower the readiness of an actor to engage in risky actions; consequently a weaker power is said to have a built-in tendency to avoid challenging a stronger power (Adameit, 1982:19). While deterrence is based on the theory that the potential aggressor will act only when the predicted benefits exceed the probable costs, neither superpower has been satisfied with the comforting thought that few conceivable gains would be worth such staggering losses (Coffey, 1971:48). Instead, both powers have attempted to gain the capability to inflict on each other casualties at least equivalent to those each actor would suffer itself, even if this means going above levels of unacceptable damage, possibly emerging from any nuclear exchange with a relative advantage over its adversary.

However, there are problems and paradoxes of deterrence. One such problem is that the ability of a nuclear-armed aggressor to inflict damage on the deterrer may inhibit the latter from actually launching a strategic strike, thereby reducing the punishment for aggression from a certainty to a possibility. Another is that if the damage ratios are favourable to the aggressor, he may be even more inclined to act, since now his benefits would exceed his costs - at least in the material sense - even if the deterrer did initiate nuclear war. Finally, the presumed reluctance of the deterrer to suffer heavy losses and/or to accept a disadvantageous war outcome may so weaken the credibility of the deterrent as to make aggression or risk-taking more likely.

However, coupled with the more objective factor of the relative military balance, there is also the question of the willingness to use force, communication of this intent to the adversary, perceptions of intent and resolve along with an analysis of the benefits and costs of such action. In many instances these subjective elements may be more significant than the actual ability to cause casualties. The willingness to take risks may vary with the importance of the interests threatened (thus tying into Proposition 1) as looked upon by both sides. Thus the degree of commitment by both actors and the local situation, as well as the military balance may all affect the risk-taking propensities of the actors. If so, then it does not necessarily translate that the weaker side will always be deterred from action. The weaker actor may have a preponderance of interests and therefore be willing to take greater risks.

Although a superpower is less likely to launch its strategic strike forces in the event of an attack on one of its allies, this likelihood should not be ignored. A decision-maker must always consider the possibility that his opponent might initiate force, since the importance that the opponent attaches to maintaining a given position or commitment may induce seemingly 'irrational' actions (brinkmanship). The willingness to risk a confrontation by supporting opposing clients in a regional conflict forms a variant of 'extended deterrence'. However, because the more subjective variables affecting deterrence come into play, such as level of commitment and intent, it must be questioned under the circumstances whether the military capabilities or the outcome of a strategic exchange alone would affect the risk-taking propensities of the actors. As Coffey (1971:63) argues history suggests that there is little correlation between levels of strategic power and the willingness to support opposing parties in a local conflict. Soviet support for the Chinese Communists in 1945-1946, the Greek rebels in 1947-1948 and the North Koreans in 1950-1953 occurred when the U.S.S.R. had either no nuclear weapons or very few compared to the Americans.

The preceding analysis suggests that the relationship between strategic power and political behaviour is at least a tenuous one. However, a concentration on the level and means of punishment aspect of deterrence has led to an emphasis upon the relative military capabilities of both superpowers (Freedman, 1983; Coffey, 1971; Snyder, 1961). There has also been a problem of having the Western concept of deterrence imposed on the Soviet Union, thus causing some perceptual

problems (see Erickson, 1982). It is proposed that such a strict reliance on military strength may be somewhat misplaced, especially in areas where local confrontations threaten to draw in the superpowers. Increased emphasis should be placed on examining the more subjective factors of deterrence and their influence on risk-taking propensities (see also Adameit, 1982:18-20). During a conflict the weaker side could threaten its stronger opponent with 'disaster', creating an asymmetry of interests in which the weaker side is no longer so intensely interested in avoiding risks. This is because risk-taking also gives him a chance to force the stronger player to give up his advantage. The weaker side's threat is a credible strategy of persuasion flowing from the disparity in interests and positions. It is reasonable for him to expect that the stronger opponent can be persuaded to accept temporary disadvantage rather than expose probable gains to the risk of 'disaster'.

Therefore, in order to examine further the question of reliance on the single dimension of a preponderant military capability and its influence on an actor's risk-taking propensities, Proposition two will analyze this objective element in its relation to superpower risk-taking in the Middle East during regional conflicts between their respective client states.

It will attempt to show that such a reliance is perhaps inappropriate, that the military balance does not necessarily affect superpower risk-taking in these particular bargaining situations. If confirmed, it may be discovered that, as in Proposition one, it is the preponderance of interests or threat to those interests which are far

more influential in their impact on superpower risk-taking.

Proposition two, therefore, will deal with the relative strategic and regional military strengths of the superpowers during conflicts between their clients. The problem of gaining or losing in a conflict is often claimed to be directly related to the relative ability of the antagonists to bring, to be willing to bring, or appear to bring more strength into the conflict (Bueno de Mesquita, 1975; Schelling, 1965; Kahn, 1960; Russett, 1969). Because of the inherent dynamism of conflict, the analysis must also transcend the states of the crisis dealt with by this proposition, as well as by the first.

The military balance shall be measured by examining the global nuclear positions and capabilities of both superpowers as well as their more regional military capabilities, especially in regards to their respective naval forces. Military capabilities can refer to a whole set of factors which point to the relative potential for victory if a local confrontation occurs; or to the potential for achieving and maintaining objectives. Many of the factors which may be included in an analysis of the balance of power are intangible: quality of leadership, morale of fighting men (Milstein, 1972). However, because of the extreme difficulty in measuring these factors, only readily available quantitative indicators shall be used to express the difference in military capabilities. It is also recognized though that these indicators will reflect the intangibles to some degree. Thus, Proposition two will be couched so as to give a positive direction to the proposition advanced in the classical deterrence literature

therefore enhancing the analysis:

"The military balance between the actors will influence their risk-taking propensities such that the greater the margin of superiority over one's opponent, the less willing that opponent will be to engage in risk-acceptant behaviour."

Thus, in summary, the foregoing discussion comprises the theoretical statements and propositions on risk-taking in general and of superpower risk-taking during regional conflicts between their client states in particular. Subsequent discussion will consist of the case studies, the analysis of which will provide the basis for the empirical confirmations of the theoretical propositions.

NOTES

1. These axioms are:

- A. The complete ordering axiom: For any two lotteries, L_1 and L_2 , the decision-maker prefers either L_1 to L_2 or L_2 to L_1 , or else is indifferent. Furthermore, if L_1 is preferred to L_2 and L_2 to a lottery L_3 , then L_1 must also be preferred to L_3 (transitivity).
 - B. The continuity axiom: If $\$x$ is preferred to $\$y$ and $\$y$ to $\$z$, then there must exist some probability p (between 0 and 1) so that the decision-maker is indifferent between a sure amount $\$y$ and a lottery offering $\$x$ or $\$z$ with probabilities p and $(1-p)$ respectively.
 - C. The independence axiom: If the decision maker is indifferent between alternatives x and y , then he should also be indifferent between two lotteries offering x and z in the first and y and z in the second, with probabilities p and $(1-p)$ in each lottery for any z and p value.
 - D. The unequal probability axiom: If x is preferred to y , then lottery L_1 should be preferred to L_2 when both lotteries contain only the outcomes x and y and when the probability of winning x is greater in L_1 than in L_2 .
 - E. The axiom of complexity: If two lotteries, L_1 and L_2 , offer outcomes x and y for L_1 and produce two new lotteries, L_3 and L_4 , as the outcomes for lottery L_2 , with L_3 and L_4 offering only x and y , then the decision maker should be indifferent between L_1 and L_2 if, and only if, the expected values of L_1 and L_2 are identical (this axiom guarantees that probabilities are calculated in accordance with traditional probability calculus (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947:42)).
- 2. For Bueno de Mesquita's empirical testing and mathematical measures see Bueno de Mesquita, (1980:925-929).
 - 3. See Stein and Tanter (1980:252-305) for an example of applying probability estimates to decision-making under these new conditions.
 - 4. 'Disaster' in this instance would mean a resulting global nuclear exchange between the superpowers.
 - 5. Crisis shall be defined in this instance as:

"a sequence of interactions between the governments of two or more sovereign states in severe conflict, short of actual war but involving the perception of a dangerously high probability of war." (Snyder and Diesing, 1977:6).

6. The terms "patron and client", of course, are not used as pejoratives. No more is meant than that a militarily weaker power is under the protection of a stronger. There is no imputation of vassalage, unilateral dependency or even of inequality in bargaining strength. (Dismukes and McConnell, 1979:5).
7. The concept of bargaining used here includes both coercive and accommodative aspects (Snyder and Diesing, 1977:22-23). What coercion and accommodation have in common is that, in both contexts, one party is presented with a choice between accepting the other party's proposal (offer, demand) or rejecting it, and holding out in the hope of something better at the risk of getting something worse.

CHAPTER 2

SETTING THE STAGE

Evolution of the Global Perspective

It has been said that the one factor that affects Soviet and American behaviour lies in the fundamentally different perceptions that both bring in their approach to politics. Brzezinski and Huntington (1963:38) for example, believe that "to the Bolshevik, politics is the craft of conflict;" to the American, it is the art of compromise". However, the advent of nuclear weapons after the Second World War led to a re-evaluation of Soviet and American conflict behaviour, especially regarding the uses of force. The threat of force became more important than its actual use and even where force was used in some instances and not merely threatened, it was deliberately held down to a lower key (Williams, 1976: 43). It was hoped that widespread recognition of military force now being dangerously volatile and potentially uncontrollable, would ensure that many states would resort to it only in the face of serious provocation and after the most careful consideration (Bull, 1973: 125).

While both superpowers openly recognized the dangers involved in a crisis in which the nuclear shadow would hang over them, neither power followed an active policy of crisis avoidance through capitulation. Occasionally, both Soviet and American decision-makers have been prepared to initiate policies carrying a distinct risk of confrontation

with the each other. Where such a course has been embarked upon, however, it seems to have been as a result of sober calculations and not recklessness (Williams: 47). Although both the Soviet Union and the United States have been prepared to use coercive bargaining methods to gain advantage, they have concurrently been extremely reluctant to employ overt violence against the other. Indeed it appears the distinction between coercion and violence has formed the most salient threshold in superpower crises (Bull: 128).

This fear of conflict escalation to the level of an unrestrained nuclear war has, in fact, deterred them from putting the theory of limited war to the test of a direct confrontation. Nonetheless, this does not necessarily mean that there is no risk involved in a low level conflict between the superpowers. Uncertainty, misperception, the force of and possible loss of control over events, along with the somewhat autonomous behaviour of third parties are just a few factors which can combine to increase the risks of confrontation substantially.

While there were risks inherent in the crises over Berlin in 1948 and 1961, including the use of coercion in 1948, they were resolved without overt violence. Each side was immensely careful to avoid any action that might invite a violent response from the other by using retractable diplomatic and military moves (Adomeit, 1982; George and Smoke, 1974; Spencer, 1967; and Murphy, 1964).

This changed in 1962 with the development of the Cuban missile crisis. Although there was some tactical maneuverability available to

the U.S., such as the blockade option, the crisis appeared to be a watershed in Soviet and American risk-taking and crisis behaviour. On one hand, the lack of tactical flexibility available at a local level proved decisive to both sides, while on the other hand, the missile crisis was precipitated by some poor Soviet and American estimates of each others' willingness to take risks (Allison, 1971; Wohlstetter, 1965). There was, however, the unexpected catalytic effect of facilitating an improvement in relations between the two parties in the dispute. As a result, Kennedy and Khrushchev moved expeditiously to relax tensions and began, with the partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, to create a less volatile and more constructive relationship (George, 1983;5).

Although massive retaliation was an essential part of the U.S. strategy of deterrence, it soon became evident that it was an unreliable, imperfect strategy at middle and lower levels of conflict. As deterrence did not prevent dangerous crises from erupting during the cold war between the superpowers, nor prevent the use of force against third parties, the U.S. and Soviet Union were forced to develop an understanding of the requirements and modalities of crisis management. While the superpowers had been successful in managing crises to avoid direct military clashes between their armed forces, crisis management could not be counted upon to prevent a war in the future. The problem of regulating American - Soviet rivalry and competition in the Third World still remained. This competition continued to be a matter of great concern because it frequently added to regional or local instability in exchange for immediate gains. It also tended to increase the likelihood

of dangerous crises erupting in areas like the Middle-East into which the two superpowers might be drawn (George, 1983:6).

Superpower Competition in the Middle-East

In the Middle-East, the cold war pattern of rivalry manifested itself immediately after the Second World War. To the two superpowers the area presented opportunities, problems, dilemmas and most importantly, a shared danger and constraint. Concern revolved around the possibility that any disturbance in the area would escalate into an American-Soviet confrontation with its accompanying risk of a global nuclear war. Despite this overriding concern with avoiding a nuclear confrontation, other interests in the Middle-East appeared destined to prolong both Soviet and American involvement in the area.

Historically, the Soviets have had a desire to expand southward, initially in search of a warm water port that would free them from the stricture of the Bosphorus. Later, the drive toward expansion of Soviet influence and extension of the Communist revolution took a heavy-handed turn when Stalin in 1945 denounced the treaty of neutrality and non-aggression with Turkey. He demanded joint Russian-Turkish management of the Straits and the surrender of three provinces in the northeast adjacent to Soviet Armenia. With Red Army units still in Iran, he promoted the secession of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan in the northwest. Stalin's diplomacy, however, deprived the Soviets of an opportunity to update the 1936 Montreux Convention, which would regulate the use of the Straits, while U.S. pressure, coupled with a censure by the U.N.

Security Council, helped force the Soviets to withdraw its troops from Iran. It also drove Turkey, and later Iran, into intimate relations with the United States (Hurewitz, 1969; Dadant, 1973).

By 1953, having alienated the states on its southern border, the Soviets began a program to gain influence in the Middle-East by backing, at the United Nations, the Arab claims in their dispute with Israel. According to Hunter (1969:1-15), the western states themselves largely created new opportunities for the Soviet Union. As a result of an American denial of President Nasser's 1955 request for arms, Nasser turned to the Soviets and acquired (through Czechoslovakia) about \$250 million worth of weapons. When the U.S. withdrew its offer to help finance the Aswan Dam in 1956, the Soviets again extended their own offer in 1958, which Egypt readily accepted. While Nasser's strategy was to lure the Soviet Union and the United States into bidding for Egypt's favour, the Soviet's appearance on the scene made the Dam an indicator of East-West rivalry (Burns, 1962). Finally, the Eisenhower Doctrine, proclaimed in 1957, apparently alienated more Arabs than it impressed. The Doctrine proclaimed American willingness to use 'armed-force' if necessary to assist any state or group of states in the region requesting such assistance against any communist backed armed aggression. It was widely interpreted as outside interference in Arab affairs and projected the Soviet Union as the only great power that seemed willing to support Arab nationalism and freedom from outside interference. This view was strengthened and the Soviet's influence increased when the U.S. sent troops into Lebanon in 1958.

The Soviets had no long-standing position to protect and little to lose, but potentially much to gain by change and disruption in the Arab Middle-East (Hunter, 1969:7). However, they apparently failed to understand the nature of Arab politics and appreciate the conflict between Communism and various Arab nationalist attitudes. In both Syria and Iraq, the Soviets supported local Communists who moved too fast, overstepped themselves and lost out to nationalistic forces. Soviet relations with Egypt, Syria and Iraq fluctuated considerably as various Arab factions struggled for power and regimes changed in Syria and Iraq. By the mid-1960s the Arabs, spurred by competition for power within their own world, had stepped up their anti-Israel activities. These actions by the Arabs provided new opportunities for the Soviets, whose aid and support grew in demand. Therefore, in order to capture the market and gain whatever influence possible, especially at the expense of the Americans, the Soviets increased their arms supplies and economic aid, as well as vocal support to the Arabs. In the beginning the Soviets seemed perfectly safe in becoming more deeply committed in the Middle-East, showing little evidence that they had begun to consider seriously the risks entailed in such opportunism (Hunter, 1969:9).

While the Soviets were following this path of opportunism, the United States was attempting to contain the Soviets. The U.S. had consistently opposed Soviet expansion in all parts of the world. When Eastern Europe came under Soviet domination after the war, the U.S. developed a containment policy in an attempt to encircle the Soviet Union with states allied to, and supported by, the United States.

Containment took several forms in the Middle East; military assistance to Turkey and Iran began during the Marshall Plan years (1949-1952), and expanded greatly after 1953. Individual mutual defense agreements were arranged with Turkey in 1951 and with Iran in 1952. Turkey was admitted to NATO in February of 1952 and in 1955 the Baghdad Pact was formed. Turkey and Iraq initially comprised the Pact, with obvious U.S. support, but without open United States membership. The United Kingdom and Pakistan joined in 1955 and in November of that year, Iran also signed.

After the 1956 Anglo-French-Israeli military action against Egypt, Moscow again deliberately launched a policy of polarization. Despite American efforts to alleviate the situation, the Suez fiasco gained new positions and advantages for the Soviets at the expense of the Western bloc (Pearson, 1957). A further result of the Suez crisis included the almost inadvertent assumption by the U.S., of the position of primary defender of western interests in the region. The Soviet-West rivalry in the zone was now transformed into a regional competition between the Soviets and the Americans. The alarm in Washington caused by a rapid decline in influence in the area and the corresponding increase in Soviet influence and commitment, convinced the Eisenhower administration to institute the previously discussed Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957. The United States intended to help prevent the spread of what it perceived to be Soviet "imperialism" to the Middle East (Dulles, 1957).

Initially, the Baghdad Pact seemed to promise success in blocking the Russians from expanding into the Middle-East, even though it tended

to alienate states to the south. After the coup in Iraq in July of 1958, however, Iraq swung away from its close ties with the West and withdrew from the Pact prior to the alliance's redesignation as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in August 1959. Without Iraq, CENTO appeared to lose whatever strength and meaning the organization had.

Soviet-American naval rivalry in the region grew in the middle to late '60's after the Soviets established a permanent naval presence in the Mediterranean. While the U.S. had amassed the foremost naval force in the area by 1963 (the Sixth Fleet), Soviet security planners were persuaded that a permanent Soviet presence in the Mediterranean was necessary only after the Cuban missile crisis (Hurewitz: 106). The missile crisis had provided tangible proof to the Soviets of the important diplomatic function a surface fleet could provide, particularly in a crisis. This was intended to reinforce Soviet diplomacy, consolidate their role as a major power in the Middle East and manifest their security interest to compete more effectively with its superpower rival in the area.

Thus, from 1955 to 1965 Soviet-American policies were characterised, in general, by assertion on the part of the Soviets and containment on the part of the more status quo power, the United States. By the mid-60's however, significant changes in the relations of the two superpowers had altered their behaviour patterns from expansive expectations and antagonistic reactions to include a broader range of interactions. Yet from 1967 to 1973 both powers came to limit their expectations, thereby permitting operational rules of conduct to emerge,

though they were subsequently violated by both sides. (Whetton, 1981).

The pattern of controlled competition in the Middle-East emerged primarily as a result of three interacting factors:

1. The nuclear factor imposed on each superpower serious constraints and one over-riding shared interest - to avoid escalation of conflict to nuclear war.
2. An increase of Soviet conventional military capability coupled with important political inroads into a region of American strategic interests.
3. The rise and increasing power of regional states along with the problem of controlling these states.

A policy of military non-intervention stemmed from the desire to inhibit the degree of any involvement which perpetuated the notion of self-enforcing restraint implicit on superpower behaviour. Thus, before the June war of 1967 both superpowers demonstrated sensitivity to the danger of over-involvement and systematic attempts to refine the nature of their commitments were undertaken. However, this under-involvement promptly shifted as soon as war broke out in 1967 and both the United States and the Soviet Union became deeply engaged in the conflict.

THE PLAY

There are many difficulties encountered in compiling data on Arab-Israeli conflicts. Not only does the mass of information present problems, but the reliability of that information also proves to be an obstacle. The complexities and emotions surrounding these conflicts make

an in-depth, accurate study of them, prone to either oversimplification or a high degree of intricacy. An attempt will be made to put together this mass of information in a way that will make it consistent with the general outlines of events as they can be gleaned from contemporary news accounts, apparently reliable memoirs or secondary sources. To accomplish this task, several key sources which incorporate Middle-East diplomatic history will be relied upon to provide the basic facts of the three wars (Dupuy, 1978; Sachar, 1976; Quandt, 1977; Brecher, 1980; Stein and Tanter, 1979; Golan, 1975; Butterworth, 1976; Whetton, 1981; Dismukes and McConnell, 1979; Johnson, 1971; Nixon, 1978; Kissinger, 1979, 1982; Kalb and Kalb, 1974 and Laqueur, 1969).

While the origins and developments of the Arab-Israeli rivalry are important and necessary to understand the reasons for the conflicts, they have been well documented elsewhere (Dupuy, 1978 and Sachar, 1976) and need not be recounted here. What will be of primary importance in the development of the case studies is the Soviet-American involvement and actions in the immediate period leading up to the outbreak of hostilities and during the conflict itself. If necessary, a more detailed examination of certain aspects of the conflicts will be utilized in the forthcoming analytical chapters.

Act I - The Six Day War of 1967

In early May of 1967, the Soviets apparently 'warned' Syria and Egypt that Israeli troops were massing on the Syrian border, prepared to attack. While patently untrue, these reports escalated an already tense

political situation and military movements with the Arab states until Israel suddenly launched what she considered a preventive war on June 5, 1967. The most serious of the Egyptian actions had been the reoccupation of positions formerly held by the U.N.E.F. (requested by Egypt to pull back) and the blockading of the Straits of Tiran during mid-May.

Superpower Behaviour

On May 22, in a message to Premier Kosygin, President Johnson reiterated his suggestion of joint action to calm the situation. On May 23 Tass published a Soviet statement pledging support for the Arabs, but only if they were attacked - not for a 'holy war' against Israel. The Soviets coupled this with a strong warning to Israel against attacking Syria. It is possible the Soviet Union may have received an updated briefing by Egyptian War Minister Shams Badran who was in Moscow to seek badly needed spare parts and ammunition. Badran reported back to Nasser that the supplies would be delivered, but that the Soviet Union would not intervene unless the U.S. did so first (Middle East News Agency, May 19 1967; as quoted in Dismukes and McConnell, 1979:201).

In the wake of the blockade announcement the U.S. increased its forces in the Mediterranean and alerted additional units. President Johnson gave a major address on May 23 and sent a corresponding formal note to Cairo rejecting Egypt's right to interfere with the shipping of any nation in international waterways. Johnson also informed Cairo that the U.S. was firmly committed to the political independence and

territorial integrity of all states in the Middle East, including Israel (New York Times, May 24 1967). The next day reporters were told, off the record, that the government had quietly reassured Israel that the U.S. would meet its obligation to oppose an Arab invasion of Israel.

Kosygin proposed on May 26 that he and President Johnson should act mutually to reduce tension in the area. As a result, both leaders agreed to send virtually identical notes the next day to Egypt and Israel. The notes urged restraint and stated that aggressive action would have severe consequences for the entire world. The Soviets later claimed in a second note to Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol, that it was doing its best to restrain the Arabs and assured Israel that a diplomatic solution would soon be found.

The Soviets informed Johnson on May 27 that they had information that Israel was planning to attack and Johnson forwarded this message to Eshkol along with his own warning that Israel not start hostilities. In an attempt to keep American initiatives alive, Johnson also sent a special envoy to Cairo, to arrange an exchange of visits by the American and Egyptian Vice-Presidents, the highest level of talks yet. It was felt that Nasser still had a week's grace, therefore the visits were to take place June 7. However, on June 5 the eruption of hostilities circumvented any chance of such meetings taking place.

The naval situation in the period leading up to the outbreak of hostilities was such that by early May 1967, the capability of the Soviet Fifth Fleet was still very limited and was greatly surpassed by

the military and tactical position of the American Sixth Fleet. The Soviets had no surface combatants of destroyer size or larger in the area, since the cruiser and three destroyers that had been deployed for an exercise in March, had departed before the end of April. The gun cruiser 'Slava' and a Kashin-class SAM destroyer entered the Mediterranean through the Turkish Straits on May 12 but it is uncertain whether this was because of the developing crisis or a routine re-establishment of the Soviet's naval presence. The Eskrada was not further reinforced during May and its operations consisted of routine surveillance of the Sixth Fleet in the area.

The first Soviet naval response to the crisis in the Middle East came after the blockade of the Straits by Egypt. Turkey received a Soviet declaration for the transit of the Turkish Straits by ten Soviet units.¹ The major reinforcements which entered between June 3 and 4 included: two SSM destroyers, a SAM destroyer and a gun destroyer. No further increases in Soviet surface ships took place during the crisis presumably because the United States did not augment the Sixth Fleet during the period once Johnson had ordered the Sixth Fleet with its two carriers; the 'Saratoga' and 'America' to the Eastern Mediterranean.

However, several Soviet ships did respond to the crisis before the fighting began. Soviet combatants began to shadow U.S. and British naval forces in the Mediterranean - supplementing or replacing intelligence collecting ships that normally carried out these tasks. On June 1 a Soviet destroyer took up surveillance of the U.S.S. America, on June 2 another destroyer joined two mine-sweepers watching the British carrier

'Victorious' at Malta and on June 4 a Kashin-class SAM destroyer relieved the destroyer trailing 'America'. The departing destroyer then took up a 'tattletale' position with the U.S.S. Saratoga.

In order to keep the initial tension between the Soviet and American naval forces low prior to the fighting, the U.S. carrier 'Intrepid' was deliberately kept separate from the Sixth Fleet ships and command organization while it transitted the Mediterranean en route to southeast Asia via the Suez Canal on May 31. One aspect of U.S. naval operations that may have disturbed the Soviets was the disposition of the Sixth Fleet's two attack carriers; one northeast of Crete, the other southwest of Crete. This put them in good position for a quick dash toward the war zone. This had been done in non-crisis periods, however, and they continued to operate in a routine manner. On June 4, the Soviet cruiser 'Slava' and ten other ships were sighted fifty miles northwest of Crete, where the bulk of the force remained inactive just before the fighting broke out, carrying out routine surveillance of the Sixth Fleet.

Thus, as tension rose, it became apparent that both the Soviet Union and the United States had important interests at stake in the event of hostilities between their clients. The United States' stated commitment to protect Israel in the event of an Arab attack; American determination to minimize Soviet involvement in the region; and the aim of American decision-makers to maintain their image as the power and peace broker in the region combined to stimulate the U.S. into verbal and military actions to protect these interests. The Soviet Union on the

other hand, also had an interest in supporting its Arab clients against possible aggression by Israel; in increasing its position and influence in the area; as well as, maintaining a dialogue with the U.S. regarding forestalling hostilities and thus ensuring recognition of the Soviets as a major power in the area. But first of all, both superpowers had a shared interest in avoiding a direct confrontation in the Middle East by attempting to stay the outbreak of hostilities between their respective clients.

Then, on June 5 at 7:45 a.m. (local time; 1:45 a.m. N.Y. time), Israel launched a successful pre-emptive air strike against Egyptian air fields while an Israeli armoured division crossed the border in full-scale attack. Minor naval engagements and frogmen operations were successful in curbing any impact the Egyptian navy might have had. Although Israel informed Jordan that no offensive operations against it were planned, Jordan attacked nonetheless. Israel then countered and seized the West bank of the Jordan River.

