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CHAPTER ONE

THE PROBLEM: COLONIAL LEGACY AND SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION

1.0 Introduction.

Reading through the numerous pronouncements on the transformation of Zimbabwe's colonial legacy into a trend towards socialist development, one becomes increasingly aware of the complexity of both the practice and the theorization of the class struggle. In the writings of those western Marxist academics who had hoped that Zimbabwe would provide the success story upon which to develop new insights into the revolutionary process, one encounters what might be the bitter lamentations of disillusioned hope. For Callinicos, the triumph of the Zimbabwean liberation movement was never the revolution it was said to be in the first place (Callinicos, 1981). Astrow, for his part, insinuates that the nationalist movement's "petty-bourgeois" leadership strategically hijacked the revolutionary forces towards its own nationalist goal of stepping into the shoes of colonial rulers (Astrow, 1983). More bitterly, Fogel charges that the Zimbabwe African National Union [ZANU] actually "betrayed" its own revolution by negotiating a ceasefire and sacrificing earlier principles (Fogel, 1982: 337-368).

Through such polemics, these scholars have also created the impression that no constructive criticism could be expected from.

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The undersigned hereby recommend to
The Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
acceptance of the thesis,

CIVILIZATION, REVOLUTION AND THE LEGITIMATE WEED:
SETTLER AGRICULTURE, CAPITALIST DOMINATION AND
SOCIALIST DEVELOPMENT IN ZIMBABWE, 1945-1985

submitted by

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in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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April 23, 1987

The successful completion of this thesis left me with a huge debt, of gratitude. Some of the people whose goodwill went into this task opted to remain anonymous. To avoid under-stating anyone's contribution, I must begin by expressing my profound gratitude to everyone who did anything in support of this effort.

Professor Bryan Heading of the University of East Anglia revealed Carleton University to me and supported my difficult return to school in 1979. In helping me find my way to Canada, Ms Barbara Houldin and Mrs Hendrickse of London spared no effort. Across the Atlantic, Professors G Irving and S Richer, together with Bari Hall, must have done a lot to secure my admission.

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This work is dedicated to the eternal memory of Mujibha and Chimbwido. Without your courage, this whole effort would have remained entirely speculative. This thesis is about our past and your future.

ABSTRACT

This dissertation offers a critical contribution to the conception of socialist development in Zimbabwe. The central problem identified is that of the extent to which post-colonial planning theoretically specifies and historically analyses the complexity of capitalist domination as it developed in Zimbabwean society after 1945. Developments in the production of flue-cured tobacco leaf for export are analysed to reveal the various ways in which capital established its rule through settler colonialism. The Transitional National Development Plan of 1982/3-1984/5 and other selected texts are reviewed as exemplars of the current discourse on socialist development in Zimbabwe.

Inspired by Preston's contribution to the Sociology of Knowledge, a Marxist methodology is developed to show how rival theories of development programmatically or inadvertently contribute either to the legitimization of capitalist reformism and intervention or to the advancement of socialist change. Each substantive chapter on the development of capitalist domination in settler agriculture proceeds from an expose of the theoretical and practical implications of conventional and certain "radical" economic histories of Zimbabwean rural society towards an alternative approach based on analysis of the relations of production and their reproduction.

The last chapter analyzes the assumptions of the current discourse on socialist transformation and the social-economic

plans based upon it and affirms the central thesis of this dissertation. It is contended that the premises on which both the current discourse on socialist development and the social-economic strategies drawing upon it have been based, such as self-reliance, equal access to services, social justice, enhanced productivity, etc., are basically compatible with strategies for capitalist accumulation and reproduction. On the basis of a historical materialist reconstitution of the process through which capitalism became the dominant mode of production and capitalists the dominant class in Zimbabwean society, it is argued that the conception of socialist transformation that is currently established in the discourse on development is incoherent and needs to be refined through criticism.

Since the focus here is on the conception of socialist development, the sources used in this exercise are necessarily located in the Sociology of Knowledge framework. They are not regarded as the "hard" evidence against which propositions could be rigorously tested, falsified, or confirmed as "accurate", as in positivist approaches to social science.

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INTRODUCTION

This dissertation attempts to make a critical contribution to the current discourse on socialist development in Zimbabwe. The argument begins with the contention that the conception of socialist development that has come to dominate that discourse, by encompassing both the common sense of capitalist "development" and some postulates of socialism, has tended to obscure the fundamental issues concerning social change. This subject, it is argued, is necessarily problematic precisely because the conception of socialist transformation, being part of social development, is itself socially contested.

Since the focus here is the conception, as opposed to the execution, of socialist development, it must be emphasized that Zimbabwe today is not a case of "existing socialism". That said, it must also be stressed that there is a socialist movement in Zimbabwe which, having successfully struggled to take state power from a colonial regime in 1980, exists under circumstances where it has to contend with the historical legacy of capitalist domination. What we have here is a case that informs the reader more about a critical aspect of the struggle to bring about socialist development [its conception] than about the actual accomplishments of an existing socialist society. Accordingly, the target of the argument developed here - the conception of socialist transformation that is currently dominating the

discourse on development in Zimbabwe - must be distinguished from policy studies in societies already identified as "socialist". The focus is on the discourse whose ~~full~~ implications are only confronted squarely in Chapter Eight, after its origins, scope and contradictions have been reconstructed through the argument in earlier chapters. Inevitably, the actual practices and policies associated with the discourse on development come under examination in attempting to grasp the social character of the current conception of socialist transformation. This is inescapable because the relationship between theory and history, at least from the Marxian perspective, is such that one cannot separate the two into entirely distinct entities and hope to show the relationship between them at the end of a dissertation.

Strategically, the present argument begins by noting how some analysts have rushed to pronounce on the prospects or the fate of socialist transformation in Zimbabwe without adequately specifying the social character of the society that forms the object of such transformation. It is contended that such approaches not only constrain but actually obstruct the development of a coherent discourse on socialist transformation. Once the problem is described and the main thesis formally stated in Chapter One, the next two chapters open up the discourse by addressing the social character of social science, its theories and its concepts in the sociology of knowledge context. Those two chapters provide the epistemological background necessary for a full grasp of the argument advanced here. Chapters Two and

Three prepare the reader for a form of argumentation that involves constant attempts to maintain the unity between history and theory. They are not, and should not be read as, either a mere "literature review" or an attempt to provide something like a solid technical conceptual/theoretical foundation within which propositions could be tested against evidence from such apparently "separate" realms of reality as settler agriculture [capitalist domination of producers] and socialism. It is precisely because the positivist approaches to social science impose false distinctions between theory and practice that they come under criticism throughout this study. In this study, theory and practice interpenetrate and the study of settler agriculture [an instance of the constitution of capitalist domination] automatically entails a certain approach to the discourse on socialist transformation in Zimbabwe. The question of showing the relationship between settler agriculture and socialist transformation as apparently "separate" themes does not arise in this context.

From Chapters Four through Seven, the argument concentrates on the subordination of settler farmers and African workers to the exigencies of capitalist accumulation as part of the historical reconstitution of the present conjuncture of capitalist domination and socialist endeavour in Zimbabwe. Settler agriculture, taken to be the case which best reveals the historical interpenetration of the process of capitalist accumulation and the development of the current discourse on

socialist development, is highlighted only as a means of penetrating the social character of the present conjuncture. The subordination of settler farmers and African workers to capital, it must be stressed, has no independent presence here as a separate theme running parallel to a critique of Zimbabwe's development policies. As part of the process through which capitalism became the dominant mode of production and the bourgeoisie the dominant social force, the developments analysed in Chapters Four through Seven are meant to be understood as a reconstitution of the object on which socialist transformation ~~efforts are directed~~. Accordingly, they form an essential part of the substance of the current discourse on socialist development. Socialist transformation presupposes that there is a capitalist society to be changed ~~into another~~ social formation. These chapters concentrate on the business of reconstituting that substance, both theoretically and historically, to the point where the current conception of socialist transformation can be examined directly. There is no clear-cut distinction between theoretical and substantive chapters, a distinction that is more appropriate in the framework of positivist social science.

Once that task is accomplished, Chapter Eight concludes the disquisition by examining how the current discourse on socialist transformation developed throughout the history of the struggle against colonialism in Zimbabwe and demonstrating how the contested process of decolonization eventually culminated in a contradictory conception of socialist transformation. Throughout

the argument, a modest effort was made to adhere to a central principle of Marxian political economy, 'to transcend the seeming boundaries between theory, abstractly formulated, and history, concretely recorded; between the conceptual clarity of theory, and the seemingly endless muddles of political practice' (Harvey, 1982: xiv). In such an effort, a major difficulty is to maintain the focus on the central issue, the coherence of the current conception of socialist transformation in Zimbabwe in this case, while also keeping in view of the interrelationships between the various elements that went into its constitution. The immense tactical problems that have tended to impose a pragmatic approach to socialist transformation in Zimbabwe, the problem of geographical proximity to South Africa for instance, had to be taken as given in the reader's prior awareness of the global situation.

Within this context, there can be no pretending that a perfect integration of all the elements relevant to the argument has or could be accomplished in a study of this sort. What was accomplished to a considerable extent was a modest beginning towards a critical, historical materialist, discourse on socialist transformation in Zimbabwe. The argument presented here establishes that the subordination of all producers to the exigencies of capitalist accumulation - as part of the constitution of a society dominated by capitalists - is the basic premise from which any adequate and coherent discussion of socialist transformation must begin. This contrasts sharply with

conceptions of socialist development which begin, for instance, with the idea that peripheral societies could effect socialist revolution by weening the "economic surplus" from the metropolis.

Since this dissertation is focused on the discourse on development in Zimbabwe, not on existing socialism, the only criteria that need specification here are those for an adequate and coherent conception of socialist transformation. Taking socialism to mean simply the transcendence of capitalism by a system that restores human integrity to members of the species previously alienated by one that violates it, the criteria for a coherent discourse on socialist transformation can be taken to be those that do not entail the subordination of producers to non-producers for the purpose of accumulating wealth for its own sake, and the reproduction of that process. For instance, a discourse on socialist transformation that upholds the production of surplus-value and its accumulation among a class of capitalists, and various expressions of the same, such as increased productivity among workers still dominated by capitalists, would have to be considered incoherent and implausible and therefore in conflict with the struggle for socialist development. Insofar as this study illuminates how capitalism subordinates producers to value production and how it reproduces the subjection of society to a class of capitalists, it accomplishes its modest purpose of restoring a critical edge to the discourse on socialist transformation.

CHAPTER ONE

THE PROBLEM: COLONIAL LEGACY AND SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION

1.0 Introduction.

Reading through the numerous pronouncements on the transformation of Zimbabwe's colonial legacy into a trend towards socialist development, one becomes increasingly aware of the complexity of both the practice and the theorization of the class struggle. In the writings of those western Marxist academics who had hoped that Zimbabwe would provide the success story upon which to develop new insights into the revolutionary process, one encounters what might be the bitter lamentations of disillusioned hope. For Callinicos, the triumph of the Zimbabwean liberation movement was never the revolution it was said to be in the first place (Callinicos, 1981). Astrow, for his part, insinuates that the nationalist movement's "petty-bourgeois" leadership strategically hijacked the revolutionary forces towards its own nationalist goal of stepping into the shoes of colonial rulers (Astrow, 1983). More bitterly, Fogel charges that the Zimbabwe African National Union [ZANU] actually "betrayed" its own revolution by negotiating a ceasefire and sacrificing earlier principles (Fogel, 1982: 337-368).

Through such polemics, these scholars have also created the impression that no constructive criticism could be expected from.

them. Their condemnations are not based on historical analysis of the conditions under which Zimbabwe's struggle for emancipation has been conducted. To the extent that they have addressed political economic problems relating to Zimbabwean history, these western scholars have only managed to reveal their own theoretical limitations. Fogel, for instance, quoting a ZANU article citing Mao on the need to overthrow imperialism, feudalism, bureaucratic-capitalism, etc., declared that "feudal remnants" no longer existed in Zimbabwe in 1976 and proceeded to criticize ZANU for not grasping that all that was then true of Zimbabwean social structure was "industrial capitalism and large-scale agricultural capitalism".

The uncritical assumption of the existence of "agricultural capitalism", with an "agricultural bourgeoisie" dominating it, has become so widespread in the literature on Zimbabwe that questioning it is bound to stir some controversy. However, that conceptual error is both significant and influential. Simply because European settlers became owners of the land from which Africans were removed and of other means of production that Africans could not own, as well as employers of Africans as wage-labour, they have been automatically lumped in most "radical" literature as a "rural" or "agrarian" bourgeoisie, without any investigation of how they became settled on the land and what role they actually perform in capitalism. Equally questionable has been the prevailing approach to the social situation of African cultivators in rural areas. Despite sound theoretical

arguments to the effect that peasants had become part of the working class, some "peasantry" historians have steadfastly clung to the belief that peasants remain "peasants" whatever happens to them historically. They must remain a "class in itself" (Ranger, 1985: 289). In short, without ever attempting to theorize Zimbabwe's colonial legacy, too many western "radical" scholars have pronounced on the country's social development and the validity of its current plans for socialist transformation.

Unfortunately, Zimbabwe's own accounts of the colonial legacy and socialism have also been lacking in theoretical specificity. Capitalist exploitation is often condemned in the same breath that exhorts workers to increase their productivity in the capitalist enterprises. A starker self-contradiction could not be found. Reading through both the academic and official critiques of colonialism and agendas for socialist change, one experiences a different sort of frustration from that of reading Astrow etc., a theoretical poverty that has immediate and long-term practical implications. For instance, the Transitional National Development Plan [TNDP], the first attempt to mobilize Zimbabweans towards systematic socialist endeavours in this post-colonial period, while genuinely attempting to articulate the government's general commitment to socialist development, simultaneously reflects the deep penetration of capitalist and "radical" nationalist ideologies into socialist planning itself. Concepts of the modernization orthodoxy and its dependency critique, both ultimately drawn from conventional economics, are

used in defining the colonial legacy and the socialist programme in tension with superimposed Marxist terms. Mechanical dislocation of social concepts into disparate categories referred to as, for instance, "economic", "social", "wealth" and "income" inequalities, the hallmark of capitalist reification, harmoniously co-exist with the objectification of social categories into physical entities that can be utilized, reconstructed, redistributed, "exploited" etc. to the "common" benefit. The social relationships implied in such appropriation of things are simply assumed. Self-contradiction and imprecision, particularly on such key Marxian concepts as "productivity" and exploitation, and allusions to classes as "the few" or "the many", pervade the current conception of socialist change as an egalitarian "philosophy". Eventually, the tension between Marxian and capitalist conceptualization reaches a point where described [as opposed to analyzed] classes may be mobilized towards a presumed common interest of the whole nation (TNDP: 19). The assumption that the state can mobilize all classes towards a common national goal, such as socialist transformation, within a capitalist-dominated social formation, is in itself logically untenable. Worse, it constitutes one of the prime methods of diverting the working class away from socialist goals towards capitalist ideology.

The polemical and conspiratorial conjectures of Western intellectuals may be ignored if they do not directly impinge on Zimbabwe's struggle for socialist change. What the policy

planners of Zimbabwean socialist development proclaim about the colonial inheritance and what they say about changing it into socialist development, on the other hand, could have long-term implications which must be grasped before it is too late for remedies. As a contribution to the advancement of socialist planning, this dissertation defines as its central problem the conceptual specificity and theoretical coherence of the current conception [as opposed to execution] of socialist transformation in Zimbabwe as defined in both official documentation and academic writings. Stated otherwise, does Zimbabwe's post-colonial development programme consistently specify the capitalist character of the colonial society whose transformation to socialism constitutes its theoretical object? In response to that question, this dissertation advances the following as its central thesis: the current conception of socialist development in terms of economic growth and social equity does not coherently specify its object of transformation in historical materialist terms. In supporting that argument, research will be focused upon the development of settler agriculture in Zimbabwe between 1945-1985, with particular reference to the production of flue-cured tobacco for export. Section 1.1 begins to explain why and how that will help in discovering the social character of Zimbabwe's colonial legacy and through that advance the conception of socialist transformation.

1.1 Changing Social Perceptions of Settler Agriculture.

There are several reasons why an inquiry into the social character of Zimbabwe's settler agriculture would advance the conception of socialist transformation. One could begin by noting that at independence in 1980, commercial agriculture, including what is specifically identified here as settler agriculture, was 'the largest contributor to formal wage employment (more than 32% of total in 1980)', and that over 70% of the total population earned its livelihood from the land (TNDP: 10). One could also note that the increase in capital investment was highest in that sector in 1979 (TNDP: 8). Immediately, it becomes clear that some of the most important social developments under colonialism were occurring in that sector. However, such facts only define a still picture which does not reveal the historical dynamics involved in the making of Zimbabwean society. One has to go into the actual historical process to reconstruct the manner in which settler agriculture developed into the epitome of what today constitutes Zimbabwe's colonial inheritance of capitalist domination and class struggle.

The broad parameters of capitalist development in Zimbabwe have been generally well revealed by both conservative and "radical" economic historians - ownership of property by "the few", foreign ownership of means of production, Africans working

as the labourers, plus all the implied social inequalities of the colonial system. However, there has hitherto been little that could be described as adequate specification and theorization of the manner in which capitalists came to dominate other classes, of the situation that calls for socialist transformation. What substantive analysis of the class struggles involved in the constitution of the colonial inheritance has been undertaken by social historians has been critically lacking in theoretical substance. Consequently, much of today's discourse on socialist transformation is addressed to the problem of a colonial legacy whose dimensions and complexities are largely insufficiently grasped. One indication of that is the fact that current discussion on socialism is concentrated on considerations of generalized ownership of means of production by Europeans, which implies that if Africans also acquire property or if means of production were somehow redistributed regardless of racial privilege, the result would be some kind of socialism. For one thing, that belief entirely ignores the possibility that capitalists could still dominate and exploit some people despite their formal ownership of means of production. Discussions which focus on workers' participation in management under capitalism are no more convincing, since a large part of contemporary capitalist management ideology aims at just that. All these apparently contentious claims will be substantiated in the coming chapters.

For now, attention must be limited to introducing the

historical constitution of settler agriculture as an expression of the particular way in which the bourgeoisie established its class rule in Zimbabwe, particularly after World War II and variations in the perception of that process in time and in society. When the first capitalists to set themselves up in Zimbabwe, the mineral-prospecting and land-claiming companies led by the British South Africa Company [BSAC] pushed northwards from South Africa, they hoped to find large goldfields comparable to those of the Witwatersrand, the extraction of which would provide the basis for a rapid industrial revolution. The sporadic occurrence of gold deposits eventually changed the capitalists' development agenda towards agriculture. From the turn of the century to World War II, the BSAC and its political successor, the Southern Rhodesian colonial government, attempted in vain to settle European farmers on the land for the specific purpose of producing commodities, as opposed to giving them land on which to subsist by collecting rents from expropriated African peasants turned into labour tenants, or allowing them to acquire the land for speculative purposes. For capitalist purposes, expropriated Africans had to be directed towards wage employment wherever the demand for labour-power occurred.

Settling farmers on that basis entailed removing African peasants from the land even as the latter were beginning to produce commodities for the market. Several studies have recorded the difficulties encountered by the colonial state in its struggle to replace the evicted African peasants with European

commodity producers. Europeans who acquired landed properties before the settlement programmes of the late 1940s tended to prefer trading and land speculation as ways to make a living, which from a capitalist perspective represented nothing but barriers to accumulation of wealth. Accordingly, most of the criticism directed at the pre-1945 European agricultural policies of the Rhodesian colonial regime have concentrated on the racial inequalities in land tenure, access to markets, services, etc., bypassing the significant hostilities between European farmers of that period and those who would have the land used only for the purpose that accords with the logic of capitalist accumulation, namely commodity production. Given the "thriving" appearance of settler agriculture in the post-war period, most of the economic historians writing under the partial influence of dependency theorization of "underdevelopment" in the 1970s simply assumed that the settler farmers themselves had become an "agrarian bourgeoisie". The struggles between the settler farmers and capitalists outside agriculture, which have continued to date, have yet to be acknowledged in the intellectual discourse on the development of agriculture, let alone adequately theorized. That applies to social analysis of the colonial legacy as a whole.

It may also be noted that although settler agriculture expanded rapidly between 1945-1960 to provide the colonial economy with foreign exchange and a supply basis for the reproduction of labour-power, together with raw materials such as semi-processed tobacco leaf for British manufacturers, it soon

ran into a series of crises. Problems began with overproduction in tobacco during the early 1960s, and then the sanctions precipitated by the colonial regime's unilateral declaration of independence [UDI] in 1960 intensified the crisis tendency right up to 1980. Further curtailment of tobacco export markets allowed capitalists outside agriculture to take every advantage of that situation they could, diversifying industries in order to monopolize the supply of embargoed inputs to local farmers and surcharging on handling of the exports under the secret trading arrangements. Consequently, settler farmers bore the brunt of the crises in increased production costs and reduced commodity prices just as they came under increased pressures to borrow and increase the role of capital in production. For their part, the farmers' capitalist "benefactors" increased their demands for farmers' credit worthiness and for labour's productivity, that is, for the intensification of exploitation in the various ways analyzed historically in later chapters. By the 1970s, some capitalists outside agriculture were even urging the suspension of tobacco production until the crisis was over [citations ahead]. From this historical perspective, what Zimbabwe inherited in 1980, which is often celebrated from various perspectives as a thriving commercial agricultural sector enviable throughout Africa, was in fact the product of decades of crisis and complex class struggles. Extra-agrarian capitalists in the various sectors, indirectly investing in, but not operating within agriculture, were able to profit through exploitation of both the

settler farmers and their African employees, who together constitute what may be called a "global working class", that is all producers of commodities. It is that legacy of class struggle that confronts today's planners of socialist transformation as part of the complex history of colonialism.

On the way to independence and socialist planning, perceptions and interpretations of the social character of settler agriculture have varied widely and these express the simultaneously ideological, political, economic class struggles involved in the constitution of Zimbabwean society under colonialism. In the self-image of settler farmers, meticulously nurtured over the decades by capitalist ideologues, the various technical and labour "experts" institutionalized in the services organized to guide settler farmers on the secrets of "productive" and "beneficial" occupation of the land, settler agriculture was "free-enterprise", and they themselves were its "capitalists" on the land, even though their miserable experience at the hands of extra-agrarian capitalists indicated otherwise. To take that image beyond decolonization, the leaders of settler agriculture preoccupied themselves in the late 1970s with extending that perception beyond the settler community. From the perspectives of all opponents of colonialism before 1980, settler agriculture epitomized all the injustices of colonialism which had to be corrected after independence. The European farmers had, after all, benefitted from the expropriation of African peasants and their consequent exploitation as capital's cheap labour reserve.

They had monopolized all that had come to be regarded as necessary for successful farming - public and private services, access to markets, technology, credit, and the land itself. Most significantly, settler farmers appeared to have acquired the very power to control the labour-power of others for their own purposes, to be "capitalist" farmers.

When the oppressed Africans began to protest against expropriation and to demand equal access to the land and the changing farming resources, they focused their attention initially on racial inequalities in land apportionment and on remuneration in wage employment. Consequently, the nationalist movement was originally mobilized around what came to be known as "the land question", which referred simply to land redistribution according to need, rather than racial privilege or to the skewed ability to purchase it. Africans looked at their increasingly overcrowded and fast-deteriorating reserved lands and compared these to the largely unused and ecologically more favourable European farmlands and protested against maldistribution. That became the favourite theme of those "radical" economic historians who came under the influence of dependency theory and its problematic of such "dualisms" as development/underdevelopment, centre/periphery, etc. The history of colonial repression of protest movements in Zimbabwe is well known, so attention shifts straight to the implications of the distributive perceptions of settler agriculture beyond the original theme of protesting against injustice.

When the independence struggle escalated into armed confrontation, the first Europeans to come into hostile contact with the liberation forces and to be mobilized into the Rhodesian army were the settler farmers; many of them tobacco growers in the north-eastern districts famous for their suitability for that crop. For various historical reasons not of immediate concern here, many of these farmers were already not on the best of terms with Africans, both their resident employees and the subsistence cultivators in the neighbouring reserves. Their increasing military involvement only polarized those prior hostilities. Thus the farmers came to be viewed as the visible representatives of the colonial regime in the countryside. The African liberation movement, which was then going through the transformation from a nationalist protest mass movement towards class analysis of the colonial society, incidentally identified settler farmers just as they perceived themselves, as the "capitalists" on the land operating a "free-enterprise" agriculture. The land was considered to be the major means of production in that sector and it was duly understood that the whole struggle in Zimbabwe was about land redistribution. Hence the liberation movement pointed to a free society where the land especially, plus all the new things now considered necessary for lucrative farming, would be equally redistributed among all Zimbabweans who needed to make a living on the land. For their part, settler farmers continued to view and represent themselves as the vanguard of "western Christian civilization" [capitalism], even when their position in

that enterprise was becoming increasingly precarious, with the capitalists, both inside and outside the country, taking advantage of sanctions and eventually proclaiming the inevitability of decolonization. When that option became the most politically attractive to capitalism, it took a lot of persuading to convince the settler farmers that their little businesses could thrive under an African government committed to socialist transformation. However, in preparing for that change, leaders of settler agriculture embarked upon an ideological offensive aimed at changing African perceptions of the social character of settler agriculture, at defining a role for it even in a post-colonial society controlled by the advancing liberation movement, which had now become explicitly committed to a socialist world view. The Rhodesian preparations for decolonization, whose influence may still be detected in current thinking about the role of commercial agriculture and tobacco production in particular, will be examined critically in the final chapter. For now, the next task must be to present what seems to have become the liberation movement's perception of the role of settler agriculture in its own agenda of socialist development.

Once it assumed control of the post-colonial state, the liberation movement pragmatically took into account the need to create a stable environment in which to organize socialist transformation. Land redistribution would have to be planned and executed systematically. Both "wholesale" expropriation of

settler farmers [nationalization of the land] and unauthorized occupation of unused land by landless African cultivators were explicitly ruled out. They had actually been legally forestalled in the independence constitution on the insistence of the British colonial officials. It was not until ZANU's Second Congress in 1984 that the ruling party formalized its position on the "land question". Delegates did that by endorsing "Thesis Six", which was described as a section

...dealing with agricultural land reform, which is seen by most farmers as a practical move to socialize the economy, but not at the expense of throwing away a productive commercial baby out with the colonial bath water.

"Thesis Six" also proclaimed the party's intention to overhaul the land tenure system inherited from the colonial regime

...in order to bring about equity in landholding as well as maximum productivity (Farming Gazette August, 1984).

That approach was later echoed in a symposium on "agricultural viability", during which workers were encouraged to co-operate with their employers towards attainment of national "self-reliance" by increasing their efficiency and productivity (Zimbabwe Agricultural Viability Conference '84, Supplement to "The Farmer", October 22, 1984: 6).

Here begins to emerge the problem of coherence in the current conception of socialist transformation on another level. How could the capitalist ideologues of colonial expertise and the planners of post-colonial transformation towards socialism both be interested in raising efficiency and labour "productivity" in

settler agriculture, given that it was still based on producing commodities for extra-agrarian capitalist accumulation? Although it is true that socialism is supposed to involve the deployment of productive forces towards the greatest efficiency in production, that formulation holds true only insofar as the workers themselves have taken over control of the development of productive forces. When workers are encouraged by leaders of a socialist movement to assume that increased productivity for a generalized economic "growth" and redistribution of the main means of production or of opportunities to acquire them are the substance of socialist transformation, fundamental questions arise concerning not only the formal definition of particular concepts but the very social relations they describe.

The immediate theoretical question arising from the liberation movement's perception of the social character of settler agriculture in the post-colonial period in fact forms the basis for a more elaborate formulation of the major problem addressed in this dissertation: What relations of production are entailed in increasing workers' productivity under the capitalist mode of production and how does the systematic redistribution of land and private property generally affect that process? In short, how could the major interest of the capitalist class, maximizing labour's productivity, be reconciled with socialist transformation? The problem can now be reformulated in more historical terms. What relations of production developed in settler agriculture under colonialism and how were they

reproduced throughout the period under investigation? What are the implications of the answer to that question for the currently prevailing conception of socialist transformation in Zimbabwe? The changing perceptions of settler agriculture's social character between classes and through their history indicates that those perceptions are themselves as much an expression of the class struggle as the actual process of commodity production on the land. Accordingly, the current conception of socialist transformation must be treated as an important dimension of any critical analysis and reconstitution of the colonial legacy as the object of socialist planners' theoretical practice. Section 1.2 locates the case study in its wider social context.

1.2 The Case Study and its Wider Setting.

Although the bulk of the research done for this dissertation has focused on developments in Zimbabwe's settler agriculture and tobacco production in particular, its intended application as a contribution to socialist practice and the problem defined imply a much wider scope. In extending the argument beyond the immediate context of tobacco production, any unique configurations of social forces at the local level that are likely to reveal new theoretical insights must be recognized. In anticipation of such possibilities, this section outlines the local constitution of the typical tobacco farm and locates it in

the wider social setting of an expanding global capitalism. In so doing, particular attention is paid to those local conditions which tended to modify the general character of settler agriculture as an expression of the penetration of Zimbabwean society by the capitalist mode of production. Even global capitalism has to adjust to the conditions it encounters in its history of expansion.

As a capitalist enterprise, the systematic settling of European farmers in an African country for the specific purpose of producing commodities entailed a global context, which in this case was the end of World War II. The Southern Rhodesian government, which had thrown its military forces into the British war effort, was seeking imperial concessions such as extension of its jurisdiction to the British protectorates of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland and "preferential treatment" by British tobacco buyers. The former materialized as the Central African Federation which lasted between 1953-1963, while the latter has had a protracted history beginning with the 1948 London Agreements, covering the period of international sanctions between 1966-1980, and continuing in the post-colonial period in the context of European Economic Community relations with countries of the Lome Convention. In addition, World War II had allowed Southern Rhodesian colonials to initiate import substitution industrialization, bringing within their grasp the local industrial revolution that had eluded them since finding that there were no mineral deposits on which to base such

development earlier in the century.

While all these developments had their impact on the penetration of capitalism into agriculture, the one that gave Zimbabwe's commercial agriculture its particular "settler" character was the combination of circumstances which created a surplus population of potential settler farmers. Post-World War II economic difficulties in Europe rekindled British interest in colonial developments and produced pressures for emigrating from Europe towards any place where economic opportunities could be identified. Military demobilization in both Europe and the colonies provided suitable candidates for that kind of systematic land settlement based on commodity production which would help overcome one barrier to capitalist accumulation, namely speculative land grabbing. Meanwhile, by implementing the racially discriminating Land Apportionment Act, the colonial state continued to drive African cultivators from those lands considered suitable for European settlement and commodity production. In the process, the protracted expropriation of Africans towards wage labour went on apace.

From the planned land settlement schemes emerged the social group identified throughout this study as "settler farmers", a designation which has nothing to do with the European origins of those farmers but refers to the particular way in which they came into being and continued to reproduce themselves through the decades. It must be noted here that even their fellow European immigrants called these farmers "the settlers". Initially placed

on the designated farm by the colonial state as a tenant on Crown land, which included lands purchased from non-producing European owners and before that sequestered from African peasants, the settler was given the option of purchasing it on completion of a prescribed development plan, defined in terms of beneficial occupation in the colony's interests, which implied capitalist accumulations. The basic condition for a settler to take on the land was that a male tenant or owner would occupy the land for the purpose of producing his livelihood, including reproduction of his family, through commodity production and exchange. Thus the settler farm was, in the first instance, a "family farm" as North Americans know it.

Yet this particular family farm was immediately modified by the local conditions in ways which potentially complicate its theorization. Colonial convention made it imperative that Europeans should assume the conception of labour and leave the execution to Africans. Regular employment of wage labour thus appears to immediately distinguish the settler farm from the "family farm" that characterizes North American simple commodity agriculture. Yet everything else in the settler farmers' relationships with capitalists outside agriculture remained intact. Rapid expansion of operations would further complicate the farm's relations at the local level with additions to the European household such as the farmer's male offspring, visiting relatives, friends or any new arrivals from Europe and South Africa interested in "making a go at it", or "raising capital".

Such attachment to the settler farmer were initially engaged as apprentices, before the practice was routinized as formal employment of European assistants to help supervise African labourers. Through all these developments, the settler farmer, although remaining a simple commodity producer dominated by extra-agrarian capitalists, began to acquire some of the appearances of a "capitalist".

Besides employing and directly controlling African labourers, the settler farmer became the owner of land and the appropriate means of production required for commodity production in settler agriculture. The commodities produced were his to exchange with capitalist buyers outside agriculture. Furthermore, where necessary, the farmer could enter into localized commercial relations with his employees, assuming the roles of retailer, creditor and even banker. He could also assume such "welfare" responsibilities as providing elementary schooling for African children, health services and food for the whole labour force, even if only in order to secure a stable labour supply of African men, women and children.

Given all these appearances at the local level, theoretical problems arise regarding the precise social character of settler agriculture. The usual tendency among social historians critical of colonialism has been to go by these appearances and identify the settler farmer as an agrarian "capitalist" or to refine the distinction and invoke the category of "petty bourgeoisie". While such an approach may be useful in distinguishing particular

social groups and studying their political and ideological tendencies on the local level, they generally tend to bypass the relationships that lie behind the appearances. It is such tendencies which made it necessary in this study not to take the local configurations of social forces for granted but to work out their historical constitution through abstraction of each group's role in commodity production. That is why the farmers are identified as settler farmers rather than by their "capitalist" legal appearances, which also need explanation.

Exploration of the local setting must also enquire into how the African workers were brought into the business of commodity production. Before 1945, European farmers could simply retain expropriated African villagers on their lands and collect rents in kind or labour rents. Under the assumptions of planned land settlement after World War II, settler farmers had to be directly engaged in the production of commodities and employ African workers in the role of execution, commanding them according to the provisions of the Masters and Servants Act. Having lost control of means of production, African men and their families might have to come and reside on the settler's farm as an extension of his means of production, depending on whether or not they were recruited as individuals or as families. To the extent that the women and children were actually involved in commodity production, the convention became established of counting these categories of labour in terms of fractions of men. Local differentiation of the labour force began at the level of

ascribed characteristics such as race, age and gender.

Due to the uneven expansion and contraction of the demand for labour through the tobacco-growing season, further complications to the pattern of African labour participation developed at the local level. African workers regularly engaged in subsistence activities in neighbouring reserves might be brought in for a day or a fortnight each year at the peak period and employed as casual labourers in addition to resident African families. An even more transient category of African workers might be brought to the settler farm at specific times in the course of implementing the settler's prescribed development plan under the auspices of African labour "contractors". Employed by such proletarian labour-merchants who made their living by buying and selling other African workers' labour-power, "contract labour" was usually brought in to perform such "one-time" operations as stumping the lands and barn-building. As the formal employer of his gang, the contractor was formally responsible for supervising and maintaining [feeding] his employees as well as for providing them with the means of production. Any services rendered to such work groups by the settler farmer were calculated as deductions from the whole gang's wage bill. In another twist, settler farmers behind the season in their operations might call upon their neighbours to come and help out. The Masters and Servants Act entitled every European farmer to call upon his employees to come with him wherever he went. Market pressures to speed up local operations might force some tobacco

growers to take their cured leaf to commercial graders, where the final operation in tobacco production might be undertaken by a labour force they did not directly command.

What emerges from this preliminary exploration of African workers' participation in tobacco production is a mixed pattern of labour involvement at the local level, a polymorphous labour market. African participation tended to be regulated by such matters as the rhythm of the season, type of operation, proximity to African reserves, and the general balance of labour supply and demand. If the object of this enquiry were merely to profile the labour market in settler agriculture, this wide variety of forms of engagement of African labour at the local level would satisfy that curiosity. Since the purpose here is to develop a theoretical analysis which illuminates how settler agriculture expresses the capitalist character of the colonial inheritance as the object of socialist transformation, research into the labour-capital relationship was informed by the view that these local variations were less important than discovering the ways through which capitalism transforms all these labours into the one form that expresses its logic, namely abstract labour. On that abstract level, the basic relations of production can be illustrated more effectively by treating the role of settler farmers, of the immediate employers of African labour, in terms of abstract labour than by arbitrarily locating them within the historical process according to their "capitalist" trappings or by resorting to such residual creations as "petty bourgeoisie".

The next step is, accordingly to locate the capitalist class into this setting. Initially, the capitalist presence emerged in Zimbabwean agricultural history in the early attempts by the colonial state to settle Europeans on the land for commodity production. Concurrently, it expressed itself in the expropriation of Africans in a bid to make them available for wage labour. Having failed to realize the former before World War II, the state found capitalist penetration into agriculture obstructed by the fact that most of those Europeans who had availed themselves of large portions of the land were unable to use it "productively", that is for commodity production and the accumulation of capital. The post-World War II land settlement schemes provided the state with the opportunity to reorganize land as capitalist property in the real sense of converting it into a means of commodity production by building that assumption into the settlement schemes themselves. In that context, the capitalist presence came to be expressed in settler agriculture first through the conditions for being selected as a settler and for remaining in the scheme. Over time, the role of the state in agriculture expanded in several directions in ways which tended to facilitate capitalist accumulation outside agriculture with the capitalists themselves never directly investing in that sector. From 1966-1979, the state's capitalist role in agriculture had expanded in response to the growing crisis to the point where government had, through its Tobacco Corporation, become the sole direct buyer of tobacco from settler farmers. The

ultimate question about the state's role in settler agriculture in this study is how the post-colonial state can transform it from that of facilitating capitalist accumulation into that of socialist transformation.

More explicitly, the presence of capital in settler agriculture came to be expressed through the process of indirect investment in that sector. Here capitalists confronted settler farmers on two main fronts. First, as the source of credit and the new agricultural means of production produced by industry as commodities, extra-agrarian capitalists sought to control settler agriculture's labour process from outside. Secondly, as the buyers of agricultural commodities, extra-agrarian capitalists were able to control developments in settler agriculture's labour process through the very act of buying. While efforts have been made to demonstrate that such exchanges involve exploitative mechanisms different from the definitional case of wage labour, the approach adopted in the substantive chapters is that while overcharging on inputs and underpricing the outputs may not necessarily occur, the important consideration is just how the confrontation of settler farmers and capitalists on that front actually affects the way actual production process and its social relations. At this point, the local site of production becomes indirectly linked to the various capitalists outside agriculture and on a global level.

However, a lot of mediation became historically necessary at what might be called the "national level", in addition to state

intervention. One of the ways in which capitalist domination of settler farmers as commodity producers was mediated at this level was through the co-optation of farmers' own organizations. The most basic level of organization was the intensive conservation area [ICA] council, from which tobacco farmers sent delegates to the Rhodesia Tobacco Association [RTA, later ZTA], and settler farmers generally found representation in the Rhodesia National Farmers Union [RNFU], which later combined with its African counterpart to form the Commercial Farmers' Union [CFU]. Beyond the democratic rituals at the annual congresses of the settler farmers' organizations, closer examination of their social role indicates that they operated under colonialism to protect the interests of extra-agrarian capitalists rather than those of settler farmers. For instance, settler farmers experienced but apparently never grasped the implications of the RTA's involvement in work study schemes and the organization of agricultural research and extension. For the post-colonial state, the major question about settler farmers' organizations must be not just the attitudes expressed by their leadership towards socialism but their actual historical role in the constitution of the colonial legacy. In addition, the role of settler farmers' organizations in the colonial preparations for decolonization is critical for understanding their approach to socialist change. Other mediations will be encountered in the substantive chapters.

Finally, research was focused on tobacco production for several strategic reasons. First, tobacco production and exchange

was considered ideal for a study that seeks to reveal the capitalist character of the colonial legacy because being an export crop, it automatically links the local settler farm to its global context. That global context has been dominated for most of this century by the United States' huge stockpile and by the monopoly cigarette manufacturers. From another perspective, the global context of Zimbabwe's tobacco trade focuses on the special relationship between settler farmers and British buyers, one which changed over four decades and reveals all the hostilities between farmers and capitalists. Secondly, as an expression of the historical class struggles between labour and capital, tobacco production provided a suitable context. Even conventional economists and tobacco enthusiasts recognize that the crop is very demanding on labour since many operations involved in its production are not readily mechanized. In addition to that fact, tobacco production brings so many different forces of capital into confrontation with both farmers and farm workers that one can immediately identify capitalists and their political and ideological surrogates just by reflecting upon every aspect of tobacco production, from controlled seed production to the elaborate auction sales and abroad. Section 1.3 outlines, in the most general terms, how the argument is organized towards greater understanding of the capitalist character of Zimbabwe's colonial heritage as the object of socialist transformation.

1.3 Towards a Historical-Materialist Analysis of Settler

Agriculture.

As an academic exercise in social analysis and theorization, the task involved in this dissertation transcends mere chronicling of events and moral criticism of conditions in settler agriculture. This is not intended to be just one more report on Zimbabwe's agriculture or a description of the contribution of the tobacco industry to what is usually uncritically called "the economy". Enough has been written elsewhere to protest against the maldistribution of land under colonialism, to indict tobacco manufacturing corporations' nefarious practices in the Third World, to reiterate denunciations of the tobacco smoking habit from the medical perspective, etc., for another contribution to such efforts to be considered superfluous. Nor is this study preoccupied with protesting against the conditions under which farm workers around the world have toiled under various kinds of injustice. While the exposition of such conditions in empiricist studies devoted to recommending ameliorative reforms has been worthwhile, it must be emphasized that the contribution here is aimed at the actual emancipation of workers through socialist practice rather than protest. Rather than protesting against it, the study engages farm labour's poverty by explaining its social basis within the colonial legacy, its reproduction and the conditions under which the classes subjected to capitalist exploitation have to struggle out of it. As Fuller put it, the task of exposing the occurrence

and protesting against farm labour's poverty has been a trivial indulgence of agricultural economics throughout its intellectual career:

Low farm income, in various sloganistic and arithmetic construction, has been the central preoccupation of agricultural economics since the beginning of that specialty. Theorems about causes and cures have been divergent, ephemeral and subject to the whims of fashion... There also was a wispy supposition that if farmers were more prosperous, hired farm labour would also benefit, but that linkage was likewise never specified (Fuller, v., in Emerson, 1984: xii).

Based on experiences with American agricultural economics, Fuller's observation is apposite to the accomplishments of that discipline elsewhere, including Zimbabwe.

In his many writings on agricultural labour in colonial Rhodesia, Clarke was very critical of the working conditions on settler farms. Focusing on labour recruitment, wage structures and various other matters, he concentrated on exposing the poverty of farm labourers, contesting the claims of the policy makers, and trying to convince them that their efforts would only lead to general "underdevelopment" among Africans. His persistent calls for enquiries on the basis of which appropriate policies could be made fell on deaf ears. Clarke was preoccupied with identifying causes of poverty and discovering their appropriate cures towards amelioration of such conditions. That, he hoped, would work to everyone's benefit, with workers' productivity rising as a result and prosperity coming to the farmers as a result of their own enlightenment. All this would happen without any changes in the material relations prevailing under

colonialism, under what Clarke described as the "plantation mode of agricultural production".

In the 1970s, when several studies on Southern African agricultural development were published, "radical" economic historians, generally influenced by dependency theory but still very much grounded in orthodox economics, uncritically assumed that the settler farmers who had replaced African peasants on the land as the main agricultural producers had themselves become the capitalists in settler agriculture, an "agrarian bourgeoisie". Once that assumption was made, everything simply followed. A post-colonial state would simply move to socialism by nationalizing the large farms and creating the appropriate institutions for a socialized economy. Indeed, for some of these economic historians, mere substitution of labour for capital in agricultural production would "radically" transform the colonial legacy into socialist development.

In short, studies of colonial agriculture which focused on the assumption that settler farmers were the "agrarian bourgeoisie" and the colonial state was automatically operating in their class interests only managed to obstruct analysis of the capitalist character of colonial society. Clarke's "plantation agriculture", which he tried to represent as specific "mode of production", encompassed everything from the extensive estates run multinational corporations, through large and middle-sized one or two-owner settler farms, down to the small marginal and undeveloped European farm. The category "plantation" was too

inclusive to be analytically useful. Although he indicated some awareness of the differences in employer-labour relations between settler farms and corporate estates, Clarke never tackled the theorization of such differences. Most importantly, by identifying settler farmers as an "agrarian bourgeoisie", all the "radical" critics of colonial agriculture left the relations between extra-agrarian capitalists, that is capitalists in general, and the settler farmers and their employees virtually untouched. Their critique could not be carried beyond the well known facts of racial inequality in land distribution and labour remuneration. This was reflected in the long discourse on reforming land and labour policies. "Radical" economic history was policy science written in the language of political economy.

While recognizing all the Rhodesian colonial injustices based on racial discrimination, the argument in this dissertation begins not by assuming the existence of particular classes in agriculture based on property ownership but by investigating the historical constitution of classes in colonial society. The only class whose existence as such can be taken as given in this context is the capitalist class. Faced with the imperative of initiating and maintaining the accumulation of abstract wealth through commodity production and profit realization, the capitalist class avoided direct investment in agriculture and sought alternative ways of circulating capital through that sphere. Systematic placing of European farmers on the land for commodity production provided the basic strategy for such

investment. To that end, measures were taken to remove African peasants from the land and to obstruct their reproduction as independent producers by closing access to all the developing capitalist markets except those for labour-power and its reproduction. Such expropriation would "free" the African workers for wage labour in the Marxian sense.

From that historical perspective, analysis of settler agriculture as the epitome of the colonial legacy proceeds as follows. Beginning with a review of the origins of the sub-discipline of rural sociology, Chapter Two proceeds to explain the argument form and methodology of this study with reference to Preston's approach to the social character of social theorization. Generally, that argument proceeds from the premise that social theorization, far from being the value-free enterprise positivist science assumes it to be, in fact involves the construction and criticism of ideologies [social theories] and the defence of political programmes implied by those ideologies. The implication is that the competing explanations of the social character of Zimbabwe's settler agriculture and their corresponding conceptions of socialist transformation are part of the process of class struggle and ought to be considered as part of any analysis of the colonial legacy. To the extent that advocates of any of those explanations remain silent on their own social engagement, their own plausibility comes into question. Chapter Two defines further criteria for judging the coherence and plausibility of rival explanations of the social character of

settler agriculture. On that basis, each substantive chapter begins with at least two subsections which present alternative accounts of the matter at issue from non-capitalist conservative and "radical" perspectives and attempts to show their inadequacies. That is followed in each case by an argument informed by Marx's work on political economy, which is regarded here as adequate for the purpose of illuminating the secrets of capitalism and, by the same token, of refining the conception of socialist transformation. Rather than dogmatically asserting that social development "can only be understood" from one's own Marxist perspective, as Marxists often do, this approach makes it possible to debate non-Marxist theorists on the basis of definite criteria of adequacy.

Chapter Three develops a conceptual framework from the same premises as the argument in Chapter Two. A special effort is made to lay the basis for understanding the social contestability of concepts. The argument rejects the idea of a finalized conceptual framework which forms the foundation for subsequent unreflective "substantive" research. From that perspective, an attempt is made to distinguish the meanings given to the same labels in non-Marxist and Marxist explanations of such matters as exploitation and social change. In that context, a particular point to be emphasized is that the term "productivity" means one thing in capitalist ideology and another in the actual relationship between labour and capital as viewed from the Marxian perspective.

Chapter Four then begins analysis of the history of settler agriculture by asking how the settler farmers came into being and how they initially related to capitalists outside agriculture. At that point, analysis of relations between farmers and capitalists is organized around the concept of the formal subsumption of labour under capital. In Chapter Five, the same approach is applied to relations between African workers and capitalists. Chapters Six and Seven approach the relations between capitalists and, respectively, settler farmers and African workers, with special reference to the real subsumption of labour under capital. Each of these chapters begins with examination of the conventional and non-Marxist "radical" approaches to the same issues and attempts to show how their implicit or explicit positions on socialist transformation compare with the corresponding Marxian position.

In concluding this study, Chapter Eight focuses on the various agendas for social-economic development in Zimbabwe, with special reference to settler agriculture. An attempt is made to distinguish each agenda according to the agents of its execution and to follow its implications against the Marxian conception of socialism as a movement for workers' emancipation. The argument about the contestability of social theorization and its criteria of adequacy is invoked first against settler agriculture's auto-critique in its preparations for decolonization. Then it is extended to current non-Marxist "radical" conceptions of socialist change. Then the currently established official

conception of socialist change is outlined from the TNDP and other texts. It is concluded that the current conception of socialist transformation in Zimbabwe reveals the intervention of several non-socialist influences which tend to undermine its coherence and that this is also evident in Zimbabwe's current approach to development. The study closes with a discussion of the implications of the current conception of socialist transformation from the Marxist perspective on relations between capital and the various groups that constitute the global working class.

CHAPTER TWO

SOCIAL THEORY AS SOCIAL PRACTICE: TOWARDS A CRITICAL METHODOLOGY

2.0 Introduction.

The problem raised here - coherence of Zimbabwe's conception of socialist transformation - arises in the wake of the general state of affairs in the theorization of what has come to be known as "development". Readers might therefore wonder why this author does not simply align himself with one of the many theoretical trends in vogue and proceed onto the "real" task of accurately describing how settler agriculture became the epitome of Zimbabwe's colonial heritage. For reasons that will become clearer in the course of this chapter, it is considered that such an approach is in fact part of the reason why studies such as this one have become necessary. The problem was conceived in such a way as to invoke some involvement with matters of the philosophy of science and analysis of the business of social theorizing itself. Avoiding the minimal involvement in that discourse that is intended here (in order to concentrate on concrete developments in Zimbabwe's settler agriculture would amount to endorsing what precisely seems to be the trouble with much of contemporary social research, the tendency to compartmentalize into different specialties that do not communicate on the practical implications of their theoretical

endeavours. The current debate on the state of the art in the theorization of "development" reflects that tendency and also points the way out of it (see McFarlane, 1983, Preston, 1982, 1983).

What this means in practice may be illustrated with reference to the situation that has ensued after the dethronement of the positivist orthodoxy in social science generally, and development studies in particular. A dialogue of the deaf seems to have begun whereby social researchers, isolated into sub-disciplinary "interest communities", have acquired the habit of asserting their claims without heeding those of the theoretical schools they must disagree with, given their specific social agendas. Within Marxism, that tendency usually appears in the now familiar religious claim to the effect that this or that problem "can only be understood" [or explained] within our elaborate framework, while non-Marxist frameworks and claims on the same issues are casually dismissed as "inadequate". In a way, the positivist orthodoxy's recent fall from grace has shielded it from its critics. Because we assume that positivism is dead, we do not talk to it anymore, yet its influence in social theory and practice remains quite considerable, particularly in the field of economic development planning. Most socialists know that several theories advanced by positivist social scientists are inadequate for our ideological purposes, yet after dismissing them as such, we remain silent on the specific nature of their "inadequacy". Marx, on the other hand, always elaborated his criticism of rival

theorists' claims by subjecting them not only to the test of logical coherence but also by tracing their apparent incoherence to those theorists' social programme. In the process, Marx demonstrated in various ways that social theorizing was itself one expression of the theorist's engagement in the historical process and developed a sociology of knowledge which is seldom identified as such.

The problem addressed here implies that the development process has been inadequately theorized in the convergence of the colonial legacy and the socialist movement. Section 1.1 indicated how impressions of the social character of settler agriculture, and colonialism generally, have been changing through time within and between Zimbabwe's major social divisions. The reproduction of those contested impressions within current social-economic planning has been identified as the socialist movement's theoretical problem. This chapter begins to develop the methodology whose dimensions will be demonstrated as the rest of the argument unfolds through the chapters. That critical methodology begins from the contention that since social theorization necessarily involves the construction and critique of ideologies, with its practitioners actively involved in that process as social subjects, the idea of a general social or development theory is but one expression of that character of social theory. Preston's sociology of knowledge argument is affirmatively invoked in organizing a methodology that makes it possible to submit the claims routinely advanced by the technical

experts in settler agriculture - the carriers of bourgeois ideology - to criteria of valuation and interpretation applied to all other pronouncements on the issues addressed in the research.

Section 2.1 reviews the theorization of agrarian or rural society in the context of 19th century origins of sociology and political economy under the shadow of industrialization. That preliminary enquiry into the nature of social theorizing as social practice reveals how the values presupposed by the founders of social theory influenced their selection of intellectual problems, their modes of explanation, their conclusions and their political programmes. The point is to establish that social theorization has, from its very origins, been a socially contested business. In 2.2, the social origins of "rural sociology" in conservative ideology are traced to the preponderance of modernization ideology in the theorization of Third World development. Then the challenge to modernization presented by dependency theorists seeking to reverse Third World "underdevelopment" [variously conceived] into "development" is itself examined towards elaboration of an approach to theory criticism that transcends the familiar techniques of pointing out what a writer "failed" or "omitted" to address, even when it was never on their programme to do so. It is argued that although the dependency critics of modernization ideology significantly shifted it away from the centre of the academic discourse on development, that did not quite affect its position as the dominant ideology in development practice. Likewise, it is also

contended that the dependency critique of modernization itself remained inadequate as a guide to the complex issues involved in the development business.

Section 2.3 refers the matter to two critics of development theory whose debate with each other should have actually taken place. Dennis McFarlane criticizes conventional development theory from within the value assumptions of capitalism and positivism. He defines "development" in such a way that its success might be measured against the premise that "the drive to productivity becomes a creative therapy, and welfare promotes productivity for the society as a whole" (McFarlane, 1983: 9). While acknowledging the existence of a high degree of disintegration and incoherence in conventional theorization of economic development, McFarlane continues to look for ways of assembling the bits of growth theory into a general theory of development (1983: 49-63). From the opposite direction, Preston contends that 'the project of an autonomous discipline' of development studies 'has collapsed under the combined weight of its own inherent implausibility (one theory for so many interests?) and its success in refining argument' (Preston, 1985: 7-8). On the suggestion of systematically reconstructing the collapsed project of general social theory, Preston asks: 'what use would a new orthodoxy be?' (1985: 2). Preston's position on this matter, well argued in studies that define social theorization in general as social practice, as ideology construction and critique, is affirmed as a plausible statement

on the state of the art in the theorization of development. From Preston's arguments, it was possible to order the interpretation and ranking of the various pronouncements on the social character of Zimbabwe's settler agriculture and her colonial legacy in general. The rules thereby set are treated as the organizing principles behind an enquiry that allows a theoretical debate to proceed throughout this study between capitalist, "radical", and Marxist claims about Zimbabwe's colonial legacy and the programme for socialist transformation.

2.1 The Treatment of Agriculture in Early Social Theories.

As McFarlane noted, most English classical economists theorized and generalized about an institutional environment that was mainly agricultural and mercantilist and, consequently, those conditions were imprinted on their static theories of rent, population, trade, etc. (1983: 10-20). According to Preston, just as classical political economists and the "founding fathers" of sociology viewed social developments from their experience of "discovering industrialization", today's theorists of development have explained society from the perspective of "discovering the Third World" (Preston, 1982: 3, 229). What Preston implies, which is affirmed here, is more than the fact that these developments opened up new theoretical horizons. More fundamentally, Preston means that social theory itself became one of the ways in which

the social experience of the above episodes came to be expressed. This section examines the treatment of agricultural society in the works of some of the early pioneers of social theory to elaborate on the meaning of theorizing the experience of "discovering industrialization". Three major trends are examined: a conservative interventionism traceable to the work of Ferdinand Tönnies, a liberal reformism represented by Durkheim, and Marx's revolutionary ideology. While all classical social theorists viewed industrialization as a fundamental social transformation requiring "scientific" treatment, their theorization of the social situation preceding it reveals their attitude towards industrialization as a social process and, conversely, how they viewed agrarian or rural society from those perspectives.

Through his polar dichotomous concepts of "Gemeinschaft" and "Gesellschaft" [community and association], Tönnies developed a reactionary conservative critique of industrial society. For him, industrialization signalled the "loss of community" or, crudely stated, the triumph of social disruption over order. His theoretical exercises, focused on contrasting characterizations of the structures and contents of personal relationships, implied a moral, spiritual and nostalgic critique of the scientific and technical advances of 19th century Europe (Lee and Newby, 1983: 53). However, Tönnies' romantic view of "community" as the embodiment of all that was human about society implied that "community" was exempt from the diagnostic scheme that was critically applied to "association". From that perspective, since

rural society retained all the characteristics of an idyllic tranquility, the idea of a scientific study of rural society remained inconceivable to the founders of sociology in Europe (Newby, 1977: 92-93; Buttel and Newby, 1980: 4-6). It was across the Atlantic, in Jeffersonian America, that the same concern for the preservation of rural order had the very opposite effect on social theorization. There the tradition of "grass roots democracy" and values of "community" were translated into 'active state sponsorship of rural sociology as a means of servicing the rural population in the retention of distinctively rural values and ways of life' (Newby, 1977: 93). Hence, anxiety about the threat posed by industrialization to the integrity of rural life would influence the development of rural sociology into a distinctively institutionalist sub-discipline which intellectual social scientists have learned to despise for its anti-theory orientation (Hightower, 1973: 50-51; Buttel and Newby, 1980: 12).

Meanwhile, the conservative line of theorizing industrialization pioneered by Tonnies became linked with developments in urban sociology associated with the Chicago school, where Wirth elaborated upon the conception of "the urban way of life", with the implicit contrasting concept of "the rural way of life" remaining an idealized entity. In the wake of the post-World War II "discovery of the Third World", the search began for the specific characteristics of "the rural way of life" to serve as a contrast with the industrial product of what was now to be viewed as "progress" or "development". The challenge

was taken up by Redfield, whose construct of the "folk society" formed the "underdeveloped" end of the "folk-urban continuum". That model of rural society depicted all the supposed characteristics of the undisrupted rural social order. Redfield's ethnographic study of the Mexican village of Tepoztlan presented his "findings" as the corroboration of the existence of rural tranquility, characterized by communal co-operation and unity of purpose (Redfield, 1947: 293-308).

However, when another anthropologist critically replicated that research from a different problematic which did not assume the idealized "community" to exist in Tepoztlan but rather questioned its existence, he was able to demonstrate that Redfield had relied too much on the folk-urban antithesis in ordering his ethnographic information. Lewis pointed out that Redfield had been obliged by his problematic of rural order to emphasize peasant co-operation and unity while glossing over all the evidence of disruption and conflict within that "folk society" (Lewis, 1953: 123, Lee and Newby, 1983: 58). The significant part here is that the respective value commitments of both researchers were revealed through their theoretical debate. Just as Lewis had pointed out Redfield's bias towards a conservative critique of industrialization [or "development"] as disruption, implied in the conclusion that all was tranquil in Tepoztlan, Redfield was able to retort that Lewis himself was committed to the objective of improving the villagers' living standards and changing their traditional attitudes. In

retrospect, what was at issue in the Redfield-Lewis debate was a shift in the problematic of conservative social theorization from the defence of "community" towards the emphasis on progressist interventionism that became the theme of modernization theory in the 1950s and 1960s. Further developments in that reorientation will be discussed in 2.2.

Although he viewed rapid industrialization in terms of the disruption of the "moral basis" of non-industrial society [mechanical solidarity], Durkheim remained cautiously optimistic about industrialization itself and its implications for what mattered to him most, namely individual liberty (Durkheim, 1964: 3). By the "moral basis" of society Durkheim meant that which bound together similar or different individuals or groups into stable entities within which individual liberty was guaranteed by society. For Durkheim, the problem with industrialization was not that it was disrupting the good society but rather his fear that its rapidity, evident in the advance of specialization in all spheres of society [division of labour] was such that anomic or coercive forms of social regulation might ensue instead of "organic solidarity", which alone could guarantee individual liberty, being the most rational set of values. Nothing in Durkheim's critique of industrialization implied nostalgia for community or "mechanically" integrated society. Industrialization was not, in his framework, the "cause" of contemporary social problems. Rather, the problem lay in the possibility of modern society not developing the appropriate mechanisms for organic

solidarity, for the correct balance between social regulation and individual freedom in a society where rapid specialization had resulted in the need for mechanisms of mutual guarantees. In short, for Durkheim, the fundamental problem for 19th century Europe was how to adapt to modern times in the most "socially rewarding" ways. So important was the concept of organic solidarity to Durkheim that, like the conservative romantics, he took the counter-instance of industrial society for granted. Since the immediate pre-industrial European societies could hardly offer the appropriate context for elaborating his mechanical solidarity concept, Durkheim was forced to rely for illustrations on small-scale societies so far removed from his European experience that critics today can easily point out the many ways in which he took their social organization for granted. Consequently, like the conservative adherents of the lost community thesis, Durkheim's approach to rural society was part of his theorization of the social problems that accompanied industrialization. His model of rural society had the almost passive role of accentuating the problem-prone character of industrial society. Since it was inconceivable that problems of social cohesion and individual liberty could occur without rapid industrialization, rural society did not actually constitute sociological material for Durkheim. Later, the changes that occurred to make Durkheim one of the inspirations of modernization theory will be discussed. What must be noted immediately is that Durkheim's interest in cohesion and

regulation to ensure individual liberty entailed a liberal interventionism which would be quite compatible with the post-World War II spirit of conservatism, out of which modernization theory emerged as the main neo-colonialist "development" ideology.

From a radically different perspective, Marx also viewed industrialization as destructive of agrarian/rural society. Like Durkheim, he did not lament the demise of the aristocracy and the Third Estate. Along with most of his contemporaries, Marx shared the ethical view that industrialization was dehumanizing. Accordingly, he concentrated on promoting proletarian revolution as a way of restoring to humanity its historical integrity, lost in class society, particularly in the experience of capitalist industrialization. On the issue of theorizing rural/agrarian society, it has been suggested that Marx generally conformed to the 19th century urban-centric outlook which drew all attention to the city as the locus of all social problems and took rural society for granted as no more than a counter-case. Marx is in fact known to have made statements amounting to the view that rural society had decayed into an historical irrelevance (Newby, 1977: 92-93). Marx's caustic references to peasants as the bulwark of archaic society, and to the aristocracy [landlords] as a vanishing excrescence or superfetation all add credence to that impression. Given that the bourgeoisie had accomplished its first historical mission of overthrowing the aristocracy [the outstanding one being developing the productive forces], Marx

would inevitably be drawn to the antagonism between labour and capital in town, with no significant theoretical object in the country to indulge his curiosity.

The impression that Marx tended to view rural society as "problem-free" in order to concentrate on urban-industrial developments is further reinforced by Marx's approach to what for him only apparently resembled feudal residues in modern society, namely landlords' claims to rent. For Marx, such relations had to be explained in terms of the effects of the dominant capitalist mode of production acting upon its previous antithesis. The subservience of apparent remnants of feudal society to urban-based capitalism was implied in Marx's explanation of ground rent. Accordingly, capitalist rent was no longer the feudal residue it appeared to be but an expression of the distribution of surplus-value among capitalist class factions. Rent now expressed a relationship materially conceivable only within the context of the labour-capital antagonism. More fundamentally, rent had become so subsumed under the capitalist mode of production that it had ceased to have anything at all to do with the land itself, so that the landowner could claim his share of surplus-value from anywhere in the world, provided someone used the land "productively", that is in the capitalist sense of producing surplus-value.

Beyond that, Marx seemed to take the same attitude towards rural society in explaining the origins and conditions of the proletariat. Capitalist development entailed the development of

wage labour in the cities and the centralization of agriculture. Both of these meant that rural depopulation would virtually despatch history to town. Decaying rural society depressed the conditions of peasants and agricultural centralization created the surplus population that fled to urban areas to become the "latent" part of the proletariat. The "free" labour already in industrial centres constituted the "floating" part, while that section still employed "in the decaying branches of industry" constituted "migrant" labour (Munslow and Finch, 1984: 3). Thus, in studying the making of the proletariat, Marx once again implied that rural society was decaying.

Taking Marx's urban bias towards its logical conclusions, Kautsky and Lenin later attempted to locate the antagonism between labour and capital within rural society itself, focusing on the differentiation of peasants into small, middle and "agrarian bourgeois" categories, in short, to develop the Marxist equivalent of "rural sociology". In the process, the trend they established, now identifiable as the orthodox Marxist "agrarian question", involved crude extension to agriculture of an analysis that had been developed in an urban-industrial context. Today, Marxists can criticize that reductionist tendency on the grounds that capitalism did not historically spread to agriculture in the manner orthodox Marxists assumed it would, that is inexorable class polarization everywhere, towards the revolutionary big bang. Contemporary Marxist analysts of rural society also recognize that Marx actually did provide the elements of an

elaborate approach to social relations within agriculture and between it and the rest of the capitalist system. From the perspective of Marx's approach to capitalism as commodity production and his distinction of it from other modes of production, it is clear that his personal urban bias aside, Marx's framework could be extended to rural situations not only by focusing on pre-industrial modes of production but by following the implications of his concept of simple commodity production. This allows Marxists to extend Marx's framework to rural contexts without crudely positing the ahistorical polarization of peasants into non-existent "rural" classes.

Obviously, Marx's political and ideological orientation necessarily involved an urban bias which led him to neglect the development of his elaborate insights into the penetration of capitalism into the countryside. His atrophy conception of rural developments - evident in those caustic remarks noted earlier - confirm his tendency to dismiss them rather too casually. Yet that attitude remains a far cry from that of Marx's conservative contemporaries, who believed that the problems of their time were to be found only in the industrial cities. In fact, evidence has now been cited which indicates that late in his life, after previously dismissing the Russian "populists" for claiming that "the rural community" [specific institution] formed the mainspring of Russian revolutionary potential, Marx ended up revising his ideas about the vitality of the country and its revolutionary potential (Marx to V I Zasulich, March 8, 1881, in

Marx and Engels 1965: 339-340; Wada, 1983: 40-71). On the balance, so broad was the scope of Marx's social theorizing that the effects of his urban bias are not likely to make much difference upon the whole project.

For present purposes, what is important is not the extent to which particular social theorists were biased towards the "social problems" that accompanied industrialization or how that influenced their efforts but rather to demonstrate that, from its very beginnings, social theory in general has always been a field in which participants become socially involved and attempt to make sense of the world according to the values in their given or changing world views. Social theorizing never became the "purely scientific" business of detached intellectuals floating above the mundane struggles of secular society, as positivists were eager to claim for some time without encountering deserved criticism. Section 2.2 examines how the experience of "discovering the Third World" led to new approaches to social theorization in general, and of "development" in particular.

2.2 Limits to Technical Critique of Development Theories.

Section 2.1 set the historical background to the contention that social theories express specific programmes of social practice and that as such they are socially contestable. A number of trends were identified. First, the problems raised by

classical social theorists were traced to their experience with the process of industrialization or capitalist development, particularly to their own political relationship to those developments. Hence, those conservatives who considered industrialization to be socially disruptive and to look back upon an idealized "lost community" tended to focus on diagnostic criticism of industrial society as a situation full of "social problems". On the other hand, those who viewed industrialization as "progress" sought to establish "scientifically" how society could adapt to modernity and avoid the problems it brought along with it, or transcend capitalism and leave it and its problems behind. It was noted that by 1945, the progressist problematic had replaced the reactionary orientation to "community" in conservative thought and that the former had become the basis of modernization theories of Third World development. Secondly, it was also noted that Marx and those of his early followers now identified as "orthodox Marxists" tended to espouse that progressist orientation in their approach to non-industrial society. Accordingly, it can be generalized that across the ideological spectrum, social theorists addressing themselves to the experience of "discovering the Third World" became preoccupied with attempts to articulate the passage from "backwardness" towards "modernity". From the end of World War II, conservatives modified and refined their arguments on the matter of development from "traditional" to "modern" society until the late 1960s. Then the project lost intellectual plausibility as

some "radical" economists, disillusioned with the trajectory of modernization, began to address the alternative theme of "underdevelopment" as a consequence of the expansion of capitalism to the Third World.

This section continues to set the background to, and argue for, the critical methodology that organizes this study by elaborating upon the contention that social theory is social practice, this time with specific reference to contemporary theories of Third World development. The argument is organized as follows. First, the definitive claims of each theory are outlined. Then, the technical criticisms brought against that theory in the literature are evaluated at two levels: (a) within the assumptions of a standardized positivist view of social science, and (b) from the perspectives of those who began to question the fundamental assumptions and to point out the limitations of that theory.

First in line are the conservative modernization theories. These emerged as the dominant expression of conventional thinking about Third World development after World War II. Similar questions of technical adequacy are raised with reference to dependency theories as they proliferated between the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s to challenge modernization theories before they themselves became increasingly vulnerable to a structuralist revision in Marxism which became known in the development discourse as articulationist theory. By examining how the theories of development were conceived, reviewed and

contested along the above lines, this section advances the present argument towards the claim that much of the theorization of development has been conducted without sufficient consideration of the social character of social theorizing and that this has set severe limitations to the development discourse, one that could be transcended through a critical methodology informed by an argument from the sociology of knowledge.

It is noted that although by 1945, the destructive capacity of industrial civilization had been amply demonstrated by the war itself, industrialization remained the only plausible form of social reorganization for most of the western world. Instead of the romantic return to pre-industrial society once contemplated by some of their predecessors, conservative social theorists had come to accept industrialization and its spread to the rest of the world as the "normal" course of "development". Along with the idea of "development" came the "Cold War" the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union for global alliances. For the former, the model for such alliances was established by its new relationship with European countries in the context of Marshall Aid for post-war reconstruction. In the case of the Third World, aided development meant economic expansion under a national state dedicated to transforming the "traditional" [in the sense of primordial] society towards a "modern", industrial, stable, capitalist situation. In the corresponding social-theoretical discourse, the Durkheimian framework of

organic solidarity was combined with that of Weberian rationality and it was now assumed that the latter was no longer the unique characteristic of Western Europeans and North Americans but a possibility for the rest of the world. The basic premises were combined into a sociological model of industrial society, based on the elaboration of value systems, role differentiation and psychological typologies. Hence, "modern" society, assumed to reflect American characteristics, was defined as one where traditions were challenged, by the postulate of "progress", ascribed kinship roles were superseded by achievement motivation, and fatalistic orientations were replaced by a spirit of rational enquiry and calculation, entrepreneurship, and innovation (Webster, 1984: 51).

This time, it was no longer enough to articulate only the "developed" side of the transition. In fact it was considered that the "social problem" was now on the other end of the evolutionary continuum. The encounter with the Third World entailed, for American social theorists, the need to specify what European defenders of "community" had tended to take for granted. Crude reversal of the American model of industrialism qua "modernism" provided both the model of "backwardness" and the methodology by which to measure "development". Lack of development meant, and still means in the dominant bourgeois conception of development, an emphasis on ascription rather than achievement, an orientation to the past, and what Americans had come to view as an irrational world-view, that is lacking a

disposition to calculate every little gain and loss, as capitalists compulsively do. From that view, "development" entailed a shift from everything that contradicted American ethnocentrism, that is everything that was not capitalism, which tended to invoke the spectre of "communism".

However, there was no real specification of the state of "underdevelopment" in modernization theory beyond the reversal of American capitalist ideology. While conservative thought became reconciled with industrialization as the "civilized way of life", rural society remained a non-object for social theory and was accordingly crudely postulated on the negative end of the evolutionary continuum, with the arrow of "progress" pointing towards "mass consumption society". Stages of development could be defined variously, ranging from the segments on Rostow's curve of economic growth to more elaborate checklists of development indicators, such as 'GNP, per capita income; acceptance of "modern values", social differentiation, political integration, etc.' (Fitzgerald, 1983: 13). More concretely, development could be indicated by such attributes as '...adoption and diffusion of agricultural technology, quality of life, social indicators, community development, demography, and the educational and occupational achievement of rural youth' (Buttel and Newby, 1980: 5).

The whole enterprise of theorizing development as modernization became the business of academic theorists who also moonlit as co-opted development consultants and officers in

government or international organizations. In addition to its conception by social scientists, modernization theory also entails the presence of agents of execution, technical consultants and development agents who render their services to governments and other authorities as socially detached, "value-free" or non-political scientific "experts". From that perspective, modernization theorists or their agents claim to be helping Third World countries to develop by stimulating the diffusion of modern values, providing technical know-how, and creating the environment within which capital investment and available resources could be used to the advantage of everyone in society, or of "the economy". That this means capitalist exploitation of labour is either ignored or implied in language which conceals the fact by giving such words as productivity non-antagonistic, technical meanings.

Although the broad claims of modernization theorists tended to go virtually unquestioned within social science during the 1950s-1960s, there was an internal critical discourse which tended to focus on the technical criticism of theories. Thus critics could point out that Rostow's stages of development were imprecise because the criteria he suggested for demarcating them overlapped between successive stages, so that one could conclude that the theory needed further elaboration (McFarlane, 1983: 42). Within the technical framework of positivist theorization, criticizing a theory ranged from commenting upon its conceptual precision to demonstrations of its empirical validity or

usefulness in prediction through techniques of verification or falsification. Accordingly, many critics have mobilized evidence towards demonstrating that modernization theories' basic distinction between "tradition" and "modernity" is untenable, having been repeatedly empirically falsified in such examples as the intensification of Islamic pilgrimages to Mecca in the wake of modern transport technology, increased participation in Highland New Guinean traditional ceremonies upon the replacement of stone with steel axes, and continued compatibility between ascriptive norms and values and advanced capitalism in Japan (Webster, 1984: 58). Whilst such considerations might reduce the plausibility of isolated claims of modernization theorists within the assumptions of positivist theory-testing, they may also enhance the school's claims to "scientific openness" and legitimate the whole school without ever questioning the validity of its basic assumptions. Most importantly, such technical criticisms leave the social agenda implied in modernization theory, and the nature of social theorizing itself, unquestioned.

Beginning in the late 1960s, there have been attempts to refute the basic claims of modernization theorists by demonstrating empirically that the spread of capitalism beyond Western Europe and North America has not led to development but to "underdevelopment". From that perspective, it looked as though the fundamental claims of modernization theorists had finally been refuted, until some Third World countries started to exhibit some of the characteristics of "development" despite being

integrated to a surplus-sucking world capitalist system. In criticizing modernization theory, dependency theorists focused on its ethnocentrism, the teleology in its postulate of "underdevelopment", its "inability" to recognize, let alone "explain" the "hard facts", its closure to alternative development routes, and its "failures" with respect to theorizing class conflict and underdevelopment as effects of capitalist development (Bodenheimer, 1969: 12-25)

While such criticisms touch on some of the main weaknesses of modernization theory, they also raise some interesting questions about the evaluation of theory in social science. The dependency critiques' presupposition that the proponents of modernization theory should not have "omitted" or "failed" to address such matters as capitalist underdevelopment and exploitation - matters which modernization theorists as capitalist ideologues have to ignore - is indicative of the limitations inherent in a purely technical critique of social theory. Even criticizing modernization theorists for "failing to explain" and being ethnocentric has to be considered from the perspective of its social context. While many of its dependency critics pointed out that modernization theorists were operating as the ideologues of capitalism, they also criticized these theorists' blindness to exploitation as a fundamental theoretical flaw. How could bourgeois ideologues be expected to explain capitalism as exploitation? Such complacent criticism of bourgeois ideology reveals a weakness in "radical"[dependency]

theorizing itself. One wonders to what extent the early critics of modernization theory questioned the positivist assumptions about the determination of theoretical adequacy. Their complacency frequently appears in the tendency of dependency theorists to assume that the exposure of modernization theory's weaknesses in the seminar room entails its collapse as a theory, as a social practice, as Wallerstein implies in his "Modernization: requiescat in pace" (1979: 132-137). The pronouncements of modernization theorists and practitioners cited throughout the coming chapters indicate that modernization theory remains very much alive in the practice of economic development and that it is not yet available for polemical obituaries. Section 2.3 will resume the critique of modernization theory as ideology and indicate where to go from the impasse that has resulted from the refinement of the discourse in development theorizing. Before turning to the theoretical claims of dependency theorists and their immediate critics, it will be necessary to explain what became of the early Marxist tendency to postulate a variation on the theme of "modernization" from the left.

In 2.1, Marx's tendency to dismiss agricultural and pre-industrial situations as declining backgrounds to capitalist development was noted. Despite indications that Marx had begun to review his position on the specificity of relations in agriculture in his late life, the view that non-capitalist relations were destined to vanish under the inexorable evolution

of capitalism towards its revolutionary explosion into socialism became the standard for his orthodox followers. They could cite Marx's claim that 'The country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future' (Marx, 1976a: 91). From there, Lenin developed his theory of imperialism, which in fact inadvertently anticipates the basic claim of modernization theory on the ideological left. The details of Lenin's theory concerning the falling rate of profit and crisis resolution are not the issue here. It is the implied postulate that capitalist expansion to the Third World - despite the attendant plunder and exploitation - would bring development to these "backward" regions which makes Lenin's theory of imperialism, alongside with modernization theory, part of the background against which dependency theorists propounded the thesis of capitalist-induced underdevelopment. Both Lenin's and modernization theories of development imply that capitalist expansion to the Third World would overcome a primordial state of underdevelopment (Webster, 1984: 83).

The crucial element in Lenin's theory of capitalist modernization was the suggestion that while the Third World was being opened up for capitalist penetration, the "progressive" European working class would overthrow the bourgeoisie in the capitalist metropolis and liberate the world proletariat. Asian and Latin American nationalists disagreed and history has been on

their side.(1) Baran gave them the theoretical expression for their contention that, far from diffusing and stimulating development elsewhere, capitalism had historically enabled Western Europe and North America to develop by depriving the Third World of its resource for industrialization, its "economic surplus". Specifically, this meant that capitalist industrialization in the West had not only blocked capitalist industrialization in the Third World but actually continued to generate its underdevelopment by siphoning away its economic surplus through unequal advantages in the world commodity market. Development and underdevelopment were thus reformulated from being evolutionary opposites to being symbiotic antitheses. Both were now seen as opposite effects of the same process, namely, economic surplus transfers from periphery to core.

Once more, industrialization was to be seen as the locus of contemporary social problems, this time as the process which terminated any pre-colonial development that might have preceded capitalism before it spread its tentacles to wherever an economic surplus could be identified. Instead of a return to the pre-colonial situation, dependency theorists looked for a way of circumventing the unwanted consequences of "development". The solution to underdevelopment would be sought in a nationalist disengagement from the rigged capitalist system, a process which dependency theorist Frank equated with socialist revolution.

(1) For instance, it was the African liberation movements - PAIGC, FRELIMO and MPLA - that overthrew the Salazar-Caetano dictatorship in Portugal, not the Portuguese working class.

entailing the overthrow of the system's weak link in the periphery, the national elite and the post-colonial state through which the economic surplus was being siphoned out. With that, local accumulation would begin and the revolution in the periphery, by blocking cheap food supplies to the centre, precipitate a revolution there in which capitalism would be denied cheap raw materials and faced with wage bills it could not meet.

Most technical criticisms of dependency theories have focused on its conceptual imprecision. The concept of "dependency" has been queried for implying circularity, so that dependent countries end up being those unable to sustain autonomous growth while such inability is explained as dependency (O'Brien, 1975: 24). The centre/periphery and similar paired antitheses have also been questioned on the ground that while they refer to geographical divisions, they are used as though they had a precise social-historical content. More devastating to the fundamental claim of dependency theorists that capitalism in the periphery entails underdevelopment has been evidence of economic growth in some countries which, according to the logic of dependency theory, should have become increasingly underdeveloped as they became more closely integrated with the capitalist system. However, such evidence has only led to debates about whether or not the evidence actually points this way or that, with definitions of what counts as "autonomous development" being refined all the time but without resolving the issue.

Again, it is those criticisms which appear to be the most fundamental, which raise the most crucial questions about the terms of debate in development theorization. For instance, when Kitching criticizes the concept of dependency on the ground that measuring it in terms of money capital inflows and money capital outflows is "...a totally inadequate basis on which to build a theory of exploitation", it is implied that the point of all social theoretical efforts is to build such a theory (Kitching, 1982: 167). The same logic lies behind Brenner's criticism of the whole dependency-underdevelopment tendency from the perspective that because its adherents concentrate on relations of exchange rather than those of production, dependency theory makes them "neo-Smithians" rather than "neo-Marxists" (Brenner, 1982: 54-70). While such criticisms are no doubt pertinent in attempting to distinguish Marxist from other "radical" theoretical claims, the attempt to portray dependency's concentration on surplus transfers, rather than surplus-value extraction as "failures" or "omissions", or even as mistakes, is quite inappropriate when viewed from the perspective of social theory as social practice. By demanding that dependency theorists ought to address the problem of surplus-value extraction [class exploitation] rather than the transfer of economic surplus [underdevelopment], Marxist critics imply that all social theorization is addressed to the same programme within a single problematic. The idea of a master science guided by universal rules of technical adequacy is thereby reasserted not from the

perspective of dogmatic positivism but that of a supposedly reflexive [self-conscious] ideology of class struggle.

While much of the technical criticism of dependency theory by Marxists from the articulationist perspective has led to further efforts to specify the mechanisms of capitalist penetration into non-capitalist societies, little has been revealed in these efforts as to why dependency theorists assumed the stance they did with respect to combating capitalism in the Third World. It is simply argued that they were wrong this way or that. As Webster states it, the issue as to whether capitalism in the Third World is leading to development or not has been treated mainly on the level of empirical enquiry:

Since what is treated as significant data in support of one position rather than another depends on the theoretical assumptions that are adopted from the outset, the debate is likely to continue for a considerable time' (Webster, 1984: 90).

Thus throughout the theoretical debate on the subject of development, arguments have been constructed, criticized on the technical level, and increasingly refined without being resolved. The next and final section of this chapter investigates the current state of the debate on development, attempts to transcend the limits on technical criticism of theory by referring the issue to the subject of social theorization as social practice, thus defining the methodology that organizes the argument in this thesis.

2.3 Beyond Technical Criticism of Theory: A Critical Methodology.

The discourse on "development" has not and will not resolve the issue of what industrialization or capitalism entails for the Third World, at least not for everyone. Faced with the impasse, theorists have responded in various ways, mainly by offering more technical criticism of theory which, as argued in 2.2, does not make sense beyond certain limits. This section concludes the chapter by presenting an argument that elaborates on the limits to technical refinement of theory, introduces the notion of critique of social theory as social practice, and defines the methodology of comparative theory criticism that organized the research process throughout this study.

First, further attempts to refine "development theory" are examined from the perspective of the now not-so-dominant positivist orthodoxy in social science. Here, some conventional economists can still be cited holding up the prospect of development as evolution from low productivity "traditional" society towards a high productivity "modern" society, with the only reason for Third World economic problems appearing insurmountable being taken to be that social scientists have 'not yet evolved an adequate theory to explain them' (McFarlane, 1983: 57). Preston's critique of the positivist orthodoxy as a paradigm of knowledge production for conventional social sciences provides a useful background for examining McFarlane's response to the disarray in "development theory". That orthodoxy constitutes a

philosophical elucidation of logical positivism, holding out the established uncritical view of the natural sciences as the model for scientific practice. Knowledge production, or in McFarlane's case theorizing development, is considered to be a matter of objectively discovering the "truth" and reporting it accurately as one's "findings". Anything that sounds like an expression of the theorist's preferences, biases or values is nominally considered to be "non-scientific" or "ideological", with science and ideology assumed to be mutually divorced. Scientific or theoretical problems are taken to be those of accurately organizing data, while the knowledge production process is considered to proceed from fact gathering through descriptive generalization to summary statement of "findings" (Preston, 1985: 90-91). Along the way, recourse is routinely made to approximations of real relationships between observations in the form of hypotheses, frameworks and models, with theories considered to be the most general expressions of such relationships, that is as accurate approximations of those relationships.

In the positivist paradigm, social theory is supposed to be isolated from social practice until its practitioners are invoked as "authorities" or "experts" who can pronounce their wisdom on difficult situations, just like specialists in the natural sciences can be relied upon to solve problems. Accordingly, theoretical questions are taken to be entirely technical matters concerned with discovering connections between the observations

with linking the disparate phenomena into systems of regularities useful for making predictions. The assumptions themselves are seldom questioned, being as a rule exempted from the validity tests to which the findings are routinely subjected. In short, the point of positivist social theorizing lies in improving the technical capacity of the theories in question, towards the version that offers the most accurate representation of the observations in question, is then considered to be the general explanation of the observations made. Thus according to one who still considered "growth theory" and modernization to be the basis for a general theory of development as late as 1983, a "thorough examination" of development literature reveals

...that there is an urgent need for a higher degree of coherence, rigour and integration in theoretical expositions than has so far been achieved. It may well be said that there is almost no single parametric relation or equation, nor any system of partial or limited theory in the field of development, which has attained a position of general acceptance (McFarlane, 1983: 49).

Although he apparently anticipates some problems with the feasibility of advancing the mechanical-technical precision of "growth theory" toward greater generalization, McFarlane is too tied to the positivist paradigm for social science to seek alternatives to technical criticism of theory. Accordingly, he cites the following as the problems besetting the greater coherence and generality of "growth theory" as development theory: (a) how to relate so-called "economic" to "non-economic" factors and their respective functions in the development "process" [i.e. model], (b) handling the numerous variables

considered necessary in elaborating a suitably general model of Third World development, and (c) dealing with the protean character of Third World development in empiricist terms.

In McFarlane's view, until such problems are overcome, development theory will continue to suffer from the problems of "low level organization" and lack of acceptability in the intellectual and policy-making circles. To help matters, he initiates progress towards general theory status. A general theory therefore would have to (a) provide for the comprehension of all relevant observations about "the economic mechanism" at each stage in the evolution from "traditional" towards "modern" society, (b) explain so-called "non-economic" factors as variables in the system, or at least treat them descriptively as residuals thereof, (c) be dynamic by taking time into account, (d) assimilate all variations in type and size of whatever entities are observed, and (e) address the objective of sustained economic growth from the perspective of an equilibrium situation (McFarlane, 1983: 50). (1) The ideal for such a general theory would be one elegantly expressed in terms of mathematical formulae, preferably simultaneous equations which can take the effects of both "non-economic and economic" factors into

(1) Note that the objective of sustained economic growth is assumed to be a universal value, something socially neutral.

(2) It must be emphasized that the problems of relating the "economic" and the "non-economic" factors is integral to any social theoretical effort that relies so much on empiricism that it takes the such distinctions for granted.

account.(2) However, McFarlane believed that there was still much to be accomplished on the level of ensuring accurate observation, organizing the evidence, and establishing the connections between empirically diverse phenomena (McFarlane, 1983: 57-58). In short, in the positivist view of development, what the theoretical discourse lacked was technical evolution towards the established view of how the natural sciences operate and what they accomplish thereby. Accordingly, "scientific progress" is reckoned in the same evolutionary terms that define the positivist conception of "development", that is, as the progression from specific models towards more general representations of the "found" truth.

The positivist attempt to improve the generality of models constitutes the simplest, clearest expression of the technical criticism of theories. However, recalling the argument in 2.2, technical criticism of theories ceases to make sense and becomes inane when extended beyond the assumption that there is a general expression of the truth in question, when the theories are being addressed to different and even conflicting problematics, as often happens in the theorization of Third World development, and of society generally. However, such has been the practice in the discourse on development. As noted earlier, criticizing modernization theorists for ignoring class antagonisms and dependency theorists for addressing themselves to "economic surplus" transfers from periphery to core rather than relations of production, becomes misleading when it is not recognized that

the problematics are changing and that the strategy of technical criticism alone cannot handle the theoretical differences at that level. The theories of capital's ideologues [modernization] and those of "radical" nationalists [dependency] are not less but more coherent and consistent with their implicit programmes to the extent that they bypass the concerns of Marxist theorists.

