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Russia's Relations with CIS states in the Context of NATO
Expansion 1991 - 1998:
A Complex Relations Approach

by:
T. Rosemary Yeremian, B.A. Hon.

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree

Master of Arts

Carleton University
Ottawa Ontario
August, 1999

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**RUSSIA'S RELATIONS WITH CIS STATES IN THE CONTEXT OF
NATO EXPANSION, 1991-1998: A COMPLEX RELATIONS APPROACH**

submitted by

Rosemary Yeremian, B.A. Hons.

in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts

Chair, Department of Political Science

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September 7, 1999

ABSTRACT

In the latter half of the 1990s, Russia has sought greater integration with the Commonwealth of Independent States. Interestingly, this has occurred at the same time as Russian foreign policy decision-makers perceived NATO expansion as a threat. The relationship between these two developments creates a need for a new theoretical approach to examine the ways in which Russia seeks integration. Using Complex Relations Approach, a variant of Neo-Institutionalism, the development of Russia's foreign policy is traced from formulation to implementation. This thesis investigates how Russia has used its foreign policy tools in innovative ways to achieve closer integration of the CIS states in the context of the perceived threat posed by NATO expansion.

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CHAPTER ONE -

RUSSIA, THE CIS, AND NATO: A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 set forth dramatic changes to the formulation and direction of Russian foreign policy. The uncertain climate of the post-Cold War environment prompted a search for fresh principles to understand how Russia's foreign policy addressed issues of political security, particularly with regards to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Russia's relations with the CIS states took on increased importance as discussions emerged about changes to Europe's security framework. In particular, the debate surrounding the eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) prompted Russian officials to look more towards the CIS states when addressing issues of Russian political security as well as economic prosperity.

During the first half of the 1990s, a debate emerged over the eastward enlargement of the NATO. There were two contending views. Proponents of NATO enlargement argued that the countries of Eastern Europe had stability and security concerns that NATO could address. Opponents of NATO expansion came from both the U.S. and the Russian Federation. It was believed that NATO enlargement would deepen the gap between Russia and the West, result in Russia's inward reorientation, and create a rebirth of the Russian sphere of influence among the former states of the Soviet Union.¹

¹ Jeffrey Simon, "An Overview of NATO Enlargement," in Jeffrey Simon (ed.) NATO Enlargement: Opinions and Options, National Defense University Press, Washington, 1995, p.9.

The breakup of the Soviet Union left fifteen independent republics struggling with political, economic, and social instability. Vestiges of the economic, political, social and security ties left by the Soviet system made it difficult for the newly independent states to organize their political and economic affairs without the help of Russia and the other new states. As a result, discussions emerged about reintegration between the former Soviet republics, primarily within the forum of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Despite Russia's initial reluctance to get involved in issues concerning the 'near abroad', a major policy realignment during most of 1993-1994 prompted Russia to lead CIS attempts to reintegrate the CIS Member states. Russian foreign policy decision-makers realized that the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union form a zone of vital interest for Russia. They affected the prospects for Russia's success in political and economic reform, as well as had consequences for Russia's internal stability and external security.² Although some former Soviet republics, such as Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, made it clear that reintegration was not desirable, the countries which made up the CIS began discussions, post-1994, about the security requirements in view of the new economic and political situation in Europe.

Since the Madrid Summit of 1997, and the subsequent decision to expand NATO eastward to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, the discussions surrounding CIS integration have intensified. Evidence has emerged from within these discussions that Russia perceives the eastward enlargement of NATO as a threat to its

² Alexei Arbatov, "Russian Security Interests and Dilemmas: An Agenda for the Future," Alexei Arbatov et al. (eds.) Managing Conflict in the Former Soviet Union, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1997, p.411.

security.³ The enlargement of NATO, the former adversary of Russia's predecessor, the Soviet Union, brings the borders of the Alliance closer to Russia. Seemingly in an attempt to meet this perceived threat, a parallel debate has emerged in Russia about re-aligning itself more closely with the former Soviet republics in political, economic, and security terms. Some have suggested a new security alliance that could include all former Soviet republics, except the Baltics.⁴ Such an alliance could create new adversarial relationships that would threaten the long-term prospects for the maintenance of peace in Europe.

It is interesting that Russia's increasingly anti-NATO stance, and its increasing control of the CIS, seem to be at odds with Boris Yeltsin's initial pro-Western foreign policy. When the Soviet Union broke up, Yeltsin and his foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, adopted a foreign policy that was geared towards cooperating with Western Europe and North America for purposes of receiving financial assistance to help boost its deteriorating economy. It could also be argued that Yeltsin and Kozyrev's "Atlanticist" foreign policy aimed to ensure Russia's inclusion in Western international political fora in order to still be considered a great power. During this time, very little attention was

³ Evidence of this can be found in numerous sources, such as Interviews with Russian officials printed in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS-SOV-95-205) "Danish Daily Warns West Not to Ignore Russia" & "Duma Deputies Debate Over Course of Foreign Policy"; FBIS-SOV-96-124, "Russia: Primakov Sets Out Foreign Policy Priorities"; FBIS-SOV-98-352 "Primakov Reaffirms Negative Attitude on NATO Expansion") and in essays by Russian scholars, such as Alexei G. Arbatov, "Russian Foreign Policy Priorities for the 1990s" in Teresa Johnson and Steven Miller (eds.) Russian Security After the Cold War, Brassey's, Washington, 1994.

⁴ See Leonid Mayorov & Dmitri Afinogenov, "An Important Direction for Integration: Formation of a Collective System of Security in the CIS," Nezavisimaya gazeta, Moscow, February 3, 1998.

paid to Russia's relations with the CIS.⁵ This pro-Western stance differed dramatically from the USSR's perception of the West as the capitalist enemy during the Cold War. The Soviet perception of the international arena as a zero-sum game, where a gain for the USSR was a loss for the West, also contributed to its hostile relations with Western nations. Thus, the pro-Western direction of Russian foreign policy in the early 1990s was a major shift from its previous Soviet foreign policy stance.

In the mid-1990s, a major readjustment led to a foreign policy that was more balanced in direction between east and west. Russia increasingly concerned itself with activities in the former Soviet republics, as well as eastern neighbours such as China and Iran. This shift in policy was marked by a change in foreign ministers from pro-Western Andrei Kozyrev to pro-Eurasianist Yevgenii Primakov. Many in the West considered the increased focus on the CIS states to be a neo-imperialistic direction of Russian foreign policy:

Russian spokesmen have compared the policy to the United States' "Monroe Doctrine," and have promoted it in the international arena as "peacekeeping." ... This tends to obscure the frankly partisan nature of the exercise, which once again seeks to subordinate the nations of the periphery to Russian hegemony.⁶

It was through this policy that Russia promoted, and continues to promote, integration with the CIS states. The shift in policy can be attributed to, among other things, the increasing alienation felt by Russians from the West. Some issues and events that may

⁵ The Commonwealth of Independent States was founded on December 8, 1991, when the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus signed a formal agreement in Minsk. This association includes the following states: Russian, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan.

have contributed to this development include the increasing debate about NATO's eastward expansion and the realization of the importance of the economic, political, and social ties that bind Russia to the CIS states.

Despite the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia seems to have maintained a high level of influence over the policies of the former Soviet republics. Why does Russia exert such a high level and sustained influence on the direction of foreign policies of states that are external to it? How does Russia utilize its own foreign policy tools to exert influence over the foreign policies of former Soviet states? As many have observed, Russia no longer has the military might to exert the influence it had during the Cold War. Authors such as Mikhail Tsypkin cite the fragmentation of the Russian military as being caused by lack of a clear command and control system.⁷ Other factors contributing to the fragmentation of the military include:

The use of some of its units for internal security missions, great disparities in social conditions and economic prospects among different groups of officers, and differences between enlisted volunteers and conscripts.⁸

If Russia can no longer use its military strength to maintain influence over its neighbors, what tools does it currently utilize to exert influence? How does Russia use these tools?

The focus of the present study is to examine whether there is a relationship between the debate about CIS integration and the perceived threat of NATO expansion,

⁶ Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "Russia's Monroe Doctrine: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, or Imperial Outreach?" Maureen Molot & Harald von Riekhoff (eds.) Canada Among Nations 1994, Carleton University Press, Ottawa, 1994, p.233.

⁷ Mikhail Tsypkin, "The Politics of Russian Security Policy," Bruce Parrott (ed.), State Building and Military Power in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, 1995, p.20.

and if so, how Russia utilizes its foreign policy tools to exert influence on the other former Soviet republics as a result of the perception of this threat.

Statement of the Problem

This study investigated the various ways Russia uses its foreign policy tools to influence the CIS into closer integration. This issue was examined in the context of the perceived threat of NATO expansion. Thus, the following hypothesis was tested: As NATO expands eastward, Russian foreign policy decision-makers are compelled to seek closer integration with the CIS states (due to the perception of NATO expansion as a threat to Russia's vital interests and security) through Russia's foreign policy linkages.

In order to test the hypothesis, the study attempted to answer five main questions:

- 1) Who are the decision-makers of Russia's foreign policy?
- 2) Does Russia perceive NATO expansion as a threat to its security?
- 3) Does the development of this perception impel Russia to seek closer integration with the CIS states?
- 4) What linkages did Russian officials use, and in which way, to achieve this closer integration?
- 5) What approach can be used to best understand this problem?

The study is important for four reasons. First, analysis of this issue will lead us to a greater knowledge of emerging security issues in Europe. Issues of political security have, since the end of the Cold War, become the foundation for renewed pan-European political and economic activity. The end of the Cold War brought highly idealistic sentiments of peace, democracy, and economic prosperity to the fore. It was believed that

⁸ *Ibid*, p. 21.

this new Europe, with NATO acting as the most important successive institution in Europe, would entrench these sentiments. The eastward enlargement of NATO, however, has lead many to question this development. By examining how foreign policy decision-makers in Russia respond to the perception of the threat posed by NATO expansion, a better understanding can be reached about Russia's place in the new security environment in Europe.

Second, the study adds valuable information about the formulation of Russian foreign policy. It identifies the areas in the Russian foreign policy decision-making structure where issues of European security and CIS integration are addressed. As well, it takes into account the role of actors outside the traditional model of government foreign policy decision-making, such as that of industry leaders and interest groups. This knowledge is important because it will facilitate understanding of Russia's transition to democracy in the field of foreign policy development.

Third, the study explores the new foreign policy tools that are being used by Russia with regards to its agenda in the former Soviet republics. During the Soviet era, Russia used military capabilities and a system of domination through Communist Party control and secret services surveillance to exert influence on these republics. Since the end of the Cold War, it has become evident that Russia now uses other foreign policy tools to achieve the same goals. Russia's decreased reliance on the military as a foreign policy tool is best evidenced by its military spending. During the Soviet era, up to 33 per cent of the budget was spent on defence.⁹ In 1995, defence spending was cut to

⁹Vladimir Lopatin, "Military Budget: Old questions to New Generals", in Moscow News, no. 14, April 8, 1994.

approximately 2.9 percent of GDP as the Russian economy collapsed.¹⁰ Furthermore, the military only received between 46 and 70 per cent of its capital allocation between 1994 and 1996.¹¹ The result was a grossly undermanned, under-equipped and under-trained Russian army with low morale problems.¹²

Despite its inability to rely on the military as a tool of foreign policy, Russia has been able to maintain its influence in the CIS member states, to varying extents. According to some observers, Russia remained deeply involved in CIS member states' affairs in a fashion that looked much like a reassertion of imperial domination.¹³ At the same time, "local leaders and factions facilitated – sometimes intentionally, sometimes unintentionally – the return of Russian hegemony."¹⁴ Thus, Russia was able to address its foreign policy objectives using what president Boris Yeltsin labeled: "nonstandard approaches and novel forms of interaction."¹⁵ This thesis will go on to argue that these "novel" foreign policy tools include attempts to monopolize control over: natural resources in the region, information and communications, transportation, and energy. This study explores Russia's relations with the other CIS countries through the use of these new tools in the context of NATO expansion.

¹⁰ Russian Economic Trends, Vol. 4, No. 4, 1995, p. 11.

¹¹ Mike Bower, Russian Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War, Dartmouth Publishing Co., Brookfield, 1997, p. 214.

¹² See for instance, John Lepingwell, "The Russian Military in the 1990s: Disintegration or Renewal?" in Douglas Blum, (ed.), Russia's Future: Consolidation or Disintegration?, Westview Press, Boulder, 1994, pp. 109 – 126.

¹³ William E. Odom & Robert Dujarric, Commonwealth or Empire?, Hudson Institute, Indianapolis, 1995, p. 14.

¹⁴ *Ibid*, p. 14.

¹⁵ Boris Yeltsin, "President Yeltsin's Address to Russian Diplomats," Speech in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Russia on May 12, 1998, in International Affairs (Moscow), Vol. 44, No. 3, 1998, p.2.

Finally, this study is important because Russia's policy development towards the CIS is an important factor in its relations with other regional and global powers. Russia's geopolitical position is an important one. It occupies space in three major world regions. Historically, Russia was considered a rival to many states surrounding it. Currently, it has the opportunity to change this paradigm of relations and to forge genuine partnerships and cooperative relationships. This is predicated on Moscow's policy towards the CIS. Issues of conflict resolution, economic cooperation, and political interchange inside the post-Soviet space will have great implications for Russia's policies outside the post-Soviet space.

Purpose and Objectives

The purpose of the study was to examine Russia's foreign policy linkages with CIS countries due to the perceived threat of NATO expansion. The study looked at what the main actors in the making of Russian foreign policy were claiming about CIS integration in the context of a discussion of NATO expansion. The following objectives were examined in the study:

- 1) To demonstrate that NATO enlargement was perceived as a threat among Russian foreign policy decision-makers.
- 2) To demonstrate that the perception of this development as a threat prompted actors in Russian foreign policy to engage in a discussion of closer integration with the 'near abroad' within the same context.
- 3) To demonstrate the usefulness of Complex Relations Approach, which examines foreign policy linkages, in examining the perception of NATO expansion as a threat by

Russian foreign policy decision-makers, and the subsequent attempt by Russia to seek deeper integration with the CIS as a response.

Background to the Study

There have been many theories of international relations that have attempted to maintain their relevance in the post-Cold War era. Particularly with respect to Russian foreign policy, there are limits to their explanatory capacity in a post-Cold War environment riddled with uncertainty and unpredictability. The following section briefly reviews existing international relations theories and provides some of the background reasoning that contributed to the development of this thesis.

The traditional approach used to analyze Russian foreign policy in the Cold War era was based on the international relations theory of realism.¹⁶ According to realist authors, such as Hans Morgenthau and John Mearsheimer, international politics define the concept of a state's interest in terms of power.¹⁷ Specifically, realists view the international system as:

A brutal arena where states look for opportunities to take advantage of each other and therefore have little reason to trust each other. Daily life is essentially a struggle for power, where each state strives not only to be the most powerful actor in the system, but also to ensure that no other state achieves that lofty position.¹⁸

¹⁶ see for instance, Mike Bower, Russian Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War, Dartmouth Publishing Co., Brookfield, 1997, pp.245-249; and Peter Shearman, "Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1991" Peter Shearman (ed.), Russian Foreign Policy Since 1990, Westview, Boulder, 1995, pp. 9-13.

¹⁷ Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 4th edition, Alfred A. Knopf Inc., New York, 1968, p.5.

¹⁸ John Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3, p. 9.

Realist theory, according to Hedley Bull, was primarily concerned with the balance of power, international law, the diplomatic mechanism, the managerial system of great powers, and war in the study of the international system.¹⁹ The realist approach, therefore, assumed that “the character of a foreign policy can be ascertained only through the examination of the political acts performed and of the foreseeable consequences of these acts.”²⁰

This focus of realist theory seemed to best reflect the international environment of the Cold War, from World War II onwards:

The decade after 1945 saw the emergence of a “realist” school of thought...Reacting to the traumas of appeasement and the rise of fascism in the 1930s – and later the impact of Stalin, the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, and the initial years of the Cold War – this approach tended to focus on what international relations is, rather than what it should be...To the extent that competing approaches existed, they often reflected “idealist” interpretations.²¹

Realists viewed international politics through the lens of the security dilemma: the means by which a state tries to increase its own security decreases the security of others.²² Indeed, the U.S. and the USSR both took measures during the Cold War to increase their own security while placing the others’ at risk.²³ Thus, realist theory became popular in analyzing international affairs because it seemed to best explain the balance of power and

¹⁹ Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, Columbia University Press, New York, 1977, p. 74.

²⁰ Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 4th edition, Alfred A. Knopf Inc., New York, 1968, p.4.

²¹ Robert Lieber, No Common Power, 3rd edition, HarperCollins, New York, 1995, p.10.

²² K.J. Holsti, International Politics, 7th edition, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1995, p.5.

²³ Some measures would include the US led creation of NATO, the USSR led creation of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, and the struggle for domination over Third World countries.

competition for resources that existed between the U.S. and the USSR during the Cold War.

The end of the Cold War brought to light some limitation of realist theory in comprehensively explaining international affairs. In particular, realism has demonstrated limitations in analyzing Russian foreign policy:

Realism as a political theory failed to predict the end of great-power rivalry, the unilateral Soviet withdrawal from its sphere of influence, and the rise of nationalism.²⁴

After the Cold War, it became evident that the realist approach could no longer adequately explain the factors that shaped Russian foreign policy, and how Russia used its foreign policy tools in the post-Cold War era to achieve its desired results without the use of military capabilities. Realism's emphasis on military strength as a foreign policy tool no longer addressed the other means used in the post-Cold War era to influence other states' behavior. Even attempts to revive the applicability of realism, through neo-realism, had some limitations. Neo-realism was considered to be a "modernized" version of classical realism. Unlike classical realism, neo-realism sought to "transcend empiricist fixations by comprehending deeper levels of social reality through systematic social scientific investigation."²⁵ This new approach, however, led to contradictions and ideological narrowness. Both realism and neo-realism demonstrated their limitations in addressing why Russia cooperated with other states to achieve gains that did not seem

²⁴ Peter Shearman, "Soviet Foreign Policy 1917 – 1991", in Peter Shearman (ed.), Russian Foreign Policy Since 1990, Westview Press, Boulder, 1995, p.1.

²⁵ Robert O. Keohane, "Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics," Robert O. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and Its Critics, Columbia University Press, New York, 1986, p.19.

directly beneficial to Russia. Thus, the realist approach could not adequately address many of the issues surrounding the topic of this thesis.

Another dominant international relations theory is that of Liberalism.²⁶ This theory also demonstrated its limitations in satisfactorily explaining post-Cold War developments, particularly the development of Russia's policies towards other states. Using scenarios such as the "Stag Hunt" and the "Prisoner's Dilemma",²⁷ Liberalists tried to demonstrate that cooperation between states is not only likely, but desirable as well. Liberalism holds that states will cooperate with each other in order to avoid war and its accompanying unpredictable and uncontrollable elements. Unlike Realism's view of the world as a zero-sum game, Liberalists view a state's gain as independent of other states' gains. In other words:

[The] utility functions [of states] are independent of one another; they do not gain or lose utility simply because of the gains or losses of others.²⁸

Liberalism, thus, rejects the security dilemma and downplays the importance of military-security issues.

The theory of Liberalism, however, fails to adequately address the issues surrounding Russian foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. By rejecting the security dilemma and over-emphasizing the possibilities for cooperation in the international arena, Liberalism can not satisfactorily explain Russia's perception of NATO expansion as a threat. Furthermore, Liberalism demonstrates its limitations regarding cooperation within

²⁶ The term "Liberalism" is used here as an international relations theory. Elsewhere in international relations literature, it is also referred to as "Idealism". The use of this term should not to be confused with the theory of Liberalism in the philosophical sense.

²⁷ See Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma" *World Politics*, Vol. 30, no. 2, January 1978 for explanations of the Stag Hunt and Prisoner's Dilemma scenarios.

the CIS. Among CIS member states, cooperation is largely brought about by Russian attempts for domination in the region, rather than by each of the other CIS member states.²⁹ By emphasizing the desirability of cooperation by a state, Liberalism thus does not contribute to a sufficient understanding of CIS integration.

A more recent international relations theory developed by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye is known as Complex Interdependence Theory. Unlike realism, Complex Interdependence does not prioritize military-security issues. Instead, it is based upon three principle characteristics:

First, societies are connected by multiple channels – interstate, transgovernmental, and transnational. Second, the agenda of interstate relations consists of multiple issues not arranged in a clear or consistent hierarchy... Third, the threat or deployment of military force is not an important factor in the relationship.³⁰

Indeed, the relationship between Russia and the CIS states can be well understood as a series of links through multiple channels. In this sense, Complex Interdependence does provide some insight into Russian foreign policy.

Although this theory began to address some of the issues surrounding Russian foreign policy towards the CIS (such as the issues that link states together), it was limited in its ability to address Russia's security issues. By giving security issues less of a priority, Complex Interdependence did not address the fact that a great deal of Russia's

²⁸ Robert Keohane, After Hegemony, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1984, p. 27.

²⁹ Renée de Nevers, Russia's Strategic Renovation, Adelphi Paper 289, USS Brassey's, July 1994, p.6. This point will be elaborated upon in chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis.

³⁰ Charles Pentland, "Integration, Interdependence, and Institutions: Approaches to International Order" in David Haglund & Michael Hawes (eds.) World Politics, HBJ, Toronto, 1990, p.174, p. 189.

foreign policy priorities revolves around security issues.³¹ Two of the most important issues of great concern to Russia had very real security dimensions to them: the eastward expansion of NATO and the prospects of integration with the CIS states. These two issues as related to Russian foreign policy thus increased the demand for a more comprehensive approach in the study of international relations.

An approach was needed that took into consideration the institutional linkages between states and how they contribute to the development of a state's foreign policy. No state creates or develops foreign policy in a vacuum. The collaboration and interchange of information and opinions with other states is crucial in the development of a state's foreign policy. It becomes important then to look at the linkages formed between states' foreign policy officials and decision-makers in order to comprehensively understand how a state's foreign policy comes about.

Existing literature about foreign policy decision-making seemed to analyze decision-making using a rigid approach. Decision-making approaches, such as argumentation, cognitive mapping, and means-ends approaches,³² did not seem to adequately address the myriad of factors and considerations that appeared to be both directly, and more importantly indirectly, influential in the formulation of Russian foreign policy. Other pieces of literature on foreign policy decision-making were limited in that they predominantly addressed decision-making with reference to external stimuli, instead

³¹ See for example "Russia: Primakov Sets Out Foreign Policy Priorities", FBIS-SOV-96-124, June 25, 1996.

³² See for instance: Irmtraud N. Gallhofer & Willem E. Saris, Foreign Policy Decision-Making, Praeger, Westport, 1996.

of analyzing the vying of power by various domestic institutional players.³³ Thus, existing literature on foreign policy decision-making did not seem to satisfactorily address the concerns of this thesis.

One theory that seemed to partially address some of the issues at hand was that of Neo-institutionalism. The theory of neo-institutionalism focuses on how state institutions shape the goals that political actors pursue and the way they structure power relations among them.³⁴ Thus, in order to understand a state's policies, one must analyze the institutional structure and decision-making processes of that state. Although not a theory of traditional international relations, many of its postulates could be modified to create a new approach, which could then be applied to Russian foreign policy.

In her book, *Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research*, leading institutionalist Theda Skocpol found that historically, civil service administrators consistently made more important contributions to social policy development than political parties or interest groups.³⁵ In this sense, it becomes important to analyze a state's bureaucratic organization and decision-making processes in order to understand the policies of that state. By analyzing the institutional setting of a

³³ See for instance: Yaacov Vertzberger, *The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition, and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1990.

³⁴ Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, "Historical institutionalism in comparative politics", in Steinmo, Sven, Thelen Kathleen and Longstreth, Frank (eds.) *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992, p. 2.

³⁵ Theda Skocpol's "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research," in Evans, Peter B. et al (eds.) *Bringing the State Back In*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985, p. 11.

state, asymmetries in the construction of power become evident. It is these asymmetries of power within the institution that shape and mold political actions taken by the state:

In a historical/institutional view, politics is structured by persistent incongruities and frictions among institutional orderings.³⁶

The analysis of a state institution and the rivalry for power within it leads to a more comprehensive understanding of the state's policies and actions.

Other institutionalists furthered Skocpol's assessment of the importance of institutions. Ellen Immergut cited political opportunities within institutions as also being crucial for understanding policy formulation. She claimed that it is not only important to analyze political institutions and their processes, but it is also necessary to consider the structure of political opportunities within an institution to understand how they shape the political actions taken.³⁷

How does this relate to the issue at hand? It was the researcher's belief that if institutionalism was so effective in understanding the formulation of a state's social policy, then the same logic could be applied to a state's foreign policy. If one analyzed a state's decision-making structures and administrators in the field of foreign policy, then perhaps a better understanding could be reached of those policies and how a state can influence other states through governing structures and institutions.

When applied to Russian foreign policy, this would necessitate the analysis of the Russian government and the competition for power among Russian foreign policy decision-makers who are placed in a variety of institutions. The eastward expansion of

³⁶ Stephen Skowronek, "Order and Change," *Polity*, Volume XXVIII, No. 1, Fall 1995, p.95.

NATO, perceived as a threat by Russian officials, provided the Russian government with a political opportunity. This opportunity could be used to seek new strategic relationships with the CIS states in the form of political, economic, and social integration.

Although institutionalism seemed to address many of the concerns of this thesis, its approach was primarily concerned with socio-economic policy, not foreign policy. Existing neo-institutional analyses of Russia, such as by Jack Snyder,³⁷ did not formulate an approach that could be specifically applied to Russian foreign policy. As such, a new approach was created for the purposes of this thesis that was a variant of the institutionalist theory. The new approach created by this thesis was termed Complex Relations Approach. Although based on institutionalist literature, this approach would capture the foreign policy arm of the Russian state and analyze the decision-making linkages between Russia and the CIS. Furthermore, this approach would investigate the formulation and implementation of Russian policies towards the CIS that were aimed at achieving integration with the CIS member states.

Definitions of Terms

Many terms and concepts used in this thesis require clarification. As such, the following section aims to define some of the terms and concepts used throughout the thesis.

³⁷ Ellen M. Immergut, "The Theoretical Core of the New Institutionalism," Politics & Society, Vol. 26, No. 1, March 1998, p.21.

³⁸ See for instance, Barnett R. Rubin & Jack Snyder (eds.), Post-Soviet Political Order: Conflict and State Building, Routledge, New York, 1998.

- **Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS):** Founded on December 8, 1991, when the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus signed a formal agreement in Minsk,³⁹ this association attempts to provide a coordinating mechanism for the territory of all the former Soviet republics, except for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The CIS includes: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.⁴⁰
- **‘Near Abroad’:** A Russian term for the other fourteen successor states of the former Soviet Union. This includes: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Tajikistan, Kyrgystan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan.
- **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO):** A collective defence organization between the United States, Canada, and many European states that was formed after the Second World War to deter Soviet aggression.⁴¹ The NATO treaty is a pact that considers an attack on one member to be an attack on all members.
- **Security:** A definition of the concept of security is important for the purposes of this thesis because it is premised on the assumption that Russia perceives NATO expansion as a security threat. The hypothesis presupposes that because of this security threat, Russia seeks greater control over its relations with the CIS states. Therefore, the definition of “security” as a concept is crucial for the testing of the hypothesis.

³⁹ Carol Barner-Barry and Cynthia A. Hody, The Politics of Change: The Transformation of the Former Soviet Union, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1995, p.269.

⁴⁰ Wynne Russell, “Russian Relations with the Near Abroad” Peter Shearman (ed.) Russian Foreign Policy Since 1990, Westview Press, Boulder, 1995, p.53.

During the Cold War, the hostile security environment -- overshadowed by the rivalry between two opposing superpowers and the threat of nuclear annihilation -- was a major determinant of the prevailing security paradigm.⁴² The constant possibility of nuclear conflict shaped the ideas around which the concept of security was based. As Kenneth Waltz stated in his book, *Man, The State, and War*, the security system in Europe was such that “a gain for any one state became a gain for its side, and simultaneously a loss for the other.”⁴³ Subsequently, the concept of security was narrowly focused on the zero-sum survival of the state against outside military threats.

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a drastic overhaul of the notion of security. The rise of the importance of economic, political, and social issues have resulted in “security” being broadened to encompass elements more reflective of the post-Cold War environment. As J. Ann Tickner argues in *Re-Visioning Security*:

In the present international system, security is tied to a nationalist political identity which depends on the construction of those outside as ‘other’ and therefore dangerous.⁴⁴

This definition of security introduces the concept of identity as being inherently tied to the concept of security. The issue of identity has become increasingly important to Russia since the end of the Cold War. The dissolution of the Soviet Union produced monumental confusion about the Russian identity. Overnight, Russia lost its superpower

⁴¹ John Baylis, “The Evolution of NATO Strategy 1949-1990” Colin McInnis (ed.) *Security and Strategy in the New Europe*, Routledge, New York, 1992.

⁴² Michael Clarke (ed.) *New Perspectives on Security*, Centre for Defence Studies, New York, 1993.

⁴³ Kenneth Waltz, *Man, The State, and War*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1959, p.219.

status and had its frontiers rolled back to where they had been in the mid-1800s, and in the case of the West the mid-1600s:

The loss of the Caucasus revived strategic fears of resurgent Turkish influence; the loss of Central Asia generated a sense of deprivation regarding the enormous energy and mineral resources of the region as well as anxiety over a potential Islamic challenge; and Ukraine's independence challenged the very essence of Russia's claim to being the divinely endowed standard-bearer of a common pan-Slavic identity.⁴⁵

Throughout the post-Cold War period, Russia has been struggling with its identity, and attempting to find direction in its foreign policy and its place in the international arena:

The "accursed question" – what is Russia and where does it fit within the international system – is far from resolved... [T]he country continues to drift, searching for a usable history and a paradigm that will enable it to regain its balance.⁴⁶

Since the concept of identity has become increasingly important in Russia as it grapples with the management of their national political, economic and social issues, the researcher believes that any definition of security for the purposes of this study must also include the concept of identity.

Hence, the researcher proposes the following definition of security. Security is when an issue is presented as posing a threat to the identity, self-interest, and self-determination of a state or set of states. Many researchers of the concept of security argue that the concept should not be limited to the state, but should also include societal

⁴⁴ J. Ann Tickner, "Re-Visioning Security" Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds.) International Relations Theory Today, Pennsylvania State University Press, Pennsylvania, 1995, p. 189.

⁴⁵ Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard, Basic Books, New York, 1997, pp.88-89.

⁴⁶ Ilya Prizel, National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia and Ukraine, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998, p.235.

organizations, corporations, and other non-state actors.⁴⁷ The analysis presented in this study, however, is focused on states and their apparatuses. Therefore, the definition of security used was state-based rather than societal-based. This is not to say that societal-based definitions of security are not valid. Societal-based definitions, however, are not the most useful in examining the issues presented in this particular study.

- **Perception:** A definition of the concept of “perception” is required because of its significance in the hypothesis. The hypothesis does not state that closer integration with the CIS states is a direct result of NATO expansion. Rather, it is the “perception” of this event as a security threat that prompts Russian foreign policy makers to seek closer ties with the CIS states. The concept of “perception” can have different meanings, the definition of which will result in a specific interpretation of the outcome of this thesis. Therefore, the use of the term “perception” in this thesis is discussed below.

As Lloyd Jensen stated in his book, *Explaining Foreign Policy*, “International events are *perceived* by decision makers on the basis of images they hold about the world.”⁴⁸ Various factors shape these images, including a state’s historical experience, its power position, its domestic political and economic conditions, and its national belief systems. In the study of international relations, “perception” can be defined in the realist sense and in the post-modern sense.

In the realist sense, every state’s decision-makers have different “perceptions” of reality, based on the factors mentioned above. It is not possible for any one individual, or

⁴⁷ see for instance, Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 1998.

any state, to know what is the true reality. John Locke wrote in his essay entitled *Perception and Knowledge*, “That the certainty of things existing in *rerum natura* when we have the testimony of our senses for it is not only as great as our frame can attain to, but as our conditions needs.”⁴⁹ Therefore, one’s “perception” in the realist sense can only mirror reality, but the true reality is never known. Because everyone’s “perception” can only mirror reality, everyone’s perception is equally valid and true.

In the post-modern sense, the concept of “perception” is deconstructed. As such, one’s perception becomes reality. According to this philosophy, there are many different realities. There is, however, a fundamental flaw in this argument. If taken to its logical conclusion, there can be no reality in the post-modern sense because everything is subjective.

The aim of this thesis is to demonstrate that reality as seen by Russian foreign policy decision-makers carries an equal weight to the “perceptions” of reality in the West. In other words, if Russian officials perceive the eastward expansion of NATO as a threat, then this belief should be held as valid, even if Western officials disagree. Thus, for the purposes of this thesis the realist definition of “perception” is used. This supposes that there is no such thing as an objective reality. The Russian perception of reality, therefore, is only a mirror of the true reality, but one that can still be analyzed. *Perceived threat* therefore, according to Bruce Porter, would be:

⁴⁸ Lloyd Jensen, Explaining Foreign Policy, Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, 1982, pp.33-34.

⁴⁹ John Locke, “Perception and Knowledge,” James E. White (ed.) Introduction to Philosophy, West Publishing Company, New York, 1989, p.112.

[T]hose that a given party perceives as existing, regardless of whether they objectively do. A perceived threat may derive from an objective threat or it may be largely in the imagination, a product of suspicion and doubt.⁵⁰

An analysis of the Russian perception of international events may provide insight into the direction of Russia's foreign policy. Thus, the Russian perception of NATO expansion as a threat must be taken into consideration as a valid perception to be acknowledged in the international arena.

- **Russian National Interest:** According to Francis Fukuyama, nations have a certain unchanging core of permanent interests imposed on them by geography and the external environment.⁵¹ In the past decade Russia has gone through substantial changes in its political structure, economic status, territorial boundaries and military capability. Consequently, a set of fundamental interests are continuously evolving that will eventually determine Russia's national interest.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, there has been a debate within Russia about how to define its national interests. This debate, however, has largely been a fight against "straw men" rather than against real arguments in the words of author Sergei Stankevich:⁵²

Many of a country's national interests leave, in fact, almost no room for real debate. They are to a large extent predetermined by geography,

⁵⁰ Bruce Porter, "Russia and Europe After the Cold War," in Celeste Wallander (ed.) The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy After the Cold War, Westview Press, Boulder, 1996, p. 123.

⁵¹ Francis Fukuyama, "The Ambiguity of 'National Interest'", Stephen Sestanovich (ed.), Rethinking Russia's National Interest, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, 1994, p. 12.