After consultations with the President, Secretary Rusk sent a message through normal channels to Moscow, expressing surprise at the outbreak of war and calling for cooperation in bringing the fighting to an early end through the Security Council. Kosygin replied at 8:00 a.m. (NYT) using the 'hot-line' stating his 'grave concern' about the fighting and indicating the U.S.S.R. intended to work for a ceasefire. He also asked the U.S. to exert its influence with Israel while the Soviets worked on Egypt. Johnson quickly responded at 8:47 a.m. stating that the superpowers should stay out of the conflict, encourage a

ceasefire and finally, reiterating that American influence would be used to bring hostilities to an end.

At the U.N. later that day, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. expressed interest in a call for an immediate ceasefire but both Egypt and Israel refused to end the fighting, thus adjourning the Security Council meeting without the tabling of a resolution. While Ambassador Goldberg would agree to the proposal of his counter-part Federenko for an unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces to the armistice lines of 1956, he would do so only if the withdrawal was accompanied by a commitment by all parties to refrain from acts of force. Israeli Ambassador Rafael, now better informed of battlefield developments, was not interested in terminating the fighting. Although Federenko put pressure on Egypt, they also refused to end the fighting, precisely for the opposite military reasons espoused by Rafael. One of the major problems in getting a resolution tabled was that a restoration of the immediate status quo ante of June 4 would have left the Straits still closed, therefore ruling this option out. The difference between an 'inplace' versus a 'return to the lines' ceasefire is important not only in 1967 but also in 1973.

Israel subsequently occupied the Gaza strip after breaking Egypt's second line defense on June 6. At this point with the Soviet Fifth Eskrada and the American Sixth Fleet remaining stationary, Kosygin called Washington on the 'hot-line' to press for an immediate ceasefire, as well as American action to halt Israel's advance. President Johnson responded immediately, emphasizing that the U.S. would take no

unilateral action with respect to its client and again urged the U.N. as the appropriate mechanism for the termination of hostilities.

Meanwhile at the U.N., the Americans were insisting a ceasefire be accompanied by a lifting of the blockade. The Soviet Union tried and failed to persuade the Egyptians to agree to a ceasefire on those terms. Moscow then agreed to an unconditional ceasefire and disassociated itself from Egyptian and Jordanian charges of American collusion with Israel in the fighting. At 19:10 of the same day the Security Council called for a simple ceasefire 'in place' (Resolution 233) but it was rejected by Nasser as Israel was now fifty miles into the Sinai and the resolution did not go further and condemn Israeli aggression.

Word of the ceasefire attempt reached Israel early on the morning of June 7 and in responding to an imminent end to military action, decided to move its forces forward as quickly as possible; accepting at the same time, revised Resolution 234 as long as the other belligerents did so. In an apparent effort to delimit the boundaries of acceptable military action, the U.S. sent a message to Israel claiming it would oppose any advance beyond the Jordan River. The Soviets, for their part, continued to press for observance of the ceasefire which was to take hold at 8:00 p.m. that evening. Israel again promised to observe the ceasefire if the others would, convincing Jordan to accept immediately. Although this ended the fighting between the Jordan and Israel, Egypt continued to claim the ceasefire resolution should include a withdrawal to the 1956 armistice lines.

On June 8, the American intelligence ship, the 'Liberty' was attacked by a then unidentified aircraft. Both McNamara and Johnson feared that the Soviet Union was in some way responsible, and thus, hurriedly confirmed the identity of the attacker as Israeli. There are some such as Pearson (1976) and Springborg (1976) who believe that the incident may have not been an accident. It is claimed that Israel knew the ship to be American from the start and attacked because of concern that the vessel's intelligence-gathering efforts could harm Israel by possibly leaking Israel's war maneuvers. The incident however, has yet to be satisfactorily explained. Johnson promptly informed Moscow through the 'hot-line' of the incident and of the dispatch of aircraft from the Sixth Fleet to investigate. Meanwhile Egypt, reacting more to the defeat of its army than to Soviet pressure, accepted an unconditional ceasefire.

Syria finally accepted the ceasefire on June 9, after continuous violations of Resolution 234 had caused a further revision of the resolution (Resolution 235). Israel, however, took advantage of some limited fighting on the Syrian border to move en masse against Syria on the Golan Heights. The Security Council met once again and called for an immediate compliance with the ceasefire and adjourned for two hours to await reports. That same day, the Soviet Union convened a Summit in Moscow of Communist Party leaders. In a show of solidarity with the Arabs, they pledged military aid as well as signing a joint communique breaking diplomatic relations with Israel. The Soviets, also stepped up the pressure in the Security Council by introducing a draft resolution condemning Israeli aggression and insisting upon a withdrawal to the

1949 lines. Finally, later in the evening the field reports came in claiming the fighting was continuing.

At 8:26 a.m. June 10, Syria announced that the city of Kuneitra had fallen, leaving open the road to Damascus despite the fact that Israeli troops were several hours away. Through the 'hot-line' Kosygin ominously stated that a critical moment had arrived and that if Israel did not immediately accept a ceasefire, the Soviet Union might have to take independent action in order to avoid a 'grave catastrophe' (including military operations if necessary). Johnson assured the Soviets that Israel was prepared to stop and instructed McNamara to turn the Sixth Fleet toward the Syrian coast to make certain that the Soviet Union would not underestimate Johnson's determination to meet any Soviet military move with one of his own.

The U.S. coupled this signal with a warning aimed at Israel to halt all military operations and Goldberg warned Rafael of the possibility of Soviet intervention. Finally, Israel's Defense Minister met with General Odd Bull of the U.N. Truce Supervisory Organization and agreed to cease all fighting and troop movements by 4:30 p.m. Syria accepted this final Resolution (236) and a cable was sent to the U.N. Secretary General moments before the Soviet Ambassador was to speak. No further violations of the ceasefire were reported, and the Sixth Fleet stopped its eastward movement. Soviet naval interactions with Western naval forces during the war had, in essence, been limited primarily to 'tattle-tale' operations and all ship movements were announced publicly during this period.

It appears that despite the overriding concern of both superpowers to avoid a direct confrontation, other interests and goals in the region prompted Soviet and American decision-makers to make trade-offs. These were designed to minimize the risk of confrontation and enhance the benefits derived from such involvement. The at times intense diplomatic and military signalling which occurred between both powers symbolized the commitment both the Soviets and Americans had in protecting their interests in the area.

Israel's inability to translate its military victory into tangible political gains after the Six Day War resulted in continued tension especially along the Sinai. Despite U.N. interest and Gunnar Jarring's efforts to solve the problem, by the end of 1969 these efforts had clearly failed. The failure of these peace efforts were the result of several factors, not the least of which was Nasser's War of Attrition against Israel. The Soviet Union also escalated its involvement in the dispute by committing enormous amounts of military supplies to Egypt, as well as supplying pilots and men to maintain the missile sites.

As the confrontation escalated, the U.S. launched the first unsuccessful 'Rogers Plan' during late 1969. When the Rogers Plan was renewed during the summer of 1970, both Israel and Egypt finally began to move towards accepting some of its provisions under strong criticism from other Arab countries and various Palestinian Liberation groups. Essentially, the second Rogers Plan involved an immediate cease-fire, a return to negotiations, a recognition of Israeli sovereignty and an

Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory. However, the ceasefire was the only item that was successfully achieved, albeit short-lived. Soviet and Egyptian forces took advantage of the ceasefire to install nearly impregnable clusters of surface-to-air missiles along the Canal's West bank, causing Israel to refuse further participation in any peace talks.

Act II - Crisis in Jordan 1970

Meanwhile, various groups of Palestine guerrillas had established themselves in Jordan from which they penetrated into Israeli-held territory. With the U.N.E.F. patrolling the Israeli-Egypt ceasefire line in the Sinai, Jordan provided the longest, most easily accessible frontier over which the guerrillas could operate against Israel. Yet these groups presented a significant problem for Jordan's King Hussein by their actions. If they were allowed to build up their armed strength without control, the guerrillas might join with a substantial element of Hussein's former Palestinian subjects to overthrow him and his government or invite more Israeli reprisals. However, if he opposed the guerrillas, it was possible that with the assistance of the other Arab states and support from the substantial dissident element in his country, they could also overthrow him.

Over the next two years Hussein operated within these narrow limits. Between November 1968 and July 1970 there were frequent violent incidents between the guerrillas and the Jordanian army. Despite several attempts by Hussein and the P.L.O. leaders - usually Yassir Arafat - to arrange an effective ceasefire, tension continued to rise

and there were new outbreaks of fighting. By the end of August, Hussein's authority had been virtually eroded and he took action to reassert that authority by announcing firmer measures to deal with the guerrillas. A further complication for King Hussein resided in the existence of 20,000 Iraqi troops still in Jordan. Together with the eruption of new fighting on September 1, and an assassination attempt on Hussein, Iraq warned that it would order its troops to support the guerrillas if the fighting continued. However, possibly because of a split in the Iraqi ruling party, these troops remained neutral throughout the crisis.

By this time civil war seemed imminent and the maverick PFLP group led by George Habash, carried out several airplane hijackings between September 6 and September 9, in which over five hundred hostages, many of whom were American, were held in a Jordanian desert. These hijackings proved to be a considerable challenge to Hussein who was, therefore, forced to look for possible support elsewhere against outside intervention.

Superpower Behaviour

Towards the end of July, a high level group had met in Washington to discuss American contingencies with regards to military intervention, in the event that Lebanon or Jordan should be threatened by P.L.O. actions (Quandt, 1977). They concluded, however, that without access to bases in the Eastern Mediterranean, the United States would find it difficult to send a sizable ground force into the area. The Sixth Fleet

could provide some air support if it were on station, but otherwise American military capability was not impressive. The group realized that if a serious military option were required, Israel was in a better position to provide both ground forces and air cover. That option, however, was also very sensitive politically in that no Arab regime would want to be rescued by Israel if there were any other alternatives. Hussein was a realist though, and had gone as far as to query the U.S. on the full range of options available to him.

The U.S. had been concerned about Hussein's weakened position for some time, as well as the situation in Lebanon. An outbreak of civil war in Jordan could create new dangers in the Middle East where, at one extreme, war might ignite a renewal of the Arab-Israeli conflict. There was concern over the possibility of Syrian intervention in Jordan on the side of the guerrillas which might precipitate direct intervention by Israel against Syria and the guerrillas. Egypt and the Soviet Union could then be brought into the conflict with a possible U.S.-Soviet confrontation resulting. However, the threat of Hussein being overthrown, was almost as dangerous to U.S. interests as a superpower confrontation. There were implications inherent in an American friend being defeated by 'radical' forces armed with Soviet weapons, plus the realization ~~that even~~ if the Soviet Union were not directly involved, the symbolism of a fedayeen victory would be to the Soviets advantage. The initial American response to the hijackings was cautious, for at a minimum it may have proven necessary to evacuate several hundred Americans in Amman. While caution prevailed, Nixon also saw the need for a strong show of American force in the Eastern Mediterranean as a

deterrent to Soviet, Syrian and Iraqi moves.

Although Egypt and the Soviets were not openly supporting the fedayeen in Jordan, Nixon was determined to see that the crisis was not settled on terms set by the guerrillas. Instead of acceding to PFLP demands to release fedayeen prisoners held by Israel, Nixon urged a strong response. The U.S. reacted with a steady escalation of military moves meant to demonstrate the Administration's determination to act, forcefully if necessary, and provide a modest intervention capability if needed.

On September 10, the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, was placed on alert and six C-130 transport planes were flown from Europe to the Incirlik air base in Turkey. Here they could be available for evacuation of Americans from Jordan. As well, on September 11, units of the Sixth Fleet began to leave port as part of what the White House termed 'a routine precaution in such a situation which may require evacuation procedures' and four more C-130's were escorted by twenty-five F-4 jets to Turkey. The same day, the fedayeen blew up the planes and took the remaining fifty-four hostages, thirty-four of whom were Americans, to an undisclosed location in Jordan.

Civil war finally erupted on September 16, the day after Hussein had established a new military government. Hussein had also indicated to the U.S. that he might need not only American help, but 'others' as well. Nixon wanted Hussein to move against the fedayeen while restraining Israel in order to keep the conflict contained in Jordan.

Nixon also believed, however, that an American and Israeli show of force might help deter the Syrians, Iraqis and Soviets. As Nixon was warning against outside intervention during a speech at Kansas State University on September 16, Israeli forces began moving toward the Syrian border, presenting a counter threat to any possible Syrian intervention in the conflict.

Back in the United States, Kissinger had convened a meeting of the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) to discuss further military moves. As a result of this meeting the aircraft carrier 'Saratoga' was ordered to proceed to the Eastern Mediterranean to join the 'Independence' off the Lebanese coast. Airborne units in Germany were also placed on alert and additional C-130's were flown to Turkey. Along with these maneuvers, it was decided that the U.S. would not try to rescue the remaining aircraft hostages unilaterally.

While there were conflicting views on the likelihood of Syrian or Iraqi intervention, Nixon was convinced either country would intervene. On September 17, the President met with the editors of some Chicago papers to discuss the crisis. He stated that the U.S. was prepared to intervene directly in the Jordanian war should Syria and/or Iraq enter the conflict and tip the military balance against the government forces loyal to Hussein (Chicago Sun-Times, September 17 and New York Times, September 19). When Nixon returned to Washington on September 17, he met with his advisors and ordered a third carrier, the 'John F. Kennedy' to move from the Atlantic into the Mediterranean and the helicopter carrier 'Guam' with 1,500 marines from Norfolk to the Mediterranean.

Meeting with Prime Minister Meir on September 18 to mend U.S.-Israeli relations fractured because of a quarrel over the placement of Soviet SAM missiles on the Suez Canal and U.S. restraint in providing arms to Israel, Nixon authorized five hundred million dollars in military aid to Israel and accelerated the delivery of eighteen F-4 fighters. However, despite all efforts, Syria intervened in Jordan with three armoured brigades and other motorized army units.

The Soviet charge in Washington, Yuli Voronstov, informed the State Department that the Soviets were urging restraint on the Syrians and they themselves were in no way involved in the attack. Neither Nixon nor Kissinger were convinced by these statements because of the Soviet's previous denial of any complicity in the standstill ceasefire violations along the Suez. It was thus difficult for both men to believe the sending of Syrian tanks into Jordan did not have their patron's blessing. The most damaging evidence of Soviet complicity in the intervention were confirmed reports that Soviet military advisors had accompanied Syrian tank units as far as the Jordanian border (it is possible that the tanks were PLA units in the Syrian Army, however they were thought to be 'Syrian' by the U.S.).

The WSAG met continuously on September 19 following which Nixon not only ordered the 82nd Airborne and other units in West Germany to be placed on high alert, but he also sent the Sixth Fleet farther east. In addition to these signals to the Soviet Union, a warning was conveyed to Voronstov, stressing that both Israel and the U.S. would be forced to

intervene unless Syria pulled back.

King Hussein then sent an urgent message through the American Ambassador in Amman for help against the Syrians. While the situation in the capital was under control, the situation in the north was very threatening. Later that evening the White House received a further request for intervention by air and land, from any quarter, against the Syrian tanks. The WSAG met at 7:00 p.m. to consider the request and was informed by Alexander Haig that the town of Irbid had fallen to the Syrians. Kissinger then contacted Prime Minister Meir and Ambassador Rabin; who were still in New York, informing them of Hussein's request and the urgency of the situation. As a result, Rabin went to Washington and Meir returned to Israel to consider the matter further.

On Monday September 21, Hussein modified his request several times as the situation changed, at times calling for only air strikes, at times merely ground intervention and finally, both. The WSAG met again at 8:30 a.m. with the Joint Chiefs of Staff voicing opposition to U.S. ground intervention by claiming a lack of capability. This therefore, left only Israel to fill the gap as needed. The situation had now become critical in Jordan and for that reason Nixon authorized Kissinger to work out a plan for intervention with Rabin, seeing that Israel was already prepared to move. In agreeing to a plan, however, Rabin insisted on an American 'umbrella'; that is, a Presidential commitment to use force if necessary to prevent a Soviet attack on Israel. That evening, Hussein again requested aid and Nixon finally approved the Israeli plan.

As negotiations for a ceasefire continued, Israel began to move its forces ostentatiously toward Jordan. In a signal, again aimed at the U.S.S.R., and as a symbol of American commitment to Israeli actions, the U.S. ordered a plane to fly from the Sixth Fleet to Tel Aviv for the announced purpose of coordinating targeting information. A moderate message was conveyed by Voronstov during the evening, stressing Soviet opposition to all outside intervention in Jordan and appealing to the U.S. to restrain Israel.

By September 22, Israel, and thus the U.S. were poised to act, but, Hussein, assured of American support, ordered his own small airforce to attack the Syrian tanks around Irbid. By that afternoon, Syrian tanks began withdrawing from Jordan. This retreat may have been due in part to internal dissension in Syria, with Defense Minister Hafez Assad withholding air cover for fear of provoking Israeli intervention. By the end of the day the prospect of an Israeli or American intervention had virtually passed. Kissinger and Nixon had met several times that day and were very aware of how difficult it would be for the U.S. to intervene, even with access to British bases in Cyprus. They could manage only fifty air sorties daily over Jordan from Cyprus and only two hundred from the Sixth Fleet, far from what Israel was capable of. At an Egyptian reception that evening, Kissinger had emphasized to the Soviet Ambassador that it was up to them to rein in their friends. By Wednesday, all Syrian tanks were out of Jordan. Now that the situation was under control, Hussein was firm in his refusal to allow any form of intervention, especially from Israel. Finally, Joseph Sisco (Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs) was asked by Nixon to

contact Rabin to obtain assurances that Israel would make no further military moves after Arafat and Hussein signed a ceasefire on September 27. Although Hussein and Arafat had agreed to amnesty for the guerrillas if they acknowledged his sovereignty and authority, and withdrew their guerrilla forces from populated areas, minor clashes soon erupted and continued until the middle of 1971. It was not until July 19, 1971 that Hussein managed to capture and destroy all the guerrilla bases in Jordan, incurring at the same time strong condemnations from Libya, Iraq and Syria.

It was evident that Soviet naval activities during September and October 1970 appeared keyed to the U.S. buildup in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Fifth Eskrada was increased from forty to sixty ships; a greater number than during the 1967 war. In response to the movements on September 9, of the 'Independence', 'Saratoga' and later the 'John F. Kennedy', the Soviets went beyond the tactics used in 1967. Instead of assigning one 'tattle-tale' to each U.S. Task Force, they positioned the Eskrada's most powerful combatants near the U.S. ships and formed functioning 'anti-carrier warfare' groups once again signalling the importance placed on Soviet interests in the region.

Although the crisis began to wind down on September 25 as the Syrians withdrew, the stand-down at sea did not occur until almost a month later. This coincided with the withdrawal of the U.S. hospitals that had been established in Amman. These field hospitals had been established as part of an international effort to aid the numerous casualties injured in the conflict. While the helicopter carrier 'Guam'

remained in the Eastern Mediterranean, the U.S. was concerned the Palestinians would make good their threat to attack U.S. interests in the region. Therefore, only when the hospitals were withdrawn at the end of October did the possibility of direct U.S. intervention fade and American forces return to a normal state of readiness from the high state which existed throughout the crisis.

Act III - The October War 1973

The period between late 1970 and 1973 remained deceptively calm. Relative quiet presided over the Sinai, and after the Jordanian Civil War the same could be said in the north, despite increasing guerrilla activity out of Syria. Soviet involvement never really wavered from the Arabs, despite Egyptian anti-communist policies following the death of Nasser in September of 1970. In fact, Soviet ties with Syria and Iraq were increased as a result, in order to diversify their influence with the Arabs.

While Egypt had concluded a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviets in early 1972, Egypt expelled most of the Soviet advisors in July. The Egyptian reaction was the result, not only of slow deliveries of Soviet offensive weapons, but also out of fear that Egyptian sovereignty was being undermined by Soviet advisors. The gesture of expelling the Soviets was also aimed at getting the U.S. more actively involved in a negotiated peace process.

The aftermath of the Jordan crisis brought with it a more cooperative and positive atmosphere between the U.S. and Israel. While the relationship continued to be laced with disagreements, mainly over arms deliveries, Kissinger viewed Israel as a strategic asset, correspondingly increasing American military aid to Israel from 1970 to 1973. However, the military balance did not prove to be the key to regional stability and the prevention of war. Nor did detente at the global level prevent the Soviet Union from continuing to arm Egypt, Syria and Iraq, despite mounting signals of Arab intentions to resume hostilities.

Superpower Behaviour

As Egypt and other concerned Arab states began operational planning for a limited war; intended to recover at least some of the lost territory and more importantly, change the political balance in the area, the Soviets began giving veiled warnings of an impending conflict. In May 1973 both Brezhnev and Gromyko warned of the danger of war in meetings with Kissinger and Nixon, but these warnings were dismissed. The U.S. did not see any rational military option that would not worsen the Soviet and Arab position. They also took lightly the warning by King Hussein of Jordan that Syrian and Egyptian military preparations were too realistic.

In a repetition of history, Israel retaliated against continuing terrorist activities on September 13, shooting down thirteen Syrian jets. The Israelis, however, may have been baiting the jets by flying a

provocative penetration course over the Mediterranean toward Latakia. Moscow's harsh reply attacked Israeli militarism and warned of an Israeli buildup for another attack.

Gromyko again warned Nixon of the danger on September 28 and the two men scheduled a meeting between the superpowers on the Arab-Israeli conflict to take place in November 1973. However, between October 3-4 the Soviets began evacuating their dependents from Syria and Egypt. While the extent of Soviet complicity and responsibility in the October war continues to be the subject of debate, the Soviets did increase the supply of offensive weapons to Egypt five months before the war and also evacuated their dependents out of Egypt and Syria on October 4th. Although this has been interpreted as a gesture of disassociation and criticism of hostilities the Egyptians planned to renew, it is likely they evacuated their dependents more for safety reasons. Soviet complicity in this matter will be discussed further in the analytical sections of this research, but it is sufficient to state at this point that the Soviets did indeed increase the stakes in the region by 'appearing' to be involved in the Egyptian decision to go to war against Israel.

Three hours before hostilities began on October 6, the U.S. contacted all parties concerned and attempted to prevent open conflict by acting as a mediator. The Americans sought assurances from each party so that it could provide assurances to the others. In response, Prime Minister Meir assured the U.S. that it would not preempt and asked for American help directed at preventing war. Two hours before the outbreak of hostilities, Kissinger again called Israel to warn against

preemption. He also urged the Soviets to use their influence to prevent war, telegraphed the Egyptian Ambassador at the U.N. with the Israeli message that it would not preempt and quickly sent messages to King Hussein and King Faisal to enlist their help on the side of moderation. All his efforts were to no avail however, as Egyptian and Syrian forces launched a massive surprise attack against Israel across the cease-fire lines. The question of why Israel and the U.S. had been caught off balance, while important, will not be discussed at length within the scope of this work due to the existing parameters.

When it finally became clear who in fact began the fighting, both the Soviets and Americans immediately called for and proposed an early termination to the war. However, at this time, the superpowers linked their proposals to an evaluation of the relative military capabilities of their clients. The Soviet Ambassador urged Sadat to consolidate his considerable military gains along the Canal and agree to a ceasefire by claiming that Syria was anxious to stop the fighting. Sadat rejected this proposal outright as premature and inappropriate. Kissinger, on the other hand, proposed a ceasefire status quo ante, but admitted that only military realities could make the proposal acceptable to Egypt. Although Israeli reserves had not yet been mobilized and its defense forces not fully alerted, Kissinger expected that an Israeli military victory would ensue once these actions took place. This would therefore make battlefield actions serve as the determining mechanism in the political calculations of both Egypt and Israel.

agreement. Kissinger now urged Israel to agree to the ceasefire, particularly in light of the serious threat of encirclement posed to the Egyptian Third Army by Israeli advances. Israel reluctantly accepted the ceasefire on the 21st because of several reasons including a promise by Kissinger of U.S. support in the post-war bargaining along with an increase in military aid. In light of these developments, combined with joint Soviet-American pressure, Syria discontinued its plans for another offensive.

The Security Council then passed Resolution 338 at 12:50 a.m. on October 22, for a ceasefire to take effect on all fronts. Kissinger left Moscow and met with Meir in Tel Aviv, before returning home, insisting Israel take up a defensive position and not violate the ceasefire. The stoppage was shortlived however, as fighting again erupted on the Sinai and Israel tightened its encirclement of the Third Army. Sadat sent hourly messages to both Brezhnev and Nixon charging systematic violations by Israel. The Soviets in turn repeated these charges to Kissinger. However, both the Americans and the Soviets agreed that the defeat of the Third Army would destroy any basis for post-war political negotiations. Realizing that a defeat of the elite Third Army would also seriously damage American credibility with the Soviet Union, the U.S. began to increase its pressure on Israel.

Once again, as a result of joint Soviet-American cooperation, revised Resolution 339 was passed October 23, providing for the dispatch of U.N. observers to supervise the ceasefire. Although Syria wanted to continue the fighting, it was not willing to do so alone and also

destroyer was assigned to her as a 'tattle tale'. No effort was made at this time by the Soviets to cover the other Sixth Fleet carrier, the 'Franklin D. Roosevelt', which remained moored at Barcelona in the Western Mediterranean until October 10. While the last clear pre-war ship passed through the Turkish Straits on October 2, between October 7 and 12, five other Soviet ships transited the Straits. Although these five ships may have been scheduled for transit before the war, the last two or three ships dispatched may have been accelerated once the war had begun. During this period as well, other ships began moving away from the combat zone.

On the battlefield, Israel began to encounter further military difficulties on both fronts. The Syrian air defenses on the Golan were taking a high toll of Israeli planes and in the Sinai, Israel's efforts to break through Egyptian lines with heavy armour, had been thwarted. With demands for American resupplies mounting, Israeli Ambassador Dinitz continued to complain about the 'slow American response. While Kissinger repeatedly blamed the State Department for the tardiness of deliveries, it is possible that it was Kissinger himself who was responsible. In playing this double game, Kissinger could pose as a friend of the Israelis, who wanted to accelerate U.S. arms shipments, while actually hindering them in order to make Israel more pliable to a settlement.

The war entered a new and acute phase on October 9, as reality refused to conform to the comparatively optimistic forecasts upon which initial U.S. policy had been based. Between October 9 and 12, the possibility of a swift and conclusive Israeli military victory on both

fronts faded despite a favourable change in their military situation along the Golan. Soviet restraint began to erode and pressure increased for an urgent American military resupply of Israeli forces. Because of these factors, the U.S. modified its demand for a ceasefire status quo ante to a ceasefire in place and at the same time began to allow arms to flow in modest quantities to Israel, first aboard unmarked El Al aircraft, then later using military transports. The main Sixth Fleet amphibious force, assembled at Soudhas Bay, Crete, was now being monitored by Soviet intelligence ships and intermittently by surface combatants.

In one of the most controversial decisions of the war, the President used the supply of arms to Israel to try and obtain Israeli acceptance of the principle of a ceasefire in place. Kissinger had proposed this new ceasefire although no belligerent faced total defeat or a clear victory. He felt that Egypt had made its point and the ceasefire would consolidate their military gains, as well as, establish a framework for post war bargaining (Kissinger, 1982:978). Israel disagreed, claiming that if they were first to end the fighting, the political costs of not reversing earlier losses would outweigh the benefits of an immediate cessation of hostilities. The very reason for Israel's refusal should have made it attractive to Egypt, but they were also equally negative. Egypt continued to demand that the cease fire be linked explicitly to a withdrawal, by Israel from the occupied territories coupled with the convening of a major peace conference to discuss issues in the conflict. Nixon and Kissinger felt this linkage was unrealistic, resulting therefore, in the failure of this second

attempt at a ceasefire.