However, due to the continuing influence of positivist philosophy in the social sciences, throughout the political-ideological spectrum, the debate on development theory has been concentrated on technical criticism of different theories, with the postulate of a socially independent world of facts and a general theory that accurately reports on it omni-present. In the event, both modernization and dependency theorists were persuaded to somehow deal with those matters which their critics had suggested were inappropriate omissions. Predictably, they handled those matters according to their problematics. Thus in revising their framework, modernization theorists kept all the assumptions of positivist philosophy about the character of social scientific explanation - increasingly elegant quantification and presentation of findings in general terms - and proceeded to accommodate some "class" variables in their theoretical efforts. With Huntington, modernization became neo-modernization theory, in which taking class into account became a matter of

...taking over the well-known Marxist concepts for dealing with Third World realities while dispensing with - or even inverting - the revolutionary theory in which they were normally contained. However, Huntington demonstrated how this could be done without making any significant change in

the essential structure of the ideology of modernization (Leys, 1982: 334).

Allerted to the difficulties of concealing class antagonisms in a capitalist world, Huntington responded from the positivist perspective [from the right] not only by increasing the impression of scientific elegance in his research but also by more subtly theorizing such matters as class behaviour, revolution as an aberrant form of political change, and reform as the "normal" option, all from the perspective of social control, towards the prevention of socialist change in the Third World (Leys, 1982: 332-347). Since Huntington (1968), conservative theorists have been studying the behaviour patterns of those "classes" which they consider to have a tendency to "disrupt" Third World development by supporting revolutionary movements, and of those which might "stabilize" these societies by introducing timely reforms (e.g. Paige, 1975).

Similarly, when the relevance of class conflict was impressed upon dependency theorists, they tended to deal with it according to its implications for their social-political programme, or to treat it superficially. Having originally focused exclusively on the centre-periphery exchanges, theorizing classes and production relations remained, for dependency theorists generally, a matter of enhancing the technical elegance of their arguments by grafting class concepts onto what one of their leading lights described as "the primary contradiction", namely the centre-periphery, national or regional antagonisms of

the world capitalist system (Wallerstein, 1979: 200). Meanwhile, the very relevance of studying classes remained questionable throughout the dependency/world systems tendency. Capitalists could be easily located empirically in the centre and its multinational corporations. Likewise, their peripheral allies were empirically identified as the "comprador bourgeoisie". Yet the obvious need to specify why these allies constituted a "bourgeoisie" was simply ignored. Instead, a whole process of identifying local classes - "bourgeoisies" and various other "classes" - according to their functions in the world capitalist system and the asymmetrical "economic surplus" transfers between core and periphery followed without making any difference to the original formulation of the problem of dependency. The notion that class is just one among several identities around which group action or some kind of "consciousness" might be organized - which is not at the centre of Marxist political economy [see 3.2.2A] - became the standard class concept for dependency theorists when they were obliged to take class into account. In short, when different "development theorists" were obliged, by over-extended technical criticism of their efforts, to deal with issues that were essentially extraneous to their social-political programmes, they tended to deal with them either in purely technical terms or according to the logic of their own programmes. Where Marxists study classes with the intent to explain the necessity of emancipation, conservative ideologues of capital do so in order to articulate the need for social control,

as in the case of neo-modernization theorists. It is in that light that Marxists must understand the suggestions for "cross-fertilization" between Marxist and non-Marxist social theorization in Zimbabwe (Weinrich, 1982: 190-208). The awakening of Huntington and modernization theorists to the importance of studying classes and revolution [neo-modernization] indicates how readily non-Marxist ideologues [social theorists] will deal with matters that interest Marxists only in order to divest Marxist theory of its revolutionary implications.

By now, it should be clear that the positivist/empiricist conception of social science - particularly its technical criticism of theory - must be contested and transcended. Here Preston's work not only provides an alternative to positivist philosophy but also elaborates on the corresponding methodology for the critique of social theory as social practice, thereby helping to transcend the limitations of technical criticism of theories.⁽¹⁾ According to Preston, in the rationalist [or humanist Marxist] conception of social science, the knowledge production process is aimed at the construction of sensible, plausible arguments, rather than at pacing the established script of how natural sciences are done. Scientific progress in this case is not what it is considered to be in positivistic social science, i.e. about improving techniques for describing an

(1) Readers are spared the trouble of reading a paraphrased version of Preston's eloquent exposition of the social programmes implied in various development theories. The real thing - Preston 1982, 1985 - reads much better.

external, given reality. Rather, it is the 'history of particularly located efforts of argument construction', i.e. it consists in increasingly skillful argumentation towards grasping the truth about some socially significant issue (Preston, 1985: 91). The positivist formal distinction between ideology and science is rejected - together with the implication that technical criticism constitutes the sole mechanism for advancing the knowledge production process - and replaced by the principle that all theories are ideological constructions, some of them constituting more plausible arguments about the truth of the social issue in question than others. The Mannheimian idea of total relativity between social theories is rejected in favour of a conception of ideologies that allows them to be rationally ranked or adjudicated as valid pronouncements on the issue at hand (Preston, 1985: 92-95, 103).

From that perspective, a good social scientific explanation is one that focuses on developing proper premises, appropriate frameworks, analysing ideologies, and rationally judging competing claims, that is, on 'constructing, criticizing and comparatively ranking ideological schemas' (Preston, 1985: 92). Central to that process is the Marxian notion of scientific enquiry as social critique, which focuses on attempts to decipher the human experience in a conscious dialogue with various social groups about human emancipation (Preston, 1985: 93).⁽¹⁾ Whereas

(1) Nothing could be more misleading than a belief in "scientific socialism" when such a belief is based on a positivist understanding of what social scientists should be doing.

the positivist orthodoxy emphasizes accurate descriptive investigation of independent "facts"; social science as rational critique affirms the centrality of debate, so that ideological constructions or claims can be ranked according to their plausibility and coherence, as more or less crude or refined. Accordingly, in the Marxian view of social science, explanation has nothing to do with model building, generalization, or causal predictiveness. Rather, it is technically specified in terms of "reconstruction of the real". In Preston and throughout this study, the Marxian notion of scientific explanation is invoked. It is a process that is '...essentially active, investigative, critical and practical...one which solve[s] conceptual mysteries and present[s] the human world accurately, intelligibly and politically' (Carver, 1975: 40-41; cf. Preston, 1985: 40-41).

From this conception of social science as critical argumentation and social theory as social practice, the problem defined in 1.0 is located in its appropriate philosophical context. The problem of the conceptual specificity and theoretical coherence of Zimbabwe's current conception of socialist transformation clearly could not be handled in terms of the empiricist investigation of events, "objective" calculation of economic magnitudes of supposedly "given" facts, confirmation or falsification of hypotheses and formal statement of "findings". From the beginning to the end, the problem is qualitative and the approach interpretive. The issue is explicitly involved politically, revolving as it does around the

plausibility of current efforts in social-economic planning specifically aimed at the transformation of a colonial legacy of capitalist domination into a process of socialist development. The research resources presupposed in both the problem and the strategy of investigation are not given facts deposited somewhere as "hard data" where they could be picked from "the field" ready for theoretical consumption and digestion. On the contrary, they consist of various contestable arguments about the social character of a colonial legacy and the programme of a socialist movement specifically addressing the problem of human emancipation.

Those arguments featured in the sources referred to - call them texts - as so many social-historical claims about how Zimbabwean society developed between 1945-1985 and about the changes that have been planned and set into motion since 1980. As the arguments on certain matters in settler agriculture conflict in their interpretation of the social character of the colonial heritage, one encounters them as elements of what Preston describes as ideological constructions occasioned by the specific circumstances in which the social conjuncture that presents a problem situation was constituted. Since the constitution of such ideological claims on the matter raised in this study was already historically accomplished, research consisted in identifying, criticizing and evaluating them towards a critical reconstruction of the reality in the conjuncture of the colonial legacy and the socialist movement, one ultimately informed by a Marxian approach

to political economy. Accordingly, the part of Preston's analysis of "development theories" that is immediately significant here is his explanation of the methodology for the critique of social theory as social practice, that is for the rational evaluation of ideological claims.

In his account of critical methodology, Preston focuses upon the exchange between an argument's "conception" [its abstract constitution] and its "intent" or "practicality", that is the values and objectives that guide social theorists in arguing the way they do (Preston, 1985: 103-104). Generally, conception addresses the question of the reflexive consistency of a theoretical argument, that is whether or not the theorists in question acknowledge that their effort is in fact an ideological argument. Preston elaborates on the "conception" problem by asking whether (a) the theorists acknowledge their value judgements [Internal Reflexive Consistency], (b) specifies the implied agent of execution who will translate it into the rest of its social theoretical aspects beyond its formulation [External Reflexive Consistency], (c) the theory itself is consistent with its own claims [General Reflexive Consistency] and (d) the text is formally consistent within itself (Preston, 1985: 103). On the matter of practicality, Preston asks two questions: (a) Is the intended outcome tenable or realizable [External Practicality] and (b) Is it ethically sustainable - does it, for instance, enhance human freedom [Internal Practicality]? (Preston, 1985: 104). The question about the exchange between conception and

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practicality is simply whether or not the premises and categorical framework of the argument provide for the comprehension of the problematic situation. For instance, if the premise is that labour productivity is a "modern" virtue, then it makes no sense to address the problem of class exploitation and vice versa. From that perspective, much of the technical criticism of "development theories" since the advent of dependency and other "radical" theorizations have been futile insofar as theorists did not address the exchange between the conception and practicality of various efforts to make sense of what was happening to the Third World with the global expansion of industrial capitalism.

In applying the above criteria to the ranking of "development theories", Preston argued that ideological arguments could be evaluated on the scale of subtlety, from the crudest to the subtlest, according to the extent to which each reflectively related its conception to its intent. A management-centred "industrial sociology" which was explicitly concerned with raising efficiency in the production of consumer goods would, he indicated, be considered crude in a discourse which was held to be dispassionately "scientific". Similarly, an attempt to co-ordinate "development theory" which specifically addressed itself to "the main objective of sustained economic growth" and presupposed that the drive for productivity under capitalism was "creative therapy" for workers would be considered unreflective insofar as its author was inspired by the prospect of enhanced

recognition and acceptability in the academic and policy circles and the desire to attain the status of a general theory (e.g. McFarlane, 1983: 9, 50). Thus Preston criticised the neo-classical economic growth and modernization [hereinafter "conventional"] theorists for simultaneously muffling and presuming the role of "the expert", the supposedly value-neutral technician or master-scientist practically engaged in translating these development theories into practice. He noted that Frank's agent of execution in dependency theory was even present in the theorist's own writings as the political pamphleteer [commentator, spokesman], expressing the need for Third World countries to disengage from the predatory world capitalist system as implied in the theory (Preston, 1985: 108-112).

In attempting to reconstruct the historical constitution of Zimbabwean society since 1945, this author found Preston's strategy particularly valuable in stimulating theoretical debates between different social claims about the social character of Zimbabwe's colonial legacy and the current conception of socialist transformation. Diverse pronouncements on the social character of settler agriculture by writers identifiable with conventional and "radical" theoretical trends were examined and engaged in a dialogue with the author's Marxian informed reconstruction of how capitalists operating outside agriculture came to dominate both settler farmers and African workers in the ways explained in Chapters Four through Seven. In preparation for that debate, the argument in Chapter Three is advanced in order

to clarify the manner in which the conceptual framework that unfolds throughout this study was developed. Just as the materials used here were not found lying out there, ready for picking, so were the concepts also encountered as socially contestable elements of the theoretical arguments presented throughout this study.

CHAPTER THREE

CAPITALISM AND SOCIAL CHANGE: A CRITICAL FRAMEWORK.

3.0 Introduction.

The analysis of capitalism and the current conception of socialism in Zimbabwe requires a critical framework because the extrapolation of concepts across historical epochs, cultures and disciplines often increases the chances of their being socially contested. The glossary approach to concept specification - universal abstract definitions followed by operationalization - tends to reinforce conceptual ethnocentrism. This chapter therefore concentrates instead on a critique of rival interpretations of the Marxian framework. Marx's criticism of classical economics and Preston's sociology of development theories provide a useful background for identifying the problematics between which concepts are differently defined and contested. An adequate analysis of the domination of settler agriculture by extra agrarian capitalists, towards a critical grasp of the current conception of socialist change in Zimbabwe would have to enable one to distinguish between various meanings of such terms as "efficiency", "productivity" and "revolution" in different and conflicting frameworks. The specific meanings of particular terms cannot be fully established at once. They will be defined in the chapters as their meanings become crucial to

the analysts. Section 3.1 examines two frameworks adopted for the analysis of social change in the Third World by some contemporary political economists and indicates their implications for certain Marxian concepts. Section 3.2 outlines Marx's ideas on capitalist production, exploitation and crisis, questions their application to different historical contexts and examines their implications for class struggle.

3.1 Some Current Frameworks for Analysing Social Change.

Affirming that social theorization involves social conflict and rejecting the idea of a value-free social science, this section critiques certain analyses of Third World social change by questioning the meanings they give to some familiar Marxian terms. The relevance of analysing the social origins of concepts was recently explained as follows :

The sociology of knowledge may be helpful in explaining the beliefs of economic agents, hence also their actions and hence in fact the aggregate structure that generates the beliefs in the first place...To explain the economy, one must also explain how the economic agents - and, following them, the political economists - arrive at incorrect beliefs about how it works (Elster, 1985: 127).

Elster thus restates the interpenetration of all aspects of social practice which capitalist ideologues and some Marxists arbitrarily isolate. In this study, reintegrating economic concepts into their social contexts is particularly important in view of the apparent harmony between colonialist ideologies of

'development' and post-colonial conceptions of socialist change. To begin with, this section analyses the social origins of two acclaimed contributions to Third World political economy in order to show what happens to Marxist concepts when they are taken outside their revolutionary context.

3.1.1 Paige, 'Agrarian Revolution', and Neo-Modernization.

Until the early 1970s, modernization theory, in which Third World "development" was explained through the framework of a value-neutral, technicist, "evolutionary" trajectory from 'traditional' irrationality towards 'modern' rationality, had dominated development studies. When various critics transcended it, the modernization school revised its framework, shedding some of its earlier assumptions, such as the irrationality of traditional society, and addressing a new problematic, that of containing revolution 'abroad'. The theoretical part of that strategy involves the reformist reinterpretation of Marxian concepts of class conflict and purports to prove that Marx's revolutionary predictions were mistaken (Leys, 1982: 345). Marx's frequent criticism of bourgeois economists for mechanically plagiarizing scientific premises outside their framework in order to reach 'cautious, not radical conclusions' indicate that the struggle over social theory is nothing new (Marx, 1978: 117). The reformization of Marx is analysed here with reference to Paige's

framework for class conflict and social change.

Focusing on the so-called "immiseration thesis", upon which Marx supposedly based his revolutionary prognosis, Paige pointed to the rising wages and social mobility in industrialized societies and argued that a proletarian revolution was no longer the workers' rational option there. However, where the dominant classes, in the Third World, failed to reverse immiseration into mobility, he argued, revolution might attract those classes, such as migrant workers and sharecroppers, which had little or nothing to lose by joining revolutionary movements. Affirming that peasants, despite the earlier assumptions of modernization theorists, were actually rational decision-makers whose tendency to resist modernization ought to be understood in terms of survival strategies rather than irrationality, Paige cited Mao's reference to peasant greed, envy and fear of revolution and concluded that peasants might revolt but were unlikely to join revolutionary movements as long as their economic survival was not threatened. The conception of revolution implicit in that analysis will soon be revealed.

First, Paige's alleged 'improvement' upon Marx's concept of class must be examined carefully. He claims to base his analysis on

...a strict definition of class in terms of relations to property in land, buildings, machinery, and standing crops and financial capital in the form of corporate assets, commodity balances or agricultural credit (Paige, 1975: 10).

Then he constructs a model of 'class action' which correlates

sources of income and types of property to indicate which 'cultivating classes' [rural workers] are expected to revolt occasionally or join revolutionary movements, and which 'non-cultivating classes' are likely to resort to self-interested reform or repression (Paige, 1975: 11). Because of their 'class relation' to land or wages, sharecroppers and migrant workers, are depicted as the most likely to resort to revolutionary activity if landowners and capitalists do not reform farm wages. The rest of Paige's analysis is devoted to speculation about 'the effects of principal sources of income' on cultivators' and 'non-cultivators' political behaviours. By contrast, Marx specifically dismissed attempts to define classes in terms of either income or the rest of Paige's criteria (Marx, 1977 III: 886). For Marx, classes define relations between human beings, not between people and things. The emphasis is on relations, not behaviours, rationally calculated or otherwise, because there are some external constraints involved in class action.

What, then, is the basis of Paige's concepts of class, revolution, productivity, etc.? Like all others, Paige's framework cannot be judged in universalistic terms. For present purposes, a framework is adequate to the extent that it illuminates the historical character of both capitalism and socialism. Whether consciously intended as such or not, Paige's framework clearly conforms to neo-modernization theory's problematic of order, develops a phenomenology of 'rural class conflict' which simultaneously neutralizes the revolutionary

implications of Marxism. He ends up with a framework which defines 'social classes' in terms of relations between people and things, and considers "revolution" as the irrational behaviour of certain factions of labour and projects reform as the rational calculation of dominant classes in the Third World. Leys described that framework as "false scientifically and yet 'a dramatic example' of the 'ideological flexibility of which bourgeois thought is capable'" (Leys, 1982: 347).

Although modernization theorists have abandoned such ethnocentric notions as traditional backwardness and modern rationality, and despite their apparent adoption of class and revolution as central concepts, their revised framework remains completely incompatible with a socialist analysis of social change. Its influence, however, is not to be underestimated. By strategically shifting its focus from the optimism of technicist evolution towards 'class' analysis and enlightened reformism, neo-modernization theorists have succeeded to make their new framework attractive to some of their critics. As a counter-revolutionary "framework" that sounds like Marxism, featuring all the familiar labels, neo-modernization ideology can easily undermine labour's comprehension of capitalism. It was not accidental that when the colonial regime began to crumble in the late 1970s, Rhodesian politicians and academics joined the bandwagon of what colonial society had regarded as a taboo, the advocacy of land and other reforms. Although resembling a realistic adjustment to changed circumstances, the new reformism

in fact involved a switch to neo-modernization concepts as part of the capitalist ideological response to the revolutionary forces in Zimbabwe.

3.1.2 Kitching: Conceptual Problems Within Marxism.

Criticism of modernization ideology intensified in the late 1960s under the growing influence of dependency theories and their nationalistic problematic of disengagement from the world capitalist system, with some infusions of orthodox Marxism (Preston, 1982). As more people read Marx and Engels' "Manifesto", African political economists tended to sacrifice systematic analysis for thunderous polemics. Direct extrapolations from crude orthodox Marxist formulations to substantive research and political protest about colonial injustice continued while groups of Western leftist intellectuals enthusiastically viewed the advancing African liberation movement from outside. With independence, African liberation movements were frequently confronted by these groups with blueprints for "socialist reconstruction": "smashing" the state, creating "collective" institutions, "nationalizing" means of production and, insofar as the leaders did not oblige, with accusations that, as petty bourgeoisie, they had consciously betrayed their followers (e.g. Astrow, 1983; Callinicos, 1981; Fogel, 1982; Bolton, 1985). In addition, as the terminology of Marxism increasingly became more

appealing than its implications, the political economy of things [e.g. of land, education, labour institutions, and of countries] increasingly concentrated on protesting the inequalities of colonialism and emphasizing the need for the abolition or redistribution of privileges.

In the late 1970s, Marxist analysis of African societies was becoming more theoretical, with some anthropologists trying to construct an "African mode of production" and focusing on various ways in which surplus came to be appropriated by capitalists in non-capitalist societies (e.g. Seddon ~~ed.~~ 1978). This subsection focuses upon Kitching's contribution to that latest development in the application of Marxist categories to African studies in order to show how even Marxists can neutralize the social context of Marxian concepts. Kitching's problem arose from his attempt to distinguish the Marxian class concept from those of bourgeois sociologists. The former, he suggests, deals with the "realm of reality", objective issues about production and relations of production, by which he means exploitation relations, while the latter — deal with subjective matters of 'appearance' (Kitching, 1980: 438-439). The Hegelian distinction between "essence" and "appearance" means: (1) that an immediately observable object may be explicable in terms of deeper structures, and (2) that the object may be viewed partially from a particular perspective (Elster, 1985: 125).

In Kitching, the distinction is reified into a phenomenalist differentiation between 'objective' structure and 'subjective'

superstructure and a neat separation of the two is considered to be a condition for clarity in African political economy (1980: 455). Kitching may have been reacting to crude correlations of economic condition and political behaviour, but his own effort to distinguish between Marxian and bourgeois concepts in African studies exemplifies the neutralization of Marxian concepts within Marxism itself. The capitalist mode of production is read as an 'ideal type' and so are the classes it defines. The proletariat and bourgeoisie do not, he argues, actually exist and Marx's interest in them is supposed to have been minimal:

Classes are groups in society which either exploit or are exploited by other groups. A further implication of this is that classes in themselves are of little interest. What is important is their relationship. Marx is, if anything, a theorist of class relations, not a theorist of class (Kitching, 1980: 442).

Marx was not only a theorist of class but of a specific proletarian class (Marx, 1975: 116). An immediate objection to Kitching's claim is that classes and the relations they constitute cannot be separated. Eventually, Kitching's equation of the economic [or logical] with reality and his distinction between the economic and the "non-economic" is extended to a conceptual hypostatization which implies that classes, as mere "abstractions", being insignificant "in themselves", only entered Marx's analysis of capital 'in order to distinguish clearly concepts of use value, exchange value, value, surplus labour and surplus-value' (Kitching, 1980: 441). On the contrary, Marx developed those abstractions precisely to explain relations

between real people living through a social process that compelled them to exchange commodities as equals but simultaneously divided them into classes when it came to production. Value concepts featured in Marx's analysis of capital to explain classes, not the other way round.

The bulk of Kitching's study addresses the theme of class formation and locates classes and the labour process in historical perspective as historical realities. Yet his insistence that Marx's categories in Capital were pure abstractions indicates what can happen to Marxian concepts when a crude separation between base and superstructure is pushed too far. In order to give ontological priority to the abstractions, events such as the Mau-Mau have to be treated as though they were irrelevant to the history of Kenya (Kitching, 1980: 2-3). The separation between objective and subjective aspects of society was one which Kitching promoted but never resolved even to his own satisfaction:

One aspect of my failure [to synthesize narrative and theory] which intrigues me is the grinding change of gear between the historical and the theoretical parts of the book...such a change occurs from time to time even in the historical narrative, when I attempt to draw out the theoretical implications of a historical trend (Kitching, 1980: 6-7).

Predictably, any prior distinction between theory or logical deep structure understood as 'realm of reality' and history reduced to 'appearances' would lead to such problems. When Marxist analysis is divorced a priori from praxis and addressed only to the "problem" of explaining production and production relations and

the logic of inquiry is given more significance than history, the task is reduced to that of defining 'mechanisms' of exploitation and measuring value transfers that occur between classes reduced to mere abstractions. Marx, on the other hand, insisted that

...even the most abstract categories, despite their validity - precisely because of their abstractness - for all epochs, are nevertheless in the specific character of this abstraction, themselves likewise a product of historic relations, and possess their full validity only for and within these relations (Marx, 1973: 105).

Distinguishing between concepts of varying levels of abstraction might be helpful. Evaporating classes into mere abstractions is quite a different proposition.

Ultimately, some Marxists end up operating within the same bourgeois conceptual frameworks they seek to transcend. By postulating the distinction between economy and society, by reading modes of production as ideal types, and by misrepresenting social theories as value-free statements, both left and right class analysts endeavour to displace social process from their own scientific efforts, but in fact they can only end up reproducing capital's viewpoint. On the right, class analysis anticipates social instability or revolution and promotes pre-emptive reform. On the left, the problem is that as it becomes more sophisticated, Marxism may degenerate into a self-justifying preoccupation with abstractions. Although they do address questions of class, production and revolution, such frameworks can only obstruct efforts to understand the character of capitalism in settler agriculture and the current conception

of socialist change in Zimbabwe. Section 4.2 introduces an interpretation of the Marxian framework from that perspective.

3.2 From Commodity Production to Socialism.

Marx's framework for the analysis of capitalist society is historical in the sense that capitalism is not natural and that just as it transcended other societies, it in turn will be overtaken by socialism. Likewise, Marx's framework is critical in the sense that it seeks to reveal what capitalism systemically obscures. By consciously endeavouring to restore a social-historical perspective on alienated society, Marx showed that concepts used to describe contemporary society - his own - are historically constituted, reproduced, socially contested and transcended. However, the more Marxism has been absorbed into the social scientific disciplines of capitalist society, the more its historical and critical edge has been blunted. The double definition of terms at "conceptual" and "operational" levels and the formal priority of base over superstructure, for instance, continue to be reproduced within Marxism even when analysts proclaim an historical and critical approach. Consequently, Marxian concepts often lose their historical and social implications. This section attempts to outline a framework within which Marxian concepts remain historical and critical. Section 3.2.1 focuses on what may be analytically identified as Marx's

'economic critique', which is actually part of his general critique of capitalism (Dupre, 1983: 185). Subsection 3.2.2 critically extends that framework to analysis of the class struggle in its totality.

3.2.1 Marx's "Economic" Critique: Production vs. Crisis.

For Marx, material production generates social structures, their reproduction, and even their own dissolution. To explain the emergence and eventual dissolution of capitalism, Marx advanced two theories which focus on production as the fundamental basis of all social development. His labour theory of value production and exploitation focuses on the generation and reproduction of capitalist relations through material production, while his theory of social change - historical materialism - focuses on crisis or the contradictions which propel capitalism towards its own dissolution and the ascendance of socialism. The economic claims of these theories are not meant to be considered in isolation from their implications for social development generally, as Marxists often do.

3.2.1A Production and Exploitation.

Marx's labour theory of value production and exploitation simultaneously dissects capitalist production and explains the class struggle: equal commodity exchange also involves the struggle between capitalists and wage labourers. This contradicts the influential idea that since Marx in *Capital* analyses production at a high level of abstraction, he did not address class struggle therein. The implications of all this on the Marxian framework will be addressed later. First, his claims through the labour theory of value production and exploitation must be outlined. Increased commodity circulation enabled certain individuals to transform their accumulated wealth into private means of production. With that, those who became separated from society's means of production had to produce commodities for the capitalists in order to subsist. Social wealth thereby took the general form of commodities, i.e. products of alienated labour which exchange relative to the value of other commodities, determined by the amount of labour-time socially reckoned to be necessary for producing each. Thus in capitalism, commodities exchange according to the law of value, that is at their real value, so that the capitalist mode of production a two-fold process: (a) accumulation of abstract wealth among non-producers and (b) exploitation of direct producers. This process is explained by the fact labour-power, the only commodity direct producers have to sell in order to subsist, has an exchange value that is lower than its use value or the value of the commodities it produces, a difference which Marx

identifies as surplus value.

By contrast, goods produced for use-value [U] in so-called "natural" economies can exchange only to satisfy needs or meet customary obligations, as in $U \rightarrow U' \rightarrow$, without systematically transferring value or altering prior social relations. Where commodity [C] exchange for money [M] becomes a routine procedure necessary for maintaining or raising a given life standard, as in $C \rightarrow M \rightarrow C' \rightarrow$, simple commodity production [SCP] prevails and any simple accumulation of wealth that occurs only distinguished producers by status, not class. Primitive accumulation may occur among those, like merchants, who may be able to control access to markets for both inputs and outputs of the production process, by overpricing the former and underpricing the latter, for instance, as in $M \rightarrow C \rightarrow M' \rightarrow$. In such cases, independent producers, although formally retaining their means of production, become formally subordinated to emergent capitalists in the sense that part of the value they produce is lost in reproducing their means of production and partially realizing the value of their commodities.

Eventually, however, growing competition among individual capitalists increasingly contradicts such unequal exchange, and capitalists can systematically accumulate abstract wealth on the basis of legally equal exchange but structurally unequal production relations. Marx then explains how capitalists can still realize profits despite exchanging commodities at their value, thereby addressing the secret of capitalism, its hidden

class structure. He does so by reasoning that since labour is the only active factor in capitalist production, the only one that regularly exchanges at less than the value it creates, labour is what creates and augments capital or value in motion. Through production itself, surplus-value is automatically extracted from labour as capitalists appropriate the whole commodity, paying wages equivalent to the exchange value of labour-power and nothing for the extra portion in its use value, all within the assumptions of individuality, equality and free exchange.

Initially, capitalists compulsively seek to expand surplus-value absolutely by extending the working-day as far beyond necessary labour-time - the time labour takes to produce its consumption fund - as is socially possible. That process is ultimately limited by the fact that labour-power cannot be reproduced if workers' consumption fund is continually depleted and its physical endurance overstretched. Formally subordinated workers may in fact decide to produce use values only. Chapters Five and Six will elaborate upon the processes through which two categories of producers in settler agriculture, each working under quite different circumstances, became formally subordinated to capital. Alternatively, capitalists may ensure the creation of surplus value by labour relative to the time the latter takes to reproduce its consumption fund. Relative surplus value expresses itself either as a fall in the value of labour's consumption fund through the subsidization of wage-goods industries or as an increase in constant capital [means of

production, raw materials, etc.] relative to variable capital [labour-power], as workers continue to toil full days while the exchange value of labour-power falls relative to its use value. When capitalists are able to initiate increases in relative surplus value, accumulation of abstract wealth is relentlessly promoted as a universal social objective. The real subordination of labour is thereby expressed as "purely technical" matters of "productivity and efficiency", as socially neutral economic progress. That forms part of capital's ideological class struggle and a crucial consideration in any critical approach to the current conception of socialist transformation. The capitalist conception of "productivity", for instance, must be distinguished from its socialist parallel.

Beyond exposing the origins of profit under the egalitarian formalities of capitalist society, Marx ambitiously extended the scope of his labour theory of value production and exploitation to such operations as computing relative prices, rates of profit and explaining the rational allocation of goods in capitalist economies (Elster, 1985: 127). In so doing, he set a precedent for contemporary attempts to deploy his theory in complex calculations which are often beset by such logical problems as circularity and infinite regressions and whose relevance to socialist praxis remains questionable. Furthermore, considering the number and validity of the assumptions one has to make during such calculations in any particular historical context, one can set aside all questions about the validity of Marx's labour

theory of value and concentrate on its social implications for producers and non-producers in Zimbabwe's settler agriculture and for the current conception of socialist transformation.

From that perspective, the extension of Marx's framework to the analysis of agriculture and ground rent must also be approached critically. Beginning with questionable assumptions to the effect that all the 'prerequisites' of capitalist production were met in agriculture - free competition among capitals, full mobility of capital between sectors, uniform levels of average profit, direct investment by capitalists in agriculture as they might do elsewhere, production of wheat, etc. - Marx put aside analysis of relations of production in agriculture and concentrated instead on explaining the origins of super-profits, those parts of surplus value due to be claimed by landlords as ground rent. The task here is not to rediscover and calculate ground rent in each and every historical case but to grasp the implications of its occurrence or absence in the history of Zimbabwean settler agriculture for relations between extra-agrarian capitalists, settler farmers, and labour, and for the current conception of socialist transformation.

To begin with, capitalist rent refers to payments made to landlords in exchange for rights to use land and its attached resources (Harvey, 1982: 330). - When landlords claim rent because the land in question is desired for its special spatial or productive qualities, or because they can speculatively withhold it in anticipation of higher payments, monopoly rent arises.

(Marx, 1977 III: 775; Harvey, 1982: 349-350). If landlords can obstruct the free flow of value between sectors of lower and higher value compositions [e.g. agriculture vs. industry], they can claim absolute rent. This implies that once the sectoral value compositions are equalized, the basis of absolute rents disappears and landlords are left to speculate on monopoly rents (Marx, 1977 III: 761-762; Harvey, 1982: 350-353). Landlords may therefore obstruct technical improvement in a bid to stop the erosion of one basis of their revenue. By insisting on short leases that discourage farmers from carrying out land improvements whose value they could not retrieve, landlords could obstruct the development of productive forces in agriculture and capitalism generally, that is the relations of production described earlier might not be allowed to develop. The condition is that landlords should be there in the first place and powerful enough to exercise such influence. Chapter Four contends that the ubiquity of landlords should not be assumed uncritically and proceeds to rethink their capitalist role from the historical fact that from 1945 onwards, landed property in the form of landlords was progressively eliminated through post-war settlement of European farmers who could not speculate with the land as the landlords in Marx could.

Abandoning his earlier polemic against landlords as parasites who collected rent without being ever involved in production, Marx moved on to explain the origins of two other forms of rent which suggest a more positive role for landlords in

capitalist production (Harvey, 1982: 331). From the premise that the market prices of all products where land is the basic means of production are fixed by the price of production of the worst land, Marx reasoned that production on economically better lands would lead to above average profits. He identified rents arising from the natural variegation of land in terms of location and fertility, assuming equal applications of capital to all lands cultivated, as differential rent I and noted that such rents would clearly be attributed to the land rather than to its cultivation by capitalist farmers.

Alternatively, when different amounts of capital are assumed to be applied to lands of equal natural endowments [fertility, etc.], differential rent II arises due to shifts in capitalist investment and yet landlords will invariably claim it as their due. Marxists may want to investigate how rents are generated in each case and do a rigorous accounting job but, that is beside the point as far as the problem addressed here goes. Evidently, what was significant for Marx was not so much how much rent landlords claimed or how surplus value was apportioned between the parties involved in agricultural production but what the ambiguity surrounding rent claims and their contestation by tenants implied for the possibility of using the land in accordance with capitalist rationality. As Harvey explains it, Marx saw in such ambiguity a perpetuation of the role of landed property independently of landlords' speculative contrivances, so that landed property itself became integral to capitalist

accumulation without ever resolving the conflicting claims over rent. Landlords' role ultimately transcended passive sharing in surplus value and regressive obstruction of technical development in agriculture. By preventing investment in those lands where no surplus value could be produced, ground rent inadvertently became a catalyst in capitalist accumulation (Marx, 1977 III:735; Harvey, 1982: 357).

From that position, the rigorous calculation of actual rents in particular situations in order to show that the farmers in question are exploited will be redundant and futile, particularly since the basis of ground rent will still be contested by the parties to the lease. Furthermore, two of Marx's assumptions in Capital may not be made in the case of Zimbabwean settler agriculture: (1) that land is owned by landlords and leased to capitalist farmers, and (2) that capitalists directly invest in agricultural production as tenant farmers. How landlords become the agency and ground rent the mechanism for co-ordinating land-use with capitalist accumulation in any particular situation must be historically established and not axiomatically asserted. What is necessary for co-ordinating land use with capitalist accumulation is not the mere existence of landed property or ground rent but the requirement that land be appropriated by capital as an instrument and condition of value production. Chapters Five and Seven will argue that landed property as it featured in Marx's analysis was actually prevented from developing in Zimbabwe. The colonial state, finding that landlord

speculation was obstructing the co-ordination of land-use with capitalist accumulation, intervened to separate land ownership and use in the innovative way described ahead as 'systematic settlement', and thereby became the agency for mobilizing land as a form of capital. From that perspective, it is not surprising that one look at the balance sheet of settler agriculture reveals land rents to be one of the least substantial expenditure items. Ground rent is historical, not essential to capitalism.

If Marx's labour theory of value is not suitable for positivist economic calculations, its scope for revealing the character of capitalism is by no means diminished. Testing the validity of Marx's labour theory of value production and exploitation against empirical data would require a totally different kind of study, probably conceived outside its revolutionary context. For present purposes, it is recognized that many of the theory's basic assumptions cannot be readily tested empirically and that capitalism involves distortions, innovations and purposive interventions which tend to obscure its structural movements. As Chevalier suggests, the law of value should be seen as 'the object of the class struggle, not its invariant cause' (Chevalier, 1982: 10). If Marx's labour theory of value production and exploitation addresses the generation of capitalist relations of production and their reproduction, it also implies capitalism's self-destructive contradictions, which are better articulated through his theory of social change, crisis theory.

3.2.18 Crisis.

Beyond value production and exploitation, Marx analyses how capitalism generates a self-contradictory momentum which ultimately can only be resolved in a socialist reconstitution of society. Attention therefore shifts to what may be analytically identified as his "economic" framework for analysing social change. Crisis theory is Marx's attempt to explain how capitalism itself propels the process which generates the forces of proletarian revolution. Again, economic interpretations abound. Whether or not variations in the profit rates of settler agriculture reveal anything about the fate of capitalism in Zimbabwe is not the issue here but what the Marxian crisis framework as a whole reveals about social development. Marx concentrated on the falling rate of profit only in order to convince his opponents that what they had mistaken for a natural invariant was in fact an expression of the historical and terminal character of capitalism (Marx, 1977 III: 242; 1978 II: 468). He was aware that capitalist crises expressed themselves in various other ways he did not systematically analyse: over- and under-production, differential turnover times of labour and fixed capital, state and financial interventions in capital circulation, etc. (Harvey, 1982: 191). Some of these are more significant for the present study than falling profit rates.

The critical issue in Marx's crisis theory concerns the interaction between relations of production and the development

of productive forces. For Marx, the development of capitalist relations of production [social organization of production] also involves that of the productive forces in general, that is 'the sheer power to transform nature' (Harvey, 1982: 99). The proletariat, for instance, is inseparable from the labour-power it expends in production and the power of its co-operation in the labour process. The relations and forces of production are moments of the same labour process (Ibid.). However, some accounts of Marx's general theory have tended to shatter the dialectical unity of these concepts in order to specify the relationships they represent in positivistic terms, so that certain levels of productive capacity could be correlated with the obsolescence of certain relations of production, as if the magnitudes involved were naturally rather than socially determined. Consequently, the theory has often been criticized and defended out of context.

The crudest economistic interpretation claims that "economic factors" unilaterally cause "non-economic" phenomena. Next in line is one that reduces productive factors to technology or its products and claims that technological development "determines" [causes] changes in relations of production, as in

Since the productive forces provide the underlying rhythm of the historical process, Marx can be seen to be tending a technological determinist account of history (Shaw, 1985: 42).

Politically, this version implies that workers should patiently submit to capitalist exploitation in order to propel the

transition towards socialism.

Cohen's interpretation has provoked considerable controversy. Opposing productive forces and relations of production as, respectively, "materially constituted" and "socially formed" elements of the labour process, Cohen claims that 'the old relations of production cease to exist because they no longer favour the forces and the new relations come into being because they are apt to do so' (Cohen, 1978: 89, 161). His account is mechanistic and ahistorical. Articulationist accounts of the co-existence of capitalist and non-capitalist relations are more plausible. However, Cohen's "analytical Marxist" critics insist on testing Marx's theory within this mechanistic framework. Elster contends that it lacks "micro-foundations" such as criteria for measuring the development of productive forces against historical change. His own interpretation leads to the general conclusion that Marx's theory of social change is "a conceptual jungle" that distorts history or remains incomplete (Elster, 1985: 300-301). Granted Marx did not completely develop his crisis theory, social theories and their concepts necessarily remain contestable and do not have to "fit history". Beyond that, Elster reveals how mechanistic his interpretation is when he criticizes Marx for arguing that population growth, 'rather than the development of the productive forces', caused the breakdown of earlier modes of production. In some cases, population growth may actually be the form assumed by the development of productive forces.

Above these mechanistic debates occurs an interpretation of Marx's theory of history which posits a dialectical interpenetration of aspects of the mode of production [economistically distinguished in Cohen as "material" and "social"] as 'elements of the same material labour process' (Harvey, 1982: 99). The same elements that are related in commodity production are the bearers of productive capacities. Labour-power expresses itself as a capitalist productive force only insofar as workers expend it in producing surplus value and so is any other capacity to appropriate nature. "Analytical Marxists" usually begin with a false separation between productive powers and their human bearers and miss the fact that the proletariat itself, at least in Marx's view, becomes the major productive force in capitalism. Accumulated value, in the form of money capital for instance, can also be mobilized as a productive force to accelerate the circulation of fixed capital.

Another critical issue in interpreting Marx's crisis theory is whether or not to focus exclusively on the terminal crisis that is supposed to cripple capitalism. Are the earlier crises capitalism created or encountered in penetrating non-capitalist societies, in attempting to dissolve their relations of production and subordinating producers to its own logic of abstract accumulation, any less important for understanding the character of capitalism? The present analysis of settler agriculture in Zimbabwe reveals how capitalism encountered or created such barriers as landlord speculation and labour

shortages, under- and over-production, etc., and how the colonial state systematically resolved them through land settlement of Europeans, recruitment of foreign African workers, and controlled tobacco production for instance. Economistic interpretations of the Marxian framework tend to overlook such recurrent crises because they begin with the assumption that the economic instance can be analysed in total separation from the rest of the social process. In this study, the interpretation of Marx's production and crisis theories assumes that the political and ideological instances of the class struggle are already contained in the 'economic' critique. The rest of this chapter examines different interpretations of Marx's framework from the perspective of the class struggle, focusing on the concept of class, state, ideology and revolution.

3.2.2 Class Struggle and Social Change.

So far, examination of the Marxian framework has revealed that the forces of socialist change develop from within capitalism itself. More specifically, commodity production generates a momentum which ultimately paralyzes capitalist reproduction. Marx also argued that social change results from the class struggle. Now, some readings of Marx lead to the idea that social change in the Marxian framework arises from two different processes - development of productive forces and class

struggle - with no clear connection between them being visible. However, it has been contended earlier that a dialectical reading of the process of social change in Marx presupposes that classes are the bearers of productive forces and that the two are inseparable. Since the terminal crisis of capitalism could not be directly addressed in Zimbabwean history between 1945-1985, only the earlier crises encountered in the initial expansion of capitalism are of immediate interest here, those which arose in the wake of the advance of capitalism and the subsequent crises which could be resolved within it. To develop the Marxian framework further, this subsection focuses on the the following: A. conceptions of class in Marxian theory; B. class, state and ideology, and C. Marxism and the conception of social change.

3.2.2A Conceptions of Class in Marxist Discourse.

After avoiding a formal definition of the term class throughout Capital, Marx began to write about classes, raised the question "What constitutes a class?", and then cryptically indicated how he would tackle it within his framework:

- and the reply to this follows naturally from the reply to another question: what makes wage-labourers, capitalists and landlords the three great social classes? (Marx, 1977: 886).

Marx then specifically forestalled current definitions of classes according to the infinite fragmentation of society by types and

sources of revenue [see 3.1.1]. Recognizing that 'the stratification of classes' remained complex, with lines of demarcation often obliterated by 'middle and intermediate strata', Marx remarked that this was immaterial for his analysis since the tendency towards growing confrontation between labour and capital was already established throughout his analysis of capitalism (Marx, 1977: 885).

However, all that has not discouraged contemporary political economists from embracing economic definitions of class, attributing them to or claiming to improve upon Marx, and avoiding his radical conclusions on the character and destiny of capitalism. Perhaps best articulated by Weber, an actionist conception of classes - that they are "rational associations" of individuals sharing similar economically defined "class situations", and capable of acting collectively only when their members comprehend the causation thereof - has become increasingly influential among social scientists, Marxists included. By addressing questions of consciousness, political alliances, social movements etc., that notion of class has often obscured the Marxian historical framework. It all originates from the premise that Marx's main use of the term class was 'to explain the incidence and forms of collective action', i.e. to predict collective behaviour (Elster, 1985: 318, 328).

Similarly, it is that actionist conception of class that is currently prompting contemporary Marxists to dispute the supposed priority of class over other bases of collective action -

ethnicity, nationality, gender, etc. That supposition, in fact, follows directly from that notion of class. Obviously, it would be difficult to justify axiomatically the priority of "class" over other foci of social aggregation, religious denomination for instance, as grounds for collective action. Furthermore, the political implications of such actionist conceptions of class depart considerably from Marx's revolutionary perspective. Neo-modernization theorists use that concept to identify potential recruits of revolutionary movements and justify pre-emptive reformism. Academic Marxists can neatly separate "objective" questions about production from "subjective" issues concerning class consciousness, politics and ideology and develop "purely scientific" theories in which classes can only feature as "exploiting" and "exploited" groups defined in economic terms [Section 3:1]. 'Radicals' can use the actionist conception of class to condemn supposedly "pampered" individualistic urban African working classes and extol the discipline of rural masses as revolution's real hope (Fanon, 1963: 107-112). Various defined minorities may emphasize their "non-class" social identities to reassert the protean character of collective action and the limited effects of economic position upon it. That class concept is voluntaristic and entails an ahistorical conception of capitalism. Ultimately, it reinforces the self-fulfilling prophecy that the working class is doomed to infinite fragmentation due to the intervention of non-class identities in workers' causal analysis of their "class situation". It is that

notion of class that is supposed to give a worker one consciousness at work and another one at tea break (Burawoy, 1979).

Once separated in economic, voluntaristic terms, the "class situation" and its social context cannot be easily reintegrated. The implications of such a separation for current theorizations of relations between class, state and ideology will be examined in 3.2.2B. For now, it must be concluded that this actionist class concept substantially departs from the Marxian framework, and would prove inadequate in seeking to reveal the secrets of capital in the development of settler agriculture in Zimbabwe, and in the current conception of socialism. Most of the work based on that concept tends to represent capitalism's capacity for self-reproduction as a natural eternity. When early Marx approached European events from an actionist perspective, the results were quite similar. Capitalism appeared invincible before a divided working class.

Following Althusser's identification of an epistemological break between young and mature Marx, a structuralist conception of class developed in the 1960s and became influential the next decade. Turning away from those works of Marx where classes were identified from the actionist perspective, structuralists drew their concept of class from a reading of Capital that separated economic base from political and ideological superstructures. Poulantzas undertook one of the most elaborate expositions of the structural Marxist class concept. Asking, "What are social

classes in Marxist theory?", he concentrated on criticizing economistic and voluntaristic formulations. Defining classes as 'groups of social agents' principally identified 'but not exclusively by their place in the production process', he proposed that

A social class is defined by its place in the ensemble of social practices, i.e. by its place in the social division of labour as a whole. This includes political and ideological relations. Social class, in this sense, is a concept which denotes the effects of the structure within the social division of labour (social relations and social practices) (Poulantzas, 1974:14).

His emphasis on "the ensemble", together with his dismissal of the actionist notions of "class-in and class-for-itself" in favour of defining classes within the class struggle indicates the structuralist dilemma of reintegrating action and structure in the context of the economistic distinction between base and superstructure. The structuralist solution to that problem - emphasizing the ultimate determinacy of the economic and the relative autonomy of the superstructures - will be closely examined later in discussing Marxist conceptualization of the state and ideology [3.2.2B]. That solution reflects the economistic presupposition of the structuralist class concept. Asserting the 'relative autonomy' of superstructures constitutes an attempt to reject economistic conceptions of class from economistic premises.

By contrast, historicists object to the de-emphasis on human agency in the structuralist framework and its portrayal of classes as categories of the exploiters and the exploited

fossilized within economically or variously determined structural ensembles. The very effort to define the class concept formally is considered to be ill-conceived:

I do not see class as a "structure", nor even as a "category", but as something which in fact happens (and can be shown to have happened) in human relationships...Like any other relationship, it is a fluency which evades analysis if we attempt to stop it dead at any given moment and anatomize its structure (Thompson, 1964: 9).

Whether or not Marx was proceeding towards a formal definition of class is now a matter of conjecture. What is clear is how far he could penetrate the secrets of capitalism without formally defining the term class. He concentrated instead on investigating how class society historically developed and pursuing the implications thereof. In the Marxian framework, the existence of classes [wage labour] in capitalism is a theoretical and practical "fact" arising from centuries of struggle between emerging capitalists and labourers. The immediate problem for Marx was explaining how, beneath assumptions of individuality, equality and freedom, collective inequality, hostility and compulsion reigned (Harvey, 1982: 27-28).

Now, one influential interpretation of Marx's Capital identifies therein a "2-class" model for economic analysis on a high level of abstraction, with questions of political and ideological practice postponed. A detailed rebuttal would require a separate study. Suffice it to show that Marx's "2-class" approach immediately and simultaneously analyzes economic, political and ideological relations between labour, capital and

anyone else who exchanges commodities and lives. Commodity production entails compulsion to produce use values for others. 'Exchange value already in itself implies compulsion over the individual' (Marx, 1973: 248). Competition, not divine predestination or an ascetic ethic, compels capitalists to produce and accumulate for the sake of it. With each capitalist individually compelled to push labour productivity up, appeals to class or national interest or any form of "rational association" are beside the point. Capitalists begin to act collectively as a class not through mutual affinity or consciousness of their collective interests but through mutual compulsion. The implications of all this for the conceptions of the state and ideology will be pursued in 3.2.2B.

For workers, capitalist competition implies direct compulsion and violation of their formal individual freedom to contract for exchanging labour-power. To maintain the average rate of absolute surplus value, each capitalist must compel labourers to work at least the average working-day. Individually, capitalists extend the working day for the whole working class, so that surplus value refers not merely to technical division of the working-day or economic apportionment of commodities between labour and capital but to the political violence capitalists collectively inflict on workers under assumptions of formal individuality, equality and freedom. The political content of absolute surplus-value already exists without empirical conflicts over the length of the working-day.

When the state intervenes to shorten [or extend, see Chapter Five] the working-day, it does so only to check individual employers' excesses and to preserve the status quo. The ideological effects of absolute surplus value assume the form of workers' compulsive competition for such "privileges" as incentive bonuses, overtime opportunities etc., which forces the workers as a class to extend the working-day against their collective interest.

Rather than an over-simplified "ideal type", Marx's "2-class model" is in fact a versatile framework for analyzing class society. Contrary to Kitching's claim that Marx used the terms "working class" and "capitalist class" as an ideal type to clarify his value concepts, he in fact used those concepts to illuminate the historical constitution of those most important classes and through that, the character of capitalism. Marx's fundamental contention, emphasized throughout *Capital*, was that far from being the natural phenomenon bourgeois economists mistook it for, capitalism was the culmination of the transformation of commodity circulation into a specific mode of production involving class domination in the context of individuality, equality and freedom under which capitalist production is organized. If Marx had completed his chapter on classes, he would probably have emphasized their historical character from this perspective. He did indicate his expectation that the meaning of classes 'follows naturally' from analyzing the historical struggle between 'the three great classes', which

he accomplished to a great extent. Along that path, he also showed how money lenders had become organized as money capitalists, merchants as commercial capitalists, and how the "other" classes related to capital - all within the "two-class" framework.

From that perspective, one can elaborate on subsequent historical developments in the class character of capitalism. The "two-class" framework initially draws attention to the dual confrontation between labour and capital, but its extension to other classes is not problematic. One can indicate how the latter became involved in the processes reducing all other labours to abstract labour. In the following chapters, that task will be executed in the framework of the formal and real subordination of all producers in settler agriculture to capital.

3.2.2B Class, State and Ideology.

Hobbes' rationalist Leviathan of order, Hegel's idealist enlightened arbiter, and Durkheim's functionalist moral authority all imply a neutral state standing above worldly struggles. By contrast, the state and ideology in Marxist theory is only apparently elevated above society while remaining actively involved in the class struggle. The implications of conventional theories of the state and ideology and their influence on contemporary political theory and social practice will be kept in

the background to this discussion. The immediate task is to circumscribe the framework within which to analyze the state and ideology as part of the historical process of capitalist development. As with class, several conceptions of the state and ideology have been produced, in Marxian language, from economistic and neutralist premises. For the most part, they concentrate on establishing finite definitions of class, state and ideology, contrary to Marx's dialectical, open conceptual framework.

Economistic correlations of class, state and ideology prevail in the literature on Zimbabwe. The most implausible among them simply assert that the "ruling class" directly and consciously deploys political and ideological weapons in pursuit of its imputed "class interests", directly reflected in state policies. Hence the colonial state was frequently labelled as the "settler state" because European settlers were racially lumped together as the "ruling class", with racial discrimination identified as the "dominant ideology", and interpreted as the framework for justifying the Europeans' economic greed (e.g. Clarke, 1974). Such correlations are simply asserted, accusatively, towards reformist conclusions, such as the possibility of ending class domination through egalitarian legislation. Legal equality, however, is already implied in the juridical framework of capitalism. By extension, the advent of an African government would be equated with the emergence of an African "ruling class". Where that sounds implausible, all kinds

of "class alliances" between the colonial state and foreign capital may be asserted, including the "absence" of a dominant class. In context, the classical Marxian descriptions of the state as a committee for managing the common affairs of all capitalists and of society's prevailing ideas as those of the dominant class never implied such direct correlations (Marx and Engels, 1971: 17; 1976: 44). That the lack of such correspondence between class, state and ideology is in fact crucial to the operation of capitalism and that it was what Marx and Engels implied will soon be clear.

The structuralist notion of "relative autonomy" emerged from a counter framework which sought to correct economic reductionism. However, before Poulantzas could develop a convincingly dialectical reintegration of the structural ensemble of base and superstructures, the idea of relative autonomy was extended to the analysis of the post-colonial state. A simple reversal of direct economic correlations of class and the state led to the idea that the post-colonial state in peripheral societies was particularly "autonomous" in the sense that independence had freed it from class control. Hence its "centrality" was proclaimed to be the post-colonial state's most distinctive characteristic (Saul, 1974: 351-352). Phenomenally conceived, the "no-class" autonomy view of the post-colonial state simply replicates the economic reductionism. It implies that if a dominant class were present, the state would directly reflect its economic interests. However, as conceived in

structuralism, the relative autonomy idea alerted Marxists to the implications of economic reductionism by suggesting that political and cultural superstructures might not directly reflect the dominant class's imputed interests.

A third framework - present in Marx's earlier works - has been identified as the abdication thesis (Elster, 1985). It suggests that the less the state and ideology are specifically associated with the dominant class's interests, the greater the probability of subordinate classes acquiescing with the status quo. Specifically, this means that the dominant class can strategically refrain or withdraw from political competition - voluntarily and rationally abdicating its crown in order to keep its purse. In short, the abdication thesis implies an "opportunity cost" conception of the state's relationship to the dominant class and ideology (Elster, 1985: 419-421). In the case of ideology, capital would secure its economic interests by strategically shifting the burden to someone else - financially supporting scientific research and information services for instance - in order to concentrate on accumulating wealth.

Evidence supporting the abdication thesis is abundant but frequently inconclusive and misleading. In 1924, for instance, the British South Africa Company abandoned its administrative role in Zimbabwe to concentrate on economic business. However, the question remains as to whether the abdication was rationally calculated or forced. Likewise, Third World decolonization can be interpreted as global capital's strategic move calculated to

pacify the empire and reduce the administrative costs of world accumulation. However, where capital² had taken root, colonial powers³ tended to resist decolonization just as stubbornly as Portugal did without capitalist development in its African colonies. The current South African emergency and the West's approach to it suggests that strategic abdication is not on global capital's agenda. Ultimately, the abdication thesis does not offer an adequate basis for explaining how the colonial state and its world view were mobilized in Zimbabwe as obscured class power and class ideology and how that might influence the current conception of socialist transformation.

The state derivationist debate initiated a development towards a more fundamentalist framework for relating the state to classes. Basically, state derivationist theorists attempted to explain how the state could be said to operate according to the needs⁴ of the capitalist class without arbitrarily asserting the correspondence between state policy and generalized interests of individual capitalists. The "capital-logic" side of the derivation debate began from the premise that the state's capitalist character developed from the bourgeoisie's collective weakness arising from competition of all against all, not from its collective strength. Then it explained the state as a "fictitious" capital, - one without a profit motive - arising to provide what individual capitalists avoided or failed to contribute to their collective interest (Altwater, 1978: 42). That functionalist framework echoes Hobbes: the state has no

individual greed and so emerges to save capitalists from the suicidal consequences of insane competition. An important flaw inherent in all functionalist explanations that make universalistic claims is their vulnerability to a single counter-instance: the fact that Japanese capitalists did provide labour with social security debunks the "capital-logic" explanation of the state (Harris, 1980: 250). The Rhodesian colonial state, on the other hand, systematically left that role to be performed either by labour itself or by enlightened employers and concentrated on doing other things for capital. The "capital-logic" framework collapses before changing historical facts.

The "mediationist-actionist" side aimed at deriving the capitalist state from the results of the class struggle, against the assumption that the state automatically deferred to capitalists' needs regardless of labour's demands. The state is explained as follows: capitalists' suicidal individualism threatens to precipitate a fiscal crisis and the state's dependence on capitalist accumulation for its own revenues pragmatically compels it to respond more favourably to capital's needs than to labour's demands (O'Connor, 1973: 10). Similarly, threats of massive capital flights, investment, aid squeezes etc. - particularly in the case of the post-colonial state - compels the state to respond to capital's needs and to frustrate labour's demands, including socialist programmes. The 'mediationist-actionist' framework might be qualified to set

appropriate historical limits on capital's mobility and its possible full subordination to the state. Instances like the subjection of capitalists to the emergency states of Nazi Germany, colonial Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa may then transform the notion of state autonomy from a structuralist abstraction to an historical concept.

Perhaps the derivationist framework could be extended to the class-ideology relationship too. The "capital-logic" side could identify such public services as scientific-technical research and information institutions as some of the conditions for accumulation neglected by capitalists and functionally provided by the state acting as a "fictitious" capital. Empirical examples abound, yet individual capitalists seldom avoid scientific-technical research in their pursuit of relative surplus value. The "mediationist-actionist" side could argue that the state's interest in this matter was a pragmatic response to capital's ideological needs against labour's world view. However, the implied competing claims of labour and capital in that framework is reminiscent of pluralism, according to which the state stands above social conflict and performs a balancing act between labour and capital.

Clearly, the number of things capitalists, the state and ideologues do for or against one another or omit, by necessity or default, strategically, compulsively or pragmatically, remains an historical question. This suggests that closed concepts of the state and ideology, and empirical checks on their relation to

classes, are likely to be futile. The problem addressed in this study deals with an historical process which requires an open, dialectical framework, in place of the established "glossary" or "building-block" approach to concept development. In the framework that unfolds throughout the following chapters, the capitalist state emerges in part as the historical mobilization of the instruments of ultimate coercion in centralizing and delegating the conception [planning] and reproduction of accumulation. Capitalist ideology emerges partially as the centralization of powers of conception into administrative, scientific and technical institutions. Together, the state and ideological institutions can be said to have been mobilized in the colonial context as part of 'that battery of hierarchically ordered, organizations linking individual labours into the totality expressed as abstract labour' (Harvey, 1982: 448-449). Accordingly, the concepts of class, state and ideology are already implied in the development of commodity production, accumulation and the reproduction of its social basis. The following chapters will elaborate on the state's and ideologies' contribution to the subsumption of various producers in Zimbabwe's settler agriculture to capital, to the transformation of their labour into abstract labour, to the reproduction of the accumulation process and the conditions thereof, towards an understanding of the current conception of socialist development.

3.2.20 Marxism and the Conception of Social Change.

Marx never completed his analysis of capitalism, within which his conception of social change was being developed. Not surprisingly, his conception of socialist transformation - of the transcendence of capitalism by a higher form of society - has been one of the most bitterly contested issues in the first century of Marxist praxis. A full exegesis of Marxian pronouncements on social change would require a different study. The limited task here is to circumscribe parameters within which the coming exposition of capitalist development in Zimbabwe will become the basis for informing a critical analysis of the conception of socialist transformation currently prevalent in southern African official and academic practice. Like the rest of the Marxian framework, the concept of socialist transformation loses its critical edge when defined in finalist [abstract vs. operational] terms. The argument so far has been that any conception of socialist transformation arises from its proponents' understanding of the character of capitalism. From that perspective, Section 3.2 showed how easily Marxian concepts of class and revolution, when defined outside their historical context, can be deployed towards reformist conclusions. Here, a critical framework for analyzing social change is developed with reference to Marx's analysis of capitalism.

The simplest, but very effective, misrepresentation of the transition from capitalism towards socialism predictably emerged

from capitalist ideology, as scientifically represented by orthodox economics (Marx, 1975: 116). It portrays capitalism as the "natural" [or rational] form of civilized existence and derides socialism as some irrational or pathological deviation, a human subversion resorted to by inherently violent and greedy "agitators" visiting upon the otherwise contented masses, always from "outside". That view portrays advocates of collectivist economic organization, nationalization, working class rights, etc. as dangerous agents of some "foreign" [meaning ~~called~~] communist influence which can only be supported by the masses through its resort to "intimidation" or other sinister pressure. Images of alleged "prosperity under free enterprise" and of purported "collective poverty and political repression under communism" as projected by colonialist ideologues during the 1980 Zimbabwean elections and rejected by the voters came straight from the lexicon of bourgeois ideology. Such misrepresentations of both capitalism and socialism would be ignored here were it not for the strong influence they continue to exert among socialists and workers world-wide. Witness the tendency of socialists to dissociate themselves from the spectre of "communism".

Beyond that bourgeois caricature, other misrepresentations of capitalism and socialism abound on all sides. Much of the misunderstanding arises from different interpretations of Marx's dictum about the history of capitalism [modern society] being one of class struggle. For instance, to those who define classes as

economically constituted "rational associations", it is difficult to see why Marx would claim that history would lead to socialism rather than, say, protestantism. They would ask why people should act according to their economic rather than religious allegiances. They would focus on the so-called "immiseration thesis" and its implications. Capitalist accumulation and proletarian pauperization polarizes the classes and violent revolution erupts. A "dictatorship of the proletariat" emerges, nationalizes the economy, "smashes" the bourgeois state and restores collective ownership of the means of production, etc. The conception of capitalism implied in such formulations of class, state, ideology, etc.- amounts to crude reduction of Marx's ideas. Non-Marxists can easily invoke evidence to debunk that caricature: "embourgeoisement" of workers, compatibility of nationalization with different types of economy, inability of "existing socialism" to generate substantial surpluses, survival of repressive regimes and new classes, etc. The "immiseration thesis" can be pushed farther towards the reformist neutralization of Marxist concepts as argued earlier [3.1.1].

Disillusioned with the "development" promise of modernization theory, some "radical" economists turned to dependency/world systems theory and inaugurated "neo-Marxism" by extending the "immiseration thesis" to a global context. Capitalist development [accumulation] and worker embourgeoisement were confined to the "core" countries while underdevelopment [pauperization] was said to have occurred in the "periphery" as a

result. Increasing polarization between core and periphery - essentially referring to unequal trade terms - would lead the latter to a rational "disengagement" from the world capitalist system, which would enable the periphery to retain its surplus for its own development, to make its economy "autocentric", so that it would cater to the needs of its own masses. The question is why should such a restructuring of trade be considered socialist rather than another expression of worker embourgeoisement.

The idea that class struggle involves "rational association" between individuals in similar market situations thus found a "radical" and popular expression. Rejected earlier, it must still be contended with if only because the concept of socialist transformation that follows from market voluntarism and collective actionism seems to have become entrenched among leftist academics and development planners in the Third World. It is from that perspective that "socialist transformation" was recently said to imply

An ongoing effort to repeal the most oppressive aspects of the law of the market...in favour of planned development...to expand democratic control of the "collective producer" over the planning process at all levels...[and]...to ensure the betterment of the lot of the mass of the population (rather than advance the interests of any more privileged strata) (Saul, 1985: 11).

The socialist struggle is thereby reduced to a fight against privilege, for the "betterment" of the masses. Why "repealing" the law of the market should imply a "socialist transformation" rather than a capitalist liberal reform remains unclear.

Elsewhere, the phenomenalist formulation of social change appears as "the pattern of development chosen", as a "difficult road", or as some particular sets of political, economic and ideological innovations (Saul, 1985: 15, 19 etc.). What is clearly lacking in the dependency framework is a precise analysis of the capitalist character of the colonial legacy from which the socialist movement arose. Casual references to absolute and relative surplus value, to "dialectical" relations between economy, politics, and ideology, between leaders and followers, and to economic "crises" etc., rather than clarifying it, only obscure that historical legacy.

An alternative "radical" approach to "socialist transformation" would involve attempts to integrate the crisis element into the orthodox Marxist evolutionary trajectory. Since development of "productive forces" is supposed to precede the proletarian revolution, social change is split into regional stages. First, a "political revolution" occurs and the workers' party takes control of the state, democratizes social institutions and propels development of productive forces - reduced to technology or growth of the working class in size. When such developments enable the production of the sizeable economic surplus required for socialist transformation, the "second [economic] revolution" is supposed to be accomplished. However, both the regionalization of social practice into political and economic activity and the reduction of productive forces to particular capacities implied in the stages view of

revolution are integral to the bourgeois world view, against which Marxism exists. Moreover, the stage conception of socialist transformation implausibly encourages workers to submit meekly to their own exploitation as a way of fuelling the momentum of socialist transformation. That view is also well established in the conception of socialist development among academics and planners. The next four chapters will elaborate on the development of capitalism in Zimbabwe and Chapter Eight will recall the stages view of "revolution" as one that implies that increased exploitation ["productivity"] is a necessary precondition for socialist transformation.

The conception of socialist transformation and its implications for socialist praxis in Zimbabwe will be developed from the extension of Marx's analysis of capitalism. This means that phenomenalist reduction of socialist transformation to economic reforms such as "repealing" certain aspects of the law of the market, or to political innovations that supposedly define the "road" to socialism must be eschewed, in favour of dialectical analysis which relates current socialist efforts to the historical development of capitalism. Like all other perspectives on this matter, the Marxian framework for analyzing social change originates in a particular world view. According to Marx, capitalist development involves alienation, class exploitation beneath the formalities of individual equality and freedom and contradictions such as those between productive forces and relations of production. The whole process simultaneously

propels, obstructs, and transforms itself within capitalism, producing the forces which will ultimately make it impossible for the contradictions to be temporarily resolved and regenerated within capitalism, towards a socialist revolution, a healthy development which entails the restoration of human creativity to producers. As Marx stated it, capitalism's tendency to universalize its relations also becomes

...destructive of all this, and constantly revolutionizes it, tearing down the barriers which hem in the development of the forces of production, the expansion of needs, the all-sided development of production, and the exploitation and exchange of natural and mental capacities (Marx, 1973: 410).

Since capital simultaneously tears down other relations and also obstructs itself in reconstituting society, it ultimately produces those forces, like the proletariat, which will dismantle its own relations of production as a barrier to the further development of productive forces.

For Marx, the transformation of society towards socialism began and is implied in capitalist development itself. Its conception should therefore follow from the analysis of historical development, not from models of chosen developmental roads. Those who seek to carry that process through to socialism will do so not entirely because they choose to but partly because they have to. In reconstituting society in socialist ways, emancipated workers will have to contend with the historical legacy of capitalism: alienation, exploitation, contradictions, all integral to the conception and practice of capitalism.

Instead of relying on Marx's exploratory conceptions of

revolution - "dictatorship of the proletariat", state "smashing", co-operative organizations, etc. - and conducting a checklist investigation of socialist development, this study will approach the current conception of socialist transformation in Zimbabwe by attempting to discover what capitalist domination as analysed in the next four chapters entails for further development. The substantive analysis of capitalist domination eventually leads to consideration of the current conception of socialist transformation in Chapter Eight. Accordingly, instead of a positivist investigation of socialist progress - e.g. how many enterprises or economic sectors have been nationalized, organs of the state "smashed", institutions collectivized or otherwise "restructured", laws repealed, numbers of politicians "committed" to socialist goals, wage rises to determine reductions in exploitation magnitudes, man-days lost to strikers as measures of "class consciousness", etc. - Chapter Eight simply assumes that a socialist movement did emerge from capitalist development in Zimbabwe and that there have been historical obstacles to its progress. With the insights gained from analyzing the subordination of all labours involved in the production of flue-cured tobacco in Zimbabwe since 1945, it should be possible to adequately critique the conception of socialist transformation currently prevailing among social-economic planners and theorists without resorting to the polemical thunder and ahistorical speculations that have characterized the radical discourse.

The next four chapters address two strategic questions about

the social character of Zimbabwe's colonial legacy as reflected by the development of settler agriculture after World War II. First, Chapters Four and Five, respectively, focus on the question of how European farmers and African workers were brought into settler agriculture and what that entailed for their relationships with capitalists [outside agriculture] as a class. Then Chapters Six and Seven will follow by addressing, respectively, the issue of how the industrialization of settler agriculture affected the farmers' and the workers' relationship to capital.

CHAPTER FOUR

FORMAL SUBORDINATION OF SETTLER FARMERS TO CAPITAL

4.0 Introduction.

This chapter begins the analysis of settler agriculture by focusing on the relationship of Zimbabwe's European farmers to capitalists outside agriculture after 1945. Predictably contentious, the argument advanced here will be justified by its critical approach to Zimbabwe's colonial legacy. It is contended that in acquiring land and becoming commodity producers, European farmers in Zimbabwe entered a complex relationship with capital which may be understood in terms of Marx's conception of formal subordination of labour to capital. In developing his theories, Marx confronted circumstances in which capitalism had developed within a decaying feudal society. In the historical context of this study, capitalism, already in an advanced form, encroached upon Zimbabwean peasant society through a colonial process of violent primitive accumulation, with greater discontinuity in social development, a comprehensive analysis of which would require a separate study. After removing Africans from the land and confining them to reserves where moving to urban areas and other places of exclusive European enterprise offered them more viable prospects for survival than subsistence cultivation, colonialism reorganized agricultural development on the basis of

systematic European settlement and commodity production. European settlers replaced African peasants as the social basis of agriculture both spatially by taking over the land and in relation to capital. In short, under colonialism, settler farmers became to capital what the burgeoning African peasantry would have become had it not been confined to the overcrowded reserves and subsequently scattered elsewhere as wage labourers.

Without directly investing therein, capitalists sought to reorganize agriculture according to the logic and in the institutional image of their class. European immigrants were settled on the land as "private entrepreneurs", with potential or actual legal property in land and access to everything capital uses in production, including other people's labour-power. Further development brought to these farmers advanced technology - mechanical and chemical inputs, technical and extension services and credit "facilities", etc., from all of which African people were excluded. The process of bringing in Africans as wage workers will be examined in Chapter Five. For now, attention must be focused on how extra-agrarian capitalists came to relate to the Europeans whom the colonial state settled on the land as commodity producers.

This is where the character of capitalism under colonialism has been most effectively obscured. Did the settler farmers, who enjoyed exclusive access to everything from which African "ex-peasants" were barred, themselves become "capitalists" or were they, as frequently happens to peasants when capitalism

advances on them, also subordinated to capital as commodity producers? It is suggested that approaching settler farmers as commodity producers, instead of "capitalist farmers", will illuminate the history of capitalist development in Zimbabwe to an unprecedented degree and, through that, the conception of socialist development will become much more coherent. By critically examining the convention that settler farmers developed into a so-called "agrarian bourgeoisie", distinguishing and separating them from various capitals accumulating wealth outside agriculture, one can anticipate some of the implications of opening up the markets hitherto closed to African farmers as they are resettled on the land in the post-colonial period.

It shall be argued that behind the appearance which suggests that European farmers became agricultural capitalists - access to land as private entrepreneurs, to credit monies, inputs as well as research and extension services - lie the processes through which settler farmers, for all their colonialist orientation, were themselves subjected to capitalist exploitation by extra-agrarian capitalists. This chapter therefore attempts to trace the beginnings of the process whereby settler farmers simultaneously rendered services to extra-agrarian capitalists as commodity producers and also appeared to be a group of capitalists who owned property, consumed commercial inputs and regularly employed wage workers, just like capitalists in agriculture. Section 4.1 opens with a Marxist critique of such concepts as "agrarian bourgeoisie" and leads to an alternative

and relational approach to relations of production and exchange between settler farmers and capitalists. Section 4.2 invokes Marx's notion of formal subordination in investigating how the colonial state, in the early period of systematic settlement, placed the seemingly independent European farmers under the indirect control of extra-agrarian capitalists, through planned land settlement, induced technological change, privileged access to credit and commodity markets, and the political and ideological interventions of other burgeoning institutions of industrial society.

4.1 European Farmers in Southern Africa: A Social Enigma.

At the turn of the century, European settlers in South Africa were still practicing an extensive type of subsistence agriculture which early Rhodesian settlers tended to reproduce. As an early British visitor wrote, 'Improvement of the soil by scientific methods is particularly unknown in Rhodesia and throughout South Africa' (Thomas, 1904: 257). Recently, dependency social historians have emphasized that the technological gap between African and European farmers only began to widen after 1945 as discriminatory practices proliferated (Arrighi, 1979: 172). Hodder-Williams explored in detail the difficulties encountered by early colonial officials as they attempted a rational organization of colonial agriculture based on commodity

production by settlers (Hodder-Williams, 1971: *passim*). The expansion of settler agriculture under effective capitalist domination in Zimbabwe is a post-World War II development. An adequate socialist analysis of capitalist domination in Zimbabwean agriculture after 1945 requires precise identification of the manner in which capital was invested in agriculture and a grasp of 'the specific conditions of production and circulation' which arose from such investment (Marx, 1977 III: 614-615). Subsection 4.1.1 examines the social and theoretical origins of the notion that Zimbabwe's settler farmers are an "agrarian bourgeoisie" which invests in agriculture and identifies its limitation. Subsection 4.1.2 suggests a way of transcending those limitations, one which recognizes that capital is not only owned by certain groups of individuals but a process of production and circulation involving exploitation and accumulation within circumstances marked by contradictions and crisis tendencies.

4.1.1 Mechanical Fragmentation of the Bourgeoisie.

Although Marx identified 19th Century English farmers as one of the groups that shared-surplus value with other capitalists, he consistently avoided fragmenting the capitalist class into agrarian, financial and other "bourgeoisies". It was early Marxists working within the evolutionist problematic now associated with "orthodox Marxism" who introduced the

fragmentation. Harvey has traced the practice to Hilferding, whose notion of a dominant 'finance capital as a unity of banking and industrial capital leads him to construct a "financial theory of monetary phenomena" in which these are reduced to 'pure organs of capitalist financing' under the hegemony of "finance capital" (Harvey, 1982: 191-192).

Similarly, Lenin introduced the notion of an "agrarian [or peasant] bourgeoisie" in order to distinguish the prospering kulaks from the disappearing "middle peasantry" and the emerging Russian proletariat (Lenin, 1967: 178-180). Lenin's, numerical [mechanical], as opposed to relational, approach to capitalization of agriculture indicates what is wrong with the concept "agrarian bourgeoisie": it originates in an empiricist theory of agrarian phenomena and does not relate farmers to capital in materialist terms. The limitations of that approach are evident in Lenin's account of 'the significance of machinery in agriculture' (Lenin, 1967: 231-240). He simply focused on the elimination of non-wage forms of labour in rural Russia and made no attempt to relate agricultural mechanization to capitalist accumulation beyond the countryside, in all sectors. The problems posed by machinery as a form of fixed capital were simply overlooked.

Marx, on the other hand, made remarks which tend to dissociate him from the subsequent orthodox concept of "agrarian bourgeoisie" as defined merely by legal ownership. For instance, 'The capitalist farmer...is engaged in agriculture merely as a

particular field of exploitation for capital' (Marx, 1977 III: 618). This implies that such capital may be withdrawn according to calculations of profitability. Furthermore, the CMP 'transforms agriculture from a mere empirical and mechanical self-perpetuating process ... into the scientific application of agronomy [and] dissolves the connection between landownership and the land...' (Marx, 1977 III: 617-618). Accordingly, neither landownership nor commodity production under capitalism entails the existence of a class relationally identifiable as an "agrarian bourgeoisie". Moreover, whereas Marx's contemporary capitalists might have considered direct individual investment in agriculture as one of the profitable fields for exploitation, post-World War II capitalists have tended to regard such investment as risky. They have come to prefer - except in unusual circumstances - exploiting agricultural labour indirectly and more profitably through such activities as supplying industrially produced inputs, advancing credit monies, buying agricultural commodities as raw materials for manufacture or resale, providing services, without all of which peasants or other agricultural producers, such as settler farmers, could not reproduce their social subsistence or retain their land under capitalist domination.

The uncritical adoption of Lenin's concept of "agrarian bourgeoisie" in the literature on Zimbabwe came via dependency writers' differentiation of a developing "core" from an underdeveloping "periphery". In the proliferating plethora of

blue-prints for post-colonial transformation of Zimbabwe's colonial heritage coinciding with the ascendancy of dependency theory, a series of studies anticipated decolonization by suggesting "radical" alternatives to the colonial order. Many of the contributors were so preoccupied with criticism of the primitive accumulation practices of colonialism as the cause of underdevelopment in African areas that few authors bothered to examine post-1945 developments. Those who did so tended to extend the polemics against primitive accumulation to the present period, emphasizing empirical research rather than theoretical development. Consequently, settler farmers, placed on the land to serve capital, were themselves presented as the "capitalist farmers" in rural Zimbabwe, as the "agrarian bourgeoisie", which completely obscured and distorted the nature of capitalist domination in Zimbabwean agriculture.

Accordingly, dependency social history focused on land apportionment legislation, which divided the land unequally between an African majority that formed 96%, and a European minority that never reached 4% of the total population. In fact, such was the fixation with racial division and its obvious injustices that the fact that settler farmers never counted 8,000 in the whole country was seldom recalled in research. Thus was added to the nationalist "land question" of protesting unequal distribution an academic/populist trend which uncritically drew upon the conceptual archives of orthodox Marxism to embellish the dependency framework and to conduct social historical research

into the causes of rural underdevelopment. Such studies typically concluded with calls for "radical change" which seldom specified anything beyond demands to reopen all the markets from which colonialism had banished African peasants. In short, "radical" change in this sense offered nothing but more of the traditional liberal reformism of which it was so critical.

The burden of dependency-informed research can be unpacked as follows. On the "land question", the usual argument was that colonial land tenure was inequitable and therefore unjust, which it too manifestly was. The accompanying populist solution was, predictably, equitable land redistribution. Meanwhile, struggles over landownership and use between settler farmers and capitalists [e.g. the BSAC], beginning at colonial occupation and continuing right up to 1979 usually got no more than passing attention (see Martin and Johnson, 1981: 51-52). The very detailed colonial reports on the actual process of land settlement, on the conditions under which Europeans were selected as viable settler farmers, as well as specific references to the rationale of post-1945 colonial land settlement in the relevant documents on that specific topic, have all been eclipsed under the tide of anti-colonial protest, all conducted within the problematic of distribution and focused on land tenure statutes rather than practice.

Today, the so-called "political economy of land" continues to recycle the polemic against the now repealed Land Apportionment and Land Tenure Acts and their subsequent de facto

entrenchment in the constitutional Bill of Rights during the decolonization process (see Moyana, 1984). With demands for "radical" land redistribution now having to be balanced against perceived imperatives of economic stability, the emphasis in post-colonial rural development planning has shifted toward orderly occupation of unused or unoccupied land under various institutional arrangements, some of which are associated with socialist transformation, and the extension to Africans of all that was preserved for white farmers before 1980. This new emphasis is premised on the belief that access to land, to factor and commodity markets and to agricultural services all benefitted settler farmers. Compared to Africans, they certainly did. That belief, however, also obscures the specific character of capitalist domination on the matter of land ownership.

For Marxian political economy, and for the socialist movement, the relevant question is not how much land Europeans legally monopolized while they could but what relations of production capital established through colonial land settlement. While Zimbabwe's economic historians have hitherto talked about "relations of production", what they have in fact dwelt upon are the obvious injustices of unequal racial distribution, whether or not Marxist categories have been superimposed on the distributive problematic. In his study of "dualism" in the colonial economy, Ndlela locates the cause of all aspects of African underdevelopment in unequal land distribution, so that unequal access to credit, to productive factor and commodity markets and

to services can all be ultimately traced to land apportionment. Ndlela's argument is questionable on account of both logical accuracy and historical validity. He claims that "dualism" originated in land maldistribution, permeated all aspects of agriculture, and enabled European farmers to obtain greater access to credit funds than their African counterparts. With more savings possibilities, European farmers enjoyed higher creditworthiness. All this, according to Ndlela, 'indicates that lending rates were determined by government policy [i.e. racial discrimination] and were unimportant in the allocation of credit' (Ndlela, 1981: 128, [...] added for clarity). It does not indicate so. Governments of course regulate changes in lending rates. Racism of course affected the creditworthiness of African borrowers under colonialism. But lending rates were certainly not unimportant in the allocation of credit nor were they determined primarily, if at all, by race.

Ndlela avoids such questions as why white farmers continued to seek credit despite their greater land and growing "savings possibilities". Ultimately, he arrives at the tautological conclusion that 'the dualistic conditions in the land market and direct discrimination [dualism] in the allocation of credit are the main reason for dualism in the credit market' (Ndlela, 1981: 147, [...] added for clarity). As with all those who work within the problematic of racial distribution, Ndlela could not penetrate the form to grasp the substance of colonial financial practices. From that perspective, the credit system appears as

and is taken for a welfare system catering for Europeans lacking capital, a blessing for those who lack money and want to get started in business, not an investment by capitalists for the realization of interest.

However, settler farmers themselves understand that credit monies are not "assistance given" to privileged creditworthy savers but 'monies required to be paid back', with interest, hence the relevance of lending rates to credit allocation. Such was the settler farmers' concern with their privileged creditworthiness that someone observed with alarm that lack of capital forced many farmers

...to avail themselves of loans, in order to stay on the land [while] the burden of debt on many has assumed so great a proportion that some are in real danger of losing their self-respect' (Staff Reporter, RTJ May 1968: 17).

That reporter further noted that if the trend continued, tobacco growers would attempt to secure even more loans or leave the land or the country (Ibid). The relevant question, clearly is not whether settler farmers obtained more access to everything farmers desired in their quest for prosperity because they obviously did. The issue is instead what relations of production and distribution were involved in the circulation of credit moneys and other forms of capital in and out of agriculture and throughout the economy. In other words, who invests in agriculture through advances of credit moneys to farmers, for what purpose and with what implications for Zimbabwean society?

Similar questions arise from the treatment of settler

farmers' greater access to tractors, machinery, agro-chemicals etc. in the "radical" studies of economic historians. Pioneering the critique of Rhodesian underdevelopment, Arrighi noted the pre-1945 technological parity between all Zimbabwean farmers and identified the "agrarian bourgeoisie" that monopolized these technological advantages after 1945 (Arrighi, 1979: 172). However, arguing that 'tobacco growing demands more labour-intensive methods than maize', Arrighi also blamed 'agrarian capitalism' [settler farmers] for holding back mechanization, as if the farmers could do so at will (Arrighi, 1973: 355). Voluntarist notions of technological change also impress Ndlela, who puts the relationship between technical change and underdevelopment down to one simple law: '...the lower the relative costs of capital inputs, the more widespread will be the adoption of an innovation, that is the more readily will farmers invest in capital which embodies an improved technology' (Ndlela, 1981: 186). Accordingly, underdevelopment occurred in African areas because, unlike European settlers, Africans were too poor [underdeveloped?] to afford the advanced technology at the going prices. Once more, the argument involves tautological assertion and historical inaccuracy. Even technicist modernization ideologues admit to other influences on innovation besides input costs (e.g. McClymont, 1982: 82-83; 187-189). Ndlela's cost-price theory of technical advancement allows him to condemn racial "discrimination" in the factor market at the cost of obscuring the social-economic implications of technological

change. Ultimately, the argument reinforces the case for a reformist intervention to remedy the retardation of technology by racial discrimination: open up the factor markets to African farmers and underdevelopment will be technologically undermined.

An alternative "radical" dependency package on technology proposes substituting labour for capital in production so that the whole 8-million Zimbabwean people will be involved in development, rather than the mere 3-million who would benefit from opening up ownership and management to some of the Africans (Stoneman, 1981: 147-148). Stoneman points to China as an example of his regressive approach to the development of productive forces, forgetting that China and other examples of "existing socialism" have recently turned to technological "modernization" as one way to overcome the contradictions within that very straitjacket. By concentrating on racial distribution instead of relations of production, dependency social historians have missed the social implications of technological change completely.

Consequently, settler farmers have continued to feature in social history as a privileged 'agrarian bourgeoisie' which enjoys the fruits of technological change while African farmers, deprived of access to such advantages, have continued to be presented as landless 'peasants'. Abundant evidence indicating that settler farmers often resisted extra-agrarian pressures directed towards compelling them to adopt current innovations have usually been ignored. Despite their privileges and relative

advantages, settler farmers have continued to baffle the experts with their ambiguous responses to innovation. As a wealthy tobacco grower liaising for capital among his poorer peers observed in 1960, farmers remained 'as impatient with, and suspicious of, scientists as they were towards fertilizers: they could not bear spending their dwindling resources on a 'leisurely and untroubled intellectual exercise' (Frank Clements, RTJ February, 1960: 37).

The dominant ideology that sells capitalist technology to settler farmers is modernization theory and its corresponding sciences. Its experts lament the apparently 'irrational' apathy of settler farmers and African 'peasants' towards technical innovation and continue to revise their studies of 'rates of adoption' (e.g. McClymont, 1982: 187-197). However, there are indications that there have been more to farmers' resistance than what the experts usually look for. A survey of growers by the Tobacco Research Board (TRB) in 1978/9 indicated that technical experts were more interested in communicating with farmers than the latter, supposedly, the beneficiaries of technical research were (RAJ, 1980: 133-141). Despite definite indications of conflict between farmers and those who brought them advanced technology, dependency analysts and others who are hooked onto the problematic of racial maldistributions of resources between the European-descended "agrarian bourgeoisie" and the impoverished African "peasantry" have continued to recycle the polemic on the injustice of it all. For our part, colonial injustice is there

for every historian to see; little, if anything, about it requires further exposition.

To conclude this subsection, the prevailing notion of an "agrarian bourgeoisie" as applied to Zimbabwe's settler farmers is theoretically inadequate and historically implausible from the point of view of informing socialist transformation. Theoretically, it misses or even distorts the relations of production on which class relations in general are based. Historically, it ignores the fact that some settler farmers never actually owned the land they worked on and simply assumes that all settlers actually became legal "owner-occupiers". Even if that were true, there is an important conceptual distinction between legal and real ownership which the designation "agrarian capitalist" suppresses. In this connection, it is worthwhile noting Harvey's warning that 'nominal owner-occupancy often conceals a mortgage relation [equivalent to rent] and a credit relation [equivalent to interest on capital loaned for current production], leaving the owner-occupier with profit of enterprise only' (Harvey, 1982: 365). His suggestion for taking these complications into account in analysing capitalist domination will be recalled in 4.1.2.

For now, suffice it to note that contemporary theoretical discourse on simple [or independent] commodity farmers' relations with capital has begun to reveal that mere legal ownership of means of production does not shield these farmers from capitalist

exploitation(1) The same applies to the farmers' relationship to capital through technological change. Privileged access to credit, industrially produced inputs, scientific services and commodity markets controlled by extra-agrarian capitalists did not, it shall be argued, make settler farmers an "agrarian bourgeoisie" any more than did their legal ownership of means of production. On the contrary, an attempt will be made to show the ways in which, through these very privileges, settler farmers became available for capitalist exploitation. Why then have settler farmers been so easily identified as an "agrarian bourgeoisie"? One reason is that politically, these farmers have erroneously regarded themselves as part of it all, aligning themselves with the bourgeoisie as some bulwark of the civilizing mission. Political alliances, however, are a matter of contingent convenience. Capital, incidentally, has a history of making alliances with some of its subordinates and labour tories are nothing strange. The most plausible case for arguing that settler farmers are "capitalists" is that they regularly employ wage-labour. While certain irregularities such as some farmers' tendency not to pay farm workers for long periods of time during the colonial period may be cited against that to argue that employers who skrimp on wages are bad capitalists, it is the weight of all other considerations regarding the relationship of these farmers to capital in general that informs the present argument.