⁵² Sergei Stankevich, "Toward a New 'National Idea'", Stephen Sestanovich (ed.), Rethinking Russia's National Interest, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, 1994, p. 24.

history, culture, ethnic composition and political tradition. Fundamental interests such as survival, prosperity, and security are common to all countries, and the pursuit of those interests is a natural aspect of stable international relations.⁵³

As many authors, such as Sergei Stankevich and Ilya Prizel, have argued the concept of Russian national interest is currently in flux.⁵⁴ In other words, Russia is moving towards a new definition of its national interest. Despite this transition, a number of factors can be identified as important components in the development of Russia's national interest, particularly as a new consensus seems to be emerging among the Russian political élite.⁵⁵

Russia's unique geographic status presents an important consideration for Russia's national interests. The territory of the Russian Federation spans a vast area that allows Russia to be considered a major player in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. The development of its foreign policy, then, must consider all three regions. In the beginning of the post-Soviet period, Russia was predominantly occupied with establishing good relations with the West.⁵⁶ Since 1993, however, a consensus seems to have emerged between key policy-makers in Russia that provides for a more balanced foreign policy, taking into consideration both East and West.⁵⁷ This balance seems to be more indicative of Russia's geopolitical position and hence increasingly important in its national interest.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

⁵⁴ See Sergei Stankevich, "Toward a New 'National Idea'", p.25; and Ilya Prizel, National Identity and Foreign Policy, p. 297.

⁵⁵ Rajan Menon, "After Empire: Russia and the Southern 'Near Abroad'", in Michael Mandelbaum (ed.) The New Russian Foreign Policy, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1998, p. 102.

⁵⁶ Alexei Arbatov, "Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2, Fall 1993, p. 10.

⁵⁷ Leon Aron, "The Foreign Policy Doctrine of Postcommunist Russia and its Domestic Context," in Michael Mandelbaum (ed.) The New Russian Foreign Policy, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1998, p. 25.

The revolutionary events in 1991 resulted in a substantial draw back of Russia's external borders:

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia lost not only an empire but an essential attribute of its identity: the ability of a people to know where 'ours' begins and ends. As the term near abroad suggests, it is no longer clear where Russia ends and the outside begins.⁵⁸

Indeed, the search for Russia's national interest had become closely intertwined with a concern for the 25 million ethnic Russians living outside the Russian Federation in the "near abroad."⁵⁹ As these ethnic Russians make up part of Russia's identity and historical legacy, Russia has a direct interest in their civic equality and welfare.⁶⁰

The most crucial interest for Russia is its economic prosperity. The post-Soviet states inherited a high level of economic interdependence that made them far more reliant on each other for trade than on the outside world.⁶¹ As a result, Russia has a direct interest in maintaining cooperative and constructive relations with these states. These strong economic linkages further give Russia a concrete interest in reducing tensions among the former Soviet states.⁶² In order to achieve this, Russia asserts that must play a central role in the maintenance of peace in the region. This is the case even when Russia is sometimes the cause of some conflicts.

The national interests of Russia are similar to those of most states. Its geographical position necessitates positive relations with its neighbours. It seeks survival

⁵⁸ Franklyn Griffiths, "From situations of weakness: foreign policy of the new Russia," International Journal, Vol. XLIX, Autumn 1994, pp.715-716.

⁵⁹ Karen Dawisha & Bruce Parrott, Russia and the New States of Eurasia, Cambridge University Press, 1994, p.63.

⁶⁰ Sergei Stankevich, "Toward a New 'National Idea'", p. 28.

⁶¹ Karen Dawisha & Bruce Parrott, Russia and the New States of Eurasia, p. 161.

and the endurance of its cultures and historical legacies. Moreover, it aims to achieve economic prosperity. Central to all these interests is the need for a cooperative relationship with the states of the CIS.

Limitations of the Study

The study has been restricted by certain conditions that were beyond the researcher's control. The fact that the research was conducted in Canada has limited the results of the study. The breadth of sources for the purposes of providing evidence for the hypothesis were limited to sources available in Canada. To address this concern, attempts were made to order sources from Russia and other former Soviet republics, and to focus on sources which come directly from Russia, such as the *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*.

The study was also restricted by the extent to which Russian sources were translated into English. Although attempts were made to read as many sources as possible in the Russian language, the researcher's lack of complete fluency in Russian limited the extent to which sources only available in the Russian language were used in the study.

Delimitations of the Study

The scope of the study has been delimited in a number of ways. First, the study was restricted to drawing a link between the *perception* of the threat posed by NATO expansion and attempts to integrate with the CIS. It did not attempt to establish a direct link between these two phenomena. A direct link, caused by Russian foreign policy officials' desire for CIS integration because of NATO expansion, would have been very

⁶² Sergei Stankevich, "Toward a New 'National Idea'", p. 28.

difficult to demonstrate. These types of objectives behind foreign policy stances in Russia are, in many cases, classified information that would be very difficult to obtain. The hypothesis is based on the assumption that the development of NATO expansion is the compounding factor for Russia to work out new strategic alliances and closer integration with the other members of the CIS. The link between the two variables in the hypothesis, therefore, was determined on a rhetorical, or ideological, basis.

A second delimitation is that the study was restricted to Russian foreign policy decision-makers and their relations with those of other CIS states. The study did not examine Russia's formal relations with NATO,⁶³ nor Russia's relations with any NATO country. It did not examine Russia's participation in the Partnership for Peace Program under NATO, nor did it analyze the NATO-Russia Founding Act. The study was limited to an analysis of how Russia perceives the developments within NATO, and how this perception influences Russian foreign policy decision-makers to state their opinions and act in ways that support the closer integration of the CIS.

A third delimitation of the study was that it only investigated the relationships between Russian foreign policy decision-makers and other CIS states. It did not investigate the relations of other CIS states' foreign policy decision-makers with each other or with any other state beyond the borders of the territories of the CIS member states. The analysis was limited to the issues surrounding the relations between Russia and the former Soviet states' in the context of the perception of NATO expansion.

⁶³ An analysis of Russia's cultural and political responses to NATO expansion eastward can be found in J.L Black, Understanding Russia's Objections to the Expansion of NATO Eastward: The Implications for NATO, Final Report, NATO Research Fellowship, Ottawa, June 1999.

A fourth delimitation of the study is that it uses the word “expansion” rather than “enlargement” when discussing NATO’s growth eastwards. In the context of NATO expansion, Russians tend to perceive the word “expansion” in a threatening way, whereas the word “enlargement” is seen as predominantly neutral. Because, as this thesis will demonstrate, NATO’s move eastward was seen by Russian officials as threatening, this thesis uses the word “expansion” when discussing this phenomenon as it more accurately addresses the Russian perception of the event.

It is important to remember that the study of Russian foreign policy is like a string that frays at every twist. Each new issue explored opens a door to a new set of other issues. As such, it is possible to find oneself going astray in exploring each “fray.” This thesis attempts to limit this potential problem by following the string to the very end. Although the door may be opened to other issues, the researcher has consciously avoided following too many tangents to avoid losing sight of the issue under consideration.

Overview of the Study

As has been previously stated, the purpose of the study was to examine the relationship of the perception of NATO expansion in Russia to closer CIS integration. The study will examine these issues from the year 1991 to the present. The year 1991 was chosen because the CIS was created in that year, and the debate surrounding the issue of NATO expansion began shortly after that event.

An analysis of the theoretical literature relevant to this topic, as well as an outline of the methodology for Complex Relations Approach is covered in Chapter Two. Chapter Three will provide an historical overview of Russia’s relations with NATO and the former Soviet Republic. The history chosen for this chapter will not predate 1985, the

year when Gorbachev came into power and instilled changes to the Soviet system that brought about its downfall in 1991. This chapter analyses the development and direction of Russian foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. It also outlines how Russian foreign policy is made and the central actors that are influential in this process. Chapter Four determines Russia's stance with regards to NATO expansion. It also outlines Russia's policy towards the CIS, including the reasons why and in which ways the linkages between Russia and other CIS states have been maintained. Chapter Four applies Complex Relations Approach to the issue of Russia's relations with other CIS states and the negative perception of NATO expansion. As such, the testing of the hypothesis occurs in Chapter Four. On the basis of a confirmation of the hypothesis, Chapter Five examines how Russia used its linkages (policy networks and policy tools) to consolidate power vis a vis other former Soviet republics as a response to the perceived threat posed by NATO expansion. This will fulfil all methodological questions posed by Complex Relations Approach. The final chapter of the study discusses whether or not the hypothesis put forth was confirmed. It is concerned with the summary of findings, discussion, implications, and suggestions for further research.

CHAPTER TWO –

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THEORY

The study of Russian foreign policy traditionally has been conducted using a number of international relations theories. These theories have come under increasing criticism since the end of the Cold War regarding their ability to comprehensively analyze international affairs, especially Russian foreign policy. Chapter One outlined the topic under consideration in this thesis and provided the background to some of the theories that may be used in the study of international affairs. This thesis is concerned with the relationship between Russia and the CIS states in the context of NATO's eastward expansion. Specifically, it hypothesizes that Russia perceives NATO expansion as a threat and thus attempts to promote integration with the CIS states. In order to analyze the hypothesis, a theoretical framework must be developed under which an investigation of the topic may take place.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the various theories that may be applicable to the hypothesis presented in the first chapter. The outcome of this examination will result in the determination of an approach to be followed throughout the thesis in order to confirm the hypothesis. After determining the approach to be used in this thesis, this chapter will provide a detailed outline of the methodological steps that will be taken, according to the approach, in order to

confirm the hypothesis. As Barbara Goodwin states in her book on political science methodology:

The practice of political theory helps us to set about answering questions logically, and to criticize the answers which others give, by dealing with political matters at a more abstract and general level than does political science.⁶⁴

Thus, it is important to review the various international relations theories and approaches in order to specify one approach with which to analyze the hypothesis. The determination of one approach will facilitate a more complete description and explanation of the political phenomenon under examination.⁶⁵

The traditional theories used in international relations, such as Realism, Liberalism, and Complex Interdependence, are examined in this chapter. A study of these theories will determine their relevance and usefulness in examining the hypothesis of this thesis, which is primarily concerned with the development of Russian foreign policy. Based upon the preliminary analysis provided in the first chapter, it is my belief that none of these theories will adequately provide the foundation on which to base my analysis of Russian foreign policy. In this case, the theory of Neo-Institutionalism (a theory prevalent in comparative politics literature) will be examined in order to determine its relevance to the study of Russian foreign policy. Then, a modification of this theory will be made in order to create an approach that will be used in the analysis of the hypothesis. This modified approach will be termed “Complex Relations Approach.” This chapter

⁶⁴ Barbara Goodwin, Using Political Ideas, 3rd edition, John Wiley & Sons, Toronto, 1987, p. 3.

will then outline the methodology to be used in this approach. By determining the approach to be used throughout the thesis, this chapter will lay the foundation of the analysis to be done, and facilitate the confirmation or falsification of the hypothesis.

This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section will outline the analytical criteria to be used in order to determine the most applicable theoretical approach for the hypothesis. The second section will review and analyze the gaps in the theories and approaches traditionally used in the examination of Russian foreign policy. This will include an analysis of Realism, Liberalism, and Complex Interdependence. The third section will examine the theory of Neo-Institutionalism and propose a modified theoretical approach based on this theory. The fourth section will provide an overview of the methodology to be used by the modified approach, termed Complex Relations Approach, to analyze the hypothesis presented in the first chapter.

Theoretical Criteria

In order for an approach to examine Russian foreign policy comprehensively, a number of analytical criteria must be laid out. In his article on 'The Politics of Foreign Policy',⁶⁵ Alex Pravda pointed out the increasing domestic preoccupation with foreign policy. He noted that with the end of the USSR, Moscow's relations with other union republics suddenly became a matter

⁶⁵ Alan Isaak, Scope and Methods of Political Science, The Dorsey Press, Georgetown, 1969, p. 6.

⁶⁶ Alex Pravda, "The Politics of Foreign Policy," Stephen White et al. (eds.), Developments in Russian Politics, Duke University Press, Durham, 1997.

of relations with new sovereign states. According to Pravda, policy interests in the CIS go to the heart of domestic concerns, and that the transformation of domestic politics increasingly shaped the direction of foreign policy.⁶⁷ From this, it was induced that for any approach to be valid, it would have to take into account domestic influences in Russia's foreign policy, such as decision-makers, bureaucrats, political leaders, organized group interests and industry. It was also decided that these actors' relations with their counterparts in other CIS countries must be taken into account. As well, the process of democratization on the foreign policy process has opened new avenues for the use of various foreign policy tools that were not prevalent during the Cold War. The use of these "new" foreign policy tools (such as attempts to gain monopoly power over energy)⁶⁸ enabled Russia to address its foreign policy objectives in unique and creative ways. On this basis, the following analytical criteria were established by which this chapter analyzed various theoretical approaches and investigated their application to Russian foreign policy. An approach must take into account and explain:

1. a) The individual actors who are involved in the making of foreign policy;
1. b) The interaction between these actors and their counterparts in other states in the development of a state's foreign policy;

⁶⁷ *Ibid*, p.209.

⁶⁸ Alex Pravda cites some of these 'new' tools, such as promoting Russia's export strengths in energy and raw materials, and the promotion of minority rights in the

2. The evolution of a state's foreign policy decision-making tools and their implementation;
3. How a state implements its foreign policy tools to achieve its foreign policy objectives.

The next section will analyze the theories of Realism, Liberalism, and Complex Interdependence based upon the above criteria. First, the main postulates of each theory will be explained. Then, an analysis will be done on each theory's applicability to the hypothesis based upon the criteria outlined above. Finally, depending on whether the theory fulfils the criteria, the theory will either be accepted or rejected as the basis of the analysis for the hypothesis. The analysis of these theories will facilitate the determination of an approach that will be used to either confirm or falsify the hypothesis.

The Realist Approach to Russian Foreign Policy

The traditional theoretical tool used in analyzing Russian foreign policy was "political realism", or "realism" for short. According to John Mearsheimer, realism maintains five assumptions about the international system:

1. The international system is anarchic;
2. States inherently possess some offensive military capability, which gives them the wherewithal to hurt and possibly to destroy each other;
3. States can never be certain about the intentions of other states;
4. The most basic motive driving states is survival;
5. States think strategically about how to survive in the international system.⁶⁹

CIS as a bargaining tool for Russia to achieve other goals, in Alex Pravda, "The Politics of Foreign Policy," p.215.

⁶⁹ Summarized by author from John Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3, 1995, p.10.

Statesmen, according to realists such as Hans Morgenthau, think and act in terms of interest defined as power.⁷⁰ States are unitary actors “who, at minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination.”⁷¹ As a result, a balance of power exists between states. This balance of power can be defined as: “an actual state of affairs in which power is distributed among several nations with approximate equality.”⁷² This balance of power limits the extent to which states can achieve monopoly over others, and thus produces a measure of stability in the international system.

In this state of international affairs, realists such as Kenneth Waltz hold that the structure of international politics is anarchic:

Despite the changes that constantly take place in the relations of nations, the basic structure of international politics continues to be anarchic. Each state tends for itself with or without the cooperation of others. The leaders of states and their followers are concerned with their standings, that is, with their positions *vis-à-vis* one another.⁷³

As a result of the anarchic nature of the international system, states are fearful of conquest by other nations and therefore build up national capabilities, including armaments, and form coalitions, including military alliances, to protect

⁷⁰ Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 4th edition, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1967, p. 5.

⁷¹ Martin Griffiths, Realism, Idealism, and International Politics, Routledge, New York, 1992, p. 83.

⁷² Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p.161.

⁷³ Kenneth Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” Michael Brown et al. (eds.), The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 1995, p. 57.

themselves.⁷⁴ Military security and defence issues hold high priority and are a central consideration in the world of international politics. The realist approach focused on power and the acquisition of military capabilities over other states, especially in terms of maintaining the integrity of a state's security. States, thus, are unitary actors who seek their own national interest and survival, and who may aspire to greater power.⁷⁵ For international relationships, anarchy means that states can ultimately rely only upon themselves for their security.⁷⁶ The concept of attaining power, then, is relative. Relative power results in what is called the 'security dilemma.' The security dilemma is a problem of international politics whereby many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others.⁷⁷ Legitimate security-enhancing measures by one state are likely to be perceived by other state as a threatening military movement.⁷⁸ In this sense, cooperation of states is unlikely to succeed and is undertaken for short-term gains only.

The approach used by realist theory to analyze international relations phenomena is outlined by Hans Morgenthau in his book *Politics Among Nations*. Morgenthau assumes that the character of foreign policy can only be ascertained

⁷⁴ Frank Wayman and Paul Diehl, "Realism Reconsidered: The Realpolitik Framework and Its Basic Proponents," Frank Wayman and Paul Diehl (eds.), Reconstructing Realpolitik, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1994, p. 5.

⁷⁵ Taken from a discussion of Waltz in Robert Lieber, No Common Power, 3rd edition, HarperCollins, New York, 1995, pp.345-6.

⁷⁶ K.J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, 7th edition, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1995, p.5.

⁷⁷ Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2, 1978, p. 169.

⁷⁸ J. Ann Tickner, "Re-visioning Security," p. 176.

through the examination of political acts and the consequences of these acts.⁷⁹

Thus, in order to surmise the objectives of a state and the formulation of its foreign policies, one must analyze its international conduct and the aftereffects of actions taken.

The realist approach has come under much criticism since the end of the Cold War. As Peter Shearman points out in his book, *Russian Foreign Policy Since 1990*, realism as the dominant theory that has been used to explain international relations during the Cold War period becomes increasingly less convincing as a tool to analyze Russian foreign policy in the post-Cold War era.⁸⁰ He maintains that realism could not have predicted the events that unfolded in the late 1980s when the Soviet Union conceded defeat of the Cold War. As Shearman argues, nor could realism explain the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and Eastern Europe, or the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. He noted that in order to understand these events through a theoretical perspective, it would be necessary to reevaluate definitions of power to give more prominence to non-military sources.⁸¹ It would be difficult to modify the realist approach to apply more emphasis on these since it is a theory reliant on military activity of the state as the focus of analysis.

The realist approach does not adequately explain, for the purposes of this study, how states must exchange information in order to develop foreign policy.

⁷⁹ Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, p. 4.

⁸⁰ Peter Shearman, "Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1991" in Shearman, Peter (ed.) *Russian Foreign Policy Since 1990*, Westview Press: Boulder, 1995, p.9.

⁸¹ *ibid*, p. 12.

The main postulate that states are unitary actors hardly reflects the nature of the new global environment where the growth of the economy, the wide and free interchange of information, and the spread of societal values of democracy have lead to systemic changes in the way international relations is conducted. In order to ensure the continuation of their self-interest outside their territorial borders, states can no longer afford to remain unitary actors in an age where the interchange of information, opinions, beliefs and values shape the way foreign policy is made and the directions it takes. If there is one defining characteristic of the post-Cold War, it is that inter-state cooperation has increased politically, economically and socially. In other words, states have made more use of the linkages between them in order to achieve their desired goals. Whereby prior to the watershed collapse of the Soviet Union, states used military means and power (or the threat thereof) to achieve goals such as economic prosperity, today no state can achieve these goals in isolation. Realism, thus, as an approach to analyzing the post-Cold War world (and the place of Russia within it) does not adequately reflect the new global environment.

Towards the end of the Cold War, the theory of realism underwent a transformation. Although the new theory, called Neorealism, had its roots in classical realism, some inherent modifications were made. The Neorealist approach continued the traditional realist emphasis on power and balances, but focused on the systemic, rather than national, characteristics of the international

system.⁸² Neo-realists sought to transcend the empiricist fixations of classical realism by seeking to analyze the limitations and constraints upon human action in the international context.⁸³ Among this camp, Kenneth Waltz recast the tenets of classical realism in order to delineate more clearly the effects of the structure of the international system on the behaviour of nation states.⁸⁴ The greatest advance of neo-realism from its original form was its decision to conceptualize international politics 'as a system with a precisely defined structure.'⁸⁵ The basis of neo-realism, however, continued to hold that states are unitary actors in an anarchical arena. As Joseph Grieco points out, in the context of anarchy, each state tries to avoid dependence on others and each is afraid of receiving a lesser share of the economic gains of interdependence.⁸⁶ The basic reality of Neorealism was that:

The nature of the state system ... places rational constraints upon the unbridled pursuit of rival national interests through the mechanism of the balance of power.⁸⁷

⁸² Frank Wayman and Paul Diehl, "Realism Reconsidered", p.6.

⁸³ Robert Keohane, "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond," Robert Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics, Columbia University Press, New York, 1986, p. 169.

⁸⁴ David A. Baldwin, "Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics," David A. Baldwin (ed.) Neorealism and Neoliberalism, Columbia University Press, New York, 1993, p.3.

⁸⁵ Kenneth Waltz, "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 44, 1990, pp.29-30.

⁸⁶ Andrew Linklater, "Neorealism in Theory and Practice," Ken Booth & Steve Smith (eds.) International Relations Theory Today, Pennsylvania State University Press, Pennsylvania, 1995, p.245.

⁸⁷ Robert Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders," Robert Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics, Columbia University Press, New York, 1986, pp. 211-212.

Thus, by analyzing the constraints placed on states in the context of the international system, Neorealism's approach to the study of international politics was more holistic than that of classical realism.

The theory of Neorealism, however, also does not adequately address some of the issues facing Russian foreign policy. For instance, Neorealism does not adequately address the issue of the mechanisms through which Russia cooperates with the states of the former Soviet Union to influence them into closer integration. This is especially true when traditional realist as well as neo-realist tools of foreign policy, such as military strength, are no longer the only means to influence other states behaviour. Russia's military has been left to degenerate rapidly after the Cold War.⁸⁸ The Russian army's poor performance in Chechnya demonstrates that Russia cannot rely only on its military to exert influence. Russia continues to influence the former Soviet states by other means. As mentioned above mutual dependencies exist between Russia and the other CIS states due to the rise of economic, political, social and technological concerns. Russia and the other CIS states depend on one other for information, economic prosperity, and political stability. This dependency creates cooperation that in turns affects the formulation and direction of Russia's foreign policy objectives. The mechanisms through which cooperation is achieved, that can alternatively be thought of as foreign policy tools, must then be analyzed in order to understand the cooperation that takes place between Russia and the CIS states. Realism and

⁸⁸ Bruce Russett and Allan C. Stam, "Courting Disaster: An Expanded NATO vs. Russia and China", pp. 368-9.

neo-realism do not adequately address how and why cooperative linkages between Russia and the former Soviet states are created and sustained. Neo-realism's attempt to use a more systemic approach by examining the state in the context of the international system does not satisfactorily address Russia's cooperation with the CIS states. Furthermore, neo-realism's dual focus on states as unitary actors as well as the international system as a whole demonstrates the inherent contradiction in the theory.⁸⁹

The linkages and networks of decision-makers between Russia and former Soviet states need to be explored and analyzed in order to fully understand the breadth of how Russia creates and sustains its influence on other states' foreign policies. In summary, the theories of realism and neo-realism do not meet the criteria set out above to explain Russia's foreign policy in the post-Cold War era.

The Liberal (Neo-Liberalist) Approach

Another approach common in the study of international politics is the Liberal approach to international relations (also called Liberal Institutionalism). Unlike Realism, traditional Liberalism does not believe the international system is anarchical. They believe that international cooperation is possible, and in many cases necessary in the case of joint decision-making.⁹⁰ States cooperate with one another in order to achieve certain "pay-offs", or the enhancement of mutual

⁸⁹ A similar argument was made in Richard K. Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," Robert Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics, Columbia University Press, New York, 1986, pp. 255-300.

⁹⁰ Arthur Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an anarchic world," David A. Baldwin (ed.) Neorealism and Neoliberalism, Columbia University Press, New York, 1993, p.31.

interests. According to neo-liberalists, such as Arthur Stein, these gains are absolute.⁹¹ In other words, a state seeks to maximize its absolute gains and is indifferent to the gains achieved by others. Liberalism claims that cooperation between states is likely because of three reasons. First, most statesmen know that to enter a war is to set off a chain of unpredictable and uncontrollable events. Second, there are high domestic costs of wars. Third, the gains from cooperation can be increased if each side comes to value the other's well being positively.⁹² Thus, the gains to be made and the high costs of war make cooperation feasible and likely.

Because of its highly idealistic nature, Liberalism came under criticism from realists. As a result, Liberalism was modified into neo-liberalism. What is distinctive about neo-liberalism is that it starts from the realist premise that anarchy impedes the achievement of cooperation. However, as Joseph Grieco states:

[T]he core liberal arguments – that realism overemphasizes conflict and underestimates the capacities of international institutions to promote cooperation – remain firmly intact. The new liberal institutionalists basically argue that even if the realists are correct in believing that anarchy constrains the willingness of states to cooperate, they nevertheless can work together and can do so especially with the assistance of institutions.⁹³

Using scenarios such as the “Stag Hunt” and the “Prisoner’s Dilemma”, neo-liberalists demonstrate how cooperation is possible in the international arena.

⁹¹ *Ibid*, p.47.

⁹² Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2, January, 1978, p. 177.

In the Prisoner's Dilemma scenario, neo-liberalists such as Robert Axelrod demonstrate that a state will cooperate with another state based on the assumption that if both cooperate, both do fairly well and there will be a reward for mutual cooperation. If one state cooperates, but the other defects, the defecting state gets the temptation to defect, while the cooperating player receives some gains. If both defect, both receive punishment for mutual defection.⁹⁴ On this basis, there is a likelihood that states will cooperate with each other, even in an anarchical system.

Neo-liberalists, such as Robert Keohane, have cited the increased cooperation since World War II as a basis for the theory's legitimacy:

International cooperation among the advanced industrialized countries since the end of World War II has probably been more extensive than international cooperation among major states during any period of comparable length in history.⁹⁵

The major reason cited for this cooperation is the increased interdependence among states in terms of global economy and political issues. To facilitate the process of cooperation, neo-liberalists place much emphasis on international institutions.⁹⁶ Sometimes called "liberal institutionalism", this approach focuses on the joint decision making that takes place within international regimes or institutions. International regimes in this sense can be defined as "principles,

⁹³ Joseph Grieco, Cooperation Among Nations, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1990, pp.27–28.

⁹⁴ Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, Basic Books Inc., New York, 1984, p.8.

⁹⁵ Robert Keohane, After Hegemony, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1984, p. 5.

⁹⁶ *Ibid*, p. 9.

norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area.”⁹⁷ Cooperation comes about in the international arena through the use of these international regimes and institutions.

On the basis of the criteria mentioned above, the neo-liberalist approach demonstrates a number of shortcomings for the purposes of my analysis. First, although the neo-liberalist approach can be useful in explaining how states interact with each other on a macro level of analysis through the use of international institutions, it does not adequately explain how states interact with each other on day-to-day diplomatic levels of cooperation. Cooperation between states occurs much more often at lower bureaucratic levels than it does on macro (i.e. head of state) levels. By concentrating analysis on international institutions, neo-liberalism leaves out of its analyses entire sections of inter-state cooperation which occur in national institutions through decision-makers’ linkages. These linkages can play a crucial role in understanding certain types of international cooperation. For instance, in regions such as the CIS where formal institutions are currently in a state of instability, an analysis of how state actors cooperate with each other on a day-to-day basis can facilitate understanding of a number of issues. One example is how trade of subsidized oil and gas by one state may be used as a bargaining tool for another state to follow a policy direction in other policy areas. This type of phenomenon would only be revealed through an examination of the linkages made by state actors. As such, neo-liberalism does

⁹⁷ Stephen Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” Stephen Krasner (ed.), International Regimes, Cornell

not address how the institutions within a state, and their linkages with other states, contribute to the development of a state's foreign policy direction. It also does not address how these institutions shape the development of a state's activities internationally.

Second, the neo-liberalist approach investigates cooperation on the basis of state interests and absolute gains, but it does not describe the specific diplomatic mechanisms through which these gains are achieved. In other words, it does not address how a state uses the foreign policy tools in various ways to achieve its objectives. Although neo-liberalism downplays the importance of military capability as a foreign policy tool in the post-Cold War era, they do not adequately investigate the evolution of new foreign policy tools available to states to achieve their goals. One prominent proponent of the neo-liberalist view, Charles Lipson, argues that knowledge about other state-actors is important in cooperation.⁹⁸ Within neo-liberalist literature, however, issues surrounding the achievement of gains through knowledge, such as the acquisition of knowledge or information about other states, the dynamic of state actors in gaining this information, or how this information is used to develop a state's foreign policy, are largely ignored. Furthermore, with respect to absolute versus relative gains, the liberal approach does not take into consideration that many times, one state

University Press, Ithaca, 1995, p.1.

⁹⁸ Charles Lipson, "International Cooperation," David A. Baldwin (ed.) Neorealism and Neoliberalism, Columbia University Press, New York, 1993, p.66.

may gain considerably from a cooperative effort, whereas another state may not gain as much.

Neo-liberalists also assert that in the post-Cold War era, states are becoming less concerned with issues of power and security.⁹⁹ In many cases, particularly in Russia, there is evidence to suggest that cooperation with other CIS states is based on the objectives of achieving greater security in the region and the accumulation of power over resources as bargaining tools in Russia's foreign policy. It seems that often neo-liberalists make the same assertions as realists by equating issues of power and security with military issues.¹⁰⁰ This is not always the case. Many times, power and security can be tied up with issues of self-interest in the region, maintaining a state's identity in the region and asserting a state's self-determination. The means used to address these issues may involve military capabilities, but this is not always the case. Other means to address these issues can include: influencing other states to act in certain ways through control of information in the region, or control of sources of energy. Thus the liberal approach does not adequately address the criteria laid out above for understanding Russian foreign policy.

The Complex Interdependence Approach

In their highly influential book, *Power and Interdependence*, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye constructed a new theory to challenge the

⁹⁹ Taken from a critique of liberalism by Joseph Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation," David A. Baldwin (ed.) *Neorealism and Neoliberalism*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1993, p.119.

¹⁰⁰ See for instance Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*, p.4.

dominant realist approach to international relations called Complex

Interdependence. According to Keohane and Nye, this theory has three main characteristics:

1. Multiple channels connect societies, including informal ties between government elites; informal ties among non-governmental elites; and transnational organizations. These channels can be summarized as interstate, trans-governmental and transnational relations.
2. There is an absence of hierarchy among issues. This means that the distinction between domestic policy and foreign policy issues becomes blurred.
3. The role of military force is not emphasized. In other words, military security does not consistently dominate the agenda of international relations.¹⁰¹

As an approach to understanding Russian foreign policy, complex interdependence begins to address some of the criteria mentioned above. Through its first characteristic, it focuses on the linkages between state actors in the making of a state's foreign policy. Furthermore, it takes into account the fact that there is increasingly less of a distinction between issues of domestic policy and those of foreign policy. Indeed, many issues that dominate the domestic agenda in Russia, such as that of national identity, have become important factors in its foreign policy direction and objectives.¹⁰²

¹⁰¹ Summarized by researcher from Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Complex Interdependence, 2nd ed., HarperCollins Publishers, 1989, pp.24-29.

¹⁰² See for instance Ilya Prizel, National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia and Ukraine, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1998, particularly pp. 239-299.

Although the complex interdependence approach begins to address some of the criteria outlined above, there are a few shortcomings. By downplaying the importance of military issues, complex interdependence acknowledges other tools of foreign policy. According to Keohane and Nye, “Dominant states may try to secure [outcomes] by using overall economic power to affect results on other issues.”¹⁰³ They claim that this occurs through linkage strategies between states. However, although complex interdependence takes into account linkages between states and foreign policy tools other than military ones, it does not place emphasis on how these tools are developed, how the dynamics of linkages shape foreign policy, and how foreign policy tools are implemented to achieved the desired result.

Furthermore, the use of the word “linkage” has a particular meaning in complex interdependence. According to Keohane and Nye, “linkage” in complex interdependence has the following meaning:

Militarily and economically strong states will dominate a variety of organizations and a variety of issues by linking their own policies on some issues to other states’ policies on other issues.¹⁰⁴

In other words, “linkage” in terms of complex interdependence does not refer to the relationships established by foreign policy decision-makers, but rather the extent to which a state can successfully “link” an issue-area, practice, or policy of its own to that of another state’s. Thus, complex interdependence does not stress the examination of domestic factors in the making of foreign policy and

¹⁰³ Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Complex Interdependence, p.31.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid*, p.30.

how these domestic factors link with those in other states. As a result, it does not sufficiently meet the criteria listed above to analyze Russian foreign policy.

Foreign Policy Decision-Making Approaches

The approaches and theories of foreign policy decision-making represented another body of literature that was examined for its applicability to the thesis topic. These approaches presented a variety of analytical tools for “gaining a better understanding of the forces inside and around high-level policy groups that determine their impact on policies and actions.”¹⁰⁵ Some of these approaches, and their suitability to the topic of Russian foreign policy, are examined briefly here.

There are three predominant theories in the literature of foreign policy decision-making. The first approach is called Argumentation Theory. This approach analyzes the dialogue and discourse of foreign policy decision-makers to assess whether or not the content of the argumentation meets certain standards for good reasoning and consistency.¹⁰⁶ Although this approach seems to be able to apply to any phenomenon and any state, its general approach does not analyze arguments in favour or against different strategies and directions of foreign policy. Furthermore, it does not address the crucial issue of asymmetries in information processing and interpreting events. “Decisionmakers are aware that knowledge is

¹⁰⁵ Paul Hart, Eric Stern, and Bengt Sundelius, “Foreign Policy-making at the Top: Political Group Dynamics,” Paul Hart et al. (eds.), Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-making, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1997, p.6.

¹⁰⁶ Irmtraud Gallhofer and Willem Saris, Foreign Policy Decision-Making, Praeger, Westport, 1996, p. 3.

power and, like power, can be distributed asymmetrically.”¹⁰⁷ Therefore, this approach does not adequately address the topic at hand.

The second approach is called Cognitive Mapping. In this approach, the values and beliefs of decision-makers are analyzed to examine what role they play in the explanation of events.¹⁰⁸ In terms of Russian foreign policy, the limitation of this approach is that it fails to examine and scrutinize the relations between foreign policy decision-makers both within a state and between states.

A third approach in foreign policy decision-making literature is called the Means-Ends Approach. In this approach, the goals of the foreign policy decision-maker are examined in order to understand the means used to bring about the goal.¹⁰⁹ The limitation of this approach, similar to that of the previous approach, is that it does not take into account the network of information and relations that influences a state’s foreign policy:

Actors – states, international organizations, and non-state actors – are not unitary but are comprised of a number of subactors or bureaucratic bodies that struggle for influence over policymaking.¹¹⁰

Thus, an approach was needed that took into consideration the influences of foreign policy decision-making, but that could also examine the “wider picture” – the direction and goals of a state’s foreign policy.

¹⁰⁷ Yaacov Vertzberger, The World in their Minds, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1990, p.22.

¹⁰⁸ Irmtraud Gallhofer and Willem Saris, Foreign Policy Decision-Making, Praeger, Westport, 1996, p.7-8.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid*, pp. 9 – 11.

¹¹⁰ Yaacov Vertzberger, The World in their Minds, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1990, p.26.

Neo-Institutionalism

Neo-institutionalism is a prevalent theory in comparative politics literature. The main aim of neo-institutionalism is to regard the manner in which institutions shape how political actors define their interests and structure their relations of power to other groups.¹¹¹ It attempts to demonstrate “how political struggles are mediated by the institutional setting in which they take place.”¹¹²

Neo-institutionalists, such as Theda Skocpol in her work *Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research*, did much to re-introduce analysis of state institutions and structures.¹¹³ Skocpol states that:

States necessarily stand at the intersections between domestic sociopolitical orders and the transnational relations within which they must maneuver for survival and advantage in relation to other states.¹¹⁴

An analysis of the structure of the state, since it contains both domestic and international influences, will reveal much about what means and how that state will operate on the international level. In her work, Skocpol cited Hugh Heclo’s “Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden.” Heclo noted that historically, civil service administrators consistently made more important contributions to social policy development than political parties or interest

¹¹¹ Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, “Historical institutionalism in comparative politics”, in Steinmo, Sven, Thelen Kathleen and Longstreth, Frank (eds.) Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992, p. 2.