As the two superpowers continued to search for a ceasefire, the Soviets also began to mobilize its military resources even further for its clients. The Soviet resupply increased as a result of the fierce fighting on all fronts, but especially since the Israelis had repulsed the latest Syrian advance. Soviet surveillance tactics also changed as an anti-carrier group led by a Kyanda-class missile cruiser took up station near the 'Independence'.

By October 10, Israeli reserves had begun to reach the front lines and from that time, through the rest of the conflict, the Arabs suffered a string of progressive defeats and reverses. Throughout the 10th and 11th, Israeli missile boats attacked Syrian forces in the port of Latakia, sinking some ships and doing considerable damage to others, including several Soviet freighters. While the exact timing of alerts and movements of the Soviet Airborne Divisions during the war have not been revealed, it is plausible that three Divisions were put on alert at this time as a result of Israeli actions.

Although the Soviets continued to indicate they would cooperate in the search for a ceasefire in place, the gesture was offset by evidence that the U.S.S.R. was now beginning a substantial airlift of supplies to Damascus and later Cairo. Despite these actions and intense Israeli pressure on the U.S. for supplies, the Americans continued to delay, hoping to negotiate a ceasefire and only replaced Israeli losses on a one to one basis. Israel expressed some interest at this point in the

American proposal for a ceasefire with a withdrawal from captured Syrian territory in exchange for the return to the status quo ante with Egypt. However, this was not likely to be accepted by Sadat and Israel soon lost any interest they had had in the proposal. While these political discussions continued, Israel was being strongly cautioned by the Soviets for their sinking of a Soviet merchant ship, the 'Latakia', during an attack on Syrian freighters in Tartus.

Finally, Meir agreed to a ceasefire in place because of increasing casualties and arms supply problems, but coupled this acceptance with an urgent demand for an immediate supply of equipment. In order to avoid a rejection of the proposal by Sadat (for fear of bowing to superpower pressure), Great Britain was to introduce the resolution in the Security Council. However, Great Britain first insisted on obtaining Sadat's agreement to the proposal, who when asked, rejected it outright.

Having received confirmation of Sadat's refusal of a ceasefire in place, Nixon took the responsibility of ordering a full scale airlift of military equipment to Israel on October 13. Delivery of F-4's were accelerated and a SR-71 reconnaissance plan was ordered to photograph the battle area in order to provide an independent basis for judging losses on both sides.

In their first clear response to the war, three Soviet ships transitted through the Turkish Straits with a total declared cargo of 7,000 tons. These ships probably sailed from Black Sea ports about October 11 with the reports of the first Syrian reverses. A Soviet SAM

destroyer also appeared in the area north and east of Cyprus, with the clear mission of ensuring positive Soviet control and protection over those merchantmen in Tartus. As a result of these actions, the carrier 'John F. Kennedy', which had been berthed in a British port, was ordered to a position just west of Gibraltar. By October 14, the first American transports began arriving in Israel (behind the 1967 lines).

After finally defeating Egypt in the largest tank battle of the war, Israel changed their relative military position and abandoned any interest in ending the fighting. Israel's change in fortunes and U.S. assurances of arms also prompted Israel to undertake plans to cross the Suez within the next couple of days.

As two Soviet Alligator-class LST's transited the Dardanelles en route to Syria, a detachment of the more potent U.S. escorts from the two Sixth Fleet carrier groups arrived in the Eastern Mediterranean to provide navigation and other assistance for the American airlift to Israel. Neither superpower was prepared at this time to force their clients to terminate the war, thus temporarily transferring to their clients the political onus to end the hostilities.

While the American airlift became public knowledge on October 15, the Soviets indicated they were actively trying to persuade the Arabs to accept a ceasefire. This was especially true since Arab forces had already been pushed back beyond the October 6 line. Kosygin also announced a visit to Cairo to take place the next day to reinforce the ceasefire efforts while Kissinger planned to meet with Foreign Minister

Zayyat at the same time. Both he and Nixon were also scheduled to meet with four Arab Foreign Ministers on the 17th in an attempt to keep all diplomatic ties open.

Ironically, while Kissinger and Nixon met with the four Arab Foreign Ministers of Morocco, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, to discuss their concerns over the war, the Arab oil Ministers met in Kuwait. As a result they announced a production cut of five percent each month until Israel withdrew to pre-1967 lines (three days later King Faisal called for a ten percent cut in production and an embargo of oil shipments to the U.S. and Netherlands).

Accompanying Kosygin on his trip to Cairo were photographs taken by a high altitude surveillance plane, showing the possibility of a serious military reversal on the part of his Arab clients. He used these in an attempt to persuade Sadat to accept a ceasefire while the situation still favoured Egypt. Sadat, however, was not convinced and continued to insist on an Israeli withdrawal coupled with a peace conference. The Soviet Union also asked the Americans their view of a ceasefire in place linked to Security Council Resolution 242, and while the American reaction was positive the Israelis continued to demand a ceasefire linked to direct negotiations between the parties.

With serious Arab reverses and the crossing of the Suez by Israel, the war was now being fought to determine the terms of participation in post-hostilities bargaining. While it was generally expected that an advantage in military position could be translated into a tangible

resource for bargaining, Kissinger believed an ambiguous military outcome would foreclose unilateral advantage and promote negotiations. He also saw the airlift to Israel in terms of matching Soviet arms supplies to the Arabs, and as such now wanted to keep twenty-five percent ahead of supplies to the Arabs. As a result, Nixon requested the passing of a massive aid bill for Israel, from Congress. Meanwhile, in response to Kosygin's visit to Cairo, Brezhnev called Washington on October 19 to arrange a meeting to discuss a process to end the fighting. Kissinger's subsequent visit to Moscow culminated in a Soviet-American agreement to a ceasefire resolution that could serve as a basis for later diplomatic efforts.

The 'Roosevelt' meanwhile, had initially elicited overt Soviet attention when she transitted the Straits for Sicily heading east. She was en route to her assigned position for monitoring the U.S. airlift and supporting U.S. fighter bombers being ferried to Israel. As she moved, she was joined first by a 'tattle-tale' then, successively by the escort patrolling the Straits, by a destroyer and finally after it became clear she was not going to move farther east, by another escort.

After meeting with his Commander-in-Chief, Sadat informed the Soviet Union and the United States that Egypt would agree to a ceasefire on the terms that Kosygin offered in Cairo. Syria, however, did not share the pessimistic military outlook and laid plans for a major offensive to begin within forty-eight hours. While it was the two superpowers who negotiated a ceasefire agreement as a result of the Moscow talks, it was the resistance of their clients which shaped that

agreement. Kissinger now urged Israel to agree to the ceasefire, particularly in light of the serious threat of encirclement posed to the Egyptian Third Army by Israeli advances. Israel reluctantly accepted the ceasefire on the 21st because of several reasons including a promise by Kissinger of U.S. support in the post-war bargaining along with an increase in military aid. In light of these developments, combined with joint Soviet-American pressure, Syria discontinued its plans for another offensive.

The Security Council then passed Resolution 338 at 12:50 a.m. on October 22, for a ceasefire to take effect on all fronts. Kissinger left Moscow and met with Meir in Tel Aviv, before returning home, insisting Israel take up a defensive position and not violate the ceasefire. The stoppage was shortlived however, as fighting again erupted on the Sinai and Israel tightened its encirclement of the Third Army. Sadat sent hourly messages to both Brezhnev and Nixon charging systematic violations by Israel. The Soviets in turn repeated these charges to Kissinger. However, both the Americans and the Soviets agreed that the defeat of the Third Army would destroy any basis for post-war political negotiations. Realizing that a defeat of the elite Third Army would also seriously damage American credibility with the Soviet Union, the U.S. began to increase its pressure on Israel.

Once again, as a result of joint Soviet-American cooperation, revised Resolution 339 was passed October 23, providing for the dispatch of U.N. observers to supervise the ceasefire. Although Syria wanted to continue the fighting, it was not willing to do so alone and also

accepted the Resolution. Tension soon peaked, however, when Israel completely encircled the trapped Third Army.

The ensuing confrontation feared by both Kissinger and Nixon, had arrived. Sadat used direct lines of communication with the United States, to request their help in resupplying the trapped Egyptian forces and called for an enforcement of the ceasefire on October 24. Kissinger then met with Dinitz to insist upon Israel's respect of the ceasefire, and to allow medical supplies and food to reach the Third Army.

At this point, Sadat proposed a joint Soviet-American force to supervise the ceasefire. The U.S. refused immediately mainly because of the obvious ramifications of placing Soviet troops on Middle-Eastern soil. In his subsequent talk with Dobrynin over using Geneva as the site for the proposed peace conference, Kissinger claimed Dobrynin denied any Soviet interest in sending a joint U.S.-Soviet force. Three hours later, however, Dobrynin called Kissinger stating that the Soviets would support the idea of a joint superpower peacekeeping force, if the nonaligned members of the U.N. called for one. Subsequently, Dobrynin called back and stated that the Soviets were now considering introducing such a resolution themselves.

As Israel tightened the noose on the Third Army and continued its march toward Cairo, Dobrynin called with a letter from Brezhnev to the President. In the letter Brezhnev strongly emphasized that if Israel continued to violate the ceasefire, there would be a desperate need for the U.S. to join the Soviet Union in compelling observance of the

ceasefire. Brezhnev went on to say that if the U.S. did not act with them, the Soviets would be forced to seriously consider the question of taking the urgent steps needed unilaterally. The credibility of Soviet intentions was enhanced by several actions, including the establishment of an air borne command aloft, the marshalling of its air transports from supply duties, the alerting of seven air borne divisions and the movement of Soviet ships, including an amphibious force, towards Egypt. With the warning from Brezhnev and subsequent Soviet actions, Kissinger, acting on behalf of the President (see Kissinger, 1982:585-588) ordered a military DEFCON III alert as a signal of resolve. The alert raised the readiness of the American forces without the determination that war was likely: it is the highest stage of readiness for essentially peacetime conditions. This was also the highest general state of readiness by American forces since the Cuban Missile Crisis in which American forces went to DEFCON II indicating a condition in which attack is imminent. Coupled with this, Quandt quotes Moshe Dyan and Eban as saying that Kissinger warned Israel that the Soviet Union might try to resupply the Egyptian forces (Quandt, 1977:198 n.71) It is claimed Kissinger also threatened that if the movement of Israeli forces were to continue, American support for them would be withdrawn, as the U.S. would not permit the destruction of the Third Army. There is, however, no reference to these warnings in Kissinger's memoirs (see Kissinger, 1982:589-593).

The subsequent WSAG meeting headed by Kissinger, resulted in the drafting and sending of a Presidential reply to Brezhnev stating that the dispatching of troops to the region would be considered a violation

of the Principles signed in Moscow in 1972 and Article 2 of the June 22, 1973 Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War. Kissinger met with Nixon later in the morning to prepare their own plans to send American troops to the area if the Soviets did in fact intervene. Information was also received at this time that a Soviet ship was suspected of giving off neutron emissions, similar to that of nuclear weapons, as it transitted the Bosphorus on October 22 before arriving at Alexandria. Although this was cause for concern, the information was never substantiated and had come after the alert had been issued (Kalb and Kalb, 1974:493-494; Schlesinger press conference, Oct. 26, 1973).

At this time the Soviets made one important move when a Kinds-class cruiser and two destroyers left their anchorage east of Crete and relieved the anti-carrier group assigned to the 'Independence'. The Sixth Fleet had continued in an advanced condition of readiness since the crisis began but with the alert it was ordered to concentrate in the Eastern Mediterranean. As the 'Roosevelt' left her holding position in the process shaking her 'tattle-tale', the 'J.F. Kennedy' and the 'Iwo Jima' entered the Mediterranean from Gibraltar heading eastward at high speed. The U.S. also had information that the Soviet fleet heading towards Egypt included amphibious landing ships.

Israel finally bowed to intense American pressure and accepted the ceasefire as the Security Council passed Resolution 340, calling for the immediate compliance of the ceasefire and a return to the October 22 lines. The Resolution also called for the creation of a U.N. peacekeeping force which would exclude permanent members of the Security

Council, as well as, implementation of Resolution 338.

Once again superpower interest in avoiding a confrontation in the Middle East was severely tested by their need to protect other interests in the area. The Americans were adamant about limiting Soviet influence in the area and promoting themselves as the only power able to bring peace to the region. They also wanted to increase their influence with the Arabs, not only to promote peace, but also to alleviate the threat of an oil boycott. The Soviets' prestige and stature as a superpower was at stake in the event of another Arab loss to Israel. They also wanted to reduce the U.S. position as the only power in the region and increase their own standing with both the Arabs and Israelis. However, as the war escalated the Soviets moved more towards protecting their clients and minimizing their losses - as did the Americans - than attempting to keep the risks low. As with the previous two cases, superpower signalling and military movements in 1973 indicated the value placed on the issues at stake.

The events of the October 1973 war fundamentally affected American policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. It was widely believed before the war, that stability in the Middle East was assured by Israel's military predominance, that Arab oil could not effectively be used to pressure the West and that Soviet influence in the region had reached its limit. The war challenged several basic American assumptions that had been central to its pre-war policy, most notably that Israeli military power had not assured stability in the region, as had been expected after 1967. That 'lesson', reinforced in the September 1970

crisis, was destroyed on October 6. Another assumption that was shaken by the October war dealt with the belief that U.S.-Soviet detente would serve to minimize the danger of regional conflicts. Each side was too deeply committed to allow its friends to be sacrificed for the spirit of detente. Finally, attitudes held by American policy-makers toward the Arab world were also challenged in that the Egyptians and Syrians had fought relatively well, achieving surprise in the initial attack, they had maintained comparative Arab solidarity, the use of the oil weapon was well coordinated with the diplomatic and military moves and the tone of restraint in private and public communications by the Arabs was a welcome contrast to 1967 (Quandt, 1977;201).

NOTES

- 1.. A declaration is required under the Montreux Convention such that combatant ships can not pass through the Turkish Straits until eight days after the declaration.

2

THE INTERESTS AT STAKE AND RISK-TAKING

Proposition 1

"An actor's interests affect its risk-taking behaviour such that the greater the perceived threat to those interests, the greater the actor's propensity will be to take risks."

As the three crises demonstrate, the two superpowers found it impossible to remain idle during a regional conflict between their respective client states. Soviet and American interests in the area coupled with, at times, autonomous behaviour of their clients forced the superpowers to focus on these regional conflicts. The client states were able to effectively mobilize patron resources and increase their own autonomy while at the same time, magnifying the risks for their superpower patrons. It may be argued that only when one patron deliberately and self-consciously manipulated the risk of confrontation with its adversary, through the threat of intervention, were the conflicts brought under control.

This chapter will analyze to what extent the superpowers took increasingly greater risks as the result of a perceived threat to their interests and objectives in the region. This will be accomplished first of all by examining superpower interests in the area at the time of the conflicts; secondly by determining if there was a perceived threat to those interests and what the threat consisted of; and thirdly, to

analyze what, if any, risks were increased to protect those interests.

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American objectives and policies in the region prior to the war, can be grouped under several general headings (not necessarily in rank order of preference):

1. Preoccupation with limiting a growing Soviet presence and influence in the area.
2. Preoccupation with increasing and maintaining their own influence and presence in the area.
3. Commitment to Israel's security and well-being while also attempting to broaden its influence in the Arab world (especially to protect its oil interests).
4. Avoidance of a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union in the area.

The avoidance of a direct confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States was more or less an unambiguous vital objective of the decision makers at the time (Johnson, 1971:287; and Quandt, 1977:50). This acted as shared constraint on both powers in achieving their objectives in the area because of the inherent danger such a confrontation would entail. However, the same could not be said for America's other policies in the area. For instance, there was much disagreement among policy makers about whether their commitment to Israel was a result of historical or moral factors; national interest or domestic pressure (Quandt, 1977).

The background and explanations of these objectives have been more than adequately discussed and analyzed elsewhere (see for example,

Quandt, 1977; Johnson, 1971; Rostow, 1976; Dadant, 1973; and Whetton, 1981) thus it would suffice to say, that American philosophy was basically to consolidate, conserve and stabilize. Although there was a dynamic element in American foreign policy it was, in general, directed towards maximizing gains for itself and its 'friends' within the existing status quo. At the same time the U.S. attempted to minimize the risks inherent in regional instability and the 'excessive ambitions' of the more 'radical elements' in the Middle East.

American diplomatic efforts were also aimed at limiting Soviet influence by attempting to bring about a regional balance of power. This was done in order to maintain an American military presence in the area and promote a military alliance in the Middle East linked to the West. One method the Americans used to achieve this balance was to limit its arms sales to Israel prior to the Six Day War and concomitantly increase its influence with the Arabs.

The Soviet Union had correspondingly, a different set of goals and objectives in the area. The Soviet concept of history deemed that many great nations had risen and fallen in a more or less cyclical pattern. They believed that with their allies they were in a position to break this pattern by maintaining the impetus of their advance indefinitely. While avoiding nuclear war, the Soviets' main target was the acquisition of real political influence in states they regarded as important. In an analysis of Soviet policy from 1967 - 1972, George Breslauer (1983: 65-105) listed several objectives for Soviet policy in the region:

1. Maintenance, consolidation, and expansion of influence in the Arab world, with influence building being an end in itself for political, ideological and prestige reasons.
2. Support of a geostrategic rivalry with the U.S. leading the Soviets to use influence to gain strategic assets such as military bases, port facilities and anti-Western allies (thus decreasing American influence).
3. Acquisitions of some economic advantages through receiving hard currency from arms sales to the Arabs.
4. Avoidance of a superpower confrontation, not only because of its intrinsic dangers but also because (after 1969). of the damage it might do to detente.
5. Maintenance of a dialogue with the U.S. regarding terms for a peace settlement between the Arabs and Israelis (thus ensuring the recognition of the Soviets as a major power in the area).

In order to maintain and increase their influence in the area, the superpowers were also deeply committed financially (see Tables 1 and 2 for cross country and extended time span figures) and militarily to the area (see Appendices A through E as well as Cahn, 1979:101-133; Pajak, 1979:134-163 and Dadant, 1973:169-200).

Table 1: United States Economic Loans and Grants to
Middle East Nations (in millions U.S. Dollars)

NATION	1953 - 1970		1946 - 1970	
	LOAN	GRANT	LOAN	GRANT
Iran	570.5	438.8	596.3	455.3
Iraq	26.0	27.8	26.9	28.3
Israel	772.0	282.8	907.0	369.3
Jordan	31.3	564.7	31.1	569.9
Kuwait	50.0	—	50.0	—
Lebanon	16.5	71.2	18.1	73.0
Saudi Arabia	12.0	27.1	31.1	27.5
Syria	24.0	36.0	24.0	36.4
Turkey	1,310.4	1,058.7	1,439.9	1,198.8
UAR	608.4	291.1	619.1	293.0
Yemen	—	42.9	—	42.9
CENTO	18.3	35.3	18.3	35.3
Regional**	18.3	271.0	18.3	273.7
TOTAL M.E. Less Regional	3,439.4	2,877.0	3,762.0	3,129.7
TOTAL WORLD WIDE	31,241.0	37,839.0	42,751.0	60,207.0

Source: "U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from
International Organizations", Agency for International
Development, May 14, 1971.

** includes Near East and South Asia

Table 2: U.S.S.R. and Eastern Economic Credits and Grants to Middle East Nations (in millions U.S. Dollars)

NATION	U.S.S.R. TOTAL 1954 - 1968	EASTERN EUROPE TOTAL 1954 - 1968
Iran	508	331
Iraq	184	-
Syria	233	169
Turkey	210	8
UAR	1,011	562
Yemen	92	17
TOTAL M.E.	2,238	1,087
TOTAL WORLD WIDE	6,298	2,460

Source: U.S. Department of State, "Communist Governments and Developing Nations: Aid and Trade in 1968", RSE-65, Sept. 5, 1969, p.3.

It is possible that until a few months before the outbreak of hostilities in 1967, the Soviets did not comprehend the probability that their involvement in Arab politics must necessarily entail some responsibility for the actions by the latter against Israel. The continued Soviet warnings of an imminent Israeli attack against Syria prompted Nasser to dispell the U.N.E.F., remilitarize parts of the Sinai, close the Straits of Tiran, and recall troops from Yemen. It can be said that the Soviet warnings were designed to provide the 'mise-en-scene' for the Egyptian evacuation of Yemen (the U.S.S.R. had recently signed a treaty with Yemen on March 21 of that year), and compel the Egyptians to come to the defense of the Syrians (Roi, 1974:437). There appears to be no evidence of Soviet collusion in the closing of the Straits especially since the Soviets were very aware of the value the U.S. placed on keeping them open. With the closing of the Straits, the Soviets may have realized the crisis was getting out of control and that

the risk of being dragged into a full-scale war between the Arabs and Israelis. The Soviets may have also realized that a diplomatic solution at this point could have favored the Arabs and therefore themselves.

The nature of Soviet commitment to the Arabs was not as clear beforehand as that of the Americans to the Israelis. The American position had been known since 1948 through the pledges of four successive presidencies (Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson) to ensure both the continuing existence and integrity of existing ceasefire lines forming the parameters of Israel. By May 23, American policy as pursued by President Johnson contained several elements:

1. Prevent war by restraining Israel and warning both Egypt as well as the Soviets against initiating hostilities.
2. Build public and congressional support for the idea of an international effort to reopen the Straits.
3. Make an effort through the U.N. Security Council to open the Straits, and failing that, attempt a multinational flotilla to transmit the Straits.
4. Oppose Nasser's efforts to change the status quo as such changes would be contrary to U.S. and Israeli interests.

When Nasser closed the Straits on May 22, 1967, the size of the Fifth Eskadra was nominal by later standards. The Soviets immediately began to augment, transforming a presence expressing a generalized regional interest into a limited show of force oriented to a definite crisis in which the Sixth Fleet might become involved. According to McConnell (1979:267) Soviet intentions at this point remained circumspect. Nonetheless, the Soviet naval posture was prototypical of subsequent crises. Carriers of the Sixth Fleet were shadowed by

combatants and, though there is no evidence of functioning anti-carrier task groups being formed, the ships that could make them up were deployed to the theater. It should be noted that the Eskadra was small compared with the forces withheld in the Black Sea. The Soviet Black Sea Fleet order of battle in June 1967 included thirty-three major surface combatants and reinforcements, particularly submarines. They could also have sent units from the Northern and Baltic Fleets. The Sixth Fleet, on the other hand, was comprised of two carriers (sometimes three as in 1973) and approximately fifty other surface combatants.

The initiation of hostilities on June 5 created a dynamically different situation, with the problems of the removal of the U.N.E.F. and the closing of the Straits becoming of a lesser order. Even though the war began with an Israeli surprise attack, Moscow as well as Washington gave reciprocal notice on the 'hot line' of intentions not to intervene. However, these could have been declarations only for the moment, before an asymmetry of interests and motivation developed.

President Johnson recalled in his memoirs that his paramount and immediate concern at this stage was to ascertain the intentions of the Soviet Union and deter any intervention (Johnson, 1971:297). One question arises over Johnson's strong commitment and support of Israel once hostilities began after repeatedly warning Israel against starting hostilities. The key to understanding Johnson's position may have been his fear that the U.S. might be drawn into another war to help Israel, possibly involving a confrontation with the Soviets. Vietnam was bad enough, but the combination of Vietnam and the Middle East, with the

possibility of a confrontation with the Soviet Union, was unthinkable. The U.S. feared a military stalemate in hostilities between the belligerents as this would be the situation which would most likely force them to become involved. However, within hours of the beginning of hostilities, it was clear that the Israelis would prevail and Johnson's main fear of being drawn in to help vanished. President Johnson believed that a military victory by Israel may have seemed less likely to lead to American involvement, unless of course, such a victory precipitated a direct intervention by the Soviets on behalf of its Arab clients. This would increase the risks for both the Soviets and the Americans.

Already on the second day of the war there was a thinly veiled threat of Soviet intervention in the Sinai if the Israelis did not halt their advance. It is instructive to note however, that Moscow did not follow through on its threat. But the Soviets did begin to increase their vocal support of the Arabs and later began a limited airlift of supplies to Egypt and Syria (Durch, Davidchik and Shulsky, 1979:338). With the Israelis continuing to make military gains against its clients, the Soviets increased their commitment to Egypt and Syria. However, the immediate support was verbal and the airlift did not take effect until after hostilities ended. These actions coupled with the non-augmentation and mere surveillance tactics of the Fifth Eskadra initially resulted in a controlled risk-avoidant policy. The Americans as well were being very cautious initially and risk-avoidant by their pronouncements.

The most serious threat of intervention came after the acceptance of a ceasefire by both Israel and Syria on June 9, when the Israelis continued their advance in the Golan Heights, Moscow had evidently become concerned about the fate of Damascus itself and the Syrian heartland. A Soviet hot-line message to Johnson warned that the Soviets would take necessary actions including military, if Israel did not stop its advance. Johnson responded to this Soviet threat of possible intervention on June 10 at two levels. At one level he sent a portion of the Sixth Fleet toward the Syrian coast, followed there by Soviet tattletales. At the same time he urged the Israelis to agree to the ceasefire which they subsequently did (timed with the successful securing of the Golan Heights). Under the circumstances, the move of the Sixth Fleet ought to be designated as a temporizing show of force, against any unilateral Soviet action which would put Soviet Troops in Middle East soil. Such a Soviet move would threaten Israeli interests as well as the U.S. objective of limiting a Soviet presence in the region and possibly resulting in a direct confrontation with the Soviets.

Any increase in Soviet and American risk taking behaviour at this time must be analyzed with regard to the credibility of the Soviet threat to intervene. The problem is how to characterize Soviet objectives. A previous account of this crisis by Jonathan Howe questioned the credibility of the Soviet threat. He felt that the intervention may actually have been contemplated, but that as long as there was a "possibility" of American counteraction, it was "unlikely" Moscow actually intended to intervene. He does acknowledge, however, a very important difference between his interpretation of Soviet

intentions and that of the White House at the time of the crisis (Howe, 1971:117,122). Senior officials in Washington took the Soviet threat quite seriously; they were extremely concerned about Israeli actions, which were felt to give Moscow a 'legitimate' reason for intervention. Secretary Rusk characterized the move of the Sixth Fleet toward the Syrian coast as a 'gesture' rather than a purposeful show of force. If the Soviets had followed through with Airborne Troops in the defense of Damascus, he thought Sixth Fleet aircraft could be landed at Israeli airfields to confine the conflict to Syria - a limiting show of force (Johnson, 1971; Rostow, 1976; McConnell, 1979). The whole crisis suggests the essentially defensive character of superpower commitments and the credibility of these commitments. Even if Washington had felt an Israeli seizure of Damascus to be in its broader interest, which seems unlikely, its essential concern for the integrity and viability of all states would not have given it the political will to underwrite militarily, against the U.S.S.R., an Israeli advance on the Syrian capital. Although superpower commitments do seem to have been strictly defensive, it must be pointed out how, in this and in the other crises, they might have had the effect of encouraging client initiatives and making them less willing to compromise (Whetton, 1977:9).

