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**MILITARY CULTURE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION:
A CASE STUDY OF THE RWANDAN DEFENCE FORCES**

by

Robin Camken

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

Masters of Political Science

Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada

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ABSTRACT

When the army was formed in 1960, military culture in Rwanda was corrupted by colonial policy, ethnic bias, and elitism. Under the First and Second Republics, the military was moulded on an ideology of regionalism, racism, and hostility towards the Tutsi population. After the Genocide in 1994, the Rwandan government introduced a deliberate program to create a new national army by promoting an inclusive ideology, advancing professionalism, and improving civil-military relations. The goal was to make the military an institution that decreased ethnic tensions and built public confidence. This study examined the evolution of military culture in the Rwandan army from the colonial period to the present. The research found that military culture can be changed to reduce conflict, increase security, and contribute to conflict resolution.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ALIR	<i>L'Armée de Libération du Rwanda</i>
CSS	Credit and Savings Scheme
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ex-FAR/I	former <i>Forces Armées Rwandaises</i> and <i>Interahamwe</i>
FAR	<i>Forces Armées Rwandaises</i>
FDLR	<i>Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda</i>
FPC	<i>Force Publique Congolais</i>
GNR	<i>Garde Nationale du Rwanda</i>
GTR	<i>Garde Territoriale du Rwanda</i>
MRND	<i>Mouvement Révolutionnaire Nationale pour le Développement</i>
NRA	National Resistance Army
NURC	National Unity and Reconciliation Commission
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PARMEHUTU	<i>Parti du Mouvement et d'Emancipation Hutu</i>
RANU	Rwandan Alliance for National Unity
RDF	Rwanda Defence Force
RDRC	Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission.
RPA	Rwandan Patriotic Army
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
UN	United Nations
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda
VVTC	Veteran Vocational Training Centre

GLOSSARY

<i>Akazu</i>	Kinyarwandan for “little house”, name given to Habyarimana’s inner circle
<i>Amatorero</i>	Kinyarwandan for military school
<i>Bega</i>	name of one of the ruling clans of Rwanda
<i>Genocidiaries</i>	people responsible for carrying out the genocide
<i>Ingabo</i>	Kinyarwandan for battalion or army
<i>Ingando</i>	Kinyarwandan for military camp, name now used for solidarity camps
<i>Interahamwe</i>	Kinyarwandan for “those who attack/fight together”, name of the Hutu militia involved in the genocide
<i>Intore</i>	Kinyarwandan for “chosen ones”, also the name for male Rwandan dancers in a troupe that performs the traditional Rwandan warrior’s dance
<i>Itorero</i>	Kinyarwandan for regiment
<i>Inyenzi</i>	Tutsi insurgents from 1962-1972, means cockroach in Kinyarwandan
<i>Kiga</i>	name given to Hutus from northern Rwanda
<i>Mwami</i>	Kinyarwandan for king
<i>Nyiginya</i>	name of one of the ruling clans of Rwanda




Figure 1. Map of Rwanda by Linda Turenne with permission 02-01-05

INTRODUCTION

What a society gets in its armed service is exactly what it asks for, no more and no less. What it asks for tends to be a reflection of what it is. When a country looks at its fighting forces, it is looking in a mirror; the mirror is a true one and the face that it sees will be its own.

Hackett, *The Profession of Arms*¹

Domestic, regional, and international organizations are in the process of developing and implementing programs to assist with conflict resolution and democratic transition in several countries in Africa. Experts in conflict resolution have recognized the importance of security sector reform in peace building. As part of the peace process following an intra-state conflict, members of the opposing forces are usually merged into a new national army under the terms of a power sharing agreement. Failure to manage properly the reform of security forces during the transition period can provoke a return to hostilities.² Rwanda in 1994 presents the extreme example of the costs that may be associated with a determined effort to oppose security sector reforms. Negotiators at the time did not appreciate the significance of the military terms of the Arusha accords for hardliners in the army. The powersharing arrangement threatened the extremists' control over the military and became one of the factors that provoked the genocide.³

A lesson learned from the Rwandan experience is that military elites play a major role in conflict and conflict resolution, and their interests cannot be ignored. As “managers of violence”, military officers must support programs related to security policy, disarmament, demobilization and repatriation of former combatants, and security force restructuring in order to guarantee their success. However, the role that the armed forces can play in national reconciliation is often overlooked or marginalized as militaries

are usually viewed as the problem rather than part of the solution.⁴

The next three sections present a summary of the review of the literature on African militaries, causes of intra-state conflict, conflict resolution, and military culture.

The Study of Militaries in Africa

Almost all analysis of African militaries has been devoted to the role they played in coups or the performance of military regimes in development.⁵ This is not surprising given the high percentage of countries in Africa whose armies have interfered directly in the political system. For example between 1966 and 1993 sixty-three African governments were overthrown by military coups.⁶ Research by Thomas Johnson, Robert Slater, and Pat McGowan revealed that organizational factors can influence the probability of a military intervention taking place. These factors can be grouped under two categories: the role of the military in society, and the degree of cohesion amongst the members of the institution. When the military's purpose and values are not clearly separated from those of civilian institutions, and its primary role is not external security, the probability of military intervention increases. The probability further increases if the military is funded disproportionately compared to other institutions. If the military leadership is culturally or ethnically uniform, but different from that of the ruling elite, there is an increased risk of a coup taking place. If action is taken to increase the ethnic balance within the military--particularly within the officer corps--the likelihood of the military attempting to seize power may be reduced.⁷

While military elites may be responsible for the decision to launch a coup, the use of military force against one's own population is most often the decision of the civilian government. Many African armies that were formed during the colonial period were designed as instruments for maintaining political power. Colonial rule was based on a monopoly of force, and the precedence for the military in politics in Africa had already been established prior to independence. Military leaders often saw themselves as "the guarantors of political stability and national integrity."⁸ In many cases following independence, the power of civilian governments could only be guaranteed with the approval of the military elite.⁹ The military, as a result, became part of the political system in Africa--in very few cases was the military apolitical. Stability of the government was dependent on support from the military.¹⁰ How to disengage the military from politics in Africa is a significant challenge that must be met by governments undergoing democratization. However, no agreement has been reached on the best actions to take to reduce the military's involvement in politics, while maintaining stability and security within the state.¹¹

Classic civil-military relations theory was written in the context of a civilian government maintaining control over the military. Research in this field has focused on the military in a democratic state.¹² This theory has little application to a situation where the military is the government or the government is in transition and still heavily influenced by the military elite. Scholars such as Robin Hay, Gilbert Khadiagala, and Rocklyn Williams have identified that most concepts and theories on military culture and civil-military relations are Eurocentric in nature and not always applicable to post-

conflict reconstruction in Africa.¹³ For example, the requirement to depoliticizing the military, which is central to western civil-military relations theory, cannot be easily implemented following a civil war where the only functioning institution within the state may be the armed forces. Removing the mission of internal security from the military's mandate is not possible when there is no civilian police force in place. The goals of military reform must be realistic and tailored to fit the context of the country undergoing democratization.¹⁴

Conflict and Conflict Resolution

A review of the literature on intra-state conflict completed by Michael Brown showed that factors which increased a country's risk for internal conflict could be grouped into four categories: structural, political, economic/social, and cultural/perceptual factors. Structural factors include weak states, internal security issues, and certain types of ethnic demographics. Political institution that discriminate against specific ethnic groups, nationalist ideologies which exclude part of the population, inter-group dynamics that are highly confrontational, and elite politics that enflames existing tensions are political factors which predisposed a state towards internal conflict. Economic and social factors which lead to internal conflict include deterioration in the country's economic situation, discrimination in government distribution of resources and employment opportunities, and challenges related to modernization and uneven development. The potential for internal conflict is also increased if the government discriminates against minority groups in the area of language, religious and education rights, and an ethnic mythology is promoted that is hostile toward any group

within the state. While the literature is strong in its analysis of factors that can increase the potential for conflict, Brown argues that little attention has been paid to the role of elites in triggering violence.¹⁵ Although various conditions may create situations which elevate the risk of conflict, political and military elites in Africa play a major role in directing the population toward reconciliation or hostilities.

Analysis of conflict must take into account the effects that a country's history plays on the attitudes and behaviours of the parties involved. An understanding of history provides insight into the current state of relations and the nature of the conflict between groups.¹⁶ The end of hostilities may only be temporary unless the root causes of conflict are identified, understood and addressed.¹⁷ Intra-state violence is not an isolated event, but evolves as a result of dysfunctional relationships, processes and structures. When a nation is recovering from the affects of a civil war, real or perceived threats to security continue to evoke fear, animosity and suspicion between parties.¹⁸ David Lake and Donald Rothchild argue in a 1996 article on the management of ethnic conflict that collective fear of the future is most often the cause of extreme inter-group conflict. Emotions and memories of repression and violence are often exploited by ethnic entrepreneurs to increase fears and divide the society for political purposes. The government needs to work constantly to reassure groups that their physical security is guaranteed and their rights will be protected.¹⁹

As part of the process of confidence-building and conflict management, strong stereotypes of ethnic differences and perceived inferiority must be overcome. Trust is

essential for workable relationships to develop between former adversaries. Reconciliation involves repairing or building of trust between the parties.²⁰ When democratization is viewed as a ‘winner-take-all’ or “majority rules” process, it creates severe anxiety in minority groups as their wealth, status, freedom, or even their lives may be perceived to be in danger.²¹ Demonstrating that exclusionary practises of the past will not be tolerated is key in eliminating fear and building trust. More study is needed of successful confidence building measures used by African countries following ethnic and religious conflict.²²

The foundation of good governance following an ethnic conflict includes building confidence and mending bridges, focusing on inclusion rather than marginalization, and sharing power rather than monopolizing control of the government institutions.²³ Clear reforms within the armed forces can play a critical role in demonstrating the commitment of the new government to conflict resolution. In situations where the military has been a major perpetrator of violence against the civilian population or has been used to support the supremacy of one group, re-establishing public trust in the military institution will be a challenge. Ensuring that no one ethnic group controls or dominates the military will reduce fears of the armed forces being used as a political tool.²⁴ The literature on democratization in Africa has downplayed or discounted the military’s contribution to the transition to democracy. Military power can be used to promote, rather than undermine, democratic transition. A study by Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle published in 1997 showed that military support for democracy makes a critical difference in the success of transitional governments in Africa.²⁵ Whether or not a military supports the

democratic transition will depend on its attitudes towards the new leaders and the role it sees for itself under the new system. A shift in military culture may be necessary for a smooth transition to occur. The following section explains the importance of military culture for the acceptance of new roles and advancing the integration process.

Military Culture

The culture of an organization is shaped through the sharing of history and “important intense experiences.” In the case of the armed forces, the history of battles and recent combat experience play an important part in the development of military culture.²⁶ History and experience establish institutional norms that determine what an organization is and how it behaves. The cultural norms of a military institution will influence the structure of the organization, what tactics and strategy it employs, how personnel are trained, what is deemed as acceptable behaviour, and the military’s relationship with the rest of society.²⁷

When armies are formed, they reflect the ideology of the society that created them.²⁸ Militaries are established to protect society from its enemies. The state determines who its enemies are, but the military will normally determine how to respond to the threat.²⁹ Under an authoritarian government the military’s role is often primarily one of internal security and guaranteeing loyalty to the regime. When part of the population is identified as a threat to the state, a military culture develops that condones violence against civilians.³⁰ In these situations, civilians are seen as legitimate targets of internal security operations because they are associated with--or support opposition to--

the ruling party. A major challenge following a civil war or transition from military rule is the need for the military to regain the confidence of the civilian population. A significant shift in force structure, military training, education, and ideology is needed to transform soldiers from being a group that is menace to part of the society into one that protects all citizens.³¹ Cultivating a positive military culture is a key element in making this transformation.

Military culture is built on the ideology, attitudes, discipline, loyalty, duty, principles, values and customs that are shared within the military institution.³² For the soldier, military culture defines his role in society, and how he should conduct himself, both on and off the battlefield.³³ Military culture is affected by history, geography, leadership, beliefs, training, and experience.³⁴ How soldiers are viewed and treated by their country will have a strong influence on their culture. Factors which can influence the population's perception of their military forces include: outward appearance and deportment of soldiers, the ability of the force to provide security for civilians, how internal security operations are conducted, the degree to which the soldiers are integrated within the society, and whether or not the military is seen as representing/protecting all citizens and not just a special group or interests.³⁵

If the current military culture views a certain group as hostile or unsuitable for military service, the integration of members of previously excluded groups at the unit level can eliminate bias and increase the acceptance of individuals through the building of unit cohesion. Bonding and trust between members of a military unit have been shown

to be essential for effective performance in a combat environment. Military training focuses on shifting identity from the individual to the group, as such, ethnic, gender, and racial identities become subordinate to the military identity of being a soldier.³⁶ Over time, as members of various groups prove their value to a unit, the military culture which previously rejected them will be changed. As John Hillen wrote “change is characteristic of military culture because of the many influences that constantly affect the values, behaviour, and beliefs that together define it.”³⁷ Socialization within the military can overcome previously learned attitudes and values. The military as an institution tells its soldiers how to behave; the leadership dictates what is and is not acceptable. Change is possible, but only if the leadership supports it.³⁸ Furthermore, a significant effort must be devoted to changing military culture of the former forces, if amalgamation, reform and cooperation are to be achieved between previously warring parties.³⁹ Military culture is the glue that binds the organization together. It defines the soldier’s identity, role, and expectations. Without a strong and common culture amongst the troops, the military will not be effective.⁴⁰

Gaps in the Literature

As indicated in the review of the literature conducted by the author as described above, little academic research has been devoted to examining the role that a military can play in conflict resolution or to understanding how military culture can impede or enhance the implementation of a peace process.⁴¹ Nowhere in the literature are there guidelines on how to establish positive civil-military relations following an intra-state war or military coup.⁴² Anja Miller commented in her paper on the integration of armed

forces following civil war, how surprising it is that very little scholarship has been devoted to the study of military mergers considering the importance of the issue to the peace process.⁴³ Almost nothing has been written on a country's successful integration of armed forces following ethnic conflict. Very few studies have examined how military culture can influence national reconciliation and conflict management in Africa. The positive role an African military can play in peace building has virtually been ignored in academic research.

Research Questions

To help address the gaps in the literature identified above, this thesis will examine the following research questions:

- How does a damaged military culture contribute to or increase intra-state conflict?
- Can military culture be changed in order to reduce conflict or promote conflict resolution? If yes, how?

Hypotheses

This study will test the following hypotheses:

1. Exclusionary national ideology, discriminatory recruiting practises, and the army's misuse in an internal security role to suppress or kill members of the local population may corrupt military culture. These factors may produce a military that is politically biased, racist, and a threat to its own people.

2. Military culture may be changed to reduce conflict, increase security, and contribute to conflict resolution. The military may become an institution that lessens ethnic tensions and builds confidence in the democratic process. Military culture may be transformed by introducing programs that make the military representative of the population, increase professionalism, improve civil-military relations, ensure a proper mandate and mission are assigned, make the forces non-partisan, and promote a non-racist ideology and a respect for human rights.

Analysis of the evolution of military culture in Rwanda will be used to test these hypotheses.

Why Rwanda as a Case Study?

Since November 1959, ethnic conflict in Rwanda has caused the deaths of more than a million people,⁴⁴ and has forced hundreds of thousands of Rwandan citizens to live as refugees for decades in neighbouring countries. The majority of bloodshed has resulted from direct and indirect attacks by government-controlled armed forces on the civilian population. While obviously the most extreme level of violence occurred during the genocide, the crisis in Rwanda did not start or end in 1994. For more than 45 years, instability in Rwanda has fluctuated between low and high intensity conflict and varied in nature from protracted social conflict and insurgency to revolutionary and civil war.*

* Low intensity conflict being 100-1000 death per year and <5% of the population displaced, high intensity conflict more than 1000 death per year and/or >5% of the population displaced. Definition from Stanley Samarasinghe, Brian Donaldson, and Colleen McGinn, *Conflict Vulnerability Analysis: Issues, Tools & Responses* (USAID Africa Bureau, 2001); available from <http://www.certi.org/publications/Manuals/CVA.htm> [September 12, 2004].

Resolving the conflict in Rwanda will contribute to stabilization of the Great Lakes Region in general.

A comprehensive review of research on Rwanda was completed by Timothy Longman and published in 2004. Longman highlights the lack of studies that have been done on military forces prior to, during or following the genocide. While it is generally agreed that the armed forces played a significant role, little analysis has been conducted on military organizations.⁴⁵ A comparative study of the conflict between the Rwandan Patriotic Army and the *Forces Armées Rwandaises* offers several unique factors. Rwanda is the only country in Africa where an insurgent army has defeated the government forces, and then the former-government forces continued to fight the new regime, but now as a rebel force. The role of the two forces was completely reversed; no one has examined how this affected the way they conducted operations or altered their ideology after they adopted the opposite position in the conflict. Both armies took power by force: one by a military coup, the other through a successful rebellion; did the resulting military regimes differ, if so why? How were these two armies integrated, while their forces continued to fight each other? By examining the military culture and evolution of the two forces within the same country, under similar circumstance, an answer to why one led to committing genocide and the other to becoming one of the most capable armed forces on the continent may be revealed. Finally, the Rwandan government has successfully used the military as a vehicle to promote national unity and reconciliation in a post-genocide environment which may provide an example that can be used by other states faced with similar challenges.

Methodology

A qualitative case study research method was used to compare the military culture of the opposing forces in the Rwandan Civil War. A lot of time was devoted to researching the military and ethnic history of Rwanda because of the importance it played in the evolution of military culture. Due to time and cost restrictions, secondary sources were used to assess the factors that contributed to the development of military culture in the *Forces Armées Rwandaises* (FAR) and the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA). Data was derived from relevant journal articles, news reports, official publications from government agencies and non-governmental organizations.




Figure 2. Elements of Military Culture

Analysis of military culture in Rwanda was based on the various elements that are known to contribute to military culture as illustrated in Figure 2 above and described earlier on pages 7 and 8 of this text. Morris Janowitz observed in 1977 that academics who were in a position to observe military culture in developing nations chose not to write on the subject.⁴⁶ As military culture is not something normally documented in writing, its nature must be deduced from studying military history, observing the army's recent actions and conduct, as well as reviewing records of doctrine, training, ideology, and mandate. Ideally the actual military documents would be used to obtain the necessary data, but these items are often classified and not available to the general public.

To determine how the military culture of the new Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF) was formed, I used several primary sources including interviews with three former and eight current Rwandan government and military personnel who have direct knowledge and experience related to military process, training and procedures. Individuals interviewed were assured that their identities would remain anonymous. I conducted a series of in-person research interviews using the general interview guide approach. A letter of introduction requesting an interview and an informed consent form were sent out in advance; these documents explained the purpose and nature of the research, and supplied an outline of the issues to be covered (see Appendix F). During the course of the interview, I adjusted the specific content, sequence and wording of questions to fit the individual expertise of the participant.⁴⁷ This provided a flexible, informal approach that enabled me to investigate additional related subjects that arose

during questioning. As a result, interview times varied between 45 minutes and four hours--with the majority being 1 hour in length. All interviews took place in a relaxed, private environment, either at the hotel where I was staying in Kigali or at the interviewee's office. In addition to the Rwandan officials interviewed, I had informal discussions with five foreign Defence Attachés to obtain a non-government point of view.

Other primary sources used included the current Constitution of Rwanda, Rwandan law related to the military, and relevant reports from United Nations Missions in Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Various secondary sources were also used including: relevant newspaper and journal articles, and published and unpublished academic papers. This study is limited to an examination of military operations in Rwanda and will not extend to the war in the DRC, other than to references related to conflict between the RPA and the former-Rwandan Government Forces--now known as the *Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda* (FDLR).

Chapter Overview

This study is divided into five chapters with the following content:

Chapter One reviews the history of the Rwandan military from the pre-colonial period to independence. It describes the military culture of the Rwandan army prior to colonial intervention and explains how the national military was undermined and dismantled by the colonial government. This chapter also details the evolution of ethnic

relations and conflict through the colonial period. It explains how the colonial powers manipulated ethnicity and political/military structures in Rwanda. The traditional military was dissolved and the foundation set for the development of a distorted military culture based on foreign interests and racist ideology.

