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**IS THERE A ROLE TO PLAY FOR THE POLISH
INTELLIGENTSIA AT THE DOORSTEP OF THE 21ST
CENTURY?**

by

ILONA KACZMAREK-BARTMAN, B.A.

A thesis submitted to
the faculty of Graduate Studies
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

Masters of Arts

Department of Sociology

Carleton University

Ottawa, Ontario

August 24th, 1999

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Thesis Supervisor

Chair, Department of Sociology and Anthropology

Carleton University
August 24, 1999

ABSTRACT

The objective of this study is to determine the degree to which the mentality of Polish society changed since the collapse of communism. The focus is on the position of the intelligentsia during the early 1990s. Data for this study come from the International Social Survey Program and the survey on educational needs conducted by the main Statistical Bureau of Poland.

Overall, the social attitudes are supportive to the capitalistic value system of rewards. The Polish people are gradually adopting the capitalistic notion that education is a financial long-term investment. Such a belief is at odds with that held by the traditional Polish intelligentsia, who believe that the ability to think for oneself and to share ideas are the greatest benefits of education.

The findings suggest that Poles will continue the development of their capitalistic notion of value system and therefore fertilize the development of capitalism. At the same time, the development of a capitalist value system is causing the gradual phasing out of the Polish intelligentsia.

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Chapter 1: Why a Polish Intelligentsia in the 1990s?

The end of the twentieth century has brought enormous political and economic changes to East-Central Europe. With the collapse of communism, Poland, as well as other countries in Central Eastern Europe, gained its capitalistic structure and began a process of radical reform.

The countries of East-Central Europe have set out on the road to political and economic reform on a scale unprecedented in this century. Their broad objective is a rapid transition from a centrally planned to a market-oriented economy integrated with the European and global economy. Furthermore, the reforms are aimed at a simultaneous transformation of the political system from a one-party totalitarian dictatorship to a modern parliamentary democracy (Michalak, 1993:1573).

The 1990s have become a period of drastic change in Poland. The U.S. Department of State has included Poland among the ten largest emerging markets in the world (Krajewska, 1996:15). This Central-Eastern European country is in the process of building democracy and capitalism. For these reasons I have decided to write about Poland of the 1990s, as I find this country's trip towards market economy and democracy an extremely interesting issue to study,

In today's world, the terms "democracy" and "market economy" have somewhat interchangeable meanings. Scott Stripling claims that the principles of capitalism and liberal democracy complement one another (1994:1). When Leszek Balcerowicz, Poland's minister of finance, was asked whether capitalism and democracy can co-exist, he wrote:

This question may appear absurd as what we call "democracy" has existed *only* in conjunction with capitalism. But it signals in a somewhat pointed form some real tensions and dilemmas relating to the role of money in contemporary politics. It was Karl Marx who referred to them in the following exaggerated fashion: democracy is impossible under capitalism since under capitalism it is the capitalists who rule. The government is simply an executive committee of the

bourgeoisie. Democracy is only 'formal' or, in other words, a sham. History has falsified this extreme view" (Balcerowicz, 1995: 134).

When we talk about democratic countries with capitalistic economies and a high standard of living, we use the term *market democracy*. Market democracy means "a pluralistic democracy in a free market-oriented society with private property and civil rights, transcending narrow nationalism, where everyone has the freedom to develop" (Macesich, 1991:1). As recent history has taught us, socialist societies – particularly those in Central Eastern Europe – have not been successful in measuring up to the quantity and quality of goods produced in the capitalist countries of Western Europe and North America. For this reason, Poland is reforming its social, economic and political structures.

The collapse of communism helped the Poles to launch a series of reforms to the economic structure and the political system of Poland. The goal of these reforms is to modernize the state to the level of the countries of the Western World. In order to become equal partners with Western Europe and North America, post-communist countries had to shake up their social foundations and rebuild their social structures. Such changes are taking place on several different levels. As Pannu et al. state, many loans granted by the World Bank for reforms in Eastern Europe are conditional upon the implementation of changes that require "the curtailment of government expenditures, a goal that can only be achieved through a drastic reduction of public employees and cuts in social programs, especially in health and education" (Pannu et al., 1992: 508). Educational reforms mean staff reduction, course rationalization (i.e., phasing out departments with low enrolment,

remedial programs in arts, redundant programs, etc.) and increasing revenues from the private sector (tuition fees, contracts with businesses, etc.) (Pannu et al., 1992).

The role of the state in the reforms taking place in the educational system in Poland is not limited to cutting funds and introducing tuition fees. The importance of institutional support for market economy has been recognized by many economists. “Historically, the state has been deeply involved in the creation of markets; moreover, economic growth seems to require concentrated state intervention” (Domanski and Heyns. 1995:319). The state, which serves the economy, has a much greater role to play in the implementation of capitalist ideology. As well as the necessary political, social and economic changes, capitalism also requires for its success and legitimacy certain attitudinal changes in the population. I have chosen to concentrate on one aspect of the Eastern European transition in attitudes. This thesis will be devoted to the analysis of changing values regarding **higher education in twentieth century Poland, particularly the situation of the Polish intelligentsia.**

I have chose to write about the Polish intelligentsia because traditionally the value placed on higher education has been very closely related to the existence of this social group. The strong identity of the intelligentsia is based on education. As Aleksander Gella wrote, “The single most important institution for inculcating this [the intelligentsia’s] set of values and attitudes - and thus for creating the very identity of the stratum – was the educational system” (Gella, 1976:14). The situation of the intelligentsia both past and present can be used to present information describing a wide range of social, economic, educational and cultural features of Poland.

Because I was raised in Poland and lived there through the beginning of the transitional period of the 1980s and 1990s as Poland moved towards democracy, I was able to observe the growing spirit of capitalism in Central Eastern Europe. Annual visits to Poland throughout the 1990s allowed me to notice the changing character of the educated stratum. This has led me to conclude that one of the indicators of if, how, and to what extent Poland accepts the capitalist value system would be the position of the intelligentsia. Moreover, the changing character of the educated stratum in Poland reflects the changes in the system. Consequently, in this thesis I will examine the relevance of the Polish intelligentsia in the 1990s.

The thesis will develop two arguments:

1. The character of the Polish educated stratum reflects the social and political position of Poland. While the character of the Polish Intelligentsia has historically reflected the social and political beliefs of Poles, it does not today. As the modern democratic Polish State evolves, the intelligentsia slowly disintegrates. Its purpose, as defined by its missionary character, is no longer needed. Nevertheless, the weakening of the Intelligentsia is an indicator of a profound and fundamental change that is occurring in Poland since the early 1990s. Therefore a thorough understanding of the polish Intelligentsia is necessary to understand Polish society.

2. Education in capitalism is considered a financial investment. If the value of education per se is seen in Poland as an investment, it means that the Poles have accepted a capitalist value system.

1. The definition of **the intelligentsia** used by Aleksander Gella describes this social group as **people well educated in many different sciences and disciplines. The intelligentsia includes professionals, scientists, and artists who work in order to support themselves and their families; i.e. they participate in the system. Members of this social stratum believe that the ability to think for oneself and to share ideas are the greatest benefits of education. They are constantly engaged in a struggle for fundamental socio-political change and the liberalism of the lower classes of their nation from economic and cultural poverty and /or socio-political oppression** (Gella, 1976:25). The ties among the intelligentsia members seem to be the strongest during times of oppression and war (Krzeminski, 1998:74). The definition of the intelligentsia suggested by Adam Podgorecki (1979) presents the broad characteristics of this social group.

On average, the intelligentsia are superior in education. For them, knowledge has an autotelic (per se) value independent of instrumental potential, and should be the focus of attention in day to day life. This generalized attitude – probably a meta-attitude – has an important impact on numerous aspects of social activity: professional occupation, social engagement, leisure, the choice of friends and life partners, etc. (Podgorecki, 1979:310).

At this point I should clarify whether the classical intelligentsia was a social stratum or a social class. I have decided to use the term *stratum* for two reasons. First, the word *stratum* is used to distinguish groups determined by income, prestige and power, but at the same time it refers to segments of society which are not social classes in the Marxist sense, i.e., “which do not directly determine the economic structure of society” (Gella, 1976:28). The classical intelligentsia was a social stratum because it included men and women who shared certain beliefs, attitudes and manners. Secondly, the intelligentsia

existed during the communist era, and the communist ideology postulated 'a society without classes'. For these two reasons I believe *stratum* is a more accurate term to define this social group. It is important to note that the intelligentsia does not have a counterpart in either Western Europe or America (Gella, 1989:130).

The intelligentsia, which had constituted a small part of the socioeconomic fabric of Poland throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, became a more significant stratum during the communist era. The social structure created by the communist government, however, was not suitable for a capitalist society. When communism collapsed, the social order had to be modified. Its change mirrors the rooting of capitalistic values among Poles. This thesis will demonstrate that the current situation and social position of the educated and their perception by the rest of the society reflects the advancement of capitalist reforms in Poland.

2. Education in capitalism is considered a financial investment. If the value of education per se is seen in Poland as an investment, it means that the Poles have accepted a capitalist value system. At this point I would like to emphasize that the attitude towards education is not, of course, the only indicator of whether or not Poles accept a capitalist value system. The capitalist value system is a complex phenomenon, and a focus on education is only one of many of its indicators. What I am arguing in this thesis is that the way people value education per se is a valid indicator of the adaptation process towards the new value system in Poland. In the following chapter I will argue that the acceptance of education as an investment is necessary for capitalism to prosper.

As stated above, the capitalist value system is a complex phenomenon and it is difficult to define it in a simple way. I have chosen to base the definitions of the capitalist value system and the capitalist spirit on writings by Cox (1964) and Haslett (1994). I will also link these definitions directly to education.

Values are criteria that help to distinguish that which is perceived to be 'good' from that which is perceived to be 'not good'. They take the form of virtues, ideals and so on. Ethical values prevailing in a society determine the moral status of particular acts, policies, and even particular social institutions such as, for example, the economic system. Capitalism is an economic system; therefore it is subject to moral values.

Values also indicate what is to be striven for, and that it is to be striven for, even if incapable of ever being fully achieved. One of capitalism's strongest convictions is individualism – individuals strive towards individual success. Cox notes that individualism is a natural outcome of free enterprise, and consequently it is the most highly developed in capitalist societies. "Individualistic traits thus tend to be typical of capitalist personality. They represent the basis of the societal drive for freedom" (Cox, 1964:26). Among other freedoms, the **capitalist value system** emphasizes people's freedom to gather wealth within a system based on ownership and one's right to own things. Accumulation of wealth allows for consumptive use of the capital; those who gather wealth spend it on increasing their level of living (which in a certain way is another freedom). At the same time, capitalists must be willing to abide by the rules of the game (of gathering wealth) which are based on the belief in individual effort – that hard work, self-improvement, and self-development will lead to the accumulation of

wealth. (Cox, 1964 and Haslett, 1994). Capitalism also opens up countless opportunities for the exercise of individual creativeness, leadership and expertise.

In other words, in a capitalist society, self-interest invariably has important qualifications and requires choices. Individuals exert themselves to find the most advantageous employment for whatever capital they can command. Employers do recognize education as a credential increasing workers' value; therefore it is only logical that those who look for good employment will try to obtain the credentials employers value, i.e., education (among others) (Cox, 1964 and Haslett, 1994).

The capitalist spirit may be regarded as a primary social attitude manifesting itself in innumerable actions in relation to the economic way of life of the community (Cox, 1964). This primary social attitude in terms of education manifests itself in the community through the belief that education is a credential and therefore investment in it should bestow higher financial reward.

Based on Bowles and Gintis' (1976, 1986) theory I will elaborate on the link between education and money and how it reflects capitalist values present in society. These two economists argue that a strong economy must be supported with a strong social value system that will yield economic growth. With regards to Poland, the sooner the Poles accept the new value system, the faster Poland's financial recovery will be. The adaptation to the new value system must necessarily follow the introduction of a new form of government – capitalism.

In making my argument, I utilize two types of sources; the first is historical data, which present the situation of the intelligentsia before and after the Second World War;

the second is survey data. I use two surveys to show that attitudes regarding the well-educated in Poland have changed. The results from the surveys are supplemented with literature-based research.

The thesis opens with a theory chapter titled “Capitalism and State”. The theory I use in this thesis is Bowles’ and Gintis’ (1976, 1986) educational theory, according to which education ought to reflect social position, and social position should influence income. Interestingly enough, in communism there was a strong relation between education and social position; the correlation between education and prestige was stronger in communist Poland than in Western countries (Bialecki and Wesolowski, 1979:67). However, the relation between education, occupation and income seemed to be very weak or non-existent. “In the centrally planned economy, wage differentials for various occupations and employees of different sectors of the economy were set by the central administration” (Bialecki, 1996:13). Bowles and Gintis present a few conditions that must be present in society for capitalism to be successful. In the theory chapter I will present these conditions and discuss them.

In the second and third chapters I examine whether or not these conditions have been fulfilled in Poland. The historical chapter, entitled “The Well Educated Throughout the 19th and 20th Century” introduces the phenomenon of the intelligentsia in pre-war Poland and throughout the communist period. I use the intelligentsia as a “case study” to test my hypothesis derived from Bowles and Gintis. The role of the intelligentsia has been changing according to the needs of Polish society from the 1800s to the present; thus the perceived value of higher education was different in the 1800s, in the inter-war period, and during communism. In order to understand the dynamics of the changes in attitude

regarding higher education in the Republic of Poland (1989 to present) one must grasp the historical value of education in this country.

Chapters four and five include the analysis of the surveys dealing with the perception of the educated stratum, as well as background literature on this topic. The surveys may seem a bit outdated as they were conducted in 1987, 1992 and 1994. However, as Kolodko and Nuti state, "The claims that Poland's successes of 1994-1997 are rooted in the earlier policies of 1989-1993 must necessarily imply that by September 1993 Polish fundamentals were already poised for recovery and growth" (1997:8). Moreover, according to Anna Krajewska, "The first signs of economic revival appeared in mid-1992" (Krajewska, 1996:7). The surveys used in this thesis are the International Social Survey Programme and the Educational Needs survey. The hypothesis, that 'if Poles believe that income ought to reflect education then Poles accept the capitalist value system', is tested in these chapters.

In the fourth chapter, I look at the analysis of ISSP'92 and some of the questions from ISSP'87. The comparison of ISSP'92 and ISSP'87 aims at explanations of the social belief in the relation between education and income. The second section of Chapter Four looks at the significant factors in shaping social beliefs regarding education and income.

The fifth chapter presents the analysis of a survey on the value of a university degree in post-communist Poland. The survey, "Educational Needs", deals with the issue of education and money in a very direct way.

Chapter Six, entitled "The well-educated of Poland at the doorstep of the 21st century", reviews the reforms being undertaken presently by the education system in Poland. How the economy has influenced the changes in the educational system in

Poland is also shown in Chapter Six. The conclusion also summarizes the data presented in all chapters and answers the thesis question regarding attitudes towards education and income in Poland.

Chapter 2: Capitalism and The State

As mentioned in the introduction, the theory I apply in my research question is an education theory created by two American economists, Herbert Gintis and Samuel Bowles. Although the economics of education has an ancient heritage, the idea of using education to accelerate the rate of economic growth appeared only in the 1960s (Bowles, 1969:1). The theory explains the functioning and goals of the American system of education as well as the link between state ideology and the structure of the educational system. Gintis and Bowles elucidate the structure of the educational system and how it is linked to the capitalist economy. They have based their theory on the presumption that the educational system reproduces the capitalist economy: "It does so by virtue of a correspondence between the social relations of education and the social relations of production" (Bowles and Gintis, 1988:237). Since the communist educational system and the values it carried were found unsuitable for democratic Poland, a new approach to education has been necessary.

In my thesis I argue that politics and economics are interdependent, and that education is a system in service to both the state and the economy. Thus, changes in the economy and the polity will be followed by changes in education. I widen the approach to education and economy using George Macesich's analysis of market democracy. In term of Poland's goal to build a market democracy, Macesich's theory on the market economy complements Bowles' and Gintis' theory on education. "The recent history of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union suggest that a people's determination to achieve a higher standard of living underlines the drive not only for better economic performance

but for political freedom and democracy as well. These are desires that a market democracy can satisfy” (Macesich, 1991:2).

I develop the theory by presenting the following arguments:

1. As the spirit of capitalism is a vital factor in accepting a market democracy in Poland, the capitalist spirit ought to be reflected in many attitudinal changes, one of which is an attitude towards the correlation between income and education.
 2. Education is extremely important in a market democracy as educational achievements have a strong relation to economic success. Economic success should be reflected and examined on two levels:
 - Personal (personal gain)
 - National (the educational system supplies workers for a country’s economy)
 3. The system of rewards in a capitalist economy is based on money. Money allows freedom of goods exchange and builds a hierarchy in society. “The quest for higher living standards is ultimately linked to the desire for freedom; which is really an aspect of the other” (Macesich, 1991:2).
 4. Both capitalism and democracy need a large middle class.
-
1. Attitudes towards capitalism held by the society members are based on many presumptions and beliefs, one of which is a belief that people’s credentials and skills will determine their position in the social hierarchy. Of these qualifications, one of the most understood and accepted as an important credential is education.

(E)mployers find it desirable to vest hierarchical authority in well-educated workers, not only because higher levels of schooling may enable an employee to better do the work at hand or because the more educated seem more fit by their demeanor to hold authority, but also simply because **educational achievements ... legitimate authority according to prevailing social values** (Bowles and Gintis, 1976:82).

Education should reflect not only the position one holds in the hierarchy of occupations but also one's financial success. Educational achievements legitimate authority according to prevailing social values; therefore one can expect to find among the general population of a capitalist state, attitudes towards education that reflect the social and financial rewards of education. **The attitudes in a capitalist society should reflect the premise that people ought to be rewarded based on their credentials, not on the basis of their political beliefs. One of the roles of a capitalist state is to secure the structural and ideological changes under which capitalism can flourish. One of the ways the state can achieve its goal is through education.** The educational curriculum, in one of its latent functions, implements the legitimization of the capitalist social arrangements, in particular the division between the "haves" and "have-nots". This division is based on occupation and associated income. The ranking of occupations is based on a number of different factors such as: the importance of the role to the social network; the abundance or scarcity of alternative roles fulfilling approximately the same function; the degree of difficulty involved; and others (Miffen and Miffen, 1982). The hierarchy in educational institutions prepares the student for the hierarchy in the work force.

The growing spirit of capitalism is tested in this thesis by using both historical data and survey data. In the historical chapter I present information on how the communist party tried to diminish the financial value of the credentials of the

intelligentsia, and how that began to change in Poland in 1989. The historical data also demonstrates how the intelligentsia fought for political freedom but lacked the financial spirit of capitalism. I argue that this was one of the reasons for economic stagnation in Poland before the Second World War.

The survey data presents the changes in attitudes towards the financial value of education in the Republic of Poland. The data analysis also presents the argument that education is seen by more and more Poles as an investment in their financial future. The intelligentsia in the past saw education only as an intellectual investment in personal development. I attempt through the data analysis to illustrate that presently the well educated see their diplomas as means of securing good incomes.

2. According to Bowles and Gintis, "Different levels of education feed workers into different levels within the occupational structure and, correspondingly, tend toward an internal organization comparable to levels in the hierarchical division of labour" (Bowles and Gintis, 1976:132). Another research finding supporting the premise that education is a very important factor in how much one is paid, is Jencks' research results on the value of education. He analyzed the effects of education on both occupation and earnings and came to the conclusion that a year of university education contributes more than one year of secondary education. Moreover, the last years of high school or university raise earnings twice as much as the intervening years between starting education and graduating. This strongly suggests that "employers reward credentials per se" (Jencks, 1979:227). The results of research on the financial rewards of higher education done by

Bowles, Gintis and Jencks clearly state that **educational achievement has a very strong relation to economic success.**

Bowles, Gintis and Jencks also came to the conclusion that achievement is extremely important at the university level but not at the elementary or secondary levels. Further, those who come from middle-class families have greater chances to attend university. "The two most important contributors to adult earnings and status are college attendance and being born in the right family environment" (Mifflin and Mifflin, 1982:319)¹.

While the capitalist system of education, as much as it may seem egalitarian, includes obstacles that create social inequalities, it is generally accepted that **education is a major mobility channel.** Indeed, in order to get better jobs or higher pay, many North Americans go back to school to upgrade their skills. In a communist country, the mobility channel was mainly dependent on membership in the communist party and the position one held in the party apparatus (Tellenback, 1973:42).

In theory, in a communist society, there was no difference between the incomes of people with different education, or the difference was very small. In a capitalist society, a form of society that Poland is attempting to build, one's status, income, and personal autonomy depend in great measure on one's place in the work hierarchy. In turn, social positions are mirrored through the "educational credentials reflecting the number of years of schooling and the quality of education received" (Bowles, 1975:47).

¹ One may point also to the strong relationship between one's educational attainment, social background and occupation. I do acknowledge such a relationship, but I maintain that using educational attainment alone is appropriate, as "social origins, native intelligence and community environment are so intimately intertwined with educational attainment that the task of disentangling them can easily be made to look hopeless" (Woodhall and Ward, 1972:41).