(1) See Chevalier, 1982 and Denis, 1983 for reviews.

On balance, it seems that more substantial insights into the character of capitalist domination in Zimbabwe will be obtained from an analysis that regards settler farmers as commodity producers subordinated to capital in ways other than wage labour than from one that assumes that they are an agrarian fraction of the bourgeoisie while obscuring some ~~important~~ aspects of the relations of production and exchange in question. As Roemer has suggested recently,

It is more enlightening, perhaps, to emphasize what is not necessary to 'produce' [the exploitation and class characteristics of capitalism], namely an institution for the exchange of labour. Exploitation can be mediated entirely through the exchange of produced commodities, and classes can exist with respect to a credit market instead of a labour market - at least at this level of abstraction...it suffices for the coercion to be at the point of maintaining property relations and not at the point of extracting surplus labour directly from the worker (Roemer, 1986: 93)

The implications of all this will be elaborated upon in the course of developing a relational approach to the exchanges between settler farmers and capital in the next subsection.

4.1.2 Settler Farmers and Capital: A Relational Analysis.

Once the conceptual enigma 'agrarian bourgeoisie' is rejected, one can see how capitalists outside agriculture came to dominate settler farmers like a peasantry, despite all appearances to the contrary. By settling European farmers on the land, supplying them with agro-industrial inputs, with research

and scientific services, with badly needed labour recruits, and with credit moneys to pay for it all, capital and the colonial state did not simply bring them prosperity but provided them with their instruments of production and simultaneously placed these farmers under capitalist domination. In short, investment in settler agriculture was the task of extra-agrarian capitalists while commodity production became the farmers' assignment. Since the institutions which mediated that subordination lay outside the market for direct exchange of labour-power, i.e. away from the point of production, the subordination of African workers through wage labour will require separate chapters. Thus in investing in agriculture for the production of surplus value, capital separated between European commodity producers, to be exploited mainly outside the labour market, and African labourers, to be exploited at the point of production under the supervision of settler farmers. It is recalled that the 'owner-occupier' ideal prevalent in settler agriculture may obscure variations in the forms in which the surplus labour was actually realised, such as mortgage payments, in lieu of rent and stop-orders on current production (Harvey, 1982: 365).

It is further recalled that the accumulation of abstract wealth, the reason for all capitalist production, suffers from inherent contradictions and tendencies towards crisis. Continued reproduction of the capitalist process requires regular circulation of exchange values, but some of the forms capital takes, such as fixed capital, tend to obstruct capital's process

through their low circulation velocity, which is integral to capital itself. They constitute some of the barriers which give rise to crisis. Capital, however, has developed certain forms which are relatively immune from such constraints in the short run, but whose very velocity eventually leads to the opposite problems. While such 'fictitious capitals' may momentarily lubricate the circuits of capital, they also tend to reproduce its crisis tendencies. On the concrete level, the state and other agencies may intervene to decongest the circulation process further. Since it is the farmers' privileged access to all agricultural resources that gave them the identity of 'agrarian bourgeoisie' in colonial history, this alternative approach to their relationship to capital will attempt to relate all those resources to capital as value in motion.

Continuous and immediately 'relevant' data adequate for rigorous deployment of the whole corpus of Marx's 'Capital' to the analysis of concrete historical situations is often non-existent and researchers usually have to depend on approximation of categories. Because of such difficulties, the emphasis will be placed on the implications of Marxian capital analysis rather than on the complications involved in the precise computation of value exchanges and their transformation into the forms taken by empirical data. Historical evidence of the relations to which those analytic implications refer is more accessible to content analysis than hard numerical data are available for rigorous computation of value movements. What,

then, are the analytical implications of capital analysis for the settler farmer's relationship to capital?

Although Marx's political economy allows for the capitalist domination of non-wage commodity producers, contemporary Marxists have generally avoided countenancing that possibility, preferring to view such producers as species vanishing behind the capitalist front. Others have sought to accommodate them within capitalism as its functionally necessary accessories or articulated pre-capitalist adjuncts. Yet others have attempted to reduce them to imperfect approximations of what Marxist convention has established as the 'essential' capitalist relationship, namely to wage-labour 'equivalents' (see Chevalier, 1982: 151-170). The following empirical criteria for analysing the relational situation of self-employers in the role of commodity producers have also been suggested:

If producers grow on contract, perform much of the labour themselves, and are heavily indebted to financial institutions for both mortgage payments and credit on current operations, the nominal owner-occupier is probably better regarded as a manager or even a labourer who receives some kind of 'piecework' share of value produced. It is important, as always, to penetrate beneath the surface appearance, and to establish the real social relations that prevail (Harvey, 1982: 365).

While such approximations have contributed to the attenuation of the golden convention of wage-labour, they have continued to reinforce it by presenting their insights as its equivalents, thereby obstructing 'the systematic rethinking of the formal and real subsumption mechanisms' (Chevalier, 1982: 153n). Roemer concurs, 'It is a mistake to elevate the struggle between worker

and capitalist in the process of production to a more privileged position in the theory than the differential ownership of productive assets'(Roemer,1986: 93).

Chevalier significantly advances the analysis of capital's power over self-employers. First, once a self-employer begins to apportion to himself the value of certain commodities he needs to reproduce his livelihood, his labour-power is commodified without its 'real' monetization, that is without being exchanged in a labour market. Formal subordination therefore does not entail the independent producer's involvement in wage labour. Second, complete separation of self-employers from legal ownership of all instruments and objects of labour becomes unnecessary for formal subordination once Marx's distinction between legal and real economic appropriation and effective control of means of production is pursued to its logical conclusion, namely that capital can control such productive assets without assuming their ownership (Chevalier,1982: 158,166). Once self-employers are obliged to produce exchange values for a living, capitalists can let or encourage them to retain or acquire 'sham property' as an economic poisoned gift while retaining or assuming remote control of the labour process and extracting absolute surplus value, and in the case of settler farmers even relative surplus-value. Legal ownership of means of production by self-employers relieves capital of certain costs of production(Chevalier,1982: 167). Thirdly, the variability of the process of formal subordination suggests that capital can dominate self-employers in those forms

which most entail but least reflect the exigencies and contradictions of capitalist accumulation (Chevalier, 1982: 167). Interest-bearing capital [the credit system], for instance, by appearing as a self-expanding value, as a self-reproducing thing [M-->M'], obscures the fact that interest is a portion of surplus value appropriated by non-producing capitalists and thereby becomes the ultimate capitalist fetish (Marx, 1977 III: 191). The heavy dependence of self-employers on credit simultaneously subordinates them to capital and lubricates capitalist circulation. With credit, surplus value can be appropriated long before it is produced so that independent producers will have to extend the working day to the length pre-set by the credit terms. Given such possibilities, capitalists can pre-empt landlords' rental intervention by vesting landed property among insecure independent producers from whom 'rent' can be appropriated by the capitalist class as a whole through alternative arrangements, such as state taxation or compulsory land development at the owner-occupier's expense.

The major difference between Zimbabwe's tobacco growers and the self-employed farmers to whom all this directly applies - the Ontarian, South Carolinian and Greek growers for example - is that the former regularly employs African wage workers continuously during the season, thereby acquiring the trappings of 'capitalist' employers. That appearance both conceals and constitutes the form in which capital appropriates the labour-power of the settler farmer without a legal wage contract.

The settler farmer's labour-power, even though usually expended on such non-manual tasks as supervision and co-ordination, constitutes an integral part of tobacco production to the extent that he spends the production season attending to nothing but supervision of commodity production in order to retain the enterprise, which is but another term for reproducing his subsistence. From his budget, the tobacco grower deducts the value of his own labour-power and pays it to himself as a revenue, in the same way as an independent farmer appropriates his livelihood from his earnings. Taking the labour-power consumed in production as a whole, that part of it that is attributable to the settler by virtue of his participation in the working day can be considered to be monetized abstractly, while the rest is really monetised in the African workers' labour contracts.

While there is no specific labour contract for the settler farmer, there are several contracts which govern his land acquisition, admission to the ranks of tobacco growers, his right to sell a specific tobacco quota during the marketing season, securing credit for farm development and current crop production, and obtaining one's share of productive factors. In securing all such conditions, tobacco growers not only lose their control of the labour process to their commodity's buyers and a host of other capitals seemingly remote from 'the [tobacco] industry' but also become subject to the contradictions and crises of capitalist accumulation. Whether or not the grower regards extra-agrarian capitalists as his political allies or as economic

predators cannot be derived directly from his relationship to capital as a settler farmer. The ultimate political issue here with regard to socialist transformation centres on the implications of resettling Africans on the land under conditions comparable to those through which settler farmers were dominated by extra-agrarian capitalists or, alternatively, of retaining settler agriculture as it is in view of its stabilization of the whole economy. That question will be addressed in Chapter Nine.

Regarding ownership, tobacco growers generally endeavoured to attain legal title to their means of production. The point, however, is that from about 1945 onwards, legal ownership as such would increasingly decline in economic importance as both capital and settler acquired new interests in agriculture. What settlers sought to own tended to be what capitalists outside agriculture wished someone else would seek to spend their resources on. While the settlers enthusiastically demanded their share of everything they were entitled to as rewards for their military contributions to empire, it will become apparent in Section 4.2 that their options in systematic land settlement were severely limited and that remaining on the land would become a matter of survival rather than profit calculation. Within a decade of the post-war settlement schemes, it would become clear to the settler farmer that land ownership and tobacco production meant greater dependence on extra-agricultural forces to guarantee and reward it. The more settler agriculture was drawn into the circuits of capital, the less effective became the grower's legal ownership

of his means of production, and the more capital in general, mediated by the state and other colonial institutions, assumed greater power over their economic mobilization and appropriation. All this only emerges when the polemic on the inequity and obvious injustice of colonial administration are recognised as accomplished facts and set aside so that analysis of the actual historical development of settler agriculture may be undertaken in the context of the contradictions and crises of capitalist accumulation, which begins in Section 4.2.

4.2 Accumulation and the The Landed Craftsman.

With capitalists identified outside agriculture as indirect investors and settler farmers located within it as commodity producers, the various processes through which settler farmers were placed under the power of capital may now be examined. Since the period covered in this study coincides with a profound and extensive reorganization of Zimbabwean society, the processes of formal and real subordination, easily specified in the abstract, have tended to overlap in practice, so that the periodizations attempted here must be regarded as no more than heuristic sketches. Subsection 4.2.1. examines how the property relationship between the farmers and capital developed under the systematic post-1945 land settlement schemes. Subsection 4.2.2 analyses how the supply of mechanical and chemical inputs

affected the development of craftsmanship among tobacco growers, while 4.2.3 focuses on the separation of the commodity from the settler farmer, both in the process of production and in exchanging it with foreign buyers in the commodity market. While other factors in the subordination of settlers may be significant, the development of the credit system for instance, it shall be argued that the developments to be analysed in the subsections just outlined will suffice to demonstrate the processes identified here as formal subordination of settler farmers to capital.

4.2.1 European Farmers, Capital and Land Settlement.

As the British South Africa Company [BSAC] began occupying Zimbabwe between 1890-1900, it attempted both to assume political power and to continue pursuing its private economic goals. The contradictions inherent in such a role-set surfaced around 1907, when both the BSAC's assumption of political power and legal claim to own all Zimbabwean land privately were openly contested by other companies and by individual "pioneers" who had both become entangled in land speculation and found a political voice in the Legislative Council. Since gold was believed to be abundant in Zimbabwe in those days, speculative land grabbing for financial reasons, with no reference to the prospects of agricultural development, became an immediate threat to organized

settlement and capitalist development. Vested financial interests in land speculation and the scarcity of gold precipitated the first crisis for the BSAC as both the political vanguard of colonial capitalism and a private capitalist enterprise. In 1914, the Privy Council announced in London that the BSAC held the land as the state and not as a private owner and placed hitherto unsold land in the trusteeship of the English monarchy as Crown Land. In 1924, the BSAC's administrative role lapsed into a legislative council and cabinet elected by settlers, while the BSAC was thus being "freed" from its political constraints so it could freely compete with other companies, the early settlers celebrated their ambiguous 'victory' over capital. The story of the BSAC's governance has been detailed elsewhere. The record of its landownership and futile efforts to initiate settler agriculture as a basis for capitalist rather than primitive accumulation, although outside the scope of this study, provides significant background insights into the post-1945 practice of land settlement. First, it shows how this early multinational corporation became immediately entangled in conflicts with other capitals, the British state and European adventurers who had established lucrative ties with some of the BSAC's own administrators. In short, it was not all peace and co-operation in the colonialist camp. Secondly, while the BSAC unsuccessfully attempted to induce some aristocratic elements in England to co-operate in undermining absentee landlords through a policy of 'beneficial occupation or

surrender" (Palmer, 1977: 45, 60-61), upon which settler agriculture would eventually thrive, early landlords and other interests remained strong enough to resist such a challenge to their proprietary interests. That early conjuncture prevented the BSAC from implementing systematic land settlement schemes as viable from the point of view of capitalist accumulation as those initiated by the colonial state after 1945.

This subsection advances the argument that in the post-1945 systematic land settlement programme, the position of settler farmers became one of increasing subordination to capital, not of mastery over it. It is misleading to conclude from the fact that these farmers constituted 24.54% of white income earners that they became 'the most powerful group' (Palmer, 1977: 137). It was capital that became the ruling social force in colonial society, with settler farmers becoming no more than its willing accomplices or obedient servants, for the most part. Admittedly, it was the "representatives" of European farmers who agitated for a segregated land market in the 1920s and settler farmers did appear to be "powerful" in the politics of later decades. By the same token, settler farmers became subordinated to capital in a manner quite specific to that group, that is as self-employed owner-occupiers, who employed wage workers, but who increasingly lost effective control over both their means of production and the production process itself. It shall further be argued that although absentee landlords persisted right up to 1979, their speculative activities came under increasing constraints after

1945 as the state assumed responsibility for co-ordinating land use with the demands of capitalist accumulation throughout the economy.

In sum, the original objective of bringing the land into capital's overall development programme, which the BSAC had failed to realize, was increasingly secured by the colonial state after World War II. One capitalist company's attempt to invest directly in agriculture or indirectly through sponsorship of settlers trained on its "Central Farms" were unsuccessful because capital had not yet established itself as the ruling social force. Systematic land settlement, upon which a settler agriculture integrated with capitalist accumulation could be developed, required more than the availability of land and the will of an enterprising capitalist company. By 1948, when Rhodesia Tobacco Association [RTA] and Tobacco Marketing Board [TMB] delegates met representatives of British tobacco manufacturers and agreed on a guaranteed market for Rhodesian tobacco, sufficient conditions for systematic settlement had come into existence. They included Britain's demand for dollar reserves for post-war reconstruction, a surplus population in post-war Europe and availability of potential European immigrants, incipient local industrial development through import substitution, colonial state control of available land and the successful removal of Africans from the land as well as the general movement of labour in the Southern African region.

By 1945, when settler agriculture became a viable field for

indirect capitalist investment, capital had outmanouevred land speculators. For all its resilience, landed property [as a social force], had sufficiently decomposed to pose no obstacle to systematic settlement. The power to allocate available land had passed onto the colonial state, from which it could be obtained by settlers only on the basis of settlement schemes systematically co-ordinated with the demands of capitalist accumulation, particularly those of British based enterprises.(1) Struggles within the colonial coalition to establish settler agriculture based on European "owner-occupation" date back to 1890, with BSAC administrator Colquhoun's early but unsuccessful confrontation of land speculators. However, as Palmer remarked, the victory won by absentee landlords in 1903 over current BSAC administrator Milner was a Pyrrhic one because landlord property proved to be a fetter on agricultural development (Palmer, 1977: 66). Palmer, and many others, however have continued to miss the fact that its uneasy relationship with capital marked the doom of speculative landed property and saw to assert its influence even when it had long collapsed. In this chapter, it shall be argued that systematic land settlement was capital's answer to landed property's tendency to retard agricultural development in Zimbabwe. Landed property as an institution survived throughout the rest of Zimbabwe's colonial history as an historical obsolescence. As the

(1) For Marx, "landed property was not a permanent feature of capitalist society but a decomposing excrescence whose role would lapse into the state (Marx, 1973: 279).

legal "land owner", the settler farmer might appear to be in a position to appropriate the economic advantages from his land. However, being a "land owner" who was frequently indebted to sundry creditors, the settler farmer was usually obliged to pass any super-profits that might legally accrue to him onto the extra-agrarian capitalists on whose behalf systematic land settlement for commodity production was organized.

After the difficult 1930s, systematic land settlement based on commodity production for accumulation outside agriculture began with implementation of the Land Settlement Act, 1944 (Dunlop, 1971: 7; R of LSB, 1945-1962). This coincided with a period of rapid agricultural expansion which ended in the early 1960s with overproduction in tobacco (see ahead). The new Rhodesian Front [RF party] government of 1962 brought with it a switch in emphasis from expansionist land settlement to intensive agricultural development, under strict public control of the settler farmers. The political crisis associated with that government's phony 'independence' declaration in 1965 [the so-called UDI], and the associated economic sanctions, targeting tobacco among other exports, added further complications to the relationship between settler farmer, capital and the land as an object and instrument of labour.

Developments in colonial land settlement can be divided into three phases punctuated by changes in its relationship to capitalist accumulation. Phase I includes the long period of pre-World War II land grabbing for financial speculation, with no

basis in capitalist accumulation. Phase II begins with the 1944 Land Settlement Act, coincides with the period of rapid agricultural expansion under systematic settlement, and ends with the crisis of overproduction and the beginning of a new approach to settlement under the RF regime in the early 1960s. That subsequent approach will be examined in Chapter Six, while this subsection focuses on developments in Phase II. To grasp the relationship between capital and settler farmers established through systematic settlement in Phase II, it will be necessary to ask how and why the colonial state sponsored European settlement after World War II. The first point to grasp is that land settlement was conceived within capital's own crisis and that it was not a matter of the colonial state simply parcelling out the land to the governing racial group's white constituents as favours or rewards for participating in the mother country's wars, or sharing the booty gained from primitive accumulation among the winners. This time land settlement worked for capital precisely because settlers were not allowed to grab what they could and property syndicates were discouraged from hoarding land for speculative purposes. Post-war land settlement was tied to commodity production by settler farmers according to the capitalist logic articulated by the Land Settlement Board as part of the colonial state.

In approaching post-1945 land settlement practice, Marxists will find that the analysis of ground-rent in Capital III is not historically transferable to all situations where capital has

been invested in agriculture. The landowner in Marx's analysis, that non-producer who claimed rent on the basis of ownership alone, was replaced in Zimbabwean colonial land settlement by the state, which sought to exclude land speculation as an obstacle to capitalist accumulation. Furthermore, Marx's English capitalist farmer was clearly not the social equivalent of the settler farmer in terms of their respective relationships to capital. Marx's farmer was an accomplished capitalist whose decision to invest in agriculture was premised on, inter alia, the possibility of moving his capital to wherever he expected higher profits. The settler farmer, on the other hand, became tied to the land as a prospective or actual owner-occupier producing commodities under supervision by the state and others working towards the same objectives as those of extra-agrarian capitals. In this case, capitalists historically stood outside agriculture, investing their capital not by becoming 'capitalist farmers' but, among other ways, by promoting settlers through whose productive activities capital could be mobilized in and out of agriculture at maximum advantage and minimum risk to the investors. To complete that fiction, capital not only gave the settler a piece of land and all other trappings of a capitalist but also supplied the settlers with labour recruits, in exchange for a 'capitation fee', for the cost of recruitment plus profit (Clarke, 1974a: 44-45, 47).

The particular circumstances under which colonial land settlement proceeded in Phase II were such that settler farmers

were not even capable of autonomous investment in agriculture, let alone moving "their capital" elsewhere. Those Rhodesian tales about 'young pioneers [who] rode off to their fortunes with pick and plough...and carved out a living out of the virgin forest', of families leaving London 'with a carry-cot and less than £100' etc. are often too easily dismissed as elements of a "settler ideology" used to justify European land grabbing (Cauter, 1983: 54, 57, 129). That such stories usually appear in colonialist ideologies cannot be denied. Yet that is not all there is to them. That most European farmers in Zimbabwe settled on 'the' land without substantial resources is a fact whose significance lies in that it presents a different context of capitalist investment in agriculture than that of the familiar capitalist farmer in 19th century Britain, where the individual farmer did have his own capital to invest.

Since the prospective farmer usually lacked initial investment capital, those who provided it on behalf of capital in general - banks and the state - acquired the power to decide where, how and for how long their assets would be mobilized towards agricultural production. To accumulate, capital must circulate in and out of all economic sectors. The settler, on the other hand, had to become tied to the land in order to subsist and qualify for legal title to the land allocated to him. The prospect of appropriating the land and establishing a 'viable' enterprise came to depend not on where the farmer himself might want to invest "his" [usually borrowed] capital but on

successfully developing the farm to his benefactor's satisfaction, under close public supervision, on pain of eviction and lost effort. The capital he mobilized in and out of agriculture did not belong to the settler. As with the other productive factors that went into agriculture, land came to the settler as an alienated asset whose economic value could be realized only in producing commodities for capitalists outside agriculture. Of course, the land might itself become an asset whose value the farmer could eventually realize by selling to another farmer or the state for the purpose of further systematic settlement for commodity production. In such a case, the system would simply reproduce itself while that particular farmer went out of production, unless the farmers were allowed to become speculative landlords, which was out.

As it developed, the relationship between capital and settler had to be reinforced through both ideological legitimation and coercive supervision by the colonial state. The state's obligation, so to speak, was 'to keep worthwhile farmers on the land' and, by implication, to get rid of the rest (Jeremy Field, RTJ August, 1969: 35). Whereas Marx's capitalist farmer could concentrate on pursuing profit and avoid squandering his capital on land improvements that might lapse into the ownership of the landlord at the end of each contract, the Rhodesian settler farmer was coerced by the state to carry out specifically required improvements or face ejectment from the settlement scheme or other penalties which might cost him the opportunity to

become a legal landowner and his whole livelihood. Whereas Marx's capitalist farmer could move his assets strategically, capital confronted the Rhodesian settler farmer like an alien force over which he had little or no control, almost in the same way he encountered the vagaries of nature, which might be controlled but not systematically eliminated.

In approaching the relations between capital and the Rhodesian settler farmer, it is worthwhile noting an important difference between the character of colonial land settlement in Kenya and Zimbabwe. Recently, one author touched upon this matter but quickly reverted to the populist problematic of racist maldistribution without attempting to pursue the full implications of his lead:

In its upper-class ambience and its influence abroad, European Kenya was unlike the other centre of permanent British settlement in that part of Africa, Southern Rhodesia ... White Kenyans disdainfully referred to Rhodesia as 'the sergeant's mess', conveying their perception that it did not provide the suitable environment for officers and gentlemen that Kenya did (Leo, 1984: 4).

Contemporary analysts of colonial land settlement have missed such social differences and emphasized instead the manifest "consequences" of unfair European appropriation of, and African expropriation of, the land. In short, the history of colonial land settlement has been reduced to that of primitive accumulation. Racist land apportionment did provide the initial determination of how European settlers and dispossessed Africans would be subordinated to capital. It did not create a "bourgeoisie" out of the farmers insofar as classes are defined

in terms of relations of production. Beyond the Land Apportionment and Land Tenure Acts lie the even more meaningful distinctions between legal possession and real economic appropriation of the land as object and instrument of production. Some of the practices involved in colonial land settlement, outlined in Land Settlement, Land Tax, Land Bank and Agricultural Finance legislation, which reveal more about the relationship of the settler farmer to capital than land apportionment legislation ever did, have hardly been examined in the discourse on land. Once attention shifts from maldistribution to the actual relations of production involved in colonial land settlement, the subordination of the settler farmer to capital emerges from the polemical dust of the "land question".

In the conception and execution of post-1945 land settlement, the colonial state assumed the role of a 'benevolent' land owner explicitly set against predatory land speculation in favour of systematic acquisition and easy delivery of the land to the settlers. It undertook to protect the the settler against both landlord extortion and African competition. Provided he met some of the requirements - 1/5 of the purchase price, affidavits of agreement between prospective farmer and intending seller [of privately held land to the state as crown land for European settlement], appropriate application procedure, age, character, will to farm "beneficially", citizenship, capital assets held and, where applicable, war record - every effort would be made to obtain the land for the settler (SLSR VII, Ch.261). Expenses for

attending interviews and moving to the farm would be paid by the state. Such conditions were clearly meant for destitute European immigrants looking for the "land of opportunity", not for capitalists seeking to invest directly in agriculture. As it unfolded, settler agriculture proved less generous to the privileged minority than the appearances of prosperity suggest.

Land settlement legislation stressed that its programme was meant for the sustenance of the individual European settler and his family through prescribed commodity production, not for capitalist farmers' looking for profits in agriculture. The settler was there to produce commodities demanded by capitalists outside agriculture. One of the conditions for selecting a settler was his willingness to occupy and develop the land 'exclusively for the benefit of himself and members of his family, if any' (SLSR, Ch. 261.15.2). If the applicant happened to be incorporated as a company, it was stipulated that one of the shareholders would have to occupy the land as a resident farmer, to develop and work it 'in the beneficial way', to the satisfaction of the Land Settlement Board [LSB] (SLSR, Ch. 261.15.3). This simultaneously reveals a preference for family farming and a concern to exclude speculative appropriation of the land by individual landlords or capitalist syndicates. Even though prior struggles between landowners and capital had not decisively eradicated the former, there can be no mistaking that after 1945, capital was increasingly in control of the land, with the settler farmer legally appropriating the land

but becoming subordinated to capital in the process.

Once the settler took up his allotted portion of the country, further stipulations regarding actual economic appropriation of the land followed. 'Rent' at 4% of the purchase price was a straightforward item. Beyond that was the power of the LSB, which effectively administered the land while the farmer tried during the seven-year lease to obtain legal title to it. The LSB's supervisory powers virtually reduced the farmer to its servant. For instance, 'beneficial occupation according to established principles of good husbandry' entailed such obligations as occupying the farm within 6 months of allotment, personal residence of the lessee or the approved shareholder, 'observance of the Natural Resources Act and other laws relating to farm practice and management', and proper care and maintenance, annual cultivation of a prescribed area of arable land, raising specified numbers of stock, practicing sound methods of husbandry and other prescribed farm developments, all under LSB supervision and at the settler's financial risk as the legal 'owner' and investor. Although there was no labour contract between capital and the settler farmer, the latter's position vis à vis LSB was such that a formal contract would have made little difference.

Only when settlement was completed satisfactorily - the balance, rentals, and sundry liabilities fully paid, prescribed farm developments fully accomplished to satisfaction of the LSB - was the farmer given the opportunity to purchase the legal title to the land. If the LSB reported that its instructions had not

been satisfactorily followed, the lease could be terminated before legal title was obtained and compensation withheld for any improvements made unless the settler could remove them without causing damage to the land and pay all liabilities in full. During the lease period, federal and territorial officials enjoyed rights of entry and inspection to ensure compliance with prescribed developments.

Ostensibly, official preference for leasehold over immediate purchase offered 'easy terms' to settlers lacking capital. Effectively, leasehold authorised the LSB to enforce officially specified farm developments. During the initial seven-year lease, pressure to develop and earn legal title to the land sent the farmer into sundry financial obligations, with encouragement from and under close supervision by the state. Meanwhile, as the settler worked to earn title and became absorbed into various circuits of capital, the LSB attempted to manage his finances in the interests of both the individual farmer and the colony generally' (R. of LSB, 1945: 9; regularly repeated thereafter). Within 15 years of Phase II, the results of land settlement organized towards the enhancement of capitalist productivity were such that the Secretary of Lands could express official satisfaction with the Young Rhodesian Settlement Scheme as follows:

The crops and stock grown and produced therefrom total millions of pounds in value, most of which has brought in much needed foreign currency and has swelled government coffers from the taxation received therefrom. I feel I can, with confidence, assert that no other settlement scheme of this size has been as successful or beneficial to the country originating it (R. of Secretary, Department of

Lands, 1961: 10).

In official calculations of the results of "beneficial" settlement, the interests of the farmers did not feature. Their success lay in earning foreign exchange for other industries, in swelling government coffers, augmenting capitalist accumulation outside agriculture, and remaining on the land despite it all. Nevertheless, the hope of individual prosperity continued to attract the imagination of prospective settlers. Farmers tended to accept the burden as an integral part of their "way of life" and to propagate that view. In the early 1960s, Phase II and the general agricultural expansion accompanying it entered a period of crisis, the details of which lie ahead. For now, land settlement Phase II must be examined more closely.

Table 4.1 depicts the programme as the ISB began to place the first group of settlers on Crown Land and to prepare them for their role. The noteworthy features are: (1) the re-training of trained farmers, which suggested that there was a new content in the farmer's job; and (2) deferred decisions and re-interviews, 'withdrawals' and rejections from the schemes. About 40% of Europeans who applied for admission to the land settlement schemes were not immediately successful. About 1/5 of these were specifically excluded. This suggests that getting the land after 1945 was no longer automatic even for European settlers.

3

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Table 4.1 Cases Dealt With by the LSB During 1945.

Trainees.	111
Trained farmers on refresher courses	51
Crown Land Grants	54
Contributory Purchase Scheme (Loans to farm owners)	55
Accepted trained farmers: Proposals awaited	30
Total accepted under scheme	317
Decisions deferred	74
To be reinterviewed	9
Granted in terms of Land Settlement Act (outside scheme)	8
Withdrawn (refused LSB offer or made own arrangements)	10
Declined or refused by LSB	34
Total	452

(Report of the Land Settlement Board for 1945: 14).

As a surplus of would-be farmers applied for land, LSB officials clearly became more selective. It was expected that such factors as 'indecision on the part of the younger man regarding his future career' and 'the difficulty some of the older men find in settling down after years on active service' would result in inevitable early failures and facilitate the selection process (R. of LSB, 1945: 8). The following passage reveals what the LSB considered to be relevant criteria in selecting farmers in the context of systematic settlement for commodity production:

The generous terms of the scheme have also undoubtedly attracted some applicants who will seek pastures new when they realise how much hard and constant work is called for in order to open up and establish a farm (R. of LSB, 1945: 80).

As far as the LSB and capitalists were concerned, only those settlers who submitted to the discipline of 'hard and constant work', to beneficial occupation as defined by the Land Settlement

Act, constituted a viable investment in agriculture. Table 4.2 depicts the situation in one of the settlement schemes inaugurated in 1944 at the end of Phase II in 1962-3.

Table 4.2. Land Settlement Scheme No.1 for Ex-servicemen.

(Of European Descent of the 1939/45 War)

	1962	1963
No longer under scheme (title granted)	289	393
Voluntarily withdrawn from scheme	100	100
Evictions	19	19
Deaths	20	20
Remaining under scheme	64	60
Total	592	592

(Report of the Rural Land Board, November-December, 1963: 7).

Although the majority of recruits had 'earned' title deeds, the 17% who had 'withdrawn', and the 3% who had been evicted indicate that settlers were not in control of land settlement as they became occupiers or actual owners of land. Those who remained on the land could do so only insofar as they satisfied LSB specifications for farm development.

In the early 1960s, a number of new developments coincided with the end of land settlement Phase II. The Rhodesian Front [RF] party won the territorial elections in 1962 on a platform that promised more racial separation and a more favourable deal for settler farmers including such items as 'easier credit' (RTJ, October, 1963:31). The Central African Federation was dissolved at

the end of 1963 and in 1964, overproduction in tobacco and the consequent reduction in market prices brought a new sense of insecurity to the tobacco growers. While the settler farmers looked forward to the new deal promised by the RF, subsequent events, including the UDI, attenuated the settler's hold on the land he had acquired. The RF government displayed a remarkable ability to mobilize the exclusively European electorate behind its policies while simultaneously subjecting the European farmers to further subordination to the purposes of capital. How this affected land settlement policy and practice will be discussed in Chapter Six in terms of a movement towards the real subordination of settler farmers to capital.

Recalling earlier arguments, establishing that agricultural producers who had become owner-occupiers were formally subordinated to capital requires demonstrating that their labour-power was, in one form or another, bought by extra-agrarian capitals in terms of its 'abstract' monetization and that their retention of means of production is only a legal formality which does not entail these farmers' capacity for the real economic appropriation of such property. It was also argued that in the Zimbabwean case, the investing 'capitalist' in agriculture was capital in general, those capitalist firms based outside agriculture but circulating various forms of capital in and out of the sector as part of the various operations contributing to capitalist accumulation. A third contention was that by 1945, speculative hoarding of land by non-productive

landowners, having shown tendencies to obstruct agricultural development, and therefore capitalist accumulation in Phase I, had been superseded by the intervention of the colonial state to regulate land settlement in accordance with British capitalists' global response to the post-World War II crisis. Finally, it was pointed out that although plausible equivalents of a 'labour contract' between capital and settler farmers could be identified in the practice of land settlement Phase II, it is neither desirable nor necessary to posit these since they tend to obstruct theoretical development on the question of the subordination of owner-occupiers. What all this implies for the nature of colonial land settlement in general, and for the relationships between Zimbabwean settler farmers and extra-agrarian capitalists in particular, between 1945-1979, becomes clearer when one relates the developments in Phase II and three to certain issues arising from Marx's analysis of the transformation of surplus profit into ground-rent.

The full deployment of Marx's labour theory of value for economic accounting purposes is neither intended nor essential for developing the present argument. The distinction is maintained between using Marx's theory as a basis for hypothesis testing and confirmation, on the one hand, and what is intended here, namely, pursuing its implications in furthering the analysis of colonial land settlement in Zimbabwe, as it was organized by the state after 1945 and, through that, grasping the relationship of settler farmers to the forces of capitalism and

socialist transformation. Marxists who have attempted to use the LTV to confirm or support hypotheses, such as demonstrating that simple commodity farmers are exploited by capitalists, have tried to show how 'rents' [conceived in Marxian terms as profits above average] constitute the substance of indirect or 'non-wage' relations of exploitation (e.g. Denis, 1983: 123). Where no landlords exist in relation to such farmers, these farmers themselves have been identified as the appropriators of such rents. As Denis puts it, 'Full and outright ownership removes this [land] cost from producers and allows full retention of value by the owner-occupier' (1983: 160). In practice, such efforts have been beset not only by the limitations of Marx's value theory as a basis for economic accounting but by practical research problems such as indexing the variables that determine the types of rent, such as location, fertility and capital investments. In the face of such problems, alternative conceptual approximations and imputations of the effects of such variables have often presented themselves as obvious solutions to accounting problems (Denis, 1983: 161).

Such difficulties, it shall be contended, arise only when the analysis of ground-rent is regarded as a matter of demonstrating the magnitude of exploitation of independent farmers by landlords. If rent here were seen as a mere mechanism of exploitation, the transfer of a certain amount of value to whoever owned the land used by settler farmers, one might as well rest with the figures listed under 'rent' in the Monthly

Statistical Digest, in which case rent would be no issue since it is listed as one of the most insignificant 'inputs' in settler agriculture (CSO 1965, APR: 21). The analysis would be based on 'hard' data, but its significance in the relationship between settler farmers and capitalists would remain a curiosity.

Rather than calculating such 'rents' or scrambling for information relating to the very complex value movements associated with all types of ground-rent, the attention here will be placed initially on the social implications of the theory of rent for the relationship between independent farmers and capital, then on the historical interpretation of the relationship established through the specific conditions in Zimbabwean colonial and post-colonial land settlement practice. To begin with, rent under capitalism is merely a payment made to a landlord for the right to use land and the resources within it (Harvey, 1982: 330). When rental charges arise from the fact that the land in question is desirable because of its spatial qualities or location, or because landlords have strategically withheld it in speculative anticipation of higher payments for its use, monopoly rents may be appropriated (Marx, 1977 III: 775; Harvey, 1982: 349-350). When a surplus profit arises from a landlord intervention, which obstructs the free-flow of value between sectors of lower value composition (e.g. agriculture) and those of higher value composition (e.g. industry), absolute rent is appropriated. Once agriculture's value composition equals or exceeds those of other sectors through greater investment

therein, absolute rent disappears and landlords can only speculate on monopoly rents (Marx, 1977 III: 761-762, 765; Harvey, 1982: 350-353). Private landed property therefore has an interest in obstructing technical improvements in agriculture because these tend to erode one basis of its revenues.

To maintain the overall basis of absolute rent, landlords were known to insist on short-term leases for capitalist farmers in 19th Century Europe, so that the farmers could only invest in agriculture at the risk of losing all their improvements as these lapsed to the landowners at the end of such contracts. In the contradiction of such rules of distribution as those adhered to by landlords and those of capitalist production and accumulation lies the significance of Marx's interest in ground-rent under the capitalist mode of production. The speculative pursuit of ground-rent compels landlords to obstruct the development of productive forces and to precipitate or contribute to crises of accumulation. Where agricultural producers are tied to the land (e.g. peasants), landlords can compel them to invest on unfavourable terms and so as to appropriate absolute rents continuously and incrementally. Owners of mobile capital, on the other hand, will not stand such conditions; they will withdraw and seek to invest elsewhere, or simply hoard their capital, thereby obstructing the circulation process. While Marx polemically chastised landlords for obstructing the development of productive forces under capitalism, the implications of allowing landlords to speculate and obstruct capitalist

development were actually experienced in Phase I, first by the BSAC and later by the colonial state so that after 1945, it was decided that the state itself, acting on behalf of capital in general, would preclude such intervention by insisting on systematic settlement as described earlier. That implication of Marx's analysis, it shall be argued, is more important in the political economy of Zimbabwe than the actual calculation of exact amounts of rent extracted or not appropriated from settler farmers by landlords. It explains why the state itself assumed the role of landlord and the fact that settler farmers submitted to 'hard and constant work', as required by the LSB.

Marx, of course, does not stop with absolute rent. In analysing the various mechanisms in the production of Differential Rents I and II, Marx muffles his anti-landlord polemic and implicitly suggests a more positive role for landlords in capitalist accumulation, one largely ignored by subsequent Marxists as analysis acquired more significance than its meaning (Harvey, 1982:331). The natural variegation of land in terms of location and fertility - both economically defined - where equal amounts of capital are applied to all lands under cultivation gives rise to Differential Rent I. Since Market prices of all products where land is the basic means of production are fixed by the price of production on the worst land, the products from the economically better lands receive surplus profits which landlords may claim as rents attributable to the advantages inherent in their land (Harvey, 1982: 353-354).

Alternatively, when different amounts of capital are applied to lands of equal natural advantages [fertility, location, etc.], Differential Rents II arise but these are clearly due to shifts in capitalist investment (Harvey, 1982:354). The important point is that Differential Rents-I and II tend to interact and perpetuate the role of private property independently of the speculative contrivances of landlords and that in the process landed property itself becomes integral to capitalist accumulation without ever resolving the conflicting claims of landlords and capitalists. Ultimately, by preventing investment in lands where no surplus value could be produced, this increasingly obscure role of ground-rent appropriation emerges as a catalyst for capitalist accumulation (Harvey, 1982: 357; Marx, 1977 III: 735). That landed property in the form of a class of landlords as Marx knew them is necessary for co-ordinating economic land use and capitalist accumulation does not follow from this analysis. What does follow is that capitalist accumulation requires that land be used according to the exigencies and contradictions of capitalist accumulation. The matter of which social agency assumes that role must be resolved historically. In Zimbabwe, where landlord speculation had discredited itself by obstructing development of the productive forces, that role was assumed from 1945 onwards by the colonial state. What landlords might have accomplished inadvertently by claiming differential rents regardless of the basis for doing so, it seems, was accomplished through systematically coercive land

settlement in the absence of a speculative land market, under state supervision, and it shall be argued that this is precisely what happened in Zimbabwe after 1945. It must still be emphasized, however, that this role, whoever performs it within capitalism, remains contradictory. Rental appropriation by landlords may continue to alternate between disruption, indifference and support for accumulation (Harvey, 1982: 358). Systematic land settlement through direct action by the capitalist state will inevitably reproduce the inherent contradictions of capitalism.

It is the contradictory role of landed property in making land use more or less viable for capital that makes it a capitalist one. This, rather than computation of exact amounts of ground-rent appropriated by particular landlords from their tenants, is what will illuminate the relations between capital and settler farmers in Zimbabwe's history of colonial land settlement. Essentially, what capitalist accumulation requires is that 'the connection between land ownership and the land' be dissolved, so that the landowner forfeits the land as an instrument and a condition of production to capital (Marx, 1977: 636-638). Harvey drives it home: like interest-bearing capital, rent becomes a purely financial asset traded upon future revenues and profits which only labour produces. Once transformed into such a 'fictitious capital', landed property can be traded for rents directly collected from the agricultural producer or indirectly appropriated as income forfeited because of the

producer's failure to mobilize capital, a conclusion which Marx only barely implied (Harvey, 1982: 347-348; Marx, 1977 III: 805-813). Like the credit system, the land market emerges as a mechanism for mobilizing capital where it could have remained fixed in the production season while accumulation required it to circulate. How the capitalist transformation of landed property into circulating capital occurs in concrete situations depends on the historical conjuncture. It does not presuppose or require the existence of a specific class of landlords. As the Zimbabwean case shows, the state may assume the role of the landlord on behalf of capital. Reduction of Marx's analysis of rent into an instrument for the mechanical calculation of the extent of exploitation of independent farmers by landlords or capital turns it into that kind of 'philosophical-historical theory' which Marx disowned when he explained that he had attempted no more than an 'historical sketch' under very specific circumstances (Marx and Engels, 1965: 312-313).

Some elements of the Rhodesian colonial mission did try to superimpose a dying system of feudal landed property upon the ruins of a peasant society ravaged by primitive accumulation. Individual European landowners attempted to live upon labour rents and rents in kind collected from Africans who had been persuaded to remain on the land expropriated from them ['squatters'] but systematic colonial settlement was to end all that (Rennie, 1978). In promoting capitalist development throughout the economy, the state moved to complete the

separation from the land as an instrument of production not only from the African labourer but also from the European farmer. Even though the latter was allowed legal ownership, his real economic appropriation of the land was to be progressively undermined. In particular, the colonial state sought to prevent individual or collective land speculation by landlords and accomplished this through systematic settlement based on commodity production by owner-occupiers or Crown Land tenants. The ideal of capitalist landed property as Marx encountered it in 19th Century Europe, however, continued to appeal to some of those who were concerned with stabilization of the land market. As a land agent suggested in 1964, the trend ought to be towards separation of the landowner, who looks upon his farm as his capital investment, to produce a steady income, while the tenant is the person who provides the capital to work the land to its maximum efficiency' (Lister, RTJ May 1964: 58-59). The state, however, retained the former role in colonial land settlement. The settler farmer both sought to own the land and to work it, while landlords were kept out of systematic settlement because they tended to regard leasing their land as an 'evil necessity' and to insist on short [1-3 year] leases, which would obstruct capitalist development (Ibid). Why and how did colonial land settlement take this character?

Back in 1918, the Crown had secured for itself, and for capital, the monopoly of disposing of unalienated land according to the purposes of capital. Once the colonial state replaced the

BSAC and thereby inherited the Crown's prerogative in effect, it adopted the measures, described earlier, calculated to exclude both the producer and the speculator from real economic appropriation of the land. In the place of both peasant and landlord, the colonial state created a 'fictitious capitalist' in the form of the European 'owner-occupier', granting him the prospect of attaining legal ownership on condition that he satisfactorily submitted to the discipline of farm development. For capital's purposes. In short, such a 'land owner' was, from the moment he was settled on his allotment, formally subordinated to capital in the sense that he could not use his land for any other purposes than those prescribed by the agents of capital working through the LSB. Thus from 1945 onwards, colonial land settlement aimed at making the settler farmer a 'landowner' in name only, while extra-agrarian capitals indirectly invested in agriculture through promoting land settlement and other mechanisms still to be examined. Under close supervision by state agencies, the settler was to produce certain commodities and to develop the land as prescribed by "the authorities", with minimal victimization by speculating landlords. In the exchange with capital, the farmer got his livelihood and the prospect or satisfaction of legal title, and capital got its surplus value, however this was distributed thereafter.

Because he could not mobilize the capital to invest in land purchase and development, the new settler committed his future earnings, at his own financial risk, to immediate land settlement

based on advances of fictitious capitals by extra-agrarian capitalists which took various forms such as loans, mortgages, and stop-orders on current production. It is in such alternative arrangements that one ought to look for the mechanisms that regulated and gave colonial land settlement its capitalistic character after 1945. What official statisticians have entered as 'rent' forms only a small part of the total deductions made from the settler farmer's revenues by capitalists as they mobilized their assets through land settlement into agriculture. To the extent that such 'rent' served capital, it did so by helping to tie the settler to the land, legitimating private property, and obscuring the basic social relations that lay below the appearance of colonial land settlement. The more obscure those relations became, the less they were perceived as forms of value appropriation from settler farmers by capitalists, and the greater was the effect on the farmers' subordination to capital. Chapter Six will show how colonial land settlement changed during the early 1960s into new efforts by the state to complete the capitalist control of the settler's holding, even to control the use of that land which settlers had come to own legally as private property. The question for the movement of socialist transformation on this matter, to be addressed in Chapter Eight, will be that of the extent to which post-colonial resettlement of African producers on the land has taken into account the lessons of colonial land settlement regarding the various ways in which independent farmers can be subordinated to capital even when they

are allowed legal ownership on the most favourable terms. To what extent has Zimbabwe's planned socialist land resettlement attempted to avoid and overcome the reproduction of the relations of production established in colonial land settlement? Land being only the basic object, and only one of the instruments of agricultural production, the analysis proceeds to the examination of the settler's formal subordination in relation to other instruments of production.

4.2.2. 'Appropriation of Agriculture's Productive Factors.

Reputedly 'labour-intensive', tobacco production in Zimbabwe has undergone a complex technical reorganization since 1945. The transformation from a 'conventional' to an increasingly capitalistic tobacco culture has been marked by struggles between extra-agrarian capitals and their agents against tobacco growers in addition to the main class struggle between labour and capital. Throughout that transformation, this subsection will argue, extra-agrarian capitals increasingly excluded the settler farmers from effective control of their instruments of production and from the conception of their labour process, such as capital has done elsewhere in dealing with 'peasants'. Through the activities of an increasingly elaborate scientific and administrative infrastructure, new types of machinery, agro-chemical and improved varieties which are both

higher-yielding and resistant to various "pestilences", have increasingly displaced what is now remembered as 'conventional' tobacco culture, which usually refers to old instruments and methods of production. The focus here, however, is on development of certain relations of production which arise from capital's attempts to wrest the control of the labour process from agricultural producers, with changes in the techniques and instruments of production being regarded as the symptoms, not the substance, of that transformation.

To begin with, it shall be argued that whereas the tobacco grower before 1945 was on the way to becoming an agricultural craftsman who produced many of his own inputs, developed skills from practice and attempted to pass them on to the next generation of his family through apprenticing them to his enterprise, the massive intervention of the state and capital after World War II pre-empted that development by increasingly replacing the craftsman with the specialized grower. As he came to rely less on self-provided and converted instruments of production, and on gut methods, and as he increasingly adopted those instruments and methods produced, supplied and 'recommended' by capitalists through their experts, the tobacco grower increasingly lost control over his labour process, particularly its conception and its further development.

Although the general trend has been in favour of capitalists, the grower has both been inclined towards, and often able to hold on to, the conventional methods not preferred by the

experts. That way, growers have often frustrated the agents of innovation. Capitalists' reluctance to invest directly in agriculture has permitted the process of formal subordination to last longer than would have been the case if, for instance, large goldfields had been discovered. Consequently, as late as 1967 and 1978, settler farmers were still debating the economic possibilities of reverting to ox-drawn ploughing and conventional barn curing (Scrace vs. Bullock, RTJ November-December, 1966; Tilden vs. Perepeczko, RTJ March-April, 1978). In short, by 1980, when the colonial regime was replaced by a post-colonial government led by the movement of socialist transformation, the movement towards real subordination in terms of the farmer's relationship to his instruments of production was still in progress.

Until the late 1950s, tobacco growers had the potential to become masters of their own trade. They passed on the art of tobacco production to their offspring or other immigrants by adopting them as apprentices. Capital obtained its absolute surplus value in that context by controlling the farmer's entry into the trade and the dispatch of his commodity onto the world market. During the period of primitive accumulation preceding 1945, European settlers equipped themselves with cattle for use in transport and land preparation by seizing or impounding them from African neighbourhoods. Contemporaneously, a local craft industry, in which farmers themselves were active, produced 'hand tools and simple instruments for draught animals' (Bullock, 'Show

Times', RTJ 1967:19). Without an established basis for supplying its own commodities as alternative instruments of production to agriculture, capital thrived on absolute surplus value and little was done to change existing conceptions of the labour process. The emphasis on coercive supervision of African labour remained paramount. The limits of formal subordination had yet to be reached. For instance, if a settler farmer cleared land for tobacco planting and stacked up the wood for curing the leaf to be produced over the next few years, the labour-power expended in land clearing was thereby partially spread into tobacco production while the wood was productively consumed. In other words, the working-day (or production season) was lengthened ahead of each year by addition of the value of inputs obtained from land clearing. In the process, the forests on each farm ceased to be a surplus of domestic fuel as farmers increasingly burned tree trunks for curing fuel and cut saplings to be shaped into mutepes (4-foot sticks) which they used as leaf hangers in the barns.

Arrighi's observation that settler and African peasant agriculture had remained on the same technological level since 1945, subsequently invoked in various renditions of how the monopolization of technical services by settler farmers had led to underdevelopment in African areas, which lacked such advantages, may now be recalled in historical materialist perspective. The technical composition of Southern African agriculture in general had not exactly remained static since Thomas' observation of its general poverty around 1900

(Thomas, 1904: 257). As capitalism penetrated the whole regional economy, the technical basis of agriculture had slowly changed and so had the relationship of the European farmer to his instruments. When systematic land settlement began in 1944, settler farmers had already learned to enhance labour's productivity by improving soil fertility and converting whatever was seen as potentially useful instruments of production in response to the pressures of commodity production and competition. Settler farmers had taken to producing a regular crop of green manure, a practice which only began to decline significantly after 1958 as fertilizer imports and consumption increased (Kay, 1970: 111-112). Similarly, tobacco growers had been allowed to produce their own seed when the Rhodesian Tobacco Seed Association (RTSA), formed in 1958, allowed only 38 tobacco growers to monopolize seed production in future (RT February, 1959: 28-29). By 1984, only 26 ZTSA members were licenced to grow a much widened range of tobacco seed varieties under strict control of bureaucrats who often acted in accordance with the interests of extra-agrarian capitals. Today, ZTSA members also produce seed of various other crops, both for local farmers and for export (ZIT, 1984: 8). The commodification and separation of the seed as an instrument and condition of production from agriculture, which started with tobacco, was on the way to completion. A more comprehensive step towards separation of the instruments of production and the conception of labour from agricultural producers to capital came with the

reconstitution of the Tobacco Research Board [TRB] in 1950 as a statutory body with power to assume control of all scientific and technical development in tobacco production (R of TRB June, 1981:8). With that, the days of the tobacco farmer-craftsman and his apprentices were numbered.

The roles of many of those administrative and scientific services that emerged in Phase II of colonial land settlement will be examined more closely later. For now, suffice it to note that in planning for capitalist expansion generally, post-World War II colonial administrators grasped such limits on agricultural expansion as 'low standards of farming practice' among European settlers and the vital necessity of information and other services to capitalist development (SR 1949, DCC, Second Interim Report:26). In view of the slow pace of technical change in settler agriculture, a cautious approach to Marx's depiction of the 'original' encounter between capital and independent commodity producers seems appropriate. Marx wrote,

At first, capital subordinates labour on the basis of technical conditions in which it historically finds it. It does not, therefore, change immediately the mode of production (Marx, 1977 I: 293).

There is an ambiguity in the above passage. Structuralist readers tend to focus on the second sentence and reason towards the position that capital necessarily encounters all independent producers for the first time on the basis of a pre-capitalist mode of production. The more general first sentence allows for the possibility that capital may begin to subordinate independent

producers under various historically possible conjunctures of technical conditions and relations of production. The latter interpretation, which guides this analysis, recognizes that there was already a history of technical change in pre-1945 Zimbabwean agriculture, under the influence of capital, but with no substantial movement towards subordination of the craftsman-farmer. It also makes it possible to come to terms with the fact that the planning of settler agriculture after 1945 did not constitute the replacement of a pre-capitalist MOP but the further development of what was already in progress, the uneven development of capitalism. Stated otherwise, what is identified here as 'conventional tobacco culture', which capital moved to dislodge, was not a remnant of a pre-capitalist MOP but the earlier history of capital itself, whose continuation had become incompatible with the further development of productive forces.

With that, the struggle between settler farmers and capital between 1945 and the early 1960s over the instruments of production and conception of the labour process may be approached as a reflection of contradictions within the history of capitalism itself. In 'conventional' tobacco culture, earlier relations of capital existed side by side with new relations. Since the farmer's relationship to his productive factors cannot be fully exposed within one subsection, the unity of the whole process will only emerge slowly as analysis moves on through the chapters from an emphasis on the formal subordination of European settlers to that of African workers in Chapter five, and from

there to real subordination of all tobacco producers on European farms in Chapters Six and Seven.

In the initial stages of systematic settlement, land clearing was an important source of inputs in settler agriculture. Depending on the individual's manner of settlement, a European farmer could hire either African labour contractors and their gangs or a bulldozer from the Federal Department of Conservation [CONEX, the precursor to AGRITEX], or he could find the stumping done for him by the government if he happened to be on one of the settlement schemes (RT June, 1955:20-23; R of LSB, 19...:..). He either found his curing fuel stacked next to the barns or obtained it through land clearing or purchase. "Self-reliance" on the bounty of nature could only last for a few years. Once arable land was fully stumped, it was time to look beyond the farm for fuel, to the coal merchants, oil companies, the Electricity Supply Commission [ESC], and other farmers. Switching fuels involved further expenditure on curing equipment, which brought the farmer into new relationships with various capitals, from merchants through manufacturers to financiers. Once production became commodity production for capital, the basis was established for the eventual real subordination of all agricultural producers, African workers as well as European owner-occupiers, with the real outcome depending on historical circumstances.

Meanwhile, the annual cycle of land preparation witnessed a slow transition from reliance on locally made hand tools and

ox-drawn ploughs towards increased use of imported tractors and appropriate ~~mechanical~~ attachments which were mostly simple adjustments of what farmers had used on ox-drawn ploughs. The change from wet to dry-planting and from single to double-crop seasons was in sight. Planting brought in temporary workers who would be dispensed with once suitable equipment was available for that purpose but that was a long shot because it was the seedling itself that had to be placed securely on the ridge. The next phase in tobacco production consisted of several operations calculated to enhance the vitality and even growth of the leaf. Conventional cultivation, sorting out the illegitimate weeds and destroying them, was done by African labourers with hand hoes. If labour was temporarily hired from neighbouring reserves for the specific purpose, the workers themselves often brought in their own hoes, for which the farmer did not pay, wages being fixed by the day or the fortnight. Alternatively, the farmer provided hand hoes obtained through the local trade in simple implements.

Although soil fertility could be enhanced by crop rotation and green manuring to some extent, tobacco tended to be allergic to such devices. In the early years of systematic settlement, imported fertilizers and anti-disease chemicals could be obtained through various arrangements, such as stop-orders on standing crops, so that capital's inputs entered agriculture long before their formal monetization. As early as 1940, some tobacco growers were already obtaining their fertilizer supplies through such

credit arrangements with local importers/distributors (SR 1941, R of LAB:2). Fertilizer manufacturing within the country was still a tentative proposition on the drawing board (SR 1949, DCC, Second Interim Report: 13-14). As fertilizer consumption increased during the 1950s, so did the social emphasis on 'adequate fertilization', that is 'using fertilizers of the correct analysis'. Whereas conventional wisdom among tobacco growers persuaded them to increase quantities or try various mixtures informed more by guesswork than by bio-chemistry, the experts had other ideas. In 1953, the TRB issued the first fertilizer handbook (RT March, 1957: 14-15).

That marks a new development in the relationship between settler and capital over the economic appropriation of some of the farmer's most critical inputs. With the issue of an 'impersonal' handbook, farmers lost control over the conception of fertility while capitalists took the initiative in future technical developments on the matter. New chemicals arrived on the market. In 1959, mineral oils for controlling sucker growth were tentatively but persuasively introduced to replace the labourer's hand. They would be produced, supplied and replaced by capitalists alone, as commodities. Attempts by some tobacco growers to substitute engine oil and dieseline for the new suckecides were immediately discouraged (RT February, 1959: 8). By 1979, the Rhodesia Tobacco Association [RTA] vice-president Bertie Palmer was protesting the "cost squeeze" applied by fertilizer companies on poor tobacco growers who had become 'the

nut between the crackers' (RTT March, 1979: 5). Chapter Seven will examine the development of that cost squeeze, while Chapter Nine will recall all that in the context of the growing accessibility of agro-chemicals to African farmers resettled on the land after 1979.

Then comes 'reaping', which involves several operations both in the fields and on the farmstead. In conventional tobacco culture, the first reaping task was what North Americans call 'priming', that is removing the tobacco leaves from the plant as they become ripened (mellowed). Emphasis was placed on accurate selection of ripened (not green) leaves, speed and leaf 'safety'. Each African 'reaper' took one row at a time and was followed by a 'waiter', who took each full hand back to the trailer parked on the field road. The leaf was then either immediately tied onto mutepes before it was loaded onto the trailer and taken to the barn or, if there were no separate tiers for the purpose, the leaf was dispatched immediately on the trailer to a shed near the barn, where the reapers and waiters would follow it up in the afternoon to tie and load it into the barn. Tying the leaf to mutepes was done with cotton or twine threads, depending on costing and full mutepes were horizontally hung in the flue-curing barn for two or more days before the leaf was unloaded, untied and loose-bulked in crates.

The conventional 'reaper' [i.e. the farmer himself] could minimize his costs by reorganizing the work so as to get the most out of labour, improvising various instruments which cost him

next to nothing or eliminating them altogether so that performance depended as much on his organizing skills as on the dexterity of the 'unskilled' African labourer. Whether or not the grower adhered to conventional reaping instruments and techniques depended to some extent on the implements he owned and his calculation of the value of inputs. Even though some of the inputs that went into reaping cost next to nothing, the fact that their value was accounted for in commodity production indicates that they were monetized in the 'real' sense, which means that the conventional reaper, as a commodity producer, became formally subordinated to capital even before he had to rely on capital to provide him with industrially produced instruments of production. However, many of the options of relying on easily acquired [not purchased from extra-agrarian capitals] inputs would slowly vanish as capital moved in with instruments and methods of production made and conceived by itself. With the transition to new means and methods of reaping [Chapter Seven], the grower would have to eliminate many of his own means of production as well as the gut calculations which accompanied them and replace them with elements produced by capitalists as commodities, whose proper use was specified by manuals whose logic was that of capitalist productivity, that is production of relative surplus value. More new inputs would enter production, at increasing cost to the grower, and through him to the African labourer.

Passing over other detailed operations, reaping, which ended in curing and loose-bulking, was followed by conventional

grading. Like all conventional operations, grading varied according to the grower's craftsmanship. Since tobacco manufacturers and traders controlled the world market, the initiative lay with extra-agrarian capitalists and the effects of their power would soon be felt by the conventional grader. All that buyers had to say in driving a bargain on the auction floor was 'The bale is mixed', and the grower would have to reconsider his inputs and grading methods the following season. Grower A.F.Green outlined his experience with conventional grading (RTJ October, 1964: 42-43). The work site was a 'hot steamy and often dusty tin-roofed shed'. Without crates, Green improvised partitions between graders with bricks left over from farm building. His losses were so high that Green had to send part of the next crop to commercial graders in order to sell the whole crop within the market season. In itself, the rise of commercial graders marks the beginnings of the separation of tobacco semi-processing from the farmer towards control by capitalists outside agriculture. The failure of Green's technical improvisation with bricks meant he had to accept the need for the 'proper' grading equipment, that is some commodities supplied by extra-agrarian capitalists.

After unsuccessfully trying a more advanced system by organizing graders on conveyor belt principles, Green was advised by experts to return to conventional grading, with improvements. The episode has lessons for capital's possibilities through formal subordination. First, capital can organize alternative

ways of facilitating the circulation of commodities if conventional methods threaten to obstruct it, as in the intervention of commercial graders in tobacco semi-processing, to enable the grower to make the market season. Secondly, independent producers cannot freely shift to more advanced techniques while the old ones still permit capital to profit on the basis of conventional operations, as in the case of Green's trial with the conveyor belt method. Thirdly, while technological change generally takes a direction favourable to capital, it does not proceed in simple unilineal evolution. Last, but not least, capitalists do not need to attend agricultural operations in person in order to control the labour process or direct its course of development.

Essentially, conventional grading involved the following sequence of operations. Cured tobacco was taken from the loose-bulk, untied and weighed into 'scales' [portions of work] ranging from 9-12 pounds each. A 'runner' moved all day long between graders who needed more scales and 'checkers' who examined grading accuracy [like leaves to be placed together] and allotted more scales on either continual or piece-work basis. Graders removed string from their scales, sorted the leaves according to colour, spot coverage, size and a list of other physical properties specified by the buyers in the increasing range of cultural mystifications of the tobacco leaf in the market. Then checkers examined the leaf and carted it on trolleys to 'blenders', who rechecked accuracy and packed the leaf into

crates. After that tiers, usually women and juveniles employed temporarily (see Chapters Five and Seven) tied the leaf into hands and handed it to 'balers', who steamed and baled it in hessian or crates with a manual press. Like all instruments used in semi-processing tobacco leaf until about 1963, the baling press was simple, cheap to buy and easy to repair but increasingly reputedly [contested] "slow" and "costly on labour" (Tony Oates, RTJ November, 1964: 39). Their operation might involve some expenditure on labour-power but did not require further inputs whose prices were beyond the grower's influence.

Although capital was already taking control of tobacco production within conventional culture, the grower still had the potential for becoming master of his own trade. In the transition to new instruments and techniques of production, the grower was to lose both the control of his instruments and the conception of the labour process to forces outside agriculture. Settler farmers, however, did not automatically embrace every innovation placed before them. The transition was therefore an uneven and contradictory process which needed a suitable institutional framework to stabilize it. The coercive measures adopted by the colonial state in co-ordinating land settlement with capitalist development were not guaranteed to be as effective in promoting development of productive forces. The pressure of competition, to which technological change is often uncritically wholly attributed, could not have succeeded on its own to induce settler farmers to innovate as rapidly as they did between 1945 and the

early 1960s. Moreover, as argued in Chapter Three, capitalists are often too reluctant and unable to exercise their class power directly and collectively in common cause. The formal, and increasingly real, subordination of settler farmers to capital through the commodification and indirect but effective appropriation of their means of production - mechanical, agro-chemical and cultural inputs - required the intervention of historical agents organized through the institutions of colonial society in order to secure the farmers' submission with minimal overt conflict within the colonial enterprise as a whole.

Accordingly, capital's power to that effect was channelled through the 'objective' and authoritative institutions of science and the state. Such institutions, seemingly elevated above the mundane squabbles of civil society and working for a perceived 'common good', became crucial to the often contested power of capital. From Scorrer's Marandellas Central Farm in the 1900s to the Blackfordby Tobacco Training Institute [TTI] established in the twilight of the colonial regime, capital appropriated such ideological canopies to legitimate its class power and to represent its interests as though they were those of the whole society. In between, various, research stations, training and extension services as well as semi-autonomous (and quasi-official) 'farmers' associations emerged to contribute to that role. The analysis of how capital came to subordinate settler farmers to its purposes must identify the agencies through which the process was mediated. Without such mediation,

Ford, International Harvester, Windmill Fertilizers and other upstream capitalists would have encountered severe limitations in their attempts to transform settler agriculture from a conventional practice oriented towards subsistence towards becoming a lucrative market for the regular supply of industrial outputs and a stable source of raw materials required for capitalist production and accumulation. That is why it will be necessary, in considering the real subordination of settler farmers to capital in Chapter Six, to examine and not just receive, the historical roles of the Rhodesia Tobacco Association [RTA, now ZTA], the Tobacco Research Board [TRB], the Department of Conservation and Extension [CONEX, superseded by AGRITEX], the Standing Committee on Agricultural Mechanization [SCAM], and others.

The argument that the relations between settler farmer and capital from 1945 to the early 1960s were initially those of formal subordination, developing towards real subordination, would remain incomplete without an examination of how the tobacco grower related to the capitals that appropriated his commodity, namely the buyers of tobacco leaf downstream from settler agriculture. That follows in the next subsection.

4.2.3 Capital, Tobacco Growers and Their Commodity.

In attempting to organize the land market according to the

logic of capitalist accumulation, the colonial state set out to control tobacco growers through a programme of systematic settlement in which the Land Settlement Board determined how the land was to be used, hence forestalling landlord speculation. To control the production process without directly investing in agriculture, capital moved to undermine the autonomy of the farmer as a craftsman, so that the latter increasingly came to depend on capital to provide the instruments of production and to determine the conception of production. This subsection concludes analysis of the initial subjection of tobacco growers to capital by examining their changing relationship to capital through the exchange of their commodity on the auction floors with the agents of merchant buyers and manufacturers.

Most economic historians of Zimbabwean agricultural development have rightly demonstrated how African peasants were ruined out of agriculture through their initial participation in the colonial commodity markets earlier this century (Kosmin, 1977; Phimister, 1977; Ndelela, 1981). Few, however, have considered the possibility of European farmers encountering the same fate in the commodity market. It was European farmers, after all, who demanded and got exclusive access to agricultural produce markets and supported racist curbs on African competition therein. Only recently did someone point out that in the very markets he had come to monopolize, the settler farmer encountered some of his most agonizing experiences (Caute, 1983:98). Accordingly, it is contended that in the exchange of his crop on the Harare auction

floors, the European tobacco grower became increasingly subjected to the objectives of extra-agrarian capitals, that is to the steady supply of semi-processed leaf to merchants and manufacturers who circulated and processed it for profit, mostly overseas.

As usual, developments in economic history, particularly among those primarily critical of "underdevelopment" in African areas, have tended to confuse the issues. Once more, beginning with the racist monopolization of privilege by European colonials, who are often indiscriminately lumped together as 'capitalists', economic historians have concentrated their polemics on institutional racist exclusion of Africans from the market, conveniently forgetting that it was in those very markets that African peasants were squeezed out of agriculture. As with land apportionment, well-meaning critics of colonial racism have ended up reproducing intact the analytic distortions of capitalist domination of agriculture simply by focusing their research efforts uncritically on condemnation of racist institutions.

Before turning to analysis of the development of certain relations between tobacco growers and buyers, this section will first attempt to remove the smokescreen of racist politics and ideology by critically evaluating the claims of certain economic historians in their criticism of colonialism. One must begin by crediting our economic historians for recording how Zimbabwean peasants quickly responded to agricultural marketing

"opportunities" when European traders and miners established themselves in their neighbourhoods. However, it is not enough simply to reiterate that the strangers were impressed with the African people's business acumen, which they had not expected, as economic historians have tended to do (Phimister, 1977: 265; Ndlela, 1981: 155, 175). Our economic historians have also appropriately recorded that the "peasant prosperity" due to the much celebrated African market alertness was destined to be short-lived.

From that point onwards, the efforts of economic historians have been spent in arguing the now too clear point that African peasants who entered the commodity market earlier this century were destined to suffer 'underdevelopment' and 'proletarianization'. Logically, two conflicting conclusions, rarely seen as such by our economic historians, have been emphasized on the matter of African participation in agricultural produce markets. First, the capitalist market turned out to be a terrain of exploitation in which African peasants were economically destroyed. Second, by blocking that market to Africans and letting European farmers monopolize it, the colonial state gave the latter an enviable privilege which enabled them to prosper. Accordingly, the predatory capitalists in the commodity market appeared to be an asset to the European farmers who monopolized access to markets under the colonial system.

From that conundrum, economic historians somehow emerged with the idea that "underdevelopment" was largely due to the

unenlightened colonial state interventions through marketing boards and producer associations which, instead of rationally stabilizing prices for the benefit of all farmers, degenerated into racial discrimination, irrational economic practices and 'distortions'. Hence, while encouraging settlers to increase their productivity, marketing institutions stampeded African farmers out of the produce markets and relegated them to the labour market by increasing their "effort cost". From these economic historical perspectives, "productivity" is considered to be class-neutral and in everyone's interest while 'the principal goal of marketing in an underdeveloped economy' is also neutrally assumed to be the achievement of 'the greatest possible participation in the cash economy' by producers (Dunlop, 1970, cf. Ndlela, 1981: 165). Alternatively, 'The aims of the producer pricing policy for Rhodesian regulated products are determined by that which strives to return to producers the best price possible' (Hunt, 1973: 195). Implicitly, there is supposed to be an objective equalizer in the market which requires that producers get the maximum price and that their participation also be maximal. In other words, without the racism embedded in the colonial system - market quotas, levies, grading and transport systems - 'rational' intervention would have achieved those 'desirable' goals. Therefore 'underdevelopment' can be overcome by removing institutional barriers to African market participation.

From a Marxist perspective, the object of capitalist

marketing is neither maximizing producer participation in exchange nor guaranteeing the best possible returns to the producer but the realization of surplus-value by capitalists as profit. Hunt clearly states in conventional terms what the position of the producer becomes on entering the commodity market with his product:

Up to the stage of marketing, the success of the production process rests largely with the producer himself. But once he has delivered his produce to a marketing body he relinquishes his control of its disposition. Yet his interest in what is achieved remains vital to him, as a most important determinant of success or failure in his farming venture (Hunt, 1973: 195).

For Marxists, the farmer's relinquishment of his product in the market has more significance than any considerations of maximal returns to him. It forms part of his domination by capitalists. Since some producers would be compelled to sell only labour-power, the narrowing or total blocking of African peasants' access to the produce market was quite compatible with capital's objectives. That this was a condition for capitalist development has been openly acknowledged and recorded by colonial officials and our economic historians have extensively argued that point. If racial discrimination sent some of the agricultural producers (Africans) to the labour market and promoted the other farmers' (Europeans') capitalist productivity and legitimated capitalism among the latter by guaranteeing them privileges, capitalism could only thrive and there would be nothing irrational about it from that perspective. Furthermore, those market institutions which some economic historians have

lumped together under 'racism' were subsequently applied to those agricultural produce markets in which only European settler farmers were allowed to participate. The quotas, levies, and the grading system applied to the flue-cured tobacco market operated no less effectively in a sector from which Africans were completely excluded? Against whom were they supposed to discriminate?

If such market controls had ruined African peasants - which they certainly had - would they also harm European tobacco growers in any way? Colonialism, of course, had no interest in the full proletarianization and expulsion of each and every agricultural producer from the land, particularly the European settlers. It needed them to produce raw materials and surplus value and did a lot to keep them on the land, and to help them subsist. So the effect of market participation on European farmers cannot be expected to coincide with what capital had done to the African peasantry. For economic historians, this difference remained a fascinating 'problem'.

Taking the quota system in maize marketing before 1945, for instance, Ndlela focused exclusively on the fact that it 'protected the small-scale European farmers against African competition by restricting African participation in the high-price internal market' (Ndlela, 1981: 164). While the history of African competition and its obstruction through racial discrimination by colonial administrations cannot be ignored, there is clearly much more significance in the role of market

quotas for agricultural producers than their discriminatory function in some specific circumstances. The quota system can and has been applied to different purposes. In the context Ndlela encounters it, the quota system was applied to various effects which must not be ignored: legitimization of colonialism among poor white farmers through racial discrimination, forcing Africans to abandon peasant farming and to submit to wage labour, and enabling the settler farmer to replace the African food and raw material producer who had been displaced from the land. Furthermore, subsequent introduction of tobacco marketing quotas in the early 1960s suggests that they were considered necessary in regulating the overproduction crisis of the time and their application during the UDI period shows how indispensable they became to the illegal regime's strategy for diversification and sanctions-busting.

Since administrative controls of all sorts continued to be applied to the product market long after they had been used to drive the African peasant from agriculture, their significance extends well beyond their initial association with racial discrimination. Assuming that association beyond its historical context, Ndlela notes that the state continued to expand its role in agricultural marketing but does not ask why. It is pointless simply to remark that the state's marketing role became 'greater', particularly after 1965 (Ndlela, 1981: 159). His focus on racial 'dualism' prevents him from pursuing the analysis of that growing state role. As it turned out to be, the expansion of

that state role, particularly in the tobacco market, entailed the mobilization of all the controls previously used against African peasants in attempts to extend and intensify the subordination of European tobacco growers to extra-agrarian capitals.

Whereas early settlers did enjoy a certain degree of autonomy with respect to capital in the land market by acquiring large tracts when land was cheaper, and in the factor market by improvising implements, and in production by practicing 'conventional' methods as craftsmen, there seems to be no clear parallel of such autonomy with respect to the tobacco market. It would be an oversight, however, to conclude from the fact that tobacco was immediately destined to the world market that the grower was immediately and fully subjected to the buyers of his commodity. As with all other relations between capitalists and producers, subordination of the latter to the former was historical, involving protracted struggles between them. Kosmin's account of the demise of the once 'prosperous' Inyanga tobacco industry in Zimbabwe through African peasants' increased access to, and powerlessness within, the market provides a useful background for later developments in the exclusively white flue-cured tobacco market (Kosmin, 1977). Although Cripps' 'pioneering' 1894 crop sold lucratively at 52d/lb, European growers had an early taste of their market vulnerability when the World War I glut on British markets precipitated a 'virtual collapse' from which recovery was slow after 1919 (Rose, 1960: 305).

A close approximation of the 'European grower's market autonomy before tobacco buyers began to impose their class control would be the practice of 'sale by private treaty', in which buyers and individual growers made their own arrangements for exchange. This was only briefly interrupted by auction sales between 1911-1913 and in 1928. Sale by private treaty was ended in 1936 when the Tobacco Marketing Act established compulsory auction sales (Rose, 1960: 305). Meanwhile, British tobacco traders sought ways of reducing their dependence on the more expensive American supplies and saving on dollars. Pursuing their own interests as capital, the buyers prevailed upon colonial officials to co-opt the Rhodesian growers' leadership as the recognized 'representatives' of all growers into an alliance with capital. In 1933, RTA membership became compulsory so that all growers had to register through it in order to participate in the market at all.

The RTA leadership became integral to capital and joined the Tobacco Marketing Board [TMB] in negotiating agreements with British [1933, 1948] and Australian [1949] buyers whereby buyers guaranteed markets and 'imperial preference' to Zimbabwean growers in exchange for guarantees from the RTA and the TMB that they would ensure that supplies were steady, and that prices and quality were 'reasonable' (Rose, 1960: 306). For capital, 'reasonable' refers to the possibility of realizing profit on a continual basis. ~~Ostensibly,~~ 'imperial preference' would give Zimbabwean producers 'advantages' over their American and

Canadian competitors. More significantly, the agreements would save dollars for the buyers by providing them with cheaper leaf and enabling them to buy within the sterling area. The norm that the whole effort should be aimed at meeting the needs of the customer and the belief that it was the growers who were 'capturing' the markets from their competitors in other countries, rather than the markets capturing the growers, was easily established. As capitalists, buyers insisted on a steady annual supply and tended to view the 'quality' and other properties of the product as always at best modest, all of which was consistent with meeting the exigencies of capitalist accumulation.

With those very agreements which offered them 'preference', the growers' relative autonomy as equal exchange partners under the private treaty system would be eroded in the auction system. In 1936, the TMB introduced compulsory auctions, ostensibly to 'protect' growers against speculative buyers, but effectively to subject them to 'the Trade', as the buyers are collectively known in the business. Initially commissioned for technical co-ordination of the market, the TMB was increasingly authorised to regulate auction sales, classify the crop into an increasingly complex range of colour, grade, type and other properties desired by the buyers, conclude trade agreements, licence buyers, auction floors, grading and packing warehouses and commercial graders, control floor charges and deliveries from growers, determine minimum prices and, in exceptional circumstances, pool the

surplus leaf and dispose of it as it saw fit (Brelsford, 1960: 736-737; Rose, 1960: 309). By 1950, the TMB was no longer a mere co-ordinator but the concentration of capital's power in the tobacco market. Its power would soon extend from the point of commodity exchange to control of certain aspects of the conception and execution of the labour process on the farm.

To comprehend its social-economic role and power, it is necessary to probe beyond the TMB's official 'functions' by locating it within the relations of production and exchange between capital and growers. To begin with, the TMB was established to bring tobacco marketing under public control within the context of promoting capitalist accumulation. Originally, it consisted of a chairman, 3 members selected from a list submitted by the RTA and 2 from a list submitted by the Tobacco Trade Section of the Salisbury Chamber of Commerce. The chairman was selected from high ranks of the public service, while the members were appointed by the Minister of Agriculture on good reputation in business, that is among capitalists. As usual, RTA nominees would be drawn from among the already co-opted leadership. From 1950 onwards, the Trade representatives were to be nominated by the newly formed Tobacco Trade Association [TTA]. Then in 1958 another TTA representative was added to the Board. Officially, this was explained as 'putting an end to 20 years of grower domination' in the public administration of tobacco marketing (Brelsford, 1960: 736). All TMB members, however, were in fact state bureaucrats. The

so-called "grower domination", which refers to the RTA majority of 1 on the Board until 1958, is misleading because RTA leaders were always at great social distance from their compulsory membership and much closer to capital. The ordinary tobacco growers have never dominated anyone in the tobacco industry except African workers, which they tried to do absolutely, as Chapter Five will demonstrate.

However, the composition of the TMB and the growing list of its official 'functions' only indirectly reflect the relationships between buyers and growers. Economic historians have tended to reproduce uncritically the self-misrepresentations of colonialism by taking its institutions at face value and emphasizing only their racist character. To grasp those relations, it is necessary that buyers be identified as capitalists, just as growers have been identified as commodity producers who also happened to employ wage workers. The buyers of Zimbabwean tobacco are either merchant capitalists who profit from selling the leaf repeatedly at prices higher than market price or the cigarette manufacturing monopoly corporations themselves, who also profit from repeated purchases and sales in addition to the profits of enterprise realized from tobacco processing. Membership of the TTA is open to all 'bona fide' traders. In 1984, the TTA consisted of 25 member companies, among whom were 10 licenced buyers and 8 packing houses (TIC, 1984: 11). Most are local branches of companies whose origins go back to the expansion and complex reorganization of the international tobacco

industry in 19th Century Britain and America. (1) In 1948, the Tobacco Trade Section of the Salisbury Chamber of Commerce temporarily separated itself from other merchants to establish a tobacco 'solidarity' with the growers. By 1952, it had rejoined the Chamber as an affiliate under the name of the TTA (Rose, 1960: 312).

As an association of traders within civil society, the TTA has specifically capitalist class interests and strategies for pursuing them. Public officials could not represent these openly to growers without jeopardizing the credibility of the TMB and the whole relations between growers and merchants. Rose freely depicted the TTA as a private organization, open to all established tobacco merchants, and set up 'to look after the interests of the selling, buying, packing, exporting and allied interests' in Central Africa (Rose, 1960: 311). He explicitly revealed that it intended to co-operate with other capitalist interests on an international level and that it would seek to influence the political process, directly intervening in the colonial state 'to promote, draft, assist in drafting and promoting any bill or ordinance calculated to further its interests for presentation to parliament...'. Its interest in promoting research into production, handling, manipulation,

(1) Their specific history is complex enough a subject to require separate treatment elsewhere. Interested readers may begin with Corina, 1975.

grading and storage' was also emphasized (Rose, 1960: 312). (1) Rose began to obscure the TTA's identity when he described it as 'a non-profit making organization'. This contrasts sharply with the fact that the whole purpose of its membership is nothing other than profit making without ever entering the two spheres of production (growing and processing).

The tendency to obscure the capitalist identity of the TTA intensifies as one comes to the official accounts of its role in the public regulation of the market by the TMB. Attention now focuses on the growing subordination of the grower through the circulation of his commodity, beginning with the 1936 Tobacco Marketing Act, continuing through the crisis of overproduction in the early 1960s and on [in Chapter Six] to the arrangements for secret trade and agricultural diversification after 1965 until the end of sanctions in 1980. It must be emphasized that although growers began to lose what autonomy they might have had before 1936, their nominal relationship to the commodity remained the same throughout the period under study. Growers continued to enter the market as legally free and equal partners in commodity exchange. In that sense, their subordination to capital remained formal. The extra-agrarian capitals who profited from the circulation and eventual processing of tobacco did not directly place the growers under their immediate control.

In establishing their indirect power over formally

(1) In Chapter Six, it will become clear that the Trade often preferred to burden the growers and the public with such responsibilities.

independent producers, capitalists could not present themselves as sectional interests without incurring grower hostility. The only power apparently elevated above sectional and conflicting interests was that of the colonial state and it was crucial that capital's power be mediated through that state. Accordingly, the TMB was established by parliament and nominated by the Minister of agriculture. The Trade calmly accepted what appeared as a minority position, strategically deferring to the RTA 'grower representatives' and only eventually pressing for 'parity'. From the outset, however, the TMB's control of the growers for capital was financed 'almost entirely by the growing side of the tobacco industry', that is by the growers (Brelsford, 1960: 736). By 1960, legislation had been passed to 'allow' the TMB to receive funds from any source. Growers were made to finance their own control by capitalists through a marketing levy charged by their own RTA representatives on the Board. In addition to the moneys from the Tobacco Levy Account, established in 1955 by the Tobacco Levy Act, which imposed a charge on 'all sellers of tobacco' [growers only], the TMB was authorized to 'recover' part of its revenues from 'penalties' imposed on growers who did not meet the specifications demanded by capitalist buyers on entering the market (Brelsford, 1960: 736). (1)

By making auction sales compulsory, placing them under public administration and restricting the number of auction

(1) The nature of these penalties will be examined in greater detail in Chapter Six in connection with the intensification of this process after 1965).

floors, the colonial state took the first steps in centralizing capital's power over the tobacco market through the 1936 Tobacco Marketing Act. It was just a beginning. Simultaneously, it tried to ensure that no individual buyers could selfishly conclude independent agreements with individual growers, which might give growers the power to bargain for higher prices outside the concentrated powers of all capitals. Even then, it was not until the early 1960s that the state moved to control the practice whereby growers had come to habitually pay previous debts at the auctions out of the season's income and immediately placing stop-orders with merchants in order to plant tobacco in the next season' (RTJ October, 1963: Editorial). The 1963 Stop-Order Bill centralized the execution of such stop-orders by stipulating that they be henceforth registered with the TMB and made available for regular inspection. It was suggested that this would be in the long-term interest of the growers as it created a 'healthy credit situation' (RTJ October, 1963: 31). The stabilization of credit, however, was in capital's interest; it was not growers who would realize interest from the regularization of market credit but the buyers-turned-lenders. Table 4.3 indicates that farmers' reliance on stop-order finances increased sharply after 1963.

Table 4.3: New Stop-orders Registered Against Farmers.

(Source: CSO, December, 1971, Monthly Statistical Digest).

Period	Number	Total \$
1958	7,513	8,560
1959	7,309	10,712
1960	7,545	12,714
1961	11,155	14,942
1962	12,961	15,994
1963	12,981	21,410
1964	12,085	30,976
1965	12,365	33,134
1966	14,801	36,950
1967	14,716	34,148
1968	16,469	42,544
1969	16,024	42,559
1970	16,868	44,841

Hence tobacco buyers, in addition to their indirect administrative control over growers, could easily double as creditors, with the TMB intervening to register bad debtors. In effect, the 'healthy credit situation', supposedly so good for growers, became one of the various mechanisms through which the grower's future labour-time could be appropriated in advance by tobacco merchants and manufacturers.

The system of sales by auction itself has been the site of hostile confrontations between growers and buyers. A recent observer reveals what was still happening on the floors as recently as 1977:

Leo will of course attend his moment of truth in one of Salisbury's gigantic auction warehouses. Striding in a pack from bale to bale, dealers will finger the leaf and make bids to a selling agent representing the farmer but appointed by the auctioneers. The buyers never reveal whom they represent, bidding on behalf of 'Number 2' or 'Number 5'. The first bid is not irrevocable; sometimes their

assistants will finger the leaf disparagingly as a prelude to a diminished offer. For the farmer, it's agonizing (Caute, 1983: 98).

Although that observation was made under the 'unusual' UDI conditions, the history of 'free auctions', later recalled with nostalgia by some growers was by no means a peaceful process. In 1961, one grower who frequently liaised between his fellows and capital observed 'that dissatisfaction with the system of auction sales is greater than ever before' (Frank Clements, RTJ February 1961: 27). Grower resentment arose from the frustration of seeing their commodity traded under conditions resembling 'a jumble sale or a lucky dip'. Buyers wanted the system to minimize the strain on their staff by eliminating attempts by some of them and growers ~~to~~ strike trivial bargains which frequently infuriated the growers. The problem for growers was how to regain ~~some~~ control over the exchange process. For the buyers, it was how to consolidate their class power in profit realization, how to deal with the speculative urge amongst them and conceal their collective weakness.

For Clements, and fellow protagonists of modernization, the system had become too antiquated for modern times and only persisted because influential 'conservatives' would not countenance any changes and because some individual buyers insisted on freedom to speculate. His solution for capital's contradictions lay in liberal reform: sales should be rationalized by delegating the whole operation to experts who would calmly study the leaf in the absence of those speculative

elements on both sides who tended to destabilize the exchange process. Clearly, growers and buyers had conflicting experiences in free auctions. While growers watched with increasing frustration their loss of control over the commodity, buyers sought ways of consolidating their class gains and overcoming the contradictions inherent in their logic of competition. As usual, where there is capital, contradiction thrives and no institutional reform could avert that reality.

By September, 1962 the same Clements was claiming that 'it has been conclusively proved that the whole strength of the industry derives from the free auction system' (RTJ September, 1962:70). Clearly, Clements' anxiety arose from fears that the auction system's contradictions could jeopardize 'the industry', that is capital's interest in the growers' acquiescence. It was clear from his subsequent remarks that he feared that both the irrational forms of speculation and the perils of class struggle might get out of control. To that effect, Clements criticized the growers of Marondera South for launching an 'attack on certain buyers', which he significantly equated with an assault on the auction system itself:

These regular flare-ups against the auction system are perhaps one of the most dangerous pests with which the industry is plagued. Like their insectoid and bacterial counterparts, they suddenly appear after a period of dormancy and are apt to infect large areas before they are brought under control (RTJ September, 1962: 70).