Chapter Two describes the rise and fall of the *Forces Armées Rwandaises* (FAR) which responds directly to the first research question of this thesis and supports the hypothesis that a corrupted military culture can produce a military that is a threat to its own nation. The FAR was formed on the basis of regional and ethnic exclusiveness and developed an officer corps that was dominated by Hutu extremist. This produced an army that took over the government in a successful military coup and later organized and perpetrated the genocide.

Chapter Three outlines how military culture evolved in the Rwandan Patriotic Army and was linked to the Tutsi refugee experience in Uganda's National Resistance Army (NRA). It describes how a crisis of legitimacy evolved for the RPA following the genocide which led to the leadership's decision to create a new military that would reduce ethnic tensions and facilitate national reconciliation.

Chapter Four contributes to the primary objective of the thesis by presenting the steps taken by the Post-Genocide Rwandan government to transform the Rwandan Patriotic Army into the Rwanda Defence Force and to use it as a vehicle for conflict resolution. The chapter describes a number of programs implemented by the government

in creating a military that was professional, disciplined, inclusive and respected by the population. It outlines how members of the RPA and the FAR were integrated successfully. A new military culture was fostered and inspired using the example of the positive role played by the army in pre-colonial Rwandan in society.

Chapter Five presents some concluding comments on the current status of the Rwandan government and military's progress in advancing national reconciliation and highlights a number of challenges it continues to face.

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CHAPTER 1

The Rwandan Army during the Pre-Colonial and Colonial Periods

Children of Rwanda, Be Prepared for Battle
Let us all swear together...
Oh Rwanda our mother,
We shall die for you,
I swear total devotion to you.
- *The defender-warriors of Rwanda* *

This chapter begins by providing an overview of the formation of ethnic identities in Rwanda. Without having an appreciation of ethnic history, the dynamics of conflict and military formation in Rwanda cannot be fully understood. The country's military and ethnic history were key factors in the formation of Rwandan military culture. The characteristics of the pre-colonial Rwandan military are described and an interpretation of traditional military culture is discussed. Analysis of the nature of this pre-colonial institution is important as it influenced the ideological formation of future Rwandan armed forces. The chapter concludes by examining the effects that colonialism had on both political and military evolution in Rwandan society. This chapter establishes the baseline for the analysis of military culture for both the *Forces Armées Rwandaises* and the Rwandan Patriotic Front which will be used to answer the research questions and test the hypotheses identified in the introduction to this thesis.

* Tract from a poem written by Tutsi leader Gratién Sendanyoye in 1959 based on the pre-colonial warrior tradition and oath to the *Mwami* taken prior to battle as described in Warren Weinstein, "Military Continuities in the Rwanda State," in *The Warrior Tradition in Modern Africa*, ed. Ali A. Amin Mazrui (The Netherlands: E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1977).

Ethnic History

Military history and conflict in Rwanda is closely linked to the evolution of the relationship between the country's three ethnic groups--the Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa. Prior to the arrival of European explorers and missionaries, there was no written record of Rwandan society. Much of what was written by European observers was influenced by their cultural and racial biases. Reliable information on Rwandan society prior to the latter half of the 19th Century is limited.¹ Mahmood Mamdani discovered while conducting research on Rwanda that "the further back one went, the mistier the historical background" became.² Official Rwandan pre-colonial oral history was maintained by the poets of the royal court. In 1943, Alexis Kagame, a Rwandan philosopher, clergyman, and descendant of earlier royal court historians, published the first of many books of ancient Rwandan poems and myths based on oral history. According to David and Catharine Newbury, "Kagame was the single most influential actor in consolidating court historiography—and in turning court history into Rwandan history."³ Narratives on the pre-colonial historical relationship between ethnic groups in Rwanda have been the subject of much debate; a consensus amongst specialists on Central Africa has not been reached.⁴ Reports vary depending on whose version of events is being depicted. Hutu and Tutsi have disagreed profoundly on the relationship that existed between their two groups in pre-colonial times, and neither one has had difficulty finding authorities to back up their account of the past.⁵

One thing appears to be universally accepted that is--in the territory that became known as Rwanda--the population was comprised of three social groups. The majority

were farmers who co-existed with two minority groups: foragers and herders. The name given to the foragers was 'Twa'. The designation of Twa was assigned to the pygmoid group of forest-dwellers who survived by hunting and gathering, and also to a number of small communities of potters. The cattle-rearing pastoralists were identified in Central Africa as Hima, and the elite within this group were called Tutsi. Eventually the term Hima was dropped in Rwanda, and all herders were referred to as Tutsi, even if they were commoners.⁶ The term 'Hutu' had a number of meanings at different times, including servant, foreigner, and non-combatant, but by the mid-1800s, Hutu had become synonymous with the identity of farmer or agriculturist.⁷ The terminology of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa to designate social groups was in place in Rwanda prior to the arrival of Europeans to the region.⁸

Formation of the State

The Hutu, Tutsi and Twa lived within the same territorial boundaries in what became a number of small statelets headed by a king, chief or prince. The leaders at the top of the political structure were either Hutu or Tutsi, which group was in control depended on the community, location, and timeframe studied.⁹ Clan and family affiliation was more important for political status than the distinction between Hutu and Tutsi.¹⁰ Clans were not based solely on ancestry or lineage, but on alliances that varied over time.¹¹ Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa were members of the same clan.¹² In the 1700s, the Nyiginya clan--led by a Tutsi king (*mwami*) Cyilima II Rujugira[†]--began to amalgamate other statelets into its territory; this was accomplished through a combination of

[†] See Appendix E for a list of Rwandan kings from 1744 AD to independence.

organizational skills and military force. Over a period of several hundred years, the Nyiginya became the dominant clan in Rwanda.¹³ Much of the oral history maintained by the Rwandan royal court is an interpretation presented by the ruling clan which celebrates “the triumphs and glory of the Nyiginya dynasty”.¹⁴

Just prior to the arrival of the Europeans, *Mwami* Kigeri IV Rwabugiri of the Nyiginya clan led a series of military campaigns through which he incorporated all of what is now southern and central Rwanda into his kingdom. The degree of penetration of the central court’s authority varied across the territory that is now recognized as the country of Rwanda, with some communities, in the north and northwest in particular, maintaining political autonomy from the central state well into the colonial period.¹⁵

Under Rwabugiri’s reign the distinction between Hutu and Tutsi began to harden. In order to consolidate his power, Rwabugiri replaced previous rulers of the territory he conquered with his own officials and created a multilayered hierarchy of chiefs, sub-chiefs, and sub-sub-chiefs. Tutsis were placed in charge of the army and most other institutions. Although the highest echelons were filled by Tutsi, lower-level leadership positions were held by Hutu, and Twa. The Tutsi minority became the dominant group in this society, but did not completely monopolize power at all levels.¹⁶

Pre-colonial Rwandan Army

The army in the pre-colonial period was an integral part of the political and administrative structures of Rwandan society. The *mwami* was at the top of the political

hierarchy. Below the *mwami*, the country was divided into provinces and then districts. Administration of the province was conducted by a High/Great Chief or Army Commander; these positions were always filled by Tutsis. Each district was administered by a system of three chiefs, also appointed by the *mwami*. The chief in charge of the land, “the Soil Chief” (almost exclusively Hutu) was responsible for managing landholdings and agriculture production. The chief in charge of pastures, “the Cattle Chief” (always a Tutsi) was responsible for managing grazing land and livestock. Both of these chiefs were responsible for collecting tributes (taxes in the form of agricultural goods and/or cattle) for the *mwami*, the Soil Chief in the form of produce and the Cattle Chief in the form of stock. At the same level of authority as the Cattle and Soil Chiefs was the chief of men, “the Army Chief” (almost exclusively Tutsi). The Army Chief was responsible for organizing and recruiting soldiers, defending territory, and leading cattle raids against other kingdoms. Districts were divided into Hills which were the basic administrative unit. The *mwami* also appointed the “Hill Chief” who could be Hutu, Tutsi or Twa.¹⁷

Legends of military tradition in Rwanda date back to the 11th century and the militia of Gihanga, who according to royal mythology was the first king of Rwanda and the country’s founder.¹⁸ The *mwami*’s power was reinforced by the strength of his royal guard. The guard consisted of professional soldiers, who were selected from families within the *mwami*’s kin group, then educated at the royal court.¹⁹ Each *mwami* in succession incorporated lessons learned from battle to enhance the combat skills of his warriors.

During the 16th century, study and practise in the military arts became a priority for the Rwandan aristocracy. Jan Vansina accredits the formation of the first formalized Rwandan army to *Mwami* Ruganzu II Ndori (c. 17th century). Prior to Ndori, local commanders selected soldiers to act as military guards, but there was no central organization or structure. Under Ndori's system new units were formed by recruiting young men who were then trained by experienced warriors, and all forces came under a unified command in times of war. *Mwami* Yuhi III Mazimpaka (c.17th-18th century) introduced a system of conscription under which entire lineages were trained and assigned to the royal army. With Maimpaka, the army became hereditary and permanent. Sons of soldiers became warriors in the same units as their fathers.²⁰ Young men were educated in military schools (*amatorero*), where morale was built and bonding occurred between the recruits. Lessons on military tactics were taught and reinforced with stories of heroic acts conducted by their fathers and grandfathers. Pride and respect for military tradition was passed on through the generations. In addition, the ideals and values of the Rwandan society were instilled through the military school system. Culture and history were taught using a tradition of poetry, dance and songs. The now famous *Intore* (the chosen ones) dance associated with Rwandan folklore and culture was a regimental dance that a warrior mastered as part of his military discipline and training.²¹

The pre-colonial Rwandan army had three primary missions: defence of the kingdom from external threats, expansion of territory through conquest, and rustling cattle to augment the royal herd.²² As the number of units within the army multiplied,

specialization of functions began to evolve. Members of the army became identified with a specific trade or speciality that included: warriors, foragers, herders, rustlers, farmers, and weapons bearers.²³ This division of labour is similar to what we see today in the combat arms, combat support, and support classifications of modern military occupations. Improvements to command, structure, composition and planning continued to be made until the Rwandan army developed into a formidable force that was able to expand the empire through military conquest and annexation of neighbouring lands.

As a means of holding territory and protecting it from external attack *Mwami* Rujugira (c. 18th century) introduced a new military strategy. In addition to increasing the size and number of battalions (*Ingabo*) under his command, the king established permanent camps of soldiers in strategic locations and deployed fighting patrols along the frontier. Military commanders were appointed as the administrators of communities located in border areas of the kingdom, creating a form of martial law to ensure stability in the tenuous outlying areas of the realm.²⁴ As a result of the requirement to occupy new territory, many soldiers now lived outside the central kingdom for long periods of time. Military units from various areas were deployed to the camps established near the borders. Soldiers and their families from different locations lived together for long periods of time; in this way, the army served to integrate people from different regions.²⁵

Eventually, the army as an institution became the foundation and structure used to manage and organise the society. The army's logistical link with the system that managed herds, controlled pastures, produced food and collected tributes made it a

natural vehicle for government administration. In the pre-colonial society, every Rwandan was organized within a military structure in the following order: family (*urugo*), lineage (*inzu*), clan (*ubwoko*), regiment (*itorero*) and battalion/army (*ingabo*). Traditional education through the *amatoreo* (military schools) had another unifying influence on the society by creating a common culture and language. The military system promoted a warrior's values which emphasised strength, integrity, courage, patriotism and loyalty.²⁶

While warriors were originally drawn exclusively from Tutsi families of the nobility, once the army began to expand, soldiers were recruited from all of the three social/ethnic groups. Hutus initially served in the army only in an administrative role as herders or porters. However, Twa soldiers were employed as the king's personal guard and used as shock troops in battle. The army of *Mwami* Kigeri IV Rwabugiri at the end of the 19th century had Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa soldiers.²⁷ Military units from different regions became specialized in the type of warfare skills associated with fighting in the terrain where they lived, i.e., mountain, plains, or forest combat.²⁸ The more the non-Tutsi groups were used as fighters in battle, the less they were restricted to employment in non-combatant roles. On the battlefield, all soldiers were Rwandans first, fighting for their king and country.²⁹ Philip Gourevitch quotes the following observations of Rwanda made by missionaries Monsignor de Lacger and Father Pages:

The natives of this country genuinely have the feeling of forming but one people... the unity created by loyalty to the monarchy--I would kill for my *Mwami*" was a popular chant--...The ferocity of this patriotism is exalted to the point of chauvinism,... Rwandans were persuaded before the European penetration that their country was the center of the world,

that this was the largest, most powerful, and most civilized kingdom on earth.³⁰

Military Culture in the Pre-colonial Army

Soldiers in the pre-colonial army were highly regarded and valued within the society as a whole. Military expeditions were the vehicle through which the state was expanded and enriched. Warriors were viewed as strong, courageous, honourable, fierce, loyal and proud. The military was considered one of the principal institutions in Rwanda and membership in the royal guard carried considerable status. Soldiers were professionals, and were specifically selected and trained for their role as defenders of the nation. The army was a centralizing agency that united the sons of chiefs from across the realm in preparation for battle. Heroic myths, songs, rituals, and dances were used to instil the values of courage, integrity, patriotism, solidarity, and camaraderie. The military was inclusive and employed members from all regions and ethnic groups. The traditional army saw itself as the leader, educator, and protector of the people. In Kinyarwanda, the military was described as *Ingabo z' u Rwanda*--the shield of the nation.³¹

Colonial Influence on Ethnic Identity

As outlined earlier in this chapter, a political and economic system which favoured the Tutsi-minority over the Hutu-majority was already in place when the colonial powers arrived, but specific actions taken first by the Germans and later by the Belgians would greatly accentuate ethnic inequality and hatred in the Rwandan state.³² When the colonial scramble for Africa occurred, Rwanda and Burundi were allotted to

Germany at the 1885 Berlin Conference. Germany administered Rwanda and Burundi as one unit--then known as Ruanda-Urundi--from Dar-es-Salaam as part of German East Africa. On finding a well functioning indigenous system, the Germans chose to adopt a policy of indirect rule in governing this territory. The Tutsi monarchy developed a working relationship with the German occupying forces and used their presence to its own advantage.³³

The death of *Mwami* Rwabugiri in 1895 led to a violent competition over succession between the Nyiginya clan and Bega clan, which became known as “the Coup of Rucunshu”. One of Rwabugiri's wives, Kanjogera, plotted to overthrow the heir to the throne, Rutarindwa, who had been chosen by the king to be his successor. After a number of battles, the Bega emerged victorious; Rutarindwa and his supporters were killed. Kanjogera then proclaimed her own young son, Musinga Yuhi V, to be the new *mwami*. The Queen Mother was able to exercise significant influence over the court. Recognizing the benefit of collaborating with the German forces for additional military advantage over their enemies--both internal and external--Musinga's family negotiated an arrangement with the colonial authorities. With the assistance of the German army, the Rwandan royal court was able to expand its territory and consolidate control across the kingdom. In the north, where several Hutu kings had operated with considerable autonomy, earlier attempts by the court to impose the Tutsi king's authority had been strongly opposed. When the Tutsi nobles attempted to impose a land tax/rent in northern Rwanda in 1912, the Hutus revolted. The rebellion was violently suppressed by a combined German and Tutsi-led force of soldiers from southern Rwanda. The defeat of

the Hutu kings, and the resulting imposition of Tutsi political control, fuelled fierce resentment toward the court and Tutsis in general, which later was fostered by northern politicians into an extremist form of Hutu nationalism.³⁴

During World War I, the Allied forces of Europe captured German East Africa. In 1922, the League of Nations awarded Belgium the mandate for Ruanda-Urundi. After the United Nations was formed, Ruanda-Urundi became a UN Trust Territory with Belgium as the Trustee. Like Germany, Belgium adopted a policy of indirect rule, but went further in reinforcing Tutsi hegemony. The Belgians abolished the hierarchal system of the chiefs; any Hutu or Twa in a position of authority was removed and replaced by a Tutsi administrator. Colonial rule transformed the existing client/patron arrangement-- that was based on a degree of reciprocity--into a coercive system which greatly intensified the demands on the Hutu peasants.[†] Under the threat of losing their land, the Hutu were forced to pay steep taxes and perform manual labour for their Tutsi “overlords” on behalf of the colonial power. When the campaign for independence began, the Hutu opposition was able to portray the Tutsi authorities as equal to the Belgians, and as another foreign group of oppressors that needed to be removed.³⁵

In the period from 1910 to 1940, the White Fathers (Catholic missionaries) promoted the Hamitic hypothesis in Central Africa. The ‘Hamitic hypothesis’ was

[†] What needs to be mentioned at this point is the fact that not all Tutsis were rich or in a position of power. Many Tutsis were peasants and lived under the same depressed socio-economic conditions as the Hutu. Most of the country’s wealth, industry and commerce was owned and controlled by foreigners. However the small local professional class and elite was monopolized by the Tutsi as the colonial powers had intentionally impeded Hutu advancement. For more information see Leo Kuper, "Continuities and Discontinuities in Race Relations: Evolutionary or Revolutionary Change," *Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines* 10, no. 39 (1970), 369-370.

vaguely based on the biblical account of Noah's son Ham in the book of Genesis. John Hanning Speke, a 19th century English explorer, identified two distinct races in Central Africa based on physical characteristics like face shape, nose width, and brow length (also known as race science). He concluded that the Tutsi, with their "fine oval faces, large eyes, and high noses" were lost Christians (descendants of Ham), who must have originated outside Rwanda.³⁶ Speke deduced that the Tutsi were a 'Caucasian tribe' of Ethiopian ancestry and descendants of the biblical King David, therefore, superior to the Negroid Hutu.³⁷ The missionaries' motive in promoting this ideology was to enlist the Tutsi elite in their efforts to convert the population to Christianity.³⁸ Hamitic theory was also used to legitimize the rigid hierarchy that was implemented to administer the colony. In the 1930s, the Belgian authorities instituted the requirement for each member of the population to be registered as Hutu, Tutsi or Twa.³⁹ Identity cards were issued to all citizens; from this point on, ethnic identity became absolute and permanent. The Belgians originally set up the identity card system for census-taking purposes. What was referred to in hindsight as "bureaucratic error" would later be employed as a tool for 'official' discrimination.⁴⁰

The Belgians systematically removed the Hutu from positions of power and excluded them from higher education, which prevented them from obtaining the skills needed for a career in administration. The Tutsi monopoly on positions of authority was thereby guaranteed for several generations. The only Hutu who had access to higher education were those permitted to enter the religious seminaries.⁴¹ Hutus were further alienated by limitations that were placed on education opportunities for Hutu children.