As emphasized at the very beginning of this chapter, education is extremely important in a market democracy as educational achievements have a strong relation to economic growth. On the national level, education is important to the economic performance as today's technologically advanced industries need well-educated personnel. The effects of changes in economic structures always extend to major non-economic institutions, such as education. "These institutions are intertwined with the economic system, and mold the psychological makeup of individuals in such a manner as to facilitate its operation" (Gintis, 1975:320). Thus, the educational system has both economic and non-economic functions. **The economic function of the educational structure is to insure the development of the capitalist economy by supplying workers.** Changes in economic policy have been accompanied by major changes in the labour market. As stated by Hussain (1981), an advanced economy requires highly educated people, enforcing a greater enrolment in institutions of higher education where new programs are geared towards serving the developing economy. Social institutions through which individuals develop do not consider the needs of individuals on whom they operate, in this case students. Rather they respond to the accumulation of capital – the growth of material goods and services (Gintis, 1975). Given both Bowles' and Gintis' argument on the economic function of education, one can understand the recent growth and development of departments of computer science, business administration, and studies in communication at universities across the globe. Economic growth involves dramatic technical and organizational breakthroughs, the opening of new markets, and the development of new products (Bowles and Ginitis, 1996). This change towards 'modern disciplines' allows the economic rationalization of such social institutions as

universities. Poland's universities are in dire financial straits. In order to attract funds, they must offer cooperation with the private sector, which requires programmers, translators and business people. The dependence of academia on business for financial support, and of business on academia to supply the needed work force, creates interdependence. If the relation is well planned and mutually satisfying, capitalism can flourish.

The strong relation between economic success and education on the personal level is presented in the historical overview and through the survey data. In the historical overview, I argue that the absence of a relation between economic success and education has caused many educated Poles to emigrate. Also, I demonstrate how the low university enrolment during communism was due to government control and how poorly the Polish economy of the communist era performed. In the survey chapter I show how more and more Poles see the link between education and economic success and how it motivates them to remain in the educational system for longer periods of time. The relation between national economic success and education is mainly addressed in the last chapter, where I present data on enrolment in higher education and economic growth in Poland and explain how they are correlated.

3. The system of rewards in a capitalist society is based on money. The more valuable a worker is to a company the more he/she earns. Education generally increases the worker's value; thus higher education means a higher salary. It is a common observation that those who are well educated are well paid, because they hold positions higher in responsibility and prestige. Hussain (1981) compares education to bonds, whose

possession is a guarantee of good income. Qualifications represented by an employee are sold to an employer. When workers increase their qualifications, “there must exist opportunities for monetary success” (Aglietta, 1976:177). **Education offers the credit one needs to enter a specific occupation; the occupation prescribes how much this individual will be rewarded financially and socially.** Education is an entry ticket to certain occupations; educational qualifications are entitlements to those occupations.

Money is a commodity essentially different from all others, but it can define the value of any other commodity, work included. “Capitalism is a commodity economy given specific features by the wage relation” (Aglietta, 1991:328). In capitalism, monetary gain is one of the main measures of a professional’s success. In a market democracy, individuals are able to estimate their value by the work they perform and consequently through the money they earn. Moreover, through getting a salary that reflects one’s credentials, an individual “can possess through wealth what he has lost through work – his essence and being” (Macesich, 1991:45).

When money becomes the most powerful tool of exchange, the individual becomes more dependent on society as a whole and less dependent on the peculiarities of personality. The loosening of bonds between the access to goods and ‘personalities’ serves to promote economic freedom (Macesich, 1991:53). One can conclude that money allows the building of a social hierarchy that does not depend on personal peculiarities or one’s network of friends. When Marx wrote about social inequalities, he believed that they were based on ownership. Bowles and Gintis, writing over one hundred years later, showed that **not ownership but control is central to social inequality** (Bowles and Gintis, 1988:16). The communists believed that they could build a society free of social

inequality by getting rid of any forms of ownership – the basis of social stratification in the nineteenth century. However, as Tellenback (1973:45) states, the class criterion in Eastern-European societies was based on control over the means of goods production and their distribution . Such a scenario created an abnormal hierarchy of power in society.

I demonstrate in the history chapter that communism caused a shift of the source of inequality from ownership to control. The phenomenon of control over the distribution of goods granted positions of power to people who had certain connections, for example with the communist party. The effects of the inequality based on control over the distribution of material goods is also discussed in the history chapter.

Money as a reward system is a critical element in the market mechanism. The confidence in the stability of its purchasing power offers a motivational element for work per se. Communism failed to create such conditions. The lack of money as a motivational factor among workers is presented in the historical overview. While money and credit are perhaps the primary indicators of social and economic standing in capitalist societies, this was not true in communist Poland. . Although education was still an indicator of prestige in society (or, as one may say, the socio-status), membership in the communist party was the primary indicator of economic status. This created an abnormal hierarchy in society, which is also demonstrated in the historical overview. The last chapter shows the changing role of money as the primary mode of exchange in Poland during the 1990s.

4. The success of capitalism depends on a large middle class. The middle class fulfills two major roles. Firstly, the middle class of the Western capitalist societies has been formed in tempo with, and as an inherent part of, the development of modern capitalism

(Johnson, 1982:87-91). Secondly, the middle class is the basis for democracy.

Historically “the adherence of the business middle class to an ideology of law and democracy forced the industrial capitalist rich to rule within a framework of ‘government by law’, and within the constraints of the electoral majority of the middle class”

(Glassman, 1997:106). In other words, the middle class is needed not only to provide the large consumers’ market for capitalism to flourish, but it is also a guarantor of democratic laws. Mokrzycki writes that middle class is the foundation of economic, political and social orders in modern capitalism (1995:57). The new middle class is made up of educated and skilled labour-force members. People attain certain educational levels or particular skills in order to secure a comfortable life-style. “The idea that education is a form of investment which increases a nation’s wealth by implementing the skills and the productive capacity of the labour force, and which brings financial benefits to individuals in the form of improved career opportunity and higher life-time earnings, is far from new” (Woodhall and Ward, 1972:33).

In Western cultures such as Canada, education is viewed as a means to achieve personal success or a ticket that entitles one to enter a particular profession. The middle class in such cultures constitutes mainly those who have education; consequently, a large middle class means a well-educated work force. In the following chapter I argue that the communist policy on higher education hindered the educational development of the Polish people. I also demonstrate the appearance of a middle class in 1918 and its disappearance after the Second World War.

In this chapter I have demonstrated that there are certain conditions that must be fulfilled in a society for capitalism to succeed. Four of these are presented and discussed here.

In the ensuing pages I present both historical and survey data to argue that Poland has been developing exactly these conditions. My hypothesis is that certain conditions are required for capitalism to flourish (these are presented in this chapter), and that they are being fulfilled in contemporary Poland.

What I ultimately argue is that until 1989 the Polish intelligentsia reflected the political and economic situation in Poland. In the 1990s the intelligentsia begins to play a lesser role in society. The diminishing role of the intelligentsia also reflects the overall socioeconomic situation of Poland at the end of the twentieth century.

Chapter 3: The Well Educated Throughout The Nineteenth And Twentieth Century

Having discussed the theoretical background of this paper, I now turn to the more detailed aspects of the intelligentsia phenomenon in Poland. I would like to acknowledge that this chapter is not a historical review of the 20th century Poland. The aim of this chapter is to exemplify the position of the Polish intelligentsia throughout the 20th century and how it reflects the Polish situation.

In Chapter 2, I argued that in order for the capitalist economy to succeed Poles must understand and accept that education, among other goals, is an economic investment in the long term. For many, the correlation between education and income may seem obvious, but the educated in Poland have traditionally held a philosophy different from that of the educated in North America or Western Europe. For the Eastern Europeans, higher education carried the mandate of a higher calling. For example, in Russia the intelligentsia fought illiteracy and poverty; in Poland the intelligentsia sought to regain national independence (Podgorecki, 1994:159). In Western countries, education has long been seen as a means to obtaining certain positions in the labour force which would then give a worker a reward relative to his/her position. To understand the difference between Eastern Europe and other countries in respect to education, it is important to comprehend the role of the intelligentsia in Polish society through the centuries. In order to understand the present we must understand the past. Since this social group is distinctive to Poland and rooted in Polish society, a discussion on the changing role of the intelligentsia can show how far Poland has to go to become a true capitalist state.

In this chapter, I discuss the relationship between income and education in communist Poland and the consequences arising from the communist social structure.

The Intelligentsia: A Brief History

Many people living abroad (i.e. living outside Eastern Europe) believe that the intelligentsia is a general Eastern European phenomenon. However, more detailed research on this topic suggests that this is a social stratum that has existed only in Poland and Russia (Gella, 1989). The following paragraphs describe the peculiar qualities of the intelligentsia, when they appeared in Polish society and the reasons behind the formation of this particular social stratum.

The term, *intelligentsia*, as a sociological designation was used for the first time in Polish literature by K. Liebelt in 1844, for it was in Poland, that this new stratum began to form from about the end of the eighteen century (Komorowski, 1976:201). Although, I should mention here that it is somewhat awkward to talk about the formation of the Polish intelligentsia since Poland as a distinct. political entity did not exist at that time.

In 1410, after the federation with Lithuania and the defeat of the Teutonic Order, Poland became the largest and strongest country in Central Europe. A series of events over the next three centuries cost Poland its independence, and in 1795 Poland disappeared from the map of Europe altogether and did not re-appear for 123 years. It was then partitioned between the three great European powers of the eighteenth century:

Russia, Prussia and Austria. The Polish state re-emerged in 1918; the Polish Republic came into being in November 1918 after the First World War (Davis, 1981:393).

The creation of the intelligentsia was partly due to the process of losing independence; that is, the intelligentsia emerged when the Polish identity was in danger. As Adam Podgorecki put it, it was a social stratum with a mission (Podgorecki, 1994:177). Its role was to maintain Polish nationalism and to keep the dream of independence alive. Educated Poles were willing to sacrifice their personal interests and ambitions, to direct their energy and wealth and even risk their lives, in order to keep Polish nationalism vital. Indeed, giving the national interest priority over personal interest is one of the intelligentsia's strongest convictions.

The partitioning of Poland in 1795 caused many of the Polish noblemen to lose their land and property, and many of them had to work to support their families. They moved to cities and towns where they began to create a social stratum that consisted of people who possessed an education but no land. "While deprived of old privileges, they preserved the bureaucratic inclination and the respect for offices, as well as a kind of exclusivity" (Komorowski, 1976:202). They were a group of alienated individuals who were, at the same time, the heralds of patriotism (Gella, 1989:135). One may say that the growth of the intelligentsia was attributable in part to the efforts of the imperial courts in Moscow, Berlin and Vienna to "de-nobilize" the Polish nobility (Gella, 1989:21).

The intelligentsia in Poland was comprised of individuals of different religions², ethnic backgrounds, and socioeconomic groups. The population of inter-war Poland was

² Nearly half of the doctors and lawyers in the inter-war Poland were of Jewish extraction (During the inter-war period Poland had the highest percentage of Jewish population in the world) (Dziewankowski, 1977:88).

a mosaic of many different ethnic origins³. Varying information on the distribution of the ethnic minorities in Poland is available from many different sources (Horak, 1961:81). Roszkowski reports that in the 1920s, 65% of the population were Polish, 16% Ukrainian, 10% Jewish, 5% Bialorus, 4% German, and 1% other (Roszkowski, 1997:32). The ethnic origins also indicate the variety of religions practiced by people living in Poland, such as Roman Catholicism, Orthodox Catholicism, Judaism etc. Moreover, the intelligentsia included not only noblemen and their descendents but also educated children of other social strata. Despite these differences, “the old intelligentsia was a culturally united (though not homogenous) social stratum of educated people characterized by a charismatic sense of calling and a certain set of values and manners” (Gella, 1989:133).

The makeup of the intelligentsia was constantly changing. At the end of the nineteenth century and at the beginning of twentieth, they started to accept into their circle people of peasant background who had *gymnasium*⁴ education. Over the years, the gymnasium diploma became “the coat of arms” of the intelligentsia; it is worth noting that 40 % of the students in gymnasium were of peasant origin (Gella, 1989:144). The changing makeup of the intelligentsia allowed for a new ideology to evolve. At the

³ I was unable to find a source directly stating that all these minorities had Polish citizenship. However, Jan Ciechanowski (Polish Ambassador to the United States during WWII years), writes in his memoirs about a discussion he had with Sikorski (Prime Minister of Poland). During this conversation Sikorski told Ciechanowski about Polish Jews, Ukrainians and Belorussians who were deported to work camps in Soviet Russia in 1939-1940 where they were stripped of their Polish passports, which made it very difficult for the Polish government to ask for the return of these prisoners when Poland and Russia signed a treaty (after Hitler invaded Russia in 1941).

⁴ Gymnasium – a school for the higher branches of literature and science; especially used in connection with German classical schools preparatory to the universities (Webster, 1951). It had a similar meaning on the Polish territory during the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. One should keep in mind that at that time Poland was under German occupation.

beginning of its formation, the Polish intelligentsia followed the patterns of the nobility.

However, the move for independence in Poland was closely allied with the struggle for social change. In the late nineteenth century the intelligentsia had the dream of extending full rights of citizenship to all social classes. This made the intelligentsia the moral leader of the nation. Its character reflected the desire for regaining national independence and a need for social change. The struggle united the peasants and the intelligentsia, and the united force of these two social groups kept Polish identity alive.

There were many attempts to regain independence in Poland. The people organized uprisings and rebellions. As mentioned above, Poland was absorbed by three European powers and consequently into three different economic structures. "The uprising disrupted economic growth, and the repression steadily eliminated the most capable elements from public life. For these reasons, the rate of economic development was considerably lower than in other European countries" (Szczepanski, 1970:17). The low rate of economic progress on the Polish territory hampered the development of modern capitalism, since there was no dominant modern middle class as existed in other European countries.

In addition to uprisings and rebellions, the struggle for Poland also adopted another form of fighting – art. Literature was one of the strongest motivational tools in engaging the nation in the fight for the independence of Poland. Authors such as Adam Mickiewicz, Henryk Sienkiewicz, and Juliusz Slowacki; and later Stefan Zeromski, Wladyslaw Reymont, Maria Dabrowska, Zofia Nalkowska and others, mobilized the nation through their writings. The written word became the weapon of the intelligentsia (Roszkowski, 1997:35).

The censorship imposed on Polish writers by the three powers – Prussia, Russia and Austria – did not allow the intelligentsia to speak about independence openly. Stories and poems carried the message of nationalism, which for Poles was a message of political freedom and independence (Bromke, 1960:636). The artists had to overcome the barrier of the enemy's censorship through writing on the so called "second level". Situations and things described in their writings usually had double meanings, the obvious one and the hidden one. The hidden message was the pertinent topic – to keep nationalism among Poles alive. The character of Polish writings changed when Poland became independent.

After the First World War Poland regained its independence. One of the members of the intelligentsia – Jozef Pilsudski - became the provisional chief-of-state and commander-in-chief of the Polish armed forces (until the formation of a truly national government through free, democratic elections) (Dziewanowski, 1977:74)⁵. We can say that the independent Poland of 1918-1939 was a state of the intelligentsia, as virtually the entire government was in its hands (Gella, 1989:159, Krzeminski 1998:72). Thus, it influenced the cultural and economical character of the new country. The new role of the intelligentsia as a governing stratum caused it to lose some of its moral and spiritual mission. The social group started to divide into three sub-groups: (1) the professionals, (2) artists and (3) the technical intelligentsia and other white-collar workers. The role of the educated simply changed. After all, Poland had become an independent country. Despite the changing character of the social stratum, the intelligentsia played an important role in re-building Poland.

⁵ Norman Davies uses the term Chief-of-state (1981:391)

Coordination between the fight for independence and the need for social reforms was visible through the changes introduced to improve the standards of living for the blue collar workers. The first Polish government introduced a 46 hour workweek, medical insurance for workers, legal protection for those who were renting their apartments and houses, and other regulations to help the workers. In 1922, the government even introduced the paid vacation (Roszkowski, 1997:33). The social responsibility carried on the shoulders of the intelligentsia was to help the workers and peasants to improve their living conditions after regaining national independence.

As stated in the theory chapter, capitalism needs a middle class to flourish. Roszkowski in his book on the history of Poland (1997) and Mokrzycki⁶ in his paper on the history of the middle class in Poland (1995) state that among different social classes and strata there was a middle class in inter-war Poland. Therefore, since Poland was a capitalist country at that time, albeit a weak one, it did have a middle class. The middle class as well as the landed aristocracy were dissolved under the communist regime. (Their land and property were confiscated by the communist government). At the same time, the working class and technical intelligentsia grew rapidly (Tellenback, 1973:27).

The intelligentsia were also known for their stubbornness in the disapproval of business and making money. As stated earlier, Poland in the period 1918-1939 was a state of the intelligentsia. Many believe that the intelligentsia accomplished positive things, but at the same time it impeded rapid industrialization of the country through its

low regard for the money motive. Consequently, the lack of industrialization in Eastern Europe meant the absence of a large middle class, which is a characteristic of democratic, capitalist societies (Mokrzycki, 1995). The intelligentsia desired that Poland should be a powerful country, but because some of them did not approve of working for money, the country's development was not as rapid as it could have been (Chalasinski, 1997:96). According to George Macesich, who wrote on modern capitalism, the money motive is one of the strongest convictions of capitalism. Money allows freedom of goods exchange and it builds a hierarchy in society. People strive for better earnings by increasing their educational level, developing and improving their skills, and working hard. A higher standard of living is achieved through money. Macesich wrote: "The quest for higher living standards is ultimately linked to the desire for freedom." The desire for freedom was always present among the intelligentsia but in the past it was never linked to money.

One of the four theoretical points listed in the theory chapter that relates to the situation in Poland after the First World War is point number four, which states that capitalism needs a middle class. As mentioned in the above paragraph, the middle class did constitute a part of the Polish society in the inter-war period. Moreover, the fact that the government of Poland at that time was created from the intelligentsia suggests that those who possessed high education occupied high national offices. The division of the intelligentsia into professionals, artists and the technical intelligentsia supports the

⁶ Mokrzycki (1995) differentiates between the "old" middle class and that of the intelligentsia. The former included owners and small businesses, managers and technical experts. The intelligentsia included people with degrees in liberal sciences as well as professionals.

argument that education serves the economy by feeding workers into different occupations.

World War II

The events of World War II, in threatening the very existence of the Polish nation, united the intelligentsia in its traditional role as collective hero (Gella, 1976:16). The magnitude of the destruction of the classic Polish intelligentsia was second only to that of the Jews. Poland lost 50 % of her population with university degrees and 35 % with a gymnasium diploma to Nazism's scheme to exterminate these social groups (Gella, 1989:178-187). The attacks on the Polish intelligentsia also came from the East. Stalin murdered 42 % of the officers corps of the Polish army. During the Second World War the Soviet Union took over the eastern parts of Poland. One and a half million Poles were deported to the east Soviet republics where tens of thousands of Polish scholars, scientists and professionals died of hunger and starvation in the concentration camps (Gella, 1976:30, Ciechanowski, 1947:65). Despite vicious attempts on Hitler's and Stalin's part to destroy the Polish national movement during the six years of war, the Poles built the greatest underground army in all of occupied Europe (Gella, 1989:178-187; Podgorecki, 1994:163). The army was officially created by the Polish government in exile in London and it counted two hundred thousand soldiers (Roszkowski, 1997:115). In fact, many officers in this army were members of the intelligentsia. The members of the army came from different political spectrums; they saw post-war Poland in different political settings, but "in their scale of values, national independence took precedence over social reforms" they might have believed in (Bromke, 1960:636).

The intelligentsia was also the creator of the network of conspiracy that allowed for the leaking of information outside of Poland. The underground activities went as far as building a conspiratorial network in Auschwitz. One of the members of the Polish intelligentsia – Witold Pilecki – infiltrated into Auschwitz in order to organize a network to facilitate the passing of information to the outside world⁷ (Roszkowski, 1997:184).

The social role of the poets and writers re-appeared again during the German occupation. The national values were being carried on through the writings of Krzysztof Kamil Baczyński, Tadeusz Gajcy, Zdzisław Stroiński, Andrzej Trzebiński and Czesław Miłosz. The artists organized underground theaters and concerts. During WWII Hitler prohibited any Polish publications and closed Polish libraries and bookstores. In answer to his actions the Polish people founded 200 illegal publishing houses and released two thousands titles. Seventeen newspapers were regularly published throughout the six years of war (Roszkowski, 1997:115).

The underground army fought for an independent and democratic Poland. Such an ideology was in opposition to Soviet plans to make Poland communist. For this reason, the communists leaders of the post-war period tried to undermine the underground army and even accused it of collaboration with the Germans. Additionally, Stalin's propaganda presented Poles as the "evil capitalists", and many Poles were murdered by the Soviet army as enemies of communism. Moreover, in the 1947-1948 period, many of the intelligentsia members of this army were arrested. Over the next few years, many of the underground soldiers were tried by the communist government and sentenced to death or prison (Roszkowski, 1997:185).

⁷ He was sentenced to death by the communist government in 1948.

The preceding paragraphs on World War II present only a few examples of the intelligentsia's movement in the 1939-1945 period. The actions undertaken by the Polish intelligentsia during the Second World War strongly indicate how, again, the situation of this social stratum was linked to the situation of the Polish nation. The fact that the intelligentsia was attacked by Stalin's propaganda emphasizes the intelligentsia's unquestionable desire for their country to be democratic and independent. The spirit of democracy which is a necessary condition of modern capitalism was certainly present among Poles in the 1930s and the 1940s.

The Communist Era

Before elaborating on the situation of the intelligentsia after World War II, I would like to bring the reader's attention to the theoretical chapter where I presented the conditions for capitalism to flourish. Obviously, none of these were present in post-war Poland for the simple reason that it was a communist country. However, I will emphasize just how abnormal the conditions for proper development of democracy were in communist Poland.

"The Communist regime in Poland was established only after a prolonged and, at times, fierce struggle between the Polish Workers' Party, backed by Soviet military might, and the anti-Communist political forces supported by the overwhelming majority of the people" (Bromke, 1960:637). Once the communist era began, the brutal methods of the Soviet Union completely destroyed any hopes of restoring democratic Poland in the post-war period. By 1948, after the political changes which had taken place, Poland

was a country with one main political party – The Polish United Workers Party (PZPR – the main communist party). Other parties existed; they were The United Peasants' Party (ZSL) and The Democratic Party (SD), but they played a role of “younger brother” to the Communist Party (Kloc, 1991:11). The constitution of 1975 legally sanctioned the monopoly of the communist party and dependence on the Soviet Union (Figa, 1982:124). The democracy was buried and the intelligentsia had a new task to fulfill. Therefore, its character had to change again. Over the period of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, the main role of the intelligentsia had shifted from that of individuals whose responsibility was to keep nationalism vital to those who were building a new country while fighting Bolsheviks, and those who committed their lives to building an underground army to fight the Germans. Until 1945 the enemy was external to Poland. After the Second World War, the main enemy of the intelligentsia was now part of the Polish nation, that is, the communists. The communist government aimed at the degradation of the intelligentsia and the minimization of its role.