Those remarks clearly establish the class contradictions between growers and buyers. Clements' entomological depiction of grower

discontent and his implicit diagnosis of it, together with the treatment thereof are typical of neo-modernization theorists' agenda for containing social discontent. His ideological contribution towards that goal was to remind the growers 'that middlemen have a valuable function' and to urge them 'not to disorganize a system which works'. It would be disastrous for 'growers as a body to plunge into the labyrinth of merchanting'. If any growers thought they could make easy fortunes as merchants, they should have the 'common sense' to combine and form buying companies. To soothe the wounds, capital's ideologue complemented Marondera South growers for 'wisely' withdrawing their resolution against certain buyers (Ibid.). As usual, the leaders' social wisdom had prevailed and the growers of Marondera South had dutifully retreated.

By meticulously fostering the illusion of 'the industry', in which the various branches should perform their functions for the vitality of the whole under the free auctions system, and by cultivating the semblance of democratic participation for the growers in the market through their RTA representatives, capital and its ideologues impressed it upon the growers that they had a stake in it all. As buyers steadily increased and tried to consolidate their class power through the TMB, and as the post-war British boom absorbed colonial Zimbabwe's tobacco exports, the illusion of Rhodesian prosperity prevailed and tobacco production soared towards 1964, when optimistic overproduction precipitated not just low prices but the most

decisive pretext for capital to impose the most stringent controls hitherto attempted in the tobacco market. While the bubble floated, free auctions had acquired the status of a 'sacred cow' just as the necessity of controlled production had begun to unfold. As that moment of truth arrived, growers initially contemptuously dismissed "crop control" as "creeping socialism". To the extent that the subject of crop control was countenanced in the early 1960s, most growers considered only the alternative forms of it, if they were found to be necessary, by the authorities as usual. Few questioned its implications for growers' relationships with capital. Most growers indicated a preference of control through quotas on weight sold over quotas on acreage and barns per grower. Implicit in crop control was that 'the authorities' would have the power to destroy unwanted surpluses or unauthorized acreages. What actually transpired from the combination of overproduction in 1963 and 1964 to the subsequent embargo on tobacco exports after 1965 constitutes major shifts in the relationships between growers, buyers and the colonial state. When the growers faced the reality of crop control and sanctions, they looked upon the pre-1963 period as the 'halcyon days' in the industry. Those developments will form the substance of Chapter Six.

4.2.4 Conclusion.

This chapter presented what may be considered as a 'first-cut' argument towards the conclusion that Zimbabwe's settler farmers have, since 1945, become subordinated to the exigencies and contradictions of capitalist accumulation outside agriculture. It was argued and demonstrated that this has been happening precisely in terms of what many have seen as the development of a so-called 'agrarian bourgeoisie', namely through the farmers' acquisition of the land, of their own productive instruments and modern methods of farming, as well as their unlimited access to the commodity markets. It was contended, on the basis of current theoretical developments on the matter of capitalist subjection of independent producers, that these farmers' employment of wage workers and their ideological-political identification with capitalism made no difference on the fact that their own relations with capitalists outside agriculture are basically hostile and have been experienced as such historically. Accounts of European agriculture in Zimbabwe conducted within simple distributive problematics of 'development' and 'underdevelopment', which ended up identifying these farmers as a local 'agrarian bourgeoisie' and advocating various economic reforms, were critically evaluated on matters of internal theoretical coherence and political plausibility, from the perspective of socialist transformation. They were convicted on both grounds.

In 4.2.1, the actual historical process of post 1945 colonial land settlement, as opposed to the institutional manifestations of racist land apportionment Acts, was examined with reference to its official records. An attempt was made to explain how farmers who own their own land actually ended up working for subsistence under capitalist domination in this reorganization of agriculture. It was argued that settling individual farmers on the land as owner-occupiers facilitated capital's transformation of land into a capitalist means of production without capital itself risking to invest directly in agriculture. The problem for capital in this case, namely how to control the use to which land is put and how to contain landlord speculation, which had become a barrier to capitalist development, was thereby temporarily resolved. Substantively, it was indicated that from the mid-1960s onward, new forms of colonial land settlement developed whose impact would be discussed in the context of the intensification of capital's control of agriculture in Chapter Six.

In 4.2.2, attention focused on the possibility that Zimbabwean tobacco growers, as owners of their own means of production and supervisors of African wage labour, might have become capitalists in their own right. First, it was theoretically established that 'owning' means of production without retaining power over their mobilization or their real economic appropriation remains quite consistent with the Marxian criteria for formal subordination. Then it was demonstrated that

the Zimbabwean tobacco grower's independence on these matters had begun to be eroded with the reorganization of agriculture between 1945 and the early 1960s. The invasion of Zimbabwean agriculture by capitalists wielding alternative instruments and conceptions of production was interpreted as evidence of increasing domination of settler farmers by capitalists outside agriculture, not of the farmers' mastery over capital, as the protagonists of an 'agrarian bourgeoisie' would like to believe. Again, details of further developments on that matter were postponed to Chapter Six.

In 4.2.3, attention moved from what settler farmers had acquired and how capital had taken control of it by leaving it in their legal possession towards the problem of how such producers relate to their commodity and to capital as the two exchange commodities in the market. It was argued that tobacco growers, even though remaining legally equal to tobacco buyers in the market, had actually increasingly become subordinate partners in the exchange process. Once more, state power was crucial in mediating this development and again, its further intensification will be part of the subject of Chapter Six. That chapter will consider the extent to which the capitalist class had successfully transformed its formal domination of independent settler farmers towards real subordination by 1979. The emphasis will be on the movement towards that outcome, not on the analysis of real subordination as a fiat ~~accompli~~. Chapter Five interrupts the argument advanced so far to bring in the African wage workers,

the immediate producers of the flue-cured tobacco leaf on the lands,

CHAPTER FIVE

FORMAL SUBORDINATION OF AFRICAN WORKERS TO CAPITAL

5.0 Introduction.

If, as Chapter Four argues, settler farmers became formally subordinated to capital by retaining and acquiring means of production, which they lost control of, and by circulating their commodities through the capitalist market in order to subsist, what became of the African producers who were separated from both? Ostensibly, African workers automatically became subordinated to those settler farmers who appropriated their land and other means of production and with whom they made their wage contracts. Exponents of an 'agrarian bourgeoisie' have to make such an assumption and thereby lose sight of the extra-agrarian capitals that lie behind the whole transformation. The argument in this chapter rejects the assumption that their expropriation immediately delivered African producers to capital as an instant "proletariat" born out of primitive accumulation, which is what many economic historians of Zimbabwean development have assumed uncritically.

It shall be contended instead that proletarianization was a protracted historical development in which African producers responded to each act of expropriation by resorting to the next subsistence possibility, each of which in turn represented a new

barrier to capitalist accumulation, until wage labour became the most viable one. In short, wage labour, particularly on settler farms, was only taken up as the last resort. Even then, African workers did not necessarily submit completely to capitalist exploitation without resisting it in the workplace. Accordingly, whereas Chapter Four argues to establish that settler farmers did in fact become subordinated to capital, despite appearances, Chapter Five argues to restore the historical dynamic in the formal subordination of African workers to capital by demonstrating the limited effectivity of the initial expropriation and alienation of their means of production and products thereof.

Section 5.1 locates the argument in the contemporary discourse on the capitalization of labour in Zimbabwe, beginning in 5.1.1 with a critique of two theories on the matter, namely the theory of 'civilization', advanced by modernization theorists, and that of 'proletarianization', propounded by some dependency theorists. In 5.1.2, an alternative approach, based on Marx's analysis of the labour process, is offered. Section 5.2 examines the development of a labour market in Zimbabwe. Subsection 5.2.1 examines the various subsistence alternatives to which African producers resorted with each step in colonial expropriation and indicates the ideal relationship with labour which capitalists generally projected in Zimbabwe. Subsection 5.2.2 examines capital's first resort in tackling its labour 'problem' in terms of the contradictions encountered in the use

of migrant labour. Subsection 5.2.3 analyzes the initial struggle between labour and capital in the apportionment of labour-time into necessary-labour for workers and surplus-labour for capitalists in flue-cured tobacco production for export, with settler farmers managing labour on behalf of capital. The chapter concludes that the struggle over the length of the working-day remained inconclusive as a new approach to labour exploitation was superimposed on it.

5.1 "Civilization", Proletarianization and the Labour Process.

5.1.1 Social Scientists, Farm Labour and Capital.

This subsection begins analysis of the formal subordination of African farm labour to capital in settler agriculture by demonstrating how the relationship has been obscured in contemporary literature and documents on rural Zimbabwe. Realizing how little attention social scientists had given to farm workers, a leading sociologist introduced his exploratory study 14 years ago as follows:

We know very little about farm workers, that is their social composition, family life, mobility, attitudes to work, wages and other related matters. With this in mind, four European farms were studied in 1971 (Chavunduka, 1972:18).

With the proportion of wage labour employed in agriculture fluctuating around 40% of the total between 1957 and 1970 (Table 5.1), agriculture was the single biggest employer of African labour at the time.

Table 5.1 Annual Average Number of African Employees by Sector.

(in thousands).

Period	Agric.	Mining	Manuf.	Grand Totl	Agric. %
1957	226.0	60.7	76.0	620.0	36.45
1958	230.0	57.1	72.4	628.0	36.62
1959	231.0	52.5	74.2	628.0	36.78
1960	240.0	52.3	75.0	640.0	37.50
1961	240.9	48.5	74.3	628.0	38.36
1962	243.9	44.1	73.4	617.0	39.53
1963	257.3	40.9	65.8	610.0	42.18
1964	274.4	41.6	67.1	627.0	43.76
1965	273.8	43.6	71.0	638.0	42.93
1966	270.4	45.7	70.6	640.0	42.25
1967	254.0	47.3	76.9	639.0	39.75
1968	255.9	48.4	84.7	663.0	38.60
1969	267.3	50.4	92.6	697.0	38.50

(CSO, MDS, December, 1970: 11; Ten other sectors not shown here).

Between 1957-1973, the colonial state had recorded 543 strikes (43% of the total stoppages) in agriculture alone (Clarke, 1977: 177-178). Agriculture and private domestic service were the two labour ghettos of Rhodesian colonial society, with the least remunerative and worst conditions of all. Accordingly, neglecting agricultural labour amounted to neglecting labour as a whole. Retrospectively, what social science had neglected as a field of academic interest had long become a specialty of a whole colonial tradition, of labour management 'experts', to whom labour was a

practical economic problem rather than a mere academic curiosity. In the tradition of the British colonial office and such luminaries of modernization ideology as Major Orde Browne, E.A.G. Robinson and Elspeth Huxley, the mandarins of the Rhodesian Department of Native Affairs and management 'experts' in the private sector had long become renowned contributors to the accumulation of an hegemonic consensus about 'the African' as a worker. The spirit of capitalism was articulated without much protest or ethic. It was not until 1977 that a whole study was devoted to protesting the conditions of farm labour and condemning the colonial state's ungenerous reluctance to ameliorate these with positive reforms (Clarke, 1977).

By 1945, the school of management studies had long entrenched itself within colonial society. Its adherents in settler agriculture were already conducting an ideological 'Battle Against Africa', focusing on such matters as what they considered to be 'the African's' attitude towards work, to wages and to family life, on what they assumed to be "his" child-like psychology, taken as a genetic or environmental endowment, all of which were supposed to be strangely combined with "his" unique ingenuity in skrimping [avoiding] set tasks during work or by deliberately concocted absence, and the problems of coping with it all (e.g. D.O. Cowland-Cooper, 'The Battle Against Africa', RT, November, 1959: 19-20). The nasty stereotyping of 'the African' in such writings may discourage 'objective' social scientists of the positivist tradition and the populist

'radicals' of dependency reformism. But if planners of socialist transformation in post-colonial society have anything to learn from the colonial legacy which forms the object of their efforts, the labour management ideology that underlay the reproduction of colonial society on the matter of African labour's relations with capital must be part of it.

The labour-management school remains relevant to socialists because the way it relates labour to capital, so integral to capitalist domination, seems to appeal to post-colonial society once it is separated from the racist component that earned it a bad name in colonial society and presented as a 'purely technical' discipline. Colonial society regarded African labour as a 'problem', the so-called 'Native Problem' for the following reasons. Labour had to be obtained, mobilized at a regular pace and, in agriculture, at the right time during the rainy or marketing season. Labour cost money and had to be operated in such a way as to bring a return on investment. Finally, labour was a problem for colonial society because it was human and alienated from that humanity, so that workers tended to resist control and, if discontented, to revolt and/or withdraw from the production process, which posed a threat to the reproduction of capital. Viewing all this, the labour 'experts' emphasized the technical side of the labour-capital relationship. Social economic relations between labour and capital were to be ignored and addressed only in terms of labour making a problem of itself in an otherwise tranquil society, an occurrence usually not

attributed to workers themselves but to "agitators" from elsewhere. Hence when the conflicts between labour and capital could not be ignored, they were displaced to the realm of aberrations, so that the Commissioner of Native Labour [CNL] could proudly report annually that each year was free of 'labour troubles' or 'disturbances'.

To that end, colonial bureaucrats and labour 'experts' regularly reviewed the labour market, addressing such matters as they considered to be 'problems': 'labour relations' meaning the frequency of open confrontation between workers and their employees, the level of organization among workers, the supply, stabilization, discipline, motivation and efficiency of labour, leading up to the question of mechanization as a 'labour-saving' strategy. Socialists are, in fact, interested in the same problems and this chapter will address similar issues, this time in reverse perspective, that is from the viewpoint of labour's emancipation. To get into that perspective, it will be necessary to ask how other social scientists opposed to colonial domination, 'radical' economic historians for example, have critically addressed and analysed the labour-capital relationship.

With Africans legally separated from the land and other means of production and capitalist penetration disguised as a civilizing process, some economic historians have tended to oversimplify it all by moving straight from legal expropriation to crude generalizations about the 'proletarianization' of

Africans. The outstanding question is whether legal expropriation as such automatically delivered African workers to capital as a labour force. Did the loss of land immediately subject Africans to the discipline of absolute surplus value production? Within the populist discourse on the 'land question', the very act of expropriation has often been treated as the essence of African 'proletarianization' or, as one exponent of that view would have it, of human 'commodification'. A passage from *Capital*, where Marx simply distinguished the recurrent sale of labour-power by 'free' workers from ceding it 'rump and stump', as one must do if sold as a slave, was recently interpreted as 'what Marx observed about the value of labour' [sic.] (Moyana, 1984: 93). The Marx who wrote *Capital* would not make 'observations' about the 'value of labour'. Value is not observable and 'value of labour' is a tautology because the value of everything in Marxist terms is measured in terms of labour. There can be no value of value. Marx could only refer to the value of labour-power as a commodity that takes so much labour-time to reproduce.

Precision aside, Moyana declares that legal separation of African peasants from their land actually commodified them:

the landless peasants, who were converted into commodities by the Land Apportionment Act had no choice in the matter of their status (Moyana, 1984: 93).

The protracted historical process of subordinating labour to capital could not be imposed at the stroke of a pen like that, and in any case the Land Apportionment Act did not decree the

commodification of African peasants.(1) The passage Moyana quoted from Marx is silent on peasant expropriation. Historically, expropriated peasants in Zimbabwe did not cede their labour-power rump and stump to anyone. However crudely peasants were recruited for farm labour, settler farmers never actually owned, bought or produced the peasants themselves as commodities. To make such claims, some 'radical' social historians have quietly ignored Capital while freely extracting isolated bits from Marx's conceptual archives. Such claims usually collapse on the first test of logic. Moyana's formulation of the relationship between labour and capital, for instance, implies that the legal abolition of land segregation in Zimbabwe should have had the effect of turning human commodities into people or of ending capitalist domination of peasants.

A less cavalier but still erroneous conception of 'proletarianization' emerges from attempts to reduce 'wage-labour' to phenomenalist abstractions. Among some of the historians of Zimbabwean 'underdevelopment' for instance, 'proletarianization' became anything and everything that happened to inhabitants of so-called 'peripheries', so that the historical transition from peasantry to working class was considered as a mere change in "status" and geographical location. "Proletarianization" was accordingly defined, after Bundy, as a process whereby Africans were turned from their prior existence

(1) In 'The Land Apportionment Act: A Paper Tiger' (ZAJ 1982:101-105), Bannerman goes some way towards restoring the historical context of land segregation in colonial Zimbabwe.

as 'pastoralist-cultivators' to their contemporary status: 'that of sub-subsistence rural dwellers, manifestly unable to support themselves by agriculture and dependent for survival upon wages earned in "white" industrial regions or on white farms' (Kosmin, 1977: 268). Proletarianization is not a matter of status changes, and many proletarians actually are able to support themselves by agriculture. It is not where they work that defines workers as the proletariat; rather, it is how they relate to the capitalist class, the bourgeoisie.

If the Bundy formulation misses because it originates in so-called 'peasant studies', Clarke's much narrower dependency version fares no better for focusing on 'wage-labour' in 'plantation agriculture'. "Wage-labour" is conceived in the phenomenalist sense of receiving high or low wages in their qualitative physical forms of dollars and rations while farm labour is geographically isolated as 'agricultural production', that being the laboratory within which "rural proletarianization" is observed. Casually mixing conceptual elements of Marxism and dependency, a conventional economist bypasses the material relations between labour and capital and emerges with a concept of 'proletarianization' which means being employed, in the sense that a worker who gets fired or displaced by a machine is considered to be 'deproletarianized' (Clarke, 1977: 19). Without necessarily meaning it, Clarke implies that capital can save itself by resorting to policies of unemployment which lead to 'deproletarianization' of the workers.

Unintended as they might be, such formulations could only contribute confusion to social-economic planning in the socialist movement. The attempt to synthesize conceptual threads from theories as divergent as conventional economics, dependency and Marxism hangs particularly tenuously in Clarke's work on 'wage-labour' in Zimbabwean 'plantation agriculture'. For instance, in his attempt to specify 'plantation agriculture' as a particular 'mode of production', the Marxian concept is reduced to a typology of economic institutions, so that settler agriculture can be considered to be an 'economic type', a 'mode of plantation production'[sic.] which embodies 'underdevelopment biases' and produces 'underdevelopment effects'(Clarke, 1974b: 29-32). Clarke's gestures to dependency continue elsewhere with occasional references to certain regions which have either 'peripheral' or 'central' status, while infusions of Marxism come in the form of references to any expression of 'economic grievances' by workers as a manifestation of 'working class consciousness' (Clarke, 1974a: 41). The analysis of wage-labour remains on the phenomenal level as a matter of calculating magnitudes of remuneration and ethically condemning low wages, which workers everywhere have known throughout the history of capitalism. The relations between labour and capital, immanent within commodity production and exchange, remain concealed under their qualitative manifestations, as dollars and rations.

Other contributions to the analysis of the labour-capital relationship come from the 'Africanist' specialty of 'peasant

studies'. The best known story in that field is that of an African peasantry that emerged as a rational response to the early development of a colonial commodity market, prospered for a while, then got squeezed out by racist competition and state intervention and ended up on the labour market as a proletariat (Palmer and Parsons, eds.: 1977). It has since been critically reviewed by other historians and labelled the 'rise and fall thesis' (Cooper, 1981; Ranger, 1978). Credit is due to all those historians who have questioned the myths of evolutionary modernization of 'the African', propagated by the school of labour management and others in colonial society, and offered alternative historical accounts of 'proletarianization', beginning with the episode of land alienation. As Cooper stated,

By what they do and what they leave out, they force readers to look more closely at the most basic determinants of change: the control of labour, capital accumulation and reproduction (Cooper, 1981: 287).

In the critique of the "rise and fall thesis", one experiences the futility of treating the peasantry as the centrepiece of analysis in an effort to reaffirm the premise that it is the "African agency" of change (e.g. Ranger, 1978: 133).

It has been suggested that the ambiguity of the concept 'peasantry' is both its weakness and 'its most valuable feature' (Cooper, 1981: 286). In terms of the specificity of labour and capital that must be established here, the idea of the ambiguity of a concept being its 'valuable feature' sounds like a riddle. What can be stated confidently is that peasants cannot remain peasants and agents of change when expropriation leaves them with

nothing to exchange but labour-power. Only despair will attend efforts to preserve the peasantry as the normative and invariable adversary of capital in Africa. When peasants are set up as the eternal locus of rural development, capital is exonerated as an exogenous and occasional intruder, with its relationship to direct producers eclipsed as Africanists over-emphasize labour's resistance as rational or irrational responses to an unspecified capitalist presence. As long as peasants and merchants only exchange 'agricultural produce' and money, the relations that are implicit in the Marxian concept of commodity are bound to remain in the horizon like the edge of the world. Even worse, when 'commodity' is taken to be anything that is produced and exchanged between anyone, all social relations are taken for granted.

Even Cooper, who is more conscious of the pervasiveness of capitalism in his critique of "radicals' peasant studies", makes some revealing errors on relating labour to capital. He correctly criticizes the misidentification of a certain class in colonial society by dependency theorists as follows:

Even the colonial nucleus, the class which Clarence-Smith labels as 'capitalist' was not very capitalistic: it had little capital and no great reliance on wage labour, and little dynamism (Cooper, 1981: 295).

Chapter Four went against the trend of "radical" economic history, which views Zimbabwean settler farmers as an "agrarian bourgeoisie" precisely because they are reputed to "own" capital, to use wage-labour and to be dynamic. It went on to argue that

being a capitalist class does not depend on how much capital a group legally owns, the extent to which it employs wage-labour or the perception of its dynamism but on its own relationship to capital in its entirety as the bourgeoisie. The adjustments necessary in moving from the relationship between settler farmers and capital to that of farm labour and capital will be discussed in 5.1.2. For now, attention will remain focused on the treatment of the labour-capital relationship in "peasant studies" and the critique thereof. Towards the end of his article, Cooper condemns the theorization of that relationship by dependency writers as follows:

Marxist scholarship would be greatly furthered by a long moratorium on the use of the words "peasantization" and "proletarianization", although "peripheralization" deserves a permanent place in the museum of gobbledygook. Not only is the use of such words an act of violence against language, but they pose a danger to thought-processes as well (Cooper, 1981: 312).

Through his eloquent condemnation of dependency concepts, Cooper demonstrates his sensitivity towards history. However, he also reveals some weaknesses of his own conception of relations between labour and capital.

Instead of analysing capital as commodity production and exchange, Cooper simply asserts what the 'nature of capitalist penetration into the realm of production is': it remains 'partial' because peasants [ambiguously] 'resist' (Cooper, 1981: 286). Everything in colonial society becomes a matter of an amorphous capital compromising with an ambiguously resisting peasantry. Those who write about "quasi-feudal" relations between

peasants and landlords are criticized for over-simplifying something that remains too simple. Hence his explanation of labour-tenancy as capital's "solution" to peasant resistance:

While far from an antiquated labour system distinct from capitalism, the various forms of labour tenancy represent a particular type of solution to the problems of control and supervision of farm labour, made essential by the resistance of cultivators to their total cut-off from the land and to the capitalist work discipline (Cooper, 1981: 292).

While this analysis agrees with Cooper that their initial expropriation did not automatically throw African peasants into the labour market as docile proletarians, Cooper's rendering of the argument of inconclusive expropriation leaves the impression that capital deliberately preserves the ancient world to serve its own purposes, even though it requires a peasantry to resist what capital really tries to do. The labour-tenancy system Cooper tried to subsume under capitalism in the above passage is the same as the one whereby some European landowners in pre-1945 Zimbabwe tried to thrive on labour rents collected from expropriated peasants who preferred to remain on their lost lands, rather than sell labour-power elsewhere. For Cooper, such an obvious barrier to capitalist development seems to be a "particular solution" for capital to peasant resistance. If this was anybody's solution, it was one for the expropriated peasants and the land-speculating landlords to capitalist penetration. Cooper's empiricist conception of capital does not equip him to contemplate such a possibility. After all, capital can only be resisted by peasants "ambiguously". Having foreclosed any

possibilities save a compromise between a generalized "white capitalism" and an ambiguous African peasantry, all "partially" accomplished in empiricist terms, Cooper remained unable to grasp that capital, backed by the colonial state, actually had to overthrow the system of labour tenancy in order to reorganize European agriculture for regular commodity production in post-1945 Zimbabwe.

The same problem of mistaking any European landowner for a "capitalist" trying to discipline African tenants in terms of "wage-labour" led another analyst of the tenant system to difficulties when he tried to interpret Rhodesian anti-landlord legislation before 1930. After lumping all Europeans under the omnibus category of "white capitalists" and pitting them against African peasants, which was only generally valid, Rennie found that his assertion that legislation reflected the interest of a generalized "the powerful" did not historically hold and had to conclude that the legislation in question was 'confused, inconsistent and ineffective' (Rennie, 1978: 91). Had he not been working within the Interest Reflection Theory of the state, Rennie would not be concerned with the inconsistency of legislation because the state has to be inconsistent in order to be both a public authority and a class power for co-ordinating the contradictions of capitalist society.

Despite being conscious of conflict in capitalism, Cooper's phenomenalist conception of the labour-capital relationship confuses him. European farmers seem to emerge as "capitalists"

even when capital is still looking for ways of penetrating agriculture for commodity production, not just land grabbing. For Cooper, labour seems to be already "wage-labour" even when landowners are still collecting labour rents and rents in kind from tenants and once capital has arrived on the scene, no relationship can remain archaic. Admitting that 'accumulation remains an elusive concept and a process - in its different manifestations - that is largely unexamined' in the prevailing literature, Cooper reveals that his understanding of it remains imprecise, such that no distinction is made between simple qualitative acquisition of possessions and quantitative amassing of wealth in the abstract. (Cooper, 1981: 300). He focuses on its 'different manifestations', on its 'forms and shapes', such as the 'accumulation of individual rights', the emergence of Giriama "accumulators" in Kenya, who needed witnesses to confirm the existence of their wealth, etc. (Cooper, 1981: 300-301). While expressing the need for conceptual precision and warning that the mere attachment of labels to certain processes can delude us into assuming that we understand the nature and causation of their referents, Cooper's own conceptualization of capitalism seems to proceed without the benefit of such caution (Cooper, 1981: 312-313).

In attempting to identify the causes of revolution in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, Cooper puts it all down to these countries' 'stunted forms of capitalism' and suggests that it is such

regimes that intensify production without transforming the

structures through which that production takes place, that are most vulnerable to revolutionary change (Cooper, 1981: 313).

Cooper forgets that all capital is frequently "stunted" by contradictions internal to itself. What Marx identified as an endemic ailment integral to capitalism is tied to particular economies that promote productivity without changing their relations of production as unique characteristics which make them particularly 'vulnerable to revolutionary change'. Cooper thus joins Paige and other neo-modernization theorists who conduct "Marxist" analysis within the problematic of containment. The argument also implies that those countries that do change their "production structures" as they intensify production can perpetually avert revolution. In short, reformism is accommodated within Marxism (See 3.1.1).

In sum, the various schools of thought on the labour-capital relationship in Zimbabwe have committed the following errors. The "labour experts" of the school of labour management and the colonial administration tried to conceal the material conflicts between labour and capital or to banish them to the realm of aberrations where they could only be explained as irrational behaviour or results of "misunderstanding" on the part of labour. The various critics of colonialism - economic historians, "Africanists", "radicals", peasant studies and labour economists - have generally been troubled by ineffectual attempts to superimpose Marxian categories upon their conventional empiricist analyses of capitalist penetration. Nevertheless, some useful

insights can still be salvaged from some of these efforts. The labour-management school reveals to the socialist analyst how capital appropriates science in dominating labour. Its work provides a window through which the reproduction of capitalist ideology in a colonial situation can be recognized. Through their errors, the "radical" critics of colonial underdevelopment compel Marxists to define their categories with greater precision than would otherwise be the case. Accordingly, 5.1.2 attempts to define an approach that can adequately relate labour and capital in Zimbabwean settler agriculture.

5.1.2 Labour and Capital in Settler Agriculture: A Marxist Approach.

This subsection introduces an alternative approach to the relationship between African labour and capital in Zimbabwe. The argument in Chapter Four effectively shifts attention from the usual discourse on an unspecified process of 'rural proletarianization' and underdevelopment towards a 'Marxian analysis of the changing labour process in settler agriculture. Once settler farmers were identified as a class of commodity producers whose ownership of means of production and dependence on commodity exchange became their form of subordination to capital, their designation as an "agrarian bourgeoisie" was nullified. The relationship between African labour and capital

here accordingly refers to a much broader structure than the confrontation between these workers and the farmers who employ them. It depicts the historical struggle between 'collective capital, that is the class of capitalists, and collective labour, that is the working class' (Marx, 1977 I: 225).

It shall be understood throughout this study that the composition of the capitalist class that exploits African labour in settler agriculture is greater than the collection of 3 000 tobacco farmers who have themselves been subjected to capitalist domination. It encompasses an entity greater than the few multinational corporations that have come to monopolize international tobacco manufacturing and trading, which have themselves become integrated with sundry other capitals. It also includes those which make and supply machines and chemicals to agriculture worldwide as well as those which trade nothing but money bills in order to capture parts of surplus value without entering the sphere of production or coming face to face with these workers. Up to this point, the bourgeoisie has been referred to as 'extra agrarian capitalists' specifically to emphasize the point that the capital that set up settler agriculture and came to dominate Zimbabwean society in the colonial period was not the so-called "agrarian bourgeoisie". During this century, the bourgeoisie has developed into a global force that knows no national or sectoral frontiers in its material operations. With that, capitalists have virtually disappeared from the production site, out of labour's sight.

It is not intended here to exonerate settler farmers from their role in the subordination of African farm workers to capital but only to clarify it. In analysing the labour-capital relationship in settler agriculture, it will become clear that the settler farmer's actual historical management role was seldom in harmony with the capitalist conception of it, that it was frequently problematic. Once capital is identified according to the present arguments, a considerable conceptual readjustment becomes necessary.

When categories are defined relationally, then it follows that one cannot be altered or magically whisked out of the analysis without disturbing the others (Harvey, 1982: 141-142).

Accordingly, although what individual tobacco growers habitually extracted from their African employees is obviously part of the latter's exploitation, it is the precise manner in which capital as a whole, as the bourgeoisie, established its rule over African labour and the whole society that is at issue here. Subsection 5.1.1 has shown how that process has been obscured by various analysts; this subsection suggests a way of illuminating it.

Once more, Marx's concept of formal subordination of labour to capital offers a useful insight into the process by which producers lose control of their labour. Whereas formal subordination of settler farmers meant their loss of control over those means of production they legally owned and the commodities they had to buy and sell, for African workers, the same concept refers to their total separation from both the instruments and

the products of labour. At first sight, it appears as though the subordination of African workers would be unproblematic since their expropriation and alienation of the commodity by capital would automatically place the direct producer under the control of the non-producer. Yet history is more complicated than that and it has been established that legal expropriation does not lead directly to wage-labour. Workers do not necessarily turn to wage-labour on losing their means of production. Even in Capital, where Marx frequently assumes that all the elements of the capitalist mode of production are in place, his analysis always recognizes that the actual labour process involves class struggle. It is therefore necessary to keep the basic labour-capital relationship in historical perspective even when sketching it under the assumption of total expropriation and alienation of the commodity.

When labour is only formally subordinated to capital, work continues under the same technical conditions that capital found it. The subjects and instruments of labour, however, are now mobilized on behalf of a capitalist under his supervision, so as to avoid waste of all these elements, that is maintain efficiency. Labour-power, a condition of capitalist production, must be continuously reproduced. Accumulation, which is the whole point of capitalist production, requires that the total value produced and deposited in commodities exceed what is socially necessary for reproducing labour-power. The excess value or surplus-labour, which arises from extension of the working-day

beyond what is necessary for reproducing labour-power is, in this case, absolute surplus-value. Value, or labour, is measured in time units, so that if x hours is necessary to produce the necessities of reproducing labour-power, any time worked beyond x is appropriated by the capitalist as absolute surplus-value. Although Marx focused on the working-day, he did not preclude the working minute, week, month or season from consideration.(1)

Marx demonstrated how the division of the working-day between necessary and surplus labour varies in different modes of production, with that division defining different relations between producers and non-producers in each MOP. In non-capitalist MOPs, where labour-tenancy prevails for instance, necessary and surplus-labour are clearly demarcated temporally, spatially or both. The difference between the producer's subsistence fund and the landowner's rent is predetermined, subject to historical revisions. In capitalism, on the other hand, only socially necessary labour-time is known for each social situation, so that capital can resort to all kinds of strategic calculations in order to extend the working-day while necessary labour remains constant. Capital will only stop attempting to extend the working-day when doing that threatens the reproduction of labour-power, when it enervates the workers to the point where they may not make it to work the next shift.

(1) Labour "experts" and conventional economists operate with labour-days or man-days, understood as purely temporal units with no reference to the social conflict implied in Marx's working-day.

Even then, it might require state intervention to enforce compliance, since the economics of competition are left to the individual entrepreneur's "business acumen". The unique interpenetration of the portions that respectively go to the reproduction of labour-power and to capitalist accumulation enables capital to add small bits of value to its portion of the working-day at every opportunity.

It is not intended to rewrite the Marxian analysis of absolute surplus-value here. One needs only show how it illuminates the labour-capital relationship in Zimbabwean settler agriculture. An important point established so far is that certain relations that had developed between European landowners and Africans who worked for them before 1945 were definitely non-capitalistic, under the tenancy system for instance. The spatial and/or temporal distinctions between necessary and surplus-labour in the calculation of labour rents and rents in kind were clearly formalized in tenancy agreements, or supposed to be in theory. Cooper's unsubstantiated assertion to the contrary, that the tenancy systems were all capitalist "solutions" allowed him to remain consistent in oversimplifying the struggles between capital and others (Cooper, 1981: 292).

What followed after 1945, when both rentier-landowners and new European arrivals were all forced to become commodity producers for the world market must be investigated historically while both the CMP and other MOPs are clearly specified. However, efforts to concentrate on the MOPs can be as misleading as

subsuming everything under capitalism. Both strategies easily violate historical validity. Marx addressed the issue more ambiguously than many of his current exegetists can either tolerate or admit:

But as soon as people, whose production still moves within the lower forms of slave-labour, corvée-labour, &c., are drawn into the whirlpool of an international market dominated by the capitalistic mode of production, the sale of their products for export becoming their principal interest, the civilized horrors of over-work are grafted onto the barbaric horrors of slavery &c. (Marx, 1977 I: 226-227).

Marx elaborates by referring to the preservation of patriarchal relations between masters and slaves in Southern USA before cotton exports became the vital interest of those states. He aptly links the change to the working-day by pointing out that when the relations between cotton planter and labour were subjected to a calculated and calculating system, it ceased to be a matter of obtaining a certain quantity of use-values and became one of producing surplus-labour itself (Marx, 1977 I: 226-227). While clearly distinguishing between qualitatively and quantitatively appropriating surplus-labour, Marx also established the precedents for subsequent conflicts in the interpretation of his work by articulationists and evolutionists. Does the commodification of labour-power occur and neutralize old relations "as soon as" production for the world market begins or does it lead to the articulation [grafting] of the CMP onto pre-existing MOPs? On the page in Capital cited above, Marx remained ambiguous and it is not intended to pursue the matter

any farther at this point.

What can be stated confidently here is that as commodity - particularly tobacco - production became the main interest on Zimbabwe's European farms after 1945, relations between producers and capitalists began to develop towards of absolute surplus-value production, but not at once did that happen. The change would involve struggles between capitalists outside agriculture and both settler farmers and African producers, but the direction of change was unmistakably in favour of capital. As commodity production expanded, non-capitalist relations between settler-farmers and hired hands tended to thrive upon their own momentum, with capital and the state attempting to change everything from the outside, but encountering some resistance. Marx's account of the ascendancy of cotton in southern USA was rendered in terms of a simple 'proportional' correlation between the growing interest in cotton exports and the capitalist subjection of labour to the cotton trade. While tobacco production did reflect the ascendancy of capital in post-1945 Zimbabwe - in that neither Africans nor settler farmers could grow so much tobacco for their own consumption or local trade - no clear correlation can be established between the expansion of tobacco exports and commodification of labour-power in this case. Clearly, however, the emphasis did shift from how much grain or labour rent could be extracted from African tenants toward how much profit was made on the annual national crop by the trading and manufacturing capitals, with settler growers always expecting

some profit in addition to their subsistence revenue.

With much of the conception of labour initially left to settler farmers, the spectre of an "agrarian bourgeoisie" may continue to float but that presents no real problem. By the middle of the 20th Century, the bourgeoisie had learned the economies of delegating labour supervision and even conception to some of the producers as its managers, who themselves became salaried workers. Settler farmers, most of whom had been nothing but workers in Europe and South Africa, or poor peasants in Zimbabwe prior to 1945, welcomed the opportunity to distinguish themselves from other workers, and racial differences facilitated the institutionalization of that differentiation. However, settler tobacco growers always knew that they would have to do it all for the satisfaction of "our friends abroad", who had the last word on the production, handling and presentation of the leaf. It would take more than time before the average tobacco grower in colonial Zimbabwe became fluent in, or tolerant of, the calculation of portions of value for labour and capital in the working-day. This is where labour "experts" and all other "scientific" proxies of capital could intervene, precisely to lecture settler farmers in the economics of the working-day, without revealing its political implications in full. As Section 5.2 will argue and demonstrate. Instead of an "agrarian bourgeoisie" pursuing its own specific capitalist interests in an agricultural sector of its own, what developed in settler agriculture after 1945 was a case whereby the formal

subordination of the European part of labour [settler farmers] was superimposed upon that of African workers, all for the sake of accumulation in the abstract, beyond the confines of agriculture, among capitalists as a whole.

Before turning to the specifics of the labour-capital struggle in settler agriculture, it is important to ask how capital's interest in profit came to be regarded as a problem for the whole of colonial society. As new settlers arrived from Europe or returned from World War II, everything necessary for their systematic settlement seemed to be available except a steady supply of African labour. A contemporary economist explained the shortage as follows:

Two factors worked against the continuation of [African labour's] abundance: the indisposition of the African to identify himself with the new way of living, and the attitude of the European towards the native's inferior status, which kept the native's wage to a minimum. In the presence of a large Native population there emerged a "shortage" of labour (Roberts, 1991: 177).

More recently, another economist attempted to explain what he called 'the alleged "shortage" of indigenous labour' [by the 1940s] as a case of official justifications for employers' preference for cheap migrant labour from neighbouring countries and for their minimalist wage policies (Clarke, 1977: 156-158) and/or of 'peasant rational maximizing reluctance to engage in low wage employment' (Clarke, 1974b: 30).

Both Clarke and Roberts quotation-marked the word "shortage" to highlight the fact that the availability of manpower surpluses raised empirical questions about the validity of the

labour supply problem. Both writers implicitly accepted that the labour shortage was a social problem by proceeding to identify their culprits. Reasoning from the evolutionist modernization perspective, Roberts finds 'progress' interrupted by the combination of "the African's" indisposition towards modern ways and the European farmer's disinclination to change with the times. He remains silent on capital's understanding of "labour shortage" in terms of labour-time. Unable to choose between labour shortage as an ideological ploy concocted by officials to justify employers' preference for cheap migrant labour imports and as a real consequence of local peasants' hard bargain for a higher wage level, Clarke vacillates between the rationalizing peasant and the deceitful official in different attempts to explain the same shortage. In another gesture of allegiance to dependency theory, Clarke also claims that

'the real causes' of the 'shortage', '... - a point so basic even to the most orthodox of neo-classical economists [is] that the rationale for government policy can only be found in the political context of a policy designed explicitly for the development of underdevelopment in Rhodesia, whatever the consequences for the periphery areas' (Clarke, 1974a: 12).

Repressive as it was, the colonial state never "explicitly" adopted a policy of underdeveloping African areas. It was certainly more subtle than that, as the Land Husbandry Act and subsequent "community development" policies clearly indicate.

In all such explanations of "labour shortage", capital's material involvement remained at best obscure. Both Clarke and Roberts found that the "shortage" could not be verified in their

empiricist conception of it because there also existed a surplus of manpower within the African population. Having empirically refuted the existence of that "shortage", these economists were left only with the option of explaining the riddle in voluntaristic terms as the manouvres of defensive policy makers, smart peasants, apathetic Africans, reactionary employers, and/or a conspiratorial state explicitly committed to underdeveloping the peripheral areas. Colonial officials had no need for elaborate justifications of repression and no-one opposed to their policies would buy them anyway. If Zimbabwean peasants were rational maximizers, how about migrant workers who took what they could from purse-tight Rhodesian employers and deserted them for South African gold mines, as van Onselen elaborately recorded (Van Onselen, 1976)? If Zimbabweans were somehow inherently disinclined towards modernity, how are the thousands of Zimbabwean workers who used to cross over to South Africa as "clandestine labour" to be explained? Roberts and Clarke apparently never considered the logical implications of their explanations of "labour shortage".

What these two economists entirely missed was in fact the very meaning of commodified labour-power, of labour-power measured in relation to other commodities as value, all socially calculated in the labour market according to the elastic distinction between socially necessary and surplus labour. Clarke, for instance, cited a Rhodesian MP who referred to African labour as 'just another commodity', clearly missed the meaning,

and retreated into ethical indignation. For Clarke, reference by a colonial politician to African labour as a commodity that can 'be used at will and dispensed with at will' is a sign of irresponsibility. The colonial regime ought instead to pass laws that would ameliorate working conditions, in everyone's interest (Clarke, 1974a: 13). A colonial state that operated with such moral responsibility would obviously neither be a colonial nor a capitalist one. Radical reformists either do not understand how capital accumulates or will not consider the implications of their propositions for the labour-capital relationship. An examination of Marx's analysis of English factory acts clearly reveals how such laws, far from ameliorating labour's conditions, constitute an integral part of capital's strategy in its struggle to extend the working-day (Marx, 1977 I).

How, then, is "labour-shortage" to be understood in terms of absolute surplus-value production? First, like all capitalist relations, "labour-shortage" is contradictory, and labour itself is abstract. The empiricist reference to workers as "labour" is a short hand for relations between capitalists and workers, a reification which could not allow Clarke and Roberts to grasp what was at issue in the co-existence of a surplus of manpower and a shortage of labour. Marx's abstract notions of labour as value, and of the working-day as the relationship implied in the apportionment of that value between labour and capital explains that co-existence as one of many contradictions inherent within capitalism. Administrators of the colonial labour market were not

quite as mischievous and irrational as some of their "radical" critics often claim, nor were they quite as naive as to concoct "labour shortage" as a transparent justification for what could not be justified. In 1951, the Secretary for Native Affairs addressed the capitalist conception of labour shortage with revealing precision.

Condemning certain "pernicious practices" among some Rhodesian employers, such as inducing workers to enter their employment by advancing to them monies that would tie them to the job, and "giving them an easy time" in the form of a day's task which is often finished by 10 a.m., the colonial bureaucrat revealed it all. He explained labour-shortage as follows:

There seems to be too much stress on mere numbers and insufficient realization of the fact that by these practices, the total output of many is put on a par with that of a few. One native commissioner states the position concisely as "a shortage of labour, but no shortage of manpower" (SNA, 1951:28).

Clearly, the capitalist conception of labour shortage has abstract and relational reference. It does not merely refer to numbers of workers available to employers. However, for most employers, particularly settler farmers, the shortage was initially presented and perceived as one of manpower. Getting more workers to the workplace at the lowest possible wage rates seemed to be a sound investment for many of these employers. Some farmers even resorted to shortening the working-day as an incentive for more workers to come into their service. To the labour "experts" at the Department of Native Affairs, and indeed

to capital as a whole, shortening the working-day for this purpose was a "pernicious practice". When labour inspectors went after those farmers with a reputation for scrambling for labour [manpower], urging them to work the prescribed working-days and to attract labour with better working conditions and higher wage rates, the two notions of labour shortage came into conflict.

For capital, attracting workers with shorter working-days created labour shortages in terms of both manpower supplies and the labour process. Empirically, it resulted in the hoarding of manpower in sectors where it could only be under-employed. Related to that, it also created a labour shortage in the abstract sense that the total value of commodities fell when labour was used inefficiently, that is when its output did not constitute as substantial a portion of surplus labour as was possible. That is the deeper meaning of labour shortage for capital and as long as capital was calling the tune of accumulation in the abstract, the labour shortage could never be eliminated by mere manpower recruitment. As the Secretary for Native Affairs put it: '...recruiting is not the magic wand whereby the shortage of labour can be solved' (SNA, 1950: 17). Emphasizing the shift from labour recruitment to efficient use and stabilization of available manpower, he 'uttered a serious warning to the work-shy' [meaning Africans], exhorting them to change heart and 'do a fair day's work for a fair day's pay', with 'fairness' understood in terms of the working-day. Historical struggles between capital and labour over the

working-day will be analysed in 5.2.

Before that, a few more clarifications of the Marxian conception of the working-day will be useful. First, although the working-day is measured in hours per day, what is crucial in it as a concept is not its technical usage as a variable but the social-economic relations it denotes. Labour economists, for example, use the variable "mandays lost" to calculate the economic effects of strikes and other work stoppages (e.g. Clarke, 1977: 177-178). In the Marxian sense, the capitalist working-day is not finite but relational and elastic. Its two portions, socially necessary and surplus labour, are in interaction throughout its duration. From that perspective, it is easy to grasp how labour shortages occurred contemporaneously with surpluses in Zimbabwe after 1945. The settler farmer's demand for labour would rise precisely when the expropriated African cultivators needed all their labour-time to somehow replenish their subsistence fund. In order to reach the market early and beat the quotas during the selling season, settler farmers might need all the labour-time they could pack into their leaf at the same time. By investing in agriculture through its proxies, the bourgeoisie could attend to other business while one group of producers scrambled to appropriate the labour-power of another on its behalf.

Second, defining the working-day in the abstract allows capital to evaluate the labouring capacities of different categories of workers under the value of necessary labour. Race,

nationality, age, sex, etc. may be appropriated as 'natural' grounds for redefining necessary labour as African, foreign, temporary, female, juvenile, etc. while male permanent labour remains the standard capacity measured in full hours per day. Absolute surplus-value is thereby augmented by socially reducing necessary labour time. In tobacco grading, for example, female graders and young tiers would automatically be counted as "half men", while the African men themselves were referred to as "boys" in the calculation of the capitalist working-day. The labour-power that went into grading the leaf, however, would be that of whole human beings, representing the true measure of the working-day. The grower could go further and demand free labour-power from workers' children 'in exchange' for a dubious educational service.

Third, capital could remove itself physically from the struggle over the working-day and still appropriate absolute surplus-value. For instance, once tobacco growers became aware that extending the working-day somehow meant greater profits, all kinds of strategies for making 'profit' came into play. Labour-management "experts" initiated the process by codifying "scientific management" principles in a Work Study Manual and the RTA recommended it to its membership. Tobacco growers ignored it at their own risk and often discovered their own ways of nibbling at any part of necessary labour that might be appropriated as surplus labour. All this appeared in the labour process as overtime allowances, incentive bonuses, work designs that

compelled workers to supervise one another for fear of collective punishment and, most generously, growers discovered the value of "meals at work". Marx had long recognized how

[Capital] higgles over a meal-time, incorporating it where possible with the process of production itself, so that food is given to the labourer as a mere means of production, as coal is supplied to the boiler and oil to the machinery (Marx, 1977: 252).

Once settler farmers were alerted to the correlation between labour nutrition and profit, African farm workers would become experimental subjects for testing all kinds of 'protein-rich' feeds, all reputed to prevent disease and through that reduce absenteeism, which had been identified as 'the curse of the colony'. The feeds would of course be provided by extra-agrarian capitals and healthy workers could produce in less time what the farmer paid for them than sickly and often absent workers.

Towards a greater understanding of the labour-capital relationship in settler agriculture, this subsection has established some principles to guide the coming historical analysis. First and foremost, the relations of production that develop when labour is formally subjected to commodity production under capitalist supervision, direct or by proxy, are not empirically given in phenomenal manifestation, such as wages in dollars and rations per month. The differences between socially necessary and surplus labour are not as distinct as they are in non-capitalist MOPs. This makes it necessary to distinguish clearly, through abstraction, between capitalist and non-capitalist relations, and to beware of any possible

interactions between them. This implies the futility of attempting to specify the subordination of labour to capital in the country as "rural proletarianization" and the advantage of approaching relations of production as a whole, through abstraction.

Secondly, neither the mere legal expropriation of producers nor the general commodification of labour-power automatically entails the existence of a proletariat. Historically, the formal subordination of direct producers to capital may involve protracted struggles in which producers attempt to reappropriate or adapt to different means of production for subsistence so as to evade wage-labour, which is alienated labour performed for capitalist accumulation. To take such possibilities into account, the following analysis will focus on the working-day, with the forces of capital attempting to establish and extend it, while those of labour first avoid and subsequently attempt to minimize it during commodity production.

Thirdly, to cope with the problem of the so-called "non-class" bases of social action - race, gender, age, citizenship, nationality, etc. - from a socialist perspective, the social-economic definition of the working-day helps to make sense of the various ways in which capital may appropriate natural differences as a basis for redefining social-labour time in its own interests. Recently, there has developed a great debate among Marxists, provoked by earlier reductionism, concerning the autonomy of gender, race, etc. with respect to

class. In this study, such autonomy will be recognized automatically insofar as the question is whether or not people act according to class or the so-called "non-class" allegiances. Where the question is that of the relationship between labour and capital, what is relevant is simply an understanding of how capital formally subsumes such differences in the notion of the working-day, correlates them with inferior labouring capacities to reduce necessary labour-time, and augments its absolute surplus-value in the process. On that basis, Section 5.2 advances the analysis of capitalist domination in Zimbabwe by focusing on the relations of production that developed between capital and African workers employed in settler agriculture after 1945.

5.2 Agriculture and Commodification of Labour-power in Zimbabwe.

5.2.1 Diminishing Labour's Options: Towards an Ideal Labour Force.

As argued before, early colonial expropriation did not immediately and could not automatically transform African peasants into instant proletarians. Yet, given their diminishing options, it is also clear that Africans could not remain viable peasants with their increasing separation from the land and the products thereof. Furthermore, capital - in the form of the BSAC

- soon found that not only did the fabled large gold fields not exist but that within its "pioneer" community, there were few capitalists it needed in order to execute its alternative development programmes. The equation of land alienation with "proletarianization" has been duly criticized. Among those who remained historically sensitive, the major weakness has been an over-emphasis on the efficacy of the so-called "purely-political" (also identified as "non-economic") mechanisms, which ruptures the unity of the historical process. In this subsection, an overview of the formal subordination process in Zimbabwe is abstracted from certain historical developments, beginning with early expropriation in the 1900s, moving towards the development of a labour force thoroughly dominated by capital, which allegedly existed at Masasa Estate between 1945 and 1965.

One of the major accomplishments of our "radical" historians has been the rediscovery of regular economic surpluses in pre-colonial African societies after evolutionist historians of the colonial era had virtually deleted them from history. Some historians simply exposed the fact that a peasantry initially flourished in response to colonial market opportunities and eventually vanished due to racial prejudice and merchant exploitation. Others, pre-occupied with "underdevelopment", dwelt on the identification of its causes and culprits, arguing towards reaffirmation of the premise of "core and periphery". Meanwhile, the surplus-labour which Africans continued to produce

under diminishing options remained subsumed under the generalizations of "underdevelopment". It is the aim of this subsection to establish how the colonial administration and the few capitalist enterprises existing earlier in the century attempted to capture that surplus-labour for capital, and to give an idea of what a labour force fully dominated by capitalists would be like. In between lies the struggle for labour-time.

Since there were virtually no capitalist enterprises in early colonial Rhodesia, the surplus labour of Africans could not immediately be appropriated on the basis of wage labour. The forced labour recruited for early "public works" may be set aside as one particular solution for capital's initial problems. On the whole, the mechanism of surplus appropriation at that time depended on who had captured particular means of production and to what purpose they put them. Where supplies were needed for mining and administrative settlements, for instance, African cultivators were initially allowed to remain on their lands and to provide surplus labour by independently producing and exchanging commodities. As merchants intensified their predatory practices and the colonial state moved to substitute European for African farmers, which it finally accomplished after 1945, that option was increasingly limited and eventually closed to Africans.

Where the land happened to have been appropriated for speculative purposes by Europeans who could not demonstrate 'effective and beneficial occupation', agreements might be made

between the appropriating landowners and the expropriated African villagers allowing the latter to use the land for their own purposes and yield surplus-labour to the landlords as labour rents and/or rents in kind (Rennie, 1978). As financial realization of their land acquisition remained a remote prospect, some landlords contented themselves with recovering such rents for simple reproduction or simple accumulation. For some expropriated Africans, paying rent was an acceptable alternative to instant eviction from their ancestral homes, to the uncertain prospect of subsistence cultivation in already over-crowded reserves, and to the degrading option of wage-labour in the emerging capitalist enterprises, especially mining. For capital in general, however, the whole tenant system was nothing but an antiquated practice which hoarded means of production and wasted productive forces that ought to be mobilized in commodity production. Hence the emerging capitalists in mining combined with the state and the less regressive farmers to attack what they called "kaffir farming". The operation took the form of a movement for land segregation, with European settlement tied to commodity production [Chapter Four], while their expropriation would eventually close all options to Africans except that of wage labour.

Of course, not all Europeans grabbed land for speculative purposes. The uneven rise in tobacco production before 1945 indicates that settlement for commodity production preceded World War II. During the long period between 1890 -1945, relations

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between African workers and European employers were influenced by a combination of two European traditions established in South Africa. British capitalism, having foresaken slavery, had turned to the ideal of 'free' wage labour. Isolated in South Africa, far from Europe's industrial revolution, Dutch Calvinism had stuck to its ideal of pre-destined subordination of "inferior" producers to Europeans as subsistence 'masters'. However, since they had conquered the Dutch in South Africa, the British settled for a legal compromise which simultaneously downplayed and provided for their material interest in wage labour. In 1899, the BSAC adopted a Cape version of the Masters and Servants Act, which was destined to be amended several times in colonial Rhodesia before the government of Zimbabwe abolished it in the post-colonial period.

The Masters and Servants Act regulated relations between [European] emp[loyers] and [African] manual labourers in the mining, commercial, manufacturing, domestic and agricultural sectors, with European workers excluded by their designation as "skilled workmen", until 1960, when the law was left to apply only to Africans in agricultural and domestic service. While defining the relations between African servants and masters in the racist terms that had permeated the European world-view in Southern Africa, the Masters and Servants Act cryptically provided for the operation of capitalist mechanisms in the division of labour-time between socially necessary and surplus labour. The clue to that lies in the implications of its

provisions for appropriating the servant's labour-time. For most of its "radical" reformist critics, the Masters and Servants Act was nothing but 'an infamous charter of serfdom' (Ainslee, 1973: 11; Clarke, 1977). The fact that the Act applied to all African workers in Zimbabwe until 1960 indicates that its scope was much wider than that of feudal relations because a charter of serfdom could not operate in a rapidly expanding capitalist economy. The Masters and Servants Act in fact provided the legal framework for the formal subordination of African labour to capital in Zimbabwe and for direct state intervention to that effect, whatever the feudalistic connotations of its terminology.

Given its South African origins, it would be misleading to suppose that the Masters and Servants Act was conceived solely for subjecting workers to capital. It was more of a subtle compromise made by a capitalist state within the context of Calvinist colonial tradition. One must therefore cope with its non-capitalistic as well as its capitalistic implications. Clarke found its provisions to be altogether 'archaic' and accordingly called upon the colonial regime in the late 1970s to replace it with 'more positive legislation' (Clarke, 1977: 170, 176). He criticized its repressive aspects without questioning capital's interest in the Masters and Servants Act. For instance, workers were obliged to accompany their employers on long journeys if the latter might need their services, to remain in their employers' service in case of an "invasion" of, or a "commotion" within, Southern Rhodesia which might result in the employers being

conscripted by the army, and generally to be obedient (SLSR, Ch.247). Clarke was also attracted to the Act's scope for coercion. Labour inspectors from the Native Affairs Department were authorized to arrest African workers suspected of any infringement of its provisions, to summon witnesses, administer oaths, pass judgement and impose fines or jail sentences. Clarke described these powers as "significant" but left their significance unspecified (Clarke, 1977: 174). Why would a capitalist colonial state intervene to reproduce "archaic", feudalistic relations in capitalist development?

Nor did most of the European employers of African labour, particularly settler farmers, grasp the capitalist implications of the Masters and Servants Act. To average settlers, the Act was just there to enable them to cope with what they had come to perceive as an inferior race of people who were irrationally ill-disposed towards work. It would take their own struggles with capitalists outside agriculture for settler farmers in general to learn what the capitalist "problem" of African labour was. Instead of asking what the law sounded like and wondering if the colonial state could make it 'more positive', the question here is that of its implications for the labour-capital relationship.

It shall be argued that the significance of the Masters and Servants Act for capital lay in its provisions for controlling Africans' labour-time without ever directly referring to capital. If one concentrates on the immediate confrontation between the servant and the master, without grasping that the latter was also

subordinated to capital as a propertied producer, one can easily miss the labour-capital struggle implied in it. All that is immediately apparent is that European employers [e.g. settler farmers] were extremely powerful in relation to a servile African labour force. Laws, however, are not made merely to reflect relations that already prevail but to deal with what legislators perceive as remaining problems, a matter over which compromises might have to be made among members of different powerful groups. Here the colonial state empowered itself to intervene on its own terms, which were ultimately those of capital, in the execution of the contract between European employers who had not, by and large, become capitalists and African employees who had not become fully subjected to wage labour. For instance, although the law obviously favoured European employers on these matters, labour inspectors were actually authorized to charge and punish employers who contravened the capitalist rule that labour should be paid wages. That provision in itself would tend to legitimate wage payment even though settler farmers were usually let off the hook through the stipulation that the labour inspector be satisfied that the employer had 'reasonable or probable cause to believe that the wages were not really due' (SLSR, Ch. 247, Sec. 38).

Beyond the provision for state intervention to enforce wage relationships are other indications that capital's interests were implied in the operation of the Masters and Servants Act. The best indicator lies in its oblique references to the working-day. For instance, most of the penal provisions of that law prohibited

workers to take time off the working-day and imposed sanctions against lateness, absence, desertion, intoxication at work, inattentiveness, resistance, insubordination, and use of means of production outside the work situation. In other words, beyond placing the African servants under the European master, the ultimate material import of the Masters and Servants Act was concentrated on the appropriation of surplus labour-time in the way capital initially does it, namely by extending the working-day. The whole framework was in place before capital effectively penetrated Zimbabwean society after 1945. Through the Masters and Servants Act, the colonial state cryptically circumscribed capital's preferred relationship with labour and established it as the 'normal' state of the labour market when the responsibility for extending the working-day was largely left to employers who did not necessarily share capital's conception of that relationship. The actual historical struggle between labour and capital, in which settler farmers as both employers of African labour and subordinates of capital had to learn to extend the working day in order to survive in agriculture will be examined later.

To complete this overview, it is necessary to ask what kind of relationship capital wanted to have with African labour when all had been done according to its logic. For that purpose, a review of the labour policy of one multinational corporation, the Imperial Tobacco Company [ITC], at its buying, seat-processing and selling branch on Masasa Estate is scrutinized. As an

accomplished capitalist enterprise, the ITC encountered few problems in systematically implementing capital's ideal programme for controlling African labour. In 1964, ITC was cited as a company that had 'carefully planned and meticulously carried out [a] labour policy' that had come to pay 'its own dividends in productivity and loyalty among the 1,800-strong African labour force' (RTJ January, 1964: 63). An account of ITC's labour policy at Masasa is of particular interest here because it reflects some of the aspects of the formal subordination of African labour to capital under the particular conditions prevailing in colonial Zimbabwe and the steps taken to solve capital's "problem" of African labour (see 5.1.1).

By 1964, 250 African families had become permanently housed on Masasa, with all facilities for accommodation, recreation, religious practice, dining, health and education provided by the company within the township, "free of charge". A seasonal contingent of "single men" - that is workers recruited without permission to bring their families to the workplace - lived in blocks of 4,200 sq. ft., 4-5 to a room, with basic furniture and other amenities considered by management as "modern" and therefore "attractive" to African workers. The system of issuing rations to these workers and letting them cook for themselves was abolished in 1947 and special staff were engaged to cook for them. In 1964, cash replaced rations and a 'modern' dining room, fully equipped with labour-saving devices allegedly "designed to promote cleanliness" was introduced. Thirty-two senior African

staff members were segregated from the rest in all amenities and a training department was set up for personnel selection modelled on World War II officer cadet selection experience (RTJ, 1964: 72-73).

In the review of ITC's labour policy, it was claimed that the company had come to enjoy a phenomenally low staff turnover of about 2% per year and that 'This indicates that collectively the labour force accepts and respects the facilities ITC have to offer' (RTJ January, 1964: 64). All these "facilities", including joint-management consultation committees, were conceived as capital's progressive solution to its labour "problems": high turnover, discontent, low productivity, etc.

On closer examination, it is precisely such "fair" deals that epitomize capital's sophisticated approach to dominating labour. All the facilities, from housing to training, were freely provided not out of altruism but because they were necessary for the steady appropriation of surplus labour through extension of the working-day, month or season. Accommodating workers on the premises, for example, prevented them from travelling long distances during time that could be spent productively. The interest in "labour-saving" was reflected not only in the provision of vegetable-cutters and dish-washers for "single" workers' dining room but also in such apparently progressive improvements as substituting communal feeding for issuing uncooked rations. As ITC explained

...this practice [issuing uncooked rations] was found to interfere with factory operations as it meant that some men were having to leave their work early to prepare food. The

solution to this problem lay in communal feeding and it was decided to experiment by engaging a special staff to cook for all the single people (RTJ January 1964: 63).

Similarly, all the apparently generous facilities made available at Masasa were focused on solving capital's "problem" of time taken off the working-day by African workers attending to the basic necessities of life and obtaining the prevailing social wants - food, shelter, reproduction, recreation etc. In the event, ITC claimed that Masasa offered an ideal situation for a "contented staff" which produced the "desired results" in terms of labour-time: absences for reasons other than sickness were reduced to 0.17%, for sickness to 0.5% and turnover rates to the lowest level expected. The "Works Committees", urged on all employers of African labour by the Commissioner of Native Labour without much success, were lauded at Masasa for creating a bond of mutual trust between the two sides, which actually means the workers were co-opted into the cause of capital.

To anticipate the problems and avert them before they even emerged, a Selection, Testing and Industrial Training Department was set up. Its intended purpose was not so much to equip African workers with skills as 'to ensure the correct utilization of labour resources...to maximum advantage' [to the ITC], to minimize 'the costly errors of both under-selection and over-selection', avoid 'the bogey of misplacement of labour' and maintain favourable relations with labour. Additionally, the training department adopted 'social interaction tests' based on World War II officer cadet selection in assessing leadership

potential for promotion of African foremen (RTJ February, 1964: 72). More bluntly, training was premised on the analysis of work in terms of an elementary breakdown of all the steps, with expert instructors teaching the cadets at 'effective worker speed'. The practice of leaving the worker to "pick up" the job from workmates was considered antiquated, costly and frustrating. Effective training focused on gaining labour-time for capital:

The new employees' unproductive training time is cut to a minimum and they enter their new work with confidence and with the knowledge that they are doing it in an approved manner (RTJ February, 1964: 73).

In appropriately capitalistic ideological terms, ITC was considered to be 'far ahead of the times', a 'go-ahead, throbbing industrial complex, proving what business can do when it tries' (Ibid.).

What ITC seemed to have singularly achieved at Masasa, however, had already been extensively developed in Western Europe, namely elaborate welfare programmes for workers. It looked unique under colonial conditions because many European employers, especially settler farmers, were non-capitalists who did not grasp capital's changing framework for dominating labour. The developments at ITC contrast sharply with the idea propagated by some "radical" historians which presents "proletarianization" as pauperization or the deliberate strangulation of whole "peripheral" populations. Likewise, they differ from the process by which African labour in settler agriculture came to be subordinated to capital and the reasons are easy to grasp. First,

with the colonial state having largely preserved social welfare as a European privilege, capital could only provide it to African workers on its own initiative, if it ever did, and at its own expense. Secondly, capital had avoided investing directly in agriculture, leaving the elaborate layout required for stabilizing labour to its settler surrogates who eventually had to incur the expenditure on this matter, under conditions like those discussed in Chapters Four and Six. Accordingly, the process of formally subordinating labour to capital in agriculture became a protracted triple struggle between capital, generally trying to subsume the lot under the process of accumulation, settler farmers, lacking a full grasp of capital's strategy and guarding their own position against capital, and African workers, initially avoiding wage labour but with their diminishing options pushing them towards it all.

From this overview, it is possible to grasp what the initial struggle between African labour and capital involved, to follow its course and the direction in which capital, given its contradictions, would have wanted to steer it. The initial struggle between capital and African producers was clearly over the apportionment of labour-time between necessary and surplus labour. Yet without the conditions for effecting such an apportionment on the basis of wage-labour, with some of the subjects resisting it, capital was forced to resort to alternative or feasible ways of appropriating surplus labour, which also involved their own contradictions. Africans' first

colonial option, commodity production as peasants, was soon smothered by a combination of predatory merchants and a colonial state in whose development programme it was European settlers who had to become agricultural commodity producers, while Africans were destined to become the colonial labour force. With the closing of the agricultural commodity market, the expropriated Africans had to adjust accordingly.

With the development of settler agriculture, possibilities of convenience agreements between rentier landlords and African tenants were also diminished. As tobacco production looked more lucrative after 1945, more Europeans already on the land and new immigrants turned to the option of commodity production with African labour. The colonial state extended the expropriation of African producers and tightened the conditions for European land settlement.

Meanwhile, possibilities of subsisting on cultivation in the reserves were further eroded for Africans. Able bodied Zimbabwean males had increasingly submitted to wage labour in various branches of the expanding post-war economy. The option of farm labour, however, remained avoidable. As migrant labour from neighbouring countries remained scarce (see 5.2.2), some possibilities for Zimbabweans being employed in settler agriculture arose. One of these involved the temporary hiring of African contractors for such tasks as brick-making, barn-building, wood-cutting and root-stumping. The essential feature of this type of 'contract labour' was that the workers

were employed by their African recruiters, 'labour merchants' with whom alone the settler farmer contracted and for the particular task. For these workers, the system of 'contract labour' was tolerable because it left them free to attend to their homes in the reserves at their own time, and prevented the settler farmer from exercising direct control over them. For the settler farmer, the major advantages were that he was relieved of the burden of supervision, could save on rations and retrieve part of the wages through the farm store, on which the gang depended for provisions before it moved on. For capital, the contract system might temporarily relieve the manpower shortage by catering to particular tasks without whose completion commodity production might be held up during critical periods of the year. However, this "contract" system remained too unstable and the workers involved continued to exercise too great a degree of autonomy for capital to rely on it. Surplus labour could not be steadily appropriated that way, and contract labour was ultimately regarded as a necessary convenience which tended to obstruct the systematic subordination of all Africans to capital as wage labour.

The other possibility for Zimbabwean workers in the early decades of settler agriculture involved the most erratic forms of recruitment for settler agriculture. Those Zimbabweans left in the villages when the adult men had found work elsewhere, in the mines and towns, old men, women and children, occasionally became available to settler farmers as "seasonal" or "casual" labour for

meeting the shortages in manpower. Their unfamiliarity with tobacco growing meant that the people of the reserves could only be recruited for specific tasks, such as sowing seedlings, hoeing, waiting on reapers, and not for the more-skilled tasks such as grading. Recruited overnight by the sound of a tractor arriving in the village and the recruiter shouting his message, the casuals travelled the following morning to the farm, returned in the evening with their pay or continued for a fortnight or more. Unfamiliar with the workplace, reserve people would immediately be assigned a "reserve" role on the farm, while the more skilled migrants worked full time and often supervised their territorial hosts.

For the villagers, casual work was necessary to make the shortfall in subsistence. The wages, paid daily 'by the coin' instead of 'by the green leaf' [the green pound bill] could hardly justify the fortnight or month during which the family fields in the reserve were left untended. For the farmer, such casual labour came in handy when manpower shortages were most acute. For capital, casual labour was a nibble at the subsistence cultivator's necessary labour time but a very erratic way of extending the working-day in commodity production. Casual labour was to emerge later in the 1960s on a larger and more organized scale, in connection with cotton picking, with certain African chiefs collaborating with the colonial regime's agents and forcefully recruiting young women for the farmers. By the middle 1960s, however, the emphasis in settler agriculture had long

shifted from mere employment of large numbers of workers, through intensified supervision, to mechanization and other strategies for increasing the rate of exploitation. While the options for Zimbabwean workers dwindled one after another towards wage labour, settler agriculture came to depend on labour migration recruited in neighbouring countries, particularly Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia. Subsection 5.2.2 examines capital's attempts to regularize the migratory labour system until its abandonment in the early 1960s as an obstacle to capitalist development.

5.2.2 Migratory Labour and Further Contradictions.

With Zimbabweans responding to expropriation by adapting to it through non-wage forms of subsistence - labour tenancy, subsistence cultivation - or migrating to South Africa for more remunerative wage labour, the burgeoning capitalists in mining and other branches, as well as some of capital's proxies in agriculture, [settlers] had come to rely on migrant workers recruited in neighbouring countries or on their way south. Such was the reliance on these 'non-indigenous' workers that they came to be regarded as 'the life blood of the colony' (CNL, 1948: 49). However, despite an 'elaborate and ostensibly successful recruiting campaign after 1945 (Table 5.2), colonial officials continued to warn Rhodesian employers that large-scale recruitment in neighbouring countries would not meet the labour

shortage induced by the expanding economy, by those workers' unwillingness to work where capitalist development required them, and by competition from South African recruiters (CNL, 1950: 45-46; 1947: 38). In the reports of colonial officials who organized the post-1945 recruitment campaign, migratory labour was regarded as a temporary means for coping with the crises involved in the rapid transition to a capitalist labour market, yet settler farmers continued to rely on it when other sectors had turned against it.

Table 5.2 Migration of African Workers to/from Zimbabwe

Year	Immigrants	Emigrants	Net Migration
1954	111 070	100 500	+10 600
1955	110 970	112 800	- 1 800
1956	114 200	116 800	- 2 600
1957	115 700	114 300	+ 1 400
1958	107 000	109 000	- 1 600
1959	86 070	98 500	-12 400
1960	79 080	85 300	- 6 200
1961	68 690	75 000	- 6 300
1962	53 820	65 200	-11 400
1963	45 220	51 300	- 6 100
1964	40 370	48 600	- 8 200
1965	29 030	31 760	- 2 730

(CSO, MDS June, 1974:4).

Table 5.2 shows how the heavy traffic in labour migration in the mid-1950s suddenly declined in 1959 and indicates that emigration continued to exceed immigration thereafter. It continued to do so in the twilight decade of the colonial regime. Clearly, what had once become 'the lifeblood' of the Colony' had turned within 13 years into a liability, as the Secretary for Labour described it:

The system represented a 100% turnover of labour - an obstacle to any form of continuous training or acquisition

of skills, a depressant of any increase in wages, and an acute social problem in the separation of men from their families for several years at a time. If this influx could have been confined to the needs of primary industry in the rural areas, the system might have remained tolerable (SL 1961: 1).

Having earlier dismissed requests to direct labour to those branches where it was needed as impracticable, costly and risky, colonial labour officials resolutely turned to labour direction in the early 1960s. They also indicated that this "acute social problem" would have been "tolerable" if only -- it had remained in those branches where such labour was required, namely mining and agriculture. In short, the change of policy on migrant labour had nothing to do with consideration for the workers' plight. That the importance of migrant labour had continued to decline in proportion to the the participation of Zimbabweans in wage labour over the century certainly has more to do with the change in policy, as Table 5.3 indicates.

Table 5.3 Proportions of Migrants and Zimbabweans in Employment.

Year	Zimbabweans %	Migrants %
1903	25	75
1921	34	66
1946	43	57 *
1954	48	52
1969	66	34
1972	72	27

(SL 1973: 4; * Calculated from CNL:1946).

Zimbabwean workers, whom colonial officials and employers had

somehow come to regard as irrationally "work shy", had finally entered the labour market in large enough numbers to render migrant labour superfluous.

From 1960 onward, the effort expended in disposing of migrant workers from the urban areas, where they were no longer needed, was to match that previously spent on recruiting them. The organization of the recruitment campaign has been well documented by colonial officials and some economic historians, have led the way in interpreting it (CNLA through Clarke, 1974a). While the focus here is on establishing the significance of foreign recruitment as part of the process of formal subordination of African labour to capital, an historical outline remains a necessary background. Labour recruitment to South African gold mines had been established in the region during the late 19th Century expansion. This provided the organizational and logistical precedents for early Rhodesian recruiters. Violent colonization, expropriation and forced labour had all soured relations between Zimbabweans and the colonizers. As non-wage subsistence options slowly dwindled, the regional traffic of migrant workers between South Africa and its neighbours continued. Before 1945, migrants had learned to use the recruitment facilities for their own movement southwards (van Onselen, 1976). Meanwhile, Rhodesian employers had come to perceive Zimbabweans as habitual "work-shirkers" and migrants recruited elsewhere as affordable and submissive hard workers, conveniently ignoring that the latter's strategy was to use the

system to get as far south as possible. However, the very migrants whom colonial employers preferred and believed to be abundant in their home countries were less tolerant of exploitation than they were expected to be.

With their individual efforts frustrated by the organized Witwatersrand Native Labour Association [WNLA], the recruiting agency for South African mines, Rhodesian miners promptly launched their own labour monopsony, the Rhodesian Native Labour Bureau [RNLB] (Clarke, 1974a: 8; Mosley, 1983: 135). The RNLB co-ordinated labour recruitment until 1933, when the depression rendered its efforts redundant. During World War II, leaders of the farmers' organizations prevailed upon the state to subsidize, and persuaded their members to invest privately in a recruiting agency for agriculture. Between 1942-1965, Agricultural Native Labour Limited [ANLL] profited from "capitation fees" charged on farmers, including some of its own shareholders, for each recruit supplied and regularly "repatriated" for more lucrative recruitment, without ANLL itself producing anything (see Clarke, 1974a: 128-131). After the war, the state established the Rhodesian Native Labour Supply Commission to regulate migrants for all European employers according to the Trilateral Agreement between the colonial governments of Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe, and the Tete Agreement with the Portuguese government in Mozambique (Clarke, 1974a; CAC, 1947; CNL, 1947).

In negotiating the agreements, the neighbouring colonial governments bargained for compensation of their manpower losses.

In return for facilitating recruitment, they stipulated that each contract provide for family remittances and deferred payments, to be spent within their respective territories. The Rhodesians, for their part, tried to stimulate the movement of labour into Zimbabwe and to ensure "timeous" [punctual] repatriation of male workers unaccompanied by their families, to prevent their movement further south, and generally to ensure that the recruits went exactly where they were allocated and no further. Van Onselen's analysis of the Rhodesian mining industry's recruitment efforts up to 1933 insightfully reveals how the preferred migrant workers elaborately manipulated the system and turned the tables on their recruiters (van Onselen, 1976). On the whole, the evidence suggests that foreign recruitment could not be the answer to capital's problem of inconclusive expropriation of African peasants in Zimbabwe. Like their Zimbabwean counterparts, migrant workers continued to adapt to alternative forms of subsistence instead of completely submitting to the stalled labour market. Migratory labour itself contained serious contradictions which eventually forced capital to turn to the stabilization of African labour within Zimbabwe.

In capital's programme, migrant labour was from the beginning a crisis option. At first, the role of migrant labour was to come in handy, work its contracted time where needed, particularly in mining and agriculture, and submit to repatriation. Most colonial employers, however, lacked the sophistication of capital, its labour-management "experts" and

state officials. Such was the dislocation between capital's programme and its motley group of employers that, despite the statistical success of recruitment, manpower shortage continued to assert itself as a barrier to capitalist expansion. In the attempts to overcome that shortage, capital's management "experts" began to emphasize the distinction between maintaining a steady supply of manpower and appropriating increased surplus labour from the available workers. Given that distinction, the contradictions of migrant labour within the emerging labour market, personified by settler farmers and other employers in the primary sector, began to appear.

Aware that manpower shortages would hit them first and only partially grasping the implications of labour commodification for the economy, settler farmers often resorted to subterranean manipulations of the migratory labour system, as the Secretary for Native Affairs noted anxiously:

In one district, it is reported that some farmers are actually keeping natives out of work by giving false leave passes to unemployed natives in order to curry favour and perhaps establish a claim to their services at some future date (SNA 1952: 28).

In desperate attempts to hold down the very mobile migrants to their own limited-expansion enterprises, settler farmers often violated capital's class strategies. In resorting to such practices as advancing credit monies to African workers, allocating them tasks that could be accomplished in half a day for the going full day's pay, winking at absenteeism and forging bribes to keep particular workers out of competition, they

inadvertently undermined the development of a capitalist labour market (SNA 1952: 27). While African workers tried to move freely and bid economically throughout the regional labour market, the state often contradicted itself and capital by attempting to confine them to certain sectors, such as agriculture. Taking the cue, settler farmers went farther and tried to obstruct the free movement of labour between the sectors. The threat to the accumulation process was serious enough for the Secretary to deliver a stern warning to settler farmers: they should clean up their act or expect no sympathy in their competition with more powerful employers. As in the tenant system, settler farmers had found non-capitalistic ways of holding African workers to their narrow purposes. Once again, European farmers posed a barrier to the development of a capitalist labour market and a submissive labour force.

The Migrant Workers Act of 1948 provided for implementation of the inter-territorial labour agreements of 1946 and 1947 but was proving difficult to implement. Because many migrant workers were southward-bound and working in Zimbabwe simply to use the system for that purpose, they resented employers' attempts to hold their wages for deferred payment and family remittance at the end of their contracts. Without any channels for protest, migrant workers resorted to obstruction, concealing their work books from employers for instance. For their part, settler farmers resented the burden of enforcing such deductions against resentful workers. Some farmers even made individual arrangements

with African workers, often contravening the African Labour Regulations Act of 1911 and other laws designed to counter the tendency towards uncaptalist recruitment practices. Between 1950-1953, the Commissioner of Native Labour issued annual threats to introduce a Native Employment Bill which would help consolidate state control of what was considered to be 'employer malpractices'. After 1953, the threat disappeared from the annual reports, indicating the dilemma of state intervention to discipline employers rather than labour.

For their part, migrant workers continued to find ways of avoiding full submission to wage labour while making the most of it, of minimizing the length of the working-day, month or season even when employers deliberately endeavoured to endear themselves by ameliorating working conditions. The "good" foreign workers just were not as submissive and affordable as they reputedly were in contrast to Zimbabwean workers. Van Onselen's account of the struggle between the RNLB and Rhodesian employers, on the one hand, and migrant recruits stopping over on their way south, on the other, provides a useful background to the post-war disposition of migrant workers and their recruiters. According to van Onselen, migrants had learned to abscond en masse on the way to assigned work places, using the incentives and facilities offered them by their recruiters in the process. They had learned how to forge documents which might impede their progress southwards, or when to dump them and assume new identities. They had developed labour market intelligence systems which enabled

them to counter-direct workers from notorious employers who might rely on official recruitment to get the labourers who would otherwise work elsewhere (van Onselen, 1976: 232-233, 235). The practice of nicknaming employers and workplaces by their management habits, such as 'Matikiti' [Mr Tickets] for 'one who issues tickets for workers' daily output', noted in van Onselen's study, was still in vogue in 1959 when the present author joined other village casual workers for a week of tobacco reaping under a new European tobacco grower, who was appropriately named "Mangoromera" [fist-fighting charms] for his enhanced appetite for assaulting African workers.

Employers who did not grasp the implications of a "free" labour market in the capitalistic sense continued to plague the labour market even when the state began to close its doors on labour migration from neighbouring countries. As he listed the 'problems created by the system of migrant labour' and attempted to restrict its use to agriculture, the Secretary for Labour explained African workers' alleged continuing aversion to employment in settler agriculture as part of the evolutionary trend set in motion by the industrial revolution (SL 1960: 5). A sociologist took the 'nature-nurture' debate to the Rhodesian Tobacco Journal and began to persuade farmers to recruit African workers within Zimbabwe since, after all, they were born equally endowed with Europeans at birth and only needed some training to correct their initial social environmental disadvantages (J. Clyde-Mitchell, February, 1962: 35). Some "prosperous farmers"

issued a statement to the effect that "local Africans" were not, after all, ill disposed towards work of any sort and urged their less sophisticated peers to resort to incentives that would supposedly attract "responsible" African workers: better housing, education, etc. As the over-supply of migrant workers was being gotten rid of, the welfare strategy for stabilizing a locally recruited labour force began to be sold to settler farmers.

Yet the officials who had supervised foreign recruitment had all along been aware of the contradictions of migratory labour. Employers in primary sectors had been frequently warned that the ceiling would soon be reached in foreign recruitment and their growing demand for labour would never be met from that source (CNL, 1951: 47). The wastefulness of publicly and privately financed recruitment, of the 'free' transport service called "ulere" [for "no fare"], of administration and of policing African workers' movements, and of receiving foreign workers who initially made their way to South Africa and only became available to Zimbabwe's settler farmers when rejected by WNLA, the 100% turnover rate involved in recruiting workers and mandatorily repatriating them, etc., had been accepted as a matter of course by agricultural employers. 'Labour shortage' had remained, for most of them, a matter of finding the numbers and putting them to work under coercive supervision, not of calculating socially necessary and surplus labour time. As long as industrial capitalists and employers in other sectors needed workers, the farmers' demand that labour be directed to

agriculture and legally tied there was dismissed as 'counter-productive' and 'impracticable'.

Yet when the migratory system was finally condemned by industry, management "experts" and the state, the Foreign Migratory Labour Act was promptly passed in 1958 and amended in 1960 precisely to enable the Labour Minister to close urban areas to foreign Africans seeking work in Zimbabwe (SL 1960: 12). Like WNLA, industrial employers in Zimbabwe had begun to send their labour 'rejects' to the agricultural ghetto. The inter-territorial agreements with neighbouring countries were terminated at short notice after the Secretary for Labour enumerated 'these reasons that the government has set its face against the use of migrant labour in towns' (SL 1960: 11). However, since 'the demand for unskilled labour in the farming sector could not be satisfied from local sources...the Closed Areas Order was amended to remove the restrictions applying to the employment of aliens in farming areas' (SL 1968: 38).

Among the reasons given by the Secretary for Labour for ending migration to urban areas, only the 100% turnover rate reads literally enough to reveal what he was referring to, namely the unappropriated labour-time wasted [for capital] in the unnecessary movements between home country and each worker's successive workplaces within Zimbabwe. The rest need closer scrutiny because they effectively conceal capitalist contradictions under cryptic phraseology. The pass system, on which labour recruiters had heavily relied in their attempts to

prevent workers from proceeding on to South Africa, was now to be 'relaxed' to allow Africans to settle permanently in urban areas. However, the Secretary rationalized its previous relevance as a recognition of 'the African's preference for a migratory form of existence', while the relaxation was to be explained as a recognition of his "modernization". Behind that relaxation lay capital's interest in a settled African labour force which would fully submit to the regular and efficient expropriation of its surplus labour, approximating the situation at Masasa Estate.

The rest of the "reasons" were identified as the 'evils inherent in a system of migrant labour'. The pious criticism of the "evil" recruitment of African workers without their families, as "single" men housed as quintets of "boys" in communal quarters, which tied accommodation to employment and threw them onto the streets if fired, was in fact the cryptic expression of capital's calculation that housing its employees permanently, with their families, would not only attract "responsible" Zimbabwean workers but also eliminate such problems as high turnover. The secretary's reference to the migrant system as 'a depressant of wages' implies his recognition of the fact that the determination of African wages on a definition of necessary labour which ignored the existence of African families was not in capital's interest. A definition of necessary labour which ignored biological reproduction ultimately threatened capital's own interest in the reproduction of labour-power. It allowed the employer to regularly appropriate a large part of necessary

labour on behalf of capital, to "mine" labour-power from the working class without investing sufficiently in its reproduction. Ultimately, the official reasons given for abandoning foreign labour recruitment indicate that the system had changed from being the 'lifeblood of the Colony' to become the latest barrier to capitalist accumulation, which might still be useful in settler agriculture (SL 1960: 10-11).

Faced with the contradictory combination of material resources for capitalist expansion and a potential labour force that would not automatically succumb to the degradation of wage labour, despite violent and increasing expropriation, Rhodesian employers and the colonial state first resorted to the established system of subordinating African labour, namely foreign recruitment. However, for the reasons just scrutinized, the system ultimately went against the logic and the process of sustained accumulation. The resort to migrant labour had been made necessary by the resistance of Zimbabweans to expropriation and compulsion to submit to wage labour and concealed under the ideology of "the backward African" who was unable to awaken to the opportunity for modernity. While capitalists attempted to mobilize this migratory reserve army of labour, little was done to ensure its reproduction. Necessary labour was defined in such a way as to undermine the very reproduction of this source of labour-power. Meanwhile, the vanishing subsistence options of Africans within Zimbabwe made them increasingly available for wage labour, and the contradictions of migrant labour increasingly

came to the surface. Once capitalists turned against that system, the whole strategy, including its relations and associated ideologies, came into question and the state was mobilized first to confine migrant workers to agriculture, then to pursue their employers with a different approach to labour, based on stabilization of the work force and intensification of the labour process. Subsection 5.2.3 focuses on the organization of production in tobacco farming to get a closer view of the struggle to make African workers optimally productive once they turned to wage labour.

5.2.3 Formal Domination of African Labour in Tobacco Production.

The dwindling viability of non-wage subsistence activities increasingly alleviated manpower shortages even for agriculture. However, their mere availability for farm labour did not guarantee that African workers would be optimally and continuously productive as required for capitalist accumulation. Once the workers were secured for settler agriculture, the problem for capital became that of asserting its dominance over the labour process. How could capital, which had opted for indirect investment in agriculture, ensure that labour was supervised according to the logic of value accumulation? Settler farmers did not necessarily share capital's interest in value productivity and, even if they did, lacked a comprehensive grasp

of the capitalist labour process. This is evident in the fact that, as late as 1976, the Agricultural Committee for Management Education [ACME] was still expressing dissatisfaction with the managerial aptitudes and "professional" apathy of settler farmers (RTJ February, 1976: 16).

Before the state and various support services began to intervene on a large scale to reorientate agricultural labour management towards an emphasis on "efficiency", the process of production largely depended on the subjective approaches of both settler and labourer. Although African labour was regarded in settler agriculture as an extension of "the grower's" own hands, the latter being a self-employer in his own enterprise, African workers had only submitted to agricultural employment as the next viable option. Taking up wage labour in agriculture and giving up their autonomy did not entail full or final submission to capital. As Braverman puts it, 'the transition of working humanity into a "labour force", a "factor of production", an instrument of capital, is an incessant and unending process [which] becomes a permanent feature of capitalist society (Braverman, 1974: 139-140).

From 1960 onwards, migrant workers were to be closed out of urban areas while Zimbabwean workers were to be 'stabilized' along the lines outlined in the Masasa model, except that what had been a private venture for ITC was to be extended to all African workers and administered by municipal governments. The same approach would increasingly be recommended for settler

agriculture on the level of individual farms. Settler farmers, however, had a reputation for persistently frustrating management experts by ignoring their suggestions for "modernization". While the 'stabilization approach' was generally adopted and implemented by those multinational corporations that had directly invested in certain agricultural lines on their estates, the approach to labour management remained overwhelmingly coercive on settler farms (see Clarke, 1977). In the period of expansion between 1945-60, managing African workers was for settler farmers a matter of retaining them since it was already assumed that Africans had no interest in work. For capital, however, an unlimited supply of African workers, employed for optimum contract length and available at all times would not conclusively resolve the labour 'problem'. The crucial question for capital, given adequate supplies of African labour, was how to increase surplus value on the basis of existing technical conditions. The emphasis on "facilities" in the stabilization programme expressed but did not articulate this problem sufficiently.