The church openly favoured Tutsi candidates for entry into the Catholic mission schools, which were the dominant education institution during the colonial period.⁴² The special treatment of Tutsi in the school system was intended to ensure that the future elite would “share the values and Christian beliefs of their colonizers.”⁴³ Hamitic ideology was taught in the mission schools and several generations of Hutu and Tutsi children were indoctrinated with this ‘official version’ of Rwandan history.⁴⁴ According to David Newbury, colonialism “fostered not just the emergence of new forms of competition and new ideologies, but also the creation of new forms of oppression and exploitation, as well as intensification of older ones.”⁴⁵

Rwandan Army in the Colonial Period

Due to its mountainous terrain and military resistance to attempts by Europeans and Arab Slave traders to penetrate the country, Rwanda was able to avoid occupation by the colonial powers until the last quarter of the 19th Century.⁴⁶ When Henry Morten Stanley attempted to enter south-eastern Rwanda in 1876, he was driven out by the army.⁴⁷ The first Europeans to enter the country were part of a German expedition led by Count von Gotzen in 1894, nine years after the 1885 Berlin Conference had assigned the territory to Germany without Rwandan consent or acknowledgement. At the same time as the Germans were attempting to establish a presence in Rwanda, the royal clans were involved in the conflict over the succession following the death of *Mwami* Rwabugiri in 1895 as outlined earlier in this chapter. Further complicating the situation, a group of Belgian officers with *Force Publique* soldiers from the Congo Free State, which bordered on Rwanda, set up a military station at the southern end of Lake Kivu. The Congolese

force was armed with guns which easily defeated the local Rwandan army units' attack using spears and arrows to defend its territory. The central court then mobilized several companies of warriors--an estimated 8,000 men--and sent them to confront the intruders. Again the Rwandans found their weapons were no match against the Belgian led force. One of *Mwami* Rutarindwa's best military leaders and hundreds of Rwandan soldiers were killed in the conflict, and the remaining chiefs and their soldiers were forced to retreat. A German officer from Bujumbura, Burundi, intervened shortly after the battle and told the Belgian officers that they were violating German territory; the Congolese force then withdrew from Rwanda. This series of events left the Rwandan king's forces morally and physically weakened. Shortly after this defeat, the battles between the forces of the Nyiginya clan and Bega clan took place at Rucunshu, where *Mwami* Rutarindwa was killed in December 1896.⁴⁸

In March 1897, two months after Queen Kanjogera and the Bega clan had managed to enthrone the young Musinga as *mwami*, a German officer arrived at the court and presented an offer for cooperation between the court and the colonial authorities to manage the country. Having German authority behind Musinga secured his position. With the assistance of the German army, Musinga's forces were able to extend his authority and subdue any opposition or challengers. German indirect rule was thus established through the existing Rwandan power and administrative structures. When World War I began, German authorities formed a regiment of Rwandan soldiers and trained them in the use firearms and other modern military skills. By April 1916, Belgian forces had entered Rwanda and driven the Germans into Tanzania. Some Rwandan

troops retreated with the German army. After the Belgians occupied Rwanda, they too mobilized local men to fight and act as porters for the allied forces.⁴⁹

After WWI ended, the Belgians took responsibility for Rwanda from the Germans under a League of Nations mandate. The new administrators were suspicious of *Mwami* Musinga because of his former allegiance to the German authorities. The Belgians reduced Musinga's powers in 1917 and began to deal directly with the regional chiefs.⁵⁰ As a result, the king's ability to direct and control the chiefs was undermined significantly and his prestige and authority further reduced. In 1926, the Belgians revamped the traditional structure of government. The positions of the Soil, Pasture, and Army Chiefs were removed and consolidated into a single position. According to Lemarchand, "this measure struck at the very roots of Rwanda society". The removal of the army chief resulted in the elimination of the military ethic of protecting and defending subordinates. In addition to the military related functions, the army chief had acted as an advocate for his clients and was obligated to represent them at any tribunal, including hearings at the royal court. With the destruction of the balance of powers, the remaining chiefs were "virtually omnipotent" and resulted in an authoritarian system that lacked any of the reciprocity found in the previous patron/client structure. As discussed earlier, the Belgians also advocated the supremacy of the Tutsi "race" and removed all Hutu chiefs and replaced them with Tutsi appointees.⁵¹

The colonial powers opposed having indigenous forces managed and led by native officers. The role of the Army Chief was therefore seen as redundant.

Furthermore, as a mandated territory under the League of Nations and later a United Nations Trusteeship, the Belgians were prevented by treaty from organizing local military formations.⁵² A battalion of the *Force Publique*, which the Belgians had maintained in the Congo since 1888, was used to police Rwanda and Burundi. The *Force Publique Congolais* (FPC) was a combination defence force and gendarmerie composed of Belgian officers and non-commissioned officers commanding Congolese soldiers.⁵³ No Rwandans were recruited into the *Force Publique*.⁵⁴ Instead of recruiting men for the army, the Tutsi chiefs now enlisted workers for Belgian mines in the Congo and other labour in Rwanda. The *mwami* had lost control over the principal 'instruments of coercion' in the state and the Rwandan army became dormant.⁵⁵

By 1931, the Belgians' patience with *Mwami* Musinga had come to an end. Musinga was resisting reforms, opposed the church and refused to convert to Catholicism. The monarch had lost so much status with the Rwandan people by this point that his forced abdication and exile to the Congo by the Belgian authorities met with little objection. The colonial administration selected Musinga's 21 year old son, Mutara III Rudahigwa to replace him. Rudahigwa was educated in a seminary school and was selected because of his perceived support for Belgian policy. Although Rudahigwa had not come to the throne in the traditional manner, he soon won the respect of the Rwandan people.⁵⁶ When the king and the Tutsi aristocracy converted to Catholicism, most of the country followed suit, some believing that the king had ordered them to do so.⁵⁷

The 1959 Rwandan Revolution

In the 1950s, a new generation of Belgian officials arrived in Rwanda, most of whom were Flemish. The Francophone minority had dominated the Flemish majority in Belgium for centuries; perhaps for this reason, the Flemish identified with the Hutu situation in Rwanda.⁵⁸ Whatever the rationale, the Belgian colonial and church authorities began to change their position to favour the Hutu majority rather than the Tutsi elite. These changing attitudes were reflected in a letter written in the late 1950s by the bishop of Kabgayi, Monsignor André Perraudin, in which he stated that “the social discrimination faced by the Hutu was no longer consistent with a sound organization of Rwandan society.”⁵⁹ Since the 1920s, the political sphere in Rwanda had been closed to the Hutu because of the Belgian’s preference for Tutsi administrators. The Hutu elite was now able to gain status and recognition through their relationship with the church. The Hutu *intelligentsia* began writing articles about their concerns in several Catholic periodicals and newspapers, as well as building networks and forging political ties.⁶⁰

Under the UN Charter, Belgium was pressured to promote “progressive development towards self-government or independence”⁶¹ in its trust territories. As part of the decolonization effort, a series of elections were held. When Hutu candidates were successful in winning the 1956 elections for sub-chiefs (Hutu 66.72%, Tutsi 33.08%, Twa 0.01%), the emerging Hutu elite began to see the potential for power to be taken from the Tutsis via the democratic process.⁶²

Shortly before the arrival of the UN Trusteeship mission visit in 1957, the *mwami* and his *Conseil Supérieur* prepared a *Mise au Point* (statement of views) which insisted that power be quickly transferred to the incumbent (primarily Tutsi) authorities. The *mwami* and his council emphasised the need for increased political participation, additional education opportunities, and social and economic reforms. However, the only inequality that was recognized in their statement was between Europeans and Rwandans; no mention was made of the difference between Hutu and Tutsi.⁶³

In response to the *Mise au Point*, a group of Hutu intellectuals published a document titled 'Notes on the Social Aspect of the Racial Native Problem in Rwanda', more commonly known as the 'Hutu Manifesto'. This manuscript highlighted the dominance that the Tutsi held over the Hutu, and called for a change in Rwanda's power structure.⁶⁴ The Manifesto embraced the concept that 'race' was the source of inequality in Rwanda. Hutu liberation from oppression by the Tutsi minority was promoted in the Manifesto, as well as democratization.⁶⁵

In preparation for general elections, political parties started to be created in 1957. One of the authors of the Hutu Manifesto, Gregoire Kayibanda, launched the *Mouvement Social Muhutu* (MSM) with a political platform based on the manifesto. The Hutu leadership decided that their best tactic would be to direct their political campaign against all Tutsi, and not just the ruling oligarchy. Since Belgium had placed only Tutsis in positions of political and administrative authority, it would not be difficult to attribute the 'suffering of the masses' to exploitation by the Tutsi.⁶⁶ As colonial policy had promoted

the myth of Tutsi superiority and Hutu inferiority, it was more effective to appeal to Hutu solidarity rather than Rwandan nationalism. As such, the 'Rwandan Revolution' became a 'Hutu Revolution'.⁶⁷ Instead of denouncing the Hamitic Hypothesis, the Hutu elite embraced the concept and turned it against the Tutsi population. As the Hamitic theory professed that the Tutsi came from a foreign land and conquered Rwanda, this opened the door for the Hutu to claim that they were the only true Rwandans and, therefore, the rightful rulers (conveniently ignoring the status of the Twa minority).⁶⁸

With the withdrawal of Belgian support and growing attacks from the Hutu leadership, the Tutsi elite became very defensive. In 1958, a group of Tutsi elders in the royal court issued a statement which further alienated the Hutu majority. In rejecting the Hutu request for greater participation in the country's political process, the court appealed to its history of conquest by declaring that "there could be no basis for brotherhood between Hutu and Tutsi" as the Tutsi king had "conquered the country and the Hutu, and killed their petty kings."⁶⁹ *Mwami* Rudahigwa, who had been seen as 'a puppet of the Belgian Resident', now became openly hostile to the colonial presence and any party that threatened the monarchy.⁷⁰ In June 1958--appealing to the image of pre-colonial unity and military strength--the *mwami* summarized his thoughts on the Hutu protests as follows:

It is a damaging increasing noisy propaganda spread by a small group acting under foreign influence with communist ideas. Their intention is to divide the country. They would not succeed to divide a country whose national unity and secular political force organization has annihilated the most powerful attackers.⁷¹

Rudahigwa publicly stated that he would “compel the Europeans to leave using force if necessary.”⁷² Under the authority of the king, a group of members from the Tutsi aristocracy formed an association in 1959 to defend Tutsi interest against the increasingly hostile Hutu population. This association would later become the pro-monarchy political party the *Union Nationale Rwandaise* (UNAR). As the perception that the Belgian and Hutu threat against the *mwami* was growing, Rudahigwa attempted to reconstruct the former power structure by calling up the old army formations using the network of chiefs.⁷³ When *Mwami* Rudahigwa died under mysterious circumstance in a hospital in Bujumbura, Burundi on July 24, 1959, the royalist leaders in Rwanda blamed the Belgians for his death.[§] Four days later at the king’s funeral, further evidence was seen that the traditional army was being resurrected. Many attendants at the funeral were carrying arms, including bows, spears, and knives.⁷⁴ A new *mwami*--Kigeri V Ndahindurwa-- was chosen by hard-line Tutsi royalists without the consent or acknowledgement of the Belgian administration. The lack of involvement of the Belgian authorities in selecting the new king demonstrated their declining control over the events that were taking place in Rwanda at the time.⁷⁵ In further defiance of the colonial power, Ndahindurwa appointed a Chief of the Army to lead the forces being mobilized.⁷⁶

The pro-monarchy, anti-Belgian UNAR party was official formed in August 1959. The strong anti-colonial position of UNAR may have been one of the reasons why Belgium shifted its support toward the Hutu counter-elite.⁷⁷ On 24 September 1959,

[§] Mutara III Rudahigwa died suddenly after being given an injection by a Belgian doctor. The official report stated that he had died as a result of a brain tumour. Another possible explanation given for his death was anaphylactic shock from a penicillin injection given to treat a venereal disease. Newbury, *Cohesion of Oppression*, 193. Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 54.

Monsignor Perraudin dispatched a circular to all Rwandan clergy that attacked the UNAR and compared its policies to German 'National Socialism' and asserted that the UNAR was pro-Communist and pro-Islamic.⁷⁸ In October 1959, Kayibanda converted the MSM into a new party--the Party of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Hutu (PARMEHUTU). Tensions between these two sectarian parties continued to build. Although two moderate parties (one Hutu and one Tutsi based) were also recognized--both of which downplayed ethnic differences, promoted power sharing and attempted to appeal to all people--they were drowned out by the more extreme views on each side.⁷⁹

On 1 November 1959, a group of young UNAR militants beat-up a Hutu sub-chief and member of the PARMEHUTU. When a rumour was started the next day that the PARMEHUTU member who was assaulted had died from his wounds, a group of Hutus attacked and killed four Tutsi officials outside the residence of a local Chief. Hutu on Tutsi violence quickly spread throughout the country. Anger and mob violence was directed mainly at wealthy Tutsis in positions of power, their homes were burned and looted, and people were attacked and killed with spears and clubs.⁸⁰ On 5 November, Kigeri V Ndahindurwa requested permission from Vice-Governor General Harroy to establish order using the *mwami*'s army. The request was denied. A telegram with the same request was then sent to the King of Belgium. An order was sent to Ndahindurwa to stand down the forces being assembled; the *mwami* refused to follow the instructions from the Belgian authorities. On 7 November, formations of Rwandan troops were deployed using traditional military tactics and weapons. Squads of Twa commandos were also dispatched as advance parties and shock troops. The target of the army's

counter-attack was the Hutu leadership, many of whom were arrested and some were killed before the Belgians intervened.⁸¹

The colonial administration declared a state of emergency and called in additional ground forces and paratroopers of the *Force Publique* from the Congo to restore order. The country was put under the command of Colonel Guy Logiest. Once again, the Rwandan military units using traditional weapons were no match for the Belgian-led forces armed with rifles and machine guns. By 14 November 1959, order had been re-established; but the two weeks of violence had resulted in the deaths of approximately 300 people.⁸² Far more Tutsis than Hutus were arrested by the authorities (919 Tutsi vs. 312 Hutu).⁸³ Arguing that the presence of Tutsis as sub-chiefs and chiefs "disturbed the public order," Colonel Logiest began to install Hutus in their positions. About half the local Tutsi authorities, who had been deposed or killed during the uprising, were replaced with Hutu chiefs. The Belgians had not contained the 'Hutu Revolution', but supported it with their own a pro-Hutu military administration under Logiest.⁸⁴ As a result of the November 1959 anti-Tutsi violence, approximately 10,000 Tutsi refugees fled to neighbouring states.⁸⁵ A military tribunal was established to try the Tutsi and Twa leaders who carried out the counter-attack in November 1959 against the direct orders of the Belgian authorities. The process broke the back of the Tutsi military command, as many of the army chief were arrested or fled the country.⁸⁶

More than half the soldiers in the *mwami*'s army that assembled in 1959 were Hutu who fought under the leadership of Tutsi commanders.⁸⁷ The Twa companies

continued to operate in their customary role as the lead elements in an attack. The army had been reconstituted in a manner which mirrored the pre-colonial military organization and tradition.⁸⁸ In the following years, shifts in power and ethnic relations would be reflected in the leadership, ideology, mission and composition of the Rwandan military.

Summary

The traditional Rwandan Army had a military culture that was for the most part positive. Military ideology was built around defending and expanding the nation. Soldiers and units were representative of all regions and social groups. Clan affiliation was more important than ethnicity for political/social status. Hutu, Tutsi and Twa belonged to the same clan. Although inequality existed between groups within Rwandan society, and fighting occurred amongst the clans for power, there was no record of ethnic violence in the pre-colonial state. The colonial powers initially reinforced the power of the ruling clan and assisted the Tutsi king's military to expand the state. The spread of Tutsi influence and hegemony was enabled under colonial rule. Under the Belgian colonial administration ethnic identities were hardened and tensions increased. Power structures were then shifted to favour the Hutu majority at the expense of the Tutsi and Twa minorities. The authority of the king was undermined and the traditional army was dissolved. The military became a foreign force representing colonial interests. The former political and military leaders were forced into exile, arrested or killed.

Colonial interference in the Rwandan state destroyed the traditional army, fomented ethnic conflict and laid the foundation for the development of a military culture

that was exclusive, racist, and hostile to its own population and government. These observations contribute towards answering the first research question by explaining how the traditional military culture was corrupted.

Chapter two highlights how the Belgian administration moulded a national army that was based on regionalism, racism, and hostility towards the Tutsi population. As a result, a military culture evolved that was elitist, exclusive, and hostile to anyone who challenged the ruling party's authority. The substance of chapter two answers the first research question and directly supports hypothesis 1 by illustrating how a corrupted military culture can increase tension and contribute to intrastate conflict.

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- ⁸⁷ Weinstein, "Military Continuities," 61.
- ⁸⁸ Weinstein, "Military Continuities," 55-56.

CHAPTER 2

Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR) **The Rwandan Army from Independence to the Genocide**

To understand the evilness of armed forces institutions in Rwanda context, one needs to consider and reconsider the fundamental problem that exists among various human groups that make up the country's society. This problem is fear. There is inter-ethnic fear between Hutu and Tutsi are concerned, and intra-ethnic fear among Hutu of different regional groupings. Each group fears that if the other one gets more armed it will not only jump to power but exterminate the others as well. This fear leads to creation of monoethnic armies by those who get a chance to be in power.

- James K. Gasana (former Rwandan Defence Minister, 1992-1993)¹

This chapter traces the evolution of the Rwandan government forces from the end of the colonial period until the genocide. The transformation of the national army into an insurgent group based in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is also examined. Particular attention is given to the history and events that contributed to the formation of military culture in the armed forces that supported an extremist ideology. The research findings presented in this chapter directly support hypothesis 1 by illustrating how the “Hutu Power” environment damaged the military culture of the FAR and contributed to the escalation of intrastate conflict.

Politics Under the Transition to Independence

After the uprising in November 1959, *Mwami* Kigeri V Ndahindurwa traveled to various locations in Rwanda, the Congo and Burundi visiting UNAR leaders who had fled the country to escape prosecution by the Belgian military authorities. In May 1960, the king moved to Bujumbura with his entourage. Ndahindurwa traveled to Léopoldville in the Congo in June 1960, to meet with the Secretary-General of the United Nations,

Dag Hammarskjöld. After 25 July 1960, the *mwami* was prevented from returning to Rwanda by the Belgians, who stated that he would be kept outside the country until a decision was made by the people on the fate of the monarchy.² The Belgian Minister for African Affairs announced on 17 October 1960 that a provisional government and national assembly would be formed. On 26 October 1960, Grégoire Kayibanda was sworn in as the head of the provisional government.

The General Assembly of the United Nations was severely critical of Belgium's policy for Rwanda. On 20 December 1960, UN Resolutions 1570 & 1580 called on the territorial authority to abolish the emergency regime and to facilitate the release of prisoners and the return of Tutsi leaders in exile, including the *mwami*.³ The Belgian authorities ignored the UN instructions and proceeded to move the country towards elections and independence. From 1960 to 1961 confrontations between Hutu and Tutsi continued, resulting in the additional displacement of an estimated 22,000 people.⁴

The First Republic

A referendum was held in September 1961, in which 80 percent of the population voted against retaining the monarchy and in favour of adopting a republican form of government. The transition from Tutsi to Hutu political domination was sealed through the parliamentary elections of 25 September 1961. PARMEHUTU obtained 78 percent of the votes, gaining 35 seats out of 44, while UNAR received 17 percent of the vote and won seven seats. The monarchy was officially abolished in October 1961. Parliament elected Grégoire Kayibanda to be President of the new Republic on 26 October 1961.