“Poland was given a transplanted version of the type of economic system and political institutions that had taken shape in the Soviet Union. Although the essence of the economic system and political regime in Poland was just the same as the Soviet model, fundamental differences were nonetheless apparent: the survival of the predominance of the individual sector in agriculture, which provides the bulk of agricultural production; the existence of a private sector in small industries, crafts, trade and services, admittedly on a relatively minor scale but still of vital importance; the existence of a powerful Catholic Church that is not subordinate to the authorities; and the considerable importance of the intelligentsia, from amongst whom there flowed a current of ideological thought that was at variance with the ideology prevailing in the state” (Minc, 1982:151).

Some of the most significant social changes introduced by the communist government between 1945 and 1955 included the liquidation of the nobility and the

bourgeoisie. Secondly, as mentioned earlier, communist ideology and politics aimed at degradation and political marginalization of the classical intelligentsia. “In the new social system, there was no longer a place for the intelligentsia, which for a century had dominated the spiritual and political developments of those (Poland and Russia) nations. The charismatic leadership of the intelligentsia was unneeded and unwanted in the countries where the communist parties took the responsibility for the present and future” (Gella, 1976:16). Indeed, “the Second World War and the introduction of the communist system as a result of the Yalta Treaty caused a political exile and emigration of Poles that was one of the greatest dispersions in history” (Gella, 1989:162). Thirdly, the communist government allowed for the creation of a new stratum in Polish society – the new folk intelligentsia. The Polish economy was in need of a social stratum that would fulfill the requirements of developing industry, and it was the folk intelligentsia that was to fulfill this task. This social group was built from children of blue-collar workers and peasants. They were offered university education in order to fulfill the needs of the rapid industrialization of the country. Many people with university degrees were sent to villages and industrial communities to enlighten the farmers and educate the workers. The dispersion of the educated Polish stratum was partly planned by the communist party (divide and rule), and it did not allow a strong development of the new social group. “Thick, detailed files would be kept on any Pole with any education or official position. Telephones would still be tapped, agents would still be infiltrated into every student, intellectual, economic or commercial body” (Bethell, 1972:233).

The communist government, although it was repressive towards the classical intelligentsia, did create conditions for the folk intelligentsia to grow (Mokrzycki,

1995:62). Thus, despite their dispersion in the communist era, the intelligentsia did exist. The definition of this social stratum was under constant modification as the communist government did not want this group to carry on its missionary character from the past. In the 1945-1989 Poland, one could speak of the people's intelligentsia, the socialist intelligentsia, the workers'-peasants' intelligentsia (Tellenback, 1973:31), and the working intelligentsia (Podgorecki, 1994:153). Thus, the intelligentsia of this period had a different structure than that of the pre-war period and it was divided into many subgroups. According to Szczepanski (1991), there were 8 main subgroups:

1. Theorists – people who create scientific, philosophical and moral theories
2. Artists
3. Ideologists – people who try to make the world a better place
4. Experts – the professionals
5. Those who are responsible for the passing on and interpretation of knowledge. This group includes teachers, and people who work in communication.
6. Technical intelligentsia – engineers
7. Politicians
8. The Administration (Szczepanski, 1991:117).

Adam Podgorecki divides the Polish intelligentsia differently than Szczepanski; he defined the following subgroups:

1. The creative intelligentsia – artists, writers, poets etc.
2. The half-intelligentsia – those who wanted to be members of the intelligentsia but did not have the proper psychological preparation
3. The first generation intelligentsia – (the folk intelligentsia), those who had the proper education but did not possess the intelligentsia upbringing and manners
4. The rope-intelligentsia – those who were poor and did not care about their presentation. The rope symbolizes their documents that they carried tied with a rope instead of in a briefcase.
5. The provincial intelligentsia – educated people of small town and villages.
6. And of course there was the traditional intelligentsia (Podgorecki, 1994:154-155).

Adam Podgorecki (1994) stated that the traditional intelligentsia was the target of the communist regime, as this social group did not accept Marxist ideology from the very beginning. The free education and wider access to universities available after the Second

World War required more than a gymnasium education for an individual to be a part of the intelligentsia. New members were expected to have a university degree. The new form of education and the classification of the educated strata into different groups caused the intelligentsia to be given many different definitions. The most popular term for the intelligentsia during the communist time was *working intelligentsia*. This new term includes a redundancy, since the intelligentsia were working people by definition (Gella, 1976:31).

The above grouping of the intelligentsia suggested by Szczepanski and Podgorecki illustrates how inconsistent the definition of the intelligentsia was during the communist era.

It goes without saying that the above mentioned policies of degradation of the intelligentsia resulted in the separation of wealth and social position, as well as that of personal attributes and education attainments (Mokrzycki, 1997). The separation of education and income took place partly because the communist party did not want to antagonize the two main classes of socialist society: the workers and the intelligentsia. Any forms of upper class or privileged elite were unwelcome in communist Poland. The intelligentsia was to be an “ancillary stratum” (Tellenback, 1973:32), characterized by its position of subordination to the working (blue-collar) class. The above situation caused a separation of occupation and income. Certain groups of the population had low education and high incomes, or high incomes and low prestige. The positive relationship between these three – education, income and prestige – is one of the requirements of the capitalist ideology presented in the theory chapter. In the communist period this relationship did not exist. “Class structure formed during the socialist era mirrors class interests typical

for the era. These interests are rooted in the relation of each class toward the state apparatus, the government in particular” (Slomczynski, 1994:173). The stratification system in a capitalist society at least appears to be based on merit. If one of the merits is educational attainment, then the correlation between education and earnings and between occupation and earnings must be strong. The lack of such a correlation becomes an obstacle for economic development (Slomczynski, 1994). The above statement strongly suggests that the communist ideology of the classless society would hamper economic development. Indeed as communist Poland tried to create a classless society, the economic development of this country was indeed hindered.

The above paragraphs discuss how the lack of correlation between education, occupation and income hampered the development of the Polish economy. The next few paragraphs demonstrate how the lack of the above correlation weakened the motivational function of wages and prompted the rise of an abnormal hierarchy of power.

As stated earlier, the communist ideology tried to create a system of social equality. However, the communists did not found a political order of equality but rather changed the source of inequality (Mokrzycki, 1997:41). The individual became a part of central planning and central planning divided the wealth according to its presumptions, not according to free market needs. The communist ideology was based on the presumption that there should not be people who are very well paid and people who are poorly paid. During the socialist era “the pool of funds was in the hands of the central authorities, who distributed these funds according to political criteria rather than according to economic rationality. This system evolved from the fifties in such a way that, at the end of the period of real socialism, branches (industries) often became a

stronger determinant of wage differentiation than membership in an occupational category” (Bialecki, 1996:13).

One of Poland’s communist leaders, Wladyslaw Gomulka, divided the Polish economy into two sectors: the production sector and the non-production sector. Those in the production sector (mainly miners, farmers, and factory workers) became the engine of the communist economy. The other sector (mainly the intelligentsia) was regarded sometimes as a nuisance. It became the subject of systematic degradation. Their income continued to decline and, by 1981, 60% of workers with higher education had income below the Polish average. The disproportion in the sphere of income increased again in the 1980s:

In Poland, during the period 1964-1991, there is an overall decrease of the correlation between formal education and job income, and between occupational rank and job income. For eleven surveys ordered according to their dates, this decrease is neither linear nor even “smooth” but the trend is clear: in the period 1964-1978 the correlation coefficient range from .31 to .40 while in the period 1982-1991 they range from .08 to .16. The main change occurred at the beginning of the 1980s when according to official statistics, the average earnings of non-manual workers were lower than those of manual workers (Slomczynski, 1994:175).

Furthermore, the growing gap between the level of skills and responsibilities on the one side and financial rewards on the other weakened the motivational function of wages (Pohorille, 1982:161). In the 1980’s many young, educated Poles emigrated. Between April 1981 and June 1983 alone, 1100 doctors, 6500 engineers, and 3000 other scientists left Poland. The number of people with university diplomas who emigrated during this period reached 33,000. Many of those leaving Poland used ideology as an

excuse for living abroad (Sulek, 1983:261)⁸. However, a closer look at the ideology suggests that these young professionals were simply looking for a country where the hierarchy of power or even income was based on one's credentials not on one's proximity to the ruling party. As Adamski states, "to restore the disrupted links between educational and work aspirations and attainments, on the one hand, and on the other, their economically measured rewards is the main precondition for successful strategies of transition" (1994:316).

The lack of relation between education, income and prestige did not stop the society from creating a hierarchy of power. Power was obtained by getting an influential position that allowed control over commodities that were in short supply on the market (Bialecki and Sikorska, 1998). Although a university degree in the communist era did not carry a direct material value, i.e., value expressed in one's salary, a higher education diploma increased one's chances to hold directorial or managerial positions in different factories and organizations. These managerial positions gave those who held them certain power to gather material goods. For example, agent A, a director of an institution assigning⁹ apartments, could put agent B at the head of the list of people waiting for an apartment allowance. In exchange, agent B would help agent A to procure new furniture in a store where he (agent B) was a manager. As one can see, because of the shortage of many things on the market, money was not the most powerful tool for the exchange of

⁸ Thirty three thousands Poles with university diplomas who immigrated in the period from April 1981 to June 1983 counted for 22% of the immigration during that period of time (Sulek, 1983:261). Keeping in mind that only 5-7% of the Polish population had a university degree at that time, one can see how those with higher education were much more likely to leave Poland than those without education.

goods; rather access to the distribution of goods was the strongest factor in the exchange of goods and services, and this was the indirect 'material' value of a university degree in a communist society. In the 1980's the stores were usually empty anyway, so money could not secure the possession of material things. The above example illustrates, from a democratic, capitalist point of view, the abnormality of the situation during the communist period. "If formal settings fail to satisfy needs, informal groups take over their role" (Figa: 1982:130). The lack of wide access to goods caused the appearance of a 'second market' in Poland. I use the word 'second' rather than 'black', as it is difficult to call a market 'black' when it was actually to large degree run by state officials. In capitalism the main form of reward is financial. In communism the method of reward lay in the proximity to a position of control of the distribution of goods. Such a situation is anomalous to a market democracy and in present day Poland would not allow the full development of capitalism. As stated in the theory chapter, money is an indifferent commodity which grants certain freedom in obtaining material goods.

Moreover in the communist system, people did not try to work harder and earn more money, because money did not have a market value; i.e., money itself did not guarantee a higher standard of living. With the end of communism, the main method of reward used in capitalism – money – was reestablished. Thus, the lack of financial motivation to work hard ended in Poland in 1989. The beginning of the reforms raised the *zloty* - Polish currency unit - to its marketable value. The methods of goods' distribution used in communism disappeared (Bialecki and Sikorska, 1998:81).

⁹ During communism people did not buy an apartment. The apartments were assigned to citizens by the government. There was a long list of people waiting for an apartment as the population was growing faster than the apartments were built.

Receiving education and widening one's intellectual horizon was the main reason why people attended university in the past, but other reasons also existed; for example, as cited above, education could gain one a position in the abnormal hierarchy (which was based on one's access to goods distribution.) Another fact supporting university attendance was avoidance of military service. Many young men saw university as an escape from the two years of obligatory service. The reprieve allowed young people to enjoy their youth since university was free and many scholarships and bursaries were available. Despite the fact that the above reason brought many young men to university, the communist government succeeded in decreasing the power of the intelligentsia. After all, people who were taught critical thinking were a threat to the communist regime. As pointed out in the theory chapter, the middle class is the base of democracy. Since the majority of the middle class consists of educated people, logically they are the prerequisite for democracy. The communist government controlled the number of university students, as they feared the educated citizenry. (The numbers of students enrolled at universities in Poland are reported in the last chapter, where the enrolment patterns of the present and the past are compared).

Having discussed the abnormality of the social structure during communism, I would like to demonstrate how the intelligentsia fought again for social change and for the independence of the Polish nation.

By the 1950s, Polish society had become the closest it would ever come to the ideal type of the "monocentric system whose characteristic features are: central control over organization, blocking of any autonomous social dynamics resulting in atrophy of

class structure, social isolation of smaller groups and emergence of the second economy” (Wnuk-Lipinski, 1991:6)¹⁰. In Poland, this period did not last long, since the crisis of 1956 brought some changes. First of all, small private businesses were allowed, and farmers became the owners of their land. Secondly, even Stalin’s iron hand could not diminish the significance of the Catholic Church. People were allowed to attend religious services, and the church could release its own publications. Additionally, Poles were allowed to visit the West. This was a great opportunity to learn about other political systems and economic solutions. Many Poles had migrated immediately after end of the Second World War. Due to this vast emigration, many people in Poland had relatives abroad: in England, France, Canada and the USA (Kloc, 1991:13). The exposure of Polish people to Western values, as well as the Christian doctrine so prevalent in the society, enabled many Poles to quickly understand the dynamics of capitalism and democracy. “Poland has been a Christian nation for over one thousand years and the values of western civilization are deeply rooted in Polish culture. The new social order, implemented in Poland after the Second World War, brought an alternative, and often contradictory, set of values. A clash of these value systems was inevitable” (Wnuk-Lipinski, 1991:7). The era of Stalinism, that was considered a deviation from the socialist values preached by the communist party, ended in 1956. Since the communists admitted that Stalinism was wrong, the people of Poland were given hope for a better future. One may say that the party was given another chance. However, many of the promises made by the communist government were slowly phased out or not delivered at all, and a wave of new protests began. “The collapse of the intellectual, social and economic promise of

1956 lay at the root of two protests which marked the final years of Gomulka's rule: the 1968 intellectuals' and student protest and the December 1970 workers' revolt on the coast" (Figa, 1982:124). The success of political and economic systems requires a widely accepted ideology justifying the social structure (Bowles and Gintis, 1976). The communist ideology was not accepted by the majority of Polish society, therefore the citizens rebelled. The Polish people discredited the communist government by creating social unrest, demonstrating, belonging to the underground movement, etc. If there had been an illusion that things might be changed for the better from within the party, it was soon dispelled by the above events.

Hence, once more the thesis returns to the earlier emphasis on the common calling of all the intelligentsia members to serve the nation. The spirit of the traditional intelligentsia was not only present among the educated. According to Adam Podgorecki (1994:148) the intelligentsia's ethos was present in the "Solidarity" organization, despite the fact that it was a workers' union. In defiance of the efforts of the communist regime to get rid of the intelligentsia, the social group survived and it played a leading part in the underground movement to destroy the communist system (Gella, 1976:17). The main stimulus that brought about a new opposition movement in Poland was the revolts of the 1970s in the Polish coastal cities. Additionally, throughout the 1980s, the Polish government began to introduce many small reforms in a desperate attempt to end another crisis, this time an economic one. These events, and many others taking place in Eastern Europe, triggered the new intelligentsia to fight communist oppression. "Some groups of

¹⁰ As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the Polish communism was different from the Soviet communism.

intellectuals and student youth began to organize protests on behalf of liberalization” (Gella, 1989:201).

There were also underground groups of intellectuals who worked on diagnosing the social conditions of the country in preparation for independence and change. These organizations were Logofag in Krakow and Klub Neopickwickstow in Warsaw, and others like Club “Pawianow”, Club “Pomodorow”, “Keep Smiling”, and “Krzywego Kola” (A Bent Circle Club) (Podgorecki, 1994:179).

Another way in which the intellectuals fought the regime was through the Committee for Workers’ Defense. This committee, known by its Polish abbreviation KOR, “emerged following the strikes of June 1976. It initially consisted of prominent Polish intellectuals, and was joined by people known for their activity in 1968” (Figa, 1982:131). Its task was to defend workers who were persecuted for their participation in strikes, to help their families, and to collect funds for them. KOR played the role of a link between the workers and the intelligentsia. The interesting thing about KOR is the fact that it was against any conspiratorial activity. It acted according to the Polish Constitution and the Charter of Human Rights (Figa, 1982).

In addition to KOR, a group of Polish intellectuals created a Society for Scientific Courses in January 1978. They organized lectures on topics that could not be discussed at universities. One of the groups that existed in Krakow was the Catholic intelligentsia. The patron of the group was cardinal Karol Wojtyla, later Pope John Paul II. Some of the members of this group became the advisors to “Solidarity”¹¹ when it was first formed in

¹¹ Solidarity, led by Lech Walesa, emerged in Poland in late 1980 in protest against government economic mismanagement and party authoritarianism and corruption. Employing peaceful instruments of work stoppages and negotiations, Solidarity won a number of important industrial and political concessions, including the right to free trade unionism, the legality of strikes, and the undertaking of far-reaching economic reforms (Wilczynski, 1982:177).

1979 (Figa, 1992: 132). The missionary character of the intelligentsia reflected the need for social change in Poland. Since the educated concentrated first on regaining independence and second on economic growth, the character of this social stratum reflects the economic and political situation in Poland and the need for transformation to a different social system.

In 1980, the government introduced sharp increases in the price of food ranging from 20 to 100 percent (Wilczynski, 1982:178). The situation became very difficult when the government introduced the coupon system. Every citizen of Poland over the age of 18 received each month a coupon for basic things such as flour, sugar, meat, and even cigarettes and gas. The joke of the 1980s was: "Mom, is it socialism yet or is it going to get even worse?" Well, it did get worse, as Polish people entered the period of waiting in line for absolutely everything. Queuing became a "normal" part of life in Poland.

The extremely difficult food situation in Polish cities was the last straw for the Polish workers – they decided to strike. On August 16, 1980 "an Inter-Factory Strike Committee was created at the Lenin shipyard in Gdansk, originally representing workers from twenty one enterprises, to co-ordinate strike activity in the region, and it soon established links with other centers of unrest" (Wilczynski, 1982:178). This was the beginning of "Solidarity". Most of its members were young or middle aged, reasonably well-educated Poles. "Largely due to the actions of Solidarity and intellectual dissidents, incompetence and corruption within the Party and the state apparatus were exposed, and the staggering foreign indebtedness (\$25,000 million), hidden and open privileged shops, private villas, special allowances and various perks were brought to light" (Wilczynski

citing Lubowski, 1982:181)¹². Many families had suffered for more than one generation from forced savings and under-consumption so the state could build up assets that were enjoyed by a privileged elite (de la Dehesa, 1991:24). In the fall of 1981, all of Poland's universities and colleges joined a strike over academic reforms (Davies, 1984:18).

Once more in Polish history, the intelligentsia fought for the country's independence. On December 13, 1981, General Jaruzelski proclaimed martial law. Tens of thousands of people were arrested without charge, and some 10,000 were detained in 49 internment camps. After the events of the early 1980s, the communist tried to re-establish control over the organizations that earlier had repudiated them. "Their main target, to begin with, was the intelligentsia, that incurable source of festering dissent. The Journalists' Association (SPD) was abolished in March, the Film Makers' Union and the actors' Union (ZASP), which had bravely boycotted the official media, were dissolved in December" (Davies, 1984:25).

The crisis of the 1970s and the martial law of the 1980s ended in the formal cessation of the communist party in January 1990 (Wnuk-Lipinski, 1991:9). Poland began to undergo an enormous transformation from a totalitarian system based on one party to a democratic, multi-party system, "and from a centrally planned economy to a competitive market economy, based on private ownership of capital and guided by efficiency criteria and the profit motive" (Rosati, 1991:28). Poland heralded its social, political and economic transformations with many reforms. The dynamics of the changes introduced at the very beginning of 1990 is described as follows:

¹² The original article was published by Lubowski in "Zycie Gospodarcze" on May 3rd, 1981.

The currency was sharply devalued and rendered convertible for all commercial transactions, prices and interest rates were substantially freed and subsidies to the state sector were drastically cut. The era of the hard budget constraint and the discipline of import competition had arrived. Price liberalization met with almost instant success. In a matter of days, queues for food and consumer goods had vanished and shops were full (Wyznikiewicz et al, 1993:3).

To sum up, and reiterate, the intelligentsia's role before, during, and after the Second World War was a different one. The working intelligentsia had a different character than the classical stratum but the calling was similar. For the pre-war intelligentsia the goal was to maintain Poland's independence; for the post-war intelligentsia the fight was for radical change of Poland's political and social structures.

So far this thesis has demonstrated how the changing circumstances of the educated stratum reflected the social and political conditions in Poland. In the following chapters I concern myself with the role of this social stratum in the 1990s. I shall return to these issues in the last chapter where I raise the following questions: Does the intelligentsia exist in the 1990s or is it a social stratum of the past? The intelligentsia existed because the Polish society needed a stratum with a mission, a group that would lead the nation towards a better future. Does the Poland of the 1990s need such a group? Does the political, economic or social situation in Poland require the existence of the intelligentsia at the doorstep of the 21st century?

In the following chapter I complement my historical portrait of the intelligentsia with more contemporary survey data which provide insights into the attitudes of today's Poles towards education. I turn now to analysis of survey data.

Chapter 4: Do Poles Believe In Capitalism? - The Value Of Education In 1992 (part 1)

In the preceding chapter I demonstrated the changing roles of the Polish intelligentsia throughout the 1800s and 1900s, and how it reflected the situation of Poland at any given time in the period of its existence. Here I shall concentrate on the emergence of attitudes that represent capitalist values. I do so by looking at people's opinions as to whether a person's income should reflect his/her education. I do acknowledge that the capitalist value system is not limited to one's opinion on the education-income link. However, in this thesis I am predominantly interested in higher education in Poland and for this reason I decided to base the measure of a capitalist value system on people's attitudes towards higher education that would or perhaps would not reflect a capitalist mentality.