¹¹² *Ibid.*

¹¹³ Theda Skocpol’s Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research, in Evans, Peter B. et al (eds.) Bringing the State Back In, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid*, p.8.

groups.¹¹⁵ This insight may have important implications for foreign policy. If this can hold true for a state's social policy, then perhaps the same logic could be applied to foreign policy. If one analyzes a state's decision-making structures and administrators in foreign policy, then perhaps a better understanding can be reached of that state's policies and how that state can influence other states through the same structures.

Institutionalists, such as Stephen Skowronek, point to the various struggles for power within institutions that help shape and define not only a state's policies, but also the actions that a state takes:

Institutional politics is most significant... as the arena in which these different rules of legitimate order converge, collide, and fold back on one another. Far from homeostatic, the picture of politics that emerges here is kinetic, featuring a stubbornly tenacious intercurrency of different standards of legitimate action.¹¹⁶

Thus, by examining the interplay of political forces within an institution, a better understanding can be reached about why certain policies were followed and certain actions taken.

Other institutionalist literature demonstrates that political institutions may facilitate and shape the organization of interests:

Not only may political institutions, political authorities, and political culture play a critical role in the definition, mobilization, and organization of interests, but the structure of political opportunities will shape the strategies of organized interests and

¹¹⁵ *Ibid*, p.11.

¹¹⁶ Stephen Skowronek, "Order and Change," *Polity*, Volume XXVIII, No. 1, Fall 1995, p.95.

their beliefs regarding the efficacy of different types of political action.¹¹⁷

In other words, political institutions can use political opportunities to provide the basis for the organization of an interest and the formulation of a policy or set of actions to be taken. Thus, by analyzing the institutional mechanisms for interpretation of political events, the formulation and implementation of policies will be better understood.

One variant of neo-institutionalism that focuses on the linkages between state actors is called “policy network institutionalism.” This variant holds that a state’s policy is formulated through the interaction of governmental actors, national institutions, international institutions, and the organization of society.¹¹⁸ The actors who participate directly in the policy process are members of policy networks, and those involved in a more general sense belong to a policy community.¹¹⁹ The relationship between actors and institutions that typically occurs in the policy process is:¹²⁰

¹¹⁷ Ellen M. Immergut, “The Theoretical Core of the New Institutionalism,” Politics & Society, Vol. 26, No. 1, March 1998, p.21.

¹¹⁸ see for instance Michael Howlett & M. Ramesh, Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystems, Oxford University Press, Toronto, 1995, pp. 50-75.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid*, p.51.

¹²⁰ taken from Michael Howlett & M. Ramesh, Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystems, Oxford University Press, Toronto, 1995, p. 51.

“Linkage” in the sense of policy network institutionalism, refers to the network of links that join together state and societal actors in the formulation of a state’s policy. According to this variant of institutionalism, these linkages are interest-based. That is to say, participants are involved in these networks in order to achieve their own ends.

Although the theory of neo-institutionalism, particularly its policy network variant, begins to address some of the issues surrounding the criteria mentioned above, it is a theory that is applied predominantly to government policies other than foreign policy, such as labour or social policy. Furthermore, neo-institutional analyses that have been conducted on Russia and Russian foreign policy, such as by Maryanne Ozeroy, have not formulated a methodical approach specifically for Russian foreign policy.¹²¹ As well, despite the fact that policy network institutionalism claims to address the policy network linkages to the international system, the history of the literature has not demonstrated a systematic way of doing this. Nor has it been applied to the study of foreign policy in a consistent manner, so as to constitute an approach. Moreover, policy

network institutionalism, specifically, has not been applied to Russian foreign policy.

In the case of Russian foreign policy, policy network institutionalism can not be used in its present form. The policy environment in the Russian Federation today is such that societal actors do not have an equal influence on state policy as the diagram above would suggest. This is particularly true of foreign policy. As Neil Malcolm notes, one of the legacies of the Soviet system in Russia is that the upper echelons of the Russian government control foreign policy formulation and direction.¹²² This may be due to the fact that the Russian government is presently in a state of flux. Many Russian institutions responsible for foreign policy are considered unstable since they are currently undergoing a transition to democracy. As such, elite levels of the Russian government and their counterparts in other states make up the majority of the foreign policy network in Russia, with societal actors such as industry leaders and interest groups having a lesser degree of influence on the policy process.¹²³

¹²¹ See for instance: Maryanne Ozernoy, "A Political History of the Russian State: the Basis for Bureaucratic Power," The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review, Vol. 23, No. 1, 1996, pp. 1-14.

¹²² Neil Malcolm, "Russian Foreign Policy Decision-Making," Peter Shearman (ed.) Russian Foreign Policy Since 1990, Westview Press, Boulder, 1995, pp. 23-39.

¹²³ This claim is made notwithstanding the influence of Russian business leaders, or "tycoons." These oligarchs are typically business leaders who have a monopoly on a particular industry, good, or service. They can be highly influential actors in Russia's foreign economic policies. Their influence, however, is of a rather chaotic nature, and thus does not represent a formal influence on the policy process. It will, however, be addressed in Chapter Four.

In summary, although policy network institutionalism stresses analysis of the linkages between policy decision-makers, its lack of systematic application to foreign policy (particularly Russian foreign policy) renders it less valuable in analyzing the issue at hand. A variant of institutionalism based on the policy network approach is therefore needed to comprehensively analyze Russian foreign policy with the analytical criteria mentioned above.

Complex Relations Approach

In order to examine Russia's response to NATO expansion, this study created a variant of neo-institutionalism termed *Complex Relations Approach*. This approach, based on the basic postulates of policy network institutionalism, examined the linkages of decision-makers between state structures. By "linkages" what is referred to is the system of policy networks and the policy tools that are part of the formation of Russia's overall foreign policy. These policy networks include: government actors involved in foreign policy, their counterparts in other states, and to a lesser extent non-governmental actors, such as industry leaders, business leaders (particularly in the banking sector), regional authorities, interest groups, and competing elites. The policy tools include attempts to achieve: monopoly control over natural resources in the region; control of information and communications; control of transportation; and foreign policy initiatives aimed at the former Soviet republics.

Complex Relations Approach is based upon one of the taxonomies of policy networks presented in Michael Howlett and M. Ramesh's book, *Studying*

Public Policy.¹²⁴ The type of network that Complex Relations Approach built upon is the “bureaucratic network.” According to Howlett and Ramesh, this network is state directed and is made up primarily of state agencies.¹²⁵ By focusing on this bureaucratic network, Complex Relations Approach highlights how foreign policy administrators in Russia utilized policy networks and the resources available to them to exert influence on other states’ foreign policy decision-makers in order to achieve the desired foreign policy result.

In order to study these linkages and policy networks, the researcher had to construct the overarching approach of Complex Relations that would address these in a systematic manner. To construct the approach, the researcher combined both Thomas Kuhn’s and I. Lakatos’ prescriptions for building new approaches to the study of politics. Thomas Kuhn purported that a new approach must contain two things: first, a constellation of values and beliefs, cognitions, rules of order and techniques of procedure shared by a given scientific community; and second, a collection of exemplary work within a discipline that serve as recipes for problem-solving activity.¹²⁶ Lakatos, on the other hand, stated that to build a new approach one must follow a ‘research programme’. This research programme is characterized by a core of definitive propositions protected by a belt of auxiliary theories and hypotheses which connect the ‘core’ to the domain of facts to which

¹²⁴ Michael Howlett & M. Ramesh, Studying Public Policy, p. 130.

¹²⁵ *Ibid*, p. 130.

¹²⁶ Taken from a discussion of Thomas Kuhn and I. Lakatos in John A. Hughes, The Philosophy of Social Research, 2nd edition, Longman, New York, 1990, p.73.

they pertain.¹²⁷ From these two authors, it was assumed that an approach must be able to explain a phenomenon and predict future behaviour. In the construction of Complex Relations Approach, a number of propositions were set out that reflected the criteria through which to analyze Russian foreign policy.

To address the criteria mentioned above, Complex Relations Approach addressed the importance of analyzing the institutional settings in which foreign policy takes place. The approach can be described in the following manner:

- 1) In order to examine an international issue, it is important to focus analysis on the institutional setting and the struggles for power within a state's institutions that influence the making of a state's foreign policy;
- 2) To achieve this, it is therefore important to examine the various actors and influences in the decision-making process and formulation of foreign policy.
- 3) Central to the analysis must be an investigation into the ways in which foreign policy goals are implemented;
- 4) Finally, it must be determined whether the implementation of foreign policies successfully achieved stated policy objectives.

It is through the analysis of linkages between decision-makers and the manner in which they use the foreign policy tools available to them that a better understanding can emerge of international phenomena.

¹²⁷ *Ibid*, p.77.

Methodology of Complex Relations Approach

As mentioned in Chapter One, the hypothesis being tested was: As NATO expands eastward, the Russian perception of this development as a threat impels Russian foreign policy decision-makers to seek closer integration with the CIS countries through its foreign policy linkages. This study used Complex Relations Approach to test this hypothesis. The following section outlines the technique used by Complex Relations Approach to analyze the hypothesis of the study.

On the basis of the description of Complex Relations Approach, the following questions can be formulated. The hypothesis will be tested with regards to these questions:

- 1) Who are the main actors in Russian foreign policy (what is the “policy community”)?
- 2) Has observable dialogue arisen in these linkages that suggests that NATO expansion is perceived as a threat?
- 3) Has observable dialogue arisen in these linkages that suggests the CIS should integrate further?
- 4) Has it been suggested that there is a relationship between these two?
- 5) What are the “foreign policy tools” or linkages that facilitate Russian influence in the CIS?

The first questions, or methodological aspect of Complex Relations Approach, will be dealt with in Chapter Three. The second, third and fourth questions will

be significant in the testing of the hypothesis, and will be addressed in Chapter Four. The fifth methodological aspect will be explored in Chapter Five.

In order to answer the above questions, Complex Relations Approach was applied to the hypothesis in the following manner. First, the Approach examined the *context* in which Russian officials discussed both NATO expansion and CIS integration. The aim of this first method was two-fold. It would bring to light the actors involved in Russian foreign policy making. This included government officials, elites, and non-governmental actors. The second aim was to investigate whether any relationship was drawn between perceived threat of NATO expansion and CIS integration. In many interviews with, and speeches by Russian officials, it was found that a discussion of CIS integration directly followed vehement opposition to NATO expansion.¹²⁸ The researcher sought to determine whether the perceived threat of NATO expansion and CIS integration were being discussed in the same context, and if so, whether there were any direct connections drawn between them, at least on a rhetorical level. In other words, analysis would focus on how a discussion of NATO expansion led to a discussion of CIS integration.

Second, Complex Relations Approach explored the dialogue between Russian foreign policy officials¹²⁹ and those of other CIS countries which was

¹²⁸ see for example Minister Yevgeniy Primakov's speech to Moscow State Institute of International Relations Academic Council entitled, "The Role of Follower is Not for Us" in FBIS-SOV-96-124, June 25, 1996.

¹²⁹ The term "Russian foreign policy officials" or "Russian officials" in this study refers to a group of professional bureaucrats in the Russian government,

documented in various sources, including Russian newspapers, articles, magazines, broadcast services, and other sources. This was done to determine how the view of Russian officials influenced those of other CIS officials. This would be done by concentrating the examination on the types of foreign policy tools used by Russian officials to influence the officials of other states, and in which manner these tools were used. It also concentrated on the objectives Russian officials were attempting to accomplish using these foreign policy tools, and how the use of these tools was implemented. Then it would examine whether Russian officials were successful in the use of these tools by analyzing whether any action was taken on the part of other CIS officials towards further integration. This would be apparent from things such as policies undertaken, documents signed, and agreements reached. Success would also be determined by the extent to which the actions taken by other CIS countries met with the stated objectives of Russian officials, evident from interviews, speeches, and other documentation. In other words, the success of Russian officials in using foreign policy tools available to them to achieve their goals would be determined by the actions of other CIS states and whether these actions conformed with Russia's own foreign policy objectives.

Third, the approach used the principle of timing and effect. This principle holds that "the concept associated with the cause in the explanans must occur

politically elected members of the Russian legislature, the president, his chosen advisors, and appointed Ministers.

earlier than the concept associated with the effect.”¹³⁰ The principle of timing and effect is one of the four factors of causality used in empirical analysis. Although this study used qualitative analysis, this principle could be used in a similar manner to either confirm or disconfirm the hypothesis. Complex Relations Approach analyzed the timing of statements regarding the perceived threat of NATO expansion and attempts to integrate the CIS, and the effect of foreign policy actions that demonstrated opposition to NATO expansion, and support for CIS integration. Within this analysis, there was first an examination of statements by Russian foreign policy decision-makers, statements from CIS meetings, and policy statements regarding the perceived threat of NATO expansion. This was followed by an examination of the actions which were antecedent to these statements, and which supported CIS integration. Included in this were documented policy platforms, CIS agreements, foreign policy initiatives in the CIS region, and informal agreements of increased cooperation among the CIS. If the timing of statements regarding the perception of the threat posed by NATO expansion occurred before actions which supported attempts to integrate the CIS further, and if the relationship between these two were confirmed by the above two methods, then the hypothesis can said to be confirmed.

The advantage of using the methodology described above for analyzing the hypothesis is that it focuses on the internal factors of Russian foreign policy. It also emphasizes the perceptions around which foreign policy is formulated.

¹³⁰ Scott Bennett, Public Affairs Research Methods, Edwin Meller Press, Lewiston, 1996, p.50.

Furthermore, the methods used in this study address the various types of foreign policy tools used in international relations to influence states' behaviours.

Finally, the methodology used may lead to a better understanding of mechanisms for foreign policy implementation in Russia in the post-Cold War era.

According to Loraine Blaxter, Christina Hughes and Malcolm Tight, "qualitative data offers more detail about the subject under consideration, while quantitative data appears to provide more precision."¹³¹ Because the author was more interested in analyzing the detail of the linkages between decision-makers, rather than the precision of how many linkages were made, the evidence for the study was based primarily on qualitative data. The research for this study focused on primary sources. Samples of the sources used include: policy statements; official documents; and published interviews with Russian officials and copies of Russian political party platforms which are available through the *Foreign Broadcast Information Service* (a daily news source of interviews, events, and commentaries from Russia and other CIS countries).¹³² Other samples of primary sources included translated CIS documents and agreements, some of which are available through the *Russian and Eurasian Document Annuals*, by J. Larry

¹³¹ Loraine Blaxter, Christina Hughes and Malcolm Tight, *How to Research*, Open University Press, Philadelphia, 1996, p.177.

¹³² For example, an interview with Nikolay Ahdanov-Lutsenko, secretary of the foreign policy chamber of the Russian Presidential Political Consultative Council, can be found in "Russia: Former Soviet Republics Form Zone of 'Strategic Interests'" in *FBIS-SOV-96-174*, Sept. 5, 1996.

Black.¹³³ Also, a number of interviews with Russian officials, governmental agreements, declarations and policies were used from Zbigniew Brzezinski and Paige Sullivan's *Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States: Documents, Data and Analysis*.¹³⁴ Examples of secondary sources include: articles in journals such as *Foreign Affairs*, *International Affairs (Moscow)*, and *Europe-Asia Studies* by both Western and Russian scholars;¹³⁵ newspapers from Russia, such as *Moscow News*¹³⁶ and *Nezavisimaya gazeta*; newspaper articles from Canada which discuss Russian foreign policy and NATO, such as the *Globe and Mail* and the *Toronto Star*;¹³⁷ news sources, such as the *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*;¹³⁸ conference papers;¹³⁹ books which highlight internal factors

¹³³ Particularly useful will be the numerous CIS documents translated in J.L. Black, "CIS & Successor States", *Russia and Eurasia Documents Annuals*, Vol. 2, Academic International Press, 1992.

¹³⁴ Zbigniew Brzezinski and Paige Sullivan, *Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States: Documents, Data and Analysis*, M.E. Sharpe, New York, 1997.

¹³⁵ Such as Richard Pipes, "Is Russia Still an Enemy?" in *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 76, No. 5, Sept/Oct. 1997; B. Kazantsev, "Why We Oppose NATO's Expansion," *International Affairs (Moscow)*, Vol.44, No. 3, 1998; and David Lane, "the Transformation of Russia: The Role of the Political Elite" *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol.48, No.4, 1996.

¹³⁶ Such as Sanobar Shermatova, "CIS: The Divorce is Dragging On," *Moscow News*, April 10-16, 1997, p.4.

¹³⁷ Such as Stephen Handelman, "Russia, NATO wary in first security talks," *The Toronto Star*, September 27, 1997, A16.

¹³⁸ Such as Yulia Petrovskaya, "Primakov gives Year-End Foreign Policy Review," *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, Vol. 50, No. 1, Feb. 4, 1998, p.1, which gives an overview of Russia's foreign policy for 1997 and also contains an interview with Yevgenyi Primakov.

¹³⁹ Such as Judith S. Kullberg, "The End of New Thinking? Elite Ideologies and the Future of Russian Foreign Policy," prepared for the Midwest Slavic Conference, Michigan, 1993; Ambassador Yuri Nazarkin, "Security Issues for Russia in the New International Context", Conference Paper #005115, School of International Affairs, Carleton University, 1997; and Henrikki Heikka,

in Russian foreign policy;¹⁴⁰ papers published by institutes devoted to security studies or issues of Russian foreign policy;¹⁴¹ magazine articles; and internet sources.¹⁴² Information about the Russian foreign policy bureaucracy and its linkages were also obtained through looking at elite or leadership analyses of Russian foreign policy which have been previously conducted.¹⁴³ Although an attempt was made to include both English and Russian sources, there was a concern that adequate Russian sources for the purposes of providing evidence for the hypothesis were available only in the Russian language. To address this concern, attempts were made to find translations of Russian sources in various books, articles, and on the internet. On the basis of these sources, this thesis attempted to confirm or disconfirm the stated hypothesis.

The level of foreign policy decision-making that was analyzed was at the upper to middle echelons of the CIS and Russian bureaucracy. Within the Russian Federation, the study focused on the Presidential, governmental and legislative branches of the Russian government. This included the President, Boris Yeltsin, his aids, the Security Council and its Commissions, the Presidential

“Constructing Threat and Russian Foreign Policy: Some Theoretical Spin-offs” prepared for the ISA Conference in San Diego, 1996.

¹⁴⁰ such as Celeste Wallander, ed., The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy After the Cold War, Westview Press, 1996; Roger Kanet & Alexander Kozhemiakin, (eds.), The Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, MacMillan Press Ltd., 1997; and Ilya Prizel, National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine, Cambridge University Press, 1998.

¹⁴¹ such as Renée Nevers, Russia’s Strategic Renovation, Adelphi Paper #289, IISS, Brassey’s, July 1994.

¹⁴² Internet sources, such as www.integrumworld.com, feature a myriad of Russian primary and secondary documents and articles in both English and Russian.

Council and its advisors, and services falling under the President that have direct links with other countries (such as the Foreign Intelligence Service, the Federal Security Service, and Border Troops). Within the government, the Prime Minister was examined, as well as the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Cooperation with the CIS States, Foreign Economic Relations, and Defence, and their Joint-Coordinating Committees. Within the legislature, although to a lesser extent, State Duma Committees dealing with international affairs was examined, as well as Federation Council Committees. Also, careful consideration was given to some domestic influences of Russian foreign policy, such as regional authorities, competing elites, industrial leaders, military leaders, and interest groups (see Appendix A for a model of Russian foreign policy decision making). Much of the literature points to these decision-makers as the key internal factors in Russian foreign policy.¹⁴⁴

To a lesser extent, analysis of the CIS Executive Secretariat, located in Minsk, was conducted, as well as an analysis of the leaders of the various CIS countries. The CIS Executive Secretariat was conceived upon the formation of the CIS in December 1991 and has since performed a largely ceremonial function,

¹⁴³ See for example, Neil Malcolm, et al. Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy, pp.40-42.

¹⁴⁴ see for example Nodari Simonia "Priorities of Russia's Foreign Policy and the Way It Works" and Jeffrey Checkel "Structure, Institutions, and Process: Russia's Changing Foreign Policy" in Adeed Dawisha & Karen Dawisha (eds.) The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, M.E. Sharpe, New York, 1995; and Neil Malcolm, et al. Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press, 1996, p.108.

serving as a depository of the various CIS treaties and a frequent venue for high-profile CIS conferences.

The study did not examine lower levels of the Russian bureaucracy because they are not as important to the making and direction of foreign policy in Russia. It also would have been difficult to gather information about them in a methodical way.

It is possible that there may be different possible explanations of the results found in this study. Some alternative hypotheses are presented here. One alternate hypothesis is that NATO's eastward expansion has resulted from a perception in the West of Russian neo-imperialism in the CIS. This would seem to be the reverse of the hypothesis presented in this study. A second alternate hypothesis may be that Russian foreign policy is incoherent and is the result of a divided state and inter-elite rivalries. A third alternate hypothesis may be that the CIS states demand that Russia play a greater role in their affairs as a result of being left out of NATO's expansion. This thesis will attempt to confirm the hypothesis presented and disconfirm the alternative hypotheses presented above.

The independent variable used in the study was the Russian perception of NATO's expansion eastward as a threat. The dependent variable was the extent to which Russian foreign policy decision-makers sought closer integration with the CIS countries through their foreign policy linkages. The analysis applied Complex Relations Approach to these two variables in order to confirm or disconfirm the hypothesis. By using Complex Relations Approach to uncover and analyze the foreign policy linkages, it was believed that decisions regarding

Russian foreign policy and the resulting policy directions with regards to the hypothesis would be more accurately described and explained.

Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to provide the theoretical context for the analysis of this study. This chapter analyzed the main theories of international relations, Realism, Liberalism, and Complex Interdependence, and demonstrated their shortcomings for the purposes of examining the hypothesis. It then assessed approaches used in foreign policy decision-making literature to determine their applicability to the issues surrounding the hypothesis. The theory neo-institutionalism, and its variant policy network institutionalism, was then examined. This chapter found that some of the basic tenets of these theories could be used as a basis for a new approach with which to analyze the hypothesis presented in this thesis. This chapter then created a variant of the neo-institutional approach. This new approach, Complex Relations Approach, was then described and a methodology for the use of this approach was outlined. Complex Relations Approach will provide a basis for the analysis of the hypothesis in Chapters Four and Five of this thesis. Before this analysis can take place, however, the issue of Russia's relations with the CIS in the context of NATO expansion must be put in context. Chapter Three will provide a historical background for the issues involved in the hypothesis.

CHAPTER THREE –

THE DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

The formulation of Russian foreign policy has been an object of contention between differing positions as well as the victim of bitter infighting among rival forces.¹⁴⁵ Various actors have assigned varying importance to the ‘near abroad’ as a region and the CIS as an instrument for integration. The direction of Russian foreign policy has also taken dramatically different postures in the few years since the demise of the Soviet Union. Undoubtedly, the Soviet Union has left some legacy on both the formulation and conduct of Russian foreign policy. The direction of foreign policy in the early 1990s is quite different from what is emerging today. Yeltsin and Kozyrev’s earlier “liberal” or pro-Western stance failed to consistently address issues of how the CIS states would deal with their intertwined economies in a cooperative way.¹⁴⁶ This policy stance also came under increasing pressure from domestic actors who claimed Russia had put the interests of the West ahead of its own. Since the mid-1990s, Russia seems to have taken a foreign policy direction that highly regards its “special role” in the CIS. Many call this Russia’s “Monroe (or Monrovisky) Doctrine.”

¹⁴⁵ Alexei Arbatov, “Russia’s Foreign Policy Alternatives,” International Security, Vol. 18, no.2, Fall 1993, p.5.

¹⁴⁶ See for instance: Suzanne Crow, “Why Has Russian Foreign Policy Changed?”, RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 3, No. 18, May 6, 1994, p.1; and Mike Bowker, Russian Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War, Dartmouth, Brookfield, 1997, p. 207.

How has Russian foreign policy evolved from the Soviet era? Finally, is there a consensus emerging regarding the direction of Russia's foreign policy?

This chapter has two main objectives. First, it aims to trace the development of Russian foreign policy and demonstrate the evolution of its direction from the end of the Soviet period to the present day. By placing the direction of Russian foreign policy in context, this chapter will facilitate the understanding of the issues surrounding the hypothesis. Second, this chapter aims to describe the making of foreign policy within the Russian Federation. It will determine which players are influential in the foreign policy making process in Russia, and it will investigate the institutions in which foreign policy is made. By outlining the key actors and influences, this chapter will fulfil the first methodological aspect of Complex Relations Approach that seeks to investigate who is involved in the foreign policy process.

By achieving these objectives, this chapter will provide the background and context for the issues involved in testing the hypothesis. As well, the analysis provided in this chapter will facilitate the testing of the hypothesis that will take place in Chapters Four and Five.

The Soviet Legacy

In order to place in context Russia's relations with the other former Soviet republics, it is necessary to outline the overarching Soviet system that governed the activities of these republics. In particular, it is important to discuss the characteristics of the Soviet policy making system. By doing this, we can get a

clearer picture of the framework from which Russian foreign policy making evolved. As well, it will lead to a better understanding of how Soviet foreign policy had an influence on the manner in which Russia develops its foreign policy.

In his book, *Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II*, Alvin Rubinstein outlined five generalizations that were relevant to understanding Soviet foreign policy.¹⁴⁷ First, much of Russia's expansion at the expense of other nations and peoples throughout history can be attributed to the quest for strategic frontiers:

Emphasizing such persistent aims as the desire for security, urge for access to the sea, manifest destiny in Asia, and the leadership of the Slav peoples, [scholars] contend that Soviet policy was pragmatic and power oriented.¹⁴⁸

As such, the acquisition of land became associated with security from attack. Indeed, throughout its history Russia had come under attack from the east, by the Mongols, the west, by various European nations, and from the south, by the Ottoman Empire. Thus, the quest for security has been a central theme in Russian foreign policy.

Second, according to Rubinstein, Russia's political elite never questioned the wisdom of expansion. The pursuit for security by Russian élites remained ambitious even though expansionism brought with it the conquest of other

¹⁴⁷ Alvin Rubinstein, *Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 4th ed., HarperCollins, New York, 1992, p.9.

¹⁴⁸ David Mackenzie & Michael Curran, *A History of the Soviet Union*, 2nd edition, Wadsworth Publishing Company, Belmont, 1991, p. 307.

peoples, and hence increased difficulties in maintaining order.¹⁴⁹ This development strengthened the perceived need for “strong, centralized, autocratic rule.”¹⁵⁰

A third generalization about Russian foreign policy, according to Rubinstein, was that Russia’s empire endured because it consisted of one geographic entity that was permeated with and settled by Russians. The Russian élite always felt it was at least necessary to have a very visible Russian presence in newly acquired territories. This is evidenced by the policy of russification followed by the tsars as an essential means of cementing together the empire’s diverse social components.¹⁵¹

Rubinstein’s fourth generalization about Russian foreign policy was that strategic considerations were invariably preeminent. From the time of Ivan the Terrible, to the onset of the Cold War, to the present day, security issues have been at the forefront of Russian foreign policy. This was primarily a result of the external environment of both tsarist and Soviet Russia being fraught with military threats and military opportunities.¹⁵²

¹⁴⁹ See for instance a history of the Tsars’ foreign policy in Robert Donaldson & Joseph Noguee, The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing Systems, Enduring Interests, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, 1998, pp. 3-22.

¹⁵⁰ Alvin Rubinstein, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II, p.9.

¹⁵¹ Karen Dawisha & Bruce Parrott, Russia and the New States of Eurasia: The Politics of Upheaval, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, p. 7.

¹⁵² Bruce Porter, “Russia and Europe After the Cold War,” in Celeste Wallander (ed.) The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy After the Cold War, Westview Press, Boulder, 1996, p. 124.

The last generalization about Russian foreign policy is that decisions were the domain of the few and powerful.¹⁵³ This was true during the Tsarist era through the Soviet period:

In the communist world... the centralisation of power in the party-state also belied the modernisation approach; political stability seemed assured without the legitimization of a pluralistic competitive party system or representative infrastructure.¹⁵⁴

Indeed, extreme centralization was at the heart of the Russian control system. All important decisions were made in Moscow by an oligarchy which furnished the nucleus of Moscovite military power.¹⁵⁵ Power was wielded through a strong centralized bureaucracy and augmented by a secret police, and an economy and social order controlled by the state.¹⁵⁶ This tightly knit configuration worked throughout Russia's history to preserve social order at home, while securing and promoting prosperity of the Russian people abroad.¹⁵⁷ The main political goal, due to its turbulent history, was survival.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵³ Alvin Rubinstein, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II, p.9.

¹⁵⁴ David Lane, "The Transformation of Russia: The Role of the Political Élite," Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 48, No. 4, 1996, p.535. See also: Karen Dawisha & Bruce Parrott, Russia and the New States of Eurasia: The Politics of Upheaval, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, p. 7.

¹⁵⁵ Carol Barner-Barry & Cynthia Hody, The Politics of Change: The Transformation of the Former Soviet Union, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1995, p.39.

¹⁵⁶ Robert Donaldson & Joseph Noguee, The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing Systems, Enduring Interests, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, 1998, p. 23.

¹⁵⁷ Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Internal Politics and Foreign Policy in the Soviet System," in Vernon Aspaturian (ed.) Process and Power in Soviet Foreign Policy, Little, Brown and Co., Boston, 1971, p.498.

¹⁵⁸ Carol Barner-Barry & Cynthia Hody, The Politics of Change: The Transformation of the Former Soviet Union, p. 38.

These generalizations are profoundly important in understanding the context of Russia's present foreign policy questions. They indeed have an impact on what Russian foreign policy decision-makers consider crucial to the well being of Russia, its self-interest and its self-determination. As a country that has few, if any, natural boundaries with its neighbours Russia has often used its foreign policy as a survival mechanism. This legacy can not be ignored when dealing with current Russian foreign policy issues. Despite the dissolution of the Soviet empire, it is important to remember that there is no such thing as an absolutely clean break with the past. The Soviet legacy shapes the way in which Russia considers its neighbours. Indeed, it has a deep impact on the manner and direction in which Soviet foreign policy decisions are taken.

Rubinstein's last characteristic, that foreign policy was the domain of the few, is particularly important in understanding the development of Russian foreign policy. Decision-making in foreign policy was always *élite-driven*.¹⁵⁹ Franklyn Holzman and Robert Legvold elaborated on this by listing three important features of the Soviet foreign policy making system:

1. It enforced greater *centralization* (concentration of decision-making power)
2. It maintained deeper *differentiation* (role specialization of institutions and individuals)

¹⁵⁹ Alex Pravda, "The Politics of Foreign Policy," in Stephen White, Alex Pravda & Zvi Gitelman (eds.) Developments in Russian Politics, Duke University Press, Durham, 1997, p. 209.

3. It allowed little *participation* (access to the decision-making process)¹⁶⁰

Concurring with this view, Robert Service stated that political centralism, dictatorship, ideological monopoly, national manipulation and state ownership were the key ingredients of the Soviet system.¹⁶¹ Thus the direction and conduct of foreign policy in the Soviet system was restricted to the most upper echelons of the Soviet government. Information, as a general rule, was only distributed on a “need-to-know” basis. Opinions, such as those of intellectuals, were only sought when those in power deemed appropriate. The structure of the decision-making system was such that two hierarchies controlled decision-making: the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Government. The Secretariat of the Communist Party was responsible for filtering information to the Politburo (the policy-making body of the Communist Party). The Foreign Ministry, Defence Ministry, and the military were responsible for implementing foreign policy initiatives with strict guidelines from the Politburo. Near the end of the Soviet period, this system led to many demarcation battles between the bureaucratic level of foreign policy and the Politburo. As a result, Soviet foreign policy frequently appeared to lack coherence and flexibility.¹⁶²

In 1985, when Gorbachev came to power, he set in train numerous changes that would forever change the course of foreign policy making in the

¹⁶⁰ Quoted from Neil Malcolm, “Russian Foreign Policy Decision-making,” Peter Shearman (ed.) Russian Foreign Policy Since 1990, Westview Press, Boulder, 1995, p. 24.

¹⁶¹ Robert Service, A History of Twentieth-Century Russia, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1998, p.xxv.

Soviet system. Through his policies of *perestroika* (restructuring) and *glasnost* (openness) he sought to fix the problems of the deteriorating Soviet system, whose problems were a result of corruption, monopolization, and economic deterioration. *Perestroika* was largely an economic program aimed at decentralizing decision-making. As the program continued to evolve, it spread to the political system allowing for increased public involvement in administration and decision-making.¹⁶³ *Glasnost*, on the other hand, was a policy directed at releasing state controls on information and debate:

Controls on the media were eased, eliciting a barrage of public discussion and criticism covering most aspects of Soviet history, culture, and policy.¹⁶⁴

Through *glasnost* and *perestroika*, Gorbachev succeeded in opening up the discussion of foreign policy issues and in breaking down some of the barriers of specialization.¹⁶⁵ The effect was that the balance of influence was shifted in favour of the Foreign Ministry, and the military had less monopoly on defence-related data and judgements. *Perestroika* and *glasnost* opened the doors to free and open debate about foreign policy issues and directions among the various government departments and divisions:

In a system that had been held together by strict central control and where debate had been discouraged, there was no underlying agreement on national goals to soften the rivalry between the different agencies.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶² Neil Malcolm, "Russian Foreign Policy Decision-making," p.25.

¹⁶³ Joan Debardeleben, *Soviet Politics In Transition*, D.C. Heath & Co., Toronto, 1992, p.65.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid*, p. 66.

¹⁶⁵ Neil Malcolm, "Russian Foreign Policy Decision-making," p. 25.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid*, p. 25.

During the latter part of 1990, various foreign policy arms of the Soviet system seemed to be forwarding their own policies, seemingly at odds with Gorbachev's New Political Thinking.

The freeing of debate in the Soviet government about foreign policy issues was similar to that of opening Pandora's box. The decentralization of decision-making and the opening up of deliberation on foreign policy to the general public unleashed the resurrection of deeper issues of the deteriorating status of the Soviet system. In an effort to encourage support for his reforms, Gorbachev took the unconventional step of enlisting the support of the liberal intelligentsia to mobilize public support, to release the creativity stifled by years of repression, and to legitimize the crumbling Soviet system.¹⁶⁷ This development turned against him when the intelligentsia aimed to fundamentally democratize the Soviet system and the policy making structure. Contradictory agendas were put forth on many issues, especially foreign policy. The policy of *glasnost* had exposed a number of previously taboo topics, such as the horrors of Stalinism, the economic realities of the USSR, and ecological disasters that had been largely ignored by the Communist Party.¹⁶⁸ The evolution of these developments led to the mobilization of public pressure against the Soviet bureaucracy and an open attack

¹⁶⁷ Ilya Prizel, National Identity and Foreign Policy, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1998, p.211.