Eight months later, on 1 July 1962, Rwanda gained formal independence as a sovereign state.⁵

Garde Territoriale - Garde Nationale du Rwanda

In May 1960, at the request of Rwanda's new Hutu-led administration, Belgium began to create a national security force called the *Garde Territoriale du Rwanda (GTR)*. The composition of this guard became a major socio-political point, and manning was supposed to be based on ethnic proportionality with 86% Hutu and 14% Tutsi. However, after having experienced the hostile behaviour of the national troops in the Congo after independence in June 1960, Belgium was not in a hurry to create an armed force in Rwanda that could potentially become anti-Belgian. The massive success of the Hutus in the communal elections in July 1960 reassured Colonel Logiest to proceed with the formation of a Rwandan Force. Since the Congolese Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba had just removed the Belgians from the *Force Publique*, some of these Belgian soldiers could now be used to establish the *Garde Territoriale*. Equipment for the army was brought in from Burundi. The first Rwandans were recruited for the new military organization in October 1960, the same month as the provisional government was put in place. The plan was to create a national army made up of Rwandan junior officers and senior non-commissioned officers (NCOs), along with Belgian officers and NCOs acting in a supervisory the role. About 20 Rwandan junior officers and NCOs were sent to Belgium for training by the end of 1961.⁶ The seven officers candidates in this group attended the *Ecole Royal Militaire* in Brussels, Belgium for one year, then received an

additional eight months of training at the infantry school in Arlon, Belgium, before returning to Rwanda.⁷

Colonel Logiest ensured that recruitment for the *Garde Territoriale* was limited primarily to Hutus so that the force could act as shield to protect the new regime that the Belgians had put in place. The first contingent was drawn mainly from the Northern provinces, a region where the Hutus had a history of being the dominant group. When the 650 man guard was initially established, its intended purpose was to counter the mercenary force that *Mwami* Ndahindurwa and the UNAR were suspected of organizing in an effort to return to power. The total strength of the *Garde Territoriale* was planned to be 1,200 officers and men. Each of the ten districts in Rwanda would have a platoon of 50 soldiers; an intervention battalion of 700 men would be on standby to deploy where needed.⁸ Under the First Republic, the name of the army would change to *Garde Nationale du Rwanda* (GNR). The military mission would evolve into guaranteeing the permanence of the new republican institutions that were founded following the electoral victory of MDR PARMEHUTU. Ironically, one of the first Rwandans recruited into the new army was Juvénal Habyarimana, who would eventually lead a military coup to overthrow President Kayibanda and have the PARMEHUTU party disbanded.⁹

Tutsi Rebel Attacks

Despite all of the discussion and debate in the UN about the transition to democracy in Rwanda, advocating for the return of the refugees prior to elections, and the status of the Monarchy, no concrete action was taken to address the Rwandan refugee

situation.¹⁰ Not all of the refugees that fled in 1959 were willing to accept passively their fate in exile; some formed rebel bands and began to launch small-scale attacks into Rwanda beginning in 1961. The most well known of the Tutsi commando groups was called *Inyenzi* (cockroaches).^{*} Other guerrilla groups that operated during the early 1960s were the *Intare* (lion) and the *Ingangurarugo* (a name used by warriors in *Mwami* Rwabugiri's army).¹¹ A small group of Tutsi leaders went to the People's Republic of China for military training and returned with new ideas about tactics and guerrilla strategy.¹² Numerous small raids were launched from Uganda, the Congo, and Burundi with the aim of destabilizing the new regime in Rwanda. The Rwandan government recorded 36 terrorist incidents near the border of Burundi alone between March 1961 and May 1962. After each incursion, Hutu officials conducted reprisal attacks on Tutsi civilians who had remained in the country. The government attacks on Tutsis were justified by accusing the victims of aiding the guerrillas.¹³

The most serious guerrilla offensive was launched on the night of 20 December 1963. The Tutsi forces attempted a three pronged attack from Uganda, the Congo and Burundi. The attacks were not successfully synchronized and the forces moving in from Uganda and the Congo were quickly repulsed by the *Garde Nationale*. A column of about 1,000 rebels advanced quickly from the south and was able to seize a military camp in Gako (south central Rwanda) where they captured some vehicles and arms. As the

^{*} There is a difference of opinion amongst the writers on Rwanda about the origin of the name *Inyenzi*. According to Warren Weinstein's article, the name was chosen by the insurgents because, "like the cockroaches, the *Inyenzi* attacked at night eating away at the vitals of the Hutu state." See Weinstein, "Military Continuities in the Rwanda State," 62. Other writers (Filip Reyntjens, Gérard Prunier) have stated that the Hutu government gave the name *Inyenzi* to the Tutsi rebels as a derogatory term to dehumanize them, which would definitely become the case in the 1990s. See International Panel of Eminent Personalities, "Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide," 3.13.

guerrilla force advanced it was joined by farmers and other Tutsi residences who had been displaced in 1959-61. The rebels moved to within 12 miles of Kigali, before they were stopped by the *Garde Nationale*.¹⁴

At the time of the *Inyenzi* offensive, the *Garde Nationale du Rwanda* was not much larger than the invading rebel force. The rebels were defeated when they were intercepted at a bridge on a road leading into the capital by a combined force of Belgian and Rwandan soldiers, including some recent Rwandan graduates of the new officers' school in Kigali.¹⁵ The Rwandan army was able to prove itself superior to the Tutsi guerrillas. However, the fear and panic caused by the December 1963 invasion prompted a Hutu-on-Tutsi backlash, which lasted four days and resulted in the deaths of between 10,000 and 14,000 Tutsi civilians.¹⁶ In addition, all surviving Tutsi political leaders inside the country were executed, effectively eliminating the two pro-Tutsi parties, and ending Tutsi participation in public life in Rwanda for the next three decades.¹⁷ By the time the *Inyenzi* attacks ended in 1967, an estimated 20,000 Tutsi had been killed and as many as 336,000 had fled to Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania and Zaire (name for the Congo after 1965).¹⁸

The 1973 Coup

As time went on, the government of Gregoire Kayibanda became more authoritarian and elitist. In an effort to consolidate his power, Kayibanda appointed PARMEHUTU members from his home region in central Rwanda to the key positions in the government. In the formation of what became a one-party state, Kayibanda

eliminated not only his former Tutsi competition, but also other Hutu leaders outside his inner circle. Regional tensions within the Hutu elite quickly developed as northern leaders grew frustrated with Kayibanda's PARMEHUTU monopoly on power.¹⁹

As conflict broke out between members and officials of the PARMEHUTU, the army became sensitive to the competition that was splitting the ruling party.²⁰ Colonel Juvénal Habyarimana kept a low profile, presenting an image that he was loyal to President Kayibanda, while manipulating the security forces. Habyarimana had been able to convince Colonel Logiest--and then his Rwandan successors--of the benefits of recruiting officers from Gisenyi and Ruhengeri into the army due to their 'pure' Hutu qualities. According to the extremist ideology, the northern Hutu had not been contaminated by intermarriage or cultural influence that came with Tutsi infiltration of society. As the northwest had been politically independent of the Tutsi kingdom until the 20th century, they remained untainted.²¹ Although he attributed the Belgians with coming up with the concept, Habyarimana promoted the ideology of the *Kiga* (Northern Hutu) as being the perfect soldiers. According to the story told by Habyarimana, when the Belgians started recruiting in 1960, they did so in Gisenyi, Ruhengeri and Byumba, because in North the men were strong mountain dwellers. In Nyanza (seat of royalty), men were weak: they fell to the ground when they had to carry a rifle for a long time under the sun. It was for this reason that so many officers had come from the North. The truth was that Habyarimana, himself, had benefited from the beginning by ensuring that Hutus from other areas were marginalised in the army, and by building his career by exploiting regionalism.²²

In March 1973, the interior and external security services of the army and police were brought together into one organization placing all the country's intelligence operations under the control of Colonel Juvénal Habyarimana. On 1 April 1973, Habyarimana was promoted to the rank of Major-General and maintained his posts as Minister for Defence and Chief of Staff of the *Garde Nationale*. On 29 June 1973, Kayibanda dissolved the national police force and integrated the 1124 men (51 officers, 153 warrant officers, and 920 police officers) into the *Garde Nationale*. By integrating the police force into the army, Kayibanda believed he was counterbalancing the weight of northern Hutus in the *Garde Nationale* because the national police force had more personnel from central/southern Rwanda than were in the army. What the president actually succeeded in doing was to place all security forces under Habyarimana, making him the most powerful man in the country.²³

Seeing his popularity falling, Kayibanda fell back on the tactic that had worked so well for him in the past. In an effort to divert attention away from the failings of his regime, he attempted to unite the Hutu using an anti-Tutsi campaign. As promised in the 1957 'Hutu Manifesto', Kayibanda had introduced a system called '*équilibre ethnique*' (ethnic balance), which imposed a requirement for proportional representation for student enrolment and hiring of government employees. Under this program, Hutus were officially allotted 85 percent of educational and employment opportunities, with Tutsi given 14 percent, and Twa 1 percent.²⁴ In 1972, the quotas were extended to private business, where Tutsis had continued to hold a disproportionate share of the jobs as a

result of their former privileged status and better education.[†] Kayibanda had vigilante groups called 'Committees of Public Salvation' formed in October 1972 to ensure that the government's ethnic quota policy was being respected. Although the anti-Tutsi program in 1972 resulted in a relatively limited number of assaults and killings, the negative atmosphere triggered another stream of Tutsi refugees to flow into neighbouring countries. When Hutu students began beating and killing their Tutsi classmates and teachers at secondary schools around the country and on the campus of the National University of Rwanda in Butare, Army General Juvénal Habyarimana used the violence caused by the anti-Tutsi campaign to launch a military coup on 7 July 1973. The soldiers justified their seizure of power as necessary to stop the disorders in the schools and insecurity in the country. Although the overthrow of President Kayibanda was referred to as a bloodless coup, shortly afterwards Kayibanda and fifty other prominent politicians of the First Republic were arrested by the military junta and executed or left to die in prison.²⁵

The Second Republic

General Habyarimana's military coup was initially welcomed by both the Hutu and Tutsi members of the Rwandan population, as they were relieved that the authoritarian and elitist Kayibanda regime had been removed. Habyarimana maintained the state policy of ethnic exclusion started by Kayibanda, including national identification cards, ethnic quotas for employment and education, and a Hutu monopoly of political

[†] Kayibanda was able to exploit the emotional impact of the 1972 massacre of up to 300,000 Hutu by the Tutsi government in Burundi following attacks by Hutu rebels in April that year. Almost all educated Hutu were slaughtered in this 'selective genocide' as it was called by Rene Lemarchand in a 1974 article published by Minority Rights Group.

power. Although discrimination against Tutsis continued, physical harassment and violence against them would cease for the next 17 years. Outside the public sphere, Tutsis began to advance in business and international trade. Conditions for the Tutsi significantly improved under the Second Republic, but this would not last.²⁶

Immediately after seizing power, Habyarimana outlawed all political parties. A year later, he created his own party, the *Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement* (MRND); all citizens of Rwanda were made to become members. The new regime evolved into a totalitarian one-party state. The Party became involved in all aspects of daily life.²⁷ “Control was the obsession of the regime; the domination of the state was firmed up in even the remotest corners of the land.”²⁸ Over several years Hutus from the president's home area of northern Rwanda were given the majority of public service and military positions. A disproportionate amount of government funded projects, development and aid money was channeled into the northern region. Political and economic power became concentrated in a small group composed of the President's wife, family, and close associates, which became known as the *Akazu* (little house). Habyarimana's inner circle controlled the country's main financial institutions, and a variety of economic and commercial enterprises. As this group became more corrupt, its activities deteriorated into the illegal arms trade and drug trafficking. The regime became completely removed from the population.²⁹

Forces Armées Rwandaises

When Habyarimana formed the MRND in 1974, he also created a new military organization called the *Forces Armées Rwandaises* (FAR), which was composed of the *Armée Rwandaise* (AR) and the *Gendarmerie Nationale* (GN).³⁰ While the FAR did not have a unified command, both the army and the gendarme came under the Ministry of Defence with the President filling the positions of Minister of Defence, Chief of the Army Staff, and Chief of the Gendarmerie Staff.³¹ With only a few exceptions, the army was exclusively Hutu, and officers were not permitted to marry Tutsi women.³² Furthermore, recruitment was not only restricted to one ethnic group, but now the army concentrated on drawing its members from a small regional group to which Habyarimana belonged. The president was able to marginalize both groups that he viewed as his potential opponents--the Tutsi and Hutus from the south--by tightening his control over the national security system. Although there was no external threat at this time, the strength of the army was increase by 25 percent in 1974 and doubled in size by 1980 (see Table 1). Local army commanders, who reported directly to the president, began to

Table 1. Rwandan Army Manpower and Organization 1972-1980

Years	Personnel	Formations	Military Police
1972-1973	2,750	2 infantry battalions 1 recce squadron	400
1974-1979	3,750	8 infantry companies 1 recce squadron 1 commando company	1,200
1980-1990	5,200	8 infantry companies 1 recce squadron 1 commando company 1 engineer company 1 air wing (200 persons)	1,200

Data from: The Military Balance 1972-1973 through 1990-1991
Sub-Saharan, Rwanda. Publisher: Oxford University Press

mirror and monitor the civilian administration down to the prefectural level. The dual military-civilian structure allowed the FAR to control the government without the overt impression of a country under military rule. The army's mission now shifted from protecting the state institutions to keeping men in power.³³

By the end of the 1980s, regional and class competition among Hutu elites was beginning to threaten the position of the *Akazu*.³⁴ A sharp drop in international coffee and tea prices devastated the Rwandan economy. With growing economic hardship for most of the population, the government's habit of diverting international development assistance to the northwest fueled public resentment in south and central Rwanda.³⁵ As the gap between rich and poor grew, the government and its people became increasingly polarized. Calls for a return to multiparty democracy were raised from several sectors of Rwandan society. When Western aid donors began to pressure Habyarimana, he conceded to political reforms. In July 1990, he announced that he was seriously considering lifting the ban on political parties.³⁶

1990 Civil War Begins

On 01 October 1990, a new refugee-led rebellion was launched into northern Rwanda from Uganda by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and its military wing the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA). Most of the FAR at this point had little or no combat experience. Government troops in Kigali panicked at one point and began attacking units of their own forces, whom they mistook for rebels fighters. By regional standards, the FAR was a competent, well equipped force with a capable officer corp. Once Belgian,

French and Zairian troops arrived to assist the Rwandan army, the rebels were quickly pushed back into Uganda.³⁷ Although it was initially not believed to pose any serious threat to the regime, the RPA attack presented Habyarimana with an opportunity to focus attention away from internal tensions. The President accused the RPF of aiming to overthrow the Hutu government in order to reinstate the monarchy and re-establish Tutsi domination. Despite the RPF's denial of these goals, the recommencement of insurgent activity followed by the government's propaganda campaign was enough to stir up old fears and ethnic tensions.³⁸ In addition, the Tutsi army in Burundi had massacred an estimated 20,000 Hutus civilians in 1988 which served as a reminder of what could happen should the Tutsi be allowed to retake power.³⁹ Reminiscent of the 1963 campaign, government propaganda began portraying all Tutsis inside Rwanda as RPF collaborators. For three and a half years the *Akazu* worked on categorizing the population of Rwanda into friends of the regime and "accomplices of the enemy," referring to the Tutsis and any Hutus who opposed the ruling party. To create an atmosphere of fear, the government played upon memories of the exploitation of the Hutu by the Tutsi in the past. To inspire solidarity, stories were relayed of the glorious 'Hutu revolution' that drove the Tutsi into exile in 1959.⁴⁰ The Rwandan elite would once again be successful in redirecting the masses' anger and frustration towards the Tutsi scapegoat and away from the real source of their problems--a corrupt and self-interested ruling class. Although President Habyarimana had promised political reform in 1990, he continued to stall on the initiation of a genuine multi-party system.⁴¹

For the next three years, thousands of Tutsis were killed in separate massacres in several parts of the country. The Rwandan military distributed anti-Tutsi propaganda through the *Kangura* (Awaken) newspaper. It was in this paper that the now infamous 'Ten Commandments of the Hutu' was published (see appendix A). By the end of 1992, Habyarimana's government had succeeded in increasing the divisions between Hutu and Tutsi through the use of physical attacks, powerful propaganda, and persistent political maneuvering. In 1993, Hutu extremists started a movement called 'Hutu Power', which personified the vision of ethnic solidarity that Habyarimana had been championing since 1990.⁴² In July 1993, this group established a new radio station *Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines* (RTLNC), which immediately commenced broadcasting virulent anti-Tutsi hate propaganda.⁴³

Rapid Expansion of FAR 1990-1993

In response to the RPA invasion in October 1990, the military started a massive recruiting campaign. What had started out as a compact FAR force of 5,200 grew to 15,000 in a period of eight months, and reached 30,000 by the end of 1991. By the start of the conflict in 1994, the FAR was assessed to have 39,000 personnel, including the gendarme.⁴⁴ French army military assistance enabled the Rwandan government to train and arm the large number of recruits it needed to process in order to reach these manning levels in such a short timeframe.⁴⁵ Many of the soldiers incorporated into the army during this period of rapid expansion had little or no education. The new conscripts received little training, resulting in an overall reduction in the competency and efficiency level of the Rwandan military.⁴⁶ Once thrown into actual combat when the RPA broke

the ceasefire and renewed its offensive in 1993 (see below), thousands of the new poorly trained FAR recruits deserted.⁴⁷ All military training was supposed to cease under the terms of the 1993 Arusha accords, but FAR officials continued to conduct training covertly so that ceasefire monitors would not discover their activities.⁴⁸

The *Interahamwe* Militia

In 1992, Habyarimana's inner circle began organizing and making logistics preparations for a large scale attack on the Tutsi population. Civilian self-defense forces and militias were formed and trained by former soldiers and commune police, who instructed them on how to attack the 'enemy' in their communities. The *Interahamwe* (those who attack together) was the largest militia group and was primarily recruited from the youth wing of the President's party. An accurate assessment of the number of militia members trained is not available, but estimates range between 20,000 and 50,000 in April 1994. The *Interahamwe* were furnished with grenades and AK-47 rifles, as well as machetes, knives, clubs, and bows and arrows. Deployed throughout the Rwanda, these militias committed massacres on order from both local officials and central authorities. In mid-March 1993, the government ordered the militias to stand down, but their network remained in place, ready to be reactivated on order.⁴⁹

1993 RPA Offensive

In February 1993, the RPA launched a new offensive, only this time the guerillas were much more successful and advanced to points just outside Kigali. French forces were again deployed to help the Rwandan government push back the rebel offensive.

The RPA only succeeded in capturing 2 percent of Rwandan territory before the ceasefire was reached. On 4 August 1993, after months of negotiations, Habyarimana and the RPF signed a peace accord in Arusha, Tanzania,[‡] under which a Hutu-RPF coalition government would be formed and the return of Tutsi refugees was to be coordinated. On 5 October 1993, the Security Council established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), and 2,500 UN troops were deployed in Kigali to oversee the implementation of the accord.

Once again events in Burundi would work to the advantage of extremists in Rwanda. The perfect example of Tutsi villainy was provided by the murder of the newly elected Hutu President Ndadaye by Tutsi soldiers on 23 October 1993. The flood of Hutu refugees into Rwanda following the assassination provided eye witness accounts of Tutsi treachery. As Alison Des Forges observed, “the movement known as Hutu Power, the coalition that would make the genocide possible, was built upon the corpse of Ndadaye.”⁵⁰ The killing of the Burundian president was a key factor which radicalized previously moderate Hutus and led them to side with the *genocidiaries*. For Habyarimana, the death of Ndadaye provided evidence of a Tutsi conspiracy to destroy Hutu ‘democratic’ rule in Rwanda. The President immediately “denounced the Arusha Peace Agreement as treason”.⁵¹

[‡] For a detailed analysis of the Arusha negotiations see chapters 4 & 5 of Bruce D. Jones, *Peacemaking in Rwanda: the dynamics of failure* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001)

Significance of the Arusha Accord

Systematic discrimination based on ethnicity had ensured Hutu political and economic domination in Rwanda for the past three decades. Power sharing arrangements under the Arusha Accord now threatened Hutu supremacy in general and the hegemonic position of the *Akazu* in particular.⁵² The OAU International Panel of Eminent Personalities, which investigated the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, made the following statement in their July 2000 report:

Our own view is that the Hutu radicals were never prepared to accept any limits on their power and privileges... Searching for ethnic equity and democracy, the negotiations succeeded in persuading the *Akazu* that unless it acted soon, its days of power were numbered... The [Arusha] agreement would seal their fate unless they took drastic action to re-establish their supremacy. The more it appeared that power... would have to be shared not only with other Hutu parties, but also with the RPF itself, the more determined were the *Akazu* insiders to share nothing with anyone. The *Akazu* occupied key positions in the Presidential Guard, FAR, and both the MRND and CDR political parties, and they controlled the *Interahamwe* militias as well as radio station RTLMC. They were set to play their spoiler role with a vengeance, and now moved to accelerate their plans.⁵³

Particularly objectionable to the Rwandan Government were the Arusha terms on the integration of forces. The Arusha negotiating teams had agreed on reducing the 35,000 FAR and the 20,000 RPA into a combined force with a total of 19,000 personnel. To reach this total, the FAR would provide 60 percent (11,400) and the RPA would provide 40 percent (7,600) of the soldiers for the new military. The officer corps would be comprised of 50 percent representation from each army. A FAR officer would be appointed as Chief of Staff. In addition to the army, a 6,000 man gendarmerie was planned with the same 60/40 split for personnel supplied by the FAR/RPA and a 50/50 sharing of command positions. The RPA was awarded the position of Chief of Staff for the gendarmerie.⁵⁴ These figures meant that more than 60 percent of the current FAR

troops would have to be demobilized. The FAR military advisor at the Arusha negotiations made it clear that they found the agreement unacceptable. Hutu control and domination of the army had been a principal element of political power and security since independence, and the Tutsi RPA should not be given an almost equal share in the military.⁵⁵ Many soldiers were angry with the President for being pressured into accepting terms that were not favourable to the military. In spite of their poor performance early that year, many FAR members believed they were capable of defeating the RPA on the battlefield.⁵⁶ In December 1993, some FAR officers advised the UNAMIR Commander that Hutu extremists within the military were preparing to oppose the Arusha Accords and were taking measures to maintain the status quo power arrangements. Their plan would be achieved by exterminating the Tutsi and eliminating any Hutus perceived to be political opponents.⁵⁷