While the Soviets may have 'contemplated' intervention to save Syria, their failure to alert Soviet Airborne Troops at this time proved to make the credibility of this threat somewhat transparent. It can be claimed that the threat was a signal not only in support of a Soviet client but also to the U.S. to restrain Israel. The risk in this action was low due to the more verbal, as opposed to physical pronouncement.

The American response was a controlled signal as well, showing that any Soviet intervention would be considered a threat against American interests in the area. The use of the hot-line, the open recognition of each other's presence, limited public naval interactions and the mutual recognition of the risks involved in challenging what were perceived by the other side as vital interests tempered the conflict tension between the superpowers to some degree and kept the risks relatively low (Evron, 1979:22).

By not intervening to prevent the collapse of Nasser's army, the Soviets circumscribed the means by which it might have advanced its interests (the strengthening and unification of the progressive wing of the Arab world). The Soviet Union's interest in a ceasefire was inherently aimed at protecting their client's survival. The Soviet tolerance threshold was somewhat defined on June 9-10 with their 'grave concern' for the preservation of Damascus and the Ba'athist regime. Increasingly, Soviet military power in the Mediterranean depended on the Syrian regime and the total collapse of the regime posed a very serious threat to Soviet interests in the area. The importance of Syria is also shown by the warnings of an Israeli attack on Syria before the war so as to mobilize Nasser to aid Syria with a show of force (Hottinger, 1975:115; Evron, 1979:21; Freedman, 1982:17).

The tolerance threshold of the Americans was also defined by their reaction to the Soviet threat of intervention. American interests would be severely challenged in the area if the Soviets were to intervene directly. Not only would this legitimize the Soviet presence and

influence in the area and make it extremely difficult to get them out again, but it would also be a grave threat to Israel's security which the Americans desperately wanted to protect.

It is evident that the termination of hostilities was brought about by increasing the risk involved. At this point a convergence of different interests over the salvation of the Syrian government occurred. The Soviets were anxious to preserve the leftist Ba'athist regime as an important disciple of Soviet Middle Eastern policy. For its part the U.S. would ultimately have to agree that however undesirable the existing government might be, its demise would create not only the risk of confrontation with the Soviet Union but it would also create new uncertainties at a time when the nature of its own involvement remained unclear. Any irregular changes in political systems or governments in the core Middle Eastern states appeared, therefore, as a threat to the delicate political relationships in the area, as well as introducing unknown factors that might jeopardize superpower commitments in the region.

Although it appears that the calculated risks that were taken by the superpowers were of a lower order, one can speculate how the risks would have increased substantially had Israel not heeded American warnings to halt the fighting or had planned further military objectives. The actions taken by both patrons amounted to signalling the degree of interest in the situation taken by the superpowers. Both the Soviets and Americans signalled the extent to which they valued their interests in the area while being constrained at the same time by

their desire to avoid a direct confrontation.

While the probability that such superpower behaviour would have involved them in a question of war or for that matter, a direct confrontation with each other was low, the actions of their clients did indeed manifest such a risk. The Israeli attack on the American intelligence ship the 'Liberty', on June 8, is a perfect example. Both Johnson and McNamara felt that with Israel secure from military defeat, the only threat to U.S. interests could now come from a confrontation with the U.S.S.R., thus the identity of the attacker had to be established quickly. Tension was increased substantially at this point until the identity of the attacker had been verified as not being Soviet. The chance of misunderstanding or misperception in this incident temporarily increased the risk for both superpowers. But despite this Johnson continued to try and keep the risk low by calling Kosygin to inform him of the dispatch of American aircraft to investigate.

By their independent actions at times, the client states (especially Israel) increased the risks to their patrons by confounding superpower calculations and attempts to negotiate and maintain a ceasefire. Even with the 'controlled' measures used by both superpowers to terminate the conflict, the risks brought on by 'accidents' inherent in close naval surveillance, questionable intentions of the adversary and actions by third parties manifested themselves during the crisis.

Therefore, it can be claimed that a moderate degree of risk-taking did indeed occur in 1967. The level of risks was somewhat influenced by:

1. the perceived threat the Soviets believed Israel was posing to their interests, namely Syria's survival, thus causing the Soviets to threaten military action if necessary and increase its verbal and later, physical commitments to Egypt and Syria;
2. an American 'show of force' in moving the Sixth Fleet toward the Eastern Mediterranean and the war zone, in order to limit Soviet involvement and counter the threat to American interests such intervention would pose; and
3. the sometimes autonomous actions of the client states which precipitated most superpower actions, including the Soviet threat of unilateral action.

Jordan 1970

When the Egyptian-Israeli ceasefire took effect on August 7, 1970, it unleashed forces that quickly undermined the prospects for peace talks and instead led to another episode of Soviet-American risk-taking. By the time Israel pulled out of the Jarring talks on September 6 as a result of continued Egyptian violations of the standstill ceasefire, King Hussein of Jordan was in the midst of a power struggle that threatened to draw in both superpower patrons.

The causes of violence in Jordan were many and varied, but the central one was the contest between Hussein and various Palestinian groups for control of Jordan especially during the late 1960's. The Palestinians were supported to some degree by Iraq and by the radical government of Syria, which claimed for itself, a special relationship with the Palestinian movement. Syria also adamantly refused to accept any settlement with Israel, including the Rogers Plan.

The United States was involved in the crisis for at least four reasons. First, it had a traditional policy of supporting conservative

Arab regimes, of which Jordan was a prominent example. Secondly, it sponsored the Rogers Plan, which had been the cause of some of Hussein's problems and which would be scuttled if the Palestinians took over in Jordan. Thirdly, the U.S. was concerned for the safety of its nationals, both hostages (from the hijackings) and residents in Jordan. Finally, both Nixon and Kissinger came to believe the Jordanian crisis had much more to do with U.S.-Soviet relations than with the Arab-Israeli conflict or the Palestinians. Their relations with the Soviets were strained for numerous reasons, not the least of which was the feeling that the Soviets were much at fault for the imminent collapse of the Arab-Israeli ceasefire between Egypt and Israel. Because of Syria's close relationship with the U.S.S.R., the United States could not allow Hussein to be overthrown by what appeared to be a Soviet backed insurrection, which if successful, could cause the entire Middle East to erupt. Israel might preempt against Syria dominating a radical government in Jordan. Egypt was also tied to Syria by military alliances and both the Soviets' prestige and influence would therefore be on the line. It has been claimed that this would have resulted in an increase in Soviet-American risk-taking leading to a possible confrontation. (Nixon, 1978:282-284; Quandt, 1977:105-127; Kalb and Kalb, 1974:183). Although the crisis erupted primarily from regional problems, American decision-makers at the time saw the situation in East-West terms. However, this perception may have been somewhat exaggerated and dangerous in light of its effects on American behaviour. The threats to the Jordanian regime and to U.S. citizens in Jordan insured that the U.S. would take an active interest in the crisis and raised the possibility, however remote, that it might use its armed

forces in some form of direct military intervention, as it had in Lebanon in 1958.

According to Bryson (1977:253) American economic assistance to maintain Jordan's stability between 1952-1970 amounted to more than five hundred million dollars. At the height of the crisis in September, Nixon and the Congress authorized a further ten million dollars in emergency aid. This is in spite of the fact that after 1966, United States economic aid to the Middle East had decreased sharply. Grants to the area in 1970 totalled only \$22.8 million, a mere 1.0 percent of the worldwide total. Although substantial loans were made to Israel (\$50.9 million), Turkey (\$71.0 million) and Iran (\$46.7 million), total loans to the Middle East dropped to \$183.7 million, about 7.3 percent of the U.S. worldwide total (Dadant, 1973:189; see Tables 2 and 3, plus Appendices A-E).

Table 3: U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
(Chargeable to Foreign Assistance Act Appropriations)
CREDIT ASSISTANCE AND GRANTS TO MIDDLE EAST NATIONS
(in millions)

Nation	1970 Credit Assistance	Grants	Total 1946-70 Credit Assistance	Grants
Iran	70.0	15.2	504.1	830.4
Iraq	-	*	-	46.7
Israel	+	-	+	-
Jordan	+	1.0	+	53.2
Kuwait	-	-	-	-
Lebanon	-	0.1	-	9.0
Saudi Arabia	+	0.5	+	35.1
Syria	-	*	-	0.1
Turkey	-	116.6	-	2,939.4
U.A.R.	-	-	-	-
Yemen	-	-	-	*
Cento	-	0.1	-	1.0
Regional++	114.9	-	271.6	790.0
TOTAL M.E. (less Regional & Classified	70.0	133.5	504.1	4,705.8
TOTAL WORLDWIDE	286.0	522.0	1,856.0	34,856.0

Source: "U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from
International Organizations", May 14, 1971.

* - Less than \$50,000.

+ - Data classified. Credit assistance to Israel prior to 1968: 23.9
Credit assistance to Jordan prior to 1968: 12.9
Assistance to Saudi Arabia prior to 1968: 123.0

++ - Includes Near East and South Asia.

The Soviets had much to lose and relatively little to gain in the Jordanian crisis. The key to their policy was their special relationship with Syria (Shulsky, 1979:169). The Soviet Union had made heavy investments of military aid and diplomatic support in the Syrian regime in the four years since the left-wing Ba'ath coup of February 1966. Although the Soviets' links with Syria were not as important as their relationship with Egypt, Moscow was reluctant to jeopardize these ties by open condemnation of, much less active opposition to, Syria's invasion of Jordan. Furthermore, the Soviets shared the Syrian view of Hussein's regime as a Western outpost and, under other circumstances, would have been pleased by its downfall.

During this period, however, Hussein was somewhat sheltered by the temporary alliance he had made with Nasser, who remained the chief Soviet client in the Middle East. Nasser's strategy, which the Soviets appeared to accept, was to exploit the American desire to see the Rogers Plan succeed in reducing tensions in the area. Nasser hoped the U.S. would induce Israel to participate in the Jarring talks under the Rogers Plan, despite Egyptian 'violations' of the ceasefire and despite Palestinian raids from Jordan. In this context the Jordan crisis presented an obstacle to the exploitation by the Soviets of what was otherwise a favourable diplomatic situation. The Soviets also took account of American objectives in the region so as to further their own policies.

There were a number of incidents which proved threatening to American interests. One was the hijacking by Palestinian guerillas of

four international airliners in early September. While one airline was blown up in Cairo, the others were flown to a remote desert airstrip in Jordan, carrying with them many American passengers, held as hostages. The second was the domestic threat posed by the fedayeen to the established Jordanian government of King Hussein. Finally, on September 18-19, the third and most serious threat came with a Syrian armoured intervention across the Jordanian border in support of the guerrillas. It was perceived by Washington that these two forces together seemed capable of overthrowing Hussein's government (Nixon, 1978:290; Kalb and Kalb, 1974:186).

In an early response to the crisis, Nixon moved one carrier task group to the Eastern Mediterranean, to be joined later by two additional carrier groups along with the helicopter carrier carrying marines. The U.S. thus arrayed a purposeful show of force, responding to the hijackings and violence in Amman. These commitments were strengthened by the promised American support to Israel in case of an Egyptian or Soviet attack. This promise made Israel's commitment to assist Jordan, if the latter appeared near defeat, even more credible (Brandon and Schaenbaum, 1973:171-181). The crisis contained some elements of controlled behaviour between the superpowers, such as the Soviet advisers being prohibited from following Syrian tanks across the border and the maintenance of communications between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. via the Soviet Ambassador in Washington. The superpowers did, however, engage in certain actions which increased the risk involved. Kissinger felt that the U.S. had to prevent Hussein's collapse, if necessary by direct American military intervention. If the guerrillas backed by Syria and

indirectly the Soviet Union were successful, a major Israeli strike against the Arabs in reaction would cause the whole region to erupt (Kissinger, 1979:600-611; Kalb and Kalb, 1974:198) and result in an immediate threat to the balance of power in the area with its accompanying risk of direct confrontation between the superpowers.

The U.S., by guaranteeing to intervene if Israel was attacked, explicitly established its tolerance threshold. The possibility of direct U.S. intervention continued through October as the U.S. became quite concerned that the Palestinians might try to make good their threats against U.S. interests in the Middle East by attacking the American Army hospitals in Amman. Only when the hospitals were withdrawn at the end of October did the possibility of direct American intervention disappear completely.

Soviet policy as it emerged during the crisis was shaped by the desire to support Syria and inhibit direct U.S. intervention ashore without incurring the unacceptable risk of a direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation. Although the Soviets clearly supported the Syrians to a point, it is difficult to determine the extent of the Soviet role in the original Syrian decision to invade Jordan. However, the mere presence of Soviet advisors at the border suggests the Soviets were willing to engage in some risk-taking with the United States. The Soviets did avoid stronger support for Syria, which might have incited an unacceptable U.S. counteraction, and limited Soviet naval operations primarily to inhibit American freedom of action. On the other hand, while unwilling to assist the Syrians in the invasion or to defend their client should

it run into some trouble, they also signalled to the Americans that counteraction against their client would not be permitted to go too far.

It was a major but closely controlled demonstration from the Soviet perspective, employing ships that were in the area from the beginning or dispatched during the crisis. Because of its steady growth from June 1967 through mid-1970, the Fifth Eskadra had more ships at the start of the Jordanian crisis than it had at the height of the war in 1967 (Shulsky, 1979:171-172). It was not under strength by comparison with the Sixth Fleet, as was the case in 1967. Instead it had sufficient cruise-missile equipped combattants and submarines to match each of the two Sixth Fleet attack carrier groups with an anti-carrier task group. Moscow subsequently deployed the elements of two additional anticarrier task groups to counter the additional attack and amphibious carrier task groups sent by the U.S. Qualitatively, the forces deployed by the Soviets were appreciably more capable than in 1967. Indeed, with the number and combination of units, the Soviets could have posed a significant military threat to the Sixth Fleet.

The Soviets also gave both explicit and tacit signals that they were attempting to control the level of risk. Several cruisers, including an SSM-Kresta-I, were kept from the scene on their way to Cuba via the Mediterranean and the Straits of Gibraltar. Only a fraction of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet was deployed and some of the more modern ASW ships remained in the Black Sea during the crisis.

American behaviour during this crisis acted to increase the risks involved. Their interests lay not only in protecting Hussein but also in protecting American citizens in Jordan and those held captive as a result of the hijackings. As the chance of outside intervention increased, the U.S. moved from verbal warnings to actual physical movements of the Sixth Fleet already in the Mediterranean; the alert of American Airborne units in Germany and North Carolina, the flight of additional C-130's to Turkey and finally the movement of a third carrier, the 'John F. Kennedy' into the Mediterranean. Coupled with this, the helicopter carrier 'Guam' was ordered from Norfolk to the Mediterranean. Both military aid and the delivery of eighteen F-4's were also accelerated to Israel. Thus, the U.S. signalled to the Soviets the importance of the threat posed to American interests in the area. While it may be questioned whether a 'competition' in risk-taking occurred in this instance, the U.S. was risk-acceptant, increasing the level of risk beyond that of 1967.

The American guarantee to Israel would have increased the risks even further if Hussein had been unable to turn the Syrian attack back. While again open to speculation, it can be claimed that if Israel had moved on Syria, Egypt and the Soviet Union would have become more directly involved, thus increasing the probability of American involvement in a direct confrontation with the Soviets in order to protect Israel.

For the Soviets' part, their main concern was with limiting American actions in the area and insuring American counter-action

against Syria did not go too far. While the Soviets may have been risk acceptant in allowing their advisors to go to the Syrian-Jordanian border, they attempted to keep the risks relatively low as the crisis proceeded. Soviet behaviour involved verbal declarations and 'tattle-tale' naval surveillance of the Sixth Fleet by the most powerful combatants of the Soviet navy. The Eskadra also formed functioning anti-carrier groups, after being augmented from forty to sixty ships.

However the sustained presence of two powerful fleets in close proximity during a period of international tension tends to produce an inherently unstable situation at the tactical level. Although it was not as high in the June war, the risk of unintended exchange in 1970 as a result of misjudgement by unit commanders was greatly enhanced by the close proximity of opposing forces.

Another unfortunate effect of increasing commitments by both superpowers is the possible effect it has on client intransigence. For example, Syrian anticipation that the Soviets would, in the end, bail them out of serious difficulties may well have encouraged activist elements in Damascus to take the initiative in the first place and to persist in that initiative longer than the situation warranted. Therefore, as in 1967, client autonomy may have influenced the patron's willingness to take risks it otherwise would have preferred to avoid. But to protect superpower interests, a certain amount of risk-taking was necessary.

Thus, while attempts were made to control the risks in 1970, the perceived threat to American interests in Jordan by the Syrian backed Palestinians caused the U.S. to make more explicit its commitments to protect Hussein. These actions coupled with an American promise to support an Israeli strike against Syria if Syrian tanks did not withdraw, posed a serious counter threat to Soviet interests in the area, namely the protection of Syria. However controlled the crisis appeared, Nixon and Kissinger perceived the situation in East-West terms and as a dangerous Soviet challenge to U.S. interests which could lead to a direct confrontation. It is quite possible Nixon and Kissinger overemphasized the Soviet role in the Syrian invasion and minimized the degree it grew out of internal Syrian politics (Quandt, 1977:179), but it was their perceptions of the situation at the time which must be taken into account.

It is also not clear whether the U.S. would have intervened were Syria more successful in the invasion or whether Israel refused to act or did act and was attacked by Egypt. Despite a great reluctance on the part of the U.S., the available evidence suggests that American military intervention was a very distinct possibility (Kissinger, 1979:612; Evron, 1979:36; McConnell, 1979:177; Nixon, 1978:292; Kalb and Kalb, 1974:199; Brandon and Schaenbaum, 1973:178; Brown, 1971:43). The U.S. could have justified an intervention (as the Soviets had frequently done in other cases) by claiming they were invited by the legitimate regime in Jordan in response to a threat against its very existence.

Thus it appears the level of risk in 1970 was greater than in 1967. In 1970 however, it was the U.S. which was increasingly risk-acceptant once it perceived a threat to its interests in the area. The Soviets played more of a limiting role against the U.S. as hostilities got under way. It is open to conjecture, however, that if Israel had moved against Syria because of Hussein's inability to rout the tanks, the risk to both superpowers would have increased sharply.

October 1973

Despite the passing of a decade since the crisis in October 1973, much ambiguity and controversy still remains in regards to the complex crisis bargaining and signalling that occurred between the superpowers during this critical period. The implications of the war strongly affected both Soviet and American policy in the years since.

The Middle East and American policy was, as in 1970, perceived to be part of the East-West global relationship as seen by Nixon and Kissinger. American peace initiatives (second Rogers Plan) were by this time based on a preferred conception of a permanent peace treaty in the Middle East, which included a complete normalization of ties (Steinberg, 1977). This idea for peace was to satisfy several important American objectives in the region (not necessarily in rank order of preference):

1. Maintain positive relations with the moderate Arab countries and attempt to substantially increase American influence in the Arab world generally. Although not a critical concern at the time, the energy crisis focused attention on the West's need for imported oil and the possibility of an oil embargo from Arab exporters (see Kissinger, 1982:865-873).

2. Reduce as much as possible Soviet influence and involvement in the Middle East while asserting American leadership in the region.
3. Ensure Israel's continued viability.
4. Reduce the likelihood of a superpower confrontation which could threaten the continued maintenance of detente and lead to a nuclear war.

Nixon believed that the key to peace lay in Moscow as much as Cairo or Damascus, however, he felt the Soviets continued to be the main cause of Middle-East tension (1978:478-483). One objective of American policy, especially since 1970, was to demonstrate to Sadat that a Soviet military presence in his country was an obstacle to his recovering the Sinai. Soviet arms would be matched by American arms to Israel, thus ruling out Sadat's military option (Quandt, 1977:180).

To increase American influence in the Arab world, the U.S. attempted a more even handed approach to peace. To this end Nixon had earlier decided to postpone the delivery of Phantom jets to Israel because of the reports that the Soviets were coming under renewed pressure from its Arab clients to surpass the new American deliveries to Israel. Nixon hoped that since Israel was already in a strong military position, the postponement would slow the arms race without tipping the fragile military balance in the region (Nixon 1978:920). Some Soviet restraint was in evidence in early 1972, a major factor in Sadat's decision to expel the Soviets from Egypt in July of that year. The Soviets persisted in stating that a military battle must be ruled out and that the question had to be settled peacefully. The Soviets later decided however, to resupply Egypt with newer, offensive type weapons by mid-summer 1973 (Whetton, 1977:67).

By 1970, the major military-strategic rationale for arms sales was embodied in the Nixon Doctrine: reduced United States presence overseas required large-scale arms transfers to enable America's allies to defend themselves and aid the U.S. in its regional objectives (Cahn, 1979:121). The U.S. had sold nearly one billion dollars worth of arms to Israel in a five-year period since the 1967 war (Sobel, 1974:82). The major portion of the Israeli purchases, \$936 million worth, was for F-4 Phantom jets and A-4 Skyhawk attack planes (see Appendices A-E; these figures only accounted for weapons for which a country paid and did not cover military equipment given free under separate aid programs).

The threat and dangers inherent in an Arab oil boycott were of strategic importance especially in relation to Western European and Japanese supplies. While the U.S. was at the time not receiving a substantial amount of oil from the Middle-East, (less than 2% of the annual production of Middle East oil in 1970) its oil consumption was increasing steadily. Their allies however were heavily reliant on imported sources of energy thus the protection of this supply was to become of prime importance (see Table 4). Although the U.S. may not have been adversely affected by a boycott at the time, their reserves were being quickly outstripped by consumption. Access to the vast reserves of easily recovered Middle East oil was much more crucial now than in during the unsuccessful oil embargo of 1967 (Kissinger, 1982:854-895).

Table 4: WESTERN EUROPE'S CRUDE OIL CONSUMPTION VS
IMPORTS FROM THE MIDDLE EAST

MILLIONS OF TONS			
Country(s)	Crude Oil Consumption	Middle East Imports	Import as percent of Consumption
Benelux	59.3	53.6	90.4
France	86.6	45.5	52.5
West Germany	120.0	35.1	29.3
Italy	83.8	63.9	76.2
U.K.	96.3	61.5	63.9
Scandinavia	65.3	18.4	28.2
Other Western Europe (a)	70.5	30.0	42.6
TOTAL	581.8	308.0	52.9 average

Middle East includes: Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Qatar, Neutral Zone, Egypt, Abu Dhabi and other smaller producers.

(a) includes: Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, Austria and Iceland.

Source: The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Oil Statistics: Supply and Disposal, 1970 (Paris, OECD, 1971), pp22-23 and 26 following.

Meanwhile, the central issue for the Soviets revolved around the fate of the territories gained by Israel in the war. Soviet efforts focused primarily on the prevention of American exploitation of the issue for the purpose of becoming the power broker in the Middle East and eliminating any Soviet influence. This may represent the key to understanding Soviet conduct toward the Arab-Israeli conflict and American reactions to it (Rabinovitch, 1978:14).

The Soviets were facing a dilemma in their approach to peace in the Middle East as a result of several cross-cutting and competing objectives. The climate in relations between the superpowers in 1973 was somewhat different from that of 1967. The June war had coincided with a new upsurge of militancy in Soviet policy. Moscow did not originate that crisis, but it encouraged Arab initiatives that precipitated it and it played little or no restraining role during the drift to war. By 1973, however, detente had emerged, and the Soviets not only had to be concerned about the risks of confrontation with the U.S. - this concern was just as evident in 1967 - but also about the risks of crisis (Adomeit, 1982:42-44), with its potential for spillover political effects on detente (Golan, 1977; Breslauer, 1983). On the other hand, the Soviet Union continued to try and increase its influence in the area in conjunction with a corresponding reduction in American influence. The resumption in arms transfers to Egypt in 1973 may have been motivated not by the desire to incite war but to maintain some influence over a policy of war resolved upon by Egypt regardless of the availability of Soviet assistance (McConnell, 1979:396, n.61-62).

The Soviet dilemma existed because although a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict would substantially reduce the risk of a superpower confrontation, such an agreement would seriously undermine the maintenance and growth of a Soviet power and influence in the region. This influence was initially established through a Soviet policy of promoting Arab intransigence toward Israel, therefore gaining a foothold in the region via supplying military aid to the Arabs (Rubenstein, 1977:231; Freedman, 1982:108-111; Golan, 1977:53; Dawisha,

Given the risk associated with full scale violence in the Middle-East it is not surprising the Soviets preferred minimum peace to war, however, if the alternatives were minimum peace and erosion of Soviet influence; or war and the maintenance of Soviet influence, the trade-offs presented a difficult choice to Soviet decision-makers.

As a result of Egypt's war of attrition with Israel, an unprecedented Soviet commitment of military aid was given to both Egypt and Syria. By 1971 Soviet military aid to the Middle East accounted for 2.5 percent of the total Soviet military production, however, military aid to Egypt alone equalled 7.5 percent of the military budget available for conventional weapons. After the Soviet expulsion from Egypt in 1972 there was a shift in the center of gravity of Soviet aid from Egypt to Syria and Iraq (Ofer, 1979:74). This shift, despite an upsurge of arms transfer to Egypt immediately prior to the war and massive air and sealifts during the hostilities, became much more marked following the war (see Appendix F).

Soviet expansion and deepening commitment in the early 1970's was a result of a reactive policy to the sometimes uncertain behaviour of its clients and American attempts to drive a wedge between the Soviets and Egypt. This commitment frequently deepened precisely in order to increase Arab dependence on them. While the Soviets gave the Arabs the military capability prior to October 6, the Soviets did not want to assume responsibility for hostilities breaking out.

At the same time this increasing commitment of aid was being given, the superpowers at a global level were becoming more concerned with detente, as was evidenced by the May 1972 Moscow Summit and the June 1973 Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War. As this new relationship became the strategy at a global level, the Soviets followed a dual policy of urging Egypt not to begin an all out offensive against Israel, while at the same time trying to recoup their influence lost as a result of the July expulsion.

Although much controversy surrounds the 'surprise' aspect of the war, it is not within the scope of this research to examine the question to the degree that it warrants. It will be sufficient to state that while both the Americans and Israelis were surprised by the well planned Arab attack on October 6, (Kissinger, 1982:460; Nixon, 1978:920), they should not have been. With American spy satellites, the CIA, monitoring stations of the NSA and the world renowned Israeli Intelligence Service itself, there was ample evidence of Arab military preparations along the Suez and Syrian fronts. It appears that the evidence was not ignored but rather misinterpreted because of the assumption that the Arabs were too aware of their own technical inferiority and of Israeli invincibility to venture an attack.

Inherently linked with the controversy over the surprise of the war but also intrinsically necessary to the discussion of risk is the question of Soviet complicity and responsibility for the war, which continues to be the subject of much debate. At a minimum, a finding of

some Soviet involvement or prior knowledge of the onset of hostilities would shed some light on Soviet perceptions of the risks to detente and superpower involvement that a renewal of hostilities would bring.

In order to grasp the question as a whole, one must again go back to Sadat's expulsion of Soviet advisors in 1972. The withholding of offensive weapons by the Soviets and their rejection of a military solution to the Middle East problem did not deter Sadat from his desire to go to war at any cost. The Soviets realized Sadat's determination and once again began increasing arms shipments including the more sophisticated SCUD missiles to Egypt (Golan, 1977:62-68). The Soviets hoped to regain some of their influence and temporary control to placate the Arabs. There was also some doubt in Soviet minds as to whether Sadat was really serious this time (Golan, 1977:67; Kissinger, 1982:461). Although the Soviets constantly emphasized the need for a political settlement, they also continued to report Israeli troop concentrations and aggressive intentions to the Arabs, as well as supplying both Egypt and Syria with arms (Rubinstein, 1977:183).