¹⁶⁸ David Mackenzie & Michael Curran, A History of the Soviet Union, 2nd edition, Wadsworth Publishing Company, Belmont, 1991, p. 493.

on the legitimacy of the Party and its Marxist-Leninist ideology.¹⁶⁹ The outcome was a de-legitimization of the Soviet system in the eyes of both the Soviet bureaucracy and the public at large.

Another development that resulted from *glasnost* was that of reopening the histories and cultures of the Soviet republics. The resurrection of issues such as the 1933-1934 famine in Ukraine, the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the mass murders under Stalin fueled separatist tendencies challenging the internationalist ideology underpinning the regime.¹⁷⁰ Long-repressed nationalist tensions arose and began to corrode the core of the Soviet system. Glasnost had allowed ethnic nationalities to express their cultural identities, their languages, and their grievances regarding Soviet rule.¹⁷¹ Ethnic nationalism began to flare up in the face of Soviet oppression. By 1990, many republics began to declare sovereignty or independence.¹⁷²

Gorbachev's policy of greater freedom of expression led to the rapid de-legitimization of the Soviet regime in both Russia and the smaller republics. By 1989, it was clear that the reforms instituted during the Gorbachev era were not having their intended effect. What Gorbachev failed to understand was that power and the relations of power were not corroding the Soviet system, but they were the

¹⁶⁹ Robert Donaldson & Joseph Noguee, The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing Systems, Enduring Interests, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, 1998, pp. 95-96.

¹⁷⁰ Ilya Prizel, National Identity and Foreign Policy, p.213.

¹⁷¹ Robert Service, A History of Twentieth-Century Russia, pp. 456-457.

¹⁷² Joan Debardeleben, Soviet Politics In Transition, p. 90.

system.¹⁷³ As *glasnost* uncovered this fact, a sequence of events was set in motion that led to the downfall of the Soviet Union in 1991:

By the end of 1990, all fifteen union republics had declared themselves sovereign or independent. Following the failed coup d'état in August 1991, most republics that had not yet done so declared independence.¹⁷⁴

With this development, the Soviet Union collapsed.

There are many legacies left by the Soviet system in terms of foreign policy. First, the Soviet system of foreign policy making in the upper levels of government continues in Russia today, albeit to a lesser extent. This was particularly true during the “honeymoon with the West” period of Russian foreign policy in the early 1990s. At that time, a narrow circle of people formed the foreign policy decision-makers, including President Yeltsin, his aides, the Foreign Minister, and his aides. Although foreign policy has since opened up, there continues to be great control exercised by the upper echelons of the Russian government regarding foreign policy. This narrow circle has been able to maintain its centralized control of foreign policy from the disarray, lack of expertise, and preoccupation with domestic problems displayed by the military, parliament, political parties, and other domestic actors.¹⁷⁵ This is not to say that these other domestic actors have a history of influencing foreign policy. As mentioned above, during the Soviet era domestic players could not influence

¹⁷³ Carol Barner-Barry & Cynthia Hody, The Politics of Change: The Transformation of the Former Soviet Union, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1995, p.186.

¹⁷⁴ Joan Debardeleben, Soviet Politics In Transition, p. 91.

¹⁷⁵ Alexei Arbatov, “Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives,” p.8.

policy directions at all, least of which in the foreign policy realm. Russia does not have a history of democratic decision-making structures, where domestic actors can access the decision-making process. This characteristic has to a large extent carried over to the foreign policy process in post-Soviet Russia. Thus, centralization of decision-making on foreign policy issues continues in the Russian Federation today.

A second legacy of the Soviet system is Russia's tendency to dominate the region. During the Cold War, the bipolarity of the international arena led Russia to assume a "super-power" role in the region. In the post-Cold War era, Russia continues attempting to assume a "great power" or "special" role with regards to the other CIS member states.¹⁷⁶ As the successor to the Soviet Union, Russia inherited 60 per cent of the population and economy of the former USSR and occupies 76 per cent of its territory.¹⁷⁷ Despite the fact that its geopolitical parameters have been reduced, Russia continues to exert influence on its surrounding states. This is based on an activist policy that emerged on political, military, and economic fronts. The recovery in the post-Cold War world by the Russians of their historic identity has shaped their perceptions of new Russia's role and interests.¹⁷⁸ These perceptions have shaped the policies towards the 'near

¹⁷⁶ John Lepingwell, "The Soviet Legacy and Russian Foreign Policy," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 3, No. 23, June 10, 1994, p. 2.

¹⁷⁷ Alexei Arbatov, "Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives," p. 6.

¹⁷⁸ Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "Russia's Monroe Doctrine: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, or Imperial Outreach?" Maureen Molot & Harald von Riekhoff (eds.) Canada Among Nations 1994, Carleton University Press, Ottawa, 1994, p.232.

abroad.’ Russia claims that the ‘near abroad’ is Russia’s exclusive sphere of influence by virtue of past imperial heritage.¹⁷⁹ Russia legitimizes this interference in support of this assumption by focusing on the protection of Russian minorities that have been left outside the territory of the Russian Federation as a result of the demise of the Soviet Union. There are approximately 25 million Russians stranded outside Russia that form crucial minorities in the newly independent states of the CIS and that look to Moscow for protection.¹⁸⁰ Russian spokespeople have referred to this doctrine as the Russian “Monroe Doctrine,”¹⁸¹ and have promoted it in international arenas outside of Russia.

Developed by Andranik Migranian, this doctrine:

recognizes Russia’s vital interests and special role in the former republics of the Soviet Union and legitimizes Russian intervention to protect them, by military means where deemed necessary.¹⁸²

Yeltsin and his advisors have argued the case for international recognition of the Russian “Monroe Doctrine” in international fora such as the United Nations and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. As well, during a two-day conference on Russian foreign policy towards the former Soviet republics in January 1994, officials spoke of a need “for Russia to maintain a military presence

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid*, p. 232.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid*, p.231.

¹⁸¹ It is also referred to as the “Monrovisky Doctrine,” for purposes of distinguishing it from the U.S. “Monroe Doctrine” as put forward by President James Monroe in 1823 which has been used to symbolize U.S. dominance.

¹⁸² Peter Shearman, “Defining the National Interest: Russian Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics,” Roger Kanet & Alexander Kozhemiakin (eds.), The Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, St. Martin’s Press, 1997, p.10.

in areas of the CIS ‘which for centuries had been the sphere of its military interests.’¹⁸³ Thus, the Soviet legacy of maintaining a strong role in the region has continued in post-Soviet Russia.

A third legacy left by the Soviet Union concerns rival participants in foreign policy practice. Although decision-making about, and the direction of, Russian foreign policy continues to be centralized, debate about foreign policy implementation has arisen among numerous factions. Different ministries within the Russian government often take diametrical positions with regards to the implementation of foreign policies. For instance, with regards to sustainable development in the Caspian Sea region, the Ministry of Fuel and Energy paired up with the Ministry for Cooperation with CIS States against the Foreign Ministry. The former coalition sought limited, economical gains, while the Foreign Ministry sought to exert influence on the CIS for political reasons.

This legacy has manifested itself most prominently in the military establishment that has begun to exert a significant influence on the formation of foreign policy, especially in relation to the ‘near abroad.’¹⁸⁴ Certain factors have combined to raise the profile of the military in foreign policy decision making. First, the collapse of the Soviet system left the military forces as just about the only national organized structure in Russia. Second, as the struggle between the executive and legislature in Moscow weakened the ability of the Russian

¹⁸³ *Ibid*, p.11.

¹⁸⁴ Roy Allison, “Military Factors in Foreign Policy,” Neil Malcolm et al. (eds.), Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press, New York, 1996, p. 230.

government to enforce decisions, the military leadership assumed a greater role in being the “power-broker”. Third, the rejection of the Communist ideology in Russia removed the psychological block to direct military intervention in politics. The military now became an institutional interest that could lobby and prescribe policy options.¹⁸⁵ As a result, the military often prescribes its own foreign policy directions, some of which can be contrary to the foreign policy goals of other foreign policy decision makers, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Local elites and companies are also rival participants in the implementation of foreign policy. As Douglas Blum points out, the capacity of local elites (such as regional authorities) to exercise influence on the manner in which foreign policies are implemented has increased. For instance, local leaders in the Astrakhan *oblast'* have worked energetically to ensure that any agreement about the division of oil resources in the Caspian Sea with other countries have guarantees against environmentally unsound practices and establish multilateral measures to regulate fisheries.¹⁸⁶ Large Russian companies, such as LUKoil, and banking groups, such as LogoVAZ and ONEKSIMbank, have attempted to exert influence on Russian foreign policy in order to satisfy their own goals. For example, when new oil was discovered in the Caspian Sea, the large Russian company LUKoil rushed to invest in the production sharing deal. LUKoil's involvement in the Caspian Sea oil consortium has considerably shaped Russia's foreign policy towards the Caspian Sea oil and the major issues surrounding it. In

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid*, pp.230-231.

particular, the issue regarding where the oil pipelines should be laid was of substantial interest to Russian foreign policy makers, as was the issue of gaining downstream commercial opportunities for Russian companies.¹⁸⁷

After the breakdown of the USSR, the legacy left to Russia made it difficult to establish coherent methods of foreign policy making. According to Neil Malcolm, the entire political and administrative system had to be reconstructed in a country where formal institutional hierarchies and predictable procedures in policy making had never been given a chance to take root and where organizational changes had always tended to be linked to top-level power struggles.¹⁸⁸ What resulted in post-communist Russia was a system that had numerous foreign policy institutions, but little means of coordinating and controlling them. As such, the conduct and direction of Russian foreign policy came under much debate.

The Debate on Russian Foreign Policy

The fundamental interests of Russian foreign policy have changed dramatically over the course of the 1990s. There have been three main groups of actors attempting to influence the direction of foreign policy in Russia: the pro-Westerners (also called the “atlanticists”), the moderate liberals (also called the “eurasianists”), and a variety of groups called the “ultra-nationalists.” This

¹⁸⁶ See Douglas W. Blum, “Domestic Politics and Russia’s Caspian Policy,” Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1998, p.155.

¹⁸⁷ Suha Bolukbasi, “The Controversy over the Caspian Sea Mineral Resources,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 50, No. 3, 1998, p. 399.

section explores how the direction of Russian foreign policy has evolved through the influence of these three groups. In the next chapter, this information will provide the basis for the analysis of the hypothesis.

The first group, the pro-Westerners, consisted of Boris Yeltsin, Andrei Kozyrev and his advisors, a large portion of the intelligentsia and Yeltin's close associates in the presidential quarters and cabinet of ministers.¹⁸⁹ The latter consisted of people such as Gennady Burbulis, Yegor Gaidar, and Mikhail Poltoranin. This group's ideas dominated the foreign policy formulation, direction and implementation of Russia until approximately 1993. The primary aim of the pro-Westerners was the political and economic integration of Russia into the West.¹⁹⁰ They desired to create a new basis for mutual cooperation, founded on mutual trust, international law, and common values:

They [Pro-Westerners] believe the collapse of the Soviet Union was a unique opportunity to remove the historical barriers that previously prevented Russia's integration with the West. Their identification with the West leads to their affirmation of democracy and human rights and to their call for the economic and political transformation of Russia.¹⁹¹

This direction of Russian foreign policy, however, had four severe deficiencies. First, it failed to outline or formulate Russian national interests and priorities abroad that would differentiate themselves from its traditional imperialistic Soviet ambitions. Second, the pro-Western stance failed to recognize that its priority

¹⁸⁸ Neil Malcom, "Russian Foreign Policy Decision-making," p. 26.

¹⁸⁹ Leszek Buszynski, Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War, Praeger, Westport, 1996, pp. 4-6; See also Robert Donaldson & Joseph Noguee, The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing Systems, Enduring Interests, p.113.

¹⁹⁰ Alexei Arbatov, "Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives," p.10.

should not have been economic integration and political relations with Europe and North America, but rather with the other states of the former Soviet Union. Due to the interconnected economies and interrelated politics of the former Soviet region, a successful transition to democracy and free market economy could not have occurred in Russia without cooperation with other 'near abroad' countries. The third deficiency of the pro-Western stance was that in dealings with Western governments a widespread impression was produced in Russia of a never-ending sequence of easily given unilateral concessions.¹⁹² Examples of these unilateral concessions given to the West include: UN sanctions on Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Libya; the levels and limitations set by START 2; missile technology exports to India; arms sales to Iran; and the readiness to give away the South Kuriles to Japan. The outrage expressed by Russians as a result of these concessions highlights the fourth deficiency of this foreign policy stance. That is: it did not rely on any substantial domestic constituency. Decision-making was highly centralized. No serious efforts were made to bring on board parliament, the mass media, or the academic community to forge a solid domestic political basis for foreign policy.¹⁹³ At the same time, decision-making was highly fragmented and unclear. The promise of Western aid and assistance to Russia to help its deteriorating economy led Russia to cooperate with the West, arguably, to the detriment of its own national interests.

¹⁹¹ Leszek Buszynski, Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War, p. 4.

¹⁹² Alexei Arbatov, "Russian Foreign Policy Priorities for the 1990s," Teresa Johnson & Steven Miller (eds.), Russian Security After the Cold War: Seven Views from Moscow, Brassey's, Washington, 1994, p.11.

The second group attempting to influence Russian foreign policy were the moderate liberals, or Eurasianists. While the pro-Western group had monopoly on foreign policy decision-making, this group rallied support for their goals. They argued that there was a need for a distinctly Russian foreign policy and security priorities. These should be based on the specifics of Russia's geopolitical position and its transitional domestic situation.¹⁹⁴ This group stated that the highest foreign policy priority for the Russian Federation should be its relations with the former Soviet republics. The Eurasian view does not hold that Russia should depart from Europe altogether, but rather it recognizes a balance of eastern and western trends in Russia's policy, placing the highest priority on the states surrounding it.¹⁹⁵ Advocates of this position include some parliamentarians, the academic community, and some officials in the Foreign and Defence Ministries.¹⁹⁶

The moderate liberals have argued that the improvement of relations with the West does not mean automatic acceptance of all positions and proposals of the current Western governments. They have been very critical of reliance on the promises of Western economic aid, and considered sound national security policy valuable in its own right, regardless of the foreign credits this policy might earn.¹⁹⁷ Indeed, the amount and scope of aid promised by the West has not been delivered

¹⁹³ *Ibid*, p. 12.

¹⁹⁴ Alexei Arbatov, "Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives," p.11.

¹⁹⁵ N.G. Bugeuli, Russia In Transition: Left, Right or Center?, Nova Science Publishers, New York, 1997, p.189.

¹⁹⁶ Suzanne Crow, "Why Has Russian Foreign Policy Changed?" RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 3, No. 18, May 16, 1994, p. 3.

¹⁹⁷ Alexei Arbatov, "Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives," pp. 11-12.

to Russia's satisfaction, nor has it developed Russia's economy to the extent professed by the West.

The third group that has attempted to influence Russia's foreign policy is the ultra-Nationalists (sometimes referred to as the "neo-communists" or "national-patriots"). This extremist group consists of actors such as Gennadiy Zhirinovskii, and Dmitri Vasiliev. In recent years, this group has been gaining political power by taking advantage of Boris Yeltsin's domestic failures and foreign policy weaknesses. Inside the State Duma, the hard-liners are organized in a multi-party coalition called "Russian Unity." The primary aim of this group is the revival of the Russian empire, by military means if necessary:

There is a general agreement [among ultra-Nationalists] that Russia's objectives should be to consolidate and extend its sphere of influence at the expense of its competitors. National-patriots share strong distrust of all outside actors, including international agencies, and consequently express a preference for unilateral solutions.¹⁹⁸

These politicians are extremely anti-Western and are the most critical about developments in the West, such as NATO's eastward expansion. Although not taken seriously by many, this group's ideas have been influential in turning the tide of Russia's foreign policy direction towards a more moderate liberal approach.

The three groups have had varying degrees of influence on Russia's foreign policy direction. As stated above, the pro-Westerners dominated the

¹⁹⁸ Douglas W. Blum, "Disintegration and Russian Foreign Policy," in Douglas Blum (ed.), Russia's Future: Consolidation or Disintegration? Westview Press, Boulder, 1994, p.138.

direction of foreign policy until approximately 1993. At that time, there was an increase in opposition against this policy by the mass media, parliamentarians, the military, and interest groups. Domestically, many Russians felt that Russia had made too many concessions to the West and that it was not following a course of foreign policy that best suited its national interest. Economic dependence on the West for financial aid and credits was humiliating to Russian national pride and provoked a nationalistic anti-Western backlash in Russia's domestic politics.¹⁹⁹ As well, many Russian politicians became disillusioned with Western promises of \$2.5 billion in aid, little of which found its way directly to Russia. They were outraged by the number of Western 'fact-finding' missions that visited Moscow, staying in luxury hotels funded by aid money earmarked for Russia, making recommendations and then leaving, with no tangible results.²⁰⁰ The grandiose legacy of the Soviet empire prompted many Russians to believe that it should promote its "great power" role abroad and not be "stepped on" by Western powers.

During 1993, a dramatic shift began to take place in Russian foreign policy. The debate that had started domestically grew to foreign policy circles in Russia and prepared the ground for a major realignment. The shift was based on a number of facets. First, there was a growing anti-Western sentiment in the public mood and in political debates. Second, there was a growing popular move

¹⁹⁹ Alexei Arbatov, "Russian Security Interests and Dilemmas: An Agenda for the Future," in Alexei Arbatov et al. (eds.) Managing Conflict in the Former Soviet Union, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1997, p. 414.

towards Russian self-assertiveness. Finally, it was recognized domestically that relations with the CIS states should come to the foreground of practical policymaking, leaving all other issues behind. These facets culminated into the articulation of the Russian “Monroe Doctrine,” also called the “Monrovsy Doctrine.” As stated above, this doctrine emphasizes Russia’s special role in the ‘near abroad’ in ensuring stability and security of the region.

Alexei Arbatov cites a number of reasons for this profound shift in foreign policy. The fundamental explanation is the deterioration of Russia’s economic and social situation and the growing popular dissatisfaction with the results of previous reforms to the Russian economy and political system. Russia’s political leadership came under increasing criticism from not only the public, but also from within the bureaucracy, the military, industrial groups and the new private entrepreneurs. The support of the military and security institutions gave new importance to the need for a shift in foreign policy direction.²⁰¹ The shift was marked by a change in foreign ministers from the pro-Western Andrei Kozyrev to the more Eurasianist Yevgenii Primakov.

The shift towards the “Monrovsy Doctrine” represents a reassertion of Russian nationalism in the face of growing instability and chaos. This development, however, does not mean that Russia has returned to its historic imperialistic tendencies. Great Powers traditionally exert significant influence over their smaller neighbours for a number of reasons. Some of these reasons

²⁰⁰ Renee de Nevers, Russia’s Strategic Renovation, Adelphi Paper 289, Brassey’s, July 1994, p.12.

include: prestige; to ensure access to raw materials; to prevent conflicts outside their borders spilling over; to protect their nationals abroad; to secure the capacity to project power; and in some cases to defend their perceptions of sovereignty.²⁰²

The leverage that Russia is attempting to acquire over the CIS states, therefore, need not imply the re-creation of the USSR. Indeed, Russia does not have the military capability, nor the economic base, to support this type of action. Russia can attain influence through other foreign policy tools.

Some authors, such as Arbatov, have claimed that there is no strategic vision to the “Monrovsky Doctrine.” They assert that it is a policy of default, whose meaning is vague and subject to various interpretations. Although it cannot be disputed that CIS integration is a necessary component for a successful transition to democracy and free market economy, the researcher believes that the “Monrovsky Doctrine” has been used as a tool to work out new strategic relationships because of perceived external threats, such as that of NATO expansion. Before exploring this issue further, it is important to examine how foreign policy is made in Russia.

How Russian Foreign Policy is Made

The foreign policy process in Russia is riddled with competing institutions and struggling factions. Despite its centralized character, the decision-making process does take into account views from the State Duma, different ministries,

²⁰¹ Alexei Arbatov, “Russian Security Interests and Dilemmas,” p.424.

²⁰² Renee de Nevers, Russia’s Strategic Renovation, Adelphi Paper 289, Brassey’s, July 1994, p.6.

and the public. To understand the foreign policy process, the institutions of Russia must be examined.

The president, Boris Yeltsin, officially determines foreign policy. This centralization of foreign policy decision-making appears to be yet another legacy inherited by the Soviet era. Article 86 of the Russian constitution states:

The President of the Russian Federation shall:

- a) supervise the conduct of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation;
- b) conduct negotiations and sign international treaties of the Russian Federation;
- c) sign instruments of ratification;
- d) accept credentials and instruments of recall of diplomatic representatives accredited with him.²⁰³

The president relies on a network of institutions and advisors to reach his decisions. The four groups most critical to this process have been the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Defence, the Security Council, and Yeltsin's advisors in the Presidential Council. The Constitution of the Russian Federation allows the president to hand-pick these ministers and advisors, without the parliament's agreement:

The President of the Russian Federation shall:

- a) appoint Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation subject to consent of the State Duma;
- e) appoint and dismiss deputy chairmen of the Government of the Russian Federation and federal ministers as proposed by the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation;
- g) form and head the Security Council of the Russian Federation, the status of which is determined by federal law;
- h) endorse the military doctrine of the Russian Federation;²⁰⁴

²⁰³ Constitution of the Russian Federation, Article 86, www.russianet.com.

²⁰⁴ Constitution of the Russian Federation, Article 83, www.russianet.com.

Furthermore, Article 90 of the Constitution allows the president to issue decrees and executive orders.²⁰⁵ The president, therefore, is the most essential actor with regards to foreign policy decision-making in Russia. His monopoly on foreign policy direction, his ability to choose ministers, and his capacity to rule by decree signify a very centralized foreign policy decision-making process.

Yeltsin ensures that the “power ministries” (the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Defence, the Security Council, and the Presidential Council) answer directly to the president rather than to parliament.²⁰⁶ This demonstrates Yeltsin’s desire to keep his hands on the levers of power and to intervene actively in the foreign policy process. The President and his aides are faced with the enormous tasks of information handling, coordination, and supervision. These tasks may sometimes be beyond their capabilities. Yeltsin has recently allowed the ministries a greater role in the decision-making process.

Before 1996, the Foreign Ministry was responsible for implementing the policies set by the president. With the changeover of foreign ministers from Kozyrev to Primakov, the Foreign Minister took on an increasing role in foreign policy decision-making. According to Yeltsin’s adviser, Sergey Karaganov, Primakov was given responsibility for foreign policy in Yeltsin’s government.²⁰⁷ A presidential decree gave the Foreign Ministry the additional role of

²⁰⁵ Constitution of the Russian Federation, Article 90, www.russianet.com.

²⁰⁶ See for instance: Constitution of the Russian Federation, Chapter 6, www.russianet.com.

²⁰⁷ “Yeltsin Adviser Views Foreign Policy After Election,” [FBIS-SOV-96-129](#), July 3, 1996.

coordinating and monitoring work by other Russian ministries, committees, and departments to ensure a unified political line by the Russian Federation in relations with foreign states.²⁰⁸ The Foreign Ministry is responsible for the development, formulation and implementation of Russia's foreign policies. The Ministry occupies a position in the Security Council.

The Defence Ministry is also responsible for implementing policies set by the president. It has taken an increasingly important role in Russian foreign policy decision-making since it backed Yeltsin in 1993 during the president's battle with the Supreme Soviet.²⁰⁹ As well as direct access to the president, the Defence Ministry enjoys representation on the Security Council. In fact, the general balance of representation on the Security Council favours military and security departments.²¹⁰ The Defence Ministry has played an instrumental role in the CIS region through various agreements with the corresponding ministries in the CIS states, through peacekeeping operations, and through the quelling of conflict in the territories of CIS countries:²¹¹

Central Moscow military authorities have promoted the various proposals for a CIS military structure on the basis of the Tashkent Collective Security Treaty of May 1992. The military's interest has been to... prevent the escalation of local conflicts in a way that would destabilize Russia's peripheries.²¹²

²⁰⁸ *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 18 Nov. 1992.

²⁰⁹ Neil Malcolm, "Foreign Policy Making," p.124.

²¹⁰ *Ibid*, p.124.

²¹¹ See for instance: Mikhail Shevtsov, "CIS Defense Ministers to meet on Integration" FBIS-UMA-98-028, January 28, 1998.

²¹² Leszek Buszynski, Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War, p. 23.

Thus, the Defence Ministry's role in maintaining and promoting CIS integration has been significant.

Under the Defence Ministry, the military establishment has also had an influence on foreign policy decision making. This has been done in three ways. First, military leaders have shaped the formation of military doctrine, including the nature of threat perceptions, which they see as lying within their professional capacity. Second, the Russian military command has occasionally sought direct influence over major national security or foreign policy decisions that lie beyond the scope of their professional responsibilities. Third, Russian military leaders have promoted military solutions, such as the use of peacekeeping forces, to restore the 'stability' in the 'near abroad'.²¹³ According to Roy Allison's analysis of the military's influence in foreign policy, both the military leadership and the officer corps have gained political leverage since the collapse of the Soviet system and have entered the foreign policy decision-making arena.²¹⁴

The Security Council was designed to be a consultative body that would make recommendations and proposals, and 'prepare decisions for the President of the Russian Federation' on security matters.²¹⁵ The Security Council is chaired by the president, and includes the prime minister, the speakers of both chambers of the Federal Assembly, the ministers of defence, foreign and internal affairs, and emergency situations, the heads of intelligence and counterintelligence agencies,

²¹³ Roy Allison, "Military Factors in Foreign Policy," p. 251.

²¹⁴ *Ibid*, p. 251.

²¹⁵ Neil Malcom, "Foreign Policy Making," p.110.

and the commander of the border guards.²¹⁶ The Security Council is a constitutional body that helps the President formulate and implement his policies. According to the former secretary of the Security Council, Ivan Rybkin:

It is the job of the Security Council to determine the vitally important interests of society and the state, reveal internal and external threats to security, develop the guidelines of the strategy of the security of Russia, and organize the preparation of federal goal-oriented programs in support of the latter.²¹⁷

The Council contains both a Foreign Policy Commission and a Defence Security Commission. The role of these commissions is to oversee foreign policy and security decisions, including the right to recommend policy 'improvements.'²¹⁸ The Security Council has had varying degrees of influence in decision-making and membership has shifted several times:

The overall picture of the decision-making process suggests, however, that the Security Council cannot be the fulcrum of security policy making because it lacks a gatekeeping mechanism to control its most powerful members' access to the president.²¹⁹

Russia's constitution, adopted in 1993, makes it difficult for the legislature to mount challenges to the President's role in foreign policy.²²⁰ The State Duma, Russia's parliament, however, has had some influence over the tone and direction of Russia's foreign policy. Committees in the Duma, such as the Committee for

²¹⁶ Mikhail Tsyarkin, "The Politics of Russian Security Policy," in Bruce Parrott (ed.), State Building and Military Power in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, 1995, p. 17.

²¹⁷ Ivan Rybkin, "Rybkin Views National Security Threats," FBIS-SOV-97-124, May 1, 1997.

²¹⁸ Renee de Nevers, Russia's Strategic Renovation, p. 21.

²¹⁹ Mikhail Tsyarkin, "The Politics of Russian Security Policy," in Bruce Parrott (ed.), State Building and Military Power in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, 1995, p. 18.

International Affairs, Defence, and CIS Affairs, provide an important alternate view to the policies put forth by the executive branch of government.

Despite the seemingly clear nature of the Russian foreign policy decision-making process, it has not displayed a coherent and coordinated nature. Much of Russia's foreign policy in the 1990s has been reactionary with presumably little forethought. The researcher, however, believes that there is some consensus on Russian foreign policy between its decision-makers with regards to issues such as the perceived threat of NATO expansion and the development of CIS integration. By examining the networks of relations between foreign policy decision-makers, as this study intends to do, a clearer picture emerges on the consensus that does emerge regarding the states of the CIS.

Conclusions

This chapter had two objectives. The first objective was to trace the development of Russian foreign policy and demonstrate the evolution of its direction from the end of the Soviet period to the present day. It achieved this objective by analyzing the Soviet legacy in Russia's foreign policy, and outlining the development of the direction of Russia's foreign policy since the breakup of the Soviet Union.

The second objective of this chapter was to describe the making of foreign policy within the Russian Federation. This objective was achieved in two ways. The chapter described the different "camps" of opinion (pro-Western, Eurasian, and ultra-Nationalist) on the direction of Russia's foreign policy. It further

²²⁰ Neil Malcom, "Foreign Policy Making," p.107.

determined the actors affiliated to each of these “camps”. The chapter then outlined the various actors and institutions that are influential in the making of Russia’s foreign policy.

The fulfillment of these objectives brings the thesis closer to the development of Complex Relations Approach and the hypothesis. By examining the institutional setting where Russian foreign policy is taking place, and determining the actors involved in those institutions, this Chapter fulfilled the first criteria of Complex Relations Approach. That is, it determined who the main actors were in Russian foreign policy. This development will be important in the next two chapters where the statements and actions of these actors will be examined in order to establish the links between the perceived threat of NATO expansion and attempts by Russia to integrate with the CIS. It will also facilitate the investigation in Chapter Five of the different foreign policy tools used by Russian officials to achieve integration.

By outlining the development of Russian foreign policy since the breakup of the Soviet Union, this chapter further provided the basis on which to test the hypothesis in Chapter Four. It also provides an understanding of the opinions held foreign policy decision-makers that will be of great importance as this thesis explores the different actions taken to integrate with the CIS in Chapter Five. In other words, it facilitates the understanding of the reasons why Russian officials seek greater integration with the CIS, thus helping to test the hypothesis. This will further the development of Complex Relations Approach in the next two chapters.

CHAPTER FOUR –
RUSSIA'S VIEW OF NATO EXPANSION AND CIS
INTEGRATION: A COMPLEX RELATIONS APPROACH

The phenomenon of NATO expansion has been debated to a great extent in Russian foreign policy circles. There has emerged an overwhelming consensus among Russian officials that this development is negative. At the same time, there have been numerous attempts at gaining greater influence in the CIS region. Russia has prioritized its relations with CIS member-states in its foreign policy. It has also actively led discussions of political, security, and economic integration of the member-states. How, if at all, is this development related to the eastward expansion of NATO? Do Russian foreign policy decision-makers perceive the eastward expansion of NATO as a threat to Russian security? If so, is CIS integration seen as a viable counter-action to this perceived threat? This chapter will explore possible answers to these questions.

Chapter Three provided the necessary background to understanding the development, direction, and making of Russian foreign policy. By doing this, it achieved the first methodological aspect of Complex Relations Approach, that of establishing who the main actors are in Russian foreign policy.

On the basis of what has been understood in Chapter Three, this chapter will further develop the testing of the hypothesis. Chapter Four has three primary goals. The first is to view the opinions of Russian foreign policy makers on one major foreign policy issue in Russia, that of NATO's eastward expansion. It will

provide evidence that Russian foreign policy makers perceived NATO expansion as a threat. This will provide the basis for confirming the independent variable, that Russia perceives the eastward expansion of NATO as a threat. It will also fulfil the second methodological aspect of Complex Relations Approach by establishing that observable dialogue has arisen that suggests NATO expansion is perceived as a threat.

Second, this chapter aims to demonstrate how the CIS countries continue to be intertwined economically, politically and socially, so as to show the reasons why CIS integration is considered desirable on Russia's part. This will establish the linkages between Russia and the CIS countries that is necessary to fulfil the third methodological aspect of Complex Relations Approach: Whether there has been observable dialogue that suggests the CIS should integrate further.

A third aim of this chapter is to test the hypothesis of whether Russia seeks closer integration with the CIS as a response to the perceived threat posed by NATO expansion. The first two sections of this chapter will provide the basis for this analysis. This analysis will satisfy the fourth methodological aspect of Complex Relations Approach, that of establishing whether observable dialogue has arisen between the dependent and independent variables. The testing of the hypothesis will be conducted using the three techniques of Complex Relations Approach: exploring the context in which CIS integration and NATO expansion are discussed, investigating the dialogue of foreign policy decision-makers, and utilizing the principle of timing and effect. By satisfying these, the hypothesis can be confirmed.

In order to confirm the hypothesis of this thesis, it is necessary to test the null hypothesis, which is the “logical opposite of the research hypothesis.”²²¹ For the purposes of this thesis, the null hypothesis is that there is no relationship between the perceived threat of the eastward expansion of NATO and Russian attempts to integrate with countries of the CIS. If the null hypothesis is disconfirmed, then the hypothesis of this thesis can be confirmed. Furthermore, the foundation will be laid for exploring the foreign policy tools used by Russia in seeking integration with the CIS in the next chapter.

Russia’s Perception of the Eastward Expansion of NATO

One foreign policy issue that all factions of the Russian government are united is that of the eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. With the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia experienced losses to the territory acquired by the Soviet empire. The “loss” of Eastern Europe with the dissolution of the Warsaw pact removed the “buffer zone” which Russia relied upon during the Cold War. NATO expansion to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech republic brought the borders of the Alliance distressingly closer to Russia’s. Indeed, Russia has reason to be suspicious. This is an organization that was the Soviet Union’s opponent for close to 50 years. Since the end of the Cold War, although the Warsaw Pact became defunct, NATO lived.

During the initial years after the break up of the Soviet Union, Russia’s relations with the West were very positive. This was a result of the dominance of the pro-Western direction of Russian foreign policy. In December 1991, Foreign

²²¹ Scott Bennet, Public Affairs Research Methods: A Quantitative Introduction,

Minister Andrei Kozyrev outlined the contours of Russia's foreign policy, proclaiming his acceptance of the priority of the individual over society, the free market, and all those values that unite the West.²²² Kozyrev further identified France, Germany and the United States as Russia's natural allies, and claimed that the direction of Russia's foreign policy would reflect this.²²³ In other words, he identified NATO member-states as Russia's allies. Indeed, Russia joined the newly established North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1992.²²⁴ When U.S. President Clinton formulated the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Program to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, Russia hesitated, indicating that it would demand a special position in the partnership that reflected its special status.²²⁵ In June 1994, however, Russia signed on to the Partnership for Peace agreement on the basis that it referred to Russia's special status in global and

Edwin Mellen Press, Queenston, 1996, p.68.

²²² Leszek Buszynski, Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War, Praeger, Westport, 1996, p. 4.

²²³ Andrei Kozyrev, "We Appear to Have a New Value System," *Krasnaya zvezda*, December 20, 1991.

²²⁴ NACC – Created on December 20, 1991 for the purpose of consultations and cooperation on security and related issues between Eastern Europe, Former Soviet Union states and NATO. Membership was open to all NATO countries, all Eastern European countries and all Former Soviet states. See Alexei Pushkov, "A View from Russia," Jeffrey Simon (ed.) NATO Enlargement: Opinions and Options, National Defense University Press, Washington, 1995, p.126.

²²⁵ Partnership for Peace was a program aimed at increasing participation of Eastern European and former Soviet states in the political and military bodies at NATO headquarters. Partners agreed to have transparency in defence budgeting, promote democratic control of defence ministries, and conduct joint planning and joint military exercises. See "Declaration of the Heads of State and Government issued by the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, Belgium," NATO Press Communiqué, M-1 (94)3, January 11, 1994, p.5. See also Mike Bowker, "Russian Policy Toward Central and Eastern Europe," in Peter Shearman (ed.) Russian Foreign Policy Since 1990, Westview Press, Boulder, 1995, p. 83.