Even in the heydays of migrant recruitment [1945-1958], when unpleasant living conditions and low wages were generally regarded as the main reasons why Zimbabweans shunned agricultural employment, on both sides of the colonial social frontier, and hence as the obstacles to capitalist development in agriculture, colonial officials often questioned the plausibility of certain prescriptions for "stabilizing" labour:

Again good pay, good food and good living conditions, though they will attract many, are by no means an infallible incentive, and one is forced to the conclusion

that for a large body of Africans, their only interest is in the smallest possible amount of work for as much as they can get, by any means, including shameless pilfering, with no sense of responsibility, or loyalty or interest in their job (SNA, 1952: 28).

Now, to grasp the significance of the above passage, it will be necessary to take the colonial bureaucratic insolence as given and examine it more closely. Here is a rare admission by a state official that workers have their own interests and no matter how much appeasement employers resort to, those interests remain the workers' primary focus. Here also is the official specification of the stake in the class struggle between labour and capital in the workplace, namely the working-day. Just being in the workplace does not imply that workers will automatically co-operate in their own exploitation. Stated otherwise, once Africans were secured for wage labour, the erstwhile contradiction of their inconclusive expropriation was superseded by the struggle over the length of the working-day, with capital interested in its extension and augmenting absolute surplus-value, and labour struggling to confine it to necessary labour.

By delegating labour supervision to settler farmers, capital had risked the intervention of managerial practices that might 'cost' it in terms of unappropriated labour-time and obstruction of the accumulation process. Some relevant examples of this were cited in 5.2.2. With relations of production changing rapidly in agriculture during the century - self-employed African peasants up to the mid-1920s, self-supervised tenants [where applicable]

through the 1930s, self-employed European settlers with African labour after 1945, both under capitalist domination from outside, followed by 'scientific management' and mechanization from the early 1960s onwards - settler farmers could not keep up with new management practices. Although the need to educate European farmers as managers of African labour was recognized early in the 1950s, little was actually done to that effect until the early 1960s, when work-study officers and others in the support services intervened in settler agriculture with manuals for effective management. The struggles involved in getting the farmers to comply will be examined in greater detail in Chapter Six.

All that needs grasping about capitalist labour management education at this point is how it ignores work organization and concentrates on defining conditions under which workers supposedly will 'co-operate in the scheme of work organized by the individual engineer', with changes in the labour process assumed as 'inexorable givens, and...accepted as "necessary and inevitable"' (Braverman, 1974: 140-141). Since settler farmers were themselves subordinated to capital, they could not be trained to grasp the capitalist relations of production in full without being awakened to their own exploitation and no-one conspired to avoid that. The curriculum of management education for capital historically includes that bias. Accordingly, between 1945-1960, most settler farmers had come to understand the struggle in the workplace to be between one human species [Europeans] which had

brought the benefits of 'civilization', and another [Africans] which did not readily appreciate the good turn and reward it with loyalty. Instead of simply ignoring social aspects of the labour process, management doctrine in colonial Zimbabwe had set out to distort them systematically. It distorted the material basis of settler agriculture by concealing its subordination to extra-agrarian capitals and mobilizing a racist ideology which had become the world-view of Europeans in southern Africa. In short, the struggle in settler agriculture had become, for the majority of its European employers, "The Battle Against Africa". In both its assertions and its silences, much has been revealed about how capital came to dominate African labour in settler agriculture without capitalists ever directly supervising its productive activities.

Rhodesian labour "experts" assumed the existence of "the African", an abstraction depicting certain "traits" which allegedly explained African workers' imputed aversion to work. Some opponents of colonialism have sought to counter these claims by merely denying them, without seeking to explain their material basis, that is without reflecting much on whether Africans would actually gladly submit to the degradation of wage labour in settler agriculture, given the choice. Most of those who have undertaken studies of so-called "settler ideology" have tended to dismiss its claims as mere distortions or "myths" concocted by a guilty ruling white group in defence of its privileges, and lacking any factual basis. The present analysis recognizes that

the claims of racist ideology in southern Africa have no validity sui generis, but insists that their mobilization as invalid claims about society is precisely what gives them their relevance and significance. Whatever "his" ontological status, colonialism's "the African" and his "K-factors" must be taken seriously in any investigation of the historical process whereby capital came to dominate African labour in settler agriculture. How did capital appropriate and mobilize "the African" in the production of absolute surplus-value?

The idea that Africans had no needs beyond food, shelter, etc., or could not understand wages and preferred leisure, however it was interpreted by settler farmers and other employers, constituted the first step in defining different necessary labour-times not only for different races but for different sexes and ages. Second, the endless list of "K-factors" often reveals that they were direct abstractions from capital's "labour problems" everywhere. "The African's" assumed absenteeism, drunkenness, unreliability, incorrigibility and kleptomania all indicate colonialism's concern for the continuity of labour and the sanctity of property. They all imply that unless African workers were closely supervised, the "K-factors" within them would rob capital of its share of labour-time and its property. The European supervisor's task, therefore, was to counteract these factors with their corresponding virtues of "civilization", which would promote the efficient use of labour. In other words, colonial society's "the African" was as good an

expression of the capitalist conception of 'abstract labour' as any, in the specific historical context.

Yet in "his" reified mobilization by settler farmers and other colonial employers, "the African" acquired a semi-autonomous existence of his own which proved as contradictory for capital as it was degrading for its human referents. Initially, settler farmers, many of whom as speculative landlords had lived entirely on labour rents yielded by unsupervised African tenants before the advent of systematic settlement for commodity production, simply received the dogma that Africans in general were a "labour problem" which had to be forced to deliver 'a fair day's work' for its wages. In the view of colonial labour 'experts', settler farmers who clamoured for a larger share of migrant recruits were letting the side down. They should instead economize in using available labour, cut out waste and raise efficiency. Farmers should identify causes of losses and wastage, which were invariably located in the use of labour rather, and eliminate them (Dick Taunton, RTJ April, 1960: 42-43). Whatever conception of abstract labour might be implicit in the expert's strategies, identifying the "causes" of inefficiency became, among settler farmers, a matter of witch-hunting as they looked for 'passengers to weed out', 'idlers' to punish, 'slovenly and inefficient workers' to drive, 'smart Alocs' who might fraudulently fill their tickets by presenting the same finished tasks repeatedly, and hungover Monday slackers who should be promptly fired (RT March, 1957: 25; RT November 1957:

22; RT March, 1958: 8; RTJ March, 1962: 27-29). Such crude practices might bring isolated self-satisfaction to the bellicose employer but the accumulation process generally might be threatened.

Firstly, given the frequent manpower shortages in agriculture, such aggravation threatened to exacerbate worker resentment, lead work seekers to avoid farmers notorious for bad managerial habits, reproduce the already high turnover rates and reinforce the other contradictions already noted in 5.2.2. Secondly, workers might adapt to such practices creatively. One tobacco grower who believed that close supervision was the secret to success admitted that his operations had become 'a battle of wits from early morning until the end of the day' (Cowland-Cooper, 'The Battle Against Africa', 1959: 19). He counted several ways in which African workers could turn the tables on him and use every moment he left the work site by ploughing shallow, soiling stumps, concealing errors, destroying standing crops by driving ox-and-plough through field corners to get home early, loosening bolts to shatter implements, fraudulently entering tasks on tickets, dumping graded leaf outside the shade, etc. Although he recognized that a grower would need eyes at the back of his head to prevent all this, Cowland-Cooper remained convinced that close supervision was the way 'to defeat the African' (Ibid.: 20).

Inadvertently, this grower revealed both the class hostilities in the workplace and the modes of worker resistance

under formal subordination. In addition to outright withdrawal of labour and increasing turnover rates, African workers could continually attenuate the amount of surplus-value already appropriated for capital by attacking both the commodities and the means of production under their immediate control and by 'skrimping' on assigned tasks. While isolated acts of sabotage and fraud might have minimal effects on the individual grower's livelihood, it is clear that if the practice of close supervision were to provoke widespread worker resistance along these lines, the total value lost to capital throughout the industry might be considerable. Given the de-stabilizing implications of coercive supervision, management "experts" increasingly condemned settler farmers for inefficient use of labour even when farmers were intensifying their supervisory efforts. By 1960, the "experts" throughout settler agriculture's expanding support services were ready to intervene directly in the production process to replace the capricious farmer [a subjective element] in the labour process with a dogmatic executor of the Work Study Manual, which ideally represented capital's conception of the labour process. Through that, presumably, capital's own reflexive subjective element, "the African", would be displaced by an unreflecting factor of production, a "labour force".

Partly inspired by the doctrine of "scientific management" and perhaps partly alerted to the implications of coercive supervision for accumulation in general, management "experts" began to emphasize a shift away from coercion towards

incentive-based management. However, "the African" was retained replete with his "K-factors". The issue of a Work Study Manual to growers by the RTA in 1961 was the first comprehensive attempt to displace the subjective settler from the labour process and leave African labour to struggle with capital's shadow. However, the reception of the manual among the settlers was mixed, with optimistic growers dogmatically following it and letting the results confirm the prophecy of greater profits, while pessimists either clung to traditional methods or experimented with innovation, with many grey cases in between (RTJ, 1960s).

One example of each extreme response was recorded from interviews with growers in the Norton District by the Rhodesia Tobacco Journal. On Voorspoed Farm, Mr and Mrs Scholtz reported that the manual's proposed incentive bonus had been effectively applied to grading operations. They remained ambiguous as to what the effective factor was: 'Provided supervision was close, bonuses had induced workers to make additional efforts' (RTJ September, 1962: 35-37). Apparently, the workers only responded to the 'incentive' bonus because they were being closely watched not only by the Scholtzs but by one another. The "incentive" bonus was simultaneously balanced with its punitive negative. 'Women were paid a basic 2s [20 cents] per good quality tying of 400 hands of graded leaf a day', with 5d [5 cents] being deducted for 100 hands less, with the record output standing at 450 hands per day just before the interview. No one had yet reached the possible extra 5 cents per day but the hands put together by the

"collective woman" in individual efforts to excel must have been considerable. Mrs Scholtz went on to explain the coercive aspect of her "incentive" bonus: 'part of the secret...was to give lots of verbal encouragement to the staff and to keep the bonus cards in a prominent place so all the women could see who was doing best and who was slacking' (RTJ September, 1962: 37).

At first, one wonders why the Scholtzs were celebrating managerial "science" since none of the graders had individually yielded them the extra 100 "hands" per day they were prepared to pay for. However, since the Voorspoed graders were women, they counted as "half-men" while working at the standard rate. They were paid half the wages of men and none of the rations their spouses received for the whole family. Furthermore, while it gave the women the chance to raise their earnings from 20-25 cents per day, no-one actually reached 500 hands a day individually. Collectively, however, if the women all exceeded the minimum daily output by another 400 hands, the Scholtzs could collect the "collective woman's" 400 hands without paying her the basic 20 cents per shift. Ideally, they were bound to realize a profit. However, it is precisely at the point of realization that extra agrarian capitals frequently presented themselves to settler farmers as an alien force appropriating what African labour had yielded to them. The Scholtzs' moment of truth came when they compared leaf samples with a friend from Choma [Zambia] who was collecting twice their market receipts for his leaf. They put it all to the effect of latitude on leaf qualities.

Harry Meyer, the skeptical manager of Mr Burdett-Coutts' Porta Farm, rejected the Work Study Manual outright. He emphasized the need for 'good organization' as he knew it, that is 'close supervision', advance planning and personal responsibility. Incentive bonuses, he maintained, would not work. Instead, he preferred 'to set a standard of work, at a flat wage, and dismiss any labourers who did not reach it' (RTJ September, 1962:35). For Meyer, tobacco labourers' work was manual labour and incentive bonuses would only create unnecessary discontent and disharmony among the workers. Moreover, to emphasize speed was to risk bad performance while the 'real' problem in agriculture was the weather, not labour.

These two examples, which broadly represent the two typical reactions of Zimbabwean tobacco growers to the intervention of management "experts" in the early 1960s, suggests that the limits to revolutionizing the labour process in settler agriculture remained very narrow and serve as a warning against rushing to the conclusion that the intervention was itself immediately effective. The idea of "scientific" work studies had only been recently introduced to settler farmers, many of whom had never employed anybody before settling down to produce tobacco. According to Taunton, if farmers were paying workers by results and organizing work on the task system, they were already operating on a work study principle. What was left was to make it all "scientific" by recording tasks, identifying and eliminating unproductive work [and workers], determining the most economical

methods and standardizing them (RT June, 1959: 15). It was still a long shot to the combination of time studies and motion studies and those further post-Taylorist developments that had long revolutionized the labour process in the American factory. In fact, it was to take a long publicity campaign just to get the ordinary tobacco grower/settler farmer off the rule-of-thumb and onto records and planning in organizing the labour of African workers.

Meanwhile, the very "experts" whose managerial authority was supposed to liberate settler farmers from the claws of tradition seemed unable to extricate themselves from the tradition of coercion. Their contributions, seldom questioned in management fraternity, often simply reproduced existing wisdom. Early articles by the Harare grower Brian Danckwerts indicate that coercion remained the supreme management principle in settler agriculture even when "science" had become the catch-word for agricultural development. His "guide" to the art of labour management advised fellow growers to 'be firm but fair', insist on obedience while accommodating questions and suggestions, jump immediately on any insubordination and only reflect later, etc. (RTJ January, 1963: 29-30). He goes on to list the allegedly environmentally acquired traits of "the African" and the cures thereof:

TRAIT	CURE
Ignorance	Training
Laziness	Responsibility

Unreliability

Inspire loyalty, etc.

Danckwerts also suggested ways of pacifying labour, the 'secrets of a good reprimand' which, to ensure the desired effects, must make the worker feel ashamed of himself rather than humiliated (RTJ February, 1963: 35). The familiar message was still prominent: Africans would not work unless European supervisors constantly supervised them.

In the rush to promote labour efficiency through "scientific management", the emphasis on coercive supervisory techniques calculated to make labour co-operate, the contradictions between labour and capital were almost completely obscured. Labour "problems" were identified only to be answered by magic solutions which only indicated that settler agriculture was exhausting its supervisory possibilities. Settler farmers could still find more ways to augment productivity without over-driving labour. They could extend the working-day by stratifying different categories of workers such that different levels of necessary labour-time could be determined for men and women, adults and children, "farm labour" and others, etc. This practice was but an extension of the early colonial designation of different levels of subsistence for Europeans and Africans. In all these cases, the category designated as "inferior" was supposed to make up its shortfall in subsistence elsewhere: Africans from cultivation in the reserves or country of origin, women and children from the male household head's superior earnings. That way, women and children could work the same hours as men, on the same job, at half the wage rates,

minus the rations paid to the household head.

The most economic way to obtain child labour was to link it to farm education. One good example was recorded in Chegutu district, where farmer J de Wet had built 'a school for adolescents who were no longer eligible for education in the African area schools'. He had taken in 60 of them for feeding, schooling and housing, so that they could, 'in return, give their services free' (RTJ September, 1960: 51). To that effect, half the children would attend school in the morning, and the other 30 in the afternoon, each group producing 6 000 bricks "a day". In other words, counting the children as "half workers", 60 of them would produce 12 000 bricks per full day, all in return for food, accomodation and school.

Alternatively, the normal working-day could be extended by rendering commodity production entirely irrelevant to African workers' subsistence, with some employers deciding that African workers' money wages were only pocket money'. An example was recorded at T. Negri's Maryland Farm, Macheke district, where 300 out of 8,000 acres were allocated for African workers' subsistence cultivation, under supervision by a headman (RTJ August, 1962: 37). Wallerstein applied this to a general theory of exploitation which focused on all sources of the worker's real lifetime income:

The major way in which an employer can reduce his wage bill is if he can arrange it so that the wages of the employees are not the only source of income. To the extent that this is so, whoever provides additional sources of income to the employee [for other than productive work] is paying the overall wage bill (Wallerstein, 1979: 125-126).

At Maryland farm, however, it was more than a matter of different sources of income. Farmer Negri actually displaced necessary labour completely from commodity production, so that the workers' real wages came entirely from the workers' own subsistence activities, with tobacco [commodity] production entirely being transformed into surplus labour-time. The feudalist temporal/spatial separation between necessary and surplus labour was thereby adjusted for capitalist production and the working-day extended beyond normal. While settler farmers explored various ways of raising efficiency by economically organizing the labour force in the individual workplace, a different and superior approach to labour exploitation, based on reduction of necessary-labour relative to surplus-labour, was in the making.

5.3 Conclusion.

This chapter opened with a critical examination of existing literature on the labour-capital relationship in Zimbabwe's settler agriculture. It developed the argument that both the modernization ideologues who informed colonial labour policy and those of its radical critics who addressed the problematic of "proletarianization" failed to penetrate the complexity of capital's formal subsumption of labour in agriculture and largely obscured it as well as its implications for socialist

transformation. By distorting the character of capitalism, one also obscures the conception of socialism. Informed by a Marxist conception of the labour process, an alternative analysis was developed which focused on the historical dialectic of capital's management of its recurrent crises and African labour's adjustment to uneven expropriation and subjection to the degradation of wage-labour. The climax of the process of formal subordination of African labour to capital was located in the early 1960s, when efforts to promote labour efficiency through the organization of co-operation began to be reinforced by attempts to increase productivity through a transformation of the labour process itself. It is concluded that by the early 1960s, capital was poised to transform its relations in settler agriculture through mechanisms based on greater but still indirect investment in that sector. Chapters Six and Seven pursue those developments to the point when the post-colonial state assumed responsibility for transforming a legacy of capitalist domination into a future of socialist development.

CHAPTER SIX

CAPITAL VERSUS SETTLER FARMERS: TOWARDS REAL SUBORDINATION

6.0 Introduction.

Chapter Four established that by 1960, the relationship between settler farmers and capitalists had begun to change from formal towards real subordination. Marx never extended his analysis of the production of relative surplus-value, which expresses the real subordination of labour to capital, to the case of agriculture, understandably since for him the dynamic of capital was in industry. Yet so much of the penetration of capitalism in Zimbabwean society between 1945-1985 was expressed in agricultural developments that the extension of his analysis to the industrialization of settler agriculture must be regarded as necessary for a critical grasp of the current conception of socialist transformation in Zimbabwe.

To comprehend how the settler farmer-capitalist relationship changed towards one of real subsumption and what that implies for the current conception of socialism in Zimbabwe, Section 6.1 critically engages some well known accounts of the relationship that might develop between farmers and capitalists as the industrialization of agriculture proceeds. Subsection 6.1.1 examines the arguments of conventional economists, modernization theorists and orthodox Marxists, indicates their respective views

on how tobacco production affects the farmer-capitalist relationship, and specifies their programmatic implications. Subsection 6.1.2 examines the arguments of those "radical" economic historians who are generally informed by theories of "dependency" and "underdevelopment". Subsection 6.1.3 specifies in Marxian terms what the real subordination of Zimbabwean settler farmers to capital means both theoretically and programmatically. Section 6.2 deploys that argument in substantive analysis of historical struggles between capital and Zimbabwean settler farmers. It is argued that changes in the use of land, the means and techniques of production, the manner in which capital is invested in agriculture, and the way in which the semi-processed tobacco crop is appropriated, all involved struggles which constituted the real subsumption effects of capital upon settler farmers.

6.1.1 Two Orthodoxies on the Industrialization of Agriculture

In the late 19th century, two schools of thought attempted to explain what has been described as the 'third great agricultural leap forward that began [in Europe c. 1850] with the industrialization of agriculture based on sources of energy, machinery, and chemicals' (de Janvry, 1981: 143). This subsection inaugurates the theoretical argument towards analysis of the relations between capitalists and settler farmers after 1960,

when the industrialization of settler agriculture began to intensify.

6.1.1A Agricultural Industrialization in Conventional Economics.

Extolling its 'outstanding extension and marketing organization', its managerial expertise and skills, a leading agricultural economist recently described Zimbabwe's tobacco industry as 'a sophisticated agro-industrial complex closely integrated into the country's diverse economy' (Blackie, 1983: 75,79). His tribute simultaneously obscures the meaning of an "agro-industrial complex" and reveals conventional economists' role in mystifying it. This chapter argues towards the conclusion that the industrialization of settler agriculture through the "agro-industrial complex" - that is the combination of all firms and organizations investing in, appropriating the products, and promoting the productivity of agriculture - entails the real subsumption of all agricultural labours under capital.

From its classical roots to "modernization" theory, conventional social-economic thought has represented technological change in agriculture as a rational response to the "needs" of all sections of society. In the process, social conflict has been systematically obscured and partially represented as universal "progress". As Wallerstein put it:

The years 1945-70 were a period of exceptional obscurity in all fields of study, and African studies has been in this sense typical. Liberal ideology prevailed in the world

of social science reflecting the easy and unquestioned economic hegemony of the United States (Wallerstein, 1979: 67).

In that context, conventional economists have tended to ignore the social-economic implications of the industrialization of agriculture by representing it as a matter of objective technical progress. Malthus fixed the dummy on economic "factors" when he expounded his doctrine of population growth accompanied by diminishing returns to agricultural labour. His disciples, aware that no population explosion had occurred to outstrip food supplies, invoked the successful intervention of technological "progress" as the west's 'rational escape from the spectre of diminishing returns to land in the face of population pressure'. Subsequently, "capital" was added to land and labour as the "third factor" in the puzzle of agricultural industrialization.

Subsequent calculations of the effects of these "factors" on agriculture led to a number of variations on the theme of diminishing returns and "growth". In that reshuffle of factors, population growth was relegated from a causal factor to a "trigger mechanism" that launched technological change according to each economy's resource endowment. Hence technologies were classified as "labour-intensive", suitable where land remained plentiful, and "capital-intensive", where its supply was diminished. Other efforts focused on the technology-adoption behaviours of farmers in "developing" countries. Some proposed that farmers "rationally choose" techniques according to their factor prices on the competitive market. Others suggested that

the factor prices themselves positively induced farmers to adopt or forego alternative technologies which might allow farmers to economize on labour (Booth and Sundrum, 1985: 93-94). Even when factor-price explanations were criticized for assuming a simplistic economic "rationality" and ignoring the intervention of other factors in farmers' "adoption behaviour", conventional economists continued to look for more behavioural explanations of technical change rather than rethink the problem.

Accordingly, the general thrust of conventional explanations of agricultural industrialization has remained intact, with calculations of "factor biases" increasingly obscuring the social-economic forces that operate at its core. The "choice of technique" problematic, replete with its voluntaristic assumptions, remains at the centre of agricultural economics and its influence has even penetrated Marxist analysis (Elster, 1986: 207-211). In the attempts to explain "the factor bias of technical change", land, labour and capital feature as things that individual investors rationally "choose" to throw into production so as to induce desired "effects", like mixing portions of chemicals. Items of investment, conceived as "capital goods", are reified from their social relations and located in a typology of "replacement effects".

Accordingly, capital goods such as tractors are said to "replace" labour by operating in a "labouresque" fashion, while factors such as fertilizers are supposed to "replace" land

through their "landesque" effects (Sen, 1968: 82; cf. Booth and Sundrum, 1985: 160). Labour and capital, whose circulation as different moments of capital is central to capitalist production, are depicted as neutral "choices" whose deployment depends on the investor's speculative accounting. The possibility of tractors improving the land during its preparation and of fertilizers reducing necessary labour-time is not allowed for. On that basis, orthodox economists calmly prescribe "expert" advice for the success of the investor's enterprise, while simultaneously proclaiming its "advantages" for the whole of society.

From that perspective, an economics "expert" recently launched an anonymous defence of Third World tobacco production. In the Economist Intelligence Unit, he sought to refute charges brought against certain practices of tobacco corporations and their political associates in dealing with Third World "development" (see 6.1.2). Anonymous argued that tobacco, far from competing with food crops for land, labour and capital or plunging farmers into debt, is actually indispensable for the economic "development" of the Third World. Insofar as "development" means "modernization", that argument is of course partially tenable. Tobacco is supposed to alleviate the unemployment and underemployment problems of developing countries because it brings them cash and because it is likely to remain "labour-intensive" in the foreseeable future, as if capitalists had given up on reducing necessary labour (EIU, 1983: 88).

Yet tobacco is the one crop, he argues, whose "technical"

sophistication and support services will generate technological "diffusion" to farmers in "developing" countries. Since farmers who grow tobacco would be obliged by market standards to use chemicals and adopt other new techniques, food crops would supposedly "benefit" from fertilizer residues. Moreover, adds Anonymous, where tobacco is grown, its technology will "spill-over" to other crops and this, along with the "social-psychological spill-over" in the farmers' attitudes, will enhance the technological diffusion which developing countries supposedly need. Increased "productivity", a concept whose interpretation is crucial for distinguishing 'social productiveness from capitalist exploitation, is uncritically assumed to be desirable for "development" (EIU, 1983: 102-105).

On the whole, Anonymous skillfully accomplishes the inversion of every mechanism through which the "agro-industrial complex" effects the real subordination of tobacco farmers to capital, making them all look like "advantages" for the exploited producers. Occasionally, however, the "intelligence" unit blows its cover and bares the underlying social conflicts:

Farmers in the Third World are very cooperative and reluctant, however, to adopt new cultivating and harvesting practices. This unwillingness to adopt new systems and methods of production has been a major challenge to tobacco companies and government officials (EIU, 1983: 94).

The challenge has been taken up by capitalists and governments. Tobacco companies and extension agencies in the Third World have co-operated to extend new instruments, techniques and other forms of assistance such as credit and marketing services to Third

World farmers (EIU, 1983: 101). It can be demonstrated that through these very services, extra-agrarian capitalists can intensify the labour process as part of the real subsumption process.

Against the charge that tobacco production beggars farmers, Anonymous lists the supposed advantages of leaf-buying and operating capital schemes whereby "working" and "long-term" capital goods are made affordable to farmers by the credit system. Lenders are supposed to "subsidize" and "reduce" the risks of tobacco operations by providing instructors and other extension "facilities" to ensure that inputs are properly applied and all operations adequately managed (EIU, 1983: 119). What Anonymous will not reveal is that interest is charged on these "subsidies" and credit is in fact a form of capital invested for that purpose. Under the pretext that they want to "protect" themselves and farmers from possible loss, tobacco and other capitalist firms in the "agro-industrial" complex assume remote control over the labour process without ever entering their global farm. As the "facilities" are extended, capitalists can profit not only from marketing the commodities and collecting interest but also through indirect intervention in the labour process itself.

By obscuring its intervention in the labour process, capital can profit from agriculture without "risking" unpredictable losses. By employing the technical services of physical science, capital can raise value productivity in agriculture without

constituting it into a centralized factory system. With intellectual support from neo-classical economics, capital can legitimize domination of farmers as an indispensable and beneficial intervention to develop the Third World. From that perspective, conventional social science routinely interprets the industrialization of agriculture as a purely technical and socially neutral aspect of "development". Farmers are encouraged to adopt capital's innovations and raise productivity as a universal rather than a class interest. Productivity is accordingly defined in purely technical terms: so many units of raw material transformed to such a state in so many man-hours. Such a physical conception of "productivity" is in conflict with workers and the socialist movement and Marx was at war with it (Harvey, 1982: 104). For conventional economists, capital enters the labour process as anyone's "factor" of production, as an object, an amount of money!

The legitimization of exploitation through conventional social science has been developing into an elaborate ideological practice ever since the bourgeoisie learned to rely on a positivist philosophy which inherently affirms, 'through its moral disengagement and technical manipulative mode of reasoning, the emergent status quo' (Preston, 1982: 12). Before turning to the modern critical reactions to conventional social science, it would be useful to examine how orthodox Marxists have approached the problem of agricultural transformation.

6.1.1B . Agricultural Industrialization in Orthodox Marxism.

Most 19th century social thinkers viewed development in evolutionist perspective, with agricultural industrialization represented as the triumph of "modernization" over antiquity. While the liberal orthodoxy degenerated into the progressist apologetics now known as modernization theory, orthodox Marxists attempted to be more critical by focusing on their "agrarian question". This is not the place to engage Kautsky and Lenin in a full theoretical debate. All that is intended here is to critique those aspects of their problematic which immediately reflect upon the real subsumption process insofar as it affected Zimbabwean settler farmers after 1960.

Lenin's contribution, prompted by the writings of Narodnik economists, was a generally optimistic prognosis which lauded "agricultural capitalism's" accomplishment as "a very good thing" "a great historical service" (Lenin, 1967: 320-322). He criticized Narodniks for failing to recognize "the capitalist character of the employment of machinery in our agriculture", their cover-up of ~~class~~ contradictions arising from peasant differentiation, and their partial view of capitalism as a "destructive" force (Lenin, 1967: 322-323). For Lenin, all the characteristics of "agricultural capitalism" [which has been criticized in Chapter Five] "reduce to a "single process" - socialization of agricultural labour and intensification of capitalist contradictions - "the development of the productive

forces of social labour" which he regarded as necessary for the impending revolution (Lenin, 1967: 319, 322). Although taking a more theoretical approach, Kautsky generally concurred with Lenin: the modern system of production in agriculture expressed "the right alliance of science and business" which characterizes capitalism (Banaji, 1976: 10). Although the orthodox Marxist celebration of productive forces pointed to a revolutionary future, its progressist affinity with the bourgeois notion of technological diffusion and its "spill-over effects" in modernization ideology is too close to ignore.

Given their optimism about "the development of productive forces in capitalist agriculture", whatever their political programme, one must be sceptical about orthodox Marxists' view of developments in agriculture. Lenin's account of the significance of machinery in agriculture raises a number of questions on his understanding of the penetration of agriculture by capitalism. In the rest of this section, the argument advanced earlier about Lenin's notion of the "agrarian bourgeoisie" becomes crucial in grasping his view of how capitalists dominate agricultural labour.

At one point, Lenin echoes Marx's dramatization of the transcendence of domestic industry by the capitalist mode of production and claims, 'The systematic employment of machinery in agriculture ousts the patriarchal "middle" peasant as inexorably as the steam-power loom ousts the handicraft weaver' (Lenin, 1967: 233). What Marx had used to illustrate historical changes in

modes of production, Lenin reduced to an evolutionist analogy of chronological inexorability. The resulting trajectory simply equates "development of productive forces" with "technological diffusion", both of which imply technical progressivism.

Other questionable aspects of Lenin's treatment of "agrarian capitalism" arise from his methodology. He correctly emphasized that the application of machinery to Russian agriculture was 'of a capitalist character', i.e. it leads to the establishment of capitalist relations and their further development (Lenin, 1967: 231). What all proponents of an "agrarian bourgeoisie" mean by "capitalist relations" has been criticized throughout this study. Of particular relevance here is the fact that Lenin often reduced capitalism to a causal "factor" e.g. "capitalism is the factor giving rise to, and extending the use of, machinery in agriculture" (Lenin, 1967: 231). Lenin thereby implies something similar to neo-Malthusian explanations of technical change. The difference is that in Lenin, "capitalism" replaces population growth as the "cause" of agricultural industrialization. Peasant competition and the consequent drop in grain prices are mechanically presented in Lenin as something that makes mechanization in agriculture necessary. Similarly, diminishing returns to labour are supposed to have made technical change necessary in the face of population growth in neo-Malthusianism.

To substantiate his claim that mechanization transforms relations of production into those of capitalism, Lenin drew upon an empiricist problematic which focuses on peasant

differentiation into "agrarian bourgeoisie" and "rural proletariat". Accordingly, 'the spread of agricultural machines means the elimination of labour-service by capitalism' (Lenin, 1967: 232). Here Lenin simply echoes the claim that "technological diffusion" accelerates the transcendence of modernity over antiquity. Quite frequently, it is simply the "introduction" (as opposed to the employment) of machinery that is taken to effect the change in the mode of production. In the history of mechanization in settler agriculture, many machines were introduced only to be abandoned or rejected by settler farmers.

When Lenin got to calculating "the significance of machinery in agriculture", the validity of his analysis was undermined by a number of clearly untenable claims. Generally, "agricultural mechanization", or the mere "introduction" of machines to farmers, is taken to 'reveal all the typical features of capitalist progress with all its inherent contradictions' (Lenin, 1967: 233). However, many of the "features" and "contradictions" cited are quite conceivable without the deployment of the kind of technologies that were associated with the "third great agricultural leap forward" - steam and electrical energy, machinery, and chemicals. In Zimbabwean settler agriculture, for instance, the concentration of workers and their practice of co-operation on the farm, low wages, and the use of female and child labour in a factory-like hierarchy, which Lenin argued would follow upon the introduction of machines, actually preceded

systematic mechanization (Lenin, 1967: 233-239). In fact, it was precisely the failure of the features [or contradictions] to generate an infinite rise in productivity that compelled extra-agrarian capitalists to increase indirect investment of constant capital in settler agriculture.

Furthermore, Lenin's list of the social-economic effects of machines in agriculture raises questions about the meaning of "capitalist contradictions". For, instance, the introduction of wage-labour is contrasted with that of machines, so that the question of a "peasant bourgeoisie" appears "contradictory" with the ousting of wage-workers. The trouble with Lenin's concept of "contradictions" is that, unlike Marxian concepts, it refers directly to empirical phenomena. Conceived on the empirical level, the Marxian idea that capitalists replace variable with constant capital is reduced to a matter of 'so many workers being "ousted" from work by so many machines, as if machines could mobilize themselves in agriculture without human labour. It is that notion of "labour displacement" which gives rise to the strange concept of "deproletarianization". In 6.1.3, Braverman's abstract conception of worker displacement within the labour process will be invoked in elaborating upon the real subsumption process.

For now, suffice it to note that the contradictions Marx sought to uncover in the obscure secrets of capitalist production could not be as "manifest" as the characteristics of capitalism Lenin identified in rural Russia. The same empiricism has tended

to vitiate the orthodox Marxist conceptions of the "working-day". Lenin claims 'The capitalist mode of employing machinery here (as everywhere) is a powerful stimulus to the lengthening of the working-day. Night work, something previously unknown, makes its appearance in agriculture too' (Lenin, 1967: 238). In the Marxian relational notion of the working-day, the extension of surplus labour relative to the reduction of necessary labour due to investment in constant capital has nothing to do with working into the night. For his part, Kautsky reveals further confusion in the orthodox Marxist conception of the relationship between machinery and labour by claiming that machinery has another "advantage" in addition to "saving labour", namely "saving time" (Banaji, 1976: 9). Marx's *Capital* makes it clear that labour is measured in time units and that saving time in production is the same as saving labour and that the "advantage" goes to capital.

Lenin's analysis of the role of constant capital in Russian agriculture falls short of the theoretical rigour achieved by Marx in *Capital*. In fact, it is closer to conventional economics and modernization theory. While Lenin appropriately emphasized the "capitalist character" of the industrial transformation of agriculture, his empiricist approach was inadequate for Marxist analysis. By over-generalizing his concrete observations, Lenin ended up asserting the same ahistorical conjectures that modernization theorists later standardized as "development" economics. In 6.1.2, more recent analyses of capital in agriculture are critically examined towards elaborating upon the

real subsumption process in settler agriculture.

6.1.2 "Radical" Critique of Underdevelopment: Technical Reformism.

Chapter Four criticized those economic historians who focused on the technical gap between European and African agriculture, who concentrated on condemning the obviously unjust exclusion of Africans from the credit and factor markets, and who demanded remedial reforms. It was argued that the issue of differential access to productive factors does not address the relations of production that developed between capitalists and settler farmers during the industrialization of agriculture. This subsection examines the "radical" critique of developments in Zimbabwean agriculture with reference to the post-1960 technical changes and their implications for post-colonial development. It is proposed that "radical" critics conducted their analysis within the assumptions of orthodox economics and replicated some of the errors of orthodox Marxism. Accordingly, it is contended that, insofar as it purports to transcend orthodox economics' view of the industrialization of agriculture, the "radical" critique remains analytically inadequate and politically implausible as an argument on post-colonial socialist development.

To begin with, although "radical" economic historians

criticize "underdevelopment", they begin with orthodox economics only to reject it for a "socialized economics" (Preston, 1985: 16,25). For instance, in criticizing the "underdevelopment" impact of "dualism", Ndlela invokes the factor-price theory of technical advancement in arguing that African farmers remained unable to modernize their techniques because they were excluded from the credit system and, through that, from the factor markets. Of course, one economic consequence of that practice was to create a technical gap between African and settler farmers. However, the argument completely misses the relationship that developed between the firms manufacturing and supplying inputs and settler farmers. It affirms the neutralist view of technological "progress" asserted by orthodox economists. Ultimately factor-price explanations of technical innovation, already repudiated by orthodox economists, lead to the reformist conclusion that the granting of equal access to factor markets would end underdevelopment among African farmers (4.1.1).

Likewise, in defining his "viable options" for post-colonial "radical" reform in Zimbabwean agriculture, Stoneman invokes the categories of conventional economics and affirms its assumptions. Land, labour and capital are viewed as economic "factors" which post-colonial planning can manipulate into various appropriate combinations according to the country's "factor endowment". Accordingly, Stoneman calls for a "radical" substitution of labour for capital that would bring more people into the development process (Stoneman, 1981: 148). Analytically, this

view simply challenges orthodox economics to take the population into account without questioning its assumptions and implications. Programmatically, the argument presupposes an accommodation between nationalist "radicalism" and capitalism. It laces the liberation movement with the substance of capitalism under the guise of "radical" change. Conventional social scientists, as remarked earlier, are already adopting the language of "revolution" and using it out of context.

In his contribution to the "radical" critique of settler agriculture in colonial Zimbabwe, Clarke exemplifies recent efforts to combine disparate elements of orthodox economics, dependency theory and Marxism. The product, a critique of agricultural mechanization as a state and employer policy, shows the inevitable tensions within the analysis. Post-war agricultural mechanization, Clarke claims, was being pursued by the colonial state in collusion with employers (settler farmers), manufacturers, spare-part distributors and equipment-importing merchants, all of whom "collectively" constituted a coalition of 'powerful vested interests' (Clarke, 1977: 18, 179-182). However, this specific approach to mechanization, argues Clarke, was not as "rational" as possible. It ignored the "effects" on farmworkers, the "possible structural distortions", such as worker "displacement" and, "deproletarianization" [empirical], burdens of unemployment, joblessness, depressing effects on family and health, costs of job search and the human tragedy of deeper poverty. Without foreign exchange constraints, Clarke

contends, there would be a "mechanization explosion" (1977: 180-182). He thus implies that what was wrong about the mechanization policy pursued then was its conspiratorial origins among those interested in increasing their profits, earning foreign exchange to finance industrialization and alleviating "labour shortages", the existence of which Clarke usually dismisses as ideological distortion.

Accordingly, in Clarke's view, if only it was morally defensible and economically rational, the policy of promoting agricultural mechanization offered social benefits. Indeed, he went on to point out the pluses: the high farm outputs and incomes that might result from "carefully planned mechanization", a proposition Clarke considers to be "easier said than done". Better land clearing and soil preparation might lead to higher yields and productivity, and farm workers' toil might be lightened and the labour force stabilized (Clarke, 1977: 181). The only problem, for Clarke, was that the policy pursued by the "powerful vested interests" in their collective interests disregarded the "effects" on labour. The question arises: was Clarke critical of the capitalist collective interest as such, in favour of labour, or was he admonishing the "vested interests" against narrowly defining their interest in a contradictory way? Clearly, the latter interpretation follows from his argument. Moreover, his accounting of the possible benefits that might accrue to society if mechanization policy was "carefully planned" is hardly distinguishable from Anonymous's argument for

technological "spill-over" effects in Third World tobacco production.

The effects of mechanization for African workers will be examined in Chapter Eight. For now, the question remains that of the implications of the "radical" critique for the relationship between settler farmers and capital from the early 1960's onwards. Clarke's work exemplifies many of the theoretical difficulties encountered but often ignored by "radical" economic historians. First, settler farmers, as employers of African workers, are uncritically lumped with the "vested interests" that promoted irrational mechanization.

The fact that some farmers viewed their interests from that perspective obscures the conflict between extra-agricultural capitalists and settler farmers over the industrialization of agriculture. It replicates the orthodox Marxist assumption of an "agrarian bourgeoisie" in the context of conventional economic analysis and puts the actual capitalists on the fringes of agriculture. With state assistance, Clarke's "plantation producers" [settler farmers] obtain interest-free loans, subsidies for machinery purchases and state provided conservation and extension services (Clarke, 1977: 179). Moreover, tariff, credit and tax concessions cheapen the real price to the purchasing farmers, so that low, even negative, rates of interest often apply (1977: 181). Clarke does not question why financiers would extend credit at uneconomic interest rates. He assumes that European farmers would simply be favoured by fellow whites and

extra-agrarian capitalists.

Second, by arguing that it is the specific mechanization policy that was at fault, rather than addressing the role of mechanization in the process of capitalist accumulation, the "radicals" simply affirm the conventional view of "development" as a matter of adopting the appropriate technical practices. This exemplifies what Preston criticizes as "crude polemical inversion of the modernization orthodoxy" (Preston, 1982: 213). The "radicals" simply assert that the Third World is not being developed because its available potential is being squandered by the coalition of "vested interests". Clarke offers a reformist liberal solution within the colonial situation - "carefully planned mechanization" would bring benefits to all involved, including labour stabilization for the "powerful vested interests".

Some "radical" critics, however, argue for a quasi-socialist disengagement from the world capitalist system. Stoneman's voluntaristic substitution of labour for capital in order to involve the entirety of Zimbabwe's population in the "development" process for instance. The mere substitution of factors is supposed to turn "underdevelopment" into an undefined process of genuine "development". From a faulty analysis of the industrialization of agriculture which draws upon conventional economic thought, through a misidentification of settler farmers as capitalists, the "radical" critique reaches the proposition of socialist transformation by mixing the assumptions of

conventional economics, orthodox Marxism, and dependency theory. It remains unable to theorize the relations that prevail under capitalism.

Provoking the defence of tobacco production and its effects on Third World farmers, Muller launched a "radical" attack on the vested interests. Describing the "War on Want" programme as 'a campaign against world poverty and injustice' and highlighting action rather than theory, Muller's account largely reveals the "radicals'" plan of action which most dependency economic historians take for granted in their analysis. The role of educator, declares Muller, is 'fighting poverty by investigating and exposing its causes and by giving support to organized groups of the poor striving for self-reliance, power and dignity' (Muller, 1978: 4). According to Muller, "radical" action involves exposing the fact that the technology which excites Third World tobacco growers as "modernization" will in fact ruin them through high purchase prices, lost jobs, farmers' security and the inevitable drop in prices when the current "spectre" of mechanization reaches its apogee.

Although Muller sounds implausible in appealing to capital for social responsibility, his trajectory of technological change in world tobacco production almost takes the "radical" critique to the heart of the matter. He recognizes the difference of interests between capitalists, tobacco growers and the hired workers. Elaborating on his prognosis, Muller identifies the following trends. Direct seed-sowing is about to eliminate

transplanting labour. American mechanized reaping has reduced labour demand for that operation from 240 hours to 12 hours per acre, ending harvest-time labour shortages and high wages. This implies undermining of the "cost advantages" which had made Zimbabwean leaf more attractive to British and other world buyers. In addition, small farmers stand to be eliminated because mechanization becomes economic only with large-scale operations. Bulk-curing, which has slashed curing labour from 125 to 50 hours per acre, leads to the next and decisive step, homogenized leaf curing [HLC], which will eliminate curing and grading, the most difficult operation to mechanize. The production line, concludes Muller, "will have reached down to the farm" (1978: 69-71).

Muller then touches on the implications of all this for the relationship between capitalists and Third World tobacco growers but does not pursue them. Elimination of the processes which have become central to world tobacco production will end the craft farmer's practice. Whilst Third World growers are still learning the practice of tending each individual operation with a view to producing leaf of the highest quality, American producers are on the threshold of making it all irrelevant with their new technology. The supposed "advantage", in the view of conventional economists, of tobacco being a "labour-intensive" crop, will soon disappear and the supposed employment "advantages" will be eliminated.

Muller's critique accurately identifies capitalists outside agriculture and properly depicts tobacco growers as producers

subordinate to that class. That puts him in a position to reject the claims of conventional economists about the benefits of technological "progress" to Third World farmers. However, his problematic of "underdevelopment", when popularized as a fight against poverty, entails the same voluntaristic disengagement from the world capitalist system that characterizes the "radical" critique of "underdevelopment": Third World farmers would prosper if they withdrew from tobacco production. He does not explain how. His premise that the rich will get richer while the poor stay poor, remains a mirror reflection of conventional "development" ideology. In developing a critical analysis of the conception of socialist transformation in Zimbabwe, subsection 6.1.3 examines Marx's work on the real subordination of labour in general and attempts to modify it for application to the relationship between the agro-industrial complex and Zimbabwe's tobacco growers.

6.1.3 Marx, Capitalists and Settler Farmers.

If conventional economists, orthodox Marxists and "radical" critics of "underdevelopment" distort relations between farmers and capitalists, Marx's own analysis of agriculture also has its limits. To explain ground-rent in 19th century European agriculture, Marx focused on the distribution of surplus-value and how it affected land, development as capital moved through

agriculture. Having explained how surplus value was produced in industry and how that shaped relations between labour and capital generally, Marx assumed that the basic relations of capitalism would be understood throughout his analysis. Contemporary Marxists, who are both more critical than orthodox Marxists and more thorough in reading Capital, have revealed variations in the penetration of agriculture by capitalism. The industrialization of agriculture has not followed the evolutionary trajectory popularized by orthodox Marxists on the basis of some of Marx's own crude generalizations, the inexorable eradication of the "bulwark of old society" [peasantry] for instance. In their work, recent Marxists have initiated a more critical and historically sensitive account of the domination of farmers by capitalists throughout the world.

Here, the industrialization of agriculture and capitalist domination of farmers is approached as follows. First, Marx's general account of the production of relative surplus-value in industry is invoked, with settler farmers identified as a group of producers who, but for employing African workers to extend their means of production, would be in exactly the same social position as simple commodity farmers are in advanced capitalist society. As the immediate managers of capital invested in agriculture by the agro-industrial complex, settler farmers formed part of what Marx called the "global worker", which 'explicitly included...engineers, technologists and even managers' (Mandel, in Marx, 1977a 1:945). In a materialist sense,

the history of settler agriculture in post-1960 Zimbabwe revolved around capital's struggle towards the full subjugation of the "global worker", African labourers as well as their European employers.

Secondly, the industrialization of agriculture, as a social process involving the subjection of all producers to capital, will be analyzed as the accomplishment of the "agro-industrial complex", a unity of capital presenting itself in the form of industrial and commercial capitalists and colonial social institutions ostensibly working for the common good while simultaneously reducing all agricultural producers to capital's taskmen, with settler farmers bearing capital's investments as independent producers. That argument replaces phenomenalist orthodox Marxist assertions about the "capitalist character" of the industrialization of agriculture.

Thirdly, concepts such as "productivity" and "efficiency", neutralized in conventional economics as technical matters and popularized by "radicals" in their critique of "underdevelopment", are criticized for obscuring the relations of production which develop from the capitalization of agriculture. This subsection examines how those concepts are interpreted in capitalist practice and how liberal and "radical" reformists represent them in Third World development planning and "development" discourse.

Since Marx's did not directly analyse relative surplus-value in his discussion of agriculture, it is tempting to suggest a

historically informed reformulation. The first question must be what Marx considered to be the concrete expression of the capitalist transformation of agriculture. For Marx, "the easy-going farmer" is replaced by "the businessman", while the "husbandman" is turned into "a pure wage-labourer" (Marx, 1978 II: 110). That fits perfectly into the evolutionist trajectory of peasant differentiation and the "proletarianization effects" popularized by orthodox Marxists without analyzing commodity production in Marxian terms. Complex modifications in capitalist penetration of agriculture have since discredited orthodox generalizations. Similarly, assuming that capitalists would be prepared to invest directly in agriculture as elsewhere, Marx expected the emergence of "large-scale agriculture ... with concentrated capitals" in every capitalist formation (Ibid.).

The present case reveals that capitalists invested in agriculture by proxy, through settler farmers. How that has affected relationships between extra-agrarian capitalists and settler farmers since 1960 is the task for this chapter. Despite some crude generalizations, Marx was aware that some of the conditions necessary for the industrialization of agriculture had developed, namely 'The development of chemistry, geology and physiology, the sciences that directly form the basis of agriculture rather than industry' (Marx, 1978 I: 110). Regrettably, Marx never pursued how such developments entailed the production of relative surplus value in agriculture, under conditions different from those he saw in industry. The omission suggests

that Marx expected it all to follow from his general analysis of capitalism. Pacing Marx's silence, orthodox Marxists analyzed the industrialization of agriculture without any specific reference to relative surplus value, viewing capitalist mechanization of agriculture, for instance, in empiricist terms. Machine owners became the "agrarian capitalists"; those who used them wage-labourers. History did not follow that logic. Acquisition of new technologies by independent farmers for use in the interest of extra-agrarian capitalists remained unthinkable in that context.

As Chapter Four argued, settler farmers had already become formally subjected to capital by 1960. They had come to operate just as craftsmen had under the system of "manufacture" and became formally subordinated to capital in ways structurally similar to the case of simple commodity farmers in advanced capitalism but expressively different from that of African labourers. With intensified capitalist investment in agriculture through the "agro-industrial complex", settler farmers' relation to capital would increasingly change towards real subsumption without direct "proletarianization". The question now is how farmers who had learned all the "traditional" skills in the hectic cycle of tobacco production, and become a well organized group, could be reduced to capitalists' passive taskmen on their own farms? How would the real subsumption process be expressed in this case? Braverman, whose contemporary interpretation of Marx's thinking on labour subordination to monopoly capital was

based on studies in industry, describes farming as 'the most important and widespread of all crafts', whose apprenticeship includes 'most of childhood, adolescence, and young adulthood' (Braverman, 1974: 109).

In its concrete manifestation, the transformation of tobacco production from a traditional craft mastered by growers to a capitalist industry controlled by the agro-industrial complex - the real subordination process - takes the form of the same developments depicted by Anonymous in Economist Intelligence Unit [6.1.1A] as "benefits" indispensable to Third World farmers. The scientific-technical revolution supposedly brings to the farmer all the instruments and methods of production said by conventional economists to make it all productive and "economic": lower labour demands, lighter toil, higher yields, returns to investment, etc. It all rings tragically attractive to farmers as well as social-economic planners of various theoretical positions. The apparent harmony between the concepts of capitalist domination and the corresponding concepts of socialist endeavour makes a critical examination of the ideological claims of conventional economists on the industrialization of agriculture crucial for grasping the implications of the current conception of socialist transformation. It is in interpreting the scientific-technical revolution that some of the most critical questions arise in the conception of socialism in Zimbabwe. One must distinguish between the real capitalist conceptions of capital, productivity, efficiency etc., their technical

formulation in conventional economics, and their meaning in the Marxian framework.

Marx's account of relative surplus value begins with the same basic abstraction dividing the working-day between necessary and surplus labour. The problem this time was to specify how capital could increase its takings without or despite extending the working-day. The relevant explanation of relative surplus value for this part was that capital could reduce the time required for producing commodities equivalent to the basic necessities for labour's reproduction by increasing constant relative to variable capital. Such a change, according to Marx, constitutes the critical advance in labour exploitation that defines the capitalist mode of production. Since the general formulation of the real subsumption process is more directly relevant to the exploitation of African labourers than that of settler farmers, it shall be invoked directly in Chapter Seven.

In Zimbabwe, the capitalists never attempted to reduce the task of settler farmers to physical drudgery. Recently, Marxists have eschewed earlier evolutionist projections of peasant differentiation into "agrarian capitalists" and wage labourers. As more farmers around the world have retained formal ownership of means of production and acquired considerably more of these without becoming big employers or wage labourers, as one group has retained while another has lost control over the labour process, as some farmers have actively resisted the real subsumption process, evolutionism has become increasingly

implausible. On the other hand, as many of the projected effects appear in cases where the industrialization of agriculture has been retarded rather than advanced - degradation of labour, reduced bargaining power in commodity markets, dependence on other sectors for subsistence, etc. - the real subsumption process has attracted more attention. Summing up, Chevalier suggests that the theorization of real subsumption and relative surplus value should accommodate the historical impact of capitalist contradictions, such as "development of underdevelopment" and labour's resistance to total submission (Chevalier, 1982: 170-174).

Historical accuracy is certainly crucial to Marxist analysis. However, as theorists of practice, Marxists must also address programmatic questions such as the conception of socialist transformation. Historically sensitive Marxists, that is, must aim at more than accurate reporting of past events. They must also discuss current developments and their programmatic implications. The history of real subsumption in Zimbabwean settler agriculture has important implications for current and future relations between extra-agrarian capital, resettled African farmers, and the state as industrialization of agriculture continues.

Some modifications to Marx's basic formulation of the real subsumption process become necessary. Since settler farmers were never reduced to day-labourers, Marx's basic formulation cannot be directly transferred to their case. Furthermore, since the

real subsumption effects tend to be protean, the idea of craftsmen being reduced to taskmen, as applied to Zimbabwean settler farmers, should not be interpreted as a matter of ideal types. Settler farmers' "separation" from labour conception does not entail the laying off of workers in particular industries for instance. It is important to grasp what is meant by workers' displacement from the labour process by machines and other forms of capital because it is precisely when political economists attempt to verify such processes in positivistic terms that false "refutations" of Marx's ideas on this matter and empiricist ideas such as "deproletarianization" arise. From such perspectives, distinctions between labour conception and execution are reduced to occupational stratification (Harvey, 1982: 105). In that view, conventional claims about how capitalism affects farmers may be spuriously sustained.

To grasp the real subordination of Zimbabwean settler farmers to capitalist exploitation, it is necessary to consider how capital enters agriculture. In conventional economics, capital supposedly enters agriculture as one of several "factors" acquired by farmers from the market and invested in each operation. For example, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development defines fixed capital as follows:

In general, all producers' goods with an expected lifetime of more than one year are included; increases in natural resources due to growth, as well as capital gains due to price changes are excluded. For agriculture... capital items such as land improvement and reclamation, farm buildings, farm machinery and vehicles are generally covered by fixed asset formation, while changes in livestock, farm forests and working capital are not covered; nor is expenditure due to the purchase of land

(OECD, 1970 I: 22).

While statistical series based on such definitions are doubtlessly useful for indicating general trends in the industrialization of agriculture, the conventional conception of capital is ahistorical and too narrow for present purposes. The natural forms assumed by capital in particular instances must not be treated as the basis for analysing capitalist relations because it is not capital itself that produces value but labour (Harvey, 1982: 206). Naturalist conceptions of capital arbitrarily exclude the possibility that such items as livestock and forests might have been appropriated in settler agriculture's production process as draught animals and fuel. Furthermore, the identification of particular elements of capital as certain items of expenditure conceals the movement of capital as value, which is what matters in analyzing capitalist development and its implications for socialist transformation.

In conventional economics, capital enters agriculture as inanimate "inputs", "fixed assets" or loans advanced on more or less "favourable" terms by generous creditors. Everything is expertly organized by scientific and both public and private services. Only "conservative" farmers would fail to take advantage of capital's benefits. From that perspective, farmers' problems are reduced to a matter of obtaining capital on favourable terms, using the inputs and labour "efficiently", getting a fair deal in the input and output markets, fair taxation on imports and 'timely allocation of foreign currency',

all supposedly calculated to ensure labour "productivity" and profits for the farmers (Kirkman, Supplement to "The Farmer", October 22, 1984: 15-21). Capital and its support services are extolled as the champions of "productivity and efficiency", all assumed to be socially neutral objectives. Accordingly, the visible effects of the industrialization of agriculture - higher yields, greater returns to investment, overall growth, etc. - are promoted as everyone's interest and that raises the problem of whether or not socialists should be interested in increasing productivity while capital still dominates society.

Such views reveal very little directly about the power of capital over producers and the latter's capacity for resisting exploitation. Indirectly, they reflect capital's versatility in legitimizing exploitation and universalizing its class interests as those of society as a whole. To grasp how the industrialization of agriculture enhances the power of extra-agrarian capitalists and the real subjection of all producers, including settler farmers, it is necessary to comprehend Marx's dynamic conception of capital. In Marx, all products of human labour are capital to insofar as they are exchanged for other commodities or consumed in the production of surplus-value. In short, capital refers to value in motion. Its movement through the labour process, in which the value is augmented, defines capital's social relations more effectively than its natural forms can do. Without circulating, value will

neither be augmented nor accumulated (Harvey, 1982:20,83,129). (1)

Likewise, the technical sense in which "productivity" is understood when capital is defined as money, fertilizers, machines etc. tends to conceal the relations between capitalists and producers under measurements of output per unit time. Against that view, Marx outlined the truly capitalist conception of productivity which refers to labour exploitation as follows:

That labourer alone is productive, who produces surplus-value for the capitalist...hence the notion of productive labour implies not merely a relation between work and useful effect, between labourer and the product of labour, but also a specific social relation of production, a relation that has sprung up historically and stamps the labourer as the direct means of creating surplus-value. To be a productive labourer is, therefore, not a piece of luck but a misfortune (Marx, 1977 I: 447; Marx, 1978 I: 393).

Marx illustrated the point with reference to weavers who still worked the same 12 hours daily as they did before the power loom replaced the hand loom. Since the weavers continued to require the same vital necessities [necessary labour] as before but could now produce twice as much in 12 hours as they had done without it, Marx identified the the 6-hour cut in linen production - the increase in productivity, as the extent to which each productive labourer was being exploited by the owner of the power loom (Marx, 1978 I: 393-394).

Distinguishing the materialist meaning of productivity defined by Marx from the conventional formulation entrenched in bourgeois ideology and development literature in universalistic

(1) Marx analyzed capital in greater detail. This outline should not be mistaken for a standard Marxian definition of capital.

terms presents post-colonial socialist planners with the problem of ensuring political stability without contributing to the obscuring of capitalist relations of production and the reproduction of capital within programmes of socialist transformation. From the socialist perspective, productivity as the universal goal of all members of society refers only to the expansion of people's wealth, not to private accumulation. It must not be confused with value productivity under capitalism, in which increasing efficiency becomes a relentless preoccupation with saving the capitalist system from crashing on the momentum of its own velocity (Braverman, 1974: 208). How Zimbabwean settler farmers, despite occasional resistance and protest, received the bourgeois notions of "efficiency and productivity" and propelled their own and African workers' real subjection to capital forms the substance of the rest of this chapter. Viewing themselves as "capitalists", settler farmers accepted that their greatest liability was African labour and its wages and set out explicitly to eliminate it from the production process. However, as capitalist circulation through agriculture intensified from 1960 onwards, the previously creative, skilled settler farmers, who had enjoyed the art of growing tobacco, would be increasingly alienated from their work (RTJ Editorial, October, 1971: 5).

What then does the "displacement" of settler farmers from the labour process entail in Marxian terms? The reorganization of settler agriculture entailed the reconstitution of an activity initially understood among European colonials as earning a

certain standard of consumption into the relentless pursuit of abstract wealth by extra-agrarian capitalists. That process could and did force some farmers out of operation and lead to some workers being laid off, European assistants as well as African labourers. However, that does not convey the material meaning of labour "displacement" by capital. In the working-day context, labour displacement abstractly refers to the contraction of necessary-labour and the expansion of surplus labour as relative surplus-value. In concrete terms, the effects of such "displacement" appear in many different forms since capital had to do different things to bring about that result and since producers could resist the real subordination process to some extent.

One of the steps taken towards that result was to promote the "efficient" use of that land already appropriated by settler farmers. As land settlement Phase II ended and settlers completed their purchases, the new concept of "intensive settlement and development" was established. That and subsequent developments associated with sanctions busting and "diversification" from tobacco had the overall effect of separating land use from land ownership, so that the land they had just finished purchasing as private property henceforth confronted settler farmers as an alien force which, translated into tobacco quotas, could be traded abstractly as mobile value. Elaborating on that theme, 6.2.1 explains how land, tied to commodity production, was mobilized as capital, as a transferable value, in Zimbabwean

settler agriculture between 1960-1980, and how that alienated settler farmers as producers subjected to the logic of capital.

Already in progress but accelerating after 1960, capitalist appropriation of the scientific-technical revolution and its integration in the industrialization of agriculture intensified and confronted settler farmers with everything from the estranged seed to the mystery of tobacco grades. Subsection 6.2.2 pursues the implications of the scientific-technical revolution for settler farmers' relations to capital. In addition, the credit system, viewed by settler farmers' friends and foes alike as their saviour, was expanded both to allow them to afford the risks avoided by extra-agrarian capitalists and to facilitate the circulation of capital through that sector and realize interests on their indirect investment in agriculture. Subsection 6.2.3 examines how credit, operating as a mechanism that accelerates the circulation of capital, can be deployed to circumvent capital's own inherent barriers to accumulation.

Finally, as agriculture's commodity buyers, capitalists had long confronted tobacco growers on the auction floors as "equals" in exchange. Disregarding experience, tobacco growers had come to regard "free auctions" as their asset. The overproduction crisis that escalated in 1964 and then intensified when sanctions closed the traditional export markets almost ended the illusion of equal exchange as growers yearned for a return to "free auctions", which they viewed as the epitome of "free enterprise". The rearrangement of tobacco sales in crisis context will be

discussed as part of the conditions for real subsumption of tobacco growers under capital in 6.2.4.

Following Preston's analysis of social theorization, this section opened with a critique of various accounts of the implications of the industrialization of agriculture on relationships between independent farmers and capitalists. The views of conventional economists and modernization ideologues were criticized for systematically obscuring the real subordination of farmers to capital in terms of "progress". Orthodox, Marxist and dependency accounts of that process were criticized for imprecisely specifying the character of capitalist domination over farmers and for obscuring its implications for the conception of socialist transformation in Zimbabwe. As an alternative approach, a Marxist analysis of that relationship, based on the understanding that capital is mobile value, conscious of the protean character of capitalist penetration in agriculture, but focused on the relations of production between capital and various agricultural producers, was proposed to guide the following analysis of the reduction of Zimbabwe's settler farmers from skilled craftsmen to capital's taskmen since 1960.

6.2 The Real Subordination of Zimbabwean Settler Farmers.

Introduction.

Commenting on the gradual attenuation of the creative

aspects of tobacco production, a Rhodesian Tobacco Journal editorial once touched on the real subordination of settler farmers and remonstrated:

It is a tragedy that a once highly skilled, creative section of the community should be subjected to a system which denies the grower the inducement to use his enterprise and skills (RTJ October, 1971: 5).

The RTJ had an easy solution: restore "free and unfettered auctions". What it missed was that capitalism itself was producing the crisis and forcing the state to control the tobacco trade. While North American growers were getting used to tobacco quotas, Zimbabwean farmers continued to assert the dogma of "free enterprise", dismissing any regulation of capitalism as abnormal or "socialist" intervention.

The rest of this chapter examines the various ways in which the agro-industrial complex, capital's concerted indirect investment in settler agriculture, attempted to dissolve tobacco growing as a creative activity and reconstitute it as a labour process geared to accelerating relative surplus-value production. Changes in land use, the scientific-technical revolution, the manner of investment, and the appropriation of settler agriculture's chief commodity accentuate the following argument.

6.2.1 Land as Capital: From Intensive Farming to Resettlement.

Since Ricardo, political economists have attempted to

explain how 'land, a naturally given instrument and condition of production, gets mobilized in production as capital, to specify the origins of its value. Recently, Chevalier has rejected the following explanations: 'its intrinsic natural properties..., its mere ownership..., the intervention of legal property relations, as Marx would have it' and suggested that in 'all extensively commodified economies...all factors of personal and productive consumption [are valorized] as scarce values amenable to the laws of supply and demand' (Chevalier, 1982: 169-170). He then specified that land, as a 'naturally given "object of labour"', expresses the formal subjection principle as 'the subjection of nature to the social logic of "abstract wealth"' (Ibid.). As Chapter Four demonstrated, the initial valorization of land in Zimbabwean settler agriculture - expressing the formal subjection of settler farmers, was accomplished through systematic settlement to ensure that land would be used for commodity production and not for speculative purposes.

After its commodification, how could land be mobilized against producers such as settler farmers towards the production of relative surplus-value? Since land remained plentiful and available for commodity production in the European half of the total area, its commodification did not automatically render it scarce. If the demand and prices of land remained low, its use could not be co-ordinated with capitalist crises. Accordingly, emphasis in land settlement policy shifted from terms of acquisition towards regulation of its actual use, that is from

mere commodification towards rational mobilization of land as value, in pursuit of abstract wealth.

In 6.1.1, conventional economists were criticized for treating land and "capital" as alternative factors which could replace each other in agriculture. That view implies a naturalist conception of capital and forecloses the possibility that land itself can be mobilized as value, as an object and instrument of labour. Marx argued that capitalism 'totally separates land as an instrument of production from landed property and landowner, for whom the land merely represents a certain money assessment' to its legal owner (Marx, 1977 III: 618). Hyperbolically, Marx added that the rationalization of agriculture, which made it operate on a social scale, and the reduction of landed property ad absurdum, i.e. to a mere financial claim [rent] 'are the great achievements of the capitalist mode of production' (Ibid.).

Elsewhere, Marx explained how land became the joint property of the bourgeoisie, regardless of the existence of landowners:

The landowner is quite superfluous in this mode of production. Its only requirement is that land should not be common property, that it should confront the working class as a condition of production, not belonging to it, and the purpose is completely fulfilled if it becomes state property, i.e. if the state draws the rent. The landowner is a useless superfetation in the industrial world (Marx, 1978 II: 44).

Later, Marx distinguished such bourgeois "state property" as Crown Land from "people's property" which entails abolition of the whole basis of capitalism - the separation of workers from land as the basic condition of production (Marx, 1978 II: 104).

Marx thereby indicated that land itself could become one of the forms in which capital confronts producers as an alien power subordinating them to its logic.

Without indicating precisely how, as joint bourgeois property appropriated by the state on behalf of all capitalists, land confronts producers as capital in the labour process itself, Marx assumed a capitalist mode of production in which landlords, though "superfluous", necessarily intervened in the appropriation of surplus-value and influenced farmers' investment decisions simply because the bourgeoisie could not challenge one form of private property without undermining its own legitimacy (Marx, 1978: 44-45). Consequently, even Marxists came to treat land as a factor of production onto which "capital" could be added or through which it could circulate productively but not as a capital in its own right. In Marx's analysis, capital sometimes appeared as something fixed onto [e.g. buildings, irrigation works] or temporarily incorporated within the land [e.g. fertilizers]. He identified the former as "la terre capital" (Marx, 1977 II: 618-619).

The value concept of capital implies that it is misleading to treat land as a mere container or conductor of capital since land itself can be abstracted as an embodiment of value. Furthermore, land can be mobilized as capital if the state intervenes to rationalize its use on behalf of the whole bourgeoisie, as Marx suggested but never pursued. From that perspective, Rhodesian land settlement and land use policies

between 1963-1979 can be explained as the capitalist solution, through the state, to the problem of valorizing land as an instrument of production, towards the real subordination of settler farmers.

Before 1960, the colonial state had concentrated on securing land for commodity production by appropriating it as Crown Land from landlords and leasing it to new settlers who could only purchase it by becoming commodity producers and productively occupying it. That way, land was "freed" from the stranglehold of speculative ownership. By 1960, the old generation of European landowners had been effectively undermined but much of the land remained underused in respect to its potential, partly because there were not enough settlers and partly because settlers had acquired more land than they could effectively use. As early decolonization elsewhere in Africa generated European migration southwards, the demand for "European" land in Zimbabwe rose just as previous settlement schemes were completing Crown Land sales to post-1945 settlers. A new generation of "landowners" [settler farmers] began emerging from systematic settlement and it became necessary to prevent the recurrence of speculative leasing and obstruction of accumulation. Accordingly new land settlement policy focused on the problem of "economically" organizing further subdivision and subletting unused land on settler farms, the solution to which will soon be examined.

First, it must be emphasized that the problem of making the land "productive" was and could never be finally resolved under

capitalism. While the effects of the early crisis of overproduction were still being felt, the colonial regime precipitated a permanent state of emergency and international sanctions exacerbated the position of settler farmers. While settlers were still preoccupied with "diversifying" from tobacco, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army [ZANLA] launched the liberation struggle in which many settlers were forced to abandon farming altogether. By 1978, the RTA was urgently appealing for another public 'effort to settle new growers speedily' in case the tobacco industry collapsed altogether (RTT 1978, May 16-17; June: 8; July: 10).

By 1978, however, capital's problem was no longer how to get new settlers onto the land but whether they would accept the political and economic risks of farming. The problem of resettling deserted farms would be tackled more effectively after 1980, in the context of resettlement schemes conceived by the post-colonial state as part of the process of generating socialist transformation. This overview accentuates the recurrent contradictions which continued to make land settlement a problem for capital even after "the initial Phase II settlement schemes had been successfully completed. Accordingly, Phase III land settlement policies can be divided into 3 parts: A. "Intensive Settlement and Development", in which the colonial state concentrated on preventing the resurgence of speculative landownership; B. "Diversification" and other sanctions-busting strategies, which also involved state attempts to reassert

capitalist use of land which had become the private property of settler farmers, and C. Post-independence "Resettlement" schemes, commencing 1980, focusing on the integration of African commodity farmers in the industrialized "commercial" sector.

6.2.1A "Intensive Settlement and Development".

As post-1945 settlers completed their purchases, the state anticipated a resurgence of land speculation and planned to forestall it. Originally "encouraged" as a new deal for farmers, "intensive settlement and development" involved attempts to regulate and render "economic" the subdivision and subletting of unused lands between old and new settler farmers. Encouragement would soon be superseded by land policing:

The "policing" of privately owned land to see that it is not being misused is a task calling for the utmost diplomacy and I believe that our training programme [for land inspectors] will do much towards maintaining the good relations which the Inspectorate already has with the public (Secretary for Lands and Natural Resources, 1972:1).

For the Land Department, land policy was to ensure that settlers who had purchased their farms could not use it other than as prescribed by the authorities.

However, in view of the new Land Tenure Act, 1969, discussion on land was preoccupied with the issue of unjust racial distribution, and focused on two political-legal cases. The better known one involved state attempts to remove en masse Chief

Tangwena and his people from their ancestral lands in favour of a settler who claimed to own the Tangwena home as his "Gaeresi Ranch". The Tangwena contested the removal before the courts and won. When the state persisted with illegal eviction, the Tangwena were forced into exile where they remained until 1980. Inevitably, the legend totally obscured the other case, involving forcible appropriation of part of a ranch owned by Allan Savory, a Rhodesian Front MP, which the state wanted to include in a game park. The Tangwena case indicates that primitive accumulation was still afoot, while the Savory case focuses attention on the issue of "economic" land use by settler farmers. The history of Africans' removal from the land and formal subordination to capital was examined in Chapter Five and in other studies. Here, the issue is that of the manner in which the colonial state, without legally dispossessing settler farmers, sought to determine the what and the how of European settler farmers' land use.

In itself, the Savory case reveals very little about that process, except indicating that the colonial state would stop at nothing in securing the co-ordination of land use and accumulation. More than a Rhodesian Front MP, Savory was also reputed to be a military and land conservation innovator. Once Africans were excluded from land ownership, the emphasis in settler agriculture was placed on value productivity. In pursuing "intensive settlement and development", the state duly consulted settler farmers at the "grass root" level of Intensive

Conservation Area councils. Settler co-operation was conceded by their ICA councils at Masvingo in May 1963 when, hoping to influence the new land policy, ICA delegates demanded "centralization" of all aspects of land settlement and subdivision (RTJ June, 1964: 67).

"Centralization" originated in the 1920s as a demand for land segregation. In conceding segregation, British colonial officials had persuaded Rhodesian settlers to abandon their demand for total exclusion of Africans from land ownership (Palmer, 1977: 139). Accordingly, the colonial state had maintained a separate Native Land Board [NLB] for settling the rump African peasantry in Native [later African] Purchase Areas. With the advent of the RF regime in 1962, European farmers demanded "centralization" on the assumption that the state would be consistent with racist policies and finally eliminate all Africans from land ownership. The RF regime obliged by passing the Rural Land Act in 1963, "centralizing" land settlement and replacing both the LSB and NLB with the Rural Land Board [RLB], one of whose 9 members was an African (RLB Report, 1963: 1). Ambiguously, the RLB adopted the principle that 'all applications for Crown Land will be treated in exactly the same manner regardless of race' (Ibid.). Settler farmers understood that as subtle discrimination and endorsed it.

However, the colonial state was a capitalist one. If settler farmers understood "centralization" in terms of ending African land ownership, the RLB focused on state control of land use.

Only when implementation of "intensive settlement and development" began did settlers begin to experience the material implications of "centralization". A land official hinted:

The Department is moving from the old concept of Crown Land settlement to the infinitely more complex problems of intensified settlement of developed areas (Director of Lands, 1964: 1).

Always assuming that laws were made for their benefit, settler farmers could not immediately grasp what the Rural Land Act and new land policy in general entailed for their relationship to capital. They could not understand why these made 'a mockery of previous legislation which had "served the farming community so well"' and promoted Rhodesian natural conservation better than the rest of Africa (Fry, RTJ June, 1964: 67). Behind it all moved capital, rationalizing agriculture and reducing landed property to the absurdity Marx noted in Europe. With the state controlling, settler farmers could hold on to their title deeds, subdivide and sublet their farms without obstructing accumulation and land could be "economically" used.

As settlers completed their land purchases, the colonial administration moved to oblige them to use it in ways beneficial to extra-agrarian capitalists in general. Bureaucratic delays in processing applications for farm subdivision, subject to RLB conceptions of "economic" and "beneficial" subdivision, provided ways of counteracting the tendency towards speculation and soon appeared to farmers as obstacles to the "normal" functioning of the land market, as "frustrations" to all involved in land

transactions - buyers and new settlers, rentiers and tenants. The state's role was rationalized in terms of protecting "the ignorant purchaser" against established farmers and speculators. Once they acquired legal title, settler farmers were suspect of speculation and state control was clearly not a matter of protecting novices in the land market.

The next step was the establishment of a Land Inspectorate, detailed to ensure that prescribed subdivisions and farming practices were adhered to according to the Natural Resources Act. Whereas the old LSA had emphasized persuasion, the RLB resorted to such practices as aerial surveillance of farmlands, with local authorities and ICA committee members involved in approving subdivisions aboard. The Director of Land declared:

Although persuasion has been used as the initial step in rectifying damage to natural resources, it has not always proved successful, and coercion has become necessary as the sphere of activities has expanded (Director of Lands, 1964: 7).

Table 6.1 lists the number of actions taken to that effect in 1964 alone.

Table 6.1 Supervision of Land Use, 1964.

Individual Cases Handled	Total
No action necessary	186
Forwarded to other agencies [e.g. ICAs]	200
Total warnings issued	1,723
Warnings complied with	370
Warnings extended	1,089
Warnings not complied with	1,353
Orders served	555
Orders withdrawn by inspectors	141
Orders extended	39
Orders not complied with	94
Orders not followed pending amendment of Act	320
Orders set aside by Natural Resources Board [NRB]	-
Cases referred to police	590
Convictions	316
Dismissals	11
Remanded	14
Pending	249
Provisional exemptions issued	166
Confirmed by NRB	70
Withdrawn by inspectors	9
Rejected by NRB	-
Total individual cases handled	2,482

(Report of the Director of Lands for 1964: 8).

Such coercive control was explained in terms of avoiding breaking the land 'into units which cannot provide a living for anyone' (Director of Lands, 1964: 8). Under capitalism, a "satisfactory living" is defined by the logic of accumulation, not by producer's wants. In the African reserves, the same colonial state that cared so much for settlers' "satisfactory living" was hardly disturbed by the subdivision of land into tiny plots because such land was not considered "productive" in the capitalist sense.

In regulating land use for capital, the state had clearly shifted from the policy of placing easily qualified European settlers into agriculture towards a more explicit emphasis on co-ordinating land use with accumulation crises. The early 1960s crises - over-production in tobacco and arrival of European immigrants from the northern countries - created pressures to monitor the use of land by those settlers who had purchased their farms and the new arrivals. If the colonial state needed any excuse for intervening in the agricultural land market on a higher level, economic sanctions, particularly on tobacco, provided an important one. Intensified state control could be explained as a condition for "national" survival through "diversification". Part B examines how "crop control" and "diversification" schemes were used to mobilize land as capital, land legally owned by settler farmers but estranged from them as a valorized object of labour and means of production.

6.2.1B Quotas and the Valorization of Land.

If the state could control land use when farmers applied for subdivision and subletting, how could it control those not interested in such arrangements? The quota system affected all tobacco growers from 1964 onwards. Promoted as an anti-sanctions strategy after 1965, "diversification" meant that farmers should grow other crops to replace tobacco, the export markets for which

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had become heavily curtailed even before sanctions. This part examines how the crisis in tobacco, the staple of settler agriculture, enabled the state to mobilize land as capital in the sense that it could be put into or withdrawn from production according to that crisis. Marx's assertions that capitalism separates 'land as an instrument of production from landed property and landowner', and that landed property comes to represent a mere financial assessment for the owner, is apposite here. As settler farmers were being urged to use up "the idle acres" through subdivision and leasing out, restrictions on the amount of tobacco that could be profitably produced became a barrier to expanding acreage (G.O. Lister, RTJ May, 1964: 58; Eric Palmer, RTJ June, 1964: 46-48). Distribution of the right to grow tobacco through quotas meant that land value was no longer to be measured by legal "farm size" but in terms of its assessment as a transferable value, as capital.

To grasp that point, it is necessary to transcend the physical conception of land as so many acres per farm. Land as capital must be understood in terms of the potential value of commodities that can be produced on it.

Table 6.2 Farm Analysis by Legal Size of Holdings.

Size by acres	# of Farms	Area of farms*
*Under 51	52	2.0
51-100	151	13.0
101-250	318	57.0
251-500	317	116.7
501-1000	612	489.1
1,001-2,500	1895	3,278.9
2,501-5,000	1,562	5,399.9
5,001-7,500	518	3,160.2
7,501-10,000	222	1,927.1
10,001-15,000	259	3,148.1
15,001-20,000	114	1,973.6
20,000-above	246	14,124.3
Total	6,226	33,690.0

* Thousand acres.

(Source: CSO, 1965 Agricultural Production in Rhodesia).

Table 6.2 reveals wide variations in legal "farm sizes" at 1965. Settler farmers would grow tobacco on farms 501-5,000 acres, with smaller farms practicing market gardening while the largest estates became corporate sugar or fruit plantations. On their average-size farms, settlers would normally plant 60-200 acres of tobacco per year. From capital's perspective, urging farmers to "use up the idle acres" must be understood in terms of economic

use rather than area planted. Under the crisis conditions in settler agriculture, this meant that if farm A was 5,000 acres, in area, 1,000 being arable and 200 suitable for tobacco, it would be considered less valuable than farm B, 2,000 acres larger, 1,000 acres arable and 800 acres tobacco land. Accordingly, any analysis of "forms of production" based on the assumption that legal "farm size" indicates whether the owner is a capitalist or simple commodity farmer would constitute a naturalist reduction of social relations.

The valorization of land also affects the concept of "fertility". Where production is of use-value, fertility remains a matter of mineral richness and high crop yields. Where production is for accumulating value through commodity exchange, "fertility" is defined according to the production of surplus-value. As Marx noted, fertility becomes an abstract economic relationship (Marx, 1977 III: 651). However, Marx did not pursue the implications of that for the mobilization of land as capital. Elsewhere, he indicated that land could have both use and exchange values, just as houses can be used for both shelter and production, vehicles for both pleasure outings and transport, and streets for both taking walks and production property etc. (Marx, 1973: 687). As the crisis of overproduction deepened, with tobacco remaining the big money earner for settler farmers, land came to be evaluated according to its tobacco potential and traded on that basis, through the abstract exchange of tobacco quotas.

Distinguishing the social from the physical conception of fertility enables one to separate the mobilization of land as a capitalist object of labour from its direct appropriation as nature. For instance, in Chegutu district, rich, red and heavy loam soils, considered "fertile" for most crops, were shunned by tobacco growers in favour of "poor" granite soils because leaf grown on the former tended to be coarse, stained and regarded as "off type" on the auction floors. Farmers who had to use red soils had to "starve" them by growing winter wheat and ploughing in the straw and still carry the extra burden of ensuring that the leaf grown there was not stained (RTJ April 1962:). During diversification, farmers were obliged to select soils according to the economic [capitalist] definition of fertility.

4 Ostensibly left to settler farmers, diversification was actually controlled by the state and agro-industrial services. In the process, tobacco growers' "traditional" specialization was undermined as part of their real subordination to capital (RTJ "Show Times", 1967: 7). Conventionally presented to farmers as planting "replacement, alternative or incentive crops", diversification involved much more than crop substitution. Before sanctions, attempts to control land use by limiting the amount of tobacco grown in Zimbabwe had been casually dismissed by growers as "un-Rhodesian" interference, extraneous to "free enterprise" and tolerated only as a temporary inconvenience, pending normalization of prices. For capital, however, land was tied to the accumulation process and intervention was part of

rationalizing land use and co-ordinating it in the "national interest", towards maximum productivity (Fry, RTJ June, 1964: 69).

To that end, several ways of controlling the tobacco crop were proposed. Quotas could be allocated by poundage, acreage or barns cured. Depending on the method adopted, a quota could either be fixed to the farm, transferable only between farm sellers/lessors and buyers/tenants or it could be granted to the individual grower on his record of producing the leaf type in demand. The irrational alternative was for growers to outshout one another in demanding their quotas (RTJ February, 1965: 53-54). Without sanctions, crop control proved ineffectual in attempts to control overproduction, as a property correspondent noted:

Until such a time as a more organized system of quota restrictions is devised, land values are going to depend mainly on the persuasive abilities of the prospective buyer or tenant, with the seller able to do little or nothing to establish the proper value of his farm. Hardly a satisfactory state of affairs in a multi-million pound industry (RTJ February, 1965: 54).

That means land could not be fully mobilized as capital unless its use was tied to commodity production. Whilst crop control remained "voluntary", farmers continued to assert "free enterprise" and various authorities pondered about enforcing it. Comprehensive land taxes to force subdivision or subletting, formal separation of landowners from farmers, loan control, i.e. co-ordinating creditors in withholding funds from greedy volume producers so that credit could be extended only to "quality" producers and new growers, were among the remedies proposed (RTJ, 1964: May: 55-56; June: 46-48).

As the RTA tried to convince growers that crop control was the way to regulate production in their common interest, before any particular form of quotas was generally established, the colonial regime declared itself "independent" from Britain. The ensuing sanctions rendered any further grower resistance to crop control impossible. The state formed the Tobacco Corporation [TC] as the sole buyer of tobacco. As such, the TC working in consultation with merchants and manufacturers - the real buyers of Rhodesian leaf, - assumed responsibility for deciding not only the "national" quota but the rules for assigning quotas to individual farmers, the administration of which was delegated to the RTA. The TC immediately decided that the "national" quota would be issued in poundage terms. The relevance of all this here lies in the way in which the TC and RTA - regarded by the growers as their "own" organizations, became the agencies for increasingly isolating tobacco growers from the use of their own land and for mobilizing land as capital against all agricultural producers. Insofar as land was to be used for commodity production, both the purpose and the acreage used towards it would be indirectly but very effectively decided by the RTA and the TC, both of which were tied to capital's programme of securing accumulation and weathering the crisis.

Farmers were given two options: producing their quotas as required or withdrawing from tobacco production by selling their quota to other farmers so as to concentrate on replacement crops. That way, land could be mobilized as capital by trading it as

quotas or abstract land values, with all transfers registered and approved by an allocation committee (RTJ August, 1966: 21). In order for each to reach his allocated quota, growers were urged to make use of available facilities, that is to submit to the whole agro-industrial complex, to the real subsumption process (RTJ September, 1966: 17).

To cope with the crisis, it was necessary that growers remained in production, that suitable land be used by the most "economically" productive farmers, that the clandestine customers of the TC be assured of their annual leaf supply, and that capital continue to circulate through agriculture. As demand for Rhodesian leaf decreased, prices plunged to their lowest ever level during the late 1960s. Many growers, unable to sell their quotas to their colleagues, had them purchased by the state at 6d/lb where they would have expected to realize over 35d/lb had they produced tobacco under "normal" conditions or over 24d/lb under sanctions. The diversification alternatives were not very lucrative. For instance, when farmer Nigel Sligh of Bindura quit tobacco, he complained that maize was a dubious long-term prospect, the prices for which fell as production increased, that cotton was a difficult crop to care for because it consumed too much labour-power, and that peanuts were a "peasant crop" (RTJ August, 1967: 39). As their illusion of prosperity receded, growers had to be comforted with an ideological treatment that depicted them as a uniquely hardy breed toughened by 'the economic facts of life in the school of hard knocks' (RTJ

August, 1966: 21).

For capital withdrawal of certain growers from production was not disturbing as long as it did not threaten the tobacco industry as a whole. As RTA president Carol Heurtley explained: 'The edifice may be cracked, but we have no intention of allowing it to topple' (RTJ December, 1967: 51). Accordingly, he endorsed government policy 'of keeping every worthwhile farmer on the land' (Ibid.). It was considered that grower departure from tobacco would lead to faster expansion on farms more suitable for its production than was otherwise possible (RTJ September, 1967: 24-25). Indeed, Agriculture Minister Rudland responded to farmers' criticism that he had not done everything to keep farmers on the land by congratulating himself:

We have kept the best within the industry, and by this I mean right through the industry, including the merchants. I think we can look to the future with some enthusiasm (RTJ July, 1967: 21).

By buying off the quotas of those farmers who could not use the land as prescribed by extra-agrarian forces, the state could still obtain its annual tobacco quota while the farmers remained on the land to produce other crops for much lesser returns. For their part, farmers could only admit that quotas had been 'a bitter pill to swallow' (RTJ February, 1967: 29). Rationalizing that fact, the RTA contended that the quota system spread production and profit among the growers and promised that the principle of control, 'anathema to producer and consumer' alike, would soon be replaced by the auctions (August, 1966: 19). Already

established among Canadian and American growers, quotas were not "anathema" to capitalism but part of its crisis management. It was only just beginning

With sanctions and diversification, what had begun as a crisis of overproduction deepened into a recurrent crisis which eventually threatened the very survival of settler agriculture and tobacco production in particular. As they wondered about their fate, settler farmers continued to lose control of their activity through selective displacement by capital and the sale of tobacco quotas to the state. Without tobacco, many of them would be plunged into debt [6.2.3] and would be pleading 'to be kept viable' (RTJ January, 1969: 17). State and industry officials hoped that because the quota system allowed farmers to remain on the land while foregoing tobacco, enough growers would be available if demand suddenly rose (RTJ March, 1970: 11). Meanwhile, farmers would have to buy the right to use their own land and produce commodities for capital.