Based on the standpoint developed in the theory chapter, this part of the paper seeks answers to questions regarding the changing attitudes towards education and income in Poland during the 1990s. The reader will recall point one from chapter 2 concerning the spirit of capitalism:

The spirit of capitalism is a vital factor in accepting a market democracy in Poland, and the capitalist spirit ought to be reflected in many attitudinal changes.

One of them is the attitude towards the correlation between education and income. In looking for the reasons why people are the way they are, why they do the things they do, and why they believe in the things they believe in, we implicitly assume that their actions and opinions are to a large extent determined by forces and factors operating on them (Babbie, 1995:60). In this rein of thought, the belief concerning education which

is the subject of this (education should /should not be reflected in salary) is introduced by the capitalist system operating on them. The capitalist system is imposed by the state through the educational system, the system of financial rewards, and other systems that justify the differences between the 'haves' and 'have-nots'.

Income difference existed in the communist era but there was never any attempt on the part of the communist government to rationalize why such differences. Indeed, the communist government could not even attempt to explain the differences in incomes because it did not admit that such differences existed. Just to remind the reader I shall repeat that the communist ideology was based on "everybody equally". Brunon Gorecki (1994:33) calls this philosophy of income distribution "Soviet-Type". Any significant difference in income was contrary to the communist philosophy. However, in practice such differences did exist. As Domanski and Heyns (1995:330) point out, after the collapse of communism one of the characteristics of income distribution that disappeared from Polish society was the inequality between Communist Party members (or former members) and the population. The logic of capitalism dictates that there will be income inequality, and the credential system is used to justify and make people accept the income inequality. Education is the most obvious credential and the easiest one to understand, thus education is very often used as an explanation of diversity of income.

I am going to measure the growing spirit of capitalism by looking at people's attitudes towards the correlation between education and income. The units of analysis are individuals. As the theory is stated and evidence to support it is sought, a deductive logic is applied in the analysis, using survey data. Based on Bowles' and Gintis' theory one can

assume that if people believe in the spirit of capitalism then they will agree that income should reflect education.

To examine the changing attitudes, the International Social Survey 1987 and 1992 are used first. The methodology of the ISSP survey is presented in Appendix A. Both surveys (ISSP and Educational Needs) asked the respondents a question about the correlation between education and income.

Before elaborating on the analysis and results obtained from the ISSP, it is necessary to show how the changing attitudes will be measured. The hypothesis statements above are quite general, the statements set forth below are fit to test the general hypothesis by means of these particular surveys.

The common data for 1987 and 1992

As mentioned in the theory chapter, education is like a bond that enables the holder to enter certain professions. It was true in the communist era and it is true in a capitalistic setting. One of the differences between capitalist and communist Poland lies in the financial rewards offered by different professions. The communist notion that everyone should be rewarded equally meant that a cabinet minister and a farm worker should earn similar amounts of money¹³. If the communist ideology had prevailed, one should find in the analysis that people believe that the difference in pay between a cabinet minister and a farm worker should be small. If the ideology has changed between 1987

¹³ These two professions are cited because they are available in both ISSP'87 and '92. For more detail see Appendix B.

and 1992, one should find a significant difference between the expectations of the income levels of a cabinet minister and a farm worker.

Table 1 below includes answers to two questions asked in 1987 and 1992. The first question asked the respondent's opinion on how much a job pays. It should be emphasized that the questions were not to find out if the respondent knows how much a job pays but how much he/she presumes it pays. The second question asked the respondents their opinion on how much a job should pay. In other words the respondents were asked what they believe would be a fair pay for different jobs. The answers to the first question are presented in the column titled *Do make*; the answers to the second question are presented in the column titled *Should make*.

Based on the theory one can hypothesize that,

If the attitudes towards the correlation between education and income changed from 1987 to 1992, I should find that the perceived-to-be-fair financial rewards for different occupations differ according to the educational attainment assumed for the different positions, i.e., the believed-to-be-fair (should make) salary of a doctor will be higher than the believed to be fair salary of an unskilled worker, and the difference between these two salaries will be bigger in 1992 than in 1987.

The observations based on the medians of the presumed and believed-to-be-fair salaries is limited, as I can compare only people's presumption, which may have very little support in reality. But, as stated at the beginning of this chapter, I am interested in people's attitudes, not in the real financial rewards scale present in Poland in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

The comparison of incomes between the ISSP'87 and ISSP'92 is based on medians¹⁴. Usually the researchers compare the means; in this case, however, medians are the better value to compare since they are not sensitive to extreme values.

In 1991, Poland introduced monetary reform. This reform changed the value of the Polish *zloty* (the basic currency unit). The values from 1987 are presented in the old monetary system and the values for 1992 are presented in the new *zloty*. As the focus here is not in the value itself but the percentage it represents according to different professions, the old *zloty* was not recalculated to the value of the new *zloty*, because such a recalculation is unnecessary to obtain the information sought.

Table 1: ISSP'87 and ISSP'92: MEDIANS OF INCOME FOR DIFFERENT PROFESSIONS. Variables asking respondents about presumed pay (do make) and believed to be fair pay (should make) for different jobs.

Jobs	Do make		Should Make	
	1987	1992	1987	1992
Cabinet Minister	80000	8000	80000	8000
Chairman of a large company	60000	10000	60000	10000
Doctor	25000	2500	49000	5000
Owner of a small shop	60000	5000	50000	5000
Skilled Worker	30000	1900	40000	3000
Farm Worker	30000	1600	40000	3000
Unskilled Worker	20000	1200	28000	2500

Table 1 brings to light a few interesting observations; the most striking of which is the presumed pay for a doctor in 1987. A doctor is thought to earn less than a skilled

¹⁴ The test of significance for the medians was not conducted because the values for 1987 and 1992 are in different currency values.

worker. (Since the real wages for that period of time are not available to me, I am not able to comment on this value in more detail). However, it was shown in the historical chapter that in the 1980s, the salaries of the intelligentsia did drop below the national average.

Besides the striking observation on the doctor's salary, at first glance the differences may seem rather small. In both years people agreed that a doctor, a skilled worker, a farm worker, and an unskilled worker should earn more than they are thought to earn. One may believe that the population does not recognize the different levels of responsibility required by different positions. The tables could also suggest that the greater educational achievements an employee in high a position should have, are not considered worthy of financial reward. After all, the respondents agreed that the salaries of a chairman of a large company and a cabinet minister should not be higher than people think they are. Such a conclusion is, however, misleading. When we compare the medians of believed-to-be-fair salaries of a doctor and a skilled worker, we see that in 1987, a skilled worker's salary median is only 81.6% of a doctor's salary median. In 1992, the gap between the believed-to-be-fair doctor's salary median and a skilled worker's salary median increased. Although the respondents were not asked to estimate the salaries in direct ratios, the answers they gave indicate that a skilled worker's median salary ought to equal only 60% of a doctor's.

As a second example the difference between the believed-to-be-fair of a chairman of a large company's salary and that of an unskilled worker in a similar way. In 1987, the

respondents implied that an unskilled worker's salary median should equal 46.7%¹⁵ of the salary median of a chairman of a large company. In 1992, an unskilled worker's salary median was placed at only 25% of the financial value ascribed to a chairman of a large company.

Moreover, in 1987 people believed that an owner of a small shop makes more than he/she should. Since opening a little corner store does not require any educational attainment, people did not accept the situation in which a shop owner was making much more than a teacher or an engineer. This scenario is also described in the history chapter in the discussion concerning those who earn more but have little prestige, and those who earn little but have enormous prestige in society. The legitimization of social inequality must be accepted and understood by society as a whole. In Poland those who were "under-rewarded" -- well educated but earning little money-, needed to adjust to their situation. Those who were "over-rewarded" - least educated but making better money - needed to defend their position. Such a situation hinders conformity towards social norms (Slomczynski, 1994). "Unskilled manual workers in large factories received the highest wages, higher than their foremen and much higher than workers with a university education, such as doctors, teachers, and so on (Gorecki, 1994:33). Social norms, as generally accepted beliefs, must be understood and consciously agreed upon by the majority or any reform in such a society will be impossible. In a socialist state, the differences in income among people were not based on any merit system. The

¹⁵ The respondents to ISSP'87 indicate that an unskilled worker should earn about half of the salary paid to a chairman of a large company, which may look hardly equality based. However, a chairman of a large company, in the 1980s had high probability of being a communist party member, and throughout the thesis it is argued that those who were high in the party hierarchy did earn more than the rest of the society.

dismantling of the communist reward system has become one of the most important aspects of the transition from communism to capitalism (Domanski, 1997:64).

The above observations lead to the conclusion that there was an increase in the acceptance of capitalist values in Poland between 1987 and 1992. Society increasingly accepted the capitalist philosophy that income should reflect one's education. The fact that respondents indicated that skilled workers, farm workers and unskilled workers should receive more money for their work, (in both years, 1987 and 1992, the respondents indicated the believed-to-be-fair salary as higher than the presumed salary) reflects the respondents objection to the low standard of living of these social strata. However, despite their support for higher blue-collar salaries, people still seem to believe that certain occupations should have much greater financial rewards than others. Those occupations are high in prestige and require higher educational standing.

In communist Poland, a university degree and knowledge of a foreign language did bestow some benefits at work, but they did not yield meaningful financial rewards. Financial planning came from the top and did not include any space for an individual career as such. Additionally, manual labour was appreciated more than intellectual work (Mokrzycki, 1997:40). Manual workers were the main force of socialist industrialization, because they produced goods for export. Since export was a substantial part of the Polish economy, blue-collar workers were needed to produce the goods for export. This gave them the mechanism to fight against the government by means of strikes and demonstrations (Slomczynski, 1994:171). Miners were the foundation of the Polish export industry(Poland was one of the biggest exporters of coal in the world) and they

earned substantially more than teachers, for example. The lack of relation between income and education planted among young Poles the idea that education does not pay off. Moreover, as mentioned in the historical overview, as a result of war and emigration, Poland had lost a large portion of its intelligentsia and the country was therefore left with little intellectual power. As a consequence of this policy, the belief in the value of intellectual work decreased throughout the communist era. In the 1990s when the political system changed, Poles began to believe that educational level is one of the fundamental features of a work force based on a capitalist merit system.

The acceptance of the capitalist value system is apparent in the analysis based on the 'presumed' and 'the believed to be fair' salaries (Table 1). The believed-to-be-fair salary variance among different professions indicates that some changes in the attitudes of Polish citizens have taken place. However, for such changes to be strongly rooted in any society the support and belief of a large majority of the members of society is necessary.

Possible predictors of one's attitude towards education-income relation

As mentioned earlier, the system of rewards in communist Poland was mainly based on "proximity" to the communist party. In capitalism, the system of rewards is based on credentials. One may argue that capitalism, despite its strong merit system, is not perfect because not everybody in Western countries has equal access to university education. However, leaving this argument aside, it is generally accepted that those who are very well educated earn very good money. Consequently, **those in Poland who are**

closer to the capitalist system of rewards or have a better understanding of it, are more likely to agree than those who are not so close to the capitalist system of rewards, that income should reflect education. By those who are closer to the capitalist system I mean people living in large cities such as Warsaw, Krakow, Poznan, Lodz and a couple of others¹⁶. By those who have a better understanding of the dynamics of political systems and social order including market democracy, I mean people with higher education. Considering that the current middle age generation of Poles grew up in a communist regime, one would expect to find that younger Poles are much more likely to accept the capitalistic system of rewards than the older generation. One would also expect women to be more inclined to believe that income should reflect education since the communist Poland had more educated women than men, but women's salaries were lower. Despite the fact that women had equal access to universities, they seem to have had less access to highly paid and prestigious positions in the labour force.

As mentioned in the introduction, individualistic traits tend to be typical of capitalist personality. Even the rule of wealth accumulation is based on individualistic traits. If the above is true (and I believe it is), people who believe in hard work, ambition, and natural ability would also believe that these traits can lead to the accumulation of credentials that would allow for better employment and, consequently, for a higher standard of living. **Thus, education as a credential obtained through hard work, ambition, and natural ability should guarantee better rewards - the higher the educational level the higher the rewards.** Using data from ISSP'92 I built a scale

¹⁶ In October of 1991 there were 5000 foreign investment registrations in Poland. Although the number is quite small compare for example, to Hungary (10600), Polish large cities were the first to be exposed to foreign companies. The foreign investors were expected to bring higher standards of quality, environmental

measuring one's belief in individual success. This scale measured whether and, if yes, how strongly respondents believe that getting ahead in life depends on ambition, natural ability and hard work. I called this scale *personal*. I expect that those who indicate on the personal scale that these three factors are essential in getting ahead in life are more likely to agree that education should be reflected in income.

Hypothesis on personal scale: if individuals recognize ability and personal effort as determinants of individual success they will be more likely to agree that education should be reflected in income.

Those who count on external factors to guarantee personal success, such as wealthy family, well-educated parents, and knowing the right people, would seem to have less individualistic spirit, i.e., weaker capitalist values. In contrast to the *personal* scale I built a *social* scale, that measured whether and, if yes, how strongly respondents believe that getting ahead in life depends on wealthy family, well-educated parents, and knowing the right people (Details on the scales are presented in Appendix C). One would expect that, those who pay more attention to external factors as indices of one's success would be less likely to agree with the education – income link.

Hypothesis on social scale: if individuals recognize external factors as one's determinants of success, they will be less likely to agree that education should be reflected in income.

acceptability and competitiveness. The last was rather a new concept for many Polish firms that were used to a centrally planned economy (Michalak, 1993:1574).

(Cross-tabulations of the dependent variable with these scales are presented in appendix C)¹⁷.

At this point it should be acknowledged that networking is extremely important in capitalist societies also. However, the focus of this chapter is not the reality of the labour force in a capitalist economy, but the Polish people's beliefs concerning the attributes of success, in particular the attitudes towards personal effort in relation to expected success. In terms of high unemployment, as in Canada throughout the 1990s, people do emphasize "knowing the right people". However, knowing the right people and building one's network throughout the course of life, is different from emphasizing the importance of having parents or associates who are strategically positioned in the labour force, and who can thus facilitate one's access to the higher positions in the labour force.

The logistic regression analyses are based on a variable that deals with education and income. This variable is an examination of the belief that years of education should influence workers' wages. Twelve percent of respondents to ISSP'92 believed that one's salary should not be influenced by education; eighty three percent of respondents to ISSP'92 believed that one's salary should be influenced by education; and five percent had no opinion. This variable dealing with the belief in correlation between education and income, is the dependent variable throughout the remaining analysis of ISSP'92. The purpose of the analysis was find out what factors determine the belief in correlation between education and income.

¹⁷ The cross-tabulation are presented in the appendix as the tables are large (each scales has 13 points), which is rather difficult to read and it does not present the influence of scales on the dependent variable in a clear manner.

The independent variables -- education, community size, sex, and age were cross-tabulated with the dependent variable. The cross-tabulations were conducted on weighted data.

The first cross-tabulation (table 2) introduces educational level. According to the numbers, those with university degree are most likely to agree that income should reflect education. This is rather an obvious finding. However, most of those who have university education in Poland in 1992 received it during the communist era and at that time they were aware of the small financial rewards bestowed by higher education. Those with less than high school education are the least likely to agree that income should reflect education. The test, which measures for association between these educational levels and the dependent variable indicates that this difference is statistically significant..

Table 2: ISSP'92: EDUCATIONAL LEVEL DETERMINING PEOPLE'S BELIEF IN SALARY REFLECTING EDUCATION – PERCENTAGE.

Income = education	UD	<UD	< HS	% (of total pop)	TOTAL
NO	1	11	15	12%	151
YES	99	86	76	83%	1091
NO OPINION	0	3	9	5%	64
% (of total pop)	9%	56.5%	34.5%	100%	
TOTAL	452	738	116		1306

Cramer's V = .195; Approx. Sig = .000

UD - respondents with university degree

Less than UD - respondents with a high school diploma and higher but less than university diploma

Less than UD - respondents with less than a high school diploma

The next cross-tabulation table (Table 3) presents the community size and the dependent variable. The capitalist value system was brought to Poland not only through the political change itself but also through the foreign companies that have been allowed to operate in Poland since the collapse of communism. As those living in large cities have greater access to foreign investment in Poland one would expect to find that the population of metropolitan areas are more prone to accept the capitalistic value system

than inhabitants of small towns or villages are. Table 3 shows that the biggest difference occurs between those living in cities and those living in villages. Keeping in mind the fact that cities tend to have a larger percentage of educated population, I checked for the correlation between education and community size. Such correlation¹⁸ indeed exists, although it is weak it is important to warrant further consideration of community size as a predictor.

Table 3: ISSP'92: COMMUNITY SIZE DETERMINING PEOPLE'S BELIEF IN SALARY REFLECTING EDUCATION – PERCENTAGE.

Income = education	city	town	village	% (of total pop)	TOTAL
NO	8	10	16.5	12%	151
YES	88	85.5	78	83%	1091
NO OPINION	4	4.5	5.5	5%	64
% (of total pop)	22%	44%	34%	100%	
TOTAL	291	571	445		1306

Cramer's V = .081; Approx. Sig. = .002

city - community of 250000 people and larger

town - community smaller 250000

villages - communities that have status of villages (usually smaller than 2000)

The last two demographic characteristics I examined were age and sex. Both of these variables were found to have weak or no association with the dependant variable. Table 4 shows that there is hardly any difference between men and women when it comes to the capitalist value of education.

Table 4: ISSP'92: GENDER DETERMINING PEOPLE'S BELIEF IN SALARY REFLECTING EDUCATION – PERCENTAGE.

Income = education	men	women	%	TOTAL
NO	13	10	12%	152
YES	83	84	83%	1091
NO OPINION	4	6	5%	64
%	47.5%	52.5%	100%	
TOTAL	619	688		1307

Cramer's V = .051; Approx. Sig = .184

¹⁸ The correlation is .263.

To look at the age variable, the respondents were divided into three age groups.

The reason for the division is presented in Appendix A. The cross-tabulation of the age variable with the dependent variable did not suggest a meaningful correlation.

Table 5: ISSP'92: AGE DETERMINING PEOPLE'S BELIEF IN SALARY REFLECTING EDUCATION – PERCENTAGE.

Income = education	under 30	31-51	over 52	%	TOTAL
NO	13.5	11	11	12%	151
YES	81	85.5	83	83%	1091
NO OPINION	5.5	3.5	6	5%	64
%	26%	42%	33%	100%	
TOTAL	337	544	428		1306

Cramer's V = .048; Approx. Sig = .191

The cross-tabulations based on the whole sample of the ISSP'92 suggest that the strongest predictor of one's belief in the correlation between education and income is educational level.

In order to introduce a wider range of variables describing personal characteristics, i.e., the personal and social scales, the following section introduces logistic regression analysis.

Logistic Regression Analysis

In this final section of this chapter, the theoretical model is empirically tested by using logistic regression procedures. A logistic framework is used to determine the probability of a Polish citizen believing in the education-income correlation. Guided by the conceptual framework presented earlier, it is hypothesized that the 4 dimensions of socio-background (education, community size, personal and social scales) will determine the measure of one's belief in the correlation between education and income.

The dependent variable in all regression takes the value of either 1 or 0. If the respondent agrees that income should reflect education, the dependent variable takes the value of 1 otherwise it takes the value of 0. The dependent variable is regressed on 4 predictors: social scale, personal scale, community size, and education. (the cross-tabulation suggested that neither sex nor age are significant predictors). After deletion of the missing cases, data from 577 males and 734 females were available for analysis. Missing data appeared to be scattered randomly across categories of outcome and predictors.

The final model of logistic regression analysis included the following variables

- **Bigcity** (a dummy variable describing people living in communities bigger than 250 thousand people)
- **Middle** (a dummy variable describing people with middle level of education)
- **Univers** (a dummy variable for respondents with university degree)
- **Personal** (scale measuring belief in individualism)
- **Social** (scale measuring belief in social network)

The reference category for the variables used in this analysis is a person with education lower than high school, not living in a city. Table 7 presents variables that were found significant in predicting a person's attitude towards education and income.

Table 6: ISSP'92: RESULTS OF LOGISTIC REGRESSION.

variable	B	EXP(B)
social scale		
Social	-0.5	0.6*
personal scale		
Personal	0.25	1.25**
education		
Middle	0.7	2*
Univers	3.3	26.6*
community size		
Bigcity	0.35	1.4**
constant	1.1	

* significant at .05 level

** significant at .10 level

all variables are significant at .10 level¹⁹

Nagelkarke = .101 Model Chi-Square = 74.32

Logistic regression results presented in Table 7 confirm what was shown in the cross-tabulations. The probability of a person believing that education and income ought to be correlated is positively associated with the respondent's education level and community size.

The analysis of data based on logistic regression allows us many different methods of results interpretation. The results can be interpreted by looking at 'Wald' values, so called 'scores', 'B coefficients' or the 'odds ratio'²⁰. In table 7, I have included the last two. EXP(B) (in other words the odds ratio), can be interpreted as follows: The odds of believing in the education-income link among those with a university degree are 27 times higher than the odds for those with less than high school education. The scales

¹⁹ Scott Menard in his book on logistic regression analysis wrote that ".05 criterion for inclusion (variables in the model) appears to be too severe" (1995:57). Bedel and Afifi (1977) suggest that for logistic model the statistical significance criterion for variables inclusion can be set as high as .15 to .20

²⁰ The odds ratio is usually the parameter of interest in a logistic regression due to its ease of interpretation (Hosmer & Lemenshow, 1989:44).

should be interpreted in a manner analogous to linear regression²¹. Increasing social scale by one unit decreases the odds ratio by 0.6. This means that the higher respondents score on the social scale, the less prone they are to agree that income should mirror education (the reader is referred here to appendix C, because the scale was reversed i.e. higher score means lesser conviction about the power of social network etc.). The social scale indicates that the same people who believe in networking, wealthy family and well-educated parents as indices of one's success, believe that education should be reflected in income. The personal scale indicates that those who believe in personal attributes as a guarantee of getting ahead in life do not believe that education should be reflected in income. This finding suggests that the capitalist philosophy of individualism was not present in 1992 in Poland.