European affairs.²²⁶ During this period, labeled the “romantic period of Russian foreign policy” by Andrei Kozyrev, Russian President Boris Yeltsin made a famous statement in Warsaw that Eastern European countries were free to join any alliance they deemed necessary.²²⁷ In fact, in December 1991, Yeltsin expressed an interest in belonging to NATO.²²⁸ Thus, Russia demonstrated a pro-Western and pro-NATO stance in the early 1990s.

Yeltsin’s declaration that Eastern European states were free to join any alliance created the pretext for bringing the NATO expansion issue from theory into practice.²²⁹ In the months and years directly following Yeltsin’s speech, the debate about the eastward expansion of NATO increased substantially, particularly in Russia.²³⁰ Due to domestic political pressures and a concern for Russia’s immediate security, the Yeltsin government reversed its previous position on the issue:²³¹

Immediately after Yeltsin’s visit to Warsaw, Moscow reversed its stance trying desperately to prevent enlargement. Yeltsin sent letters to the leaders of the main NATO powers making his case against the Alliance’s extension to Central and Eastern Europe in the foreseeable future...[T]here was a virtual consensus in Russia that NATO enlargement eastward would create conditions for the

²²⁶ Peter Shearman, “Russian Policy Toward Western Europe: The German Axis” in Peter Shearman (ed.) Russian Foreign Policy Since 1990, Westview Press, Boulder, 1995, p. 101.

²²⁷ Yeltsin’s speech was given on August 26, 1993. Alexei Pushkov, “A View from Russia,” p. 127.

²²⁸ Hall Gardner, Dangerous Crossroads: Europe, Russia and the Future of NATO, Praeger, Westport, 1997, p. 13.

²²⁹ Alexei Pushkov, “A View from Russia,” p. 127.

²³⁰ See William G. Hyland, “NATO’s Incredible Shrinking Defense,” in Ted Carpenter & Barbara Conry (eds.) NATO Enlargement: Illusions and Reality, CATO Institute, Washington, 1998, pp.31-40.

²³¹ Leszek Buszynski, Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War, Praeger, Westport, 1996, p. 39.

isolation of Russia, and therefore would run contrary to its national interests.²³²

Despite its efforts to counter this development, in July 1997 in Madrid, NATO leaders invited three Central European nations – Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic – to join the Alliance.

During the debates surrounding NATO expansion in the mid-1990s, as well as after the decision to expand was finalized, there were overwhelming criticisms of this development in Russia. Many Russians, such as Yevgenii Primakov, claimed that NATO has not transformed itself into a collective security instrument appropriate to the new political climate, but remained a ‘military-political’ grouping.²³³ During the time he was head of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, Primakov warned that Russia was ‘far from indifferent to which bloc extends its area of responsibility up to [its] borders.’²³⁴ As Minister of Foreign Affairs, Primakov expanded on this view in his speech entitled “The Role of Follower is Not For Us.” In outlining the irritants in Russia’s relations with NATO, he claimed:

One is NATO enlargement. During numerous contacts with representatives of the Western countries the Russian president and Russian Federation Foreign Ministry have pointed out that in the event of NATO enlargement, particularly if NATO military structures advance toward our territory, an unfavourable geopolitical situation will be created for Russia... We are told: You need not worry, because nowadays NATO presents no threat to Russia. But intentions in politics are changeable things.²³⁵

²³² Alexei Pushkov, “A View from Russia,” p. 127.

²³³ Renee de Nevers, Russia’s Strategic Renovation, p.66.

²³⁴ *Ibid*, p. 66.

²³⁵ Report by Anatoliy Repin on speech by Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov to Moscow State Institute of International Relations Academic Council

In an interview with Primakov in 1996, he further stated that:

We continue to adhere to a negative position on NATO expansion since we believe that it is contrary to our interests – and this is not, of course, unfounded.²³⁶

Primakov therefore demonstrated his negative stance toward NATO expansion.

As Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, his view reflected the overall perception of the Russian Foreign Ministry. Indeed, NATO's claim that it consists of a new community guided by new values, which embodies a new expanded idea of security without a unilateral enemy image, is a hard sell in Russia.²³⁷ This is particularly true when one considers that to provide a convincing guarantee of security for new members of the alliance in the eastern part of Europe, NATO relies on:

additional military investments in new communications and cooperation support equipment, new air defence systems, upgrading obsolete arms of new members and creating an infrastructure which would make it possible, in the event of threat, to rapidly move reinforcements from NATO's central region (Germany) to peripheral regions of East Europe.²³⁸

The military worked out that due to expansion, the alliance needs an extra 731 fighter-bombers, 3400 or more tanks, almost 290 airfields, and a network of roads, railroads, pipelines, depots, and test sites.²³⁹ In light of these "necessities"

entitled "The Role of Follower is Not For Us. Yevgeniy Primakov on Basic Guidelines of Russia's Foreign Policy", FBIS-SOV-96-124, June 25, 1996.

²³⁶ Tomas Kolesnichenko, "Our Foreign Policy Cannot Be the Policy of a Second-Rate State," *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, December 17, 1996, pp. 1, 7.

²³⁷ Gernot Erler, "NATO Expansion: Myths and Prospects," *International Affairs* (Moscow), Vol. 43, No. 5, 1997, p.150.

²³⁸ *Ibid*, p.150.

²³⁹ Yurii Nikolaev, "Elaborate Retaliatory Actions to Plans for NATO Expansion," *Rossiiskie vesti*, Jan. 9, 1997, translated in J.L Black, *Russia &*

in order to secure the NATO guarantee in the new members' territory, it can easily be seen why Russia believes NATO continues to see it as a threat. This build-up tilts the balance of forces in the European security sphere in favour of NATO countries. Consequently, Russia has a legitimate reason to be concerned for its security.

Negative opinions concerning NATO's eastward expansion were also iterated by other key foreign policy decision-makers. Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin claimed that he was absolutely against NATO's plans to expand eastward during a speech to the State Duma:

[NATO expansion plans] are completely out of step with the global security system that has been shaping up during the past few years. Russia has been, remains, and will remain opposed to NATO expansion, and our stance is understood in several European countries.²⁴⁰

Some of the main reasons why many Russian officials were opposed to the eastward expansion of NATO were outlined by Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, chief of the Russian Federation Defence Ministry Main Directorate for International Military Cooperation:

"Why is Russia strongly opposed to NATO expansion today? ... Why, because we see this process, first, as damaging to Russia's security, and, second, as a return to elements of the Cold War. Third, Russia cannot treat today's declarations of intentions with confidence. Russia has been left out of these intentions several times already."²⁴¹

Eurasia Documents Annual, Academic International Press, Volume 1, 1997, p. 180.

²⁴⁰ "Russia: Chernomyrdin Reiterates Opposition to NATO Expansion" FBIS-SOV-96-156, August 10, 1996.

²⁴¹ Quoted in Aleksandr Yerastov, "In Whose Court is the NATO 'Ball'?" Roundtable on the Theme of 'NATO Expansion and Russia's National Security' Was at Least Two Years Overdue, in the Opinion of the Participants

Thus, it seems evident that many Russian officials view NATO expansion negatively. What are some of the reasons for this negative view of NATO expansion? Does this negative outlook translate into the perception of NATO expansion as a threat?

According to Boris Kazantsev, the Deputy Director of the Department of European Cooperation in the Foreign Ministry in Russia at the time, and Dr. Alexei Pushkov, former foreign policy adviser for Gorbachev, there are several reasons why Russia has a negative attitude towards NATO expansion. First, the expansion of NATO deepened the gap between Russian civilization and the West. NATO expansion leaves Russia outside the Alliance. As such, the West lost a unique opportunity to bring Russian civilization closer to itself, which was the only way to solve the West's historical task of making Russia into an ally rather than a rival.²⁴²

Second, Russia is convinced that this bloc approach creates new dividing lines in Europe. It divides Europe into countries that have a security guarantee, and those that do not. NATO expansion brings the borders of the Alliance frighteningly closer to those of Russia's, leaving Russia on the outside.

According to Boris Kazantsev:

First and foremost, we are convinced that this is a bloc approach creating new dividing lines in Europe... The process of Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary's admission to NATO has failed to convince Russia that it is meant to increase European security and stability. In fact, it has become another source of tension in

Themselves," translated in J.L. Black, Russia & Eurasia Documents Annual, Academic International Press, Volume 1, 1997, p. 184.

²⁴² Alexei Pushkov, "A View from Russia," p.136.

international relations. This is not an adequate answer to the new European realities; this will inevitably breed alienation among the European states. This pushes us back, closer to confrontation and worsened geopolitical situation in the world.²⁴³

The expanded Alliance now borders on Belarus, which has a sovereignty-association agreement with Russia, and one of Russia's only warm water ports: the Kaliningrad *oblast*'.²⁴⁴ Kaliningrad is host to one of Russia's largest military bases. With NATO being brought closer to the borders of Russia, leaving Russia on the outside, a sentiment of being threatened and left out cannot be helped. Although NATO has attempted to alleviate this feeling with the Russia-NATO Founding Act, this agreement only gives Russia a "say" in NATO affairs.²⁴⁵ The purpose of the Russia-NATO Founding Act is that:

Russia and NATO will work together to contribute to the establishment in Europe of common and comprehensive security based on the allegiance to shared values, commitments and norms of behavior in the interests of all states.²⁴⁶

To carry out this objective of cooperation in the interest of European security, Russia and NATO created the Russia-NATO Permanent Joint Council. The aim of this Council is:

To build increasing levels of trust, unity of purpose and habits of consultation and cooperation between Russia and NATO, in order

²⁴³ Boris Kazantsev, "Why Moscow Opposes NATO Expansion," International Affairs, (Moscow), Vol. 44, No. 3, 1998, p.33.

²⁴⁴ See for instance Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard, BasicBooks, New York, 1997, particularly Chapter 4 "The Black Hole – Russia's New Geopolitical Setting," pp. 87-122.

²⁴⁵ The NATO-Russia Founding Act was signed on May 27, 1997. See The Founding Act of Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in J.L Black, Russia & Eurasia Documents Annual, Academic International Press, Volume 1, 1997, p.191-196.

²⁴⁶ *Ibid*, pp.191-192.

to enhance each other's security and that of all nations in the Euro-Atlantic area and diminish the security of none.²⁴⁷

Despite the Founding Act, Russia is not given any direct influence in discussions of European security within NATO. Furthermore, the concessions given to Russia in the Founding Act do not constitute meaningful, binding restrictions on NATO's conduct.²⁴⁸

A third reason why NATO expansion is met with a negative attitude in Russia is because it establishes indirect US domination over a greater portion of Euro-Atlantic space:

The United States, that are playing the key role in the alliance, are able to establish their control over the regions formerly part of the WTO [Warsaw Treaty Organization] and find new armament markets in Central and Eastern Europe. In a wider sense there is a major aspect of the American strategy aimed at establishing US domination over the Euro-Atlantic space.²⁴⁹

NATO expansion thus allows the U.S. to establish control over the region of Eastern Europe and gives the U.S. a greater voice in Eastern European affairs.

Fourth, the process of Poland, Czech republic and Hungary's admission to NATO has failed to convince Russia that it is meant to increase European security and stability. It pushes Russia back in terms of its geopolitical situation and closer to confrontation.²⁵⁰ NATO expansion tips the balance-of-power in favour of the West and the new Eastern European NATO member states. As a result, it creates tensions between Russia and NATO-Europe, obstructing and possibly

²⁴⁷ *Ibid*, pp. 192-193.

²⁴⁸ Ted Carpenter, "Strategic Evasions and the Drive for NATO Enlargement," in Ted Carpenter & Barbara Conry (eds.) NATO Enlargement: Illusions and Reality, CATO Institute, Washington, 1998, p.23.

²⁴⁹ Boris Kazantsev, "Why Moscow Opposes NATO Expansion," p.33.

preventing the emergence of meaningful discourse about the security needs of post-Cold War Europe.

The above arguments provide reasons for Russia's negative attitude towards NATO expansion. But does signify that Russia perceives the development of NATO expansion as a threat? In order to discover this one must examine how Russian foreign policy decision-makers respond to this development.

In October 1995, the General Director of the INOBIS (Institute of Defense Studies) in Moscow released a document outlining the main external threats to Russia's national security and a strategy for countering these threats. In section 1 of this document Anton Surikov outlined the main external threats facing Russia. One of the main external threats outlined was that "Western policy with respect to NATO's future [was] seen as an attempt to isolate Russia and ultimately oust it from Europe."²⁵¹ By outlining this as an external threat to Russia, this document provides evidence that there exists a perception in Russia that NATO expansion is a threat. Indeed, the evidence for this document was taken from remarks made by Defense Minister Grachev after his meeting with the president in Sochi.²⁵² This would suggest that there was a discussion between the Minister of Defense and the president where NATO expansion was viewed as a potential threat. The

²⁵⁰ *Ibid*, p.33.

²⁵¹ Anton Viktorovich Surikov, Conceptual Provisions of a Strategy for Countering The Main External Threats to Russian Federation National Security, INOBIS (Institute of Defense Studies), Moscow, October 1995.

²⁵² Aleksandr Lyasko, "'Provisions' May Underlay New Military Doctrine," *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 27 October, 1995.

document was widely circulated and was influential in the making of Russia's military doctrine.

Other evidence of this can be found in an interview conducted with Yevgenii Primakov in April 1996, during his time as Foreign Affairs Minister. In an interview published in *Krasnaya zvezda*, Primakov was quoted saying:

They [NATO] tell us: NATO is expanding, and since there is nothing we can do to stop this, we will have to put up with it. This position runs counter to Russia's national interests, and so we want to prevent NATO enlargement. *And the most important thing is to prevent the NATO military infrastructure from approaching our territory.*²⁵³

The fact that Primakov vehemently opposed and wished to prevent NATO's military infrastructure from approaching Russia suggests that he perceived the eastward expansion of NATO as a threat. As the Foreign Affairs Minister, his opinion had a great impact on the conduct of Russian foreign policy. As well, in light of his position it would be probable that this opinion heavily influenced other members of the Foreign Ministry and the general public.

Other Russian foreign policy decision-makers have also expressed the view that NATO expansion is perceived as a threat in Russia. For instance, Andrey Kokoshin, the First Deputy Defence Minister and the chairperson of the Interdepartmental Commission for Defence Security, stated in an interview that:

The replacement of systemic relations (inside and outside Russia) has taken place so rapidly that many people have been unable to assimilate these changes either mentally or emotionally. And this is followed by the idea of NATO's expansion. As a result very

²⁵³ Yevgenii Primakov, "Vneshniaia politika Rossii dolzhna byt' mnogoverktoinoi," *Krasnaya zvezda*, April 2, 1996. Translated in J.L. Black, *Russia & Eurasia Documents Annual*, Academic International Press, Volume 1, 1996, p. 182. Emphasis added by researcher.

many Russians have seen this as a challenge and even as a threat and a negative and painful reaction has arisen in response.²⁵⁴

Kokoshin iterated the view that while Russians were attempting to adjust to the realities of the post-Cold War environment, the additional strain of the eastward expansion of NATO was perceived by Russians as a threat. In the same interview, he stated that as a result of NATO's expansion Russia's security was harmed and that a search for ways of safeguarding national security was made more difficult.²⁵⁵ Thus, Kokoshin affirmed that some Russians perceive NATO expansion as a threat to their national security.

Within the Security Council, NATO expansion was perceived as a threat by its Secretary at the time, Ivan Rybkin. In an article outlining the major threats to the Russian state, Rybkin stated that:

A most appreciable threat to the security of Russia are, in my view, the hegemonistic and expansionist ambitions of certain foreign states. They could create a real prospect of Russia being squeezed to the periphery of the world integration process and a loss of independence in the pursuit of foreign and domestic policy and influence the domestic political situation in the country.²⁵⁶

It was evident that he was referring to NATO expansion in the above quotation, as he stated a few sentences further that:

[T]he expansion of NATO eastward, the approach of the bloc's military infrastructure to our borders, and the plans for this bloc's further expansion thanks to our former Warsaw Pact allies and new states that formed after the disintegration of the Soviet Union represents a serious comprehensive and, most important, long-term

²⁵⁴ Vladimir Kuznechevskiy, "Andrey Kokoshin: Is Every Peasant's Hut in Europe Under NATO's Shadow?" *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, May 15, 1996, p.7.

²⁵⁵ *Ibid*, p. 7.

²⁵⁶ Ivan Rybkin, "Rybkin Views National Security Threats," *FBIS-SOV-97-124*, May 1, 1997.

threat to the security and interests of Russia, ignoring the potential danger of which would be a mistake.²⁵⁷

As a key decision-making institution in Russian foreign policy, the Security Council's declaration that NATO expansion is a threat reflects the overall perception of the President, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, as well as the Russian bureaucracy in general.

The perception of NATO expansion as a threat was not only iterated in the Russian bureaucracy, but also in the legislature. The Russian State Duma published a document in October 1996 where it outlined how the perceived NATO expansion as a threat:

In the military sphere the combat potential of the NATO Joint Armed Forces will increase considerably. With the admission of even one Central or East European state into NATO, the level of armaments set for NATO but the CFE Treaty will be exceeded significantly.²⁵⁸

The threat posed by NATO expansion is seen by the Duma as being caused by the increase in armaments allowed by NATO-Europe under the CFE Treaty. An increase in armaments by NATO countries that are very close to Russia's borders has significant implications for Russia's security. It is also significant that a consensus exists between the executive and the legislature with regards to this development being perceived as a threat. The executive consists of the president and his ministers, all of whom are viewed by the general public as supporting a relatively balanced foreign policy between east and west. In the legislature, on

²⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁸ Russian Federation Federal Assembly State Duma, "State Duma Appeal. In Connection with the Plans for NATO's Expansion," Moscow, October 25, 1996,

the other hand, there are many nationalists with different party affiliations who wish to rebuild the Soviet empire. This includes both left and right wing Russian Duma parties (such as People's Power, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, and the LDPR). The fact that these two seemingly opposite camps all perceive NATO expansion as a threat demonstrates that this opinion is widespread and deeply rooted in Russian society.²⁵⁹

Russia's foreign policy has gone through much revision since the demise of the Soviet Union. Consensus, however, does seem to be emerging with respect to the direction of foreign policy. One issue that all factions of the Russian government, particularly those who are influential in Russian foreign policy such as the Foreign and Defence Ministers, seem to agree on is that NATO expansion is perceived as a threat. The fact that consensus seems to exist is significant. It provides evidence for the independent variable (as well as the second methodological aspect) of this study which is that NATO expansion is perceived as a threat by Russian foreign policy decision-makers.

In establishing the independent variable that NATO expansion is perceived as a threat, it is crucial for the development of the hypothesis to now turn to how Russia has dealt with this perceived threat. The hypothesis indicates that CIS integration is the answer. Before the hypothesis can be fully tested, however, an overview of Russia's policy toward the CIS is needed.

translated in J.L. Black, Russia & Eurasia Documents Annual, Academic International Press, Volume 1, 1996, p. 194.

²⁵⁹ See for instance "Russia: Party Leaders Present Foreign Policy Views," FBIS-SOV-96-057-S, March 22, 1996.

Russia's Policy Towards the CIS

The disintegration of the Soviet Union created an economic crisis that was in large part due to the vestiges of the command-style economy that had united the USSR into a coherent economic space.²⁶⁰ The interdependence created by the old Soviet command economy makes it very difficult for the former Soviet republics to make the transition to a market economy without a high degree of cooperation. The Soviet Union's economy had been integrated across republic borders, with industries in different republics depending on supplies of both raw materials and finished goods from diverse corners of the Union.²⁶¹ Economic factors are critical in any state's foreign policy, and economic capabilities determine a state's ability to operate effectively in the international environment.²⁶² Russia's relations with the former Soviet republics transcend economic, political, ethnic, security and other ties:

They affect the prospects of Russia's success for democratic, political, and economic reform; in fact, they affect the course of its internal evolution. The reverse is equally true: Moscow's successes and failures in domestic reform greatly affect its relationship with other former Soviet republics.²⁶³

The success of reform in Russia was thus inextricably tied to reforms in the other former Soviet republics. Some mechanism to guide Russia's relations with the 'near abroad' was needed.

²⁶⁰ Karen Dawisha & Bruce Parrott, Russia and the New States of Eurasia, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1994, pp.162-163.

²⁶¹ Renee de Nevers, Russia's Strategic Renovation, p. 10.

²⁶² Peter Shearman, "Defining the National Interest: Russian Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics," Roger Kanet & Alexander Kozhemiakin (eds.), The Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, St. Martin's Press, 1997, p.9.

²⁶³ Alexei Arbatov, "Russian Security Interests and Dilemmas," p.412.

The formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States was needed to preserve the existing links of inter-republican cooperation, mainly in the economic sphere.²⁶⁴ However, there were many different interpretations of the role of the CIS. In Ukraine, President Leonid Kravchuk believed that the CIS was needed solely for the purpose of solving the temporary logistical problems associated with the “divorce” of the USSR. For Russians, on the other hand, the CIS was primarily a political and economic mechanism to secure and legitimize its dominant position in the region.

Russia formally recognizes the CIS states as foreign countries. However, they remain closely bound to Russia by a comprehensive web of vital economic, ethnic, cultural, personal, and psychological ties, as well as historic grievances. This extremely high degree of integration results in a dependence on Russia as the successor to the Soviet Union.²⁶⁵ Conflicts and problems afflicting the new republics are rarely confined to their borders, and may expand into other states, particularly Russia.²⁶⁶ Consequently, many CIS states rely on Russia to assist them in times of civic strife and economic hardship.²⁶⁷

²⁶⁴ Alexander Kozhemiakin and Roger Kanet, “Russia and its Western Neighbours in the ‘Near Abroad,’” Roger Kanet & Alexander Kozhemiakin (eds.), The Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, St. Martin’s Press, 1997, p. 29.

²⁶⁵ Sergey Vsevolodovich Kolchin, “Russia – Near Abroad: Mutual Relations, Interests, and Policy Goals,” *Mirovaya Ekonomika I Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya*, No. 4, April 1995, pp. 47-56.

²⁶⁶ Alexei Arbatov, “Russian Security Interests and Dilemmas,” p. 415.

²⁶⁷ Sergey Vsevolodovich Kolchin, “Russia – Near Abroad: Mutual Relations, Interests, and Policy Goals,” p. 48.

Attempts to strengthen the CIS by developing it into a viable multilateral organization have largely failed.²⁶⁸ Although by 1994, the CIS had grown to encompass all former Soviet republics except for the Baltics, no consensus exists among the member-states regarding how much power the CIS should have. This lack of agreement prevents Russia from using the CIS as a legal basis for neo-imperialistic actions, as advocated by the ultra-nationalists, in the region. Russia does, however, use the CIS as a mechanism to pursue its objectives in the region in a particular way. It combines its initial emphasis on multilateralism with the development of power-based bilateral relations with each of the CIS states separately.²⁶⁹

The nationalist shift in Russian foreign policy manifested itself in a greater attempt to expand Russia's influence in the 'near abroad,' particularly concerning security matters. According to Nikolay Ahdanov-Lutsenko, former secretary of the foreign policy chamber of the Russian Presidential Political Consultative Council:

All post-Soviet countries and adjacent regions, no matter whether Russian influence is still strong or gone there, form the zone of Russia's strategic interests.²⁷⁰

This view was a confirmation of the view held by President Boris Yeltsin himself when he claimed that the relations with member-countries of the CIS must remain

²⁶⁸ Alexander Kozhemiakin and Roger Kanet, "Russia and its Western Neighbours in the 'Near Abroad,'" p. 30.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid*, p. 30.

²⁷⁰ Yevgeniy Yevdokimov, "Russia: Former Soviet Republics Form Zone of 'Strategic Interests'" FBIS-SOV-96-174, September 5, 1996.

the main direction of Russia's foreign policy.²⁷¹ According to Yeltsin, the promotion of dynamic integration of all CIS member-states must remain the aim of Russia's foreign policy in the years to come.²⁷² Indeed, in setting out Russia's foreign policy priorities, Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov stated that:

The Foreign Ministry regards work in the CIS sphere as its main task and has appropriate instructions from the president. We have two aims in this work: to develop integration processes and support centripetal tendencies (while preserving the sovereignty of all Commonwealth states), and to eliminate conflicts.²⁷³

In connection with targeting the CIS as a foreign policy priority, Russian officials have also attempted to expand their level of influence in the CIS with regards to economic policy. For instance, Yegor Stroyev, the spokesperson for the Russian Federation Council, claimed that preserving a single Eurasian economic space is an objective reality for Russia.²⁷⁴ He further stated that an effort should be made at aligning national legislations in the trade and economic sphere, and that special attention should be paid to market relations between the CIS states.²⁷⁵ This view was supported by Deputy Prime Minister, Valeriy Serov, who indicated that the positive economic benefits of the Russia-Belarus Union should be pondered by

²⁷¹ Andrey Surazhanskiy & Viktor Ahilyakov, "Russia: Yeltsin: Ties with CIS States Foreign Policy Priority," FBIS-SOV-96-075, April 16, 1996.

²⁷² Pavel Kuznetsov, "Russia: Yeltsin Urges More CIS Integration in 1999" FBIS-SOV-98-362, December 28, 1998.

²⁷³ Report by Anatoliy Repin on speech by Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov to Moscow State Institute of International Relations Academic Council entitled "The Role of Follower is Not For Us. Yevgeniy Primakov on Basic Guidelines of Russia's Foreign Policy", FBIS-SOV-96-124, June 25, 1996.

²⁷⁴ Lyudmila Yermakova, "Russia: Stroyev Calls for More CIS Integration Efforts," FBIS-SOV-98-167, June 16, 1998.

²⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

other CIS member-states.²⁷⁶ He further added that: “Very interesting forms of cooperation are now emerging, which will be more effective, and they have the right to exist.”²⁷⁷

Russia’s policy of strengthening cooperation and integration with the CIS member-states has produced significant outcomes since 1993. In terms of security relations, there have been numerous examples of integration between Russia and CIS states on a bilateral basis. For instance, agreements between Russia and both Georgia and Armenia have resulted in the continued presence of Russian troops in these republics and the establishment of joint guard units to protect the borders of both countries.²⁷⁸ The Russian army has intervened in Tajikistan to keep a Russia-friendly regime in power against internal opposition groups.²⁷⁹ Another example is in Moldova, where Russia sent its 14th Army to quell a conflict in the Transdniester region.²⁸⁰ These examples will be further elaborated upon in the next chapter which discusses the tools used by Russia to achieve further integration. Thus, it seems that some CIS states are already moving towards closer integration with Russia in terms of security relations.

CIS integration with Russia has been developing in more general terms as well. Belarus has signed an economic union agreement with Russia. In a

²⁷⁶ Robert Serebrennikov, “Russia: Official Urges Strengthened Integration Within CIS” FBIS-SOV-98-006, January 6, 1998.

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁸ Bess Brown, “Armenians and Georgians to Serve in Russian Border Troops,” RFE/RL Daily Report, Vol. 3, No. 52, March 16, 1994.

²⁷⁹ Alexei Arbatov, “Russian Security Interests and Dilemmas,” pp. 448-9.

²⁸⁰ Edward Ozhiganov, “The Republic of Moldova: Transdniester and the 14th Army,” Alexei Arbatov et al. (eds.) Managing Conflict in the Former Soviet Union, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1997.

referendum in May 1995, approximately 80 per cent of Belarusian voters approved economic integration with Russia.²⁸¹ Other agreements between the two former Soviet republics include: Russian-Belarusian monetary union, the lifting of customs control on the border between the two republics, and the continuing presence of 30,000 Russian troops guarding the nuclear missiles that still remain on Belarus soil. On 2 April 1996, Russia and Belarus officially signed the Treaty on the Formation of the Community.²⁸² Thus, it seems that some states of the CIS seem to be moving closer towards integration with Russia.

Many questions of Russia's motivations emerge with regards to CIS integration. What are the reasons behind Russia's willingness to be a major guarantor of security in the region? Is there a perception of a threat that Russia uses as an excuse to work out these strategic relationships with certain CIS states? By establishing that observable dialogue and actions have arisen that suggests Russia is attempting to integrate with CIS states, this section established the third methodological aspect of the study. In order to confirm the hypothesis, I will now examine how the perceived threat of NATO expansion and the goal of CIS integration are related. This analysis will test the hypothesis of the study, establish the fourth methodological aspect of the study, and provide the basis on which to examine how Russia's goals are executed through its foreign policy tools in the next chapter.

²⁸¹ Alexander Kozhemiakin and Roger Kanet, "Russia and its Western Neighbours in the 'Near Abroad,'" p. 39.

²⁸² *Ibid*, p. 39.

Discussions of NATO Expansion and CIS Integration

In his article, "Russia Contemplates the Risks of Expansion," Scott Parrish outlined four possible outcomes of Russian foreign policy in response to NATO expansion.²⁸³ The most likely of these outcomes was the Russian attempt to accelerate integration of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), including its transformation into a military alliance.²⁸⁴ This section will explore interviews, documents, and speeches many Russian foreign policy makers where the threats posed by NATO expansion have been highlighted in the same context as a discussion of the desirability of CIS integration.

In June 1995, as debate about the implications of NATO expansion heightened, the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy outlined Russia's possible responses to NATO expansion.²⁸⁵ It stated that Russia might be most likely to counter the threat of NATO expansion with increased efforts to accelerate the economic, political and military integration of the CIS.²⁸⁶ Indeed, in September 1995, Russian president Boris Yeltsin signed a decree on CIS strategy that states the CIS is a "priority area" for Russia and proclaims that mutually beneficial economic cooperation should be the cornerstone of Russia's policy toward the

²⁸³ Scott Parrish, "Russia Contemplates the Risks of Expansion," *Transition*, December 15, 1995.

²⁸⁴ *Ibid*, p. 11. The other three possible Russian responses to NATO expansion were: withdrawal from the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty; refusal to ratify the START II agreement; and significant changes in Russian military doctrine and foreign policy orientation;

²⁸⁵ A nonpartisan group founded by a wide range of Russian scholars, business people, and politicians. See Scott Parrish, "Russia Contemplates the Risks of Expansion," *Transition*, December 15, 1995, p. 11.

near abroad.²⁸⁷ The decree also stated that Russia should set forward attempts to transform the CIS into a collective security alliance and aim for more consistent implementation of already existing CIS military pacts, such as the 1992 Tashkent collective security agreement.

In October 1995, a widely circulated and highly influential document was published by Anton Viktorovich Surikov of the Institute of Defense Studies (INOBIS) in Moscow, entitled *Conceptual Provisions of a Strategy for Countering the Main External Threats to Russian Federation National Security*.²⁸⁸ The text of the document was based on dialogue at that time between Defense Minister Grachev and President Boris Yeltsin, and became the foundation for Russia's military doctrine.²⁸⁹ The document first highlights the nature of the main threats to Russia's national security, one of the most critical of which was NATO expansion. The second part of the document outlined a strategy for the neutralization of external threats. One component of this strategy was:

Opposition by force to the NATO bloc's eastward expansion seems an extremely urgent task... It is obvious that Russia has no real opportunities to hinder this by way of force, and threats not backed up by corresponding actions only discredit a state... But creating a military bloc of CIS countries, particularly the

²⁸⁶ Published in "Rossiya I NATO: Tezisy Soveta vneshnei I oboronnoi politike," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, June 21, 1995, p.2. Translated in Scott Parrish, "Russia Contemplates the Risks of Expansion," p.11.

²⁸⁷ Rossiiskaya gazeta, September 23, 1995, p. 4.

²⁸⁸ Anton Viktorovich Surikov, *Conceptual Provisions of a Strategy for Countering the Main External Threats to Russian Federation National Security*, INOBIS (Institute of Defense Studies), Moscow, October 1995.

²⁸⁹ Aleksandr Lyasko, "'Provisions' May Underlay New Military Doctrine," *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 27 October, 1995.

involvement of Central Asian countries in confronting the NATO bloc, is also obviously needed.²⁹⁰

This strategy recognizes that Russia does not have the military capability to counter a possible threat posed by NATO expansion. During the Soviet era, the military bloc with Eastern European countries, the Warsaw Treaty Organization, was established and maintained with either the use of force or the threat of force.²⁹¹ In the post-Cold War era, Russia recognizes that this is no longer possible. Because of this, it outlines an alternative way to secure Russia's security interests by using the vehicle of the CIS to create a military bloc. By doing so, the strategy uses a foreign policy tool (or, foreign policy mechanism) that was not previously used by Russia. The mechanism consisted of instigating dialogue on a multilateral basis to promote Russian interests without the use of force or the threat of force. The aim is to counter a perceived threat posed by NATO expansion, to further Russia's national interest in the region, and to reestablish the balance of power in Europe.

In terms of non-military ways of countering the perceived threat posed by NATO expansion, the strategy investigates CIS integration on the whole:

²⁹⁰ Anton Viktorovich Surikov, Conceptual Provisions of a Strategy for Countering the Main External Threats to Russian Federation National Security, INOBIS (Institute of Defense Studies), Moscow, October 1995.

²⁹¹ The Warsaw Treaty Organization was established on May 14, 1955 as a formal security alliance. Member states included: the USSR, Poland, Hungary, Albania, Czechoslovakia, Romania, German Democratic Republic and Bulgaria. On July 1, 1991 the Warsaw Pact was dissolved. See Neil Fodor, The Warsaw Treaty Organization, Macmillan Press, London, 1990.

The course toward integration within the CIS framework, above all with Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, must become a very important direction of Russian policy.²⁹²

Thus, in order to counter external threats to Russian security, of which NATO expansion is one of the most important, the strategy advocates the integration of the CIS. Integration in this sense refers to economic and political integration. Economically, the document recognizes Russia's monopoly of oil and gas in the region, and other states' reliance on these energy sources, particularly Ukraine. As such, it recognizes another foreign policy tool Russia can use to promote its interests and policies, namely that of economic assistance. Politically, it promotes integration through a series of multilateral and bilateral channels under the framework of the CIS. According to the document, Russia should, on one hand, act decisively with regards to the strategy, and on the other hand, react with extreme caution to provocations of nationalism in CIS countries, which would deter integration. By stating the importance of CIS integration as an essential component of countering the perceived threat posed by NATO expansion, this document thus establishes a link between the two issues.

This view of how to counter the perceived threat posed by NATO expansion was also iterated by the State Duma. In Russia's Lower House of parliament, a number of MPs formed the Anti-NATO Association.²⁹³ This

²⁹² Anton Viktorovich Surikov, Conceptual Provisions of a Strategy for Countering the Main External Threats to Russian Federation National Security, INOBIS (Institute of Defense Studies), Moscow, October 1995.