However it originated, the quota system allowed the state to control settler farmers' private property according to the crisis of accumulation, as the farmers' leaders admitted:

Our policy is that private agricultural land should be held in the most productive hands and that all land must ultimately be put to productive use if all the people of Rhodesia are to prosper (J. Strong, Pres. RNFU, and G. Dornward, Pres. RTA, RTJ March, 1977: 17)

Issued in response to the first indication that the RF regime was going to settle with the African liberation movement, that statement subtly introduced the capitalist notion of "productive

use" to post-colonial land policy. As ZANLA intensified the liberation war in the late 1970's, more and more settler farmers left the land regardless of "productive" use. As ZANLA closed settler farms, the RTA desperately campaigned for a "resettlement" scheme to provide European farmers who could 'hold the operation' during the transition to independence proper (RTT June, 1978: 8; July, 1979: 20). Meanwhile, suspicion that the post-colonial state would allow 'a massive hysterical land grab' triggered the search for a pre-emptive initiative. A "liberal" speaker urgently appealed to farmers: "We should convert our institutions to build real barriers, not against change but against chaos" (Ian Hume, RJJ July, 1977: 5). The implications of all this for Zimbabwe's current conception of socialist transformation will be addressed more directly in Chapter Eight.

In conclusion, after systematically settling Europeans between 1945-1960 and effectively "freeing" the land from speculating landlords in favour of capitalist "productive" use, the state moved to forestall any reversion to land speculation when settlers became owners of their holdings by initiating "intensive settlement and development", aimed at controlling the use of land belonging to settlers. That strategy overtaken by overproduction and sanctions, the colonial state pushed capitalist land use to its highest point through the quota system and forced diversification. From 1945-1980, regardless of their legal ownership of the land, settler farmers increasingly encountered their landed property as an alien object compelling

them to use it ever more "productively" towards extra-agrarian accumulation. Controlling land use was but one way in which capital came to confront settler farmers in production. Subsection 6.2.2 examines their productive consumption of capital in the form of agricultural "inputs".

6.2.2 Settler Farmers and the Scientific-Technical Revolution.

The real subsumption process was also effected through intensification of the agronomic revolution. Marx somewhat doubted the feasibility of rationalizing agriculture under private property and even suggested that the two might contradict each other (Marx, 1977[III]: 617). His reservations arose from an awareness that conflicts between capitalist farmers and landlords tended to retard the industrialization of agriculture and that partly explains why Marx did not dwell on production of relative surplus value in agriculture. A cautious approach to the real subsumption process in Zimbabwean agriculture is also necessary for reasons that have to do with disruptions of the scientific-technical revolution.

Firstly, the considerable discontinuity in the circumstances of settler agriculture between 1960-1980 precludes direct correlations between the movements of capital and the farmer-capital relationship. Trade sanctions, crop diversification and import substitution in supply industries

tended to disrupt earlier trends. Secondly, settler farmers could and did resist some aspects of the real subsumption process. Consequently, state intervention and other mediations necessary for continuous production of surplus value in settler agriculture and its accumulation elsewhere were expanded in scope. The capitalist role of those agricultural services - which are often lauded as among the great accomplishments of the colonial regime - must be grasped in material terms, if its implications for the conception of socialist transformation are to be comprehended. Part A examines the historical appropriation and socialization of the scientific-technical revolution by extra-agrarian capital in order to demonstrate the impact of those mediations and interventions. Part B investigates the actual mobilization of the products of that revolution into the production of relative surplus-value. Both parts, it must be emphasized, deal with two aspects of the same real subsumption process.

6.2.2A Capitalism and the Scientific-Technical Revolution.

As indicated in 4.2.2, the technical conception of agricultural labour began to be systematically separated from settler farmers around 1960 and vested into "support" services which operate towards reduction of different labours to abstract labour. A historical materialist analysis of developments between

1960-1979 reveals that the integration of settler agriculture with the "sophisticated agro-industrial complex" tended to alienate the farmers from conception of labour and reduce them to capital's taskmen, without directly expropriating them. Accordingly, this part focuses on struggles between tobacco growers as legally independent commodity producers, on the one hand, and farmers' organizations, research institutions, extension services and private firms, on the other, to substantiate the point that behind all the organizations supposedly working for farmers moved the collective power of capital, working towards extra-agrarian accumulation.

The RTA's role in the technical conception of labour comes to the forefront. Formed in 1928 to represent the interests of growers in all aspects of production and marketing of the national virginia blue-cured crop, the RTA gradually assumed the capitalist role of mediating the movement of capital through settler agriculture. Whatever constitutional formalities and democratic rituals characterized the annual RTA conference, its executive council was already co-opted through bureaucratic co-operation with various parts of the agro-industrial complex and the state throughout the colonial period. Compulsory membership reduced the farmers to subjects whom the RTA council could tax in order to finance its capitalist role. For instance, by compelling growers to fund tobacco research, the RTA facilitated the real subsumption of settler farmers at their own expense. When researchers produced innovations such as those

included in the "Work Study Manual", the RTA council would recommend them to growers, relieving input manufacturers and suppliers of the burden of promoting their products as well as undermining the growers' conventional skills and instruments of production. While appearing to champion the interests of its membership, the RTA relentlessly promoted "efficiency" and "productivity", mediating the real subsumption process.

One of the RTA council's achievements for capital was the formation of the Tobacco Research Board [TRB] with growers' funds and a substantial annual grant from the state. Like the RTA, the social basis of the TRB was from the beginning systematically obscured through ideological evasions focused on exclusive emphasis on its technical "functions". According to one explanation, its formation followed upon 'grower pressure for increased research to cope with the demands of a rapidly expanding post-war industry' (MFP, 1982: 65). Another one reveals that the RTA council, not the growers, 'was responsible for the establishment of and continues to largely finance this organization' (MFP, 1984/85: 61). The TRB itself explicitly revealed that it was

...constituted as a statutory body in 1950 on the initiative of the [RTA], the body representing flue-cured tobacco growers...which foresaw the need for a more substantial research backing than the government was able to provide through the Ministry of Agriculture, if the local tobacco industry was to expand in the world market (TRB June, 1981: 8).

Democratic rituals notwithstanding, the RTA council represented those capitalist companies in "the world market" to which it

wanted "the local industry" to expand, not tobacco growers. Suggestions that ordinary settler farmers "demanded" research facilities contradict their historical response of apathy and resistance to the introduction of research-based technologies.

The claim that "grower pressure" produced the TRB is part of the ideological mystification of the capitalist character of the scientific-technical revolution and the role of industrial research. Historical analysis reveals that tobacco research was conceived as capital's response to crisis and growers' burden. After lobbying unsuccessfully for state establishment of the TRB, the RTA took the initiative, prevailed upon the state to contribute financially, and ensured that the bulk of research expenditure would be financed from compulsory levies extracted from Zimbabwean and Malawian growers by their respective farmers' organizations, as the following financial summary reveals:

Table 6.3 Contributions to Tobacco Research Board in Z\$, 1981.

Source	Flue-cured tobacco	Oriental tobacco	Air cured	Pesticide Control	Total	%
ZTA	809,600	-	-	4,500	814,100	57
Zimbabwe Govt.	404,210	57,800	82,990	6,000	551,000	38
Malawi TA	-	-	10,000	-	70,000	5
Malawi Govt.	-	-	-	-	-	0
TTA	-	-	-	-	-	0
Manufacturers	-	-	-	-	-	0
TOTAL	1,273,810	57,800	92,990	10,500	1,435,100	100

(Source: TRB June, 1981: 30).

The rest of the TRB's income would come from its own services and experimental tobacco sales. The corporate manufacturers and merchants who could expect greater profits to result from tobacco research attended only to their increasing profits from leaf, machinery, chemical and other sales. The effect would express itself in terms of reduced production costs and enhanced circulation of capital towards greater accumulation of relative surplus value. The real subordination of farmers to capital would be intensified.

The capitalist role of industrial research went farther. Officially, the TRB's "functions" were defined as directing, controlling and carrying out research within and outside Zimbabwe, as well as educating growers. Research was ideologically neutralized as scientific-technical activity confined to such matters as disease and pest control, engineering and "cultural" practices, information propagation, etc. (TRB June, 1981: 8; previous issues). From that perspective, the TRB

represented itself to growers as a benevolent institutional support service. Its affinity with capitalists outside agriculture was systematically obscured as part of the "national" achievement. One has to analyse its actual operations to discover how the TRB was set up to mediate capitalist circulation through agriculture and enhance production of relative surplus-value. Pursuing its official goals through co-operation with the colonial state and 'groups of officers employed by fertilizer and pesticide companies', among others, the TRB used its scientific-technical authority to promote agricultural input sales to growers and enhance their value productivity. For instance, in administering the Pesticide Approval Scheme, officially described as 'a voluntary scheme...to enable growers to select, and advisors to recommend, efficient and appropriate pesticides', the TRB often became the bearer of the chemical industry's sales gimmicks.

In colonial society, official approval usually implied expert advice or even directive. Advertisers of controversial agricultural inputs needed only add "officially approved" to their sales repertoire to draw the converted farmers towards their merchandize. As an illustration, Fisons Chemical Company once advertized as "officially recommended" a chemical compound called "Pesco Rogor 40", described as a "systemic insecticide" because it reputedly fought "Rosette" or "Bushy Top" disease by seeping through the sapstream. On the basis of a dubious official approval, Fisons was able to present "Pesco Rogor 40" as the

ultimate anti-pest solution. Grower anxiety that the Rhodesian crop might be avoided by British buyers for being chemically contaminated were promptly squelched. Contestation of the supposed cost advantages of "Pesco Rogor 40" dissipated when Fisons, the TRB and British manufacturers concertedly moved to secure an official exoneration of the suspicious substance and urge farmers not to "discriminate" against it (RTJ December, 1960: 37).

In addition to mediating the circulation of capital through settler agriculture, the TRB also conducted research aimed at directly influencing developments in the labour process from the capitalist perspective of cost reduction and value productivity. Its findings in that area, however, could only be reinforced by the RTA. In 1961 for instance, the RTA council issued its "Work Study Manual", later replaced by the 1982 "Farm Management Handbook". Detailing "recommended" practices - appropriate methods, work planning, tobacco culture and appropriate mixes between constant and variable capital for each operation - the manual also emphasized that ultimate responsibility for raising labour productivity and efficiency rested with the growers (RTJ August, 1961:53). In effect, the "recommendations" represented TRB research attempts to eliminate growers from the conception of labour, to "displace" them as creative subjects from the labour process. In adhering to the recommended practices, growers submitted themselves and African workers to the discipline of a seemingly "objective" fetish of scientific research [the Manual.]

which in fact represented nothing but capital's conception of labour and growers' subjection to it.

However, neither the RTA's claims to represent the growers nor the TRB's scientific "objectivity" was entirely beyond growers' comprehension. Some growers repudiated the technical advice of the Manual and stuck to the "conventional" practices and technology, while the TRB's "scientific" wisdom was frequently questioned. Since the RTA's intervention in the labour process through the Manual and the TRB's evasions through scheduled "field-days" and its liaison department were not entirely adequate in subjecting growers to capital responsibility for directly confronting farmers with capitalist innovations was shifted to the state and exercised through the Department of Conservation and Extension [CONEX].

The formation of CONEX in 1948 was typically attributed to farmers' alleged demand for "expert" advice. Clearly, however, CONEX was nothing but direct state intervention to control the labour process in agriculture. Officially, CONEX's role was presented as one of advising farmers in implementing the principles of conservation and basic agronomy, 'such as plant populations, spacing and fundamental fertilizer recommendations' (Kirkman, 1976:9). However, while farmers might have initially been 'receptive to the advice being offered', their disposition had evidently changed during 25 years of CONEX, as one "expert" observed:

The ICA [Intensive Conservation Area] committees, certainly in Mashonaland, struggle to maintain interest in their constituent farmers. Field days are often badly attended

and the very relevance of [CONEX officers'] work is sometimes called into question (Kirkman, 1976: 9).

In response to farmers' resistance to being isolated from the conception of labour, extension "experts" attempted to obscure the social basis of that conflict by explaining it as a matter of farmers' irrational apathy towards technical "progress". Kirkman, for instance, reasoned that farmers ignored conservation advice because it cost them nothing. Hence he proposed the imposition of "realistic" charges "which would exclude undeserving farmers, so that CONEX could concentrate on select groups of decided enthusiasts whose exemplary collaboration with the "experts" would influence others to modernize their operations. Once more, farmers would be made to pay for their subjection to capital and increased accumulation.

Farmers' apathy and resistance to "modernization" were also encountered in attempts to oversell machinery to them. For instance, two major machinery demonstration events organized by CONEX, RNFU, Agricultural Machine Distributors Association and National Resources Board at Centenary and Chinhoyi in 1960. They were so badly attended that 'at no time did the number of farmers attending exceed the number of government and trade organizations' (RTJ September, 1960: 5).

Agencies mediating between capital and settler farmers often experienced tension between the technical objectivism of capitalist ideology and the ambiguities of their practice. Consequently, the "experts" would attempt to neutralize such

conflicts simply by denying them. For instance, McClymont claimed that

An authoritative decision does not really play a part with the adoption of either herbicides or suckercides, as the grower was not forced into adoption, nor was he in a position to force anyone else into using them. The use of herbicides and suckercides is optional, being up to the grower himself or to him as a member of a community (RAJ May-June, 1979: 129).

The same experts, however, would not refrain from cajoling reluctant tobacco growers to adopt innovations and submit fully to the capitalist process. Whether or not the experts consciously performed the mediation role for capital is inconsequential. Conventional economists' argument that tobacco growing is indispensable to Third World farmers because it generates technological diffusion cannot entirely obscure the fact that farmers are compelled, both by mutual competition and by extra-agrarian pressures, to adopt the very innovations that lead to their real subordination.

It must be emphasized, however, that capital's appropriation of the scientific-technical revolution entails neither a conscious conspiracy between scientists and capitalists nor a masters and servants relationship. Even colonial economic planners did try to preclude massive transfers of wealth created in settler agriculture to capitalists in industry or abroad (SR OCC, 1945: 12-13). Yet the evidence suggesting that by merely executing their tasks, all the support services mediating between settler farmers and capitalists were engaged in relentless efforts to subject settler farmers to the logic and crises of

capitalist accumulation after 1960 remains substantial. By reducing the scientific-technical revolution to a routine of socially neutral operations, such that value productivity could be universally accepted as everyone's interest, RTA councillors, TRB scientists, CONEX officers and agricultural economists [capital's ideologues], their intentions notwithstanding, regularly contributed to the subjective displacement of settler farmers from creative aspects of the labour process, to the real subsumption process.

As the scientific-technical revolution was being integrated into the accumulation process in Zimbabwean agriculture, settler farmers' comprehension of their real subsumption diminished with every technical development. The agro-industrial institutions built up by colonial society before 1980 did not simply spring from some neutral technical "development" process. They arose from the class struggle in colonial society to facilitate the circulation of capital through agriculture and to promote the accumulation process generally. Chapter Eight will investigate the role assumed by those institutions after independence in discussing the implications of their participation in post-colonial socialist planning. Part B elaborates on the real subsumption process by focusing on the actual mobilization of constant capital against settler farmers.

6.2.2B Mobilizing Constant Capital Against Settler Farmers.

Analyzing the real subsumption of settler farmers must proceed from the premise that the scientific-technical revolution involves the mobilization of capital against all producers. With every innovation they adopted, settler farmers became less active in the conception of their productive role. The protean character of capital makes it necessary to outline what is not intended in this part before attempting to demonstrate how the real subsumption process occurred under the specific historical circumstances.

First, it is recalled that the point here is not to calculate the details of value transfers from farmers to those capitalists who supplied them with new instruments of production. In addition to the theoretical problems of deploying Marx's labour theory of value, there are some critical methodological limits to such a task. One reason for setting detailed calculations aside is that the records needed for that type of analysis simply do not exist. The effort that went into persuading farmers to record and supply information that might be needed in such operations serves to remind Marxists that information itself is a stake in the class struggle. Whatever information exists about settler farmers' capital purchases has been recorded remains inadequate for such calculations. Any precise calculations of value transfers based on such information could mislead one without appearing to do so. Accordingly, such information may be used here only to indicate the most general trends.

Secondly, the argument that the overpricing and overselling of inputs by price-fixing oligopolies specifies the mechanisms through which self-employed farmers are exploited by capital is approached critically (see Denis, 1983: 236-237, 251-252). Moreover, focusing on specific commercial exchanges between Zimbabwe's tobacco growers and "input" suppliers involves ignoring the fact that settler farmers could and did recycle equipment among themselves through the farmers' Co-op, thereby mitigating the excesses of monopoly suppliers. From a theoretical perspective, calculating magnitudes of value transfers with reference to purchase receipts on such items as tractors, machines, fertilizers, etc. reinforces the view of capitalist ideologues that capital goods, not workers, are the active agents in capitalist production. Calculating the irregularities of commercial exchange between farmers and their suppliers does not explain the relations of production that might develop between them.

Thirdly, capital confronts such independent producers as settler farmers at too many different points of production and in so many ways that the rigorous calculation of value transfers could only over-simplify the labour process, its class structure and its historical development. In fact, the very elegance of detailed value calculations tends to become a self-justifying preoccupation among political economists, divorced from their social-economic implications. Accordingly, the rest of this chapter takes for granted that commercial exchanges between

settler farmers and their suppliers involved unequal transactions [mark up prices, etc.], invokes evidence to that effect, and proceeds to explain how the mobilization of capital against all producers affected the relations between farmers and capitalists as a class, towards grasping the implications of the industrialization of agriculture for the current conception of socialist transformation.

Conflicts over the pricing of agricultural inputs and outputs have been well-known in Zimbabwean settler agriculture, particularly in tobacco production. Both farmers and dealers have been aware of them. For instance, farmers once protested to their associations - the RTA and RNFU - against suppliers who were allegedly "profiteering". The director of a leading tractor and implement company in Harare was not impressed:

The farmers have been bleating about this for some time. I can speak only for my Company and I can say quite clearly that there is no profiteering. There have been increases in prices but this is unavoidable. Now that our traditional sources of supply have gone, we have had to look elsewhere. The supplies have come from different countries and different duties have come into effect. Our prices have been affected accordingly (W.F. Munn, RTJ December, 1966: 21).

For all their belief in "free enterprise", settler farmers never hesitated to condemn profit when they were on the losing end and the struggle continued. In 1970, farmer Giles Dorrward noted that farm input dealers' charges were 'always regulated to give them at least 10% [profit] on their capital' and warned his fellows that if farmers did not secure representation among the dealers - that is become capitalists themselves - they would become serfs

of organized commerce (RTJ May, 1970: 17-18). In the twilight of the colonial regime, RTA president Bert Palmer was still lamenting unfair fertilizer prices, (RTJ March, 1979: 5). The regular overpricing of agricultural inputs testifies to a long-term hostility between farmers and their suppliers. While farmers' production costs continued to rise throughout the UDI period, calculations of value magnitudes transferred to capital through such practices neither reveal much about the real subsumption process nor are they very reliable since they usually involve violations of the capitalist assumption of equal exchange between free owners of commodities.

What, then, did the mobilization of the scientific-technical revolution [constant capital] entail for the relations of production between settler farmers and capitalists between 1960-1980? Capitalists scored their first victory when settler farmers adopted the capitalist class project - the relentless pursuit of abstract wealth through increased "efficiency" and the rush to increase the "productivity" of African workers. Convinced that they had become "capitalists", many settler farmers readily accepted the argument that only increasing production costs, particularly African workers' wages, prevented them from accumulating wealth and prospering. As one of them put it bluntly: 'The whole point about anything is its profitability' (G. Doward, RTJ May, 1970: 18). The tragedy of settler farmers was that, despite their experience of formal and real subordination to capital, they continued to regard themselves as part of

capital rather than as direct producers. Their resistance to capital has seldom been based on a complete understanding of their class hostility towards capitalists in general. The offenders have been identified as "profiteers" rather than capitalists in general.

6.2.3 Settler Farmers and the Credit System.

Conventional discussion of farmers' credit in colonial Zimbabwe has been side-tracked by the assumption that credit was a privilege monopolized by white farmers, and withheld from Africans. Liberal and so-called "radical" critics of the colonial regime have concurred, explaining "underdevelopment" in African areas in part as an effect of African farmers' unfair exclusion from the financial trough and calling for a "radical" reform of the colonial fiscal system without even analysing the social basis of capitalist credit. As indicated earlier, empiricist approaches to colonial racism by-pass the material relations beyond the apparent. This subsection draws upon Marx's explanation of the credit system to demonstrate how the very exclusive allocation of credit to settler farmers contributed to their real subjection from 1960 onwards. The argument that settler farmers never became an "agrarian bourgeoisie" or powerful enough to "control" the state and other institutions involved in the industrialization of agriculture remains critical

throughout.

The "radical" economic historians who have attempted to dissect Zimbabwe's "colonial inheritance" have portrayed farmers' credit simultaneously as a catalyst for their own "accumulation" and as a wasteful handout lavished by the racist RF regime upon its constituency of "inefficient" farmers (Harris, 1981: 92). The solution proposed for a fiscal policy assumed to have been 'dictated by the economic aims of the Rhodesian Front' - its so-called "radical alteration" - neither explains why settler farmers needed financial assistance nor specifies what radically altering the fiscal system entails (Harris, 1981: 93-94). The view that settler farmers' credit was nothing but RF patronage has also been expressed by economists. From the postulate that land maldistribution permeated everything including credit allocation, Ndelela argues that despite their greater "savings possibilities", settler farmers enjoyed greater access to credit and concludes that this was because 'lending rates were determined by government policy [i.e. racism] and were unimportant in the allocation of credit' (Ndelela, 1981: 128).

The fundamental weakness of all explanations based on differential racial or other types of resource allocation lies in their tendency to magnify the obvious and ignore the subtlety of the class struggle. Simple correlations between racial "dualisms" and state policies suppress such important issues as why settler farmers, so able to save up, continued to rely on credit and increase their debt. Ndelela's argument is in fact

tautological: 'the dualistic conditions in the land market and direct discrimination [dualism] are the main reason for dualism in the credit market' (Ndlela, 1981: 147). Furthermore, the patronage view of credit clearly ignores the farmers' experience under the credit system [see ahead]. It precludes analysis of what credit means, how it arises and how it relates to capitalist production and accumulation. The conclusions reached by both Harris and Ndlela, moreover, are based on questionable correlations between racial divisions translated into "classes" and the colonial state reduced to a class instrument, so that colonial policies could directly "reflect" the perceived "ruling" group's interests [Chapter Three].

Programmatically, conventional [including "radical"] analyses of farmers' credit leads to liberal reformist "development" programmes which propose extending capital's credit facilities to all farmers as a matter of equal resource distribution, which is quite consistent with capitalism. For present purposes, the injustice of unequal access to everything in colonial Zimbabwe's agricultural history is noted as an historical fact and set aside so as to concentrate on the material character of the credit system and its implications for the post-colonial conception of socialist transformation. The credit system is accordingly considered to be the form in which capital circulates. What does that suggest about the role of credit in socialist practice? How has the social-economic role of credit been represented in conventional economic thought and in

the current discourse on socialist development?

According to Marx, credit developed from the simple circulation of commodities as a means of payment where real money could not suffice into an integral part of the capitalist mode of production (Marx, 1977 III: 400). Thus credit developed into a mechanism of capitalist circulation and reproduction and not, as conventional economists assume, a facility for those who lack capital to invest (Marx, 1977 III: 400). As credit, interest-bearing capital appears as 'a self-expanding value' or money reproducing itself as a thing, an appearance Marx described as the ultimate capitalist fetish (Marx, 1977 III: 191). Conventional economists either simply reproduce that fetish as they find it or further mystify it. Their "radical" critics are only concerned with extending it to "underdeveloped" parts of society.

For Marx, the money that accumulates on interest-bearing capital - i.e. bankers' interest - is not money born out of money but part of the surplus-value created by labour in the production process for which credit has been advanced. At the moment of its advance to farmers, credit money does not represent any actual commodity exchange but a mere promise to pay the lender from the value of commodities to be produced in a future labouring period, with the interest deducted from the surplus-value thereby extracted from the workers (Marx, 1977 III: 400). When commodification develops to a point where bills of exchange rather than real money become the regular means of payment, the

multiplication of advances between various enterprises emerges as a concentration of loanable money-capital held by bankers against all commodity producing enterprises (Marx, 1977 III: 402).

A comprehensive theoretical analysis of capitalist credit exceeds the limits of this study. Suffice it to explain why settler farmers needed to operate on credit, how that affected their relationship to capitalists, and what it implies for current thinking on farmers' credit. Due to the risks of investing in agriculture, capitalists have tended to avoid direct investment in that sector. Only selectively have some corporations vertically integrating such operations as fruit, poultry and vegetable farming with corresponding processing industries been prepared to invest directly in American agriculture. In Zimbabwe, similar developments have been confined to the production of sugar, fruit and tea on estates owned by such corporations as Anglo-American. In the case of flue-cured tobacco and other risky business, capitalists have concentrated on indirect investment in industries supplying farmers with such inputs as chemicals, machines, energy and money to buy them. It is through such services that capital was mobilized into the largest part of colonial Zimbabwe's agriculture.

Even before systematic settlement began in 1945, Zimbabwe's European farmers were already depending on finances advanced by the statutory Land and Agricultural Bank established by the BSAC in 1912 and by commercial bankers (R. of LAB, 1940: 2).

Reconstituted in 1971 as the Agricultural Finance Corporation [AFC], "the bank" has hitherto shared its lucrative business not only with private financiers but also with other capitalists which do not appear as so-called "finance capital", fertilizer companies for instance. That underlines the fact that credit is not the specialty of a particular faction of capital but actually permeates the whole capitalist mode of production.

As commodification intensified after 1945, credit became increasingly tied to tight securities, such as stop-orders on current and future crops, and to intensification of labour. From land purchasing in the 1940s through the crises of the 1960s until independence in 1980, farmers' credit increased substantially as tobacco production was transformed from a farmer's craft into a struggle for solvency. Credit might be represented by capital's ideologues as a great service provided by a "sophisticated agro-industrial complex" to deserving farmers or partially criticized by their "radical" opponents as a featherbed for "inefficient" farmers but it was not extended to settler farmers because capitalists and the state loved them. Rather, it was extended to ensure the continuous reproduction of accumulation through accelerated circulation. What makes credit significant in the real subsumption process, therefore, is not so much that farmers short of capital resorted to it and got ruined through "unfavourable terms" or surcharges on interest payments but the fact that by circumventing certain circulation barriers, credit can accelerate the accumulation process.

Farmers' credit, therefore, arose not from the demands of those lacking capital but from capital's need to overcome its own internal barriers. The credit system penetrated settler agriculture not because European farmers demanded it from the colonial state and that is evident in the fact that the Land and Agricultural Bank and other financial organizations preceded the development of settler agriculture. In short, the credit system developed in response to the demands of (a) lending capitalists individually searching for interest payments and (b) all capitalists collectively seeking to accelerate the accumulation process. This latter explanation is more significant in analyzing the capitalist role of credit. It arises from the fact that interest-bearing capital circulates faster than fixed capital so that credit increasingly becomes necessary as the organic composition of capital increases. Capital needs credit not just to ensure that bankers get their interest but also in order to deal with its own systemic contradictions. As a crisis solvent, credit becomes one of the forms in which capital is mobilized against the producers as constant capital, expressing the real subsumption of all agricultural producers, settler farmers included.

In the capitalist ideological inversions of colonial Zimbabwe's agricultural economics, credit was represented as so many generous advances by financial institutions to assist needy farmers to "get started" and thereafter continue to operate ever more "efficiently", in "their own" interest. In considering

indirect investment in settler agriculture, extra-agrarian capitalists were confronted by two problems. The first one was how to ascertain that advances to farmers were used specifically for prescribed purposes since the investors themselves had opted to stay away from agricultural production sites. The capitalist solution to that one, regularly reiterated in reports of the Land Settlement Board, was that of direct state intervention and control of indebted farmers' expenditure:

In the interests not only of the Government but also of the individual settler, it was recognized that it would be necessary to exercise some control on the disbursement of approved loans (R of LSB, 1945: 7 and on).

That declaration was usually followed by elaboration of controls on farmers' credit: order of payments, expenditure reviews, discretionary securities, specifications of what each debtor should produce and a ceiling on advances (R of LSB, 1945: 8 etc.). To ensure that new settlers did not immediately fall victim to financial speculators' excesses, the LSB initially discouraged them from borrowing from merchants. Once farmers were well established, however, the same LSB advised them not to rely on the state as their sole source of credit but to borrow 'from the commercial sphere' (R of LSB, 1947: 7; 1961: 5). In other words, the state intervened to ensure that individual financiers did not disrupt the accumulation process by prematurely plunging settlers in debt.

To keep farmers obtaining their basic production requirements through the credit circuits, finance experts

skillfully advised them on how to obtain assistance: 'the Land Bank will, in suitable cases, advance £7,500 to a farmer, £5,000 on long-term basis, the balance being on seasonal basis' (RTJ October, 1962: 47). (1) Regardless of the specific terms in which it was paid out to individual farmers, credit obtained to purchase basic instruments of production in Zimbabwean settler agriculture gave them "sham property" and expresses the formal subsumption process discussed in Chapter Four, a prerequisite of further development towards real subsumption.

The second problem encountered by capitalists when considering indirect investment in agriculture through European settlers was how to induce the farmers to adopt those rationalizing economies which would enhance labour productivity - reducing variable capital and increasing constant capital - a process that would require further borrowing. Once they removed themselves from the site of agricultural production by investing indirectly, capitalists had to find alternative ways of ensuring that they realized steady profits on their investments. The state and such statutory organizations as the Agricultural Finance Corporation and the Rural Land Board, alongside such farmers' organizations as the RTA and the RNFU, conveniently mediated towards that effect. The illusion was maintained that settler farmers were independent capitalists who directly invested their own capital and controlled their own operations in agriculture,

(1) 6.1.1A discussed how some agricultural economists still invoke such arrangements in denying the fact that tobacco production in the Third World plunges farmers into debt.

particularly African labour.

As commodity production intensified, agricultural credit increasingly became integral to the rationalization process. State credit was extended in scope from assisting new settlers to financing the expansion of those already established on the land. In the wake of UDI, sanctions and the liberation offensive of the 1970s, the process of capitalist rationalization tended to be obscured as a populist policy orchestrated by the RF among the farmers for "purely political" reasons. Settler farmers, who had apparently "prospered" from the pre-UDI expansion, found greater access to credit than ever before. After the demise of the colonial regime, credit was extended to all farmers through post-colonial planned resettlement. In historical perspective, farmers' credit in Zimbabwe may be periodized as follows:

FARMERS' CREDIT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, ZIMBABWE 1900-1985.

PHASE	CONTEXT	EMPHASIS	AGENCY
II. 1900-39 Merchant and Depression credit.	Immigration, Af- rican competit- ion and merchant speculation.	Protection for settlers Preventing speculation.	BSAC, SRG, Land and Agricultural Bank and merchants.
III. 1945-63 Expansion credit	Farm development and expansion of operations	State assista- nce for new settlers, pvt. credit for es- tablished ones	Fed. Govt., LSA Land Bank
III. 1964-79 Crisis credit	UDI, sanctions liberation war and intensific- ation of labour	Rationalizat- ion and diver- sification.	Colonial state, AFC and private finance
IV. 1980-85 Transforma- tion credit.	Post-war recon- struction and socialist plann- ing.	Extension of resources to Africans and productivity	AFC and post- colonial state plus private financing

Analysis of farmers' credit through the history of settler agriculture reveals that despite the great expansion of production in Phase II, or rather because of it, the use of credit continued to rise even when it seemed as if settler farmers would have saved up and paid off their mortgages on land and met their other liabilities. With both land settlement and tobacco production extended to those limits that appeared in the early 1960s as overproduction, the emphasis shifted from sheer expansion to crisis management through forced diversification and farm subdivision as farmers' credit continued to rise. The RTA chief executive finally admitted:

...that Rhodesian European farmers were deeper in debt than they have ever been, and that while they have put up a valiant battle to maintain profitability their real situation has been steadily deteriorating for the past ten

years (RTT March, 1978: 12).

The fact that settler farmers' exclusive access to credit and the "facilities" produced by the scientific-technical revolution continued to affect them adversely as agriculture's gross output increased supports the argument that credit was used for the benefit of capitalists outside agriculture, not that of farmers.

6.2.4 Tobacco Growers and Capitalist Buyers After 1960.

Changes in the relationship of settler farmers to capital after 1960 may also be analysed by focusing on developments in agricultural marketing. In 4.2.3, pre-1960 developments in Rhodesian tobacco marketing were interpreted as one expression of the formal subsumption of growers. Conventional representations of the tobacco market as part of an harmonious industrial unity of merchants, manufacturers, growers and others were criticized for obscuring the domination of growers by capitalists. Even corporate authors acknowledge the occurrence of struggles between buyers and growers, though not anything as serious as the 1906 riots and arson attacks on American Tobacco Company properties in the United States (RTJ February, 1966: 23; review of P H Mack's 'Andrew Chalmers' Centenary Book).

Also criticized for obscuring such relations were liberal and "radical" critics of colonial marketing institutions who frequently rehash the obvious injustice of privileged European

access to markets and discrimination against African farmers. In the current conception of socialist transformation, such criticisms only imply the demand to open up the markets to African farmers, which capitalism can live with. Instead of equal access to markets, the relevant issue for the socialist movement may be indicated by recalling what one tobacco grower said about producing "this nefarious weed...this abominable task master"

...which brings in a colossal income to all who handle it and to the government which taxes it, but only a bread-line to the grower...; which ties the grower hand and foot to his task for every month of every year; which is, in fact, an intolerable and decreasingly remunerative crop to grow.

Yet, so help me, one grows it. Worse, one likes to grow it (A A W Baker, RTJ April, 1966: 43).

For once, a grower deviated from capitalist ideology and summarized what many so-called "radicals" miss - the real subsumption process - when they concentrate on ethical polemics and institutional reformism in their critique of colonial agricultural marketing.

Here, non-Marxist accounts of colonial agricultural marketing - conservative, liberal, "radical" etc. - may be set aside and invoked critically as necessary. This subsection returns to the tobacco auction floors to investigate how developments in the disposal of flue-cured leaf into the stocks of capitalist buyers affected the material relations between capital and growers after 1960. It is contended that the capitalist crisis in general, not the immediate exchanges between tobacco buyer and grower, provides the key to understanding the

intensification of settler farmers' labouring role, towards their real subjection to capital.

Recent Marxist attempts to isolate the "specificity" of mechanisms by which self-employed farmers are exploited in the market have confused the issue of how agricultural marketing might affect these relations. These have focused on positively identifying, verifying and measuring direct "value-transfers", supposed to occur when farmers sell their products to monopoly buyers. Theoretical formulation of such mechanisms looks deceptively plausible, yet the research task thereby raised may be rather complicated. Validating such exploitation mechanisms becomes problematic and implausible as the effort proceeds. In investigating whether and how Canadian prairie farmers were exploited by extra-agrarian capitalists, Denis focused on buyer underpricing and service surcharging as the locus of those "value-transfers" he had theoretically specified as exploitation mechanisms in the output market. He easily identified the oligopolies under which market facilities had become concentrated and centralized. However, demonstrating their occurrence was complicated by the dearth of relevant data. That forced Denis first, to modify the mechanisms from realities to possibilities, and then to ~~admit that~~ no evidence of systematic underpricing and surcharging was found. Unable to assert the mechanisms' validity against what the evidence suggested, he was forced to conclude that 'the whole area deserves further study' (Denis, 1983: 244-254).

Having focused on the exchange activity itself, Denis hesitated to "affirm categorically" that the buying of agricultural outputs by capitalist firms constituted an act of exploitation. Inadequate analysis of the state's role in marketing was also acknowledged. Denis's difficulties raise a fundamental question. Are farmers directly exploited in produce markets through such irregularities as underpricing and surcharging on services, or does commodity exchange - fair or foul - exert some pressures on their labour process which tend to increase the rate of exploitation?

It is contended here that attempts to specify market exploitation mechanisms and verify their occurrence inevitably lead to such problems. Capitalist exploitation occurs in the sphere of production, but struggles in the output markets may lead to the same developments Marx identified as the real subsumption process in the relationship of settler farmers to capital. Investigating exploitation mechanisms at the point of realization may require one to cite evidence of irregularities which buyers usually conceal. Instead of groping for such evidence, one could focus on actual historical struggles between farmers and buyers and ask whether these had any implications for farmers' relationship to capital. Historical analysis of exchanges between buyers and growers in the Rhodesian tobacco market since 1960 suggests, that buyers had to balance their interest in quick profit with paying to the growers prices that would enable them to remain on the land and produce a steady

supply of the Leaf types in demand. The actual historical price "fixing" - downward or upward as the case might be - tended to be influenced both by inter-buyer competition and buyer-grower struggles on the floors, etc., not by systematic fraud. The real subsumption of growers tended to express itself in the market in terms of pressures exerted on growers to improve their chances of higher prices through recommended practices. Materially, growers' unpleasant sales experiences were interpreted from capital's perspective in terms implying the intensification of their labour, their exclusion from its conception, and increases in productivity.

To counter American monopoly power and save dollar reserves, British government and industry had nurtured Rhodesian tobacco growing by offering the settlers a "privileged" market (RTJ December, 1965: 49). Rhodesian tobacco officials had accepted "preferential" prices in British and Australian markets. This nullifies the underpricing "mechanism" theorem. British buyers maintained their monopoly in Zimbabwe precisely because they paid growers higher than other buyers did, carefully balancing short-term profit with continuity of supply or reproduction of labour-power. By 1960, the formal subsumption process had been generally accomplished in all spheres. Subsequent modifications in the marketing system would be focused on the developing overproduction and sanctions crisis.

No doubt, individual buyers would try to get away with underpricing growers. Yet competition between them tended to

counteract this tendency. More important, however, was their long-term class interest in continuity of supply and increased productivity. Recognizing the limits to buyers' capacity for underpricing growers, this subsection concentrates on the long-term pursuit of profit, focused on promoting growers' productivity and reproduction. In other words, the question here is how the growers' experience in tobacco marketing reacted back upon their labour process. For their part, growers viewed themselves as "the growing side" of a united industry, glossing over their actual relationship to capital. With their income identified as "returns", they became vocal advocates of "free and unfettered auctions", and dedicated themselves to satisfying the needs of their "friends abroad", not to abstract accumulation as capitalists are. They viewed growers in other countries - potential "thieves" of their markets - as their "opponents", not the buying merchants and manufacturers who regularly celebrated accumulating dividends. The 1960s began with a global rise in the supply of flue-cured tobacco and an incipient tendency for grower prices to fall. The US, which maintained a large surplus stock and threatened to dump it onto the world market any time, was alternately implored to exercise fraternal restraint and deplored for insensitive competitiveness (RTJ October, 1965: 23). To most growers, British buyers remained the "friends" even during the sanctions period, when their tobacco was traded at considerable discount.

Although the colonial regime began intervening directly in

tobacco marketing in 1936, the illusion was maintained that auction sales were strictly between buyers and growers, with state intervention - interpreted as "socialist" interference - dismissed as prejudicial to "the industry's" free enterprise reputation of offering best grades at the lowest prices. So long as the British market was secured, growers pledged themselves to meeting any demands of their prime customers and expanding into other world markets. They did not anticipate new complications. Then the 1962/3 short crop forced British buyers to seek their preferred grades elsewhere. In 1964, Rhodesian growers, mobilized to "recapture" the market, expanded their acreage and increased their yield. Sensing the demand, other growing countries did likewise. A record weight crop was sold with difficulty at the unusually low average price of 25.94d/lb. The 1964 season indicates how effectively buyers could control growers just by stating their demands and bargaining hard. Although growers remained complacent, the overproduction crisis had reached a new peak and sanctions would exacerbate it.

Rhodesian crisis management before and under sanctions offers a suitable context for analyzing how developments in tobacco marketing contributed to the real subjection of growers to capital. It reveals that although growers were legally "self-employed", it was the buyers who decided what leaf grades and types were to be produced during the season, how much of it they would buy and how much growers would be paid for their crops. Now, whereas capitalists usually tell wage workers what

and how to produce per unit time, tobacco growers could not count on the buyers of their labour-power to do so. On the auction floors, buyers found commodities already produced under someone else's auspices. They reserved the right to reject any product according to the logic of controlling both the grower's productive activity and his remuneration. What buyers collectively rejected would have to be destroyed or sold at give-away prices. That put growers in the quandary of producing something irrevocably during the season whose rejection by buyers would cost them dearly, too late, and this became a condition for their isolation from the conception of labour.

Under the previous private treaty system, growers took the leaf directly to buyers. The bargaining was simple despite buyer speculation. Under "free and unfettered auctions", buyers learned to co-ordinate their strategies for reducing the "self-employed" growers to obedient taskmen, as the following observation indicates:

United Kingdom buyers these days are shy. Little more than two years ago, they were quite prepared to get down to detail if asked by growers exactly what was meant by such a phrase as "good quality" in describing the tobacco they wanted. There were even travelling exhibitions of samples to explain it all to growers.

Then the stream of guidance dried up. Growers, groping in the dark, looked to the sales for a lead. But prices have been so erratic that they disclose little about the intrinsic merits of various grades. Only the buyers know exactly what they mean in asking for tobacco of high quality. And they aren't telling (RTJ September, 1961: 27).

When the role of assigning to growers their next seasonal task lapsed into the colonial state and the RTA under post-1965 secret

trade arrangements, the strategy of buyer evasion continued. Each year, growers waited anxiously for the directive specifying their national and individual quotas (RTJ January, 1968: 13). Late announcement of buyer requirements tended to minimize their options, as a Karoi farmer protested:

I know. I speak for a large number of growers when I say: "Tell us what you want us to do now". The industry [growers] will not willingly let the country down; but right now, it is being asked to fight blindfold and with one hand tied to the back (T H P Bashford, RTJ April, 1967: 29).

Buyers would not be hurried. Delaying task assignment enabled them to surprise growers on the floors with objections to "off-type, sleek, slatey" etc. leaf, to insist on prices that suited their circumstances, and to challenge growers to accept the technical advice expressing their intensification of labour.

Grower demands that the TRB "scientifically" simplify market grade classification systems were shrugged off as prejudicial to the industry's global reputation for excellence and low prices (Rose vs. Stonhill, RTJ July, 1966: 28-29). Demands for early quota announcements were often resisted in terms of anti-sanctions secrecy. TRB scientists could only explain "off-type" and other buyer objections by referring to the leaf itself - e.g. excessive absorption of chlorine on certain soils - but never to buyers' strategies. Then followed more technical recommendations expressing the real subsumption principle. Appeals to the very people mediating and rationalizing capital's overall strategy only indicate how partial growers' grasp of

their relation to capitalists remained. For too long, capitalist ideology had preached to them the virtues of deference to buyers: '...under a free auctions system, the buyer has the last say and it is a foolish man who lightly provokes his customer' (RTJ RTJ July, 1960: 51).⁽¹⁾ All this suggests that the struggles between tobacco buyers and growers on the auction floors could not be fully grasped without reference to their effects on the labour process itself.

Some general trends in tobacco production in Zimbabwe and other world exporters between 1948-1984 are comparatively displayed in Tables 6.4-6.6. While Brazilians steadily increased area planted and weights, their average yield remained quite modest compared those of Canada's and Zimbabwe's more capitalized growers. The contrast between area planted and crop reaped, on the one hand, and yield on the other, indicates where production economies have been intensified most. The starkest contrast was between Zimbabwe's shrinking area planted after the 1964-debacle and the steady output in weight on the one hand, and the sharp rise in yield per hectare. These developments also coincided in Zimbabwe with the overproduction crisis and trade boycott between 1966-1980. In brief, what the developments in the Zimbabwean balance between area planted, crop size and yield per hectare indicate is that growers were compelled to produce more leaf from less land, adopt more of the "recommended" techniques and

(1) In this case, Clements was admonishing growers against the practice of "ticket tearing", their only recourse if a selling agent made an unsatisfactory sale to a buyer.

generally submit more to capital with every barrier they encountered in marketing the annual crop. It was not entirely accidental that Zimbabwean growers' average yield began to rise by leaps and bounds as constraints to marketing forced drastic reductions in area planted and weight produced.

It was in attempting to avoid sheer physical expansion and concentrate on raising value productivity that tobacco buyers, co-operating with the colonial state and others, brought new pressures to bear on the growers in the tobacco market between 1960-1980. The period began with British buyers protesting growers' failure to meet their "quality" requirements in 1958 and showing their displeasure by taking much of the 1959 crop 'at give-away prices' (RTJ 1960 April: 61; May: 33). They threatened to reduce the premium prices hitherto guaranteed to growers to "realistic" levels (RTJ May, 1960: 27). Growers questioning marketing rules and buyer practices were invariably urged to adopt "proved" cultural practices - more meticulous field, grading, handling and presenting - and to accept the argument that survival of "the industry" depended on the artificially high prices falling to their "natural" levels (RTJ 1960, March: 47; June: 55).

Before 1964, growers had responded to disappointing sales by increasing acreage so as to compensate for low prices by selling larger crops. For buyers, emphasis was shifting from sheer weight towards greater value from lesser bulk. From that perspective, growers' solution to low prices lay in adherence to "proved"

cultural practices and meeting buyers' needs. Focusing on the bidding itself, growers often doubted the validity of buyers' grading classifications and viewed dismissal of their leaf as "off-type" as attempts to underprice their tobacco. They demanded "scientific" validation, noting that "...the financial penalties of producing unorthodox tobacco are now so savage that growers need firm, reliable guidance" (RTJ July, 1960: 27). They protested in vain; the issue was referred to the Ministry of Agriculture's chemists, who routinely identified excessive chlorine in the soil as the cause of "off-type" leaf. "Ticket-tearing" to protest unsatisfactory bids soared as some growers campaigned for a system of co-operative marketing (RTJ July, 1960: 51). Others proposed formation of a local leaf-buying house to compete with incipient British oligopolistic tendencies or relocation of manufacturers to the country (RTJ September, 1960: 61). Most growers, however, anxious to retain bargaining power within the auction system, opted for its continuation. In the auctions, the emphasis was shifting towards increased "efficiency" or "quality production" through greater use of research and advisory services (RTJ August, 1960: 61). Elaboration of the logic of capital in the market would soon be reflected in changes at the point of production.

As the debate on pricing continued, a committee reviewed the tobacco-marketing system, focusing on (a) the advantages of "free auctions" for "the industry", (b) possibilities of anticipating buyers' specific needs and (c) alternative marketing arrangements

(RTJ September, 1961: 33). A Prime Ministerial candidate quoted a leading buyer's idea of what buyers really wanted: 'We will always want what you have not got' (RTJ September, 1961: 33). Mutual resentment between buyers and growers broke into literary sniping in the press (RTJ November, 1961: 31). The committee vindicated "free-auctions" and recommended intensification of TRB and CONEX campaigns to advise low-quality bulk growers out of their "inefficiency" habits (RTJ October, 1962: 54). The TTA president [local buyers' leader] applauded exoneration of the auctions system, only regretting that no "magical formula" had been found 'to ensure no heartburns for growers...and to enable the industry to expand' (d'Arcy Baker-Carr, RTJ April, 1963: 65). Further expansion would soon be halted and growers would have to endure more severe heartburns, for years.

Growers' failure to supply buyers' needs in 1963 shifted the debate from fair prices to survival of "the industry". With the usual area planted, that crop failed to reach the expected weight. With average yield unusually low, British buyers decried the "quality" of Rhodesian leaf and turned to high-price American growers for their main requirements, leaving Rhodesians scrambling to supply the balance, and down plunged the average price. To rectify the default and 'fill the dangerous supply vacuum', the RTA ordered growers to produce, on the same acreage, a much larger crop of 250 million lb. and increase their yield to 1,000 lb./acre, promising that growers would be rewarded for their efforts. As it turned out, it was the beginning of a long

crisis that would almost wipe out the local tobacco industry. See
 Tables 6.4-6.6 (RTJ September, 1963: 33).

Table 6.4 Total Area of Tobacco Crop in Zimbabwe, Brazil, Zambia
 Canada, 1948-1984, in 1000 hectares. (FAO, World Crop Statistics).

DOWN: AREA

ACROSS: YEAR

Table 6.5 Total Weight of Tobacco Product in Zimbabwe, Zambia, Canada and Brazil, 1948-1984, in 100 metric tons. (FAO, World Crop Statistics, 1966-1985).

DOWN: WEIGHT

ACROSS: YEAR

Table 6.6 Average Yield in Tobacco Production in Brazil, Zimbabwe, Canada and Zambia, 1948-1984, 100kg/hectare. (Constructed from Food and Agricultural Organization, World Crop Statistics, 1966-1985).

DOWN: YIELD

ACROSS: YEAR

All the possible "benefits to the country" were predicted: greater revenue to railways, more coal, fertilizer, pesticide, paper etc. consumption and so on (F. Hoffman, RTJ September, 1963: 80). What is important here are the implications for growers' relationship to capital of producing as buyers and other capitalists wanted them to do - cut costs, increase cultural [technical] efficiency, consult extension officers, use more of the prescribed inputs, etc. (RTJ October, 1963: 35).

Persuaded that an unusual demand existed, growers tried to rectify 1963 by planting 37,000 acres more than the prescribed area for 1963/4 and ended up with their biggest crop ever. Despite the technical services rendered, average yield was modest and "quality" was judged only "reasonable". Contingency plans included expansion of handling capacities of sales floors, warehouses and transport services. If British buyers could not take the whole crop, others would be enticed by the lower prices and new markets would be "captured". Local buyers applauded the big crop as a gesture to continuity of supply, promised expeditious handling, and praised growers for wisely withdrawing from their "daggers drawn" position against buyers (Baker-Carr, RTJ April, 1964: 54). Eight weeks into the sales, predictions of the final average price for 1964 put it close to the price of production (RTJ May, 1964: 23, 71). Local buyers' only regret was that the drought had produced a more variegated grade pattern than had looked possible earlier and that they would have to pick and choose (RTJ May, 1964: 23). For British buyers, the strategy

was holding back, weakening the competition, and depressing average price (RTJ May 1964: 73). Finally, the 1964 crop was duly sold at an average grower price of 25.94d/lb., lower than the 1947 record low of 30d/lb, and the usually desirable average of 35d plus. For growers, the struggle for survival had just begun.

However, growers viewed it only as a temporary setback. That persuaded some of them to accept controlled production [hereafter "control"] for the next season, something otherwise dismissed as a violation of "free enterprise" and prejudicial to the industry's reputation. While buyers and others viewed control as a long-term strategy for ensuring continuous supply and labour reproduction, growers were tended to regard it as a Rhodesian strategy, for restoring a favourable price level. A new debate therefore arose, focusing on the logistics but playing down the logic of control. The full context of the crisis in the world tobacco trade by 1964 can be sketched briefly as follows: out of the total of 800 million lb. involved annually, the US monopolized 50% of the market and held a 700 million lb. subsidized stockpile. American officials often threatened to dump the lot on the world market at "going world prices" - i.e., 1964 prices for the Rhodesian growers who had just added another 100 million lb. to the buyers' stocks! Tobacco production elsewhere was also increasing annually.

Noting how two years of grower ruin in the tobacco market had started a vicious cycle of overproducing to recoup previous losses, H. Garmany suggested controlling future crops to balance

tendencies of both stagnation and uncontrolled expansion. Pointing out some of the contradictions of Rhodesian agricultural policy - intensive settlement and development versus restrictions, the Tobacco Export Promotion Council's [TEPCOR's] world-wide search for extra markets and control, etc. - E Palmer dismissed control as "impractical". Small growers, he argued, would be ruined out of production while others would find loopholes in the scheme (RTJ June, 1964: 46-48).

As the control debate continued, more contradictions were cited against the control principle, from the capitalist perspective. Finance houses, it was suggested, could not be persuaded to withhold credit from qualified bulk producers and forego their interest revenues. The usual image management strategy was repeatedly cited as a reason not to interfere with "free auctions". However, vacillations on control enforcement continued for a while. Eventually, it was assumed that growers had learned the lesson of 1964 and the RTA issued a "national directive to growers", instructing them to "voluntarily" confine their 1965 crop to 250 million lb., i.e. reduce the 1964 weight by 28%, and limit their plantings to 220,000, down from 280,000. That "voluntary" scheme, however, was to be backed with internal sanctions, \$1,000 fine or 1 year in jail for 'any black sheep wilfully impervious to the general weal' (RTJ 1964, July: 21; October: 21). The Minister of Agriculture concurred; legislation was considered unnecessary.

If only to avoid risking control legislation, most growers

grudgingly limited their plantings (RTJ November, 1964: 21). A determined challenge by some growers to nullify the directive at a November special RTA conference failed because it was too late in the season for others to revise their plans. Hence "voluntary control" could prevail by default, pending two RTA referenda, one on the control principle, another one on the specific proposals. Meanwhile, fears of the gradual elimination of "imperial preference" and possible American stock dumping began to recede against the background of a total British trade boycott, should the colonial regime seize "independence". When that suddenly happened in November, 1965 - too late for many growers to turn back from their current crop plans - all prior assumptions about "free and unfettered auctions", grower "democracy" were automatically nullified.

As tobacco marketing became part of the state of emergency, the state's marketing and capitalist role was greatly elaborated. Tables 6.4-6.6 display the dramatic trends in tobacco trading through the sanctions period. By 1968, area planted and weight produced had been reduced by 50% and 30% respectively, and both were held down to their respective low levels until weight began to fluctuate in the late 1970s, partly in response to efforts in sanctions-busting and partly to ZANLA's advance in the countryside. Meanwhile, about half the growers were steadily displaced from tobacco growing due to the control strategy. Conversely, the level of average yield began to rise by leaps and bounds, rising to an unprecedented high in 1967 and plunging to a

significant low only in 1973. What British buyers had failed to induce through premium prices and encouragement - a restricted output on a smaller area with the emphasis on rising yields and valuable leaf - was apparently achieved with guarantees of minimum support prices well below the usual average grower's price. The economies of "efficiency" involved in control involved the production of relative surplus-value and are an expression of the real subsumption process. The explanation of these developments must, in part, lie in the the expansion of the state's capitalist role.

Hitherto, the state had not been under pressure to intervene directly in tobacco marketing as a buyer and as the ultimate authority in assigning what and how much growers had to produce per season. When it did, it did so under the compulsion of historical necessity. It was clearly not a question of the state colluding with merchants against growers. The evidence in fact indicates that local buyers were initially opposed to UDI, fearing that it would lose them "imperial preference" and their most valuable and largest British as well as possible new markets, risking the emergence of the US as a supplier monopoly. As Chapter Three argued, the state's capitalist role arises from the contradictions generated by capitalism. Obviously, without UDI, expansion of the state's capitalist role in general would have been unnecessary in the short run. What UDI did immediately was to threaten disruption of the reproduction of capital so that after the fact, economic stability and the regime's political

survival became a single imperative.

As for the growers themselves, they could hardly countenance losing their British "friends" [market] and half their usual annual earnings. The "master plan" hatched to maintain the viability of tobacco production clearly defined the state's own and capital's survival imperative. The argument that growers became the beneficiaries of state subsidies for their support of the RF is simply ahistorical and based on crude theorization of the state's capitalist role. The imperative was that if capitalist accumulation were to continue outside agriculture, growers and African workers had to be kept on the land producing and paid to subsist. Buyers, both manufacturers and merchants, had to continue in business and many remained in the country, watching the signals of continuity of supply and political stability. Only the state could guarantee any of these conditions under the circumstances. For its part, the state needed the merchants to continue the trade abroad and bring it some taxable earnings. The state's tobacco marketing role was duly formalized in 1966 with the formation of the statutory Tobacco Corporation ["the corporation"], which assumed the responsibility for pooling the whole tobacco crop, crediting growers with reserve prices for each grade and paying them as much more after the sales as it could get in the secret sales or from impounded interests on loans from Britain (RTJ December, 1965: 48-49). The TMB and RTA retained their previous administrative roles.

It was the cabinet that assumed the direct role of assigning

to growers their annual task and deciding how much to pay them if they were to remain in production, productively. In assuming that responsibility and establishing a monopsony, the state reproduced all the complications that characterized relations between growers and buyers in the "free auctions" system: contested grade classifications, delayed demand specifications, etc. and tried to avoid grower resistance by organizing secret bidding. Promising an early political deal with Britain and an end to sanctions, the RF regime initially convinced growers that their ordeal would be transient and the latter reluctantly acquiesced in the imposition of control as a temporary sacrifice and viewed the drive for "productivity" as part of the battle against senseless British sanctions (RTJ August, 1966: 19-21). Under state direction, the strategy of treating settler agriculture as a holding operation until a return to the "free auctions" seemed to work for the first 3 years under sanctions. The TTA and RTA presidents summarized the growers' task, claiming that CONEX and TRB had "conclusively shown" that

....a reduced acreage grown with the same facilities inevitably leads to an increase in yield per acre. This really is the correct way to reach a target figure because the elimination of unnecessary losses will reduce the vital cost-per-pound figure (RTJ September, 1966: 21).

In response, growers generally submitted themselves to the "efficiency" drive, swallowing the bitter pill of control and raising their post-UDI yields. Yet control and exclusion from the sales only added to the usual frustration of growers about what and how much to produce each year if they were to profit from

settler agriculture.

By 1968, grower resentment about how their commodity was being marketed - particularly the regime's procrastination and evasion about the next crop - could not be concealed. When the 1969 target crop was announced, growers responded to further cuts in weight past the "golden minimum" of 132 million lb., and in price below the acknowledged subsistence minimum of 26d/lb., by questioning the legitimacy of control, resisting further cuts and demanding a return to "free auctions" (RTJ, 1968: 14-15). At an RTA special congress on April 22, 1968, growers repudiated further cuts and demanded that the finance minister find the money to continue subsidizing their prices (RTJ May, 1968).

The government opposed continued price supports on the grounds that these not only encouraged growers to keep increasing the stockpile but pushed up the rate of inflation. For their part, buyers and other businessmen, assured of continuity of production and even higher productivity, viewed state subsidization of grower prices with envy, demanding their share and that 'agriculture must stand on its own feet', or even the suspension of tobacco production until the country returned to "normal" trading conditions (RTJ July, 1970: 29). RTA president Carol Heurtley had been forced to defend grower's price subsidies to disgruntled businessmen: '...very little of the money channelled to growers has stuck to their hands in passing through them on its way to purchasing the materials with which to produce the crop' (RTJ August, 1968: 20). Likewise, the RTJ editor was

moved to rebuke a businessman whose comments indicated disregard for the farmer who '...has spent nearly four times as much money as before on fertilizers, pesticides, insecticides [etc.]...And in the process...aided good fortune to smile on many business houses whose turnover has increased fourfold' (RTJ November, 1969: 9; August, 1968: 11).

By 1970, optimism about an early end to sanctions had further paled. The state had stepped in to save "the industry" from either stagnating to a halt or choking on its earlier momentum. In doing so for its own emergency purposes, the state had avoided early confrontation with the settlers, who later became rather restless, as the Rhodesia Tobacco Journal revealed with some exaggeration of the settlers' power:

Though perhaps he protested inwardly, the tobacco grower accepted the conditions placed upon him every year at quota time. But after 5 years a point was reached when he could no longer accept any further imposition (March, 1970: 11).

The fact is that Zimbabwean tobacco growers have never been organized to challenge the conditions under which they have had to produce. As the sanctions continued up to 1980, growers had to learn to produce a limited crop, to survive on subsidized prices, to trade their commodity at a discount worked out between the corporation and the merchants, to diversify as required by government and others outside agriculture, and to submit to the drive for "productivity". In fact, the growers themselves became champions of their own real subjection to capital, identifying with the whole programme largely because their own domination of

African workers prevented them from grasping the extent to which capitalists outside agriculture dominated the lot from the very beginning of systematic settlement.

On the eve of independence in 1980, RTA president Don Bulloch celebrated the end of sanctions, ironically, by proudly reviewing the real subjection of growers to extra-agrarian accumulation:

...control and quota systems became the order of the day and a substantial number of growers dropped out of production or diversified into other crops for economic reasons.

Low prices - at many times sub-economic returns - had a drastic effect on profitability and viability. However, the majority of growers survived and learned to operate more efficiently, to be more productive. 'Our average yield per hectare has increased some 25% since UDI and our standards of quality, handling and presentation have been maintained, if not improved' (RTT January, 1980).

In short, in 1980, Zimbabwean settler farmers simply found their way back into the world markets without having learned any lessons about their relations with capital regarding the marketing of their most lucrative commodity. Since then, their priority has been to re-establish their historical role of producing the most financially attractive leaf and turn it over to the buyers on the latter's conditions. The commitment to outproduce and outsell rival producers prevails. The relationship of growers to buyers and other extra-agrarian capitalists is still taken for granted, or partially understood, but largely unexamined. Chapter Eight discusses the implications of this on the current conception of socialist transformation.

6.3 Conclusion.

Continuing the argument introduced in Chapter Four, this chapter rejected conventional and some "radical" accounts of the social-economic implications of the industrialization of agriculture for farmers who work for themselves. It demonstrated that between 1960-1980, Zimbabwe's settler farmers became increasingly subjected to various processes that define the Marxian conception of the real subsumption of labour to capital. That process was partially articulated, albeit uncritically, by a colonial Minister of Agriculture in 1968, who told Gwebi Agricultural college students that "rule of thumb" [craft] farming was being replaced by "professional" farming, based on intensive techniques, guided by scientists and experts, and geared to productivity (David Smith, RTJ November, 1968: 27). Under the conditions just examined, "productivity" means exploitation of the farmer by extra-agrarian capitalists.

performance of each task. The fast worker would be rewarded positively; slower workers would either be enticed with incentives to speed up or punished. That way, 'the most advanced methods of science and calculation [were appropriated] by a social system that is at odds with human needs...' (Braverman, 1974: 206).

Not to dwell on the details, the following conclusions outline the capitalist character of conventional analysis of the labour-capital relationship. First, economists who write about the role of labour in agriculture may attempt to neutralize the class antagonism between labour and capital by ignoring it altogether. As analysis of the "Economist Intelligence Unit" contributions to that theme reveals, the tendency is to be defensive and emphasize the dubious contributions of capitalist penetration, represented as the benefits of tobacco production to the whole country or to the welfare of otherwise idle workers for instance. The implausibility of that effort becomes clear when the same agricultural economists point to the cost of labour as the greatest obstacle to prosperity, while simultaneously promising that the technical innovations supposed to deal with that barrier by reducing the cost of labour constitute one of the advantages of the industrialization of agriculture. At that level, conventional analysis of the relationship between labour and capital remains crudely evasive and patently self-contradictory while claiming scientific validity. Capital is simultaneously credited with alleviating unemployment and

labour under the capitalist mode of production. Part B does the same with the critique of that representation from the so-called "radical" left, which in this study designates the broad spectrum of writers who work within the "dependency" context. That leads in 7.1.2 to further examination of the Marxian concept of real subsumption of labour under capital, focusing on its implications for the relationship between capital and African farm workers between 1960-1980. Section 7.2 analyses the historical struggle to reduce the value of labour-power in settler agriculture. Subsection 7.2.1 analyses the transition from formal to real subsumption, beginning with the introduction of work-study methods [Taylorism] and other approaches to labour management to the point where no more labour-time could be gained by capital through worker coercion alone. In 7.2.2, individual growers' efforts to reduce the value of Africans' labour-power by employing superior production techniques in selected operations are examined. Concluding historical investigation of the development of settler agriculture under the colonial regime, subsection 7.2.3 examines the extension to settler agriculture of capital's overall strategy for real subordination of all labour, namely, management of the workers' consumption fund or the reproduction of labour.

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noted that it was the vanguard of technical modernization in agriculture, from which cost-reducing technologies would diffuse to the production of other, particularly food, crops. Anonymous also tried to rationalize tobacco's supposedly given "labour-intensiveness" by listing what he described as its "socio-economic implications". On the basis of tobacco's reputed labour-demand, he contended that its production offered indispensable "advantages" to Third World countries. From the one end, he identified tobacco production as "the vehicle for spreading new technologies to backward rural economies towards reduction of the value of labour-power therein. From the other, he tried to sell tobacco production as the great agrarian job creator. The whole effort was aimed at the ideological deflection of liberal accusations to the effect that Third World tobacco production involved the irresponsible misappropriation of labour and land resources otherwise available for food production.

In fact, the social-economic implications of any economic activity can never be determined by listing its "advantages" to whole countries or economies. There is no need to prove that under capitalism, different sectors compete for labour, land or other resources because they obviously do. There is no doubt that tobacco production does mitigate unemployment in some cases and that many producing countries do draw considerable amounts of foreign exchange from leaf exports. However, citing such "advantages" as the "socio-economic implications" of producing tobacco is part of bourgeois ideological practice, whose overall

strategy involves the total displacement of the labour-capital relationship from social-economic analysis.

However, if only because the farmers - the bearers of capital's productive instruments in settler agriculture - tended to remain unaware of capital's class strategies, conventional economics' real view of the labour-capital relationship would only slowly become established in practice after it had become linked to industrial engineering. From that perspective, the real bourgeois conception of the labour-capital relationship would be articulated as the rational basis of labour management, as '...the only acceptable basis...for the setting of equitable tasks and for the planning of production' (RT February, 1959: 25). All considerations of the "advantages" of tobacco growing to the whole "economy", such as rural employment and foreign exchange, would be muted as emphasis focused on labour productivity, as labour came to be confronted as the necessary evil to be minimized in the competitive pursuit of profit.

Still shrouded in ideological mystery, conventional economic analysis of labour as one of the factors of production became institutionalized in agricultural research and technical extension services [Chapter Six], and applied directly to the organization of production as the practice of work [time, motion and process] studies. The assumptions of bourgeois economic theory became the basis of conventional understanding of the labour-capital relationship. These can be traced back to Adam Smith's claim that the source of all wealth is the skill,

dexterity and judgement with which labour is applied, and to Taylor's subsequent reinterpretation of it to mean that the chief source of waste consists in the "blundering, ill-directed or inefficient daily acts of human effort" (cf. J. de Jong, RTJ July, 1970: 38). Labour was thereby identified as the cause of capital's losses. Taylorist ideology took conventional analysis of the labour-capital relationship from bourgeois economics to the point of production, from which management science developed as a professional specialization.⁽¹⁾ Once labour was pin-pointed as the major dispensable cost, the labour-capital relationship in settler agriculture could be understood without being submitted to explicit analysis. Attention was shifted from the social relations to the techniques of production. For instance, instead of specifying division of the working-day into contested portions, one due to labour and the other to capital, the bourgeois view depicted working time as an infinite continuum standardized only by the industrial engineer's clock into degrees of "efficiency": 50%, 100% 150% etc. The job, not the worker, became 'the real basis of work measurement' (RT February, 1959: 25). Accordingly, the only division of time recognized in capital's approach to management was into the simplest components or elements of the job viewed separately and then reduced to a common base measuring the rates of speed and effectiveness in the

(1) The detailed historical development of Taylorism and associated approaches elsewhere is recognized and skipped to highlight the particular developments in Zimbabwean settler agriculture.

performance of each task. The fast worker would be rewarded positively; slower workers would either be enticed with incentives to speed up or punished. That way, 'the most advanced methods of science and calculation [were appropriated] by a social system that is at odds with human needs...' (Braverman, 1974: 206).

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exist under a capitalist system without being "subordinated" to their employers.

Clarke's analysis turned out to be quite conventional after all. He made that quite clear by remonstrating:

It should be stressed that these [his] criticisms are made not to discourage initiatives but rather that they are correctly evaluated (Clarke, 1977: 115).

Programmatically, that leads straight into liberal reformist strategy: rational capitalist planning can lead both to higher productivity and industrial peace. Planners of socialist change may be attracted to the populist appeal of extending benefits to workers, but the approach remains as implausible in the context of socialist change as it was in the colonial drive for capitalist expansion. The limitations of "radical" polemics against capitalist exploitation of labour are also evident in the arguments of those writers who explicitly set out to analyze "the labour process" only to end up with more polemical indictment of capitalists. For instance, in his "description of "the labour process" in California's lettuce industry, Thomas dwells upon such themes as the "tremendous" exertion of the workers. The "labour-process" is "demanding and destructive" and careers are as short as 10-18 years in this very productive and efficient sector where labour remains "unprotected" by unions (Thomas, 1985: 92-102). Given the theoretical poverty of much of what passes for "radical" political economy, one is compelled to return to the insights pioneered by Marx for a socialist perspective on the material character of capitalist relations of production.

7.1.18 Labour and Capital: A "Radical" Critique.

In their anti-colonial polemics, some "radical" economists and historians have criticized the conventional approach to the labour-capital relationship and the policies based on it without ever grasping either of these. Working within the centre-periphery context, their view of the labour-capital relationship has always been informed by the problematic of nationalist disengagement from the world capitalist system. Clarke's critique of Rhodesian farm mechanization and health management policies in settler agriculture under colonialism exemplifies that tendency. Critically evaluating the rationality of the policy of rapid mechanization, Clarke proceeded on the basis of all the assumptions of conventional economics and then demanded, in "radical" polemical fashion, that the policy should have been fashioned to benefit labour no less than capital. Specifically, he contended that the existing policy on mechanization was not "carefully planned", by which he meant that it would benefit only the "vested interests who formulated it and bring such ruinous consequences upon the workers as "deproletarianization" [workers being laid off], impoverishment, etc. all that is covered by the radical concept of "underdevelopment". The real material implications of mechanization for the labour-capital relation - well recognized though muted in bourgeois theory and practice - were either glossed over or entirely missed in Clarke's polemical

denunciation of the greedy "vested interests". Worse still, Clarke could conceive of circumstances where "careful" planning of mechanization policy would not only guarantee higher profits to the "vested interests" but also increase yields, raise "productivity", and even reduce workers' toil without risking "deproletarianization" (Clarke, 1977: 181). In short, Clarke criticized capitalist mechanization for not doing what it was never intended to do and in the process contradicted himself. Mechanization policy was criticized simultaneously for causing the poverty of African workers without any rise in "productivity". Table 6.6, incidentally, shows clearly that during the period in question, Zimbabwean tobacco average yields [productivity] were rising significantly.

Clarke took the same approach to G. D. Campbell's "5-Point Plan" for feeding rich protein to African farm labourers so that their improved health would lead to higher productivity. He made an effort to prove that Campbell's plan would not lead to the "desired" results. The polemic focused on the plan's "paternalism" in assuming that African workers could not be trusted to use money wages "productively" [for food and other reproductive necessities], on the humiliation of workers in being forced to eat separately from their families, and on the shadowy involvement of Nutresco and other consortiums behind Campbell's "Health Management Plan" (Clarke, 1977: 111-115). Meanwhile, the implications of the Campbell plan for the relationship between capital and African labour were entirely by-passed.

On both mechanization and consumption management, the historical context of the productivity drive in Rhodesian settler agriculture eluded Clarke because he approached it from the ideological assumptions of capitalism, that is "productivity" as a socially neutral, technicist result of "rational" economic planning. The "vested interests" identified by Clarke behind the policy of rapid mechanization and protein feeding, minus the settler farmers he uncritically lumped with capitalists, quietly understood their strategies in enhancing the production of relative surplus-value, through employment of superior production techniques in the former case, and through systematic management of labour's consumption fund in the latter. Clarke's ethical protests about the effects of both strategies on African workers' welfare and dignity are understandable, given the severity of colonial oppression, but for purposes of understanding the character of capitalist domination and planning socialist change, they are almost irrelevant. Protesting the irrationality of capitalist strategies within the premises of conventional economics is both ineffectual and implausible. Criticizing capitalists for being interested only in profit and showing no concern for the "underdevelopment" effects of their policies on workers and pointing out that the mechanization and welfare policies of colonialism resulted in workers being "subordinated" to their employers reveals an inadequate grasp of the labour-capital relationship as a class antagonism (Clarke, 1977: 113). In Clarke's view, it is quite conceivable that workers can

exist under a capitalist system without being "subordinated" to their employers.

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7.1.2 Marx, Marxists and Real Subsumption of Labour.

In applying the real subsumption concept to the relationship between settler farmers and capital, Chapter Six noted that the process could not be analysed at the basic level since settler farmers were producers who were burdened with the role of employing and managing African labour. From that perspective, it would appear that the case of African workers' real subordination would be much simpler. After all, African workers were brought to settler agriculture straight into the role of execution, to obey the "master" according to the elaborate provisions of the Masters and Servants Act. It would be misleading to conclude from this that the real subsumption process in this case was instant. Chapter Five ended by noting the introduction of certain innovations in the formal subsumption process. To grasp the subsequent developments, this subsection now returns to Marx's explanation of relative surplus value, examines some contemporary debates on theorization of the labour process, and suggests some modifications for extending the real subsumption concept to the case of African farm workers.

As with formal subsumption, Marx abstracted the real subsumption process on the basis of apportionment of the working-day into labour's necessary and capital's surplus labour-time. Aware that capitalists' struggle for absolute surplus value would be necessarily limited by their own interest in the reproduction of labour-power, Marx reasoned that

capitalists would have to overcome that barrier via reductions in the value of necessary labour. That specifically capitalist-mode of dominating labour would enable capitalists simultaneously to increase the rate of exploitation while appearing to oppress labour less. From a Marxian perspective, the developments referred to here as the post-1960 productivity drive in Rhodesian settler agriculture would indicate a radical bourgeois revolution if they operated without any historical constraint:

The search for a constant increase in surplus-value production implies a search for constant reductions in cost price, a constant cheapening of commodities. Thereby capital, rather than adapting itself to a given structure of demand or socially acknowledged needs, by revolutionizing production revolutionizes demands and needs themselves, expanding markets, provoking new needs, creating new products and new spheres into which production of exchange values for more value, production for profit, makes its appearance (Mandel, in Marx, 1977 Ia: 944-945)

Struggles over the length of the working-day might be modified by legislation, but surplus-value would be augmented despite or without changes in the working-day. All that was required was a revolutionization of the technical and social conditions of labour, of the very mode of production, a transformation which 'presupposes a change either in the productiveness or in the intensity of the labour' (Marx, 1977 I:298-299, 479).

Further Marxian elaborations of that process focused on distinctions between a specific and a general expression. The more specific process of real subsumption [RS-I] depicts individual capitalist enterprises, propelled by mutual competition, employing production methods superior to average

technical conditions in search of excess profits realizable on ability to trade at market price while producing at average cost. This could be effected by increasing constant and reducing variable capital. Relative surplus-value obtained that way, however, would remain ephemeral, as other enterprises could neutralize the technical advantage by following suite (Harvey, 1982: 31). Nevertheless, a large part of the Rhodesian productivity drive in settler agriculture emphasized that strategy, so that it remains significant in the discussion that follows in 7.2.

The other expression of real subsumption [RS-II] identified by Marx, which is more systematic and more generally applicable to the whole working class, involves a capitalist class strategy for reducing necessary-labour. Here, the capital-labour antagonism is focused on reproduction of labour-power and intensification of the labour process through capitalist management of labour's consumption fund or, in concrete terms, on social determination of the average consumer goods basket. That strategy entails a class antagonism in that it violates labour's legal right to manage its consumption and to reproduce itself outside the capitalist workplace when capitalists come to view that right as a barrier to further accumulation. As noted in Chapter Five, under formal subsumption conditions, capitalists keep trying to accumulate small portions of necessary labour, risking both worker resistance and general emasculation of the work force. To overcome that barrier, capital's remaining option

is to manipulate the value of labour's consumption fund so as to reduce consumer prices while maintaining the absolute standard of living. Since systematic cheapening of wage goods may prove uneconomic for individual capitalists, a class strategy for managing labour's consumption fund might become necessary. The intervention may take the form of state subsidization of wage good sectors: cheap food, housing and health programmes, etc. (Harvey, 1982: 30-31).

After Marx, orthodox Marxists tended to lose historical perspective on these developments, generally subsuming everything under an evolutionary trajectory towards the great revolutionary climax. For instance, Lenin's simplistic equation of the mere introduction of machinery in agriculture with the social-economic effects of mechanization was criticized in 6.1.18. So urgent was the revolutionary prognosis to Lenin that he even went so far as to suggest adapting Taylorism to Soviet production as a strategy for developing the productive forces and advancing the revolution (Lenin, 1965: [CW] v.27: 259; cf. Braverman, 1974: 12). Meanwhile, capitalists elaborated further methods of controlling labour through innovation - Taylor's work-study methods, Ford's flow-line assembly techniques, and increasingly more subtle approaches to labour control.

In some current revisions of Marx's double formulation of real subsumption, in the light of Braverman's contribution, attempts have been made to demonstrate that workers are no longer "subordinated" to capital. Specifically, Marx and Braverman are

criticized for wishfully articulating an "optimistic teleology" which supposedly mistakes specific forms of labour control (e.g. Taylorism) for actual historical process and ignores the effects of worker resistance, for adhering to a supposedly evolutionist formal-real subordination continuum, and for ignoring a supposed shift from worker "subordination" towards forms of control based on legitimation, all in order to postulate the revolutionary outcome of capitalist crisis (Herman, 1982: 7-14). To rectify such 'serious historical and theoretical lacunae', a 'serious Marxist analysis of the labour process' is announced.

Unfortunately, that effort simply violates the basic Marxian approach to the labour process. Gramsci's typology of political control by ruling classes is invoked to make the distinction between "economic" subordination interpreted as "direct coercion" and responsible autonomy labelled as "hegemony", which involves workers' consent to capitalist control by legitimation. From that Gramscian distinction, all post-Fordist approaches to labour control are taken to be extricated from the supposedly unnecessary constraints of Marx's materialist framework of formal and real "subordination" as these are understood in that "serious" context. First, Marx's concepts of subordination are misread in economic terms, then for that reason they are dismissed for restricting analysis of labour "control" to economic "subordination" understood as separate from political, ideological and any other type of subtle manipulation of workers by management.

Essentially, what the Gramscian critics of Marx's subordination concepts would wish to establish, with historical hindsight, is that modern management approaches to worker control have nothing to do with capital's pursuit of profit and much emphasis is placed upon Burawoy's distinction between relations "in" and "of" production. Attempts to refute Marxism and its revolutionary implications on the basis of misreadings of Marx were first cited early in Chapter Three. All that needs adding here is that it is quite possible to emphasize the subtlety of struggles in the work place as well as the complexity of class rule within Marx's framework of labour subordination. In other words, capitalist "hegemony" is just as material as the cruder forms of labour's subordination to capital. The difference arises from the Gramscian distinction between the political and the economic. The distinction between "hegemony" and "subordination" is untenable because it rests on an economistic reduction of the Marxian concepts of subordination. Once it is accepted that all of Marx's concepts entail the interpenetration of political, ideological and economic aspects of social practice, so will his concepts of capitalist subordination of labour be understood in their full historical sense.

Given Marx's double formulation of the real subsumption process, the next task is to modify it to the historical context of Zimbabwean settler agriculture after 1960. Earlier chapters established a number of complications. First, settler farmers' own struggle with capital and response to RS-I, their ability to

subsist between the general drive for productivity and the ceiling to expansion, and the context of mediations and interventions all suggest that even the struggle over substitution of constant for variable capital extended well beyond the point of production. This must be taken into account. The point was anticipated in a different context: theorization of real subsumption must recognize the effects of labour's tendency to resist total subjection to capital and the increasingly complex division of labour (Chevalier, 1982: 174). How the antagonism between African labour and capital over substitution of constant for variable capital was modified by settler farmers' relationship to either and the accompanying expansion of state and other institutional mediations will be discussed in 7.2.2. Theoretically, all these mediations automatically extend the scope of that antagonism beyond the confines of the workplace, but the relationship of class subordination remains intact.

The second part of Marx's formulation of real subsumption automatically extends the struggle over necessary labour-time beyond the workplace. Conditions in advanced capitalism favour the assumption of capital's struggle on that terrain by the state and other agencies, with monopoly firms simply making their demands. A modifying circumstance in Zimbabwean settler agriculture was the general absence of such a strategy. Consequently, when the first efforts to reduce necessary-labour by directly encouraging farmers to feed and shelter African workers within the context of the productivity drive, the focus

remained on the particular work-place - each farmer experimenting with his own workforce. Since the individual employers of farm labour seldom had a full perspective on capitalist class relations, they tended to direct their efforts straight at the concrete labourer. Protein feeding for profit or productivity appeared to them as a substitute for money wages, as a direct infusion of fuel into the human means of production. The "decent" house, if any, went to the valued African foreman as a reward for his loyalty, not as part of a capitalist class strategy towards reducing the value of labour-power through management of workers' consumption fund. Subsection 7.2.3 examines settler farmers' reaction to pressures from outside firms urging them to assume the role of capitalist intervention in the management of labour's consumption fund as a strategy for relative surplus-value production.

Another matter that needs clarification is that of the historical transition from formal to real subsumption. Some Marxist critics of these concepts object to what they read as their evolutionist implications. Marx was not aware of the impending changes in the capacity of capitalism to dissolve constraining labour processes and to reconstitute them towards greater productivity. Developments since the introduction of Taylorism in Rhodesian settler agriculture suggest that capitalist work study and measurement can be usefully subsumed under Marx's concepts of formal and real subordination as a transitional process between the two. Of course, what the

adoption of Taylorist principles initially does in the work place is simply to push the formal subsumption process to its limits. It allows capitalists or their surrogates in any particular sector, such as settler agriculture, to stretch the limits of the working-day by picking up every usable minute within the given working-day. Insofar as Taylorism simply enables management to extend the working-day by reorganizing work, without substituting any constant for variable capital, all its "rational" aspects make little difference to the basic relationship defined by absolute surplus-value. However, by breaking down the labour-process and reconstituting it in capital's favour, Taylorism also lays the basis for real subsumption by revealing where economies may be made through substitution of constant for variable capital. None of this implies that Taylorism necessarily forms the transition between formal and real subordination in the evolutionist sense. Historically, there may be other forms of transition between the two aspects of capitalist domination of labour. However, the introduction of Taylorism in Zimbabwean settler agriculture suggests how the change from formal to real subsumption might be explained as a transitional form of class struggle rather than a sudden break in historical process. This suggests that critics of Marx and Braverman who argue that Taylorism "failed" are mistaken. Just because it was resisted in certain cases and subsequently overtaken by other approaches to capitalist labour control does not mean that it was not effective. Even the fact that it provoked workers to resist

further coercion and became obsolete in the process, suggests that it played some historical role in capitalist development, taking formal subsumption to its limits and thus laying the basis for real subordination. Subsection 7.2.1 examines the early approaches to the drive for productivity in settler agriculture, in which the themes of work-study and labour control were predominant.

7.2 Towards the Real Subordination of African Farm Labour.

As Chapter Five emphasized, the transformation of working humans into one of capital's productive factors - the subsumption of labour under capital - is a historical rather than an evolutionary process. The change from formal to real subordination, often conveniently illustrated by contrasting craft and industrial production relations, shall be understood here as a transformation within capitalism, as part of the class struggle rather than its evolutionary outcome or a change in stages of capitalist relations. If the intensification of the scientific-technical revolution analyzed in Chapter Six seemed to have swept away the barriers to accumulation, that could only be affirmed in the most general terms. Historically, within those developments, contradictions abounded. An important consideration in any critical examination of the current conception of socialist change in Zimbabwe would be the extent to which its

analysis of the "colonial legacy" grasps the connection between the drive for productivity in settler agriculture and the antagonism between labour and capital therein concealed.

Subsection 7.2.1 extends investigation of capitalists' efforts to intensify their control of African workers beyond the limits of extensions to the working-day towards measured reductions in necessary-labour. The concurrent struggle to transform settler farmers into effective managers of African labour on capitalist principles is a crucial dimension of what became a relentless drive for productivity, focused on studying and measuring the various elements of every operation in tobacco leaf production, on attempts to devalue labour-power by simplifying and reducing tasks, and on facilitating managerial control by promoting worker participation in the pursuit of capitalists' profit. Subsection 7.2.2 focuses on the extension to settler agriculture of capitalists' attempts to generate relative surplus-value through increasing constant and reducing variable capital. Attention will be focused on two operations in tobacco production which have tended to be difficult to capitalize, namely reaping and grading, both of which are considered to be crucial determinants of tobacco market prices. Substantive historical investigation into the development of settler agriculture ends in 7.2.3 with examination of attempts within settler agriculture to reduce the value of labour-power or increase the rate of exploitation by systematically intervening in the sphere of consumption to manage the reproduction of labour

towards greater productivity. Investigation is focused on labour feeding, housing and other welfare programmes conceived as part of the pursuit of efficiency between 1960-1980.(1)

7.2.1 Work Study and Control for Efficiency.

On narrowing the focus to the labour-capital relationship, some of the ways in which capitalist control of the labour-process in settler agriculture was exercised may be recalled. First, through indirect investment, appropriation of the scientific-technical revolution, public control of land use and credit, etc., capital established its control in settler agriculture long before the productivity drive explicitly began in the early 1960s. By then, most of the operations in flue-cured tobacco production - seed production, ploughing and other aspects of land preparation, fertilization, disease control, transportation, etc. - had been radically altered towards higher levels of efficiency, beyond what was considered necessary for the mere subsistence of growers. As one grower noted retrospectively, much of the capitalization had been superfluous in a situation where high mechanical costs and relatively cheap labour co-existed (Ted Scrace, RTJ

(1) Throughout this chapter, reference to "political" interventions in this matter by the state through legislation has been avoided in order to focus attention on the labour-capital antagonism at the point of production.

November, 1966: 23). Accordingly, the new drive for efficiency became focused on those operations which management experts identified as "bottlenecks", as the obstacles to growers' prosperity - reaping, green tying, barn loading, flue-curing, unloading, bulking, untying, grading, dry tying, baling - upon whose handling depended the evaluation of the commodity on the auction floors.

Secondly, and more directly, tobacco buyers and traders extended their control of the labour process in settler agriculture through strategic buying. As 6.2.4 argued, the tobacco auctions became the arena where buyers could assign the annual task to growers simply by stating their needs and later by strategically concealing those needs so that growers had to rely on technical experts to show them how capitalists wanted the tobacco grown next time. That way, buyers compelled growers to constantly re-examine the handling of their crop by African workers in performing the above operations. Following each unsatisfactory selling season, growers had to consider implementing the labour economies recommended by management experts in the hope of securing the elusive profit. In attempting to anticipate buyers' demands every year, to "chase the market", growers focused on eliminating unnecessary tasks from the "bottleneck" operations. In the process, African workers were increasingly subjected to the relentless quest for the always uncertain growers' profit, in effect to the accumulation of capital outside agriculture.

In planning their strategy, management experts encountered a two-fold social barrier to enhanced and steady accumulation, namely, the farmers' general managerial ineptitude and what was perceived as the African workers' apathy towards material acquisition. In the incipient drive for productivity, the pioneers of "scientific" management had initially concentrated on controlling both African workers and the farmers in terms of extensions to the working-day as argued in Chapter Five. As the limits to extensions to the working-day were reached, management thinking increasingly turned towards greater efficiency, first through the application of work-study principles, and eventually through strategies calculated to reduce the value of labour-power through increased labour productivity. The first step, was publication of the RTA's "Work Study Manual", consisting of the adaptation of Taylorist principles to agriculture, based on pilot studies of tobacco production in some areas and later extended to the whole country.

The growers' responses to the monthly survey "Round the Farms", indicates that there were at least as many resisters as there were converts to Taylorism throughout the period 1960-1980 (RTJ, 1960 onwards). To overcome that first obstacle, a number of initiatives for educating settlers in managing African labour were undertaken. One of these involved invoking the authority of positive science in targeting African labour as the major cause of growers' low income or inefficient handling of tobacco leaf. One management expert described the "scientific" approach

diagnostically:

There is a common scientific approach to problems. For instance, if you are ill and the cause is bilharzia, applying the appropriate treatment for bilharzia will result in your illness disappearing...