1994 Genocide Begins

When a plane carrying President Habyarimana and Burundi President Ntaryamira was shot down on 6 April 1994, the plot for the extermination of the Tutsi and the Hutu opposition was set in motion. Within an hour of the crash of the president's aircraft, selected assassinations of Hutu opposition party politicians began. Among the first people to be killed were the Prime Minister, the President of the Constitutional Court, and the Minister of Information. Other party leaders and prominent officials were also eliminated. The next group to be targeted were Hutu and Tutsi civilians who had challenged the regime. They included journalists, human rights activists, workers for non-governmental organizations and civil servants. Once the organized opposition was

removed, the countrywide massacre of the Tutsi began.⁵⁸ The details of the Rwandan genocide are extensively examined in numerous books, reports and journals and will not be addressed further in this paper. In the 100 days from the time the killing began on April 6, 1994 to when the RPA entered Kigali on 18 July 1994, Hutu extremists had managed the massacre of 800,000 to one million Rwandans, the vast majority of whom were Tutsi, but an unknown number of Twa and Hutu were also killed.[§]

FAR Resistance to the Genocide

Along with the *Interahamwe*, the presidential guard, para-commando and reconnaissance battalions of the FAR were directly implicated from the beginning in the killing of Rwandan civilians, politician and UNAMIR personnel. However, not all FAR members took part in the genocide. Colonel Marcel Gatsinzi, who had been named Chief of Staff of the army on April 7, 1994 attempted to keep the FAR from being directly involved in the assassination of civilians. As a result, fighting broke out between some elements of the FAR and the presidential guard in Kigali. On 10 April, Colonel Gatsinzi and the Minister of Defence issued direct orders to stop the assassination of civilians, but their orders were ignored or countered by subordinate officers. The majority of FAR units chose to take part in the genocide rather than resist, and Gatsinzi was replaced after only nine days for failing to co-operate. Nine FAR officers including Gatsinzi would later attempt to convince FAR members to denounce the extremists and commit to a

[§] A Rwandan government census completed in 2004 places the number of people who died during the genocide at 937,000. Calculation on the number of Rwandans killed during April-June 1994 will continue to be analysed and updated as new information is discovered. IRIN, *RWANDA: Census finds 937,000 died in genocide* (April 2, 2004); available from http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=40394&SelectRegion=Great_Lakes&SelectCountry=RWANDA [September 12, 2004].

ceasefire under the terms of the Arusha agreement.⁵⁹ Several thousand FAR troops chose to stay in Rwanda and were absorbed into the RPA during the fighting in 1994.⁶⁰

FAR Retreat

With the assistance of the French Army, under the guise of a humanitarian operation called *Operation Tourquoise*, the Hutu government, army, militia, and most of the *Akazu* were able to escape to Zaire. In the wake of the RPA advance, over a million Hutu refugees fled into neighbouring Tanzania, Burundi and Zaire. In a few short months following the downing of the presidents' aircraft, the entire situation of rulers and refugees in Rwanda had been reversed. The former Rwandan government forces and *Interahamwe* (ex-FAR/I) were able to withdraw virtually intact and fully armed into the Goma and Bukavu areas of eastern Zaire directly bordering on Rwanda.⁶¹ Along with the retreating army and its militia came a sea of Hutu refugees, who feared retaliation from the advancing Rwandan Patriotic Army. The international community, which had departed during the genocide, now returned en masse to aid the Hutu refugees.⁶²

The former Hutu government elite began to construct a replica of its "Hutu power" state within the refugee camps. Only a few miles from their former territory, the *genocidaires* established a government-in-exile with the same leadership, political hierarchy, and community groupings that existed in pre-genocide Rwanda. All of their basic needs were provided for by the international relief organizations attending to the refugee population and, by default, sustaining the military embedded in it. The former government ministers continued their propaganda and campaign of violence against the

RPF, effectively using the refugee population as hostages in order to maintain their new camp-based regime.⁶³ In addition, the Zairian government and army openly and covertly collaborated with their former allies by providing access to weapons and safe areas in Zaire from which attacks were launched into Rwanda.⁶⁴

Rwandan Hutu Insurgency

As early as August 1994, members of the ex-FAR/I began to launch insurgent operations from refugee camps in Zaire against the new RPF-dominated government in Rwanda. The former government elite terrorised the refugee population into staying in the camps with stories of reprisal killings and massacres that would be carried out against them by the RFP should they return to Rwanda. Recruiting into the ex-FAR/I continued drawing new members from the Rwandan refugee population and also from Hutu refugees from Burundi that were also in Zaire. Rwandan and Burundian rebel forces at times cooperated in attacks on their respective government forces. The ex-FAR/I conducted military training and openly carried weapon inside the refugee camps in Zaire and Tanzania. As the former government had stripped the country of its assets and continued to have access to the state's foreign bank accounts after its flight into exile, it had no shortage of funds with which to purchase arms. The Zairian government facilitated arms deliveries from China, Bulgaria, Albania, France and South Africa to the former Rwandan army operating from refugee camps on its territory.⁶⁵

Efforts by the new Rwandan government and international organizations to repatriate the refugees were ineffective. The RPF-led government repeatedly asked the

international community to find a solution to the ex-FAR/I problem. The UN studied a number of possible options to separate the refugees in Zaire from the armed groups in the camps, but no action was taken to disarm or relocate the Hutu threat. No country was willing to take on the military and financial commitment needed to mount a Chapter VII operation to disarm the former-Rwandan government forces, particularly in view of the disastrous US-led UN humanitarian intervention mission in Somalia in 1993. After waiting for two years for the international community to act, the Rwandan government decided to take matters into its own hands.⁶⁶

In October 1996, a coalition of Rwandan, Ugandan, Burundian government and Congolese rebel forces launched a three-pronged attack to envelop the Zairian army and ex-FAR/I forces in the eastern DRC. The coalition force proved to be vastly superior to their opposition, which rapidly retreated into the jungles of eastern Zaire. With the Rwandan Hutu army and militia removed from the refugee camps, the other refugees were free to leave. When the Congolese rebels declared a ceasefire in November 1996, 700,000 refugees left the camps and returned to Rwanda.⁶⁷

Following the destruction of the refugee camps in eastern Congo in 1996, the ex-FAR and militia groups dispersed to a number of locations. Some returned to Rwanda and entered the demobilization programs, while others moved into third countries in Africa. An estimated 5,000 former Rwandan government soldiers were taken into the Congolese armed forces and integrated into their formations. Approximately 20,000 ex-FAR/ Interahamwe adopted a new name--the *Armée de liberation du Rwanda* (ALiR)--

and continued the genocidal campaign, now in the form of an insurgency in Northwest Rwanda. Thousands of ex-FAR/I infiltrated back into Rwanda with the influx of refugees from the camps in Zaire. The insurgents began attacking civilians and government officials, as well as infrastructure including schools in Gisenyi and Ruhengeri provinces. The objectives of the insurgency were to demonstrate to the population that the RPF government was not capable of protecting them, to make the northwest ungovernable, to attempt to reinstate the former government, and to finish the genocide.⁶⁸ The ex-FAR/I also wanted to provoke the RPA into attacking the Hutu population inside Rwanda to validate the theory that the Tutsis wanted to destroy the Hutu.⁶⁹ The London based human rights group African Rights interviewed a number of Rwandan insurgents in 1998. In one interview, their strategy and tactics were described as follows:

The few weapons the infiltrators have allow them to terrorise the population, to force them to feed and shelter them, and to carry out certain acts of sabotage, which they hope will force the regime to negotiate with them. Among these acts of sabotage are the assassinations of Tutsis, who are blamed for the existence of the present regime, and their Hutu collaborators. The aim is to complete the genocide if possible, or force the 'Tutsi regime' to negotiate with them if that fails. The assassination of Tutsis aims to show the Hutus that the infiltrators work only in the interests of Hutu. As for the assassination of Hutu collaborators of the regime, it aims to show the Hutu population that the present regime is incapable of protecting its population and that they should hate the regime. All this and the burning of vehicles and commune offices proves their strength to the population.⁷⁰

Dozens of raids were conducted between 1995 and 1998 by ALIR, in which thousands of civilians were killed. Counterinsurgency operations by the RPA prevented the ALIR from successfully occupying any territory inside Rwanda. As a result, the organization decided to establish a headquarters in North Kivu Province of the DRC (formerly Zaire).⁷¹

ALIR merged with another group of Rwandan Hutus who were based in Kinshasa and South Kivu in September 2000 to become the *Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda* (FDLR).^{**} The strength of the FDLR was estimated to be between 15,000 and 20,000 combatants. A major offensive by the ALIR division of the FDLR was launched against the RPA in May 2001. Fighting between the RPA and rebels continued for several weeks in the border areas between Rwanda and the DRC before the rebellion was crushed. The Rwandan government claimed to have killed 735 Hutu extremists and captured 350 during the fighting.⁷² No other major attacks would occur on Rwanda for the next three years. In July 2002, the governments of Rwanda and the DRC signed the Pretoria Peace Agreement under which Rwandan forces would be withdrawn from the DRC in 90-days and the ex-Rwandan Armed Forces and *Interahamwe* would be disarmed and repatriated. While Rwanda successfully withdrew its troops ahead of the 90 day schedule, little to no evidence was seen of a DRC government initiative to disarm the FDLR.⁷³

FDLR Ideology

The FDLR takes no responsibility for the events which occurred in 1994, but blames the RPF for provoking the crisis. In their version of events, the October 1990 RPA offensive caused the ethnic tensions that radicalized the Hutu majority and triggered the genocide. For the FDLR “Hutu Power” never existed, and was only a coalition of political parties that formed in response to the Burundian president’s assassination in October 1993. They blame the 1993 assassination and that of the Rwandan and

^{**} For the published objectives of the FDLR see appendix C.

Burundian presidents that followed in April 1994 as part of an “International Tutsi Power” conspiracy. They argue that the FAR was too busy fighting the RPA to have massacred innocent civilians. If the RPF had accepted the truce proposed by the interim government, then the FAR could have stopped the massacres. The FDLR dismisses that the genocide was planned, arguing that it was simply a spontaneous reaction by the population in response to the murder of their president and the invasion by RPA. Analysts with the *International Crisis Group* have commented that “the FDLR’s revisionist discourse is not an encouraging sign of its ability to make a peaceful contribution to a sincere process of reconciliation, and to respect the rules of normalized political life.”⁷⁴

Conclusions

By extracting the elements described in this chapter that contributed to the formation of the FAR’s military culture, as shown in Table 2 below, I came to the following conclusions. FAR military culture was formed around a racist ideology that promoted the concept of ethnic and regional supremacy. This concept was reinforced by recruiting practices that virtually excluded minority groups, and by training that identified specific segments of the population as enemies of the state. The massacre of civilians was carried out repeatedly and condoned, which made the logic of a genocide acceptable to most of the military members by 1994. Soldiers viewed themselves as superior to and apart from the civilian population. Role of the military was not to defend the country against foreign aggression, but to suppress and eliminate Tutsis and maintain an elite

Table 2: Elements Contributing to the Formation of Military Culture in the Rwandan Hutu Forces 1960-2004

Elements	1960-1990 GTR/FAR	1990-1994 FAR / Interahamwe	1994-2004 ALIR/FDLR
Leadership	- Belgian Officer Corp until 1963 - primarily Hutu after 1973	- Akazu, Hutu Extremist - a few moderates	- hard corps Hutu extremists
Personnel	- primarily Hutu with some Tutsi representation	- exclusively Hutu by 1994	- exclusively Hutu
Primary Mandate	- defensive - internal security	- defensive - Civil War - genocide	- offensive - insurgency to remove RPF
Threat	- Tutsi insurgents	- RPA rebel force	- RPA government forces
Education Training	- primary & secondary school - some officers with university - Belgian & French military training	- officer corps relatively well trained - large number of uneducated poorly trained recruits	- self trained in refugee camps
Operational Experience	- limited - confrontations with Tutsi insurgents	- conventional warfare against RPA - counter insurgency - massacres	- terrorist and insurgency operations
Ideological Base	- Hutu Manifesto - Hamitic Myth	Kiga (supremacy of Northern Hutus)	- Genocidal
Conduct	- relatively well disciplined - killed Tutsi civilians - conducted a military coup	- various levels of discipline depending on unit - genocide of Tutsi - massacre of Hutu opposition	- routinely attack civilians in both Congo & Rwanda - murder, rape, torture, loot

group in power. Through its training, ideology, mandate, and extremist leadership, the FAR military culture became one that promoted hate, advocated violence against civilians, and supported the elimination of all political opposition.

The findings of this study of the Rwandan government forces from 1960 to 1994 supports the first hypothesis that an *exclusionary national ideology, discriminatory recruiting practises, and the army's misuse in an internal security role to suppress or kill members of the local population may corrupt military culture. These factors may produce a military that is politically biased, racist, and a threat to its own people.*

Chapter 3 examines the formation of the Rwandan Patriotic Army with the mission to oppose the FAR and return the Tutsi refugees to Rwanda. The elements of the RPA's military culture are identified and the difficulties that the rebel army faced establishing its legitimacy are discussed. The chapter explains why this crisis of legitimacy occurred and leads into the decision to create a new national army that would facilitate conflict management and reconciliation in the post-genocide environment.

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CHAPTER 3

The Rwandan Patriotic Army

No one starts a war--or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so--without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.

- Clausewitz, On War¹

This chapter studies the factors which influenced the formation of military culture in the Rwandan Patriotic Army, first as rebel force based in Uganda until 1994, and then as the military for the government of Rwanda from 1994 to 1998. As most of the historical factors which influenced the RPA have already been reviewed in the previous two chapters, the focus of this discussion will be on the events and elements which contributed to the formation of the RPA's character. The substance of this chapter provides the other half of the equation needed to answer the second research question and hypothesis on how military culture can be changed to reduce conflict, increase security, and contribute to conflict resolution. The factors contributing to problems within the military cultures of both the RPA and the FAR need to be determined before change and/or solutions can be assessed.

Seeds of the Refugee Revolution

As discussed in Chapter 2, no satisfactory solution to the Rwandan Tutsi refugee problem that originated in 1959 was found. After Rwanda gained independence in 1962, the plight of the Rwandan refugees soon faded from the international agenda.² The refugees met with varying degrees of acceptance and hostility in the main host countries

of Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, and Zaire. President Habyarimana repeatedly refused to consider repatriation of the so-called 59er's, claiming that there was no land or jobs to support the returnees.³ The refugees found themselves in a situation where they were barred from returning to their country of origin and were not offered permanent residency in the countries to which they were exiled.⁴

Members of the refugee population in some locations joined local armed liberation movements and gained military experience and exposure to various revolutionary ideologies. In the late 1960's, a group of Rwandan Tutsi refugees in eastern Zaire--who had been trained in guerrilla warfare by the Chinese--fought with the Laurent Kabila's People's Revolution Party against the government of Mobutu Sese Seko. For a one year period, they worked with a contingent of Cuban soldiers led by the famous revolutionary Che Guevara.⁵ In the 1970s, others would join Idi Amin's army in Uganda, but also the anti-Amin forces based in Tanzania.⁶ In Tanzania, they would be influenced by Julius Nyerere's philosophy of African socialism, one-party democracy, self-reliance, and nationalism. In the 1980s, Ugandan President Milton Obote began to attack Rwandans for political purposes. During the Ugandan civil war tens of thousands of Rwandans were killed in the Luwero triangle area, where a large number of Rwandan refugees and immigrants had settled. Obote's persecution of Rwandans in Uganda inspired thousands of Tutsi refugees to join Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Army (NRA).⁷

From the Rwandan Alliance for National Unity to the Rwandan Patriotic Front

The Tutsi diaspora kept their Rwandan identity and nationalism alive through a number of cultural organizations which promoted Rwandan language, dance, song and other art forms. In 1979, a political movement called Rwandan Alliance for National Unity (RANU) was established in the guise of a Rwandan cultural association, and began lobbying for the rights of the refugees to return to Rwanda. RANU's membership was initially composed primarily of intellectuals, who debated and discussed ideology and strategy for the organization.⁸ RANU established branches in several countries in East and Central Africa, Europe and North America, but was only able to initially recruit a small group of followers.

When peaceful negotiations with the Rwandan government failed, RANU decided to take a more militant approach. Inspired by the success of the NRA in overthrowing the Ugandan government, the decision was made to form an armed wing with the aim of using military force to achieve their objective of returning to Rwanda.⁹ The RANU congress held in December 1987 announced the organization's name change to the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and introduced the political program known as the "Eight Point Plan" (see appendix B).¹⁰ The plan was designed to appeal to a broad audience in order to attract as much support as possible. The RPF wanted flexible guidelines to which all refugees could relate, no matter where they were located. The purpose of their movement needed to be clearly stated so its members would know why they were fighting. Two of RANU's original founders, Fred Rwigyema and Paul Kagame, both senior officers in the NRA, used their influence in the military to recruit new members.¹¹

Fred Rwigyema was a charismatic popular leader who became the head of the RPF's military wing, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA). There was a strong link between the political and military wings, and all RPA officers were mentored to become political as well as military leaders in the movement.¹²

Ideology and Code of Conduct

The focus of RPF/RPA leadership training was to advance a common identity to unify the movement. A nationalist ideology was promoted that emphasised a Rwandan identity and equality amongst its people. Pre-colonial history of Rwanda was idealized as a time of unity and co-operation. Bad politics and foreign influence were stressed as the reasons for discrimination in Rwanda, rather than a primordial hatred between the ethnic groups. The RPF's purpose in returning to Rwanda was not to seek revenge on the Hutu, but to share in everything the country had to offer.¹³

The RPA military code of conduct promoted self discipline and loyalty. Corruption, sexual promiscuity, and the use of alcohol or drugs were strongly discouraged. Leadership by example and tough discipline practises became the cornerstone principles of the army. The punishment for severe breaches of conduct--in particular murder, rape, and desertion--included the death penalty. Execution of soldiers for serious crimes was not uncommon.¹⁴

From the beginning the RPA was known for their strict military discipline, dress, and deportment. Unlike many rebel armies in Africa, it was extremely rare to find an

RPA soldier drunk or disorderly in public. The Rwandan members of the National Resistance Army had learned the importance of discipline during the many years they spent in the bush fighting the Ugandan military. Their experience in the NRA also taught them the importance of winning the trust of the civilian population,¹⁵ but the RPA would have little opportunity during the civil war to exercise this principle due to their lack of direct contact with the Rwandan people until 1994. Reporters who visited RPA-controlled territory during the war commented on the lack of looting of civilian property that had occurred, even though most of the homes had been abandoned by their owners. However, human rights investigators received complaints from civilians during the civil war that the RPA had taken their cattle, forcibly recruited peasants to act as porters and herders for the rebels, and forced people to stay in temporary camps in order to create free-fire zones.¹⁶ The RPA appeared to place military priorities ahead of human rights during combat operations, a practice that would later be repeated during the counter-insurgency campaign from 1996-1999.¹⁷

Personnel Profile

Key personnel for the RPA were recruited from the Rwandan members of the Ugandan army who held senior positions in the NRA including the heads of training, intelligence, police, and health services. The skills and experience acquired from professional army training that its corps members had received in Uganda significantly enhanced the military capabilities of the front.¹⁸ The original cadre of the RPA were also well educated. For a guerrilla force, the level of education amongst its soldiers was very high; all members had completed primary school, about half had gone to secondary

school, and about 20% had attended university. A number of professionals would join the rebel army including doctors, lawyers, veterinarians, accountants and engineers.¹⁹ From the beginning the RPF had an inclusive policy, with the only restriction being that you had to be Rwandan. Women were included in both combat and support roles, as officers and regular members. Disabled people were accepted and employed where ever their skills could be used.²⁰

Tactics and Strategy

When the RPF began planning its struggle, secrecy was viewed as imperative. New members were warned not to discuss the movement's activities and communications security was taken extremely seriously.²¹ Despite their precautions, Habyarimana's secret service was able to infiltrate the organization and advise the president that an invasion was being prepared. The inability of the rebel army to organize and train overtly caused errors in planning, co-ordination, and tactics when the rebellion launched its initial offensive.²²

On 1 October 1990, with approximately 2,500 men the Rwanda Patriotic Army crossed the border from Ugandan in to northern Rwanda. At first the rebel force made significant gains moving 100 kilometres into Rwanda and capturing a major military depot during the first three weeks of the operation. However, their initial success would be short lived. The lightly armed foot-mobile force had chosen to advance using conventional warfare tactics in open terrain. As the Rwandan president was out of the country when the attack began, the FAR was initially taken off guard and was slow to

respond to the invasion. However, when the government launched a counter-attack--reinforced with French and Zairian forces--it engaged the rebels using lightly armoured vehicles supported by heavy weapons mounted in trucks. Out-gunned, out-manned, and caught in the open, the rebels suffered heavy losses. Of most significance, nearly all of its senior commanders were killed. Until this point the RPA commanders had chosen to lead from the front with their troops, but following this operation the organization took a very protective stance with their senior staff, and would keep the location of their political and military leaders a secret.²³

What remained of the rebel forces scattered in several directions.²⁴ Despite its disastrous conclusion, the October 1990 attack had a number of positive outcomes for the rebels. The first was the international attention that was drawn to their cause by the armed invasion of Rwanda. Second, the capture of the weapons depot provided them with a large amount of ammunition and arms that they were able to cache for later use. Third, as a result of the negative response domestically to its direct involvement in the events, Belgium withdrew its military support to the Habyarimana regime, and began to use its diplomatic influence to negotiate a political settlement.²⁵

Major Paul Kagame had been in the United States on training at the time of the first attack. When he returned in November 1990, he immediately began to rebuild the rebel army. His first decision was to change tactics to a guerrilla operation and avoid direct contact with the government forces. One of the first objectives was not to dwell on defeat, but to rebuild morale with a successful operation. The rebels moved their base to

the Virunga mountain range in the north west. In January 1991, they launched an attack that took the government by surprise. The primary target was the Ruhengeri prison, a government stronghold in the region. The rebels were able to quickly overrun the prison, free the prisoners, and capture a good quantity of ammunition and weapons. After the attack, the rebels withdrew into the mountains and continued to conduct frequent guerrilla attacks on government targets, while working concurrently on recruiting and training its soldiers. The attack on the Ruhengeri prison was a huge success. Many of the prisoners that were released joined the RPA. This successful and well publicized operation, inspired more people to join the struggle to overthrow Habyarimana and to fight for the right of the refugees to return to Rwanda.²⁶

For the rest of the war, the RPA continued to use a hit-and-run strategy against the government of Rwanda. The rebels exploited commercial targets and were able to deny the government access to the major road north through Uganda. This action forced commercial shipments to use the more expensive route via Tanzania to access a port. The rebel occupation of the Virunga mountains shutdown the lucrative tourist industry in that region (a tactic that would later be repeated by the FDLR against the RPF government).