²⁹³ The Anti-NATO Association was established on January 24, 1997 on the initiative of one of the Sergey Glotov. See Anatoliy Yurkin, "Russia: Anti-NATO Association Exists to Oppose Eastward Expansion," FBIS-SOV-98-021, January 21, 1998.

association issued a statement calling for pooled efforts to oppose NATO's expansion into Eastern Europe.²⁹⁴ The statement asserted that NATO had not altered its initial targets and continued to build up its military power. By expanding into Eastern Europe, it was pushing its "zone of responsibility" further eastwards to the Russian borders. NATO's enlargement threatens Russia's security and national interests.²⁹⁵ The Chairman of the Duma Subcommittee for International Affairs, Sergei Glotov, who is one of the Anti-NATO Association's organizers, stated that the association would see that the State Duma passes bills to strengthen Russia's national security and defend its vital interests in Europe:

[The] Anti-NATO [Association] will cooperate with the executive branch to settle all issues regarding the consolidation of Russia's position on the international arena... It will help solidify integration between Russia and other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States in an attempt to set up a collective security system in the former Soviet area.²⁹⁶

The fact that such a statement was given by an association specifically created as an Anti-NATO Association signifies that the desire for CIS integration in terms of security is directly related to the issue of NATO expansion. Indeed, the negative stance towards NATO expansion and the desire to integrate the CIS on a collective security basis was iterated in the same context in many such statements issued by the Anti-NATO Association. For instance, during an interview, Sergey Glotov stated that the aims and tasks of the Anti-NATO Association included:

Assisting in drawing up a common stance of Russian cops of deputies on the issue of NATO's expansion eastwards; conveying

²⁹⁴ ITAR-TASS Jan. 27, 1997, cited in J.L. Black (ed.), Russia & Eurasia Documents Annual, Academic International Press, Volume 1, 1997, p. 181.

²⁹⁵ *Ibid*, p. 181.

²⁹⁶ *Ibid*, p. 181.

to the Russian and foreign public the concerted stance of the people's representatives; ensuring the soonest adoption by the State Duma of the legislative framework connected with strengthening Russian national security and the effective protection of its vital interests in Europe and the world. Also: ... assisting the deepening of Russia's integration with other CIS states, including in the sphere of defense, too, with a view to creating an effective collective security system on the territory of the former Soviet Union.²⁹⁷

In outlining the aims of the Anti-NATO Association, not only did the leader state that measures needed to be taken with regards to NATO expansion, but also that Russia's national security needed to be strengthened and that CIS integration must also therefore be increased. Thus, the Anti-NATO Association perceives NATO expansion as a threat to Russia's national security, and believes that in order to counter this threat attempts must be made to integrate with the CIS in terms of security. In an interview with Sergei Baburin, another member of the Anti-NATO Association and the Deputy Chairman of the State Duma, he stated that:

As you know, the process of the integration of Russia and Belarus has started, and if our two states unite, the West should think about it. Our possible unification will be an important factor, and it will make NATO think twice about the admission of new members. Russia should also think about other similar integration processes with the countries of the former USSR, and as a response to the expansion of NATO, start creating an efficacious system of collective security on the territory of the former USSR.²⁹⁸

In other words, Baburin endorsed CIS integration as a possible response to the perceived threat posed by NATO expansion. In particular, he advocated integration in terms of security.

²⁹⁷ Interview with Sergey Glotov on Moscow Radio Rossii Network, "Russia: Anti-NATO Duma Deputies Leader Announces Aims of New Group," FBIS-SOV-97-036, February 21, 1997.

It is noteworthy that the Anti-NATO Association is made up of more than 243 MPs.²⁹⁹ This high number of MPs united on one issue demonstrates a massive consensus among the State Duma in a highly divided legislature regarding the need for CIS integration due to NATO expansion. Arguably, as this consensus is in the legislative branch of the Russian government, it is likely to be a mirror of the views in Russian society at large.

The view that CIS integration is needed to counter NATO expansion was not limited to the State Duma. It can also be seen in the executive branch of the Russian government. Official statements issued by Yevgenii Primakov, then Foreign Minister, emphasized a similar opinion. In October 1996, Primakov made the following statement:

We have taken a negative position on this and we will stick to it. Of course, this does not mean that we can veto new admissions to NATO. Naturally, Russia today cannot respond in the same way as it responded before when it sent its tanks to Prague or Budapest. But we have a right to protect our national interests, and if NATO advances to our territory, we will take adequate measures in terms of military construction and will try to remedy the geo-political situation, unfavourable for us, in order to find new partners and allies.³⁰⁰

Primakov thus recognized the need for new partners and allies as a response to the eastward expansion of NATO. The most likely allies to the Russian Federation are those of the CIS. These states have the longest history of association with

²⁹⁸ Interview with Sergei Baburin, by Vlado Vurusic, "Russia: Baburin on NATO Expansion, Security," FBIS-SOV-97-046, February 28, 1997.

²⁹⁹ "Russia: Anti-NATO Duma Deputies Leader Announces Aims of New Group," FBIS-SOV-97-036, February 21, 1997.

³⁰⁰ ITAR-TASS, Oct.30, 1996, translated in J.L Black, Russia & Eurasia Documents Annual, Academic International Press, Volume 1, 1996, p. 197.

Russia. They were dominated by Russia for almost 70 years, and they territorially surround Russia, creating a quasi-“buffer-zone”. As Ivan Rybkin stated:

The prospects of Russia’s security are closely connected with the development of interaction with the CIS countries. We are essentially talking about the role and significance of Russia among the CIS countries and in world politics at the regional, subregional, and global levels. We understand by the military security in Russia in the CIS not only the absence or risk of armed attack from outside but primarily from a stable state of relations of the Russian Federation and the Commonwealth countries that ensures the prevention and a readiness to eliminate threats to the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and inviolability of the Russian state.

Rybkin therefore sees the security of the Russian Federation as inherently tied to the security of the CIS states. This supports the view from Russian officials that the CIS states are the most likely allies of Russia. President Yeltsin himself also stated that relations with the CIS states were an important factor in Russian foreign policy, and that integration should be enhanced:

Relations with member-countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States must remain the main direction of Russia’s foreign policy...[Russia’s] foreign policy in this respect should aim to promote dynamic integration of all CIS member-states.³⁰¹

By stressing the CIS as a priority in Russian foreign policy and by advocating further integration, Yeltsin seemed to indicate that Russia relied on the CIS states in its foreign policy. Likewise, in a speech given to a meeting of Russian ambassadors to CIS states, Primakov stressed that, “The CIS is the key field of Russia’s foreign policies.”³⁰² Other key Russian foreign policy decision-makers,

³⁰¹ Andrey Surzhanskiy and Viktor Zhilyakov, “Russia: Yeltsin: Ties with CIS States Foreign Policy Priority,” FBIS-SOV-96-075, April 16, 1996.

³⁰² Aleksandr Valiyev Yuri Kozlov, Tatyana Selivanova, “Russia: Primakov States CIS ‘Key Field’ of Russian Foreign Policy” FBIS-SOV-96-147, July 29, 1996.

such as Nikolay Azhanov-Lutsenko, Secretary of the Foreign Policy Chamber of the Russian Presidential Political Consultative Council, stated that: "All post-Soviet countries and adjacent regions... form the zone of Russia's strategic interests."³⁰³ They are the most likely to be influenced by Russia politically due to their long history of being dominated by and dependent on Russia. On this basis, it seems apparent that according to Russian officials, the CIS states are the most natural allies of Russia.

This view was repeated by Defence Minister Pavel Grachev one year earlier. Grachev made it clear that "if Russia is faced with a new, powerful [military] bloc, it will be forced to seek allies," adding that "we will seek the most dependable allies from among the countries of the former Soviet Union and the CIS."³⁰⁴ There is little doubt that the military bloc Grachev was referring to was that of an expanded NATO. By reiterating Primakov's position that Russia will need to seek new allies, one can speculate a certain degree of consensus among the executive branch of the Russian government. To further state that the most likely allies for Russia are those states that make up the CIS emphasizes Russia's focus on this region in terms of security. It thus seems evident from my point of view that both the Foreign and Defence Ministers have used the rhetoric of NATO's eastward expansion as a justifiable pretext to search for new military and security ties with the CIS.

³⁰³ Yevgeniy Yevdokimov, "Russia: Former Soviet Republics Form Zone of 'Strategic Interests'", *FBIS-SOV-96-174*, September 5, 1996.

³⁰⁴ Taken from quotation in Scott Parrish, "Russia Contemplates the Risks of Expansion," *Transition*, December 15, 1995, p. 12.

In December 1996, Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin announced a similar opinion at the Lisbon OSCE Summit. In his speech, he declared strong opposition to the expansion of NATO and the approach of its military infrastructure to Russian territory.³⁰⁵ Directly after this statement, Chernomyrdin stressed Moscow's support for integration in the CIS:

[Chernomyrdin] stressed that Moscow stands for integration in the CIS. In Russia's opinion, the voluntary formed Commonwealth based on the principle of sovereign equality, may become a pillar of security and cooperation in Europe.³⁰⁶

By linking together integration with the CIS and issues of security in the context of a discussion of the threat posed by NATO expansion, the Prime Minister clearly demonstrated that these issues are inextricably related. Further, he demonstrated that the executive branch of the Russian government is united in perceiving NATO expansion as a threat, and using this rhetoric to justify the discourse of security integration in terms of the CIS.

As demonstrated above, there seems to be a similar approach in both the legislative and executive branches with regards to the issue of NATO expansion and CIS integration. In both branches of government, the perceived threat posed by the eastward expansion of the Alliance is used as a vehicle for seeking new security relations with the states that make up the Commonwealth of Independent States. Various factions of the Russian government have demonstrated in numerous dialogues their support of integration with CIS states as a way to

³⁰⁵ "Chernomyrdin Speaks Against NATO Expansion, at Lisbon OSCE Summit," Interfax, Dec. 2, 1996, translated in J.L Black, Russia & Eurasia Documents Annual, Academic International Press, Volume 1, 1996, p. 200.

³⁰⁶ *Ibid*, p.201.

counter the perceived threat posed by NATO expansion. To what extent, however, is this rhetoric backed by action? Although Russian foreign policy decision-makers espouse the view that NATO expansion is a threat, to what extent do they use this language to attempt integration with the CIS in political, economic, and most importantly, security terms? The next chapter will assess the extent to which action has been taken to support this integration in the context of NATO expansion.

Conclusions

This chapter had three goals. The first goal was to demonstrate the Russian foreign policy decision-makers perceived the eastward expansion of NATO as a threat. By examining their dialogues, speeches, documents and interviews, this chapter achieved this goal. It also fulfilled the second methodological aspect of Complex Relations Approach and established the independent variable of the hypothesis by demonstrating that Russian officials perceive NATO expansion as a threat.

The second aim of the chapter was to demonstrate that Russian officials viewed CIS integration as desirable. This was also the third methodological aspect of Complex Relations Approach. This objective was also achieved by examining how the nationalist swing in the direction of Russia's foreign policy promoted the view that relations with the CIS were a Russian foreign policy priority. Furthermore, the chapter examined some of the ways Russia has attempted to integrate with the CIS. These will be further elaborated upon in the

next chapter. Thus, the third methodological aspect of Complex Relations Approach and the dependent variable of the hypothesis were established.

The final objective of this chapter was to determine whether there was a relationship between the perception of NATO expansion as a threat and the issue of CIS integration. By examining speeches, interviews, statements, and documents of Russia foreign policy decision-makers, this chapter demonstrated that there is a link between these two issues. In other words, evidence was provided in this chapter that Russian officials perceive NATO expansion as a threat and that integration with CIS states is a stated foreign policy objective. Furthermore, it was also established that key Russian foreign policy decision-makers indicated that integration with CIS states is desirable due to the perception of NATO expansion as a threat. Hence, evidence was provided in support of the hypothesis of this thesis. Furthermore, the establishment of the hypothesis fulfilled the fourth methodological aspect of Complex Relations Approach.

This thesis now turns to the fifth methodological aspect of Complex Relations Approach to determine how the hypothesis is put into practice. In other words, the next chapter will examine the foreign policy tools used by Russian foreign policy decision-makers in order to achieve the objective of CIS integration. By testing the hypothesis, its confirmation or rejection will be facilitated.

CHAPTER FIVE –
RUSSIA AND CIS INTEGRATION: THE USE OF
INNOVATIVE FOREIGN POLICY TOOLS

The foreign policy of any state is determined by the interaction between its own properties – its geography, population, social and political system, economic power and military posture, etc. – and its surrounding environment, primarily the foreign policies of other states or set of states.³⁰⁷

As discussed in the previous chapter, Russia favours integration with the CIS politically, economically, and in terms of security. It uses the rhetoric of NATO expansion as a threat as an excuse to strengthen its position vis-à-vis the CIS states. To what extent has this language been carried out in terms of action? How does Russia use the foreign policy tools, mechanisms and instruments available to it to achieve its desired goals? As stated previously, Russia no longer has the military capability to force the CIS states into integration. Therefore, it must use other foreign policy tools to achieve this integration. In order to achieve the goal of CIS integration, Russian foreign policy decision-makers use a variety of new and innovative foreign policy tools. According to Mehdi Mozaffari, “The CIS constitutes a multi-dimensional cooperative network with multiple

³⁰⁷ Alexei Arbatov, “Russian Foreign Policy Priorities for the 1990s,” Russian Security After the Cold War: Seven Views from Moscow, Brassey’s, Washington, 1994, p.1.

objectives.”³⁰⁸ In order to understand how Russia achieves its goal of integration with the CIS, it is important to examine the various layers and dimensions through which Russia influences CIS states into integration.

The previous chapter demonstrated that Russia perceives the eastward expansion of NATO as a threat, and that integration with the CIS states was a clear foreign policy objective for Russia. It further provided evidence to support the hypothesis that the perception of NATO expansion as a threat impels Russia to seek integration with the CIS states. On the basis of the evidence provided in the previous chapter, this chapter explores the means used by Russian foreign policy decision-makers to achieve the goal of integration with the CIS states. It investigates the various foreign policy instruments used, and illustrates that the “old” reliance on the military as a foreign policy tool has been relatively supplanted by other, more creative, foreign policy tools.³⁰⁹

This chapter has two primary goals. First, it aims explore the ways in which Russian foreign policy decision-makers seek integration with the CIS states in the context of the perception of NATO expansion. This will fulfil the fifth methodological aspect of Complex Relations Approach, that of examining the

³⁰⁸ Mehdi Mozaffari, “CIS’ Southern Belt: Regional Cooperation and Integration,” in Mehdi Mozaffari (ed.), Security Politics in the Commonwealth of Independent States, Macmillan Press Ltd., 1997, p. 151.

³⁰⁹ These tools include: various political, economic and security agreements on a bilateral and multilateral basis with Russia, Russian involvement (sometimes military) in the domestic affairs of a CIS state, military integration tools, the politicization of ethnic Russians in the other CIS states, the use of border guards, industry and trade linkages (including energy and communications tools), Russian monopoly over energy and oil (particularly with regards to the Caspian sea pipelines issue), the Customs Union, and Russia’s internal regions.

various foreign policy tools used by Russia to influence the CIS states into integration. The second aim of this chapter is to test the validity of the hypothesis of this thesis. By examining the manner in which the various foreign policy tools used by Russia, evidence will be provided to support the hypothesis that Russia perceives NATO expansion as a threat and thus seeks integration with the CIS states.

This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section will explore the foreign policy tools used by Russia on a geographic basis, and investigate the manner in which Russia exerts influence on these states. This section is further subdivided into Western CIS states, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. The second section will examine the use of foreign policy instruments on an issue and sector basis. These foreign policy instruments are the mechanisms used by Russian foreign policy decision-makers to gain influence and power within the CIS states, hence compelling them to integrate with Russia. It is important to note that these tools are not independent of each other, but are often used together in varying degrees to achieve Russia's foreign policy goals.

A caution, however, must be noted. As stated in the first chapter, each issue discussed may open the doors to many other issues. The sections examined in this chapter are only brief glimpses at the variety of issues surrounding Russia's relations with the CIS. Each section could easily be expanded upon. In this chapter, however, a relatively brief overview is given to each section in order to provide evidence to support the hypothesis. When these sections and issues are

considered together, the manner in which Russia uses its foreign policy tools to achieve integration becomes evident.

Western Commonwealth States and Integration with Russia

Belarus

One of the most visible examples of Russia undertaking integration with a CIS state was with Belarus. Russia's Union with Belarus has stood out as the most successful case of integration with a CIS state to date. In the early 1990s, while discussion of NATO expansion was in its infancy, Russia paid less attention to the states of the CIS. This was done in order to establish good relations with the West. As the eastward enlargement of NATO appeared to become more of a reality, Russia began to prioritize its relations with CIS states. In particular, Russia's relations with Belarus strengthened considerably. In September 1993, Belarus and Russia agreed to a ruble zone, followed shortly thereafter by an agreement on monetary union.³¹⁰ That same year, Belarus joined Russia and other CIS states in a collective security pact called the Tashkent Treaty. The Tashkent Collective Security Treaty was originally signed in May 1992 by Russia, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.³¹¹ Despite its lack of centralization, the entry of Belarus' into the Tashkent Treaty facilitated Russia's leverage over Belarus in terms of security. According to the Treaty, members were obliged to consult in the event of a threat, and an attack on one

³¹⁰ Leszek Buszynski, Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War, Praeger, Westport, 1996, p.132.

³¹¹ *Ibid*, pp.105-106.

member would be considered an attack on all.³¹² Since Russia is the only CIS member-state with effective military strength, Belarus' entry into the Tashkent Treaty created a dependence of Belarus on Russia for its security:

CIS collective security was basically a misnomer as Russia was the only effective military actor with the other members depending on Russian support in varying degree.³¹³

With a security framework in place, military integration between Russia and Belarus was strengthened. The two states began furthering their military cooperation in terms of joint use of infrastructure, air defence and joint air exercises.³¹⁴ In fact, in a 1997 interview, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka stated that military cooperation and integration with Russia was needed in order to protect Russian-Belarusian economic space:

[Bontsman (interviewer)] And a military union?
[Lukashenka] Listen to my logic. In an economic union, we need deeper integration to recover the standards of 1990 for the sake of improving people's living. There is a very wise expression: Politics is a concentrated reflection of economics. Therefore, we need to shape our politics according to economics requirements. In order to defend our single economic area, our coordinated policy, we need a politico-military alliance.³¹⁵

Thus the strengthening of military cooperation with Belarus not only achieves the goal of security integration with Russia, but also creates a Belarusian security

³¹² See Tashkent Collective Security Treaty, Article 2 and 4. Text of treaty can be found in *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, May 23, 1992.

³¹³ Leszek Buszynski, *Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War*, p. 105.

³¹⁴ See for instance A. Dubnov, "'The Lukashenko Incident' or How to Organize the Minsk Compact Replacing the Warsaw Pact," *Novoye Vremya*, February 28, 1995, pp. 14-15.

³¹⁵ Interview with Alyaksandr Lukashenka, "Belarus, Russia: Lukashenka Interviewed on Union with Russia," *FBIS-SOV-97-102*, May 23, 1997.

dependence on Russia and protects the gains made between the two states in terms of economic integration.

Since the breakup of the Soviet Union Belarus has been economically dependent on Russia.³¹⁶ In terms of economic integration, a number of agreements have been signed between Russia and Belarus to further economic cooperation. In May 1995, a Russian-Belarusian Customs Union was signed, along with Kazakhstan.³¹⁷ According to Russia's Vice Premier Aleksey Bolshakov:

The customs union provided for a common customs legislation, standard approaches to regulating external economic activity and a common financial market.³¹⁸

This Customs Union introduced a regime of free trade without exceptions. Following this, in May 1996, Belarus and Russia signed the Treaty on the Deepening of Integration in the Economic and Humanitarian fields, along with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.³¹⁹ This Treaty further strengthened the single economic space between Russia and Belarus, and intensified the concept of a common market.

The most illustrative example of integration between Russia and Belarus was the Russia-Belarus Union, signed in 1996. This Union represented the highest

³¹⁶ Robert Donaldson & Joseph Noguee, The Foreign Policy of Russia, M. E. Sharpe, Armonk, 1998, p. 167.

³¹⁷ Sherman Garnett, "Europe's Crossroads: Russia and the West in the New Borderlands," Michael Mandelbaum (ed.), The New Russian Foreign Policy, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1998, p.73

³¹⁸ Nikolay Zharebtsov and Andrey Petrovskiy, "Vice Premier on Customs Union Agreement," FBIS-SOV-95-017, Jan. 25, 1995.

³¹⁹ Robert Donaldson & Joseph Noguee, The Foreign Policy of Russia, p. 169.

degree of integration between Russia and a former Soviet republic, as it included political, economic, and military integration. Many observers viewed the Russia-Belarus Union as a countermeasure to NATO's expansion.³²⁰ Indeed, integration with Belarus has many strategic advantages. First, its border with Poland has numerous strategic implications now that Poland is a NATO member. By securing relations with Belarus, Russia has in effect created a "buffer zone" between itself and NATO. Military integration with Belarus also brings Russia closer to the Kaliningrad *oblast'*, an isolated region of Russia that houses a significant portion of Russian military facilities and troops.³²¹ The relatively small Kaliningrad *oblast'* has six military districts, six hundred tanks, nine hundred armored combat vehicles, seven hundred artillery pieces, and between 3 and 7 per cent of its population are part of the Russian armed forces.³²² Most importantly, Kaliningrad is one of the few warm water ports available to the Russian military.

Evidence of strategic considerations is eminent in the Charter of the Union of Belarus and Russia. The most obvious strategic consideration lies in the date of when the Charter was signed. The Russia-Belarus Charter was signed on 2 April

³²⁰ "Russia-Belarus Union Seen as a Counter to NATO" FBIS-SOV, No. 010 (16 Jan. 1997), in J.L. Black, Russia & Eurasia Documents Annual, Academic International Press, Volume 1, 1997, p.203.

³²¹ Scott Parrish, "Russia Contemplates the Risks of Expansion," Transition, December 15, 1995, p. 12.

³²² See for instance, Elaine Holoboff, "National Security in the Baltic States," in Bruce Parrott (ed.) State Building and Military Power in Russia and the new states of Eurasia, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, 1995, p. 113; "Russia: Russian Troops in Kaliningrad Transferred to New Command," FBIS-UMA-97-217, Aug. 5, 1997;

1997, almost three months before the NATO Madrid Summit where, as Russian officials already knew, the eastward expansion of the Alliance to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic was to be announced.

Strategic considerations toward NATO expansion can also be found in numerous instances in the language of the Charter. Article 6 outlines the aim of the Union. The first aim is to strengthen relations between Russia and Belarus in the political, economic, social, military, and other spheres. Another stated aim of the Union is:

(e) to ensure security and maintain a high defense capability, and to combat crime jointly; (f) to promote the guaranteeing of security throughout Europe and the development of mutually beneficial cooperation in Europe and throughout the world.³²³

This reference to security cooperation and defence capability in the same context of guaranteeing security in Europe strongly suggests that there is a need to protect the security of Russia and Belarus in the context of Europe. As demonstrated above, many Russian foreign policy decision-makers perceived NATO expansion as a threat. To state as an objective in the Charter the maintenance of a “high defense capability” emphasizes the need for a defence and security relationship between the two countries. Directly following this objective is the emphasis of the need for promotion of security in Europe. This language appears to provide

and Grigoriy Krichevskiy, “Russia: Defence Minister Sergeyev Visits Kaliningrad Military,” *FBIS-SOV-97-248*, September 5, 1997.

³²³ Charter of the Union of Belarus and Russia, Article 6, translated in J.L Black, *Russia & Eurasia Documents Annual*, Academic International Press, Volume 1, 1997, p.209.

evidence for the use of Belarus as a “buffer zone” between Russia and the expanded NATO.

In Article 11, the Union’s security objectives are further elaborated on:

(a) to adopt joint measures, where necessary, *to forestall a threat to the sovereignty and independence of each of the Union member states*; (b) to coordinate the activities of the Union member states in respect of the structural evolution and development of their armed forces, *to encourage the joint use of military infrastructure and to adopt other measures, bearing in mind the interests of the Union member states, to maintain both their defense capability and the defence capability of the Union as a whole.*³²⁴

In Article 16, the operationalization of this security integration is elaborated upon. It states that in order to achieve the security objectives set out, the member states will ensure collective security and interact in ensuring the territorial inviolability of the member states and the protection of the frontiers of the Union. This implies a degree of military integration. The emphasis on the “defence capability of the Union as a whole” indicates the need for capabilities to forestall external threats. Since the main external threat that most Russian officials had consensus upon was that of NATO expansion, this language seems to further provide evidence that security integration with Belarus was needed so as to provide a “buffer zone” between Russia and NATO.

The idea of Belarus as a “buffer zone” or a “security belt” was further elaborated upon by Colonel Yuri Mozorov in 1998:

Priority is being assigned to the development of a system of bilateral and multilateral understandings between states on

³²⁴ Charter of the Union of Belarus and Russia, Article 11, translated in J.L. Black, Russia & Eurasia Documents Annual, Academic International Press, Volume 1, 1997, p.211. (emphasis added by researcher)

rejecting a policy of force and the formation of a “security belt” around Russia by introducing our country into regional security structures in the near abroad or by establishing cooperative relations with them.³²⁵

Russia’s most visible attempts at integration have been made with Belarus.

Moreover, the two states have signed various agreements on defence and security integration (particularly within the Russia-Belarus Union). Therefore, Colonel Mozorov’s comments about the creation of a “security belt” around Russia in the near abroad are most illustratively reflected in Russia’s relations with Belarus.

Thus, there is clear evidence of an emphasis on security and ensuring territorial inviolability in the Charter of the Union of Belarus and Russia, as well as in the various agreements signed between the two states. This emphasis on military and economic integration demonstrates Russia’s desire to consolidate power in terms of security cooperation vis-à-vis Belarus in an effort to counter the perceived threat posed by NATO expansion.

Ukraine

Juxtaposed with Belarus, Russia’s relations with Ukraine are much more complex. Both Belarus and Ukraine represent the Nearest Abroad states from a geopolitical perspective, and both are heavily dependent upon Russia in terms of their economies.³²⁶ Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine all share the same linguistic origins, Slavic heritage, and Cyrillic alphabet. Linguistic differentiation into

³²⁵ Colonel Yuri Morozov, “Geopolitics: The Country’s Strategic Interests Are Not Imperial Ambitions,” *Moscow Oriyentir*, October 1998, No. 10, pp. 8-9.

³²⁶ Adrian Karatnycky, “The Nearest Abroad: Russia’s Relations with Ukraine and Belarus,” in Uri Ra’anan and Kate Martin (eds.), *Russia: A Return to Imperialism?*, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1995, p.72.

separate ethnic groups began as early as the eleventh century, and by the seventeenth century, Russians Ukrainians, and Belarusians had evolved into distinct national groups.³²⁷ After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Belarus demonstrated that it lacked a vigorous sense of a national identity distinctive from Russia.³²⁸ Ukrainian citizens, on the other hand, shared a broad consensus on the desirability of national independence, despite the clear division between Eastern and Western Ukraine. Eastern Ukraine tends to be more pro-Russian due to its significant ethnic Russian population, while Western Ukraine tends to be more nationalistic due to its higher concentration of ethnic Ukrainians. Whereas in Russia, only one-third regretted the dissolution of the USSR, in Ukraine approximately 75 per cent of the population welcomed the change.³²⁹

The differences between Ukraine and Belarus, in terms of the strength of their national identities, has been reflected in their willingness to integrate with Russia. Russian attempts to integrate with Belarus have been facilitated by the fact that integration was seen as desirable to both parties. Agreements between Russia and Belarus cover almost all aspects of integration, from defence and security to economic union. Ukrainian and Russian relations, on the other hand, have been hampered by a number of contentious issues, including: the status of

³²⁷ See Francis Dvornik, The Slavs, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, NJ, pp. 307-309.

³²⁸ Karen Dawisha & Bruce Parrot, Russia and the New States of Eurasia, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1994, p.75.

³²⁹ *Ibid*, p. 70.

the Black Sea Fleet, ethnic Russians living in Ukraine, and the status of Crimea.³³⁰

These issues have made it difficult for Ukraine and Russia to foster good relations and sign agreements that would strengthen cooperation and integration.³³¹

Ukraine has always held strategic importance for Russia. With the eastward expansion of NATO, maintaining a close relationship with Ukraine is increasingly fundamental for Russia's security. This is particularly true considering that with the expansion of NATO, Ukraine shares a border with two new NATO countries: Poland and Hungary. As noted above, after independence a number of contentious issues strained Russia's relationship with Ukraine, including: formal political and economic ties, the status of the Black Sea fleet, and energy resources. With each of these issues, Russia used the leverage it had over Ukraine in order to achieve closer integration.

One manner in which Russia has been able to seek integration with Ukraine is through the Russian-Ukrainian Friendship Treaty. In May 1997, in the shadow of the NATO enlargement decision, the two states completed an agreement on the status of the Black Sea Fleet and signed the Friendship Treaty. Both agreements had been under negotiation since the end of the Soviet era, and both met with continuous deadlocks in negotiations. The signing of these agreements, which occurred just a few months before the NATO decision to

³³⁰ See for instance, John Jaworsky, Ukraine: Stability and Instability, McNair Paper 42, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington, 1995, pp.45-54.

³³¹ Sherman Garnett, Keystone in the Arch: Ukraine in the Emerging Security Environment of Central and Eastern Europe, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 1997, p.42 & 46.

expand was finalized, represented a turning point in Russia-Ukraine relations. In order to have the agreements signed, Russia had to make certain concessions. The Treaty largely favours the Ukrainian position that Moscow had long resisted. However, the fact that these agreements were finalized just before NATO's decision to expand is revealing in two ways. First, it is clear that the Russian leadership did not want to carry deep divisions with Ukraine into the post-NATO expansion period.³³² Second, this treaty reveals some of the new strategies employed by Russia in terms of negotiations to achieve foreign policy goals. The goal in this case was to finalize an agreement with Ukraine to solidify the Russian-Ukrainian relationship before the advent of NATO expansion. The following strategy seems to have been used. In negotiations, it begins with a stance that is most appealing to Russia, but not desirable to the other state. It holds to this position while attempting to influence the state to concede in other ways (through leverage on natural resources and trade, for example). Finally, Russia takes a slightly detrimental position in order to come to an agreement with the other state. This occurs only when it is necessary for Russia to finalize negotiations for other reasons (e.g. to secure its relations with Ukraine prior to the eastward expansion of NATO).

When one examines the text of the Friendship Treaty, the above strategy seems to have been realized, despite the fact that Russia made concessions to get the final treaty signed. The Treaty includes a legally binding recognition of

³³² Sherman Garnett, "Europe's Crossroads: Russia and the West in the New Borderlands," pp. 87-88.

existing borders, eliminating the ambiguity created by previous agreements, dependent on Ukraine remaining “within the framework of the CIS.”³³³ Although Russia made concessions in order to ensure the Treaty was signed before NATO expanded, it also made some gains in the negotiations of the Treaty. Within the text of the treaty itself, Article 6 states that “Neither party shall allow its territory to be used to the detriment of the security of the other party.”³³⁴ This clause was clearly intended to protect Russia against possible use of Ukrainian territory by NATO. Furthermore, it strengthens and ensures Russia’s security to the west by creating a virtual “buffer zone” between itself and NATO. As Bruce Porter states:

The rise of this new buffer zone does not supplant the original one – the former Warsaw Pact states of Eastern Europe – but only adds an additional layer.³³⁵

While not a traditional form of a “buffer zone” as solid as the Iron Curtain during the Cold War, Article 6 of the Treaty fosters the same sense of security that a real “buffer zone” would provide. Russia’s security interest in Ukraine is inherently tied to its national interest. Solid relations with Ukraine are a particularly important component of Russia’s national interest.³³⁶ Russia’s national identity, and hence its national interest, is inherently tied to Ukraine’s because of their

³³³ *Ibid*, p.86.

³³⁴ Article 6, Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, May 1997, translated in J.L Black, Russia & Eurasia Documents Annual, Academic International Press, Volume 1, 1997, p.218.

³³⁵ Bruce Porter, “Russia and Europe After the Cold War” Wallander, Celeste (ed.) The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War, Westview Press, 1996, p. 129.

common history, language, culture, and value system.³³⁷ The protection of Russia's historical roots in Kiev that are part of Russia's overall identity is therefore critical to Russia's security.

Articles 8 of the Friendship Treaty further augments Russia's attempt at integration in the field of security. It states that:

The high contracting parties shall develop their relations in the fields of military and military-technical cooperation, of ensuring states security, and also of cooperation in border issues, customs, and control of export and immigration on the basis of separate agreements.³³⁸

By developing relations in military, border, customs, export and immigration terms, Russia and Ukraine further intensified their cooperation and integration. Furthermore, the presence of this article promotes and increases Russia's sense of security in the face of an expanded NATO.

The Friendship Treaty also contains sections on economic integration, found in Article 13. This article stipulates that Ukraine and Russia create and develop a shared economic space by establishing conditions for the free movement of goods and services, and by deepening economic integration.³³⁹ By explicitly committing to deepen economic integration, Russia achieved two goals. The first is closer economic ties with Ukraine, who is heavily dependent on

³³⁶ See Illya Prizel, National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia and Ukraine, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1998, pp.157-160.

³³⁷ Nikolai Travkin, "Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe," in Stephen Sestanovich (ed.), Rethinking Russia's National Interests, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, 1994, p.36.

³³⁸ Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, Article 8.

Russian oil and gas. The second is solidifying economic ties with Ukraine before NATO expands. With an expanded NATO, there were fears that its closer proximity to Ukraine would prompt the country to seek closer economic ties with the West, thereby leaving Russia without the Ukrainian market for its goods. Article 13 gives Russia the confidence that Ukraine will continue to maintain close economic relations with Russia.

Another issue that Russia and Ukraine settled in the months before NATO expansion was the status of the Black Sea Fleet. This issue had been subject to deep disagreements between the two countries since 1992. This is another case whereby Russia used its negotiating strategy by providing concessions at the last minute to reach an agreement. In the end, the Black Sea Fleet Agreement seems to have worked out favourably for Russia, as it signaled an important turning point in the relationship, one that finally could move bilateral ties to a secure and normal footing.³⁴⁰ The Agreement provides Russia with a 20-year lease to key port facilities in Crimea; however, in return, the treaty is clear acknowledgment that Crimea is Ukrainian.³⁴¹ The treaty provides Ukraine with rent for the facilities in the form of debt relieve and access to port facilities in Sevastopol. Ukraine consented to sell back a substantial portion of its half of the ships in the Fleet to reduce its energy debt. Considering that Ukraine's energy debt is also to Russia, it seems clear that Russia accomplished its original foreign policy goals.

³³⁹ *Ibid*, Article 13.

³⁴⁰ Sherman Garnett, "Europe's Crossroads: Russia and the West in the New Borderlands," p. 86.

³⁴¹ *Ibid*, p. 86.

Also, the presence of the Russian military in Crimea for the next 20 years may allow for closer military integration with Ukraine.