“The capitalist world view sees individual initiative, entrepreneurship, and risk - taking as crucial elements in making an economy move forward. The socialist tends to view these concepts with suspicion, as being more of a cover-up for unequal wealth than a genuinely needed resources allocation mechanism. To the extent that they are needed in the socialist world, entrepreneurial functions are tolerated but never loved” (Weitzman, 1993:311).

The *bigcity* variable should be interpreted as follows. For those living in cities with a population larger than quarter of million the odds ratio of believing that education should reflect income is 40% higher than for those living in smaller communities.

Another way of interpreting logistic regression is by looking at the B coefficients. These values allow us to seek the value of prediction of one's belief by inserting the values of B into the logistic regression equation.

²¹ b is interpreted as the expected change of logit (P) associated with a unit change in X. “When b is positive, increases in X are associated with increases in logit. When b is negative, increases in X are associated with decreases in logits” (Pedhazur, 1997:714).

The logistic regression equation of calculation of the probability of '1' value for the dependent variable (Y^*) is

$$\frac{e^{A+b_1x_1 + b_2x_2 + b_3x_3}}{1+e^{A+b_1x_1 + b_2x_2 + b_3x_3}}$$

Where e is the base of natural logarithm, A is the constant, b is the coefficient, x is the variable in the model (Tabachnick and Fidell, 1996; Menard, 1995).

The equation below presents the calculation of probability of one's belief using the values from table 6.

Therefore the probability for *person A, low educational standing, with a social scale of 10 (does not believe in social networking), personal scale of 10 (does not believe in personal attributes) and not living in a large city* is

$$\frac{e^{1.1+(-.7)(0) + (3.3)(0) + (-.5)(10)+(.25)(10)+(.35)(0)}}{1+e^{1.1+(-.7)(0) + (3.3)(0) + (-.5)(10)+(.25)(10)+(.35)(0)}}$$

which is equal to .16.

This means that person A (a complete pessimist) has a 16 percent probability of believing that education should be reflected in one's salary.

The probability for *person B with university education, social scale of 1 (strongly believes in social network), personal 3 (rather strongly believes in personal attributes) and lives in a big city* is

$$\frac{e}{1+e} = \frac{1.1 + (-.7)(0) + (3.3)(1) + (-.5)(1) + (.25)(3) + (.35)(1)}{1.1 + (-.7)(0) + (3.3)(1) + (-.5)(1) + (.25)(3) + (.35)(1)}$$

which is equal to .99.

This means that person B has a 99 percent probability of believing that education should be reflected in one's salary.

The probability of person A believing in the correlation between income and education is lower than that of person's B. Table 7 presents a few scenarios of how the independent variables, that are included in the final model influence, the dependent variable.

Table 7: ISSP'92: EXAMPLES OF PROBABILITIES OF "1" VALUE FOR THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES BASED ON THE FINAL MODEL.

variables	scenarios													
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
education														
university	y	y	y	n	n	n	n	n	y	y	y	y	y	y
middle	n	n	n	y	y	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n
social	l	m	h	l	m	l	h	h	h	m	l	m	m	m
personal	h	m	h	l	m	l	h	l	m	m	m	h	m	l
bigcity	y	n	n	y	n	n	y	n	n	n	n	n	n	n
Y' *	99	85	60	65	51	35	5	0**	43	75	99	98	64	80

* the number represents the probability of an individual with different scores to agreeing that income should reflect education

** 0 is a rounded value. The true value is .005

h - high, m - middle, l - low score, n -no, y -yes

The values from row Y' in Table 7 should be interpreted as follows: column 1 represents a person with **high education** (university degree), who scored **low on the social** scale. A low score on this scale means that the person believes that factors such as: strong network, wealthy family and well-educated parents are essential in getting ahead in life. Moreover, the person's **high score on the personal scale** indicates that this person does not believe in hard work, ambition and natural ability as factors determining

whether one will get ahead in life. This person also lives in a city with a population of a quarter of million or higher. This individual has a probability of 99% agreeing that years education should be reflected in one's income.

The other columns of Table 7 should be interpreted in similar fashion. As mentioned earlier, the influence of *bigcity* is rather diminutive, however, for some scenarios it does make a difference worth noting. For example, for scenario six, the Y' increases from 35 to 43 if we consider a person who lives in a city larger than 250,000 people. In scenario 14, Y' increases from 80 to 85 when a person from a large city is considered. However, in scenario 12 the Y' increases only one percent for people from large cities. It seems that if the logarithm increases, the influence of *bigcity* decreases. The influence of *bigcity* depends on the possible scenario of the other independent variables.

Generally speaking, we can state that people with a university degree are much more likely than people with less than high school education to agree that income should reflect education (The odds ratio is not reported, as the subsample requires closer analysis and careful attention on the side of the researcher. It is explained in Appendix D). Also, as stated in the hypothesis, large cities are significant predictors of one's attitudes towards the education - income link.

On the other hand, the results of the social and personal scales do not support the hypothesized relation between the scales and the dependent variable. The results on the social scale indicate that people who believe in the education-income link also emphasize the power of the social network and thus undermine individualism. The belief in the strength of the social network in Poland during the early 1990s could be attributable to

the change from a system with very strong social programs and no unemployment - communism - to a system with very few social programs and high unemployment - capitalism. After all, “the proponent of the capitalist system offers no fundamental guarantee of employment or stability” (Weitzman, 1993:312). Perhaps one of the first lessons of capitalism in Poland was to secure one’s employment, and for this reason the social network and wealthy family were so important. The results on the social network, although different than hypothesized, do not allow me to state that people did not believe in capitalism at that time. Briefly mentioned earlier, high unemployment motivates people to build social networks. Especially during a ‘jobs crisis’, people value the social network very highly as this is a way of securing their survival in a tight job market²².

The results on the personal scale i.e. those who have high regard for personal attributes are less likely to agree with the education- income link, suggest that the capitalist individualism was not present in Poland in 1992.

Although the altering themes of the ISSP create certain limitations in analyzing the changes in Poland, the analysis of ISSP’92 allows the discovery of certain characteristics of Polish society immediately following the collapse of communism. The debates between Solidarity and the communist government started in 1989. However, true reforms did not begin until 1991. This leaves only one year of reforms. It does not seem like a long time, but the changes in Central Europe were so enormous at that time that the mentality was arguably shaped by the drastic transformation.

The theme of the ISSP survey was social inequality, and it did not deal directly with the relation between income and education. The next chapter is based on the

“Educational Needs” survey which directly asks if salary should reflect income. The ISSP analysis supports the hypothesis stated in the theory chapter, but the lack of complete data from 1987 does not allow for any final conclusion to be drawn about the changes in the attitudes of Polish citizens.

Summary

The first part of this chapter address the question on the trend of attitudes among Polish citizens regarding the relationship between income and education. A comparison between 1987 and 1992 data suggests that there are in fact changes in attitude on this issue among Poles. The data, based solely on the ISSP’92, limits the strength of the results on the changes after 1991, but the results do allow one to make inferences about attitudinal changes that have occurred over that time (Babbie, 1995:107). The results of the ISSP’92 suggest that level of education, the size of community one lives in and belief in social and personal capital influence one’s opinion on the relation between education and salary. Despite the fact that data from 1987 are not available, based on the theoretical model and the results of my analysis I can conclude the following. Polish people exposed to capitalistic values, i.e., those respondents who better understand social issues (better educated) are more likely to accept the capitalistic value system than do those not exposed to the values of capitalism.

The latest economic indicators suggest that Polish economic growth is proceeding in a steady and strong manner. In 1998, the yearly change of GDP in Poland equaled

²² The unemployment in Poland in 1992 reached 13.6% (Data obtained from the Main Statistical Office, Warsaw [Krajewska, 1996:6]).

+6.5 %, while foreign reserves increased from \$19.4 billion in 1997 to \$24.3 billion in 1998. The steadiness of the Polish *zloty* is also a strong indicator of a stabilized economy. The value of the Polish *zloty* from September 1997 to September 1998 dropped only 12 groszy (100 groszy = 1 zloty) from 3.5 zloty 3.62 zloty for an American dollar, which is about a 3% difference (The Economist, September 12th 1998:118). Considering the economic crisis in Russia, the Polish *zloty* is doing extraordinarily well. As presented in the theory part of this paper, Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis argue that a strong economy must be supported with a strong social value system that will yield economic growth. The transformation of the value system in Poland seems to be fertilizing economic development.

Chapter 5: Education And Capitalism – Do Poles Believe In Capitalism?

(Part 2)

The transition from a state owned economy to a free market economy has an influence on the role of education in a nation. Education in a market sense is a means to acquire money (Szymanderski, 1995:11). In order to prepare a strategy for the economical development and political changes, the Polish government had to learn how Polish citizens thought about and how they valued education in the 1990s; such was the role of the survey analyzed in this chapter. The survey Educational Needs was conducted by the Central Statistical Office of Poland in July of 1994. The original sample included people aged 3-55 and consisted of 10,171 respondents. The sub-sample used in this chapter includes 6231 respondents aged 18 and older. More details about this survey and its methodology are presented in Appendix E.

The hypotheses tested through the Educational Needs data are the same as those tested in the preceding chapter. I look at the characteristics of respondents who believe that one's education should be reflected in one's income. If people believe that salary should reflect education, then their attitudes resonate with the capitalist value system. If the value system is widely accepted in Polish society, Poland fulfils a condition for capitalism to flourish, i.e., the capitalist spirit which is necessary for capitalism to prosper.

The spirit of capitalism is a vital factor in accepting a market democracy, and the capitalist spirit ought to be reflected in many attitudinal changes. One of them is the understanding of the correlation between education and income.

Parallel to the analysis of the ISSP, cross-tabulations were looked at, followed by analysis based on logistic regression.

The dependent variable was built on the answer to the question, “Do you think that people with more education should earn more money?” The answers 1) ‘yes, always’ and 2) ‘yes with some exceptions’ were collapsed into a *yes* answer. The answers 3) ‘no with exceptions’ and 4) ‘no’ were collapsed into a *no* answer²³. In the Educational Needs survey just over 70 percent of respondents indicate that they believe that there should be a positive relation between one’s educational level and his/her salary.

Possible predictors of one’s attitude towards education-income relation

The preliminary analysis based on cross-tabulation and chi-square tests suggests that the 3 significant predictors of the relationship between education and income were educational level, community size, and sex. At this point I would like to remind the reader that in the ISSP’92 analysis, the 4 significant predictors of belief in the link between education and income were education, community size, and social and personal scales. The tables below present the percentage of the “yes” and “no” answers to the question regarding the relation between income and education.

²³ Those who did not have an opinion on this issue were omitted in the regression analysis.

Table 8: EDUCATIONAL NEEDS 1994: EDUCATIONAL LEVEL DETERMINING PEOPLE'S BELIEF IN SALARY REFLECTING EDUCATION – PERCENTAGE.

Income = education	UD	<UD	<HS	%	TOTAL
NO	4	18	28	23%	1407
YES	95	78	62	70%	4373
NO OPINION	1	4	10	7%	451
%	7%	37%	56%	100%	
TOTAL	440	2289	3502		6231

Cramer's V = .158; Approx. Sig. = .000

UD – respondents with a university diploma

Less than UD – respondents with a high school diploma and more, but less than a university diploma

Less than HS - respondents with less than high school education.

The above table clearly indicates that those with university diplomas are the most likely to believe that one's education should be reflected in one's salary. Table 8 also shows that the support for the positive relation between education and earnings decreases as the respondent's educational level decreases. Moreover, the lack of opinion on this social matter increases when the level of education decreases.

Table 9: EDUCATIONAL NEEDS 1994: COMMUNITY SIZE DETERMINING PEOPLE'S BELIEF IN SALARY REFLECTING EDUCATION – PERCENTAGE.

Income = education	city	town	village	%	TOTAL
NO	21	22.5	24	23%	1407
YES	74	71	67	70%	4373
NO OPINION	5	6.5	9	7%	451
%	23%	40%	37%	100%	
TOTAL	1420	2517	2294		6231

Cramer's V = .053; Approx. Sig. = .000

City – community larger than 200 th

Town – communities smaller than 200 th

Villages – communities that have status of villages (usually smaller than 2 th)

The overall differences between the city, town and village are small. The largest difference lies between the city dwellers and the villagers, but it is only 7%. Cramer's V suggests a significant association between community size and one's belief in the correlation between education and income. One must, however, keep in mind that Cramer's V is a Chi-square test, and it is influenced by the sample size. The sample analysed here numbers more than six thousand respondents, which is a large sample and

therefore influences the Cramer's V. Only further analysis can test if community size is indeed a significant predictor of one's attitudes towards the education-salary link.

Table 9 indicates that those who live in big cities are the most likely to believe in the positive correlation between education and salary. As argued earlier (Chapters 2 and 4) people in big cities have much more exposure to capitalistic values; also cities have a higher percentage of well-educated people. However, the narrow range of percentage difference – less than 10 percent – is too small to warrant a definite answer on the significance of community size as a predictor of one's attitudes towards income and education.

Table 10: EDUCATIONAL NEEDS 1994: GENDER DETERMINING PEOPLE'S BELIEF IN SALARY REFLECTING EDUCATION – PERCENTAGE.

Income = education	Female	Male	%	TOTAL
NO	20	26	23%	1407
YES	73	67	70%	4373
NO OPINION	7	7	7%	451
%	52.5%	47.5%	100%	
TOTAL	3270	2961		6231

Cramer's V = .08; Approx. Sig= .000

Table 10 indicates some differences between men and women in the belief that educational standing should be reflected in earnings. This is a very interesting result as in the ISSP'92 analysis there was no significant difference between women and men. However, as in the preceding table, the narrow range of percentage difference requires more analysis before it can be claimed that one's sex was a significant predictor of one's attitudes towards education and income in Poland in 1994. As in the case of community size, the strength of gender as a predictor will be investigated in the logistic regression analysis procedure.

Table 11: EDUCATIONAL NEEDS 1994: AGE DETERMINING PEOPLE'S BELIEF IN SALARY REFLECTING EDUCATION – PERCENTAGE.

Income = education	<=30	31-51	>=52	%	TOTAL
NO	23	23	23	23%	1407
YES	70	70	68	70%	4373
NO OPINION	7	7	9	7%	451
%	33%	60%	7%	100%	
TOTAL	2017	3760	454		6231

Cramer's V = .013; Approx. Sig = .742

Table 11 presents data on three age groups and their attitudes towards the relation between income and education. There is no difference between those who are younger than 30 and those who are between 31 and 51 years old. The difference between those who are 52 and older and the rest of the population is very small. Parallel to the findings in ISSP'92, the analysis of the Educational Needs survey suggests that age is an insignificant predictor of one's attitude towards education and income.

The sample of the Educational Needs survey used in this chapter does not include variables that would grant building a social scale used in ISSP'92.

Before I move to logistic regression analysis I will look at the university student population alone. The survey conducted by the Central Statistical Office of Poland in July 1994 allows us to look at the university students only, as the variable asking the respondents about their education includes those who are still in school (one of the categories is reserved for university students). Table 12 presents the data for this student subgroup. Keeping in mind that the student representation is small compared to the overall sample size, (there are only 126 university students in the sample – 2% of the 6231 respondents), we can see a difference in the students' approach towards the relation between income and educational level. As stated earlier, 23% of the whole sample of the "Educational Needs" survey believed that salary should not reflect education. Among the student body, only 9% support such an approach.

Table 12: EDUCATIONAL NEEDS 1994: UNIVERSITY STUDENTS DETERMINING PEOPLE'S BELIEF IN SALARY REFLECTING EDUCATION – PERCENTAGE

Income = education	university students only
NO	9
YES	90
NO OPINION	1
%	100%
TOTAL	126

Interestingly enough, when asked why it is worthwhile to get a higher education, only 13 % (exactly 12.7) of the students gave “high salary” as a reason for getting a university degree. The students’ most popular reasons for getting an education were:

- personal, intellectual development
- independence and self-reliance
- interesting job.

Moreover, when comparing Table 9 and Table 12, one can see that students are less likely to agree that salary should reflect education than the respondents with university degrees. The above data may indicate that students of the 1990s are simply expecting that they will earn more money than their less educated peers, or that they believe that skills per se, and not educational credit per se, will obtain them a higher salary. However, this is only an assumption. Literature research should be able to help in answering this question.

Logistic regression analysis

In this section, results are presented for the logistic regression used to estimate the probability of a Polish citizen having capitalist values regarding income and education.

“Logistic regression, like multiway frequency analysis, can be used to fit and compare models. The simplest model includes only the constant and none of the predictors” (Tabachnik and Fidell, 1996:576). My goal in running the logistic regression using the “Educational Needs” data was not only to find the best model for this survey but to create a similar model to the one used in the ISSP chapter. Unfortunately, I was unable to match the model based on ISSP’92 because some of the variables available in ISSP are not available in “Educational Needs”. As mentioned earlier, social and personal scales were used in the ISSP model but it was not available in “Educational Needs”. Another difference between these two surveys lies in the characteristics of community size. *Big city* in ISSP includes cities over 250,000 people. *Big city* in “Educational Needs” includes cities larger than 200,000 people.

There is also a difference in the age range. The Educational Needs survey includes only people up to 55 years of age. The ISSP does not have such a limit.

The model built on the “Educational Needs” variables included education, community size, age, and sex. Only education and sex were found to be significant predictors of one’s attitudes towards education and income.

Educational level

- **middle** (those with high school diploma and more, but less than university diploma)
- **univers** (those with university diploma)
- **sex** (males are coded as 1, females as 0)

The reference category includes a male who has less than high school education. The three variables that were found to fit the model the best were: “*univers*”, “*middle*” and “*sex*”. The above conclusion is based on the goodness-of-fit test. “The researcher uses goodness-of-fit tests to choose the model that does the best job of prediction with the

fewest predictors” (Tabachnick and Fidel, 1996: 576). (Appendix G presents the check on multicollinearity of these three variables.)

Table 13: EDUCATIONAL NEEDS 1994: RESULTS OF LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS.

Values obtained in logistic regression analysis: ENTER method

Variables	EXP (B)	B
Sex		
Male	0.74*	-0.3
Education		
Middle	1.85*	0.59
Univers	9.81*	2.26
constant		0.98

*significant at .05 level, Nagelkerke = .043

The logistic regression suggests that the strongest predictors of one’s attitude on the relation between income and education is the respondent’s education. Again, the odds of believing in the education-income link among those with a university degree are 10 times higher than the odds for those with less than high school education. Sex, although a weak one, was found to be a significant predictor of one’s attitude towards the education-income link. Men are 26% less likely than women to agree that one’s education and salary should be related. Community size was found to be an insignificant predictor of the dependent variable. More details on the logistic regression analysis are presented in Appendix F.

The logistic regression equation of calculation of the probability of 1 value in the dependent variable (Y') is

$$\frac{e^{A+b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + b_3X_3}}{1+e^{A+b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + b_3X_3}}$$

Where e is the base of natural logarithm, A is the constant, b is the coefficient, x is the variable in the model.

For example, Person A, *a male with education less than high school diploma* would have a predicted value of

$$\frac{e^{.98+(-.29)(1) + (2.26)(0) + (.58)(0)}}{1+e^{.98+(-.29)(1) + (2.26)(0) + (.58)(0)}}$$

which is .66.

This means that a male with no education would have a 66% probability of believing that salary should reflect one's education.

Person B, *a woman with a university degree* would have a predicted value of

$$\frac{e^{.98+(-.29)(0) + (2.26)(1) + (.58)(0)}}{1+e^{.98+(-.29)(0) + (2.26)(1) + (.58)(0)}}$$

which is .96.

This means that a female with university education has a 96 percent probability of believing that education should be reflected in one's salary.

The above examples illustrate the difference between the sexes and educational levels regarding belief in the correlation between income and education. The table below presents all 6 scenarios according to age and education.

Table 14: EDUCATIONAL NEEDS 1994: PROBABILITIES OF VALUE 1 IN THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE ACCORDING TO SEX AND EDUCATIONAL LEVEL.

educational level	male	female
university	95%	96%
middle	78%	82%
low	66%	72%

As presented in Table 14, educated women and men are the most likely to agree that financial reward and educational level should be correlated. Females are generally more likely than men to agree that education and income should be linked. As presented in Appendix G, there are more women with middle level education than men. Although the check for multicollinearity indicates that the correlation between sex and education is not strong enough for sex to be eliminated from the final model. Table 14 clearly indicates that gender plays a very small role as a predictor of one's attitudes. Unquestionably, education is the strongest predictor.

To sum up the findings based on the Educational Needs survey, I would like to add that the respondents were also asked if it is worthwhile to get an education and, if yes, for what reasons. In this sample of over 6000 respondents, 5101 indicated that it is worthwhile to get an education. Of the 5101, 1728 gave money as one of the three most important reasons for getting an education. This means that over one fourth of the sample believes that higher education ought to guarantee higher income. There was no significant difference between the survey's general population distribution and the distribution of those who gave money as a reason to pursue higher education.

Summary

The studies based on ISSP and Educational Needs do not agree in every detail, but by and large they indicate that education is the strongest predictor of one's attitude regarding the relationship between income and education. Social and personal scales were found to be significant in the 1992 survey and gender in the 1994 survey. The percentage of people supporting the income – education link is higher in the ISSP'92 than

in the “Educational Needs” 1994 survey. However, the methodology of these surveys differed to some extent in that the “Educational Needs” survey dealt with the subject matter in a more straightforward fashion: The ISSP asked if years of education ought to influence pay; the “Educational Needs” asked if people with more education should earn more money.