Golan (1977:63) reports that Sadat told the Soviets of the exact date of the war on October 3 (although Heykal places it at October 1), resulting in the Soviet evacuation of dependents between October 4-5. This could have been done for two reasons, firstly for the safety of Soviet citizens now that war was imminent, and secondly to attempt to signal some diplomatic distance from the war. A report by TASS (October 3) stated:

"The Soviet Union believed and believes that the road to detente and lasting peace in the Middle East is but one, through the complete liberation of Arab lands occupied by Israel in 1967...the essential condition is to therefore increase the economic and military potential of the Arabs. The Soviet Union will continue to give moral and political support and material aid to the Arab peoples." (Golan, 1977:65)

This report was probably in response to the increasing divergence of interests between Sadat and the Soviets over the issue of detente. Sadat felt that superpower adherence to detente would freeze the status quo which he so desperately wanted to change. As a result, Moscow's overall interest in remaining in the Middle East, presumably outweighed its opposition to war once informed of the Arab's intent. However, the Soviets reiterated to the Arabs not to expect direct Soviet intervention in a conflict unless the U.S. intervened first (Freedman, 1982:281).

Although some strongly believe the Soviets acted in collusion with the Arabs in 1973 as a result of the failure to warn the United States of impending conflict under the 1972 Basic Principles of U.S.-Soviet Relations and the continued supply of arms to the Arabs (Kohler et al., 1974), these actions do not necessarily translate into a forsaking of the 'rules of the game' under detente. The erosion of U.S. influence was still not a breach of detente per se. The Soviet Union could obviously not provide the type of explicit warning the U.S. expected under the 'Basic Principles' in such a situation without openly acknowledging Soviet complicity in its client's military preparations (Whetton, 1977:67).

Moscow was not necessarily part of a grand deception, rather it is assumed that they decided to keep their options open and go along for the moment to see what would happen (Rubinstein, 1977:183). The evacuation of Soviet personnel was known to both the Israelis and Americans but it was explained away as the result of a Soviet refusal to help Syria in their air battle with Israeli planes on September 13. It was thought that this had aggravated Soviet-Syrian tensions, presaging another possible expulsion of Soviets similar to the one fourteen months before. However, there was no formal Syrian request for this and no slow down in Soviet arms to Syria.

The signals given by the Soviets were generally weak and ambiguous in warning the Americans. This probably reflected the Kremlin's ambivalence - Moscow did not really want war but at the same time the Soviet leadership was not quite sure that it might benefit by allowing events to unfold. After all the invasion of Czechoslovakia had not prevented detente (Rubinstein:182).

Regardless of Soviet collusion in 1973, they did little to try and hold Sadat back in October (such as freezing arms shipments). The arrival of the more sophisticated, offensive SCUD missiles proved to be an important factor. It is difficult to believe that the significance and risks of the SCUD deployment was lost on the Kremlin:

1. In providing Egypt with this deterrent weapon, they were also enhancing the offensive potential of Egypt's existing force structure.
2. It recognized Sadat's resolve for war in his personally difficult but militarily compelling decision to permit Soviet personnel once again to control weapons on Egyptian soil.

3. Coming on top of the large quantities of weapons shipped since early 1973, the SCUDs could not help but encourage Sadat to believe he had Soviet backing, certainly for limited military objectives.

Once hostilities broke out the U.S. had two primary objectives (Quandt, 1977:181):

1. To end the hostilities as quickly as possible to prevent the superpowers being drawn into the risk of direct confrontation and;
2. To end the hostilities in such a manner that [sic] would contribute to the maximum extent possible to the promotion of a more permanent; more lasting peace in the Middle East.

Kissinger was apprehensive because in the absence of a rapid end to the war, the U.S. would have to rearm Israel and the Arabs would react by possibly embargoing oil and attacking American interests in the region. This could bring about direct American intervention and a collision with Soviet interests in the area. To try and avoid this, Kissinger and Nixon attempted to gain a ceasefire early.

Moscow also had several primary objectives at the start of hostilities:

1. To prevent the escalation of the war which might precipitate a Soviet-American military confrontation.
2. Limit those effects of the war (with its natural polarization of the international scene) detrimental to detente.
3. To derive all possible benefits from the action for the maintenance and future of Soviet interests in the Middle East (Golan, 1977:65).

To do this the Soviets needed a dualistic approach to the crisis. As with the Americans, the Soviets were interested in an early termination of hostilities. Another rout of Arab armies, this time with an even

greater threat to their capital cities than in 1967, would not be in Soviet interests either from the danger of intervention or from the point of view of Soviet prestige. Therefore, the Soviets as well as the Americans, expressed an immediate concern over escalation of the conflict and an interest in a ceasefire early in the war. However, this mutual desire was not translated into effective control of the crisis or an early ceasefire.

After the Arab successes on the first day, Moscow twice transmitted an alleged Syrian request for a ceasefire to Cairo. When the Israelis began their counter attack, Moscow was the medium for another such 'Syrian' request on October 9. Initial Soviet reaction may have been hesitant because of doubts that plagued Soviet leaders as to the capability of the Syrian and Egyptian armies to carry out their offensive successfully, even against an over-confident and poorly prepared Israel. The Soviets may have also had reservations because of the damage to detente that would ensue for the sake of a 'fickle' Arab ally (Rubinstein:145). Perhaps only after its clients were winning did the Soviets sense the possibility of furthering its interests in the area.

According to Nixon, despite Soviet overtures to end hostilities quickly, the Soviets objected to the U.S. calling the Security Council into session because they felt the Arabs would gain tremendous political advantages on the battlefield given enough time (1978:921). The Soviets dual policy of protecting detente and promoting self-interests was very much in evidence in the early days of the war. No assistance was

promised to the Arabs besides vocal support, and the emphasis on Soviet restraint continued through October 5-7 when Soviet ships left the battle zone and the Fifth Eskadra made no naval demonstrations. However, the Soviets were loyal to the Arabs in the Security Council. As well, the Soviets attempted to enlist the aid of other Arab states evidenced by Brezhnev's October 8 letter to Algerian President Boumedienne and other Arab leaders. In this way they were able to support their clients without becoming directly involved, thus maintaining their version of detente while, at the same time bolstering the Soviet's image to the Arabs.

Although Kissinger was angry at the Soviets because of their apparent 'violation' of the spirit of the Basic Principles agreement and their shipping of massive amounts of arms weeks before the war, he recognized that he needed their cooperation in establishing a framework for negotiation and containing the fighting (Kissinger, 1982:468). Initial estimates of an eventual Israeli victory once they fully mobilized coloured American decision-makers' perception of the ensuing developments (Kissinger:467; Nixon:921; Quandt, 1977:71). As a result, and in order to control the risks involved, the Americans were hesitant to increase their commitments to Israel at this time. By October 7-8 the initial Arab successes on the Sinai and the Golan Heights caused Kissinger to sense that the strategic balance was shifting away from them. However, he did not want to restore it immediately because of its possible benefits in causing a standstill, which Kissinger thought would promote greater room for negotiations in the post-war period (Sheehan, 1980:46).

• Towards this end Kissinger continued to withhold major military deliveries to Israel so long as the Soviets exercised restraint and so long as he hoped Sadat would accept a ceasefire. Even when the crisis deepened on October 10, Kissinger continued to use 'delays' in resupplying Israel. Kissinger claimed (1982:498) Schlesinger and the Pentagon were responsible for causing the delays. What appears to be slightly more credible is that the delays were part of Kissinger's overall 'game plan'. In this way he attempted to maintain his stature and credibility to both sides for his peace efforts. Following the war, he blamed the delays on something beyond his immediate control.

To this point, the superpowers were able to keep the risks low in order to obtain a ceasefire before events got out of hand and threatened their interests in the area. The Soviets were carefully observing events on the ground because they realized that while it was in Soviet interests to see their clients make some gains against Israel (and the U.S.), they were acutely aware that if Israel's survival was threatened, American reprisals would be swift. This is one explanation for the Soviet interest in a ceasefire in place. The Americans for that matter were convinced that Israel would either be victorious once they fully mobilized or, as Kissinger hoped, obtain a military standstill which would encourage post-war bargaining. To this end American decision-makers did not perceive an imminent threat to their interests at this point and aided in keeping the risks low by remaining in constant communication with the Soviets and only ordering one carrier of the Sixth Fleet east.

Initially the Soviets did not bother to put 'tattle tales' on the 'Roosevelt' which remained in the Western Mediterranean. However, on the 9th the Soviets did escalate its 'tattle tale' operations by using destroyers and cruisers in place of the normal surveillance ships. The formation of anti-carrier task groups was presumably done out of concern for the security of the massive resupply effort that Moscow was on the verge of mounting to Syria and Egypt. This show of force was maintained in part to lend credibility to the subsequent threats of intervention by the Soviets. Soviet combatants also reacted to Israeli threats to the lines of communication. After Israeli air and sea attacks at Latakia from October 10 to 12, in which several Soviet merchant ships were damaged and one sunk, Soviet warships sailed into the war zone off the Syrian coast to protect their air and sealift operation (Whetton, 1977:38; Herzog, 1982:283).

Threat to Intervene in Syria

Though not as dramatic or as critical as the threat to intervene in Egypt, the Syrian episode nonetheless emphasizes how the Soviets, when reacting to a threat to their interests, increased not only commitments of aid but also implied a tacit signal to intervene, thus increasing the risks involved for the superpowers.

By the close of October 7, the Syrians had made their maximum advance through the Golan Heights. There was no Soviet threat to intervene either during the Syrian attack or as the Israelis made their

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successful counter attack. However, three Soviet airborne divisions are thought to have been placed on advanced alert on the evening of October 10, after the Israelis had returned to the "Purple Line". This Israeli action now required a decision from them on whether to invade the territory of a Soviet client (Herzog:128-129). Between October 9-10, the Soviets began to mobilize a substantial air lift of military supplies to Damascus in response to a perceived turning point on the front and the possible ensuring threat this would pose to the Soviet client's possible survival (for resupply figures see Appendix F).

By October 13, when Israeli troops had reached the defensive lines shielding Damascus and the Syrian heartland, the advance staff of a Soviet Airborne division is said to have settled in Syrian military headquarters outside the capital, demonstrating "the probability that the Soviets would have intervened to prevent the Israeli capture of Damascus" (Herzog:130). The Soviets then conveyed to Kissinger the explicit warning that Soviet airborne forces were now on the alert to move for the defense of Damascus. By these actions and the fact that the Soviets alerted not only three Airborne divisions but also increased their 'tattle-tale' operations by changing surveillance ships with cruisers and destroyers, the degree of risk was raised to a point beyond that of 1967 and possibly 1970.

Golan (1977:85) claims that the Soviet threat also came as a result of the October 9 reports that Israel had shelled Damascus, killing several Soviet citizens when the Soviet cultural center was hit. However, Herzog (1982:136) states that there was no shelling of the

Syrian capital because it was not in Israel's interest to do so, recognizing credible Soviet interests in Damascus. The Israelis had not advanced beyond a point from which Damascus could be threatened by artillery fire as claimed by Golan.

As a result of the Soviet resupply effort to Syria and Sadat's refusal of the ceasefire on October 12, the U.S. began a full-scale airlift of military equipment to Israel on the 13th (see Sobel, 1974:101-102 for figures). The resulting increase in the risk of confrontation was due to both powers attempting to protect their respective clients by increasing the direct military assistance to them. Kissinger attempted this new strategy of releasing an immense amount of military supplies to Israel in order to end the war quickly. By doing this he would prove to the world that the conflict could not be decided by Soviet guns (Sheehan, 1980:49). Kissinger did, however, admit at a press conference on October 12, that the Soviet response was less incendiary and less geared to military threats than in 1967 (Sheehan, 1982:49; Golan, 1977:88; Kalb and Kalb, 1974:291). But the Soviet alert of Airborne troops and the level of its resupply effort served to increase the risk if the threat to Israel became more menacing.

The Soviets did show some restraint in an effort to save detente by not repeating Arab claims that American pilots were involved in the fighting and de-emphasizing the American resupply effort especially in the Soviet media (Golan, 1977:138). The Soviets disappointed Boumedienne at a meeting in Moscow October 14-15 by not increasing their level of aid significantly. It therefore appears at this point that while the

Soviets were increasing their commitments, detente was still in play and on the 16th they attempted another ceasefire to protect their client and Soviet interests.

By Nixon and Kissinger reacting to these events with an airlift, they implied they were prepared to take the risks associated in competing with the Soviets and angering the Arabs (resulting in the devastating oil embargo on the 18th). Nixon's speech of October 15th compared U.S. policy at present to Lebanon in 1958 and Jordan in 1970. This served to emphasize the value of interests at stake and the risks inherent in the present situation because in the former instance, American marines had been dispatched, and in the latter American intervention was threatened (Sobel, 1974:101).

Threat of Intervention in Egypt and the Alert

When Egyptian fortunes turned on October 13-14, especially after the massive tank battle on the Sinai, the Soviet Union began a massive air and sealoift to Cairo. Although this aspect of the crisis is better known it is also more complicated and led to the American DEFCON III alert. It resulted from the breakdown of the ceasefire 'imposed' by the superpowers which went into effect on October 22. This ceasefire, negotiated in Moscow by Kissinger and Brezhnev served to temporarily reduce the tension and the level of risk at the time. Coupled with Meir's promise not to violate the ceasefire and that Israel would take up a defensive position (as requested by Kissinger in their subsequent meeting in Tel Aviv) brought hope that the crisis was almost over. The

Egyptians were on the east bank of the canal, ten miles into the Sinai and the Israelis were on the west bank. At this point both sides could claim victory or maintain a deadlock, thus fitting Kissinger's plans perfectly. However, the balance was upset on October 23 and 24, when the Israelis took advantage of an outbreak of fighting on the Sinai to complete the encirclement of the Egyptian Third Army, even against American warnings against such action (Kissinger 1982:508-582).

Soviet efforts to establish the credibility of an intervention in this situation have been previously stated - the establishment of an airborne command, four more airborne divisions placed on heightened alert, the marshalling of air transport, and information suggesting the transmission of military orders to the troops on alert and finally Brezhnev's letter to the President, implying unilateral Soviet intervention to enforce the ceasefire. In attempting to prevent the complete routing of Egypt via the destruction of the Third Army and Israeli attacks on Cairo - now that Israel had also crossed the Suez - the Soviet Union increased the level of risk substantially to save their client. Initially they had attempted to do this by increasing military aid and diplomatic support, but now they were engaged in a competition in risk-taking that could lead to a direct confrontation with the Americans. The U.S. would never allow the Soviets to intervene unilaterally because of the threat such action would pose to Israel. In order to protect their own client, the U.S. would then also have to intervene, raising the probability of a direct confrontation almost to the point of certainty.

The breakdown of the ceasefire and the subsequent Soviet threat of intervention led to a dangerous confrontation when the U.S. responded with an alert of its strategic forces. At this point the primary American objective was to deter Soviet intervention and stalemate the tactical situation. The secondary aim was to signify to the belligerents, especially Israel, that the U.S. had larger interests at stake than their respective bargaining positions. Despite the high degree of risk involved, the U.S. indulged in a dangerous bout of 'brinkmanship' to which the inherent risks were well known to both sides. Nixon himself felt that this was the most serious crisis since the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 (1978:926). Kissinger called off a trip to China when intelligence informed him that there was a sharp and sudden drop off in the number of Soviet planes carrying military supplies to Egypt and Syria (implying their new use as troop carriers), and that signals had been picked up from the Ukraine indicating a number of Soviet army and logistical units had been put on alert. This, coupled with the previous signals, strongly suggested the credibility of Brezhnev's threat.

To understand why Kissinger called an alert and to assess the risk involved in such action, a closer examination of the interpretation of the Soviet threat to intervene must be undertaken. One supposition postulates (McConnell:274) that the Soviet Union, whatever its misgivings, really did contemplate intervention. However, as a threat to intervene on the Canal front, it lacked credibility from the standpoint of both capabilities and political will. As Durch and others detail (1979:336), Soviet airborne divisions are well-equipped to hold a fixed

objective such as Cairo or Damascus, but they would be handicapped in combat on the Canal front, which demands a greater battlefield mobility and sustainability. While an Israeli move on Cairo was a distinct possibility (Whetton 1977:44), the transformation of a Soviet airborne show of force in the U.S.S.R. into an air-borne politico-military intervention in the neighborhood of Cairo - which is what this interpretation implies - does not necessarily translate into the same thing. This is what a Soviet presence in the canal zone would have had far greater danger of implying. In other words, one threat of combat action would have been followed by another threat of combat action, not by combat action itself. This is true even if Brezhnev, relying on the credibility of his forces in a point defense of Cairo, could have positioned them there hoping for a political impact at a distance that would pressure Tel Aviv into acceptable behaviour on the Canal.

The political will may not have been enough either, to intervene on the Canal. Asked whether the Russians really would have come in, Dayan argued, "not over the Third Army but definitely over Cairo or Aswan" (Sheehan, 1976:37). In both the June and October wars, Soviet threats to intervene in Syria had not come with the Israeli seizure of the Golan Heights or the territory immediately beyond, but with the threat to Damascus itself and the Syrian heartland. It has been argued that the Soviets got their way in the October confrontation basically because it was Washington's way also (Kalb and Kalb, 1974:487). Kissinger wanted to save Egypt, but he wanted it for himself in order to aid American postwar negotiations.

A second possibility, which may be more credible, is that Brezhnev's note and military action was aimed at strengthening Kissinger's hand in stopping Israel. Moscow put on a supportive show of force, not in support of its own client, as is the usual case, but in support of the other superpower. Washington's responses, including the military alert are said to have been tailored to accord with both interpretations of Soviet motivation; compellant and supportive, aimed at Israel as much as the Soviet Union. The sharp increase in risk at this point was necessary to convince Israel that further provocations would have greater implications for American interests beyond the immediate hostilities (Whetton, 1977:49; Sheehan, 1978:38). It was felt that Israel would not believe a Soviet threat or apparently to credit Kissinger with believing it. Hence the U.S. alert was needed as an expressive show of force, to lend credibility to the seriousness of the situation. Regardless of the appearance of a controlled escalation the inherent risks were present due to many factors including the use of dangerously risky coercive signals from both the Soviets and the Americans which could promote uncertainty and misinterpretation.

None of the key participants in the crisis took the possibility of nuclear war seriously, but that does not detract from the role played by the risk of nuclear war in resolving the crisis (Blechman and Hart, 1982). Both sides drew attention to the dangers of confrontation and the U.S. emphasized its stakes in the situation by manipulating this risk. The U.S. was prepared to get involved in an interactive escalation process with unknown but possibly devastating results if the Soviets

were to land troops in Egypt. Therefore, the U.S. and for that matter the Soviet Union, by their actions were demonstrating and making credible the stakes they perceived threatened in the situation. It should be noted here that the tacit norm that legitimizes military intervention by a superpower in Arab-Israeli conflicts is limited to certain extreme contingencies in which intervention is clearly needed to assure the survival of a regional ally or client (George, 1983:377). This does not however, lessen the risk involved in such action.

The overall Soviet objective was to prevent the deterioration of the Arab position to a point which severely threatened its client's survival, at which point they might be called upon to intervene. They also attempted to reap what benefits they could from the conflict, for example the oil embargo against the west. Their behaviour appears to have been a major factor in ultimately and seriously jeopardizing detente and cooperation with the U.S.

What Soviet involvement there was in the war and the escalation of this involvement was in fact less a result of a Soviet-Israeli confrontation than a function of Soviet-American signalling and maneuvering designed to influence the course of events on the battlefield (Golan, 1974:21). This demonstrates how the dynamics of a local crisis can draw the superpowers into a 'competition in risk-taking'. As there is evidence of controlled competition in 1967 and 1970, one may postulate that the actions by the superpowers in 1973 were controlled and the crisis successfully managed. Although Kissinger himself admits that the nuclear alert was extreme and may have been an overreaction

(Kalb and Kalb:298), he also believed there was a seventy-five percent chance of Soviet intervention if Israel did not stop. As such, the U.S. could not have allowed such a substantial shift in the balance of power in the Middle East and the transplanting of superpower rivalry into the region. Therefore a substantial increase in the level of risk was to some degree necessary to convey American determination to resist unilateral moves by the Soviets and as a tacit signal to the Israelis to ease their stranglehold on the Third Army (Kissinger, 1982:587-610).

Thus, both powers were essentially reacting to events rather than controlling them as in the case of the threat of Soviet intervention and the U.S. response of the alert. In this way, as the Soviets perceived a threat to their interests, they reacted with air and sealift commitments and threats to intervene. This posed a counter threat to American interests thus resulting in an increase in their own commitments to its clients and the alert.³ It can be argued that a competition in risk-taking did, in fact, ensue, brought about by the actions of third parties, despite the shared objective of avoiding a confrontation and protecting detente.

Again one can speculate as to the further increase in risk if Israel had continued on to Cairo. While this was improbable, the possibility still existed. As with 1970, the sheer number of naval vessels in close proximity also greatly increased the risk by 'accidents' or miscalculation. Ultimately Moscow put into the Mediterranean enough units to form anti-carrier groups for each of the three aircraft carriers and two helicopter carriers deployed by the U.S.

towards the end of the crisis. Although it appears that the superpowers engaged in calculated risk-taking, the credibility of verbal threats were backed by physical actions that went beyond those of 1967 and 1970.

Synthesis

In essence what this proposition has analyzed evolves around the question of what major considerations influence each superpower's willingness to risk a direct confrontation with each other. It appears that a state calculates its interests and assesses what it has to gain if its projected actions are successful or what it has to lose by inaction. The greater the value placed on an objective, the more unlikely it is that the state will refrain from policies that put it in direct competition with its rival.

A state also assesses the risks of war involved in the projected action and the extent to which these are regarded as controllable. In cases such as the Middle East crises, the patrons may or may not have confidence in their ability to control a crisis situation but they may have little alternative to becoming involved given the importance of their interests and objectives as well as the autonomous actions of their clients. This highlights the basic contradiction of the superpower's Middle East objectives: the need to protect and enhance their influence in the area versus the need to avoid a direct confrontation with the other superpower.

An inverse relationship could be at work here between the assessment of the probability of disaster should a crisis erupt and the

propensity to risk provoking a confrontation in the first place. By manipulating risk a decision maker can undertake coercive actions to generate a greater risk that the conflict bargaining will surpass a threshold at which management becomes difficult if not impossible (Lockhart, 1979:68). This is a tenuous situation when both parties have central interests at stake; here neither party will back down on what is perceived as the crux of the problem even if the alternative is increasing commitments, thus escalating the conflict. The manipulation of risk is not a technique to be applied without reference to its political objectives (Maxwell, 1968:13). Kahn (1965:3) claims that what is crucial to the increase in the propensity to take risks is the amount of value put on the disputed objective. There will be corresponding increases in risk-taking to protect a state's interests if they are perceived to be threatened. As with the crises analyzed, risk was increased in the crises as the elements of crisis bargaining became more coercive and conflictual as opposed to cooperative.

The best way of convincing an opponent of one's resolve according to Ikle (1967:62) is by making commitments that both threaten to inflict costs on the adversary and that leaves something to chance, i.e. engage in some form of risk-taking behaviour. These can be substantially reinforced by increases in commitments. Another way to demonstrate one's risk-taking resolve is to take dramatic and forceful actions that involve a profound escalation in the crisis (the rationality of irrationality argument). Therefore as both Maxwell (1968:13) and Osgood (1967:48) argue, the greater the interests involved in a conflict, the greater the risk that power is willing to take.

The danger of an Arab-Israeli conflict is one which most directly threatens to bring the superpowers into direct action given the degree of their involvement and respective commitments to the survival of the participating belligerents. Ultimately, the realistic aim on both sides, is not to maximize gains but to reduce losses even though it may not start out that way. The patron threatening intervention is limiting the losses of not only its client against the other client but also for itself. The countering patron is limiting the scope of the threat to its client by the other patron, as well as to its own interests.

Although it is obvious that neither superpower would allow the total collapse of its client state or states, the limits of tolerance below this level are not well defined. The extent to which each superpower is prepared to tolerate gains by the ally of the other superpower is something that not only differs from one Arab-Israeli conflict to the next, but also fluctuates during the hostilities as well. While the patrons are aware of these dangers, their attempt at limiting the objectives of the clients and controlling them often prove futile except by increasing the level of risk involved. Thus, even the possible benefits derived from such conflicts convey risks if the competition leads to the increased probability of a direct superpower confrontation.

Therefore, it appears this analysis has substantiated the first proposition to some degree. An actor's interests do affect its risk-taking behaviour such that the greater the perceived threat to those interests, the greater the actors propensity to take risks.

NOTES

1. "An article in Pravda for September 17, 1970 expressed the assessment of U.S. policy, which appears to have underlined the Soviet and Egyptian strategy:

In the U.S. today bifurcation in the approach to the Middle East conflict is having more influence than ever before. On the one hand Zionist circles, backed by banks and many newspapers, are exerting an influence on government policy; on the other hand there are a considerable number of the monopolies connected with Middle East petroleum which fears for their interests in the Arab countries. Moreover, further inducement in the Middle East conflict at a time when the U.S. position in Indochina is continually becoming more complex, cannot fail to alarm American public opinion.

In this situation, Nixon's administration has deemed it useful to adopt positions which are a little more realistic regarding reaching an agreement on a Middle East ceasefire." V. Mayevskiy, "The Pharisees", (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report vol. III, The Soviet Union, September 17, 1970, p. A30, as quoted in Dismukes and McConell, 1979:216 n.20).

2. While some argue the reports of nuclear material on way to Egypt via a Soviet ship for possible use on the SCUD missiles was an important factor, these reports did not come in until after the alert had been called.
3. Although it was Israel that was on the defensive and suffering losses during the first few days of the war, the U.S. did not respond to protect their client mainly because both Kissinger and Nixon as well as the other key decision makers involved believed Israel would be recouping these losses and change the course of battle once they fully mobilized.

CHAPTER 4

THE MILITARY BALANCE AND RISK-TAKING

Proposition 2

"The military balance between the actors will influence their risk-taking propensities, such that the greater the margin of superiority over ones opponent, the less willing that opponent will be to engage in risk-acceptant behaviour."

The main tenet of this second proposition examines the degree to which a superpower's global, and regional level capabilities, affect its risk-taking propensities. The strategic nuclear balance and doctrine¹ along with the regional capabilities of the superpowers will be examined in relation to the three Middle East crises. What is of particular importance at the regional level involves the two powers' ability to deploy forces in the region, especially the main instrument of coercion - their respective naval fleets.

The Strategic Balance

Kinter and Schwarz (1965) have argued that the military balance, especially at the nuclear level, has a profound influence on the course and outcome of superpower crises. Not only were superpower crises contests of power, but in these contests, strategic superiority was the vital ingredient, ensuring a favourable outcome for the states involved. Assertions made by this type of analysis however, should be regarded with some caution. These arguments have much to do with the dilemmas

inherent in the arms race, especially as it applies to the value of deterrence. For those who advocate an attempt in both Washington and Moscow either to obtain or to maintain a position of overwhelming nuclear superiority, this argument about crises is a useful one. If it can be demonstrated that strategic predominance endows its owner with significant advantages in superpower confrontations, then the case for strategic superiority will be substantially reinforced. However, one must be aware that such analysis dealing with crises bargaining and risk-taking may be shaped by more tenuous extraneous considerations.