Another foreign policy tool used with Ukraine is that of energy. Russia is one of the world's leading exporters of natural gas and crude oil.³⁴² Ukraine has long been dependent on Russian oil and natural gas exports to fuel its economy. As a percentage of consumption in 1996, 49 per cent of Ukraine's natural gas and 69 per cent of its crude oil was imported from Russia.³⁴³ During the Soviet era, oil and gas were supplied to the Ukraine at heavily subsidized prices and paid for in rubles or in goods.³⁴⁴ Russia began to limit its oil exports to the former Soviet republics, including Ukraine, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Knowing the dependence on Russian oil, Russia began to demand payment in hard currencies (i.e. convertible) from Ukraine when it had economic and political policies that were at odds with Russia's own objectives. When in mid-1993, Ukraine was unable to make payments in hard currency, Russia's response was clear:

Russian officials unilaterally stated that henceforth they would provide oil and gas to Ukraine at world market prices, and that this price policy would take effect retroactively to cover all energy supplied to Ukraine since 1 April 1993.³⁴⁵

³⁴² Roland Goetz, "Russia's Economic Potential as a Basis for its Foreign Policy," Aussenpolitik, Vol. 47, No. 2, 1996, p. 138.

³⁴³ Margarita Mercedes Balmaceda, "Gas, Oil and the Linkages between Domestic and Foreign Policies: The Case of Ukraine," Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 50, No. 2, 1998, p. 259.

³⁴⁴ Carol Barner-Barry & Cynthia Hody, The Politics of Change, p.198.

³⁴⁵ Karen Dawisha & Bruce Parrott, Russia and the New States of Eurasia, p. 180.

In addition, Russia began cutting energy supplies to Ukraine.³⁴⁶ The rapidly falling availability of natural gas threatened the ability of Ukraine's energy-intensive heavy industries to maintain output levels. As such, there was increasing pressure from domestic actors in Ukraine to improve relations with Russia, particularly among Ukraine's large ethnic Russian minority population. Later that year, an extensive strike in the Donbas region by miners voiced similar concerns.³⁴⁷ As a result, an agreement was reached with the Russian gas company Gazprom to set the price of gas to US\$ 80 per 1000 cubic meters – much higher than the 1995 prices paid by other Central and Eastern European countries.³⁴⁸ Since Gazprom, however, has no competitors in Ukraine, it can set monopoly prices. The use of gas and oil, thus, create a dependence of Ukraine upon Russia.

The dependence created by Russian exports of oil and gas to Ukraine allow it to have leverage in order to achieve other political gains. In addition to the monopoly on oil and gas, Russia also charges Ukraine higher taxes for the gas. It then uses these taxes as leverage to pressure Ukraine into joining CIS agreements:

In imposing the oil excise duty, Moscow tried to pressure Ukraine to join the Russian-Belorussian-Kazakh customs union... In fact, the Kremlin has vowed to leave the excise tax intact until Ukraine joins it.³⁴⁹

³⁴⁶ *Ibid*, p. 180.

³⁴⁷ *Ibid*, p. 181.

³⁴⁸ Margarita Mercedes Balmaceda, "Gas, Oil and the Linkages between Domestic and Foreign Policies: The Case of Ukraine," *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 50, No. 2, 1998, p. 259.

³⁴⁹ *Ibid*, p. 260.

Thus, Russia uses its energy resources in Ukraine to achieve economic gains by creating a level of dependence upon it. Furthermore, Russia has demonstrated its willingness to use Russian resources as a political lever in order to achieve integration with a CIS state.³⁵⁰

Moldova

Russian attempts at integration with Moldova, another Western CIS state, have revolved largely around the politicization of Moldova's ethnic Russian minority. Moldova has a large minority of ethnic Russians among its population. Ethnic Russians constitute 25.5 % of Moldova's Transdnier region.³⁵¹ After Moldova achieved independence from the Soviet Union, the ethnic Russian population became increasingly disillusioned with Moldovan nationalism. Fears of assimilation led ethnic Russians to become greatly alarmed and plead with the Russian government for help. In 1992, one of the fiercest conflicts of the post-Soviet period broke out in this region. The outbreak of hostilities occurred precisely as President Yeltsin and his government were under intense domestic pressure from parliament over the issue of Russian-speaking settler communities outside the Russian Federation.³⁵² The Russian government quickly sent in the 14th Army, headed by the controversial General Lebed, to stop the fighting and subsequently introduce peacekeepers to the region. The political and military pressure exerted by Russia reinforced Moldova's economic problems after the war

³⁵⁰ Carol Barner-Barry & Cynthia Hody, The Politics of Change, p.198.

³⁵¹ Neil Melvin, Russians Beyond Russia, Chatham House Papers, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1995, p. 64.

³⁵² *Ibid*, p.73.

that led to a \$25 million trade deficit.³⁵³ As a result of this economic deterioration, Moldova was forced to seek closer reintegration with Russia and the other CIS states.

The Caucasus

The Caucasus region provides an interesting window through which Russia's intentions with regards to CIS integration may be observed. All three south Caucasian states – Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan – share geography, historical experiences, the disparity of power between themselves and Russia, and a desire to maintain their newly found independence.³⁵⁴ These states' individual interests, however, vary considerably, as do their relations with neighboring states. Russia, therefore, uses different tactics with each state to influence them into integration with the rest of the CIS.

Georgia

After the dissolution of the USSR, the newly independent state of Georgia was initially reluctant to join the CIS. It sought to develop economic independence from Russia and the other CIS states, and was therefore wary of formally joining the Commonwealth.³⁵⁵ In 1992, Moscow overcame Georgia's reluctance to join the CIS by inciting a rebellion of the Abkhaz minority inhabiting the northwestern region of the country.³⁵⁶ At the time, only 17.8 per

³⁵³ *Ibid*, p.74.

³⁵⁴ Edward Marks, "The CIS and the Caucasus," Strategic Forum, National Defense University, No. 90, November 1996, p.2.

³⁵⁵ Karen Dawisha & Bruce Parrott, Russia and the New States of Eurasia, p. 225.

³⁵⁶ Richard Pipes, "Is Russia Still an Enemy?" Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 5, September/October 1997, p. 73.

cent of the inhabitants of the Abkhaz region were ethnic Abkhazians, and only a small number of these Abkhazians were in favour of separation.³⁵⁷

The bitter year-long war in Abkhazia, which claimed over 35,000 lives was precipitated by Russian military involvement authorized by [Russian] Defence Minister Grachev. The few Abkhaz separatists (numbering a mere 90,000 out of Abkhazia's population of more than 500,000) could never have created a modern fighting force of their own. The poorly trained and inadequately equipped Georgians were faced with Russian-supplied tanks, artillery, and modern communications equipment.³⁵⁸

With Russian political and military backing, the Abkhazians expelled 200,000 ethnic Georgians and declared independence.³⁵⁹ At that point, Georgian president Eduard Shevardnadze began seriously to consider joining the CIS:

[H]e realized that only by taking Georgia into the CIS and accepting Russian bases could he prevent Russian intelligence and military operatives within Georgia from tearing the country apart in a civil war.³⁶⁰

In 1994, Georgia was compelled to request aid from Moscow, which consented to provide it so long as Georgia joined the CIS and acquiesced to 15,000 Russian troops on its territory, along with a Russian "peacekeeping" force in Abkazia.³⁶¹ Thus, by involving itself in Georgia's domestic affairs, Russia was able to pressure Georgia into closer integration with itself and the CIS.

³⁵⁷ Ariel Cohen, "Revisiting Russia's Turbulent Rim," Uri Ra'anan & Kate Martin (eds.), Russia: A Return to Imperialism?, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1995, pp. 94-95.

³⁵⁸ *Ibid*, pp. 94-95.

³⁵⁹ Richard Pipes, "Is Russia Still an Enemy?" p. 73.

³⁶⁰ William E. Odom and Robert Dujarric, Commonwealth or Empire? Russia, Central Asia, and the Transcaucasus, Hudson Institute, Indianapolis, 1995, p.86.

³⁶¹ Richard Pipes, "Is Russia Still an Enemy?" p. 73.

Armenia & Azerbaijan

Russia has used the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh to exert influence over both countries.³⁶² The region of Nagorno-Karabakh is located in the territory of Azerbaijan, but is predominantly inhabited by Armenians. It had been incorporated into Azerbaijan by the Soviet government after the Revolution.³⁶³ During *perestroika* and after the collapse of the USSR, Armenians took the opportunity to attempt to regain the territory as their own. In 1988, war broke out between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Armenia maintained its cooperative links with Russia and joined the CIS in 1991. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, resisted joining the CIS. During the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Russian military advisors helped train and supply the Armenian side of the conflict through 1992 and early 1993.³⁶⁴ Armenia had joined the CIS Tashkent collective security pact early on, and thus had the advantage of having Russian support:

[O]n 15 May [1992], Yeltsin had come to a collective agreement with certain CIS states, excluding Azerbaijan, to go to the aid of Armenia if it was in danger. He dispatched his defence minister, Pavel Grachev, to Armenia to discuss the role of the '7th Army', which was stationed in Armenia under Russian control, and to assure the Armenians he would not abandon them.³⁶⁵

³⁶² Robert Donaldson & Joseph Noguee, The Foreign Policy of Russia, p. 179.

³⁶³ William E. Odom and Robert Dujarric, Commonwealth or Empire? Russia, Central Asia, and the Transcaucasus, p. 75.

³⁶⁴ *Ibid*, p. 78.

³⁶⁵ Edgar O'Balance, War in the Caucasus 1990-1995, New York University Press, New York, 1997, p. 61.

While assisting the Armenian side, unofficially, the Yeltsin administration made clear that Russia must play the dominant role in managing the conflict.³⁶⁶ By 1994, Russian mediation succeeded in producing a cease-fire and an agreement for a peacekeeping force.

Indeed, Russia had three clear economic and geopolitical motivations in mind. First, Russia had economic interests in Azerbaijan's cooperation in the exploitation of the Caspian Sea oil and the role of Russia's LUKoil company in this development (discussed in greater detail below).³⁶⁷

Second, Russia wished to pressure Azerbaijan into greater cooperation and integration in the CIS by supplying the Armenian side, and hence creating instability in Azerbaijan. This strategy succeeded as Azeri president Aliyev went to Moscow in September 1993 to agree to make Azerbaijan a member of the CIS.³⁶⁸ By January 1994, Russia achieved regularization of its troop presence and an agreement for Russian Border Troops to control Azerbaijan's border with Iran.³⁶⁹ This strategy also succeeded in bringing Armenia closer to Russia in terms of security cooperation. In August 1997, Armenia and Russia signed a comprehensive security treaty that supersede the previous one signed in December 1991.³⁷⁰ The new document contains a number of provisions creating the closer

³⁶⁶ Robert Donaldson & Joseph Noguee, The Foreign Policy of Russia, p. 180.

³⁶⁷ *Ibid*, p. 180.

³⁶⁸ William E. Odom and Robert Dujarric, Commonwealth or Empire? Russia, Central Asia, and the Transcaucasus, p. 81.

³⁶⁹ *Ibid*, p. 81.

³⁷⁰ Rajan Menon, "After Empire: Russia and the Southern 'Near Abroad'", Michael Mandelbaum (ed.), The New Russian Foreign Policy, Council on Foreign Relations, 1998, p. 130.

alignment sought by Russia. For instance, it provides for “mutual assistance” if either is attacked, coordination of defence production, standardization of military hardware, and a pledge not to join treaties or alliances injurious to the other party.³⁷¹

A third motivation for Russia was the desire to gain influence in this region in order to maintain a geographic security buffer between Russia and its powerful neighbours to the south, Turkey and Iran.³⁷² Historically, Russia has had many security concerns with these two states. Moreover, Turkey is a member of NATO, and as the previous chapter established, Russia continues to have a negative view of NATO.

On this basis, Russia can be said to have utilized its presence in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh to pressure both Armenia and Azerbaijan into closer integration. In fact, Russia’s activity in the Caucasus in general has succeeded in compelling all three Caucus states to seek closer integration with Russia and the CIS.

Central Asian States

The fall of the Soviet Union gave the five Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) a status of political independence none of their leaders had sought.³⁷³ None of these republics had a strong political movement for independence, and some had never

³⁷¹ Harry Tamrazian, “Russian, Armenia Committed to Strong Military Ties,” RFE/RL Newsline, September 3, 1997, pp. 5-6.

³⁷² Edward Marks, “The CIS and the Caucasus,” p. 2.

existed as independent states prior to the dissolution of the USSR. Shortly after the creation of the CIS by Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, the Central Asian leaders worked out a deal to adapt the CIS to include eight additional republics (excluding Georgia and the Baltics). The subsequent agreement was signed in Almaty in Kazakhstan on December 21, 1991.³⁷⁴

During the initial few years after the fall of the Soviet Union, Moscow paid less attention to the states of Central Asia. As foreign policy priorities shifted, in 1993, toward the CIS these states took on increasing importance for Russian foreign policy. Indeed, Russia has many and varied interests in these states. With regards to Kazakhstan, Russia has vital interests for ethnic, economic and security reasons. Kazakhstan has a large ethnic Russian minority living in its northern region, which is of great importance to Russia. Russia and Kazakhstan both have common security concerns and defence priorities with regards to Islamic fundamentalism and China:

The spread of nationalism and Muslim fundamentalism would be fatal for Kazakhstan and tragic to Russians living there, as well as Russia itself. Moreover, the destabilization of Kazakhstan would certainly invite China's expansion and precipitate a conflict between Russia and China in circumstances most unfavorable for Moscow.³⁷⁵

Russia has interests in quelling Islamic fundamentalism in all of the Central Asian states, lest they spread to Kazakhstan and hence north to Russia.

³⁷³ William E. Odom and Robert Dujarric, Commonwealth or Empire? Russia, Central Asia, and the Transcaucasus, p.8.

³⁷⁴ *Ibid*, p. 10.

As a consensus began to emerge in Russian foreign policy after 1993, Russia began expanding its ties to other major powers, such as China and Iran.³⁷⁶ In this attempt to make its foreign policy more “balanced”, Russia has also developed stronger relations with the Central Asian states. As such, the latter half of the 1990s has seen increasing ties being forged between Russia and the states of Central Asia.

The decision by most of the Central Asian states to join the CIS was greatly affected by military considerations:

For most of the southern states, these considerations included the lack of an established military doctrine, an absence of both an adequate arsenal and an independent military-industrial base, and a nonexistent or an insufficiently trained officer corps.³⁷⁷

As a result, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan were some of the original signatories to the Tashkent Pact as well as the Almaty Declaration on CIS Collective Security.³⁷⁸ Thus, through the CIS mechanism, Russia was able to secure its interests in Central Asia in terms of security.

³⁷⁵ Alexei Arbatov, “Russian Foreign Policy Priorities for the 1990s,” Teresa Pelton Johnson & Steven Miller (eds.), Russian Security After the Cold War, Brassey’s, Washington, 1994, p. 28.

³⁷⁶ Sherman Garnett, “Europe’s Crossroads: Russia and the West in the New Borderlands,” p. 69.

³⁷⁷ Karen Dawisha & Bruce Parrott, Russia and the New States of Eurasia, p. 252.

³⁷⁸ “‘Text’ of Almaty Declaration on CIS Collective Security” FBIS-SOV-95-070, April 12, 1995. Although Turkmenistan is a CIS member state, it has not joined other CIS Central Asian states in agreeing to the Tashkent Pact nor the Almaty Declaration. In October 1995, it joined the non-aligned movement and is now officially recognized as a neutral state. For further information, please see R. Freitag-Wirninghaus, “Turkmenistan’s Place in Central Asia and the World,” Mehdi Mozaffari (ed.) Security Politics in the Commonwealth of Independent States, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1997, pp. 74-76.

The Almaty Declaration is an interesting document that gives Russia a greater hand in coordinating defence efforts. Article 3 of the Declaration states that:

The member states are assured that the coordination of their defense efforts will address the purpose of reducing military expenditures, taking into account the existing military infrastructure, uniformity of weapons and military equipment in armed forces, traditional ties between defence industries, as well as scientific research and military training basis.³⁷⁹

The existing military infrastructure was that of the Soviet system, which the Russians had originally put in place. Furthermore, considering the weakness of Central Asian defence industries and military training, Russia would be able to dominate these fields due to its better-developed military.

Within the text of the Almaty Declaration, after pledges to unify efforts in the sphere of collective security, is a reference to NATO expansion:

The member states consider the NATO “Partnership for Peace” program as a real alternative to the mechanical expansion of NATO. The member states believe that its practical implementation should be oriented toward the formation of a universal pan-European structure of military-political cooperation, which strengthens the CSCE foundation. The concrete form and content of such a partnership will be subject to discussion by the member states.³⁸⁰

In other words, this article clearly unifies the position of Russia and the Central Asian states against the issue of NATO expansion and in favour of a pan-European security system. Given Russia’s perception of NATO expansion as a threat, such a declaration could have only been inserted at the insistence of

³⁷⁹ Article 3, *Ibid.*

³⁸⁰ Article 8, *Ibid.*

Russia. The Central Asian states have no real security threats based on NATO's expansion. Such a clause allows Russia to consolidate Central Asian states' positions against NATO expansion, while at the same time supporting integration with these states.

In addition to CIS documents that ensure Russian military and economic hegemony in the former Soviet space of Central Asia, Moscow has also resorted to numerous bilateral and multilateral arrangements outside of the CIS with these states. For instance, Kazakhstan joined Russia and Belarus in signing a customs union in early 1995. The union provided for common customs legislation, standard approaches to regulating external economic activity and a common financial market.³⁸¹ The establishment of this agreement soon put pressure on other Central Asian states to join due to the strong economic ties between Russia and each of these states:

In the meantime Kyrgyzstan has gotten "in line" to sign agreements on the customs union with Russia. ... In Bishkek they understand that under conditions where there are no common borders with Russia, which is separated from Kyrgyzstan by Kazakhstan, the republic has no choice other than to join that union. Then, however, that path must also be followed by Uzbekistan as well since the entire commodity and raw material flow into that republic and out of it goes to the European part of the CIS, again, through Kazakhstan.³⁸²

³⁸¹ Nikolay Zhrebtsov and Andrey Petrovskiy, "Vice Premier on Customs Union Agreement," *FBIS-SOV-95-017*, January 25, 1995.

³⁸² A. Dubnov, "'The Lukashenko Incident' Or How to Orgnize the Minsk Compact Replacing the Warsaw Pact" *Novoe Vremya*, No. 9, February 28, 1995, p.10.

Shortly after the agreement was signed between Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus, Kyrgyzstan joined the customs union.

Another example of an agreement being signed to strengthen integration outside the formal CIS institution is the Russian agreement with Turkmenistan for gas. In 1995, Russia and Turkmenistan signed a cooperation agreement in the field of gas-power engineering. The agreement established a joint Turkmen-Russian company "Turkmenrogaz" which will control 100 per cent of Turkmen gas supplies to CIS markets.³⁸³ Since Gazprom, a Russian company, controls most of the pipelines running through the CIS territory, this gives Russia control over the gas while further achieving the aim of integrating with Turkmenistan.³⁸⁴

While attempting to pressure Central Asian states to integrate with it, Russia has also been actively involved in these states domestic problems. In Tajikistan, civil war broke out in late 1991 as a result of the country's political instability. At the same time, Russian border troops remained in charge of the Afghan border and the 201st Motor Rifle Division remained in Dushanbe, leaving Russia implicitly involved in Tajik political affairs.³⁸⁵ On July 13, 1993, more than 20 Russian border guards were killed by fighters from Afghanistan. This action catalyzed Russian action with regards to Tajikistan. Russia immediately signed two agreements with Tajikistan to protect its borders, and quickly sent

³⁸³ "New Gas Agreement Signed with Turkmenistan," FBIS-SOV-95-230, November 28, 1995.

³⁸⁴ See for instance Sanobar Shermatova, "The Prime Minister's Gas Policy: Gazprom is mapping out the contours of a new foreign policy," Moscow News, Jan. 29, 1998, p. 3.

troops to guard the border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan.³⁸⁶ That same year, the leaders of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan formally authorized the formation of a CIS peacekeeping force. This operation, controlled by Russia, reached a size of approximately 25, 000 troops.³⁸⁷ In June 1997, the presidents of Russia and Tajikistan, and the leader of the Tajik insurgency signed a Moscow-brokered pact to end the war.³⁸⁸

After the fighting had ceased, Tajikistan issued the following statement:

Tajikistan is not indifferent to the way the situation has been developing lately in Afghanistan, as hostilities move right up to the border with Tajikistan; therefore, it is grateful to Russia and a number of Central Asian states for appreciating this real threat and for participating in the deploying of additional joint measures to strengthen the security of the CIS' southern borders.³⁸⁹

Tajikistan was therefore grateful to Russia and to the other Central Asian CIS states that assisted Tajikistan with its internal and external conflicts. Not surprisingly, when the CIS Collective Security Treaty was renewed, Tajikistan was one of the first states to ratify it in its parliament.³⁹⁰ Furthermore, a number of other agreements with Russia were also ratified, including the establishment of

³⁸⁵ William E. Odom and Robert Dujarric, Commonwealth or Empire? Russia, Central Asia, and the Transcaucasus, p.70.

³⁸⁶ Nadezhda Yemelyanova, "Russia: Border Troops in Tajikistan Reorganized," FBIS-UMA-98-363, December 29, 1998.

³⁸⁷ See Iver Neumann and Sergei Solodovnik, "The Case of Tajikistan," in Lena Jonson and Clive Archer (eds.) Peacekeeping and the Role of Russia in Eurasia, Westview Press, Boulder, 1996, pp. 83-101.

³⁸⁸ Robert Donaldson & Joseph Nogee, The Foreign Policy of Russia, p. 175.

³⁸⁹ ITAR-TASS August 20, 1998 in "Tajikistan Thanks Russia for Security Along Afghan Border," FBIS-SOV-98-232, August 21, 1998.

³⁹⁰ Galina Gridneva and Valeriy Azukov "Tajikistan Approves CIS Collective Security Treaty" FBIS-SOV-1999-0630, July 1, 1999.

a free trade zone and an agreement on export and import duties.³⁹¹ It seems evident then that Russia's involvement in the Tajikistan conflict brought Tajikistan closer in terms of integration with Russia.

The Central Asian states play a key role in Moscow attempts to integration with the CIS to a greater extent due to the perceived threat posed by NATO expansion. Through the use of various foreign policy tools, Russia has largely succeeded in bringing the Central Asian states closer to Russia in terms of security and economically. Many foreign policy tools used by Russia, however, to achieve closer integration are not limited to one particular region of the CIS. This chapter now examines the various other tools used by Russian foreign policy decision-makers to impel CIS states into integration with Russia.

Foreign Policy Tools Used by Russia

Military integration in CIS

During the Soviet era, the main tool traditionally used by Russian foreign policy decision-makers to achieve the goal of external security was military capability and defence policy. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia's military capability dramatically decreased. However, Russia is still in need of new strategic relationships with the states surrounding it to ensure its security, especially in the post-NATO expansion era. One manner in which Moscow has used defence policy to achieve security is through military integration with the CIS states. Indeed, in geopolitical terms, the defence of Russia is closely tied to

³⁹¹ *Ibid.*

the security of the CIS as a whole. It makes sense from Moscow's perspective to retain the security framework that had been developed during the Soviet era.³⁹²

Although the Russian demand for closer integration has continually clashed with the sovereignty assertions of the newly independent states, Russia has been successful in overall terms in establishing security relationships with the states that border on NATO countries. This section will explore the extent to which and in what manner this has been done by examining both agreements signed by CIS states concerning military integration and the actions that have been taken under these agreements.³⁹³

In May 1992, in an effort to promote common security within the CIS, the Tashkent Collective Security Treaty was signed by six CIS states: Russia, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Since that time, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Belarus joined on the condition that it avoided centralization of military capabilities. An examination of the text of the treaty is extremely revealing in its Warsaw Pact-like structure. Article 2 of the treaty obliges members to consult in the event of a threat to the security territorial integrity, and sovereignty of any member-state. Under Article 4, an attack on one

³⁹² Leszek Buszynsky, Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War, Praeger, Westport, 1996, p.103.

³⁹³ Recognizing that there have been numerous documents signed by Russia and other CIS states regarding military integration that have not been implemented for various reasons, the author chose only to examine agreements where action has occurred under the umbrella of these agreements.

member would be considered an attack on all, and the other members would be obliged to show “necessary assistance, including military support.”³⁹⁴

As the debate surrounding NATO’s eastward expansion intensified, Russia stepped up its attempts at military integration in the CIS. The CIS’s western frontier now shares a border with the new NATO states of Poland and Hungary. Not surprisingly, Russia has signed a number of agreements with Belarus and Ukraine regarding military integration. One such Russian agreement with Belarus allows a Russian troop presence for 25 years. In one exercise under this agreement, Russian and Belarusian armed forces practiced the destruction of NATO armies.³⁹⁵ During the exercise, Belarusian armed forces were considered as one of the units of Russia’s armed forces.

With regards to Ukraine, an agreement was signed between Russia and Ukraine in January 1998 at the CIS Defence Ministerial Council. This agreement expands military cooperation and includes provisions for joint exercises with the two countries’ land and naval forces.

Armenia is another CIS country that shares a border with a NATO country, namely Turkey. In March 1999, Russia and Armenia stepped up their military integration by integrating Armenia in to the joint combat patrol within the framework of the CIS unified Air Defence System.³⁹⁶ As part of this, Russia decided to enhance Armenia’s air defence capabilities by sending to Armenia: 10

³⁹⁴ Leszek Buszynsky, Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War, p.105.

³⁹⁵ I. Bulavinov, “Igor Sergeyev Fortifies Russia-Byelorussia Defence” Kommersant-Daily, December 20, 1997, p.2.

MiG-29 fighters, S-300V anti-aircraft missile systems and a radar station capable of spotting air targets at a range of up to 300 kilometers.³⁹⁷ The agreement also allows for troops under Russia's 102nd Armed Forces Base in Armenia to remain for another 25 years. Border controls were set in place, as well as a system for the exchange of information about the condition of their airspace with the Air Force Central Command, located near Moscow. The Commander of the Russian Air Force, Colonel General Anatoly Kornukov, gave this reason for the stepped up military integration with Armenia:

...There is a real threat from Turkey, which hosts NATO bases, from where warplanes fly to bomb Iraq [during the U.S. bombing in late 1998] almost every day. We cannot rule out that they may erroneously, or, perhaps not erroneously, intrude the air space of the sovereign state of Armenia which is a party to the Collective Security in the CIS Treaty. The new S-300 anti-aircraft system will allow us to rebuff those attacks, if necessary.³⁹⁸

The fact that this Russian officer was so quick to view Turkey as a threat to the CIS implies that a threat was perceived because Turkey is part of NATO, and not because the U.S. was bombing Iraq. Indeed, Russian military integration with Armenia would ensure that the southern flank of the CIS, which happens to border a NATO country, is secured. This is particularly important in light of recent rumours that Azerbaijan would allow Turkey or the U.S. to place NATO bases on its territory.

³⁹⁶"Armenia To Do its Best to Protect CIS Air Space," Interfax Russian News, April 21, 1999.

³⁹⁷ Sergei Sokut, "'Umbrella' for Armenia," Nezavisimaya Gazeta, January 19, 1999, p.2.

³⁹⁸ David Petrosyan, "Russia-Armenia Military Cooperation Moves onto a New Level," Armenian News Network, February 24, 1999.

Russia's attempt to integrate the CIS military more generally culminated in the creation of a combined air defence system (CADS) that was finalized in February 1995.³⁹⁹ This agreement allows for joint control over the use of air space, and it coordinates joint actions when air space is breached. Among the CIS states that signed were Belarus, Ukraine, Armenia and Georgia, all of whom share a border with a NATO country. To support this agreement financially, it was decided that each CIS country will pay 6.25 % of the necessary sum and Russia will pay 50 %.⁴⁰⁰ Under this agreement, the command of these republics' air defence forces is exercised from the Central Command Point of the Russian Air Defence Troops, with the rest of the member-states developing operational exchanges of information.⁴⁰¹ In an interview with General Yuri Bondarev, AF Deputy Commander-in-Chief for the CIS Joint AAD System, the importance of this agreement was revealed:

I think that it is very important for us [Russia and the CIS] to have operational information on the air space in the border area of a country adjacent to NATO.⁴⁰²

Clearly, Russia's aims for military integration, especially in terms of an air defence system, are to position itself and the CIS in a Europe that includes an

³⁹⁹ The formal title of the agreement is: "On the Creation of a Joint AAD System for CIS Member States," signed February 10, 1995 by Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine.

⁴⁰⁰ Victor Prudnikov, "Press Conference with Chief of Staff for Coordination of the CIS countries Military Cooperation" *Defence and Security*, December 29, 1997. This is a Russian document database, located at www.integrum.com. This information can also be found in *Rusky Telegraph*, December 25, 1997, p.2.

⁴⁰¹ Y. Golotyuk, "Fruits of Integration" *Defence and Security*, Nov. 24, 1997.

eastward expanded NATO. The fact that Russia has taken the lead in realizing action under these agreements provides evidence that it is using military integration with the CIS as a tool to ensure its own security.

Russia has also pushed for other agreements that would strengthen military integration in the CIS in more general terms. Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan signed an accord in 1995 aiming at a common military strategic area. In January 1995, Russia and Kazakhstan announced the creation of a joint military force. On November 2, 1995, a meeting of the CIS defence ministers concluded an agreement on a joint air defence system.⁴⁰³ Under this agreement, a unified air defence system was set up to do the following tasks:

- Ensuring the protection of the airspace of the member states' state borders;
- Implementing joint monitoring of the procedure governing the utilization of the member states' airspace;
- Informing member states about the aerospace situation and providing warnings of missile or airborne attack;
- Conducting coordinated actions by the member states' air defense troops to repulse airborne or missile attack.⁴⁰⁴

According to Article 6 of the Agreement, Russia would also finance the upgrading of air defence facilities in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Armenia,

⁴⁰² Sergei Grigoriev, "AAD Systems of the CIS are Integrating," *Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie*, No. 32, 1998, p.3.

⁴⁰³ "CIS Unified Air Defense Agreement", *FBIS-SOV-95-040*, February 25, 1995.

⁴⁰⁴ Article 2 of the Agreement on the Creation of a Unified Air Defense System for the CIS States. Text of Agreement can be found in *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, February 25, 1995, p. 5.

Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan.⁴⁰⁵ This allows Russia to play an enhanced role in the maintenance of the air defence system.

It seems evident that Russia uses military integration with other CIS states to achieve its goal of ensuring its own security. By cooperating with other CIS states, taking the lead in promoting security, and shouldering a large portion of the cost, Russia is able to use the foreign policy tool of the military in a new way to achieve its goal of military integration with the CIS.

Ethnic Russians in CIS

Another tool used by Russian foreign policy decision-makers to achieve their policy goals is the use of ethnic Russians living in CIS states. There are approximately 25 million ethnic Russians living in the former Soviet republics.⁴⁰⁶ These Russians were essentially “left-out” of Russia when the Soviet Union collapsed. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, many Russian officials felt that ethnic Russians in the former Soviet republics were being treated “unfairly” and that the Russian government should be “concerned” with the violation of their rights.⁴⁰⁷ Although ethnic Russians living in former Soviet states were initially largely ignored by the Russian government during the first few years after the Soviet Union, the shift in Russian foreign policy towards the ‘near abroad’ catalyzed the importance of ethnic Russian minorities. As consensus began to

⁴⁰⁵ Article 6 of the Agreement on the Creation of a Unified Air Defense System for the CIS States.

⁴⁰⁶ Graham Smith & Andrew Wilson, “Rethinking Russia’s Post-Soviet Diaspora,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 49, No. 5, 1997, p.845.

emerge in foreign policy after 1993, the Russian government outlined as one of the key postulates of Russia's "vital interests" in the Near Abroad the prevention of "mass violation of human rights of ethnic minorities, especially of ethnic Russians in the Near Abroad."⁴⁰⁸ By outlining this "vital interest" in their foreign policy, Russian officials legitimated their involvement in the affairs of CIS states by exercising their right to protect ethnic Russians outside their borders. In other words, ethnic Russians in the former Soviet republics were seen as a potent tool to be fully deployed in the pursuit of foreign policy goals in the post-Soviet space.

Many Russian officials in Moscow have politicized the ethnic Russians in the former Soviet states. For instance, Sergey Baburin, a leading figure in the formerly existing Russian Supreme Soviet, has argued that the Russian Federation is "an unnatural formation" spawned by "Bolshevik experiments" and that the real Russia "is the former Soviet Union."⁴⁰⁹ Others, such as Sergey Stankevich, have insisted that Russia is responsible for the fate of these ethnic Russians, and that even the use of force may be necessary for Russia to protect its thousand-year historical interests.⁴¹⁰ Even Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov justified attempts at integration using the excuse of ethnic Russian minorities living in former Soviet states:

⁴⁰⁷ Leon Aron, "The Foreign Policy Doctrine of Postcommunist Russia and its Domestic Context," Michael Mandelbaum (ed.), The New Russian Foreign Policy, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1998, p.40.

⁴⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p.34.

⁴⁰⁹ Sergey Baburin quoted in Karen Dawisha & Bruce Parrott, Russia and the New States of Eurasia, p. 63.

⁴¹⁰ "Weekly Review of Events 17-23 June 1992," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 27, July 3 1992, p. 72.

From the territorial viewpoint the CIS countries were a single state not for the 70 years of the Soviet period but for centuries. And over this time there were large-scale migration processes and the demographic situation changed fundamentally. Nowadays there are 26 million Russians outside Russia. There are also tens of millions of Russian-speakers including a great many representatives of the eponymous nations in the republics. This naturally fuels the desire for integration.⁴¹¹

Thus, Moscow politicized the Russian diaspora to justify negotiations and political activity. This is especially true with regards to issues such as the redrawing of borders and peacekeeping in CIS states such as Moldova, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, that had some of the highest concentration of ethnic Russian minorities.

In Moldova, ethnic Russian minorities constitute 25.5 % of Moldova's Transdnister region.⁴¹² As mentioned above, the engagement of the 14th Army in Moldova and the dispatch of Russian peacekeepers to protect the ethnic Russian minority was one of the first occasions the Russian military was used in the CIS region to maintain stability. Henceforth, military involvement in other CIS states under the premise of protecting ethnic Russians outside the Russian Federation's border became an integral part of Russia's foreign policy.

In Ukraine, ethnic Russians constitute 21.9 % of Ukraine's 51.7 million people.⁴¹³ Many of these Russians are concentrated in the east and south of

⁴¹¹ Speech by Yevgeniy Primakov to Moscow State Institute of International Relations Academic Council, "The Role of Follower is Not for Us," text published in FBIS-SOV-96-124, June 25, 1996.

⁴¹² Neil Melvin, Russians Beyond Russia, Chatham House Papers, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1995, p. 64.

⁴¹³ Jeff Chinn & Robert Kaiser, Russians as the New Minority, Westview Press, Colorado, 1996, p.144.