The difference between these two surveys could arise from the fact that they were conducted in different years. As mentioned in the introduction, the dynamics of transition in Poland are intense, and people’s values are changing very quickly. In 1992 the foreign investment was present in large cities only, but by 1994, it had become wide spread across Poland. For this reason, community size lost its value as a predictor of one’s attitudes towards the education-income link. After 1989 the remuneration system begun shifting from centrally administered incomes to remuneration according to individual potential – which for some means the level of education. Bialecki’s research indicates that employees of the private sector and residents of large cities benefited the most from having a university diploma (Bialecki, 1996:17).

The other reason could lie in the methodology. After all, in the “Educational Needs” survey there is some correlation between education and community size, which indicates that community size still carries some predictable strength as a variable. The strong relation between community size and educational level in this survey poses some ambiguity as to how to interpret the comparison between this survey and the ISSP. Nevertheless, we can state that education, social capital and personal capital are the variables that would build the strongest model of attitude prediction in Poland.

Additionally, the gender issue is more of a concern for Polish women who are still in the workforce – i.e. those under 55. The release of information that was hidden during the communist era helps women to realize that financial rewards used to be based on gender and not on one's credentials. For this reason women are stronger advocates of credentials such as education than men are.

The women's issue was also researched by Bialecki, whose results based on comparison between 1987 and 1993 data show that the general public believes that the salaries paid to higher education institution graduates are definitely too low, and this is perceived as unjust. Bialecki found that in the last few years the financial value of a university education increased; individuals with a university degree in 1987 earned 7% more than the average, in 1993 the difference increased to 31%. The large increase in the remuneration provided by a university diploma is ascribed to the private sector, where the money incentive is most visible. The 1990s also brought a clearly higher payoff for a higher education institution degree for women. Although women still earn on average less than men do, women with higher education earn 36% more than the average female worker in Poland (Bialecki, 1996:17).

Many other surveys were conducted in the last few years in Poland. Quite a few of them dealt with education in one way or another. In January 1994, CEBOS (Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej – Center of Research on Public Opinion) conducted a survey titled "Educational Aspiration of Polish Society"²⁴. The goal of this survey was to find out if Polish people believe that getting an education is worthwhile. The results indicate

that most people believe that it is worthwhile to pursue higher education. The reasons behind getting an education, however, differ among the respondents. Most people pointed to self-development and self-improvement as goals of education. 71% of the respondents answered that education leads to wealth (Bs/6/5/94, page 2). The opinion that education is worthwhile is the strongest among the intelligentsia, farmers, and among those who are satisfied with their financial standing.

Education in Poland – Public Opinion²⁵ conducted in November 1994, assessed the effectiveness of education in Poland. This survey also looks at the influence education has on respondents' lives. According to the respondents, education influences their careers and professional lives the most. Most respondents correlate education with good careers, financial success, and personal development (BS/189/167/94, page 13).

These two examples of other surveys conducted in Poland confirm that the society more and more accepts that education ought to offer financial rewards. (Appendix H includes more examples of surveys on education conducted in Poland). More information on the attitudes on education and income among Poles is given in the next chapter.

The next and final chapter of this thesis presents the present situation of the Polish well-educated stratum. Using historical knowledge and the information on the attitudes towards education and income provided in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, I shall explain why their situation has changed. By summarizing all the information presented so far, I will draw

²⁴ Research conducted by the Research Center on Political Science and Higher Education UW and CBOS in November 1993, N=1226.

²⁵ Research conducted by the Research Center on Political Science and Higher Education UW and CBOS, 2-5 September 1994, N=1219.

conclusion as to whether the Poland of late 1990s fulfils the conditions necessary in society for market democracy to prosper.

In the next chapter entitled “The well-educated in Poland on the doorstep of the 21st century” I discuss the latest reforms in the university system in Poland as well as their influence on the future workforce, and present figures showing a drastic increase in the university population. An increase in the university population is not limited to countries in economic transition. For example, the United States has experienced a large increase in the return to institutions of higher learning. This increase is attributable in large part to skill-based technological change that has increased the relative demand for educated labour (Baker and Solon, 1999:17). A similar trend can be observed in Poland. Thousands of people have decided to continue or go back to institutions of higher education in order to make their labour skills more marketable. If those who are educated have greater probability of believing in capitalist values, the growing number of the educated population will cause even greater acceptance of capitalist values in the whole population. “The high priority now attached to economic growth as an objective of government policy, whether in developed or underdeveloped countries, means that the economic contribution of education and the supply of educated manpower is a matter of increasing concern” (Woodhall and Ward, 1972:7).

Chapter 6: The Well-Educated of Poland at the Doorstep of the 21st

Century

Is There a Role for the Intelligentsia in the Near Future?

In the nineteenth century, Europeans who wanted to take advantage of economic opportunities generally changed their geographical location. They headed for the Southern or Eastern colonies or moved to the West. Many Europeans immigrated to North America in order to reach a satisfactory financial level. Many Americans from the eastern parts moved west in their quest for a comfortable life.

In the twentieth century, especially at the end of it, the quest for a better life has undergone a profound change. From a geographical journey to different parts of the globe, it has become a journey to university campuses. "With the closing of the Western frontier in the latter part of the nineteenth century and with the growing conflicts accompanying the spread of the now established "factory system", a new ideology of opportunity became the order of the day" (Bowles and Gintis, 1976:3). Education has become the new frontier.

In this paper, I have concentrated on the journey of the Polish nation towards its own newly discovered "land of opportunities", in particular the way to that land which is opened through a university diploma. I have demonstrated how the value of such a diploma has increased in the last few years. Although my arguments are based on scholarly research, one may very quickly discover the value of education in Poland by trying to buy a counterfeit diploma on the black market. In present-day Poland, a criminal makes a bigger profit by selling counterfeit diplomas than by producing counterfeit

money (Flankowska and Mojkowski, 1998:4). Amusing as this statement may seem, it is nevertheless striking evidence of where wealth is to be found in the 1990s in Central Eastern Europe – that is, in education.

In 1998, 1.5 million Poles were enrolled in universities; one third of them were first year students. Why has getting a university diploma become such an important goal for so many people? After all, the Polish Central Statistical Office reports that only 30 percent of university graduates actually use their academic knowledge at work. The answer is very simple – money. Any interesting job described under “help wanted” in Polish newspapers requires a university degree. Of course other skills, such as fluency in a foreign language, knowledge of computer software, and foreign experience are assets. But the fact remains that without a university diploma one’s chances of embarking on a really good career path are minimal. As Flankowska and Mojkowski (1998) as well as Buchner-Jeziorska (1998) state, in many cases employers pay little attention to the discipline in which one has achieved a diploma; they are mainly concerned with whether a candidate has or has not completed a university degree program. From the employee’s point of view, faith in the financial rewards bestowed by higher education which is currently prevalent in Polish society is a rather recent development: “In 1990, 90 percent of respondents to the CBOS survey maintained that an individual’s success depends on one’s patronage (backstairs influence) and networking. In 1997, the backstairs influence dropped to number four and education surfaced as the strongest factor in an individual’s success” (Flankowska and Mojkowski, 1998:3).

Staszewski reports on another CBOS study in which Poles were asked about their financial priorities. In 1996, 24 percent of respondents listed ‘utilizing financial resources

for education'; in 1997, the percentage grew to 32 (1997:4). Belief in the power of education has also increased significantly among the poorer stratum. In 1993, the better off put greater emphasis on education than the poor did. By 1997, the situation had reversed: 24 percent of the well off indicated that education is an important financial investment; among the poor, 42 percent voiced this belief. This does not mean that the wealthier have lost their faith in education. Rather it means that the poorer have learned about the financial opportunities that higher education bestows (Staszewski, 1997:4).

The growing number of university students promises to serve the Polish economy well. While currently in developed countries the percentage of university graduates in the general population ranges from 20 to 24, in the latter half of the 1990s only 7 percent of Poland's population have a university degree (Flankowska and Mojkowski, 1998:2). The low percentage of the well educated in Poland is probably one of the reasons why this stratum seems to have a special role to play in society. Its specific character has, in the past, been preserved by its small size. As access to higher education widens and the number of the university educated grows in Poland over the next few decades or even years, a university degree will increasingly be seen as an investment in one's future, and the "mystique" of the intelligentsia as the educated stratum will disappear. The chart below illustrates the growing number of university students in Poland in the 1990s.

CHART 1: THE GROWING NUMBER OF UNIVERSITY STUDENTS AND GRADUATES IN POLAND²⁶ DURING THE 1990s (in thousands).

The demanding economy was not the only cause of this rapid growth in the number of students: “1990 was the last year when the number of students admitted, and the uniform system of entrance procedures, was imposed by the central government” (Bialecki, 1996:142).

As the growing number of students in Poland created a shortage of available places at state run universities, this shortage in turn became another factor in the changing makeup of Polish higher education – a change which has been taking place as a result of both internal reforms and the appearance of non-state higher education institutions. In the 1993/1994 academic year there were 28 such institutions in Poland; by 1994/1995, the number had increased to 49. These non-state educational institutions are thus one of the reasons for the unprecedented increase in the number of students in higher education over the 1990s (Bialecki 1996, Rajkiewicz 1998). Currently, the most popular disciplines include economics, law, and administration-related courses as well as

²⁶ Central Statistical Office of Poland, Higher Schools in the School Year 1996/97, Information and Statistical Papers, Warsaw 1997

computer science (Bialecki and Sikorska, 1998), while medicine, the humanities, fine arts, and physical education have lost a significant proportion of students *over the last few years* (Bialecki, 1996:144). Flankowska and Mojkowski found that the most popular disciplines in 1998 among foreign employers were administration, sociology, and marketing (1998:5).

The popularity of privately owned institutions of higher education lies in their quick response to the market economy and associated employment needs. Students welcome the opportunity to study in private universities as they are prepared well for entry into the job market after graduation, and the diploma secures them a very good salary (Bialecki and Sikorska 1998:60). The private institutions seem to be more up-to-date with the shape of the curriculum in terms of the distribution of marketable skills. Their graduates are better prepared to serve developing enterprises and influence the viability of tomorrow's competing firms.

The fact is that, in today's society, Poles need to be well educated and motivated. They must reach the high standard of education that is required by the economy: "The most important point of excellence which any form of government can possess is to promote the virtue and intelligence of the people themselves. The first question in respect to any political institutions is how far they tend to foster in the members of the community the various desirable qualities, moral and intellectual" (Mill, 1958:25).

Another reason for the growing number of university students is admission to non-regular (part-time or extramural) degree courses. "In 1985, almost 79% of admissions were to regular degree courses of higher education; in 1990 the proportion was 78%, while in 1993 it had fallen to 57%" (Bialecki 1996:144).

The general student population is growing dramatically in response to the rapidly developing economy. The economic policy introduced in the early 1990s has had to be adjusted to the reforms in many other systems in Poland. The recent and sudden changes in the economy have occurred not only as a transition from communism to capitalism, but also in response to pressures stemming from global international markets as well as the need to combat inflation and reduce national debt. In 1990 the proportion of students between 19 and 24 years of age attending a higher education institution was 12.8%; by 1993 it had increased to 16.8%. The Ministry of National Education hoped to reach 29% by the year 2000. It was expected that the number of students in Poland would exceed one million by the year 2000 (Bialecki, 1996:146). As stated above, the goal was reached earlier than planned: in 1998 enrollment exceeded 1.5 million.

The government's decision to increase the number of university students is supported by several factors that play a role in the growth of the educated population. One of the strongest of these is obviously economics. Increasing the educational level of society usually means increasing the country's GDP. In addition, social costs in several areas are reduced. For example, crime rates are lower among the well educated; educated parents take better care of their children, which lowers the cost of social assistance; and the unemployment rate is lower among those who have higher education (Bialecki and Sikorska, 1998:73).

As stated in the previous chapter, the educated are the most likely to identify themselves as the middle class. The social classes of the communist era – the working class, the intelligentsia and the peasantry – are fading away. The system has changed and society must change as well. Today, the *economic and social* needs of the average Pole

are much greater than they were in 1989 (Beskid, 1997). Morawski states that there is no “normal” middle class in today’s Poland (Morawski, 1994:11). and Slomczynski suggests a transformation of the foundation of society - the social class system – to rectify this. Indeed, the growing number of the educated in Poland is fast becoming the new middle class in this country.

Poland is presently undertaking many reforms in the higher education sector which aim at fulfilling the need for more and better-educated Polish citizens. A number of these reforms are structural, and it is important to address these here, keeping in mind that, as Ireneusz Bialecki states, “the factors which shape the functioning of our [Polish] education are a shortage of money, autonomy of educational institutions and the pluralism of the actors involved” (Bialecki 1996:3).

Economic changes in Poland have brought the issue of free education to public attention. University education before the Second World War required tuition fees (Wroblewski, 1993). With the beginning of communism, education became free of charge and to a certain degree remains so. This has allowed youth from poor households to attend university in spite of their financial standing. Many believe that free education is a very positive phenomenon in any society. Some, however, dare to differ. The president of Warsaw University, Andrzej K Wroblewski, claims that free education has, in fact, created many disadvantages. One of these is the lack of prestige associated with a university degree. People do not appreciate things that cost nothing or very little. Secondly, the faculty tend to approach their job with little responsibility. If the professors had to depend on students for their salaries, they would feel more accountable to them. Finally, because the universities receive little money from the government, professors

earn very little. While it is generally accepted that a university professor's social prestige is still high, unfortunately many professors cannot fully concentrate on their university jobs because they must have other employment in order to make up for their low teaching salaries. Wroblewski mentions that students who get employment in the private sector often make 5 times as much as their professors. This is especially true for students in foreign languages, computer engineering, marketing, and other modern disciplines.

The fact that the private sector pays much more than the public sector causes a brain drain from academia. Young and well educated people do not stay at the university to pursue an academic career; they leave for the private sector. People with high qualifications and who are more mobile move to private firms, where their salary mirrors their credentials. The hierarchy of financial rewards seem to be more merit based in the private sector, especially foreign companies, than in the public sector (Rosochacz, 1997, Domansli, 1997).

The situation (as described above) has forced the Polish government to consider many reforms to the educational system. The suggested reforms include the following:

1. introduction of tuition fees. This of course would have to be followed by widely available loan programs. Appendix K presents the issue of student loans in Poland.
2. introduction of a credit system. The present system in Poland is based on annual exams. A credit system would allow much greater co-operation with foreign universities, and would also make student exchange programs much easier to run. Exchanges with

Western universities provide a valuable and enriching experience to many students and faculty.

Presently only 3,500 Polish students participate annually in exchange programs, most of them in a 1 to 3 semester exchange. Compared to our western neighbours, Poland comes out very poorly. Also, taking into consideration the number of foreign students coming to Poland, the situation leaves much to be desired. In 1996 there were 5,300 foreign students in Poland, whereas Germany, for example, welcomed 31,000 government-sponsored students and 13,000 sponsored by other organizations. Moreover, of the 5,300 foreign students in Poland, 2,600 were of Polish background (Rajkiewicz, 1998:108). Intercultural student exchange is very valuable as it introduces variety and new dimensions to disciplinary knowledge. It also provides opportunities to learn new languages and the histories of other nations, and to experience other social structures.

3. more interdisciplinary programs. (Heyns, 1993). The university has to develop some flexibility in allowing individual creation of programs that would enable each student to find his/her educational niche.

As well as being more interdisciplinary, the programs should be more skills oriented. Students in the social sciences and humanities ought to be given the opportunity to develop the analytical skills needed in the workforce such as application, evaluation, and synthesis, thereby “developing students’ abilities to undertake independent research, [and] enhancing students’ abilities in verbal and written expression” (CEP, 1997:49). As indicated by CEP research, students currently have very limited influence on the content and methods of social sciences teaching (CEP, 1997:55).

4. creating a healthy climate of inter-university competitiveness. Universities should be evaluated and financed according to their ability to educate high quality professionals and scholars as well as fulfilling the needs of the economy (Bialecki, 1993). University alumni have an important role to play. Alumni interest and support would add to the university's profile and budget. It would also become a symbol of prestige, encouraging alumni to donate to their alma mater.
5. acceptance of more students on a part-time basis (Heyns, 1993).
6. granting more independence to universities so they can find their own sponsors and partners in the private and public sectors. More independence would encourage professors and students to identify themselves with the university. This in turn would make them more concerned about the financial position and national prestige and standing of the university (Swierzbowska - Kowalik, 1993).

To improve the standards of university teaching and to redress structural imbalances inherited from the communist period, the universities of Central and Eastern Europe have undertaken profound changes since 1990. They have gained substantial academic autonomy from the state, devolved authority to their faculties and departments, revised curricula, and introduced new programs of undergraduate studies (CEP, 1997:19).

7. offering more flexibility to students themselves in choosing their courses and a second subject of study or double major. Ewa Swierzbowska - Kowalik notes that a comparison of the surveys "Student 87" and "Student 90" showed that during this three-year period, student approval rates of the university programs and curriculum fell significantly (Swierzbowska - Kowalik, 1993).

The structural changes in Central and Eastern European universities are definitely serving the changing economy. On the other side of the coin, many of the faculties and programs that are popular among private businesses have a good chance of receiving

some sponsorship, but what will happen to more traditional disciplines or less popular programs? Social sciences are among those faculties that are in certain danger; however, the academic body of Eastern European countries has begun a long process of revitalization of the social sciences. "Up to now the favorite task for a sociologist was either to develop scientific sociology with a very specialized, hermetic language not accessible to a large public or to serve as an expert preparing analyses of various phenomenal studies (sometimes very critically) for the authorities. What is missing or unsatisfactory is a contribution to the discourse accompanying the societal and economic transformation" (Bialecki, 1984:348).

The development of higher education in the social sciences is a crucial component of the transition to stable market economies and democratic societies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEP 1997: 17). However, it is important to remember that each country in transition is an individual case, and copying a Western blueprint would not necessarily guarantee a successful outcome. Eastern and Central European scholars must find their own solutions to the difficulties involved in the socioeconomic transformation of their countries.

Prior to the changes of the 1990s, education in social sciences was based on lecturing by the professors and regurgitation of knowledge by the students. Democracy, however, requires critical thinking. Students must be taught how to question and analyze social issues and phenomena. The knowledge obtained at the university level ought to be linked to situations of everyday life and applicable to the solving of social problems. In January 1997, many professors and scholars of Central and East European universities

met in Salzburg to discuss the future of the social sciences in a post-communist Europe.

The aim of the conference was to initiate and plan international co-operation among universities, with an emphasis on social sciences. Participants in the conference lined up a series of reforms that must be implemented at certain European universities in order to provide education that could measure up to that obtained in comparable Western European or North American institutions. The main problem lies, of course, in the financial gap between Western universities and Central and East European universities. The alternatives discussed during this conference included:

- increasing efficiency in the allocation of state funds
- tuition fees
- improving funding (CEP, 1997:22)

Certain issues arise from each of the above propositions. Allocation of state funds in most Eastern European countries takes place through negotiations. The two exceptions are Poland and Hungary. These two countries have developed a “formula based” system. “A formula-based system, with the allocation of state funds determined by explicit criteria, such as student enrolments, is more transparent than a system based on negotiation, but not necessarily more equitable or efficient. The criteria used to determine budget allocations in a formula-based system may work to the advantage of the country's most prestigious universities” (CEP, 1997:23).

The second option for financial recovery is copied from Western countries. Despite the fact that before the Second World War Polish students paid tuition, such a concept is foreign nowadays to most Polish citizens. Many parents are not prepared financially to pay for their children's education, and students are not accustomed to the

requirements of adaptation to the financial responsibilities of paid education. The idea of part-time or summer jobs is foreign to most young Poles. Parents have usually covered whatever financial costs are required to live in a city where there is a university. Tuition costs would be a new barrier for many students. Certain programs in Poland already require tuition fees, but the majority of the students attends universities for free.

In addition, taxation rates in Eastern Europe are higher than, for example, rates in the USA. University graduates in the United States, because of low taxation rates, earn about twice as much as workers without a university degree; in Germany the salary differential is closer to 40%” (CEP:25). Taxes in Eastern Europe are, however, higher, which means that university graduates, in Poland for example, will pay the costs of university education through higher taxation on their future earnings. Is it then fair to charge them high tuition fees? Low tuition fees may be not profitable; witness Hungary, where, when low tuition fees were introduced, the cost of collection was more than the amount of the tuition itself.

The last option – fund raising - also poses some problems. In order to make fund raising a big enough program to have any financial significance, the university projects must be community oriented. Private companies that would contribute to university research must be provided with tax deductions. Additionally, university fund raising in Poland is rather a new phenomenon. It will require some time before people understand the importance of contributing to institutions of higher education.

Money leads to another problem experienced by many universities – the brain drain. As mentioned earlier, many talented professors and lecturers are leaving the universities because of low pay. In order to make ends meet, many professors have

second or third jobs. This additional employment limits the time they can devote to teaching, exploring new teaching methods, or even talking to their students and becoming more involved in academic life. In order to solve the problem of low salaries for professors, the Higher Education Support program was created. The goal of the program is to allow Eastern European professors to teach abroad (mainly in America) and to provide them with sufficient financial benefits while they are, at the same time gaining valuable experience. As Rajkiewicz claims, a teacher's authority depends mainly on his/her qualifications, but it is also shaped by the teacher's economic standing (Rajkiewicz, 1998:110).

Another issue faced by many professors is the lack of interest in academic research. Working more than one job leaves neither time nor energy for research and career development. For this reason, Central and East European universities are considering the introduction of sabbaticals.

Finally the last problem, probably completely foreign to Western populations, is administration. As every student in Poland knows, the most important person at the university is the secretary, then the administration officer, and then the professors. The service leaves much to be desired in its present state. As a university student in Poland in 1992 and in 1998 I did see some changes that improved the operation of universities. Nonetheless, the positive changes must continue to take place for a while yet before the administration services in Poland match those in Canada. Considering that Poland is scheduled to enter the European Union in the year 2002, the above listed actions are necessary to raise the Polish education system to a level of compatibility with the systems existing in the EU.