With the attainment of relative nuclear parity with the United States in the late 1960's and early 1970's, the Soviet Union's increased capability also brought questions about its effects on both Soviet and American risk-taking during superpower confrontations. Ra'anan claims that the Soviets' risk-taking propensity was given a substantial boost, while that of Washington underwent a corresponding reduction. He argues that parity provided the Soviet Union with options that were unavailable to it before and that consequently Moscow was likely to become far more risk-acceptant (Ra'anan, 1972). In support of this it was postulated that in earlier confrontations with the U.S., the Soviets were almost invariably bargaining and negotiating from weakness. They were far more cautious and restrained in their behaviour than would have been necessary had the strategic balance been less unfavourable. Brzezinski also suggests that in 1962, acute awareness of the inadequacies of the Soviet nuclear posture not only made Khrushchev withdraw the missiles, but also rendered possible counter-moves elsewhere out of the question (Brzezinski, 1971:8-12).

Brzezinski postulated that with the arrival of relative parity, Soviet leaders knew that the United States now faced destruction of the same magnitude as themselves, and their self-confidence was significantly enhanced. In other words, Soviet risk-taking propensities during international crises were seen by Brzezinski and Ra'nan as a direct function of the nuclear balance between the superpowers.

Although this interpretation may be very compelling, its basic premise is suspect. It appears from the present analysis that other considerations may affect the relative risk-taking propensities of the two superpowers in areas outside their respective blocs, other than the hair-splitting, discriminating calculations about the strategic balance. Such analysis of 'accepted casualty levels' that each superpower would likely suffer in a nuclear exchange is less influential than the sentiment echoed by McGeorge Bundy (Coffey, 1971:49):

"A decision that would bring even one hydrogen bomb on one city of one's own country would be recognized in advance as a catastrophic blunder, ten bombs on ten cities would be a disaster beyond history, and a hundred bombs on a hundred cities are unthinkable."

Thus, the suggestion that somehow nuclear war becomes less abhorrent once the opponent is as vulnerable as oneself does not carry conviction. Nuclear holocaust will hardly be an attractive option even to the side that has the apparent capacity to 'win'. So long as neither superpower regards nuclear war with equanimity, therefore, it appears the strategic balance is unlikely to be the major determinant of either side's risk-taking propensity.

Debate has also surrounded the issue of whether emphasis should be put on conventional or nuclear weaponry. The debate seemed to come about following the Cuban missile crisis and the subsequent Soviet removal of the missiles. On one side were those like General LeMay who argued that superior U.S. strategic power, coupled with the obvious will and ability to apply this power was the major factor in forcing the Soviets to back down (Kaufmann, 1964:273). Others, such as General Wheeler and Secretary of Defense McNamara emphasized the conventional advantages as being decisive. They claimed that nuclear forces, while not irrelevant, were in the background. In other words, the "non-nuclear forces were our sword: our nuclear forces were our shield" (Kaufmann:273).

Adomeit (1982:338-339) in his concluding remarks on the relationship between the balance of forces and risk-taking, states that it is unwise to establish artificial correlations in the strategic sphere alone. As opposed to Ra'anan, he claims that mechanistic correlations of American and Soviet strategic power with the evolution of post-World War II Soviet foreign policy yields the false conclusion that 'military-strategic inferiority' induces risk-taking and 'military-strategic parity' induces restraint. He remarks that:

"What is evidently necessary is to see strategic power in conjunction with conventional power, the global balance together with the local or regional balance and to consider tactical or theater nuclear weapons along with strategic nuclear weapons." (Adomeit, 1982:339).

Adomeit admits, however, that risk-taking is not affected to a large degree by moderate changes in the respective arsenals, so long as

a credible second strike capability still exists. He concludes that it would be fair to assume that political leaders on both sides, would be restrained in their willingness to use force, even at low levels, by the realization that to drift into large-scale war would have been a catastrophic mistake. For this reason the concept of military superiority or "supremacy" is likely to be of little operational value in crises unless this superiority is clear cut in all categories of military power (Adomeit, 1982:339).

Adomeit's comments may clearly demonstrate the relevance of the military balance and its relationship to risk-taking in Europe as a necessary but not sufficient condition. However, it may be questionable, after examining the three Middle East crises, whether the same can be said for superpower confrontations involving clients in an area of uncertain or disputed symmetry (George, 1983:385).

The sensitivity of the United States and the Soviet Union to the conditions of the central balance in Europe may have driven them to other areas in order to enhance their prestige and standing. While the U.S.-Soviet rivalry in the Middle East is a function of their competing power positions, it is but one factor. Their regional interests and respective client's behaviour could also have a substantial effect on affecting superpower actions. The governments of these Middle Eastern states, however, were keenly aware of the benefits of superpower diplomatic assistance, the value of economic and military aid and of politico-military support in preserving their authority against domestic and foreign enemies (Dismukes, 1979:47). As a result of this

superimposition of bloc on regional rivalry, the analytical construct of competing 'patrons' and 'clients' was developed.

While the Soviet Union may have used its growing strategic power in the 1960's to pursue more active policies in the region, these activities continued when it was apparent that the U.S. had undisputed strategic nuclear superiority. Even in June 1967, the United States still enjoyed strategic superiority over the Soviet Union in terms of the number of deliverable nuclear missiles (McNamara had even gone as far as to suggest that the ratio was possibly 1:3 or 1:4 in favour of the U.S. (Evron, 1973:144). Soviet strategic inferiority in 1967 did not prevent them from encouraging Nasser with arms shipments before the crisis or from augmenting their naval forces with war in the Middle East imminent. This indicated an evolutionary step in Soviet doctrine. There was apparently less concern before the conflict that a local confrontation might rapidly escalate into a global exchange. Moscow was less cautious and seemed to have a more liberal interpretation of a 'low' risk policy in the nuclear age. However, once hostilities began, Soviet behaviour was limited to verbal pronouncements in support of their clients. Although the Soviets were again somewhat risk-acceptant in verbally threatening intervention on June 10, the level of risk remained relatively low as long as Israel stopped fighting. The Soviets may have realized that further risk-acceptant behaviour could have resulted in direct confrontation once the U.S. had signalled its resolve and commitments to protect Israel from any harm as a result of Soviet actions.

The U.S. attempted to keep the risks under control throughout the initial stages of the crisis. However, they did respond to the Soviet threat of intervention by physically turning the Sixth Fleet toward the war zone, thus posing a threat to any Soviet intervention. In so doing, the U.S. was accepting the risk such an escalatory move entailed.

The strategic nuclear power of the United States and the Soviet Union had very little influence except in encouraging greater caution. It is not likely that either country would have been willing to increase the calculated risk of a nuclear showdown by more coercive actions. However, as with 1970 and 1973, in spite of hot-line and other diplomatic exchanges and cautious movements of forces, doubt of intentions existed throughout the crises. Autonomous risks of unintended consequences as a result of misunderstanding were increased by the close proximity of forces and client intransigence.

By 1970, the Soviets had attained a relative measure of parity with the United States. They overtook the U.S. in the number of their ICBMs and in total megatonnage, while still remaining inferior in the number of their Polaris-type missiles, the number of heavy bombers serving as a delivery system for nuclear weapons and in the total number of warheads (The Military Balance, 1971/72). But as Evron (1973:144) and others (Freedman, 1982:215) rightfully postulate, these margins lost their relevance to strategic stability as both superpowers had achieved a significant second-strike capability.

The existence of relative parity in nuclear capability did not appear to affect the risk-taking propensities of the superpowers except, as in 1967, to induce caution. Once again it appears that a threat to the interests of a superpower was the stimulus for calculated risk-taking behaviour. The augmentation of both fleets with its accompanying risk of confrontation, the credible U.S. 'umbrella' guarantee given to Israel during the Jordanian crisis, the involvement of Soviet advisors on the Syrian-Jordanian border and the American semi-alert of particular forces, all seem to have been taken in spite of the global nuclear balance. One other point that should be mentioned is the fact that the alert of American forces also carried with it an implied nuclear threat against the Soviets. This signal not only emphasized the importance of the events unfolding in Jordan for the U.S., but it also served to increase the risks if the situation precluded Israeli intervention.

As with the previous two crises, the October war of 1973 was again the forum for an episode of Soviet-American risk-taking behaviour. While aspects of the crisis appeared controlled such as the naval maneuvers of the respective fleets, the use of the hot-line and the attempts to negotiate a successful ceasefire demonstrated, the superpowers engaged in an intense competition in risk-taking. The credible Soviet threats of intervention and subsequent alert of their Airborne Troops, coupled with increased American naval activity and the global alert, combined to manifest the risks in that crisis to a degree far greater than in 1967 or 1970.

The existence of credible second strike capabilities and substantial nuclear arsenals on both sides again acted as a constraint on superpower behaviour. However, patron interests in the region coupled, with client intransigence drew the superpowers, as in 1967 and 1970, into increasing their risk-taking behaviour despite the nuclear threat. Thus, it appears that this competition in risk-taking had less to do with the strategic balance and more to do with the manipulation of the nuclear risk.

Therefore, while the strategic balance acted as a shared constraint on superpower behaviour during the three crises it cannot be claimed that it prevented them from taking risks. Although the proposition stated that the actor in the more inferior military position would be less likely to engage in risk-acceptant behaviour, it appears that from a strategic level the proposition can not be substantiated. In spite of American superiority in 1967, the U.S. did embark upon some low level risk-taking despite their client being in the predominant position. The Soviets on the other hand, were somewhat risk-acceptant, especially immediately prior to the outbreak of hostilities and in threatening intervention on behalf of its clients. However, both powers did engage in risk-avoidant behaviour in searching for a ceasefire. It thus appears that other, more complex variables influenced superpower behaviour, rendering the proposition impossible to substantiate.

In 1970, with relative strategic parity in play, the Soviets remained somewhat cautious, moderately increasing the level of risk only as a signal to limit American action against its client, Syria. The U.S.

however, was more risk-acceptant in its behaviour with the alerts and guarantee to Israel. A major factor in explaining this could be the fact that their client was on the defensive, therefore regardless of the strategic balance, the U.S. had to protect Hussein. Despite continued hesitation and reluctance to get involved, American interests were perceived to be threatened.

The competition in risk-taking which occurred in 1973 came at a time of nuclear parity as well. Both powers, perceiving a threat to their interests however, increased the risks in spite of the overhanging nuclear shadow. The fact that no clear-cut strategic superiority existed in 1970 and 1973 makes it difficult to assess the impact of the nuclear balance on the risk-taking propensities of the superpowers. However, aside from the tempering influence of nuclear weapons, it appears that a threat to a patron's interests and the relative positions of their clients continued to have a much greater effect than the strategic military balance in drawing the superpowers into a regional conflict. An examination of the more regional military balance is now necessary in order to analyze further the effects on the actors' risk-taking propensities.

The Regional Balance

For the United States the Vietnam war posed serious problems of overcommitment and reduced strength during a protracted crisis or war in another region of the world. This was especially true in regards to the events of 1967. The Commander of the U.S. Marine Corps at the time

described shortages of helicopters and pilots, lower experience levels and reduced battalion strength in the Mediterranean. Growing reluctance to consider utilization of tactical nuclear weapons in limited war situations had increased the importance of relative strength in conventional arms compared with earlier years of the cold war. Such reluctance was mainly due to an improving Soviet credible second strike capability, decreased public support and a heightened awareness of the difficulties in utilizing such weapons. The Administration felt that a 'firebreak' must be preserved between conventional and nuclear weapons to prevent the escalation of a local conflict to large-scale nuclear war (Howe, 1971:34; Enthoven, 1965:120-124). However, both Howe and Enthoven emphasized that in any confrontation with the Soviet Union, American strategic superiority would provide additional confidence.

In considering the deployment of force in the Middle East, the status of the Sixth Fleet was an important factor. The strong Mediterranean fleet consisted of some fifty ships, 25,000 men and two hundred aircraft. The major strike force was centered around two attack aircraft carriers. In addition there was an amphibious capability to land a battalion of marines (approximately 2,000 men). However, the fleet was operating at reduced strength in 1967, particularly in its amphibious and anti-submarine warfare capability. Since the first year of heavy American involvement in Vietnam, there were no helicopters with the Sixth Fleet and no ASW carrier in the Mediterranean; both of which were essential for a modern day amphibious assault (Howe:75). In light of Soviet submarine strength, the absence of a special ASW group was a serious military shortcoming. In addition a number of important radar

systems were inoperative in both fleet task forces (see U.S. Congress, Senate, Worldwide Military Commitments 1966-67). In spite of these deficiencies, however, the Sixth Fleet remained the dominant naval force in the Mediterranean.

Meanwhile, Moscow had been maintaining a fleet of some ten surface ships including the oilers and supply vessels necessary to sustain the force in the Mediterranean since 1965. At the beginning of May 1967, the capabilities of Fifth Eskadra were very limited (Lewis, 1976:59-72). As previously mentioned, it had no surface combatants of destroyer size or larger since the cruiser and three destroyers that had deployed for an exercise in March had departed before the end of April. The Eskadra was not further reinforced during May once the gun cruiser 'Slava' and a Kashin-class SAM destroyer entered the Mediterranean May 12.

By June 3-4, the major combat reinforcements - two SSM destroyers, a SAM destroyer and a gun destroyer - had arrived. The Soviets did not further increase the number of surface combatants operating with the Eskadra during the crisis, presumably because the U.S. did not augment the Sixth Fleet. As a consequence, the maximum surface strength of the Fifth Eskadra during June was twenty-seven ships, roughly double its prewar level. The number of cruisers and destroyers increased sharply, rising from two to seven. These were apparently deployed in a formation weakly resembling anti-carrier task groups to match each of the Sixth Fleet carrier groups and were composed of SSM and SAM surface units as well as cruise missile and torpedo-attack submarines.

On the surface side, the Soviet contingent was qualitatively deficient by later standards. Although the Black Sea Fleet had a Kynda-class cruiser equipped with SSN-3 anti-ship missiles, the only cruiser in the Mediterranean before June 28 was the gun-equipped 'Slava' a unit of the Kirov class launched in 1939. 'Jane's' had been reporting for some years that the 'Slava' was nothing more than a 'training hulk' and was probably less than entirely combat ready (Wells, 1979:161). Rather than SSM cruisers, the augmentation forces included a Kildin and a Krupnyy-class destroyer armed with the SSN-1 cruise missile, a first generation anti-ship weapon which was cumbersome and probably not very reliable. However, the behaviour of the Eskadra was unprecedented and the Soviets may have felt its military capabilities were sufficient to ensure that it would not be ignored.

Table 5: LARGE SOVIET COMBATANTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN - 1967

	CRUISERS			DESTROYERS			TOTAL
	SSM	ASW	GUN	SSM	SAM	GUN	
4/1 - 4/15	-	-	1	-	1	2	4
4/16 - 4/19	-	-	-	-	1	2	3
4/20 - 5/5	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
5/6 - 5/11	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
5/12 - 5/30	-	-	1	-	1	-	2
5/31 - 6/2	-	-	1	-	1	1	3
6/3	-	-	1	1	2	2	6
6/4 - 6/17	-	-	1	2	2	2	7
6/18 - 6/21	-	-	2	2	3	3	10
6/22	-	-	1	2	2	3	8

Notes: The left-hand column gives the dates between which Soviet surface forces were at the indicated levels. For the purposes of this chapter, large Soviet surface combatants are grouped as follows:

SSM Cruiser : Kynda, Kresta I (all also have SAM)
 ASW Cruiser : Kresta II, Kara (all also have SAM)
 GUN Cruiser : Sverlov (including GLG and CC)
 SSM Destroyer: Kildin, Krupnyy, Mod-Kildin, Mod-Kashin
 SAM Destroyer: Kashin, SAM-Kotlin, Kanin
 GUN Destroyer: Kitlin, Skoryy

(Source: Dismukes and McConnell, 1979:161)

Table 6: TOTAL BLACK SEA FLEET SURFACE - SHIP
ORDER OF BATTLE MAY - JUNE 1967
(Including Units Deployed)

SSM Cruiser	1 Kynda
GUN Cruiser	4 Sverdlov 1 Chapayev 1 Kirov
SSM Destroyer	2 Krupnyy 2 Kildin
SAM Destroyer	5 Kashin 1 SAM Kotlin
GUN Destroyer	7 Kotlin 9 Skoryy

(Source: Dismukes and McConnell, 1979:162.)

The question of naval bases is quite relevant to the situation of the Soviet Fleet in the Mediterranean, especially with their lack of carrier protection. The Soviet squadron appeared to have developed by this time a capacity to operate to some degree without need of shore bases for repairs and maintenance. But for a credible deterrent (and compellent) they must have bases to provide air cover, and it is this requirement that motivates any Soviet search for shore bases rather than facilities for supply and maintenance. Until their expulsion from Egypt in 1972, Soviet planes could give some air cover to the Mediterranean fleet (Evron, 1973:148).

The Institute of Strategic Studies declared that a small but modern Soviet amphibious capability had also been developed and they estimated that as of June 1967, there was a "small Marine Corps of perhaps 6,000 men, units of which were stationed with all four fleets"

(The Military Balance, 1967-68:8). There were a few landing ships already in the Mediterranean at the time of the crisis, but these were not thought to have made any contribution during the war nor to have been a significant force. While the Fifth Eskadra was no match for the Sixth Fleet, one can contemplate whether the Eskadra's strength was sufficient to be a formidable challenge to the American fleet. In two respects it was: firstly, there were between ten to twelve Soviet submarines in the area and secondly, several ships were equipped with surface to surface missiles in the eastern Mediterranean (Howe:49). Although the Soviets only had a small force available for actual intervention, they had enough strength to present a formidable obstacle to the Sixth Fleet even if they could not completely counter-balance its forces.

Because of the strain of Vietnam it was predicted that the U.S. could not carry out a sustained action for more than a limited period and that mobilization would be required for any protracted conflict (U.S. Congress, Senate, Conflicts between U.S. Capabilities and Foreign Commitments, 1967). However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that even with a war in Vietnam, sufficient forces existed to execute its "Mideast Contingency Plan". The Atlantic fleet had an attack carrier and an ASW carrier in immediately deployable readiness and within two weeks the U.S. could have put into action four carrier task forces and a marine Expeditionary Brigade (U.S. Congress, Senate, Conflicts, 1967).

The Sixth Fleet could have played a limited role without any preliminary reinforcements but its effectiveness would have been small

in any direct support of Israel. Because of the status of the military establishment, it would seem safe to assume that reserves would have been called up if Washington had intended to prepare for a major intervention on behalf of Israel in the event that Israel itself was threatened. Failure to do so was a result of initial Israeli victories and military strength together and was further evidence of Washington's desire to avoid any military involvement. At the same time, however, the Sixth Fleet represented a credible deterrent to Soviet intervention.

It appeared Washington wanted to avoid a confrontation with Moscow, but it did not shy away from it. It could be argued that the President had an unrealistic conception of the power realities when he ordered the Sixth Fleet toward Syria. It is believed, though, that the capability for countering a Soviet action would have been enhanced by firmer domestic support and more positive allied backing (Howe:134). Paradoxically, Soviet intervention would have been a more severe military challenge but in some ways easier to cope with. If the Soviet Union intended to intervene on June 10, 1967, it probably planned to confine its move to a show of strength behind the battle lines, while a likely American response would have been to initially airlift logistic and supply forces to Israel as a show of commitment.

A Soviet move to intervene would have given the conflict a global dimension. Instead of U.S. military power being engaged in a peripheral challenge, it would be concentrated on the main adversary. It is difficult to conceive that a direct clash between American and Soviet forces in the Middle East would not rapidly escalate to a world war.

Although it could be argued that this likelihood could impose sufficient restraint to keep it localized, this argument appears somewhat optimistic.

With the conventional capability of the Soviet navy oriented toward combat at sea rather than against the shore, it could protect the flow of supplies to Soviet clients for use against clients of the United States. It could also inhibit American intervention from the sea against Soviet clients. It could not, however, effectively operate inland against Western clients. Lacking significant shipboard air and amphibious capabilities for power projection ashore, Moscow had to rely for quick reaction in this aspect, on its Airborne Troops, using the navy mainly for maintaining their sea and air lifeline back to the U.S.S.R.

Presumably as a result of deliberate scheduling, the airborne forward area force matured concomitantly with those of the Navy. By the mid-1960's the Soviets probably had the capability for the simultaneous military airlift over long distances of one and later of two airborne divisions. It is evident that it was no accident that, only after 1965 (tending to confirm the estimated timing of the Soviet adoption of a limited war doctrine) did discussions begin simultaneously of the Navy's role in local war and the airborne capability for long range independent operations with implications for intervention outside the theater war context (Dismukes and McConnell, 1979:23).

Moscow's threat of intervention may not have been credible at the time, but American decision-makers took the threat seriously, especially in light of the possible threat to a Soviet client's survival. It may be assumed that if Israel had continued, the Soviets would have alerted their Airborne troops thus making any threat of intervention more credible and concomitantly increasing the risks of escalation. Johnson's decision to demonstrate American resolve did not, therefore, appear to be based on unrealistic assessments of capabilities despite problems of overcommitment. U.S. strategic and local superiority would still predominate in a brief confrontation.

The problem remains however, that the local balance of conventional forces of the superpowers is only partially relevant since an actual attack on the Sixth Fleet would probably lead to an escalation involving a full-scale global exchange (this remains speculative), especially in light of the Sixth Fleet's nuclear capability. According to Howe (1971:49) the Soviets appeared to be hoping to neutralize the Sixth Fleet, but it was doubtful that they would have risked a third world war. The principal military and diplomatic strategy of both superpowers in 1967, was to deter the other side from a direct military intervention in the Middle East. Howe goes on to claim that although such reasoning remains speculative, it appears that Moscow decided that a carefully controlled low-risk crisis in the Middle East would bolster sagging Soviet prestige in their existing spheres of influence. However, while their relative risk-acceptant behaviour immediately prior to the war may have been tampered during the initial states of the conflict, it was Israeli military actions in threatening Damascus which influenced

the Soviets to escalate the risks. While threatening intervention was a calculated risk, it also increased the more autonomous risks. Thus, regardless of the asymmetry in balance of power in 1967, the Soviets were indeed risk-acceptant, although at a moderate level, in order to save a Soviet client from humiliation.

1 While the U.S. appeared to be in the most favourable strategic and tactical position in regards to military strength in 1967, there is little evidence that this alone affected their risk-taking behaviour. Soviet inferiority also did not appear to be the main deciding factor in their relatively risk-acceptant behaviour. What the strategic nuclear balance did, however, was act as a shared constraint on both parties, while the regional conventional levels influenced the determinations of credibility for any threat to intervention and limited the spectrum of actions open to each superpower.

Along with the calculated risks of escalation, the autonomous risks inherent in close surveillance or 'tattle-tale' tactics were also increased. These tactics serve two functions for the Soviets: to inform Soviet command authorities of western force movements and activities during peacetime and to give targeting information on these forces in case of war. With American carrier's residual nuclear strike capability, information on their movements also has strategic value. However, during this crisis and later ones, these tactics had a more important diplomatic value, since carrier movements can give insight into U.S. intentions.

The Soviets also acquired three advantages in replacing auxiliaries with combatants in the 'tattle-tale' role. It makes it less likely that the carrier can elude the shadowing ship through evasive or high-speed maneuvering; it increases the immediate military threat to the carrier; and it expresses increased Soviet interest, both military and political, in the force being shadowed. In later crises, including 1970 and 1973, the Soviets not only placed combatant tattle-tales near U.S. carriers, but also on occasion, moved cruise-missile units into firing range, increasing the threat posed to the carriers (Wells, 1979:164). At one point in the 1967 war, one of the SSN-1 destroyers paralleled the course of one of the U.S. carriers for a short time, but it is doubtful that this or any other cruise-missile unit was engaged in specific anti-carrier warfare exercise.

Recognizing the function of the Soviet naval maneuvers, the U.S. took considerable pains to show that they did not intend to use their naval forces offensively. As mentioned previously, ship movements were announced publicly as the crisis escalated and routine visits and leave were allowed to continue. As well, the U.S. carrier 'Intrepid' was carefully kept separate from the Sixth Fleet during its transit of the Mediterranean en route to Southeast Asia. President Johnson also maintained the U.S. amphibious forces east of Crete when he ordered the Sixth Fleet carriers toward Syria on June 10.

However, even with these measures, the risk of a U.S.-Soviet confrontation still existed. Each navy devoted considerable effort to tracking the other through radar, sonar, electronic intercept and visual

observation. The possibility of equipment failure or human error in such activities is always present and tends to grow as the number of interacting units increases and as the crisis becomes prolonged. Even accurate information can be garbled in transmission or misinterpreted by decision-makers. The possibility of confusion and error is further increased by the presence in the Mediterranean of numerous civilian aircraft and neutral merchant ships. Finally, as the actions of the clients have shown, activities of third parties confound superpower intentions and act to increase the risks for the Soviets and Americans. The 'Liberty' incident is a prime example of this. Had the 'Liberty' been attacked earlier, before the hot-line and other diplomatic exchanges had made the superpower's intentions clear to each other or later, when the threat of Soviet military intervention in Syria arose, the possibility of sudden exchange may have been increased dramatically.

It has been argued by some (Zoppo, 1973:202) that by 1970 the very stability alleged to exist in the strategic balance may have influenced the superpower's willingness to take the risks inherent in an escalation of conflict. It has also been said that the relative strategic parity achieved by the Soviet Union at this time increased their risk-taking propensity (Beling, 1973:91). At a regional level, while the Fifth Eskadra was formidable and still growing, it was still no match for the Sixth Fleet. However, the Soviet fleet could still act as a 'tripwire' and thus inhibit Washington's freedom of action. A direct U.S.-Soviet conventional confrontation in the Mediterranean would not be free from potential escalation to a nuclear level.

Since one of the Soviet objectives in the Jordanian crisis was to discourage and limit the scope of U.S. intervention, the Eskadra took an active part in the Soviet response. During September and October 1970, the Soviets increased the size of their squadron from forty-six to sixty ships. Major surface combat strength rose from eight ships on September 6 to thirteen on October 1. With its steady growth since the June war, the Fifth Eskadra had more ships at the start of the Jordanian crisis than at the height of the crisis in 1967 and was not under strength by comparison with the Sixth Fleet. Instead, it had sufficient cruise missile equipped combatants and submarines to match each of the two and later three American carrier groups with an anti-carrier task force. Qualitatively, the forces mustered by the Soviets were appreciatively more capable than in 1967 (Shulsky, 1979:171). In fact, with the number and combination of units the Soviets had present, they could have posed a significant military threat to the Sixth Fleet.