One economic impact that the rebels had not planned intentionally was the massive movement of peasants out of their area of operations. In addition to having to deal with an internally displaced population of 350,000 people, the government had lost its labour force in the region where most of the cash crops were located.²⁷ Further

exacerbating the economic situation was the structural adjustment program (SAP) the government had to adopt in November 1990 because of the failing economy. The SAP drove the price of basic necessities up by 50% and introduced or increased user fees for education, health care and other services, furthering a decline in living standards for most of the Rwandan people. The counter-insurgency campaign and rapid expansion of the army caused military spending to rise from 2% to 6.9% of the GDP.²⁸ In an already gloomy economic environment, the financial cost of the insurgency was probably the major factor that brought Habyarimana to the negotiating table.

Once the genocide began in April 1994, the RPA would return to conventional combat operations as it pushed to capture Kigali. When the final offensive started, the rebel army held a section of territory in the north of Rwanda where most of its troops were located. A 600-man battalion of RPA troops had been moved into the centre of Kigali to protect the RFP politicians who had come to the capital to take up their positions as part of the Broad Based Government that was formed under the terms of the Arusha Accords. Since 1990, the RPA's numbers had increased to an estimated 12,000 to 15,000 combat troops with an additional 5,000 support personnel. Facing them, spread out in seven sectors on the other side of a demilitarized zone, was approximately 18,700 FAR with an additional 6,300 in Kigali. The remainder of the government's 39,000 strong army and gendarme personnel were deployed to various locations around the country.²⁹

The disposition of the FAR deployment gave it a shallow line of defence which allowed the rebel forces to easily by pass around the main body of their units. Using a tactic which avoided engaging the enemy in a frontal assault, the rebels surrounded the government forces by infiltrating fighters into positions where they could attack the FAR units from the flanks and the rear. The government was placed in a position where it was constantly put on the defensive, having to withdraw and regroup. The FAR leadership was concentrating on carrying out the genocide instead of combating the RPA, so command, control, and communication (C3) with its defending forces was neglected. The rebels were able to defeat the larger, better equipped government force through a combination of mobility, disciplined and highly motivated troops, effective use of C3, and a combat strategy which allowed them to take and maintain the offensive.³⁰

Civil-Military Relations

During the insurgency campaign from 1990 to 1994, the RPA had met with an unexpected reaction to its 'liberation struggle' from the civilian population inside Rwanda. The RPA believed that its efforts to remove the dictator Habyarimana from power would be supported by the peasant population. Instead, civilians fled en-masse in front of the advancing rebel force, leaving the RPF to oversee a deserted landscape in the rebel-controlled areas. As a result, the RPF was unable to indoctrinate the people of Rwanda into its political program, which stressed good governance over ethnic differences, or to counter thirty-plus years of Hutu propaganda that had demonised the Tutsi. In addition, the entire state infrastructure had been destroyed during the war, the former-government had looted the banks as it withdrew, and the economy had been

devastated.³¹ Winning the war was easy compared to the fight the RPF would now face to gain legitimacy as a government and a national military.

The major challenge for the RPA would be to establish security in the post-genocide environment. Not only would it face a growing insurgency from the remaining ex-FAR/I forces now operating from inside and outside the country in internally displaced persons (IDP) and refugee camps, but the population itself was hostile towards the army which was viewed as a foreign occupying power.³² Furthermore, a force that had been known for its well disciplined soldiers, now had to deal with a serious problem resulting from uncontrolled poorly trained troops that were in its ranks. As the RPA had advanced across Rwanda during the genocide, many young men and boys who had survived the attacks by government militias were quickly incorporated into the rebel army. These new members had not undergone the demanding military training or political indoctrination which produced the highly disciplined, loyal fighters of the original RPA cadre. In addition, many had lived through the horror of witnessing their families massacred and were more inclined towards reprisal killing of genocide suspects than the more experienced members who were recruited outside the country.³³ Another group of recently recruited RPA members that was particularly brutal were Rwandan Tutsi-refugees from Burundi. These men came out of an environment of ethnic violence and retaliation in Burundi, where Tutsi militias did not hesitate to kill Hutu civilians. This group was reported by the UN to be responsible for the arbitrary killing of civilians and the illegal confiscation of Hutu property in southern Rwanda.³⁴ The new members of the RPA did not share the common history and experience of the older members of the

group who had been based in Uganda. Consequently, the recent recruits had not been influenced by the RPA's military culture which demanded discipline and honourable conduct nor by the ideology that the army represented all Rwandans and not one ethnic group.

Thousands of civilians were reportedly killed by members of the RPA by the end of 1994. Estimates by various human rights organization range from 10,000 to 100,000 people killed between April and September 1994. Most of these figures were based on interviews conducted with alleged survivors of the massacres; however, follow-up investigations conducted by UNAMIR found that many of these killings had been perpetrated by the ex-FAR/I, and then blamed on the RPA.³⁵ The RPF government never denied that unauthorized killings of civilians took place and many soldiers of various ranks, including officers, were arrested in 1994; at least 62 soldiers were summarily tried and executed for crimes against civilians including rape and murder. A number of public executions of soldiers were carried out by the RPA, to reinforce how serious the government considered offences against innocent civilians.³⁶

Human rights abuses committed by the RPA only served to reinforce propaganda being spread by the former-government. Hutu extremists continued to use psychological tactics to maintain the divide between Hutu and Tutsi and increase mistrust of the new RPF-dominated government. The leaders in exile promoted the idea that the new government considered all Hutu to be "*genocidaire*", and would kill them without hesitation, if they left the "protection" of the camps. The extremist also used the press to

publicize negative acts committed by the RPA on members of the Hutu population.³⁷

The RPA's often brutal counter-insurgency operations further enflamed tensions. By March 1995, closure of the IDP camps became a priority for the government. The largest of the nine remaining camps was Kibeho with a population of 115,000. The government was convinced that a large number of the people inside Kibeho were *Interahamwe*. On 18 April, two battalions of soldiers arrived and cordoned off the camp so no one could leave without going through an RPA screening process. The RPA had no training in crowd control, and herded the IDPs into a small confined area like sheep. The combination of armed people inside the camp, panicking refugees, and frustrated inexperienced soldiers eventually exploded into mayhem on the fifth day. The RPA fired indiscriminately on the IDPs with automatic rifles, rocket-propelled grenades and a 50-calibre machine-gun. The results were devastating; UNAMIR counted 4,000 dead and 650 injured.³⁸

With the Kibeho massacres taking place in front of hundreds of international humanitarian workers and UN personnel, the RPA's image as a disciplined, humane military was shattered.³⁹ Although the eight remaining IDP camps were forcibly closed by the RPA without incident,⁴⁰ thousands of other civilians would be killed during counterinsurgency operations in north west Rwanda between 1996 and 2000.* A new approach to conflict management was needed in order for the RPA to win the confidence of the Rwandan population. Discipline, pride and professionalism needed to be restored amongst the soldiers. The following chapter on the Rwandan Defence Force will outline

* For a detailed account of the counterinsurgency operations see Jackson, "Legacy of Bitterness: Insurgency in North West Rwanda."; Orth, "Rwanda's Hutu Extremist Genocidal Insurgency: An Eyewitness Perspective."

the measures that were implemented by the government to create a new national army, foster an inclusive military culture, and attempt win the hearts and minds of the Rwandan people.

Conclusions

The military culture of the Rwandan Patriotic Army was influenced by the elements summarized in Table 3 below. RPA soldiers viewed themselves as the

Table 3: Elements Contributing to the Formation of Military Culture in the Rwandan Patriotic Army 1987-1998

Elements	1987-1990	1994-1998
Leadership	- Tutsi officers from NRA	- Tutsi officers with some Hutu representation
Personnel	- mainly Tutsi refugees from Uganda	- mix of Tutsi refugees from Great Lakes region and a small percentage of Hutu ex-FAR
Primary Mandate	- overthrowing the Habyarimana regime and returning refugees to Rwanda	- countering internal security threat from ex-FAR/I
Threat	- FAR and foreign support from Belgium, France and Zaire	- ALIR/FDLR insurgency
Education Training	- well educated cadre - military training in the NRA	- a small corps of well trained troops augmented by new recruits with varying degrees of training
Operational Experience	- support to revolutionary wars in Zaire and Uganda	- Civil War and counter insurgency in Rwanda
Ideological Base	- strong Maoist influence - Rwandan nationalism	- anti genocidal/extremist - Rwandan nationalism
Conduct	- well disciplined - some human rights abuses	- accused of multiple criminal and human rights violations

liberators of a divided and oppressed nation that should have welcomed their return. The troops felt betrayed by the international community and the Hutu population that hesitated to recognize the legitimacy of the rebel army. While the soldiers regarded themselves as Rwandans, the population saw them as foreigners and something to be

avoided and feared. Consequently, a crisis in troop morale and civil-military relations rapidly developed. In order to establish legitimacy for the new government, a national army needed to be created that combined the members of the warring factions and was representative of the entire population. A military culture would have to be cultivated that reflected the army's inclusive and professional nature, as well as a revised mission and mandate. Chapter 4 describes the programs introduced by the Rwandan government that used the army as a vehicle to promote national reconciliation.

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CHAPTER 4

The Rwanda Defence Forces

The Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF) sought to re-institute, by capturing the unifying values as enshrined in the concept of *Rwandanicity*. This had to be captured at the ideological and institutional levels, which saw the increased deployment of the military as an instrument for social reconstruction, cohesion and conflict management. In this context, post-genocide Rwanda found its defining mission to integrate and re-integrate its people, beginning with the military.

- Col. Frank K Rusagara, 2004¹

Chapters 2 and 3 described the historical circumstances in Rwanda that led to a civil war between ethnic groups and the creation of opposing military forces--one viewed as representing the interests of the Hutu majority, the other portrayed as defending the rights of the Tutsi minority. When the RPF took control of the government of Rwanda following the genocide in 1994, it was clear that ethnic tensions had to be resolved and the population united under a common identity in order to end the ongoing conflict and prevent future manipulation of ethnicity for political purposes. The Rwandan government made a conscious decision to use the military as a vehicle to promote national unity and reconciliation. This chapter examines how the government employed a number of programs for the military aimed at reducing conflict, increasing security and facilitating national reconciliation. In doing so, the chapter answers the second research question and tests the hypothesis that the military can become an institution that lessens ethnic tensions by developing a new inclusive military culture.

As described in the quote at the start of this chapter, the RPF government decided to take a nationalist approach to reconciliation. Using the example of the pre-colonial

military as the basis, a new military would be constructed that included members both of the RPA and the ex-FAR and would represent all regions and ethnic groups. They believed that the example set by former enemies in the military working together on an equal basis could become a role model for the society as a whole. A military culture that promoted teamwork and bonding would provide an ideal environment for integrating Hutu and Tutsi identities. Changing the name of the military to the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) was part of the effort to promote a cultural shift and disassociate the new organization from the old armed forces, and hopefully remove the psychological links to the former groups.²

The new military would be modeled on the pre-colonial Rwandan army that was ‘rooted in the society’ and always defended the society’s values and served the interests of the nation.³ The portrait of the pre-colonial military on which the new force would be fashioned was an inclusive organization where Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa worked towards the same goal.⁴ The traditional Rwandan warrior was used as the role model to which all troops could aspire. The classic Rwandan soldier is described as a gentleman who is strong, proud, patriotic, loyal, self-disciplined, ethical, brave, respected, and technically skilled in his craft.⁵

Restoring the common heritage, culture, and language which bound the people of Rwanda together and transcended ethnic identity was always part of the RPF ideology. The RPF never viewed itself as exclusively representing Tutsi interests, although it was often portrayed that way by people outside the organization. During the civil war, the

RPF had been focused on achieving a military defeat over the old regime rather than winning the hearts and minds of the population. Thus, the peasantry was not aware of the Front's 'political platform'.⁶ Winning over the Hutu peasants by creating a representative professional military, now became a major part of the conflict management strategy of the new government.

Integration of Forces Program

From the beginning of the rebellion, the RPA had maintained a policy of accepting former FAR members into its ranks. There were primarily three reasons for this: the rebels needed to increase their strength, they didn't want to look like a conquering force, and they needed people with knowledge of the enemy.⁷ After the war ended, the integration process would become a key part of the reconciliation program. In late 1994, approximately 2,000 ex-FAR voluntarily returned to Rwanda. Of this group, 1,011--including 81 officers--were integrated into the RPA in January 1995. Several former ex-FAR officers were placed in command positions in the RPA. They included:

- Colonel Deogratias Ndirwami who became Chief of Staff of the Gendarmerie,
- Colonel Marcel Gatsinzi who became the Deputy Chief of Staff of the RPA,
- Colonel Balthazar Ndengeyinka who became commander of the 305th Brigade,
and
- Lt. Colonel Laurent Munyakazi who became commander of the 99th Battalion.

The integration of these senior FAR officers into the RPA reduced the perception that it was a 'foreign occupying force made up of Tutsi oppressors' and helped to undermine the extremist propaganda campaign.⁸

In April 1998, Rwanda graduated the first class of approximately 1,200 ex-FAR soldiers from a new program at the training center in Ruhengeri province. Many of these recently integrated members of the RPA went to units working in the communes from where their families originated. The presence of these new soldiers had a significant effect on the efficiency of the RPA counterinsurgency operations. People in the northwest were able to see how well members of their families were being treated in the military and they realized that the army was no longer the enemy. In addition, the ex-FAR knew all the tactic and strategy used by the insurgent force and were able to advise on the best measures to counter an attack. Senior military officials went out to the countryside to mobilize the population by explaining why it was important for the individual citizen to assist them. They also traveled to areas where the RPA had committed human rights abuses and spoke directly to the population about the programs to correct these failing of the past. As a result of this “hearts and minds campaign” many Hutus wanted to join the RPA and the local population stopped supporting the Hutu rebels.⁹ The results of this program can be seen by the large jump in numbers of ex-FAR integrated into the RPA in 1999 as shown in Table 4 below.

Since 1995 more than 23,000 members of the former government’s armed forces have been integrated into the national army. When a member of the ex-FAR/I returns to Rwanda, they are assessed and either integrated into military or demobilized and reintegrated back into the Rwandan society. If a soldier is selected for integration, he/she

Table 4: Integration of former members of the *Forces Armées Rwandaises* (ex-FAR) and Armed Groups into the Rwandan Patriotic Army/ Rwanda Defence Force (RPA/RDF) Force Integration Program

Year	Number Integrated	Year	Number Integrated
1995	3,986	2000	826
1996	1,494	2001	365
1997	4,945	2002	5
1998	3,115	2003	34
1999	8,083	2004	176
Total ex-FAR Integrated 23,029			

Data Source: Rwanda Ministry of Defence. 25-01-05

first attends a solidarity camp, where they are educated about the new government and the root causes of conflict in the country's history. The solidarity camps were modelled on the pre-colonial military schools (*Amotorero*) where training and cultural formation of future soldiers took place. On this same framework, the integration camps were given the name *Ingando* (traditional military encampment). At the *Ingando*, officers and men from the RPA interact with officers and men of the ex-FAR in a series of participatory workshops that promotes national unity and provides an orientation to the current political situation in the country. During the exchange between the RPA and the ex-FAR participants, the RPA (and now the RDF) discuss its expected standards of behaviour, discipline, as well as debating and comparing the philosophies of the two organizations (RPA vs FAR). The program combined military training and the reconciliation process, and normally takes a minimum of two months to complete. A different curriculum was designed for the ex-militia members and concentrates more on military training and

political education than interaction with members of the RPA. *Ingando* for the former militia normally takes six months to complete.¹⁰

The *Ingando* process was also adopted by the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) and modified for use in the civilian reconciliation process. Members of the army continue to work as teachers and consultants at the civilian version of the solidarity camps under the NURC umbrella. This civic education programme created by the RPA is aimed at creating awareness for Rwandans of the importance of reconciliation in the reconstruction their society. The curriculum draws on lessons learned from the past to understand the events that shape Rwanda today. Individuals are encouraged to take responsibility upon themselves to find a way to contribute to national unity. Participants are shown how things such as history, language, and culture can provide a common ground on which to unite the people of Rwanda. Stress is placed on promoting a Rwandan identity (as opposed to an ethnic identity) as a means to ensuring lasting peace which will lead to development.¹¹

After completing *Ingando*, the ex-FAR members are most often transferred to the RDF at the rank level they held in their former organization. Integration is complete and transparent with former FAR and RPA soldiers mixed together in the same units, and those FAR officers with the necessary rank and experience are given command positions. The last large group to return voluntarily to Rwanda occurred in November 2003 when 103 members, including the commander-in-chief of the FDLR Major-General Paul Rwarakabije arrived in Kigali.¹² Major-General Rwarakabije and three other senior officers (1 Col, 2 LCol) were integrated into the RDF in July 2004, and confirmed at

their current rank levels. At the same time, several RDF officer promotions were announced including Chief of General Staff Major-General James Kabarebe and the Defence Minister, Major-General Marcel Gatsinzi to the rank of General.¹³ In doing so, the FDLR members were brought in without undermining the positions of the RDF's established senior officers, thus eliminating a possible negative affect on morale that could damage the integration program.