Conclusion

This chapter has so far presented the changing character of higher education in Poland. The first few paragraphs concentrated on the approach to university education and the later paragraphs describe the undergoing reforms. In the introduction to this paper I outlined two of my main arguments. One of them stated that the situation of the well-educated stratum reflects the political and social situation of Poland; my second argument referred to the value of education per se. If the value of education were seen in a capitalistic perspective the position of the intelligentsia would change as the value of education and the existence of the intelligentsia are very closely linked. Now, I would like to conclude this paper with a prediction of the future role the educated stratum will play in Polish society.

I support my conclusion with results obtained by Samanta Stecko and Tomasz Jasturn in their research on the new generation of Poles, conducted in the second half of 1996 among high school students in Polish cities, and described in "Kultura", (September, 1997).

I believe that the Polish intelligentsia is changing its character as it has been doing throughout the last two hundred years. If we adhere to the definition of intelligentsia introduced at the beginning of this thesis, this social stratum is fading away in the Polish society. The research literature convinced me that the intelligentsia needs a mission for its existence, but Poland's present situation offers no great mission to fulfil and so does not require such a stratum. Furthermore, the growing number of those who have a university diploma will dispel some of the clouds of mystery surrounding the members of this social

group. Moreover, the analysis of ISSP and "Educational Needs" surveys as well as examples of other surveys brought to the attention of the reader suggest that more and more Poles look at education as an economic investment. The situation of today's educated stratum in Poland indicates that the country has begun a process of transition to modern capitalism. The educated seem to support such a course of action and their energy is directed towards personal gains. Since capitalistic gains are usually material ones, the educated in Poland devote their energy to and use their expertise for getting well-paid employment. The private sector opens up such possibilities. "In 1994, more than 50% of the GDP was generated by private economic activity and more than 60% of the labour force (including farmers) were employed in the private sector" (Bialecki, 1996:10). "Differences in earnings between employees having completed higher education institution diplomas widened significantly. These differences are greater among persons employed in the private sector, where higher education has a greater influence on earnings" (Bialecki, 1996:20). The earnings in the private and public sectors in Poland are presented in Appendix I. The social network of socialism built from friends and relatives seems to be weakening.

Today, young people realise that they have to count on themselves. Most of the respondents to Jasturn and Stecko's questionnaire believe that the best investment they can make in their lives is to get a university education. They seem to be more concentrated on themselves. The young generation of Poles was found to be free of illusions regarding their future. The emotional patriotism present in the previous generation seems to have cooled off; instead, they are much taken by rational scepticism.. They have adopted a Western approach of tolerance which may sometimes seem to be

an act of indifference or self-indulgence. Although most of the respondents are proud of the heroic character of Polish history, they seem to accept that it is the past, and it is time to move on.

As observed by Jasturn and Stecko, the new generation of Poles has grown up in a different Poland. Although many of them see the present situation of Poland as disorderly, they believe in a better future and they do not rebel. Many of them believe that Poland needs a bit more time to fully bloom and fulfil its potential. Some are, however, quite pessimistic about the political direction in which Poland is going. Their approach to historical values of devotion to their motherland, and willingness to sacrifice their personal happiness for the country is weakened by the conditions they grew up in. These young adults were born between 1978-1982, and they hardly remember the martial law period, the shortage of food in Polish stores, the political prisoners, the strikes, and the fear of what comes next. They have to concentrate on developing other survival skills. They deal with unemployment, developing technology, high levels of pollution and finding a job that will allow them to enjoy the goods available in stores. Material goods became a very powerful motivational tool for the younger generation, a tool which was unknown for those who grew up in communism. Those who enter Polish universities in the 1990s, have made up their mind to do so, not only to secure an employment but also to secure good wages. And this may as well mean the end of the intelligentsia. Although, the intelligentsia will always remain a part of Polish history, and its special characteristic, I do not think it will be a part of Polish society in the 21st century. Perhaps, this is a good sign that Poland does not need a missionary social group. It is finally an independent, democratic, capitalist country. But let's hope that if ever in the future Poland needs its

intelligentsia back, the educated stratum will revoke its hidden power to carry the moral leadership.

On a more economic note, I argued that the quicker Poles accept the capitalist value system the sooner Poland's financial recovery. The Economist's (April 24, 1999) emerging market indicators demonstrate that Poland is the only country among the emerging economies that will increase its GDP by more than 120%. "Poland has been the star performer among transition economies during the 1990s. Its GDP is forecast to be 21% bigger in 1999 than it was in 1989. Slovenia and Slovakia are the only other economies where output this year is expected to be higher than in 1989".

The above quotation from the Economist presents evidence to support the belief in the economical recovery of Poland. Ten years ago the political, economical and social systems changed. In the last few years, attitudes have changed as well.

APPENDIX A – METHODOLOGY OF ISSP SURVEYS

The data used in chapter 4 come from the ISSP – International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). The ISSP program has operated since 1985. During this time studies were completed on the following topics: "Role of Government I" (1985), "Social Networks and Support Systems" (1986), "Social Inequality I" (1987), "Family and Changing Sex Roles" (1988), "Work Orientations" (1989), "Role of Government II" (1990), "Religion" (1991), "Social Inequality II" (1992), "Environment" (1993), "Family and Changing Sex Roles II" (1994), "National Identity" (1995), and "Role of Government III" (1996). Problems to be studied are determined by representatives of all members of the ISSP on annual plenary meeting (voting is conducted if there is no agreement). Projects of study are prepared by work teams chosen at a plenary meeting.

The International Social Survey Programme currently embraces 25 countries. The goal of the program is to have each of the members conduct annual studies on a particular subject using the exact same methodology. ISSP questionnaires are distributed as a 20-30 minute supplement to general national social surveys. It is assumed that in each country respondents should complete the ISSP questionnaire by themselves after completing the main interview in the presence of the interviewer. The ISSP research in Poland conforms to those principles.

The ISSP in Poland is a part of the Polish General Social Survey. It is conducted annually by the Main Statistical Office of Poland. The Polish General Social Survey (PGSS), and consequently the part that is the ISSP, are collected through personal questionnaire interviews conducted on a representative national sample of the adult population (at least 18 years old). Since the ISSP is a part of the general survey, only a

part of the respondents answer to the ISSP questions. The PGSS interview is conducted by a trained interviewer who asks questions from the questionnaire, omitting response options such as "don't know," "difficult to say," etc. (marking them only when the respondent cannot decide). In the ISSP questionnaire, however, completed by respondent himself, answers are visible (ISSP web page – Poland).

I am using the ISSP to compare attitudes among Polish citizens regarding the correlation of income and education. The comparison of Polish citizens' attitudes before and after the collapse of communism on the basis of International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) is somewhat limited, as pointed out earlier, the ISSP surveys deal with different issues every year. Some of the questions are repeated but most of them change from year to year. The theme of the ISSP'87 was the same as for ISSP'92 - Social Inequality (I) and (II) respectively. However, some of the questions on social inequality changed from 1987 to 1992..

A certain number of questions was asked in both years 1987 and 1992. These questions do not deal directly with the difference in income based on education, but they have nevertheless allowed me to draw some general conclusions about social mentality or, if one prefers, social ideology regarding educational level and income. The first set of questions asks for the respondent's assumption of pay for different jobs. The second set of questions asks for the respondent's assumption of how much different jobs should pay.

Type 1: How much, do you think, a doctor earns?

Type 2: How much, do you think, a doctor should earn?

The questions I use in the analysis are:

v26 – v55 (selected only).

The jobs included in the questionnaire are:

- a cabinet minister
- a chairman of a large company
- a doctor
- a small shop owner,
- a skilled worker
- a farm worker
- an unskilled worker

The dependent variable for the logistic regression analysis was based on question v78:

Do you think that ‘years of education’ is an important factor in deciding how much one gets paid? Answers 1 through 3 were collapsed to “yes”, and answers 4 through 5 were collapsed to “no”.

1. essential
2. very important
3. fairly important
4. not very important
5. not important at all

The main analysis are based on logistic regression. There are many advantages to logistic regression. Firstly, the covariates do not have to be normally distributed, linearly related or of equal variance. Secondly, the covariates can be a combination of continuous, discrete and dichotomous variables. “Logistic regression emphasizes the probability of a particular outcome for each case” (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996:575).

Before the analysis, discrete and ordinal variables were re-coded into series of dichotomous (dummy) variables. The original variable measuring education has nine categories (variable V103), which I collapsed and re-coded into 3 education categories. In the next step each category was transformed into a dummy variable: a dummy variable “**University**” includes respondents with a university degree; “**Middle**” characterizes

respondents with high school education and up. The reference category represents respondents with less than high school education and it was created from the third category of the collapsed variable education. The age groups are based on theoretical argument and the percentiles. Group one includes people 30 and under. It is also the first quartile according to age. Theoretically, this is the generation that graduated in the late 1980s and early 1990s thus experiencing the free market economy from the very beginning. The second age group consists of people age 31-51 and this is the 66.6 percentile (the third) of the sample according to age. The group number 3 includes everybody older than 51. This is the group of people that were born before or during the Second World War, thus remembering the changes from capitalist to communist Poland. The remaining variables were dealt with in a similar fashion.

Table 15: ISSP'92: CHARACTERISTIC OF THE WEIGHT VARIABLE V176

WEIGHT for ISSP'92		
N	Valid	1307
	Missing	0
Mean		1.313419
Median		1.1056
Mode		0.6512
Minimum		0.2161
Maximum		6.7828
Percentiles	25	0.7954
	50	1.1056
	75	1.5531

The only case with a weight higher than 6.78 is id 1307045. Looking at this respondent more carefully I decided to keep him in the sample as I did not found any significant changes in my analysis after excluding this single case. As the above table suggests most cases have weight below 1.6 and the number of cases that have higher weight than 6 is very small.

APPENDIX B – ISSP'87.

This appendix presents data from ISSP 1987. As the missing values for variables that deal with the expected income of different professions were higher than 50%, I looked into the cause of such high number of missing values. As frequencies indicated, 50.1% of the respondents in 1987 were not asked the questions (2-NAP). Professor Ireneusz Bialecki of the University of Warsaw informed me that ISSP is a part of the General Polish Social Survey and only half of the respondents were asked certain questions in order to save money. The fact that only 49.9% of respondents were asked the questions reduces the missing data significantly. Such a low percentage of missing values allows the researcher to proceed in the data analysis.

(The percentage of missing values for variables v27 to v35 on average equaled 10%.

High portion of the 10% constituted answers “Do not know”).

Table 16 presents the number of respondents who were asked questions v27 to v35 in 1987.

Table 16: ISSP'87: NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS WHO WERE/WERE NOT ASKED QUESTIONS V27 TO V35 .

Respondents	V35	V36	V32	V31	V30	V29	V27
Asked	1613	1430	1472	1680	1588	1471	1543
Not asked	2330	2513	2471	2263	2355	2472	2400

APPENDIX C- SCALES.

During the analysis of ISSP'92 I built 2 scales: **personal and social**. The effects of the scales were found significant and they were used in the logistic regression analysis.

The social scale is built from 3 variables. These are:

1. The respondent believes that getting ahead in life depends on having well-educated parents
2. The respondent believes that getting ahead in life depends on knowing the right people
3. The respondent believes that getting ahead in life depends on having a wealthy family

The answers to the above questions regarding factors that aid people in getting ahead included 5 possible answers: 1) essential 2) very important 3) fairly important 4) not very important 5) not important at all.

Before I proceeded with creating a scale I re-coded the values from 1-5 to 0-4. In the next step I looked at the correlation between these three variables. The strongest correlation occurred between the wealthy family factor and the educated parents' factor. The values of the correlation allowed me to continue with the creation of the scale. I called this scale social as it incorporated characteristics of the social capital. Reliability analysis of this scale indicate Alpha = .61, which is a significant value.

In similar fashion I created the personal scale. The alpha for the persobal scale = .52, which is a significant value.

In both scales the missing values were replaced with the medians for each question. For example for question 1 in the social scale it was 3.00 (fairly important), for question 2 and 3 the medians were equal 2.00 (very important). The values of Alpha if item deleted were as follows:

For variable “wealthy family” .3847

For variable “well-educated parents” .5128

For variable “knowing the right people” .6000

As I mentioned earlier, I also created a scale called **personal**. This scale reflected the beliefs the respondents had in personal skills. The scale was built from 3 variables. These were:

1. The respondent believes that getting ahead in life depends on ambition
2. The respondent believes that getting ahead in life depends on natural ability
3. The respondent believes that getting ahead in life depends on hard work.

The following table presents the frequency of the social scale and personal scale.

Table 17: ISSP'92. FREQUENCY OF THE SOCIAL AND PERSONAL SCALES.

SOCIAL

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	27	2.1	2.1	2.1
	.33	43	3.3	3.3	5.4
	.67	119	9.1	9.1	14.5
	1.00	207	15.8	15.8	30.3
	1.33	240	18.4	18.4	48.7
	1.67	209	16.0	16.0	64.7
	2.00	182	13.9	13.9	78.7
	2.33	116	8.9	8.9	87.6
	2.67	78	6.0	6.0	93.5
	3.00	37	2.8	2.8	96.4
	3.33	33	2.6	2.6	98.9
	3.67	7	.6	.6	99.5
	4.00	7	.5	.5	100.0
Total		1307	100.0	100.0	

PERSONAL

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	3	.2	.2	.2
	.33	1	.1	.1	.3
	.67	1	.1	.1	.4
	1.00	5	.4	.4	.8
	1.33	7	.6	.6	1.3
	1.67	20	1.6	1.6	2.9
	2.00	45	3.4	3.4	6.3
	2.33	102	7.8	7.8	14.1
	2.67	180	13.8	13.8	27.9
	3.00	416	31.8	31.8	59.7
	3.33	274	21.0	21.0	80.7
	3.67	155	11.8	11.8	92.5
	4.00	98	7.5	7.5	100.0
Total		1307	100.0	100.0	

The social scales measures one's belief in how important is one's social background in getting ahead in life. The lower the score on the social scale the more a respondent believes that one needs strong social capita to get ahead. The higher the score on the social capital scale, the less the respondent believes in the necessity of strong social capita in getting ahead. Inversely, the more the respondent believes in other factors that help an individual to get ahead.

The personal scale reads in a similar way. The lower score on the personal scale the more important are personal attributes such as ambition, hard work and natural ability in getting ahead. The higher score means that the respondent does not find these personal attributes important in getting ahead in life.

In the logistic regression analysis I found that for every unit increase in the social scale there is .62 of a unit decrease in the dependent variable. Analogous to this definition, if a respondent strongly believes in the social capital and his social scale score is low, he has greater probability of believing that education should reflect salary. If the score is increasing than his/her probability of believing in the education-income link weakens.

The personal scale logistic regression result is a coefficient of .25. This means that if a respondent strongly believes in the personal capita and his score is low, he has smaller probability to believe in the education-income link. If his/her score on the personal is high, which means that he/she does not believe in the personal attributes, they have greater chances of believing in the education-income link.

The tables below present the cross-tabulations of the scales personal and social with the dependent variable.

TABLE 18: ISSP'92: CROSS TABULATION OF THE PERSONAL SCALE WITH THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE AND CROSS-TABULATION OF THE SOCIAL SCALE WITH THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE.

PERSONAL * VALUEEDU financial value of education Crosstabulation

		VALUEEDU financial value of education		Total
		.00	1.00	
PERSONAL	.00	Count	3	3
		% within VALUEEDU financial value of education	.3%	.2%
	.33	Count	1	1
		% within VALUEEDU financial value of education	.5%	.1%
	.67	Count	1	1
		% within VALUEEDU financial value of education	.1%	.1%
	1.00	Count	1	4
		% within VALUEEDU financial value of education	.5%	.3%
	1.33	Count	2	7
		% within VALUEEDU financial value of education	.9%	.5%
	1.67	Count	3	20
		% within VALUEEDU financial value of education	1.4%	1.5%
	2.00	Count	14	45
		% within VALUEEDU financial value of education	6.5%	3.4%
	2.33	Count	29	102
		% within VALUEEDU financial value of education	13.5%	7.8%
	2.67	Count	24	180
		% within VALUEEDU financial value of education	11.2%	13.8%
	3.00	Count	71	416
		% within VALUEEDU financial value of education	33.0%	31.8%
	3.33	Count	26	275
		% within VALUEEDU financial value of education	12.1%	21.0%
	3.67	Count	22	155
		% within VALUEEDU financial value of education	10.2%	11.9%
	4.00	Count	22	98
		% within VALUEEDU financial value of education	10.2%	7.5%
Total		Count	215	1307
		% within VALUEEDU financial		

SOCIAL * VALUEEDU financial value of education Crosstabulation

		VALUEEDU financial value of education		
		.00	1.00	Total
SOCIAL	.00	Count	3	24
		% within VALUEEDU financial value of education	1.4%	2.2%
	.33	Count	8	35
		% within VALUEEDU financial value of education	3.7%	3.2%
	.67	Count	10	110
		% within VALUEEDU financial value of education	4.7%	10.1%
	1.00	Count	15	191
		% within VALUEEDU financial value of education	7.0%	17.5%
	1.33	Count	37	203
		% within VALUEEDU financial value of education	17.2%	18.6%
	1.67	Count	41	168
		% within VALUEEDU financial value of education	19.1%	15.4%
	2.00	Count	37	145
		% within VALUEEDU financial value of education	17.2%	13.3%
	2.33	Count	26	90
		% within VALUEEDU financial value of education	12.1%	8.3%
	2.67	Count	20	58
		% within VALUEEDU financial value of education	9.3%	5.3%
	3.00	Count	6	30
		% within VALUEEDU financial value of education	2.8%	2.8%
	3.33	Count	11	23
		% within VALUEEDU financial value of education	5.1%	2.1%
	3.67	Count	1	6
		% within VALUEEDU financial value of education	.5%	.6%
	4.00	Count		7
		% within VALUEEDU financial value of education		.6%
Total		Count	215	1090
		% within VALUEEDU financial		

APPENDIX D – LOGISTIC REGRESSION.

More detail description of the dummy variables used in the logistic regression analysis.

Category called **University** includes respondents who have a university diploma (category 9 in V103). Those individuals were coded as 1; otherwise the respondents were coded as 0.

The second dummy variable based on education is called **Middle**. This category includes respondents with completed secondary school, incomplete semi-higher school (Canadian collage), completed semi-higher school and incomplete university studies. Everybody else was given the value of 0.

Less than high school education is the reference category and it is identified by code 0 on the two dummy variables Univers and Middle.

The value of the odds ratio coefficient for the Univers indicator poses some questions as there is only one respondent with a university degree, who does not believe that years of education should influence pay. This is presented in the table below.

Table 19a: ISSP'92: CROSS-TABULATION OF DUMMY DEPENDENT VARIABLE AND DUMMY UNIVERS

		university degree		total
		0	1	
Financial value of education	0	214	1	215
	1	976	115	1091
total		1190	116	1306

Table 19b: LIST OF ID NUMBERS WITH 0 VALUE FOR THOSE WITH UNIVERSITY DEGREE, WHO DO NOT AGREE WITH DEPENDENT VARIABLE.

1)

Statistics	N	
	valid	missing
Respondents ID number	1	0

2)

	ID#	Frequency	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Valid	1327201	1	66.7	66.7	66.7
	1363031	0	33.3	33.3	100
Total		1	100	100	

The difference between part 1 and part 2 of table 22b lies in the weighting procedure. Table 22b indicates two cases. However, one of the cases has a value lower than 50 % which is rounded to zero. As a result of the rounding table B1 indicates only one case. The one case is causing very large logit. But if we deleted the one case, the logit would move to thousands. Correlation is, however, much more sensitive to the one case than the logit, for this reason the correlation between the two variables (the dummy dependent and Univers) is found quite weak. The association between the two variables can be found through Eta or Cramer's V. The values for these tests of strength of association are presented below.

Table 20: STRENGTH OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN THE DUMMY DEPENDENT VARIABLE AND THE UNIVERS INDICATOR CALCULATED THROUGH TWO DIFFERENT TESTS: ETA AND CRAMER'S V.

Measure	Test	Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Interval	Eta	.131	
Nominal by Nominal	Cramer's V	.131	.000

The variables income, age, and community size were re-coded into dummy variables in the same manner as education. In the tables presenting the results of the logistic regression, the estimated coefficients are displayed as the odds ratios. In the case of a categorical variable, “the odds ratio is the increase (or decrease if the ratio is less than one) in odds of being in one outcome category when the value of the predictor increases by one unit” (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996:607).

The first series of logistic regression analyses, which included the enter method found insignificant 2 indicators: age and sex. The rest of the indicators were found to influence the dependent variable.

The table below presents values of statistical tests obtained through the logistic regression analysis: the Wald, Sig(nificance) and the Exp (B) for all the variables. Model chi-square equals 80.34 with 5 degrees of freedom and it is significant. Degrees of freedom are the difference between degrees of freedom for the bigger (including the independent variables) and smaller models (without the independent variables). The significance of the Model chi-square indicates that the model is proper for the prediction of the dependent variable. In logistic regression, the analogue of the global F test is a likelihood ratio chi-square test statistic, which is often referred to as the model chi-square.

Table 21: ISSP'92 LOGISTIC REGRESSION – FINAL MODEL -WALD.

Variable	B	Wald	df	Sig	Exp (B)
SOCIAL	-.4541	21.0066	1	.0000	.6350
BIGCITY	.3501	2.9093	1	.0881	1.4192
MIDDLE	.6671	18.4304	1	.0000	1.9486
UNIVERS	3.2809	15.0354	1	.0001	26.6005
PERSONAL	.2264	3.0832	1	.0791	1.2540
Constant	1.1456	6.6902	1	.0097	

All variables are significant at .10 level

The Wald test is one of many tests offered in logistic analysis that evaluates the contribution of an individual predictor to a model. A significant result indicates a predictor that is reliably associated with outcome. The SPSS, used here, estimates the reliability of each dummy variable separately, but not a discrete predictor as a whole (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996:599). The constant indicates the probability of predicting the dependent variable without considering any information available about the subjects. The Wald test for the constant in this model equals 6.7. (The value 6.7 means that the Wald statistics for constant is 6.7 times bigger than its standard error. It is also agreed upon that the Wald statistics is a rough approximation of the strength). The Wald statistic is described here with details because the significance of the regression coefficients in the SPSS LOGISTIC REGRESSION output is calculated based on the Wald statistic for each variable.