Ukraine, particularly in the Crimea where they account for 61.6 % of the population. These regions have had a traditionally close relationship to Moscow and are geographically adjacent to the Russian Federation. As a result, the Russian language dominates in eastern Ukraine and Crimea. For instance, ethnic Russians account for approximately 67 per cent of the population of Crimea, while ethnic Ukrainians only constitute 25.75 per cent.⁴¹⁴ Since Ukrainian independence, a number of issues have emerged that have contributed to a general feeling of disenchantment on behalf of the ethnic Russians living in Ukraine.⁴¹⁵ Some of the most predominant contentious issues between Ukrainians and ethnic Russians include the status of Crimea (whether it belongs to Russia or Ukraine), language rights and citizenship rights. With relation to these issues, a number of key groups in Moscow (such as the Communist Party) have attempted to exert control over Ukraine using the ethnic Russian minority as a premise.⁴¹⁶ After the breakup of the Soviet Union, many Russian foreign policy decision-makers, particularly in the State Duma, called for a revision of the Ukrainian-Russian border on the basis that the high concentration of ethnic Russians needed to be reunited with the Russian Federation. In July 1993, a decision by the formerly

⁴¹⁴ Roman Solchanyk, "The Politics of State Building," Europe-Asia Studies, vol.46, no.1, 1994, p.50.

⁴¹⁵ See for instance Roman Solchanyk, "Russia, Ukraine, and the Imperial Legacy," Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol.9, No.4, 1993.

⁴¹⁶ See for instance Adrian Karatnycky, "The 'Nearest Abroad': Russia's Relations with Ukraine and Belarus" Uri Ra'an and Kate Martin (eds.), Russia: A Return to Imperialism?, pp. 81-82; Mette Skak, From Empire to Anarchy, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1996, p. 156; and Evgenii Golovakha, Natalia Panina, & Nikolai Churilov, "Russians in Ukraine," Shlapentokh, V., et al (eds) The New Russian Diaspora, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994.

existing Russian Supreme Soviet claimed Sevastopol, a port city located in Crimea, for Russia. Yeltsin, however, stepped in and made clear his support for the territorial integrity of Ukraine. When Ukrainian President Leonard Kuchma asserted direct rule over Crimea in March 1995, the head of the Duma Committee for CIS Affairs, Konstantin Zatulin, was active in organizing opposition to Ukrainian actions in the Russian parliament.⁴¹⁷ Despite the fact that the executive branch of the Russian government has since halted its attempts to gain territory within Ukraine on the basis of presence of ethnic Russians, it continues to use this Russian minority as a tool for playing a role in Ukrainian affairs.

Like Ukraine, Kazakhstan also contains a large portion of ethnic Russians (37.8 per cent), located predominantly in the northern regions close to the border with the Russian Federation.⁴¹⁸ Ethnic Russians settled in this area as a result of colonization and a steady attempt at Russification of the Kazakh people. Since independence, Kazakh policies such as “nativisation” of the territory, especially the northern region, have attempted to push ethnic Russians into the margins of society.⁴¹⁹ Increased use of the Kazakh language, revitalization of the Kazakh culture, and clear priorities being given to the promotion of ethnic Kazakhs within all spheres of public administration have contributed to fears of assimilation by the ethnic Russian population.⁴²⁰

⁴¹⁷ Neil Melvin, Russians Beyond Russia, p.98.

⁴¹⁸ Mehdi Mozaffari, “The CIS Southern Belt: A New Security System,” in Mehdi Mozaffari, Security Politics in the Commonwealth of Independent States, p. 11.

⁴¹⁹ William E. Odom and Robert Dujarric, Commonwealth or Empire? Russia, Central Asia, and the Transcaucasus, p. 49.

⁴²⁰ Neil Melvin, Russians Beyond Russia, pp.108-9.

As a response to these policies, there has been growing Russian involvement in Kazakh affairs in order to ensure the protection of right for the ethnic Russians. Russian foreign policy toward Kazakhstan became increasingly assertive. Contacts and linkages between ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan and Russian political and public organizations intensified. For example, during the Russian electoral campaign in 1993, Vladimir Zhirinovsky made repeated accusations about violations of the rights of Russians and of Russia's right to territory in Kazakhstan.⁴²¹ Public organizations, such as the Congress of Russian Communities, have also been active in highlighting the issue of ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan.⁴²² Russian assertiveness has also been manifested in efforts by the Russian Foreign Ministry to achieve dual citizenship for the ethnic Russians, which would increase the ties between Kazakhstan and Russia. Moscow's politicization of the ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan has worked to bring the country closer in terms of integration with Russia. Faced with the growing secessionist sentiments among ethnic Russians, supported by Russian public and political organizations, and faced with a deteriorating economy, the leaders of Kazakhstan have had little choice but to seek closer integration with Russia on Moscow's terms.⁴²³

As debate around issues such as NATO expansion intensified, so did Russia's attempts at integration with Kazakhstan. In 1995, Russia and Kazakhstan signed a series of agreements, including military cooperation, border

⁴²¹ *Ibid*, p. 121.

⁴²² *Ibid*, p. 122.

agreements and provisions for increased contacts between Russian regions and the northern regions of Kazakhstan.⁴²⁴ Thus, Russia politicized ethnic Russian minorities in Kazakhstan, as well as in other CIS states, in order to achieve closer integration with them.

Border Troops

Another foreign policy tool Russia has used to promote CIS integration is through border troops. During the Soviet period, border protection was previously the responsibility of the KGB border troops. The disintegration of the Soviet system left many of the new states dependent on Russia for border troops. In April 1994, General Andrei Nikolaev, Commander of Russian Border Forces, convened the first Conference of CIS Border Guards and declared that the aim was to create a CIS command for border forces.⁴²⁵ With Russian persuasion, a tentative approval was reached at the May 26 1995 CIS Summit in Minsk by Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Georgia and Tajikistan to place Russian border guards on their outer borders using military facilities and joint operation of defense production.⁴²⁶ By October 1996, Russia had outlined the fundamentals of its Border Policy. This policy stated that:

An integral part of the Russian Federation border policy is the preparation and implementation, in conjunction with interest member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States, of

⁴²³ *Ibid*, p. 122.

⁴²⁴ See "Rossiia i Kazakhstan khotiat vernut 'druzhbu navek'" *Segodnya*, January 28, 1995, p. 3.

⁴²⁵ Leszek Buszynski, Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War, p. 107.

⁴²⁶ Robert Blackwill, "The Context of Russian Foreign Policy," Robert Blackwill et al., Engaging Russia, The Trilateral Commission, New York, June 1995, p. 14.

measures to ensure national and collective security on the Commonwealth's external borders.⁴²⁷

By outlining domestically a policy, that was ratified on October 5, 1996, that has international ramifications, Russia was indeed attempting to integrate with CIS states in terms of border guards. Since that time, the CIS Border Troops Commanders Council has formed, and the following CIS states are party to the CIS treaty on border guards: Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Armenia. Belarus' constitution specifically forbids participation of Belarusian service-people in any military actions abroad. However, Russia and Belarus do have border controls for the external Belarus' border under the Russia-Belarus Union. It is also noteworthy that the Federal Border Guards Service (that protects the inner borders of Russia and the outer borders of the CIS) is subordinate to the Federal Security Service, that is directly under the authority of Russian President Yeltsin.

Since 1996, Russia has clarified its border strategy by adopting what it terms a "strategy of two borders."⁴²⁸ This strategy protects collective security and common interests along two lines: the outer CIS border and along Russia's new borders. This approach allows the country to preserve as much geopolitical space as possible to maximize its security. It seems evident that through this policy, as

⁴²⁷ The "Fundamentals of Russian Federation Border Policy" translated in J.L. Black Russia & Eurasia Documents Annual, Academic International Press, Volume 1, 1997, p.166.

⁴²⁸ Igor Naumov, "A Strategy of Two Borders," Defence and Security, September 23, 1998.

well as through playing on the needs of the CIS states in terms of protection, Russia uses border troops as a tool to further integrate with the CIS states.

Industry and Trade

As private industry emerged in Russia, large corporations have found themselves playing an increasing role in Russian foreign policy. This new “tool” of foreign policy has been welcomed by many Russian foreign policy decision-makers, who find allies in corporations such as LUKoil and Gazprom when it comes to issues of seeking closer integration with the CIS states. In recent years, corporations and government have been increasingly working together to achieve common goals.

In terms of economic integration, an analysis of imports and exports to CIS countries from Russia provides interesting findings.

Table 1 - The Southern Near Abroad and Trade with Russia, 1994⁴²⁹

	A	B
Azerbaijan	22.1	15.2
Armenia	52.7	48.8
Georgia	58.0	14.9
Kyrgyzstan	83.6	99.0
Kazakhstan	67.6	59.4
Tajikistan	26.4	57.5
Turkmenistan	10.1	16.1
Uzbekistan	45.7	47.5

⁴²⁹ Source: Rajan Menon, “After Empire: Russia and the Southern ‘Near Abroad’” Michael Mandelbaum (ed.), The New Russian Foreign Policy, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1998, p.115.

As Table 1 demonstrates, most of the southern 'near abroad' is heavily dependent on Russia for both imports and exports. Column A represents exports to Russia as a percentage of the country's total exports and column B represents imports from Russia as a percentage of its total imports. The high degree of economic integration is especially true for CIS states such as Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Armenia and Tajikistan. Economic integration in the CIS is largely a product of the Soviet era. However, Russia has used economic interdependence of the CIS to its advantage to foster greater economic integration. These attempts have been directed in various ways in the CIS industry sector. Three examples of economic integration in the CIS that have been fostered by Russia include energy and communications.

The fuel and energy complex in Russia are of paramount importance to its domestic markets and its exports to the CIS. In 1995, Russia produced 305 million tonnes of crude oil and 569 billion cubic meters of natural gas.⁴³⁰ Russia's economic crisis, subsequent to the collapse of the Soviet system, meant that previous subsidies of energy flows to CIS countries had to be stopped:

Slightly less than half the energy resources being produced and delivered is not paid for at all. However, the result of this state of affairs is a sharp drop in the investments in the strategically important branches, the progressive rates of obsolescence of the equipment, and, in the final analysis, a situation that threatens national security – the sharp decrease in the production of life-support products: oil, gas, etc.⁴³¹

⁴³⁰ Roland Goetz, "Russia's Economic Potential as a Basis for its Foreign Policy," p. 138.

⁴³¹ Yuri Shafranik, RF Minister of Fuel and Energy, "Russia: CIS Energy Security Discussed," FBIS-SOV-96-135-S, May 12, 1996.

As a result, an International Consultative Conference on the Energy Security of the CIS Countries took place in 1996 to examine this issue. Central to the conference was the awareness that it was impossible for any of the CIS states to support their own energy security independent of Russia.⁴³²

An outcome of the Conference was the establishment of the Russian-based Unified Energy Systems of Russia (UES), headed by Anatoliy Chubais. The company is responsible for supplying reliable energy to the CIS states and ensuring that any energy used is paid for.⁴³³ As of February 1999, debts owed by CIS energy consumers to Russia exceeded US\$ 640 million.⁴³⁴ Although agreements have been reached between UES and customers such as Ukraine and Kazakhstan, many other CIS states remain in debt to Russia. By cracking down on the use of Russian energy by the CIS states, Russia is able to achieve two goals. First, by establishing the UES, Russia ensures that the CIS states remain integrated in terms of energy consumption. Second, by creating a mechanism through which to ensure payment for energy use, Russia was able to maintain economic and political leverage over CIS states due to their high debts to Russia. Therefore, through the establishment of the UES Russia was able to ensure increased CIS economic integration.

Another important tool used by Russian officials to support integration of CIS states is communications. Presently, almost all CIS countries use only

⁴³² *Ibid.*

⁴³³ "Russia "Chubays Promises Energy Payment Rigor" FBIS-SOV-98-318.

⁴³⁴ Igor Ivantsov, "Debts to Russia by CIS Energy Consumers over \$640 million," FBIS Transcribed Text, February 4, 1999.

Russian equipment to ensure the secrecy and reliability of all kinds of special communications.⁴³⁵ Because the present equipment is Russian-made, any upgrades to this communications equipment (i.e. for the Y2K problem) will have to be made by Russian companies.⁴³⁶ This increases the economic links between CIS states in the communications sector. Furthermore, all telecommunications lines from within Russia and from the CIS states pass through Moscow before they are relayed outside the former Soviet space.⁴³⁷ Therefore, Moscow has control over the telecommunications of all CIS states. This is another mechanism through which Russia can gain power over the CIS states to pressure them into integration.

Caspian Pipeline Politics

Another manner in which Russia has persuaded CIS countries into integration is by making them reliant on Russian oil companies, which are closely tied to the Russian government. In 1997, at the time of the signing of the Russo-Chechen peace accord, many Moscow observers claimed that Yeltsin had been successfully lobbied by LUKoil to settle the conflict. It is interesting to note that LUKoil remains a partly state-owned company with close ties to the Yeltsin administration.⁴³⁸ The aim of LUKoil's lobbying was to achieve peace in order to

⁴³⁵ "Representatives of CIS Countries' Government Communications Services Meet," Russian Television, Vesti, May 14, 1998, available at www.integrum.com.

⁴³⁶ Grigory Milov, "381 Days left till the Year 2000," *Computerworld*, December 15, 1998, p.3, translated by www.integrumworld.com.

⁴³⁷ See for example: Alexander Levinskiy, "Main Communications Operator has Hard Heritage," *Vremya*, June 8, 1999, p. 4.

⁴³⁸ Douglas Blum, "Domestic Politics and Russia's Caspian Policy," *Post-Soviet Affairs*, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1998, p.139.

secure the flow of oil across Chechnya and Azerbaijan from the Caspian oil fields. This company had a direct interest in securing peace in the region, since Azerbaijani president Heidar Aliev renegotiated the contract with the Azerbaijani International Operating Company (AIOC) and the Caspian Pipeline Consortium in order to allocate LUKoil 10 % of AIOC.⁴³⁹ LUKoil's connections with Azerbaijan and its desire to secure an oil pipeline with Azerbaijan allowed the company to use its linkages as leverage to secure a domestic situation with foreign policy implications. Yeltsin's capacity to be influenced in this manner reveals that he recognized the use of this innovative way to achieve foreign policy goals. In this case the goal was the settlement of a domestic situation to achieve closer integration with Azerbaijan in terms of oil pipelines.

There has been much controversy over the oil in the Caspian Sea. Some of the controversy surrounds whether the Sea should be jointly managed by coastal states, or be divided into exclusive national sectors. The Russian government was at the forefront of these negotiations. Although there was some bureaucratic infighting regarding the desirability of cooperation with Western companies, the key foreign policy decision-makers decided to maintain Russia's strong presence in the Caspian Sea oil issue. In order to maintain Russia's sphere of influence in the region:

Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev and the future Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov convinced Yeltsin on 21 July 1994 to sign a

⁴³⁹ Leon Aron, "The Foreign Policy Doctrine of Postcommunist Russia and its Domestic Context," p.46. See also Suha Bolukbasi, "The Controversy over the Caspian Sea Mineral Resources: Conflicting Perceptions, Clashing Interests," in Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 50, No. 3, 1998, p. 398.

secret memorandum regarding the protection of Russian interests in the Caspian. Accordingly, this aim views the development and export of oil as a zero-sum game, and is staunchly against the involvement of 'outsiders' like Turkey, the USA and others in Russia's backyard.⁴⁴⁰

Russia thus lobbied aggressively for the Russian oil companies (such as LUKoil) to be invited into the energy consortia. By taking such an aggressive approach to this issue, the Azeris found themselves in a position where they needed to seek the aid of Russian oil companies and the Russian government. This was particularly the case when the Russian Foreign Ministry sent the following note to the CIS states involved in the Caspian Sea controversy:

[In the absence of an agreement regarding the delineation of the Caspian Sea's respective zones. It said:] 'All responsibility for (undesirable) situations, including material damage, will lie with those who have taken unilateral steps, disregarding the Caspian Sea's judicial nature and obligations brought by international agreements... The Russian Federation reserves the right to take the necessary measures to restore order and to eliminate the results of such unilateral moves.'⁴⁴¹

Azerbaijan thus realized that Russia needed to be co-opted so as to moderate its position on the Caspian. The Azeris allowed Russian oil companies into the energy consortia, and as a result, Russia diminished its bellicose position.⁴⁴² In the meantime, by acting as a potential spoiler and challenger of the legal validity of national zones in the Caspian Sea, it acquires leverage with which to further

⁴⁴⁰ Suha Bolukbasi, "The Controversy over the Caspian Sea Mineral Resources: Conflicting Perceptions, Clashing Interests," p. 399.

⁴⁴¹ *Ibid*, p. 399.

⁴⁴² See for instance Arkady Dubnov, "Russia is Moving in the Right Direction," *Moscow News*, June 8, 1998, from www.integrumworld.com.

achieve its goals.⁴⁴³ This is another example of the negotiating strategy, mentioned above, whereby Russia begins with an aggressive stance and then allows itself to be accommodated by CIS states in order to achieve its goals.

There is also another controversy in terms of where the pipelines for the Caspian oil should be laid. Russia has put forward a proposal that would enable Azerbaijan as well as Kazakhstan to export their oil. Russia's proposed route consists of two legs:

One requires construction of a 1500-kilometre \$1.8 billion pipeline from the Kazakh Tengiz fields through Tihoretsk... to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiisk. This pipeline ... would join the existing 1400-kilometre Baku-Tihoretsk pipeline which could carry the Azeri oil from the Caspian Sea.⁴⁴⁴

This proposal, if accepted, would solidify Moscow's position in the region and allow Russia to maintain a monopoly over the transportation of oil in the region. Furthermore, three out of the four other states surrounding the Caspian are CIS states (Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan). Russia could potentially pressure these states to agree on the Russian proposed pipeline by using its leverage in terms of other foreign policy tools. Russian oil companies LUKoil and Gazprom have already taken advantage of Kazakhstan's dependence on Russian pipelines to acquire major stakes in the development of the Tenghiz and Karachaganak fields, possibly for the purpose of developing its proposed pipeline.

⁴⁴³ Leon Aron, "The Foreign Policy Doctrine of Postcommunist Russia and its Domestic Context," p. 120.

⁴⁴⁴ Suha Bolukbasi, "The Controversy over the Caspian Sea Mineral Resources: Conflicting Perceptions, Clashing Interests," p.402.

Furthermore, the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, of which Russia is a member, signed an agreement in early 1996 on the construction of a pipeline that will run from the Tenghiz field in Kazakhstan to the Russian port of Novorossiisk.⁴⁴⁵

Notwithstanding Russia's clear attempts at influencing the CIS states involved in this issue, it will be interesting to examine whether Russia's attempts to gain power through its already existing mechanisms of CIS integration are realized.

Customs Union

In pursuing economic integration more generally, Russia made significant gains when in January 1995 a customs union agreement was signed within the CIS. The signatories included: Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan.⁴⁴⁶

The agreement allowed signatories to coordinate their customs policies and legislations, create a common financial market, and establish a single customs space regulated by common acts.⁴⁴⁷ As well, the signatories agreed to remove customs barriers in reciprocal trade and adopt a single customs tariff for trade with third countries.⁴⁴⁸ This development allows Russia to have a greater say in the pricing policies of these CIS states as well as establish common methods of

⁴⁴⁵ Mark Webber, CIS Integration Trends - Russia and the Former Soviet South, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Washington, 1997, p. 58.

⁴⁴⁶ Nikolay Azerebtsov and Andrey Petrovskiy, "Vice Premier on Customs Union Agreement," FBIS-SOV-95-017, January 25, 1995.

⁴⁴⁷ Gennadiy Yezhov, "Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus Sign Customs Union Agreement," FBIS-SOV-95-019, January 28, 1995.

⁴⁴⁸ Mark Webber, CIS Integration Trends - Russia and the Former Soviet South, p. 55.

pricing.⁴⁴⁹ As the largest trading partner in the Customs Union, Russia can use the Union to achieve greater integration with the CIS states.

Russia's Internal Regions

The role of the regions in Russian foreign policy, particularly with regards to CIS integration, has increased dramatically in recent years with the support of the Russian government. Moscow has indirectly used the regions as a tool to further CIS integration, especially the regions that share a border with another CIS state.

In many regions, the local administrations often claim ownership of resources located on their territories in order to advance their agendas.⁴⁵⁰ Frequently, this results in foreign policy implications. When this occurs, local administrators are generally successful in their endeavours for two reasons. First, they often have the support of Moscow because their agendas usually involve securing closer ties with other CIS states. Indeed, the power of local actors depends in part on their ability to gain support from the centre. Second, they are successful by gaining local-level endorsement for their policies, which are crucial for policy implementation.

One example of the regions playing a role in Russia's attempts of integration with the CIS can be seen in Russia's Caspian policy. In this policy, the local elites in the region of Astrakhan were significant for Russia to achieve its goals in the Caspian. The local elites also prevailed in forwarding their own

⁴⁴⁹ "Russian Duma Deputy Zatulin on Customs Agreement," FBIS-SOV-95-094, May 15, 1995.

agenda because of their close link to Moscow. Traditionally, Astrakhan's interests have been closely linked to the Caspian Sea for commercial fishing operations, processing plants and canneries, and ship-building enterprises.⁴⁵¹ With the fall of the Soviet Union, local shipping and fishing industries have deteriorated. As a result, the region's administration worked actively to help the local industry obtain orders and investments, and to attract domestic and foreign investment. With the Caspian Sea oil controversy and the subsequent drive by surrounding states and foreign investors to "get a piece of the pie," the internal Russian Astrakhan *oblast'* (region/province) energetically lobbied the Russian government to ensure that any policy include pollution management and sustainable development. As a result, an agreement was reached with LUKoil to use environmentally safe technology on the condition that Astrakhan was made the regional headquarters for LUKoil. LUKoil is the primary Russian oil company involved in the extracting of oil from the Caspian Sea. As well, it is closely tied to an Azerbaijani energy consortium and involved in discussions of cooperating with the CIS states surrounding the Caspian on the issue of oil extraction. Thus, through the lobbying efforts of local administration of Astrakhan, closer integration with the CIS states surrounding the Caspian Sea was made possible through a "domino effect" that involved the Russian partly state-owned company LUKoil.

⁴⁵⁰ Douglas Blum, "Domestic Politics and Russia's Caspian Policy," p. 144.

⁴⁵¹ *Ibid*, p. 154.

The regions of Russia and their local administration are indirectly influential in Russia's foreign policy process. By involving themselves in issues that have foreign policy implications, they indirectly support Russia's overall aim to integrate with the states of the CIS.

Conclusions

This chapter had two primary objectives. The first aim of this chapter was to test the fifth methodological aspect of Complex Relations Approach. That is, to examine what foreign policy tools were used by Russian foreign policy decision-makers to influence the CIS states into integration. The second aim of this chapter was to provide evidence to support the hypothesis that Russia sought integration with the CIS states as they perceived NATO expansion as a threat.

This chapter investigated the foreign policy tools Russia used to achieve CIS integration. It was discovered that in order to achieve this integration, Russia used foreign policy tools in innovative and creative ways. These tools included: various political, economic and security agreements on a bilateral and multilateral basis with Russia, Russian involvement (sometimes military) in the domestic affairs of a CIS state, military integration tools, the politicization of ethnic Russians in the other CIS states, the use of border guards, industry and trade linkages (including energy and communications tools), Russian monopoly over energy and oil (particularly with regards to the Caspian sea pipelines issue), the Customs Union, and Russia's internal regions. This chapter provided evidence to support the claim that through the use of these tools, Russia promoted and

pressured CIS states into closer integration. Therefore, the fifth methodological aspect of Complex Relations Approach can be said to be fulfilled.

With regards to the second aim of the chapter, evidence was presented to suggest that in the context of NATO expansion, Russia's perception of this development as a threat compelled it to seek various ways of further integrating the CIS states with Russia. Many of the agreements discussed above provided clear indications of Russia attempting to secure its position with regards to NATO expansion by promoting integration with the CIS states. Furthermore, all the varied and innovative foreign policy tools discussed indicated that Russia was attempting to regain power over the CIS states as a possible response to the perceived threat posed by NATO expansion. On the basis of the evidence presented in the previous chapter, and considering the evidence provided in this chapter, this thesis may reject the null hypothesis, that claims there is no relationship between the dependent and independent variables. Based on the evidence provided above, this thesis is able to tentatively confirm the hypothesis that there is a relationship between the perception of NATO's eastward expansion as a threat and Russia's attempt to integrate with CIS countries. Chapter Six will discuss these conclusions and their implications in greater detail in order to confirm the hypothesis.

CHAPTER SIX –

CONCLUSIONS

The problem this study investigated was how Russia uses its foreign policy tools to influence the CIS into closer integration, due to the perceived threat of NATO expansion. This study had four objectives. First, it aimed to construct an analytical tool, called Complex Relations Approach, in order to study Russia's relations with the CIS states in the context of NATO expansion. Second, it aimed to demonstrate that NATO expansion was perceived as a threat among Russian foreign policy decision-makers. Third, it aimed to demonstrate that this perception prompted actors in Russian foreign policy to seek closer integration with the CIS countries. The fourth purpose was to demonstrate the usefulness of Complex Relations Approach in examining Russian attempts to integrate with the CIS based upon its perception that NATO expansion was a threat. This chapter investigates the extent to which the hypothesis, based upon the objectives of the study, was confirmed.

Summary of Findings

The research presented in this thesis applied Complex Relations Approach to the hypothesis: As NATO expands eastward, the Russian perception of this development as a threat compels Russian foreign policy decision-makers to seek closer integration with the CIS countries through its foreign policy linkages. As outlined in Chapter Two, Complex Relations Approach examines the linkages, or

foreign policy tools, between foreign policy decision-makers. This was done in three ways. First, it examined the dialogue of the various actors and influences in the decision-making process of Russia's foreign policy to investigate whether NATO expansion was perceived as a threat. Second, it explored the context in which NATO expansion and CIS integration were discussed to determine whether any substantial link was drawn between the two issues. Finally, the principle of timing and effect was utilized to explore whether actions regarding CIS integration were taken after the dialogue concerning the perception of NATO expansion as a threat. In examining this action, this thesis investigated the manner in which Russia carried out the goal of CIS integration.

By applying Complex Relations Approach to the hypothesis, the following findings were revealed. First, by examining the dialogues regarding NATO expansion among foreign policy decision-makers (in Chapter Four) it became evident that there is a general perception that NATO's eastward expansion to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech republic is regarded as a threat to Russia's security. Second, the thesis analyzed the context in which NATO expansion and CIS integration were discussed. It found that CIS integration was viewed as desirable and as a key goal that Russia should strive towards in light of the perceived threat posed by NATO expansion. In Chapter Five, this thesis explored the various ways in which Russia attempted to integrate with the CIS countries. It examined the innovative and creative ways Russian officials used foreign policy tools to secure CIS integration. These foreign policy tools included: official agreements between CIS states (e.g. Russia-Belarus Union), the politicization of

ethnic Russian minorities in the CIS countries, using the vulnerability of other CIS countries to achieve military integration, the use of industry (particularly energy, oil and gas) as leverage to promote economic integration, border troops, and the use of regional ties with CIS countries. Through these mechanisms, Russia attempted to achieve the goal of CIS integration as a response to the perceived threat posed by NATO's eastward expansion.

The third methodological tool of Complex Relations Approach was timing and effect. Most of the statements by Russian foreign policy decision-makers regarding the perception of NATO expansion as a threat, and regarding the need for CIS integration as a response to this phenomenon occurred in 1996 and the early part of 1997. Although CIS integration has been an ongoing process, real progress regarding the settlement of contentious issues and the finalization of integration agreements were made after this time. For example, the Russia-Belarus Union was signed in April 1997, a full six months after discussion of CIS integration as a response to the perceived threat posed by NATO expansion began. Also, the Friendship Treaty between Russia and Ukraine as well as the agreement on the Black Sea Fleet were also signed in mid-1997. Furthermore, military integration in terms of common air defence was implemented in late 1997, even though the agreement had been finalized in 1995. Military integration with Armenia in terms of joint combat patrol and the enhancement of Armenia's military capabilities occurred in early 1999. Since the timing of discussions favouring CIS integration as a response to the perceived threat posed by NATO

expansion preceded real attempts by Russia to integrate with the CIS, the principle of timing and effect can be said to have been fulfilled.

Discussion

On the basis of the evidence provided throughout this thesis, the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between the perceived threat of the eastward expansion of NATO and Russian attempts at CIS integration can be rejected. Chapter Two forwarded three alternative hypotheses that this section will now examine. The first alternative hypothesis was that NATO's eastward expansion has resulted from a perception in the West of Russian neo-imperialism in the CIS. This is not the case for the following reasons. First, discussions of NATO expansion preceded any serious attempt by Russia to integrate with the CIS states. As stated in Chapter Three, for the first few years after the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russian officials looked more towards strengthening their ties with the West and left the CIS states largely to their own devices. It was not until after 1994 that a consensus among Russian officials emerged regarding the need to integrate and focus on the CIS. Discussions of NATO expansion had already begun in 1993. On this basis, this alternative hypothesis can be rejected.

The second alternative hypothesis put forth was that Russian foreign policy is incoherent and is the result of a divided state and inter-elite rivalries. This can be said to have been the case in the early 1990s when Russia was grappling with the breakup of the Soviet Union and attempting to find a direction in foreign policy. Since 1993, however, a clear consensus has emerged among Russian foreign policy decision-makers around two issues: NATO expansion and

CIS integration. As demonstrated by the evidence provided in this thesis, almost all factions of the Russian government oppose NATO expansion. A significant portion of the executive, as well as the legislative, branches also perceive NATO's expansion as a threat. The other consensus that has emerged among Russian foreign policy decision-makers is the desire to integrate with the CIS. Officials on both sides of the spectrum, Eurasianists and Ultra-nationalists,⁴⁵² all covet integration with the CIS countries. Despite the fact that there are differing reasons behind this aspiration, the overwhelming consensus regarding CIS integration as being advantageous implies that there is a direction to Russian foreign policy. As a result, this second alternative hypothesis can also be rejected.

The third alternative hypothesis was that the CIS states demand that Russia play a greater role in their affairs as a result of being left out of NATO's expansion. This hypothesis can be rejected for numerous reasons. First, states such as Ukraine have kept Russia at arms' length regarding integration, particularly in terms of security. Other states, such as Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, have been reluctant to sign CIS agreements, and are actually withdrawing from some CIS agreements. Second, if this alternative hypothesis were true, then the CIS as an organization would be playing a much greater role in integrating the states. Third, the fact that many CIS documents and agreements have not been

⁴⁵² Please note: the term "Eurasianist" is used in the manner in which Russian foreign policy scholars (such as Alexei Arbatov) have used it in the years following the breakup of the Soviet Union with regards to Russian foreign policy. It should not be confused with the term "Eurasian" in the historical sense. Also, the pro-Western group is not included here as its presence has been diminished, as evidenced by Kozyrev's replacement by Eurasianist Primakov as foreign minister.

implemented perhaps demonstrates the lack of desire on the part of the other CIS states to actualize integration in any real sense. Finally, the strong nationalism of states, such as Ukraine, prevents these states from seeking integration with Russia on the basis that there are intense fears of re-Russification of CIS cultures and languages. As a result, the third alternative hypothesis can also be rejected.

All three alternative hypotheses have been found to be invalid. At the same time, the evidence provided above suggests that all three methodological aspects of Complex Relations Approach have been fulfilled in testing the hypothesis. On this basis, this thesis rejects the null hypothesis and the alternative hypotheses, and confirms the hypothesis presented in this thesis.

In confirming the hypothesis tested, a few considerations are in order. First, it is important to consider that this thesis attempted to confirm that Russia pushed for integration with the CIS countries. It did not attempt to verify whether it was successful in its attempts. Indeed, recent developments such as the Azerbaijani announcement of its intention to leave the CIS military alliance⁴⁵³ suggests that perhaps Russia was not as successful as it had hoped in its goal of CIS integration. The aim of this thesis was simply to establish that Russian foreign policy decision-makers are striving towards the goal of CIS integration as a response to the perceived threat posed by NATO expansion.

A second consideration is that Russia's attempts at integration have not taken place within the framework of the CIS as an institution or organization.

⁴⁵³ Simon Saradzhyan, "Baku Wants Out of CIS Defense Treaty," Moscow Times, February 13, 1999.

Rather, it has attempted to integrate with the CIS states on largely a bilateral basis. In this sense, CIS integration can be likened to a wheel. Russia can be seen as the hub of the wheel, and each CIS country is one spoke. The wheel surrounding them can be likened to the CIS as an organization. Although the wheel has many gaps in it, it is the hub (Russia) that keeps everything together.

Implications

This thesis has confirmed that Russian foreign policy decision-makers seek to integrate with the CIS as a response to the perceived threat posed by NATO expansion. There are a number of implications in confirming this hypothesis. One important implication is that Russia is increasingly taking a negative stance toward the West, and NATO in particular. This could have severe implications for the stability and security in Europe. As evidenced by recent developments in Yugoslavia, it will be increasingly difficult for Russia to work constructively with other great powers in Europe to ensure peace in the region.

A second implication is that Russia is attempting to play a greater role in the CIS region. This could mean that ultra-Nationalists in Russia are attempting to revive the Soviet Union. It would be impossible to do this, however, given Russia's economic deterioration and the desire on the part of CIS countries to avoid Russian re-domination. At the same time, it gives cause for concern as to the extent to which Russia has leverage over the CIS states politically, economically, and in terms of security.

A third implication is that there should be concern of how efficiently and effectively (and indeed, whether at all) the CIS countries other than Russia can

successfully complete their transitions to democracy and a free market given Russia's dominance over them. If Russia continues to use its various tools of leverage (e.g. political and in terms of energy resources) there can be serious negative consequences for the achievement of economic and political independence in the CIS countries. This is particularly true for the Central Asian states that seem to be having a more difficult time with the transition.

Suggestions for Further Research

One suggestion for further research might deal with the extent to which CIS countries desire integration with Russia in order to develop economically and politically. Examining each CIS country separately would achieve this. Then, one could determine their particular needs in terms of transition, and examine whether and how Russia can fulfil those needs. This would highlight the requirements of each CIS country in relation to Russia's attempts at CIS integration.

A second suggestion for further research may be an exploration of the extent to which CIS states can make the transition to democracy and a free market without the aid or involvement of Russia. This would involve examining the extent to which each CIS country has reached benchmarks in the transition where Russia has not been involved in any manner. It would be necessary to research this over a period of time to determine whether the CIS country could make the transition without Russia, and whether it could seek out new relationships with other states to secure resources that Russia currently provides them with. This

would reveal the extent to which CIS countries are dependent upon Russia for their transition.

A third recommendation for further research is an examination of the relationship Russia has with NATO now that expansion has occurred and the NATO-Russia Founding Act has been signed. It would be interesting to find out the extent to which the NATO-Russia Founding Act has resulted in increased consultations between Russia and NATO regarding security issues, and whether NATO regards Russia's concerns about security in Europe valid or mere rhetoric. This would be achieved by investigating the various factors that influence NATO's decision-making processes.

A final suggestion for further research may involve exploring the extent to which Russia has attempted to work out new strategic alliances with countries other than those of the CIS as a response to the perceived threat posed by NATO expansion. For instance, one could examine Russia's relationships with China, India, and the Middle East and investigate whether these relationships have intensified as a result of Russia's dissatisfaction with the development of NATO expansion. This would allow one to examine the direction of Russian foreign policy in a broader sense.

APPENDIX: RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING MODEL

Presidential Apparatus

Government

Legislature

State Duma Committees:

Subcommittees:

Federation Council Committees:

Legend:

- Direct lines of influence / accountability
- - - Indirect lines of influence

Source:

Neil Malcolm, et al. *Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy*, Oxford University Press, 1996, p.108.

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