The new military culture of the integrated force was built on the need to guaranteed security and protect the population from a common enemy. The FDLR/ALIR with their Zairian, and later Congolese, Angolan and Zimbabwean allies, provided the external force to counter. Hence, the war in the DRC became a conflict management tool for the Rwandan army as it focused the threat outside the national borders on a foreign enemy. The integration process was further advanced when Hutu and Tutsi soldiers bonded during fighting in the DRC. There have been no problems related to Hutu members of the RDF fighting their former colleagues in the DRC, because they now realize that the information they were told about the new government in Rwanda was not true. Consequently, they are no longer motivated towards the Hutu extremist camp.¹⁴

Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration

Not all ex-FAR/I members are integrated into the Rwandan army and many have to be disarmed, demobilized and prepared for life as a civilian. Furthermore, the military as a whole has to be downsized. The target number for the Rwanda Defence Forces is 25,000 by 2006. To reach this target, an estimated 60,000 soldiers needed to be

demobilized; this figure included fighters from the RPA, ex-FAR and Interahamwe (see table 4). In 1997, the government of Rwanda with assistance from the World Bank established a Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission to assist in the safe return of former combatants back to their communities. Returning soldiers are transported to demobilisation centres where their military status is verified, their information is recorded, and they undergo medical screening. The demobilised soldiers then undergo a two-week reintegration course, where they are briefed on the government's programs for demobilisation, national unity and reconciliation. This process is similar to the *Ingando* training conducted by the NURC.

The former combatants selected for demobilization are processed under three main categories of groups as follows:

- a. The first group consists of former Rwanda Defence Force personnel (Ex-RDF). This category includes any soldier that was part of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) or RDF after 1994. It includes former members of the *Forces Armées Rwandaises* (FAR) who joined the RPA in 1994. The main purpose for demobilizing this group is downsizing and to allow opening for the integration of members of other armed groups.
- b. The second category consists of former members of the old army (Ex-FAR) who were not integrated into the RPA, and did not become members of other armed groups.
- c. The last group is referred to as Ex-Armed Groups and includes former members of the ex-FAR/Interhamwe subdivided into the following three categories:

- i.. those that operated as Rwandan Hutu Rebels in Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) including members of *Armée de liberation du Rwanda*, (ALIR), *Forces Démocratique de Libération du Rwanda* (FDLR), *Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi* (FOCA));
- ii. those who became part of the Congolese military, the *Forces armées congolaises* (FAC); and
- iii. those members who joined Mai-Mai tribal militia groups in DRC.*

The total number of individuals processed under each category is shown in Table 5 and the target objects for the program are also indicated.

Table 5: Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (RDRC)

Category	Cumulative	% of target	Target	Balance
Ex-RDF	16,592	83	20,000	3,408
Ex-FAR	12,260	82	15,000	2,740
Ex-Armed Groups	4,509	20	22,500	17,991
Ex-AG Child >18	554	22	2,500	1,946
Total Armed Groups	5,063	20	25,000	19,937
Total	33,915	57	60,000	26,085

Data Source: RDRC statistics as of 30 November 2004

Releasing former combatants back into the population can present a number of social and economic problems, if the soldiers are not properly prepared to return to a civilian environment. How soldiers are treated following the end of a conflict reflects the value that society places on its military and will affect the self image of the demobilized and serving soldier. Respectful handling of war veterans will enhance civil-military relations and contribute to the formation of a positive military culture. In preparation for

* The Mai-Mai are local defence forces in the DRC. They are loosely organized and not under any central command. Some groups co-operate with DRC government forces, but others oppose the government. They tend to align themselves with which ever group they view as furthering their interests at the time. They switched sides routinely throughout the DRC conflict.

reintegration the ex-RDF and ex-FAR members receive a two week orientation course, and the former members of armed groups receive two months of orientation training. A number of financial and training packages are available to help with the transition and to assist the demobilized personnel to find some means to support themselves outside the military. Every province has an RDRC office to assist demobilized fighters with problems after they return to their communities. The former combatants can choose where they want to relocate and what occupational training they wish to pursue.¹⁵

Special Target Groups. Specific measures are taken to address the needs of women, children, and disabled combatants that enter the program. The demobilisation of child soldiers (those under 18 years of age) is managed through a separate process. Children are separated from adults and given special attention. Where possible their families are located and the children reunited with their relatives. Trauma counselling, psychosocial care and access to education are also provided. Like the child soldiers, there is a special program for physically and mentally disabled ex-combatants to ensure that their medical issues are addressed and supported after demobilization. Program managers are directed to ensure that female soldiers receive the same benefits as their male counterparts, and are encouraged to participate in community level counselling and associations.

Severance Package. Immediately on demobilisation, each former member of the national army is given the equivalent of \$90 USD, while former militia members get \$70 USD. They are also provided with basic household items such as blankets, dishes, and tools for farming. In addition, former regular force soldiers, including the ex-FAR, are

given a "recognition of service allowance" in accordance with their rank. For example, an army private will receive the equivalent of \$180 USD and a Colonel would receive \$820.[†] The money is paid in two cash instalments, the first within three months of discharge.

Reintegration Package. A variety of vocational training packages are conducted by the demobilization commission in conjunction with some foreign NGOs. The former soldiers can choose what training they would like to pursue and the commission assists them in selecting a program. In 1999, the Veterans Vocational Training Centre (VVTC) was established in Butare to help former soldiers learn skills such as masonry, carpentry, welding and tailoring to help them start a new career. In order to encourage an entrepreneurial spirit in the former combatants, reintegration grant of \$180 USD is issued six months after demobilisation, if the candidate can present a viable project to be sponsored. For example, one group of veterans used their loans to set up a cooperative in Kigali which specializes in carpentry work and owns a number of small shops that sell building materials and household goods. The cooperative has 18 members, which includes a mixture of former RDF, FAR veterans, as well as civilians. The group also runs workshops to train other demobilised soldiers in carpentry skill. Earnings are shared equally amongst the members of the co-op.¹⁶

[†] According to USAID Gross National Income (GNI) for Rwanda in 2003 was \$220.00USD. A household survey conducted in Cyangugu Province in 2003 found that annual per capita income ranged between \$22.00 and \$268.00 USD with the average income at \$83.00 USD. Cyangugu is a rural area; average income is higher in an urban area like Kigali which accounts for the difference from the 2003 GNI figure. For more information see Robert Soeters and Antonio Luzito, "Baseline Household Survey, Republic of Rwanda," in *Basic Health Services Programme 2003-2006*, ed. USAID (Cyangugu: CORDAID, 2003), 3.

A limited survey of 26 demobilized combatants conducted in 2002 found that the majority of ordinary soldiers had taken up farming as an occupation, while NCOs were more likely to stay in urban centres where they were now engaged in some form of trade -drivers, security guards, construction workers and fishing were mentioned. In most cases, their standard of living and social status was better when they were members of the military, which has caused some discontentment amongst demobilised soldiers. Until the Rwandan economy can be improved in general, this will be an ongoing problem.¹⁷ The key stabilizing factor in the current program is that ex-FAR and RPA soldiers are equally disadvantaged by their removal from the military and so the ethnic dimension to the demobilization of soldier has been removed. The loss of a position in the army can not be attributed to ethnic discrimination which had been a major dissatisfier in the past.

Paying the Troops

When the RPF initially took over responsibility for governing Rwanda in 1994, it was unable to pay its troops for months because the former-government had taken all the countries assets with them when it pulled out. Unpaid soldiers caused a number of problems, including hiring themselves out as private gunmen, robbing civilians, and looting property.¹⁸ Many of the criminal acts by soldiers that occurred in the year following the genocide were the result of troops going unpaid. Morale of the army was seriously affected by the fact the UN soldiers in Rwanda from other countries were very well paid and the international community had rushed to care for the former government forces in refugee camps in Zaire. The RPA soldiers who had won the war and stopped the genocide appeared to be the ones least rewarded or recognized.

Learning from these lessons of the past, the RDF has ensured that its soldiers are paid regularly. Soldiers are paid through direct deposit into their own bank accounts, and not given cash directly. This eliminates the problem of pay roll theft or mismanagement that is often seen in other African countries. The soldiers receive a modest salary on a regularly basis which eliminates the need to extort or steal from the local population for income purposes. The number of incidents of harassment of civilians by military personnel significantly reduced compared to 1994-95 when the military was not being paid.¹⁹ Making sure that the soldiers were financially secure contributed to a positive military culture and increased the self-respect of the troops. The need for a soldier to extort money from the population in order to survive no longer exists, and has improved civil-military relations.

In 1997, the Ministry of Defence established a Credit and Savings Scheme (CSS) to manage the high volume of financial assistance requests that it was receiving from the soldiers. Ten percent of the soldiers' salaries are deducted and used to finance the CSS. When 20,000 soldiers were deployed to the DRC from 1998-2002, their salaries were invested by the CSS through commercial banks. The spouses of soldiers on deployment are able to access their salaries through the CSS, if they have written permission from the military member. When the soldiers returned from deployment, they were able to collect their salaries with the accumulated interest. The CSS is also used to manage payments to soldiers in the demobilization program. The ex-FAR/I members who are demobilized or

integrated into the RDF become stakeholders in the CSS and also benefit from the services it provides.²⁰

Reorganisation of Security Forces

In October 2002, the government of Rwanda announced a reorganization of its military which would now focus on territorial defence rather than light infantry expeditionary operations that it had been conducting in the DRC. The name change was also unveiled at that time. The army would now be called the Rwanda Defence Force. As mentioned at the start of this chapter, the decision to change the name was not only to highlight the new mission, but also to disassociate the organization from the Rwandan Patriotic Army of the past. The name change to the RDF represented the way ahead for the new national military that was a blend of the two forces seen as ‘uni-ethnic’ that had fought the civil war. Under the 2003 constitution, the reorganization of the army was made official and its mission defined. Separate National Police and Security Services were established and removed from the army’s structure. According to the constitution:

The National Police are responsible for: ensuring compliance with the law; maintenance of internal public order; ensuring security of person and property; providing urgent humanitarian assistance in case of disasters, calamities and accidents; ensuring respect for the law relating to air space, borders and waters; combating terrorism ; participating in international peace keeping missions, humanitarian assistance and training.

The National Security Service is responsible for: organizing and supervising intelligence inside and outside the country; analysing the impact of international affairs on national security; dealing with all issues relating to immigration and emigration; advising the Government on all issues concerning national security.

The Rwanda Defence Forces are responsible for defending national territorial integrity and sovereignty; collaborating with other security organs in safeguarding public order and enforcement of the law;

participating in humanitarian activities in case of disasters; and contributing to the development of the country; and participating in international peace keeping missions, humanitarian assistance and training.²¹

Separating the internal policing and intelligence functions from the primary military mandate will contribute to the development of a military culture focused on external security. The National police undergo six-months of intensive training that includes courses on human rights, law and justice. The police forces are currently undermanned while personnel are being trained and deployed. Local Defence Forces (LDF) have been re-established to augment local police in the interim.

Local Defence Forces

The LDF are an unpaid, volunteer force that is locally recruited; many members are unemployed. The LDF receives two to three months of training, but their operational capability is assessed to be limited. They wear burgundy coloured uniforms and many carry rifles. Perception of the effectiveness of the LDF varies from being seen as a useful measure to augment police and security forces at the community level to being a dangerous group of organized thugs that form a local armed militia. The variation in reporting is probably due to the differences in command, control, and training of the force depending on the local authorities in the area where they are recruited and employed. Individual members of the LDF have been accused of various crimes and human rights violations. The national police are responsible for investigating complaints related to the LDF.²²

Professionalization

With the role of the Rwanda Defence Forces clarified in the new constitution, the military began to pursue professional training for its personnel to meet these requirements. The Rwandan Ministry of Defence introduced an adult education program at the military college in Ruhengeri to make sure that soldiers have at least a minimum level of literacy. The adult education program provides the soldiers with the basic education level that is needed to proceed on formal military training. The RDF has the technical capability to train its soldiers in most of the basic military skills. Experienced combat instructors ensure candidates for the RDF are highly motivated and develop a high level of competency in field crafts, weapons skills, and tactical knowledge. A number of combat manoeuvres and principles are taught and drilled at the company level. According to the 2004 Jane's security assessment, the Rwandan army's "enlightened training philosophies have produced a light infantry that is superior in nearly every way to its counterparts on the African continent."²³

For specialized training in areas where it lacks experience, the RDF seeks assistance from military professionals in other countries. Additional training is provided to the RDF primarily by Kenya, Uganda, South Africa, and the USA. The United States has provided military training to the Rwandan army since 1995, which has included courses in civil-military relations and counterinsurgency methods. Rwandan officers now attend foreign staff colleges in Ghana, Nigeria, Zambia, Egypt, the USA, Belgium and China. The International Red Cross sponsored and facilitated the training of officers in International Humanitarian Law, and those officers are now training other members of

the RDF. International Humanitarian Law has become part of the standard component of RDF training doctrine. Army officers have also received human rights training with the assistance of local and international human rights organizations.²⁴

The Rwandan Defence Forces have expressed an interest in participating in UN peacekeeping operations for a number of years. To date, the UN has not accepted any Rwandan troops for a peacekeeping mission. However, the RDF deployed for its first peacekeeping assignment to Darfur, Sudan under an African Union mandate in August 2004. Prior to deploying on a peacekeeping mission, Rwandan soldiers receive training from the Peace Support Training Centre in Nairobi, Kenya. The RDF hopes that its involvement in peacekeeping assignments will increase the army's professionalism and allow it to demonstrate in an international environment how far the organization has progressed from its days as a guerrilla army.²⁵

Taking the Military Out of Politics

A big challenge for the former-RPA members will be to completely disengage from politics. One of principles on which the RPF was founded was that its military officers would have political and leadership responsibilities. The importance it placed on the role of the military in helping to build and govern the country was reflected in the 6 positions reserved specifically for RPA members in the transitional parliament. With the move to multiparty politics and the introduction of a new constitution in 1993, the government implemented measures to ensure that the military would become non-partisan. The law which formed the RDF also prohibited its members from becoming

affiliated with any political party or association. Soldiers are barred from publicly promoting the political ideology of any party or from taking part in any type of demonstrations. However, members of the military are entitled to vote.²⁶

According to Article 106 for the 2003 Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda, “The office of the President of the Republic is incompatible with the holding of any other elective public office, public function or any other civilian or military employment or professional activities.” In accordance with the constitution, Major General Kagame officially retired from the Rwandan Defence Forces on 3 July 2003, so that he could legally campaign as a candidate in the presidential elections held in the August that year.²⁷

When the first elections were held at the local level in 1999 and district level in 2001, there were several complaints from outside observers of the military’s interference in the process. The military was accused of forcefully recruiting people to join the RPF political party, of holding political meetings for select candidates on army bases, and of pressuring people to vote. Groups of up to 10 soldiers were reported to be present at polling stations.²⁸ In the 2003 presidential and parliamentary elections, none of the after action reports that I reviewed mentioned intimidation by members of the army. Although there were reports of harassment of candidates and voters by militant members of the RPF and by the police, direct army involvement or influence in the elections was not referenced.²⁹ While members of the local defence forces were present at polling stations, they were located a good distance from any polling rooms and were primarily sleeping or

lying around on the grass. No uniformed members of the RPA were visible.[‡] However, the final report by the EU monitoring team stated that at 9% of the polls visited, their team members observed unauthorized personnel present, which included military.[§]

Socio-Economic Role

Included in missions designated for the RDF are participating actively in National development, and promoting income generating activities. At the basic level, the RDF through the integration program provides jobs for the former members of the ex-FAR/I. Instead of posing a threat to security, these soldiers' skills are now applied to defending the country and their salaries go into supporting the economy of their local communities. Rather than being a menace, they are now contributing to stabilization.³⁰ The army also helps with local economic development by repairing roads and infrastructure. The demobilization program encourages former soldiers to create new businesses and contribute to the enhancement of their communities. On a less conventional framework, the RDF involvement in the war in the DRC had economic benefits for the county. As the UN report on the illegal exploitation of resources in the DRC highlighted, for Rwanda, exploitation of resources was used to serve the state rather than individual interests.³¹ The war did not drain the country's resources, but added to them. However, it is unlikely that this type of economic diversification would be encouraged as a means

[‡] Personal observations as a member of the Canadian Election Observer team to the 2003 Parliamentary elections. My team observed 12 polling stations in Gitarama, other members of the Canadian contingent confirmed that the same situation was observed in other provinces.

[§] No distinction was made between security forces and military personnel, so the exact number of incidents where unauthorized military (i.e. RDF) were present is not clear, if they were at all. See Elections Legislatives - Rapport Final, 37. EOM, *EU Election Observation Mission (EOM) to Rwanda*.

to building the economy, and no member of the RDF promoted or even mentioned the subject of resource exploitation in the DRC during our interviews.

Summary

The elements that influenced military culture for members of the ex-FAR and the RPA before they were integrated to form the Rwanda Defence Force are shown in Table 6 below. The desired qualities of the new organization that will contribute to a positive military culture that is free of ethnic discrimination and will improve civil-military relations are listed in the last column of the table. A significant effort has been

Table 6: Analysis of Military Culture of Rwandan Forces 1994-2004
Represents the key characteristic of each force at the time of integration and the desired end state of military culture in the RDF

Elements	FAR 1994	RPA 1994	RDF 2004
Leadership	Hutu extremist	Tutsi rebels	Professional military officers
Personnel	exclusively Hutu	predominately Tutsi	mix of Hutu and Tutsi at all levels
Primary Mandate	- civil war - genocide	- overthrow regime & return refugees	- national defence
Threat	Tutsi rebels	Hutu extremists	foreign aggressors
Education Training	- varied	- varied	- minimum education standard - professional military training
Operational Experience	internal security	revolutionary guerrilla warfare	- civil war -counter-insurgency -war in the DRC
Ideological Base	Hutu extremist	Maoist	Rwandan pre-colonial culture
Conduct	- relatively good discipline - committed genocide and mass murder	- initially high level of discipline, but broke down over time - arbitrary killing and detainment of civilians	- high standard of discipline - good civil-military relationship

made by the Rwandan government to ensure not only ethnic representation in the military, but the formation of a new military culture that will undermine the racial bias and negative ideology that has plagued the organization since independence.

Security in Rwanda has significantly improved with the transformation of the military to the Rwanda Defence Force. The focus has been to legitimize the mandate of the army and make it representative of the entire population, so that no group feels threatened inside Rwanda. The incorporation of the former government's forces into the army has reduced ethnic tensions and ex-FAR soldiers in the RDF no longer buy into the Hutu extremist ideology of their former leaders. Equal treatment of veterans from both the RPA and ex-FAR in terms of access to programs and demobilization benefits has demonstrated the government's commitment to recognizing soldiers from both sides in the civil war. The removal of the military from direct involvement in politics has contributed to the appearance of politically neutral force. Civil-military relations have improved and Human Rights Watch has not reported any attacks on civilians by members of the military in Rwanda since the year 2000.** On going professionalizing of the military should further reinforce the people of Rwanda's confidence in the military as an institution that is designed to protect them, rather than the primary source of violence and corruption as it was in the past.³² All of these factors support the hypothesis that military culture can be changed to enhance security and contribute to conflict resolution.

** Human Rights Watch reported alleged crimes against civilians committed by the RPA in the DRC, but not inside Rwanda. From 2001 on, the only mention of Rwandan soldiers in the HRW annual reports were in reference to the organization's dissatisfaction with the Rwandan government and the international community failures to hold RPA soldier accountable for war crimes committed in the past. See HRW, *Overview of Human Rights Developments: Rwanda* (Human Rights Watch, 1994-2004); available from <http://hrw.org/doc/?t=africa&c=rwanda> [January 25, 2005].

Chapter 5 provides some concluding remarks on the current status of the Rwanda Defence Force's reconciliation process and some of the challenges it continues to face.