In economics and medicine, the approach is the same. If you have a low income due to poor land selection, you will improve it by treating this cause. If you wrongly attribute it to the small scale of production and expand onto less suitable land, a small profit will become a large loss. If you do nothing about it, impoverishment will be a crippling economic doom (G B Thorpe, RAJ May-June, 1962: 132).

(1)

The first step in diagnosing the condition of farmers' low income in management ideology was for them to keep production records. That would help the experts identify the "causes" of inefficiency and prescribe appropriate cures. Record-keeping involved defining the "labourer-day" as the physical time unit done per day per worker, stratifying the African work force according to prevailing conventions of competence, and calculating the amount of labour needed to perform each operation according to the average standards of accuracy. On that basis, the alleged "causes" of growers' low income would be positively identified and duly cured. Record-keeping thereby became the the experts' way of demonstrating "scientifically" that the "high" cost of African labour, as a productive factor, was the major obstacle to settler farmers' prosperity. By urging farmers to keep farm records, management experts took their first step in extending to

(1) See 5.2.3 for other ailments and their corresponding cures.

agriculture the Taylorist principles which had already been established in industry and helped intensify labour through method studies and motion control.

One of the approaches may be described as "organizational mobilization" because it involved rallying settler farmers behind such influential organizations as the RTA, RNFU, TRB and CONEX, alongside industrial-engineering firms in pursuing greater productivity. For instance, in preparing its "Work Study Manual", the RTA consulted with all the "above" and hired the services of H H Frazer and Associates to identify and simplify the inefficient tobacco growing operations. The experts demonstrated how to define the average worker, set work standards, measure effectiveness of given techniques detail by minute detail, establish ranges of variation in the observations made, execute and interpret the data, calculate the results, and implement the economies of efficiency (RT February, 1959: 25-27).

A third approach to management training of settler farmers on the job was "demonstrative" in the sense of setting success examples. In 5.2.1, ITC's "progressive" labour policy at Masasa Estate was analysed from the formal subsumption perspective. It was argued that the economies practiced there, "with substantial benefits to management - personnel selection and training, health, catering, housing, entertainment, leave allowances, etc. - all aimed at stabilizing the African labour force by ensuring steady accumulation of absolute surplus-value. The matter was left there insofar as the point was to demonstrate the formal

subsumption process only, that is, the struggle over length of the working-day. At this point, it becomes apparent that, insofar as the ITC economies of labour efficiency also contributed to reduction of the value of labour-power, they also expressed the real subsumption principle. As Marx explained it, the formal and real subsumption processes are initially indistinguishable in capitalist development:

[The] methods of producing relative surplus-value are, at the same time, methods of producing absolute surplus-value...

From one standpoint, the distinction between absolute and relative surplus-value appears to be illusory. Relative surplus-value is absolute, because it requires the absolute prolongation of the working-day beyond the labour-time necessary to the existence of the worker himself. Absolute surplus-value is relative, because it requires a development of the productivity of labour which will allow the necessary labour-time to be restricted to a portion of the working-day. But...Once the capitalist mode of production has become the established and universal mode of production, the difference between absolute and relative surplus-value makes itself felt whenever there is a question of raising the rate of surplus-value (Marx, 1977 Ia: 646, brackets added).

As ITC's example was adopted on some settler farms, the real subsumption of African farm workers began to run concurrently with initial stabilization of the labour force following earlier dependence on migrant labour. Absolute surplus-value would be produced by reducing labour's movement away from the workplace, while more methodical selection and production techniques, together with economic control of labour's consumption fund defined the movement towards real subsumption.(1)

 Whether or not settler farmers were in a position to realize profit from the surplus-value accruing upon such economies was the issue addressed in Chapter Six.

Other demonstrations of the successful economies of labour management occurred within settler agriculture itself. Back from Ontario, one grower reported on how Canadian tying machines had saved growers the trouble of relying upon skilled leaf-tiers and having to "tread on eggs" to keep them happy (A. Godwin, RTJ April, 1962: 43-44). Another one explained his enthusiasm toward mechanization by pointing to the possibilities of employing unskilled, apolitical and cheaper hands (J. Cheesman, RTJ July, 1962: 33). Since Zimbabwean farm workers were then not unionized and already deprived of skills by colonial convention, the pressure to respond to such examples was negligible. Perhaps the most attractive example of Canadian economies of labour efficiency at that time was exhibited by D. Parham on Brechin Estates, which demonstrated how local growers could dispense with superfluous African workers and increase their man-acre ratio from 1:1 to 1:2.5 by adopting the horse-and-boat unit and double-ridging methods (RTJ March, 1960: 57-58).

With management experts, influential organizations, and leading growers unanimously targeting African labour as "the most important cost-factor in growing tobacco", one would expect all growers to direct their efforts towards reducing the value of labour-power. Farmers were encouraged to expect dramatic rises in tobacco grower profits once they adopted the prescribed labour-saving economies. However, the growers' responses never seemed to satisfy the experts and other champions of the efficiency drive. By 1969, management experts were seeking new

ways of educating settler farmers. The Ministry of Agriculture's Economics and Marketing Branch [EMB] and the RNFU's Management and Accounting Services [MAS] were desperately trying to sell their expertise to farmers through CONEX by demanding that farmers submit production records to them. The "Rhodesian Tobacco Journal" protested that only 2.5 % of the farmers kept suitable records for EMB while another 3.5% submitted theirs to MAS, a total of 6% or 350 out of 6,000 settler farmers (RTJ May, 1970: 9). Out of the co-ordination effort emerged the Agricultural Committee for Management Education [ACME], which continued to condemn settler farmers' managerial ineptitude throughout the rest of the last colonial decade (RTJ February, 1976: 16).

From the responses of those farmers who independently pursued the economies of efficiency to such criticism, it is evident that independent initiatives were in vain. Answering the RTJ editorial exhortation to record-keeping, one farmer with a somewhat partial grasp of the implications of the productivity drive for him and the rest of his fellows described the call as a "red herring" and observed:

....I see we are now merely to be subjected to another propaganda war about our inefficiency, this time in different terms. But I can assure you, Sir, that no amount of farm management planning is going to right the present disastrous situation...[Your article] is quite erroneous and wrongly insinuates that those of us not actively [submitting records to EMB and MAS] are therefore grossly inefficient, negligent and generally backwards (RTJ June, 1970: 47, letter from G M B Maunsell, brackets added).

Farmers' resentment towards incessant condemnation of their inefficiency continued right up to 1980, even when they were

projected as the Rhodesian military "front line" in the late 1970s:

We're not only under physical siege here...we're also up against a kind of ideological blockade. It's suddenly fashionable to claim that private enterprise farming is both wicked and inefficient. Haven't you heard that about 30% of all farms in South-West Matabeleland are either unoccupied or used only *pieds-a-terre* (Hamish Usher, 1977, cf. Cauter, 1983: 128).

As for the ordinary farmers to whom the economics of labour-management were nothing but unwelcome interference, the standard colonial approach to labour management remained that of crude coercion. As late as 1977, many farm managers still vented their economic frustration by intensifying supervision, which often involved withholding wages and physical assault of the workers, precisely what management experts sought to discourage (Cauter, 1983: 130-132).

Originating outside agriculture, the productivity drive was hardly understood by settler farmers for what it was, a capitalist drive for extra-agrarian accumulation. It arose within a deepening crisis within which settler farmers could not realistically expect any substantial share of capital's tobacco profits. Management experts' attempts to educate the farmers in managing African workers were a capitalist initiative for profit, not a way of enabling settler farmers to realize huge profits. For the extra-agrarian capitalists and the state, it was good enough that settler farmers remained on the land and continued to produce commodities and manage African labour. Thus by 1980, the

transition towards real subsumption of agricultural labour under capital remained a contested process in which settler farmers, as managers of African labour, continued to operate without a full grasp of capital's global class strategy of dominating all direct producers and accumulating capital through that. What that partial view of capital's class strategy in agriculture, which has been changing with circumstances, implies for the current conception of socialist transformation in Zimbabwe will be judged against post-colonial state policies which oblige settler farmers to manage African labour more humanely and promote workers' welfare. Meanwhile, the diagnostic approach to labour management continues to be treated as common sense: 'It was necessary to identify at the outset those factors which were seen by farmers and agricultural workers to be limiting tobacco profits' (J J Pistorius, 1983: 71). (1)

The extent to which such education effectively prepared settler farmers to manage farm labour towards greater productivity cannot be fully appreciated without historically investigating how they went about controlling the African workers in the workplace. In other words, as capital's agents on the farm, how did settler farmers proceed in attempting to overcome capital's second human barrier in agriculture? From the management experts' perspective, settler farmers' new role

(1) Pistorius' implication that agricultural workers are interested in identifying obstacles to profit sounds absurd until one understands it as part of the ideological misrepresentation of capital's interests as those of the whole society.

6

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required them to forego the conventional crude coercion once considered necessary to compel African workers to exert themselves and concentrate instead on encouraging voluntary participation in a "collective" pursuit of profit. Ideally, such control should enable the farmers to drop the whip and promote worker co-operation (de Jong, RTJ July, 1970: 38). In 5.2.3, the racist explanation of the domination of African workers under early colonialism was examined from the formal subsumption perspective, with attention focused on struggles over workers movements and duration of work. Worker resistance to and circumvention of the crude coercion involved was cited as a bare threat to the accumulation process which management experts would neutralize by taming the worker in more sophisticated ways. Most "radical" accounts of racist explanations of what European employers listed as the "K-factors" that made up their caricature of "the African" have concentrated on debunking the validity of the obviously untenable stereotypes. Explanations of "settler ideology" in terms of its supposed function of "justifying" racial privilege, low wage policies, poor working conditions, etc. all suffer from certain fundamental flaws beside their implicit functionalism. First, they beg the question whether racism actually needs justification and, if so, to whom? Second, they tend to remain ahistorical in the face of clear evidence indicating that colonialism actually started to move away from the crudest formulations of racial prejudice towards more sophisticated ideologies of worker control. The fact that

even the experts of colonial labour management would balk at minimizing wages below the level necessary for reproducing labour-power belies any explanation of racist ideologies in terms of justification of low wages.

For colonial labour-management experts, the racist formulation of capital's problem with African workers had to go. It contradicted capital's interest in involving the workers themselves in the productivity drive. That soon prompted some of the "experts" on African labour to dispute all naturalistic explanations of Africans' alleged apathy towards material acquisition and the pursuit of capital's profit. Representations of "the African" in terms of psychological or dietetic deficiencies, infantile disorders, genetic inadequacies, etc. were transcended in industrial social "science" by theories which tended to affirm both the need and the possibility of imparting materialist values and stimulating acquisitive motivations among African workers, as a condition for involving them in the capitalist productivity drive (J. Clyde Mitchell, RTJ February, 1962: 35-36). Ironically, just as they identified African labour as the curse on growers' profits, the labour experts also sought to increase African workers' subjective involvement in the pursuit of profit. From the perspective of capital, however, such participation could only be that of alienated labour.

Controlling African labour towards greater efficiency involved two aspects of the same process. First, "work-study" or

technical analysis of methods and measurement of given operations implied breaking down and reconstituting the labour process towards higher rates of exploitation. Second, "control" entailed directing and motivating workers to drive themselves towards greater profits for capital through what management experts described as 'scientific selection', training and development of the worker...development of a spirit of co-operation between workers and management to ensure that the devised procedures are in fact carried out (de Jong, RTJ July, 1970: 38). In short, this whole strategy was but a "detailed practical interpretation of modernization ideology by the labour "experts" (RTJ July, 1970: 38).

Accordingly, the productivity drive would be directed by the experts in the various services and supervised by settler farmers, with African workers voluntarily co-operating in the pursuit of profit. Historically, however, the transition towards real subsumption was subject to a number of barriers. First, capitalists' strategic abstention from direct involvement in agricultural production entailed leaving the management of African labour to a group of self-employed farmers who themselves had valid reasons for resisting certain aspects of the productivity drive, getting the right equipment for instance, given the rising costs of production and the low returns. Resistance to work-study and control, therefore, was structurally rooted within both the workers and their managers. Another contradiction arose from the geographical dispersal and the

polymorphous character of agricultural production. As the productivity drive began in the early 1960s, nearly all flue-cured tobacco growers had their own different ways of performing the "bottleneck" operations, subject to their experience with labour, different types of leaf, technology, ecology, etc. (RTJ July, 1961: 59). The effects of work-study and control would be limited despite control of the growers through the RTA and increasing repression of African workers, regardless of their formal representation by the largely ineffectual Agricultural and Plantation Workers Union (see Clarke, 1977: 188-195). Given the almost total silence of African workers in the documents that inform this chapter and the growing reticence of work-study and other labour "experts" to speak bluntly on labour exploitation, one could only rely on critical examination of settler farmers' experience as they attempted to implement the new approach to labour management in tobacco production to reveal the transformation of the relationship between capitalists and African workers towards one of real subordination.

To grasp the limits to that process, one can begin by reviewing the conventional methods which constituted the object of initial work-study efforts and came to be regarded by management "experts" as the basis of low growers' incomes. Take conventional reaping for instance, which also includes such sub-operations as green-tying, transportation and barn packing. Under the prevailing colonial conventions, it was assumed that a tobacco grower without a European assistant to help him supervise

African workers needed to grow 60 acres each year to make a living. The grower would have to do all the supervision between fields and barns and transport the truckloads of green leaf as he commuted between the dispersed work sites. It was assumed that African workers would either slack or skimp the tasks if left on their own. Assigning African women to remove suckers and join the other workers in the grading shed later, a grower would put 19 men in the fields, one of whom was the "boss-boy". Nine reapers would enter each row, pick the ripened leaf lowest first, fill their armpits and then hand the leaf over to the 9 waiters walking back and forth between the reaper and the contour road, where they could deposit the leaf in a crate or other container that could be loaded onto a truck or a trailer. With each load of green leaf transported to the barns for curing, the reaping teams would be returned to the barn area one by one and turned into green tiers of 4-leaf hands to mitepe [sticks] on which the leaf would be horizontally hung on the 8 levels [tiers] of a conventional barn.

In evaluating the conventional reaping method, grower Norval argued that it had the advantages of having the leaf transported immediately to the barn and avoiding sun-scorching, while distribution of the whole operation between barn and field prevented the rush involved in allocating both reaping and tying to the same individuals wielding machines through the rows and motivated to speed up by the offer of incentive bonuses. To rush reaping is to risk broken and prematurely picked leaf, both of

which might, by complicating grading, result in the occurrence of mixed grades and underpricing of the bales on the floors by unimpressed British buyers. Although he would be obliged to keep moving and stopping between field and barn, Norval somehow reasoned that conventional reaping enabled him to keep African workers in both places under close surveillance.

From the management experts' perspective, however, conventional reaping was wasteful on labour-power and involved too much handling, implying the risk of damaged and therefore potentially less profitable leaf than that which is least handled. The transportation of leaf to be green-tied at the barns should be avoided because it resulted in too much leaf from different areas being tied onto the same stick, with the unwanted implications for grading and selling. Worst of all, the fact that this not-so-efficient operation was over by 2p.m. each working-day represented considerable underuse of labour-power. Norval did not deny all that. He deliberately wasted labour-power during reaping so that he could keep all the workers he needed later for conventional grading. Ultimately, he stuck with conventional reaping because it worked for him: 'I use conventional reaping and tying because they suit my particular circumstances. If the circumstances were altered, I might change' (RTJ July, 1964: 45).

In describing the conventional method in grading - the other "bottleneck" operation - A F Green first noted the "fabulous cost" of his layout of barns, bulking and grading sheds. His

description of the flow of tobacco leaf through that layout indicates just what work-study experts would insist on eliminating from the grading process. First, the cured leaf was removed from the barns to the bulking rooms. Then it was loaded into crates for steaming, then into another set of crates from which two strong men took it and cut the twine to release the leaf from the mutepe into a heap where scales of 9-12 lb. - depending on current leaf size - were weighed and wrapped in hessian. Then two porters loaded the scales onto trolleys and wheeled them to 5 checkers who supplied 16 scales to each of 5 teams of 3 graders whom the checkers were commissioned to instruct, encourage and chide.

Then followed the grading operation itself. Each team had to remove all the bits of string left in its current scale, open each leaf and then grade it out completely [i.e. no rough and finer grading by variously skilled hands], green and spongy went out first, then the team sorted all the grades according to the prescribed sample. As they finished their assignments of 16 scales each, the teams were dismissed for the day between 11 a.m.-1 p.m. to spend the day resting on the farm. Instructed not to participate in the actual grading, the 5 checkers remained in the shed to the end, assigning new scales on demand to the grading trios, receiving graded leaf, checking for errors, ordering regrading if necessary, and handing over all passed leaf to 2 blenders for depositing into the appropriate crates. Then 8-12 women tied it from there into hands, to be loaded again into

crates before balers sewed it up into bales for despatching to the market (RTJ October, 1964: 42-43).

Green went over to the conventional method after abandoning his shoddy grading premises and its corresponding method, which had often forced him to rely on commercial graders at extra cost. In between, he had experimented with a system resembling a human conveyor belt which had shown some qualitative improvement on his grading. However, he had dropped it because output had decreased and conventional grading did not cost much more money. However, there was clearly no output improvement in a system that ended the working-day between 11 a.m.-1 p.m. Moreover, too much movement and handling were involved in the flow from barn through grading shed to despatch depot. Furthermore, with graders working in teams, there was no incentive to excel and no basis for apportioning responsibility for errors to the individual grader. The uniformity of leaf in the same grade could not be ensured, hence the need for five checkers.

The crucial point is that despite the various innovations in tobacco grading which might improve the performance of African workers both qualitatively and in terms of labour-time saved, Green was not only able to return to an antiquated and inefficient method but actually came to prefer it over the new ones. What the ability of tobacco growers to adhere to old methods and equipment suggests is that the existing innovations would not put conventional graders at an immediate material disadvantage. By identifying the "bottleneck" operations and

more efficient methods of performing them, - the work-study approach laid the technological foundation for the transformation of relations of production towards real subsumption in terms of substituting constant for variable capital. However, with many growers able to survive without altering their technologies, the transition would require a major crisis to induce it. Subsection 7.2.2 examines the impact of the crisis beginning in 1962 on the growers' ability to cling to conventional tobacco culture and on the implications of that for the relationship between African labour and capital.

7.2.2 Real Subsumption I: Mobilizing Constant Capital.

One of the questions socialists in Zimbabwe must address is what the scientific-technical revolution that developed in settler agriculture in the wake of the crises between 1960-1980 entailed for the labour-capital relationship. In 6.2.2, it was argued that the process involved a movement towards the real subordination of settler farmers as commodity producers to extra-agrarian capitalists. Later, in 7.1.2, Marx's twofold formulation of the real subsumption process was outlined, the first one of which focuses on the mobilization of constant capital against labour, that is on attempts by capitalists to boost labour's productive powers through investment in the "scientific-technical revolution". Now, it has just been

demonstrated in 7.2.1 that elaborate preparations were made to focus on African labour as the one cost settler farmers had to minimize if they were to grab any of the profits in the tobacco trade.

Stated otherwise, the question that arises here for socialists is how to interpret those technical innovations specifically forced upon settler farmers with a view to increasing the productivity of African farm-workers, or the rate at which they were exploited by capital. Evidently, as Zimbabwean social-economic planners were taking stock of the colonial legacy, they became aware of the association between increased productivity in settler agriculture - consequent upon the increased capital intensity in that sector - and what were described as "significant disemployment effects" (TNDP, 1982: 8). However, it is also evident that the "significance" of that association between increasing capital intensity and unemployment remained a puzzle as the planners were interested as much in creating employment as they were in increasing labour productivity.

To make sense of that puzzle, the problem is located in the framework of earlier arguments about conflicting interpretations of the industrialization of settler agriculture. For conventional economists and associated social theorists, increasing capital intensity represented no problem. All that mattered was that increased investment led to increased profits for capital. From that perspective, increasing capital intensity could be

represented as technical progress "naturally" spreading to new branches of the economy. The only important consideration from that perspective would be the extent to which the innovations actually led to reductions in labour costs and thus to higher returns on the investments made through settler farmers by extra-agrarian capitalists, or to economic growth. From the "radical" perspective, attention would be focused on whether or not the innovations "benefitted" labour just as they did the investors. Hence, the question might provoke a protest against the "vested interests" - the capitalists as well as the settler farmers - if the innovations seemed to be a mindless pursuit of profit which ignored possible adverse effects on farm labour. As in Clarke's view of Rhodesian "mechanization policy", the "radical" perspective on technical change leads to protests against "deproletarianization" [or "disemployment"] effects upon workers whose conditions were already depressed. Agricultural "mechanization policy" could be criticized for not having been so "carefully planned" as to extend the benefits to everyone - productivity [profit] to capitalists and settler farmers, and higher wages and job security for African workers. On the other hand, in the event of such a deal being extended to African workers, "radical" economists would count that as an equitable solution, an advance for labour. The social-economic implications of increased labour productivity for the labour-capital relationship would not be treated as problematic.

From the Marxist perspective [7.1.2], the issue is

theoretically as well as historically straightforward. Increased investment in constant capital is the most explicit expression of the subsumption of labour under capital, of capitalists' attempts to mobilize labour-power accumulated as capital in the means of production against labour. It constitutes the calculated deployment of capital in the labour process in order to extract relative surplus-value from the workers. In short, from the Marxist [socialist] perspective, increased capital intensity in any form signals attempts by capitalists to intensify the exploitation of labour.

As the evidence deployed in the argument in 7.2.1 indicates, the whole strategy of work-study and control had as its main target the reduction of necessary labour-time of the value of labour-power. Although the initial reaction of tobacco growers such as Messrs Norval and Green was to stick to the conventional reaping and grading methods that still worked for them, the crisis that expressed itself in the form of falling growers' prices from the early 1960s onwards eventually forced increasing numbers of settler farmers to try out the innovations. A few creative and ambitious farmers led the way by initiating alterations in the labour process that might enable them to save on wages and capture some of the profits in the tobacco business. In response to buyers' changing demands and strategic evasions on "quality" and prices, many growers began to experiment with various technologies that might simplify the "bottleneck" operations by reducing the number of stages and the amount of

physical handling involved in each. As management experts intensified pressures on growers to reduce the cost of labour, it became increasingly difficult for the latter to justify adherence to conventional methods of leaf handling and their corresponding work designs. For tobacco growers, staying in business meant capturing that elusive profit or being forced to surrender one's right to grow that crop. To that effect, the conventional wisdom - behind which lay the logic of capital - was that farmers should save on African labour. In approaching the actual developments in settler agriculture on that matter, it must be recognized that although settler farmers themselves subjected to the interests of capitalists outside agriculture, were immediately responsible for extracting relative surplus-value from the African workers, the initiative of technological change always remained with capital. Behind every move to change the labour process in settler agriculture lay capital's ideologues, already identified as the "experts".

To put the matter into the broader context of capitalist technological change, it will be useful to view the developments in Zimbabwean settler agriculture against the background of Muller's projection of the transformation of tobacco production in the United States in the 1970s. First, it must be emphasized that Muller's tendency to view those changes in evolutionist terms, contrasts sharply with the historical conception of the real subsumption process outlined in 7.1.2. Secondly, unlike the "radical" protest implied in Muller's pamphleteering approach,

what is important here is to grasp the class relationship involved in the technical innovations adopted in settler agriculture and the extent to which the socialist movement grasps it as such. Where Muller set out to admonish Third World tobacco growers to disengage from a world system that was set to their eventual disadvantage, this study assumes that a voluntarist exit from tobacco production and global capitalism was structurally precluded for both growers and African workers by the necessity to subsist under existing circumstances.

Muller began by noting the arrival of mechanical harvesters capable of picking off the ripened leaves from several rows of tobacco plants on North Carolinian farms in 1973. He interpreted that development as marking the end of tobacco production as hitherto known around the world. Remarking that the machines had shown the capacity to reduce reaping labour by 85% from 240 to 36 hours per acre, Muller contended that gone were the peak demand for high wages during the American harvesting season and the advantage hitherto enjoyed by Third World tobacco exporters. Then he predicted that direct planting of tobacco seeds, singly wrapped in foil would soon eliminate nursery and transplanting operations, while bulk-curing would, by rendering pre-curing hanging redundant, reduce curing time by 60% from 125 to 50 hours per barn.

For Muller, such technical development had already changed the fortunes of American small growers who could neither afford the expensive equipment nor withstand competition from the

increasingly larger growers. Add to that the buyers' hard bargaining in the world market, the cost advantages hitherto enjoyed by Third World growers, such as cheap labour, would soon disappear. Then more fundamental technological developments would follow inexorably. Homogeneous leaf curing, in which leaf would be reaped green, mashed into a soup, quickly fermented [cured] with microbe formulae, and fed straight into tobacco processing factories for the manufacture of cigarettes and other products, would be the most radical development. That would automatically eliminate such operations as reaping and grading, which had hitherto constituted the "labour-intensive" aspects of tobacco production. Then there would be no more need for the emerging capitalist growers to employ experienced hands to reap the leaf selectively, to handle the leaf like eggs, and to grade accurately with labourers tested for colour-blindness, because production-line technology would have reached the farm and neutralized all existing skills (Muller, 1978: 69-71).

Here, Muller's projection is only useful as a heuristic contrast against which the actual developments in world tobacco production may be historically understood. Even the Californian vegetable industries, in which large corporations have integrated farming and processing operations to a considerable degree, have continued to rely on low-status, cheap migrant labour at the lower levels (Thomas, 1985: 102). It must therefore be emphasized that the mere existence of a new technology does not necessarily mean that farmers or capitalists would automatically take

advantage of it. In the case of tobacco production, there have been further reasons for technological inertia, as an Ontario tobacco research officer commented:

It is difficult to point to another crop as valuable as tobacco which has adhered to the same extent to traditional manual methods of production and farm processing... Any change that might interfere with the all important but vaguely defined quality of the product has always been viewed apprehensively (L W Koch, RTJ March, 1964: 44).

Despite the intensive drive for productivity between 1960-1980, only the bulk-curer among all the developments in Muller's projections, actually reached Zimbabwean tobacco farms and few farmers found good reason to switch to it. Moreover, capitalist corporations did not rush to invest directly in tobacco growing and to replace the settler farmers. Instead, the drive for productivity proceeded at the pace of history, with extra-agrarian capitalists continuing to invest indirectly through settler farmers and attempting to control developments through the markets already investigated.

Instead of the gigantic reaping machines observed in America by Muller, five elementary reaping implements [dubbed "machines" in settler agriculture] and their corresponding work designs were presented to Zimbabwean growers throughout this period as alternatives to conventional reaping. Most of these were the products of individual attempts by the more innovative growers to increase their own earnings above the average market price, which was either falling steadily or held to a minimum by state regulation. Each reaping implement and its associated work design actually represented a modest technical change. All were limited

to improving the performance of hand reaping and subsequent handling of the leaf. The Barry, the Kurt and the Tilita Clip each enabled reapers to tie the leaf to a string or place it into the clip just as they picked it off the plant and to present it to the one or two waiters in the form in which it would be hung in the barn for curing. Each of these methods, accordingly, resulted in elimination of the green tiers and the extra handling that went with conventional reaping and separate green tying labour. The elimination of tiers, however, was merely a matter of combining tying and reaping in the same hands, which might save the grower some expenditure on labour in terms of numbers of African workers employed. However, with reapers performing the two operations simultaneously, some of the labour-time apparently gained by eliminating tiers would be taken up by "machine" reaping itself. In fact, some of the new reaping technologies operated at lower output levels than the conventional methods they were supposed to supersede, as Table 7.1 indicates.

Table 7.1 Comparative Output Potential in Two Reaping Technologies.

I. Traditional Reaping.

(Output per reaper in bundles per hour at 75% of standard 102 leaves per bundle or equivalent).

Position on plant	Average number of leaves per plant	0.5	1.0	1.5	2.0	2.5	3.0
Bottom	8	16	20	24	25	28	
Middle	8	16	21	27	29	31	
Top	11	22	28	32	34	34	

II. Reaping with Kurt Machine.

(Output per reaper per hour at 75% of standard 102 leaves per string).

Position on plant	Average number of leaves on plant	0.5	1.0	1.5	2.0	2.5	3.0
Bottom	9	11	13	13	14	15	
Middle	12	16	17	18	19	19	
Top	13	17	18	19	19	19	

(Agritex, 1982: 20-21).

Clearly, although the Kurt machine eliminates tiers, the reaping operation itself is considerably slowed down compared to conventional reaping. However, it must be emphasized that "output" in tobacco production is ultimately measured not only in terms of the physical amount of leaf reaped per unit time but also in terms of the state in which the leaf is judged to be in when presented to buyers. What that means is that a slower reaping method may not necessarily mean lower "output" per hour

when considered economically.

Growers who used the Scooter machine for reaping, a wheeled lever on which the leaf could be instantly tied onto a string as it was primed, emphasized the fact that it speeded up the reaping and tying operations. Since it also combined transport [from the reaper to the contour road] with reaping and tying, it represented an advance on the other devices. Scooter owners also claimed that since the device was operated individually, it accelerated reaping by motivating workers to compete for bonus payments. However, since output in all these operations was not reckoned merely in terms of the physical magnitude of the harvest, with proper handling being as important as speed, many growers considered Scooter reaping to be a risk on accuracy because it forced workers to handle the leaf less meticulously as they competed for bonus payments. Furthermore, the mechanical advantage gained in the Scooter's wheeling mechanism could become hazardous when the reaping had to be done in wet weather. Finally, the Canadian-type horse-and-boat unit allowed growers to replace waiters with horses, while tiers remained necessary as in conventional reaping (RTJ July, 1964: 43-52).

In all the reaping innovations introduced to Zimbabwean tobacco growers between 1960-1980, it remained necessary for African workers to be employed in directly picking the leaf by hand. The reaper still had to select the ripened leaf, pluck it off the plant, tie it onto a string or place it into a Canadian boat, and it remained necessary to load it into the curing barn

in the shape of a leaf, however tied and hung it was to be. Since individual growers remained able to select a reaping technology according to their experience or curiosity, the social-economic significance of the innovations remained largely obscure, just as the growers' profits remained elusive. The extent to which the pressures exerted on growers to innovate, and therefore the pace at which the real subordination of African workers to capital was proceeding, could be estimated against the comments of a Scooter reaper on his "choice" of method:

I do not claim that this is the best reaping method but it suits me. The one word of advice I would like to give (having been badly bitten recently) is this: if you have a good method by which you are satisfied, stick with it. In the long run, the old woman is better value than the glamorous blonde you saw in the pub the other day (A A W Baker, RTJ July, 1964: 51). (1)

As long as such developments as Muller noted in Carolina remained in the distant horizon, Zimbabwean growers remained able to "choose" between the elementary innovations and their economic gains remained insignificant. However, the very fact that such innovations had come to be understood in terms of profitability indicates that capital's struggle for relative surplus-value through the mobilization of constant capital against labour was the driving force behind it all. The implications of this for the current conception of socialist transformation will be discussed after examination of the innovations in grading, the other

(1) Mr Baker had suffered a financial loss the previous year which he attributed to reaping with one of the implements most acclaimed among settler farmers, the Kurt.

"bottleneck" operation.

Of all the operations in settler agriculture, grading the cured leaf to the satisfaction of the buyers provoked some of the most intense class hostilities between capitalists, settler farmers and African workers. No matter what amount of effort was expended in performing all the other tasks, if the grading did not impress the buyers, as was often the case, growers' prices would fall. Yet, as the crisis began in the early 1960s, it was grading that was the most disorganized operation, with growers usually reluctant to take chances with the unfamiliar:

Nearly every tobacco grower has a different method of grading his leaf, adapting his methods according to the experience of the labour, the type of the leaf, the shed layout and the weight of the leaf to be graded per day (RTJ July, 1961: 59).

To simplify matters, all the approaches to grading which preceded the intensification of the efforts of work-study officers shall be referred to here as "conventional grading". What was common to all such grading methods in terms of the subsequent drive for productivity, was that they came to be considered as "uneconomic" in the capitalist sense of not reducing the cost of labour. In concrete terms, they all involved repeated handling of the leaf, the risk of leaf damage, inefficient movements between different stages of the operation, and so on.

When the crises of overproduction and sanctions set in, the work-study experts identified those wasteful aspects of grading as the main causes of low tobacco prices. Since buyers still expected tobacco to be presented on the market in the form of

neatly graded, tied and baled leaf, the only way of reducing the cost of grading labour was through a reorganization of the grading operation itself. In other words, elimination of grading, as such, through homogeneous leaf curing for instance, remained out of reach as long as the tobacco export market was a leaf market. Technical innovations dealing with leaf "quality" had to be aimed at improving, not eliminating, grading. Whether the buyers would be interested in eliminating grading as such has to be considered in the light of earlier evidence that they were able to depress growers' prices on the auction floors by contesting the quality of the leaf.

In view of the overwhelming emphasis on the necessity of appropriate grading throughout the tobacco industry to date, it seems to be a simple matter demonstrating the real subordination of African workers through mobilization of capital into the grading operation. One could simply calculate reductions in the cost of labour or the growers' wage bill. Alternatively, one could work out reductions in the time taken to grade so many scales of tobacco under socially average conditions where individual growers had invested in new plant and equipment, or adopted a more rational work design with a new technology. To that end, one could examine the economic effects of specific attempts made by growers to simplify the grading operation itself: installing tilting tables, linear or revolving conveyor belt tables, bright fluorescent lights, etc., all calculated to increase efficiency. On further reflection, one might also become

interested in the more strategical approaches to the problem of satisfactory grading, such as attempts to forestall grading complications in all prior operations during the season, from land preparation through reaping, tying etc. to curing.

However, the actual historical experience of tobacco grading in Zimbabwe, both for growers and technical experts, would seem to suggest that the process of subordinating African workers to capital through mobilization of constant capital was more complicated than one could grasp through such calculations. Since homogeneous leaf curing, a sure way of eliminating grading labour altogether through mechanization and integration of all the operations, had been known for almost two decades, one wonders why capitalists did not immediately move into tobacco production with this most rational technology and replace such small producers as settler farmers with integrated agro-industrial firms. Instead of doing that and speeding up the passage of tobacco from field through factory to mass consumer, capitalists have remained outside agriculture, demanding, as buyers, their well graded leaf as usual.

As indicated earlier, the sorting of tobacco leaves into grades has always been disputed at the point of exchange between settler growers and capitalist buyers, and the latter's interest almost invariably prevailed. That advantage enabled the buyers to leave the business of reducing the cost of labour-power in settler agriculture to settler farmers. That way, buyers could get their commodity at low cost without directly investing in the

kind of technological change that is calculated to eliminate grading labour completely.

That by no means suggests that extra-agrarian capitalists ever neglected pursuing relative surplus-value through mobilization of constant capital against African farm labour. On the contrary, it suggests that in the drive for productivity after 1960, extra-agrarian capitalists' strategy was more subtle than the crude attempts of settler farmers to grab some of the profits in the tobacco trade through reductions in the cost of labour. Everything tobacco growers did to improve their grading operations, which they specifically linked to profitability, was directed towards reducing the value of African labour. To avoid elimination from "the industry", growers attempted to mobilize constant capital in search of that elusive profit. However, with the whole effort ultimately controlled by capital's "experts", growers could only contribute to the creation of relative surplus-value, which was to be accumulated by capitalists outside agriculture. To grasp how the real subsumption principle operated against African labour in Zimbabwe, the following two points must be borne in mind throughout. First, not every increase in constant capital or any switch to a new technology necessarily brings economic advantage to the particular investor/innovator, especially if that individual is one of the producers subjected to capital. Even Marx's innovative capitalist could only grab relative surplus-value that way, while other capitalists could not follow suit. Secondly, where the gains are likely to remain

minimal, capitalists may strategically abstain from direct investment in new technology and compel surrogate groups, such as settler farmers, to bear the burden of subjecting labour to the real subsumption process. Bearing such modifications in mind, one can proceed to historical examination of growers' attempts to pursue profits through changes in their grading techniques.

Discussion of developments in tobacco grading and their implications for the labour-capital relationship thus proceeds from isolated attempts to deal with specific problems identified as the "causes" of low prices through changes from one grading technology to another, towards the more comprehensively calculated strategies for relative surplus-value. One could begin by considering the case of a grower who has had a number of his bales rejected repeatedly by buyers because they contained "mixed colours". That grower might seek advice from the tobacco extension specialist in his area, who might then report that the problem arose from the fact that some of the graders are colour-blind. The expert might then recommend a "scientific" method of placing the more colour-sensitive workers on the job and avoid employing those found to have a low perception of the relevant colour variations in tobacco grading, particularly in such strategic positions as checking and blending the graded leaf.

The deployment of capital in the form of optical science against African tobacco graders began early in 1961 when the Rhodesian Tobacco Journal successfully investigated the

possibility of testing them for colour sightedness. When Rivron and Son Opticians were approached for their technical expertise, they introduced Japanese professor Shinohu Ishihara's Colour Blindness Test Book to tobacco technical experts. CONEX tobacco specialists in turn recommended it to growers as a "highly scientific", reliable and novel service to them. Colour blind graders and supervisors were swiftly identified as the growers' "price menace", as a potential cause of serious financial losses (RTJ November, 1961: 57). In practice, the Ishihara test enabled growers to stratify their grading teams into three levels of colour sightedness. The exceptionally colour sighted workers would be sent to the opticians for confirmation as suitable candidates for the positions of check grader and blender. Those with only average colour-sensitivity would be employed as graders, while the colour blind would be either dismissed or employed at lower levels of skill, as leaf openers for the graders for instance, and for lower wages (RTJ November, 1961: 57).

As indicated earlier, contesting tobacco leaf quality gave the buyers immense power over the labour process in settler agriculture without ever entering the tobacco fields or coming into contact with African workers. Grading accuracy was not a matter to be resolved through the application of positive science to the natural capabilities of African workers. Whether "scientific" determination of workers' colour sightedness as such could be translated into higher growers' prices and profits

remained a matter of faith. After recommending the "intriguing little Japanese book" available at "your local tobacco specialist", a grading expert admitted soberly that

...grading is more of an art than a science, and we all know too well that infuriating neighbour who sets about his tobacco in the most slipshod and illogical manner, yet still somehow manages to hit the jackpot (Roger Barclay-Smith, RTJ June, 1971: 10-11).

From all that, it is quite clear that the social-economic significance of the adoption of the Ishihara Testbook by the tobacco experts of colonial Rhodesia was never related to the accuracy of tobacco leaf grading as such. The book itself never became a significant item in growers' investment expenditure. Growers could always find access to the local specialist's copy. For this argument, what is important is that competition against that "infuriating neighbour" who realized an undeserved profit was behind the growers' search for answers to the buyers' strategically scrupulous buying and the evident fact that capital could be mobilized against workers in ways that are quite different from direct investment of the growers' means of production.

From the colour-blindness episode, one can see how a product of the "scientific-technical revolution", developed elsewhere and apparently unrelated to the class struggle between labour and capital, could be handily appropriated by labour-management experts and channeled through existing social institutions into the process of boosting labour productivity and capitalist accumulation. From the Ishihara tests, it was a simple step to

advise the tobacco grower to enhance the grading capabilities of his employees by adopting the appropriate equipment for successful grading: the right kind of grader's table, particularly the one recommended by the work-study experts, the appropriate lighting devices, recommended trolleys for transporting the leaf within the grading shed, and so on. Such piecemeal interventions prepared the ground for more substantial attempts to mobilize constant capital against labour and raise its productivity in settler agriculture, towards extra-agrarian capitalist accumulation.

As in reaping, the drive for productivity in settler agriculture inspired some of the more innovative settlers to adopt some substantial innovations in grading operations, all calculated towards reducing necessary labour-time or, from the perspective of the farmers, the cost of labour. From the basic cause-effect [diagnostic] approach to specific "problems", such as colour-blindness and mixed bales, growers learned to apply some more elaborate labour-reducing technologies to tobacco grading. Work-study officers guided the effort by publishing and recommending particular methods and implements which they claimed would increase daily grading output from anywhere between 25% to 50% (RTJ June 1963: 47). As with reaping, there was no clear tendency for growers to shift towards any particular technology as the most efficient one. Even when growers were increasingly becoming aware of the more efficient grading technologies - if indeed grading as such had any definite, non-contestable

objective - it remained possible for them to choose between several alternatives: conventional, grader-to-grader, grading full-out, conveyor belt and commercial.

Since most of the growers' attempts to improve grading were concentrated on controlling, motivating and organizing workers to co-operate more efficiently in the Taylorist tradition, they reveal little about the direct mobilization of constant capital against labour as an expression of the real subsumption principle. One type of grading innovation, however, involved substituting a mechanical device for organizational and disciplinary methods of reducing the cost of labour, namely the use of conveyor belts to pass on the leaf between leaf openers, graders and checkers. Describing this particular technology, which seemed so sophisticated in settler agriculture, Braverman remarked that it was

an exceedingly primitive piece of machinery, [which] answers perfectly to the needs of capital in the organization of work which may not be otherwise mechanized (Braverman, 1974: 195).

However, in tobacco grading, it represented the only substantial movement towards the real subordination of labour to capital. Still, for some growers, conveyor belt technology in tobacco grading represented no more than the appearance of technical innovation and a belief that the daily "output" was in fact increasing (RTJ, May, 1964: 33).

In one case, capitalist firms outside agriculture were tempted to move in with conveyor-belt technology in order to

displace farm labour or compete with African labour contractors. Launder and Bach, a commercial grading firm, made elaborate plans to take their prefabricated units, fully equipped with lighting and manned by experienced graders, around the farms and claimed that tobacco growers were enthusiastic about the proposal. Had commercial grading become the established way in which settler farmers semi-processed their tobacco, it would have totally transformed the relationship between labour and capital in this particular sphere because it involved the application of technological advantage into competition since the tobacco graders would have been charged lower fees than those of firms operating on their own premises and by African contractors (RTJ February, 1965: 55). For some reason which could not be pursued in the available records, Launder and Bach's plans never materialized and grading remained one of the most difficult operations on settler farms.

In some cases, the farmers themselves resorted to this technology and attempted to deploy it against both the infuriating neighbour and the costly labourer, which brought capital and labour directly into conflict at the point of production in the case of tobacco grading. For instance, beginning as early as 1955, Mr Maunsell of Bromley had his tobacco graded on a lateral conveyor belt by his own farm labour force. The change immediately increased his "output" by about one third above the level of conventional grading. Since the leaf came to the graders, each of whom was assigned to pick only one

grade from any particular barn, the mechanism minimized movement, handling and leaf damage. Maunsell took further satisfaction from his belief that "the African" became psychologically contented with the illusion that the belt was doing part of his work for him. Eventually, however, Maunsell had to confront the fact that 20% of the flow usually dropped off over the end, so that extra time was spent in retrieving and regrading it. He also had to solve the problem of workers who deliberately let their assigned grade pass in order to slow down the operation, a problem he put down to the "lazy" worker but which, as Chapter Five revealed, was symptomatic of the muted resistance of workers with no other way of expressing discontent with the intensification of labour.

Hence developed the revolving table as a direct attempt to subject African workers to further control and increased productivity through the deployment of capital in the form of means of production. With the revolving table, Maunsell found that the leaf went round each revolution without falling off into a devalued mass which needed further and more complicated handling. Furthermore, he felt that the new setting gave him an ubiquitous vantage point from which he could watch the whole operation. For the disgruntled workers, the revolving table, of course, meant less control over the labour process and hence greater exploitation. The assignment of a single grade to each worker was carried a few steps further. With each grader concentrating on one particular grade, the leaf was only handled by the opener who placed it on the table, the grader who picked

it therefrom and placed it together with others like it in the assigned place, and the checker who examined it. Since each grader only needed to master that grade assigned to him, the grower considered the job to have become much simpler and therefore expected the workers to perform more speedily and more accurately. As the workers lost their grading skills and a perception of the whole process, some of them having been reduced to mere leaf openers, the grower expected more from them, more in terms of his balance sheet, not merely in the volume of tobacco graded per day, as Maunsell candidly explained:

However, I am not a grower who seeks astronomical output figures. When I hear about such grading performances, I tend to be sceptical. Too often, in such cases, is a lot of yesterday's work done the following morning (RTJ November, 1965: 31).

Even with this relatively more elaborate technology available, the real subsumption of African workers under capital remained piecemeal and uneven as far as tobacco grading was concerned. There were none of the dramatic developments that Muller had predicted would soon follow from the discovery of homogeneous leaf curing. Yet there was no mistaking the intent of what had actually been accomplished within settler agriculture, enhancing the productivity of African labour in order for capitalists outside agriculture to accumulate wealth, so that some of it might be awarded to tobacco growers as "profit".

Evidently, direct attempts to reduce the cost of grading labour by cutting corners were not having much success. Realizing that, work-study officers and management experts began to

recommend a more comprehensive approach to grading which affected all the operations in tobacco production on settler farms. If the direct elimination of grading - such as would result from homogeneous leaf curing - seemed to remain on the distant horizons of technological development, one possible way of achieving the same result did not. According to the grading experts, although the production of a "perfect crop" - one that needed no grading - remained an ideal because there were so many factors growers were unable to control, an approximation of it was not inconceivable precisely because there were many factors growers could control. What they meant was that if all the tobacco growing operations - from planning through land preparation to post-curing storage and handling - were performed with grading in mind, the crop would probably be uniform enough to need a minimum of grading at the end. In other words, under the existing conditions in settler agriculture, the experts believed that little could be done to eliminate grading mechanically and that the way to capture the grower's elusive profit lay with intensification of labour throughout the cycle of tobacco production. Rational land selection could ensure even growth of all plants if they were treated uniformly throughout. Systematic reaping and strategical green tying as well as curing would all make an easy job of grading and neat presentation of the graded leaf would bring the profits to the growers. All this was, of course, premised on the assumption that the buyers were gentlemen who always paid according to each grower's performance.

As with reaping, growers' efforts to improve grading left the actual operation intact, to be performed manually by African hands who might become scarce, expensive or insubordinate and let the grower down when he was chasing the highest possible prices. Individual growers might separately innovate on the flow of tobacco leaf through the grading shed to create more space and tidy up their operations. They might shorten distances and reduce unnecessary movements by the graders. They might improve lighting in the shed to enhance the graders' colour perception and accuracy. They might find mechanical ways of speeding up or slowing down the operation according to their "economic" calculations of "output". They might find mechanical and other ways of increasing their surveillance and coercion of workers, or they might resort to persuasive motivation of workers to ensure that they exerted themselves well beyond necessary labour. Rough graders might still move leaf upwards through the skill hierarchy of fine graders, checkers and blenders. Workers might be instructed to grade their scales "full-out" at the risk of overlooking inaccuracies and "mixed bales" might remain a frequent occurrence. Graders might be organized as teams so that each member of the team watched the others' performance for fear of collective punishment or they might be treated as individuals and encouraged to compete for bonuses through speedy grading. The leaf might be taken to the graders by scale porters or driven along or circulated around conveyor belts. It all seemed to depend on individual grower's satisfaction and technological

change in settler agriculture was in fact slow and uneven, despite the apparent tendency towards capital intensity. There was nothing like the tendency for capitalist firms to follow suit if any of them seized technological initiative in pursuit of above average profits. Many growers continued to operate with the conventional methods long after work-study experts and leaders in technical change had shown them how to capture the elusive profit. For many of the growers, the profit indeed remained a "jackpot".

Unlike the Muller projections, where labour demand was supposed to fall with each technological breakthrough, the fate of African workers in settler agriculture seemed to depend entirely on the particular employer's inclination or his experience on the auction floors the previous season. Technologies could still be tested experimentally in actual production and frequently abandoned at the earliest signal of financial loss. There seemed to be little pressure for the other growers to follow suit on each and every development that might give an innovator some relative surplus-value. Yet the drive for productivity, precipitated by the crisis of overproduction in the early 1960s, championed by capital's management experts, and backed by capital's indirect investment, continued to exert pressures on tobacco growers and settler farmers in general to intensify the real subsumption of African labour to capital.

If the efforts of individual settler farmers did not show definite reductions in the value of labour-power as a result of

the mobilization of constant capital, it is only because the real subsumption process in settler agriculture was modified by the history of the penetrating of this sphere by capital. Capitalists, it has been argued from the beginning, invested indirectly in settler agriculture and continued to do so through settler farmers as their surrogates. As Braverman stated it, the variety of means aside, all technological innovations undertaken under capitalism operate on the basis of their one unifying principle: 'the elimination of the control functions of the worker...and their transfer to a device which is controlled...by management from outside the direct process' (Braverman, 1974: 212). Organized outside agriculture and entrusted to various technical experts, the mobilization of constant capital against African workers in settler agriculture remained indirect and uneven throughout the crisis that provoked the drive for productivity beginning in the early 1960s. The actual process has remained uneven and relatively insubstantial in terms of actual reductions in the amount of labour required to execute the difficult tasks in tobacco production, the "bottleneck" operations. However, there could be no mistaking the intentions of those who promoted the drive for productivity in settler agriculture from the 1960s through the 1970s, if only because their technical experts had to face the difficult task of educating the managers of African farm labour in the secrets of capitalism. In the capitalist ideology that informed these efforts, each technical development represented a step in universal progress. As Braverman noted a dozen years ago,

In each of these cases, the public unveiling of the new devices is accompanied by much self-congratulation and by philanthropic phrases about the lightening of the toil of the worker, the ease with which laborious tasks are accomplished, and so forth (Braverman, 1974: 205).

Whilst the management experts and fellow capitalist ideologues understood the principles underlying the mobilization of constant capital against labour, some "radical" critics of colonial development policies, as noted earlier in this chapter, have tended to regard the whole matter as one of extending the "benefits" of technological progress to workers as well as capitalists, or to the whole society, regardless of the relationships of different classes to capital. From the Marxist [socialist] perspective, the sole reason why capitalists invest in technical change is to ensure the production of relative surplus-value. Capital's experts and surrogates in settler agriculture were more than specific on that point. Subsection 7.2.3 examines attempts to generate relative surplus-value through the second strategy identified by Marx: the management of labour's consumption fund by or on behalf of capital.

7.2.3 Real Subsumption II: Managing Labour's Consumption.

As indicated in 7.1.2, the real subsumption process, capitalists' pursuit of relative surplus-value, may be accomplished more fundamentally through strategic management of the reproduction of labour-power in workers' private sphere of

consumption. The implications of this approach to relative surplus-value for the labour-capital relationship were introduced then. If the mobilization of constant capital against labour by individual capitalists in search of relative surplus-value presents socialists with the illusion of technological progress, or of the development of productive forces towards capitalism's terminal crisis, this more fundamental expression of real subsumption poses the paradox of labour's social "welfare". The next issue for the socialist movement in this chapter, therefore, is what to make of the attempts by settler farmers, guided by labour-management experts and backed by extra-agrarian capitalists, to raise the level of labour productivity though what appeared to be welfare services for African farm workers from the early 1960s to 1980. This subsection focuses on the two major intrusions by settler farmers into African workers' private sphere of consumption, namely, the promotion of productivity through improvements in workers accommodation and "supplementary feeding".

A review of settler farmers' and labour recruiters' involvement in worker's reproduction sphere prior to the 1960s crisis sets the background to these efforts. When the "labour problem" for settler agriculture was a matter of bringing African workers to the farms from neighbouring countries, the emphasis in recruiters' and employers' involvement in workers' consumption was placed on assisting the workers to reach the workplace and ensuring that their families back home would continue to subsist

while the men were away. Getting the workers to the farms involved transporting them back and forth at both ends of the contract period and feeding them on the way. In despatching workers to assigned destinations, recruiters often provided them with money and food for the journey, with which the workers often used to abscond to the more lucrative South African labour market. As for those workers who did arrive at the farms, their contracts provided for partial remission of earnings to the families back home. In all these arrangements, conflicts between workers, employers and labour recruiters were as frequent as indicated in Chapter Five.

At the farm, employers might provide the most elementary schooling and medical treatment, if only to secure the labouring services of African children and control any absences due to illness. Almost universally in settler agriculture, the farmers provided their African employees with food rations in lieu of wages in order to minimize time spent acquiring and/or preparing the food. Except in a few cases, workers had to build for themselves pole-and-mud huts on the sites provided for compound accommodation. As for beer-drinking, it was an indulgence which settler farmers regarded with hostility as something external to the working environment and the frequent cause of debilitating Monday hangovers or absences. If workers should want to indulge in beer-drinking, they had to brew it for themselves or buy it from their neighbours, and drink it at their own risk. That many of these restrictions would disappear once capitalists outside

agriculture were in a position to provide the same services was abundantly illustrated by later efforts to encourage, not just weekend but daily drinking throughout rural Zimbabwe.

Before the productivity drive commenced, settler farmers' involvement in labour's consumption was primarily aimed at extending overall working-time, expressing the formal subordination of labour to capital. Usually, farmers' intervention involved sheer coercion of farm workers in what was supposed to be their private sphere by the formal rules of capitalism. Once established, the coercive practices became the "traditional" conventions by which labour's consumption was managed in settler agriculture. Many of these conventions came into question with the application of "science" to every aspect of capitalists' class problem of securing labour productivity and the perpetual accumulation of wealth. For instance, the idea that "the African" worker had inherent genetic or dietetic "deficiencies" which worked against productivity and similar conjectures came in for some spirited "refutation" by the labour experts and social scientists of the early 1960s (Clyde Mitchell, RTJ February, 1962: 35).

At that time, farm labourers' "welfare" became a frequent subject of discussion by settler farmers, labour experts and capitalists who had direct economic interests in such schemes. Many of the farmers pleaded that but for the lack of finance, they would provide the most elaborate housing and educational services to their employees (RTJ August, 1962: 37; 1964, March:

35; May: 34). As the crisis in the tobacco trade intensified from 1964 onwards, paradoxically, 'a forward-looking trend in housing for labourers', with settler farmers coming to realize 'the value of a contented and permanent staff [by providing] modern housing' began to be reported in settler agriculture (RTJ November, 1964: 49). That settler farmers should suddenly embark upon programmes of "welfare expenditure" for African workers' housing at a time when their economic grief was intensifying may raise doubts about settler farmers' enthusiasm for these programmes. However, the important questions about the labour welfare efforts in settler agriculture pertain to their social origins in the class hostilities between labour and capital. Whether or not settler farmers enthusiastically sought ways and means of improving the living conditions of their employees is irrelevant for the present argument. What is clear from the available records is that labour-management experts and other capitalist institutions came out to promote such programmes and indicated clearly what these were about: capitalist accumulation through reductions in the value of labour-power.

With the launching of the work-study approaches to labour-management also came rational intervention in the management of labour's consumption, "rational" in the sense of calculating the benefits for capital in terms of profit making. The whole "tradition" of neglecting labour's "welfare" came under labour-management criticism as backward looking and unimaginative, epithets which implied that farmers who did not

think "labour welfare", were operating uneconomically and retarding "development". Whereas such large companies as ITC were taking "welfare" initiatives in pursuit of both absolute and relative surplus-value, systematically managing labour's consumption through the programmes encountered earlier in this study, settler farmers who supported these initiatives usually pleaded financial constraint. A constraint on any process that could reduce the cost of labour-power in fact poses a barrier to accumulation.

As with all other strategies for accumulation, the move to manage African farm workers' consumption was an initiative of extra-agrarian capitalists which the settler farmers themselves were subjected to as commodity producers. Once more, the ordinary farmers did not have a full view of the linkage between labour's "welfare" and the profits that kept eluding them. The farmers had to be informed that labour-welfare programmes such as "modern housing" and "supplementary feeding" were in their own interests. Elaborate efforts were made to get the farmers interested in these programmes (RTJ November, 1964: 49; April, 1966: 51-53). Accordingly, it was capitalist firms outside agriculture, supporting institutions such as the farmers' organizations [RTA, RNFU], and the colonial state that promptly responded to farmers' plea for financial assistance in carrying out these programmes, ostensibly for the benefit of workers, but quite elaborately on behalf of the whole capitalist class, against labour. The response was as protean as capital itself.

To make the housing programmes affordable to their surrogates in agriculture, some capitalist firms came to the "assistance" of settler farmers. To meet this "need" for cheap housing created by the demands of capitalist accumulation, leading suppliers of low-cost homes offered a variety of easy-to-erect and cheap-to-purchase structures, such as processed wood, sheet metal and asbestos, and pre-cast concrete kits which farmers could swiftly erect on a concrete base (RTJ November, 1964: 49-51). The economic advantages vaguely promised to settler farmers were calculated for them by the management experts. For instance, the "modern" housing materials were more durable and cheaper to obtain and erect than the poles and mud required for the traditional compound hut. Further savings could be made on man-days spent in constructing traditional huts. More savings could be made by restricting the use of farmers' means of production to commodity production proper (RTJ April, 1966: 51-53).

Clearly, settler farmers did not rush to seize these "advantages". By 1976, labour-management experts were still attempting to cajole settler farmers towards spending more of their financial resources on "modern" housing for African labour. They pointed out the fact that "too many farms" continued to rely on pole-and-mud huts for accommodating workers. Meanwhile, "many new companies and systems geared to take advantage of [the] obvious demand for the construction of better homes", such as Agvest and Sisk Construction Company [ASCCO], had been set up for

the purpose. Among the advantages listed in ASCCO's approach to "planned" labour force housing were "maximum management control" and "low-cost provision of services" (RTJ July, 1976: 26-27). Both of these are "advantages" to capital. They express the real subsumption principle. The construction companies and the labour-management experts were generally candid and clear about what the whole campaign to improve farm labour's housing was about. On the one hand, it was calculated to bring profits to construction companies, or at least to create a market for their commodities. On the other, it was explicitly aimed at intensifying management's control of African workers, both at work and in the private sphere of reproduction.

Approaching the whole matter ~~from~~ a reformist perspective, the one "radical" economist who investigated African farm workers' living conditions in the last decade of the colonial regime implied that the intervention was a misguided search by agricultural employers for "a solution" to what he seemed to mistake for an "objective" problem. Clarke therefore concentrated on appraisal of the changing "employers' housing policies", from the squalid compounds to the planned farm villages. In Clarke's view of the modernization of the compound, attention was focused upon housing "policies" as a matter of rational choice. He launched an ethical protest against the inhumane overcrowding of compound life and the continued perception of farm workers role in settler agriculture as that of "guest workers" which, in his view, prejudiced the rational planning of farm workers' villages.

Arguing that African workers in settler agriculture had become an increasingly permanent labour-force by the early 1970s, Clarke pleaded for the better planning, presumably socially neutral, of African farm labour's accommodation, the objective of which should be the creation of a good living environment for the workers (Clarke, 1977: 125-127).

For Clarke, as for the labour-management experts in settler agriculture, those farmers who adopted the policy of better housing for their labour force early were "progressive farmers" (1977: 124). He assumed that those farmers who did so later were attracted by tax legislation offering them concessionary deductions for undertaking "progressive" housing policies and by the loan facilities lobbied for by the RNFU (1977: 125). While settler farmers indeed tended to respond favourably to such inducements, it is worthwhile recalling earlier arguments about the capitalist character of state intervention and the credit system. Although Clarke was aware that capitalist companies were behind both the construction and feeding programmes, he never raised such questions as why the colonial state offered tax incentives and why credit money was made available for African farm workers' housing. In the "radical" economists' tradition, he simply assumed that the colonial state was doing it all for its supporters.

Without going into any detailed discussion of state intervention, it is contended here that the tax "concessions" in question were in fact the colonial state's way of equipping the

farmers with the resources capitalists would collectively wish to invest in a class strategy for reducing the cost of labour but individually tend to avoid. The tax "concessions" awarded for adopting cheap housing in settler agriculture thereby assume a very different meaning. The farmers might still view it as an incentive without which they would find no reason to spend their earnings on labour's "welfare". From the perspective of capital's class strategy for accumulation, however, tax concessions for carrying out housing programmes which augment the amount of relative surplus-value extracted from workers are better understood as capital's way of investing in such programmes where individual capitalists are too preoccupied with immediate advantages. Any loans advanced to settler farmers for the purpose of constructing suitable quarters for African farm labour were not a gift from outside agriculture but a fully calculated investment in the capitalist class strategy for effecting the real subsumption of labour under capital through management of workers' consumption. If capital's strategy was relatively more subtle and indirect on the matter of workers' shelter, the approach to feeding African workers was, simultaneously crude and revealing about the labour-capital hostilities in workers' private sphere of reproduction.

Of all the strategies for generating relative surplus-value through management of labour's reproductive consumption, "supplementary feeding" of African farm workers was the most revealing about the relations between capitalists, their labour

experts, settler farmers and their African employees. Previously, farmers had assumed the responsibility of supplying food rations to African employees instead of paying them the monetary equivalent as a way of ensuring that workmen spent the minimum of time on such domestic chores as food procuring and preparing. The emphasis then was on extending the absolute working day. With the crisis beginning in the early 1960s, the whole business of managing African workers' eating increasingly became capitalist in its conception. Beyond individual employers' attempts to maximize the working-day, new pressures developed which established "supplementary feeding" as one of the most promising way of increasing African workers' productivity, at least from the experts' perspective.

The crisis in the tobacco export trade had forced many growers to diversify into a number of hitherto neglected food crops. Meanwhile, UDI and sanctions had spread that crisis to those food crops produced on corporate plantations, such as sugar. Given the low demand for many of the "new" crops, some of which were being produced for no other reason than to keep farmers on the land during the tobacco slump, promoting African workers' consumption of "new" foods made from these crops seemed to be a highly economic proposition. As an indication of employers' overall response to the crisis, an "eat more sugar campaign", specifically targeting "the rural African" and projecting sugar as "an inexpensive and reliable form [sic] of energy, [that] helps to correct the shortcomings of the

traditional African diet", was launched and relentlessly pursued throughout the country. Free deliveries of sugar to every store in the country were inaugurated and retail prices lowered. Settler farmers were urged to "help Rhodesia and themselves by taking part in this campaign...by supplying more sugar to their employees as rations". In the typical language of modernization ideology, sugar was represented as a modern scientific corrective to alleged deficiencies in the "traditional African diet". The "development" process itself, it was claimed, could be measured by, among other indicators, the extent to which a country consumed sugar (RTJ August, 1966: 55-56).

Taking the initiative, certain farmers' organizations, such as the Grain Producers' and Oilseed Producers' Associations, formed Nutresco, a food-processing company which, it was argued, was "wholly owned by farmers", for the purpose of processing the food surplus and marketing the products thereof. That way, the whole business of pushing "supplementary feeding" in agriculture could be represented as settler farmers' own initiative. What had begun as purely promotional gimmicks for disposing of the food surplus created by forced diversification soon found its material expression in a strategy for enhancing the productivity of African workers through "supplementary feeding".

In introducing that concept and strategy, the experts typically resorted to the ideological practices associated with positivist science. For instance, a leading proponent of "supplementary feeding", himself a tobacco grower and later a

liberal-reformist politician, defined the problem primarily as one of universal "malnutrition", which ought to be avoidable in countries producing food surpluses. At first, the text read like a purely ethical indictment of the inexplicable recurrence of "malnutrition" in some most unlikely economic situations, such as that of industrialized Western Europe. To link protein feeding of African workers with labour productivity, a distinction was made between crude correlations between food intake, energy and labour-output, on the ~~one~~ hand, and 'the more subtle tie-up between health and ~~efficiency~~'. Accordingly, the expert announced a "breakthrough", namely, protein-rich drinks,

...one of which, proven to my satisfaction, is quite able to correct malnutrition and, by the same token, able to improve the efficiency of farm labour at relatively low cost (T H P Bashford, 1965: 25).

Hence, what had initially sounded like a purely ethical and philanthropic indictment of the scandal of "malnutrition" quickly emerged as a materialist statement of the hostilities between labour and capital in labour's private sphere of reproduction on the matter of food consumption. The concept of "malnutrition" was immediately translated into an expression of that relationship to mean that badly fed workers are "unproductive" in the specifically capitalist sense of producing surplus-value. Admonishing employers of African labour in general, Bashford invoked the Malthusian predicament:

Unless increased attention is devoted to the interrelated problems of malnutrition and industrial productivity, not only can there be no real economic and social progress, there will, in fact, even be retrogression of the sort envisaged by Malthus (Ibid).

To illustrate the correlation between workers' nutrition and industrial productivity in "European agriculture", Bashford noted that 219,826 African workers in that sector 'drew no less than 17.4 million pounds as wages in cash and kind', or 26.3% of the total gross-product thereof.

Asking 'whether the industry [i.e. farmers] got fair value for its money', Bashford reached the crux of the matter of labour's industrial consumption of food. From the perspective of capitalists and labour-management experts such as Bashford, African labour in settler agriculture was "under-employed", that is, the workers were producing below the economic level adequate for capitalist accumulation. In that specifically capitalist sense, the experts argued that African workers in settler agriculture were "unproductive". It was accordingly contended that one of the reasons for such "inefficiency" was that the workers, already rendered unfit by a "traditional diet" lacking in nutritional value, were further retarding "economic and social progress" [capitalist accumulation] by mismanaging their own wages and subjecting themselves to "malnutrition". However, in the protein-rich drinks that had "recently" been introduced to the country, Bashford had found a nutritional "breakthrough" which showed "dramatic improvements" in the health of his employees as well as their children, all of whom were placed on a weight-gaining diet and regularly weighed to measure the effects of the food "medicine". After dismissing "the congenital loafers", Bashford found that his cost of maintaining an

efficient labour force had been considerably reduced from the time when he relied on medical care to keep the workers healthy (RTJ November, 1965: 27). The alleged "breakthrough" was, in fact, no more than the appropriation by Nutresco and other food processing firms of an element of the real African traditional diet in Zimbabwe [a cereal drink so well-known among Africans that its designation as an innovation sounds absurd] as a cheap food commodity to be fed to African workers for purposes of boosting their productivity.

Before settler farmers in general could be persuaded of the correlation of nutrition and profit, a public relations campaign to demonstrate how that strategy had satisfied employers of African labour in extra-agrarian industries was conducted. The managers of tobacco processing, handling, warehousing and trading companies - the capitalist firms with which farmers were most acquainted - were interviewed on their experiences in managing workers' diet. In addition to the mahewu now sold under several brand names, it turned out that African workers in the selected firms were also being treated of their [productive] "malnutrition" with other cheap formulas, such as "proprietary protein-enriched soup" (Bruce Andrews, RTJ December, 1965: 41). Whilst all kinds of explanations for this practice were given - ensuring workers' contentment, reinforcing their morale, counteracting fatigue in an area of hard work, the essential capitalist claim coming out of that interview was that employers had detected 'a noticeable tendency to lassitude and indifference

[towards productivity] which was attributed to failure by employees to purchase correct foods for themselves' (RTJ December, 1965: 42). In short, the capitalist rationale behind "supplementary feeding" was the claim that if African workers were paid in money and left to manage the reproduction of their own labour-power, they would neglect their own diet and capitalist accumulation would be retarded as a result. The employers who were interviewed therefore corroborated the principle that managing labour's food consumption was "sound industrial practice". Employers, therefore, were advised to withhold that part of African workers' wages considered necessary for food consumption and restoration of their labour-power and to manage it in such a way as to promote productivity, in the specific sense of producing surplus-value of course.

As was usual with productivity strategies initiated by capitalists and their labour-management experts outside agriculture, settler farmers did not immediately grasp what was at issue. Many of them, it must be remembered, were themselves going through unusually tough economic times. With their limited perspectives on the capitalist labour process, individual farmers often hesitated to embark upon reforms which might increase their production costs. Whereas large extra-agrarian tobacco firms could afford "supplementary feeding" and other "welfare" adventures in labour management, individual settler farmers, already immersed in sundry financial liabilities, were more inclined towards sceptical dismissal of such initiatives as

unproved and risky luxuries.

Accordingly, it was necessary for the management experts to explain what the reforms were about without alerting the farmers to their own subordination to extra-agrarian capitalists. For example, in introducing his 5-point health management initiative for farm labour, D G Campbell attempted to explain the secrets of relative surplus-value to settler farmers. He tried to assure them that

...this plan is not motivated by a desire to inflict more cost [on]...to the farmer, but to try and get farmers to realize that the secret of increased production from their agricultural labourers lies not in giving higher rates of pay initially but they should be given better and evenly-spaced feeding, better clothing and hostels, more amenable working conditions (cf. Clarke, 1977: 113).

In 5 simple instructions - allow new workers a period of acclimatization on the farm, increase the volume and frequency of their water and salt intake, feed them daily with some animal protein, split the large afternoon meal into smaller ones interspersed with mahewu and compound biscuit breaks, and regularly administer vermifuge on them to rid the workers' bowels of parasitic worms which might divert the nutrition to themselves - Campbell made his strategy for relative surplus-value concrete so that farmers would participate in it without necessarily grasping its social-economic implications (Ibid.).

To the extent that farmers adopted such strategies in managing the reproduction of African farm labour, they did so specifically with a view to increasing their productivity, that is the extent to which they could be exploited. Commenting upon

that strategy, Clarke demonstrated the extent to which much of what is considered to be "radical" criticism of Zimbabwe's colonial legacy today entirely neglects to specify how capitalism as a system of social-economic relations of exploitation, operated to subordinate labour to capitalists. He treated Campbell's claims as a matter for technically objective verification and assumed that capitalists and their management experts were genuinely interested in "improving" workers' living conditions. In so doing, Clarke attempted to argue a factual refutation of the very assumptions - false of course and that is part of capital's class strategy - upon which the pursuit of relative surplus-value through management of labour's consumption were based. Campbell's, and Bashford's, contention that African farm workers were "relatively unproductive" was contested in terms of lack of "evidence" and Clarke casually claimed that it was 'surely without foundation' (Clarke, 1977: 111). Capitalists and their management experts, however, tend to be more interested in concealing or obscuring the basis of relative surplus-value than in substantiating it with "evidence". The "foundation" of the claim that workers in agriculture were "relatively unproductive" lay precisely in the fact that the productiveness of labour under capitalist domination is reckoned by the magnitude of surplus-value relative to necessary-labour, not by concrete determinations of "output".

Clarke went on to question the labour management experts' claim that African workers were "target workers" who would do

less work on being paid more money wages, adding that 'such a myth has long been discredited by development economists when it is said to apply to low-wage workers. He attempted technical refutation of such management claims as more money for poor workers will only be spent on non-essential commodities, such as alcoholic drinks (Clarke, 1977: 111-112). Clarke's aim was to demonstrate that Campbell's claims were objectively "inaccurate", that they were a pretext for avoiding wage and other improvements in farm workers' conditions. He insisted that higher wages for these workers would lead not to the consumption of luxuries but to increased expenditure on 'non-food' and non-essential items' such as health, education, shelter, clothing, etc., which in his view might themselves lead to "higher work output" (Clarke, 1977: 112). The fact that all these items, like food, do in fact constitute the consumption fund for labour's reproduction, that they are all part of necessary-labour consumption, was not even considered by Clarke.

Concluding his technical impugment of the ideological basis for the pursuit of relative surplus-value through capitalist management of labour's consumption, Clarke described the very assumptions that constitute it as "almost beyond belief", which indeed they are (Clarke, 1977: 113). He ended the subject by condemning Campbell's [capitalists'] 'excessive interest in profits as opposed to [workers'] health'. By the same logic, Clarke demonstrated that a large part of what passes as "radical" criticism of Zimbabwe's colonial legacy, conducted in terms of

ethical polemics and technical verification, usually stops short of specifying precisely what capitalists do to workers, and how they have done it in particular historical circumstances. Clearly, the health management approach to labour productivity was about increasing surplus-value relative to necessary-labour, about real subsumption of labour under capital, about exploiting labour, not about improving workers' conditions, health or otherwise. Focusing on management's ulterior concern for workers' welfare, Clarke found labour-management experts invariably unable to think rationally. From the Marxian perspective, their approach was as rational as it could be within their strategy for capitalist accumulation:

In that context, the campaign to boost African farm labour's productivity through "supplementary feeding" on those elements of pre-colonial diet since appropriated by capitalist firms as "innovations" in cheap health food continued right through to 1980. For example, in the late 1970s, labour management experts were still claiming that feeding farm workers on "Nutresco Mutakura" - an African pudding made of different varieties of beans, peanuts, and other such ingredients - 'prevents a decline in productivity'. Ideological inversion of elements of Africa's diverse pre-colonial diet into alien substances with "scientifically" determined properties calculated to boost value productivity continued with such claims as 'Labourers enjoy Mutakura and it is far more nutritious than a traditional sadza lunch' (RTT December, 1978: 21). The appropriation of mutakura and

other elements of Africa's diet by capitalists for their own purposes did not diminish African workers appetite for good food. However, beyond the apparently ridiculous distortion of the facts about the estrangement of African workers from their traditional diet moved the grim reality of the struggle between labour and capital over relative surplus-value.

More or less crudely, the spokesmen on capitalist management of labour explained what their interest in the management of labour's consumption of shelter, food, etc. was all about, namely increasing workers' productivity for purposes of "economic and social progress". Approaching the matter from the assumptions of positivist science and postulating a universal "objectivity" in a context of class struggle, a leading writer on "radical" reform into labour conditions in rural Zimbabwe attempted to contest capitalists' claims about labour's productiveness on the level of given "facts". His account of capitalist attempts to manage labour's consumption entirely missed the social-economic implications of those efforts. On the basis of Marx's extended explanation of relative surplus-value beyond interactions between constant and variable capital, this subsection investigated how the real subsumption of African farm labour under capital was advanced through attempts by employers to manage workers' consumption of two key elements in the reproduction of labour-power: shelter and food. As usual, the initiative originated in capitalist firms outside agriculture. From there, labour-management experts extended the strategy for relative

surplus-value to the settler farmers who were always searching for the elusive profit.

7.3 Conclusion.

This chapter began with a critique of conflicting interpretations of the implications of the penetration of capitalism into agriculture for the labour-capital relationship therein. Technical evasions of the labour-capital hostilities by conventional economists were criticized for systematically obscuring the social character of capitalism. However, it was argued that in the case of Zimbabwe's settler agriculture, the need to co-opt settler farmers as managers of African labour in the pursuit of relative surplus-value made it necessary for labour-management experts to be more specific about targeting African labour as the cost to dispense with.

Critical evaluation of the "radical" economists' accounts of the same developments focused on the fact that much of their contribution emphasized ethical protest at the expense of theoretical argument. Accordingly, "radical" accounts of the drive for efficiency in settler agriculture were criticized for obscuring the hostilities between African farm workers and capitalists in general. Ultimately, this implies that "radical" economists also tend to misrepresent the conception of socialism.

Accordingly, the basic Marxian approach to the production of relative surplus-value was invoked as the most plausible framework for investigating the post-1960 struggles between

African workers in Zimbabwe's settler agriculture and capitalists outside agriculture. Marx's double formulation of the real subsumption process, specified in terms of attempts to mobilize constant capital against African workers and capitalist interventions to manage those workers' private sphere of consumption, was defended against critics who interpreted it in economistic terms. An historical interpretation of the transition from formal toward real subsumption of labour under capital was offered.

Then began the historical analysis of struggles between African labour in settler agriculture and the capitalist class. Beginning with the work-study initiatives in tobacco production, the investigation and theoretical discussion of developments in settler agriculture led to examination of the more specific strategies for generating relative surplus-value. That involved historical illustration of some aspects of Zimbabwe's colonial legacy at independence which may be crucial in analyzing the present conjuncture of capitalism and the movement for socialist change. Historical investigation ends here with the claim that what Zimbabwe inherited from the colonial regime in 1980 - a legacy of capitalist crisis management through intensified exploitation of labour, presents a theoretical and practical puzzle that could not be adequately understood through current concerns with resource redistribution and social justice. Accordingly, Chapter Eight concludes this study with a critical discussion of the current conception of socialist change in

Zimbabwe against a background of conflicting interpretations of the present conjuncture and of the preceding account of the colonial heritage in settler agriculture.

CHAPTER EIGHT

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CONCLUSIONS ON THE CURRENT CONCEPTION OF SOCIALIST
TRANSFORMATION.

8.0 Reprise.

This study opened by rejecting certain accounts of post-colonial developments in Zimbabwe which allege that the country was deliberately derailed from its revolutionary path by a "petty bourgeois" leadership. It was argued that such accounts were not only ahistorical in their treatment of Zimbabwe's colonial legacy but also counter-productive insofar as their criticism of Zimbabwe's current efforts tended to put the socialists on the defensive. Already, Zimbabwe's socialist party has been compelled to respond to such criticism as follows:

We are not afraid of criticism from those who...will think that we have not achieved much...criticize, but do so constructively. Judge our progress but do so against a realistic measure (ZANU[PF], 1985: v).

Given that background, an effort was made to develop a critical discourse on the conception of socialist development currently prevailing in Zimbabwe without disregarding or dwelling upon the problems of policy execution. While all the theories of development reviewed in Chapter Two concerned themselves - within their own problematics - with the possibility of socialism, this study attempted to take a specifically Marxian approach to

Zimbabwe's post-World War II social-economic developments. It did so not only by emphasizing a programmatic commitment to socialist development but also by focusing on the class struggles between capitalists as the dominant class and settler farmers, as well as African labourers, as two of the variously dominated sections of a global working class.

To establish the specific ways in which the capitalist class came to dominate Zimbabwean society through colonialism and sought to forestall the development of socialism after independence, the development of settler agriculture was taken as a case study and attention focused on the production of flue-cured tobacco leaf for export in order to demonstrate how the capitalist class established its dominance. The social character of capitalism being seldom manifestly given in any case history, it soon became apparent that questioning the various social representations of settler agriculture would be more illuminating about the current conception of socialist transformation than a positivist approach informed by any of the established "development" theories.

Such awareness of the complexity of capitalist class domination greatly influenced the methodology of this study. In addition to analyzing the basic relations between labour and capital at the point of production, it was considered necessary to investigate various other ways in which capitalist relations were historically modified and the manner in which the class struggle developed in settler agriculture and beyond that sector.

In preparing for such a comprehensive investigation, Chapter Two adopted a critique of theories of development which treats them as part of the object to be analysed, as an aspect of social practice. Invoking Preston's critical approach to social theorization as the construction, criticism and ranking of ideologies, it was contended that technical criticism of development theories was subject to limitations which could be transcended through a social critique of theory. In other words, it was argued that in order to grasp the full implications of various development theories for socialist transformation of Zimbabwe's colonial legacy, it would be useful to treat them all as part of the social [development] process itself, as expressions of the class struggle. Since social theories are constituted from socially produced concepts, the same approach was adopted in outlining the basic conceptual framework of this study. Hence Chapter Three emphasized the social contestability of all the concepts that make up various social theories and indicated that the process of developing the concepts appropriate for this study would be continued throughout the historical investigation of developments in settler agriculture.

On that theoretical basis, investigation of the constitution of Zimbabwe's colonial legacy of capitalist domination and socialist struggle - from Chapter Four through Seven - was organized partly as historical enquiry into the development of relations of production and partly as a discourse about their social representation and complex reproduction. In inquiring into

each instance of the struggle between the capitalist class and its adversaries in settler agriculture, each argument was strategically organized into a debate between the various social-theoretical claims about the relations of production in question, about their being as well as their social representation. Accordingly, analyzing the historical constitution of those relations of production collectively referred to throughout this study as Zimbabwe's colonial legacy involved, as a simultaneous process, a continuous commentary on the conceptions of capitalist domination and socialist transformation involved in the class struggle. From that perspective, even the evidence upon which research drew took on a character very distinct from that of given "facts" which could be gathered in "the field", classified, tested against hypotheses and either confirmed or refuted in positivist fashion. The records of the constitution of capitalist ~~relations~~ of production within settler agriculture were treated as various texts expressing, more or less subtly, the confrontations between extra-agrarian capitalists, settler farmers, and African wage labourers.

Organized around the basic relations of capitalist production to which Marx referred as the formal and real subsumption of labour under capital, Chapters Four through Seven concentrated on demonstrating how the capitalist class went about establishing its dominance over settler farmers and African workers. Chapters Four and Five considered the ways and social

implications of bringing settler farmers and African farm labourers, respectively, into the roles they came to occupy in commodity production for capitalist accumulation. Focusing on the systematic settlement of Europeans on the land as commodity farmers, on how these acquired property in land, how they appropriated their instruments of production, how they first adopted certain "conventional" methods of production, and how they were integrated within the commodity markets linking settler agriculture to the entirety of the capitalist circulation system, Chapter Four investigated initial struggles between settler farmers and capitalists in the context of the formal subsumption process.

Whereas the capitalist ideologues promoting these developments tended to defend them as "progress" beyond some underdeveloped state of agriculture, and whereas some "radical" critics of colonialism came to focus their polemics on the privileges enjoyed by settler farmers to the exclusion of aspiring African peasants, these developments were interpreted here as an expression of the formal subordination of settler farmers to the capitalist class as commodity producers. The idea that these farmers were an "agrarian bourgeoisie" was contested and capitalists were properly identified outside agriculture carefully avoiding direct investment in that sector and contented to channel their investments indirectly through settler farmers as their risk surrogates. The implications of this argument become evident when one begins to consider how the opening up of

all the markets of commercial agriculture to the African population in the context of resettlement is likely to relate them to capitalists outside agriculture. The matter will be taken up again later.

Chapter Five focused on the process of bringing African workers into settler agriculture as wage labourers. It was contended that this was an expression of the formal subordination process in that it involved efforts to extend the absolute time spent by Africans working in settler agriculture beyond what it took to reproduce their own livelihood. The coercive character of the recruitment of African workers and the unpleasant conditions at the workplace, upon which "radical" politicalists usually focus, were taken as given. The major claim of colonial labour experts from the capitalist viewpoint, which was shared by some settler farmers as they became schooled in capitalist management ideology, that Africans were chronic work shirkers, was examined and located in this context of a struggle over absolute surplus-value. The capitalist claim that there had been a labour supply shortage in this early period, later contested by some "radical" economists as a fallacious justification of cheap labour policies, was likewise interpreted as an expression of the struggle over absolute labour-time.

Likewise, the elaborate legal controls of African farm workers provided for by such laws as the Masters and Servants Act, condemned by "radical" economists and historians as mere coercive instruments, were given their material expression within

the context of struggles over absolute surplus-value. The notion of "proletarianization" as an instant effect of legal separation from the land was criticized in favour of the more historical notion that the transformation of African peasants into a class of workers was a contested process involving measures calculated to diminish African peasants' economic options elsewhere. The major implication of this argument lies in its critique of various "radical" criticisms about the changes that ought to be made in labour's working conditions in the context of post-colonial change. In other words, what lies beyond abolition of the Masters and Servants Act for farm labour? The answer to that followed in Chapter Seven. Direct coercion for absolute surplus-value ceased to be capital's major strategy for capturing profits from settler agriculture as new ways of increasing labour productivity were introduced and more or less pursued by individual settler farmers.

Chapters Six and Seven examined the implications of the industrialization of settler agriculture after 1960 for the relationships between capitalists and, respectively, settler farmers and African workers. Against the claims of conventional economists and "radical" reformists, Marx's concept of the real subsumption of labour under capital was invoked in both Chapters. Chapter Six focused on the impact of a crisis in settler agriculture which began with the overproduction of tobacco in the early 1960s and deepened with the imposition of international trade sanctions from 1966 onwards. As the crisis developed,

pressures were mounted to compel settler farmers to "rationalize" their approach to farming so as to produce more efficiently. Developments represented in conventional economics and other "commonsense" accounts as spectacular "progress" in Rhodesian agriculture were examined in the context of relations between capitalists outside agriculture and settler farmers as commodity producers. It was contended that such representations emphasized technical matters while suppressing the underlying social-economic relations.

For the "radical" critics of colonial policies, these same developments were criticized insofar as they were preserved as white privileges from which Africans were excluded. Likewise, they were criticized to the extent that they were seen as the cause of deterioration in African workers' economic or working conditions, as in the case of what have been described as deproletarianization or disemployment. From the perspective of relations between capital and settler farmers, however, many of the European farmers' privileges took on a totally different social-economic aspect. Cast in the context of the production of relative surplus-value, privileged access to credit, factor and commodity markets, extension, technical and research services, etc. they began to reveal their character as expressions of the real subordination of settler farmers to capitalists established outside but linked with agriculture. They were shown to be the focus of class struggles between capitalists and settler farmers not only over marked-up factor prices, low producer prices and

accumulated debts but over settler farmers' very role in the labour process. The deskilling of settler farmers, their demotion from conception to task execution, became the basis upon which "worthwhile" farmers were selected to remain in agriculture while the others had to seek other pastures elsewhere, a sentiment often very casually expressed in the heights of the colonial establishment during the crisis associated with sanctions. The implications of simply opening up all that had been preserved as white privilege in settler agriculture to African farmers as they are resettled on the land, specifically for commodity production, whatever institutional forms the new farms might take at the local level, were evident in the very struggles between settler farmers and extra-agrarian capitalists, which used to be obscured by racial polarization.

Continuing with examination of the real subsumption process, Chapter Seven turned to the question of African farm workers' relationship with the capitalist class in the context of the crisis and the drive for productivity. The targeting of African farm labour as the cost farmers needed to get rid of if they were to prosper, the introduction of Taylorist approaches to labour management, and of the specific ways of increasing productivity in tobacco reaping and grading, were all initially approached from the perspective of capital, where they are represented as purely technical matters. Their interpretation by some "radical" economists as if they would be beneficial to all if only they were planned properly was criticized. From a historical

materialist perspective, these same developments were interpreted as a series of significant, if uneven and contested, advances towards real subsumption of farm labour under the capitalist mode of production. In other words, they were understood as the initial expressions of the labour-capital struggle over the production of relative surplus-value. The more or less effective attempts by settler farmers to increase the productivity of tobacco reapers and graders, which might appear as mere "technological progress", were understood from the Marxian perspective as an expression of the mobilization of capital against African labour, specifically identified in explanations to that effect by labour-management experts on several occasions, if only because settler farmers, as the direct supervisors of African labour, tended to miss the point. Likewise, the various labour "welfare" initiatives undertaken in settler agriculture in the last two decades of the colonial regime were traced to their outside sources and interpreted in terms of Marx's second formulation of the real subsumption of labour under capital through capitalist management of labour's consumption fund.

Systematic misrepresentation of the domination of labour by capital as "technical progress" makes perfect sense from the capitalist perspective as part of the process of obscuring the social origins of profit. However, the adoption of technical definitions of efficiency and productivity by "radical" reformists entails the obstruction of labour's efforts from the

left. If the socialist movement must increase the level of the social product, that objective must not be over-simplified and represented in terms of increasing "productivity". Productivity, as understood in the unsaid assumptions of capitalist calculations, refers to value-productivity. It refers to the exploitation of labour by capital in the ways elaborated throughout the foregoing chapters. It must be distinguished from productivity under the socialist mode of production, where the surplus product goes to the whole society rather than to the individual capitalist.