Table 7: SOVIET COMBATANTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, 1970

	Cruisers			Destroyers			Cruisers & Destroyers
	SSM	ASW	GUN	SSM	ASW	GUN	TOTAL
September 6-19	1	-	1	1	4	1	8
September 20-30	1	-	2	2	5	1	11
October 1-31	2	-	2	2	6	1	13
November 1	2	-	1	2	5	1	11

(Source: Shulsky, 1979:171)

Table 8: BLACK SEA FLEET LARGE SURFACE SHIPS
(Including units Deployed) September 1970

	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>MEDITERRANEAN</u>
ASW Helicopter Cruisers	2	0
SSM Cruisers	2	1
ASW Cruisers	1	0
GUN Cruisers	5	2
SSM Destroyers	3	2
SAM Destroyers	12	5
Gun Destroyers	18	1

(Source: Shulsky, 1979:171)

In response to the U.S. buildup in the eastern Mediterranean of the carriers, 'Independence', 'Saratoga', and later the 'John F. Kennedy', the Soviets went beyond the tactics they used in 1967. Instead of assigning one 'tattletale' to each U.S. task force, they positioned the Eskadra's most powerful combatants near the American ships and formed functioning ASW groups. Shulsky (1979:175) emphasized that appearance of functioning anti-carrier groups in a period of heightened international tension confirmed the crisis management mission of the Soviet navy. This mission required a tactical disposition for which it could pose a significant military threat to opposing forces. The close proximity of the Soviet and U.S. fleets essentially negated the range advantage of the U.S. carrier aircraft over the cruise missiles or six inch guns of the Soviet ships.³ It put the Soviet ships in an excellent position to launch a surprise attack on the carrier force and gave them

a reasonable chance of taking significant offensive action before a U.S. counter-attack could have full effect. The outcome of a conventional combat exchange is not certain, of course, but while the Soviet force would probably ultimately have been eliminated, the Sixth Fleet might have suffered serious damage.

The extension of Soviet influence in some Arab states, coupled with the build up of the Soviet navy in the region gave them a new 'sphere of influence' which American military power could not penetrate, unless ready to increase the risk of an international crisis. However, the ability of the American fleet to intervene in a Jordan-type crisis was not totally curtailed by the Soviet presence and theoretically the U.S. could still envisage a situation in which it would intervene in a Middle East state on the invitation of a legitimate government (Evron, 1979:159).

American military capability in the region was still not operating at peak levels due, for the most part, to its continuing substantial involvement in Vietnam. Their role in the resolution of the crisis became effective only when it demonstrated clearly that it had a credible means to manage the crisis (Bar-Simon-Tov, 1982:151-162). Military cooperation with Israel increased American credibility and therefore its coercive diplomatic bargaining position. The U.S. was risk-acceptant in 1970 primarily because it was able to manage the crisis by utilizing its client's military power. This was accomplished by agreeing to underwrite, militarily if necessary, an Israeli move against the Syrian forces in Jordan if Israel itself was attacked by

Egypt or the Soviets.

Soviet power in the Mediterranean did not supercede American nor did it appear that it would reach such a position in the near future. Its usefulness and influence on the risk-taking propensities for the Soviets, as well as for the Americans, lay not so much in its actual military capability but mainly in its political and deterrent power. This enabled the superpowers to make credible threats of intervention on the side of their endangered clients. Thus, a Soviet presence can act as a deterrent not necessarily because its forces can confront U.S. forces in the event of actual hostilities between the two, but rather because they can act as a 'tripwire' to a major confrontation between the superpowers. By inhibiting American freedom of action as such, they could also operate in the defence of a local regime requiring help.

During a period of international tension, the sustained presence of two powerful fleets in close proximity tends to produce not only an inherently unstable situation at the tactical level but also an increase in autonomous risks. Both sides are acutely aware that the one that strikes first can exact a heavy toll on the other. The incentive to preempt is strong if the crisis develops to a point where fighting appears likely. As with the June war, the chance of an unintended exchange as a result of a misjudgment by unit commanders is enhanced by the close proximity of opposing forces. Again, actions by third parties, can affect the course of events. On October 19, for example, a submarine surfaced in the vicinity of the U.S. carrier after having been tracked by U.S. destroyers and patrol aircraft (Shulsky, 1979:176). If it had

not been promptly identified as Israeli, it could have caused increased tension between the superpower forces.

As a result of these increased risks, opposing naval commanders are liable to further complicate the political situation by taking actions of a purely precautionary nature for self-defense. It is imperative that commanders provide for the safety of their units; but in such situations even the most judiciously chosen actions can involve not only military risks but also diplomatic implications. In 1970, the U.S. adopted the tactic of dispatching gun destroyers to trail the Soviet surface strike force. The U.S. 'tattle-tale' was to provide tactical warning to the carrier task force, and interfere with any effort to launch an attack (Zumwalt, 1972:301). The danger in this disposition was highlighted by one particular incident. A Kynda-class SSM cruiser and a Kashin-class SAM destroyer, probably reacting to low altitude, high-speed surveillance by three U.S. carrier-based aircraft, went to battle stations, trained their guns on the U.S. destroyer trailing them, ran surface-to-air missiles out on their launchers, and appeared to track the departing U.S. aircraft with their fire control radars. The U.S. destroyer did not respond to these gestures, and no more aircraft were dispatched to the scene. The Soviet units returned to normal readiness after a little more than an hour (Shulsky, 1979:176).

Another U.S. tactic that tended to increase the risk of combat was to have the Sixth Fleet carriers maneuver radically to elude their tattle-tales. If successful, this enhances its military utility because it complicates Soviet targeting and thus makes the fleet more secure.

However, it has a potentially undesirable political side effect of increasing Soviet uncertainty about, or inducing misunderstanding of U.S. intentions.

One further result of the enhanced Soviet naval capability and its close proximity to the American fleet is that it also increases the potential for diplomatic signalling by both sides. Observed changes in combat readiness can have political as well as military connotations. In some ways therefore, the Soviet naval presence has contributed to the neutralization of the Mediterranean (Evron, 1979:163). But other Soviet actions complicated the issue. The presence of Soviet forces in Egypt during the 1970-1972 period and their readiness to use troops in combat over the Canal, tended to increase superpower tension. Soviet military involvement in the Middle East and the continuous crisis situation existing at the time increased the risk of superpower confrontation. The Soviets' exodus from Egypt only diminished this danger temporarily and the risk of confrontation was again increased in October 1973.

Once hostilities began in October the Fifth Eskadra had about sixty ships, of which a quarter were submarines and another quarter were surface combatants (minesweepers and larger). The total rose more or less steadily such that by October 24 there were eighty ships, including twenty-five surface combatants and sixteen submarines. After the October 25 Soviet-American confrontation over the ceasefire, the size of the Soviet fleet increased rapidly. On October 31 it reached a peak of ninety-six ships, including thirty-four surface combatants and twenty-three submarines (Zumwalt, 1972:447).

What the Soviets were prepared and not prepared to do was reflected in the composition and size of the force, expressing reasonably clearly a combination of both activism and restraint. They deployed primarily older and presumably more expendable ships armed with guns for close-in action. Major anti-carrier power came from the peak total of eighty-eight cruise-missile launchers aboard submarines and surface ships (Roberts, 1979:195). It is obvious that a force of this magnitude could inflict a great deal of damage in a surprise attack on the Sixth Fleet.

However, the Fifth Eskadra was weak in anti-submarine capability. Neither of the two modern ASW cruisers in the Mediterranean during the crisis period took an active part in the crisis response. The new Kara-class ASW cruiser 'Nikolayev', returned to the Black Sea October 5 after making a port call to Yugoslavia; and the Kresta II class ASW cruiser which entered the Mediterranean via Gibraltar remained in the far western Mediterranean. In addition, the Soviets did not deploy either of the two Moskva-class helicopter cruisers, both of which were in the Black Sea at the time. Apparently, the Soviets withheld these ships, as in the Jordanian crisis, because they were valuable units whose primary weapon systems were better suited to attacking submarines than carriers. According to Roberts (1979:195) no information is available on the operational readiness of ships remaining in the Black Sea. Given the significant proportion of the Black Sea Fleet inventory of surface warfare ships deployed to the Mediterranean, it is possible that the fleet was approaching the limits of its resources. If so, and if events

had required, the Soviets might have been faced with the choice of deploying additional surface ships from the Baltic or Northern Fleets.

Table 9: SOVIET MAJOR SURFACE COMBATANTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, 1973

DATE	CRUISERS			DESTROYERS			PATROL VESSELS	
	SSM	ASW	GUN	SSM	SAM	GUN	SSM	TOTAL
Oct 1-4	1	1	1	-	4	2	-	9
Oct 5	1	1	1	-	5	2	-	10
Oct 6-7	1	-	1	-	5	2	-	9
Oct 8-9	1	-	1	-	5	3	-	10
Oct 10-11	1	-	2	-	7	3	-	13
Oct 12-18	1	-	2	-	6	3	-	12
Oct 19-21	1	-	2	1	7	3	-	14
Oct 22-26	1	-	2	1	8	3	-	15
Oct 27-28	1	1	2	1	8	3	-	16
Oct 29-30	2	1	2	1	10	3	-	19
Oct 31-Nov 4	2	1	2	1	10	4	2	22
Nov 5-7	2	1	2	1	9	4	2	21
Nov 8-10	1	1	2	1	8	3	2	18

Source: (Roberts, 1979:193).

Table 10: BLACK SEA FLEET LARGE SURFACE SHIPS (Including Units Deployed to the Mediterranean) Oct 1973

ASW Helicopter cruisers	2
SSM Cruisers	2
ASW Cruisers	2
GUN Cruisers	7
SSM Destroyers	3
SAM and GUN Destroyers	26
SSM Patrol Vessels	3

The U.S. Sixth Fleet underwent little change numerically in 1973 with the total number of ships equalling forty-eight at the outbreak of

hostilities (Ryan, 1981:77). The DEFCON III alert caused the Sixth Fleet to move rapidly to improve its defensive position. Early on October 25, the 'Roosevelt' left her holding station southeast of Sicily and started east at high speed to join 'Independence', shaking her tattletale in the process. The 'Kennedy', until then held outside the Straits of Gibraltar, entered the Mediterranean and also started a high speed transit eastward without a tattletale. The amphibious force sailed from Soudhas Bay and headed towards the 'Independence'. In addition the helicopter carrier 'Iwo Jima', which had entered the Mediterranean on October 24 was also steaming towards the 'Independence's' operating area, without a tattletale.

Due to the larger size of the U.S. units, the Soviets were, at a tactical level, unable to shadow them, primarily due to heavy seas. At the time of the alert, only the 'Independence' was fully covered by a Kynda group. A first try (by a Kashin) to intercept the 'Roosevelt' on her way east failed, but on the evening of October 26 the carrier was joined by a Sverdlov-class gun cruiser and a destroyer. On October 27 the amphibious task group was met by the Sverdlov group returning from its operations off Egypt. The 'Kennedy' remained uncovered and there was no Soviet cruiser left in the Mediterranean around which to form another anti-carrier group until after the crisis on October 31. The U.S. forces began moving away from the crisis area, beginning October 30 and the four Soviet anti-carrier groups were dispersed soon afterward.

One final aspect of the military balance was the activity in the Indian Ocean, which also saw a buildup of superpower naval forces. Both

the U.S. and the Soviet Union had minimal forces in the area during the war. The United States had a flagship and two destroyers while the Soviets had one destroyer, two small escorts, two minesweepers, one tank-landing ship, one Foxtrot submarine and ten auxiliaries. Shortly after the DEFCON III alert, the U.S. ordered one of its Pacific Fleet carrier groups - the attack carrier 'Hancock', four escorts and supporting auxiliaries - to a position east of Singapore (Zumwalt:448-455). The Soviets sent a destroyer and several smaller units to cover the 'Hancock' only on November 3 and this increased naval activity continued well into 1974.

Soviet credibility to intervene was enhanced in 1973 by two factors. First, the Soviets undeniably possessed the capacity to intervene by force. On the basis of their airlift performance in the war up to that time, it has been crudely estimated that perhaps as many as two divisions (15,000 Airborne Troops) could have been landed in Egypt in one to three days, and these troops possessed combat capabilities that, at the very least, meant stiff resistance to an Israeli advance on Cairo (Roberts, 1979:202).

Second, the Soviets increasing readiness to intervene was indicated by the placing of their Airborne divisions on alert at various points during the war. Their transport aircraft made fewer flights on the 22nd and ceased altogether on the 23rd. It was possible that these aircraft were needed to support the Airborne divisions and an interruption in the supply airlift was a necessary step if a troop lift was planned. Although it may be claimed that these were merely

bargaining tools to put pressure on the U.S. to halt Israel, the combination of all Soviet activity pointed more in the direction of a possible intervention.

As in the previous crises, the risks involved in having the two superpower naval forces in such close proximity were greatly in evidence in 1973. Considering the number of units involved and the level of tension, the crisis in 1973 proved to be the most paramount of the three cases studied. Although both sides attempted to control such risks of unintended combat, the superpowers were not the only parties involved. For example, during the period of highest tension (October 25), U.S. aircraft detected two small, high-speed surface craft approaching the 'Independence' task group. The group assumed a defensive posture, but fortunately the craft were identified as Israeli before stronger action became necessary (Roberts, 1979:196).

The Fifth Eskadra undertook further distinctive operations besides replacing auxiliaries with combatants, immediately after the U.S. alert. On October 26 the Soviets began large-scale anti-carrier exercises against the 'Independence' carrier group with cruise-missile submarine participation. They continued this 'training of its guns' on the U.S. fleet until November 3 (Zumwalt, 1972:447). The Soviets presumably wanted to continue to underline their message to the U.S. of the risks of making a strong crisis response with the Sixth Fleet and of Soviet interests at stake.

Therefore, with sufficient forces in the Mediterranean to inflict serious damage on the Sixth Fleet, the Soviets accepted the calculated risks inherent in their threat to intervene and the autonomous risks of increased naval activity. The U.S., on the other hand, was able to convince the Soviets that strategic parity and an uncertain conventional balance notwithstanding, the President was willing to risk a confrontation and possible war to block the contemplated Soviet action.

The superpowers attempted to control the crisis in numerous ways including their use of diplomatic statements coupled with signals inherent in their naval maneuvers. The risks were increased, however, not by the influence of the military balance, but by a perceived threat to a superpower's interests in the area. As with 1967, this threat came as a result of Israeli military action which threatened the survival of a Soviet client. It is apparent that what remained the most tenuous and risk-filled situation was the Israeli's heeding of American warnings to stop.

The U.S. recognized the risks inherent in Israeli intransigence in 1967, 1970 and again in 1973. In 1967, Johnson coupled a strong Sixth Fleet response to the Soviet threat of intervention with a stern warning to Israel. After Hussein was able to turn back Syrian tanks alone in 1970, the U.S. wanted immediate assurances from Israel that it would stop moving its forces towards the Syrian border. Finally, the American's strong signal response of a DEFCON III alert was again coupled with a warning to Israel in the 1973 war. If Israel had not

heeded American warnings the probability of a Soviet intervention would have grown substantially as would the level of risk in confronting U.S. forces because of the reciprocal threat a Soviet intervention would pose to American interests.

General Comparison

When Sixth Fleet carriers move eastward during a period of tension, they are subjected to the avid attention of Soviet surface warfare forces. Since the eastward movement of the carriers increases their capacity to deliver nuclear strikes against the U.S.S.R., and since the possibility that a local crisis may escalate to the global level can increase in such situations, some (McConnell and Dismukes:291) have concluded that the strategic defensive motivations of Soviet action are self-evident.

However, a number of the details of these responses seem sharply inconsistent with purely military motivations. While the Soviets increase the size of their surface warfare forces during periods of crisis, they do not at the same time deploy their most modern anti-submarine warfare forces. Soviet ASW forces have taken no observable measures against U.S. ballistic missile submarines during crises, although in terms of their capacity to deliver nuclear warheads on the U.S.S.R., these surely would pose a more formidable threat than the carriers. Similarly, the Soviets did not alert forces outside the area of conflict except in the case of Airborne Troops meant for use in the crisis. Finally, they did not (again as far as is known) alert strategic

forces in connection with the three crises under discussion, in spite of the fact the U.S. alerted its strategic forces on occasion. Taken together this suggests that Moscow's concern was with the local rather than the strategic-nuclear situation.

Moreover, the surface warfare forces the Soviets had dispatched during the crises tended to match in terms of anti-carrier warfare groups, the number of carriers the U.S. had deployed. Considerably more surface warfare forces were available in home waters but were withheld (although as previously shown in October 1973, the Soviets may have pressed the Black Sea Fleet to its limits). This practice would not seem in accord with Soviet principles of war which place a high premium on being stronger than the enemy at the decisive point (Garthoff, 1953:120ff). If war fighting, particularly defense against the carriers capacity for nuclear attack, were the object, one might expect the Soviets to amass rather larger forces than they had seen fit to do. Finally, the targeting by Soviet surface warfare forces of U.S. amphibious groups in the October War did not seem to reflect a preoccupation with general war tasks.

Proximity is a geographical fact that would have to confer undeniable advantage to the Soviet Union in most hypothetical confrontations between the superpowers in the Middle East. But it is an advantage which diminishes with distance from the Soviet Union (Alford, 1980:138). While the Soviets increased links with its immediate southern neighbours; Iran and Turkey, Soviet actions since World War II continued to cause these states to be leery of the superpower, making ready access

still difficult (for example through the Turkish Straits). Land and air forces were cut off from most of the Middle East by the two Northern Tier states. However, if transit permission were given the Soviets would need little time to mass forces in the crisis theater.

At sea, the credibility of the Soviet naval force has been enhanced by their ability to maintain strength in the Mediterranean and Gulf regions to at least raise substantially the threat to any Western naval presence and to increase the risks of military intervention by the U.S.

However, the Soviet maritime presence is deficient in two respects: first, the Soviet Union cannot in any sense match American amphibious capability. The Soviet naval infantry remains a small and particularly unimpressive force and secondly, the Soviets must rely on their Airborne Troops and land-based aircraft because they cannot deploy significant carrier based aircraft. Without airfields in the area and subject (as in July 1972) to the political whims of its client states, air operations would present considerable problems for the U.S.S.R., especially against U.S. carrier based airpower. Nevertheless, military reality suggests that the Soviet Union could have brought a preponderance of power to bear in a relatively short time and space. They could have mobilized and moved military forces across its borders more rapidly and, in greater strength, than the U.S. could reinforce the region.

The U.S. could have expected only some marginal military support from its allies. This was seen in 1973 when European powers objected to having U.S. forces use their bases for Middle East operations. The utility of Italian, Greek, Turkish, Spanish and West German bases as staging areas for such operations was therefore brought into question. Major problems with deploying a Rapid Deployment Force into the area included: distance from the theater of war; lack of secure access and forward bases for shortening intervention times; shortage of long range aircraft and amphibious shipping and finally, acclimatization. This made American preparations and planning for intervention in the Middle East very difficult and uncertain.

Most certain and most difficult to obstruct is the U.S. maritime presence, yet this is the one most difficult and expensive presence to sustain, given the U.S. naval force levels at the time, and the slowest to improve substantially. While the Sixth Fleet was dominant for twenty years with two or three carriers as part of the normal deployment of some fifty or more ships, the Soviet Fleet gradually overtook the Sixth Fleet numerically in 1970 (although not in firepower).

As previously mentioned however, the Soviets had no carriers, not many missile-launching ships and only a few submarines (Kemp, 1978:68). The Sixth Fleet possessed adequate firepower to remain the dominant force in the area but its position became uncertain, its movements were no longer free from possible challenge and the Fleet was still vulnerable to attack from land. The Sixth Fleet force effectiveness was somewhat contingent on the potential availability of land-based Soviet

aircraft and the existence of Soviet submarines which may hobble the offensive use of the carriers. The number of U.S. planes available to strike at Soviet ships depended on how many aircraft would be necessary to defend the carriers themselves against air and sea attacks. The strength of inhibitions against using aircraft with nuclear missiles in a conventional mode depends on many factors such as the relative distance between contending fleets, the types of land-based craft available to each side, the political constraints operating at the time of battle and the degree to which decision-makers are willing to risk escalation to the global level. As well the U.S. had continually maintained a substantial strategic reserve of army formations and marines, and could draw on front line and logistic units of up to some 200,000 men. However, over time that force tended to be earmarked for the reinforcement of other theaters of conflict during this period especially Southeast Asia and Europe.

Objective conclusions to any comparisons of rates of build-up within the area is that they must favour the Soviet Union and that the aggregate difficulties faced by the U.S. exceed by a considerable margin those which were faced by the Soviet Union. It is difficult to imagine the U.S. attempting to get 'the most instruments of coercion to the area, the quickest' (as General Nathan B. Forrest has declared) in terms of conventional land forces. Moreover, the political implications of such perceptions are likely to be profound in a crisis. It would appear to make little sense to start a race that you have little prospect of winning.

Synthesis

As Quester (1980:18) has postulated, all comparisons of tonnage or conventional firepower, "as if World War II were to be fought all over again" may miss the point. The United States Sixth Fleet carried a residual nuclear weapons capability, so presumably did the Fifth Eskadra at the peak of the crises in the Mediterranean. It is therefore very unlikely that a naval war could be fought in the area without such weapons coming into use, even leaving aside the tactical nuclear weapons that could be delivered by the aircraft of either side based within flying range of the Mediterranean.

Thus as the analysis has reflected, naval fleets were used as symbolic rather than operational signals; 'trip-wires' of national resolve and commitment. Naval maneuvers signalled not only the interests at stake in a crisis but also the level of risk at which the superpowers were willing to operate. The significance of a fleet deployed into an area of conflict may thus lie less in the number of guns or sea to sea missiles it carries than in the number of ships which simply might be maneuvered into the other fleet's way, always carrying the symbolic threat and risk of escalation to a much greater conflict.

American strategic power did not deter the Soviet Union's risk-taking propensity, but it almost certainly set stringent limits. With relative nuclear parity both superpowers continued to risk escalation by their maneuvers, although the nuclear dimension, both strategic and

tactical, acted as a shared constraint on them. This led to a relatively controlled escalation rather than the 'spasm response' type.

It could be argued that it is imprudent to assume that military capabilities do not influence the political calculations of risk. It is claimed that in an era of intensified superpower rivalry the prerequisite for any regulation of that rivalry, formally or not, requires a military balance of power. An imbalance may encourage risk-taking. However, as in the cases examined it appears that the strategic and regional military positions or balance between the superpowers during a conflict in the Middle East was not, as the second proposition states, the primary factor in influencing the risk-taking propensities of the actors. The margin of superiority over one's opponent did not necessarily dictate the opponent's risk-taking behaviour (although this may have been a result of the perceived lack of a clear-cut superiority by either power). Both powers were 'risk-acceptant' to some degree throughout all three crises and although escalation may have been somewhat controlled, the level of calculated and autonomous risk was clearly increased.

To examine how this may relate to the first proposition, another brief look at the actor's calculations of the interests at stake is necessary. The predominance of the importance of superpower interests is exemplified by Soviet behaviour. The Soviets regarded the carriers first of all as the primary instrument of the U.S. in a 'local war'. In a general war the U.S. fleet is perceived 'mainly' as a threat to Soviet naval forces, and only secondarily as a deferred-strike threat to the

Soviet homeland (Tumkovskiy, 1974:95). In the June war of 1967, the Jordanian crisis of 1970 and the October war of 1973, Soviet naval movements were clearly keyed to local crisis events - to events on land, to the reactions of the Sixth Fleet to events on land, and to potential threats from land and sea against Soviet communications. They were not keyed to possible implicit threats aimed directly at targets on Soviet territory. In non-crisis situations U.S. carrier movements into the eastern Mediterranean, where the direct threat they pose to the Soviet homeland is most immediate, warranted neither attentional nor purposeful shows of force from the Soviets. Only a simple surveillance effort by auxiliaries, rather than combatants, took place. In situations of crises, however, the Soviets increase their presence to signal an interest in events ashore. During the conflicts being analyzed, the Soviets sooner or later increased their commitments to its client thus accepting the risk of such actions coupled with those risks afforded by adopting a 'close embrace' with the Sixth Fleet. This was done however, in tune with shifting client fortunes and perceived threats to other Soviet interests.

In their initial effort in the June war, the Soviets merely sent combatants to follow U.S. carriers when the carriers moved toward the Syrian coast, in position to jeopardize the threatened Soviet airlift of Airborne Troops into Damascus. It is possible that they were preparing to adopt more specific anti-carrier tactics should intervention prove necessary. It is difficult to see how the military balance was a major factor in influencing Soviet, or for that matter American risk-taking during that crisis. A direct threat to the Soviet homeland could develop

in this situation only if Moscow first intervened in Syria to prevent the total collapse of its client and the Sixth Fleet attempted to contest this action because of the threat such action would pose to Israel. This would open the door to a subsequent escalation of the conflict to a global level.

In the Jordanian crisis, intermingling of the two fleets reached its peak at the time of the Syrian intervention, reflecting the Soviet's desire to limit the freedom of the Sixth Fleet and to signal Washington not to go too far in threatening Syria. Even establishing a worst case scenerio, it is difficult to credit Washington with the intention of attacking the Soviet Union to contain Syria. If Moscow was only interested in its own immediate survival, it could have removed any possible threat to itself by disavowing any interest in the fate of Syria, and allow the Washington-Tel Aviv team to have a free hand. The Soviets could have relaxed the posture of the Fifth Eskadra, with all the inherent risks their presence encompassed, and withdrawn their combatants, maintaining only the normal 'tattletale' operations. In other words, by ruling out Soviet involvement and the acceptance of risks in the intermediate stages of the crisis, the possible threat to the U.S.S.R. in some 'ultimate' stage would also have been ruled out. But despite relative strategic parity and inferior regional firepower capability balance, the Soviets did not stand aside, mainly because of its interests and commitments to Syria. In this way they limited an otherwise open-ended threat to its client. The U.S. accepted the risks involved in underwriting a planned Israeli counter attack even though from a strictly firepower perspective the Americans were the dominant

force. Therefore, it is apparent that once again, other more subjective elements precluded superpower risk-taking behaviour more than the objective military balance.

Similarly, in the October war Moscow made no naval demonstrations on behalf of its clients at the time of their initial successful offensive on October 5 - 7. These naval demonstrations occurred only after their offensive faltered and the Syrians (after October 11) and then especially the Egyptians (after October 19) seemed threatened with massive defeat. With the possibility of Israeli thrusts towards their client's capitals, the Soviets accepted the risks inherent in initially increasing supplies to them, by threatening intervention and then increasing the threat posed to the Sixth Fleet by the Fifth Eskadra. In the Egyptian case it appears that the tactical disposition adopted by the Soviets was designed and timed to meet the most probable Sixth Fleet reaction to the Soviet threat to intervene with Airborne Troops. Moreover, in the days following October 25, when the U.S. declared a global alert and concentrated the Sixth Fleet carriers in the eastern Mediterranean, the Soviets engaged in a sustained 'anti-carrier exercise', in effect, as McConnell and Dismukes claim (1979:297), "transforming the Fifth Eskadra into a cocked pistol pointing directly at the Sixth Fleet". During this period, American carriers were obviously concentrating on surveillance and defensive preparations. Indeed, in terms of its aircraft operations - plainly observable by Soviet tattle tales - the Fleet was not preparing for nuclear strike operations. The Sixth Fleet activities were primarily concerned with the possibility of confrontation at sea and the events ashore. For example,

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Strategic Air Command tanker aircraft continued to support the U.S. airlift to Israel rather than moving to the areas from which they would support strategic bomber strikes on the Soviet Union (Roberts, 1979:203). Thus, as in the previous crises, it was more the threats to superpower interests in the area during the conflicts (rather than the strategic and regional military capabilities and balance of their respective forces) which proved to be more influential in affecting the patron's risk-taking propensities.