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CHAPTER 5

Conclusion

This thesis set out to answer two research questions related to military culture, intrastate conflict, and conflict resolution. The first question inquired how a corrupted military culture can contribute to or increase intrastate conflict. The second question asked if military culture could be changed in order to promote conflict resolution, and if so, how? A case study of the evolution of military culture in Rwanda was conducted to test the following hypotheses:

1. Exclusionary national ideology, discriminatory recruiting practises, and the army's misuse in an internal security role to suppress or kill members of the local population may corrupt military culture. These factors may produce a military that is politically biased, racist, and a threat to its own people.
2. Military culture may be changed to reduce conflict, increase security, and contribute to conflict resolution. The military may become an institution that lessens ethnic tensions and builds confidence in the democratic process. Military culture may be transformed by introducing programs that make the military representative of the population, increase professionalism, improve civil-military relations, ensure a proper mandate and mission are assigned, make the forces non-partisan, and promote a non-racist ideology and a respect for human rights.

My research of the Rwandan military from 1960 to 1994 supported the first hypothesis. The case study revealed that in the pre-colonial period the military was an integral institution of Rwandan society. The army's role was to expand, enrich and protect the state. Families from all regions and social groups (Hutu, Tutsi and Twa) sent their sons to military schools to become professional soldiers/royal guards. To be a warrior held a great deal of status and respect within the community. The traditional army saw itself as the leader, educator, and protector of the people. However, during the

colonial period, the Rwandan military was dismantled and replaced with a foreign manned and led security force with the purpose of imposing colonial power.

Just prior to independence, the Belgians recruited and trained a new Rwandan army with the mission of maintaining the Hutu administration in power following the 1959 Revolution that forced the former Tutsi elite into exile. Under the First and Second Republics in Rwanda, the military was moulded on an ideology of regionalism, racism and hostility towards the Tutsi population. As a result, a military culture evolved that was elitist, exclusive and hostile to anyone who challenged the ruling party's authority. The role of the military was not to defend the country against foreign aggression, but to suppress and eliminate Tutsis, and maintain an elite group in power. Through its training, ideology, mandate, and extremist leadership, the FAR military culture became one that promoted hate, advocated violence against civilians, and supported the elimination of all political opposition. Out of this environment, the 1994 Genocide was conceived, orchestrated and conducted by Hutu extremists who controlled the government and the military.

My research findings on the evolution of the Rwandan military from 1994 to 2004 supported the second hypothesis. The Rwandan government has successfully integrated members of the RPA and ex-FAR and fostered a new military culture in the Rwanda Defence Force that is inclusive, professional, and focused on protecting the population from an external threat. The shift in military culture was achieved through instruction and interaction of soldiers from both groups at *Ingando* camps. These solidarity camps

were created based on the model of pre-colonial military schools where army training and cultural formation of future soldiers took place. The RDF has received professional military training, and instruction in International Humanitarian Law and human rights from both local and international experts. Systems have been established to ensure that soldiers are paid regularly and assisted when leaving the military and returning to civilian life. The military positions in National Assembly have been removed and laws are now in place that prohibited RDF members from becoming affiliated with any political party or association. These programs were designed to create a national army that is professional, non-partisan, and representative of the entire population. Consequently, security and civil-military relations in Rwanda have improved significantly.

Through a deliberate and consistent effort to legitimize the military, the Rwandan government has succeeded in producing an effective, well disciplined army that is trying to overcome the stigmatisation of the institution's violent sectarian past. If two forces evolving out of diametrically opposed institutions can come together and successfully reconcile their differences, the potential for long term stability in Rwanda will increase.

Overcoming the fear that is now entrenched in Rwandan society, driven both by personal experience and extremist propaganda, will remain a major challenge for current and future government officials. The military and political history of both Rwanda and Burundi has fed the fear that the armed forces of one ethnic group or region will attempt to seize power and try to exterminate those who challenge them.¹ With repeated cases of massacres of Hutus, Tutsis, and Twa by government controlled forces in the Great Lakes

region since 1959, confidence building and reconciliation has been extremely difficult to achieve (see appendix D for a list of past massacres in Rwanda and Burundi).

A review of Central African history reveals that most episodes of mass violence were deliberately planned and specifically executed to further political objectives of the ruling or military elite. From the late 1950s until the genocide in 1994, Rwanda's political parties and government sponsored programs systematically excluded and alienated the Tutsi members of society. These programs were so successful that by the time the genocide was initiated a large portion of the Hutu population was "deeply persuaded that the Tutsi were evil"² and that their total elimination was a rational objective. It was possible to massacre so many people in such a short time in 1994 because the general population actively participated in the killings, and "many who didn't kill, didn't mind the fact that the killings were taking place".³

The genocidal ideology against the Tutsi survives in the continuing presence of the FDLR in neighbouring DRC. New recruits have joined the group since the end of the 1994 genocide. They have been indoctrinated into the same genocidal ideology, which negates the significance of the fact that most of the current members are not from the original ex-FAR/I group that withdrew after the war. The FDLR threat has been downplayed by many international agencies which accuse the RPF government of exaggerating the risk that the group poses to Rwanda.⁴ Although the FDLR does not have the capacity to achieve a military defeat over the Rwandan army, it continues to destabilize the country and undermine the reconciliation process. Concerned for this

ongoing negative influence of the Hutu extremists, the Rwandan government has enacted laws against the promotion of “divisionism” (i.e., the promotion of ethnic differences). The Rwandan government has been accused of using these laws to suppress any form of dissent or political opposition.⁵

Rwanda has repeatedly threatened to send its forces back into the DRC to eliminate the security threat posed by the rebels, and has done so on at least two occasions in the past year.* MONUC has stated the Rwandan position poses a serious threat to the security of the region, but neither MONUC nor any other group to date has taken any serious action to disarm or contain the Rwandan rebels.⁶ The African Union recently agreed to deploy troops to the Rwanda/DRC border to “help forcibly disarm Rwandan Hutu rebels.”⁷ Rwanda’s own integration program--which initially showed very positive results--seems to have reached the limit of its ability to convince the remaining FDRL members to give up the fight. Since 2001, the rate of returnees to Rwanda has been minimal as programs in the DRC to encourage voluntary repatriation have failed. Although Major-General Rwarakabije conducted an information campaign after his return and integration into the RDF, he was unable to inspire a significant number of FDLR to lay down their arms. The FDLR insists on holding “inter-Rwandan talks” with RPF government to negotiate terms for a ceasefire. The RPF refuses to enter

* MONUC reporting confirmed the presences of RDF troops in the DRC in hot pursuit of FDLR forces following attacks on Rwanda in April and November 2004. MONUC, "Peace and Security Section," in *Daily SITCEN Mission Reports* (Kinshasa: United Nations Mission in the DRC, 2004).

into negotiation with the FDLR, on the grounds that the Arusha accord is still valid. As a result, a diplomatic solution to the stalemate is unlikely to be reached in the near term.[†]

The Rwandan government's program to transform the military and nurture a new military culture appears successful, but will need to be monitored over time to determine if it has truly created a non-partisan force. The RDF has not faced the challenge of a change in government or serious threat to the Rwandan Patriotic Front's hold on power. The military has not yet been put in the position of having to choose between supporting an individual or political party as opposed to the people of Rwanda and its institutions.

Rwanda's success integrating its forces and using the military as a vehicle for conflict resolution could be employed by other countries in the process of merging armed groups to form a national army. The Rwandan example may be particularly relevant to African states that are emerging from a civil war where the military is one of the few functioning institutions present in the country. Looking to the pre-colonial past to find a unifying identity on which to shape a new military culture or ideology may work for other forces in Africa dealing with a post-conflict environment. The Rwandans recognized that more than simple quotas were needed to build an army that could win the confidence of a divided nation. Numerical representation alone was not enough to undo

[†] On 31 March 2005, following talks in Rome between representative of the DRC Government and the FDLR, the rebel group's president Ignace Murwanashyaka declared an end to the armed struggle and announced that it would be halting all offensive operations against Rwanda. He said they would return to Rwanda peacefully and form a political party. A spokesman for the Rwandan government said "the country was ready to receive them, but that no conditions could be attached to their return. Any former rebels who committed genocidal crimes must face justice." (BBC News 31 March 2005, <<http://newswww.bbc.net.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4396785.stm>>) Whether or not Murwanashyaka speaks for all the hard-core members of the FDLR in the DRC still remains to be seen.

generations of teaching that one group should fear the other. Furthermore, quota systems in Rwanda were used to suppress the minority rather than to protect rights, and as such, were treated with suspicion.

The Rwandan government continues to fight the tendency for observers and opponents to count the number of Tutsi and Hutus in the military and government as a means of evaluating its success. The RPF has been charged by academics like Johan Pottier and Filip Reyntjens of re-writing history and of shifting the focus to a Rwandan rather than an ethnic identity as a means of camouflaging past and present Tutsi domination.⁸ Former-President and Hutu-member of the RPF, Pasteur Bizimungu, made the following statement after founding an opposition movement in 2001, “Here as in Burundi, the army is monoethnic. You cannot run Rwanda with an army that is 100 percent Tutsi, while the population is 85 percent Hutu!”⁹ Blatantly inaccurate statements like this do not help the opposition’s cause.[‡] While it is true that former-RPA members do hold the majority of the key offices in the Rwanda Defence Force, they are not all Tutsis. Furthermore, Bizimungu--who was the country’s president from 1994 to 2000--knew that more than 20,000 Hutu soldiers, including a number of senior officers, had been integrated into the RPA by 2001. When Hutu officers are appointed to senior

[‡] Pasteur Bizimungu was arrested in April 2002 on charges of attacking state security, fostering ethnic division, and engaging in banned political activities. Following a trial that began in April 2004, he was found guilty of embezzlement, inciting violence and associating with criminals, and in June 2004 was sentenced to 15 years in jail.

positions, the action is discounted as “window dressing.”[§] The defection in March 2003 of two senior Hutu officers to Uganda--Former Defence Minister Brigadier-General Emmanuel Habyarimana and Colonel Balthazar Ndengeyinka--following charges of subversion by a Rwandan parliamentary commission added fuel to the opposition’s criticism. As the RPA won the civil war, it is not surprising that they chose to maintain control over the military and not to reduce the standing of their officers. The fact that they have successfully and voluntarily integrated large numbers of the former government’s soldiers into the national army remains a significant achievement. However, some people will not be happy with any progress until the numbers of Tutsis in command positions is reduced considerably. After past decades of conditioning, the habit of viewing everything through the lens of Hutu and Tutsi identities in Rwanda will be very difficult to break.

[§] Former Prime Minister (1995-2000) Pierre Celestin Rwigema stated in a letter to the participants of the Conference on Peace in the Great Lakes in Washington in October 2002 that “In 1998 Lt. Col. Habyarimana Emmanuel, now Brig. General, was appointed Minister of State in Charge of Defense, and joined the Tutsi-led Government as a window-dressing for the International Community to show that Hutu are given high-ranking positions in the Rwandan Army and that they share with Tutsi the destiny of the Rwanda.” Rwigema resigned as Prime Minister in February 2000 after members of the National Assembly accused him of financial mismanagement and abuse of office.

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² Fergal Keane, *Interview with Gérard Prunier* (April 1997); available from <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/rwanda/etc/interview.html> [January 13, 2005].

³ Keane, *Interview with Gérard Prunier*.

⁴ ICG, *Rwandan Hutu Rebels in the Congo: a New Approach to Disarmament and Reintegration* (International Crisis Group, 2003); available from <http://www.icg.org/home/index.cfm?id=1554&l=1> [June 25 2004].

⁵ HRW, *Rwanda Country Report* (Human Rights Watch, 2005); available from <http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2005/01/13/rwanda9860.htm> [February 08, 2005]; OXFAM, *RWANDA: Parliament's Decisions Potentially Fatal for Civil Society* (Novib, 2004); available from <http://www.novib.nl/content/?type=Article&id=5859> [January 25, 2005].

⁶ Yulu Kabamba, *MONUC strongly reacts to Rwanda's threat to attack FDLR in DRC* (UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2004); available from <http://www.notes.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/f3e20cd92465be9985256f580062c3f9?OpenDocument> [January 8, 2005].

⁷ Wairagala Wakabi, "African Force to Disarm Interahamwe in Congo," *The East African* 2005.

⁸ Johan Pottier, *Re-imagining Rwanda: conflict, survival and disinformation in the late twentieth century*, *African studies series* (Cambridge [England]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 120; Filip Reyntjens, "Rwanda, Ten Years on: from Genocide to Dictatorship," *African Affairs* 103 (2004).

⁹ Reyntjens, "Rwanda, Ten Years on," 193.

APPENDIX A: TEN COMMANDMENTS OF THE HUTU

Published December, 1990 in the *KANGURA* (Awaken) newspaper - state owned.

1. Every muhutu should know that a mutusi woman, wherever she is, works for the interest of her Tutsi ethnic group as a result we shall consider a traitor any muhutu who marries a mututsi woman, makes a mututsi woman his concubine, ploys a mututsi woman as secretary or makes her his dependant.
2. Every muhutu should know that our bahutu daughters are more suitable and conscientious in their role of women, spouses and family mothers. Are they not beautiful, good secretaries and more honest?
3. Bahutu women be vigilant and try to bring your husbands, brothers and sons back to reason.
4. Every muhutu should know that every mututsi is dishonest in business. His only aim is to enhance the supremacy of his ethnic group. As a result, we shall consider a traitor any muhutu forms an alliance with batutsi in business, invests his money or government's money in a mututsi's enterprise, lends or borrows money from a mututsi, gives favours to batutsi in business like obtaining of import licences, bank loans, construction plots, public markets etc.
5. All the strategic posts, be they political, administrative, economic, military and security must be entrusted to bahutu.
6. The education sector (pupils, students, teachers) must be majority hutu.
7. The Rwandese armed forces must be exclusively hutu. The experience of the October war has taught us a lesson. No military person should marry a mututsi woman.
8. The bahutu should stop having mercy on the batutsi.
9. The bahutu, wherever they are, must have unity, solidarity and be pre-occupied by the fate of their Hutu brothers the bahutu both inside and outside Rwanda must constantly look for friends and allies for the Hutu cause, starting with our bahutu brothers; They must constantly counteract the tutsi propaganda. the bahutu must be firm and vigilant against their common enemy who are batutsi.
10. The 1959 social revolution, the 1961 referendum and the hutu ideology must be taught to every muhutu and at all levels. Every muhutu must spread widely this ideology. We shall consider a traitor any muhutu who will persecute his muhutu brother for having read, spread and taught this ideology.

 Source: Wilson Rutayisire, (1995) *Institutionalisation of Ethnic Ideology and Segregation in Rwanda* (International conference on Genocide, Impunity, Justice and Accountability in Rwanda)
 <<http://www.panafricanmovement.org/R.Genocide2.htm>>

APPENDIX B: THE EIGHT POINT PLAN

Introduced at the seventh congress of the Rwandan Alliance for National Unity (RANU) held in Kampala, Uganda- December 1987.

Stated objectives of the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF):

1. to promote national unity and reconciliation;
2. to establish genuine democracy;
3. to provide security for all Rwandans;
4. to build an integrated and self-sustaining economy;
5. to eradicate corruption in all forms
6. to repatriate and resettle Rwandan refugees;
7. to devise and implement policies that promote the social welfare of all Rwandans and;
8. to pursue a foreign policy based on equality, peaceful co-existence and mutual benefit between Rwanda and other countries.

Source: Government of Rwanda website, History of a People available from <http://www.gov.rw/government/historyf.html> [5 January 2005]

**APPENDIX C: OBJECTIVES OF FORCES DEMOCRATIQUES DE
LIBERATION DU RWANDA (FDLR).**

- End wars and establish peace in Rwanda and the region;
- Establish a regime based on universal principles of rule of law, multiparty system of democracy, free and honest elections organised on the basis of one man = one vote principle, as well as republican values;
- Promote moral values with strict respect of life and human dignity, honesty, truth, freedom, individual emancipation, equality, justice, respect, brotherhood, confidence, and interdependence among the Rwandan people;
- Work for national reconciliation and reconstruction and for social and economic development of the country;
- Establish the truth on the Rwandan tragedy, in order to punish the culprits and to rehabilitate all victims without distinction;
- Promote peace as well as co-operation between Rwanda, the neighbouring nations, and the International Community;
- Ensure good management of public property.

Source: FDLR Website <http://fdlr.r-online.info/quienglish.html> as posted on February 1, 2005

APPENDIX D: MASSACRES OF HUTU AND TUTSI IN RWANDA AND BURUNDI SINCE 1959

Rwanda

- **1959** ~300 Tutsi killed in riots by Hutu civilians, 100+ Hutu killed in retaliatory attacks by Tutsi forces.
- **1963-1967** - 10,000-20,000 Tutsi killed by army and civilians in a number of government sponsored attacks.
- **1972** - 1000+ Tutsi killed by army and civilians.
- **1994 - April-August** 800,000-1,000,000 Tutsi and unknown number of Hutu killed by army, militias and civilians.
- **1994 - August-December** 10,000s killed by Hutu insurgents and RPA retaliation attacks.
- **1995** - 4,000 Hutus IDPs killed by RPA at Kibeho.
- **1997** - January-August 6,000+ unarmed civilians killed by Hutu insurgents and during RPA counter-insurgency operations in north-western Rwanda.
- **1997** - October-December 1000s of unarmed civilians killed by Hutu insurgents and RPA in north-western and central Rwanda.
- **1997** - December 1,000 Tutsi are killed & 1,000 wounded by Hutu insurgents at Mudende refugee camp in the Gisenyi. In retaliation, Tutsi civilians & RPA killed 200+ Hutu civilians in the same area.

Burundi

- **1965** - 500 Tutsi killed by civilians, 2000 Hutu killed by army.
- **1972** - 3,000-10,000 Tutsi by Hutu Rebels, 150,000-300,000 Hutu killed by army.
- **1988** - 3,000 Tutsi killed by rebels, 20,000 Hutus killed by army.
- **1993** - 20,000 Tutsi by rebels and civilians, 50,000-100,000 Hutu killed by army.
- **2003** - ~300,000 civilians killed in fighting between army and rebels since 1993.

Sources: Matthew White. *Death Tolls for the Major Wars and Atrocities of the Twentieth Century*. (January 2003) available from <http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstat2.htm>;
 Gregory H. Stanton. *Genocides, Politicides, and Other Mass Murder Since 1945* (2004) available from <http://www.genocidewatch.org/genocidetable2003.htm>;

APPENDIX E: RWANDAN KINGS AND PRESIDENTS 1744-2004

Rwandan Kings (*Mwami*)

1744-1768	Cyilima II Rujugira
1768-1792	Kigeli III Ndararasa
1792-1797	Mibambwe III Sentabyo
1797-1830	Yuhi III Gahindiro
1830-1860	Mutara II Rwogera
1860-1895	Kigeri IV Rwabugiri
1895-Nov 1896	Mibwambwe IV Rutarindwa
Nov 1896-12 Nov 1931	Yuhi IV Musinga
12 Nov 1931-25 Jul 1959	Mutara III Rudahigwa
25 Jul 1959-28 Jan 1961	Kigeri V Ndahindurwa (in exile from 25 Jul 1960)

Presidents:

26 Oct 1961-05 Jul 1973	Grégoire Kayibanda (elected)
05 Jul 1973-06 Apr 1994	Juvénal Habyarimana (took power via military coup)
09 Apr 1994-19 Jul 1994	Théodore Sindikubwabo (acting)
19 Jul 1994-23 Mar 2000	Pasteur Bizimungu (appointed by transitional government)
24 Mar 2000-	Paul Kagame (interim until elected on 29 Sep 2003)

Sources: Bruce R. Gordon. *Regnal Chronologies* (2005) available from <http://www.hostkingdom.net/genindex.html>; Ben Cahoon. *World Statesman: Rwanda* available from <http://www.worldstatesmen.org/Rwanda.htm>

APPENDIX F: RESEARCH INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Research interviews were conducted in Rwanda between the 6th and 17th December 2004.

The interviews were focused around the following questions which were presented to the subject prior to the interview taking place:

- a. How has the *Ingando* process been used to foster a unified identity amongst the soldiers of different ethnic groups?
- b. What methods are used to encourage unit cohesion and bonding?
- c. Is there a specific code of conduct for RDF personnel?
- d. What training is being conducted to professionalize the military?
- e. How are soldiers selected and prepared for demobilization and reintegration into the civilian population?
- f. What measures have been adopted to re-instil the civilian population's confidence and trust in the military and security forces following the genocide? and,
- g. How has the integration of forces process contributed to national reconciliation?

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