The history of the constitution of settler agriculture in Zimbabwe, therefore, was one of the subordination of labour under capital, of the exploitation of both the settler farmers who monopolized the land and all those privileges denied to Africans and, much more specifically, of the African workers themselves. To grasp the full implications of that history for the current conception of socialist transformation, it would be necessary to review the programmes designed to change the colonial course of development and to do so from all the perspectives involved in the class struggles in Zimbabwe. A recent discussion of Zimbabwe's wealth of development strategies remarks: 'It is unlikely that any newly independent country received as much advice as did Zimbabwe on how it should go about the task of economic development' (Gordon, 1984: 121). As prospects for independence approached in the 1970s, economists intensified efforts to define their agendas for a "radical" transformation of

post-colonial Zimbabwean society. However, before independence, there was not much of a chance of getting the the colonial regime to reform itself radically according to these strategies. It would be left to the ZANU government to select from the various "radical" development strategies offered. For their part, neo-colonialist interests spent the last few years of Rhodesian colonialism preparing for a solution that would leave things as intact as possible and forestall all fundamental change. Leaders of the farmers' organizations, anticipating the end of sanctions, embarked upon hectic preparations for intensification of the productivity drive under the more favourable market conditions that would follow from independence. These efforts involved calculated approaches to African leadership wherever contact could be made. And so it transpired that both the conventional drive for neo-colonialist decolonization and the strategies for "radical change" became poised to influence the conception of social-economic transformation in Zimbabwe after independence. Section 8.1 examines the rival preparations to influence the post-colonial development process.

8.1 Rival Preparations for Post-colonial Development.

As European countries disengaged from African colonies in the early 1960s - implementing behind them the strategy of neo-colonialism - the Rhodesian colonial minority aligned itself

with South Africa and Portugal in opposing the process. Whatever politicians in Europe had discovered against empire, Europeans in Southern Africa would not countenance. Faced with both African nationalism and European decolonization, the Rhodesian colonial state responded by repressing the former and defying the latter with a declaration of "independence". Against imperial censure and economic sanctions, Rhodesians claimed justification in fighting "communism", a theme which will be examined more closely later. Meanwhile Britain, sparing compulsion, continued to argue in favour of neo-colonial decolonization. As long as Rhodesians maintained "order", they were left to their own wisdom. Once the Portuguese empire began collapsing in the early 1970s, with liberation movements emerging victorious over groups preferred in Europe, which boosted the liberation movement in Zimbabwe, the urgency of a neo-colonial settlement increased. The Rhodesians would have to settle for just that.

As Zimbabwe's own liberation war intensified in the mid-1970s, the rival "parties" to it began to negotiate terms for decolonization - ceasefire, constitution, economic development - the antagonists pronounced their claims about what was or had gone wrong with the status quo and the solution thereto. In the long struggle between colonialism and its Zimbabwean subjects, interpretations of the colonial situation had changed slowly, towards greater complexity of situation and sophistication of argument. African nationalist demands for constitutional justice and economic reform had been transcended in the frustration of

repression by a militant movement conscious of the fact that class domination lay under the injustice. Once African nationalists began to challenge colonialism as capitalist exploitation, to address the problem of class emancipation and to align themselves with socialism, colonialism would have to respond by attempting to forestall revolutionary change.

Hence, concurrent with the transformation of the African liberation movement, colonialists became more concerned about the vulnerability of capitalism. As the liberation movement advanced towards 1980, each side strove to ensure that its own programme of post-colonial development prevailed. Subsection 8.1.1 examines the constitution of the neo-colonial development programme in the context of its introduction to settler agriculture. Subsection 8.1.2 examines the programme of action implied by some of the writers identified as the "radical" tendency. These two perspectives provide the background to a Marxist critique of the current conception of socialist transformation.

8.1.1 The Neo-colonial Preparations.

While Rhodesian claims about "fighting communism" were nothing but a pretext for repression, Western fears for the spread of "communism" [Soviet influence] abroad were real and quite different. From the latter perspective, African nationalism as such was not "communist", although some elements within it

could be identified as "radicalized" through association with the Eastern bloc and through the experience of colonial repression itself as a contributory factor. Instead of repressing the liberation movement as a whole, the West would prefer isolating the "radicalized" elements and grooming its own preferred "moderates" to administer the post-colonial state. Western [American] strategy abroad had shifted away from direct military confrontation with liberation movements towards subtle subversion, from direct protection of minority privilege towards comprehensive defence of capitalism and containment of the revolutionary process, as President Samora Machel explained (cf. Martin and Johnson, 1981: 236). The shift had its parallel in the emergence of "neo-modernization" theory and the problematic of order. From that perspective, Rhodesian repression of African nationalism as a whole had become a capitalist liability (Ibid.). Rhodesian leaders, however, only accepted this when the West confronted them with a demand for majority rule as a means of averting the threat of a radicalized African nationalist movement.

Once the American Secretary of State and the South African Prime Minister got the Rhodesian leader to pledge his adherence to the majority rule principle on September 19, 1976, hectic preparations for counter-revolutionary decolonization began earnestly, although the relentlessness of the liberation movement's advance tended to eclipse these. If the neo-colonialist programme was to prevail, European settlers had

to be persuaded to accept the inevitability of African government and the need for them to stay on in the country and contribute to post-colonial counter-revolution. The political effort spent on that effort ["internal settlement"] has been well recorded elsewhere (See Martin and Johnson). This subsection focuses exclusively on preparations for the preservation of settler agriculture as part of that programme.

In repressing the African nationalist movement, the colonial state had not only silenced the African voice but also systematically shielded the economic establishment from perceiving any good that might come from an African government. Back in 1963, the newly formed ZANU, destined to form the first post-colonial government, had undertaken not only to 'recognize and respect the rights and aspirations of the various minorities' and to encourage private enterprise but also to do many of the things which the leadership of farmers' organizations later feared for and wished to be guaranteed (Nyangoni and Nyandoro, 1979: 65, 69). A Land Bank for financing agricultural projects, research agencies for providing the expertise, incentives for farmers engaged in intensive agriculture, and efforts to increase the production of tobacco, maize, sugar, etc. were all promised in ZANU's first policy statement, which also specifically adopted socialism for the first time among the major liberation movements (Ibid: 64-71). Within 12 months, the party was banned and its leadership imprisoned indefinitely or exiled.

Then, as political delegates met to negotiate a settlement

at Geneva late in 1976, the ZANU leader simply reiterated the principle of land redistribution. The Rhodesian Tobacco Journal declared ominously: '...if he should ever come to power, Rhodesian tobacco will probably disappear from the markets of the world for ever' (December, 1976: 5). More cautiously, the RTA president predicted that land redistribution would 'negate decades of progress and economic development'. For his part, the RNFU president admonished that statements about land redistribution 'could only lead to a hardening of views', emphasizing that settler farmers ought to be regarded as a vital section of post-colonial society (Ibid.). Considering Rhodesian attitudes towards ZANU at the time, the RTA and RNFU comments were quite polite. More significantly, they implied the development programme they were out to sell to the African leadership and reflected the settler farmers' "vital" role in it.

Fears for the future of tobacco and settler agriculture under a ZANU government were not mere journalistic hyperbole but an expression of the farmers' anxiety to end what they had come to regard as an "extraneous" quarrel between British and Rhodesian politicians, so that they could "recapture", with the benefit of a newly-acquired ability to increase labour productivity, the world markets they considered to have been "stollen" by their competitors. Ironically, according to S. Kelly, the RTA chief executive, the RF politicians - who had plunged them into the sanctions quagmire - understood and appreciated tobacco, while "the politicians of the day" (African

leaders] were the unknown factor jeopardizing their chances for recovery (RTJ January, 1977: 6).

Thus began the tobacco industry's public appeal to the African liberation movement, in the typical modernization ideology of colonialism. Tobacco was represented as a "people industry". Tobacco, not the African workers and the growers who produced it, had played a "dominant role" in the country's development. It had 'provided incentives, capital and expertise', which was responsible for agricultural and infrastructural development. Tobacco had done for Rhodesia what gold and copper had done for South Africa and Zambia respectively, all assumed to be good. Given free access to world markets, it would increase employment by 50%, earn more foreign currency than any other export, spend more money in commerce and industry, and bring benefits to everyone. Tobacco research experts constituted a "vital requirement" for continued 'improvement in productivity, hence profitability'. The RTA would resume its drive for productivity, with all that it implied for relations between labour and capital [Chapters Six and Seven].

The marketing system - regardless of growers' miserable experience in it - was simply 'the most sophisticated in the world', with the best facilities, capacity to meet demand and, predictably, the best services to the international buyers. Everything about tobacco was somehow "vital" to the country. The industry's challenge was to improve the "well-being" of all people associated with it, all the way from the buyers in the

boardroom to the "boys" in the compound. If African politicians could only guarantee law and order, stability and security, as capitalism understands them vis-a-vis workers, growers would meet their challenge (RTJ January, 1977: 6-7). African nationalists had never denied the importance of all those things that seemed to have made white farmers "successful" and prosperous, such as "free technical advice" (Nkomo, 1984: 249). All they had done was demand equal access to all these for Africans and Europeans.

Likewise, from their response to African nationalist demands for land redistribution, it is evident that leaders of farmers' associations had remained unaware of what the liberation movement had always offered them. In its first policy statement, ZANU had emphasized that land would not be grabbed but that it would belong to the people, with the state only acting as their trustee. Abolition of colonial land tenure legislation would be followed by enactment of a "Land Distribution Law", and a "National Land Board" had been proposed to handle equitable distribution. Most significantly, speculative absentee landownership, which the colonial state had already struggled to abolish because it constrained "economic" land use, would be forbidden under a ZANU government (Nyangoni and Nyandoro, 1979: 66). As usual, whenever leaders of liberation movements repeated the same land claims in the late 1970s, leaders of farmers' organizations responded with a mixture of emotional outrage and defence of the rôle of settler agriculture in the country's economic "development".

Political sparring with African leaders aside, the leaders of farmers' organizations had to grapple with the problem of persuading settler farmers to accept a new role in the context of the impending change to majority rule. The usual approach of farmers' organizations and outside interests to settler farmers - distinguished speakers from the economic establishment, influential leaders from the farmers' organizations themselves, and demonstrations of "successful" examples from similar situations - was carefully followed. Opening a seminar on "the task of planning for political change", Rhodesian Promotion Council chairman C G Tracey reminded settler farmers that "we live in times of great change". Then he spelt out what their options were. They could stand by and watch, become involved, or 'take advantage of the ground swell of change to help influence these changes for the future, not for the good but for the best. This is exactly what...[the RNFU] is doing now' (RTJ June, 1977: 7). Referring to the RNFU's "Land Policy Objectives" in an independent Zimbabwe, to be presented to that seminar as a "new deal" for agriculture, Tracey persuaded the farmers to involve themselves in the political change and take up "the challenge" presented to them (Ibid.: 8).⁽¹⁾

Delivering the RNFU paper on its "Land Policy Objectives", councillor J S Perlman opened with pious statements about the

(1) The kind of role farmers were expected to get involved in became evident when several observers of the 1978 elections reported that the farmers had become the campaign workers and transport service for parties involved in the "internal settlement".

organization's desire to concern itself with the African people and with their opportunities. The leadership of settler agriculture, which had always demanded of the colonial state that Africans be excluded from the agricultural land market, had now adopted a pre-emptive approach to the matter of land redistribution in the post-colonial period. Instead of waiting for an incoming African government to proceed with its own land settlement schemes, the RNFU experts were determined to establish themselves as that government's major consultants on land policy ahead of the transition to majority rule.

The RNFU, explained Perlman, were concerned to ensure 'future stability in the private land category'. What he meant was that the leaders of settler farmers' mother organization sought to entrench 'those standards and safeguards' considered in colonial land settlement policy and practice to guarantee "economic" [i.e. capitalist] land use. He outlined them as follows:

- (a) adherence to "acceptable" husbandry standards;
- (b) control of land sub-division within sound and economically justifiable" parameters;
- (c) restriction of the number of residents on each unit according to the nature of its enterprise, and
- (d) protecting the condition and productiveness of the land

(RTJ June, 1977: 11).

As detailed in 4.2.1, except for the minor modifications in (c), the RNFU's "Land Policy Objectives", although conceding African

participation in land ownership and the setting aside of lands for state farms, etc., were nothing but a subtle restatement of the principles by which the colonial state systematically established capitalist control over the use of land by settler farmers in the post-1945 settlement schemes. As argued in 4.2.1, those principles, although stated in apparently neutral technical terms, constituted the first expression of the formal subsumption of settler farmers under capital. Through them, the RNFU sought, on behalf of capital, to ensure that post-colonial land settlement, although abandoning racial discrimination, would continue to guarantee capitalist control over the use of land. Having shocked the farmers by conceding land redistribution, state farms etc., Perlman swiftly embarked upon a defence of the RNFU's "land policy objectives" as 'pragmatic and constructive, expressing, he claimed, the essence of a reconciliation between the "developed and underdeveloped" [European and African] sections of Zimbabwean society (RTJ June, 1977: 9). Anticipating decolonization, the RNFU asserted its authority on defining what would be "acceptable, ...sound and economically" justifiable principles of land settlement under majority rule. It did so according to the logic of the continued reproduction of the domination of agriculture by extra-agrarian capitalists.

In another stage-managed event, described as "a sombre occasion", an effort was made 'to drive home some lessons that may stand the tobacco industry in good stead for a future that will undoubtedly feature some extra-ordinary change' (RTJ

July, 1974: 4). The RTA's 17th annual congress was dramatized by the appearance of Dr Ian Hume, leader of the Whitsun Foundation. The choice of the leader of what Rhodesians had regarded as "an ultra-liberal body" working for African majority rule and all that Rhodesians had fought against, was calculated to contrast with the growers' self-perception as the 'extra-conservative [group] in a conservative country' (Ibid). That way, growers would get the feeling that it was time to move leftward from the extreme right.

As expected, Hume got to the point fast: under majority rule, there would be African demands for more land and higher wages and growers ought to work out a strategy to avoid "the worst" deal - 'a massive and hysterical land grab by Africans...[which] would be disastrous for everyone'. Their "best deal" would be land allocation on a controlled basis. Then he delivered the core of the political message he had been invited to deliver to settler farmers:

In our [Rhodesians'] recent history, we have tried to build barriers to change. Now that change is upon us, we should not assume that all is lost. We should convert our institutions to build real barriers, not against change but against chaos. I believe if we move quickly enough and sensibly enough we can do just that (RTJ, 1977: 5).

Once more, settler farmers, lacking the subtlety of capitalist ideology, were to be dragged along in plans for a post-colonial drive for capitalist accumulation. If only all the institutions considered anathema by Rhodesian colonials - state farms, land resettlement schemes, communal and collectivist farms, etc. -

were not viewed by the future African government as a substitute for "white farming", then there were 'real economic benefits ahead'. So he urged farmers to advocate such changes in advance. Tobacco production would be guaranteed and reinforced by the advent of African growers' participation. Hume concluded by urging the growers to "adapt to survive", to swallow their prejudices about "socialist" sounding agricultural institutions. The reporter noted that the farmers "swallowed hard".(1)

In another manoeuvre carefully calculated to bring settler farmers into the new scheme of things, the RNFU produced an example of "successful" settler accommodation with African majority government. The conventional wisdom of colonial society was recycled: most African countries had 'erased their farming industries' as part of 'the mad rush to erase all traces of what they considered to be the colonial yoke'. Kenya, however, was then identified as one of the few that had 'successfully maintained and even advanced its agricultural position', in terms of preserving capitalism of course (RTJ March, 1977: 8). The RNFU vice-president Dennis Norman had led a party of RNFU leaders on a trip to Kenya where they had been enthusiastically welcomed.

Norman's party had returned from Kenya reporting on the promise of comfortable white adjustment to African government. In

(1) Described by the RTJ as a 'privately funded, non-profit development agency interested in the present and future development of Zimbabwe, Whitsun Foundation was the most ideally suited agency to prepare Rhodesians for neo-colonialist decolonization. It had, all along, opposed crude repression in favour of capitalist reformism.

Kenya, security of tenure had been guaranteed under British-funded settlement schemes based on non-racial freehold. Law and order had remained "all it should be" and European farmers were "doing very well" and adjusting. They were helping African farmers with their experience and serving on statutory bodies for every sphere of life. Earlier Africanization "mistakes" had been remedied by application of the [liberal] principle of "merit", which is quite compatible with capitalism.

Although trade unions had set minimum wage levels, all wages had remained lower than in Rhodesia. Strikes had been banned in Kenya and all labour disputes were handled by "industrial courts". In short, Rhodesian farmers could count on a future African government to guarantee such a "highly acceptable" labour policy as the one Norman and company had found in Kenya. To adapt easily, the Norman party advised settler farmers to view the change to majority rule, the liberation of Zimbabwe, as a matter of British Tories losing an election to the Labour Party. They should not surrender and flee the country (RTJ March 1977: 8-15). It was understood that there was always another day for a counter-revolution.⁽¹⁾ A random telephone survey of settler farmers around Zimbabwe then reported that 90% of the farmers had expressed their determination to stay on under an African

(1) Norman went on to become Zimbabwe's first Minister of Agriculture in the ZANU government. When he was dropped, some Western media complained that Zimbabwe's Prime Minister was out to "punish" the still privileged white electorate for defeating the independent candidates and voting for the remnants of Smith's Rhodesian Front.

government. The reasons given for such an optimistic outlook was not that settlers had come to accept African political claims or that they had decided to live under socialism. Instead, they ranged anywhere between inability to sell one's farm and conviction that decolonization would work in their perceived interest (RTJ March, 1977: 11-15).

At the RNFU seminar, more participants contributed their thoughts to the search for a post-independence counter-revolution. Gyles Dorward would reform agricultural finance. Correctly describing the credit system as "the essential lubricant" for maintaining the machinery of production and increasing output, he reiterated all the principles implying the domination of both settler farmers and labour in settler agriculture (RTJ June, 1977: 13. See also 6.2.3). All that Dorward wanted to reform was to ensure that all farmers got their credit under an African government and that the pursuit of productivity ought to remain the logic of agricultural financing. He therefore called for greater centralization of agricultural financing. As a tobacco grower, Dorward proposed nothing to ensure that growers were not exploited through the credit system itself. For his part, African Farmers' Union vice-president Gary Magadzire urged white farmers to assume responsibility for racial integration and meritocratic advancement of African farmers. He extolled "free enterprise" as 'the only system in which initiative, efficiency, ability and drive as well as dedication receive their maximum reward' (RTJ June, 1977: 16-17). And so proceeded inexorably the

Rhodesians' preparations for perpetuating the colonial legacy of capitalist exploitation in settler agriculture in the impending post-colonial period.

In their everyday practice, the "experts" continued to concern themselves with what in the capitalist doctrine of "economic development" were represented as socially-neutral matters: ensuring growth, sound investment, financial management and "pragmatic" or "non-ideological" state interventions, that is interventions which appear to have nothing to do with class hostilities but in fact promote capitalist accumulation. For the Rhodesians, particularly those directly engaged in preparations for a post-colonial counter-revolution, what had gone wrong with the status quo of colonial privilege and repression was its risky racial intolerance. The solution to their problem of an advancing African liberation movement was to undermine it with enlightened reform. Hence settler farmers would become tolerant and admit those Africans who would adhere to established and acceptable practices and initiate sound innovations. The technical aspects of "economic development" would be emphasized just as the subordination of both settler farmers and farm workers, of the whole Zimbabwean society to global capitalism, would be simultaneously pursued and ideologically ignored or obscured.

However, it is recalled from the argument in Chapter Two that behind the technical emphasis of conventional [capitalist] development theory and practice lies a specific set of values which entail a counter-revolutionary programme of Third World

development. It is also recalled that both that theory and its implicit programme have undergone a considerable subtle transformation since the advent of dependency theory and other "radical" tendencies associated with the problematic of "underdevelopment". The subtle manifestation of modernization [capitalist] ideology in conventional thinking throughout our examination of the development of settler agriculture and in the foregoing review of Rhodesian preparations for counter-revolutionary decolonization support the argument that modernization theory did not perish with the emergence of dependency and "radicals". Rather, it lived on in capitalist ideological practice, adapting according to the history of class struggle and becoming more subtle in its programme. Settler farmers' acceptance of the redistribution of land and other things in post-colonial Zimbabwe was part of capital's global strategy for countering revolution, one specifically conceived and intended to allow capitalism to reproduce itself under the challenge of a nationalist "radical" reformism. It had nothing to do with acceptance of socialism. The conventional conception of "economic development" or "change" is fundamentally incompatible with socialist transformation. On the contrary, it entails the protean process of capitalist reproduction. Subsection 8.2.1 will comment upon the permeation of actual post-colonial social-economic planning by modernization ideology. But first, what preparations were made by those broadly identified here as the "radicals" towards the advent of a post-colonial society that

would be fundamentally different from Zimbabwe's colonial legacy of capitalist exploitation?

8.1.2 The Theoretical Poverty of the "Radical" School.

Whereas capitalists could rely on colonial institutions - farmers' organizations, development agencies, the colonial state, etc. - to co-ordinate their programme of counter-revolutionary decolonization, pre-independence conditions were not conducive to open mobilization of anti-colonial forces into a coherent effort of planning socialist transformation. The liberation movement itself, of course, did mobilize the rural population against colonial institutions and specifically identify colonialism as an aspect of capitalist class domination. However, this subsection refers not to the liberation movement's own perception of the colonial situation and its struggle against it but to the efforts of various academic and other writers opposed to colonialism who identified themselves with the cause of "radical change". Encountered earlier and theoretically linked to the "underdevelopment" problematic, "radical" economists and historians began articulating their critique of colonial economy and their strategy for "radical transformation" [in the projected Zimbabwean post-colonial period] in the late 1960s and continued to do so throughout the 1970s. However, only after independence in 1980 did the "radicals" find the opportunity to influence the

development process directly.

The claims of "radical" economists and historians on each of the matters considered in analyzing the development of settler agriculture in the foregoing chapters - land settlement and ownership, access to factors of production, industrialization of agriculture, the labour process, etc. - have already been critically examined in the relevant subsections. To establish how the "radical" approach has influenced the current conception of socialist transformation and the implications thereof, this subsection focuses on the thoughts of a group of academics/writers whose contributions to Zimbabwe's theoretical background for social-economic planning were "published soon after independence under the title "Zimbabwe's Inheritance"(Stoneman, 1981).

In introducing that volume, Stoneman traced the genealogy of Zimbabwean theoretical "radicalism" to the economic histories and political economies of Arrighi, Palmer, Clarke and van Onselen (Stoneman, 1981: 5). It was with reference to some of those writers' work on "development and underdevelopment", particularly to Clarke's applications of that perspective to labour and settler agriculture, that objections were raised concerning their treatment of issues about land, factor and commodity markets, technological change, the labour process, etc. As contended in the course of the foregoing chapters, the theoretical poverty of our "radical" pioneers began at the outset, when they uncritically and ahistorically mistook settler farmers for a

so-called "agrarian [or rural] bourgeoisie". From the debate against the positions of Clarke and other "radical" economists and historians who undertook studies of or referring to settler agriculture, the argument was developed that much of the so-called "radical" political economy of Zimbabwe has simply been a matter of glossing over what precisely is supposed to be "radical" in the underdevelopment approach and its implicit prescriptions for social change. The poverty of "radical" scholarship has been compounded by the absence of any theoretical effort. The scholars in question have almost totally confined their efforts to empiricist research and assumed that their theoretical and programmatic differences with the conventional wisdom they criticized were self-evident.

Beyond affirming the existence of development and underdevelopment, of centres and peripheries, apart from pointing out the obvious injustice of colonial discrimination against Africans, other than emphasizing that their approach focused on the basic truths in the "economic base" rather than dwelling upon the racial myths of "settler ideology", little, if any, of the theoretical substance of Latin American dependency theory, in which radical nationalist disengagement was originally conceived, found its way into the Zimbabwean literature. The contributors to "Zimbabwe's Inheritance" and other "radicals" have tended to take the dependency framework uncritically and to embellish their analyses within it with references to classes and exploitation. Preoccupied with empirical verification of underdevelopment,

colonial injustice, etc. "radical" historians and economists have largely avoided their theoretical project [dependency theory] and concentrated upon anticolonial polemics, with the remedies assumed to be obvious. From that context, "radical" political economy, emerged as an alternative "policy science" whose major purpose was to trade claims about social justice with conventional economics and capitalist ideology, within capitalism.

From a Marxian perspective, much of the so-called "radical" contribution to political economy in the Zimbabwean literature remains too vague to be considered as an adequate guide to socialist practice. For instance, the typical approach to the subject of "radical change", well represented in "Zimbabwe's Inheritance", involves presentation of a series of disconnected chapters on some narrowly demarcated empirical subjects, dribbling on the evidence, and concluding with calls for "radical change" which specify neither the manner of transforming society nor the agency of its execution.

This comes through in Stoneman's very introductory essay. It is not clear what he intended to convey by the proposition that exploitation could be attacked "at the very source by beginning to build a society based on co-operative rather than competitive principles" (Stoneman, 1981: 6-7). In that very same introduction, Stoneman had already contradicted the idea that capitalism had thrived upon competition and even argued that competition had been prevented from developing in Zimbabwe. He argued,

'Capitalism thus took root not as a consequence of free market policies, but thanks to a carefully planned prevention of competition and an interventionist rather than laissez-faire government' (Stoneman, 1981: 3). Competition, of course, was not only the rule in the history of settler agriculture, and of tobacco production in particular. That it was regulated to discriminate against Africans and for all the historical reasons cited earlier does not mean that it was "prevented". The "radical" focus on injustice allows spurious generalizations to go unquestioned. Already cited in earlier discussion of farmers' credit, another instance of "radical" imprecision came from Stoneman's contributor on fiscal policy. From the dubious claim that the fiscal system inherited in Zimbabwe in 1980 'was constructed along the lines dictated by the economic aims of the Rhodesian Front', Harris concluded his contribution to "Zimbabwe's Inheritance" with yet another vacuous call for the system to be "radically altered".

Beyond such obvious dead-ends, "radical" economists and historians could still reconstruct some of their more specific proposals for "radical change" into the framework in which they theoretically originated. In their overview of the Zimbabwean economy, for instance, Stoneman and Davies examined the matter of foreign ownership both before and after independence. Pointing out that 'Zimbabwe's inheritance is an economy largely the property of non-Zimbabweans or settlers who had previously dedicated themselves to defending Rhodesia', they sought to

establish how the country could 'own its own economy' (Stoneman, 1981: 123). Aware of the obstacles to what they described as 'a revolutionary policy of expropriation', they concluded by restating what seemed to be their problem: that Zimbabwe's colonial legacy was one of "total economic dependence", with political independence offering only "token compensations to the mass of the people" (Ibid: 124).

In tackling that problem "radically", Stoneman and Davies considered alternative strategies for restoring ownership of the economy to the masses. They found a promising possibility in Riddell's suggestions for agricultural reform: transformation of settler farms within 3 to 10 years into worker-managed co-operatives, compensation or employment of settler farmers in managerial or advisory capacities, with expropriation tactically held up as the ultimate sanction. The logic was 'to maintain output and investment' during the transition (Stoneman, 1981: 124). In that particular suggestion, one is reminded of both the theoretical origins of the proposition of a "radical" disengagement from the world capitalist system, namely dependency theory, and the tensions within the conception of "radical change". On the one hand, an intention is expressed to restore ownership to the workers so they can manage their own labour. On the other, managerial and technical expertise are sought from settler farmers in order to maintain and increase output. One is also reminded of how conventional capitalist ideology misrepresents "output" and expertise by treating them as purely

technical matters instead of relationally. By avoiding theory, the "radicals" are bound to reproduce such misrepresentations. In the process, a strategy of "radical change" is proposed which simultaneously promises to abolish private property and implies increased exploitation of labour.

When treating such matters as restoring ownership to workers, radical economists usually take legal ownership itself to be the crucial issue and seldom examine the relations of production it entails. By focusing exclusively upon legal ownership of the land, for example, Stoneman and Davies, as well as Riddell, assumed that changing property rules within agriculture would automatically translate into fundamental change. Chapter Four established that farmers' legal ownership of the land and other means of production does not necessarily preclude their subordination to capital insofar as such property was tied to commodity production. The tendency to gloss over relations of production becomes inevitable once the "radical" school erroneously identifies settler farmers as the "capitalists" in agriculture, whose private property is thereby targeted for redistribution.

Further oversimplifications may be cited in the "radical" perspective. For instance, in suggesting that settler farmers be given the option of managing or advising the workers' co-operatives on matters technical, Riddell and company assumed that such service would be socially neutral. Historical examination of the scientific-technical revolution in settler

agriculture revealed its class character, how capitalist ideology misrepresents all the institutions involved in its appropriation by capital as socially progressive, and how the "radical" critique of that process replicates the distortions. Historically, it may also be recalled that settler farmers, despite all the efforts made by capital's managerial and technical experts, were not automatically endowed with technical and managerial skills, as conventional and "radical" economists tended to assume. From a historical perspective, all the things which the "radicals" now wanted to be tactically preserved were part of the capitalist drive to subsume all labours in settler agriculture under capital. A change in legal ownership of the farms would not necessarily transform the relations between the workers in co-operatives and the tobacco buyers on the auction floors for instance. Such changes may be historically interesting for one reason or another, but they do not necessarily involve changes in relations of production.

The "radicals'" legalistic view of capitalist domination, together with its mechanistic implications for social change, recurs in Stoneman's chapter on Zimbabwe's agricultural inheritance. Claiming that '...agriculture has been more thoroughly analysed than any other sector of the Rhodesian society, in studies that are readily accessible', Stoneman moved on to his suggestions for a "radical" reformation of agriculture with minimal theoretical effort (1981: 127). The studies he was referring to were the same empiricist critiques of

racist land ownership and market privileges whose claims in political economy were dismissed throughout the historical analysis of settler agriculture. The usually uncritical claim that white farmers were blessed with a state that promoted them in land settlement, labour and capital markets, while African peasants' attempts to compete in all these were suppressed was simply reiterated. Development ensued from destruction of peasant agriculture and European farmers became 'a highly successful rural bourgeoisie' because they were given "cheap credit", guaranteed low land prices, provided with extension services, allowed exclusive access to markets, etc. (Stoneman, 1981: 127-128). On the other hand, enterprising African peasants were "proletarianized" into impoverished subsistence farmers (Ibid.). The old nationalist theme of getting a piece of the pie was simply reiterated and embellished with ritual references to class relations, in short, rhetorically "radicalized".

Once white "development" and black "underdevelopment" were declared, Stoneman duly asserted the existence of a potential for a development process involving the majority of Zimbabwe's population. The repeal of sanctions, plus Zimbabwe's "natural advantages", he reasoned, presented great opportunities for tobacco and sugar. Since land and capital were still plentiful, the only major constraint would be marketing and that would end with independence. The next step was therefore defining the "radical" option for development, one involving the majority. Criticized earlier, Stoneman's solution consisted in

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"substituting labour for capital" (Stoneman, 1981: 148). In place of the Lancaster House constitution, which would operate to 'preserve the pre-eminence of capital indefinitely',

A far more radical policy is needed if the fruits of independence and the prospects outlined above are not to go to a small privileged group of blacks and their foreign collaborators, but to the people as a whole (Stoneman, 1981: 148).

In another last-minute call for "radical change", one of the Stoneman contributors made token reference to relations of production by simply stating, 'For production relations to change radically in [Zimbabwean] industry, there must be a sufficiently strong labour movement' (Wieler, in Stoneman, 1981: 172). He never specified what a "strong labour movement" meant or how it would go about changing its relations with capital.

In the "radical" analysis of Zimbabwe's colonial legacy and the character of that legacy, what it is and what has to be changed in it and how, are issues which have been generally taken for granted. From that perspective, political economy remained on the level of reiterating the standard claims of dependency theories of development and most of it was simply nationalist polemics against colonialism. Capitalism was confronted as a system of foreign or minority ownership and control. What was to be opposed was perpetuation of that pattern by a class alliance of local "bourgeoisies" (e.g. settler farmers as an "agrarian bourgeoisie"), African "comprador" elites, and foreign capitalists. In the standard dependency formulation of the development problem, capitalism would be overthrown in the

periphery by breaking its weak local links and denying the "economic surplus" to the metropolitan bourgeoisie. However, among the economists and historians addressing "radical change" in Zimbabwe, even this basic formulation of the process of disengaging the periphery from the world capitalist system remained elusive. "Radical changes" were formulated almost in a theoretical vacuum. By substituting labour for capital, by changing the constitution, by redistributing land to the "landless peasants", by opening up all the markets to the majority etc., the government would bring the "great opportunity" of developing the underdeveloped. Brenner, Palma and Preston have all emphasized that such "radical" approaches to political economy are nothing but mirror images or mechanical inversions of orthodox economics (Preston, 1985:).

As such, it can be argued that the "radicals" programme for social-economic change only proposes opposing, not transcending capitalism. It does not involve efforts to transform the colonial legacy into socialist development. The "radicals" themselves are well aware of the constraints to which their proposed solutions are subject, hence the tactical manoeuvres to retain investment and skills. Lionel Cliffe, Stoneman's contributor on "Zimbabwe's Political Inheritance", revealed what the whole "radical" effort was about. It was about opposing neo-colonialism (Stoneman, 1981: 23). From the "radical" writings referred to throughout this study, one also gets the impression that the opposition to neo-colonialism was conducted according to the agenda and logic

of the neo-colonialist programme, with the "radicals" reacting to capital's actions rather than initiating their own programme.

With neo-colonialist forces having prepared themselves in the late 1970s to forestall "radical change" by initiating some of the redistributions once considered "radical" under the colonial regime, neo-colonialist and "radical" reformists could be reconciled with or without reference to socialist transformation. "Radical" reform could be represented as socialist transformation in a neo-colonialist situation. As Preston remarks, there has already been a shift within the "underdevelopment/dependency" theoretical tendency, on which much of the "radical" literature on Zimbabwe has been premised, 'from a political radicalization of common themes to a renunciation of its own perspective as being ultimately bourgeois, in theoretical character, and liable therefore to "re-absorption"' (Preston, 1985: 23). Introducing the basic conceptual framework, Chapter Three referred to capitalist ideological attempts to turn around and live with such Marxian concepts as "revolution". Throughout Chapters Four to Seven, conceptual conflicts were encountered in which the positions of capitalists and "radicals" tended to converge, and to diverge from that of Marxism. To establish the impact of the rival preparations by capitalists and "radicals" on Zimbabwe's current conception of social-economic change, Section 8.2 examined texts on post-colonial social-economic planning. The study closes with consideration of the implications of a specifically Marxist analysis of Zimbabwe's colonial legacy for

the current conception of socialist transformation.

8.2 Zimbabwe Tackles Her Colonial Legacy.

Given the foregoing background of rival agendas for post-colonial development and the preceding investigation of how the bourgeoisie established and dominated settler agriculture in Zimbabwe, attention now shifts to the major issue raised in this study. To what extent does Zimbabwe's transitional development plan coherently address the matter of socialist transformation? It has been contended that technical and institutional matters have received more attention than the social-economic analysis of both the colonial legacy and the efforts to transform it into socialist development. Given the circumstances within which Zimbabwe became independent and began planning for socialist development, this is not surprising. This study was conceived as a contribution to the theoretical refinement of the current discourse on planned development through critical analysis of relevant texts. It sought to do so by specifying the implications for future development of the prevailing conception of socialist transformation.

The preceding chapters built up an argument which specifies the material implications of social-economic developments in settler agriculture under colonialism. To proceed with the task, a few comments on Zimbabwe's post-colonial history would be

helpful. On the political front, the struggle over decolonization was decided through universal suffrage. ZANU's electoral victory in 1980 virtually liquidated the internal parties on which the counter-revolutionary movement had counted to carry out its programme. Britain had to proceed with decolonization and risk the possibility of fundamental change. For Zimbabweans, the election result offered the promise of self-determination and autonomous development. However, there still remained several historical conditions within which the new government had to work, if only because it was necessary to consolidate its power and take time to plan its development programme under peaceful conditions. The liberation war had left much to settle. Three armies and their respective political parties and constituencies remained polarized and their integration constituted an immediate security imperative. Thousands of refugees, damaged utilities, and enhanced aspirations of all sorts demanded immediate attention. Last but not least, South Africa had to be denied the pretext for intervention. Viewed from that perspective, Zimbabwe's post-colonial record has been unimpeachable.

Taking all such constraints as given [or as well recorded elsewhere], attention now shifts to Zimbabwe's current conception of socialism as if that alone were the problem. First, Zimbabwe's development strategy is examined in the context of what is considered here to be the contested terrain of development planning. The next and final task is to specify the implications of the current approach to development from the Marxian

perspective developed throughout the earlier chapters.

8.2.1 The Contested Terrain of Planned Development.

To understand how Zimbabweans went about planning for a long-term development trend towards socialism, it is necessary to grasp the immediate post-independence social/conceptual inputs into the adopted strategy. As section 8.1 argued, elaborate plans had been made for post-colonial development on both sides of the contest between counter-revolutionaries and those who considered themselves as the "radicals". With the "internal" parties eliminated from political contention, the counter-revolutionary forces had to operate within the framework politically dominated by the socialist movement. However, just as the new government moved pragmatically to calm the anxieties of the neo-colonialist side, so did the latter revive its efforts pragmatically. As "radical" economists set out to influence government policy, so did the conventional experts, already strategically placed in the economy, seek to advance their own agenda.

In settler agriculture, the more reassuring the government sounded, the more the did farmers and capital's various agents move to revive the colonial drive for productivity under the changed market conditions, such as guaranteed food prices and reopened tobacco outlets. Moving quickly to change their names, the ZTA [RTA] and the CFU [RNFU] resumed their public relations

effort to convince the African politicians that 'tobacco is crucial to Zimbabwe's economy' (ZTT October, 1984: 15). The usual exhortation of tobacco growers to get more proficient in managing "irresponsible" African workers proceeded apace in this different context (ZTT October, 1984: 17). The struggle over absolute surplus-value reached a new level. The old enumeration of "K-factors" was now more subtly approached from the position of maintaining harmonious industrial relations. The idiom of African workers' alleged propensity for 'lateness, absenteeism, drunkenness and theft' found a new expression in a rapport between the new administration and employers who linked higher output to increased wage demands (ZTT November, 1984: 13).

Concurrently, the "new" counter-revolutionary approach to labour management, commenced in the earlier drive for productivity, continued to be urged upon settler farmers by the experts, particularly as the employers now had to live with a socialist government. Accordingly, "Pips" Peech 'encouraged the farmers to respect each labourer's rights as a human being', to promote their "good name" by endeavouring to 'induce worker contentment, to create 'a' healthy environment conducive to production', to give the workers 'the stimulus of participation [as] a good platform for building loyalty and motivation', etc. (ZTT October, 1982: 21). The historically established methods of motivating worker co-operation under colonialism - 'extra earnings such as incentive bonuses, winter contracts and rewards for long service, etc'. - were now considered as a quid pro quo

for strict adherence to the minimum wage regulations introduced by the new government, all according to the capitalist logic of increasing "productivity", which the experts understood in terms of value productivity of course (Ibid.). Through their very attempts to increase capitalists' profits and intensify labour's exploitation, management experts extended their ideological appeal to the "radicals" in a different context. Accordingly, they understood that urging settler farmers to respect African workers' humanity, to adhere strictly to minimum wage regulations, and to increase "productivity" could and often sounded like attempts by former colonial forces to come to terms with "the new order" of socialist transformation. In short, the capitalist drive to intensify exploitation of African workers in settler agriculture continued to be refined with increasing subtlety in the post-colonial period.

On the "radical" side, a much less subtle complacency tended to prevail. With the advent of a socialist government, the "radical" economist emerged as a new kind of expert whose policy science was more outspoken on ethical matters. The "radical" became the policy planner and the advisor. The Riddell Commission emerged as a prime example. Appointed to enquire into "incomes, prices and conditions of service", the Riddell Commission produced a blueprint for "radical" reform which, while emphasizing the importance of distributing wealth and income and reducing inequalities, was more significant for its ideological convergence with capitalist ideology and the

counter-revolutionary development programme hastily prepared by the neo-colonialists in the twilight of the colonial regime. A perceptive reviewer remarked later,

The policies outlined in the Riddell report bring together many of the worst aspects of the agricultural policies of Kenya (dependence on large-scale maize farming), Nigeria (settlement on irrigation schemes), Tanzania (villagization) and South Africa (betterment schemes) (Williams, 1982: 119).

Williams also noted how the Riddell report advocated income redistribution, not reorganization of social relations of production (1982: 115). Recalling Chapter Two, technical criticism of development theories soon becomes superfluous and senseless. As Williams correctly noted, the problem for Riddell, and that goes for the "radical" school in general, was not to change social relations of production but 'rather how to maintain the social institutions which have proved able, in the past, to sustain a high rate of growth of industrial and agricultural output, while untying them from their moorings in a policy of racial exclusion, cheap labour, etc.' (Williams, 1982: 114). In the "radical" school's problematic, even such specifically capitalist strategies for securing relative surplus-value as providing workers with low-cost housing are assumed to "benefit the poor" (Ibid: 117). In short, by focusing on the inequalities between the developed and the underdeveloped, Europeans and Africans, rich and poor etc., the "radical" experts left the substance of capitalist domination of Zimbabwean society virtually untouched and, like Clarke and others before them, went

on to recommend reforms assumed to result in amelioration of the poor's burden within capitalism.

Within that context of conventional and radical reformism, Zimbabwe's discourse on socialist transformation developed and encompassed the implicit tensions and convergences between these approaches to development. When the basic strategy was formalized into a development plan, there remained an ambiguity as to whether the "transition" in the title referred to a movement from war to peace, from capitalism to socialism, or both. About the aim of the planners, however, there was no mistaking that 'the fundamental and ultimate goal and aspiration of the people of Zimbabwe [was] the establishment and development of a democratic, egalitarian and socialist society' (TNDP: 20). Accordingly, critics who claim that Zimbabwe's "petty bourgeois" leadership used socialist rhetoric to mobilize peasants and workers in a nationalist bid to replace the colonial settlers miss the point that the government actually set itself the criterion of socialist transformation as the test for its success and that the leadership did not need to do so to get mass support.

Given that commitment on the part of the leadership, constructive criticism must be focused on Zimbabwe's development effort as a pursuit of socialism. The critical question cannot be whether capitalist or socialist development was intended because that was already settled in the political struggle. Rather, critics must ask how the planners interpreted their colonial legacy as capitalism and how they intended to go about

transforming it into socialism. In examining that process, it is important to recognize historical limitations to the analysis of the prevailing situation and the expression of the socialist endeavour. Marx explained the limitations this way:

Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. And just as they seem engaged in revolutionizing themselves and things, in creating something that has never yet existed, precisely in such periods of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from them names, battle cries and costumes in order to present the new scene of history in this time-honoured disguise and this borrowed language (Marx, 1972: 121).

Thus, when Zimbabweans commenced planning socialist transformation, both the legacy of capitalist domination and the experience of the liberation struggle came into play. The nationalist battle cry of an oppressed majority inevitably permeated into the very planning of socialist transformation, so that the planners announced their aim as, 'to advance the broad interests [of] the main classes and social groups of our people' (TNDP: 19). At first sight, advancing the interests of the "main classes" would seem to refer to serving both capitalists and workers for these are the main classes of capitalist society. The point intended but obscured in that collapsing of class antagonisms only becomes clearer when one looks deeper into the history of Zimbabwe's liberation struggle.

Before proceeding to that task, it is pertinent to comment briefly upon the TNDP's attempt to interpret Zimbabwe's colonial

legacy in class terms. The ambiguity originates in the earlier nationalist preoccupation with abolition of racial discrimination. With the colonial regime dissolved, the conception of classes as non-antagonistic groups within the same liberation movement attempting to achieve common goals seemed quite consistent with the liberal nationalist idea of "non-racism". As an historically transmitted perception, the non-antagonistic conception of classes could be transcended through the experience of continued class struggle. Already, that misconception of class relations is partial because the planners did recognize that society was divided into classes and that the goal was a socialist dissolution of classes. The fact that classes were conceived of as non-antagonistic, however, is crucial for grasping Zimbabwe's current conception of socialism, the implications of which will be considered more specifically in 8.2.2.

It was not, of course, intended that the interests of capitalists be advanced in Zimbabwe's development strategy. What was intended can be established from the following attempt to elaborate on the historical basis of Zimbabwe's development strategy. According to Ushewokunze, given the historical character of the liberation movement, two main conceptions of "economic and social justice" emerged within the movement. The socialists' concept was expressed in the distributive principle of 'to each according to his need', while the one to which aspirants of social mobility adhered was based on the principle

of private acquisition of wealth. Because the liberation movement itself was a composite bloc fighting colonialism, an attempt was made to reconcile the concepts in a "three-pronged" development strategy which: (a) encouraged increased production, (b) distributed wealth according to need through minimum wage legislation and land resettlement schemes for African peasants, with extension services, credit and all the facilities previously reserved for settler farmers, and (c) supported emerging African businessmen (ZANU, 1985: vii-viii). Clearly then, Zimbabwe's approach to post-colonial development was still burdened with the history of the struggle against colonial racism even in the development plan and ZANU's party records. Although it is recognized in the discourse that what constitutes "economic and social justice" is not the same for everyone, there remain some fundamental exegetical issues about socialist transformation which have to be clarified if Zimbabwe's development effort is not to regress into the reproduction of capitalist domination. Subsection 8.2.2 elaborates.

In the official development planning culminating in the TNDP, this basic tension in Zimbabwe's unique development strategy was given formal expression in the phrase "growth-with-equity". The specifics included such matters as removal of those features of the inherited system that resulted in the exploitation of workers and consumers, enforcement of suitable wage levels and working conditions, promotion of workers' bargaining power through participation in management,

building of "new socio-economic institutions", introduction of socialist property relations, through state participation in ownership of important industries for instance, etc. (JNDP: 20-21). In agriculture, reforms were focused on such established nationalist demands as justice in land distribution, together with the extension to African farmers of all those things previously unfairly monopolized by settler farmers: credit, extension, marketing, price incentives and access to inputs. Meanwhile, the ideology of capitalist accumulation, in its usual technical guise, permeated the conception of those very reforms calculated to set a trend towards socialist transformation. Redistribution of income and resources, for instance, was routinely linked to demands for 'both land and labour productivity' (JNDP: 64-69). That the meaning of "productivity" is contested between capitalists and workers within capitalism, and that it varies between capitalism and socialism was not accounted for. The implications of that technical approach for Zimbabwe's current conception of socialist transformation, hinted at throughout the study, will be specified in 8.2.2.

First, however, it is worthwhile considering the logic behind Zimbabwe's development strategy implied in "growth-with-equity". As noted earlier, there has been a tendency to emphasize tactic and technique and to defer the long-term objectives (Kinsey, 1982). In the plan itself, as in the conception of "socialist" disengagement in dependency theory, combining 'rapid and sustained economic growth' with social

distribution is understood as a process whereby the "economic surplus" resulting from increased output in the capitalist sector is "tapped" in order to pay for the expansion of social services. Viewed as a purely tactical exercise, Zimbabwe's approach to development looks impressive, an 'innovative and carefully reasoned...blend of economic growth and social distribution' (Bratton, 1981: 474). From that perspective, all that Zimbabweans need think about is how to balance the tensions in "creative interaction" (Gordon, 1984: 142). From a Marxist perspective, however, the point is not just how to maintain a development approach and interpret it. As Marx's last Thesis on Feuerbach states it: 'The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it' (Marx, 1972: 13).

Approached from the Marxist perspective, Zimbabwe's innovative approach to development raises fundamental questions. For instance, would capitalists allow the "tapping" of the surplus produced in their sector to be diverted to the expansion of social services instead of accumulating profits as capital, and if so why? Stated otherwise, do capitalists have an interest in the expansion of such services? Such questions bid us to transcend tactical considerations about the present constraints on equitable development and address the issue of adequate understanding of the colonial inheritance of capitalist exploitation and how to overcome it through socialist transformation. Historical materialist analysis of Zimbabwe's

current conception of socialist development - of "growth-with-equity" - challenges us to examine its internal coherence, to grasp the processes of capitalist exploitation as well as those of socialist transformation, to grasp what is at stake in the class struggle in post-colonial development as in colonial history. The preceding examination of struggles between capitalists, settler farmers and African workers provides a historical background for a coherent interpretation of the class struggle as Zimbabwe pursues the long-term goal of socialist transformation. It does so by specifying the various ways in which capitalists established their class power over Zimbabwe and draws upon the record of colonialism itself in doing so. Attention must now be focused upon the brief record of post-colonial development efforts.

From that perspective, Zimbabwe's current conception of socialist transformation has been criticized for glossing over some important material issues. For instance, in an early appraisal of Zimbabwe's land settlement schemes, which duly recognized the tactical urgency of the situation, Kinsey was critical of the unidimensional emphasis on 'technical aspects rather than...social and economic issues', and on 'the unswerving belief that the old political rallying cry of land to the people expresses the central development issue in an independent Zimbabwe' (Kinsey, 1982: 110). Kinsey, in other words, was critical of the objectification of a human problem into one of redistributing a thing called land. Likewise, he was bidding

post-colonial Zimbabwe to keep historical perspective and avoid getting stuck in the past while the future burns. If the struggle for independence had been focused upon the settler minority that monopolized everything, post-colonial Zimbabwe had to adjust to a more subtle struggle against global capitalism, the terms of which might have little to do with the previous problem of racial inequality.

Anticipating the major contention of this study, Kinsey pointed out that much of the content and mode of implementation of the existing development programmes seem inconsistent with government's longer-term goals (Ibid.). Having correctly pointed out the shortcomings of the settlement schemes, Kinsey did not proceed to specification of their social implications. He simply warned that implementing the plans as a tactical exercise could make the future hostage to the present, i.e. what was initially regarded as tactical might become established as policy (Kinsey, 1982: 93). In this study, an attempt was made to provide a series of windows through which Zimbabweans could view the social implications of a tactical approach that emphasizes technique and glosses over social relations of production and the terms of the class struggle. Throughout the foregoing chapters, the practice of objectifying social relations of production as things, the treatment of capital's class interests as universal problems, among other things, were explained as part of the process through which capitalists dominated society. In this chapter, evidence has been cited to show how the class struggle

permeates the very business of determining what socialist development involves. Past conceptions of colonial domination conflict with attempts to grasp the present conjuncture of class forces. Aspects of the capitalist agenda for post-colonial development - promoting labour productivity, extending agricultural services to the resettled African peasants, etc. - continue to creep into Zimbabwe's conception of socialist transformation as if they were not the very substance of class exploitation.

After studying the actual schemes for resettling displaced or overcrowded Africans on the land as peasants, members of co-operative societies, etc., one of Zimbabwe's leading historians has recently recorded several instances whereby everything offered by the government as assistance was questioned or even resisted by none other than the intended beneficiaries. In many cases, Ranger encountered peasants resisting controlled [or systematic] land settlement schemes, contesting the capitalist "productivity" [improved farming] criteria of resettlement selection in favour of 'the social purposes of resettlement', that is selection according to the need criterion (Ranger, 1985: 313). Such occurrences not only demonstrate the fact that the conception of socialist transformation continues to be questioned within the the liberation movement itself but also point to the continuing influence of the "development" common sense or modernization [capitalist] ideology.

In other indications of the contestability of development

planning, Ranger also encountered what appeared to be the anomaly of resettled African farmers resisting the government's very attempts to extend to them all that had been denied to them by colonial agricultural officials, all that had supposedly brought prosperity to settler farmers - fertilizers, seeds, implements, extension services, cheap credit, etc. - unless all these were provided in ways that did not subordinate them to outside control (Ranger, 1985: 294-314). Although Ranger puts such matters down to what he calls "peasant-consciousness", imputing a tendency towards "conservatism", the matter can be understood more clearly as a case of producers resisting capitalist exploitation. Similar allegations of "conservatism", after all, have frequently been directed by the experts in settler agriculture against those "inefficient" farmers who did not respond positively to demands from outside that they modernize their operations towards greater productivity. One wonders whether the peasants had become aware of the social-economic implications of depending upon inputs from outside agriculture for their autonomy. Similar questions arise from evidence that some scepticism or hostility was expressed by the new settlers towards the socialist initiatives of commune formation and collective ownership. It has been suggested that the peasants were unaware of the advantages inherent in such unfamiliar property relations, or the "new socio-economic institutions". One wonders if the peasants were not perhaps able to calculate the cost of being so organized by others under a system of commodity production. Ranger did find that when

peasants were offered all these options on a voluntary basis, that is without evidence of compulsion, they not only accepted what was being offered but actually demanded more. These questions cannot be resolved here but the examination of how capitalists dominated both European farmers and African labourers in settler agriculture has clearly illuminated some of the apparent riddles evident in Zimbabwe's current conception of socialist transformation. When African farmers resist the "advantages", it is no longer just a matter of "conservatism".

In this subsection, it has been contended that Zimbabwe's effort in planning and implementing a development strategy intended to start a trend towards socialist development was undertaken on the contested terrain of ideological class struggle. The first indication cited to support that argument was the continued drive for productivity in settler agriculture. Critical examination of the "radical" input in development planning confirmed the view that the "radicals'" development agenda originated with dependency theorists, whose programme for socialist transformation [disengagement from the world capitalist system] rests on a mirror reversal of orthodox economics, within the same capitalist ideological framework.

Marx's explanation of the cultural traditions which might influence revolutionaries attempting both to change the world and to make sense of their efforts in a historically transmitted context helped put Zimbabwe's development approach into historical perspective. A historical, as opposed to a polemical

interpretation of the ambiguities in Zimbabwe's approach to socialist transformation was thereby pursued. A review of the TNDP and other texts expressing Zimbabwe's current approach to development revealed that, beginning with their class analysis, the planners of social change in Zimbabwe tended towards technical analysis of matters of political economy. That reinforced the argument that, being themselves part of the colonial legacy from which they wanted to escape, "radical" scholars and experts remained partially submerged under the historical legacy of capitalist ideology. That argument is supported by the frequent usage of technical notions of efficiency, productivity, etc., by the uncritical reproduction of capitalist ideology within the discourse on socialist transformation. Ranger's encounters with peasants resisting the modernizations proposed in Zimbabwe's development plan raised questions about the social implications of such efforts in a society still dominated by capitalism. The position of African peasants consciously resisting attempts to resettle them on the land under conditions of subordination was compared to that of settler farmers in the context of systematic settlement between 1945-60. Throughout this chapter, the social-economic implications of Zimbabwe's current conception of socialist transformation have not been pursued and specified. That is the task of the next and final subsection.

8.2.2 Marx and Zimbabwe's Conception of Socialist Transformation.

In Chapters Four through Seven, commentary on Zimbabwe's current conception of socialist transformation was confined to an historical exposition of the relations of production that developed between capitalists outside agriculture and both settler farmers and African farm labourers as producers of commodities under the capitalist system. In the process, particular emphasis was placed upon distinctions between conventional, radical and Marxist interpretations of significant developments in settler agriculture. Based on Marx's concepts of the formal and real subsumption of labour under capital, an argument was developed which culminated in the claim that, by 1980, when Zimbabwe's socialist movement acquired the political power to pursue its development programme, a global capitalist class was still in the process of subjecting settler farmers and African workers to its rule as different sections of a global working class. At that point, the trend was towards the deeper penetration of the capitalist mode of production in settler agriculture, a process involving the relentless pursuit of relative surplus-value, the real subjection of all labour to the logic of capitalist accumulation as abstract labour. It was noted, however, that different social analysts interpreted these developments differently, according to their problematics and programmes. In capitalist ideology, it was noted, the drive for productivity was represented as a technical matter of increasing "efficiency", which raised the issue of whether or not Zimbabwe's approach to socialist development is coherent in promoting both

productivity and social equality.

So far in this chapter, it has been noted that Zimbabwe emerged from the decolonization process with a legacy of political economy in which various social forces contested each other's approach to post-colonial development not only academically but in practice as well. Because the business of planning social change began on that contested terrain, it was contended, the very conception of socialism that emerged in development planning and the accompanying scholarly practice has been imprinted with the historical character of an inconclusive class struggle. Zimbabwe did not emerge from an overthrow of the bourgeoisie by a working class ready to form a "dictatorship of the proletariat" and to develop the productive forces beyond the level accomplished by the bourgeoisie under colonialism. Socialist planning, accordingly, began as part of a continuing class struggle between capitalists and various groupings of the global working class. Consequently, the very process of conceiving - let alone executing - socialist transformation has not proceeded according to the strict tenets of socialist practice, such as would be expected under a "dictatorship of the proletariat" for instance.

The world is currently witnessing a trend towards rethinking socialism in none other than the established socialist republics. As various Eastern European countries began to integrate their central planning with market economies and China abandoned isolationism to pursue a number of "modernizations", the dogmatic

assumption of a universal road to socialism gave way to a more critical debate. Even the Soviet Union has begun to countenance reforms around the notion of "glasnost" [openness]. At independence, Zimbabwean socialists had already witnessed reversals encountered in other Third World socialist efforts. Accordingly, one could not plausibly impugn Zimbabwe's cautious approach to socialist development for not adhering to any of the established revolutionary scripts, ignore her own history and disregard the contemporary trends in existing socialism. However, from the foregoing analysis of settler agriculture and the episode of decolonization, it is clear that there still remain some issues in Zimbabwe's current conception of socialism which lead to fundamental questions about the character of the great transformation that transcends capitalism. Writing on the Hungarian combination of market economies and central planning, Bihari raised the issue of the coherence of socialist innovations: how to judge them, whether or not they constituted an adequate approach to socialism, or whether they meant moving away from it (Bihari, 1985: 14).

The cases of Zimbabwe and Hungary are, of course, quite different. Everything else aside, one needs only note the fact that whereas Hungary has been moving away from central planning and the problems experienced with it, Zimbabwe plans to move from a semi-developed capitalism towards socialism, eschewing the uncertainties of central planning. With the background of class struggle viewed through historical analysis of settler

agriculture and the conditions under which development planning began, this subsection invokes Marx and Engels in examining some of the major elements in Zimbabwe's current conception of socialist transformation. It must be emphasized, however, that the pioneers of historical materialism are not invoked here as the arbiters on all matters concerning the conception of socialist transformation. Rather, they are treated as exemplars of a critical approach to political economy and the conception of socialist development.

Consider first the question of agency: who is supposed to initiate and accomplish the transformation to socialism? Now, it is well known that rightly or wrongly, Zimbabwe's struggle for independence was concentrated on mobilization of the rural population situated in colonial labour reserves in a movement focused on recovering lands lost to settler agriculture and securing the economic "advantages" monopolized by settler farmers under colonialism. This part of the rural population, mostly engaged in sub-subsistence cultivation, supplemented by wage labour in urban areas, and separated from the means of production required for a viable peasant agriculture, has been uncritically referred to in the literature and development planning as the "peasantry".⁽¹⁾ However, whatever one calls this majority part of Zimbabwean society, the important point here is that its

(1) Some "radicals" have argued that the "peasants" became "proletarianized" under these conditions [Arrighi Thesis] (Kosmin, 1977: 268); others have insisted that they remained peasants despite primitive accumulation (Ranger, 1985: 290).

demands formed the focus of the struggle for independence and have since become a substantial part of Zimbabwe's development planning and discourse on socialism. The planners formalized this by noting that peasants constituted 70% of Zimbabwe's total population and stating the priority in development as follows:

In its main thrust, the Plan will seek to correct the existing imbalance between the depressed rural sector and the developed sectors of the economy by injecting adequate factor inputs into the former sector as well as by the vigorous involvement of the peasantry in the development processes envisaged under the Plan programmes (TNDP: 18).

Likewise, the economic historians focused on the peasantry as the locus of the post-colonial development effort:

Peasantization was, after all, still the ideal. Peasantization on the most favourable terms, of course, with high prices, fair trading, good land and no interference and input from wage labour, but still a peasantization that still crucially required buying agencies. But there was no mitigation of the clamour for the return of the lost lands (Ranger, 1985: 287).

First, it will be remembered that many of the things the peasants wanted after independence were precisely what settler farmers had come to monopolize under capitalism and that our analysis of relations between settler farmers and capitalists focused on these farmers' very access to such things as what placed them under capitalist domination. The implication is that if Africans were resettled on the land after independence, they were likely to become another category of the global working class subordinated in various ways to the process of capitalist accumulation. In other words, resettlement without a change in the relations of production throughout Zimbabwean society might

be accompanied by institutions resembling those of socialism while in fact reproducing the formal and real subsumption of farmers in settler agriculture within the expanded agricultural sector.

Secondly, as noted in Section 2.1, Marx often expressed an urban bias that involved dismissing rural society, including peasants, a decaying residue of feudal society from which no revolutionary activity could be expected. Engels was more specific in rejecting the peasantry as an agent for social change: '...it is completely utopian to want...to upheave present-day bourgeois society while maintaining the peasant as such' (Engels, 1972: 158). For him, only the proletariat, "freed" from all fetters, including the land, and herded into the big cities, '...is in a position to accomplish the great transformation which will put an end to all class exploitation and all class rule' (Engels, 1972: 155). According to that view, the peasantry could never conceive, let alone desire, a socialist transformation. What Ranger calls "rural socialism" would be considered inconceivable.

However, as noted in 2.1, Marx later revised that position in the light of his growing familiarity with Russian literature, which alerted him to the revolutionary potential of certain rural village institutions. He did not, however, live to theorize that potential as he had done with the proletariat. Socialists who have to deal with the peasantry in their attempts to transcend capitalism are left with the challenge of theoretical innovation.

2 Taking it from there, as indicated earlier, some Marxists have focused on the theme of simple commodity production and proceeded to demonstrate that it is not necessary for peasants and small farmers to be expropriated and herded into the big cities for capitalists to exploit them. Capital's productive powers, as demonstrated in earlier chapters, can be deployed in the countryside and self-employed farmers, whoever they might be, European settlers or African peasants, can then be subjected to capitalist accumulation as illustrated earlier: through rationally organized land settlement, through the involvement of farmers in the circulation of commodities, and through changes in the labour process which follow upon such involvement. The point of analyzing the position of settler farmers vis-a-vis capitalists was to establish the implications of that analysis for the resurrected African peasantry as it returned to the land under the resettlement schemes conceived as initial steps towards socialist development. Whereas recent Marxists have written much on how simple commodity production brings independent farmers under capitalist domination, much of the work has remained on the basic level of relations of production. The literature coming out of this debate, in other words, has generally remained silent on what the relations established in agriculture or between farmers and capitalists entail in terms of the class struggle. Our analysis of relations between settler farmers and capitalists revealed that settler farmers, while more or less aware of their antagonistic relations with capitalists, tended to take what they

could and assume the eternity of private enterprise. They constituted a conservative force in colonial Rhodesia. The African peasants, however, were to be settled, according to the Plan, on the basis of socialist transformation. What preparations were made to ensure that peasant resettlement would not result in expansion and reproduction of capitalist accumulation outside agriculture?

As already noted, early studies of the situation of African peasants under post-colonial resettlement schemes have pointed out how planning has focused on tactical, technical and institutional matters and neglected analysis of the social processes involved in promoting these farmers' productivity (Kinsey, Williams, 1982). That in itself indicates how favourable the conditions are in these programmes for continued capitalist accumulation. The representation of social processes dominated by capitalists as purely technical matters, as argued throughout this study, is an important aspect of capitalist ideological practice.

The implications of that approach for African peasants are apparent in the current recurrence within the extended agricultural sector of the same crisis tendencies that plagued settler farmers from the early 1960s to 1980. Reported as a "success" story, maize overproduction in Zimbabwe presages a revival of the vicious cycle that characterized agriculture from the 1964 "big [tobacco] crop" throughout the sanctions period and ruined many settler farmers. Overproduction created a growing

stockpile which in turn led to forced diversification [which was often resisted by the farmers], quotas and elimination of the "less efficient" farmers, falling prices and debt accumulation, all of which were favourable for accumulation outside agriculture. The incipient signals of crisis resurgence are implicit in the recent government directive to farmers to cut this season's harvest by half or be paid an unprofitable price for their crops! (Globe and Mail, January 20, 1987: B20). Significantly, the warning came after the farmers had ignored earlier warnings, which points to another round of struggle over crop control and its effects on the labour process. If it comes to that, indications are that another drive for productivity, in the specific capitalist sense of higher yields from fewer hands and smaller areas, will be promoted. Such a reaction to crisis is likely as long as the relations between the farmers and capitalists outside agriculture and their agents in the services are not adequately understood. In that event, the post-colonial state could find itself performing the role of managing the crisis for capital.

On the face of it, the Plan sets out to make all the right moves. Expanded food production would not only maximize output but also enhance food security in Zimbabwe and throughout the region. It aims to reduce differentials in physical infrastructure between commercial and subsistence agriculture etc., all the things that the struggle was about. In fact, the Plan actually sets out to establish, albeit from a different

angle, what Engels considered to be a prerequisite for bringing rural society into the revolutionary scheme of things:

...an intimate connection between industrial and agricultural production together with the extension of the means of communication [that] will be able to deliver the rural population from the isolation and stupor in which it has vegetated almost unchanged for thousands of years (Engels, 1972: 158).

In the Plan, it is the town that will be delivered to the rural masses as service or growth centres, intended 'to bring the rural population into close contact with services and markets...forging linkages with the national economy' (TNDP: 25). The indicator for what this would entail for the capital-farmer relationship lies in the expressed intention to 'fully exploit export potential and the [agricultural] sector's strong forward linkages with manufacturing' (Ibid.). As Chapters Six and Seven indicated, it was mainly through such linkages, both forward and backward, that exploitation of settler farmers and African workers, was intensified from 1960 onwards. If, as the Plan indicates, 'the removal of those features of the inherited system that resulted in the exploitation of workers and consumers' [TNDP: 20] is what is intended, the full range of possibilities of capitalist exploitation of commercial farmers in Zimbabwe has to be investigated in materialist terms.

The changes announced in the Plan are of course genuinely intended as moves towards socialist development, but too much is left unspecified and open to conventional interpretations. For instance, the Plan announces that efforts will be made to ensure '...the vigorous involvement of the peasantry in the production

process...to organize [them] into Peasant Associations as an important means of creating in them a greater consciousness of their productive role and of facilitating their co-operation and stimulating the collective spirit'(TNDP: 18). All the institutional forms usually associated with social organization under socialism are proposed - state farms, centralized villages, co-operative associations etc. - as well as the mechanics for translating government policy into action. For the first time, apparently, peasants [and workers] would be 'involved in management, control and utilization of the land and in the equitable sharing of benefits', with all the services previously reserved for whites being provided: marketing, credit, transport, training, etc.(TNDP: 20). In all these senses, peasants would be mobilized towards socialist transformation. Yet the proposals are still lacking in specifics and further examination raises questions about the coherence of the current approach to socialist transformation..

There are some omissions in the Plan which raise fundamental questions about Zimbabwe's conception of socialist transformation. For instance, what precisely is the "productive role" envisaged for peasants in the Plan? Is it that of direct producers in antagonistic confrontation with capitalists? What would the peasants' management role be in terms of their relationships with extra-agrarian capitalists and fellow workers? Peasants might get some technical management training such as that envisaged for settler farmers by the management experts and

the Agricultural Committee for Management Education [ACME], with emphasis on how to increase productivity and as little reference as possible to the implicit relations of their activity to capitalist accumulation. It could be argued of course that the collective institutions would provide peasants with an organizational basis for gaining relevant experience. That, however, also implies that peasants would have to go through "the school of hard knocks" in which settler farmers became acquainted with the harsh reality of their subordination to capital while learning little about resisting exploitation. Left to conjecture, the role of peasants in "the production process" and management forebodes further contradictions and class struggle.

The institutional forms proposed to generate a collective consciousness among peasants and workers - state farms, centralized villages, co-operative societies, etc. - are of course associated with the co-ordination of producers in socialist society. There is one problem however: where similar forms of organization have been launched within capitalism, their social role has often been ambiguous, even reactionary. For instance, if the criterion for their viability were viewed merely in terms of their level of "efficiency" or the profits realized by their members, how could they be distinguished from small capitalist firms? If co-operative societies were encouraged to regard themselves as "self-reliant" entities under capitalism, might they not in reality simply operate, like settler farmers' associations in colonial Rhodesia, under the illusion of

autonomy, towards capitalist accumulation in general?

It may be recalled here that, in preparing for neo-colonial decolonization, the RNFU and its associates had anticipated and accommodated state farms, co-operatives, etc. within their new framework for capitalist expansion, in the post-colonial period. The issue, therefore, is not whether or not producers' co-operatives etc. would be appropriate institutions for socialist development because they obviously would. Rather, the question is whether or not they might be forced into performing a capitalist role as they come to operate under conditions dominated by capitalists from outside agriculture and how that might happen. To clarify their situation, it would be necessary to avoid applying to co-operatives the criteria used in determining the "success" of capitalist enterprises. Accordingly, if the performance of co-operatives organized for socialist transformation were to be assessed in terms of their "efficiency" or "productivity" within a capitalist framework, pressures might be exerted upon them to operate according to the logic of capitalist accumulation: production for production's sake and profit for profit's sake would still be a capitalist principle no matter who shared the profits and how equally they were distributed.

Before considering Marx's views on the matter of co-operatives, it would be appropriate to note how the character of co-operatives features in Zimbabwe's current conception of socialist transformation. ZANU, Zimbabwe's socialist and ruling

party, notes that African co-operatives were introduced in 1956 under the colonial regime and immediately distinguishes between those early purely business and service oriented organizations and the producer co-operatives organized in the context of post-colonial development as follows:

...the present Zimbabwean Government sees the Co-operative Movement not only as an ordinary business enterprise meant to satisfy the members' economic needs but as the cornerstone for the transformation of the country's socio-economic infrastructure and social institutions and as a vehicle for the promotion of the Government's socialist ideology and for the creation of an egalitarian society (ZANU, 1985: 11).

Then the party's record proceeds to recount the "phenomenal growth" of the co-operative movement and its "successes": how the producer co-operatives have 'broken the predominance of the pre-independence service co-operatives', how some have 'done very well', producing high quality burley tobacco and fetching 'the highest price per kilogram' on the auction floors, how some have produced "bumper" or "excellent" crops in various branches, etc. (ZANU, 1985: 12). The record also indicates what projects are planned for the future: further 'expansion of the co-operative movement', introduction of formal training, a Trust Fund to be developed into a co-operative bank, a National Insurance, savings and credit co-operatives, participation in agro-industrial production, and so on (ZANU, 1985: 13). Finally, the party record indicates that the Government would soon intervene 'to provide adequate and appropriate resources, manpower, finance, etc. (ZANU: 1985: 13-14).

Now, neither the development Plan nor the party's record of achievement in government materially specifies the role of co-operative societies in socialist transformation. The record recounts the co-operative movement's "successes" in terms of the crops produced, their volume, quality and money fetched at the

market. There is no attempt to relate the co-operative that produced the high quality tobacco crop and fetched the highest price at the auction floors to the buyers who purchased the leaf. The terms of successful performance remain basically the same as those used by the spokesmen of capital in settler agriculture during the colonial period. The belief that, if farmers grow a good crop, the buyers will pay for it seems to go unchallenged. Ultimately, there is no indication of how the co-operative movement might pose a challenge to capitalism except in terms of intentions to move towards self-funding, independent insurance, savings and credit, and participation in agro-industrial production. All this would enable the co-operatives to compete with capitalists already established in these branches. But competition, instead of threatening or transforming capitalism, actually propels its development and expansion.

While the record of their recent development says very little about how co-operatives will precisely lead to socialist change in terms of relations of production, the passage [quoted above] referring to how the government regards the movement gives some indication of how it all fits in with the current conception of socialist transformation. The new producer co-operatives are formally linked to the goal of transforming "the socio-economic infrastructure and social institutions", towards an egalitarian society. It clearly distinguishes between business co-operatives and what the contemporary movement is supposed to be, i.e. producer associations. However, it still remains silent on the

issue of how the intended transformation is supposed to occur, how capitalism will be transcended by socialist relations of production. What, for instance, are the relations of production to be changed and how are they to be transformed into what? Are there any obstacles to such transformation and, if so, how are they to be overcome? The party record indicates that Government intends to intervene and assist the movement's expansion in order to achieve 'its [the government's] plans' for socialist transformation. The record states categorically that the new co-operatives are not meant to enhance the economic interests of their members but the goals of the government. One would expect that, in a socialist transformation, the economic interests of the associated producers would coincide with those of society, represented by the government. In this apparent tension between state and co-operative movement, one finds within the prevailing conception of socialist transformation the legacy of an ideology that arbitrarily separates economy from politics. Socialist transformation cannot be the business of the people's government any more than it is that of the producers associated in co-operatives.

From the way the successes of co-operatives have been recounted, it is evident that the legacy of capitalist ideology, dominant throughout the colonial period in which the liberation movement developed, is still strong in the current conception of socialist transformation. The success of co-operatives is reckoned according to capitalist criteria while the process of

socialist transformation is taken for granted. The greater the expansion of the movement in terms of membership and output, the farther the transformation is thought to have advanced. The greater the productivity of the co-operatives, the more successful they are considered to be and the more peasants are supposed to accept them as their hope of higher income. Taking producers' associations for granted was, as argued in earlier chapters, one of settler farmers' major errors under colonialism. It allowed the RTA and the RNFU to collaborate with capitalists in intensifying the subordination not only of African workers but also of their own members to the process of capitalist accumulation outside agriculture while also appearing to "represent" the farmers. The RTA, RNFU and several other settler farmer associations actually took many initiatives similar to what is now being planned for the further expansion of Zimbabwe's producer co-operatives: crop and hail insurance, auction floors, management education, self-help schemes, etc. were all organized among settler farmers. Many of these, as demonstrated in earlier chapters, were no less part of the productivity drive than work-study lectures. During the sanctions period, the colonial state intervened by forming the Tobacco Corporation, a monopsony that bought out all the tobacco produced in Zimbabwe, managed the stockpile and guaranteed decreasing minimum prices for growers each season until the growers could no longer tolerate the sundry deals made with middlemen and manufacturers, which cost them dearly.

Marx's marginal notes on the programme of the German Workers' Party [The Gotha Programme] are critical of the initiation of producers' co-operatives under capitalism. Granted that circumstances differed widely between Germany in 1875 and Zimbabwe in 1985, Marx's comments still raise critical issues about Zimbabwe's current view of co-operatives as "the cornerstone of the transformation". For Marx, producers' co-operatives 'are of value only insofar as they are the independent creations of the workers and not proteges either of the government or the bourgeoisie' (Marx, 1972: 171). To the extent that co-operatives were state initiated or aided under capitalism, Marx scornfully compared them to public investment in railways and dismissed the idea that they might lead to a new form of society as Lassalle's fantasy (Marx, 1972: 170). Like railways, state initiated and aided co-operatives were, in Marx's view, another piece of public investment intended to enhance the expansion of capitalist accumulation for the sake of the bourgeoisie's profits.

How, then, could co-operatives be conceived as part of a genuine socialist practice. Interpreting Marx, Sweezy stated it as follows: 'A really new society requires new human beings. It is not enough to change institutions. If people do not change

too, the new institutions won't work' (Sweezy, 1985: 12). (1) That reduces the issue to the following question: "How does one change people into socialists?". When the ZANU government broached co-operative and communal farming to its rural constituency, many were clearly not changed men:

Most seemed to cling to past notions and to think merely in terms of increasing the size of their small peasant holdings and communal grazing areas. When directly asked about their opinion of co-operative and communal farming, the majority of peasants expressed ignorance as to what these organizational forms involved and recommended that new ventures be left to the youth to experiment with, showing great suspicion of such change (Riddell Commission, 1981: 34).

Engels' claim that rural folks might not conceive of socialist transformation may not be that outdated after all. Facing resistance, the government decided upon a co-operative training and education programme that would prompt peasants to pursue co-operative efforts voluntarily, and ruled out compulsion. Some peasants could be sent to China to become acquainted with the practice and benefits of co-operative farming and if they saw from their neighbours the results in terms of increased productivity, they might just accept the new institutions and their interests might then coincide with those of the government (Ranger, 1985: 290, 320-323).

(1) Sweezy was referring here to a situation where the whole society comes to regard socialism as the rational way of doing things, just as people under capitalism take its relations of production for granted. His notion of changed human beings must be distinguished from the religious idea that some people "believe" in capitalism while others are "committed" to socialism.

On the ground, the government launched a "mass co-operative training campaign" which would soon be complemented by "a programme of formal co-operative training...specializing in government staff, employees of the co-operative movement, and its officials" (ZANU, 1985: 13). Marx would have applauded the mass campaign and rejected the supplementary programme. He rejected the role of experts in the process of co-operative education in favour of a practice in which educators and society both mutually communicated in a "revolutionary practice", one which combined the conception and the practice of socialist change (Marx, 1972: 527). Marx's idea of socialist society as one made up of "individual producers in spontaneous co-ordination" may be dismissed as utopian or unrealistic (Elster, 1985: 527). However, his argument about how individual producers become compatible with socialist institutions remains pertinent. Individuals must be educated through the practice of co-operation for society's sake. It is in this sense that socialism, whose origins in Zimbabwe lie in the liberation movement's very cells, cannot be attained overnight. Accordingly, the business of building socialism needs rethinking, with more emphasis on relations between producers and capitalists and on the producers' political education than on getting the co-operatives to excel in value productivity. Promoting production for production's sake among producers, whether they are formally employed by capitalists or subordinated to them in the various ways demonstrated in the analysis of settler agriculture as autonomous co-operatives,

remains one way of reproducing capitalism. The more productive the co-operative members become under capitalist conditions, the deeper their exploitation.

Among the issues currently addressed in Zimbabwe's discourse on development, the levelling of inequalities created by colonial discrimination has at once attracted the most attention and remained the least adequately theorized. In the long struggle between the colonial regime and the African nationalist movement, the racial discrimination manifested in the almost total exclusion of Africans from the political process and the distribution of vital resources such as land seemed to be all that had gone wrong in society. Just as African protest focused on contesting the injustice of inequality, so were the colonial regime's legitimation efforts concentrated on defending it as just. Then, in the early 1970s, ZANU began to analyse the colonial system as one of capitalist exploitation and to explain the liberation struggle as a challenge not only to the colonial regime but also to imperialism as an aspect of capitalism.

In the post-colonial discourse on socialist development, the problem of inequality has featured as the immediate and most tangible legacy of colonialism and the target of efforts to create an "egalitarian society". Among other things, the foregoing analysis of relations of production in settler agriculture established that one of the assumptions made in various critiques of Rhodesian colonialism - that the European settlers invariably benefitted from their legal privileges - is

largely an uncritical generalization which tends to distort the material character of the colonial legacy. In order to relate the issue of colonial inequalities to socialist transformation, it would be necessary to clarify the terms in which the former has been understood. Early in this study, it was argued that different social groups and their theorists, necessarily unable to divorce themselves from their social involvement, tend to come to different conceptions of what has gone wrong with society in their respective contexts and to advocate different forms of social change. ZANU has stated the same point categorically in describing "economic and social justice" as something which 'means different things to different people depending on who they are and what position they occupy in a given society' (ZANU 1985: vii).

Accordingly, one of the tasks of this study was to reconstruct the rival programmes associated with different parties to the struggle in Zimbabwe, first from the positions they took or would take on the questions addressed in the analysis of settler agriculture and then, earlier in this chapter, from the rival preparations for post-colonial development, with each party informed by a particular conception of social and economic justice. It was then argued that the current conception of socialist transformation in Zimbabwe is the product of conflicting interpretations of the colonial legacy and the contested process of development planning in the context of decolonization. Hence, we arrive at another seminal issue in

post-colonial development planning, namely, what it means to correct the inequalities created by colonialism and what that implies in terms of socialist transformation. Just what does it mean to strive for an "egalitarian society" and how does that relate to socialism in historical materialist terms?

Introducing a "New Social Order", the Transitional National Development Plan announced the existence of inequalities at the most general level, describing first the "dualistic" separation between a developed, foreign-dominated, "modern" sector designed to benefit a small segment of society [Europeans], and a historically depressed, impoverished, rural peasant sector that became underdeveloped by somehow being preyed upon by the former. The influence of capitalist development ideology [modernization theory] is quite evident in the dichotomization of the modern and the rural/peasant sectors. However, the influence of "radical" economism [dependency theory] is equally present in the assertion that the former preyed upon [underdeveloped] the latter. Then the Plan goes farther and brings in elements of Marxist theory, casting the relationship between Europeans and Africans in terms of class exploitation, without specifying how it occurs:

This exploitation has resulted in gross income and wealth (particularly land) inequalities, especially between the black majority and the white minority (TNDP: 17).

Now, since Chapter Four, it has been noted that the struggle in Zimbabwe was conducted mainly in terms of legal inequalities, such as the exclusion of Africans from landownership by the Land Apportionment and Land Tenure Acts. Then it was contended that an

exclusive preoccupation with the obvious institutional inequalities of European discrimination against Africans, by merely reiterating the mundane conflicts between African nationalism and European colonialism, inadvertently ends up concealing and/or distorting the material character of the colonial legacy as well as obscuring the conception of socialist transformation.

As indicated in 8.1, even the advocates of post-colonial capitalist development within the European minority began to realize that guarding gross inequalities of wealth and income with racial barriers was beginning to threaten the reproduction and expansion of capitalism. Accordingly, they spent the last few years of the colonial regime preparing a development programme that would forego such inequalities, forestall the radicalization of the liberation movement [socialism], and ensure the reproduction and expansion of capitalism. Accordingly, by 1980, the maintenance of colonial privilege was no longer the issue ~~it~~ had been throughout the colonial regime, even though the legacy of institutional inequality still had to be dealt with in development thinking.

In the plan, however, one still encounters a lingering concern with institutional inequalities and the development/underdevelopment effects. Hence the Plan locates 'the highly inequitable land distribution patterns...at the core of the development problems', with the problems being confronted at the concrete level of physical matters such as population

overcrowding (TNDP: 3). Accordingly, solutions have been sought in equitable land redistribution, equal access to productive factors, facilities, services, in attempts to create social ownership of means of production through state intervention, in sheer expansion, modification, radical alterations where considered "necessary", and whatever else is expected to bring "benefits" to Zimbabweans as a whole (TNDP: 1). In short, the focus in the search for "egalitarian society", despite occasional references to "relations between socio-economic classes" and "exploitation" has been on the distribution of "benefits" expected from capitalist "growth" and not on the deep-seated processes that generate the inequalities in the first instance. This of course becomes inevitable once it is assumed at the beginning that all whites are "capitalists" and that distributing the advantages they legally monopolized under colonialism will result in "equity". The fact that much of the capital is foreign owned, although frequently recognized, seldom comes into consideration of the social character of the colonial legacy and how to transform it.

As it becomes more concrete, the Plan's pursuit of equality, although formally announced in terms of intended "changes in relationships among socio-economic classes", is premised upon legislation requiring employers to do a number of things for their employees: adhere to minimum wage levels, improve working and living conditions, increase workers' bargaining powers, and so on (TNDP: 20). Ultimately, the pursuit of egalitarianism

features in the current conception of socialist transformation as a matter of extending legal rights or justice to the previously repressed Africans. The connection between the process of democratization and so-called 'changes in relationships between socio-economic classes' - relations of production for short - remains unspecified.

Now, the analysis of such relations in settler agriculture revealed that, in material terms, the racial monopolization of legal rights to land, markets, etc. under colonialism by no means invariably brought material benefits to settler farmers. In the specific case of tobacco growers, considered to be among the most "prosperous" Europeans under colonialism, those very privileges were actually the means by which capitalists outside agriculture managed to subject these farmers to some of the most subtle forms of exploitation, their espousal of racial inequality and "free enterprise" notwithstanding. Moreover, subsequent examination of the resettlement of African peasants on the land under conditions materially similar to settler agriculture, even though institutionally different from it, indicated that short of a change in the mode of production, the predatory relations between capitalists and settler farmers and their African employees, already deepening in the period leading to independence, were about to be extended and reproduced in the context of a post-colonial drive for productivity. Recent reports of developments towards maize overproduction, low prices and renewed crop control indicate that it did not take long for the crisis

tendencies that characterized settler agriculture after 1960 to spread to the extended commercial agricultural sector. The "enlivened peasantry", through its very "success" in terms of sheer expansion and rising productivity, could easily precipitate the crisis that will ruin it out of business once again.

Furthermore, the obviously well-intended measures aimed at reducing the income gap, improving workers' living and working conditions, and increasing their bargaining power, etc., while certainly extending legal rights to workers previously repressed, could only ameliorate their situation relatively within the capitalist mode of production. The injustice of capitalist exploitation, from the socialist perspective, remains intact so long as the mode of production lasts. The establishment of legal equality does not abolish relations of exploitation; it only alters them and the effects can go either way. In earlier chapters, instances were cited where capitalists themselves often initiated the extension of rights to workers in elaborate strategies aimed at maintaining stable labour forces and inducing worker contentment. More fundamentally, capitalists have learned that extending such "benefits" as improved living and working conditions, education and health facilities, and so on, to workers and their families entails increasing relative surplus-value through management of workers' consumption fund.

Fairness, justice, equality, in the distribution of resources, services, the products of labour, whatever, varies not only between individuals and classes in capitalism but also

between historical epochs and among different socialists (Engels, 1972: 157; Marx, 1972: 162). However, within capitalism, it is the bourgeois conception of fair, equal and just distribution that is consistent with the existing mode of production (Marx, 1972: 162). The "normal" rules of exchange or distribution under capitalism in fact presuppose equal individuals freely exchanging their commodities. It is in the relations of production, in the production of surplus-value, that the rights and freedoms of workers are violated by capitalists in the process of exercising their own rights under the same rules (Harvey, 1982: 32-35). The law in capitalism provides equal rights to unequal individuals, with unequal consequences for the relations between them. Real equitable redistribution, therefore, could only occur in the actual transcendence of capitalism by socialism. Accordingly, it is neither feasible nor plausible to reconcile capitalist and socialist conceptions of "economic and social justice".

Driving workers to increase production without comprehending the relations of production involved in the labour process entails increasing exploitation. Doing so in order to realize a "surplus" so as to redistribute it as "benefits" among the workers only deepens their subjection to the accumulation process. Insofar as they produce commodities for the world or local capitalist markets, peasants and settler farmers constitute part of the global worker that is increasingly subordinated to exploitation and the accumulation process. Their ownership of

certain means of production, on capitalists' terms, does not invariably enable self-employed or self-managed workers to escape exploitation, even though it may strengthen their position in the struggle. Such strength can only be realized if the relations of production are correctly analysed by the producers themselves.

Zimbabwe's current discourse on socialist transformation has so far been largely influenced by a "radical" economism whose theoretical accomplishment consists in the crude reversal of the logic of capitalist ideology that ensues in polemical attacks on the "underdevelopment effects" of colonialism. The task of alleviating the excesses of colonial discrimination and underdevelopment has been undertaken since independence. However, the business of building an egalitarian, socialist society cannot be sustained, let alone accomplished, within the confines of the capitalist mode of production, whatever institutional adjustments are embarked upon. The task before the socialist movement - the transcendence of capitalist by socialist relations of production - presupposes not only the comprehension of capitalist relations of production by this and that "intellectual" but the recognition by the whole socialist movement that these relations violate and nullify any equitable redistribution of land, income, benefits, everything. It presupposes that the workers themselves shall attain a position to organize themselves and assume the burden of transforming those relations. This study makes a contribution to socialist transformation insofar as it illuminates the operations of capitalism and the struggles between capitalists and the

various producers they have subjected to the process of accumulating wealth for the sake of accumulating it.

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