Yet the calculations made by both superpowers were profoundly affected in the crises by the knowledge that the other could not be preempted. From a Soviet perspective, this still would be true even if it were to look as if the Soviet Union might be strong enough to overcome such resistance as the United States could sustain. The implications of having to overcome American resistance; of forcing an American withdrawal and of killing Americans to secure objectives, "feed back to the original political calculations" (Alford:143). The United States must be able to convince the Soviet Union that it would be prepared to escalate rather than allow a perceived threat to American interests to solidify - with all that this implies in terms of risk-acceptant behaviour. Clearly it is undesirable to have to defend an interest by the threat to escalate militarily (rather than by evincing a manifest capability of defending the interest itself), but it appears there was no perceived realistic alternative in the cases examined.

It can be argued that the military balance between the superpowers did not sufficiently affect their risk-taking propensities first of all

because neither power had a clear-cut preponderance of power to dominate effectively the other in a crisis after 1970. But secondly and more importantly American and Soviet willingness to risk a confrontation was more than adequately defined by the interests at stake in all cases. However, movements of naval fleets and the alerts of Soviet Airborne Troops and American strategic forces allowed a credible projection of power into the region. This made it probable that both Soviet and American calculations of risk would be affected to some degree by the constraints such forces imposed.

Although the existence of mutually credible forces and not necessarily precise power calculations appeared to act as a constraint on the risk-taking propensities of the patrons, the occasionally autonomous behaviour of their clients caused some degree of weakening in this constraint. In order to protect both their interests and clients survival, the patrons escalated the risks in an effort to minimize losses.

A final point should be clarified as to the emphasis on Soviet naval calculations and behaviour as opposed to American Sixth Fleet maneuvers. The U.S. Sixth Fleet unit composition remained somewhat static during this time. While American naval maneuvers are important, it was the Soviets who greatly increased the Fifth Eskadra's unit force. Soviet naval dynamism came about as a recognition of the importance that Fleet size, unit quality, auxiliary and combatant differences could play in signalling Soviet resolve, commitment and the value of interests at stake.

The U.S.'s Sixth Fleet behaviour was also used symbolically as a signalling mechanism to show American resolve and commitment. However, in 1967 and 1973 especially, it was the Soviet Union and its clients who were on the 'defensive'. Soviet threats and naval maneuvers reflected this concern. It was the Soviets who had to react to Israeli military threats against their clients by increasing the risks first. And it was these Soviet threats that then prompted the U.S. to signal its concern. In 1970, the Soviets used the Fifth Eskadra to limit all possible American action against its client. Thus, it was this Soviet activity in increasing and changing unit composition and combatant force in its 'tattle-tale' operations compared to the dynamic disposition but relatively static Sixth Fleet composition which justifies such an emphasis on Soviet naval diplomacy.

In summary, it appears that proposition two can not be substantiated to a great degree because of the reasons already given. Besides raising the stakes, an American or Soviet dominance in force especially at a regional level in the Middle East does not appear to have substantially affected their risk-taking behaviour in the crisis periods under discussion. However, in this rather limited analysis of the problem, it is not possible to come to any definitive conclusion concerning the relationship between force balance and risk-taking propensity. The implications this may present for arms control and deterrence theorists may be substantial if further research into this area discloses the limited constraining effect objective balance of power estimates have on the superpower's propensity to take risks in

order to protect their interests in areas of uncertain or disputed symmetry. These risks have been shown to be initiated and magnified for the most part by the autonomous actions of their client states constituting a third party effect on patron behaviour when the patrons themselves do not necessarily want to become involved.

NOTES

1. For a somewhat similar proposition which links utility and the threat capacity of adversaries see Bueno de Mesquita, 1980 and 1981.
2. See for example:
 - a) U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Preparedness investigating Subcommittee, Worldwide Military Commitments, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, 1966, 1967).
 - b) U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Conflicts Between U.S. Capabilities and Foreign Commitments, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., (Washington, 1967).
 - c) U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services and the Subcommittee on Department of Defense of the Committee on Appropriations, Military Procurement Authorizations for Fiscal Year 1968, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., January 25-27, 30, 31 and February 1, 2, 1967 (Washington, 1967).
3. "The Soviet advantage depended on the U.S. practice, during a crisis, of holding its naval forces in relatively static positions. Under these circumstances, the best diplomatic response to a crisis for the Soviet navy is also the best military response, since it puts its ships close to both the crisis theater and the U.S. ships. For the U.S. the diplomatic response of moving carriers and amphibious forces forward towards a crisis area, while politically potent, imposes severe military disadvantages vis-a-vis the Soviets" (Roberts, 1979:216n.25).

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, a critical analysis of superpower risk-taking in Middle East crisis situations has been attempted. While the findings are by no means conclusive, this 'realpolitik' approach provides a logical framework for posing questions and answers in a manner consistent with the theoretical foundations of risk-taking. The two independent variables dealing with an actor's interests and the relative military balance as they affect the dependent variable of risk-taking have been analyzed. This analysis has been accomplished with regard to superpower behaviour during regional conflicts between their respective clients.

It appears that proposition one has been substantiated to some degree. In the three cases, the greater the perceived threat to a superpower's interests the greater that superpower's willingness to take risks. This corresponds to George's (1982:372) postulation that the more important and valued the objectives pursued, the greater the willingness of a state to expend more resources and accept higher costs and risks.

The relative military balance between the superpowers, as discussed in the second proposition, both strategically and at a regional level during these conflicts, does not appear to be a primary consideration in their risk-taking propensity. It did not necessarily translate that the greater the margin of superiority over one's opponent, the less willing that opponent will be to engage in risk-

acceptant behaviour. While the existence of substantial nuclear arsenals on both sides acted as a shared constraint on their behaviour, the superpower patrons still engaged in risk-taking as a result of threats to their interests at a regional level. Conventional regional forces acted more as diplomatic signals and lent credibility to certain threats.

It follows that the mutual restraint of the superpowers in avoiding a direct confrontation, or coming perilously close to one, depended less on the military balance than on their estimation of each others' comparative resolve to use force. Under conditions in which neither side can be sure of avoiding devastation in a nuclear exchange, the relative risk-taking propensities of the U.S. and the Soviet Union may depend more on clear cut disparities of local conventional strength than on disproportionate levels of nuclear weapons. However, they will depend much more on the relative intensity of interest than on either nuclear or conventional capabilities. Purely military considerations are, therefore, far from being dominant in superpower confrontations in the Middle East.

While the risks of escalation were increased during each individual crisis by the use of concrete, physical actions as opposed to verbal pronouncements, they were also raised across all three. There were attempts by the super powers to hold down the level of risk and degree of risk taking in an effort to avoid a direct confrontation. However, they were successful only in avoiding such a confrontation and not in the tempering of any increased risk taking. In 1967 a moderate

degree of risk taking ensued with the U.S. being slightly more risk acceptant than the Soviet Union. The level of risk taking was increased in 1970 to a point beyond that of 1967 with the U.S. once again accepting risks to a greater degree than the Soviets. Finally in 1973 both super powers became involved in a dangerous competition in risk taking that surpassed the previous two crises. Despite the Soviets' threat to intervene in 1973 it appears that the Americans' propensity to take risks was marginally enhanced because of the global alert.

One important question that arises during each of the conflicts surrounds the behaviour of Israel, although the Arab clients of the Soviet Union also resisted their patron's influence to a degree. What if Israel had not stopped in 1967 and 1973 or had been forced to move against Syria in 1970 as a result of Hussein's failure to rout Syrian tanks? Would the Soviets have intervened? Although speculation abounds, it serves to illustrate that once the threshold of active military involvement is crossed, finding a stopping point becomes far from easy. Signalling may still lack clarity and be beset with 'noise', or poorly timed offers and threats may be lacking in credibility. Communication, co-operation and acknowledgement of common interests, as well as a shared constraint remain insufficient in avoiding the risk of a direct confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union.

It is precisely American and Soviet management of indirect conflict, as articulated through regional competition, which has had such an important impact on detente. The exercise of detente between the superpowers should have been correlated with reduced competition in

contested regional systems and with some smoother and better coordination in managing crises in the latter. However, it appears that regional competition and conflict may in fact constrain superpower cooperation on issues of direct concern, enhancing the conflicting interests of the superpower patrons. For instance, those who argued that detente was a stabilizing factor on the 1973 crisis (Golan, 1975; Kissinger, 1982) claim the Soviet Union not only sought to preserve and protect its relations with the U.S., it actually risked its future relations with the Arabs. Soviet efforts to obtain a ceasefire and its cooperative efforts with the U.S. throughout most of the war, coupled with their hesitation to identify the Americans as the villains, suggested their concern for detente. However, this behaviour may well have been dictated more by the overriding consideration of avoiding a military confrontation with the U.S. than by detente. While Brezhnev and Nixon may have paused between 'rungs on the escalation ladder' to refer to the 1973 Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, Johnson and Kosygin managed equally well with no such explicit 'rules of the game'.

Although the superpowers were risk-avoidant in certain aspects of their behaviour, such as the use of the hot-line, attempts at gaining a successful ceasefire, and the signing of the Incidents at Sea Agreement in 1972, the possibility of unintended hostilities between American and Soviet forces in close proximity during these crises increased autonomous risks. Equipment failure, human error and misjudgment can have unpredictable results in situations marked by the prolonged interaction of many units in locations that may be densely travelled by commercial shipping and aircraft. Intentions can also be misperceived.

Tactical dispositions adopted purely for reasons of military prudence - for example, U.S. carriers eluding their Soviet tattletales - may convey unintended political signals. Similarly, measures adopted for purposes of political communications - such as the commencement of Soviet anti-carrier exercises in the tensest moments of the October War - could under some circumstances be interpreted on purely military grounds as preparations for an attack. The intervention of third parties, intentional or accidental, could also trigger a violent exchange between the superpowers. The tragic episode of the 'Liberty' shows that this is not a hypothetical danger.

The indicators of potential superpower involvement and risk-taking were generated by the tactical ground situation in the Middle East which threatened superpower interests (primarily their client's survival). This could act as a signal to the superpowers, warning that the risk of a confrontation is greatest when derived from a tactical situation arising from a localized conflict. If a patron's client were to win a decisive victory, it would only invite the opposing superpower's intervention to prevent the destruction of its own client. Although the two superpowers could not effectively control their clients, they could protect them. It was precisely when, as in 1967, 1970 and 1973, there was a credible threat to a client's survival, that the defending patron escalated the risk in order to protect its own client and as such protect its own inherent interests.

The superpowers may view the changing ratios of capability between their clients as an index of the broader competition between them and so

fuel the conflict, even as they monitor the risk of direct confrontation which is inherent in the escalation of a regional war. Conflict between the obligations of superpowers and patrons sharpened not at the margin, but at a high threshold of risk to the client. It thus appears that the risk of a superpower confrontation increased exactly when military action in the region threatened to lead to political conclusions.

Therefore, this study has dramatically illustrated not only the influence that an actor's interests have on its risk-taking propensity, but that the threat to those interests was initially brought about by the actions of third parties. Subsequent risks to the superpowers were also incurred by client intransigence in heeding patron warnings. A regional war waged with modern technology can get out of control if the rapidly changing interests of the belligerents create parallel dynamics among their patrons. Incidents of clients drawing in patrons have occurred in the past, thereby forcing the superpowers into a confrontation, and they will occur again in the future. How many can occur without the superpowers actually fighting one another is impossible to say.

While it can be misleading to draw firm conclusions from such a limited number of cases, the analysis does serve to increase the importance and necessity of studying the concept of risk-taking in international relations to a much greater extent. As stated previously, the Middle East will continue to be an area of great concern. Any analysis which can indicate situations where the superpower's risk-taking propensity tends to increase, can be an extremely valuable

monitor of crisis behaviour.

As this study has also demonstrated, the relative military balance plays only a limited constraining role on superpower behaviour. It can also act as an indicator of the credibility of threats to intervene in a regional conflict. The relative superpower interests being threatened in a regional dispute among client states appears to be the predominant factor which influences superpowers to take risks, regardless of the military balance. This thesis also demonstrates the importance of armed forces as instruments of policy and political will. Without political ends, military maneuvers remain sterile. The present American administration's use of military forces in Lebanon exemplifies this futility when armed force is used as an end in itself and not a means by which to achieve political-diplomatic goals.

Unless the superpowers increase their dialogue on rules of behaviour in the Third World, in order to gain explicit or tacit understandings, they will continue to become entangled in regional conflicts which threaten to embroil them in a direct confrontation. Where both superpowers are deeply involved and have relatively vital interests in a given area, they must refrain from creating conditions for such a direct confrontation, even if this necessitates an immediate decrease in tactical influence. Further research into the effects of the 'bargaining setting' on risk-taking is necessary in order to create a better understanding of the influence such an external stimulus has on the states involved. Risk does not necessarily flow from a flawed process of bargaining, as this study has demonstrated. Risk, as shown

in this study, flows from an inability to delimit objectives and interests in areas where superpower influence is questionable. If the superpowers do not gain a better understanding of what tends to influence their propensity to take risks, can they continue to avoid a nuclear Armageddon?

✓ The Middle East may become what the Balkans were to Europe - an area where local rivalries draw the great powers into confrontations they did not necessarily seek or start."

- Henry Kissinger (October 22, 1973)

APPENDIX A

US FOREIGN MILITARY SALES (FMS) AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE (MAP) TO THE MIDDLE EAST, 1950-74 (\$ Thousands)

		1950 - 64	1969	1974
Iran	FMS	1,285	235,839	3,794,369
	MAP	653,939	22,206	-
Israel	FMS	7,121	312,944	2,117,623
	MAP	-	-	-
Saudi Arabia	FMS	87,026	4,220	587,698
	MAP	30,400	620	184
Big 3 Sub Total	FMS	95,432	553,003	6,499,690
	MAP	684,339	22,826	184
Middle East	FMS	100,961	568,151	6,581,113
	MAP	779,307	23,448	358,969
Arab-Israeli Participants	FMS	10,044	326,418	2,178,239
	MAP	40,774	272	358,785
Oil (OPEC) Countries Middle East	FMS	90,917	241,733	4,400,240
	MAP	738,533	23,176	184
World Total	FMS	5,162,667	1,557,597	8,262,579
	MAP	30,528,327	454,154	788,614
FMS As A Share of FMS + MAP, %	World	14	77	91
	Arab-Israeli	24	100	86
	Arab OPEC Countries	11	91	100
	Middle East	11	96	95
Share of Middle East FMS, %	Big 3	95	97	99
	Arab-Israeli	10	57	33
	Oil Countries	90	42	67
Share of Middle East MAP, %	Big 3	88	97	-
	Arab-Israeli	5	1	100
	Oil Countries	95	99	-
Middle East, Share of World, %	FMS	2	36	80
	MAP	3	5	46

Source: Foreign Assistance Authorization, Arms Sales Issues, Hearings, Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance, Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 1975. Notice should be taken of the discrepancy between figures in Appendix A for Israel in 1974 and those given in Appendix B.

APPENDIX B

US ARMS TRANSFERS TO ISRAEL, 1950-1976

(\$ Millions)

	<u>1950-70</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>TOTAL</u> <u>1950-76</u>
Foreign Military Sales Orders	580,905	413,492	409,230	181,740	2,455,205	864,052	923,245	5,904,274
Commercial Deliveries	72,897	26,526	63,068	21,555	50,118	46,746		200,910
Total Sales	653,802	440,018	472,298	203,295	2,505,323 ^a	910,798 ^b	923,245 ^c	6,185,184

a) \$1,500,000 payments waived

b) \$100,000 payments waived

c) \$750,000 payments waived

Source: Department of Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), Foreign Military Sales
and Military Assistance Facts (December 1976) pp. 8, 12, 16.

APPENDIX C
US ARMS TRANSFERS TO MIDDLE EAST EXCLUDING ISRAEL (\$ Thousands)

COUNTRY	FY 1950-1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1950-1976 ^{d)}
IRAN	Grants ^{a)}	2,080	888	339	2	----	----	895,830
	Sales ^{b)}	423,900	556,085	2,176,776	4,408,547	3,070,389	1,382,062	12,920,860
	Total:	425,980	556,973	2,177,115	4,408,549	3,070,389	1,382,062	13,816,690
JORDAN	Grants	29,798	46,265	55,471	45,896	71,009	55,785	370,088
	Sales	17,594	19,023	6,113	61,543	77,612	455,916	787,814
	Total:	215,580	65,288	61,584	107,439	148,621	511,701	1,157,902
SAUDI ARABIA	Grants	632	429	179	169	37	----	38,116
	Sales	23,181	465,766	1,999,271	1,924,732	1,408,424	2,492,637	12,307,166
	Total:	23,813	466,195	1,999,450	1,924,901	1,408,461	2,492,637	12,345,282
OTHER ARAB STATES	Grants	4,480	----	695	171	174	350	65,759
	Sales	1,170	371	8,402	45,167	381,442	329,903	900,888
	Total:	5,650	371	9,097	45,338	381,616	330,253	966,647
TOTAL ARAB STATES	Grants	36,990	47,582	56,684	46,238	71,220	56,135	1,369,793
	Sales	465,845	1,041,245	4,190,562	6,439,989	4,937,867	4,660,518	26,916,728
	Total:	502,835	1,088,827	4,247,246	6,486,227	5,009,087	4,716,653	28,286,521

a) Includes Military Assistance Program, Excess Defense Articles Program-Acquisition Cost, & International Military Education and Training Program

b) Includes Foreign Military Sales agreements 1950-1976 and Commercial Exports 1960-1975 only

c) Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Oman, Syria and Yemen

d) Includes Transitional Quarter (FY 1977)

Source: Department of Defense Security Assistance Agency, Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Facts

APPENDIX D

COMPARISON OF ACDA AND DSAA DATA FOR US ARMS

TRANSFERS TO THE MIDDLE EAST,

1966-1975

(Million Current Dollars)

<u>Country*</u>	<u>ACDA Data</u> <u>Total Imported</u>	<u>Imported from US</u>		<u>DSAA Data**</u>
		<u>\$</u>	<u>(% Total)</u>	
Egypt	\$ 2780	-	-	\$ 1.4
Iran	3877	2702	(69.7)	2805.3
Iraq	1721	2	(.12)	13.3
Israel	4031	3856	(95.7)	3018.1
Jordan	538	400	(74.3)	372.2
Kuwait	97	14	(14.4)	.7
Lebanon	126	21	(16.7)	19.8
Oman	67	3	(4.5)	2.8
Saudi Arabia	1038	473	(45.6)	1013.4
Syria	1905	3	(.16)	1.9
Yemen	65	1	(1.5)	2.6
Totals: Near East	16,245	7475	(46)	7251.5

* Aden, Bahrain, Cyprus, Qatar and United Arab Emirates are included in ACDA's Near East Region but are not included in this table since the US has transferred no or negligible amounts of arms to each since 1966.

** Whenever inconsistent DSAA data exist the figures used in this table are based on the mean of the five DSAA sources cited below.

Sources: ACDA: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers
1966-1975.

DSAA: Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales,
1971, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976.

Appendix E

Military Aid Delivered to LOCs and the Middle East 1954-1975 Groups of Countries, and Countries

Country, group of countries ^a	CIA (SD) estimates ^c				(Per cent)		
	1955-74	1955-66	1967-70	1971-74	1961-66	1967-70	1971-74
Total (million US\$) ^d	12 010	4 605	2 300	5 205	2 875	2,318	5 191
Annual average (million US\$)	601	376	575	1 301	479	580	1,298
Per cent	100 0	100 0	100 0	100 0	100 0 ^e	100 0 ^e	100 0 ^e
Region	73 0	65 4	75 9	86 8	48 3	77 0	81 2
Main 3	59 6	50 7	56 2	68 7	37 1	64 6	63 9
Egypt	28 7	32 3	43 9	18 9	22 6	44 0	23 9
Syria	17 5	8 3	4 7	31 0	3 4	8 2	26 6
Iraq	13 3	10 0	7 6	18 7	11 1	12 4	13 3
North Africa ^f	3 3	3 4	6 7	1 7	6 8	3 4	5 4
Red Sea countries	2 8	1 1	6 3	3 3	3 8	3 8	2 9
Iran	7 1	—	7 2	13 2	—	6 2	9 0
Arab countries	66 7	66 2	68 2	73 7	47 7	71 7	72 2
Persian Gulf	23 2	11 1	20 1	35 2	14 9	21 4	25 2
Oil countries	23 3	13 1	21 6	33 0	17 6	21 0	27 7
Afghanistan	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Central Asia	16 6	19 2	23 2	11 4	21 6	23 0	12 6
Others ^g	10 4	26 3	0 6	1 8	29 7	—	0 6 ^e

Notes and Sources:

- The 'Region' is a widely defined Middle East ranging from Turkey and Iran in the north and north-east, to Somalia in the south and Morocco in the west. The Main 3 are Egypt, Syria and Iraq; North African countries include Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya; Red Sea countries include South and North Yemen, Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia; oil countries are Iran, Iraq, Libya and Algeria; the 'Persian Gulf' includes Iran, Iraq and the Red Sea countries; Arab countries are all the regional countries with the exception of Iran (Turkey) and Ethiopia; finally, Central Asia includes Afghanistan and the countries in the Indian subcontinent.
- The percentage distribution is based on the dollar figures. Since the ruble/dollar exchange rates changed over the period (and also within sub-periods), the distribution based on ruble figures could, in principle, be different. In fact, however, the differences are very small and seldom larger than one percentage point.
- Based on US Department of State, *Communist States and Developing Countries Aid and Trade in 1974*, Bureau of Intelligence and Research Report No. 208 (Washington DC, January 1976) (henceforth SD 1976), Table 7; and on earlier annual issues of the same publications (henceforth CIA estimates). This source does not provide a full breakdown of MA received by each country for each year, instead each year's report contains new cumulative figures for aid extended to each country covering one additional year. However, each new annual report contains, in addition to data for one more year, also corrections, based on new information, for previous years (SD 1976, p.iii). Therefore, presenting yearly figures for each country involves making adjustments based on other sources on arms deals and also some heroic assumptions. For this reason the figures should be looked upon with caution. Grouping of yearly figures into four-year periods (since 1967) reduces significantly the potential mistakes.
- Based on US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfer 1965-1974* (Washington DC, 1976), Tables IV and V; and *The International Transfer of Conventional Arms (1973)* and *World Military Expenditures of Arms Trade (1963-1973, 1974)* issued by the same agency. The underlying figures for the distribution, as well as the totals for the LOCs for individual years and sub-periods, were estimated from information on (a) total MA received by each country from all suppliers every year over 1961-4, and (b) the total MA extended to each recipient country over the entire 1961-71, 1964-73 and 1965-7 periods. The 'missing' link was filled by outside information on arms-supply agreements and by a 'proportionality principle', that is dividing Soviet MA over the years in accordance with the proportion constituted by Soviet MA in the total MA received by the given country during the relevant period.
- Totals do not include aid to a few countries included under 'Other' which amount to 1-3 per cent of the total.
- SD figures do not include cash deliveries of arms to Libya. According to ACDA they amounted to \$125 million during 1971-3, about 2-4 per cent of total Soviet MA during 1971-4.
- 'Other' includes south-east Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, with the exception of Somalia and Latin America.

Appendix F
Operations Involving Soviet Naval Forces, October 1973 War

Soviet Surface Combatants and Amphibious Ships Engaged in Crisis Operations ^a							Airlift and Sealift Tonnages (In hundreds of tons) ^b				
Date	Evacuation	AGI	Anti-USN	Resupply:		Total Soviet	Equivalent USN	Syria:		Egypt	
				Syria	Egypt			Sea	Air	Sea	Air
Oct. 5	4					19	35				
Oct. 6	5					18	35				
Oct. 7	3	1	1			18	35				
Oct. 8	3	2	2			19	35			12.0	
Oct. 9	—	2	4			19	32	5.5	—	5.5	
Oct. 10	—	2	2			22	32	15.0	—	15.0	
Oct. 11	—	2	2			22	32	—	2.3	—	
Oct. 12	—	2	2	2		21	32	35.0	1.8	—	2.4
Oct. 13	—	2	2	3		21	32	31.6	2.3	—	3.3
Oct. 14	—	2	2	3		23	32	33.7	4.2	36.8	4.6
Oct. 15	—	2	2	5		23	32	—	3.8	—	2.8
Oct. 16	—	2	3	6		23	32	—	5.6	11.5	3.2
Oct. 17	—	2	3	6		27	32	13.3	4.8	16.0	1.7
Oct. 18	—	2	3	3		27	32	15.3	2.8	—	7.6
Oct. 19	—	2	3	3		29	32	28.3	4.0	—	4.5
Oct. 20	—	2	3	8		29	32	—	3.0	17.1	9.5
Oct. 21	—	2	3	8		29	32	77.2	3.5	—	6.6
Oct. 22	—	2	3	9		30	32	37.4	1.0	32.5	7.2
Oct. 23	—	2	5	5		32	32	54.8	3.2	84.5	6.6
Oct. 24	—	2	4	4		32	33	35.0	1.3	—	3.8
Oct. 25	—	2	7	3	4	32	37	—	—	54.0	—
Oct. 26	—	2	7	1	10	32	37	—	—	48.7	—

Table 5.8. Operations Involving Soviet Naval Forces, October 1973 War (Continued)

Soviet Surface Combatants and Amphibious Ships Engaged in Crisis Operations ^a							Airlift and Sealift Tonnages (In hundreds of tons) ^b				
Evac- uation	AGI	Anti- USN	Resupply:		Total Soviet	Equivalent USN	Syria:		Egypt:		
			Syria	Egypt			Sea	Air	Sea	Air	
Oct. 27	—	2	8	—	11	33	37	—	—	—	—
Oct. 28	—	2	11	1	7	33	37	—	—	28.0	—
Oct. 29	—	2	11	3	7	36	41	—	—	10.0	—
Oct. 30	—	2	15	3	7	38	41	38.6	—	17.7	—
Oct. 31	—	2	15	2	—	41	41	20.0	—	29.7	—
Nov. 1	—	2	11	2	—	40	41	—	—	25.0	—
Nov. 2	—	2	11	2	—	40	41	—	—	—	—
Nov. 3	—	2	11	2	—	40	41	—	—	—	—
Nov. 4	—	2	5	1	—	40	41	—	—	—	—
Nov. 5	—	2	5	1	—	39	41	—	—	—	—
Nov. 6	—	2	5	1	—	38	41	—	—	—	—
Nov. 7	—	2	5	1	—	36	41	—	—	36.7	—
Nov. 8	—	2	5	1	—	33	41	—	—	—	—
Nov. 9	—	2	6	1	—	32	41	—	—	—	—

^aThe five left-hand columns indicate the number of Soviet surface combatants (of all types) and amphibious ships involved in each of five crisis-oriented operations: the evacuation of Egyptian and Syrian ports at the start of the war; intelligence ship escort operations (by minesweepers) off the Israeli and Syrian coasts; all operations intended to watch or counter the U.S. Sixth Fleet (by task forces or anticarrier warfare groups); and the force that formed off Syria and Egypt to protect the resupply airlift and sealift and to be prepared for other contingencies. The sixth column gives the total number of ships of these classes in the Fifth Fleet, while the seventh column gives comparable figures for the Sixth Fleet.

^bFigures for the airlift and sealift are approximate and are given in hundreds of tons. Figures for the sealift are tonnages declared by the Soviets, which were usually only a small fraction of the capacity of the ships involved. Dates for the sealift are for the Turkish Straits transit: most ships would have left the Soviet Union about two days earlier and arrived at their destinations two or three days later.

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