The table below presents the check for multicollinearity among the variables included in the final model. Menard wrote that the easiest way to detect collinearity among the independent variables is to look at the tolerance statistic. “Although tolerance is not available in SPSS LOGISTIC REGRESSION, it can be easily obtained by calculating a linear regression model using the same dependent variable and independent variables as

you are using in the logistic regression model. Because the concern is with the relationship among the independent variables, the functional form of the model for the dependent variable is irrelevant to the estimation of collinearity” (1995:66). Tolerance exceeding .70 indicates no serious problem of collinearity. The table below present the tolerance statistics for the variable used in the final ISSP’92 model.

Table 22: ISSP’92: COLLINEARITY STATISTICS FOR THE FINAL MODEL.

variable	Tolerance
social scale	
<i>Social</i>	0.98
personal scale	
<i>Personal</i>	0.98
education	
<i>Middle</i>	0.80
<i>Univers</i>	0.85
community size	
<i>Bigcity</i>	0.98

As indicated in table 25, the final model poses no multicollinearity problems.

APPENDIX E – METHODOLOGY OF “EDUCATIONAL NEEDS SURVEY”

The survey, analyzed in this chapter, was conducted by the Central Statistical Office of Poland in July 1994. Unfortunately, the survey was a one-time project and it was not continued. The original sample included people age 3-55 (born between 1939 and 1991) and consisted of 10171 respondents. The sub-sample used in this chapter includes people age 18 and older and consists of 6232 individuals. Some of the respondents to the survey were interviewed via telephone, and others received the questionnaires in the mail. The sub-sample I am using mainly consists of the respondents who were interviewed via telephone and thus includes very few missing cases. Furthermore the sub-sample was prepared for me by one of the researchers of the Central Statistical Office of Poland and he did not include cases that had substantial amount of missing answers²⁷.

I am mainly concerned with the following questions of the survey:

Question 40: Should people with higher education earn more?

1. yes –always
2. yes –with exceptions
3. no- with exceptions
4. there should be no correlation between income and education
5. no opinion

Question 29: is it worthwhile to get education?

1. definitely yes
2. rather yes
3. rather not
4. definitely not
5. it is hard to say

Question 30 (following answer yes to the previous question): If yes, what are the motives of getting education?

²⁷ There are variables that include some missing data.

- Personal intellectual development
- Career
- Independence
- Avoiding unemployment
- Interesting job
- Comfortable life
- High salary
- More relaxed, calm Eveready living
- Prestige
- Avoiding lowered standard of living
- Possibilities of social promotion
- Possibilities of travel

•

APPENDIX F-LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS

Logistic Regression Analysis of the "Educationl Needs" survey.

Table 23: EDUCATIONAL NEEDS 1994: LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS.

Variable	B	EXP (B)	WALD
Sex			
Male	-0.3	0.74	22.2
Community size			
Bigcity	-0.05	0.95	0.39
Smalcity	-0.07	0.93	1
Education			
Middle	0.59	1.85	77.04
Univers	2.26	9.81	90.82
Age			
Old	0.02	1.02	0.13
Constant	.98		114.83

* significant at .05 level; the constant for the table is 114.83 Wald

The findings that community size, especially big cities are not exclusively associated any longer with the "capitalistic" values may suggest that between 1992 and 1994 many western values entered smaller communities. This is however only a hypothesis.

The most interesting predictor is sex, as I did not anticipate finding gender a significant predictor of the dependent variable.

APPENDIX G - MULTICOLLINEARITY

Conducting regression analysis requires carefulness on the side of the researcher when it comes to multicollinearity. The variables included in the final model: *sex*, *univers* and *middle* present no such problem. The tables below show the analysis of the check up for multicollinearity.

I run 3 different models based on the last 3 variables in order to check for multicollinearity. Model 1 included all three variables. model 2 included sex and univers and model 3 included only sex and middle.

Table24: EDUCATIONAL NEEDS 1994: REGRESSION COEFFICIENT FOR 3 FINAL MODELS.

variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Sex	-.30	-.39	-.32
Univers	2.25	2.04	
Middle	.59		.43
const	.98	1.24	1.14

In order to check for multicollinearity we must compare the differences in Bs between model one and two for univers and one and three for middle. As one can see the differences are quite small which allows us to state the final model does not present any multicollinearity problems.

Another method of checking for multicollinearity between two or more independent variables is based on cross-tabulation analysis. The table below presents the cross-tabulation between the dummy dependent variable and education variable. An education variable consists of three categories. The variable univers and middle are based on these categories.

Table 25: EDUCATIONAL NEED 1994: CROSS-TABULATION OF EDUCATION AND SEX VARIABLES

Education			female	male	total
University degree	1	Count	231	209	440
		Column %	7.10%	7.10%	7.10%
HS and up	2	Count	1438	852	2290
		Column %	44.00%	28.80%	36.70%
Less than HS	3	Count	1601	1901	3502
		Column %	49.00%	64.20%	56.20%
Total		Count	3270	2962	6232
		Column %	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

The index of dissimilarity (delta) for table B equals 1.52. Such a difference is not trivial but it allows including both variables in the final model because the correlation is small. Table 29 indicates that there is a difference in the education level between men and women. Women are on average better educated than men are. Although the percentages in the “university degree” category are the same for male and female, the other two categories show that there are more women than men who have high school education and up. In order to insure the validity of my analysis I run a few test to check how strong is the relationship between middle and sex.

Table 26: EDUCATIONAL NEEDS 1994: CHI-SQUARE TESTS FOR EDUCATION AND SEX

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	161.928	2	0
Likelihood Ratio	163.239	2	0
Linear-by-Linear Association	92.124	1	0
N of Valid Cases	6232		
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 209.13.			

Table 27: EDUCATIONAL NEEDS 1994: SYMMETRIC MEASURES FOR EDUCATION AND SEX CROSS-TABULATION

		Value	As.Std.Err	Approx. T	Approx. Sig.
Ordinal by Ordinal	Gamma	0.255	0.022	11.083	0
	Spearman Correlation	0.139	0.013	11.098	0
Interval by Interval	Pearson's R	0.122	0.013	9.669	0
N of Valid Cases		6232			

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

c. Based on normal approximation.

Despite the fact that table 26 indicates somewhat strong Pearson chi-square, table 27 shows acceptable Spearman Correlation and Pearson's R.

The model based on sex, univers and middle is significant and presents multicollinearity low enough allowing to accept the model.

Table 28: EDUCATIONAL NEED 1994: CROSS-TABULATION OF EDUCATION AND COMMUNITY SIZE VARIABLES

Community size			University degree	HS and up	Less than HS	Total
			1	2	3	
Above 200th	1	Count	209	676	535	1420
		Column %	47.5%	29.5%	15.3%	22.80%
Below 200th	2	Count	181	1057	1280	2518
		Column %	41.1%	46.2%	36.6%	40.40%
Village	3	Count	50	557	1687	2294
		Column %	11.4%	24.3%	48.2%	36.80%
Total		Count	440	2290	3502	6232
		Column %	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

The tests for table 28 indicate a correlation between the educational level and the community size. Pearson's R equals .289 (at the .01 level), Chi-Square test equals

579.091 and it is significant and Gamma equals .446. The above values are significant but they do not post a problem of multicollinearity as the border for multicollinearity starts at .6 of correlation value.

The table below presents 4 models I built in order to analyze the multicorrelation between the education and community size variables.

Table 29: EDUCATIONAL NEEDS 1994: TESTS FOR MULTICOLLINEARITY AMONG THE VARIABLES INCLUDED IN THE MODEL.

Variables	Model	Chi-square	Nagelkerke
sex	1	39.185	0.007
sex, education*	2	255.227	0.043
sex, com size*	3	45.723	0.008
sex, education, com size	4	256.986	0.043

Education included two dummy variables: univers and middle
Community size included two variables: bigcity and smalcity

The Nagelkerke test shows the variation in the dependent that is explained by particular model. The difference between models 1 and 2, 1 and 3 presents the collinearity between sex and education and sex and community size. Both the tests suggest that there is no multicollinearity problem between sex and education and sex and community size. The difference between model 2 and 4 is however statistically insignificant, which means that education and community size are correlated. Such a situation however does not pose a problem for the final model, as the final model does not include community size. Nevertheless one must keep in mind that community size does influence the respondents attitude towards the relationship between income and education.

APPENDIX H - RESEARCH DONE ON THE TOPIC OF POLISH EDUCATION AFTER THE COLLAPSE OF COMMUNISM.

The higher education in Poland has been research in the last decade by many organizations and researchers. Education is a crucial part of any social order and it is necessary that the link between education and economy is strong. The thesis present two detailed analysis of surveys dealing with education in post communist Poland; however, this small chapter gives a brief description of other surveys that dealt with education and different its aspects.

- *dazenie edukacyjne polskiego społeczeństwa**

In January 1994 CEBOS (Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej – Center of Research on Public Opinion) conducted a survey titled “Educational Aspiration of Polish Society”²⁸. The goal of this survey was to estimate if Polish people believe that getting education is worthwhile. The results indicate that most people believe that it is worth to get educated. The reasons behind getting education differ among the respondents. Most people pointed self-development and self-improvement as a goal of education. 71% of the respondents answered that education leads to wealth (Bs/6/5/94, page 2). The opinion that education is worthwhile is the strongest among the intelligentsia, farmers, and among those who are satisfied with their financial standing.

This survey deals also with the opinion on the number of educated people in Poland. One of the questions asks if the number of people getting university degree should increase. Those who support the growing number of students are the youngest (24

²⁸ Research conducted by the Research Center on Political Science and Higher Education UW and CEBOS, 10-15 November 1993, N=1226.

years old and younger), people with university degree, white-collar workers, those with satisfied financial situation and those who are interested in politics.

The "Educational Aspiration of Polish Society" also asked questions on the educational plans for the respondent's children. Those who live in big cities and have a lot of money as well as those who are very well educated wish their offspring receive high education. Those who want university education for their children justified their ambition with independence, intellectual development and self-improvement. Those who justified education with high income, easier life and pleasant job support middle level of education (BS/6/5/94, page 10).

The researchers found that those who postulate high education for their children believe that income should reflect education, and that there should be more people getting higher education. Majority of parents believes that their daughters should get education in economics or medicine. For boys they prefer technical degrees. (Bs/6/5/94 page 15).

The above information, received through the analysis of the "Educational Aspiration of the Polish society" is similar to information obtained from the analysis of ISSP'92 presented in Chapter 4. Seventy six percent of the respondents of "Educational Aspiration of the Polish Society" believes that getting education is worthwhile in post-communist Poland. Two thirds of the sample would like their children to receive a university degree.

- *efektywnosc wykształcenia w opinii społecznej**

Another CEBOS survey answered to a question how effective education in Poland is. The survey titled “the Effectiveness of Education in Poland – Public Opinion”²⁹ were conducted in November 1994. According to this survey most people with higher education in Poland are satisfied that they possess such an educational level but only one third states that their education is fully used in their place of work. People with medical degrees are the ones who use their education at work. The researchers came to the conclusion that changing dynamics of Polish economy causes a phenomenon of redundant qualifications. By redundant qualification they mean that people cannot apply their knowledge in their work. The more educated feel that they can use more of their education than those less educated and the same relation appears between those living in big cities and villages.

The survey also looks at the influence education has on respondent's lives. According to the respondents education influences the most their careers and professional lives. Most respondents correlate education with good careers, financial success, and personal development (BS/189/167/94, page13).

- *aspiracje edukacyjne polakow, ocena wykształcenia narodu I kosztow edukacji**

In August 1996, CEBOS conducted a research on the aspirations of young Poles and the assessment of cost of education, “The Educational Aspirations of Poles –

²⁹ Research conducted by the Research Center on Political Science and higher Education UW and CEBOS, 2-5 September 1994, N=1219.

Assessment of Costs of Education”³⁰. The goal of this survey was to find out if Poles believe that they are a well-educated nation.

Those who think that Poles are generally well educated are the elderly, unqualified workers, blue-collar workers and population of villages and small towns (BS/126/124/96 page 2). The young generation of Poles and students believe that the Polish are not very well educated. Those who stated that Poles are not very well educated were asked for reasons of such circumstances. (It was an open-ended question.) The third most popular answer was that education does not bring financial rewards or high prestige. The reason number one was a high cost of education and the reason number two – a bad condition of Polish educational system. As in the survey described earlier, three-quarters of respondents would like their children to receive a university degree, and those who want such a high level of education for their children are those with relatively high income. Every third family complained about high cost of education but the researchers found no correlation between such a complaint and parents’ wish to educate their children as highly as possible.

- *prestige zawodow a struktura zarobkow**

According to the respondents to a survey “Prestige of Work and The Structure of Wages”, the president earns the most money. Companies’ owners and managers of large companies are also seen as people who make very good money. At the same time these professions are found less prestigious than for example university professorship or teaching positions. Strangely enough, in public opinion the correlation between prestige and income is very small. Any form of education is however highly regarded in Polish

³⁰ Research conducted by CBOS, 9-13 May 1996, N=1152.

society, which is visible throughout the differences in prestige between a qualified blue-collar worker, an unqualified blue-collar worker (BS/132/130/96, page 3).

The “new” professions that entered the Polish labor force with the market economy seem to have much greater prestige among private business people and the well educated than among those who work for somebody else or are in the public sector. One of these professions is *makler*, ‘businessman’.

The researchers noticed that the society slowly but surly starts to respect physical work, office jobs and ‘*handel*’, retail. They believe that this is caused by 2 phenomena. Firstly, having a job in a capitalist setting is some kind of success because Poles for the first time since the Second World War experience unemployment. Secondly, the ethos of intelligentsia is losing its significance as argued in this thesis the intelligentsia is not a part of a democratic, capitalistic, and free market orientated society. Work is considered as means of obtaining money. In the 1990s, very few Poles see work as a social mission or service to improve the society. Such as missionary character of work was specific for the intelligentsia.

Two things measure the status of an individual: his/her prestige in society, and the financial award. When respondents were asked about the supposed income of different professions, the highest one was ascribed to the president and the lowest one to a cleaning lady. The president was thought to earn 19 times the amount a cleaning lady is believed to make. One may conclude that the Poles differentiate between prestige and money when it comes to one’s job. One must however keep in mind, that 40 years of communism taught Poles to disregard any form of power even the government. The

respondents believe that the president make 12 times more than a factory worker, while in reality the president makes only 7 times more than a factory worker. The most important observation made by the researchers is the range of income (BS/132/130/96, page 10). The range of assumed income increased, which brings me to the conclusion that the communist ideology "everybody equally" has been dying.

"According to the social idea of just income the discrepancies between those who earn the most and those who earn the least should be a ratio 1:10" Those who have very high salaries were believed to stay at the same level. (BS/132/130/96, page 10). The above data suggest that differences in earnings in Poland are much higher than the socially accepted definition. The respondents also stated that those who earn little should be paid more. The respondent did not state that those who earn very good money should earn less. Those who have very high salaries were believed to stay at the same level. The researchers came also to the conclusion that the Poles see different levels of earnings as less unjust than a year earlier. This very clearly states that the Polish society accepts the capitalistic system of rewards where different professions pay differently. "The egalitarianism of earnings is visible in Polish society through the idea of more equal income, but at the same time more and more the Poles accept the market value system of rewards where earnings mirrors market value of jobs" (BS/132/130/96).

APPENDIX I – WAGES IN POLAND IN 1998.

The tables below present the salaries in Poland in 1st half of 1998. The values are given in Polish currency unit – *zloty*. These tables are copied from Information and Statistical Papers – employment, wages and salaries in national economy in 1st half of 1998 (Central Statistical Office, ISSN 0079-2896).

I am afraid that the tables may cause the reader concern, as the salaries of the private sector seem to be lower than the public sector. However, one must keep in mind that these tables present the average (not just the well educated). The public sector seems to divide salaries among its workers more evenly. Blue collar workers usually earn more working in the public sector than if they worked in the private sector. The private sector seems to have wider range of salaries for its workers depending on the worker's value to the company.

Table 30: AVERAGE MONTHLY GROSS WAGE AND SALARY IN ENTERPRISE SECTOR BY OWNERSHIP SECTORS IN 1ST HALF OF 1998.

Enterprise Sector	public	private
generally	1479.06	1184.87
forestry	1709.44	1269.53
fishing	910.34	854.17
Industry	1598.09	1174.21
mining	2043.02	1512.47
manufacturing	1325.57	1169.03
electricity, gas	1701.49	1527.19
Construction	1160.06	1204.23
Trade and repair	1551.29	1148.83
Hotels and restaurant	1370.27	919.82
Transport and com	1250.5	1385.05
Real Estate	1391.87	1358.7

Table 31: SELECTED AVERAGE MONTHLY GROSS WAGE AND SALARY IN NATIONAL ECONOMY BY OWNERSHIP SECTORS IN 1ST HALF OF 1998.

National economy	public	private
Transport and com	1267	1385.05
Financial intermediation	1754.87	2102.46
Public Administration	1618.42	1224.12
Education	1123.37	1250.05
Health and social work	1018.65	943.35

In the opinion of Janusz Witkowski, vice president of the Central Statistical Office (GUS), Poland's main achievements in 1996 were the improvement in the population's living standards, reducing unemployment, decreasing inflation and continuing economic growth (despite its lower rate).

“Basing on data from the first three quarters of 1996, GUS estimates that the real incomes of the Polish population in 1996 will prove to be much higher than in 1995. During the first nine months of 1996 they increased by as much as 7.2%. **The average monthly gross wage in the business sector amounted to PLN 956 (USD 355-monthly), and in the public sector - PLN 811 (USD 300).** The average wage in the whole of the economy reached PLN 892 (USD 330)”. (Text Copyright © 1997 The BOSS Information and Publishing Agency Ltd. Design Copyright © 1997 Internet Polska)

APPENDIX J – STUDENT LOANS

Presently the only tuition-free form of education in Poland is a day, full-time study program. Any other form of education, such as part-time, extra-mural or private education requires a tuition fee. The Polish Constitution says that education ought to be free and accessible to all citizens; however, article 70 of the Constitution allows a joint financial responsibility between the government and those who study. Such an interpretation of the article allows the Minister of Education, Mirosław Handke, to suggest 9 types of “joint economical responsibility for higher education” (GW 281.2874, 1998).

The 9 types of tuition arrangement are divided in 3 groups.

1. Students pay partly for the cost of the education and the university decided which lectures and classes are paid for and which are free. The tuition cannot be higher than half of the cost of higher education per student. One of the proposals suggested that the lectures ought to be free, but students should cover the cost of practical classes, for example laboratories.
2. The first three years of university are free of tuition (which allows receiving a BA), but continuation of education on higher level (MA, Ph.D.) should require a tuition fee. Those students who come from poor families but have very good marks should be able to receive some financial aid or scholarship.
3. Only certain programs or departments should be paid.

In short interviews included in the article on tuition at Polish universities, most of university presidents expressed that in their opinions all programs at all levels ought to require some tuition fee (GW 281.2874, 1998).

In 1998, 25 percent of Polish youth was getting a university education. Despite the fact that the number of university students doubled in the last decade it is still 10 points lower than in Western Europe.

Presently, 10% of university budgets in Poland come from tuition fees. There are, however, schools that receive as much as 50% of their budget from tuition fees (GW 281.2874, 1998).

The above data indicate how important the tuition is to run a university in Poland. Above and beyond the institution of higher education must computerized and increase their physical space in order to accommodate the growing number of students.

The issue of tuition brings to mind the problem of student loans. Such loans are to be available as of September 1999. The determination of how the loans are to work, who should be responsible for them, how much students should be receiving and when they should pay the loan back, causes as much controversy as the discussion over tuition fees. Some of the proposals considered by the Citizens Committee on Equal Access to Higher Education included loans for students where the amount of money landed would not exceed 10 times average monthly income in Poland (Jakubiak and Radziwill, 1998). First in line to receive a loan would be students from poor families. The process of paying off the student loan would begin one year after graduation, and it should not take longer than twice the time spent in school. This means that a person who receives a Magister Diploma (which takes 5 years), should be able to pay the student loan back in 10 years. If a student received good marks at university, his/her loan or part of it should be pardoned.

The organization that would govern and represent the student loan would be Rada Nadzorcza (Watching committee) and the government. The committee would include

representatives from the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Finance, Main Committee on Higher Education (*Rada Główna Szkolnictwa Wyzszego*) and the National Students Council.

First students' loans were given this academic year 1998/99 but only in Poznan and Warsaw. The monthly loan is 500 zł (approximately 250 Canadian dollars). This amount is to cover: dorm/shared room 120 zł, food 150zł, clothing 50zł, transport 50 zł, books 20zł and spending money 50zł (Jakubiak and Radziwill, 1998:96). The rest of the money is to help with the tuition payments. A monthly tuition in a private school equals 450 zł, however, it is assumed that the tuition in schools owned by the government would be much lower.

Malgorzata Jakubiak and Artur Radziwill compare the situation of Polish students to the situation of students in Great Britain. According to the calculation the situation of Polish students ought to be much worse but in reality it is not. Such a situation would be impossible to explain in any Western European countries (1998:98). The reason for it lies in Polish custom where parents pay for their children education. The tuition fees would only stop from educating those from very poor families.

It is expected that in a few years all forms of higher education will require tuition. The tuition itself and the loan will be in a constant process of evolution as the changes in Poland are too dynamic to foresee how the situation will look in 10 or 15 years. Another very important factor in planning the financial side of higher education is the interest rates and the inflation. At this point it is impossible to give more details on students loans.

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